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### 3. Andronicus of Rhodes

[T1] **A Strabo, *Geographica* 14.2.13.**

Ἄνδρες δ' ἐγένοντο μνήμης ἄξιοι πολλοὶ στρατηλάται τε καὶ ἀθληταί, ὧν εἰσι καὶ οἱ Παναιτίου τοῦ φιλοσόφου πρόγονοι· τῶν δὲ πολιτικῶν καὶ τῶν περὶ λόγους καὶ φιλοσοφίαν ὅ τε Παναιτίος αὐτὸς καὶ Στρατοκλῆς καὶ Ἀνδρόνικος ὁ ἐκ τῶν περιπάτων καὶ Λεωνίδης ὁ στωικός...

Many men worthy of remembering, military commanders and athletes, were born [on Rhodes]. Among them are the forebears of Panaitios the philosopher. Among the statesmen and those specialising in rhetoric and philosophy are Panaitios himself; Stratokles; Andronikos the Peripatetic; and Leonides the Stoic.

[T2] **A Strabo, *Geographica* 13.1.54**

Ἐκ δὲ τῆς Σκήψεως οἱ τε Σωκρατικοὶ γέγονασιν Ἐραστος καὶ Κορίσκος καὶ ὁ τοῦ Κορίσκου υἱὸς Νηλεὺς, ἀνὴρ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλους ἠεροαμένος καὶ Θεοφράστου, διαδεδεγμένος δὲ τὴν βιβλιοθήκην τοῦ Θεοφράστου, ἐν ἧ ἦν καὶ ἡ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους· ὁ γοῦν Ἀριστοτέλης τὴν ἑαυτοῦ Θεοφράστου παρέδωκεν, ὥπερ καὶ τὴν σχολὴν ἀπέλιπε, πρῶτος ὧν ἴσμεν συναγαγῶν βιβλία καὶ διδάξας τοὺς ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ βασιλέας βιβλιοθήκης σύνταξιν. Θεόφραστος δὲ Νηλεῖ παρέδωκεν· ὁ δ' εἰς Σκήψιν κομίσας τοῖς μετ' αὐτὸν παρέδωκεν, ιδιώταις ἀνθρώποις, οἱ κατάκλειστα εἶχον τὰ βιβλία οὐδ' ἐπιμελῶς κείμενα· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἦσθοντο τὴν σπουδὴν τῶν Ἀτταλικῶν βασιλέων ὑφ' οἷς ἦν ἡ πόλις, ζητούντων βιβλία εἰς τὴν κατασκευὴν τῆς ἐν Περγάμῳ βιβλιοθήκης, κατὰ γῆς ἔκρυσαν ἐν διώρυγί τινι· ὑπὸ δὲ βιβλιοθήκης, κατὰ γῆς ἔκρυσαν ἐν διώρυγί τινι· ὑπὸ δὲ νοτίας καὶ σιπῶν κακωθέντα ὡς ποτε ἀπέδοντο οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους Ἀπελλικῶντι τῷ Τηίῳ πολλῶν ἀργυρίων τὰ τε Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ τὰ τοῦ Θεοφράστου βιβλία· ἦν δὲ ὁ Ἀπελλικῶν φιλόβιβλος μᾶλλον ἢ φιλόσοφος· διὸ καὶ ζητῶν ἐπανόρθωσιν τῶν διαβρωμάτων εἰς ἀντίγραφα καινὰ μετήνεγκε τὴν γραφὴν ἀναπληρῶν οὐκ εὖ, καὶ ἐξέδωκεν ἀμαρτάδων πλήρη τὰ βιβλία. συνέβη δὲ τοῖς ἐκ τῶν περιπάτων τοῖς μὲν πάλαι τοῖς μετὰ Θεόφραστον οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὅλως τὰ βιβλία πλὴν ὀλίγων, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν, μηδὲν ἔχειν φιλοσοφεῖν πραγματικῶς, ἀλλὰ θέσεις ληκυθίζειν· τοῖς δ' ὕστερον, ἀφ' οὗ τὰ βιβλία ταῦτα προήλθεν, ἄμεινον μὲν ἐκείνων φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ ἀριστοτελίζειν, ἀναγκάζεσθαι μέντοι τὰ πολλὰ εἰκότα λέγειν διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἀμαρτιῶν. πολὺ δὲ εἰς τοῦτο καὶ ἡ Ῥώμη προσελάβετο· εὐθύς γὰρ μετὰ τὴν Ἀπελλικῶντος τελευταίαν Σύλλας ἦρε τὴν Ἀπελλικῶντος βιβλιοθήκην ὁ τὰς Ἀθήνας ἐλὼν, δεῦρο δὲ κομισθεῖσαν Τυραννίων τε ὁ γραμματικὸς διεχειρίσατο φιλαριστοτέλης ὢν, θεραπεύσας τὸν ἐπὶ τῆς βιβλιοθήκης, καὶ βιβλιοπώλαι τινες γραφεῦσι φαύλοις χρώμενοι καὶ οὐκ ἀντιβάλλοντες, ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλωνσυμβαίνει τῶν εἰς πράσιν γραφομένων βιβλίων καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Ἀλεξανδρείᾳ. περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἀπόχρη.

From Scepsis came the Socratic philosophers Erastus and Coriscus and Neleus the son of Coriscus, this last a man who not only was a pupil of Aristotle and Theophrastus, but also inherited the library of Theophrastus, which included that of Aristotle. At any rate, Aristotle bequeathed his own library to Theophrastus, to whom he also left his school; and he is the first man, so far as I know, to have collected books and to have taught the kings in Egypt how to arrange a library. Theophrastus bequeathed it to Neleus; and Neleus took it to Scepsis and bequeathed it to his heirs, ordinary people, who kept the books locked up and not even carefully stored. But when they heard how zealously the Attalic kings to whom the city was subject were searching for books to build up the library in Pergamum, they hid their books underground in a kind of trench.

But much later, when the books had been damaged by moisture and moths, their descendants sold them to Apellicon of Teos for a large sum of money, both the books of Aristotle and those of Theophrastus. But Apellicon was a bibliophile rather than a philosopher; and therefore, seeking a restoration of the parts that had been eaten through, he made new copies of the text, filling up the gaps incorrectly, and published the books full of errors.

The result was that the earlier school of Peripatetics who came after Theophrastus had no books at all, with the exception of only a few, mostly exoteric works, and were therefore able to philosophize about nothing in a practical way, but only to talk bombast about commonplace propositions, whereas the later school, from the time the books in question appeared, though better able to philosophise and Aristotelise, were forced to call most of their statements probabilities, because of the large number of errors.

Rome also contributed much to this; for, immediately after the death of Apellicon, Sulla, who had captured Athens, carried off Apellicon's library to Rome, where Tyrannio the grammarian, who was fond of Aristotle, got it in his hands by paying court to the librarian, as did also certain booksellers who used bad copyists and would not collate the texts—a thing that also takes place in the case of the other books that are copied for selling, both here and at Alexandria. However, this is enough about these men. (Loeb translation)

[T3] **A Plutarch, *Sulla* 26.1-2**

Ἀναχθεὶς δὲ πάσαις ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐξ Ἐφέσου τριταῖος ἐν Πειραιεῖ καθωρμίσθη· καὶ μνηθεὶς ἐξείλεν ἑαυτῷ τὴν Ἀπελλικῶνος τοῦ Τηίου βιβλιοθήκην, ἐν ἣ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ Θεοφράστου βιβλίων ἦν, οὐπω τότε (5) σαφῶς γνωριζόμενα τοῖς πολλοῖς. λέγεται δὲ κομισθείσης αὐτῆς εἰς Ῥώμην Τυραννίωνα τὸν γραμματικὸν ἐνσκευάσασθαι τὰ πολλὰ, καὶ παρ' αὐτοῦ τὸν Ῥόδιον Ἀνδρόνικον εὐπορήσαντα τῶν ἀντιγράφων εἰς μέσον θεῖναι καὶ ἀναγράψαι τοὺς [2] νῦν φερομένους πίνακας. οἱ δὲ πρεσβύτεροι Περιπατητικοὶ φαίνονται μὲν καθ' ἑαυτοὺς γενόμενοι χαριέντες καὶ φιλόλογοι, τῶν δὲ Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ Θεοφράστου γραμμάτων οὔτε πολλοῖς οὔτε ἀκριβῶς ἐντετυχηκότες διὰ τὸ τὸν Νηλέως τοῦ Σκηψίου κληρὸν, ᾧ τὰ βιβλία κατέλιπε Θεόφραστος, εἰς ἀφιλοτίμους καὶ ιδιώτας ἀνθρώπους περιγενέσθαι.

Having set out from Ephesus with the whole navy, he [Sulla] came the third day to anchor in the Piraeus. Here he was initiated in the mysteries, and seized for his

use the library of Apellicon the Teian, in which were most of the works of Theophrastus and Aristotle, then not in general circulation. When the whole was afterwards conveyed to Rome, there, it is said, the greater part of the collection passed through the hands of Tyrannion the grammarian, and that Andronicus the Rhodian, having through his means the command of numerous copies, made the treatises public, and drew up the catalogues that are now current. The elder Peripatetics appear themselves, indeed, to have been accomplished and learned men, but of the writings of Aristotle and Theophrastus they had no large or exact knowledge, because Theophrastus bequeathing his books to the heir of Neleus of Scepsis, they came into careless and illiterate hands. (Loeb translation)

[T4] **A Galen, *Quod animi mores corporis temperamenta sequantur* 782,14.** <Andronicus declared the οὐσία of soul to be a κράσις or a δύναμις of the body. The insertion of Andronicus's name in this passage, supported by the Arabic text of Biesterfeldt (1973), was maintained by Marquardt, Müller and Helmreich (1884-1909). See Moraux I, 132-34 and 134 n. 1; also Gottschalk, 1113.>

ἡ μὲν οὖν τῆς καρδίας κράσις τὸ θυμοειδὲς εἶδος ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἥπατος τὸ καλούμενον ὑπὸ Πλάτωνος μὲν ἐπιθυμητικόν, θρεπτικὸν δὲ καὶ φυτικόν <ὑπ' Ἀριστοτέλους. Ἀνδρόνικον δὲ τὸν Περιπατητικόν>, ὅτι μὲν ὅλως ἐτόλμησεν ἀποφήνασθαι τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς ψυχῆς <κράσιν ἢ δύναμιν εἶναι τοῦ σώματος> ὡς ἐλεύθερος ἀνὴρ ἄνευ τοῦ περιπλέκειν ἀσαφῶς, ἐπαινῶ τε πάνυ καὶ ἀποδέχομαι τὴν προαίρεσιν τάνδρός (εὐρίσκω γὰρ αὐτὸν καὶ κατ' ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιοῦτον). [783] ὅτι δ' ἦτοι κράσιν εἶναι φησιν ἢ δύναμιν ἐπομένην τῇ κράσει, μέμφομαι τῇ προσθέσει τῆς δυνάμεως. εἰ γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ πολλὰς ἔχει δυνάμεις οὐσία τις οὐσα καὶ τοῦτ' ὀρθῶς Ἀριστοτέλει λέλεκται οὐσία τις οὐσα καὶ τοῦτ' ὀρθῶς Ἀριστοτέλει λέλεκται καὶ τούτῳ διώριστα καλῶς ἡ ὁμωνυμία—λεγόμενης γὰρ οὐσίας καὶ τῆς ὕλης καὶ τοῦ εἶδους καὶ τοῦ συναμφοτέρου τὴν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος οὐσίαν ἀπεφήνατο ψυχὴν ὑπάρχειν—, οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ <λέγειν> ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὴν κράσιν, ὡς ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν ἐδείκνυτο. ἐν ταύτῳ δὲ γένοι τῆς οὐσίας καὶ ἡ τῶν Στωϊκῶν (10) περιέχεται δόξα. πνεῦμα μὲν γὰρ τι τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι βούλονται καθάπερ καὶ τὴν φύσιν, ἀλλ' ὑγρότερον μὲν καὶ ψυχρότερον τὸ τῆς φύσεως, ξηρότερον δὲ καὶ θερμότερον τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς.

The blend of the heart is the thumotic form of the soul, while the [blend] of the liver is called by Plato 'epithumotic', but 'nourishing and growing' <by Aristotle>. And I praise <Andronicus the Peripatetic>, since he dared to show forth fully the essence (οὐσία) of the soul, <declaring it a blend (κράσις) or a potentiality (δύναμις) of the body.> [...]

[T5] **B Aspasius, in *Ethica* 44,18-45,5.** <Andronicus maintained that 'affection is an irrational *kinêsis* of the soul produced through *hupolêpsis* of evil or good'. The second repetition of Andronicus's statement and vocabulary, ὁ δὲ Ἀνδρόνικος εἰπὼν, δι' ὑπόληψιν... (44,33-45,1), may suggest that the sentence is near to the *ipsissima verba* of Andronicus, at least as Aspasius found them presented in his source.>

ὅτι δὲ ἐστὶ τι ὀρεκτικὸν καὶ παθητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς, σκεπτέον ἐν ἄλλοις τῶν δὲ ἐκ τοῦ Περιπάτου τῶν μὲν παλαιῶν παρ' οὐδενὶ εὐρίσκομεν (20)

ὀρισμὸν τοῦ πάθους· τῶν δὲ ὕστερον Ἀνδρόνικος μὲν εἶρηκε πάθος εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς κίνησιν ἄλογον δι' ὑπόληψιν κακοῦ ἢ ἀγαθοῦ, ἄλογον λαμβάνων οὐ τὸ ὑπεναντίον τῷ ὀρθῷ λόγῳ ὥσπερ οἱ ἐκ τῆς Στοᾶς, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦ ἀλόγου τῆς ψυχῆς μορίου κίνημα· Βόηθος δὲ τὸ πάθος τῆς ψυχῆς κίνησιν ἄλογον ἔχουσάν τι μέγεθος, ἄλογον μὲν λαμβάνων καὶ αὐτὸς τὴν τοῦ ἀλόγου τῆς ψυχῆς (25) μορίου κίνησιν, τὸ δὲ μέγεθος προστιθείς, ἐπειδὴ γίνονται τινες καὶ ἄλλαι κινήσεις τοῦ ἀλόγου τῆς ψυχῆς μετ' οἰκειώσεως τῆς πρὸς τινὰς καὶ ἀλλοτριώσεως βραχείας· τὰς οὖν μετὰ βραχείας οὐκ ἄξιον ἡγεῖτο ὀνομάζειν πάθη. οὐκ οἶδα δὲ ὅπως τοῦτο εἶπε· πάσα γὰρ κινήσεις τοῦ παθητικοῦ μορίου τῆς ψυχῆς, ἂν μὴ λανθάνη, πάθος ἂν εἴη τοῦ σώματος, οὐ μόνον δὲ ἢ σὺν μεγέθει· (30) τὸ δὲ κατ' ἀλλοίωσίν του ὥσπερ καὶ πάσα κινήσεις σώματος οὐ κατ' ἀλλοίωσιν, ἂν μὴ λανθάνη, πάθος ὃν τοῦ σώματος πρόσκειται, ὅτι ταῦτα ἔοικεν ἢ κατὰ τὰ πάθη μεταβολὴ τῆς ψυχῆς. ὁ δὲ Ἀνδρόνικος εἰπὼν, δι' ὑπόληψιν ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν γίνεσθαι τὸ πάθος, πρῶτον μὲν ἴσως ἠγνόησεν, ὅτι γίνεται τινὰ πάθη ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς φαντασίας χωρὶς συγκαταθέσεως καὶ ὑπολήψεως· καὶ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν αὐτὴν, ὅτε ἡδὺ ἢ λυπηρὸν φανῆ, ἐνίοτε γίνεται πάθος τῆς ψυχῆς· ὥστε οὐ μόνον μετὰ τὰς ὑπολήψεις ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸ τῶν ὑπολήψεων τὰ πάθη γίνονται.

We find no definition of *pathos* in any of the ancient Peripatetics. Among the later members [of the Peripatos], Andronicus said that *pathos* is an irrational motion of the soul produced through (*dia*) a supposition (*hupolêpsis*) of evil or good; he took 'irrational' not as the opposite of right reason, as the Stoics do, but rather as a movement of the irrational part of the soul.

Boethus defined *pathos* as an irrational motion of the soul that has a certain magnitude; he too took 'irrational' as a motion of the irrational part of the soul, but he added magnitude, since there are also some other motions of the irrational part of the soul accompanied by brief *oikeiôseis* to people or estrangements (*allogriôseis*) from them. He thought that those movements accompanied by brief [affections] were not worthy of the name *pathê*...

Andronicus said, '*pathos* arises through (*dia*) a supposition (*hupolêpsis*) of good or bad things', first of all, perhaps, because he did not know that some *pathê* arise merely out of imagination (*phantasia*), apart from assent (*sunkatathesis*) and supposition. (Tr. D. Konstan)

[T6] **A Alexander of Aphrodisias, in An. Pr. I 160,28-161,1.** <Andronicus claimed that the *De Int.* was not a genuine work of Aristotle; Alexander defends its authenticity.>

ὅτι δὲ εἰσιν αἱ ἐνδεχόμεναι ἀποφατικαὶ καταφάσεις ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀποφάσεις, ὑπομνήσκει ἡμᾶς. ἐν γὰρ τῷ Περὶ ἐρμηνείας ἔδειξε τὰς τὸν τρόπον ἐχούσας ἄνευ τοῦ ἀποφατικοῦ κατηγορούμενον πάσας καταφάσεις (30) εἶναι· διὰ τοῦτο προσέθηκε τὸ καθάπερ ἐλέχθη πρότερον. ἐξ ὧν καὶ αὐτῶν ἔνεστι δεικνύναι, ὅτι τὸ Περὶ ἐρμηνείας Ἀριστοτέλους ἐστίν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς Ἀνδρόνικός φησιν. ἢ καὶ ἐν τούτῳ προείρηκεν ἤδη περὶ τούτου, ὅτε ἔλεγε μὴ ἀντιστρέφειν τὴν καθόλου ἀποφατικὴν.

[T7] **A Porphyry, Vita Plotini 24.7.** <Apollodorus of Athens collected the works of the comedian Epicharmus into ten parts. Andronicus the Peripatetic divided the works of Aristotle and

Theophrastus into *pragmateiai*, placing together kindred subjects (*tas oikeias hupotheseis*). Porphyry states that he himself has followed their pattern in collecting the works of Plotinus.>

μιμησάμενος δ' Ἀπολλόδωρον τὸν Ἀθηναῖον καὶ Ἀνδρόνικον τὸν Περιπατητικόν, ὃν ὁ μὲν Ἐπίχαρμον τὸν κωμωδιογράφον εἰς δέκα τόμους φέρων συνήγαγεν, ὁ δὲ τὰ Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ Θεοφράστου εἰς πραγματείας διείλε τὰς οικείας ὑποθέσεις εἰς ταύτων συναγαγών· οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ νῦν ὄντα ἔχων τὰ τοῦ Πλωτίνου βιβλία διείλον μὲν εἰς ἕξ ἑννεάδας τῆ τελειότητι τοῦ ἕξ ἀριθμοῦ καὶ ταῖς ἑννεάσιν ἀσμένως ἐπιτυχών, ἐκάστη δὲ ἑννεάδι τὰ οικεία φέρων συνεφόρησα δούς καὶ τάξιν πρώτην τοῖς ἐλαφροτέροις προβλήμασιν.

[T8] **B Porphyry, in Cat. 125,14-23.** <Andronicus states that 'relatives are those things for which being is a disposition toward something different'. Thus Cat. 8a32, but there we read *pros ti* instead of *pros heteron*.>

ἀλλ' ὁ δεύτερος λόγος οὐ τούτῳ ἐπερείδεται τῷ τινὸς εἶναι, καὶ ἐν τῇ σχέσει τινῶν τῶν πρὸς τι ἄλληλα τὸ εἶναι ἔχειν τὰ πρὸς τι· οἷον γὰρ μέσον τί ἐστιν τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἢ σχέσις, καθ' ἣν ὑφίσταται τὰ πρὸς τι, πλεονάζουσα παρὰ τὰ ὑποκείμενα οὐκ ἄλλῳ τινί, ἀλλὰ τῷ μηνύειν ποιάν τινα συνάφειαν αὐτοῖς πρὸς ἄλληλα ἐπιθεωρουμένην, καθὸ τούτοις καλεῖται τοῖς ὀνόμασιν. ἵνα δὲ μὴ δοκῇ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὑπογραφῆς ἀξιούμενον λαμβάνεσθαι εἰς τὴν αὐτοῦ (20) ὑπογραφὴν, ἠξίουσιν τινὲς οὕτως ὑπογράφειν· 'οἷς τὸ εἶναι ταύτων ἐστι τῷ πρὸς ὅτιον πῶς ἔχειν', ἢ ὡς Ἀνδρόνικος, 'οἷς τὸ εἶναι ταύτων ἐστι τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον πῶς ἔχειν, ἐκεῖνά ἐστι πρὸς τι'.

[T9] **A Hippolytus, Refutation of all heresies 5.21.1-5 Marcovich.** <The Sethian Gnostics adopt a theory (logos) of blending and mixture, a subject which has been studied especially by Andronicus the Peripatetic. Although expressed in Gnostic terminology, we may infer from Hippolytus's language that he believes the Sethian position on blending has certain affinities with Andronicus's account. In this case, their view would shed light on the Andronican theory of blending and mixture of soul and body mentioned by Galen. According to the Sethian theory, a 'luminous' nature (likely soul) enters the 'dark waters' (likely body) and these are thoroughly blended into a unity (*hen*). But the knowledgeable individual (*epistēmōn*) can distinguish them as one might distinguish the individual components of a scent, such as an incense-offering.>

[1] Ταῦτ' ἐστιν ἃ λέγουσι καὶ τοιοῦτοις παραπλήσια ἐν ἀπείροις συγγράμμασι· πείθουσι δὲ <διὰ τοῦ> ἐντυγχάνειν τῷ περὶ κράσεως καὶ μίξεως λόγῳ τοὺς μαθητευομένους, ὃς <μέντοι> μεμελέτηται πολλοῖς <τε> [2] ἄλλοις καὶ Ἀνδρονίκῳ τῷ Περιπατητικῷ. λέγουσιν οὖν οἱ Σηθιανοὶ τὸν περὶ κράσεως καὶ μίξεως λόγον συνεστάναι τῷδε τῷ τρόπῳ· τὴν ἀκτίνα τὴν φωτεινὴν ἄνωθεν ἐγκεκράσθαι καὶ τὸν σπινθήρα τὸν ἐλάχιστον [ἐν] τοῖς σκοτεινοῖς ὕδασι κάτω καταμεμίχθαι λεπτῶς καὶ συνηνώσθαι καὶ γεγονέναι [ἐν] ἐν φύραμά τι, ὡς<περ> μίαν ὀσμὴν ἐκ πολλῶν καταμεμιγμένων (5) [3] ἐπὶ τοῦ πυρὸς <ὀσμώμεθα> θυμιαμάτων. καὶ δεῖ τὸν ἐπιστήμονα, τῆς ὀσφρήσεως ἔχοντα κριτήριον εὐαγές, ἀπὸ τῆς μᾶς τοῦ θυμιάματος ὀσμῆς διακρίνειν λεπτῶς ἕκαστον τῶν καταμεμιγμένων ἐπὶ τοῦ πυρὸς θυμιαμάτων, οἷονεὶ στύρακα καὶ σμύρναν καὶ λίβανον ἢ εἶ

[4] τι ἄλλο εἶη μεμιγμένον. χρῶνται δὲ καὶ ἑτέροις παραδείγμασι, λέγοντες καταμεμίχθαι [καὶ] χρυσίῳ χαλκόν, καὶ τέχνη τις εὔρηται ἢ διακρίνουσα τὸν χαλκὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ χρυσοῦ. ὁμοίως δὲ κἂν [ἐν] ἀργύρῳ κασσίτερος ἢ χαλκὸς ἢ τι τῶν ὁμογενῶν καταμεμιγμένον εὔρεθῆ, μίξεώς τινη τέχνη [5] κρείττονι καὶ ταῦτα διακρίνεται. ἤδη δὲ τις καὶ ὕδωρ μεμιγμένον οἴνῳ διακρίνει· οὔτω, φησί, καὶ [κἂν] πάντα τὰ συγκεκραμένα διακρίνεται. Καὶ δὴ ἀπὸ τῶν ζώων, φησί, <τοῦτο> καταμάνθανε· τελευτήσαντος γὰρ τοῦ ζώου ἕκαστα διακρίνεται καὶ λυθὲν οὔτω τὸ ζῶον ἀφανίζεται. τοῦτό ἐστι, φησί, τὸ εἰρημένον· «οὐκ ἦλθον εἰρήνην βαλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν, (5) ἀλλὰ μάχαιραν», τουτέστι [τὸ] διχάσαι καὶ χωρίσαι τὰ συγκεκραμένα.

[1] These [claims], and others like them, are asserted [by the Sethians] in their interminable commentaries. And they persuade their students to get familiar with the theory (*logos*) of blending (*krasis*) and mixture (*mixis*). In fact, this [theory] has been treated by quite a few [thinkers], in particular (*alloys kai*) [2] Andronicus the Peripatetic.

The Sethians, then, state that the theory about *krasis* and *mixis* is constituted as follows: the luminous ray from above is blended into, and the smallest spark is finely mixed into, the dark waters beneath. And these are made into a unity, and are formed into one compound mass, just as one savour (*osmê*) [arises] [3] from the mixture of many incense offerings in the fire. And the knowledgeable [adept], who has as his criterion an acute sense of smell, needs to discern finely each of the mixed offerings in the fire, like storax and myrrh and frankincense, or [4] whatever else might be mixed in.

[...] Thus, they say, though all things are mingled together (συγκεκραμένα) they are distinguishable (διακρίνεται).

[T10] **A Themistius, in *De An.* 31,1-5.** <Andronicus claims that Aristotle sought to refute Xenocrates's definition of the soul merely by arguing against the use of the word 'number'. See Moraux I, 132.>

Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα διελέγχει τὸν Ξενοκράτους ὀρισμὸν τῆς ψυχῆς, οὐ πρὸς τοῦνομα τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ μαχόμενος, ὡς φησιν Ἀνδρόνικος καὶ Πορφύριος, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάνυ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐπιζητῶν τὴν Ξενοκράτους, ὡς δῆλόν ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν Περὶ φύσεως αὐτῷ γεγραμμένων, ἐν οἷς ἂν δόξειε μοναδικὸν ποιεῖν ἀριθμὸν τὴν ψυχὴν ὁ Ξενοκράτης.

Next [Aristotle] refutes Xenocrates' definition of the soul, not by contesting the term 'number', as Andronicus and Porphyry say, but by really inquiring into Xenocrates' meaning, as is clear from the latter's books *On Nature* where he would seem to make the soul a unit-like number. (Tr. Todd)

[T11] **B Themistius, in *De An.* 32,19-34.** <On DA 408b32-409a30. Andronicus explains the construction of Xenocrates's definition of the soul, and further asserts *in propria persona* that the soul is the cause of the blend of primary elements in the body of the living being according to certain *logoi* and *arithmoi*. On Andronicus's view here, see also Donini (1971), 98, nn. 46, 47.>

Ἄ μὲν οὖν Ἀριστοτέλης ἀπορεῖ πρὸς τὸν Ξενοκράτους ὄρισμὸν τῆς ψυχῆς, ταυτὰ ἐστίν· ἃ δὲ ὁ τὰ Ἀριστοτέλους ἀδιανόητα ὀνομάζων, καὶ τὰ (20) καλῶς ἄλλοις εἰρημένα καὶ ἐν καιρῷ οὔτε καλῶς οὔτε ἐν καιρῷ μεταφέρων αὐτός, ἄλλης ἂν εἴη σχολῆς ἐξετάζειν. ἀλλὰ χρὴ παραβάλλειν τὰ Ἀνδρονίκου πρὸς τὰ ἐκείνου, ὅσῳ καὶ σαφέστερα καὶ πιθανώτερα πρὸς σύστασιν τοῦ λόγου τοῦ Ξενοκράτους. ‘ἀριθμὸν γὰρ ἐκάλουν’ φησὶ ‘τὴν ψυχὴν, ὅτι μηδὲν ζῶον ἐξ ἀπλοῦ σώματος, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τινὰς λόγους καὶ (25) ἀριθμοὺς κραθέντων τῶν πρώτων στοιχείων. σχεδὸν οὖν ταυτὸν ἀπεφαίνοντο τοῖς ἀρμονίαν αὐτὴν τιθεμένοις, πλὴν ὅσῳ σαφέστερον οὔτοι τῇ προσθήκῃ τὸν λόγον ἐποίουν, οὐ πάντα ἀριθμὸν, ἀλλὰ τὸν κινοῦντα ἑαυτὸν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀφοριζόμενοι, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ καὶ ἐκείνοι μὴ πᾶσαν ἀρμονίαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀρμόζουσαν ἑαυτήν· αὐτὴ γάρ ἐστίν ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς κράσεως ταύτης (30) αἰτία καὶ τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς μίξεως τῶν πρώτων στοιχείων.’ ἀλλ’ ὅπερ εἶπον, ὅπως μὲν ἔλεγε τὴν ψυχὴν ἀριθμὸν εἶναι κινοῦντα ἑαυτὸν Ξενοκράτης, ἐκ τῶν ἐκείνου ληπτέον καὶ μάλιστα ἐκ τοῦ πέμπτου τῶν Περὶ φύσεως τάνδρῳ γεγραμμένων·

Such, then, are the problems that Aristotle raises for Xenocrates’ definition of the soul. It would take another lecture to scrutinize those [raised by] the [philosopher] who termed Aristotle’s [arguments] ‘inconceivable’ and who himself paraphrased the correct and apposite arguments of others in a way that was neither correct nor apposite. Instead, we ought to contrast *Andronicus*’ [arguments] with those of that [critic], inasmuch as they offer at once a clearer and more plausible reconstruction of Xenocrates’s theory.

[Andronicus] says: ‘They called the soul number because no living being was derived from an uncompounded body, but [only] where the primary elements were blended in accordance with specific ratios and numbers. So they made essentially the same claim as those who posit the soul as an attunement, except that they more clearly formulated their theory by adding in their definition that the soul was not every number, but [just] the self-moving number, as if those [others] too [had defined it] as not every attunement, but [just] the one that attunes itself. For this [type of] soul is the cause of this type of blend, and thus of the ratio and mixture of the primary elements’.

But as I said the way in which Xenocrates spoke of the soul as a self-moving number is to be understood from his own [works], and in particular from the fifth book of those *On Nature* that he composed. (Tr. Todd)

[T12] **A Dexippus, in *Cat.* 21,18-19.** <The full phrase λόγος τῆς οὐσίας (1a2) did not occur in the manuscripts of the *Cat.* read by Boethus and Andronicus (who, as we learn elsewhere, do not appear to have read the phrase τῆς οὐσίας).>

Πρώτον μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς ἀντιγράφοις τὸ ὁ δὲ λόγος τῆς οὐσίας πρόσκειται, ὡς καὶ Βόηθος μνημονεύει καὶ Ἀνδρόνικος.

[T13] **A Ammonius, in *De Int.* 5,28 and 7,13.** <Andronicus, the eleventh [successor to the scholarchate counting] from Aristotle, read Aristotle’s remark at *De Int.* 16a5-8 that *noêmata* are ‘affections of the soul’, together with Aristotle’s cross-reference to further discussion in his works

Περὶ ψυχῆς (16a8-9). As the promised discussion does not occur in the *De Anima*, Andronicus supposed that either *De Int.* or *De Anima* must be spurious, and athetized *De Int.* The claim that A. was eleventh scholar has been questioned, especially as [Ammonius] elsewhere claims this status for Boethus: cf. *in An. Pr.* 31,11.>

[All critics agree that the *De Interpretatione* is authentic] πλὴν Ἀνδρονίκου τοῦ Ῥοδίου, ὃς ἐνδέκατος μὲν ἦν ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους, ἀκούσας δὲ αὐτοῦ καλοῦντος ἐν τοῖς προοιμίοις τοῦδε τοῦ βιβλίου τὰ νοήματα παθήματα τῆς (30) ψυχῆς καὶ προστιθέντος ‘ὡς περὶ τούτων εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς Περὶ ψυχῆς,’ διὰ [6] τὸ μὴ συνιδεῖν ὅπου τῆς Περὶ ψυχῆς πραγματείας τὰ νοήματα παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκάλεσεν ὁ φιλόσοφος, ἀναγκαῖον ᾤθη τῶν δύο πραγματειῶν, ταύτης τε καὶ τῆς Περὶ ψυχῆς, τὴν ἕτεραν νόθον ἀποφῆνασθαι τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους, καὶ δεῖν ἐνόμισε ταύτην ἀθετεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ τὴν Περὶ ψυχῆς... [7] (13) οὐκ ἄρα δικαίως ὁ Ἀνδρόνικος νόθον ὑπόπτευσεν εἶναι τοῦ φιλοσόφου τὸ βιβλίον.

[T14a] **B** Simplicius, *in Cat.* 21,21-24. <Nicostratus suggests that it is inconsistent for the text *Categories* to begin with the ‘onymies’. Simplicius, following Porphyry, replies. The necessity of having a πρόληψις about homonyms is demonstrated by Andronicus, who made the initial phrase of the *Categories* read as follows: ‘Of things said, some are said without combination, others with combination. Of those without combination, those which have the name alone in common are called homonyms’. (Thus A. transposes 1a16-17 to the beginning. There followed a combination of 1a17 ff. and 1a1. Shortly after this point is made, Iamblichus points out that the ‘categories’ themselves are homonymous).>

ὅτι δὲ χρειώδης ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν ὁμωνύμων πρόληψις, ἐδήλωσεν Ἀνδρόνικος προτάξας “τῶν λεγομένων τὰ μὲν ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς λέγεται, τὰ δὲ μετὰ συμπλοκῆς· καὶ τῶν ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς ὁμώνυμα μὲν λέγεται, ὧν ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν”.

[T14b] **A** Simplicius, *in Cat.* 26,17 <‘Common’ is said in many senses. The name is common to the homonyms, belonging to all at once, while belonging to other things, remaining indivisibly the same. Therefore Andronicus in his Paraphrase of the *Categories* says that those things are called homonyms of which the name is identical – just as both the name and the logos are present to many indivisibly, in virtue of their asomatic nature, are present to many indivisibly. Nicostratus and his followers object that ‘dog’ alone does not yet signify anything, as it has many meanings, so it is not a name: and so it cannot be a homonym, as homonyms have their name in common.>

διὸ καὶ Ἀνδρόνικος παραφράζων τὸ τῶν Κατηγοριῶν βιβλίον ὁμώνυμά φησιν λέγεσθαι, ὧν ὄνομα ταῦτόν· καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ὄνομα καὶ ὁ λόγος διὰ τὴν ἀσώματον φύσιν ἀμερίστως πάρεσι τοῖς πολλοῖς.

[T14c] **B** Simplicius, *in Cat.* 30,3. <Nicostratus has reproached Aristotle for appearing to say that homonymy is only to be found in the first category when he states that in the case of homonyms ‘the logos of *ousia* is different’. Yet homonymy is also in the *poion* (white is both the colour and the noise), etc. Porphyry notes that the offending phrase (*tês ousias*) was not read by all of the earlier commentators. Boethus did not know it, and Andronicus, in his paraphrase, says ‘of those things which are said without combination, those things are called homonyms of which only the name is

identical (*tauton*), but the *logos* in accordance with the name is different'. Porphyry subsequently observes that Herminus and almost everyone else has read *tês ousias*, so it should be kept.>

καὶ ἐξηγούμενος δὲ ὁ Βόηθος καθ' ἐκάστην λέξιν τὸ τῆς οὐσίας παραλέλοιπεν ὡς οὐδὲ γεγραμμένον. καὶ ὁ Ἀνδρόνικος δὲ παραφράζων τὸ βιβλίον 'τῶν ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς, φησί, λεγομένων ὁμώνυμα μὲν λέγεται ὧν ὄνομα μόνον ταυτόν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοῦ ὀνόματος λόγος ἕτερος'.

[T14d] **A** Simplicius, *in Cat.* 54,8-21. <Andronicus and some others (cf. Moraux I, 104) say that it is not only things predicated *en tōi ti estin* which are said to be predicated of a subject, but others as well, such as 'musical' of Aristoxenus, and 'Athenian' of Socrates. And this may be true of those things where we say that Socrates is something (he is walking, but that does not mean he is 'to walk', but we do say he is Athenian and a philosopher. And whatever is predicated of these, when we say the former is the latter, will also be said of the subject. Again they say, if a body is white, and white is a colour, then body will also be a colour. But white signifies two things: the quality and what is coloured; and it is 'coloured' that is predicated of 'body'.>

Ἰστέον δὲ ὅτι καὶ Ἀνδρόνικος καὶ ἄλλοι δὲ τινες οὐ μόνον τὰ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν κατηγορούμενα καθ' ὑποκειμένου κατηγορεῖσθαι φασιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλα οἷον τὸ μουσικὸν κατὰ Ἀριστοξένου καὶ τὸ Ἀθηναῖος κατὰ Σωκράτους. καὶ ἴσως ἐκεῖνα ὅσα κατηγοροῦντές τινος ἐκεῖνο εἶναι λέγομεν αὐτὸ ὅπερ κατηγοροῦμεν (βαδίζειν μὲν γὰρ λέγοντες τὸν Σωκράτη οὐ λέγομεν βαδίζειν εἶναι τὸν Σωκράτη, Ἀθηναῖον δὲ εἶναι λέγομεν καὶ φιλόσοφον) καὶ ὅσα δὴ τούτων κατηγορεῖται, λεγόντων ἡμῶν ταῦτα ἐκεῖνα εἶναι, καὶ κατὰ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ῥηθήσεται· εἰ γὰρ ὁ Σωκράτης φιλόσοφος καὶ ὁ φιλόσοφος δὲ (15) ἐπιστήμων, ἔσται καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἐπιστήμων. πάλιν δὲ φασιν· εἰ τὸ σῶμα λευκὸν καὶ τὸ λευκὸν χρῶμα, ἔσται καὶ τὸ σῶμα χρῶμα. ἢ τὸ λευκὸν δύο σημαίνει, τὴν τε ποιότητα καὶ τὸ κεχρωσμένον, καὶ τοῦ μὲν σώματος τὸ κεχρωσμένον κατηγορεῖται (οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ σῶμα λευκότης), τῆς δὲ ποιότητος τὸ χρῶμα <...> ἀλλ' ἢ λευκότης· ὥστε οὐ τὸ χρῶμα κατηγορηθήσεται (20) τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλὰ τὸ κεχρωσμένον.

[T14e] **A** Simplicius, *in Cat.* 63,22-28. <'The followers of Xenocrates and Andronicus' appear to include all the categories in [the opposition] 'by itself' (*kath' hauto*) and 'relative' (*pros ti*), so that, according to them, the multitude of ten are superfluous. Others make a similar division into *ousia* and *sumbebêkos*.>

οἱ γὰρ περὶ Ξενοκράτη καὶ Ἀνδρόνικον πάντα τῷ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ τῷ πρὸς τι περιλαμβάνειν δοκοῦσιν, ὥστε περιττὸν εἶναι κατ' αὐτοὺς τὸ τοσοῦτον τῶν γενῶν πλῆθος. ἄλλοι δὲ εἰς οὐσίαν καὶ συμβεβηκὸς διατέμνουσιν· καὶ οὗτοι δὲ ταυτόν πως δοκοῦσι τοῖς προτέροις λέγειν τὰ συμβεβηκῶτα πρὸς τι λέγουσιν, (25) ὡς ἄλλων ἀεὶ ὄντων, καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν καθ' αὐτό. ῥητέον οὖν κοινῇ πρὸς ἀμφοτέρους, ὅτι τὴν εἰς ἐλάχιστα τομῆν τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους ζηλώσαντες ἀτελῶς αὐτῆς ἦψαντο, τὸ καθόλου καὶ τὸ μερικὸν παραλείποντες.

[T14f] **A** Simplicius, *in Cat.* 134,5. <Perhaps Andronicus was correct to make place and time their own categories, to which ‘where’ and ‘when’ are subordinated (hupotaxas). Cf. 342,21 and 63,21.>

Ἄλλ’ ἄμεινον ἴσως, φασίν, Ἀνδρόνικος ἐποίησεν, ἰδίας μὲν ποιήσας (5) κατηγορίας τὸν τόπον καὶ τὸν χρόνον, ὑποτάξας δὲ αὐταῖς τὸ ποῦ καὶ τὸ ποτέ.

[T14g] **A** Simplicius, *in Cat.* 142,34-143,1. <Perhaps Place admits of contrariety in up and down? Andronicus’s answer is that up and down do not signify place, but Where, just as yesterday and today do not signify time, but When, which is according to time.>

ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τούτους ῥητέον ὡς τὸ ἄνω καὶ κάτω οὐ τόπον σημαίνει, ἀλλὰ τὴν ποῦ κατηγορίαν, ὥσπερ τὸ (35) χθὲς καὶ σήμερον οὐ χρόνον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ποτέ, τουτέστιν τὸ κατὰ χρόνον. [143] ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ τῷ Ἀνδρονίκῳ δοκεῖ.

[T14h] **A** Simplicius, *in Cat.* 144,7-14. <Iamblichus, following (*kata*<*kolouthon*>) Andronicus, suggests that great and small, much and few, are not only relative to something, but also indeterminate quantities. For whenever we say ‘great’, we point out an indeterminate quantity; but when we say ‘greater’ or ‘smaller’ then they are considered in terms of their relation to each other. Simplicius subsequently adds that both Aristotle and Plotinus held the view that what is great *relative to something else* is called ‘great’.>

“Μήποτε δέ, φησίν Ἰάμβλιχος τῷ Ἀνδρονίκῳ κατα<κολουθῶν>, τὸ μέγα καὶ μικρὸν καὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ ὀλίγον οὐ μόνον πρὸς τί ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποσὸν ἀόριστον. ὅταν γὰρ λέγωμεν μέγα, ποσὸν ἀόριστον δηλοῦμεν· οὐ γὰρ δηλοῦται πόσῳ ἢ τίνι μεγέθει μέγα ἐστίν ἢ πόσῳ πλήθει πολὺ· ὅταν δὲ μείζον καὶ (10) μικρότερον λέγωμεν, κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσιν θεωρεῖται. ὁ δὲ γε Ἀριστοτέλης κατὰ τὸ πρὸς τι μόνον τὸ μέγα καὶ μικρὸν ἐθεώρησεν, ὥσπερ ὁ Πλωτῖνος κατὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς μόνον· τὸ γὰρ πρὸς τι μέγα ἀντὶ τοῦ μείζον λέγεσθαί φησιν.”

[T14i] **A** Simplicius, *in Cat.* 150,31-151,7. <Even if the Caucasus is more great, and Athos less great, and Hymettus even less great, one might agree that because of the indeterminacy (*aoristos*) even quantity admits more and less as if it were a contrariety; for what is said to be great not in relation to something but per se is opposed to what is said to be small per se. That is Andronicus’s position. But Plotinus denies that great is said in relation to anything at all, but says that we often say ‘great’ instead of ‘greater’ improperly (6.3.11, 11).>

εἰ δὲ μείζον μέγεθος μεγέθους λέγομεν καὶ πλείονα ἀριθμὸν ἀριθμοῦ, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ πολὺ τὸ μάλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον θεωροῦμεν (μάλλον γὰρ μείζων τοῦ Ὑμηττοῦ ὁ Καύκασος ἢ ὁ [151] Ἄθως, καὶ μάλλον πλείω τῶν τριῶν τὰ ἐπτὰ ἢ τὰ πέντε), κατὰ τὸ πρὸς τι αὐτοῖς τὸ μάλλον καὶ ἥττον ὑπάρχειν ἐροῦμεν. εἰ δὲ καὶ μάλλον μέγας ὁ Καύκασος, ἥττον δὲ ὁ Ἄθως καὶ ἔτι ἥττον ὁ Ὑμηττός, κατὰ τὸ ἀόριστον συγχωρήσοι ἂν τις ἐπιδέχεσθαι καὶ τὸ ποσὸν τὸ μάλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐναντίωσιν· τὸ γὰρ μὴ πρὸς τι λεγόμενον μέγα, ἀλλὰ (5) καθ’ αὐτὸ ἀντίκειται τῷ καθ’ αὐτὸ λεγομένῳ μικρῷ. καὶ οὕτως Ἀνδρόνικος διατάσσεται. Πλωτῖνος δὲ οὐδὲ εἶναι ὅλως

πρὸς τι μέγα φησίν, ἀλλὰ ἀκύρως πολλάκις ἀντὶ τοῦ μείζον τὸ μέγα λέγειν ἡμᾶς.

[T14j] **A** Simplicius, *in Cat.* 153,29-155,2. <The following discussion is presented in the course of resolving the *aporia* how the unit and the point belong to Quantity when they cannot be said to be equal or unequal. Some answer that the unit and the point are principles (*arkhai*) of quantities, and not quantities themselves. Porphyry endeavours to follow Andronicus in articulating the concepts of *hen*, *monades* and *stigmê* not according to ‘idea’ but according to ‘sensation’ and ‘discursive reasoning’ [perhaps Iamblichus’s judgement of Porphyry’s approach]. The ensuing fragment of Porph. is presumably drawn from the *Ad Ged.* Porphyry remarks that we must ask in what sense we mean ‘one’ of a length, breadth, or depth. He provides a threefold account: (1) A continuous body is *hen*, its continuity *henôsis*. (2) When it is not *only* one in this way, but also unique (exists in the absence of anything else of the same genus or species), then it is *monon*. (3) The unit and the point are fundamentally different, and the point is not just the unit ‘with position’; we can conceive of the point by reducing dimensions from a three-dimensional body.>

τινὲς δὲ λύουσιν τὴν ἀπορίαν μὴ προσιέμενοι τὸ ποσὰ εἶναι τὴν μονάδα καὶ τὸ σημεῖον· εἰ γὰρ μήτε συνεχῆ ἐστὶν ποσὰ μήτε διωρισμένα, ἐν δὲ (30) τούτοις πάντα ἐστὶν τὰ ποσὰ, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ποσὰ, οὐδὲ μετρητὰ ἄρα, ὥστε οὐχ ἀρμόσει αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ τὸ ἴσον οὐδὲ τὸ ἄνισον λέγεσθαι. καὶ γὰρ ἡ μὲν μονὰς ἀρχὴ ἐστὶν ἀριθμοῦ καὶ οὐκ ἀριθμός, ἡ δὲ στιγμὴ ἀρχὴ μεγέθους καὶ οὐ μέγεθος, ὥστε ἀρχὴ ποσῶν ἄμφω καὶ οὐ ποσὰ. καὶ τοῦ ἴσου [154] τοίνυν καὶ ἀνίσου ἀρχαὶ εἰσιν, οὔτε οὖν ποσὰ οὔτε ἴσα καὶ ἄνισα, ἀλλ’ οὔτε παντελῶς τούτων ἐκβεβήκασιν, διότι ἀρχαὶ αὐτῶν εἰσιν.

Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐνταῦθα διαρθροῦν ὁ Πορφύριος ἐπιχειρεῖ τῷ Ἀνδρονίκῳ κατακολουθῶν τὴν ἔννοιαν τοῦ τε ἐνός καὶ τῆς μονάδος καὶ τῆς στιγμῆς, οὐ τῶν κατ’ ἰδέας λεγομένων, ἀλλὰ τῶν κατ’ αἴσθησιν ἢ διάνοιαν ἐναργῶν, (5) περὶ ὧν καὶ ἡ παρούσα πρόθεσις πραγματεύεται, φέρε καὶ ἡμεῖς τοῖς λεγομένοις παρακολουθήσωμεν. “ὅταν γὰρ, φησίν, ἐν λέγωμεν ἢ μήκος ἢ πλάτος ἢ βάθος, σκεπτέον πῶς τὸ ἐν φαμεν. ἢ δῆλον ὡς ὅποταν τις σῶμα θεάσῃται συνεχῆ μὲν ὄλον ἐαυτῷ περὶ πάντα τὰ μόρια, περιγεγραμμένον δὲ ἰδίᾳ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων κεχωρισμένον, ἐν τὸ τοιοῦτον συνεχῆς ὀνομάζομεν (10) καὶ τὴν τῶν μορίων αὐτοῦ πρὸς ἄλληλα συνέχειαν ἔνωσιν. καὶ οὕτως τὸ τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἐν νοοῦμεν, τὸ δὲ τῷ εἶδει ἐν καὶ ὁμοειδῆς γινώσκομεν τὰ συμβεβηκότα τοῖς ἀτόμοις κατὰ τὰς ἐνούσας διαφορὰς χωρίζοντες. ὅταν δὲ μὴ μόνον ἐν, ἀλλὰ καὶ χωρὶς ἄλλου παντὸς ὁμογενοῦς ἢ ὁμοειδοῦς ἢ ὅλως συζύγου ὑπάρχει, τῆνικαῦτα μόνον ὀνομάζομεν, σύνθετον ἤδη τι τοῦ (15) μόνον σημαίνοντος ἐκ τε τοῦ ἐνός καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸ ἀπρημῶσθαι τῶν ἄλλων καὶ μεμονῶσθαι σχέσεως· μόνωσις γὰρ συνελθοῦσα τῷ ἐνὶ ὀνομάζεται μόνον. οὐ διαφέρει δὲ μόνωσιν εἰπεῖν ἢ μονάδα· καθ’ ἐνός γὰρ ὑποκειμένου πράγματος ἄμφω ταῦτα λέγεται· οὐκέτι μέντοι ἐπὶ τῶν δύο καὶ τριῶν καὶ τῶν ἐφεξῆς τὸ ἀνάλογον τῇ μόνωσει λέγεται, διότι ἐν πλήθει ἐστὶν (20) ἕκαστος ἀριθμός. ἐστὶν οὖν σχέσις τῷ ἐνὶ κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ἀντίθεσιν, ὅταν ἐκείνων μονωθῇ. ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὴν στιγμὴν μονάδα τεθείσαν λέγουσιν τινες, τὴν δὲ μονάδα στιγμὴν ἄθετον, οὕτως ἀκουστέον τούτων οὐχὶ τῆς μονάδος στιγμῆς γενομένης κατὰ προσθήκην τῆς θέσεως· οὔτε γὰρ ἡ μονὰς μένουσα ἐτι μονὰς θέσιν προσλαμβάνει οὔτε ἡ στιγμὴ μένουσα (25) στιγμὴ τὴν θέσιν ἀποβάλλει. ἔοικεν οὖν ἀναλογίαν ταυτότητος ἐμφαίνειν μόνην, τὴν δὲ ὑπόστασιν ἐτέραν τῆς στιγμῆς ἀπὸ τῆς μονάδος, καὶ οὐχ ἥττον γε τὸ σημεῖον ἀρχὴ καὶ πέρασ ἐστὶ τῶν μεγεθῶν ἢ περὶ ἡ μονὰς τῶν ἀριθμῶν. λάβοι δὲ ἂν τις στιγμῆς ἐναργῆ νόησιν ἐξ ἀναλύσεως· ἡ δὲ ἀρχὴ τῆς ἀναλύσεως ἐξ ἐννοίας γίνεται φυσικῆς ὑπαρχούσης ἅπασιν. τὸ (30) σῶμα μήκος ἔχει καὶ πλάτος καὶ βάθος, καὶ καθ’ ἐν ἕτερον μὲν τὸ μέρος τινός, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ πέρασ λαμβάνεται. καὶ

τὸ μὲν μέρος τὰς αὐτὰς ἔχει τῷ ὅλῳ διαστάσεις, τὸ μὲν τοῦ σώματος μέρος τριχῆ διεστώως, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἐπιφανείας διχῆ, τὸ δὲ τῆς γραμμῆς μοναχῆ· τὸ δὲ πέρασ ἀεὶ μᾶ διαστάσει [155] λείπεται τοῦ περατουμένου· εἰ γὰρ ἡ γραμμὴ κατὰ μίαν διάστασιν ὑφέστηκεν, τὸ πέρασ αὐτῆς οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἔξει, ὥστε ἀδιάστατόν τε καὶ ἀμερὲς ἔσται”.

[T14k] **A** Simplicius, *in Cat.* 157,18-22. <Andronicus places the relative in order after the other categories, as a *skhesis* and *paraphuas*. The citation of *Archytas* as taking this view identifies Iamblichus as the source, or the intermediary, for this citation.>

ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ Ἀνδρόνικον ἀποδεκτέον τὰ πρὸς τι μετὰ πάσας θέντα τὰς κατηγορίας, διότι σχέσις ἐστὶν καὶ παραφυάδι ἔοικεν· προηγείται γὰρ ἡ συμφυῆς τῶν πρὸς τι σχέσις τῶν ἐπικτήτων (20) σχέσεων, ὡς καὶ τῷ Ἀρχύτῃ δοκεῖ. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἱστορήσθω περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν τάξιν διαφόρων δογμάτων.

Nor must one follow Andronicus who puts those items which are in relation to something after all the other categories, on the grounds that [relation] is a *skhesis* and a sidegrowth (*dioti skhesis estin kai paraphuadi eoiken*); for the *skhesis* of the items which are in relation to something, connatural as it is, takes the lead compared to the acquired *skheseis*, which is also Archytas’ view. (Tr. T. Reinhardt, 2007)

[T14m] **A** Simplicius, *in Cat.* 159,32. <Andronicus, among other commentators, is criticized by Achaicus and Sotion for failing to recognise that ‘relative’ should always be used in the plural.>

ταῦτα δὲ ἐπιστήσαντες οὗτοι τοὺς παλαιοὺς τῶν κατηγοριῶν ἐξηγητὰς αἰτιῶνται, Βόηθον καὶ Ἀρίστων καὶ Ἀνδρόνικον καὶ Εὐδωρον καὶ Ἀθηνόδωρον, μήτε ἐπιστήσαντας μήτε ἐπισημηναμένους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασι [160] συγκεχυμένως χρησαμένους καὶ ἐνικῶς ἐκφέροντας ἐνίοτε τὸ πρὸς τι, τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους πληθυντικῶς ἀεὶ προφερομένου·

[T14n-o] **A** Simplicius, *in Cat.* 202,5. <Referring to *Cat.* 8a31 and following, where Aristotle defines *ta pros ti* as *hois to einai tauton esti toi pros ti pōs ekhein*, Andronicus observed that the definition contains the definiendum, and proposed to substitute *heteron* for *ti* (cf. *Cat.* 6a37). He was followed by Boethus and Ariston, but Achaicus sought to show that the change wasn’t needed.>

ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀσαφῆ τὴν ἀπόδοσιν ἐποιήσατο, ὡς καὶ Βοήθῳ καὶ Ἀρίστωνι δοκεῖ, ὅπερ καὶ αὐτὸ κακία ὀρισμοῦ ἐστίν, διόπερ ὁ Ἀρίστων ὡς ἐπὶ σαφέστερον μεταλαμβάνων “τὰ πρὸς τί πως ἔχοντα, φησίν, ταῦτά ἐστιν, οἷς τὸ εἶναι ταῦτόν ἐστιν τῷ πῶς ἔχειν πρὸς ἕτερον”· [καὶ] οὕτως δὲ καὶ Ἀνδρόνικος ἀποδίδωσιν. [...]

[203] (4) σαφέστερον δὲ ταύτην τὴν ἔννοιαν δηλοῦσιν ὅ τε τοῦ Ἀχαϊκοῦ ὀρισμὸς λέγων “οἷς τὸ εἶναι ταῦτόν ἐστιν τῷ πρὸς ὅτιον πως ἔχειν” καὶ ὁ Ἀρίστωνος καὶ Ἀνδρονίκου ὁ λέγων “οἷς τὸ εἶναι ταῦτόν ἐστιν τῷ πρὸς ἕτερόν πως ἔχειν”.

[T14p] **A** Simplicius, *in Cat.* 214,22. <It is pointed out that some human beings are named from a quality which has no name in itself – for instance, there is no name for a quality of ‘boxerhood’>

paronymously derived from the ‘boxer’. Andronicus suggests that naming of qualities should occur around future potentiality, not around current potentiality>.

πρόχειρον δὲ εἶπειν ὅτι εἰ καὶ μὴ ὠνόμασται, οὐ διὰ τοῦτο ἢ τῶν πραγμάτων φύσις ἐπιλέλοιπεν, καίτοι καὶ ὀνομάσαι δυνατόν ἦν ὁμωνύμως τὸ δυνάμει τῷ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν, (20) πυκτικὴν καὶ πυκτικὸν ἄμφω λέγοντας, ἢ εἰ φυλαττοίμεθα τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν, ἄλλα ποιήσωμεν ὀνόματα. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἀνδρόνικον ἠξίουσιν οὐκ ἀφ’ ἧς ἔχουσιν δυνάμεως ὠνομάσθαι αὐτούς, ἀλλ’ ἀφ’ ἧς ἔξουσιν· τοὺς γὰρ εὐ πρὸς τὰς μελλούσας ἔξεις διακειμένους οὕτως καλεῖσθαι. καὶ οἱ Στωικοὶ δὲ κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ὑποθέσεις τὴν αὐτὴν ἂν ἀπορίαν προσαγάγοιεν τῷ λέγοντι (25) λόγῳ κατὰ ποιότητα πάντα τὰ ποιά λέγεσθαι.

[T14q] **B** Simplicius, *in Cat.* 258,15. <Andronicus did not distinguish affective qualities into those that generate affections and those that are constituted from affections, but held all affective qualities were constituted from affections (cf. *Cat.* 9a35-b11).>

Ἀνδρόνικος δὲ ἠξίου μὴ διαιρεῖσθαι τὰς παθητικὰς ποιότητας εἰς τὸ (15) ἐμποιεῖν πάθη καὶ εἰς τὸ ἐκ πάθους συνίστασθαι, ἀλλὰ πάσας ὡς ἐκ πάθους συνισταμένα παθητικὰς εἶναι, τὸ δὲ πάθους ποιητικαῖς εἶναι συμβαίνειν αὐταῖς· “τὸ γὰρ θερμὸν θερμαίνειν δύναται· ἀλλὰ καθ’ ὅσον εἰς ἄλλα ποιεῖ, οὐ ποιά ἀλλὰ ποιητικὰ καλοῦμεν αὐτά, οἷον οὐ θερμὰ ἀλλὰ θερμαντικά, ἅπερ ἤδη πρὸς τι, καθάπερ τὸ καυστικὸν καὶ τὸ καυστὸν καὶ τὰ ὅμοια. διὸ (20) θερμὸν μὲν ἔστιν καὶ μηδενὸς ὄντος θερμαντοῦ, θερμαντικὸν δὲ οὐκέτι· ποιά γὰρ κατὰ τὸ πῶς ἔχειν, ἀλλ’ οὐ κατὰ τὸ πρὸς τι λέγεται”.

‘For heat has the power to heat: but insofar as it *acts* upon others, we call [those others] not ‘suches’ (*poia*) but ‘productive [of such]’ (*poiētika*) – for example, not ‘heats’ (*therma*) but ‘heaters’ (*thermantika*). That is because they are already relative (*pros ti*), just like the burner and the burned (*kaustikon... kauston*), and similar things. For that reason, heat (*thermon*) does not belong to the heatable object (*thermantou*) unless it is producing heat (*thermantikon*). For ‘suches’ (*poia*) are said in accordance with the state (*to pōs echein*), and not in accordance with the relative (*to pros ti*).’

[T14r] **B** Simplicius, *in Cat.* 263,19-22. <Andronicus made a special genus for the fine, the dense, and such things (cf. Plotinus 6.1.11, 30 ff.), that is, a fifth kind of quality.>

Ἀνδρόνικος δὲ πέμπτον εἰσάγει γένος, ἐν ᾧ τάττει μανότητα πυκνότητα, κουφότητα βαρύτητα, λεπτότητα (20) παχύτητα, οὐ τὴν κατὰ τὸν ὄγκον, ἀλλὰ καθὸ ἀέρα λέγομεν λεπτὸν εἶναι καὶ τοῦ ὕδατος λεπτότερον· “ποιά γὰρ, φησί, λέγομεν πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τῷ ἀπὸ ποιότητος εἶναι αὐτά, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ διαφανὲς καὶ τὸ σκοτεινόν, ὥστε, φησίν, ἢ ἄλλο τι γένος ποιότητος τοῦτο θετέον ἢ συζευκτέον αὐτὰ ταῖς παθητικαῖς· τῷ γὰρ παθεῖν τι τὸ σῶμα τούτων ἕκαστον τοιοῦτο (25) γέγονεν, διαφέρει δὲ ἐκείνων, ὅτι πάθους οὐκ εἰσιν ἐμποιητικαὶ αὐταί”.

[T14s] **A** Simplicius, *in Cat.* 266,6. <Andronicus does not believe that shape exists because of qualified figure. But many editors and translators believe, based on marginalia and context, that we should read ‘Aristotle’ for ‘Andronicus’ here>.

οὔτε γὰρ τῷ † Ἀνδρονίκῳ δοκεῖ τοῦτο οὔτε ἀληθές ἐστίν. οὐ δοκεῖ μὲν γὰρ, διότι τὸ σχῆμα ἀπλῶς εἰπὼν τὴν μορφήν οὐχ ἀπλῶς εἶπεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν περὶ ἕκαστον ὑπάρχουσαν μορφήν.

[T14t] **A** Simplicius, *in Cat.* 269,21. <Andronicus puts rarity and density under ‘affective qualities’, but Achaicus does not>.

οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἀχαικὸν παραιτοῦνται καὶ εἰς τὸ πρὸς τι ἀνάγειν τὴν μανότητα <καὶ πυκνότητα> καὶ εἰς ἕτερόν τι πέμπτον εἶδος ποιότητος, ἀλλ’ (20) οὐδὲ εἰς τὰς παθητικὰς αὐτὰς τιθέασιν, ὡς Ἀνδρόνικος, ἀλλ’ εἰς τὰς ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ γένει, λεπτότητα μὲν καὶ κουφότητα ἔπεσθαι μανότητι λέγοντες, παχύτητα δὲ καὶ βαρύτητα πυκνότητι.

[T14u] **A** Simplicius, *in Cat.* 270,2. <Andronicus and Plotinus add a fifth genus of quality.>

ἀλλὰ τῷ χαρακτήρι καὶ τῷ [270] ποιῶ, πότερον ἐν ἄλλῳ εἶδει τάττεται παρὰ τὰ εἰρημένα τέτταρα τῆς ποιότητος, ὥσπερ Ἀνδρόνικος τε καὶ Πλωτίνος ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ἢ ἔνεστιν ὑφ’ ἐν αὐτὰ τῶν τεττάρων προσβιβάζειν;

[T14v] **A** Simplicius, *in Cat.* 332,15. <Andronicus held that *poiein* and *paschein* are contraries (*enantia*). Others state that this is impossible, for it would entail a contrary arising as a product of a contrary; instead, others believe they are said *antithetôs*.>

περὶ δὲ τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα αὐτῶν σχέσεως ζητοῦντες λέγουσιν ὅτι ἀντιθέτως μὲν λέγεται, ἐναντία δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὥσπερ Ἀνδρόνικος φήθη· πῶς γὰρ οἶόν τε τὸ ἐναντίον ἀποτέλεσμα τοῦ ἐναντίου γίνεσθαι;

[T14w] **A** Simplicius, *in Cat.* 342,23. <Although Aristotle put time and place in the [category of] quantity, but established when and where as two separate categories, Archytas, and following Archytas, Andronicus, arranged when together with time, and where with place, and posited two categories in this way, so that they too preserved the number of ten genera.... But Plotinus, in arranging the concept when together with time, and claiming that there are five categories in all, namely ousia, quantity, quality, relative, and movement (6.3.3, applying to the aisthetic world), ought to have shown that time belongs either to quantity or to some one other of these five categories, if time was not to be completely thrown out of the [class of] existents. But [he does not want it to be a quantity]; Simplicius later suggests (343,22) that it may be observed in ousiai; or perhaps it is under Motion].>

Ἰστέον δὲ ὅτι ὁ μὲν Ἀριστοτέλης τὸν χρόνον καὶ τὸν τόπον τοῦ ποσοῦ θείσιν τὸ ποτὲ καὶ ποῦ ἰδίας ἐποίησατο κατηγορίας, ὁ μὲντοι Ἀρχύτας καὶ Ἀνδρόνικος ἀκολουθῶν τῷ Ἀρχύτῃ τῷ μὲν χρόνῳ τὸ ποτὲ συντάξαντες, τῷ δὲ τόπῳ τὸ ποῦ, οὕτως ἔθεντο τὰς δύο κατηγορίας, φυλάξαντες τὴν δεκάδα καὶ οὗτοι τῶν γενῶν. δεῖ δὲ τοὺς ἐπομένους τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει δεῖξαι (25) πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι τοῦ ποσοῦ ὁ χρόνος ἐστίν καὶ ὁ τόπος, ἔπειτα <ὅτι> τὸ ποτὲ καὶ ποῦ οὐ χρόνον καὶ τόπον ἀλλὰ

σχέσιν πρὸς χρόνον καὶ τόπον δηλοῦσιν, καὶ ὅτι ἄξιά ἐστιν εἰς ἀριθμὸν τῶν γενικωτάτων παραλαμβάνεσθαι. ὁ μὲντοι Πλωτίνος συντάπτων μὲν τὸ ποτὲ τῷ χρόνῳ, πέντε δὲ λέγων τὰς πάσας κατηγορίας, οὐσίαν, ποσόν, ποιόν, πρὸς τι, κίνησιν, ὠφελεν ἢ τοῦ (30) ποσοῦ δεῖξαι τὸν χρόνον ἢ τινος ἄλλης τῶν πέντε τούτων κατηγοριῶν, εἰ μὴ μέλλοι τελέως ὁ χρόνος τῶν ὄντων ἐκβάλλεσθαι.

