The Structure of the first Forty-five Questions of the Summa Theologicae of Saint Thomas Aquinas

submitted by Wayne J. Hankey of St. Peter's College for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Theology Michaelmas Term, 1981.
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**Summa Theologiae** of Saint Thomas Aquinas

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The thesis has four main parts. The introduction, "Contemporary Thomism", endeavours to justify a re-examination of the structure of the initial questions of the **Summa Theologiae** on account of the distortions in the presentation of Thomas inherent in the Leonine revival. The four chapters of Part Two consider first, Lombard's **Sentences**, second, Anselm's **Monologion** and **Proslogion**, third, Boethius' **De Trinitate**, the **De Divinis Nominibus** of Dionysius and the **De Divisione Naturae** of Eriugena, and fourth, the Neoplatonism of Proclus and Porphyry in a search for the origins of Thomas' theological structure. It concludes that for the specific features of his system Thomas reaches back beyond the **Sentences** to the pagan and Christian adaptations of the opposing traditions of Porphyry and Iamblichus.

The five chapters of Part Three analyze the structure of the questions. The first chapter considers the place of the "five ways"; the other four treat questions 1 - 13; 14 - 26; 27 - 43; and 44 - 45 respectively. The analysis discovers a common circular structure in which there is a gradual development from the divine simplicity toward more inclusive and concrete forms of divine self-relation. It finds also an incompletely resolved tension between simplicity and self-relation which are drawn from the contrary Neoplatonic logics of infinite and finite. The thesis concludes that Thomas is better understood as part of the Neoplatonic development of systematic thought than from existentialist perspectives opposed to this tradition.
ABSTRACT

The Structure of the first Forty-five Questions of the Summa Theologiae of Saint Thomas Aquinas.

The thesis has four main parts. An introduction, "Contemporary Thomism", attempts to justify a re-examination of the structure of the initial questions of the Summa Theologiae because of the distortions in the presentation of Thomas inherent in the revival given authority by the Encyclical "Aeterni Patris" of Leo XIII. Pope Leo's purposes require an engagement with modern thought in order to subordinate it and the practical life regarded as founded upon it to theology and ecclesiastical authority. It is argued that these purposes involve a form of separation between philosophy and theology and an overemphasis on the Aristotelian features of Thomas' system which vitiates a sense of its structural integrity. The introduction compares and contrasts the realist and transcendental schools and finds in their common characterization of Thomas' philosophy as an existentialist doctrine of esse a perspective resembling that of Heidegger. The transcendental Thomists seem to understand better than the realists the unity of thought and being in Aquinas and so a more detailed examination of some of their work is undertaken. E. Coreth's Metaphysics and K. Rahner's Spirit in the World are found to diverge from Thomas at crucial points because of their ultimate acceptance of a Heideggerian critique of onto-theology. Coreth and Rahner are unable to unite philosophy and theology in the way Thomas does. The relation of the Thomist revival to modern philosophy is considered more widely when an endeavour is made to draw Bernard Lonergan into the picture. The idealism of the trans-
cendental thinkers as opposed to the realists shows itself in this context as does a general correspondence between the various Thomisms and contemporary philosophic perspectives. The part concludes with a consideration of the reaction of recent Catholic theologians against ontological Aristotelian Thomism in favour of a negative theology based on the Neoplatonic elevation of the One. This provides the context for a search for Thomas' sources which is the work of Part Two.

Searching out the "Sources for the Structure of the de deo of the Summa Theologiae" begins with the text book of High Scholastic Theology, the Sentences of Peter Lombard. Thomas' first system was a commentary on this work and derived its general form from it. An exitus - reitus pattern in the Sentences was discerned by St. Thomas and is carried over into his exposition and ultimately to the Summa Theologiae. But Thomas alters Lombard's order and structure at many crucial points and it is clear that he cannot be the source for much of what is distinctive about the Summa. The gradual descent toward multiplicity in the de deo through which the Trinity becomes intelligible, the centrality of man and the dependence of sacramental union upon the hypostatic are worked out structurally in the Summa but not in the Sentences. In contrast to the Sentences, Anselm's Monologion and Proslogion have an argument by which the Trinity is derived from the conception of God with which the works begin and so Anselm's reasoning has suggested itself as the source of Thomas'. Examination of the evidence fails to substantiate this link and so in chapter three of this part we move from the more Augustinian predecessors to those Christians whose thought has been more clearly influenced by Proclan Neoplatonism and in whom Thomas is intensely interested. The Theological Tractates of Boethius, as well as the
works of pseudo-Dionysius and the De Divisione Naturae of Eriugena have a circular exitus-reditus form which gives greater emphasis to the downward motion in reality than one finds in Plotinus. Moreover, there is in all three a reasoning from the principle itself, rather than from his word spoken outwardly, which Thomas believes takes one theologically beyond Augustine. In Dionysius and Eriugena what can be said of God as one and as three are separated in a way related to Thomas' division of the de deo uno from the de deo trino. Thomas uses Dionysius as an authority for this distinction and it is shown that contrary to some current theological opinion his Divine Names and the Periphyseon of Eriugena belong to the origins of a long tradition of such structure in the Middle Ages. The effectiveness of Proclus' influence through these mediaries draws us in chapter four of Part Two to investigate further the Neoplatonic sources of Thomas' doctrine. In the opposition between Porphyry, identifying the One with being, and Iamblichus with his followers, elevating the One above all the forms of division, is discovered the basis of two traditions meeting in Aquinas which explain the tension between the priority he gives both to esse and also to simplicity or goodness as names of God. This contrariety is then explored further in its manifold appearances in the first forty-five questions of the Summa Theologiae.

Part Three, "An Analysis of the Structure of the first Forty-five Questions of the Summa Theologiae", has five chapters. The first concerns "The Place of the Proof of God's Existence"; the rest consider in order questions one to thirteen, fourteen to twenty-six, twenty-seven to forty-three and forty-four and forty-five. The place of the "five ways" is a particular problem because the rise of the proof from the sensible is contrary to the direction Thomas
states belongs to *sacra doctrina*. As a whole, the *Summa* begins from the simplicity of God and moves toward ever more divided forms of the divine until it reaches creation. The need for the ascent from the sensible is a consequence of the position the human soul has for Thomas. He identifies the Proclan Dionysius and Aristotle when he finds the whole human soul descended into the temporal process and required to elevate itself by means of science in order to understand the self-revelation of separate substance. Theology is thus constituted in the meeting of the motions from above and below and a circular structure is found in the relation of the five ways. A portion of the work of analyzing the other questions treated is uncovering a similar form in them. The analysis discovers two main principles of structure. There is, first, a distinction of the simple from the multiple; plurality proceeds from unity as prior and most potent. This determines that God's substance, centred around unity, precedes his operations, centred around intellect. Further, it requires that these processions or activities, which involve only a conceptual distinction between subject and object, are prior to the procession into trinitarian personality, which is the development within the divine essence of real relation, opposition and distinction. Finally, the emanation of equal subsistences, the Trinity, through the extrinsic divine act, power, produces creation which is of necessity unequal to its source. Man as the complex of spirit and matter is the last term in the *exitus* and the point from which the return takes place.

The other structural principle by which the descending grades are connected to each other and united with their source is the motion of exit and return. Its circle binds together the substantial names which flow outward from simplicity, perfection,
goodness and infinity to arrive at the existence of God in things, thus overcoming the privative character of simplicity, and returns through immutability and aeternity to the divine unity. Similarly the circuit through the operations proceeds from intellect, and its reflective and comparative activity in truth, to will which adds desire to intellect's object and is described as ecstatic in love. Then are added the names which combine will and intellect until the operation of power is reached whose object lies outside the subject. Finally, all are collected in intellect's self-enjoyment, beatitude. The *de deo trino* describes another circle initiated by the processions formed out of the intrinsic operations. The treatise proceeds out to the plurality of distinct persons and returns to its origin in the notional acts which are the same as the processions. Within this there is a smaller circle developed in the questions on the distinct persons and resulting from the conception of the spirit as unity of what is opposed in the relation of Father and Son. There is in this progress simultaneously an increasing revelation of the divine nature and a growing understanding the ground of creation in this nature. Creation becomes intelligible as the emanation or procession consequent on that of the Trinity. Question forty-four introduces creation and shows that God is cause in all four of Aristotle's senses. Thus, it has the same structure as the "five ways". The basis for the great *exitus - reitus* circle of the *Summa* has been laid in the treatment of God himself.

The system as just described results from the union in Thomas of the Neoplatonic logics of the One and of the finite. The identification of these in the divine produces tensions at every level of his theology which unites an Aristotelian positive science of the first principle and a Proclan negative theology which knows the first
only in what is subsequent to it. In the questions on the substance of God a problem results from Thomas' negative statements about the possibility of knowing the simple through the composite and his opposed teaching that many affirmative predicates can properly be given him. In the treatment of the operations the difficulty is to reconcile the absolute identity of the various activities with the divine undivided simplicity while setting out the operations as a series of forms of self-relation distinguished precisely by different ways the subject can possess itself as its own object. In the questions on the Trinity a major difficulty is the reconciliation of belief in the plurality of subsistences in the divine essence with the knowledge of its simplicity taken as primary. This creates problems understanding how there can be a rational transition from the de deo uno to the de deo trino and from it to God's creative act.

Part Four, "Conclusion, Some Philosophical and Theological Implications", draws together the results of the earlier parts. It appears that the Neoplatonic aspect of Thomas' *Summa Theologiae* was not fully appreciated from the perspective either of Pope Leo's practical purposes or of the existentialism common to realist and transcendental Thomists. This Neoplatonism does have however both philosophical and theological justification. To explain the possibility of experience and reason philosophy requires a movement from the unity of the principle as well as from the sensible. Christian theology demands the reduction of the independent and plural to the absolute primacy of the one God. Thomas' *Summa* may be seen to solve certain of the problems in the systems of his pagan Neoplatonic predecessors and their more immediate Christian followers but it is perhaps overlaid by encompassing so much contrariety and his synthesis is impossible for the next generation of medieval theologians. Its comprehensive-
ness also makes it subject to attack from many contemporary perspectives. It is suggested, nonetheless, that Christian theology must have a place for the systematic thinking Thomas attempted.
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Preface

What could justify something more on the first questions of the *Summa Theologiae* of Thomas Aquinas? The delayed official celebrations of the centenary of Leo XIII's encyclical "Aeterni Patris" are now one year past. This and other Papal declarations meant that, for a considerable period, only recently ended, more scholarly careers and more effort were devoted to the teaching of St Thomas than to any other philosophical and theological doctrine. Yet the quantity and enthusiasm of the work is just the problem. Such a massive expenditure was made only because the scholars, theologians and philosophers had been able to identify the "mind of St Thomas" with their own urgent concerns and prevailing perspectives. The introductory part of this thesis endeavours to suggest how contemporary Thomisms were related to current philosophical interests. One fears that the teaching of Thomas, who was invoked to bless every enterprise of philosophical theology which sought -- and some which fled -- official ecclesiastical approbation in the Roman Church for nearly a century, was somewhat manhandled and pushed out of shape in the process. Now that official ardour has cooled, or at least become divided and less effective, may there not be, as Anthony Kenny has suggested, new opportunities for looking at Thomas more disinterestedly and with greater historical accuracy?

The aim of this thesis, to look at the structure of a section of Thomas' work in an historical view, may be given reason by other considerations. The preoccupation of the Thomist revival since the nineteenth century has been with ontology. Questions about structure were largely subordinated to the quest for a distinct doctrine of being.
The reaction against Thomism has partly been in order to replace ontology with henology. It happens that the same late Hellenistic philosophical and theological tradition which was most concerned to give absolute priority to the One is that which was most consumed by the problems of structuring theology. The study of these thinkers, awakened and immensely forwarded by E.R. Dodds' edition of the Elements of Theology of Proclus, has been the area of the prehistory of mediaeval scholasticism most advanced in the last decades. Thus, by the study of the structure of the initial questions of the Summa Theologiae, the ones most distorted by the abstraction of a philosophical ontology from the rest of his giant system, it is hoped to occupy some territory less trampled than others, to restore somewhat the shape of a portion of the Summa, and to exploit some current theological and philosophical interests as well as much present historical enterprise.

Another justification is required at the outset. What reason can be given for ending with question forty-five, i.e. at the beginning of the consideration of creation and indeed only part way through a subsection of it? Questions one to forty-five correspond to no division of the Summa Theologiae made by St Thomas. The rationale is found in the same late Neoplatonic logic which will be used to illumine the structure of these questions. It is characterized by the elaborate and extensive use of the exitus-reditus form. Indeed, the crucial modification of theological structure and content made by St Thomas relative to his pagan predecessors lies in applying this circular motion to the inmost reaches of divinity. In order to exhibit his use of this form, it is necessary to include the whole exitus in principle. Thus creation is touched upon but not itself investigated.
In the course of writing this thesis, I have incurred many debts. The Governors of Pusey House, the University of King's College and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada have all supported me financially. I am grateful to my colleagues in the Classics Department of Dalhousie University and at King's who assumed my work while I was on leave and to the Governing Body of St. Cross College, Oxford for giving me a place in their Common Room. Other organizations have given me the opportunity to present preliminary versions of my ideas and to benefit from support, advice and contradiction. Such benefits have accrued from my paper for the 1977 Bonn Congress of the Société internationale pour l'étude de la philosophie médiévale which has now been published in their proceedings (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 13/2, Berlin/New York, 1981), as also from my communication for the Eighth International Conference on Patristic Studies held in Oxford in 1979 which was published in the issue of Dionysius for that year. The editors of Dionysius have kindly published a second article in the 1980 volume. A paper delivered for me by Professor C.J. Starnes is about to appear in the Atti del Congresso Internazionale di Studi Boeziani (Pavia 5-8 ottobre, 1980) edited by L. Obertello to be published this year in Rome. The Pontificia Accademia Romana di S. Tommaso d'Aquino e di Religione Cattolica heard a paper delivered by me in September of 1980 and it is to appear in the Atti del VIII Congresso Tomistico Internazionale nel centenario dell'Enciclica "Aeterni Patris" di Leone XIII e della fondazione dell'Accademia di S. Tommaso edited by A. Piolanti. Other aspects of my work on Thomas have been presented in lectures or at colloquia sponsored by the Norman Sykes Society of Ripon College, Cuddesdon, the Philosophy Department and Queen's College, Memorial University, Newfoundland, the Philosophy Department of Georgia State University in Atlanta,
Georgia, the Mediaeval Colloquium of the University of the South, Sewanee, Tennessee and the Harvard Divinity School. One of these papers has been accepted for publication in The Thomist for 1982. Finally the Sixth International Conference on Patristic, Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies meeting at Villanova, Pennsylvania in September, 1981 has agreed to hear a paper, gathered from this thesis, entitled "Theology as System and as Science: Proclus and Thomas Aquinas."

My personal debts are enormous. My supervisors Canon Ian Macquarrie and Dr Anthony Meredith, S.J. have been tolerant and encouraging. My colleagues in Halifax, Professors A.H. Armstrong, R.D. Crouse and J.A. Doull have helped at every stage. The assistance of Fathers L.-J. Bataillon, O.P. of the Leonine Commission, J.G. Bougerol, O.F.M. of the College of St. Bonaventure at Grottaferrata, H.-D. Saffrey, O.P. of the Institut Catholique and of the Reverend Professors A. Patfoort, O.P. and G. Lafont, O.S.B. of the Angelicum and Anselmianum respectively has placed resources at my disposal which I could have never provided for myself. Their help and much more is owed to Dr M.-O. Garrigues of the CNRS. Dr M.T. D'Alverney, Professor J. Trouillard, Fr B. de Margerie, S.J., Dr L. Minio-Paluello, Miss Jean Petersen and Sir Richard Southern have also been generous. The Reverend Professors D.J.M. Bradley of the Oratory of St. Philip Neri and Georgetown University and E.R. Fairweather of Trinity College, Toronto have been more than kind in assisting an enterprise of which they remain suspicious. The sufferings of Miss Joyce Brewis, Mrs Margaret Kirby and Dr Marcia Rodriguez, who cared for its final production, have all contributed with these others to whatever merit it possesses.
Note on the Bibliography

The bibliography is intended to assist the reader with the notes. Frequently they give a more complete form of the reference than is provided there. Scarcely any works are included which have not been noted either directly or obliquely. The writings of Plato and Aristotle cited are not listed; they are always quoted from the Oxford Classical Texts series. Similarly patristic and mediaeval authors are included only if quotations are from editions other than those in the Patrologia Latina and Patrologia Graeca. For Aquinas the texts recommended by the current Leonine editors have been used. This is not always the one in the present Leonine Opera Omnia.

Note on Capitals

When quoting, I have followed the authors or editors; so 'deus' and its derivatives, 'être' and 'un' have received initial capitals when indicated. My own practice is not to give the initial capital in these cases unless the alternative is destructively ambiguous; as regards 'deus', this accords with many good recent editions.
Part I: Contemporary Thomism

The aim of this thesis is to show the distinction and connection by which the first forty-five questions of the *Summa Theologiae* are one continuous argument. The simple perfection, which is God, explicates itself in a series of ever more inclusive forms of self relation. The fundamental principles, by whose interpenetration this structure is created, are Neoplatonic. The continuity is achieved by a Neoplatonic logic in which being's priority is not absolute. The way being is understood, the significance of Neoplatonic principles, and the unity thereby discovered in the structure are all three opposed to the general tendency of Thomist interpretation in the past century. This direction is related to the purposes for which Pope Leo XIII gave *une consecration officielle* to the revival of Thomas' philosophy and theology.

The centenary of Leo's momentous Encyclical "Aeterni Patris" has just passed. Its authoritative exhortation sending the Roman Church back to a philosophy and theology already six hundred years old may seem to reflect only a fortress mentality. But this is an incomplete view. "Aeterni Patris" is the courageous war plan of an embattled church. The Pope believed,

> the fruitful root of the evils which are now overwhelming us, and of the evils we greatly fear... consists in this--evil teaching about things human and divine has come forth from the schools of philosophers.  

If practical and political evils flow from evil philosophy, the corrective is philosophy "rightly and wisely used".

The problem with the "new kind of philosophy... because of... which men have not gathered these desirable and wholesome fruits which the Church and civil society itself could have wished" is
that is has gone too far.

The aggressive innovators of the sixteenth century have not hesitated to philosophize without any regard whatever to the Faith, asking, and conceding in return, the right to invent anything they can think of, and anything that they please. The corrective for all these evils of so many kinds is to be found in putting philosophy and theology back into their right relation. This Thomas Aquinas does preeminently:

Carefully distinguishing reason from Faith ... and yet joining them together in a harmony of friendship; he ... guarded the rights of each. 7

The true role of philosophy, besides "guard[ing] ... all truths that come to us by Divine tradition, and ... resist[ing] those who dare attack them", 8 providing the means for expounding and scientifically organizing "the parts of heavenly doctrine" 9, is remarkably limited.

In the first place, then, this great and glorious fruit is gathered from human reason -- namely, that it demonstrates the existence of God ... In the next place, reason shows that God, in a way belonging only to Himself, excels by the sum of all perfections ... Hence reason proves that God is not only true, but the very Truth itself, which cannot deceive or be deceived. Further it is a clear consequence from this that the human reason obtains for the word of God full belief and authority ... Reason clearly shows us the truth about the Church instituted by Christ. 10

A certain irony will be immediately apparent. The separation between philosophy and theology implicit in this account of their relation and of philosophy's role is very like that in the works of "the aggressive innovators of the sixteenth century". Though the assertion of ecclesiastical authority is more directly the intention, it is the Church, not nature, in which belief is justified because God is not a deceiver. As Josef Pieper has remarked in another context, "the customary interpretation of St Thomas has been considerably determined by Rationalist thought". 11 But the relation of this revived Thomism to modern thought is not just accidental and ironic. For, as the intellectual foundation of the church's struggle in the
contemporary world, Thomism must actually engage its thought.

Pope Leo needed a philosophy and theology which would serve two contrary purposes. It should, on the one hand, enable the Church to speak to an intellectual world in which science and philosophy had become independent and even opposed to ecclesiastical theology. On the other, it should bring philosophy, and the political and social life thought to be based thereon, back within the control of and into subordination to ecclesiastical theology and authority. The scholasticism which was to provide for these aims must allow philosophy to be separated from theology, but subordinated to it. It was recognized that of the various scholastic systems only Thomas' would serve. The earlier and the more conservative mediaeval systems fused philosophy and theology too immediately; the later ones asserted the incompatibility of the two, or the autonomy of reason, or both.

If these purposes influenced the interpretation given to the relation of philosophy and theology in Aquinas, they -- as well as such circumstances as the Jesuit involvement in the revival determined that the Aristotelian aspects of Thomas' thought must be emphasised and its Platonic elements played down. The Aristotelian sciences seemed to be relatively independent of each other. This immediately provided the first object. Further, Thomas appeared to have been able to make the conclusions of Aristotelian reason cohere with his theology. So, when the ground of theology in a revelation to faith was stressed and the dependence of theology on philosophy diminished, the sciences were easily subordinated to ecclesiastical theology. In contrast, the systematic and synthetic unity of Neoplatonism, if taken together with the incompatibility of Platonic anti-empirical idealism with the nineteenth century view of modern science would seem to prevent dialogue with natural science, the separation of science and philosophy, and the disjunction of natural
and revealed theology.

A nice example of the political significance of Thomas' Aristotelianism is to be found in the interpretation of his relation to his Arabic predecessors. Thomas was understood to be reviving a purer Aristotelianism against the Platonized versions of the Philosopher which he found in the Arabic commentators. These he was obliged to combat, not only for the missionary purposes of the Church, but also because of the dangerous consequences for Christian doctrine, morals, and political life which this Arabic Platonized Aristotelianism (or Latin Averroism) was conceived to have when taken up by Christian intellectuals. It came to provide a basis for imperial anti-Papal claims. In this picture, Thomas, like Leo XIII and his followers, was seen to be struggling against the secularist philosophers of his day. There is something in this account. But, F. van Steenberghen has shown both how so many modern controversies were involved in the way the historical facts were stated, and how, as a result, the accounts by the exceedingly politically conscious historians of mediaeval philosophy involved muddles and fictions.

What is important for our investigation into the origins of the prevailing interpretation of Thomas is that those who laboured to produce an historically accurate presentation of Aquinas' thought, while remaining faithful to Leo's intentions, were themselves divided about what Thomas taught in ways which reflected contemporary philosophical concerns, as well as the division inherent in Pope Leo's purposes. On the one hand, there arose the difference between the transcendental and realist Thomists. The former attempted to bridge the gap between the contemporary world and Thomas by finding something positive in the critical spirit of the modern time and understanding Thomas' epistemology and ontology in a way not altogether exclusive of it. The realists, on the contrary, were in
touch with the aspect of the anti-modern contemporary spirit which partly moved both Pope Leo and Martin Heidegger. They found in Thomas an immediate unity with being which made the moderns' critical questions incomprehensible except through perversity. The realist and historically serious Thomism separated itself very sharply into a school centered in Louvain and a school dominated by Professor Gilson. The opposition between the realist and transcendental Thomists reflects the contrariety within the Pope's purposes, their conservative and progressive aspects, but the division between the realists themselves shows this very vividly.

As indicated, both purposes require an emphasis on the Aristotelian character of Thomas' thought and both Louvain and Gilson's followers agreed on this. But the opening to modern science and the subordination of philosophy to ecclesiastical theology are opposed to each other. Louvain, following the magnificent Cardinal Mercier, chose the first. Father Maréchal, the founder of the transcendental school, came from Louvain and in his spirit Monseigneur Noël even attempted the hopeless task of finding a critical realism which would bridge the gap separating Father Maréchal and the realists. Professor Gilson succeeded in discrediting what was to him so evidently a contradictory conception, but when, in the interests of maintaining the opening to modern autonomous reason, Louvain continued to endeavour to identify in Thomas a philosophy independent of theology, the insult was able to be returned in their criticism of the central discovery of Gilson's historical research, the idea of a Christian philosophy, as itself a contradiction. For ultimately Gilson had opted for the second of Leo's purposes. He pronounced impossible any contemporary attempt to imitate Thomas in reconciling science and theology and placed all his faith in the metaphysic of Exodus 3:14, which revelation made true no matter what modern science
said. Paul Vignaux has surely identified this position correctly as a quasi-Barthianism. But what in the end is interesting is that Louvain and Gilson are wrong not only in that on which they are opposed, but also in that on which they agree.

As we shall see, Professor van Steenberghen is right when he asserts that Thomas understood Exodus 3: 14 through his philosophical formation and not the inverse, but Professor Gilson was also correct in denying that philosophy is really distinct from theology in Aquinas. And yet the relation between philosophy and theology in Thomas cannot be understood either through a contemporary theological positivism nor yet through Aristotle's unsystematic ordering of the sciences, even if, as has been recently shown, Thomas himself used Aristotle's image of philosophy with her servants to represent theology's relation to her subordinates. What intervenes between Aristotle and St Thomas, colouring his vision of the Philosopher, is the Neoplatonic unification of all knowledge in theology. It is only on this account that the *Summae* can cover the immense ground they do. But our own interpretation of Thomas must be established later. Enough has been accomplished here if a connection has begun to emerge between the purposes of the Leonine revival and the current understandings of the relation between philosophy and theology in Thomas' thought, together with this Thomism's almost exclusive emphasis on his Aristotelianism. We turn now to its representation of his ontology.

The difference between the realist and transcendental Thomists is clear enough: the realists find an intellectual intuition of *esse* in Thomas which the transcendental Thomists deny is present in his thought. Jacques Maritain, who had certain "critical" leanings, and who differed with Gilson over Christian philosophy, speaks nonetheless of a "genuine intuition . . . a very simple seeing . . ."
the intuition of being as being". Just so, Gilson holds "l'apprehension de l'être par l'intellect consiste à voir directement le concept d'être dans n'importe quelle donnée sensible." Gilson is quite content to be called a dogmatic realist. Lonergan, one of the transcendental school, describes Gilson's dogmatic, as opposed to naive and critical, realism as follows:

His assertion is that over and above sensitive perceptions and intellectual abstractions there exists an intellectual vision of the concept of being in any sensible datum ... However, if Professor Gilson agrees with Kant in holding that objectivity is a matter of perception, if he differs from Kant in holding that de facto we have perceptions of reality, one must not think that he attempts to refute Kant by appealing to a fact that Kant overlooked. Professor Gilson's realism is dogmatic; the course he advocates is ... the blunt affirmation of the dogmatic realism whose validity was denied by Kant's critique.

Rahner and Coreth, in seeking to do greater justice to Kant's position, certainly deny the "intellectual intuition of being" replacing it by the Vorgriff of the "horizon of being". Still, even at this point of their greatest and most explicit difference, the two schools unite in associating this contact with being with the act of affirmative judgement. What is arrived at by either means is not different; it is what both call esse. "The doctrine of esse has characterized Thomism -- even constituted it in its uniqueness from the earliest days."

For Thomism esse is ultimately mysterious. Esse is just what it is and everything is in virtue of esse and yet, it appears that God is to be set off from everything in virtue of his esse. "It is the first object grasped by the intellect" and "here metaphysics comes to an end, for we cannot comprehend this Act of existing, whose very essence is to be." It is the pre-apprehension present in every judgement and "the ultimate desire of spirit". Every difference -- if there are any differences, this is the problem -- lies within it, even the difference between knower and known, both are
being. "Being is therefore the ultimate reality, both intensively and extensively." 41

The limit to what philosophy can make known in theology is set by the absoluteness of this mysterious esse. Our aim will be to show that there is in fact a Neoplatonic context and content to Thomas' concept of being which enables the union of philosophy and theology in his single system. But it is precisely the mysterious emptiness or fullness of being which prevents this unification in contemporary Thomism. Since philosophy terminates in esse, faith has nothing with which to explicate God's revelation to it. By means of this ontology, modern Thomism does the work Leo set it. Limiting philosophy, it hands man over to faith's authority. In fact, the contemporary philosophical reasoning operative here comes from Heidegger.

There is now a great mass of Thomist literature endeavouring to show that Thomas alone escaped Heidegger's criticism that western philosophy had forgotten being, that it was not fatally an onto-theology, and so it was the remaining authentic fundamental philosophy. 42 Maritain puts it as well as any:

St. Thomas did not stop short at ens -- the "being" ("das Seiende", "l'étant") -- but went straight to esse ("Sein", "l'être") to the act of existing. (A pity . . . that Heidegger couldn't see that.) 43

But K. Rahner is clearest about what accepting this Heideggerian critique of the western tradition would mean. Rahner's reasoning is Heideggerian in so far as he thinks that a metaphysics which becomes "thematic", i.e., acquires content, as theological science cannot respect the ontological difference. Being would then become a thing, an existent, the thingliest of things:

If esse is made objective in reflection in order to be known (gewusst) itself (not merely implicitly and simultaneously known mitgewusst in the pre-apprehension), then that can only be done insofar as it is concretized again by a form. This is either a definite, and then it limits esse to the fullness of a definite degree of being,
or it represents every form, it is the form of *ens commune* (any-quiddity) and then its *esse* is indeed not limited to any degree of ontological actuality, but for that reason completely reduced to the empty void of *ens commune*. Hence, insofar as this *esse* simultaneously apprehended in the pre-apprehension is able to be limited, it shows itself to be non-absolute . . . *Essence* in itself has no form distinct from itself which completely preserves the fullness of *esse* and which could be affirmed of it in a concretizing and affirming synthesis without limiting it.  

Essence in these thinkers is always treated as a limitation. 45 I do not see how this is reconcilable with Thomas' doctrine of the identity of essence and existence. For him, God is also self-subsistent form. 46 But our task here is to see the contemporary philosophical logic behind this interpretation. It is the need to preserve the ontological difference which prevents metaphysics becoming theology -- or at least *theologia philosophica*.

Heidegger's "conversation with historical tradition" seeks in it "something that has not been thought, and from which what has been thought receives its essential space". 47 "Metaphysics is onto-theology." 48 "When metaphysics thinks of beings with respect to ground that is common to all beings as such, then it is logic as onto-logic." 49 Metaphysics is founded in a particular kind of thinking.

Thinking means: letting-lie-before-us and so taking-to-heart also: beings in being. Thinking so structured pervades the foundation of metaphysics, the duality of beings and Being . . . The style of all Western-European philosophy . . . is determined by this duality "beings -- in being". Philosophy's procedure in the sphere of this duality is decisively shaped by the interpretation Plato gave to the duality. 50

He says that between beings and Being there prevails the *μεταστάσεις* . . . beings and Being are in different places . . . To make the question of the *μεταστάσεις*, the difference in placement of beings and Being at all possible, the distinction -- the duality of the two -- must be given beforehand, in such a way that this duality itself does not receive specific attention.

Indeed, "the origin of the difference can no longer be thought of within the scope of metaphysics." 52 "Since metaphysics thinks of beings as such as a whole, it represents beings in respect of what
differs in the difference and without heeding the difference as difference." But it is also just what it forgets that enables it to be simultaneously ontology and theology. "Because the thinking of metaphysics remains involved in the difference which is as such unthought, metaphysics is both ontology and theology in a unified way." Our task is to recognize that Being which is neither the presence of beings -- Being of beings -- nor identical with thought but rather keeps and guards thought within itself as what belongs to it. "For us, the matter of thinking is the Same, and thus is Being -- but Being with respect to its difference from beings." This involves also the difference between thinking and being: "Parmenides is far from holding the view that Being and thinking are of a kind, so that we could indifferently substitute thinking for being, and being for thinking." Rather, "different things, thinking and Being, are here thought of as the Same . . . thinking and Being belong together in the Same and by virtue of this Same." Thus the project of thinking the difference between Being and beings and thought and Being are identical: "We speak of the difference between Being and beings. The step back goes from what is unthought, from the difference as such, into what gives us thought." Heidegger knows the basis of metaphysical thinking but also what it has forgotten. What it is, the Being of beings, produces objectifying thought and practice:

If the Being of beings, in the sense of the being here of what is present, did not already prevail, beings could not have appeared as objects, as what is objective in objects -- and only by such objectivity do they become available to the ideas and propositions in the positing and disposing of nature by which we constantly take inventory of the energies we can wrest from nature. Metaphysics as onto-theology is just such an objectifying, making thematic, representing. Consequently, those who pay attention to the forgotten difference, and indeed to the ground of metaphysical thinking itself will not do theology in this way:
 Someone who has experienced theology in his own roots, both the theology of the Christian faith and that of philosophy would today rather remain silent about God when he is speaking in the realm of thinking. For the onto-theo-logical character of metaphysics has become question-able for thinking ... from the experience of a thinking which has discerned in onto-theo-logy the still unthought unity of the essential nature of metaphysics.

Rahner's limitation of metaphysics so that it is not in fact onto-theo-logy seems to take this problematic to heart. For him, the immediate implicit pre-apprehension of being involves no gap (ὑπόστασις), and esse is not informed by any essence to objectify and represent it in the direction of metaphysical theology. It is just the "empty concept of being" which drives man back to the world in which God reveals himself.

E. Coreth is partly in the realist and partly in the transcendental-camp. On the one hand, he, with Gilson, is "quite convinced of the priority of metaphysics over everything in general and over cognitional theory most particularly." On the other, "Coreth's immediate realism not only can be but also is mediated." Nonetheless, he frames his metaphysics explicitly to run round Heidegger's critique. He tries to avoid the Χυμηλομοιοτητα.

We cannot 'arrive' at God; the distance is infinite. We start from him and we end up in him. He is present implicitly in the premises and explicitly in the conclusion. We reach God right away or not at all ... Only the Infinite ... only God really is. All other objects are this or that.

Human knowledge can penetrate into the realm of metaphysics because it always occurs within that realm. Human thinking can reach being because it is already with being.

Moreover, he represents the subject of metaphysics in such a way that it is particularly prey to Heidegger's criticism: "beings as beings", "ον ἐν "ον", "ens qua ens", "Seiendes als Seiendes." And he admits Heidegger's criticism of the general tradition, "Since the time of Aristotle, classic metaphysics has considered as its objects 'beings
Aquinas is an exception and in virtue of his doctrine of esse:

No thinker of the past has been more aware of the ontological difference than Aquinas; nobody has more clearly distinguished between beings (ens) and being (esse), or interpreted beings more consistently in the light of being.

Though metaphysics is, in its origins, onto-theology, it is still possible, if Thomas be followed in his adherence to esse. Coreth thinks that it can be developed thematically without specifying esse by means of a limiting essence. In consequence, he carries it beyond the point permitted by Rahner. We will look at his attempt further below. But in order to judge the issue clearly we must now consider the relation of esse and essence in the thought of these contemporary Thomists.

It is clear already wherein the necessity for essential determination lies. Just because everything is esse, some determination is needed to distinguish within it. In our context, it is especially necessary to distinguish the finite from the Absolute or Infinite. The problem is also clear. Essence is regarded as limiting potency and thus it makes finite and objective. God specified by essence would be only a being masking as Being, and all the Heideggerian criticisms of the onto-theological metaphysics would fall upon such a God. The universal solution is to maintain, with Thomas, the pure formality of esse itself.

Further determinations are not added to esse in the sense that it would be perfected by them, brought from empty indeterminateness to a full determined content. Such determinations are either simultaneously given with esse as such (simple perfections), "since nothing is outside it except non-being", or they are only confining limits of the fullness which esse would have in itself, for "that which is most formal of all is esse itself", esse is determining, fulfilling, not determinable or fulfillable.

So esse is "formal", not indeed in the sense that it is itself a form; a quiddity . . . which Thomas explicitly
denies. For *esse* is precisely that which brings the quiddity (form) to reality. But *esse* is formal in the sense that which is affirmed of something, that it is thus what determines this something, although in another way than is the case with the form in respect to its subject, since it is not one determination among many but the one ground of all real determinations. Further *esse* is the "most formal and most simple": "nothing is more formal or more simple than *esse*" . . . pure *esse*, if it exists as such, can receive no further determinations at all . . . everything possible is already included in it as in its one ground. 71

There are two possible interpretations of this 'pure formality'. Either, the principle of the finite, in which essence and *esse* are divided, is the identity of *esse* and *essentia*. So *esse* would be (as Thomas says it is) "*per se forma" 72, "*per essentiam suam forma" 73, self-individuated and self-subsistent form. 74 This is not to say he is "a form". Or, alternatively, even in God, indeed especially in God, *esse* is the ground of all else and God would be *esse* as opposed to *essentia*. It is the second course which Thomists have generally followed. Rahner, as we have seen, regards essence as always a limiting determining potency. E. Mascall engages in an anti-essentialist polemic, after the manner of Gilson. However, by its very onesidedness, it passes into its opposite.

What is given us in the finite world is not a realm of essences, some of which exist, but a realm of existent acts, each of which in view of its determinate character gives rise to a particular essence. To ask what a being is, therefore, is simply to ask how it exists, for its essence is nothing but the mode of its existence. 75

How do you state the "determinate character" of the "existent act" except by giving the essence? If essence be "nothing but the mode of its existence", and, if *esse* is the fullness from which determinations come, so that, as all agree, they do not come from outside, ultimately *esse* and essence must be one, the essence as infinite as the *esse*, indeed "nothing but the mode of its existence". To understand the *esse*, its mode must be grasped.

Such an authentic Thomism will regard itself as equally
essentialist as existential. Accepting with Thomas that we do not have immediate vision, proper knowledge, of what God is, it will nonetheless strive to make the hidden known as much as is possible in via. With Grabmann it will recognize that the identity of essence and existence in God provides a Brücke to the knowledge of his essence. It will be open to the consequences for the knowledge of what he is which follow from the discovery that "ens is intrinsically ordinaible", that its Neoplatonic context gives it an intelligible structure. It will acknowledge that Thomas turned from an understanding of esse "qui annihilerait l'essence conçue comme une pure possibilité d'exister, et de façon plus générale par rapport à toute conception qui nierait l'essentialité divine". And so it will not content itself with tautologies like: "The fundamental truth about God is that he exists self-existently; it is because of this that he is self-existent being." "To my way of thinking, to be real is to actually exist or more simply to be actual. Hence, what makes something real is what makes it be actual." Nor will it be content with paradox and mystery:

... since truth ultimately rests upon esse, there is no science without some cognition of esse, and yet there is no discursive cognition of esse, either in science or dialectics. All that we can say about existence is est, est, non, non. Discourse may be needed in order to establish esse, but there can be no discourse about it. Because ... the metaphysics of St. Thomas ... had the intuition of being and saw in esse her chief object, ... the theology of St. Thomas was able to contemplate in the trans-luminous obscurity of the mysteries of Faith the Uncreated Cause of Being as Being itself subsisting by itself.

Above all it will not be self-consciously polemical in order to assert its existentialism, as when, against the very words of Thomas, Dr Mascall denies that in itself God's existence is self-evident, that a passage from essence to existence exists:

No doubt the antithesis is too sharp; we are perforce speaking more humano. Nevertheless, the point at issue
is a vital one; upon it depends the whole distinction between an essentialist and existentialist theism. 83

If too sharp antitheses are to be avoided, oppositions directly contradicting the words of Thomas, what must be acknowledged is that to be true to St Thomas we cannot approach him with these contemporary categories and antitheses already fixed.

Coreth, because of his desire to go beyond the ipsum esse as a terminus, which would leave what was beyond to some other theologian than the metaphysical or philosophical, faces the problem of what essence is adequate to esse most squarely and most nearly passes to a solution. Although, for Coreth, essence is the principle of limitation, it is nothing but an inner principle of the existent whose essence it is. It is absorbed into the existent, as a constitutive ground, it exists only in and through the existent. 84

Indeed, it is the basis of the Heideggerian "difference between beings and being, between the on'tic realm and the ontological realm". 85 (Heidegger does not think this difference suffices but that need not concern us at present.) 86

The difference between beings and being supposes another difference which explains why the existent is not absolutely being itself and does not exhaust being... Essence itself differs from being and communicates this difference to the existent whose essence it is. Hence essence is the condition of the possibility of the ontological difference. 87

Since this difference cannot come from outside being, being and essence must derive from a "common origin", 88 which is being and this "absolute being, as the fullness of all possibilities". 89 So far the argument is inescapable. At this point, however, it moves in a way which leads to Rahner's result. In the end metaphysics has hold of empty commune ens. Coreth fails to recognize that the problem is not only to distinguish finite being from being but how Absolute Being distinguishes itself from being. This second distinction is
the fundamental philosophical problem for these thinkers. Their language contains a dangerous ambiguity. Sometimes it seems the being which is immediately present to us is God in the fullest sense. This is certainly not the intended result, but, as a critic of Rahner puts it, "the concept of esse oscillates between nothing and infinity."90 Coreth, seeking the source of finite being, asks:

If the finite essence as possibility of being derives from being as actuality of being, all finite essences as finite possibilities of being must derive from absolute being as the unlimited actuality of being which precedes and gives rise to the finite duality of being and essence. But how can the empty potentiality of limited essences derive from the pure unlimited actuality of being? 91

He answers profoundly that this is possible only if "absolute being . . . as absolute identity contain at the same time difference or non-identity".92 This requires "a relative opposition".

We have already said that there exists such a relative difference in absolute being, in so far as it is absolute knowledge of self-knowledge, absolute identity of being and knowing. For in the act of knowledge the knower sets up the known against itself. 93

If this were carried through theologically, the consequence would in fact be the Thomistic argument. God essentially knows himself; being and knowing are the same, and do not merely, as in a Heideggerian Parmenidian premetaphysics, come together in the same. Thus, absolute difference would be posited in the divine as the distinction of the persons.

Thomas from the very beginning of his theological writing is clear that the reason of the procession of creatures can be found only in the prior procession of persons.94 Coreth falls back from this genuinely theological metaphysics. He explains only the origin of finite essences, although for Thomas even creation cannot be explained in this way. The difference is only one in which:

the finite possibility of being sets itself up against
the absolute actuality of being . . . Absolute being must in its absolute knowledge oppose to itself the finite as the object of its knowledge. 95

In Thomas, the "reditio ad essentiam suam", the "per se forma subsistens" is, in fact, the self-knowledge of God. God knows the finite in the knowledge of his own essence. The divine knowing is modified by the personal relations. God knows creatures in knowing his own divine Word. In Coreth, knowledge is just one of the perfections which attach to the divine fullness of being. Thus, Coreth's derivation of the properties of God lapses at crucial points from Thomas' own.

Coreth begins, not with the simplicity of God, but rather at the other end, with his infinity:

Being as being is infinite, all perfections of being are fully realized in it . . . It contains no limiting essence, hence it is the infinite fullness of all the possibilities of being. 101

This is confusing. Corporality is, among others, a perfection of being. So Thomas' own first step must be to ask, "utrum Deus sit corpus?" But, since we do not yet know in Coreth's Metaphysics the mode of this infinity, we do not know whether this is simply all beings. "It contains no limiting essence"; it may be only, as Rahner brings out, all essences in the ens commune. On the contrary, Thomas' own procedure in uniting essence and esse in the divine simplicity has the effect of bringing out the characteristic modality of the divine esse as precisely what essentially belongs to it.

Having begun with the infinity of being, Coreth moves from positive to negative when subsequently introducing simplicity and the characteristics following on it: immutability, supratemporality, supraspatiality. This is the opposite direction from that of Thomas. In the Summa Theologiae, the notion of God becomes more concretely inclusive. In Coreth's Metaphysics, on the contrary, this negation
places a wedge between the infinite being and the consequent perfections. Coreth does indeed pass to activity, life and knowing and willing, but not in Thomas' order. For Thomas, activity was necessarily present from the beginning; nothing could be said or determined about God without it. Being, at least the being of God, is not before it, because \textit{actus} is just that by which God's being marks itself from being in general or beings. Activity is not the specific form of his being, nor life the specific form of his activity, nor spiritual knowing and willing activity the specific form of his life -- this would be the worst sort of Platonism for Thomas. Rather, as in Aristotle, the higher activity contains the lower, and the lower is understood through the higher and not contrariwise. Activity, life, knowing, willing are not perfections which belong to being, as in Coreth. For Thomas, God's identity of \textit{esse} and \textit{essentia} is his actuality. His pure formality and self-relation is his knowing in virtue of which he is the truth, and, Thomas concludes:

That being whose own nature is its self-understanding, and to which what it is belongs naturally not determined by something outside, this reaches the highest level of life. However such a being is God. Thus in God is life in the highest sense. Hence the Philosopher in Book XII of the \textit{Metaphysics} having shown that God is understanding, concludes that he has life most perfect and eternal, because his intellect is most perfect and always actual.

Coreth subsequently uses the same order as Thomas when he moves on to God as "infinite freedom" and "absolute person".

Coreth seems to be genuinely caught in a dilemma. In order to be true to that metaphysical tradition to which Thomas belongs, he feels obliged to produce an \textit{onto-theo-logy}; yet, he does not want to fall prey to Heidegger's criticism. He endeavours to escape by at least an ambiguity about the relation of "Absolute Being" to its perfections. While he says that "in Absolute Being, being and essence and all
perfections are absolutely identical", he does not show how this is so. Has not Rahner, whom Coreth follows so closely at other points, been more astute in estimating the possibility for metaphysics if one accepts Heidegger's criteria? Coreth's middle ground, allowing Heidegger's standards, but attempting to find a metaphysical way around them, seems doomed to failure.

Is not Heidegger's critique destructive of Christian metaphysics root and branch? One might endeavour to solve the problem of "limiting essence" by demonstrating that the divine knowing is not a particular essence but the absolute intuitive unity of universal and particular. The particular in its utter individuality is known in the absolute universality of the divine essence itself. This is surely Thomas' own position. He knew perfectly well that the divine was not a particular being, an existent. One would not thereby satisfy Heidegger. For the difference to which Heidegger ultimately wishes man to attend is not that which is the origin of thinking but that which leaves Being unthought. Thomistic theology which draws into sacra doctrina the Aristotelian onto-theo-logy cannot allow this difference to be ultimate. For it, in the end, knowing and willing are the relations and properties of the divine essence or being, and in common with the tradition generally, he holds that the persons possess the unity of essence: "In Deo non sit aliud essentia quam persona secundum rem." There is in Thomas' ultimate being nothing unthought. Being and thought do not meet in the same. The divine thinking is the divine being. A theology which wishes to respect the Heideggerian difference must keep its distance from metaphysics. Metaphysics will become for it a transcendental or preliminary knowledge and theology will become an openness to the contingent historical, which is what revelation must be by this account. This is Rahner's more correctly Heideggerian theology. We must now
consider its relation to Thomas' *Summa Theologiae*.

The true effect of Rahner's Heideggerian reinterpretation of Thomas is to do for him what Marx and Feuerbach did for Hegel: to take his theology, which was standing on its head, and to place it squarely on its feet in the world. As we shall see, there is indeed for Thomas a difference between *philosophia prima*, or *theologia philosophica* or *metaphysica*; "*illa theologia quae pars philosophia ponitur*", on the one hand, and *sacra doctrina* or *sacra scriptura*; "*theologia quae ad sacram doctrinam pertinet*", on the other. The former begins in the world of sensible effects, common being, and rises to consider the first and highest cause of this most extensive subject matter, namely God as separate substance. The latter commences, on the contrary, where philosophy has arrived. No doubt, given its beginning, philosophy's knowledge of the first principle is not adequate: for "*necesse est uti effectu loco definitionis*", and God infinitely exceeds his effects. But Thomas is clear that the two directions of knowledge do meet; indeed, the way up is the way down. Without the philosophical sciences theology is not able to understand what God is saying to it in faith's revelation. Moreover, as we hope to show, sacred doctrine is the meeting of these two and cannot proceed if one direction were regarded as empty and to be left behind for the sake of the other. "*Omnia pertractantur in sacra doctrina sub ratione Dei*;" "*non solum in se est sed etiam secundum quod est principium rerum et finis earum*." For Rahner, on the other hand, just because metaphysics' result is empty, it must be left behind. The existence of the separate substances is known but the metaphysical object is defined only "from the empty concept of being."

For although *esse* is in itself the full ground of every existent, nevertheless, this fullness is given to us only in the absolute, empty infinity of our pre-apprehension
or, what is the same thing, in common being with the transcendental modes intrinsic to it. And so it remains true: the highest knowledge of God is the 'darkness of ignorance'.

Rahner rightly judges that spirit cannot be content with this "and seeks to fill up the formal emptiness of the being given in the pre-apprehension through the object of every individual act."[120]

Everything 'metaphysical' seems to exist only to make possible this objective sense intuition; we seem to know God, the 'object' of metaphysics, only as the necessary horizon of the experience of the world which is possible only in this way. [121]

The function of this introduction to theology, the motto of which is the "conversio ad phantasma", is to make "God the distant Unknown".

"God can speak, because He is the Unknown."[122]

Thomas' metaphysics of knowledge is Christian when it summons man back into the here and now of his finite world, because the Eternal has also entered into his world so that man might find Him, and in Him might find himself anew. [123]

This may in Rahner's view make this theology (in both its aspects) Christian, and indeed Thomist, but it is the very opposite of Thomas' own.

We turn finally to another transcendental Thomist, Bernard Lonergan. As for Rahner, the "conversio ad phantasma" is decisive for Lonergan's understanding of the metaphysical basis of theology. Rahner's Spirit in the World begins with an analysis of the question in the Summa Theologiae in which Thomas explicates this notion; Lonergan's Insight has set "τὰ μὴν ὁταν ἐδώ ἔτοιμαν ἐκ τῶν φαντάσμων μοι", from Aristotle's De Anima III, 7 on its title page. But Lonergan's position differs somewhat from that of Rahner; to comprehend it, we will need to expand the categories of our analysis.

The aim of this analysis of contemporary Thomism has been to show that certain features of the current interpretation of St. Thomas
originate in the philosophical perspectives of the present world from which, consciously or unconsciously, these thinkers tend to view him. This is true regardless of whether these Thomists think of themselves primarily as historians, or rather, first of all as creative philosophers and theologians. Such interpenetration of the present and the past is very general and perhaps unavoidable. Nonetheless, it is no doubt more fully operative here just because Thomas' philosophy and theology was revived in the Roman Church for the sake of securing certain practical and political purposes. Those who did the scholarly and speculative work of this great enterprise partook of its practical spirit. Moreover, the authority given to Thomas' thought by Canon Law itself compelled Roman Catholic theologians and philosophers who sought official approval to find it in their own perspectives and interests, thus further blending past and present. Our endeavour so far has been to demonstrate that, consciously or unconsciously, it has been a Heideggerian understanding of the relation of thought and being which has coloured the interpretation of Thomas' ontology, and the relation of philosophy and theology in his thought (and indirectly the relation of Platonic and Aristotelian elements) by both contemporary realist and transcendental Thomists. Yet, the completeness of the blending of current positions and historical interpretations, and the diversity of these present perspectives, compels a widening of our categories. The relation of these perspectives can usefully be expressed by introducing a consideration of how Heidegger stands to Kant and Hegel. This is evident, if we recollect that the realist and transcendental Thomists differ through their attitude to the critical philosophy originating in Descartes and culminating in Kant, and if we add that the realist or ontological turn common to both Thomisms and to Heidegger had already a form in the absolute idealism of Hegel. As against Kant, Hegel supposed
that the modern subjectivity could be given an objectivity and ground in being.\textsuperscript{126} By such an understanding, the Thomisms of Gilson, Rahner and Lonergan can be located relative to each other.

Before introducing the positive relation to the modern critical spirit contained in these positions, the unity with Heidegger in rejecting them needs restatement in a new form. Concerned previously with Heidegger's analysis of onto-theo-logy, no reference was made to what characterizes classical Modern philosophy. In fact, Gilson's dogmatic realism is like Heidegger's own pre-epistemological stance, despite Heidegger's opposition to the term.

This existential-ontological assertion seems to accord with the thesis of realism that the external world is Really present-at-hand . . . But it differs in principle from every kind of realism; for realism holds that the reality of the 'world' not only needs to be proved but also is capable of proof.\textsuperscript{127}

In fact, Gilson would also hold that the perversity of the critical spirit shows itself in seeking a proof of the world's reality. For him objective being is given intuitively.

Professor D.J.M. Bradley has shown that Marechal, the founder of transcendental Thomism, accepting certain features of the Kantian critical spirit but moving in a realist direction relative to Kant, is forced toward Hegel. He "raises the Hegelian question but withdraws from the Hegelian answer".\textsuperscript{128} When Rahner's position is criticised within this framework, the two poles in the movement beyond Kant are seen to be Hegel and Heidegger.

In Spirit in the World, the Kantian quest for an apodeictic metaphysics is revitalized by being brought into the ken of Heidegger's Question of Being with, what can only be called Hegelian seriousness.\textsuperscript{129}

Dr Bradley finds that Rahner is not to be reduced to Heidegger. Whereas for Heidegger, "Being for Dasein remains inextricably finite", Rahner departs significantly from the stance of Being.
the metaphysical question reveals the essence of man as the being 'who as such is already with Being in its Totality'.

Yet, "Rahner accepts (like Heidegger) the worldly factity of Dasein."

And this accounts for his failure either to "reassert definitely or to overcome critically the realist position". This ambivalence prevents his going over finally to the Hegelian philosophy.

Hegel argues that Being is transcendentally derived as the condition of possibility for philosophical discourse; therefore, Being is always mediated and never simply recognized or affirmed as sheer unmediated "presence". But Rahner seems, at once to assert both that Being is always mediated (posited) and yet merely recognized or affirmed.

Thus he is poised uneasily between Hegel and Heidegger.

Dr Bradley states the "confrontation" between the realist and Hegelian metaphysics as follows:

The apparent incompatibility between a realist metaphysics that rests upon the judicative affirmation of Being, which as Being (esse) cannot be conceptually mediated, and a transcendental genesis of Being that posits Being as the condition for philosophical discourse which, as self-grounding rationality, is committed to the full mediation of the concept of Being.

When the issue is put thus, not in terms of Kant's subjectivity separated from the inner truth of being, but, in terms of the rational mediation of being, as opposed to an immediate positing of it beyond conceptualization, then Gilson's realism appears nearer Heidegger, and Lonergan and Rahner seem compelled to move toward Hegel, just because of their more affirmative attitude to Kant. From Gilson's perspective Rahner then seems an essentialist (Bradley stands with Gilson):

Rahner often notes, it is true that essence is only "the potency for esse" but at crucial points, he identifies esse with the totality of the extra-mental object. . . [He] has recourse to a concept of Being as that supreme essence which grounds all other essences . . . the concept of esse is none other than the concept of universal Being which subsumes the concept of every particular Being.
In Neo-scholastic terms Bradley designates Rahner's position as "Suarezian". Gilson held that of the great classical interpreters Baez alone understands Thomas' doctrine of being correctly. 136 Lonergan's epistemological and ontological positions are close to Rahner's.

Lonergan "never took to his [Gilson's] view of an intuition of being." 137 With Coreth, against Gilson, Lonergan is above all eager to bring out the distinctive character of intellect. "The intention of being in questioning bears no resemblance to sensitive or empirical knowledge . . ." 138 "The analysis of questioning forces one to conceive human intelligence not on the analogy of sense but properly in terms of intelligence itself." 139 If there is no intellectual intuition of being, which would be like sense's perception, then Thomas must be seen as going some way with modern philosophy toward epistemology.

For Lonergan, Thomas is a realist, but not dogmatic.

Aquinas himself did not offer an account of the procedure he would follow; so it is only by piecing together scattered materials that one can arrive at an epistemological position that may be termed Thomistic but hardly Thomist. 140 Yet, the need for a "comparison between the knowing and its standard" which "frightens the naive realist" is met by Aquinas. He admitted the necessity of a standard in judgement: "nomen mentis a mensurando est sumptum." 141 Aquinas maintains that our knowledge of truth is derived from our self-knowledge. And while "it is to be observed that the Aristotelian concept of wisdom or first philosophy . . . does contain an epistemological element", it does not "raise the critical problem". 142 On the other hand, because Thomas is also heir to Augustine's reflection on self, the psychological and introspective element is essential to his philosophy; he goes beyond Aristotle.
As a result, Thomas does not share the "prejudice of modern Schoolmen" against "criteriology". "His predecessors were neither Descartes nor Kant but Aristotle and Augustine." So finally, Thomist realism is immediate, not because it is naive and unreasoned and blindly affirmed, but because we know the real before we know ... a difference within the real as the difference between subject and object.

Lonergan places Thomas somewhat on the way to modern critical thought. This is also how Heidegger sees him; for Heidegger has not the same view of scholasticism as Heideggerian Thomists. Again, Lonergan and Heidegger are commonly critical of the notion "that the way to grasp the real is by a kind of knowing which is characterized by beholding," which Lonergan speaks of as Platonist.

For the Platonist, knowing is primarily a confrontation, it supposes the duality of knower and known ... For the Aristotelian, on the other hand, confrontation is secondary. Primarily and essentially knowing is perfection, act, identity.

By this means, he comes to a union of epistemology (or psychology) and ontology which is that critical or essentialist realism discovered in Rahner by Gilson's followers and, on account of which, they reject his position as authentically Thomist.

There is an identification of the self-relation of being and intellect in Rahner and Lonergan, which is a result of the union of epistemology and ontology, and which is most important for the interpretation of Thomas offered in this thesis. Rahner maintains:

The beingness (Seiendheit), the intensity of being (Seinsmächtigkeit) of the being of an existent is determined for Thomas by the reditio super seipsum, the intensity of being is determined by the degree of possibility to be able to be present to itself.

Presence to self is knowing. Lonergan has it that "Being ... is the objective of the pure desire to know" (placing being within knowing). But, "transcendence ... means a development in man's knowledge relevant to a development in man's being." "Cognitional
activity is the becoming known of being." There is "a parallelism between the dynamism of mind and the dynamism of proportional being." The concept of being is natural to intellect; for intelligibility is natural to intellect, for it is its act; and conceptualization is natural to intellect, for it is its activity; but the concept of being, on the above showing, is the conceptualization of intelligibility as such, and so it too is natural to intellect. Again it follows that the concept of being is indeterminate . . . that . . . [it] cannot be unknown to any intellect; for its sole condition is that intellect be in any act of understanding . . . [and] that being is the object of intellect. 153

Only on condition that human intellect is potens omnia facere et fieri is the concept of all concepts really commensurate with reality -- really the concept of ens. On the other hand, if intellect is potens omnia facere et fieri, then since we know by what we are, per se and naturally we do know ens, further, since we know we know by knowing what we are, it is by reflection on the nature of intellect that we know our capacity for truth and for knowledge of reality. 154

Perhaps Gilson is right that any concession to the modern critical spirit, which would endeavour to reconcile it with Thomist realism, in fact is on the way to making being into intellect's self-positing. In any case, Lonergan's position in sum is generally the same post-Kantian epistemological realism situated ambivalently between Heidegger and Hegel which Dr Bradley found in Rahner.

If Lonergan's Thomism can be understood within the same contemporary framework which comprehends other Thomists, he also shares their unhistorical view of Thomas' relation to Platonism. He regards Thomas as Aristotelian as opposed to Platonist. He is then left with no philosophical means for describing the difference between Aquinas and Aristotle. Near the beginning of Verbum, he notes:

Aquinas was troubled with a problem that had not concerned Aristotle namely how to reconcile the simplicity of God with the infinity of ideas known by God. 155

This is precisely a characteristic problem for Neoplatonic, as opposed to Hellenic, theologians. Lonergan, however, sees the treatment of the divine simplicity as Aristotelian:
From the Sentences, he appreciated the advantage of knowing as identity in reconciling divine simplicity with divine knowledge. ... there is to be discerned here an increasing Aristotelianism.  

He sees only the identity of all the attributes of God; their ordering from simplicity toward division is hidden to him. Reason knows only God's unity:

The natural light of reason will never get beyond ... identity in demonstrating the nature of self-knowledge in the infinite simplicity of God.  

One is left with the contradiction that Thomas' emphasis on the divine simplicity is both Aristotelian and beyond Aristotle.

Similarly, Lonergan's anti-Platonism causes him to miss the reason behind Aquinas' more than Aristotelian interest in the introspective psychology of knowing and his un-Aristotelian faculty psychology. He credits both to Augustine. In fact Augustine is here only a vehicle for Neoplatonism. It is because the unity on which thought depends is beyond it that the direct Aristotelian confidence that the categories of thought are also those of being disappears and epistemological concern develops. Faculty psychology equally depends on the Neoplatonic division between unity and the many. The substance of the soul and its more divided operations are not on the same level. These historical lacunae may seem trivial. Yet, because of them, there is a blindness to the full character of Thomas' thought; e.g., "Dionysian language was at hand and he did not use it." Most importantly the philosophical tension in Thomas' thought is missed. We return to a Leonine perspective in which the division between philosophy and theology is all important -- a perspective which has appeared in every Thomist we have considered. It is just this position with its anti-Platonism and overbalanced concern with ontology which is incapable of showing the unity of the first part of the Summa Theologiae.
In consequence this study of the *Summa Theologiae* stems out of contemporary concerns which include the reaction of a part of current Catholic theology to official Thomism. What is proposed is a consideration which might correct somewhat the dominant anti-Platonic tendency of the Thomism of the Leonine revival, exploit the fruits of recent historical scholarship, and establish a connection between Thomas' thinking and this present direction in Catholic theology.

The developed study of the history of late Neoplatonism is quite recent, having been set off very largely by E.R. Dodd's edition and translation of Proclus' *Elements of Theology*. The progress of these studies was interrupted by the Second World War and it is only now that they have advanced far enough to yield much fruit for the interpretation of the history of mediaeval theology and philosophy. Stephen Gersh has applied its results to the earliest part in his *From Iamblichus to Eriugena*, but Thomas, whose relation to Neoplatonism is entirely through these later forms -- he knew nothing of Plotinus -- has hardly begun to be reconsidered in this reworking.

Partly as a result of the impact of these historical studies and the possibilities for philosophy and theology which they recall, but partly also in response to their perception of the contemporary necessities of thought, some Catholic theologians have endeavoured to revive and develop a Christian Neoplatonism. What attracts them to this ancient tradition and what primarily characterizes it for them is its being a negative theology. The person who has developed the historical, systematic, and contemporary aspects of this Plotinian and post-Plotinian Neoplatonism most completely is the Frenchman, Jean Trouillard. But just as the greatest historians, philosophers, and theologians in the service of the Thomist ontology were French -- men like E. Gilson, J. Maritain, M.-D. Chenu -- so Trouillard is surrounded in France by a constellation of historians --
des Places, Festugiè, H.D. Saffrey, P. Hadot -- and philosophers and theologians like H. Duméry and S. Breton. Together they represent a considerable force in contemporary French Catholic intellectual life. Among the Germans and the English the most notable advocates of the reconsideration of Neoplatonism for the purposes of Christian thinking are W. Beierwaltes and A.H. Armstrong, respectively. It is significant for the history of Thomism not only that these scholars are all Roman Catholics, but also, that some of them, e.g., Fathers Trouillard and Breton and Professor Armstrong, are clearly reacting against Thomism. Thus, Trouillard and Breton, among others, are endeavouring to construct a henology to replace its ontological metaphysics.

Of the various "essentialisms" opposed to the ontology of esse, henology appeared to Thomists to be the most dangerous. It involved for them all the pantheistic and other errors of pagan Neoplatonism and its modern idealist counterparts. It is an extraordinary reversal then to find that immediately with the decline of the official ontological Thomism there is an assertion of henology as a basis for Catholic theology. But more ironic yet, part of the appeal of henology is that it, not Thomism, is now conceived to be exempt from Heidegger's criticism of onto-theo-logy. Both sides accept the same standard; the question is what falls under it. Also henology, which understands the first principle as the One above being seems able to lead men to worship a God, who, as not being, satisfies what is sought in the contemporary phenomenon of Christian atheism.

Further, since what is below the One is self-constituted, henology provides the room which ontology does not for modern freedom. This judgement that the priority of essence threatens freedom is also of course part of contemporary existentialism, but, perhaps it belongs there more to the side of it seen in Sartre than that in Heidegger.
All these considerations give some reason for looking at Thomas' *Summa Theologiae* through the logic of later Neoplatonism. Nothing like a complete treatment is yet possible. Our tools are insufficiently exact for a judgement of the transformations the tradition received in reaching St Thomas. We do not possess, for example, a proper critical text of his commentary on the *De Divinis Nominibus* of the pseudo-Dionysius -- the most authoritative source of the Proclan Neoplatonism for Thomas. (Dionysius' work had a quasi-biblical authority as he was accepted throughout the Middle Ages as a disciple of St Paul. 172 The other main source of this tradition is the *Liber de Causis* which for most of his life had for Aquinas the authority of Aristotle. 173) Nonetheless, contemporary scholarship and contemporary theological concerns make some study both possible and necessary. Before looking directly at this tradition, we must look at Thomas' mediaeval predecessors both to see what is peculiar in the structure he gives his *Summa Theologiae* and to see whether we can locate in them the source of his logic of order.
A portion of this Part of the thesis is published in my article "Aquinas' First Principle: Being or Unity?" Dionysius 4 (1980), 133-172; another portion is to appear as "Pope Leo's Purposes and St Thomas' Platonism," Atti del VIII Congresso Tomistico Internazionale sull'Enciclica "Aeterni Patris" e nel centenario della fondazione dell'Accademia S. Tommaso (held in Rome, September, 1980), ed. A. Piolanti.


"Aeterni Patris," p. x.

Ibid., p. xi.

Ibid., p. xxvii.

Ibid., p. xxiv.

Ibid., p. xv.

Ibid., p. xiv.

Ibid., pp. xiii and xiv.


O. Blanchette, "Philosophy and Theology in Aquinas, On Being a Disciple in our Day," Atti del Congresso Internazionale Tommaso d'Aquino nel suo settimo centenario, 8 vol (Napoli, 1976), IV, 427-431, finds E. Gilson importing a modern rationalist sense of independent philosophy and theology into his understanding of Thomas.
12 F. van Steenberghen, Introduction, p. 56.


14 There is a very extended controversy about the balance of these two aims and whether and how they provide a motive for the Summa contra Gentiles; see A. Gauthier, Introduction, Contra Gentiles (Paris, 1961), I; F. van Steenberghen, La philosophie au Xllle siecle, Philosophes Médévaux, 9 ( Louvain/Paris, 1966), pp. 316-324 and van Riet, "La Somme contra les Gentiles et la polemique islamico-chretienne," Aquinas and the Problems of his Time, Mediaevalia Lovaniensis, 5 (Leuven/The Hague, 1976), pp. 156-160.


