‘The Reception of Aristotle’s *Categories*, c. 80 BC to AD 220’

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This thesis focuses on the ancient reception of the *Categories* of Aristotle, a work which served continuously, from late antiquity into the early modern period (Frede 1987), as the student’s introduction to philosophy. There had previously been no comprehensive study of the reception of the *Categories* during the age of the first philosophical commentaries (c. 80 BC to AD 220). In this study, I have collected, assigned, and analyzed the relevant fragments of commentary belonging to this period, including some that were previously undocumented or inexplicit in the source texts, and sought to establish and characterize the influence of the early commentators’ activity on the subsequent Peripatetic tradition. In particular, I trace the early evolution of criticism and defense of the text through competing accounts of its aim (*skopos*), which would ultimately lead Stoic and Platonic philosophers to a partial acceptance of the *Categories* and frame its role in the later Neo-Platonic curriculum.
Preface

This thesis is offered towards the requirements of the Doctorate of Philosophy in Classics (Greek and Latin) at the University of Oxford. It was completed between October 2006 and February 2009, through the generous support of the Scholarships and Fellowships Commission of the Commonwealth of Nations and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

The thesis includes a substantial ‘Appendix’ of Primary Texts. This Appendix collects, mainly in Greek and Latin and in translation, the fragments and testimonia of Andronicus of Rhodes, the Platonists Lucius and Nicostratus, the Stoics Athenodorus and L. Annaeus Cornutus, Boethus of Sidon and Herminus. It also collects a more selective sample of the fragments of Eudorus of Alexandria and Ariston of Alexandria. The appendix is organized to correspond to the chapter numeration of the main body of the text. Frequent reference is made to the appendix throughout this study, in the following form:

Strabo, Geographica 14.2.13 = Andronicus T1.

The number T1 refers to the first fragment or testimonium under the chapter heading ‘Andronicus’ in the Appendix. In a case where a single source generates a large number of fragments and testimonies, I often give the source a single number and distinguish each fragment by a lowercase Latin letter, as follows:

Simplicius, in Cat. 13,16 = Herminus T6d.

Currently the numeration is limited to correspond to each chapter (for instance, Andronicus T1 is not Boethus T1), and the appendix is simply provided as a convenience to the reader. In the future I intend to renumber and organize the fragmenta and testimonia in the appendix to stand on its own, as a more comprehensive resource.1 Nevertheless, I hope that it serves as a useful aid in its current form for uniting the main sources in one place.

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1 With a view to this eventual end, several of the more important testimonies have been distinguished as A B C texts in the appendix (using an upper case, sans serif font), thus following the familiar practice of Diels-Kranz signifying testimonies, true fragmenta, and imitations.
The General Introduction discusses my methodology, and sources. I will merely stress here that my approach has been necessarily selective in several respects, chiefly for reasons of space and scope. For example, I have often been able to touch only briefly on very complex philosophical issues relating to the interpretation of the *Categories* itself and the validity or value of various ancient views expressed about it; I hope to delve deeper into the issues raised by this study in future work. Moreover, while I believe that I have included nearly all of the important personae and textual sources in Greek and Latin for my topic, and many of the lesser-known personae and sources, neither the text nor the appendix are exhaustive. In particular, I have been reliant on existing translations and commentaries for Arabic sources (which have been useful, for example, in the chapters on Andronicus and Herminus), and I hope to gain direct access to Arabic sources in the future. Also, I have not yet been able to come into contact with exciting (but presently confidential) new evidence for the *Categories* commentary in the Archimedes Palimpsest, which may be the work of Alexander of Aphrodisias. I look forward to incorporating such evidence into further research on this topic as it is disclosed and published.

English translations of the later ancient commentators are almost invariably drawn from the *Ancient Commentators on Aristotle* series under the general editorship of Prof. Richard Sorabji, unless otherwise noted; the individual translations are cited in the general introduction below, and again in the Bibliography. I discuss my reliance on secondary literature in the General Introduction, but I should note here a broad point of practice in dealing with texts from the Neoplatonic commentators, who provide the bulk of the sources. I have often given Greek texts, English translations, and (brief) discussion of the most important fragments in two places, in the main body of the text and in the appendix. This has led to some unnecessary duplication, but I hope that it has simplified the task of the reader.

I am indebted to numerous individuals for discussions and advice leading to the improvement of this treatment. I have benefited in particular from fruitful conversations with my doctoral supervisor, Prof. Tobias Reinhardt. I am also grateful to my doctoral examiners, Prof. Richard Sorabji and Dr Peter Adamson, for their very valuable comments and recommendations for the improvement of the text. (For its remaining infelicities, I remain, of course, wholly responsible!) In addition, this thesis owes its existence to Prof. Michael Griffin.

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2 I am grateful to Robert Sharples for personal communications about the palimpsest, and for the material made available on the project website at [www.archimedespalimpsest.org](http://www.archimedespalimpsest.org).
Frede, who suggested this topic in 2005 and encouraged me to pursue it. Last but not least, I was inspired to study the intellectual history of the early Roman Empire in the first place by the pioneering work of a fellow Orielensis, Prof. John Dillon’s *The Middle Platonists* (1977), and I am delighted to contribute a link to the chain of ancient philosophy at Oriel.

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Selected Abbreviations

**CAG** Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca. Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin.

**Cat.** Categories.


**OSAP** Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy.


**T1, T2, etc.** Reference to texts under chapter headings in the Appendix of Texts.

General Introduction
Well, then, what is the reason that impelled the philosophers of old to engage in disputes of every kind with each other on the subject of this Aristotelian writing which we call the *Categories*? For as far as I can see, neither have more numerous controversies occurred about any other topic, nor have greater contests been stirred up, not only by Stoics and Platonists trying to undermine these Aristotelian *Categories*, but even among the Peripatetics with each other...

It is because... the subject (*skopos*) of this book concerns the primary and simple expressions (*lexeis*) <and the realities> they signify. So since *logos* is useful to all branches of philosophy, and the first principles of this are simple expressions and their objects of reference, it is natural that much controversy has arisen....

Dexippus, *On the Categories* 5,16-22 (tr. after Dillon), 4th century CE

Es war ein eines scharfsinnigen Mannes würdiger Anschlag des Aristoteles, diese Grundbegriffe aufzusuchen. Da er aber kein Prinzipium hatte, so raffte er sie auf, wie sie ihm aufstießen, und trieb deren zuerst zehn auf, die er Kategorien (Prädikamente) nannte. In der Folge glaubte er noch ihrer fünf aufgefunden zu haben, die er unter dem Namen der Postprädikamente hinzufügte. Allein seine Tafel blieb noch immer mangelhaft.

It was an enterprise worthy of an acute thinker like Aristotle to try to discover these fundamental concepts; but as he had no guiding principle he merely picked them up as they occurred to him, and at first gathered up ten of them, which he called categories or predicaments. Afterwards he thought he had discovered five more of them, which he added under the name of post-predicaments. But his table remained imperfect for all that …

Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*  
*Transcendental Doctrine of Elements*, Pt 2, Div 1,1.1, §3, 10  
(tr. N. Kemp Smith), first ed. 1781

There is a theory called the theory of categories which in a more or less developed form, with minor or major modifications, made its appearance first in a large number of Aristotelian writings and then, under the influence of these writings, came to be a standard part of traditional logic, a place it maintained with more or less success into the early part of this century, when it made the same fate as certain other parts of traditional logic.

There are many questions one may ask about this theory. Presumably not the most interesting question, but certainly one for which one would want to have an answer if one took any interest in the theory at all, is the following: What are categories? It turns out that this is a rather large and difficult question. And hence I want to restrict myself to the narrower and more modest question, What are categories in Aristotle?, hoping that a clarification of this question ultimately will help to clarify the more general questions. But even this narrower question turns out to be so complicated and controversial that I will be content if I can shed some light on the simple questions: What does the word ‘category’ mean in Aristotle?

M. Frede, ‘Categories in Aristotle’  
(repr. in *Essays in Ancient Philosophy*, 1987).
The short, compressed philosophical essay that comes down to us under the name *Categories* (Κατηγορίαι) has exercised a special kind of fascination throughout the Western intellectual tradition. For two thousand years of recorded study, the *Categories* was embedded in the fabric of philosophical education as a key component of traditional logic (Frede 1987:29). After a thoroughgoing engagement in the Greek, Latin, and Arabic traditions, which is briefly sketched below, the *Categories* received a thoughtful critique from the seminal philosophers of early modern Europe, among them Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Kant (see, e.g., Gillespie 1925:79 = 1979:1). And while the *Categories* has since retired from its place as the gatekeeper of philosophy and higher studies coincident with the rapid transformation of modern European logic, its retirement years have been busy and fruitful: albeit in a more restricted disciplinary venue, contemporary students of Aristotle have come second to none of their predecessors in working out novel and careful interpretations of the place of the *Categories* in Aristotle’s philosophical system and intellectual development.

Following two millennia of examination, the *Categories* remains as controversial as ever. Some of its inherent difficulty as well as its allure rests in its enigmatic organisation as a text, which has not come down to us in quite the form that Aristotle intended – if indeed Aristotle was the author of parts of the treatise. The *Categories* has almost nothing explicit to tell us about its own goals as a text; nothing about its relationship to other treatises by any author; and it employs numerous locutions and arguments that do not occur elsewhere in Aristotle. Before the first century BCE, its readers complemented the text with numerous interpolations in order to piece together a coherent treatise. Even the name Κατηγορίαι was just one of many titles circulating in antiquity, each of them reflecting a different vision of the aim or subject-matter of the treatise. If we do grant, with the consensus of most contemporary scholars,¹ that our *Categories* 1-9 (if not 10-15) is an authentic work of Aristotle, then we are left with a number of difficult problems: for example, what kind of text it is, how Aristotle meant it to be read, whether it is internally consistent, when in his complex philosophical...

¹ For discussion of the authenticity of the *Categories*, see for example Frede (‘Unity, Title, Authenticity’, in 1987), De Rijk (1951), and Husik (1952:97-203). Its authenticity was not questioned in antiquity, with the exception of the postpraedicamenta. Spengel (1845), cited in Husik, may have been the earliest modern attempt to question its authorship, followed by Prantl (1846). But Zeller (II a, 67 n. 1) accepted it. The *Cat.* is broadly accepted as Aristotelian today, and discussed as Aristotle’s work by most of the critics surveyed in chapter 2 below, including Ackrill (1963), Barrington Jones (1972), Dancy (1975), Irwin (1981), Furth (1988), Rist (1989), Lewis (1991), Wedin (2000), Mann (2000), and Shields (2003).
development it might have been composed, how it relates to the other surviving treatises by Aristotle, and so forth.

The present study does not set out to grapple directly with these problems, which attract new analysis on a regular basis and may well continue to do so for another two millennia, σὺν θεοῖς. Rather, this study explores an essential chapter in the history of how these problems were approached in antiquity. In particular, it seeks to recount how the readers of Aristotle during the age of the first philosophical commentaries – coincident with the rise and teetering of the Roman Empire – thought that these problems might have been solved, and what kinds of solutions they sought to offer, sometimes in cooperation and sometimes in competition. The interest of their solutions is intrinsically clear: for it was through their early accounts of the Categories, both polemical and exegetical, that this koan of a text initially came to exercise so much fascination in the ancient philosophical schools, and ultimately made its way to the forefront of the late antique curricula in Greek and Latin.

Many studies have already demonstrated the value of the history of commentary on the Categories, and several scholars have also pointed to the first century BCE as the crucible of its fascination. For instance, Robert Sharples (2008:274) has remarked that

The attention given to Aristotle’s Categories in antiquity had major consequences for the future direction of philosophy. The prominence in subsequent discussion of the problem of universals, and more generally of questions concerning the relation between being, knowledge and language, is due in large part to the Categories coming in antiquity to occupy the place it did at the start of the philosophical curriculum. This has also affected approaches to Aristotle himself.

Marwan Rashed’s novel treatment of Alexander of Aphrodisias, Essentialisme (2007), has shown that Alexander (in the late second and early third century CE) interpreted Aristotle’s De Anima and Metaphysics through the lens of the Organon, and especially the Categories.\(^2\) The Neoplatonist Porphyry explicitly defended the value of the Categories as an introduction to philosophy, and through his agency, centuries later, it had secured a place at the gateway of the Neoplatonic curriculum for Aristotelian studies. Subsequent scholarship on the Categories in the Latin West demonstrates its far-reaching influence on thinkers ranging from

Boethius through Eriugena (c. 800–c. 877), Abelard (1078–1142), Aquinas (1225/6–1274), Roger Bacon (1214–1294), Duns Scotus (c. 1265/6–1308), William Ockham (c. 1285–1347) and into the fifteenth century with Latin commentators such as Paul of Venice: for a recent overview, see Newton (2008). In the Arabic tradition, as Peter Adamson notes, the seminal philosopher and translator al-Kindī (c. 800–870) took a special interest in the *Isagoge* and the *Categories*, and al-Fārābī (c. 872–c. 950) commented on the *Organon* in full, although Avicenna (c. 980–1037) would later offer the definitive replacement for much of the traditional *Organon*. Nevertheless, even early modern and current trends in Arabic and Persian philosophy, following Avicenna, demonstrate as strong an interest in the *Organon* as may be found in contemporary Anglo-Saxon philosophy.

But the chapter of the story that precedes Alexander – that is, the reception of the *Categories* during the period spanning the gap from the alleged ‘rediscovery’ of Aristotle’s esoteric works in the first century BCE (see chapter 3, ‘Andronicus’) to the first extant commentaries on the *Categories* in the third century CE – has not yet been treated in any comprehensive study, although it is discussed in the course of the surveys by Paul Moraux, Gottschalk, and others, noted below. It was during this period that the *Categories* came to acquire its location at the outset of the Aristotelian curriculum, which it held by the late second century (see chapter 7, ‘Herminus’). And it was also during this period that many of the familiar later difficulties regarding the *Categories* were framed, such as its relationship to the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle and the core problem of defining its subject-matter.

**From 80 BC to 220 CE**

The philosophers with whom the present study is primarily concerned lived between about the middle of the first century before our era and the middle of the third century of our era. Since, with very few exceptions, the lives of these people are not securely dated, the dates

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4 Reisman (2007), 65.

5 A recent discussion as to whether the categories properly belong to ontology or logic (noted in Ziai 2005) demonstrates that the *aporiai* of antiquity remain vital across cultures, languages, and centuries.

6 Griffin and Barnes (1989), Barnes and Griffin (1997), Long and Sedley (1987), and Sorabji and Sharples (2007) provide overviews of the literature on the intellectual life of the early Roman Empire and the second sophistic. Authoritative studies on the Peripatetic school in our period are discussed below.
used in the title of this study are rather arbitrary. But roughly speaking, this study collects and treats the first preserved fragments of views related to the *Categories* after Theophrastus, which appear to have been formulated in the first century BCE during a tremendous upsurge of interest in Aristotelian studies and the original texts of Aristotle’s school-treatises, a transformation which is frequently associated with the name of Andronicus of Rhodes. We will trace the scarce witnesses to the *Categories* for nearly three hundred years following this upsurge, until, with the third century, we arrive at the beginning of a stream of fully or partly preserved works in the age of Alexander of Aphrodisias, Plotinus, and Porphyry. In practice, this sets the bounds of our study from the middle of the first century BCE to the early third century CE, and within those bounds, the leading figures of commentary on the *Categories* are preserved only in later fragments. Although our study concludes with the early third century (and excludes Alexander and Galen, except as sources for the fragments of their predecessors), we will necessarily draw on a number of related works from the third century and later: related subject matter by Alexander, responses to the *Categories* itself by Plotinus and Porphyry, followed by Iamblichus and Dexippus in the third century, Ammonius and Boethius in the fifth, and Simplicius and Olympiodorus in the sixth. The main personae and sources are rostered below.

There are several merits in such a close study of the testimonies to the reading of the *Categories* belonging to this era. One is the fragmentary nature of the evidence, which has not previously been comprehensively collected and analysed; the more time is spent combing through the later sources for (sometimes implicit) testimonia and imitations, the more information about the lost works might be obtained. Another is the influential nature of these early interpretations. At least as the later tradition beginning with Porphyry represents them, the commentators of the first and second centuries established the boundaries of how the *Categories* might be read, why it might be important, and what function it served within Aristotle’s philosophy. Many of their ideas and arguments have been recapitulated throughout the tradition of subsequent commentary on the *Categories*, and recent scholarship is no exception (and I seek to paint at least a narrow picture of these echoes in chapter 2). Moreover, there may be some room to point out places where the preconceptions of the first-century commentators, once these are identified, have continued to shape the readings of the text until the present. While such broader implications are largely outside the scope of this study, it is hoped that the analysis here may provide a useful basis for further research along these lines.
Goals and Methods

Materials

This study proceeds through a close study of the fragments and testimonia for several of the key personae spanning the period under consideration, in particular: Andronicus of Rhodes, Boethus of Sidon, ‘Lucius’, Nicostratus, Athenodorus, L. Annaeus Cornutus, and Herminus. A briefer treatment is offered for several other personae, in particular: Eudorus of Alexandria, Ariston of Alexandria, ‘Archytas’, Aspasius, Ardrastus, Taurus, and Sosigenes. Several other Peripatetics, Stoics, and Platonists are treated in passing. The historical figures under consideration are listed fully below (‘Personae’), and discussed in detail throughout the main body of the study.

The fragments and testimonia are collected in the ‘Appendix of Texts’ attached to this study. As a survey of the appendix will show, the majority of the important philosophical fragments are drawn from the later Neoplatonic commentaries on the Categories in Greek: in particular, from Porphyry’s shorter surviving commentary, from Dexippus’s commentary (which, according to Simplicius, is effectively a selective rendition of two lost commentaries, namely Porphyry’s longer ad Gedalium and Iamblichus in Cat.), from Simplicius’s own commentary, and from the later Alexandrian commentaries, mainly those of Ammonius, Olympiodorus, and David (Elias). Simplicius’s voluminous surviving commentary is the backbone of these fragments, and often provides attributions where the others lack them. I have used a number of other sources in Greek for philosophical fragments and testimonia – Plutarch, Aspasius, and Plotinus, for examples – but most of the earlier Greek texts to be found in the appendix, such as Strabo and Lucian, have been deployed for historical and biographical detail. In Latin, Boethius’s commentaries have also proved to be a useful philosophical source, but most of the other Latin sources found in the Appendix – such as Cicero and Persius – have been deployed here just for historical and biographical detail. I have occasionally been able to draw on Arabic sources, as in the chapters on Andronicus and Herminus; in these cases, I have been reliant on editors’ translations and previous commentators. The primary texts are listed more fully below (‘Sources’), and the following chapter on the skopos following this introduction provides a detailed case-study of my use of Simplicius.

Secondary literature is cited separately for each chapter and collected in the bibliography. Like all students of the Peripatetic tradition in the early empire, I am frequently indebted to
Paul Moraux’s foundational *Aristotelismus* I and II, even (or especially) where I have ventured an alternative interpretation of the scarce evidence. Among more recent surveys of the period in question, I am especially reliant on those by Gottschalk (1987) and Sharples (2008).

For the collection of Neoplatonic sources on Aristotle, I have made liberal use of the three-volume *Sourcebook* recently published by Richard Sorabji (2005), especially volume 3, for subjects as distant from each other (at least to the modern eye) as homonymy and Iamblichean ‘noeric exegesis’. With respect to the Neoplatonic approach to Aristotle, I have also appreciated the perspectives of Ilsetraut Hadot (e.g., 1991) and Rainer Thiel (2004). More generally, I have been fortunate to rely on a number of penetrating essays in two recent survey volumes edited by Richard Sorabji and Robert Sharples (2007), among which I may mention in particular those by Barnes, Reinhardt, Sorabji, and Sharples, and in the earlier volume *Aristotle Transformed*, also edited by Richard Sorabji (1990). On subjects of Middle Platonism, I have gained a great deal from the classic treatment of Dillon (1977) and the new work of George Karamanolis (2006).

Where the fragments have demanded the traversal of difficult conceptual terrain, I have found a number of guides very useful; these are cited in the footnotes and bibliography as they occur, but here I can mention papers by Barnes and the seminal work of Patzig translated by him (for passages relating to the syllogism), several classic texts by Sorabji such as *Time, Creation, and the Continuum* (1983), Marwan Rashed’s innovative *Essentialisme* (2007), and multiple articles on the Hellenistic theories of language in the volume *Language and Learning* (2005). I have also found useful materials in the Australian ‘Reception of Categories’ project,⁷ and I am grateful to Prof. Harold Tarrant for drawing these materials to my attention, as well as sharing his own valuable survey (Tarrant, unpublished). Last but by no means least, I have profited greatly from the tremendous array of close commentaries and translations of nearly all of the source texts in the ever-growing *Ancient Commentators on Aristotle* series published by Duckworth.

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Method, Structure, and Goals

This study begins (in the present introductory chapter) by introducing the personae and sources to be considered. In chapter 1 on the ancient treatment and skopos of the Categories, I provide a brief case-study of the ‘stratigraphy’ of sources in Simplicius and the Alexandrians, both key sources for nearly all of the personae under consideration. The purpose of this case-study is twofold: first, to provide an example of the deep and complex organisation of the source-texts, including Simplicius’s mediation of Porphyry and Iamblichus and (before them) Alexander, so as to show the problems involved in the use of the primary sources; and second, to introduce the question of the skopos or ‘goal’ or ‘aim’ of the Categories, which is, perhaps, the most persistent theme in all of the sources to be studied. Among the early ancient commentators, Herminus is the chief focus of chapter 1, which will also be referred to throughout chapter 7 (‘Herminus’).

The second chapter (‘Categories 1-2 in Modern Exegesis’) surveys a selection of modern approaches to the first two chapters of the Categories, namely the ‘onymies’ and the fourfold division that leads into the decalogy. The first Bekker pages of the Cat. appear to have sparked the most vigorous (surviving) criticism in the period under consideration (whether because the issues were genuinely of special interest, or because they happened to come first: cf. Sharples, 2008), and they are tightly linked to the problem of the skopos or goal of the text. My treatment in chapter 2 aims to provide a conceptual framework for the discussion that follows, as the following chapters will make frequent reference to the concepts occurring throughout Cat. 1-2.

Chapters 3 through 7 – Andronicus, Lucius and Nicostratus, Boethus of Sidon, Athenodorus and Cornutus, and Herminus – follow a broadly chronological progression from the first century BCE to the second century CE, and share a common structure. Each introduces a major persona and discusses their fragments and testimonia, their life, and their comments on the Categories in detail, and also covers the fragments of closely related figures. Broadly, these chapters focus on the question of the skopos of the Categories as a common theme; each of the personae concerned offered a view about the subject of the work, and it is in this context that the later sources (from Porphyry onward) represent them. The smaller ‘sub-chapters’, namely ‘Eudorus and other ancients’ (ch. 3.1) and ‘The second century to Galen’ (ch. 7.1) – aim to fill in some contextual gaps around these personae; in particular, ch.
3.1 hints at the importance of the so-called ‘Neopythagorean’ tradition in the rise of the *Categories* during the first century BCE.

The first of these major forays, Chapter 3, treats Andronicus of Rhodes, examining the evidence for his alleged ‘edition’ or ‘publication’ of Aristotle, and considering the sources for his philosophical views and motives. (i) In this chapter, I argue in favour of the importance of Andronicus’s ‘publication’ and catalogue of Aristotle’s esoterica, especially its implications for the *order* of the works, but (following Barnes) I argue against the concept of a seminal ‘edition’ of the text, or significant contribution to the internal structure of our (e.g.) *Metaphysics* or *Topics*. (ii) I also suggest several strong general themes in Andronicus’s philosophical treatment: first, a clear rejection of Stoic ‘corporealism’, and a view of the *Categories*’ account of inherence as an alternative to the Stoic account about properties (cf. Menn 1999, Caston 1999); second, a view that the *Categories* is about *dialectical* practice and not about ontology (*pace* his Platonising contemporaries); third, an explanation of the *Categories* as a successful attempt to explain the twofold ‘division’ of absolute and relative (cf. *Sophist* 255C), or substance and accident (partly preserved in Boethius’s *de Divisione*). (iii) I argue that Andronicus’s notorious athetisation of the *De Int.* need not imply that he did not comment on it, or even endorse some of its views, and most importantly, need not imply that it did not appear in his publication and catalogue. Moreover, I suggest that Andronicus’s ‘athetisation’ as reported in the later tradition might reflect misgivings, anticipating Herminus, about the mediating role of παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς between verbal expressions and their objects (*De Int.* 16a6-7).

Finally, in the following brief ‘sub-chapter’ dealing with Eudorus and other figures of the first centuries (ch. 3.1), I argue that in many of these innovations Andronicus may have been responding to an Alexandrian tradition about the *Categories* represented by Eudorus rather than vice versa; in particular, I suggest that Andronicus sought to show that the *Categories* concerned language and logic (not being) precisely to dispatch the objections that had already been raised about it, and would later be sharpened by ‘Lucius’ and Nicostratus. Broadly, I propose that Andronicus’s presentation of the *Categories* offered an alternative to a contemporary or earlier Pythagorean reading represented by Eudorus.

Chapter 4 treats the Platonising figures Lucius and Nicostratus, whose names occur only in the pages of Simplicius, but who are the sources for many of the *aporiai* raised about the
Categories by Plotinus. While I suggest that Lucius – if indeed he is an historical figure at all – may have lived before Boethus of Sidon (and contemporary with Andronicus), this is largely speculation; however, I think there are some grounds for the belief that Boethus really did respond to a ‘Lucius’, and I also believe that this ‘Lucius’ represents the Pythagoreanising views inaugurated by Eudorus and shared by ‘Archytas’. In this chapter, I try to separate the views of Lucius from those of Nicostratus, who likely lived in the second century CE (with Praechter), and I seek to show that Lucius may have lived earlier than Nicostratus and may have represented the Pythagoreanising school to which Boethus replied. His arguments, I suggest, sharpened the response of that school to Andronicus.

Chapter 5 studies Boethus of Sidon, whose views on a number of subjects are treated in detail. Nearly all of the fragments that I have collected in Greek are mentioned in this chapter, although I am able to deal only with a handful in detail. I discuss (among other topics) the famous suggestion of Boethus that (at least as Porphyry interprets him) ‘form is an accident of matter’, which in some ways continues the interest of Andronicus in the inherence of properties. But this chapter’s focus is on Boethus’s account of the skopos, and in particular his inauguration of the concept that the skopos is ‘words significant of things, insofar as they are significant’. I note that Boethus’s formula is later used by Herminus to respond to the critique of the Categories leveled by the Stoic Athenodorus (who took the book to be an inadequate account of language); but Boethus himself does not appear to defend against that attack explicitly in the surviving sources. He is rather focused on defending the Categories in the face of the kinds of criticisms found in Lucius, namely, that it is an inadequate account of being. I suggest that the Athenodoran position may have been developed as a reaction to the Andronican presentation of the Categories as a dialectical work (which itself may have postdated, or even responded to, the Pythagorean-Platonic reading of the text as an account of sensible being).

Chapter 6 treats the Stoics Athenodorus and Cornutus. After examining the historical sources for Athenodorus (Calvus?) and L. Annaeus Cornutus, I suggest that they took very different lines on the Categories: I believe that Athenodorus provided a (fairly early) criticism of the Categories as an inadequate account of language, which was later rebutted by Cornutus himself, who showed that the Categories involved just the second, truly dialectical ‘part’ of Stoic dialectic (not the ‘linguistic’ portion), and therefore was not obliged to treat language as such. I also argue in this chapter that Simplicius applied the ambiguous term διάρεσις to
two distinct lines of criticism, which are preserved in two (possibly independent) traditions but are amalgamated by Simplicius in one passage. It is critical to distinguish (i) criticisms of the διάίρεσις of the ten categories from (ii) criticisms of the διάίρεσις of the Categories as a text into three major sections (namely the onymies, predicables, and postpraedicamenta). The first criticism is reliably attributed to Athenodorus and Cornutus, but it is less clear that they are the source of the second. I also seek to show in this chapter that a particular passage of Simplicius (64,18-65,13, representing a criticism of the Categories for omitting conjunctions and other grammatical entities) may be wrongly ascribed to ‘Lucius’, and might instead be reassigned to Athenodorus.

Chapter 7 studies Herminus, introduced in chapter 1, who is perhaps now best known for having taught Alexander of Aphrodisias at some point in his career. This chapter seeks to make several new points about Herminus: I suggest that Porphyry had access to Herminus only via Alexander of Aphrodisias; that Herminus revives the Boethan formulation about the skopos of the Categories; that he holds to a ‘conceptless’ view of signification (where words signify objects directly and without concepts, in contravention of the opening of the De Interpretatione, at least as De Int. 16a1-8 was usually read in the Peripatetic tradition); that Herminus’s view of signification can be found in Porphyry’s shorter commentary in Cat. and that the notion that words signify their objects ‘naturally’ is reflected in his views on the second figure of the syllogism (in Alex. in An Pr.), as well as several other passages in the commentators. Herminus’s adoption of a theory of ‘natural signification’ from the Hellenistic schools, although aspects of it were later rebutted by Porphyry and others, appears (as I suggest) to have exercised a significant influence on later antiquity via Porphyry’s shorter commentary, and to have introduced one common ‘thread’ of interpretation of Aristotle’s logic. I also question the accepted reasoning for distinguishing the ‘Peripatetic’ Herminus from the ‘Stoic’ Herminus mentioned by Longinus. Finally, it may be pointed out that Herminus appears (according to the sources available to us) to have been the first to describe the place of the Categories in the curriculum as a pedagogical necessity ‘for the young’.

A brief discussion in the following sub-chapter (ch. 7.1) treats, for the sake of context, a number of personae of the second century who commented (often in just one or two surviving fragments) on the Categories. This discussion notes the changing tide toward a more ‘syncretistic’ or eclectic approach to the text in the second century CE, challenged by a strong reaction against this eclecticism, especially from Platonists such as Taurus.
In the general conclusion, I seek to draw together this narrative, with a focus on the *skopos* or ‘subject’ of the text, and express how the *Categories* may have initially entered the scene of philosophical discourse in the earlier first century (possibly with Eudorus and the Alexandrian school); how it was read and presented by Andronicus via his general publication (as a work of ‘dialectic’ providing an Aristotelian alternative to the Stoic and Platonic dialectic – but not as a work about ontology); how certain representatives of a Platonic-Pythagorean school of thought responded (Lucius, later followed by Nicostratus), still maintaining that it was an inadequate account of *beings*; how certain Stoics responded (Athenodorus, later followed and amended by Cornutus), maintaining that it was an inadequate account of *language*, then shifting to a broad agreement with its project; and how, in the context of a more eclectic philosophical environment, Herminus was able to provide a formulation (following Boethus) that achieved a broad consensus, and exercised a significant influence on the later tradition via Porphyry, who would amend it.

**Personae**

The following synopsis of the dramatis personae looks forward to the main body of the study, in which several of these philosophers are treated in detail. A fuller bibliography is also provided in the relevant chapters.
Andronicus of Rhodes8 (fl. after 43 BCE?). Chapter 3. A first-century BCE Peripatetic, said by some later sources to have been scholarch in Athens, who is widely credited with the publication of Aristotle that reintroduced his esoteric works to the contemporary public. Among his works was a seminal catalogue of Aristotle, and a paraphrasis of the Categories. Several unorthodox views of Andronicus about the text have come down to us: for example, his replacement of the categories ‘When’ and ‘Where’ with those of ‘Time’ and ‘Place’. He set an emphasis on the Categories as a work of dialectic, and perhaps sought to set up the Organon as a systematic alternative to Stoic dialectic. His fragments and testimonia are collected under Andronicus in the Appendix of Texts.

Eudorus of Alexandria9 (fl. c. 50 BCE?). See Chapters 3 and 3.1. An ‘Academic’ and Neopythagorean who discussed the Categories in the first century BCE, perhaps prior to or contemporary with Andronicus’s paraphrasis. He may have introduced the criticism of the Categories as an inadequate account of being, and specifically ‘intelligible’ being. At the


same time, Eudorus may have found in the Categories a congenial analogy for certain aspects of (Neopythagorean) metaphysics. The emphasis of his fragments suggests that Eudorus read the Categories primarily as a work with something to say about the structure of being, not about the structure of language and dialectic. A selection of his fragments and testimonia is collected under Eudorus in the Appendix of Texts.

Ariston of Alexandria10 (fl. c. 50 BCE?). See Chapter 3.1. A rival of Eudorus in Alexandria, who allegedly ‘apostasised’ from the Academy to the Peripatos alongside Cratippus of Pergamon. He shared many of Andronicus’s views, for example on the definition of the Relative. A selection of his fragments is collected under Ariston in the Appendix of Texts.

‘Archytas’11 (fl. c. 50 BCE?). See Chapter 3.1. The name given to the author of certain influential Neopythagorean pseudepigrapha, to signify their authorship by the fourth-century Pythagorean and Academic Archytas of Tarentum; the ‘Pseudo-Archytan’ corpus is strongly influenced by Eudorus. At least three of ‘Archytas’s’ texts dealt with the subject-matter of the Categories, and the Neoplatonic philosopher Iamblichus (see below) held that his works were written prior to the Cat., and could profitably be employed in order to obtain a higher understanding of the subject-matter of the Cat.

Philo of Alexandria12 (20 BCE to 50 CE). Briefly discussed in Chapter 3.1. The great Jewish philosopher, exegete and polymath is mentioned briefly in chapter 3.1 and elsewhere, particularly as a follower of Eudorus in some areas of his treatment of the Categories. He is not separately treated as a major subject of this study, although there is much of interest for future research in Philo’s use of the ten categories (although not necessarily of the Categories) throughout his corpus.


11 See the introduction to T. A. Szlesák (1972) and M. Frede in Der Neue Pauly, as well as Dörrie, Platonica minora, 300. I have also found the synopsis in Dillon (1977) and Bonazzi (2007) useful, with other literature given in chs. 3 and 3.1.

12 On Philo of Alexandria, see Runia in Der Neue Pauly I 12, with extensive bibliography. On his use of Peripatetic material, see Gottschalk, 1141 and 1145-46.
‘Lucius’\(^{13}\) (fl. later first century BCE?). **Chapter 4.** Evidently a Platonising critic of the *Categories*, perhaps datable before or contemporary with Boethus of Sidon; Lucius’s fragments survive only from Simplicius *On the Categories*. He seems to have broadly followed Eudorus, especially in his criticism of the *Categories* as an inadequate treatment of intelligible being, and set the stage for the discussion in Plotinus, *Enn.* 6.1. However, as I argue in ch. 4, there is very little evidence for an historical figure Lucius, and the name *may* serve to represent an entire Platonic-Pythagorean ‘school’ to which Boethus replied under this name. His fragments and testimonia are collected fully under **Lucius and Nicostratus** in the Appendix of Texts.

**Boethus of Sidon** (fl. first centuries BCE–CE). **Chapter 5.** An especially diligent and influential Peripatetic reader of the *Categories* and (according to late sources) disciple of Andronicus, who defended the text against the arguments of ‘Lucius’, among others. Boethus sought to rebut the allegation that Aristotle had failed to provide an adequate account of intelligible being, and is the first scholar on record to ask instead how the *Categories* account of *ousia* can be reconciled with that of the *Metaphysics*. He also reasserted the canonical views of Aristotle in certain respects against the less orthodox positions of Andronicus, for example, reinstating ‘When’ and ‘Where’ in the roster of ten categories. Boethus’s formulation that the *Categories* concerns ‘simple verbal expressions significant of beings, insofar as they are significant’ was later adopted by Herminus – perhaps, as I suggest, in response to Athenodorus and Cornutus – and became foundational for Neoplatonic and later semantics (with discussion below see, e.g., ‘Porphyrian Semantics’ in Lloyd 1990). His fragments and testimonia are collected as fully as possible under **Boethus** in the Appendix of texts.

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**Athenodorus [of Tarsus?]**\(^{14}\) (*fl. c. 50 BCE or later first century*?). **Chapter 6.** A Stoic philosopher, perhaps to be identified with the mentor of Octavian, who criticised the *Categories* as dealing inadequately with the parts of speech. His fragments and testimonia are collected under **Athenodorus and Cornutus** in the Appendix of Texts.

**L. Annaeus Cornutus**\(^{15}\) (*fl. c. 60 CE*). **Chapter 6.** Cornutus is chiefly known to the historical tradition as the tutor of the silver-age poet Persius and as an associate or instructor of the emperor Nero. Among other subjects, he wrote extensively on grammar and Stoic allegory (the latter work is extant), and he composed a work of commentary that challenged both Athenodorus and Aristotle on the *Categories*. Cornutus may, as I suggest, have defended the *Categories* against the attacks of Athenodorus by pointing out that it should be viewed as a contribution to the second ‘part’ of Stoic dialectic, rather than the first (linguistic) part; this defense was then taken up by Herminus and combined with Boethus’s formulation of the *skopos*. His fragments and testimonia are collected under **Athenodorus and Cornutus** in the Appendix of Texts.

**Plutarch of Chaeronea (46 to c. 122 CE).** Employed as a source in **Chapter 3**; briefly discussed in **Chapter 3.1**. The prodigious writer Plutarch is here primarily employed as a source, particularly as a philosophical source for Eudorus of Alexandria (in *Proc. An.*, discussed by Dillon 1977:226 and by Karamanolis 2006:124-25: see my ch. 3.1) and as an historical source for Andronicus of Rhodes. A remarkable passage in his *Generation of the Soul in the Timaeus*, which refers to Eudorus frequently, suggests that Plato anticipated the full doctrine of *Categories* in the *Timaeus*, and in fact has a more complete and accurate picture of it than does Aristotle; this is also the view taken by Eudorus and (implicitly) ‘Archytas’, but it survives explicitly in Plutarch.

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\(^{14}\) For the historical tradition on Athenodorus, I rely chiefly upon the review in R. Goulet, *DPhA* (entries 496-98); Moraux II 592-601; B. L. Hijmans, ‘Athenodorus on the *Categories* and a pun on Athenodorus’, 105-114 in J. Mansfeld and L.M. de Rijk (eds.), *Kephalaion: Studies in Greek Philosophy and its Continuation Offered to Professor C. J. de Vogel* (Assen, 1975). For bibliography see *DPhA* entries 496-98, and especially entry 497 on Calvus.

\(^{15}\) For my discussion of Cornutus as an historical figure, I am indebted to the entry of Pedro Pablo Fuentes González in R. Goulet, *DPhA* (entry 190); Moraux II (1984); and the overviews of Cornutus’s allegorical practice in G. Boys-Stones (2007 and in *id.*, 2003), in G. W. Most, ‘Cornutus and Stoic Allegoresis’ in *ANRW II.36.3* (1989), 2014-2065 (with bibliography) and in A.A. Long, ‘Stoic Readings of Homer’, 53-54 = *Stoic Studies*, 71-72. For comprehensive bibliography see *DPhA* entry 190.
**Nicostratus**\(^{16}\) (early second century CE). **Chapter 4.** Like Lucius, whose views he endorses, the fragments of Nicostratus survive solely in Simplicius *On the Categories*. Praechter identifies him persuasively with the Nicostratus honoured in an inscription at Delphi (*Sylloge* II\(^3\) Nr. 868). He shares Lucius’s concern with the adequacy of the *Categories* as an account of intelligible being, and is is likely that Plotinus found these difficulties expressed in Nicostratus, directly or indirectly. But Nicostratus also demonstrates (either through his own interests or through the accidents of preservation) a stronger interest in the rhetorical coherence and internal consistency of the *Categories*, and appears to be equally concerned with these problems as he is with matters of doctrine. His fragments and testimonia are collected fully in the Appendix of Texts under **Lucius and Nicostratus**.

**Achaicus** and **Sotion** (later first to early second century CE?): see Moraux II, 211. Not dealt with in a separate chapter. Scattered comments on the *Categories* are ascribed to each, although we do not know the form that their treatments took. According to Simplicius, both A. and S. held that we should only speak of ‘relatives’ in the plural, never in the singular (*in Cat.* 159,25); notably, they criticise ‘the ancient commentators’, being ‘Boethus, Ariston, Andronicus, Eudorus, and Athenodorus’, for failing to make the distinction. Later, Achaicus also appears to respond to Andronicus and Boethus regarding the definition of the Relative (203,1). Other comments of Achaicus and Sotion are noted by Simplicius. Their treatment of earlier sources might suggest that A. and S. played some role in conveying the views of the ‘ancient’ commentators; see also Porphyry *in Cat.* 111,22 and Ammonius *in Cat.* 66,14. Both A. and S. are only briefly treated here, and are not considered in our discussion of the *skopos* of the text.

**Albinus or Alcinous**\(^{17}\) (mid second century CE). Briefly discussed in **Chapter 7.1**. Whether the *Didaskalikos* is compiled by Albinus of Smyrna or by the ‘Alcinous’ named by the MSS, its author follows the earlier Platonising tradition of claiming the categories for Plato – that


\(^{17}\) See Dörrie and Baltes (III, 1993), 341; Dillon (1993); Whittaker in *ANRW* II 36 1; and bibliography in *Der Neue Pauly* for Albinus and Alcinous.
is, Plato anticipated Aristotle in his account of the ten categories. This syncretising and
Platonising attitude is common to this text as well as Eudorus, ‘Archytas’, and Plutarch.

Atticus (later second century CE). Briefly addressed in Chapter 7.1. By contrast, the
Platonist Atticus wrote a polemical tract ‘Against those who interpret Plato’s philosophy by
means of Aristotle’, some of which is preserved by Eusebius (Praep. Ev. bks. 11 and 15). In
taking this line, Atticus appears to follow L. Calvinius Taurus (second quarter of the second
century), who wrote ‘on the doctrinal differences’ of Plato and Aristotle (Suda T 166, v. iv p.
509.12 Adler). 18 Both mark a more polemical stance toward Aristotle.

Aspasius (early second century CE). Employed as a source in Chapters 3, 3.1 and 5, and
briefly discussed in Chapter 7.1. Aspasius – who taught Herminus, who in turn lectured to
Alexander of Aphrodisias – authored a series of commentaries, on the Categories, De Int.,
Physics, De Caelo, Metaphysics and Nicomachean Ethics. Of these, just the last is (in
significant portions) extant today. For our purposes, he is a key source for the ‘pathology’ of
Andronicus and Boethus, for which see the discussion in their chapters below.

Adrastus of Aphrodisias (early second century CE). We know from Galen (De libr. propr.
42) that Adrastus wrote a commentary on Categories, and from Simplicius (in Phys. 122,33)
that he wrote a commentary on Physics. An important position associated with Adrastus is
the decision to place the Topics immediately after the Categories at the head of the
Aristotelian corpus; he appears to have defined their relationship in a work entitled
‘Concerning the Order of Aristotle’s Treatises’ (Simplicius, in Cat. 16. 1-4). He also revived
the title ‘Before the Topics’ for the Categories – this may suggest that he was responding to
Andronicus, who explicitly rejected the placement of the Categories (with the
postpraedicamenta) before the Topics, and with it the title Ta pro tôn topôn. Adrastus notably
discussed a second version of the Categories, which the later commentators, following
Porphyry, dismiss. 19 Aside from his work on the Organon, Adrastus also did work in


19 On A. cf. Simplic. in Phys. 4.11, 6.4 ff; in Cat. 15.36, 18.16 ff.; Anon Prol in Cat. 32b36 Brandis;
cf. Zeller III 1, 809 n. 3; Moraux Listes 58 ff. See recently Sorabji (2007b).
Herminus (later second century CE). Chapter 6; fragments and testimonia collected in Appendix of Texts under Herminus. Herminus is perhaps best known today as a lecturer to Alexander of Aphrodisias. He has not attracted the most charitable reviews from modern scholars; already Prantl judged him an ‘offenbar höchst bornierter Mensch’, and Moraux finds him almost wholly derivative of Boethus (1983:363-64). While my treatment can hardly be judged a rehabilitation, I will try to show that Herminus’s importance for the tradition on the *Categories* has been underestimated. He is the first on record to claim that the *Categories* should come first in the Aristotelian curriculum for pedagogical reasons. He is, as I suggest, the forefather of Porphyry’s influential theory of ‘double imposition’; he moulds the ‘narrative’ of the historical dialogue regarding the *Categories* that has come down to us, pitting Boethus of Sidon against the partisans of the *Categories* as concerning ‘being’ and the partisans of the *Categories* as concerning ‘language’, revitalising Boethus’s formulation of the subject-matter of the work in so doing; and he offers a theory of signification (although we can only reconstruct bits and pieces of this) which deploys a Stoic or Epicurean concept of ‘natural’ significance to displace the mediating role of concepts (*noêmata*) found in the opening lines of the *De Int.*, which he broadly rejects. I also suggest that Herminus left (so far as we can tell) no written works to posterity, and that Porphyry was reliant on Alexander’s lost in *Cat.* for Herminus’s views; in connection with this, I propose in chapter 6 that there is some cause to reconsider the identification of the Peripatetic Herminus with a Stoic Herminus mentioned by Longinus (preserved by Porphyry, *Vita Plotini*).

Sosigenes (later second century CE). Sosigenes, who also lectured to Alexander, raised an important question for the *Categories*, inquiring what is meant by ‘what is said’ (*to legomenon*): ‘word’ (*phônê*), ‘thought’ (*noêma*) or ‘object’ (*pragma*) (cf. Simplic. *in Cat.* 7,4-9,24; Dexippus 7,4). His ‘tripartite’ approach contrasts with the ‘bipartite’ approach of Herminus (who considers only ‘words’ and ‘objects’). As we shall find below, in the discussion of chapter 1 and broadly in chapter 7, this inquiry would have a far-reaching

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20 On Herminus see Gottschalk (1987), 1158-60 and (1990), 79; Moraux (1984), II, 361-98; and Goulet (2000), III, 652-54. His fragments were collected by Schmidt (1907). Modern students of Aristotle’s logic have noted and criticised his views on the *Prior Analytics* and the *Topics*; see for example Łukasiewicz (1951), 30-31; Patzig (1968), 118-22; Smith (1997), 141-42; Barnes et al. (1991); Flannery (1995); and Bochenski (1947), 64. For earlier studies on Herminus, see Prantl (1855-70), I, 545-46 (*Categories*), 584-50, 552-53; 555-57 and Zeller (III 1, 778, 1 and 783, 2).

21 On him see Zeller III 1, 813; Rehm RE III A 1, and Moraux.
influence. Sosigenes himself did not choose between the three arguments (Dexipp. 7.4; cf. Moraux, *Hermes* 95 (1967), 169 on Alexander).

**Aristoteles (later second century CE).** Perhaps teacher of Alexander of Aphrodisias, as argued for by Moraux22 (but see now Opsomer and Sharples, 2000); he is mentioned by Galen as ‘a man preeminent in Peripatetic philosophy’; Syrianus also mentions him as ‘the younger Aristotle, interpreter of Aristotle the philosopher’ (Galen *Peri eth.* 11.4 Müller; Syrianus *in Met.* 100.6).

**Alexander of Aigai.** On one occasion Simplicius ascribes to this Alexander the same view as Alexander of Aphrodisias about the skopos of the *Categories (in Cat.* 10.19-20), and at *in Cat.* 13.11-18 again refers to the view of ‘the Alexanders’ (cf. Moraux II, 222). Simplicius at *in de Cael.* 430.32 states that the Aphrodisian Alexander cited Alexander of Aigai on Aristotle’s argument at *de Cael.* 2.6, 288b22; see Moraux II, 223-25.

**Major Sources**

The relationships and stratigraphy of the key sources is explored in the following chapter on the ancient tradition and the skopos. Here I just aim to give a brief synopsis of the sources. A much more comprehensive bibliography on the later ancient commentators may now be found in the *Sourcebook* produced by Richard Sorabji (2005, three volumes), and in Sellars (2005); likewise, a more comprehensive discussion of philosophers active during the first centuries BCE may be found in Sorabji and Sharples (2007). Most of the figures mentioned here are also discussed in detail in Sorabji (ed.), *Aristotle Transformed* (1990).

**Alexander of Aphrodisias** (late second to third centuries CE). While Alexander himself, the exemplary ‘commentator’ on Aristotle, is not systematically treated in the course of this study (with some exceptions, e.g. chapters 1 and 5), a number of his commentaries serve as sources. In particular, *On Prior Analytics I* (text in *CAG*; translated with commentary in Barnes et al. 1991) is used heavily in chapter 7. Most unfortunately, Alexander’s own commentary *On the Categories* is lost to us; but I suggest in chapter 1 that some aspects of his discussion of the skopos, including his criticism and development of his teachers

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22 He is apparently mentioned in Simplicius *in de cael.* 153.16; Alex. *De an.* II (Mantissa) 110.4; Moraux discusses him in ‘Aristoteles, der Lehrer des Al. v. Aphr.’, *Arch. Gesch. Philos.* 49 (1967), 169-82. See also P. Accattino, ‘Allessandro di Afrodisia e Aristotele di Mitelene’, *Elenchos* 6 (1985), 67-74, who suggests (73) that Alex *in Met.* 166.19-67.1 follows one of Aristoteles’s lost discussions.
Herminus and Sosigenes, may be identified in the later sources. Several other works of Alexander are used in the chapter on Boethus, in discussing the status of universals.

**Galen** (late second to third centuries CE). Like Alexander, the work of Galen himself falls outside the scope of the current study. However, his texts are cited throughout the study, including (for example) *On My Own Books* 19.42 Kuhn and *Institutio Logica* 13.

**Plotinus** (c. 204-270 CE), especially *Enneads* 6.1-3. The founder of the philosophical tradition that we regard as Neoplatonism, Plotinus is here chiefly referenced in the discussion of Lucius and Nicostratus, although he does not cite them directly, and their fragments are drawn exclusively from Simplicius.

**Porphyry of Tyre** (c. 233-309 CE). Later sources rely mainly on Porphyry’s lost commentary *ad Gedalium* for their account of the *Categories* and its earlier critics and defenders (cf. Smith 1993, Hadot 1990, Chase 2003), although Iamblichus also introduced other sources not used by Porphyry, such as ‘Archytas’. (For Porphyry’s alleged ‘debate’ with Plotinus regarding the status of the *Categories*, see my chapter on Lucius and Nicostratus, with recent bibliography). Porphyry’s lesser ‘introductory’ commentary in *Cat.* is used throughout this study (text in *CAG*; translation and commentary in Strange, 1992), as is his *Isagoge* (see the excellent introduction and detailed commentary in Barnes, 2003). With respect to Porphyry’s logical influence, I have made heavy use of Lloyd (1990) and several treatments by Sten Ebbesen (see bibliography).

**Iamblichus** (c. 242-325 CE) According to Simplicius in *Cat.*, Iamblichus took over Porphyry’s commentary *ad Gedalium* and (i) added an exegetical approach called *noêra theôria*, a ‘higher criticism’ which reinterpreted the *Categories* in the mould of Neoplatonic metaphysics (see my chapter 1, below, and Dillon 1997); (ii) adduced ‘Archytas’ for Neopythagorean metaphysics, supporting (i). The interpretation of the *Categories* as a text with something to say about Platonic or Pythagorean metaphysics may be traced all the way back to Eudorus (chapter 3.1), and Iamblichus evidently followed ‘Archytas’ in adopting a similar view of the work. However, the earlier Neopythagoreans such as Eudorus and ‘Archytas’ (cf. 22,31 and 31,5 Thesleff) held that the *Categories* concerned the sensible world only; Iamblichus seeks to show, as in several examples discussed below, that the text can also lead the reader ‘upward’ to the noetic realm. Iamblichus’s own commentary on the
Categories is now lost, but was heavily used by Dexippus (as Simplicius informs us), by Simplicius himself, and by Olympiodorus.

Dexippus (mid fourth century CE). A pupil of Iamblichus, Dexippus’s brief surviving commentary in Cat. (text: CAG; translation and commentary in Dillon, 1990) combines some of the defenses of the Categories found in either or both of Porphyry and Iamblichus (as Simplicius informs us). Dexippus does not name names of sources as consistently as Simplicius, but he can be a very useful guide and occasionally provides a fuller discussion of the arguments used to refute a criticism. A prime example is his fuller discussion of the views of Athenodorus and Cornutus (see chapter 6); although he does not name them explicitly, the answering passage of Simplicius gives us their identity, and Dexippus provides more detail. Dexippus can also be useful to us for identifying where Iamblichus has added something to Porphyry’s basic account.

Ammonius (c. 435/45-517/26 CE). A disciple of Proclus of Lycia, the towering Athenian Platonist of late antiquity (412–485 CE), Ammonius taught the last great generation of Neoplatonist commentators – including Simplicius, Olympiodorus, and Philoponus, among others. He was an influential holder of a chair in pagan philosophy at Alexandria at a time when such a position was rather controversial (cf. Westerink 1990). One commentary in De Int. is known to survive from his pen; a commentary in Cat. constitutes a student’s notes, as does the commentary On Prior Analytics I. I have made some use of all of these commentaries in the following chapters. See Hadot (1991) on the Alexandrian introductions to Aristotle, and see Westerink (1990) and Wildberg (1990) on Ammonius.

Boethius (c. 480-524/5 CE). Boethius followed Marius Victorinus in translating the Greek masters into Latin. I have made considerable use of his De Divisione in discussion of Andronicus (see chapter 3 below, where I discuss the likelihood that the proem and conclusion are ‘Andronican’), and I have also made use of his commentaries Peri Hermeneias and in Cat. (and to a lesser extent his commentary on the Isagoge), particularly in ch. 1 below.

Simplicius of Cilicia (c. 490–c. 560 CE). As his commentary in Phys. is invaluable for the recovery of Presocratic fragments, the commentary in Cat. by the Neoplatonist Simplicius is the single most valuable source for the earlier tradition on the Categories that reaches him from Porphyry and Iamblichus. As we find below, he even informs us of the process that he
uses in comparing and reporting earlier commentaries now lost to us, which is a great aid in
evaluating his sources. And unlike many of the other later commentators, such as Ammonius,
Simplicius explores and reports the views of earlier figures in detail, often with their names
attached. We are entirely reliant on Simplicius for the supposed existence, let alone the
positions, of some of the commentators who appear in his pages. The CAG text of Simplicius
in Cat. has been translated into English and annotated in four volumes in the Ancient
Commentators on Aristotle series (1-4 in Chase 2003; 5-6 in Fleet 2001; 7-8 in Fleet 2002;
9-15 in Gaskin 2000). I have found the most recent introductory material and notes in Chase
(2003) especially exemplary and useful. The Categories commentary has also been closely
studied and translated into French by Hoffman and Hadot (1990), with valuable comments on
the problem of the skopos. The study given in the next chapter surveys an example of the
‘stratigraphy’ in Simplicius’ text.

Olympiodorus of Alexandria (c. 495-570 CE). A student of Ammonius, Olympiodorus the
Younger was among the last pagan philosophers to teach at the Alexandrian school in the
sixth century CE; he may, in fact, have been the last pagan philosopher to hold the chair.
Wilberding (2007) and Westerink (1990) are both useful introductions to Olympiodorus’s life
and times, with bibliography. His Prolegomena to Aristotle’s Logic and Commentary on
Aristotle’s Categories (Busse’s text in CAG) is used extensively in the discussion of the
skopos below, especially with respect to Herminus. Again, see Hadot (1991) on the
Alexandrian introductions to Aristotle in general. I have translated some excerpts of
Olympiodorus in Cat. in chapter 1, below.

John Philoponus (c. 490-570 CE). Philoponus was also a pupil of Ammonius – although,
unlike Olympiodorus, he did not succeed Ammonius in a chair. A Christian philosopher who
brought innovation to the commentary form elsewhere, his commentary in Cat. was
relatively orthodox (cf. Hadot 1991); I have made several references to it, but my case-
studies of the Alexandrians following Ammonius have chiefly focused on Olympiodorus.

David (Elias) (later sixth century CE). The writings on the Categories ascribed to ‘David’
mention Olympiodorus several times, and their author may have been his student. They may
have been written during Olympiodorus’s life, or later (cf. Westerink 1990, 1967; Wildberg
1990; Wildberg 2003). ‘David’ in Cat. diverges from Olympiodorus in one important respect
in discussing the skopos of the text, which I will survey below.
1. The *Skopos* in Ancient Criticism: A Case Study

A Case Study
This section introduces the central problem of the story told in the following chapters – namely, what the *Categories* is about, or what its ‘aim’ or σκοπός might turn out to be. As I will suggest in chapter 2, this problem has exercised ancient and modern critics in broadly similar ways. It is also an old problem, dating to the early centuries under consideration here.

In its earliest form, however, the problem was probably not formulated as a search for the ‘aim’ or σκοπός of the text. Rather, the discussion of the σκοπός represents a critical component of the later Neoplatonic pedagogical and technical method of dealing with an Aristotelian or Platonic text: in this specialised sense of ‘aim of the text’, the word σκοπός does not even occur in Porphyry’s short surviving commentary *in Cat.* I follow the example of the later Neoplatonists in using the word σκοπός (usually in transliteration) as a shorthand for the fundamental question of the subject-matter of the text.

*Problems of interpretation*

Nearly all of our information about the relevant fragments on the *Categories* derives from the later Neoplatonists, as described in the introduction. Their source is Porphyry, in his long (and now lost) commentary *ad Gedalium*. In particular, it was Porphyry who told the story of the reception of the *Categories* as an historical dialogue between partisans of several different answers to the question described above. According to these partisans, the *Categories* may be an account of (i) simple expressions of language (*phônai*), or (ii) of their objects of reference (*pragmata*), or somehow of both, that is, of linguistic expressions *qua* significant of beings; and there is a dimmer echo, discussed below, of the view (iii) that the text concerns concepts (*noêmata*) as these mediate between beings and expressions. It may not be entirely anachronistic to identify in the commentators’ *noêmata* and *pragmata* a loose analogy for the ‘intensional’ and ‘extensional’ field of Carnap and Montague, and for Frege’s famous distinction between *Sinn* and *Bedeutung* (1892): the objects chiefly dealt with by the author of the *Categories* could be linguistic expressions, or their ‘sense’, or their

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23 See e.g. I Hadot (1990 and 1991), Mansfeld (1994), and Chase (2003), introduction.

24 Porphyry’s short surviving commentary *in Cat.* hints at the same story, with discrepancies discussed below.

25 The full ‘story of the *skopos*’ narrated by Porphyry himself is lost with his commentary *Ad Gedalium*, but largely preserved, with Iamblichus’s additions, in Simplicius. Porphyry’s surviving shorter commentary hints at the same story, with discrepancies discussed below.
‘reference’.\textsuperscript{26} (Benedikt Strobel has recently discussed the semantical implications of the approach adopted by Porphyry, and the denotation and connotation of general terms in the *Categories*: Strobel, 2009).

The nature of this narrative, the story that Porphyry wants to tell us, crucially shapes the selection of fragments that Porphyry and his successors chose to pass down to us. The positions attributed to the dramatis personae are, as we shall see, tailored to fit the characters that Porphyry wishes to represent. Thus many of the fragments of Lucius and Nicostratus betray the ‘one-sidedness’ of reading the *Categories* as an account of the genera of ὄντα, whilst many of the fragments of Athenodorus and Cornutus betray the ‘one-sidedness’ of reading the *Categories* as an account exclusively of language and grammar. The one-sidedness is important for Porphyry’s account, as he will seek to show that only a unified account can suffice; and he wishes to imply that earlier commentators, with the prominent exceptions of Boethus and Herminus, failed to anticipate the possibility of such a unified account.

I begin with these remarks in order to stress the tremendous influence of Porphyry’s ‘storytelling’ on the key sources. Granted that nearly all of our knowledge of what those earlier sources said derives from Porphyry, his desire to frame their places in a specific narrative (and what is more, a narrative that progresses until it reaches the correct answer with Porphyry) may determine the character of the philosophical positions in the fragments almost totally.

There are, therefore, two major hurdles to pass in getting back to the earlier critics of the *Categories*: first, we need to reconstruct (so far as possible) what Porphyry wrote about them in his lost commentary *ad Gedalium*, the common source of the surviving Neoplatonic treatments; and second, we need to reconstruct (so far as possible) what the personae whom he describes might have said and believed about the *Categories*, piercing the veil of the Porphyrian narrative and hunting for a glimpse of some true intellectual history behind it. The first hurdle is reasonably passable, as I attempt to show in the analysis below. The second hurdle is virtually impassable, if we restrict our discussion to what can be

\textsuperscript{26}See also ch. 2 below. For the Stoic theory of signification, Barnes, ‘Meaning, Saying, and Thinking’ (1993) provides an interesting and useful (if aporetic) treatment, of these kinds of difficulties; in ‘Grammar on Aristotle’s Terms’ (1990), Barnes also contrasts Aristotelian logic with Frege, although with a rather different focus.
independently verified as historical fact. Indeed, ‘piercing the veil’ does not seem to be a useful way to go about the problem; there are many cases where the veil is all we have. For example, the apparent preservation of a ‘dialogue’ in the pages of Simplicius between, say, Lucius and Boethus could easily be a product of Porphyry’s desire to show that Boethus’s interpretation of the *skopos* represents a correct reply to the arguments of ‘Lucius’ – not that they actually had such a debate.\(^{27}\)

From a skeptical position, we may even wonder how we can be confident that the majority of the early fragments on the *Categories* represent historical positions at all, rather than Porphyry’s rendering of patchwork views to make a point, which was then further ramified and complicated by his successors. In some instances, this may well be true. But I will also attempt to show that a reasonable argument can be made, in other cases, for getting back behind the veil of Porphyry’s narrative, and that of his successors, from the starting-point of finding out what the veil is made of. That is what the present chapter attempts to do. In particular, this chapter seeks to show that we can use the later sources to deduce (with a high degree of plausibility) the doxography originally presented by Porphyry, and then (with a reasonable degree of plausibility) pre-Porphyrian positions. As one such contribution, I will suggest that the entire ‘story’ told by Porphyry is itself largely the work of the pre-Porphyrian Peripatetic Herminus, ‘corrected’ in certain respects by Alexander and subsequently developed by Porphyry and Iamblichus.

That said, throughout this study my goal will be relatively modest, and I will make few claims for certainty. I aim to collect the evidence of the texts and to establish, for any given fragment, both consistency – can this fragment be interpreted in a way that is consistent with the other preserved fragments ascribed to the same philosopher, and if possible, the same text?\(^{28}\) – and plausible motivation. By controlling the later sources so far as possible with

\(^{27}\) This difficulty has perhaps not always been emphasised in the major surveys, although this is not a rule: Jonathan Barnes (1997) has recently shown how uncertain some of the evidence may be for even a core chapter of the narrative, such as Andronicus’s seminal ‘publication’ of Aristotle’s esoterica, and Sharples (2008) provides an extremely useful and balanced account of the early reception of the *Categories* in the first century BCE.

\(^{28}\) The fragments are not always consistent – for one prominent example discussed in ch. 3, Andronicus is said by Simplicius in one place (*in Cat.* 63.22 and following) to have reduced the categories to two; but he is said by Simplicius in another place (*in Cat.* 342.23 and following) to have recognised ten categories. Nor is the motive for a given criticism or defense always clear; where it is possible, I attempt to show how, based on our knowledge about the philosopher’s other positions or even (dangerously) school affiliations, we might construct a motive for him.
reference to earlier texts, and testing the sources’ own motivations at each turn, I hope to demonstrate the emergence of consistent, interesting, and plausible patterns in the early positions. I have sought to tell a novel story that proposes reasonable motives for each of the views that the sources ascribe to our personae, once those views are recovered and ‘fleshed out’ from the positions that the Neoplatonists have tailored. And in the course of exploring the sources, this chapter also aims to introduce the problems of the *skopos* in general, and the main personae dealt with by Porphyry and his successors.

Textual references (Tn) in the following discussion refer to the Herminus section of the general Appendix of Texts to this study. The discussion is organised as follows:

(A) §A concerns the sources of Porphyry’s formulation of the *skopos* of the *Categories* and of the ‘double imposition’ of names upon which it builds (*in Cat. 57,20 and following = T3b*). I stress that Porphyry’s discussion excludes the mediating role of concepts and presents the historical debate as a ‘bipartition’ of views (words–things) rather than a ‘tripartition’ (words–concepts–things). Comparing the subsequent passage explicitly assigned to Herminus, I also suggest that Herminus may underlie all or most of T3b.

(B) §B expands the argument that Herminus maintained a ‘conceptless’ view of the *skopos* of the *Categories*, which is reflected in the ‘bipartition’ of the shorter *in Cat.* of Porphyry. I discuss two divergent traditions in Simplicius (signaled as α and β below) which, as I argue, reflect Simplicius’s effort to unite a bipartite discussion of the *skopos* (originating with Herminus, himself reporting Boethus, but criticised by Alexander and Porphyry) with a tripartite discussion of the *skopos* that includes ‘concepts’ and seeks to supersede the bipartite treatment in Porphyry (representing a ‘summary’ treatment by Iamblichus, and primarily reflected in the Alexandrians).

a. The historical debate of Porphyry and Herminus regarding the role of concepts (T4a) and the opening lines (especially 16a5-8) of the *De Int.*

b. Analysis of Simplicius 9,8-13,26 into α β γ δ ε.

c. Analysis of Olympiodorus *Prol. in Cat.* 18,30-19,30 and the tradition that Herminus viewed the *skopos* as *pragmata* alone; argument that Iamblichus is the source for the passage and that the attribution to Herminus is correct.
d. Discussion of Iamblichus’s motives and approach to Porphyry’s commentary, and proposed analysis of the structure of Porphyry’s discussion of the *skopos* (preserving Alexander preserving Herminus).

§A: Porphyry in *Cat.*

At *in Cat.* 57.20 (T3b1), Porphyry commences an influential account of the origins of language and the ‘two impositions’ of words.\(^{29}\) The ‘first imposition’ of words occurred, according to Porphyry’s account, when early human beings began using vocalisations (*phônai*) to signify objects. Thus the words obtained their primary significance. Among his examples, Porphyry mentions seat, human, dog, sun, white, black, number, size, 2 or 3 cubits – a slight echo of Aristotle’s illustrations of simple terms at *Cat.* 1b25-2a10. (Porphyry uses the word *tode* to imply that the primordial speaker is quite literally pointing and vocalising what he sees).\(^{30}\) Porphyry speaks of the primary imposition as a *protê thesis* (τῆς πρώτης θέσεως τῶν ὄνομάτων, 58,1-2). This, as we shall see, is a technical phrase. But his vocabulary can shift; it is an imposition of *lêxei*ς (τεθείσας λέξεις, 57,31) or a usage of them (ἡ πρώτη χρήσις τῶν λέξεων, 57,22), or of *phônai* (57,29; 57,34). In every case, they signify ‘real things’ (τῶν πραγμάτων, e.g. 57,20).

The ‘second imposition’ (τῆς δευτέρας θέσεως, 58,2-3) came about when humans began to reflect, in a self-conscious way, upon these vocalisations, and so began to make statements about language, such as the distinctions of *onomata* and *rhêmata* presented by Aristotle in the *De Interpretatione.* Thus, for instance, pointing and speaking ‘sun’ or ‘gold’ are examples of a primary imposition; but saying ‘the word “gold” is an *onoma*’ is an example of a secondary imposition. (In addition, Porphyry distinguishes a third, pre-verbal kind of imposition, in which human beings initially gained the capacity to ‘indicate and signify’ objects: τῶν

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\(^{29}\) On the influence and later interpretation of Porphyry’s ‘theory of imposition’ see in particular Ebbesen (1990) and (2005). It would become an important tool in linguistic theory in the Latin West, drawing chiefly on Boethius in *Cat.* PL 64, 1159A-C. On the sources of the theory, especially the probability of Stoic (and Epicurean) sources, see discussion below with references. The relevant Neoplatonic passages for the theory itself are usefully summarised and translated in Sorabji (2005), Vol. 3. As Strange (1997, ad loc.) suggests, contemporary logicians might find in Porphyry’s account a precedent for the modern distinction of object language and metalanguage. Moreover, within the examples that Porphyry provides, *protê thesis* and *deutera thesis* also seem to correspond closely to the intuitive contemporary distinction of use and mention.

\(^{30}\) See 57,25-26: τόδε δὲ ἄνθρωπον, τόδε δὲ κύνα, ἥλιον δὲ τόδε, καὶ πάλιν τόδε μὲν τὸ χρώμα λευκάδο, τόδε δὲ μέλαν, καὶ τόδε μὲν ἀριθμόν, τόδε δὲ μεγέθος, καὶ τόδε μὲν δύσπηχος, τόδε δὲ τρίπηχος.
πραγμάτων ἐκκειμένων δηλωτικὸς γενόμενος καὶ σημαντικὸς αὐτὸς ὁ ἀνθρώπος, 57,20-21. The first imposition of language depends on this natural capacity).

Within this scheme, as Porphyry will go on to suggest (58,5 = T3b1) the Categories is concerned with the primary imposition of language. Thus Porphyry presents this ‘prehistory’ of language in order to introduce and contextualize his forthcoming claims about the Categories.31 But the structure of the account itself does not originate with Porphyry, a point that is sometimes overshadowed by its subsequent influence. The theory of two sequential θέσεις of language had been formulated in the Hellenistic schools,32 and within the context of a broader debate, building around central passages in Plato’s Cratylus (e.g., 421C-426C),33 about whether names were imposed by nature (φύσει) or by θέσις in the sense of convention.34 In the Stoa, at least since Chrysippus,35 it had been maintained that primary vocalisations signified πράγματα ‘by nature’; so Origen informs us in a widely cited passage of the Contra Celsum (φύσει μιμουμένων τῶν πρώτων φωνῶν τὰ πράγματα: Cels. 1.24 = SVF 2.146 = Hülser FDS fr. 643).36 For the Stoics, as for Porphyry in this

31 Ebbesen (2005:300) suggests the following interpretation: ‘For Porphyry the two impositions served two purposes. First, to structure the Organon: in Categories we study words that signify items of the physical world and qua significative; in Perihermeneias we move up a level where we study linguistic entities qua parts of linguistic structures. Second, by taking the Categories to be a book about words concerned with the physical world Porphyry made it harmless in a Neoplatonic context: it did not present a rival account to Platonic metaphysics’. I suggest some further perspectives on this below.


33 On the relevance of the Cratylus see Long (2005) and Sedley (1998). The first segment of this part of the Cratylus seems to discuss Porphyry’s ‘first imposition’, but the second segment, where Socrates begins to discuss the theory of language, corresponds to Porphyry’s ‘second imposition’. For the first imposition, see for example τῶν πρώτων ὄνομάτων, 424B; πρῶτον αὐτῷ τῷ χρώματι καὶ τῇ φωνῇ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐσία, 423E.

34 For this formulation of the question, see Sextus, Adv. Math. 1.143-4, cf. 37; Adv. Math. 11.241-42; PH. 3.267-68; Aulus Gellius 10.4; Simplicius in Cat. 40,6 and 187,7; and Origen, Exh. Mart. 46.

35 Chrysippus had already discussed the θέσις τῶν ὄνομάτων: see Eusebius, PE 6.8.1-10 = SVF 2.914; the phrase, as Allen 2005:18 argues from 6.8,11-24, seems to be Chrysippus's own.

36 Platonists seem to have adopted this view, presumably (as in late antiquity) as an exegesis of the Cratylus. See Alcinous Intr. ch. 6; Proclus in Crat. 16.18 and 18.14 Pasquali; Stephanus in Int. 9.19-22 and 10.7; and see Cratylus 390A. The Epicureans also seem to have presented a narrative in which the primordial imposition of language was ‘natural’, although the sense was very different than that applied by the Stoics; perhaps what evolved naturally, like the faculty of speech, did so without ‘purpose’, until we found a use for it. See Lucretius 4.824, and Epic. Ep. Hdt. 75.
passage, the primary θέσις ‘by nature’ transpired in human prehistory.\textsuperscript{37} This kind of explanation is certainly not limited to Stoic sources; famously, the emergence of language by nature at some point in history is discussed by Lucretius, \textit{DRN} 5.1028-90 and by Epicurus, \textit{Letter to Herodotus} 75-6 (see Verlinsky, 2005; Brunschwig, 2004; Atherton, 2005; Reinhardt, 2008).

At this stage, several early points are worth making about this account and its sources. (a) At least up to Porphyry’s application of it to the \textit{Categories} at 58.5, the account is likely Hellenistic (Stoic or Epicurean) in origin;\textsuperscript{38} in this connection, we might note Simplicius’s observation that Porphyry’s longer commentary \textit{ad Gedalium} contained plenty of Stoic ideas (πολλὰ καὶ τῶν Στωικῶν ἐκεί δογμάτων κατὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν τοῦ λόγου προσιστορῶν, S. \textit{in Cat.} 2.8);\textsuperscript{39} the present account, which Porphyry may have expounded in more detail in his longer commentary, seems like a good example. (b) With that said, the use to which the account is put (clarifying the relationship of Aristotle’s \textit{Cat.} and \textit{De Int.} and establishing the \textit{skopos} of \textit{Cat.}) appears to be novel\textsuperscript{40} and perhaps original to Porphyry, although I will suggest that this division may have been employed by Herminus, as it appears to be assumed in the ‘summary passage’ explicitly ascribed to Herminus shortly afterward (T3b2).

Porphyry’s application of this passage to the division of the \textit{Organon} is also discussed by Lloyd (1990:37-38). (c) The account makes no mention of ‘concepts’ (νοήματα) as mediating principles between names and πράγματα, neither here nor anywhere else in the shorter commentary of Porphyry, a point that later commentators expressed as a divergence

\textsuperscript{37} With references above (Frede and Inwood, 2005), see Gera (2003) on the ‘golden age’ and Frede (1989:2088-89) on Stoic ‘prehistory’.

\textsuperscript{38} This point seems to have received little recent discussion, at least to my knowledge. Ebbesen (2005:301) remarks that ‘I do not know who first proposed a Stoic origin, but it was the standard assumption in Copenhagen when I learned my Stoicism in the late 1960s. Cf. Pinborg (1962). The idea seems to have been forgotten in the meantime, not because it has been discredited but because there has been little or no interest in searching for the origin of the theory of two impositions’.

\textsuperscript{39} On Stoicism in Porphyry’s \textit{ad Gedalium}, see notes in Chase (2003:95); see also Dörrie (1959), and Hadot (1968).

\textsuperscript{40} Allen (2005:18) points out that the later commentators, such as Ammonius, develop this account in a somewhat different direction than the Stoics, by making the ‘first imposition’ primarily about the significance of \textit{terms} (the subject-matter of the \textit{Categories}) and the ‘second imposition’ primarily about the differentiation of nouns from verbs.
from the opening of the *De Interpretatione* and appears to have been a point of contention between Herminus and Porphyry (preserved by Boethius: T4a). (d) The account presupposes the direct imposition of names upon πράγματα ‘by nature’ (φύσει) and not ‘by convention’, and it may be worth mentioning that Herminus also maintained that terms signified their objects ‘by nature’ (cf. Alex. in An. Pr. I 72,17 and following = T2c, discussed in chapter 7).