[T14x] **A** Simplicius, *in Cat.* 347,6. <Archytas and Andronicus posited as a particular separate nature [i.e. category] that of time, and they arranged the concept when together with it, since it subsists in connection with time. For [Archytas] proposes to construe the primary and first genera of reality around which the others subsist as the principle ones. Since therefore time has been treated as prior to when, and place as prior to where, in respect of their very existence, he reasonably regards [time and place] as primary [genera] passing over the things included in them as being secondary to them. Accordingly it has been shown in what has been said how on the one hand Ar., paying heed to the differences in their meanings, puts the concept when in another category [from time]; and how on the other hand Archytas, having regard to the kinship in respect of their objects, arranged the [concept] when together with time; and how finally Plotinus, in reducing the primary genera to the smallest number, and in not granting much significance to the *parallagai* between the conceptions and meanings [of time and when], did away with the category of when.>

Ἀρχύτας δὲ καὶ Ἀνδρόνικος ἰδίαν τινὰ φύσιν τῆν τοῦ χρόνου θέμενοι ὁμοῦ τούτῳ συνέταξαν τὸ ποτὲ ὡς περὶ τὸν χρόνον ὑφιστάμενον. αὐτὰ γὰρ τὰ προηγούμενα τῆς ὑποστάσεως πρῶτα γένη, περὶ ἃ τὰ ἄλλα ὑφίσταται, πρόκειται αὐτῷ ὡς ἀρχηγικώτατα λαμβάνειν· ἐπεὶ τοίνυν ὁ μὲν χρόνος τοῦ ποτέ, ὁ δὲ τόπος τοῦ ποῦ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι προτέτακται, εἰκότως (10) αὐτοῖς ὡς προηγουμένως γένεσι χρήται παραλιπὼν τὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς περιεχόμενα ὡς δεύτερα ἐκείνων ὄντα. δέδεικται οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, ὅπως μὲν Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν ἄλλῃ κατηγορίᾳ τὸ ποτὲ τίθεται ταῖς διαφοραῖς τῶν σημασιῶν προσέχων, ὅπως δὲ Ἀρχύτας τῷ χρόνῳ συνέταξεν τὸ ποτὲ πρὸς τὴν κατὰ τὰ πράγματα συγγένειαν ἀποβλέπων, πῶς δὲ Πλωτίνος ἀνείλεν τὴν τοῦ (15) ποτέ κατηγορίαν διὰ τὸ συνάγειν εἰς βραχύτατον ἀριθμὸν τὰ πρῶτα γένη καὶ μὴ πάνυ τι διδόναι ταῖς τῶν νοήσεων καὶ σημασιῶν παραλλαγαῖς. Ἄλλ' ἐπὶ τὰς ἀπορίας λοιπὸν ἰτέον τὰς φερομένας πρὸς τὸ ποτὲ καὶ τὰς λύσεις αὐταῖς ἐπακτέον. ὅταν οὖν οἱ περὶ Πλωτίνον καὶ Ἀνδρόνικον τὸ χθές καὶ αὔριον καὶ πέρυσιν μέρη χρόνου λέγωσιν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀξιῶσιν (20) τῷ χρόνῳ συντετάχθαι, φήσομεν οὐκ εἶναι αὐτὰ μέρη χρόνου, ἀλλὰ σχέσιν περιέχειν τῶν ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ ὄντων πραγμάτων πρὸς τὸν χρόνον, ἄλλο δὲ ἐστὶν τούτων ἐκότερον.

Archytas and Andronicus posited as a particular separate nature that of time, and they arranged the concept when together with it, since it subsists in connection with time. For he proposes to construe the primary and first genera of reality, around which the other things subsist, as the principal ones. Since therefore time has been treated as prior to when, and place as prior to where, in respect of their very existence, he reasonably regards them as primary....

When the followers of Plotinus and Andronicus say that yesterday and tomorrow and last year are parts of time, and on account of this think that they should be arranged together with time, we shall reply that these are not parts of time, but contain a relation of the objects which are in time towards time, and that each of these differs from the other. But, they say, if yesterday is past time, or a

measure of time, it will be a kind of composite (past and time), two categories.  
(Tr. Gaskin)

[T14y] **A** Simplicius, *in Cat.* 357,28. <Archytas and Andronicus place when with time, and where with place, whilst Aristotle puts time and place in the category of quantity, and sets up separate categories of when and where. Plotinus goes further in allocating place and time both to the category of quantity or relative (358,10-11).>

εἴρηται δὲ ἤδη, ὅτι Ἀρχύτας μὲν καὶ Ἀνδρόνικος συνέταξαν τῷ μὲν χρόνῳ τὸ ποτέ, τῷ δὲ τόπῳ τὸ ποῦ, καὶ οὕτως ἔθεντο τὰς δύο κατηγορίας, Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ τὸν μὲν χρόνον καὶ τὸν τόπον τοῦ ποσοῦ τέθεικεν διὰ τὰς (30) εἰρημένας ἔμπροσθεν αἰτίας, τοῦ δὲ ποτέ καὶ τοῦ ποῦ ἄλλας ὑπεστήσατο κατηγορίας· ὡς τὰ πρὸς τι προὑποκειμένοις ἄλλοις γένεσιν παρεφύετο οἷον τῇ οὐσίᾳ καὶ τῷ ποσῷ κατὰ τὴν ἀντιστρέφουσαν καὶ ἐξισάζουσαν σχέσιν θεωρούμενον, οὕτως καὶ τὸ ποτέ καὶ τὸ ποῦ καὶ ἄλλοις ἐπισυνίσταται [358] γένεσιν, οὐδὲν ἄποπον ἰδίας αὐτῶν κατηγορίας ὑποτίθεσθαι, εἰ μόνον ἰδιά τινα τὰ σημαίνόμενα ἔχουσιν.

[T14z] **A** Simplicius, *in Cat.* 359,16.

Πάλιν δὲ ὁ αὐτὸς ἀνήρ τὸ πόρρω καὶ ἐγγὺς εἰς τὸ πρὸς τι ἀνάγειν (15) ἀξιοῖ τοπικὸν ἔχοντα τὸ ὑποκείμενον, Ἀνδρόνικος δὲ εἰς τὸ ποῦ τίθησιν αὐτὰ ἀόριστα κατὰ τόπον ὄντα. καὶ εἶπερ ἢ τοῦ τόπου διαφορὰ ἐπικρατοῦσα φαίνεται ἐν αὐτοῖς, εἰς τὸ ποῦ μᾶλλον ἀνενεκτέα, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰς ἕτερον γένος· οὐ γὰρ τὴν ἀντίστροφον σχέσιν ἔχει πρόχειρον, ὡς τὸ πορρώτερον καὶ ἐγγύτερον, ἀλλὰ τὴν τοῦ τόπου διάστασιν.

[Cornutus] thinks one should refer *far* and *near* to the relative, since they have a spatial subject, but Andronicus places them in the category of where, since they are indefinite in respect of place. Since the difference of place manifestly predominates in their case, they are indeed to be referred to the where rather than to another genus. For they do not obviously evince a reciprocating relation, as do farther and nearer, but rather separation of place.

[T14za] **A** Simplicius, *in Cat.* 379,9-11. <Andronicus holds that the postpraedicamenta were appended against the purpose of the book. (Note, despite the often repeated claim that Andronicus 'athetized' the postpraedicamenta, that Andronicus does *not* plainly claim they are not by Aristotle, only that they are 'against the purpose' of this book and do not belong here). He believes the person who added them was also responsible for the title 'before the Topics'. Adrastus placed Top. after Cat. and may have favoured the name, whilst Herminus is also said to have favoured the name. But they cannot have originated it. See Moraux I, 99-101.>

τινὲς μὲν γάρ, ὧν καὶ Ἀνδρόνικός ἐστιν, παρὰ τὴν πρόθεσιν τοῦ βιβλίου προσκεῖσθαί φασιν ὑπό τινος ταῦτα τοῦ τῶν Κατηγοριῶν βιβλίου Πρὸ τῶν τόπων ἐπιγράψαντος, (10) οὐκ ἐννοοῦντες οὗτοι, πόσῃν χρείαν οὐ τῇ τοπικῇ πραγματείᾳ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ περὶ τῶν κατηγοριῶν λόγῳ εἰσάγει τὰ εἰρημένα.

For some, among whom Andronicus is one, says that these matters [the postpraedicamenta: on Opposites; Prior and Posterior; on the Simultaneous; n the

Species of Movement; and On the Homonymy of Having] have been appended by someone against the purpose of the book, namely the man who inscribed the book of the Categories with the title *Before the Topics*.

[T14zb] **A** Simplicius, *in Cat.* 385,3-9. <Andronicus claimed that acting and undergoing are not merely opposites but also contraries. Cf. T14v. [Aristotle said that acting and undergoing admit of contraries, but are not contraries, but he demonstrates contrariety within each of them, e.g. whitening and blackening, being whitened and being blackened].>

Ἀνδρόνικος δὲ οὐκ ἀντίθετα μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναντία τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πάσχειν ἀπεφήνατο. καὶ τοῦτο δὲ ἐπιστήσαι ἄξιον, ὅτι τὰ μὲν πρὸς τι πρὸς ἄλληλα λέγεται, τὰ δὲ ἐναντία αὐτὰ (5) μὲν ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἐναντία, τουτέστιν τὰ τῇ ἐναντιώσει περιεχόμενα, ὥσπερ τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν, πρὸς ἄλληλα οὐ λέγεται, τὸ δὲ ἐναντίον αὐτὸ καὶ οὐχὶ τὰ περιεχόμενα ὑπ' αὐτοῦ κατὰ τὰ πρὸς τι λέγεται καὶ οὐχὶ κατὰ τὸ ἐναντίον· ἀντεισάγει γὰρ ἄλληλα καὶ συνυφέστηκεν.

[T15a] **B** Simplicius *in Phys.* 440,13

ἰστέον δὲ ὅτι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χωρίῳ οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ σαφέστερον οὕτω γράφουσι ταύτην τὴν λέξιν· ἐντελέχεια γὰρ ἐστὶ τούτου ὑπὸ τοῦ κινητικοῦ, ὁ δὲ Ἀνδρόνικος οὕτως· ἐντελέχεια γὰρ ἐστὶ τοῦ κινητοῦ καὶ ὑπὸ τούτου. καὶ ἐξηγεῖται ὅτι κἂν ἔξωθεν ἦ (15) τὸ κινεῖν, ἐκ τῆς ἐνούσης δυνάμεως εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἀγόμενον, ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ κινεῖσθαι δοκεῖ τὸ κινούμενον.

And it should be known that in this area most write this passage more clearly as follows: 'for it is the actualization of this by the source of change'; but Andronicus writes as follows: 'for it is the actualization of the changed and from it'. He gives the interpretation that, even if the changer be eternal, the changed seems to be changed by itself, since it is brought to actuality through its inherent potentiality'.

[T15b] **A** Simplicius *in Phys.* 450,18.

ἡ δὲ φύσις καὶ προδιατιθεμένη διατίθησι τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἔνδοθεν καθ' ἕκαστον κινήσεως εἶδος, ὡς καὶ ὁ Ἀνδρόνικος ἔλεγε. κἂν γὰρ θερμαίνεται ὑπὸ πυρὸς τὸ ὕδωρ, ἀλλ' ἢ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι φύσις πρώτη θερμὴ γενομένη, οὕτως θερμαίνει ἢ συνθερμαίνει τὸ ὑποκείμενον. δυνάμει οὖν κινητικὸν εἶπεν, ὡς δυνάμει κινητὸν (20) ἔλεγε πρότερον τὸ μένοντος τοῦ δυνάμει κινούμενον, οὕτως οὖν τὸ μένοντος τοῦ δυνάμει κινεῖν.

[T15c] **B** Simplicius *in Phys.* 923,9.

εἴρηται δὲ καὶ πρότερον, ὅτι τὰ μὲν πέντε βιβλία τὰ πρὸ τούτου Φυσικὰ καλοῦσιν, τὰ δὲ ἐντεῦθεν τρία Περὶ κινήσεως· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ Ἀνδρόνικος ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους βιβλίων διατάττεται, μαρτυροῦντος περὶ τῶν πρώτων καὶ Θεοφράστου γράψαντος Εὐδήμου περὶ τινος (10) αὐτῶ τῶν ἡμαρτημένων ἀντιγράφων κατὰ τὸ πέμπτον βιβλίον· “ὑπὲρ ὧν, φησὶν,

ἐπέστειλας κελεύων με γράψαι καὶ ἀποστείλαι ἐκ τῶν Φυσικῶν, ἥτοι ἐγὼ οὐ ξυνήμι ἢ μικρὸν τι παντελῶς ἔχει τὸ ἀνὰ μέσον τοῦ “ὅπερ ἡρεμῆν καλῶ τῶν ἀκινήτων μόνον· ἐναντίον γὰρ ἡρεμία κινήσει, ὥστε στέρησις ἂν εἴη τοῦ δεκτικοῦ,” ὥστε καὶ τὸ πέμπτον βιβλίον ‘ἐκ τῶν Φυσικῶν’ ὁ (15) Θεόφραστος νομίζει.

[T15d] **A** Simplicius *in Phys.* 924,20.

καὶ Ἀνδρόνικος δὲ ταύτην τὴν τάξιν τούτοις τοῖς βιβλίοις ἀποδίδωσι, καὶ μέντοι (20) καὶ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης τοῖς ἐν τῷ πέμπτῳ βιβλίῳ προδιδαχθεῖσι, τῷ συνεχεῖ καὶ ἀπομένῳ καὶ ἐφεξῆς, εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ τούτου τοῦ βιβλίου προσεχρήσατο.

[T16a] **A** Boethius, *De Divisione* 4,3-11 Magee.

Quam magnos studiosis afferat fructus scientia diuidendi quamque apud peripateticam disciplinam semper haec fuerit in honore notitia, docet et Andronici, diligentissimi senis de diuisione liber editus; et hic idem a Plotino grauissimo philosopho comprobatus et in libri Platonis, qui *Sophistes* inscribitur commentariis a Porphyrio repetitus, et ab eodem per hanc introductionis laudata in *Categorias* utilitas. Dicit enim necessarium fore generis, speciei, differentiae, proprii, accidentisque peritiam, cum propter alia multa tum propter utilitatem quae est maxima partiendi.

[T16b] **A** Boethius, *De Divisione* 49-50 Magee.

Posterior quidem Peripateticae secta prudentiae differentias diuisionum diligentissima ratione perspexit et per se diuisionem ab ea quae est secundum accidens ipsasque inter se disiunxit atque distribuit, [50] antiquiores autem indifferenter et accidente pro genere et accidentibus pro speciebus aut differentiis utebantur, unde nobis peropportuna utilitas uisa est et communionem harum diuisionum prodere et eas propriis differentiis disgregare. Et de diuisione quidem omni quantum introductionis breuitas patiebatur diligenter expressimus.

[T17] **A** Philoponus, *in Cat.* 5,19. <Boethus says that one should begin the study of Aristotle from physics; Andronicus, from logic. Andronicus was ‘teacher’ (*didaskalos*) of Boethus>

Τρίτον ἦν ἐφεξῆς κεφάλαιον τὸ πόθεν δεῖ ἄρχεσθαι τῶν Ἀριστοτελικῶν (15) συγγραμμάτων. Βόηθος μὲν οὖν φησιν ὁ Σιδώνιος δεῖν ἀπὸ τῆς φυσικῆς ἄρχεσθαι πραγματείας ἅτε ἡμῖν συνηθεστέρας καὶ γνωρίμου, δεῖν δὲ αἰεὶ ἀπὸ τῶν σαφεστέρων ἄρχεσθαι καὶ γνωρίμων. ὁ δὲ τούτου διδάσκαλος Ἀνδρόνικος ὁ Ῥόδιος ἀκριβέστερον ἐξετάζων ἔλεγε χρῆναι πρότερον ἀπὸ τῆς λογικῆς ἄρχεσθαι, ἥτις περὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν καταγίνεται. (20) ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἐν πάσαις αὐτοῦ ταῖς πραγματεῖαις ὁ φιλόσοφος κέχρηται τῇ ἀποδεικτικῇ μεθόδῳ, δεόν ἡμᾶς πρότερον ταύτην κατορθῶσαι, ἵνα εὐχερέστερον παρακολουθήσωμεν τοῖς ἄλλοις αὐτοῦ συγγράμμασι. φασὶ δὲ τινες ἀπὸ τῆς ἠθικῆς δεῖν ἄρχεσθαι.

[T18-19] **A** Philoponus, in *Cat.* 27,18-26 and 45,8-12. <Andronicus athetized the De Int. Cf. T6, T13>.

τὸ γὰρ ὅλον οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπερ τὸ ἓν, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ὅλον τῶν μερῶν ἐστὶν ὅλον, τὰ δὲ μέρη πολλὰ καὶ οὐχ ἓν· ὥστε οὐχ ἓν τὸ ὅλον, εἴ γε ἐν πολλοῖς ἔχει τὸ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πεπονθὸς ἔχει τὸ ἓν· πέπονθε (20) δὲ τὸ ἓν τὴν οἰκείαν τελειότητα ἀπολαβόν. ἐκ τοῦ χωρίου δὲ τούτου ἐλέγχομεν τὸν Ἀνδρόνικον τὸν Ῥόδιον νοθεύσαντα τὸ Περί ἐρμηνείας· εἰπόντος γὰρ ἐκεῖ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους ὅτι τὰ νοήματα παθήματα ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡσπερ εἴρηται ἐν τῷ Περί ψυχῆς, φησὶν ὁ Ἀνδρόνικος ὅτι τοῦτο οὐδαμοῦ εἴρηται ἐν τῷ Περί ψυχῆς, ὥστε ἀνάγκη ἢ τὴν Περί ψυχῆς (25) νοθεῦσαι ἢ τὸ Περί ἐρμηνείας· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἢ Περί ψυχῆς ὠμολόγηται τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους εἶναι νόθον ἄρα τὸ Περί ἐρμηνείας. [...]

[45] (8) καὶ φοβουμένων, καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων συνδιατίθεται καὶ συγκινεῖται τὸ σῶμα· ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐταὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι τῶν παθῶν τούτων περὶ (5) σώματά εἰσι. ὥστε τοῦ συναμφοτέρου καὶ οὐκ ἴδια τῆς ψυχῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα. [403a7] Μάλιστα δ' ἔοικεν ἰδίῳ τὸ νοεῖν. (6) Ἴδου πάλιν πάθος τὸ νοεῖν ἐκάλεσε. τοῦτο ὡς πρὸς Ἀνδρόνικον τὸν Ῥόδιον νοθεύσαντα τὸ Περί ἐρμηνείας διὰ τὸ ἐκεῖ μὲν εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην τὰ νοήματα παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡς εἴρηται ἐν τῷ Περί ψυχῆς, μηδαμοῦ δὲ φαίνεσθαι ἐν τῷ Περί ψυχῆς, ὡς ἐνόμισεν ὁ Ἀνδρόνικος, (10) τὰ νοήματα παθήματα εἰρηκότα. ἰδοὺ οὖν καὶ ἐνταῦθά φησὶν ὅτι μάλιστα δὲ ἔοικεν ἰδίῳ τὸ νοεῖν· ἰδίῳ γὰρ πάθει δηλονότι.

[T21] **A** Olympiodorus *Proleg.* in *Cat.* 6,7-16.

λαμβάνεται, ὅτι ἐπταχῶς, φέρε καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ δεύτερον κεφάλαιον ὁδεύσωμεν, ἐπὶ τὴν διαίρεσιν τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους συγγραμμάτων φημί. τῶν τοίνυν συγγραμμάτων Ἀριστοτέλους τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ μερικὰ τὰ δὲ καθόλου τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ (10) τῶν καθόλου καὶ τῶν κατὰ μέρος. καὶ ἐστὶ μερικὰ μὲν ὅσα πρὸς τινὰς ἰδία γέγραπται, οἷα εἰσὶν αἱ ἐπιστολαί, ἄστινας Ἀνδρόνικος τε καὶ Ἀρτέμων συνήγαγον. καθόλου δὲ ἐστὶ συγγράμματα ἐν οἷς τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων φύσιν ζητεῖ. μεταξὺ δὲ οἷα εἰσὶν αἱ ἱστορίαι, οἷα ἐστὶν ἢ Περί ζῴων ἱστορία καὶ αἱ Πολιτεῖαι σν' οὐσαι τὸν ἀριθμὸν, ἐν αἷς τὸν βίον Ἀθηναίων καὶ (15) ἄλλων τινῶν διηγείται. καὶ μὴ λεγέτω τις πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀπορῶν τί δήποτε γέγραπται τῷ φιλοσόφῳ τοιαῦτα συγγράμματα·

[T22] **A** David (Elias) in *Cat.* 113,17-21. <Andronicus was the eleventh 'successor' after Aristotle.>

Δεύτερον ἦν κεφάλαιον τῶν προτεθέντων τὸ εἰπεῖν τὴν διαίρεσιν τῶν Ἀριστοτελικῶν συγγραμμάτων χιλίων ὄντων τὸν ἀριθμὸν, ὡς Ἀνδρόνικος παραδίδωσιν ὁ † ποίτου ἐνδέκατος γενόμενος διάδοχος. τῶν τοίνυν Ἀριστοτελικῶν συγγραμμάτων τὰ μὲν εἰσι μερικὰ τὰ δὲ καθόλου τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ. (20) μερικὰ δὲ λέγονται οὐχ ἀπλῶς τὰ πρὸς ἓνα γεγραμμένα (δυνατὸν γὰρ καὶ καθολικὸν πρᾶγμα πρὸς ἓνα γράψαι·

[T23] **A** David (Elias) *in Cat.* 117,22. <Andronicus was the eleventh ‘successor’ after Aristotle. Where Boethus recommended starting the study of Aristotle from physics, Andronicus recommended starting from logic.>

ταῦτα δὲ ζητοῦμεν οὐ μόνον διὰ τὸ πλῆθος αὐτῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν διαφωνίαν τῶν ἀρχαίων· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἔλεγον ὅτι δεῖ ἀπὸ τῆς φυσικῆς ἄρξασθαι, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς λογικῆς (20), ἄλλοι δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἠθικῆς, ἕτεροι δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς μαθηματικῆς· Βοηθὸς γὰρ ὁ Σιδώνιος ἀπὸ τῆς φυσικῆς λέγει, Ἀνδρόνικος δὲ ὁ Ῥόδιος ὁ Περιπατητικὸς ὁ ἐνδέκατος διάδοχος τῆς Ἀριστοτέλους σχολῆς ἀπὸ τῆς λογικῆς ἔλεγε, τῶν δὲ Πλατωνικῶν οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ἠθικῆς οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν μαθηματικῶν. καὶ πάντες τὰς οἰκείας δόξας κατεσκευάζον·

[T23] **A** David (Elias) *in Cat.* 201,18. <Andronicus assigned the final place to the *pros ti* among the categories.>

Τρεῖς τοίνυν δόξαι γεγόνασι περὶ τῆς τάξεως αὐτῶν· Ἀνδρόνικος μὲν μὲν γὰρ ὁ Ῥόδιος τελευταίαν ἀπονέμει τοῖς πρὸς τι τάξιν, λέγων αἰτίαν τοιαύτην· τὰ πρὸς τι ὕλην οἰκείαν οὐκ ἔχει (παραφυάδι γὰρ ἔοικεν οἰκείαν (20) φύσιν μὴ ἐχούση ἀλλὰ παραπλεκομένη τοῖς ἔχουσιν οἰκείαν ῥίζαν), αἱ δὲ ἐννέα κατηγορίαι οἰκείαν ὕλην ἔχουσιν· εἰκότως οὖν τελευταίαν ὄφειλον ἔχειν τάξιν. Ἀρχύτας δὲ ὁ Ταραντίνος τετάρτην ἀπονέμει αὐτοῖς τάξιν, ἐπειδὴ οὐσία καὶ ποιὸν καὶ ποσὸν καθ’ αὐτὰ εἰσι, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τι σχετικὰ εἰσι, προηγείται δὲ τὰ καθ’ αὐτὰ τῶν ἐν σχέσει· πρῶτον γὰρ γίνεται τις (25) ἄνθρωπος καὶ τότε πατήρ, πρῶτον γίνεται ἀριθμὸς καὶ τότε διπλάσιος ὡς ἀριθμὸς.

## 3.1.1. Eudorus of Alexandria

[T1] **A** Strabo, *Geog.* 17, 1, 5. <Eudorus accuses Ariston of plagiarising his book *On the Nile*. Also given as Posidonius fr. 63,10 Theiler>

Ἄλλ' ἐὼ ταῦτα, πολλῶν εἰρηκότων, ὧν ἀρκέσει δύο μνηῦσαι τοὺς ποιήσαντας· καθ' ἡμᾶς τὸ περὶ τοῦ Νείλου βιβλίον, Εὐδώρον τε καὶ Ἀρίστονα τὸν ἐκ τῶν Περιπάτων· πλὴν γὰρ τῆς τάξεως τά γε ἄλλα καὶ τῆ φράσει καὶ τῆ ἐπιχειρήσει (10) ταῦτά ἐστι κείμενα παρ' ἀμφοτέροις. Ἐγὼ γοῦν ἀπορούμενος ἀντιγράφων εἰς τὴν ἀντιβολήν, ἐκ θατέρου θάτερον ἀντέβαλον· πότερος δ' ἦν ὁ τὰλλότρια ὑποβαλλόμενος, ἐν Ἄμμωνος εὖροι τις ἄν. Εὐδώρος δ' (15) ἠτιάτο τὸν Ἀρίστονα· ἢ μέντοι φράσις Ἀριστώνειος μᾶλλον ἐστίν.

But I dismiss this subject, since it has been discussed by many writers, of whom it will suffice to report only the two who in my time have written the book about the Nile, I mean Eudorus and Ariston the Peripatetic philosopher; for except in the matter of arrangement everything found in the two writers is the same as regards both style and treatment. I, at any rate, being in want of copies with which to make a comparison, compared the one work with the other; but which of the two men it was who appropriated to himself the other's work might be discovered at Ammon's temple! Eudorus accused Ariston; the style, however, is more like that of Ariston. (Tr. Jones)

[T2] **A** Arius Didymus *ap.* Stobaeum, *Ecl.* 2.7.2, 64 ff. Wachs. <The *Diairesis* of Eudorus.>

[T3a] **A** Plutarch, *An. Proc.* 1013B5. <Eudorus holds that neither Xenocrates nor Crantor are entirely wrong; Dörrie, *Hermes* 79 (1944), 27-28 argues that Eudorus reconciled Xenocrates's symbolic exegesis with Crantor's more 'literal' exegesis. Xenocrates held that soul was 'a number set in motion by itself', while Crantor described it as a mixture of *noêtê ousia* with 'that which forms impressions of perceptible objects by means of opinion'.>

[T3b] **A** Plutarch, *An. Proc.* 1019E-1020C. <How the means are to be found. Eudorus appears to be Plutarch's source for what follows. At 1020C3, he follows Crantor.>

[T3c] **C\*** Plutarch, *An. Proc.* 1023D-F.

Not only do the souls of mortal beings possess the capacity to know the sensible (*gnôstikên tou aisthêtou dunamin*), but [Plato] adds that the soul of the cosmos – whenever she touches the scattered being or the undivided being of anything – is moved throughout her entire being and announces what the object is identical with, and from what it is different, and in what relation (*pros ti*), and where and how, and when, it comes about that each thing exists (*einai*) and is acted upon by others (*paschein*), both in the sphere of becoming and in that of the ever-one. In these words he is also giving an outline of the ten categories; likewise in what follows, he makes the case more clearly...

[T4] **A** Alexander of Aphrodisias, *in Met.* 59,7. <On *Met.* 1.6, 988a7-12. Moraux has discussed the text in detail in 'Eine Korrektur des Mittelplatonikers Eudoros zum Text der Metaphysik des Aristoteles', *Beiträge zur alten Geschichte und deren Nachleben*, Berlin,

1969, vol. 2, 592-504. Bonitz had proposed to amend the variant quotation at 59,1-2 to print *eidesi* for *eidosi* (cf. *Met.* 988a10-11), but *eidesi* does not seem compatible with what Alexander says next. Moraux would take *kai têi hulêi* as outside the variant reading, to read something like: ‘it is clear that [Plato] used only two causes, the essence (for the Forms are causes of the essence for the other things, [and], for those who know, the One), and matter’. If that reading is right, Eudorus did not attempt to interpret Aristotle’s account of Plato according to a more ‘Middle Platonic’ view; Moraux 503). But Dillon suggests (1977:128 n. 1) that Eudorus intentionally makes the One the cause of Hyle as well as the Eide, noting that this ‘Eudoran’ monism appeals to Philo and appears later in the Chaldaean Oracles (e.g. fr. 34 Des Places and Psellus *Hypot.* 27).>

Some manuscripts have this reading: ‘For the Forms are the causes of the essence for the other things, and for those who know, the One [is the cause of the essence] even for matter’. [Read thus] the text must be informing even those who do not know Plato’s doctrine about the principles that the One and the underlying matter are principles, and that the One is the cause of the essence for the Idea too. The first reading, however, is better; this makes it clear that the Forms are the cause of the essence for the other things, and the One for the Forms. Aspasius relates that the former is the more ancient reading, but that it was later changed by Eudorus and Euharmostus. (Tr. Dooley).

[T5a] **A** Achilles Tattius, *Isagoga excerpta* 2.1. <Dillon, 1977: 129 suggests that Eudorus may be the authority for Diodorus and Posidonius throughout, and generally held with the Stoics that the heavens were composed of pure fire (40,15), that there is no void (38,11).>

The philosopher Eudorus says that the astronomer Diodorus of Alexandria said that Astronomy differs from Physics in this respect, that Astronomy is concerned with the attendant circumstances (*parhepomena*) of Substance [e.g. ‘From what cause and how do eclipses come about?’], whereas Physics concerns Substance itself [e.g. ‘What is the nature of the Sun?’ ...]. But although these sciences are different in the questions they ask, they are interconnected, since one needs the other.

[T5b] **A** Achilles Tattius, *Isagoga excerpta* 13.1.

[T6a] **A** Simplicius, *in Cat.* 159,32. <Simplicius lists Eudorus among the ‘ancient exegetes’ of the *Categories*, with Boethus, Ariston, Andronicus, and Athenodorus.>

οὕτως οὖν οὐδὲ τὸ πρὸς τι, ἀλλὰ μόνως τὰ πρὸς (30) τι. ταῦτα δὲ ἐπιστήσαντες οὗτοι τοὺς παλαιοὺς τῶν κατηγοριῶν ἐξηγητὰς αἰτιῶνται, Βόηθον καὶ Ἀρίστων καὶ Ἀνδρόνικον καὶ Εὐδωρον καὶ Ἀθηνόδωρον, μήτε ἐπιστήσαντας μήτε ἐπισημηναμένους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασι [160] συγκεχυμένως χρησαμένους καὶ ἐνικῶς ἐκφέροντας ἐνίστε τὸ πρὸς τι, τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους πληθυντικῶς ἀεὶ προφερομένου.

[T6b] **A** Simplicius, *in Cat.* 174,14. <Eudorus complains (*ad. Cat.* 6a36) that Aristotle, having contrasted the absolute and relative categories, discusses the relative, but makes no further mention of the absolute. These two ‘Platonic categories’ can be traced to Xenocrates

(fr. 12 Heinze) and seem to have been maintained by Andronicus in some way, at least in Simplicius's view. Dillon (1977:133) points out that the view may be traced to Plato himself (on the testimony of Hermodorus *ap. Simplic. in Phys.* 248,2 Diels); in the *Sophist* 255C, Plato distinguishes *auta kath' hauta* from *pros alla*; in later Pythagorean circles, the Even/Odd distinction is assimilated to the Absolute/Relative distinction (see 'Callicratidas' *De Dom. Fel.* 103,12-13 Thesleff. >

Αἰτιᾶται δὲ ὁ Εὐδωρος, διὰ τί ἀντιδιηρημένου τοῦ καθ' αὐτὸ τῷ πρὸς τι περὶ μὲν τοῦ πρὸς τι διείλεται ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης, περὶ δὲ τοῦ καθ' (15) αὐτὸ οὐκέτι.

[T6c] **A** Simplicius, *in Cat.* 187,10. <Eudorus the academic objects that wing is not coordinate with winged; for the wing is spoken of in actuality, and the winged in potentiality, as having the potential for wings... in the case of the rudder: that is, it should be spoken of in relation not to the ruddered, but to that which possesses a rudder and the head to that which possesses a head. But each is spoken of in two ways....>

Εὐδωρος δὲ ὁ Ἀκαδημαϊκὸς ἐγκαλεῖ ὡς οὐ συντάπτεται τὸ περὶ (10) τῷ περωτῷ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ περὶ ἐνεργείᾳ λέγεται, τὸ δὲ περωτὸν δυνάμει, ὡς δυνάμενον περωθῆναι· εἰ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ γένοιτο, οὐ περωτόν, ἀλλ' ἐπερωμένον λέγεται. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πηδαλίου διορίζεται, ὅτι οὐ πρὸς πηδαλιωτόν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς πεπηδαλιωμένον ἂν λέγοιτο, καὶ ἡ κεφαλὴ πρὸς κεκεφαλωμένον.

[T6d] **A** Simplicius, *in Cat.* 206,10. <Eudorus reorders the categories, placing Quality after *ousia*, then Where and When, which he identifies with space and time. Eudorus's explanation that *ousia* is in Space and Time suggests that he takes the *Categories* to be concerned with the sensible world. In this, at least in Simplicius's presentation, 'Archytas' seems to follow Eudorus as Szlezak (1972) suggests. Archytas takes it as given that the categories concern just the sensible world (cf. 22,31 and 31,5 Thesleff; also Dillon 134-35 for discussion). He agrees with Andronicus in separating the postpraedicamenta, and with And. and Ariston in changing Aristotle's definition of Relation (Simplic. 202,2). Archytas also differs from Eudorus on the ranking of Relation, Space, and Time. He puts Relation fourth, after Quality and Quantity, and Space and Time at the end of the list, in which he is followed by Philo. The order of the categories may reflect Eudorus's Pythagorean metaphysics: thus if the One represents *ousia*, the Monad and Dyad may be represented by Quality (Form or Logos) and Quantity, Relation by the imminent logos; thus Moderatus regards the indefinite element in the intelligible world as Quantity (cf. Simplic. *in Phys.* 230,41. For Dillon, Philo's comments (*Fug.* 12-13) might suggest that Eudorus made these equivalences; moreover, we might point to the passage of Plutarch cited above as T3c. Eudorus and Archytas will also be followed by 'Lucius' in several respects.>

Ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἀρχύτας, ὡς καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται, μετὰ τὴν οὐσίαν εὐθὺς τάττει τὴν ποιότητα λέγων· “δευτέρα δὲ ἡ ποίωσις· ἄνευ γὰρ τῷ τί ἐστὶν ἡμεν ἀδύνατον ποιόν τι ἡμεν. τρίτα δέ, φησὶν, ἡ ποσότης”. καὶ Εὐδωρος (10) δὲ τῷ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας λόγῳ τὸν περὶ τῆς ποιότητος λόγον καὶ μετὰ τοῦτον τὸν περὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ συνεξέυχθαι φησὶν· τὴν γὰρ οὐσίαν ἅμα τῷ ποιῶ καὶ ποσῶ συνυφίστασθαι, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τὴν χρονικὴν τε καὶ τοπικὴν

κατηγορίαν παραλαμβάνεσθαι· πάσαν γὰρ οὐσίαν ποῦ τε εἶναι καὶ ποτέ, δηλονότι τὴν αἰσθητήν.

Eudorus declares that the account of Quality is to be subjoined to that of Substance, and after that should come the discussion of Quantity. For Substance exists only in conjunction with quality and quantity, and after these should be taken the categories of Time and Space. For every substance is ‘somewhere’ and ‘at some time’. [...] (tr. Dillon)

[T6e] **B** Simplicius, *in Cat.* 236,28. <Eudorus challenges Aristotle’s account of condition (*diathesis*) on the grounds that ease-of-change (*eukineton*) will no longer be an *idion* of condition if a state (*hexis*) is also *eukinetos* and every state is a condition>

Εὐδωρος δὲ ἐγκαλεῖ ὅτι εἰπὼν ἴδιον εἶναι τῆς διαθέσεως τὸ εὐκίνητον φησὶ πάλιν † εἶπερ εἶδη αἱ ἕξεις καὶ διαθέσεις· “οὐκέτι γὰρ ἴδιον ἔσται τὸ εὐκίνητον τῆς διαθέσεως· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἕξις εὐκίνητος ἔσται· καὶ (30) γὰρ εἰ ἴδιον ζῶον ἦν τὸ λογικόν, οὐκ ἂν ἦν ὁ κύων ζῶον ἄλογος ὢν· καὶ εἰ πάσα ἕξις καὶ διάθεσις, οὐδεμία δὲ διάθεσις ἕξις, πῶς οὐ συναχθήσεται τὸ τὰς ἕξεις μὴ εἶναι ἕξεις;”

[T6f] **B** Simplicius, *in Cat.* 246,22. <Eudorus finds that natural capacities will be conditions if they are *eukinetos*, otherwise states. Thus he finds that this species of Quality is the same as the preceding species.>

Ὁ δὲ Εὐδωρος αἰτιάται ὡς τῷ προτέρῳ ταῦτὸν ὄν τοῦτο τὸ εἶδος τῆς ποιότητος· ‘αἱ γὰρ φυσικαὶ δυνάμεις, εἰ μὲν εὐμετακίνητοι τύχωσιν, διαθέσεις ἔσονται, εἰ δὲ μόνιμοι, ἕξεις’.

[T6g] **A** Simplicius, *in Cat.* 256,16. <Eudorus inquires why Aristotle lists warming, chilling, disease and health among conditions in discussing the first species of Quality, but later ranks them under ‘affective quality’.>

Ἀλλὰ πῶς, φησὶν Εὐδωρος, ἐν μὲν τῷ πρώτῳ εἶδει τῆς ποιότητος θερμότητος καὶ ψύξεις καὶ νόσον καὶ ὑγείαν ἐν ταῖς διαθέσει καταριθμήσεν, ἐνταῦθα δὲ ὡς εἰς ἄλλο εἶδος τὴν παθητικὴν ποιότητα αὐτὰς καταλέγει; ἢ φήσομεν ὡς ἐκεῖ μὲν κατὰ τὸ διακείσθαι οὕτω καὶ πῶς ἔχειν θέσεως κατὰ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν ἐλαμβάνετο, ἐνταῦθα δὲ κατὰ τὸ πάθος (20) ἐμποιεῖν εἰς ἄλλο ἢ παθητικὴ ποιότητος θεωρεῖται.

[T6i] **A** Simplicius, *in Cat.* 263,27. <Eudorus posts thickness and thinness as another genus of quality.>

Εὐδωρος δὲ τὴν παχύτητα καὶ λεπτότητα εἰς ἕτερον τάπτει γένος, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας οὐ· οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἀχαϊκὸν ταύτας μὲν εἰς τὸ τέταρτον γένος τάπτουσιν συνεπομένας τῷ μανῶ καὶ πυκνῶ, ἐκείνας δὲ μᾶλλον αἰνίπτεσθαι τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη φασὶν ἐν τῷ ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἄλλο γένος, ἃς ἐν τῇ Περί (30) γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τῷ θερμῶ καὶ ὑγρῶ καὶ ψυχρῶ καὶ ξηρῶ

συνέταξεν· εἰσὶν δὲ αὐταὶ βαρὺ κοῦφον, σκληρὸν μαλακόν, τραχὺ λείον, παχὺ λεπτόν.

[T6j] **A** Simplicius, *in Cat.* 268,13. <Eudorus wonders how rare, dense, smooth and rough signify position (*thesis*) while crooked and straight do not.>

Εὐδωρος δὲ ἀπορεῖ, τί δήποτε τὸ μὲν μανὸν καὶ πυκνὸν καὶ λείον καὶ τραχὺ θέσιν σημαίνει, οὐκέτι δὲ καὶ ἡ καμπυλότης καὶ ἡ εὐθύτης. πρὸς δὲ ῥητέον ὅτι περὶ ἄλλα μὲν θεωρεῖται ἡ θέσις τὰ ἐν τόπῳ ὄντα (15) σώματα ἢ περὶ τὰς γραμμὰς τὰς ἐν τῇ ἐπιφανείᾳ οὔσας, ἢ μέντοι εὐθύτης καὶ ἡ καμπυλότης περὶ τὰ θέσιν ἔχοντα τὸ ποιὸν ἀφορίζει, οὔτε ἐν θέσει οὔσα οὔτε κατὰ τοῦτο εἰδοποιουμένη.

[T7] **B** Simplicius, *in Phys.* 181,7-30. <Eudorus states that the Pythagoreans posit a One above the duality of Monad and Dyad, and he describes this One as principle of matter as well as of all created things; it is the *huperanō theos*. He may draw on *Phileb.* 26E-30E.>

Καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι δὲ οὐ τῶν φυσικῶν μόνων ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντων ἀπλῶς μετὰ τὸ ἓν, ὃ πάντων ἀρχὴν ἔλεγον, ἀρχὰς δευτέρας καὶ στοιχειώδεις τὰ ἐναντία ἐτίθεσαν, αἷς καὶ τὰς δύο συστοιχίας ὑπέταττον οὐκέτι κυρίως ἀρχαῖς οὔσαις.

γράφει δὲ περὶ τούτων ὁ Εὐδωρος τάδε· “κατὰ τὸν ἀνωτάτω (10) λόγον φατέον τοὺς Πυθαγορικοὺς τὸ ἓν ἀρχὴν τῶν πάντων λέγειν, κατὰ δὲ τὸν δευτέρου λόγον δύο ἀρχὰς τῶν ἀποτελουμένων εἶναι, τό τε ἓν καὶ τὴν ἐναντίαν τούτῳ φύσιν. ὑποτάσσεσθαι δὲ πάντων τῶν κατὰ ἐναντίωσιν ἐπινοουμένων τὸ μὲν ἀστεῖον τῷ ἐνί, τὸ δὲ φαῦλον τῇ πρὸς τοῦτο ἐναντιουμένη φύσει. διὸ μὴδὲ εἶναι τὸ σύνολον ταύτας ἀρχὰς κατὰ τοὺς ἀνδρας. (15) εἰ γὰρ ἢ μὲν τῶνδε ἢ δὲ τῶνδὲ ἐστὶν ἀρχή, οὐκ εἰσὶ κοιναὶ πάντων ἀρχαὶ ὡσπερ τὸ ἓν”. καὶ πάλιν “διό, φησί, καὶ κατ’ ἄλλον τρόπον ἀρχὴν ἔφασαν εἶναι τῶν πάντων τὸ ἓν, ὡς ἂν καὶ τῆς ὕλης καὶ τῶν ὄντων πάντων ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεγενημένων. τοῦτο δὲ εἶναι καὶ τὸν ὑπεράνω θεόν” .

καὶ λοιπὸν ἀκριβολογούμενος ὁ Εὐδωρος ἀρχὴν μὲν τὸ ἓν αὐτοὺς τίθεσθαι λέγει, στοιχεῖα (20) δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνὸς γενέσθαι φησὶν, ἃ πολλοῖς αὐτοὺς ὀνόμασιν προσαγορεύειν. λέγει γάρ· “φημὶ τοίνυν τοὺς περὶ τὸν Πυθαγόραν τὸ μὲν ἓν πάντων ἀρχὴν ἀπολιπεῖν, κατ’ ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον δύο τὰ ἀνωτάτω στοιχεῖα παρεισάγειν. καλεῖν δὲ τὰ δύο ταῦτα στοιχεῖα πολλαῖς προσηγορίαις· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ὀνομάζεσθαι τεταγμένον ὠρισμένον γνωστὸν ἄρρεν περιπτόν δεξιὸν φῶς, τὸ δὲ ἐναντίον τούτῳ ἄτακτον ἀόριστον ἄγνωστον θῆλυ ἀριστερόν ἄρτιον σκότος, ὥστε ὡς μὲν ἀρχὴ τὸ ἓν, ὡς δὲ στοιχεῖα τὸ ἓν καὶ ἡ ἀόριστος δυάς, ἀρχαὶ ἄμφω ἓν ὄντα πάλιν. καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἄλλο μὲν ἐστὶν ἓν ἢ ἀρχὴ τῶν πάντων, ἄλλο δὲ ἓν τὸ τῇ δυάδι ἀντικείμενον, ὃ καὶ μονάδα καλοῦσιν”.

It must be said that the Pythagoreans postulated on the highest level the One as a First Principle, and then on a secondary level two principles of existent things, the One and the nature opposed to this. And there are ranked below these all those things that are thought of as opposites, the good under the One, the bad under the nature opposed to it. for this reason these two are not regarded as absolute first principles by this School; for if the one is the first principle of one set of opposites and the other of the other, then they cannot be common principles of both, as is the (supreme) One. (tr. Dillon).

## 3.1.2. Ariston of Alexandria

[T0] **A** Strabo, *Geog.* 17, 1, 5. <Eudorus accuses Ariston of plagiarising his book *On the Nile*. Also given as Posidonius fr. 63,10 Theiler>

Ἄλλ' ἐὼ ταῦτα, πολλῶν εἰρηκότων, ὧν ἀρκέσει δύο μηνῦσαι τοὺς ποιήσαντας· καθ' ἡμᾶς τὸ περὶ τοῦ Νείλου βιβλίον, Εὐδωρόν τε καὶ Ἀρίστωνά τὸν ἐκ τῶν Περιπάτων· πλὴν γὰρ τῆς τάξεως τά γε ἄλλα καὶ τῆ φράσει καὶ τῆ ἐπιχειρήσει (10) ταῦτά ἐστι κείμενα παρ' ἀμφοτέροις. Ἐγὼ γοῦν ἀπορούμενος ἀντιγράφων εἰς τὴν ἀντιβολήν, ἐκ θατέρου θάτερον ἀντέβαλον· πότερος δ' ἦν ὁ τὰλλότρια ὑποβαλλόμενος, ἐν Ἄμμωνος εὖροι τις ἄν. Εὐδωρος δ' (15) ἠτιάτο τὸν Ἀρίστωνά· ἢ μέντοι φράσις Ἀριστώνειος μᾶλλον ἐστίν.

But I dismiss this subject, since it has been discussed by many writers, of whom it will suffice to report only the two who in my time have written the book about the Nile, I mean Eudorus and Ariston the Peripatetic philosopher; for except in the matter of arrangement everything found in the two writers is the same as regards both style and treatment. I, at any rate, being in want of copies with which to make a comparison, compared the one work with the other; but which of the two men it was who appropriated to himself the other's work might be discovered at Ammon's temple! Eudorus accused Ariston; the style, however, is more like that of Ariston. (Tr. Jones)

[T1] **A** Cicero, *Acad.* 2.4, 12.

[T2] **A** Philodemus, *Index Acad. Herc.* col. 35 (p. 110,2-112,16 Mekler).

που καὶ αὐτὸς .....

δι[ε]δεγ[μ]έν[ος]· τὴν δὲ δι-  
ατριβ[η]ν αὐτοῦ (scil. τοῦ Ἀντιόχου) διεδέξατο  
ἀδελφ[ὸ]ν [ς] ὦν [κα]ὶ μα[θ]ητῆς  
Ἄριστος, ἀκου[σ]τ[ὰ]ς δὲ καίπερ (5)

ἀσχολούμεν[ο]ς ἔσχε πλεί-  
ους καὶ δὴ [κα]ὶ [συ]νήθ[ε]ις [ἦ]-  
μ[ῶ]ν Ἀρ[ί]στωνά τε καὶ Δίω-  
να Ἀλεξανδροεῖς καὶ [ι] Κρά-  
τ[ι]πον [Π]εργαμηνόν, [ῶ]ν (10)

Ἀρίστων [μὲν] καὶ Κράτ[ι]π-  
πος ἐ[π]εῖ] ..να..... [ἦ]-  
κουσα[ν] .....ηλο.σ....  
ἐγ[έ]νον[το] Περιπ[α] [τητι-]  
κοὶ ἀ [ποστα]τήσα[ν]τες τῆς Ἀ-  
καδημείας. [ἀ]φ' οὗ κα[τὰ] χρό-  
νον τιν[ᾶ] ..ω.ουσ.....  
ωνε.....σα..ξα.... (15)

[T3] **A** Ps.-Apuleius, *De Int.* 13, 193,16-20 Thomas (fr. 4). <Ariston introduced five ‘subaltern’ moods of the syllogism, three in first figure, two in second, by substituting particular for universal conclusions in those moods which can yield universal conclusions. He seems to imply knowledge of the indirect moods of the first figure discovered by Theophrastus; he is probably not the author of the list of nineteen valid moods in the last ch. of Apuleius’ books; cf. Moraux I, 190 f.; see also Mariotti 59, Prantl I 557, M. W. Sullivan, *Apuleian Logic*, 1967, 96 f. and 165f.>

[T4] **A** Diogenes Laertius 7.164.

Γέγονε δὲ καὶ ἄλλος Ἀρίστων ... ἔκτος Ἀλεξανδρεὺς Περιπατητικὸς.

[T5] **C\*** Porphyry, *De Fac. ap.* Stobaeum 1,49,24; p. 347,19-349,17 Wachsmuth. <Grilli proposes to assign to Ariston this passage concerning at least two distinct faculties of soul, one concerned with intellection and the other concerned with sensation.>

[T6] **B** Marius Victorinus, *Ars. Gramm.* 1.

'Ars', ut Aristoni placet, 'collectio est ex perceptionibus et exercitationibus ad aliquem vitae finem pertinens, id est generaliter omne quicquid certis praeceptis ad utilitatem (5) nostram format animos'. [...] Ut Aristoni placet, 'grammaticae est scientia poetas et historicos intellegere, formam praecipue loquendi ad rationem et consuetudinem dirigens'.

[T7a] **A** Simplicius *in Cat.* 188,31 ff = fr. 2 Mariotti. <Ariston inquires whether *kosmos* may be a relative term. See Zeller III 1, 649; Prantl I 546; Moraux I 181-93; Mariotti (1966) 48-57.>

[T7b] **A** Simplicius *in Cat.* 201,34 ff. <Ariston altered *ti* to *heteron* in the definition of the relative at *Cat.* 8a31 f. to avoid circularity. Andronicus appears to have done the same (Simplicius subsequently states οὕτως δὲ καὶ Ἀνδρόνικος, although it is not clear who follows whom). Tarán, ‘Aristotelianism’ 742, suggests Stoic influence on Ariston; Gottschalk, 1106 n. 138, points to Aristotelian sources instead.>

ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀσαφὴ τὴν ἀπόδοσιν ἐποίησατο, ὡς καὶ Βοήθῳ καὶ Ἀρίστωνι δοκεῖ, ὅπερ καὶ αὐτὸ κακία ὀρισμοῦ ἐστίν, διόπερ ὁ Ἀρίστων ὡς ἐπὶ σαφέστερον μεταλαμβάνων “τὰ πρὸς τί πως ἔχοντα, φησὶν, ταῦτά ἐστιν, οἷς τὸ εἶναι ταῦτόν ἐστιν τῷ πῶς ἔχειν πρὸς ἕτερον”· [καὶ] οὕτως δὲ καὶ Ἀνδρόνικος ἀποδίδωσιν. [...]

## 4. Lucius and Nicostratus

### A. Lucius and Nicostratus: Simplicius in *Cat.*

[T1] **A 1,19.** <Nicostratus followed Lucius in raising eristic and tendentious difficulties about the *Categories*, with some benefit to subsequent philosophical discussion.>

ἄλλοις δὲ ἤρρεσεν ἀπορίας μόνας γράψαι πρὸς τὰ λεγόμενα, ὅπερ Λούκιός τε πεποίηκε καὶ μετ' αὐτὸν Νικόστρατος τὰ τοῦ Λουκίου ὑποβαλλόμενος, σχεδὸν τι πρὸς πάντα τὰ εἰρημένα κατὰ τὸ βιβλίον ἐνστάσεις κομίζειν φιλοτιμούμενοι, καὶ οὐδὲ εὐλαβῶς, ἀλλὰ καταφορικῶς μᾶλλον καὶ ἀπηρυθριακῶς· πλὴν καὶ τούτοις χάρις, καὶ ὅτι πραγματειώδεις τὰς πολλὰς τῶν ἀποριῶν προεβάλλοντο καὶ ὅτι λύσεώς τε τῶν ἀποριῶν ἀφορμὰς καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν θεωρημάτων τοῖς μεθ' ἑαυτοῦς ἐνδεδώκασι.

[T2] **A 21,2-25,9** <The associates of Nicostratus raised problems concerning the opening of the text: (A) Aristotle claims to speak about 'categories', but opens with the discussion of homonyms, synonyms, and paronyms. (B) Thus while he claims to speak about 'expressions' (*lexeis*), he opens by discussing *pragmata*. (C) Homonymy is said to apply only to nouns (*onomata*), but should also refer to verbs.> **Speakers: Hoi Peri N., cont. Ἀποροῦσι. Respondents: Porphyry, Iamblichus.**

[A. 21,2-4] Ἀποροῦσιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Νικόστρατον, τί δήποτε περὶ τῶν κατηγοριῶν εἰπεῖν προθέμενος οὐ περὶ αὐτῶν εὐθύς, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων διδάσκει τῶν τε ὁμωνύμων καὶ συνωνύμων καὶ παρωνύμων.

[B. 24,6] Ἀποροῦσι δὲ καὶ διὰ τί, καίτοι περὶ λέξεων προθέμενος εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων, ὅμως περὶ ὁμωνυμίας μὲν οὐδὲν λέγει, περὶ δὲ τῶν ὁμωνύμων διδάσκει, καίτοι προηγουμένης τῆς κατὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν ἐννοίας, εἶπερ ἀπ' ἐκείνης τὰ ὁμώνυμα. καὶ λέγουσιν καλῶς, ὅτι ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων γίνεται δηλατὰ τὰ ὁμώνυμα, ὅταν τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὀνόματος (10) ῥηθέντος ἐγὼ μὲν ἄλλην ἐννοίαν, σὺ δὲ ἄλλην περὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος προβαλλώμεθα, ὥσπερ τοῦ κύων ὀνόματος ῥηθέντος ἐγὼ μὲν τὸν χερσαῖον, σὺ δὲ τὸν θαλάττιον ἐννοήσεις.

[C. 25,9] Ἀποροῦσι δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, πῶς ὁμώνυμα ἐκεῖνα μόνον εἶπεν, ὦν ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, καίτοι τῆς ὁμωνυμίας καὶ ἐν ῥήμασιν οὔσης, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ ἠνδραπόδισται, καὶ ἐν μετοχαῖς, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ ἠνδραποδισμένος, καὶ ἐν συνδέσμοις· καὶ γὰρ τοῦ ἦ καὶ τοῦ ἦτοι πολλὰς διαφορὰς οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ παραδιδόασιν. λέγουσι δὲ πρὸς τοῦτο, ὅτι τὸ ὄνομα τριχῶς λέγεται· τὸ μὲν γὰρ δηλοῖ τὸ κύριον, τὸ δὲ τὸ προσηγορικόν, τὸ δὲ τὸ κοινῶς ἐπὶ πᾶν μέρος λόγου διατεῖνον, καθὸ Πλάτωνα μὲν καλοῖς, Ξενοφῶντα δὲ κοινοῖς ὀνόμασιν κεχρησθαί φαμεν. οὐδὲν οὖν ἄτοπον νῦν λέγεσθαι τὸ κοινῶς ἐπὶ πάντα τοῦ λόγου τὰ μέρη διατεῖνον.

[T3] **A 26,21-28,1.** <The associates of Nicostratus claim (A) that homonyms are not proper ‘names’ because they are not significant; (B) to the anonymous defense that not all ‘names’ (*onomata*) are significant, they *would* reply (it is not clear that they actually *did* reply) that the definition furnished by Aristotle requires *onoma* to be significant (*sêmeinei ti*) in this context.> **Speakers: Hoi peri N., cont. φαίεν ἄν.**

**Respondents: τινες.**

[A. 26,21-27,15] Ἀποροῦσι δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τὸ ὄνομα τῶν ὁμωνύμων λέγεσθαι οἱ περὶ τὸν Νικόστρατον. ὁ γὰρ εἰπὼν κύνα ὅτι μὲν μὴ βούνῃ μηδὲ ἵππον ἢ ἄλλο τι λέγει τῶν τοιούτων ἐδήλωσεν, ὃ δὲ βούλεται σημαίνειν, οὕτω δεδήλωκεν· τίνα γὰρ τῶν κυνῶν, πότερον τὸν ἀστρῶν ἢ τὸν χερσαίων ἢ τὸν θαλάττιον ἢ τὸ περὶ τὴν γνάθον συμβαῖνον σπασμῶδες πάθος, οὕτω (25) δῆλον. εἰ οὖν μηδὲν σημαίνει, οὐδὲ ὄνομα ἂν εἴη, ὥστε οὐδὲ ὁμώνυμον· τὰ γὰρ ὁμώνυμα κοινὸν ἔχειν ὄνομα ἐλέγετο. εἰ δὲ προσθήκης δεῖται τινος πρὸς τὸ σημαίνειν τί τῶν πολλῶν ἐκείνων ἐστὶ τὸ ῥηθέν, οἷον ὅτι τὸν ἀστρῶν λέγει ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν κυνῶν, οὐκέτι κοινὸν μένει τὸ ὄνομα· τῇ γὰρ προσθήκῃ, καθ’ ἣν μάλιστα σημαίνει ὃ βούλεται, ἰδιωθήσεται·

ὥστε (30) εἰ μὲν μὴ σημαίνει τι, οὐκ ἔστιν ὄνομα τὸ ἐπὶ τῶν ὡς ὁμωνύμων ἀποδοθέντων λεγόμενον· εἰ δὲ τῇ προσθήκῃ τῇ ἴδιον ἐκάστου ποιούσῃ τὸ ὄνομα σημαίνει, οὐκέτι καθὸ κοινοῦ ὀνόματος μετέχει ὁμώνυμά ἐστιν, ὅποτε τὸ μετὰ τῆς [p. 27] προσθήκης οὐκέτι οὔτε ὄνομα μόνον ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ λόγος. ὥστε κὰν μὴ σημαίνει τι, οὐκ ἔστιν ὄνομα· τὸ γὰρ ὄνομα σημαντικὸν εἶναι βούλεται· κὰν σημαίνει μὲν μετὰ τῆς προσθήκης δέ, πάλιν οὐκ ἔστιν ὄνομα ἀλλὰ λόγος διὰ τὴν τῆς διαφορᾶς προσθήκην, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ κοινὸν ἔτι διὰ τὴν διαφορᾶν. ὅλως δὲ κατ’ οὐδὲν τῶν τοῦ κοινοῦ σημαυνομένων εἴη ἂν κοινὸν (5) τὸ τῶν ὁμωνύμων λεγόμενον ὄνομα· οὔτε γὰρ κατὰ τὸ διαιρετὸν κοινόν· ἄλλο γὰρ ἄλλης συλλαβῆς τοῦ ὀνόματος μετέχον οὐκέτι ἂν εἴη ὁμώνυμον· οὔτε κατὰ τὸ ὅλον μὲν ἄλλοτε δὲ ἐν ἄλλου χρήσει γινόμενον· ἅμα γὰρ ἐκάστῳ τῶν ὁμωνύμων λεγομένων ὑπάρχει τὸ ὄνομα· οὔτε κατὰ τὸ ἐν προκαταλήψει καὶ ιδιότητι ἅμα, καὶ διότι ἔμελλεν ἕκαστον ἄλλοτε ἄλλο (10) μεταλαμβάνειν ὄνομα, ὡς ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ τοὺς τόπους, καὶ οὐκέτι πάλιν ὁμώνυμα· ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ὡς ἡ φωνή· ἢ μὲν γὰρ φωνὴ τὴν αὐτὴν πᾶσιν ἐμποιεῖ διάθεσιν τοῖς ἀκούουσιν, τὸ δὲ ὁμώνυμον ἄλλην ἄλλοις ἔννοιαν παρέχεται, εἶπερ ἄρα τι σημαίνει, εἰ δὲ μὴ ἄλλην ἄλλοις, ἀσήμαντον μένει καὶ οὐκέτι ἐστὶν ὄνομα.

[B. 27,25-28,1] ἀλλ’ ἀδύνατον, φαίεν ἄν, τοιούτων εἶναι τὸ ἐν τῷ ὄρῳ τῶν ὁμωνύμων παρελημμένον ὄνομα· τὸ γὰρ ὦν ῥηθέν ἀφορίζει τινὰς εἰς οὐς κατετάχθη, τὸ δὲ τῷ χαρακτήρι μόνον ὄνομα οὐ κατατέτακται. εἰ οὖν ἀκατάτακτον, οὐκ ἂν ὑπάγοιτο τῷ ὀρισμῷ, ἢ εἰ κατατεταγμένον εἴη, οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινόν· οὐδὲ γὰρ κοινὴ εἶναι ἢ κατὰτάξις δύναται. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοῦνομα λόγος ἕτερος ὡς κατατεταγμένου πάντως ἐστίν· τὸ γὰρ τὸν χαρακτήρα (30) μόνον ἔχον οὐδὲ λόγον ἔχει τίνα· τίς γὰρ ἂν εἴη λόγος τοῦ βλίτυρι, μηδὲν σημαίνοντος; εἰ δὲ κατατέτακται, οὐκ ἔστιν κοινόν, ὡς οὐδὲ οἱ ὅροι κατὰ τὴν διάφορον κατὰτάξιν τὸ διάφορον ἔχοντες.