16 On this division see E. Mascall, The Openness of Being, Gifford Lectures, 1970-71 (London, 1971) and J. Macquarrie, Twentieth Century Religious Thought: The Frontiers of Philosophy and Theology, 1900-1970 (rev. ed.; London, 1971). Macquarrie makes some useful remarks relating the two Thomisms to other features of twentieth century philosophy, particularly to "realist metaphysics", "kerygmatic theology" and existentialism (pp. 254-56, 279, 288, 392). Other divisions are possible, but they mainly reduce to a distinction between those who treat Thomas historically and those who have primarily a speculative or practical interest. Klaus Kremer, Die Neuplatonische Seinsphilosophie und ihre Wirkung auf Thomas von Aquin, Studien zur Problemgeschichte der Antiken und Mittelalterlichen Philosophie, 1 (Leiden, 1966), p. xxiii, has drawn a line among scholars of mediaeval philosophy between those who, like Baemker, Denifle, Ehrle, Grabmann, Graf von Hertling, Pelster, Geyer, Koch, practise "literar-historische Forschungen" and those who, like Gilson, Geiger, Fabro, Hirschberger, Meyer, "das philosophische Gedankengut mittelalterlicher Werke für uns zum Sprechen zu bringen". The latter suffer from "eine Illusion . . . der philosophische Gedanke in seinem An sich" wären uns unmittelbar zugänglich". F. van Steenberghen, "L'avenir au thomisme," 203 (quoted with approval by Kremer, p. 470) speaks of those for whom "Aristoteles genuit Thomam, Thomas genuit Cajetanum, Cajetanus genuit Ioannem a Sancto Thoma . . ." and who thus place St Thomas "dans une tradition fort étroite, dans laquelle Aristote fait figure de précurseur". This tradition is the "philosophia perennis . . . la philosophie éternelle, la vrai philosophie". This last group is actually set against those who place him in no historical context at all! Both these groups are contrasted to historians like himself and Gilson. (See also his The Philosophical Movement and most
exhaustively Introduction.) But the divisions of Kremer and van Steenbergen fail to satisfy because of the interpenetration of historical return and contemporary practical purpose which characterizes this revival. Thus, Ehrle's literary historical researches produce results necessary to these purposes (cf. n. 13 above) and Gilson is the most distinguished of the historians of mediaeval philosophy.

Of course, there are Thomists whose thought does not fall within these categories, but they are very exceptional. One is Austin Farrer, Finite and Infinite (Westminster, 1943). He distinguishes himself from "the Thomists . . . [who] by their rigid Aristotelianism and their insistence on the possibility of inescapable demonstration make themselves vile in modern eyes", and endeavours to "re-state the Analogy of Being in a credible form" (ibid., p. vi). He engages in an extraordinarily free dialogue with Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Hume, Berkeley -- to give only examples -- and he very evidently takes them seriously. His whole aim is to enable an "apprehension of substantial being" (p. 98), but he is certainly neither a one-sided existentialist nor an essentialist. "Essence without existence is not, and therefore cannot be presupposed as the measure of it; and finite existence without essence is not, and cannot therefore receive the imposition of a measure" (p. 266). Indeed, the only aspect in which he shares the spirit of contemporary Thomism is in his limitation of rational theology:

The knowledge of God to which rational theology leads us . . . is the knowledge of existent perfection conceived through the analogy of spirit, and the knowledge that this Being is the creator of all finite existence. But that is all . . . no sound reason for a belief in Providence is deducible from these premises . . . As with providence, so it is with grace . . . For this knowledge . . . we must turn to the field of particular 'contingent' events . . . Rational theology deals with God and Freedom, but not with Immortality, Providence or Grace, except in considering their mere possibility when the idea of them has come from another quarter (pp. 299-300).

St Thomas himself would certainly include providence and immortality within the philosophical knowledge of God, although it will be important to notice that, unlike Farrer, Gilson, Rahner or the rest, he never produced a work of philosophical -- in the sense of natural -- theology and, unlike Farrer, began rather than ended his theology with the proofs for God's existence.

17 The great master is J. Marechal, Le point de départ de la metaphysique, the five cahiers of which were published between 1922 and 1946 in Belgium and France; cf. D. Bradley, "Transcendental Critique and Realist Metaphysics," The Thomist, 39, 4 (1975), 631-667. K. Rahner, Geist in Welt, zur Metaphysik der endlichen Erkenntnis bei Thomas von Aquin, foreword by J.B. Metz (2d ed.; München, 1957) is translated as Spirit in the World by W. Dych (London, 1968). All references are to the translation. Fr Rahner is the greatest of Marechal's heirs. E. Coreth, Metaphysics, ed. and trans. J. Donceel (New York, 1968) is clearly a reflection on Rahner's developments, but with a greater confidence in ontology and metaphysics. B. Lonergan, Verbum, Word and Idea in Aquinas, ed. D.B. Burrell (Notre Dame, 1969), is an interpretation of Thomas' teaching on the "mental word". It is a series of articles actually written before his own philosophic construction, Insight (New York, 1957). Fr
Lonergan differentiates himself in a number of ways from Rahner and Coreth. See Mascall, Openness, pp. 84 and 89, Donceel's preface to Coreth's Metaphysics, especially p. 12 and Lonergan's "Metaphysics as Horizon" (a review of Coreth) reproduced at the end of Metaphysics. In general, Lonergan sees Coreth as more on the realist and ontological side of the post-Kantian alternatives, whereas Mascall puts Lonergan himself on the idealist side. "Lonergan's own ultimate is not being but intelligence" (Openness, p. 89). All this is considered more fully further on in Part I. The division between transcendental and realist is only relative. Both are in the spirit of what Macquarrie calls the new realism, i.e., the twentieth century's reaction against idealism, its turn toward the objective.

The realists are a host beyond enumeration. Most prominent are E. Gilson (on his realism cf. especially the works listed in n. 23 below) and J. Maritain (see nn. 29 and 30 below). Mons. L. Noël (see n. 22 below); L. de Raeymaeker, "La profonde originalité de la métaphysique de saint Thomas d'Aquin," Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter, Miscellanea Mediaevalia, II, ed. P. Wilpert (Berlin, 1963), pp. 14-29; G. van Riet, L'epistemologie thomiste, Bibl. phil. de Louvain, 3 (Louvain, 1946) and F. van Steenberghen are all realists of the Louvain school. Notable followers of Gilson include A.C. Pegis, The Basic Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas (New York, 1945), outstanding for its anti-Platonism, Summa contra Gentiles -- first published as On the Truth of the Catholic Faith (New York, 1956) -- translation, introduction and notes (Notre Dame/London, 1975); J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics (Toronto, 1951), which is very important as part of the endeavor to establish the supposed difference between Aristotle's teaching and that of Christian metaphysics; A. Maurer, who, in the last pages of St. Thomas and Historicity (Milwaukee, 1979), was still trying to maintain that the true solution to the problem of modern thought is "a radical counter-Copernican revolution" (p. 40). E. Mascall, Existence and Analogy (London, 1949), He Who Is (London, 1943), and The Openness of Being, is explicitly a Gilsonian realist. "For the principle of the primacy of existence over essence and for the view that, while essence is grasped in the concept, existence (esse) is affirmed in a judgement, I was heavily indebted to M. Etienne Gilson" (He Who Is, p. xii). J. Pieper is similarly dependent. In his Introduction to Thomas Aquinas, translation of Einführung zu Thomas von Aquin (London, 1962), he acknowledges the basis of his account in Chenu, Gilson, van Steenberghen (p. ix) and notes that Gilson and Chenu "go beyond mere scholarliness to ask and answer the question of the truth of things" (p. 9). This truth is brought out as follows: "The most marvellous of all the things a being can do is to be. In these words, Gilson most clearly and convincingly elucidates that insight of St. Thomas which I am discussing here" (p. 136). He subsequently reproduces Gilson's account of the history of the doctrine of being (pp. 136-139). Here and in The Silence of St. Thomas, he associates himself with his existentialist account of Thomism. "It can be demonstrated that this common concern of all the Existentialists finds in St. Thomas's teaching both a positive correspondence and a specific corrective" (The Silence, p. 91). "Etienne Gilson, Jacques Maritain, and other French scholars have expressly termed St. Thomas' metaphysics an existential philosophy" (Introduction to Thomas Aquinas, pp. 138-139).
Gilson's realism and that of many other Thomists is usefully compared to Heidegger's position in Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (New York/Evanston, 1962), where despite his opposition to the name (207, p. 51) he adopts a stance very similar to realism and shares the same attitude towards Descartes: 25, p. 46; 40, p. 64; 93, p. 126.


23 See E. Gilson, "Le réalisme methodique," Philosophia Perennis, II, pp. 744-755; idem, Réalisme thomiste et critique de la connaissance (Paris, 1939); the second is a reply to the criticisms of the first. F. van Steenberghen, who follows in Noël's tradition, remains attached to "critical realism" but "safe from Professor Gilson's censures," or so he reports in Epistemology, trans. L. Moonan from the fourth French edition (Louvain/New York, 1970), pp. 9 and 245.


26 Chapter II, D below.


29 Maritain and Gilson write in very different ways. The first is primarily a poetic philosopher; the second writes what is called

Their earlier differences over the critical character of realism and over Christian philosophy were minor. "It is important to avoid here a double-sided danger; one, which consists in accepting, in whatever way and however little, the idealist setting of the critical problem; and here I am in the fullest agreement with M. Gilson; and the other which consists in the refusal of any possibility whatsoever of posing as philosophically soluble the whole critical problem. It is here that I part company with M. Gilson." J. Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, translation of the 2d French edition (London, 1936), p. 87. He is opposed to "abandoning into the hands of the idealists the whole use and possession of the word 'critical' and all it signifies" (ibid., p. 89). He thus finds himself doctrinally in accord with Noël (p. 98). He accepted with Gilson the notion of Christian philosophy (cf. his De la philosophie chrétienne (Paris, 1933), pp. 8-9, 13, 16, 56-7). But he saw no need to divide Thomas from Aristotle in so doing (cf. "Marginal Notes on Aristotle," Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism, translation of La philosophie bergsonienne [New York, 1955], pp. 349-377; also An Introduction to Philosophy [London, 1932], p. 101). J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics represents just the opposite tendency in pure Gilsonians.


31 E. Gilson, Réalisme thomiste, p. 215.


34 Rahner, Spirit in the World, pp. 25-29, especially n. 8, p. 25; Metz, Introduction, Spirit in the World, pp. xliii-xliv. Metz writes (n. 39, p. xliii): "Rahner is very insistent in his rejection of a metaphysical intuition. This rejection is his major correction of the Thomistic or neo-scholastic interpretations." Coreth uses the term "intellectual intuition". For example, Metaphysics, pp. 34-35.
"we are also aware of knowing this object (intellectual intuition). In other words, every instance of sense experience contains elements which transcend that experience." However, he does not use it in the realist but in a "transcendental" sense. No immediate thematic knowledge can be used to found metaphysics. "We do not really start from an immediate evidence, but this evidence itself cannot be demonstrated, except by showing that whatsoever rejects it, affirms it in his very act of rejection. In this sense, we have what Hegel called vermittelte Unmittelbarkeit, a mediated immediacy," p. 35. Rather than founding metaphysics in the objective content of an intellectual intuition, Rahner and Coreth found it in the unthematic or implicit "Vorgriff" by which men are conscious of the "horizon of being". See Donceel's Preface to Coreth, Metaphysics, pp. 11ff. and Mascall, Openness, pp. 68ff.

35 Cf. Lonergan on Gilson above. "This method [of Maréchal, Lotz, Marc] resembles ours, insofar as these authors try to establish metaphysics by demonstrating that the absolute affirmation of being is a condition of every judgement." Coreth, Metaphysics, pp. 46-47. Rahner: "Esse as the In-Itself (Ansich) of the Reality Apprehended in the Judgement. We should not expect a long discussion of this question in Thomas. To him his view seems self-evident . . . " (Spirit in the World, p. 163).

36 At this point, "Esse in Thomas", Rahner cites Marc, de Finance, Gilson, et al. (Spirit in the World, p. 163).

37 M. Jordan, art. cit., p. 2.


39 Ibid., p. 287, citing Gilson, God and Philosophy.

40 This is the language of Coreth and Rahner; the quotation is from Rahner, Spirit in the World, p. 407; cf. Coreth, Metaphysics, p. 35 and pp. 62-63.

41 The quotation is from Coreth, Metaphysics, p. 67. See also ibid., p. 70: "In every act of inquiring or knowing, some being is given which coincides immediately with knowing, which knows itself as being." Also Donceel in his Preface quoting Coreth,"'Metaphysics, as about being' equates with absolutely every being, including the 'subjective pole'. The incarnate inquirer 'is a being, and nothing but a being' " (p. 12). Rahner, Spirit in the World, "Being is the one ground which lets knowing and being-known spring out of itself as its own characteristics . . . Knowing is the subjectivity of being itself. Being is the original unifying unity of being and knowing in their unification in being known " (p. 69).

42 See n.29 above and E. Gilson, "Trois leçons" and Appendix II, L'être et l'essence (2d ed. revue et augmentée; Paris, 1962); C. Fabro, Participation et causalité, p. 636; idem, "Le retour au fondement de l'être," S. Thomas d'Aquin Aujourd'hui, Recherches de
philosophie, 6 (Paris, 1963, pp. 177-193); idem, "Il nuovo problema
dell'essere e la fondazione della metafisica," Commemorative Studies,
II, pp. 423-457; the articles by G. Giannini and C. Moreau in
Sapientia Aquinatis, Communicationes IV Congressus Thomistici Inter-
nationalis (Rome, 1955) and those by T.A. Fay and C. Fabro in Atti
del Congresso Internazionale Tommaso d'Aquino nel suo settimo centenario,
IV, pp. 480-484, 119-128; also E. Coreth, Metaphysics, p. 16.

43 The Peasant, pp. 133-134.


45 Rahner, Spirit: "The ultimate reason for this limitation is to
be sought in the fact that essence is to be conceived as potency
(which implies limitation in itself) with respect to esse, whose
finiteness, as the limitation by essence of what is infinite in it-
self, makes possible the comparison between the scope of various
essential natures" (p. 151). "Thomas knows essences only as the
limiting potency of esse" (p. 160). Coreth, Metaphysics: "Whereas
the act of being is the principle of all positivity in every existent,
its essence is the principle of negativity of limitation" (p. 83).
Mascall, Existence and Analogy: "In finite beings, essence is distinct
from existence, being related to it as the potential to the actual.
In God everything is actual, so everything is existence" (p. 42).

46 S. Thomae de Aquino, Summa Theologiae, editio Piana (Ottawa,
1953), I, 3, 2 ad 3; hereafter abbreviated as ST. The Summa contra
Gentiles is abbreviated as ScG. For Thomas, Platonic separated self-
subsistent forms are appropriate for speech about God.

47 Martin Heidegger, "The Onto-theo-logical Constitution of Meta-
physics," Identity and Difference, translation of Identität und
p. 48


49 Ibid., pp. 70-71.

51 Ibid., p. 227.


53 Ibid., p. 70.

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid., p. 50.


57 Heidegger, "Identity and Difference" in *Identity and Difference*, p. 27.


61 See below, n. 108.

62 See below, n. 119.


64 Ibid.


67 Ibid., p. 19.

68 Ibid., p. 28.

69 Ibid., p. 29.


71 Ibid., pp. 175-176.
72 ST I, 3, 2.
73 Ibid.
74 ST I, 3, 3.
75 Mascall, Existence and Analogy, p. 48.
76 M. Grabmann, Thomas von Aquin (München, 1912), p. 88.
77 M. Jordan, art. cit., p. 15.
78 E. zum Brunn, "La 'méthaphysique de l'Exode' selon Thomas d' Aquin," Dieu et l'Être, p. 252.
79 Mascall, Existence and Analogy, p. 48.
81 E. Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, p. 230.
82 Maritain, The Peasant, p. 143.
83 Mascall, Existence and Analogy, p. 43.
84 Coreth, Metaphysics, p. 85.
85 Ibid., p. 87.
87 Coreth, Metaphysics, p. 87.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid., p. 88.
91 Coreth, Metaphysics, pp. 88-89.
92 Ibid., p. 89
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93 Ibid.


95 Coreth, Metaphysics, p. 89.

96 ST I, 14, 2 ad 1: "ipse est maxime rediens ad essentiam suam et cognoscens seipsum."

97 "Sed illa forma quae non est receptibilis in materia, sed est per se subsistens, ... et huiusmodi forma est Deus." ST I, 3, 2 ad 3.

98 ST I, 14, 5.

99 ST I, 34, 2 ad 4; ST I, 37, 1 ad 4; ST I, 39, 7 ad 2, see Chapter III, D below.

100 ST I, 34, 3 and ST I, 41, 3 ad 4.

101 Coreth, Metaphysics, p. 184.

102 ST I, 3, 1.


104 See In de Div. Nom., V, 1, 634ff. and Sancti Thomae de Aquino, Super Librum de Causis Expositio, ed. H.D. Saffrey, Textus Philosophici Friburgenses 4/5 (Fribourg/Louvain, 1954), Prop. 18; see also Prop. 3 and 12.

105 "Illud igitur cuius sua natura est ipsum eius intelligere, et cui id quod naturaliter habet, non determinatur ab alio, hoc est quod obtinet summum gradum vitae. Tale autem est Deus. Unde in Deo maxime est vita. Unde Philosophus in XII Metaphysica, ostensio quod Deus sit intelligens, concludit quod habeat vitam perfectissimam et sempiternam, quia intellectus eius est perfectissimus et semper in actu." ST I, 18, 3.


107 Ibid., p. 185.

108 We have already considered several points of common ground between Rahner and Coreth: the contact with being in judgement, the doctrine of esse, the limiting potency of essentia, their common endeavour to deal with certain problems for metaphysics posed by
Heidegger (and one can add, by Kant), the attempt to avoid the \( \text{wennnoch} \), the recognition that classical metaphysics is subject to Heidegger's critique, the attempt to escape it through what they think to be Thomas' doctrine of \( \text{esse} \). There is also the crucial difference over the onto-theo- logical possibility for metaphysics. What is also worth noting is that the very method of Coreth's argument rises out of the development of ideas present already in Rahner. Crucially, "The point of departure: the Metaphysical Question" (Rahner, Spirit, p. 57), which Coreth turns into the question about metaphysics. There is also between them a common teaching that every question involves the known as well as the unknown. "Every question is evoked by an antecedent summons from what is questioned, which as conscious (although not reflexively known, or although not even knowable reflexively) and as known (although not explicitly known, or although not even knowable explicitly) is present in the question itself" (ibid., p. 68). Being is, for both, the unity of the subject and the object of knowing (ibid., p. 69). They both have a quasi-Cartesian recognition of the finitude of the questioner shown in the fact that he doubts or questions: "the being that must ask is non-being, is deficient in its innermost ground of being" (ibid., p. 72). There is also a denial of the \( \text{wennnoch} \) in Rahner: "It is not a question of bridging a gap, but of understanding how the gap is possible at all" (ibid., p. 75). They both teach the pre-apprehension of being as opposed to its intellectual intuition. Finally, they commonly criticise Kant because in him the form and content of knowing and questioning remain divided. Their common endeavour to overcome this division is perhaps what is crucial to their method.

109 ST I, 14, articles 5ff.

110 See p. 10 above.

111 Scholarship subsequent to Rahner's Spirit in the World makes his separation of metaphysics, as the science of being, from sacred doctrine, as the science which has God for its subject, untenable as a representation of Thomas' teaching. For example, there are the articles by R.D. Crouse (cf. n.27 above); J.H. Walgrave, "The Use of Philosophy in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas," Aquinas and the Problems of His Time, pp. 161-193; A. Patfoort, "Théorie de la théologie ou réflexion sur le corpus des Écritures?", Angelicum, 54 (1977), 459-488; L. Ducharme, "L'idée de la métaphysique dans les écrits du premier enseignement parisien de saint Thomas d'Aquin," Colloque commemorative saint Thomas d'Aquin, Église et théologie, 5, 2 (1974), pp. 155-169; C. Stroick, "Commentaire: La métaphysique de s. Thomas", ibid., pp. 171-188.

Crouse writes:

It is usual to think of philosophia ancilla theologiae as specifying the relationship between natural and revealed knowledge, as in the Philonic-Patristic tradition. It is therefore important to emphasize that for St. Thomas and St. Albert, that is not the primary reference of the concept; for them it refers rather to the relationship which obtains between the particular philosophical sciences and theology, whether theology takes the form of metaphysics, or the form which it has in sacred doctrine, deriving its principles from revelation. Theologia, for these doctors,
though double in form, is radically one . . . but because the modes are two, the question necessarily arises as to the relationship between these modes, and once again the concept of philosophia ancilla theologiae comes into consideration . . . the hierarchical order of the two forms is worked out in terms of the principle . . . with reference to the same Aristotelian texts employed elsewhere to specify the relationship between the particular philosophical sciences and metaphysics, thus apparently suggesting that the relationship here is similar ("St. Thomas, St. Albert, Aristotle: Philosophia ancilla theologiae", pp. 182-183).

As nature is both presupposed by and perfected by grace so metaphysics is both presupposed by and perfected in sacred doctrine (ibid., p. 185).

Ducharme finds Thomas both affirming and denying that metaphysics has God as its subject (p. 161). He concludes that "saint Thomas décrit surtout la métaphysique comme science divine, théologie des philosophes" (p. 168) but is ambiguous about whether God is its subject because God is both the subject, and principle of the subject (when this is expressed as 'being qua being').

In Rahner, these are detached:

But the relationship of these two "objects" of metaphysics is defined in Thomas in such a way that Absolute Being as such is really not its object (subjectum) at all . . . He is thus only in the word of His revelation. Metaphysics reaches God only as the ground (principium) of its object, common being, and it is essentially impossible for it then to make the ground so reached another "object" in a discipline of its own . . . Every natural theology . . . as a special discipline is, therefore, a repetition of general ontology or a usurpation of what can be possible only in a theology of sacred Scripture (Spirit, pp. 388-389).

There is in Thomas no difficulty about a principle becoming an object of science. This is indeed usual, e.g., "sicut musica credit principia tradita sibi ab arithmetico, ita, doctrina sacra credit principia revelata sibi a Deo, ST I, 2, 1. Of course the real problem is whether the same science can have the same things both as principles and as subject. But even the controversial texts affirm this.

Crucial texts are his commentaries on Boethius, De Trinitate II, 2; V, 4; and on Aristotle, Metaphysics; S. Thomae Aquinatis, In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio (Taurini/ Romae, 1964), and the Summa contra Gentiles: Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, Summa contra Gentiles, Opera Omnia (Leonine), XIII-XV (Romae, 1918-1930), III, 25 and IV, 1. In Boethii de Trin. V, 4 is usually cited by those who would divide the two theologies. In fact it teaches that they meet. The divine is able to be treated in two ways: "res divinae, quia sunt principia omnium entium et sunt nihilominus in se naturae completae dupliciter tractari possunt . . ." They are not just abstract principles, but things in themselves. Yet, the two ways of looking at separate substances start at opposite points. "Per lumen naturalis rationis pervenire non possimus in ea nisi secundum quod in ea per effectus ducimur." We arrive at God but do not start with him, and, thus being, as our beginning, is the formal subject of the science. The other theology has not this limitation. "Est autem alius modus cognoscendi huiusmodi res, non secundum quod per effectus manifestetur, sed secundum quod ipsae seipsas manifestant." It therefore begins with Deus as its subjectum.
In a particular science there would be a difficulty about the principles becoming themselves subjects (or objects), i.e., something treated by the science. Metaphysics, theological science in its philosophical aspect, is not however a particular science. This is not only due to the generality of its subject, *commune ens*, but because it treats its own principles. Indeed, because it is also the science of principles, it is theology!

Part of the argument of this thesis is that Thomas' theology is a circle in which the movement of human knowledge from creatures joins the movement from God's revelation of himself. A weakness of Thomas' system is his failure to recognize that this movement from the first principle is also a natural movement of the mind. In general, it is the Neoplatonic movement. It is not a motion possible only by grace. But a fundamental integrity is present in Thomas' thought because philosophy is not involved in a vicious circle of always treating its objects by principles known elsewhere and assumed by it. First philosophy turns its eyes upon the per se nota which it arrives at through effects -- effects being just what are known through another. "Philosophus primus . . . probat . . . peraliqua principia per se nota. Et sic non est aliquid circulus in diffinitione" (In de Trin. V, 1 ad 9). These "naturae completae", which are "in se res quaedam" (ibid., V, 4) are able to be given a kind of demonstration: "cum per eos effectos pervenimus ad cognitionem causarum primarum, . . . ex quibus probabantur demonstratione quia." Just as demonstration "propter quid" derives from them (ibid., V, 1 ad 9). In contrast, Rahner speaks as if we have at this point only an "intuition* of concepts" (Spirit in the World, p. 26).

Thus, also his difference from Aquinas on the role of angels.

"The essentially 'incidental' character of Christian angelology has been well brought out by K. Rahner" (K. Foster, in St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, IX [Blackfriars, 1968], p. 302). But Thomas says: "necesse est ponere, ad hoc quod universum sit perfectum, quod sit aliqua incorporea creatura" (ST I, 50, 1). The deduction here is from the divine nature as known: "Deus . . . producit per intellectum et voluntatem" (ibid.). The angelic nature is not for the sake of what is below it but exists for its own part in God's glory (ST I, 50, 3). In this perspective the universe must be a much more angelic than a human place both numerically and qualitatively (ibid. and I, 50, 4 ad 3). Separate substances are not, as in Rahner's theological anthropology, mere abstractions.

At root the unity of Thomas' thought stems from the unity of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* -- as Crouse argues above. It depends on the unity in that work of the science of being as being and the science of separate substances, i.e., on metaphysics being onto-theology. One knows, of course, that modern scholarship denies this unity, e.g., W. Jaeger, *Aristoteles: Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung* (Berlin, 1923). But this is not Aquinas' view:

*Secundum igitur tria praedicta, ea quibus perfectio huus scientia attenditur, sortitur tria nomina.*


These separate substances do actually become objects of knowledge in this science: "... secundum sententiam Aristotelis manus intellectus potest pertingere ad intelligendum substantias simplices" (ibid., IX, 11, 1916). "Cum haec scientia sit de premis causis et
principiis oportet quod sit de Deo" (ibid., I, 3, 64).

Patet . . . quae sit natura huius scientiae, quia est speculativa libera, non humana sed divina; et quae est eius intentio, qua oportet habere quaestionem et totam hanc artem. Intendit enim circa primas et universales rerum causas, de quibus etiam inquirit et determinat. Et propter harum cognitionem ad praedictum terminum pervenit, ut scilicet non admiretur cognitis causis (ibid., I, 3, 68).

112 ST I, 39, 1; cf. also I, 42, 1.


114 ST I, 2, 2 ad 2; also I, 1, 7 ad 1.

115 ScG IV, 1: "Quia vero naturalis ratio per creaturas in Dei cognitionem ascendit, fidei vero cognitio a Deo in nos e converso divina revelatione descendit; est autem eadem via ascensus et descensus." Cf. n.111 above.

116 ST I, 1, 5 ad 2.

117 ST I, 1, 7.

118 ST I, 2, prolo.


120 Ibid., p. 283.

121 Ibid., p. 407.

122 Ibid., p. 408.

123 Ibid. J.B. Metz, a student of Rahner's, brings out the practical (as well as further theological) consequences of this Marxist turn. See his foreword to Spirit in the World, pp. xliii, xliv, liii, and his Christliche Anthropozentrik, Ueber die Denkform des Thomas von Aquin (München, 1962) and Zur Theologie der Welt (Mainz und München, 1968).


125 Theological examples are supplied by Gilson, ibid., pp. 685ff. The labour of M.D. Chenu, in Toward Understanding St. Thomas, revised translation of Introduction à l'étude de saint Thomas d'Aquin, Université de Montréal, Publications de l'Institut d'études médiévales, 9 (Montréal/Paris, 1950; Chicago, 1964), pp. 305ff. and "Création et

126 It is Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit which are being opposed here.


129 "Rahner's Spirit," p. 172. Also, "the philosophy of religion developed in Hearers of the Word has been described as a 'Thomistic dialogue' with Heidegger. The metaphor can be extended to include against the background of Kant, a quartet of speakers: Rahner, Heidegger, St. Thomas and Hegel." D. Bradley, "Religious Faith and the Mediation of Being: The Hegelian Dilemma in Rahner's Hearers of the Word," The Modern Schoolman 55 (1978),128.

130 "Rahner's Spirit," n.29, p. 173.

131 Ibid., p. 173.

132 Ibid., n.38, pp. 175-176.


134 Ibid.


136 Gilson's complaint is that authentic Thomism has been so little taught that no one knows its real power. Suarez had a version for the Jesuits (on its faults cf. L'être et l'essence, chap. V). Cajetan is more Aristotelian than Thomas (cf. History of Christian Phil., p. 800); his rendering is what the Dominicans transmit. This is Gilson's account in "Trois leçons", p. 685ff. He recommends Baez in History, p. 707 and L'être et l'essence, p. 356. For a useful survey of part of the history of Thomas' doctrine of being, see L. Kennedy, "Thomism at the University of Salamanca in the Sixteenth Century: the doctrine of existence," Atti del Congresso Internazionale Tommaso d'Aquino nel suo settimo centenario, I, pp. 254-258.


139 Ibid., p. 215.

Ibid., p. 60; Fr Lonergan is quoting *De Veritate*, q. 10, a. 1.

Ibid., p. 71.

Ibid., p. 72.

Ibid., p. 88.


Ibid., 202 p. 246.

Verbum, pp. 133-134.


Ibid., p. 636.

Ibid., p. 445.

Ibid.


Ibid., pp. 86-87.

Ibid., p. 5.

Ibid., p. 189.

Ibid., p. 194.

Ibid., p. 188 and n. 143 above.

Ibid., p. 219.


Some important writings of Père Trouillard include La procession platonienne (Paris, 1955); "L'Ame du Timée et l'Un de Parmenide," Rev. inter. de phil., 92, 2 (1970); L'Un et l'Ame selon Proclus (Paris, 1972); "Théologie negative et autoconstitution psychique chez les néoplatoniciens," Savoir, faire, espérer, hommage à Mgr Henri Van Camp (Bruxelles, 1976), pp. 307-321. The work of this school can be seen in Études néoplatoniennes (Neuchâtel, 1973) which he edited with others. A partial bibliography and consideration of the significance of his early work can be found in A. Charles, "La raison et le divin chez Proclus," Rev. sc. ph. th., 53 (1969), 458-482.


Pierre Hadot, Porphyre et Victorinus, 2 vol., Études augustiniennes (Paris, 1968) is fundamental for establishing the tradition of Porphyry. Many of his articles are referred to below.


See W. Beierwaltes, *Proclus: Grundzüge seiner Metaphysik* (Frankfurt am Main, 1965) and *Identität und Differenz* (Frankfurt am Main, 1980).


it is Pseudo-Dionysius and not Aquinas who radically goes beyond the essentialist way of thinking being. For in my view a radical overcoming of essentialist metaphysics requires not only that essence be subordinated to esse ... such an overcoming requires that esse not be thought as a being or as subsisting in itself (p. 126). Aquinas ... uses the essentialistic language and constantly makes crucial distinctions based on such language. Thus while one needs to depart considerably from traditional interpretations of Pseudo-Dionysius to comprehend his understanding of being, it seems one must engage in an Heideggerian retrieve of monumental proportions to get Aquinas to say that esse is not an ens, and is to be not thought as per se subsistens (pp. 128-129). The Thomism of Coreth and Rahner is such a monumental Heideggerian retrieve.


See H.D. Saffrey, "L'état actuel", p. 277:

On voit que ... le Liber est officiellement rattaché à la Métaphysique d'Aristote, et dans la charte du 19 mars 1255, qui règle le statut de la faculté des Arts à Paris, nous trouvons inscrit parmi les œuvres d'Aristote comme texte à lire officiellement, le Liber.
It was only in his exposition of the work, his last commentary that he reveals his knowledge of its Arab and Proclan sources:

in arabico inventur hic liber qui apud Latinos De causis dicitur, quem constat de arabico esse translatum et in graeco penitus non haberi; unde videtur ab aliquo philosophorum arabum excerptus.

In de Causis, proemium, p. 3, 5-8.

Part II: Sources for the Structure of the *de deo* of the *Summa Theologiae*

A

The *Sentences* of Peter Lombard

Part of the justification given the *Summa Theologiae* in its prologus is that the necessities of theological teaching cannot be adequately provided when the teacher of catholic truth must follow the order which expositing another book requires. Besides the Bible, the book whose order dominated the teaching of theology in the High Middle Ages and beyond, was the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard. The discovery of what alteration of the traditional order of High Scholastic theology St Thomas thought necessary so that it might conform to the "*ordo disciplinae*"¹ and be carried forward "*secundum quod materia patietur*"² requires a comparison of the structure of these two works.

The *Sentences* had been explicitly recommended by the Lateran Council in 1215 and, from about 1230, it was the official text-book for theological instruction. It maintained this position even beyond the Middle Ages.³ Indeed, though scholars, and its own prologue, suggest that Thomas intended the *Summa Theologiae* "to take the place of Lombard's *Sentences* as an elementary introduction to dogmatics for divinity students",⁴ it had no such success in the Middle Ages. Thomas' *Summa* was more used than his own *Commentary on the Sentences*,⁵ but it remained an experiment which did not gain authority outside a limited school.⁶ It may be that his designating the *Summa* for "incipientes" implies that his *Sentences* commentary continued to be for him proper magisterial theology but this is made more doubtful by the discovery that his supposed second version of that commentary was only the work of a disciple.⁷ The alterations
in the *Summa* to the order of theology fixed by the *Sentences* are so closely bound up with Thomas' own doctrine that it seems hard to believe that he would ever want to write another *Sentences* theology.

The popularity of the *Sentences* stems in part from its limitations as theology. It is a text-book -- a collection of texts. A great deal of room is left for the commentator to develop his own thought:

> there is very little or hardly any metaphysics, the philosophical data are fragmentary or badly assimilated, there are frequent (and often intentional) cases of indecision in thought. But the exposition . . . is rich in content for the period, and assembles its materials in a relatively brief and convenient organic whole . . . [There is an] absence of long drawn out digressions, [it] goes forward accurately, is clear in its plan, alert to dialectical discussions, careful in noting all opinions, sufficiently impersonal to give free play to comment by other teachers, and rigorously orthodox. 9

The development of both lectio, or exposition, and quaestio as techniques of commentary increased the freedom for the expositor implicit in the character of the work. But, despite Thomas' relation to Lombard having been mediated by Alexander, or his contemporary who produced the organizing "distinctions", and Bonaventure, his *Commentary* was still confined by certain features of the Lombard's structure.

Thomas analyses the structure of the *Sentences* accurately. There are two fundamental divisions. The first is into things, "res", and signs, "signa". The last of the four books is about signs, the earlier, things. These three books are again divided. The first, "de mysterio Trinitatis" concerns things to be enjoyed, "frui"; the second, "de rerum creatione et formatione corporalium et spiritualium et aliis pluribus eis pertinentibus" is of things to be used, "uti". Book Three, "de incarnatione Verbi, aliisque ad hoc spectantibus" is of those things which order the useful to the
enjoyable. Book Four is entitled "de sacramentis et signis sacramentalibus". According to Thomas the first three books have an exitus-reditus structure; the exit is described in the first two, the return in the third.  

The Summa Theologiae gathers Books One and Two of the Sentences into the Prima Pars, which considers God and his works. The Secunda Pars organizes around man all the virtues and vices scattered through the books of the Sentences. The Tertia Pars combines Books Three and Four by treating Christ, his sacraments and our end. In addition to the reorganization of the virtues and vices around man as free and the source of his own works in the Second Part, and the founding of the sacraments and our way to our end in Christ by regrouping the material of Books Three and Four into Part Three beginning with our Saviour, Thomas makes important alterations to the first book. He divides what in Peter Lombard is the "de mysterio Trinitatis" into a de deo uno and a de deo trino and begins divinity with the unity. Then he moves the operations of God from their place in Lombard at the end of Book One to a new position between the substance of God and the three persons.

Peter Lombard's material is largely drawn from Augustine and his explicit principles of organization are derived from him as well. Thomas' structural transformations depend upon principles outside Augustine's world. The change of the definition of the subject of theology from res et signa to God -- on which the simplification of the Summa is based -- is, in part, a move toward Aristotelian science. The division of the de deo comes to Thomas through Dionysius and is Proclan in its philosophical origins. The step by step development from the unity of substance through the conceptual division of the operations to the real relation and opposition of the persons also has a late Neoplatonic logic behind it. The
anthropology on which the Secunda Pars is founded is from this source and the Greek Fathers, and the Christology of the Tertia Pars has similarly drawn on later Greek patristic and philosophical sources.  

The shift from the psychological categories of Lombard in making God the centre of theology as its object seems to depend on a genuine move by Thomas in the direction of Aristotelian science. An Augustinian source is precluded and such a view does not come from the Proclan Neoplatonism of the Liber de Causis nor of Dionysius. God is certainly one of the subjects of the science, which for Aristotle is alternatively called metaphysics, first philosophy or theology, and this is how the Philosopher is understood by Aquinas. Paradoxically, it is the movement toward Aristotle which allows Thomas to imitate Proclus and embrace the whole course of reality within theology's exitus-reditus framework. Whereas, by Thomas' account, only the material belonging to res in Lombard's scheme could be given such a structure, the whole course of theology falls within it in his own Summa.

All things are treated in sacred doctrine with reference to God for its matter is either God himself or what is ordered to God as its principle and end. From whence it follows that God truly is the subject of this science.

What is remarkable is both the lateness of this development for Christian theology and the mixing of Aristotelian and Neoplatonic logics in this solution. The division of the de deo we must consider later but a word is appropriate here about the interposing of the operations between the substance of God and the Trinity so as to lead the mind step by step from the unity of God to the divisions which lie within, and then without, his essence. The treatment of unity and Trinity in the first book of the Sentences is mixed. This seemed unsatis-
factory to even early followers of the Lombard and to those usually called Augustinians who remained as faithful as possible to him. Thomas understands that in such an arrangement the purpose of placing the operations of knowing, power and will at the end of the treatise is to provide a transition to the procession of creatures. But the logic of Thomas requires from his earliest works a different order:

his approach . . . consists in three simple steps, moving out from the oneness of the divine essence, to the plurality of the rationally distinct attributes, and finally to the plurality of the really distinct persons.

And indeed, in a revision of the Sentences' commentary he introduces such an order into the structure of his consideration of one of the "distinctions". As we shall see, placing the operations before the procession of persons and creatures enables a rational link to be made between the unity and the Trinity. The persons are understood through the internal activities of knowing and willing and the procession to creatures through the activity ad extra of power. The three operations and the three persons are related by a Proclan triad. This connection was not accomplished in the Summa contra Gentiles either and the treatment of the Trinity there, separated by the entire remainder of the work from the de deo uno, is much more scriptural in its argumentation than the Summa Theologiae's consideration. The "missionary" purposes of the contra Gentiles compel this as it is Thomas' scheme to go through the whole material accessible to reason before touching on what is only available to faith. Consequently, it is only in the Summa Theologiae and the Compendium Theologiae that this logic is able to be carried through structurally. These considerations must make impossible the view that Thomas' thinking becomes less Dionysian after the Commentary on the Sentences.

Only after it the full implications for theology of a gradual exitus
and a complete \textit{reditus} of reality from and to God are able to be developed in form and content.

The anthropocentrism of Thomas which permits the organization of the whole \textit{Secunda Pars} around man as free and source of his own works stands in opposition to the more pessimistic Augustinian account of man in Lombard. Augustine,\textsuperscript{43} Gregory the Great,\textsuperscript{44} Boethius,\textsuperscript{45} Anselm\textsuperscript{46} and Peter Lombard\textsuperscript{47} all hold a view of man which is incompatible with the anthropocentrism of Thomas,\textsuperscript{48} and the tradition in western theology stemming from Eriugena.\textsuperscript{49} The followers of Augustine maintain that man makes up the number of the angels which fell with Satan. In Anselm and Gregory this is indeed said to be the reason for his creation. The cause for this shift in the understanding of man we must consider later, but it is part of the move from the inward turning Augustinian spirituality to the much more affirmative attitude to the sensible world found in the Proclan-Dionysian psychology and picked up in the west by Eriugena, his twelfth century followers like Honorius Augustodunensis\textsuperscript{50} and St Thomas. St Thomas understands a statement deriving from Proclus in the \textit{Liber de Causis} so as to see man as the crux of the universe, the line linking spirit and matter,\textsuperscript{51} but, in fact, the dominant influence here is from the Greek Fathers.\textsuperscript{52} In Proclus, man is at the end of theology not in its midst.\textsuperscript{53}

If man in his independence, freedom and sin provides the middle of the Thomist theology, such a being can be reunited to its source, and such a theology can be made complete only through what unites God and man.\textsuperscript{54} Christ forms the basis of the \textit{Tertia Pars}, joining what in the \textit{Sentences} is divided between two books. He enables the \textit{reditus} and thus allows God to be the subject of the whole work as both principle and end. Such a view of the relation of the Third Part to the \textit{Summa} as a whole is opposed to M.-D. Chenu's
view, referred to above, that there are two returns in the work, a natural one in the Secunda Pars, and one through gracious history:

The transition from Ila Pars to the Ilia Pars is a passage from the order of the necessary to the order of the historical, from an account of structures to the actual story of God's gifts. 56

Two difficulties attend this position. First, it depends upon an opposition of the historical and the necessary which is not Thomas'. Thomas is eager, like the ancients generally, to resolve the contingent into the essential -- he is not an existentialist.

For the Greek, the question of salvation was primarily a question of knowledge, but it is not possible to have true knowledge of what is transient in history, only of what is permanent and unchanging. Thomas's starting point is essentially the same: everything in salvation depends on revelation, but revelation is conceived as the giving of an otherwise inaccessible knowledge of God. We can indeed, says Thomas, have a knowledge, scientia, de rebus mobilibus . . ., but only on the assumption that we are aware of the immovable order that is presupposed by all motion and change and know how to refer such motion and change to aliquid immobile. 57

Second, there is nothing optional about the so-called second return. There is no return in sacred doctrine without it. The very first article of the first question makes clear that a teaching based on revelation is necessary because "man is ordered to God as to an end which exceeds the rational understanding." 58 The man of Thomas' Secunda Pars "has freedom and a power over his own works", 59 but he is also fallen, and certainly this power cannot bring him to God his end. 60 Over and again Christ is called the via. 61 The whole argument is assimilated to the logic of exitus et reditus and it is to the tradition which transmits this logic to Thomas that we must be alert.
Part II

B

The Monologion and the Proslogion of St Anselm

The examination of the structure of Peter Lombard's "Augustinian breviary" has disclosed the movement of Thomas' thought beyond Augustine in both an Aristotelian and a Neoplatonic direction. Our investigation of the sources of the structure of the Summa Theologiae again and again involves a question of the relation to Augustine. We turn now to inquire into the significance of Aquinas' reversal of the order of Augustine's De Trinitate in his Summa Theologiae and its relation to Anselm's Monologion which has appeared to some as the inspiration in this process. This reversal can be seen in the alteration of the position of the psychological image of the Trinity by Anselm and Aquinas as against Augustine. Two preliminary questions arise: first, the relation of the Proslogion to the Monologion, since the former is more evidently influential on Thomas, and second, how Anselm's two works are related to Augustine's De Trinitate.

The Monologion and the Proslogion share certain basic structures. They both begin with a prologue; proofs, or a proof, of God's existence, follow. The Proslogion inserts between these a prayerful dialogue on knowing and enjoying God which is a prayer for, a questioning of and an exhortation to fallen man. Then comes a treatment of God's attributes which are primarily derived from the idea of his perfection and which does not generally move outside the content of Thomas' de deo uno, though Anselm's treatise is not structured exactly like Thomas' nor is it as exhaustive as his. Then there is a treatment of the Trinity of persons and finally a consideration of the Three and One as man's salus. The two books share also a dialectical character apparently derived from Aristotle's logical works.
The works also differ in important respects. The Proslogion is more ecstatic, prayerful, mystical than the Monologion. Whereas the Monologion develops the idea of God primarily through the contrast and positive relation of creatures to the supreme perfection, the prime contrast in the Proslogion is between God and fallen man. This coheres with the character of proof in the Proslogion. For, given that anyone who understands the idea of God must know him to exist and exist necessarily, the question is first why (end of Chapter III) and then how (Chapter IV) anyone can say what he cannot think. The movement in the Monologion's proofs is from various perceived and distinguished degrees of goodness, greatness, existence and value to the nature, supremely good and great, the supreme being and subsistence, by participation in which creatures have whatever being and goodness they possess. On the other hand, the proof in the Proslogion is from an idea of God to his necessary existence. Clearly, the greater concern with human subjectivity in the Proslogion than in the Monologion is related to the difference in their ways of rising to (or proving the existence of) God. But the differences between the proofs stem from the fact that "the Proslogion is actually a continuation of the Monologion." Anselm is dissatisfied with the concatenation of the proofs in the Monologion. He seeks an argument which accords better with the nature of the object of the proof: to establish the existence of a "sovereign good that has no need of any other" he sought a proof worthy of its object and in its image "a single argument which to be proven needs nothing but itself alone". Because the Proslogion is an advance upon and in a way assumes the Monologion, and precisely because it strives for a greater simplicity, both in its proof and the subsequent argument cohering with it, the later work eliminates a great deal of what is found in the earlier.
 Crucially, although the Trinity is introduced at about the same point in the two, there is no real attempt to demonstrate it in the Proslogion.\textsuperscript{72} This lack of any complete deduction of the Trinity, or indeed of any extensive treatment of it -- the Proslogion has one chapter, the Monologion about thirty-five or half the work -- makes the earlier work the one more suitably compared with the Summa. Because the Monologion's deduction of the Trinity from Augustine's psychological triad of memory, understanding and love as characteristic of Spirit is so abbreviated in the Proslogion, the section following this treatment of the Trinity in the Monologion has gone. For it concerned how the Trinity can in some measure be understood on account of its image in the soul. The Proslogion goes on directly to the conclusion common to both works, the beatitude of man found in the knowledge and possession of the Trinity. Certain doctrinal preoccupations of the Monologion also disappear: notably the problem of the reality of nothingness, and the question as to whether in any sense God generates himself.\textsuperscript{73} Finally the dialectical style in the two works is somewhat different. Whereas in the Monologion, Anselm often arrives at the contradiction to be solved by pursuing two different "necessary reasons",\textsuperscript{74} in the Proslogion, he tends to begin with the problem, the opposition ready made.\textsuperscript{75} No doubt, this difference proceeds from the greater tightness and simplicity aimed for in the second work.

The Proslogion follows on the Monologion, its character transformed and simplified to cohere with its different form of the proof of God's existence. The self-conscious source of the Monologion is Augustine's \textit{De Trinitate}.

If it should seem to anyone that in this little work I have put forward anything which is too novel or departs from the truth, I ask him not to immediately denounce me as presumptuously novel or as a maintainer of error, but let him
first read diligently the books *On the Trinity* of the previously mentioned doctor Augustine, then according to these let him judge my book. 76

On the basis of these considerations, it should suffice to compare the *Summa Theologiae* with the *Monologion* alone and both with the *De Trinitate*.

The movement from faith to understanding which structures the *De Trinitate*, not only involves a thinking of how Father, Son and Spirit are one God, but also a process by which the mind knowing the Trinity is "united with its illuminating source" and so comes to "see itself solely as memoria Dei, intellectus Dei, voluntas Dei, that is, to see itself as precisely nothing other than imago Trinitatis." 77 By this the mind returns to itself in its source through its experience in the outer world and the visible Word. Because this experience is absolutely necessary for the return, the beginning must be in faith and the exterior Word, the proper order for this characteristically Plotinian spiritual motion of return is determined. 78 The consequence is that the consideration of the trinitarian image in the soul can occur only in the last of the three parts of the work. The order in Thomas' *Summa Theologiae* and Anselm's *Monologion* has turned this upside down. Despite sharing with Boethius and Anselm a professed dependence on Augustine, 79 Thomas and Anselm, like Boethius, follow an order "per rationes" which is the opposite of Augustine's "per auctoritates et per rationes". 80

In Anselm and Thomas this "rational" theological order begins from the unity or goodness of God, 81 and moves from that to the plurality of attributes and persons, and Thomas agrees with Anselm in moving from the knowledge and love of God to the treatment of the persons. As a result, Thomas' argument is able to proceed from God's esse to his operations of knowledge, will and power. Knowledge and
will, the intrinsic operations, determine that the processions in God are, and can only be, those of Word and love. They produce the divine relations and the relations the persons. The extrinsic operation, power, is the ground of the divine emanation into creatures. Anselm's Monologion uses the trinitarian image of the soul twice; once, as the structure of Spirit itself from which the Trinity can be demonstrated, then again, with Augustine, after the Trinity has been demonstrated, in order to judge how much we can understand it and to show how it is our beatitude. It is the first use which concerns us; for, although Anselm begins by showing the existence of the Word in God from the fact of creation, he later maintains that the supreme spirit would have this character whether or not anything were created. This seems to correspond with Thomas' movement from the pure spirituality of God's being, that is his immateriality, to his knowing and thus to his willing, from whence, as Word and love, the persons are derived. The common order of the two arguments and the rational necessity with which Thomas' argument proceeds has persuaded some that, despite his protests to the contrary, Thomas, "haunted" by Anselm's procedure by reason alone, is at least unconsciously imitating him.

This by no means follows. Aquinas pushes more strongly than many of his mediaeval predecessors the arguments which show why the Trinity cannot be produced by philosophical reason. To proceed in sacred doctrine from natural reason to faith would violate a first principle of his theological method, i.e., that in theology the articles of faith are the premises, not the conclusions, of the argument. Further, there is no need for the order of theological argument to follow the order by which a doctrine is discovered (via disciplinae is not via inventionis) but rather theology can be made intelligible in precisely the reverse order. Consequently, there is
no reason to disbelieve Thomas' explicit denials that he is deducing the Trinity by natural reason because of the order in which matters appear. But what is the reason of his ordering?

Answering this question has been greatly hindered by viewing Thomas as an Aristotelian. Despite the fact that with equal lack of reason Augustine's trinitarian theology has been called Aristotelian Latin in contrast to Greek Platonist, Anselm and Aquinas are also set against Augustine at this point as Aristotelians. Apparently to proceed by such deductions as they are supposed to employ here provides the justification for this categorization. If, in fact, the structure and order of Thomas' questions are examined directly, the principles turn out to be Neoplatonic from beginning to end.

Thomas himself acknowledges the source of his conception of theological order as Boethius' *De Trinitate*, and, as we shall see, his understanding of the logic of Boethius' treatises finds in them Proclan forms of thought rather than the Plotinian forms of Augustine. He is explicit that Dionysius teaches that the *de deo uno* should be separated from the *de deo trino* and he finds in Boethius that the procession of creatures follows that of the persons. Augustine's *De Trinitate* -- and Aristotle's *Metaphysics* -- are moving in the opposite direction, toward the principle. Further the order of attributes treated under the substance of God (simplicity, goodness, infinity, immutability, aeternity from whence we arrive again at unity) is to be derived from the Iamblichan-Proclan tradition known to him, at this point, in the *Divine Names* of Dionysius and the *Liber de Causis*. The distinction between *esse* and operations in the form he uses it has a similar source and he gives the *Liber de Causis* as the authority for his use of the notion
of the *redire ad seipsum*. This idea, so important in Proclus, structures being itself for Thomas, thus enabling the questions on God's *esse* to be bound together. That God knows himself is able to be deduced from his being and his will as self-love from his knowledge. It also binds the operations to the substance; being returns to itself through them. This common form ties the operations and persons together. The movement from knowledge through will to power is a movement towards the external but beatitude belongs to intellectual life; the Spirit as love is a kind of unity of the Father and his distinct Word. There is a similar form for the divine *esse*, operations, and persons and the treatises in which they are considered. Finally, as we have seen, exit and return provides the notion by which the procession into creatures and redemption are related to the idea of God himself -- creatures return to God through man and man through Christ. All this we must attempt to establish below in Part III. It is introduced at this point in order to make clear that Aquinas' principles of structure are neither from Augustine or Aristotle and that what is common between Aquinas and Anselm has not likely been derived from the saint of Canterbury.

But what may we conclude from this analysis? First, that in the treatment of God in Aquinas and in Augustine's *De Trinitate* we have two Neoplatonic structures. Augustine's involves primarily the return into unity of a soul which has necessarily had to go out into the external world, where faith operates, so that its principle could speak to it and draw it back into unity with itself. In the other, theological method proper is identified with beginning from the inner being of that principle as it comes toward us. Neither the philosophical nor the theological structures are fundamentally different, no greater than say the difference between Plotinus and Proclus, although in Thomas' case the interest in structure appears
to be greater and the structural devices are more elaborated and complex. Second, Anselm's rationes necessariae have not been shown to haunt Aquinas. He is acquainted with Anselm's argument but gives no evidence of being particularly interested in it and his own theology seems to have a structure in no way dependent upon it. Anselm's argument can be looked at either in an Augustinian or a Dionysian-Eriugenan context. In an Augustinian view, Anselm has dogmatically taken one side of Augustine's necessarily two-sided dialectic, i.e., the side where the understanding of self is a kind of demonstration of the principle by which, on the other side, the self is itself understood, and endeavoured to represent the former alone. In fact this is completed in the sequel to the Monologion. In the Proslogion, the second part of the argument is altogether dropped. There is a severely pruned statement of the derivation of the Trinity from the structure of the self-conscious soul but no movement from the Trinity to the mind's self-awareness. Such a procedure Thomas finds unsatisfactory. His theology involves the intellectual interpenetration of the motions from God to creatures and creatures to God. Alternatively, on the basis of the structural similarity of the de deo of the Summa Theologicae and the Monologion, together with some of its language, we may regard Anselm as at some point on the way from Augustine to the Proclan Platonism of St Thomas. Neither way of treating him is very satisfactory. But, since he tells us so little about what he is trying to do and virtually nothing about his sources, it is hard indeed for us to do better.
Part II

C

The De Trinitate of Boethius, the De Divinis Nominibus of Dionysius and the De Divisione Naturae of Eriugena

The result of our search for the sources of the structure of the first forty-five questions of the Summa Theologiae in the Sentences of Peter Lombard and the Monologion of St Anselm has been largely negative or indeterminate. In fact, we have been looking in the wrong direction. But this investigation has forced us to turn from the Augustinian tradition toward the Christian mediaevals who were influenced by the Neoplatonism of Proclus. Our results here will be more directly fruitful, though once again we must see how Thomas moves beyond Augustine.

Recently St Thomas Aquinas has been both praised and criticised for introducing a distinction within the theological treatment of God between his unity and the Trinity of persons and for beginning theology with the unity. His supporters see in this the appropriate rational order through which revelation is made intelligible by means of its proper praemable in natural reason. His critics oppose this same rationality and think that through it the distinctively Christian revelation of the triune God is reduced by an abstract and merely natural reasoning to the unity of an impersonal first principle. They maintain as well that the vitality and concreteness of a proper Christian understanding of the Trinity is thereby lost. We will consider briefly at the end of this chapter the justification of aspects of this praise and blame, but before doing so, the statement of facts on which both are based needs examination, for it is capable of doubt.

The Jesuit theologian Karl Rahner gives a full statement of the
received view in which he is followed by the Protestant Eberhard Jüngel. Their position accords with that of the Orthodox Vladimir Lossky. The account has then weighty ecumenical authority. According to it the distinction between the de deo uno and the de deo trino was first made by Thomas and it "only came into general use since the Sententiae of Peter Lombard were replaced by the Summa." The division and order of the two treatises goes back to the Augustinian and western conception of the Trinity which is said to start with the one single nature of God as a totality. This procedure is held to be the inverse of that of the eastern Fathers, who treating the nature of God in general when considering the person of the Father, may be represented either as commencing with the persons or with the unity and triad simultaneously. Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite is for Professor Lossky the epitome of the Orthodox tradition. In elevating a negative mystical theology to the highest rank, Dionysius finally celebrates God not only as simultaneously unity and Trinity, but also, as beyond being known in either of these categories. His eastern followers are held to be moving in the direction opposite to that the west is travelling. Despite the authority of this common account, the actual history seems to be its contrary.

First, Thomas is by no means the originator of the distinction between the de deo uno and the de deo trino nor does he originate the explicit ordering of the theological system, whether pagan or Christian, beginning with the Divine unity. Second, neither Augustine nor those who are faithful to his theological logic make this distinction. Third, Thomas finds the authority for the ordering in Boethius and Dionysius and for the distinction itself actually in Dionysius and he is to some degree correctly interpreting them in doing so.
A curious feature of St Thomas' Commentary on the *De Trinitate* of Boethius is that it contains his most extended statement on the relation of the various sciences and consequently on theological order. These are themselves connected because the order of theology follows from the relation of natural to revealed theology. This feature of the Commentary is rightly attributed to the presence in Boethius' little treatise of an enumeration of the parts of speculative knowledge as *naturalis*, *mathematica* and *theologica*. But it is not a complete account. St Thomas, in his *Prologus*, makes three observations we must consider. First, he contrasts the theologian's starting point with that of the philosopher. Natural knowledge begins from corruptible bodies and subsequently rises to God, thus inverting in thought the structure of reality. The theologian, by virtue of faith's superior light, is able to start aright, that is to begin from God and proceed subsequently, as God's own knowledge does, to creatures. Theology does not begin where it does because of its dependence on natural knowledge but precisely because it escapes its deficiencies and is able, as Thomas explains later in the Commentary, to proceed from his self-revelation; it manifests the *occulta* of God. Second, Thomas notices that Boethius' *Theological Tractates* may be systematically arranged. Two consider the procession of persons, another the procession of creatures (depending upon and hence subsequent to the first procession) and two more treat the restoration of creatures in Christ. Thus Thomas finds that the treatises have a systematic connection through the Neoplatonic logic of procession and return. Thomas is not the first to see a unity in them and his understanding of their connection has recently been defended as accurate. Finally, and most perceptively, Thomas discerns in Boethius a theological method different from that used by Augustine. According to Thomas, whereas the argument of Augustine's
De Trinitate is a complex of reason and authority and others use only authority, Boethius chooses the remaining alternative, reason alone. 110

If Thomas is right, his comments point to something most significant in Boethius. For he identifies in Boethius a systematizing spirit very different from that found in Augustine. It is not the spirit of Plotinus, who, although logically beginning with the One, leaves behind a series of discursive, often tentative, treatises on various philosophical subjects. 111 Nor is it that of Porphyry, which, although very concerned about structure, in ordering Plotinus does not unite form and content adequately. But the spirit is nearer that of the Iamblichan school best worked out by Proclus, who produced in his Elements of Theology an extremely formalized system in 211 propositions, beginning with the divine unity and ending with the human soul entirely descended into the temporal world. Thomas' systematizing of his own works and the elaborate formalizing, in his commentaries, of the arguments of the works he expounds is clearly in this tradition. But, is he not also sensitive to the change in Boethius, who, although only explicit about his dependence on Augustine in theology, 112 has on other grounds been found following Proclus? 113

What separated the more Plotinian Platonism of Augustine from that of Boethius is not just the greater formalism of Boethius but the character of the logic. The formalism shows itself in the division of the content between different treatises, their ordering relative to one another and penetration of the logical spirit into the internal argumentation of the treatise itself. The different character of the logics manifests itself, if Thomas is right, in placing three of the five treatises in the two parts devoted to the
movement downward from the divine unity. For the Augustinian teaching, in common with that of Plotinus, was dominated by an ascending movement: inward and upward. As argued above, the result is that the De Trinitate of Augustine begins per auctoritates, with the Word of God addressing man in the external world in order to save him from it. Augustine proceeds only secondarily to the argumentation per rationes, through the psychological analogies, in order that man may know his true unity with God out of the sensible world through mind's inward and upward turning. Augustine, and his mediaeval followers, reflect in this teaching the influence of the Plotinian doctrine of the higher and lower parts of the soul. But in Proclus there is the philosophical basis of a different Christian spirituality. The soul is altogether descended into the temporal world. Because of its weakness and distance from the One, it needs spiritual assistance from the world in which it finds itself. Because of the likeness of matter to the divine, it has the assistance of spiritual power given to sensible things by theurgy. The soul is forced and it is able to return upward by moving outward. In Thomas, Dionysius, and Proclus there is a sense of the equal weight of the downward and upward movements in reality so that the eros and activity, which underlie it, have themselves the exitus-reitus structure. Moreover, the One is also able, in such a view, to be given its place at the beginning; it is not just the end to be sought. Eriugena makes all this systematically explicit in his De Divisione Naturae. But Thomas finds the same logic in Boethius and in doing so he is in tune with a long tradition of mediaeval comment.

Remi of Auxerre believed Boethius taught that God was unity and all else was its explication and descent from his simplicity. In consequence of this, theology began from this simplicity. Carlo
Riccati has collected other comments with a similar import. 122 Pierre Hadot has traced the history of the mediaeval interpretation of Boethius' doctrine that essence and existence are united in God and divided in creatures, a teaching with such profound influence on St Thomas. 123 Bernard Hüring's works on later commentators must also be noted. 124 For Abelard, in whose theology the one and the three are not divided, remained faithful to Augustine in reaction against this specific Neoplatonic logic deriving from Boethius which he found in Gilbert of Poitiers. 125

If Boethius hints of the fruit for Christian theology of the Proclan Neoplatonism, fruit actually borne in the systems of Thomas and Eriugena, the nature of the flower is more easily recognizable in Dionysius. Dionysius' treatises can also be given a systematic relation 126 and their content as symbolic theology certainly involves the transformation of theurgy into a Christian movement to God through sensible things. 127 Moreover, the divine movement in things is clearly a full circle, 128 in which the divine unity and goodness have the right of the principle to be the beginning. 129

But most importantly for our investigation, there is in his theology an explicit division of the treatises between one on the names belonging to the unity of the Trinity and another on those names belonging to the persons. Thomas is clear (and correct) that this division and the reason for beginning from the divine as one and good is to be found in Dionysius. 130 For Dionysius separates the consideration of the undifferentiated and the differentiated names and speaks of two treatises. 131 One, the De Divinis Nominibus, considers the names common to the divinity; the other, which does not now exist and may never have existed, deals with the names proper to the distinct persons. 132 And he calls perfect and one the name most potent
because goodness and unity are the highest names of God as cause. We shall see that Thomas recognized this argument as giving goodness a priority among the names. But by the same reasoning, he sees that "unum habet rationem principii", and so he imitates Dionysius almost exactly by beginning his own treatment of God's substance with perfection and goodness -- which immediately follows simplicity -- and ending it on the unity of God. The same reasoning no doubt determines the priority of the de deo uno over the de deo trino. It is not Augustine, but Dionysius, whom Thomas follows.

The line Thomas stands in goes back in fact to the first fully explicit and unified western Christian system of theology, the De Divisione Naturae of Eriugena. Father Cappuyns, in his magisterial work, declared already that Books One and Two divided roughly as a de deo uno and a de deo trino. At least one recent treatment of the Periphyseon follows him in this judgement. But it has been challenged by Professor Allard, and is generally replaced by the view that the work is rather an hexameron. Yet these opinions are not incompatible unless the second be taken very narrowly and exclusively. For Book One is certainly about the unity of God preceding creation to which Eriugena, following the Neoplatonic logic to be found in Dionysius, brings back all things in return. The Trinity is developed only in the second book in explaining creation, for as Thomas and Eriugena agree, creation cannot be properly understood without the Trinity.

On a "bedrock, Latin and Augustinian", Eriugena constructed in his De Divisione Naturae a system "neither Augustinian nor Dionysian nor that of Maximus nor of Gregory". Augustine's Platonism was developed through Dionysius, and Dionysius was
carried beyond himself. Dionysius' thought was unified, completed, and made consistent. Into this system, which lacked a developed anthropology, Eriugena placed his own vitalism and a doctrine of man taken from Augustine, Gregory of Nyssa and Maximus. Thus "a new thing" was created.

It is a commonplace of Eriugena's commentators that, like Neoplatonists generally, he identifies the logical and real -- or the logical and physical. His system is a division of nature arrived at through logical analysis. Yet the treatment of the categories in Book One is regarded as a "preliminary" or a "digression".

Eriugena needs no proof of God's existence to begin his theology. Indeed it would be inappropriate as God is more properly non-being than being. He can begin through logical division, having taken care to start with the widest possible genus, nature, as containing what is and what is not. By this process he arrives at a complete division of reality, really complete because logically complete, and is able to begin with God. Sheldon-Williams reports the structure of Liber I as follows:

(i) Introduction: On the Division of Nature ... Definition of the genus Nature. Classification into four species (Bk. I.1-10 = 441A-451C)

(ii) First Species: That which is not created but creates, i.e. God as efficient Cause ... (Bk. I.11-78 = 451C-524B). Includes a digression on the first eight Categories (22-61 = 469A-504A).

But an examination of these categorical "digressions" shows that they have to do not only with how God, who is in himself unknown and unknowable, is known in his creatures but also with how this non-being is in what it makes. The categories are the dialectic of self-revelation and self-creation precisely because they are simultaneously the categories of thought and being. And therefore, in the process of Eriugena's successive examination of these
categories, we pass from the logical to the real. We discover how
God is spoken of and how he is: how he can be named through his cre­
ation and how his creation comes into being through him. These are
all covered in the de deo uno of Thomas: how God is -- or is not --,
how he is in things, how he is known and how named.

Eriugena starts with the problem of naming, a logical question:

But I should like to hear from you, clearly and succinct­ly, whether all the categories -- for they are ten in
number -- [can truly and properly be predicated] of the
supreme one essence in Three Substances of the Divine
Goodness, and of the Three Substances in the same one
Essence.

It turns out that they cannot apply to God directly:

And yet as we have said before, in the same way as almost
all that is properly predicated of the nature of created
things can be said metaphorically of their Creator, so
that some significant statement may be made (concerning
Him), so also what is signified by the categories, which
strictly speaking can only be discerned in created things,
can without absurdity be pronounced about the Cause of
all things . . .

And so, we are able to go through the categories a first time, dis­
covering how they are said of God. As in Anselm, the categories
of place and time turn out to be particularly important, for they are
in Eriugena both the conditions of all "consistere et cognosci" and
the means of creation. The act of definition and the act of
creating in space and time are identified, both are defining.
Placing and God's reasoning, or running, or creating, his presence
in all things are connected through these categories.