Porphyry introduces this account in order to describe the subject or aim of the *Categories*. Thus he continues (58,5 = T3b1):

> ἔστιν τοῖνυν ἡ πρόθεσις τοῦ βιβλίου περὶ τῆς πρώτης θέσεως τῶν λέξεων τῆς παραστατικῆς τῶν πραγμάτων· ἔστιν γὰρ περὶ φωνῶν σημαντικῶν ἀπλῶν, καθὸ σημαντικὰ εἰσὶ τῶν πραγμάτων, οὐ μὴν τῶν κατὰ ἀριθμὸν ἄλληλον διαφερόντων ἄλλα τῶν κατὰ γένος.

The subject (prothêsis) of the book [*Categories*] is about the first imposition of verbal expressions (*lexeis*), namely, that imposition which is directly representative (*parastatikos*) of real things (*pragmata*). [I say this] because [*the Categories*] is about simple significant verbalisations (*phônai*), just insofar as they are significant of real things (*pragmata*) — not as they differ from one another in number, but [as they differ] in genus.

The multiplicity of numerable individuals explains Aristotle’s introduction of genera, to which the ten categories correspond (58,9-20 = T3b1):

> ἀπειρα μὲν σχεδὸν καὶ τὰ πράγματα καὶ οἱ λέξεις κατὰ ἀριθμὸν. ἀλλ’ οὐ τὰς κατὰ ἀριθμὸν πρόκειται διελθεῖν λέξεις· ἕκαστη γὰρ κατὰ ἀριθμὸν σημαίνει τῶν ὄντων· ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ τὸ ἀριθμὸν πολλά ἐστιν ἐν ὧντα τῷ εἴδει ἢ τῷ γένει, καὶ ἡ ἀπειρία τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν σημαντικῶν αὐτὰ λέξεων εἰς δέξα γένη εὑρητα περιλαμβανομένη εἰς τὸ γραφεσθαι. εἰς δέξα τοῖνυν γενικὲς διαφορὰς περιληφθέντων τῶν ὄντων δέξα καὶ αἱ δηλοῦσα τούτα φωναὶ γεγόνασι κατὰ γένη καὶ αὐτὰ περιληφθέονται. δέξα οὖν λέγοντα κατηγορία τῷ γένει δηλονότι, ὡσπερ καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ ὧντα δέξαι τῷ γένει.

> ὅθεν ἐπεὶ περὶ φωνῶν σημαντικῶν ἡ πρόθεσις καθὸ σημαίνουσι τῶν κατὰ γένος διαφόρων ὄντων, τὸ δὲ ἀγορεύειν τὰ πράγματα κατὰ τὰ σημαντικὰ κατηγορεῖν ἐνγέγονα καὶ ὧν ὁ λέξων σημαντική κατὰ πραγμάτων λέγειν, εἰκὸς Κατηγορίας ἐπέγραψεν τὴν περὶ τῶν ἄπλων λέξεων στοιχείωσιν τὴν καθὸ σημαντικὰ τῶν πραγμάτων εἰσίν προηγομένως κατὰ γένος ἐκαστὸν θεωρομένην.

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41 The inclusion of concepts was felt to be an important point in the later tradition, and representative of the differentiation of Stoicism from an Aristotelian view grounded in *De Int*. 1a1-8 (cf. [Ammonius], in An. Pr. 17,24-28). We shall explore the exclusion of concepts from this account below.

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Things (*pragmata*) and expressions (*lexeis*) are practically infinite in number. But [Aristotle’s] intention is not to list expressions one by one – for each signifies one particular being – but since things that are many in number are one in species or in genus, the infinity of beings and of the expressions that signify them is found to be included under a list of ten genera. *Since beings are comprehended by ten generic differentiae, the words that indicate them have also come to be ten in genus, and are themselves also so classified. Thus predications (katêgoriai) are said to be ten in genus, just as beings themselves are ten in genus.*

So since the subject of this book is significant expressions differing in genus, insofar as they signify, and people used to call speaking of things according to a certain signification, and in general the utterance of a significant expression about something, as ‘predication’ (*katêgorein*), it was quite reasonable for him to give the title *Categories* to this elementary discussion of simple expressions, which considers them according to genus insofar as they primarily signify things.  (Tr. Strange, my emphasis)

(Porphyry argues that *Categories*’ value lies in gaining knowledge about countable things; knowledge cannot be attained from the study of ‘uncountable’ particulars.42 This argument is discussed further in chapter 7 under the heading of *aparithmêsis*). Porphyry goes on to explain that earlier commentators, such as Lucius, Nicostratus, Athenodoros, and Cornutus, were unaware of the distinction between primary and secondary imposition, and, thus becoming confused as to whether the *Categories* concerned things or words, attacked the work as an inadequate account of one or the other. However, he mentions two commentators who took the view just mentioned: Boethus of Sidon and Herminus. Porphyry does not tell us what Boethus said, but elects to report Herminus’s view instead – for the reason, evidently, that it is ‘brief’ (εἴρηκεν... βραχέως, 59,18-32 = T3b2; we might be led to deduce, as Simplicius reports Boethus’s view in a parallel passage, that Boethus of Sidon was adduced alongside Herminus in the longer commentary *ad Gedalium*).

Λέγει τοίνυν ὁ Ἑρμῖνος προκεῖσθαι οὔτε περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ φύσει (20) πρῶτων καὶ γενειστάτων γενῶν (οὗ γὰρ νέος προσήκουσα ἢ τῶν τοιούτων διδασκαλία) οὔτε τίνες αἱ πρῶται καὶ στοιχεῖωδεῖς τῶν λεγομένων διαφοράς, ὥσ τὸν λόγον εἶναι δοχεῖν περὶ τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον περὶ τῆς καθ’ ἐκάστοτον γένους τῶν ὀντῶν ὁμοίως ἀν ἐσομένης τῶν λεγομένων κατηγορίας· διὸ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον ἐγένετο

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42 For Aristotle’s own view, see *Topics* 8.33 (there is ‘a finite number of species subordinate to each genus’) and especially *Soph. El.* 165a10-12 (‘names are finite, and so is the number of expressions; but objects are infinite in number’). Barnes (2003:126-28) discusses these passages and others, and notes that Porphyry took a different line on the finiteness of names. On my view, Herminus did so as well. The later tradition would continue to take a serious interest in this problem; as Adamson (2005) points out, Avicenna’s claim that there is no such thing as ‘knowledge of particulars’, and that God knows them ‘universally’, is also rooted in the *Posterior Analytics.*
Herminus says that the subject of the work is not the primary and highest genera in nature, for instruction in these is not suitable for young persons, nor the issue of what the primary and fundamental differentiae of things said are, since in that case the discussion would seem to be about the parts of speech. Rather, it is about the sort of predication that will properly belong to what is said in each of the genera of being. Hence it also became necessary to touch in some way upon the genera to which the predications in question correspond, for it is impossible to recognize the kind of signification that is proper to each genus without some preconception (prolēpsis) of it.

This also accounts for the title Category (Katêgoria), which indicates the proper mode of signification connected with each genus. The discussion will reveal as it proceeds that these genera are ten in number, so that the number of predications is also ten.

But it would not be unreasonable for one to give the work the title *On the Ten Genera*, provided this title is taken to refer to the correspondence between the predications and the genera, and one does not think that the book is primarily concerned with the ten genera.

First, it may be noted that Herminus’s ‘brief’ statement here provides a good match for Porphyry’s discussion, as it is expressed in the passages immediately preceding the excerpt (T3b1). Indeed, Herminus’s summary statement in T3b2 presupposes several of the arguments in T3b1. Moreover, Porphyry agrees with Herminus that the *Categories* should be studied by students at an early stage (both here and in the introduction to the *Isagoge*), and that its content and subject-matter reflects this pedagogical principle. Porphyry also agrees with Herminus that the *Categories* concerns ‘words that are significant of things’, and that *genera* of words are significant of *genera* of things in such a way that both fall into ten ‘modes of predication’. They agree, moreover, that the inquiry of the *Categories* is incidentally concerned with the genera themselves, but primarily with the significant words.

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43 See chapter 7, particularly under the discussion of the syllogism (Alexander, in An. Pr. I), and also Sandbach, ‘*Ennoia and Prolēpsis*’ (1971).
Comparing the earlier pages, in which Porphyry appears to speak in his own voice, Porphyry describes verbal significance as a ‘relation’ (skhesis) of vocalisations towards their objects (σχέσιν τῶν φωνῶν τὴν πρὸς τὰ πράγματα, 57.24). (According to Simplicius, this language had also been used by Boethus: 11.26). Such signification is a unique, one-to-one relationship: thus ‘each verbal expression signifies, according to number, one of the beings’ (ἐκάστη γὰρ κατὰ ὁμοθυμὸν σημαίνει <ἕν> τῶν ὅντων: 58.9), and ‘things and expressions are both virtually infinite in number’ (ἀπειρὰ μὲν σχεδὸν καὶ τὰ πράγματα καὶ αἱ λέξεις κατὰ ὁμοθυμόν, 58.7-8). As a consequence of this virtual infinity, it is necessary to discuss beings under genera and species, and most broadly under the ten greatest genera (58.10-15). (Simplicius ascribes that argument to Alexander of Aphrodisias: 10.10-15). As a useful analogy, Porphyry continues, ‘words are like reporters (angeloi) that report to us about things, and they get their generic differentiae from the things which they report. So our inquiry is incidentally concerned with the generic differentiae of beings, while primarily it is about significant expressions, as I said’ (58.28-29). Simplicius does not parallel the analogy of ‘reporters’, but Olympiodorus does (in Cat. 19.19-27), and Olympiodorus ascribes the analogy to Alexander of Aphrodisias. (However, we will find that Olympiodorus makes Alexander a partisan of the view, which I shall refer to as α.iii below, that the Categories concerns concepts instead of words or things, whereas Simplicius mentions Alexander after attributing that view to another anonymous party, and ascribes to him the view that the Categories concerns concepts and words and things).

Perhaps the most significant point about Porphyry’s language in the passages preceding the excerpt of Herminus is that he does not once mention ‘concepts’ (noêmata) as the mediating principle between words and objects. This is consistent with the story of the ‘two

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44 In this connection, it may be interesting to note that the ‘ten categories’ were occasionally described as ‘the ten skheseis’ in late antiquity: cf. Ps.-Iamblichus, Theol. Ar. 79.19.

45 I follow Busse and Strange in supplying <ἕν>, but the point is also clear without the supplement. Felicianus’s edition omits ἐκάστη... ὅντων altogether.

46 As mentioned above, Barnes (2003:126-28) discusses the Aristotelian sources of this view, and the divergence of Porphyry, who suggests the words are as infinite as individual objects. See also my discussion of ‘enumeration’ (T6i) in chapter 7.

47 Ebbesen (1990:147) suggests that the word noêma is never used in the surviving in Cat. True enough, but the adjective ἐννοηματικὸς is used, and in a very interesting context: ἐννοηματικὸς is Porphyry’s ‘gloss’ on παραστατικός (παραστατικὸν τοῖς καὶ οἷον ἐννοηματικόν, 73.22). παραστατικός is used in our passage to express the representational relationship of words to their objects, but there is no hint here that it carries a mental force.
impositions’ of language, as we noted above, which also does not mention concepts. This is especially striking, as it contrasts with the parallel passage in Simplicius (11,23-12,18) and with the Alexandrian tradition. For Simplicius, both Porphyry and Boethus held that ‘the goal (skopos) is neither mere vocalisations (phônai), nor beings as such, nor concepts (noêmata)’, but all three, in that words signify concepts that signify things (12,2-3, a view deriving at least partly from De Int. 16a3-8). The Alexandrian commentators also hold that the Categories concerns words signifying concepts (noêmata) signifying things (see Ammonius in Cat. 8.20 = T5a and Olympiodorus in Cat. 18,30-19,30 = T7), and Boethius (in De Int. [2] 7,18) provides the same threefold formulation for the intentio of the Categories, almost certainly drawing it from Porphyry (as he himself claims). Indeed, for Pseudo-Ammonius, this tripartition, as opposed to the bipartition actually provided in the shorter commentary of Porphyry in Cat., represents a crucial doctrinal distinction of authentic Aristotelianism from Stoicism, grounded in the interpretation of De Int. 16a3.48

Yet in Porphyry’s surviving discussion of the skopos, we read just of words directly signifying things. In place of the Alexandrian tripartition of words, concepts, and things, we have a bipartition of words and things. And in place of Simplicius’s story about the earlier protagonists each capturing one third of the truth (which I shall cite as the ‘tripartition’ or passage α = Simplicius 9,8-10,20),49 we have a story about the earlier protagonists each capturing one half of the truth (which I shall cite as the ‘bipartition’ or passage β = Simplicius 10,20-12,1).50

§B. Two traditions on the skopos (α, β)

In what follows, I suggest that the distinction of the ‘bipartite’ and ‘tripartite’ version of the skopos is essential for distinguishing the positions of Herminus (and through Herminus, Boethus), on the one hand, from that of Porphyry, on the other. I also propose that we can

48 At [Ammon.] in Anal. Pr. 17,24-28, we are told that the Stoics rejected the mediating ‘concepts’ (of Aristotle, De Interpretatione 16-3) and ‘saw no need’ for an intermediate principle between words and things, postulating the lekta in its place. See my chapter on Athenodorus and Cornutus for literature and discussion.

49 Namely, Lucius and Nicostratus advocating the skopos of ‘beings’, Athenodorus and Cornutus ‘words’, and someone, perhaps Alexander, ‘concepts’.

50 With the view of Alexander of Aphrodisias notably omitted from the analysis provided by Porphyry himself (who refers, in the surviving commentary in Cat., only to the views of Lucius and Nicostratus and Athenodorus and Cornutus).
describe Simplicius’s endeavour to ‘unify’ $\alpha$ and $\beta$ as an effort to unify the respective emphases of Iamblichus and Porphyry in their historical treatments of the skopos — despite the original design of $\alpha$ to supersede $\beta$. The following discussion relies on an analysis of the relevant passage of Simplicius (9.8-13.26) into five components, $\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \delta, \epsilon$, comparing parallels in Olympiodorus ProL in Cat. to the ‘tripartition’ of $\alpha$.

These views are broken down in detail below under §B.b. Here, a brief and high-level narrative may be useful. (a) Simplicius presents three ancient positions about the subject or skopos of the Categories (9.8-10.8). Some believe that it concerns (i) phônai, others (ii) pragmata, others still (iii) noêmata. Simplicius tells us that all three views are partially correct, as Alexander of Aphrodisias and Alexander of Aigai already recognized; he endorses their view that the Categories concerns ‘all of the above’ (10.9-20). I will argue that the immediate source for this view is Iamblichus, who emphasised it (as I shall argue) more than did Porphyry; the ultimate source for this tripartite view, I will suggest, is the second-century Peripatetic Sosigenes, a teacher of Alexander of Aphrodisias, who (I suggest) preserved and developed this view. (b) Simplicius ‘leaves behind’ this tripartition, and commences a separate analysis in which there are just two views: some believe that the text concerns (i) phônai, others that it concerns (ii) pragmata. Simplicius explains that both views are required: katêgoriai are phônai significant of pragmata, insofar as significant. As I will argue, the immediate source for this bipartite view is Porphyry in his commentary Ad Gedalium; its ultimate source is Herminus, also a teacher of Alexander, who (I suggest) both preserved and criticized Herminus’s position. Most broadly, I will argue below that the ‘conceptless’ view outlined by Porphyry in the shorter commentary discussed above (T3b1 and T3b2), including the theory of double imposition, should be fully ascribed to Herminus, transmitted (with criticisms) via Alexander. The remaining elements ($\gamma, \delta, \epsilon$) will be discussed below, and are used to support this interpretation.

Before proceeding, it may also be useful to sketch a brief outline of the transmission (or ‘stratigraphy’) that I will argue for and seek to support in the following discussion.

1. On my view, Herminus first defended the Categories just as Porphyry reports (throughout T3b), primarily against Athenodorus and Cornutus, and cited Boethus of Sidon in doing so. Among the tenets of Herminus’s defense was an argument that terms relate to things φύσει (which Alexander ascribes to Herminus elsewhere: cf. T2d), but Herminus also doubted the role of νοηματα in mediating language (cf. Boethius in Int.)
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Michael Griffin

[2] 1.1, 37,30-40,28 = Porphyry no 81F Smith = T4a) and raised aporiai against the account of De Int. 16a5-8 (παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς, 16a6). On this view, Herminus is the ancestor of the ‘bipartite’ argument, which excludes concepts.

2. At the same time or slightly later, I believe that the Peripatetic Sosigenes, also a teacher of Alexander (cf. in Meteor. 143,13) presented his argument that the term legomenon at Categories 1a16-19 could mean (i) words, (ii) concepts, or (iii) things (Simplic. in Cat. 7,4-9,24); he himself took no definite position between the three (Dexippus 7,4). He is Alexander’s source for the tripartite view, but in place of Sosigenes’s agnosticism, Alexander actively held that all three views were correct together.

3. Alexander subsequently adopted Herminus’s defense against Athenodorus and Cornutus in his own commentary in Cat., but proceeded to defend the role of ‘concepts’ and the doctrine of the De Int. against Herminus. In other words, I take it that Alexander actively promoted a decisive view that the Categories concerned all three together – words, concepts, beings – against Herminus, who omitted concepts. Alexander may have drawn this position from his namesake Alexander of Aigai, or formulated it himself. Alexander’s outline of the tripartite view, being partly concerned to refute Herminus, necessarily emerged as a defense of concepts. (Thus in one tradition, preserved by Olympiodorus 19,17-36, Alexander appears as a partisan of νοηματα as the skopos of the Categories, who attempts to reconcile ‘Herminus’ at 19,6 with the verbalist account confusingly now represented by ‘Porphyry’ at 18,30; I argue below that this tradition, strange as it seems, derives from Iamblichus).

Both Alexander’s endorsement of Herminus’s defense against Athenodorus and Cornutus, and Alexander’s criticism of his rejection of mediating noêmata, were then taken up by Porphyry (cf. Porphyry in Cat., above, Simplicius β, and fr. 81F against Herminus = T4a). Porphyry’s shorter commentary carries Herminus’s defense against Athenodorus and Cornutus (culminating in the explicit citation of Herminus at T3b2, which is reliant on the preceding arguments of T3b1), and with it a view of the skopos of the Categories that Porphyry subsequently extended to serve his own purposes.51

51 Namely, whereas Herminus’s argument was chiefly directed against Stoics who mistook the subject-matter of the Categories for the second part of Stoic dialectic, namely linguistic (see chapter on Athenodorus and Cornutus), the resulting formulation of ‘words significant of realities insofar as they are significant’ was ideal for Porphyry’s constructive engagement with Plotinus, and the aporiai of Lucius and Nicostratus raised in Plotinus’s seminars.
But only in the longer commentary ad Gedalium did Porphyry proceed to criticise the underlying preconceptions of Herminus’s view and resolved his difficulties against mediating concepts and De Int. 1a5-8. This criticism of Herminus, on my view, Porphyry drew from Alexander and himself endorsed and developed. (This underlies Boethius in Int. [2] 1.1, 37,30-40,28 = Porphyry fr. 81F Smith. Moreover, Porphyry’s endorsement and expansion of Alexander’s view generated the tradition that Alexander agreed with Porphyry that the Categories concerned words and concepts and beings: cf. Simplicius 9,30-10,21, my α.iii below, and 13,16, my δ).

4. Iamblichus provided his distinctive contributions to the stratigraphy of the commentary after Porphyry. As Simplicius informs us, Iamblichus followed Porphyry ‘right down to the letter’ (ἐπ’ αὐτῆς τῆς λέξεως κατακολουθῶν, 21,11), but reorganized certain points for clarity (τινὰ δὲ ἐπικρίνων ἕκαστο τῶν νεφαλαίων ἐπικρίνων, 11-12), contracted Porphyry’s prolix solutions to historical objections, contributed noêra theôria everywhere (πανταχοῦ δὲ τὴν νοερὰν θεωρίαν ἑκάστῳ τῶν κεφαλαίων ἑπιτιθεῖς, 13-14) and adduced the Περὶ τοῦ παντὸς ascribed to Archytas throughout the text (15-16). (As we shall see, the addition of noêra theôria and the comparison of Archytas is a most helpful signature of Iamblichus’s activity).

In discussing the skopos, as I will suggest, Iamblichus inaugurated a new tradition in the following way: he combined the Herminian bipartition ‘words–realities’ with the Aphrodisian critique that included ‘concepts’, and mapped out a schematic tripartition ‘words–concepts–realities’. Superficially, this tripartition looks like that of Alexander (and previously Sosigenes); but Iamblichus immediately interprets the three terms in a very different way. He draws on a key Neoplatonic tripartition of universals, as we find at Olymp. Prol. 19,31-34 (discussed below; cf. Ammonius in Cat. 8,20-9,16). According to this tripartition, universals (τὰ καθολοῦ) may be understood as (i) enmattered (which the Neoplatonists refer to as ‘in the many’), that is, a form that is not

52 I discuss Iamblichus’s ‘intellectual interpretation’ in further detail below; its specific application in Simplicius has also been surveyed by Dillon (1998) and Sorabji (2005, Vol. 3). Simplicius himself, in working with this material, sought to ‘convey down’ the lofty Nous of Iamblichus to the multitude (τὸν ὑψηλὸν νοῦν τοῦ ἄνδρος καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἅβατον ἐπὶ τὸ σαφέστερον τε καὶ συμμετρότερον καταγαγεῖν, 3,6-7).

53 On this see discussion below, particularly on Alexander and the passage Olymp. Prol. 19,31-34: οὐκ ἤξεσθαι τὸν θεολογόν καὶ τὸς πολλοὺς ἅβατον ἐπὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ ὑστερογενῆ. This, as I suggest below (cf. 19,36) is Iamblichian.
separable from material multiplicity); or as (ii) mentally abstracted (‘after’ or ‘over the many’, a concept obtained through mental abstraction from the observation of many material instances, and posterior to those instances); or as (iii) separate and ontologically prior (‘before the many’, that is, the Platonic eidos that is prior to the multiplicity of the sensible world). Iamblichus, as we learn from Ammonius and Olympiodorus, maps this tripartition to Alexander’s, such that he maintains that phônai are ‘enmattered’, noêmata are ‘abstracted’, and pragmata are ‘separate’. This generates (in its later form) what I will refer to as α (Simplicius 9,8-10,20, Olymp. Prol. 18,23-19,36, Ammonius in Cat. 8,20-9,16). Iamblichus then interpreted this triadic schema through noëra theôria, arriving at the ontological (and clearly Iamblichean) hierarchy preserved by Olympiodorus: pragmata are conveyed ‘from God’, noêmata ‘by Mind’, phônai ‘by Soul’ (τὰ μὲν πράγματα θεόθεν παράγεται, τὰ δὲ νοῆματα ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ, ἀἱ δὲ φωναὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς, 18,25-27). Iamblichus’s new tripartition is reflected by Simplicius α (9,8-10,20), while its symbolic or ‘noeric’ component is reflected in Simplicius γ (12,1-13,11).

This ‘noeric’ reading comes as a surprising step for those unfamiliar with the esoterica of later Neoplatonism. We do not need to examine its details here, but I do want to stress its role as a motivation for Iamblichus, as it influences the stratigraphy of the commentary in Simplicius. Iamblichus pointed out the inadequacy of Porphyry’s treatment and so explained the necessity for his ‘higher criticism’ or noëra theôria. For there are strong traces of his view that Porphyry’s interpretation was strictly ‘verbal’ and ‘psychic’ – that is, concerned with ‘enmattered universals’, here phônai – whereas Alexander’s treatment (based on Alexander’s criticism of Herminus) focused on abstracted ‘posterior universals’, here noêmata. For Iamblichus, it was Herminus alone, who maintained a direct link of terms to realities φύσει, who maintained that the

54 Iamblichus’s goal, as I suggest below, was to map these three elements to the tripartition of universals in later Neoplatonism, namely, separate, enmattered, and abstracted or ‘posterior’. See under Olympiodorus below for discussion and references. I should stress that I am not suggesting that Porphyry did not already have in mind, or mention in the ad Gedalium, some such tripartition; but I think Iamblichus schematized it and interpreted it in a novel way.

55 On Iamblichus’s reinterpretation of his predecessors, especially their language, for the purposes of symbolic exegesis, see especially Dillon (1997, 1998).

56 That is, not ‘noeric’, and failing to recognise levels of being in the text beyond psukhê. For discussion and literature see below. For the shorter in Cat., Porphyry might well have said, as he suggests in the Isagogê, that a beginner’s commentary on the Categories is no place for such lofty speculations.
Categories concerned the divine realm of ‘real things’, here pragmata (compare Olymp. 18,25-27 with 19,6 and 19,36-20,12). Again, this line of interpretation may seem surprising, but Herminus earns this position, perhaps, less for what he said than for the manner in which Alexander refuted him. Olympiodorus, on this view, transmits an authentic piece of Iamblichus in 19,36-20,12, where Iamblichus hectors Porphyry, Alexander, and Herminus on the partiality of their views, and provides α.ι.υ as the unified and correct alternative. (In this connection, it is also worth comparing a comment by Simplicius that Iamblichus claimed for Alexander the view that ‘things that are said’ are the things signified, whereas in reality Simplicius finds that Alexander said they were the signifiers).  

5. Finally, Simplicius came to produce the surviving in Cat. As he tells us, he followed Iamblichus closely and respectfully, and also sought to ‘convey down’ the lofty Nous of Iamblichus to the multitude, making it clearer to the common [level] of understanding (τὸν ύψηλὸν νοῦν τοῦ ἄνδρος καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἄβατον ἐπὶ τὸ σαφέστερον τε καὶ συμμετρότερον καταγαγεῖν, 3,6-7). Thus, for example, we find that the ‘theological’ symbolism of Olymp. 18,25-27 is not in Simplicius, although Simplicius retains Iamblichus’s narrative of the soul’s fall and return to the intelligible world via phônai (12,1-13,11 = γ). Moreover, Simplicius sought to ‘draw together’ the diversity of the commentary tradition (τὸ πολὺ πλήθος τῶν πολυειδῶν συγγραμμάτων ἐπ’ ἐλαττον ὀπωσοῦν συντεῖλαι, 3,8-9), as Syrianus had done before (3,9-8), but somewhat more expansively. (It is worth mentioning here that Simplicius seems to have had direct access to Alexander).  

As I suggest, this process of πλήθος τῶν πολυειδῶν συγγραμμάτων συντεῖλαι generates the complex of views that I analyze (chiefly in the discussion that follows) as α-ε, by inserting a basically Porphyrian passage (the bipartite β) between Iamblichean extracts (the tripartite α and its ‘noeric’ corollary γ), and attempting to unify them in 13,11-26 = δ. This unification has the potential to generate considerable

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57 ὁ μὲν γὰρ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον φησι τὰ λεγόμενα τὰ σημαινόμενα ὑποθέσθαι πράγματα τὰ ἀπλούστα καὶ γενικώτατα, 41,21-22 – but Simplicius looks this reference up at 22-24 and finds that Alexander really claims that τὰ λεγόμενα are signifiers and not things signified).

58 Dexippus’s intermediary discussion appears to have followed Iamblichus and Porphyry, and Simplicius thought it contained little new (2,25), although it is very useful.

59 See in Cat. 41,17-27, which seems to imply that Simplicius had access to a full text of Alexander.
confusion, as $\beta$ was originally written to supersede $\alpha$, and they do not get on well side by side: they attach rather different meanings to φωναί, νοήματα and πράγματα, and moreover, $\beta$ wants a Porphyry who follows Herminus in showing that the *Categories* concerns φωναί representative of πράγματα, and $\beta$ thinks this is the right idea; but $\alpha$ reads this as an insufficiently lofty exegesis, and thinks that Porphyry and Herminus each have only a third of the story. $\beta$ wants an Alexander who is on the side of the angels, with Porphyry; $\alpha$ wants an Alexander who awaits Iamblichus’s hectoring. $\beta$ does not have much interest in ‘concepts’ (as it occurs in the *ad Gedalium*, on my hypothesis, from the ‘defensive’ portion of the *ad Gedalium* before Porphyry began to critique Herminus’s defense), whereas $\alpha$ wants a parallelism of words–concepts–realities. And so on; but Simplicius endeavours valiantly to give us a coherent picture, as I argue below.

§B.a: Porphyry and Herminus on the role of concepts

Sten Ebbesen (1990), who notices that Porphyry in *Cat.* does not mention νοήματα as an intermediary in the process of signification, suggests several explanations: perhaps Porphyry changed his view to incorporate νοήματα as intermediaries after writing the lesser commentary on the *Categories* (a proposal that Ebbesen rejects), or perhaps he merely sought to simplify the ‘decidedly compendious’ character of the work for a less advanced audience, and thus ‘had no need to expatiate on concepts as the immediate significates of expressions... to produce a compendium of a reasonable size he had to sacrifice something, and he chose to sacrifice the concepts’ (147). Certainly brevity and simplicity were key values in the construction of Porphyry’s lesser commentary, and he says as much; Herminus himself appears to have shared this view (T3b). But this does not appear to fully explain a shift so fundamental as replacing ‘words-concepts-things’ with ‘words-things’; the tripartition is the heart of the story for the other commentators on the *skopos* of the *Categories*, while the bipartition corresponds to a view that (at least on the view of Pseudo-Ammonius in *An. Pr.* 17.24-28) is notoriously counter-Aristotelian. Moreover, Ammonius amply demonstrates (*in Cat.* 8.20) that a commentator could briskly present the tripartite ‘words-concepts-things’ exegesis using fewer words than Porphyry’s surviving commentary employs to explain the bipartite ‘words-things’ exegesis, and no less straightforwardly.

Boethius, I think, provides a valuable perspective on this passage, and on the broader problems associated with it. Early in the second edition of his *Peri hermenias* (7.18) he remarks that the *intentio* of the ten categories is words signifying concepts signifying things...
– also the view defended by Simplicius, Ammonius, and Alexander. Later in the same work, Boethius records a criticism by Porphyry of Herminus. Herminus evidently raised aporiai about the mediating role of concepts, as their function is recounted by Aristotle at De Int. 16a3-8, and Porphyry subsequently sought to answer and solve these aporiai. The relevant passage is in Int. [2] 1.1, 37,30-40,20 = T4a (comprising a portion of Porphyry fr. 81F Smith):


Herminus questions whether the ‘concepts’ or ‘passions of the soul’ mentioned by Aristotle as ‘the same to all’ can really be the direct significata of vocalisations (non esse verum eosdem apud omnes homines esse intellectus, quorum voces significativa sint). For in the case of homonymy, one phônê signifies multiple things (unus idemque vocis modus plura significat). Porphyry sought to defend the view expressed in the De Int. and replied to Herminus that two speakers could relate a single utterance to different concepts corresponding to different pragmata, yet the concepts themselves could be the same in two minds.

Other late ancient sources shed further light on this criticism of Herminus by Porphyry, and enable us to distinguish Herminus from Porphyry more clearly.

§B.b: Two traditions in Simplicius

First, it is important to note that Simplicius appears to present two distinct discussions of the skopos in sequence. These are easily conflated, but they are different, and arrive at subtly different conclusions. The distinction mainly turns on the presence or absence of concepts in the discussion. The first version, I take it, begins at 9,4 and concludes at about 9,20. The second version begins at about 9,20, with the direction citation of Porphyry’s two commentaries. For our purposes in the next few pages, let us call these α and β respectively.
The first version (α) is clearly concerned with a tripartite view of the skopos of the Categories, in the sense that the underlying framework (and the concluding formula for this version) is phônai–noêmata–pragmata: this is the threefold formulation that will conclude this version, and we may notice that the historical ‘dialogue’ is also configured to arrive at this conclusion.

In the first segment of the first version (α.1) Simplicius retails three views. He tells us that (i) ‘certain people’ held that the skopos is ‘simple words’ or phônai, adducing Aristotle’s division of ‘things said’ and related linguistic language in the text (see below for discussion). But (ii) others, disputing this, held that it was the grammarian’s business to deal with words as such, and the focus of the Cat. is properly the very beings that are signified; these people cite some of Aristotle’s language as well, such as the division of ‘things that are’. And finally (iii) a third group hold that neither (i) nor (ii) are correct, but the true skopos is noêmata or ‘concepts’ that mediate between words and things. And this is so because ‘posterior’ genera (that is, abstracted universals – see discussion below) are the subject-matter of the Categories, and moreover, the true topic is what the Stoics refer to as lekta – and these are concepts (10,4).

In the second segment of the first version (α.2), Simplicius steps in in propria persona. He credits Alexander of Aphrodisias with a more ‘complete’ view that took on board all three of these partial possibilities, and he notes that the teacher of Alexander, Alexander of Aigai, maintained the more complete position as well. This results in the concluding formulation that the skopos concerns words and realities and concepts, namely, words signifying realities via simple concepts.

The second version (β) concerns a bipartite view – it is plainly Porphyry’s, and Simplicius says as much. This view can be neatly summed up (as indeed Porphyry and Simplicius do sum it up) in the statement that the Categories concerns katêgoriai, that is, words significant of beings, insofar as they are significant. At first sight, this seems rather similar to the conclusion of α, but concepts are missing, and the ‘historical narrative’ is now primarily concerned with two groups of people, namely, those who held that the Categories involved just things, and those who held that the Categories involved just words. These people seem to overlap with (ii) and (i) above, but it is not altogether clear that they are the same people.
In this version, Simplicius briefly summarises Porphyry’s position that the Categories concerns katêgoriai, or the primary imposition of words significant of beings insofar as they are significant, which is quite familiar to us from Porphyry’s shorter commentary; it is effectively the view recounted in the passages above. Although Herminus himself is not named by Simplicius here, it is clear by comparing those passages that these views expressed can be attributed to Herminus as well as to Boethus. Simplicius mentions that Porphyry ‘added in the comments of Boethus of Sidon, which are full of ankhinoia’ (12,23) – those sharp-witted remarks that must have been preserved in the ad Gedalium. Here, Boethus makes the basic argument against the ‘linguistic’ critics of the Categories, namely: they are wrong to complain about the omission of conjunctions and such grammatical entities, because the Categories concerns words just insofar as they are significant of beings (compare the parallel passage of Dexippus, discussed in my chapter 6 on Athenodorus and Cornutus).

Beginning around 12,16 (γ), following the second version, Simplicius appears to copy a clear example of Iamblichus’s noêra theôria. Nous possesses the Beings directly, but the Soul possesses these in a ‘secondary’ way when it is turned toward Intellect. When the Soul departs from the intelligible world, this source (Iamblichus) continues, it separates the logoi from beings; and when it falls into becoming, it requires sight and hearing to ‘recollect’ the real world of the intelligibles. This, therefore, is the value of phône, or speech, which is the ‘limit of psychic activity’ (13,5) – namely, for souls that have fallen into becoming, words are tokens to remind the fallen soul of the truth, and to lead it back upward (cf. 13,6-8: ἡ φωνὴ τὰς ἀποστάσας ἀπὸ νοῦ καὶ τῶν ὄντων ψυχῆς... συνάγει τε εἰς ὀμόνοιαν καὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν συναρμότερος ποιεῖ καὶ πρὸς νοῦν ἀναστέπει). (The discussion of Iamblichus admits the mediation of νοήματα, both in the limited sense of α and in a richer, Neoplatonic sense in which their mediation of words and realities represents a mediation of Mind and Soul).

60 See above for Simplicius’s report (2,9-17) and references, and discussion of examples below. I discuss Iamblichus’s ‘intellective interpretation’ in further detail below; its specific application in Simplicius has also been surveyed by Dillon (1998) and Sorabji (2005, III). Simplicius himself, in working with this material, sought to ‘convey down’ the lofty Nous of Iamblichus to the multitude (τὸν ὑψηλὸν νοῦν τοῦ ἀνδρός καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀβατον ἐπὶ τὸ σαφέστερον τε καὶ συμμετρότερον καταγαγεῖν, 3,6-7).

61 Iamblichus’s rich language here (e.g., ὁ αὐτοφυὴς ἔρως τῆς ψυχῆς ἀποπίμπλαται, 13,4) seems to draw chiefly on the Phaedrus, especially Stephanus pp. 249-52, for the theory of recollection and the plight of the fallen soul. See Chase (2003) ad loc.
At this stage (13,11: ἔστιν οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων δήλον), Simplicius appears to be done with his initial statements of both versions α and β, and his report of the ‘noeric interpretation’ added by Iamblichus (γ). In the following brief passage (let us call this δ) Simplicius attempts to draw the strands together and clearly state what the Categories is about. First, he restates the bipartite solution to the skopos of the Categories from β; second, he adds a qualifying phrase to encompass the tripartite solution of α. The following paragraph states this third and final view (13,12-15 = δ):

sterol oikeios τῇ λογικῇ πραγματείᾳ περὶ τῶν ἄπλων καὶ πρώτων καὶ γενικῶν φωνῶν, καθὸ σημαντικαὶ τῶν ὁντῶν εἰσίν, συνδιδάσκεται δὲ πάντως καὶ τὰ σημανόμενα ύπ’ αὐτῶν πράγματα καὶ τὰ νοῆμα, καθὸ σημαίνεται τὰ πράγματα ὑπὸ τῶν φωνῶν.

(δβ) The true (οικείος) skopos for the logical work concerns simple and primary and generic (genikôn) vocalisations, insofar as (katho) they are significant of beings (tôn ontôn), and (δα) it is also instructive in an all-inclusive manner (pantôs) about the [entities] signified by these [vocalisations], (δβ) pragmata and noêmata, insofar as pragmata are signified by phônai.

The phrases marked δβ and δα are a brief reformulation of β and α. (This is clear in the case of δβ, with the signal phrase being καθὸ σημαντικαὶ, and in δα, with the signal word being πάντως, betokening that no one of the three ‘partial’ views is being expounded: cp. μερικῶς, 10,7). The tail end of the whole formulation, which I have marked δβ, seems to be distinguishable from each of its two predecessors, and to aim at a novel unification of both. Thus in the closing lines we find the characteristic locution of the bipartition (καθὸ σημαίνεται) with concepts added in (καὶ τὰ νοῆμα).

Simplicius offers a resounding endorsement of δ. It was, he says, the view of the two Alexanders (of Aigai and of Aphrodisias), of Herminus and Boethus and Porphyry. Second, he adds that Iamblichus ‘added his vote’ for this view (ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος ἐπιψηφίζει, 13,17), that Syrianus ‘made it clear’ (Συριανὸς σαφηνίζει, 18), and that his own teachers (sc. Ammonius and Damascius, unless only one is intended) accepted it. Clearly, on Simplicius’s view, this is the correct way to think about the Categories. We might also note that, just following δ, Simplicius clearly speaks in his own voice (for at 13,17-18 he mentions ‘my teachers’).
Immediately after attributing δ to his predecessors, Simplicius adds a brief trailing remark that begins at 13,18 (ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ δἐδειξται περὶ φωνῶν ὁ σκοπός...) This new remark reiterates the point that the phônai of the Categories are ‘simple and primary’, but interprets this simplicity in a rather different manner than β (which, as we recall, constitutes Porphyry, insofar as he follows Herminus and Boethus). In agreement with β, this new source states that such simple phônai must therefore signify the most simple and primary beings, which are γενικώτατα τῶν ὄντων (13,20). Taking this view in a novel direction, however, this source adds that this signification requires the mediation of the most simple and primary concepts (διὰ μέσων τῶν ἀπλῶν καὶ πρώτων νοημάτων, 13,20-21). Moreover, as the final source concludes, this is akin to the Pythagorean enterprise of ‘leading the simples to the Ten’ (τὰ δὲ ἀπλὰ εἰς δεκάδα συνήγαγον οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι), as Archytas did (ὡς Αρχύτας, ὃ καὶ Πλάτων συνήγαγον, 13,22). Let us call this source ε. As the passage is rich with noêra theôria and adduces Archytas, this source must surely be Iamblichus.

ε seems to pick up immediately where δ left off at 13,15, so I am inclined to think that ε simply continues δ after Simplicius’s interjected remark on the unanimous acceptance of δ. (Indeed, it may have been rather difficult to attribute ε to all of the philosophers mentioned as endorsing δ). Thus I would attribute the spirit, and perhaps the letter, of δ to Iamblichus, more or less as Simplicius presents it. But it also appears clear, as sketched above, that the source of δ primarily intends it to shuttle between α and β and provide a coherent view that embraces both.

To summarise (repeating the conspectus above for convenience), we have in Simplicius the following structure:

α.1 Tripartition of views on skopos: (i) phônai, (ii) pragmata, (iii) noêmata. Simplic. 9,8–10,8

α.2 All three (i-iii) are correct if taken together. [Maintained by Alexander of Aphrodisias; also by Alexander of Aigai]. Simplic. 10,9–20

β Bipartition of views on skopos: (i) phônai, (ii) pragmata. Both are required: katégoriai are phônai significant of pragmata, insofar as significant. [Maintained by Porphyry, who here (presumably in ad Gedal.) adduces Boethus against the linguistic view. Herminus maintains this view in P. in Cat.] Simplic. 10,20–?12,1
γ  (Iamblichean) remarks on the ‘turn’ of the fallen soul to Nous through phônai. These comments presuppose that noêmata mediate (cf. α). Simplic. ?12,1–13,11

δ  (Iamblichean and Simplician) combination of α.1-2 and β: comprises Porphyrian formulation of β with addition of noêmata from α. (Simplicius intercedes with a comment in propria persona that δ is unanimously accepted by the Alexanders, Herminus, Boethus, Porphyry, the divine Iamblichus, Syrianus, and ‘my teachers’). Simplic. 13,11–26

ε  (Continuing δ, Iamblichus) confirms that the Categories concerns simple phônai significant of realities (ἀλλ ἐπεὶ δέδεικται περὶ φωνῶν ὁ σκοπός) via noêmata. The ‘simplicity’ of the uncombined vocalisations answers to the simplicity of the highest and γενικώτατα of real beings (20), and for this reason the signification of the Categories is analogous to the work of Archytas (22). Simplicius 13,11-26

If we can get clearer about the stratigraphy of α, β, and γ–δ, I believe that this will help us to get clear about the differences between Porphyry and Herminus on the subject of the skopos of the Categories, particularly with respect to the role assigned to concepts, and to establish where in these critical passages the authentic positions of Herminus can be discerned.

We have already noted that Simplicius, at 13,16 = T6d, includes Herminus among those commentators who (on Simplicius’s view) accepted δ. Thus we would deduce from Simplicius that Herminus joined Porphyry and the Alexanders in accepting some version of a words–concepts–things formula, or that Simplicius believes that Herminus would have accepted such a formula. There is not yet any reason to associate Herminus with any of the three (or four) views in α, although our reading of Porphyry in Cat. strongly suggests that his comments underlie most or all of β.

§B.c: Olympiodorus and the Alexandrian tradition on α

But Olympiodorus and the Alexandrians62 preserve a distinct tradition about Herminus. The starting-point is familiar from Simplicius-α. Thus for Olympiodorus (Prol. in Cat. 18,30-19,30 = T7) opinions (doxai, hairesis) differ about the skopos: it may concern (i) phônai or (ii) pragmata or (iii) concepts (noêmata). Olympiodorus provides a brief

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62 The ‘tripartite’ view of Olympiodorus and Simplicius-α is also summarized by Ammonius (in Cat. 8,20 = T5a) and paralleled by David [Elias] (in Cat. 129,11 = T8a) and Arethas (Schol. in Cat. 214.10 = T9).
explanation from his own ontology\textsuperscript{63} in a remark that does not occur in Simplicius: \textit{pragmata} are conveyed ‘from God’, \textit{noémata} ‘by Mind’, \textit{phônai} ‘by Soul’ (τὰ μὲν πράγματα θεόθεν παράγεται, τὰ δὲ νοήματα ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ, αἱ δὲ φωναὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς, 18,26-27; see below for discussion). For this reason, ‘the skopos is partitioned into these three’ (εἰς τοσαύτα τοῖνυν καὶ ὁ σκοπὸς μερίζεται, 27).

Olympiodorus then proceeds to reveal the proponents of the three views, and their reasoning. The views, and the arguments given, are more or less identical to those discussed in Simplicius-\textit{α}, with the exception that Olympiodorus names a protagonist\textsuperscript{64} for each of the views.

First (i) he presents the view of Porphyry, who is said to have advocated the solely verbal interpretation (περὶ φωνῶν μόνων, 18,29), arguing from the title \textit{Κατηγορίαι} (οὐδὲν δὲ ἔτερον ἐστι κατηγορία ἢ τὸ κατὰ ἄλλου ἄγορεύεσθαι, 18,35) and suggesting that ‘the philosopher’ [sc. Aristotle] announces his intention ‘out of the very gates’ of the text (ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν θυρῶν, 19,1) with the words ὁμώνυμα λέγεται (1a1). On Porphyry’s view (Olympiodorus continues), the word λέγεται demonstrates that the subject is words and not things (τὸ δὲ λέγεται οὐκ ἐπὶ πραγμάτων ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ φωνῶν λαμβάνεται, 19,2-3; note that Porphyry is not said to hold that \textit{homonyms} are words; the argument ascribed to him is based on the usage of λέγεται and not ὁμώνυμα). Likewise, Porphyry is said (19,4-5) to have adduced Aristotle’s words at \textit{Cat.} 1a16-17 (τῶν λεγομένων τὰ μὲν κατὰ συμπλοκὴν λέγεται τὰ δὲ ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς) in order to demonstrate that the subject is words. These are familiar moves; they were ascribed to protagonist (i) in Simplicius-\textit{α}. Modern

\textsuperscript{63} In this case, as I suggest below, Olympiodorus is primarily operating within the framework of Iamblichus’s \textit{noera theoria} about the \textit{Categories}. More generally, Olympiodorus’s ‘fourfold’ Neoplatonic ontology, of which the top three levels are represented here, draws from Damascius (cf., e.g., Dam. \textit{in Phaed.} 1.74). It is plainly set forth in his \textit{Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy} and especially in his \textit{in Alc}. (an example of exegesis in practice is 7,11-10,2). He utilizes a fourfold system of ‘modes of interpretation’, namely, enthusiastic (corresponding to God), contemplative (corresponding to Nous), cathartic (corresponding to the separable soul), and political or constitutive (corresponding to the inseparable soul). The discussion of the skopos of the \textit{Categories} in these terms might look back in some respects to the traditional division of Aristotle’s works, including the ‘logical’, ‘physical’, ‘ethical’, mathematical’, ‘theological’ (on which cf. Olymp. \textit{Prol.} 9,33 and Hadot, 1991).

\textsuperscript{64} David [Elias] \textit{(in Cat.} 241,30 = \textit{T8a}), followed by Arethas (\textit{Schol. in Cat.} 214.10), appears to follow Olympiodorus in most respects – but reverses the names of the protagonists of (i) and (iii). I shall discuss this below. The protagonist of (ii) is Herminus in all of these accounts, however.
commentators, too, have adduced 1a1 and 1a16-17 in laying out the evidence for a linguistic interpretation of the Categories.65

Next (ii), Olympiodorus expounds the second view, which he ascribes to Herminus. This is the view that the Categories is concerned with pragmata (ὁ δὲ Ἑρμῖνος οἰόμενος αὐτὸν περὶ πραγμάτων διαλαμβάνειν, 19,6-7). Herminus argues that Aristotle is always using the word ἔστι throughout the Categories, which he habitually uses when he is talking about pragmata (ἐν τού τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη πανταχοῦ τῷ ἐστὶ προσφήματι κεχρῆσθαι, ὡς ἐπὶ πραγμάτων εἴοθε λέγεσθαι, 19,7-8). Moreover (Herminus continues) Aristotle plainly makes a division of beings, and not of words, at Cat. 1a20 (τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἔστιν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, τὰ δὲ καθ’ ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται), and this is evidence that the skopos is concerned with pragmata (19,12). These arguments, of course, were ascribed to protagonist (ii) in Simplicius-α. Olympiodorus notes a potential objection to Herminus’s use of this passage, namely, that τῶν ὄντων at 1a20 could apply to vocalisations because φόναι too are beings (τῶν φωνῶν αὐτῶν οὐσῶν, 14-15). But a defender of Herminus’s view would reply that words and vocalisations are not properly called real beings (αἱ φωναὶ καὶ οἱ λόγοι οὐ λέγονται κυρίως εἶναι, 19,16), because they have their existence in becoming, ‘as we shall discover’ (ἐν τῷ γίγνεσθαι τὸ ἔην ἔχουσιν, ὡς μαθησόμεθα, 19,16-17).

Third (iii), Olympiodorus discusses the view that the Categories concerns noêmata, a position that he ascribes to ‘Alexander’ (presumably the Aphrodisian): ὁ δὲ Ἀλέξανδρος ὑπολαμβάνων αὐτὸν περὶ νοημάτων διαλέγεσθαι (19,17-18). Alexander ‘took his start’ from the two views just expressed (ἐξ ἐκατέρων λαμβάνων τας ἀφορμὰς κατεσκεύαζε τὸν ἑαυτοῦ λόγον, 19,18-19), and maintained that each had merit (φησὶ γὰρ ὅτι ἀμφότεροι ἐμοὶ νικᾶτε, 19,19), as he would demonstrate by division (ἐκ διαιρέσεως δείξωμεν, 19,20). Alexander continues (19,19-27):

65 See my chapter 2.
Among beings, (a) some solely deliver reports (angeloi), (b) others are solely reported about (angelletai), and (c) others are both reporters and reported about (kai angellei kai angelletai).

Now vocalisations (phônai) are solely reporters, and realities (pragmata) are solely reported, but thoughts (dianoêmata) are both reporters and reported about. [This is clear] because [thoughts] report realities, but are reported by vocalisations. Thus concepts (noêmata) mediate (mesa esti) between vocalisations and realities.

Now you [sc. proponents of the previous two views] maintain that [the Categories] investigates vocalisations and realities, but mediating between these are concepts, and whoever grasps the outer terms [necessarily also] grasps the middle terms.⁶⁶ Therefore, the skopos [of the Categories], in his [sc. Alexander’s] view, concerns concepts.

The conclusion (seemingly delivered in Olympiodorus’s own voice)⁶⁷ is, at first sight, surprising. The argument that he has attributed to Alexander seems to build toward a case that the Categories concerns vocalisations and concepts and real things; and yet in introducing and closing the argument, Olympiodorus strongly implies that Alexander declared noêmata alone to be the preferred skopos. If Alexander is meant to be identified with protagonist (iii) in Simplicius-α, this is all the more puzzling; for Alexander, in Simplicius, is the fourth protagonist who arrives to resolve the bickering μερικῶς of (i), (ii) and (iii). In Olympiodorus, as we shall find, that diplomat is Iamblichus himself.

Olympiodorus goes on to cite further evidence adduced by protagonist (iii) in favour of this view (εὔπορεί δὲ ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος καὶ ἄλλον λόγον τοιούτου... ὃτι περὶ νοημάτων ἔστιν αὐτῷ ὁ σκοπός, 19,27-29), namely, that the passage linking the praedicamenta and the postpraedicamenta (11b15-16) mentions genera as the subject-matter of the preceding section (ὑπὲρ μὲν οὖν τῶν προτεθέντων γενών ἵσανα τὰ εἰρημένα). The use of this

⁶⁶ The obvious source of this principle is Aristotle himself: see for example An. Pr. 46b22 and 48a41, and De An. 407a29 (προσλαμβάνουσα δ’ ἅει μέσον καὶ ἄκρον εὐθυπορούσην).

⁶⁷ I translate Olympiodorus’s αὐτῷ (e.g. 19,29 and 19,34) as a dative of interest referring to the original speaker (thus ‘in his [sc. Alexander’s] view’). On my view, then (as one would have suspected from the language) these words do not represent a direct citation of Alexander, but a paraphrase or interpretation – presumably, as I suggest below, Iamblichus’s interpretation of what source (iii) had to say about this.
citation, as ascribed to Alexander, is of interest in several ways. Of direct interest to us here, Alexander explains (Olympiodorus continues) that the genera under discussion are not ‘before the many’ (for that would be the subject-matter of Theology), nor ‘in the many’ (for that would be the subject-matter of Physics), but rather are the innate concepts (ἐννοηματικά) that are ‘over the many’ and ‘subsequent’ to them (ὑστερογενῆ, 19,34).

This is also the view ascribed to the third source (iii) in Simplicius-α (cf. ταῦτα δὲ ὑστερον καὶ ἐννοηματικά, 10,1-2), who adds that these ‘simple concepts’ answer to the Stoic ‘sayables’ (λεκτὰ τὰ νοήματα ἔστιν, ὡς καὶ τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς ἐδόκει, 10,3).

The characteristically Neoplatonic tripartition of universals upon which this interpretation turns in both Simplicius and Olympiodorus can hardly be Alexander’s own, at least in the form in which Olympiodorus presents it. Alexander’s own position on universals is very much a live question, but the primary sources clearly suggest (as we have noted in the chapter on Boethus, especially in reference to De anima 90,2-8 and Quaestio 1.11) that Alexander viewed universals as dependent on a mind – what is unclear is whether they are dependent on mind for their existence, or merely for their recognition. However, it is certainly straightforward to see how a Neoplatonist maintaining a threefold view of universals – the separate ‘before many’, the inseparable ‘in many’, and the subsequent (husterogenê) ‘abstracted’ from many in thought – would read Alexander as a proponent of the third view, if he knew Alexander.

At this stage, however, a reader who has come to Olympiodorus from Simplicius, or from modern commentators primarily reliant on Simplicius, might justly wonder how Olympiodorus arrived at the view that Porphyry adopted a purely ‘linguistic’ interpretation of

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68 Of incidental interest, the language he uses to refer to this passage (ἐν τῷ τέλει τῶν Κατηγοριῶν, 19,29) suggests that he believes either (a) that the Categories ends with these words, i.e., he accepted 11b10-16 as authentic, but ignored the postpraedicamenta, or (b) that he refers to katêgoria in the sense of praedicamenta, the main body of the work, and Κατηγοριῶν should perhaps not, with Busse, be capitalized as if it was a citation of the book title.

69 The analysis of Lloyd (1955:59-61), who traces the tripartition before Plotinus, remains very useful. Recently, see Harari (2005).

70 The key passages, such as De anima 90,2-8 and Quaestio 1.11, clearly suggest that Alexander viewed universals as dependent on a mind – whether for their existence or merely for their recognition is unclear. See recently Sharples (2005), Rashed (2004 and 2007), Flannery (2003), and Tweedale (1984). The so-called ‘nominalist view’ of Alexander promoted by Moraux (1942) and Pines (1961), namely that universals depend on thoughts, was challenged by Tweedale, and his more moderate view is defended in the main by Sharples (2005). See further discussion in my chapter 5 (‘Boethus of Sidon’), and Rashed (2007), especially discussion on 254-57 of ‘un faux problème’.

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the *Categories*, and how Olympiodorus came to associate these three views with Porphyry, Herminus, and Alexander respectively. We may be tempted to conclude that Olympiodorus has corrupted his information, or drawn from a faulty source; or perhaps that he derives the tripartition of opinions on the *skopos* just from the lectures of his teacher Ammonius (T5a),\(^1\) who does not name any sources at all, with the consequence that Olympiodorus had to guess at the identities of the protagonists.

Moreover, in the manuscript of Olympiodorus’s pupil David [Elias]\(^2\) in *Cat.*, the names of Porphyry and Alexander are reversed, although Herminus retains the second view. The fact that both sources present the same names in reverse order could suggest a palaeographical explanation for the confusion.\(^3\) But David’s remixed attribution does not solve any of our problems,\(^4\) and we might reasonably doubt the witness in this case: David appears to be

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\(^1\) As a student, Olympiodorus heard Ammonius lecture, and calls him ‘ancestor’ (*progonos*, Ol. in *Met.* 153,7). It may be the case that Olympiodorus succeeded Ammonius as holder of the chair of Philosophy at Alexandria, perhaps with the mathematician Eutocius intervening. See Westerink (1961) for discussion.

\(^2\) Consensus, based on recent analysis of an Armenian version of David, appears to have shifted back in favour of the manuscript tradition, which attributed this commentary on the *Categories* to David and not to Elias. See Mahé (1990) with Mahé in *Der Neue Pauly* (David [2]), and Hadot in *Der Neue Pauly* (Elias [2]).

\(^3\) Namely, that Olympiodorus and David used the same source manuscript at Alexandria, where David studied with Olympiodorus. This might have been a copy of Ammonius’s lectures, or an earlier text upon which Ammonius himself had drawn. If a scholiast added the names of Porphyry, Herminus, and Alexander *in margine* alongside these three anonymous views, it may have been left dangerously unclear which name properly belonged to which view.

\(^4\) The fundamental discrepancy between Olympiodorus and Simplicius is that Simplicius needs *both* Porphyry and Alexander to come to the rescue of the three antagonists; they cannot *be* any two of the antagonists. We might also add that David’s attributions seem (at first sight) no more philosophically compelling as accounts of the protagonists than Olympiodorus’s – although it is rather unlikely, as we shall see, that (i), (ii) and (iii) are more than caricatures. Olympiodorus’s Alexander appears to have argued in a manner compatible with mind-dependent universals, which seems a better fit for the Alexander we think we know from the *De anima* and *Quaestiones*; a ‘verbalist’ Alexander is not a more appealing choice. And Porphyry is repeatedly associated, both by himself in the shorter *Cat.*, and by Simplicius-\(\beta\) above, with the discussion of words significant of beings, omitting concepts; it is less attractive to make him the conceptualist, with David, than to make him the verbalist, with Olympiodorus.
chiefly reliant on Olympiodorus, and there is a greater opportunity for corruption in David's text.\textsuperscript{75}

However these names came to be in the text of Olympiodorus, and however the first and the third names subsequently came to be reversed in the manuscripts of David, there must have been an original source that licensed the attributions, including the consistent attribution of view (ii) to Herminus, and it is this source in which we are primarily interested here.\textsuperscript{76}

Leaving aside the confusion in David, which is only of incidental interest, our doubts about the usefulness of the names in Olympiodorus are founded on the incompatibility of these names with the account of Simplicius-\textsuperscript{α}.\textsuperscript{77} Regardless of which view is ascribed to Porphyry and which to Alexander, the incompatibility remains. Simplicius-\textsuperscript{α} needs Alexander of Aphrodisias to stay out of the fray, so that the latter can come to the rescue with a fourth view and a final resolution. Porphyry in Simplicius-\textsuperscript{β} clearly knows nothing about ‘Porphyry’ in Simplicius-\textsuperscript{α} in any case, but in order to maintain the patchwork that binds \textsuperscript{α} and \textsuperscript{β} together and permits their unification in \textsuperscript{δ}, Simplicius himself needs Porphyry to stay out of the fray in \textsuperscript{α}; otherwise many of the claims in \textsuperscript{β} and especially \textsuperscript{δ} are simply contradicted by \textsuperscript{α}. Finally, Simplicius needs Herminus to stay out of the fray in \textsuperscript{α} or he too will contradict \textsuperscript{δ}, which has Porphyry, Herminus, and Alexander on the side of the angels.

\textsuperscript{75} The names of the protagonists are repeated multiple times across several pages in Olympiodorus; David, on the other hand, mentions them just once, in a single paragraph. David also introduces Eustathius alongside Alexander. Thus (129,9-11): οἱ μὲν οὖν περὶ φωνῶν εἰρήκασι τὸν σκοπόν, ὡς Ἀλέξανδρος καὶ Εὐστάθιος, οἱ δὲ περὶ νοημάτων, ὡς Πορφύριος, οἱ δὲ περὶ πραγμάτων, ὡς Ἑρμῖνος.

\textsuperscript{76} These attributions appear in Olympiodorus either (a) because he invented them or (b) because he found them in his immediate source or sources. As for (a), it is very unlikely that he invented the attributions, particularly when his teacher Ammonius was content to leave the sources anonymous; in any case, Olympiodorus must have had a motive to cite names, which would imply a source. (b) If the attributions appeared in a direct source and such a source was a copy of, say, Iamblichus, they are of considerable interest to us. Even if they are the work of a marginal scholiast, it is improbable that the scholiast pulled them from thin air or guesswork; like Olympiodorus, the scholiast, too, must have had a source. If the attributions are wrong in our text of Olympiodorus, they might have been corrupted at various stages, which need not be exclusive: for example, (a) the attributions could have been wrong in the sources that Olympiodorus used, or (b) correct in those sources but corrupted by Olympiodorus himself, or (c) correct in the lecture or autograph of Olympiodorus but corrupted by the copyist or student who was ultimately responsible for the archetype of our manuscripts. In any of these cases, the fact that names are given here suggests an original source who, in some pattern, ascribed these three views to these three names; and consistently, as far as our evidence goes, attributed view (ii) to Herminus.

\textsuperscript{77} Needless to say, I am not here (primarily) discussing the validity of the attributions as accounts of what these three philosophers actually thought or said; it should already be clear that they are heavily interpreted, and that the attributer has motives of his own (see below).
The real discrepancy, it seems, lies between the source of Olympiodorus and the patchwork that binds Simplicius α to Simplicius β and Simplicius δ. It is clear that Olympiodorus relies on a separate source who interpreted Alexander’s remarks into the framework outlined above, ascribed the ‘linguistic’ view to Porphyry, and advanced such lofty exegeses as 18.26-27 (‘pragmata derive from God, noêmata from Nous, phônai from Soul’). Fortunately we do not have far to look for this source; his identity can be deduced with near certainty from the lines immediately following Olympiodorus’s report of the view of Alexander. Olympiodorus concludes that all three opinions can be demonstrated from the words of Aristotle himself (ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ φιλοσόφου πιστοῦμεν, 36), and continues:

ο ὁ δὲ θείος Ἰάμβλιχος, ἔπιγενόμενος ὑπερθεὶς, φησὶ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὅτι μάχεσθε, ἄνθρωποι, μὴ μαχόμενοι καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἀληθεύετε καὶ οὐκ ἀληθεύετε: ἀληθεύετε γὰρ ἔκαστος υἱὸν λέγων τοῦτον εἶναι τὸν σκοτόν τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους, ἰσχύεται δὲ, ὅτι τοῦτον λέγει καὶ μόνον [ἵ] ἐὰν φωνῶν μόνος εἴηται ἢ περὶ νοημάτων μόνων ἢ περὶ πραγμάτων μόνων]. Ὁ δὲ θείος Ἰάμβλιχος, ἔπιγενόμενος τις τὸν ἄνθρωπον εἶπον αὐτὸν ἢ ζῴων μόνον εἶναι ἢ λογικὸν ἢ θυμίτον μόνον, ἀληθεύει μὲν, ἐπειδὴ ταῦτα ἐστὶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἰσχύεται δὲ ἐν ἦν ἐκαστὸν μόνον εἶναι λέγων τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὑπερθεὶς καὶ ὁ περὶ φωνῶν μόνον (5) ἢ περὶ πραγμάτων ἢ περὶ νοημάτων μόνον ὑπερθεὶς τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη λέγειν κατορθοῖ τι καὶ οὐ κατορθοὶ κατορθοὶ μὲν, ἐπειδὴ μερικῶς πως ἤκαθε τοῦ σκοτοῦ, οὐ κατορθοὶ δὲ, ἐπειδὴ μὴ τελείως ἴδινική ἀποδοῦναι τὸν σκοτόν τοῦ συγγράμματος ἐστὶν οὖν τῷ δὲ ὅτι ἤκαθε τοῦ σκοτοῦ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους οὔτε περὶ φωνῶν μόνον οὔτε περὶ νοημάτων μόνον οὔτε περὶ πραγμάτων μόνον, (10) ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν τριῶν ἀμα, φωνῶν, νοημάτων, πραγμάτων οὖν ἢ ἄρ τοῦτον περὶ ἐνός διαλεξήθηκαι ἄνευ τῶν λοιπῶν.

But the divine Iamblichus, who was born later, replies to them [sc. Porphyry, Herminus, and Alexander]: ‘Gentlemen, you are “warring in peace.”’ You are right and wrong – since each of you rightly identifies this or that to be Aristotle’s aim (skopos) but wrongly to be his only aim. It is almost as if someone set about to define ‘human being’ and said only ‘animate’, but someone else said only ‘rational’ and another person only ‘mortal’. [Each] would tell the truth, since ‘human’ is all of these, but [each] would also err in saying that ‘human’ is each one only.

In the same way, someone who supposes Aristotle to speak only about phônai or pragmata or noêmata is both correct and incorrect. He is correct, since he touches on the aim in a partial way (merikōs), but he is incorrect, since he is unable to present the aim of the work in a complete way (teleiōs).

In reality (tōi onti), then, the aim of Aristotle [in the Categories] concerns neither phônai only, nor noêmata only, nor pragmata only, but all

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78 The phrase (μάχεσθε, ἄνθρωποι, μὴ μαχόμενοι, repeated by David [Elias] with ὃ ἄνθρωπος for ἄνθρωποι, and elsewhere by Olympiodorus) has the ring of a literary quotation. I have not found a source for the words, but I have translated the phrase (with some license) as a pithy aphorism.
three at once (hama): phônai, noêmata, pragmata. For it is impossible for any one [of these] to be discussed (dialekthēnai) without the others.

Iamblichus, then, emerges as the original source for this threefold ‘division’ of views on the Categories, which also appears in Simplicius as source α and in Ammonius. Moreover, the present exegesis of pragmata, noêmata, and phônai as respectively ‘from God, by Nous, by Soul’ (Olympiodorus 18.26-27) must be a sample of Iamblichus’s ‘intellective theôria’ as applied to the Categories,79 suggesting that Iamblichus underlies much of the material in the preceding pages of Olympiodorus’s discussion as well as the core of the tripartition itself. The fact that Simplicius does not provide a parallel to Ol. 18.26-27 is, in fact, a good example of Simplicius’s claim that he occasionally ‘led down’ Iamblichus’s lofty and noeric exegesis to a level ‘accessible to the multitude’.80 And with proof that Iamblichus underlies Simplicius-α, we notice that Iamblichus is now recognized as the direct source for all of the Simplician passages that we demarcated α, γ, (most of) δ, and ε above, leaving the bipartite discussion of Simplicius-β standing alone as a direct, and perhaps unmediated, representation of Porphyry’s commentary ad Gedalium.

§B.d: Iamblichus and Porphyry

Does this help to shed any light on the problems associated with the names in Olympiodorus, and especially the association of Porphyry with the ‘verbal’ analysis of the Categories? Iamblichus either constructed the tripartition of α or adapted it to his own purposes; in either case, he may be the source of the names. Moreover, we know from the proem of Simplicius that Iamblichus constructed α in full awareness of the account given by Porphyry in his ad Gedalium; and we can reasonably deduce from the contents of β that it represents the ad Gedalium, as it certainly represents Porphyry and contains material that is not found in the shorter commentary in Cat. I suggest that Iamblichus asserted that Porphyry, in his

79 See earlier notes on the intellective interpretation, with Dillon (1997) on the noera theoría of Iamblichus as applied to the Categories, and comments of Chase (2003) and Hadot (1990) ad loc. Sorabji (2005), Vol. 3, helpfully summarises the relevant sources in translation; see for example 74-75. Iamblichus also applied the model of noera theoría to religion (e.g., De Myst. 1.2).

80 As we recall, Simplicius remarks that he ‘followed Iamblichus’s considerations as closely as possible... often using the philosopher’s very words’, but sought to reduce the inaccessibility of his noeric analysis: for ‘I wished to convey the lofty nous of the man, which was inaccessible to the multitude, downwards, to be more clear and commensurate [with the common understanding]’ (τὸν ὑψηλὸν νοῦν τοῦ ἄνδρος καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἁβατον ἐπὶ τὸ οἰαφέστερον τε καὶ συμμετρότερον καταγαγεῖν, 3.6-7).
commentary *ad Gedalium*, had adopted an approach that treated the *Categories* as a
document concerned with *phônai* – for this, I think, was how Iamblichus read and criticised
*β*. The claim that the *Categories* concerned just ‘words significant of beings’ was felt by
Iamblichus as an inadequacy in Porphyry’s commentary; in short, Porphyry had studied the
text at a ‘lower level’ of exegesis than Iamblichus’s own ‘intellective’ interpretation would
entail.81 This reading, from a Iamblichean viewpoint, is true.82 Moreover, even if Porphyry
had entertained such speculations, he did not suppose a beginner’s commentary on
predications to be the place to present them.83 Viewed as a work of noeric exegesis, both of
Porphyry’s commentaries fell flat.

Iamblichus, therefore, embarked upon the enterprise that Simplicius tells us he implemented,
namely, to supplement the *ad Gedalium*, which, in his view, was mostly ‘verbal’ in content
and approach (see below), with *noëra theôria*. In doing so, Iamblichus restated Porphyry’s
project84 in his own philosophical framework, and redeployed several of Porphyry’s analyses
using his own terminology.85 By positioning Porphyry at the initial, ‘linguistic’ level of
interpretation, *through the tripartition of *α*, Iamblichus facilitated his own ability to ‘add
on’ (cf. προστιθείς, Simplic. 2,15) comments such as *γ* and *ε*, and thus to correct Porphyry’s
partiality (as he may have seen it; cf. μερικῶς in Simplicius-*α* and Olympiodorus) by
demonstrating the necessity of higher levels of interpretation.

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81 For the concept of ‘level of exegesis’ here, see the following notes on the Iamblichean approach to
Plato, and Dillon (1973, 1998 and 1999). Below, I rely on a briefly sketched analogy with the
Iamblichean exegesis preserved in Proclus in *Alcibiadem*. Sorabji (2005) provides several examples
of Iamblichus’s noeric theoria at work. Rappe (2000) offers a useful general introduction to the textual
and exegetical approach of the Neoplatonists, coupled with references to modern literary criticism.
Rappe discusses an example of ‘mapping’ the levels of being to a text, similar to what I take
Iamblichus to be doing with the *Categories*, on p. 168 and following (focusing on Proclus in
*Parmenidem*).

82 That is, one can see how Iamblichus might arrive at the view that Porphyry is indeed concerned (in
Iamblichus’s own formulation) with how *psukhê* emanates *logoi*, and not with the ‘higher’ senses of

83 Rather, one should ‘avoid deeper inquiries and aim suitably at the more simple’ (Isagoge, §0, tr.
Barnes; and passages of the in *Cat.* cited above).

84 What Porphyry himself claimed to be doing, was, one might conjecture, of relatively limited
interest to Iamblichus. We may suppose that the commentary *ad Gedalium* contained an extensive
discussion along the lines of the excerpts from *in Cat.* discussed above, and this discussion arrived at
the conclusion that the *skopos* of the *Categories* concerns ‘vocalisations significant of beings, insofar
as they are significant’, or a very similar formulation.

85 As Dillon (1998) points out, translating a predecessors’ words into their own technical language is a
familiar trait of many later Neoplatonists’ exegetical practice, including Iamblichus.
On this hypothesis, Iamblichus may have developed the tripartition of \( \alpha \) with a view to replacing the bipartition of \( \beta \). Iamblichus, we might suppose, was not especially interested in the bipartition of views that we meet in Porphyry’s shorter commentary (linguistic and ontological, which must have also appeared somewhere in the longer commentary even if only to be superseded, as Ebbesen suggests, by a theory inclusive of concepts).\(^86\) Rather, Iamblichus wished to embark on a new kind of exegesis for the document – one that required a new tripartition of previous views (\( \alpha \)), answering to the Neoplatonic tripartition of universals, as we have seen in Olympiodorus: separate, enmattered, and abstracted or ‘posterior’. In the course of Iamblichus’s analysis, he would show that the *Categories* possessed meaning on all three ‘levels’ of exegesis, just as he, and his successors, approached a Platonic dialogue.\(^87\) The triad ‘linguistic, conceptual, and real’ carried a different force for Iamblichus than it carried for Porphyry: for Iamblichus than it carried for Porphyry: for Iamblichus took the view that these three terms referred to a triad of *levels of being*, namely, divine, noetic, and psychic. Thus the colourful metaphysical narratives of \( \gamma \) and \( \varepsilon \) can be interspersed with the Porphyrian exegesis of the text, which, on Iamblichus’s view, is merely *logikós*.

How, then, did \( \beta \) come to be where it is in Simplicius, sandwiched between excerpts of Iamblichus? One solution is to suppose that Simplicius did his best to patch up the discussion he found in Porphyry with that in Iamblichus. We know that Simplicius intervenes in the ‘summary’ of \( \delta \), which includes a conscious effort to produce a formulation of the *skopos* that includes both the tripartition of \( \alpha \) and the bipartition of \( \beta \). If it was Simplicius who produced that final formulation, it may be attractive to imagine that he also inserted \( \beta \), a short and largely unmodified excerpt from the *ad Gedalium*, after the Iamblichean tripartition \( \alpha \) and before the commencement of noeric exegesis in \( \gamma \), and sought to make a unity of them.

Iamblichus’s construction of the tripartition of \( \alpha \), however, can also tell us something about the structure of Porphyry’s own account, and where in it \( \beta \) may have occurred. For *every one*

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\(^86\) This hypothesis would be compatible with the notion that Porphyry had already discussed such a tripartition of views in his *ad Gedalium*, and plausibly Porphyry’s treatment of Alexander and Herminus suggested to Iamblichus that the ‘conceptual’ view belonged to Alexander, while the ‘pragmatic’ view belonged to Herminus.

\(^87\) On Iamblichus’s reading of Plato, see Dillon (1973); on the broad exegetical approach of later Neoplatonism, see in particular Rappe (2000). Proclus in Alc. is an excellent example of the application of a ‘noeric’ exegesis of *levels of being* to a text, and may draw on Iamblichus himself; below I suggest some direct comparanda from that text.
of the three views propounded in \(\alpha\) includes some comments that we know to have been made by Porphyry. For example, it is true, in part (i) of \(\alpha\), that Porphyry read the title \textit{Katêgoriai} as suggesting that the \textit{Categories} concerned \textit{phônai} (Olymp. 18.35), and he may well have said everything attributed to him under (i). But Porphyry also lurks in part (ii), for he also argued that the \textit{Categories} must have to do with real things (and surely Porphyry offered a detailed discussion of 1a16-17 and 1a20 in his longer commentary, arriving at the ‘blended’ conclusions ascribed to him by Simplicius). While we lack ironclad evidence that Porphyry expounded the words–concepts–beings tripartition \textit{himself}, it seems almost certain (following Simplicius and Boethius, discussed below) that he did, and on this ground I suspect that some of his remarks on the mediating role of concepts may have been involved in passing on the position of ‘Alexander’ in part (iii) to Iamblichus. Certainly Porphyry lurks \textit{somewhere} under part (iii), which shares the imagery of \textit{phônai} as ‘messengers’ (\textit{angeloi}) of realities and uses it much as Porphyry does (\textit{in Cat. 58.23}).