[T4] **A 29,23-30,5.** <The associates of Nicostratus reproach Aristotle for appearing to say that homonymy is only to be found in *ousia* (1a1-2), as homonymy is also found in, e.g., Quality and Position. Porphyry replies that *tês ousias* is omitted in some MSS and observes that neither Boethus nor Andronicus read it: as included in most MSS, however, it means just that Aristotle includes both *horos* and *hupographê* in *logos*>. **Speakers: Hoi peri N. Respondent: Porphyry. NB: The Nicostratus comment clearly postdates Boethus, who shows no awareness of the reading criticized by N.**

ὁ οὖν λόγος τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τὸν ὀριστικὸν λόγον καὶ τὸν ὑπογραφικὸν περιείληφεν. ὥστε μάτην ἐγκαλοῦσι πάλιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Νικόστρατον ὡς ἐν μόνῃ τῇ οὐσίᾳ δοκοῦντι λέγειν τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν (25) τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει, εἶπερ τὸν τῆς οὐσίας λόγον ἕτερον εἶπεν ἐν τοῖς ὁμωνύμοις, καίτοι καὶ ἐν ποιῶ οὔσης ὁμωνυμίας, εἶπερ λευκὸν καὶ χρῶμα καὶ λευκὴν φωνὴν λέγομεν, καὶ ἐν τῷ κείσθαι καὶ ἐν ἄλλαις κατηγορίαις. πρὸς γὰρ ταύτην τὴν ἀπορίαν ὑπαντῶν ὁ Πορφύριος πρῶτον μὲν φησιν μηδὲ ἐν πάσι τοῦτο γεγράφθαι τοῖς ἀντιγράφοις· μήτε γὰρ Βόηθον εἰδέναί, ὅς φησι δεικνύναι τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη τίνα ἐστὶν τὰ ὁμωνύμα λέγοντα Ὁμώνυμα λέγεται [p. 30] ὧν ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοῦνομα λόγος ἕτερος· καὶ ἐξηγούμενος δὲ ὁ Βόηθος καθ' ἐκάστην λέξιν τὸ τῆς οὐσίας παραλέλοιπεν ὡς οὐδὲ γεγραμμένον. καὶ ὁ Ἀνδρόνικος δὲ παραφράζων τὸ βιβλίον “τῶν ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς, φησί, λεγομένων ὁμώνυμα μὲν λέγεται ὧν ὄνομα μόνον ταῦτόν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοῦνομα λόγος ἕτερος”.

[T5] **A 30,16-22.** <Nicostratus objects that homonyms are synonyms, an objection maintained more clearly (*saphesteron*) by Atticus.> **Speakers: Nicostratus, followed by Atticus. Respondent: Porphyry.**

Προσαπορεῖ δὲ ὁ Νικόστρατος περὶ τῶν ὁμωνύμων, καὶ ἔτι σαφέστερον Ἀττικὸς τὴν ἀπορίαν ἐξέθετο. εἰ γὰρ συνώνυμά ἐστιν ὧν τό τε ὄνομα κοινόν καὶ ὁ ὀρισμὸς κοινός, ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὰ ὁμώνυμα τό τε ὄνομα κοινόν ὁμώνυμα καλούμενα καὶ τὸν τοῦ ὁμωνύμου ὀρισμόν· ἐφ' ἐκάστου γὰρ ὁμωνύμου ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὅτι ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοῦνομα λόγος τῆς (20) οὐσίας ἕτερος· τὰ ἄρα ὁμώνυμα συνώνυμά ἐστιν. ἔστιν δὲ καὶ τὰ συνώνυμα συνώνυμα· πάντα ἄρα τὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ὄνομα ἔχοντα συνώνυμά ἐστιν.

[T6] **A 48,1-50,3.** <The associates of Lucius object (A) against the thesis that colours, figures, shapes, etc. are in a substrate ‘not as a part’: in fact, completers (*ta sumplêrôtika tês ousias*) such as colour and shape do not appear to be in a substrate at all; and even if they are so, they are so as parts. Furthermore (B) individual substances such as Socrates appear to be subsumed under Aristotle’s account of things ‘in a substrate’, as they are in time and place and not so as a part, reducing Aristotle’s position to the absurdity that Socrates is an accident of his place.> **Speakers: Hoi peri L. Respondents: Porphyry (A), Boethus (B).**

[A. 48,1-11] Ἀποροῦσι δὲ οἱ περὶ τὸν Λούκιον καὶ τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ μὴ ὡς μέρος λέγεσθαι τὸ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ. εἰ γὰρ τὰ συμπληρωτικά τῆς οὐσίας, φασί, μέρη αὐτῆς εἶναι λέγομεν, συμπληροῖ δὲ ἀπλῶς μὲν τοῦ σώματος τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ τὸ εἶναι χρῶμα σχῆμα μέγεθος καὶ ἀπλῶς ποιότης καὶ ποσότης (ἄχρουν γὰρ καὶ ἀσχημάτιστον οὐκ ἂν εἶη σῶμα), τοῦδε δὲ τοῦ σώματος οἷον χιόνος λευκότης καὶ ψυχρότης, ἀνάγκη δυοῖν θάτερον, ἢ μὴ λέγειν ταῦτα ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἢ μὴ καλῶς ἀποφάσκεσθαι τῶν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ τὸ μὴ ὡς μέρη εἶναι. πῶς δὲ καὶ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ὅλως τὰ συμπληρωτικά δυνατὸν λέγεσθαι; οὐ γὰρ ἢ Σωκράτους μορφή ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστὶν τῷ Σωκράτει, ἀλλ' εἶπερ ἄρα, τὰ τοῖς ἤδη τελείοις ἔξωθεν ἐπεισιόντα, ταῦτα ἂν εἶη ἐν ὑποκειμένοις αὐτοῖς.

[B. 49,31-50,3] Ἀλλὰ πῶς, φασίν, οὐχὶ καὶ αἱ ἄτομοι οὐσίαι, οἷον Σωκράτης καὶ Πλάτων, τῷ λόγῳ τῶν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ὑπαχθήσονται καὶ ἔσονται συμβεβηκότα, εἶπερ καὶ ἐν τινὶ ἔστιν ὁ Σωκράτης (ἐν τόπῳ γὰρ καὶ χρόνῳ) καὶ οὐχ ὡς μέρος καὶ ἀδύνατον χωρὶς εἶναι τόπου καὶ χρόνου; κὰν γὰρ τοῦδε [50] μεταστῆ τοῦ τόπου, πάντως ἐν ἄλλῳ ἔσται, ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς εὐωδίας ἐλέγετο. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ τόπου λυεῖν ὁ Βόηθος ἔδοξεν εἰπὼν τὰ κινούμενα μὴ εἶναι ὅλως ἐν ᾧ ἦν τόπῳ.

[T7] **A 58,14-28.** <The associates of Nicostratus rather tendentiously suggest (A) that Aristotle is indulging in unnecessary verbiage (*mataiologia*) when he observes that ‘two-footed’ is not a differentia of knowledge. Simplicius responds that Aristotle’s point is not self-evident (πρόχειρος) without examples, citing a perceived error of Herminus. (B) They also object to the statement that the substrate has all the differentiae of the predicate: how can ‘rational animal’ inherit both ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’ from ‘animal’? Boethus amended the text, but Simplicius proposes to solve the *aporia* by distinguishing divisive from constitutive differentiae.>  
**Speakers: Hoi peri N., cont. αἰτιῶνται (sc. hoi peri L).**<sup>1</sup> **Respondents: Boethus, Simplicius.**

[A. 58,14-22] Οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Νικόστρατον ματαιολογίαν ἐγκαλοῦσιν ἐν τούτοις· τίς γὰρ, φησὶν, ἀγνοήσει ὅτι ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης οὐκ ἂν ποτε τῷ δίποδι διενέγκοι ἢ τετράποδι, ὥσπερ τὸ ζῶον; ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν, κὰν τοῦτο σαφές, οὐκέτι καὶ ἐκείνο ὁμοίως δῆλον, ὅτι τῶν ὑπάλληλα οὐδὲν κωλύει τὰς αὐτὰς εἶναι διαφοράς· ἔδει δὲ περὶ ἀμφοῖν ἅμα τῶν ἀντικειμένων εἰπεῖν. ἔπειτα ὀρθῶς ὅτι οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἑρμῖνον τὸ ἕτερον καὶ μὴ ὑπάλληλα οὐ καλῶς ἐξεδέξαντο, (20) νομίσαντες δυνατὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὑπάλληλα ὄντα ὑφ’ ἐν ἀνάγεσθαι γένος· οὕτως οὐκ ἦν πρόχειρος ὁ λόγος, κὰν τὰ παραδείγματα καλῶς ληφθέντα σαφῆ τὸν λόγον ποιῆ.

[B. 58,23-28] αἰτιῶνται δὲ καὶ <ὅτι> ἐν τοῖς ὑπάλληλοις γένεσιν ὅσαι τοῦ κατηγορουμένου φησὶν διαφοραί, τσαῦται καὶ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ἔσονται· ὄντων γὰρ ὑπάλληλων τοῦ ζώου καὶ τοῦ λογικοῦ ζώου, (25) ἐπειδὴ τοῦ ζώου διαφοραὶ εἰσι τό τε λογικὸν καὶ τὸ ἄλογον, πῶς οἷον τε τοῦ λογικοῦ ζώου τὸ μὲν εἶναι λογικόν, τὸ δὲ ἄλογον; ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν Βόηθος ἐνδοῦς τῇ ἀπορίᾳ μεταγράφειν ἡξίου τὴν λέξιν οὕτως·

[T8] **A 62,28-65,14.** <(A) Those who opposed the division of the categories included Herminus, Athenodorus, Cornutus, Lucius, and Nicostratus (in a rather curious order). Simplicius makes a threefold division of the objectors into those who reproach the division with being *excessive*, those who criticize it as *deficient*, and those who consider that some genera have been introduced in the place of others. (B) ‘The associates of Nicostratus’ declare the division deficient, suggesting that it lacks an *ekhesthai* answering *ekhein*. (C) ‘The associates of Lucius’ claim that Aristotle wrongly omitted conjunctions, (D) articles, (E) negations, privations, moods of verbs, (F) the monad and the point. Simplicius replies directly to all but the final point (F), where Boethus is the main respondent.> **Speakers: Hoi peri L. and Hoi peri N. Respondents: Simplicius, Boethus.**

<sup>1</sup> The plural can properly reference neither Nicostratus’ associates nor the intervening school of Herminus mentioned at 58,20, if Boethus’ ‘reply’ at 58,28 is chronologically correct: rather, the subject of αἰτιῶνται must be the associates of Lucius. This would not be unprecedented, as Simplicius elsewhere introduces a view of Nicostratus’ school and then continues the position to *hoi peri ton Loukion* as if it makes no difference (e.g., 64,13-20).

[A. 62,28-30] Ἄλλοι δὲ πολλοὶ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἀμφοσβήτησαν, αὐτόθεν κατηγοροῦντες τῆς εἰς τοσοῦτον πλήθος διαιρέσεως, ὡσπερ Ἀθηνόδωρος ἐν τῷ Πρὸς τὰς Ἀριστοτέλους μὲν Κατηγορίας ἐπιγεγραμμένῳ βιβλίῳ, μόνην δὲ τὴν εἰς τοσοῦτον πλήθος διαιρέσιν ἐξετάζοντι. καὶ Κορνούτος δὲ ἐν οἷς Πρὸς Ἀθηνόδωρον καὶ Ἀριστοτέλην ἐπέγραψεν καὶ οἱ περὶ τὸν Λούκιον δὲ καὶ τὸν Νικόστρατον, ὡσπερ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα πάντα σχεδόν, οὕτως καὶ πρὸς τὴν διαιρέσιν ἀντειρήκασιν. ληπτέον δὲ ἐν ὅροις ὠρισμένοις τὰς ἀντιλογίας τριχῆ διαστελαμένους αὐτάς. καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν ὡς πλεονάζουσιν αἰτιῶνται τὴν διαιρέσιν, ἕτεροι δὲ ὡς ἐλλιπῆ καταμέμφονται, τρίτοι δὲ εἰσιν οἱ ἄλλα ἀντ' ἄλλων εἰσῆχθαι γένη νομίζοντες. ...

[B. 64,13-18] Οἱ δὲ ἐλλείπειν ἀποφαινόμενοι τὴν διαιρέσιν, ὡς οἱ περὶ τὸν Νικόστρατον, διὰ τί, φασίν, τῷ μὲν ποιεῖν τὸ πάσχειν, τῷ δὲ ἔχειν οὐκ ἀντέθηκεν τὸ ἔχεσθαι; ἢ ἐχρῆν ἐφιστάνειν τοὺς ταῦτα λέγοντας, ὅτι τὸ ἔχεσθαι εἰς τὴν τοῦ κείσθαι κατηγορίαν ἐνέπιπεν ἤδη διωρισμένην· ἔχει μὲν γὰρ τις τὴν ἀσπίδα, ἔχεται δὲ ἢ ἀσπίς ἐν τῷ οὕτως περικείσθαι· θέσις οὖν ἐστὶν τοῦτο.

[C. 64,18-20] ἀλλὰ διὰ τί, φασίν οἱ περὶ τὸν Λούκιον, τοὺς συνδέσμους παραλέλοιπεν, εἰ λέξεις καὶ οὗτοι σημαντικαί; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἄσημοι. ἢ ὅτι \* \* \* οὔτε προηγουμένη αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ἢ σημασία, ἀλλὰ συσσημαίνουσιν, ὡσπερ τὰς διπλᾶς εἰώθαμεν παραγράφειν καὶ τὰς κορωνίδας, αἵτινες μετὰ τῶν γεγραμμένων σημαίνουσιν τι, αὐτὰ δὲ καθ' ἑαυτὰς οὐδὲν σημαίνουσιν. ...

[D. 64,28] ἐπιζητοῦσιν δὲ καὶ τὰ ἄρθρα ποῦ ταχθήσεται.

[E. 65,2-3] ἀλλ' αἱ ἀποφάσεις καὶ αἱ στερήσεις αἴ τε διάφοροι τῶν ῥημάτων ἐγκλίσεις ἐν τίνι ταχθήσονται;

[F. 65,13-14] ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔν, φασί, καὶ ἡ μονὰς καὶ τὸ σημεῖον πῶς οὐκ ἔξω πίπτει τῶν κατηγοριῶν;

[T9] **A 73,15-76,16.** < (A) Do the ten categories distinguish only the sensible beings, or both the sensible and the intelligible beings? If the former, then Aristotle has omitted the intelligible world altogether. If the latter, then how can they have commonality? These problems are raised by Plotinus (*sc. Enn.* 6.1), Lucius, and Nicostratus. Simplicius, following Boethus and others, responds that Aristotle speaks here only about sensibles, and is not speaking about 'beings' at all, but words significant of beings (B). The position of Nicostratus and Plotinus is reiterated apart from Lucius: how can *ousia* be one genus embracing the intelligible and the sensible? Simplicius replies that this is validly Platonic, Aristotelian, and Pythagorean (citing Archytas), while Boethus holds that the question is redundant, as Aristotle is addressing only sensible *ousia*. Porphyry corrects Boethus. > **Speakers: Plotinus, Hoi peri L. and Hoi peri N. Respondents: Simplicius (likely relaying Iamblichus), Boethus, Porphyry (correcting Boethus).**

[A. 73,15-32] Εἰ δὲ τις ἀπορεῖ, πότερον τὰ αἰσθητὰ μόνα καὶ γενητὰ διείλεν ἐν (15) τούτοις ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ ἀπρηριθμήσατο ἢ πάντα τὰ ὁπωσοῦν ὄντα, καὶ ὅλως πότερον ἄλλα ἐστὶ τὰ νοητὰ γένη ἢ τὰ αἰσθητὰ, ἢ τινὰ μὲν τὰ αὐτά, τινὰ δὲ ἕτερα· καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὲν ἄλλα, παραλέλειπται πάντῃ ἐκεῖνα· εἰ δὲ τὰ αὐτά, συνώνυμα ἔσται τὰ αἰσθητὰ τοῖς νοητοῖς· καὶ πῶς ἔσται κοινωνία τῆς αὐτῆς οὐσίας, ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον ἔστιν καὶ τὸ ὕστερον, καὶ τὸ μὲν (20) παράδειγμα, τὸ δὲ εἰκῶν; εἰ δὲ ὁμωνύμως λέγονται ἐπὶ τῶν νοητῶν αἱ δέκα κατηγορίαι, οὐκ ἔσονται αἱ αὐταί, εἴπερ ὀνόματος μόνου τοῦ αὐτοῦ κοινωνοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ πλείω ἔσται τὰ γένη, οὐ περιληφθέντων τῶν νοητῶν. ἔτι δὲ πῶς οὐκ ἀπίθανον ἐν ἐκεῖνοις ἀτρέπτοις οὖσιν

εἶναι τὸ πάσχειν καὶ τὰ πρὸς τι, παραφυάδι εἰκότα ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ προηγουμένως ἐστῶσιν; εἰ δὲ τὰ (25) μὲν ἐστὶ κοινὰ νοητοῖς καὶ αἰσθητοῖς, τὰ δὲ ἴδια, παραλέλειπται ἢ τούτων διάρθρωσις. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν καὶ ὁ θειότατος Πλωτίνος ἀπορεῖ καὶ οἱ περὶ τὸν Λούκιον καὶ Νικόστρατον. οἱ δὲ ταῦτα ἀποροῦντες ὑπαλλάττειν εἰκάσιν τὴν ὑπόθεσιν. ὡς γὰρ περὶ τῶν ὄντων προηγουμένως τοῦ φιλοσόφου διδάσκειν ἐπαγγελλομένου, οὕτως προάγουσιν τὴν ἀπορίαν· λέγομεν δὲ ὅτι (30) οὐ περὶ τῶν ὄντων ἢ ὄντα ποιούμενος τὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' εἶπερ ἄρα, ἢ ὑπὸ τοιῶνδε σημαίνεται φωνῶν, προηγουμένως μὲν περὶ τῶν τῆδε διαλέγεται ...

### INCIPIIT ΠΕΡΙ ΟΥΣΙΑΣ (76,23)

[B. 76,14-17] Ἀποροῦσι δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὸν περὶ τῆς οὐσίας λόγον ὃ τε Πλωτίνος καὶ οἱ περὶ τὸν Νικόστρατον, πῶς ἐν γένος ἡ οὐσία· εἰ γὰρ κοινόν τι καὶ τῆς νοητῆς καὶ τῆς αἰσθητῆς εἶη, πρὸ ἀμφοῖν ἐστὶ καὶ ἀμφοῖν κατηγορηθήσεται, καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὔτε σῶμα οὔτε ἀσώματον ἐστὶ, ἵνα μὴ τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἀσώματον γένηται καὶ τὸ ἀσώματον καὶ σῶμα.

[T10] **A 125,16.** <The associates of Lucius object that Aristotle transfers body to Quantity rather than *ousia*. Simplicius replies that body is both a quantity *and* a substance.> **Speakers: Hoi peri L.**  
**Respondent: Simplicius.**

Τὸ δὲ σῶμα, καθόσον μὲν τριχῆ διαστατὸν καὶ μετρεῖσθαι πέφυκεν, ποσὸν ὑπάρχει· καθόσον μέντοι ὑποκείμενόν ἐστιν καὶ ταῦτόν καὶ ἐν ἀριθμῷ μένον τῶν ἐναντίων ἐστὶ δεκτικόν, κατὰ τοῦτο οὐσία ἐστίν· ὥστε οὐ καλῶς οἱ περὶ τὸν Λούκιον ἐγκαλοῦσιν ὡς τὸ σῶμα τῆς οὐσίας ὄν εἰς τὸ ποσὸν μετενεγκόντι. Ἐπιστήσαι δὲ ἄξιον, ὅπως εἶπεν· ἔτι δὲ παρὰ ταῦτα χρόνος καὶ τόπος ἐστὶν ποσά, διότι οὐχ ἦνωται τῷ σώματι οὐδὲ ὁ χρόνος οὐδὲ ὁ τόπος, ἀλλ' ἔξωθεν ταῦτα ἐπακολουθεῖ.

[T11] **A 127,11-128,10.** <Problems concerning Quantity.> **Speakers: Plotinus (6.1), Hoi peri L., Hoi peri N.** **Respondents: Simplicius, Porphyry, Iamblichus, Plotinus (6.3).**

- (A) Plotinus asks: how can both the continuous and discrete be quantity? What is common to both? (cf. *Enn.* 6.1.4.5) Plotinus himself responds in 6.3.13 that the 'so much' is common to both, viewed as measure and limit.
- (B) The associates of Lucius and Nicostratus object against Aristotle that magnitude is not a quantity at all, but a 'so much', as only Number is Quantity.
- (C) They also criticize the division of Quantity into only Number and Size, as he should also have established weight, with Archytas, Athenodorus, and Ptolemaeus.
- (D) They find problems with each species of Quantity, distinguishing Number into two kinds.
- (E) Plotinus asks why Number in the sensible world is not substance, whereas intelligible number is.
- (F) Plotinus asks whether Number is inherent or acts as a measure by being apart.
- (G) 'They' also are puzzled about the inclusion of speech in Quantity, as it has combination and is quantity only per accidens.
- (H) Moreover, they say, why did Aristotle say that speech was measured by syllables and not written characters?
- (I) And why, they ask, is speech measured by long and short syllables?
- (J) And why, they ask, does Aristotle say 'if five is part of ten' (*Cat.* 4b28).
- (K) 'The same person' (*sc.* Plotinus, cf. *Enn.* 6.1.4.11) raises questions about the continuous, observing that body, surface, line, and generally magnitude are not *per se* quantities, but are said to be so because they

share in being ‘so much’ and in number: only number is Quantity. He resolves this in 6.3.13 by describing it as the forward progression of the point to line to plane to solid.

(L) They ask why Aristotle introduces ‘place’ and ‘time’ without explaining the terms.

(M) They suggest that Andronicus did better by making place and time categories on their own.

(N) They question whether place is really Substance or Relative.

(O) ‘The same people’ question whether anything has ‘position’ on Aristotle’s doctrine.

[A. 127,11] Ἔτι δὲ ὁ Πλωτῖνος ζητεῖ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος· ‘εἰ τὸ συνεχὲς ποσὸν ἐστίν, οὐκ ἔστιν τὸ διωρισμένον ποσόν· εἰ δὲ ἄμφω ποσά, δεικτέον τί τὸ ἐν ἀμφοτέροις κοινόν’. καὶ λύει τὴν ζήτησιν ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ λέγων ὅτι κοινὸν αὐτοῖς ἐστὶν τὸ τοσόνδε, δηλονότι τὸ ὡς μέτρον καὶ ὡς πέρασ θεωρούμενον, καθ’ ὃ ποσὸν ἕκαστον γινώσκεται.

[B. 127,30] Ἐγκαλοῦσιν δὲ οἱ περὶ τὸν Λούκιον καὶ Νικόστρατον τῇ διαιρέσει πρῶτον μὲν ὡς μὴ δεόντως καὶ τὸ μέγεθος ποσὸν λεγούσῃ· πηλίκον γὰρ ἔδει τοῦτο λέγειν, ποσὸν δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν, τὸ δὲ κοινὸν ἢ ἄλλο τι ἢ ὁμωνύμως τῷ ἐνὶ τῶν εἰδῶν ποσὸν καὶ αὐτὸ ὀνομάζειν. ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ κὰν κατὰ τὸ πλείστον τὸ μὲν συνεχὲς πηλίκον, τὸ δὲ διωρισμένον ποσόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπαλλάττει πολλάκις (τὸ γοῦν ὕδωρ συνεχὲς ὄν ποσὸν λέγομεν, ἀλλ’ οὐ πηλίκον· πολὺ γὰρ καὶ οὐχὶ μέγα· καὶ τὸν χρόνον ποσὸν λέγομεν), εἰκότως οὔτε δύο πεποίηκεν κατηγορίας τὸ ποσὸν καὶ πηλίκον οὔτε κατὰ τὸ πηλίκον καὶ ποσὸν διείλεν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς καὶ διωρισμένον, ἅπερ οὐδέποτε ὑπαλλάττει.

[C. 128,5] Αἰτιῶνται δὲ καὶ τὸ εἰς δύο γενέσθαι τὴν διαίρεσιν· ἔδει γὰρ μετὰ τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ τὸ μέγεθος τρίτον εἶδος τάττειν τὸ βάρος ἢ τὴν ῥοπήν, ὡς Ἀρχύτας καὶ ὡς ὕστερον Ἀθηνόδωρος ἔταξεν καὶ Πτολεμαῖος ὁ μαθηματικός. ἀλλὰ ῥητέον ὅτι ἡ βαρύτης ποιότητός ἐστιν, ὡς ἡ πυκνότης καὶ παχύτης οὐχὶ κατὰ τὸ ποσόν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ποιόν, καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἀντικείμενα.

[D. 129,8] Κατ’ ἰδίαν δὲ περὶ ἑκάστου τῶν εἰδῶν τοῦ ποσοῦ διαποροῦντες περὶ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ πρῶτον διαιρούμενοι λέγουσιν ὡς ἄλλη μὲν τίς ἐστὶν τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ φύσις, καθ’ ἣν ἐστὶν ὠρισμένος καὶ πόσος βαρυτόνως, ἄλλη δέ, (10) καθ’ ἣν τὸ ποσὸν αὐτῷ ἀορίστως καὶ ὀξυτόνως ὑπάρχει· καὶ ταύτην εἶναι τὴν δηλουμένην, ὅταν ποσὸν τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἶναι λέγωμεν, τὴν δὲ ἐτέραν παραλελειφθαι τοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ διαλεχθεῖσιν.

[E. 129,27] Ἀλλὰ διὰ τί, φησὶν ὁ Πλωτῖνος, οὐσιώδους ὄντος ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ὁ ἐνταῦθα οὐκ ἔστιν οὐσία;

[F. 130,6] Περὶ δὲ τοῦ μοναδικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ διαπορεῖ πάλιν ὁ Πλωτῖνος, καθ’ ὃν πέντε ἵπποι θεωροῦνται καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὡσαύτως κατὰ σύνθεσιν μονάδων μετρεῖται, πότερον ἐνυπάρχει ἢ χωρὶς ὧν μετρεῖ, ὥσπερ ὁ κανὼν· ‘καὶ γὰρ εἰ χωρὶς ὧν μετρεῖ, ποσά οὐκ ἔσται τὰ ὑποκείμενα μὴ μετέχοντα (10) τοῦ ποσοῦ· ἔπειτα μέτρα μὲν ἔστω τὰ κεχωρισμένα ὡς μετροῦντα, διὰ τί δὲ ποσά; ἢ γὰρ αὐτοποσότης οὐ πάντως ἐστὶ ποσόν’. τοῦτο δὲ αὐτὸς μὲν λύων ‘εἰ ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ὄντες, φησὶν, οἱ ἀριθμοὶ εἰς μηδεμίαν ἄλλην κατηγορίαν ἀνάγονται, ποσὸν ἂν εἶεν’.

[G. 130,31] Περὶ δὲ λόγου ἀποροῦσιν, πῶς ὁ λόγος ἐν ποσῷ, πρῶτον μὲν, ὅτι τὰ ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς εἰς τὰς κατηγορίας ἀνάγεται, λόγος δὲ πᾶς κατὰ συμπλοκῆν· ἔπειτα, εἰ

τοσόσδε ὁ λόγος, κατὰ μὲν τὸ τοσόνδε ποσὸν ἔσται ὡς κατὰ συμβεβηκός, καθὸ μέντοι λόγος σημαντικός ἐστιν κατὰ πληγὴν τοῦ ἀέρος ὑφεστηκώς, εἴτε οὖν πληγὴ ὁ λόγος εἴτε τύπωσις τῆς πληγῆς μορφοῦσα αὐτήν, ἢ πάθος ἐστὶν ἢ ποιήσις, ποιήσις μὲν τῆς κατὰ φαντασίαν ὀρμῆς τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ, πάθος δὲ τοῦ ἀέρος· ἔσται οὖν ἢ τοῦ ποιεῖν ἢ τοῦ πάσχειν ὁ λόγος ὁ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ ἢ καὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦ πάσχειν, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ποσόν. εἰ δὲ τις κατὰ τὴν πληγὴν μόνην ἀφορίζειτο τὴν φωνὴν καὶ τὸν λόγον, εἰς κινήσιν αὐτὸν ἀνάξει· εἰ δὲ κατὰ τὸν πληγέντα ἀέρα, οὐ μία κατηγορία, εἶγε οὐχ ἓν τὸ σημαντικὸν καὶ συσσημαντικὸν καὶ τὸ ἐνεργοῦν καὶ τὸ ἐν ᾧ ἐγγινόμενον ἐνεργεῖ.

[H. 132,7] Διὰ τί δέ, φασίν, οὐ τοῖς γράμμασιν εἶπεν μετρεῖσθαι τὸν λόγον, ἀλλὰ ταῖς συλλαβαῖς;

[I. 132,13] Πῶς δέ, φασίν, βραχεῖα καὶ μακροῦ καταμετρεῖσθαι τὸν λόγον εἶπεν;

[J. 133,6] Ἀλλὰ διὰ τί, φασίν, ἐνδοιάζων εἶπεν· εἰ τὰ πέντε τῶν δέκα μόριον;

[K. 133,11] Περὶ δὲ τοῦ συνεχοῦς ὁ αὐτὸς ἀνήρ [sc. Plotinus, 6.1.4.11] ἀπορεῖ τοιάδε· ‘τὸ σῶμα, φησίν, ἢ σῶμα, καὶ ἐπιφάνεια καὶ γραμμὴ καὶ ὅλως μέγεθος, ἢ τοιαῦτα, οὐκ ἔστι ποσά, ἀλλὰ ποσὰ λέγεται τῷ μετασχεῖν τοῦ τοσοῦδε καὶ τῷ ἀριθμοῦ μετασχεῖν· μόνος ἄρα ὁ ἀριθμὸς ποσόν’. λύων δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ [6.3.13] φησίν πρόοδον εἶναι τῆς στιγμῆς εἰς τὸ πόρρω, καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐφ’ ἓν, (15) γραμμὴ γίνεται, εἰ δὲ ἐπὶ δύο, ἐπίπεδον, εἰ δὲ ἐπὶ τρία, σῶμα, καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐπὶ πολὺ ἢ διάστασις, μέγα, εἰ δὲ ἐπ’ ὀλίγον, μικρόν, καὶ ὅταν μὲν κατὰ κοινὸν ὄρον ἢ πρόοδος γίνεται, συνεχὲς τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὅταν δὲ κατὰ ἴδιον, διηρημένον· ποσὸν οὖν καὶ τὸ μέγεθος, ἀλλ’ ἀορίστως μὲν μέγα ἢ μικρόν ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ πλήθους πολὺ ἢ ὀλίγον, ὀρισθὲν δὲ μέτρῳ τινὶ ἢ ἀριθμῷ ἢ πῆχει (20) ὀρισμένως λέγεται.

[L. 133,35] Διὰ τί δέ, φασίν, μὴ προδιδάξας περὶ τόπου ἢ χρόνου ὡς ἐγνωσμένοις αὐτοῖς χρῆται;

[M. 134,4] Ἀλλ’ ἄμεινον ἴσως, φασίν, Ἀνδρόνικος ἐποίησεν, ἰδίας μὲν ποιήσας κατηγορίας τὸν τόπον καὶ τὸν χρόνον, ὑποτάξας δὲ αὐταῖς τὸ ποῦ καὶ τὸ ποτέ.

[N. 134,32] Μετὰ δὲ τὸν χρόνον περὶ τοῦ τόπου διαποροῦσιν· [cf. Plot. 6.3.11.6] εἰ περιεκτικός ἐστι σῶματος, ἢ ὡς οὐσιώδης ποιότης συμπληρωτικὴ τῆς οὐσίας ἐστὶν (135) καὶ οὐκέτι ποσόν, ἢ εἰ κατ’ αὐτὴν τὴν σχέσιν θεωρεῖται μόνην, τῷ πρὸς τι ἀποδοθήσεται.

[O. 140,22] Ἀποροῦσι δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἐνταῦθα λεγόμενα οἱ αὐτοὶ ἄνδρες οὐδὲν ἔχειν θέσιν λέγοντες· εἰ γὰρ θέσιν ἔχειν ἐκεῖνα λέγεται, ὦν τὰ μόρια ὑπομένει, πάντων δὲ ῥεόντων οὐδὲν ὑπομένει, οὐδὲ θέσιν ἂν τι κυρίως ἔχοι. ἢ κὰν ἢ ὕλη ῥεῖ συνεχῶς καὶ τοῦτο δοίη τις καὶ τὰ σῶματα ἐπ’ (25) ἄπειρον ἔχει προσθήκας καὶ ἀφαιρέσεις, ἀλλ’ ὅμως ἔστιν τι καὶ τὸ μένον ἐναργῶς, εἴτε τὸ δεύτερον ὑποκείμενον, ὡς τινες λέγουσιν, εἴτε τὸ ἰδίως ποιόν, ὡς ἄλλοι, εἴτε ἢ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος οὐσία ἢ ἡ ἄτομος καὶ σύνθετος οὐσία ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον, ὃ καὶ ἐν ταῖς μεταβολαῖς ὑπομένει καὶ ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς ἄχρι τέλους γνωρίζεται· περὶ γὰρ τῶν ἐναργῶν ὁ λόγος, ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ (30) περὶ τῶν ἀφανῶν καὶ ἀμφισβητουμένων.

δεύτερον δέ, ᾧ λόγῳ, φασίν, τὸ λευκὸν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς εἶναι ποσὸν [ὡς] ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης λέγει, τῷ τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν ποσὸν εἶναι, τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἡ ἐπιφάνεια κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἔσται ποσὸν τῷ πλήθους μετέχειν.

[T12] **A 156,16.** <The associates of Lucius claimed that Quality is nearer to Substance than is the Relative: for example, Socrates can be better identified by his qualities than his relatives. Cf. Boethus at 163,6-9 = Boethus T4c\*, T4d\*, T14r.> **Speakers: Hoi peri L. Respondents: Boethus.**

εἰ τοίνυν προτέτακται τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ τῶν πρὸς τι καὶ τὰ ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένων τάξει προϋπάρχοντα τῶν ὡς συμβεβηκῶτων ἐπιγινομένων, δῆλον ὅτι προηγείται τὸ ποιὸν τῶν πρὸς τι. καὶ τῆ οὐσίᾳ δὲ οἰκειότερον, ὡς καὶ οἱ περὶ τὸν Λούκιον ἐγκαλοῦσιν· οἰκειότερον γὰρ τὸν Σωκράτη δηλῶσαι ἀπὸ τοῦ σιμοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἐξοφθάλμου καὶ προγαστορος, ἅπερ ἐστὶν ποιὰ, ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ δεξιῦ καὶ φίλου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν πρὸς τι. ἄλλως τέ, φασίν, εἰς δύο διαιρουμένων τῶν λεγομένων, εἷς τε τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ εἰς τὸ πρὸς ἕτερον, ἀρξάμενον περὶ τῶν καθ' αὐτὸ λέγειν, ἐν οἷς ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ ποσόν...

[T13] **A 231,19-23. Speaker: Nicostratus. Respondent: Iamblichus.**

Αἰτιᾶται δὲ ὁ Νικόστρατος, ὅτι εἰπὼν ἐν εἶδος ποιότητος οὐχ ἐν ἐπήγαγεν, ἀλλὰ δύο, τὴν τε ἕξιν καὶ τὴν διάθεσιν. ἀγνοεῖ δέ, φασίν, ὅτι τὸ ἐν εἶδος τὴν διάθεσιν λαμβάνει, ὑφ' ὃ τάπτει τὴν ἕξιν καὶ τὴν διάθεσιν τὴν ὁμώνυμον τῷ κοινῷ, ὥσπερ ὑπὸ τὴν κοινὴν δικαιοσύνην ἢ τε μερικωτέρα δικαιοσύνη τέτακται καὶ ἡ ὁσιότης.

[T14] **A 257,31-36. Speaker: Hoi peri N.**

Λέγοντος δὲ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους ὥσπερ τὰ ὀλιγοχρόνια χρώματα ἀπὸ πάθους γίνεται, οὕτως καὶ τὰ πολυχρόνια ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ συμβαίνειν, ἄλογον νομίζουσιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Νικόστρατον τὸ πάντα τὰ χρώματα πάθους ἐγγινομένου γίνεσθαι καὶ μάλιστα τὰ σύμφυτα καὶ οὐσιώδη, ὥσπερ τὸ τῆς χιόνος· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς παραδείγμασιν τοῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ φόβου καὶ τῆς αἰσχύνης ὡς ἐπιγινόμενα τὰ πάθη παρέθετο, ὥστε καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων οὕτως ἔοικεν δοξάζειν.

[T15] **A 268,19-32. Speaker: Hoi peri N. Respondent: Iamblichus.**

Οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Νικόστρατον καὶ τὴν μανότητα καὶ πυκνότητα ποιότητος φιλονεικοῦσιν δεικνύναι, τὸ πῦρ μανὸν εἶναι παρατιθέμενοι καὶ τὸν ἀέρα, τὴν δὲ γῆν πυκνὴν οὐ κατὰ θέσιν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ ποιότητα. ῥητέον δὲ πρὸς αὐτούς, ὡς καὶ ἐν τούτοις κατὰ τὸν θεῖον Ἰάμβλιχον “ἐκάτερον τούτων δύο σημαίνει, καὶ θέσιν μορίων καὶ ποιότητα, θέσιν μὲν ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ὑφασμάτων, ποιότητα δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀέρος, διακρίνειν δὲ ταῦτα ἐν εἰσαγωγῇ οὐκ ἦν ἀναγκαῖον. καὶ γὰρ ἄλλο μὲν ἐστὶ μανόν, οὐ τὰ μόρια ἀφέστηκεν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, οὐχ ὅτι κενόν ἐστὶν μεταξύ, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἑτερογενὲς σῶμα λεπτότερον· ὁ μέντοι ἀῆρ οὐ τῷ ἀφεστάναι ἀπ' ἀλλήλων τὰ μόρια αὐτοῦ μανός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ τῷ κοῦφος εἶναι καὶ εὐδιαίρετος, διόπερ τῶν κατὰ ποιότητα ἂν εἴη τοιούτων, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν κατὰ θέσιν. τῷ δὲ τοιούτῳ μανῷ, φησὶν Ἰάμβλιχος, οὐ τὸ πυκνόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ στερεὸν ἀντιτάξομεν, ᾧ τὸ δυσδιαίρετον ὑπάρχει καὶ βαρὺ, καὶ τὸ μὲν τοιοῦτον κατὰ ποιότητα ἔσται, τὸ δὲ κατὰ θέσιν ὑπὸ τὰ πρὸς τι ἀναχθήσεται”.

[T16] **B 368,1-371,27.** <Questions about the category ‘having’. (A) Plotinus questions whether all the categories will be referred back to ‘having’ if it is ‘said in many ways’. (B) Nicostratus, in a long and

apparently verbatim quotation, objects that Aristotle's account of the category 'having' does not strictly match any of his own definitions of 'having' later in ch. 15. Unlike many other examples from Nicostratus, Simplicius here preserves his entire supporting argument, as well as Iamblichus' direct reply. (C) That interchange is followed by a sequence of *aporiai* from Plotinus, to which Simplicius appears to respond directly.>

**Speakers: (A) Plotinus, (B) Nicostratus, (C) Plotinus. Respondents: (A') Simplicius, (B') Iamblichus, (C') Simplicius.** In addition, Simplicius adds a second reply to Nicostratus at 371,15 (D) and concludes the long section with a cap sentence (E).

[A. 368,1-6: Plotinus suggests that all the categories will be referred back to the category of 'having', as Aristotle defines it.] Ἀπορίαὶ δὲ πολλῶν καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο γεγόνασι τὸ γένος. καὶ γὰρ Πλωτίνος ἀπορεῖ λέγων· [6.1.23] “περὶ δὲ τοῦ ἔχειν, εἰ τὸ ἔχειν πολλαχῶς, διὰ τί οὐ πάντες οἱ τρόποι εἰς ταύτην τὴν κατηγορίαν ἀναχθήσονται; ὥστε καὶ τὸ ποσόν, ὅτι ἔχει μέγεθος, καὶ τὸ ποιόν, ὅτι ἔχει χρῶμα, καὶ ὁ πατήρ, ὅτι ἔχει υἱόν, καὶ ὁ υἱός, ὅτι ἔχει πατέρα, καὶ ὅτι κτήματα”.

[A'. 368,6-11: Simplicius replies that there cannot be a single category of homonyms.] πρὸς ὃ (5) ῥητέον ὅτι οὐχ οἶόν τε τῶν ὁμωνύμων καὶ κατὰ γένος ἐξηλλαγμένων μίαν εἶναι κατηγορίαν καὶ ἐν γένος. οὐ μέντοι οὔτε τὸ ποσόν ἐν τῷ ἔχειν τούτῳ ἐστίν, διότι ἔχει μέγεθος, οὔτε τὸ ποιόν, ὅτι ἔχει χρῶμα· ἀσώματα γὰρ τὸ ποιόν καὶ τὸ ποσόν, ἢ δὲ κατηγορία αὕτη τῶν περὶ ἡμᾶς ἐπικλήτων σωμάτων ἦν. ὁ δὲ πατήρ, εἰ μὲν καθὸ σῶμα, ἀλλ' οὐ περίθετος ἦν· (10) εἰ δὲ καθὸ σχέσιν ἔχει πρὸς υἱόν, ἀλλ' ἀσώματος ἢ σχέσις.

[B. 368,12-369,14: Nicostratus objects that the definition of the category 'having' here does not clearly belong to any of the meanings of 'having' provided in ch. 15. He suggests, constructively, that Aristotle should have separated off the irrelevant significations of 'having' here.] Ὁ δὲ Νικόστρατος ἐγκαλεῖ· “διὰ τί, φησίν, οὐκ ἔθηκας τὰ ὀκτώ σημαינוμένα τοῦ ἔχειν, ἅπερ ἐν τέλει τοῦ βιβλίου διηριθμήσω, καὶ διὰ τί οὐκ ἀπέκρινας τὰ ἀλλότρια τῆς προκειμένης κατηγορίας, ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν οἱ πολύσημον φωνὴν διαιροῦμενοι; οὐ γὰρ ἴσμεν νῦν, τί ποτέ ἐστιν τῶν κατηγορηθῆμένων (15) τὸ δέκατον τοῦτο γένος. ἐὰν γὰρ ἀκριβολογήταις, οὐδὲν τῶν ἐκκειμένων τὸ ἔχειν τὸ ὡς γένος σημαίνει. προκείσθω δὲ αὕτη ἢ ἐπὶ τέλει τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους ῥήσις οὕτως ἔχουσα· “τὸ ἔχειν κατὰ πλείους τρόπους λέγεται. ἢ γὰρ ὡς ἔξιν καὶ διάθεσιν ἢ ἄλλην τινὰ ποιότητα· λεγόμεθα γὰρ ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν καὶ ἀρετήν. ἢ ὡς ποσόν, οἷον ὃ τυγχάνει τις ἔχων (20) μέγεθος· λέγεται γὰρ τρίπηχυς. ἢ ὡς τὰ περὶ τῷ σώματι, οἷον ἱμάτιον ἢ χιτῶνα. ἢ ὡς ἐν μορίῳ, οἷον ἐν χειρὶ δακτύλιον. ἢ ὡς μέρος, οἷον πόδα ἢ χεῖρα. ἢ ὡς ἐν ἀγγείῳ, οἷον ὁ μέδιμνος πυροῦ. ἢ ὡς κτήμα· ἔχειν γὰρ οἰκίαν καὶ ἀγρὸν λεγόμεθα. λεγόμεθα δὲ καὶ γυναῖκα ἔχειν καὶ ἡ γυνὴ ἄνδρα· εἰκεν δὲ ἀλλοτριώτατος ὁ νῦν ῥηθεὶς τρόπος τοῦ ἔχειν (25) εἶναι· οὐθὲν γὰρ ἄλλο τῷ ἔχειν γυναῖκα σημαίνομεν ἢ ὅτι συνοικεῖ”

ἐν δὲ τούτοις τὸ μὲν ὄγδοον τὸ ἔχειν γυναῖκα ἢ ἄνδρα καὶ αὐτὸς παρητήσατο ὡς μήτε τοῦ ὁμωνύμως λεγομένου ἔχειν ἀπτόμενον, ἀλλὰ μάλλον τὸ συνεῖναι δηλοῦν. τὸ δὲ πρῶτον σαφῶς ἐστίν τοῦ ποιού· τὸ γὰρ ἔξιν ἔχειν καὶ διάθεσιν οὐδὲν ἄλλο, φησὶν ὁ Νικόστρατος, σημαίνει, ἐὰν μεταλάβωμεν (30) [p. 369] εἰς τὸ τί ἐστίν, ἢ τὸ ἐπιστήμονα

εἶναι καὶ ἐκτικὸν εἶναι, ἅπερ ἐστὶν τοῦ ποιοῦ. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ μέγεθος ἔχειν καὶ τρίτην εἶναι τοῦ ποσοῦ, καὶ τὸ τρίτον δὲ καὶ τέταρτον καὶ τὸ ἕβδομον τοῦ ἔχειν σημαίνοντα σαφῶς ἕκαστόν ἐστιν ἐν τῇ τοῦ πρὸς τι κατηγορίᾳ· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἰμάτιον, φησὶν, ἔχειν καὶ δακτύλιον ἔχειν ἴσον ἐστὶν τῷ οἰκίᾳ ἔχειν καὶ κεκτήσθαι, καὶ (5) ἐστὶν τῶν πρὸς τι· τὸ γὰρ κτήμα τοῦ κτήτορος καὶ ὁ κτήτωρ τοῦ κτήματος. καὶ τὸ πέμπτον δέ, τουτέστιν τὸ μόριον ἔχειν οὐκ ἄδηλον ὅτι καὶ τῶν πρὸς τί ἐστὶν, εἴπερ μέρος πρὸς ὅλον, καὶ ἄλλως τῆς κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐστὶ κατηγορίας· ἐὰν γὰρ μεταλαβὼν εἴπῃς, τί ἐστὶν τὸ ἔχειν πόδας καὶ χεῖρας, ἐρεῖς κατὰ τὸν ἀκριβῆ λόγον, κἂν ἀσύνηθες ἦ, τὸ πεποδῶσθαι καὶ (10) κεχειριδῶσθαι καὶ κοινῶς τὸ οὐσιῶσθαι, ἄηθες ὃν καὶ τοῦτο· διαλεκτικῶ δὲ οὐκ οὕτως συνηθείας ὡς ἀκριβείας μέλει. ἤμαρτεν οὖν, φησὶν, μὴ ἀποκρίνας τὰ ἄλλα σημαίνοντα, ὡς εἰδείμεν, τίς ποτέ ἐστὶν ἢ τοῦ ἔχειν κατηγορία”.

[Br. 369,14-370,11: Iamblichus replies that this was precisely the reason why Aristotle differentiated the any significations of having later in ch. 15, in order to differentiate them from the strict *category* so described here. He gives examples and suggests that N. is wasting his time with this criticism; perhaps Aristotle should have specified in ch. 15 which senses answered to the category of ch. 9, but this would be out of sorts with his ‘conclusion’.] πρὸς δὴ τοῦτό φησιν Ἰάμβλιχος, ὅτι “διὰ τοῦτο ἐν τῷ τέλει διεκρίνειν τὰ τοῦ ἔχειν σημαίνοντα, ἵνα αὐτὰ χωρίσῃ τῆς τοῦ ἔχειν κατηγορίας. (15) ἐν μὲν ἀρχῇ καὶ ἐν μέσῳ, ὅτε περὶ τῶν ἕξι ἅμα γενῶν ἔλεγεν, διὰ τῶν παραδειγμάτων ἐδήλωσεν· καὶ γὰρ σύνηθες τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς τὸ ἀφορίσαι τι παράδειγμα, ὡς τὰ τοῦτο μὴ ὄντα παραπλήσια ἀποκρίνεσθαι. οἱ γοῦν ἐκ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας ὀρισάμενοι τὸ ἐκτὸν τὸ οἶόν τε ἔχεσθαι, πρὸς τοὺς ζητοῦντας, κατὰ τί τοῦ ἔχειν σημαίνοντα λέγουσιν, ἐπειδὴ πολλαχῶς (20) τὸ ἔχειν, ὡς καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης διώρισεν—πρὸς τοὺτους οὖν παραράσειγμα ἐπήγον, ἐκτὸν λέγοντες εἶναι ὃ οἶόν τε ἔχεσθαι οὕτως ὡς ἢ φρόνησις ἔχεται ὑπὸ τοῦ φρονίμου, διὰ τοῦ παραδείγματος τὴν ὑπογραφὴν ποιούμενοι καὶ ἅμα τὰ ἀλλότρια σημαίνοντα τοῦ ἔχειν ἀποκρίνοντες. καὶ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης οὖν ὅταν τοῦ ἔχειν πολλαχῶς λεγομένου τοιοῦτον τὸ κατὰ γένος ἔχειν ὑπολαμβάνῃ (25) οἶον τὸ ὑποδεδέσθαι καὶ ὀπλίσθαι, διὰ τοῦ παραδείγματος πᾶν τὸ ἄλλο πλῆθος τῶν ὁμωνύμως λεγομένων ἀπεσκευάσατο.

καὶ γὰρ χωρίζεται ἀπὸ κτημάτων· οὐ γὰρ περικείμεθα ἐκεῖνα· καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἕξεων καὶ τῆς ποσότητος· συμβεβήκασι γὰρ αὐταὶ καὶ ἅμα εἰσὶν ἀσώματα. χωρίζεται δὲ καὶ τῶν ὡς μορίων ἐχομένων, ὅτι ἐκεῖνα μὲν συμφυῆ, ταῦτα δὲ ἐπίκτητα, (30) καὶ ἔτι τῶν ὡς κτημάτων, ὅτι πάντῃ ἕξωθεν ταῦτα καὶ οὐ περικείμενα. χωρίζεται δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐν ἀγγείῳ, ὅτι ἐκεῖνα ἀπλῶς κείται ὡς ἐν τόπῳ. μόνα δὲ ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς ἀπληριθμημένοις τῆς τοῦ ἔχειν κατηγορίας τὸ τε τρίτον καὶ τὸ τέταρτον, τὸ μὲν ἰμάτιον ἔχειν κατὰ τὸ ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ σώματι, τὸ δὲ δακτύλιον κατὰ τὸ ἐν μέρει. καὶ δῆλον ὅτι εὐσύννοπα ταῦτα ἦν (35) διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ ὀπλίσθαι καὶ ὑποδεδέσθαι ὁμοιότητα, ἅπερ τῆς τοῦ ἔχειν κατηγορίας ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης παραδείγματα προεβάλλετο.

μάτην οὖν ὁ [p. 370] Νικόστρατος ἐγκαλεῖ ὡς ἐν τοῖς τοῦ ἔχειν σημαίνομένοις μὴ ἀποκρίνοντι τὸ κατὰ τὸ γένος ἔχειν, εἰ μὴ ἄρα ὅτι μὴ προσέθηκεν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης τῷ τρίτῳ καὶ τετάρτῳ ὅτι ταῦτά ἐστιν κατὰ τὸ γένος, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἐκτὸς ἀποβλητέον· ἀλλ’ οὐκ εἰσὶν αἱ τοιαῦται προσθήκαι συνήθεις τῇ Ἀριστοτελικῇ συντομίᾳ. τὸ δὲ καὶ ἐν μέσῳ θεῖναι τὰ τῆς κατηγορίας

σημαινόμενα (5) γυμνάζοντος ἦν, ὡς οἶμαι, τοὺς ἐντευξομένους πρὸς ἀγγίνοιαν. ὁ μέντοι Νικόστρατος ὑπὸ τὰ πρὸς τι καὶ τὸ τρίτον καὶ τὸ τέταρτον ἀνάγων συγκρούπτει τὴν ἀλήθειαν· κὰν γὰρ κτήματά ἐστιν τὰ ἱμάτια καὶ ὁ δακτύλιος, ἀλλὰ κατὰ γε τὴν περίθεσιν καὶ τὸ ἔχασθαι προχείρως διαφέροντα τῶν ἄλλων κτημάτων, ὡς καὶ τῷ Πλάτωνι δοκεῖ τῆς τοῦ ἔχειν γίνεσθαι (10) κατηγορίας”.

[C1. 370,11-14: Plotinus questions why, if the division of somatic and asomatic ‘having’ makes the category distinct, actions are not distinguished in the same way.] ‘Ἄλλ’ εἰ τὸ τὰ σωματικά, φησὶν ὁ Πλωτίνος [6.1.23], ἔχειν περὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ μὴ ἀσώματα ἄλλην ποιεῖ κατηγορίαν, διὰ τί καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν πολλῆς οὔσης διαφορᾶς οὐκ ἄλλη μὲν κατηγορία γίνεται κατὰ τὸ τέμνειν, ἄλλη δὲ κατὰ τὸ κάειν ἢ κατορύττειν ἢ ἀποβάλλειν;’

[C1<sup>r</sup> 370,14-21: Simplicius replies that the category of *having* is unlike *acting* in this respect: the somatic-asomatic distinction is the sole and entire feature that makes it unique.] ἢ ἡ μὲν τοῦ ποιεῖν ἐνέργεια (15) μία ἐστὶν καὶ ἓνα ἔχουσα λόγον καὶ οὐδὲν δεομένη τῆς διαφόρου ὑποδοχῆς τῶν τὸ ποιεῖν ὑποδεχομένων· καὶ ὁ τέμνων γὰρ καὶ ὁ κάων καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οὐδὲν κατὰ τὸ ποιεῖν διαφέρουσιν· ἢ μέντοι τοῦ ἔχειν κατηγορία ἐν τούτῳ τὴν ὅλην ἔχει ιδιότητα ἐν τῷ μὴ ἀσώματον, σῶμα δὲ εἶναι τὸ περικείμενον, ἢ οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς τυχούσης σχέσεως χαρακτηρίζεται, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῆς πρὸς ἄλλο εἰς (20) ἑαυτὸ κυρίως θεωρεῖται.

[C2. 370,21-22: If a cloak is on a bed rather than a person, asks Plotinus, will this not create an additional category?] ‘ἄλλ’ εἰ τὸ περικείμενον, φησὶν, ἱμάτιον ἄλλην κατηγορίαν ποιεῖ, διὰ τί μὴ καὶ τὸ κείμενον ἐπὶ κλίνης ἄλλην ποιήσει;’

[C2<sup>r</sup>. 370,22-30: Simplicius replies that the cloak on the bed is in the *keisthai* category, and the bed is not animate.] ἢ τὸ μὲν κείσθαι ἱμάτιον ἐπὶ κλίνης τῆς τοῦ κείσθαι ἐστὶν κατηγορίας ἢ τῆς ἐν τόπῳ· οὐδεμίαν γὰρ ἐνέργειαν παρέχεται ἢ κλίνη εἰς τὸ ἔχειν· ἔξιν γὰρ καὶ κράτησιν ἐμφαίνει τινὰ ἢ τοῦ ἔχειν κατηγορία, ἀλλὰ σωμάτων (25) ἐπικτήτων. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἀληθές, ἐπὶ μόνων τῶν ἐμψύχων τὸ ἔχειν ἐπαληθεύεται, ὥστε κὰν ἀγάλματι κόσμος περικείται, ὡς μὲν ἄψυχον οὐκ ἂν λέγοιτο ἔχειν τὸ ἀγαλμα, ἀλλὰ κείσθαι ἐν τῷ ἀγάλματι ὁ κόσμος· εἰ δὲ ὡς ἔμψυχόν τι θεωροῖτο, κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ ἔμψυχον ἀναφορὰν ἔχειν ἂν λέγοιτο τὸν κόσμον.

[C3. 370,30-31: Plotinus suggests that having is a state of possession, and so a quality.] ‘ἄλλ’ εἰ κατὰ τὴν κάθεξιν τὸ ἔχειν χαρακτηρίζεται, (30) εἰς ἔξιν ἀναθῆσεται, φησὶν, ἢ δὲ ἔξιν ἐν τῇ ποιότητι’.

[C3<sup>r</sup>. 370,32-371,1: Simplicius replies that the having which answers to a ‘state of possession’ is homonymous with the category: the category describes **control of acquired bodies**, whereas the state of possessing a quality is the containment of non-bodily things.] ἢ ὁμώνυμος αὕτη ἢ ἔξιν· ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἦν ἀσωμάτων συνοχή, αὕτη δὲ ἐπικτήτων σωμάτων κράτησις, καὶ ἢ μὲν τοῦ ἔχειν δι’ ἐνεργείας τῶν ἐχόντων παραγίνεται, ἢ δὲ ποιότητων οὐ δι’ ἐνεργείας οὔτε τῶν μετεχομένων οὔτε τῶν μεταλαμβανόντων. διαφέρουσιν δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰ ἐχόμενα, ὅτι ἐκεῖ μὲν

(35) ἀσώματά ἐστιν, ἐνταῦθα δὲ σώματα, καὶ κατὰ τὰ ἔχοντα, ὅτι ἐκεῖ μὲν ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ, ἐνταῦθα δὲ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἔξωθεν.

[C4. 371,1-3: Plotinus points out that if *having* a quality is not categorical ‘having’ because quality is already accounted for, it follows that *having* a weapon is not categorical ‘having’, because a weapon is *ousia*, which is already accounted for.] ‘ἀλλ’ εἰ ποιότητα, φησὶν, οὐ δεῖ λέγειν ἔχειν, ὅτι ἤδη ποιότης εἴρηται, οὔτε ποσότητα ἔχειν εἰρημένης ποσότητος οὐδὲ μέρη ἔχειν εἰρημένης οὐσίας, διὰ τί τὸ ὄπλα ἔχειν ἄλλης δεῖ λέγειν κατηγορίας καίτοι εἰρημένης οὐσίας, ἐν ἧ τὰ ὄπλα;’

[C4<sup>r</sup>. 371,3-9: Simplicius replies that it is not the weapon, but the *control* of the weapon, that generates the category of ‘having’.] ἢ ὅτι οὐ τὰ ὄπλα ἢ τὰ ὑποδήματα καθ’ αὐτὰ εἴρηται εἶναι τῆς τοῦ ἔχειν κατηγορίας οὐδὲ ἡ κτήσις αὐτῶν, εἴ τις κεκτημένος αὐτὰ χρῆσιν αὐτῶν (5) μὴ ποιήσαιτο, ἀλλ’ ἡ κράτησις αὐτῶν καὶ ἡ ἐκ τοῦ ἔχειν αὐτὰ λεγομένη ἔξις, αὕτη ποιεῖ τὴν τοῦ ἔχειν κατηγορίαν. ἄλλο δὲ ἦν τὸ ποιότητα ἔχειν καὶ ποσότητα, ἄλλο τὸ ὄπλα ἔχειν καὶ ὑποδήματα· ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ ἀσωμάτων ἡ ἔξις, ἐνταῦθα δὲ σωματικῶν, καὶ ἐκεῖ μὲν ἀλλοιωτικά ἐστι τῶν μετεχόντων τὰ μετεχόμενα, ἐνταῦθα δὲ περικείται μόνον.

[C5. 371,9-10: Plotinus asks: how can an entire genus arise for such a limited number of cases?] ‘ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν ὀλίγοις, φησὶν, πῶς γένος;’

[C5<sup>r</sup>. 371,11-14: Simplicius replies that this genus obtains only for the most extreme cases (*eskhatois*), and that it is irrelevant that there are few instances, as some species have only one member]. ἢ ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἐσχάτοις ἐστὶ τοῦτο τὸ γένος καὶ περὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν ὑπάρχει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἰς βραχύτατον συνέσταλται, καὶ οὐ διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἂν εἴη γένος· καὶ γὰρ ὁ φοῖνιξ εἰς ὧν τὸ εἶδος ὅλον ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ.

[D. 371,15-23: Simplicius, in an interlude which appears to respond again to Nicostratus (B), explains why Aristotle offers the second discussion of the ‘homonymy’ of having in ch. 15.] Ἀλλὰ διὰ τί μὴ συνήψεν τὸν περὶ τοῦ ἔχειν λόγον ταῖς ἄλλαις κατηγορίας, (15) ἀλλ’ ὡσπερ ἐκ μετανοίας μετὰ τὸν περὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἅμα καὶ περὶ κινήσεως λόγον περὶ τοῦ ἔχειν ἐμνημόνευσεν; ἢ συμπληρώσας τὸν περὶ τῶν κατηγοριῶν λόγον, ἐπειδὴ τινων κατὰ παραδρομὴν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐμνήσθη, ἐξεργάζεται καὶ ἐκεῖνα. τελευταίας δὲ οὔσης τῆς τοῦ ἔχειν κατηγορίας, φροντίζων τάξεως εἰκότως τελευταίας <τῆς> τοῦ ἔχειν ὁμωνυμίας (20) ἐμνημόνευσεν, οὐ μόνον αὐταῖς ταῖς κατηγορίας τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀποδιδούς τάξιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἔξωθεν ἐπιλεγόμενοις καὶ ἐξεργαζομένοις τὴν αὐτὴν ἀποδιδούς.

[C6. 371,23-24: It is absurd, Plotinus suggests, for Aristotle to omit ‘having a wife’ from the later homonymy in ch. 15.] ‘ἀλλ’ ἄτοπος, φησὶν, ἀποδοκιμάζων τὸ λέγειν ἔχεσθαι γυναῖκα σύνηθες ὄν’.

[C6<sup>r</sup>. 371,24-26: Simplicius replies that it would have been equally absurd to pass over a customary phrase, rather than classifying it as a dialectician should.] ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν μὴ ἐμνήσθη, ἄτοπος ἦν παρῆς τὸ ἐν τῷ ἔθει, ὁ δὲ μνησθεὶς καὶ ἐπακρίνας διαλεκτικοῦ ἔργον ἐποίησεν, ὧ (25) μάλιστα διαφέρει ἡ τῆς ἀληθείας κρίσις.

[E. 371,36-27: Summary.] ταῦτα μὲν οὖν καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἀπορίας εἰρήσθω.

[T17] **A 381,3-32.** < ‘Certain Peripatetics’ (likely N., cf. Moraux A. II 553) hold that the opposite is a genus. Iamblichus replies> **Speakers: ‘Certain Peripatetics’.** **Respondents: Iamblichus.**

εἰ οὖν πᾶσιν τοῖς εἶδεσιν ἐφαρμόζει ὁ τῶν ἀντικειμένων λόγος, οὐ φωνῆς εἰς σημαϊνόμενα ἀλλὰ γένους (15) εἰς εἶδη ἐστὶν ἡ διαίρεσις, εἶπερ οὐχ ὁμώνυμος ἀλλὰ συνωνύμως κατηγορεῖται τὸ ἀντικείμενον”. πρὸς δὴ ταῦτα ὁ Ἰάμβλιχος φησὶν ὡς “εἰ μὴ ὁμώνυμος ἦν ὁ ὄρος, ἦν ἂν τῷ ὄντι κοινὸς λόγος καὶ κοινὸν γένος πάντων τῶν ἀντικειμένων· ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ συνυπάρχειν καὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ ἄλλως μὲν, φησὶν ὁ Ἰάμβλιχος, θεωρεῖται ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τι, (20) ἄλλως δὲ ἐν καταφάσει καὶ ἀποφάσει καὶ ἄλλως ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς τῶν ἀντικειμένων, ἀληθεύει ὁ ἐξ ἀρχῆς λόγος, τὸ ὁμώνυμα εἶναι τὰ ἀντικείμενα. διό, φησὶν, καὶ ἡμαρτεν Νικόστρατος ὡς πρὸς ἓν γένος αὐτῶν τὴν ἀντιλογίαν ποιούμενος”. ὁ μέντοι Πορφύριος γένος μᾶλλον καὶ αὐτὸς τίθεται, καὶ ἐγὼ ταύτη μᾶλλον ῥέπω οὐδὲ λόγου ἀκούσας πιθανοῦ τινος τὴν ὁμώνυμίαν (25) κυροῦντος οὔτε αὐτὸς ἐννοῶν, πλὴν τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλη εἰπεῖν· περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ποσαχῶς εἴωθεν ἀντιτιθεσθαι. καίτοι τὸ ποσαχῶς καὶ εἰ γένος ἦν, δυνατὸν εἰπεῖν· εἴτε γὰρ τρία εἴτε τέτταρα εἶχεν εἶδη, τριχῶς ἢ τετραχῶς ἀληθὲς ἦν εἰπεῖν ἀντικεῖσθαι, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ποσαχῶς· οὐ γὰρ τὸ πολλαχῶς εὐθύς τὴν ὁμώνυμον δηλοῖ φωνήν, ἀλλὰ τὸ πολλαχῶς (30) μόνον λέγεσθαι, μὴ μέντοι εἶναι. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν κοινῶς περὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων εἰρήσθω, λοιπὸν δὲ τὴν λέξιν τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους προληπτέον καὶ ποιητέον αὐτῆς τὴν ἐξήγησιν.