The second consideration of the categories begins with a dis­
tinction between the four "in statu" and the six "in motu". It
treats their totality as moving and creative and yet simultaneously
at rest so that they constitute altogether an image of God. As the
creative side is developed, the definition of body and of spirit
occurs, and the arts are introduced, for they form reality as
all the Categories are incorporeal when considered in themselves. [Some] of them, however, by a certain marvellous commingling with one another, as Gregory says, produce visible matter, while some appear in nothing and remain for ever incorporeal. 165

The elements behave in the same way. We are able to arrive, without leaving the categories, at corporeal and material being by passing through the rational soul.

Place is incorporeal but the basis has been laid for the coming into being of the sensible world with the fall of the soul. The argument moves on to accidents, matter, shade, "de accidentibus accidentium", until we ask again how to act and to suffer apply to God. 167

We are required in considering whether he moves and loves to turn to a consideration of Scripture which is the basis of all statement concerning him. 168 Having established the remainder of the argument of this book on a treatment of the relation between authority and reason, Eriugena concludes with a statement as to how God is present in the whole of creation as its very being and yet remains still in himself.

Therefore, just as being is predicated of Him although He is not in the strict sense being because He is more than being and is the Cause of all being and essence and substance, so also He is said to act and to make although He is more than acting and making and is the Cause of all for making and acting without any motion that could be attributed to accident, being beyond all motion. For of all motions and of all accidents, as indeed of all essences, He is the Cause and Principle. 169

This is then the conclusion of the "digression" concerning the categories. We know just what it means for God to be uncreated
creator. This is how God appears in Book One. When the first causes through which he creates, the created creating causes, are considered in Liber II, we come to the distinction of persons.

Sheldon-Williams outlines the contents of the second book as follows:

(iii) Second Series: That which is created and creates (Bks. II.1-III.4 = 523-634A). After a brief recapitulation (1-2 = 523D-528C) the second species is shown to be the Primordial Causes = the Platonic Forms. 170

After the summary of the division of nature generally, Eriugena speaks of what was accomplished in the first book. Although its subject was the first form of nature, the ten categories were discussed because it cannot be spoken of directly. 171 The first is to be spoken of again in the treatment of the fourth division -- "de reditu omnium in eam per primordiales causes", though, even there, not "proprie quod aut digne". 172 The procession and return are inseparable. So a discussion of the return occurs here. After which Eriugena returns to the proper subject of this book, the second form, the created creating. His consideration commences once again "ex divinis eloquiis", the Scriptures, "ex ea enim omnem veritatis inquisitionem initius sumere necessarium est." 173 We are able to commence at Genesis I, 1 because in Liber Primus we have already spoken about the God with which it begins so far as we are able.

But whereas there he appeared in his unity, the Trinity comes into view along with the primordial causes.

But as for myself, when I consider the interpretations of the many commentators, I think none is more acceptable, nothing more likely to be true, than that in the aforementioned words of Holy Scripture, that is, by the choice of the terms 'heaven' and 'earth', we should understand the primordial causes of the whole creature, which the Father had created in His only begotten Son, Who is given the name of 'Beginning', before all things which have been created ... 174
These causes cannot be spoken of without their place, the Form of forms and have no content without it.

For in being ever turned towards the one Form of all things which all things seek, I mean the Word of the Father, they are formed . . . For in themselves they are formless, and know that they themselves are perfectly created in their universal Form, I mean the Word. 175

The Spirit is introduced in order to show that God comprehends the primordial causes:

For God made them in the beginning as a kind of foundation and principle of all the natures which are from Him, and He comprehends them in His supereminent (and) infinite gnostic power, and His Spirit is borne above them [not by movement through space but by the eminence of its knowledge]. 176

Thus, from creation, we arrive at the Holy Trinity: "Pater scuidem vult, filius facit, spiritus sanctus perficit."177 Father, Son and Spirit are:

the supreme Trinity Whose being is understood from the things that are, and Whose Wisdom is known from the things that are wise, and Whose Life is most clearly demonstrated from the things that move. 178

Because the Trinity has arisen necessarily in considering creation, Eriugena proposes "to say a few words about the first and supreme Cause of all, the Holy Trinity."179 From treating the Trinity itself, the argument passes on easily to its images, particularly that in us. It is only at the beginning of Book Three that he comes back to the primordial causes themselves. After them, he goes on to the third form -- the created not creating.

In Thomas proper knowledge of creation and of the Trinity are also connected:

the knowledge of the divine persons is necessary for us . . . for the right understanding of the creation of things. For by saying that God created all things in his Word the error is excluded that God produced things from the necessity of his nature. And by saying that in him there is a procession of love, it is shown that God does not produce creatures through some lack, nor for
some extrinsic reason, but because of the love of his own goodness. 180

Moreover the procession of creatures has its reason in the procession of persons, and follows from it. 181 Though, since the Trinity acts here as one, it is not known adequately from creation. 182 Thomas' argument is more like the second of Anselm's derivations of the Trinity in the Monologion, i.e., it moves from the Trinity to creation not vice versa. 183 In any case, the interpenetration of the two sides in Eriugena is not sufficient reason to exclude calling the second book of his De Divisione Naturae a de deo trino. Further, it should now be clear that just as Thomas' Summa contains an hexameron but is not simply an hexameron, so the same is true of the De Divisione Naturae. Liber Primus and, qualifiedly, Liber Secundus are treatises de deo uno and trino corresponding to the treatises of Tho. de deo. Both works may only be regarded as hexamera if these treatises are only an extended commentary on the God who is "in the beginning". But in both cases, sacra scriptura as sacra doctrina has gotten to a systematic and rational freedom which lectio, or commentary on scripture, cannot have. 184

This then is the result of Proclus' logic, mediated through Dionysius, on the first system of theology produced in the mediaeval west. But Eriugena's influence has been ignored or played down by many modern historians. Professors Gilson 185 and Pieper 186 have thought him unwestern and believed him without influence because the west had turned decisively away from this alternative. M. Landgraf, 187 even revised, 188 shows no significant tradition deriving from him. And, despite Fr Chenu's corrective work, 189 Gillian Evans' 190 two books published only last year on the transformation of theology in the twelfth century, although noting the importance of Boethius' influence and of Honorius Augustodunensis, do not mention
Eriugena. In fact the influence of the *De Divisione Naturae* on Thomas and his immediate predecessors is, for well known reasons, indirect \(^{191}\) -- although the quantity of it in the *Dionysian Corpus*, which Thomas must have known, is extensive. \(^{192}\) But in the twelfth century this was not the case. Both the *Summa "Quoniam Homines"* of Alan of Lille\(^ {193}\) and *De Anima et de Deo* of Honorius Augustodunensis,\(^ {194}\) themselves two enthusiastic disciples of Eriugena, show its influence in making a clear division between tracts *de deo uno* and *de deo trino* and ordering them from unity to trinity. Indeed, the Proclan tradition seems to have this result where there is no direct knowledge of the *Periphyseon*. For even where its influence is quite diffused and other structural considerations are given equal weight, as in the *Summa Theologica*\(^ {195}\) of Alexander of Hales, this distinction and order are present. Karl Rahner explicitly denies\(^ {196}\) that there is a clear separation here, and the primary division is between the kinds of confession, yet certainly this logic is at work. What influences Richard of St Victor is not clear; but one and three divide his *De Trinitate*.\(^ {197}\) Dionysius seems the moving force behind Bonaventure's use of it in the *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*.\(^ {198}\) It could be the influence of the *Elements of Theology* themselves which move Albert the Great in his *Summa Theologiae sive de Mira-bili Scientia Dei*,\(^ {199}\) and Ulrich of Strasbourg certainly knows Albert's teaching, Dionysius, and Proclus when he follows this tradition of order in his *Summa de Bono*.\(^ {200}\)

On the other hand, theologians who followed Augustine more conservatively,\(^ {201}\) like Abelard\(^ {202}\) and Peter Lombard,\(^ {203}\) do not make the distinction whose origins we are investigating. This would seem to finally exclude the tracing of these roots to Augustine's *De Trinitate*. Indeed, while Thomas accords with
Augustine in giving priority to simplicity as what separates God and creatures, E. zum Brunn has pointed out that for Thomas this simplicity is more exclusive of multiplicity than for Augustine:

La citation du De Trinitate: de illa simplicitate vel multiplici simplicitate est remplacee par le illa simplicitate (De pot. g.7, a.5, S.C. Cf. De Trin. VI, 4, 6).

In fact, as both Lossky and Rahner admit, Augustine's position is not really very different from that of the Cappadocians, especially that of Gregory of Nyssa, as they all stress the unity of the three and the plurality of the unity. It is not then to a difference between eastern and western theological traditions we must look but to differences which separate the Neoplatonic philosophical schools together with their Christian followers. The origins of Thomas' distinction are to be traced back through the twelfth century followers of Eriugena, Dionysius and Boethius to these early Christian Neoplatonists of the Iamblichan-Proclan school. It remains to consider what the meaning of this division is in its initial context.

In Proclus' Elements of Theology, the henads interpose between the One and the intelligences. Professor E.R. Dodds interpreted their presence as deriving partly in the desire for logical completeness and symmetry . . . and partly in an attempt to bridge the yawning gulf which Plotinus had left between the One and reality. Doubtless he is correct, and this feature of Proclus' thought agrees with the tendency of his school to multiply entities and logical distinctions. But these distinctions also serve the contrary purpose of separating the one and reality. The henads' mediation both separates and unites. Just so, in Thomas himself, we find a gradual movement outward from the simplicity of the divine substance, treated between questions on the divine unity and simplicity, through those
on the divine operations, enclosed as they are within noetic activity, and separated from the substance by the questions on the knowing and naming of God. The movement continues downward through the real distinction within the unity introduced by the relations of persons and terminates in the procession from the unity of creatures. Beginning from the divine unity, Thomas is able to give theology its proper intelligibility. The ordo disciplinae is the order of comprehensible teaching because it is the union of logic and reality.

Returning then to the judgements with which the chapter began, the historians who find Thomas using this order for the sake of the intelligibility of theology have something on their side. But there is no question here of praeambula of faith. Thomas finds in Dionysius that neither the unity nor the Trinity of God is adequately known from creatures and he teaches this in his own works. He also learns from the pseudo-Areopagite that unity is by nature principle. He imitates Dionysius and Eriugena in making the divine simplicity and perfection the starting point of sacred doctrine, a science which reflects logically the order of God's own thinking, and which thus proceeds sub ratione Dei. Theology certainly needs philosophical reason. Indeed sacred doctrine is constituted in the meeting of the philosophical movement up from creatures with the movement of revelation down from God. The ascending and descending orders are united in one circle. But theology as sacred doctrine has an origin proper to itself. The beginning from God, from the self-revelation of the separate substances, to which philosophical reason has been reaching, is its special privilege. But here again we meet with the influence of the Proclan elevation of the One to be an object beyond science. For this revelation is a movement from the occulta, from the unknown
God, -- whose substance in Thomas remains unknown \textit{in via}, \textsuperscript{216} --
who is manifesting himself.

Sacred doctrine is not beginning in philosophical reasonings. They are necessary to it but they do not provide its basis or origins. Sacred doctrine is the unknown One as principle disclosing itself.

A reduction of the full concrete life of God to an abstract category known to natural reason is not thereby implied. The opposition set up here is false, for neither Plotinus nor Proclus\textsuperscript{217} thought the One to be a nature in itself knowable but hid only to eyes like ours.\textsuperscript{218} Indeed it is distinguished from \textit{via} itself. These, with Boethius, Dionysius and Thomas, begin from a deep mystery, the \textit{occulta}. The common aim of their works is that which Thomas ascribes to the \textit{De Trinitate} of Boethius: "\textit{finis vero huius operis est, ut occulta fidei manifestentur, quantum \textit{in via} possibile est}."\textsuperscript{219}
Part II

D

Neoplatonic sources of the structure of Thomas' *de deo*: Porphyry and Proclus. The primacy of being or of unity? 220

The result of this investigation into the sources of the structure of the first questions of the *Summa Theologicae* has been to force us back toward pagan Neoplatonism. The Augustinian tradition has failed over again to provide what is sought and more and more it is the Proclan side of the tradition behind Boethius, Dionysius and Eriugena which answers affirmatively. But the Iamblichan-Proclan school is only one of the post-Plotinian Neoplatonisms to which Thomas is indebted. A more than one-sided account of Thomas' *Summa* and its sources requires equally a consideration of what he owes to that interpretation of Plotinus against which Iamblichus and his followers were reacting. If it is also taken into account, some sense of the real inner tension, both doctrinal and structural, of Thomas' system may come into view. This involves us in an account of the origins of the ontology of Thomas which has so preoccupied contemporary Thomists and of the aspects of henology in him. As indicated in Part I, the construction of a henological theology has been an aspect of the reaction against this Thomism. Our interpretation will suggest that Thomas himself may not be claimed for one or the other of the sides in this contemporary debate. His synthesis has perhaps a wider appeal than recognized, although it remains to be seen whether the tensions necessary to this breadth are genuinely held together within his thought.

The harshness of Iamblichus' attack on Porphyry once caused historians to doubt that his *De Mysteriis* could have been written by Porphyry's pupil. 221 Yet it seems it was, and that, within a
generation of the death of Plotinus, his successors had divided sharply over the direction in which his development of the Platonic tradition should be carried. Moreover, because these differences reappeared in the Christian theologies which grew out of these Neoplatonisms -- the later reflects the earlier scholasticism -- these same conflicts continued to emerge in western mediaeval thought. Partly, this is due to the great authority of both Augustine and the pseudo-Dionysius. For Augustine's Plotinus is at least partially mediated by Porphyry and Victorinus and shares certain of the features of this Roman school, whereas objective and doctrinal connections between Dionysius and Proclus, the greatest systematizer of the direction Iamblichus gave Neoplatonism, are well established.

The Porphyrian Neoplatonism was the first to establish itself in the west and even in the Middle Ages it was, as embodied in the Augustinians, the conservative position. It seemed also to have the power of self-renewal, for as late as Julian of Norwich, we find reiterated a characteristic Plotinian doctrine which Iamblichus and his followers had explicitly rejected: the doctrine of the two parts of the human soul, the higher remaining in contemplative unity with God, the lower fallen into the temporal world. The Augustinian illuminationist epistemologies have their source in this psychology transmitted to Augustine, for whom the human mind remains in touch with the divine truth. In contrast, Aquinas unites Aristotle and Dionysius when he maintains that we know through reversion to the phantasm and that we can rise to the contemplation of the divine only through sensible things. In this Thomas has chosen the Iamblichan-Proclan tradition against Porphyry but in fact both Augustine and pseudo-Dionysius are of the greatest authority for him and his system is a synthesis of their divisions.
The doctrine characteristic of Porphyry's own special position which we find in Thomas is the primacy given to being and indeed the representation of the prime term by the infinitive -- ἐίναι in Greek, esse in Latin. So much has been written about this aspect of Thomas' philosophy that little need be said to show that it is a feature of it. An adequate statement of his teaching can be found in the *Summa Theologiae* where, within the treatment of the divine simplicity, Thomas denies the composition of essence and existence in God. Rather, the simplicity of God requires that both be united in his esse. A little later on, when he reflects on the knowledge of the divine substance attained in this *de divinis nominibus* and lays down the rules for applying names to God, Thomas tells us that esse is the highest of them: "this name Qui est . . . is the most proper name of God." No major revision of the usual description of Thomas' doctrine on this point is required.

However, the newly uncovered facts relating to the source and transmission of this doctrine overthrow the Thomist representation of the significance of his teaching. It is of revolutionary import that the anti-Christian Neoplatonist Porphyry, uniting the One and the first intelligible triad, identified the One and ἐίναι. It is also significant that he is the source of this doctrine in the Christians Victorinus, Augustine, and Boethius and that thus it was held well before Thomas. Indeed Thomas is only one in the long line of interpreters of the crucial early texts in Boethius which convey it to the Middle Ages. Finally, it is important that it is Porphyry, not a common scriptural revelation, that stands behind the similar teaching in Arab Neoplatonists like Avicenna. Avicenna and Thomas both maintained that God was the simple act of being and that, in contrast, existence and essence were distinct in
Indeed Avicenna may be one of Thomas' sources of the Porphyrian tradition. If these considerations destroy the notions that Thomas' ontology, his philosophy of esse, is unique, or Christian, or a "metaphysic of Exodus", or reflects the Aristotelian rather than Platonist side of his thought, the historical investigations used to establish these views are not therefore useless. What served to distinguish Thomas from Aristotle in this regard -- Thomas was thought to have been able to grasp the import of Exodus 3:14 because of the Aristotelian direction of his thought, though his "existential" philosophy of being was contrasted with Aristotle's "essentialism" -- in fact rather serves to distinguish his position as Neoplatonic as opposed to Aristotelian. Theology is one of the names of Aristotle's science of being as being, but God is not distinguished by being ἐξωτερικός, nor is his activity without subject or object, indeed it is subject and object and their unity: "ὅπου ταύτῳ νοῦς καὶ αὐτός τὸν ὄντος", and so Aristotle has not the difficulties of either Plotinus or Thomas about making predications of God. Also the characteristics stated above, meant to place Thomas and Avicenna together in the tradition of Exodus, rather serve to identify their common filiation from Porphyry.

Yet what is meant by Neoplatonic here needs some attention. Plotinus is said to initiate the Neoplatonic tradition in contrast to Middle Platonism by his teaching that the One is above νοῦς. Porphyry, like Iamblichus and his followers, is attempting to reconcile Plotinus and the Chaldean Oracles, "a collection of Greek magico-mystical poems of late antiquity, which . . . was elevated by the Neoplatonists to the rank of a scripture of holy revelation" and which philosophically are Middle Platonist. To accomplish this Porphyry identifies the Father, or first principle, with being in
the triad being, life, thought. But there is an essential feature of his doctrine of the identity of the first principle and which marks its Neoplatonic context and this feature is common to the teaching of Boethius, Avicenna and St Thomas. Namely, the first is called esse (or the equivalent) precisely to give it a form appropriate to the One: an activity without subject or predicate, a simplicity beyond the distinction of essence and existence. What then constitutes the lower or created quality of what is other than the One-being is the division in it of existence and essence. Plotinus himself speaks of the first as this subjectless, predicateless activity, although not calling him esse. While Iamblichus and Proclus are reacting against Porphyry's debasement of the One in his "telescoping of the hypostases", their teaching is characteristically more negative than that of Plotinus. They speak of his existence as οὐνομάζει rather than ἔσει, but they deny ἐνεργεῖ of him, and Proclus places his henchas between the One and the noetic. But in fact both sides are endeavouring to think how the first can both be transcendent and yet all things be in and derive from it as their source, though perhaps they are looking at this problem from its opposite ends. What is curious is that Thomas is actually able to derive his teaching by combining both traditions. For he follows the Liber de Causis and Dionysius -- both most obviously derivative from Proclus -- in calling God being because being is his first effect, and the divine is known and named from its effects. These are both Neoplatonic commonplaces. But there is in fact a feature of Thomas' teaching on being which is characteristically Proclan. Thomas teaches not only that causing existence is what God specially does but that his causative power is not limited to what immediately derives from him; rather it is active at every level
of creation. This direct relation to the first of all which comes from him is a doctrine of Proclus and accords with the whole tendency of his school to which we now turn.255

What comes to Thomas from the tradition of Neoplatonism originating in Iamblichus is much more multiform, though its provenance is just as indirect. Although Thomas did read Proclus' Elements of Theology (in William of Moerbeke's translation) when he was commenting on the Liber de Causis -- itself largely excerpts from the Elements --, this was near the end of his life and after he had written his various treatises de deo.256 But through the works of Dionysius and through the Liber, both of which Thomas knew from his student days (indeed our first piece of Thomistic autograph is his notes of Albert the Great's lectures on the De Divinis Nominibus),257 as well as through their generally diffused influence, Thomas came to know both the characteristic formal structures as well as the doctrines of this tradition. So far as the content of his teaching is concerned we have referred already to how it affects his view of the character of the divine causality and of the place and nature of the human soul. Proclus' understanding of evil is also important, and we must see how all this coheres with Thomas' reception of their criticism of the identification of the One and being.

The pseudo-Dionysius is an authority for Thomas' holding to the Iamblichan-Proclan view of the situation and nature of the human soul fallen into the temporal process.258 No part of it remains above fixed and stable in the realm of ἀληθή, illumined by the ideas and divine truth. A result of such a psychology is that material means must be found from within the soul's contact with the sensible world for assisting its rise back toward the One through science and intellection. Among the pagans the means is theurgy, a
word also found in Dionysius, though with him we speak more generally of a symbolic theology. The influence of this theology on the spirituality and aesthetic views of the Christian Middle Ages is profound though because of its association with heterodoxy not fully appreciated. Its teaching that the soul can ascend to God through an opening toward the sensible rather than simply by turning inward away from it provides a counterpoint to the more Plotinian Augustinian psychology and spirituality throughout the period. When secularized in the thirteenth century, the phenomena of this attitude in Thomas are the things which Thomists speak of as his realism: his Aristotelian epistemology, his starting in the evidence of sense to prove God's existence, his interest in the physics of Aristotle, etc. Indeed one might say that his Aristotelianism should be seen within the context of his Neoplatonism. Certainly he generally reads Aristotle through Neoplatonic spectacles, but more significant is that the movement toward a more positive view of Aristotle is a feature of the later Neoplatonism and especially of its Christian adherents. Nor is it exclusively a feature of the Iamblichan tradition. Porphyry's view of the first principle is closer to Aristotle's than are the positions of either Plotinus or Iamblichus and his followers, and he is responsible for the assimilation of Aristotle's logic into Neoplatonism after Plotinus' critique. It is perhaps enough to mention that Porphyry, Boethius, and the Arabs provide the main western mediaeval sources for the knowledge of Aristotle until the time of St Thomas.

If the soul is altogether fallen into the temporal world and is able to use that world to rise again to God, indeed can effect its rise in no other way, the appearance of the sensible world will be different from the picture which corresponds to Plotinus' psychology.
Sensible matter will have a goodness relative to this human necessity which it does not have in Plotinus. It will not itself be evil. 266

Indeed, the similarity between the top and the bottom of the cosmos will come out: prime matter and the One are in opposite ways unspecified by form. 267 In common with Proclus, Thomas holds the notion that evil is not itself real but is rather privation. 268

And he stands with Proclus in opposition to Plotinus on two other points which cohere with this:

that the higher a principle, the further does its creative activity extend; and that matter therefore is a direct creation of the One, and not, as in Plotinus, a product of the partial soul. 269

In consequence, for Thomas, as for his pagan predecessors, there is a positive character to the downward movement in reality which enables the development of a system with an equipoise between the upward and the downward. 270 Perhaps this is prerequisite for the creation of explicit formalized system, in fact one of the contributions of this school of Neoplatonism to philosophy. There is no doubt a logical hierarchy in Plotinus but he does not develop this into an explicit formal system 271 and the movement in his cosmos is "avant tout ascendant." 272 Porphyry joins the lower to the higher soul by the upward movement of the former, 273 if anything strengthening the upward tendency, and his systematizing of Plotinus' writings is notorious for its divorce between form and content. The form is a numerical scheme. 274 In Proclus, 275 and in Thomas 276 the form penetrates the whole content. The system is total in that primary conceptions, like activity, being, love, 277 278 have the same movement which informs the whole as their own internal structure.

Finally, cohering with these doctrines, is the concern of this school to protect the transcendence of the One from any admixture with finitude. The careful distinction of all the elements of reality
clearly belongs to their reaction against Porphyry's heterodox "telescoping of the hypostases", but even the emphasis on theurgy, the development of cultic and ascetical practice and the new thinking about evil, matter and the divine action are concordant with its higher theological aims. For this school has not only a psychology radically different from that of Plotinus but also carries his negative theology further. Most obvious is the doctrine of Damascius that the highest God is above the One. But two features of Proclus' position might be appropriately adduced. First, whereas there is at least a suggestion in Plotinus (although a much disputed one) that there is a self-reversion in the One, in Proclus, the logic of self-reversion, or more generally of ἐν ἑαυτῷ and ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ, is just what distinguishes all else from the One. Second, it has now been shown that while Proclus is not the originator of the henads interposed between the One and the intelligences, he is the great developer and diffuser of the doctrine. While it is perhaps fruitless to argue over whether they are meant to separate what is above and below them or to join these, the need for them indicates the greater feeling for the transcendence of the One in Proclus than in his predecessors. This negative theology and the other features of Neoplatonism in the Iamblichan school belong together. For theurgy and the rest is necessary for the unification of the soul, altogether descended into the temporal world, with the God so highly elevated above what proceeds from him. His transcendence makes his grace necessary.

The view that the highest is the Good or One elevated above being is known to Thomas through Dionysius and others. It has two effects. First, it conditions his doctrine of the divine being. God's being is not properly known to us; we have no vision of it.
While he does not teach with Dionysius and Eriugena that God's being is the being of his effects, for Thomas we can only know it through God's effects and thus inadequately. God's being is by no means the common being of things. It is known indirectly, negatively and abstractly. Second, Thomas also teaches that from a certain perspective Good is a higher name for God than being:

In causation then the good precedes the existent as end precedes form; and, for this reason, in any list of names designating divine causality, good will precede existent.

Thomas knows also the identification of the One and Good in Platonism. We shall see that these two doctrines are of great importance in his structuring of theology, in which, as in Proclus' Elements, form and content are united.

At least as important for Aquinas as the content he derives from the Iamblichian school, its own peculiar teachings, its development of Plotinus' thought, and, its critique of Porphyry are its formalism and the theological literary genre it created. The movement toward a systematizing of the diverse dialogues and separate treatises of Plato and Aristotle respectively predates Neoplatonism. But the complete encompassing of the whole circuit of reality within theology, together with its explicit formal ordering into one system, is specifically the work of Proclus. Iamblichus arranged Plato's dialogues into a systematic schema but Proclus' Elements of Theology is an explicit formal system of reality beginning from the One and ending in the last of its 211 propositions with the soul altogether descended into the temporal world.

Such a system is the form appropriate to the content we have described: a view of a spiritual world with its elements and levels carefully separated and subordinated, encompassing everything from spirit utterly transcendent and unmoved to a form which must turn
toward sensible matter to perfect its life, and the whole requiring a powerful divine motion running downward and back to draw its dispersed parts in return toward the unity from which they had come out. Plotinus shows no interest in such a formal system. His treatises begin very obviously from individual questions and even current problems and Porphyry is unable to unite form and content in schematizing Plotinus' works. It is Proclus' invention which the mediaeval summae recreate.

Thomas follows Iamblichus' school in the doctrines belonging to this literary development and he is imbued with its formalizing and systematizing spirit. In his Aristotelian and other commentaries, he not only looks at the content through Neoplatonic spectacles, but, indifferent to its own form, he divides and restructures it into a systematic chain of arguments. The greatest fruit of this spirit in him is his Summa Theologiae. It is, like the Elements of Proclus, an explicit, consistently formalized system containing the complete circuit of reality. It begins, as we have seen, by justifying itself because of the formal inadequacies of the available writings on the subject. It proceeds to show how its object, God, in himself and as principle and end, can be unified under one formal consideration, the revelabilia, in order to produce a science.

The whole immense content is divided into components organized in a single form, the quaestio, itself a product of that same endeavour to both think and remain faithful to the conflicting authorities which characterizes our Neoplatonists after Plotinus. The work embraces every level of reality from God to prime matter, what is given to man in creation, what he does in his freedom, and what completes his freedom in grace. It includes time and eternity and time's beginning and end.
All of this is not to deny that much stands between Proclus' Elements of Theology and Thomas' Summa Theologiae and this will become clear at many particular points. In any case the Elements could not have been the direct inspiration of the Pars Prima of the Summa, which is what we will mainly consider. But there are connections via Dionysius. Thomas had a direct knowledge of Dionysius and there is also the important influence of the De Divisione Naturae and the De Fide Orthodoxa of Dionysius' followers Eriugena and John of Damascus respectively on the formation of the Summa as a theological literary genre for the High Middle Ages.

Proclus, mediated by Dionysius, also provides Thomas with a second genre, that for treating God in himself in the Summa Theologiae. For this treatise may be regarded as a "de divinis nominibus". This form was Christianized by Dionysius but the very first tract de divinis nominibus is contained in the Platonic Theology of Proclus which Dionysius was imitating and transforming. The originality of Proclus has been discovered by the editors of the Platonic Theology, H.D. Saffrey and L.G. Westerink. What they call a "traité des attributs divins" is an exposé uncovering, enumerating and organizing the essential divine characteristics. Such a treatise is not to be found either among the classical or Neoplatonic predecessors of Proclus.

A comparison of the treatises is too large a task to be undertaken here but a few points may be noted. For the three thinkers, the discovery of the names involves a dependence on authority. Proclus derives his from Plato's dialogues. Dionysius will not presume to speak or conceive of the Godhead anything which is not revealed in Holy Scriptures. The relation of Thomas' argument at different stages to various kinds of authority, scriptural,
ecclesiastical, philosophic, is complex. For him in principle the Trinitarian names are known only through scriptural revelation. In fact his use of the *quaestio* involves the citation of both scriptural and other authority throughout the *de deo* of the *Summa Theologiae*. However, the form Proclus uses to relate his treatise to its sources means that he is more limited in arranging it logically than these successors. For "the attributes are classed according to the Platonic dialogues in which they appear." No comparable principle confines Dionysius or Thomas.

Aquinas exposes with great acuity the principles organizing Dionysius' treatise. He perceives that Dionysius begins with good as a name and employs an *exitus-reeditus* structure in drawing the exposition back to its source by means of the names perfect and one. As indicated above, Thomas knows the Proclan conception by which these names, good and one, are identified. He notices that the author moves from the more to the less generic in relating the names. He calls these Platonic principles and in fact they are generally used also by Proclus. Thomas employs them in forming his own treatise, though not exclusively, and its structure has important differences from those of either Proclus or Dionysius, despite a fundamental formal continuity.

As if leaping over the intermediary, Thomas begins like Proclus -- as opposed to Dionysius -- by establishing the existence of his divine subject and in fact, for both, the first argument is from motion. (Our editors mistakenly state "tout traité des attributs divins commence toujours par une ou plusieurs démonstrations de l'existence de dieu." But there is a great difference between this aspect of Proclus' treatise and subsequent Christian ones. Proclus demonstrates "*τὸ εἶναι τὸν θεόν*", which is sharply contrasted with the *οὐφόρος* of the One.
If they were identified, he would be following Porphyry not Iamblichus. The Christians and Arabs cannot make this distinction. One alternative is to avoid speaking of God as existing in himself. For Dionysius and Eriugena, God's existence is not in himself but in his effects. This is the strongly negative sense of naming through effects. Though for Thomas naming God from effects is necessary because we do not see his essence directly in this life; nonetheless, the names taken from creatures are properly and affirmatively predicated of God. The other alternative is to speak of God's own existence, but then this involves, as in Thomas, a fundamental shift from the Proclan theology toward Porphyry, even if, as also in Thomas, the other tradition negatively conditions the Porphyrian affirmation.

The two major divisions of Thomas' treatise de deo (qq. 2-43) originate in the Dionysian mediation of Proclan Neoplatonism. The first is the distinction of the de deo uno (qq. 3-26) from the de deo trino (qq. 27-43). The second divides the de deo uno between a consideration of God's substance (qq. 3-11) and his operations (qq. 13-27). Question two, "de Deo an sit," is more a condition of beginning the treatise than a part of it; it is of significance that there is in fact no question on being as a name of God. Questions twelve and thirteen, on how we know and name God, are also exceptional and are considered below.

We have considered above the origins of the first distinction. It is not of course to be found directly in Procius, though his treatise on the divine names is, like that of Dionysius, on the names common to the divine, rather than those specific to particular gods (or persons). Further, he, Dionysius, and Thomas share the distinguishing formal spirit at work here, and his henads represent
a high development of this mentality and the desire to keep the highest consideration of God above all multiplicity.

The second division, that within the *de deo uno*, has its ultimate origin in Aristotle's distinction between the first and second acts of the soul, but has been considerably altered in its passage through the Neoplatonic filter. The formula Thomas uses for the structure of spiritual substances and which orders their treatment is "there are three things found in spiritual substances namely essence, power and operation," or "operation follows power and substance" and these he finds in Dionysius. That operation follows nature is a formula derived from John of Damascus. These formulae imply a much wider gap between the two sides than in Aristotle's psychology. This remains so even if power is not represented structurally at this level of divinity, because of the greater simplicity of the activities within the essence as compared to the procession of distinct persons; power does appear as a characteristic of the Father at the level of the persons. The widening of the division within spirit shows itself in many ways in Thomas. For example, it produces his faculty psychology in which the acts of the soul do not inhere directly in its substance. Here, in the *de deo uno*, it is manifest by the separation of the two sets of names. The first begins in simplicity and ends in unity. Substance, being more simple than act, is centred around unity. The second begins in knowledge, and passing through will and power, arrives at beatitude, which "significat bonum perfectum intellectualis naturae." That is, operation, being more divided than substance, is centred around intellect or , which both for Thomas and his Neoplatonist predecessors is that by which multiplicity enters. Between the two come the questions on how we know and how we name
God. These questions (qq. 12 and 13) provide evidence that the treatise is a de divinis nominibus but this is not their structural justification. They come after the substantial names because in Aquinas' Aristotelian epistemology the knowledge of the mind which knows is reflexive upon its act. Moreover, they divide the substance from the operations in the stronger Neoplatonic way. An example of this widening of the difference which Thomas finds in the Liber de Causis (Prop. 32), and traces back to Proclus in his Expositio, is the notion of what has its substance in eternity and its activity in time (cf. Proclus' Elements, Propositions 106 and 107, and 191). While quite consistent with Proclus' philosophical principles, this is surely an outstanding example of his formalistic mentality and of the spirit and doctrine which enables Thomas to distinguish God's own substance and his operations.

Enough has perhaps now been said to indicate the general structural principles of the Summa Theologiae. They are, first, a distinction of the simple from the multiple, which proceeds from unity as prior and most potent. This principle determines that God's substance, centred around unity, precedes his operations centred around intellect. Further, it requires that these processions, which involve only a conceptual distinction of subject and object are prior to the procession into trinitarian personality, that this comes before the procession into creation, and that, within creation, and government the treatment of pure spirit, angels, and matter precedes the complex of both, man. For the Trinity is the development of real relation, opposition, and distinction between the terms of knowing and willing, activities, the object of which remains in its subject. In creation, the Trinity as one is related through the extrinsic activity, power, to what is of necessity unequal to
its source. The result is in the multiplication and dispersion of the forms of goodness. Finally man joins spirit and matter, but only by being more complex than either, and he is thus appropriately both the last element in the exitus, and the point from which the return takes place.

The second general principle, and that by which the descending elements are connected to each other and reunited with their source is the motion of ἐξίσος, and ἐπίστάμενος, exitus and reditus, going out and return. Its circle binds together the substantial names, which flow outward from simplicity, perfection, goodness and infinity to arrive at the existence of God in things, overcoming by this motion the privative character of simplicity, and return through the denial of mutability and temporality, i.e., through immutability and aeternity, back into the divine unity. Similarly the circuit through the operations moves out from intellect through will, which adds desire to intellect's object and is described as ecstatic in love, and power, the divine activity whose object lies outside its subject, back to intellect in beatitude. Bernard Lonergan has shown how the de deo trino describes a great circle which begins in the processions, formed from the intrinsic operations, passes out to the plurality of the distinct persons and returns to its origin in the notional acts which are the same as the processions. Within this there is the lesser circle developed in the questions on the distinct persons and evolved in understanding the Spirit as unity of Father and Son. Creation and government contain the dialectical movement involved in the notion of man as complex unity of the simple elements of spirit and matter. Finally the Summa, as a whole, describes a great circle. The Prima Pars, which treats God's being, his intrinsic acts, from which the
Trinity develops, and his extrinsic act, creation, and concludes with man, creation's sum, passes into the Secunda Pars, where man, as free and principle of his own works, displays his powers for good and evil. But the great circle is only closed in the Tertia Pars when Christ, the unity of God and man, restores the universe with and in man to the divine source from which it had come out. 347

What is significant for our purposes is that these two principles are the structural foundations of Proclus' Elements of Theology:

The total structure of the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική is that of μόνον, πολυτικός, and τὸ πολλὸν. This total structure is developed within the logical framework of one and many. One as principle is infinite and its structure as μόνον is as conceived an infinite logic. Many as principle is finite and its structure as πολυτικός and τὸ πολλὸν is as conceived finite or phenomenal logic. Thus, the movement of the total work is triadic while the principles of this totality are dual. 348

In forming the content of his Summa by means of these principles, Thomas develops many matters differently from his source in Proclus and his tradition. A number of these points have been touched on before. With Plotinus and Aristotle, he places life and providence under intellect. 349 With Dionysius against their pagan predecessors, Thomas reduces the separate Neoplatonic hypostases to attributes of God. 350 Beyond Dionysius, in one direction he is clear that the predicates belong properly to God, in the other, he separates the operations from the substance and places them below it, thus securing a tighter step by step movement from unity to multiplicity and enabling the Proclan triad which constitutes the operations to supply a logical connection between them, the persons and the creation. 351 The influence of the Greek Fathers allows Thomas to make man as free the turning point, rather than, as fallen, the end of his system. 352 Much more could be said but not to our purpose. For our aim has been only to show how the Neoplatonism stemming
from Iamblichus is operative in aspects of Thomas' Summa Theologiae. This established, it remains to consider the implications of his also having followed the opposing Porphyrian tradition.

What is the net result of our investigation? Does Thomas' Summa have two opposed later Neoplatonic teachings about the nature of the first principle and a henologically biased structure? This would be an incorrect summary. For the two contrary logics are integrated in the Summa Theologiae. On the one side, God's being is never ordered above his unity. On the other, the structure of the finite, of exitus and reditus, is incorporated into the highest consideration of God. First, in the Summa Theologiae, and indeed in Thomas' other works, the specific character of God's being -- that he is esse, that in him, and in him alone, existence and essence are one -- follows from his simplicity. This is represented structurally by treating the being of God within the treatment of the divine simplicity. The fact that in the Summa the proof of his existence occurs in the previous question is not against this. Quaestio II, "an Deus sit", by the form of its title as well as by its content, is not a treatment of being as a name of God. Thus, although many of Thomas' Neoplatonic predecessors would not name God being at all, Thomas has clearly done so within a Neoplatonic tradition and context: God's being is simple; it is not composed of existence and essence.

The second side, although a consequence of this identification of being with the first principle, is in danger of destroying the very Neoplatonic thought patterns through which we are able to describe it. We have identified the two Proclan structural principles operating in the Summa, the logic of the One and the logic of the finite. The first keeps the ultimate above all multiplicity. The second, πορεία and ἐκατορομαι, structures the finite.
It is led out from the One, and drawn back again. In Proclus, the two meet in all that is below the One, giving reality its triadic structure. For, without the immanence of the One, the finite would not be. But no reversion, not even self-reversion, can occur in the One without destroying its essential simplicity. This is not so in Aquinas. The exitus-reditus form is found at all levels of his Summa. Recollect how it structures central concepts in the system as well as ordering its elements together. Though both of these features are found in later Neoplatonism, Thomas has moved beyond his predecessors. He has pushed the logic of the finite up into the divine unity itself. As described above, the questions on the divine substance are ordered so as to flow out from the simplicity and to return to the unity. This logic is effective in the content as well. God's being is self-relation. The highest is self-subsistence.

The movement upward has the same form as the movement downward; the structure of both informs the nature of God. The ways in the proof by which we rise to the knowledge of his existence are ordered in a sequence never used by Aristotle. Corresponding to his four causes, they begin with the moving cause and, passing through the material and formal causes, they conclude with the final. In God these causes are identical. Descending, the self-subsistent divine esse progressively unfolds its simplicity to reveal itself as knowing and willing, a Trinity of persons and finally, as creator and saviour of the world. All these are forms of self-relation. This unification of the two Proclan logics in Aquinas' treatment of God is just what answers the criticism of those who cannot find what is Christian in his doctrine of God. Jesus, they think, ought to appear in the Prima Pars and not wait for his entry in the Tertia Pars. The truth is that he appears in different forms in...
both. The consubstantiality of Father and the Son, of the ultimate source and the *Verbum*, forces the logic of the finite into the infinite. This is the Christian motive for "telescoping the hypostases". Thus even in the strongly Proclan Dionysius the separate existence of hypostases begins to be annihilated. The division between creator and creature comes to be more felt than that between the One and the rest of the spiritual and material hierarchy.

A similar change takes place among the Arabic Neoplatonists. Thomas and modern scholars are aware of the similarity of the philosophical positions of the *De Divinis Nominibus* and the *Liber de Causis*.

No doubt this can be connected to the motive force of Moslem monotheism.

There is, however, something further to be said about these developments. For this "telescoping" is not just a feature of Porphyrian heresy, or Christian orthodoxy or Arabic philosophy but it is also a necessity even for the Iamblichian tradition. E.R. Dodds comments on Proclus:

> he has the interesting phrase *καλλίτεις μὲν τοσοῦτον* καλλίτεις de πολλῷ πολλῷ. If this be pressed, it must mean that the separateness of the lower is an illusion resulting from a partial point of view, and it follows that the sensible and intelligible cosmos are both of them appearance, and only the One fully real. This doctrine was never accepted by the Neoplatonists, but they often seem on the verge of falling into it.

Further, the difference between Porphyry and Proclus may only be that of two mutually necessary perspectives taken separately:

> *Il est précisément remarquable que Iamblique et Proclus, réfractaires aux initiatives de Porphyre, n'étudient pas la transition de l'Un à l'être sur le trajet descendant qui va (en imagination) de l'unité pure à l'unité multiple; ils l'étudient à l'intérieur du processus par lequel la totalité s'autogénère en explicitant une unité qui lui est immaté, qui lui appartient, une unité qu'elle enveloppe pour la développer.*

P. Hadot states it simply: Porphyry wishes to explain "la génération
de l'Un-Étant par le premier Un". Iamblichus and his successors describe "l'autogénération de l'Un-Étant, c'est-à-dire le passage de l'Un à l'Étant dans la totalité Un-Étant." 364

If these differences be really a matter of from which side we look at the generation of reality and its elements, Thomas is attempting to unite them both.

Quia vero naturalis ratio per creaturas in Dei cognitionem ascendit, fidei vero cognitio a Deo in nos e converso divina revelatione descendit, est autem eadem via ascensus et discensus. 365

So finally, it seems that in diverse ways, each with its own special difficulties, Porphyry, Proclus and Thomas are all forced to identify unity and being and to elevate simplicity. There is in Thomas no clear choice between ontology and henology, between the primacy of unity or of being.

Our examination of Thomas' sources has resulted in uncovering a fundamental tension in his thought. It remains to substantiate our interpretation of the structure of the Summa by a more detailed examination of the first forty-five questions, seeing how in these the opposed logical forces operate. Beyond that we must try to judge how successfully their tension has been resolved and to what extent the life and comprehensiveness of Thomas' system compels its own dissolution.
"ordo disciplina" is both the order of teaching and the necessary objective order of the content: M.-D. Chenu, Toward Understanding St. Thomas, brings out its ambiguity:

St. Thomas uses the words: ordo disciplina. In point of fact the construction of such an order is required by the very object of science. The latter does not surrender itself to the mind apart from that hidden order without which the most exact formulae would be, scientifically speaking, shapeless and impenetrable matter (p. 301).


1ST I, prologus.


3Per Eric Persson, Sacra Doctrina, p. 7.

4Judging by the number of surviving MSS discovered to date, see J.A. Weisheipl, Friar Thomas d'Aquino: His life, thought and works (Oxford, 1975), pp. 358, 360-361. This list gathers in everything before printing and the domination of the Summa Theologiae in the earlier period might be less than for the whole period; still it is clearly in majority.

5The Dominican order soon rallied round Thomas' teaching and used the Summa to expound it but outside it was far different; see F.J. Roensch, Early Thomistic School (Dubuque, 1964). Even within the order, the Summa's structure did not immediately conquer that of the Sentences: Albert the Great in his Summa written after Thomas' death follows the order of Alexander's Summa; cf. M.M. Gorce, "Le problème des trois Sommes, Alexandre de Hales, Thomas d'Aquin, Albert le Grand," Revue thomiste, 26 (1931), 293-301. "The first comprehensive work of the Thomist school . . . rather

The issue is discussed by M. Grabmann, La Somme Théologique de saint Thomas d'Aquin, trans. of Einführung in die Summa des hl. T. von Aquin (Fribourg i. Br., 1919/Paris, 1925), p. 91, Chenu, Toward, p. 300 and Weisheipl, Friar Thomas, pp. 216-217 and there is an extensive literature on the subject but the debate is effectively terminated by H.F. Dondaine, "'Alia lectura fratris Thomae' (Super I Sent.)," Medieval Studies, 42 (1980), 308-336. Fr Dondaine has discovered the supposed second commentary of Thomas on the Sentences: "un manuscrit du Super primum Sententiarium, qui fait mention d'une alia lectura fratris Thomae" (p. 308).

La doctrine est évidemment celle de Frère Thomas, puisée à bonnes sources. La 1ère Pars est exploitée dans nos pièces VII, IX, X, XII, XIV et XV; le Compendium est utilisé en extraits pour les pièces VII et XI; l'In Boetii De Trinitate est au moins consulté pour I, II et III, du De Veritate est transcrit un extrait en pièce X. On peut donc parler d'un disciple de Saint Thomas; disciple inconnu et discret, qui fait son profit des clairs chapitres du Compendium pour enrichir le Commentaire thomiste au premier livre des Sentences. . . . Or cet ensemble ne favorise guère l'idée d'une intervention personnelle de saint Thomas (ibid., p. 335).

For the sources cf. Magistri Petri Lombardi, Sententiae in IV Libris Distinctae, Editio Tertia, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum 4 (Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, Grottaferrata, 1971), I, pp. 1194. J. Pieper, Scholasticism, trans. R and C Winston (London, 1961), p. 98, calls it "... a systematically organized Augustinian breviary . . . It contains one thousand texts from the works of Augustine; these works make up nearly four fifths of the whole. In consequence Lombard is placed by the author of the Summa philosophiae in the third rank of theologians, "those that are called 'makers of Summaries' (multique moderniores scriptores, quos summarum vocant confectores)," E. Gilson, History, p. 267. He removes most of the philosophical speculation in his sources (ibid., p. 314). Apparently, this lack of originality is honestly derived from its model, John Damascene's The Source of Knowledge. Its "... third part [was] a collection of texts taken from his predecessors and arranged in systematic order, about the fundamental truths of the Christian religion. This third part . . . was to serve as a model for the Book of Sentences of Peter Lombard . . . John Damascene did not claim to do any original work in philosophy but to organize a hand-collection of philosophical notions useful to the theologian" (ibid., p., 91).

Fairweather, Scholastic Misc., pp. 226-227 quoting and translating de Ghellinck.

On this see M.-D. Chenu, S. Thomas d'Aquin et la théologie,
Maftres Spirituel 17 (Paris, 1959), p. 179; idem, La theologie au douzieme siecle, Etudes de phil. medievale, 45 (Paris, 1957) and G.R. Evans, Old Arts. On the specific character of Thomas' development of the quaestio see Grabmann, La Somme Theologique, p. 80

11 The editors of the Sentences write: "Quaestionem profundius indagantes, concludere coacti sumus Magistrum Alexandrum primum Distinctiones introduxisse sive tanquam ab ipso inventas sive, quod multo minus probabile est, ut sumptas ab alio magistro anonymo et huc usque ignoto" (Sententiae In IV Libris Distinctae, p. 144*). Cf. Magistri Alexandri de Hales, Glossa in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, I (Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, Quaracchi, 1951), pp. 33*, 65*, 102*, 107*-109*.


14 "Item prima in tres: in prima de fruibilibus, in secunda de utibiliibis, et secundo libro, in tertis de his quae ordinant utibilia ad fruibilia, quae etiam partim sunt utibilia, partim fruibilia, et hoc in tertio libro." Ibid. Lombard is explicit that both divisions derive from Augustine.

15 "Unde in prima parte determinat de rebus divinis secundum exitum a principio; in secunda secundum reditum in finem et hoc in principio tertii [libri]." Ibid.

16 "primo tractabimus de Deo." ST I, 2, prol. "... postquam praedictum est de exemplari, scilicet de Deo et de his quae proccerunt ex divina potestate secundum eius voluntatem." ST I-II, prol.


18 "tertio de Christo, qui secundum quod homo via est nobis tendendi in Deum", ST I, 2, prol. "Circa quam primo considerandum occurrit de ipso Salvatore; secundo, de sacrementis eius, quibus saltem consequimur; tertio de fine immortalis vitae, ad quam per ipsum resurgendo pervenimus." ST III, prol.

19 "Quia Salvator noster Dominus Iesus Christus" Ibid.
Post considerationem corum quae ad divinam substantiam pertinent, restat considerandum de his quae pertinent ad operationem ipsius." ST I, 14, prol. These are qq. 14-26.

See below chapter II,C.

P. Faucon, Aspects néoplatoniciens de la doctrine de saint Thomas d'Aquin is concerned with these sources of his doctrine of Christ.

"This order [of the Sentences] cannot have the objective breadth of speculative reaches that the plan of St. Thomas offers, because these Augustinian categories are centred on the psychology of man, not on the work of God as such." Chenu, Towards, p. 310.

"Pour lui, 'l'inconnaissance de cette Suressentialité même qui dépasse raison, pensée et essence, tel doit être l'objet de la science suressentielle.' L'objet de la théologie ne peut être que Dieu." Ch. A. Bainard, "Les formes de la théologie chez Denys l'Areopagite," Gregorianum, 59 (1978), 41. Cf. ST I, 1, 7 obi. 1 drawn from Dionysius' disciple John of Damascus.

J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics, pp. 152ff.; E. Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, p. 157 are sufficient to establish that God is a subject of metaphysics for Aristotle. The claim of Fr Owens that separate entity or God is the subject rather than being is more doubtful, cf. J.D. Beach, "Separate Entity as the Subject of Aristotle's Metaphysics," The Thomist, 20 (1957), 75-95. The names of the science are given at Metaphysics, E, 1: 1026a19 and 1026a24.

See n.I, 111 above.


"Omnia autem pertractantur in sacra doctrina sub ratione Dei, vel quia sunt ipse Deus, vel quia habent ordinem ad Deum, ut ad principium et finem. Unde sequitur quod Deus vere sit subjectum huius scientia." ST I, 1, 7. Cf. also ST I, 1, 3 ad 1 and I, 2, prol.

If one sticks strictly to the exact form of the statement, Deus is the subjectum of this scientia, Thomas is likely its initiator among Christians. For a history of "theology" cf. E. Schillebeeckx, Revelation and Theology, trans. of 'Theologie' in Theologisch Woordenboek, III (1958), trans. N.D. Smith (London, 1967),
chapter V. The objective and deductive character of theology thus understood is opposed by contemporary theologians who prefer to understand it more subjectively -- it has to do with God in his self-communication rather than in himself; cf. for example, "theology" in Sacramentum Mundi, 6 (London, 1970), pp. 234-236. On the history see also de Chellinck, Le mouvement théologique, pp. 91ff.

32 There is no possibility of understanding the structure of Thomas' Summa simply through Aristotle, as in Garrigou-Lagrange, De Deo Uno, p. 19 who thinks distinctions made in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics will suffice.

33 The first place where Lombard treats anything equivalent to Thomas' consideration of the essentia Dei is at Distinctio VIII "De proprietate et incommutabilitate et simplicitate Dei essentia" which occurs right in the middle of what Thomas would designate as "ea quae pertinent ad distinctionem Personarum".


35 Alexandri de Hales, Summa Theologica, 4 vol. (Ad Claras Aquas, Quaracchi, 1924-1948) distinguishes within the "Libri Primi Pars Prima" between the inquisition "de substantia divinae Unitatis" and that "de pluralitate divinae Trinitatis" and within the "inquisitio prima" of the "Libri Primi Pars Secunda" between the tract "de nominibus essentialibus" and that "de nominibus personalibus". Bonaventure's Itinerarium mentis in Deum, Opera Theologica Selecta, 5 vol., V (Quaracchi, 1964), pp. 296-313 divides chapter 5 and 6 between a de deo uno and a de deo trino respectively.

36 Distinctio XXXV is "de quibusdam quae secundum substantiam de Deo dicuntur, quae specialem efflagitant tractatem, scilicet de scientia et praescientia et providentia et dispositione, prae-destinatione, voluntate et potentia". This gives the plan for the rest of Liber I.

37 Thomas comments I, d. I, div. textus: "Primus autem liber dividitur in duas partes ... in secunda determinantur attributa quaedam, ex quorum rationibus completur causalitas in divinis personis respectu productionis creaturarum, scilicet de scientia, potentia, voluntate infra, XXXV distinct. . . ."


Dodds, Elements, p. 264:
Goodness, Power and Knowledge constitute the primary divine triad (Th. Pl. I.xvi, 44), which prefigures in a seminal form the triad of the second hypostasis, Being, Life, and Intelligence (prop. 101) -- is already a standing definition of the One in Plot (e.g. V.iii.15) . . . The Procline doctrine reappears in ps.-Dion., who devotes separate chapters of the Div. Nom. to the praise of God as , as , and as .

One might say it extends to Thomas as well where a source is Augustine (ST I, 39, 8 obj. 3). See ST I, 39, 8 c. as follows:

Potentia enim habet rationem principii. Unde habet similitudinem cum Patre caelesti, qui est principium totius divinitatis . . . Sapientia vero similitudinem habet cum Filio caelesti, inquantum est Verbum, quod nihil alius est quam conceptus sapientiae . . . Bonitas autem, cum sit ratio et objectum amoris, habet similitudinem cum Spiritu divino, qui est Amor."

See n.I, 14 above. For the plan consequent on these purposes cf. ScG I, 9.

T. Delvigne, "L'inspiration propre du traité de Dieu dans le Commentaire des Sentences de saint Thomas," Bulletin thomiste, 3 (1932), 119*-122*. E. zum Brunn, "La 'metaphysique de l'Exode' selon Thomas d'Aquin," Dieu et l'être, p. 253, reports this view but holds rather that his use of Aristotle's ways to God's being through sensible effects already alters the Augustinian logic of the Sentences and "les voies dionysiennes sont intégrées à une épistémologie sui generis." Ibid., pp. 266-267. She makes a great deal of Thomas' reversal, after the Sentences' commentary, of Augustine's placing of immutability after eternity; this change is owing to Thomas' Aristotelian ascent to God as the unmoved mover ibid., pp. 250-251.


Hom. in Evang. II, 34 (PL 76, 1249 and 1252): "Decem vero drachmas habuit mulier, quia novem sunt ordines angelorum. Sed ut completeretur electorum numerus, homo decimus est creatus . . . Quia
enim superna illa civitas ex angelis et hominibus constat, ad quam tantum credimus humanum genus ascendere, quantos illic contigit electos angelos remanisse, sicut scriptum est: "Statuit terminos gentium secundum numerum angelorum Dei." This occurs then in the context of the parable of the ten coins and includes Gregory's listing of the nine orders of angels so like that of ps.-Dionysius. Miss Jean Petersen informs me that "the exegesis of this parable and that of the lost sheep by Gregory, Cyril of Alexandria, Gregory of Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa and Origen (scraps only) is extraordinarily similar." This would indicate that in Gregory the Great, at least, the Augustinian and Greek tradition meet at this point. Anselm, Gregory and Peter Lombard are considered in M. Chenu's treatment of this question "Cur Homo? Le sou-sol d'une controverse," La théologie au douzième siècle, pp. 52-61. Fr Chenu thinks that Honorius changed his mind on this matter from the Elucidarium to the Libellus VIII Quaestionum (p. 55). But M.O. Garrigues has shown that Honorius never held that man was "pro angelo sed non pro ipso creatus". He never belonged to the more pessimistic Augustinian tradition on this point; cf. her L'oeuvre d'Honorius Augustodunensis; Inventaire critique, unpublished Ph.D. diss., Univ. de Montréal, 1979, pp. 280-299. This is of some importance as Honorius is a main source for the Eriugenan tradition in the twelfth century.

45 De fide Catholica (PL Brevis Fidei Christianae Complexio), last sentence (PL 64, 1328): "Sola ergo nunc est fidelium exspectatio, qua credimus resurrecturas homines . . . ut ex eis, reparato angelico numero, superna illa civitas impleatur."

46 Cur Deus Homo 1, 16-18 (PL 158, 381-385): "Deum constat proposuisse ut de humana natura, quam fecit sine peccato, numerum angelorum qui ceciderunt restitueret."

47 Sent. lib. II, d.1,c.9 (PL 192, 654): "De homine in Scriptura interdum reperitur quod factus sit propter reparationem angelicae ruinae. Quod non est ita intelligendum, quasi non fuisse homo factus, si non peccasset angelus; sed quia inter alias causas ut praecipuas, haec etiam nonnulla existit."

48 In II Sent., d.1,q.2,a.3; ST II prol. cites John of Damascus as the source of his view of man. Cf. also ST I, 93, 5, obj. 2 and 1, 93, 9.

49 See n.III, 73 below.


51 Thomas transforms a formula about the soul -- "quasi horizon et confinium spiritualis et corporalis naturae" -- from Prop. 2 of the Liber de Causis, into a doctrine of man as sum of creations's elements. The text is found in ScG II, 68 and 81. Cf. F. Ruello, "Saint Thomas et Pierre Lombard," p. 202. For man as gathering the
aspects of the cosmos together cf. Proclus In Tim. I, 5. 7-21 and
H.D. Saffrey, "Théologie et anthropologie d’après quelques préfaces
de Proclus," Images of Man in Ancient and Medieval Thought, Studia
Gerardo Verbeke, ed. C. Laga et al. (Leuven, 1976), pp. 210-211.
Man’s dignity stems from his complexity. As rational, irrational
creatures are ordered to him, but as corporal and sensible he has a
part with them and so in heaven they will be given a glory to match
his: ST I,20, 2 ad 3; ScG III (1), 81-83; ScG III (2), 112; ScG IV,
97; Comp. Theo. I, 148. His humanity joins him to Christ and so he
is better and more loved than the angels: ST I, 20, 4 ad 2. See
also n.III, 77.

52 C. Lafont, Structures et méthode dans la Somme Theologique de
saint Thomas, Textes et étude theo. (Paris/Brugé, 1961), pp. 192ff.;
J. Pelikan, "Imago Dei, An Explication of Summa theologiae, I, 93,"
Calgary Aquinas Studies, ed. A. Parel (Toronto, 1978), pp. 27-48;
P. Faucon, Aspects néoplatoniciens. This is also true of Eriugena
and perhaps accounts for the similarities between their anthro-
pologies at least in respect to the role man plays in both systems.

53 Proclus, Elements, Prop. 211.

54 "Necesse est ut ad consummationem totius theologici negotii
... de ipso omnium Salvatore ... nostra consideratio subseguatur." ST III, prol.

55 n.I, 125 above.

56 Chenu, Towards, p. 315.

57 Persson, Sacra Doctrina, p. 254; cf. also A. Maurer, St Thomas
and Historicity for a similar view. Lafont, Structures, chap. 1,
considers Chenu’s theory along with a number of other current posi-
tions and finds it unsatisfactory.

58 "quia homo ordinatur ad Deum sicut ad quandum finem qui com-pre-
hensionem rationis exedit" ST I,1,1.

59 "quasi liberum arbitrium habens et suorum operum potestatem."
ST II, prol.

60 It is significant that Lombard moves directly from man's crea-
tion to his fall: Lib. II, d. XVI, "de homine facto ad imaginem Dei";
d. xvii, "de creatione animal, et de paradiso", d. xviii, "de
formatione mulieris, et de causis rerum", d. xix, "de primo hominis
statu ante peccatum", d. xxi, "de invidia diaboli et modo tentationis",
d. xxii, "quae fuerit origo et radix primo peccati". But Thomas
divides the matter between the Prima Pars and the Secunda Pars. Prima
Pars has a treatise on man as God's work (qq.75ff.) where man is
considered according to his essential powers and his unfallen state
(qq.96ff.). It is in the Secunda Pars, where he is "suorum operum
principium" (prol.) that his fall is considered -- sin begins
(I-II, qq.71ff.), the fall (qq.80ff.).
61**ST** I, 2, proI.; III, prol.; Comp. Theo., I, 2.

62Cf. n.II, 8 above. Much of this chapter was presented as a paper for the Eighth International Conference on Patristic Studies, Oxford, 1979 and was printed in Dionysius 3 (1979), 99-110, entitled: "The Place of the Psychological Image of the Trinity in the Arguments of Augustine's de Trinitate, Anselm's Monologion, and Aquinas' Summa Theologiae."

63The Proslogion is the source of ST I, 2, 1 obj. 1 but in fact both it and the Monologion and seven other works by Anselm are cited in the Indices, S. Thomae de Aquino, Summa Theologiae et Summa Contra Gentiles, Leonine Manual edition (Romae, 1948), index tertius, p. 155.

64Most works on Anselm do not get past his proofs for God's existence. On the structure of the Monologion as a whole there is P. Vignaux, "Structure et sens du Monologion," Rev. sc. ph. th., 31 (1947), 192-212. The results of this analysis are found in his Philosophy in the Middle Ages, trans. of Philosophie au moyen âge (Westport, 1973), pp. 35-38 and now idem, "Les raisons dans le Monologion," Rev. sc. ph. th., 64 (1980), 3-25. F. Copleston, Medieval Philosophy, A History of Philosophy, II (New York, 1962), pp. 180-182 and E. Gilson, History, pp. 134-136 contain partial analyses beyond the proofs but they always avoid what is not "philosophy". Vignaux thinks that to apply these distinctions between philosophy and theology to the Monologion "is to shatter its dialectical structure."

By considering only these proofs, and by including in the essence of the Creator a doctrine of the divine attributes, seen as ideas, a 'natural theology' is extracted from Anselm's tract, a treatise 'on the one God' as distinguished from a treatise 'on the triune God' as the subject of 'revealed theology'. Philosophy, pp. 36-37.

Les thèmes entremêlés d'un de Deo uno et d'un de Deo trino sont à ne pas séparer sous peine d'incompréhension de la dialectique du Monologion dans son originalité. "Les raisons", p. 4.

Thomas' treatises are more separable but to divide some out as philosophy and others as theology has also brought about a misunderstanding of the dialectic of the Summa in its originality.


... the project that was to dominate his intellectual life "to see with the eye of reason those things which in the Holy Scriptures . . . lay hidden in deep obscurity . . ." Eadmer . . . It was in this context [of the remarkable intellectual life at Bec] . . . that Anselm found the means of executing his project; he drew mainly upon certain of Aristotle's logical works, together with the commentaries [of] Boethius.

E. Gilson, History, p. 363:

[ Aristotle's] logic spread in all the Christian schools a dialectical ideal of exposition which progressively invaded theology . . . Saint Anselm . . . used a dialectical mode of exposition that little resembled the free and supple digressions so frequent in the works of his master [Augustine].


68 Vignaux, Philosophy, p. 35.


Vignaux, Philosophy, p. 36.

72 "Pros. cap. xxiii simply begins: 'Hoc bonum es tu Deus Pater; hoc est Verbum tuum id est Filius tuus.'" The Monologion, on the other hand, laid the grounds of the demonstration that God is Trinity very early. When considering the source of creation, the divine speaking ('locutio rerum') was introduced (cap. x), the nature of his word and its relation to the Coeternal Word are considered some twenty chapters later (cc. xxix, xxxff.), only after this is the manner of relation of the Spirit to this Word discovered to be best explained as birth, begetting -- the relation of a father begetting a son rather than a mother a daughter etc. (cc. xxxixff.). The Holy Spirit is similarly arrived at through love. There then follows a section on the relations of the Persons with each other (respectively cc. xlxff. and cc. lviiiff.).

73 These concerns, especially that with nothingness, the question of self-creation is taken up by Augustine (but on Eriugena see n. III, 238 below), may indicate some interest by Anselm, though negative, in the thought of Eriugena and his followers, see Duclow, "Anselm's Argument."

74 For example Mono. c. xx, "quod illa sit in omni loco et tempore" and c. xxi, "quod in nullo sit loco aut tempore" are resolved in c. xxii, "quomodo sit in omni et in nullo loco".

Pros. cc. vi and vii are concerned with problems raised as questions at the beginning of c. vi.

76 "Quapropter si cui videbitur quod, in eodem opusculo aliquid protulerim, quod aut nimis novum sit aut a veritate dissentiat; rogo, ne statim me aut praesumptorem novitatum aut falsitatis assertorem exclamet, sed prius libros praefati doctoris Augustini de


78 J.J. O'Meara, "Magnorum Vivorum Quendam Consensum, Velimus Machinari, Eriugena's Use of Augustine's de Genesi ad Litteram in the de divisione naturae" a paper for the Third International Eriugena Colloquium, Freiburg i.Br., 1979 gives useful examples from the Confessions and De Genesi ad litteram (e.g., de Gen. I.ix, 17) of how things are formed by turning back toward their source. Prof. O'Meara finds the origin of this notion in the Enneads (e.g., V i,6,7) and refers us to the Notes Complementaires of Agaësse and Solignac in Bibliothèque augustiniennne, Volumes 48 and 49. For the return as a structural principle in Augustine see R.D. Crouse, "Recurrens in te unum: The Pattern of St. Augustine's Confessions," Studia Patristica XIV, ed. E.A. Livingstone, Texte und Untersuchungen 117 (Berlin, 1976), pp. 389-392. J. Trouillard believes that procession in Plotinus is "above all ascending", see n. 272 above. A. Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition, treats Plotinus and his influence on the structure of spiritual life for Augustine.


80 Aquinas, In de Trinitate, prol., p. 47, 17-22.

81 Interchangeably the Neoplatonic first principle, "τὸ ἐν τῷ τοῦτῳ" Proclus, Elements, Prop. 13.

82 The first use begins at c.x (p. 24) with the "locutio rerum" but the crucial turning round is in c.cccii: "Sive igitur ille cogitatur nulla alia existente essentia, sive alius existentibus: necessè est verbum illius coae ternum illi esse cum illo" (p. 51). From c.xxvii (p. 45) the Divine is treated as "individuus spiritus" and compared to "mens rationalis" (p. 51); this development reaches its conclusion in c.li (p. 65): "Palam certe est rationem habentium non idcirco sui memorem esse aut se intelligere quia se amat ... Patet igitur amorem summí spiritus ... ." The second use begins at c.lxvi: "Quod per rationalem mentem maxime accedatur ad cognoscendum summam essentiam" (p. 77).
The crucial texts are Summa Theologiae I, 14, 1: "Unde cum Deus in' summo immaterialitatis . . . sequitur quod ipse sit in summo cognitionis", I, 19, 1: "Unde in quolibet habente intellectum est voluntas", and I, 27, 1: "actiones in natura intellectuelle et divina non sunt nisi duae, scilicet intelligere et velle, . . . Relinquitur igitur quod nulla alia processio possit esse in Deo, nisi verbi et amoris."