Porphyry’s arguments have become isolated from one another, so that his contention that the \textit{Categories} is \textit{not} about beings has become his argument that it \textit{is} (just) about words (i); and his argument that the \textit{Categories} is \textit{not} about words has become ‘Herminus’s’ argument that it \textit{is} (just) about beings (ii); while his contention that there must be a mediating principle, of which a portion is preserved by Boethius in his criticism of Herminus, has become (iii) ‘Alexander’s’ argument that it is \textit{solely} about the mediating principle, concepts. I take it that Porphyry adopted all three of these lines of argument at various points in the \textit{ad Gedalium} commentary, underlying the structure of both Iamblichus’s and Simplicius’s later treatments, in the process of arguing against earlier commentators. When he stated the contentions in favour of \textit{phônai} preserved in (i), he did so in the context of arguing against Lucius and Nicostratus (with various provisions of which the argument in Olympiodorus has been stripped); when he stated the contentions in favour of \textit{pragmata} preserved in (ii), he did so in the context of arguing against Athenodorus and Cornutus (again, with various provisions now lost); and finally, when he stated the contentions in favour of \textit{noêmata} preserved in (iii), he did so in the context of arguing against Herminus, quite likely following arguments first made against Herminus by Alexander in his own \textit{in Cat.}

We have good evidence for this in the context of his arguments against (i) Lucius and Nicostratus and (ii) Athenodorus and Cornutus, which he touches on himself in the surviving \textit{in Cat.}. In the shorter commentary, however, he only allows himself time to remark that
Lucius and Nicostratus and Athenodorus and Cornutus are wrong, and he adduces Herminus to tell us, ‘briefly’ (βραχέως), how they are wrong (T3b). The shorter commentary then moves on to other business. But it seems that the longer commentary dwelt on the finer points of Herminus’s account, in which Porphyry raised Herminus’s doubts about the De Interpretatione and the doctrine of ‘mediating concepts’ expressed in its opening lines (cf. Boethius in Int. [2] 37.30-40.28 = T4a), proceeded to refute Herminus’s doubts (in Por. fr. 81F Smith), then clearly stated that the Categories concerned the signification of concepts by words, and of real things by concepts.

I suspect that Porphyry, in the commentary ad Gedalium, made a clear break after wielding Herminus against Lucius and Nicostratus, and before criticizing Herminus himself. At the end of the earlier section, I take it, he directly stated Herminus’s claim that the Cat. concerns ‘simple words significant of beings, insofar as they are significant’, giving rise to this formulation in the later tradition, especially as it is wielded against Lucius, Nicostratus, Athenodorus, and Cornutus. In this earlier section, he also discussed in propria persona the aporiai raised by Plotinus. Then, starting (as it were) a new zêtêma, Porphyry dealt with those aspects of Herminus’s doctrine that were incompatible with the Aristotelian view he ultimately sought to propound, a view that included mediating concepts. At the end of this second discussion, he arrived at the second formulation, ‘words significant of concepts significant of beings’.

I would like to briefly lay out how I think these discussions were organized, based on the sources we have seen so far. Structurally, I take it that they are reflected (via Iamblichus) in Simplicius’s commentary.

A. I believe that the first major discussion of the skopos had two parts (i) and (ii), corresponding to (i) and (ii) above. The first was concerned with the discussion of Plotinus 6.1-3 and the refutation of Lucius and Nicostratus (who were, of course, read as proponents of the view that the Categories concerned ‘genera of being’) and the second with the refutation of Athenodorus and Cornutus.

Both parts, I take it, drew heavily on Herminus via Alexander. That Porphyry’s refutation of Lucius and Nicostratus and Athenodorus and Cornutus was reliant on Herminus to some degree is clear from his own words, and the extent of the dependence seems abundantly clear from the long discussion that immediately precedes the verbal citation of Herminus in
Porphyry in Cat., presented above (broadly, 57.20-59.17). As we noted in discussing that passage above, each claim that is explicitly attributed to Herminus in the following lines (from 59.18 onward) is mirrored and expanded in the earlier passage, and the refutation of Lucius, Nicostratus, Athenodorus, and Cornutus presupposes those earlier arguments, such as the primary and secondary impositions of speech. These arguments also depend, I believe, on a view held by Herminus that each simple verbalisation corresponds *phusei* to a real object, and that these real objects include not only individuals, but also a taxonomy of genera and species capped by the ten highest genera. Some such conceptless theory underlies the ‘history’ of primary and secondary imposition, and until Porphyry introduces concepts, this theory will need to do the leg-work for refuting Lucius, Nicostratus, Athenodorus, and Cornutus.

Most of all, however, the attribution to Herminus is the cleanest explanation for the fact that Porphyry makes no mention of concepts in refuting Lucius, Nicostratus, Athenodorus, and Cornutus, and repeatedly provides a formulation that does not even allow for concepts. Indeed, in the place of an account based on the opening lines of the *De Int.*, which retails how all human beings came to have identical *pathêmata* of the soul signified in different tongues of speech, we have a new account, namely, the ‘history’ of primary and secondary imposition. I take it that this narrative was initially adopted by Herminus as an alternative to the opening of the *De Int.*, whose account of ‘affections of the soul’ (*De Int.* 16a5-8) he found unconvincing. (Indeed, as I will note in later chapters, this issue may be rooted in Andronicus’s athetization of the *De Interpretatione*).²⁸

(i) I take it that the first part of the first discussion (preserved and condensed in the early passages of the surviving *in Cat.* discussed above, especially 57.20 ff., and in Simplicius) was primarily concerned with the refutation of Lucius and Nicostratus, and a proof that the *Categories* was not primarily an account of *genera of being*, but rather an account of predications, or terms that naturally signify the genera of being. However, I believe that Herminus was not a dominant personality in this part, for this discussion also included Porphyry’s own commentary on Plotinus 6.1-3, which resurfaces in Simplicius and was surely preserved in Iamblichus as well.

²⁸ As I argue in my chapter on Andronicus, Andronicus athetized the *De Int.* precisely because of the comment about ‘affections of the soul’, which is also the object of Herminus’s doubts. I have also argued that this tradition had a Stoicizing tendency (see my chapter on Athenodorus and Cornutus).
From this section, I believe we derive several verbal echoes of Boethus at third-hand (cp. *skhesis* at Porph. *in Cat.* 57.24 with Simplic. *in Cat.* 11.26), and reports in Simplicius and Porphyry that ‘Herminus and Boethus’ held this and that about the *skopos*. For I take it that Herminus often adduced Boethus of Sidon’s commentary in his lectures on the *Categories*, and that Alexander reported these references. Moreover, in some cases, Porphyry seems to have launched a ‘dialogue’ between the positions of Herminus and Plotinus. With Herminus explicitly drawing on Boethus, and Plotinus implicitly drawing on Nicostratus, the structure of the argument could become awfully complex, and lead to the curious anachronism that sometimes appears in Simplicius, with ‘Boethus’ replying to an *aporia* of ‘Nicostratus’ (perhaps at Simplic. 58.28) or even of ‘Plotinus’.

At the end of this first section, I believe, Porphyry had completed the bulk of his initial discussion of Plotinus 6.1-3 (although this would recur under specific categories, e.g. Quantity) and had reported Herminus’s refutation of Lucius and Nicostratus. While Herminus was named in several of these direct refutations, which come down to us chiefly in Simplicius, Porphyry himself predominated.

(ii) I take it that the second part of the first discussion was also indebted to Herminus, who himself cited Boethus, and that here Herminus emerged as a stronger personality, quite distinct from Porphyry, making the case against Athenodorus and Cornutus that the *Categories* concerned words signifying beings, and not solely words. (As I will suggest in the chapter on Athenodorus and Cornutus, this case was made largely in terms of the Stoic bipartition of the ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ parts of dialectic, which I link to the ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ imposition of words in Porphyry *in Cat.*, and trace to Herminus). This refutation survives in Simplicius and Dexippus, as we have seen (chiefly in the chapter on Athenodorus and Cornutus), but also in Olympiodorus 19.6-7 (ii above, ascribed to Herminus, and drawing from Iamblichus).

During this section, I believe, Herminus stressed the *reality* of the ten genera to which the ten categories correspond, and it is here that Porphyry preserves his claim, later reported by Simplicius, that the ten genera are an ‘enumeration’ (*aparithmēsis*: cf. *in Cat.* 62.7-23 = T6i). But I believe, as I suggest below, that *Iamblichus* took special interest in this suggestion, both for the purpose of ‘noeric interpretation’ and for the perceived affinity of Herminus’s view with the Pythagorean position of Archytas – for whom the ‘ten’ are also signified ‘by nature’. Thus, somewhat unusually, when Simplicius reports this view it is alongside a citation of
Iamblichus himself, and when Simplicius responds to this view it is in the form of a response to Iamblichus.

At the end of (i) and (ii), again, I take it that Porphyry presented a clear (but primarily Herminian) formulation to the effect that the *Categories* concerned words significant of beings, insofar as they are significant – a conclusion for the discussion of Plotinus, Lucius, and Nicostratus. Moreover, at this point I take it that we have had most or all of the surviving Herminian remarks about the *skopos* that are to be found in Simplicius. And I maintain that Porphyry drew Herminus from the pages of Alexander in this section, such that their *zêtêmata* appear to fall into close alignment (cf. Simplic. *in Cat.* 1,14 = T6c), but that Alexander himself does not yet emerge as a distinct personality.

B. The second major discussion had, I think, one key component, which I will call (iii) overall. In it, Porphyry turned to consider and develop the formulation of Herminus and to criticize Herminus’s *aporiai* concerning the *De Interpretatione*. I suggest that this discussion was largely indebted to *Alexander* (who was rather more of a passive repository for other views in the first discussion), that is, that Alexander spearheaded the discussion and criticism of Herminus’s view here and that Porphyry, in large part endorsing what Alexander had to say on the subject, was more sparing with his own remarks *in propria persona*. (For the question of Porphyry’s access to Herminus, see discussion in my chapter on Herminus, below).

Alexander here would have propounded a view on the dependence of universals on the mind to be recognized, along the lines of the argument Sharples (2005) finds in his other works, or to exist, along the lines of the argument that Moraux (1942) and Pines (1961) held him to maintain, and so sought to demonstrate the necessity of the mediating step.

I take it that this section (iii) resulted in the formulation heavily used by the Alexandrians but also evident in Simplicius, and that this was also the formulation subsequently interpreted ‘noerically’ by Iamblichus, namely: the *Categories* primarily concerns *phônai* significant of *noêmata* significant of *pragmata*. This formulation was not only the one endorsed by Porphyry, but it may have originally been stated (on my view) by Alexander (cf. Simplicius *in Cat.* 13,16 = T6d).

It is important to note that Porphyry’s acceptance of both formulations led, in the later tradition, to the two becoming largely indistinguishable. Thus Simplicius, writing *in Cat.*, could cite the formula ‘words signifying things’ and, shortly afterward, describe it as ‘words
signifying concepts signifying things’. This strongly suggests that Porphyry built on the first formulation, rather than discarding it. But I do not think it suggests that Porphyry took these to amount to quite the same thing. Rather, I think the sole presence of the first view in the shorter commentary in Cat. suggests that this commentary draws throughout on Herminus, and on (i)-(ii) above. In other words, with respect to Porphyry, I would agree with Ebbesen (1990) that the value of brevity and simplicity played a role in the restriction of the views expressed early in the shorter in Cat. to the exclusion of ‘concepts’. However, I believe that another factor played a significant role, and this was the degree to which Porphyry made direct use of Herminus throughout these passages in refuting Lucius, Nicostratus, Athenodorus, and Cornutus.

Iamblichus, then, came to review and rewrite these major discussions on the skopos. According to Simplicius, he sought to contribute noëra theôria and, where possible, to adduce the Neo-Pythagorean text attributed to Archytas. I believe that the resulting procedure, which I will endeavour to describe briefly here, fits well with Iamblichus’s operation in Platonic texts (sketched above). Thus Iamblichus found in (i), (ii) and (iii) three different ‘levels’ of discourse. (i) The first, which was primarily associated with Porphyry in propria persona, is full of language about words and their imposition, while militating against any suggestions that the Categories directly concerns ‘real beings’; within a Iamblichean exegetical framework, this represents a ‘psychic’ level of interpretation (concerned with ‘diction, figures of speech, verbal form’: cf. Proclus in Alc. 10-11 and [Olympiodorus], Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy 210,21-6, and compare Iamblichus at Olymp. Prol. in Cat. 18,26-27: ‘phônai [are conveyed] by psukhê’).

Next, Iamblichus encountered in (ii) the discussion of Herminus against Athenodorus and Cornutus, and Herminus’s insistence on the reality of the ten genera (signified by the categories) as pragmata, their enumeration (aparithmêsis) in ten, and the claim that there was ‘no genus over them’ (T6i) – which follows from Herminus’s own views on the nature of the syllogism in Alex. in An. Pr. I 72,26 = T2c (discussed in further detail below). Here, on my hypothesis, Herminus emerged more distinctly; for there was no need to address Plotinus, and so less intervention by Porphyry in propria persona. Now Iamblichus himself, according to Simplicius, understood the enumeration of the ten genera as a case of homonymy (‘from one and in relation to one’), and he sought to discuss them in ‘noeric’ terms deriving from his
interpretation of Archytas. He may have found certain affinities in Herminus’s arguments – particularly the suggestion that terms naturally represent real *pragmata*, that there are as many terms as there are *pragmata* (cf. Porphyry), and that the highest genera are tenfold. And he certainly found in Herminus’s rebuttal of a purely ‘linguistic’ interpretation of the *Categories* a suggestion of ‘ascent’ to a higher level of exegesis. Thus, I think, Iamblichus associated this section (ii) with a lofty level of discourse (cf. Iamblichus ap. Ol. Prol in Cat. 18,26-27: ‘*pragmata* are conveyed from God’; Procl. in Alc., loc. cit.: ‘analogous to the Good is [the highest *skopos* of the text *Alc.*, namely] sameness to God’; and cf. [Ol.] Prol. in Plat. 210,21-6).

Finally, in (iii) Iamblichus found a rather detailed discussion of the intermediary principle: and here the mediator was described, in Alexander’s terms, as a ‘mind’ working out an account of universals in order to signify real beings, somewhat on the model of *De Int.* 16a1-8. It is not at all strange that a systematic Neoplatonist in quest of a ‘noeric’ interpretation of the dialogue should conclude that this Mind is *Nous*, that the *Pragmata* are the divine realities, and that the ‘words’ spoken by *Psukhê* are ‘significant’ of Nous, itself ‘significant’ of the *pragmata*, in the sense that a Neoplatonist attaches to the ‘emanation’ of one hypostasis to the next. And to judge from Ol. *Prol in Cat.* 18,26-27, this seems to have been precisely what Iamblichus did in making the connection that ‘*noêmata* are conveyed by *Nous*’, situated between ‘*pragmata* conveyed from God’ and ‘*phônai* conveyed by *Psukhê*’.

This hypothesis helps to explain the principles behind the seemingly astounding attribution of the three views (i) (ii) and (iii) to Porphyry, Herminus, and Alexander in the text of Olympiodorus’s *Prolegomena*. It also outlines a scenario that might reasonably explain how the early passages of Porphyry in *Cat.* could borrow heavily from Herminus for an account of the *skopos* that does not include concepts, yet still provide the impression to later commentators such as Simplicius that Porphyry maintained the formulation of the *skopos* as ‘words–concepts–realities’. It also accounts for the isolated criticisms of Herminus by Porphyry in Boethius, specifically focusing on the *De Int* and the exclusion of concepts. And it may shed some new light upon the process represented by Simplicius’s brief methodological remarks regarding his intention to ‘convey the lofty *Nous* of Iamblichus down’ to a point where it is ‘clear and commensurate’ to the mind of the multitude.

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89 So M. Chase (2003:143, comparing 71,17 and 91,14-33).
Relevant to this, a further point to be stressed in relation to the skopos is the tremendous importance of pedagogy for nearly all of the commentators on the Categories; Herminus appears to have been very explicit that ‘the young’ should address themselves to predications and touch only by prolépsis on the real genera that they signify, and Porphyry followed him in this. The view that predications were chiefly appropriate to ‘the young’ echoes throughout the later commentary tradition, and beyond, in the position of the Categories in the curriculum.

From this long analysis, comparing the language early in Porphyry in Cat. = \text{T3b1} and the subsequent reliance of Herminus (59,17-33 = \text{T3b2}) upon its claims, we have argued that the forefather of the ‘conceptless’ account of signification (β) was Herminus, resurrecting the view of Boethus against Athenodorus and Cornutus. Herminus, as Alexander (\text{T2d}) informs us, already maintained that the outer terms of the Aristotelian syllogism signified their objects φύσει, and questioned the account of De Int. 1a1-8 and raised aporiai about the role of νοήματα in mediating language (Boethius in Int. [2] 1.1, 37,30-40,28 = Porphyry no 81F Smith), suggesting that he at least considered a position that appeared ‘Stoicising’ in the later tradition (cf. [Ammonius] in An. Pr. 17,24-28). In this case, I have suggested, the original application of the ‘double imposition’ theory to the organization of Aristotle’s text, and especially its defense against the linguistic argument of Athenodorus and Cornutus, may be attributable to Herminus, drawing on an older tradition.\footnote{Namely, a tradition that began with Andronicus’s athetization of the De Int., perhaps in order to dispense with the words παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς at 16a6-7 and the application of words by convention (see my chapter on Andronicus), and continued with Boethus of Sidon.}

More broadly, it is hoped that this review has served as a useful introduction both to the relationships of the later sources, and to their general approaches to the problem of the skopos of the text. As we have seen, the opening chapters of the Categories itself played a significant role in those discussions. For example, the opening όμώνυμα λέγεται (Cat. 1a1) and the later statement τῶν λεγομένων τὰ μὲν κατὰ συμπλοκὴν λέγεται τὰ δὲ ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς (1a16-17) are alleged to signify that the work concerns verbalizations (Olymp. 19,23), whilst the fourfold division of ὄντα at Cat. 1a20 (τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐστιν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, τὰ δὲ καθ’ ὑποκειμένων τινὸς λέγεται) is alleged to show that the skopos is concerned with the objects themselves, πράγματα. In the following chapter, we will review the opening pages of the Categories itself with a view to establishing the framework for these
ancient difficulties, and also showing that the modern literature on them often follows the same paths as did the ancient commentators. This survey will be useful in the chapters on specific personae that follow.
2. *Categories 1-2 in Modern Criticism: 1. The Onymies*
In the last chapter, we noticed several occasions on which the critics of late antiquity cited the opening of the *Categories* (the ‘onymies’) or Aristotle’s fourfold division of τὰ ὄντα in order to support a particular view about the *skopos* of the text. The first two chapters of the *Categories* provided the main well of material for criticism and defense of the text during the period under consideration. The present chapter, divided into two sections (corresponding to the first two chapters of the *Cat.*) will study these difficulties in the *Categories* directly, and from the standpoint of modern criticism, in order to establish a framework for further study of the ancient debate.

**Prolegomena**

The opening of the *Categories* (1a1-15) classifies different objects that share some name in common (ὅν ὄνομα κοινόν, 1a1) or derive a name from another. These are divided first into two groups, contingent on whether the definition answering to the common name differs (ὁ δὲ κατὰ τούνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἐτερος, 1a2) or is also held in common (αὐτός, 1a6-7). A third, distinct group contains every object that derives an appellation from another (ἀπὸ τίνος) with a change of verbal form (διαφέροντα τῇ πτώσει, 1a13).

91 Thus Aristotle’s tripartition omits from account objects that have no onomastic relationship at all, as well as any object designated by multiple names. Speusippus, on the testimony of Simplicius (*in Cat.* 38.19-24), called these ‘heteronyms’ and ‘polyonyms’ respectively, and developed a more elaborate scheme than we meet here in *Cat.* 1a1-15. It has been suggested that Speusippus’ ‘onymies’ are formulated on a linguistic principle, while Aristotle’s are formulated on an ontological principle; but see J. Barnes, ‘Homonymy in Aristotle and Speusippus’, *CQ* 21 (1971) 65-80. See also Leonardo Tarán, ‘Speusippus and Aristotle on Homonymy and Synonymy’, *Hermes* 106 (1978) 73-99.

92 No paronymous pair is also homonymous or synonymous. (A) No paronymous pair can be homonymous, because the condition of koinon onoma (1a1) does not fully obtain: paronyms are διαφέροντα τῇ πτώσει and have a different form of address (1a13). (B) No paronymous pair can be synonymous, a distinction that Aristotle makes explicit at *Topics* 2.2, 109b4-7: ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲνος γὰρ γένους παρωνύμως ἢ κατηγορία κατὰ τὸ εἴδος λέγεται, ἀλλὰ πάντα συνωνύμως τὰ γένη τῶν εἰδῶν κατηγορεῖται· καὶ γὰρ τούνομα καὶ τὸν λόγον ἐπιδέχεται τῶν τῶν γενῶν τὰ εἴδη, ‘For the predicate (κατηγορία) deriving from a genus is never said-of the species paronymously, but always the genera are predicated of their species synonymously: for the species inherit both the name and the definition of their genera’ (109b4-6), a position also stated at *Cat.* 2a19-27. By contrast, no paronym inherits the definition of its derivee: if courage is ‘knowledge of what to fear’, it does not follow that the brave man is a ‘knowledge of what to fear’ (for the example compare EE 1228a35-6). See also the fully developed comparison of genetic and paronymic relationships at *Topics* 1.4, 111a33-111b11.

93 διαφέροντα τῇ πτώσει has been translated ‘with a difference of ending’ (Ackrill). But πτώσεις are words that have differences of ending (cf. *De Int.* 16b17-18). ‘Verbal form’ (Cooke) is perhaps better. Moreover, if *homonyma*, *synonyma* and *paronyma* are ‘things’ and not words, we could hardly countenance *paronyma* ‘changing ending’ (1a13), but we could accept that all paronyms ‘change their verbal form’. (Some may, as words are also ‘things’: cf. Charles 2000, 85 n. 15).
According to their membership in one of these three groups, objects are called homonyms (ὁμώνυμα λέγεται, 1a1), synonyms (συνώνυμα δὲ λέγεται, 1a6) or paronyms (παρώνυμα δὲ λέγεται, 1a12). These opening lines may be excerpted in English as follows:

(1) ‘Homonyms’ are said to be those that have only a name (ὄνομα) in common, while the account of essence corresponding to that name (ὁ δὲ κατὰ τούνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας) differs. For instance, [the name] ‘animate’ (ζῷον) is applied to a human being and a drawing…. If one should explain τί ἐστιν τὸ ζῷον εἶναι for each of these, one would give a distinct account (ἴδιον λόγον) in each instance.

(2) ‘Synonyms’ are said to be those that have a name in common, while the account of essence corresponding to that name is [also] the same… for ‘human’ and ‘ox’ are addressed (προσαγορεύεται) by a common name, while the account of essence is the same. If one were to explain τί ἐστιν τὸ ζῷον εἶναι for each, one would give the same account.

(3) ‘Paronyms’ are said to be those that derive the form of address corresponding to their name (τὴν κατὰ τούνομα προσηγορίαν) from something [else], while differing in verbal form (πτῶσις)… for instance, ‘grammarian’ [is named] from ‘grammar’, and ‘courageous’ from ‘courage’.

This chapter constitutes a challenging propylaea to the Categories. What purpose is served by these definitions? Why do they stand here, where we might anticipate an introduction outlining the purpose and the boundaries of the work? One answer is found in Ackrill (1963:69), who follows the ancient Greek and Latin commentary tradition in describing 1a1-15 as containing ‘certain preliminary points and explanations’ presupposed by the main body of the work. John Rist (1989a:94), by contrast, lays aside 1a1-15 as ‘loosely connected’ with the rest of the text. According to other interpretations, as Barrington Jones rhetorically suggests (1972:117), the first chapter appears as ‘an incidental excrescence on the work’. Yet many critics, such as Jones (1972), Dancy (1975), Frede (1987), Furth (1988),

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94 Michael Wedin (2000:11-37), cites this as a question posed by early scholars: ‘The book begins without introductory remarks that give its purpose and object’ (Brandis 1833:267), while this peculiar introduction makes for ‘the lack of any very definite information as to Aristotle’s precise object in formulating’ the theory of categories (Ross 1924, I, lxxii). It is also posed by Simplicius.

95 Cf. Simplicius in Cat., with Simplicius’ reports of his predecessors.
Lewis (1991), Wedin (2000), and Mann (2000), hold that a coherent account of 1a1-15 is valuable for the interpretation of the text.

In constructing an account from internal evidence, we might begin by exploring common features that recur in the author’s definitions of homonymy, synonymy, and paronymy. All three of these principles involve the way in which objects can be named. But paronymy, according to some interpretations, may not be analogous to its two siblings. The kind of disjunction distinguishing (1) homonyms from (2) synonyms is ὁ κατὰ τοῦνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας (ἕτερος ∨ ὁ αὐτός) (1a2, 1a6-7). However, (3) paronyms are distinguished in a different way. They are not explicitly said to share a name in common (ὄνομα κοινόν), and while we are told nothing about their definitions here (1a12-14), it is clear from elsewhere in the Cat. and from the (comparatively early) text Topics 2.2 (109b4-6) that a paronym does not inherit the definiens of its source, whereas a synonym inherits the definiens of its genus (cf. Cat. 2a19-27, 3a15-21): a grammarian is not a grammar, but man is an animal.

One common feature shared by homonyms, synonyms, and paronyms is that they are ‘addressed’ (προσαγορεύεται, 1a9; προσηγορία, 1a14) ‘by name’ (κατὰ τοῦνομα, 1a4, a7, a13). As we shall find below, ‘forms of address’ constitute a familiar conceptual tool elsewhere in the corpus. At Topics 1.7 (103a32-40), for example, we can ‘address’ a man by his name (κατὰ τοῦνομα), e.g. ‘Socrates’, or by his accident (κατὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός), e.g. ‘the man who is sitting’, while signifying (σημαίνειν) the same man in each instance. If such a dual framework were applicable here, then homonyms and synonyms would be objects, such as ἄνθρωπος and γεγραμμένον that can be ‘addressed by the name’ ζῷον (κατὰ τοῦνομα). Paronyms, conversely, might appear to be objects addressed according to one of their accidents (κατὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός) with a change of verbal form, such as γραμματικός and ἀνδρεῖος. If accidents are said of their subjects paronymously (as Aristotle appears to maintain at Topics 2.2, 109b1-12) then paronymy would emerge, with

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96 So Ackrill (72). A difficulty lies in determining whether paronyms are entirely linguistic items, unlike homonyms and synonyms, or non-linguistic, mixed-level items (Hintikka 1959:141) whose relationship is described linguistically (Annas 1974:151). But neither view seems entirely tenable in the face of Cat. 10a28-b13, where Aristotle rosters several cases of counter-linguistic paronymy, and in particular the instance of the spoudaios who derives his name from aretê.

97 Thus no paronymic pair will also be homonymous or synonymous (see note, above) – though either member of the pair might be a synonym or homonym of some other word.
some scholars, as a verbal principle that typically coincides with the ‘inherence’ principle of the following chapter (1a20-b8).

But it is not clear that evidence from outside the *Categories* itself can be considered in interpreting the *Categories*. As a rule, each effort to ‘map’ the onomastic phenomena of *Categories* 1 to the taxonomy of *Categories* 2 runs aground on rocky shoals, which I shall attempt to articulate below. But in the next section of this study I shall argue on internal grounds that προσηγορία plays a relevant part in the action of *Categories* 1a1-15, and sheds light on the functional role of the introductory chapter. I shall suggest that the concept of ‘address by name’, which recurs throughout the onymies, is demonstrated to be imprecise and reliant on verbal convention (κατὰ συνθήκην). In particular, προσηγορία is unable to distinguish between generic and accidental predication. In order to establish the strict (ἀναγκαῖον) implications that bind predication to ontology in later chapters (2a19-33), Aristotle requires a more precisely defined function that corrects for the fortuities of verbal convention. This is κατηγορία or ‘predication’, the word from which the *Categories* derives its traditional title. However, by beginning from particular and empirical instances of everyday verbal address, and only then introducing a more rigorous subdivision that derives the concept of κατηγορία by induction, Aristotle deploys the approach that he recommends at *Physics* 1.1: ‘to advance from what is more knowable to us [but more obscure by nature] to what is more knowable by nature [but more obscure to us]’ (*Phys.* 104a9-21). This account of the opening chapter of the *Categories*, as I shall argue, provides a natural explanation for its primary placement, while accounting for the relative scarcity of allusions to homonymy, synonymy and paronymy by name later in the book.

**Definitions**

Before outlining a theory of the onymies (‘Applications and Readings’, below), the first section of this study will analyze several words whose usage is presupposed in *Cat.* 1a1-15. In particular, I will focus on the meanings of the terms (1) ὄνομα, (2) λόγος τῆς οὐσίας, and (3) κατὰ τοῦνομα λόγος with a view to interpreting the central disjunction ὁ κατὰ τοῦνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας (ἐτερός ν ὁ αὐτός). With this information, I will return to the force of (4) προσηγορία or ‘address’ by name, and suggest some broader conclusions concerning the role of the ‘onymies’ in the *Categories* as a whole, and especially in the action of the fourfold construction that follows in ch. 2.
Onoma. The intuitive force of ὄνομα in Greek is the ‘name’ of a person or thing, as in Homer (e.g. Od. 9.366). But here it is meant in a technical sense, as Aristotle’s examples show: onoma is something like a ‘noun’ (cf. Plato Crat. 399B or Th. 168B) with semantic value, a verbal token. Thus τὰ κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγόμενα can ‘represent’ or ‘signify’ (σημαίνει) categories (1b25-26). More specifically, ‘names’ in the Cat. can be predicated of beings (2a20-26, 3a3a16), or derived with a change of verbal form (10a28-33, cf. 10a33- 10b2). Names can also be coined anew (ὀνοματοποιεῖν, 7a5-6) if no appropriate (οἰκείως) name exists, suggesting that names are viewed as conventional and not necessarily as natural. These features match the account of ὄνόματα offered in a closely related work, the De Interpretatione (16a20-29):

Onoma is a meaningful sound (phasis seṁantikê) established by convention (kata sunthêkên), and without [reference to] time. No part of it is meaningful when it is separated from the whole. […] We say ‘established by convention’ because no sound is naturally (phusei) an onoma: rather, it becomes one when it becomes a symbol (sumbolon).

The description of onoma as a kind of conventional ‘symbol’ (sumbolon) belongs to a theory of ‘signification’ worked out in the opening lines of the same work (De Int. 16a1-9):101

98 So Ackrill points out in defending the traditional rendering ‘name’ (115 ad De Int. 16a19).

99 As Jones (1972:119-20) suggests, ὄνομα does not mean ‘adjective’ in the Cat., although in practice it sometimes appears to apply to an adjective. See also Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus (Berlin, 1870), ὄνομα.

100 On most accounts the Cat. and the De Int. appear to be proximate in composition (but contrast Rist 1989). I will not rely directly on the De Int. here. I will, however, suggest that all four of the main demands placed by Aristotle on the notion of onoma in the Cat. are answered by the definition of the De Int., and that the two accounts seem fully compatible in this and other respects. It is not necessary to take on board the entire apparatus of the De Int. theory here.

101 On this passage see Whitaker (1996), 8-25. ‘Semantics’ and ‘signification’ reference a complex nub of discussions: see for example T. Irwin on ‘Aristotle’s concept of signification’, in M. Schofield and M. C. Nussbaum, eds., Language and Logos [Cambridge, 1982] 241-66, and later P. Tselemanis, ‘Theory of Meaning and Signification in Aristotle’, in Language and Relativity in Greek Philosophy (Athens, 1985, 194-9), criticizing N. Kretzmann’s ‘Aristotle on Spoken Sounds and Significance by Convention’ in J. Corcoran (ed.) Ancient Logic and Modern Interpretations (Dordrecht, 1974). As this study proceeds I will try to engage with some of the basic issues surrounding representation – in particular with Owen’s account of ‘focal meaning’ for late Aristotelian homonymy in light of Irwin’s and Ferejohn’s revisions, and the recent magnum opus of L. M. de Rijk, Aristotle: Semantics and Ontology (Brill: Leiden, 2002). I will also review Kahn, Matthen, and de Rijk on the uses of ‘is’ signifying pathêmata in psukhê and ‘extra-linguistic realities’. For our purposes here in revisiting the De Int. it is important to note that signifiers can be non-linguistic (Irwin 254, and cf. C. Kahn, ‘Questions and Categories’ in Questions, ed. H. Hiz [Dordrecht, 1978], 227-78, esp. p. 256), and hence ‘pathêmata of the soul’ can be sêmeia of beings just as ‘words’ are of pathêmata: see below.
Let us first of all define onoma and rhêma and apophasis and kataphasis and apophasis and logos…. [Words] in speech are symbols (symbola) of affections (pathêmata) in the soul;\(^{102}\) again, [words] in writing are symbols of words in speech. Like writing, so too is speech not the same for all human races. But the affections of the soul, of which these words are primarily (prôtôn) signs (sêmeia), are the same for all human beings; and what these affections are ‘resemblances’ (homoïômata)\(^ {103}\) of – namely, things (pragmata) – are surely (êdê) the same.\(^ {104}\)

Thus in the De Int., Aristotle classifies onomata and other forms of writing and speech within a ‘stack’ of representational layers, which may be sketched as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Onomata, logoi etc. in writing} & \quad \text{symbola by convention} \\
\downarrow (\text{sêmeainei}) & \\
\text{Onomata, logoi etc. in speech} & \quad \text{symbola by convention} \\
\downarrow (\text{sêmeainei}) & \\
\text{Pathêmata in psyche} & \quad \text{sêmeia [by nature]} \\
\downarrow (\text{sêmeainei}) & \\
\text{Pragmata (to which they are alike, homoïômata)} & 
\end{align*}
\]

\(^{102}\) To lend colour to this phrase, we might note that ‘pathêmata of the soul’ (most involving both soul and body) are rostered at De Anima 403a3: ‘Anger, courage, desire, and sensation… Thinking… passion, gentleness, fear, pity, courage, joy, loving, and hating.’ The ‘psychic intermediary’ of pathêmata between words and things (pragmata) is omitted at SE 165a8, and for D. Charles (2000:80-111) its introduction draws on the De Anima, while Rist (84) suggested that the underlying psychology might just as well draw on the earlier Eudemus. Pathêmata are evidently ‘signs’ in virtue of being homoïômata of what they signify; for the meaning of that word here, see the following note.

\(^{103}\) With de Rijk ‘On Aristotle’s Semantics in De Int. 1-4’ in K. A. Algra, P. W. van der Horst and D. T. Runia (edd.), Polyhistor: Studies in the History and Historiography of Ancient Philosophy Presented to Jaap Mansfeld = Phil. Ant. 72 (Leiden: Brill, 1996), homoïômata might be translated ‘substitutable representations’ and, following Boethius, pragmata as ‘things as conceived in the mind’. In a more recent analysis (2002) I 20-23, de Rijk describes homoïômata as ‘some entity that is regarded as representative of something else, with which it has its effectiveness in common’, citing Aristotle’s account of family relationships as homoïômata of constitutions (NE 8.10, 1160b21-2) and of rhythms and melodies as homoïômata of anger, gentleness, courage, and other affections (Pol. 8.5, 1340a16-17), just in that we experience the same kind of affection when confronted with the representation as when confronted with the reality (tên alêtheian). See also Whitaker (1996), 13-17.

\(^{104}\) On the passage see H. Weidemann, Aristoteles, Peri Hermeneias. Übersetzt und erläutert. Aristoteles. Werke in deutscher Uebersetzung. Band 1, Teil II (Berlin, 1991) 134-51 for a full discussion, with J. Pepin, ‘Symbola, Sêmeia, Homoiômata. A propos de De int. I, 16a3-8 et Politique VIII 5, 1340a6-39’ in J. Wiesner (ed.), Aristoteles. Werk und Wirkung. I: Aristoteles und seine Schule (Berlin, 1985), 22-44. For a treatment of this passage in application to Cat. 1a1-15, see D. Charles, Aristotle on Meaning and Essence (Oxford, 2000), 80-111. As Charles points out, different ‘thoughts’ (or affections of the soul) may be signified by the same name, and these ‘thoughts’ would correspond to zôion\(^ {1}\) and zôion\(^ {2}\) above.
Aristotle states that the relationship of a *sumbolon* to its object is a ‘semantic’ one (in his own terminology): the corresponding verb is *sēmainei* (cf. *De Int.* 16b7), and words conventionally (*kata sunthēkên*) represent what they signify because they are both symbols (*sumbola*) and signs (*sēmeia*). In these early passages of the *De Int.* Aristotle states that *onomata* and *logoi* are *sumbola*; and he continues to expand the hypothesis to include *relationships* between names: that is, propositional *logoi* such as assertions and denials (*kataphaseis kai apophaseis*) containing truth and falsehood. (See below for further discussion of *logos*). The concluding chapter of the *De Int.* notes that such verbal ‘assertions and denials are *sumbola* of those in the *psukhē*’ (24b2-4). As Aristotle contrasts the multivalence of spoken language against the ‘affections in the soul’ that convey a persistent identity (*homoiômata*), this passage exemplifies the ancient concern with the shifting surface of conventional language that several scholars have characterised as an appeal to ‘deep structure’.

Do these reflections shed light on the features of *ὀνόματα* in the *Categories*? In fact, the ‘signification’ of categories by names is initially suggested at 1b25-26, and developed...

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105 Aristotle’s usage does not necessarily coincide with ours. In the *De Int.*, the force of these two terms is clarified by Whitaker (1996:23) as follows: ‘The term “token” is used to point to the fact that a word is adopted by convention to stand for a thought of a thing, and so for the thing itself. The term “sign” on the other hand does not convey anything about whether words are conventional or not’.

106 On ancient approaches to the problem of ‘language and reality’ see K. Oehler (1984), *Index s.v. Parallelismus Sein-Denken-Sprache*, with A. Graeser, ‘On Language, Thought, and Reality in Ancient Greek Philosophy’, *Dialectica* 31 (1977), 359-88, stressing the potential for language’s divergence from reality (262), and more recently R. Rehn, *Sprache und Dialektik in der Aristotelischen Philosophie*. K. Flasch, R. Imbach, B. Mojsisch, O. Pluta (edd.), *Bochumer Studien zur Philosophie*, Band 31 (Amsterdam, 2000, e.g. 190-3) discussing Aristotle’s mistrust of language in particular. Aristotle’s own treatments of how language relates to ‘reality’, as here in the opening lines of the *De Int.*, are clearly relevant to our interpretation of his own philosophy’s linguistic expression: thus Kahn (1973) expressed the view that he would not have formulated the categories as he did if he were not a native speaker of Greek, to which De Rijk (2002:15) ripostes that ‘Ancient thinkers... unlike modern linguistics, were not so much interested in language itself, but concentrated on the ways in which linguistic expressions are representative of thinking, and, by the same token, somehow disclose the diverse features of extra-linguistic “reality”’ (15). The whole debate takes on some significance for our discussion of predication; on the relevance of ‘ordinary Greek usage’ in getting a grip on the theory of predication itself, see now A.T. Bäck, *Aristotle’s Theory of Predication* (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 12-15 and following. It is not entirely clear what kind of theory of signification is implied by the ‘layers’ represented in the opening of the *De Int.*, but certainly comparisons could be drawn to sense and reference, connotation and denotation, or de Saussure’s (1916) account of a sign as comprising a (linguistic) *signifiant* and a (mental) *signifié* both representing the (actual) referent, among many other contemporary discussions.
systematically throughout the work.\textsuperscript{107} Thus, without necessarily presupposing the full apparatus of the \textit{De Int.}, we may assert on internal evidence alone that \textit{όνοματα} possess several features in the \textit{Categories} upon which Aristotle can draw here and elsewhere throughout the text:

1. Names can ‘signify’ (\textit{sêmainei}) things, and in particular they can signify categories (\textit{Cat.} 1b25-26), such as \textit{poion} (3b18) and \textit{poson} (5b27);
2. Names can be predicated of multiple things, either with (10a27-10b2) or without a change of form (\textit{σχήματι τῆς προσηγορίας}; for the terminology cf. 3b14);
3. Without a change of form, names can be predicated with (2a20-26) or without (3a3a16) their definition;
4. Names are conventional, such that verbally defined relationships coincide with logical relationships ‘for the most part’ (\textit{ἐπὶ πολλῶν}, cf. 10b9-10 and preceding) but not always or necessarily, and such that, if necessary, new names can be coined to signify an unnamed concept (7a5-6). As a paradigmatic example of this ‘convention gap’ Aristotle offers οἷον ἀπὸ ἀρετῆς ὁ σπουδαῖος \[\textit{λέγεται}\] (10b8), a relationship like others described by paronymy (cf. 10a33-10b8) but unreflected by Greek convention.

The ‘name’ mentioned in \textit{Cat.} 1a1-15, both as the articulated contraction τοὔνομα (1a2, 4, 7, 13), and the unarticulated ὄνομα (1a1, 4, 6), must be the ‘common name’ (ὄνομα κοινόν) on which the definitions of homonymy and synonymy hinge: the unarticulated formulation occurs first (1a1) and, following immediately after it, τοὔνομα could only refer back to it.\textsuperscript{108}

\textit{Logos tês ousias}. The precise phrase λόγος τῆς ὀυσίας does not occur elsewhere in the corpus, which may lend some support to the ancient claim that it is not Aristotle’s own.\textsuperscript{109} (In the course of the following discussion, I compare the similar formulation λόγος τοῦ τί ἐστι

\textsuperscript{107} See also \textit{Cat.} 3b10-21 for the signification of categories, and for obiter dicta with the same force compare 5b27, 10a18, [11b13], and among the postpraedicamenta 15b30. It is not necessary to take on board the full semantic theory (including the psychology) of the \textit{De Int.}; but on semantics in the \textit{Cat.} see also Bäck (2000:132-43).

\textsuperscript{108} The contraction τοὔνομα regularly occurs with κατά (so \textit{Topics} 1.7, cited above, and cf. \textit{Cat.} 3b7). Clearly the ‘name’ under discussion in both cases is the same, and it is likely the avoidance of hiatus that underlies the \textit{variatio} between the version with and without the article. But the article may be necessary here to bind the definitions of homonymy and synonymy: the name in 1a2 must be clearly identical to the name in 1a1 for the definition to hold force.

\textsuperscript{109} So Boethus of Sidon \textit{ap.} Simplicium in \textit{Cat.} 29,30–31,1. Andronicus of Rhodes – on whose dates see now J. Barnes, “Roman Aristotle”, in J. Barnes and M. Griffin (edd.), \textit{Philosophia Togata} II (Oxford 1997), esp. 24-44 – paraphrased the passage as follows: τῶν ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς λειγμένων, ὄμωνυμα μὲν λέγεται ὧν ὄνομα μόνον ταῦτα, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τὸύνομα λόγος ἔτερος. On the text, see below. I note that the full phrase \textit{logos tês ousias} does occur in Plato, \textit{Rep.} 534B, where the dialectician finds the \textit{logos tês ousias} of each being he considers. One might compare the apparent hendiadys at \textit{Phaedrus} 245E: psukhês ousia te kai logos.
at An. Post. 2.10, 93b29-37). Since logos with the genitive can carry a ‘definitional’ force in Aristotle, and often does in the Categories, the phrase at Cat. 1a2 has been rendered ‘definition of being’ (Ackrill). But logos is famously multivalent, and we might begin from the most basic account of logos offered at De Int. 16b2-34:

Logos is a meaningful sound (phônê sêmantikê) of which any part may have meaning (sêmantikon) in separation – as something that is uttered but not an assertion or a denial… every logos has meaning, though not as a natural instrument (organon) but by convention, as we said. We call ‘assertion’ only that [kind] in which there is truth and falsehood.

Thus Cooke in 1938 rendered λόγος τῆς οὐσίας simply by ‘statement of essence’, and H. P. Apostle was equally cautious, writing ‘the expression of the substance [i.e., the definition]’ (see also his note ad De Int. 16b26 for a note on the Aristotelian meanings of logos). Logos is a paradigmatic example of multivalence, especially between a linguistic expression and its signified (an ambiguity viewed by Ackrill 75 as ‘careless’; see also Oehler 1984:85), as logos can mean ‘phrase, definiens, or assertible as linguistic tools, and their respective contents as expressed by those tools’ (de Rijk 2000:64).

111 Of course logos occurs alone with its definitional force quite frequently, as at Cat. 2a19-33 and elsewhere (a classic example being λόγος τῆς οἰκίας), and Plato already licenses the ‘definitory’ sense as the most familiar (Tht. 208B-210B). But the locution λόγος τῆς οὐσίας is not coordinate with the phrase λόγος τῆς οἰκίας: the first logos is not ‘an account of Substance’ in the same way that the second logos is ‘an account of House’ (for which cf. Met. 1041b4-5). Rather, the former glosses the meaning of λόγος in the latter phrase: in other words, where λόγος occurs meaning ‘definition’ it might be glossed as λόγος <τῆς οἰκίας>, as in λόγος <τῆς οὐσίας> τῆς οἰκίας. That expansion is necessary because there could be other λόγοι τῆς οἰκίας, e.g., one might explain διὰ τὴν οἰκίαν ἐστιν rather than τὶ ἐστιν όσία εἰναι (cf. Post An. 93b29-30). Logos needs no expansion like τῆς οὐσίας to carry that sense, and if Andronicus is correct in not reading this text, it may not have that expansion here; but it will possess this force, as I argue below (cp. Post An. 93b29-30).
dialectician provides for each thing (τὸν λόγον ἐκάστου λαμβάνοντα τῆς οὐσίας), a function echoed in Aristotle’s mention of the dialectician at DA 403a25-403b1.\textsuperscript{112}

In this context it appears to be pleonastic to translate the phrase λόγος τῆς οὐσίας as ‘definition of being’ (Ackrill), and it may be unnecessarily limiting to do so if that rendering suggests that a τί ἐστιν εἶναι statement cannot be answered for entities that are not οὐσίαι (at least in the strict sense later expressed at 2b11). Rather, we should write ‘statement of being, i.e. definition’. But the rendering ‘definition’ may also cast rather too wide a net, if Aristotle already has in mind any distinctions of sense within the term ‘definition’, such as the tripartite scheme that he offers at Post. An. 2.10 (93b29-94a19). In fact the usage λόγος τῆς οὐσίας appears to correspond very well to the first subdivision of ὁρισμός in that passage of the Posterior Analytics:\textsuperscript{113} ‘an account of what the thing is (λόγος τοῦ τί ἐστι)... i.e., an account of what the name – or some other account answering to a name – means (σημαίνει), like the meaning of “triangularity” (λόγος τοῦ τί σημαίνει τὸ ὄνομα ἢ λόγος ἔτερος ὀνοματώδης, οἷον τὸ τί σημαίνει [τί ἐστι] τρίγωνον’) (93b29-31).\textsuperscript{114} This account fits very well with the ‘onymies’ of Cat. 1 and the ‘semantic’ account of names outlined above. It also matches the kind of definitional force that seems to attach to logos throughout the Cat. (e.g., 2a19-34, 3b2-8, 9a28-35, and 11a5-14, where the familiar exemplar of the triangle’s definition recurs).

\textsuperscript{112} Here the phrase occurs verbatim: ἦ καὶ διαλεκτικὸν καλεῖς τὸν λόγον ἐκάστου λαμβάνοντα τῆς οὐσίας; ‘What else but “dialectician” do you call the man who exacts the statement of the essence of each thing?’ In a comparable passage (DA 403a25-403b1) Aristotle drops tês ousias and uses logos alone to make the same point – ὁ διαλεκτικὸς ἐκάστον αὐτῶν... ἀποδίδωσιν... εἰδος καὶ τὸν λόγον – as Plato does elsewhere (e.g. Rep. 343A). Thus it seems clear that both Plato and Aristotle use logos tês ousias as a technical phrase to gloss the ‘definitional’ force of logos.

\textsuperscript{113} On the subdivision, see Barnes (1994), ad loc.

\textsuperscript{114} If it were shown that the words τῆς οὐσίας were added to the text at some later stage than its original composition, by Aristotle himself or by an editor, or appeared in the later of two versions of the Cat., it may have been as a gloss to specify this kind of definition. If τῆς οὐσίας was a marginal comment in the archetype that came down to Andronicus, and was omitted in his paraphrase and by Boethus in his own reading, that might have led to uncertainty. But for our purposes here it is not crucial whether τῆς οὐσίας is retained or omitted, so long as the force of the whole phrase or logos alone corresponds to the first sense of ‘definition’ at Post. An. 93b2 ff. On the importance of the textual problem for the interpretation of homonymy, see J. P. Anton, ‘The Aristotelian Doctrine of Homonyma in the Categories and its Platonic Antecedents’, JHPh 6.4 (1968), 315-26.
On the view advanced in the *De Int.*, *onomata* and *logoi* are kinds of ‘*symbola* established by convention’ (*kata sunthêkên*, 16a21), representing certain *pragmata*. What distinguishes *logoi* from *onomata*, according to 16b2-34, is simply that *logoi* may be divided into meaningful parts (*onomata*, or *onomata* and *rhêmata*), whereas *onomata* can be reduced no further without losing their meaning, as the –ouse in *mouse* is senseless in isolation (16b31). Thus *logoi* are complexes of simpler meaningful terms.

A *logos tês ousias* (*Cat*. 1a2, 1a3, 1a7) is certainly a certain kind of *logos*; as we have seen above, it appears to be the definiens that answers a *ti esti* question (‘what is it?’). This is confirmed at *Cat*. 1a5: in answer to the question *ti esti* posed about ‘animal’ or ‘life-form’ (*zôiôn*, 1a4), the appropriate *logos* (*idion hekaterou logon*, 1a5-6) expresses *to zôiôi einai*, ‘what it is to be for a *zôiôn*,’ i.e. a locution meaning ‘essence’. Thus a *logos tês ousias* is a sentence (*logos*) which answers some *ti esti tini einai* statement by representing (*sêmainei*) a given *ousia*, e.g. ‘animal’, ‘man’, ‘ox’, in a definitory mode. Here and in the *De Int.* the examples of definition appear to follow the account of genus cum differentia (cf. *Top*. 6.4, 141b26), as the *logos tou anthrôpou* takes the form *to zôion pezon dipoun* etc. (*De Int*. 17a9-15). As in the *Post. An.*, these *logoi* ‘describe the meaning of the name’ (cf. 93b30-31, cf. 92b26-27).

Bearing all of this in mind, we might interpret *logos tês ousiâs* at *Cat*. 1a2 as follows: a meaningful (*sêmantikê*) sound that is comprised of meaningful parts and represents (*sêmainei*) *A* in a definitory mode, where *A* is the referent in question, and ‘definition’ is a mode of representation (e.g. genus cum differentia) that answers the question *ti esti tini einai*.

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115 Presumably some *pragmata* are *ousiai*, although some are not; for example, at the conclusion of *De Int* we read that assertions and denials represent counterparts in the soul, such that these soul-assertions and soul-denials are *pragmata*. Certainly *logoi* can symbolize objects (*pragmata*) that are not ‘real’ in the sense that *ousiai* will be said to be real at 2b11.

116 Which amounts to the same thing, in that ‘*rhêmata* by themselves are *onomata*’ (*De Int*. 16b20).

117 *Logoi tês ousias*, once properly formed as in *Post. An.* 2.10, 93b29-94a19, represent just one signified object, regardless of convention (92b26-34). According to the fully developed account of the *Post. An.*, this amounts to ‘the conclusion of the syllogism which demonstrates the essence’ of something (*τῆς τοῦ τί ἐστιν ὑποδείξεως συμπέρασμα*, 94a14). There Aristotle makes it clear how definitions, as *logoi tou ti esti*, differ from names (92b26-34) – namely, how proper definitions must correspond to just one signified essence, whereas names are ambiguous – and that account might appear to be relevant to the contrast of *onomata* and *logoi tês ousias* at *Cat*. 1.
Kata tounoma logoi. These explorations of the key terms ὀνόματα and λόγοι τῆς οὐσίας may help us to explore the full phrase ὁ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας (ἐτέρως ν ὁ αὐτός), upon which rests the differentiation of homonymy and synonymy. In the opening lines of the Cat., ζῷον exemplifies a ‘name’ that may be carried in common by two objects, e.g. ἄνθρωπος and βοῦς. ζῷον must also be the ὄνομα referenced in the phrase κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας (1a2). Thus the λόγος τῆς οὐσίας of 1a2, 1a3, and 1a7 does not define either of the primary objects, e.g. man, ox, but rather is a definition answering to some name that they hold in common. This much is clear, and is demonstrated from the implications of the following sentence: ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ βοῦς κοινῷ ὄνομα προσαγορεύεται ζῷον, καὶ ὁ λόγος δὲ τῆς οὐσίας ὁ αὐτός (1a8-10). The two definitions (λόγοι τῆς οὐσίας) of ἄνθρωπος and βοῦς are certainly not the same in respect of their own names, but precisely in that they reference the same definition of a shared name, ζῷον.118

In brief, homonymy and synonymy hinge on whether some shared verbal token varies or remains constant, a polarity that hinges on the definition answering to the shared token. The paradigmatic example is ζῷον, which names a genus, and forms (as a token of ζῷον 1) one element of the definitions of both ἄνθρωπος and βοῦς, and (as a token of ζῷον 2) one element of the definition of γεγραμμένον.119

Prosêgoria. We may now return briefly to the role of προσηγορία in the exposition of 1a1-15. It is part of the definition of paronymy: here it is not the ‘name’ itself (τοὔνομα), but ‘the προσηγορία corresponding to the name’ that varies in verbal form (πτώσει, 1a13). Similarly, one προσαγορεύεται the name ζῷον for ‘man’ and ‘ox’ (1a8-9). The noun προσηγορία appears to mean the ‘form of verbal address’, as later in ch. 5: there Aristotle observes that secondary substances look like primary substances τῷ σχήματι τῆς προσηγορίας (3b14), because of their form of address.

118 The logos tês ousias does differ in respect of a whole man and a whole ox: e.g. man is ‘a bipedal animal’, the ox ‘a quadripedal animal’. Where these synonymous cases are the same, is precisely kata tounoma: ‘with respect to’ or ‘according to’ their use of some common name, ζῷον, to represent (sêmainei) the genus of living beings (ζῷοι). Here they diverge from the logos tês ousias of the painting, for which the onoma in question, ζῷον, represents the genus of paintings (ζώια).119

119 In what follows I will try to justify the proposal that for homonyms and synonyms the ‘shared name’ occurs somewhere in the definition of the primary object, as for instance a name ζῷον might recur in the definitions of several objects (e.g. ‘man’ = ‘biped ζῴον […]’, ‘ox’ = ‘quadriped ζῷον […]’, ‘painting’ = ‘[…] ζώιον’), while itself betokening either a single definition (ζῷοι) or several definitions (ζώια) in each instance.
There are plenty of examples throughout the corpus of how προσηγορία may be applied to individuals, and it is generally through accidental predication. Thus we assign to some human being the προσηγορία ‘miserly’ (φειδωλός) because he has the quality of miserliness (NE 1121b21), the προσηγορία ‘self-loving’ because he has certain related qualities (NE 1168b12-22), and so on. Similarly, some people get the προσηγορία ‘citizen’ by happenstance (Politics 1275a6). But the Topics offers several passages that are directly relevant to the features of paronyms under consideration here: namely, how do they obtain τὴν κατὰ τοὔνομα προσηγορίαν from something else (1a12-13), and what is a κατὰ τοὔνομα προσηγορίαν? Earlier we cited the following passage from Topics 1.7 (103a32-40):

The truth of what we have just said [sc. that verbal expressions of sameness indicate numerical identity] can best be understood by how we alter our forms of address (μεταβαλλόντων τὰς προσηγορίας): for often when we order someone to summon one of a group of seated persons, to call him by name, we then change the description when the person does not understand, since he will understand better from some accident (ἀπὸ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος); we, therefore, tell him to summon ‘the man who is seated’ or ‘the man who is talking’, obviously conceiving that we are signifying (σημαίνειν) the same thing both corresponding to the name (κατὰ τε τοὔνομα) and corresponding to the accident (κατὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς).

This passage gives a good indication of what Aristotle might mean in the Categories by the phrase τὴν κατὰ τούνομα προσηγορίαν. Here at Top. 1.7 we find προσηγορία illustrated by κατὰ τούνομα, and the idea of a προσηγορία κατὰ τούνομα is exemplified: it is just ‘calling someone by their name’. We can also change (μεταβαλλόντων) the form of address to be a προσηγορία κατὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς, which answers to the ‘accidental’ examples of predication referenced above in the Ethics: it is ‘calling someone by their accidental [attribute]’. To call Socrates ‘Socrates’ is a προσηγορία κατὰ τούνομα; but to call Socrates ‘the man who is sitting’ or ‘the white man’ or ‘the grammatical man’ is a προσηγορία κατὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς.120

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120 A prosêgoria may naturally be a phrase rather than a word. The following passage from Topics 3.5 is relevant (119a15-18): Some [commonplace examples of the ‘more’ and the ‘greater’] can be made more general (καθόλου) by a slight change in their form of expression (παραλλάσσοντα τῇ προσηγορίᾳ): for example, we can say that ‘what is naturally such-and-such’ is more such-and-such than ‘what is not naturally such-and-such’ (οἷον τὸ φύσει ἀγαθὸν τοῦ μὴ φύσει τοιοῦτον μᾶλλον τοιοῦτο) The ‘change in the mode of expression’ here is a change from the (more specific) example ‘what is naturally good’ (τὸ φύσει ἀγαθὸν, 119a9) to the (more general) example ‘what is naturally such-and-such (τὸ φύσει τοιοῦτο, 119a17).
The second element of our definition of paronymy in the *Cat.* is that paronyms differ from the προσηγορία κατὰ τοῦνομα by διαφέροντα τῇ πτώσει (1a12). From the *De Int.* we know that πτώσεις are complete grammatical forms and not merely endings: so the examples ύγίανεν and ύγιανεῖ (De Int. 16b17-19). Now this definition of paronymy makes use of the προσηγορία κατὰ τοῦνομα, but it also involves a προσηγορία κατὰ τὸ συμβεβηρκός. The ‘name’ with which we are concerned here at Cat. 1a12-15 is not Socrates’ name, but the name γραμματική, whose referent is grammatical science. Therefore it is ‘according to the name’ (κατὰ τοῦνομα) of grammar itself to call Socrates γραμματικός paronymously ‘with a change of verbal form’. But from the point of view of Socrates himself, addressing him as ‘grammariam’ is to address him κατὰ τὸ συμβεβηρκός.

Homonymy, synonymy and paronymy are empirical phenomena sketched from observation of our habit to προσαγορεύεσθαι κατὰ τοῦνομα, and in particular to address several objects by a shared verbal token. While these relationships are verbal, they can coincide in a systematic way with non-verbal relationships. For example, our habit of referring to objects paronymously tends, as we have seen, to coincide with the phenomenon that Aristotle will later describe as accidental inherence, or ‘being-in’ a subject. That is not always or necessarily the case: for example, at 10a33-b9 Aristotle rosters examples of paronymous relationships that are not verbally paronymous, such as the σποῦδαιος (virtuous man) so named from ἀρετή (virtue). Likewise, the verbal relationship of synonymy appears to coincide, always or for the most part, with the inheritance of a common definition (λόγος τῆς οὐσίας) by two objects: thus a genus, ζῷον, is said of several species. Homonymy is not yet shown to coincide necessarily or systematically with any non-verbal relationship.

The *Categories* commences with these three examples of προσηγορία as empirical observations of behaviour that require subdivision and analysis. The onymies, while analyzing the kinds of προσηγορία that are κατὰ [κοινόν] τοῦνομα, also demonstrate that the familiar notion of προσηγορία, employed elsewhere in an intuitive way, is insufficiently precise. In particular, our conventional forms of everyday address are unable to distinguish generic predication from accidental predication, two phenomena that will be separated in *Cat.* 5, 2a19-33 and elsewhere.121 The onymies introduce samples of phenomena that necessitate

121 Aristotle observes the imprecision of everyday address (προσηγορία) at *Physics* 4.3 (210a30), where he points out we address an entire object by accidents of its parts. Similarly, synonymous address is distinguished from paronymy by species’ inheritance of definition from genus at *Topics* 2.2 (109b4-12), which is a near sibling to *Cat.* 5, 2a19-33.
a function more strictly defined than προσηγορία, one that corrects for verbal convention and allows for strict logical implication. That function, as I shall suggest, is κατηγορία, predication itself.

Applications and Readings

A good account of Cat. 1a1-15 would ideally explain why chapter 1 appears at the beginning of the text.\textsuperscript{122} One approach is to demonstrate that the three onymies are structuring principles that underlie Aristotle’s argument in the pages ahead, and correspond especially to the following fourfold division of τὰ ὄντα (Ch. 2, 1a20-1b8). For instance, the onymies might map to the principles καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένῳ λέγεται and ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν. Thus Dancy (1975) and Furth (1988) suggest the identification of paronymy with the ἐν ἐστίν relationship, while Lewis (1991:59) suggests that Michael Frede (1978) describes the καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένῳ λέγεται relationship in terms of synonymy. Similarly, Ackrill (72) proposes that homonymy plays a central role in 2a29-34. Recently, Michael Wedin has defended a novel account of synonymy as the ‘one grouping principle that can provide a basis for the system’ of categories (27), while refuting Furth’s arguments (19-20) and Ackrill’s (17).\textsuperscript{123} Again, Wolfgang-Rainer Mann, in an innovative treatment of these opening chapters (2000),\textsuperscript{124} suggests that paronymy and homonymy can be understood as corresponding to the inherence relationship of chapter 2. More broadly, the onymies constitute a kind of test for whether a predicate is ‘said-of’ or ‘in’ a subject.

Each account that describes 1a1-15 as furnishing an infrastructure for the remainder of the book faces a textual challenge. The terms ὀμώνυμα, συνώνυμα, and παρώνυμα are carefully described and defined by name, yet they become very scarce after the conclusion of

\textsuperscript{122} Of course, it may prove to be the case that the first sections of the Cat. are simply a composite of editorial activity, and require only the loosest thematic links. On that point see Oehler (1984:37-119) and Frede (1987:11ff.). In this case, we can at least hope to get clear about what the compiler might have intended to accomplish or clarify by placing 1a1-15 here, although we cannot uncritically father those motives on Aristotle himself.

\textsuperscript{123} On Wedin’s view, ‘all individuals come in 0-level synonymy groups… groups of things that are not said-of anything else’ (23) and therefore synonymy, coupled with the ‘ladder principle’ that Wedin elegantly formulates from 1b10-12, entitles them to categorization (24). In this way, synonymy – and more generally the necessity for a ‘grouping principle’ and a ‘ladder principle’ – emerge as central to the project of the Categories.

the first chapter. Tallying mere verbal occurrences is misleading, as it misses instances where the onymies are implied but are not mentioned by name (such as 2a19-33, discussed below). Nevertheless, if Aristotle did intend the onymies to underwrite his argument in a basic way, it is surprising that he does not say so explicitly, and that they do not play a prominent role in the sequel. Similarly, if he introduces this tripartition in order to isolate synonymy from its siblings and to single out its function as essential to the system of categories, it may seem equally odd that he does not explicitly assign any unique status to synonymy, neither here nor later in the text.

I have suggested that Aristotle is setting out to analyze the familiar linguistic phenomenon of προσηγορία, and specifically προσηγορία κατὰ τούνομα, whose everyday application he elsewhere claims to find inadequately precise. Homonyms, synonyms, and paronyms are samples of objects that are ‘addressed by name’, which reveal necessary subdivisions in the concept of ‘address’. Coupled with the distinction of generic and accidental predication that will be drawn in chapter 2, the ambiguity of the onymies demonstrates the need for an operation more precisely defined than προσηγορία, which will be introduced in chapter 3. As we come to the next section, I shall suggest that synonymy and paronymy as verbal relationships do tend to coincide for the most part with the non-verbal relationships καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένῳ λέγεται and ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν. But they need not always do so, allowing for exceptions such as the σπουδαῖος who is named from ἀρετή. The verbal relationships are subject to convention, as we have seen.

On this account, it is appropriate for Aristotle to begin his analysis with everyday examples that also demonstrate the ambiguity introduced by convention and the possibility for a systematic subdivision. Thus we have the onymies. Nor is this an unusual opening gambit. Beginning with these examples at 1a1-15 follows the strategy of Physics 1.1: ‘to advance from what is more knowable to us [but more obscure by nature] to what is more knowable by nature [but more obscure to us]’ (Phys. 104a9-21). It is a strategy frequently adopted by Aristotle. For instance, he inaugurates the Hist. An. by reminding us how animals appear to be put together according to our empirical experience, and then he proceeds to elicit the principles of subdivision that underlie his observations.

125 After 1a1-15, the term ‘homonym’ never occurs again in the Cat.; ‘synonym’ recurs in passing (3a34, 3b7-9), but certainly not with a prominence to suggest that it is fundamental; and the dark horse, ‘paronym’, is perhaps the most prominent term, recurring at 6b14 and repeatedly in a long passage devoted to the notion of paronymy (10a28-10b10).
In commencing this analysis of the purpose of the onymies, I would like to review several major passages in the *Categories* where these three relationships are deployed by Aristotle, and to draw from these textual analyses an account of what homonymy, synonymy, and paronymy are, and eventually some account of why they are described at the outset of the work. In the course of this review, I will make forward references to the fourfold ‘ontology’ of Chapter 2, and I will draw on the analyses of ὄνομα and λόγος τῆς οὐσίας developed in the first part of this chapter.

**Cat. 5, 2a19-33.** A familiar account of synonymy recurs in chapter 5 (tr. Ackrill, modified):

(a) It is clear from what has been said [about primary and secondary ousiai] that if something \( [F] \) is said-of a subject \( [x] \) (καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένου λεγομένων) then both its name (τοὔνομα) \( [N_F] \) and its definiens (λόγος) \( [D_F] \) are predicated (κατηγορήται) of that subject \( [x] \). For example, man is said of a subject, a man (τινος ἀνθρώπου), and the name ['man'] is also predicated: for you predicate ‘man’ of a man. And the definiens of man will apply to ‘man’ and to a man: for a man is both ‘man’ and ‘animal’. Thus the name and definition will be predicated of the subject.

(b) But as for things that are in a subject (ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ὄντων), in most cases neither the name nor the definiens is predicated of the subject. In some cases there is nothing to prevent the name from being predicated of the subject, but it is impossible for the definiens to be predicated. For example, white (to leukon), which is in a subject, is predicated of the subject; for a body is called white (leukon). But the definiens of white will never be predicated of the body.

We recall from 1a6-12 that ‘synonymy’ is the relationship of objects that share a common name (τοὔνομα) and a definition (λόγος τῆς οὐσίας). This is the principle of the relationship described in (a) above, where ‘both τοὔνομα and ὁ λόγος are predicated of’ a subject. The paragraph (a) makes it clear that the said-of relationship implies the conditions of synonymy: φανερὸν... ὅτι τῶν καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένου λεγομένων ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τοὔνομα καὶ τὸν λόγον κατηγορεῖσθαι τοῦ ὑποκειμένου. Somewhat more formally, we can say that

\[ F \text{ is said-of } x (κατὰ } x \text{ λέγεται) } \rightarrow \text{ } N_F \text{ and } D_F \text{ are predicated-of (κατηγορήται) } x \]

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126 Which describes beings as ‘said-of’ or ‘in’ or ‘said-of and in’ or ‘neither said-of nor in’ a subject (1a20-1b8), and which I discuss in more detail in the following section.
The condition ‘\(N_f\) and \(D_f\) are predicated-of (κατηγοροῦται) \(x\)’ is precisely the relationship that facilitates synonymy. In turn, this condition depends on the \(καθ᾽\)ὑποκειμένου \(λέγεται\) relationship. On this account, we should expect synonymy to coincide with the said-of relationship for the most part. But there will be exceptions. For the implication at 2a20 is strict (ἀναγκαῖον), and therefore κατηγοροῦται cannot represent an everyday language operation subject to convention and chance. Rather, it must represent a technical operation that corrects for the missteps of conventional speech. But in formulating the onymies at 1a1-15, Aristotle does not yet make use of this concept. Rather, the relationships underlying homonymy, synonymy, and paronymy are described empirically as results of προσηγορία, based on the conventions of everyday language.

Turning to section (b), we encounter a situation in which the name and the definiens of \(F\) may fail to be predicated of \(x\): this situation is said to correspond to the ‘being-in’ relationship of chapter 2 (ἐν ύποκειμένῳ ὄντων, 2a28). In this situation, the definiens \(D_f\) will never be predicated-of \(x\). In most such cases (ἐπὶ…πλείστων, 2a28), the name \(N_f\) will also not be predicated-of \(x\). But in some such cases (ἐπὶ…ἐνίων, 2a29) ‘nothing prevents us from predicating the name \([N_f]\) of \(x\) sometime (ποτε). For instance, the name ‘white’ (to leukon) may be ‘said-of’ a body that it is ‘in’ (2a31-33); yet the definition of white (ὁ δὲ λόγος ὁ τοῦ λευκοῦ) cannot be ‘predicated-of’ any body at all (2a33-34).

Thus we have a situation like this:

\[
F \text{ is in } x \quad (\text{ἐν } x \text{ εἰναί}) \rightarrow D_f \text{ is not predicated-of } x & \quad (\text{ἐπὶ πλείστων}) \\
(N_f \text{ is not predicated-of } x \lor N_f \text{ is sometimes [ποτε] predicated-of } x) \quad (\text{ἐπὶ ἐνίων})
\]

127 More precisely, as we have seen, the precise condition of synonymy is that, for some two objects, a ‘name’ and ‘the logos tês ousias corresponding to the name’ are shared by both objects. This is a horizontal (or same-level) relationship between objects like ‘man’ and ‘ox’, which is facilitated by the vertical (or mixed-level) relationship between objects like ‘man’ and \(zôion\): that vertical relationship between ‘man’ and \(zôion\) is precisely the ‘predicated-of’ relationship, and Aristotle says so.

128 The implication is strict (ἀναγκαῖον, 2a20; on Aristotle’s special use of ‘necessity’ in the context of the syllogism, see Putzig, 1968, ch. 2, and for broader uses, Sorabji, 1980, 143-74). Yet in everyday language, predication is governed by an element of convention; thus we are reminded later in the Categories (10a33-10b10) that conventional predications sometimes fail to express reality. (Yet even in everyday language, the true relationship is evident ‘for the most part’, ἐπὶ πλείστων). How, then, can Aristotle claim that the predication of \(NF\) and \(DF\) necessarily (ἀναγκαῖον) follows from the said-of relationship \(F\) of \(x\)? This can only be valid if ‘predication’ (categorization), as used here, is a technical operation that controls for the imprecisions of everyday language, which are, in any case, generated by particular instances outside the bounds of strict logic.
The second condition – according to which the definition $D_F$ is not predicated-of the object, while the name $N_F$ is predicated-of the object ‘sometimes’ (but not so ἐπὶ πλείστων) – might answer either to homonymy or to paronymy. Yet neither will be the ‘inheritance’ relation, as some have argued: rather, either one of these onomastic relationships may coincide with the ‘inheritance’ relation on most (or in this case ‘some’) occasions.

There are several reasons why the sample here does not look like an homonymous instance. Rather, the familiar example of ‘the white’ predicated of ‘a white [body]’ – coinciding with the white ‘inhering in’ the body (1a28) – might incline us to regard this condition as paronymous; later (8, 10a28-32), the example is repeated as παρωνύμως λέγεται, ἀπὸ τῆς λευκότητος ὁ λευκὸς.

As a whole, the condition is discussed a second time in the same chapter (5, 3a15-21, tr. after Ackrill, with modifications):

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129 For arguments, see Ackrill (72) in favour of homonymy and Furth (15-21) in favour of paronymy.

130 By ‘coincide’ in the present context, and throughout this essay, I just mean that the presence of

(1) some (signified) ontological relationship $r$ between a subject $x$ and an attribute $F$ (viz. ‘$F$ is said-of $x$’ or ‘$F$ is in $x$’)

implies, not strictly but for the most part (ἐπὶ πλείστων), the presence of

(2) an equivalent (significant) verbal relationship $rv$ of predication between $x$ and a name $NF$ (signifying ‘$F$ is-in $x$’) or between $x$ and a name $NF$ and a definition $DF$ (signifying ‘$F$ is said-of $x$’).

131 I agree with Owen (1960:175) that the Categories ‘could not make use of [paronymy] to explain how the subordinate categories depend on the first’, and I cannot fully subscribe to the ‘paronymy transformation’ argued for by Furth (1988:15-21); but I will argue that paronymy is a linguistic relationship that typically coincides with the inheritance relationship of a quality or quantity in an ousia (see the preceding note).

132 A textual argument along the following lines would suggest that homonymy has no place in this passage. (1) Here in the first part (a), once the said-of relationship is explicitly defined (including the qualifier ‘of a subject’), it is explicitly stated that there is no such thing as a true (proper) said-of relationship where the definiens $DF$ is not inherited together with the name $NF$. Therefore, homonymy will never coincide with the said-of relationship as described in part (a). (2) Again, in the second part (b), where the definiens $DF$ is not inherited by $x$, we are discussing the ‘inheritance’ relationship and not the ‘said-of’ relationship. Now the example of the ‘white’ (leukon) belongs to chapter 1’s discussion of paronymy, and not to the discussion of homonymy, where the example is zōion. (3) Finally, a non-textual argument: there must surely be some similarity between the ‘white’ of the body and ‘whiteness’: their definitions will be different, but share some contents in common. This seems to contradict the language ὅν ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν for homonymy at 1a1, and so to imply a ‘weak homonymy’ that is rejected by Wedin (13) and others.

133 There is a difficulty in that ‘the white’ there is to leukon, while ‘whiteness’ here is leukotês. The latter is rather handier for a paronymic account, because the ‘change of verbal form’ is plainly manifest in leukon < leukotês. The distinction between the two is pointed out by Owen, 103-4.
Further, while there is nothing to prevent the name of what is in a subject from being sometimes (ποτε) predicated of the subject, it is impossible for the definiens to be predicated. But the definition of the secondary ousiai, as well as the name, is predicated of the subject: you will predicate the definition of man of a man, and also that of zôion. No ousia, therefore, is in a subject.

The clearest comparandum for the whole discussion occurs in another early text cited several times in the early pages of this study, namely Topics 2.2. This passage sheds light on all three of the preceding texts. In this section, we meet with the same evidence applied in the service of distinguishing synonymy from paronymy:

Top. 2.2, 109b4-12

The predicate (katêgoria) deriving from a genus is never said-of the species paronymously, but always the genera are predicated-of their species synonymously:134 for the species take on both the name and the definition of their genera. A man, therefore, who speaks of white (to leukon) as ‘coloured’ has not assigned colour as a genus, since he has described it by a paronymous form, nor as a property (idion), nor as a definition; for the definition and the property of the thing belong to nothing but that thing, whereas many other things are ‘coloured’, for example, a piece of wood, a stone, a man, or a horse. It is obvious, then, that he assigns ‘coloured’ as an accident.

Here we have an affirmation of the name-and-definiens-inheritance account of synonymy, coupled with an explanation of how paronymy differs: a paronym does not inherit the

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134 This sentence appears to imply that the said-of and predication relationships differ along the lines that we have suggested and outlined in the preceding pages.
definition, and the name is assigned as an accidental feature. Comparing this passage and rostering the instances of paronymy mentioned throughout the Categories, it appears to be correct to infer that the onomastic relationship under discussion in connection with ‘inherence’ is indeed paronymy, while the objects that ‘inhere’ are non-ousia items, and the subjects are ousiai. This is supported elsewhere in the corpus, as we shall see, but in the Categories it is especially qualities that ‘inhere’ in ousiai: thus the ‘grammarian’ is so called from ‘grammar’ (1a14), and the ‘white man’ from ‘whiteness’ (10a28-32). But this is only so ‘in some cases’; there are other cases (10a33-10b8), such as the good man (σπουδαίος) so-called (λέγεται) from the quality of excellence (ἀρετή, 10b8), where the inheritance of a quality does not imply the paronymous naming of the subject, although it ought to do so. Thus the linguistic convention, as we have noted, agrees only ‘for the most part’ or ‘sometimes’ with the reality of the relationship.