[T18] **A 385,9-15.** < Nicostratus holds that the contraries are said in relation to each other. > **Speakers: Nicostratus.** **Respondents: Simplicius.**

Ἀνδρόνικος δὲ οὐκ ἀντίθετα μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναντία τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πάσχειν ἀπεφήνατο. καὶ τοῦτο δὲ ἐπιστήσαι ἄξιον, ὅτι τὰ μὲν πρὸς τι πρὸς ἄλληλα λέγεται, τὰ δὲ ἐναντία αὐτὰ (5) μὲν ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἐναντία, τουτέστιν τὰ τῇ ἐναντιώσει περιεχόμενα, ὡσπερ τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν, πρὸς ἄλληλα οὐ λέγεται, τὸ δὲ ἐναντίον αὐτὸ καὶ οὐχὶ τὰ περιεχόμενα ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ κατὰ τὰ πρὸς τι λέγεται καὶ οὐχὶ κατὰ τὸ ἐναντίον· ἀντεισάγει γὰρ ἄλληλα καὶ συνυφέστηκεν. καὶ ἴσως τούτου αἴτιον ἢ κοινὴ τῆς ἐναντιότητος ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις συνύπαρξις. Νικόστρατος δὲ (10) δεικνύει νομίζει, ὅτι τὰ ἐναντία πρὸς ἄλληλα λέγεται, οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπὸ τὸ ἐναντίον ἀλλ’ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἐναντίου ποιούμενος τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν. ἐπὶ πάντων δὲ ἴσμεν ὅτι ἄλλο μὲν ἐστὶν αὐτὸ ἕκαστον, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ὑπ’ αὐτὸ τεταγμένον καὶ μετέχον αὐτοῦ, ὡσπερ τὸ ἴσον αὐτὸ μὲν ἐστὶ τῶν πρὸς τι, τὰ δὲ ὑπ’ αὐτὸ ποσὰ ἐστὶν ἐν οἷς τὸ ἴσον· οὕτως οὖν καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐναντία (15) αὐτὰ ὡς συνυπάρχοντα πρὸς τί ἐστὶν, τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ τὰ ἐναντία ὡς μετέχοντα τῶν ἐναντίων ἐναντία ἐστίν. καὶ ἔστιν μὲν θαυμαστόν, πῶς τὰ ἐναντία καθὸ ἐναντία οὐκ ἔστιν ἐναντία ἀλλὰ πρὸς τι. εἰ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τῷ ἐναντία εἶναι ὑπῆρχεν αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸ πρὸς τι εἶναι, οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν· εἰ δὲ ἐναντία ὄντα οὐδὲ ὅλως ἐστὶν ἐναντία, καθὸ ἐναντία ἐστὶ, θαύματι ἔοικεν. (20)

[T19] **A 388,1-13.** < Nicostratus holds that contraries exist in contrary genera, contra Cat. 6a11-18. > **Speakers: Nicostratus.** **Respondents: Simplicius.**

χρησαμένου δὲ ὅμως τῷ ὄρω τούτῳ ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ λόγῳ μετὰ τοῦ ἐπισημῆνασθαι ὅτι παλαιὸς ὁ ὄρος, οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς παραλαβόντες αὐτὸν

ἐχρήσαντο, τὸ μὲν σαθρὸν αὐτοῦ παραδεικνύοντες, πειρώμενοι δὲ ὅμως λύειν τὰ δοκοῦντα ἄτοπα. ὁ μὲντοι Νικόστρατος αἰτιάται, ὅτι μὴ μόνον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει <...> τῷ χρώματι τὸ λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν, καὶ γλυκὺ καὶ πικρὸν ἐν τῷ χυμῷ, δικαιοσύνη δὲ καὶ ἀδικία ἐξ ἐναντίων γενῶν· τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς, τῆς δὲ κακίας τὸ γένος· αὐτὴ δὲ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία τρόπον μὲν τινα ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους (ἕξις γὰρ ἀμφοῖν τὸ γένος καὶ ποιότης), τρόπον δὲ ἄλλον ἐξ ἐναντίων γενῶν (τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς γένος τὸ ἀγαθόν, τῆς δὲ μοχθηρίας τὸ κακόν, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν (10) αὐτὰ γένη δοκεῖ, εἰ μὴ ἄρα ἐν ποιότητι καὶ ταῦτα ὡς γένει· ὁ μὲντοι γε Ἀριστοτέλης πολλαχοῦ φαίνεται τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακὸν μὴ ὡς γένη ἀλλ' ὡς ὁμωνύμους φωνᾶς τιθεῖς).

[T20] B 390,14-19. < Nicostratus doubts that the intermediates are characterized by the negation of the extremes, contra *Cat.* 11b33-12a25. > **Speakers: Nicostratus. Respondents: Simplicius.**

Διελόντος δὲ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους τὰ ἐναντία εἰς τε τὰ ἄμεσα καὶ τὰ ἔμμεσα καὶ ἄμεσα μὲν λέγοντος ἐκεῖνα ὧν ἐξ ἀνάγκης θάτερον ὑπάρχει τῷ δεκτικῷ καὶ ἀνά μέρος πάρεστιν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ, εἰ μὴ τῶν συμφυῶν εἴη ὡς ἡ θερμότης τῷ πυρί, ἀλλὰ τῶν συμβεβηκότων, γίνεται λόγος τῶν ἀμέσων τοιούτους, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἄμεσα ἐναντία ἐν οἷς τὸ ἕτερον ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχει περὶ τὸ δεκτικόν, ἔμμεσα δὲ ὧν οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ ἕτερον. εἰπόντος δὲ Ἀριστοτέλους τῇ τῶν ἄκρων ἀποφάσει τὰ μέσα χαρακτηρίζεσθαι, ἀντιλέγει Νικόστρατος, ὡς “εἰ ἡ ἀπόφασις τὸ μέσον δηλοῖ, καὶ τὸ οὐκ (15) ἄνθρωπος καὶ οὐκ ἵππος μεσότητα δηλώσει· δεῖ οὖν, φησὶν, προσκεῖσθαι ‘ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει λαμβανομένου τοῦ μέσου, ἐν ᾧπέρ ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ τὰ ἄκρα”.

[T21] B 402,11-403,5. < (A) Nicostratus questions the definition of the differentiation between the opposition of contraries and that of possession and privation; (B) Nicostratus further argues that privation can change into possession as well as vice versa. > **Speakers: Nicostratus. Respondents: Simplicius.**

Τούτων δὲ προειλημμένων ῥᾶδιον λοιπὸν καὶ τὰς Νικοστράτου ἀπορίας διαλύειν, ὅς φησιν μὴ ἀκριβῶς ταύτην ἀποδεδόσθαι τὴν διαφορὰν· μήτε γὰρ τὰ ἐναντία εἰς ἀλλήλα πάντως μεταβάλλειν, διότι ἀπὸ σπουδαίου φαῦλος οὐ γίνεται, μήτε πᾶσαν στέρησιν ἀμετάβλητον εἶναι εἰς ἕξιν· “καὶ φαῦλος οὐ γίνεται, μήτε πᾶσαν στέρησιν ἀμετάβλητον εἶναι εἰς ἕξιν· “καὶ γὰρ ἐκ πεφωτισμένου καὶ ὠπλισμένου καὶ ἡμφιεσμένου γένοιτο ἂν ἐσκοτισμένον καὶ ἄνοπλον καὶ γυμνόν, καὶ ἐκ τῶν στερησέων αὐθις ἢ ἕξις· ἄτοπον οὖν τὰ ἀμφοτέροις ὑπάρχοντα διακρίνειν καὶ τὰ μὲν προσνέμειν τῷ ἐτέρῳ, τὰ δὲ τῷ λοιπῷ”.

[T23] B 406,5-407,14. < Nicostratus says that dividing the true and false is not the *idion* of contradictories, citing oaths and expressions of wonder and blame. > **Speakers: Nicostratus. Respondents: Simplicius.**

Ὁ δὲ Νικόστρατος αἰτιάται κἀνταῦθα λέγων μὴ ἴδιον εἶναι τῶν κατὰ ἀντίφασιν ἀντικειμένων τὸ διαιρεῖν τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος. “οὔτε γὰρ μόνοις οὔτε πᾶσιν αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχει· οὐ μόνοις μὲν, ὅτι καὶ τοῖς ὁμοτικαῖς καὶ τοῖς ἀπομοτικαῖς λόγοις ὑπάρχει τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης θάτερον, οἷον ‘νῆ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν ἔπραξα τάδε’· ‘οὐ μὰ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν οὐκ ἔπραξα’· ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς (10) θαυμαστικαῖς, φησὶ, τὸ αὐτὸ ὑπάρχει· ‘ὡς καλὸς γε ὁ Πειραιεύς’, καὶ τοῖς ψεκτικαῖς, οἷον ‘φαῦλός ἐστιν’, ‘οὐ φαῦλός ἐστιν’· οὐκ ἄρα μόνοις ὑπάρχει τοῖς κατὰ ἀντίφασιν τοῦτο, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ πᾶσιν, φησὶν. αἱ γὰρ εἰς τὸν μέλλοντα χρόνον ἐγκεκλιμένα προτάσεις οὔτε ἀληθεῖς εἰσιν οὔτε ψευδεῖς διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἐνδεχομένου φύσιν· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ‘ἔσται ναυμαχία’ ἀληθὲς οὔτε τὸ ‘οὐκ ἔσται’.

ἀλλ' ὀπότερον ἔτυχεν". "πρὸς δὴ ταῦτα ἔνεστι μὲν, φασί, λέγειν ὅτι τεττάρων ὄντων ἀντικειμένων τοῦ ἐνὸς ἴδιον τοῦτο οὐ πρὸς πάντα ἀλλ' ὡς πρὸς τὰ τρία ἀποδέδωκεν· ὁ γὰρ εἰπὼν ὅτι τῶν τεττάρων τὸ ἐν μερίζει τὸ ἀληθές καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος, οὐ καθάπαξ τοῦτο ἀπεφήνατο, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μόνων τῶν ἀντικειμένων τοῦτο ἐποίησεν. χωρὶς δὲ τούτων, φασίν, πάλαι (20) λέλυται ταῦτα ἐν ταῖς ἐξηγήσεσιν τοῦ ὅρου τοῦ ἀξιώματος τοῦ ἀφοριζομένου τὸ ἀξίωμα ὃ ἐστὶν ἀληθές ἢ ψεῦδος. οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ ὁμοτικὸν οἷόν τε ἀληθές εἶναι ἢ ψεῦδος, ἀλλ' εὐορκεῖν μὲν ἢ ἐπιορκεῖν ἐν τοῖς ὅρκοις εἰκός, ἀληθεύειν δὲ ἢ ψεύδεσθαι ἐν αὐτοῖς οὐχ οἷόν τε, κὰν περὶ ἀληθῶν ὁμότης τις ἢ ψευδῶν. καὶ τὸ θαυμαστικὸν δὲ πλεονάζον τῷ θαύματι παρὰ τὸ ἀξίωμα (25) καὶ τὸ ψεκτικὸν τῷ μῶμῳ οὔτε ἀληθές ἐστὶν ἢ ψευδές, ἀλλὰ ὅμοια ἀληθείς ἢ ψευδέσιν".

[T24] **A 410,25-411,28.** < (A) Nicostratus censures Aristotle for an incomplete division of the contraries, not noting that *adiaphoron* is opposed to *adiaphoron*. (B) Nicostratus accuses Aristotle for also not including the division of good as contrary to good, as prudent walking is contrary to prudent rest. > **Speakers: Nicostratus. Respondents: Simplicius.**

Νικόστρατος δὲ αἰτιάται ἐν μὲν ὅτι ἀτελῶς ἔχει ἢ τῶν ἐναντίων (25) διαίρεσις· οὐ γὰρ προσέθηκεν ὅτι ἀδιάφορον ἀδιαφόρῳ ἀντίκειται. ὅπερ ἐν μὲν τῷ Περί τῶν ἀντικειμένων βιβλίῳ προσέθηκεν εἰπὼν εἶναι τινα τρόπον ἀντιθέσεως τῶν μήτε ἀγαθῶν μήτε κακῶν πρὸς τὰ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακά, ὡς εἴρηται πρότερον· ἀδιάφορα δὲ αὐτὰ οὐκ ἐκάλεσεν, ὡς οἶμαι, διότι νεώτερον ἦν τὸ τοῦ ἀδιαφόρου ὄνομα παρὰ τῶν Στωικῶν τεθέν. ἐνταῦθα (30) δὲ αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐμνήσθη, διότι ἀμφισβητήσιμον ἦν, μήποτε οὐ μόνον ἀδιάφορον ἀδιαφόρῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀδιάφορον κακῷ ἀντίκειται, ὡς δοκεῖ τὸ τεχνικὸν μέσον ὄν τῷ ἀτέχνῳ κακῷ ὄντι ἐναντιοῦσθαι καὶ τὸ νήφειν τῷ μεθύειν, καὶ αὐτὸ πάλιν ἀγαθῷ μέσον ἐναντίον, ὡς τὸ οἰνώσθαι τῷ νήφειν. [p. 411] ἀκατάλληλος δὲ ἢ λήψις· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἄτεχνον μέσον, εἶπερ καὶ ἐπὶ παίδων λέγεται, καὶ τὸ νήφειν διπτόν, τὸ μὲν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ μέσον, ὅταν τὸ μὴ οἰνώσθαι δηλοῖ καὶ τὸ μεθύειν τὸ μὲν κακόν, τὸ δὲ μέσον, ὅταν τὸ οἰνώσθαι δηλοῖ, καὶ οὕτως μέσα μὲν μέσοις, ἀγαθὰ δὲ κακοῖς ἀντιτιθέσθαι προσήκει. ἅπερ ἢ ἀνεξέταστα καταλιμπάνων ἄτοπον ἐποίει μνημονεύσας ὅλως αὐτῶν ἢ (5) ἐξετάζων μῆκος ἐπεισήγεν ἀσύμμετρον τῇ εἰσαγωγῇ. ἕτερον δὲ αἰτιάται ὁ αὐτὸς ἀνήρ πειρώμενος καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθῷ δεικνύειν ἐναντίον· τὴν γὰρ φρονίμην περιπάτησιν τῇ φρονίμῃ στάσει ἐναντίαν φησὶν καὶ τὴν φρονίμην ἡδονὴν τῇ φρονίμῃ λύπῃ, καὶ τὰλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἅπερ καὶ ἐναντίως λέγεσθαι δοκεῖ. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἐναντία συμφωνοῦντα πρὸς τὸν ἕνα σκοπὸν καὶ τὸ ἐν τέλος (10) τοῦ ἄμφω ποιοῦντος ἐμφρόνως. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἔστιν ὅλως ἐν τούτοις ἐναντίωσις, οὐχ ὡς ἀγαθοῦ πρὸς ἀγαθόν ἐστὶν, ἀλλ' ὡς μέσου πρὸς μέσον· ὡς γὰρ περιπάτησις πρὸς στάσιν καὶ ὡς ἡδονὴ πρὸς λύπην ἀντίκειται.

Ζητήσοι δὲ ἂν τις, διὰ τί κακῷ μὲν κακὸν ἀντίκειται καὶ μέσῳ μέσον, ἀγαθῷ δὲ ἀγαθὸν οὐκ ἐναντιοῦται. καὶ ῥητέον ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἐν ἐστὶ (15) καὶ ἀπλοῦν, τὸ δὲ κακὸν ποικίλον. ὡσπερ οὖν πανταχοῦ τὸ μὲν τυχεῖν καθ' ἐν γίνεται, κατὰ τὴν εἰς τὸν σκοπὸν βολήν, τὸ δὲ ἀποτυχεῖν κατὰ πολλά, κατὰ γὰρ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς καὶ τὰς ἐνδείας, οὕτως τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἐν ὄν οὐκ ἐναντιοῦται πρὸς ἑαυτό, τὸ δὲ κακὸν ποικίλον ὄν ἐναντιοῦται. τὸ δὲ μέσον οὐδὲ αὐτὸ ὡς μέσον ἐναντιοῦται, ἀλλὰ καθ' ἣν ἔχον φύσιν μέσον (20) ἐστίν· ὡς γὰρ λευκὸν μέλανι καὶ γλυκὺ πικρῷ· τὸ μέντοι κακὸν οὐ κατ' ἄλλο, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν, καθ' ἣν καὶ ἀσύμμετρα καὶ κακά ἐστίν. ὡσπερ δὲ δύο ἀληθῆ οὐκ ἀντίκειται, ψευδῆ δὲ δύο ἀντίκειται, ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς ἐνδεχομένης ὕλης τὸ πᾶς καὶ οὐδεὶς, οὕτως ἀγαθῷ μὲν ἀγαθὸν οὐ μάχεται, κακῷ δὲ κακὸν μάχεται. διόπερ οἰκονομία μὲν καὶ ἐλευθερία (25) οὐ μάχονται, καίτοι ἢ μὲν

σφζειν βούλεται τὰ χρήματα, ἢ δὲ προίεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἄμφω τοῦ καιροῦ στοχαζόμεναι συνάπτονται κατὰ τὸ ἀγαθόν· θρασύτης δὲ καὶ δειλία μάχονται.

[T25] **B 414,23-415,15.** < Nicostratus objects to 14a19-25, stating that there are no contraries which are genera and not also species of a genus. 'The students of Porphyry' (*hoi peri ton P.*) reply that some of the categories are homonymous and said of many things despite not being under one genus, and so are themselves genera, such as the good and the bad. Theophrastus is cited next, and Iamblichus replies to him. > **Speakers: Nicostratus. Respondents: 'The associates of Porphyry'.**

Τέταρτον θεώρημα παραδίδωσιν ὅτι πάντα τὰ ἐναντία ἢ ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος ἐστίν, ὥσπερ τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν ὑπὸ τὸ χρῶμα, ἢ ὑπὸ ἐναντία γένη, ὥσπερ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀδικία, εἶπερ τῆς μὲν ἀρετῆ, τῆς δὲ κακίας τὸ γένος, ἢ αὐτὰ γένη ἐστίν, ὥσπερ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν, ἃ οὐκ ἐστὶν ἐν γένει ἄλλω, ἀλλ' αὐτὰ τυγχάνει γένη ὄντα. ταύτης δὲ τῆς διαιρέσεως (25) ὁ Νικόστρατος λαμβάνεται, ἀνύπαρκτον λέγων τὸ τρίτον ἐν αὐτῇ τμημα· μὴ γὰρ εἶναι τινα ἐναντία, ἅπερ ἐστὶν μόνον γένη, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ εἶδη τινὸς ἢ τινῶν. “αὐτίκα γοῦν τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν ὑπὸ τὴν ποιότητα τάττεται, καὶ ἦτοι τὴν διάθεσιν ἢ τὴν ἕξιν. ἄλλως δὲ πᾶν ἐναντίον ἦτοι ὑπὸ τι τῶν δέκα γενῶν ταχθήσεται καὶ ἔσται πάντως ὑπὸ γένος καὶ μάτην εἴρηται (30) τὸ αὐτὰ γένη εἶναι, ἢ ἕξω τῶν δέκα κατηγοριῶν ἐστὶν καὶ ἀτελής ἐστὶ ἢ εἰς δέκα διαίρεσις”. ταύτην δὲ τὴν ἀπορίαν καλῶς ὀρηθεῖσαν οἱ περὶ τὸν Πορφύριον λύουσι λέγοντες τῶν ἐναντίων τὰ μὲν ὁμώνυμα εἶναι, τὰ δὲ [p. 415] οὐχ ὁμώνυμα, καὶ ὅτι “τὰ μὲν μὴ ὁμώνυμα διείλεν εἷς τε τὰ ὑφ' ἐν γένος τεταγμένα καὶ εἰς τὰ ὑπ' ἐναντία γένη, τὰ δὲ γε ὁμωνύμως μὴ ὑφ' ἐν γένος ὄντα, κατὰ πολλῶν δὲ λεγόμενα, διότι ἔοικεν τὰ γένη τοῖς ἀφ' ἐνὸς ὁμωνύμοις, αὐτὰ γένη φησὶν εἶναι. τοιοῦτον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν· ὁμώνυμον γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθόν· καὶ γὰρ ἐν οὐσίᾳ, ὡς θεός, καὶ ἐν (5) ποιότητι, ὡς ἀρετῆ, καὶ ὡς ποσὸν δέ, ὡς τὸ σύμμετρον, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις κατηγορίαις”. ἀλλ' οἱ οὕτως λέγοντες πρῶτον μὲν τὸ γένος ἀκύρως εἰρησθαι ἐπὶ ὁμωνύμου φωνῆς λέγουσιν, ἔπειτα οὐ προσποιοῦνται τὸ ποιότητος εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν. ἄλλοι δὲ ἰδιοτρόπως τὴν λέξιν ἐξηγοῦνται λέγοντες μηδὲν ἄλλο δηλοῦσθαι ἐν τῷ ἀγαθὸν δὲ καὶ κακόν οὐκ ἐστὶν (10) ἐν γένει, ἀλλ' αὐτὰ τυγχάνει γένη τινῶν ὄντα ἢ ὅτι τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν οὐκ ἐστὶν ὑπ' ἐναντία γένη, ἀλλ' αὐτὰ γένη ἐστὶν ἐναντία· κἂν γὰρ ὑπὸ τὸ ποιόν ἐστὶν, τὸ ποιόν οὐκ ἐστὶν ἐναντίον ἄλλω γένει. βεβίασται δὲ καὶ αὕτη ἢ λύσις· οὐδὲν γὰρ διοίσει ἢ τρίτη διαφορὰ τῆς πρώτης, εἶπερ ἐναντία ὄντα τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν ὑφ' ἐν ἐστὶ γένος.

[T26] **A 428,3-13.** < Nicostratus observes that in the *Physics* (225a20 ff.) Aristotle does not make generation and destruction movements, but here at *Cat.* 15a13-33 he enumerates them among movements. Simplicius replies that this is appropriate based on the place of the *Categories* as an introduction. > **Speakers: Nicostratus. Respondents: Simplicius.**

ἐγκαλεῖ δὲ ὁ Νικόστρατος, ὅτι ἐν μὲν τῇ Φυσικῇ ἀκροάσει τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν φθορὰν οὐ βούλεται εἶναι κινήσεις, ἐνταῦθα δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς εἰς τὰς κινήσεις συγκαταριθμεῖ. καίτοι ῥᾶδιον ἦν συνορᾶν ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν εἰκὸς (5) ἦν κοινῶς ἐνταῦθα τῷ ὀνόματι χρήσασθαι τῆς κινήσεως ἀντὶ τῆς μεταβολῆς, ἐπεὶ [ταυτὸ] ἐνταῦθα ὡς ἐν εἰσαγωγῇ κατὰ τὴν κεκρατηκυῖαν συνήθειαν ἐχρήσατο τῷ ὀνόματι· ὕστερον δὲ ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ ἀκροάσει προηγούμενον περὶ τούτου ποιούμενος λόγον τὸ ἀρέσκον ἑαυτῷ δοκιμάζει, τὰ γινόμενα καὶ φθειρόμενα μὴ ἀξίων λέγειν κινεῖσθαι, διότι ἢ κινήσεις τῶν (10) ὑφεστηκότων ἐστί. μεταβάλλει δὲ καὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐκεῖνα, διὸ κοινήν ἔθετο τὴν μεταβολὴν ἐκεῖ καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ φθορὰν οὐκέτι κινήσεις ἀλλὰ μεταβολὰς ἀφωρίσατο.

[T27] **B 429,13-430,4.** < Nicostratus states that Aristotle is incorrect to use the example of the ‘square’ with the gnomon (15a30-31) as something increased in size but not altered: if it is an immaterial square, it is inalterable and unmoveable, beyond quality and matter; if it is an enmattered square, it will be altered as increased in size. > **Speakers: Nicostratus. Respondents: Simplicius.**

Λαμβάνεται δὲ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους ὁ Νικόστρατος ὡς οὐ καλῶς διάφορον τῆς αὐξήσεως τὴν ἀλλοίωσιν διὰ τοῦ παραδείγματος ἀποδείξαντος τοῦ κατὰ τὸ τετράγωνον καὶ τὴν τοῦ γνώμονος περιθῆσιν ὡς αὐξομένου (15) μὲν, οὐ μὲντοι ἀλλοιούμενου. διπλᾶ γὰρ φησιν εἶναι τὰ σχήματα, “τὰ μὲν σωματικὰ καὶ ἔνυλα, τὰ δὲ μαθηματικὰ καὶ ἄνυλα, καὶ εἰ μὲν περὶ τοῦ ἀύλου λέγοι τετραγώνου, οὔτε ἀλλοιοῦται οὔτε αὐξεται ἐκεῖνο, ἄτρεπτα ὄντα ἐκεῖνα καὶ ἀναλλοίωτα, ἅτε ἔξω ποσότητος ὄντα καὶ ὕλης· εἰ δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἐνύλου, φησί, λέγοι τοῦτο, ὥσπερ αὐξεται, οὕτω καὶ ἡλλοίωται”. ὁ δὲ ταῦτα (20) λέγων ἔοικε μὴ διορίζειν κατὰ Ἀριστοτέλη τὴν μὲν ἀλλοίωσιν ἐπὶ τῆς κατὰ ποιότητα μεταβολῆς, τὴν δὲ αὐξῆσιν ἐπὶ τῆς κατὰ ποσότητα, ἀλλ’ ὡς εἴρηται πρότερον, πᾶσαν τὴν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος μεταβολὴν μένοντος τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ἀλλοίωσιν καλεῖ, διότι καὶ τὸ αὐξανόμενον εὐθὺς ἀλλοιοῦσθαί φησιν. ἔδει δὲ ἐννοεῖν ὅτι καὶ αὐξάνεσθαι δυνατόν ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ μορφῇ (25) μένον καὶ τῇ αὐτῇ ποιότητι, κατὰ μέγεθος μόνον γινομένης τῆς διαφορᾶς, ὡς ὅταν τὸ Ἀλεξάνδρου εἶδος καὶ ἐν σφενδόνη δακτυλίου γένοιτο καὶ ἐν τῷ Ἄθῳ εἰς κολοσσὸν Ἀλεξάνδρου σχηματισθέντι. διὸ καὶ ὁ ἰδίως [p. 430] ποιὸς ἐκ νηπίου μέχρι γήρωσ ὁ αὐτὸς διαμένειν λέγεται τοῦ ποσοῦ ἀμειβομένου, τοῦ δὲ εἶδους μένοντος. καὶ αὐτὸ πάλιν τοῦ αὐτοῦ μένοντος μεγέθους οὐδὲν κωλύει μεταβάλλειν κατὰ ποιότητα, ὥσπερ ὁ οἶνος τραπεῖς μετέβαλε μὲν κατὰ τὸ ποιόν, μένει δὲ τῷ ποσῷ ὁ αὐτός.

## 5. Boethus of Sidon

*Named Testimonia*

[T0] **Strabo, *Geographica*. Chapter 16 part 2 section 24.** <Notice of Strabo's 'study with' Boethus of Sidon, in the context of a general discussion of Sidonian art and science.>

Σιδώνιοι δὲ πολύτεχνοί τινες παραδέδονται καὶ καλλίτεχνοι, καθάπερ καὶ ὁ ποιητῆς δηλοῖ· πρὸς δὲ καὶ φιλόσοφοι περὶ τε ἀστρονομίαν καὶ ἀριθμητικὴν, ἀπὸ τῆς λογιστικῆς ἀρξάμενοι καὶ τῆς νυκτιπλοίας· ἐμπορικὸν γὰρ καὶ ναυκληρικὸν ἐκάτερον· καθάπερ καὶ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων εὗρεμα γεωμετρίαν φασὶν ἀπὸ τῆς χωρομετρίας, ἣν ὁ Νεῖλος ἀπεργάζεται συγγέων τοὺς ὄρους κατὰ τὰς ἀναβάσεις. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν παρ' Αἰγυπτίων ἦκειν εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας πεπιστεύεσθαι, ἀστρονομίαν δὲ καὶ ἀριθμητικὴν παρὰ Φοινίκων· νυνὶ δὲ πάσης καὶ τῆς ἄλλης φιλοσοφίας εὐπορίαν πολὺ πλείστην λαβεῖν ἔστιν ἐκ τούτων τῶν πόλεων· εἰ δὲ δεῖ Ποσειδωνίῳ πιστεῦσαι, καὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν ἀτόμων δόγμα παλαιὸν ἔστιν ἀνδρὸς Σιδωνίου Μόχου πρὸ τῶν Τρωικῶν χρόνων γεγονότος. τὰ μὲν οὖν παλαιὰ ἐάσθω· καθ' ἡμᾶς δὲ ἐκ Σιδῶνος μὲν ἔνδοξοι φιλόσοφοι γεγονάσι Βόηθος τε, ᾧ συνεφιλοσοφήσαμεν ἡμεῖς τὰ Ἀριστοτέλεια, καὶ Διόδωτος ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ· ἐκ Τύρου δὲ Ἀντίπατρος καὶ μικρὸν πρὸ ἡμῶν Ἀπολλώνιος ὁ τὸν πίνακα ἐκθεῖς τῶν ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος φιλοσόφων καὶ τῶν βιβλίων.

The Sidonians, according to tradition, are skilled in many beautiful arts, as the poet also points out; and besides this they are philosophers in the sciences of astronomy and arithmetic, having begun their studies with practical calculations and with night-sailings; for each of these branches of knowledge concerns the merchant and the ship-owner; as, for example, geometry was invented, it is said, from the measurement of lands which is made necessary by the Nile when it confounds the boundaries at the time of its overflows. This science, then, is believed to have come to the Greeks from the Egyptians; astronomy and arithmetic from the Phoenicians; and at present by far the greatest store of knowledge in every other branch of philosophy is to be had from these cities. And if one must believe Poseidonius, the ancient dogma about atoms originated with Mochus, a Sidonian, born before the Trojan times. However, let us dismiss things ancient. In my time there have been famous philosophers from Sidon; Boethus, with whom I studied the Aristotelian philosophy, and his brother Diodotus; and from Tyre, Antipater, and, a little before my time, Apollonius, who published a tabulated account of the philosophers of the school of Zeno and of their books. Tyre is distant from Sidon not more than two hundred stadia; and between them lies a town called City of Ornithes; and then one comes to a river which empties near Tyre, and after Tyre, to Palae-Tyre, at a distance of thirty stadia. (Tr. Jones).

[T1] **Galen, *Institutio logica*. Chapter 7 section 2 line 2.** <Boethus makes hypothetical syllogisms primary.>

ὅπερ οἱ περὶ Χρύσιππον οὐχ ἡγεμονικὰ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τροπικὰ <τὰ> τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀξιωματῶν ὀνομάζουσιν ὡς ἂν ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ὅλου τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ πηγνυμένου καθάπερ ἐπὶ τρόπιδι νεῶς. καὶ μέντοι καὶ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ Περιπάτου τινὲς ὥσπερ καὶ Βόηθος οὐ μόνον ἀναποδείκτους ὀνομάζουσι τοὺς ἐκ τῶν ἡγεμονικῶν λημμάτων συλλογισμούς, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρώτους· ὅσοι δὲ ἐκ κατηγορικῶν προτάσεων εἰσιν

ἀναπόδεικτοι συλλογισμοί, τούτους οὐκ ἔτι πρώτους ὀνομάζειν συγχωροῦσι·

[...] Some of the Peripatetics, among them Boethus, call the syllogisms which are based on leading assumptions [i.e. certain hypothetical syllogisms] not only unproved but also primary; but they are not prepared to call primary those unproved syllogisms which depend on predicative propositions. (Tr. Barnes, 2007b)

**[T2] Aspasius, *In ethica Nichomachea commentaria*. (A.D. 2) Page 44 line 24.** <A fragment of Boethus's pathology, in which he distinguishes 'brief' affections from true *pathê*.>

Βόηθος δὲ τὸ πάθος τῆς ψυχῆς κίνησιν ἄλογον ἔχουσάν τι μέγεθος, ἄλογον μὲν λαμβάνων καὶ αὐτὸς τὴν τοῦ ἀλόγου τῆς ψυχῆς μορίου κίνησιν, τὸ δὲ μέγεθος προστιθείς, ἐπειδὴ γίνονται τινες καὶ ἄλλαι κινήσεις τοῦ ἀλόγου τῆς ψυχῆς μετ' οἰκειώσεως τῆς πρὸς τινὰς καὶ ἀλλοτριώσεως βραχείας· τὰς οὖν μετὰ βραχείας οὐκ ἄξιον ἡγεῖτο ὀνομάζειν πάθη.

Boethus defined *pathos* as an irrational motion of the soul that has a certain magnitude; he too took 'irrational' as a motion of the irrational part of the soul, but he added magnitude, since there are also some other motions of the irrational part of the soul accompanied by brief *oikeiōseis* to people or estrangements (*allogriōseis*) from them. He thought that those movements accompanied by brief [affections] were not worthy of the name *pathê*...

**[T3] Alexander, *De anima libri mantissa*. Page 151 line 8.** <Alexander cites a number of thinkers who define the first and primary 'appropriate' goal (*oikeion*) for each of us as 'our own selves' (*hēmas autous*), which are the object of our desire (*orekton*). Boethus is primary in the list. Similarly, Boethus' name is associated by Damascius (*in Phileb.* 147,6 and 148 = T13) with a view that the self is the goal sought (*telos... orekton*) by each of us. >

κατὰ δὲ Ἀριστοτέλη οἱ μὲν φασιν εἶναι πρῶτον οἰκεῖον ἡμῖν ἡμᾶς αὐτούς. εἰ γὰρ τὸ φιλητὸν ὀρεκτὸν ἐστὶ (φιλοῦμεν δὲ οὐδένας πρὸ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, οὐδὲ ὠκειώμεθα πρὸς τι ἄλλο οὕτως· καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ἀντιποιούμεθα καὶ φιλοῦμεν τινὰ κατὰ τὴν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς ἀναφοράν), εἴη ἂν τὸ πρῶτον οἰκεῖον ἕκαστος αὐτῷ κατὰ τοῦτο. ταύτης τῆς δόξης οἱ περὶ Ξέναρχον εἰσι καὶ Βοηθόν, τὴν ἀφορμὴν λαβόντες ἀπὸ τῶν περὶ φιλίας εἰρημένων ἐν τῷ ὀγδόῳ τῶν Νικομαχείων, οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς λέξεως· 'τάχα δ' ἂν γένοιτο περὶ αὐτῶν φανερόν, γνωρισθέντος τοῦ φιλητοῦ' ἕως· 'διοίσει δ' οὐδέν· ἐστὶ γὰρ τὸ φιλητὸν φαινόμενον'· καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐνάτῳ δὲ ὁμοίως λέγει· 'τοῖς λόγοις δὲ τούτοις τὰ ἔργα διαφανεῖ' ἕως· 'φιλητέον δὴ μάλιστα ἑαυτόν'.

**[T4] Porphyry, *in Cat*. Page 59 line 17.** <Porphyry's account of the *skopos* of the *Categories* derives from Boethus and Herminus.>

– Ἄρα οὖν πάντες ἐσφάλησαν περὶ τὴν πρόθεσιν τῆς τῶν κατηγοριῶν γνώσεως;  
– Οὐδαμῶς· ἀλλὰ καὶ Βόηθος ἐν τοῖς εἰς τὰς Κατηγορίας εἴρηκεν ταῦτα καὶ Ἑρμῖνος βραχέως.

[cf. 58,4-7: ἡ πρόθεσις τοῦ βιβλίου περὶ τῆς πρώτης θέσεως τῶν λέξεων τῆς παραστατικῆς τῶν πραγμάτων· ἔστιν γὰρ περὶ φωνῶν σημαντικῶν ἀπλῶν,

καθὸ σημαντικαὶ εἰσι τῶν πραγμάτων, οὐ μὴν τῶν κατὰ ἀριθμὸν ἀλλήλων  
διαφερόντων ἀλλὰ τῶν κατὰ γένος.]

[T5] Themistius, *in Phys.* Page 26 line 20. <According to Boethus, matter is itself formless and becomes a ‘subject’ as soon as form comes upon it.>

ὅταν δὲ διορισθῇ τῇ μορφῇ, οὐκέθ’ ὕλη ἀλλ’ ὑποκείμενον. σημεῖον δέ, ὅτι κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον μένων ὁ χαλκὸς αὐτὸς οὕτως ἄλλοτε ἄλλως γίνεταί ὕλη. ὅπερ γὰρ φησιν ὁ Βοηθός, ἡ ὕλη ἐν τοῖς ποιοῖς οὐκέτι ὕλη διαμένει· ἄμορφος γὰρ καθ’ αὐτὴν καὶ ἀνείδεος εἶγε ὕλη, ἀλλ’ εἰς ὑποκείμενον ἤδη περιίσταται· μετ’ εἶδους γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ πέρατος καὶ ὑποκείμενον εἶδει καὶ πέρατι. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὕλη πρὸς τὸ ἐσόμενον ὠνομάσθαι φαίνεται, τὸ δὲ ὑποκείμενον πρὸς τὸ ἤδη ἐνόν· καὶ εἴη ἂν τὸ πρᾶγμα τοῦτο, ὃ λέγομεν ὕλην, ὑποκείμενόν τι ᾧ συμβέβηκεν ἐν τῇ φύσει τὸ δεκτικὴν εἶναι τῶν ἐναντίων· ὥσπερ γὰρ τοῦ εἶδους, οὕτως καὶ τῆς στερήσεως ἐστὶ δεκτικὴ.

[T6] Themistius, *in Phys.* Page 160 line 26. <Boethus argues that number can exist without the numberer – thus time can exist apart from soul.>

εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἄλλο πέφυκεν ἀριθμεῖν ἢ ψυχὴ καὶ ψυχῆς ὁ νοῦς, ἄρα μὴ οὐσίας ψυχῆς δυνατὸν εἶναι τὸν χρόνον; εἰ τοίνυν διχῶς λέγεται ὁ ἀριθμὸς, τό τε ἀριθμητὸν καὶ τὸ ἀριθμούμενον, τὸ μὲν, τὸ ἀριθμητὸν δηλαδή, δυνάμει, τὸ δὲ ἐνεργεία, ταῦτα δὲ οὐκ ἂν ὑποσταίη μὴ ὄντος τοῦ ἀριθμήσοντος μήτε δυνάμει μήτε ἐνεργεία, φανερόν ὡς οὐκ ἂν ὁ χρόνος εἴη μὴ οὐσίας ψυχῆς. καίτοι φησὶ γε ὁ Βοηθός ‘οὐδὲν κωλύει τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἶναι καὶ δίχα τοῦ ἀριθμοῦντος’, ὥσπερ οἶμαι τὸ αἰσθητὸν καὶ δίχα τοῦ αἰσθανομένου. σφάλλεται δέ· ἅμα γὰρ τὰ πρὸς τι καὶ τὰ δυνάμει πρὸς τὰ δυνάμει, ὥστε εἰ μὴ καὶ ἀριθμητικόν, οὐδὲ τὸ ἀριθμητὸν, ἀλλ’ ᾧ συμβέβηκεν ἀριθμητῶ εἶναι, τοῦτο εἶναι ἐνδέχεται καὶ χωρὶς τοῦ ἀριθμοῦντος, οὐ μὴν ἀριθμητὸν, οὐδὲ ὡς ἀριθμητὸν, ὥστε κίνησιν μὲν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι καὶ χωρὶς τοῦ ἀριθμείσθαι, τὸ δὲ πρότερον αὐτῆς καὶ τὸ ὕστερον διαλαμβάνεσθαι τε καὶ διακρίνεσθαι, ὧν ἡ διάληψις καὶ διάκρισις καὶ ἀριθμὸς τὸν χρόνον ποιεῖ, πῶς δυνατὸν μὴ οὐσίας ψυχῆς; μάλλον δὲ οὐδὲ κίνησιν εἶναι δυνατὸν ἄνευ ψυχῆς.

[T7] Themistius, *in Phys.* Page 163 line 6. <On the other hand, no measure comes about by nature.>

ὥσπερ γὰρ φησὶ Βοηθός, οὐδὲν μέτρον ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως γίνεται, ἀλλ’ ἡμέτερον ἤδη καὶ τὸ μετρεῖν καὶ τὸ ἀριθμεῖν ἔργον ἐστίν. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐξετάζειν πολλάκις τε χρῆναι καὶ ἀβασανίστως μὴ παραδέχεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ μετρεῖται ἕκαστον τῶν μετρητῶν ἐνὶ συγγενεῖ, μονάδες μονάδι, γραμμαὶ γραμμῇ, μετρητὸν τε καὶ ὁ χρόνος, δῆλον ὡς καὶ ὁ χρόνος ἂν ὑπὸ τινος ὠρισμένου χρόνου μετροῖτο.

[T8] Dexippus, *in Cat.* Page 21 line 19. <Boethus, like Andronicus, omitted τῆς οὐσίας from the phrase λόγος τῆς οὐσίας in the opening chapter of the *Categories*.>

Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς ἀντιγράφοις τὸ ὁ δὲ λόγος τῆς οὐσίας πρόσκειται, ὡς καὶ Βοηθός μνημονεύει καὶ Ἀνδρόνικος. εἰ δὲ καὶ προσκείμενον εἴη τὸ ὁ δὲ λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερος, διότι παρὰ τοῖς πλείστοις οὕτως εὐρίσκεται γεγραμμένον, ἀλλ’ ὀρθῶς γε ἔχει προσ-

**[T9] Dexippus, in *Cat.* Page 45 line 3-30.**

— Περί δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ ζήτημα κάκεινο στρέφεται, διὰ τί ἐν μὲν τοῖς Φυσικοῖς τὰ κοινὰ προτάττει ὡς πρῶτα, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα.... (12) Ἀλλὰ τί ἂν εἴποιμεν πρὸς τοὺς περὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου διαμφοισβη τούντας, μήποτε οὐδὲ φύσει πρότερα ἢ τὰ καθόλου τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον ἀλλὰ ὕστερα;

— Ἡ σκοποῦντες ἀκριβῶς εὔροιμεν ἂν τὰ ἀμφοισβητούμενα ὡς ὁμολογούμενα (15) αὐτοὺς λαμβάνοντας· ὅταν γὰρ ἐνὸς ἐκάστου πρῶτα φύσει λέγωσι τὰ καθόλου, πάντως δὲ πάλιν ὕστερα, ὑποτιθέμενοι τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα εἶναι καὶ τῇ φύσει πρότερα, οὐ καλῶς ὡς ἐν ἀρχῇ λαμβάνουσιν αὐτὸ ὅπερ δεῖται ἀποδείξεως. ἐπιπόλαια δὲ ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπιχειρήματα· κοινῶ μὲν ὄντος ἀνάγκη καὶ ἄτομον εἶναι (ἐν γὰρ τοῖς κοινοῖς τὰ ἄτομα περιέχεται), (20) ἄτομου δὲ ὄντος οὐ πάντως τὸ κοινόν, εἴ γε τὸ κοινόν ἐπὶ πολλοῖς ὑπάρχει. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον καταταχθέντος εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦ κοινῶ καὶ συμπληροῦντος αὐτοῦ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐστὶν ἄτομον· ὁ γὰρ τις ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἄνθρωπος ἐστὶ. ψεῦδος δὲ καὶ τὸ λέγειν, ὡς ἀναιρουμένου τοῦ κοινῶ οὐ πάντως τὸ ἄτομον ἀναιρεῖται· εἰ γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ ἔχει τὸ κοινόν τὴν (25) οὐσίαν ἐν τῷ διατείνειν ἐφ' ὅλα τὰ ὑπ' αὐτὸ τεταγμένα, ὁ ταύτην ἀναιρῶν ἀνήρηκεν εὐθύς καὶ τοῦ κοινῶ τὴν ὅλην ὑπόστασιν. οὕτως μὲν οὖν τοῖς περὶ Ἀλέξανδρον καὶ Βόηθον τοῖς τε ἄλλοις Περιπατητικοῖς ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἀποκρίνεσθαι χρή, δεικνύει δὲ ἐξηγουμένους τὰ Μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ προσήκειν, ὅτι τὰ κοινὰ Ἀριστοτέλης προτάττει καὶ ἐν τῇ τῶν (30) αἰσθητῶν θεωρίᾳ.

— [W]hy is it that in the *Physics* (cf. 1.1, 184a23) [Aristotle] gives prior ranking to common items (*ta koina*) as primary, whereas here [in the *Categories*] he ranks particulars first? (45,1-4) ... What could we say to those who dispute [that universals are prior by nature]... claiming that in fact universals are not prior by nature to particulars, but posterior to them?

— If we were to take the question carefully, we would find that they actually take as agreed what they are disputing. For when they say that the universals are prior in nature to each thing taken in particular, but on the other hand posterior in nature to *all* of them (*pantôn*), they are postulating that particulars are *also* (*kai*) prior by nature, and are proceeding invalidly in taking as a first principle the very thing that requires demonstration...

It is obvious that the particular (τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον) can be an individual (ἄτομον) only if a common item (κοινόν) is immanent in it and completes (συμπληροῦντος) its essence, for a particular man is also Man. And it is also false to say that, when the common item is eliminated, the individual is not always eliminated also; for if the common item possesses its essence in its extension over all those things that fall under it, one who eliminates this eliminates straightaway also the whole reality (ὑπόστασις) of the individual as well.

It is on these lines that one must reply to the school of Alexander and Boethus and the rest of the Peripatetic arguments in their attempts at explanation, and one should show, in interpreting the *Metaphysics*, that Aristotle takes common natures (τὰ κοινὰ) as prior *also* (καὶ) in his theory of sensibles (τῶν αἰσθητῶν). (Tr. Dillon).

**[T10] Syrianus, in *Met.* Page 106 line 5. <Boethus identified the *ideai* as 'generic' (*genika*).>**

παραφρεται δὲ καὶ Βοηθὸς ὁ περιπατητικὸς ἐκ τῶν παρὰ τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει κατηγήσεων εἰς ταῦτον ἄγων τοῖς γενικοῖς τὰς ιδέας· ᾧ καὶ τὸν Κορνοῦτον συντάττειν εὐλόγον, οὐ πόρρω καὶ αὐτὸν ταύτης ὑπενεχθέντα τῆς δόξης·

[T11] **Ammonius, in An. Pr. Page 31 line 12.** <Boethus regarded the second and third forms of the syllogism as perfect; he was followed by Porphyry, Iamblichus, and Maximus, whilst Themistius defended Aristotle's view.>

οἶον ὁ εἰρημένος ἐν δευτέρῳ σχήματι συλλογισμὸς ἀντιστροφῆς δέεται πρὸς τὸ ἀναχθῆναι εἰς τὸ πρῶτον σχῆμα· ἐὰν γὰρ τὴν δευτέραν πρότασιν τὴν λέγουσαν ‘οὐδεὶς ἵππος λογικόν’ ἀντιστρέψῃς καὶ εἴπῃς ‘οὐδὲν λογικὸν ἵππος’, ἀναχθήσεται εἰς τὸ πρῶτον σχῆμα. ἰστέον δὲ ὅτι ὁ μὲν Ἀριστοτέλης ταύτης ἐγένετο τῆς δόξης, ὅτι οἱ ἐν δευτέρῳ καὶ τρίτῳ σχήματι συλλογισμοὶ πάντες ἀτελεῖς εἰσιν, ὁ δὲ Βοηθὸς ἐνδέκατος ἀπὸ Ἀριστοτέλους γενόμενος ἐναντίως τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει περὶ τούτου ἐδόξασεν, καὶ καλῶς ἐδόξασεν καὶ ἀπέδειξεν ὅτι πάντες οἱ ἐν δευτέρῳ καὶ τρίτῳ σχήματι τέλειοί εἰσιν. τούτῳ ἠκολούθησεν Πορφύριος καὶ Ἰαμβλίχος, ἔτι μέντοι καὶ ὁ Μάξιμος, ὃς ἀκροατὴς ἦν Ἰερίου τοῦ Ἰαμβλίχου ἀκροατοῦ. καὶ Θεμιστίος δὲ ὁ παραφραστὴς τῆς ἐναντίας ἐγένετο δόξης τῆς καὶ τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει δοκούσης. τούτοις οὖν τοῖς δύο, τῷ τε Μαξίμῳ καὶ τῷ Θεμιστίῳ, ἐναντία περὶ τούτου δοξάζουσιν καὶ κατασκευάζουσιν, ὡς ὄντο, τὸ δοκοῦν αὐτοῖς [καὶ] διήτησεν αὐτὰ ὁ βασιλεὺς Ἰουλιανός, καὶ δέδωκεν τὴν ψήφον Μαξίμῳ καὶ Ἰαμβλίχῳ καὶ Πορφυρίῳ καὶ Βοηθῷ. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ Θεόφραστος ὁ Ἀριστοτέλους αὐτοῦ ἀκροατὴς τὴν ἐναντίαν αὐτῷ περὶ τούτου δόξαν ἔχων. τούτοις δὲ τοῖς ἀπὸ Βοηθοῦ ἠκολούθησεν καὶ ὁ μέγας Πρόκλος καὶ ὁ τούτου διδάσκαλος καὶ ὁ ἡμέτερος πατήρ, ὅτι καὶ οἱ ἐν δευτέρῳ καὶ τρίτῳ σχήματι πάντες τέλειοί εἰσιν. τινὲς δὲ, ὡς εἴρηται, ἀποβλέποντες εἰς τὸ παρ’ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους λεγόμενον, ὅτι ἀτελεῖς οἶεται εἶναι τοὺς ἐν δευτέρῳ καὶ τρίτῳ σχή-

ματι, εἰρήκασιν ὅτι τὸ τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι εἶπεν διὰ τοὺς ἐν δευτέρῳ καὶ τρίτῳ σχήματι ἐκβάλλων αὐτοὺς τῆς τῶν συλλογισμῶν ἐστίας· οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ εἶναι καὶ ὁμολογηθῆναι ταῦτα τὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὁμολογήματα συμβαίνει τὸ συμπέρασμα, ἀλλὰ δέονται ἔξωθεν βοήθειας πρὸς τὸ γενέσθαι τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, οἶον τῆς ἀντιστροφῆς ἢ τινος ἄλλης τῶν τριῶν τῶν εἰρημένων. ἡμεῖς δὲ φάμεν ὅτι οὐ διὰ τούτου εἶπεν τὸ τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι.

[T13] **Damascius, in Philebum. Section 147 line 6.** <According to Boethus, the self is the goal sought (*telos... orekton*) by each of us.>

Ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἐλπίδες δόξαι τινές, θάρρος δὲ καὶ φόβος πάθη τῆς ζωῆς, διήρηται δὲ πάντα τῷ κακῷ τε καὶ ἀγαθῷ. οἶον ἐλπίζομέν τι ἀγαθὸν ἐσόμενον ἢ κακὸν μὴ ἐσόμενον, θάρρος ἐπὶ τούτοις· πάλιν ἐλπίζομέν τι κακὸν ἐσόμενον ἢ ἀγαθὸν μὴ ἐσόμενον, φόβος ἐπὶ τούτοις· καλείσθω δὲ οὐκ ἐλπίς ἢ δόξα, ἀλλὰ δυσελπιστία. οὕτω χρὴ διαιεῖν ἄμεινον ἐπομένους τῷ Πλάτωνι, ἀλλὰ μὴ τῷ Βοηθῷ. [...]

[148] Ὅτι τὸ ὄρεκτον πρόκειται ὡς τέλος, τὸ δὲ ὄρεγόμενον φύσει δυσέγεστον καὶ οἶον δεόμενον τοῦ διεγείροντος· ἐν μέσῳ δὲ ἡ γνώσις ἐγείρουσα τοῦτο πρὸς ἐκεῖνο. διὸ καὶ ἡ φαντασία προτείνει τὸ ὄρεκτον τῇ ἀλόγῳ ὀρέξει· ἀνάλογον ἄρα καὶ ἡ λογικὴ γνώσις τῇ λογικῇ ὀρέξει προτείνει τὸ ὄρεκτον.

[T14a] **Simplicius, in Cat. Page 1 line 18.**

τινὲς μέντοι καὶ βαθυτέrais περὶ αὐτὸ διανοίαις κατεχρήσαντο, ὥσπερ ὁ θαυμάσιος Βόηθος. ἄλλοις δὲ ἤρρεσεν ἀπορίας μόνας γράψαι πρὸς τὰ λεγόμενα, ὅπερ Λούκιός τε πεποίηκε καὶ μετ’ αὐτὸν Νικόστρατος τὰ τοῦ Λουκίου ὑποβαλλόμενος...

Some commentators, however, also applied deeper thoughts to the work, as did the admirable Boethus....

**[T14b] Simplicius, in Cat. Page 11 line 23.** <Boethus explains the *Categories* as concerning significant expressions, but the division is applicable just so far as spoken words (*lexeis*) have a relation to beings, of which they are significant.>

[Porphyry] προστίθησιν δὲ καὶ τὰ τοῦ Βοήθου ὁ Πορφύριος πολλῆς ἀγχινοίας γέμοντα καὶ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ τείνοντα τοῖς εἰρημένοις. λέγει γὰρ καὶ ἐκεῖνος, ὅτι κατὰ μὲν τὸ ὄνομα καὶ τὸ ῥῆμα ἢ διαίρεσις εἰς τὰ τοῦ λόγου γίνεται στοιχεῖα, κατὰ δὲ τὰς κατηγορίας ἢ διαίρεσις γίνεται, καθὸ σχέσιν ἔχουσιν αἱ λέξεις πρὸς τὰ ὄντα, σημαντικαὶ τούτων οὐσαί. “διό, φησὶν, οἱ σύνδεσμοι ἐν μὲν τῇ λέξει εὐρίσκονται, τῶν δὲ κατηγοριῶν ἐκπίπτουσιν· οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν ὄντων δηλοῦσιν, οὔτε οὐσίαν οὔτε ποιὸν οὔτε ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον”.

**[T14c] Simplicius, in Cat. Page 13 line 16.** <The *skopos* of the *Categories* is about simple, primary, generic words (*phōnai*) insofar as they are significant of beings; this view, adopted by Simplicius himself, is ascribed to a list of commentators of whom Boethus appears to be chronologically earliest.>

ἔστιν οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων δῆλον, ὅτι ἐστὶν μὲν ὁ σκοπὸς οἰκείος τῇ λογικῇ πραγματεῖα περὶ τῶν ἀπλῶν καὶ πρώτων καὶ γενικῶν φωνῶν, καθὸ σημαντικαὶ τῶν ὄντων εἰσὶν, συνδιδάσκαται δὲ πάντως καὶ τὰ σημαινόμενα ὑπ’ αὐτῶν πράγματα καὶ τὰ νοήματα, καθὸ σημαίνεται τὰ πράγματα ὑπὸ τῶν φωνῶν. καὶ ταῦτα καὶ τοῖς Ἀλεξάνδροις καὶ Ἑρμῖνφ καὶ Βοήθφ καὶ Πορφυρίφ δοκεῖ καὶ ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος ἐπισηφίζει καὶ Συριανὸς σαφηνίζει καὶ οἱ ἡμέτεροι διδάσκαλοι ἀποδέχονται.

**[T14d] Simplicius, in Cat. Page 25 line 18.**

Βόηθος δὲ διχῶς φησιν τὸ ὄνομα λέγεσθαι, τό τε πρόταξιν ἄρθρου λαμβάνον, ὃ καὶ ἰδίως ὄνομα λέγεται, καὶ τὸ ἐφ’ ἅπαντα τὰ τοῦ λόγου στοιχεῖα διατεῖνον· ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἐν τῷ ζητεῖν ἐφ’ ὁποιασοῦν λέξεως, εἰ ὁμώνυμός ἐστιν, προτάττομεν τὸ ἄρθρον ὁμοίως ἐπὶ τε τῶν κυρίως ὀνομάτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων λέξεων, λέγοντες ‘τὸ κύων ὁμώνυμόν ἐστιν’ καὶ ‘τὸ ἡνδραπόδισται ὁμώνυμόν ἐστιν’ (σημαίνει γὰρ καὶ τὸ ληφθῆναι αὐτὸν αἰχμάλωτον καὶ τὸ λαβεῖν ἄλλον), εἰκότως τὸ ὄνομα τῶν ὁμωνύμων κοινὸν εἶναι φησιν, διότι τὸ ἴδιον τοῦ ὀνόματος ἴσχουσι πάντα τῷ προτάττεσθαι αὐτῶν ἄρθρον·

Boethus says that ‘name’ has two meanings: one in which it takes a preceding article, which is called ‘name’ in the more particular sense, and one which extends to all the elements of *logos*. When, therefore, we ask of any expression whatsoever whether it is homonymous, we place the article first, just as much in the case of names in the proper sense of the word as in that of other expressions. We say ‘dog is homonymous’ and ‘he was enslaved (*to êndrapodistai*) is homonymous’ (for [this phrase] signifies both ‘he was taken prisoner’ and ‘taking someone else prisoner’). Boethus is thus right to say that homonyms have the name in common, for they all have the proprium of names, insofar as they are preceded by the article. (Tr. Chase).

[T14e] **Simplicius, in Cat. Page 29 line 30.** <Boethus, like Andronicus, omitted *tês ousias* at *Cat.* 1a2, as it does not appear in his commentary.>

πρὸς γὰρ ταύτην τὴν ἀπορίαν [*sc.* that homonymy is in every category, rendering the phrase λόγος τῆς οὐσίας *ap. Cat.* i inaccurate] ὑπαντῶν ὁ Πορφύριος πρῶτον μὲν φησιν μηδὲ ἐν πάσι τοῦτο γεγράφθαι τοῖς ἀντιγράφοις· μήτε γὰρ Βόηθον εἰδέναι, ὅς φησι δεικνύναι τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη τίνα ἐστὶν τὰ ὁμώνυμα λέγοντα Ὅμώνυμα λέγεται ὦν ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοῦνομα λόγος ἕτερος· καὶ ἐξηγούμενος δὲ ὁ Βόηθος καθ' ἐκάστην λέξιν τὸ τῆς οὐσίας παραλέλοιπεν ὡς οὐδὲ γεγραμμένον.

[T14f] **Simplicius, in Cat. Page 36 line 28.** <Boethus claims that Aristotle has omitted what 'recent' writers (presumably Stoics) call synonyms, which are what Speusippus used to call polyonyms. Via Porphyry, *ad Gedalium*.>

ἐνθα δὲ περὶ τὰς πλείους φωνὰς ἢ σπουδῆ καὶ τὴν πολυειδῆ ἐκάστου ὀνομασίαν, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ Περὶ ποιητικῆς καὶ τῷ τρίτῳ Περὶ ῥητορικῆς, τοῦ ἐτέρου συνωνύμου δεόμεθα, ὅπερ πολυώνυμον ὁ Σπεύσιππος ἐκάλει. καὶ οὐ καλῶς ὁ Βόηθος παραλείφθαι τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει φησὶ τὰ παρὰ τοῖς νεωτέροις καλούμενα συνώνυμα, ἅπερ Σπεύσιππος ἐκάλει πολυώνυμα· οὐ γὰρ παραλέλειπται, ἀλλ' ἐν ἄλλαις πραγματείαις, ἐν αἷς ἦν οἰκείος ὁ λόγος, παρελήπται.

[T14g] **Simplicius, in Cat. Page 38 line 19.** <Boethus reports that Speusippus's division of *onomata* was exhaustive, organised into tautonyms (including homonyms and synonyms) and heteronyms (proper heteronyms, polyonyms, and paronyms). Via Porphyry, *ad Gedalium*.>

καὶ μέντοι ἄμφω ταῦτα παρήκεν, ὡς εἴρηται, διότι ῥητορικῆς μᾶλλον καὶ ποιητικῆς ἐστὶ περιεργίας, ἀλλ' οὐ φιλοσόφου θεωρίας, ὡς εἴρηται. πλὴν καλῶς ἔχει καὶ ἐκεῖνα τοῖς παραληφθεῖσιν εἰς μίαν διαίρεσιν συμπεριλαβεῖν. Σπεύσιππον τοίνυν ἱστορεῖ Βόηθος τοιαύτην διαίρεσιν παραλαμβάνειν τὰ ὀνόματα πάντα περιλαμβάνουσιν. τῶν γὰρ ὀνομάτων, φησὶ, τὰ μὲν ταυτώνυμά ἐστιν, τὰ δὲ ἐτερώνυμα· καὶ τῶν ταυτώνυμων τὰ μὲν ὁμώνυμά ἐστιν, τὰ δὲ συνώνυμα, κατὰ τὴν τῶν παλαιῶν συνήθειαν ἀκουόντων ἡμῶν τὰ συνώνυμα· τῶν δὲ ἐτερωνύμων τὰ μὲν εἶναι ἰδίως ἐτερώνυμα, τὰ δὲ πολυώνυμα, τὰ δὲ παρώνυμα.

[T14h] **Simplicius, in Cat. Page 41 line 14.** <Boethus thinks that 'what is said' should be understood in three ways in combined expressions.>

ἀλλ' ὁ γε Βόηθος ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἀσυμπλόκων τετραχῶς, <ὡς> εἴρηται [cf. 41,7-14: *pragmata, noemata, logos*, meaningless expressions] τὸ λεγόμενον ἀκούειν ἀξιοί, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν κατὰ συμπλοκὴν τριχῶς μόνον· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι τὰ συμπεπλεγμένα πράγματα, οἷον τὸ 'ἡμέρα ἐστίν' λεγόμενον, οὐχ ὅτι οὐδὲν σημαίνει ὁ λόγος, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν τοῦ πράγματος ὄνομα, ὥσπερ τὸ ἡμέρα. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστι μὲν τοῦ πράγματος, περὶ δὲ τοῦ πράγματος.

[T14i] **Simplicius, in Cat. Page 41 line 28.** <According to Boethus, the only things said or signified 'among the ancients' were intellections. Cf. Dillon 1990, 28 n. 16; cf. Dexippus in *Cat.* 9,26; source is Porphyry via Iamblichus?>

ὁ δὲ Βόηθος μόνα λεγόμενα καὶ σημαινόμενα τὰς νοήσεις εἶναι φησι παρὰ τοῖς ἀρχαίοις· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν, ἀλλ' ἐν διανοίαις καὶ ταῖς τοῦ νοῦ διεξόδοις, ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ τῆς Περὶ ψυχῆς λέγει· ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ διάνοια διὰ τοῦ λόγου σημαίνεται.

[T14j] **Simplicius, in Cat. Page 50 line 2.** <Boethus's answer to the *aporia* that Socrates may appear to be an accident of place and time.>

ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ τόπου λύειν ὁ Βόηθος ἔδοξεν εἰπὼν τὰ κινούμενα μὴ εἶναι ὅλως ἐν ᾧ ἢ τῷ τόπῳ· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐν τοῖς περὶ κινήσεως δεδειχθαι. τῷ δὲ αὐτῷ λόγῳ οὐδὲ ἐν χρόνῳ εἴη ἂν μερικῶ· ῥέοντος γὰρ συνεχῶς τοῦ χρόνου, ἄλλος ἀεὶ καὶ ἄλλος ἐστίν, ὥστε, εἴπερ ἄρα, ἐν τῷ καθόλου χρόνῳ ἐστίν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο λύων ὁ Βόηθος πρῶτον μὲν οὐδὲ εἶναι τὸ καθόλου ἐν ὑποστάσει κατὰ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη φησίν, εἰ δὲ καὶ εἴη, οὐ τί εἶναι· ὁ δὲ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τινι εἶπεν· ὥστε οὐ δύναται τὸ ἐν τινὶ ὄν ἐν τῷ καθόλου εἶναι. ῥαδίως δὲ ἂν αἱ τοιαῦται ἀπορίαι διαλύοιντο, εἰ τὸ ἐν τῷ ὑπάρχον συντάξομεν· τὸ γὰρ συμβεβηκὸς ἐνυπάρχει τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ, οὔτε δὲ τὰ ἐν τόπῳ οὔτε τὰ ἐν χρόνῳ ἐνυπάρχειν λέγοιτο.