"sola ratione", Monologion, c.i, 11, p. 13; Eadmer, Vita Sancti Anselmi, c.xix, p. 29.

Summa Theologiae I, 32, 1; In I Sent. 3, 1, 4; De Veritate X, 13; In Rom. I, 6; In de Trinitate I, 4; see chapter III, D below especially at n. 368.

"haec doctrina non argumentatur ad sua principia probanda, quae sunt articuli fidei; sed ex eis procedit ad aliquid ostendendum" ST I, 1, 8. Cf. Schillebeeckx, Revelation, p. 148; Persson, Sacra Doctrina, p. 74.

Richards, Apologetical Perspective, is a complete discussion of Vagaggini's argument and makes this point at the conclusion. R. Garrigou-Lagranges, De Deo Trino et Creatore ed. altera revisa (Turin, 1951), p. 224 speaks of the order of philosophy as " . . . ordo inventionis et ascensionis. E contrario tractatus theologicus . . . descendingo de Deo".

P. Vanier, Théologie trinitaire chez saint Thomas d'Aquin: Évolution du concept d'action notionnelle, Univ. de Montréal Publ. de l'Institut d'études médiévales, 13 (Montréal/Paris, 1953), p. 15. See in contrast Augustine's own negative statement on the categories of Aristotle: Confessions IV, 16. But the attitude to pagan thought has changed by the time of Boethius and Augustine is to be set against Boethius, Eriugena and perhaps Anselm in this -- cf. J.A. Doull, "Augustinian Trinitarianism and Existential Theology," Dionysius 3 (1979), p. 152, n.48 and R.D. Crouse, "Semina Rationum: St Augustine and Boethius," Dionysius 4 (1980), pp. 77-86. On the peculiar Platonism of the High Middle Ages which had increasing less interest in Plato himself cf. R.W. Southern, Platonism, scholastic method and the School of Chartres, The Stenton Lecture 1978, 12 (Reading, 1979), pp. 5-15. In fact, Boethius, Eriugena and St Thomas are more Aristotelian and more Platonist than Augustine, something perfectly possible for Neoplatonists. Eriugena's De Divisione Naturae "is in some ways the purest statement of Platonism ever put forward" (J.N. Findlay, Plato, The Written, p. 387) and yet the first book is devoted largely to a consideration of God in terms of Aristotle's categories. For the return to Aristotle in late


91 See chapter II, C.

92 See chapter II, A.

93 Judged by the evidence of the new *Index Thomisticus* (ed. R. Busa, Frommann-holzboog, 1975) -- if explicit citations count for anything -- the influence of Anselm on the first book of the Commentary on the Sentences and of the *Summa Theologiae* is less than that of Boethius, for example, and when compared with Augustine, Aristotle, Dionysius and even Origen only his number of citations decreases (to almost half) between the two works whereas the others all at least double.
The reason for this apparent decline in influence on Thomas from the Commentary on the Sentences may stem from the dependence of that work on Bonaventure's Commentary (cf. n. II, 12 above). For Anselm's considerable effect on Bonaventure's theology cf. J.G. Bougerol, "Saint Bonaventure et saint Anselme".

Augustine's argument necessarily involves these two sides; cf. R.D. Crouse, "St. Augustine's De Trinitate," conclusion; also J.A. Doull, "Augustinian Trinitarianism," p. 124, n.12 speaks of Augustine's logic in the Confessions: "There is neither experience without the relation [to God] nor is this without experience." A criticism of Anselm's Proslogion from this perspective involves all the problems of his so-called ontological proof.


For a complete list of references cf. Southern, St. Anselm and His Biographer, p. 17; for his consequent difference from developed mediaeval scholasticism see p. 52.


E. Jüngel, The Doctrine of the Trinity, God's being is in becoming, trans. H. Harris, Monograph supplement to The Scottish


102 Ibid., p. 84.

103 Ibid.


105 Boethius, De Trinitate, p. 8, 5-16.

106 "Sicut ergo naturalis cognitionis principium est creaturae notitia a sensu accepta, ita cognitionis desuper datae principium est primae veritatis notitia per fidem infusa. Et hinc est quod diverso ordine hinc inde proceditur. Philosophi enim, qui naturalis cognitionis ordinem sequuntur, praeordinant scientiam de creaturis scientiae divinae, scilicet naturalem metaphysicae. Sed apud theologi proceditur everso, ut creatoris consideratione considerationem praeveniat creaturae. Hunc ergo ordinem secutus Boethius ea quae sunt fidei tractare intendens in ipsa summa rerum origine principium suae considerationis instituit, scilicet trinitate unius simplicis dei." In de Trin., prol., p. 45, l.22-p. 46, l.10.

107 See n,1,111 above.

108 "Prima namque est de trinitate personarum, ex quorum processione omnis alia nativitas vel processio derivatur, in hoc quidem libro, qui prae manibus habetur, quantum ad id quod de trinitate et unitate scendum est, in alio vero libro, quem ad Ioannem
diaconum ecclesiae Romanae scribit, de modo praedicandi, quo utimur in personarum trinitate, qui sic incipit: Quaero an pater. Secunda vero pars est de processione bonarum creaturarum a Deo bono in libro, qui ad eundem Iohannem conscribitur De hebdomadibus, qui sic incipit. Postulas a me. Tertia vero pars est de reparacione creaturarum per Christum. Quae quidem in duo dividitur. Primo namque proponitur fides, quam Christus docuit qua iustificamur, in libro qui intitulatur De fide Christiana, qui sic incipit, Christianam fidem. Secundo explanatur quid de Christo sentiendum sit, quomodo siclicet duae naturae in una persona conveniant et hoc in libro De duabus Naturis et una persona Christi, ad Iohannem praedictum conscripto, qui sic incipit: Anxie te quidem." In de Trinitate, prol., p. 47, 1-16.


110 "Modus autem de trinitate tractandi duplex est, ut dicit Augustinus in I De trinitate, scilicet per auctoritates et per rationes, quem utrumque modum Augustinus complexus est ... Boethius vero elegit prossequi per alium modum, scilicet per rationes, presupponens hoc quid ab aliis per auctoritates fuerat prosecutum." In de Trinitate, prol., p. 47, 17; p. 48, 1. "In his complete espousal of classical tradition, Boethius seems far removed from St. Augustine. While St. Augustine was conscious of deep indebtedness to the theology of the platonici, he was still more conscious of the need for a fresh beginning, a new principium ... Thus, for St. Augustine, the Revealed Word must be the new starting point of philosophy, and therefore, in his treatise, De trinitate, for instance, a beginning is made by establishing the doctrine on the authority of Scripture ... When Boethius approaches the same subject, in the Tractates, there is no Biblical exegesis, no exegesis of auctoritates of any sort; there is only logical explanation ... The point is that, for Boethius, the doctrine is established in the world ... To demonstrate them [the principles of Catholic doctrine], to 'conjoin faith and reason', means to provide the logical categorical explication of them." R.D. Crouse, "Semina Rationum," pp. 83-84.

111 The distinctions between Plotinus, Porphyry and Proclus are considered at length in the next chapter.

112 Cf. n.II, 79 above.

113 P. Courcelle, Les lettres grecques en Occident de Macrobe à Cassiodore (Paris, 1948), pp. 258-312; H. Chadwick, "The Christian Platonism of Boethius". valedictory lecture, Christ Church, Oxford, June, 1979; idem, "The Authenticity," p. 551: "It is also recognized that the first three and fifth tractates contain rather more Neo-
platonism than the Consolation itself, which is to say much." Of
the third tractate he writes, "All the basic ideas in it can be
traced to the various writings of Proclus." ibid, n.2. See also R.
D. Crouse, "Semina Rationum".

114 De universis autem quae intelligimus non loquentem qui per-
sonat foris, sed intus ipsi menti præsidentem consulimus veritatem . . .
Ille autem qui consulimus, docet, qui in interiore homine habitore
dictus est Christus, . . . id est incommutabilis Dei Virtus atque
sempiterna Sapientia; quam guidem omnis rationalis anima consult
him very closely in this though it belongs to a different stage of
his argument: "Eia nunc, homuncio, fuge paululum occupationes tuas,
absconde te modicum tuae mens tuis cognitationibus . . . 'Intra
in cubiculum' mentis tuae, exclude omnis praeter deum." Proslogion,
I, 4-8. M.-D. Chenu, Nature, Man and Society, pp. 45ff., 63-64, 125
contrasts the Augustinian and Dionysian spiritualities. Also R.D.
Crouse, "Intention Moyaist," pp. 153-155 and A. Louth, The Origins of
the Christian Mystical Tradition, pp. 162ff.

115 Plotini, Enneades, Opera, ed. F. Henry et H.R. Schwyzer, 3
vol., Museum Lessianum, Series Philosofia 33 (Paris/Brussels, 1951-
1973), I 6, 8,4; I 6,9,1; III 8,6,40; IV 8,1,2; V 8,2,32; V 8,11,11;
VI 9,7,17; VI 9,11,38. Cf. n.II, 78 above and A.H. Armstrong,
126-139 in Plotinian and Christian Studies, Variorum Reprints (London,
1979).

116 Chapter II, B.

117 For a list of texts from Augustine and an example of a
mediaeval interpretation see S. Bonaventure, Quaestiones Disputatae
de scientia Christi, Opera Omnia 10 vol., V (Ad Claras Aquas, Quaracchi,
1891), V, pp. 17ff. This is the illuminationist exegesis which is
not explicitly found in Anselm.

118 Enneades IV 8,8,2-3; V 1,10. Cf. C.G. Steel, The Changing
Self, A Study of the Soul in later Neoplatonism; Iamblichus,
Damascius and Priscianus (Brussels, 1978).

119 See chapters II, D and III, A.

120 In the relation of the first and fourth divisions of nature
in Eriugena, i.e., "quae creat et non creatur" and "quae nec creat
quarta unum sunt, quoniam de Deo solum modo intelliguntur; est enim
principium omnium, quae a se condita sunt, et finis omnium quae
eum appetunt, ut in eo aeternaliter immutabiliter quiescant." ibid., II,2 (PL 122, 526). The passage just following, which con-
tains the same doctrine, was in the Corpus Dionysianum used by
Thomas; cf. H.F. Dondaine, Le Corpus Dionysien de l'Universite de
Paris au XIIIe siecle (Roma, 1953), p. 137. There is scholarly
opinion which regards the identification of the first and fourth
divisions as involving a shift in Eriugena's thought. He originally
calls the fourth division "impossible." The shift is said to be from
"impossibility to teleology." This is discussed in D.F. Duclow, "Dialectic and Christology in Eriugena's Periphyseon," Dionysius 4 (1980), 101-102.

121 The title of the work is Trinitas unus Deus ac non Tres Dii and has been understood to teach the priority of the divine unity; see for example "Rerum universitas subjecta est theologia, ut est in simplicite . . . Deus enim est unitas in se complicans univer- sitatem rerum in simplicitate . . . pluralitas vero explicantio est unitatis et unitas est principium et origo pluralitatis: ab unitate enim pluralitas, ab unitate descendit omnis aternitas sic Deus est unitas complicans in se rerum universitatem in simplicitate quaedam. Nam sicut unitas praecedet pluralitatem, ita simplicitas que Deus est . . . praecedet rerum diversitatem et pluralitatem." Un Commentaire anonyme sur le De Trinitate de Boece" in J.M. Parent, La doctrine de la Creation dans l'école de Chartres, études et textes, Pub. Institut d'études médiévales d'Ottawa, 8 (Ottawa/Paris, 1938), p. 183. M. Cappuyns, "Le plus ancien commentaire des Opus- cula sacra et son origine," Recherches de theo. anc. et méd. 3 (1931), p. 272 concludes that "le véritable auteur est Remi d'Auxerre." The authorship is still disputed; cf. G. Schrimpf, Die Axiomschrift des Boethius (De Hebdomadibus) als Philosophisches Lehrbuch des Mittel- alters, Studien zur Problemsgeschichte der Antiken und Mittelalter- lichen Philosophie 2 (Leiden, 1966), pp. 37-38.


et dicit quod nunc in isto capitulo sufficienter laudavit, secundum suum posse, bonum sicut vere amabile, ubi tractavit de amore; et sicut principium et finis omnium, in principio, ubi dixit de effectu boni; in quo manifestatur quasi quidam circulus in existenti-bus, dum habent idem principium et finem, scilicet bonum." In de div. nom. IV, 23, 605. See also IV, 3, 307; XIII, 3, 986-989 and text of Dionysius corresponding.

In de div. nom., II, 2, 135; "cum omnis multitudo rerum a Principio primo efflunt, primum Principium, secundum quod in se consideratur, unum est", "unum habet rationem principii." Ibid., 143; also XIII, 2, 135 and text cited. Significantly for our interpretation of the effect of Proclan, as opposed to Plotinian, influence P. Rorem finds that the treatises are arranged as three successive stages in the same direction, descending from transcendent ineffability down through the intelligible sphere to perceptible symbols. They proceed "down" into plurality regarding both their sequential subject matter and also their increasing length . . . This procession stands in the larger context of "procession and return" . . . This pattern . . . is found not only in individual passages of Pseudo-Dionysius but also in the overall organization of his corpus, namely in the sequence of the treatises before us ("The Place of the Mystical Theology," pp. 88-89).

"in hoc II cap. intendit ostendere quod divina Nomina, de quibus in hoc libro agitur, communia sunt toti Trinitate . . ." In de div. nom., II, 1, 108. Cf. also ibid., 126 and II, 2, 153.


In the next chapter.

See n.129 just above.

When showing that creation is a work of the Trinity as one not as a work of the persons individually, Thomas cites, "Sed contra est quod dicit Dionysius, II cap. De Div. Nom. quod communia totius divinitatis sunt omnia creabilia" (ST I, 45, 6).

Jean Scot Erigène, sa vie, son oeuvre, sa pensée (Louvain/Paris, 1933), p. 213.


Ibid., p. 7.


Eriugena is "a Platonist of the Platonists": W. Pittenger, "The Christian Philosophy of John Scotus Eriugena," Journal of Religion, 24, 4 (1944). "Whereas St. Augustine's thought was always moving away from Neoplatonism, Eriugena's is moving into it."
carries some elements of this Platonism "... to extremes of which probably not even the Ps.-Dionysius would have approved" Sheldon-Williams, "Eriugena's Greek Sources," p. 5. Cf. also J.N. Findlay quoted n.II, 89 above.

145 n.III, 73 below.


148 J.J. O'Meara commenting on Allard in The Mind of Eriugena, p. 157: "the first book was occupied with the disposing of the question of the categories and was to that extent preliminary."

149 I.P. Sheldon-Williams, Iohannis Scotti Eriugenae, Periphyseon, I (Dublin, 1968), p. 6. The longer passages below are given in his translation and we follow his Latin text for Books I and II.

150 Ea vero quae per excellentiam suam naturae non solum omnem sensum sed etiam omnem intellectum rationemque fugiunt iure videri non esse -- quae non nisi in solo deo materiagique et in omnium rerum quae ab eo conditae sunt rationibus atque essentiis recte intelliguntur." De Div. Nat. I, 3 (443A-443B), p. 38, 19-25. He cites Dionysius as an authority.


152 I.P. Sheldon-Williams, Periphyseon, I, p. 6.

153 ST I, 3 prol.: "Sed quia de Deo scire non possimus quid sit, sed quid non sit, non possimus considerare de Deo quomodo sit, sed potius quomodo non sit."

154 ST I, 8: "de existentia Dei in rebus."

155 ST I, 12 and 13.

156 "Nosse tamen aperte ac breviter per te velim utrum omnes categorieae, cum sint numero decem, de summa divinae bonitatis una essentia in tribus substantiis et de tribus substantiis in eadem una essentia [vere proprieque possunt praedicari]." De Div. Nat. I, 14 (457D-458A), p. 72, 24-27.

157 "Attamen, ut praediximus, quemadmodum fere omnia quae de natura conditarum rerum proprie praedicantur de conditione rerum per

158 Monologion, cc. xxff.


160 Ibid.


164 Ibid.


168 "Sanctae siquidem scripturae in omnibus sequenda est auctoritas..." De Div. Nat. I, 64 (504A), p. 188, 8.


170 I.P. Sheldon-Williams, Periphyseon, I, pp. 6-7.

171 "proprie de creatrice omnium causa dici non possunt." De Div. Nat. II (528C), p. 12, 27.
172 Ibid., 31.


D. Duclow, "Dialectic and Christology in Eriugena's Periphyseon," has hold of the essential divisions and how they correspond to the Books: Since Book I discusses God as both transcendent and self-diffusive, it has nature's first division as its dominant theme; that is, God remains uncreated insofar as he transcends all origination, and creates insofar as he is origin of all subsequent being . . . Ostensibly the main topic of Book II is nature's second division, the primordial causes. Yet much of the book concerns the Trinitarian context for these causes, since John places their creation in the Father's generation of the Son . . . In this way, the Trinity marks the fundamental distinction within the divine unity, and initiates the dialectic of nature's division (p. 104).

At this point, Professor Duclow refers the reader to "Dionysios, De divinis nominibus, II,5"!


180 "Dicendum quod cognitio divinarum Personarum fuit necessaria nobis . . . ad recte sentiendum de creatione rerum. Per hoc enim quod dicsmus Deum omnia fecisse Verbo suo excluditur error ponentium Deum produxisse res ex necessitate naturae. Per hoc autem quod
ponimus in eo processionem amoris, ostenditur quod Deum non propter aliquam indigentiam creaturas produxit." ST I, 32, 1 ad 3. Cf. also ST I, 39, 8; I, 45, 6 and 7.

181 Cf. n.I, 94 above and chapters III, D and E below.

182 ST I, 32, 1 and chapter III, D below.

183 Cf. n.II, 82.

184 G. Lafont’s (Structures, p. 473) development of Chenu’s interpretation of the Summa Theologica through salvation history (n.I, 125 and chapter II, A above) are close to the hexameral view of the De Divisione Naturae. For Pere Lafont, the three sections of the Prima Pars “essentia divina, distinctio Personarum, processio creaturarum” correspond aux trois grandes données de la Révélation sur Dieu; ils sont mis sur le même plan parce que selon les explications de la question ler, c’est la Révélation qui fait l’unité de la connaissance théologique. La Révélation mosaïque, au Sinai, commande une étude de Dieu en son essence; la Révélation évangélique commande une étude de Dieu en son Trinité; l’ensemble, peut-on dire, de la Révélation judeo-chrétienne commande une étude de Dieu créateur ... All three interpretations attempt to leap over the philosophical reasoning and questioning which stands between scripture and sacred doctrine. Père Chenu and Père Lafont are forced to invent biblical theologies which would not have occurred to St Thomas. P.E. Persson (Sacra Doctrina, p. 89) seeks “the ratio of the theologian”. If theology were understood broadly and historically enough, this would provide the key to Thomas’ structure but he does "not ... regard the question of whether Thomas is to be regarded primarily as an Aristotelian or a neo-Platonist in his philosophical outlook as vitally important for this present study." p. 12. On the development of philosophical thought in mediaeval theology see the works cited n.II, 10 above.

185 History, pp. 113, 122 and 128.


187 Einführung in die Geschichte der theologischen Literatur der Frühskolastik.

188 Introduction à l’histoire de la littérature théologique de la scholastique naissante.

189 La théologie du douzième siècle.

190 Old Arts and New Theology and Anselm and a New Generation.

191 There is a short account of the results of its condemnation

192. H.F. Dondaine, Le Corpus Dionysien, pp. 137-138 gives a list of parts of the De Divisione Naturae in this corpus; cf. n.II, 120 for an example of possible influence on Thomas.


195. Cf. n.II, 35.


201 Augustine treats the one and three together:
Quapropter adiuvante domino deo nostro suscipiemos et eam ipsam quam flagitant, quantum possimus, reddere rationem, quod trinitas sit unus et solus et verus deus, et quam recte pater et filius et spiritus sanctus unius eiusdemque substantiae vel essentiae dicatur, credatur, intelligatur" (Sancti Aurelii Augustini, De Trinitate, Libri XV, ed. W.J. Mountain with Fr. Glorie, Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina 50, pars 16 (1), I, II, 4, p. 31, 1-6 (PL 42, 822).

We have referred to the consideration of the structure of the De Trinitate by R.D. Crouse, n.II, 77 above. It coheres with that of R. Markus, Camb. History, pp. 352-353 and A. Louth.

202 Cf. n.II, 125 above.

203 See chapter II, A above.

204 E. zum Brunn, "La 'metaphysique de l'Exode'," p. 260.


207 Ad Ablabium Quod non sint tres dei and Ad Eustathium De sancta trinitate, ed. F. Mueller, Gregorii Nysseni Opera, 9 vol., Institutum pro Studiis Classicis Harvardianum, III (1) (Leiden, 1958). To say that "Augustine begins with the unity of God" -- as F.W. Green, "The Later Development of the Doctrine of the Trinity," Essays on the Trinity and the Incarnation, ed. A.E.J. Rawlinson (London/New York/Toronto, 1933), p. 265 -- or that "Augustine... approaches the Trinity from the side of the divine unity" -- as E.J. Bicknell in Essays Catholic and Critical, ed. E.G. Selwyn (2d ed.; London, 1926), p. 148 -- or to suggest, as these authors do, that the accusations of modalism have some justification, does not tell
against our interpretation. It is just this unification of the two sides which produces the undivided treatise de deo. Jürgen Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom of God; The Doctrine of God, trans. Margaret Kohl (London, 1981) accepts Rahner's account and criticism of western trinitarian theology (see p. 17, n.20, p. 225, p. 190 etc.) and the standard version of the role of Augustine and Thomas in it. He attempts to have the eastern and western traditions correct each other and to effect a rapprochement between them. The latter would not perhaps be so difficult if the initial penetration of western theology by eastern thinkers was more fully appreciated.

208 Dodds, Elements, pp. 258-259 and Saffrey-Westerink, Theo. plat., III, pp. lvii-lviii stress their function of joining the "real" or ontological with the One. H. Duméry, "Le néant d'être," p. 316 writes: "Proclus n'a pas renié la procession universelle à partir de l'Un, mais il a eu soin d'intéposer les hénades, les unités modales, entre l'Un et la cycle de l'être pour que le premier n'eut pas à pâtir de la multiplicité naissante. Il a maintenu l'Un intact, exempt de tout ce qui affecte un processus d'être où se mêlent un et non-un." R.J. Wallis, Neoplatonism (London, 1972), p. 131 stresses how intermediary terms keep the elements of the system apart.

209 "Cuius unitatis et distinctionis sufficiens similitudo in rebus creatis non invenitur ..." In de div. nom., proem. (Pera, p.1). Cf. also II, 2, 143.

210 Simplicity in creatures has the opposite significance of God's; ST I, 3 prol.: "simplicia in rebus corporalibus sunt imperfecta et partes." Creatures cannot represent God's simplicity adequately. "Effectus Dei imitatur ipsum non perfecte ... id quod est simplex et unum, non representari nisi per multa". ST I, 3, 3 ad 2. Cf. also ST I, 88, 2. On distinction cf. ST I, 32, 1.

211 See n.II, 129 above.

212 See n.III, 31 below.

213 See nn.I, 111 and I, 115 above.

214 Ibid. and n.II, 106 above.

215 Union with God is certainly not achieved by and it seems to be both for and beyond it; cf. Procli Diadochi, In Platonis Timaeum Commentaria, ed. E. Diehl, 3 vol., I (Lipsiae, 1903), B92D-93A, pp. 301-303.

216 See n.II, 153 above.

This opposition is set up by Professor Lossky in The Mystical Theo., chapter 2: "The God of Plotinus is not incomprehensible by nature... it is because the soul, when it grasps an object by reason, falls away from unity", p. 30.

In de Trin., prol., p. 48, 7-8.

This chapter forms part of an article published in Dionysius 4 (1980) entitled "Aquinas' First Principle: Being or Unity?"


"On a donc pu dire très justement que Porphyre était, à partir du IVe siècle, le 'maître des esprits' en Occident. C'est lui qui révèle le néoplatonisme aux philosophes latins", P. Hadot, Porphyre et Vict., p. 86. The quotation is from P. Courcelle, Les lettres grecques, p. 394.

"Ryght as there is a bestely wylle in the lower party that may wylle no good, ryght so there is a godly wyll in the hygher party, whych wylle is so good that it may nevyr wylle evylle, but evyr good." A Book of Showings to the Anchoress Julian of Norwich, ed. E. Colledge and J. Walsh, 2 vol., Pont. Inst. of Mediaeval Studies, Studies and Texts, 35 (Toronto, 1978), chapter 37, p. 443; cf. also I, 254, line 10 and note, and pp. 109ff. and chapter 55, p. 569, lines 54ff., where what is expressed first in the language of will is spoken of in terms of "prevy inwarde syghte". Cf. also Julian of Norwich, Showings, trans. E. Colledge and J. Walsh, The Classics of Western Spirituality (New York, 1978), pp. 64-66 and 88-89.

See n.II, 118.

See n.II, 117.
Consider the texts from Dionysius used in the context of Thomas' "Aristotelian" epistemology at n.III, 70 below.


"Est igitur Deus suum esse, et non solem sua essentia." ST I, 3, 4.

"hoc nomen Qui est ... est maxime proprium nomen Dei." ST I, 13, 11.

Cf. P. Hadot, "Dieu comme acte d'être dans le néoplatonisme. À propos des théories d'E. Gilson sur la 'métaphysique de l'Exode'," Dieu et l'être, pp. 57-63; see the "présentation" by P. Vignaux and also P. Hadot, "L'être et l'étant dans le néoplatonisme," Études néoplatoniciennes, pp. 27-39.

Cf. n.222 above. For endeavours to show that Thomas and Augustine share a similar doctrine of God's esse cf. E. zum Brunn, "L'exégèse augustinienne de 'Ego sum qui sum' et la 'métaphysique de l'Exode'" and "La 'métaphysique de l'Exode' selon Thomas d'Aquin" in Dieu et l'être, pp. 141-164 and 245-269 and J.F. Anderson, St. Augustine and Being (The Hague, 1965).

P. Hadot, Porphyre et Vict., pp. 490ff. and "La distinction de l'être et de l'étant dans le De Hebdomadibus de Boèce," Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 2, pp. 147-153.

P. Hadot, "Forma Essendi, interprétation philologique et interprétation philosophique d'une formule de Boèce."


E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, p. 365 and his other works listed in n.I, 24 above. This is a very common theme for contemporary Thomists. A most useful piece of scholarship to emerge from this enterprise is J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics.
Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, § 1, 1026a 19.

*Metaphysica*, Λ 7, 1072b 21.

See chapter III, B below especially n.216.


"Le commentaire de Porphyre Sur le Parménide est très explicite sur ce point: L'Étre qu'est l'Un est un agir pur [in Parm., II, 25-26]. Cela veut dire que le "predicat" (κατηγορία) pris absolument représente à la fois le maximum d'indétermination et d'abstraction et le maximum d'activité ... Donc ... l'Étre premier sera inconnaisssable. Pour la première fois, dans l'histoire de la pensée, une théologie negative est appliquée à l'Étre." *Porphyre et Vict.*, pp. 415-416.


Cf. e.g., Proclus, *Théologie platonicienne*, II, 4, p. 31,7-8. "Existence in the specific sense of ἔχειν must inevitably be prior to activity" (p. 101). "It is a general term for 'existence (entity) at various levels of reality, it is therefore applied right up to the One." S.E. Gersh, *KINHEIΣ ΑΚΙΝΗΤΟΣ*, A Study of Spiritual Motion in the Philosophy of Proclus (Leiden, 1975), pp. 32-33. On the history of "ἔχειν" cf. P. Hadot, *Porphyre et Vict.*, pp. 489-490. "L'originalité de la doctrine ontologique de Porphyre, c'est identifier l'.dynamicus avec l'Étre μόρφων ... ", p. 490

"L'inventeur de cette théorie des hénades divines est Syrianus ... C'est un fait que nous trouvons chez Proclus la théologie des
henades divines dans cet état achevé" Saffrey and Westerink, Theo.
mat., III, pp. li-lii. Proclus is "le grand diffuseur de cette

251 See nn. 363-364 below.

252 "Si alia causa nominatur a suo effectu, oportet quod princi-
palis nominetur Deus per ipsum esse a primo effectu per quem omnia
fuit; huismodi autem est ens; ergo principalis nominatur Deus per
 ipsum esse." In de div. nom., V, 1, 636. Cf. his comments on
Propositions 3, 9, 12, In librum de causis where he uncovers the
teaching of Proclus and the auctor libri that the characteristic
effect of God is the being of things -- see below n.255. "Ipsum
enim esse est communissimus effectus primus et intimior omnibus
aliis effectibus; et ideo soli Deo competit secundum virtutem
propriam talis effectus; unde etiam, ut dicitur in lib. de causis
[ propos. 9 ] intelligentia non dat esse, nisi prout est in ea
virtus divina." S. Thomae Aquinatis, De Potentia, ed. P. M. Pession,
Quaestiones Disputatae, 2 vol. (Taurini/Romae, 1965), II, q.3, a.7.
See also q.7, a.2, ST I, 105, 5 and ST I-II, 66, 5 ad 4. There seems
to be a difference between Proclus and both the author of the Liber
and Dionysius of importance here. A. Pattin writes in the intro-
duction to his edition of the Liber de Causis ("Le Liber de Causis,
edition établie à l'aide de 90 manuscrits avec introduction et
notes," Tijdschrift voor Philosophie, 28 [1966], 90-203):

Dans le texte . . . se trouve la distinction entre
"dare ens per modum creationis immo per modum formae"
(prop. 17, 56-57 et 57-59). Cette distinction, qui
manque totalement dans les Éléments de théologie de
Proclus est à vrai dire déjà la célèbre distinction
scolastique entre "esse causam per modum creationis"
et "esse causam per modum informationis ou specifica-
tions" (pp. 93-94).

In note 35 he refers us to the De Potentia of Aquinas, q.3, a.1
for the celebrated scholastic distinction: "Et inde est quod in
lib. de Causis, dicitur, quod esse eius est per creationem, vivere
vero et caetera huismodi, per informationem." S. Gersh, From
Lamblichus, stresses the crucial role of the doctrine of creation
in Dionysius (e.g., p. 205 quoted in n.II, 265 below). Studies
of importance on the doctrine of the Liber de Causis include
Saffrey's introduction to his edition and his article in Misc.
Mediaevalia 2, also Leo Sweeney, "Doctrine of Creation in Liber de
Causis," A Etienne Gilson Tribute, presented by his North American
Students with a response by E. Gilson, ed. C. J. O'Neil (Milwaukee,
1959): "the Esse creans of the Liber de Causis makes everything
simply to be by an act of genuine creation" (p. 289). Studies of
the relation between Thomas' teaching and that of Dionysius and the
auctor libri include: C. Fabro, Participation et causalité selon s.
Thomas d'Aquin, pp. 171-244; K. Kremer, Die Neuplatonische Seins-
philosophie und ihre Wirkung auf Thomas von Aquin, pp. 299-313 and
300-396; F. van Steenberghen, Introduction, pp. 100-101; F. Ruello,

253 See nn.1, 169, II, 223 and 252 above. See also J. Lowry,
The Logical Principles of Proclus' STOIKEISTIK THEOREIAKH
as Systematic Ground of the Cosmos, Doctoral Dissertation, Depart-
ment of Classics, Dalhousie University, 1976 now published in
Elementa, Schriften zum Philosophie und ihrer Problemgeschichte (Amsterdam, 1980). I have not been able to obtain the book so references are to the dissertation MS. Dr Lowry treats the influence of Proclus in the Introduction, n.4.

254 "Si autem consideremus virtutem qua fit actio, sic virtus superioris causae erit immediatior effectui quam virtus inferioris; nam virtus inferior non coniungitur effectui nisi per virtutem superioris; unde dicitur in lib. de Caus. [Prop. 1], quod virtus causae prius agit in causatum, et vehementius ingreditur in ipsum." De Potentia III, 7. Cf. also Summa contra Gentiles III, 74 and ST I, 14, 11 ad 3 and I, 44, 2.


256 Cf. n.I, 173 above. The Prima Pars was written between 1266 and 1268 (J.A. Weisheipl, Friar Thomas D'Aquino, p. 361). On the much disputed date of the Compendium Theologiae cf. Sancti Thomae de Aquino, Compendium Theologiae, Opera Omnia (Leonine), XLII (Roma, 1979), p. 8: "Le De fide serait à peu près contemporain du De potentia (1265-1267)."


258 Cf. n.228 above.


See n.II, 191 above.

Cf. n.II, 114 above and chapter III, A below.

"the fundamental philosophical notions of being, thing substance, and accident are regularly related by him [Thomas] to the metaphysics of Avicenna, never to that of Aristotle. Inversely, of the 426 quotations of Avicenna in the complete works of Thomas Aquinas listed by C. Vansteehenhise, only twenty-five are found in the commentaries on Aristotle, eleven of which are in the commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. Between the metaphysics of Aristotle and that of Thomas Aquinas, the metaphysics of Avicenna act as a kind of filter." E. Gilson, "Quasi Definitio Substantiae," p. 125.


Boethius and Porphyry, as opposed to Plotinus, try to reconcile Plato and Aristotle; cf. on Boethius, *De interpretatione*, ed. C. Meiser (2d ed.; Leipzig, 1880), p. 79, on Porphyry and later Neoplatonism, R.T. Wallis, *Neoplatonism* (London, 1972), pp. 24ff. On the Christians: Andre Tuiller, "La tradition aristotélicienne à Byzance des origines au VIIe siècle. La formation de la scolastique byzantine," *Actes du Congrès de Lyon*, Association Guillaume Budé (Paris, 1960), pp. 186-197. Christian Neoplatonists in this tradition are comparatively more accepting of Aristotle than their pagan predecessors; because of their "belief that as long as God's transcendence is preserved the difference between various levels of creation diminishes in importance" (p. 205), they have a "tendency to apply Aristotelian principles at all levels of the created world in contrast to the pagan approach in which such doctrines were confined in their application to the world of sense," pp. 235-236, S.E. Gersh, *From Iamblichus to Eriugena*. On the congeniality of Dionysius' turn to the sensible and an Aristotelian perspective cf. Chenu, *Nature, Man and Society*, p. 135; Thomas, *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum, In II Sent.*, d.14, g.1, a. 2 and n. 228 above. Quotations from Chenu, Boethius and Thomas are given in full at nn.III, 65,67,68 below. R.D. Crouse, *Semina Rationum* speaks of the "ecumenical" position of Boethius (p. 77).

Cf. D. O'Brien, "Plotinus on Evil," *Le néoplatonisme*, pp. 113-

267 A. Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition, p. 162, writes of the Neoplatonism of Iamblichus and Proclus which so affected Dionysius:

Much is made of the fact -- which Plotinus had noted and which Denys was to note also -- that the hierarchy of existence is simple at both ends, top and bottom, and more complex in the middle. The One and Pure Matter -- both simple -- are respectively above and below Being, Life and Intelligence. This observation provides the rational justification for theurgy -- magic -- which was important to Iamblichus and his successors (in marked contrast to Plotinus . . .) . . . So, whereas for Plotinus the only activity by which man draws nearer the One is contemplation, theoria, for Iamblichus and Proclus, theurgy, theorgia, magical operations with plants and animals . . . is more likely to be effective.

"The Platonic-Plotinian One and the Aristotelian-Plotinian Matter are alike simple . . ." Dodds, Elements, p. 232. "Matter does not come within the province of being, and so the activity of the One which precedes Being and also includes Matter represents a wider range within which the activity of Being must fall": Gersh, op. cit., p. 180 where he refers to Syrianus in Metaph. 59, 17-18. Thomas finds this doctrine in Dionysius, cf. In de div. nom. IV, 2, 296-298, and in the Liber de Causis Prop. 4. He relates this doctrine to the primacy of the good over being as a divine name which doctrine he partially embraces, cf. below n.289. At ST I, 3, 8, Thomas considers the likeness between God and prime matter.


270 How positively Proclus understood the supreme Good's diffusion of itself can be seen from the following passage of the Alcibiades commentary: 'The Good from above -- seated as if it is beyond the intellectual nature -- if it is lawful to say so, proceeds to the last limits, and illuminates all things and preserves and adorns all things and turns them towards itself' (181) . . . it would have shocked Plotinus, especially as Proclus goes on to make clear that by 'the last limits' he means formless matter" A.H. Armstrong, "Platonic Eros and Christian Agape," The Downside Review, 79, No. 255 (1961), 105-121, reprinted in Plotinian and Christian Studies, IX, p. 117, n.16. Professor Armstrong is writing here about the downward moving and uniting force of eros in Proclus. Cf. also Gersh, KINHEL , pp. 123ff. Dodds' Elements, p. 198 shows that Proclus regards Aristotle's teaching as deficient from a Platonic perspective because "the Aristotelian system affirms the upward tension towards . . . God . . . without tracing the downward chain of causal dependence." A. Charles, art. cit., p. 460 puts the difference
between Plotinus and Proclus thus: "Plotin nous avait rendu familière
la voie ascendante et réductrice par laquelle l'âme se ressemble au-
tour de ce qui, en elle est le plus uniifié, le moins corporel . . .
Les Éléments de Théologie présentent un style de cheminement tout
opposé. Il s'agit bien d'une méthode synthétique, c'est-à-dire de
composition. Au primat de l'intérieurité se substitue le schème
dominant de la causalité." See also P. Rorem as quoted in n.II, 129
above.

271 "he prefers to deal with individual philosophical problems
rather than expound his thought in a formal system (cf. Vita Plotini
4. 10-11) . . . He had an aversion to formal systems." R.T.
Wallis, Neoplatonism, p. 41.

272 J. Trouillard, La procession plot., p. 6; also p. 85.

273 Andrew Smith, Porphyry's Place in the Neoplatonic Tradition,
A Study in Post-Plotinian Neoplatonism (The Hague, 1974), p. 70 and
passim.

274 Porphyry, On the Life of Plotinus and the Order of his Books,
in Plotinus, trans. A.H. Armstrong, 3 vol. of 6 have appeared, Loeb
Classical Library (London/Cambridge, 1966), I, 4. 10-11; 24. 11-17
and Armstrong's remarks, pp. xiv-xv and ix-xi.

275 E.R. Dodds' Elements, pp. ix-xii and J. Lowry, op. cit., passim.

276 See pp. 95ff. below.

277 On the exitus-reditus structure of activity and being in Proclus
cf. Gersh, KINHEIL, p. 131, "the strictist definition of activi-
ty is 'the combination of procession and reversion in a single
cyclic process." p. 4 and passim. On Thomas see M. Jordan, "The
Grammar of Essse."

278 On Proclus see S. Gersh, "SOS as a cosmic process," Appendix
I, KINHEIL, pp. 123-127. "If love is an activity, it would be
reasonable to conclude that love like activity manifests itself in
two forms (i) as the complete cycle of remaining, procession, and
reversion, and (ii) as the third element in such a triadic forma-
tion." p. 124. Thomas collects this doctrine from Dionysius: love
is a complete activity in God by which he moves himself: In de div.
nom. IV, 7-12 esp. 369, 390, 439, 444, 455, 460. So in the Summa
Theologiae love carries God out of himself (I, 20, 2 ad 1) and is
the unifying bond (I, 37, 1 ad 3 and I, 39, 8), see n.346 below.
On Dionysius see Louth, The Origins, p. 176; Fr Louth does not
know the Neoplatonic source of Dionysius' doctrine.

279 Damascii Successoris, Dubitationes et Solutiones de primis
discussions in Wallis, Neoplatonism, pp. 158-159 and Hadot, Por-
phyre et Vict., p. 258. Hadot sees Damascius as carrying on the
negative element also found in Porphyry, cf. p. 122.
Enn. V, 1, 6, 18 and V, 1, 7, 5-6. Henry and Schwyzer change their interpretation of the second passage between their Brussels edition and that in the OCT. Professor A.H. Armstrong discusses the matter in his note on the passage in his Loeb translation which is unfortunately delayed by the publishers.

See n.348 below.

See n.250 above.

See n.208 above.

On this context for grace in pagan Neoplatonism (though is it not the same in Dionysius?) cf. A. Smith, Porphyry's Place, p. 110: "Grace is radically re-emphasized in Iamblichus beyond Porphyry, for whom the soul is ontologically lower in rank and nous is fallen, thus putting man at a lower level and increasing the necessity for divine aid."

"Quasi dicit quod Ipse, inquantum est unitas, est Principium super omne principium, habens in se suam proprietatem qua supra omnia existit." In de div. nom. II, 2, 143. "Sic igitur bonum est universaliore et altior causa quam ens quia ad plura se extendit eius causalitas." Ibid. III, u, 226. Also ibid. V, 1, 629-630 and In de Caus., Prop 4 and elsewhere.

We have no vision of God in this life (ST I, 12, 12) but from effects we can know that God is, an sit, but not what he is, quid sit (ibid. and I, 2, 2). At I, 12, 12 obj. 1 he cites Boethius: "ratio non capit simplicem formam" (De consolatione philosophiae V, 4. PL 63, 847) which he explains as follows: "ratio ad formam simplicem pertingere non potest, ut sciat de ea quid est; potest tamen de ea cognoscere, ut sciat an est." I, 12, 12 ad 1. This must be contrasted with Aristotle's teaching on knowledge of the simple: Metaphysica IX, 10, 1051b30-33, De Anima III, 6. Thomas understands this true immediate grasp of essences to apply only to the knowledge of the sensible things to which our form of cognition is suited. Thus his comment on De Anima III, 6, 430b20. Aristotle is discussing our knowledge of points and units but Thomas adds: "Et inde est etiam quod omnia quae transcendent haec sensibilia nota nobis non cognoscuntur a nobis nisi per negationem; sicuti de substantiis separatis . . . " (In Aristotelis librum de Anima, ed. A.M. Pirotta [4th ed.; Romae/Taurini, 1959] III, 758, p. 180). The root of the difference lies in their different conceptions of the relation of ratio and intellectus or divided and intuitive reason in man. For Aristotle, man may be characterized by practical intellect (cf. Ethica Nico. VI, 2, 1135b4-5), but practical intellect exists only in virtue of theoretical intellect and, while this belongs primarily to the gods, man shares in it (Metaphy. A, 2, 982b 27-983a24 and Ethica Nico. X, 7, 1178a2). For Thomas, in contrast, man has this unified intellectual power only through a participation mediated by the angels:

Intellectus non est enim secundum hominem quantum ad naturam compositam, est autem propriisime secundum hominem.
quantum ad id quod est principalissimum in homine; quod quidem perfectissime inventur in substantiis superioribus, in homine autem imperfecte et quasi participative...


Unde quamvis cognitio humanae animae proprie sit per viam rationis, est tamen in ea aliqua participatio illius simplicis cognitionis quae in superioribus substantiis inventur, ex quo etiam intellectum vim habere dicuntur; et hoc secundum illum modum quem Dionysius in VII cap. De divinis nominibus assignat...

Et hanc quidem differentiam angelorum et animarum Dionysius in VII cap. De divinis nominibus ostendit...

Id autem quod sic participatur non habetur ut possessio; id est sicut aliquid perfecte subiacens potentiæ habentis illud, sicut dicitur in I Metaphysiae quod cognitio Dei est divina et non humana possessio.


Human reason (as opposed to that of intellectual beings) ... must grasp unity in multiplicity rather than multiplicity in unity. This is what it means for man to be rational rather than intellectual: he begins on the side of multiplicity.

A. Maurer, trans., The Division and Methods of the Sciences, Questions V and VI of [Aquinas'] Commentary on the De Trinitate (Toronto, 1963), p. xxxii. Cf. also In de div. nom. VII, 2, 711ff. What stands between Aquinas and Aristotle is the Neoplatonic teaching on the soul. Proclus teaches a strong distinction between reason and intellect, e.g., In Platonis Timaeum Commentaria (Diehl), B92D-93A, 1, pp. 301-303.

287 "tantum se nostra naturalis cognitio extendere potest, inquantum manuduci potest per sensibilia. Ex sensibilibus autem non potest usque ad hoc intellectus noster pertingere quod divinam essentiam videt; guia creaturae sensibiles sunt effectus Dei virtutem causae non adaequantes." ST I, 12, 12. The unknowability of God from effects is ultimately a consequence of the inferiority of effects to their productive causes. This principle Proclus states in Prop. 7 of the Elements on which Dodds comments: "This is the principle on which the whole structure of Neoplatonism is really founded."

288 See ST I, 3, 5, and 8; I, 8, 1. H. Duméry in "L'Être et l'Un," extracts "d'un ouvrage de jeunesse", attempts to reconcile Thomas and Neoplatonism. In the course of this he stresses that Thomas "refuse d'assimiler d'être transcendental(déjà composé) à l'être divin." p. 335.

289 "Et sic in causando bonum est prius quam ens, sicut finis quam forma; et intellectus ratione, inter nomina significantia causalitatem divinam, prius ponitur bonum quam ens." ST I, 5, 2 ad 1.
Thomas recognizes that "ipsum Unum et ipsum Bonum separatum" is the "sumnum et primum rerum Principium" for the Platonists; cf. In de Caus., Prop. 3 and Prop. 4, and treats them as identical in accord with Proclus Prop. 13 of the Elements (cf. also Dodds' comment, pp. 199-200). But he does not seem to know the doctrine of Plat. Theo. II, 6 that the First is One, as principle of procession, and Good, as principle of reversion. For at In de div. nom. XIII, 3, 989 and elsewhere he treats the One as cause of return: "divina Unitas est virtuosior omni unitate, omnia relinquentes in ipsum convertimur: ... finis enim et terminus ad rationem unitatis pertinere videntur." The good is treated in a similar way, e.g., ibid. I, 3, 94. One and good are also thought of equally as belonging to God's character as source.


The Stoics made theology a part of physics -- cf. A.H. Armstrong, An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy (4th ed.; London, 1965), p. 120. The Neoplatonists continued the reduction of the sciences, although, with them, theology was the encompassing knowledge. In the later Neoplatonists ethics, which had remained distinct for the Stoics, was assimilated:

the interpretation of praxis in theurgia, rather than in moral terms, has left the ps.-Dionysius, like the other late Neoplatonists with no moral philosophy at all. Theology, which had already swallowed up the rest of théoria has now engulfed praxis as well.

This is Sheldon-Williams in Cambridge History, p. 459. E.R. Dodds writes of the comprehensive aims of this Neoplatonism thus:

On the theoretical side it reflects the desire to create a single Hellenic philosophy which could supercede the jarring warfare of the sects by incorporating with the Platonic tradition all that was best in Aristotle, in Pythagoreanism and in the teaching of the Porch (Elements p. xviii).

A useful article on the differences between Classical and Hellenistic structures in philosophy is P. Hadot, "Les divisions des parties de la philosophie dans l'Anciité." J. Lowry's The Logical Principles is an attempt to exhibit the inclusiveness of Proclus' system, to demonstrate its originality and to defend his project.

Formalism was general in the Middle Ages. There are many works in which the originality of the author is seen only in his selection and structuring of finished material chosen from often incompatible works by others. See for example the "Transcription of the Initial Folios of the Summa de Bono, Codex Vaticanus Latinus 4305" by Leo Sweeney and others in Manuscripta, 7 (1963), 131ff. or the elaborate Prolegomena of the Quaracchi editors necessary to determine that Alexander of Hales' Summa Theologica was not a similar work -- Alexandri de Hales, Prolegomena, Summa Theologica IV (Ad Claras Aquas, Quaracchi, 1947). But in Thomas form and content are united at least in his own works: "The plan of his Summa opens the way to his mind." "The doctrine of Saint Thomas is already recorded and revealed in the very plan of his Summa." Chenu,
Towards Understanding St. Thomas, pp. 301 and 314. This is why his ordering from God's simplicity is so significant.

294 In chapter I, A we have attempted to show why the structure of theology determined by the Sentences of Peter Lombard was unsatisfactory to him and thus why the Commentary on the Sentences could not be his final system. Difficulties about the Summa Contra Gentiles because of its apologetical stance we also discussed. His remaining extant system (incomplete) is the Compendium Theologiae. But its structure is determined by the needs of piety. The Compendium shows its intention for piety not only by its organization around the virtues of faith, hope and charity but also because it is meant for Frater Reginald "semper pre oculis . . . habere." It imitates Christ, who compresses the divine immensity "nostra brevitate assumpta", "propter occupatos sub brevi summa humanae salutis doctrinam conclusit" (I, cap. 1, p. 83). Thus the Lord's Prayer and the Apostles' Creed are important to its structure as Thomas indicates and as his editors agree; Compendium Theologiae I, cap. 1 and introduction, pp. 6-7.

295 "Consideravimus namque huius doctrinae novitios in his quae a diversis conscripta sunt plurimim impediri; partim quidem propter multiplicationem inutilium quaestionum, articulorum et argumentorum; partim etiam quia ea quae sunt necessaria talibus ad scientiam non traduntur secundum ordinem disciplinae, sed secundum quod requirebat librorum expositio, vel secundum quod se praebebat occasio disputandi; partim quidem quia eorundem frequens repetitio et fastidium et confusionem generabat in animis auditorum." ST I, prologus.

296 ST I, 1, 3.

297 See chapter I, A above and chapter III, B below.


299 See n.I, 173 above.

300 Mainly via Honorius Augustodunensis on whom cf. M.-O. Garrigues, L'oeuvre d'Honorius Augustodunensis. And see chapter II, C above.

301 Cf. E. Gilson, History, p. 92 and n.II, 8 above.


Speaking of the name wisdom, which follows goodness, being and life: "Est autem considerandum quod semper in posterioribus priora salvantur ... Bonum autem, secundum quod prius dictum est, quantum ad causalitatem est prius quam ens, quia bonum etiam ad non entia suam causalitatem extendit, ens autem ad plura se extendit quam vita et vita quam sapientia, quia quaedem sunt quae non vivunt et quaedem vivunt quae non cognoscunt." In de div. nom. VII, 1, 697; cf. also IV, 1, 263; V, 1, 606-611, 635, etc. An extended discussion of his attitude to this Platonic teaching is found in In de Caus., Prop. 12.

ST I, 2: "de Deo, an Deus sit".

Plat. theo. I, chapters 14ff.

Ibid., p. cxc.
315 Ibid. I, 59, 18-19.


320 Chapter II, C.


322 "'Εστι [ἐκλεξεία] ἐκ λέγεται ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἴνα ἐκ αὐτοῦ
ἐκποιήσῃ, ὅθεν ἐκ τοῦ οὗ ἄναξ ἐκποίησαι
De Anima II, 1, 412a22-23.

323 For Thomas' use of it in a form "inconnue d'Aristote, ... elaborée à l'aide de Denys: la perfection secondes, ou ultime, toujours mise en parallèle avec la perfection première ou nature (ou essence)," cf. E.H. Weber, Dialogue et dissensions, pp. 463-465.


325 "operatio sequitur virtutem et substantiam." De Pot. VII, 1 obj. 7.

326 "sicut Damascus dicit in III libro, 'operatio sequitur naturam.'" ST III, 19, 2 sc.

327 "Processiones in divinis non possunt nisi secundum actiones quae in agenti manent ... potentia est principium agendi in aliud, unde secundum potentiam accipitur actio ad extra. Et sic secundum attributum potentiae non accipitur processio divinae personae sed
solum processio creaturarum." ST I, 27, 5 resp. and ad 1. Cf. also ST I, 25 1 ad 3, I, 41, 4 ad 3 and chapter III, D below.

328, "Patri attribuitur et appropriatur potentia, quae maxime manifestatur in creatione; et ideo attribuitur Patri creatorem esse." ST I, 45, 7 ad 2 and ST I, 41, 4. Power is modified in the personal relations; ST I, 42, 6 ad 3 and I, 45, 6.

329, "Dicendum quod impossibile est dicere quod essential animae sit eius potentia ... Operatio autem animae non est in genere substantiae; sed in solo Deo ..." ST I, 77, 1. See comment ad loc and Appendix 6 by T. Sutter in St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae XI (Blackfriars, 1970). This "faculty psychology" is already found in Proclus. C. Steel, The Changing Self, p. 60ff. and passim for context of its development.

330, QQ. 3-11.

331, Q. 14.

332, ST I, 26, 2; cf. also Comp. Theo. I, 107. ScG, Liber Primus concludes with beatitude according to a similar reasoning.


Quod primo cognoscitur ab intellectu humano, est huiusmodi objectum; et secundario cognoscitur ipse actus quo cognoscitur objectum; et per actum cognoscitur ipse intellectus, cuius est perfectio ipsum intelligere," ST I, 87, 3 and cf. J. Gervais, "La place et le sens des questions 12 et 13 dans la Prima Pars de la Somme Theologique," Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa, 19 (1949), section spéciale, pp. 80*-84*.

Sed actio ab agente non distinguetur in Deo nisi secundum rationem tantum;" ST I, 41, 4 ad 3.

Post haec considerandum est de distinctione corporalis et spiritualis creaturarum. Et primo, de creatura pure spirituali, quae in Scriptura Sacra angelus nominatur; secundo, de creatura pure corporali; tertio, de creatura composita ex corporali et spirituali, quae est homo." ST I, 50, prologus; cf. ibid. I, 75, prologus and 106, prologus. That what is more like the producer precedes the less is a principle of Proclus (Elements, Prop. 28; cf. Dodds' comment and citation of ScG I, 29 on p. 216). That governance follows on
creation in treating God, Thomas finds in Dionysius, In de div. nom. XII, u, 939. This is parallel to the priority of being over operations and follows from the primacy of the simple to the divided. On the Dionysian influence in Thomas' treatment of governance cf. T.C. O'Brien, "The Dionysian Corpus," pp. 187ff.

337 ST I, 28; I, 29, 4 ad 1; I, 32, 3 ad 3.

338 See n.327 above and ST I, 14, prol.

339 ST I, 45, 6.

340 ST I, 47.

341 See nn.II, 51 and II, 336 above.

342 "Et quia simplicia in rebus corporalibus sunt imperfecta et partes, secundo inquiritur de perfectione . . ." ST I, 3, prol.

343 "Scientia habetur de rebus secundum quod sunt in sciente; voluntas autem comparatur ad res secundum quod sunt in seipsis." ST I, 19, 3 ad 6. Will is the equivalent of "appetitus naturalis" in God, ST I, 19, 1; although because he is his own good he rests in himself; nonetheless "cum voluntas Dei sit eius essentia non movetur ab alio se, sed a se tantum, eo modo loquendi quo intelligere et velle dicitur motus. Et secundum hoc Plato dixit quod primum movens movet seipsum" (ibid. ad 3) and following Dionysius, speaking of God's love, he says he is "extra se in amatum translatus" (ibid. I, 20, 2 ad 1).

344 See n.332 above. For an argument that the return is also to substance cf. E. Pousset, "Une relecture du traité de Dieu dans la Somme Théologique de saint Thomas," Archives de philosophie, 38 (1975), 559-593; his argument does not seem convincing, see chapter III, C below.

345 Verbum, pp. 206-207.

346 This is the reason of his name ST I, 36, 1. Father and Son are two hypostases with a single act of spiration: "Si vero consideretur supposita spirationes sic Spiritus Sanctus procedit a Patre et Filio ut sunt plures; procedit enim ab eis ut amor unitivus duorum." ST I, 36, 4 ad 1. He "dicitur esse nexus Patris et Filii inquantum est Amor." ST I, 27, 1 ad 3. He is "nexus duorum," ST I, 39, 8. Aquinas quotes Augustine's designation of him as "aequalitatis unitatisque concordia," ST I, 39, 8 obj. 2. In fact this understanding of the Holy Spirit through a Neoplatonic notion of return comes from Augustine, cf. B. de Margerie, La Trinité chrétienne dans l'histoire, Théologie historique 31 (Paris, 1975), p. 164; P. Hadot, "Les divisions des parties de la philosophie dans l'Antiquité," p. 212; and J. Chaitillon, "Unitas, Aequalitas, Concordia vel Connexio, Recherches sur les origines de la théorie thomiste de appropriations (ST I, q.39, art.7-8),"

347 See the prologues to the Pars Secunda and Pars Tertia and to I, 2. Also ScG IV, 97 and Comp. Theo. I, cc.169-170 and chapter II, A above.

348 Lowry, The Logical Principles, chapter V.

349 Q 18, de vita Dei, and q. 22, de providentia Dei, follow q. 14 de scientia Dei. On life: "unde Philosophus in XII Metaph. ostensq. quod Deus sit intelligens, concludit quod habent vitam perfectissimam et sempiternam." ST I, 18, 3. So also Plotinus places life within A.H. Armstrong, "Eternity, Life, Movement in Plotinus' Accounts of Eternity," Le néoplatonisme, Plotinian and Christian Studies, XV. In Proclan teaching, as more generic, life precedes intelligence; cf. Elements, Prop. 101-103, Dodds' comments, pp. 252-253, the order of Caput VI, de Vita, relative to Caput VII, de Sapientia, etc., of the Divine Names (also n. 310 above) and S. Gersh, From Iamblichus, pp. 83, 87, 113, 115, etc. For the problems in Proclus' logic associated with this ordering cf. Lowry, op. cit., chapter V. By ordering providence under intellect and will, Thomas clearly rejects Proclus' doctrine in Elements, Prop. 120. Yet Thomas does hold to Prop. 122 -- that God acts without relation to what he acts upon -- In de Caus., Prop. 20, ST I, 13, 7, and I, 45, 3 ad 1. Thus, Aquinas manages to maintain the point of Proclus' placing of providence above intelligence -- that it is in virtue of their being "et divina" (Prop. 120) and without themselves being moved or affected "et divina" (Prop. 122) that the gods act -- without accepting his structure "et divina" (Prop. 120) and diminution of intellect. On Plotinus cf. Armstrong, ibid. and Dodds, Elements, p. 263. For the mediaeval, Aristotle's teaching on providence involved considering his reduction of chance to the rational in Physics II, whether God knows singulars according to Metaphysics XII (on which see De Sub. Sep. cc.'XIIIff.) and the relation of prudence to other parts of the soul (see ST I, 22, prol. and chapter III, C below).

350... Platonici, quos multum in hoc opere Dionysius imitatur, ante omnia participatanti compositionem, posuerunt separata per se existentia... Haec autem separata principio ponebant ab invicem diversa a primo principio quod nominabant per se bonum et per se unum. Dionysius autem in aliquo eis consentit et in aliquo dissentit: consentit quidem cum eis in hoc quod ponit vitam separatam per se existentem et similiter sapientiam et esse et alia huiusmodi; dissentit autem ab eis in hoc quod ista principia separatam non dicit esse diversa, sed unum principium, quod est Deus..." In de div. nom. V, i, 634. Cf. Corsini, II trattato; S. Gersh, From Iamblichus, p. 11 and passim and A.H. Armstrong, "Negative Theology, Myth and Incarnation," Mélanges Trouillard, forthcoming.

351 See n.II, 40 above.

352 See n.II, 52 above and n.III, 73 below.

353 Sancti Thomeae de Aquino, De Ente et Essentia, Opera Omnia

"redire ad essentiam suam nihil aliud est quam rem subsistere in seipsa." ST I, 14, 2 ad 1. Cf. K. Rahner as quoted at n.I, 148 above and P.C. Courtes, "L'être et le non-être selon saint Thomas d'Aquin," Revue Thomiste, 67 (1967), 390: "Là, dès le départ, la métaphysique de l'être se lie à la conversio ad seipsam, qui est la loi de la substance spirituelle pour saint Thomas comme pour l'auteur des "de Causis." Ce n'est donc pas une métaphysique du sens commun, purement et simplement. La métaphysique ne se constitue pas comme un discours sur l'être en soi; elle s'élabora dans la conscience de la jonction de l'être et de l'esprit." And F.M. Genuyt, Verité de l'être et affirmation de Dieu, essai sur la philosophie de saint Thomas, Bibliotheque Thomiste 42 (Paris, 1974), chapter VII, pp. 139ff. discusses the redire ad essentiam suam: "L'être en soi est donc Réflexion sur soi." p. 150

God is "per se agens", and "per se forma" (ST I, 32). "Sed illa forma qua non est receptibilis in materia, sed est per se subsistens, ea hoc ipso individuat, quod non potest recipi in alio, et huiusmodi forma est Deus." ST I, 3, 2 ad 3. But contrast Proclus' Elements, Prop. 10:

The proof is discussed in the next chapter (III, A).

See n.II, 290 above.

G. Lafont, Peut-on connaître Dieu en Jésus-Christ?, Problematic, Coll. Cogitatio fidei 44 (Paris, 1969) and E. Pousset, "Une relecture du Traité de Dieu dans la Somme Théologique de saint Thomas (fin)," Archives de phil. 39, No. 1 (1976), 61-89. This is also the implication of the criticism of Thomas' trinitarian doctrine by Rahner, Jüngel and Lossky; cf. chapter II, C above.

"En effet, la notion de mission du Verbe incarné, charnière des troisième et quatrième livres des Sentences implique les notions de Trinité et de création mises en lumière par les deux premiers livres. Le système que nous voyons prendre forme se développe donc à partir du thème de l'émanation des Personnes en unité d'essence ... donc à partir du dogme trinitaire, qui commande le thème de la mission de Verbe devenu homme, c'est-à-dire ayant assumé en sa personne la nature humaine. La notion fondamentale d'une telle théologie est celle de principe." F. Ruello, "Saint Thomas et Pierre Lombard," p. 182. Ruello's article shows the inner penetration of the two ends of the system.

Gersh, From Iamblichus, p. 205; cf. n.II, 265 above.
361 See n. II, 252 above.

362 Elements, p. 217; the text quoted is from in Tim. I, 210.2.


364 P. Hadot, Porphyre et Vict. I, p. 484.

365 ScC IV, 1.
Part III: An Analysis of the Structure of the first Forty-five Questions of the Summa Theologiae

A The Place of the Proof for God's Existence

So far, reasons have been suggested for the failure of contemporary Thomists to recognize the logical unity of the first forty-five questions of the Summa and the sources of Thomas' structural principles have been indicated. In the course of this, it has been necessary to outline in a preliminary way our account of the structure of the Summa. It is now our task to substantiate this statement by a detailed analysis of the first forty-five questions. Some attention has been given already to the Prologus and question one, and something further must be said about the first question in the next chapter.

The proof of God's existence in the five ways of article three, question two, requires special attention, for its very presence in the Summa would seem to contradict Thomas' representation of the order and logic of sacred doctrine. Moreover, though according to Thomas this question is within the first section of the Prima Pars, the treatment of God's essence, it stands by itself. It is separated from the other questions which consider how God is and his operations. As already claimed, "an Deus sit" is not the investigation of one of his predicates or attributes. Properly Aquinas initiates his discussion of them with question three, "de simplicitate Dei". So we start our structural analysis with a consideration of the place of the proof for God's existence in the Summa.

After inquiring whether God's being is self-evident and whether it can be demonstrated, Thomas asks whether God exists. He raises two objections to God's existence: first, the presence of evil in
the world, and second, that nature, together with human will and reason, are sufficient to explain what we experience. Then, on the other side, he cites God himself. "But, on the contrary, there is what is said in Exodus 3 by the person of God 'I am who I am'." 6 Aquinas starts from what God in his own person says; he begins treating God's existence from what we have been told. Faith seeks understanding but certainly need not commence with philosophical reason. 7 So Aquinas teaches that theology or sacred doctrine is a knowledge which begins from principles made evident to a higher form of cognition, namely, that possessed by God and the blessed. 8

The knowledge from which theology begins is God's own simple knowledge of himself, and all else in him, 9 communicated to the Prophets and Apostles who wrote the canonical books, 10 handed on to us through that scripture, and summed up in the articles of the faith. 11 Because sacred theology begins with God's own self-revelation grasped by faith, it has a shape and order distinct from natural theology, the theology which is a part of philosophy. 12

Sacred doctrine is able to start with God. After considering God, it shows how creatures come out from God and how he then brings them back into union with himself. Philosophical reason starts rather with creatures and climbs by a long and difficult ladder to knowledge of God. 13 The order of sacred doctrine determines the order of matters in the tripartite structure of the Summa Theologicae. It begins with God and treats him and his creative work in the First Part. The movement in this part is from God's simplicity towards otherness and diversity. There is first God's unity, treated initially as substance, and then, as operations. The consideration of substance starts in simplicity and ends in unity, but the self-conscious relation of knowledge dominates the operations. The real relation of God
to himself in three persons comes next, and then the work of his power in creation. Creation is treated in three sections. First, by privilege of the likeness of their knowledge and spiritual existence to God's, come the angels, then there is the material creation, and finally, because he unites spiritual and material in himself, is man. Man concludes God's creative work just as he also concluded the last section of this part, the section on God's governance of the world, which has a similar tripartite structure.  

The Second Part is the largest of the three and is regarded as the most original. It considers man, the image of God. Man drew together and completed God's work of creation and governance in the First Part; now, man's work is considered. Thomas says in the Prologue what he means by treating man as the image of God: "that is to say, man as a source of his own works because he is free and has power over his own deeds." This part is organized around the virtues and vices and begins, as one would expect from the Prologue, with man acting for the sake of an end. Freedom consists in man's capacity to shape his actions in accord with what he regards as his complete fulfillment or happiness.

Man's freedom cannot, however, complete the Summa Theologiae. The first article of the first question of the First Part said that sacred doctrine is required just because the ultimate end of man is God, the comprehension of whom exceeds human reason. Consequently the Summa requires a Third Part beyond that treating man's freedom, power and works. This concerns Christ, who, uniting God and man, is our way of actually arriving at God our end. The Third Part thus treats Christ, his sacraments through which we are united to him and attain salvation, and the eternal life at which we arrive through Christ by resurrection.
This is the course then which theology runs, a course determined by its origin in God's revelation of himself from beyond the comprehension of human reason and seeking a union past his natural rational capacity. As we have seen, Thomas refined and clarified this theological structure in important ways but fundamentally its logic derived from the later Neoplatonists and has been set out in systematic form in the Christian west as early as the ninth century by John Scotus Eriugena. The rough use of the pattern by Peter Lombard in his *Sentences*, the theological text book of the High Middle Ages, assured its influence into modern times. Thomas was content with this basic structure, combining the step by step derivation of multiplicity from the divine unity and the gathering in and return of this to God again. Indeed, his alterations of the system, as he received it, have the effect of making the Neoplatonic structure more clearly and completely present. However if this be granted, the need for proofs of God's existence becomes a problem. If we begin from what we have been told about God and from his inner unity, why does theology need, and how can it have a proof which rises to God from his sensible effects? How can it have a philosophic proof of God's existence?