Thus, according to 2a28-33, it is only ἐπ᾽ ἐνίων that the inherence relationship coincides with paronymy, i.e., F is-in x → ◊ F is predicated-of x ποτε (2a29). On these occasions, it usually happens (ἐπὶ...πλείστων, 10a30) that the name applies by convention, and we have a typical case like γραμματικός < γραμματική (10a32-33). But there is an even smaller set of conditions (ἐνίοτε, 10b6) where the mental convention is correct, but the verbal convention does not correspond (10a33-10b10), and this gives rise to the exception noted above: the good man (σπουδαίος) is so-called (λέγεται) from excellence (ἀρετή, 10b8) according to custom, yet the Greek language does not reflect the link paronymously.

To reiterate, in the Categories it is items in non-ousia categories, and especially qualities that ‘inhere’ in primary ousiai as in subjects and can generate paronymy, depending on our mental and verbal conventions. That this occurs only in what will be described as non-ousia categories is stressed in the passages above. The texts that we have encountered in the Categories strictly contrast (i) the interweaving of categories – such as qualities inhering ‘in’ ousiai as accidents – with (ii) the case of one ousia being said-of another. The latter case (ii) tends to coincide with a case of synonymy; the former case (i) sometimes (ἐπ᾽ ἐνίων)

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135 The interpretation as ‘accident’ is also met at Post. An. 1.22, 82b37-83a33 (discussed below).
137 While in the Physics we encounter an example of quantities being said paronymously: τὸ γὰρ τρία καὶ δύο παρώνυμα ὀνόματα ἔστιν, ὄμοιος δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀριθμῶν ἑκαστος (207b8-10).
coincides with a case of paronymy. What crucially distinguishes them, in the Categories as well as Topics 2.2, is whether the object inherits both definition and name (ii) or inherits only the name (i). The ‘said-of’ and ‘in’ relationships may coincide with synonymy and paronymy, but they are not identical.

A thoroughly developed account of this theory appears at Post An. 1.22, 82b37-83a33, which may be quoted in full here:

It is evident [that there is a limit to attribution] for predications in the what-is-it [category] (katêgoroumenôn en toî ti estî). For if definition is possible, i.e. if the essence (ti ên einai) is knowable, and things infinite in number cannot be exhausted, the predicates in the ‘what-is-it’ must be limited in number….

Let us assume that the predicate is predicated of the subject simply, not accidentally: for that is how demonstrations demonstrate. Then, when one (hen) is predicated of another one, it is either in the ‘what-is-it’ or it is in the ‘what-sort’ or in the ‘how-much’ or in the ‘relative-to-what’ or in the ‘doing’ or the ‘undergoing’ or the ‘where’ or the ‘when’.

Moreover, [predicates] that signify ousia (ta sêmainonta ousian) indicate precisely what [the thing] is (ti estî), or precisely of what (kath’ hou) it is predicated [i.e. definition or genus].

But those which do not signify ousia, but are said of some other – neither of the thing itself (ekeino) nor of any instance of it (ekeino ti) – indicate accidents (sumbebêkota), as ‘white’ is said of (kata tou) ‘man’: man is neither whiteness (to leukon) nor some particular instance of white (leukon ti), but he is presumably an animal (zôion); for man is an animal (hoper gar zôion estin ho anthrôpos). Those [predicates] which do not signify ousia must be predicated of some subject, and there cannot be any particular instance of white which is not (on) something else (heteros) that is white.

This discussion is worth noting here, as it answers to the account of synonymy and paronymy above, and distinguishes them with clarity in terms of the ‘what-is-it’ question (ti estî). Here we learn that synonyms alone inherit their definitions in the ‘what-is-it’ category, as for instance ‘man’ inherits a definition from the genus ‘zôion’; but the inherence of a non-ousia in a primary ousia occurs in a different, ‘sidelong’ way (para–), as for instance the white [man] is named from the quality ‘white’. Accordingly, man is ‘an animal’, facilitating the relationship that can generate synonymy; but the grammarian is not ‘a grammar’.

Returning to the Categories, we can summarize the results that we have found at Cat. 2a19-33 as follows:
We suggested that in (a) the said-of relationship for any \( F \) and \( x \) implies the predicated-of relationship, and that the predicated-of relationship in turn facilitates synonymy as it is outlined at 1a6-12. We also suggested that in (b) the in relationship for any \( F \) and \( x \) sometimes (ἐπʻἐνίων) facilitates paronymy, if the name of \( F \) is somehow or sometime (ποτε) predicated-of \( x \). On these grounds, we have argued from the text that the synonymy and paronymy relationships, as described in 1a1-15, will often coincide with the ‘said-of’ and ‘in’ relationships of chapter 2. We have also begun to outline a case, to be developed more fully in the following discussion of the fourfold division of ὅντα, that the ‘said-of’ operation relates secondary ousiai to primary ousiai, while the ‘in’ operation relates non-ousiai to primary ousiai, an operation that we will link to the notion of ‘weaving’ (sumplokê) in the following. Finally, we have sought to parallel these arguments throughout the Categories, and also to note comparable passages from other texts in the logical oeuvre, including Topics 2.2 and Post. An. 1.22.

The strict (ἀναγκαῖον) implications at Cat. 2a19-33 require the concept of κατηγορία to correct for verbal convention, as we have observed, and to be bear a stricter definition than its everyday sibling, προσηγορία. In particular, this concept of a formal ‘predication’ is meaningful within a semantic stratigraphy, where names signify things, while onomastic relationships (such as the onymies) ‘represent’ conceptual relationships (such as κατὰ \( x \) λέγεται and ἐν \( x \) εἰναι). Such a stratigraphy will be referenced throughout the Categories, and we have already noticed a systematic sketch of it in the opening lines of the De Interpretatione. Κατηγορία distinguishes between names and definitions, and this operation also ‘binds’ habitual forms of verbal address, like ‘animal’ for man, to a conceptual relationship. It is this notion that will underwrite the discussion that follows in the text.

\[\text{138} \text{ There is no reason that this relationship might not also facilitate homonymy, but the examples given in the Cat. and elsewhere, as we have suggested, tend in the direction of paronymy; yet there are later examples in the NE and Metaphysics that imply examples of focal multivocity along the lines of the [b] principle, noted below.}\]

\[\text{139} \text{ Compare the discussion of necessity in the syllogism in Patzig (1968), ch. 2.}\]
Conclusion

The fundamental distinction between synonyms and paronyms is the inheritance of a definiens (logos) by their subjects. For some secondary ousia F said-of x, x inherits (ἐπιδέχεται) the definiens Dr, and x can become the synonym of some y that has also inherited the definiens Dr: thus ‘Man is an animal’ and ‘Ox is an animal’ – synonyms. But for some quality or quantity F in x, x does not inherit the definition Dr: thus ‘Grammarian is not a grammar’: yet sometimes x inherits the name Nf with change of form, while in other cases only a non-verbal, conceptual convention conveys this relationship – the good man ‘so called’ from ἀρετή: paronyms. The distinction is typically conveyed in language according to the rules conveyed at 1a1-15, but the intellectual or logical necessity is more important, at root, than the verbal convention; thus, again, it is of greater relevance to Aristotle that we think of the spoudaios as ‘good’ from the concept of aretê, than it is that the Greek language does not bear this relationship out (10b8-9, cf. 10a33-b9).

Nevertheless, the verbal relationships are part of our everyday experience and illustrate the underlying conceptions ‘always or for the most part’: and so Aristotle begins with these phenomena, the onymies, and then introduces the said-of and inherence relationships (ch. 2) and κατηγορία (ch. 3) to reveal the deep structure that underlies and generates the familiar onomastic conventions. The verbal conventions that are described by homonymy, synonymy and paronymy are perhaps not a thoroughgoing linguistic ‘test’ for the underlying conceptual relationships, as Mann suggests (2000:192-93), but in most cases they are a good indicator.

As Bäck (2000) points out, Aristotle uses natural language as a tool to illustrate the reality of deeper conceptual relationships – which we might refer to in his own terms as παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς (De Int. 16a4-9). These can include, not only the psychic counterparts of names, but also the psychic counterparts of logical assertions and denials (24b-11). Above we observed the introduction of ‘predication’ in a technical sense, correcting for everyday language. Now ‘predication’ in this technical sense is still a verbal operation: but because it has been corrected from its conceptual counterpart to overcome verbal convention, it is able to underlie a strict implication.

In general, Aristotle’s posture towards the relationship of conventional language and psychic or logical reality is pithily expressed at Topics 1.11 (104b37-105a2), a passage cited by Bäck. Here Aristotle remarks on the distinction of two words, dialektika problemata and theseis:
It need not matter which of the two names of is used: for we distinguish them not out of a desire to coin new names, but that it might not escape us what differences actually (ousai) exist between them.

Why should paronymy sometimes (ἐπ᾽ ἐνίων) but not always coincide with inherence, and synonymy usually (ἐπὶ πλείστων) with the said-of relationship? We might outline a theory along the following lines. In the opening lines of the De Int., names are generated by the soul as symbols of concepts in the soul, which are signs of realities (πράγματα). When its concepts are related in a certain way, the soul can generate – and in fact typically does generate – names that correspond in a comparable way. What Aristotle is really seeking is a classification of the reason why the soul generates the verbal name-relationships that it does: because it does so always or for the most part, it follows that a natural process (φύσις) is at work, not a mere accident, and it is this natural process that Aristotle seeks to study. Thus his introductory examination of homonyms, synonyms and paronyms (1a1-15) is an empirical review of the soul’s actions in language as we naturally experience them, which will unfold back through the semantic layers of De Int. 16a4-9, reaching from (1) verbal tokens (ὀνόματα) to (2) παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς (we might call this the ‘intensional’ field) and finally to (3) πράγματα (the ‘extensional’ field).  

There are certain linguistic, ‘vertical’ (mixed-level) relationships involved in the definitions of homonymy, synonymy, and paronomy. These signify corresponding non-linguistic, ‘vertical’ relationships, namely the said-of and inherence relationships that are rostered under τῶν ὄντων at 1a20-b8. The semantic bonds are not spelled out in 1a1-15, but a conventional and everyday version of them – the one with which we are empirically familiar – is assumed. We simply grant Aristotle that ‘animal’ is said of man, ox, and painting because this is a fact of our daily linguistic intuition and experience. Thus the introductory review is empirical.

As we have suggested, by beginning with these examples at 1a1-15, Aristotle follows the strategy of Physics 1.1: ‘to advance from what is more knowable to us [but more obscure by nature] to what is more knowable by nature [but more obscure to us]’ (Phys. 104a9-21).

Aristotle begins by observing the simple facts that we typically call a man, a painting, and an

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140 In the language of Carnap and Montague: thus (i) [verbal] ‘the morning star’ and ‘the evening star’ are verbal tokens indicating (ii) [intensional/psychic] the concept of the morning star and the concept of the evening star, both of which indicate (iii) [extensional/pragmatic] the real planet Venus. Spoudaios and aretê happen not to bear any relation at level (i), but they do bear a meaningful relation at level (ii), which reflects an inherence relationship on level (iii).
ox ζῷα, while we call some certain expert γραμματικός. From these particular instances he isolates the concept of a verbal relationship (συμπλοκή) under the heading τῶν λεγομένων (1a16-19), and then, under the heading of τῶν ὄντων (1a20-b8) describes the said-of and inherence relationships that tend to imply synonymy and paronymy (2a19-33), but not homonymy. The said-of and inherence relationships are the real principles that initially appeared to our observation through the phenomena of homonymy, synonymy, and paronymy: they have been isolated by induction from the onymies as particular examples. Thus illustration is the primary function of 1a1-15: the onymies exemplify linguistic phenomena which Aristotle will come to treat as καθ᾽ ἑκατόν ἐκαστὰ cases for which the καθολοῦ rules that he is about to introduce can account. He can then drop the illustration or redeploy it as he wishes throughout the main body of the text.

All of these illustrations, however, focalize around one notion: ‘categorization’. This is the only relationship (apart from ‘representation’) that is present in homonymy, synonymy, paronymy, sumplokê, and in the descriptions of the said-of and inherence relationships (2a19-34), and it is relevant to the onymies, to the relationship of συμπλοκή, and to the relationships of τὰ ὄντα. Predication is a technically precise organization of language that accurately reflects the unambiguous relations of the soul (cf. De Int. 16a3-9, 24b2-11). In order to discover this focal concept, the Categories commence with a number of particular examples that help us towards it inductively. That is not necessarily to suggest that pros hen multivocity or ‘focal meaning’ is already a developed principle in the Cat.; all three onymies are simply illustrations pointing inductively to the idea of ‘predication’.

For example, on the view that we meet during the first three chapters of the Categories, we perform two basic operations that generate linguistic symbols: signification (sêmainein) and predication (katêgorein). (a) Signification assigns a single name to a concept, and it is ultimately a one-to-one relationship of identification. (That is, the name ‘Socrates’ just represents Socrates and ‘Iliad’ represents some composite poem, while the name ‘man’ just represents the eidos man, and equates to a definition of man). This operation is assumed in 1a1-15, but – as I argued at the outset of this chapter – it is not the focus of those lines: we

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141 This develops a point observed by De Rijk (2002:375), drawing on Oehler (1984:158-77), that the principle of ‘things being called so-and-so from something (ἀπὸ τινος), whether synonymously, paronymously, homonymously, is the focal point in the Categories’.

142 These appear to be the only two operations that are consistent across the onymies and ch. 2.
are not interested in how to define *anthrôpos* or *bous*. Rather, 1a1-15 are suggestive of how the name and definiens of some *eidos* (such as *zôion* or *hê grammaticê <epistêmê>*) is said-of or inheres in *anthrôpos*; and in both cases these lines serve to illustrate and introduce the notion of predication. (b) Predication occurs when we combine these names with one another. Predication ‘tags’ a concept with a name that describes some other feature of the object: for example, Socrates can be tagged with ‘man’ (representing the *eidos* man) and ‘white’ (representing the colour white), and therefore we can ‘categorize’ man and white of Socrates.

This is a verbal operation subject to convention, as we have seen, but it can coincide with a mental operation in either of two conditions: because the predicated feature is ‘said-of’ Socrates, or because the predicated feature is ‘in’ Socrates. In order to get to those mental operations, we have to control for the element of chance, and this is what the strict operation of ‘predication’ can do. Like any natural process, the generation of names and symbols may have exceptions; thus it is no surprise that chance homonyms (τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης ὀμώνυμα, *NE* 1096b26-27) might arise, or that some mental relationships may have no linguistic correlates. (That does not rule out the existence of non-chance homonyms).

From this standpoint, we may be able to gain a clearer sense of the thesis propounded in the opening discussion of Porphyry in *Cat.*, which I have attributed to Herminus, and which may have its roots in the thought of Boethus of Sidon. The *Categories* concerns ‘simple *phônai* significant of beings, *qua* significant’. Moreover, simple *phônai* are significant of their primary objects *by nature* – that is, according to *phasis*. From the Aristotelian perspective, this implies that they are significant of their objects *always or for the most part*, and develop from direct empirical experiences. However, there is another degree of unpredictability involved due to verbal convention (*thesis*). The onymies disclose this unpredictability and set the stage for a more strict process that is able to correct for it. In this framework, it is also possible that ‘chance’ homonymy only occurs after Porphyry’s ‘second imposition’ of terms: the situation obtaining after the ‘first imposition’ may be an Edenic situation where there is always ‘one name for one thing’. (On the ‘golden age’ of language, and the likely role of Plato’s *Cratylus* in the background of this discussion, see e.g. Gera 2003).
2. Categories 1-2 in Modern Criticism: 
2. ΛΕΓΟΜΕΝΑ and ΟΝΤΑ
Following the conclusion of the onymies at 1a15, Aristotle commences a classification of ‘things said’ (τῶν λεγομένων, 1a16-20), followed by a classification of ‘things that are’ (τῶν ὄντων, 1a20-b8). I have suggested, broadly, that the principles underlying the ‘onymies’ are introduced to illustrate the idea of ‘predication’ by induction from particular examples in the opening lines. The onymies themselves might also be regarded as a certain subset of ‘things said’ (1a16-19) representing (σημαίνει) a set of ‘things that are’ (1a20-b8), such that the predicative relationships underlying 1a1-15 can coincide with the ‘said-of’ and ‘in’ relationships according to 2a19-33. That relationship is described, as we suggested, by Aristotle in Chapter 5 (2a19-33): thus the ‘said-of’ and ‘in’ conditions, in application to objects (or concepts), generate kinds of predication that facilitate synonymy and paronymy.

We have left open the function of homonymy – namely, whether non-chance homonyms are considered in the Cat., and indeed whether ‘being’ (τὸ ὄν) is predicated homonymously over the ten categories: but we may find some clarification on this question ahead.

A. τὰ λεγόμενα: sayings combined and uncombined (1a16-19)

The four lines immediately trailing the onymies distinguish ‘simple’ from ‘complex’ expressions. Here we read:

Of what is spoken (τῶν λεγομένων), some are spoken in combination (τὰ κατὰ συμπλοκὴν λέγεται) and some without combination (τὰ ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς). What is spoken in combination is, e.g., man runs (ἄνθρωπος τρέχει) or man wins (ἄνθρωπος νικᾷ); what is spoken without combination is, for example, man (ἄνθρωπος), ox (βοῦς), runs (τρέχει), wins (νικᾷ).

(i) Identifying τὰ λέγομενα

To what does the phrase τὰ λέγομενα refer here: to words or to things? Jones (1975) finds a use-mention confusion in this passage (156), and endorses the view that τὰ ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς means ‘isolated words or phrases used to refer to a particular object’ (158). This view, also suggested in earlier scholarship, will ultimately show that secondary ousiai are just words ‘misrepresented as things’. On this account, offered by Jones as well as Sachs (1948), the


144 David Sachs in 1948 took the position that ‘in the Categories the characterizations “secondary substance” and “primary substance” refer to terms, and not to substance in the ontological sense’: ‘Does Aristotle have a Doctrine of Secondary Substances?’, Mind 57 (1948), 221-25. A similar conclusion is argued by Gilbert Ryle, ‘Categories’, in A. N. Flew (ed.), Logic and Language: Second Series (Oxford, 1961), 65-81, for whom the Categories collect linguistic ‘predicates’.

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‘categories’ themselves, being spoken κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμμετοχὴν (1b25), are also just collections of linguistic items or ‘terms’.

But other commentators reply that the terminology is unambiguous and that the categories are ‘things’. This position is articulated by Ackrill (1963), and as Wedin (2000) puts it we require some sensitivity to the fact that ‘τὰ λέγομένα may be the things that are spoken, namely linguistic items, or the things that are spoken of, namely, the non-linguistic items these signify’ (106-7). One might compromise, of course, by adding the possibility that the proper subject is concepts in the mind, the rather enigmatic παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς of De Interpretatione 1 – those that represent beings and are represented by words.

The dialogue of modern scholarship was anticipated in antiquity. Thus the sixth-century CE commentator Simplicius of Cilicia, during his inquiry into the σκόπος (goal and topic) of the Categories, surveys the views of his predecessors and remarks on the following four positions (discussed above in the course of chapter 1 on the skopos):

- It is about some ten simple things, which, since they are most universal (holikóttata) they call ‘genera’.

  (1) Now some say that they are words (phônai), and that the goal is about simple words… Just as the book on propositions [sc. De Int.] is about composite words, but not about real things (pragmata), so this [book], being about the parts of the proposition, would be about words. Moreover, Aristotle begins his discussion as follows: ‘Of things that are said, some are said in combination, others without combination’…. As if the goal were about significant words.. It is the combination of words (phônai), not of realities, that becomes an affirmation [sc. true or false].

  (2) Others, however, do not accept this goal. It does not, they say, pertain to the philosopher to theorize about words, but rather to the grammarian… [Rather], the goal is about the very beings (onta) which are signified by words; and these are ‘what is said’ (to legomenon). These critics also bring forth Aristotle as a witness, when he says ‘of beings, some are said of some subject’, as if the division was about beings, and again: ‘ousia is that which is so called in the strictest sense, primarily, and most of all’…

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145 Therefore, even if τὰ [ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς] λέγομένα at 1a16-19 are linguistic terms, it does not follow that the categories themselves are also linguistic solely on the grounds that they are likewise spoken κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμμετοχὴν.

(3) Others say that the goal is neither about significant words nor about signified realities, but about simple notions (noëmata)… ‘what can be said’ (lekta) are notions, as was also the view of the Stoics.

(4) Of these people, each one had an incomplete grasp of the goal: they accuse each other with just cause, and are in turn justly called to account themselves. Let us, however, also consider those who had a more complete grasp, among the foremost of whom, in my view, was (a) Alexander of Aphrodisias. Thus, the goal would be about the simple and most generic parts of speech which signify simple realities, and the simple notions which exist in conjunction with these simple realities…. (b) Porphyry… says that the goal is about katêgoriai. These are simple words, significant of realities, qua significant, and not qua simple expressions.

Thus we are traversing very old ground. As for the modern complaint that Aristotle disregards the use-mention distinction, one might agree with Bäck (2000) when he remarks that the philosopher appears to ‘switch back and forth from speaking about words to speaking about real things’ and does so ‘quickly and blithely’ with confusing rapidity (133-34). Two recent approaches to this ambiguity are evident in Wedin (2000) and De Rijk (2002:I). As a policy, Wedin will ‘follow Aristotle’s practice of disregarding use-mention boundaries in formulating a number of his theses’ (12 n. 6). By contrast, De Rijk, who expresses this equivocation as ‘the absence of a clear-cut borderline between a linguistic expression […] taken as a linguistic tool, and its significate’, proposes that Aristotle exploits it intentionally and systematically, and christens this ‘the rule of indiscriminate reference’ (63-64) – a necessary law and ‘main rule’ for his exegetical approach to Aristotelian semantics.

Now on a textual basis, the context at 1a16-19 will not easily give us the ‘things that are spoken of’ for τὰ λεγόμενα, as Wedin suggests. In the first place, let us suppose that the author intended all of 1a16-1b9 (the second chapter in our edition) to be read intact. Thus he has given us two classes of entities, the first shorter than the second, headed by parallel constructions, with the second heading commencing in asyndeton: [1] τῶν λεγομένων τὰ μὲν… (1a16) and [2] τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν… (1a20). It is natural for the hearer or reader to contrast τῶν λεγομένων with τῶν ὄντων, and it is natural to infer that the writer or editor intended this. That contrast makes sense only if τῶν λεγομένων are considered as entities that differ from τῶν ὄντων in some way that is meaningful to the argument. In particular, these ‘words’ may be ‘interwoven’ to signify certain relationships; and those appear to be the relationships of things (τῶν ὄντων). Thus when the words ἄνθρωπος and τρέχει are woven (‘man is running’), this is verbally κατὰ συμπλοκὴν (1a18). But there is no verbal συμπλοκή capable of linking the actual ἄνθρωπος to his activity, τρέχει: the connection
performing that function is the *inherence* of some activity (running) in the *ousia* Man, much like the inherence of some quality (white) in Man, and the inherence relationship is described next, under the aegis of τῶν ὄντων.

This appears to make good sense of the introduction of the ‘categories’ themselves at 1b25-26: τῶν κατὰ μιθὲν ἁμαρτιὰν συμπλοκήν λεγομένων ἔχαστον ἕτοι οὐσίαν σημαίνει ἢ ποιοῦν ἢ ποιοῦν…, ‘each one of the [words] spoken with no combination signifies either *ousia* or *quantity* or *quality*…’ In this passage we learn that (1) the verbal elements of the τῶν λεγομένων heading, such as ‘man’, ‘runs’, and ‘wins’, signify (2) the ontic elements of the τῶν ὄντων heading, such as *man*, *white*, and *knowledge* (and under different categories, *running* and *winning*). Now again, (1’) the verbal relationships of the τῶν λεγομένων heading, such as the συμπλοκή that binds the sentence ‘man runs’, signify (2’) the ontic relationships of the τῶν ὄντων heading, such as the inherence relationship that binds running with running by indicating that running is—in man as in a *subject*. In short, where the onymies introduced verbal relationships that appeared to bind real objects, the following section under τῶν ὄντων and the ‘ten categories’ will demonstrate what real relationships underlie or *coincide* with those verbal relationships; and the τῶν λεγομένων heading is transitional between these two early sections of the *Categories*, the ‘onymies’ and the fourfold ‘ontology’ of chapter 2.

**ii. Concerning Συμπλοκή**

What is the nature of this verbal συμπλοκή? Ackrill (73) cites *Sophist* 262A-E, where the Stranger observes that only a ‘weave’ of names (όνόματα) and verbs (ῥήματα) comprises a *logos*, whereas unwoven strings of names and verbs alone do not. Similarly, Aristotle remarks on several occasions throughout the *Categories* (e.g. 2a4-20), and in the *postpraedicamenta* (13b10-13), that ‘unwoven’ words are not assertions, and only statements κατὰ συμπλοκήν are true or false. The underlying assumption that *logos* consists of names and verbs would already be familiar from *Cratylus* 425A and from the *Sophist*.147

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147 For an interesting perspective on this (especially relevant to the discussion in later antiquity), see Barnes (1990). To this passage, Cornford (ad loc. in his commentary on the *Sophist*) also compares *Ar. Rhet.* 1404b26. Aristotle might not intend only ‘indicative sentences’ (Ackrill 73 ad 1a16) to serve as expressions κατὰ συμπλοκήν, although these are his examples here. He is perhaps not exactly ‘indifferent to the linguistic complexity of expressions like “in the Lyceum”’ (as Ackrill 74 suggests for ch. 4).
Ackrill, with most of the commentators, finds a link between this line of thought and *De Int.* 16a9-18 and 17a17-20, where we learn that only ‘combined’ statements (τὰ κατὰ συμπλοκὴν) can be assertions and therefore true or false. In short, the evidence from the *Categories* suggests that the central point of ‘weaving’ has to do with generating assertions susceptible of truth and falsehood; and this may be taken as a general point of agreement.

We also know that each one of the ten ‘categories’ is signified (σημαίνει) without a weave (ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς, 1b25-26). As Ackrill suggests (73), this implies that ‘interweaving’ occurs when an item in one ‘category’ is woven together with an item in another category through κατηγορία, as in ‘man is running’ or ‘man is winning’ or ‘man is white’ or ‘man is good’ – or indeed ‘justice is good’ or ‘motion is at rest’.\(^{148}\) Thus ‘weaving’ appears to bear some relevance for the two relationships introduced in chapter 2. The said-of relationship appears to apply within a category, as man is said-of a man (1b9-15) and knowledge of a knowledge, namely ‘grammatical knowledge’ (1b2-3). But the ‘inheritance’ relationship appears to apply between categories, and therefore if one wants to represent inheritance in spoken language (τὰ λέγομενα) – for example, to express the assertion that Socrates is white or just – one will need to do so κατὰ συμπλοκὴν. This is a position that Ackrill and Furth, among others, confirm. For example, De Rijk (2002:116-120) argues that συμπλοκή makes reference ‘to an act of combining notions that indicate different categorial modes of being’ (118).\(^{149}\)

We may notice a particularly plain example of how συμπλοκή occurs in this sense close to home at *De Int.* 11 (20b38-21a17):

A man is a man and is white. He will, therefore, be also a white man. And if he is white, then it follows that the composite also is white, which will give us ‘a white, white man’, and so on *ad infinitum*. Take ‘musical’, ‘walking’, and ‘white’: these may all be combined (πεπλεγμένα) many times. And of Socrates too, we may say ‘he is Socrates’, ‘he is a man’, and

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\(^{149}\) De Rijk compares a wide range of passages to imply this over the course of his study of the meanings of συμπλοκή (115-120). On de Rijk’s view (for which cf. 100-115), the term is employed by Aristotle in two senses, the ‘onomastic’ (συμπλοκή1) and the ‘apophantic’ (συμπλοκή2). In the first sense, συμπλοκή1, we meet most of the instances of the verbal form συμπλέκειν. Examples in the sense of crossing categories include *Met. E* 4, 1027b29-33, as well as the ‘compounding’ (συνέπλεξαν) of the soul from two principles, the mover and the knower (*De An.* 1.2, 404b27-30), and the idea of ‘compound categories’ at *Pr. An.* 49a8.
is, therefore, the man Socrates. We may call him a man and a biped, and therefore, a two-footed man.

To maintain, therefore, that predicates can always be combined (τὰς συμπλοκὰς) without exception leads clearly to many absurdities. Let us, then, state the real case. Predicates, if accidental (συμβαίνει) to the subject or one to the other, are not a unity (οἷν ἔσται ἕν). [Thus] we may say ‘man is musical and white’…

Thus to say that ‘Socrates is a man’ is a fundamentally different kind of thing than to say that ‘Socrates is white’.150 Combination (συμπλοκαί) is necessary to represent a predicate-subject relationship wherever the referent of the predicate is accidental to the subject, or to another predicate. Similarly, according to the Categories, it is appropriate to a man to give a definition of the εἰδός ‘man’, but to state that he ‘runs’ or ‘is white’ is to state a ‘foreign’ attribute (ἄλλοτρίως ἔσται ἁποδεδωκώς, 2b35). The function of the ‘weave’ itself is explored in similar terms during the discussion of causes at Physics 2.3, 195a32- 39, b10-12:

Another mode of causation is the accidental (τὸ συμβεβηκὸς) and the genera. For example, in one way ‘Polyclitus’, and in another ‘sculptor’, is the cause of a statue – because ‘being for Polyclitus’ and ‘for sculptor’ are accidentally conjoined. Likewise with the [kinds] embracing (περιέχοντα) the accident: for instance, ‘man’ could be said to be the cause of a statue, or more generally ‘animal’. An accidental attribute too may be said to be more or less remote, e.g., suppose that ‘white [man]’ and ‘musical [man]’ were said to be causes of the statue….

[W]e may use a woven expression (συμπλέκομενα), and say, for example, neither ‘Polyclitus’ nor ‘sculptor’ but ‘Polyclitus sculptor’ (Πολύκλειτος ἀνδριαντοποιός).

Here again συμπλοκή weaves a (non-ousia) accident with an essence, in such a way that man can be named ‘paronymously’ from whiteness (Cat. 1a12-15). In the preceding chapter on the onymies, we have noted comparable passages in Categories 2, 5 and 10 (13a37-b15) with Topics 2.2 and Post An. 1.22. The Physics offers another relevant passage which we noted earlier in connection with paronymy (4.3, 210a30):

A thing is spoken of according to its parts (κατὰ τὰ μέρη), and also according to the whole: for instance, a man is said to be ‘white’ because his surface is white (οἷον λευκὸς ὅτι ἐπιφάνεια λευκή), or to be ‘knowledgeable’ because of his reasoning faculty (καὶ ἐπιστήμων ὅτι τὸ λογιστικόν)… In this sense, then, but not primarily, a thing can be in itself,

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150 So corresponding to a basic division of the uses of εἶναι, a modern argument to which C. Kahn (e.g. 1966, 1973, 1981) has made a major and controversial contribution. For an alternative account see M. Matthen (1983). De Rijk (2002) replaces the entire notion of ‘S is P’ predication with the proposal of an ‘assertoric operator’, which alters the terms of the debate.
In these passages we seem to encounter a collection of relationships – (1) paronymy, (2) inherence, and (3) accident – that share some common scheme of reference. We have argued that (1) paronymy is a linguistic relationship that coincides, for the most part, with (2) the inherence relationship of a non-ousia entity in an ousia as (3) a sumbebêkos, as ‘white’ or ‘knowledge’ might inhere in man.

While these passages offer a helpful framework for interpretation, we need not rely on external evidence for our account. For our purposes here, we just stress that (1) the idea of ‘weaving’ is closely associated with assertion of truth and falsehood in the Categories, as in the De Int, and (2) ‘interweaving’ appears to link items across categories, perhaps especially, as is posited, non-ousia items that inhere in primary ousiai. As words signify realities, relationships between words signify relationships between realities. Thus these four lines, intervening between the onymies and the forthcoming treatment of τὰ ὄντα (1a20-1b8), describe a verbal relationship (συμπλοκή) that corresponds to a series of ontic relationships in what follows.

B. τὰ ὄντα (1a20-1b8)

With 1a20 commences the fourfold division of beings (τῶν ὄντων) according to two relationships: (1) καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένου λέγεται and (2) ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστιν, in the sense ‘in something, not as a part, but as unable to exist apart from what it is in’ (1a24-26, to be discussed in detail below).

Of beings (τὰ ὄντα),

(a) Some are said-of (καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένου λέγεται) a subject, but are in (ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστιν) no subject: for example ‘man’ is said-of a subject, namely a particular man, but is in no subject.

(b) Some are in a subject, but are said-of no subject…. For example a piece of grammatical knowledge is in the soul as in a subject, but is said-of no subject; likewise, a piece of whiteness is in the body as in a subject (for all colour is in body), but is said-of no subject.
(c) Some are said-of a subject and are also in a subject: for example knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) is in the soul as in a subject, and is also said-of grammatical [knowledge] (ἡ γραμματική) as over a subject.

(d) Some are neither in a subject nor said-of anything as a subject: for example, some man (τις ἄνθρωπος) or some horse (τις ἵππος). For nothing like this is ever in nor said-over a subject.

(a) καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένου λέγεται

The first formulation is generally agreed to catch situations in which some genus or species is said-of something as a subject (καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένου). This seems clear, for instance, from the examples at 1b9, where man is predicated of a man, and animal of an animal. Under this heading falls the ‘said-of’ relationship of animal to man (in which both the definition and the name are predicated), which facilitates the collection of man and ox under the aegis of synonymy.  

The force of Aristotle’s examples here is clear. The predicates in question are γένη and εἴδη (cf. 2a16-19) such as ‘man’ and ‘animate’, i.e. those οὐσίαι that are called δεύτεραι, ‘secondary’ (2a18). This is the only work of Aristotle in which the phrase δεύτεραι οὐσίαι occurs, as Sachs (1948) points out, but the force of this designation seems to be clear: these ‘alone among the predicates point out primary οὐσίαι’ (μόνα γὰρ δῆλοι τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν τῶν κατηγορουμένων, 2b32-33), for it is ‘only by species or genus that this or that man can be given appropriately’ (τί ἐστι, τὸ μὲν εἶδος ἢ τὸ γένος ὑποδιδοὺς οἰκείως, 2b33-34). As δεύτεραι οὐσίαι, these also provide subjects for non-ουσίαι, such as qualities (3a1-6).

The difficulty about these entities is to determine whether, with Sachs (1948) and Jones (1975), ‘secondary οὐσίαι’ are purely linguistic terms (cf. Ryle 1961). In particular, has Aristotle ‘misrepresented [words] as things’ (Jones)? After all, if ‘what is said without combination’ are words (λεγόμενα) at 1a16-19, and these same entities are said-of individuals, then they include γένη and εἴδη; then these ‘secondary οὐσίαι’ must be words. But certainly the γένη and εἴδη are existent: these secondary οὐσίαι are classed under τῶν ζῴων (1a20) and contrasted with τῶν λεγόμενων (1a16). The fact that there are ζώα in the

151 Using ‘vertical’ for mixed-level and ‘horizontal’ for same-level. As we have noted there, the said-of relationship, expressed strictly, will not include the ‘vertical’ relationship of ζῷον-painting facilitating the horizontal relationship of man-painting (homonymy).
world suffices for the assertion that the genus ζῷον exists (is ὄν), on the same principle that the fact that some body is white suffices for the assertion that the colour quality white exists (is ὄν).

Ackrill replies to this line of argument (75) as follows:

[I]t is perfectly clear that Aristotle’s fourfold classification is a classification of things and not names, and that what is ‘said of’ something as subject is itself a thing (a species or genus) and not a name. Sometimes, indeed, Aristotle will speak of ‘saying’ or ‘predicating’ a name of a subject; but it is not linguistic items but the things they signify which are ‘said of a subject’… Thus at 2a19 ff. Aristotle sharply distinguishes things said of subjects from the names of those things.

This last argument seems persuasive on textual grounds. After all, τὰ καθ’ ὑποκειμένου λεγόμενα ‘have’ definitions and names (τῶν καθ’ ὑποκειμένου λεγομένων… τούνομα καὶ τὸν λόγον, 2a19-21): it is not the case that they ‘are’ definitions and names, to adapt the terminology of Code and Grice.152 Thus there is no indication that they are linguistic terms in their own right.

But this position appears to be challenged at 2a31-34, where Aristotle indicates that white is in a subject (body) and is predicated of the subject: according to Ackrill, this is a ‘mere slip’, for which Aristotle should have said white is ‘in’ a subject and its name is ‘predicated’ of that subject. Here, then, we might encounter another use-mention confusion. For de Rijk (2002:63-64), however, that could be viewed as another example of Aristotle’s systematic exploitation of indiscriminate reference and semantic counterpoint (66): in particular, de Rijk suggests that Aristotle claims that ‘white is predicated of its subject’ to indicate something about (1) the object white, (2) its definition, and (3) its name, all of which are related to one subject. This relationship can be indicated simultaneously by using the name ‘white’, which, in de Rijk’s metaphor, plays on all three ‘instruments’ at once – name, definition, and being – in contrappunto.

One can determine the relevance of this account without taking on board the entirety of de Rijk’s metaphor and hypothesis. We noted earlier, with respect to Cat. 5, 2a19-33, that for

some subject $x$ and some entity $F$ said-of $x$ with definiens $D_F$ and name $N_F$, the following implication strictly (ἀναγκαῖον, 2a20) holds:

$$F \text{ is said-of } x (\kappaατὰ \ x \ λέγεται) \rightarrow N_F \text{ and } D_F \text{ are predicated-of } (\kappaατηγορήται) \ x$$

After this principle is expressed, it is only necessary for Aristotle to indicate that $F$ is said-of $x$ in order to convey the additional (implied) assertions that $N_F$ and $D_F$ are predicated-of $x$. Put differently, the assertion $F \kappaατὰ \ x \ λέγεται$ expands into three assertions. So it might be straightforwardly the case that at 2a31-34, immediately following this formulation, Aristotle can say λευκὸν γὰρ σῶμα λέγεται and indicate simultaneously that white (the object $F$) is said-of body, while ‘white’ (the name $N_F$) is predicated-of body.

Of course ‘white’ is not said-of body. Rather, it is the paradigmatic example of a quality that ‘inheres in’ body (2a27-33) and whose name alone (and not definition) is predicated of body: therefore it cannot be said-of body. In fact, that is exactly what Aristotle says in the next lines (2a29-34). In the preceding discussion we expressed those lines as follows:

$$F \text{ in } x (\ἐν \ x \ εἰναί) \rightarrow D_F \text{ is not predicated-of } x \ & \ (N_F \text{ is not predicated-of } x \text{ and } \varepsilonπ \ πλείστων \ \text{ sometimes } \text{[ποτε] predicated-of } x) \ \varepsilonπ᾽ \ενίνων$$

By stating that ‘body is called white’ (λευκὸν γὰρ σῶμα λέγεται), Aristotle indicates simultaneously that the being (ὄν) white is inhering-in body ($F \text{ in } x \ εἰναί$), and that the name (ὄνομα) ‘white’ is predicated-of body ($N_F \text{ is sometimes } \text{[ποτε] predicated-of } x$).

Thus there is no ‘slip’ (Ackrill 75): in fact, this instance serves as a good example of the two principles that Aristotle has just outlined (2a19-33), in which an entity inheres-in a subject and its name is simultaneously predicated-of that same subject. Like other beings (ὠντα), ‘secondary ousiai’ exist and also have names. And like other beings, they can be said-of primary ousiai, a relationship that is typically signified by their names being predicated of those same primary ousiai.

Therefore in both cases, and especially in this latter instance, these lines demonstrate that there is no inconsistency regarding whether ‘predication’ occurs of words or of beings. Predication itself occurs of words: either of names only ($N_F$), or of both definitions ($D_F$) and names ($N_F$). Predication can coincide, however, with two ontological relationships – namely,
the said-of relationship and the inherence relationship: one can say ‘Socrates is a man’ (predicating definition and name, in addition to asserting the ontological said-of relationship) or ‘Socrates is white’ (predicating the name, in addition to asserting the ontological inherence relationship).

Predication also signifies the said-of and in relationships, just as particular predicates (names and definitions) signify beings (ὄντα): thus, we note, τὰν κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων ἔχοντο ἤτοι οὐσίαν σημαίνει… (1b25-6). Aristotle’s distinction of ὄνομα, λόγος and ὁν not only clarifies Aristotle’s awareness in this passage of the use-mention distinction, but goes one step further by introducing λόγος as a separate intermediary between mention (ὄνομα) and use (ὁν).

In conclusion, then, the secondary ousiai (F) emerge as beings (ὄντα) described under that heading (1a20-b8) that can be ‘said-of’ primary ousiai (x) – in such a way that their definitions (Dr) and names (Nr) are also ‘predicated-of’ those ousiai. It is ‘in’ ousiai, including secondary ousiai, that non-ousiai inhere (3a1-6).

(b) ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἔστιν

The situation of ‘inherence’ presents a greater challenge to interpretation. A number of fine-grained views have been put forward, particularly in the past fifty years, to explain how one object can be ‘in’ a subject in the way that Aristotle appears to specify. There are two particularly influential arguments. The difference between them is chiefly contingent upon the reading of 1a25-26.

(i) The recent story begins with John Ackrill (1963:74-6). One aspect of Ackrill’s account is universally accepted, and this is the distinction that he draws between the ‘in’ of the definiens (‘in, not as a part… and cannot exist separately from what it is in’) from the ‘in’ of the definiendum (‘in a subject’). The ‘in’ of the definiens, with Ackrill, must catch some other, presumably ‘natural language’ notion of inherence, and not the notion that is being defined; without this distinction the definition is circular.

Ackrill also held (74-5) that the entities referred to here – such as ‘a grammatical knowledge’ (grammatikē tis) and ‘a white’ (leukon τι) – should be characterized as individuals that we would now call ‘nonrecurrent’. As Ackrill put it, ‘only this individual generosity – Callias’s generosity – is in Callias’. Thus examples might include ‘the white
(currently visible) in Socrates’ face’ or ‘a bit of grammatical knowledge (currently available) in Socrates’ soul’, both of which vanish the moment that Socrates’ body becomes darker, or that Socrates forgets how to conjugate λύω, and will not recur in him nor in others. Frede (1987:57-56) represents this position as follows:

Some philosophers… want to maintain not only that Socrates is an individual but that his wisdom also is, that is, the wisdom with respect to which we say of Socrates that he is wise. This wisdom, they maintain, is Socrates’ but not Plato’s.

(ii) Owen (1965) came to criticize that view, and found it so common among his contemporaries and predecessors\(^{153}\) that he declared it a ‘dogma’. In its place, he proposed that the entities referred to here are recurrent and might be predicated of many primary ousiai: ‘to say that pink is a particular colour … is not to say that it cannot be found in more than one subject’ (Owen 99, my emphasis). Consider for another example ‘chalk white’. White can be said-of chalk white. Yet chalk white can, let us suppose, be ‘said-of’ nothing else (and is moreover ‘indivisible’), but it can nonetheless recur across any number of particulars.\(^{154}\) For Owen, the passage 2a36-b3 settles the issue in favour of this interpretation: here it is ‘colour’ in general that appears to recur in several instances, rather than some particular instance of colour. The same lines are described by Ackrill as ‘careless’ and ‘compressed’, ostensibly because they seem to describe these entities as recurrent and general.

Those two views have been represented as the two corners in a prize-fight that subsequent scholarship has sought to nuance into a reasonable compromise. R. E. Allen (1969) and B. Jones (1972) both took issue with details of Owen’s argument. Jones made a strong case that neither of the primary views really make for a good account of the text at 2a23-29, and he went on to suggest that we should regard the subjects of ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ as recurrent, but individual precisely in virtue of their inherence in particulars. Owen’s supposition that the


\(^{154}\) Owen points out the ambivalence of leukon and suggests using ‘pink’ instead of ‘white’; he deploys the alternative ‘vink’ for some sub-shade of ‘pink’, as ‘chalk white’ is a sub-shade of ‘white’. I shall suggest below that the selection of any example of an infima species on these implicit principles is necessarily arbitrary.
ἄτομον can include ‘maximally determinate’ properties like chalk-white, or his hypothetical ‘vink’, has been supported by others.\textsuperscript{155}

But Frede took a somewhat different approach (1987, originally pub. as ‘Individuen bei Aristoteles’, 1978), which has been characterized (Wedin 2000) as a more effective rebuttal of nonrecurrence than Owen’s own. Frede draws on 1a25-9 to show that, had Aristotle intended to say that some individual property is in an individual body, he would not have written ἅπαν γὰρ χρώμα ἐν σώματι, ‘all colour is in body’, but ἐν τινι σώματι, deploying the expression to clarify the particularity of the subject. Frede also concurs with Owen that ‘1a24-25 does not say that if something is in something else as in its subject, it cannot exist independently of it… the reference of ἐν τινι is not fixed by the preceding words. [W]hat is being claimed… is that if something is the kind of thing that occurs in a subject, then there is at least something, at least one subject, without which it cannot exist’ (61).

As we noted above, one element of the challenge of formulating the condition is to show that there is no circularity involved – that the definiens does not need to draw on the concept of ἐν that it defines (so Ackrill). Frede goes on to show clearly that the Greek ἐν ‘does no work’ in the definiens itself, as we can see from the fact that the definition is formulable as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
x \text{ is in something as its subject, if there is a subject } y \text{ such that} \\
(i) & \ x \text{ is not a part of } y, \text{ and} \\
(ii) & \ x \text{ cannot exist independently of } y.
\end{align*}
\]

On this interpretation, as Frede continues (62), ‘there is no longer any need… to assume that individual properties are peculiar to the individual whose properties they are’.

Michael Wedin agrees (47) that Frede’s approach here avoids circularity, but adds that this ‘won’t do because its conditions are only sufficient’. (Nonetheless, this might still be a fair approximation of 1a24-26). Wedin suggests that we replace this formulation’s term ‘if’ by equivalence. But that allows for various counterexamples: on this account, for instance, Socrates ‘inheres-in’ the unmoved mover, echoing the ancient dilemma regarding whether S. is an ‘accident of time or space’. After considering several reformulations of Frede’s view,

such as Matthews (1989), and embarking on a comprehensive review, Wedin proposes the following:

\[ x \text{ is in } z, \text{ as its subject } \equiv \text{there is a subject } y \text{ such that} \]

(a) \( x \text{ is in } y \) &
(b) \( x \text{ is not a part of } y \) &
(c) \( x \text{ cannot exist independently of something } u \) &
(d) \( y = u \equiv x \text{ is nonrecurrent } \& z \text{ is particular.} \)

Among the benefits of this formulation, as Wedin observes, it allows general features to be found in particular subjects – the denial of which was taken as a failing of Ackrill’s original view (74). It also resists commitment to the view that these ‘inherent’ ὄντα comprise particulars predicable of many objects (e.g. Benson 1988). But among the challenges facing this formula, it pries apart all three referents of ‘in’ in the definition. Thus, for Aristotle’s

\[ \varepsilonν \ [a] \ υποσκειμένῳ \ δὲ \ λέγω, \ οδ \varepsilonν \ [b] \ τινι \ μὴ \ όζ \ μέρος \ ύπάρχον \ αδύνατω \ χωρίς \ εἶναι \ τοῦ \ [c] \ \varepsilonν \ ό \ \varepsilonστίν \]

Wedin’s variables \( x, y, z \) and \( u \) allow us to conceive of \( \varepsilonν \ [a] \ υποσκειμένῳ \) as referencing one object, \( \varepsilonν \ [b] \ τινι \) as another object, and \( \varepsilonν \ [c] \ \varepsilonστίν \) as yet a third object. That level of distinction seems to press the Greek. I will return to this problem of interpretation below.

**Analysis**

Ackrill established the boundaries of this debate. (1) In the first place, he signposted the danger of circularity at 1a24-25: ‘the “in” which occurs twice in this definition cannot be the technical “in” of the definiendum. It must be a non-technical “in” which one who is not yet familiar with the technical sense can be expected to understand’ (74). (2) Second, he observed that ‘the inseparability requirement [i.e. \( x \) cannot exist outside of what it is in] has the consequence that only individuals in non-substance categories can be ‘in’ individual substances. Aristotle could not say that generosity is in Callias as subject, since there could be generosity without any Callias’ (74).

To return to the text, let us begin with the examples of the ‘in a subject’ relationship that occur in the *Categories*. As well as frequently reminding us that no *ousia* is ‘in’ a subject in this way (e.g. 3a8-9), Aristotle gives us instances like the following:

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The example of ἐπιστήμη at 1b2, and perhaps the example of χρῶμα at 2b1, refer to some entity that is both ‘said-of and in’ a subject. The other examples are of entities that are just ‘in’ a subject: ἡ τίς γραμματική (ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ), τὸ τί λευκὸν (ἐν τῷ σώματι).

I would like to focus on the primary example, ἡ τίς γραμματική, which is given at the outset. In the first place, aside from the τίς, what is ἡ γραμματική? It is ‘the grammatical’. The grammatical what? We might gloss this phrase ἡ γραμματική <τέχνη>, ‘the grammatical art’, in the familiar Platonic turn of phrase (e.g. Cratylus 431e11, Philebus 18d2). But we do not need to go so far afield, as we are explicitly told that ἡ ἐπιστήμη… καθ’ ὑποκειμένου δὲ λέγεται τῆς γραμματικῆς (1b2-3): therefore the underlying phrase is ἡ γραμματική ἐπιστήμη, ‘grammatical science’—an Aristotelian locution familiar from elsewhere in the corpus (e.g. Topics 6.5, 142b31-32, cited again below).

This ἡ γραμματική, then, is a subject of-which ἐπιστήμη is said (1b2-3). But how is this relevant to the basic question about ἡ τίς γραμματική at 1a26, an example of the kind of entity with which our inquiry is chiefly concerned? Now the phrase ἡ τίς γραμματική will not be met in Aristotle outside the Cat., but a related phrase will: and this is ἡ τίς ἐπιστήμη.

We meet that phrase in several interesting contexts. For example, consider An. Pr. 2.15, 64a5-9, which occurs in the midst of a syllogism proven in the middle figure from contradictory and contrary premises:

όμως δὲ καὶ εἰ πάσαν λαβὼν σπουδαίαν τὴν ιατρικὴν μὴ σπουδαίαν ἔλαβε· τῷ μὲν γὰρ Β παντὶ τὸ Α, τῷ δὲ Γ οὐδενί, ὥστε ἡ τίς ἐπιστήμη οὐκ ἔσται ἐπιστήμη.

157 The locution ‘in body’ without the article (like ὁνόματις and ξύλῳ elsewhere in 1a20-1b8) might, with Owen, indicate that a general notion of colour is under consideration.
Likewise too, if after assuming that all [science] is good, we then assume that medical [science] is not good: for then A applies to all B, but to no C, so that some science (ἡ ἑ σπιστήμη) will not be science.

Here ‘some science’ (tis episteme) refers to the example of ἡ ἰατρικὴ <ἐπιστήμη>.

Another instance of this phrase involves the inheritance of features of the genus by the species, and of the species by the particular (Topics 2.4, 111a33-b4):

Since of all those things of which the genus is predicated, one of its species must necessarily also be predicated, and since all those things which possess that genus, or are said (legetai) paronymously from the genus, must also possess one of its species or be called paronymously from one of its species – for example if epistêmê is predicated of someone (tinos), then grammaticê or mousikê or some one of the other sciences (tis epistêmôn) will be predicated of him... he will derive his description paronymously from one of them, being called a grammarian or a musician.

In these passages we find again that ἡ ἑ epistêmê can mean several things, such as ἡ ἰατρικὴ [ἐπιστήμη] and ἡ γραμματικὴ [ἐπιστήμη]. The latter two cases are simply eidê of the genos epistêmê (as Topics 4.5, 126a4-6 states explicitly). These passages are relevant to our context chiefly because they tell us something about what tis might mean when it is added to ἡ γραμματική <ἐπιστήμη>: that is, tis grammaticê simply signifies an entity of which grammaticê can be said, i.e., of which both the name grammaticê and the corresponding definition can be predicated, just as the name epistêmê and the corresponding definition can be predicated of ἡ γραμματική. This tis grammaticê might be some ‘lower’ species, as (working with the corporeal example) Owen suggests vink as a lower and ‘maximally determinate’ species of pink, and as we might suggest ‘chalk white’ as an infima species of ‘white’. But perhaps tis grammaticê is itself the infima species, like vink: then it would be predicated (but paronymously) of some individual ‘grammarian’.158

The question then recurs: what is tis grammaticê? The crucial problem that defines the literature is, what kind of ‘particularity’ is furnished by the addition of tis? Our review here

158 ‘Grammatical science’ will be predicated of a grammarian only in a paronymous way: never by the said-of relationship. Thus, in a notorious example, we read in Owen that we should go about counting literate people (grammatikoi) in a room to understand how many literacies (hai grammatikai) there are. But ‘grammar’ is not, after all, ‘said of’ literate people, or grammarians. It may be predicated of them (katégoreisthai), but it is predicated paronymously – as is noted explicitly in the passage Topics 2.4 cited above – and this means that only the name (in a roundabout way) and not the definition is predicated. This is not the same thing as the said-of relationship: as the definition is not inherited, no grammarian is a ‘grammar’ (cf. Cat. 2a28-33).
suggestions that it is simply the kind of particularity by which the species ἄνθρωπος is ‘a’ (τι) ζῷον, or by which any eidos is ‘a’ member of a genos: in other words, 

\[ x = \taui F \rightarrow F \text{ is said-of } x. \]

Thus if ἡ γραμματικὴ is τις εἰσιμένη, then as we have shown, εἰσιμένη (the genos) is said-of ἡ γραμματικὴ (the eidos). So far, so good. Now for τις γραμματικὴ: it will be something (x) of-which the kind ἡ γραμματικὴ <εἰσιμένη> (F) is said. Obviously, then, it will not be a soul or a person; rather, it will be something of which the definitions of εἰσιμένη and γραμματικὴ will both be predicated: it will be ‘a science’ and specifically ‘a grammatical science’. This would point to the possibility that it will be a shared property.

Scholars working on this problem have made necessary assumptions about what Aristotle means when he talks about ἡ γραμματικὴ, e.g. Owen’s ‘literacy’, and especially ἡ τις γραμματικὴ; some scholars have abandoned Aristotle’s example altogether. I would like to introduce here a section of the Topics in which, I suggest, we encounter just the kind of example Aristotle has in mind. At Top. 6.5, 142b30, he offers this advice:

Furthermore, you must see whether, though the term which is being defined (tou horizomenou) applies to a number of things (pros pleió), your opponent has failed to apply it to all of them: for example if he has defined ἡ γραμματικὴ εἰσιμένη as ‘the knowledge of writing from dictation’; for he ought to add that it is also ‘the knowledge of reading’.

Aristotle goes on to explain how the two instances – the knowledge of writing and the knowledge of reading – are simply particulars of the wider kind γραμματικὴ εἰσιμένη. In other words, γραμματικὴ εἰσιμένη can be said-of ‘the knowledge of writing from dictation’; which means that ‘the knowledge of writing from dictation’ is precisely what we are looking for: an example of τις γραμματικὴ. Now clearly many individuals can share the knowledge of writing from dictation. And there is no reason to suppose that Aristotle means anything else by τις γραμματικὴ at Cat. 1a26 and 1b8 than something resembling ‘the knowledge of writing by dictation’.

Now if the τις γραμματικὴ at 1a26 is something like this, it follows that it is (1) in a subject, but (2) said-of no subject. To begin with, then, (1) in whom or what will it be? Now ἡ γραμματικὴ is ‘in’ the soul of the grammarian (ho grammaticos), and by the paradigmatic

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159 It seems intrinsically unlikely that Aristotle’s notion of what constitutes a reasonable example of grammatical knowledge would have changed radically between his writing of the sixth book of the Topics and the Categories. In any case, these works do not appear distant in composition.
example of the *Categories* it is in virtue of this inherence that he is paronymously called ‘grammariam’ (the ‘paronymous’ derivation is also paralleled from the *Topics*, above). So in what will *tis grammaticê* be found? Presumably ‘in’ the soul of grammaticos *tis*.

But the analogy does not imply that grammaticos *tis* means this-or-that grammatariam, say, Chomsky or Socrates. Rather, in symmetry with *hê tis grammaticê*, e.g., ‘knowledge of writing from dictation’, it follows that grammaticos *tis* means, rather laboriously, ‘the grammatariam-knowing-how-to-write-from-dictation’: e.g. a writer, or *grapheus*. Now *grapheus* is not this-or-that person, say, Chomsky, because there are plenty of grammarians capable of writing from dictation: *grapheus* still just names a class (*eidos*). Thus, working from the example, there is no reason to bring ‘individuals’ like Socrates and Callias into the matter at all, and to wonder whether *grammatikê tis* is Socrates’ *grammatikê epistêmê* (nonrecurrent) or the *grammatikê epistêmê* shared by Socrates and Callias (recurrent). It is neither. It is a certain kind of grammatical *epistêmê*, of-which both the definition and the name *grammatikê epistêmê* are validly predicated, which is not necessarily ‘in’ the soul of Socrates or ‘in’ the soul of Callias, but simply ‘in’ *the soul* – and specifically the soul of the *grapheus*, a class. It is said-of nothing, but in something: namely, the soul as an *eidos*.

This, then, brings us around to the manner in which this thing, *hê tis grammaticê*, is ‘in’ the soul as a subject – a property that it has presumably inherited from ‘grammatical knowledge’ in general:160

\[ \epsilonν \ [a] \upsilon\omega\chi\epsilon\mu\epsilonν\upsilon \delta\epsilon \lambda\epsilon\gamma\omega, \circ \ \epsilonν \ [b] \tau\iota\nu\iota \mu\iota \ \circ\epsilon\zeta \ \mu\epsilon\rho\circ \upsilon\alpha\rho\chi\circ\upsilon \\alpha\delta\upnu\nu\alpha\tau\upsilon\circ \chi\omega\circ\iota\iota \ i\epsilon\nu\iota\alpha \ \tau\circ\upsilon \ [c] \ \epsilon\nu \ \omega \ \circ\epsilon\sigma\tau\iota\nu. \]

The crucial issue here – the problem that has driven discussion – is whether \[c\] \( \epsilonν \ \omega \ \circ\epsilon\sigma\tau\iota\nu \at\end\) signifies the same container as do \[a\] \( \epsilonν \ \upsilon\omega\chi\epsilon\mu\epsilon\nu\upsilon \at\begin{\begin{align} \left(1\right) x \ \text{is in} \ y \ \text{as in a subject} \ = \\
& \left( a \right) x \ \text{is in}_2 y \ (\text{not as a part}) \ &
& \left( b \right) x \ \text{is unable to exist separate from} \ y
\end{align}\] or is it

160 The reason that this particular kind of knowledge of grammar is in the soul, of course, is that all knowledge of grammar is in soul, and cannot be elsewhere: thus, in the other exemplary register, \( \alpha\tau\epsilon\alpha\nu \ \gamma\omicron \ \chi\omicron\delta\omicron\alpha \ \epsilon\nu \ \omicron\omega\omicron\alpha\tau\omicron\tau \ (1a29) \). It is part of the definition of knowledge of grammar to be in the soul, and accordingly this is inherited by the infima species \( \upsilon \ \tau\iota\zeta \ \gamma\omicron\omicron\mu\omicron\alpha\omicron\tau\omicron\omicron\zeta\omicron\).
These might be formalized with much greater detail and variation, but the ambiguity is captured by these two equations. Yet there seems to me to be relatively little ambiguity in the Greek. If Aristotle had wanted to say (2), he had plenty of ways to do so with reasonable clarity. For instance, he might have simply written ἀδυνατον χωρὶς εἶναι τινος to retain the ambiguity that modern commentators imply. If he meant to say more explicitly that the container was different from the subject, he might even have written ἑτέρου τινος (for that locution cf. De caelo 269b2) or simply ἑτέρου alone (cf. Cat. 11a25). But to write τοῦ ἐν ὧν ἐστὶν immediately after writing ἐν τινι seems to be the clearest and least ambiguous way of all to state (1) in Greek – that is, to indicate that \( z = y \), or that \( b = c \). Thus it seems to me a strongly probable claim that (1) is basically correct, at least in outline, and therefore it is valid to understand the subject of the inherent property as that same container outside of which it cannot exist.

**Concluding remarks and implications**

In our example, *tis grammatikê*, such as the knowledge of writing from dictation, is ‘in’ the soul; it is not a part of the soul; and it cannot exist apart from the soul. Now ‘the knowledge of writing’ cannot be this-or-that knowledge of writing in the soul of Chomsky or of Socrates or of Callias. It inherits from knowledge (*epistêmê*) the property that it must be ‘in the soul’, in the same way that white inherits from colour the property that it must occur ‘in body’ (1a28). There is no knowledge of grammar or writing outside the soul, just as there is no colour outside body. If you point to some particular body, there is no need for white to inhere in it in order for ‘white to be in [the eidos] body’; on the other hand, if there were no bodies at all, there would be nothing for colour to inhere in, and ‘colour is in body’ as a universal claim would be false (2b1-7). (Thus the universal and particular modes of the syllogism, AEIO, might be noted as relevant for distinguishing these senses).

We learn at 3a1-6 that all non-substance items (such as qualities, knowledges, and colours) depend on (inhere in) *ousiai* (tr. Ackrill, modified):

\[
\text{ἐτὶ αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι διὰ τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀπασιν ὑποχείσθαι κυριώτατα ὡς δὲ γε αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα πάντα}
\]
It is difficult to be clear about the exact distinction between τὰ ἄλλα πάντα (for which primary ὄνσιαι are subjects) and τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα (for which secondary ὄνσιαι are subjects). In particular, do the non-ὄνσιαι inhere in both the primary ὄνσιαι and the secondary ὄνσιαι, or only in the secondary ὄνσιαι? The first part of the sentence is clear:

αἱ πρῶται ὄνσιαι διὰ τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἁπασιν ὑποκεῖσθαι κυριώτατα ὄνσιαι λέγονται

Thus it is chiefly as subjects for τὰ ἄλλα πάντα (including secondary ὄνσιαι and non-ὄνσιαι) that primary ὄνσιαι are so called. But just as primary ὄνσιαι are to these, so secondary ὄνσιαι are to τὰ λοιπὰ. The distinction of ἄλλα and λοιπὰ suggests that it is through the ἐίδη and γένη that particulars serve as subjects. Primary ὄνσιαι underlie genera, and genera underlie non-ὄνσιαι: therefore ὄνσιαι underlie both genera and non-ὄνσιαι.

This logical progression takes on a very interesting character. ‘Man’ and ‘horse’ appear as the ‘primary ousiai’ of which the secondary ousiai are said. But we will find that these primary ousiai are not the ‘subjects’ in which non-substance qualities such as tis grammatikê inhere.

Rather, those inhere ‘in eidê and genê’ (3a1-6), i.e. the secondary ousiai on which ‘all the rest [non-ousiai] depend as subjects’. This suggests that whatever grammatikê and tis grammatikê are in as a subject, it is not in Socrates or Callias, but in some eidos, perhaps soul. Then, precisely because that eidos is ‘said-of’ Socrates, he has those properties. The two relationships of ‘said-of’ and ‘inherence’ are not merely parallel, but descriptively sequential, the first ‘vertical’ or ‘subordinating’ (κατά- or ὑπ᾽ ἄλληλα) and the second ‘horizontal’ (παρά- or μὴ ὑπ᾽ ἄλληλα). In order to explain how Socrates as an individual soul has the knowledge of grammar, which is still in a sense ‘general’, we have first to show (1) that this knowledge is ‘in’ the relevant eidos (here, ‘soul’) as in a subject. This is a cross-

161 For the spatial analogy of ‘vertical’ and ‘parallel’, cf. ὑπ᾽ ἄλληλα etc. in 1b16-20.
category predication, a ‘horizontal’ (παρα-) κατηγορία, that requires a ‘weave’ or combination (συμπλοκή). As we have seen, it frequently coincides with paronymy: Socrates is γραμματικός if he has γραμματική. Then, we have to show (2) that this eidos is ‘said of’ the individual Socrates: he is ‘a soul’. This is a ‘vertical’ κατηγορία. This sequence of operations, pictured here like the ‘L’-form move of a knight on the chessboard, comprises the account of how non-οὐσίαι inhere in particulars. It analyses the Platonic notion of eponymy, as Mann (2000) points out.

However, as we have noticed in our analysis of the phrase τίς γραμματική, the mere addition of τίς to a word does not imply ultimate particularity. It does imply the vertical operation that ‘moves’ from

\[ \text{ἐπιστήμη} \rightarrow \text{γραμματική [ἐπιστήμη]} \]
\[ \rightarrow \text{τίς γραμματική} = (\text{e.g.}) \text{ ‘knowledge of writing by dictation’}. \]

These are all kinds of ‘knowledge’: but even the last is an εἶδος and not a ἔκαστον.

Proceeding downward by the κατά operation (and lengthening the string of differentiae), we could imagine further instances ad infinitum: knowledge of writing by dictation on papyrus or stone, for example, or knowledge of writing by dictation in poor light. I think we should disregard this point, as Aristotle does not make it, and no example of τίς γραμματική is given in our text: in fact it is very difficult to imagine a real infima species in this category, as Owen’s invented example vink demonstrates. Therefore Aristotle simply employs the indicative phrase τίς γραμματική. With τίς γραμματική we reach the ‘bottom’ of our vertical moves through the κατά operation. Ex hypothesi, we can descend no further. Our only remaining move is horizontal: we can detect this particular species of knowledge as an accident ‘inhering’ in another εἶδος, the soul.

The point that something like ‘knowledge of writing by dictation’ is what Aristotle means by τίς γραμματική – and that this represents the concept of an infima species (even if it may not literally be infima) – is important, I believe, for some of the later discussions of inherence (see chapter 3, Andronicus) and of universals (see chapter 5, Boethus).

\( \text{(e) kath’ hupokeimenou legetai kai en hupokeimenoi einai} \)

By contrast, ‘knowledge’ and ‘grammatical knowledge’ do inhere in the general εἶδος ‘soul’. They are found in all souls, always or for the most part. It may take time for such features to
appear: according to the psychology that Aristotle would eventually offer (DA 3.6 and following), the soul as a whole possesses these features in potentiality (δύναμις), and in particular instances they can be actualized.

Thus the third class of beings in Categories 2 (1a30-1b3), and its exemplar ἐπιστήμη, are relatively clear. At the level of the infima species τίς γραμματική, we have ‘descended’ as far as we can move by the κατὰ operation, and our only remaining move through the operation of κατηγορία is ‘horizontal’, through inherence, to the soul in which τίς γραμματική exists. These two kinds of move are differentiated at 2a19-33, as we have found in the preceding chapter.

But here, at the level of ἐπιστήμη, both moves remain open to us: we can move ‘downward’ καθ᾽ ὑποκείμενον or sideways ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ. This is neatly indicated in the description. To continue the analogy, when we reach (a) τὰ καθ᾽ ὑποκείμενον λέγεται, e.g. the species ἄνθρωπος (1a22), the operation of κατηγορία can only take us downward: we cannot move horizontally, as there is no passage open that is μὴ ὑπ᾽ ἀλλήλα. With (b) τὰ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν, e.g. τίς γραμματική (1a26), we can just move horizontally. Ex hypothesi, this is the infima species, and κατηγορία cannot take us further ‘downward’. With (c) τὰ καθ᾽ ὑποκείμενον λέγεται καὶ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, both directions of κατηγορία are open to us. Finally, with (d) τὰ οὔτ᾽ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν οὔτε καθ᾽ ὑποκείμενον λέγεται, κατηγορία can take us no further in either direction.

The spatial analogy of ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ predication (as I have been using it) is introduced with the word κατηγορία itself at Chapter 3, 1b9-19. After explaining the process by which definitions are inherited (1b9-15), Aristotle further explains (tr. Ackrill):

The differentiae of genera which are different and not subordinate one to the other (μὴ ὑπ᾽ ἀλλήλα) are themselves different in kind. For example, animal and knowledge: footed, winged, aquatic, two-footed are differentiae of animal, but none of these is a differentia of knowledge: one sort of knowledge does not differ from another by being two-footed.

However, there is nothing to prevent genera subordinate one to the other (ὑπ᾽ ἀλλήλα) from having the same differentiae. For the higher are predicated of the genera below them, so that all differentiae of the predicated genus will be differentiae of the subject also.\(^{162}\)

\(^{162}\) This passage raised several problems in its own right in antiquity, which are discussed below, particularly in the chapters on Herminus and on Lucius and Nicostratus.
This passage distinguishes the axes in which predication moves. The ‘horizontal’ or ‘coordinate’ (μὴ ὑπ’ ἄλληλα) move of predication links objects differing in kind, while the ‘vertical’ move of predication links objects that are the same in kind, where ‘same in eidos’ will mean ‘having the same differentiae’.

(d) out’ en hupokeimenōi estin oute kath’ hupokeimenou tinos legetai

The final class in this fourfold group may seem to be the simplest, based on the familiarity of the examples: man, horse. But it is not at all clear what man and horse are mean to signify. Presumably they are ‘things’ and not words, as commentators agree. We get clarification about this immediately at 1b6: they are ‘indivisibles’ (atoma) which are ‘one in number’. Some such things like tis grammaticē can be ‘in’ a subject; primary ousiai cannot. What does ‘one in number’ mean here? This has been discussed in relation to this passage by Jones (1972), and it would seem appropriate to turn to an account such as that found in Met. Δ.

We shall return to this in more detail in the following sections of this study; Boethus of Sidon as well as Lucius and Nicostratus, for example, are reported by Simplicius to have discussed where in the categories ‘unity’ belonged. For the moment, we may simply ask what kind of entities these ‘particulars’ have to be within the bounds of the Cat. We have already noticed that the additional word that signifies them, namely τις in ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος and ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος, can imply infima species as in ἡ τὶς γραμματική. There may, however, be some difficulties with the assumption that they are just sensible particulars.163 A man is ‘some animal’ (vertically) with one or more differentiae (horizontally); Socrates is ‘some man’ (vertically), with accidents (horizontally). But it is not being ‘some man’ or having certain accidents that defines Socrates.

For the moment, in terms of our study of the opening chapters of the Cat., we note that we are introduced to these primary ousiai through a certain operation, ‘predication’, of which they are the termination point. These entities remain the same with respect to themselves,

163 As the commentators Lucius and Nicostratus argued (ap. Simplicium 49,31 and following), the sensible Socrates would be ‘in’ time and space as an accident. Boethus of Sidon responds (for his response, see Sorabji 1983 (e.g., 82 and 413) and Sorabji, ‘Time, Place, and Extracosmic Space’, in Sorabji and Sharples, 2007) that Socrates is not in any moment of particular time, insofar as any object in kinesis is never occupying the moment where it just was (Phys. 231b15): if anything, then, Socrates is in time katholou. But nothing katholou subsists, and therefore the Categories definition of ‘inherence’ does not apply: nothing can be ‘in’ time katholou. Thus in the Categories sense, Socrates is not ‘in’ time at all.
while changing with respect to their ten predicable properties: κατηγορία can be further subdivided into one ‘vertical’ move (ουσίαν σημαίνει, 1b26) and nine kinds of ‘horizontal’ move (1b25-2a4). By introducing the concept of κατηγορία, that allows strict correspondence of verbalization with the inherence and the said-of relationships (as outlined at 2a19-33), we are able to move semantic ‘tokens’, as it were, horizontally or vertically on a logical board, in a way that correctly and systematically represents the relationships of things to their properties – both the properties that they contain and the genera that embrace them.

Logical discourse, which is by definition concerned with the conceptual and the katholou, having corrected for verbal convention, is able to bind the katholou with the kath’ hekaston through the semantic capacity of the soul. The ability to manipulate these bound variables – transcending the intuitive ambiguities of ‘names’ as conventional variables and constants in prosègoria (1a1-15) is employed to reach conclusions about realities via certain rules in Ch. 4, where the process is further analyzed into ten referents for simple speech. Not merely single verbal tokens can be manipulated in this way, but even verbal relationships (so 2a5), which can produce verbal affirmations mirroring affirmations in the soul. Τὰ λεγόμενα ‘represent’ τὰ ὄντα, and by the same kind of representation, κατηγορία ‘represents’ movement through τὰ ὄντα. This theory we have also met in the closing lines of the De Int.

As we have already noticed, the ancient critics construed Aristotle’s Categories (at least in part) as a text about semantics. The approach that we have taken to the text in this chapter may help to elucidate how the problems of signification – especially signification ‘by nature’ – were drawn from the text. We turn now to the ancient tradition from Andronicus to Herminus, and the specific problems raised by these commentators.
3. Andronicus of Rhodes
Many men worthy of remembrance, commanders and athletes, were born [on Rhodes]. Among them are the forebears of Panaitios the philosopher. Among the statesmen, rhetoricians, and philosophers are Panaitios himself; Stratokles; Andronikos the Peripatetic; and Leonides the Stoic.

Strabo, Geography 14.2.13 [T1]

Regrettably, we remember relatively little of Andronicus the Peripatetic, ἀνὴρ μνήμης ἄξιος.164 From Strabo we know that he was born on Rhodes, a centre of Peripatetic learning since Eudemus; his later eponym ὁ Ῥόδιος (Plutarch, Sulla 26.1, 9) is consistent with this origin, and his philosophical affiliation is suggested in epithets such as ὁ ἐκ τῶν περιπάτων or περιπατητικός by Strabo, Galen (An. Corp. 4.782 Kühn), and Porphyry (VP 24.7). His work was sufficiently familiar to later Peripatetic commentators that he could be mentioned as Ἀνδρόνικος without prior introduction or qualification (Alexander in An. Pr. 161.1; Porphyry in Cat. 125.22), and his lucidity as an exegete of the Aristotelian text was respected in late antiquity, particularly following Porphyry: thus he wins praise from Themistius (in De. An. 32.22-4), and Ammonius refers to him as a successor to Aristotle in the Peripatetic

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scholarchate (in De Int. 5.29).\textsuperscript{165} The tradition about his scholarchate would seem to presuppose a degree of respect for Andronicus as a Peripatetic philosopher, either from his contemporaries (if the testimony is literally accurate) or from Ammonius’s later sources (if the testimony was invented, or a product of guesswork).