[T14k] **Simplicius, in Cat. Page 58 line 27.** <At Cat. 1b23-24, Aristotle proposes that 'however many differentiae there are of the predicate (κατηγορουμένου), there will be just as many differentiae of the subject (ὑποκειμένου)'. This position, as Simplicius reports (58,27 = T14k), is critiqued by the school of Nicostratus (cf. 58,15). As Simplicius outlines the problem, 'animal and rational animal are subordinate one to the other; since rational and irrational are differentiae of animal, how is it possible for one part of rational animal to be rational, while the other is irrational?' (58,25-27). Boethus of Sidon 'gives in' to the problem and proposes to read ὅσαι τοῦ ὑποκειμένου διαφοραί, τσαῦται καὶ τοῦ κατηγορουμένου ἔσσονται, thus transposing the words κατηγορουμένου and ὑποκειμένου. Simplicius expresses 'gratitude to Boethus for pointing the way towards the solution of this problem' (59,5), and develops a solution that distinguishes constitutive (sustatikai) from divisive (diairetikai) differentiae (cf. Porph. Is. 10,1-21).>

ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν Βόηθος ἐνδοῦς τῇ ἀπορίᾳ [cf. 58,23-27] μεταγράφειν ἡξίου τὴν λέξιν [cf. Cat. 1b23-5] οὕτως· ὥστε, ὅσαι τοῦ ὑποκειμένου διαφοραί, τσαῦται καὶ τοῦ κατηγορουμένου ἔσσονται· “αἱ γὰρ τοῦ μερικωτέρου διαφοραὶ καὶ τοῦ ὀλικωτέρου ἔσσονται ἅτε τὸ μερικώτερον περιέχοντος, εἰ καὶ μὴ ὁμοίως καθόλου ἐπὶ τοῦ κατηγορουμένου, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου λέγονται· τὸ γὰρ λογικὸν ἀνθρώπου μὲν παντὸς κατηγορεῖται, ζώου δὲ οὐκέτι παντός, ἀλλὰ τῶν ζώων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ λογικά, τὰ δὲ ἄλογα. εἰ δὲ μένοι, φησίν, ἡ αὐτὴ γραφή, προσεκτέον τῷ οὐδὲν κωλύει τὰς αὐτὰς εἶναι διαφοράς· συμπίπτει γὰρ ποτε τοῦτο· τὸ γὰρ θνητὸν καὶ τοῦ ζώου διαφορὰ ἐστὶν καὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου”. καὶ χάρις τῷ Βοήθῳ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς λύσεως ὑποδείξαντι.

‘... For the differentiae of the more particular shall also belong to the more universal, since the latter contains the more particular, even though the differentiae are not said as universally in the case of the predicate as they are in the case of the subject. “Rational”, for example, is predicated of every man, but not of every animal; rather, of animals, some are rational and others irrational. If we were to retain the same reading, we should have to take into consideration Aristotle’s remark that “there is nothing to prevent the differentiae from being the same” (1b20-1). For this does sometimes occur; “mortal”, for example, is a differentia both of “animal” and of “man”.’

[T14l] **Simplicius, in Cat. Page 65 line 20.** <Boethus ‘would say’ (ὁ Βόηθος ἂν φαίη) that the monad is twofold: one which is *ousia* and is in intelligible number (which he and Aristotle hold to exist, according to Simplicius); the other which is a relative or quantified (Boethus appears to prefer the latter).>

ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν, φασί, καὶ ἡ μονὰς καὶ τὸ σημεῖον πῶς οὐκ ἔξω πίπτει τῶν κατηγοριῶν; οὔτε γὰρ ποσὸν ἐστίν, ὡς ἂν τῷ δόξειεν· οὔτε γὰρ συνεχές ἐστίν, ἅτε ἀμερῆς ὄν, οὔτε διωρισμένον· πᾶν δὲ ποσὸν ἢ συνεχές ἢ διωρισμένον εἶναι προσήκει, καὶ εἰ διωρισμένον, ἢ περιττὸν ἢ ἄρτιον. ἢ καὶ ὡς ἀρχὴ τῶν ἀριθμῶν καὶ ὡς μέτρον ἐν τῷ πρὸς τι καταταχθήσεται, ὡς καὶ τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ δοκεῖ. εἰ δὲ διττὸς ὁ ἀριθμὸς, ὁ μὲν ἀσώματος, ὁ δὲ σωματικός, ἔσται, ὡς καὶ ὁ Βόηθος ἂν φαίη, καὶ ἡ μονὰς διττὴ, ἢ μὲν οὐσία, ἢ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ ἀριθμῷ (τοῦτο δὲ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλει δοκεῖ), ἢ δὲ πρὸς τι ἢ ποσόν. ὕστερον δὲ φησὶν ὁ Βόηθος μήποτε ἄμεινον εἶναι ποσὸν φάναι· ὡς γὰρ λευκότης ἔχει πρὸς λευκόν, οὕτως καὶ ἡ δυὰς πρὸς τὰ δύο· εἰ οὖν ἐκεῖνα ἄμφω ποιόν, καὶ ταῦτα ποσόν. ἀντιλέγουσιν δὲ τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ δυνατὸν λέγοντι μέρος τοῦ ποσοῦ τὴν μονάδα τιθέναι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐν τῷ ποσῷ καταριθμοῦντι αὐτήν· ἀριθμὸς γὰρ ἐστίν τὸ ἐκ μονάδων συγκείμενον πλῆθος.

[T14m] **Simplicius, in Cat. Page 78 line 4.** <Boethus holds that the *Categories* is concerned with sensible and not intelligible *ousia*. Instead of discussing *aporiai* around the *Categories*’ account of intelligible and sensible *ousia*, he suggests that we should compare the *Categories*’ and *Metaphysics*’ account of what *ousia* is.>

Ὁ μέντοι Βόηθος ταῦτα [cf. 77,27-78,4] μὲν παρέλκειν ἐνταῦθα τὰ ζητήματα βούλεται· μὴ γὰρ εἶναι περὶ τῆς νοητῆς οὐσίας τὸν λόγον· μάλλον δὲ ἔδει, φησὶν, προσαπορεῖν ὅτι ἐν ἄλλοις τὴν οὐσίαν διελόμενος εἰς τρεῖς ἄλλως μὲν τὴν ὕλην, ἄλλως δὲ τὸ εἶδος, ἄλλως δὲ τὸ συναμφότερον οὐσίαν λέγεσθαι εἶπεν, ἐνταῦθα δὲ μίαν τίθεται κατηγορίαν τὴν οὐσίαν. τίνα οὖν ταύτην, καὶ πῶς αὐτῇ τὰς τρεῖς ὑποτάξει τὰς μὴ καθ’ ἓνα λόγον λεγομένας; ἀπαντῶν δὲ πρὸς ταῦτα ὁ Βόηθος τὸν τῆς πρώτης οὐσίας λόγον καὶ τῆ ὕλη καὶ τῷ συνθέτῳ ἐφαρμόττειν φησὶν. ἐκατέρῳ γὰρ αὐτῶν ὑπάρχει τὸ μήτε καθ’ ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεσθαι μήτε ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ τινὶ εἶναι· οὐδέτερον γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐστίν. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν σύνθετον, κἂν μὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐστίν, ἔχει τὸ εἶδος τὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐν ἄλλῳ ὄντι τῇ ὕλη, ἢ δὲ ἡ ὕλη οὐδὲ ἔχει τι ὃ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐστίν· καὶ κοινὸν οὖν τι ἔχουσι καὶ διάφορον, καθόσον ἢ μὲν ὕλη τινὸς ἐστίν ὕλη, καθὸ ὕλη, ὡσπερ καὶ ὑποκείμενον, ἢ δὲ σύνθετος οὐσία οὐκ ἐστίν τινός. ἀλλ’ οὕτως μὲν, φησὶν ὁ Βόηθος, ἢ ὕλη καὶ τὸ σύνθετον ὑπαχθήσονται τῇ τῆς οὐσίας κατηγορίᾳ, τὸ δὲ εἶδος τῆς μὲν οὐσίας ἐκτὸς ἔσται, ὑπ’ ἄλλην δὲ πεσεῖται κατηγορίαν, ἢτοι τὴν ποιότητα ἢ ποσότητα ἢ ἄλλην τινά.

ταῦτα δὲ λέγοντα τὸν Βόηθον σφάλλασθαι φησὶν ὁ Πορφύριος, ὅτι τὸ ἀντιδιαιεθεὲν τῇ ὕλη εἶδος καὶ οὐσία ῥηθεὲν ὑπὸ Ἀριστοτέλους, τοῦτο ποιότητα καὶ ἄλλο τι τῶν συμβεβηκότων φησὶν. τὸ γὰρ ποιωτικὸν οὐσίας οὐσιώδες καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐσία· καὶ γὰρ τὸ σύνθετον κατὰ τὸ εἶδος μάλιστα οὐσία. ὅλως δὲ εἰ ἡ ὕλη καὶ τὸ σύνθετον οὐσίαι εἰσίν, διότι κοινὸν αὐταῖς τὸ μὴ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ εἶναι, οὐδὲ τὸ εἶδος ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ ὡς τὸ λευκὸν ὑπάρχει τῷ συνθέτῳ, οὕτως τὸ εἶδος τῇ ὕλη.

[T14n] **Simplicius, in Cat. Page 97 line 28.** <According to Boethus, one should (properly speaking) class the differentia with the species and not with the genus, because the differentiae are often substituted for the species.>

ὁ μέντοι Βόηθος πρὸς τὸ εἶδος κυρίως συντάττεσθαι φησιν τὴν διαφορὰν, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὸ γένος, διόπερ καὶ πολλάκις ἀντὶ τοῦ εἴδους παραλαμβάνονται αἱ διαφοραὶ. καὶ σύμπασαι μὲν ὁμοῦ ῥηθεῖεν ἂν περὶ τοῦ γένους, καθ' ἑαυτὴν δὲ ἐκάστη κατὰ μὲν τῶν ὑφ' ἑαυτὴν, καθ' ὧν ἂν λέγηται, κατὰ πάντων ῥηθεῖη ἂν, κατὰ δὲ τοῦ γένους οὐδαμῶς· οὐδὲ γὰρ μορφωτικὴ ἐστὶν ἐκάστη τοῦ γένους. διενήνοχεν δὲ τοῦ εἴδους, ὅτι ἡ διαφορὰ ἐστὶν μετὰ τοῦ γένους, καὶ ἐστὶν ἢ μὲν διαφορὰ μορφῆς τῆς τοῦ γένους, τὸ δὲ γένος ὡσπερ ὑποκείμενον προϋπάρχει. ἐστὶν οὖν ἡ διαφορὰ συμπληρωτικὴ οὐσίας ἀπλούστερον <ἢ> ὡς τὰ εἶδη καὶ τὰ γένη συμπληρωτικὰ οὐσίας λέγεται· συμπληροὶ γὰρ τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ τὸ ζῷον καὶ τὸ λογικόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ζῷον μεθ' ὑποκειμένου καὶ διαφορᾶς, τὸ δὲ λογικόν ὡς ἀπλή ποιότης· κὰν πάλιν τὸ λογικόν προστεθεῖη μετὰ τοῦ ζῷου, τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἐστὶ ὡς σύνθετον, τὸ δὲ προστιθέμενον πάλιν, οἷον τὸ θνητόν, ὡς ἀπλή ποιότης.

[T14o] **Simplicius, in Cat. Page 104 line 27.** <Boethus determines unity by means of the 'this' (*tode*).>

ἀλλὰ κατὰ τί λέγομεν τόδε τι τὴν ἄτομον οὐσίαν, πότερον κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ἢ τὴν ὕλην ἢ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν; ἢ φήσομεν κατὰ πάντα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μὲν τὴν ὕλην, καθόσον ὑπόκειται καὶ εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἢκει τοῦ δέχεσθαι τὸ εἶδος, κατὰ δὲ Πλάτωνα καὶ μὴ ὡς ἐξισταμένην τῆς οἰκείας φύσεως· κατὰ δὲ αὐτὸ εἶδος, καθόσον ὠριστα καὶ ἓν ἐστὶν ἀριθμῶ· καὶ γὰρ ὁ Βόηθος τὸ ἓν κατὰ τόδε ἀφορίζει. εἰ δέ τις τὴν ὕλην ἀόριστον οὐσαν μηδαμῶς τόδε τι εἶναι φησιν, ἀναμνήσομεν αὐτόν, ὡς οὐ περὶ τῆς ἀσχέτου ὕλης ἐστὶν ὁ παρῶν λόγος, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἤδη σχέσιν ἐχούσης πρὸς τὸ εἶδος. τὸ δὲ σύνθετον δηλονότι ὅπερ ἐστὶν τὸ ἄτομον ἐπιδέχεται τὸ τόδε.

[T14p] **Simplicius, in Cat. Page 159 line 14.** <Boethus suggests that Aristotle, in his first definition of the Relative, follows Plato. Simplicius questions Boethus's account of Plato's definition, but states: 'It seems that Boethus forgot what was said by Plato, for I would not claim that he did not *know*, since he was held in high regard... '>

καὶ τοῦτο ποιεῖ τῷ Πλάτωνι κατὰ τὴν ἀπόδοσιν τὴν πρώτην ἀκολουθῶν, ὡς φησιν Βόηθος· λέγεται γὰρ καὶ ὁ Πλάτων οὕτως ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἀποδοῦναι περὶ τῶν πρὸς τι· “ὅσα αὐτὰ ἄπερ ἐστὶν ἐτέρων λέγεται” [*Cat.* 6b7: cf. *Porph. In Cat.* 112,1; 118,15]. καὶ ὡς ἔοικεν ἐπιλέγηται τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος εἰρημένων ὁ Βόηθος (οὐ γὰρ δὴ εἵπομι ἂν ὅτι ἠγνόει ἐλλόγιμος ἀνὴρ γεγονώς)· ὅτι γὰρ οὐ τῷ λέγεσθαι πρὸς ἄλληλα, ἀλλὰ τῷ εἶναι τὰ πρὸς τι χαρακτηρίζει, ὡς καὶ τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει δοκεῖ, δηλοῖ μὲν καὶ ἐν Πολιτείᾳ λέγων “ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἦν δὲ ἐγώ, ὅσα γέ ἐστὶν τοιαῦτα οἷα εἶναι † αὐτὰ μὲν ποια ἅπτα ποιῶ τινος”, καὶ ἐν Σοφιστῇ δὲ βουλευθεὶς τὸ ἕτερον τῶν πρὸς τι ὄν ἐπιδείξει οὕτως φησίν· “ὅτιπερ ἂν ἕτερον ἦ, συμβέβηκεν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐτέρου τοῦτο αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶν εἶναι”.

τὰ γὰρ πρὸς ἄλληλα οὐκ ἐστὶν ἓν οὐδ' ἂν τις εἴποι τὸ πρὸς ἄλληλα, ἀλλὰ μόνως τὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα· οὕτως οὖν οὐδὲ τὸ πρὸς τι, ἀλλὰ μόνως τὰ πρὸς τι. ταῦτα δὲ ἐπιστήσαντες οὗτοι τοὺς παλαιοὺς τῶν κατηγοριῶν ἐξηγητὰς αἰτιῶνται, Βόηθον καὶ Ἀρίστων καὶ Ἀνδρόνικον καὶ Εὐδωρον καὶ Ἀθηνόδωρον, μήτε ἐπιστήσαντας μήτε ἐπισημηναμένους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασι συγκεχυμένους χρησαμένους καὶ ἐνικῶς ἐκφέροντας ἐνίοτε τὸ πρὸς τι, τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους πληθυντικῶς ἀεὶ προφερομένου·

[T14q] **Simplicius, in Cat. Page 160 line 14.** <Iamblichus remarks that Boethus and the subsequent commentators, following ‘the ancients’, use the plural and the singular in discussing the Relative. But Achaicus and Sotion thought that we should only use the plural.>

τούτους δὲ τοὺς λόγους ὁ μὲν Πορφύριος ὡς ἀρεσκόμενος ἀναγράφει, ὁ δὲ Ἰάμβλιχος “μάχεται, φησίν, τὸ τοιοῦτον καὶ πρὸς τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον καὶ τὴν τῶν παλαιῶν συνήθειαν· καὶ γὰρ πληθυντικῶς καὶ ἐνικῶς αὐτῇ χρῆται, ὡς δῆλον ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀρχυτείων τε καὶ Ἀριστοτελικῶν λέξεων καὶ ὧν Βόηθος καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι μιμούμενοι τοὺς παλαιοὺς προφέρονται ἐπίσης ἀμφοτέροις χρώμενοι τοῖς ὀνόμασιν· καὶ ὁ λόγος δὲ ἀξιοὶ πᾶσαν κατηγορίαν καὶ ἐν εἶναι καὶ πολλὰ, καὶ ἐν μὲν, καθ’ ὅσον ἐστὶ γένος, πολλὰ δὲ κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν περιεχομένων ἐν αὐτῷ. καὶ τὰ πρὸς τι οὖν κατὰ μὲν τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐχόντων τὴν σχέσιν καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα λεγομένων πολλὰ ἔσται, κατὰ δὲ τὴν μίαν σχέσιν τὴν ἐν τοῖς πλείοσιν ὡσαύτως ἐνυπάρχουσαν καθ’ ἐν νοεῖται· κατὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ μία αὐτῶν ἢ κατηγορία.

[T14r] **Simplicius, in Cat. Page 163 line 6 and 15.** <(a) Boethus wrote a ‘whole book’ about the Relative and the relatively disposed (*pros ti pōs ekhon*). He held that Plato’s definition was ‘are said to be just what they are [as being] of other things’, but the rest of Aristotle’s definition was added to correct Plato. (b) But Boethus also criticises the full definition – the relatively disposed, when defined, should not have included that which is relatively disposed *to something* other.>

(a) ὁ μέντοι Βόηθος ὅλον βιβλίον γράψας περὶ τοῦ πρὸς τι καὶ πρὸς τί πως ἔχοντος οἶεται τὸν ὅρον ὑπὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἀποδεδόσθαι μέχρι τοῦ ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἐτέρων εἶναι λέγεται, τὸ δὲ ἐξῆς ὑπὸ Ἀριστοτέλους προσκείσθαι διορθώσεως ἔνεκεν. ἔοικεν δὲ ὅλος μὲν ἀποδεδόσθαι ὁ ὅρος ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀπο- δεδωκότος, σαφηνισθῆναι δὲ διὰ τῶν παραδειγμάτων πρότερον μὲν οἰκείως ἀποδοθέντων τῷ ἐτέρων εἶναι λέγεται· τὸ γὰρ μείζον, φησί, τινὸς μείζον λέγεται καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον ἐτέρου λέγεται· εἶτα καὶ τῷ ὅπως οὖν ἄλλως πρὸς αὐτὰ τοῦ οἴον ὅρος μέγα λέγεται πρὸς ἕτερον· καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον δὲ τινὶ ὅμοιον λέγεται.

(b) Ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν πλήρη ὅρον ὁ Βόηθος αἰτιάται λέγων· “ἔοικεν δὲ ἡμαρτηθῆναι καὶ ὁ οὕτως ἔχων λόγος· οὐ γὰρ ἐχρήν τὸ πρὸς τί πως ἔχον ὀριζόμενον ἐμπεριλαμβάνειν τὸ πῶς ἔχον πρὸς ἄλλο· τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν ὃ καὶ προέκειτο ὀρίσασθαι. οὐκ ἐχρήν δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ ἕτερον ἢ τὸ ἄλλο περιλαμβάνειν τῷ ὄρω τὸ πρὸς τι ὀριζόμενον· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τῶν πρὸς τι”. ἀγνοεῖν δὲ δοκεῖ, ὅτι μοχθηρὸς ὁ ὅρος οὐχ ὅταν διὰ τῶν ὁμογενῶν γράφηται τῶν εἰς τὸν λόγον παραλαμβανομένων (καὶ γὰρ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου οὐσίας ὄντος ὁ ἀποδοθεὶς ὅρος ‘ζῶον λογικὸν θνητόν’ διὰ οὐσιωδῶν ἀποδέδοται), ἀλλ’ ὅταν ὄνομα ἀντ’ ὀνόματος ἀποδοθῆ, οἶον εἴ τις ὀριζόμενος τὸν ἄνθρωπον μέροπα ἀποδιδόη.

[T14s] **Simplicius, in Cat. Page 167 line 4.** <Boethus proved that for things that are relatively disposed, some character should necessarily inhere in the subjects.>

καὶ ὅτι μὲν τοῖς πρὸς τι μετὰ τοῦ οἰκείου χαρακτήρος καὶ ἡ σχέσις συνυφίσταται, παρὰ πάντων ὁμολογεῖται· ὅτι δὲ καὶ τοῖς πρὸς τί πως ἔχουσιν ἀνάγκη χαρακτήρα ἐνυπάρχειν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις, ἰκανῶς ὁ Βόηθος ἀπέδειξεν.

[T14t] **Simplicius, in Cat. Page 167 line 22.** <The Stoics argue that the Relative follows from the relatively disposed. Boethus argues, perhaps in reply, that the Relative is not posterior to the relatively disposed.>

ἔπεται δὲ αὐτοῖς κάκεινο ἄτοπον τὸ σύνθετα ποιεῖν τὰ γένη ἐκ προτέρων τινῶν καὶ δευτέρων, ὡς τὸ πρὸς τι ἐκ ποιοῦ καὶ πρὸς τι. ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀκολουθίας οὔτε, ὡς οἱ Στωικοὶ λέγουσιν, τῷ μὲν πρὸς τί πως ἔχοντι τὸ πρὸς τι ἔπεται, τῷ δὲ πρὸς τι οὐκέτι τὸ πρὸς τί πως ἔχον, οὔθ' ὡς ὁ Βόηθος ἀμυνόμενος αὐτοῦς “τῷ μὲν πρὸς τι, φησὶν, τὰ πρὸς τί πως ἔχοντα συνακολουθεῖ· μετὰ γὰρ τοῦ πρὸς ἕτερόν πως ἔχειν ταῦτα προσεῖληφεν καὶ τὴν οἰκείαν διαφορὰν· τῷ δὲ πρὸς τί πως ἔχοντι οὐκέτι τὰ πρὸς τι συνέπεται· οὐ γὰρ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς πρὸς τι (25) πρὸς ἕτερόν τε λέγεσθαι τῇ σχέσει καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν τὴν οἰκείαν ἔχειν”.

[T14u] **Simplicius, in Cat. Page 188, lines 3-6.** <Boethus reconciles the two treatments of head, as relative and substance, by saying that it is only *qua* part of a whole, not *qua* head, that Aristotle described ‘head’ as relative. So also Plotinus 6.3.28. See Sorabji (2004), vol. III, 3(i) for discussion.>

καὶ ὀρθῶς ὁ Βόηθος τὴν χεῖρα καὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν καθ’ ὅσον μέρη συνεχῶρει τῶν πρὸς τι εἶναι, οὐ μὴν καθό ἐστιν χεῖρ καὶ ὅ ἐστιν χεῖρ οὐδὲ ὅ ἐστιν κεφαλὴ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τοῦτο οὐσίας εἶναι. νῦν οὖν τὸ πρὸς τι αὐτῶν θεωρεῖσθω ὡς μερῶν πρὸς ὅλα, καὶ οὐδὲν ἀδύνατον συμβαίνει.

[T14v] **Simplicius, in Cat. Page 202 line 1.** <According to Boethus and Ariston, Aristotle made his second definition of the Relative insufficiently clear, because it contains the definiendum (*pros ti*). Ariston changed it to read ‘[things] whose being is the same as being relatively disposed to something else’, and Andronicus presents the same view. By contrast, Achaicus resolves the difficulty by saying that the *definiendum* is not included in the definition, but Aristotle uses the second *pros ti* homonymously, meaning ‘relative to anything whatsoever’ (*pros hotioun*), as if he were saying ‘those things whose being is the same as being relatively disposed to anything whatsoever’ (*pros hotioun pōs ekhein*).>

Τινὲς δὲ τὸν νῦν ὡς ἀκριβέστερον ἀποδοθέντα ὀρισμὸν τοῦτον ἐπιχειροῦσιν διασύρειν ὡς τὸ ὀριστὸν ἐν ἑαυτῷ περιλαβόντα· τὰ γὰρ πρὸς τι ὀριζόμενος οἷς τὸ εἶναι, φησὶν, ταῦτόν ἐστιν τῷ πρὸς τί πως ἔχειν. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀσαφὴ τὴν ἀπόδοσιν ἐποιήσατο, ὡς καὶ Βοήθω καὶ Ἀρίστωνι δοκεῖ, ὅπερ καὶ αὐτὸ κακία ὀρισμοῦ ἐστίν, διόπερ ὁ Ἀρίστων ὡς ἐπὶ σαφέστερον μεταλαμβάνων “τὰ πρὸς τί πως ἔχοντα, φησὶν, ταῦτά ἐστιν, οἷς τὸ εἶναι ταῦτόν ἐστιν τῷ πῶς ἔχειν πρὸς ἕτερον”· [καὶ] οὕτως δὲ καὶ Ἀνδρόνικος ἀποδίδωσιν.

[T14w] **Simplicius, in Cat. Page 302 line 16.** <Boethus and Iamblichus object to the difficulty that movement should be a single genus before ‘acting’ and ‘undergoing’. They point out that the prime mover (prime actor) is unmoved (not acted upon), and thus ‘acting’ and ‘undergoing’ must belong to different genera.>

ἀλλ’ οἱ ταῦτα λέγοντες [*sc.* ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ἔδει κίνησιν θέσθαι ἐν γένος ἐν ταῖς κατηγορίαις, 302,8], ὡςπερ Πλωτίνος, οὐ ταῖς Ἀριστοτέλους ὑποθέσει προσχρῶνται. ἐκεῖνος γὰρ τὸ πρῶτως κινεῖν καὶ ποιεῖν ἀκίνητον εἶναι φησιν· διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν παρ’ αὐτῷ κενῶριται τοῦ πάσχειν καὶ οὐχ ὑφ’ ἐν ἄμφω τέτακται γένος, ὥστε οὔτε εἰς ἐν ἄμφω ταῦτα ἀνάγειν χρή, ἀλλὰ δύο ἀφορίζεσθαι, ὡςπερ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης αὐτὰ χωρὶς διέστησεν. οὕτως μὲν οὖν καὶ Βόηθος καὶ Ἰάμβλιχος πρὸς τὴν ἀπορίαν ἐνέστησαν τὴν ἐν γένος ἀξιούσαν τὴν κίνησιν τοῦ τε ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦ πάσχειν προὑποτίθεσθαι. Πορφύριος δὲ φησιν· “ἐν τισι δοκεῖ τὴν κίνησιν ἐπὶ τε τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ

τοῦ πάσχειν μίαν καὶ συνεχῆ εἶναι, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ πληγῆν κινήσεων, οἷον ῥύψεως καὶ ὤσεως·

[T14x] **Simplicius, in Cat. Page 339 line 19.** <Boethus believes that one must define the category ‘being-in-a-position’ precisely, to be those in whose case neither acting nor undergoing is additionally present [merely] in virtue of the position in which they are positioned or in virtue of the order in which they are arranged – for instance, standing or sitting said of a statue, or an image being set up.>

βέλτιον δὲ δι’ ἀκριβείας ἀφορίζεσθαι τὸ κείσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ Βοήθῳ δοκεῖ· ἐφ’ ὧν γὰρ οὔτε τὸ ποιεῖν οὔτε τὸ πάσχειν πρόσσεστιν καθ’ ἣν κείται θέσιν καὶ καθ’ ἣν τέτακται τάξιν, ταῦτα μόνον φησὶν εἶναι τῆς κατηγορίας, οἷον τὸ ἐστηκέναι ἢ καθῆσθαι ἐπὶ ἀνδριάντος λεγόμενον ἢ τὸ ἀνακείσθαι τὴν εἰκόνα· ἐφ’ ἡμῶν μὲν γὰρ ἐνέργειαν τὰ τοιαῦτα συνεμφαίνει, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀψύχων οὔτε τὸ ποιεῖν οὔτε τὸ πάσχειν ἐνδείκνυται ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ μόνον καθαρώς τὸ κείσθαι.

[T14y] **Simplicius, in Cat. Page 348 line 2.** <Boethus hypothesises that time is a different thing from what partakes of time and is in time: for example, a year and a month are time, while yearly and monthly partake of time.>

καὶ Βοήθος δὲ ἄλλο μὲν τὸν χρόνον ὑποτίθεται, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ μετέχον χρόνου καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ, καὶ εἶναι μὲν ἐνιαυτὸν καὶ μῆνα χρόνον, ἐνιαυσιαῖον δὲ καὶ μηνιαῖον μετέχον χρόνου, ὥσπερ ἄλλης κατηγορίας φρόνησις καὶ τὸ κατὰ φρόνησιν, οἷόν ἐστι τὸ φρονεῖν, ἄλλης, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐστὶ ποιότητος, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ποιεῖν· οὕτως καὶ ὁ χρόνος καὶ τὸ κατὰ χρόνον διέστηκεν.

[T14z] **Simplicius, in Cat. Page 373 line 8.** <The Stoics hold that one should refer ‘having’ to the category of ‘being a certain way’ (*pōs ekhein*), but Boethus contends that ‘having’ must be its own category. For (on Boethus’s view) it is a ‘relatively dispositional’ (*skhētikos*) category, which could refer to some entity (i) in itself, e.g., ‘a man with his guard up’; (ii) in relation to something else, e.g., the father and the man to the right; (iii) from something else towards the entity, e.g., an armed or shod man (because this is a relative disposition of the weapons towards the armed man or shoes towards the shod man). Boethus discusses other cases, including having anything at all (*hotioun*), and control.>

Τῶν δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς ἀξιούντων εἰς τὸ πῶς ἔχειν ἀναφέρειν τὸ ἔχειν ὁ Βοήθος ἐναντιοῦται, οὔτε εἰς τὸ πῶς ἔχον ἡγούμενος δεῖν οὔτε εἰς τὰ πρὸς τι ἀνάγειν αὐτό, ἰδίαν δὲ εἶναι κατηγορίαν· εἶναι μὲν γὰρ σχετικὴν αὐτήν, τριχῶς δὲ μάλιστα καὶ ὁμωνύμως τὴν σχέσιν λέγεσθαι· τὴν μὲν γὰρ εἶναι ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ καθ’ ἑαυτό, τὴν δὲ πρὸς ἕτερον, τὴν δὲ ἑτέρου πρὸς ἑαυτό. ἢ μὲν οὖν ἐν ἑαυτῷ θεωρεῖται κατὰ τὸν πῶς ἔχοντα, οἷος ὁ προβεβλημένος· σχέσις γὰρ ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ πρὸς ἑαυτόν. ἢ δὲ πρὸς ἕτερον ἢ τῶν λεγομένων πρὸς τι· ὁ γὰρ πατήρ καὶ ὁ δεξιὸς κατὰ σχέσιν λέγεται οὐ τὴν αὐτοῦ τινος πρὸς ἑαυτόν, ἀλλὰ τὴν πρὸς ἕτερον. ἢ δὲ ἀφ’ ἑτέρου πρὸς ἑαυτό, οἷα ἢ τοῦ ὤπλισμένου καὶ ὑποδεδεμένου· ἐστὶν γὰρ ἄλλου σχέσις πρὸς αὐτόν, τῶν μὲν ὄπλων πρὸς τὸν ὤπλισμένον, τῶν δὲ ὑποδημάτων πρὸς τὸν ὑποδεδεμένον.

“μήποτε δέ, φησὶν ὁ Βοήθος, τοῦ ἔχειν ἐστὶ σημαίνοντα τὸ μὲν ὁ ἰσοδυναμεῖ τῷ ἔχειν ὅτιον εἴτε μέρος εἴτε χωρίον, ὃ δὴ καὶ τάχα ὑπὸ τῆς λέξεως καθ’ αὐτήν προταθείσης σημαίνεται, τὰ δὲ πλείω ἐκεῖνα καὶ ἕτερα ἐν τῇ συντάξει· ὁ γὰρ ἀγρὸς

προταθείς ἢ ὁ πατήρ ἢ τὸ μέρος τὴν διαφορὰν ποιεῖ”. ὑπὸ δὲ ταύτην ἄλλην εἶναι τοῦ ἔχειν σημασίαν τὴν ἰδίως ἐπὶ τοῦ κρατεῖν τεταγμένην. “ἐὰν μὲν οὖν τὴν κατηγορημασίαν τὴν ἰδίως ἐπὶ τοῦ κρατεῖν τεταγμένην. “ἐὰν μὲν οὖν τὴν κατηγορίαν κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον σημαινόμενον τιθῆ τις, καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ σωφρονεῖν καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν εἰς ταύτην τὴν κατηγορίαν ἀναχθήσεται (φρόνησιν γὰρ ἔχειν τὸ φρονεῖν ἐστίν), ὑπεξαίρεθήσεται δὲ ἀπὸ ταύτης ἢ κατὰ τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν κατηγορία· διακριθήσεται δὲ καὶ τοῦ πρὸς τι· ὁ μὲν γὰρ κεκτημένος τοῦ πρὸς τι ἔσται, τὸ δὲ κεκτηθῆναι τοῦ ἔχειν, καὶ ὁ μὲν πατήρ τοῦ πρὸς τι, τὸ δὲ πατέρα εἶναι ἐν τῷ υἱὸν ἔχειν. ἐὰν δὲ κατὰ τὸ δεύτερον, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τοῦ ἔχειν σημαινόμενα εἰς τὰς ἄλλας κατηγορίας (30) ἀναχθήσεται, ὅσα δὲ κατὰ κράτησιν ἐπικτήτου τινός, εἰς ταύτην μόνον”. τοιαῦτα μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοῦ γενναίου Βοήθου προσιστορήσθω.

[T14za] **Simplicius, in Cat. Page 433 line 28.** <Boethus does not hold that rest is a quality when it is opposed to movement-in-quality, nor a size when opposed to movement-in-size. Rather, he holds that rest and movement are a *relation* (*skhesis*) towards the time and form in respect of which a thing is actually being moved or is at rest. (Translation from Gaskin 2000 follows).>

Ὁ μέντοι Βόηθος τὴν ἀντικειμένην ἡρεμίαν τῇ κατὰ ποιότητα κινήσει οὐκ ἀξιοῖ ποιότητα εἶναι οὐδὲ τὴν κατὰ μέγεθος <μέγεθος> οὐδὲ τὴν κατ’ οὐσίαν <οὐσίαν>, ἐναργῆς τοῦτο λέγων εἶναι ἐκ τῆς κατὰ τόπον· ἄλογον γὰρ τὴν ἐν τόπῳ ἡρέμησιν τόπον καλεῖν. οὐ μέντοι οὐδὲ ἀποφάσεις τῶν κατ’ αὐτὰς κινήσεων τὰς ἡρεμίας εἶναι συγχωρεῖ, ἀλλὰ σχέσιν εἶναι τὴν ἡρέμησιν καὶ τὴν κίνησιν πρὸς τε τὸν χρόνον καὶ τὸ εἶδος, καθ’ ὃ ἂν τύχη κινούμενον τι ἢ ἡρεμοῦν.

“ἔοικε γὰρ, φησὶν, ὁ χρόνος φύσιν ἔχειν ὥστε ἀεὶ ῥεῖν καὶ εἰς ἕτεροῖα μεθίστασθαι, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο συμπαρήκει πάση κινήσει καὶ ἡρεμίᾳ. ἢ μὲν οὖν κινήσεις ὁμοίως ἔχει πρὸς τε τὸν χρόνον καὶ τὸν τόπον (οἶον ἐπὶ τῆς φορᾶς ἔχειν φησὶν ὁμοίως διὰ τὸ καθ’ ἕτερον καὶ ἕτερον ἀεὶ τοῦτο γίνεσθαι)· ἢ δὲ ἡρέμησις ἐναντίως, φησί, πρὸς τὸν τόπον ἔχει καὶ τὸν χρόνον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ χρόνος οὐδέποτε ὁ αὐτός, ὁ δὲ τόπος ἀεὶ ὁ αὐτός, ὥστε ἢ σχέσις αὕτη πρὸς τε τὸν χρόνον καὶ τὸν τόπον διάφορος οὐσα ὅτε μὲν ἡρεμία, ὅτε δὲ κίνησις γίνεται. καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, φησί, κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐροῦμεν, ὅταν μὲν ἢ αὕτη σχέσις ἢ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου πρὸς τε τὸν χρόνον καὶ τὸ μέγεθος, κίνησιν εἶναι, ὅταν δὲ ἐναντία τῇ κατὰ μέγεθος, ἡρεμίαν. τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ καὶ περὶ ἀλλοιώσεως ῥητέον, ὥστε δῆλον, φησὶν, ἐκ τούτων, ὡς οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος οὐδὲ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος οὐδὲ αὐτὸς ὁ τόπος ἐστὶν ἡρεμία, ἀλλ’ ἢ πρὸς ἕκαστον ἅμα τούτων καὶ πρὸς τὸν χρόνον σχέσις. καὶ οἱ τρόποι οὖν τῶν ἡρεμήσεων οἱ αὐτοὶ οἵπερ καὶ τῶν κινήσεων· καθ’ ἕκαστον γὰρ τῆς σχέσεως αὐτῆς ἐδείχθη ἐναντιότης ἐπὶ τε τῶν κινουμένων καὶ τῶν ἡρεμοῦντων”.

ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὁ Βόηθος κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀγχίνοιαν διακρίνει. μήποτε δὲ οὔτε ἢ κινήσεις οὔτε ἢ ἡρεμία σχέσις πρὸς χρόνον ἐστίν, εἴπερ ἀριθμὸς κινήσεως ὁ χρόνος.

‘... For’, he says, ‘Time seems to be of such a nature as to be always flowing and changing into other kinds, and because of this it accompanies every movement and state of rest. But movement is similarly related to time and place (for instance, in the case of motion, he says that it is similarly related to time and place on account of its continuously coming about in respect of different places), whereas rest (he says) is contrarily related to place and time, for the time is never the same, while the place is always the same, so that this relation to time and place, being differentiated, becomes sometimes a state of rest, and sometimes a movement. And in the other cases (he goes on) we shall say, in the same way, that whenever there is the same relation of the subject to time and size there is movement, but whenever [the relation to

time] is contrary to that in respect of size, there is rest. And the same has to be said about alteration too, so that it is clear from these considerations ([Boethus] claims) that rest is neither the size *itself* nor the form *itself* nor the place *itself*, but is rather the simultaneous relation towards each of these and towards time. And so the varieties of states of rest are the same as those of the [corresponding] movements, for in each instance a contrariety of the relation itself was shown applying to things which are moved and things at rest.’

These are the differentiations that Boethus makes, thanks to his sharpness of mind. But perhaps neither movement nor rest is a *relation* towards time, since time is the number of movement.

**[T15] Simplicius, in Phys. 211,15.**

ἢ φαμεν ἐνεργεῖα ὑποκείμενον αὐτὸ εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο δυνάμει ἔχει· συμβέβηκε δὲ αὐτῷ τὸ δύνασθαι κοινωνεῖν τοῖς εἶδεσιν· ὥστε καὶ ἡ στέρησις τῶν εἰδῶν, ὧν μέλλει δέχεσθαι, συμβεβηκὸς ἂν αὐτῷ εἴη. “ὅταν γὰρ, φησὶν Ἀλέξανδρος, ὡς ὕλη τινὸς λαμβάνηται, τότε ἐστὶ μετὰ στέρησεως· ὅταν δὲ αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ὑποκείμενον, οὐ μετὰ στέρησεως”. ὁ μὲντοι Βόηθος ἔλεγεν ὅτι “ἄμορφος μὲν οὐσα καὶ ἀνείδεος ὕλη λέγεται· ἢ γὰρ ὕλη πρὸς τὸ ἐσόμενον ὠνομάσθαι δοκεῖ· ὅταν δὲ δέξηται τὸ εἶδος, οὐκέτι ὕλη ἀλλ’ ὑποκείμενον λέγεται· ὑποκείσθαι γὰρ τι λέγεται τῷ ἤδη ἐνόντι”. μήποτε δὲ ὕλη μὲν ὡς ἐσχάτη λέγεται, ὑποκείμενον δὲ ὡς πρὸς τὸ εἶδος, εἴτε ἔχει ἤδη τὸ εἶδος εἴτε μέλλει δέχεσθαι αὐτό. “ἄποιος δέ, φησὶν ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος, κατὰ τὸν ἑαυτῆς λόγον ἢ ὕλη, οὐχ ὡς ἐν στέρησει οὐσα ποιότητος (καὶ γὰρ ἡ στέρησις ποιότητος), ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐν ἀποφάσει· ὥσπερ γὰρ τοῦ εἶδους οὕτως καὶ τῆς στέρησεὸς ἐστὶ δεκτικὴ”.

**[T16] Simplicius, In Aristotelis physicorum libros commentaria. (A.D. 6) 759,18.**

εἰ οὖν τὸ μὲν ἀριθμῆσον ψυχῆ κατὰ τὸν ἑαυτῆς νοῦν, ὁ δὲ χρόνος ἀριθμὸς, μὴ οὐσης ψυχῆς οὐκ ἂν εἴη χρόνος. Ἐνίσταται δὲ πρὸς τὸν λόγον τοῦτον ὁ Βόηθος λέγων μηδὲν κωλύειν τὸ ἀριθμητὸν εἶναι καὶ δίχα τοῦ ἀριθμοῦντος, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν δίχα τοῦ αἰσθανομένου.

**[T17] Simplicius, In Aristotelis physicorum libros commentaria. (A.D. 6) 766,18.**

ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ μέτρον καὶ τὸ ἀριθμὸν λέγειν τὸν χρόνον τοιαύτην ἐστὶν ὑπόνοιαν ἐνδιδόντος, ὥσπερ καὶ Βόηθος φησὶν, ὅτι οὐδὲν μέτρον ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως γίνεται, ἀλλ’ ἡμέτερον ἔργον ἐστὶ τὸ μετρεῖν καὶ ἀριθμεῖν.” [Cit. Themistium: cf. T7]

**[T18†] Simplicius, In Aristotelis libros de anima commentaria. (A.D. 6) 247,23.**

τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἐναργῶς, οἶμαι, καὶ ἀναγκαίως συνήκται, τὸ ὅσον ποιοῦν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀθάνατον τε ὄν καὶ αἰδίων. καλῶς γὰρ καὶ τὸ αἰδίων προστέθεικεν, ὡς ὁ Πλάτων τὸ ἀνώλεθρον ἐν τῷ Φαίδωνι, ἵνα μὴ ὡς ὁ Βοηθὸς οἰηθῶμεν τὴν ψυχὴν ὥσπερ τὴν ἐμψυχίαν ἀθάνατον μὲν εἶναι ὡς αὐτὴν μὴ ὑπομένουσαν τὸν θάνατον ἐπιόντα,

ἐξισταμένην δὲ ἐπόντος ἐκείνου τῷ ζῶντι ἀπόλλυσθαι. διὰ τί δὲ τοῦτο μόνον αἰδίων; ἢ ὅτι, ὡς σαφῶς ἐπάγει, ὁ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός. ἀλλὰ ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις, πῶς νοῦς ὢν καὶ ἐκεῖνος φθείρεται, εἴ γε ἄυλος καὶ ἐκεῖνος· πᾶς γὰρ νοῦς ἄνευ ὕλης εἶναι ἠξιώται, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πᾶς μὲν νοῦς εἶναι νοητός, οὐκέτι δὲ τὸ ἄυλον εἶδος νοητὸν ὄν καὶ νοῦν εἶναι.

† Likely fr. of Boethus Stoicus

[T19] Joannes Philoponus, In Aristotelis categorias commentarium. 5,16.

Τρίτον ἦν ἐφεξῆς κεφάλαιον τὸ πόθεν δεῖ ἄρχεσθαι τῶν Ἀριστοτελικῶν συγγραμμάτων. Βόηθος μὲν οὖν φησιν ὁ Σιδώνιος δεῖν ἀπὸ τῆς φυσικῆς ἄρχεσθαι πραγματείας ἅτε ἡμῖν συνηθεστέρας καὶ γνωρίμου, δεῖν δὲ αἰεὶ ἀπὸ τῶν σαφεστέρων ἄρχεσθαι καὶ γνωρίμων. ὁ δὲ τούτου διδάσκαλος Ἀνδρόνικος ὁ Ῥόδιος ἀκριβέστερον ἐξετάζων ἔλεγε χρῆναι πρότερον ἀπὸ τῆς λογικῆς ἄρχεσθαι, ἥτις περὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν καταγίνεται.

[T20] Elias (olim Davidis) in Aristotelis categorias commentarium. (A.D. 6) 117,21.

ταῦτα δὲ ζητοῦμεν οὐ μόνον διὰ τὸ πλῆθος αὐτῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν διαφωνίαν τῶν ἀρχαίων· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἔλεγον ὅτι δεῖ ἀπὸ τῆς φυσικῆς ἄρχεσθαι, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς λογικῆς, ἄλλοι δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἠθικῆς, ἕτεροι δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς μαθηματικῆς· Βοηθὸς γὰρ ὁ Σιδώνιος ἀπὸ τῆς φυσικῆς λέγει, Ἀνδρόνικος δὲ ὁ Ῥόδιος ὁ Περιπατητικὸς ὁ ἐνδέκατος διάδοχος τῆς Ἀριστοτέλους σχολῆς ἀπὸ τῆς λογικῆς ἔλεγε, τῶν δὲ Πλατωνικῶν οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ἠθικῆς οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν μαθηματικῶν. καὶ πάντες τὰς οἰκείας δόξας κατεσκευάζον· οἱ γὰρ λέγοντες ὅτι δεῖ ἀπὸ τῆς ἠθικῆς ἄρχεσθαι ἔλεγον ὅτι δεῖ πρότερον κοσμήσαι τὰ ἠθικὰ.

[T21] Aeneas Gazaus, *Theophrastus*. (A.D. 6) p. 12 Boissonade = Numenius fr. 49

Οἱ μὲν παλαιοὶ μυσταγωγοὶ τῶν λεγομένων [sc. ὀνόματα] μετεκίνησαν οὐδέν, εὖ εἰδότες ὅτι τῶν Αἰγυπτίων ὁ Πλάτων τὴν παιδείαν δεδιδασχῶς καὶ παρ' ἐκείνων διατεθρυλλημένος τὰ ὅσα, ὡς ἢ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ψυχὴ πάντα τὰ ζῶα μεταβαίνει, πανταχοῦ τῶν λόγων διασπείρει τὸ δόγμα. Πλωτῖνος γοῦν καὶ Ἀρποκρατίων, ἀμέλει καὶ Βοηθὸς καὶ Νουμήνιος τὸν τοῦ Πλατωνος ἰκτίνον παραλαβόντες, ἰκτίνον παραδιδόασιν καὶ τὸν λύκον λύκον καὶ ὄνον τὸν ὄνον· καὶ ὁ πίθηκος αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἄλλο ἢ τοῦτο καὶ ὁ κύκνος οὐκ ἄλλο ἢ κύκνος νομίζεται καὶ πρὸ τοῦ σώματος κακίας ἐμπίπασθαι τὴν ψυχὴν δυνατὸν εἶναι λέγουσι καὶ τοῖς ἀλόγοις ἐξεϊκάζεσθαι· ὧ γοῦν ὁμοιώθη, κατὰ τοῦτο φέρεται, ἄλλη ἄλλο ζῶον ὑποδύσα.

[T22] ?Boethus, *Περὶ τῆς τοῦ ποτὴ κατηγορίας* = *On the Category 'When'* [published in T. Waitz, *De codicibus graecis organi*, p. 19 = Laurentianus 71, 32, saec. XIV, adapted from P. Huby, 'An Excerpt from Boethus of Sidon's Commentary on the *Categories?*', *CQ* 31 (1981), 398-409]

[line 42] Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα περὶ τῆς ποτὲ κατηγορίας δίκαιον ἂν εἶη διαλαβεῖν πρότερον περὶ χρόνου τὰ χρήσιμα ἐκθεμένουσιν διὰ τὸ οἰκείον εἶναι τὸν χρόνον τῇ τοιαύτῃ φωνῇ. ἔστιν οὖν ὁ χρόνος ποσόν· συνεχές [Waitz p. 20] γὰρ ἐδείχθη τῶν μορίων αὐτοῦ τοῦ τε παρεληλυθότος καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος κατὰ τὸ νῦν συνημμένων. ὥσπερ δὲ ἕκαστον τῶν ὑπὸ τὸ ποσὸν ἀναγομένων, εἴτε διωρισμένον λέγεις εἴτε συνεχές, τὰ μὲν ὑπὸ τινος ἐνὸς τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς μετρεῖται, ὡς ἄνθρωποι δέκα ὑπὸ τινος τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς, τὰ δὲ συνεχῆ θεμένων τι μέτρον ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἡμῶν οἶον πόδα ἢ τι ἕτερον κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον· καὶ ὁ χρόνος ἐν τι γε ὄν τῶν συνεχῶν ποσῶν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ μέρεσιν μετρεῖται θεμένων ἡμῶν ἐλάχιστον πρὸς αἰσθησιν χρόνον οἶον ὥραν ἢ ἡμισυ ταύτης ἢ καὶ ἕτερον μέρος. ἔστι δὲ ὅτε καὶ μείζονί τι μετρεῖται οἶον ἡμέρα καὶ νυκτὶ καὶ τῇ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τοῦ ἡλίου περιόδῳ καὶ μηνὶ καὶ ἐνιαυτῷ. [11] ἔτι τριῶν ὄντων, μεγέθους, οἶον σταδίου φέρε εἰπεῖν, ἐφ' οὗ ἡ κίνησις γίνεται, καὶ κινήσεως καθ' ἣν τὸ κινούμενον κινεῖται, καὶ χρόνου, ἐν ᾧ τὸ κινούμενον κινεῖται, ταῦτα μετροῦσιν ἄλληλα καὶ ὑπ' ἀλλήλων μετροῦνται. μετρεῖ γὰρ καὶ ὁ χρόνος τὴν κίνησιν· ἐρωτηθέντες γάρ, πόση τις ἡ κίνησις, φαμὲν ἡμερησία· καὶ αὖθις ἡ κίνησις τὸν χρόνον· πόσος γὰρ χρόνος; γνωρίζομεν ὅτι πολὺς, ἐὰν πολλὴ ἡ κίνησις· καὶ αὖθις τὸ μέγεθος ἡ κίνησις μετρεῖ καὶ ἀντιμετρεῖται γε ὑπ' αὐτοῦ· πολλὴν γὰρ φαμὲν ὁδὸν ἢς ἡ πορεία πολλή, πολλὴν δὲ πάλιν πορείαν, ὅταν ἡ ὁδὸς μῆκος ἰκανὸν ἔχη. τριῶν οὖν ὄντων τούτων, διὰ μὲν τὸ μέγεθος ὃ διερχόμεθα, ὅτι ποσὸν καὶ ὅτι τοσόνδε, καὶ ἡ κίνησις δῆλον ὅτι ποσὴ καὶ ὅτι τοσήδε, διὰ δὲ τὴν κίνησιν ὁ χρόνος δῆλον ὅτι ποσὸν καὶ ὅτι τοσόνδε. [23] ἔτι δὲ δῆλον καὶ ἐκ τῶνδε, ὅτι συνεχές ποσὸν ὁ χρόνος, ἐκ τοῦ πᾶν τὸ λαμβανόμενον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ μέρος διαιρετὸν εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ διαιροῦντες τὸν χρόνον εἰς ἀδιαίρετόν τι λήγομεν ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ εἰς τὴν μονάδα ἀδιαίρετον οὐσαν, ἀλλὰ τῷ μεγέθει καὶ τῇ κινήσει ἀκολουθεῖ ἄπερ συνεχῆ ὄντα πᾶς τις ἐρεῖ. [27] ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐν τῷ μεγέθει ἔστι τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν κινήσει εἶναι τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον διὰ τὸ μέγεθος. ἔτι γε μὴν καὶ ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ διὰ τὴν κίνησιν· [30] ὀρίζομεν δὲ τὸν χρόνον<sup>a</sup> τῷ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο<sup>b</sup> ὑπολαβεῖν τό τε πρότερον νῦν καὶ τὸ ὕστερον καὶ τὸ μεταξὺ αὐτῶν ἕτερον· ὅταν γὰρ ἕτερα τὰ ἄκρα τοῦ μέσου νοήσωμεν καὶ δύο εἴπη ἢ ψυχῇ τὰ νῦν, τὸ μὲν πρότερον τὸ δὲ ὕστερον, τότε φαμὲν χρόνον εἶναι. [34] τινὲς μὲν οὖν χρόνον τὴν τοῦ παντὸς

περιφορὰν εἰρήκασιν, οἱ δὲ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς σφαῖραν, ἔστι δὲ οὐδέτερον ἀληθές. περιφορᾶς μὲν γὰρ τὸ μέρος οὐκ ἔστι περιφορὰ, χρόνου δὲ μέρος χρόνος· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ χρόνος ἢ τοῦ παντὸς σφαῖρα, ὡς τινες ὠήθησαν ἐκ τοῦ ἀμφότερα περιεκτικὰ εἶναι. οἱ γὰρ οὕτω λέγοντες πρῶτον μὲν οὐ συλλογίζονται, ἔπειτα καὶ ἐτέρως ἀμαρτάνουσι. τὸ γὰρ περιέχειν πρὸς τι ὄν οἰκείως ἐν ἀμφοτέροις ἀποδέδοται. οὐ γὰρ ἀπλῶς ἢ τοῦ παντὸς σφαῖρα περιεκτικὴ σωμάτων πάντων, ὁ δὲ χρόνος περιεκτικὸς τῶν ἐν γενέσει καὶ φθορᾷ πραγμάτων. [43] δόξειε δ' ἂν μᾶλλον κινήσεις εἶναι καὶ μεταβολὴ ὁ χρόνος, οὐκ ἔστι δέ. ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἐκάστου [Waitz p. 21] μεταβολὴ καὶ κινήσεις ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ μεταβάλλοντι μόνον ἐστίν, οἷον ἐγὼ κινούμαι καὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ ἢ κινήσεις, οὐ μὴν δὲ καὶ ἐν σοί, ὁ δὲ χρόνος ὁμοίως καὶ πανταχοῦ καὶ παρὰ πᾶσιν. ἔτι κινήσεις μὲν λέγεται καὶ θάττων<sup>c</sup> καὶ βραδυτέρα, χρόνος δὲ οὐκέτι, ἀλλὰ πολὺς καὶ ὀλίγος. τὸ δὲ θάττων καὶ βραδυτέρον ἐν χρόνῳ μετρεῖται· ταχὺ μὲν γὰρ λέγομεν τὸ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ πολὺ κινούμενον, βραδὺ δὲ τὸ ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ὀλίγον διάστημα κινούμενον, ὥστε οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ χρόνος κινήσεις ἢ μεταβολή, [8] ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἀριθμὸς ὁ μὲν ἀριθμῶν, ὁ δὲ ἀριθμούμενος. ζητητέον πῶς φαμεν τὸν χρόνον ἀριθμὸν κινήσεως, ἀρα ὡς ἀριθμοῦντα τὴν κίνησιν ἢ ὡς ὑπ' αὐτῆς ἀριθμοῦμενον. φαμέν δὴ τὸν χρόνον ἀριθμῆσθαι μὲν ὑπὸ τῆς πρώτης καὶ ἀπλῆς κινήσεως τῆς κυκλοφορικῆς, ἀνταριθμεῖν δὲ πάλιν αὐτήν. εἰ μὴ γὰρ ὑπὸ χρόνου ἢ τοιαύτη κινήσεις, ὑπὸ τίνος ἀριθμηθεῖται ἂν; τὴν πρώτην οὖν καὶ κυριωτάτην τῶν κινήσεων τὴν κυκλοφορικὴν ὁ χρόνος μετρῶν κατ' ἐκείνην καὶ τὰς ἄλλας μετρεῖ, ὥστε τῆς μὲν κυκλοφορικῆς κινήσεως ἀριθμὸς ἔσται ὁ χρόνος καὶ ὡς ἀριθμῶν καὶ ὡς ἀριθμούμενος, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν κινήσεων ὡς ἀριθμῶν μόνον οὐ μὴν καὶ ὡς ἀριθμούμενος· οὐ γὰρ τῆς ἐμῆς βαδίσεως ἀριθμὸς ἔσται ὁ χρόνος ὡς ἀριθμούμενος, ἀλλὰ μόνον ὡς ἀριθμῶν. [20] οὐ μόνον δὲ τῶν κινήσεων μέτρον ὁ

χρόνος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἡρεμιῶν· καὶ αὗται γὰρ ὑπὸ χρόνου μετροῦνται πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οὐ γὰρ καθὸ ἡρεμίαι, ἀλλὰ καθὸ καὶ ἡρεμίαι καὶ ἐν ῥοῇ εἰσι διηνεκεῖ μηδέποτε ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἰστάμεναι.<sup>d</sup> ἄλλως τε, εἰ ἀρχὴν ἔχει χρονικὴν ἢ ἡρεμία καὶ τέλος, δῆλον ὅτι χρόνῳ καὶ αὐτὴ μετρεῖται, ὥστε συνελόντα εἰπεῖν μέτρον ἔστιν ὁ χρόνος τῆς ἐν γενέσει ῥοῆς, ἣτις ἐστὶ κοινὴ κινήσεως καὶ ἡρεμίας. [27] διαιρεῖται δὲ ὁ χρόνος εἰς παρεληλυθότα καὶ μέλλοντα, διαιρεῖται δὲ κατὰ τὸ νῦν. καὶ ἔστι τὸ νῦν πέρασ μὲν τοῦ παρελθόντος ἀρχὴ δὲ τοῦ μέλλοντος, ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἐν γραμμῇ τὸ σημεῖον καὶ τὸ κίνημα ἐν κινήσει, τοῦτο καὶ (τὸ) νῦν ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ. [31] τὴν δὲ χρεῖαν ἦν ὁ χρόνος τῷ παντὶ παρέχεται δίκαιον ἂν εἶη προσθεῖναι περὶ χρόνου λέγοντας. φαμέν δὴ ὡς ἡ γένεσις διὰ τὸν χρόνον ἐν τάξει διακέκριται, ὡς, εἴπερ μὴ ἦν χρόνος, σύγχυσις ἂν ἦν καὶ τῶν γενέσεων καὶ τῶν πράξεων ὡς συγκεχύσθαι τοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν Τρωϊκῶν τὰ νῦν.

[Waitz p. 21, line 35] *Τινὲς μὲν οὖν τὸν χρόνον ὡσπερ δὴ καὶ τὸν τόπον οὐ τῷ ποσῷ, τοῖς δὲ πρὸς τι συνέταξαν διὰ τὸ μὲν τὸν χρόνον μέτρον εἶναι κινήσεως, τὸν δὲ τόπον περιεκτικὸν σώματος καὶ πέρας τοῦ περιέχοντος, ἐν σχέσει δὲ εἶναι ταῦτα καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ὑποκείσθαι τοῖς πρὸς τι. φαμέν δὴ ὡς τὸ μέτρον εἴτε ἐπ' ἀριθμοῦ τὸν λόγον ἐκδέξῃ εἴτε ἐπὶ μεγέθους διττὸν ἔστιν, ἢ γὰρ αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ θεωρεῖται ἢ κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ μετρούμενον ἀναφορὰν· καὶ ὡς μὲν καθ' αὐτό, ποσὸν καὶ τῶν ποσῶν πάντων ἀρχή, ὡς δὲ πρὸς τὸ μετρούμενον, πρὸς τι ἂν εἴη. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ τῆς κινήσεως μέτρον ὁ χρόνος, ὡς μὲν καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ διάστημα ἔχον, ποσὸν ἂν εἴη τι, ὡς δὲ πρὸς τὴν κίνησιν, πρὸς τι, καὶ οὐδὲν ἄτοπον κατ' ἄλλας καὶ ἄλλας ἐννοίας εἰς διαφόρους κατηγορίας ἀνάγεσθαι. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦ (Waitz p. 22) τόπου· ὅτι κατὰ μὲν τὴν διάστασιν ἐπιφάνειά ἐστι καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ποσόν, κατὰ δὲ τὴν πρὸς τὸ περιεχόμενον σχέσιν οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν εἰ καὶ ὁ τόπος εἰς τὸ πρὸς τι ἀνάγοιτο ὡσπερ καὶ ὁ χρόνος. οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν ὁ χρόνος ἢ τοῦ ποτέ κατηγορία, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ ὄν ἐν χρόνῳ· ὁ μὲν γὰρ χρόνος ποσόν, τὸ δὲ ὄν ἐν χρόνῳ οὐσία τυχόν· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ συνθετὸν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν· ἀπλή γὰρ ἢ κατηγορία, ψιλὴ δὲ μόνη ἢ σχέσις τοῦ πράγματος πρὸς τὸν χρόνον εἰδοποιεῖ τὴν τοῦ ποτέ κατηγορίαν, οἷον τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ εἶναι τουτέστιν αὐτὸ τὸ χρονίζειν. ὡσπερ δὲ ἄλλο μὲν ἔστι φρόνησις, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ κατὰ φρόνησιν, τουτέστι τὸ φρονεῖν, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἔστι ποιότης, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ποιεῖν, οὕτω καὶ ὁ χρόνος καὶ τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ εἶναι διέστηκε· καὶ ὁ μὲν ἔστι ποσόν, τὸ δὲ τῆς τοῦ ποτέ κατηγορίας δηλωτικόν· ὅταν γάρ τι πρᾶγμα ἕτερον ὄν τοῦ χρόνου καὶ οὐχ ὡς μέρος χρόνου λαμβανόμενον σχέσιν ἔχη<sup>a</sup> πρὸς τὸν χρόνον καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐν χρόνῳ ἔστί,<sup>b</sup> ὡσπερ ἢ ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχία ἐν τῷδε τῷ χρόνῳ, τότε ἄλλη κατηγορία γίνεται, ἢ τοῦ ποτέ ἄλλη οὐσα παρὰ τὸ ποσὸν εἰδοποιουμένη μὲν ἐν τῷ δίστασθαι τοῦ χρόνου θεωρουμένη δὲ [ὁ μὲν]<sup>c</sup> ἐν χρόνῳ.*

[18] *Καὶ χρόνου μὲν διαφοραὶ παρεληλυθῶς ἐνεστῶς μέλλων, τοῦ δὲ ποτέ τὸ χθὲς αὔριον τήμερον, τὸ μὲν οἰκείως ἔχον πρὸς τὸ παρελθὸν τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὸ μέλλον τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἐνεστῶς, εἰ πρὸς τὸ νυχθήμερον ἀποβλέψεις· εἰ δὲ πρὸς τὸν τοῦ ἡλίου κύκλον, ἀντὶ μὲν παρελθόντος τὸ πέρυσι, ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ μέλλοντος τὸ εἰς νέωτα, ἀντὶ δὲ ἐνεστῶτος τὸ τῆτες. λοιπὸν δὲ καὶ ἀορίστως ἔστι λαβεῖν διαφορὰς τοῦ ποτέ· πρὸς μὲν τὸ παρὸν τὸ ἤδη καὶ ἄρτι, πρὸς δὲ τὸ παρελθὸν τὸ πάλαι, πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέλλον τὸ οὐπω. [25] καὶ ὁ μὲν χρόνος ἄπειρος, εἴπερ ἢ γένεσις συνεχῆς, τὸ δὲ ποτέ πεπερασται, ὅτι καὶ ἢ ἐν αὐτῷ πρᾶξις πεπερασμένη καὶ ὁ μὲν χρόνος οὐκ ἐν χρόνῳ, τὸ δὲ ποτέ τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ εἶναι δηλοῖ.*

[28] Τοῦ δὲ ἐν τινι ἑνδεκαχῶς λεγομένου λέγεται γὰρ ἐν τινι ὡς τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ καὶ ὡς τὰ μέρη ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι καὶ ὡς τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ καὶ ἔτι μέντοι ὡς τὸ γένος ἐν τοῖς εἶδεσι καὶ τὰ εἶδη ἐν τῷ γένει καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τὰ τῶν ἀρχομένων ἐν τῷ ἀρχοντι καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἀρχοντος ἐν τοῖς ἀρχομένοις καὶ τὸ ὡς ἐν ἀγγείῳ καὶ τὸ ἐν τόπῳ καὶ χρόνῳ· τοσαυταχῶς οὖν λεγομένου τοῦ ἐν τινι ἄξιον ἀπορῆσαι, διὰ τί κατὰ μόνας τὰς δύο σχέσεις ταύτας ἴδιαι κατηγορίαι συνέστησαν. λέγομεν δὴ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα σημαινόμενα τοῦ ἐν τινι συμπληρωτικά ἐστὶν ἀλλήλων ὡς τὰ μέρη καὶ τὸ ὅλον καὶ τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἶδη καὶ τὸ ἀρχον καὶ τὸ ἀρχόμενον. τὰ δὲ οὐ δυνάμενα χωρὶς ὑποστῆναι ὡς τὸ ἐν ὕλῃ εἶδος καὶ ὡς τὸ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ συμβεβηκός, ὅπερ καὶ μορφῇ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου γίνεται· διὸ καὶ καλεῖται κατ' ἐκείνο τὸ ὑποκείμενον οἷον λευκὸν καὶ ηὔξημένον καὶ ἐπὶ ἄλλων κατηγοριῶν τῶν τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὑπαρχουσῶν. πῶς οὖν ἂν εἴη ἐν τούτοις τὸ ἕτερον ἐν ἐτέρῳ κυρίως, ὅτε μηδὲ εἰσὶν ἀπλῶς ἕτερα ἀλλήλων κεχωρισμένα καθ' ὑπόστασιν, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἐπίνοιαν μόνην καθ' ἣν τὰ γένη χωρίζομεν; διὰ τοῦτο μὲν οὖν οὐδὲ κατηγορίας ἰδικῆς ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων ἐκρίθη ἄξιον, τὰ [Waitz p. 23] μέντοι ἐν χρόνῳ καὶ ἐν τόπῳ ἐν τούτοις γὰρ μόνοις, ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν περιέχει τὸ δὲ περιέχεται, ἐκατέρου τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν διασώζοντος καὶ μηδετέρου μέρους τοῦ ἐτέρου γινομένου μηδὲ συμπληροῦντος τὸ ἕτερον. ἐν γὰρ τούτοις μόνοις αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν τινι φύσις τις ἀφωρισμένη γίνεται κατὰ τὴν σχέσιν ὑφεστῶσα. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ κατηγορίας ἰδίας ἐκάτερον τούτων ἡξιώται· φανερώτατα γὰρ τὰ ἐν χρόνῳ καὶ ἐν τόπῳ ὄντα ἕτερα ἐστὶ τοῦ χρόνου καὶ τοῦ τόπου· τοιγαροῦν καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἄλλοτε καὶ ἄλλοτε ἐν ἄλλῳ γίνονται τόπῳ καὶ χρόνῳ.