To renounce the assistance of philosophy to that theology which is sacred doctrine would mistake theology's strength and weakness. On the one hand, it would violate theology's sovereignty which uses what is subordinate to it. On the other, it would ignore the necessities of human theological thinking. For, although its beginning is established through God's revelation to faith, yet, because of the frailty of human reason, theology cannot proceed one step on its immense course without assistance from philosophical reason. St Thomas says:
Among the inquiries that we must undertake concerning God in Himself, we must set down in the beginning that whereby his existence is demonstrated, as the necessary foundation for the whole work. For if we do not demonstrate that God exists, all consideration of divine things is necessarily destroyed. 23

The demonstration of God's existence is the necessary foundation of the whole of theology. This is a surprising statement given the descending logic of theological system for Thomas. What can it mean? Minimally, the proof provides evidence that the subject of theological science exists in contradistinction to knowledge of the nature of the subject. The words of Thomas have been taken in this sense and not without some foundation; for, following Boethius, he does distinguish sharply between the knowledge that a thing exists and the knowledge of what it is and says that we know properly only that God is. 24 Our human faculties are suited only for the direct knowledge of sensible individuals and even these we know only from the outside, through their sensible accidents, and imperfectly, despite their mode of being corresponding to ours. 25 In them and in us, there is a division between the sensible and intellectual aspects of existence. Yet this agnosticism about the nature of things cannot be pushed too far. Our knowledge from sense means that we have no direct knowledge, vision, of the intellectual but it does not mean that we have no knowledge at all and this applies also to God. The very simplicity of God, the fact that in him existence, that he is, and essence, what he is, are identical, means that our proof must yield knowledge of his nature. 26 It is then primarily for the sake of making God's revelation thinkable, of making it a science, of allowing a consideration of divine things, that the proof is required. 27 When the five ways in the proof are taken together, they can be immediately seen to produce a considerable knowledge of God. He is the unmoved source of the motion, existence, goodness, and perfection of all
else, which is ordered into a unity, because the God who does all this knows. 28

The proof of God's existence in the *Summa* is primarily a summary of the ways, corresponding to Aristotle's four causes, by which thought moves from the world of sensible creatures to God. 29 So, the movement of knowledge coming down from God's self-disclosure mediated to us through Scripture meets the movement of thought rising from the scientific understanding of natural phenomena and reaching up towards God. Theology as sacred doctrine starts in the uniting of these two.

For our deficient understanding is more easily guided into those things which pass reason and are treated by divine science by passing through the world known by natural reason from which the other sciences proceed. 30

In commencing with God, sacred doctrine progresses in the same order as God's own self-knowledge. 31 As sacred theology begins with God and knows all else coming from him and returning to him, so God knows all things in knowing himself, though, unlike our theology, his is a direct and immediate seeing of everything in his own being. This does not mean that the laborious climb to philosophical or natural theology is solely a human work. Thomas agrees with Aristotle that we can have knowledge of God only because God is not jealous; rather he wishes us to share in his knowledge. 32 Both theologies, theology as philosophy and theology as sacred doctrine, are "divinely given modes of sharing in the one divine science". 33 In this sharing, philosophical knowledge is subordinate to the knowledge based on Scripture, as nature is subordinate to grace but always, indeed eternally, presupposed by it, and present with it. 34 We have come some way in understanding what the proof does, but do we understand sufficiently its necessity?

To get hold of the place of this climb from nature to God in
Thomas' theology, and indeed, partially the place of nature, human freedom, power and work in his system, it is necessary to digress a little into the historical background of its inclusion in his system. If the proof is primarily derived from the Aristotelian causes, and is in theology only because of an Aristotelian conception of science which allows God both to be the subject of the investigation and to be established as an object in its course, it follows that it is possible for Thomas to use the ways only because of the third wave, which occurred in his time, of the gradual rediscovery of Aristotle. This third wave was the transmission to the mediaeval west of the sciences of Aristotle: physics, metaphysics or theology, psychology, politics, and ethics as opposed to the two previous waves of logical works. This is not, however, a sufficient explanation. Just because means are present we are not thereby actually enabled or compelled to use them. Theology is not a salad into which anything edible can be thrown. Because it is the most fundamental science endeavouring to draw reality together under one principle, the knowledge of how its elements are united is essential to it. With what kind of theological structure will Thomas' proof cohere?

Prior to St Thomas, Christian theology had often thought that it was unnecessary, inappropriate or impossible to prove God's existence, or if it was in fact necessary or useful that a much more direct method than that employed by him was preferable. In the tradition of pseudo-Dionysius, represented in the west most strongly by Eriugena, God is known first of all as non-being. Because all determinate and finite beings come out of his fathomless depths and presuppose them as their horizon, it does not seem necessary, appropriate or possible to prove his existence. On the other hand, a proof seems appropriate in an Augustinian perspective where God is thought of
more positively as being, but for the Augustinian spirituality, the most natural motion to him is inward. Within that perspective, Anselm begins by urging us to turn within ourselves toward God; there our thinking must make contact with the only and divine truth by which all truth is known and touches God. Anselm's ontological argument has such a beginning in coming immediately upon an idea of God which directly leads us to the knowledge of the existence which corresponds to this idea.

For Thomas neither of these approaches was satisfactory. A proof was necessary and possible just because the sensible stands between us and God. Because our minds are not immediately with God, proof is necessary, and because the sensible provides the mediation, it is possible. Without this middle, there is no proof and Thomas does not call Anselm's argument a proof. For him, the fact that the fool can say in his heart there is no God compels a proof, and that the invisible things of God are known through created things as St. Paul testifies, enables a proof from sensible effects. Thomas' understanding and use of this famous text from the Epistle to the Romans to justify the use of Aristotelian arguments from what is evident to sense indicates his turning from the Augustinian perspective. What is the standpoint from which such an enterprise takes place?

To understand this as a theological perspective we need to turn again to the intellectual principles of the tradition of pseudo-Dionysius, Boethius and the Liber de Causis. It is in the direction of this Proclan theological tradition that Thomas' thought is moving. The conventions of the contemporary organization of theological study required Thomas to build his first system as a commentary on the Augustinian Sentences of Lombard. But we must recollect that
our first autograph from St Thomas is his notes of Albert the Great's lectures on the *Divine Names* of pseudo-Dionysius. St Thomas commented on this work, with its quasi-apostolic authority, two treatises of Boethius, and the *Liber de Causis*, which he originally thought Aristotle had written. The movement of St Thomas' thought is indicated by the fact that this is his final and most personally revealing commentary. In it he not only tells us a good deal about his own thought -- as well as explaining the text of the *Liber de Causis* -- but he also reveals that he has read the *Elements of Theology* itself. He continues to refer to it in his *De Substantiis Separatis* which dates from the same period. Thomas must be seen in the context of Albert the Great's enthusiasm for Dionysian theology and his establishment of a tradition which becomes explicitly Proclan in the next generation. Nor are its creative figures found only in the thirteenth century. Meister Eckhart and Nicolaus of Cusa have yet to come. Moreover, though there are exceptions, the later Proclan Neoplatonism tends to overpower and assimilate the more Plotinian Augustinian theology when they come into contact. We have seen how it affected Boethius, Eriugena, Anselm, Alexander of Hales and Bonaventure, even if some of these spoke only of Augustine's influence, and others were conscious of themselves as conservative followers of him. Thomas is not likely to have felt the differences between these two traditions. Even when mediaeval thinkers are sensitive to philosophical and theological divergences, they often reconcile or blend the opposed views -- as in Eriugena's conflation of Augustine and Dionysius. Thomas has little more historical sense than most of his contemporaries.

The last two chapters considered the consequences of the Proclan Neoplatonism for the development and character of Christian systems.
of theology. What is particularly important is his teaching on the soul. Recall that Plotinus sees it partly in the world of sense and body, which soul animates, and partly above in the higher realm of pure intellectual life. This higher soul never loses its contemplation of higher things and its direct access to the intellectual world. 56

Consequently, for Plotinus, as for Augustine and his followers, the movement to God is inward. Proclus, on the other hand, following his predecessor Iamblichus, in accord with their mutual tendency to formalize and to differentiate entities, with his sense of the weight of the downward movement in reality, and the weakness and evil of our human situation, sees our soul as altogether fallen into the sensible world. 57 The very last proposition of his Elements of Theology is:

Every particular soul, when it descends into temporal process, descends entire; there is not a part of it which remains above and a part which descends. 58

Both the content and the position of this statement are important. The content requires a relation between man and the sensible world. For Proclus, man in his weakened and humbled position requires help from outside. This help takes the form of theurgy. 59

Theurgic union is attained only by the perfective operation of unspeakable acts correctly performed, acts which are beyond all understanding, and by the power of unutterable symbols which are intelligible only to the gods. 60

Thus, although Proclus, in contrast to St Thomas, still holds that the soul knows itself through knowing its higher spiritual causes, 61 an essential move toward exterior sensible reality has been made, both in respect to the soul's return to God, and in its location in the cosmos.

A Christian spirituality moving forward from this position is to be found in pseudo-Dionysius' symbolic theology, which advances to God beginning from symbols "natural, historical, scriptural or sacramental". 62 This theology, worked out in Eriugena, forms a foundation
for mediaeval aesthetics so that Abbot Suger at St Denis structures and adorns his gothic abbey around the principle that the material light gleaming on silver and gold or in jewel and glass leads the spirit to the immaterial God. The twelfth century revival of this Dionysian spirituality develops a previously absent sense of the reality of the natural world, a universe functioning by its own second causes through which man comes to God. This movement towards secularization and feeling for the natural world is crucial to Thomas' use of the Aristotelian proofs and in fact Thomas refers to Dionysius when he wishes to justify the knowledge of God through sensible effects.

As said above, one of the characteristics of the later Neo- platonism identified by modern scholarship is its greater acceptance of Aristotle. This also characterizes the Christian thinkers. Whereas Augustine has little use for Aristotle, Boethius thinks that he and Plato have the same teaching, and Boethius is responsible for the first of the three Aristotelian waves to wash the west. Thomas says early in his career that Dionysius follows Aristotle, and, while he later comes to understand the Platonic character of Dionysius' thought, he continues to see what is usually regarded as the Aristotelian ascent to God through knowledge of the sensible world in Dionysian terms. To Dionysius he credits the following: "Men reach the knowledge of intelligible truth from proceeding from one thing to another." "The intellectual soul then . . . holds the last place among intellectual substances . . . it must gather its knowledge from divisible things by way of sense." "The human mind cannot rise to the immaterial contemplation of the celestial hierarchies unless it uses the guidance of material things." "Divine things cannot be manifested to men except under sensible likenesses." "Men receive the divine illuminations under the likenesses of sensible things." (It is worth noting the necessity of the turn to the sensible expressed here and that it is
precisely this that divides Thomas and Bonaventure, who is also less
Aristotelian than Thomas. Bonaventure certainly uses the sensible way
in his theology but he regards it as only one way. The soul may also
take the Augustinian more directly inward route.) Thus, the context
of this turning to the sensible in which Aristotelian proof eventually
becomes necessary and intelligible is originally religious, in the most
cultic and mystical signification of that term. It is the subsequent
development of what has been called a more "secular" feeling for the
natural world, and the discovery of the sciences of such a world,
which actually brings us to the proof itself.

The place of man and the position of the statement about his place
in the Elements of Theology is really part of this content. His soul
descends into the temporal process and all of it is there. In Proclus,
this is the final statement in his systematized theology. Although
St Thomas' view of man is exactly of this kind, for him and for the
first western Christian systematic theologian, Eriugena, this is not
the end of theology. Man is rather the pivot point, the hinge, or
crux, on which the cosmos turns. For these thinkers, man's reason is
distinguished from intuition or intellectus by reason's divided or dis-
cursive nature. In Eriugena, Genesis 2: 20, associating man with the
naming of the beasts, means that the sensible world comes into particu-
larized sensible being through man and his form of divided knowing and
is restored to its heavenly and intellectual unity in the redemption
of man in Christ. We have seen how man, uniting the material and
spiritual creation through his unity of body and soul and, as free
agent in the world, forms the structural centre of the Summa Theo-
logiae. Thomas transforms a statement from Proclus about the soul as
the "horizon and mutual limit of the corporal and spiritual" --
mediated to him through the Liber de Causis -- into a teaching about
man joining the two worlds.
Neoplatonic theology, Christian or pagan, by no means universally applauds this anthropocentrism, which is not to be identified with the very general conception that man is a microcosm, uniting in himself the elements of spiritual and material reality. One of Plotinus' complaints about the gnostics and, by implication, the Christians who share their perspective, is the vanity of their anthropocentric pride:

But really! For these people who have a body like men have, and desire and griefs and passions, by no means to despise their own power but to say that they can grasp the intelligible but that there is no power in the sun which is freer than this power of ours from affections and more ordered and more unchangeable, and that the sun has not a better understanding than we have, who have only just come to birth and are hindered by so many things that cheat us from coming to the truth! And to say that their soul, and the soul of the meanest of men, is immortal and divine but that the whole heaven and the stars there have no share given them in the immortal soul.

We have seen that Augustine, Gregory the Great, Boethius, Anselm and Peter Lombard all hold a view which seems incompatible with the anthropocentrism of Eriugena and Aquinas, viz., that man makes up the number of the angels who fell with Satan.

The much more positive view of man in Eriugena, his twelfth century followers, like Honorius Augustodunensis, and St Thomas emphasises rather his relation to the sensible creation and his freedom. Significantly, for both Eriugena and Thomas the dominant influence at this point is that of the Greek Fathers. Man's place at the bottom of the ladder of spiritual creatures is seen positively in Thomas, because, as in Eriugena, his knowing is the source of their being, and his redemption the basis of their return to God. In Thomas, man's knowing is also suited to the sensible world so that his body becomes essential, not only to his communication with all other reality, but even for his knowledge of himself. We have suggested how the Proclan-Dionysian Neoplatonism is at work in this development. But further, the sensible world provides the sphere in which man shows
his freedom. As its governor, he stands to it as God stands to the whole of creation, and so he is seen as image of God. It is for him. On this account, the eternal raising up of the sensible world is also related to man.

Because the bodily creation is finally ordered to be in accord with the state of man... it will be necessary for it to have a participation in the light of his glory. The sensible world has become something separate from man, but their interrelation requires its resurrection with him.

The proof of God's existence is necessitated by the position of man descended into the temporal, sensible world and turning toward it in order to rise out of it. Theology evidently needs this rise in order to make its beginning intelligible to man, for it starts with God, and is addressed to this humble creature separated from the intelligible world. But it is not because theology is human science that man has a crucial place in it. Man's place and role are objectively given. Because theology is primarily the knowledge of God and those who have the vision of him, man's crucial role is determined by the structure of reality. The movement from both God and man which determines the rhythm and structure of the Summa Theologiae is a reflection of the inner rhythm and structure of being. Not only is the whole a movement from God to material creation and back through man, but this pulse of going out and return runs through the individual parts of the work.

The Neoplatonists gave this form to the Aristotelian notion of activity or pure act, by which Thomas understands God, and he and they both regard this activity as a kind of motion. This motionless motion structures the five ways of the proof, which allows us some understanding of God's being, just as it orders the proof that he is the first cause in each of the four senses of cause, with which the treatment of creatures begins. In both cases the causes are arranged
in a way never used by Aristotle. Thomas starts with the source of motion and concludes with final cause, so that there is a return to the motionless beginning. Between these two opposed causes are placed, first, the material cause, and then, the formal. The reduction of the material cause to God shows that there is no barrier to his efficacy. The formal is linked to the final, as the moving end is the good as known and perfected in form, here the divine essence itself.

Thus, the being which God is, is said to return to itself. As we have claimed above, and must attempt to substantiate in what follows, this idea links the levels of divine, spiritual and corporal life internally and to each other. The motion and multiplicity within the divine spiritual life is the intelligible pattern and basis of the motion and multiplicity at the lower levels. The whole is constructed out of circular activities uniting two contrary motions. The proof is crucial in Thomas because the five ways initiate that movement from below, from man to God, which is essential to theology. The proof stands at the beginning but it is not a ladder which is then pushed away. It remains present in the content and structure of what follows. To this we now turn.
Part III
B
Structural Analysis of Questions One to Thirteen

The matter of questions three to eleven is the attributes of God's unity of essence -- how he is, or better, is not. Only part of what may be ascribed to the common unity falls into this first section. Here Thomas treats what belongs to God's substance as opposed to his operations. The difference between them is that the substantial predicates do not depend directly upon self-consciousness, but this is the foundation of the operations. For example, under substance God is recognized as good; the corresponding operation is will. God's will is just his possession of his own good as the object of desire. The most important of the principles structuring this material and situating it in the *Summa Theologiae* are before us already. A logic has been identified in Thomas' sources by which it becomes intelligible why, in treating God, unity should be divided from the distinct persons and substance from operations. Within this Neoplatonic thinking it has appeared how and why theology should begin with God and with him as one or simple and good. Both a model and a reasoning for drawing the treatise about God's names back to the unity from which it began has been found in the *De Divinis Nominibus* of Dionysius and the philosophical theological tradition to which it belongs. Another tradition has been discerned in which it also becomes comprehensible how being can have a priority in his theology and proper predications made about God. This makes it understandable how, more positively than in Dionysius, the *exitus-reditus* structure can apply at the highest reaches of divinity.

Thomas' own peculiar synthesis of these diverse logics coming
down to him enabled our recognition of why these nine questions were preceded by a proof for God's existence and followed by questions on knowing and naming him. The significance for what follows of beginning the proof with the moving sensible has been indicated. This has already been used to suggest why Thomas argues from God's immutability to his eternity, rather than giving eternity its Augustinian priority. The motionless motion which forms the five ways has been picked out and its importance in indicating the way thinking can unite knowledge of the finite and the knowledge of God has been suggested. We have already given a general statement of the circular structure found in questions three to eleven -- a form consequent on their constitution in this unity which is sacred doctrine. Since this circle unifies the movements in Thomas' Neoplatonic-Aristotelian divinity, the task now before us is to display in detail its actuality in these questions. This will take us a little beyond our previous analyses of its character. For it is essential now to show just how it belongs to our knowledge of God in Thomas -- specifically how it is more positively applied than in his sources, and yields, in questions twelve and thirteen, a more positive account of how we name God. Bringing out what is more positive in Thomas' use in theology of the circular form requires us to begin by going over again briefly some previously covered ground. We commence by looking once more at question one and the structure of the five ways in the proof of God's existence.

The first question, "de sacra doctrina, qualis sit et ad quae se extendat" starts with an article asking whether it is necessary to have another knowledge beyond what natural reason can attain in the philosophical disciplines: "utrum sit necessarium praeter philosophicas disciplinas aliam doctrinam habere." Such a knowledge, namely sacra doctrina, is compelled by the ordination of man to an end exceeding reason's comprehension: "quia homo ordinatur ad Deum sicut
ad quendam finem qui comprehensionem rationis excedit." The immediately subsequent articles continue to place this knowledge beyond the categories of the humanly achieved arts and sciences. It transcends the distinction of scientia and sapientia, i.e., the difference between the intellectual intuitive wisdom which knows the first principles and the rationative activity which applies this knowledge to the various objects of the sciences. It is primarily speculative, but it comprehends the practical within itself, thus passing beyond the distinction of human sciences into theoretical and practical. Moreover, it has no place in the mutually certifying structure of scientific knowledge -- the hypothetical rise from science to wisdom and the deduction from wisdom to science. Plato established this as the dialectic through which knowledge attained whatever certainty belongs to it. Finding such a unifying dialectic is the problem Aristotle set himself in his Metaphysics, first philosophy, or theology. The transcendence of the categories of human knowledge is necessitated by the incapacity of man for his principle. The weakness of his intelligence, adapted to the knowledge of sensible particulars, makes him unfit for the splendid elevation of pure intellectual substance. Man cannot raise himself to the knowledge of God; God must reveal himself. On the other hand, it is the character of God, the object of this knowledge, which enables this transcendence. "Dicendum quod Deus sit subjectum scientiae." He reveals its principles, the articles of faith. Sacred doctrine is wisdom and science, when it knows both God in himself, and all else in relation to him. It is theoretical, because it knows the God who possesses all by seeing them in his own essence, and it is subordinately practical, because this God makes all things in his vision of them. This is possible because theology's subject, God, stands above these human divisions and is the absolutely free self-sufficient source and end of everything.
After transcendence of sacred doctrine is established through the twofold relation --natural and gracious -- of man to his principle, the argument turns. The modes of human rationality, against which sacred doctrine was originally set in contrast, are now restored to it. The sovereignty of its object places all at its disposal:

Since grace does not destroy nature but perfects it, it is necessary that natural reason should serve faith, just as the natural inclination of the will follows love. Hence also the Apostle says, II Cor. 10:5: "Bringing every thought into captivity for the service of Christ." 107

Thus the three articles which follow article seven, "utrum Deus sit subiectum huius scientiae", show that sacred doctrine is "argumentativa", that sacred scripture uses metaphors and has one literal sense. That the science is argumentative establishes its use of the modes of discursive human reason despite its superiority. The very superiority, which enables this free use, compels it, for, as we discovered in article five, the raising of the mind through the discipline of its sciences is necessary for the better adaptation of its weakness to this supra-rational knowing. 108 The employment of metaphor by scripture involves the same free condescension of the divine superiority to our weakness:

For God provides for everything in accord with what is proper to its nature. It is however natural to man that he come through sensible things to intellectual, because all our cognition has its beginning in sense. So properly in Sacred Scripture spiritual things are handed on to us under corporal metaphors. And this is what Dionysius says, I cap. De Cael. Hier.: "It is impossible for the divine ray to shine on us except wrapped up in different sacred veils." 109

Because scripture has spiritual things under material images, it cannot communicate its teaching directly and it has many senses. There are three spiritual senses: "allegoricus", "moralis", and "anagogicus". But its doctrine is not at the mercy of fancy and inspiration; the spiritual three are subordinated in Thomas to the "one literal" sense. 110
In this the interpretation of scripture is given a foundation which shows Thomas' confidence in reason and its necessity for theology. So the last article of question one restores a subordinated human reason which the first article had found incapable of reaching man's true good.

The first question is then a dialectical circle in form, suggestive of the Neoplatonic structures we have previously identified in the content and ordering of Thomas' theology. This is present for St Thomas' own understanding in terms of the meeting of the movement of God's self-revelation coming down from him and of the human philosophical endeavour to rise from creatures toward God -- the enterprise archetypically displayed in the work of Aristotle, the Philosopher. The logic of sacred doctrine is revealed by identifying what Aristotle's science cannot reach. It uses his categories to point at what escapes them, and then it encorporates within the sovereign sufficiency of sacred doctrine the Aristotelian argumentative ratio, by which the necessity of principles is discovered, and the Aristotelian rise through the sensible to the spiritual, the latter significantly given authority by Dionysius. Thomas identifies the movement downward from the principle as sacred doctrine's peculiar privilege. We, however, know it to belong to Neoplatonism and to have been made explicit as the origin of theological system by Proclus. Dionysius communicates the theurgic side of Proclus to Aquinas; using it, suitably transformed, Thomas is able to give a theological justification to Aristotle's logic. Nonetheless the deficiency of Aristotle's philosophical science is the same for Thomas and Proclus.

Prop. 12 follows Rep. 509B in identifying the efficient with the final cause of the universe; the  is also the of the system. It is Pr.'s prime quarrel with Aristotle that on this cardinal point he lapsed from the Platonic teaching: the Aristotelian system affirms the upward tension toward a
God who *πνεύμα* *τὸ ἀνεπιτύπτωτον* without tracing the downward chain of causal dependence. Pr. urges that the conception of deity as goal of desire is unintelligible when divorced from its counterpart the conception of deity as source of being . . . 112

The initial question also involves another union of Aristotle and Proclus.

Historians are correct in identifying a relation to Aristotle in Thomas' notion that theology is a science with God as its subject. 113 Thomas is quite explicit that God, as principle of being, is subject of the Aristotelian metaphysics, in fact this is what makes it theology. 114 God in himself is one of the topics treated in sacred doctrine and the *Summa Theologiae* begins with a treatise *de deo*. Its form resembles the treatise *de divinis nominibus* established by Proclus more than anything found in Aristotle, but certain features mark it as Aristotelian. To one we have already attended in Part II, D. Thomas' treatise on the names of God is about the absolutely first principle. It is not about inferior gods and it makes proper predictions about the first. It is probably because Thomas was also an heir of the Neoplatonic tradition stemming from Porphyry that one of the characteristics given to the first is *esse*. What, however, most definitely marks Thomas' theology as neither Porphyrian nor Proclan is his description of the nature of sacred doctrine corresponding to his confidence that positive predications are properly made of the absolutely first principle. This is that theology is called by Thomas a *scientia* having *deus* as its *subiectum*. Such a statement implying the validity of *epistemic* knowledge in respect to the principle itself would be impossible for a Neoplatonist. 115 As indicated previously, it is not a Dionysian conception; the names are not proper predicates of God. Proclus is explicit that the soul must altogether pass beyond *ἐνεργεία* to rise to God. For Plotinus, union with the One is perfectly achieved neither in *ύφορες*, nor certainly in science, but only
when the soul has gone beyond that self knowledge by which it turned back toward its source, and discovered a more profound identity than knowledge gives. Their views on predications complement what moderns might call their epistemologies.

It is not only the Neoplatonic tradition which is incomplete from Thomas' standpoint, owing to what its negative theology of the One excludes, but Aristotle and his followers have also a conception of theology which lacks the breadth of _sacra doctrina_. The relation of the various objects of such a theology is considered within Aristotle's tradition in the form of the question as to whether being as being or separate substances is the subject of metaphysics. We have tried to show earlier that Thomas interprets Aristotle as teaching that the highest science has both subjects: being, because of its inclusiveness, and separate substance, because it is principle. On the basis of this understanding of Aristotle, Thomas is able to think how philosophical theology, rising from sense knowledge, and scriptural theology, descending from the self-revelation of spiritual substance, are able to meet. Aristotle's unification of ontology and theology is thus crucial for Thomas' conception of sacred doctrine. Yet metaphysics, first philosophy or theology, remains a distinct science among others for Aristotle and the inclusion of the whole scope of articulated reality in theology as the only knowledge is not directly the work of Aristotle. But, it is at the point where Aristotle's onto-theology is necessary for Aquinas that his followers fail Thomas.

Avicenna's _De Philosophia Prima_ or _Metaphysica_ or _Scientia Divina_ forms a part of a larger work _Kitāb al-shifā_ (The Healing). The larger whole contains logic, physics and mathematics as well as this metaphysics and so it resembles a Neoplatonic system. Moreover, the metaphysical part, although having elements corresponding to the content of Aristotle's _Metaphysics_ comprehends as well moral and
political sciences and a psychology through which transition is made
from intellect to will. The treatise, consequently, concludes with
the contracts which constitute the family and the state. In this way,
Avicenna's system is moving, under the obvious influences, in the di­
rection which Thomas' sacred doctrine assumes. On the other hand,
Avicenna is determined that our knowledge of God have an independence
of the sensible which is appropriate to the absolute being of God him­
self and desires that a certain basis for all science be provided.
Metaphysics cannot then receive its object as something given to it
and established by physics but must prove its existence; the proof must
not be from sensible existences, hence its special metaphysical or
logical character (see note 126 below). However, Avicenna also accepts
that a science cannot prove its own subject. Where, then, would it
start? In consequence, although God or separate substance is among its
objects as principle of its subject, he is not its subject. Because
"the subject of every science is something the existence of which is
conceded", 120 the subject of this science must be being as being.
God is "himself one of those things sought in this science". 121 Indeed
"divine sciences do not inquire about anything else except things
separate from matter both in definition and existence". 122 Yet it is
only as united with other beings under a common conception that God is
in the science:

If, however, one considers the causes inasmuch as they
possess being and considers all that belongs to them
so considered, it will be necessary that the subject
be being as being. 123

This position is not without likenesses to that of Thomas but it is
unable to hold together the extremities as Thomas does. That theo­
logy could both call God the subjectum, and prove his existence from
sensible things would be unthinkable within Avicenna's categories.
Similarly, the elements of the Thomistic synthesis fall apart in Averroes.
Agreeing with Avicenna that a science cannot demonstrate its own object, but differing on the nature of physics and metaphysics and their relation, Averroes drives the sides apart in another way. He does not begin with being precedent to matter but with physical reality; the proof for God's existence belongs to the physics. Metaphysics receives its subject from the physics and is dependent upon it.

Physics studies material forms and secondly it studies simple forms separate from matter, and it is the science which considers being taken simply. But it ought to be noted that this kind of being, being which is separate from matter, is not demonstrated except in this natural science, and whosoever says that first philosophy is necessary to demonstrate the existence of separate beings errs. For these separate beings are the subjects of first philosophy, and it is shown in the Posterior Analytics that it is impossible that any science demonstrate the existence of its own subject, but rather it concedes its existence. This is either because its existence is self-evident, or because it is demonstrated in another science. Here Avicenna made a great error when he said that the metaphysician demonstrates the existence of the first principles, and when he proceeded to do this in his own book about the divine science, through the way he thought necessary and essential in that science. 124

Averroes' position establishes a more immediate relation between physics and metaphysics than Avicenna's does, but it deprives theology of the independence and absolute character, its judgemental freedom, the movement from above, which belongs to theology as sacred doctrine in Thomas. Further, in the end metaphysics, as the investigation of one kind of being, becomes an isolated special science. Neither of these Aristotelian solutions has the breadth of the sapiential science of Thomas.

Thomas' movement beyond Aristotle and those self-consciously following him is comprehensible only through his own adoption of a Neoplatonic and especially Proclus sense of religion. The theology of Proclus, as opposed to that of Aristotle, is not directly a knowledge of the first principle but rather a knowing of it only as manifest in all else and of all else as unified into one reality through relation
to the unknown One. The development of this unified systematic knowledge occurs together with a strongly negative theology; there is a determination to set the first beyond all science, predication, and being. As we have asserted, the negative element is certainly present in Thomas and modifies his science of God in himself; his *Summa Theologiae* is a wonderfully ordered and comprehensive treatment of all else as it comes from and returns to God. After question one is concluded wherein theology appeared as the science which treats God and all else *sub ratione Dei*, Thomas sets out in the prologue of question two "*de Deo, an Deus sit*" his plan for the whole work. There, Aristotle is present when he speaks of sacred doctrine as cognition of God "*secundum quod in se est*" but Proclus makes his influence felt when Thomas goes on to say that he will also treat God in this science "*secundum quod est principium rerum et finis earum*". It is a Christian understanding of sacred doctrine involving a positive revelation of the divine nature and a humanity raised to receive this through its reasonings about physical things which is able to unite as never before these two aspects of divinity and these two opposed theologies in one science under a most comprehensive conception of the *ratio Dei*.

Earlier we attempted to show that the five ways in the proof of God's existence, though they correspond to the four causes of Aristotle, are given an order never used by Aristotle when listing his causes. Rather they constitute in Thomas' ordering a Neoplatonic circle. This emerging of Aristotle and Neoplatonic logic was also represented as appearing in Thomas' use of Dionysius to provide theological authority for his emphasis on the rise of man to spiritual things through the sensible which ascent is also typified for him in the structure of the sciences of Aristotle. The unification of these Hellenic and Hellenistic approaches is readily enough seen. What is not so clear is their import and balance. We propose now to restate the circle described by the ways
in order to bring out its significance for Thomas' restoration of the finite, i.e., sense and discursive reason and their objects, and the affirmation of positive predication in the knowledge of God in the *Summa Theologiae*.

The order of the five ways not only demonstrates once more that the separation of the divine from the finite and their subsequent unification is the characteristic logical structure of these questions, but also clarifies its theological point. The first way identifies God as first in a series of movers. The second, from efficient causality, distinguishes the first and what follows on it as belonging to different orders of being. Efficient cause is separated from moving cause by its capacity to produce a new substantial being, rather than a modification to an existing being. The third way emphasizes the gulf between first principle and all else. For it deals with the contrast between the generated and corrupted and what is not subject to these changes in the form of the distinction between the possible and the necessary. This is the way most satisfactory to thinkers like Avicenna and John Duns Scotus. They endeavour to move to the necessary being from the possible in order to have a proof for God which reflects his own independence of actual finite existents. For these thinkers the first two ways cannot be transformed so as to free them from their beginning in sense experience. This way seems then to represent the furthest distance in the movement from that experience to its principle and it is the turning point. Thomas explicitly includes here a return to creatures in the denomination of God at the end of the way. He is "causa necessitatis aliis". The fourth carries this further. God is in all things as "causa esse et bonitatis et cuius perfectionis". Finally, reflecting upon the perfection of nature in that it has a purpose and end operative in it rather than considering its incom-
pleteness as moved or contingent or corruptible, God is named positively. This is not only because he is immanent in things, being that "a quo omnes res naturales ordinantur ad finem", but also because he is himself "intelligens". The argument has come full circle. For in thought, the return of being upon itself becomes explicit and it can be known how beginning and end are joined in a motionless motion. The first principle thinks and, through this thinking, by which the divine orders to itself as end his goodness, being and perfection dispersed as finite existence, there is a return to the motionless beginning, "primum movens quod a nullo movetur". What has itself as end and is moved by nothing outside it fully possesses itself in all it does. The form here displayed in which Thomas both distinguishes the first and what comes from it and unites them involves the development of the conception of God in the direction of all inclusive self-relation and provides a plan for the questions which follow.

Thomas certainly regards unmoving motion, in the sense of "actus perfecti", as a valid way of speaking about God, showing that he has brought together Plato and Aristotle, in a way Stephen Gersh has shown to be characteristic of the later Neoplatonists. In applying their conceptions to the absolutely first, Thomas would shock these Hellenistic thinkers. Still, since at this point in the Summa Theologiae, it has not been said that intellection is this return upon self, some evidence is required to make clear that the logic we ascribe to Thomas' treatment of our knowledge of God from creatures in the context of sacred doctrine is not an extraneous invention.

Thomas set it out himself when he described how men know God in this life (question twelve, article twelve). We know first that he is the cause of all, "omnium est causa". Second, we grasp the difference between him and them, that he is not any of the things which he causes "differentiam creaturarum ab ipso, quod scilicet ipse
non est aliquid eorum quae ab eo causantur." Third, we understand that this difference is not because anything good is excluded from him, that he is defective or lacking. Rather, he superexceeds everything; "haec non removentur ab eo propter eius defectum, sed quia superexcedit."

This is a description of the logic ordering questions two to eleven. Question two establishes that God is causa omnium. Thomas states that question three "concerns his simplicity, through which composition is removed from him"; "de simplicitate ipsius, per quam removetur ab eo compositio". But he also adds that this negation must be overcome by the subsequent questions on God's perfection, goodness, infinity and existence in things. Because we know God from creatures, we may confuse his simplicity with theirs. Simple corporal things are imperfect; they are only parts of larger complex wholes. Their simplicity is incompleteness; "simplicia in rebus corporalibus sunt imperfecta et partes." We will consider questions three to eleven in detail; but before this, we must consider another change by Thomas in the ordering of what he takes from his sources. He has altered the order of the process of knowing, which has just been described, from its source in Dionysius.

If Aquinas reforms Aristotle using a Neoplatonic logic, he also restructures his most authoritative and most apophatic late Neoplatonist source so as to restore the validity of finite knowledge. M.-D. Chenu reports:

About the knowledge we can have of God, Dionysius says (De div. nom., c.7 . . .): "... we rise [to God] by removing from Him all else, by attributing to Him all else in an eminent degree, by making of Him the cause of all else"; Saint Thomas, however, restates these three operations in an inverted order: "[Dionysius] says that from creatures we arrive at God in three ways, namely: by way of causality, of removal, of eminence" (In I Sent.; d.3, div. textus). De facto, the entire Dionysian doctrine is thus reversed.

Thomas maintains Dionysius' order when he comments on this passage.
in his exposition of the Divine Names. When, on the other hand, he is setting it out as a basis for the structure of his own theological work, as in the Commentary on the Sentences, or when the order affects the content of his argument, as in Summa Theologiae I, 12, 12, he changes the arrangement of the Dionysian steps. There is no reference to Dionysius in this article, but the language is so like that in the commentaries on the Divine Names and the Sentences that he must have had Dionysius in mind. So Aristotle is restructured to conform to Dionysius and Dionysius is reordered to admit Aristotle.

The simplicity of God is then that by which he is separated from creatures and what prevents our knowledge of him through them. The imperfect representation of God by his effects stems from their multiplicity in contrast to his simplicity: "hoc ad defectum imitationis pertinet, quod id quod est simplex et unum, non potest representari nisi per multa." This multiplicity also affects our speech:

It ought to be said that we are not able to speak about simple things except through the mode of composition, by which we receive knowledge. And therefore speaking about God we use concrete words in order to indicate the subsistence of a thing because with us things do not subsist except in composition; and we use abstract words to indicate their simplicity.

But of course, the division this implies between subject and nature does not belong to the things but to our manner of thinking and speaking. Thomas is fully aware of the negative implications of God's simplicity for our knowledge; as we have said, he is explicit that God's simplicity removes him from things. What must surprise the reader is that in this question, set at the head of his theology and formally giving God his first name, Thomas moves unalterably forward in the determination of God as infinite self-relation. For there is developed, in the very process of separating God from the finite, an ever fuller statement of his own nature.

The principle of this argumentation is the conception of God
reached in the five ways and it must consequently be conceded that they do more than indicate that he is; they involve insight into the divine essence. The first reference to the demonstration of God's existence simply designates him as "primum movens immobile", but immediately thereafter the first being is said to be "esse in actu et nullo modo in potentia." It may not be directly seen how these descriptions involve self-relation; indeed this is drawn out only in the second article. Yet we have already pointed out the significance for this conception of the divinity that the first article in which they occur shows God has no body. This leads to the demonstration, in the second, of his utter immateriality: "impossible est in Deo esse materiam ... materia est ... in potentia. Ostensum est quod Deus est purus actus." What is immaterial has complete return upon itself -- as we have seen, a Proclan principle given to Thomas in the Liber de Causis and used by him to connect the questions on God as one to his knowledge and its consequent attributes.135 So, in this second article, it appears first that God is "bonum per essentiam" and "per essentiam suam forma"; indeed, form which is "per se subsistens ex hoc ipso individuntur" is God. These forms are "supposita subsistentia" and this substance is able to be predicated of God.137 "Substantia vero convenit Deo secundum quod significat existere per se."138 It is only inasmuch as substance means something more than "quod est per se esse" that this predication is impossible.139 It is in terms of this self-related activity, "eius est primo et per se agere",140 like the self-subsistence of substance, that what has been taken as the defining statement of Thomistic metaphysics, "sua ... essentia est suum esse",141 is to be understood. God's existence is actuality of this kind. The intention is that knowledge of his existence should be the beginning of the unfolding for us of his nature, not that we should be left knocking our heads vainly against the blank wall of this esse.
If the consideration "de Dei simplicitate" separated God from all else and raised difficulties about the probability of knowing him in the forms belonging to human cognition and which it gives to language, "de Dei perfectione" moves in the opposite direction. The distance of God from all else appears as the problem, his simplicity, or what is implied by it constitutes half the objections in this question; for example,

God is simple as has been shown. But the perfections of things are multiple and diverse. Therefore all the perfections of things are not in God. 142

The requirement is to bring the two sides together in so far as the perfections of all things are in God and his creatures are like him. Crucially for our argument, it is the positive conception of God developed in considering his simplicity that now enables the apparent limitations of that simplicity to be overcome. It is the actuality of God and the other forms of being which allows both to be called perfect;

a thing is said to be perfect, according as it is actual, for perfection is an attribute of that to which nothing is lacking which is proper to its kind of perfection. 143

Because God is "ipsum esse per se subsistens, ex quo oportet quod totam perfectionem essendi in se contineat." 144 There is a likeness between God and all else: "ipsum esse est commune omnibus." 145 The analogia entis based on the likeness and difference between his perfection or being and that of all else is the principle of all community between them and him.

The doublemindness of Thomas in respect to the opposition between Aristotle and the Neoplatonists comes out in the questions on goodness in general and God's goodness. 146 For Neoplatonists being belongs to ὁ οὖς and is subsequent to the One or the Good. Thomas determines the order both ways: in the respondeo of question five article two, being is made prior to good because of the priority of knowledge
to desire, *ens secundum rationem est prius quam bonum*. In the response to the first objection, as pointed out before, good is said to be prior from the perspective of causation, and also within this Platonic-Dionysian view, when the extension of God's activity beyond the existent is considered. If the priority of either being or goodness depends upon your vantage point, goodness will not ultimately be able to be kept apart from intellectual or, in general, self-related activity as it is in Proclus, for example. Despite Thomas' balancing of the Platonic and Aristotelian sides, the argument moves forward in the direction we have already discerned. For emanation is referred to final cause *"bonum dicetur diffusivum sui ipsius esse eo modo quo finis dicitur movere"*. It is thus given the character Aristotle claims it lacks in Plato, though such a conception of it is for Proclus the deficiency of Aristotle. Progressing further toward Aristotle, the good is brought within self-consciousness when final causality is subjected to will, *"voluntas autem respecit finem ut objectum proprium"*. Still, the placing of the divine perfection and goodness just after the simplicity of God, and before intellect, shows he has not sacrificed the causal priority of goodness.

The questions on goodness have internally the logical structure already identified. After showing that God's perfection implies his goodness, Thomas distinguishes this goodness from that of other things and in such a way as to remove it from any genus or order of things. So God is *"sumnum bonum simpliciter"* and *"per suam essentiam"*. But this is just what enables him to contain all perfection and to inhhere in every good thing so as to be that by which they are called good.

Therefore from the first essential being and goodness, everything is able to be called good and existent, inasmuch as it participates in the character of the first by a certain assimilation, though remotely and deficiently
... So therefore a thing is called good by the
divine goodness. 153

The superiority of the divine goodness is not exclusive, "et sic est
bonitas una omnium et etiam multae bonitates". 154

The next two questions are a development of these concluding
words of the "de bonitate Dei". "De infinitate Dei" and "de existentia
Dei in rebus" evidently explore how God is in things and includes all
that is. The dialectical structure of this consideration comes out
when the two questions are taken together, as Thomas directs; "for
God's ubiquity and presence in all things is attributed to him in so
far as he is uncircumscribed and infinite." 155

Infinity appears first
as exclusive self-relation. Infinity is a perfection in form apart
from matter. Because "maxime formale omnium est ipsum esse" and be-
cause "esse divinum non sit esse receptum in aliquo, sed ipse sit suum
esse subsistens," 156 God is infinite. He is unlimited because there
is no matter to receive and limit the pure form which he is. It be-
ongs to the very notion of this formality that it is exclusive, self-
related, self-subsistent. God is distinguished "ab omnibus aliis et
alii removentur ab eo". 157 The remaining articles in this question
sharpen and complete this separation, not only by showing that infinity
belongs essentially to God, but also by demonstrating that nothing else
can actually be infinite. The argument is then primarily negative and
it remains for the next question to accomplish the reunion of the
infinite and finite. Hence, "because it seems to belong to the in-
finite to be everywhere and in all things", 158 we treat the existence
of God in things.

That God is existent through his own essence is once again the
turning point. Just as before this notion of self-sufficient actuality
has served both to distinguish God from his creation and unite him to
it, so it reappears here. "Cum autem Deus sit ipsum esse per suam
Because God is cause and cause of the very being of things, he is intimately present to all by his own essence:

\[
\text{Deus dicitur esse in omnibus per essentiam, non quidem rerum, quasi sit de essentia earum; sed per essentiam suam, quia substantia sua adest omnibus ut causa essendi.} \quad 160
\]

Indeed, he is wholly everywhere: "secundum se totum est ubique." 161

The next two questions "de Dei immutabilitate" and "de Dei aeternitate" are also connected: "the notion of aeternity is consequent on that of immutability as the definition of time is upon motion". 162

We have considered at an earlier point the significance of Thomas' reversal of the Augustinian order, dependent as he is here upon Aristotle's definition of time. 163 The connection of this inversion with the origins of the whole treatise in the five ways, beginning as they do at the demonstration "ex parte motus", is perhaps hinted in the affirmation "quod Deus movet seipsum" found in the first article of the pair. Further, as aeternal, life belongs to God and so the second question is the more positive of the two. But in general, these questions are negative when compared with their immediate precedents. They deny motion and time of God. Since these belong to the very finitude and corruptibility of the world in which we found him entirely and everywhere present according to his own essence, the negation of them relative to God would seem necessary to protect his mode of being from confusion with that of his creation. So the possession of all things which has already been affirmed of God is understood negatively by its qualification as "interminabilis", in the definition of aeternity Thomas adopts from Boethius. 164 Thomas is explicit about this. This negativity follows from the necessity of our cognition of the simple through the composite:

As we must arrive at the cognition of simple things through the composite so we arrive at the cognition of aeternity through time . . . Simples must be defined.
by negation, e.g., the point is that of which there is no part. But this is not because negation belongs to their essence, but because our intellect, which first knows composites, is not able to come to the understanding of simples except by passing beyond composition. 165

This negation provides a starting point for the last question of this part of the treatise de deo uno.

This last question is "de unitate Dei". It represents a return to the point from which the predications of God began, that is his simplicity. The argument has run full circle. This is made explicit by Thomas not only in subsequently turning to the questions on how God is known and named by us as a reflection on a completed series of names, but also by his conclusion of the last article. We are referred back to the starting point.

He is moreover most undivided, in so far as he is neither divided actually or potentially according to any mode of division whatever, since he is simple in every way, as has been shown above. Hence it is clear that God is maximally one. 166

But as the structure demands this return into unity as the absolutely undivided, simple first principle, so it also determines the form this unity must have. This is not the Plotinian unity above substance, life, and being; these have been attributed to God in the course of these questions. Rather, the unity here genuinely predicated of God is the unity which he has "per suam substantiam". 167

This is said in the first two articles where unity is first shown to be convertible with being and so the problem arises "whether one and many are opposed". 168 Not having accepted the Neoplatonic separation of unity from being, Thomas is confronted with the question of how his earlier division between God and all else in terms of the difference between simplicity and composition can hold. Since everything has unity to the degree it has being, God and creation seem to compose a single continuity. The second objection of article two puts
the problem thus: "Nothing opposed to something else is constituted out of its opposite. But unity constitutes the many. Therefore it is not opposed to the many." Thomas' balanced solution to the contrary difficulties represented by the first two articles is best captured in the respondeo of the third article which recapitulates the whole logical movement to his conception of the divine unity.

The respondeo consists of three proofs of God's unity. Like the five ways to God's existence they are not redundant repetitions but the three moments of a movement by which the divine unity is understood and explicated. The first way is "ex eius simplicitate". This was the beginning of the whole argument. God is the singularity of his own nature "idem est Deus, et hic Deus"; hence, by his own essence, there is only one God. But this obviously constitutes him as totally outside all else; he would be negatively self-limited if he were one in this sense alone. Consequently, the second and mediating way is "ex infinitate eius perfectionis". "God comprehends in himself the whole perfection of being." He does not just exclude but also includes everything. This is the same logical movement from negative simplicity to positive perfection Thomas set out in his plan for these questions. God's inclusive infinity makes him exist in all things. Therefore, the third way to the divine unity does not start with a name of God at all but rather with his unity communicated. It begins "ab unitate mundi". God is the per se one which is the cause of unity. And so God is "maxime unus" because he is "maxime ens et maxime indivisum". So little is this the Plotinian unity into which the Neoplatonic return has taken place that the sed contra of the final article designates it as the Trinity.

The aim of this structural analysis of questions three to eleven has been to show that there is in them a positive knowledge of God, to display how it occurs and how it is qualified and conditioned by the
form through which it appears. They originate in a Neoplatonic descent from the first principle, understood as the peculiar logic of Christian revelation, and in a rise from the sensible, through which Aristotelian science human knowing acquires the concepts with which revelation can be grasped. The questions themselves unite in a number of ways these two contrary movements so that their characteristic form is a dialectical circle beginning in the rational and sensible, which is negated as adequate to the apprehension of God, but to which a return is finally made. Expressed in a word, the result is that reason gives knowledge of God only if its mode is denied as belonging to its divine object. Whether such a conclusion is either the real final result of what Thomas has done, or whether it is in fact a genuinely thinkable notion must occupy us later. What is now required is to confirm these statements about what the structure conveys by demonstrating that Thomas himself draws them in those questions, meant as a reflection on what questions three to eleven attain.

Earlier the structural purpose and justification of questions twelve and thirteen was indicated. They are intended to separate the treatment of the essence from the operations in accord with a general Neoplatonic logic which understands them as belonging to different levels of reality because operations are more divided than substance. In Aristotle the distinction between them cannot be so sharply drawn. This explains why they occur where they are rather than at the end of the operations, or even after the Trinity has been considered. After all, both these sections also involve knowing and naming God. But why do twelve and thirteen not occur before predications have in fact been made? Why do we not have swimming lessons before we are thrown into the water? The answer to this question is from Aristotle. Thomas' views on how we know our own psychic capacity are dependent on Aristotle's determination that the soul's acts are
known through its objects and its powers from its acts. When this is combined with the Philosopher's theory of language, the relation of twelve and thirteen to the earlier questions and to each other is manifest.

It ought to be said that according to the Philosopher, words are signs of concepts and concepts are likeness of things. And so it is clear that words refer to things signified by means of an intellectual conception. And therefore according as something is able to be known by our intellect, it is able to be named by us. 173

Thomas is absolutely explicit that predication is dependent on knowledge and knowledge on being. The structure of God's being and the structure through which it is known ought then to be reflected in -- indeed determinative of -- what is said of him. Attend to the prologues of questions twelve and thirteen:

Because in the above we have considered how God is in himself, it remains to consider how he is in our knowledge, that is how he is known from creatures. Having considered what pertains to knowledge of God, we ought to proceed to the treatment of the divine names; for everything is named by us as we know it. 174

In fact, question twelve has the structural logic we found in its predecessors and the doctrine of questions twelve and thirteen reflects what precedes them.

The dialectic of question twelve is subtle and beautiful; it is also important because it enables the most radical preservation by Thomas of human nature in the face of the absolute knowledge of God. This is the doctrine of created grace. The general structure is clear enough. The thirteen articles of the question begin by affirming that by nature and grace the knowledge of God is necessary to the fulfillment of man and that this knowledge must be the seeing of God's very essence, since he cannot be adequately known through any likeness. The argument then takes a more negative direction, at least in respect to man as we now find him in the body, knowing by his natural powers
through sense. It is made clear that this vision is not for bodily
eyes: it is by the assistance of grace and it is not comprehensive.
Man cannot have the proper vision of God in this life and he never
knows either all that God knows or just as God knows. Then the descent
takes place. The last three articles all concern knowledge "in statu
huius vitae", "in hac vitae", "in praesenti vita". Here is set out
that positive development of Dionysius' dialectic to which we have al­
ready averted and which provides the basis for the positive doctrine
of predication of God which is found in question thirteen. What makes
question twelve worth exploring in detail is the marvelous way in which
the integrity of human nature is preserved in the middle articles,
while the modes of this human life are denied as adequate to full know­
ledge of God.

The first article, "whether a created intellect is able to see
God through his essence", 175 involves an affirmation set against
Dionysian Neoplatonic objections. Against essential vision are placed
Dionysius' view that of God there is "neither sense, nor image, nor
opinion, nor reason, nor science", that God is unknown because infinite,
because he is not, and because there is an infinite distance betwixt
him and creatures. 176 But the denial of such sight is contrary to both
faith and reason, which are distinguished here and in the last article
of the question. Faith would be nullified because its basis is the
actuality of man's beatitude in God.

Since the final happiness of man consists in his high­
est activity, which is that of reason, if no created
intellect could see God, either it would never achieve
happiness or its happiness would consist in something
other than God. This is foreign to faith. 177

Reason would be denied. Its fulfillment is in knowledge of the
principles and causes; this frustrated, man's natural desire would be
vain. So both faith and reason demand that "the blessed see the
essence of God". 178 At this point it also comes out that there is
indeed a proportion between the creatures and God:

And so it is possible for there to be a proportion of the creature to God, in so far as it is related to him as effect to cause, and as potential to act. And in this way, created intellect is able to be proportionate to the knowledge of God. 179

(The negative side appears later when it is shown that the relation is not in God but in creatures, a doctrine of Proclus. See n. II, 349.)

The words just quoted conclude the reply to objection four of article one and the whole article. The second article brings out the disproportion of God and created intellect; the created knows either through external likenesses (in the case of the human knowing adapted to sense) or internal ones (in the case of angels), but neither of these are adequate to the knowledge of God because of the inequality of all effects to their cause. This reason E.R. Dodds singles out as "the principle on which the whole structure of Neoplatonism is really founded." 180 It is just at this point that the argument takes a very remarkable turn. Instead of inferring that the created never knows God's essence, Thomas concludes rather that it must be known directly, without a similitude. What both nature and grace require is not to be frustrated. Instead created intellect is "a certain participated likeness of first intellect" 181 and demands its vision be perfected. It will be raised up and strengthened to know directly God's essence. The adaptation of nature will take place on the subjective rather than the objective side. Yet the integrity of the subject must then be respected and so the basis of the doctrine of created grace is developed:

To say that God is seen through a likeness is to say that the divine essence is not seen which is erroneous. Therefore it must be said that for the seeing of the essence of God some likeness is required on the side of the power of seeing, namely the light of divine glory strengthening the intellect for seeing God, of whom is said in the Psalm "in your light we will see light". Not, however, through any created likeness is the essence of God able to be seen, which would represent the very divine essence as it is in itself. 182
The sublime excellence of the final end of created intellect also assures however that a strong contrast must be drawn between knowledge deriving from sense and its ultimate hope. So the reply to the second objection distinguishes between knowledge of God "in via" and the vision of which Thomas has just spoken. Article three therefore asks, "whether the essence of God is able to be seen by bodily eyes." The response is of course negative. Article four, "whether any created intellect is able to see the divine essence through its own nature", is primarily about the angels, as the objections make clear. It continues the negation of nature in as much as a natural inadequacy is found in the angels as well as in men and the absolute necessity of grace is brought out.

Knowing subsistent being itself is natural to the divine intellect alone . . . It is not therefore possible for created intellect to see God except in so far as God by his own grace joins himself to the created intellect so as to be understood by it. 185

Yet the negation of human nature here is not total. Neither the human nor the angelic forms of knowledge are the same as God's; they are not of the same nature, "connaturale", but, because they are elevated above the material, they have the capacity to be raised by grace. And while humans do not know intellectual forms directly, they do know them by abstraction:

And therefore, since the created intellect is made to naturally apprehend individualized form and concrete being abstractly by means of a certain power to separate out, it is able through grace to be raised so that it can know subsisting separated substance and separated subsisting being. 186

Thus, through these most negative questions we are prepared for the explicit teaching of created grace in article five. In it the immediate vision of God is affirmed through a light which makes the rational creature "deiformis". 187 To preserve his nature in the vision, the light must actually become a power possessed by the creature; the grace
must be created. To be raised above its created nature, "it must be disposed by some disposition above its own nature" -- "oportet quod disponatur aliqua dispositione, quae sit supra suam naturam." "Hence it is necessary some disposition supernatural to it be superadded to it so that it is elevated into such sublimity": "Unde oportet quod aliqua dispositio supernaturalis ei superaddatur ad hoc quod elevetur in tantam sublimitatem". 188

What succeeds maintains the integrity of the created, not only its difference from God, but also the differences between one creature and another. Thus, despite the gracious character of the power of vision by which God is seen, some see him more perfectly than others. The differences between individuals become differences in charity or desire; "and desire in a certain way makes the desirer apt and ready for receiving the desired object. Hence, who has more charity, will more perfectly see God and will be happier." 189 This is the point of article six. The next three articles define how God is known and what is known in him. Although the blessed are perfectly fulfilled and nature is in no way frustrated, we cannot comprehend God. This would just exactly do away with the difference between the created and the creator. He is infinite and, as formally, not materially, infinite, he is perfectly known to himself. In contrast, the created does not know the infinite infinitely; this would destroy the finite.

Since therefore the created light of glory, received in whatever created intellect, is not able to be infinite, it is impossible that any created intellect should know God infinitely. 190

In the course of replying to the objections, Thomas states what applies both to our knowledge in patria and in via: "the mode of the object is not the mode of the knowle". 191 This determines what is positive and negative in articles eight, nine and ten. Positively, they maintain that what we know in God we know through the vision of his
essence, not through exterior likenesses, and all at once, not successively. This is also how God knows what is outside him: "omnia per unam essentiam Dei". Negatively, we will not know all that God knows. Created intellect will not know what God was capable of doing but has not done. This would be to grasp his essence infinitely and comprehensively, as he himself possesses it. Further, the differences between the blessed, already established in principle, will consist in knowing more or less of his effects through his essence.

The remaining articles return us to this world and human knowing now. Here as well, even in the knowledge of God, Thomas is concerned to hold to the especial character of the human as he understands it. Thus, when he denies in article eleven that anyone in this life is able to see God through his essence, the objections are primarily drawn from Augustinian illuminationist epistemology, which would seem to deny the necessity of proceeding to God through sensible effects and to assert in its place an immediate grasp of the forms in the divine truth. This appears to Thomas to amount to that knowledge of things in the divine essence, which he has just affirmed of our knowing in patria, and to forget the contrasting movement from sensible effects, which Thomas takes as the defining feature of human cognition. This explains why the doctrine of article twelve, which shows what knowledge we can in fact have of God in this life, uses the teaching of Dionysius, in contrast to Augustine, though transformed, in the way set out previously, into a more positive dialectic. The anthropology determinative at this point is the same which makes Thomas regard Anselm's argument as a statement that the existence of God is self-evident and to move him instead to demonstrate God's existence from sensible effects.

The final article makes it comprehensible how the predications of God in the de deo uno can be drawn together with those of the de deo
The question is "whether through grace a higher knowledge of God is possessed than that which is had by natural reason." The answer is affirmative and so by revelation in this life we are able to reach what the natural reason cannot attain "ut Deus esse trinum et unum." But this knowledge does not destroy the characteristic human mode of knowing. The knowledge is "ex phanthasmatis, vel a sensu acceptis secundum naturalem ordinem, vel divinitus in imaginatione formatis". It is still tied to image and sense; however the light of grace enables more to be seen in these than the natural light grasps. "For the natural intellectual light is strengthened by the infusion of the light of grace." The principle is the same as that governing the raising of the created intellect to see the divine essence -- a natural power is not destroyed but strengthened.

The logic of question twelve is reflected in the doctrine of thirteen, though the tensions of the system come out very strongly. Partly, question thirteen has to do only with the concluding articles of twelve; it is about naming God from creatures, naming according to our knowledge in via. But the perfect knowability of God in himself and our heavenly vision of his essence are not forgotten. Only this can explain how Thomas, holding to a conformity of being, knowing and naming, can both maintain steadfastly the form of human ratio, subject and predicate logic, on the one hand, and assert, on the other, that the simple divine nature is able to be affirmatively named through it. God can be named from creatures and substantially. The names signify him properly; indeed, "they more properly belong to God than to creatures." They are not mere synonyms; their variety and plurality make them more adequate for speaking of him than the contrary. They are not stated of him univocally but analogically, in the way a principle is related to inferior causes; thus, "as far as what is signified through the name is concerned they are more..."
primarily predicates of God than of creatures." God is not really related to creatures but rather they to him. This, however, does not prevent using language of him which implies a temporal relation to creatures. His name "Deus" is the name of his nature and is thus incommunicable. He has a most proper name, "Qui est", and affirmative propositions are able to be formed of God. All of this is possible, because, in doing it, we can affirm the content of the predication while denying its mode. Abstract and proper nouns are both necessary in naming God although both kinds of noun are defective in respect to his own proper mode, as our intellect is not able in this life to know him as he is.

"Creatures imperfectly represent him." The human "modus significandi" is inadequate to God; it is for representing creatures. The problem is that the composition in human knowledge and naming is untrue to this "unity entirely simple." But the very division, plurality and variety are necessary to its speaking of God. Nothing created reveals God perfectly, rather "the simple principle is represented through the divine perfections of creatures variously and in plurality." The relation of division and unity in a sentence becomes a mirror of how both are necessary to express our knowledge of God as adequately as we can.

To this diversity which belongs to reason, there corresponds the plurality of predicate and subject; the intellect signifies the identity of the thing through the very fact of uniting them (per ipsam compositionem). However, God considered in himself is entirely one and simple; but our intellect knows him by differing concepts; this is because it is not able to see him as he is in himself. Yet, although it understands him under diverse conceptions, it actually knows that to all these notions there corresponds one and the same object simply. This plurality, therefore, which is according to reason, it represents through the plurality of predicate and subject; the unity however intellect manifests by composing them into unity.

Man's understanding is on both sides of the relation of God and
creation. It reasons about composite sensibles, and thus attempts to rise to God, but participating, through the mediation of the angels, in the prime intellect, it looks down and judges the inadequacy of the composed and the ratio appropriate to it for knowing God as he is. Though it can name God only from creatures in accord with a cognitive power suited to sensible things, man also knows that he is made for the direct vision of God's essence without the intermediation of created likenesses. The origin of theology in revelation gives him already a participation in that vision as already enjoyed by the blessed. Thus, he can affirm the content of his rationative knowledge and predications, because he judges how their form is inadequate to the thing they describe. Neoplatonic descent and Aristotelian ascent, Aristotle's science of God and Proclus' theological knowledge of all else, meet in the affirmation of content and the denial of mode. But this only states the profound difficulties of the position of Thomas. Form and content are not ultimately separable.

There is a fundamental conformity between what is maintained about the being (or non-being), knowledge and predication of the first principle in the traditions upon which Thomas draws. Yet they say exactly opposed things. Further, although efforts have been made to resolve the difficulty by suggesting the contrary, Thomas believes there is a coherence between ontology, knowing and naming. Clearly there is a unity on the subjective side. How we name God from creatures follows from how he is known through them and this is a result of their composed unity. In all three there is a division and unity. On the other side, the divine side, he is fully known to himself because his immaterial simple being is a complete return upon itself and his names belong to his perfection. The subjective and objective are connected in our heavenly knowledge of God directly through his essence. Incoherence occurs because our knowledge in via is not this
direct essential knowledge. Yet Thomas' teaching about naming God is remarkably positive. Can this be justified without dissolving the unity of ontology, psychology and logic?

For Aristotle, the first principle is one of the separate substances. The divine is the activity of thought; it is not a capacity which might reveal its hidden nature in the form of noetic activity. Rather the divine element is the active possession of the object. Aristotle's psychology of knowledge is similar. The power of the soul is known through its acts which its objects reveal. What soul is is known only in reflection on them. Soul knows itself to be separable when it has found such an object separable from matter and it is thinkable in exactly the same way as its objects are. Because the unified activity of subject and object in thought is the highest metaphysical and psychological truth, the Aristotelian subject predicate logic is not untrue to what is and how it is known but rather reveals its structure. Logic has its justification in a doctrine of what primarily is, the self-thinking activity. The *Categories* simultaneously teaches what is, and how statements are made. The logic set out there remains valid when Aristotle reaches the heights of divinity and he shows no hesitation in making predications of the first. It is noetic activity, it is aeternal, it is life, and it is happy. 216

With Plotinus, there is a similar unity of all the elements, ontological, psychological and logical, but the whole concatenation has the opposite import. Above noetic activity there is the One. Nothing beneath the One reveals it as it is, though all else is nought except the revelation of it. Noesis is the highest and first revelation but thought and vision are also untrue to it for they make its absolute simplicity dual. The structure of soul corresponds to that of reality. The divine hypostases are known when the soul returns upon itself and seeks to know its origins and nature. Soul has levels
of existence -- immersion in the sensible, the government of the sensible, noetic activity, and union with the first above the noetic -- which mirror the levels of what is and what is not. The divided activity which is noesis ultimately fails; soul seeks a union which is beyond it and which language cannot express. So too the subject-predicate logic of our speech is incapable of the ultimate truth and the first cannot be named. Calling it the One is not to designate it as it is, but only to locate it for us. "The One is" is not a statement of the One in itself; this is already the second hypostasis.\textsuperscript{217} As claimed previously,\textsuperscript{218} the ineffability of God is even more strongly developed in some at least of the subsequent Neoplatonists. They refuse to link him to the structure of what is beneath him even through the notion of activity. Although beginning already with Porphyry the Aristotelian logic is regarded more positively again, it is only a logic of the finite. It is impossible without severing ontology, psychology and logic to make proper predications of the absolutely simple. Dionysius and Eriugena are in grave difficulties as the Neoplatonic separation of the hypostases starts to disappear in their systems but neither of them would assert unambiguously with Thomas that proper affirmative predication can be made of God.\textsuperscript{219} There is not in Thomas a complete and direct contradiction between the doctrine of God's being, on the one hand, and his teaching about knowledge of it and predications about God, on the other, but neither can there be a total consistency.

Contradiction is apparent if one sets sharply against each other his statements on the divine simplicity and those on predication. On the one hand, he teaches that God is entirely simple, without any composition, that what he is is consequently unknowable through the composed. He gives the simplicity, goodness and unity of God structural priority in his system and divides sharply the \textit{de deo uno} and \textit{de deo trino}, because, from the unity, the three cannot be known and that
God is one and three is inconceivable; it is for faith only, not for reason. On the other, he teaches that God's proper nature is signified in affirmative propositions. But there is more yet to Thomas. If one takes that aspect of his theology which we have described as taking the Neoplatonic exitus-reditus structure of the finite into the first principle, then a mediation between these two contradictory poles appears. Then, one explores the implications of Thomas' conceiving the entirely simple as pure act, the self-relation of subsistent substance, and of his teaching that the good is the self-possession of absolute will. Aristotle is transformed through his use by the Neoplatonists and one will see how Thomas, by such means, develops positive dialectic. By it, the nature of God is even more fully manifested in ever more complete forms of self-relation, so that the theological movement from unity through operations to Trinity and creation becomes thinkable as one continuity. This mediating dialectic overcomes the contradiction between God's simple being and our knowing and naming him. However, by such a solution, God's simplicity is no longer absolute and it would be wrong to absolutely deny the mode of our predication when speaking of God. Its justification would no longer be simply in the subjective necessities belonging to our form of cognition; rather, as in Aristotle, the subject-predicate logic would reveal something about how God is in himself.