Andronicus is μνήμης ἄξιος because his name is attached to a prodigious expansion in the study of Aristotle’s ‘esoteric’ texts during the first century BCE, whose causes are not yet clearly understood.\textsuperscript{166} His attachment to that expansion is first explicitly attested, in our record, by Plutarch (Sulla 26 = T3); a century earlier, Strabo, while speaking in markedly similar terms (Geog. 13.1.54 = T2),\textsuperscript{167} describes the sorry state of Aristotle’s works in the hands of inferior booksellers, but stops short of mentioning the editorial rescue allegedly mounted by Andronicus\textsuperscript{168}—whom Plutarch credits with a corrected, usable publication of Aristotle and Theophrastus, a collection that revitalized a Peripatos previously incapacitated, on Strabo’s account, by the loss of its founder’s school texts. Coupled with the report of Porphyry (VP 24 = T7) that Andronicus organized the corpus into its contemporary form, these texts have traditionally, if perhaps insecurely,\textsuperscript{169} underwritten the legend of a Roman ‘critical edition’ woven in Andronicus’ hands, constituting the foundation of our modern Aristotle.

\textbf{Life}

When did Andronicus live and work? This is a knotty problem. It is widely agreed that he was active in the first century BCE. According to the sixth-century commentator John Philoponus (in Cat. 5.16-19 = T16), Andronicus taught Boethus of Sidon, himself a

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{165} But the credibility of Ammonius’ testimony has been doubted; elsewhere, he bestows the same title on Boethus of Sidon (in An. Pr. 31,11): cf. Lynch (1972), 203-04 and Brink (1940), 938-40.
\item \textsuperscript{166} See for example Moraux (1976) I; Gottschalk (1987), 1089-97; Tarán; and Sharples.
\item \textsuperscript{167} On the possibility of a common source, see Moraux, Aristotelismus I, 21-4, with Barnes (1999), 9, 19-20.
\item \textsuperscript{168} Perhaps, as Barnes suggests, because the text is corrupt. In that case, Plutarch may be simply reporting Strabo. On the other hand, H. Diels, Doxographi Graeci (Berlin, 1879) 216 proposed that Plutarch simply fabricated a connection between Strabo’s Apellicon story and the fact that the current catalogue of the day carried the name of Andronicus. See Moraux I, 48 and following for discussion.
\item \textsuperscript{169} See Barnes (1997) and also Primavesi (2007), with discussion below.
\end{itemize}
‘brilliant’ scholar (θαυμάσιος, Simplicius in Cat. 1,18), whose ‘quick-witted’ (πολλῆς ἀγχινοίας, 11,23) defenses and exegeses of Aristotle’s Categories might appear, to a loyal reader of Simplicius, to have left his opponents Lucius and Nicostratus in the dust. If we trust Philoponus, we can set a reasonably sure date for Andronicus’ activity. Boethus ‘philosophised with’ Strabo (συνεφιλοσοφήσαμεν, Geog. 16.2.24) as a teacher or a fellow-student,170 and Strabo’s birth can be fixed around 63/64 BCE.171 That might place Boethus’ activity, as a student of Andronicus, not much before the middle of the first century BCE, and consequently establish Andronicus’ floruit around the late seventies (Moraux)172 or sixties (Gottshalk).173

We might be reluctant to rely upon Philoponus’ isolated notice, however, which was composed centuries after the fact.174 Düring, following Brink,175 would view Andronicus and Boethus as near contemporaries, and date Andronicus’ publication of Aristotle and Theophrastus around the thirties BCE: after all, Cicero would surely have mentioned Andronicus had a seminal Peripatetic publication circulated under his name before 43 BCE, yet Cicero calls another man, Cratippus of Pergamon,176 the leading Peripatetic in Athens (Off. 1.1.1, 3.2.5; Tim. 1.1). Conversely, if Barnes (1997) is right to doubt whether Andronicus’s work made any ‘splash’ at all during his lifetime, this line of reasoning loses its

170 The ambiguity turns on the force of συνεφιλοσοφήσαμεν + dat. in ὑμεῖς τὰ Ἀριστοτέλεια; it could imply ‘as a teacher’, or ‘as a fellow-learner’.

171 On Strabo’s dates, see W. Aly, ‘Strabo (3)’, Realencyklopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft 4 (1932), 76-155.


174 It has been argued that the later Neoplatonists, such as Philoponus and Ammonius, really knew nothing about Andronicus, save what they read in the sources available to us: see L. Tarán, “Aristotelianism in the 1st century BC”, in L. Tarán, Collected Papers, Leiden/Köln/Boston 2001, pp. 479-524, in particular pp. 495-497.

175 Düring (1957), 420-25 proposes a date between 40 and 20 BCE; for earlier views see C.O. Brink in RE suppl. 7 (1940), 938.

176 On Cratippus see Moraux I, 223-56.
speculative bite; and Gottschalk (1987) casts doubt on it for other reasons. We shall return to this problem in more detail below.\footnote{In this context (De Off. 1.1, 3.2) Cicero is praising a tutor who was ‘like a father’ to his son (cf. Ad Tironem xxi): even if word of Andronicus’ work had already reached him at the time of this composition, and even if he viewed these improved texts as philosophically important, why should Cicero retail the scholarly merits of Cratippus’ contemporaries or rivals here? There is no reason to suppose that one of the greatest contemporary Peripatetics (Cicero, Tim 1.1), renowned as a teacher, would lose his mystique as soon as booksellers replaced Tyrannio’s lousy text with a better edition. The argument \textit{ex silentio} is more persuasive: but I do not see that an Andronican ‘edition’ or ‘collection’ could not have been published before 43 BCE just because Cicero fails to mention it (despite his readiness to give names); if Triclinius’ groundbreaking work on Greek tragedy and comedy, fifteen centuries later, is a fair comparandum, it could easily take decades until a critical mass of scholars – the sources of the tradition reported by Strabo and Plutarch – recognized the importance of such a work of close philology. There seem to be two variables in play: (1) when Andronicus made his collection public, and (2) when the sources of the tradition reported by Strabo and Plutarch resolved that it was a superior text, and worthy of primary attention. I return to this point below.}

Where did Andronicus do his research, after an early life presumably (on Strabo’s testimony) occupied on Rhodes? If Ammonius of Alexandria is telling an historical truth when he claims the eleventh Peripatetic ‘scholarchate’ for Andronicus,\footnote{On which see Brink (1940), 938-40; against the report, see Lynch (1972), 203-04. Barnes (2007) discusses the issues without commitment, including Littig’s simple, perhaps too simple, emendation at \textit{in An. Pr.} 31,11.} then it is possible to infer, with Gottschalk and others, that Andronicus’ activity centred around Athens. Adopting the later chronology, it has been proposed that Strabo, Andronicus, and Boethus attended the same lectures,\footnote{Düring (1957), 413, condemned by Barnes (3) as a ‘garbled invention’.} and even met as young men in Alexandria, where Strabo spent time (2.3.5); perhaps it was there that Strabo heard Tyrannio at some point in the middle forties (cf. 12.3.16). But this is pure speculation. It had at one point seemed fairly clear that Andronicus had to visit Italy in order to produce his collection, the putative ‘Roman edition’ of Aristotle. However, it is not self-evident from Plutarch’s text (\textit{Sulla} 26 = \textbf{T3}) that Andronicus obtained physical access to the copies in Sulla’s library, as Tyrannio did.

What we do learn from Plutarch’s source, speaking in \textit{oratio obliqua}, is that Andronicus had ‘ready access’ to \textit{τὰ ἀντίγραφα} from Tyrannio, and proceeded to put them \textit{εἰς μέσον}, himself writing up (\textit{ἀναγράψαι}) the catalogues current in Plutarch’s day. This language might suggest, with room for uncertainty, that Andronicus spent time in Italy; but these \textit{ἀντίγραφα} might just as well have been sent to him elsewhere, say, in Athens or even Rhodes. Following Gottschalk, one might imagine Andronicus making his copies in Italy,
and elsewhere across the Aegean, before retiring to Athens, where his epoch-making research rightly won Aristo of Alexandria – who followed him on several points of interest in the exegesis of the Categories – and Cratippus of Pergamon over from the Academy. On the other hand, if Andronicus’ research was not understood as ‘epoch-making’ or even as especially important in his own lifetime, this story is evidently less attractive.

Sources

The secondary sources discussed below extend from the first century BCE to the sixth century CE. Their focus moves from (1) biography and bibliography with Strabo and Plutarch (I BCE – I CE) to (2) psychology with Galen, Aspasius, and Themistius (I – IV CE) before coming to rest upon (3) logic and the pinakes or ‘catalogue’ with Porphyry, and the later Neoplatonists (III – VI CE).

(1) Strabo, the only contemporary source, mentions Andronicus as a ‘noteworthy’ Rhodian philosopher (14.2.13 = T1). A century later, Plutarch (Sulla 26.1-2 = T3) remarks on the reported role of Andronicus in the recovery and organization of the Aristotelian texts, completing the tale curiously left unfinished in (our text of) Strabo’s thirteenth book (13.1.64 = T2). Later, Porphyry (T7) is clearly interested in Andronicus as a bibliographer of Aristotle, and renews Strabo’s and Plutarch’s intrigue with the fate of the Aristotelian and Theophrastan library and Andronicus’ pinakes.

(2) Galen (T4) refers to an Andronican account of the soul as a ‘blend’ (χράσις) or ‘power’ of the body: as we shall see, this doctrine is plainly expressed in a Stoic context. The Christian apologist Hippolytus (T9) curiously notes Andronicus’s doctrine of ‘blending’ as an authoritative resource for the Gnostic Sethians in describing the relationship of soul to matter. Aspasius (T5) focuses on Andronicus’ account of pathos as a hupolēpsis of the soul, echoed by the pseudo-Andronican Peri Pathôn, itself a highly Stoicizing work. In the fourth century, Themistius (T10, T11) provides a first-hand quotation from Andronicus in defense of Xenocrates’ doctrine of the soul as a self-moving number. In this full paragraph Andronicus describes psychic χράσις in his own words, explaining that ‘the [self-moving] soul is the cause of the blend’ of ‘the primary elements in accordance with specific ratios and numbers’.

180 Gottschalk 1095, citing Index Acad. Herc. 35, 8ff., p. 110ff f. Mekler with Mekler’s notes ad loc. for the story that Aristo and Cratippus went over from the Academy to the Peripatos around 60 BCE. See appendix of texts under Aristo of Alexandria for his views on the Relative.
(3) Alexander of Aphrodisias (T6), with later sources such as Ammonius (T13) and Philoponus (T16), takes an interest in Andronicus’ opinion, evidently unique in antiquity, that the De Interpretatione was not written by Aristotle. Porphyry famously develops an abiding interest in the Categories, and in this he seems to have taken his cue from Andronicus. Indeed A. is quoted in Porphyry’s Commentary by Question and Answer (125.22 = T8); and Porphyry’s full Commentary on the Categories must have contained many more references, to judge by the vast array of named citations in Simplicius (collected in T14). The de Divisione of Boethius, which draws on an essay by Porphyry in his Sophist commentary, cites Andronicus and may be modeled on an Andronican publication of the same name (Andronici... de diuisione liber editus, T16a).

We know that Iamblichus followed Porphyry’s lead in commenting on the Categories, and a notice in Simplicius indicates that Iamblichus ‘followed Andronicus’ in at least one point of exegesis (T14h). Simplicius himself offers the most prolific preserved resource for Andronican doxography in his own Commentary on the Categories; Simplicius appears to be heavily dependent on Porphyry, and the names of Andronicus and Boethus do not frequently occur except in Porphyry’s company. The later Neoplatonists, including John Philoponus (T16) and Ammonius, offer some biographical details that have been doubted due to their late date, including Andronicus’s putative scholarchate and his relationship to Boethus of Sidon.

Works

Publication and Catalogue of the corpus Aristotelicum

The available sources for Andronicus’s publication and pinakes can be read with varying results depending on the outlook of the commentator. Jonathan Barnes’s skepticism about the sources is surely healthy,181 and sounds a cautionary note about the preconceptions latent in the earlier consensus broadly shared (with some differences) by Gottschalk, Düring and Moraux. The present treatment will focus rather narrowly on identifying the influence, if any, of Andronicus’s alleged publication on subsequent interpreters of the Categories, and especially upon several of the key commentators belonging to the subsequent century – Boethus, Lucius, and Athenodorus.

However, a broader survey of the general problems, however speculative, is a prerequisite to make headway on the specific questions associated with the *Categories*, and to establish how the early ‘historical’ texts about Andronicus (especially T2-T3 and T7) might be read usefully in combination with the ‘philosophical’ reports of the later commentators in *Cat*.

The present discussion is therefore divided into two sections: the first will survey the general sources for Andronicus’s ‘publication’ and *pinakes*, with critical discussion, and the second will offer an assessment of the evidence within the narrower confines of the reception of the *Categories*.

1. Sources and discussion

Despite Barnes’s salutary recent reminder of the poverty of the direct evidence, the ‘legend’ of Andronicus’ formative collection, publication, and organisation of Aristotle and Theophrastus must have begun somewhere. Like so much of our information about the first-century Peripatetics, this particular story may have gained currency with Porphyry (*Vita Plotini* 24), who tells us that ‘Andronicus, the Peripatetic, divided the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus into treatises (πράγματείας), collecting related material (τὰς οἰκείας ὑποθέσεις) into the same [place]’ (T7), and that Porphyry himself followed suit in his edition of Plotinus. Barnes, reasonably enough, keeps Porphyry waiting ‘in the wings’ while he tackles the earlier sources such as Strabo and Plutarch, but he also introduces *Vita Plotini* 24 as ‘the text upon which Andronicus’s reputation as the founder of modern Aristotelian scholarship ultimately rests’ (37).

It takes at least three separate but overlapping pieces of testimony to establish the ‘orthodox’ narrative of Andronicus as the individual responsible for the first reliable publication of Aristotle’s school works, and, by extension, as the individual who deserves credit for the first-century revitalization of the Peripatos. These are Porphyry’s evidence (T7), coupled with Strabo’s report that the Hellenistic Peripatos lacked Aristotle’s school treatises until the first century (T1), when they were inundated by damaged and inferior copies, and Plutarch’s addition (T2) that ‘the Rhodian Andronicus, gaining ready access from Tyrannio to the copies, made [them] public (εἰς μέσον θεῖναι), and composed the catalogues that are now in circulation (τοὺς νῦν φερομένους πίνακας)’. The later tradition took the same line, presumably following Porphyry; but there is a reasonable argument, as Tarán observes, for tracing the later Neoplatonic reports back to the same brief textual notices now in our
possession, namely, T1-2 and T7, or something very much like them. These notices might bear multiple interpretations.

There are several reasons not to dismiss Strabo’s tale of the Hellenistic history of the ‘library’ itself as a fabrication. Some of its essentials are independently ratified. Neleus did take possession of the books of Theophrastus, according to the latter’s will (Diog. Laert. 5.53); and according to Andronicus’ countryman Posidonius (ap. Athenaeum 5.214d, if the attribution is correct), Apellicon did purchase some ‘library of Aristotle’ several centuries later. Moreover, the Arabic translation of Ptolemy’s catalogue of Aristotle, which may be a kind of digest of Andronicus’ pinakes, refers to a collection of books ‘found in the house of a man called Apellicon’, perhaps, with Barnes, as a section title.

Posidonius, as preserved by Athenaeus, may be the source of the entire story reported by Strabo and Plutarch. On the other hand, Athenaeus himself claims elsewhere that Neleus sold his books to Ptolemy for the Library at Alexandria (1.3a), which is difficult to reconcile with the ‘Posidonian’ tale. Perhaps, as Gottschalk suggests (1085), Athenaeus tried to harmonize Strabo’s story with a different tradition that recalled Ptolemy purchasing the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus in Rhodes and Athens, in a way that would maintain the pre-eminence of Alexandria itself. Alternatively, there may have been two ‘libraries’ in play. Neleus, perhaps, sold Aristotle’s βιβλία to Ptolemy, but kept Aristotle’s own writings aside; or perhaps it was Aristotle’s ‘exoterica’ that circulated, while Neleus managed to maintain a portion of the collection, comprising the unpublished esoterica that allegedly vanished into the underground of Skepsis. (Admittedly this is not directly supported by either source).

In either case, it may strain the bounds of credibility that all of the original texts of Aristotle’s lectures were lost, as Strabo indicates, and that the intellectual treasury of the Lyceum was borne away in a single copy. The ‘letter of Aristotle to Alexander’ preserved by Aulus

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182 The Arabic text itself suggests that the author composed the pinakes from memory, as his copy of Andronicus was not to hand – from which it is reasonable, though not necessary, to infer that the author’s catalogue is loosely based on Andronicus’s own.


Gellius (20.5; cf. Plezia 1961, 42 and 127), presumably circulated by Andronicus himself among the ‘letters of Aristotle’, suggests that someone thought the esoterica were circulating during Aristotle’s lifetime, and that *Andronicus* credited this report with authenticity.\(^{185}\) Stahr’s and Zeller’s collections of the evidence for Hellenistic reading of the Aristotelian works\(^{186}\) coupled with Barnes’ careful survey, agree that several of the school treatises, including the books now collected as the Analytics, were available to read in several locations under the Hellenistic kingdoms, including Rhodes. Hermippus, working at Alexandria, had enough material to compile a catalogue of Theophrastus’ œuvre (see fr. 54 Wehrli). Diogenes Laertius also records the contents of a Hellenistic catalogue of Aristotle including logic, rhetoric and ethics (5.22-27, and 42-50). Notably that earlier catalogue demonstrates a different organization than our ‘standard’ edition.\(^{187}\)

About what information, then, can we be confident? (1) It is reasonably uncontroversial that a copy of the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus passed to Neleus, as Strabo suggests, bolstered by the circumstantial support of Theophrastus’ reported will; this should have happened before the 270s BCE. (2) It is also uncontroversial that a copy of the works of the school came down to an Apellicon of Teos in Athens, sometime around 90 BCE. (3) Finally, it is reasonably uncontroversial that the Rhodian Andronicus published a copy of the works of the school some decades later in the first century BCE, accompanied (presumably, though not necessarily, at the same time) by a significant catalogue (πίνακες) that had displaced its Hellenistic predecessor or predecessors by the lifetime of Plutarch, and would win the respect of Porphyry in the third century.

It is on the interstices between these three events that criticism centres. There are no obvious reasons to doubt the reports themselves – the will of Theophrastus bequeathing books to Neleus, the purchase of the books of Neleus for Alexandria, the sale of an Aristotelian library to Apellicon in the first century – but perhaps a fictional fabric of continuity has been woven

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\(^{185}\) cf. Gottschalk (1088) and M. Plezia, *Aristotelis Epistularum fragmenta cum Testamento* (Warsaw, 1961), 42f., 127 ff. Of course, as Peter Adamson has kindly pointed out to me, we can hardly rule out the possibility that Andronicus invented some of the letters himself.

\(^{186}\) Stahr, Aristotelia II, 92 and following, and Zeller, II.2, 144 and following, with references, collect the evidence for Hellenistic citations of the treatises; Gottschalk (1085) points out that many of those held to have consulted the school-treatises were old enough to have done so at the Lyceum before their removal to Skepsis.

to relate them, positing that all three report the history of a single collection of books, the autograph of the first Peripatetic Masters. Such a fabric would, after all, make the story far more interesting, and provide narrative continuity. On the assumption that a single library was involved, some original source of Strabo’s story may have asked: what happened during the long gap between Neleus’ receipt of the books and their appearance in the hands of Apellicon of Teos two centuries later? If one knew something of Neleus’ reported family history, or was aware that the texts purchased by Apellicon were full of holes, or had some polemical axe to grind against the Attalids, one could easily come up with a clever story such as the romantic ‘tunnel’ of Strabo, where the scrolls were hidden away to protect them from prying Pergamene eyes. On the other hand, if one were keen to promote the scholarly prestige of Alexandria, as Gottschalk suggests that Athenaeus was, one might well imply that it was these very books, the autographs of Aristotle himself, that were purchased by Ptolemy from Neleus and employed to produce the well-known Alexandrian catalogues of Aristotle and Theophrastus.

The catalogue of Ptolemy, which now survives only in the Arabic version ascribed to ‘Ptolemy the unknown’, lends some report to the story. At no. 92, AB p. 230 (see Düring, incl. commentary p. 245), Andronicus himself – again, on the assumption that the digest of Ptolemy is a decent representation of Andronicus’s catalogue – appears to include a heading ‘Books found in the library of a man called Apellicon’. If Strabo’s source constructed a romance in which Apellicon’s mysterious scrolls represented, not just a few tattered pages of dubious provenance, but the long-lost autograph of the Master, then Andronicus’ possession of copies of these same texts would serve to explain the superiority of his publication. In reality, one might suggest, Andronicus was a capable Aristotelian scholar and philologist who collated many extant copies from around the Mediterranean, including copies of works then regarded as not particularly interesting, or mingled with spuria, and produced a text which came to be accepted as superior in the fullness of the next century. But this, it seems to me, would be to grant that it really was the quality of the texts, particularly in the modern sense of an editio princeps, that got Andronicus’s generation and its successors excited about his publication; in reality, what evidence we have suggests that the later tradition, including Porphyry and the second-century Peripatetic Herminus, found Andronicus readings to be less

188 On Düring’s view, this embraces certain items (93-99), which are not particularly interesting and not philosophical; the heading may refer to books found only in Apellicon’s library.
authoritative than what they read as the paradosis (cf. Porphyry ap. Simplicium, in Cat. 30.3 = T14c; Simplicius in Phys. 440.13 = T15a).

In fact, the entire story of Sulla’s capture of the texts from Athens could be a fabrication. Our fabricator, perhaps, knew that Andronicus collaborated with the grammarian Tyrannio in Rome before producing his edition. How did they get hold of the ‘library of Aristotle’? Apellicon was in Athens; the great general Sulla sacked Athens shortly after he procured the collection, and brought spoils back to Rome; any reader of Cicero knows about Sulla’s library; Sulla is the obvious candidate to have taken the books to Rome, and his library the ideal place for them to have languished for several decades longer. If this particular part of the story was mere romantic invention, it would readily explain why Cicero never mentioned these seminal tomes lurking in his friend’s library; perhaps they were never there at all. For that matter, it would readily explain why Strabo never mentions Andronicus in connection with his Skepsis story. Like the rest of the story, there are several genuine events that have been linked together by bright imagination. Such a line of criticism would father such inventions on Strabo’s and Plutarch’s sources. In fact, Plutarch was accused of some such invention by Diels and Susemihl (1879), focusing on Andronicus’ work in Rome.\(^{189}\) Perhaps the best testimony against such a skeptical line is the mention of Apellicon in the catalogue of Ptolemy the Unknown, but this too is susceptible to skepticism.

Was there anything original about Andronicus’s publication? Other testimony seems to imply that the esoterica were available in some form before Andronicus – for example, Philodemus provides fairly good reasons to believe that Epicurus read some *Analytics* of Aristotle,\(^{190}\) and Andronicus himself preserves the so-called ‘letter of Alexander’ claiming that Aristotle had published the *Metaphysics* in some form – if Andronicus held that letter to be authentic, presumably he himself could not have claimed originality for his publication of the *Metaphysics*. Barnes (50-63) demonstrates the difficulty of relying on the *structure* of various texts to show the importance of the Andronican publication; there is no evidence, Barnes argues, that Andronicus played a major role in the formation of the *Physics* (cf. Simplic. 924,18, 1036,18, on the seventh book); it appears that a *Rhetoric* like ours was available before Andronicus, and Cicero writes of Antonius reading Τόποι in the 90s BC (*de


\(^{190}\) Philodemus in P. Herc. 1005, fr. 111.
Orat. 2.36.152); Cicero himself clearly knew the Topics (Topica 1.1) in some form, possibly directly.

2. Assessment

The interest in Andronicus’s originality as an editor (in the sense of producing something like an editio princeps by collating manuscripts) may be a modern invention, not unreasonably drawn from Strabo and Plutarch. The ancient tradition demonstrates no special interest in Andronicus’s activity as an editor, aside from what Strabo licenses us to infer. (On the contrary, Porphyry and Simplicius tend to brush off ‘Andronican’ readings that are contrary to their paradigms).

An example of modern embellishment might perhaps be spotted in the Loeb translation of one key passage in Plutarch (T3): ‘The greater part of the collection passed through the hands of Tyrannion the grammarian, and Andronicus the Rhodian, having through his means the command of numerous copies (εὐπορήσαντα τῶν ἀντιγράφων), made the treatises public’. But the Greek εὐπορήσαντα τῶν ἀντιγράφων does not need to say anything about the numerousness of copies available, which, in the English translation, might lead us to infer that the availability of multiple manuscripts was somehow relevant to the quality of the publication. Rather, τὰ ἀντίγραφα are presumably exactly those copies made from Tyrannion’s single set of (tattered) originals, which were just mentioned; and εὐπορήσαντα could merely refer to the fact that Andronicus possessed ready and convenient access to those copies (unlike earlier Peripatetics), not that he had a great quantity of copies to compare. Barnes’s careful critique of the view that Andronicus produced an authoritative text, then, certainly removes a modern layer of interpretation, by showing that Andronicus’s enterprise did not necessarily presage that of Immanuel Bekker. For Plutarch in T3, it is the information that Andronicus made the texts widely available (εἰς μέσον θείναι) and that his catalogue became current (τοὺς νῦν φερομένους πίνακας) that deserves attention, not the readings in the text and how he arrived at them.

Porphyry’s testimony (T7) provides more detailed and direct information about Andronicus’s process. Thus from Porphyry’s famous observation that Andronicus τὰ Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ Θεοφράστου εἰς πραγματείας διείλε τὰς οἰκείας ὑποθέσεις εἰς ταύτων συναγαγόν,

191 For example, Porphyry seems to have brushed off the authority of Andronicus’s text in a critical passage of the Categories (T14c), preferring the authority of the second-century Peripatetic Herminus ‘and just about everyone else’. Simplicius in Phys. 440.13 = T15b notes an Andronican reading (if that is what the comment amounts to) as a curiosity, upon which Andronicus built an innovative but unusual interpretation of one lemma.
and that Porphyry himself (at least partly) followed Andronicus’s model in his own publication of Plotinus’s *Enneads*, it has sometimes been inferred that Andronicus was responsible for ‘pulling together’ the *books* of, say, the *Metaphysics* or the *Topics* or the *Physics* into their current collected form as free-standing works, perhaps adding cross-references and bridge passages for coherence. But Barnes has effectively undermined that hypothesis as well, which similarly seems to be a relatively modern layer on the tale. It is certainly not self-evident that this is what Porphyry means. What Porphyry himself did in the *Enneads* was not, in any case, to *invent* treatises by pulling together previously unrelated material and adding bridge passages or cross-references, but simply (as he himself claims) to pull self-contained treatises into the same collection, wherever he believed they contained similar subject-matter, and within each collection to organize the treatises in such a way that easier or ‘lighter’ material came first (ἐκαστῇ δὲ ἐννεάδι τὰ οἰκεῖα φέρων συνεφόρησα δοῦς καὶ τάξιν πρώτην τοῖς ἐλαφροτέροις προβλήμασιν, 24.14-16).

This final point, I think, deserves somewhat greater emphasis: giving τάξιν πρώτην τοῖς ἐλαφροτέροις προβλήμασιν, the starting position to the lighter material, is also the reasoning that Porphyry endorses in explaining the location of the *Categories* at the outset of the Aristotelian curriculum (*in Cat. 59,21-22*), and the argument that Porphyry provides for the introductory nature of his own *Isagoge* (1,8-9) as a precursor to the study of categories (εἰς τὴν τῶν παρὰ Αριστοτέλει κατηγοριῶν διδασκάλιαν, 1,2-3). As Porphyry says that he followed this principle on Andronicus’s authority, and Porphyry himself applies it to the *Categories*, we might speculate that Andronicus took a similar line in the organisation of the Aristotelian corpus, and that his argument for the location of the *Categories* in the reading of Aristotle provided impetus to this tradition; indeed, we are told elsewhere that Andronicus argued for the introductory role of logic (*T16*), although we do not know exactly how he argued.

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192 Barnes also suggests that Porphyry’s own method was not to ‘invent’ treatises as Andronicus is supposed to have ‘invented’ the *Metaphysics* by ὑποθέσεις εἰς ταὐτὸν συναγαγών. (Of course, in a different sense that answers to the other half of Andronicus’s alleged activity, εἰς προγματείας διείλε, one might argue that Porphyry did invent treatises). Thus, for example, Porphyry seems to have split the longer treatises of Plotinus such as *On the Soul*, and indeed 6.1-3 *On the Genera of Being*, into separate books – perhaps in order to arrive at the number of fifty-four individual works. Perhaps we should understand that Andronicus found *pragmatai* with divisions that struck him as nonsensical, and organised them to have more rational partitions.
For our purposes, then, we can leave aside the attractive touches of Andronicus the editor and the compositor of the *Metaphysics*, and focus on his status as a publisher and a cataloguer, but perhaps most importantly an organiser, of the corpus. The primary texts do seem to permit some inferences about the influence of an Andronican ‘publication’, but that influence appears to have to had (relatively) little to do with the readings that Andronicus chose, or with the internal structuring of pragmateiai made up of multiple books, like the *Topics* and *Metaphysics*. Rather, what seems to have been most influential is the order in which Andronicus presented the works of Aristotle, and the arguments that Andronicus made in favour of that order.

Andronicus certainly published a catalogue (πίνακες) of the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus. We can, I think, take a confident line not merely about the existence of this catalogue, but about its material influence. It accompanied a publication that Plutarch recognized as the source of ‘the copies now current’ on the cusp of the second century, and this is just the kind of point that a polymathic, well-travelled scholar like Plutarch should be able to advise us on. More than a century later, Andronicus’ stylistic example was followed by Porphyry – and presented, as the VP passage implies, in order to underwrite and justify Porphyry’s own approach to the *Enneads*. The passage of Ptolemy the Unknown, however else we may put it to use, shows that a catalogue carrying Andronicus’s name possessed ‘canonical’ status in Ptolemy’s lifetime (whenever that might have been), and that it was not like the Hellenistic catalogue preserved by Diogenes Laertius (5.22-27).

More specifically, we can infer from later reports that Andronicus’s catalogue opened with the Organon, and that here, or elsewhere, Andronicus provided some justifications for the position of ‘logic’ at the propylaea of Aristotelian studies (cf. T16, T23); this organization of the corpus was also to prove influential. Indeed, it was one area where the later tradition, including Porphyry and the Neoplatonists, favoured Andronicus’s view over that of his ‘pupil’ Boethus (cf. T16), who recommended commencing the study of Aristotle with physics. As we have at least some evidence that Andronicus felt the need to argue for the usefulness and importance of logic in his effort to build an Aristotelian ‘system’ based on the corpus (with T16 and T23, cf. the proem to Boethius’s *De Div.*), we may infer that this was

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193 The catalogue had at least five books, if not more (see Ptolemy, no. 95, at Düring 230; but cp. Baffiori 101 for a different version); Littig ii.18-25 offers a reconstruction, and Plezia 16-35 studies it in detail, as does Moraux i. 58-94.
not taken for granted, and that Andronicus played something of an original role in asserting (or reasserting) the importance of logic in Peripateticism, and of Peripatetic logic in general. This would be supported by the evidence that Andronicus paid special attention to the *Categories*, if this is not merely an artifact of the later sources.  

It is sometimes pointed out – *against* the enduring influence of the ‘Andronican’ ordering of the corpus – that the *De Interpretatione* appears in the later catalogues and discussions, but was athetised by Andronicus (cf. T6, T13, T18-19). Yet such an argument appears to assume that Andronicus’s athetisation entailed the deletion of the work from his catalogue, a kind of *damnatio memoriae*. It seems to me much more likely that the *De Int.* was accompanied by a marginal siglum in the Andronicus catalogue pointing the reader to discussion of Andronicus’s view that someone other than Aristotle had written the work (and in this discussion, presumably, Andronicus explained how the author of the *De Int.* cross-referenced a *De Anima* that did not appear to be the *De Anima* he published under the name of Aristotle). We know that these *pinakes* of Andronicus included titles, *capita*, and comments on authenticity; it is presumably here that Andronicus questioned the *De Interpretatione*. Later scholars could perfectly well continue to use Andronicus’s catalogue whilst ignoring (or rebutting) his associated comments against the *De Int.*

Moreover, although Andronicus suspected that the *De Interpretatione* was by some other philosopher, there is no evidence that he thought there was something *wrong* with it, or held its contents to be somehow philosophically suspect. He simply doubted that Aristotle wrote it. But Andronicus was not a man to suppose that Aristotle had all the answers when it came to Aristotelian logic. We have multiple examples of Andronicus’s efforts to improve and

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194 We are aware that Andronicus provided a ‘paraphrase’ of the *Categories* (so Porphyry via Simplicius: T14b, T14c), and we are not directly aware of any other such ‘paraphrases’; this may merely be an accident of preservation, but in other cases where Andronican ‘readings’ are cited, such as the *Physics* (cf. Simplic. *in Phys.* 440,13 = T15a) it appears that Andronicus has offered a reading of the Aristotelian text rather than an interpretive paraphrase. This too might suggest some special concern with logic.

innovate on Aristotle’s ideas, especially in the *Categories*.\(^\text{196}\) And we have some evidence that Andronicus sought to distinguish himself from the ‘earlier’ Peripatos in the field of logic;\(^\text{197}\) moreover, he held strong views about the way in which the Organon should be organised in order to present a coherent and systematic picture of Peripatetic logic. Indeed, setting aside the notice that Andronicus believed someone other than Aristotle had written the *De Interpretatione*, we have every reason to suppose that Andronicus is the source, or at least the proximate source, of the ordering *Categories–De Int.–Prior Analytics–Posterior Analytics–Topics* that turns up in the catalogue of Ptolemy and is assumed by the Neoplatonists, and similarly that Andronicus endorsed or originated the associated pedagogical view that the Organon systematically builds from Terms to Propositions to Syllogisms to Demonstrations.\(^\text{198}\) Andronicus felt sufficiently strongly about this organization to argue against those who would place the *Categories* before the *Topics*, a view which, he felt, had caused the postpraedicamenta to be appended (wrongly) to the *Categories* in the first place (see *T14za*).

All in all, Andronicus’s most lasting influence appears to reside in his organisation of the corpus Aristotelicum – that is, the order in which he placed the works, and the *account* that he gave of why they belong in that order. Perhaps we can press this further to include the account that he may have given of how they produce a coherent *system* in that order. His views on how the texts should be read relative to each another appear to have been far more influential than his views about specific readings in any given text, or even the correct attribution and authenticity of the *De Interpretatione* or the postpraedicamenta to the

\(^{196}\) For example, he famously replaced Aristotle’s categories of Where and When by Place and Time (*T14f*, *T14w*, *T14y*). He added a fifth kind of quality to Aristotle’s own list (*T14r*). He seems to have suggested – if this is not a textual criticism but a philosophical point – that Aristotle could have expressed himself more clearly at *Cat*. 6a37, as his extant definition of the relative is circular (*T14n-o*). All of these innovations sparked defenses of Aristotle by Andronicus’s successors, especially Boethus.

\(^{197}\) In the opening to Boethius’s *De Div.*, Andronicus is cited as remarking on the value and *utilitas* of logic, and (see discussion in Magee) he *may* be seen as the source of criticism of ‘earlier Peripatetics’ for failing to differentiate accidents, on the one hand, from genera and species and differentiae, on the other hand. Indeed, throughout Boethius’s *De Div.* everything is divided into a *per se* and *secundum accidens* dichotomy, a point that *may* be fruitfully compared to Andronicus’s view that the ten categories can be reduced to something like substance and accident.

\(^{198}\) Thus Andronicus seems to have argued, against some unnamed predecessor, that the *Categories* should not come immediately before the *Topics* (cf. Simplic. *in Cat*. 379.9-11 = *T14za*), and for reasons we discuss below, he seems to have placed the *Categories* at the outset of the curriculum. See below for further discussion.
Categories. Due to the emphasis that Porphyry, and so the successors of Porphyry, placed on the Categories itself, we have the best evidence for Andronicus’s approach to the Cat. as opposed to, say, the Topics. Certainly some of his contemporaries seem to have followed his lead in certain respects, as did Ariston and perhaps ‘Archytas’ on the redefinition of relation (T14n-o) and Eudorus on the replacement of Where and When by Place and Time (206,10 and following). In these cases, however, it may be difficult to tell who is influencing whom. Nonetheless, these cases may reflect Andronicus’s own interest in the Cat., if indeed he carried the Categories to the head of the curriculum in order to create a systematic progression. Why it was that Andronicus took a special interest in logic is not yet clear, and perhaps cannot be demonstrated; but we can tentatively infer his influence in this respect, his organization of the corpus, if in no other.

De Divisione

Quam magnos studiosis afferat fructus scientia diuidendi quamque apud peripateticam disciplinam semper haec fuerit in honore notitia, docet et Andronicus, diligentissimi senis de diuisione liber editus; et hic idem a Plotino grauissimo philosopho comprobatus et in libri Platonis, qui Sophistes inscribitur commentariis a Porphyrio repetitus, et ab eodem per hanc introductionis laudata in Categorias utilitas. Dicit enim necessarium fore generis, speciei, differentiae, proprii, accidentisque peritiam, cum propter alia multa tum propter utilitatem quae est maxima partiendo. (Boethius, De Divisione, Proem = T16a)

Boethius’s monograph On Division begins with a short notice about ‘Andronicus the Peripatetic’, an ‘ancient’ and and exceedingly ‘careful’ philosopher (senis... diligentissimus) who also published (editus) a book On Division (4,3-11 = T16a). Boethius takes Andronicus as his authority for the usefulness of the science he will expound (quam magnos studiosis afferat fructus scientia diuidendi, 4,3) and for its enduring value in the ‘Peripatetic’ tradition (quamque apud peripateticam disciplinam semper haec fuerit in honore notitia). According to Boethius, Andronicus’s book was praised by Plotinus and adapted by Porphyry in his own

199 With Szlezak (1972), we find that ‘Archytas’ relies on several points that (to our knowledge) originate with Andronicus. For instance, he and Ariston both follow Andronicus’s apparent redefinition of Relation (Simplicius 202,2 = T14n-o). In other respects, however, ‘Archytas’ differs from Andronicus: he does not place the category of Relation last, but rather fourth.

200 On which see the introduction of Magee, especially ‘Boethius, Porphyry and Andronicus’, and notes to the prologue and final lines of the work. It is also studied by Plezia 10-15, 44-6 and Moraux i.120-32. Littig (ii.12-15), followed by Plezia, argues that Boethius’ Div. was not only an homage to, but also closely modeled on, the work of Andronicus. In fact, if there appears to be Stoicism at work in the De Div., Andronicus may have been influenced by Posidonius (Littig iii.10).

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commentary on the *Sophist*; indeed, Porphyry’s essay is almost surely the source for Boethius’s knowledge of Andronicus and for the main contents of the *De Div.* (see Magee, Plezia, Moraux, Littig, cited above).

Moreover, Littig (iii.10) had suggested that Andronicus may be the original model for the entire work, a view that Moraux and Magee have argued against. Nonetheless, the proem establishes that Andronicus provided some kind of a model for Porphyry’s essay on division in the latter’s *Sophist* commentary, and Boethius in turn used Porphyry’s essay to construct his own. There must be some Andronicus in Boethius – at the least, we can assume that the arguments for the value of the science of division for ‘the Peripatos’, associated with Andronicus at the beginning of the work, express his genuine views.

We cannot be certain about the degree to which the *De Div.* of Boethius is informative about its Andronican predecessor. We can, however, make one point about the general doctrine set out in the book. The proem, likely drawing on Andronicus himself via Porphyry, indicates that ‘earlier’ (perhaps pre-Andronican) Peripatetics had failed to make a sufficiently clear distinction between the two major kinds of division under discussion, *per se* and *secundum accidens*; a distinction that ‘later’ Peripatetics noted, and corrected their predecessors. This might suggest that the central concept of the *De Div.*, that is, the strong emphasis on this bipartition of *per se* and *secundum accidens*, does go back to Andronicus. The terminology of ‘earlier’ and ‘later’ Peripatetics may have particular relevance to Andronicus’s own role; compare Aspasius in *EN*. 44.20 and following, where ‘earlier’ and ‘later’ seems to mean pre-Andronican and post-Andronican, and explicitly makes Andronicus and Boethus ‘later’.

This evidence might be compared to another fragment that we will study below (Simplicius, *in Cat.* 63,22-28 = T14e), where we learn that Andronicus believed the ten categories might

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201 It is on this ground that the book *De Div.* seeks to render an account of the science of ‘division’. In a core passage (6,17-8,2), division is itself divided into two forms, (A) *per se* and (B) *secundum accidens*. These two forms are then respectively broken down further, as (A) (i) genus into species, (ii) whole into parts, (iii) verbal expression into significations, and as (B) (iv) subject into accidents, (v) accident into subjects, (vi) accident into accidents.

202 Magee notes that the distinction of ‘earlier’ and ‘later’ Peripatetics could hardly go back to Andronicus himself, if he means to refer to himself as a ‘later’ Peripatetic. But this does not seem entirely clear; certainly later sources refer to Andronicus as a ‘later’ Peripatetic (*τὸν δὲ ὑστερὸν Ἀνδρόνικον*, Aspasius, *in Eth.* 44,18-45,5 = T5), and he need not have used the word ‘later’, *husteron*, simply to distinguish himself from ‘earlier’ Peripatetics.
be reduced to just two groups, namely ‘by itself’ (kath’ hauto) and ‘relative’ (pros ti). In that passage, Andronicus is (puzzlingly) named alongside Xenocrates, an Old Academic, while Simplicius compares a similar bipartition into substance and accident, respectively analogous to kath’ hauto and pros ti. We also encounter various examples of Andronicus pointing to problems caused (perhaps) by an apparent failure to sufficiently distinguish genera, species, and differentiae, on the one hand, from accidents, on the other (e.g., T14d). Combining these testimonies, we might infer that Andronicus made some comment to the effect that all ten modes of predication need to be clearly distinguished into the kath’ hauto and pros ti, lest one fall into the errors of the ‘earlier’ Peripatetics.

Possibly an immediate source for this division in Andronicus is Aristotle himself, in passages like Met. 5.6, 1015b16 and 5.7, 1017a7, where he appears to distinguish predication kath’ hauto from predication kata sumbebekos, and points to the example of the ‘musical’ as something that can take on another property kath’ allo. Plato in the Sophist (255C12-D7) appears to be the ultimate source for the twofold division of beings along these lines:

\[\text{Visitor: But I think you’ll agree that among beings, some are said by themselves (kath’ haute), but some are always said in relation to other things (pros alla).... but the different is always in relation to another...}\]

Thus it is quite appropriate that Porphyry’s discussion of Andronicus’s position on division (and perhaps of Xenocrates’s as well) should have occurred in his commentary on the Sophist. We also know that this passage of the Sophist was read in antiquity (e.g. by Eudemus, ap. Simplic. in Phys. 99.25-31) as a locus classicus for the distinction between substances and accidents.

Porphyry, then, may have picked up Andronicus’s remarks and noted Andronicus’s view both in his Categories commentary and in his essay on division in the Sophist. In further circumstantial support of this, we might point to a passage of Alexander on the Metaphysics (in Met. 242,15-16 and 243,3), where the bipartition of substance and accident is said to be the ‘first division’ found in the Categories (τῇ πρώτῃ διαιρέσει τῶν ἐν Κατηγορίαις).

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I discuss the preserved fragments of Andronicus on this question below.

**Categories (‘paraphrase’)***

We also know of a paraphrase of the *Categories*, which will be investigated in more depth below. One reliable fact about Andronicus, upon which the sources agree, was his focus upon the *Categories* as a foundational text of Aristotelian studies, and his work to make it, and Aristotelian logic in general, more comprehensible and systematic. Plotinus, judging from Simplicius 270.2 and 347.19, appears to have respected Andronicus’s treatment, and Simplicius himself refers to it at length (cf. Plezia 6-10); it is not mentioned in Simplicius’s full ‘honour roll’ (Barnes) at 1,3-2.29, where the limelight is won by Boethus, and when Andronicus is mentioned with others he does not have first place (63.21, 159.32, 202.1-5, 203.4). Simplicius calls this a *paraphrasis* (26.17-20), a fairly generic term, and ‘Andronicus the paraphrasist’ contrasts with ‘Boethus the exegete’ at 30.3-5. It is not clear whether this paraphrase included the *postpraedicamenta*, which Andronicus is said to have athetized (see below); but as I have suggested above, Andronicus does not appear to have doubted that the postpraedicamenta were *by* Aristotle, merely whether they belonged where he found them.

It may be possible that Andronicus made some of his critical or corrective comments about the *Categories* in his paraphrasis – where he found Aristotle’s language ambiguous (*T14n-o*) or insufficiently precise (*T14d*), for example, he may have offered an alternative and remarked on the need for the alteration. However, the comments on the text that we find in Simplicius could just as well come from a commentary that Simplicius does not mention.

**Spuria**

Also ascribed to Andronicus are a first-century or second-century CE study inscribed *On Affections* (*Περὶ Παθῶν*, ed. Thirry, 1977) and a much later, Renaissance text inscribed with his name. Thirry discusses the authorship of the *Περὶ Παθῶν* in detail, and as we shall see below, the tradition demonstrates a very real interest in Andronicus’s ‘pathology’. Despite the apparent inauthenticity of the *Περὶ Παθῶν*, Andronicus does appear to have offered a real definition of παθός that attracted the attention of later philosophers, discussed below (Aspasius, *in Eth.* 44-45), and made favorable remarks about Xenocrates’ definition of the soul (*ap. Themistium in de an.* 32,23).
3. Andronicus of Rhodes

Michael Griffin

The *Peri pathôn* can be divided into two parts (cf. Thesleff and Gottschalk, 1130 and Moraux, 138 and following), the first a catalogue of passions and the *eupatheiai* that the Stoic sage might feel, and a longer section of virtues and vices. The first part seems thoroughly Stoic; the second a mixture of Peripatetic and Stoic material. First in the second part comes the chapter on the virtues, with lists of Stoic definitions; next a chapter entitled *Kata Chrysippon*, giving Chrysippus’s definitions of phronesis and subordinate virtues (though this is omitted in the oldest MSS and bracketed by Glibert-Thirry: it states that *aretê* is a mean, giving a reference to EN 2 at c. 2-6).

*Letters of Aristotle*

Andronicus appears to have included a number of ‘Aristotelian’ letters in his edition, including the famous letter of ‘Aristotle to Alexander’ (Aulus Gellius 20.5; cf. Plut. *Alex.* 7, 668bc, with Simplicius *in Ph.* 8,21-9). Olympiodorus (6,11-13 = T21) indicates that Andronicus and Artemon ‘collected’ these letters; the text of Ptolemy the Unknown (no. 96) suggests that Andronicus actually found these letters himself. In any event, if he included them in his collection it follows that he (almost certainly) viewed them as genuine witnesses. As these letters suppose the publication of various Aristotelian esoterica during Aristotle’s own lifetime, Andronicus might well have believed that such contemporary publications really existed.

*Philosophy*

Simplicius (*in Cat.* = T14) is our key source for Andronicus’ paraphrase of, and comments on, the *Categories*. Andronicus does not play a very prominent role in the commentary as a whole, particularly in contrast to Boethus of Sidon; his paraphrase is frequently adduced early on to support certain points against critics of the *Categories*, and later Andronicus’ more unorthodox views are expressed and sometimes challenged.

In the present survey, I would like to explore two general themes: (1) Andronicus’s account of the *Categories* as a work concerning dialectical technique, specifically the ‘division’ of absolute and relative; (2) Andronicus’s interest in the relationship of incorporeal entities (including *logoi* and ‘soul’) with corporeal entities.
1. The Categories and Division

1.1. Absolute and Relative

Simplicius remarks that the circles of Xenocrates and of Andronicus204 ‘seem to include all things’ in the opposition ‘by itself’ and ‘relative’ (πάντα τῷ καθ’ αὑτὸ καὶ τῷ πρὸς τι περιλαμβάνειν δοκοῦσιν), making the number of ten genera superfluous [63,22 and following = T14e]. T14e occurs in the context of a discussion of thinkers who have found the ten categories superfluous in number, and Simplicius may appear to imply that Andronicus reduced the ten to two; however, there is no outright statement that he did so.

The distancing verb δοκοῦσιν also indicates that this is not necessarily a point made by Andronicus explicitly, but rather an interpretation of his words by Simplicius or a source, perhaps a reader such as Porphyry. Perhaps, then, there need be no direct contradiction with a later passage [342,23 = T14w] where Andronicus is said to have ‘preserved the number of ten categories’;205 that is, Andronicus might well have defended (or at least accepted) the number of ten categories while still suggesting that these ten fell into two kinds. In any case, Andronicus must have given Simplicius’s source some reason to suppose that he meant that the ten categories could or should be, in some sense, contained by two kinds, τῷ καθ’ αὑτὸ and τῷ πρὸς τι.

Moraux suggested that T14e might represent a misinterpretation of Andronicus’s true views (if he was not really critiquing Aristotle); perhaps Andronicus did not truly reduce the categories into two (given the evidence we have for his acceptance of ten categories at Simplic. 342,21-25 = T14w). As Reinhardt points out (2007:521), if Simplicius’s interpretation is correct and Andronicus did make such a bipartite reduction, then he must have revised the notion of the relative somehow; indeed, Andronicus is also said [T14k] to have ranked relatives (ta pros ti) after all the other categories, on the grounds that relation is a skhesis and paraphuasis, an ‘outgrowth’.

204 It may also seem surprising that Andronicus and Xenocrates should be drawn together so casually in the same sentence, but as Reinhardt (11 n. 14) points out, Andronicus himself may have made the connection – if it was not simply a matter of a later reader conflating two superficially similar notions.

205 On which see Moraux 103-4 and in Cat. 134,5-11.
Tarán suggests that Andronicus’s definition of the relative has a Stoicising tone (cf. SVF 2.403-4). For Andronicus, as for Ariston, relatives are those entities for which being (to einai) is identical with their relationship (pós echein) to something different than oneself [T14n, T14o]. In contrast to Moraux, Tarán (1981/2001a: 509-10) also suggests that Andronicus combined substance and the eight other categories excepting the relative under one heading, and made the relative (as strictly defined) into a second heading. As such, Andronicus could well have recognized ‘ten categories’ and yet also recognized just two groups into which they fit; one of the big categories contains nine of the small categories.

Simplicius, in his analysis after T14e, judges that the claims of Andronicus and Xenocrates amount to more or less the same thing as the claim that the categories are divisible into ‘substance’ and ‘accident’, which is what unnamed others suggest; Simplicius goes on to state that all of these people (wrongly) reduce accidents to a single genus, the relative. We might deduce either (a) (with Tarán) that Andronicus ‘took substance and its attributes, i.e. substance and all the other categories except relation in the strict sense, as one category, and as the other category relation defined in the Stoic manner’ (510), or (b) that Andronicus made substance one category, and all of the other, non-substance categories relatives (in some broad sense, including the relative strictly defined).

As I have noted above, it may be useful at this point to compare the De Div. of Boethius and the notion, which likely belongs to Andronicus in the proem and conclusion, that the ‘earlier Peripatetics’ had failed to make a sufficiently clear distinction between absolutes and relatives, or what is per se and secundum accidens. So 48,26-50,5 (lineation in Magee 1998, with translation):

Posterior quidem Peripateticae secta prudentiae differentias diuisionum diligentissima ratione perspexit et per se diuisionem ab ea quae est secundum accidens ipsasque inter se disiunxit atque distribuit, antiquiores autem indifferenteret et accidente pro genere et accidentibus pro speciebus aut differentiis utebantur, unde nobis peropportuna utilitas uisa est et communiones harum diuisionum prodere et eas propriis differentiis disgregare.

As R. Sorabji has pointed out to me, David Sedley (2000) suggests that before Aristotle the Academy already introduced the concept of pros ti pós ekhon used by Aristotle at Cat. 8a31-32, and that the Stoics drew the category from the Academy. So Andronicus may be reflecting earlier Academic views, not necessarily drawing on Stoic doctrine.

Based on the proem to the De div., as noted above, it seems likely that Andronicus authored this criticism of the ‘earlier’ Peripatos (see introductory notes in Magee 1998, and commentary ad loc).
The later sect of Peripatetic wisdom discerned in the most diligent manner the differences between divisions: it separated division *per se* and *secundum accidens* from each other and distributed them both. Its predecessors, on the other hand, indiscriminately employed both an *accident in place of the genus* and *accidents in place of species, or differentiae*.

Might such a division *per se* and *secundum accidens* have been applied by Andronicus to his reduction of the categories? On the basis of the *De div.*, we could be inclined to infer from Simplicius (63,22-30) that Andronicus made substance absolute and the other categories accidental and relative. Turning to Andronicus’s contemporaries, we notice that the Pythagorean Eudorus of Alexandria criticises the *Categories* for missing the Platonic distinction of ‘absolute’ and ‘relative’ altogether (drawing on *Sophist* 255C), because the *Categories* (on Eudorus’s view) proceeds to deal only with the relative after making some initial mention of the absolute (Simplicius in *Cat.* 174,14 = Eudorus T6b); moreover, Eudorus goes on to describe the relative as an ‘outgrowth’ from the other nine (παραφυομένην ταῖς ἐννέα, 174,18), using the same language as Andronicus. If Eudorus made this criticism following Andronicus’s publication and ‘paraphrasis’, and under Andronicus’s influence, then this might suggest that Andronicus also presented all of the categories after substance as ‘relatives’, and that it was this view that Eudorus criticised.

But there is no particularly strong reason to suppose that the direction of influence must run from Andronicus to Eudorus, as the evidence for the originality and immediate influence of Andronicus’s ‘publication’ is not very firm. We might equally well imagine that Eudorus’s comments were made prior to Andronicus’s publication, or at least without knowledge of Andronicus’s views. Indeed, for the sake of argument, we should leave open the possibility that the direction of influence could have flowed in the other direction.

Pseudo-Archytas, who followed Eudorus in many respects (cf. Dillon 1977:35 and Szlezák 1972:30), agrees with Andronicus (as it seems), Xenocrates, and Eudorus that substance is the *per se* or *kath’ hauto* (Simplic. in *Cat.* 199,17 and Ps.-Archytas 26,21 Thesleff).208 But David, in *Cat.* 201,23-25 suggests that Pseudo-Archytas described all of the categories except the (narrowly defined) relative as ‘absolute’, more the model suggested by Tarán above (cf. Sharples 2008: n. 46). This would be quite different from Eudorus’s position on the meaning

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208 As Sharples (2008:282, citing a paper in Schrenk, 1994, 148) points out, the Christian apologist Hippolytus clearly presents the *Categories* in terms of a twofold distinction of substance and accident (Ref. 7.18.5; cf. 1.20.1).
of the *Categories*, as it seems. But it is important to remember that ‘Archytas’ was not
producing a criticism of the *Categories* in itself, but a ‘*Categories as it should have been*’ for
the Platonic and Pythagorean point of view. As I discuss in the sub-chapter on Eudorus (3.1)
and the chapter on Lucius and Nicostratus (4), it seems quite clear that many of the initial
criticisms of the *Categories* from Platonic angles – for example, that the categories quality
and quantity ought to be viewed as ‘substantial’ in their own right – were motivated by
Platonic or ‘Neopythagorean’ metaphysical doctrines. Thus ‘Archytas’ might have presented
quality and quantity (for example) as *per se* in the *Categories*, not *differing* from Eudorus so
much as correcting the deficiency that Eudorus had spotted in Aristotle’s presentation. For
indeed Eudorus, having criticised Aristotle’s presentation for failing to deal with the *kath’*
*hauto* after substance, goes on to say that the relative is an ‘outgrowth on the other nine’,
which are in themselves existent *per se*.

This brings us back to Andronicus, who also held that the relative could be viewed as an
‘outgrowth’ on the other nine categories – a view that, according to Iamblichus via
Simplicius, he shares with ‘Archytas’ (157,18-22 = T14k). Without yet inquiring who
inaugurated this view of the *Categories* (which I will discuss further in the sub-chapter on
Eudorus) it seems plausible that Andronicus held that the non-substance categories in the
*Categories* were indeed *per se* and not relative; this is the best fit for T14e, for his definition
of the relative, and for the views expressed in the proem and conclusion of the *De div.* of
Boethius, where the earlier Peripatos is said to have erred in confusing accidents with genera
and species.

1.2. *Predication*

For Andronicus states that predications can be ‘of a subject’ in the non-*ousia* categories, such as
‘musical’ of Aristoxenus and ‘Athenian’ of Socrates (Simplicius, in *Cat.* 54,8-21 = T14d;
cf. Moraux I, 104):

> Ἰστέον δὲ ὅτι καὶ Ἀνδρόνικος καὶ ἄλλοι δὲ τινες οὐ μόνον τὰ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν κατηγοροῦμενα καθ’ ὑποκειμένου κατηγοροείσθαι φασιν, ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα οἶν τὸ μουσικὸν κατὰ Αριστοξένου καὶ τὸ Ἀθηναῖος κατὰ Σωκράτους. καὶ ἰδίως ἐκεῖνα ὡς κατηγοροοῦντες τινος ἐκεῖνο ἐκεῖνο εἶναι λέγομεν αὐτῷ ὑπό κατηγορούμεν (βαδίζειν μὲν γὰρ λέγοντες τὸν Σωκράτη οὐ λέγομεν βαδίζειν εἶναι τὸν Σωκράτη, Ἀθηναῖον δὲ εἶναι λέγομεν καὶ φιλόσοφον) καὶ ὡς δὴ τούτων κατηγορεῖται, λεγόντων ἡμῶν ταῦτα ἐκεῖνα εἶναι, καὶ κατὰ τού ὑποκειμένου ῥηθήσεται.
We should note, however, that Andronicus and some others say that it is not only things predicated essentially (en tòi tì estin) which are said to be predicated ‘of a substrate’, but other things as well, such as ‘musical’ of Aristoxenus, and ‘Athenian’ of Socrates. And perhaps [this is true of] those things which, when we predicate them of something, we say that [the subject] is that very thing which we predicate, for when we say that Socrates is walking, we do not say that Socrates is ‘to walk’, but we do say that he is ‘Athenian’ and ‘a philosopher’. Whatever is predicated of these, moreover, when we say the former are the latter, will also be said of the substrate. For if Socrates is a philosopher and philosophers are knowledgeable, then Socrates will also be knowledgeable. Again, they say: ‘if a body is white and white is a colour, then body will also be a colour’. But ‘white’ signifies two things: the quality and what is coloured, and it is ‘coloured’ which is predicated of ‘body’ – for whiteness is not a body – whereas <colour is predicated of quality, for it is not the coloured that is a colour>, but rather whiteness. Thus it is not colour which will be predicated of the body, but the coloured.

The lemma, which comes just after the fourfold division of ta onta in the Categories (see my ch. 2 for discussion), is Cat. 3, 1b10-15: ‘Whenever one thing is predicated of another as of a subject, all things said-of what is predicated will be said-of the subject also’ (tr. Ackrill).

Andronicus and the unnamed ‘others’ want to stress that Aristotle’s criterion, ‘predicated of something else as of a subject’, does not explicitly restrict this rule to the first category, the ti esti (où μόνον τὰ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν κατηγοροούμενα). Thus Aristotle, as they reason, is allowing us to predicate any F of any x and claim that x inherits the genera, species, and differentiae that are said-of F. This leads to problems, as various examples show: for instance, if some body is white and white is a colour, then body will be a colour (πάλιν δὲ φαίνει ἐι τὸ σῶμα λευκῶν καὶ τὸ λευκὸν χρώμα, ἔσται καὶ τὸ σῶμα χρώμα). This appears to be an aporia raised by Andronicus about the lemma. (On this difficulty and Andronicus’s concerns, see also Barnes 2003:360-61).

Alexander of Aphrodisias appears to have discussed a similar problem, perhaps in his commentary on the Categories. In a fragment preserved in Armenian, reported by Ernst
Schmidt (1966; cf. Tweedale 1984 and Sharples 2005), Alexander explains why the premises ‘Animal is a genus’ and ‘Aristotle is an animal’ do not lead to the conclusion that ‘Aristotle is a genus’. Alexander’s solution is that genus is not said of animal ‘as of a subject’, but of animal as a universal, which cannot be predicated of particulars (282). More broadly, Alexander seems to stress that the universality of a definable nature such as ‘animal’ is accidental to it.\(^{209}\) (See also chapter 5 on Boethus).

Why did Andronicus raise this particular problem? The \textit{aporia} might, again, be linked with the Andronican comment in Boethius \textit{De Div.} mentioned earlier, namely, that the ‘earlier Peripatetics’ had muddled accident and substance in an important way, enabling accidents to be treated as if they were genera and species and differentiae. Andronicus might, then, have raised this issue to point to some problems with the ambiguity: perhaps he saw 1b10-15 as an example of Aristotle making the distinction insufficiently clear (compared to the clear distinction of accidental and essential predication at \textit{Met.} 5.6-7). Thus his examples:

‘Athenian’ works, because Socrates is \textit{an} Athenian; ‘musical’ does not, because Socrates is not \textit{a} music. The problem is a potential confusion of \(F\) and \(F\)-ness – say, \textit{poion} and \textit{poiotès}. Body \textit{is} white, and \textit{whiteness} (as Simplicius points out) is a colour.

Andronicus seems to be stressing a fundamental point about what the Aristotelian conception of a category amounts to – that the ‘white’ referenced by Aristotle is a \textit{poiotès} and not a \textit{poion}, or rather, that Aristotle does not rigorously distinguish between the two. This is a key point to note when comparing Aristotle’s theory of categories to the Stoic theory of the four summa genera or so-called ‘Stoic categories’, \(\upiota\,\upomega\xi\eta\iota\mu\epsilon\upsilon\nu\nu\,\pi\omicron\upsilon\omicron\,\pi\omicron\upsilon\zeta\,\dot{\epsilon}\chi\omicron\omicron\nu\), and \(\pi\rho\omicron\xi\,\dot{\epsilon}\chi\omicron\omicron\nu\,\pi\omicron\upsilon\xi\zeta\dot{\epsilon}\chi\omicron\omicron\nu\).\(^{210}\) As Stephen Menn put it in a recent study, the Stoic theory differs from the Aristotelian not only in its corporealism, but also in the sharp distinction which [the Stoics] observe, much more carefully than Aristotle, between concrete and abstract terms, \(F\) and \(F\)-ness’ (1999:217). Thus it is the \textit{poion} white that belongs to the Stoic second category, but the \textit{poiotης} whiteness that belongs to the Aristotelian ‘Quality’. In other words, for Aristotle ‘A

\(^{209}\) In our passage, Simplicius will respond by pointing to the ambiguity in the word \textit{is} – between the predicative and copulative sense, so that the \textit{is} in ‘Socrates is Athenian’ is not quite the \textit{is} in ‘Socrates is walking’. Simplicius will also point out that ‘white’ has two significata, the quality and the subject, so the latter objection, on Simplicius’s view, does not hold up.

is \( F \) is a true *per se* predication, but if it is accidental rather than essential, then \( F \) signifies a non-substantial being that is *in* \( A \). Aristotle explains the function of this ‘in’, famously, at *Cat.* 1a24-6: ‘in something, not as a part, and cannot exist separately from what it is in’.

By contrast, as Simplicius tells us in the *in Cat.* (212,12-13,7), the Stoics believed there were a number of cases where something could be \( F \) without there being a corresponding \( F \)-ness (cf. Menn 217-18). In cases where an \( F \)-ness existed and its inherence could be explained *corporeally*, Stoics were readily able to explain its influence on the \( x \) that was \( F \): a paradigm example is the soul (*SVF* 1.89), and even its virtue (cf. Sextus, *M.* 9.24), as the soul can be seen as corporeal and so able to act and cause effects. But in cases where there was no obvious corporeal explanation for \( F \)-ness, a Stoic needed to present an alternative account for the inherence of something: that \( x \) is \( F \) simply \( pós \) echôn (whether that is relative disposition or absolute disposition).

### 2. Corporeality

This brings us to our next consideration, namely, Andronicus’s views about the corporeality of certain entities (such as qualities and pathê) that may be predicated of subjects according to the *Categories*, and about the corporeality of words (*logoi*) themselves. Several fragments suggest that Andronicus argued for the possibility of non-corporeal entities inhering in, and influencing, bodies (see, for example, Simplicius, *in Cat.* 258,15 = T14q, Simplicius *in Phys.* 440,13 = T15a, discussed below). We may speculate that if Andronicus held that the non-substance categories were *per se* such that not only substantial genera but also qualities (for example) could be ‘said-of’ Socrates, he needed to describe that relationship, and this drove his interest in various matters discussed below – such as the relationship of soul to body and the capacity of a word or *logos* to be ‘incorporeally’ applied to many bodies.

#### 2.1. Affective qualities

Andronicus is said to have argued against dividing pathetic qualities (τὰς παθητικὰς ποιότητας) into those that *produce* affections (τὸ ἐμποιεῖν πάθη) and those that are *constituted* from an affection (τὸ ἐκ πάθους συνίστασθαι) [T14q]. All pathetic qualities, on his view, were so called as composed from a pathos, while the existence of productive qualities coincides with (συμβαίνειν) the passive qualities.

For heat has the power to heat; but insofar as it *acts* upon others, we call [those others] not ‘suches’ (*poia*) but ‘productive [of such]’ (*poiētika*) – for example, not ‘heats’ (*therma*) but ‘heaters’ (*thermantika*). That is because they are already relative
(pros ti), just like the burner and the burned (kaustikon…kauston), and similar things. For that reason, heat (thermon) does not belong to the heatable object (thermantou) unless it is producing heat (thermantikon). For ‘suches’ (poia) are said in accordance with the state (to pòs echein), and not in accordance with the relative (to pros ti).

At Categories 8 (9a35-b11), Aristotle commences a discussion of affective qualities. Sweetness, bitterness, and sourness are examples, as are hotness (θερμότης) and coldness (ψυχρότης). Hotness and coldness are called παθητικαὶ ποιότητες, not because the entities that admit of them are affected (πεπονθέναι τι), but because these qualities are capable of producing an affection (πάθους ποιητικὴν) through sensation (αἰσθήσεις). At Met. E 1020b Aristotle also remarks that ‘the thing that warms (thermantikon) or cuts (tmetikon) is relative to the thing warmed (thermanton) or cut (tmêton), and on the whole the productive (poiētikos) [is relative] to the affective (pathetikos)’.

In the excerpt from Andronicus, we have the following kinds:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Heater</th>
<th>thermantikon</th>
<th>Poietikon</th>
<th>Pros ti</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heated</td>
<td>thermanton</td>
<td>Pathetikon</td>
<td>Pros ti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heat</td>
<td>thermon</td>
<td>Poion</td>
<td>Pòs echein</td>
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</tbody>
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Why should Andronicus draw attention to the capacity of such ‘affective qualities’ to produce an affection, and add that qualities ‘productive of affection’ and qualities ‘constituted from an affection’ are not fundamentally different? Complicating this question is his reported view [T14v and T14zb] that poiein and paskhein are true ‘contraries’ (enantia). Other commentators objected against Andronicus that a contrary could not arise from a contrary (cf. 332,15): perhaps Andronicus suggested that productive affective qualities could arise from passive affective qualities in the object affected, just as the heated object (thermanton) produces heat (thermantikon). Such an argument is implied, it appears, by another Andronican passage cited by Simplicius On the Physics (440,13, tr. Urmson, modified = T15a):

And it should be known that in this area most write this passage more clearly as follows: ‘for it is the actualization of this by the source of change’; but Andronicus writes as follows: ‘for it is the actualization of the moved and from it’ (ἐντελέχεια γάρ ἐστι τοῦ κινητοῦ καὶ ὑπὸ τούτου). He gives the interpretation that, even if the mover be eternal, the moved appears to be moved by itself (ὑπ’ ἑαυτοῦ), since
We may compare a similar passage in the commentary (in Phys. 450,18 = T15b):

Nature, which is is also so predisposed, gives their disposition from within in relation to each form of motion, as Andronicus also said. For even if water be heated by fire, still the natural constitution in the water first becomes warm or thus warms, or warms with itself, the subject.

It has been pointed out that Andronicus appears to contradict Metaph. 9.8, where something actual is required to move anything potential into actuality: the interpretation that the moved ‘appears to be moved by itself’ due to its innate potential need not contradict this, however. The interesting question is why Andronicus should have insisted on such a point as an affected entity also being, in a sense, active with respect to itself.

I suggest, in connection with Andronicus’ favourable interpretation of Xenocrates’ doctrine of the soul as a ‘self-moving’ number, that this point was made partly to challenge the corporeality of quality. For Chrysippus, the quality of heat (thermotês) itself must be a body (ap. Galenum, de qual. inc. 473.5-9 Kühn = fr. 386) precisely in order both to act and to be acted upon as poioun and paschon (cf. Zeno frs. 90, 98), in the language of the Sophist. For Andronicus, heat is a quality and a state that need not be a body. His emphasis on the capacity of affective qualities to produce a pathos may point to a disproof of this line of Stoic corporealism, demonstrating that an incorporeal quality could be active in producing a pathos. Moreover, his proposal that no division should be made between affective qualities productive of pathê and those constituted from a pathos may have formed part of an argument that if such a quality could be active in producing an affection, it could also be acted upon in the specific sense that it arose from a pathos. Considering this in the case of the soul, which he suggests to be the cause of the ratios of the blend of the bodily elements, he is able to represent an affective quality of the soul – such as the innate ‘temper’ described at Cat. 8 – as actively influential on the body, producing the pathê.

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211 We will return to this very interesting passage below. Diels suggests that the reading is due to other commentators rather than the transcript by Andronicus: see ‘Zur Textgeschichte der Aristotelischen Physik’, in Abhandlungen der Kgl. Pr. Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin (1882), repr. in W. Burkert (ed.), H. Diels, Kleine Schriften (Darmstadt, 1969).

212 The position might be reminiscent of the man in the Cratylus (413C) who describes justice as ‘not the fire, but the heat itself that is in the fire’ (auto to thermon to en toi puri enon).
In itself, the suggestion that certain incorporeal entities such as qualities can influence bodies is pure Aristotelianism (see, e.g. GC 2.2). But there is other evidence of Andronicus’s special interest in arguing against a corporeal analysis of qualities, bodies, and other entities. As we go on to suggest below [T14b], Andronicus elsewhere argues for the asomatic nature of unities, such as an account (logos) or a name, that spread across many particulars. Here, he may be arguing, from the nature of affective qualities, that an asomatic quality can act upon bodies by producing an affection.

The whole discussion might be compared to a passage of Plotinus (1.2.1, 31-46), in which he explains how human beings may be made alike to a virtueless God by means of virtue (tr. Armstrong):

If something is made hot by the presence of heat, must that from which the heat comes also be heated? And if something is made hot by the presence of fire, must the fire itself be heated by the presence of fire? One might object to the first argument that there is heat in fire, but as part of its nature… But if that [quality analogous to heat] in which the soul [as analogous to the heated] participates were the same as the source from which it comes, it would be right to speak in this way; but in fact the two are distinct. The sensible house is not the same as the intelligible house, though made in its likeness.

In this connection, it is interesting that Andronicus (in Cat. 263,19-22 = T14r) added to the four kinds of quality outlined in the Categories – habit or disposition; inborn capacity; affective qualities; figure and shape – a fifth kind, within which he included ‘fine’ (λέπτον; cf. Plot. 6.1.11, 32-33) and ‘thick’ (πάχυ).

2.2 Incorporeal presence of logos

Porphyry follows Andronicus [ap. Simplicium = T14j] in ‘articulating the concept of the hen, monades, and stigmê not spoken according to the ideal, but as evident in aisthēsis and dianoia’. According to Porphyry, the unity (hen) of body (length, breadth, and depth) is coherence (synecheia); when such unity is also unique and unparalleled in species or genus, it is a monad (monon). The point (stigmê) may be thought of as a monad placed in position, but it is essentially different, and is arrived at by reducing the dimensions from a three-dimensional body. It is not clear where in this account Porphyry follows Andronicus.

Several points suggest that the distinction of somatic and asomatic unity may express Andronicus’ own position, as he (and Boethus of Sidon) demonstrate an interest in related
problems. Notably, we are told elsewhere that Andronicus regards the name (onomā) and the account (logos) as present at once to many things ‘indivisibly, in virtue of their asomatic nature’ [T14b]. This sounds like a Peripatetic reply to the Stoic doctrine that logos is a soma present in all things (e.g. Zeno, SVF I, 153; I, 146); I discuss this further below.213 Also, Boethus of Sidon elsewhere in Simplicius (66,1) suggests that ‘number’ is twofold, asomatic (and intelligible) and somatic; again (78,1), Boethus appears to suggest that the Categories is concerned, not with intelligible ἁλή, but with sensible ἁλή, allowing for a similar division. If Boethus’ thought may offer clues to the oeuvre of Andronicus’ doctrines, as Aspasius and the later tradition suggest, then it does not seem unreasonable to read the distinction of somatic from asomatic unity as relevant for Andronicus.

2.3. Psychology: The soul causes the blend (κρᾶσις) of the body [T4] [T9] [T10] [T11]

The prominent physician Galen, active in the late second and early third centuries CE, held that the mortal portion of the soul should be described as the ‘blend’ (κρᾶσις) of the somatic elements. (By contrast, Alexander of Aphrodisias maintained that the soul was the dunamis of the blend: cf. De An. 24.21-3). At An. corp. 782,12-783,1 [T4], Galen focuses on the nature of the mortal portion of the soul (τὸ θνητὸν τῆς ψυχῆς), referencing the thumotic (τὸ θυμοειδές) and epithumotic (ἐπιθυμητικόν) aspects of ψυχή. In outlining his position, Galen – according to the consensus of editors214 ratified by the Arabic text – cites Andronicus of Rhodes:

> The blend of the heart is the thumotic form of the soul, while the [blend] of the liver is called by Plato ‘epithumotic’, but ‘nourishing and growing’ <by Aristotle>. And I praise <Andronicus the Peripatetic>, since he dared to show forth fully the essence (οὐσία) of the soul, <declaring it a blend (κρᾶσις) or a capacity (δύναμις) of the body.>

Andronicus, on this testimony as interpreted by Moraux and Gottschalk,215 defined the soul as the δύναμις arising from the κρᾶσις of the somatic elements. Galen goes on to praise

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213 For Chrysippus, logos is everywhere in both living and unloving ἁλή, as mind, soul, nature, and state (I, 158): as hexís there is logos in bones and sinews and earth; as nous there is logos in the intelligence and the aether (II, 634). For Andronicus too, logos is everywhere; but Simplicius tells us that Andronicus explains this by ‘asomatic indivisibility’.


215 See Moraux 132-4; Gottschalk 1113. On the insertion of Andronicus’ name here, see Moraux 134 n. 9 with references, together with the comments in the Arabic text of Biesterfeldt (1973).
Andronicus for behaving as a ‘free man’ (ἐλεύθερος) in openly revealing the true nature of the soul, but also criticizes him for adding δύναμις to his account and not defining the soul simply as χράσις. The force of χράσις goes back at least to Plato (Phaedo 86B-C, where the term is interchanged with harmonia) and Aristotle (de gen. et corr. A10 327b31-328a18, where a ‘blend’ is a homogeneous compound of elements, rather than a σύνθεσις or juxtaposition of parts). Caston (1997) discusses the equivalence of harmonia and krasis in the tradition after Plato. In this particular context, however, the choice of the word χράσις to describe the οὐσία of the soul also suggests Stoic influence. Later in the same passage (783,10-15), ‘the Stoics’ discuss ‘the same kind of οὐσία’, ψυχή, as πνεῦμα. Galen reports Chrysippus (fr. 787 von Arnim = T4):

δῆλον οὖν ἦδη σοι γέγονεν, ὡς ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐσία κατὰ ποιὰν χράσιν ἀέρος τε καὶ πυρὸς γίνεται κατὰ τοὺς Στωϊκούς, καὶ συνετός μὲν ὁ Χρύσιππος ἀπείρασται διὰ τὴν τούτων εὐχροτον μὲν.