#### Unnamed References (Working Collection)

[T4b\*] Porphyry, *In Aristotelis categorias expositio per interrogationem et responsionem*. (A.D. 3) Page 90 line 30. [unnamed; cf. T9]

– Ὅτι περὶ Σωκράτους μόνον πεποίησαι τὸν λόγον, οὐδ' ἀναιρεθέντος ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ ζῷον μένει, δεῖ δὲ οὐκ ἐφ' ἑνὸς ποιεῖσθαι τὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' εὖ εἰδέναι, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἄτομος οὐσία ὁ εἷς τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀλλ' οἱ καθ' ἕκαστον ἄνθρωποι πάντες, ἐξ ὧν καὶ ὁ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενος ἄνθρωπος ἐπενοήθη, καὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον ζῷα, δι' ἃ τὸ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον ἐνοήσαμεν ζῷον. ἃ δὴ καὶ αἴτια τοῖς κοινῇ κατηγορούμενοις ἐστὶ τοῦ εἶναι· παρὰ γὰρ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον οὔτε βούν οὔτε ἄνθρωπον οὔτε ἵππον οὔτε ὅλως ἔστι νοῆσαι ζῷον. εἰ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον αἰσθήσεως ἐπὶ τὸ κοινῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἀφικνούμεθα, ὅπερ οὐκέτι τότε τι νοοῦμεν ἀλλὰ τοῖόνδε, εἰ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον ἀναιρεθῇ ζῷα, οὐκέτι οὐδὲ τὸ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον κατ' αὐτῶν ἔσται. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ αἱ σημαντικαὶ λέξεις τῶν ὄντων ἐπὶ πρότερα τὰ ἄτομα κατωνομασμένα, εἶτα ἀπὸ τούτων ἐπὶ τὰ κοινὰ ἢ διάνοια μετῆλθεν. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν περὶ λέξεων σημαντικῶν ἢ πρόθεσις, αἱ δὲ λέξεις ἐπὶ πρῶτα τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἐπετέθησαν (τούτοις γὰρ πρῶτοις κατ' αἰσθησιν ἐντυγχάνομεν), ταύτας καὶ πρῶτας ἔθετο ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης εἶναι οὐσίας κατὰ τὴν πρόθεσιν, ὥσπερ πρῶται αἱ αἰσθηταὶ κατωνομάσθησαν, οὕτως ὡς πρὸς τὰς σημαντικὰς λέξεις πρῶτας τιθεὶς τὰς ἀτόμους οὐσίας.

[T4c\*] Porphyry, *In Aristotelis categorias expositio per interrogationem et responsionem*. (A.D. 3) Page 95 line 16-38. [unnamed; cf. T12, T14n]

- [...] ἡ διαφορὰ, τί ἂν εἴη;
- Φησὶν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης, ὅτι οὔτε ποιότης ἐστὶν μόνον (ἦν γὰρ ἂν συμβεβηκός), οὔτε οὐσία μόνον (ἦν γὰρ συγκαταριθμημένη ταῖς οὐσίαις ταῖς δευτέρας), ἀλλὰ τὸ ὅλον τοῦτό ἐστι ποιότης οὐσιώδης· διόπερ οὐκ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορεῖται ἐκάστου οὐ κατηγορεῖται ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ ποῖόν τί ἐστίν.
- Ἐπίδειξον οὖν, πῶς ποιότης οὐσιώδης ἐστὶν ἡ διαφορὰ.
- Οὐσιώδεις εἰσὶν ποιότητες αἱ συμπληρωτικαὶ τῶν οὐσιῶν. συμπληρωτικὰ δὲ εἰσὶν ἐκεῖνα, ἅτινα ἀπογινόμενα φθείρει τὰ ὑποκείμενα. ἃ δὲ γινόμενα καὶ ἀπογινόμενα οὐ φθείρει, οὐκ ἂν εἴη οὐσιώδη. οἷον ἡ θερμότης πρόσεστι τῷ θερμῷ ὕδατι, πρόσεστι δὲ καὶ τῷ πυρὶ· ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν ὕδατι οὐκ οὐσιωδῶς πρόσεστιν· ἀρθείσης γὰρ τῆς θερμότητος οὐ φθείρεται ψυχρὸν γινόμενον τὸ ὕδωρ. τῷ δὲ πυρὶ οὐσιωδῶς πρόσεστιν· ἀρθείσα γὰρ ἡ θερμότης φθείρει τὸ πῦρ. καὶ αἱ διαφοραὶ οὖν σχεδὸν τοιαῦταί εἰσιν ὡς ποιότητες οὐσιώδεις· τὸ γὰρ λογικὸν ἐὰν ἀρθῆ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, φθείρεται, καὶ τὸ χερσαῖον ἐὰν ἀρθῆ αὐτοῦ, φθείρεται, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ θνητὸν ἐὰν ἀρθῆ αὐτοῦ, φθαρεῖν ἂν μεταβάλλων εἰς ἀθάνατον. διὸ καὶ εἰς τὸν ὀρισμὸν τῆς οὐσίας παραλαμβάνεται ἡ διαφορὰ ὡς συμπληρωτικὴ οὐσα τῆς οὐσίας, τὰ συμπληρωτικὰ δὲ τῶν οὐσιῶν οὐσίαι. καὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα μὲν οὐ δηλοῖ τὴν οὐσίαν, ἡ διαφορὰ δὲ δηλοῖ· ζῶου γὰρ ὄντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ποῖόν τι ζῶον, δηλοῦσιν αἱ διαφοραί· ἔσονται οὖν οὐσιώδεις ποιότητες. τὸ μὲν οὖν μὴ εἶναι ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ προσὸν πάσαις ταῖς οὐσίαις οὐ μόναις προσῆν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῖς διαφοραῖς. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἴδιον ὡς τὸ κυρίως λεγόμενον ἴδιον.

**[T4d\*] Porphyry, In Aristotelis categorias expositio per interrogationem et resposionem. (A.D. 3) Page 111 line 5 – 112 line 7. [unnamed: cf. T14p, T14r]**

- Μετὰ τὸ ποσὸν τίς ἐστὶ τρίτη κατηγορία τῆ τάξει; (5)
- Ἡ τῶν πρὸς τι. (7)
- Διὰ τί μᾶλλον μὴ τὸ ποῖόν;
- Ὅτι προϋφεστηκόςτος μήκους, πλάτους, βάθους ἐπιγίνεται τὸ μείζον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον, ἅπερ ἐστὶν πρὸς τι. (10)
- Διὰ τί μετὰ τὸ ποσὸν εὐθύς τὰς τῶν πρὸς τι ἐπήγαγεν;
- Καὶ διὰ ταύτην μὲν τὴν αἰτίαν, καὶ διότι ἐμνήσθη τῶν πρὸς τι ἐν τῷ ποσῷ. ἔδει οὖν εἰς τὸ εὐσύνοπτα γενέσθαι πῶς εἴρηται καὶ τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρὸν καὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ τὸ ὀλίγον διδάξαι εὐθύς, τίνα ποτέ ἐστὶ τὰ πρὸς τι. (15)
- Τίνα οὖν ποτέ ἐστὶ τὰ πρὸς τι;
- Ὅρον μὲν αὐτῶν γενικώτατον οὐκ ἔστιν ποιήσασθαι, ὡς οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, τὴν δὲ ἐπίνοιαν ἔστιν συλλαβόντας ἀποδοῦναι, ὃ πεποίηκεν καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης εἰπὼν πρὸς τι εἶναι ταῦτα, ὅσα αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἐτέρων εἶναι λέγεται ἢ ὅπως οὖν ἄλλως πρὸς ἕτερον. (20)
- Τί οὖν διὰ ταύτης τῆς ἀποδόσεως παραστήσαι βούλεται;
- Πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἐπὶ πλήθους λέγεται τὰ πρὸς τι ὡσανεὶ τινῶν ὄντων πρὸς τι, ἐνὸς δὲ οὐ. ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ ἐνὸς τῶν πρὸς τι ὄντος οὐ μὴν τοῦτο πρὸς τι ὀρθῶς ἂν ῥηθῆι. ὥσπερ οὖν οὐκ ἂν εἴποις τοῦ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀλλὰ τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα, οὕτως οὐ τοῦ πρὸς

τι ἀλλὰ τῶν πρὸς τι. (25) δι' ἣν αἰτίαν καὶ περὶ οὐσίας καὶ περὶ ποσοῦ ἐνικῶς εἶπεν, περὶ δὲ τῶν πρὸς τι πληθυντικῶς ἔφη· πρὸς τι δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται. ἔπειτα ἡ ἐκκειμένη ὑπογραφή Πλατωνικὴ εἶναι λέγεται, ἣν καὶ παρελθὼν διορθοῦται.

– Τί οὖν παρίστησιν; καὶ τί βούλεται ἡ προσθήκη ἡ προκειμένη ἢ (30) ὀπωσοῦν ἄλλως πρὸς ἕτερον ἔχει;

– Λέγω ὅτι τῷ τὰ μὲν πρὸς τι λέγεσθαι φάναι εἶναι ἐκεῖνα, ὅσα [p. 112] αὐτὰ ἄπερ ἐστὶν ἐτέρων λέγεται, παρίστησιν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόλυτα τὰ πρὸς τι ἀλλ' ἐν σχέσει τινὸς πρὸς ἄλλο τι, καὶ ὅτι τινὰ μὲν ἐτέρων λέγεται κατὰ πῶσιν τὴν αὐτὴν ἄμφω, τινὰ δὲ καθ' ἐτέραν καὶ ἐτέραν, τινὰ δὲ οὐ κατὰ πῶσιν.

– Ἐξῆς δὲ τί προσέθηκεν; (5)

– Ὀπωσοῦν ἄλλως πρὸς ἕτερον ἔχει.

**[T12\*] Ammonius, In Aristotelis categorias commentarius Page 27, l. 16-27 [unnamed: cf. T14j]**

φασὶν οὖν οἱ μὲν τὸν ἀποδεδομένον ὀρισμὸν μὴ πᾶσι τοῖς συμβεβηκόσιν ἐφαρμόζειν, οἱ δὲ καὶ ἐτέροις τισὶ παρὰ τὰ συμβεβηκότα· λέγουσι γὰρ ὅτι ὁ Σωκράτης ἐν τόπῳ ὧν ἐν τινὶ ἐστὶ καὶ οὐχ ὡς μέρος ἐν ὄλῳ (οὐ γὰρ μέρος ἐστὶ τοῦ τόπου) καὶ ἀδύνατον χωρὶς αὐτὸν εἶναι τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶν (ἀδύνατον γὰρ χωρὶς εἶναι τόπου), ὥστε κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ὁ Σωκράτης συμβεβηκὸς ὑπάρχει, ὅπερ ἄτοπον. φασὶν οὖν ὅτι δυνατὸν χωρὶς εἶναι τὸν Σωκράτην τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶ· κἂν γὰρ ὑποθώμεθα αὐτὸν καταλιπόντα τὸν τόπον, ἐν ᾧ ἦν πρότερον, πορευθῆναι εἰς ἕτερον τόπον, οὐδὲν ἦττον Σωκράτης ἐστὶ· τὸ δὲ συμβεβηκὸς χωρισθὲν τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ἐφθαρταί. ἰστέον δὲ ὅτι παρέπεται τῷ Σωκράτει ὁ τόπος οὐχ ὡς συμπληρῶν αὐτοῦ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀλλ' ὡς παρακολούθημα, ὥσπερ τῷ ἐν φωτὶ βαδίζοντι ἡ σκιά παρέπεται μηδαμῶς αὐτοῦ συμπληροῦσα τὴν οἰκείαν οὐσίαν.

**[T14m\*] Simplicius, In Aristotelis categorias commentarium. (A.D. 6) Page 73,28-74,29. [unnamed: cf. T14m]**

ταῦτα μὲν οὖν καὶ ὁ θεϊότατος Πλωτῖνος ἀπορεῖ καὶ οἱ περὶ τὸν Λούκιον καὶ Νικόστρατον.

οἱ δὲ ταῦτα ἀποροῦντες ὑπαλλάττειν εὐόκασιν τὴν ὑπόθεσιν. ὡς γὰρ περὶ τῶν ὄντων προηγουμένως τοῦ φιλοσόφου διδάσκειν ἐπαγγελιομένου, οὕτως προάγουσιν τὴν ἀπορίαν· λέγομεν δὲ ὅτι (30) οὐ περὶ τῶν ὄντων ἢ ὄντα ποιούμενος τὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' εἴπερ ἄρα, ἢ ὑπὸ τοιῶνδε σημαίνεται φωνῶν, προηγουμένως μὲν περὶ τῶν τῆδε διαλέγεται· ταῦτα γὰρ ἐστὶν τὰ προσεχῶς ὑπὸ τῶν φωνῶν σημαίνόμενα, διότι ταῦτα καὶ ἐγνώσθη πρῶτα καὶ πρῶτα τῶν ὀνομάτων τετύχηκεν, τὰ δὲ νοητὰ ἀθέατα. καὶ οἱ θεασάμενοι δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ὀρμηθέντες ὅτι ἄρρητα (35) [p. 74] ἐκεῖνα κατέλαβον· διὸ καὶ παρεγκλίνοντες ἔλεγον ἀνθρωπότητα ἢ αὐτοάνθρωπον ἢ πρῶτως ἀνθρωπον. ὁ οὖν τῶν ὄντων φιλοθεάμων ἀπὸ τούτων μεταβαίνοι ἂν ῥαδίως ἐπὶ τὰ νοητὰ, τῇ ἀναλογίᾳ προσχρῶμενος.

ἐπεὶ ὅτι περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν διαλέγεται, περὶ ὧν καὶ ὁ πολὺς ἄνθρωπος τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν ποιεῖται, δῆλόν ἐστι πρῶτον μὲν ἐκ τοῦ τὴν παρὰ πᾶσι λεγομένην οὐσίαν (5) προχειρίσασθαι, ἔπειτα ἐξ ὧν δυεῖν οὐσίαι μνημονεύσας, αἰσθητῆς τε καὶ διανοητῆς, εἰς δὲ τὴν ὑπὲρ ταύτας μηδὲ ἀνελθῶν ὅλως τὴν αἰσθητὴν κυριωτέραν εἶναι τῆς διανοητῆς φησιν, ὡς ἐν τῷ περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν σκέμματι προηγούμενον ἔχουσαν λόγον, ἐν ᾧ καὶ ἡ διανοητὴ οὐσία οὐ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν θεωρεῖται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν σχέσιν, ἣν ἔχει πρὸς τὴν αἰσθητὴν, (10) καθ' ἣν καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀπὸ μὲν τῆς αἰσθητῆς εἰς τὴν διανοητὴν ἀναβαίνειν δυνάμεθα, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς διανοητῆς τὴν αἰσθητὴν καίτοι πολλῆς ἀπειρίας καὶ ἀοριστίας ἀναπλησθεῖσαν ὄρω περιλαμβάνομεν. οὐ μόνον δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων κατηγοριῶν τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ μερικὰ τῶν καθόλου καὶ διανοητῶν προτάττει, καὶ τοῦτο εἰκότως ποιεῖ, κατὰ τὰς σημαντικὰς φωνὰς τὴν διαφορὰν μετιῶν, αἱ πρῶτως καὶ κυρίως ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐτάχθησαν καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις εἰσὶ γνῶριμοι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικεν, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τριττὴν τὴν οὐσίαν εἰπὼν, τὴν μὲν κατὰ τὴν ὕλην, τὴν δὲ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος, τὴν δὲ κατὰ τὸ συναμφοτέρον, ἐν τούτοις \* \*, ἐπειδὴ κατὰ τὰς σημαντικὰς λέξεις τὰς τοῖς πολλοῖς γνωρίμους μέτεισι τὴν (20) θεωρίαν, ἡ δὲ ὕλη φιλοσόφου δεῖται διανοίας καὶ τὸ εἶδος τὸ τοιοῦτον ὡς συμβεβηκὸς δοκεῖ τοῖς πολλοῖς.

ὅτι δὲ ἡ κατὰ ἀναλογίαν αὕτη μετάβασις ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐπὶ τὰ νοητὰ ταῦτα προσήκει τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει, δῆλον, εἴπερ ὕλην καὶ εἶδος προϋποθέμενος ἀρχὰς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς καὶ ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς πάλιν κατὰ ἀναλογίαν τὰς αὐτὰς ἀποφαίνεται εἶναι καὶ ἐτέρας δὲ (25) τῷ τρόπῳ τῆς ὑποστάσεως διαφερούσας. τί οὖν κωλύει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δέκα γενῶν τὴν κατὰ ἀναλογίαν ταυτότητα ἐπὶ τε τῶν νοητῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν μετὰ τῆς ἐτερότητος διασφύζεσθαι;

[T14y\*] *Simplicius, In Aristotelis categorias commentarium. (A.D. 6) Page 347,19-348,2.*  
[unnamed: cf. T14y]

ὅταν οὖν οἱ περὶ Πλωτίνον καὶ Ἀνδρόνικον τὸ χθὲς καὶ αὔριον καὶ πέρυσιν μέρη χρόνου λέγωσιν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀξιῶσιν (20) τῷ χρόνῳ συντετάχθαι, φήσομεν οὐκ εἶναι αὐτὰ μέρη χρόνου, ἀλλὰ σχέσιν περιέχειν τῶν ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ ὄντων πραγμάτων πρὸς τὸν χρόνον, ἄλλο δὲ ἐστὶν τούτων ἐκάτερον. ‘ἄλλ’ εἰ χρόνος, φασίν, παρεληλυθὸς τὸ χθὲς ἢ μέτρον χρόνου, σύνθετόν τι ἔσται, εἰ ἕτερον τὸ παρεληλυθὸς καὶ ἕτερον ὁ χρόνος, καὶ δύο κατηγορίαι ἔσονται καὶ οὐχ ἓν ἀπλοῦν τὸ ποτέ’. ἢ τῷ αὐτῷ (25) λόγῳ φήσομεν, εἰ ἕτερον τὸ ζῶον καὶ ἕτερον τὸ λογικὸν καὶ ἕτερον τὸ θνητόν, οὐχ ἀπλοῦν ἔσται, ἀλλὰ τρεῖς κατηγορίαι· εἰ δὲ ἐπὶ τούτου ἐνὶ τῷ εἶδει τὰ τρία συλλαμβάνομεν, καὶ ὁ χρόνος καὶ τὸ παρεληλυθὸς εἰς ἓν πρᾶγμα συντελεῖ καὶ οὐ ποιεῖ δύο κατηγορίας. μήποτε δὲ οὐδὲ χρόνος ἀπλῶς παρεληλυθὸς ἐστὶ τὸ χθὲς οὐδὲ ἔννοια πλείονες εἰς ταῦτο συντρέχουσιν (30) ἐπὶ τούτου· κατ’ αὐτὴν γὰρ μόνην τὴν σχέσιν τοῦ πρᾶγματος πρὸς τὸν χρόνον τὸ χθὲς εἰδοποιεῖται. ‘ἄλλ’ εἰ τὸ ποτέ, φασί, τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ λέγεται, τοῦτο τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ, εἰ μὲν πρᾶγμα τί φατε, οἷον τὸν Σωκράτην, ὅτι πέρυσιν ἦν ὁ Σωκράτης, ἄλλης ἐστὶ κατηγορίας· εἰ δὲ τὸν χρόνον, καὶ οὗτος ἄλλης· εἰ δὲ τὸ σύνθετον, οὐκ ἔσται μία κατηγορία’. ἢ οὔτε τὰ πρᾶγματα τὰ ἐν (35) χρόνῳ οὔτε αὐτὸς ὁ χρόνος οὔτε τὸ σύνθετον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν εἰδοποιεῖ τὴν τοῦ ποτέ κατηγορίαν, ψιλὴ δὲ ἡ σχέσις τοῦ πρᾶγματος πρὸς τὸν χρόνον· διὸ (p. 348) οὔτε μέρη χρόνου

παραληψόμεθα ἐν τῷ ποτὲ οὔτε τὰ πράγματα, ἀλλ' ἔσται καὶ τοῦτο ἀπλοῦν ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα γένη.

[AL1\*]. Alexander, DA 87,5-32. τὰ ἔνυλα εἶδη καὶ αἰσθητὰ ἄλλως μὲν ἢ αἰσθησις, ἄλλως δὲ ὁ νοῦς κρίνει... πᾶν τὸ αἰσθητὸν τότε τί ἐστι καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον, τὸ γὰρ συναμφοτέρων τοιοῦτον, ὁ δὲ νοῦς τοῦ εἶδους καὶ τοῦ λόγου καθ' ὃν ἐστι τότε τι θεωρητικός ἐστι. διὸ οὐ τοῦδε, ἀλλὰ τοιοῦδε, καὶ οὐ τοῦ καθέκαστα, ἀλλὰ τοῦ καθόλου. κατὰ γὰρ τὸν λόγον πάντα τὰ ὁμοειδῆ ἀλλήλοις εἰσὶν ὁμοειδῆ τὸν αὐτὸν ὄντα, οὗ ἐστὶν ὁ νοῦς θεωρητικός· ἐφ' ὧν μὲν οὖν ἄλλο ἐστὶ τὸ τότε καὶ τὸ τῷδε εἶναι, ἐπὶ τούτων ἄλλη μὲν ἢ γνωστικὴ δύναμις τοῦδε (ἢ γὰρ αἰσθησις), ἄλλη δὲ ἢ τοῦ τῷδε εἶναι (ὁ γὰρ νοῦς), ἐφ' ὧν δὲ ταῦτ' ὅτι τὸ τότε καὶ τὸ τῷδε εἶναι (20) (τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τῶν εἰδῶν τῶν χωρὶς ὕλης), τούτων νοῦς μόνος ἐστὶ θεωρητικός. οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων αἰσθητὸν ἔτι. πᾶν γὰρ τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἔνυλόν τε καὶ σύνθετον.

Sensation recognizes (*krinei*) enmattered sensible forms in one way, and mind (*nous*) in another.... [E]verything sensed is a specific 'this' and a particular, since a composite is that sort of thing. Mind, in contrast, is for studying the form and the definition in virtue of which it is a specific 'this'.

Hence, [mentation] is not of a 'this', but rather of a 'such', that is, not of the particular, but rather of the universal (*katholou*). [It is universal] because everything which is the same in form as one another is the same in form in virtue of the definition, since the definition is the same [for all of them], and the mind is for studying this.

In those cases, then, where the 'this' and the what-it-is-to-be for 'this' are different, one power for apprehension is of the 'this' (namely, sensation), while another is of what-it-is-to-be for 'this' (namely, mind).

But in those cases where the 'this' and what-it-is-to-be for 'this' are the same — that is, with forms separate from matter — only the mind is for studying them. For nothing of this kind is sensible, since every sensible is enmattered and compound.

[AL2\*]. Alexander, DA 90,2-14. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἐνύλων εἰδῶν, ὥσπερ εἶπον, ὅταν μὴ νοῆται τὰ τοιαῦτα εἶδη, οὐδέ ἐστὶν αὐτῶν τι νοῦς, εἴ γε ἐν τῷ νοεῖσθαι αὐτοῖς ἢ τοῦ νοητοῦ εἶναι ὑπόστασις. τὰ γὰρ καθόλου καὶ κοινὰ τὴν μὲν ὑπαρξίν ἐν τοῖς καθέκαστά τε καὶ ἐνύλοις ἔχει. νοούμενα δὲ χωρὶς ὕλης κοινά τε καὶ (5) καθόλου γίνεται, καὶ τότε ἐστὶ νοῦς ὅταν νοῆται. εἰ δὲ μὴ νοεῖτο, οὐδὲ ἔστιν ἔτι. ὥστε χωρισθέντα τοῦ νοούντος αὐτὰ νοῦ φθείρεται, εἴ γε ἐν τῷ νοεῖσθαι τὸ εἶναι αὐτοῖς. ὅμοια δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως, ὁποῖα ἐστὶ τὰ μαθηματικά. φθαρτὸς ἄρα ὁ τοιοῦτος νοῦς, τουτέστιν τὰ (10) τοιαῦτα νοήματα.

ἐν οἷς δὲ τὸ νοούμενον κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον, οἷον νοεῖται (ἔστι δὲ τοιοῦτον ὃν καὶ ἀφθαρτον), ἐν τούτοις καὶ χωρισθὲν τοῦ νοεῖσθαι ἀφθαρτον μένει, καὶ ὁ νοῦς ἄρα ὁ τοῦτο νοήσας ἀφθαρτὸς ἐστὶν...

With enmattered forms, as I said, when such forms are not currently being thought, none of them is *nous* either, since what-it-is-to-be for *noeta* exists for them while they are thought. For universal, common [characteristics] inhere in enmattered particulars, but they become common and universal when they are thought separate from matter, and they are *nous* at the moment when they are thought. But if they are not currently being thought, they are not [*nous*] any longer either. Consequently, they perish once they have been separated from the

*nous* thinking them, since their being consists in being thought. (Abstractions, such as mathematical objects, are like these.) This kind of *nous*, therefore, is perishable, that is, these sorts of concepts are.

In cases, on the other hand, where what is thought is such as to be thought in virtue of its own nature — and it is imperishable because it is of this sort — it remains imperishable even after it has been separated from being thought....

[AL3\*]. Alexander, *Quaest.* 1.11a, 22,15-20. That [the genus] is posterior to the thing (πρῶγμα) is clear. For given the existence of animal, it is not necessary that the genus animal exist... but if the genus animal should exist, it is necessary also for animal to exist. And if ‘ensouled substance capable of sense perception’ were removed, then the genus animal would not exist either... But if the genus animal were removed, it would not be necessary that ‘ensouled substance capable of sense perception’ would also have been removed, for it might be... in just one thing...

Although posterior to the thing of which it is an accident (ᾧ συμβέβηκεν), nevertheless it comes to exist as prior to *each of its parts*, i.e. each of the items under it.... Removing (ἀναιρουμένῳ) one of the items under the common item does not remove the common item as well, because it exists in many. But if the common item should be removed, there would not exist any of the items under the common item, since their being lies in having that [common item] in them.

[AL4\*]. Alexander, *DA* 90,2-8. In the case of enmattered forms, as I said, when such forms are not being thought, none of them is intellect (*nous*), if their being intelligibles has its being in their being thought. For the things that are universal and common have their being in the enmattered particulars, but when they are thought apart from matter they come to be common and universal, and they are intellect just when they are thought. If they are not thought, they are no longer. So when they are separated from the intellect that thinks them, they perish, if their being is in being thought.

[AL5\*]. Alexander, *Quaest.* 8,22. The common items are indestructible, in virtue of the fact that the particulars they are in are *everlasting by succession* (*ek diadokhês aidiotêti*).

[AL6\*]. Alexander *ap. Simplicium, in Cat.* 85,13. But he [Alexander] says that the common item can be nothing apart from the individual, but the individual exists apart from the common item, for example, the sun, the moon, and the universe.

[AL7\*]. Alexander, *Quest.* 8,8-16. For the definition of man, two-footed pedestrian animal, is common since it is in all the particular men (*pasin on tois kathekasta anthrôpois*), and is complete (*holoklêron*) in each; it is common in virtue of being the same in many, not by each man sharing a part in it. Therefore, definitions are not of common items *qua* common, but rather of those to which it is an accident to be common in respect of each nature. For even if there is just one man in concrete existence, the same definition of man [applies]....

[BO1\*]. Boethius, *in Isagogem* 166,8-167,3. Therefore, when genera and species are thought (*cogitantur*), from the singulars (*ex singulis*) in which they exist their likeness

(*similitudo*) is gathered, for example a likeness of humanness (*hominibus*) is gathered from singular humans who are dissimilar from each other. This likeness when thought by the mind (*cogitata animo*) and accurately sensed (*perspecta*) becomes the species. Again when a likeness of these different species has been considered (*considerata*), which likeness can exist only in those species or their individuals, it creates a genus.

Thus these certainly exist in singulars, and are thought as universals (*universalia*): a species is to be considered nothing other than a thought (*cogitatio*) gathered from a substantial likeness of individuals numerically dissimilar, and a genus a thought gathered from a likeness of species. But this likeness becomes sensible when it is in singulars; when it is in universals, it becomes intelligible. In the same way when it is sensible it persists in singulars; when it is understood, it becomes universal. Therefore, they subsist in association with sensibles (*circa sensibilia*), but are understood over and above bodies (*intelliguntur autem praeter corpora*).

For it is not precluded that two things in the same subject are diverse in definition... Thus it is also with genera and species, i.e. singularity and universality. Certainly there is one subject, but in one way it is universal, when it is thought (*cum cogitatur*), in another way singular, when it is sensed in those things in which it has its being.

## 6. Athenodorus and Cornutus

[T1a] Porphyry, in *Cat.* 58,3-7. <The subject of the *Categories* according to Porphyry.>

(3) ἔστι τοίνυν ἡ πρόθεσις τοῦ βιβλίου περὶ τῆς πρώτης θέσεως τῶν λέξεων τῆς παραστατικῆς τῶν πραγμάτων· ἔστιν γὰρ περὶ φωνῶν σημαντικῶν ἀπλῶν, καθὸ σημαντικαὶ εἰσι τῶν πραγμάτων, οὐ μὴν τῶν κατὰ ἀριθμὸν ἀλλήλων διαφερόντων ἀλλὰ τῶν κατὰ γένος.... (12) εἰς δέκα τοίνυν γενικᾶς διαφορᾶς περιληφθέντων τῶν ὄντων δέκα καὶ αἱ δηλοῦσαι ταῦτα φωναὶ γεγόνασι κατὰ γένη καὶ αὐταὶ περιληφθεῖσαι. δέκα οὖν λέγονται κατηγορίαι τῷ γένει δηλονότι, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ ὄντα δέκα τῷ γένει.

[T1b] Porphyry, in *Cat.* 58,30-59,2. <The distinction of primary and secondary imposition>.

Ἐ. Ἄλλ' εἰ ἐνθάδε εἰς δέκα γένη διείλεν τὰς σημαντικὰς φωνάς, πῶς ἐν τῷ Περὶ ἐρμηνείας εἰς δύο, εἰς ὄνομα καὶ ῥῆμα;

Ἀ. Ὅτι ἐνθάδε μὲν περὶ τῆς προηγουμένης θέσεως τῶν λέξεων τῆς κατὰ τῶν πραγμάτων ποιεῖται τὸν λόγον, ἐν δὲ τῷ Περὶ ἐρμηνείας περὶ τῆς δευτέρας, ἢ οὐκέτι ἐστὶ περὶ τῶν σημαντικῶν λέξεων τῶν πραγμάτων, καθὸ εἰσι τούτων σημαντικαί, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν σημαντικῶν λέξεων τοῦ τύπου τῶν (35) φωνῶν, καθὸ τύποι εἰσι τοιούτων· τύπος γὰρ τῆς φωνῆς τὸ εἶναι ἢ ὄνομα ἢ ῥῆμα. καὶ τὸ κυρίαν δὲ εἶναι τὴν λέξιν ἢ μεταφορικὴν ἢ ἄλλως [p. 59] τροπικὴν τῆς δευτέρας ἐστὶ περὶ τῶν φωνῶν πραγματείας καὶ οὐ τῆς πρώτης.

[T1c] Porphyry, in *Cat.* 59,5-19. <Not all commentators on the *Cat.* recognize the distinction between expressions *qua* expressions, and expressions *qua* significant of beings. For example, some see the division of categories as too limited or superfluous. Among these are the followers of Athenodorus and Cornutus, who took the subjects of the *Cat.* to be expressions *qua* expressions. As there are many expressions that do not belong to a category, they complained that the division was incomplete.> **Speaker:** *hoi peri A. and K.*  
**Respondent:** Porphyry (favouring Boethus and Herminus).

Ἐ. Ἄρα οὖν τὴν διαφορὰν ταύτην πάντες ἔγνωσαν οἱ περὶ τῶν κατηγοριῶν τι γράψαντες;

Ἀ. Οὐδαμῶς· οὐ γὰρ ἂν οἱ μὲν περὶ τῶν γενῶν τῶν ὄντων προηγουμένως ᾔνοντο ἐνταῦθα πραγματεύεσθαι, οἱ δὲ ἀντέλεγον ἀθετοῦντες αὐτῶν τὴν διαίρεσιν ὡς πολλὰ παρῆσαν καὶ μὴ περιλαμβάνουσιν ἢ καὶ πάλιν πλεονάζουσιν.

Ἐ. Τίνες εἰσὶν οὗτοι;

Ἀ. Οἱ περὶ Ἀθηνόδωρον καὶ Κορνοῦτον οἱ τὰ ζητούμενα περὶ τῶν (10) λέξεων καθὸ λέξεις, οἷα τὰ κύρια καὶ τὰ τροπικὰ καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, (διαφορὰ γὰρ ἐστὶ λέξεων καθὸ λέξεις εἰσὶ) τὰ τοιαῦτα οὖν προφέροντες

καὶ ποίας ἐστὶ κατηγορίας ἀποροῦντες καὶ μὴ εὐρίσκοντες ἔλλιπῆ φασιν εἶναι τὴν διαίρεσιν, ὡς ἂν μὴ πάσης φωνῆς σημαντικῆς εἰς αὐτὴν περιλαμβανομένης.

Ἐ. Ἄρα οὖν πάντες ἐσφάλησαν περὶ τὴν πρόθεσιν τῆς τῶν κατηγοριῶν γνώσεως;

Α. Οὐδαμῶς· ἀλλὰ καὶ Βόηθος ἐν τοῖς εἰς τὰς Κατηγορίας εἵρηκεν ταῦτα καὶ Ἑρμῖνος βραχέως.

Ἐ. Εἰπέ τὰ Ἑρμῖνου, ἐπεὶπερ αὐτὰ φῆς διὰ βραχέων εἰρησθαι.

Α. Λέγει τοίνυν ὁ Ἑρμῖνος προκείσθαι οὔτε περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ φύσει (20) πρώτων καὶ γενικωτάτων γενῶν (οὐ γὰρ νέοις προσήκουσα ἢ τῶν τοιούτων διδασκαλία) οὔτε τίνες αἱ πρώται καὶ στοιχειώδεις τῶν λεγομένων διαφοραί, ὡς τὸν λόγον εἶναι δοκεῖν περὶ τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν, ἀλλὰ μάλλον περὶ τῆς καθ' ἕκαστον γένος τῶν ὄντων οἰκείας ἂν ἐσομένης τῶν λεγομένων κατηγορίας· διὸ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον ἐγένετο ἀμωσγέπως ἄψασθαι τῶν γενῶν, ἐφ' (25) ἅπερ ἢ τῶν κατηγορουμένων ἀναφορὰ· ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὴν ἐκάστου οἰκείαν σημασίαν γνώριμον εἶναι μηδεμίᾳ αὐτῷ προλήψεως προυποκειμένης. διὰ τοῦτο δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐπιγραφὴ Κατηγορία, δηλωτικὴ οὖσα τῆς ἐκάστῳ γένει συνημμένης οἰκείας σημασίας, ὅτι δὲ αὐτὰ τὰ γένη τὸν ἀριθμὸν δέκα, προϊὼν ὁ λόγος δηλώσει· ταύτῃ δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς ὁ τῶν κατηγοριῶν δέκα. (30) ὁ δὲ ἐπιγράφων Περί δέκα γενῶν οὐδὲ αὐτὸς ἀπεικότως, εἰ μόνον πρὸς τὴν ἐπὶ τὰ γένη ἀναφορὰν ποιοῖτο τὴν ἐπιγραφὴν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὅτι προηγουμένως περὶ τῶν δέκα γενῶν νομίζοι.

[T1d] Porphyry, in Cat. 86,20. <A. and C. object to the division in their works.>

{Ἐ.} Ἄρα οὖν πάντες συγχωροῦσι τὴν εἰς τὰ αὐτὰ γένη καταριθμησιν τῶν σημαντικῶν λέξεων πρώτως καὶ προηγουμένως τῶν πραγμάτων;  
 {Α.} Οὐδαμῶς· Ἀθηνόδωρος γὰρ ἠτήσατο ὁ Στωϊκὸς βιβλία γράψας Πρὸς τὰς Ἀριστοτέλους κατηγορίας Κορνοῦτός τε ἐν ταῖς Ῥητορικαῖς τέχναις καὶ ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἀθηνόδωρον ἀντιγραφῇ καὶ ἄλλοι πλείστοι.  
 {Ἐ.} Ἄρα οὖν ὀρθῶς ἀντιλέγουσιν;  
 {Α.} Οὐδαμῶς.

[T2a] Dexippus, in Cat. 1,9 [chapter heading].

[δ. Πῶς χρὴ τὰς κατηγορίας εὐρίσκειν καὶ μὴ ὑπάγεσθαι ταῖς τῶν Στωϊκῶν ἀπορίαις;]

[T2b] Dexippus, in Cat. 11,1-12,31. <Defense for the Stoics>. Initial numbers in [square brackets] refer to the subject-headings in my discussion.

[1] Ἀλλὰ δὴ πῶς μέλλομεν διαγινώσκειν τὰς προτιθεμένας λέξεις πότερον ὑπὸ τὰς κατηγορίας πίπτουσιν ἢ οὐ; δὸς οὖν τι κριτήριον, ἵνα τὰ μὴ ὑποπίπτοντα τῇ τῶν κατηγοριῶν διαιρέσει διακρίνωμεν.

[2] Φημί δὴ ὅτι τὸ σημαντικὸν πᾶν γένος προϋπάρχειν δεῖ ὡς ὑποκείμενον καὶ ἐν ἀρχαῖς τάξει ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ διαιρέσει· οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τέ ἐστιν (5) οὐδέποτε ἄνευ τοῦ τοιοῦτου τρόπου τῆς φωνῆς κατηγορεῖσθαι τι ὡς ἕτερον καθ' ἕτερον. οὐκοῦν εἴ τι ἄσημόν ἐστι μόριον καθ' αὐτὸ οἶον τὸ βλίτυρι ἢ κατὰ ἀναφορὰν ἐφ' ἕτερον σημαντικὸν ὡς αἱ οὕτως καλούμεναι ἐπαναφοραί, αἵτινες κατὰ τὴν ἐπὶ τὰ ἀόριστα μόρια ἀναφορὰν δηλοῦσί τι ὡς ἡ ἐκείνος φωνὴ ἐπὶ τὸ τίς ἀναγομένη, ἢ εἴ τι συσημαντικὸν εἴη μεθ' ἕτερον (10) ὡς τὰ ἄρθρα καὶ οἱ σύνδεσμοι, οὐδαμῶς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐν ταῖς κατηγορίαις θεῖν ἄν τις δικαίως. πάλιν τοίνυν μετὰ τῆς πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα σχέσεως καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὰ πρᾶγματα διαφορᾶς βούλεται ἡ κατηγορία κυρίως εἰδοποιεῖσθαι, ἐπειδὴ προηγουμένως ἡ σημαντικὴ λέξις τῆς πρώτης ἔχεται χρείας τοῦ λόγου, καθ' ἣν τὰ πρᾶγματα δηλοῦν ἀλλήλοις ἐφιέμεθα, οἶον ἡ μὲν ἄνθρωπος λέξις πρὸς οὐσίαν ἔχει τὴν σχέσιν, ἡ δὲ λευκότης πρὸς ποιότητα, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ὁμοίως.

[2.1] ἐὰν οὖν λέξις οὕτως σχηματισθῆ, ὡς μὴ τῆς πρώτης εἶναι σημασίας τοῦ λόγου, ἀλλὰ τοῖς οἰκείοις μέρεσι τὸν ἐπιβάλλοντα χαρακτήρα ἀφορίζειν, ὡς διόθεν, οἴκοθεν, κάλλιστα, ὀρθότατα, σοφώτατα, ποιητικώτατα,

[2.2] ἢ κατὰ τὴν τῶν νοημάτων πρὸς ἀλλήλα (20) ἐπιπλοκὴν, ὡσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀκολουθίας τοῦ ὑποθετικοῦ οἶον τοῦ 'εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστὶ', καὶ τῆς μάχης τοῦ διαιρετικοῦ οἶον 'ἦτοι ἡμέρα ἐστίν', οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο λέξις οὐδ' ἠτισοῦν τούτων προσήκουσα ταῖς κατηγορίαις· ἅπασαι γὰρ αἱ τοιαίδε χρεῖαι τοῦ λόγου παντάπασιν ἀφίστανται τῆς τῶν κατηγοριῶν προηγουμένης πρὸς τὰ πρᾶγματα συντάξεως.

[2.3] πάλιν εἴ τις ἄρρητος εἴη κίνησις τῆς διανοίας (25) ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν στεναγμῶν καὶ βρυχημάτων, ἢ εἴ τις ἀναρθρος ψόφος ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ποπυσμμάτων, ἢ εἴ τις ἀφάνταστος φωνὴ ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν τερετισμάτων, ἢ εἴ τι ὄνομα μηδὲν πρᾶγμα δηλώσειεν, οὐδαμῶς οὐδὲν τούτων ἐστὶ κατηγορία· οὐδαμῆ γὰρ διασώζουσι τὴν ιδιότητα τῆς κατηγορικῆς οὐσίας.

[2.4] ἔτι τοίνυν αἱ ἀνωτάτω τῶν γενῶν διαστάσεις ἢ εἰ οὕτω τις βούλοιο (30) λέγειν τῶν γενικωτάτων λέξεων οὐδὲν ἔχουσι κοινὸν πρὸς ἀλλήλας· οὐκοῦν οὐδὲν ἔξουσιν οὐσιώδεις ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ ὃν ἡ λεγόμενον κατηγορημα ἕτερον ἀνωτέρω. κατὰ δὴ τούτον τὸν διορισμὸν δεῖ τοὺς ὀρθῶς θηρεύοντας τὰς κατηγορίας μῆτε τὸ ὄν ὡς κοινὸν καθ' ὅλων ἀποδεικνύναι (εἰ δὲ [p. 12] μῆ, οὕτω οὐκέτι ἔσσονται δέκα, ἀλλ' εἰς ἓν γένος συναχθήσονται), μῆτε τὴν κίνησιν κατὰ τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ὡς κοινὸν κατηγορεῖν· οὐ γὰρ ἔτ' ἔσται δύο γένη ταῦτα, ἀλλ' ἐν τὸ συναμφοτέρον ἡ κίνησις.

[2.5] καὶ τὸ ἀπλοῦν καὶ ἀσύνθετον, ἐὰν τέ τις ἐν τοῖς τῶν ὄντων γένεσιν αὐτὸ ἐπισκοπῆ, ἂν τ' ἐπὶ τῶν γενικωτάτων σημαντικῶν λέξεων, ἐὰν τε καὶ συναμφοτέρως, (5) πανταχῆ οὕτως τὸν χαρακτήρα ἀφορίζει τῶν κατηγοριῶν· οὔτε οὖν τὰ σύνθετα οἶον Δίων περιπατεῖ οὔτε τὰ ὑποσύνθετα οἶον † ξυστρόπων οὔτε τὰ κατὰ συγκοπὴν ἢ ἀποκοπὴν λεγόμενα οὔτε τὰ πεποιημένα ὀνόματα οὔτε τὰ παρεσχηματισμένα οὔτε τὰ ἐπίθετα οὔθ' ὅσα ποιητικῆς ἢ ῥητορικῆς ἴδια θεωρεῖν, οὐδαμοῦ προσήκει τι ταῖς κατηγορίαις· ἄλλης γὰρ θεωρίας (10) τῆς περὶ τὴν λέξιν καὶ δευτέρας τὰ τοιαῦτα γινώσκειν.

[2.6] ἡ δὲ κατηγορία τὴν προηγουμένην σημασίαν βούλεται θηρεύειν τῶν λέξεων καὶ τὰς προηγουμένας οὐσιώδεις κοινότητας τῶν ὄντων, αἵτινες ἐν τοῖς ἀνωτάτω γένεσι θεωροῦνται, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τὰς κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἄλλως θεωρουμένας δευτέρας κοινὰς

ἐπινοίας. οἱ μὲν σχηματισμοὶ καὶ αἱ ἐπίνοιαι ἐπ' ἄπειρον δυνάμεναι (15) προΐεναι ἄχρηστοὶ εἰσι πρὸς ἐπιστήμην, αἱ δὲ γενικαὶ σημαντικαὶ λέξεις ἢ αἱ τῶν πρώτων γενῶν περιλήψεις ἐν ἀπείρῳ τὸ πεπερασμένον παραδιδούσαι ἐμποιοῦσιν εἴδησιν ἀκριβῆ τοῦ τε λόγου ἐν ταύτῳ καὶ τῶν ὄντων.

[3] διόπερ ταύταις χρηστέον ταῖς ἀφορμαῖς ὡς εἰκότως μάλιστα σπουδαζομέναις ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦ λόγου τε καὶ τῆς οὐσίας φιλοθεαμόνων.

[3.1] οὔτε ἄρα τὸ τροπικὸν ἢ (20) μεταφορικὸν ὄνομα ὡς τὸ 'ἀνεχαίτισεν' ἢ 'πόδα νείατον Ἰδης',

[3.2] ἀλλ' οὐδὲ οἱ τρόποι οἷον τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ἐνδέχασθαι καὶ ὑπάρχειν,

[3.3] οὔτε οἱ προσδιορισμοὶ ὥσπερ τὸ πᾶς ἢ οὐδεις ἢ τὸ τις ἢ οὐχί τις ὑπὸ τὰς κατηγορίας ταχθήσεται· οὐδὲν γὰρ ὅ τι τῶν τοιούτων ἀφωρισμένην ἰδίαν πραγμάτων ἔχει φύσιν· διόπερ ἂν τις αὐτὰ εὐλόγως ἀποδοκιμάσειεν ὡς οὐκ ἐφαρμόζοντα (25) τῷ τῶν νῦν προειρημένων σκοπῷ τῶν κατηγοριῶν.

[4] οἶμαι τοίνυν καὶ τὸ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν βλέπον τοῦ λόγου καὶ ἐν ᾧ κυρίως τὸ ἀληθεύειν ἢ ψεῦδεσθαι περιέχεται, τοῦτο προηγουμένως συναρμόζειν ταῖς κατηγορίαις. ὅσα δὴ οὖν δύναται μόρια τῆς σημαντικῆς φωνῆς εἰς κατηγορικὴν ἀπλήν πρότασιν ληφθέντα τοὺς ὅρους, ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκε, κυρίως (30) ἀποτελεῖν, ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη τῶν κατηγοριῶν ἐχόμενα.

[T2c] **Dexippus, in Cat. 32,17-29.** <On the omission of conjunctions and punctuation from the *Categories* as 'co-significant'>.

Ἀλλὰ διὰ τί τοὺς συνδέσμους παρέλιπεν, ἀποροῦσιν. Ἐπειδὴ, φαμὲν ἡμεῖς, οὔτε προηγουμένη ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἢ χρεία τοῦ λόγου ἀλλὰ δευτέρα, οὔτε τελεία ἀλλ' ἀτελής, οὔτε λεκτικὴ συμβολικὴ δὲ μᾶλλον, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ σημαίνει προηγουμένως συσσημαίνει δὲ μᾶλλον, ὥσπερ τὰς διπλᾶς εἰώθαμεν παραγράφειν, αἵτινες μετὰ τῶν γεγραμμένων μὲν συσσημαίνουσι τὸ ἀπαρτίζον τῆς διανοίας αὐταὶ δὲ καθ' ἑαυτὰς οὐδὲν δηλοῦσι. καὶ οἱ σύνδεσμοι τοίνυν συσσημαίνουσι μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων μερῶν τοῦ λόγου, αὐτοὶ δὲ καθ' ἑαυτοὺς οὐκ εἰσὶ σημαντικοί, ἀλλ' εἰκότασι τῇ κόλλῃ· διόπερ οὐδὲ λόγου στοιχεῖα αὐτοὺς τιθέμεθα, ἀλλ' εἴπερ ἄρα μέρη λέξεως. κὰν σημαίνωσι δὲ οὗτοι, κατὰ σύνταξιν σημαίνουσι, ὥσπερ ἢ βα συλλαβῆ, τὸν δὲ λόγον εἶναι φαμὲν περὶ τῶν ἄνευ συντάξεως καὶ καθ' αὐτὰς σημαίνουσῶν λέξεων καὶ κατὰ τὰς προηγουμένας χρήσεις τοῦ λόγου, οὐ μέντοι κατὰ τὰς ἐπομένας.

[T4] **Plotinus 6.1.5,14.** <How one part of voice 'co-signifies'. First documented use of συσσημαντικόν>.

Τὴν δὲ κίνησιν ταύτην κατὰ τὴν πληγὴν ποίησιν μᾶλλον ἂν εὐλόγως τις θεῖτο, τὴν δὲ ἀντικειμένως πάθος, ἢ ἐκάστην ἄλλου μὲν ποίησιν, ἄλλου δὲ πάθος, ἢ ποίησιν εἰς τὸ ὑποκείμενον, πάθημα δ' ἐν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ. Εἰ δὲ μὴ κατὰ τὴν πληγὴν ἢ φωνή, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἄερα, δύο ἂν εἴη καὶ οὐ μία ἢ κατηγορία ἐκ τῆς σημαντικῆς, εἰ συσσημαντικὸν ἐκείνης τῆς κατηγορίας.

*Apud Simplicium in Cat.*

[T3a] **Simplicius in Cat 18,22-19,7.** < Criticisms of the division. (i) Some reject Aristotle's division of chapters. (ii) Moreover, some claim that the division of categories is redundant, such as Cornutus and Athenodorus, who believe that the *skopos* concerns *lexeis* in so far as they are *lexeis*. (iii) They believe that the onymies are linguistic, and that the text combines physics, ethics, and theology. > **Speakers: 'Cornutus and Athenodorus', others.**

**Respondents: Simplicius.**

(i) Λοιπὸν δὲ τὸ περὶ τῆς εἰς τὰ κεφάλαια διαιρέσεως τοῦ βιβλίου λέγειν ὑπολείπεται, ἅ τινες μὴ ἐπιστήσαντες ὅπως τε κατ' ἄρθρα διήρηνται καὶ ὅπως τὴν τε πρὸς τὸν ὅλον σκοπὸν χρεῖαν ἀποπληροῦσι καλῶς καὶ τὴν πρὸς ἄλληλα συνέχειαν διασώζουσιν, στοιβηδὸν κείσθαι νομίζουσιν τὰ κεφάλαια κατὰ τὸν ὑπομνηματικὸν τρόπον.

(ii) καὶ δὴ καὶ ἀντιλέγουσιν αὐτῷ τινες ἀθετοῦντες τὴν διαίρεσιν, οἱ μὲν ὡς πλεονάζουσιν μάτην, οἱ δὲ ὡς πολλὰ παρείσαν ὥσπερ Κορνοῦτος καὶ Ἀθηνόδωρος, οἵτινες περὶ λέξεων οἰόμενοι τὸν σκοπὸν εἶναι καθὸ λέξεις εἰσίν, πολλὰς λέξεις προβάλλοντες τὰς μὲν κυρίας, τὰς δὲ τροπικάς, ἐλέγχειν οἴονται τὴν διαίρεσιν, ὡς οὐ πάσας τὰς λέξεις περιλαβοῦσαν.

(iii) οἱ καὶ διαίρεσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων οἴονται ποιεῖσθαι εἰς ὁμώνυμα καὶ συνώνυμα καὶ παρώνυμα καὶ εἶναι τὸ βιβλίον παντοδαπῶν θεωρημάτων σωρείαν ὑπολαμβάνουσιν λογικῶν τε καὶ φυσικῶν καὶ ἠθικῶν καὶ θεολογικῶν· εἶναι γὰρ τὰ μὲν περὶ ὁμωνύμων καὶ συνωνύμων καὶ παρωνύμων σκέμματα λογικά, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων, τὰ δὲ περὶ κινήσεως φυσικά, ἠθικά δὲ τὰ περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας, ὥσπερ θεολογικά τὰ περὶ τῶν δέκα γενῶν φιλοσοφήματα.

(iv) In fact, however, the truth is otherwise. [Aristotle] is not carrying out a division (*diairesis*) of names [in the onymies], for if he were, he would not have omitted heteronyms or polyonyms.

[T3c] **Simplicius in Cat. 62,25.** <Athenodorus (a) wrote a book 'Against Aristotle's Categories', whose subject was in fact the organization 'into such a number', *eis toouton plethos exetazonti*. [As M. Chase 144 n. 680 observes, this may be interpreted as meaning that Athenodorus saw *too many* categories, with B. L. Hijmans 1975, 108 and following, and followed the Stoic view that there were only four (cf. M. Pohlenz 1984(6), I, 294). But with Moraux 588-9 and n. 18, this may mean 'into this particular number and no other'; since Athenodorus viewed the Categories as words (Praechter 1922, 508-10) he may consider the number as too small.] (b) Cornutus in his 'Against Athenodorus and Aristotle' also argued against the division. He is listed alongside Lucius and Nicostratus, which *may* imply that Simplicius perceives some sympathy with their positions. **Speakers: Athenodorus; Cornutus. Respondent: Simplicius.**

(a) Ἄλλοι δὲ πολλοὶ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἀμφεσβήτησαν, αὐτόθεν κατηγοροῦντες τῆς εἰς τοσοῦτον πλήθος διαιρέσεως, ὥσπερ Ἀθηνόδωρος ἐν τῷ Πρὸς τὰς Ἀριστοτέλους μὲν Κατηγορίας ἐπιγεγραμμένῳ βιβλίῳ, μόνην δὲ τὴν εἰς τοσοῦτον πλήθος διαίρεσιν ἐξετάζοντι.

(b) καὶ Κορνοῦτος δὲ ἐν οἷς Πρὸς Ἀθηνόδωρον καὶ Ἀριστοτέλην ἐπέγραψεν καὶ οἱ περὶ τὸν Λούκιον δὲ καὶ τὸν Νικόστρατον, ὥσπερ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα πάντα σχεδόν, οὕτως καὶ πρὸς τὴν διαίρεσιν ἀντειρήκασιν.

[T5] **Simplicius in Cat. 128,7.** <Some criticize the division of quantity into number and size, and suggest the addition of weight or downward thrust; Athenodorus is rostered with ‘Archytas’ and Ptolemy as expressing this view.> **Speaker: Athenodorus. Respondent: Simplicius.**

Αἰτιῶνται δὲ καὶ τὸ εἰς δύο γενέσθαι τὴν διαίρεσιν· ἔδει γὰρ μετὰ τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ τὸ μέγεθος τρίτον εἶδος τάττειν τὸ βάρος ἢ τὴν ῥοπὴν, ὡς Ἀρχύτας καὶ ὡς ὕστερον Ἀθηνόδωρος ἔταξεν καὶ Πτολεμαῖος ὁ μαθηματικός. ἀλλὰ ῥητέον ὅτι ἡ βαρῦτης ποιότητός ἐστιν, ὡς ἡ πυκνότης καὶ παχύτης οὐχὶ κατὰ τὸ ποσόν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ποιόν, καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἀντικείμενα. ἀλλ’ ἡ μὲν καὶ τὸ τάλαντον τὰ ἐπὶ βάρους λεγόμενα πού ἂν περιληφθεῖη; ἢ εἰς μὲν τὰ προηγούμενα ποσὰ φήσομεν οὐδαμῶς, εἰς δὲ τὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός·

[T6] **Simplicius in Cat. 129,1.** <Cornutus appears to have *rebutted* (?) the suggestion of Athenodorus at 128,7 by claiming that downward thrust is quality, and was followed by Porphyry. Iamblichus replied that it was the *measure* of the quality, and so quantity.> **Speaker: Cornutus. Respondent: Iamblichus.**

διὰ τί δέ, φησίν, τὰ μὲν διαστήματα τῆς φωνῆς ποσὰ λέγομεν, τὰ δὲ τῆς ῥοπῆς διαστήματα οὐ λέγομεν ποσὰ;” πρὸς δὲ Κορνοῦτον καὶ Πορφύριον τὴν ῥοπὴν κατὰ βαρῦτητα καὶ κουφότητα θεωρουμένην ποιότητα λέγοντάς φησιν τὴν ῥοπὴν μὴ εἶναι βαρῦτητα καὶ κουφότητα, ἀλλὰ μέτρον βαρῦτητος καὶ κουφότητος· “αὐτὰ μὲν γὰρ καθ’ αὐτὰ τὰ βαρέα ἢ κοῦφα ἐπ’ ἄπειρον ἂν προίοι μηδένα ἔχοντα ὄρον ἐξ ἑαυτῶν, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν μέτρων τῆς ῥοπῆς δύναμις τάξιν καὶ ὄρον ἐντέθεικεν, τῆνικαῦτα εἰς εὐταξίαν κατέστη”.

[T7] **Simplicius in Cat. 159,33.** <Linked with Boethus, Ariston, Andronicus and others in commenting on the Relative.>

οὕτως οὖν οὐδὲ τὸ πρὸς τι, ἀλλὰ μόνως τὰ πρὸς τι. ταῦτα δὲ ἐπιστήσαντες οὗτοι τοὺς παλαιοὺς τῶν κατηγοριῶν ἐξηγητάς αἰτιῶνται, Βόηθον καὶ Ἀρίστων καὶ Ἀνδρόνικον καὶ Εὐδωρον καὶ Ἀθηνόδωρον, μήτε ἐπιστήσαντας μήτε ἐπισημηναμένους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασι συγκεχυμένως χρησαμένους καὶ ἐνικῶς ἐκφέροντας ἐνίοτε τὸ πρὸς τι, τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους πληθυντικῶς ἀεὶ προφερομένου·

[T8] **Simplicius in Cat. 187,24-34.** <Comments on the Relative: Athenodorus believes that the Aristotelian relative is ‘that for which the name begs that relating to which it is uttered’ (as one looks to a slave-owner when one hears ‘slave’); Cornutus believes the Aristotelian relative is those whose condition ‘coincides with’ something else, not through the condition of combination, but essence.>

Ἄλλοι δὲ λέγουσιν ἄτοπον εἶναι τὸν διορισμὸν τῆς τοιαύτης ἀποδόσεως· τὸ γὰρ περὸν καὶ τὸ πηδάλιον καὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν, ὅπως ἂν ἀποδοθῆ, μὴ δεόντως ἀποδίδοσθαι· μηδὲ γὰρ εἶναι ὅλως τῶν πρὸς τι, διότι ἕκαστον αὐτῶν μέρος ἐστὶν οὐσίας καὶ οὐσία, οὐδεμία δὲ οὐσία τῶν πρὸς τι, ὡς καὶ αὐτῷ δοκεῖ τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει.

εἴτε οὖν ὡς Ἀθηνόδωρος οἶεται πρὸς τι εἶναι κατὰ Ἀριστοτέλη, ἐφ' οὗ ἡ προσηγορία ἐπιζητεῖ τὸ πρὸς ὃ λέγεται (ὁ γὰρ δοῦλον ἀκούσας ἐπιζητεῖ τὸν οὐ ἔστι δοῦλος), εἴτε ὡς Κορνοῦτος πρὸς τι εἶναι φησιν οἷς συμπροσπίπτει πρὸς ἕτερον ἢ σχέσις, οὐ μέντοι ἢ συντακτική, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ἐχόντων καὶ ἐχομένων, ἀλλ' ἢ πρὸς ὑπόστασιν, ὅταν αὐτῷ τῷ ᾧ εἶναι τὴν πρὸς ἕτερον ἀπόνευσιν ἔχη, κατ' οὐδένα τρόπον τὸ πηδάλιον ἢ τὸ πτερόν πρὸς τί ἐστιν. οὔτε γὰρ ἐπιζητεῖ τι πρὸς ὃ λέγεται οὔτε κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ἕτερον ὑποστατικὴν σχέσιν λέγεται· οὐσία γὰρ τὸ πηδάλιον καὶ ἡ κεφαλὴ καὶ τὸ πτερόν.