This statement of the implications of the analysis being attempted here will perhaps suffice for this point of the discussion. No doubt some hint of the relation of these questions to the controversies of contemporary Thomism will have suggested themselves. Further explication of these must wait for the concluding part. What remains is to continue the exploration of how the logic of infinite self-relation can tie together the parts of the treatise on God and some of the ways in which the opposing Aristotelian and Neoplatonic ontological,
psychic and logical structures are modified in their unification within Thomas' argument.
Part III
C
Structural Analysis of Questions Fourteen to Twenty-six, the Divine Operations

Questions fourteen to twenty-six treat the operations, or activities, of God. As already suggested, Thomas strongly separates the operations from the being, or substance, of God and gives priority to the divine substance. The reasoning involved is initially known to him from Dionysius and the Liber de Causis, but ultimately Thomas found and recognized it in The Elements of Theology of Proclus. Something has been said already of Thomas' originality in placing the operations before the Trinity, rather than between the consideration of God as one and three and his creatures. Indeed, the fundamental division necessary to the plan of the whole Summa Theologiae makes its appearance here; for the immanent operations produce the Trinity, and the operation ad extra is the very power of creation. But, it will be more comprehensible to look at the continuity of the divine operations with what follows them after their consequences have been presented. So this and some doctrinal matters concerning the activities, but primarily important to illuminate these connections (and distinctions), will be treated in the next chapters. The work of this chapter is, then, a more detailed analysis of these twelve questions.

The broad outline of their structure has been described. Beginning in God's knowledge, the movement is outward through will and love, and those activities, like providence and predestination, which combine them, to the operation ad extra of power and back to God's knowing self-enjoyment in beatitude. Within the parts of this general exitus-reditus pattern, there are a number of movements of the same type. It would be prolix to detail them all but some substantiation of the
argument is no doubt required.

The first question of the group "de scientia Dei" has the familiar order. Thomas begins by asserting that God knows. This involves an identification between God and creatures. The initial form of this is simply the self-relation and motion that knowing involves. Article one of question fourteen concludes by deducing his knowing from his immateriality: "Unde cum Deus sit in summos immaterialitatis, ... sequitur quod ipse sit in summo cognitionis". Article two moves from immateriality to absence of potentiality, and from this to God as pure act, from which it follows that he must be the object of his own understanding. "Et sic seipsum per seipsum intelligit". The objections bring out the circular self-relation involved in this. In the reply to objection one, the Liber de Causis is quoted to the effect that "sciens essentiam suam redit ad essentiam suam". The reply to objection two brings out that "intelligere est motus" as "actus perfecti existens in ipso agente." The third and fourth articles absolutely assimilate this self-related activity to God as his self-comprehension and his very substance. The drawing together of God and creatures which knowledge entails becomes most explicit and problematic in article five which asks, "utrum Deus cognoscat alia a se". The answer here and at six, "utrum Deus cognoscat alia a se propria cognitione", is affirmative. In order to prevent a complete dissolution of the mode of the divine into the mode of the finite it is brought out that he sees things other than himself not in themselves but in himself, in so far as his essence contains a likeness of things other than himself. 224

This creates the problem of article six, as the first objection makes explicit. 225 For how is something known properly if it is known as it is in the knower rather than as it is in itself? The only solution to this is that the thing must exist more perfectly in God than in itself:
Sic igitur dicendum est quod Deus non solum cognoscit res esse in seipso; sed per id quod in seipso continet res, cognoscit eas in propria natura; et tanto perfectius, quanto perfectius est unumquodque in ipso. 226

Things are so much the more perfectly known by God as they are so much the more perfectly existent in him. The essence of creatures is compared to God's essence as imperfect to perfect. This determines the complete knowability of creatures by God but the inadequacy of our knowledge of him from creatures. 227 The sense of the eminence of the being of effects in their causes is Neoplatonic, and comes out strongly in the Liber de Causis, which begins with the material on causation from the Elements of Theology. 228 It is in such a framework that the divine ideas enter Thomas' theology with question fifteen. The ideas are the exemplars and the truth of all that is other than God, the standard by which it is judged. 229 Fr L.B. Geiger 230 has shown that they enable Thomas both to identify the object of the divine thinking with the act of God's knowing, thus making his knowing and self-conscious act causative, and yet to keep God free from the finitude of the world he makes. This is fully worked out in the questions following that on the divine knowledge but the problems are present already in fourteen.

Immediately after Thomas has most radically assimilated the caused object of thought and its causal subject, by insisting that in their own proper nature particular existents are more perfectly in God than in themselves, he is forced to turn to the negative aspect of causation so as to protect God's simplicity. Aquinas denies that God's knowledge is discursive and this is just because he knows things in himself as their cause. "Unde, cum Deus effectus suos in seipso videat sicut in causa, eius cognitio non est discursiva." 231

The next article, eight, has a curious, though crucial, dialectical role. Its objections bring out the opposed sides of the dilemma whose
solution lies in a partial distinction between God's knowing and his causing. Objection one proposes that God cannot be the cause of the future as future because he always is, i.e. is aeternal. If causing the future threatens to lower God, the second objection fears his causation may remove the difference between God and his world:

"scientia Dei est aeterna. Si ergo scientia Dei est causa rerum creaturarum, videtur quod creaturae sint ab aeterno". In his reply, Thomas answers affirmatively; God's knowledge is cause. But between his self-knowledge and things something else, a different relation to things than knowledge, must intervene. Forms do not produce without an "inclinatio ad effectum", knowledge does not cause "nisi adiungatur ei inclinatio ad effectum, quae est per voluntatem". Unde necesse est quod sua scientia [Dei] sit causa rerum, secundum quod habet voluntatem coniunctam". So the solution of objection one is the addition of will to knowledge, and of two, the distinction between the mode of cause and that of effects. Thomas has now the foundation to give God knowledge in the subsequent articles of that to which he is opposed. As cause of being, he has knowledge of non-being, as cause of good, evil. As cause, he knows singulars and quantitative infinity in the unity of his being, future contingents and the temporally variable in his aeternal being, and propositions, with their inherent division, in his simple being. Because knowing is not simply causing, and because the cause has a higher mode of being than the effect, he is able to know reality without the non-being, evil, multiplicity, potentiality, change, and division which belongs to it. Nonetheless, finally a reconciliation between the two sides is achieved. Their separation depends upon a distinction between the practical and speculative in God. This difference is preserved in the sixteenth and last article.

Deus de seipso habet scientiam speculativam tantum; ipse enim operabilis non est. De omnibus vero aliis habet scientiam et speculativam et practicam.
But as already seen, Thomas does not hold to any final division between speculative and practical in theology. The concluding words of question fourteen close the gap:

\[ \text{quia (\text{Deus}) omnia alia a se videt in seipso, seipsum autem speculative cognocit; et sic in speculativa sui ipsius scientia, habet cognitionem et speculativam et practicam omnium aliorum.} \]

Significantly, this is a reply not to the initial objections but to the \textit{sed contra} and is intended to correct Aristotle's view that speculative science is more noble than practical.

The questions which immediately follow fourteen, on the divine ideas, truth, falsity, and life, are still a consideration "\textit{eorum quae ad divinam scientiam pertinent}". Their effect is to develop the self-relation belonging to the divine knowing as it is presented by Thomas from the very beginning. By this means the transition to will is made.

Question fifteen, "\textit{de ideis}", despite the evident Platonism, has not been included by Thomas by external necessity, "\textit{ou par respect à l'égard l'autorité de s. Augustine (Gilson)}", but because it has "\textit{une nécessité intelligible dans sa synthèse théologique}". They allow Thomas "\textit{éviter la contradiction entre la thèse de la simplicité divine et la nécessité d'affirmer la connaissance distincte, par Dieu, d'une multiplicité d'objets de sa connaissance}". These ideas are not just imitable by things, as in Thomas' Commentary on the Sentences, "\textit{Hoc nomen 'idea' nominat essentiam divinam secundum quod est exemplar imitatum a creatura}". But crucial to Thomas' argument in the \textit{Summa contra Gentiles} and \textit{Summa Theologiae} is a "\textit{distinction entre l'essence divine imitable et l'essence connue comme imitable}". The ideas do not fall outside the divine knowledge, but, as in the Neoplatonists, they are within it. The multiplicity of the ideas expresses their difference from the essence of God and the fact that
they are this essence as turned toward creatures and productive of
their manifold existence. But God's knowledge also reaches around the
ideas and knows them as the truth of creatures, it knows the relation
of the ideas to creatures:

\[
\text{Sic igitur inquantum Deus cognoscit suam essentiam ut}
\text{sic imitabilem a tali creatura, cognoscit eam ut propriam}
\text{rationem et ideam huius creaturae . . . Deus autem non}
\text{solum intelligit multas res per essentiam suam sed etiam}
\text{intelligit se intelligere multa per essentiam suam. Sed}
\text{hoc est intelligere plures rationes rerum; vel, plures}
\text{ideas esse in intellectu eius ut intellectas . . .}
\text{Dicendum quod . . . respectus, quibus multiplicantur}
\text{ideae, non causantur a rebus, sed ab intellectu divino,}
\text{comparante essentiam suam ad res.} 240
\]

The ideas prevent the divine simplicity being directly divided in
causing the proper diversity of things; still, so that it remains
ultimately the cause of multiplicity, it must develop self-relation.
Significantly, in the reply to the last objection of article two,
Thomas is forced to distinguish this relation and the real relations
which are the persons of the Trinity. 241

The circle of self-knowledge by which God knows his relation to
things becomes more explicit in question sixteen, "de veritate". It
is well known that Thomas rejects in this question more Platonic
notions of truth, which place it in the ideas as separate beings.
Rather truth is in the intellect; "verum sit in intellectu secundum
quod conformatur rei intellectae". It is only secondarily in things.
"Sic ergo veritas principaliter est in intellectu; secundario vero in
rebus, secundum quod comparantur ad intellectum ut ad principium". 242
A relation or comparison is essential to truth either in intellect
or in things; for truth proper, the comparison must fall within the
intellectual act. Truth is "in intellectu componente et dividente".
Truth is not in the intuitive identity of sense or intellect with
their respective objects; "non autem ut cognitum in cognoscente, quod
importat nomen veri; perfectio enim intellectus est verum ut cognitum." 243
For truth proper, intellect must know its conformity with its object. God is "summa et prima veritas". All "compositio et divisio" is denied of his intellect as truth. Yet it is not enough to say, as Thomas does, that "est conforme suo intellectui, sed etiam est ipsum esse intelligere; et suum intelligere est measura et causa omnis alterius esse, et omnis alterius intellectus". God knows this conformity; therefore he is truth. Because his being perfectly returns on itself, it is called intelligere as well as esse. Because he knows the relation between his essence as ideal exemplars and what is caused, he is the truth of them. "Res naturales dicuntur esse verae, secundum quod assequuntur similitudinem specierum quae sunt in mente divina". It is now clear not only why "de ideis" follows "de scientia Dei", but also why it intervenes between God's knowledge and "de veritate". "De falsitate" is dependent on "de veritate" as its negative contrary.

There are many considerations deriving from his predecessors which might incline Thomas to place and treat "de vita Dei" differently. Yet, Thomas is perfectly explicit that life is predicated of God because he is intellectual: "intelligere quoddam vivere est", "intelligere viventium est", "vivere Dei est eius intelligere". He also states that he is following Aristotle in this. Two features of the question allow it to be understood as a summary of what precedes and a transition to what follows. The first is the positive treatment of self-motion in God which would seem to follow from the reasoning about the reflective character of divine knowing as truth. The second nearly concludes the question and, in opposition to question fourteen, brings out the sense in which material things are more truly in their existence external to the divine ideas then in God's intellect.

It is not possible for Thomas to affirm life of God unless he find
some sense in which motion belongs to the divine. For he defines life in terms of self-movement, though importantly Thomas returns again to a distinction between the motion which is the act of the imperfect and that which is the act of the perfect:

It is clear that those beings are properly living, which move themselves according to some form of motion; either what is taken as motion proper, then motion is called the act of the imperfect, that is the act of a thing existing in potentiality, or motion taken more generally, as when it is said of the act of the perfect; namely when understanding and sensing are called motions, as is said in De Anima III. 253

In the second sense "vita maxime proprie in Deo est." Those living things which "operantur ex seipsis, et non quasi ab aliis mota" possess highest life. God's knowing is such a motion. Other forms of life are compared unfavourably to intellection. Further, the thinking activity of all except the first is found to be dependent upon given first principles. Only God has himself both as principle and object of his thinking -- this, incidently, is why he must be the subject of the ultimate science which participates his knowing, namely, sacred doctrine -- "sua natura est ipsum eius intelligere". Thus Thomas concludes with Aristotle that life most perfect and eternel belongs to God, "quia intellectus eius est perfectissimus et semper in actu". But the argument here is as much Platonic as Aristotelian.

In article two Aquinas identifies life and activity, "operatio", as he defined life in terms of self-movement in the first article. And so, in the third, Plato and Aristotle are explicitly assimilated. This is a typically Neoplatonic equation. For the intellectual God of whom Aristotle predicates life in Metaphysics is complete activity but the unmoved mover and, in De Anima I, 4, Aristotle is at pains to show against Plato and others that soul is not self-moving. Thomas is quite clear about the reason for this when he comments on the passage:

appetere, et velle, et huiusmodi, non sunt motus
animae sed operationes. Motus autem est operatio
differunt, quia motus est actus imperfecti, operatio
vero est actus perfecti. 257

At De Anima III, 7 Aristotle states that, because the faculty is not itself changed into its contrary, the passive affection of sense in knowing is not motion (κίνησις), though it is μοτός. Thomas' text seems to have translated "ἐνδέ έλλος τέτορο κίνησις" (431a6) as "unde alia haec species motus" and he interprets the first sentences of the chapter as follows:

Sed iste motus est actus perfecti; est enim operatio sensus iam facti in actu, per suam speciem. Non enim sentire convenit sensui nisi in actu existentii; et ideo iste motus simpliciter est aliter a motu physico. Et huius modi motus dicitur proprie operatio, ut, sentire et intelligere et velle. Et secundum hunc motum anima movet seipsam secundum Platonem, inquantum cognoscit et amat seipsam. 258

Moreover the self-moving Platonic soul is assimilated, by this argument, to the unmoved mover in the arguments for God's existence in the Summa contra Gentiles.

Sciendum autem quod Plato, qui posuit omne movens moveri, communius accepit nomen motus quam Aristoteles. Aristoteles enim proprie accepit motum secundum quod est actus existentiae in potentia secundum quod huiusmodi; qualiter non est nisi divisibilium et corporum, ut probantur in VI Physic. Secundum Platonem autem movens seipsum non est corpus; accipiebat enim motus pro qualibet operatione, ita quod intelligere et opinari sit quoddam moveri; quem etiam modum loquendi Aristoteles tangit in III de Anima. Secundum hoc ergo dicebat primum movens seipsum movere quod intelligit se et vult et amat se. Quod in aliquo non repugnat rationibus Aristotelis; nihil enim differt devenire ad aliquid primum quod moveat se, secundum Platonem; et devenire ad primum quod omnino sit immobile, secundum Aristotelem. 259

Thus, in the ad primum of article three of the question "de vita Dei", Thomas unites Plato and Aristotle, by finding a way of regarding the complete activity of God's intellect as both life and motion. One recollects that this is a common enterprise of later Neoplatonists and yet that Thomas divides himself sharply from them by applying this motion to the absolutely first principle. After referring to
De Anima III, 7, he says:

Hoc igitur modo quo intelligere est motus, id quod se intelligit, dicitur se movere. Et per hunc modum etiam Plato posuit quod Deus movet seipsum, non eo modo quo motus est actus imperfecti.

The fourth and last article of question eighteen, "utrum omnia sunt vita in Deo", reunites the life and motion of what is other than God, "actus imperfecti", with the aeternal and absolutely complete life, "actus perfecti" from which it had been distinguished in article three. That "omnia in ipso sunt ipsa vita divina" follows from the identity of God's life and his thinking, together with the identity of his thinking and what he thinks. This remarkable union is accomplished in the respondeo of the article; it remains to the replies to the objections to make the necessary separation between the modes of divine and finite being. The first reply removes from God's life the form of motion belonging to physical creation. The second denies of lifeless material being in itself, the life it has in God. The fourth makes certain that evils, and other forms of privative being, are not given, by their life in God, a reality they do not possess. The third is part of this negative process but it has, with the second, a positive character which in fact also enables the transition to the questions on will. As noted above, the differentiation of knowledge and will in Aquinas depends partly on a distinction between the object as it is known and comes to be within the knower and the object as willed. In order that the object be further sought by will, beyond intellect, it must in some way remain a further object in itself for love beyond its possession in knowledge. In the reply to the third objection of this last article of the final question on God's knowing, Thomas allows that there is a sense in which material being has a truer existence outside the divine intellect than it has within it. This
did not appear in the question "de scientia Dei" where, as indicated above, things were said to exist more perfectly in God than outside him and thus were able to be known more perfectly in God's knowledge of himself than directly through their exterior effects. The new position is as follows:

It must be said that if in the knowledge of natural things there were not matter, but only form, in all ways natural things would be more truly in the divine mind than in themselves . . . But because by definition matter belongs to natural things, it must be said that natural things have a truer being absolutely in the divine mind than in themselves, because in the divine mind they are uncreated, in themselves, however, they are created. But to be this particular being, as a man or a horse, this they more truly possess in their own distinct being than in the mind of God, because it belongs to the truth of man to be material, but they do not have the materiality in the divine mind. 261

Next, the love, the appetite or will, which conjoined to intellect, creates this being of things as they are distinct from the divine thinking, is to be considered. It too is a form of self-relation. In love God rests in himself through his own ecstasy.

Will is God's relation to himself as good. It is distinguished from the self-relation which is knowledge, wherein God possesses his being as true: "sicut bonum addit rationem appetibilis supra ens, ita et verum comparationem ad intellectum". 262 Truth, and the act apprehending it, is prior to will and its object, because it is a more immediate relation to being "verum respecit ipsum esse simpliciter et immediate". 263 Cognition also naturally precedes appetite in the attaining of an object, in so far as desire depends upon apprehension. This is a fundamentally Aristotelian way of relating the faculties. In Aristotle's theology the divine described as self-knowledge moves other beings because they desire what they know. 264 Thomas' ordering of will after intellect reflects his teaching at previous points in the Summa that truth is prior to good, that being is the most appropriate name of God, and that being is
prior to good. In the questions on the divine operations, this Aristotelian aspect of Thomas' thought comes through strongly, as indeed it often does for Neoplatonists when they are dealing with the second level of spiritual life. In Thomas, intellect dominates questions fourteen to twenty-six, as already indicated. More might indeed be added to the previously mentioned intellectualizing of life, providence, and beatitude. It is of some significance that God's willing is a consequence of his knowing and Thomas' treatment of will is often just a reproduction in other terms of the treatment of knowing. For example, he writes, "Sicut alia a se intelligit intelligendo essentiam suam, ita alia a se vult volendo bonitatem suam". Moreover, God can properly be said to love because he is intellectual.

It also belongs to Aristotle's influence on the treatise of the divine operations that the passions ("passiones animae") are distinguished from the habits which are moral virtues ("habitus moralium virtutum") and that the consideration of providence follows the latter. To Aristotle's distinction Thomas owes his division of the question on God's love, twenty, from that on his justice and mercy, twenty-one. To the order of the Ethics in which the problem as to the nature of prudence is consequent on a consideration of the moral virtues, Thomas attributes his placing of his question on providence, and consequently its subordinates on predestination and the Book of Life. Aquinas is explicit in his prologue to question twenty that the basis of his theological division is one made in human psychology. When he takes up passions and human moral virtues in the Summa, Thomas is conscious of following Aristotle. But more than Aristotle is behind the structure of the treatise on the
If the priority of being, truth and knowing in Thomas has a positive relation to the fundamentals of Aristotle's way of thinking, the priority given to simplicity and goodness reflect the Neoplatonic criticism of Aristotle. Will and goodness must acquire a precedence, if God's simplicity hides him to our way of knowing, and if "ei quasi ignoto coniungamur". In causing God's goodness is prior and the *Summa* proceeds from and returns to a God of whom we do not now have vision and who is never known comprehensively to us. Conformity to a God, to whom we are unified through inclusion in his self-revealing unity of exit and return, determines the further development of the questions on the operations of God. There is a strong sense of these activities as forms of self-relation and there is a movement outward from the simplicity of God in their course. As from the perfect self-return of immaterial being, it was deduced that such being knew itself and was conscious of the conformity of its being to its intellect and of its truth as exemplary idea to the being of other things, so it is now shown that to self-knowledge there is necessarily added the perfection of willing itself.

Understanding God to be self-related is absolutely necessary in order to conceive what it means for God to will. In will, God "vult et se et alia, sed se ut finem, alia vero ad finem". This is both a different relation of God to himself than knowledge is, and, by adding it, we are more fully able to understand how God's power to cause is grounded in his nature. By willing and loving them God is more adequately related to things outside him as they are in themselves. If God's knowledge of material creation is abstracted from the perfection added in his willing it, there is an inadequacy between the way these things are in themselves and how they are present to God in his knowledge. When will is conjoined,
the relation "ad res secundum quod sunt in seipsis" is also given.

So the movement outward in these questions, partly outlined previously, is simultaneously a development in our knowledge of God, in the presence of creatures to God, and in our knowledge of the reason for their creation. There is the movement from will, God's relation to himself as the good end in which he rests, to love, God's ecstasy. Love moves outward to justice, mercy, providence and predestination. In these God is for other things their law or measure -- justice is for will and intellect what truth is for knowing -- a measuring rooted in his liberal goodness or mercy, and he is the reason in things, non-human and human, drawing them into their end, itself ultimately the divine goodness. Love, as "vis unitiva etiam in Deo . . . quia illud bonum quod vult sibi non est aliud quam ipse, qui est per suam essentiam bonum", has a reality for God's inner being not found in those more externalized designations of his activity. Thus, love is a proper name of God the Holy Spirit; it is a proper designation of an internal personal relation. Finally, by this outward movement, the operation ad extra is reached. Power is "principium effectus".

Power implies the idea of a principle executing what will commands toward that which reason directs, which three coincide in God. Or it may be said that God's own knowledge or will, as it is the origin of effects contains the notion of power. Hence the consideration of knowledge and will precedes in God the consideration of power, as cause precedes act and effect.

The consequence of this development of the knowledge of God's nature, together with the understanding of how he can cause and have relation to the real independent existence of creatures, will be that, for Thomas, the proper conception of creation requires the knowledge of the Trinity.

The transition from the divine knowledge which "importat relationem ad creaturas secundum quod in Deo" to relations "ad res secundum quod sunt in seipsis" makes the problem of expressing
the divine self-relation consistently with the divine simplicity more and more difficult. Treating God as object of himself in will, Thomas is required once again to speak of him as moving upon himself. "And this is what Plato meant when he said that the first mover moves himself". To express God's various relations to his creatures, his acts must be defined even more concretely. To such differences as "scientia visionis" and "scientia simplicis intelligentiae" and "scientia speculativa" and "scientia practica", there is added the difference between "amor amicitiae" and "amor concupiscientiae". For, "Deus, proprie loquendo, non amat creaturas irrationales amore amicitiae, sed amore concupiscientiae". Just because his love is cause, to create the difference in things, God must love one thing more than another. Because the statements about God's nature must show the grounds for the actual character of creation, it becomes increasingly hard to make sense of the denial of the composition which makes creatures creatures of God. What is the "amor vis unitiva etiam in Deo, sed absque compositione" or the "amor divinus, ... vis concretiva, absque compositione, quae sit in Deo, inquantum aliis bona vult"? Must not God be self-divided by the self-knowing and loving which includes relation to external creation, if he is the unified one of the love, "extra se in amatum translatus"?

It is not, however, simply with the outward movement culminating in the "divina potentia" of question twenty-five that the treatise on the divine operations concludes. "De divina beatitudine", question twenty-six, effects a return to God's knowledge which began the tract and which dominates it. Beatitude "significat bonum perfectum intellectualis naturae". The perfection of such a nature will be an "intellectualis operatio, secundum quam capit quodammodo omnia". Thomas specifically excludes the possibility that "beatitudo ei convenit secundum rationem essentiae" or "secundum
Thus the statement of E. Pousset is not altogether precise. He is correct that beatitude concludes the entire first twenty-five questions of the Summa. Thomas says that it is last "post considerationem eorum quae ad divinae essentiae unitatem pertinent." But this is not "l'unité de l'être et de l'agir". Beatitude does not specifically unite "l'acte d'être et de la connaissance"; nor is the fact that they, "en Dieu, sont identiques" the salient point. As Pousset states himself, in God will is "aussi identique à l'être et à l'agir." Rather, it is precisely as intellectual act, "secundum rationem intellectus", that beatitude gathers together all the preceding perfections and so happiness, by concluding the treatise on the divine operations, completes the second stage of the progressive revelation of the divine nature.

There can be no doubt that, like its corresponding member in the first series of divine attributes, i.e., question eleven, "de unitate Dei", the "de divina beatitudine" involves a return to the point of departure which contains what intervenes. Happiness is a perfection which collects rather than removes. This is made clear by the first words of the first article; according to Boethius, happiness is "status omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectus". The first objection asks how such a thing is compatible with God's simplicity. This aggregation is not denied of God by Thomas but said to exist in him "per modum simplicitatis". Specifically, happiness is presented as an intellectual activity containing will and power, rather than as being a less complete relation to the object than they. Happiness knows the good it possesses -- or, put otherwise, it is by knowledge that will enjoys its self-possession as its own end or good. Further the intellectual nature, which is happy, is, as will, source of good and evil, and has power over its acts. Intellect is the origin of
will and power -- this was already clear -- but they are also the perfections of intellect and as such intellect contains them and is happy. So beatitude is intellect knowing and enjoying its will and power and synthetically completes the divine operations. It also involves the subjective relation to God explicit in questions twelve and thirteen. Partly God is recognized to be happy "secundum intellectum", because it is by intellect that we enjoy God in vision. He is our blessedness; objectively, he alone is happy since other intellects are happy by knowing him. Returning to the solutions in question twelve, Thomas is able to place happiness in the subjective act of finite intellects through created grace. The whole de deo uno is then concluded by showing that God's happiness includes all happiness. So, as God's unity gathers into his simplicity all those positive perfections which its initially privative form seemed to deny, happiness gathers into his knowledge all the perfections of the acts of his creatures.

In these questions on the divine operations Thomas has opened and developed the self-relation of the divine being to the point where it becomes increasing comprehensible how God is that self-division and plurality which is the Trinity of persons and why Christians regard the first principle so described as creator and true explanation of the existent world. Yet Thomas will pull back from regarding the transition to these descriptions of God as possible for reason. What lies behind this retreat is implicit in the tensions present within Thomas' treatment of the operations and is at root the same difficulty discovered in his consideration of the substantial names. This is the contrariety active in his return within Neo-platonic structures to more Hellenic philosophical positions. The general problem is the opposition of God's simplicity to the knowledge of him and the continuing specific difficulty for Thomas is how the
content of what is known of God from the finite can be attributed to him if its mode is simplified. In the questions on the operations the structures of thought belonging to the sciences of psychology and ethics are the means employed to order the theological material. The use of these patterns may be inessential as to content. Of the essence, however, are the self-reflective character of the divine acts, and the difference between the operations precisely in terms of the way subject and object of the activities are related. A mode, which the divine acts have in common with the finite spiritual forms, is essential to their nature. It is also necessary to distinguish various forms of this mode if God is to be spoken of in theology as cause of what is other than him. Our argument has shown that God must divide and unite himself as subject and object of his acts and that these acts are many not only from the perspective of the created intellect viewing them, but also that the different forms of these self-relations are absolutely essential to distinguishing them from each other. The self-return which is knowledge is not the same as those which are truth and will. And so knowledge, truth, and will are not simply identical with the being of God. This comes out very clearly, when, in the introductory question to the treatise on the Trinity, Thomas is at pains to show that the procession of love is not generation, which would have the consequence that it was indistinguishable from the procession of the word or knowledge.

There is a difference between intellect and will, because the intellect is actualized by the thing understood coming to be in the intellect according to its likeness; will however is actualized, not because some likeness of the object of will is in the will, but because the will has an inclination toward the thing willed. The procession then which belongs to the nature of intellect, is according to the nature of likeness, and so is able to have the character of generation . . . However, the procession belonging to the nature of will, is not considered according to the character of likeness, but more according to character of impulse and movement into
something. And therefore ... it proceeds in the
divine through the mode of love ... for from love
someone is said to be moved and impelled toward
something to be done, 300

The different forms of relation to creation correspond to these
different forms of self-relation. Unless the modes of finite
composition are in some way carried into the divine it will be nothing
but blank incomprehensible unity. If this was the sum of Thomas's
theology, it could not proceed, as it does next, to the Trinity of
persons.
Part III

D

Structural Analysis of Questions Twenty-six to Forty-three,
the Trinity of Persons

Questions twenty-six to forty-three complete the consideration
of God "in se" in the Summa Theologiae by that procession or emanation
which produces real relation and opposition within the divine essence.
These real relations are subsistent divine persons. There are two
main aspects of the structural analysis herein attempted. The first
is a treatment of the internal structure of the treatise de deo trino.
In this considerable assistance is derived from Bernard Lonergan's
Verbum, to which reference has already been made. The analysis must,
however, be more extensive than his and, ultimately, conclusions
other than his will be drawn about the logic operative in these
questions. The second part is an examination of the connections be­
tween the treatise on the predications belonging to the divine unity
and that on the Trinity of persons. Included in this must be some
consideration of the significance of the different relations between
metaphysical theology and scriptural theology which Thomas holds to
exist in these two. As the examination of the links and discontinuities
within the whole de deo in se will require venturing well outside
the de deo trino and will lead more easily to general conclusions,
it is taken up after the internal structure has been sifted.

Bernard Lonergan writes the following (I have supplied the
references to specific questions):

There is the order of our concepts in fieri, and then,
processions [q. 27] precede relations [q. 28] , and
relations precede persons [qq. 29-43]. There is
the order of our concepts in facto esse, and then,
there are the persons as persons [qq. 30-32] , the
persons considered individually [qq. 33-38] , the
persons compared to the divine essence [q. 39] , to
the relations [q. 40], to the notional acts [q. 41]. Now these orders are inverse. The processions and the notional acts are the same realities. But the processions are in God prior, in the first order of our concepts, to the constitution of the persons. On the other hand, the notional acts are acts of the persons and consequent to the persons conceived as constituted. He [Thomas] maintained a distinction between the property of the Father as relation and the same property as constitutive of the Father. As relation, the property is subsequent to generation; as constitutive, the same property is prior to generation. . . . there are two systematic and inverse orders.

Leaving aside whatever else is said or implied here, there seems to be the grounds for asserting, in these questions, a circular motion of the same kind as discovered in the movement from simplicity to unity, in questions three to eleven, and from intellect to beatitude, in questions thirteen to twenty-six. There is at least a return to the matters which began the treatise in those questions which conclude it.

Question twenty-seven is "de processione divinarum personarum". It shows how the operations of intellect and will, which are internal to the divine essence, are productive of processions or origins. These words are used more or less as synonyms. The relations of origin, generation and spiration, are treated in question twenty-eight, "de relationibus divinis". The relations are the persons as subsistences in the essence and their treatment commences properly at question twenty-nine, "de personis divinis". These are parallel to questions forty, "de personis in comparatione ad relationes sive proprietates", and forty-one, "de personis in comparatione ad actus notionales". (Questions forty-two and forty-three are considered later in this chapter.) This appears immediately from the names of the notional acts: "innascibilitas, paternitas, filiatio, communis spiratio et processio". And Thomas is quite clear on the subject: "notio dicitur id quod est propria ratio cognoscendi divinam personam. Divinae autem personae multiplicantur secundum originem."
The relations of origin and the notional acts are two ways of regarding the same thing. "Dicendum quod actus notionales secundum modum significandi tantum differunt a relationibus personarum, sed re sunt omnino idem". This is the ad secundum of question forty-one. It goes on to consider the relations primarily in their character as origins or quasi-motions. The notions are abstract nouns grounded in the activities. For this reason their existence causes Thomas great difficulty. As substantives, they seem to provide a way to arrive at the subsisting persons by philosophical reason. If the point be strained, questions twenty-seven and forty-one are the specifically corresponding members; in effect, notional acts reach back to the origin of relations.

It is evident, on the face of it, that question forty, "concerning the persons as compared to the relations or properties" draws the extensive treatment of the persons back to its earlier ground in the relations (q. 20). Article four of question twenty-nine is "utrum nomen personae in divinis significet relationem vel substantiam" and concludes "hoc nomen persona significat relationem in recto, et essentiam in obliquo". Article one of question forty is similarly "utrum relatio sit idem quod persona". By the same arguments, it determines:

Sed quia relatio, secundum quod est quaedam res in divinis, est ipsa essentia; essentia autem idem est quod persona, ut ex dictis patet; oportet quod relatio sit idem quod persona.

The shape of the treatise is then a movement from the activities within the essence to the persons and back again. Fr Lonergan finds a rationale for these opposed movements in the distinction between the order of our concepts in fieri, i.e., the order corresponding to the origin, production or becoming of things, factually or logically, and in facto esse, i.e., a knowing beginning with the thing produced.
and proceeding from it to the origins through which its being is made intelligible. The latter mode is the form under which the Trinity is made known to men, nor could we have discovered it by the alternative route. Because of the origins of sacred doctrine in divine revelation, the *Summa Theologicae* has an "ordo disciplinarum", the inverse of the human "via inventionis". Thomas is explicit that human reason cannot invent the Trinity. But,

Trinitate posita, congruunt huiusmodi rationes; non tamen ita quod per has rationes sufficienter probetur Trinitas Personarum. 305

Thus, the circular motion in the treatise *de deo trino* derives from the joining and difference of the movements of man's knowledge from nature to God and from God to nature. This is the reason we have assigned to the circular motion of the *Summa* generally and of its parts. Still a full analysis of the structure of the questions on the Trinity requires other considerations be drawn into the argument.

What is chiefly to be added in order that the structure of the treatise on the Trinity might become more completely understood is the relation of unity and plurality in it. The direction forward from the operations, through the persons, to creation is in general a development of multiplicity. The self-related operations of knowing and willing, which determine the divine processions, are a more unified form of being than that to which they give rise. This is why there is no power posited between the essence of God and his operations, from which the latter would derive. Indeed properly speaking, "potentia est principium agendi in alium" and "maxime manifestatur in creatione"; power is the operation of God outside his essence. In this perspective, Thomas says, "Sed intelligere et velle non sunt tales actus qui designent processionem alicuius rei a Deo distinctae, vel essentialiter vel personaliter." Yet power is a notional act; "Patri attribuitur et appropriatur". 308
The Father is the source of all procession. In fact, because he is the ultimate origin of personal procession, the power of creation belongs properly to the Father. And, because the power which creates has its first form in the "potentia generandi", power in God is modified, as knowing and willing also are, in the personal relations. That is, power has a different character in the Father than in the Son and so on. In this way, the de deo trino occupies a position midway between the treatise on the operations and that on creation.

Putting the same point differently, Thomas maintains that, although the distinction of persons is real, it is the minimal distinction; "distinctio personarum non debet esse nisi per id quod minimum distinguat, scilicet per relationem". Because the distinction is within a substance or nature, it can be compared to a relation of identity; "per huiusmodi relationes non diversificatur substantia nec per rationem identitatis". It is a distinguishing not through a relation "ad aliud" but "ad se". This involves mutual opposition; "oppositio relativa faciat pluralitatem realem in divinis". Still, mutual opposition demands intimate unity; "oppositorum relatione unum est in altero". The reason for moving beyond the operations comes out in this reflection. For actions of this kind, the more complete the issuing the more perfect the return to the source.

Sed id quod procedit ad intra processu intelligibili, non oportet esse diversum; imo, quanto perfectius procedit, tanto magis est unum cum eo a quo procedit.

In contrast to operations ad extra, the source and result are equal. The penultimate question of the treatise has to do with the "equality and likeness of the divine persons in respect to each other." It is just this lack of equality between source and effect which marks off the first processions within the essence from that outside it, creation.

It must be said that what first proceeds from unity is
equality, and then comes multiplicity. And therefore from the Father, to whom, according to Augustine, unity is proper, the Son processes, to whom equality is appropriate, and then the creature comes forth to which inequality belongs. 

In fact, on this account, the elements of the created world must also be unequal to each other. Since none of them can individually mirror the divine perfection adequately, they represent it as best they can by embodying different goods variously, and so together they do better than any one could. 

The unity of equality and of substance is lost in the procession ad extra.

Dicendum quod cum creatura procedat a Deo in diversitate naturae, Deus est extra ordinem totius creaturarum, nec ex eius natura est eius habitudo ad creaturas.

He is really and essentially distinguished from creatures. "Secundum rem quidem Deus distinguitur per essentiam a rebus quarum est per creationem principium". Yet, the two genera of procession are linked. The procession within the essence is the basis of that emanating outside the divine being.

The last chapter of this Part will elaborate this connection. At this point it is necessary to make clear only that the procession of creatures becomes intelligible through the procession of persons and that what differentiates the two is the dissimilarity of the relation between unity and plurality in them. Thomas is explicit:

Here Thomas reaches right back to the development of knowledge and will in the essence, and mediates that through the distinct persons of the treatise on the Trinity, to provide "rationes" for creation. The movement toward creatures is evident at every level of this
treatise just as it recurred again and again in the consideration of the operations. "... persona procedens in divinis procedens ut principium productionis creaturarum." 322 Each of the persons is understood through such a relation. Something has been said already of the Father's appropriation of power. The Word is similarly conceived; "in Verbo importatur respectus ad creaturam Deus enim cognoscendo se, cognoscit omnem creaturam." 323 Thus, as already mentioned, the Word is "Sapientia genita et creata". 324 Something will be said about the Spirit's relation to creation below.

The other side of this is that the creation is obviously not a specific act of one person of the Trinity, though its ground in power is particularly appropriated to the Father as the source of all procession, as stated above. The unity of the whole Trinity stands over against the multiplicity of creatures:

creare convenit Deo secundum suum esse; quod est eius essentia, quae est communis tribus Personis. Unde creare non est proprium alicui Personae, sed commune toti Trinitati. 325

Creation signifies a divine action, "quae est eius essentia cum relatione ad creaturam." 326 Being is properly the object of the creator in creation and, as God is the proper producer of being, to create properly belongs to God alone; it is his being which is known from creation. 327 It is then the essential unity not the plurality and distinction of persons which unaided reasoning from creatures attains.

Virtus autem creativa Dei est communis toti Trinitati, unde pertinet ad unitatem essentiae, non ad distinctionem personarum. Per rationem igitur naturalem cognosci possunt de Deo ea quae pertinent ad unitatem essentiae, non autem ea quae pertinent ad distinctionem Personarum. 328

The de deo trino is situated between the operations in the unity and the operation from the unity. The intelligibility of creation requires both that the procession of persons within the unity be developed, and that there be a return from these to the unity of essence. This is in fact what is to be found.
The circle of the questions on the Trinity begins with a movement from unity to plurality, i.e., from the unity of the activities to the distinction of persons.

Et quia personae divinae secundum relationes origines distinguuntur, secundum ordinem doctrinae prius considerandum est de origine sive de processione; secundo, de relationibus originis; tertio, de Personis.

After this the persons can be treated individually. Question twenty-nine is "de personis divinis"; thirty is "de pluralitate personarum in divinis". Question thirty-one declares that "trinitas" does not signify "unam essentiam trium personarum" but rather "significat magis numerum personarum unius essentiae." It is because the Trinity is a teaching of plurality in God that the Trinity is not knowable by the reasoning from creatures which manifests instead the unity of essence. Examining the evidence, Thomas is convinced that the pagan philosophers did not arrive at consubstantial subsistences in the divine. In this perspective it is clear why question thirty-two "de divinarum personarum cognitione", which considers the problem of our knowledge of the Trinity since it is not discoverable by natural reason follows thirty-one, wherein Trinity is primarily given the significance of plurality. The following questions, thirty-three to thirty-eight, are thus "de singulis Personis".

The circle described by the treatise on the Trinity begins to turn back toward the divine unity even within the questions on the individual persons. The last person treated, the Holy Spirit, is the union of what differentiates Father and Son. The Spirit has a dual role in the theology of Thomas. His is the procession of will or love. Love is a force impelling to unity but it also carries the subject out of himself and is an endeavour to attain union beyond the possession already given in knowledge. Will is necessarily added to knowledge for production or practice and involves a relation to
things in themselves. This has already been gathered above.\textsuperscript{332}

Just so God the Spirit is God both as perfectly united and resting in himself in love and translated ecstatically out of himself by love. The second role of the Spirit is displayed in question forty-three on the mission of the persons, the transitional question between the de deo trino and the de deo creante. For, the Spirit is the medium of the gracious indwelling of the Trinity and so he is the person to whom 'gift' is appropriated: "omnia dona, inquantum dona sunt, attribuantur Spiritui Sancto, quia habet rationem primi doni, secundum quod est Amor".\textsuperscript{333} This follows from questions thirty-seven and thirty-eight which treat 'love' and 'gift', proper names of the Spirit. Their order and rationale are readily determined:

\begin{quote}
Ratio autem gratuitiae donationis est amor; ideo enim damus gratis alicui aliquid, quia volumus ei bonum. Primum ergo quod damus ei, est amor quo volumus ei bonum. Unde manifestum est quod amor habet rationem primi doni, per quod omnia dona gratuita donantur.\textsuperscript{334}
\end{quote}

And so, because the Holy Spirit is love, he is the gift by which God bestows his other graces. The movement is outward to creatures from love. This is one side of the development in the de deo trino toward creation but the other side is also present in the three questions on the Holy Spirit which begin with thirty-six, "de persona Spiritus Sancti". They also involve the return to unity. In this perspective, one notices their situation between the questions on the Father and the Son considered as individual persons, on the one hand, and the questions comparing the essence and the persons (forty-one) and treating the equality and likeness of the persons (forty-two), on the other.

The Holy Spirit is called 'spirit', the general name for God, because he is what is common to Father and Son; "ex ipsa communitate eius quod dicitur Spiritus Sanctus."\textsuperscript{335} Even what is proper to the notion of spirit, "impulsionem et motionem significare videtur",\textsuperscript{335}
conveys the idea of making one. "Est autem proprium amoris quod moveat et impellat voluntatis amantis in amatum." Because the persons are distinguished solely by relation, personality is nothing apart from the essence except the opposition expressed in the relations. "Relationes autem personas distinguere non possunt, nisi secundum quod sunt oppositae." Father and Son will thus be one except as they are opposed. "Pater et Filius in omnibus unum sunt, in quibus non distinguunt inter eos relationis oppositio." They are evidently not opposed in that which makes them common principle of the Spirit.

Sicut igitur Pater et Filius sunt unus Deus propter unitatem formae significatae per hoc nomen Deus; ita sunt unum principium Spiritus Sancti, propter unitatem proprietatis significatae in hoc nomine principium.

Nor is this incompatible with their also being two. "Neque est inconveniens unam proprietatem esse in duobus suppositis quorum est una natura". To put the matter somewhat paradoxically, the Holy Spirit is the return, under the form of personality, to the unity of essence of the Father and Son out of their personal opposition. They are two hypostases with one act and so he unites the two. "If the subjects of the spiration are considered, then the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and Son in their plurality; for he proceeds from them as the unifying love of both." Thus, the Spirit is posited because of the unity out of division of the Father and Son. He is not the essence prior to their distinction but the return to that essential unity through relation, i.e., as person. Without him their personal union does not exist. So the language about him as union and connection becomes theologically intelligible.

The structure of the Godhead just exposed is in fact the application to it of the Neoplatonic logic of exitus and reditus, present from the beginnings of western trinitarian theology.
La contribution propre et géniale de saint Augustin, c'est d'avoir associé l'utilisation de l'"épistrophè" -- de la conversion vers le principe, prônée par le néo-platonisme -- d'une "épistrophè" aimante à l'analyse du donné biblique sur les relations aimantes entre le Père et le Fils pour découvrir dans l'Esprit la communion d'amour entre le Père et le Fils qui retourne à son Père dans l'amour.

The intellectualizing of the Trinity in this way brings the Stoic and Neoplatonic systematizing of the sciences into Christian theology. Recollect how Thomas finds in the De Trinitate of Boethius a treatise on the divisions and methods of the sciences. The Neoplatonists carry forward the Stoic division of science into physics, logic and ethics and "l'intuition fondamentale du stoïcisme, selon laquelle le Logos est l'objet commun des parties de la philosophie". Augustine picks up this tradition, but, for him, the interior relations of the persons of the Trinity found the relations of the parts of science.

Selon Augustin, la physique a pour objet Dieu comme cause de l'être, la logique Dieu comme norme de la pensée, l'éthique Dieu comme règle de la vie. Cet ordre augustinien: physique, logique, éthique correspond à l'ordre des Personnes divines dans la Trinité: le Père est la Principe de l'être; le Fils, l'Intelligence; l'Esprit-Saint, l'Amour. L'unité systématique des parties de la philosophie reflète ici l'intériorité réciproque des Personnes divines.

Pierre Hadot also notes that in Augustine the triad natura, doctrina, usus similarly functions both in the sciences and in the relations of the divine persons. Thomas employs it as well. "Usus ergo quo Pater et Filius se invicem fruuntur, convenit cum proprio Spiritus Sancti inquantum est Amor." By a Neoplatonic logic, the Holy Spirit is, consequently, a certain gathering in of the distinguished persons. Indeed, Thomas agrees with Augustine, not only in speaking of the Spirit as that whereby Father and Son enjoy each other, but also as "dilectio, delectatio, felicitas vel beatitudo". He thus recalls that aggregation in happiness which concluded the operations.
After the questions on the Holy Spirit, it is altogether reasonable that we should return to the unity of essence. Question thirty-nine, comparing the essence and persons, commences this work. Its first article maintains, in fact, that "divina simplicia hoc requirit, uod in Deo sit idem essentia et suppositum, quod in substantiis intellectualibus nihil est aliud quam persona." The question goes on to show from this that essential names are predicated of the persons and explains how this is done. This requires Thomas to raise again the problems of question thirty-two, on how the divine persons are known. For, if essential predicates are appropriate to the persons there must be some knowledge of the persons from the rational consideration of creatures.

Sicut igitur similitudine vestigii vel imaginis in creaturis inventa utimur ad manifestationem divinarum Personarum, ita et essentialibus attributis. Et haec manifestatio Personarum per essentialia attributa appropriatio nominatur. 351

As previously explained, questions forty and forty-one, on the comparison of the persons first with the relations and then with the notional acts, draw the argument of the treatise back toward its starting point in the operations. Question forty-two, on the equality and likeness of the persons, also considers their unity. As indicated above, equality is a relation of the terms of procession which belongs to that of the persons in contrast to that of creation. According to a scheme worked out in the last article of question thirty-nine, equality as a predicate of God connotes unity, "unitatem importare". "Aequalitas autem importat unitatem in respectu ad alterum; nam aequale est quod habet unam qualitatem cum alio." Indeed equality proves to be a term exactly suited to explain the essential unity of the persons without dissolving their differences. In divine persons, it connotes both essence and relations.

Aequalitas autem utrumque importat, scilicet
So in equality, the argument returns to the unity of essence without leaving behind the distinction of persons. The structure of the *de deo trino* conforms in this way to those of the divisions already analyzed. The unity to which simplicity returned was fuller than it. Beatitude consisted in the intellectual activity with which the operations began but it included the self-enjoyment belonging to will and the practical ease of infinite power which had not yet appeared in the *"de scientia Dei"*. The final return of creatures to God will also involve such a development. For though the all in all contains no more than what is in the source, the unity of the divine *principium* and what has come out of it even to the point of self-conscious freedom, makes the implicit explicit, both in fact and for knowledge. In Thomas what intervenes between beginning and end is included in the beginning as end. So equality comprehends both the self-distinction of the persons and the unity of essence.

The last question of the *de deo trino* concerns the mission of divine persons. Its very title suggests its appropriateness for providing a transition to the *de deo creante*. Something more will be said about it below as we take up again comprehensively the problem of the connections between the sections of the *de deo*. Just now two points must be made to show how it arises out of the immediately preceding questions and leads to those beyond. First, the inter-penetration of essence and person, which has been the main subject since the consideration of what belonged peculiarly to the Holy Spirit, appeared in thirty-nine as the persons were shown to be knowable through essential names, in forty, as the personal relations and essential, or notional, acts were related to each other (article
four), and in forty-one, as persons and notional acts were compared.

What happens throughout is that the essential acts, and by implication, the essence, are shown to be modified in the personal relations.

Knowing, willing, power are differentiated as they are given or received in the relation of one person to another. This is a predominant consideration when thinking about equality and likeness in God. It gives content to Thomas' thinking that, as in God there is "principium secundum originem, absque prioritate", it is necessary "ibi esse ordinem secundum originem, absque prioritate." This is "ordo naturae". So the final article of forty-two works out the equality of Father and Son "secundum potentiam" in so far as the absolute divine potency is given and received. The last words of the question are:

Habet ergo Filius eamdam potentiam quam Pater, sed cum alia relatione. Quia Pater habet eam ut don; et hoc significatur, cum dicitur quod potest generare. Filius autem habet eam ut accipiens; et hoc significatur, cum quod potest generari. 355

Since power is the creative operation, the procession to creatures might follow immediately but the missions intervene.

The intervention of the missions is the analogue for grace of the procession of creatures. The gracious mission of the Trinity to the rational creature so as to dwell in it has two aspects, the persons severally and as a whole. This carries forward the point made just above in respect to the preceding questions and reformulated constitutes the second point. The ultimate basis of the divine mission is the aeternal procession. The order of origin or nature thus determines it. As we have seen, the Holy Ghost is the person especially sent; he procedes from both the Father and Son and as love is first gift and the basis of all other graces. On the other hand since the Father is absolute principle and receives nothing, neither is he sent. "Unde cum Pater non sit ab alio, nullo modo
convenit sibi mitti, sed solum Filio et Spiritui Sancto, quibus convenit esse ab alio." The other side is that the mission is the whole Trinity both sent and received. Moreover, the consideration concludes the question and the de deo trino. It had earlier been established that the indwelling of the whole Trinity was the purpose of the mission, "per gratiam gratum facientem tota Trinitas inhabitamentem". This purpose being considered, the Trinity as a whole is also the sender; this is the final point of Thomas. "Sic vero Persona mittens intelligatur esse principium effectus secundum quem attenditur missio, sic tota Trinitas mittit Personam missam." What is significant is that it is this "tota Trinitas", persons and essence taken together, not the essence considered apart from the persons, which creates. Thomas wrote at a prior point, "virtus . . . creativa Dei est communis toti Trinitati", now, he says "creaturas visibles tota Trinitas operata sit". So the return to a concrete unity, a unity in and through self-relation, is once again the transitional moment.

The problem of the continuity between the de deo trino and what precedes it and follows it has of course two sides. One is how there is a connection between it and what is more unified; the other is the connection with what is less. The two are themselves joined; for the embracing problem is how relation to other is contained in and emerges from self-relation. It is easier to commence with the drive toward the procession of creatures.

All the main points are already before us. It is necessary only to draw them together and to fill out some elements. The treatment of God's operations moved from knowledge to will and power. By this movement the production of creatures became intelligible. God's power creates after will affirms the object known. The internal activities of knowing and willing determine the processions in the
Trinity. The power of creation derives ultimately from the potestas generandi and, as power to create, it is given and received by the persons, so, in fact, this essential operation is an act of the whole Trinity. Since, in the Trinity, knowing and willing originate real distinction, a more definite sense can be given to Thomas' statement that the procession of persons makes rational the procession of creatures. As well it becomes clearer why, on the one hand, he says that knowledge of the Trinity is necessary "ad recte sentiendum de creatione rerum", and, on the other, he maintains "similitudine vestigii vel imaginis in creaturis inventa utimur ad manifestationem divinarum personarum". Beyond this, we must recollect how a relation to creation is contained in the individual consideration of the persons. Article three of question thirty-three asks, "utrum hoc nomen Pater dicitur in divinis per prius secundum quod personaliter sumit". It concludes:

Sic igitur patet quod per prius paternitas dicitur in divinis secundum quod importatur respectus Personae ad Personem, quam secundum quod importatur respectus Dei ad creaturam.

But, the prior by no means excludes what is second. The immediately succeeding ad primum states that a person proceeding comes forth as a "principium productionis creaturarum." Moreover, as also indicated earlier, it is precisely the fact that the Father is the ultimate generating principle or undervived source of persons that makes the potestas creandi appropriate to him. He is source of creatures because he is the source of persons.

There is a similar treatment of the Word. Article three of question thirty-four asks, "utrum in nomine Verbi importetur respectus ad creaturam". The answer is affirmative. Indeed, as suggested above, Thomas uses expressions close to those of Eriugena when the latter speaks of God as making himself in his Word. 363
As in the operations, knowledge has a different character owing to its different objects. God's knowledge of himself is "cognoscitiva"; of creatures, it is "cognoscitiva et factiva." So the procession of knowledge, the Word, is "expressivum" of the Father; it is "expressivum et operativum" of creatures. This leads to Thomas commenting favourably on scriptural speech about Wisdom, begotten and created, "quia sapientia creata est participatio quaedam sapientiae increatae" or alternatively, because both creation and generation are something the Son receives from the Father.

It has already been stated how the name "gift", belonging to the Holy Spirit, involves a necessary relation to creatures. He is gift as origin of grace and the sense of possession appropriate to having God as such a gift belongs only to the rational creature. "Unde sola creatura rationalis potest habere divinam Personam." This, however, does not prevent the name being appropriated to the Spirit as aeternal person. Ultimately, the personal relation of Word and Spirit to creatures has the same basis in the origin of their processions. Love, like knowing, is an essential as well as a notional act -- they designate both the unity of essence and a person. So the same kinds of things are said of the Spirit as those which have just been noticed about the Word.

Here Saint Thomas moves between the de deo uno, the de deo trino and
the de deo creante as if there were no fundamental difference in the way men come to know God in them. This is because relation to self and relation to other are united in God's being. The ground of this must now be further explored in terms of the connection of the de deo trino with the questions which precede it by virtue of the modification being and acts receive through relation.

In the earlier chapters of this Part, a self-relation, or reflexive circle, has been uncovered in the divine being and acts. The acts were found to be differentiated by means of varying forms of this relation and this variety was discovered to involve different ways in which relation to others is bound up with self-relation. The facts, first, that the proper character of the persons includes a relation to creatures, and, second, that the relation of persons to creatures varies from person to person show the same features to maintain in this section of the de deo as were found in earlier ones. What remains to be demonstrated is that the self-relation not only continues into the treatise on the Trinity but that it has here a different character on account of the greater distinction of the terms of relation in the Trinity as opposed to the being or the activities. This would conform to the difference between the goodness of the divine essence and the same thing manifest as will in the operations.

The crucial point is simply that the persons are nothing except subsistent relations in the divine essence. Indeed they are the divine being as given and received. Thomas says it is proper to speak of an "esse acceptum, inquantum procedens ab alio habet,esse divinum." What actually forms the persons is this being given and received in knowing and willing. But, as said at the beginning of this chapter, there is a greater difference between the subject and object of these self-relations as forming the persons than as the
acts of the essential unity. It is just this which, Thomas claims,
makes the persons undiscoverable from the essence. Intellection and
loving both involve both identity and difference.

Sicut . . . ea hoc quod aliquis rem aliquam intelligit,
provenit quaedam intellectualis conceptio rei intellectae
in intelligente, quae dicitur verbum; ita ex hoc quod
aliquis rem aliquam amat, provenit quaedam impressio,
ut ita loquar, rei amatae in affectu amantis, secundum
quam amatum dicitur esse in amante, sicut et intellectum
in intelligente. Ita quod cum aliquis seipsum intelligit
et amat, est in seipso non solum per identitatem rei,
sed etiam ut intellectum in intelligente et amatum in
amante. 370

The distinguishing of the thing understood or loved, expressed in
language about thinking as speaking a word, cannot be known to be
actual in the divine simplicity. This causes the break between the
methods of the treatise on what belongs to unity of essence and that
on what belongs to the persons. More must be said of this below.

What is before us so far is that in the persons the self-relation,
already discovered in the divine essence, communicates itself in
knowing and willing as something distinct, given and received.

The giving and receiving modifies the activities which conform
to the difference the divine being has in the personal relations.

Dicendum quod eo modo convenit Filio esse intelligentem,
quo convenit ei esse Deum, cum essentieliter dicitur in
divinis . . . Est autem Filius Deus genus, non autem
generans Deus. Unde est quidem intelligens, non ut
produens verbum, sed ut verbum procedens . . . 371

The Son understands not by producing a word, but as a word which
comes from another. The distinction between the two is not "secundum
rem" but "ratione sola". Therefore, they remain one act of wisdom.

Following Augustine, Thomas says,

ut sic Pater et Filius simul tantum possint dici sapientia,
Non autem Pater sine Filio. Sed Filius dicitur sapientia
Patris, quia est sapientia de Patre sapientia; uterque
enim per se est sapientia, et simul ambo una sapientia. 372

The same modification is true of activity of loving. The Spirit
loves "ut Amor procedens, non ut a quo procedit amor." And so
there is also here one act for the "Father enjoys not only the Son, but also himself and us by the Holy Spirit." As stated before, power is also modified by being communicated in the ordered giving and receiving of the essence. The denials of motion proper (incomplete act as in bodies), which one expects to find in a treatise speaking of procession in God, are indeed present. Yet, conforming to the just described taking of active and passive into God, at one point Thomas turns from the negation of motion to an affirmation of receptivity. "Et licet motus non sit in divinis, est tamen ibi accipere." "Accipere" belongs to motion in the wider sense, the internal activity of intellectual being in which what is thought and loved is formed and is thus given by one side of the act and received by the other. Moreover, as giving and receiving acquire a meaning "in divinis", and as the analogues of the agent and patient of motion become more distinct, as here in the questions on the Trinity, so in fact one comes nearer to the proper motion of the physical world than in the de deo uno. In sum, the de deo trino communicates with the de deo uno in virtue of the gradual development toward greater distinction in the terms of the various forms of self-relation in the divine. In such a view of the structure of theology, the next stage, a procession from the divine to creatures does indeed become intelligible.

In actual fact, as we know, there is not a simple unimpeded progress in the Summa Theologiae of St Thomas. The treatise on the Trinity should not form one whole with what precedes and follows, because in principle faith is presupposed more directly in one side of the argument than in the treatise on the things pertaining to God's unity. It is not obvious that Thomas' real practice here altogether conforms with his theory. Method in the theology of the Summa involves throughout a movement from the self-manifesting God; scriptural
and ecclesiastical authority are used from the beginning. For the existence of the one God, "there is what is said by the person of God in Exodus 3, 'I am that I am'.\textsuperscript{377} The argument of the treatise on the Trinity actually begins "\textit{in fieri}", from the activities which produce the processions, and even when it turns and proceeds "\textit{in facto esse}", from the persons posited, there is no noticeable shift in the kind of reasoning employed. Moreover, seen in terms of a circle which moves out from unity and returns to it, one notices that the end includes the intermediate plurality so the two sides do not just remain in opposition. Still, whatever Thomas' practice appears to be, reason and revelation in the \textit{Summa} are very subtly intertwined. Faith is always in some sense presupposed. It will be hard to detect the shift of which Thomas speaks. There is not sufficient reason, then, to doubt what he says about his method in the \textit{de deo trino} and we must now attempt to explain that.

What is of significance is that the \textit{ordo disciplinae} in theology, the order of intelligible teaching, starts with the unity of God. Reason is more adequately employed here than on the Trinity, understood as a doctrine about plurality in God. His unity presupposed, the problem, from the perspective of Thomas, is that reason cannot consistently discover real plurality in God. This is not the universal view of the scholastics of the High Middle Ages. For Richard of St Victor and Matthew of Aquasparta the problem is rather the reconciliation of the unity and the three persons, each of which "considered by itself can both be proved by reason" and which are both believed. Matthew writes,

\begin{quote}
Tertium est habitudo et connexio ad invicem credendorum. Quamvis enim ratione possit probari unitas divinae essentiae seorsum considerata, et trinitas personarum seorsum considerata, tamen quomodo simul stat unitas cum trinitate omnino est incomprehensibile ... Unde Richardus optime, de Trinitate IV libro, cap. 1, prae­mittens quomodo rationibus necessariis probatur unitas
\end{quote}
Rather, in the *Summa Theologiae*, reason can more easily approach the unity than the Trinity of God. This way of looking at the problem would seem to be determined by the same priority Thomas gives to the divine simplicity which we have found in so many contexts.

In this light one of the few developments in Thomas thought discerned by historians acquires significance. This change from his position in the *Commentary on the Sentences*, through the *Disputed Questions*, first *De Veritate* and then *De Potentia* to the *Summa contra Gentiles* and *Summa Theologiae*, is his coming to believe that all intellection involves the production of a mental word. Intelligere is dicere. As long as Thomas held that the coming forth of a word -- a formed concept -- was not essential to intellection, there could be no demonstration on this basis of the Trinity. Once, however, this crucial step had been taken -- by the time of the *De Potentia* -- and once it was combined with the ordering of the Trinity immediately after the operations of knowing and willing, as in the *Summa Theologiae*, rather than before them, as in the *Sentences Commentary*, or separated from them, as in the *Summa contra Gentiles*, Thomas seems inevitably to be led to such a demonstration. Indeed some have held him to have made the attempt. But, in fact, in the *Summa Theologiae*, Thomas continues to make the same denials that natural reason can reach the Trinity that he makes in earlier works. The reason now given is that, though intelligere is by nature dicere, yet owing to the divine simplicity, we cannot know that inner distinction applies to God's reason. We cannot know that what belongs to the understanding, as we experience it, belongs also to God's
understanding. This is once again the problem of the difference of modes and the separation of form and content. Does the production of a distinct word in knowing apply only to our mode of knowledge or does it belong also to God's? Because of the simplicity of God this cannot be certainly answered. B. Lonergan puts it thus:

Hence, though our intelligere is always a dicere, this cannot be demonstrated of God's. Though we can demonstrate that God understands, for understanding is a pure perfection, still we can no more than conjecture the mode of divine understanding and so cannot prove that there is a divine Word. 381

Thomas puts it as follows, relating the various elements:

licet ratio naturalis possit pervenire ad ostendendum quod Deus sit intellectus, modum tamen intelligendi non potest invenire sufficienter. Sicut enim de Deo scire possimus quod est, sed non quid est, ita de Deo scire possimus quod intelligit, sed non quod modo intelligit. Habere autem conceptionem verbi in intelligendo, pertinet ad modum intelligendi: unde ratio haec sufficienter probare non potest; sed ex eo quod est in nobis aliqualiter per simile conjecturae. 382

In the Summa Theologiae, Thomas speaks of intellection as universally characterized by the production of a mental word.

Quicumque enim intelligit, ex hoc ipso quod intelligit, procedit aliquid intra ipsum quod est conceptio rei intellectae ex eius notitia procedens. Quam quidem conceptionem vox significat; et dicitur verbum cordis, significatum verbo mentis. 383

But, when considering how we know the Trinity, because the "similitudo" of our intellect to God's is not sufficient for demonstration, we must proceed, as did Augustine and "per fidem venitur ad cognitionem". 384

We cannot prove the Trinity from the first principles of reason rather, "inducitur ratio, non quae sufficienter probet radicem, sed quae radici iam positae ostendat congruere consequentes effectus." 385

Once again the incongruities in the system of Thomas result from a separation of form and content necessitated by the extreme tension within his thought between the opposed Neoplatonic logics of the finite and the infinite. What otherwise appears to belong uni-
versally to intellect is unknowable because of the divine simplicity so the rational method of the \textit{de deo uno} must be reversed in the \textit{de deo trino}. But was not the momentum in fact too much for the brakes?
The Connection of Questions Forty-four and Forty-five, "de processione creaturarum a Deo" with the "de Deo in se"

The main problems involved in the transition from the treatise on God in himself to that on the procession of creatures from him have all had to be raised in considering the de deo trino. The difficulties in moving from simplicity to real distinction are parallel in Thomas to the discontinuity between faith and reason. It remains to notice how the unity of structure appears once creation has been reached in the downward descent.

Despite the fact that one is within and the other outside the divine essence, the language used of the emergence of the divine persons and of creatures is similar. Both are called processions. There is the treatment "de processione divinarum personarum" and that "de processione creaturarum." Both are also emanations. "Word" is a proper name for the Son. "Significat enim quandam emanationem intellectus; persona autem quae procedit in divinis secundum emanationem intellectus, dicitur Filius". He inquires "de modo emanationis rerum a primo principio, qui est dicitur creatio". Both are understood in terms of relation. Because real relation in God is his essence, "oportet quod relatio sit idem quod persona." Creation is a relation to God. Creation is a relation not in God but in the creature: "creatio in creatura non sit nisi relatio quaedam ad Creatorem". Creation, like the persons, proceeds from the divine operations, they from the internal acts of knowledge and love, it from the external act, power. The power to create, like creation as object of the divine knowledge and love, is modified through the personal relations. It is ordered in accord with divine
being;

\[ \text{ita etiam et virtus creandi, licet sit communis tribus Personis, ordine tamen quodam eis convenit; nam Filius habet eam a Patre, et Spiritus Sanctus ab utroque.} \]

The Father has "creatio" as a proper attribution because he does not have the "virtus creandi" from another. The Son has it from the Father. All things are said to be made "through" him as a mediate cause "sive principium de principio." The Spirit has it from both and "creator" belongs to him because "dominando gubernet et vivificet quae sunt creat a Patre per Filium." Similarly both processions involve the coming into existence of real distinction and so the origination of a plurality of substances. From the facts that the relations in God are real and establish subsistences and that the relations are "plures", "unde sequitur quod sint plures res subsistentes in divina natura." Similarly because creation is of being -- "cum creatio sit emanatio totius esse ab ente universale", "proprie vero creata sunt subsistentia." Moreover, by an argument reported in the last chapter, God intends the multiplicity and the variety of the substances. The difference of the two kinds of procession also comes out here. For from the principle that the aim of creation is to represent the divine goodness in what is outside God, it follows not only that the source and the result of the procession of creatures are unequal but that created things must be unequal to each other. In sum, the processions of persons and creatures are different, but the language used of them is the same. As we ascended to the knowledge of God from our knowledge of creatures, so we now descend using the same concepts. The way up is the way down.