Whereas ‘the Stoics’ declare the οὐσία of the soul to exist ‘according to a certain blend of air and fire’, Andronicus the Peripatetic reportedly declares the οὐσία of the soul to be ‘a dunamis or a blend of the body’. For Chrysippus, the cause of the unity of the cosmos is the ‘blend of fire and air’ as πνεῦμα that permeates it (cf. Alex. De Mixt. 216,1-2 = SVF 2.470), a distinctly Stoic κρᾶσις δι’ ὅλων.

It has been debated whether, for Andronicus, the soul is the cause or the result of the bodily mixture; it will be clear from Themistius (T11 below) that Andronicus viewed the soul as the cause of the mixture. It should be added that Galen’s report comes in the context of discussing the mortal portion of the soul in particular: τίνος οὖν θνητοῦ ζῴου (782,1); τῆς ψυχῆς... τὸ ὅντον εἶδος αὐτῆς (782,6-8); τὸ ὅντον τῆς ψυχῆς (782,10); namely, from the Platonic viewpoint, thumos and epithumia: ἢ... τῆς καρδίας χράσις... τὸ θυμοειδὲς εἶδός ἐστι τῆς ψυχῆς (782,12-13); ἢ δὲ τοῦ ἢπατος... ἐπιθυμητικῶν... θρησκείας δὲ καὶ φυτικῶν. It may be the case that Andronicus’ discussion, in this particular textual environment, also focused primarily on the ‘irrational soul’, namely the θυμοειδὲς εἶδός and the ἐπιθυμητικῶν; he took a particular interest in the irrational affections of ψυχή, as we shall see below.

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216 Broadly, see Todd (1976) on Alexander’s reception.
The report of Galen might be compared with a third century passage of the prolific Christian writer St Hippolytus, although the following passage has not previously been compared (to my knowledge) to Galen’s testimony. Midway through the fifth book of the *Refutation of all Heresies* (5.21 = T9), Hippolytus indulges in a thoroughgoing critique of the ‘interminable commentaries’ (ἀπείροις συγγράμμασι) of the Sethian Gnostics, who persuade their disciples to become conversant with the theory respecting blending and mixture (χρόσσως καὶ μίξεως), which has formed a subject of meditation to many, and among others especially (καὶ) to Andronicus the Peripatetic. Now the Sethians say that the theory concerning blending and mixture is constituted according to the following method: the luminous ray from above is blended in (ἐγκεκρᾶσθαι), and the very diminutive spark is delicately and completely mixed (καταμεμῖχθαι) in the dark waters beneath; and [the spark and the waters] become united (συνηνῶσθαι), and are formed into one compound mass, just as a single savour results from the mixture of many incense-offerings in the fire, and just as an adept, by having a test in an acute sense of smell, ought to be able from the single odour of the incense to distinguish accurately each [ingredient] of the offerings… so, say they, though all things are commingled (συγκεκραμένα) they are distinguishable (διακρίνεται). And from living beings (ἀπὸ τῶν ζῶν), he says, learn the same lesson: for when the living being has ended, each of its parts is separated; and when dissolution takes place, the living being in this way vanishes (ἀφανίζεται). (tr. Roberts-Donaldson, adapted)

Hippolytus’ source appears to have found some reason to connect the contents of this Gnostic passage, with echoes of Stoic *krasis*, with Andronicus’ own theory of mixture. While the nature of the connection is beyond our scope here, it does show that Andronicus’s position about ‘mixture’ captured some broader interest beyond (it seems) specialised circles of commentators on Aristotle.

Another source preserves Andronicus’ own words on a related subject. Themistius, in commenting on *De Anima* 408b32-409a30 (in De An. 32.23 = T11), remarks:

“Such, then, are the problems that Aristotle raises for Xenocrates’ definition of the soul. It would take another lecture to scrutinize those [raised by] the [philosopher] who termed Aristotle’s [arguments] ‘inconceivable’ and who himself paraphrased the correct and apposite arguments of others in a way that was neither correct nor apposite. Instead, we ought to contrast Andronicus’ [arguments] with those of that [critic], inasmuch as they offer at once a clearer and more plausible reconstruction of X’s theory.”

Themistius proceeds to quote Andronicus, who explains the soul as the *cause* of a blend according to the ratio and mixture of the primary elements:

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217 See Turner (2001), e.g. 42, on the links of Sethian Gnosticism with the *Platonic* tradition.
Andronicus says:218 ‘They called the soul number because no living being was derived from an uncompounded body, but [only] where the primary elements were blended in accordance with specific ratios and numbers. So they made essentially the same claim as those who posit the soul as an attunement, except that they more clearly formulated their theory by adding in their definition that the soul was not every number, but [just] the self-moving number, as if those [others] too [had defined it] as not every attunement, but [just] the one that attunes itself. For this [type of] soul is the cause of this type of blend, and thus of the ratio and mixture of the primary elements’.219 But as I said the way in which Xenocrates spoke of the soul as a self-moving number is to be understood from his own [works], and in particular from the fifth book of those On Nature that he composed.

From this it seems clear that Andronicus views the soul as the cause of the blend of the elements and not as the blend itself.220 For the Stoics the essence of the soul arises ‘according to’ the blend of fire and air: for Andronicus the essence of the soul causes the blend of fire and air. This testimony might be connected, as I will suggest below, with several other views of Andronicus: namely that soul causes the ‘blend’ of somatic elements according to certain logoi and arithmoi (T11, endorsing, at least to a limited extent, his interpretation of the position of Xenocrates), that logoi are incorporeal (asômatikos, T14b) and yet still are a ‘cause’, as we shall see – in the special sense that logoi can act and be acted on.

2.3. Pathology [T5]

It is worth briefly reviewing Andronicus’s views on the influence of pathê on soul and body, as Andronicus’s views on pathology are particularly well preserved, and his concepts of poiein and paskhein are likely to be relevant to his treatment of the Cat. In the early commentary on the Ethics composed by Galen’s contemporary Aspasius (42,27-47,2), we

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219 Following Heinze (ed.) and Todd (tr.), I take the quotation to end here, seemingly ascribing to Andronicus himself the view that the soul is aitia of the blend. It would be odd to end the quotation before the gar clause, which is obviously anticipated by the preceding sentence; and the ipsissima verba seem unlikely to be confined to the first sentence alone, as the second sentence is needed to explain it. As Donini (1982) and Moraux (1973) point out, including the final sentence would appear incompatible with Galen, who simply asserts that Andronicus makes the soul the blend itself, or else the dunamis of the blend; but Galen is interpreting (slightly polemically), Themistius reporting direct speech, and I think we may reasonably follow Themistius here.

220 Provided that we are right to punctuate the final sentence of the quotation with Heinze, and not attribute the assertion that the soul is ‘cause’ to Themistius himself.
encounter a long digression involving the ‘generic emotions’, which proceeds to explore 
‘how pleasure and distress are said to attend on every pathos’. After some discussion, 
Aspasius observes (44,19-33 = T5):

We find no definition of pathos in any of the ancient Peripatetics. 
Among the later members [of the Peripatos], Andronicus said that pathos is an irrational motion of the soul produced through (dia) a supposition (hupolêpsis) of evil or good; he took ‘irrational’ not as the opposite of right reason, as the Stoics do, but rather as a movement of the irrational part of the soul.

Boethus defined pathos as an irrational motion of the soul that has a certain magnitude; he too took ‘irrational’ as a motion of the irrational part of the soul, but he added magnitude, since there are also some other motions of the irrational part of the soul accompanied by brief oikeiôseis to people or estrangements (allotriôseis) from them. He thought that those movements accompanied by brief [affections] were not worthy of the name pathê…

Andronicus said, ‘pathos arises through (dia) a supposition (hupolêpsis) of good or bad things’, first of all, perhaps, because he did not know that some pathê arise merely out of appearance (phantasia), apart from assent (sunkaththesis) and supposition.

Shortly afterwards, Aspasius adds that ‘The Stoics claimed… that pathê arise through a supposition (hupolêpsis) of something good or bad: when the soul is moved at present goods, there is pleasure, and when at present evils, there is distress’ (45,16). Thus we seem to have in his report of Andronicus – at least, as Aspasius would have us read it – a verbatim echo of Stoic pathology. Similarly, Galen tells us that Zeno and Chrysippus defined pain as the ‘opinion that something bad is present’ (δόξαν γὰρ έίναι πρόσφατον τοῦ κακὸν αὐτῷ παρεῆναι φησι τὴν λύπην, Galen de placit. Hippoc. et Plat. 391 Müller = SVF 1.212), while pleasure is the corresponding opinion about the presence of a good, fear of something bad in the future (336 = SVF 1.463). Indeed, Chrysippus arrived at the view that pathê are in themselves propositional judgements (discussed below). A similar position, verbally akin to Andronicus’s own, was pithily expressed by Marcus Aurelius (8.40):


In the next place remember that neither the future nor the past causes you suffering (barei se), but always the present...

Once you take away your hupolêpsis about whatever seems to cause you pain, you yourself stand entirely safe. ‘Who am I?’ The logos. ‘But I am not logos’. Let it be so. The logos, then, will not cause pain to itself; and if anything else causes you trouble, let it have its own hupolêpsis about itself.

There is some evidence to suggest that Andronicus maintained that pathê were in themselves propositional, and in themselves judgements. Thus Aspasius criticizes Andronicus for failing to recognize that ‘some pathê arise merely out of imagination, aside from assent and supposition’. A similar argument may have been leveled against the doctrine of Chrysippus that pathê are judgements, leading to the Stoic division of first and second motions. There are minor affections of which we may be scarcely aware, and over which we do not appear to exercise mental control – and these cannot be judgements or propositional. Ancient examples of such pathê in the bodily realm include ‘bites’ and ‘little contractions’ and tinglings of the fingers, which the Stoics recognized as involuntary ‘first movements (kinéseis)’, or propatheiai. 224

These involuntary first movements are strictly distinguished from more powerful and subsequent ‘second movements’, over which we could exercise voluntary control (cf. Seneca de Ira 2.2.1-2.4.2, Cicero Tusc. Disp. 3.82-83). Chrysippus’ account of pathê as judgements would apply primarily to such major and voluntary ‘second movements’; minor affections which could serve to reduce his account to absurdity could be classed as minor and involuntary ‘first movements’.

The ‘Stoic’ analysis of two classes of pathê here, effectively a division of the ‘pre-passions’ or propatheiai from the ‘greater’ kind of pathê, may be comparable to Boethus of Sidon’s division of affections into ‘pathê with magnitude’ and ‘without magnitude’. Boethus adopts

Andronicus’ definition of pathê precisely, but ‘with the addition of magnitude’ (τὸ δὲ μέγεθος προστιθειές, Aspasius 44,26) so as not to encompass mere ‘brief’ (βραχείας) affections. As well, it might be noted that Boethus’ words cleave very close to Andronicus’ own, while developing his doctrine; Aspasius’ text may lend support to Philoponus’ later indication that Boethus was a disciple of Andronicus (see chapter 5 below). Later Stoics, in fact, seem to have taken a similar line.225

Thus, in one of his works (perhaps, as Moraux suggests, a commentary or paraphrase on the De Anima), Andronicus evidently endorsed a Stoicizing view that pathê arise through hupolêpseis of good and bad, defining pathê as ‘motions of the irrational portion of the soul’. Stoic ideas permeate this pathology.226 But on Aspasius’ testimony, Andronicus went on to question the Stoic view of ‘irrationality’, suggesting that the alogos portion of the soul was not in fact opposed to orthos logos. For a Chrysippan Stoic, impressions are propositional, and therefore assenting to them amounts to a proposition.227 For Andronicus also, pathê are propositional, insofar as they arise through a ‘supposition’ of good and evil. However, the natural judgement underlying the supposition is executed without logos. It need not be ‘wrong’, the hupenantion of the orthos logos, but it need not be ‘right’. Thus we find Andronicus rejecting the ‘monism’ of the early Stoa about the psyche by distinguishing between rational and irrational parts of the soul.228

Possibly Andronicus’s pathology can be taken as some evidence that, with Chrysippus, he supposed that pathê were in themselves judgements or propositions, and the training of them made the study of logic important as a propaedeutic to ethics.

Summary

225 See Pohlenz, Stoa I 307, with references in II 154.

226 In fact, the work Peri Pathôn ascribed to Andronicus in antiquity commences with the Stoic view expressed virtually verbatim, and its ascription to Andronicus has been rejected partly due to the weight of Stoic influence evident in the text. This raises the question whether the present fragments should, in fact, be ascribed to the author of the Peri pathôn. While this is difficult to rule out, it seems likely that (assuming the author of the P. p. is not genuinely Andronicus) the attribution of the Peri pathôn to A. was made precisely because of the similarity of its content to these previously established fragments. See also Glibert-Thirry (1977).


228 See Ar. EN 1102b14ff. and for Posidonius’s view of Pathe, e.g. fr. 152 E-K.
In sum, the citations of Andronicus in the *Categories* commentary of Simplicius touch on a variety of matters from the text to the nature of unity, to the relationship of quality and body, to the absolute and the relative, and some arguments that propose minor changes to the scheme of the categories while still ‘preserving the number of the ten’. The pathology which interested the earlier, psychological commentators such as Aspasius, I suggest, together with the long passage cited by Themistius concerning the Xenocratean definition of the soul, draws on Andronicus’ unique interpretation of the categories ‘acting and undergoing’, which allows for non-bodies such as affective qualities to influence and be influenced *pace* the Stoa, and lays the groundwork for a cyclical relationship of habituated affective qualities, such as the innate temper or other soul-qualities of *Categories* 8, to *pathē* themselves, which are described as motions of the irrational soul. Something of Andronicus’ pathology may also have been related to his doubts concerning the *De Interpretatione*’s claim that *noemata* are *pathemata*, and the importance of this element of his thought may have led to his association with the subject of pathology in general, and the *Peri Pathôn* in particular. If the broad outlines of such interconnections exist, the *Categories*, and particularly the doctrines of quality, acting, and undergoing, are of importance for systematic ethics, psychology, and other areas of Andronicus’ philosophy, and this may be related to his emphasis on logic.

### 3. Other fragments on the *Categories*

**When and Where.** Andronicus subordinated ‘when’ and ‘where’ to ‘place’ and ‘time’ respectively, making place and time *idiai katêgoriai* [T14f]. For Andronicus, ‘up’ and ‘down’ do not signify Place, but *Where*, and ‘yesterday’ and ‘today’ do not signify *Time*, but *When* (which is according to time) [T14g].

Like ‘Archytas’, Andronicus made ‘when’ exist in connection with *Time* [T14x], which is primary. With Plotinus, he says that yesterday, tomorrow, and last year are ‘parts of time’. By placing *When* with *Time* and *Where* with *Place*, Andronicus appears to disagree with the position of Aristotle, who puts time and place in the category of quantity [T14y]. Andronicus also places ‘far and near’ in the category of *Where* [T14z], unlike Cornutus, who refers them to the relative.

**Great and Small.** Andronicus, followed by Iamblichus, made *great and small* and *much and few* indeterminate quantities as well as relatives [T14h]. For example [T14i], the Caucasus, Athos, and Hymettus are all ‘great’ mountains, and this ‘great’ is an indeterminate quantity:
but it admits of more and less, for the Caucasus is ‘more great’ than Athos, and Hymettus is ‘less great’ than Athos. (Plotinus 6.3.11, 11 is cited as denying that ‘great’ is in relation to anything at all, while pointing out that we often say ‘great’ instead of ‘greater’ improperly).

Text of the Categories. The wording of many of the early citations (such as T14a) suggest that Simplicius (or Porphyry, or even Boethus) is mining the paraphrase for philosophical points under the surface in making certain arguments. For example, Simplicius is arguing that it was necessary for Aristotle to write a prolepseis about homonyms before embarking on the Categories. He tells us that Andronicus held that it was necessary to write a prolepseis about homonyms at the outset of the Cat., which is clear from his initial paraphrase. However, it does not seem from Simplicius’ wording that Andronicus actually argued this case; Simplicius adduces his support from the opening words of the paraphrase itself. Of course, we have no reason to suppose that Simplicius had direct access to Andronicus (see ch. 1), whose own argument for the position of the onymies may have been superseded by the later debate in which Boethus played a larger role.

There are few other notices in Simplicius about Andronicus’ textual work; like Boethus he is cited as omitting tês ousias after logos in the first chapter of the Categories [T14c], and there is no indication that he was aware of the variant reading. (See on Herminus in ch. 7 below for further discussion of this issue).

4. Athetization of the De interpretatione [T13]

Alexander of Aphrodisias (in An. Pri. 161,1 = T6) informs us that the De Interpretatione was written by Aristotle (τὸ Περὶ ἑρμηνείας Ἀριστοτέλους ἐστιν), so that ‘it is not [spurious] as Andronicus claims’ (ἄλλ’ οἷς ὡς Ἀνδρόνικος φησιν). This testimony that Andronicus athetized the De Interpretatione was picked up by Ammonius of Alexandria (in De Int. 5,28 = T13), perhaps via Porphyry. According to Ammonius, all agree that the De Int. is authentic, except for Andronicus of Rhodes, who was eleventh [scholarch, counting] from Aristotle. He heard [Aristotle] claiming in the proem of this book that ‘thoughts (νοήματα) are affections (παθήματα) of the soul’, adding ‘as we have said on the subject in the [books] On the Soul’. Since [Andronicus] did not see where in On the Soul the philosopher had described thoughts as affections of the soul, he supposed it was necessary to declare one of the two works – this [sc. De Int.] or On the Soul – to be a spurious work of Aristotle, and he thought it necessary to athetize this [book] rather than On the Soul.
John Philoponus and other sources repeat this same explanation. It is not entirely clear when it was first advanced, by whom, and whether it really exhausts the reasons given by Andronicus for his judgement. The fact that Andronicus athetized the *De Int.* has sometimes been viewed as a sign of poor critical ability, or at least of overzealousness for a nascent form of textual criticism. It certainly would strike *us* as odd that Andronicus should have athetized the entire work because it contained a single misleading cross-reference to the *De Anima*. Either this is literally true, or our later sources have preserved less than the whole story.

There may be more to the story. If it is true that Andronicus’s criticism centered around the phrase τὰ νοήματα παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς, that phrase may have interested Andronicus in its own right, or concerned him more than the literal failure of the apparent cross-reference to the *De Anima*. The phrase τὰ νοήματα παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς spurred the later Peripatetic Herminus, a teacher of Alexander, to raise *aporiai* about the *De Int.* (see ch. 7). As we have seen, Andronicus was prominently linked to certain remarks on the nature of pathê in antiquity. Perhaps something about the phrase For Andronicus, *pathos* is ‘an irrational motion of the soul produced through a supposition of evil or good’ (*T5*). Moreover, as we shall find in our review of the *Categories* below, Andronicus held several unusual views about affective qualities, including the doctrine (*ap.* Simplicium 258,15 = *T14q*) that all *pathêtikai poiōtêtaï* are constituted from pathê, rather than producing pathê.

It is possible that Andronicus’s definition of pathê did not appear to be strictly compatible with the position that *noêmata* could be *pathêmata*. Perhaps the textual discrepancy cited by Ammonius may have formed part of Andronicus’ argument; but it seems possible that there was more to Andronicus’ doubts about the *De Int.* than the later reports hand down. Regardless of this, as I have suggested above, it is worth separating Andronicus’s claim that the *De Int.* was not by Aristotle from the question whether he thought the work to be philosophically useful, and might have retained it in the order *Categories–De Int.–Prior Analytics*, in his catalogue or discussion.

**Assessment**

This brief review of Andronicus’ life and work does not decide the question of his importance for the later tradition, or whether his collection of Aristotle’s works was a proper ‘edition’ that exercised a formative influence on posterity. Barnes (50-63) demonstrates the difficulty...
of relying on the structure of various texts to show the importance of the Andronican publication, as we have noted above. It seems evident from the Letters that he preserved that Andronicus himself did not regard his publication as the first of the Aristotelian esoterica.

But none of Barnes’ specific arguments need cause us to doubt that he πραγματεύει τάς οἰκείας ὑποθέσεις εἰς ταὐτόν συναγαγόν in a way that Porphyry found useful (VP 24,7), or that his ‘edition’ and catalogue, regardless of whether it was a truly collated and textually edited work or a collection of heretofore obscure texts, became current between the lifetimes of Cicero and Plutarch for reasons of genuine value. I have suggested above that his reported athetization of the De Int., our testimony for which rests on a brief passing notice of Alexander, may have been motivated by complementary philosophical reasons besides the flimsy textual excuse given by Ammonius and others in late antiquity.

Our survey of the evidence suggests a sweep of interest in Andronicus moving from his work on the Aristotelian text itself, which clearly made the first impression in the first centuries BCE and CE, to his psychology and pathology, and finally to his work on the Categories with Porphyry and commentators working after him. I have proposed that he brought his unique perspective on pathê, which may have been conceived as a methodology for refuting the Stoic corporealism resting on the acting-undergoing argument of the Stoa, to bear upon the Categories, and that this position was influential in many spheres of his thought.

He may, I suggested, have placed the Categories at the outset of the curriculum partly because he viewed pathê, in a Stoicizing mode, as propositional in themselves, leading to the criticisms leveled against him by Aspasius. Arguing for a soul whose judgements could be affected by and could affect pathê would offer a strong argument for mastering logic before passing to systematic ethics. Thus, as Long (1978, repr. 1996) has put it:

It is tempting to go further and to suggest that the study of dialectic itself, for Chrysippus at any rate, is an integral part of moral conduct. In analysing the structure of language and its function to express true propositions, the Stoics were taking as their subject-matter fundamental aspects of the human logos, the rationality of human nature.... the most technical details of Stoic logic, and even the solution of sophisms, [can] be regarded as actions that contribute to the understanding of man himself and of the rationality of the universe. Thus dialectic may be regarded as a method of self-discovery.
I would broadly like to stress here, aside from the validity of this particular connection, that Andronicus’s approach to the *Categories* involved treating it as a work of dialectic, or logic, which was not always the case among his contemporaries (cf. chapter 3.1). Andronicus would discuss the *Categories* primarily as a logical instrument, a competitor for the throne of Chrysippean dialectic and not (as it seems) for Platonic metaphysics. But in the contemporary Platonic and Pythagorean tradition, the understanding of the ten categories is viewed from a strongly ontological and metaphysical vantage point, while still (in Long’s words cited above) seeking to ‘contribute to the understanding of man himself and of the rationality of the universe’:

Not only do the souls of mortal beings possess the capacity to know the sensible (*gnōstikên tou aisthêtou dunamin*), but [Plato] adds that the soul of the cosmos – whenever she touches the scattered being or the undivided being of anything – is moved throughout her entire being and announces what the object is identical with, and from what it is different, and in what relation (*pros ti*), and where and how, and when, it comes about that each thing exists (*einai*) and is acted upon by others (*paschein*), both in the sphere of becoming and in that of the ever-one. In these words he is also giving an outline of the ten categories; likewise in what follows, he makes the case more clearly…

Plutarch, *An. Proc.*, 1023D-F (Loeb tr.); likely Eudoran (cf. ch. 3.1)

With respect to his later reception, Andronicus is not infrequently criticized and alternately praised in the tradition, for reasons associated with the views of the later commentators themselves: Galen praises him for describing the soul as a blend, but does not credit him with praise for describing it as a ‘capacity’. Aspasius supposes he is muddled about the relationship of imagination and judgement, and Alexander doubts him for athetizing the *De Int*. Simplicius occasionally doubts his views, but more often, following in Porphyry’s footsteps, praises him as a supporter of the position he wants to take – almost always in connection with his contemporary Boethus of Sidon, whose views are described in greater detail.

In particular, in this chapter we have explored Andronicus’s view of the *Categories* as a ‘dialectical’ work concerned with division, and perhaps especially the division of substance and accident (where he may have differed with Eudorus, in that Andronicus appears to have interpreted the non-substance categories as *per se* and not *per accidens*). If Andronicus came *after* Eudorus, as we discuss in the following sub-chapter, he may have shifted the focus of
the study of the text from ontology to dialectic. We have also explored briefly Andronicus’s
approach to the inherence of asomatic attributes in bodies and its implications for his possible
relationship to Stoic materialism. In the following brief ‘sub-chapter’ (3.1), we will consider
his relationship to Eudorus and other contemporary figures in more detail.
3.1. Eudorus and Other Ancients

Michael Griffin

3.1. Eudorus and other ‘Ancients’
Eudorus of Alexandria (fl. c. 50 BCE?)

Life. We have several hints regarding the life and chronology of Eudorus, suggesting that he was active around the middle of the first century BCE. The chief evidence is Strabo (64 BC–19 CE), who mentions (Geog. 17, 1, 5 = Eudorus T1) that Eudorus and Ariston both wrote similar books On the Nile, and Eudorus accused Ariston of plagiarism. We can infer that Eudorus and Ariston were active before or during the lifetime of Strabo himself. As Strabo declares that he cannot tell which book really came first (ἐν Ἀμμωνος εὖροι τις ἄν!), we may also infer that Eudorus and Ariston were very close contemporaries, and perhaps lived a little before Strabo.

Unlike Ariston, Eudorus is not mentioned by Cicero. This could suggest that he was less conspicuous in the years before 43 BCE, but this is inconclusive. It is difficult to guess when Eudorus produced the book that brought him into conflict with Ariston, or for that matter when he produced major publications (see below) that could have drawn him to the attention of a figure like Cicero. We may, however, hazard one speculation about his relationship to Ariston; it seems unlikely that Eudorus was a relative unknown, a newcomer to the Alexandrian scene, when he accused Ariston of plagiarism; it seems from Strabo’s report that both persons were fairly well-known in Alexandria.

With respect to school affiliation, Arius Didymus, who was active in the first century BCE, calls Eudorus an ‘Academic’ (Ἀκαδημικοῦ φιλοσόφου, ap. Stobaeum, Ecl. 2.42,7 ff. Wachsmuth-Hense = T2), as does Simplicius (ὁ Ἀκαδημαϊκὸς, in Cat. 187,10 = T6c).

Eudorus himself also appears to have traced his views to those of the Pythagoreans (see, e.g., Simplic. in Phys. 181,10), and to have sought to reconcile representatives of the Old

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230 As Dillon points out (1977:115), Cicero may not have been in contact with Alexandria’s latest developments of philosophy in the years leading up to 43 BCE.

231 If he is to be identified with the confidant of Augustus: On Arius, see Runia in Der Neue Pauly and Goulet, DPhA s.v.
3.1. Eudorus and Other Ancients

Michael Griffin

Academy within a shared Platonic tradition (Plutarch, T3a). This will be further discussed below.

**Works.** (1) Eudorus is said (by Arius Didymus ap. Stob., loc. cit.) to have written a Διαίρεσις τού κατά φιλοσοφίαν λόγον. According to Arius, this text was arranged problêmatikôs, by topic or problem. Arius preserves a portion of the ethical section of the work, and praises it as a work well worth purchasing (βιβλίον αξιόκτητον). This is the only work of Eudorus’s, as it happens, that we know by title. Several further works and commentaries are inferred from fragments and testimonia, but I take it that, in reality, any of the following testimonies may equally well derive from essays in the Διαίρεσις. (2) Eudorus also commented on Plato’s *Timaeus*, as we learn from Plutarch On the Generation of the Soul (see 1013B5, 1019E6, 1020C3; several passages are discussed below). (3) Eudorus wrote about the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle, as we learn in Alexander of Aphrodisias (in Met. 59,7, where he proposes an emendation, perhaps to show that in Plato’s ‘esoteric’ doctrine the only first principles are two, God and Matter). (4) Eudorus wrote about the *Categories* of Aristotle, as discussed below; again, however, it is unclear whether this represents a separate commentary. (5) Dillon (2000) also notes a papyrus about optics (POxy 1609) that mentions a *Timaeus* commentary by the same author; there is a chance that this could refer to Eudorus; notably, Burnyeat (2005) has recently argued that the original Archytas of Tarentum founded the Greek science of optics, commencing a tradition in which Eudorus may have worked. (6) The book On the Nile mentioned above, concerning the cause of the river’s flooding. (7) Some work of commentary on astronomy, perhaps on Aratus (see Dörrie and Baltes, 2003:290).

**Doctrines.** Eudorus is often referred to as an exemplary ‘Neo-Pythagorean’ (e.g., Fraser 493). Indeed, Dörrie suggested that he originated the Pythagorising ‘rebirth’ of Platonism in the first century (32-4, referencing Simplic. in Phys. 181 = T7). With Dillon (1977; cf. Dillon 2000), we may see Eudorus as motivated to return to the doctrines of the ‘old’ Pythagoreans, Archytas and Philolaus, and the ‘old’ Academics, Speusippus and Xenocrates, thus sharing a common motivation with Antiochus of Ascalon.

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232 Meineke (1859) initially attributed the ethical passage in Stobaeus to Arius. On Arius and his identification with the Stoic contact of Augustus, see David Runia in Der Neue Pauly, Brad Inwood s. v. ‘Arius Didymus’ in Goulet (1989), and Moraux (1973:259-450).
An example of Eudorus’s exegetical approach to the ancient Academic philosophers is found in Plutarch (T3a), where Eudorus is represented as seeking to harmonise the definitions of the soul promoted by Xenocrates and Crantor in order to produce a unified account of the soul.233 Eudorus’s own view is not entirely clear, but what Plutarch does make clear is that Eudorus seeks to show that Xenocrates and Crantor were not at odds, and neither were altogether mistaken. (Xenocrates argued that the soul was a ‘number moved by itself’, while Crantor described it as a mixture of noêtê ousia with ‘that which forms impressions of perceptible objects by means of opinion’). Without yet being clear about what Eudorus himself thought about the true definition of the Soul, we can be reasonably confident that he thought the Academics were on the right track, and he wanted to show that they were not at odds. We shall return to Plutarch below.

An instance of Eudorus’s exegetical approach to the ancient Pythagoreans can be found at Simplicius in Phys. 181.7-30 = T7, a verbatim quotation in which Eudorus ascribes to oĩ Πυθαγόρειοι the view (which he himself appears to endorse) that there exist a ‘Monad’ and a ‘Dyad’ under which all the Opposites are ranked. (The ‘Opposites’, as we shall find below, refer to the Pythagorean opposites such as defined, odd, male, light and undefined, even, female, dark). But above the Monad and the Dyad is a supreme One, which may be described as the ‘transcendent God’ (huperanô theos), and is the cause both of Matter (hulê) and of all created things. Eudorus ascribes the view that the One causes Matter, as it seems, to Plato himself as well. Thus we learn from a controversial passage of Alexander in Met. (59.7 = T4),234 in which Eudorus – preserved for Alexander via Aspasius – is said to have amended the text at Aristotle, Met. 1.6, 988a7-12 to indicate that (for eidosi, i.e. ‘those who

233 Dörrie, Hermes 79 (1944), 27-28 argues that Eudorus reconciled Xenocrates’s symbolic exegesis with Crantor’s more ‘literal’ exegesis.

234 On Met. 1.6, 988a7-12. Moraux has discussed the text in detail in ‘Eine Korrektur des Mittelplatonikers Eudoros zum Text der Metaphysik des Aristoteles’, Beiträge zur alten Geschichte und deren Nachleben, Berlin, 1969, vol. 2, 592-504. Bonitz had proposed to amend the variant quotation at 59.1-2 to print eidesi for eidosi (cf. Met. 988a10-11), but eidesi does not seem compatible with what Alexander says next. Moraux would take kai τεi hulêi as outside the variant reading, to read something like: ‘it is clear that [Plato] used only two causes, the essence (for the Forms are causes of the essence for the other things, [and], for those who know, the One), and matter’. If that reading is right, Eudorus did not attempt to interpret Aristotle’s account of Plato according to a more ‘Middle Platonic’ view; Moraux 503). But Dillon suggests (1977:128 n. 1) that Eudorus intentionally makes the One the cause of Hyle as well as the Eide, noting that this ‘Eudoran’ monism appeals to Philo and appears later in the Chaldaean Oracles (e.g. fr. 34 Des Places and Psellus Hypot. 27).
know’ the true doctrine of Plato) the One is the cause of all things, even of Matter, being superior to the Forms themselves.

Comments on the Categories

Eudorus applies these views to his reading of the *Categories*.

(1) First, at Simplicius, in Cat. 174,14 = T6b he suggests that the ten categories can be analysed into *two*, the Absolute (καθ’ αὑτὸ) and the Relative (πρὸς τί). These two ‘Platonic categories’ can be traced to Xenocrates (fr. 12 Heinze) and seem to have been maintained by Andronicus of Rhodes as well (see chapter on Andronicus, with texts *Andronicus T14e* for his bifurcation of the ten, and the *De Div. of Boethius*). One could also see how it might be supported from Aristotle. In later Pythagorean circles, this same bipartition is assimilated to the Pythagorean Opposites – for example, odd and even, male and female, defined and undefined. We know from T7 that Eudorus maintained that this kind of division of the Opposites was the orthodox *Pythagorean* view, which he appears to endorse. From this standpoint, he criticises Aristotle in T6b for taking only *Ousia* as ‘absolute’, and examining the remaining categories solely in ‘relative’ terms.

(2) Second, at Simplicius, in Cat. 206,10 = T6d, Eudorus treats the *order* of the ten categories, placing Quality after *Ousia*, then the Where and the When, which he redefines as Space and Time (as did Andronicus of Rhodes: See *Andronicus T14f*). Eudorus’s explanation is clear in T6d: after *ousia*, the remaining ten categories should be organised based on the proximity of relationship that *ousia* has to them. Quality should come second (a view also taken by ‘Lucius’ and Nicostratus) because *ousia* cannot exist without Quality;

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236 Dillon (1977:133) points out that the view may be traced to Plato himself (on the testimony of Hermodorus ap. Simplic. in Phys. 248,2 Diels); in the Sophist 255C, Plato distinguishes *auta kath’ hauta* from pros alla.

237 The twofold division is also found in the *Divisiones Aristoteleae* (DL 3.108 and following = Cod. Marc. 97, p. 39 Mutschmann). Tarán, in reviewing Moraux I, suggests that Andronicus is influenced by Stoics as well as Xenocrates; Gottschalk (1990:72) disagrees.

238 E.g. the division of being *per se* and being *per accidens* in Met. Δ 7; it might be notable, given his bipartition of the ten categories, that Andronicus’s *De Div.* takes *per se* and *per accidens* as the highest kinds of division.

239 See for example ‘Callicratidas’ *De Dom. Fel.* 103,12-13 Thesleff.
Quantity follows for the same reason; and because all *ousia* exists in Space and Time, these should be third and fourth. We may infer from this that Eudorus takes the *Categories* to be concerned with *sensible ousia*; as a Pythagorean, we might reason, he would hardly claim that intelligible *ousia* is in space and time. (However, see also my discussion of Eudorus T3c below). In this, at least in Simplicius’s presentation, ‘Archytas’ seems to follow Eudorus.  

Why is Eudorus interested in the order of the ten categories and their ‘distance’ (so to speak) from *ousia*? Here, he may have in mind a Pythagorean table of opposites descending from the Monad and the Dyad. Thus, as John Dillon has pointed out, later Pythagoreans would suggest that Quality was the Monad (and Form and Limit), while Quantity was the Dyad (and undefined Relation); if Eudorus identified *ousia* as identical with the primary Ousia that he called the ‘One’ over both Monad and Dyad (cf. T4), he might well have viewed the remaining categories as descending through a Pythagorean table of Opposites under, respectively, the *kath’ hauto* and the *pros ti* (cf. T6b), of which Aristotle had delivered only a partial account – an account that was soon to be rectified by Pseudo-Archytas (discussed below). Such a ‘Pythagoreanising’ account of the *Categories* could even have found support in Aristotle’s definition of *ousia* as ‘One and the same in number’ and ‘receptive of the Opposites’ – which suggests both the descent of opposites from a Monad and Dyad, and the arithmetic ‘One’ that transcends both. As alien as such an interpretation may appear to us, the capacity of the *Categories* to explain and embrace the ‘Monad’ and even ‘Intelligible Number’ was a point of serious concern early in the ancient discussion of the text. It seems to have sparked the Platonizing question whether the text could adequately address the ‘intelligible world’ at all: see Lucius and Nicostratus ap. Simplicium 73,15-76,16 = T9f, with Boethus’s response.

We may have in Eudorus a source for the effort to assimilate the *Categories* into a Pythagorean framework, with a focus on the division of the ten predications into ‘absolute’ and ‘relative’, and a reorganisation of the ten to match the Pythagorean Opposites. Indeed, as

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240 So Szlezak (1972). Archytas takes it as given that the categories concern just the sensible world (cf. 22,31 and 31,5 Thesleff; also Dillon 134-35 for discussion). He agrees with Andronicus in separating the postpraedicamenta, and with And. and Ariston in changing Aristotle’s definition of Relation (Simplic. 202,2). Archytas also differs from Eudorus on the ranking of Relation, Space, and Time. He puts Relation fourth, after Quality and Quantity, and Space and Time at the end of the list, in which he is followed by Philo.

Szlezak (1972) has already pointed out, such an effort is clearly represented in Pseudo-Archytas, and from the occasional correspondences in Simplicius (as at T6d) we can deduce that Archytas must depend on Eudorus, or vice versa – although there are sufficient differences to suggest that they do not represent one and the same author. Broadly, we may consider here that Eudorus (like following Platonising readers such as ‘Lucius’) examines the Categories as concerned at least partly with an account of beings, an ontology that can be ‘mapped’ to Pythagorean and Platonic metaphysics. By contrast, Andronicus would discuss the Categories primarily as a logical instrument, a competitor for the throne of Chrysippean dialectic and not (as it seems) for Platonic metaphysics.

(3) A third text about the Categories, T3c, although not explicitly ascribed to Eudorus, may also bolster the idea that he interpreted the Categories in a Pythagorean framework. This passage occurs in Plutarch’s De an. proc. Regardless of whether Eudorus is indeed Plutarch’s main source in that work, as has sometimes been suggested, this passage occurs quite close to Eudorus’s discussion of Xenocrates and Crantor, and given his interest in the categories, I think it is reasonable to consider its candidacy as an imitation of Eudorus. Plutarch writes (1023D-F = T3c):

Not only do the souls of mortal beings possess the capacity to know the sensible (gnôstikên tou aisthêtou dunamin), but [Plato] adds that the soul of the cosmos – whenever she touches the scattered being or the undivided being of anything – is moved throughout her entire being and announces what the object is identical with, and from what it is different, and in what relation (pros ti), and where and how, and when, it comes about that each thing exists (einaí) and is acted upon by others (paschein), both in the sphere of becoming and in that of the ever-one. In these words he is also giving an outline of the ten categories; likewise in what follows, he makes the case more clearly...

Here, as in the passages cited above, the author seems to assume that the ‘categories’ are concerned with the sensible world. But he suggests that the ten categories are not solely concerned with the sensible, but also with the intelligible. This passage perhaps suggests a slightly novel interpretation of the fragments of Eudorus in Simplicius: if Eudorus took the view described by Plutarch here, he believed that ousia could be in Time and Space and yet still be intelligible ousia. This was also the view of Iamblichus, who talks of ‘intelligible time’ and ‘intelligible space’, and claims dependence on ‘Archytas’ for his interpretation; so it may be reasonable to associate Eudorus with this view via Archytas. It is certainly the case...
(see ‘Archytas’ below) that Archytas raises questions about whether the *Cat.* deals with the sensible world (see 22,31; 30,19 Thesleff, with Szlezák ad loc.), and these are later taken up by Lucius and Nicostratus (see ‘Lucius’ and ‘Nicostratus’, below, with chapters on each).

Aside from this, I think that the *An. proc.* passage could shed light on two points: (a) first, Eudorus believes that Aristotle has offered an inadequate account of the non-substance categories in that Aristotle fails to describe them in their *Absolute* sense, only in their *Relative* sense. This would not make sense if Eudorus supposed that the *Categories* was solely concerned with sensible being, as no one would say that sensible Quality has an ‘absolute’ sense. But a Platonist might say that *intelligible* Quality has an ‘absolute’ sense that needs to be dealt with. (b) Second, the later line of criticism against the *Categories* maintained by ‘Lucius’ and Nicostratus suggests, as an *aporia*, that the *Categories* is not an adequate account of intelligible reality. This case would be difficult to make if one held that the *Categories* was not *meant* to be an account of intelligible reality at all. If Lucius and Nicostratus followed Eudorus in holding that the *Categories* pointed the way to an account of both noetic and aesthetic *ousia*, but was an inadequate account of the former, their *aporia* would make sense.

**Relationship to Andronicus**

We have noted that Eudorus, like ‘Lucius’, examines the *Categories* as concerned at least partly with an account of *beings*. By contrast, Andronicus would discuss the *Categories* primarily as a dialectical instrument.

We have also found that Andronicus and Eudorus both redefined the categories *Where* and *When* as *Space* and *Time*; and Andronicus was explicitly associated with ‘Archytas’ in taking this view (cf. Simplic. 347,6). As well, both Andronicus (as it seems) and Eudorus followed Xenocrates in suggesting that the ten categories could be reduced to two in some sense, the *Absolute* and the *Relative*, although Eudorus also raised problems (174,14 = Eudorus T6b) about Aristotle’s apparent failure to deal with the *Absolute* adequately.

As we have seen in the chapter on Andronicus, Eudorus appears to have held that the non-substance categories of Aristotle *were* relatives (but *should have been* per se), whilst Andronicus may have held that (with the exception of the relative proper) they could be understood per se. It seems likely, in this case, that Eudorus must have presented his case...
unaware of Andronicus’s view, and perhaps before Andronicus delivered his own studies of the *Categories* (paraphrasis and publication?) – for if Eudorus read a *Categories* coupled with Andronicus’s commentary, in which it was made clear that the non-substance categories were *per se*, it is unlikely that he could have so readily delivered the criticism that Aristotle abandoned his discussion of the *per se* after substance.

More broadly, we may ask whether Andronicus appears to have responded to Eudorus, or Eudorus to Andronicus, or neither. Although it might be naturally assumed that Eudorus responds to Andronicus’s ‘publication’, the questions raised about the status and originality of that publication (see chapter on Andronicus) suggest that this is not a *fait accompli*. In addition to the points above regarding Eudorus, we might note that ‘Lucius’, although he seems to follow Eudorus in his ‘Pythagoreansising’ or ‘Platonising’ reading of the *Categories*, appears quite unaware of Andronicus’s publication (so far as we can tell). First, we know that Andronicus’s ‘paraphrasis’ of the *Categories* began as follows: τῶν λεγομένων τὸ μὲν ἀνευ συμπλοκῆς λέγεται... 

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Considering these points, it seems at least plausible that Lucius and Nicostratus were not reliant on Andronicus’s presentation of the *Categories*. On the contrary, we might view Andronicus’s choice to re-introduce the text with the phrase τὸν λεγομένων..., together with his choice to introduce the curriculum with the *Categories* as

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242 Moraux I, 102-03 pieces together the full preamble of Andronicus’s paraphrase from Simplicius in *Cat.* 21,22-24, 26,18-19, 30,3-5 and Dexipp. in *Cat.* 21,18-19. See also Sharples (2008:280).
a work of logic, as a reaction to the kinds of problems raised by Eudorus and (perhaps later) ‘Lucius’ – namely, problems about the function of the *Categories* as a work about beings. By asserting that the *Categories* was a work about words, and publishing it with a ‘paraphrasis’ that supported this assertion, Andronicus might have dismissed those problems, and yet paved the way for new issues about its inadequacy as a work about language, raised by Stoics (cf. Athenodorus and Cornutus, discussed separately). These Stoic problems may in turn have necessitated the response of Boethus. On such a scenario, one could see Andronicus as reactive to the Platonising or Pythagorean reading of the *Categories* in Alexandria – taking over from Eudorus the focus on the Absolute and the Relative (and the accompanying interest in ‘division’) among other factors, but clearly situating the *Cat.* as a work of ‘logic’ that introduced the *Organon*.

By contrast, when Eudorus evinced interest in the *Categories*, he appears to have represented Aristotle as a genuine, if sometimes errant, expositor of a Pythagorean world-view, a picture of how the world was actually structured. We may add that some later Neoplatonic sources, such as David [Elias] in *Cat.*, refer to Aristotle as a ‘true Pythagorean’ (*Puthagoreiòi kat’ alètheian gegonoti*, 107,6 Busse), a claim which is echoed in the anonymous *Life of Pythagoras*, where Aristotle is described as the tenth diadokhos of the Pythagorean school, following Archytas and Plato. Such reports could reflect a desire on the part of earlier, first-century Pythagoreans to ‘appropriate’ Aristotle into the Pythagorean tradition, as some (such as Bonazzi 2007) have suggested; if so, this movement could have played an important role in the birth of interest in the *Categories*, a text which Eudorus and the authors of the Archytan treatises clearly saw as susceptible of Pythagorean exegesis.

Finally, there is some evidence, albeit speculative, that Eudorus may have organised the philosophical curriculum *Ethics-Physics-Logic*. Seneca (*Ep.* 89) provides this ordering, and he is evidently dependent on Arius Didymus’s *Epitome*, which in turn, as we have seen, seems to derive from Eudorus (cf. Dillon, 1977:121). Andronicus, on the other hand, clearly placed Aristotle’s logical works first in the curriculum (so Moraux).

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243 Such as the replacement of ‘When’ and ‘Where’ with ‘Time’ and ‘Space’, discussed above.

244 But it is perhaps not so clear that he viewed logic as an *organon* (cf. Moraux 76-79 and 144, and Tarán 508).
Pseudo-Archytas (fl. c. 50 BCE?)

Archytas of Tarentum was a Pythagorean contemporary of Plato, who appears to have studied a number of specialised problems in music, mathematics, and mechanics.245 His association with the Academy is documented in the Seventh Letter ascribed to Plato;246 according to Philodemus’s *Index Academicorum* (col. 6, 12) he was Plato’s student.

While the works of Archytas himself were subsequently lost, centuries later a wide array of Pythagorising texts were published under the name Archytas, evidently in a bid to associate a number of key doctrines with the ‘ancient’ Pythagorean school.247 The bid was largely successful, certainly by late antiquity; with the exception of a notice in Themistius *(ap. Boethium in Cat. PL 64, 162A)*, the Pseudo-Archytan works seem to have found wide acceptance as genuinely ‘Pythagorean’. (Indeed, by the fourth or fifth century of our era, ‘Pythagorean’ effectively meant something that modern scholars tend to call ‘Neoplatonic’; see for example Syrianus *in Met.*, with examples throughout the proem).

Several of these texts focused on the *Categories*: (I) ‘On the Universal Statement’ (*peri tou katholou logou*); (II) ‘The Ten Universal Statements’ (*katholikoi logoi deka*, which is evidently a much later, and simpler, text); (III) ‘On Opposites’ (*peri antikeimenôn*). The first two texts are extant (ed. Thesleff; see Szlezak, 1972); the third is lost, but preserved in fragments in Simplicius. All that we now possess in full is a *koinê* version of the first and substantial fragments in Doric of all, the latter preserved by Simplicius and other later commentators.248

Szlezak argues that ‘Archytas’ is reacting to the developments of the first generation of commentators, beginning with Andronicus. For example, Archytas assumes that the

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245 On Archytas see C. Riedweg in *Der Neue Pauly*.


247 For what follows, see M. Frede in *Der Neue Pauly* and especially the introduction to T. A. Szlesák (1972), alongside Dörrie. I have also found the synopsis in Dillon (1977) and Bonazzi (2007) very useful.

248 The fragments of the latter are edited by Thesleff, *The Pythagorean Texts of the Hellenistic Period* (1965) 15-18; the first by Thesleff 21-32 and Szlezák, 34-57. The latter prints the two versions separately. See also Prantl I 615 f. The *katholikoi logoi deka* is edited by Thesleff 3-8 and Szlezak 61-68.
categories’ concern only the sensible world (22,31 and 31,5 Thesleff): cf. Simplic. 76,20. He separates the last portion of the Categories, the postpraedicamenta, from the rest of the text in (I) above, but (III) examines them as Pythagorean; as Frede points out (Der Neue Pauly), it seems unlikely that a single author is behind both (I) and (III). Archytas agrees with Andronicus and Ariston in improving on Aristotle’s definition of the Relative (Simplic. 202,2).

Is Archytas also drawing on the work of Eudorus? As we have seen in our brief review of Eudorus, this is almost surely the case; for example, Archytas provides similar Pythagorean reasoning for the order of the categories (cf. Szlezak 116). But there are differences: Archytas puts Relation fourth in the order of categories, after Quality and Quantity, and Space and Time at the end of the list. Philo of Alexandria (noted below) does the same.

Several passages of ‘Archytas’ are discussed below. Several points worth stressing here are his view that the Categories concerns sensible entities (cf. 31,3-5 Thesleff: ‘πάντα γὰρ ταύτα φυσικάς οὐσίας καὶ σωματικάς συμβάματα ἐντι, ἀλλ’ οὐ νοστάς καὶ ἄκινήτω καὶ προσέτι γε ἄμερέος’), and his view that man is the measure (kanôn, stathmê) of knowledge ‘because he is endowed by nature with the capacity to enumerate (katarithmêsìn) the principles by means of which all things are known’ (31,32-32,33). All knowledge, as Archytas goes on to explain, seeks to apprehend the infiniteness of reality by means of principles limited in number, and all number is in the number ten, so there should be ten kinds of being and predication, and men have ten fingers on which to count them. These arguments, or ones very much like them, are later ascribed to Herminus (see chapter on Herminus): both reality and words are infinite, and we use the ten predications to help apply limit to the unlimited (Porphyry, in Cat. 58,9-20 = Herminus T3b1); and we have the capacity to apply such a limit through our power to enumerate (aparithmein) the ten modes of predication (Simplicius, in Cat. 62,7-23 = Herminus T6i). We shall return to this passage in our study of Herminus.

Philo of Alexandria (20 BCE to 50 CE)

So both Szlezak and Theiler suggest (Unters. zur antiken Lit. 488), in addition to Dillon (1977:134 and 2000). Conversely, Dörrie, Platonica minora 300 suggests that Eudorus is opposed to Aristotelian innovations in Platonism.

On Philo of Alexandria, see Runia in Der Neue Pauly [I 12], with extensive bibliography. On his use of Peripatetic material, see Gottschalk, 1141 and 1145-46.
Philo, a key representative of Hellenic Judaism, is not mentioned by the later commentators in association with the *Categories*, and his voluminous corpus does not include any systematic commentary on the Aristotelian text. For instance, he is not one of the ‘ancients’ named by Simplicius (*in Cat.* 159,32-33). However, it is worth mentioning at least briefly that Philo makes some use of the theory of categories, within a Pythagoreanising framework.\(^{251}\)

In one passage, Philo claims that there is ‘nothing that does not participate’ in the ten categories (cf. *Dec.* 30 and following). In particular, like Eudorus, Philo uses the order *Ousia-Quality-Quantity* for the categories (cf. *Dec.* 30 and following); in the same text, he gives the name *topos* and *chronos* for Place and Time – not retaining ‘Where’ and ‘When’. But Philo locates Time and Place at the end of the list – as does ‘Archytas’, whilst Eudorus places them immediately after Quantity. This passage suggests that Philo’s source for the *Categories* is working in the same tradition as Eudorus and Philo.

**Ariston of Alexandria (fl. c. 50 BCE?)**\(^{252}\)

Ariston may also be mentioned here as a near contemporary of Eudorus and commentator on the *Categories* with Andronicus.

*Life.* As with Eudorus, Strabo (*Geog.* 17, 1, 5) is a chief witness for the life and chronology of Ariston of Alexandria. Ariston must have lived during or before Strabo’s own life. Fraser (489) argues that Strabo was unlikely to have known Ariston during his own sojourn to Alexandria in and after 24, as the latter was a pupil of Antiochus (and his brother), and there is a lapse of forty years between the probable death of Antiochus in 69 and Strabo’s residence in Egypt. The information about Ariston’s relationship to Antiochus depends on Philodemus, *Index Acad. Herc.* col. 35. The Philodeman *Index* (T2) has Ariston ‘apostasise’ from the Academy to the Peripatos with Cratippus. It is not demonstrable, that the Academic-Peripatetic Ariston mentioned in the papyrus alongside Cratippus is the same Ariston of Alexandria mentioned by Strabo. It has been assumed, e.g. by Moraux (57), although

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\(^{251}\) The index in Borgen 2000 is very useful for identifying references; Dillon (1977:178-82) usefully summarises key passages.

Moraux also recognizes the uncertainty of the identification (182; cf. Tarán 499). If they are the same, certainly this is some help; Cratippus’s activity was contemporary with Cicero, who mentions him as the leading Peripatetic in Athens (cf. de Off. 3.2, de Div. 1.3, etc. – although as Gottschalk and others stress, this need not imply that he was ‘scholarch’);\(^{253}\) thus the close attachment of Cratippus with Ariston could also weight Ariston’s activity before the later 40s BCE.

**Works.** Two testimonies to Ariston’s views suggest an interest in logic and specifically the definition of the Relative in the *Categories*. However, as so few testimonies are available, it is difficult to establish whether this represents a special interest of Ariston’s, or simply the interest of the later commentators. (1) (a) Simplicius (in Cat. 201.34 = T7b) states that Ariston and Boethus changed *ti* to *heteron* in the definition of the Relative at Cat. 8a31 to avoid circularity;\(^{254}\) Andronicus appears to have done the same (Simplicius subsequently states οὖτος δὲ καὶ Ἀνδρόνικος, although it is not clear who follows whom). (b) At Simplic. in Cat. 188.31 = T7a, Ariston inquires whether *kosmos* may be a ‘relative’ term.\(^{255}\) (2) Pseudo-Apuleius, *De Int.* 13, 193,16-20 Thomas states that Ariston introduced five ‘subaltern’ moods of the syllogism, three in first figure, two in second, by substituting particular for universal conclusions in those moods which can yield universal conclusions. He seems to imply knowledge of the indirect moods of the first figure discovered by Theophrastus; he is probably not the author of the list of nineteen valid moods in the last ch. of Apuleius’ books.\(^{256}\) (3) Grilli (1971) suggests that a fragment of Porphyry *De Fac.* (T5) should be attributed to Ariston, describing at least two distinct faculties of the soul, one concerned with intellect, the other with sensation. (4) Some remarks on grammar are recounted by Marius Victorinus in the fourth century, assuming that the ‘Ariston’ he mentions is also our subject (T6). (5) Finally, of course, we have the report of Strabo of Ariston’s *On the Nile* (T0).

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\(^{254}\) Tarán, ‘Aristotelianism’ 742, suggests Stoic influence on Ariston; Gottschalk, 1106 n. 138, points to Aristotelian sources instead.

\(^{255}\) See Zeller III 1, 649; Prantl I 546; Moraux I 181-93; Mariotti (1966) 48-57.

Doctrines. It is very difficult to get clear about Ariston’s doctrinal views on any specific subject. The claim that he shifted his affiliation or allegiance to the Peripatos may be suggestive, if we were only clearer about what kinds of doctrines (if any) this implied, or if it was simply a change of label and location. One reasonable guess, again based on the identification of the commentator on the Categories with the Ariston of the Index Academicorum, is that Ariston, having first studied with Antiochus of Ascalon, left the school of Antiochus for the contemporary Peripatos. It is difficult to say when in this process we should imagine him traveling to Alexandria.

We turn now to Lucius and Nicostratus, who continue the tradition of ‘Platonising’ reading and criticism of the Categories whose early representative is Eudorus.
4. Lucius and Nicostratus

Michael Griffin

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Others were content to write only puzzles (ἀπορίαι) against what is said: this is what Lucius did, and after him Nicostratus, who appropriated the considerations of Lucius. These two vied with each other in providing objections (ἐνστάσεις) to nearly everything said in the book, and they did not go about their task with respect, but rather in a violent and shameless manner. Nevertheless, we must be grateful to them, too, both because the puzzles they set forward were, for the most part, substantial (πραγματειώδεις), and because they provided their successors with starting-points both for the resolution of the puzzles, and for the development of many other excellent theories.

Simplicius, in Cat. 1.18-2.2 [T1], tr. M. Chase (2003)

Lucius257 and Nicostratus258 are shadowy figures, known to us through their recurring role as antagonists in the pages of Simplicius On the Categories. They are made to portray the antithesis of Simplicius’ sketch of the capable exegete of Aristotle (7.23-28), who exercises impartial criticism (κρίσιν ἀδέκαστον) by homing in on the essential agreement of philosophical schools (συμφωνίαν αὐτῶν ἀνιχνεύειν) without indulging in ‘disputatious twaddle’ (cf. ἐριστικὴν φλυαρίαν, 8.1). By contrast, Nicostratus and his followers are represented as eager polemicists (φιλονεικοῦσιν, 268,19) who deploy Platonic doctrines and Stoic linguistics as sticks with which to beat Aristotle, and exploit the letter of the text


without regard for its deeper intent (νοῦς: cp. 7,31). They accuse Aristotle of ‘useless talk’ (ματαιολογίαν, 58,15), charge him with ignorance (αἰτιᾶται… ἀγνοεῖ, 231,21), and ‘waste time’ (370,1) with their ‘accusations’ (406,6; 410,25), managing to ‘bury the truth’ completely (370,8). Their errors are ‘easy’ to recognize (ῥᾴδιον συνορᾶν, 428,3).

There are no direct references to ‘Lucius’ and ‘Nicostratus’ outside Simplicius in Cat. Even in those cases where their criticism of the Categories appears to be implicit in other texts—for example, in Plotinus, Enneads 6.1, Dexippus, and Porphyry’s commentary by Question and Answer—we are reliant on Simplicius’s testimony to identify them. As we have them, then, ‘Lucius’ and ‘Nicostratus’ are essentially constructs of Simplicius’ text.

It is widely held that the views of Lucius and Nicostratus cannot be usefully distinguished from each another within the text of Simplicius. This consensus is certainly justified by the limited nature of the primary evidence (see the Appendix of Texts to this chapter). In the course of this chapter, however, I shall argue that passages ascribed to οἱ περὶ τὸν Λούκιον consistently betray a different set of concerns from those ascribed to Nicostratus, and that these two sources, as Simplicius represents them, may be usefully separated and discussed in isolation. I shall maintain this position through a close analysis of the identifying cues that Simplicius uses to introduce and contextualize their views. For this purpose, a key part of this chapter (which will also be useful in following chapters) is the Table of Responses, showing the (historical or constructed) ‘dialogue’ between aporists and defenders of the Categories.

259 In addition to the commentator’s force of the ‘sense’ or ‘point’ of the language (LSJ s.v. νόος), this remark may echo the ‘noeric’ interpretation, or higher criticism, that Iamblichus is credited with introducing to the study of the Categories. On Iamblichus’s noeric analysis, see, e.g., J. Dillon, ‘Iamblichus’s Noera Theoria of Aristotle’s Categories’, Syllecta Classica 8 (1997), 65-77, I. Hadot’s commentary on Simplicius 2,11 and related samples of Iamblichus’s criticism in Commentaire sur les Catégories I-III (Leiden, 1990), and the introduction to Michael Chase’s translation of Simplicius in Cat. 1-4 (2003). Sorabji (2005), Vol. 3, very usefully summarises the relevant passages.

260 As Paul Moraux (1984:530) points out, this compels us to acknowledge the exclusive influence of Simplicius in selectively shaping their representation.

261 Moraux (1984:528-63) stresses the difficulty of usefully distinguishing these two sources. Hoffmann and Hadot (1990:4 n. 11) point out that ‘il lui paraît impossible de distinguer la pensée de Lucius de celle de Nicostrate’. Gottschalk (1987:1104) notes that Lucius as a persona ‘is only known through his association’ with Nicostratus, a point that I acknowledge and expand in my discussion of historicity below.
The approach of this chapter is therefore to explore the manner in which Simplicius portrays these two figures and their polemical relationships with other sources, including Boethus, Plotinus, Porphyry, and Iamblichus. Having collected the fragments for Lucius and Nicostratus in the Appendix of Texts, I construct a typology of these references in the main body of the paper, and attempt to establish several conclusions about the differing interests of the ‘Lucius’ source and the ‘Nicostratus’ source, and to characterise the anonymous and named sources who respond to them. Specifically, I argue that οἱ περὶ τὸν Λούκιον are primarily concerned about ‘doctrinal’ points in the text, involving (for example) the distinction of intelligible from sensible reality (T9). The Nicostratans, however, demonstrate a broader set of textual, rhetorical, and logical concerns, which seem to have interested Atticus (30,16-22 = T5) as well as Porphyry and Iamblichus.

In the context of this study as a whole, this chapter also aims to show that ‘Lucius’ is a source with distinctive ‘Pythagoreanising’ or ‘Platonising’ views, who may be seen as continuing the tradition begun by Eudorus, and who is answered by Boethus of Sidon (regardless of the uncertainty whether ‘Lucius’ himself is a distinguishable historical individual). I shall also suggest, in conclusion, that Lucius may be viewed as a relatively early figure (or school) that sharpened Eudorus’s views on the Categories, possibly in response to Andronicus.

Sources

In the course of this study (see the Appendix of Texts for this chapter), I shall analyze the identifying cues that Simplicius uses to introduce and contextualize the views of Lucius and Nicostratus. There are just four: (1) οἱ περὶ τὸν Λούκιον; (2) οἱ περὶ τὸν Νικόστρατον; (3) ὁ Νικόστρατος; (4) οἱ περὶ τὸν Λούκιον δὲ καὶ τὸν Νικόστρατον.

The name of Lucius appears in eight contexts throughout the first third of Simplicius in Cat. (1,19; 48,1; 62,28; 64,18; 73,28; 125,16; 127,30; 156,17), and abruptly ceases to be cited after Simplicius’ discussion of Quantity. There is no singular ὁ Λούκιος source (except for 262 This chapter is thus primarily concerned with the identification and distinction of sources as represented by Simplicius. While it is not my primary concern to evaluate the validity of Lucius and Nicostratus’s views as such, or their usefulness as an interpretation of the relevant passages in the Categories, I have endeavoured to provide cross-references to more detailed discussions of certain passages in other chapters.

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the passage in the proem cited above), and even verbatim quotations are often ascribed to a plural collective of οἱ περὶ Lucius or οἱ περὶ Nicostratus. (The locution οἱ περὶ τὸν X might, of course, simply refer to X as the originator of a tradition rather than a literal 'school' – although, as I suggest below, its later ancient use need not necessarily imply the existence of an historical figure). Nicostratus is cited more frequently, on thirty occasions balanced throughout the entirety of the in Cat. Like Lucius, he is often the focus of a school of followers (οἱ περὶ τὸν Νικόστρατον), but he is also a lone speaker on many occasions (e.g., Νικόστρατος ἐγκαλεῖ, 370,1; ἠμαρτεν Νικόστρατος, 381,23; ἀντιλέγει Νικόστρατος, 390,15).

Regardless of the introductory cue, Simplicius frequently continues a ‘dialogue’ argument simply with ‘them’ (φάσιν, with the speakers’ identity carried over from previous citations), even if the first cue is singular; he seems to have little interest in drawing a distinction between the parties. He is even content to roll Lucius, Nicostratus, and Plotinus together as a single interlocutor, as at 73,28 and following.

Simplicius traces certain of Plotinus’ arguments in Enneads 6.1 directly to Lucius and Nicostratus. In many cases, the stratigraphy of Simplicius’ text clarifies the places where Plotinus picked up aspects of their argument and developed their thought, and this sheds additional light on their interests. Simplicius has Plotinus endorse, and sometimes spearhead, the criticisms ascribed to Lucius and Nicostratus (for example at 127,11-128,10 = T11). He describes their criticisms in similar language: for example, Plotinus provides τὰς πραγματειωδεστάτας ἐξετάσεις (2,3), whereas Lucius and Nicostratus deliver


264 It remains an open problem whether Plotinus repeats the assertions of Lucius and Nicostratus in Enneads 6.1 in order to criticise the scheme of ontological genera that he takes the Categories to present, or simply in order to show that the Categories does not purport to describe a scheme of ontological genera at all (contrary to the view of some commentators), and may therefore be compatible with the scheme of genera that Plotinus himself will present for the intelligible world and for the sensible world in 6.2-3 respectively. Both positions were recently sketched by de Haas and Chiaradonna in Celluprica (2004, with earlier bibliography in both articles); Chiaradonna maintains the ‘differenza netta tra le tesi di Plotino e Porfirio’ against the arguments of Strange (1987) and de Haas (2001), whereas de Haas maintains that ‘the echoes in Plotinus of...Lucius and Nicostratus do not testify to his agreement with the critical tradition, but to his exploitation of it for his own purposes’. See also Chiaradonna (2002) on the earlier origins, perhaps with Lucius and Nicostratus, of Plotinus’s arguments against the Aristotelian genus.
πραγματειώδεις considerations (1.22) alongside their polemics. Simplicius sometimes appears to contrast such πραγματειώδεις exegesis with the ‘noetic’ approach ascribed to Iamblichus (at in Cat. 2.9 and following; see also Dillon, 1997). I note each of the explicit correspondences with Plotinus, and some implicit correspondences, below.

Lucius’ and Nicostratus’s ‘schools’ are explicitly cited by name throughout the first third of Simplicius’ commentary, appearing as a source for the discussions of Substance, Quantity, and Quality. But the name of Lucius ceases to be cited after the discussion of Quantity, and his last appearance is on page 156 of Kalbfleisch’s text (T12). Nicostratus and his ‘school’ continue to be cited by name throughout Simplicius’ entire commentary, and are distributed throughout his discussions of the ten categories.

History

Lucius

Excluding Simplicius’ notices in his Categories commentary, there is no evidence whatsoever for Lucius as an historical figure. In fact, even Simplicius’ direct references cite a school of associates (οἱ περὶ τὸν Λούκιον) rather than an individual.265 Moraux notes that no known Imperial philosopher can be identified with Simplicius’s ‘Lucius’.266 John Dillon observed the ‘remote possibility’ that Simplicius’ Lucius should be identified with the Etruscan Pythagorean represented by Plutarch (QC 8.7-8) as active during the nineties CE.267 However, if we do accept that Lucius was an historical philosopher, we would have to imagine that he flourished before the death of Boethus, who is represented by Simplicius as ‘replying’ to the embarrassments presented by Lucius’ school; given the evidence that makes Boethus a contemporary of Strabo, born around the sixties BCE or earlier (Strabo, Geog. 16.2.24), it would be a difficult stretch to extend the activity of his historical interlocutor into

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265 Of course, the phrase οἱ περὶ τὸν Λούκιον may simply convey the force ‘Lucius and his followers’. It is noteworthy, however, that Simplicius varies the personal name with the hoi peri X locution often in the case of Nicostratus (contrast T5, T13, T16, T18-24, T25-27 against T2-4, T14, T15), but never in the case of Lucius.

266 Moraux (1984:529).

267 Dillon, MP 344-45 observes that a Lucius, pupil of Moderatus of Gades, was an Etruscan Pythagorean ‘of the strict observance’ according to Plutarch (QC 8.7-8), who represents him as active around the 90s CE, and suggests a very ‘remote possibility’ that he is the Lucius cited by Simplicius.
the nineties CE. It is also interesting that Simplicius does not mention Lucius among the ‘ancient exegetes’ of the *Categories* (*in Cat.* 159,32-33), although there are various reasons that Lucius might not appear in that list; he may not have been viewed by Simplicius or his source as an exégetês of the text as such, or he may simply not have adopted the view on the relative that Simplicius is ascribing to the other ‘ancient exegetes’, namely Boethus, Ariston, Andronicus, Eudorus, and Athenodorus.

On the other hand, as I will suggest in the following chapter on Boethus of Sidon (chapter 5, ‘preliminary conclusions’), it is not inconceivable that this ‘Lucius’ was originally the fictional interlocutor in a commentary by Boethus in *Question and Answer* format, which might have served as the model for Porphyry’s own commentary κατὰ πεῦσιν καὶ ἀπόκρισιν. The name ‘Lucius’ itself could imply literary origins, and would be a suitable fictive name to convey Pythagorean or Platonic associations. Such an interlocutor’s ‘questions’ (which may have extended only through the discussions of Substance, Quantity, and Quality, for his name is no longer cited by Simplicius after *in Cat.* 156,17) might then have been taken up and developed by – among others – the historical philosopher Nicostratus in the second century.

Regardless of the question of Lucius’ historicity, a locution like ‘the followers of Lucius’ (οἱ περὶ τὸν Λούκιον) may refer most generally to the group of doctrines that were growing in prominence with the Neo-Pythagorean and Platonic revival of the early first century CE.

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268 ‘Lucius’ was a common name for protagonists in contemporary literature, and might even be viewed as a Roman ‘Smith’ or ‘Jones’: see, e.g., H. J. Mason, ‘The Distinction of Lucius in Apuleius’ “Metaphorphoses”’, *Phronesis* 37.2 (1983), 135-43. For a sophisticated audience, the name might have carried some particularly Pythagorean (and Platonic) connotations. The passage of Plutarch (*Table Talk* 8.7-8, 728b) mentioned earlier is one example: Plutarch’s ‘Lucius’ lives in accord with strict Pythagorean *symbola*, and follows Moderatus of Gades.

269 Although purely speculative, such an hypothesis could be carried further: for example, the name ‘Lucius’ might have masked a better known contemporary or predecessor of Boethus, or collected an agglomeration of real and invented tendentious positions that Boethus set out to confute, much as Porphyry’s interlocutor functions in his commentary *By Question and Answer*. If ‘Lucius’ indeed referred to a fictional figure, or masked a better known contemporary of Boethus, his literary origins could easily have been lost to Simplicius, who seems to have had only indirect access to the text of Boethus, and may have simply followed the habit of his sources – such as Porphyry’s lost commentary *Ad Gedalium* and Iamblichus’ lost *in Cat.* – in referring to ‘Lucius’ by name. I also discuss this possibility in the chapter on Boethus.

and to which Plotinus (who took up these arguments in *Enneads* 6.1-3)\(^{271}\) was clearly sympathetic. This ‘school of Lucius’ was active in the lifetime of Boethus, as Simplicius explicitly describes Boethus’ responses to their criticisms.\(^{272}\) A locution such as ‘the school of Lucius’ (οἱ περὶ τὸν Λούκιον) may refer most generally to the group of doctrines that were growing in prominence with the Neo-Pythagorean and Platonic revival of the early first century CE.

These doctrines may be recognized in the critical concerns of ‘the Lucians’ in the pages of Simplicius; they are not so prominent among ‘the Nicostratans’, as I seek to show below. The Lucians are concerned with the possible failure of the ten categories to distinguish the Intelligible and Sensible worlds (T9), with Intelligible Number (T11E), and with the substantiality of the Monad and the Point (T8F), which they suspect Aristotle fails to recognize. They wish to show that Quality is proximate to *ousia*, and is more descriptively useful than the Relative in the sense that Socrates is better described by his qualities than his relationships (T12, cf. T6B).\(^{273}\)

Unlike Nicostratus and his ‘school’, it is difficult to contextualize the ‘Lucians’ more precisely than this.

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\(^{271}\) In the following sections, I note Plotinus’s views as they are reported by Simplicius, especially where these reports are relevant to Simplicius’s account of the aporiai set forth by Lucius and Nicostratus. Although a full discussion of *Enn.* 6.1-3 falls outside the scope of this chapter, I have summarized in my opening chapter (1) my position on Plotinus’s status as a source, and specifically the problem of his supposed hostility to the *Categories* and reliance on Lucius and Nicostratus (see de Haas and Chiaradonna in Celluprica, 2004).

\(^{272}\) In general, Simplicius seems to position the ‘dialogues’ he portrays in chronological order, but he sometimes interjects strikingly anachronistic discussions, such as the first-century Boethus ‘replying’ to problems raised by the third-century Plotinus. I have sought to show in the preceding chapter that those passages concerning Boethus, Lucius, and Nicostratus do represent a genuine historical discussion.

\(^{273}\) See Moraux (1984:548-50), and further discussion below.
In contrast to Lucius, Karl Praechter has presented attractive evidence for the historical Nicostratus, identifying him with the Claudius Nicostratus who is honoured on a Delphic stone (Sylloge II 3868) shortly after ‘Gaius, son of Xenon’ and shortly before the philosopher Taurus. As this Gaius is probably to be identified with the Platonist Gaius, and Taurus was another prominent philosopher of the Platonic school, we may conjecture with Dillon that Nicostratus was ‘in more or less the same position as Taurus was later’, and we may also follow Dillon in ‘seeing in all this a tendency on the part of the Delphians (perhaps as a result of the influence of Plutarch) to honour prominent Platonists’ (1977:234). There was not likely to have been any formal ‘Academy’ of which Nicostratus was ‘head’, but there would be reasons, judging solely from his associations on this stone and his attitudes toward Aristotle and toward the ‘intelligible world’ in the pages of Simplicius, to identify him as a ‘Middle Platonist’. Conversely, some aspects of his methodology point to a Stoic background, although he seems to use Stoic language merely as a polemical device to trip up Aristotle (see, e.g., his discussion of homonymy at 26,22 = T3): it is certainly not clear whether he was committed to any Stoic doctrines.

Simplicius makes it plain that Nicostratus postdates Boethus (cf. 23,29 and following = T4), whose floruit may have extended into the early first century CE, and that he antedates Atticus (cf. 30,16-17 = T5), whose floruit fell in the 170s CE. Thus the textual evidence supports a date for Nicostratus as flourishing close to the early second century CE, as the Delphic inscription honouring Claudius Nicostratus would indicate.

Nicostratus’ doctrinal concerns appear less prominent in Simplicius’ pages than are those of the ‘school of Lucius’. Nicostratus is interested in raising puzzles (aporiai) about the structure of Aristotle’s text (see 21,2; 24,6; 25,9 = T2), his style and rhetoric (58,14-28 = T7), and imputed textual inconsistency (368,1-371,27 = T16). By contrast, the ‘Lucians’ often criticize Aristotle’s positions because they do not see these positions as complying with certain a priori doctrines – for example, the setting of the intelligible world and the substantiality of intelligible Number and quality (as at T9). But Nicostratus and his school

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seek to exploit perceived weaknesses in the internal consistency of Aristotle’s logic or the text (e.g. T5); an excellent example of Nicostratus’ own methodology is the long, evidently verbatim passage from Nicostratus (supported by Plotinus, and rebutted by Simplicius and Iamblichus) at 368,1-371,27 = T16.

**Portrayal as critics**

Simplicius paints Lucius and Nicostratus primarily as polemical figures. Before contrasting their positions, I would like to focus on the tactics and modes of argumentation that they (or their schools) are portrayed as deploying against Aristotle.