[T9] **Simplicius in Cat. 351,23.** <Cornutus appears to have adopted a relatively 'Pythagorean' view about Time as inherent in the *spermatikoi logoi*, or (Simplicius), in prior principles. Simplicius favours this, it seems, over a more orthodox Stoic position that it is 'the extension of movement' .>

καὶ οἱ Στωικοὶ δὲ παραλαβόντες τὸν ὀρισμὸν λέγοντα “τὸ καθόλου διάστημα τῆς τοῦ παντὸς φύσεως” παρέτρεψαν τὸν λόγον ἐπὶ τὸ διάστημα τῆς κινήσεως, καὶ πλημμελοῦσιν οὗτοι, διότι τῶν Πυθαγορείων τὸ διάστημα φυσικὸν καὶ ἐν φυσικοῖς λόγοις καὶ εἰ οὕτω τις βούλοιο καλεῖν ἐν τοῖς σπερματικοῖς, ὡς ποτε καὶ Κορνοῦτος ὁπὲρ τοῦτο ὑπώπτευσεν, ἢ ὡς ἀκριβέστερον ἂν τις εἶποι κατὰ προτέρους λόγους καὶ τῶν σπερματικῶν λόγων τοὺς τῆς ὅλης κοσμικῆς φύσεως, ἐν ἧ καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ περιλαμβάνεται, τὸ διάστημα ἀφοριζομένων, οὗτοι σαφῶς μὲν οὐκ ἔχουσι διελεσθαι, ὅποῖον λέγουσι διάστημα, εἰκόσασιν μέντοι μᾶλλον τὸ τῶν σωματοειδῶν κινήσεων σωματοειδῆς διάστημα ὑπολαμβάνειν ἢ ὥσπερ γραμμοειδῆς τι τοῦτο ἀποφαίνεσθαι, ὃ πολλῆς ἀτοπίας μεστὸν ἰδίᾳ δείκνυται ἐν τοῖς περὶ χρόνου λόγοις.

[T10] **Simplicius in Cat. 359,1.** <Cornutus, (a) based on the belief that the characterization of linguistic *expressions* defines the categories, questions why, if 'where' and 'when' differ from 'place' and 'time' in linguistic expression, other expressions like 'from Dion' are not included. (b) Cornutus says 'far and near' are relative. He also examines 'simultaneous', 'apart', 'drawing together', 'separated', 'side by side' and 'underlying' to see if these belong to Where or In-a-position or Relative.> **Speaker: Cornutus. Respondent: Simplicius.**

Κορνοῦτος δὲ ἀπορεῖ, εἰ τὸ ποῦ τοῦ τόπου καὶ τὸ ποτὲ τοῦ χρόνου κατὰ τὸν χαρακτηρισμὸν τῶν λέξεων διενηνοχότα εἰς ἰδίας καταπέτακται κατηγορίας διὰ τὸ τὴν πρόθεσιν περὶ χαρακτήρων εἶναι λεκτικῶν, τί δήποτε οὐχὶ καὶ ταῦτα τῇ κατηγορίᾳ ταύτῃ προσέθηκεν, οἷον τὸ Διωνόθεν καὶ εἰς Δίωνα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πολλὰ ὄντα· ὅμοια γὰρ ἐστὶν τῷ Ἀθήνηθεν καὶ εἰς Ἀθήνας....

Πάλιν δὲ ὁ αὐτὸς ἀνήρ τὸ πόρρω καὶ ἐγγὺς εἰς τὸ πρὸς τι ἀνάγειν (15) ἀξιοὶ τοπικὸν ἔχοντα τὸ ὑποκείμενον, Ἀνδρόνικος δὲ εἰς τὸ ποῦ τίθησιν αὐτὰ ἀόριστα κατὰ τόπον ὄντα. καὶ εἶπερ ἢ τοῦ τόπου διαφορὰ ἐπικρατοῦσα φαίνεται ἐν αὐτοῖς, εἰς τὸ ποῦ μᾶλλον ἀνενεκτέα, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰς ἕτερον γένος· οὐ γὰρ τὴν ἀντίστροφον σχέσιν ἔχει πρόχειρον, ὡς τὸ πορρώτερον καὶ ἐγγύτερον, ἀλλὰ τὴν τοῦ τόπου διάστασιν. ἐφιστάνει δὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦ (20) ἅμα καὶ χωρὶς καὶ συνεγγίζον καὶ διεστηκὸς καὶ παρακείμενον <καὶ ὑποκείμενον>, εἰ δεῖ ταῦτα τῆς τοῦ ποῦ κατηγορίας τίθεσθαι ἢ τοῦ κείσθαι ἢ μᾶλλον τοῦ πρὸς τι· ὑπὸ γὰρ τούτου κρατεῖσθαι, καθάπερ τὸ διπλάσιον καίτοι ποσὸν ἐμφαίνον. μήποτε δὲ οὐ πάντα ταῦτα ἓνα ἔχει λόγον, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἅμα καὶ τὰ συνεγγίζοντα τὸ πρὸς τι μᾶλλον ἐμφαίνει· κοινὴν γὰρ (25) σχέσιν καὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἀντιστρέφουσιν συμπαρίστησιν· τὰ δὲ χωρὶς καὶ διε-

στηκότα τὴν τοῦ ποῦ· πλεονάζει γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἢ πρὸς τὸν τόπον σχέσις τῶν χωρὶς ὄντων καὶ τῶν διεστηκότων. τὰ μέντοι παρακείμενα καὶ ὑποκείμενα τῆς τοῦ κείσθαι ἐστὶν κατηγορίας· προηγείται γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡ θέσις καὶ ἔξωθεν ἡ σχέσις ἐπισυμβαίνει. καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δὲ οὕτως χρῆ (30) διακρίνειν τῷ πλεονάζοντι καὶ ἐπικρατοῦντι καὶ τὴν ἔννοιαν προβάλλοντι πρόχειρον, τούτῳ τὸ βραβεῖον τοῦ γένους ἀπονέμοντας.

*Other Sources on Stoic Philosophers named Athenodorus  
(bolded texts are referenced in the chapter)*

[T11] Cicero, *ad Familiares* 3.7

Nec mehercule aliter vidi existimare vel Cn. Pompeium, quem omnibus, qui umquam fuerunt, vel P. Lentulum, quem mihi ipsi antepono: tu si aliter existimas, nihil errabis, si paullo diligentius, ut, quid sit eugeneia, quid sit nobilitas, intelligas, Athenodorus, Sandonis filius, quid de his rebus dicat, attenderis. Sed, ut ad rem redeam, me tibi non amicum modo, verum etiam amicissimum existimes velim: profecto omnibus officiis meis efficiam, ut ita esse vere possis iudicare. Tu autem si id agis, ut minus mea causa, dum ego absim, debere videaris, quam ego tua laborarim, libero te ista cura:

[T12] Cicero, *ad Att.* 16.11.4

*ta peri tou kathekontos* quatenus Panaetius, absolvi duobus. illius tres sunt; sed cum initio divisisset ita, tria genera exquirendi officii esse, unum, cum deliberemus honestum an turpe sit, alterum, utile an inutile, tertium, cum haec inter se pugnare videantur, quo modo iudicandum sit, qualis causa Reguli, redire honestum, manere utile, de duobus primis praeclare disseruit, de tertio pollicetur se deinceps sed nihil scripsit. Eum locum Posidonius persecutus <est>. ego autem et eius librum arcessivi et ad Athenodorum Calvum scripsi ut ad me *ta kephalaia* mitteret; quae exspecto. quem velim cohortere et roges ut quam primum. in eo est *Peri tou kata peristasin kathekontos*. quod de inscriptione quaeris, non dubito quin *kathekon* 'officium' sit, nisi quid tu aliud; sed inscriptio plenior 'de officiis.' *Prospiono* autem Ciceroni filio. visum est non *anoikeion*.

[T13] Cicero, *ad Att.* 16.14.4

Athenodorum nihil est quod hortere. misit enim satis bellum u(po/mnhma .

[T14a] Strabo, *Geographica* 1.1.9.

ἡμεῖς δὲ τὸν μὲν πλείω λόγον περὶ τοῦ ὠκεανοῦ καὶ τῶν πλημμυρίδων εἰς Ποσειδώνιον ἀναβαλλόμεθα καὶ Ἀθηνόδωρον, ἰκανῶς \* διακρατήσαντας τὸν περὶ τούτων λόγον· πρὸς δὲ τὰ νῦν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον λέγομεν, ὅτι πρὸς τε τὴν ὁμοιοπάθειαν οὕτω βέλτιον νομίσει, τὰ τε οὐράνια συνέχοιτ' ἂν κρείττον ταῖς ἐντεῦθεν ἀναθυμιάσεσιν, εἰ πλείον εἴη τὸ ὑγρὸν περικεχυμένον.

[T14b] Strabo, *Geographica* 1.3.12.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πλημμυρίδων καὶ τῶν ἀμπώτεων εἰρήκασιν ἰκανῶς Ποσειδώνιος τε καὶ Ἀθηνόδωρος· περὶ δὲ τῆς τῶν πορθμῶν παλιρροίας, ἐχόντων καὶ αὐτῶν φυσικώτερον λόγον ἢ κατὰ τὴν νῦν ὑπόθεσιν, τοσοῦτον εἰπεῖν ἀπόχρη, ὅτι οὔτε εἰς τρόπος τοῦ ῥοῶδεις εἶναι τοὺς πορθμούς, ὃ γε κατ' εἶδος ...

[Other passages in Strabo: 3.5.7; 14.5.14; 16.4.21].

[T15] Seneca *De Tranq.* 3

Optimum erat, ut ait Athenodorus, actione rerum et rei publicae tractatione et officiis ciuilibus se detinere. Nam, ut quidam sole atque exercitatione et cura corporis diem educunt athletisque longe utilissimum est lacertos suos roburque, cui se uni dicauerunt, maiore temporis parte nutrire, ita nobis, animum ad rerum ciuiliu certamen parantibus, in opere esse nostro longe pulcherrimum est: nam, cum utilem se efficere ciuibus mortalibusque propositum habeat, simul et exercetur et proficit qui in mediis se officiis posuit, communia priuataque pro facultate administrans.

[T16] Seneca *Ep. Mor.* 10.5

Sed ut more meo cum aliquo munusculo epistulam mittam, verum est quod apud Athenodorum inveni: 'tunc scito esse te omnibus cupiditatibus solutum, cum eo perveneris ut nihil deum roges nisi quod rogare possis palam'.

[T17] Plutarch *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*, 207C3.

Ἀθηνοδώρῳ δὲ τῷ φιλοσόφῳ διὰ γῆρας εἰς οἶκον ἀφεθῆναι δεηθέντι συνεχώρησεν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἀσπασάμενος αὐτὸν ὁ Ἀθηνόδωρος εἶπεν 'ὅταν ὀργισθῆς, Καίσαρ, μηδὲν εἴπῃς μηδὲ ποιήσῃς πρότερον ἢ τὰ εἴκοσι καὶ τέτταρα γράμματα διελθεῖν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν', ἐπιλαβόμενος αὐτοῦ τῆς χειρὸς 'ἔτι σοῦ παρόντος' ἔφη 'χρεῖαν ἔχω.'

[T18] Plutarch *Publicola* 17.8.3.

τοῦτον τὸν ἄνδρα Μούκιον ὁμοῦ τι πάντων καὶ Σκαιόλαν καλούντων, Ἀθηνόδωρος ὁ Σάνδωνος (FHG III 487) ἐν τῷ πρὸς Ὀκταουίαν τὴν Καίσαρος ἀδελφὴν καὶ Ὀψίγονον ὠνομάσθαι φησὶν.

[T19] Plutarch *Quaest. conv.* 634E10.

καὶ πρὸς Ἀθηνόδωρον τὸν φιλόσοφον, 'εἰ φυσικὴ ἢ πρὸς τὰ <ἔκγονα> φιλοστοργία.'

[T20] Pliny the Younger, *Letters* 7.27. <The "ghost story" about one Athenodorus.>

Venit Athenas philosophus Athenodorus, legit titulum auditoque pretio, quia suspecta vilitas, percunctatus omnia docetur ac nihilo minus, immo tanto magis conducit. Ubi coepit advesperascere, iubet sterni sibi in prima domus parte, poscit pugillares stilum lumen, suos omnes in interiora dimittit; ipse ad scribendum animum oculos manum intendit, ne vacua mens audita simulacra et inanes sibi metus fingeret. 8 Initio, quale ubique, silentium noctis; dein concuti ferrum, vincula moveri. Ille non tollere oculos, non remittere stilum, sed affirmare animum auribusque praetendere. Tum crebrescere fragor, adventare et iam ut in limine, iam ut intra limen audiri. Respicit, videt agnoscitque narratam sibi effigiem. 9 Stabat innuebatque digito similis vocanti. Hic contra ut paulum exspectaret manu significat rursusque ceris et stilo incumbit. Illa scribentis capiti catenis insonabat. Respicit rursus idem quod prius innuentem, nec moratus tollit lumen et sequitur. 10 Ibat illa lento gradu quasi gravis vinculis. Postquam deflexit in aream domus, repente dilapsa deserit comitem. Desertus herbas et folia concepta signum loco ponit. 11 Postero die adit magistratus, monet ut illum locum effodi iubeant. Inveniuntur ossa inserta catenis et implicita, quae corpus aevo terraque putrefactum nuda et exesa reliquerat vinculis; collecta publice sepeliuntur. Domus postea rite conditis manibus caruit.

[T21] Lucian, *Macrob.* 21.2

Ἀθηνόδωρος Σάνδωνος Ταρσεὺς Στωϊκός, ὃς καὶ διδάσκαλος ἐγένετο Καίσαρος Σεβαστοῦ θεοῦ, ὑφ' οὗ ἡ Ταρσέων πόλις καὶ φόρων ἐκουφίσθη, δύο καὶ ὀγδοήκοντα ἔτη βιοῦς ἐτελεύτησεν ἐν τῇ πατρίδι, ...

[T22] Lucian, *Macrob.* 23.17

Ἀπολλόδωρος δὲ ὁ Περγαμηνὸς ῥήτωρ, θεοῦ Καίσαρος Σεβαστοῦ διδάσκαλος γενόμενος καὶ σὺν Ἀθηνόδωρῳ τῷ Ταρσεὶ φιλοσόφῳ παιδεύσας αὐτόν, ἔζησεν ταῦτα τῷ Ἀθηνόδωρῳ ἔτη ὀγδοήκοντα δύο.

[T23] Herodian *de pros. cath.* 320,29.

ἔστι δὲ κτίσμα Ἀγγιᾶλης τῆς Ἰαπετοῦ θυγατρὸς, ὡς Ἀθηνόδωρος περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πατρίδος γράφων καὶ παρατιθεὶς Διόδωρον τὸν γραμματικὸν (30) συμφωνοῦντα Πτολεμαίῳ βασιλεῖ «γίνεται δ' Ἰαπετοῦ θυγάτηρ Ἀγγιᾶλη, καὶ κτίζει πόλιν Ἀγγιᾶλην, Ἀγγιαλέα τε τὸν παρακείμενον ποταμόν. γεννᾷ δ' υἱὸν Κύδνον, ἀφ' οὗ ποταμὸς Κύδνος ἐν Ταρσῷ, ὁ δὲ Κύδνος υἱὸν Παρθένιον, ἀφ' οὗ ἡ πόλις μετωνομάσθη Παρθενία.

[T24] Athenaeus, *Deip.* 16.22

καὶ Ἀθηνόδωρος δὲ ἐν τῷ περὶ Σπουδῆς καὶ Παιδιάς Ἀρχύταν φησὶ τὸν Ταραντῖνον πολιτικὸν ἅμα καὶ φιλόσοφον γενόμενον πλείστους οἰκέτας ἔχοντα αἰεὶ τούτοις παρὰ τὴν δίαιταν ἀφιεμένοις εἰς τὸ συμπόσιον ἥδυσθαι.

[T25] Clement of Alexandria, *Protrepticus* 4.48.4

Ἄλλ' ὃ γε Ἀθηνόδωρος ὁ τοῦ Σάνδωνος ἀρχαίξειν τὸν Σάραπιν βουλευθεὶς οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως περιέπεσεν, ἐλέγξας αὐτὸν ἄγαλμα εἶναι γεννητόν.

[T26] Diogenes Laertius 3.3.11. <The *Peripatoi* of Athenodorus.>

ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐχορήγησεν Ἀθήνησι Δίωνος ἀναλίσκοντος, ὡς φησιν Ἀθηνόδωρος ἐν ἡ Περιπάτων.

[T27] Diogenes Laertius 5.36.2. <The *Peripatoi* of Athenodorus.>

Θεόφραστος Μελάντα Ἐρέσιος κναφέως υἱός, ὡς φησιν Ἀθηνόδωρος ἐν ὀγδοῇ Περιπάτων.

[T28] Diogenes Laertius 6.81.9 <The *Peripatoi* of Athenodorus.>

πέμπτος Ταρσεὺς, γεγραφὼς περὶ ποιητικῶν ζητημάτων ἃ λύειν ἐπιχειρεῖ. Τὸν δὲ φιλόσοφον Ἀθηνόδωρός φησιν ἐν ὀγδοῇ Περιπάτων αἰεὶ στυλπνὸν φαίνεσθαι διὰ τὸ ἀλείφεσθαι.

[T29] Diogenes Laertius 7.34. <According to Isidorus of Pergamon, Athenodorus Cordylion expunged some passages of Zeno's *Republic* during his tenure as librarian.>

Ἰσιδώρω τῷ Περγαμηνῷ ῥήτορι· ὃς καὶ ἐκμηθῆναι φησιν ἐκ τῶν βιβλίων τὰ κακῶς λεγόμενα παρὰ τοῖς στωικοῖς ὑπ' Ἀθηνόδωρου τοῦ στωικοῦ πιστευθέντος τὴν ἐν Περγάμῳ βιβλιοθήκην· εἶτ' ἀντιτεθῆναι αὐτὰ, φωραθέντος τοῦ Ἀθηνόδωρου καὶ κινδυνεύσαντος. καὶ τοσαῦτα μὲν περὶ τῶν ἀθετουμένων αὐτοῦ.

[T30] Diogenes Laertius 7.68.8. <Citation of the logician Athenodorus.>

Τῶν ἀξιωματῶν τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀπλᾶ, τὰ δ' οὐχ ἀπλᾶ, ὡς φασιν οἱ περὶ Χρύσιππον καὶ Ἀρχέδημον καὶ Ἀθηνόδωρον καὶ Ἀντίπατρον καὶ Κρίνιν. ἀπλᾶ μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὰ συνεστῶτα ἐξ ἀξιώματος μὴ διαφορουμένου [ἢ ἐξ ἀξιωματῶν], οἷον τὸ “ἡμέρα ἐστίν”· οὐχ ἀπλᾶ δ' ἐστὶ τὰ συνεστῶτ' ἐξ ἀξιώματος διαφορουμένου ἢ ἐξ ἀξιωματῶν.

[T31] Diogenes Laertius 7.121.2

καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἑκατὸν σταδίους ἀπέχων Κανώβου καὶ ὁ ἕνα ἐπίσης οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐν Κανώβῳ· οὕτω καὶ ὁ πλέον καὶ ὁ ἕλαττον ἀμαρτάνων ἐπίσης οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐν τῷ κατορθοῦν. Ἡρακλείδης μὲντοι ὁ Ταρσεύς, Ἀντίπατρον τοῦ Ταρσεῶς γινώσκων, καὶ Ἀθηνόδωρος ἄνισά φασιν τὰ ἀμαρτήματα.

[T32] Diogenes Laertius 7.149.9. <Athenodorus on the mantic art.>

καὶ μὴν καὶ μαντικὴν ὑφεστάναι πᾶσάν φασιν, εἰ καὶ πρόνοιαν εἶναι· καὶ αὐτὴν καὶ τέχνην ἀποφαίνουσι διὰ τινὰς ἐκβάσεις, ὡς φησὶ Ζήνων τε καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ Περὶ μαντικῆς καὶ Ἀθηνόδωρος καὶ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ δυοδεκάτῳ τοῦ Φυσικοῦ λόγου καὶ ἐν τῷ πέμπτῳ Περὶ μαντικῆς.

[T33] Diogenes Laertius 7.190. <Book of Chrysippus addressed to Athenodorus.>

Περὶ τῶν καταγορευτικῶν πρὸς Ἀθηνόδωρον α'.

[T34] Diogenes Laertius 9.42.4

Φησὶ δ' Ἀθηνόδωρος ἐν ὀγδῷ Περιπάτων, ἐλθόντος Ἴπποκράτους πρὸς αὐτόν, κελεύσαι κομισθῆναι γάλα· καὶ θεασάμενον τὸ γάλα εἰπεῖν εἶναι αἰγὸς πρωτοτόκου καὶ μελαίνης· ὅθεν τὴν ἀκριβείαν αὐτοῦ θαυμάσαι τὸν Ἴπποκράτην.

#### *Other Sources on L. Annaeus Cornutus*

[T35] Suetonius *Life of Persius*

Cum esset annorum XVI, amicitia coepit uti Annaei Cornuti ita ut nusquam ab eo discederet; a quo inductus aliquatenus in philosophiam est.

Amicos habuit a prima adulescentia Caesium Bassum poetam et Calpurnium Staturam, qui vivo eo iuvenis decessit. Coluit ut patrem Servilium Nonianum. Cognovit per Cornutum etiam Annaeum Lucanum aequaevum auditorem Cornuti.

[...] Usus est apud Cornutum duorum convictu doctissimorum et sanctissimorum virorum acriter tunc philosophantium, Claudii Agathurni medici Lacedaemonii et Petroni Aristocratis Magnetis, quos unice miratus est et aemulatus, cum aequales essent Cornuti, minor esset ipse.

[...] Cornuto rogavit ut daret sestertia, ut quidam dicunt, C, ut alii, L et argenti facti pondo viginti et libros circa septingentos Chrysippi sive bibliothecam suam omnem. Verum a Cornuto sublatis libris pecunia sororibus, quas heredes frater fecerat, relicta est.

[...] Leviter correxit Cornutus et Caesio Basso petenti, ut ipse ederet, tradidit edendum.

[...] Omnia ea auctor fuit Cornutus matri eius ut aboleret.

[...] Cuius versus in Neronem cum ita se haberet "auriculas asini Mida rex habet," in eum modum a Cornuto ipso tantum nomine mutato est emendatus "auriculas asini quis non habet?" ne hoc in se Nero dictum arbitraretur.

[T36] Cassius Dio 62.29. <Cornutus banished by Nero>.

ὁ δὲ Νέρων ἄλλα τε γελοῖα ἔπραττε, καὶ ποτε καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ θεάτρου ὀρχήστραν ἐν πανδήμῳ τινὶ θεᾷ κατέβη καὶ ἀνέγνω Τρωϊκὰ τινὰ ἑαυτοῦ ποιήματα· καὶ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς θυσίαι πολλαί, [2] ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν οἷς ἔπραττεν, ἐγένοντο. παρεσκευάζετο δὲ ὡς καὶ τὰς τῶν Ῥωμαίων πρᾶξεις ἀπάσας συγγράφων ἐν ἔπεσιν, καὶ περὶ γε τοῦ πλήθους τῶν βιβλίων, πρὶν καὶ ὀτιοῦν αὐτῶν συνθεῖναι, ἐσκέψατο, παραλαβὼν ἄλλους τε καὶ [3] Ἀνναῖον Κορνοῦτον εὐδοκίμουνα τότε ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ. καὶ αὐτὸν ὀλίγου μὲν καὶ ἀπέκτεινε, ἐς νῆσον δ' οὖν ἐνέβαλεν, ὅτι τινῶν τετρακόσια ἀξιούντων αὐτὸν βιβλία γράψαι, πολλὰ τε αὐτὰ εἶναι ἔφη καὶ μηδένα αὐτὰ ἀναγνώσεσθαι, καὶ τινος εἰπόντος “καὶ μὴν Χρῦσιππος, ὃν ἐπαινεῖς καὶ ζηλοῖς, πολὺ πλείω συνέθηκεν” (5) ἀπεκρίνατο ὅτι “ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνα χρήσιμα τῷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίῳ [4] ἐστίν”. ὁ μὲν οὖν Κορνοῦτος φυγὴν ἐπὶ τούτῳ ὠφλεν, ὁ δὲ δὴ Λουκανὸς ἐκωλύθη ποιεῖν, ἐπειδὴ ἰσχυρῶς ἐπὶ τῇ ποιήσει ἐπηρείτο.

[T37] Porphyry, *Contra Christ. ap.* Eusebium *Hist. Ecc.* 6.19.8.6. <>

Χριστιανῶς ζῶν καὶ παρανόμως, κατὰ δὲ τὰς περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ δόξας Ἑλληνίζων τε καὶ τὰ Ἑλλήνων τοῖς ὀθνεῖσι ὑποβαλλόμενος μύθοις. συνῆν τε γὰρ αἰεὶ τῷ Πλάτῳ, τοῖς τε Νουμηνίου καὶ Κρονίου Ἀπολλοφάνους τε καὶ Λογγίνου καὶ Μοδεράτου Νικομάχου τε καὶ τῶν ἐν Πυθαγορείοις ἐλλογίμων ἀνδρῶν ὁμίλει συγγράμμασιν, ἐχρήτο δὲ καὶ Χαιρήμονος τοῦ Στωϊκοῦ Κορνοῦτου τε ταῖς βίβλοις, παρ' ὧν τὸν μεταληπτικὸν τῶν παρ' Ἑλλήσιν μυστηρίων γνοῦς τρόπον ταῖς Ἰουδαϊκαῖς προσήψεν γραφαῖς.

[T38] Syrianus, *in Met.* 106,7. <Cornutus may be classed with Boethus the Peripatetic in identifying *ideai* with generic concepts (*genika*)>.

παραφέρεται δὲ καὶ Βοηθὸς ὁ περιπατητικὸς ἐκ τῶν παρὰ τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει κατηγήσεων εἰς ταῦτον ἄγων τοῖς γενικοῖς τὰς ιδέας· ᾧ καὶ τὸν Κορνοῦτον συντάπτειν εὐλογον, οὐ πόρρω καὶ αὐτὸν ταύτης ὑπενεχθέντα τῆς δόξης·

[T39] Syrianus, *in Herm.* 60,19. <Cornutus remarks on two forms of ambiguity, that concerning speech (*peri rheta*) and that concerning things (*peri pragmata*)>.

Κορνούτος δὲ τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν λέγων δύο εἶναι ἐν ταῖς στάσεσιν ἀμφιβολίας, τὴν μὲν περὶ ῥητὰ τὴν νομικὴν ἀμφιβολίαν, τὴν δὲ περὶ πράγματα τὴν στοχαστικὴν, πρότερα δὲ εἶναι τὰ ῥητὰ τῶν πραγμάτων, πρότερα ἄρα καὶ τὴν νομικὴν ἀμφιβολίαν τακτέον·

[T40] Syrianus, *in Herm.* 201,8. <Cornutus on ambiguity>.

Τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν Κορνούτος πρώτην τῶν ἄλλων ἀξιόι τάττεσθαι στάσεων, δι' ἣν κατ' ἀρχὰς ἔφαμεν αἰτίαν· δύο γὰρ εἶναι φησιν ἐν ταῖς στάσεσιν ἀμφιβολίας, τὴν μὲν ἐν πράγμασι τὸν στοχασμὸν λέγων, τὴν δὲ ἐν ῥητοῖς τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν, πρότερα δὲ τὰ ῥητὰ τῶν πραγμάτων, πρότερα ἄρα καὶ ἡ περὶ τὰ ῥητὰ ἀμφιβολία μελετηθήσεται.

[T41] Theodoret, *Theol. et scr. Eccl.* 2.95.4. <Cornutus composed a *Greek Theology*.>

Κορνούτος δὲ ὁ φιλόσοφος τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν θεολογίαν ξυντέθεικε·

[T42] Steph. Byz. *Eth.* 312,11 and 617,2. <Cornutus born in Leptis.>

[ἐκ δὲ τῆς Λιβυκῆς Κορνούτος φιλόσοφος Θεστίτης χρηματίζων.]

[T43] Charisius, *Gramm.* 162,9 <First name of Cornutus documented.>

[T44] Alexander *in An. Pr.* 402,1-405,16.

Ἀριστοτέλης μὲν οὖν τῆς 'Σωκράτης ἐστὶ λευκός' καταφάσεως ἀπόφασιν λέγει τὴν 'Σωκράτης οὐκ ἔστι λευκός', οὐ τὴν 'Σωκράτης ἐστὶν οὐ λευκός'. εἰσὶ δὲ, οἷς δοκεῖ μηδέπω μηδὲ ἢ οὕτως λαμβανομένη ἀπόφασιν εἶναι. μὴ γὰρ ὀφείλειν τὸ ἀποφατικὸν πρὸ τοῦ 'ἔστι' μηδὲ πρὸ τοῦ κατηγορουμένου τίθεσθαι μόνου, ἀλλ' εἶναι ἀπόφασιν τὴν τὸ ἀποφατικὸν (5) πρὸ πάσης τῆς καταφάσεως τε καὶ προτάσεως ἔχουσαν κείμενον· τῆς γὰρ 'Σωκράτης ἐστὶ λευκός' ἀπόφασιν εἶναι τὴν 'οὐχὶ Σωκράτης ἐστὶ λευκός' ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν 'Σωκράτης οὐκ ἔστι λευκός'. φασὶ γὰρ διπλὸν εἶναι τὸ μὴ περιπατεῖν Καλλιάν, ὅτε μὲν ὄλω τῷ περιπατεῖν Καλλιάν προστεθειμένου τοῦ ἀποφατικοῦ μορίου, ὃ καὶ ἀπόφασιν εἶναι, ὅτε δὲ μόνῳ (10) τῷ περιπατεῖν προστεθειμένου, ὃ φασιν οὐδὲν ἥττον καταφατικὸν εἶναι λόγον [Καλλίας οὐ περιπατεῖ]. πιστοῦνται δὲ τοῦτο τῷ ἅμα μὲν δύνασθαι ψευδῆ ποτε εἶναι τό τε 'Καλλίας περιπατεῖ' καὶ τὸ 'Καλλίας οὐ περιπατεῖ', μηδέποτε δὲ τὰ ἀντικείμενα ἀντιφατικῶς ἅμα γίνεσθαι ψευδῆ. μὴ γὰρ ὄντος Καλλίου οὐδὲν ἥττον φασὶ τῆς 'Καλλίας περιπατεῖ' ψευδῆ εἶναι τὴν 'Καλλίας οὐ περιπατεῖ'· ἐν ἀμφοτέραις γὰρ αὐταῖς εἶναι τὸ σημαίνον· ἔστι τις Καλλίας, τούτῳ δὲ ὑπάρχει ἢ τὸ περιπατεῖν ἢ τὸ μὴ περιπατεῖν'. τὸ μέντοι 'οὐ Καλλίας περιπατεῖ' οὐδέποτε δύναται ψευδοῦς οὔσης τῆς καταφάσεως τῆς 'Καλλίας περιπατεῖ' ψεύδος εἶναι καὶ αὐτό. ἔτι τοῦ μὴ δεῖν οὕτως τὴν ἀπόφασιν ποιεῖσθαι πίστιν καὶ τοιαύτην προφέ- (20) ρουσιν· οὗτος περιπατεῖ, οὗτος οὐ περιπατεῖ δεικνυμένου θήλεος· ἄμφω γὰρ πάλιν τὰ οὕτως λαμβανόμενα ψευδῆ γίνεσθαι φασιν, εἴτε περιπατοίη τὸ

δεικνύμενον εἴτε μή· ὁμοίως τούτοις ἔχειν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτά φασι· Καλλίας ὁ γραμματικὸς περιπατεῖ, Καλλίας ὁ γραμματικὸς οὐ περιπατεῖ· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα ἄμφω ψευδῆ μὴ ὄντος γραμματικοῦ τοῦ Καλλίου· ὦν τὸ μὲν “κατὰ (25) παρέμφασιν μοχθηράν”, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον “κατὰ παράληψιν” λέγουσιν· οὐκέτι μέντοι ἄμφω ψευδῆ γίνεσθαι, εἰ πρὸ πάσης τῆς προτάσεως τεθεῖη τὸ ἀποφατικόν· τοῦ δὲ κατὰ τούτων ἅμα γίνεσθαι ψευδῆ τὰ οὕτως ἀντιτιθέμενα αἰτίον φασι τὸ αὐτό· οὕτως γὰρ τὸν λέγοντα ‘οὗτος οὐ περιπατεῖ’ ἴσον λέγειν τῷ ‘ἔστιν ὁ δεικνύμενος οὗτος, ὃς οὐ περιπατεῖ’· τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ (30) ἐπὶ τῆς μοχθηρᾶς παραλήψεώς φασι γίνεσθαι· καὶ γὰρ ἐπ’ ἐκείνης τὸν λέγοντα ‘Καλλίας ὁ γραμματικὸς οὐ περιπατεῖ’ ἴσον λέγειν τῷ ‘ἔστι τις Καλλίας γραμματικὸς, ὃς οὐ περιπατεῖ’· ἔτι φασὶν ἀληθοῦς ὄντος τοῦ ‘Σωκράτης περιεπάτησεν’ οὐδὲν ἦττον ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ τὴν ‘Σωκράτης οὐ περιεπάτησε’· καὶ γὰρ περιεπάτησε καὶ οὐ περιεπάτησεν· ἀδύνατον δὲ (35) ὥσπερ συμψεύδεσθαι τὰ ἀντικείμενα οὕτως δὲ καὶ ἀληθῆ εἶναι· ἀλλ’ ὅτι γε τὸ λεγόμενον ὑπ’ αὐτῶν ψεῦδος ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ σημαίνει τὸ ὄνομα ἐν ταῖς (403.) προτάσεσιν, ὅταν χωρὶς τοῦ ἀποφατικοῦ λαμβάνηται, τὸ εἶναι τὸ ὀνομαζόμενον, μάλιστα δῆλον ἐκ τῶν καταφάσεων, αἱ κατὰ τῶν γινομένων ἔτι καὶ μηδέπω ὄντων κατηγοροῦνται· ἀληθὲς μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἐπὶ τῆς οἰκοδομουμένης οἰκίας εἰπεῖν ‘οἰκία οἰκοδομεῖται’ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γινομένης ἔτι χλαμύδος τὸ ‘χλαμύς ὑφαίνεται’· οὐκ ἀληθὲς δὲ οὔτε τὸ ‘ἔστι τις οἰκία, ἣτις οἰκοδομεῖται’ ἐπὶ (5) τῆς οἰκοδομουμένης ἔτι, οὔτε τὸ ‘ἔστι τις χλαμύς, ἣτις ὑφαίνεται’ ἐπὶ τῆς ὑφαινομένης ἔτι· πῶς γὰρ ἂν εἴη ἤδη τὸ γινόμενον ἔτι; μάχεται γὰρ τὸ εἶναι τι τῷ γίνεσθαι αὐτό· ὥστε οὐ σημαίνει τὸ ὄνομα τὸ ἐν ταῖς καταφάσεσι τὸ εἶναι τοῦτο· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐν ταῖς καταφάσεσιν, οὐδ’ ἂν ἐν ταῖς ἀποφάσεσι τοῦτο σημαίνει ταῖς οὐκ ἐχούσαις πρὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος τὸ ἀποφα- (10) τικόν μόριον κείμενον· ἔτι εἰ διὰ τοῦτο ψευδῆς ἐστίν, ἣν λέγομεν ἀπόφασιν, ἢ λέγουσα ‘Σωκράτης οὐ ζῆ’, ὅτι σημαίνει τὸ ‘ἔστι τις Σωκράτης, ὃς οὐ ζῆ’, διὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ψευδῆς ἔσται καὶ ἢ λέγουσα ‘Σωκράτης ἀπέθανεν’· ἔσται γὰρ κἀκείνη σημαίνουσα τὸ ‘ἔστι Σωκράτης, ὃς ἀπέθανε’· τὸ δὲ λέγειν, ὅτι τὸ ‘Σωκράτης ἀπέθανε’ διπτόν ἐστίν, ἐν μὲν, ὃ σύγκειται ἐξ ὀνό- (15) ματος μὲν τοῦ ‘Σωκράτης’ ῥήματος δὲ τοῦ ‘ἀπέθανεν’, ὃ καὶ ψεῦδος ἐστίν, ἄλλο δέ, ὃ ἐγκέκλιται ὅλον ἀπὸ τοῦ ‘Σωκράτης ἀποθνήσκει’, ὃ καὶ ἀληθὲς ἐστίν, οὐχ ὑγιῶς λέγουσι· τὰ γὰρ κατὰ τοὺς χρόνους ἐγκλινόμενα τὰ ῥηματά ἐστιν, ὃ δὲ μὴ χρόνου ἐστὶ σημαντικόν, οὐδ’ ἐγκλίνεται κατὰ χρόνον· τοιαῦτα δὲ τὰ ὀνόματα· ὥστε οὐδ’ εἴ τι σύγκειται ἐξ ὀνόματος· καὶ ῥήμα- (20) τος, τοῦθ’ ὅλον ἐγκλινόμενον ἂν κατὰ χρόνον εἴη κυρίως διὰ τὸ θάτερον τῶν ἐν τῇ συνθέσει ἀνέγκλιτον εἶναι· ἔτι τὸ ‘Σωκράτης ἀπέθανεν’, εἰ ὅλον ἦν ἐγκλινόμενον, οὐκ ἂν ἦν ἀποφαντικόν· τὸ γοῦν Σωκράτη τεθνάναι οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀποφαντικὸς λόγος, ὅτι ὅλου ἢ ἐγκλισις δοκεῖ γεγονέναι· τὸ δὲ ‘Σωκράτης ἀπέθανεν’ ἀποφαντικὸς λόγος, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἕτερον μένει, τὸ ὄνομα, (25) ἐγκέκλιται δὲ μόνον θάτερον, τὸ ῥήμα· οὐ ταῦτόν μὲν οὖν σημαίνει τὸ ‘Σωκράτης’ ἐν τε τῷ ‘ἀποθνήσκει’ καὶ ἐν τῷ ‘ἀπέθανεν’· ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ‘Σωκράτης ἀποθνήσκει’ τοῦ ὄντος Σωκράτους ἐστὶ δηλωτικόν, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ‘Σωκράτης ἀπέθανεν’ κατ’ ἀναφορὰν λέγεται· σημαίνει γὰρ τότε τὸ ‘Σωκράτης’ τοῦτον, ὃς ἦν Σωκράτης, οὐχ ὃς ἔστιν· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀληθῆς ἢ πρότασις (30) ἢ ‘Σωκράτης ἀπέθανεν’· ὃν γὰρ ἐσήμαινε τὸ ‘Σωκράτης’ ὄνομα, οὗτος ἀπέθανεν· τοιοῦτον δὲ ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ ‘τεχθήσεται μοι υἱός’ (οὐ γὰρ ὃς ἔστιν υἱός, ἀλλ’ ὃς ἔσται) καὶ τὸ ‘ἔσται μοι οἰκία’· οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο λέγομεν, ὅτι

ἔστιν οἰκία, ἥτις ἔσται· ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἀπό τινος ἐγκέκλιται. οὕτως μὲν λαμβανομένου τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ἀληθεύεται ἐκάστη τῶν προειρημένων προτάσεων. οὐ μὴν ὁ λέγων τὴν πρότασιν ἐν τῷ τὸ ὄνομα λέγειν προσδιορίζει τοῦτο, ὅτι ἄλλως ἔχοντος τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ὅρου ἐν τῇ προτάσει ἀληθῆς ἢ (404.) πρότασις γίνεται, ἢ οὕτως ἔχειν λαμβάνεται. εἰ μὲν οὖν τινι τῶν ὑποκειμένων μὴ ὑπάρχοι τὸ κατηγορούμενον, οὕτως· εἰ δὲ δῆλον ὅτι μὴ ἔστιν, ἐκείνως. τὸ γὰρ ὄνομα αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ λεγόμενον [ὑπ' αὐτοῦ] οὔτε τὸ εἶναι σημαίνει οὔτε τὸ μὴ εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ σημαίνον ἐπ' αὐτοῦ οὔτε τὸ μὴ εἶναι προσσημαίνει οὔτε τοῦ ὄντος μᾶλλον ἢ γεγονότος ἢ ἐσομένου δηλωτικόν (5) ἔστι καθ' αὐτό, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο μόνον σημεῖόν ἐστι πράγματος, ὃ εἰ ἢ ἔστιν ἢ ἦν ἢ ἔσται τὸ συντασσόμενον αὐτῷ δηλοῖ. οὕτως τοίνυν καὶ τὸ 'ἔζησε Σωκράτης ἢ ἀπέθανεν ἢ ἐφιλοσόφησε' πάντα πρὸς ἀναφορὰν λέγεται τῷ τὰ προστιθέμενα τῷ ὀνόματι δηλοῦν, ὅτι τὸ σημαίνον ἐπὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος πρότερον ἦν. διὸ ἐπεὶ ἕκαστον τούτων ἀληθές, ψεῦδος τὸ ἀντικείμενον τὸ 'οὐκ ἀπέθανεν' ἢ 'οὐκ ἔζησεν' ἢ 'οὐκ ἐφιλοσόφησεν'. ἔτι δὲ ἀληθές μὲν ἔστι τὸ 'ἔστι τὸ ὄν', ἀδιανόητον δὲ τὸ 'ὄν κατὰ τοῦτο ἔστιν'. εἰ δὲ μὴ τούτῳ ἴσον ἔσται τὸ 'ἔστι τὸ ὄν', οὐδὲ 'τὸ μὴ ὄν οὐκ ἔστιν' ἴσον ἔσται τῷ 'ἔστι τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὃ μὴ ἔστιν'. οὐδ' ὅλως γὰρ ἢ κατάφασις τοῦτο λέγει, ὅτι ἔστι τόδε, ᾧ τόδε ὑπάρχει, οὐδὲ ἐφ' ᾧ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι γίνεται ἢ κατηγορία, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ 'τὸ ὄν ἔστιν' καὶ 'οὗτος ζῆ' καὶ 'οὗτος ἔστι' καὶ 'θεοὶ εἰσιν'· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀληθῆ μὲν οὕτω λεγόμενα, μεταλαμβάνόμενα δὲ ἄτοπα καὶ ἀδιανόητα. ἔτι ἀληθές μὲν τὸ εἰπεῖν 'τὸ ἔστι ἔστι', παντελῶς δὲ ἀδύνατον τὸ εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἔστι τι ἔστιν, ᾧ ὑπάρχει τὸ 'ἔστι'. καὶ ἀληθές μὲν τὸ ἀδύνατον ἀδύνατον εἶναι, ψεῦδος δὲ τὸ (20) 'ἔστι τι ἀδύνατον, ᾧ ὑπάρχει τὸ ἀδύνατον αὐτὸ εἶναι'. καὶ ἀναγκαῖον μὲν πάντα τὰ τρέχοντα κινεῖσθαι, οὐκέτι δὲ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ εἶναί τινα τρέχοντα, ὅς κινεῖται ἐξ ἀνάγκης. καὶ ἀναγκαῖον μὲν πάντα τὸν τρωθέντα καρδίαν ἀποθανεῖν, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον δὲ τὸ εἶναί τινα τὴν καρδίαν τετρωμένον. καὶ γὰρ εἰ τὰ ὀνόματα ἐν ταῖς προτάσεσι τοῦτο σημαίνει, καὶ καθ' αὐτὰ (25) λεγόμενα τὸ αὐτὸ ἂν σημαῖνοι. οὕτως δὲ καὶ πᾶς ὁ ὄνομα λέγων πρότασιν ἂν λέγοι καταφατικῆν. ἔτι <εἰ> ὁ λέγων 'Σωκράτης περιπατεῖ' ἴσον λέγει τῷ 'ἔστι τις Σωκράτης, κάκεινος περιπατεῖ', καὶ ὁ λέγων 'Σωκράτης οὐκ ἔστι' λέγοι ἂν ἴσον τῷ 'ἔστι τις Σωκράτης, κάκεινος οὐκ ἔστιν', ὅπερ ἀδιανόητον. καὶ τὸ μὲν 'Σωκράτης οὐκ ἔστιν' ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ εἶναί τινα Σωκράτη, ὅς (30) οὐκ ἔστι, ψεῦδος. καὶ τὸ 'οὗτος δὲ περιπατεῖ' καὶ 'οὗτος οὐ περιπατεῖ' ἄμφω δοκεῖ ψευδῆ εἶναι θήλεος ὄντος τοῦ δεικνυμένου διὰ τὸ ἀνοίκειόν τε τῆς παρεμφάσεως καὶ τὸ δοκεῖν τὸν λέγοντα 'οὗτος οὐ περιπατεῖ' ἴσον λέγειν τῷ 'ὁ ἀνὴρ οὗτος διὰ τοῦ 'οὗτος' ἔστιν ὁ δεικνύμενος, ὅς οὐ περιπατεῖ'. ταῦτα δ' οὐκ ἂν ἔλεγον, εἰ συνίεσαν οἱ λέγοντες, τί σημαίνει ἢ ἀπόφασις; (35) σημαίνει γὰρ τὸ ᾧ λέγεται τοῦτο ὑπάρχειν, μὴ ὑπάρχειν. λοιπὸν εἴτε ἔστι (405.) τοῦτο, εἴτε καὶ μὴ, ἀμφοτέρως τυγχάνει. εἴτε γὰρ ἔστιν, ᾧ λέγεται τόδε τι ὑπάρχειν, ἢ ἀπόφασις φησι μὴ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ, εἴτε μὴ ἔστι, καὶ οὕτω λέγει μὴ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ ἢ ἀπόφασις, οὐ προσσημαίνουσα ἢ τὸ εἶναι ἢ τὸ μὴ εἶναι τοῦ ὑποκειμένου. οὐδὲ οὕτω μὲν λεγομένη ἀληθῆς, ἐκείνως δὲ οὐ, ἀλλ' ἀμφοτέρως ἀληθῆς, εἰ ἢ κατάφασις ψευδῆς. ὥστε καὶ εἰ περιπατεῖ, (5) ἀλλὰ τῷ 'οὗτος' οὐκ ὑπάρχει, ᾧ φησιν ὑπάρχειν τὸ περιπατεῖν, εἴ γε μὴ τὸ δεικνύμενον οὗτός ἐστι. τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ 'οὗτος ὁ γραμματικὸς περιπατεῖ' μὴ ὄντος αὐτοῦ γραμματικοῦ· καὶ γὰρ εἰ περιπατεῖ, αὐτὸ μὲν ψεῦδος

τὸ τῆς καταφάσεως, ἀληθὲς δὲ τὸ ‘οὗτος ὁ γραμματικὸς οὐ περιπατεῖ’· ὧ γάρ φησιν ὑπάρχειν τὸ περιπατεῖν, ἐκείνῳ οὐχ ὑπάρχει. τὸ δὲ ‘Σωκράτης (10) περιεπάτησε’ καὶ ‘Σωκράτης οὐ περιεπάτησεν’ ἄμφω ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ οὐκ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ, ὥστ’ οὐκ ἀντικείμενα· οὐ γὰρ τοιοῦτον ἡ ἀντίφασις. καὶ οὐδὲν γε μᾶλλον ἅμα ἀληθὲς τὸ ‘Σωκράτης περιεπάτησε’ καὶ τὸ ‘Σωκράτης οὐ περιεπάτησε’· καθ’ ὧν γὰρ τὸ ἀόριστον ὄνομα, τούτων τις περιεπάτησεν. οὐχ ὑγιεῖς δὴ αἱ ἐνστάσεις αἱ πρὸς τὸ δεῖν τὸ ἀποφατικὸν ἐν ταῖς (15) τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστα ἀποφάσεσι τῷ κατηγορουμένῳ συντάσσεσθαι γινόμεναι.

## 7. Herminus

[T1] **Lucian, *Life of Demonax* 56,1-6.** <The Cynic philosopher Demonax (c. 70-170 AD) abused the Aristotelian philosopher Herminus as a villainous character (a characterisation that Lucian appears to endorse: εἰδὼς...παγκάκιστον...ὄντα), and therefore deserving of ten *katêgoriai* in the homonymous legal sense. The joke turns on the recognition that Herminus 'was always full of Aristotle's ten *katêgoriai*'. Is it reading too much into the passage to suppose that the equivocation of *katêgoria* is itself part of the self-reference to *Cat.*?>

Καὶ μὴν τὸ πρὸς Ἑρμίνον τὸν Ἀριστοτελικὸν ἄξιον ἀπομνημονεῦσαι· εἰδὼς γὰρ αὐτὸν παγκάκιστον μὲν ὄντα καὶ μυρία κακὰ ἐργαζόμενον, τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη δ' ἐπαινοῦντα καὶ διὰ στόματος αὐτοῦ τὰς δέκα κατηγορίας ἔχοντα, Ἑρμίνε, (5) ἔφη, ἀληθῶς ἄξιος εἰ δέκα κατηγοριῶν.

[T2a] **Alexander, *Against Galen on Motion* 67a25-30 [Arabic, Carullah MS], tr. Rescher and Marmura.**

In the seventh Book, however, he [Aristotle] showed this at its beginning by a different argument, more suited to the way of dialectic. But a certain man (*rajulun min al-nās*) blamed Aristotle concerning this proof, [maintaining] that it is most ignorant and remote from what is correct to a degree unimaginable, and wrote a book about it (*wa wada'a fi dhālika kitāban*). Thus we see no harm if we ourselves should clarify this matter and summarise it. For it is characteristic of the person who wrote the Peripatetic Herminus the skeptical things about [Aristotle's proof], asking him to inform him how the things Aristotle used in the exposition of it could be anything but excessively bad and repugnant, to have made such a demand (*bi an yakūna qad istad'ā*).

[T2b] **Alexander, *Against Galen on Motion* 66b20-23 [Arabic, Escorial MS], tr. Rescher and Marmura.**

It may be that he [Galen] does not remember what this philosopher [Aristotle] said and declared to us repeatedly, despite the claim he makes for himself as having excellent memory and powers of retention. Had he indeed attained [these powers] to begin with, he would not have originally found it necessary to write the things he wrote to Herminus.

[T2c] **Alexander, *in. An. Pr. I* 72,26 ff.** <On the second figure of the syllogism. See references in discussion above.>

τὸ μὲν οὖν λέγειν, ὡς Ἑρμίνος οἶεται, ἐν δευτέρῳ σχήματι τὸν μείζονα ἄκρον εἶναι, ἐὰν μὲν ἀμφοτέρω ὁμογενεῖς ὦσιν, ὧν ὁ μέσος κατηγορεῖται, τὸν ἐγγύτερον τοῦ κοινοῦ γένους αὐτῶν (ἂν γὰρ ὦσιν οἱ ἄκροι ὄρνεον καὶ [73] ἄνθρωπος, ἐγγυτέρω τοῦ κοινοῦ γένους αὐτῶν, τοῦ ζώου, τὸ ὄρνεον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ διαιρέσει, διὸ καὶ μείζων ἄκρος τὸ ὄρνεον, καὶ καθόλου ἐν τοῖς ὁμογένεσιν ὁ οὕτως ἔχων πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν γένος μείζων), εἰ δ' εἶεν ἴσον ἀφεστῶτες ἀμφοτέρω τοῦ κοινοῦ γένους ὡς ἵππος καὶ ἄνθρωπος, δεῖν

ἐπισκοπεῖν τὸν μέσον τὸν κατηγορούμενον αὐτῶν, τίνος μὲν δι' (5) αὐτὸν κατηγορεῖται, τίνος δὲ δι' ἄλλον, κὰν ἢ τοῦ μὲν δι' αὐτὸν τοῦ δὲ δι' ἄλλον κατηγορούμενος, συγκρίνειν τόν, δι' ὃν κατηγορεῖται τοῦ ἑτέρου, τῷ, δι' ὃν καθ' ἑαυτὸν κατηγορεῖται, κὰν ἢ ἐκεῖνος, δι' ὃν τοῦ ἑτέρου κατηγορεῖτο, ἐγγυτέρω τοῦ κοινοῦ γένους αὐτῶν, καὶ τοῦτον, οὗ κατηγορεῖται ὁ μέσος διὰ τὸν ἐγγυτέρω τοῦ κοινοῦ γένους, μείζονα λέγειν (οἶον εἰ εἶεν (10) οἱ μὲν ἄκροι ἵππος καὶ ἄνθρωπος, κατηγοροῖτο δὲ αὐτῶν τὸ λογικὸν καὶ τοῦ μὲν ἵππου ἀποφατικῶς τοῦ δὲ ἀνθρώπου καταφατικῶς, ἐπεὶ τὸ λογικὸν οὐ καθ' αὐτὸ ἀποφάσκειται τοῦ ἵππου ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ἄλογον αὐτὸν εἶναι, τὸ οὐ καθ' αὐτὸ ἀποφάσκειται τοῦ ἵππου ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ἄλογον αὐτὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ λογικὸν δι' αὐτὸ καταφάσκειται τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἐγγυτέρω τοῦ κοινοῦ γένους αὐτῶν ἐστι, τοῦ ζώου, ὁ ἵππος ἤπερ ὁ ἄνθρωπος· [Note: the transmitted text provides an internal contradiction. Barnes, Bobzien, Flannery, and Ierodiakonou (1991) add *ekeino de* before *enguterō* in 14 and delete *ho hippos ēper anthrōpos* in 15 to provide a suitable sense] ἔσται δὴ καὶ ὁ (15) ἵππος μείζων τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἄκρος καίτοι ἴσον ἀφεςτώτος τοῦ γένους τοῦ οἰκείου αὐτοῖς, ὅτι μείζων, δι' ὃν αὐτοῦ τὸ κατηγορούμενον κατηγορεῖτο· ὡς γὰρ ἀλόγου αὐτοῦ οὐχ ὡς ἵππου τὸ λογικὸν ἀποφάσκειται, τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καταφασκομένου τοῦ λογικοῦ καθ' αὐτό), εἰ δὲ μὴ εἶεν ὁμογενεῖς οἱ ἄκροι ἀλλὰ διαφερόντων γενῶν, μείζονα αὐτῶν θετέον τὸν ἐν τῷ οἰκείῳ γένει (20) ἐγγυτέρω ὄντα αὐτῶν (οἶον ἂν κατηγορηταί τι χρώματος καὶ ἀνθρώπου, μείζων ἄκρος τὸ χρῶμα· ἐγγυτέρω γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς ποιότητος ἢ ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῆς οὐσίας· ἄτομον γὰρ εἶδος ἀνθρώπου, τὸ δὲ χρῶμα οὐ), ἂν δὲ ἴσον πάλιν ἀπέχων ἀμφοτέρω τῶν οἰκείων γενῶν, ἐπὶ τὸν κατηγορούμενον ἐπανιέναι καὶ ζητεῖν, τίνος μὲν αὐτῶν δι' αὐτόν, τίνος δὲ δι' ἄλλον κατηγορεῖται, (25) κὰν ἢ, δι' ὃν κατηγορεῖται τοῦ ἑτέρου, ἐγγυτέρω τοῦ οἰκείου γένους, καὶ τοῦτον, οὗ δι' ἐκεῖνον κατηγορεῖτο, μείζονα ἡγητέον ἄκρον (οἶον εἰ εἶεν ὄροι λευκὸν καὶ ἄνθρωπος, τὸ μὲν ἐν ποιῷ ἄτομον εἶδος τὸ δὲ ἐν οὐσίᾳ, κατηγοροῖτο δὲ τὸ λογικὸν καταφατικῶς μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀποφατικῶς δὲ τοῦ λευκοῦ, ἐπεὶ τοῦ μὲν ἀνθρώπου, καθ' ὃ ἄνθρωπος, (30) [74] καταφάσκειται, τοῦ δὲ λευκοῦ οὐ καθ' ὃ λευκὸν ἀποφάσκειται, ἀλλὰ καθ' ὃ ἄψυχόν ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ τὸ ἄψυχον, δι' ὃ τοῦ λευκοῦ τὸ λογικὸν ἀποφάσκειται, κοινότερον καὶ καθολικώτερον καὶ ἐγγυτέρω τῆς οὐσίας τῆς ἀψύχου ἢ ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῆς ἐμψύχου, καὶ τὸ λευκὸν διὰ τοῦτο μείζων ὄρος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου), τὸ δὴ ταῦτα λέγειν καὶ ζητεῖν καὶ φύσει δεικνύει ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ σχήματι (5) τὸν μείζονα ἄκρον πρὸς τῷ περιεργίαν ἔχειν οὐδὲ ἀληθές ἐστι. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἂν μὴ αὐτοὺς ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν τοὺς ληφθέντας ὄρους ἐξετάζωμεν, ἀλλὰ καθ' οὓς ὁ κατηγορούμενος ὄρος οὐχ ὑπάρχει, αἰεὶ ἐν τῇ ἀποφατικῇ προτάσει ὁ μείζων ὄρος ἔσται. ἴσος γὰρ ἢ μείζων οὗτος ἔσται τοῦ μέσου ἢ οὕτως ἀπ' ἀρχῆς εἰλημμένος ἢ, δι' ὃν ἀποφάσκειται, γινόμενος τοιοῦτος (10) οὕτως ἔχειν πρὸς τὸν μέσον μείζονα ἀποφασκόμενον. ὁ γὰρ μέσος οὐχ ὑπάρξει, ᾧ κείναι μὴ ὑπάρχειν, διότι τὸ ἀντικείμενον αὐτῷ καὶ ἀντιδιηρημένον ὑπάρχει τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ· τὸ δὲ ἀντικείμενον τῷ μέσῳ καὶ ἀντιδιηρημένον ἴσον ἐστὶν αὐτῷ. ἢ γὰρ διὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἢ διὰ τι ἄλλο ἐπιπλέον ὃν τοῦ μέσου, ὡς ὅταν τὸ λογικὸν διὰ τὸ ἄψυχον ἀποφάσκηται τίνος· (15) ἴσον γὰρ γίνεται τότε, ὅταν διὰ τὸ ἄλογον· τὸ γὰρ λογικὸν ἴσον τῷ ἀλόγῳ, δι' ὃ τοῦ ἵππου ἀποφατικῶς τὸ λογικὸν κατηγορεῖτο. ἢ οὖν τούτῳ μὲν ἴσος ὁ μέσος, οὗ ἀποφάσκειται, ἢ ἐλάττων αὐτοῦ γίνεται, ὅταν

διὰ τὸ ἄψυχον τὸ λογικὸν ἀποφάσκηται τινος· τὸ γὰρ ἄψυχον τῷ ἐμψύχῳ ἴσον, ὕφ' ὃ τὸ λογικὸν μείζον ὄν τοῦ ἐτέρου, οὐ καταφάσκεται· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ κατηγορούμενος (20) καταφατικῶς μείζων τοῦ ὑποκειμένου αὐτῷ, οὐ ἀποφάσκεται ὁ μέσος ἢ οὐ καταφάσκεται ὁ μέσος, εἴ γε ἡ αἰτία, δι' ἣν ἀποφάσκεται, ἴσος ἢ μείζων αὐτοῦ τοῦ μέσου, ὅς μείζων ἐστὶ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου αὐτῷ ἐν τῇ καταφατικῇ προτάσει. ὥστε καὶ ἡ ἀποφατικὴ πρότασις ἀεὶ μείζων ἐστὶ τῆς καταφατικῆς. ἀλλὰ μὴν λέγει Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ πρὸς τῷ ἐλάσσονι τὸ (25) ἀποφατικὸν τίθεσθαι· ὁ γοῦν δεῦτερος συλλογισμὸς ἐν τούτῳ τῷ σχήματι τὴν ἐλάττονα ἔχει ἀποφατικὴν. ἔτι διὰ τί ἐπὶ μόνων τῶν ἀποφατικῶν ἢ μετὰληψις καὶ ἡ ζήτησις ἐστὶ τοῦ, δι' ὃν κατηγορεῖται ἀποφατικῶς; καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῆς καταφάσεως τὸ αὐτὸ ζητηθήσεται. τὸ γὰρ λογικὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, εἰ καὶ καθ' αὐτό, ἀλλ' οὐ πρώτου, οὐδὲ ἢ ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλὰ ἢ λογικός· ὥστε (30) εἰ τοῦ μὲν ἵππου διὰ τὸ ἄλογον τοῦ δὲ ἀνθρώπου διὰ τὸ λογικόν, ἴσον δὲ [75] τὸ ἄλογον τῷ λογικῷ (ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς γὰρ διαίρεσεως), οὐδέπω ὁ μείζων εὔρηται καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐκκειμένην μέθοδον. διὸ οὕτως μὲν οὐ χρὴ τὴν κρίσιν ποιείσθαι τῆς προτάσεως τῆς ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ σχήματι μείζονος. καθόλου γὰρ τῷ δύνασθαι καὶ τὸ καταφατικὸν εἶναι πρὸς τῷ μείζονι ὄρω καὶ τὸ ἀποφατικὸν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ σχήματι, ὁποῖος ἂν ὄρος εὔρεθῆ κατὰ τὴν (5) προειρημένην μέθοδον μείζων, οὗτος καὶ ὡς μείζων καὶ ὡς ἐλάττων λαμβανόμενος ποιήσει τὴν συζυγίαν συλλογιστικὴν· ὁ πάσχων οὐκέτ' ἂν εἴη μείζων ἐν τούτῳ τῷ σχήματι· οὐ γὰρ ἀπλῶς μείζονος ὄρου ἢ ζήτησις ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐν τούτῳ μείζονος.

[T2d] Alexander, *in An. Pr. I 89,29-91,33*. <On non-syllogistic combinations. See G. Patzig, *Aristotle's Theory of the Syllogism*, Dordrecht, 1968, 177; Moraux II, 385-94.>

Ἀριστοτέλης μὲν οὖν οὕτως διέβαλε τὰς προειρημένας συζυγίας, ὅτι ἀσυλλόγιστοι, τῷ εὐπορήσαι ὕλης καὶ τοῦ παντὶ καὶ τοῦ μηδενί· ἱκανὴν (30) γὰρ ταύτην ἡγεῖται διαβολὴν ἀσυλλογίστου συζυγίας. τὸ δὲ ἡγεῖσθαι δύνασθαι διαβάλλεσθαι τὰς προειρημένας συζυγίας, κὰν δείξῃ τις, ὅτι μηδενὶ καὶ τινὶ τὸ Ν τῷ Ξ, διότι ἀντιφάσεις ταῦτα, ὡς ἄλλοι τέ τινες τῶν ἀρχαίων καὶ Ἐρμίνος δὲ λέγει, (“ἐφ' ἧς γὰρ συζυγίας, φησί, τὴν ἀντίφασιν ἔνεστι συναγομένην [90] δείξαι, εὐλογον ταύτην μηδὲν ἐλάττον ἀσυλλόγιστον λέγειν τῆς, ἐν ἣ τὰ ἐναντία συνάγεται· ἀσυνύπαρκτα γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα ὁμοίως ἐκείνοις”) καὶ παρατίθεσθαι ὄρους τοῦ τινὶ ἄψυχον, ἔμψυχον, σῶμα σάρκινον (τὸ γὰρ ἄψυχον ἐμψύχῳ οὐδενί, σῶματι δὲ σαρκίνῳ ἢ καὶ ἀπλῶς σῶματι τινὶ οὐχ ὑπάρχει, τὸ ἔμψυχον τινὶ σαρκίνῳ σῶματι καὶ ἀπλῶς τινὶ σῶματι ὑπάρχει), (5) τοῦτο δὲ οὐδαμῶς ὑγιὲς οὐδὲ αὐταρκές εἰς συζυγίας διαβολὴν. υγχωρηθήσεται μὲν γὰρ τούτων μηδέτερον συνάγεσθαι συλλογιστικῶς, διότι ἐστὶν ἀλλήλων ἀναιρετικά, ἐρεῖ μέντοι τις, ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς κειμένοις, δύνασθαι συνάγεσθαι ἐπὶ μέρος ἀποφατικόν· τὸ γὰρ ἐπὶ μέρος ἀποφατικὸν ὑπ' οὐδετέρου τῶν προειρημένων ἀναιρεῖται. τὰ γὰρ εἰς ἔλεγχον ἀσυλλογίστου (10) συζυγίας παρατιθέμενα οὐ μόνον αὐτὰ δεῖ μὴ δύνασθαι συνυπάρχειν ἀλλήλοις ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντων εἶναι ἀναιρετικά τῶν συλλογιστικῶς δείκνυσθαι δυναμένων.

[...]