The common ground between Thomas and the Neoplatonists at this point is evident enough. There is his language; "procession" and "emanation" are used as equivalent to "creation". More deeply
significant perhaps are the doctrines that the derived is really related to the first principle, but not the contrary, and that the first is the direct cause of the substantial being of all else. The source of these teachings in Proclus has been indicated in Part II, D. Thomas' synthesis of Porphyry and Proclus, in maintaining that God is known as esse because he is cause of being, is also considered there. Another doctrine of St Thomas, closely related to this and exposing how he has assimilated and united their divergent traditions, needs to be added to the list. This is the idea that creation is by participation. Particular beings, because they are not absolutely primary, have existence divided from essence and hence participate in the first act of being, God. Creation is this participation: "creation is the emanation of all being from the universal existence." Thomas unites Plato and Aristotle, joining causation and participation in the very first article of the questions considering the procession of creatures. He begins by returning to the simplicity of God.

Ostensum est autem supra, cum de divina simplicitate ageretur, quod Deus est ipsum esse per se subsistens. Et iterum ostensum est quod esse subsistens non potest esse nisi unum . . . Relinquitur ergo quod omnia alla a Deo non sint suum esse, sed participat esse. Because all else participates the first being, it must be caused by it.

Unde et Plato dixit quod necesse est ante omnen multitudinem ponere unitatem. Et Aristoteles dixit, in II Metaphy., quod 'id quod est maxime ens et maxime verum, est causa omnis entis et omnis veri' . . . Being itself functions like a Platonic separate form.

Sed sicut hic homo participat humanum naturam, ita quodcunque ens creatum participat, ut ita dicerim, naturam essendi; quia solus Deus est suum esse, ut supra dictum est. Fr Geiger's *La participation dans la philosophie de s. Thomas d'Aquin* brought out forcefully Thomas' Neoplatonism on this point. Since
contemporary Thomism was so deeply committed to finding a philosophy in Thomas founded on what they regarded as his unique ontology, it was necessary to discover some way of interpreting this Neoplatonism congruent with it. Professor C. Fabro's Participation et causalité selon s. Thomas d'Aquin, and indeed much else by him, endeavoured the interpretation and conciliation. On the one hand, Thomas' dependence on the Christian Platonism of Dionysius was drawn into the light. But, on the other, Thomas was discovered to have transformed this essentialism by means of a philosophical twist Fr Fabro was best able to explicate by reference to Heidegger. Similarly, as we have tried to show in Part II, A above, the great Neoplatonic circle involved in the return of creation to its divine source was reinterpreted by Fr Chenu in existentialist terms. His aim was, by maintaining the existence of two returns in the Summa, one natural in the Secunda Pars, the other gracious in the Tertia Pars, to insist on a fundamental difference between Thomas and his Neoplatonic sources. In virtue of holding to an independent Christian return founded on contingent historical facts, Aquinas was supposed to have prevented the reduction of his theology to any pagan philosophical form. These existentialist reformations of Thomas now fail to convince (see Part I above) and it remains to see him within the history of Christian Neoplatonism where these structures are fundamental.

The final exit and return in the Summa commences, as did the series within the de Deo in se, with a proof based on the four causes of Aristotle but reordered to form this Neoplatonic circle. Like question two article three, "utrum Deus sit", question forty-four as a whole, "de processione creaturarum a Deo et de omnium entium prima causa", orders the causes by beginning with the efficient or moving cause and passing through the material and formal to conclude with final cause. Thomas designates the content of the four articles as
Primo: utrum Deus sit causa efficiens omnium entium.
Secundo: utrum materia prima sit creat a Deo . . .
Tertio: utrum Deus sit causa exemplaris rerum . . .
Quarto: utrum ipse sit causa finalis rerum. 401

In fact, the ad secundum and ad tertium of article two, itself explicitly about whether God causes matter, helps to make clear that the "tertia via" of the proof for God's existence, "sumpta ex possibile et necessario" is from the material to its cause. 402 For they answer problems raised in objections one and two respectively concerning the "primum principium passivum" and what is "tantum in potentia". Pure matter is what has the possibility for existence. The ordering of the ways and articles corresponding to the causes of Aristotle is different from that given in any of the Philosopher's lists.

Aristotle catalogues the causes at Physics II, 3 (194b 23-195a3). Thomas retains Aristotle's order when he comments on them as follows: "ex quo fit aliquid insit" (section 179), "species et exemplum" (section 179), "a quo est principium motus" (section 180), "finis" (section 181). 403 Material cause is designated "ex quo fit aliquid" here and at Metaphysics V, 2. There are two lists at Physics II, 7 (198a 1-14). The second is the same as the catalogue at Physics II, 3. Thomas, again correctly, as in all his reports of these lists, gives the order in an introductory phrase to his comment "reducendo quaestionem propter quid in quamilbet dictarum quatuor causarum scilicet formam, moventem, finem et materiam". 404 It seems that the first three in this list, or the last three members in the one at Physics II, 3 are kept together because they "often coincide". 405

The catalogues in the Metaphysics occur at I, 3 (983a 24-32), II, 2 (994a 19-994b 27) and V, 2 (1013a 24-1013b 3). Thomas in his commentary writes of the first as follows:

Causa autem quadrupliciter dicuntur: quarum una est ipsa causa formalis . . . Alia vero causa est materialis.
Tertia vero causa est efficiens, quae est unde principium motus. Quarta causa est finalis, quae opponitur causae efficienti secundum oppositionem principii et finis. Nam motus incipit a causa efficiente et terminatur ad causam finalem. 406

This comment would provide a rationale for his own ordering in the

Summa but not Aristotle's.

The fourth cause is the final which is opposed to the efficient according to the opposition of source and end. For motion begins from efficient cause and halts at the final cause.

There are two lists in Chapter II of Book α. They belong to Aristotle's demonstration that there is no infinite regress in respect to and of the causes, i.e., to his equivalent of Thomas' ways.

Here they are:

Primo quidem in genere causa materialis...
Secundo exemplificat in genere causae efficientis...
Tertio exemplificat in genere causarum finalium...
Ultimo facit mentionem de causa formali. 407

Postquam Philosophus praeomit quae causae entium non sunt infinitae, hic probat propositum... Primo ostendit propositum in causis efficientibus vel moventibus. Secundo in causis materialibus...
Tertio in causis finalibus... Quarto in causis formalibus. 408

This second list has an order closest to that of Thomas' in the

Summa; indeed, it would be the same logically if the formal cause were taken as the end sought. The last is at Metaphysics V, 2.

Thomas comments:

Dicit ergo primo, quod uno modo dicitur causa id ex quo fit aliquid... Alio autem modo dicitur causa, species et exemplum, id est exemplar; et haec est causa formalis... Tertio modo dicitur causa unde primum est principium permutationis et quietis; et haec est causa movens vel efficientis... Quarto modo dicitur causa finis. 409

Of the six listings of the causes by Aristotle given above, two from the Physics and four from the Metaphysics, only the first and the last, Physics II and Metaphysics V, 2, have the same order. These two and Metaphysics I, 3 simply pair off the two opposed
causes, matter and form, moving and end. Physics II, 7 and the first of the two listings at Metaphysics II, 2 place mover and end between form and matter, or matter and form. Only the second list at Metaphysics II, 2 begins with the moving cause but, as noted, it does not conclude with the final but with formal cause. The three last mentioned instances have no evident reason for their ordering of the causes.

Thomas uses the causes to structure his writing only twice in the first forty-five questions of the Summa Theologiae; in both cases he uses the same order. He places matter and form between the moving and final causes. Proper motion, as distinguished from activity generally, belongs to the material. When seen in relation to the divine causality it involves a going out from simple immaterial being to matter which is raised to formal perfection as the good, or end, it lacks. In this causing God, as the principle of all procession, i.e., the Father, knows the form by which he acts in the Son and loves the Son and himself as end in the Spirit. Thus understood, the order Thomas uses in distinction from his sources in Aristotle has a reason. The source of motion is the obvious beginning just as its opposed cause the final is appropriate end. As noted, he says glossing Aristotle, who also mentions their opposition, "motion begins from efficient cause and ends at final cause". "Prima autem et manifestior via est, quae sumitur ex parte motus."
The moving cause is an obvious point from which to start the ways to God within a theology which also begins from him. These ways ended, "Ergo est aliquid intelligens, a quo omnes res naturales ordinantur ad finem, et hoc dicimus Deus." But intelligere et velle are motions as actus perfecti and as such display the rediens ad essentiam suam. This return is perfect in the divine being. Its exitus and reditus becomes fully manifest in the processions of persons
founded in God's activities of knowledge and love; these in turn make intelligible the procession and return of creatures. The five ways begin the theological development by which revelation becomes intelligible to us just as knowledge of the divine persons is necessary for the right idea of creation. To achieve this unity Aquinas unites Plato and Aristotle, the knowledge of infinite principle and its finite representation.

Plato understood by motion any given operation so that to understand and to judge are a kind of motion. Aristotle likewise approaches this manner of speaking in the De Anima. Plato accordingly said that the first mover moves himself because he knows himself and wills or loves himself. In a way this is not opposed to the reasons of Aristotle. There is no difference between reaching a first being that moves itself, as understood by Plato, and reaching a first being that is absolutely unmoved as understood by Aristotle. 415

The structure of theology as set out in the Summa Theologiae imitates this motionless divine motion which has itself as source and end and whose power has perfect mastery over the means. Theology is imitating God and is thus the "perfectior" way of knowing. It begins with God in himself and treats all else "sub ratione Dei" when it draws what has come out from him back to him for he is "principium rerum et finis rerum" and gives reality its structure. The unity of reality as of theological system derives from the unity of the causes in God.

Dicendum quod cum Deus sit causa efficiens, exemplaris et finalis omnium rerum, et materia prima sit ab ipso, sequitur quod principium omnium rerum sit unum secundum rem. 416
Notes: Part III

1 The substance of this chapter has been accepted for publication in The Thomist, 46 (1982).

2 Parts I and II respectively.

3 See n. II, 319 and pp. 98, 157, 179-180.

4 "Circa essentiam vero divinam, primo considerandum est an Deus sit; secundo quomodo sit. . . tertio considerandum erit de his quae ad operationem ipsius pertinent . . . " ST I, 2, prol. These divisions correspond to question 2, questions 3 to 11, and questions 13 to 26 respectively. See SCG I, 9 as quoted n. 23 below.

5 "Utrum Deum esse sit per se notum", ST I, 2, 1 and "Utrum Deum esse sit demonstrabile " ST I, 2, 2.

6 "Sed contra est quod dicitur Exod. III ex persona Dei 'Ego sum qui sum' " ST I, 2, 3 sc. For the significance of this theological beginning cf. E. zum Brunn, "La 'metaphysique de l'Exode' selon Thomas d'Aquin," Dieu et l'Être, pp. 245-269. Thomas wishes to avoid all ambiguity about the theological character of the Summa "en mettant en tete de la 'Somme de theologie' la parole 'Ego sum qui sum', et en insistant sur le fait qu'elle est revelée 'ex persona Dei'" (p. 267).

7 "Dicendum quod argumentari ex auctoritate est maxime proprium huius doctrinae " ST I, 1, 8 ad 2. While what is able to be known rationally is not an article of the faith, but a preamble and presupposed to it, nonetheless, "nihil tamen prohibit illud quod secundum demonstrabile et scibile, ab aliquo accipi ut credibile, qui demonstrationem non capit " ST I, 2, 2 ad 1. Theology begins with the unity of God not because his unity is rationally grasped but because the one is by nature principle; cf. chapter II, C.

8 "Et hoc modo sacra doctrina est scientia, quia procedit ex principiis notis lumine superioris scientiae, quae scilicet est scientia Dei et beatorum " ST I, 1, 2.

9 "Soli autem Deo conventi perfecte cognoscere seipsum secundum id quod est. Nullus igitur potest vere loqui de Deo vel cogitare nisi inquantum a Deo revelatur. Quae quidem divina revelatio in Scripturis sacris continetur " In de div. nom. I, 1, 13. "ut sic sacra doctrina sit velut quaedam impressio divinae scientiae, quae est una et simplex omnium " ST I, 1, 3 ad 2. "Unde licet in scientiis philosophicis alia sit speculativa et alia practica, sacra tamen doctrina comprehendit sub se utranque, sicut et Deus eadem scientia se cognoscit, et ea quae facit " ST I, 1, 4.
"Innititur enim fides nostra revelationi Apostolis et Prophetis factae qui canonicos libros scripsissent" ST I, l. 8 ad 2. Vision of God is the ground of this revelation: the highest kind of rapture, contemplation of God "in sua essentia" is given to Moses and Paul: "Et satis congruenter, nam sicut Moyses fuit primus Doctor Iudaorum, ita Paulus fuit primus Doctor Gentium" ST I-II, 175, 3 ad 1. See also ST I, 12, 11 ad 2. This is not, however, the usual method of divine revelation; generally the modes of human knowledge in via are respected and there is a special illumination of an object of sense or imagination, cf. chapter III, B. Those to whom there is no direct revelation have the content on authority: "principia huius doctrinae per revelationem habentur et sic oportet quod credatur auctoritate eorum quibus revelatio facta est." " ST I, 1, 8 ad 2.

"ita haec doctrina non argumentatur ad sua principia probanda, quae sunt articuli fidei" ST I, 1, 8 resp.

"Nam in doctrina philosophiae . . . prima est consideratio de creaturis et ultima de Deo, in doctrina vero fidei . . . prima est consideratio Dei et postmodum creaturarum; et sic est perfectior, utpote Dei cognitioni similior" ScG II, 4; also ScG IV, 1; In de Trinitate as quoted n.I, 111 and n.II, 106 above; In I Sent., prol., pp. 2ff.; ibid., Epilogus, p. 1092.

Thomas speaks of the length, difficulty, limited availability and ultimate inadequacy of the rational way from creatures in a number of places; for example, "veritas de Deo per rationem investigata a paucis, et per longum tempus et cum admixtione multorum errorum homina proveniret" ST I, 1, 1. See also ScG I, Chapters 2, 3, 4 and IV, 1; Comp. Theo. I, 1.

After three questions on general matters, the treatment of providence proceeds as follows: "Deinde considerandum est quomodo una creatura moveat aliam. Erit autem haec consideratio tripartita; ut primo consideremus quomodo angeli moveant, qui sunt creaturae pure spirituales; secundo, quomodo corpora moveant; tertio, quomodo homino, qui sunt ex spirituali et corporali natura compositi." ST I, 106, prol.

M. Grabmann, La Somme Théologique, p. 119: "C'est la seconde partie dependant qui est la plus originale." Cf. also P. E. Persson, Sacra Doctrina, p. 245.

"Postquam praedictum est exemplari, scilicet de Deo, et de his quae processerunt ex divina potestate secundum eius voluntatem; restat ut consideremus de eius imagine, id est de homine, secundum quod et ipse est suorum operum principium, quasi liberum arbitrium habens et suorum operum potestatem." ST I-II, prol. Cf. chapter II, A above.

"Sed finis est principium in operabilibus ab homine" ST I-II, 1, 1 sed contra.

This is the sum of this first question: "de ultimo fine hominis".
19. See n. II, 58.

20. See chapter II, A above.

21. Chapters II, A, C and D.

22. "haec scientia accipere potest aliquid a philosophicis disciplinis, non quod ex necessitate eis indigent, sed ad maiorem manifestationem eorum quae in hac scientiae traduntur. Non enim accipit sua principia ab aliis scientia, sed immediate a Deo per revelationem. Et ideo non accipit ab aliis scientiis tanquam a superioribus, sed utitur eis ancillis . . . Et hoc ipsum quos sic utitur eis, non est propter defectum vel insufficientiam eius, sed propter defectum intellectus nostri; qui ex his quae per naturalem rationem ex qua procedunt aliae scientiae cognosciuntur, facilissim manuducitur in ad quae sunt supra rationem, quae in hac scientiae traduntur." ST I, 1, 5 ad 2.


24. Thomas' statement at this point is very guarded: "ex effectibus Dei potest demonstrari Deum esse, licit per eos nos non perfecte possimus ipsum cognoscere secundum suam essentiam." ST I, 2, 2 ad 3. Boethius is cited as an authority for this division. For its Neoplatonic character in Thomas cf. n. II, 286 above. The crucial text in Boethius is De Hebdomadibus I, 2 on which Thomas has an important commentary: S. Thomae Aquinatis, Expositio super Boetium De Hebdomadibus, ed. M. Calcaterra, in Opuscula Theologica, 2 vol., ed. R.M. Spiazzi, II (Taurini/Romae, 1954). On the history of the interpretation of this text cf. P. Hadot, "Forma Essendi, Interprétation philologique et interprétation philosophique d'une formule de Boece," 143-156. This must replace M.D. Roland-Gosselin's views on the relation of Thomas to this text (in his "De Ente et Essentia" de s. Thomas d'Aquin, Bibliothèque thomiste, 8 (Paris, 1948), p. 186, n. 3) which had dominated Thomistic literature. Pierre Faucon, Aspects néoplatoniciens, p. 431 also concludes la tradition néoplatonicienne illustrée notamment par Boèce fournit à saint Thomas le couple du Quod est et l'Esse sur lequel va s'ériger au XIIIe siècle la distinction réelle de l'essence et de l'être and this takes us beyond any distinction of Aristotle. Dionysius is also a medium of transmission. Throughout the De Divinis Nominibus he makes a strong contrast between divine and angelic intellect and human reason.

25. There is much of this agnosticism in Thomas even in respect to our knowledge of the physical world. For a general treatment of it and why it has been played down in Thomism cf. Josef Pieper, Chapter II, "The Negative Element in the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas," The Silence of St. Thomas. For a list of texts cf. A. Maurer, The Divisions and Methods of the Sciences, p. xxxv, n. 50. To which one
might add as typical: "Nam cum sensus, unde nostra cognitio incipit, circa exteriora accidentia versetur, quae sunt secundum se sensibilia, ut color, et odor, et huiusmodi; intellectus vix per huiusmodi exteriora potest ad notitiam inferioris naturae pervenire, etiam illarum rerum quorum accidentia sensu perfecte comprehendit. Multo igitur minus pertingere poterit ad comprehendendum naturas illarum rerum quorum pauca accidentia capimus sensu" etc. ScG IV, 1.

26 "necesse est uti effectu loco definitionis causae ad probandum causam esse, et hoc maxime contingit in Deo . . . Nomina autem Dei imponuntur ab effectibus . . ." ST I, 2, 2 ad 2. M. Grabmann (Thomas von Aquin, p.88) puts it thus: "Die Erkenntnis des Daseins von etwas birgt schon auch irgendwelche Kenntnis seines Wesens in sich. So schlägt denn auch die Erkenntnis, dass Gott existiert, die Brücke, auf welcher die menschliche Vernunft zur Erkenntnis dessen, was Gott ist, vordringen kann." E. Zum Brunn's exposure of the inadequacies of E. Gilson's "existentialist" representation of Thomas has also the effect of bringing together the knowledge of God's existence and essence in his thought; see quotation at n.1, 78 above.

27 One manner of putting this is to say that by the ways, God is named, cf. n. 29. F. van Steenberghen has brought this out in his numerous writings on the proof. Two studies in English also elucidate this well: "So St. Thomas . . . speaks of the proof that 'God is' as among those praemambula which are necessary to the scientia fidei -- i.e. knowledge of the faith, not faith itself." " . . . there is no contradiction at all in saying that our means of proof are effects and 'the quid significet nomen of God, for they are one and the same." Victor White, God the Unknown, pp. 52 and 60.

"There is no separate theological question about God's existence: the question about God's existence is only raised at all in connexion with the study of what God is." Edward Sillem, Ways of Thinking about God, p. 43; chapters 4, 5 and 6 are all relevant.

28 We arrive at "aliquid primum movens . . . aliquid causam efficientem primum, . . . aliquid quod sit per se necessarium . . . causa necessitatis aliis, . . . causa esse et bonitatis et cuiuslibet perfectionis, . . . aliquid intelligens " ST I, 2, 3.

29 Cf. A. Kenny, The Five Ways (London, 1969), p. 36: . . . Aquinas has two distinct Ways corresponding to two different aspects of Aristotle's efficient causality. If we take these two Ways together we find that the distinction between the Five Ways reflects the distinction between the Four Causes. This is most obvious in the case of the Fifth Way, which clearly depends on the notion of final causality; but the Third Way, as we shall see, concerns itself initially with material causality and the Fourth argues from formal causality. Harold J. Johnson, "Why Five Ways? A Thesis and some alternatives," Arts libéraux et philosophie au moyen âge, pp. 1143-1160: the scheme underlying the five possible ways by which, according to Thomas, the existence of God can be proved is provided by the four causes of Aristotle. Thomas maintains that all of our natural knowledge of God is derived by causal inference from His empirically
known effects. He also specifically asserts that God is first cause of all things in respect of all four causes (p. 1143).

Aristotle's own argument against infinite regress in the causes is found in Metaphysics α . Cf. also Sillem, op. cit., Chapter 5, passim and chapter III, E below.

30 For Latin text see n.22 just above.

31 "in doctrina vero fidei, quae creaturas nonnisi in ordine ad Deum considerat, primo est consideratio Dei, et postmodum creaturarum. Et sic est perfectior, utpote Dei cognitioni simili, qui seipsum cognoscens, alia intuetur. Unde, secundum hunc ordinem, post sa quae de Deo in se, in primo sunt dicta, de his quae ab ipso sunt restat prosequendum " ScG II, 4. Cf. also ST I, 7 and I, 2, prologus and In de div. nom. VII, 4, 729. G. Lafont, Structures et méthode, p. 471 put it thus:

La hiérarchie de la connaissance théologique est celle même de la science de Dieu: nous la trouvons au prologue déjà plusieurs fois cité de la question deux: ipse Deus, Deus ut principium et finis. Les deux aspects sont pratiquement inséparables, mais il faut conserver leur ordre: Dieu en lui-même, c'est-à-dire dans son essence et ses Personnes; Dieu prince et fin, c'est-à-dire origine et terme du crée dans sa nature et son économie -- et d'une manière tout spéciale, des créatures spirituelles ordonnées à la possession personelle de Dieu.

32 Commenting on Metaphysica I, 2, 983a, 5-10, Thomas writes: "Solus [Deus] quidem habet [hanc scientiam] secundum perfectam comprehensionem. Maxime vero habet, inquantum suo modo etiam ab hominibus habetur licet ab eis non ut possessio habetur sed sicut aliquid ab eo mutatum." In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum, I, 3, 64. Cf. R.D. Crouse, "Philosophia Ancilla Theologiae, some texts from Aristotle's Metaphysics in the Interpretation of Albertus Magnus"; idem, "St. Thomas, St. Albert, Aristotle: Philosophia Ancilla Theologiae." The basis of the argument is that God alone possesses the true knowledge of himself, consequently all true knowledge of him comes from his willingness to share it. This can also be given a more evidently Neoplatonic form as in Dionysius. In his comment on the Divine Names Thomas states: "Ei [Deo] enim soli competit de se cognoscere quod quid est." I, 1, 32. "Esset enim contra rationem bonitatis divinae, si cognitionem suam sibi retineret quod nulli alteri penitus communicaret, cum de ratione boni sit quod se allis communicet" I, 1, 36. God communicates in different forms but all are revelation: "studium philosophiae secundum se est licitum et laudabile, propter veritatem quam philosophi perceperunt, Deo illis revelante, ut dicitur Ad Rom. I, 19."


34 Thus the doctrine of created grace: "Dicendum quod lumen creatum est necessarium ad videndum Dei essentiam ..." ST I, 12, 5 ad 1, see chapter III, C below.
See n.I, 111 above. Whereas Aristotle, as understood by Thomas, makes being as being and God both subjects of his metaphysics and Thomas has God as the subject of sacred doctrine and proves his existence, other followers of the Philosopher do not allow the science of first principles both to assume and establish them. This is true of both Avicenna and Averroes; see chapter III, B below especially nn.120 and 124.

"Or l’oeuvre d’Aristote fut transmise en trois étapes à la pensée théologique de l’Occident. C’est ce qu’on peut appeler les trois "entrées" d’Aristote. La première "entrée" est celle de la Logica vetus ... La deuxième "entrée" d’Aristote apporte, au XIIe siècle, les trois autres livres de l’Organon ... La troisième "entrée" d’Aristote au début du XIIIe siècle, apporte à la science sacrée un ferment philosophique qui n’est plus purement formel, mais qui concerne l’ordre même des objets et le contenu de la pensée" M.J. Congar, "Théologie," Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique (Paris, 1946), XV (1), p. 359.

For this tradition and its pagan philosophical origins see chapters II, C and D above. See especially nn.II, 150, 317, 318. Thomas interprets this thinking about the first principle so as to be reconciliable with his own more Porphyrian doctrine but it has its effect. For example, "Sed Deum non est existens, sed 'supra existentia', ut dicit Dionysius. Ergo non est intelligibilis, sed est supra omnem intellectum" ST I, 12, 1 obj. 3. He interprets this: "Deus non sic dicitur non existens quasi nullo modo sit existens, sed quia est supra omne existens, inquantum est suum esse" and thus he is known but not comprehended. ST I, 12, 1 ad 3.

Thomas holds to be correct John Damascene’s statement that God’s name is Qui est because "totum ... in se ipso comprehendens habet ipsum esse velut quoddam pelagus substantiae infinitum et indeterminatum"; for, "quanto aliqua nomina sunt minus determinate, et magis communia et absoluta, tanto magis proprie dicitur de Deo a nobis " ST I, 13, 11, resp. And he places Damascene’s notion that the "cognitio existendi Deum naturaliter est inserta" at the top of the objections showing that no proof for God’s existence is necessary; for, it is "per se notum" ST I, 2, 1.

For the philosophical background of this doctrine cf. chapter II, D above. On the relation of Augustine to it cf. nn.II, 222 and 233 above.

They are rejected in Question 2, articles 1 and 2.

"Sed quia nos non scimus de Deo quid est, non est nobis per se nota, sed indiget demonstrari per se quae sunt magis nota quoad nos et minus nota quoad naturam, scilicet per effectus " ST I, 2, 1 and "Deum esse ... demonstrabile est per effectus nobis notos " ST I, 2, 2.

It is treated under "utrum Deum esse sit per se notum " ST I, 2, 1.
Ce qui l'oppose aux partisans de la preuve ontologique, telle que l'a exposée saint Anselme, et en fin de compte lui même c'est l'epistémologie qu'il choisit pour approfondir la signification du qui est. On le voit clairement dans l'interprétation non traditionnelle que des la Commentaire (sur les Sentences) saint Thomas donne au fameux verset de Romains 1, 20, complémentaire d'Exode 3,14, qui pour les Pères grecs et latins signifiait le retour ou la remontée du monde sensible au monde intelligible. Pour Thomas cette remontée a un tout autre sens: il insiste sur l'impossibilité d'arriver à la connaissance naturelle de Dieu autrement qu'en raisonnant à partir de l'expérience sensible. E. zum Brunn, "La métaphysique de l'Exode selon Thomas d'Aquin," p. 253.
pretation on his sources. An excellent example of this is provided by J. van Banning, "Saint Thomas et l'Opus imperfectum in Matthaenum," Atti del VIII Congresso Tomistico Internazionale, in press. Thomas alters the text of this Arian work in reporting it so as to give it a fully orthodox sense. Delightfully, in one place he reads the author's Arian distinction between Father and Son as anti-Sabellian.

56 "οὐδὲν ἐμὴν ἐκεῖνην ἐν γλώσσῃ, ἀλλὰ ἐκεῖνον ἐμὲ ναὶ ἀπὸν ἕκαστον " Enneades IV 8, 9, 2-3; cf. nn. 11, 118 and 115 above.

57 "What Plotinus grasped in one global intuition, will be separated into distinct elements by Iamblichus and, later on, by Proclus. To each logical distinction, there must correspond an ontological differentiation." C. Steel, The Changing Self, p. 31. Cf. E.R. Dodds, Elements, comment on Prop. 211, pp. 309-310. There is an extensive literature on the relation of Plotinus to theurgy; e.g., A.H. Armstrong, "Was Plotinus a Magician?" Phronesis 1 (1955), 73-79, in Plotinian and Christian Studies; E.R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational, Sather Classical Lectures, 25 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1959) and idem, Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety, Some Aspects of Religious Experience from Marcus Aurelius to Constantine, Wiles Lectures, 1964 (Cambridge, 1965). A. Smith, Porphyry's Place, sees Porphyry as decisive in the move toward philosophical magic because of his desire to find permanent salvation for the whole soul (p. 70).

58 "Πάσας μεταβολὰς καταλαμβάνεις εἰς ἐνενεργοῦ ὑπὸ καταστάσεις, καὶ ὅπως ἕνα εἰς ἄλλον ἐκεῖνα γίνεται, τὸ δὲ ναι ὑπὸ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἀναρμόνος ἕκαστον." Prop. 211, Elements, ed. Dodds.

59 "In opposition to Plotinus, Iamblichus contended that the soul could not find salvation without the help and grace of the gods. Theoretical contemplation must go together with the performance of holy acts and rites which have been instituted by the gods themselves. The philosopher is not only a theologian (one who reveals the divine) but also a theurgist (one who performs divine acts). It is remarkable how closely Iamblichus here approached the criticism which was formulated in the same Christian circles against the Platonic doctrine of the soul." C. Steel, The Changing Self, pp. 156-157.

60 "ἐὰς δὲ τῶν ἔργων τῶν θεών καὶ τῶν ἁγίων φύσεως θεοτοκίας ἐνεργείας καὶ τῆς ζωομορφίας τῶν σώματος συμπάθειάς καὶ θυμοχώρίας ἡπείρως ἔπεσεν τῶν ἐφορέων τοῦ ἐφόρου." Iamblichus, De Mysteriis II, 11 (96, 17-97, 2). The translation is from Dodds, Elements, p. xx.

M. Chenu, Nature, Man and Society, p. 125. As contrasted with pseudo-Dionysius, Augustine found God "In the intimate depths of his own mind" (p. 63); his orientation was "toward an interior life that took external objects as mere occasions for its enrichment" (p. 64). To Augustine's use of "signs" corresponded a mysticism of the interior life (p. 125) as opposed to Dionysius' symbolic theology. See also A. Louth on Augustine and Denys in his The Origins of The Christian Mystical Tradition.

Nobile claret opus, sed opus quod nobile claret. Clarificet mentes, ut eant per lumina vera
Ad verum lumen, ubi Christus janua vera.
Unde, cum ex dilectione decoris domus Dei aliquando multicolor, gemmarum speciositas ab exintriinsecis me curis devocaret, sanctarum etiam diversitatem virtutem de materialibus ad immaterialia transerendo, videor videre me quasi sub aliqua extranea orbis terrarum fuerne nec tota in coeli puritate, demorari, ab hac etiam inferiori ad illam superiorem anagogico more Deo donante posse transferri.


M. Chenu, Nature, most of the essays in this volume touch on this question; most important perhaps is "The Platonisms of the Twelfth Century," pp. 49-98; on the idea that the world constituted a whole see p. 67. Cf. also R.D. Crouse, "Intentio Moysi," pp. 153-155 on Honorius and the Platonists of Chartres, their sense of cosmos, and openness to the world. Eriugena's influence is of great importance; for him 'matter was no longer that independent and opposing principle which it had so readily appeared to be for earlier Christian interpreters of the Timaeus, nor was it that 'nearly nothing' but yet something which troubled Augustine's striving for a philosophically consistent cosmology." p. 142.

See ST I, 1, 9 and n.70 just below. This identification is not unique to Thomas.

pseudo-Dionysius himself, thanks to his religious sense, so deflected Platonic idealism toward a keener subjection to sensible realities that later, he was occasionally bracketed with Aristotle in concordances or "harmonies" of "the authorities" (cordia auctoritatum).


See chapter II, D especially n.265.

"Aristotelis Platonisque sententias in unam quodammodo revocare concordiam, eosque non ut plerique dissentire in omnibus, sed in plerisque et his in philosophia maximis consentire demonstrum." Boethius, De interpretatione, editio secunda, ed. Carolus Meiser (Leipzig, 1880), p. 79. And see R.D. Crouse, "Semina Rationum."

69. "plerumque utitur stilo et modo loquendi quo utebantur platonici" In de div. nom., proem.


71. The Itinerarium mentis in Deum is obviously strongly dependent in parts on this Dionysian spirituality but "one could bypass the journey through nature and begin at once by turning into the soul; or one could bypass nature and the soul and turn at once to contemplate God... each is presented as an autonomous way, not dependent on the other." Ewert Cousins, Bonaventure, The Soul's Journey into God, The Tree of Life, The Life of St. Francis, Introduction, p. 23. In n.39 on that page he refers us to "Sc. Chr., q.4 (V, 17-20); Chr. un. omn. mag. (V, 564-574); M. Trin., q.1, a.1 (V, 45-51); Itin., c. 1-4 (V, 296-308); Red. art. (V, 319-325); Hexaem. I, n.13; XII (V, 331, 384-387) ... as places where this view is made evident."


73. "in homine... universaliter creatae sunt" De Divisione Naturae IV, 8 (PL 122, 774A). "quoniam substantiarum divisio, quae a Deo sumpsit exordium, et gradatim descendens, in divisione hominis in masculum et feminam finem constituit; iterum earundem substantiarum adunatio ab homine debuit inchoare, et per eosdem gradus ad ipsum Deum ascendere; in quo... non est divisio, quoniam in eo omnia unum sunt" De Div. Nat. II, 6 (532A). Cf. B. Stock, "The Philosophical Anthropology of Johannes Scottus Eriugena," Studi Medievale, 8 (1967), 1-57 and R.D. Crouse, "Intentio Moysi," especially pp.142-144 and D.F. Ducloy, "Dialectic and Christology in Eriugena's Periphyseon." I.P. Sheldon-Williams notes that Dionysius has no extended anthropology and that Eriugena must leap over him to the Greek fathers and to Augustine for this element of his thought: "Eriugena's Greek Sources." He sums up the central role of man in Eriugena nicely:

This is the process of creation and the constitution of
nature the *natum optimum*. The process culminates in man and is this contained in man, and it is from man that the return takes its inception. Since this is the same process in the reverse order, the hierarchies are disposed in man in the reverse order, and since time is created with the universe, and man therefore in his present state is a creature of time, they succeed one another in time, and are the three stages of human history, past, present, and future (pp. 11-12).

See n.II, 51 above.

Thus the term microcosm is not used in Eriugena except in one unfavourable context.

La raison en est chercher dans le *De hominis opificio* de Gregoire de Nysse. Au chapitre 16 de cet ouvrage (PG 44, 1770-1850) Gregoire critique violemment la théorie philosophique de l'homme-microcosme. Loin d'exalter la nature humaine, pense-t-il, cette théorie la dégrade et l'avilir, puisqu'en insistant sur le fait que l'homme est composé des quatre éléments, elle lui fait gloire d'une propriété qui lui est commune avec les moucheron et les rats.


... within the Christian tradition ... as among Platonists ... there will necessarily be a certain tension between the understanding of man as being, as it were, in the image of the material creation, and the idea that man was created in the image and likeness of God; the latter view implying, as it does, a superhuman destiny, which could not be fulfilled within the function of a microcosm related primarily to the empirical world as macrocosm.

Lars Thunberg, *Microcosm and Mediator, The Theological Anthropology of Maximus the Confessor*, Acta Seminarii Neoevangelici Upsalensis XXV (Lund, 1965), p. 142. As the following quotations from Plotinus show this is only part of the problem.

See chapter II, A which should be taken with this condition.

Augustine should not be too sharply set against Eriugena and Thomas on the place of man. One of the central problems, if not the main question, Augustine is attempting to work out in the *Confessions* is how the God, who finally becomes thinkable for him through a Platonic conception of immateriality, immutability and aeternity, can be the principle of the material temporal world. Within the solution of this question are also the satisfaction of his search to understand man's moral responsibility and his desire for salvation or unity with the principle. These are, from opposite sides, both

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questions about how spirit and matter can be held together; see C.J. Starnes, "Saint Augustine and the Vision of the Truth." The main answer given in the Confessions is man in Christ. Structurally this is indicated by the place of Book XI. In it the time consciousness of the human soul is used as a transition between the temporal journey of Augustine to his eternal patria (Books I-IX) and the exegesis of the creation narrative in Genesis (Books XII and XIII). Time is possible because the now which is eternity becomes a unity divided between past, present and future, a presence of past and future. Again, doctrinally the solution to the problem of how material temporal being can actually be one with God is the God-man, Jesus Christ. This living way overcomes the Platonic problem. The way up is the way down. The man whose infancy is analyzed in Book I is baptised into Christ in Book IX and is able to confess his sins in Book X because moral responsibility is discovered when the source of the material in the spiritual is known. There is involved here a transformation of the cosmos of Plotinus parallel to Thomas' reinterpretation of same feature in the world view of Proclus -- see n.II, 51 above. In Plotinus, soul provides the medium between spiritual and material. It is the spiritual source of the unspiritual world and, through the self-recollection of soul, the divine hypostases are found -- see n.III, 217 above and Enneades VI, 1. Thomas and Augustine are aware that crucial to the Christianizing of the Platonic cosmos is the abolition of the world soul. Man in Christ is the ultimate heir. This is the direction of Augustine's thought but he has not moved as far as Eriugena or Thomas. Aquinas brings this out rather nicely at In de Causis, Prop. 3, p. 25, 9-14:

\[
\text{Haec etiam positio non est rata in fide, scilicet quod motus caeli sit ab anima; sed Augustinus hoc sub dubio relinquit in II° Super Genesim ad litteram. Quod autem sit a Deo dirigente totam naturam et quod corporalis creatura moveatur a Deo mediantibus intelligentiis sive angelis, hoc asserit Augustinus in III° De trinitate et Gregorius in IV° Dialogorum.}
\]

78 See n.II, 52 above.

79 See n.II, 51 above and R. Southern, Medieval Humanism and Other Studies (Oxford, 1970), p. 50:

Thomas Aquinas died in 1274 and, it is probably true that man has never appeared so important a being in so well-ordered and intelligible a universe as in his works. Man was important because he was the link between the created universe and the divine intelligence. He alone in the world of nature could understand nature. He alone could use and perfect nature in accordance with the will of God and thus achieve his full nobility.

80 "seipsum intelligat intellectus noster secundum quod fit actu per species a sensibilibus abstractas per lumen intellectus agentis" ST I, 87, 1.

81 See above nn.16ff. and ScG III, 1: "Quaedam namque sic a Deo producta sunt ut, intellectum habentia, ejus similitudinem gerant et imaginem repraesentant; unde et ipsa non solum sunt directa, sed
The difference between the freedom and ruling power of God and of man is indicated structurally in the Summa Theologiae by placing the treatment of man's nature in the de deo under creation while his operations go into the second part. God's nature and operations are treated together.

ScG IV, 97. Cf. n.II, 51 above.

According to Proclus' general principles, we should expect it to be possible to identify motions described as processions and reversions with motions described as activities, for the strictest definition of activity is 'the combination of procession and reversion in a single cyclic process.'" S.E. Gersh, KINHEL,

primum ens oportet esse purum actum " ST I, 9, 1.

actus perfecti ... hoc igitur modo quo intelligere est motus, id quod se intelligere dicitur se movere." ST I, 18, 3 ad 1. Cf also ScG I, 13; ST I, 9, 1 ad 1 and ad 2 and I, 19, 1 ad 3 and n.III, 89 below.

ST I, 44.

See chapter III, E below.

The doctrine that God remains in himself when he moves upon himself in love and knowledge is found in Dionysius. Cf. In de div. nom. IV, 7, 369; IV, 8, 390; IV, 10, 439; IV, 11, 444; it is worked out systematically in the union of the first and fourth divisions in Eriugena, cf. n.II, 120. Thomas probably has the doctrine from Dionysius but, as my note attempts to show, he might also know a portion of the De Divisione Naturae containing the thinking.

Quia igitur mundus ... est factus a Deo per intellectum agendum ... necesse est quod in mente sit forma, ad similitudinem cuius mundus est factus. Et in hoc consistit ratio ideae " ST I, 15, 1. The ideas are the divine essence "secundum quod ad alia comparatur " ST I, 15, 1 ad 2. The essence is also his end and good: "nihil aliud a Deo sit finis Dei ... ipsemet est finis respectu omnium quae ab eo fiunt. Et hoc per suam essentiam, cum suam essentiam sit bonus ... finis enim habet rationem boni " ST I, 19, 1 ad 1. It is because he is the object of his own knowing and willing that he is spoken of as moving: "objectum divinae
Sed objectum divinae voluntatis est bonitas sua, quia est eius essentia. ST I, 19, 1 ad 3.

90 See n. II, 354 above.

91 Chapters III, B and C below.

92 This is a form of thinking central to the Proclan Neoplatonism; cf. Gersh, KNIGHT, p. 2.

93 A shorter version of this chapter was presented to the Sixth International Congress for Mediaeval Philosophy in Bonn in 1977 and is published as "The Structure of Aristotle's Logic and the Knowledge of God in the Pars Prima of the Summa Theologiae of Thomas Aquinas," Sprache und Erkenntnis im Mittelalter, Miscellanea Mediaevalia 13/2, ed. A. Zimmerman (Berlin/New York, 1981), pp. 961-968.

94 "Sed quia de Deo scire non possimus quid sit, sed quid non sit, non possimus considere de Deo quomodo sit sed potius quomodo non sit" ST I, 3, prol.

95 Q. 6, "de bonitate Dei" and q. 19, "de voluntate Dei."

96 "Sed objectum divinae voluntatis est bonitas sua, quia est eius essentia." ST I, 19, 1 ad 3.

97 Chapters II, C and D.

98 While Porphyry's position as identified by P. Hadot is a negative theology of being, it does make proper predication comprehensible or at least was used to this end. Porphyry's influence on Thomas is outlined in chapter II, D.

99 Chapter III, A.

100 ST I, 1, 1.

101 Cf. ST I, 1, 2 "utrum sacra doctrina sit scientia" and article 6 "utrum haec doctrina sit sapientia."

102 Wisdom is knowledge of the principles: "sapiens dicitur in unoquoque genere, qui considerat causam altissimam illius generis. . . ille igitur qui considerat simpliciter altissimam causam totius universi, quae Deus sit, maxime sapiens dicitur: unde et sapientia dicitur esse divinorum cognitio." ST I, 1, 6. Science applies the principles: "ratio scientiae consistat in hoc quod ex aliquibus notis alia necessario concludatur." In de Trin. II, 2, p. 86, 22-23; "principia cuiuslibet scientiae vel sunt nota per se, vel reducuntur ad notitiam superioris scientiae" ST I, 1, 2 ad 1. These notions of science and wisdom come from Aristotle; cf. Post.
Analytica I, 2; Metaphysica I, 2; Ethica Nic. VI.

103. "Unde licet in scientiis philosophicis alia sit speculativa et alia practica, sacra tamen doctrina comprehendit sub utramque, sicut et Deus eadem scientia se cognoscit, et ea quae facit. Magis tamen est speculativa quam practica, quia principalius agit de rebus divinis quam de actibus humanis..." ST I, 1, 4. "Cum ista scientia quantum ad aliquid sit speculativa, et quantum ad aliquid sit practica, omnes alias transcendit tam speculativas quam practicas." ST I, 1, 5. See also ST I, 14, 16.

104. Plato, Respublica VII, 13-14; Aristotle, Metaphysica especially β. Sacred theology does not have its principles provided by any of the philosophical sciences — "non enim accipit sua principia ab aliis scientiis, sed immediate a Deo per revelationem" (ST I, 1, 5 ad 2) — nor does it provide their principles.

Propria autem huius scientiae cognitio est quae est per revelationem, non autem quae est per naturalen rationem. Et ideo non pertinet ad eam probare principia aliarum scientiarum, sed solum judicare de eis. ST I, 1, 6 ad 2.

As D.J.M. Bradley puts it, "The philosopher cannot allow and the theologian should not demand that theology be placed at the apex of a philosophically constructed hierarchy of the sciences." "Aristotelian Science and the Science of Thomistic Theology," a paper for the Seventh Annual Sewanee Mediaeval Colloquium, The University of the South, Sewanee, Tennessee, April, 1980, p. 8.

105 ST I, 1, 7.

106. "Quod etiam manifestum fit ex principiis huius scientiae, quae sunt articuli fidei, quae est de Deo;" ibid.


108 ST I, 1, 5 ad 2 quoted at length in n.III, 22 above.


110 ST I, 1, 10.
All these elements, Aristotle's psychology, ratio in theology, the primacy of the literal sense of scripture are wonderfully unified by Beryl Smalley:

The Aristotelian held that substance could only be known through its sensible manifestations. In adapting Aristotle to Christianity, St. Thomas united soul and body much more closely than the Augustinians had done . . . Transferring his view of body and soul to 'letter and spirit', the Aristotelian would perceive the spirit of scripture as something not hidden behind or added on to, but expressed by the text . . . Under the influence of the Aristotelian concept of science, theologians brought themselves to admit in theory what they had long recognized in the practical organization of teaching. Theology is a speculative 'science'; it proceeds to new conclusions from the premises of revelation just as each of the inferior sciences starts from its own agreed assumptions. Its method is argumentative, not exegetical. At last theologians felt sufficiently sure of themselves to drop the fiction that all their work was a mere training for the allegorical interpretation. They finally freed theology from exegesis, and hence exegesis from theology.


Dodds, Elements, p. 198.

M.-D. Chenu is the special historian of scientific theology in the High Middle Ages; his article "La théologie comme science au XIIIe siècle," Arch. d'hist. doct. et lit. du moyen Âge, 2 (1927), 31-71 shows how Thomas as theologian "travaille selon toutes les exigences et les lois de la demonstratio aristotelicienne" (p. 33). Cf. also his La théologie comme science au xiii e siècle, 1st edition, 1927, 2nd edition, 1942, 3rd edition revised, Bibl. thomiste, 33 (Paris, 1957), La théologie au douzième siècle, St. Thomas d'Aquin et la théologie and Towards understanding Saint Thomas.

Cf. n.I, 111 and chapter II, A above, esp. n.27.

Thus obj. 1 art. 7 depends upon the statement of John of Damascus: "In Deo quid est, dicere impossibile est." Cf. n.II, 26. above and S. Lilla, "The Notion of Infinitude in Ps. Dionysius Areopagita," Jour. of Theo. Studies, 31 (1980), 1, 93-103 which brings out the unknowability of God resulting from his infinity both as this derives from Dionysius' Neoplatonic sources and from the influence of Gregory of Nyssa's Aristotelian argument. This essential unknowability prevents theological science.

Ennead VI, 9 endeavours at many points to describe the union between the duality of nous, the vision beyond the distinction of subject and object: "Το τοιοῦτον υπέρ τούτων, καταλαμβάνει το θεόν τον θείον, το τόπων τον τόπον, το ξέρει έμα, εκ τούτων εκ τιμής, εκ τυμής, εκ δόξας, εκ τιμής, εκ δόξας τούτων (VI, 9, 10, 11-14). He searches for another language than that of thinking or seeing "Το τοιοῦτον υπέρ τούτων καταλαμβάνει το θεόν τον θείον, το τοιοῦτον υπέρ τούτων καταλαμβάνει το θεόν τον θείον, το τόπων τον τόπον, το ξέρει έμα, εκ τούτων εκ τιμής, εκ τυμής, εκ δόξας, εκ τιμής, εκ δόξας τούτων.
(VI, 9, 11, 22-25). As beyond οὐκ the final union is above the dis-
cursive reasoning in the soul which are, for Plotinus, the sciences.
Noesis is beyond this and union is still higher (En. VI, 9, 5). The
doctrine of Proclus at In Timaeum, 92C, I, p. 301, 23ff. seems
fundamentally the same. The noetic activity which is the prelude to
union is beyond οὐκ... Indeed, it will call these reasoning stories:
"οὐκ οὐκ οὐκ εν οἰκονομικῆι λογική μετοχὴ οἱ συνώντες
τὸ πρᾶξι καὶ συνεκτικὸν τὴν ἀληθεία τοῦ αἰώνος...
(92D, I, p. 302, 4-6).

117 For Thomas' interpretation of Aristotle see n.I, 111 above;
for theology as all embracing system see chapter II, D and especially
n.292.

118 References are to Avicenna Latinus, Liber de Philosophia
Prima sive Scientia Divina, I-IV,édition critique par S. van Riet
(Louvain/Leiden, 1977). The Venice edition of 1495 gives the title
as "Metaphysica sive Prima Philosophia"; I am dependent upon it for
what lies outside the critical edition.

119 Cf. the "introduction doctrinale" entitled "Le statut de la
méthaphysique" by G. Verbeke, pp. 1*ff.

120 "subjectum omnis scientiae est res quae conceditur esse"
Avicenna, op. cit. I, 1, p. 4, 62. He also teaches "Nulla enim
scientiarum debet stabilire esse suum subjectum" ibid., p. 5, 85.

121 "ipse unum de his quae quaeruntur in hac scientia" ibid.,
p. 4, 59-60.

122 "Divinae scientiae non inquirunt nisi res separatas a materia
secundum existentiam et definitionem" ibid., p.2, 29-30.

123 "Si autem consideratio de causis fuerit inquantum habent esse,
et de omni eo quod accidit eis secundum hunc modum, oportebit tunc
ut ens inquantum est ens sit subjectum" ibid. I, 2, p. 8, 49-51.
This is the penultimate sentence of the first chapter. Commencing
with being as being enables a demonstration of God without dependence
on physical reality, for being as being is prior to matter.
Quia ens, inquantum est ens, et principia eius et
accidentali eius inquantum sunt, sicut iam patuit,
nullum.eorum est nisi praecedens materiam nec pendat
esse eius ex esse illius.
I, 2, p. 16, 97-99. This self-sufficient science provides the
certainty of the lower sciences: "Continget igitur ut in hac scientia
monstretur principia singularium scientiarum quae inquirunt dis-
positiones uniusculiusque esse" I, 2, p. 15, 77-79. God will then be
named "certitudo veritatis" I, 2, p. 16, 93. Thomas is not likely to
have regarded Avicenna's enterprise as a proper demonstration but
rather it would seem, like Anselm's argument, an attempt to treat
God's existence as self-evident; on this see further below.
124. "Naturalis considerat de formis materialibus, secunda autem de formis simplicibus abstractis a materia, et est illa Scientia, quae considerat de ente simpliciter. Sed notandum est, quod istud genus entium, esse, secundum separatum a materia, non declaratur nisi in hac scientia naturalis. Et qui dicit quod prima Philosophia nititur declarare entia separabilia esse, peccat. Haec enim entia sunt subjecta prima Philosophiae et declaratum est in posterioribus Analyticos quod impossible est aliquam scientiam declarare suum subjectum esse, sed concedit ipsum esse, aut quia manifestatum per se, aut quia est demonstratum in alia scientia. Unde Avicenna peccavit maxime, cum dixit quod primus Philosophus demonstrat primum principium esse, et processit in hoc in suo libro De scientia Divina, per viam quam existimavit esse necessariam et essentialum in illa scientia" Averrois, Commentaria in JL Physicorum, in Aristotelis, Opera, IV (Venetiis apud Juntas, 1574), pp. 47r8-47vH. For a summary of Averroes' doctrine and further references cf. E. Gilson, History n.21, p. 644.

125. See chapter II, D above and especially n.292.

126. Importantly, Thomas does not proceed from a bare logical distinction but from the fact that "invenimus ... in rebus quaedam quae sunt possibilia esse et non esse cum quaedam inveniantur generari et corrumpi" ST I, 2, 3. Because of his view of the situation of man's soul, proof of God's existence or of the subject of theology is not possible without the mediation of sense. Avicenna and Scotus try to overcome the dependence of God on the sensible this seems to imply. They argue from the opposition of possible and necessary given independently of any particular sensible thing-- though they would not concede that these were thereby talking only of logic or "second intentions" any more than Anselm would. Avicenna's title at cap. I, 6 is:

Capitulum in initio loquendi de necesse est et de possibile esse, et quod necesse esse non habet causam, et quod possibile est et causatum, et quod necesse esse nuli est coaequale in esse nec pendet ab alio in esse

De Philosophia Prima I, 6, p. 43, 3-6. For Scotus see John Duns Scotus, De Primo Principio, A Revised Text and Translation by E. Roche, Franciscan Inst. Publications, Philosophy Series 5 (New York and Louvain, 1949). E. Gilson explains that the motive of these proofs from the concepts of the possible and the necessary is to reflect in the proof the freedom from the sensible which belongs to the divine object. This will remind one of Anselm's endeavour to find an argument reflecting the simplicity of God and indicate the unity of content and form, of "an sit" and "quid sit."

If we start from physical bodies we will finally succeed in proving the existence of their primary cause. . . but it will remain a physical cause . . . The God whose existence physics can demonstrate does not transcend the physical order.


Nous voyons que, dans cette preuve, il faut tout d'abord
admettre l'existence des êtres possibles comme un postulate lequel nous est donné par les sens.

See also D. Chahine, Ontologie et théologie chez Avicenne (Paris, n.d.); E. Gilson, "Avicenne et le point de départ de Duns Scot," Arch. d'hist. doct. et lit. du moyen âge, II (1927), 89-149 and idem, History, pp. 206-216 and 455-463. B this destroys the proofs and is a consequence of the philosophical presuppositions brought to the works by the commentators. These presuppositions are expressed by Gilson in the passage from Realisme thomiste given at n.I, 31 above.

St Thomas is not dependent on Avicenna in the third way. Apparently following Averroes he rejects Avicenna's definition of necessity:

He defined necessity, not in terms of essence and existence, but in terms of unalterability, following Aristotle's definition of the necessary as that which cannot be otherwise (Metaphysics Δ, 1015 a34).

A. Kenny, The Five Ways, p. 48. The Master of Balliol is reporting the results of G. Talbert, Necessite et contingence chez saint Thomas d'Aquin et chez ses predecesseurs (Ottawa, 1961). All told Thomas has a view of theology which permits him neither to sacrifice its freedom -- its descent from above -- nor its connection with the sensible. He uses both Avicenna and Averroes at the point of their opposition.

127 See ST I, 19,1 ad 3 and nn.III, 85 and 89 above.

128 See nn.II, 277 and 278 above. Thomas confronts the difficulty at ST I, 19,1 ad 3 and at ScG I, 13. E.R. Dodds gives some Neoplatonic endeavours to reconcile them at Elements, p. 207.

129 "Utrum per rationem naturalem Deum in hac vita cognoscere possimus" but compare ST I, 13,1.


131 Chenu, Towards, n.51, pp. 228-229. Besides ST I, 12, 12, the texts mentioned are: "Ex tico etto, sanctus es et
tes, sanctus Deus. Quia terrae origo est et fortunae
Dei, Deus est."


Sic ergo ex ordine universi, sicut quodam via et ordine, ascendum per intellectum, secundum nostram virtutem ad Deum, qui est super omnia et hoc tribus modis: primo quidem et principaliter in omnem ablatione, inquantum scilicet nihil horum quae in creaturam ordine inspicimus, Deum astitimus aut Deo conveniens; secundario vero per excessum; non enim creaturarum perfectiones ut vitam, sapientiam et huicmodi, Deo auferimus propter defectum Dei, sed propter hoc quod omnem perfectionem creaturam excedit . . .; tertia, secundum causalitatem omnem dnum consideramus quod quidquid est in creaturis procedit sicut a Causa.

In de div. nom. VII, 4, 729. Thomas is proposing to make Dionysius' transformed logic the basis of his own theological order in the Commentary on the Sentences where he writes: "Dicit enim quod ex creaturis tribus modis devenimus in Deum: scilicet per causalitatem, per remotionem, per eminentiam" In I Sent., 3, div. textus, p.88.
While beginning with causality, the list at *Summa Theologiae* I, 13, 1 does not end positively: "Deus in hac vita ... cognoscitur a nobis ex creaturis secundum habitudinem principii, et per modum excellentiae et remotionis."

The three ways have an earlier history. E.R. Dodds, *Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety*, p. 87, writes of Plotinus that he relies on the three traditional approaches to the knowledge of God which were already listed by Albinus a century earlier -- the way of negation (perhaps originally Pythagorean), the way of analogy (based on Plato's analogy of the sun and the Good), and the way of eminence (based on the ascent to absolute Beauty in Plato's *Symposium*).

On p. 92, Dodds adds:

It seems to have been in fact the Platonists of Justin's time who elaborated the doctrine of the Three Ways to the knowledge of God ... -- the doctrine that was taken over into the philosophy of medieval Christendom.

132 *ST* I, 3, 3 *ad* 2.

133 _Dicendum quod de rebus simplicibus loqui non possumus, nisi per modum compositorum, a quibus cognitionem accipimus. Et ideo de Deo loquentes utimur nominibus concretis, ut significemus eius subsistentiam, quia apud nos non subsistunt nisi composita; et utimur nominibus abstractis, ut significemus eius simplicitatem._ *ST* I, 3, 3 *ad* 1. The doctrine here is repeated at *ST* I, 13, 1 *ad* 2. The division in our concepts and speech reflects a division in our faculties of knowing, i.e., sense and intellect, see *ST* I, 14, 11 and this follows from our being rational being in sensible matter.

134 *ST* I, 3, 1.

135 Chapter II, D.

136 *ST* I, 3, 2 *ad* 3.

137 *ST* I, 3, 3.

138 *ST* I, 29, 3 *ad* 4.

139 *ST* I, 3, 5 *ad* 1.

140 *ST* I, 3, 8.

141 *ST* I, 3, 4.

142 _Deus enim simplex est, ut ostensum est. Sed perfectiones rerum sunt multae et diversae. Ergo in Deo non sunt omnes perfectiones rerum._ *ST* I, 4, 2 *obj.* 1. Piana does not give the "non" but it is reported as an alternative reading and is clearly required by the sense and context. See also I, 4, 1 *obj.* 3; I, 4, 2 obiectiones 1 et 3; I, 4, 3 obiectiones 2 et 3.
Secundum hoc enim dicitur aliquid esse perfectum, secundum quod est actu, nam perfectum dicitur, cui nihil deest secundum modum suae perfectionis" ST I. 4. 1.

ST I, 4, 2.

ST I, 4, 3.

Questio I, 5 is "de bono in commune"; q.I, 6 is "de bonitate Dei."

Chapter II, D. That God is named good because he is first cause is also affirmed at ST I, 6, 1, the reference to Dionysius at this point is significant:

Cum ergo Deus, sit prima causa effectiva omnium, manifestum est quod sibi competit ratio boni et appetibilis. Unde Dionysius in libro De Div. Nom. attribuit bonum Deo sicut primae causae efficienti, dicens 'quod bonus dicitur Deus, sicut ex quo omnia subsistunt'.

This directly repeats the doctrine of ST I, 5, 2 ad 1 and makes doubtful the general contention that there he is reporting an opinion he rejects.


ST I, 5, 4 ad 2 and cf. J. Peghaire, "L'axiom 'Bonum est diffusivum sui' dans le néoplatonism et l'athomisme," Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa, I (1932), section spéciale, pp. 5*-30*.

Aristotle, Metaphysica A, 7, 988b 8-16; for Proclus see Dodds at n.112 above.

ST I, 5, 4 ad 3; see also I, 6, 1.

ST I, 6, 2.

ST I, 6, 3.

A primo igitur per suam essentiam ente et bono, unumquodque potest dicitur bonum et ens, inquantum participat ipsum per modum cuiusdam assimilationis, licet remote et deficienter ... Sic ergo unumquodque dicitur bonum bonitate divina " ST I, 6, 4 ad 1.

Ibid.

Attribuitur enim Deo quod sit ubique et in omnibus rebus, inquantum est incircumscriptibilis et infinitus " ST I, 1, prol.

ST I, 7, 1.

Ibid. ad 3.
Quia vero infinito convenire videtur quod ubique et in omnibus sit . . .

ST I, 8, prol.

ST I, 8, 1.

ST I, 8, 3 ad 1.

ST I, 8, 4.

Ratio aeternitatis consequitur immutabilitatem, sicut ratio temporis consequitur motum

ST I, 10, 2.

ST I, 10, 1: "Numerus motus secundum prius et posterius"; see Physica IV, 11 (220a25).

Definitio aeternitatis, quam Boethius ponit in De Consol. dicens quod 'aeternitas est interterminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio'. ST I, 10, 1.

Sicut in cognitionem simplicium oportet nos venire per compositionem, ita in cognitionem aeternitatis oportet nos venire per temporis . . . simplicia consequerunt per negationem definiri, sicut punctus est cuius pars non est. Quod non ideo est, quod negatio sit de essentia eorum, sed quia intellectus noster qui primo apprehendit compositionem, in cognitionem simplicium pervenire non potest, nisi per rationem compositionis. ST I, 10, 1 resp. and ad 1.

Est autem maxime indivisum, in quantum neque dividitur actu neque potentia, secundum quemcunque modum divisionis, cum sit omnibus modis simplex, ut supra ostensum est. Unde manifestum est quod Deus est maxime unus.

ST I, 11, 1 ad 1.

The first article is "Utrum unum addat aliquid supra ens", the second "Utrum unum et multa opponantur". It is interesting that Dionysius is the authority for the convertability of unity and being. From the last chapter of the Divine Names, Thomas quotes: "Nihil est existentium non participans uno" and "non est multitudo non participans uno . . . " The second is virtually the same as Prop. 1 of the Elements of Theology: "Προὶ πλησίος μετέξελεν πρὸς τὸν Εἶχος" and the other is the doctrine of Proposition 3, 11 and 12. They could be interpreted in the very opposite way from the one Thomas chooses. On the ambiguity of the position of Dionysius see nn. II, 252 and 350 above.

Deus comprehendit in se totam perfectionem essendi " ST I, i. 3.

"Sed contra est quod dicit Boëthius, quod 'inter omnia quae unum dicuntur arcem tenet unitas divinae Trinitatis' " ST I, i, 4. On the priority given to unity in the mediaeval interpretation of Boethius see n.II, 121 above.

"See n.II, 334 above and Aristotle De Anima II, 4 and III, 4.

"Dicendum quod secundum Philosophum, voces sunt signa intellectuum, et intellectus sunt rerum similitudines. Et sic patet quod voces referuntur ad res significandas mediante conceptione intellectus. Secundum igitur quod a nobis intellectu cognosci potest, sic a nobis nominari " ST I, 13, 1.

"Quia in superioribus consideravimus qualiter Deus sit secundum seipsum, restat considerandum qualiter sit in cognitione nostra, id est quomodo cognoscatur a creaturis " ST I, 12, prol. "Consideratis his quae ad divinam perfectionem pertinent, procedendum est ad considerationem divinorum nominum; unumquodque enim nominatur a nobis, secundum quod ipsum cognoscimus " ST I, 13, prol. Note that the names belong to God as part of his perfection; they follow on the twelfth question rather than directly on the eleventh because intellect links the thing and its sign. See also ST I, 14, 8 ad 3, "res naturales sunt mediae inter scientiam Dei et scientiam nostram" etc.

"Utrum aliquis intellectus creatus possit Deum videre per essentiam " ST I, 12, 1.


"Cum enim ultima hominis beatitudo in altissima eius operatione consistat, quae est operatio intellectus, si numquam essentiam Dei videre potest intellectus creatus, vel nunquam beatitudinem obtinebit, vel in alio eius beatitudo consistet quam in Deo. Quod et alienum a fide."  

"Unde simpliciter concedendum est quod beati Dei essentiam videant " ST I, 12, 1. The "simpliciter" strengthens the affirmation. There is an extensive literature on the question of whether there is natural desire and capacity of man for beatitude in Aquinas. Because the structure of the Summa contra Gentiles demands that the nature of desire be treated extensively in separation from grace and faith, this is largely a problem for those trying to work out the logic of that Summa. The crucial material is referred to by A. Pegis in the
introduction to his translation of the *Summa contra Gentiles* and is discussed at considerable length by A. Gauthier in his introduction to the recent French translation of the work, cf. nn. I, 14 and 18 above. The *Summa Theologiae* does not so sharply divide nature's desire and faith's hope but it does distinguish them here at ST I, 1, 1 and elsewhere. That the attempt of nature to seek God should be recognized by Thomas is consistent with his whole theology as interpreted in this thesis. The denial of it stems largely from contemporary despair about the human reason or the determination that it should not have any rights against theology. The contemporary controversy is illuminated by an examination of the disputes about the relations between philosophy and theology in neo-Thomism for which see Part One above.

179"Et sic potest esse proportio creaturae ad Deum, inquantum se habet ad ipsum ut effectus ad causam, et ut potentia ad actum. Et secundum hoc, intellectus creatus proportionatis esse potest ad cognoscendum Deum " ST I, 12, 1 ad 4.

180 There are three "modes" showing this in I, 13, 2. The first is drawn from Dionysius "per similitudines inferioris ordinis rerum nullo modo superiora possunt cognosci." For Dodds see his Elements, p. 193 and n. II, 287 above.

181"aliqua participata similitudo ipsius, qui est primus intellectus." ST I, 1, 2.

182"Unde dicere Deum per similitudinem videri, est dicere divinam essentiam non videri; quod est errorum. Dicendum ergo quod ad viden-dum Dei essentiam requiritur aliqua similitudo ex parte visivae potentiae, scilicet lumen divinæ gloriae confortans intellectum ad videndum Deum: de quo dicitur in Psalm: "In lumine tuo videbimus lumen". Non autem per aliquam similitudinem creatam Dei essentia videri potest, quae ipsum divinam essentiam repraesentet ut in se est " ST I, 13, 2.

183"Utrum essentia Dei videri possit oculis corporalibus " ST I, 13, 3.

184"Utrum aliquis intellectus creatus per sua naturalia divinam essentiam videre possit " ST I, 13, 4.

185"cognoscere ipsum esse subsistens sit connaturale soli intellectus divino . . . Non igitur potest intellectus creatus Deum per essentiam viderere, nisi inquantum Deus per suam gratiam se intellectui creato coniungit, ut intelligibile ab ipso " ibid.

186"Et ideo cum intellectus creatus per suam naturam natu sit apprehendere formam concretam et esse concretum in abstractione per modum resolutionis cuiusdam, potest per gratiam elevari ut cognoscat substantiam separatam subsistentem, et esse separatum subsistens " ibid, ad 3.

187 ST I, 12, 5 ad 3.
et desiderium quodammodo facit desiderantem aptum et paratum ad susceptionem desiderati. Unde qui plus habebit de caritate, perfectius Deum videbit, et beatior erit" ST I, 12, 5.

"Cum igitur lumen gloriae creatum, in quocumque intellectu creato receptum, non possit esse infinitum, impossibile est quod aliquid intellectus creatus Deum infinite cognoscat." ST I, 12, 7.

God's infinity makes him absolutely known to himself and knowable by others in so far as they are receptive of his life. The opposing teaching of Dionysius is treated by S. Lilla cf. n.III, 115 above.