*As Aporists*

Lucius and Nicostratus are represented as creators of ‘puzzles’ or of ‘questions’ (ἀπορίαι). Simplicius initially describes them as ‘content’ (ἠρέσει) to be aporists: ‘some were content to write only aporiai against what is said: this is what Lucius did, and after him Nicostratus’ (1,19 = T1). That portrayal is borne out by the active verbs that Simplicius employs to describe Lucius and Nicostratus elsewhere in the text.

Early in the commentary, ‘the followers of Nicostratus’ are concerned to highlight problems about the so-called ‘onymies’. They ‘raise puzzles’ (ἀποροῦσιν: see 21,2; 24,6; 25,9) as to why Aristotle opens the text with the onymies rather than the categories proper, why he discusses pragmata when he claims to be discussing lexeis, and why he limits the scope of ‘homonymy’ to nouns (21,2-25,9 = T2). The same problems have been closely studied by modern critics.275 These, Simplicius states, are among the ‘substantial’ (πραγματειώδεις) and useful problems to which Lucius and Nicostratus draw our attention (cf. 1,22).

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275 See my chapter 2, ‘Categories 1-2 in modern criticism’, for further discussion. For example, John Rist (1989:94) lays aside 1a1-15 as ‘loosely connected’ with the rest of the text; according to related interpretations, as Barrington Jones rhetorically suggests (1972:117), the first chapter appears as ‘an incidental excrescence on the work’. Michael Wedin (2000:11-37) cites earlier scholars who held the same view, such as Brandis (1833:267) and Ross (1924:1, lxxxii). Ackrill (1963:69), however, follows the ancient commentary tradition in describing 1a1-15 as containing ‘certain preliminary points and explanations’ presupposed by the main body of the work. Many critics agree, holding that a coherent interpretation of 1a1-15 is valuable for the interpretation of the text; for example, see Jones, Dancy (1975), Frede (1987), Furth (1988), Wedin (2000), and Mann (2000). For a broader perspective, see Shields’s (2003) analysis of the role of homonymy in Aristotle, including Aristotle’s apparent inferences from the katêgoriai to the homonymy of being (e.g., 244-45).
Lucius and Nicostratus raise further ‘puzzles’ about homonymy in particular, arguing that homonyms are not really significant and therefore cannot be ‘names’ in the proper sense (ἀποροῦσι δὲ καί, 26.21 = T3). Nicostratus alone (ὁ Νικόστρατος) also ‘aporizes’ to the effect that homonyms appear to be synonyms according to Aristotle’s definition (30,16-22 = T5).

The aporiai raised by ‘the followers of Lucius’ early in the text appear to be more ‘doctrinal’ in content, and revolve around the Categories’ account of οὐσία. The Lucians claim that accidents such as qualities cannot be ‘in a substrate’ at all, according to Aristotle’s theory, and argue that the theoretical framework of ‘accidents’ implies the absurdity that Socrates is an accident of his place and time (48.1-50.3 = T6). In fact, they may view Aristotle as (incorrectly) demoting the ontological status of Quality (T12). The ‘followers of Lucius’ also join Plotinus and Nicostratus in ‘raising the puzzle’ (ἀπορεῖ, 73,26 = T9A) as to whether the ten categories describe the sensible or the intelligible realm: ‘Plotinus’ and ‘Nicostratus’ reportedly develop the puzzle (ἀποροῦσι, 76,14 = T9B) with a focus on how the term ousia can describe a single genus embracing the intelligible and the sensible worlds.

The portrayal of Lucius or Nicostratus as ‘puzzle-raisers’ continues later in the text. There are further problems described as ‘puzzles’ in the discussion of Quantity (130,31 = T11G, 140,22 = T11O) and of Having (368,1-371,27 = T16). However, Lucius ceases to be explicitly cited after the discussion of the first three categories.

As Accusers

The followers of Nicostratus are also associated with more polemical verbs, ‘accusing’ or ‘reproaching’ Aristotle. The focus of the ‘Nicostratans’ often comes across as relatively superficial, from Simplicius’ viewpoint, and concerned with the structure of the text of

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276 If all homonyma share the name in virtue of which they are homonyma, in addition to the definition of the homonymous name, yet they are different things, they are also synonyma. Anton (1969:16), in explaining this problem and the commentators’ responses to it, comments on Simplicius’s response (providing an analysis of ‘accidental’ and ‘intentional’ classes of homonym: 31,23 and following) as an example of the ‘doctrine of homonyma ... strained to suit the commentators’ own intellectual loyalties’. Anton and Chase (2003) roster the other commentators on the passage, including Porphyry 65.18; Boethius 166BC; Ammonius 21,16-22,10; Philoponus 16,20,17-11; David [Elias] 139,29-140,25.
Aristotle and his rhetoric. For example, they ‘reproach’ (ἐγκαλοῦσι) Aristotle for claiming that homonymy belongs only to the category of *ousia*. They base this claim on their interpretation of the phrase λόγος τῆς ὀυσίας at 1a2 (see 29,23-30,5 = T4); the challenges associated with the text τῆς ὀυσίας, which Andronicus and Boethus did not read, have similarly exercised modern translators and commentators.\textsuperscript{277}

The Nicostratans also reproach Aristotle for ‘unnecessary verbiage’ (ματαιολογία)\textsuperscript{278} when he points out that ‘two-footed’ is not a differentia of knowledge (58,14-17 = T7). This appears, in Simplicius’s terms, to be a sample of their ‘disputatious’, rhetorical objections ‘to nearly everything in the book’ (cf. 1,20); yet Simplicius feels compelled to provide a defense. He comments that Aristotle’s meaning was not ‘self-evident’ (πρόχειρος) without the additional example, citing a perceived confusion of Herminus\textsuperscript{279} about the meaning of ἔτερα καὶ μὴ ὑπάλληλα (Cat. 1b16) which the example, when properly interpreted, clears up. It is difficult to establish whether this criticism should be taken at face value, especially without a more precise sense of the rhetorical or technical force that the author of the criticism might have attached to ματαιολογία. At face value, it may simply be a pejorative effort to tar Aristotle with the brush of poor rhetoric and rambling (see, e.g. Plutarch *De lib. ed. 6F*9 for a similar sense); indeed, the overall tone of T2 shows that Nicostratus is interested in showing the structural and rhetorical incoherence of the *Categories*, not only its supposed philosophical inconsistency.

The Nicostratans ‘charge’ Aristotle with a more serious error in describing the substrate as possessing the differentiae of its predicate (58,14-28 = T7). As Simplicius outlines the

\textsuperscript{277} See my chapter 2, under ‘Logos tês ousias’, for further discussion. The problem with translations such as, for example, ‘definition of being’ (Ackrill 124) is the implication that a τί ἐστι τινι εἶναι statement cannot be answered for entities that are not *ousiai* (at least in the strict sense later expressed at 2b11), which points to the problem raised by Lucius and Nicostratus. On the importance of the textual problem in general, see for example J. P. Anton, ‘The Aristotelian Doctrine of *Homonyma* in the *Categories* and its Platonic Antecedents’, *JHPh* 6.4 (1968), 315-26 and ‘Ancient Interpretations of Aristotle’s Doctrine of “Homonyma”’, *JHPh* 7.1 (1969), 1-18.

\textsuperscript{278} The word ματαιολογία itself is not recorded before Plutarch (*De lib. ed. 6F*9) and the New Testament, but the verbal form ματαιολογέω is found as early as Aesop (*Fab*. 39a, 7) and Strabo (2.1.19, 29).

\textsuperscript{279} Discussed in my chapter 7. The passage relevant for Herminus is 58,19-21 (ἔπειτα ὡς ὅτι οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἐμμίνον τὸ ἔτερα καὶ μὴ ὑπάλληλα οὐ καλῶς ἔξεδεξάντο, νομίζοντες δυνατὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὑπάλληλα οὐντα ὧφ' ἐν ἀνάγεσθαι γένος· οὕτως οὐκ, ἵν πρόχειρος ὁ λόγος, κἂν τὰ παραδείγματα καλῶς ληφθέντα σαφή τὸν λόγον ποιή).
problem, ‘animal and rational animal are subordinate one to the other; since rational and irrational are differentiae of animal, how is it possible for one part of rational animal to be rational, while the other is irrational?’ (58,25-27). There seems to be a genuine challenge here; Ackrill shares their view on this passage of the Categories, commenting that ‘as it stands it is a howler’ (1963:77). Ackrill suggests that the line ‘probably requires emendation’, and he settles on just the emendation advanced by Boethus of Sidon (in Cat. 58,27-29): to read ὅσαι τοῦ ὑποκειμένου διαφοραί, τοσάυτα καὶ τοῦ κατηγορουμένου ἔσονται, thus transposing the words κατηγορουμένου and ὑποκειμένου. Both the Nicostratans’ charge and Boethus’s proposed solution provide good examples of the anticipation of modern criticism in the commentators. Simplicius does not select the solution by emendation, although he praises Boethus for ‘pointing the way to the solution of the problem’; instead he solves the problem by distinguishing divisive from constitutive differentiae (59,5-24), a solution which, as Ackrill points out, may be difficult to support from the immediate context.

The Nicostratans introduce various ‘accusations’ and ‘charges’ of a similar nature throughout the discussion of Quantity (T11), and Nicostratus himself (ὁ Νικόστρατος) accuses Aristotle of inconsistency, as when he contrasts Aristotle’s description of the category ἔξις as incompatible with his account of τὸ ἔχειν in chapter 15. In 368,12-369,14 = T16B, a valuable direct quotation, Nicostratus objects that the definition of the category ‘having’ does not belong to any of the senses of the word ‘having’ that are sketched in chapter 15: ‘If one is to be exact about it (ἀκριβολογῆται), none of the [senses] given signifies ‘having’ in the sense of the genus (τὸ ἔχειν τὸ ὡς γένος σημαίνει).’ (I discuss this passage further in the following section on respondents to Nicostratus). This is an example of Nicostratus seeking to show the internal inconsistency of Aristotle’s text, strictly as an aporia; and as far as Simplicius tells us, he does not proceed to substitute an alternative view that he himself endorses (such as the ‘Academic’ statement on ‘having’ about which Iamblichus informs us at 369,20).

The followers of Lucius are also presented by Simplicius in polemical, ‘accusatory’ language. However, the Lucians also demonstrate a different interest in doctrinal problems surrounding the first category in particular. They accuse (ἐγκαλοῦσιν) Aristotle of transferring σῶμα to the category of Quantity, when it is clearly Ousia (125,16 = T10; cf. Cat. ch. 6); just earlier in
the commentary (124,29-125,1), Simplicius hinted at an approach to this problem provided by Herminus, who thinks mathematical body is quantity but ‘natural’ body is ousia (καὶ γὰρ σῶμα ἀξιῶ ἀποικεῖν ὁ Ἑρμῖνος οὐ τὸ φυσικὸν (οὐσία γὰρ), ἀλλὰ τὸ μαθηματικὸν). This objection may have carried some weight, as Boethus appears to take it seriously (65,19-24 = Boethus T14l, a passage Moraux, 1973:155, takes to show that Boethus ‘an die substantielle Realität von intelligiblen Zahlen glaubte’; cp. Tarán 1981:516).

They also accuse Aristotle of mistakenly regarding the Relative as ‘closer’ to ousia than Quality; surely Quality is nearer to ousia, because it is better at identifying Socrates than are his Relatives (156,16 = T12). Boethus defended Aristotle vigorously against this line of attack: see Boethus at 163,6-9 = Boethus T14r, and the following chapter of this study.

**Summary of portrayal as critics**

Simplicius commonly describes the activity of the ‘Lucians’, the ‘Nicostratans’, and Nicostratus himself through the aporetic verb ἀπορίζω or through the polemical verbs ἐγκαλέω and αἰτιάομαι.

Nicostratus and his ‘school’ are represented, especially early in the commentary, as interested in a common set of rhetorical and logical issues. In the examples that we have cited, the ‘Nicostratans’ suggest that the text is poorly structured (T2), that Aristotle’s definitions of the onymies are insufficiently precise or self-contradictory (T3, T4, T5), that Aristotle is being too wordy (T7), and that he is being sloppy and inconsistent in describing his own key terms, such as ‘having’ (T16B). They find fault with Aristotle’s use of illustrative examples for various reasons, sometimes on grounds of style (T7A), sometimes on grounds of appropriateness (T27). In general, Nicostratus and the ‘Nicostratans’ demonstrate a broad and often rhetorically-minded interest in the *Categories* as a comprehensive text, tackling the minutiae of many categories such as Having (as Plotinus appears to take some cues from Nicostratus in T16) as well as the theory of contraries and contradictories (T18-T25), and

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280 Quality does precede Relation at Cat. 1b26 (and Top. ch. 9), but not in Aristotle’s full exposition later in the *Categories*. I take the ‘accusation’ reported by Simplicius to be (at least in part) a gambit to demonstrate that Aristotle should recognise the substantial reality of Quality, much as 65,19-24 seeks to show that Aristotle should recognise the substantial reality of Quantity. Compare the remarks of Eudorus (206,10 and following, with primary texts discussed in my chapter 7), who also sought to fix the order of categories.
their criticisms occur throughout the text (albeit with a definite bias towards the first three categories, which may be a bias of Simplicius’s sources rather than their own).

The ‘Lucians’ appear to approach the *Categories* with a more specific set of doctrinal concerns in mind. They are disturbed about the demotion of Forms and Qualities to the status of accidents, and strive to reduce this position to absurdity (T6); in general, they find that qualities are undervalued in Aristotle’s order (T12). They argue that the system of the *Categories* is insufficiently rich to encompass intelligible reality as well as sensible reality (T9). They find no place in Aristotle’s system for the Monad and the Point, those essential Pythagorean entities, and roundly criticize Aristotle for this omission (T8F). (Notably Boethus, in his response to the Lucians, is represented by Simplicius as accepting a certain substantiality for the Monad: ἡ μονὰς διττή, ἡ μὲν οὐσία, ἡ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ ἀριθμῷ…, 65,20-21 = Boethus T14l). The Lucians are also accustomed to a philosophical framework that establishes ‘body’ (σῶμα) as substantial, and they are puzzled to find it demoted to the status of a Quantity (T10). All of this suggests that the Lucians ascribed some ontological value to the ordering of the ten categories, and commenced a tradition of criticism that would continue in Plotinus 6.1.

**Questions and responses**

The puzzles put forward by ‘Lucius’ and the Nicostratans are never final. Simplicius presents their criticisms and questions, and then describes the various solutions provided by his predecessors – especially Boethus, Porphyry, and Iamblichus. As a result, we are left with the strong impression that the schools represented by ‘Lucius and Nicostratus’ sparked a long tradition of historical dialogue around the *Categories*, and that the organization of the ‘historical dialogue’ (as described in the concluding remarks of the next chapter) provides some insight into the stratigraphy of Simplicius’ sources. However, the stratigraphy is not always or necessarily chronological.

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281 This well-known and somewhat controversial passage is discussed in detail in my chapter on Boethus, specifically with reference to the debate of Moraux and Tarán regarding Boethus’s position on intelligible number.
The Appendix of Texts to this chapter lays out each *aporia* together with the identity of the respondents portrayed by Simplicius. Based on these data, the following table maps the system of questions and responses.

**Table of Responses**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ref.</th>
<th>In Cat.</th>
<th>Primary aporist</th>
<th>2nd aporists</th>
<th>Respondent</th>
<th>2nd respondents</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T2</td>
<td>21,2-25,9</td>
<td>Hoi peri N.</td>
<td><em>they</em></td>
<td>Porphyry</td>
<td>Iamblichus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T3</td>
<td>26,21-28,1</td>
<td>Hoi peri N.</td>
<td><em>they</em></td>
<td>Some [commentators]’</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>T4</td>
<td>29,23-30,5</td>
<td>Hoi peri N.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Porphyry</td>
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<tr>
<td>T5</td>
<td>30,16-22</td>
<td>Nicostratus</td>
<td>Atticus</td>
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<td>T6</td>
<td>48,1-50,3</td>
<td>Hoi peri L.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Porphyry</td>
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<tr>
<td>T7</td>
<td>58,14-28</td>
<td>Hoi peri N.</td>
<td>[Hoi peri L.]</td>
<td>Boethus</td>
<td>Simplicius</td>
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<td>T8</td>
<td>62,28-65,14</td>
<td>Hoi peri L. &amp; N.</td>
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<td>Simplicius</td>
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<td>T9</td>
<td>73,15-76,16</td>
<td>Plotinus</td>
<td>Hoi Peri L.&amp;N.</td>
<td>Simplicius</td>
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<td>T10</td>
<td>12516</td>
<td>Hoi peri L.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Simplicius</td>
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<td>T11</td>
<td>127,11-128,10</td>
<td>Hoi peri L. &amp; N.</td>
<td>Plotinus</td>
<td>Simplicius</td>
<td>Porphyry, Iamblichus, Plotinus</td>
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<tr>
<td>T12</td>
<td>15616</td>
<td>Hoi peri L.</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Boethus</td>
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<td>T13</td>
<td>231,19-23</td>
<td>Nicostratus</td>
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<td>T14</td>
<td>257,31-36</td>
<td>Hoi peri N.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Iamblichus?</td>
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<td>T15</td>
<td>268,19-32</td>
<td>Hoi peri N.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>T16</td>
<td>368,1-371,27</td>
<td>Plotinus</td>
<td>Nicostratus</td>
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<td>T17</td>
<td>381,3-32</td>
<td>Peripatetikoi’</td>
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<td>T18</td>
<td>385,9-411,28</td>
<td>Nicostratus</td>
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<tr>
<td>T24</td>
<td>(passim)</td>
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<td>T25</td>
<td>414,23-415,15</td>
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<td>T26</td>
<td>428,3-430,4</td>
<td>Nicostratus</td>
<td>Simplicius</td>
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This table goes to highlight the considerable focus of the Lucius and Nicostratus sources on the first three categories and on the earlier third of Simplicius’ commentary. This focus may represent Simplicius’s (or his sources’) own interest, rather than the focus of the Lucius and Nicostratus sources themselves.

In each instance, Simplicius tends to open the discussion with a problem posed by the ‘Lucians’ or by Nicostratus’ school, and then describe, often in a generalized dialogue form, the positions taken by various historical commentators with respect to this problem. In some cases the dialogue is represented as a single question and single answer.
Respondents to the Nicostratans

The core set of problems credited to the Nicostratans tend to be handled directly by Porphyry (T2, T4-T6), and in one case by ‘Porphyry’s followers’ (T25). As is often suggested in the literature, it seems likely that Simplicius’ source for these Nicostratan problems is Porphyry’s commentary Ad Gedalium. Moreover, Porphyry appears to be Simplicius’ direct source for the sequence of dialogue with other historical figures such as Boethus (see e.g. T9 and my chapter 5) and Atticus, who, in Simplicius’s view, develops and improves upon Nicostratus’s aporia that homonyms are synonyms (see T5, and Anton 1969:16).

Simplicius highlights the reliance of certain passages in Plotinus Enneads 6.1 upon Nicostratus, particularly later in the commentary. In several long back-and-forth exchanges (e.g. T9, T11 and T16) Simplicius sketches a complex stratigraphy of question and answer, from which one sometimes derives the peculiarly atemporal impression that Nicostratus developed certain problems raised by Plotinus, until Boethus helped to solve them.

Particularly where Plotinus is involved, however, and in the discussion of the later categories, Simplicius becomes less concerned with the discussion of ‘historical’ figures, and strikingly begins to respond directly to ‘Nicostratus’ rather than the previously favored locution hoi peri ton Nikostraton. In these later passages where the new language predominates, Porphyry appears less prominent: Simplicius frequently cites Iamblichus as his source for solutions (T13-T15, T17), and also introduces the previously unused locution hoi peri ton Porphurion (T25). In these later parts of the commentary, it seems probable that Porphyry’s Ad Gedalium is being read through the lens of Iamblichus’ commentary (perhaps more than it was earlier), as Simplicius’ own introductory remarks (in Cat. 3,1-4) suggest.282

After these Iamblichus-citations are introduced, Simplicius gradually ceases to cite explicit sources for the solutions to Nicostratus’ problems. Instead, Simplicius offers solutions to the

282 Simplicius’ account of his own practice, given in the opening pages of his commentary (1-3), suggests that he recognized an historical progression of commentators including Themistius, Alexander, Herminus, Maximus, Boethus, Lucius, Nicostratus, Plotinus, Porphyry, Dexippus, and Iamblichus, and that his primary (direct) source was the commentary of Iamblichus, supplemented with ‘some’ (3,1) direct reading of the earlier sources that Iamblichus cited.
final Nicostratan problems in his own voice – but these solutions likely belong to Iamblichus as well, as described by Simplicius in the proem to his commentary (tr. Chase):

Now, I have read some of the aforementioned writings, and, following Iamblichus as carefully as possible, I wrote them down, often even using the philosopher’s very words. […] I wished to reduce this man’s lofty spirit, inaccessible to the common people, until it was more clear and commensurate [with the common understanding].

A good example of this system of questions and responses is 368,1-371-27 = T16. Nicostratus notes that it is unclear which, if any, among the senses of ‘having’ at Cat. 15b17-30 answer to the category. He goes on (368,26-369,14) to break down the senses in detail, assigning the first (state, condition) to Quality; the second (size) to Quantity; the third, fourth, and seventh (things-around, as on a part, as a possession) to Relation; the fifth (as a part) to Relation or Substance; and rejecting the eighth (as husband to wife) and concluding that none of these answers to the category. Simplicius now brings Iamblichus on stage, who retorts that the force of the category is concealed in the third sense (things-around) and the fourth sense (on a part), and that Nicostratus is simply insufficiently graced with ἀγχίνοια to notice this (370,5).

The subsequent introduction of Plotinus (Enn. 6.1.23) at 370,11 – portrayed as if he is jousting with a contemporary Iamblichus across the room, in a classic sample of ‘Simplician dialogue’ – likely derives from Iamblichus’s own commentary, and perhaps, through it, from Porphyry. Thus it is inserted here after Iamblichus’s initial response to Nicostratus and before the longer discussion of Metaphysics 5.23 on the senses of having (largely a paraphrase of 1023a8 and following); and this entire back-and-forth, including a report of Boethus, is then wrapped up at 374,7 where Simplicius mentions that Iamblichus has just completed τὴν τοῦ ἔχειν τεχνολογίαν, and will now proceed to deliver a higher criticism, τῆς νοερᾶς περὶ αὐτοῦ θεωρίας ἀντιλαβόμενος. Iamblichus’s search for an ‘intelligible’ account of the category, then, commences from a critical engagement with Nicostratus and Plotinus, both of whom are

283 Nicostratus does not appear to comment on the sixth sense (ὡς ἐν ἀγγεῖῳ).
concerned with the problem whether the *Categories* analysis of substance attempts to account for both intelligible and sensible substance (76.14-17 = **T9B**; cf. Plotinus 6.1.2).

The ‘wrap-up’ at 374,7 strongly suggests that Simplicius is drawing on Iamblichus throughout the preceding pages, including the report and criticism of Nicostratus and the dialogue with Plotinus. Indeed, I note a problematic section (371,23-24) where Simplicius has been interpreted from the context\(^284\) to cite Plotinus via φησίν, although these words do not occur in our text of Plotinus 6.1.23 (ἀλλά ἄτοπος, φησίν, ἀποδοκιμάζων τὸ λέγειν ἔχεσθαι γυναῖκα σύνηθες ὄν). It seems plausible that φησίν here could alternatively represent Iamblichus, presenting a point of view (not necessarily Plotinus’s own) in the voice of a rhetorical interlocutor.\(^285\)

**Respondents to the Lucians**

The situation is rather different with the first portion of the commentary, throughout Simplicius’ representation of respondents to the ‘school of Lucius’. Boethus figures heavily here, as in **T6, T7** (implicit),\(^286\) **T8** and **T12**.

The associates of Lucius appear at 48,1-50,3 = **T6** to argue that (A) ‘the things which complete substance’ (ta sumplêrôtika tês ousias) cannot be ‘in a substrate’, certainly not without being ‘parts’, and moreover that (B) Aristotle’s definition would make even Socrates appear to be ‘in a substrate’. Porphyry answers the first problem (with some additional commentary by Simplicius himself), but Boethus answers the second problem. The ‘Lucians’ may be making this case in order to prove that qualities are ‘substantial’ in a way that, on their view, Aristotle’s argument would not allow (cf. **T12**).


\(^285\) There is also an argument advanced by P. Henry (1987:123 and following) that Porphyry had access to oral lectures of Plotinus, and that passages that appear to be Plotinian, yet are not presented using the exact text of the *Enneads* (such as 73,15 and following) could represent these lectures. Michael Chase (2003:152) suspects that the mediation of Porphyry’s *Ad Gedalium* commentary, and of Iamblichus’s commentary, is sufficient to explain the difference of text. Certainly, on my view in the case of the present passage, Iamblichus may have (nearly) paraphrased the arguments of Plotinus without clearly endorsing or rejecting them, before providing his own ‘intellective’ interpretation.

\(^286\) See discussion below, with the footnote to **T7** in the Appendix of Texts for this chapter.
At 58,14-28 = T7, the Nicostratans are (A) credited with a rather tendentious attack on Aristotle’s ‘unnecessary verbiage’ (mataiologia; see note on the usage above), and ‘they’ (third person plural) are further credited (B) with an objection to the Aristotelian position that the substrate has all the differentiae of the predicate: how, they ask, can the rational animal inherit both ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’ (τὸ τέ λογικὸν καὶ τὸ ἄλογον) from the genus ‘animal’? Boethus is said to have ‘given in’ to this latter problem (ἐνδοὺς τῇ ἀπορίᾳ) by amending the text.287 But it seems chronologically unlikely for Boethus to have literally ‘given in’ to a problem first discovered by Nicostratus.288 With the exception of T7, Boethus replies to ‘Lucian’ arguments but does not reply to ‘Nicostratan’ arguments. I believe that the third person plural at T7B (but not T7A) refers loosely and implicitly to the Lucians, and not to the Nicostratans. This would not be unprecedented, as Simplicius elsewhere introduces a position ascribed to Nicostratus’ school and then continues the same position to hoi peri ton Loukion as if it makes no difference (64,13-20 = T9). Thus T7B is, like T6B, an example of Boethus responding directly to the ‘Lucians’; it is also an example of Simplicius roughly conflating the Lucian and Nicostratan positions (cf. Moraux II, 528-63) in such a way that ‘Lucius’ appears to underlie Nicostratus.

At T8, Simplicius begins a comprehensive discription of commentators who ‘opposed the division’ of the ten categories. He describes the Nicostratans among those who declared the division deficient, and continues this view to the Lucians.

The Lucians, according to Simplicius, held that Aristotle wrongly omitted conjunctions, articles, negations, privations, moods of verbs, the monad, and the point (T8C-F: I believe that the linguistic concerns in T8C may be wrongly ascribed to the Lucians, for reasons I

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287 See the discussion under ‘Differentiae’ in my chapter on Boethus. Boethus reverses the order of the terms ‘subject’ and ‘predicate’ at 1b23-24 to give ‘however many differentiae there are of the subject (ὑποκειμένου), there will be just as many differentiae of the predicate (κατηγορουμένου)’. Ackrill, in his commentary (1963:77) adopts a similar approach.

288 Firstly, Boethus’ birth is (as securely as possible) dated to the 60s BCE, and we have discussed fairly firm, if conjectural, reasons to date Nicostratus’ floruit to the second century CE. Moreover, there are other instances in Simplicius, such as 29,23-30,5 = T4, which seem to make it clear that Nicostratus cannot have been active (or, at least, active and widely known) before Boethus or contemporary with him. There Nicostratus criticizes a reading at 1a1-2 that Boethus clearly did not know.
argue in the following chapter 6 on Athenodorus and Cornutus;\(^{289}\) however, T8F is correctly assigned. Simplicius appears to respond directly to the linguistic omissions (T8C-E), but it is Boethus who responds to T8F, the omission of the monad and the point, with a distinctive solution that accords some substantiality to these mathematical and geometrical entities (Boethus T14l in my chapter 4), with an argument that these entities may be both substance and quantity.

At T9, the ‘Lucians’ are among those commentators who question whether the ten categories can describe intelligible as well as sensible beings, and it appears that the Lucians may have been the first to raise this problem (which was amplified by Nicostratus and Plotinus). Simplicius, Boethus, and Porphyry are among the respondents, with Porphyry correcting Boethus as described in the following chapter 5.

Early during the discussion of Quantity, Simplicius replies directly and in his own voice to the Lucians (125,16 = T10) when they question why Aristotle transfers body to the category of Quantity rather than substance. His solution is markedly similar to that ascribed to Boethus at T8F: much like the monad and the point, body is both substance and quantity. It is possible that the Boethan both and response implicitly underlies the comparable solution to T10 as well.

In the broader issues regarding Quantity in the very complex passage 127,11-128-10 = T11, the Lucians are included with the Nicostratans and Plotinus as holding that magnitude is not a quantity, but a ‘so much’ – because only Number, properly understood, is truly Quantity. They also wonder why sensible number is not substance, whereas intelligible number is (T11E). Their doctrinal interest seems to follow T9 (and to a lesser extent T8) where the Lucians are also concerned with the intelligible-sensible distinction and whether Aristotle has fully grasped its significance – and are particularly interested in his treatment of ‘substantial’

\(^{289}\) There are some oddities in this passage, and in chapter 6 on Athenodorus and Cornutus, I propose that it may be wrongly ascribed to the followers of Lucius. While some of the discussion in that chapter is specific to Athenodorus and Cornutus, two points may be briefly made here. First, ‘Lucius’ is unusually named here apart from Nicostratus, and most strangely, he is named immediately after Nicostratus with a differing view. Simplicius does not elsewhere set ‘Lucius’ and ‘Nicostratus’ against one another in this way, nor in this order. Second, just after the ascription to Lucius, but before the Porphyrian answer that is elsewhere associated with the Stoics, our text of Simplicius has a lacuna. This issue is discussed in further detail in chapter 6.
quantities, including ‘Number’ in an almost Pythagorean sense (T11E) as well as the Monad and the Point (T8) and ‘body’ itself (T10).

The final problem explicitly raised by the ‘Lucians’ involves the substantiality of Quality (156,16 = T12). Much as the Lucians were previously concerned with the substantiality of quantities, they are here concerned to demonstrate that Quality is closer to Substance than is the Relative. Boethus responds directly (see Boethus passages T4e* and T4d* in the next chapter, and cf. 163,6 and following = T14r) that the best descriptions are gained, not merely through qualities, but through differentiae. This treatment by the Lucians is already mirrored by Eudorus, who is also concerned about the order of the categories and places the category of quality closer to ousia (Simplicius, in Cat. 206,10 = T6d) on the grounds that it really is more proximate to ousia.

**Summary of treatment by respondents**

In those passages where the ‘Lucians’ are directly cited, they tend to underlie the positions of Nicostratus (and often Plotinus), particularly in complex passages such as T11. When Boethus is cited early in the commentary, he tends to respond directly to issues raised by the Lucians; on the occasion when he appears to be made to reply to Nicostratus (T7), it is likely that the Lucians still underlie the argument and it is to them that he is responding. (Simplicius is not especially concerned to represent the argument in chronological order, as the organization of e.g. Herminus, Athenodorus, Cornutus, Lucius, and Nicostratus [T8A] makes clear). It is later in the commentary when other figures, especially Iamblichus, respond directly to ‘Nicostratan’ points taken over by Plotinus.

The Lucians appear to have a doctrinal concern that is shared to a great extent by Plotinus (and by extension, in some passages, by the Nicostratans). This concern involves the substantiality of quantities and qualities; the distinction of intelligible from sensible reality; and whether the Categories system is capable of describing these distinctions and recognizing entities such as intelligible (and substantial) Number. These concerns share, as Dillon points out, a great deal of affinity with the Neopythagorean and Middle Platonic metaphysical tradition in general. They also seem to share affinities with Eudorus in particular, and we may posit, since Boethus appears to respond directly to Lucius, that
Lucius was an early representative of the views propounded by Eudorus, but applied them directly to a commentary on the *Categories* to which Boethus was obliged to reply. Nor were his views without influence; the set of responses given by Boethus as represented by Simplicius, particularly around the Monad and the Point, suggest that even Boethus was prepared to grant a kind of substantiality to certain quantities in response (e.g. at Boethus text T14l: see the next chapter for discussion). Moraux (155) suggests that Boethus is influenced by Speusippus and therefore ‘an die substantielle Realität von intelligiblen Zahlen glaubte’; although Tarán (1981) criticizes this interpretation, Boethus’s thinking about quantity does seem to have been formulated here in response to such ‘Pythagoreanising’ and ‘Platonising’ difficulties about the *Categories*.

The Nicostratans have a broader set of textual, rhetorical, and logical issues to discuss, which seem to have interested Atticus (30,16-22 = T5) as well as Porphyry and Iamblichus. However, they often share the more specific interests of the Lucians (e.g. T8, T9, T11) and ‘Nicostratan’ ideas, particularly when they appear to overlay ‘Lucian’ questions, anticipate Plotinus (T9, T11, T16).
5. Boethus of Sidon
Some commentators, however, also applied deeper thoughts to the work, as did the admirable Boethus.

Simplicius, in Cat. 1.8 [T14A], tr. M. Chase

To a reader of the sixth-century Neoplatonist Simplicius, Boethus of Sidon will appear to have dominated Peripatetic discourse on the Categories into the first century of our era (see Appendix of Texts). Outside of the Neoplatonic tradition, however, the work of Boethus is scarcely attested in Greek, and has left no explicit record at all in Latin. In coming to grips with his life and thought, which are indeed influential, we are limited to deductions that may be drawn from his philosophical doxography, and to a reference in the Geography of Strabo.

Life

Strabo (63/64 BCE–c. 24 CE), writing in the early first century CE, reports that he ‘studied Aristotle’ with Boethus (συνεφιλοσοφήσαμεν ἡμεῖς τὰ Ἀριστοτέλεια, Geog. 16.2.24 = T0). The word συνεφιλοσοφήσαμεν may imply that Strabo was taught by Boethus, or that they read Aristotle as fellow-students of a common master. As Strabo’s birth can be fixed

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291 While citations of Boethus Stoicus are common in the Latin corpus, there is no certain citation of Boethus Peripateticus in Latin – unless Macrobius in Somn. Scip. 1.14.19 refers to Boethus Peripateticus; the reference is ambiguous.

292 Perhaps under Andronicus of Rhodes (cf. Strabo, Geog. 14.2.13), or under Xenarchus of Seleucia (cf. 14.5.4). For literature on the question, see the earlier chapter on Andronicus.

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around 63/64 BCE, Boethus’ activity is generally assumed, chiefly on the authority of this passage, to have fallen early in the first century BCE (if he was Strabo’s tutor), or later in the first century BCE (if they were contemporaries). For reasons outlined below, the latter deduction seems more plausible.

Some further information may be gleaned from Geog. 16.2.24 = T0: Strabo reveals that Boethus had a brother (ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ) named Diodotus, and proceeds to mention two ‘contemporary’ (καθ ἡμᾶς) Sidonian philosophers, Antipater of Tyre and Apollonius, the latter flourishing ‘a little before my time’ (μικρὸν πρὸ ἡμῶν). Both references confirm the approximate chronology of the first century. They may also suggest some Stoic associations.

**Relationship to ‘Lucius and Nicostratus’**

Do the later sources offer any further clues to the chronology of Boethus’s life? On the testimony of Simplicius, we may be able to hazard a guess that was active into the middle of the first century CE, and therefore is more likely to have been Strabo’s fellow-learner than his mentor. For Boethus appears to have responded to certain criticisms of the Categories, many of which are ascribed by Simplicius to the critics Lucius and Nicostratus (e.g. Simplicius in Cat. 50,2 = T14j, comparing 48,1; and see my chapter on Lucius and Nicostratus for discussion). Each of Simplicius’ eight references to Lucius and his ‘school’ is followed by a reply from Boethus, as I discuss in the preceding chapter, implying that Lucius published the relevant criticism of the Categories before or during the life of Boethus.

The only reasonably firm point in this chronology is Nicostratus, for whom Praechter (1922) has persuasively suggested a date in the middle of the second century CE. Our Nicostratus, on Praechter’s argument, was honoured by an inscription at Delphi (Syll. 3 868) in the middle of the second century CE, late in his life. Working backwards, we are told by Simplicius that Nicostratus ‘came after’ Lucius (μετ’ αὐτόν, 1,19) and ‘took over’ his ideas (τὰ τοῦ

293 On Strabo’s dates, see W. Aly, ‘Strabo (3)’, Realencyklopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft 4 (1932), 76-155.

294 There were two Tyrian Antipaters who may answer to this reference, both Stoics, the younger of whom died just before 45 BCE (cf. Cicero, de Off. 2.24). This Apollonius, according to Strabo, ‘published a tabulated account (πίνακα ἐκθές) of the philosophers of the school of Zeno, and their books’. Together with Boethus’ own namesake, the Stoic ‘Boethus of Sidon’ (discussed below), there was a clear Stoic trend in recorded Sidonian philosophy.
Perhaps there is enough force in Simplicius’s language to suggest that, in the view of his own sources (with Porphyry the nearest detectable authority), the lives of Lucius and Nicostratus overlapped, or at any rate that they were treated as part of the same circle. If Lucius was active sufficiently late that Nicostratus knew him, and yet Boethus responded to Lucius’s aporiai, Boethus too must have been active into the middle of the first century or so.

This is shaky ground. As we shall find, such ‘conversations’ in Simplicius cannot always be taken as representative of historical discussions; rather, it appears likely that Boethus presented certain views that were later reinterpreted, for instance by the later second-century Peripatetic Herminus (see ch. 7) or by Porphyry, as useful positions to maintain against later critics. But as I argue in the preceding chapter, we can claim with some confidence that Boethus did write a book against the views that Simplicius ascribes to οἱ περὶ τὸν Λούκιον, and that the source of these views may have been a contemporary of Boethus, and certainly was not a contemporary of Nicostratus.

Thus we might take the view that Lucius was still active in the latter half of the first century CE. If this is correct, then Boethus of Sidon, who answered him, must have lived well into the first century CE – long enough to spar with Lucius, and answer several of Lucius’ criticisms of the Categories. This line of reasoning makes it unlikely that Boethus was significantly older than Strabo, and more probable that the two men studied together as fellow-students, dating the birth of Boethus around 60 or 50 BCE.

295 See in particular the ‘table of responses’ in my chapter on Lucius and Nicostratus, and discussion of dates below.

296 Our trust in the testimony of Simplicius for chronology may also be troubled by his habit of implying, if not explicitly stating, that Boethus energetically rebutted the problems raised by Nicostratus himself (58,14-28). But as I argue in the preceding chapter, the only place this occurs is more likely to be an oblique response to ‘the Lucians’, and in general I believe it is clear that Boethus is only represented by Simplicius as replying directly to Lucius’s aporiai, or rather, to difficulties presented by οἱ περὶ τὸν Λούκιον. Nevertheless it is certainly true, as Gottschalk (1990) writes, ‘Many of the criticisms [Boethus] refuted were repeated by later writers, including Plotinus, to be refuted again by others reusing many of Boethus’s arguments’ (74).

297 Even if ‘Lucius’ is in some respects a mere construct of Simplicius’s text, I will suggest that the Lucius source was equally a construct of a commentary by Boethus (that is, even if we cannot get to an historical Lucius, we can get to the Lucius that Boethus set out as an interlocutor, and this figure was not a construction of the later commentary tradition).
**Relationship to Andronicus**

Boethus may have studied under Andronicus of Rhodes, as John Philoponus (*in Cat. 5,16-19 = T19*) tells us. Conversely, Boethus may have been a contemporary and intellectual equal of Andronicus, as Düring, following Brink, proposes. Boethus may also have taken up the scholarchate of the Aristotelian ‘school’, as the tradition held (Ammonius, *in An. Pr. 31,11 = T11*). The sixth-century testimonies are considered dubious, but there are other reasons, as we shall see, to conjoin the thought of Boethus and Andronicus closely, and to view Boethus as a follower of Andronicus. For instance, in the text of Aspasius (T2), Boethus appears to cite and defend Andronicus’ pathology verbatim against a criticism that was also used to attack Chrysippus.299

We might speculate that Boethus’s apparent debt to Andronicus suggests that their lives overlapped. We might also speculate that Lucius’s life (if Lucius was more than a construct of the tradition) overlapped with Boethus’s and with Nicostratus, if we can place such weight on Simplicius’s language of ‘following’ and ‘taking over’. Then we might imagine a sequential chronology sketched in the following table, in which Andronicus overlaps with Boethus, Boethus with Lucius, and Lucius with Nicostratus:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>100-50 BCE</th>
<th>50-0 BCE</th>
<th>0-50 CE</th>
<th>50-100 CE</th>
<th>100-150 CE</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Andronicus</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boethus</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lucius</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Nicostratus</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to such a scheme, which would admittedly require each party to have grown rather old, Lucius commenced a programme of criticism with respect to the *Categories* early in his career, and made a name for himself in this way: indeed, this work appears to have been his enduring legacy. Boethus may have countered these criticisms towards the end of his own career. Such a chronology also allows for the interpretation that Boethus’ early work on the *Categories* played a role in popularizing the text in philosophical circles, particularly in Athens, and instigated a reaction from some Platonists, represented by a young exegete who

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298 Düring (1957), 420-25; for earlier views see C.O. Brink in *RE* suppl. 7 (1940), 938.

299 See the earlier chapter on Andronicus of Rhodes.
may (with Dillon) have belonged to the ascendant Neo-Pythagorean wing of the school.\footnote{As J. Dillon (1977, 344-5) proposes that Lucius was a Pythagorean ‘of the strict observance’.}

Lucius may have been active in the city of Athens, judging from the fact that Nicostratus – perhaps a member of his scholarly circle – was active in Athens; it would be elegant, then, if Boethus were a ‘grand old man’ of Athenian Peripateticism early in Lucius’ lifetime, defending his own seminal work on the \emph{Categories} against a younger critic in a \emph{magnum opus} which would set the tone for centuries of discussion. Such a narrative, while speculative, would embody one valid interpretation of the sources.

\textit{Philosophers sharing the name of Boethus}

The citations \textit{ὁ Βοηθός} and \textit{Βοηθὸς ὁ Σιδώνιος} are ambiguous in the sources. At least since Domenico Comparetti’s publication of \textit{Index Herculaneensis} LI, 7-9, it has been agreed that ‘Sidon had two Boethi’,\footnote{D. Comparetti, \textit{Papiro inedito erculanense}, in \textit{Riviste de Filologia} (Turin) III.523 (1875).} namely a Stoic contemporary of Panaetius (cf. Philo, \textit{de Aet. Mund.} 76.3) who may have succeeded Apollodorus of Seleucia (\textit{Index Herc.} LI)\footnote{The text of the \textit{Index}, however, identifies only a \textit{θος ἱδ.}, possibly the names of two men, from which Comparetti derives [Boe]thos [S]id[onios].} and the first-century Peripatetic with whose work on the \textit{Categories} this chapter is concerned. Sources tend to cite \textit{ὁ Βοηθός}, leaving the identity to be deduced from the textual context.


\footnote{300}{300}
The difficulty in distinguishing the Boethi of the later sources was well illustrated by Gottschalk in a 1986 treatment of Porphyry’s lost books Πρὸς Βόηθον περὶ ψυχῆς or *Against Boethus on the Soul*, pointing to the scarcely known Boethus of Marathon and Boethus of Paros, Gottschalk illustrated the ‘uncertainty of all assertions’ in this field’, and additionally reopened the question, seemingly resolved by Moraux, whether Porphyry’s offense *Against Boethus* was leveled against the Stoic or the Peripatetic Boethus.

In general, I have found no reason to question the consensus that a Peripatetic and a Stoic Boethus may be distinguished, based on the time of their life, the context of the relevant sources, and the focus of their interests. Certainly we are told that the Boethus who commented on the *Categories* ‘warded off’ Stoic critics (ὡς οἱ Στοικοὶ λέγουσιν… ὡς ὁ Βόηθος ἀμυνόμενος αὐτοὺς, Simplic. *in Cat.* 167,22 = T14t), while Boethus Stoicus appeared ἐν τοῖς Στοικοῖς δόγμασιν ἰσχυκότες to Philo of Alexandria and commanded the epithet Stoicus from Cicero. But, as I stress in a later chapter on Herminus, recent studies on eclecticism in the Hellenistic period certainly open questions about the applicability of such affiliative labels in this period, not least for Peripatetics with demonstrable Stoicising traits. Broadly, as Todd (1976:2) remarked on Boethus and Andronicus and other ‘early Peripatetics’,

> It is solely in virtue of this [scholarly work on Aristotle] that these figures are termed Peripatetics. We know little about their wider philosophical beliefs, if any, and nothing about the relationship they might have borne to the Peripatetic school at Athens.

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310 Known only from the *Index Academicorum Herculanensis*: Boethus of Marathon, col. 28.38 ff., etc.; Boethus of Paros, col. 23.44, 32.42, etc.

311 P. Moraux, *Aristotelismus* 1, 173 and following, ascribed the relevant authorship to the Stoic.

312 Gottschalk contends that a strong case can be made for the Peripatetic’s authorship of fragments such as Simplicius *in de an.* 247,23 = T18‡: but I suggest, below, that the balance of the evidence still points to Stoic authorship.

313 Ch. 7, Herminus, ‘Works’.

314 See for example Dillon and Long (1988). See also Moraux’s introduction (II), xxi-xxvii and 428-47, particularly with respect to his remarks on Galen’s eclectic methodology. Among older studies on the affiliation of Herminus, see Zeller (III 1 3, 778, 1 and 783, 2), Buhle (1791:302), and Funk (1907:651-52).
It is thus worthwhile to underscore the challenges of distinguishing Boethus Peripateticus from Boethus Stoicus, and not to take the distinction for granted.\textsuperscript{315} The appendix of texts to this chapter, discussed in detail below, excludes ten of the eleven fragments that are found in \textit{SVF} under the name of Boethus Stoicus, which clearly stand apart from the fragments collected below as representative of Boethus Peripateticus. An ambiguous passage, however, is Boethus Stoicus fr. 11 = Simplic. \textit{In De An.} 247,24 = \textbf{T18}†, to which we shall return.

\textbf{Works}

The tradition of Boethus’ fragments embraces a wide range of intellectual topics, many of which converge upon themes that are relevant to his exegesis of the \textit{Categories}. This chapter, with the appendix of texts, collects and analyses approximately fifty named citations in Greek which correspond with reasonable certainty to the Peripatetic Boethus of Sidon (\textbf{T0}-\textbf{T21}). Roughly half of these references derive from Simplicius \textit{in Cat.} (\textbf{T14a}-\textbf{T14za}). I have also included, as text \textbf{T22}, the treatment \textit{On the Category ‘When’} surviving in the fourteenth-century MS Laurentianus 71 and ascribed by P. Huby (1981)\textsuperscript{316} to Boethus. Finally, the appendix of texts also collects a dozen fragments, distinguished by asterisks, which contain, as I suggest, implicit or unnamed allusions to Boethus (\textbf{T4b*-d*}; \textbf{T12*}; \textbf{T14m*}; \textbf{AL1*}-\textbf{AL7*}; \textbf{BO1*}).

I have included even fragments that do not directly bear upon the \textit{Categories} in the appendix,\textsuperscript{317} as many carry at least peripheral relevance to Boethus’s views on the \textit{Categories}.

\textsuperscript{315} J. F. Dobson, ‘Boethvs of Sidon’, \textit{CQ} 8.2 (1914), 88-90 wrote that ‘the case of Boethus is perplexing: firstly, because there were several philosophers of that name; secondly, because the two best known seem both to have been natives of Sidon; thirdly, because of these two, the Stoic grafted Peripatetic doctrine onto his system’. Conversely, the Peripatetic Boethus is frequently mentioned in connection with Stoic philosophers (e.g., \textbf{T0}) and Stoic positions (e.g., \textbf{T2}). The disagreement of Moraux and Gottschalk regarding a major fragment (\textbf{T18}†) highlights the uncertainties of distinction from context. Neither the observation of Philo that Boethus was ‘learned in Stoic doctrines’, nor his mention in proximity to Panaetius and Diogenes, are thoroughly decisive against this Boethus, at some stage, ‘studying Aristotle’ with Strabo. Comparetti’s initial publication of \textit{Ind. Herc.} LI, 9, which appears to identify ‘Boethus of Sidon’ as a Stoic successor of Apollodorus of Seleucia (c. 140 BCE), in fact identifies only a θὀς ἰδ.\ldots, which may be the name of one man or the names of two, from which Comparetti (reasonably) derives the phrase [Boe]thos [Si]d[onios].

\textsuperscript{316} P. Huby, ‘An Excerpt from Boethus of Sidon’s Commentary on the \textit{Categories}’, \textit{CQ} 31 (1981), 398-409.

\textsuperscript{317} A comprehensive edition of the fragments of Boethus is now underway under the directorship of Marwan Rashed, but I have not seen it.
or the analysis of his debt to other commentators on the *Categories*, or theirs to him. However, the discussion here will focus primarily on those fragments of direct relevance to Boethus’s work on the *Categories*.

Referring to Boethus as an exegete (ἐξηγούμενος, 29,30 = T14e), Simplicius bestows high praise upon his interpretive depth (1,18 = T14a) and acumen (11,23 = T14b, drawing upon Porphyry), suggesting that Boethus answered to Simplicius’ own criteria (7,23-28) for a capable exegete of Aristotle by combining a wide knowledge of the texts (τῶν πανταχοῦ τῷ φιλοσόφῳ γεγραμμένων ἐμπειρόν) with respectful impartiality (ἀδέκαστον) regarding the authority of the Stagirite.

There are two streams of work on the *Categories* that may be distinguished. (I) There is a commentary kata lexin, which, as I argue in the concluding remarks to this chapter, may have the structural model for Porphyry’s *Ad Gedalium* and, eventually, for Simplicius in *Cat*. (II) There is a commentary responding to certain *aporiai*, which survives in named and unnamed jousts by *antilogia* (see for instance Simplicius in *Cat*. 63,2 and T14y*). As I suggest below, such a commentary is visibly echoed in Porphyry’s commentary *By Question and Answer*. My conclusion will be that these two commentaries may have begun as a single treatment in which a ‘Lucius’ played the role of interlocutor.

1. *On the Categories kata lexin*

Among Boethus’ publications, we know from Simplicius that he ‘carried out a word-by-word exegesis’ of the *Categories* (ἐξηγούμενος… καθ’ ἑκάστην λέξιν, 29,30 = T14e) and composed a ‘whole book’ *On the Relative* (ὁλον βιβλιον γράφασις περὶ τοῦ πρὸς τι, Simplic. 163,6 = T14r). This latter work presumably underlies seven explicit references to Boethus over forty pages of Simplicius’ own treatment of the Relative (159,14-202,1 = T14p-T14v).

It has been deduced that the work *On the Relative* constituted a ‘monograph’ by Boethus, based on Simplicius’ description of a ‘whole book’ (ὁλον βιβλιον) devoted to the topic.318 However, Simplicius does not elsewhere use the phrase ὁλος βιβλιος in the sense of an independent ‘monograph’, but rather to denote a sequentially numbered book within a

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318 On the force of this phrase, see Gottschalk (1990:74), Moraux (147-64), Prantl I (540 and following).
complete text. Earlier in the Categories commentary (2.4), for instance, Simplicius describes Plotinus’ work On the Kinds of Being (6.1-3) as existing ‘in three whole books’ (τρισὶν ὅλοις βιβλίοις), and he repeats the phrase in this unambiguous sense in other commentaries, with the adjective ὅλος drawing attention to the magnitude of the scholarly undertaking involved.\footnote{At de Caelo 366,25 Simplicius observes that ‘Alexander supposed the first whole book [of the work] (τὸ πρῶτον ὅλον βιβλίον) to concern the whole cosmos’, and the phrase recurs elsewhere in the same work (674.4).} It is probable, therefore, that Boethus’ ‘book’ on the Relative formed a portion of a larger work, either his ‘word-by-word exegesis’ of the Categories or the commentary per interrogationem et responsionem that I attempt to distinguish below.

Moreover, Simplicius signals that it is a whole book in order to emphasize, rhetorically, the relative size of the work;\footnote{So too he emphasizes the scope of the work contained in Plotinus 6.1-3 by the phrase τρισὶν ὅλοις βιβλίοις: see above.} this suggests that Boethus’ exegesis of the Relative was particularly elaborate in the context of his commentary, and that some of his other discussions, pertaining to certain other categories, were contained in less space.

\section*{II. On the Categories per interrogationem et responsionem}

In addition to this commentary on the Categories καθ’ ἑκάστην λέξιν, there is reason to believe that Boethus composed a work dealing specially with problems or aporiai raised about the Categories, which may or may not represent a separate publication. At least some of these aporiai were raised by commentators such as Lucius, and perhaps by Andronicus himself. That Boethus focused, in one of his works, on addressing aporiai regarding the Categories would be suggested by the reportage in Simplicius, where Boethus is often cited as defending the Categories against varied criticisms. This hypothesis would also be bolstered by a specific passage in Cat. 58.27-59.4 = T14k, where Boethus is described as ‘giving in’ to a certain problem (ἐνδοὺς τῇ ἀπορίᾳ) by amending the text of the Categories – suggesting that he typically responded to aporiai by staunchly defending the text. In addition, I describe below several places in Porphyry’s commentary By Question and Answer where large tracts of discussion, and particularly responses to aporiai that bear the brand of Lucius, might be traced to Boethus. In fact, I will suggest that Porphyry’s twin commentaries On the Categories – namely, the commentary κατὰ πεύσιν καὶ ἀποκρίσιν\footnote{On which see S. Strange, Porphyry: On Aristotle Categories (London, 1992).} and the word-
by-word treatment *Ad Gedalium* \(^{322}\) – are modeled on one or two analogous commentaries by Boethus.

In the concluding Assessments of this chapter, following the close analysis of the Boethan fragments below, I shall explore the form that a work by Boethus in the question and answer format may have taken, the role that Lucius and Andronicus may have played in such a work, its record in the stratigraphy of Simplicius *in Categorias*, and its relationship to Boethus’ commentary *kata lexin*.

**III. Other works**

A standard view of Boethus’ oeuvre is expressed by Gottschalk: ‘His main work was a grand-scale commentary on Aristotle’s writing on categories, but he had an encompassing interest in all areas of philosophy’.

The perception that Boethus’ Hauptwerk concerned the *Categories*, however, is naturally due to the space accorded to Boethus by Simplicius in his *Categories* commentary, and the magnitude and influence of the later *Categories* commentaries in themselves; and this may reflect the interests of Porphyry and Iamblichus, upon whom Simplicius relies, rather than the primary focus of Boethus himself.

In fact, to take the sparse citations in sequence, the attention of antiquity, or at least of the preserved sources, initially focuses upon Boethus’ psychology, ethics, and occasionally syllogistic (second and third centuries) to his views on time and being (4th C.) before turning to positions that are explicitly associated with the *Categories*, and the defences that he reportedly prepared for Lucius and Nicostratus.

Thanks to the late ancient tradition, however, we possess more information about Boethus’ work on the *Categories* than about any other subjects that he may have treated during his philosophical career. His fragments cross the boundaries of logic, ethics, and physics, and nearly all of his fragments shed some light on his positions on the *Categories*; it is difficult, for example, to rule out the possibility that his positions on time or movement derive from his

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\(^{322}\) On which see A. Smith, (ed.), *Porphyrii philosophica fragmenta* (Leipzig 1993) and now the unpublished dissertation of M. Chase, *Études sur le commentaire de Porphyre sur les Catégories d’Aristote adressé à Gédalios* (2000).

\(^{323}\) ‘Boethus (4)’, *Der Neue Pauly*: ‘Sein Hauptwerk war ein groß angelegter Komm. zu Aristoteles' Kategorienschrift, aber sein Interesse umspannte alle Gebiete der Philosophie.’
commentary on the category When or the argument that several categories should be collapsed under the heading of Motion.

The section headings below, which are followed throughout this chapter, are merely thematic divisions for the purposes of discussion, and do not imply separate texts. Sections F-P particularly concern the verbal commentary or commentaries on the *Categories*, but sections A-R are closely intertwined: for example, the physical treatment of motion and time in sections D and E is closely relevant for the treatment of the corresponding categories in sections N and O. In the following section, I will start by sketching the fragments, their sources, and their relationship, in topical order, mentioning more briefly those that bear only indirectly on Boethus’s reading of the *Categories*.

A. Syllogistic [T1, T11]

B. Pathology [T2]

C. Oikeiôsis [T3, T13]

D. Physics, motion and rest [T14za, T19, T20]

E. Number, time and measure [T6, T7, T17]

F. The skopos of the *Categories* [T14b, T14m, T14m*, T14i]

G. The subject, the particular, and the universal [T5, T6, T9]

H. The onymies [T8, T14f, T14g]

I. Socrates as an accident of place [T14j]

J. Differentiae [T14k, T14n]

K. The category of the monad [T14l]

L. Ousia and hylomorphism [T5, T14m, T14o]

M. The category of the relative [T14p, T14q, T14r, T14s, T14t, T14u, T14v]

N. The categories of acting and undergoing not included under motion [T14w]
O. The categories of When and Time and of Where and Place [T14y, T14y*, T22]

P. The category of Having [T14z]

Q. The immortality of the soul [T18†]

R. Metempsychosis [T21]

Philosophy

A. Syllogistic [T1, T11]

The tradition imparts some evidence of Boethus’ work on logic, and particularly the Prior Analytics. I discuss this here in order to show Boethus’s attitude to contemporary (possibly Stoic) logical ideas, and also his adoption of the view, certainly adopted by Andronicus, that the progression Categories–De Int.–An. Pr. builds from atomic units (terms) through their combination into propositions and subsequently to more complex units, syllogisms.

In Galen (Inst. Log. 7.2, 1-6 Kalbfleisch = T1), Boethus is cited just once, and the centre of attention is his view about the syllogism. Galen tells us that some Peripatetics, notably Boethus, allowed hypothetical syllogisms to be prior to categorical syllogisms:

τῶν ἐκ τοῦ Περιπάτου τινὲς ὡσπερ καὶ Βόηθος οὐ μόνον ἀναποδείκτους ὀνομάζουσι τοὺς ἐκ τῶν ἣγεμονικῶν λημμάτων συλλογισμοὺς, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρώτους· ὁσοὶ δὲ ἐκ κατηγορικῶν προτάσεων εἰσὶν ἀναπόδεικτοι συλλογισμοί, τούτους συν ἐτι πρώτους ὀνομάζειν συγχωροῦσι.

Some of the Peripatetics, among them Boethus, call the syllogisms which are based on leading assumptions [i.e. certain hypothetical syllogisms] not only unproved but also primary; but they are not prepared to call primary those unproved syllogisms which depend on predicative propositions. (Tr. Barnes, 2007b)

One way to understand this passage is to suppose that Boethus thought the ‘axiomatic’ moods of Aristotelian syllogistic, Barbara and Celarent, could be proved by hypothetical syllogistic. This, then, might carry considerable importance as a contribution to the (supposed) dispute between Stoic and Peripatetic logicians as to the priority of their respective ways of
syllogising, namely hypothetical and categorical. The passage is sometimes cited to show that the Peripatetics and Stoics were not always worlds apart. Thus Boethus and other ‘eclectic’ Peripatetics were even prepared to grant priority to Stoic hypotheticals (see Frede 1987:123). Perhaps, as Kneale (1984:175) argues, these Peripatetics supposed that the Aristotelian syllogism already used, latently, the principles of Stoic logic. In this they would have come into conflict with the ‘orthodox’ view later expressed by Alexander of Aphrodisias, namely, that Stoic hypothetical syllogisms were not syllogisms, just as the Stoics did not accept the Aristotelian syllogisms as syllogisms.

Barnes (2007b and 2007a:374) and Frede (1987, ‘Stoic vs. Aristotelian Syllogistic’, 122-24) offer reasons to doubt that the passage explicitly exposes an attitude towards Stoic syllogistic per se, despite the implication that may drawn from the Galenic context (see below). Later, [Ammonius] (in An. Pr. 31,12 = T11) reported that Boethus regarded the second and third forms of the syllogism as perfect, in opposition to Aristotle (ἐναντίως τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει), and that Porphyry and Iamblichus and Maximus followed him, while Themistius defended Aristotle’s own view. Rather than arguing that Boethus showed how both figures could be reduced to ‘hypothetical’ syllogisms, Barnes (2007b:536-42) paints a compelling case, built chiefly on the brief essay by Themistius Against Maximus that survives in Arabic, that Boethus ‘used Aristotle [A. Pr. 25b37-40 and 24b25-30] to refute Aristotle’ on this point. But Barnes also finds reasons to doubt that this was Boethus’s approach (542).

324 See Barnes (1999) for an interesting treatment of how the Stoics themselves may have viewed Aristotelian logic. Frede (1987, ‘Stoic vs. Aristotelian Syllogistic’, esp. 122-24) sketches the possible grounds and layers of the supposed ‘dispute’ between the two schools, drawing on the original work of Łukasiewicz (1935) and noting the limits of some earlier views such as Kneale (1984).

325 For the Stoic view, see Alex. in An. Pr. 262,28-29; 345,15-16; 390,16-18; for Alexander’s own side of the argument, 265,19-20; 390,17; 256,20-25.

326 Boethus naturally favoured development in the area of logic, although it is not clear that he himself characterized his views as ‘opposed’ to the text of Aristotle; indeed, such a characterization is unlikely in consideration of his defense of the text elsewhere. On Boethus’ treatments of Aristotle, particularly with respect to the Categories, see also T. Reinhardt, ch. 27 in Sorabji and Sharples (2007).

327 On Ammonius’s testimony, the matter had to be referred to the emperor Julian for resolution. Julian came down on the side of Porphyry, Iamblichus, and Maximus.

328 A. Badawi (1987) 180-94 provides a French translation, which Barnes comments is ‘in parts evidently unreliable’.

329 In brief, arguing that Aristotle’s account of perfection depends on the intuitive grasp of the quantifying phrases ‘for every’ and ‘for no’, and that this intuitive grasp is equally applicable to the first and second and third figures.
What was Boethus’s motivation in making this case? Is there anything in the suggestion that he sought to prove perfect syllogisms, like Barbara, from Stoic hypothetical sylloistic? Other Peripatetics, as we are told by Galen a few lines later, made the categorical syllogism prior because hypothetical premises are made up of categorical premises. This seems to reflect the view, certainly adopted by Andronicus, that the progression Categories–De Int.–An. Pr. builds from atomic units (terms) through their combination into propositions and subsequently to more complex units, syllogisms: on this outlook, the atoms of logic, as it were, are terms, and thus one should lead the Organon with the Categories, and the study of Aristotle with the Categories; and it follows incidentally that Stoic propositions must be posterior to the Categories. We know that Boethus disagreed with Andronicus about the way to start Aristotle (he posted physics, not logic); and we might wonder if Boethus also disagreed about the primacy of terms.

B. Pathology [T2]

In the second-century text of Aspasius, Boethus is concerned with psychology, and particularly the study of affection. His position is closely linked to his reputed master: he develops Andronicus of Rhodes’ pathology to define affection as ‘a development (kinesis) of the soul, lacking an account (logos), but possessing a certain magnitude (megethos)’ (πάθος τῆς ψυχῆς κίνησιν ἄλογον ἔχον τι μέγεθος, 44,24 = T2).

Boethus defined pathos as an irrational motion of the soul that has a certain magnitude; he too took ‘irrational’ as a motion of the irrational part of the soul, but he added magnitude, since there are also some other motions of the irrational part of the soul accompanied by brief oikeiôseis to people or estrangements (allotríoseis) from them. He thought that those movements accompanied by brief [affections] were not worthy of the name pathê…

One explanation (discussed in the chapter on Andronicus) is that Boethus follows Andronicus in using a Stoic analysis of two classes of pathê, issued as a defense of Chrysippus. The

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331 There are minor affections, as Chrysippus’ critics argued, of which we may be scarcely aware, and over which we do not appear to exercise mental control: ancient examples of such pathê in the bodily realm include ‘bites’ and ‘little contractions’ and tinglings of the fingers, which the Stoics recognized as involuntary ‘first movements (kinêseis)’ – distinct from more powerful and subsequent ‘second movements’, over which we could exercise voluntary control (cf. Seneca de Ira 2.2.1-2.4.2, Cicero Tusc. Disp. 3.82-83). See also R. Sorabji, ‘Stoic First Movements in Christianity’ in S. K. Strange and J. Zupko (eds.), Stoicism: Traditions and Transformations (Cambridge, 2004), 97 and following.
Stoic propatheiai,\textsuperscript{332} as opposed to \textit{pathê} proper, may be comparable to Boethus of Sidon’s division of affections into ‘\textit{pathê} with magnitude’ and ‘without magnitude’. As we shall see below, such an interpretation could shed light on our broader assessment.

C. \textit{Oikeiōsis} [T3, T13]

Boethus’ use of the term \textit{oikeiōsis} in this account of \textit{pathê} is interesting. Does he mean this word in the sense that we typically attach to it in studies of Stoic ethics,\textsuperscript{333} say, as Chrysippus used it (cf. Diogenes Laertius, \textit{Vitae} 7.85)? Alexander of Aphrodisias sheds some light on this. In \textit{Mantissa} 151.8 (T3), Alexander cites a number of thinkers who define the first and primary ‘appropriate’ goal (\textit{oikeion}) for each of us as ‘our own selves’ (\textit{hêmas autous}), which are the object of our desire (\textit{orekton}). Boethus is primary in the list. Similarly, Boethus’ name is associated by Damascius (\textit{in Phileb.} 147.6 and 148 = T13) with a view that the self is the goal sought (\textit{telos… orekton}) by each of us.

Alexander informs us that ‘the schools of Xenarchus and Boethus’ adopted this view from \textit{EN} 8, arguing as follows [T13]:

\begin{quote}
For if that which we love (\textit{philêton}) is that which we desire (\textit{orekton}) – and if we love nothing more than our own selves, nor do we liken ourselves (\textit{oikeiômetha}) toward anything else besides our own selves in the same way, since we exert ourselves about others, and love others, with reference to ourselves – then on this account, each person will be the first \textit{oikeion} for himself. That was the opinion of Xenarchus’ school and Boethus’ (\textit{οἱ περὶ Ξέναρχόν εἰσι καὶ Βοηθόν}), taking their start from what is said about friendship (\textit{philia}) in the eighth book of the \textit{Nicomachean [Ethics]}…
\end{quote}

This Xenarchus, mentioned together with Boethus, is evidently Xenarchus of Seleucia, the first-century BCE Peripatetic\textsuperscript{334} who studied at Alexandria and Athens before settling in Rome, where his lectures were attended by Strabo (\textit{Geog.} 14.5.4). It may be the case that


\textsuperscript{333} On this famous subject in Stoicism see for example part iii of Brennan (2005) and Striker (1991). For its later reception, which will also concern us here, see Sorabji (2002).

\textsuperscript{334} On whom see Moraux 1, 197-214 and, recently, sections of A. Falcon, ‘Corpi e movimenti. Studio sul De caelo di Aristotele e la sua tradizione mondo antico’ (Napoli: Bibliopolis 2001), esp. 80-84, 158-74. Falcon reconstructs Xenarchus’ criticisms of the Aristotelian ‘fifth element’ and suggests that he produced a positive doctrine of natural motion designed to fit Plato’s conception of the sensible world in the \textit{Timaeus}. 
Strabo and Boethus both attended the lectures of Xenarchus (cf. *Geog.* 16.2.24 = T0). The bulk of our knowledge concerning Xenarchus relates to his reverberating criticism of Aristotle’s hypothesis concerning the ‘fifth element’.

In a recent study (2001), Andrea Falcon argued that Xenarchus launched his criticism with a view to offering a new doctrine of natural motion, architected to fit the conception of the sensible world outlined in the *Timaeus*. It appears, based on passages in Proclus (*in Plat. Tim.* 2.11.24-31 and 3.114.30) and Simplicius, that Xenarchus’ position flourished in the Neoplatonic tradition. According to Simplicius (*in Ar. De Cael.* 21.35-22.17), Xenarchus posited two principles:

1. A simple body always moves in a straight line, if it is not at its natural place (οἰκεῖον τόπον).

2. A simple body always moves in a circle or rests, if it is at its natural place.

It is difficult to say whether there is a connection between this conception of the οἰκεῖος τόπος in physics and Xenarchus’ position on oikeiôsis, that is, the suggestion that the primary oikeion for any entity was its own self. In either case, there is some reason to associate Boethus’ own Stoicising views on oikeiôsis with Xenarchus, based on Alexander; there may also be some reason to combine this relationship with Strabo’s report of hearing Xenarchus lecture (14.5.4) and studying with Boethus (16.2.24), suggesting that Boethus also associated with Xenarchus.

D. Physics, Motion and Rest [T14za, T19, T20]

We are told by Philoponus (*in Cat.* 5.16 = T19), followed by Elias (117.21 = T20) that Boethus recommended commencing the study of Aristotle from the treatment of Physics, as it is most familiar and best-known to us (ἀπε ἡμῖν συνηθεστέρας καὶ γνωρίμου), and ‘it is necessary always to begin from what is clearer and more knowable’ (*Physics* 1.1). One

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335 Xenarchus’ criticisms of the ‘fifth element’ appear to have influenced Philoponus, according to Simplicius (*in De Cael.* 26,31-33 and 42,19 and following).
would tend to follow Philoponus in contrasting this with the view ascribed to Andronicus, namely, that one should start Aristotle with logic.\textsuperscript{336}

The following pages discuss fragments in which Boethus discusses motion, time, measure, and hylomorphism, all of which are relevant to his physical theory, and may have been laid out in the context of some work \textit{Peri phuseōs}. We know that Boethus’ theory of motion bore relevance for his interpretation of the \textit{Categories}: he was followed by Iamblichus, it seems, in defending the omission of ‘movement’ (\textit{kinesis}) from the ten categories on the grounds that the Aristotelian prime mover is unmoved, such that acting (\textit{poiein}) and undergoing (\textit{pathein}) must be distinguished (\textit{T14w}).

Boethus expresses a particularly distinctive position on the nature of 
Rest (ἠρεμία) and its categorization (\textit{T14za}). He describes Rest as a simultaneous relationship between factors, such as size, place, and time. For example, if \textit{both} the size and time of a thing are in flux or ‘never the same’, a thing grows; if the thing has a contrary relationship to size and time, its size does not change but its time does, and it is at rest. ‘Rest and movement’, as Boethus suggests, ‘are a \textit{skhēsis} towards the place and the form in respect of which a thing is actually being moved or is at rest’. ‘For’, he says,

\begin{quote}
Time seems to be of such a nature as to be always flowing and changing into other kinds, and because of this it accompanies every movement and state of rest. But movement is similarly related to time and place (for instance, in the case of motion, he says that it is similarly related to time and place on account of its continuously coming about in respect of different places), whereas rest (he says) is contrarily related to place and time, for the time is never the same, while the place is always the same.
\end{quote}

Related issues concerning the suggestion of a ‘category’ of motion are treated under a separate heading, below.

E. Number, Time, and Measure [T6, T7, T17]

Themistius (160 = \textit{T6}) raises the question whether Time can exist without Soul, if only Soul and Mind are able to count Time.\textsuperscript{337} The question is whether the soul ‘creates time’, as

\textsuperscript{336} This view, of course, has been adduced to explain why Andronicus put the \textit{Categories} where he supposedly did in the curriculum; see earlier chapter, with Moraux (I), Barnes (1997), Primavesi (2007), and Gottschalk (1987 and 1990).

\textsuperscript{337} On some of the broader issues noted here, see Sorabji (1983 and 2007) and further discussion below.
Plotinus and others hold (cf. Enn. 3.7.11; cf. Arist. Phys. 4.14). Themistius cites Boethus as stating that ‘nothing prevents the number from existing separately from the numberer’ (a phrase repeated by Simplicius at T16), just as the object of perception can exist separately from the perceiver. Later, Themistius cites Boethus as believing that no measure comes about by nature (163.6 = T7), but requires ‘our’ work to measure and count it.\footnote{Themistius’ report is also quoted by Simplicius in Phys. 766,18 = T17.}

It seems, therefore, that Boethus, in responding to Physics 4.14, 223a25-29,\footnote{Where Aristotle argues that since time is defined as something countable, it follows that it requires a mind to do the counting.} allows Number to exist separate from the Numberer, but believes that any Measure requires a Counter. He contends, as Sorabji puts it,\footnote{Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum (1983), 95.} that ‘a measure has no existence in reality (hupotês phuseôs) since measuring and counting are our own activities’, but ‘Aristotle should have acknowledged... that the countable can exist even without someone to count, just as the perceptible can exist without a perceiver’ (95). Boethus, as Sorabji later notes\footnote{Sorabji, ‘Time, Place, and Extracosmic Space’, in Sorabji and Sharples (2007), ch. 30, 564.} stresses that time would still have the capacity to be counted, even if there was no opportunity for it to be counted.

In what sense, then, did Boethus take time to be countable? At least in one respect, the position may be clarified by the anonymous study of the category ‘When’ ascribed to Boethus, probably rightly, by P. Huby (T. Waitz, 21.8-20 = T22, discussed in a subsequent section). With respect to the celestial rotation, time is both counter (of the rotation) and counted (by it). But with respect to anything else, time counts by means of the rotation of the heavenly sphere.

One number is that which counts, another that which is counted. We must ask in which way we say that time is number of movement, whether as counting movement or as counted by movement. Well, we say that time is counted by the primary, simple, rotating movement [of the heavens] and counts it in return. For if that sort of movement were not counted by time, by what would it be counted? Time, then, measures the primary movement, which is most properly movement, the rotatory one, and by it measures the other movements too. So time will be the number of the rotatory movement both as counting and as being counted, but will be the number of the other movements only as

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338 Themistius’ report is also quoted by Simplicius in Phys. 766,18 = T17.

339 Where Aristotle argues that since time is defined as something countable, it follows that it requires a mind to do the counting.


counting and not also as counted. For time will not be, as counted, the number of my walking, but only as counting (tr. Sorabji, 2007 ch. 30).

Categorical issues concerning the category When and its relationship to Time – including Boethus’s characterization of Time as infinite, whereas the When is finite – are treated under a separate heading, below.

F. The skopos of the Categories

Boethus, it seems, owes the late ancient endorsement of his view of the skopos of the Categories to Porphyry, with Herminus as an intermediary (see chapter 1). In chapter 1, we noted the structure of Porphyry’s account at in Cat. 57,20 and following, and the (likely Stoicising) theory of ‘double imposition’ that leads up to his endorsement of the skopos according to the Categories. His comments on Boethus at in Cat. 59,17 = T4 established the latter’s legacy. Porphyry remarks that ‘Boethus said what we say’ with respect to the subject-matter of the Categories – that it concerns ‘simple significant vocalisations, insofar as they signify realities’ (περὶ φωνῶν σημαντικῶν ἁπλῶν, καθὸ σημαντικαί εἰσι τῶν πραγμάτων).