Ἡ δεῖξις οὖν, ἣ χρῆται Ἑρμίνος, οὐχ ἰκανὴ διαβάλλειν συζυγίαν καὶ ἀσυλλόγιστον ἀποφῆναι. διὸ εὐλόγως Ἀριστοτέλης ἐλέγχει τὰς ἀσυλλογίστους μόνῃ τῇ τοῦ παντὶ καὶ μηδενὶ παραθέσει· ἐν γὰρ τούτοις οὐδὲν οἶόν τε δείκνυσθαι συλλογιστικῶς τῷ παντὸς τοῦ λαμβανομένου συνάγεσθαι συλλογιστικῶς εὐρίσκεισθαι τὸ ἀναιρετικὸν καὶ ἀντικείμενον ἐφ' ὕλης τινὸς γινόμενον (25) ἀληθές. καθόλου δέ, ἐν αἷς συζυγίαις συλλογιστικαῖς τοῦ ἐπὶ μέρους ἐστὶ συμπέρασμα, τῷ τὸ ἐπὶ μέρους ἀορίστως ἀληθές εἶναι (καὶ γὰρ μετὰ τῆς καθόλου, ὑφ' ἣν ἐστὶν, ἀληθῆς ἢ ἐπὶ μέρους καὶ μετὰ τῆς ἐαυτῆ ὑπεναντίας) καθ' ἑκατέρους τοὺς τρόπους ἀληθῆ λαμβάνοντες αὐτὴν ποτὲ μὲν εὐπορήσομεν ὄρων δεικνύντων τὸ καθόλου, ὑφ' ὃ ἐστὶν ἢ λαμβανομένη (30) ἐπὶ μέρους, ποτὲ δὲ τοῦ ὑπεναντίου τῷ εἰλημμένῳ καὶ συνηγμένῳ ἐπὶ μέρους, ὃ οὐδαμῶς ἀναιρετικὸν ἐστὶ τοῦ ὑπεναντίου αὐτῷ ἐπὶ μέρους.

[T2e] Alexander, *in. An. Pr. I 125,3-6* <Unnamed; cf. Moraux II 391-94>.

Τὸ μὲν οὖν λέγειν μηδὲ Ἀριστοτέλην ἐνταῦθα εἰρηκέναι ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις μίξεσιν ἀναγκαῖον γίνεσθαι τὸ συμπέρασμα, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὕλης τινός, καὶ τοῦτο πιστοῦσθαι ἐκ τοῦ οὕτως εἰρηκέναι αὐτὸν συμβαίνει δὲ ποτε καὶ (5) τῆς ἐτέρας προτάσεως ἀναγκαῖας οὔσης·

[T2f] Alexander, *in. An. Pr. I 140,14-141,6* <Unnamed; cf. Moraux II 342-3. Moraux argues that Alexanders' remarks concern Sosigenes, against Bochenski 80 n. 259, who suggests Herminus. In this passage, Alexander seems to talk about hypothetical necessity much as [Ammonius] does when speaking of Sosigenes at in A.Pr. 39,24 and following.>

[T2g] Alexander, *in Top. 569,3-8*. <Referencing *Topics* 161b19-34, where Aristotle describes five lines of criticism (ἐπιτιμήσεις) against an argument; the first line of criticism occurs when no conclusion is reached because most or all premises are false or unacceptable, and the addition or subtraction of no premises can make the conclusion possible. Herminus thinks the criticism where the addition or subtraction of no premises can help is one epitimesis, but the criticism where the premises are false or not generally accepted is another epitimesis. So he makes the second and the fourth the same. (?) The result is an analysis of levels of deficiency: I. No deduction at all (fails 1); II: a deduction, wrong conclusion (fails 2 but not 1); IIIa. A deduction of the right conclusion, but a premiss left out (fails 3 but not 1 or 2); IIIb. A deduction of the right conclusion with a superfluous premiss (fails 4 but not 1 or 2); IV. A good deduction with premises less acceptable than the conclusion (fails 5 but not 1,2,3,4; V. A good deduction with premises not less acceptable than the conclusion, but harder to establish than it (fails only 6). This reconstruction *treats superfluous and missing premises as subdivisions of the same vice*; it is due to Herminus here. See R. Smith, *Aristotle: Topics I and VIII*, Oxford: Clarendon 1997, 141-42.>

Ἑρμίνος μέντοι τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς προσθέσεως καὶ τῆς ἀφαιρέσεως ἐπιτίμησιν μίαν φησὶν εἶναι, τὴν δ' ἀπὸ τοῦ δι' ἀδοξοτέρων ἢ δι' ἀληθῶν πλείονος

δεομένων λόγου εἰς δύο ἐπιτιμήσεις διαιρεῖ. τοῦτο δὲ ποιῶν ποιεῖ καὶ τὴν (5) δευτέραν ἐπιτίμησιν τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ τετάρτῃ. ἢ δις παραλαμβάνομενον τὸ ἐξ ἀδοξοτέρων· καὶ γὰρ ἢ δευτέρα τοῦτο εἶχεν, εἰ καὶ μὴ τὸ προκείμενον συλλογίζεται ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι.

[T2h] Alexander, in *Top.* 574,26-575,11. <How an argument is called false, and reduction to absurdity.>

ἢ οὖν τοῦτο λέγει, ὡς Ἑρμίνῳ δοκεῖ, ἢ μᾶλλον, ὡς ἅπασι, λέγει συμβαίνειν μάλιστα τοῖς εἰς ἀδύνατον ἀπάγουσι τὸ μηδὲν πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον συλλογίζεσθαι πολλάκις, ὅταν ἀλλοτρίας τις τῆς ὑποθέσεως (575.) προτάσεις λάβῃ καὶ συμπερανάμενός τι ἀδύνατον ἀξιῶσῃ, ἐπεὶ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον, τὸ ἀντικείμενον τῆς ὑποθέσεως λαμβάνειν· τῷ γὰρ μὴ παρὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν γεγονέναι τὸ ἀδύνατον (καὶ γὰρ χωρὶς ταύτης ἐκ τῶν καταλειπομένων τὸ αὐτὸ ἀδύνατον συνάγεται) οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον· τοῦτο δ' ἦν τὸ ἀντικείμενον τῆς ὑποθέσεως κατασκευάσαι. εἶπε δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς (5) Ἀναλυτικοῖς ὅτι “τὸ μὴ παρὰ τοῦτο” ἐν τοῖς <εἰς> ἀδύνατον λέγουσι λόγοις. τρίτος τοῦ ψευδοῦς λόγου τρόπος, ὅταν τὸ λαμβανόμενον μὲν συνάγῃ τὸ προκείμενον, μὴ ἦ δὲ οἰκεία τὰ λαμβανόμενα τῷ δεικνυμένῳ, οἷον εἰ γεωμετρικόν τι δεικνύει μὴ διὰ γεωμετρικῶν ἢ ἰατρικῶν μὴ διὰ ἰατρικῶν, καὶ τοῦτο ὁμοίως, ἂν τε ἀληθὲς ἂν τε ψεῦδος ἦ τὸ συναγόμενον· ἢ γὰρ (10) αἰτία τοῦ λόγου τὸ μὴ διὰ οἰκείων γίνεσθαι τῷ προκειμένῳ.

[T3a] Longinus ap. Porphyrium, *Life of Plotinus* 20.47-57. <‘Herminus’ was a Stoic who did not publish his work.>

Τῶν δὲ Στωικῶν Ἑρμίνος καὶ Λυσίμαχος οἳ τε ἐν ἄστει καταβιώσαντες Ἀθηναῖος καὶ Μουσώνιος, καὶ Περιπατητικῶν Ἀμμώνιος καὶ Πτολεμαῖος φιλολογώτατοι μὲν τῶν καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ἄμφω γενόμενοι καὶ μάλιστα ὁ Ἄμ- (50) μώνιος· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὅστις ἐκείνῳ γέγονεν εἰς πολυμαθίαν παραπλήσιος· οὐ μὴν καὶ γράψαντές γε τεχνικὸν οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ ποιήματα καὶ λόγους ἐπιδεικτικούς, ἅπερ οὖν καὶ σωθῆναι τῶν ἀνδρῶν τούτων οὐχ ἐκόντων οἶμαι· μὴ γὰρ ἂν αὐτοὺς δέξασθαι διὰ τοιούτων βιβλίων ὕστερον γενέ- (55) σθαι γνωρίμους, ἀφέντας σπουδαιότεροις συγγράμμασι τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀποθησαυρίσαι διάνοιαν.

[T3b] Porphyry, in *Cat.* 57,20-58,21. <The imposition of names. Discussed in detail in the chapter on Herminus.>

{E.} Δεῖξον οὖν τὴν οἰκείαν πρόθεσιν τῆς τοῦ βιβλίου πραγματείας.  
 {A.} Φημί τοίνυν ὅτι τῶν πραγμάτων ἐκκειμένων δηλωτικὸς γενόμενος (20) καὶ σημαντικὸς αὐτὸς ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἦλθεν ἐπὶ τὸ καὶ διὰ τῆς φωνῆς κατονομάζειν καὶ δηλοῦν ἕκαστον. καὶ γέγονεν αὐτῷ ἢ πρώτη χρῆσις τῶν λέξεων εἰς τὸ παραστήσαι ἕκαστον τῶν πραγμάτων διὰ φωνῶν τινῶν καὶ λέξεων, καθ' ἣν δὴ σχέσιν τῶν φωνῶν τὴν πρὸς τὰ πράγματα τότε μὲν τι πρᾶγμα βάθρον κέκληκεν, τότε δὲ ἄνθρωπον, τότε δὲ κύνα, ἥλιον δὲ τότε, καὶ (25)

πάλιν τόδε μὲν τὸ χρώμα λευκόν, τόδε δὲ μέλαν, καὶ τόδε μὲν ἀριθμὸν, τόδε δὲ μέγεθος, καὶ τόδε μὲν δίπηχυ, τόδε δὲ τρίπηχυ, καὶ οὕτως ἐκάστω πράγματι λέξεις καὶ ὀνόματα τέθεικεν σημαντικὰ αὐτῶν καὶ μηνυτικὰ διὰ τῶν τοιούτων τῆς φωνῆς ψόφων. τεθεισῶν δὲ τοῖς πράγμασι συμβολικῶς τινῶν λέξεων προηγουμένως, πάλιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος κατὰ δευτέραν ἐπιβολὴν (30) ἐπανελθὼν αὐτὰς τὰς τεθείσας λέξεις θεωρήσας τὰς μὲν τοιούτον φέρε τύπον ἐχούσας, ὥστε ἄρθροις συνάπτεσθαι τοιοῖσδε, ὀνόματα κέκληκε, τὰς δὲ τοιαύτας οἷον τὸ περιπατῶ, περιπατεῖς, περιπατεῖ, ῥήματα, δηλώματα τῶν ποιῶν τύπων παριστὰς τῶν φωνῶν διὰ τοῦ τὰς μὲν ὀνόματα καλέσαι τὰς δὲ ῥήματα. ὥστε τόδε μὲν τι τὸ πρᾶγμα καλέσαι χρυσὸν καὶ τὴν τοι- @1 (35) (58.) αὐτὴν ὕλην τὴν οὕτω διαλάμπουσαν προσαγορεύσαι ἥλιον τῆς πρώτης ἦν θέσεως τῶν ὀνομάτων, τὸ δὲ τὴν χρυσὸν λέξιν εἰπεῖν εἶναι ὄνομα τῆς δευτέρας θέσεως καὶ τοὺς τύπους τῆς ποιᾶς λέξεως σημαινούσης. ἔστι τοίνυν ἡ πρόθεσις τοῦ βιβλίου περὶ τῆς πρώτης θέσεως τῶν λέξεων τῆς παραστατικῆς τῶν πραγμάτων· ἔστιν γὰρ περὶ φωνῶν σημαντικῶν ἀπλῶν, (5) καθὸ σημαντικαὶ εἰσι τῶν πραγμάτων, οὐ μὴν τῶν κατὰ ἀριθμὸν ἀλλήλων διαφερόντων ἀλλὰ τῶν κατὰ γένος· ἄπειρα μὲν σχεδὸν καὶ τὰ πράγματα καὶ αἱ λέξεις κατὰ ἀριθμὸν. ἀλλ' οὐ τὰς κατὰ ἀριθμὸν πρόκειται διελθεῖν λέξεις· ἐκάστη γὰρ κατὰ ἀριθμὸν σημαίνει τῶν ὄντων· ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τῷ ἀριθμῷ πολλά ἐστὶν ἔν ὄντα τῷ εἶδει ἢ τῷ γένει, καὶ ἡ ἀπειρία τῶν ὄντων (10) καὶ τῶν σημαινουσῶν αὐτὰ λέξεων εἰς δέκα γένη εὔρηται περιλαμβανομένη εἰς τὸ γράφεσθαι. εἰς δέκα τοίνυν γενικὰς διαφορὰς περιληφθέντων τῶν ὄντων δέκα καὶ αἱ δηλοῦσαι ταῦτα φωναὶ γέγονασι κατὰ γένη καὶ αὐταὶ περιληφθεῖσαι. δέκα οὖν λέγονται κατηγορίαι τῷ γένει δηλονότι, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ ὄντα δέκα τῷ γένει. ὅθεν ἐπεὶ περὶ φωνῶν σημαντικῶν ἡ πρό- (15) θεσις καθὸ σημαίνουσι τῶν κατὰ γένος διαφορῶν ὄντων, τὸ δὲ ἀγορεύειν τὰ πράγματα κατὰ τι σημαινόμενον κατηγορεῖν ἔλεγον καὶ ὅλως τὸ λέξιν σημαντικὴν κατὰ πραγμάτων λέγειν, εἰκότως Κατηγορίας ἐπέγραψεν τὴν περὶ τῶν ἀπλῶν λέξεων στοιχείωσιν τὴν καθὸ σημαντικαὶ τῶν πραγμάτων εἰσὶν προηγουμένως κατὰ γένος ἕκαστον θεωρουμένην.

[T3c] Porphyry, in *Cat.* 59,17-33. <Discussed in detail in the chapter on Herminus. This section follows Porphyry's comment that those who think *Cat.* is about genera of being, or attack *Cat.* as insufficiently comprehensive or extraneous – respectively Nicostratus and Plotinus (not named here) and Athenodorus' and Cornutus' followers – are mistaken. The subject is not the primary and highest genera in nature (which would not be *suitable for young persons*), nor what are the primary and fundamental differentiae of things said (i.e., language *qua* language), but the sort of predication that will properly belong to what is said in each of the genera of beings. Thus one must touch on the genera to which the predications correspond (one needs a *prolepsis*, or preconception, of the genus to talk about the categories). This justifies the title *Category*; the discussion reveals that the genera are ten in number, so the number of predications is ten; on the en genera would be a fine title assuming it is taken to refer to the correspondence between predications and genera). Discussion of place of homonymy, etc. comes next. Compare David [Elias] below.>

— Οὐδαμῶς· ἀλλὰ καὶ Βόηθος ἐν τοῖς εἰς τὰς Κατηγορίας εἴρηκεν

ταῦτα καὶ Ἑρμίνος βραχέως.

— Εἰπέ τὰ Ἑρμίνου, ἐπέιπερ αὐτὰ φῆς διὰ βραχέων εἰρησθαι.

— Λέγει τοίνυν ὁ Ἑρμίνος προκεισθαι οὔτε περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ φύσει (20) πρώτων καὶ γενικωτάτων γενῶν (οὐ γὰρ νέοις προσήκουσα ἢ τῶν τοιούτων διδασκαλία) οὔτε τίνες αἱ πρώται καὶ στοιχειώδεις τῶν λεγομένων διαφοραί, ὡς τὸν λόγον εἶναι δοκεῖν περὶ τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν, ἀλλὰ μάλλον περὶ τῆς καθ' ἕκαστον γένος τῶν ὄντων οἰκείας ἂν ἐσομένης τῶν λεγομένων κατηγορίας· διὸ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον ἐγένετο ἀμωσγέπως ἄψασθαι τῶν γενῶν, ἐφ' (25) ἅπερ ἢ τῶν κατηγορουμένων ἀναφορὰ· ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὴν ἐκάστου οἰκείαν σημασίαν γνώριμον εἶναι μηδεμιᾶς αὐτῷ προλήψεως προυποκειμένης. διὰ τοῦτο δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐπιγραφὴ Κατηγορία, δηλωτικὴ οὖσα τῆς ἐκάστῳ γένει συνημμένης οἰκείας σημασίας. ὅτι δὲ αὐτὰ τὰ γένη τὸν ἀριθμὸν δέκα, προῖὼν ὁ λόγος δηλώσει· ταύτη δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς ὁ τῶν κατηγοριῶν δέκα. (30) ὁ δὲ ἐπιγράφων Περὶ δέκα γενῶν οὐδὲ αὐτὸς ἀπεικότως, εἰ μόνον πρὸς τὴν ἐπὶ τὰ γένη ἀναφορὰν ποιοῖτο τὴν ἐπιγραφὴν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὅτι προηγουμένως περὶ τῶν δέκα γενῶν νομίζοι.

[T3d] Porphyry, *in Cat.* 107,25-36. <Cf. Boethius 212B, Moraux II 371-2. Above and below do not signify place but *pou*, as yesterday and tomorrow *pote*. (Thus above and below belong to where). When exists in virtue of time, where in virtue of place; to be something belonging to a quantity and to be a quantity are different. Thus Herminus too eliminates contrariety from quantity. (Simplicius mentions this solution as due to Andronicus, 143,1; see Moraux I 114); the information there came from Ad Gedalium? Buss suggests we restore Andronicus's name here 107,29. *Alla kai* would have its adversative force at the outset of the sentence.>

— Ἀλλὰ πῶς ὁ Ἑρμίνος ἀπήνηκεν; (25)

— Λέγων ὅτι τὸ ἄνω καὶ τὸ κάτω οὐ τόπον σημαίνει ἀλλὰ ποῦ, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ χθὲς οὐδὲ τὸ αὔριον χρόνον ἀλλὰ ποτέ· ἔστι δὲ ὡς τὸ ποτέ κατὰ χρόνον, οὔτως καὶ τὸ ποῦ κατὰ τόπον· ἕτερον δὲ ποσοῦ εἶναι τι, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ποσόν. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ Ἑρμίνος οὔτως ἀφήρει τοῦ ποσοῦ τὴν ἐναντίωσιν. (30)

— Ἄρα οὖν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ποσοῖς οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἐναντίωσις;

— Ἐν μὲν τοῖς ὠρισμένοις οὐδαμῶς, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀορίστοις ποσοῖς δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι ἐναντίωσιν.

— Τίνα οὖν ἐστὶ τὰ ἀόριστα ποσά;

— Τὰ οὕτω ἐκφερόμενα οἷον πολὺ ἢ ὀλίγον, μέγα ἢ μικρόν· πο- (35) σὸν γὰρ τι ὄν πολὺ ἢ ὀλίγον ἐστὶ καὶ μέγα ἢ μικρόν.

[T3e] Porphyry, *Isagoge* 4,15-20.

καθ' ἐκάστην κατηγορίαν ἐστὶν τινα γενικώτατα καὶ πάλιν ἄλλα εἰδικώτατα (15) καὶ μεταξὺ τῶν γενικωτάτων καὶ τῶν εἰδικωτάτων ἄλλα. ἐστὶν δὲ γενικώτατον μὲν, ὑπὲρ ὃ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄλλο ἐπαναβεβηκὸς γένος, εἰδικώτατον δέ, μεθ' ὃ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄλλο ὑποβεβηκὸς εἶδος, μεταξὺ δὲ τοῦ γενικωτάτου καὶ τοῦ εἰδικωτάτου ἄλλα, ἃ καὶ γένη καὶ εἶδη ἐστὶ τὰ αὐτά, πρὸς ἄλλο μέντοι καὶ ἄλλο λαμβανόμενα.

In each type of predication there are some most general items and again other most special items; and there are other items between the most general and the most special. Most general is that above which there will be no other superordinate genus; most special, that after which there will be no other subordinate species; and between the most general and the most special are other items which are at the same time both genera and species (but taken in relation now to one thing and now to another)...

**[T4a] Boethius in Cat. 157-59.**

**[T4b] Boethius in Int. (2) 1.1, 37,30-40,28 = Porphyry no 81F Smith, for Herminus**

**39-40: [on 16a5-8].** < Herminus contends that the thoughts which expressions signify are not the same among all, since in homonymy it happens that the same form of expression signifies more than one. Thus Herminus reads: ‘Yet that first, of which these are signs, these are affections of the soul, and that of which these are likenesses, these are also things’. That what expressions signify are affections of the soul, and that of which what is in the mind are likenesses are things. Porphyry disagreed (so Boethius) and supported Alexander that Aristotle’s assertion applies to equivocation. See Ebbesen, S. Porphyry’s Legacy to Logic, in *Aristotle Transformed*, 162 ff. and Int. 5, 17a15-17, with Ammonius. Also compare David [Elias] and Porphyry. >

Herminus vero huic est expositioni contrarius. Dicit enim non esse verum eosdem apud omnes homines esse intellectus, quorum voces significativae sint. Quid enim, inquit, in aequivocatione dicetur, ubi unus idemque vocis modus plura significat? Sed magis hanc lectionem veram putat, ut ita sit: ‘quorum autem haec primorum notae, hae omnibus passiones animae et quorum hae similitudines, res etiam hae’, ut demonstratio videatur quorum voces significativae sint vel quorum passiones animae similitudines. Et hoc simpliciter sciendum est secundum Herminum, ut ita dicamus: ‘quorum voces significativae sunt, illae sunt animae passiones’, tamquam diceret: ‘animae passiones sunt, quas significant voces’, et rursus ‘quorum sunt similitudines ea quae intellectibus continentur, illae sunt res’, tamquam si dixisset: ‘res sunt quas significant intellectus’.

**[T4c] Herminus elsewhere in Boethius [collected samples]:** I 132, 4. II 25, 22.39, 25. 157, 30. 183, 7 sqq. 273, 1. 275, 5. 293, 29. 307, 29. II 275,31–276,8. *Sententiam Aristotelis non sequitur...: I 183, 15. Ordinem turbat...: II 310,16.* <Porphyry responds: (a) the speaker has in his mental discourse a certain concept that signifies one thing only. (b) when he talks he intends that one thing only. (c) the recipient expects a message about one thing and interprets the message in one sense, but it may be other than intended (i.e. the two related the utterance to different concepts corresponding to different significata.) (d) When the difference is discovered, the speaker must formulate more clearly, and then (e) the speaker and recipient share the same concept. Ammonius like Porphyry omits the mention of *nous/noemata* as the medium (Shiel, AT 15, 357).>

**[T5a] Ammonius in Cat 8,20.**

**[T5b] Ammonius, in De Int. 24,18-21.** <Thoughts and things by nature, vocal sounds and letters by imposition; Herminus would read with the circumflex on the penultimate; see note on Boethius above. Here too the *tauta* in the phrase *pragmata ede t’auta* (things are also the same) must be read

with the accent on the last syllable, and not with circumflex on the penultimate as Herminus read, in order that A's teaching appear complete in establishing that letters and vocal sounds are by imposition from their not being the same among all peoples, and that thoughts and things are by nature from their being the same among all peoples.>

διὸ καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ ΤΑΥΤΑ ἐν τῷ πράγματα ἤδη ταῦτὰ ὀξυτόνως ἀναγνωστέον, καὶ οὐ προπερισπωμένως, ὥσπερ Ἑρμίνος, ἵνα τελεία φαίνηται τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους ἢ διδασκαλία τὰ τε γράμματα καὶ τὰς φωνὰς ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ παρὰ πᾶσιν εἶναι τὰ αὐτὰ θέσει εἶναι κατασκευάζουσα, καὶ τὰ νοήματα (20) καὶ τὰ πράγματα φύσει ἀπὸ τοῦ τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι παρὰ πᾶσιν.

[T5c] Ammonius, *in De Int.* 52,27-53,8. < On 16b6ff.: A verb additionally signifies time... specifically present time, not surrounding time. Verbs are present, those additionally signifying past and present are 'cases'. A verb properly speaking is said of present and signifies something definite. But was the initial definition deficient as Herminus believed (why did he not add all these distinctions to the definition at the beginning)? Ammonius responds that the definition at the beginning is one sense, but there is another sense described by the present additions. >

εἰ δὲ κἀνταῦθ' αἱ ἀποροὶ διὰ τί μὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰς διαφορὰς ταύτας προσετίθει τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ ῥήματος ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης, οὐκ ἐλλιπῆ εἶναι φήσομεν ἡμεῖς, καθάπερ Ἑρμίνος, τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀποδιδόμενον λόγον, ἀλλὰ πλείονα εἶναι παρὰ τῷ φιλοσόφῳ καὶ τοῦ ῥήματος τὰ σημαίνόμενα, (30) καὶ ἄλλου μὲν εἶναι σημαινομένου τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀποδιδόμενον λόγον, ἄλλο δὲ τι διὰ τῶν νυνὶ προστιθεμένων τὸν φιλόσοφον ὑπογράψαι· τριχῶς γὰρ τὸ ῥῆμα παρὰ τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει λεγόμενον εὐρήσεις, ἥτοι πᾶσαν φωνὴν [53] προσσημαίνουσαν χρόνον, ἧς μέρος οὐδὲν σημαίνει χωρὶς, ἀεὶ καθ' ἑτέρου λεγομένην, ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὠρίσατο, καθ' ὃ σημαίνόμενον εἶεν ἂν ῥήματα καὶ τὰ ἀόριστα ῥήματα καὶ αἱ πτώσεις τοῦ ῥήματος, ἢ πᾶσαν φωνὴν προσσημαίνουσαν τὸν ἐνεστώτα μόνον χρόνον καὶ ὠρισμένον τι δηλοῦσαν, ὃ σημαίνόμενον παραδίδεται ἡμῖν διὰ τῶν νυνὶ λεγομένων, ἢ πᾶσαν φωνὴν (5) κατηγορούμενον ἐν προτάσει ποιούσαν, ὥστε κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ σημαίνόμενον τὸ καλὸς καὶ δίκαιος καὶ λευκὸς καὶ ζῶν, ὅταν κατηγορούμενα ληφθῆ, ῥήματα λέγεσθαι, ὅπερ κατ' οὐδέτερον ἦν τῶν προτέρων σημαινομένων.

[T5d] [Ammonius], *in An. pr.* 39,31-38

Ἑρμίνος δ' ἔλεγεν ἀναγκαῖον γίνεσθαι τὸ συμπέρασμα οὐκ αἰεὶ ποτε, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τινος ὕλης· εἰ μὲν γὰρ λάβωμεν ζῶν, ἄνθρωπον, περιπατοῦν, ἀναγκαῖον συνάγεται· εἰ δὲ ζῶν, ἄνθρωπον, κινούμενον, [ψεύδεται ἢ] ἐνδεχόμενον. δι' ὃ καὶ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ἔφη συμβαίνει δέ ποτε. ἀλλὰ διώρισεν τοῦτο ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐπαγαγὼν πλὴν οὐχ ὀποτέρας ἔτυχεν, ἀλλὰ τῆς (35) [40] μείζονος ἀναγκαιᾶς οὐσης. καὶ ἐπὶ στοιχείων τὴν δεῖξιν ἐποίησατο ἅτε καθόλου ταύτην ποιούμενος. οἱ δὲ περὶ Θεόφραστον δικαιολογούνται οὕτως· τίς ἢ ἀποκλήρωσις μὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τρόπων τῆ χειρόνι ἔπεσθαι τὸ συμπέρασμα;

[T6a] Simplicius, *in de Cael.* 380,3-7.

Ἑρμίνος δὲ τοῦ εἰς ἄπειρον αὐτὸ κινεῖσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν ἔλεγε αἰτίαν· μηδὲν γὰρ σῶμα πεπερασμένον ἔχειν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει δύναμιν τῆς ἐπ’ ἄπειρον κινήσεως”. καὶ τούτῳ μὲν ἐπέσηκην ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος (5) λέγων τοῦ ἐπ’ ἄπειρον κινεῖσθαι μὴ τὴν οἰκείαν ψυχὴν αἰτίαν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ κινεῖν πρῶτον.

[T6b] *Simplicius, in de Cael. 430,27-431,11.*

Ἀσαφεστέρα δέ, φησίν, ἢ λέξις ἐστὶ τῷ μὴ θεῖναι τὴν διαίρεσιν πρῶτην. καὶ ἔοικε τούτῳ τῷ ἐκ διαιρέσεως εἰληφθαι τὴν ἀπόδειξιν πρῶτος αὐτὸς ὁ Ἀφροδισιεύς Ἀλέξανδρος ἐπιστήσαι· τὴν γοῦν προειρημένην ἐξήγησιν τοῦ ἀναγκαίαν εἶναι τὴν ἐπ’ ἄπειρον ἄνεσιν διὰ τὸ μὴ (30) εἶναι τὸ ἀναληψόμενον τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ πρῶτου κινεῖντος καὶ διορθῶσον τὴν ἀδυναμίαν ὡς Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ Αἰγαίου παρατίθεται. “Ἑρμίνου δέ”, φησίν, “ἤκουσα, καθὰ ἦν καὶ ἐν τοῖς Ἀσπασίου φερόμενον, εἰ ἔστιν ἄνεσις περὶ τὸ θεῖον σῶμα, ἦν ἐπίτασις πρὸ τοῦ· πᾶσα γὰρ ἄνεσις ἐπιτάσεως. ἀλλὰ μὴν, εἰ ἦν ἐπίτασις πρὸ τῆς ἀνέσεως, ἐπ’ ἄπειρον ἦν αὕτη· διὰ τί (35) [431] γὰρ μέχρι τοῦδε ἦν καὶ οὐχὶ καὶ πρὸ ἀπείρου τῆς κινήσεως οὔσης, οὐχ οἶόν τε εὐλογον εἰπεῖν αἰτίαν. ἀλλὰ μὴν, εἰ καὶ ἄνεσις ἐστίν, ἐπ’ ἄπειρον πάλιν ἐστὶν αὕτη· τί γὰρ τὸ αἴτιον τὸ τὴν ἄνεσιν ἀναληψόμενον ταύτην, καὶ διὰ τί μέχρι τοῦδε ἀνίεται, οὐχ οἶόν τε αἰτίαν ἀποδοῦναι εἰς ἄπειρον κινουμένου τοῦ σώματος. ὥστε ἐπ’ ἄπειρον καὶ ἡ ἄνεσις ἐστίν· (5) ἐπιτάσεως μὲν γὰρ ἢ ἄνεσις ἄνεσις, ἀπείρου δὲ ἐπιτάσεως ἀπείρου ἢ ἄνεσις· διὰ τί γὰρ μέρους τῆς ἐπιτάσεως ἢ ἄνεσις ἔσται, οὐ πάσης δέ; ἀλλὰ μὴν ἢ ἄνεσις κατὰ ἀδυναμίαν, τοῦτο δὲ παρὰ φύσιν, τὸ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν οὐχ οἶόν τε ἴσον εἶναι τῷ κατὰ φύσιν· ὁδὸς γὰρ ἐπὶ φθορὰν τὸ παρὰ φύσιν· ὥστε οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄνεσις· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἄνεσις, οὐδὲ ἐπίτασις.” ταῦτα (10) μὲν οὖν τὰ τοῦ Ἑρμίνου κατὰ τὸν Ἀσπάσιον εἰρημένα.

[T6c] *Simplicius in Cat. 1,14.* <Herminus, like his student Alexander, touched moderately on *zetemata* (excursus into specific topics in the text).>

ὥσπερ Θεμιστιός τε ὁ εὐφραδῆς καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος τοιοῦτος, οἱ δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐννοίας (10) μὲν, αὐτὰς δὲ μόνας ψιλὰς τὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους προτεινομένας συντόμως ἀποκαλύπτειν ἐσπούδασαν, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ κατὰ πεῦσιν καὶ ἀπόκρισιν βιβλίῳ πεποιήκεν ὁ Πορφύριος, ἄλλοι δὲ πρὸς τούτοις καὶ ζητημάτων ἐφήψαντο μετρίως, ὡς ὁ Ἀφροδισιεύς Ἀλέξανδρος καὶ Ἑρμίνος καὶ ὅσοι τοιοῦτοι, ὧν καὶ Μάξιμον ἐγὼ τίθημι, τὸν Αἰδεσίου μὲν τοῦ Ἰαμβλιχείου μαθητὴν, ἐν (15) δὲ τῷ εἰς τὰς Κατηγορίας ὑπομνήματι πάντα σχεδὸν τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ συνάσαντα· τινὲς μὲντοι καὶ βαθυτέρας περὶ αὐτὸ διανοίαις κατεχρήσαντο, ὥσπερ ὁ θαυμάσιος Βόηθος. ἄλλοις δὲ ἤρρεσεν ἀπορίας μόνας γράψαι πρὸς τὰ λεγόμενα, ὅπερ Λούκιός τε πεποιήκε καὶ μετ’ αὐτὸν Νικόστρατος τὰ τοῦ Λουκίου ...

[T6d] *Simplicius in Cat. 13,16.* <Herminus is among those who take the view that the *Cat.* concerns simple, primary and generic *phônai* in so far as they are significant of beings. Cp. Porph. 59,17-33, where Herminus expresses this view *brakheôs* following Boethus. [Cf also Philop.

9,34-10,8; 12,10-11; Olymp 21,17-22,1; David 131,15-132,4].>

τῶν εἰρημένων δήλον, ὅτι ἐστὶν μὲν ὁ σκοπὸς οἰκείος τῇ λογικῇ πραγματεία περὶ τῶν ἀπλῶν καὶ πρώτων καὶ γενικῶν φωνῶν, καθὸ σημαντικαὶ τῶν ὄντων εἰσὶν, συνδιδάσκειται δὲ πάντως καὶ τὰ σημαίνόμενα ὑπ’ αὐτῶν πράγματα καὶ τὰ νοήματα, καθὸ σημαίνεται τὰ πράγματα ὑπὸ τῶν φωνῶν. καὶ (15) ταῦτα καὶ τοῖς Ἀλεξάνδροις καὶ Ἑρμίνῳ καὶ Βοήθῳ καὶ Πορφυρίῳ δοκεῖ καὶ ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος ἐπισηφίζει καὶ Συριανὸς σαφηνίζει καὶ οἱ ἡμέτεροι διδάσκαλοι ἀποδέχονται. ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ δέδεικται περὶ φωνῶν ὁ σκοπός, τῶν δὲ φωνῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσὶν ἀπλαῖ, αἱ δὲ σύνθετοι, περὶ τῶν ἀπλῶν ἐστὶ φωνῶν τῶν πρώτων καὶ τὰ πρώτα καὶ γενικώτατα τῶν ὄντων σημαίνουσῶν διὰ (20) μέσων τῶν ἀπλῶν καὶ πρώτων νοημάτων.

[T6e] **Simplicius in Cat 30,6.** <Porphyry remarks that Herminus ‘and almost everyone else’ read τῆς οὐσίας at *Cat.* 1a2, although Boethus and Andronicus appear to have been unaware of the words. This is noted by Porphyry in the course of responding to a criticism raised by the followers of Nicostratus, namely, that Aristotle appears to suggest homonymy is found in substance alone; Porphyry believes we must read ‘of substance’ nevertheless based on Herminus’s inclusion of it (and general consensus); *logos tes ousias* simply signifies that this is *definition*, not another sense of *logos*. >

ἐξηγούμενος δὲ ὁ Βόηθος καθ’ ἐκάστην λέξιν τὸ τῆς οὐσίας παραλέλοιπεν ὡς οὐδὲ γεγραμμένον. καὶ ὁ Ἀνδρόνικος δὲ παραφράζων τὸ βιβλίον “τῶν ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς, φησί, λεγομένων ὁμώνυμα μὲν λέγεται ὡς ὄνομα μόνον ταῦτόν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοῦνομα λόγος ἕτερος”. “ἡμεῖς δέ, φησὶν ὁ Πορφύριος, (5) ἐπειδὴ καὶ Ἑρμίνος καὶ σχεδὸν οἱ πλείστοι ὡς προσκειμένου τῷ ὄρῳ ἐντετυχήκασιν τοῦ τῆς οὐσίας ὀνόματος, καὶ ἀναγκαίαν λέγομεν τὴν προσθήκην· τοῦ γὰρ λόγου καὶ τὴν ἐπαγωγὴν σημαίνοντος καὶ τὸν συλλογισμὸν καὶ πᾶσαν κατάφασιν καὶ ἀπόφασιν, εἰ μὴ προσέκειτο τῆς οὐσίας, πῶς ἂν ἀπεκρίνετο τοῦ ὀρισμοῦ καὶ τῆς ὑπογραφῆς τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ λόγου σημαίνόμενα;

[T6f] **Simplicius in Cat. 55,22.** <Herminus does not regard it as correct to call *sumplêrotikos* (‘completive’) *differentiae* – that is, those without which the substrate cannot exist – ‘*differentiae*’; he reserves ‘*differentiae*’ for *divisive differentiae*.

For Porphyry, a ‘completive’ *differentia* is ‘an essential quality ... properties the loss of which destroys their subjects. properties that can be gained and lost without the subject being destroyed would not be essential. For example, heat is a property of hot water as well as fire. But it is not an essential property of water... and *differentiae* are indeed like this: they are essential qualities. For if rational is taken away from man, man is destroyed... hence the *differentia* is included under the definition of *ousia*, and the complements of *ousiai* are *ousiai*’ (Porph. in *Cat.* 95,21-96,2 - as these are essential parts of *ousiai*: cf. *Cat.* 3a29-32).

Simplicius notes Herminus’s view after commenting that ‘many *differentiae* contribute to one species’; he continues to discuss the matter in detail in his own voice. Simplicius discusses *systtaticai* (‘those said universally’) and *diaretikai* ‘those which, taken separately, are not said of it, but are all said of it simultaneously’. The view that only *divisive differentiae* were ‘*differentiae*’ also held by Boethus (cf. Simplicius 97,28-34): ‘...some believe the *differentia* to be something which by nature separates what are under the same genus, and clearly in this way the differentiation from its genus is

given. Boethus however says that, properly speaking, the differentia should be classed with the species, not with the genus, because the differentiae are often substituted for the species. Indeed, all [differentiae] together may be said with respect to the genus, but each differentia in itself can be said of everything ranked below it of which it is said, though by no means of the genus. For each [differentia] is not constitutive (*morphotike*) of the genus. And the differentia is different from the species, because it exists together with the genus, and the differentia is a kind of form of the genus while the genus pre-exists like a subject'. (See Moraux I 153-59). See also Porph. *Is.* 9,24 and following: divisive differentiae are exemplified as 'mortal/immortal', 'rational/irrational'; they are combined to divide *zoon* into 'man', 'god', 'animal'. Constitutive examples are 'animate' and 'sensitive': they can give us 'animal' or 'plant'. As Chase (2003:136) explains, 'in Simplicius' terms, 'animate' and 'sensitive' are predicable of each member of the class animal... whereas the divisive differentiae mortal, rational, etc., while they can all be predicated of the genus animal at the same time, cannot *all* be predicated of any individual animal'. Another way of stating the point would be to say that the genus contains its differentiae potentially but not in actuality: cf. *Is.* 11,1-5 Busse. >

ὡσπερ δὲ εἶδη πλείονα πρὸς ἓν γένος, οὕτως πολλαὶ διαφοραὶ πρὸς ἓν εἶδος συντελοῦσιν. ὁ δὲ Ἑρμίνος τὰς συμπληρωτικὰς οὐκ ἀξιοὶ διαφορὰς καλεῖν, ἀλλὰ μόνας τὰς διαιρετικὰς. Ἀλλὰ πῶς τὴν διαφορὰν κατὰ διαφερόντων τῷ εἶδει λέγομεν καὶ τὸ εἶδος κατὰ διαφερόντων τῷ ἀριθμῷ; ἰδοὺ γάρ τινες διαφοραὶ καθ' ἑνὸς (25) εἶδους λέγονται, ὡς τὸ κοῦφον κατὰ τοῦ πυρός (καὶ γὰρ τὰ ἄλλα κοῦφα διὰ τὸ πύριον) καὶ τὸ βαρὺ κατὰ τῆς γῆς καὶ ὅλως αἱ ἔσχαται διαφοραὶ

[T6g] **Simplicius in *Cat.* 57,22-58,2.** <This passage (cf. Dexippus 29,29-30,9; discussing *Cat.* 3, 1b16-17) occurs in the context of explaining why Aristotle wrote that differentiae of differing, coordinate genera are different from each other *in species* (τῷ εἶδει, *Cat.* 1b17). Herminus, who is quoted here (φησὶν), points out that some non-subordinate genera fall under a single head – for example, 'winged' and 'footed' differentiate 'animal', but some of the differentiae of 'footed' (two-footed, four-footed) are also differentiae of 'winged', in that winged creatures can vary in their number of feet (sphinxes, griffins); 'footed' also differentiates 'winged'. [In other words, the sets of, say, winged and two-footed creatures are overlapping, if sphinxes are included in the mix]. These differentiae differentiate species – sphinxes from griffins, for example – but are the same in genus ('animal').

In brief, Aristotle only excludes the chance of differentiae of distinct, coordinate genera belonging to the same *species* – they may belong to the same *genus*.

Porphyry also defends the phrase τῷ εἶδει (58,8) but differently (likely responding directly to Herminus – see 58,20 below); he proposes that, if genera are not subordinate, the differentiae of the species under them must be different. Thus 'two-footed' in the case of winged things and 'two-footed' in the case of footed things are different differentiae. Simplicius adds that Porphyry considers a different possibility later, namely that Aristotle is discussing *eidopoiiai* differentiae.

See Moraux II 368 on Herminus's position. Moraux finds Herminus's view misleading at best, and Simplicius also thinks that H. is wrong to talk about 'winged' and 'footed' when Aristotle is talking about genera that cannot be brought under the same genus, like 'animal' and 'knowledge' >

Ἑρμίνος δὲ ἑτέρας τῷ εἶδει βούλεται εἶναι τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν μὴ ὑπάλληλα γενῶν ἀλλ' ἑτέρων, "διότι, φησὶν, ἔστιν τινὰ γένη οὐχ ὑπάλληλα μὲν, ἄμφω δὲ ὑφ' ἓν ἀναγόμενα, ὡς τὸ πτηνὸν καὶ τὸ πεζὸν ἄμφω ὑπὸ τὸ ζῷον, καὶ τούτων εἰσὶν τινες αἱ αὐταὶ (25) διαφοραὶ: καὶ γὰρ τοῦ πτηνοῦ τὸ μὲν δίπουν ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ τετράπουν, ὡς

γρὺν ἰστορεῖται καὶ σφίγξ, καὶ τοῦ πεζοῦ ὁμοίως· ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ τῷ εἶδει αἱ αὐταὶ εἰσιν αὐταὶ διαφοραί, ἀλλὰ γένει· ζῴου γάρ εἰσι πρότως διαφοραί. διὰ τοῦτο, φησὶν, τῶν μὴ ὑπάλληλα οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἑτέρας, ἀλλὰ τῷ εἶδει ἑτέρας εἶπεν τὰς διαφοράς· καὶ γὰρ αὐταὶ τῶν μὴ ὑπάλληλα οὔσαι, κὰν [58] αἱ αὐταὶ δοκοῦσαι, ἀλλ’ οὐ τῷ εἶδει εἰσιν αἱ αὐταί, ἀλλὰ τῷ γένει”.

Herminus will have it that the reason that differentiae of genera which are not subordinate but different are different in species is ‘because’, he says, ‘there are some genera which are not subordinate, but are nevertheless both referred under one genus, as ‘winged’ and ‘footed’ are both under ‘animal’. Of these, some of the differentiae are the same: for instance, one part of ‘winged’ is ‘two-footed’, the other ‘four-footed’ (as is said of the griffin and the sphinx), and the same is true of ‘footed’. Yet these differentiae are not the same in *species* but in *genus*, for they are primarily differentiae of ‘animal’. This is why’, he continues, ‘Aristotle did not say that the differentiae of non-subordinate genera are simply ‘different’ (*heteras*), but ‘different in species’. After all, these are differentiae of non-subordinate genera, but even though they seem to be the same, they are not the same in species, but in genus’.

[T6h] **Simplicius in Cat. 58,20.** <This passage occurs in response to a criticism of Nicostratus, though there is no evidence that Herminus is responding to them directly. The ‘Nicostrateans’ complain that Aristotle indulges in *mataiologia* in providing examples around 1b19-20; for who would not intuit that forms of knowledge do not differ by being two-footed? Simplicius, likely reporting Porphyry, points out that Herminus’s followers (οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἑρμῖνον) did not have a good understanding of the phrase ἑτέρα καὶ μὴ ὑπάλληλα, as they supposed that even the differentiae of non-subordinated genera could be referred under the same genus (as ‘two-footed’, though said of winged and footed animals, is thought by Herminus to mean the same thing under the genus animal). Thus the examples Aristotle gives are needed, as they make the truth clear.

Presumably this point and response belong to Porphyry, as in the preceding passage.>

ἔπειτα ὁρᾷς ὅτι οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἑρμῖνον τὸ ἑτέρα καὶ μὴ ὑπάλληλα οὐ καλῶς ἐξεδέξαντο, (20) νομίσαντες δυνατὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὑπάλληλα ὄντα ὑφ’ ἐν ἀνάγεσθαι γένος· οὕτως οὐκ ἦν πρόχειρος ὁ λόγος, κὰν τὰ παραδείγματα καλῶς ληφθέντα σαφῆ τὸν λόγον ποιῆ.

[T6i] **Simplicius in Cat 62,7-23.** <This passage reports Herminus’s important view that the tenfold organisation of categories is not a division but an ‘enumeration’ (aparithmesis), followed by his statement that the number of ‘ten’ is not necessarily canonical.

The passage occurs early in the discussion of the ‘division’ of the ten categories, before Simplicius recounts various objections to the division. Before this passage, Simplicius has just described two views on the division.

The first view is that the ten categories are divided ‘like soldiers drawn up according to *lokhoi*, so that just as a captain leads a company, so substance is the leader of substances, and each of the other [categories] leads the multitude assigned to it’. Dexippus 39,16-19 reports a similar view. The analogy likely is an echo of *Met.* 12.10, 1075a14 and following; in a 1974 paper (repr. in Sorabji, 1990) Pierre Hadot argued that the source of the answering passage of Dexippus was Porphyry, and it would stand to reason for Porphyry to precede Iamblichus here. However, M. Chase (143, comparing

71,17 and 91,14-33) also suggests that this passage and Dexippus may derive from Iamblichus's interpretation of Archytas.

The second view, which Simplicius associates with Iamblichus, rejects the 'company of soldiers' interpretation, on the grounds that commonality must exist between the primary genera. Rather than splitting them up like companies, therefore, it is better to distinguish them by their 'primary *idiotêtai*', and liken the genera to things that share a focal meaning ('from one and in relation to one') to the extent that their accidents all arise in *ousia* and are arrayed in *ousia*.

At this point (a, where the fragment below begins) Herminus is cited as holding a third position: the ten are neither a *diairesis* nor a *merismos*, but an 'enumeration' (*aparithmêsis*); for there is no whole over them, neither as *genos* nor in any other sense of 'whole'.

Curiously, Simplicius simply passes by this view without direct comment (as he does elsewhere in reporting Herminus), and responds to Iamblichus instead (b), *using Herminus's language* for 'enumeration' (ἀπαρίθμησιν, 62,11; see also 68,16, where Iamblichus defends the 'enumeration' of ten categories). (The shared vocabulary might suggest that Iamblichus is the source for Herminus here, and took his start for the present argument from Herminus's concept of 'enumeration'; but this in turn is already mirrored in 'Archytas', 31,32-32,33 Thesleff). Simplicius comments in response to Iamblichus that it is 'from being', not 'from the one', that the categories describe focally; and he also points out that in the *Metaphysics* (6.2, 1026a33 and following; see also 12.10) Aristotle has the ten produced as if from one thing, namely being.

After responding to Iamblichus, Simplicius returns to Herminus in the next section (c) with a brief quotation (see Moraux II 369-70). Herminus states that the number of ten categories is established by the 'significations' or 'meanings' of primary genera (*sêmasiai* – an interesting word, given the role ascribed to Herminus in establishing the 'semantic' interpretation of the *skopos* of the *Categories*). If there are just as many genera as are represented by the examples Aristotle gives in the text, namely ten, there are also this many significant categories. If there are more genera than those given in the text, the number of categories can change fluidly with them. This fluidity represents a standpoint very different from the strong defense of ten categories which Simplicius subsequently mounts in response to the *aporai* of Lucius, Nicostratus, Athenodorus, Cornutus, and others; as Simplicius points out, Aristotle may present a less flexible position, as he uses 'this same number of genera everywhere' >

[a] ὁ δὲ Ἑρμῖνος “ἀπαρίθμησις οὖν ἐστίν, φησὶν, καὶ οὔτε διαίρεσις οὔτε μερισμός· οὐδὲν γὰρ ὅλον ἐπ’ αὐτῶν οὔτε ὡς γένος οὔτε ἄλλον τρόπον ὅλον”.

[b] ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν τὰ τοῦ θείου Ἰαμβλίου ἐκ τῶν αὐτοῦ ῥητέον ὅτι τὸ ἀφ’ ἐνὸς οὐκ ἀπὸ (10) τῆς οὐσίας ληπτέον· οὕτως γὰρ οὐ τῶν δέκα τὴν ἀπαρίθμησιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῶν ἐννέα ποιησόμεθα· μάλλον δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντος, ὅπερ ἐνταῦθα μὲν πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον εἰς τὰς δέκα κατηγορίας Ἀριστοτέλης διαιρεῖσθαι βούλεται, καὶ εἰκότως, ἐπειδὴ περὶ λέξεων σημαντικῶν ἐν τούτοις ὁ σκοπός· ἐν δὲ τῇ Μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ ὡς ἀφ’ ἐνὸς τοῦ ὄντος τὰ δέκα ἐν τάξει παρὰ γέσθαι (15) φησι, πρῶτην ἐχούσης τάξιν τῆς οὐσίας καὶ περὶ αὐτὴν τῶν ἄλλων συνταπτομένων.

[c] ὁ δὲ Ἑρμῖνος ἀμφιβάλλοντι ἔοικεν, εἰ τοσαῦτά ἐστιν τὰ γένη· γράφει γοῦν οὕτως· “διὸ εἰ μὲν μόνων τῶν λεχθησομένων εἰσὶν αἱ σημασίαι, τοσαῦτα ἂν εἴη τὰ πρῶτα γένη τοσαῦταί τε καὶ αἱ κατηγορίαι· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα παρ’ αὐτά, οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνα ὁ λόγος διωθεῖται”.

[d] καίτοι τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους (20) πανταχοῦ τῷ πλήθει τούτῳ χρωμένον τῶν γενῶν καὶ οὔτε προστιθέντος οὔτε ἀφαιρούντος, ἀλλ' ἐγκρίνοντος ἀεὶ τὴν εἰς δέκα διαίρεσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ εἰς τέσσαρα τὴν τούτων συναίρεσιν ἐποίησατο.

[T6j] **Simplicius, in Cat. 124,33.** <The context is the discussion of Quantity which is continuous, and specifically Aristotle's remark (*Cat.* 5a5) that the parts of a plane or solid are, respectively, limited by a line or by a plane.

Simplicius notes a variant reading according to which Aristotle bounds the parts of a plane or solid by 'a line *and* a plane'; Simplicius believes this reading is based on the fact that 'the shared limit of bodies is always a plane', as the line is of the plane, and the point of the line.

Simplicius adduces Porphyry, who comments that 'some solid bodies have continuity according to line', and goes on to remark that *Herminus* takes 'body' here to mean mathematical body (a quantity), not natural body (a substance).

But Simplicius remarks that mathematical bodies are divided by a mathematical plane, not by a line; he speculates that he (*Herminus*?) referred to solid angles.>

ἔστιν δὲ ὅπου καὶ ἐπιφάνειαν γέγραπται. καὶ γὰρ ὁ κοινὸς ὄρος τῶν σωμάτων ἐπιφάνεια πάντως ἐστίν, ὡς τῶν (30) ἐπιφανειῶν γραμμὴ καὶ τῶν γραμμῶν σημεῖον. ὁ μὲν οὖν Πορφύριος ἐπιστήσας “ἔστιν, φησὶν, τινὰ τῶν στερεῶν σωμάτων, ἃ κατὰ γραμμὴν τὴν συνέχειαν ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ σῶμα ἀξιοῖ ἀκούειν ὁ Ἑρμῖνος οὐ τὸ φυσικόν (οὐσία γὰρ), ἀλλὰ τὸ μαθηματικόν, ὃ κατὰ ψιλὰς τὰς πάντη διαστάσεις λαμβάνεται”. καίτοι καὶ τὰ μαθηματικὰ σώματα οὐ γραμμῆ, ἀλλ' ἐπιπέδῳ (35) μαθηματικῶ διαιρεῖται. μήποτε οὖν διὰ τὴν στερεὰν εἶπεν γωνίαν, [125] τὰ γὰρ στερεὰ παραλληλεπίπεδα κατὰ γραμμὴν γωνιακὴν συνάπτεται ἀλλήλοις.

[T7] **Olympiodorus, in Cat. 18,30-19,30**

οὐ μία τοίνυν γέγονε δόξα περὶ τοῦ σκοποῦ τῶν Κατηγοριῶν, ἀλλὰ τοσαῦτα γεγόνασι δόξαι, ὅσα τὰ ὄντα καθέστηκε· τριττὰ δὲ ταῦτα, ἢ πράγματα ἢ νοήματα ἢ φωναί, καὶ (25) τὰ μὲν πράγματα θεόθεν παράγεται, τὰ δὲ νοήματα ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ, αἱ δὲ φωναὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς. εἰς τοσαῦτα τοίνυν καὶ ὁ σκοπὸς μερίζεται.

τῶν <δὲ> διαφόρων αἰρέσεων τοῦτον μερίζουσῶν τρεῖς γεγόνασιν αἰρέσεις περὶ τοῦ σκοποῦ, καὶ ἡ μὲν ἔλεγεν περὶ φωνῶν μόνων διαλέγεσθαι τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη, εἰς ἣν ἦν ὁ Πορφύριος, ἡ δὲ περὶ μόνων πραγμάτων, εἰς ἣν ἦν ὁ Ἑρμῖνος, (30) ἡ δὲ περὶ μόνων νοημάτων, εἰς ἣν ἦν Ἀλέξανδρος. καὶ ἕκαστος τούτων μάρτυρα τῆς οἰκείας δόξης τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη προεβάλλετο, Πορφύριος μὲν ὡς λέγων τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη περὶ φωνῶν διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιστοῦτο τὸν ἑαυτοῦ λόγον ἐκ τῆς ἐπιγραφῆς· ἐπιγράφεται γὰρ, φησί, τὸ σύγγραμμα Κατηγορίαι, οὐδὲν δὲ ἕτερόν ἐστι κατηγορία ἢ τὸ κατὰ ἄλλου ἀγορεύεσθαι· τὸ δὲ ἀγορεύεσθαι (35) φωνῆς ἴδιον· περὶ φωνῶν ἄρα καὶ μόνον διαλαμβάνει. καὶ ὅλως [19] ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν θυρῶν προανακηρύττει ὁ φιλόσοφος τὴν προαίρεσιν, λέγων ὁμώνυμα λέγεται, τὸ δὲ λέγεται οὐκ ἐπὶ πραγμάτων ἀλλ' ἐπὶ φωνῶν λαμβάνεται· ὥστε καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἔστιν εἰλεῖν ὅτι περὶ φωνῶν αὐτῷ ὁ σκοπός, ὅθεν καὶ διαιρεῖ αὐτάς, ἡνίκα φησὶν τῶν λεγομένων τὰ μὲν κατὰ συμπλοκὴν λέγεται τὰ δὲ ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς, τῶν λεγομένων ἐπὶ φωνῆς (5) εἰωθότων ὀνομάζεσθαι.

ὁ δὲ Ἑρμίνος οἰόμενος αὐτὸν περὶ πραγμάτων διαλαμβάνειν πιστοῦται τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ ἐκ τοῦ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη πανταχοῦ τῷ ἔστι προσρήματι κεχρησθαι, ὅπερ ἐπὶ πραγμάτων εἴωθε λέγεσθαι. καὶ οὐ μόνον, φησὶν, ἐκ τούτου ἔστι πιστώσασθαι τὸν λόγον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῆς διαιρέσεως τῆς παραδεδομένης ὑπ' αὐτοῦ περὶ τῶν ὄντων, ἔνθα φησὶ (10)

τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, τὰ δὲ καθ' ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται, ὡς δῆλον ὅτι περὶ πραγμάτων ἐστὶν αὐτῷ ὁ σκοπός. καὶ μήτις ἀπορήσει πρὸς τὸν Ἑρμίνον λέγων ὅτι ὅσον ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ συμβήσεται εἶναι τὸν σκοπὸν τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους περὶ φωνῶν, τῶν φωνῶν αὐτῶν οὐσῶν· ἐρεῖ γὰρ ἴσως τις πρὸς αὐτόν, ὑπὲρ Ἑρμίνου τὸν λόγον ποι- (15) ούμενος, ὅτι αἱ φωναὶ καὶ οἱ λόγοι οὐ λέγονται κυρίως εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ

γίγνεσθαι τὸ εἶναι ἔχουσιν, ὡς μαθησόμεθα. ὁ δὲ Ἀλέξανδρος ὑπολαμβάνων αὐτὸν περὶ νοημάτων διαλέγεσθαι, ἐξ ἐκατέρων λαμβάνων τὰς ἀφορμὰς κατεσκεύαζε τὸν ἑαυτοῦ λόγον· φησὶ γὰρ ὅτι ἀμφοτέρω ἐμοὶ νικάτε, ὡς ἐκ διαιρέσεως δεῖξωμεν· τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν μόνως ἀγγέλλει, τὰ δὲ (20) μόνως ἀγγέλλεται, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἀγγέλλει καὶ ἀγγέλλεται. μόνως μὲν οὖν ἀγγέλλουσιν αἱ φωναί, μόνως δὲ ἀγγέλλονται τὰ πράγματα, ἀγγέλλει δὲ καὶ ἀγγέλλεται τὰ διανοήματα· ἀγγέλλει μὲν γὰρ τὰ πράγματα, ἀγγέλλεται δὲ

ὑπὸ τῶν φωνῶν· οὐκοῦν μέσα ἐστὶ τὰ νοήματα τῶν τε φωνῶν καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων. λέγετε δὲ ὑμεῖς ὅτι περὶ φωνῶν καὶ περὶ πραγμάτων ζητεῖ, (25) μέσα δὲ τούτων τὰ νοήματα, ὁ δὲ περὶ τῶν ἄκρων διαλαμβάνων περὶ τῶν μέσων διαλαμβάνει· περὶ νοημάτων ἄρα αὐτῷ ὁ σκοπός. εὐπορεῖ δὲ ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος καὶ ἄλλου λόγου τοιοῦτου· τοσοῦτόν φησιν ὅτι περὶ νοημάτων ἐστὶν αὐτῷ ὁ σκοπός, ὅτι ἐν τῷ τέλει τῶν Κατηγοριῶν φησιν ὑπὲρ μὲν οὖν τῶν προτεθέντων γενῶν ἱκανὰ ταῦτα.

#### [T8a] David [Elias] in Cat. 129,11

χρήσιμον καὶ τὰ ἐξῆς. οὐχ εἰς τοίνυν ἔδοξεν εἶναι ὁ σκοπὸς τῶν Κατηγοριῶν, ἀλλὰ πλείους· ὅσα γὰρ τὰ ὄντα, τοσοῦτοι φέρονται καὶ σκοποί. τριτὰ δὲ τὰ ὄντα, φωναί, νοήματα καὶ πράγματα. οἱ μὲν οὖν περὶ φωνῶν εἰρήκασιν τὸν σκοπὸν, ὡς Ἀλέξανδρος καὶ Εὐστάθιος, οἱ δὲ περὶ νοημάτων, (10) ὡς Πορφύριος, οἱ δὲ περὶ πραγμάτων, ὡς Ἑρμίνος· πάντες μὲν γὰρ συν-εφώνησαν περὶ τῶν δέκα κατηγοριῶν εἶναι τὸν σκοπὸν, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ὡς ἐκφωνουμένων μόνον, οἱ δὲ ὡς ὑφεστωσῶν, οἱ δὲ ὡς νοουμένων. καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ὅτι ὀνόματι μὲν τρεῖς οἱ σκοποί, ἔργῳ δὲ εἷς· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀκολουθεῖ ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις· οὐ γὰρ ὅπου φωναί, καὶ νοήματα πάντως, διὰ τὰς (15) ἀσήμους φωνάς, οὐδὲ ὅπου νοήματα, ἐκεῖ καὶ πράγματα, διὰ τὸν τραγέ-

#### [T8b] David [Elias] in Cat. 241,30.

μέντοι ἀντικειμένων ἐν πάσῃ κατηγορίᾳ ἐδεήθη· ἐφ' ἐκάστης γὰρ κατηγορίας ἐζητοῦμεν εἰ ἔχει ἐναντίον ἢ οὐ. καὶ διαφορᾶς ἐναντίων δὲ ἐδεήθημεν ἐν τῷ περὶ ποσοῦ λόγῳ, ὅτε τὸ μέγα καὶ μικρὸν καὶ πολὺ καὶ ὀλίγον οὐκ ἀνήγομεν ὑπὸ τὰ ἐναντία, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τὰ πρὸς τι· τὰ δὲ ἐναντία

καὶ τὰ πρὸς τι εἶδη ἀντικειμένων. Ἑρμῖνος δὲ ὁ Πρὸ τῶν τόπων ἐπιγράψας τὰς Κατηγορίας αἰτίαν λέγει τοιαύτην, ὅτι διαλεκτικὴ ἢ προκειμένη πραγματεία, ἔργον δὲ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς περὶ τὸν ἀποφαντικὸν εἰλεῖσθαι λόγον τῷ συνηγορεῖν τῇ ἀντιφάσει καὶ τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις· διὰ τοῦτο οὖν καὶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα τῶν λοιπῶν προέταξε.

...

**[T9] Arethas Schol. in Cat. Schol 214 line 10.**

[...] Πορφύριος δὲ περὶ νοημάτων, ἀπὸ τοῦ διὰ τῶν νοημάτων, μέσων ὄντων φωνῶν καὶ πραγμάτων, καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ἡμῖν τῆς γνώσεως διὰ τῶν νοημάτων παρισταμένης, ἅτε δὴ μόνων τούτων ἐξαγγελλόντων τε καὶ ἐξαγγελλομένων, ὠρμημένος, καὶ τοῦ ἐννοηματικὰ ταῦτα τὰ γένη εἶναι. Ἑρμῖνός γε μὴν περὶ πραγμάτων, καὶ αὐτὸς (10) ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ διακένους εἶναι τὰς φωνάς, ἀλλὰ κατὰ πραγμάτων αἰε φερομένας ὑπαχθεῖς καὶ τοῦ ἔστι καὶ τοῦ ὄντος οἷς συνεχῶς Ἀριστοτέλης ἐνταῦθα κέχρηται. εὐθύνας γοῦν οὗτοι πάντες δεδώκασι· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ φωνῶν μόνων (γραμματικῆς γὰρ ἔργον τοῦτο), οὔτε περὶ νοημάτων (τοῦτο γὰρ τῆς περὶ ψυχῆς), ...

**[T10] Anonymus in Hermogenem, in *περὶ ἰδεῶν*. 863,3**

φαίνεται πεποιηκῶς, προθέμενος γὰρ θέσθαι, τί ὄνομα (30) καὶ ῥῆμα, τί δὲ ἀπόφασις καὶ κατάφασις καὶ ἀπό- @1 (863.) φανσις καὶ λόγος, εἰς ἕτερα μετετράπη, τὸ χρήσιμον ἐκ τῆς μεταβολῆς ἐμφαίνειν βουλόμενος. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ὁ φιλόσοφος ἐξέστη τοῦ προκειμένου κατὰ τὸν Ἑρμῖνου λόγον οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν· ἐπιφέρουσι γὰρ τινες τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου καὶ Πορφυρίου λύσιν, ἥτις ἐστὶ καὶ ἀκριβῆς, πλὴν (5) φαίνεται καὶ αὐτὸς περὶ ἄλλων τινῶν πρότερον διαλαβῶν, εἴθ' οὕτως ὀρισάμενος τὸ ὄνομα καὶ τὸ ῥῆμα, περὶ ὧν ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς πραγματείας λέγειν προέθετο...