"modus obiecti non est modus cognoscentis " ST I, 12, 7 ad 3.

"Nullus igitur intellectus creatus, videndo Deum, potest cognoscere omnia quae Deus facit vel potest facere; hoc enim esset comprehendere eius virtutem " ST I, 12, 8.

"pauciora et plura cognoscantur in eo " ST I, 12, 8 ad 3; cf. also ad 4.

He draws on the Confessiones, De Vera Religione, De Trinitate and Super Genesim ad Litteram.

"Utrum per gratiam habeatur altior cognitione Dei quam ea quae habetur per rationem naturalis" ST I, 12, 13.

Ibid., ad 1.

ST I, 12, 13 ad 2. The ultimate basis of revelation is the vision of God's essence. This was given to Moses and Paul, cf. n.III, 10. But it is not the general means.
Nam et lumen naturale intellectus confortatui per infusionem luminis gratuiti" ST I, 12, 13.

Sic igitur potest nominari a nobis ex creaturis" ST I, 13, 1.

Sic igitur praedicta nomina divinam substantiam significant, imperfecte tamen." ST I, 13, 2.

"Nomina proprio competunt Deo, et magis proprio quam ipsis creaturis, et per prius dicuntur de eo." ST I, 13, 3.

Nomina Deo attribute, licet significant unam rem, tamen, quia significant eam sub rationibus multis et diversis, non sunt synonyma." ST I, 13, 4.

ST I, 13, 5 et 10. Those discussing the source and nature of Thomas' doctrine of analogical predication take insufficient notice of its Neoplatonic context. Analogy is necessary when one is conscious of the difference between the simplicity of God and the mode of creatures. "The transference of Aristotelian concepts primarily applicable to the sensible world per analogiam to the intelligible sphere is a favorite philosophical method among late Neoplatonists" Gersh, From Iamblichus, p. 58, n.147.

Quantum ad rem significatem per nomen per prius dicuntur de Deo quam de creaturis" ST I, 13, 6.

"Deus sit extra totum ordinem creaturarum, et omnes creaturarum ordinentur ad ipsam, et non e converso" ST I, 13, 7.

See articuli 8, 9, 11 et 12.

"Quamvis utraque nomina deficiant a modo ipsius, sicut intellectus noster non cognoscit eum ut est, secundum hanc vitam" ST I, 13, 1 ad 2. Compare n.III, 191 above and ST I, 3, 3 ad 1. See n.III, 133 above.

"Creaturarum imperfecte eam representant" ST I, 13, 2. This is because they are composite, see ST I, 3, 3 ad 2.

Quantum vero ad modum significandi, non proprio dicuntur de Deo; habent enim modum significandi qui creaturis competit" ST I, 13, 3.

"Unum omnino simplex" ST I, 13, 4.

Sicut igitur diversis perfectionibus creaturarum respondet unum simplex principium, repraesentatum per diversas perfectiones creaturarum vari et multipliciter" ibid. The ontological basis of this is that the procession of God ad extra, i.e., creation is distinguished from the internal processions by the fact that outside
the essence the divine being can only be represented "multitudine", "distinctione", "inaequalitate" ST I, 47, 1 et 2.

213 "huic vero diversitate quae est secundum rationem, respondet pluralitas praedicati et subiecti; identitatem vero rei significat intellectus per ipsum compositionem. Deus autem in se consideratus est omnino unus et simplex; sed tamen intellectus noster secundum diversas conceptiones ipsum cognoscit, eo quod non potest ipsum ut in se ipso est, videre. Sed tamen, quamvis intelligat ipsum sub diversis conceptionibus, cognoscit tamen quod omnibus suis conceptionibus respondet una et eadem res simpliciter. Hanc ergo pluralitatem, quae est secundum rationem, repraesentat per pluralitatem praedicati et subiecti; unitatem vero representat intellectus per compositionem" ST I, 13, 12. There is considerable controversy over just how in Thomas logic reflects things but our purpose does not require a judgement as to whether the correspondence is isomorphic or hardly more than metaphorical; see H. Veatch, "St. Thomas' Doctrine of Subject and Predicate," Commemorative Studies, II, pp. 401-422, who opts for the latter. It is necessary only that the unity be composed (per compositionem).


215 Fr Herbert McCabe thinks Thomas maintains a difference between knowing "how to use our words" about God and knowing "what they mean", see his Appendix 3, "'Signifying Imperfectly' in St. Thomas Aquinas," Summa Theologiae, III (Blackfriars, 1964), pp. 104-105. This allows Fr McCabe to be more strongly and unambiguously negative about our knowledge of God than St Thomas is at this point and at the same time to assert Thomas' positive teaching about our capacity to name God. This results in at least one misleading translation. Fr McCabe translates "quod cognitio Dei per quamcumque similitudinem creatam non est visio essentiae eius" as "that any knowledge of God we have through a created likeness is not a knowledge of his essence" ibid., pp. 38 and 39.

216 This is a summary of Aristotle's doctrine drawn from several places. See Metaphysica for the treatment of the first principle as one of the separate substances, and chapters 7, 9, 10 for the noetic nature of the first, that his is self-knowledge and for the predication made of him. That the divine is theoretical activity and some of the predicates of this life also comes out in Ethica Nico. K, 7 and 8, De Anima II, 4 teaches the order of knowing in respect to soul; III, 4 maintains the theoretical soul to be formed through its objects and known by reflection on its objective acts; III, 5 teaches the same doctrine of the nature of the first as Metaph. , 7 and brings psychology and theology together. Categories 5 is perhaps best in showing the doctrine of being which goes with Aristotle's logic but the whole treatise assumes the unity of the two. There is some treatment of these questions in chapter II, D above. H.B. Veatch maintains in Aristotle (Bloomington, 1974) and Two Logics (Evanston, 1969) that Aristotle's logic is purposely limited because its role is to bring out the nature of being and not just to formalize relations. See also P.F. Strawson, "Semantics, Logic and Ontology," Semantik und Ontologie, Neue Hefte für Philosophie, 8 (1979), 1-13.
This is a precis of Plotinus' teaching taken from several places. A good part can be found in Ennead VI 9 and some of the doctrine there is given in n.III, 116 above. V 1, 7 speaks of the noetic as revelation of the One. V 6 teaches that the intellect is dual and that the first must be beyond this. See also n.II, 247 above. Something has been said of the Plotinian doctrine about the soul above, cf. n.II, 118. VI 1 makes clear that knowing the hypostases comes through knowing the origin and true nature of the soul. II 9.1, 8-9 say that calling the first one is not a proper predication but only to locate it for us. A.H. Armstrong writes of Plotinus, his demonstrations that intellect cannot be the first principle (or conversely that the One is not intellect and does not think as in VI, 7, 40-41) always take the form of showing the insufficient simplicity of the Aristotelian self-thinking intellect.


See n.II, 249 above.

See conclusion on chapter II, D especially n.350.

See chapter II, A.

See nn.II, 324-326.

See chapters II, B and D.

"seipsum perfecte comprehendit" ST I, 14, 3; "ipsum eius intelligere sit eius essentia et eius esse" ST I, 14, 4.

"Alia autem a se videt non in ipsis sed in seipso, inquantum essentia sua continet similitudinem aliorum ab ipso" ST I, 14, 5.

"Sic enim cognoscit alia a se, ut dictum est, secundum quod alia ab ipso in eo sunt. Sed alia ab eo sunt in ipso sicut in prima causa communi et universali . . . Ergo Deus cognoscit alia a se in universali, et non secundum propiam cognitionem" ST I, 14, 6 obj 1.

ST I, 14, 6 ad 1.

"essentia creaturae comparatur ad essentiam Dei, ut actus imperfectus ad perfectum. Et ideo essentia creaturae non sufficienter ducit in cognitionem essentiae divinae, sed e converso" ST I, 14, 16 ad 2.

Consider Elements, Propositions 7, 18, 30, 103. Dodds' comments
on 7 and 103 are particularly important (pp. 193-194 and 217-218). This doctrine results from primarily understanding causation through participation. The first proposition of the Liber de Causis is "omnis causa primaria plus est influens super suum causatum quam causa secunda universalis" in de causis, Prop. 1, p. 4. Thomas in his commentary refers correctly to Elements, Prop. 56 and 57. At Prop. 12 of In de Causis, Thomas discusses extensively Prop. 103 of the Elements "All things are in all things, but each according to its proper nature . . . in Intelligence, being and life . . ."; cf. pp. 78-79 of In de Causis and p. 93 of the Elements.

229,"in mente divina sit forma, ad similitudinem cuius mundus est factus. Et in hoc consistit ratio ideae" ST I, 15, 1. See also ST I, 16, 1.


231 ST I, 14, 7; see also the replies to objectiones 2 and 3.

232 ST I, 14, 8 ad 1 et ad 2.

233 This comes out in its most general form if causation is expressed as participation; "cum Deus sit ipsum esse, intantum unum-quoque est, inquantum participat de Dei similitudine . . . Sic et ea quae sunt in potentia, etiam si non sunt in actu, cognoscuntur a Deo" ST I, 14, 9 ad 2. The knowledge of non-being is a knowledge of the potentiality of what is -- ultimately God's own essence.

234,"Dicendum quod scientia Dei non est causa mali, sed causa boni, per quod cognoscitur malum" ST I, 14, 10 ad 2.

235,"cum Deus sit causa rerum per suam scientiam . . . intantum se extendit scientia Dei, inquantum se extendit elius causalitas. Unde, cum virtus activa Dei se extendit . . . usque ad materiam . . . necesse est quod scientia Dei usque ad singularia se extendat, quae per materiam individuantur" ST I, 14, 11. "Deus autem non sic cognoscit infinitum vel infinita, quasi enumerando partem post partem; cum cognoscat omnia simul non successive" ST I, 14, 12 ad 1. "Aeternitas autem, tota simul existens, ambit totum tempus . . . Unde omnia quae sunt in tempore, sunt Deo ab aeterno praesentia" ST I, 14, 13. The following articles are argued according to the same principle. In each case what is fundamental is that God knows his essence as the power in which all else is implicit. Even in patria created intellect does not know the infinite potentiality of God. Further God knows what is in his essence in accordance with the mode of his being rather than its own. This distinction of modes has already been compromised I, 14, 9 and Thomas will not be able to maintain it absolutely.

236 ST I, 19, prol.

In I Sent., d.36, q.2, a.2, p. 842 quoted by Geiger, art. cit., p. 188. Eriugena identifies the ideas with his second division "quae creatur et creat." These are the primordial causes which the Father "in verbo suo, unigento videlicet filio . . . praeformavit" De Div. Nat. II, 2 (PL 122, 529A-C), p. 14, 9024. I.P. Sheldon-Williams notes:

Since the Forms were, from the time of Plotinus at least held by pagan and Christian alike to reside in the Mind of God, Henry of Ghent held it that they were created, ibid., n.29, p. 216. Modern commentators have followed Henry of Ghent in this criticism; see E. Gilson, History, p. 118 and Being and Some Philosophers, p. 37. Prof. Gilson thought that Aquinas and Eriugena were sharply distinguished on this matter (see also Geiger, art. cit., p. 179) but in fact Thomas goes some way toward John the Scot in differentiating the essence and ideas of God and uses Eriugena's language when at ST I, 41, 3 ad 4 he speaks of the second person as "Sapientia" both "genita" and "creata" (see also ST I, 34, 3 and the discussion in chapter III, D). Thomas' position has its own difficulties and Eriugena holds more closely to something like a pagan Neoplatonic separation of the hypostases. D.F. Duclow, "Dialectic and Christology in Eriugena's Periphyseon," pp. 99-117 is a sympathetic exposition of Eriugena's doctrine. F.J. Kovach, "Divine Art in Saint Thomas Aquinas," Arts libéraux et philosophie au moyen age, pp. 663-671, shows with Geiger that Thomas treating divine art unites Plato and Aristotle, makes knowing the basis of art, and turns the divine essence toward creatures as exemplar.

Geiger, art. cit., p. 188.

ST I, 15, 2. That God reaches around the mode of his knowledge to compare it with the created thing, itself within God's knowledge, is also obscurely suggested in Thomas' attempt to express how the temporal is known in God's aeternity. God does not just know future things in their causes -- this is also possible for finite thinking -- "sed eius intuitus fertur ab aeterno supra omnia, prout sunt in sua praesentialitate." It is done without leaving God's aeternity because aeternity contains time, as God contains a relation to creatures in his self-relation, cf. ST I, 14, 13.

ST I, 15, 2 ad 4.

ST I, 16, 1.

ST I, 16, 2.

ST I, 16, 5.

ST I, 16, 5 ad 1.

ST I, 16, 5.

"verum et falsum opponuntur ut contraria" ST I, 17, 4. Yet, neither the false nor the evil are "fundatur in . . . sibi contrario," but rather in the being of which they are predicated. Because true
and false are convertible with being, "unde sicut omnis privatio
fundatur in subiecto quod est ens, ita omne malum fundatur in ali-
quo bono, et omne falsum in aliquo vero" ibid., ad 2.

Life might precede intelligence because it is more generic
and more simple -- it is not necessarily divided by self-conscious
thought. Or it might come after will, as in the Summa con­tra Gen­tiles, being associated with the third hypostasis, soul, and to
descent into material non-thinking existence. Thomas is explicitly
following Aristotle in his treatment of life in the Summa Theo­logiae
and these other reasonings belong to the more Platonic side of later
Neoplatonism. See n.II, 349 above.

248
249 ST I, 14, prol.
250 ST I, 18, prol.
251 ST I, 18, 4.
252 ST I, 18, 3, the passage is reproduced at n.I, 105.
253 "Ex quo patet quod illa proprie sunt viventia, quae se ipsa
secundum aliquam speciem motus moveant; sive accipiatur motus proprie,
sicut motus dicitur actus imperfecti, idest existentis in potentia;
sive motus accipiatur communiter, prout motus dicitur actus perfecti,
prout intelligere et sentire dicitur moveri, ut dicitur in III De
An."
254 ST I, 18, 1.
255 ibid., ad 1.
256 ST I, 18, 3.
257 In de Anima I, iv, 82.
258 In de Anima III, xii, 766.
259 SecG I, 13 (Leonine, p. 31). What Thomas ascribes to Plato
he probably derives from Aristotle's reports (there is also Meta­
physics XI, 6, 1071b 37), from Dionysius (see n.III, 88 above for
references), and the Liber de Causis which uses "redniens" to describe
knowledge (see Prop. 15 and Thomas' comment In de Causis, pp. 88ff.);
cf. n.III, 128 and II, 89.
260 ST I, 18 4; see n.III, 228 just above. Proclus draws the
conclusion that being and intelligence are vitally in life from his
general principle that all things are in all things, Elements, Prop.
103. Thomas knows the doctrine also from the Liber de Causis, Prop.
12. He finds however that the "auctor huius libri" badly under­
stands the teaching of Proclus which Thomas finds agreeable with
Aristotle; see In de Causis, Prop. 12, p. 79, 2-19.

261 "Dicendum quod si de ratione rerum naturalium non esset materia, se tantum forma, omnibus modis veriori modo essent res naturales in mente divina per suas ideas quam in seipsis . . . Sed quia de ratione rerum naturalium est materia, dicendum quod res naturales verius esse habent simpliciter in mente divina quam in seipsis, quia in mente divina habent esse increatum, in seipsis autem esse creatum. Sed esse hoc utpote homo vel equus, verius habent in propria natura quam in mente divina, quia ad veritatem hominis pertinet esse materiale, quod non habent in mente divina" ST I, 18, 4 ad 3.

262 ST I, 16, 3.

263 ST I, 16, 4.

264 Metaphysica A, 6.

265 ST I, 13, 8 and I, 5, 2; see chapter II, D above.

266 See n.II, 265 and 349 above.

267 ST I, 19, 2 ad 2.

268 ST I, 20, 1 ad 1. As well, the doctrine of the divine ideas. finally reduces the divine art or making to knowing. "Thomas often calls the divine art simply divine knowledge" Kovach, art. cit., p. 668.

269 ST I, 20, prol.

270 "Nam et post morales virtutes in scientia morali consideratur de prudentia, ad quam providentia pertinere videtur" ST I, 22, prol. "In parte autem appetitiva inveniuntur in nobis et passiones animae, ut gaudium, amor, et huiusmodi; et habitus moralium virtutem, ut iustitia . . . Unde primo considerabimus de amore Dei; secundo, de iustitia Dei et misericordia eius" ST I, 20, prol. Thomas states at ST I, 49 that he is following Aristotle rather than the Stoics on the relation of the passions and virtue of the soul. His view of how prudence in the form of providence and its consequents should be ordered in an Aristotelian framework does indeed seem to reflect the procedure of the Nicomachean Ethics where it is discussed in Book VI, the moral virtues having already been treated.

271 ST I, 12, 13 ad 1.

272 ST I, 13, 11 ad 2 and ST I, 5, 2 ad 1; the latter is reproduced at n.II, 289 above. See chapter II, D for a discussion of the opposing priorities in the system of St Thomas.

273 The texts are collected in n.II, 83 above.
Such an abstraction is implied when, in question 14, will is said to be added to intellect to move God to creation. It is also required for the distinction between God's "scientia visionis" and his "scientia simplicis intelligentiae" (ST I, 14, 9).

"Intellectus autem qui est causa rei, comparatur ad ipsum sicut regula et mensura . . . Iustitia igitur Dei, quae constituit ordinem in rebus conformem rationi sapientiae suae, quae est lex eius, convenienter veritus nominatur" ST I, 21, 2. "Opus autem divinae iustitiae semper praesupponit opus misericordiae, et in eo fundatur" ST I, 21, 4.

"Potentia importat rationem principii exequentis id quod voluntas imperat, et ad quod scientia dirigit; quae tria Deo secundum idem conveniunt. Vel dicendum quod ipsa scientia vel voluntas divina, secundum quod est principium effectivum habet rationem potentiae. Unde consideratio scientiae et voluntatis praecedet in Deo considera-
tionem potentiae, sicut causa praecedit operationem et effectum" ST I, 25, 1 ad 4.

See n.II, 180 above.

"Et secundum hoc Plato dixit quod primum movens movet seipsum" ST I, 19, 1 ad 3.
291 ST I, 26, 2.

292 Ibid., obj 2, ad 1, et ad 2.

293 ST I, 26, prol., see also the last words of the question.


295 ST I, 26, 1 ad 1.

296 "Nihil enim aliud sub nomine beatitudinis intelligitur, nisi bonum perfectum intellectualis naturae, cuius est suam sufficientiam cognoscere in bono quae habet; et cui competit ut ei contingat aliquid vel bene vel male, et sit suarum operationum domina" ST I, 26, 1. "Dicendum quod beatitudo, cum sit bonum, est objectum voluntatis. Objectum autem praointelligitur actui potentiae. Unde secundum modum intelligendi prius est beatitudo divina quam actus voluntatis in ea requiescentis. Et hoc non potest esse nisi actus intellectus. Unde in actu intellectus attenditur beatitudo" ST I, 26, 2 ad 2. See also ST I, 25, 1 ad 4 quoted in n.III, 280 above.

297 ST I, 26, 2 sed contra.

298 "ex parte ipsius obiecti, sic solus Deus est beatitudo, quia ex hoc solo est aliquid beatum, quod Deum intelligit ... Sed ex parte actus intelligentis beatitudo est quid creatum in creaturis beatis" ST I, 26, 3.

299 "quidquid est desiderabile in quacumque beatitudine, vel vera vel falsa, totum eminentius in divina beatitudine praexistit" ST I, 26, 4.

300 "est differentia inter intellectum et voluntatem, quod intellectus fit in actu per hoc quod res intellecta est in intellectu secundum suam similitudinem; voluntas autem fit in actu, non per hoc quod aliqua similitudo volit sit in voluntate, sed ex hoc quod voluntas habet quaedam inclinationem in rem volitam. Processio igitur quae attenditur secundum rationem intellectus, est secundum rationem similitudinis; et tantum potest habere rationem generationis ... Processio autem quae attenditur secundum rationem voluntatis, non consideratur secundum rationem similitudinis sed magis secundum rationem impellentis et moventis in aliquid. Et ideo ... procedit in divinis per modum amoris ... prout aliquid ex amore dicitur moveri vel impelli ad aliquid faciendum" ST I, 27, 4.

301 B. Lonergan, Verbum, pp. 206-207.

302 ST I, 32, 3.

303 "quarentibus quo sunt unus Deus, et quo sunt tres, sicut respondetur quod sunt essentia vel deitate unum, ita oportuit esse
aliqua nomina abstracta, quibus responderi possit personas distinguere.

Et huiusmodi sunt proprietates vel notiones in abstracto significantes, ut paternitas et filliationem." ST I, 32, 2. See also I, 32, 1 and question I, 39, passim, but especially article 7 as quoted n.III, 341 below.

304 See chapter II, B above.

305 ST I, 32, 1 ad 2.

306 ST I, 25, 5 and I, 45, 7 ad 2 respectively.

307 ST I, 41, 4 ad 3.

308 ST I, 45, 7 ad 2.

309 The Father is "principium totius divinitatis" ST I, 39, 8, and is called Father primarily because he generates a person (ST I, 33, 3 quoted below). Article five of question forty-one is "utrum potentia generandi significet relationem et non essentiam" ST I, 42, 6 ad 3 and I, 45, 6 show how power is personally modified in being given and received.

310 ST I, 40, 2 ad 3.

311 ST I, 28, 1 ad 2.

312 ST I, 29, 4 ad 1.

313 ST I, 32, 3 ad 3.

314 ST I, 42, 5 ad 3.

315 ST I, 27, 1 ad 2.

316 "De aequalitate et similitudine divinarum personarum ad invicem"

ST I, 42.

317 "Dicendum quod primum quod procedit ab unitate, est aequalitas, et deinde procedit multiplicatae. Et ideo a Patre, cui secundum Augustinum, propriatur unitas, processit Filius, cui proprietur aequalitas, et deinde creatura, cui competit inaequalitas. Sed tamen etiam a creaturis participatur quaedam aequalitas, scilicet proportionis" ST I, 47, 2 ad 2. It is Augustine's De Doctrina Christiana I, 5 (PL 34, 21) to which Thomas is referring.

318 "Produxit enim res in esse propter suam bonitatem communicandam creaturis, et per eas repraesentandam. Et quia per unam creaturam sufficienter repraesentari non potest, produxit multas creaturas et diversas, ut quod deest un ad repraesentandam divinam bonitatem,
suppleatur ex alia" ST I, 47, 1.

319 ST I, 28, 1 ad 3.

320 ST I, 41, 4 ad 3.

321 ST I, 45, 6; see F. Ruello, "Saint Thomas et Pierre Lombard" and chapter II, D above.

322 ST I, 33, 3 ad 1.

323 ST I, 34, 3.

324 ST I, 41, 3 ad 4 and see n. III, 238 above.

325 ST I, 45, 6.

326 ST I, 45, 3 ad 1.

327 ST I, 45, 4 et 5.

328 ST I, 32, 1.

329 ST I, 27 prol.

330 ST I, 31, 1 ad 1.

331 ST I, 32, 1 ad 1.

332 Chapter III, C.

333 ST I, 43, 5 ad 1.

334 ST I, 38 2; question thirty-seven is "de nomine Spiritus Sancti qui est amor", question thirty-six is "de nomine Spiritus Sancti quod est donum".

335 ST I, 36, 1.

336 Ibid., see also ST I, 27, 4.

337 ST I, 36, 2.

338 ST I, 36, 4.

339 Ibid.

340 ST I, 36, 4 ad 1.
"si vero considerentur supposita spirationis, sic Spiritus Sanctus procedit a Patre et Filio ut sunt plures; procedit enim ab eis ut amor unitivus duorum" ST I, 36, 4 ad 1.

"excluso Spiritu Sancto, qui est duorum nexus, non posset intelligi unitas connexionis inter Patrem et Filium. Et ideo dicuntur omnia esse connexa propter Spiritum Sanctum; quia posito Spiritu Sancto, inventur ratio connexionis in divinis Personis, unde Pater et Filius possunt dici connexi" ST I, 39, 8.

See n.II, 364 above.


See chapter II, C.


Ibid.

Ibid., n.80.

ST I, 39, 8.

Ibid.

ST I, 39, 7.

ST I, 42, 1 ad 4.

See the end of the *Summa contra Gentiles*. Thomas did not get to the last things in the *Summa Theologiae*.

ST I, 42, 3.

ST I, 42, 6 ad 3.

ST I, 43, 4.

ST I, 43, 5.

ST I, 43, 8.

ST I, 32, 1.

ST I, 43, 7 ad 3.
361 ST I, 32, 1 ad 3.
362 ST I, 39, 7.
363 See n.III, 238.
364 ST I, 34, 3.
365 Ibid.
366 ST I, 41, 3 ad 4.
367 ST I, 38, 1.
368 ST I, 37, 2 ad 3.
369 ST I, 27, 2 ad 3.
370 ST I, 37, 1.
371 ST I, 34, 2 ad 4; also I, 37, 1 ad 4.

Dicendum quod sicut Filio, licet intelligat, non tamen sibi competit producere verbum, quia intelligere convenit ei ut Verbo procedenti; ita, licet Spiritus Sanctus amet, essentialiter accipiendo, non tamen convenit ei quod spiret amorem ... quid sic diligit essentialiter ut Amor procedens, non ut a quo procedit amor.

372 ST I, 39, 7 ad 2.
373 ST I, 37, 1 ad 4.
374 "Pater non solum Filium, sed etiam se et nos diligit Spiritu Sancto" ST I, 37, 2 ad 3.
375 ST I, 41, 1 ad 2; "in divinis non sit motus"; ST I, 42, 1 ad 3; "motus non sit in divinis" and ST I, 27, 1.
376 ST I, 42, 2 ad 3.
377 ST I, 2, 3 sed contra.
378 Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones de fide, Quaestiones Disputatae de fide et de cognitione, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scolastica Medii Aevi, 1 (2d ed.; Quaracchi, 1957), I, V, p. 133.
379 See for example J. de la Vaissière, "Le sens du mot 'verbe mental' dans les écrits de saint Thomas," Arch. de phil. 3 (1926)

380 See Richards, op. cit. The most important is Cyprien Vagaggini, "La hantise de 'rationes necessariae' de saint Anselm . . ." see n.II, 84 above.

381 *Verbum*, p. 196.

382 *De Potentia*, q.8, a.1 ad 2.

383 *ST I*, 27, 1.

384 *ST I*, 32, 1 ad 2.

385 Ibid.

386 *ST I*, 27 prol. and I, 44 prol. respectively.

387 *ST I*, 34, 2.

388 *ST I*, 45 prol.

389 *ST I*, 40, 1.

390 *ST I*, 45, 3.

391 *ST I*, 45, 6 ad 3.

392 *ST I*, 45, 6.

393 Ibid.

394 *ST I*, 30, 1.

395 *ST I*, 45, 4 ad 1 and corpus respectively.

396 *ST I*, 47 articuli 1 et 2.

397 See especially nn.II, 349 and 252.

398 *ST I*, 45 prol. The Latin is given in the text at n.388.

399 *ST I*, 44, 1. Among the sources for "Plato dixit" cited ad loc.
... Proclum, Inst. Theol., prop. V..."

400 ST I, 45, 5 ad 1.
401 ST I, 44 prol.
402 ST I, 2, 3.

404 In Physicorum II, xi, 241.
405 Physica II, 7, 198a 25.
406 In Metaphysicorum I, iv, 70.
407 In Meta. II, ii, 300.
408 In Meta. II, ii, 301.
410 See chapter III, C.
411 See chapter III, D.
412 In Meta. I, iv, 70 quoted in text at n.406 above.
413 ST I, 2, 3.
414 Ibid.
415 ScG I, 13 given in Latin in the text at n.259 above.

416 ST I, 44, 4 ad 4. An excuse must be added for terminating the treatment of creation two-thirds of the way through a section. The "de productione creaturarum" is divided:

primo quidem, quae sit prima causa entium; secundo, de modo procedendi creaturarum a prima causa; tertio vero, de principio durationis rerum (ST I, 44 prol.).

The third consideration corresponds to question forty-six. The reason a stop can be made at forty-five is that a beginning in time is not necessary to the notion of creation. Creation is "emanationem totius entis a causa universali, quae est Deus" (ST I, 45, 1). That
the emanation has a beginning in time is not known to reason but only to faith.

Dicendum quod mundum non semper fuisse, sola fide tenetur, et demonstrativa probari non potest, sicut et supra de mysterio Trinitatis dictum est (ST I, 46, 2). Once posited it can be made intelligible but it cannot strictly be demonstrated, since time does not enter into the "quod quid est", the universal knowledge of a thing through which demonstration takes place. Hence some who think the world aeternal speak of it as created:

Dicendum quod illi qui ponerent mundum aeternum, diceret mundum factum a Deo ex nihilo . . . Et sic etiam recusant aliqui creationis nomen, ut patet ex Avicenna in sua Metaph. (ST I, 46, 2 ad 2).
Part IV
Conclusion: Some Philosophical and Theological Implications

Briefly, these conclusions have emerged from our study of the structure of the first forty-five questions of the *Summa Theologicae*. The thought of St Thomas is not adequately understood from the perspective of a quasi-Heideggerian anti-modern ontological realism. Thomas is genuinely a mediaeval thinker poised between antiquity and modernity. His is not the unthought being discovered in a return to pre-Classical philosophic myth. Because subjectivity and being are so intimately unified in his thought, the transcendental Thomists expose some aspects of it unknown to the realists, but they miss the concreteness and objectivity of divine science in Thomas which remains hidden to existential eyes. Both contemporary schools are blind to the Neoplatonic origins and structure of his doctrine. When his great *Summa* is investigated with these in mind, it displays a comprehensiveness undiscovered by recent admirers of his synthesis. In this light one hopes that further reason for the study of him may have been provided. Yet, it must be admitted that the examination of the actual structure of the initial questions of the theological *Summa* also shows that St Thomas was not altogether successful at unifying the opposing tensions of his system nor did he find a form which could constructively resolve their warfare. Though his solution to the problem of the one and the many is not final, it is not clear, however, that there is any better answer by which it might be judged nor is anyone likely to deny that his was a magnificent attempt.

If we are not satisfied with the context in which Thomas' *Summa* has usually been presented over the last century, and if we claim
some theological and philosophical relevance for him, we are obliged to provide at least a sketch of what can be said for and against his system from our alternative standpoint. Our principle revision of the standard contemporary account of Thomas' work is to have placed his Aristotelianism within the context of the ongoing development of Neoplatonism, pagan and Christian. This entailed distinguishing between the Neoplatonic schools which influenced him and the diverse Christian philosophic and spiritual traditions related to them. Some implications of this recasting of the framework of his thought are now to be examined.

The most general consequence is a revision of the notion of Hellenism and Platonism with which contemporary Christian theologians often work. It is wrong to identify Hellenic philosophy with Plato, nor is Neoplatonism simply a following of him or even the Hellenic alternatives to him. As A.H. Armstrong has written: "certainly nobody who knew the Enneads would insult Plotinus himself by calling his interpretation of Plato 'scholarly'." Sir Richard Southern has shown that the Platonism of the High Middle Ages actually involved a turning away from interest in the works of Plato himself. Certainly when Aquinas cites Plato neither the words nor the doctrine are often to be found in a Platonic Dialogue. The Neoplatonisms investigated in looking for the sources of Aquinas have opposing spiritual and philosophic directions. The essence of Neoplatonism -- if it exists -- is not to be captured by citing texts of Plato; certainly it will escape if the tradition of their varied interpretation is not added. Neoplatonism is not a single one-sided dogmatism to which philosophies recognizing plurality, change and experience must be opposed. Nor can one set against it religious life and its recognition of faith and feeling, scriptural and traditional authority,
celebration, ascetic practice and sacramental union. It is a
dynamic tradition constituting in its varied forms the greater part
of the history of philosophy.

Neither can a Christianity accepting the authority of the
Scriptures and tradition absolutely oppose itself to Hellenistic
Platonism. It is not accidental that a considerable part of the
Scriptures was written in Greek. The Judaism of the time of Jesus de­
finined itself in and against its Hellenistic setting and was profoundly
affected by it. The adoption of the modes of thought of the Hellen­
istic schools and of Neoplatonism as their greatest synthetic product
was not simply an apologetic device of Christians. Doctrine and the
formal statement of it became essential to Christianity. Nor have
the Christian theologians, unlike the followers of Mohammed, proved
able to terminate their association with philosophy, the thinking
the Greeks invented. Indeed the theologies of the Church are fated
to correspond roughly and generally to the world's philosophies.
Contemporary Thomism misunderstood Thomas partly because it did not
appreciate the difference between the existentialism it assumed and
the Neoplatonized Aristotle Thomas found philosophically authorita-
tive.

A result of our study is that we have come to appreciate how
deply Hellenistic and Christian forms are enmeshed. Oppositions
set up between Christian doctrine and paganism turn out to correspond
to oppositions within the tradition the Greeks initiated. Some of
these have been mentioned already, e.g., reason and tradition, rea­
son and the union before and beyond ratio. As Tertullian's warfare
between Athens and Jerusalem was at least in part a struggle between
the Stoa and the Platonists, so the antagonism between Augustinian
spirituality and Aristotelian science was also assimilated in part
to a difference between two Christian Neoplatonic traditions and such a division between Neoplatonic schools was the real origin of the strife invented between the existential ontology of Exodus and Greek essentialism. A consciousness of this should make us aware of the degree to which the historical dynamic of Christian theology conforms to that of philosophy. Indeed the life and differences of the pagan schools are carried on in one form or another by the Christian theologians after Christians closed the academies. History substantiates that unity of the two theologies, scriptural and philosophical, in which Aquinas believed and which is essential to his theological practice. They are both aspects of one thinking which is both human and divine or alternatively they are two forms of revelation. It continually turns out that any other course than this broad ecumenical way is not the limitation of revelation to Scripture but making revelation theologically incomprehensible. Of course, as a result of its intimate connection with the Hellenic tradition, Christianity must share its fate. Because Thomists accepted much of the Heideggerian account of the nemesis of the forgetting of Being for which Plato was held responsible, and which had become the destiny of Western philosophy and theology together with the practice founded upon it, they struggled to enable Thomas to escape Heidegger's net. If our account be accepted, a more complete answer to Heidegger is required.

The theology of St Thomas is to be judged as a part of this tradition of philosophic theology. The escape routes are closed. Thomas did not anticipate the logic of modern science, nor is his system founded on a specific Biblical revelation of being to which only he was adequately sensitive and which made his doctrine true no matter what science or philosophy might say. Nor yet does he
squeeze through an opening he has made for contemporary existential man turning from intellectual form and encompassing system to the world, nature and historical contingency. The knowledge of all things in a God best understood through Platonic self-subsistent forms, no matter how greatly modified, is not so direct for Thomas as for the Augustinians but it is nonetheless his whole aim; this knowledge is the conclusion of philosophy and the beginning of theology and his *Summa* is throughout their meeting. If Thomas cannot escape the Hellenistic tradition, or even the Middle Ages, those who would defend him must support also the tradition to which he belongs. They cannot turn him against his colleagues in hope of giving him the sole benefit. Nonetheless his captivity may be turned in his favour. He need no longer bear the whole burden of Christian philosophy alone.

Instead, together with his predecessors and successors, he is to be evaluated as a great contributor to a theological tradition endeavouring, and evidently to some degree succeeding, in solving the problem of the one and the many in all its diverse forms. Infinite and finite, abstract and concrete, spirit and matter, intuition and reason, reason and sense and so on are reconciled. He and his Christian coworkers are faced with divisions between creator and created, nature and grace, for example, which, though they have their pagan analogues, are more severe than those confronting theologians who did not accept the Judaeo-Christian revelation. Moreover, it is clear that his high place among his fellows in the thirteenth century derives from the depth of his understanding of the contrarieties and tensions present for theology and his construction of a unity from them. As we have seen, these tensions are represented in the Neoplatonic and Aristotelian directions of his thought, or put another way the Platonic and Aristotelian directions of his Neo-
platonism, or perhaps best, the Hellenistic and Hellenic directions of his Christianity. But this comprehensiveness has its costs. Our analysis has discovered incoherences in his system. While denying of God the mode of the finite, Thomas holds that proper predications are made of him. He affirms that his acts are all one in his simplicity and yet distinguishes them as diverse forms of self-relation. God's trinitarian distinction is rationally derived in an intelligible sequence in the *Summa Theologiae* and yet denied to be so. These and many more difficulties arise from his attempt to draw together the one and the many in the manner they appeared to him. The manifold problems of his predecessors remain imperfectly resolved in his system. His denial of the mode of the finite to the infinite, so destructive for maintaining real knowledge of God, stems from his feeling with the Platonists against Aristotle that in identifying God with the activity of *OVf* so as to make him the intelligible source of nature, the principle is in danger of being reduced to the division of the finite. His contrary elevation of the self-related activity of being into the simplicity of God has its source in Thomas' equal appreciation of Aristotle's criticism of Plato, that if the first principle is only an empty abstract unity the cause of division falls outside it and the Good is not the complete end and perfect cause of reality but God is only one of the principles. Similarly he would finish the transformation of the Neoplatonic hypostases into predicates of God's being which Dionysius began but did not complete. This work of Dionysius Thomas understands anachronistically, yet with profound philosophical sense, to belong to what he calls the Areopagite's following of Aristotle. But this is just the problem of how the real plurality of predicates can be affirmed and this division of simplicity denied. Is it not better
to throw over this whole confused tangle? Or are we so inescapably enmeshed in it that, like Aquinas, we have no choice but to make the best of it?

One might begin making some decision about this by looking at the dissolution of Thomas’ edifice. As compared with his mediaeval predecessors, Aquinas makes a sharper distinction between faith and reason than they. Gone for example are the "rationes necessariae" of Anselm’s reasonings about the Trinity and incarnation. The three subsistences in the one essence are not discoverable to the theology which is a part of philosophy. The same kind of difference is made in respect to method.

For Adelard of Bath the way up and the way down, which as for Thomas must be united to produce true thinking, both belonged to reason. They were the differing directions of the thought of Aristotle and Plato respectively. In his De Eodem et Diverso, written in the first decade of the twelfth century, he writes:

Unus eorum [in margine minio ascriptum Plato] mentis altitudine elatus pennisque, quas sibi induit obnixe nисus, ab ipsis initiis res cognoscere aggressus est, et quid essent, antequam in corpora prodirent, expressit, archetypas rerum formas, dum sibi loquitur definiens. Alter autem artificialiter callens [in margine ascriptum Aristoteles], ut lectores complices facultate instrueret, a sensibilibus et compositis orsus est. Dumque sibi eodem in itinere obuiant, contrarii dicendii non sunt. Amat enim et compositio divisionem et division et compositionem, dum utramque alteri fidem facit. Unde si quid in digitis et articulis abacii numeralibus ex multiplicatione creuerit, id utrum recte processerit divisione eiusdem summae probatur.

For Thomas on the contrary, the difference between Plato and Aristotle is not in their points of departure. Because of his nature man must necessarily begin with the things of sense. The opposition is instead in the mode of existence they ascribe to the forms of natural things. Making them separate in reality, Plato errs; though the fates compensate him, for Thomas thinks him a safer man to
follow than Aristotle on certain questions respecting the existence of the angelic separate substances. In any case, natural man cannot begin from the knowledge of these or of God. The natural and the scriptural theologies form the unity of divine science but it is the proper privilege of sacred doctrine to begin from the self-revelation of separated substance recorded in the canonical books. Man's soul, altogether descended into the temporal and sensible world and adapted to the knowledge of it and of himself through it, is certainly not naturally able to commence with the knowledge possessed by God and the blessed. But Thomas' way of uniting the content and distinguishing the starting points and directions of the theologies is fragile and scarcely survives him.

We have already seen that John Duns Scotus does not hold that the way up from sensible existents is capable of arriving at a true knowledge of God. But it is not just the theological views of his successors which must have prevented them from following Aquinas; their increased historical knowledge must also have affected their opinions. St Thomas could not have read the Elements of Theology by Proclus until 1268 when William of Moerbeke finished the translation Aquinas used when commenting on the Liber de Causis. If current scholarly opinion is correct, the treatises de deo of his various works, including that of the Summa Theologiae, were already completed by then. What he found in the Elements was a work clearly written by a pagan and beginning theologically with the One. This is the opposite order to that found in the Philosopher's Metaphysics and is not clearly preserved in the Liber de Causis, which for most of his life Aquinas ascribed to Aristotle. Of course Thomas could explain away this discrepancy between fact and theory by means of the distinction between the via inventionis and the ordo disciplinae
and certainly Proclus and Thomas are in fundamental accord about the place of the human soul, but still questions must have occurred to him.

The next generation had no escape. The Elements was known to them, they thought proofs depending on the physical inappropriate to theology and they felt the need to distinguish what Christians knew from what natural man could attain. So they separated the theology which is a part of philosophy from that based on the Scriptures not by their different starting points, but because the first treats the nature of things in relation to the First Principle "secundum ordinem providentie naturalis", the second, "secundum ordinem voluntarie providentie." According to Ulrich of Strasbourg, the second is "more fully manifest in supernatural works such as miracles, the distribution of grace and virtues ..." Thus the unity of natural and gracious theology comes to be broken. Adelard of Bath's reconciliation of the upward and downward movements of knowledge could not satisfy Aquinas because faith was more than the preliminary form of reason. For the successors of Thomas, philosophy once again contained both motions but the contrary directions no longer sufficed to distinguish Christian from pagan theology and we pass to a fundamental separation between the character of their contents.

Reflection on the historical error made by Thomas can however enable an insight into what necessitates the theological unification of the two directions of thought. We may perhaps bridge again the chasm opening between the two theologies after Thomas though not exactly on his terms. The alternative to this cleavage is that the one, or put another way, the ground of the unity of the phenomenal, which is also the source of our knowing it as unified, i.e., of our having experience, be recognized equally with the phenomenal flux as a philosophical starting point. Thomas acknowledges the necessity of
both beginnings but divides them between philosophical and scriptural theology. Modern philosophy connects them. This appears in the discovery of the necessity of the categories and their unity for experience and its rationality. This is the argument of Kant's first Critique. For Descartes, the certainty of knowledge takes a more mediaeval form in that it depends upon the consciousness of the unity of the human soul with God, a unity really, if not apparently, prior to its experience of itself in the world.\textsuperscript{22} The history of modern philosophy can be written in terms of the adoption by rationalists and empiricists of one of the two starting points, the sense experience of nature or the rational knowledge of God and the soul. Contemporary philosophy in so far as it commences with language admits that some sort of grammatical structure and unity is the condition of any human experience. Seen in this way Thomas' theological Neoplatonism has a philosophical justification and a rational inescapability in his historical circumstances. Can it also be given a theological vindication?

The inadequacy of Classical Hellenic philosophy from the perspective of the Hellenistic Neoplatonists is just that it fails to subordinate everything to an absolute ruling unity. But this is also what Christianity finds inadequate in the religion of the Hellenic world: this is its idolatry. Among the Neoplatonists, the criticism is primarily of Aristotle and the impossibility for knowing, with its self-division, to be the first principle but, it also took the form of reducing the independence of his various sciences, drawing them into one system. While Plato was turned against Aristotle in this critical process, he also was subjected to an unconscious criticism in the same direction when their view of him became explicit in Iamblichus' systematizing of the Dialogues.\textsuperscript{23}
Augustine and other Christian Platonists are at one with this spiritualizing direction of pagan Platonism. Where they think themselves to divide is on the enfleshment of the Word. Indeed, it is the same later Neoplatonists who feel a strong need for the sensuous and cultic who are most polemically anti-Christian. But this movement toward the world is both a philosophic need for later Platonism and a permanent religious necessity for Christians. The human soul entirely descended into the temporal world and conscious of its weakness and sin -- the human soul of Iamblichus, Proclus and their followers -- needs grace mediated through the sensible world to ascend again. As E.R. Dodds has shown, the situations of pagan and Christian theologians are strictly parallel.

It is through these later Neoplatonic philosophical forms that the Christians can find the means of thinking their religion. It is this which makes the return towards the more concrete philosophy of Aristotle a philosophical movement of late Neoplatonism with which Boethius, Eriugena, Anselm and Aquinas will identify and carry forward when the pagan schools are closed. Once again what is Neoplatonic in Thomas is seen to be necessary just as its correction is also required. Both the Neoplatonic and Aristotelian beginnings remain necessary for us if we continue to be both philosophers and Christians. Having suggested then that Thomas' problems are still our own difficulties, though no doubt in different forms, and that we are also enmeshed in the same toils, we ought to explore these in a little more detail. As the Elements of Theology of Proclus has throughout appeared as the system most useful for explaining the origins of theological structure in Aquinas, its problems may illumine his.

Earlier, Dr James Lowry exposed the two contrary logics of the
Elements: the logic of the infinite which gives the system its structure as unity and the logic of the finite which gives it its structure as exit and return. Dr Lowry goes on to say that the interrelation of the movement of the total work as "form with its content as informed brings to light a tension . . . between its principles and what is principled." It has been a chief aim of our analysis of the first forty-five questions of the Summa Theologiae to show how the Proclan logic of the finite has penetrated the infinite in Thomas' work. Thus, although there is an ordering of the divine names in the de deo of the Summa so that the more unified are higher, the principle and the principled are not so greatly in danger of falling apart as in Proclus. Consequently, the problems Dr Lowry finds in the Elements do not occur to the same degree, or at least not in the same way, in the Summa.

The unification by Thomas of the principle of division, being, with the One, or put alternatively, the simplification of being, is both the first priority in Thomas' Summa and the primary form of the identification of God with what returns upon itself. It is the division between these in Proclus which allows the hypostasizing of what are in Thomas attributes: "putting attributes and subjects of attributes on the same level." Consequently the problems of the relation of the henads and being do not recur for Thomas. In Proclus being as an hypostasis belongs below the henads; but because they are multiple, it is also a principle of them. The ground of the solution of this problem was worked out for Thomas by Dionysius in turning the hypostases into attributes. Thomas develops its implications by bringing the division of being as self-relation or return into the divine unity. At all levels both those within God -- his essence, operations and personal procession -- and that
outside it, creation, God is self-related spirit. As we saw this common form enables Thomas to tie the *Summa* together.

A difficulty like that which emerged in the relation of being and the henads for Proclus occurs in the ordering to each other of being, life and thought. Dr Lowry sets it out as follows:

The hierarchical orders of the *henads* of Being are the henads, intelligences, souls, and bodies. All of them are existent. But life and thought are what determine the further differences. It would seem naturally that since all four orders have existence the attributive hierarchy would be unity, thinking, life, and being. But Proclus does not allow this attributive hierarchy. He rather maintains that while unity is first, being is second, life third, and thought fourth. The two orders have different reasons. As more general and abstract, being is higher and life is next. But when in Proclus the relation of reality to motion is considered, the sequence is the One, henads, intelligences, souls and bodies. Evidently there is a problem in reconciling these. This time there is a similar difficulty for Thomas shown when he orders the names of God differently depending on whether we are thinking of them absolutely, in which case being is highest, or causally according to which good is the first divine name. The dilemma manifests itself more intensely in Proclus because of his hypostasizing of these abstractions but then the shadows of this are still present in Thomas' distinction between the kinds of attributes and his ordering of them from the essential, through the operational to the personal. Thomas' corrective is twofold. Besides the reduction of the hypostases to attributes, he chooses the Aristotelian order in which the most completely actual is highest. He makes God the possessor of beatific life because he is thinking. Here at any rate the more concrete is prior. It cannot then be said of Thomas as of Proclus that:

being as hypostatical ground is reduced below that which it comprehends. In like manner life and thought are also reduced below that which they comprehend or to abstraction.
James Lowry holds with St Thomas that the error of Proclus is to have made the "principle of quantity" highest. Whether or not this is so, there is certainly an inadequacy between form and content in this part of the Elements.

Dr Lowry thinks that the inadequacy of the principle to the principled in Neoplatonism has this result:

since philosophy cannot explain what is beyond it an intuitive extra logical leap must render the unexplainable explained. And so, "its adherents place religion above philosophy." If, however, thought were truly elevated to the principle and was able to know it thus solving the fundamental problem, then:

the result would be to show that the triad of $\mathfrak{h}$, $\mathfrak{g}$, and $\mathfrak{l}$ is the structure of the One as $\mathfrak{m}$, $\mathfrak{n}$, and $\mathfrak{o}$. This result would be to reverse their hierarchical order from the priority of $\mathfrak{h}$ to the priority of $\mathfrak{l}$, but this no longer in a linear way but circularly. That is, $\mathfrak{l}$ would be seen as existing and as the totality of life in its productive activity of thinking itself -- as producing a world which is its own activity. Such a principle would be able to allow for the triadic principles of the Proclean philosophy since its own activity as $\mathfrak{l}$ would in fact be that of subject and object as self-consciously the same. And in allowing for the principles of the Proclean philosophy, it would be completing in pure philosophical form the entire history of Greek philosophy in general and of Neoplatonism in particular.

Judged by this Aristotelian-Hegelian standard, the verdict for St Thomas is ambiguous. Certainly the logic of the infinite and that of the finite are united in the Godhead, linear and circular are joined and his philosophy can be given an idealist interpretation because of the unity of the divine thinking and being. On the other side, faith stands above reason in via and the philosophical rationality within the theological structure cannot be completely realized. The inequality between simplicity and plurality has this result. As well, it produces the ambiguities about the knowability of God, the propriety of any predication and the significance of
different predicates, and it leads to the division between the character of our approach to the unity of God and to his trinitarian personality. Because division or composition is the mark of the finite distinguishing it from the simple God, Thomas is unable to integrate it fully into his theology proper. Yet without it and without incorporating the logic and structure of the world into divinity, the different levels of his spiritual universe would collapse into each other, the whole mediaeval system of religious mediation would break down, and ultimately how there is any revelation of God would become incomprehensible. In attacking the angelology of Aquinas Karl Rahner is looking for a Catholic theology not so tied as Thomas' is to a Neoplatonic system of emanation. Because Thomas cannot think how the finite as division is capable of being fully taken into God, he is forced, like all Neoplatonists, to confess him to be hidden by what reveals him. God is manifest in what by its composition is by nature opposed to the absolutely first; all reality subsequent to the One must fail to disclose its inmost reality. There is certainly a movement in the form of his dilemma from Proclus to Thomas, and the direction is toward the more positive knowledge of God but the inner dilemma is not resolved. Part of the change within this specific historical sequence appears when Dionysius somewhat ambiguously transforms the hypostases into attributes. But the Neoplatonism of Dionysius and Eriugena dictates that the predicates belong properly to the creatures from which they are borrowed and only causally and metaphorically to God. There is again a development from Dionysius to Thomas in attributing the names properly and affirmatively to the very being of God. Yet, how this can be so remains incomprehensible because the division inherent in predication is external to the Neoplatonic simplicity of the divine. Consequently,
that through which God is revealed remains outside him in the last analysis and human intellect is appropriated to the angels; men only participate in it.\(^{35}\) Irreconcilably uniting Aristotelian science with Neoplatonic systematic theology, Aristotle's complete noetic activity with the One of Proclus, Aquinas may appear as contradictory as he seems comprehensive. For an existentialist like Fr Rahner, Thomas is at once too idealist in endeavouring a knowledge of God in himself and not in the world and equally too attached to those mediatorial structures which prevent man being simultaneously both immediately transcendent toward God and in the world. A rationalistic Hegelian like Dr Lowry criticises the Neoplatonism which prevents the full transformation of faith into reason. A contemporary Calvinist blames him for rending the seamless garment of faith and reason woven by the earlier mediaeval theologians and releasing independent secularity into the world.\(^{36}\) No doubt these opposed critical stances are not equally well founded but they indicate the degree of unresolved contrariety in the system of Aquinas. Thomas' Neoplatonism can be defended; philosophical, theological and historical reasons compel it. But the comprehensiveness of these systems is equally essential to them and impossible for them. The demand that the One be manifest as universal principle, which its nature as absolutely first requires, cannot be satisfied if the principle is undivided simplicity. The dynamism and comprehensiveness of the tradition is magnificently displayed in Thomas' development and correction of it but eventual shipwreck also seems inevitable.

However nothing brings out the virtues of the old Platonic tradition like its contemporary alternatives. Process theology has been made the standard from which Thomas' emphasis on God's simplicity has been judged and found wanting. But both the historical and theo-
logical aspects of this endeavour seem inadequate to the task. B.Z.
Cooper's *The Idea of God, A Whiteheadian Critique of St. Thomas Aquinas' Concept of God* fails to examine the structural complexity of Thomas' thought and to take into account the diversity and movement in the Hellenic and Hellenistic traditions. They are represented as a dogmatic assertion that static simplicity is the divine -- if this were so there would be no hypostases save the One, or in Thomas' alternative, no return of God upon himself. The account is feebly supported on a one-sided interpretation of a few texts of Plato; Aristotle and the Hellenistic developments are ignored.

Theologically and philosophically the position of Dr Cooper seems to amount to the demand that certain aspects of the moral, ontological and cognitional structures of finitude be absolutized just as they are. As we have seen, Thomas is more willing than his philosophical fathers to go a considerable distance in understanding the divine through the structures of finite reality, but he remains conscious of the difference. His failure to go further is not simply to be laid at the door of his Platonism; it is from it that a motion is found which he takes into the inmost being of God. Thomas' construction has its incoherence but it is not clear that the Whiteheadian alternative as presented by Dr Cooper is more than a radical anthropomorphism destructive of divinity, a *Götterdämmerung*. There is, however, a more positive side to these process and dialectical theologies, namely their capacity to give meaning to the eschatological character of the Christian religion. But this is an area in which the Neoplatonic theologies with their emphasis on the return into God are naturally strong -- unless, of course, it be insisted that the heavenly kingdom take a Marxist form. And so even here Thomas may be thought to understand at least as well as our contemporaries
the philosophical necessities for the power of God over the future. It is the particular genius of the Proclan Neoplatonism, as compared with its Plotinian alternative, to articulate what in the ἀπόθεωσις and its principle is necessary for the perfection of the return. This is the very purpose of Thomas' insistence on the absolute perfection of the divine and his freedom ad extra which is found so objectionable. Indeed the inadequacy and contingency of the created as compared with the infinite potentiality of God belongs equally to this conception. For God's freedom and omnipotence are exalted so as to be able to draw all things into their end. It is sophistical in reason and unjust in practice to demand the result if the means are not provided and St Thomas maintains that even God is bound by the necessity to will the means if he wills the end.

It is because the contemporary alternatives seem so one-sided and are not more evidently solutions to the problems which Thomas faced and partly solved that we return to him and to the tradition of theology and philosophy in which his Summa Theologiae appears: theology as the science of the first principle and this as the total knowledge of reality in its unity. Thomas' conception of this was even wider than that of his predecessors and the polarities perhaps more strongly opposed and differentiated than ever before. Nonetheless, against all this he endeavours to draw everything together into one system under one divine thinking in which, by God's generosity we are participants. Philosophically and theologically the present time may almost be defined by its turning away from this high enterprise. Its rejection is more directly of the Hegelian philosophy which attempted to unite even more widely opposed and developed elements. In Hegel's world political freedom, natural science, historical conscious and science, secular philosophy and the idea of Christianity
as supernatural revelation had all grown stronger and more independent of each other than in Thomas' time. These divisions were embodied in the institutions of modernity. Partly the revival of Thomism occurred in reaction against this modernity, and even specifically against Hegel. Pope Leo hoped for a resolution of the destructive conflicts of his world which did not go so far as Hegel went in recognizing the forms of modern freedom and the autonomy of different aspects of human endeavour this freedom demanded and so also would not require as total a speculative rationality as Hegel's in order to unite them. The aim of the Thomist revival was to promote a modern Christianity more directly under the authority of the Church than Hegel would allow.

Within the Church this Thomism has collapsed both theoretically and practically. But may not Thomas have another contemporary calling than as warrior against modern freedom? Might it not be better that those who appreciate his enormous accomplishment make common cause against those who give up or oppose the work of synthetic reason, the labour of constructing a summa? The common aim would be a theological activity which was not a movement from one dogmatically asserted partial position after another and to provide the basis of a rigorously intellectual ecumenism in the broadest sense. It would have to show again that there can be no philosophy or theology without a science of first principles and none which does not seek the unity of the opposed and divided. No doubt the task is more than human but in attempting it we would become again the heirs of Aristotle and Plato, their Neoplatonic critics and adaptors and the Christian theology which once felt itself elevated by standing on the shoulders of these giants.
Part IV: Notes

1 An early version of this Part entitled "A Vindication of St Thomas Aquinas as an Hellenic Theologian" was presented as a paper to the Seventh Annual Sewanee Mediaeval Colloquium, April, 1980, University of the South, Tennessee and as lectures for the Harvard Divinity School and the Philosophy Department of the Memorial University of Newfoundland.

2 "The Background of the Doctrine 'That the Intelligibles are not Outside the Intellect', p. 394.

3 Platonism, scholastic method, and the School of Chartres.

4 "There was available to the Latin West in the thirteenth century only three works of Plato -- the Meno, the Phaedo and the Timaeus. It is certain that Saint Thomas did not use either the Meno or the Phaedo and there is no convincing evidence that he was directly acquainted with either Cicero's or Chalcidius' translations of the Timaeus. His knowledge of Plato and Platonism came therefore, certainly for the most part, from other sources." R.J. Henle, Saint Thomas and Platonism, pp. xxii-xxiii.

5 See Part I and chapter II, D above.

6 See especially nn. I, 111 and III, 32.

7 See Part I.

8 See chapters II, D and III, E on creation and grace in pagan philosophy. I do not accept, nor would St Thomas recognize, the sharp oppositions established by many Thomists and other modern scholars between the pagan Greek and the Christian understandings of God and his power to make the world. I do not take Aristotle to represent God as closed up in his own self-knowledge unable to know the world and so not the source of its being or its effective good but only the origin of modifications in it. The texts in Metaphysics seem sufficient but useful discussions are found in J. Maritain, "Marginal Notes on Aristotle," Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism, pp. 349-377 and J.P. Atherton, "The Validity of Thomas' Interpretation of NOHIS, NONSENS", Atti del Congresso Internazionale Tommaso d'Aquino nel suo settimo centenario, 8 vol., I (Napoli, 1976), pp. 156-162. Both defend Aquinas' interpretation of Aristotle on these points.

9 See chapter III, B.

10 See chapter III, C.
11 See chapter III, D.

12 See Metaphysics, 6 987b 19ff.; for Thomas see n.29 below.

13 See nn. II, 350 and III, 68 above. Throughout his exposition of the Liber de Causis Thomas associates Dionysius and Aristotle in this reduction; see for example In de Causis, Prop. 3, p. 23, 21-24, 17; Prop. 18, p. 103, 16-23. Modern scholarship assigns the step to Dionysius, see S. Gersh, From Iamblichus to Eriugena, p. 11 and A.H. Armstrong, "Negative Theology, Myth and Incarnation," n.19.

14 See chapters II, B and III, D.


16 See n.I, 111 and chapter II, C especially n.106 and chapter III, A above.

17 In the first five chapters of De Substantiis Separatis, Thomas compares and contrasts the positions of Plato and Aristotle. On the side of Aristotle he says:

\[ \text{Et ideo Aristoteles manifestiori et certiori via processit ad investigandum substantias a materia separatas, scilicet per viam motus (cap. II, p. D44, 10-13).} \]

But if proceeding from the moving sensible is more accessible and certain the dependence of the result upon this procedure is a considerable limitation of it and so Plato in some respects does better than Aristotle by using a different method.

\[ \text{Haec autem Aristotelis positio certior quidem videtur, eo quod non multum recedit ab his quae sunt manifesta secundum sensum, tamen minus sufficiens Platonis posita (cap. II, p. D45, 97-100).} \]

Aristotle's worst error is tying the number of the angels to the number of heavenly motions. Thomas reprovces him at ST I, 30, 3, where he approves what dicit Dionysius, XIV cap De Cael Hier.: "Multi sunt beati exercitus supernarum, mentium infirmam et constrictam excedentes nostrorum materialium numerorum commensurationem."

18 See chapter III, B especially n.126.

19 See nn.I, 173 and II, 256.

20 Attributed to Theodericus de Vriberch, De subiecto theologiae, Appendix II, of Bertoldo di Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem Theologiam Procli, ed. L. Sturlese, p. xci.
21 Ulrich de Strasbourg, La "Summa de Bono", Livre I, 1, 2, 2, p. 32: the text reads "plenius manifestet in operibus supernaturalis, sicut sunt miracula, distributiones gratie et virtutem" and goes on "et in institutione preceptorum et in efficacia sacramentorum."

22 See Descartes, Méditationes, in Oeuvres et lettres, textes présentés par A. Bridoux, 2 vol., Bibliothèque de la Pléïade, 40, II (Paris, 1963). In the second meditation the "je pense" and its self-certainty seemed primary but, in Méditation troisième, Descartes recognizes his finitude by reflecting that he began with doubt, a doubt judged by a certainty it sought. Since, "ce qui est plus parfait... ne peut être une suite et une dépendence du moins parfait" (p. 290), it follows that he must in fact know God first and himself after.

Et je me dois pas imaginer que je ne conçois pas l'infini par une véritable idée, mais seulement par la négation de ce qui est fini... j'ai en quelque façon premièrement en moi la notion de l'infini, que du fini, c'est-à-dire de Dieu, que de moi-même (p. 294).

Hobbes and Hume say exactly the opposite about the relation of the conception of the finite to the infinite.

23 See chapters III, B and II, D above.

24 See Augustine, Confessions, VII, 11ff.


27 Ibid., pp. 83-84; the comparable doctrines of St Thomas are discussed in chapters II, D, III, B and C above.

28 Ibid., p. 86.

29 Ibid., p. 84. For Thomas on the idea of unity among the Platonists there is In Metaphysicorum I, x, 159, p. 47:

Unde cum unum opinaretur esse substantiam entis, quia non distinguebat inter unum quod est principium numeri, et unum quod convertitur cum ente.

See also ibid. I, x, 160, p. 47. At ibid. XII, vii, 2525, p. 591, Thomas writes

Et ne videatur incidere in opinionem Platonis, qui
posuit primum principium rerum ipsum unum intelligibile, ostendit consequenter differentiam inter unum et simplex; et dicit quod unum et simplex non idem significant, sed unum significat mensuram . . . simplex autem significat dispositionem . . .

There is also ST I, 30, 3 and I, 11 passim.


31. Ibid., pp. 91-92.

32. The use of an Hegelian standard for judging St Thomas is not so arbitrary as might first appear. S. Gersh finds it appropriate for evaluating Dionysius in just that respect in which he is one with Thomas. In From Iamblichus to Eriugena, p. 3, he writes of Dionysius:

both preserves the externally cognitative emanation theory of the pagan Neoplatonists and anticipates the Eriugenian immanently self-differentiating Godhead, he stands mid-way, in effect, between Spinoza and Hegel.

Moltmann, The Trinity, pp. 16ff. locates Thomas in an historical, philosophical theological continuum moving toward Hegelian absolute subjectivity. Idealist interpretations are to be found in P. Roussellot, L'intellectualisme de saint Thomas (2d ed.; Paris, 1924) and J.N. Findlay, Plato, The Written and Unwritten Doctrines, pp. 393-395; see also D. Bradley, "Rahner's Spirit in the World: Aquinas or Hegel?" and Part I above. C. van Riet, "Le problème de Dieu chez Hegel," Doctor Communis, Acta VI Congressus Thomisticorum Internationalis (Roma, 1965), pp. 205-213 is sympathetic but in general Hegel was hated as the presiding devil of modern spirituality from whose cauldron poured forth the worst excesses of subjective philosophy and self-certain secular freedom. A good survey of Thomist attitudes is found in G.A. McCool, "Twentieth Century Scholasticism" and J. Macquarrie, Twentieth Century Religious Thought, pp. 254-256, 279, 288, 392 show how the various realisms of our time have this anti-Hegelianism in common. Heidegger was in fact chosen against Hegel. Compare the articles in the section on Hegelian and Marxist Dialectic with those on existentialism in Sapientia Aquinatis, Communicationes IV Congressus Thomisticorum Internationalis (Roma, 1955) and see C. Fabro, Participation et causalité, pp. 635-636; idem, "Le retour au fondement de l'être"; W. Luigpen, "Heidegger and the "Affirmation of God"", Doctor Communis, p. 303.

33. See chapters III, B, C and D above.


Similarly, the problem of the nature of the angels as "higher" than that of man was affirmed in a way that took for granted too readily and indiscriminately neo-Platonic conceptions of scales and degrees. For it must not be overlooked that the intellectual nature of man cannot be so easily characterized as inferior
to that of the angels. That nature possesses absolute transcendence . . . (p. 29).

35 See n. II, 268 above.


38 It is remarkable how even very sophisticated treatments of the Hellenic and Hellenistic worlds (a description not to be extended to include Dr Cooper's work) ignore the special character of Aristotle's philosophy, including his criticism of Plato precisely in what these moderns find Hellenism lacking, and interpret Plato one-sidedly. See for example C.N. Cochrane, Christianity and Classical Culture: A Study of Thought and Action Augustus to Augustine (Oxford, 1944). For Professor Cochrane Aristotle is identified with Plato on the relation of form and matter and so the changing and the substantial and stable are separate worlds (pp. 81 and 225ff.). Professor G.C. Stead's paper "The Concept of Mind and the Concept of God," as presented to the Eighth International Conference on Patristic Studies (Oxford, 1979) is subject to similar limitations. The development of historiography by the Greeks and the essential role history plays for Aristotle in finding his scientific objects and the principles of them (see especially the De Anima, the Physics, the Metaphysics and differently, the Politics) becomes incomprehensive when his philosophy is viewed in this way. His notion of substance and activity are taken to exclude change and historical connection in R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford, 1946), pp. 20-21 and 42-45 -- see Leo Strauss, "On Collingwood's Philosophy of History," The Review of Metaphysics, 5 (1952), 559-586. This understanding of Greek thought as anti-historical belongs together with a Christian "new orthodoxy" exemplified in theologians like K. Lowith and Reinhold Neibuhr who set up a polemical opposition between Greek pagan and Christian ideas of time. On this "new orthodoxy" see W.W. Wagar, "Modern Views of the Idea of Progress," The Journal of the History of Ideas, 28 (1967), 55-70.

39 See chapters II, C and D and III, A.

40 My interpretation of Hegel conforms most nearly to that presented by E. Fackenheim, The Religious Dimension of Hegel's Thought (Bloomington, Indiana, 1967).

41 See n. 32 above.
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ADDENDA