While referring mainly to the first chapter for the view on the skopos that Herminus attributed to Boethus and defended, we may note here that Simplicius follows Porphyry in announcing his respect for Boethus early in the text of his own commentary (1,18 = T14a), describing him as θαυμάσιος; as M. Chase points out, ‘Simplicius’ wording… allows the interpretation that he admired B[oethus] more than any other pre-Porphyrian exegete’ (2003:94). It is interesting to explore the reasons why Simplicius, and presumably Porphyry before him, should bestow such admiration. In my general introduction, I have sought to trace the sources of this view in more detail.

In the first place, Simplicius credits Boethus with sharing Porphyry’s view, and his own, on the true subject-matter or σκοπὸς of the Categories (11,23 = T14b): Boethus explains the Categories as concerning significant expressions, but the division is applicable just so far as spoken words (lexeis) have a relation to beings, of which they are significant. Boethus adds (41,28 = T14i), as Simplicius paraphrases or reports him, that ‘among the Ancients, the only things said or signified were intellections (noëseis), for truth and falsehood are not in the realities, but in thoughts (dianoiai) and the developments (diexodoi) of the intellect’.
Finally, and rather cryptically, Boethus is reported by Simplicius as indicating that realities are necessarily described by non-compound expressions (41,14 = T14h). First, Simplicius is remarking on the lemma *Cat*. 1a16: ‘Of things which are said, some are said in combination…’ Here, he asks what *ta legomena* might mean. He offers a fourfold answer (compare Sosigenes *ap* Dexipp. *in Cat*. 7,1 and following, and see Moraux I 151-2): ‘things said’ might be (1) realities (*pragmata*), or (2) notions (*noëmata*), or (3) the significant expression itself, or (4) any expression at all, even a meaningless one. (See my ch. 7 on Herminus, and discussion of the ‘tripartition’ and ‘bipartition’ of the *skopos* in chapter 1 for further discussion). We might suppose that it was option (3) that Porphyry and Boethus agreed to be the *skopos* of the *Categories*.342

At this point, Simplicius himself does not suggest that we should prefer one of these options, but cites Boethus of Sidon on how they might be reduced:

“What is said” must be understood in [these] four ways in the case of non-compound expressions, but in only three ways [sc. thoughts, significant expressions, and non-significant expressions] in the case of those which have been combined.

According to him, combined realities (*ta sumpeplegmena pragmata*), such as “It is day”, are not what is said, not because the *logos* does not signify anything, but because it is not the name of a reality (*pragma*), as *day* is. It is not of the reality, but about (*peri*) the reality.

We might compare the Stoic view that the ‘self-complete proposition’, such as ‘day exists’, is a compound, and the reply that no incorporeal can be compounded or divided, so there is no such thing as a self-complete proposition (Sextus *Adv. Math*. 8,79).

Boethus also states that the *Categories* is not concerned with intelligible being (μὴ γάρ εἶναι περὶ τῆς νοητῆς οὐσίας τὸν λόγον, Simplicius 78,4-5 = T14m), but with sensible being alone. Based on this observation, which could reasonably enough be derived from the examples used in the *Categories* itself, Boethus suggests that some objections of Lucius and Nicostratus (such as whether the *Categories* amply deals with the intelligible world) are redundant. As a more interesting question, he proposes that we should inquire into the relationship of the account of *ousia* in the *Categories* and the *Metaphysics* (78,5-20).

342 cf. Chase (2003), note ad loc.
G. The subject, the particular, and the universal [T5, T6, T9]

In the fourth century, Dexippus – engaged in a lively rhetorical question-and-answer session *On the Categories*\(^{343}\) – communicates an interesting doctrine regarding the nature of the ‘particular’ (*in Cat. 45.3-30 = T9*). Here Boethus of Sidon is cited by name. Dexippus’s interlocutor Seleucus queries:

> Why is it that in the *Physics* (cf. 1.1, 184a23) [Aristotle] gives prior ranking to common items (*τὰ κοινά*) as primary, whereas here [in the *Categories*] he ranks particulars first? (45,1-4) … What could we say to those who dispute [that universals are prior by nature]… claiming that in fact universals are not prior by nature to particulars, but posterior to them?

To which Dexippus replies as follows:

> If we were to take the question carefully, we would find that they actually take as agreed what they are disputing. For when they say that the universals are prior in nature to each thing taken in particular, but on the other hand posterior in nature to *all* of them (*πάντων*), they are postulating that particulars are also (*καί*) prior by nature, and are proceeding invalidly in taking as a first principle the very thing that requires demonstration…

> It is obvious that the particular (*τὸ καθ’ ἕκαστον*) can be an individual (*ἄτομον*) only if a common item (*κοινὸν*) is immanent in it and completes (*συμπληροῦντος*) its essence, for a particular man is also Man. And it is also false to say that, when the common item is eliminated, the individual is not always eliminated also; for if the common item possesses its essence in its extension over all those things that fall under it, one who eliminates this eliminates straightaway also the whole reality (*ὑπόστασις*) of the individual\(^{344}\) as well.

> It is on these lines that one must reply to the school of Alexander and Boethus and the rest of the Peripatetic arguments in their attempts at explanation, and one should show, in interpreting the *Metaphysics*, that Aristotle takes common natures (*τὰ κοινὰ*) as prior also (*καί*) in his theory of sensibles (*τῶν αἰσθητῶν*). (Tr. Dillon)

This is a very interesting passage, and I believe that several key insights may be gained from it, which shed light on rather difficult fragments of Boethus that are later reported by

\(^{343}\) Drawing on Iamblichus, who draws on Porphyry: see my general introduction, ‘Sources’.

\(^{344}\) The text of Dexippus reads *tou koinou*, but Simplicius 82,30-35, a parallel passage, reads *tou atomou*, and a range of related passages in Alexander and Porphyry, explored below, similarly suggest that the reading *tou atomou* should be adopted. S. Strange, cited in J. Dillon, *Dexippus* (Duckworth, 1990), 83 n. 34, suggests that the text may be sound, despite the counterexample of Simplicius, but Dexippus is arguing explicitly that ‘it is false to claim that the individual is not always eliminated when the universal is eliminated’; thus his conclusion must almost surely be that the individual is eliminated when the universal is eliminated.
Simplicius. It is helpful to examine this passage in detail in order to sketch the anatomy of Boethus’s engagement with the *Categories* as a text that has something to say about ontology, and not merely about language.

There are several difficulties of interpretation in addressing the Dexippus passage (T9), chiefly related to the problem of disentangling Boethus from Dexippus himself, and analysing the relationship implied in the phrase ‘the school of Alexander and Boethus’. The final ‘also’ (καί) is important here, as it implies that (for Dexippus) Boethus and Alexander already held that Aristotle ranked the common entities (τὰ κοινά) as primary among the intelligibles, but as secondary among the sensibles. Thus Boethus would maintain some kind of a ‘mixed’ or twofold view of universals, according to which universals may be intelligible and independent (separate), on the one hand, or sensible and immanent, on the other. That view would, in fact, be much like the position that Tweedale and Sharples, with some differences, find in Alexander of Aphrodisias (as I explore below).\(^{345}\)

Such a dual interpretation would also cohere with another passage found in Simplicius (78,4 = T14m), where Boethus argues that any distinction of ‘somatic and asomatic’ ousia in the *Categories* is redundant, because the *Categories* is not concerned with intelligible ousia, but with sensible ousia. It would be reasonable to infer from this passage, together with Dexippus and Syrianus (T10), that Boethus regarded koina as ‘primary’ in an intelligible context, but regarded particulars as primary in a sensible context, and that he used the latter, sensible context exclusively in his reading of the *Categories*. Simplicius’ immediate reply to Lucius and Nicostratus at 73,28, which anticipates and perhaps reflects T14m, takes a similar line: in the *Categories*, Aristotle is ‘primarily discussing the things of this world, for these are what are immediately signified by words’ (73,30-35).

But we need some other sources of reference to control the speculations raised by Dexippus’ ‘reply’ to the Peripatetics at 45,28, and to isolate Boethus himself. To put this passage in context, we shall have to delve in some depth into the literature on Alexander of Aphrodisias, with whom Boethus is coupled in T9, suggesting that Dexippus’s ‘reply’ to Boethus should also apply to Alexander, and that Alexander’s position on universals carried some resemblance to Boethus’ own. As we shall see, there is a tangle of related views in Porphyry

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345 So Tweedale (1984), whose exegesis is credited by Dillon (1990, 83 n. 34) as ‘a most acute analysis of Alexander’s doctrine, which is quite subtle, and has been misunderstood by all Neoplatonic commentators’, and Sharples (2005), discussed below.
and even in the influential Latin writer Boethius (c. 480–524/525), each of which sheds light on Boethus’ position.

The following discussion falls naturally into three parts. (1) Analysis of Alexander’s position on universals as found in his _de anima_: I argue that Alexander endorses both (a) a doctrine of sensible or enmattered form, which may be apprehended both by _aisthèsis_ and by _nous_; and (b) a doctrine of separate and imperishable form, which may be apprehended solely by _nous_. On my view, Dexippus correctly ascribes to Alexander both a ‘theory of sensibles’ and a ‘theory of intelligibles’. But Alexander entertains just one kind of form or nature, which may or may not be instantiated multiple times – that is, universality is accidental to the form. (2) Analysis of the later Neoplatonic commentaries _On the Categories_, in particular Simplicius. These sources influentially ‘flatten’ Alexander’s view, producing the impression that he entertained solely (a) a doctrine of sensible form. They omit discussion of (b) his views on separate forms, particularly in the context of commentary on the _Categories_. (3) Analysis of Porphyry in _Cat_. (cf. chapter 1, above), on the basis of which I suggest that the later Neoplatonic sources, dependent on Porphyry, ‘flatten’ Alexander’s views precisely because of the context of commentary on the _Categories_, which (on the view outlined by Boethus of Sidon himself: Simplicius 78,4-5 = T14m) is concerned solely with the sensible world, and not with ‘deeper’ problems relating to the separability of _eidê_ (cf. Porph. _Isag._ §1).

(1) Alexander of Aphrodisias ( _de anima_ 87-90)

Alexander, in a long passage of his _de anima_ dealing with Aristotle’s account of _nous_, describes two modes of perception of ‘enmattered forms’ (τὰ ἔνυλα εἴδη). These forms may be perceived by sensation of particulars, or by _noêsis_ of the form and _logos_ which is universal ( _da_ 87,5-32, my translation):

**AL1(a).** τὰ ἔνυλα εἴδη καὶ αἰσθητὰ ἄλλως μὲν ἡ αἰσθησις, ἄλλως δὲ ὁ νοῦς κρίνει... πάν τὸ αἰσθητὸν τόδε τί ἢςι καὶ καθ’ ἔκαστον, τὸ γὰρ συναμφότερον τοιούτον, ὁ δὲ νοῦς τοῦ εἰδους καὶ τοῦ λόγου καθ’ ὅν ἐστι τόδε τι θεωρητικός ἢςι, διὸ ὁ τοιοῦτος, ἄλλα τοιοῦτος, καὶ οὐ τοῦ καθέχαστα, ἄλλα τοῦ καθόλου, κατὰ γὰρ τὸν λόγον πάντα τὰ ὁμοειδῆ ἄλληλοις εἰσὶν ὁμοειδῆ τὸν αὐτὸν ὄντα, οὐ ἐστιν ὁ νοῦς θεωρητικός.

Sensation discerns ( _krinei_ ) enmattered forms, sensibles, in one way, but the mind ( _nous_ ) [discerns] them in another way.... Everything sensed is a ‘this something’ (tode ti) and a particular, since the composite is like that; but mind contemplates the form and definition ( _logos_ ) on account of which it is a ‘this’. Therefore, [ _noêsis_ ] is not of a ‘this something’, but of a ‘such’ – that is,
not of the particular, but rather of the universal (katholou). [Noësis is of the universal] because all things that share the same form (homoeidê allêlois) do so on account of the definition (logos), which the mind contemplates.

But thus far Alexander is speaking strictly of the apprehension of ἐνυλα ἐιδη. He turns now, following his exegesis of Aristotle, to discuss the apprehension of ‘separate’ forms, or forms in themselves (continuing AL1):

AL1(b). ἐφ’ ὧν μὲν οὖν ἄλλο ἐστὶ τὸ τόδε καὶ τὸ τῷδε εἶναι, ἐπ’ τούτων ἄλλη μὲν ἡ γνωστικὴ δύναμις τούδε (ἢ γὰρ αἰσθησίας), ἄλλη δὲ ἡ τοῦ τόδε εἶναι (ὁ γὰρ νοῦς), ἐφ’ ὧν δὲ ταύτων τὸ τόδε καὶ τὸ τῷδε εἶναι (20) (τούτο δὲ ἐστιν ἐπὶ τῶν εἰδῶν τῶν χωρίς ὑλῆς), τούτων νοῦς μόνος ἐστὶ θεωρητικός. οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων αἰσθητὸν ἐτι. πάν γὰρ τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἐνυλὸν τε καὶ σύνθετον.

Thus, in cases where ‘this something’ differs from ‘what it is to be this’, there is one capacity for knowledge (gnôstikê dunamis) of ‘this’ (i.e., sensation), but the other is of ‘what it is to be this’ (mind).

But in cases where ‘this something’ and ‘what it is to be this’ are identical (i.e., forms separate from matter), mind alone contemplates these. For nothing like this is sensible, because everything sensed is enmattered and composite.

Thus Alexander draws a clear distinction between the apprehension of enmattered forms, which is twofold (aisthêsis and nous), and the apprehension of ‘separate’ forms identical with their essence, which is single (nous alone, or νοῦς μόνος). But there is more to the distinction than merely two modes of apprehension. Enmattered forms may be considered qua apprehensible to sensation or qua apprehensible to mind; but some forms can only be considered qua apprehensible to mind.

Later in the same text, Alexander goes on to suggest that forms are dependent on a mind.

There has been some controversy over whether Alexander’s forms depend on a mind for their existence, or merely for being recognized as universal. But appreciation of the distinction between enmattered and separate forms, as sketched above, may resolve this uncertainty. A central passage (90,2-14) seems to suggest plainly that enmattered forms (those which are susceptible of sensation in a compound) depend on a perceiving mind, while separate forms exist independently of a mind.

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346 Like Alexander, Aristotle can also be read as distinguishing the apprehension of sensible, enmattered forms (such as a human being, the sunamphoteron of soul and body) from the apprehension of forms that are identical with their essence (such as soul: cf. Met. 7.11, 1037a5-11 and Met. 8.3 (1043a35-1043b5).

In the case of enmattered forms, as I said earlier, whenever forms like this are not being thought, none of them is nous – if indeed, for noêta, the reality (hupostasis) of ‘what it is to be’ for them lies in being thought. For the universals (katholou) and commons (koina) have their existence (huparxis) in particulars and enmattered [things]. But when they are thought separate from matter, they become commons and universals, and then are nous, when they are thought. But if they are not being thought, they are no longer. The consequence is that they perish when they are separated from the nous thinking them – if indeed ‘what it is to be’ for them lies in being thought. And anything derived from abstraction (aphairesis), such as the mathematicals, are identical to these. Perishable, then, is this kind of nous, i.e., this kind of thoughts (noêmata).

But on the other hand, in cases where that which is thought is such (toiouton) as [to be thought] according to its own nature (phusis), and being such is also imperishable, in these cases it also remains imperishable when it is separated from being thought, and then the mind that thinks this is also imperishable....

It appears, then, that the whole question of the perishability or dependence of forms applies only to enmattered forms. By contrast, those forms which are thought ‘by nature’ and are identical with their essence are imperishable tout court. Every form can be thought by nous; but in the case of enmattered forms, that process of noësis is dependent on abstraction from sensations, whereas in the case of separate forms, that process of noësis is ‘according to the nature’ of the form itself. And there is no sensible instantiation of this latter sort of form.

To reiterate this point, the apprehension of a form in matter is dependent on the apprehension of multiple sensible particulars. That is, through the apprehension of particulars, the mind may come to apprehend a form that is ‘universal’ over these particulars (AL1; for another locus classicus of this cognitive procedure, see Aristotle, An. Post. 2.19). But again, Alexander goes further and suggests that some forms are only accessible to nous, and these...
are so by their very nature (κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν, 90,11 = AL2). This second kind of form has already been distinguished by the fact that its essence or ‘what it is to be’ is identical with the form itself (ταὐτὸν τὸ τόδε καὶ τὸ τῷδε εἶναι, 87,20 = AL1). Such forms are imperishable, and are separable from the act of thought (90,11-14). Thus forms may be divided into two classes: (1) those that may be apprehended by two faculties, namely by aisthesis and by nous (87,5), and (2) those that may be apprehended by only one faculty, by nous alone (τούτων νοῦς μόνος ἐστὶ θεωρητικός, 87,21). Also, a given form might happen to be ‘universal’ in the sense that it can be predicated of many instances (or abstracted from many instances) – although it seems likely that the second class of ‘separate’ forms, those which are identical with their essences, are not instantiated in multiple sensible instances. Indeed, it could be merely accidental to the form that it is multiply instantiated.

To return to the passage of Dexippus with which we began (T9), some such interpretation, I think, is represented in Dexippus’s implication that Alexander (with Boethus) views ‘common things’ (ta koina) as primary in Aristotle’s theory of noëta but not in this theory of aisthêta. For Alexander, it is true just so far as aisthêta are concerned that the apprehension of the universal by nous is dependent upon abstraction from the apprehension of many sensible particulars. In this case, the universal is plainly secondary, insofar as it is dependent. However, Alexander here (in discussing nous poiētikos) adds that there are noeta which are primary and are apprehended through their very nature, independent of sensible particulars. All aisthêta include forms that may be abstracted by a mind, but not all forms are accessible to aisthesis. To put it differently, all objects of sense are susceptible of noësis, but not all objects of mind are susceptible of sensation. This might be illustrated in a simple Venn diagram:
(2) Neoplatonic interpretation of Alexander

Dexippus ascribes to ‘the school of Alexander and Boethus’ the view that Aristotle makes common natures (τὰ κοινὰ) secondary in his theory of intelligibles, but secondary in his theory of sensibles (τῶν αἰσθητῶν). As we have noticed, Alexander’s de anima could be read in support of this formulation. But elsewhere, particularly in commentary on the Categories, the Neoplatonic commentators portray Alexander as consistently making universals secondary, and acknowledging only a ‘theory of sensibles’ (to use Dexippus’s language). One example is Simplicius in Cat. 85,13:

AL6. But he [Alexander] says that the common item can be nothing apart from the individual, but the individual exists apart from the common item, for example, the sun, the moon, and the universe.

No mention of Alexander’s ‘double-barreled’ view, implied by Dexippus, is offered here. A possible explanation for the omission of Alexander’s endorsement of ‘separate’ intelligibles is that the Neoplatonists endorsed Alexander’s theory of intelligible or separate forms, yet focused their polemical critique solely against his theory of sensible or enmattered forms; this would fit well with the Dexippus passage, which criticizes the latter and just mentions the former in passing.

But Tweedale (1984) suggests that Simplicius – and other, modern commentators who deny that Alexander ever treated universals as ‘primary’ – have simply misunderstood Alexander, and perhaps based their interpretations upon an insufficiently nuanced reading of the primary texts. Following Paul Moraux (1942) in some points,348 and himself followed in the main by Dillon (1990) and Sharples (2005), Tweedale takes S. Pines349 and the later Neoplatonic tradition on Alexander’s universalism to task as follows (1984:290-91):

Pines’ interpretation [of Alexander], it seems to me, is basically in line with that of Simplicius… The universal is somehow an accident of the things that fall under it, and thus posterior to them. […]

[S]omething is very wrong with this exegesis. The most obvious problem is the last sentence of 11a (22,17-20). Here Alexander attributes to the common item (to koinon) the very priority of particulars which a few sentences earlier he had denied to the universal. But in Greek philosophy there is no significant

348 cf. Alexandre d’Aphrodisie (1942), 61.

difference in meaning between ‘the universal’ (to katholou) and ‘the common item’ (to koinon)… [N]evertheless Pines… feels compelled to attribute to Alexander a distinction between these two....

[W]hen Alexander argues for the posteriority of the universal to the thing of which it is an accident, he is not arguing that the universal is posterior to the concrete particulars falling under it, as Pines, the Greek commentators, and the “translator” in Escorial 798 assumed, but rather that it is posterior to some thing like animal which can be a common item found in many particulars [my emphasis]. Then this thing is at the end of XIa asserted to be prior to the particulars under it.

Recent discussion of the Neoplatonic reading of Alexander has also revolved around Quaestiones 1.11a, which has played a prominent role in the interpretation of Alexander’s view. This passage seems to suggest that Alexander makes the individual dependent on the universal (cf. Tweedale 1984:282), suggesting that the Neoplatonists had Alexander entirely backwards in their critique. But in the very same passage it is clear that both the universal and the particular are dependent upon the same entity, as the genus ‘animal’ and any particular animal are similarly dependent on the existence of something that is an animal (22,15-20, tr. Sharples):

AL3. That [the genus] is posterior to the thing (πρᾶγμα) is clear. For given the existence of animal, it is not necessary that the genus animal exist… but if the genus animal should exist, it is necessary also for animal to exist. And if ‘ensouled substance capable of sense perception’ were removed, then the genus animal would not exist either… But if the genus animal were removed, it would not be necessary that ‘ensouled substance capable of sense perception’ would also have been removed, for it might be… in just one thing…

Although posterior to the thing of which it is an accident (ὁ συμβόηθηκεν), nevertheless it comes to exist as prior to each of its parts, i.e. each of the items under it…. Removing (ἀναιροιμένο) one of the items under the common item does not remove the common item as well, because it exists in many. But if the common item should be removed, there would not exist any of the items under the common item, since their being lies in having that [common item] in them (διὸ ἀναιροιμένο μὲν ἐνὶ τῶν ὑπὸ τὸ κοινὸν οὐ συναναφεῖται τὸ κοινὸν, ἐφ’ ὧν ἔστιν ἐν πλείσισιν ἐντὸς τοῦ κοινοῦ, ὃ τῷ ἐκείνῳ ἐξέχω πρὸς ἑαυτοῖς).
Tweedale and Sharples have convincingly rehabilitated the closing sentence, and the treatise as a whole, in the face of criticisms by Moraux and Lloyd, who doubt its authorship.\textsuperscript{350} We might understand Alexander as setting up a real entity such as ‘ensouled substance possessing sense perception’, or animal, as the primary \( \pi\rho\alpha\gamma\mu\alpha \) upon which depend both the particulars and the universal that ‘stretches over’ them. This primary \( \pi\rho\alpha\gamma\mu\alpha \) may be the form in itself, identical with its essence, quite apart from the accidental circumstance of whether it is instantiated in multiple particulars. Once this primary nature is established, the universal or particular apprehension of it are in some sense interdependent.\textsuperscript{351}

Tweedale proceeds to contend, persuasively, that the Alexandrian universal, or genus, is ‘accidental’ to a thing (\( \pi\rho\alpha\gamma\mu\alpha \)) such as animal simply because there may exist only one animal (cf. Alex. \textit{DA} 8.8-16). He strengthens this argument by pointing out that Simplicius himself, when claiming that ‘Alexander says that the common item can be nothing apart from the individual, but the individual exists apart from the common item’ (85.13) gives as examples ‘the sun, the moon, the cosmos’. These are examples of \textit{unique entities}.\textsuperscript{352} ‘What Simplicius failed to see’, Tweedale continues (293), ‘is that all Alexander meant was that the nature need not be common in order to be a definable object, and that Alexander had no intention of saying that this nature, which would indeed be common than one particular possessed it, was posterior to the individuals. Quite the contrary, he takes it to be prior to any given individual’.\textsuperscript{353}

\textsuperscript{350} P. Moraux, \textit{Alexandre d’Aphrodisie} (Liege/Paris, 1942), 22, 53; but Tweedale argues strongly for Alexander’s authorship at \textit{Quaest}. 11a, and points out (283 n. 13) that Moraux recanted of his assessment of the \textit{Quaestiones} at ‘Alexander von Aphrodisias Quaest. 2, 3’, \textit{Hermes} 95 (1967), 161 n. 2. Lloyd (1981:51) appears to have questioned the final paragraph in particular, but is rebutted by Sharples (2005:53-54).

\textsuperscript{351} The universal is required to ‘complete’ the being of the particulars, and without it they would not be. (Compare the enigmatic doctrine of \textit{sumplêrôtika}, ‘completers’, that is traceable to Lucius and perhaps Boethus: see discussion in the following section §I).

\textsuperscript{352} cf. David, 51b, 14-15 in \textit{Scholia ad Aristotelem}, ed. CA Brandis (Berlin, 1836), where Alexander is reported as holding that ‘by removing the universal sun, one does not remove the particular sun’.

\textsuperscript{353} Such a view is also supported by the following text (Alex. \textit{Quaest.} 8.8-16):

\begin{quote}
\textit{AL7}. For the definition of man, two-footed pedestrian animal, is common since it is in all the particular men (\textit{pasin on tois kathekasta anthrôpois}), and is complete (\textit{holoklêron}) in each; it is common in virtue of being the same in many, not by each man sharing a part in it. Therefore, definitions are not of common items \textit{qua} common, but rather of those to which it is an accident to be common in respect of each nature. For even if there is just one man in concrete existence, the same definition of man [applies]…. 
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\end{quote}
With Tweedale, then, it seems clear that Alexander made the form or nature primary in his ‘theory of sensibles’ after all, to use Dexippus’s language – but not because it was ‘universal’ or ‘common’. Indeed, Alexander made the form’s status as katholou merely accidental to it. Moreover, it is quite clear from the passages of the da cited above under (1), such as AL1 and AL2, that Alexander definitely asserted independent and separate forms in his theory of noeta.

What appears to have transpired, then, is that the influential Neoplatonic criticism of Alexander (at least in the context of commentary on the Categories) ‘flattened’ his doctrine of universals by discussing solely his position on sensible or enmattered forms, and omitting any mention of his position on separate forms. Except for Dexippus’s hint in T9 – where both facets of Alexander’s doctrine are implied (and ascribed to Boethus of Sidon) – the Neoplatonic commentators behave as if sensibles were the only objects under discussion, and omit to mention that Alexander entertained any views about ‘separate’ forms. The dichotomy that is discussed is all to do with two modes of apprehension of the sensible form (represented in AL1), rather than the larger dichotomy of two kinds of form, that which can be enmattered and that which is available solely to nous (represented in AL1 and AL2).

Further evidence for this ‘flattening’ may be found in Boethius’s discussion of Porphyry’s own Isagoge (166,8-167,3):

**BO1.** Therefore, when genera and species are thought (cogitantur), from the singulars (ex singulis) in which they exist their likeness (similitudo) is gathered, for example a likeness of humanness (hominibus) is gathered from singular humans who are dissimilar from each other. This likeness when thought by the mind (cogitata animo) and accurately sensed (perspecta) becomes the species. Again when a likeness of these different species has been considered (considerata), which likeness can exist only in those species or their individuals, it creates a genus.

Thus these certainly exist in singulars, and are thought as universals (universalia): a species is to be considered nothing other than a thought (cogitatio) gathered from a substantial likeness of individuals numerically dissimilar, and a genus a thought gathered from a likeness of species. But this

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354 One thing that all of this helps us to do is to deal with the aporia that if Socrates is a human, and human is a universal, then Socrates is a universal – a point that some critics took to be implied by Cat. 3, 1b10-15 (cf. Simplicius in Cat. 54.8-21 = Andronicus T14d). Being said katholou is accidental to the human being; universality need not be inherited by particular instances. It can be shown that being said katholou is accidental to the human being, because you could remove all the multiple instances of human beings and, so long as one individual remained, you would still have ‘the human being’.
likeness becomes sensible when it is in singulars; when it is in universals, it becomes intelligible. In the same way when it is sensible it persists in singulars; when it is understood, it becomes universal. Therefore, they subsist in association with sensibles (circa sensibilia), but are understood over and above bodies (intelliguntur autem praeter corpora).

For it is not precluded that two things in the same subject are diverse in definition... Thus it is also with genera and species, i.e. singularity and universality. Certainly there is one subject, but in one way it is universal, when it is thought (cum cogitatur), in another way singular, when it is sensed in those things in which it has its being.

The katholou perception in the mind answers to one of the two kinds of discrimination of the universal expressed by Alexander in DA 87.8 ff. (AL1). Thus we do have something like the inductive ‘stand’ of Post. An. 2.19 under consideration, explaining how we get from particular sensibles to universals. In Boethius, however, we have ‘flattened’ Alexander’s account and are talking only about enmattered forms – not separable forms. There is no mention that some forms, namely the second class of forms discussed in the de anima, are omitted entirely from the discussion.

What was the cause of this omission? This omission could have been made because the Neoplatonic commentators, drawing on the tradition rooted in Porphyry, were merely unaware of the depth and subtlety of Alexander’s views (so Tweedale), or lacked access to the relevant texts in which those views were fully expressed. But this explanation seems improbable, given Dexippus’s testimony (which draws on Iamblichus’s lost commentary, itself dependent on Porphyry). A second and more plausible explanation is that the omission was made for polemical and rhetorical purposes; Simplicius and his sources, for example, simply focused on the refutation of the facet of Alexander’s theory that they found objectionable.

But we should recall that all, or nearly all, of the Neoplatonic discussion is grounded in Porphyry’s longer commentary On the Categories (cf. my chapter 1), and that Porphyry explicitly rejects discussion of the separability of genera and species as too ‘deep’ for analysis in the context of a beginner’s commentary (cf. Isag. §1), namely, a commentary on the Categories (cf. Porphyry in Cat. 59,17-33). In the shorter surviving commentary in Cat. Porphyry traces this opinion to the second-century commentator Herminus, and more generally to Boethus of Sidon. In the third part of this section, we will explore how Boethus
enters the picture, and whether there is further evidence to support Dexippus’s opinion that Boethus shares Alexander’s view.

(3) Boethus and the context of the *Categories*

A passage of Porphyry’s surviving commentary on the *Categories* by question-and-answer (in Cat. 90,30 = \text{T4b*}) may shed light on both questions. Here Porphyry’s interlocutor poses a problem (*aporia*) as follows:

If those things are primary which eliminate other things along with themselves, but are not themselves eliminated when the others are, and animal and man eliminate Socrates along with themselves, but are not themselves eliminated along with Socrates, then Socrates would not be primary substance, but rather the genera and species would be. How would you respond to this difficulty?

This *aporia* is also found in the Latin commentary of Boethius (183C-D), and in his commentary on the *Isagoge* (above). Here, Porphyry replies:

90,30 = \text{T4b*}. – Ὅτι περὶ Σωκράτους μόνον πεποίησαι τὸν λόγον, οὐ ἀναρεθέντος ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ ζῷον μένει, δεὶ δὲ οὐκ ἐρ’ ἐνός ποιεῖσθαι τὸν λόγον, ἀλλ’ εὐ εἰδέναι, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἄτομος οὐσία ο εἰς τὸν κατὰ μέρος ἄλλ’ οἱ καθ’ ἐκαστὸν ἄνθρωποι πάντες, ἐξ ὥς καὶ ὁ κοινὴ κατηγορούμενος ἄνθρωπος ἐπενοήθη, καὶ τὰ καθ’ ἐκαστὸν ζώα, δι’ ἀ το κοινὴ κατηγορούμενον ἐνόησαμεν ζῷον. ἢ δή καὶ αἴτια τοῖς κοινὴ κατηγορούμενοις ἐστὶ τοῦ εἶναι: ἔπει τοῖς περὶ ἕξεων σημαντικῶν ἡ πρόθεσις, αἱ δὲ λέξεις ἐπὶ πρώτα τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἐπετέθησαν (τοῦτοις γὰρ πρώτος καιτ’ αἰσθήσαις ἐντυγχάνομεν), ταῦτας καὶ πρώτας ἔθεσε ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης εἶναι οὐσίας κατὰ τὴν πρόθεσιν, ὡσπερ πρώτα αἰ αἰσθητὰ κατανομάσθησαν, οὕτως ὡς πρῶτος τὰς σημαντικὰς λέξεις πρώτας τιθείς τὰς ἄτομους οὐσίας.

You are speaking about Socrates alone, who can be eliminated while ‘man’ and ‘animal’ both remain, but you ought not to speak merely about a single man: you must recognize that individual substance does not mean just one of the particulars, but rather all of the particular men (οὐκ ἔστιν ἄτομος οὐσία ὁ εἰς τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἄλλ’ οἱ καθ’ ἐκαστὸν ἄνθρωποι πάντες), from whom we conceive the man that is predicated in common, and all the particular animals, through which we think the animal that is predicated in common. These are the cause of the being of the common predicates (κοινὲς κατηγορουμένα).…. As sensibles are the primary objects of signification, he [Aristotle] posited individual substances as primary relative to significant expressions.

Porphyry offers these remarks in the context of commenting on the *Categories*. This passage suggests that the whole discussion of the priority of sensibles and intelligibles was answered...
by Porphyry, perhaps following Herminus (see my chapter 7), in the context of commentary on the Categories – in other words, we are here limiting our discussion to the sensible world precisely because the Categories is concerned solely with the signification of sensible beings. So long as we are talking about signification by words, we are talking about sensibles. It is reasonable that sensibles should be the primary objects of signification since these were the initial objects of vocalization.355 (See chapter 1, above, for a full discussion of this theory, and its roots in Boethus of Sidon and Herminus).

How does this shed light on Boethus? Porphyry in T4b* makes two key assumptions: (1) the Categories concerns the sensible world, rather than the intelligible world, and (2) we know that the Categories concerns the sensible world because we accept Boethus’s account of its skopos, namely, that it is an account of words qua significant of beings, and sensible objects are the primary objects of linguistic signification (thus the theory of ‘double imposition’ discussed earlier). It is already clear that the second point is indebted to Boethus, because we know from Porphyry himself (and from Simplicius) that Boethus advanced the skopos that made the Categories concerned with primary significant words qua significant (and significant of sensibles, discussed in a preceding section of this chapter). As for the first point, Boethus of Sidon himself states that the Categories is not concerned with intelligible

355 Porphyry’s suggestion that the ‘individual ousia’ (ἄτομος οὐσία) ‘human being’ means ‘all the particular’ examples of human beings (οἱ καθ’ ἑκάστον ἄνθρωποι πάντες) may appear quite surprising. The key to interpreting the force of ἄτομος οὐσία here, I think, is the close contrast between what Porphyry tells us not to do and what he tells us to do:

δεῖ δὲ οὐκ ἐφ’ ἑνὸς ποιεῖσθαι τὸν λόγον
it is necessary that the logos should not be constructed from one [instance]:

οὐκ ἔστιν ἄτομος οὐσία ὁ ἕν τῶν κατὰ μέρος
individual ousia is not one of those kata meros,

ἀλλ’ οἱ καθ’ ἑκάστον ἄνθρωποι πάντες
but all the humans kath’ hekaston,

ἐξ ὧν καὶ οἱ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενος ἄνθρωπος ἐπενοήθη
from whom we comprehend also the human predicated in common.

The contrast is between one particular instance, an element of the set of human beings (‘Socrates’), and the entire set understood kath’ hekaston as the sum of its members – Socrates, Plato, ... , from which we are able to get to grips with the human being ‘predicated in common’ over all. We might well compare Posterior Analytics 2.19, where multiple sequential sensations or sensibles ‘make a stand’ to construct the primitive katholou in the soul (see Barnes, commentary ad loc.). If we understand the present passage as describing a cognitive or epistemic event, as ἐπενοήθη would suggest, then it is reasonable to imagine that we experience a sequence of particular instances kath’ hekaston – not just one instance (kata meros) – in order to produce an intellectual recognition of the katholou over the instances. The particular instances will be sensations of (say) Socrates, Plato, ... , but the katholou will be ‘human’.
being (μὴ γὰρ εἶναι περὶ τῆς νοητῆς οὐσίας τὸν λόγον, Simplicius 78.4-5 = T14m), but with sensible being alone. (Nonetheless, Boethus seems to acknowledge that entities such as ‘intelligible number’ have real existence – or at least persuades Simplicius that he does: 65,20-21 = T14l).

Thus there is some reason to think that Dexippus rightly links Boethus and Alexander’s theories, and that the context of commentary on the Categories actually explains the limitation of the discussion to sensible or enmattered forms – the first class of forms, susceptible of both aisthesis and noesis, discussed by Alexander in AL1 and AL2.

H. The Onymies

Simplicius’ subsequent references to Boethus give particular attention to his view on the onymies. Boethus suggests, as Simplicius reports, that Aristotle’s division in Cat. 1a1-15 omits what were called synonyms ‘by more recent authors’ (τοῖς νεωτέροις), namely Stoics, and called polyonyms by Speusippus (36,28 = T14f). 356 This passage should evidently be attached to 38,19 (T14g), where Boethus is cited as the reporter of a Speusippan division into tautonyms (homonyms and synonyms) and heteronyms (true heteronyms, polonyms, and paronyms): 357 together these passages suggest some close study of the onymies by Boethus in his commentary, which also made significant use of Speusippus. Both passages are drawn from Porphyry via the Ad Gedalium.

Some of Simplicius’ later comments regarding Boethus’ work on the first chapter of the Categories are reflected earlier in the tradition, and may also, at least indirectly, imply some particular interest in the onymies. In the fourth century, Dexippus (in Cat 21,19 = T8) observes that Boethus, like Andronicus, omitted τῆς οὐσίας from the phrase λόγος τῆς οὐσίας in the opening chapter of the Categories. As Simplicius would later point out, this omission would solve the aporia, raised by Lucius and Nicostratus, that homonymy exists in the other categories as well as ousia.

356 Speusippus fr. 32c Lang = fr. 68c Tarán. For Moraux (I:151), it is possible that Boethus lacked access to the Poetics and Rhetoric, where examples of polyonyms may be found. See also Tarán (1978) and Barnes (1971).

I. ‘Symplerotika’ and Socrates as an accident of place [T14j]

According to Simplicius (48,1-12, tr. Chase):

Lucius and his circle… raise the following objection against the fact that what is in a substrate is said to be ‘not as a part’ [cf. Cat. 1a24-1b3]. ‘For if’, they say, ‘we say that things which complete a substance (ta sumplêrôtika tês ousias) are parts of that substance, and that which simply completes the being of a sensible body is colour, figure, magnitude, and simply quality and quantity (since there could be no colourless or figureless body), and of this particular body…. Then one of the two things is necessary: either not to say that these things are in a substrate, or [to say that] it was not correct to deny of things in a substrate that they are like parts. How, moreover, is it possible for completers (ta sumplêrôtika), in general, to be said to be in a substrate? For Socrates’ shape is not in Socrates as its substrate; rather, if anything, it would be those things which enter into already-complete things from outside which would be in them as their substrate’.

Simplicius intervenes with solutions to this problem, provided by Porphyry. It is the voice of Lucius – as Moraux contends – that continues at 49,31:

But why, they say, will not individual substances, such as Socrates and Plato, be subsumed under the account (logos) of the things “in a substrate” and be accidents, since Socrates is also “in something” – for he is in time and space – and not as a part, and it is impossible for him to exist apart from time and space? For even if he were to change from this particular place, he will still be in some other, as was said in the case of fragrance.

Simplicius indicates (50,2 = T14j) that

Boethus thought he solved the difficulty based on place, when he said that things in motion are, in general, never in the place in which they were, for this was proved in the On Motion. By the same reasoning (logos), however, neither would they be in partial time. For since time flows constantly, it is always other; so that if anything, they are in usual time.

Boethus, however, provides a solution for this too. In the first place, he says, universals are not even in existence (en hupostasei) according to Aristotle, and even if they were, they are not a determinate thing (ti). Yet Aristotle said ‘in some thing’. Therefore, that which is ‘in something’ cannot be in a universal.

However, some useful information is lacking from this summary of Boethus’ position. In an early passage of Ammonius’ commentary (in Cat. 27.9 = T12*), the paradox concerning place is expressed in the same terms, and a solution is given by Ammonius himself, or by an

\[\text{358 For Alexander’s discussion of ‘completers’ and substantial qualities, see Ellis (1994).}\]

\[\text{359 Moraux (I, 152 and following) argues that this problem also belongs to Lucius.}\]
unnamed commentator with whose view he identifies (φαμέν). I suggest that this commentator is also Boethus, and that Ammonius’ text records further details about his view. The text is translated below (tr. G. Matthews):

For they say that Socrates, being in a place, is in something and not as a part in the whole (for he is not part of the place) and he cannot exist apart from what he is in (for he cannot exist apart from a place), so that according to the definition Socrates is an accident, which is absurd.

We reply then that Socrates can exist apart from what he is in. For if we suppose him to have left behind the place where he was earlier and gone to another place, he is no less Socrates, whereas the accident separated from its subject has been destroyed. Moreover, one must recognize that place goes along with Socrates not as complementing his essence but rather as attending in the way that a shadow goes along with someone walking in the light and not at all as completing its proper essence.

Like the Simplician passage, this position espoused by Ammonius maintains that ‘things in motion are never in the place in which they were’. The Ammonian citation, however, also draws out the argument that Socrates, upon leaving the place where he was, remains Socrates, whereas the accident separated from its subject is destroyed. In addition, the author behind this citation also insists that place must attend Socrates as ‘completing his essence’; for Boethus, it is critical that differentiae and genera ‘complete’ or ‘complement the essence’ of the individual (T14m); for Boethus, as we noted earlier, this is a central function of universals.

Before leaving this passage, I would also like to explore the provenance of the doctrine, also mentioned by Dexippus in T9, that the koina ‘complete’ or ‘complement’ (sumpleroun) the particulars and cause them to become full ‘individuals’ in the unique sense of T4b*. The use of the concept of sumplerotika, I think, may be ascribed to Boethus.
First, we may suppose that this doctrine\textsuperscript{360} is reasonably old, as it is ascribed to ‘Lucius’ by Simplicius (Simplic. 48,1-50,2 = T\textsuperscript{14j}). Lucius argues that true \textit{sumplérotika} of beings can hardly be in a substrate, and even if they are, they can hardly be so ‘not as a part’. If they were, Lucius continues, then Socrates is shown to be an ‘accident’ of his place or time.

Boethus replies to this \textit{aporia}, arguing (rather cleverly) that the reductio ad absurdum fails because Socrates is actually never \textit{in} any particular place or time, nor is he in universal place or time (discussed below under a separate heading). Notably, however, Boethus wants to keep the idea that the \textit{sumplérotika} are in individual substrates ‘not as parts’; he does not quarrel with that formulation, and chooses instead the rather more difficult course of showing that Socrates is not ‘in’ a place or time.

But it is not clear whether Boethus himself accepts that there are such things as ‘completers’ (\textit{sumplérotika}). I think we can show this by turning to a similar passage of Ammonius (27,9 = T\textsuperscript{12*}), which – while it does not quote Boethus explicitly – reports his rebuttal to Lucius’s \textit{aporia} just as it occurs in Simplicius. Here, the rebuttal against Lucius’s \textit{aporia} continues that Socrates remains \textit{himself} even after leaving his place: and thus the real reason that Lucius’s argument fails is that ‘place’ and ‘time’ are not \textit{symplerotic} of Socrates – they are merely like ‘shadows’ of him. As this passage must (with Simplicius) must be assigned to Boethus, it seems clear that Boethus acknowledges that some features are in fact \textit{symplerotic} of Socrates, and that he acknowledges the concept of a property which is \textit{συμπληρωτικός}.

If this concept of a property that is \textit{συμπληρωτικός} \textit{οὐσίας} did belong to Boethus, what is its source? Are there other passages that may testify to Boethus’s use of it? (For its logical force and history, see also discussion from Barnes, 2003:180, in my chapter 7 on Herminus; \textit{sumplérōtikos} can be synonymous for \textit{susstatikos} when describing differentiae). The phrase

\textsuperscript{360} This doctrine appears adjacent to a citation of Boethus in Dexippus (T\textsuperscript{9}) and Simplicius (T\textsuperscript{14n}), and I will suggest that Boethus is also related to the context where it appears in Ammonius (T\textsuperscript{12*}) and Porphyry (T\textsuperscript{4c*}). But it is not clear where in the stratigraphy of these four commentaries it is introduced. In Simplicius (T\textsuperscript{14n}), immediately after Boethus suggests that differentiae should be classified with species, the voice of the passage explains that the differentia ‘complements’ the substance more completely than species and genera, just as ‘rational’ complements ‘human being’. I compare Porphyry \textit{in Cat.} (95,16-38 = T\textsuperscript{4c*}), where differentiae are \textit{συμπληρωτικα} τῶν οὐσιών in the sense that the human being can not exist without the ‘rational’ (τὸ γὰρ λογικὸν ἐὰν ἑαυτῷ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, φθείρεται). In Themistius, Boethus contends that \textit{hulê} gains quality and form (\textit{eidos}) to become a complete subject (T\textsuperscript{5}). In this connection, it is interesting to notice that Boethus ‘identified the \textit{genika} and the \textit{ideai}’ (Syrianus, \textit{in Met.} 106,5 = T\textsuperscript{10}).
itself dates at least to the second century: in our record, it first appears in Galen.\textsuperscript{361} The clear comparandum for Boethus’ usage is Porphyry in Cat. 95.21-96.3 (copied as T4c\textsuperscript{*}), where Porphyry responds to his interlocutor’s query regarding the nature of differentiae. It is critical to recognize, as Porphyry explains, that the diaphora is ‘not a mere quality – for then it would be an accident – nor a mere substance – for then it would be reckoned among the secondary substances – but that it is an essential quality (poiotès ousiôdês)’ (95.18-20). Porphyry continues at T4c\textsuperscript{*}:

\begin{quote}
Essential qualities are complements (sumplêrôtika) of substances… properties the loss of which destroys their subjects. Properties that can be gained and lost without the subject being destroyed would not be essential… and differentiae are indeed like this: they are essential qualities. For if ‘rational’ is taken away from man, he is destroyed…. And if ‘mortal’ is taken away from him, he is destroyed, i.e. if he changes into something immortal. Hence the differentia is included under the definition of substance, since it is a complement of substance, and the complements of substance are substances. Also accidents do not reveal the nature of substance, but the differentia does.
\end{quote}

But the phrase makes a more metaphysical appearance in Alexander’s Quaestiones, 53.1. The problem under consideration is: What will matter (hulê) be, if aside from deprivation it is able to be unqualified and shapeless, and aside from form (eidos) it is able to be created and shaped?\textsuperscript{362}

\begin{quote}
AL 8. \textit{Τί ἔσται ἡ ὕλη εἰ παρὰ μὲν τῆς στερήσεως ἔχει τὸ ἄποιος εἶναι καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος, παρὰ δὲ τοῦ εἴδους τὸ πεποιῶσθαι καὶ ἐσχηματίσθαι, τῷ αὐτῆς λόγῳ τί ἐσται; … οὕτως οὖν καὶ τῇ ὕλῃ εἴη ἃν τὸ ὑλὴ εἶναι οὐκ ἐν τῷ ποιῷ εἶναι, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ ἐπιτηδειότητα ἔχειν καὶ δύναμιν, καθ’ ὅν ἐστι δεκτικὴ ποιοτήτων, τὸ δ’ ἄποιον αὐτή συμβέβηκεν οὕν ὃν αὐτῆς
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{361} In a series of medical contexts which do not appear directly relevant (such as Ars Med. 341.12-14), as well as some contexts which may be relevant, such as the Commentary on the Hippocratic Aphorisms, describing the bodies that ‘fill’ or ‘complete’ our basic essence (7.418.17).

\textsuperscript{362} Τί ἐσται ἡ ὕλη εἰ παρὰ μὲν τῆς στερήσεως ἔχει τὸ ἄποιος εἶναι καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος, παρὰ δὲ τοῦ εἴδους τὸ πεποιῶσθαι καὶ ἐσχηματίσθαι?
Here we might compare the texts of Themistius, Dexippus, and Simplicius in several places:


These views were also found, without a named source, in Ammonius (T12*) and Porphyry (T4b*, and T4c*): however, T12* also bears a close relationship to Boethus’ rebuttal of Lucius on ‘Socrates as an accident of place’ as reported by Simplicius (48,1-12 = T14j), and I have already proposed several links that may be found with T4b* and T4c*. An outstanding question is whether these views belong to Boethus himself, or to Porphyry as his interpreter and mediator.

I believe that there are good reasons to ascribe these views to Boethus. First: (I) We know from Simplicius (156,17) that Lucius’ school contended that Quality is more near (oikeion) to substance than the Relative. Lucius argued this case by suggesting that Socrates could be better identified by his qualities than by his relatives. (II) This question is raised by Porphyry’s interlocutor, and answered by Porphyry, at in Cat. 111,8-112,7 = T4d*. Porphyry’s answer concludes by citing the view that Aristotle’s first definition of the Relative is taken from Plato (Boethus’ peculiar position: cf. Simplicius 159,12-15 = T14p) and subsequently corrected by the words è opósoun allós pros heteron at Cat. 6a37 (also Boethus’ peculiar position: cf. Simplicius 163,6-9 = T14r). (III) Besides these definite ties,

363 ‘Thus the essence of matter would lie not in form, but in the possession of suitability and potential. Lack of quality (to apoion) would be accidental to it, not complementing its being (ouk on autês sumplērōtikon tês ousias) – like, for any entity receptive of something [else], its not-being that of which it is receptive’. Fuller passage: ‘Τῆλε εἰ διαφορά εἰς ὑποκείμενον τάς τις στερήσεως ἐχει το δεκτικος εἶναι καὶ ἀσχημάτως, παρὰ δε τοῦ εἴδους τὸ πεποιωθα καὶ ἐσχημάτωθα, τῷ αὐτῆς λόγῳ τί ἦσαν; ἣ τούτων τῶν ἀποφάσεων ἐν τῇ τῆς υλής φύσει κατα γάρ τὸν αὐτῆς λόγον οὔτε ἀποικικος οὔτε ποιι, ὡς ὁ άνθρωπος κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸς λόγου οὔτε ἄμορφος οὔτε άνείδεος, ὡς ἐαυτῆς ἐνδιάφορος. οὔτος οὖν καὶ τῆς υλῆς οὔτε τὸν αὐτῆς λόγον, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ επιτηδεύοντα ἑχει καὶ δύναμιν, καθ’ ἑντὸς ἐστὶ δεκτικὴ πιστηθησθαι, τὸ δ’ ἀποικικος αὐτῆς συμβεβηκεν οὐκ ἄν αὐτῆς συμπληρωτικῶν τῆς οὐσίας, ὡς καὶ παντὶ τῷ δεκτικῷ τινὸς τῷ μὴ εἶναι τότῳ οὐ ἐστὶ δεκτικος. οὔσα δἐν τῷ μεθορίῳ τούτῳ εἴη ἄν καὶ ἀφθορίου.
Boethus is explicitly linked by Simplicius to the entire discussion, repeated by Porphyry in this same passage (T4d* = 111,21-112,4) concerning the reason why Aristotle speaks of substance and the relative in the singular (ἐνικῶς), but the relative in the plural (πληθυντικῶς) (Porphyry, 111,26-27: περὶ οὐσίας καὶ περὶ ποσοῦ ἑνικῶς εἶπεν, περὶ δὲ τῶν πρὸς τι πληθυντικῶς ἔφη; Simplicius, T14q: καὶ γάρ πληθυντικῶς καὶ ἑνικῶς αὐτῇ χρήται, ώς δήλων ἀπὸ... ὁν Βόηθος καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι μιμούμενοι τοὺς παλαιοὺς προφέρονται; cf. Simplicius, T14p: τοὺς παλαιοὺς τῶν κατηγοριῶν ἐξηγητὰς αἰτιῶντα, Βόηθον... χρησμονένους καὶ ἑνικῶς ἐκφέροντας ἐνίοτε τὸ πρὸς τι, τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους πληθυντικῶς ἀεὶ προφερομένου).

I would resolve this evidence as follows: (I) the Porphyrian passage T4d* is presented as an answer to Lucius, as Boethus’ answers are presented elsewhere in the text. Indeed, Lucius argued by pointing out that qualities, such as ‘snub-nosed’, made for a better description of Socrates than relatives. Boethus replied, I suggest, in T4c* (Porph. 95,16-38) that the best description is gained, not merely through qualities (οὔτε ποιότης ἐστιν μόνον), but through the differentiae, which are ‘substantial qualities’ and ‘complementary to beings’ (συμπληρωτικαὶ τῶν οὐσιῶν), such as ‘rational’ for man. Thus Lucius claimed that it is most useful τὸν Σωκράτη δηλῶσαι ἀπὸ τοῦ σιμοῦ... ἀπερ ἐστιν ποιά (156,18-19), to which Boethus responded that τά συμβεβηκότα μὲν οὐ δηλοὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, ἣ διαφορὰ δὲ δηλοὶ (Porph. 95,33). (II) Porphyry’s answer at T4d* concludes with two positions that we know from Simplicius (T14p, T14r) to have been peculiar to Boethus. (III) Moreover, the entire discussion at T4d* is echoed in Simplicius, T14p and T14q, where Boethus is named explicitly.

On account of these arguments and the other links described above, I believe that T4d* should join T4c* and T4b* as Porphyrian echoes of Boethus’ views in the Commentary by Question and Answer, and that the positions outlined regarding the differentia as ‘complementing’ or ‘completing ousia’ are Boethus’ own, both here and in the related passages quoted in Dexippus (T9), Ammonius (T12*), and Simplicius (T14n). In general, I would again stress that Porphyry, in several of his replies to an aporia in the Commentary by Question and Answer, has silently represented Boethus, and that this representation has sometimes appeared – by reference to other passages – as a verbatim report.

J. Differentiae [T14k, T14n]
At *Cat.* 1b23-24, Aristotle proposes that ‘however many differentiae there are of the predicate (κατηγορουμένου), there will be just as many differentiae of the subject (ὑποκειμένου)’.

This position, as Simplicius reports (58,27 = T14k), is critiqued by the school of Nicostratus\(^\text{364}\) (cf. 58,15; also discussed in my chapter on Lucius and Nicostratus). The Nicostratans ‘charge’ Aristotle with a serious error in describing the substrate as possessing the differentiae of its predicate. As Simplicius outlines the problem, ‘animal and rational animal are subordinate one to the other; since rational and irrational are differentiae of animal, how is it possible for one part of rational animal to be rational, while the other is irrational?’ (58,25-27). There seems to be a genuine challenge here; Ackrill shares their view on this passage of the *Categories*, commenting that ‘as it stands it is a howler’ (1963:77).

Ackrill suggests that the line ‘probably requires emendation’, and he settles on just the emendation that would be by Boethus of Sidon (*in Cat.* 58,27-29): to read ὅσαι τοῦ ὑποκειμένου διαφοραί, τοσαῦτα καὶ τοῦ κατηγορουμένου ἔσονται, thus transposing the words κατηγορουμένου and ὑποκειμένου. Both the Nicostratans’ charge and Boethus’s proposed solution provide good examples of the anticipation of modern criticism in the commentators.

For Simplicius, the emendation was a case of Boethus ‘giving in’ to this problem. He reverses the order of the terms ‘subject’ and ‘predicate’ at 1b23-24 to give ‘however many differentiae there are of the subject (ὑποκειμένου), there will be just as many differentiae of the predicate (κατηγορουμένου)’. Boethus explains,

> For the differentiae of the more particular shall also belong to the more universal, since the latter contains the more particular, even though the differentiae are not said as universally in the case of the predicate as they are in the case of the subject. “Rational”, for example, is predicated of every man, but not of every animal; rather, of animals, some are rational and others irrational. If we were to retain the same reading, we should have to take into consideration Aristotle’s remark that “there is nothing to prevent the differentiae from being the same” (1b20-1). For this does sometimes occur; “mortal”, for example, is a differentia both of “animal” and of “man”.

\(^{364}\) Following M. Chase in continuing this objection to οἱ περὶ τὸν Νικόστρατον, *pace* Praechter (1922, 486-7).
Simplicius expresses ‘gratitude to Boethus for pointing the way towards the solution of this problem’ (59,5), and develops a solution that distinguishes constitutive (sustatikai) from divisive (diairetikai) differentiae (cf. Porph. Is. 10,1-21).

Subsequently, Simplicius reports (97,28 = T14n) that Boethus classed diaphorai with form (eidos), rather than with the genos, because we often use differentiae to describe a thing, and in general, the differentiae ‘complete’ or ‘complement being’ (ousia).

For further discussion, see the later chapter on Herminus.

K. The category of the monad [T14l]

Another intriguing passage of Simplicius’ commentary On the Categories also follows a series of criticisms leveled by Lucius, Nicostratus, and others against the system of categories, contending that they omit crucial realities. Lucius’ questions (64,17; 64,29) focus on phônai such as conjunctions and articles, which appear to be omitted from the categorical scheme (but see also ch. 8 on Athenodorus and Cornutus: there may be textual issues with this passage). Simplicius, or his source, parry these questions, and proceed to add (65,4) similar verbal problems for solution: what are negations, privations, and the moods of verbs?

Subsequently, Simplicius appears in propria persona to report a purported omission of a different character:

‘But what about the One’, they say, ‘and the monad and the point? How can they not fall outside the categories? They are not, as one might think, quantified, for they are neither continuous – since they are without parts – nor are they discrete (diôrismenon). But it is fitting that everything quantified should be either continuous or discrete, and if discrete, then either odd or even’. The answer is, as Alexander also holds, that they will be placed among the Relative, both as origin (arkhê) of numbers and as measure.

If, however, number is twofold – one asomatic, the other somatic – then, as Boethus would say, the monad will also be twofold: one which is ousia and is in intelligible number – Aristotle also thinks that this one exists – and one which is a relative or quantified.

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365 Moraux, like Simplicius, prefers Boethus’ second solution, without emendation (I, 153-4).

366 Not all of the divisive differentiae of the predicate will belong to the subject; not, at any rate, those which are opposite (59,8-10). See further discussion in ch. 7 on Herminus.
Later, however, Boethus says that perhaps it is better to call it a quantified, for as whiteness (leukotês) is to white (to leukon), so is the dyad to two. If therefore the former are both qualified then the latter are also quantified.

Boethus’ resort to the notion of an intelligible, ‘asomatic’ number has struck some commentators as surprisingly Platonising. It certainly shows his direct response, I take it, to the criticisms of the Categories from a ‘Platonising’ or ‘Pythagoreanising’ perspective. Thus Moraux (155) suggests that Boethus is here influenced by Speusippus and ‘an die substantielle Realität von intelligiblen Zahlen glaubte’. Tarán (1981) argues to the contrary, pointing out that the distinction of two kinds of monads may be Simplicius’s own (‘then, as Boethus would say [ὁ Βόηθος ἀν φαίη], the monad will also be twofold...’). Michael Chase (2003, ad loc.) proposes that the influence may go back further still, as Alexander of Aphrodisias (in Met. 56,20) cites a similar discussion from Aristotle On the Good (fr. 2 Ross) and references Plato. But in itself, Boethus’ description of a non-bodily, intelligible nature is not uncharacteristic: at 78,4 (T14m), Boethus similarly distinguishes between ‘somatic and asomatic’ ousia, and this passage is analysed further below.

A related discussion is found later at Simplicius 154,3. Here, Porphyry ‘follows Andronicus’ in ‘articulating the concept of the hen, monades, and stigmê not spoken according to the ideal, but as evident in aisthēsis and dianoia’; in this way, as we suggested in the earlier chapter, it is probable that Andronicus also distinguished the monad and the point in intelligible and sensible modes.

L. Ousia and Hylomorphism [T5, T14m, T14o]

Plotinus poses a well-known dilemma in Enneads 6.1 [42] 2, 1-8. How can ousia be described as one kind (genos), as appears to be the case in the Categories, when both intelligible and sensible being can be distinguished? On the one hand, intelligible and sensible being may be of two different kinds, with nothing in common; on the other hand, if ousia is some common thing ‘before’ both kinds, it will be neither somatic nor asomatic, and nothing is neither somatic nor asomatic.

Simplicius cites Nicostratus as well as Plotinus as representatives of this line of argumentation (76,13), and later refers to Boethus as replying, in some sense, to its force (78,4), suggesting that the original author may be Lucius or another unnamed source writing in Boethus’ lifetime. Simplicius goes on to explain that Boethus treated such questions as
redundant (παρέλκειν ἐνταῦθα) in this context, because the Categories does not discuss noetic ousia (μὴ γὰρ εἶναι περὶ τῆς νοητῆς οὐσίας τὸν λόγον), presumably focusing exclusively on sensible and somatic being. He proposes a different aporia (78,5-20 = T14m, tr. Reinhardt 2007):

Rather [than asking if Cat. is concerned with intelligible substances] one should wonder in addition, given that in other works he distinguishes three different types of substance, matter, form and the compound of the two, but posits substance here as one category, which he posits in the present context, how he subsumes under that type the three to which different definitions apply.

In response to that, Boethus said that the definition of primary substance applies to matter and to the compound. For it holds of both of them that they are neither said of a subject nor are they in a subject; for neither of them is in something else. But the compound, even if it is not in something else, has form as something that is in it as in something else, namely in matter, but matter has nothing that is in it as in something else. And they share a feature as well as being distinguished by one, inasmuch as the matter is the matter of something, qua matter, just as it is the subject of something, but the composite substance is not the substance of something qua substance.

And so, says Boethus, matter and the compound will be subsumed under the category of substance, but the form will be outside the category of substance, and will fall under a different category, quality or quantity or yet another (to de eidos tês men ousias ektos estai, hup’ allên de peseitai katégorian, étoi tén poiotēta è posotēta è allēn tīn).

Here Boethus describes the Metaphysics tripartition of ousia into form, matter, and the composite, and explores the relationship of that tripartition with the definition of primary ousia in the Categories as ‘neither in a subject nor said-of anything as a subject’ (cf. Cat. 1a20-1b8). As an outcome, it appears that matter and the composite are properly ousia, whereas the form belongs to a different category. This, too, shows how Boethus responded to criticisms of the Categories as an account of ousia.  

Above, I have compared the slightly earlier passage 73,28-74,29 as a Boethan fragment, T14m*, which is presented as a direct reply to Lucius’ line of argument as followed by Nicostratus and Plotinus:

Those who raise such aporiai… seem to have altered the hupothesis, since they bring forward their problems as if the Philosopher had announced that he was going to teach us primarily about beings. We, however, say that he was not carrying out his account about beings qua beings; or, if at all, then only insofar as they are signified by words of such-and-such a kind. He is primarily

367 For a discussion of Alexander of Aphrodisias’s response, see Ellis (1994).
discussing the things of this world, for these are what are immediately
signified by words…

Those who have contemplated (theasamenoi), having taken their starting point
in sensible things, have grasped that the intelligibles are ineffable… Thus the
lover of contemplation of beings could easily pass from these [sensible] things
over to the intelligibles, by making use of analogy…

Not only in the case of ousia, but also in that of the other categories,
[Aristotle] ranks sensible and particular things before those which are
universal… and he is right to do so: for he seeks the difference in accordance
with significant words, which were first and most properly assigned to sensible
things… and this, as it appears, is the reason why in other passages he says
that substance is threefold: there is substance according to matter, another
according to form, and another according to the compound.

From its account of the dilemma regarding the genera of being to the discussion of substance
as threefold, this passage echoes T14m. An intriguing aspect of this passage is the twofold
view that (a) Aristotle is concerned with sensible beings, and correctly ranks these as primary
insofar as he is dealing with significant words, and (b) one should pass from these sensibles
to the intelligible world via analogy. The position described by (a) is distinguished in the first
and third paragraphs, while the position described by (b) is distinguished in the second
paragraph. It may be the case that (b) represents Porphyry’s commentary on Boethus’
discussion, or it may be the case that view (b) is in some way seeded by Boethus himself.

Based, as it seems, on the position expressed later in T14m, Porphyry criticized Boethus for
claiming ‘that the form which is contradistinguished from matter and called ousia by
Aristotle is quality, and some one other of the accidents’ (ὅτι τὸ ἀντιδιαιρεθὲν τῇ ὑλῇ εἶδος
καὶ οὕσια ὡθεθὲν ὑπὸ Ἀριστοτέλους, τοῦτο ποιότητα καὶ ἄλλο τι τῶν συμβεβηκότων
φησίν, 78.21-23). And following Porphyry, it has been suggested that Boethus did not regard
form (eidos) as ousia, but accorded substantial status to matter and the composite alone:
rather, Boethus appears to have described eidos as an ‘accident of matter’.

But there are several new factors to reconsider. The passage T14m, and particularly the
implicit discussion at T14m*, indicate that Boethus, in his treatment of the Categories,
regarded discussions about intelligible and sensible ousia as redundant, because the
Categories was not concerned with noetic ousia. Therefore, it should be noted that Boethus’
discussion of eidos in this particular context may not reflect his view of the intelligible eidos
that Aristotle describes as ‘primary substance’, but rather distinguish a sensible eidos such as
that outlined by Alexander (e.g. AL1, AL2) in his position on the universals, which, as I have suggested, may be profitably compared to Boethus’ own.

Boethus arrived at the conclusion that Form, or at least sensible Form, does not belong to the category ousia.

But it is not clear that he viewed ‘Form as an accident of matter’; rather, the phrase εἶδος ... καὶ ἄλλο τι τῶν συμβεβηκότων φησίν is Porphyry’s own, articulated in order to underscore his challenge to Boethus’ argument at T4m; as a formulation, it may not be coherent with Boethus’ view that matter is itself formless and becomes a ‘subject’ as soon as Form comes upon it (T5). 368 This position is also reported by Simplicius in his Physics commentary, perhaps drawing on this passage (in Phys. 211,15 = T15). Thus Themistius (in Phys. 26,20 = T5) ascribes to Boethus a position on matter (hulê) and its distinction, according to Time, from the subject (hupokeimenon).

Hulê is amorphous in itself and lacks a Form (eidos), but it is already transferred into a subject (hupokeimenon): for it is already (êdê) with eidos and peras, and a subject for eidos and peras. For hulê appears to get its name from what is yet to be, but the subject from what is now in existence: and this could be the pragma, which we call hulê – some subject with whose nature there has coincided the receptivity of the opposites: for just as it is receptive of eidos, it is receptive of its deprivation (sterêsis).

In fact, Boethus is explicit elsewhere that neither eidê nor differentiae can be accidents, because accidents do not ‘complement’ the subject (cf. T14n). With respect to Boethus’ views on Form in general, we know that he placed eidos outside the category ousia precisely on account of its not matching with the Categories’ definition of ousia (T14m); but he also

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368 The proposal that ‘Form is an accident of matter’ is also a challenging expression for Boethus to have used, as he held that ‘in itself hulê is without shape and without form (aneideos)’ and that, as soon as form comes upon matter, it ‘is already transferred to a subject’ which is receptive of eidos (Themistius in Phys. 26,20 = T15).
described *eidos* as a secondary substance, just because it is a subject for differentiae (*T14n*); and finally, as an individual which is, in fact, substance, just in that it is ‘one and the same in number’ and so a unity which is determinate as a ‘this’ (*T14o*). Here we have a subtle paradox: how can Form be excluded from the category *ousia* at 78,4 (*T14m*) yet described as individual *ousia* at *T14o*?

This same paradox, together with the same puzzle, are also posed by the interlocutor of Porphyry at *T4c* *,* which I have characterized as perhaps reliant on Boethus. Here, however, the source is discussing the differentia, rather than the Form (tr. Strange):

> – If, then, a differentia is not a substance – for you claimed that it was not a substance – nor is it an accident – for it is not in a subject – but there is nothing intermediate between substance and accident – for every being is either in a subject or not in a subject, for they are all either substances or accidents those items that are in the nine categories, substances those that exist in the way that substances do – if, then, a differentia is neither a substance nor an accident, what could it be?

The discussion about differentiae is relevant in that Boethus regarded differentiae as akin to Form (*T14n*), save that unlike Form, they determine a subject as a ‘simple quality’: an *eidos* or *genos* (and, by extension, an *idea*: cf. *T10*) is, for Boethus, a ‘secondary substance’ as a subject for differentiae, but differentiae are not *ousiai* because they do not contribute to being, but being *such*.

The speaker at *T4c* *,* whose voice I have identified with Boethus, replies to the interlocutor’s puzzle as follows:

> Aristotle says that [differentia] is not a mere quality – for then it would be an accident – nor a mere substance – for then it would be reckoned among the secondary substances – but that it is an ‘essential quality’ (*poiotes ousiôdes*). Therefore it is not predicated in the essence of what it is predicated of, but as an essential qualification… Essential qualities are those that are complements of substances. Complements (*sumplêrôtika*) are properties the loss of which destroys their subjects… if ‘rational’ is taken away from man, man is destroyed… and if ‘mortal’ is taken away from him, he is destroyed, i.e. if he changes into something immortal. Hence the differentia is included under the definition of substance, since it is a complement of substance, and the complements of substances are substances.

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369 At *T14o*, echoing the content of *T4b* *,* Simplicius recounts ‘why we call the *atomon* substance (*ousia*)’ and notes that ‘the *eidos* is determinate and one in number’, and that ‘Boethus determines unity by means of the *this here*’. Cf. Alexander *ap*. Philoponum, *in GC* 314,9-22: the form needs to be numerically the same.
I propose that this excerpt reflects a corrected Boethus (corrected, that is, by Porphyry), with the Porphyrian rectification coming in the final lines. At the root, this passage expresses, I believe, Boethus’ solution to the puzzle how Form is related to Matter: it is, like the differentia (T14n) an ‘essential quality’ which, unlike a mere accident, is able to ‘complement’ and ‘fill’ substance. Without this complement, the primary subject could not exist; conversely, without the primary subject, there would be nothing to complement; thus there is a tenuous interdependency of individuals in the universal and the particular, the same interdependency expressed in the passages of Alexander cited earlier in this chapter. As ‘essential’, it has elements of substance that enable it to be a subject for differentiae; conversely, as a quality, it does not fall simply under the category of ousia.

But the source goes on to explain that the complements of substances are substances and therefore, in another sense, differentiae are substances (95,33). This latter point appears to be precisely the objection actually made by Porphyry against Boethus at the conclusion of T14m: ‘that which qualifies (poiotikon) ousia is ousiôdes [note the shared language], and therefore is ousia’. Boethus himself may not have taken this final step, and therefore Porphyry adds this conclusion to T4c* in his QA commentary, and, presumably in the Ad Gedalium, offers the verbatim criticism which recurs at the end of Simplicius T14m.

This much offers an account of how Form, while not strictly falling under the category of substance (T14m), does ‘complete the subject’ and is therefore not an accident, but an ‘essential quality’; precisely in its capacity as a subject for differentiae, it is also a secondary substance (T14n). This does not yet explain Boethus’ view of eidos as a ‘unity’ and an ‘individual’ as ‘one and the same in number’ (T14o); but as I have proposed above, he anticipated the view of Form expounded by Alexander (AL1, AL2) which distinguished a separate and enmattered eidos.

Now according to Boethus’ view at T14l, the Monad may be understood both as intelligible ousia and as quantity; in the same way, I suggest, Boethus’ Form may be understood as intelligible ousia and as sensible quality, and it is exclusively in this latter sense that Form is treated, on Boethus’ view, in the Categories. As we have noticed, this position underlies his insistence that the Categories focuses only on sensible substance (T14m). As sensibles are ‘primary relative to significant expressions’ (T14y*, T4b*, cf. T2), the skopos of the Categories is to treat ‘expressions insofar as they are significant’. This result is perhaps
relevant to the later Neoplatonic schools’ treatment of Boethus in general, as his position on Form, while complex, is not thoroughly incompatible with the Neoplatonic position.

M. The Relative [T14p, T14q, T14r, T14s, T14t, T14u, T14v]

A long segment of Simplicius’ named citations of Boethus, extending throughout approximately forty pages (159,14 to 202,1), describes Boethus’ views on the controversial category of the Relative. The citations are presumably drawn from his book (ὅλον βιβλίον, 163,6 = T14r) on the subject, mediated by Porphyry and Iamblichus.

At 159,14 = T14p and 163,6 = T14r (cp. Porphyry, 111,5-112,7 = T4d*), Boethus examines Aristotle’s initial definition of the relative at Cat. 7, 6a36-7, and traces it back to Plato’s Sophist (255D). He takes the basic description of the relatives as those ‘which are said to be what they are “of” or “than” other things’, and indicates that Aristotle adds ‘or to be in some other way relative to something else’ in order to correct this initial definition.

Boethus wrote a whole book about the Relative and that which is relatively disposed. He thought that the definition given by Plato went as far as ‘are said to be just what they are [as being] of other things’, but that the rest was added by Aristotle by way of correction... But Boethus criticises the full definition as well when he says: “The argument put this way seems to be at fault; for the relatively disposed, when defined, should not have included that which is relatively disposed to something other. For that was just what it was proposed to define; nor should the relative, when defined, have included 'other' or 'else' in the definition; for these too belong among relatives”.

The correction, according to the mirror passage at Porphyry 112,1-7 (T4d*), is meant to indicate that relatives are not absolute, but exist in a relationship (skhesis) to another, which may be construed with a grammatical case; for example, perception is perception of the perceptible (112,14). There is an interesting comparison with other passages such as Simplic. In Phys. 759,18 = T16, where Boethus is said to distinguish ‘the number from the numberer, and the perceptible from the perceiver’ and to state that as the perceptible can exist in separation from the perceiver, the number can exist in separation from the numberer.

At T14r, Boethus analyses the Stoics’ treatment of relatives, and criticizes a perceived lack of consistency, favouring a single, Aristotelian definition (167,22 = T14t). In a related passage,

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the language of Porphyry at 112,1-7 is picked up at Simplicius, 167,4 = T14s, where every relationship (skhesis) must coexist with the natural character (oikeios kharaktêr) of the relative, and the kharaktêr must also exist in the subjects. This theme recurs at 373,8 = T14z, which treats the category of ‘having’.

Boethus also characterizes the head and the hand as relatives qua parts, but as substances in themselves (T14u). As for the broad ‘bipartition’ of absolute and relative at Sophist 255D (as discussed by Simplicius), Boethus agrees with Ariston (Simplicius, 202,1 = T14v) and with Andronicus:

But in the opinion of Boethus and Ariston, [Aristotle] also made the definition unclear, which is itself a fault of the definition (cf. Porphyry, 123). That is why Ariston, changing it to make it clearer, says 'things that are relatively disposed are those whose being is the same as being relatively disposed to something else'. This is how Andronicus presents it too. But Achaicus resolves the problem, the definiendum is not in the definition, but he does say that Aristotle used the second 'relative to something' homonymously instead of 'relative to anything' as if he said 'those things...' [203,1] The concept is more clearly shown by the definition of Achaicus which says 'whose being is the same as being relatively disposed to anything whatsoever' and that of Andronicus and Ariston which says 'whose being is the same as being relatively disposed to something else'.

This passage hints that Boethus was prepared, with Ariston, to see the expression of Aristotle’s definition as ‘unclear’ – but not necessarily as incorrect or in need of improvement, simply as obscure.

N. The Categories of Acting and Undergoing [T14w]

At T14w (Simplic. 302,16), Boethus responds to the aporia that Motion (kinesis) should be a separate katêgoria by observing that ‘acting’ must be separated from ‘affection’ for Aristotle, for whom the prime mover is unmoved; in this he is followed by Iamblichus (καὶ Ἰάμβλιχος πρὸς τὴν ἀπορίαν ἐνέστησαν: T14w).

O. The Category of When and Time & of Where and Place [T14y, T14y*, T22]

At T14y (Simplic. 348,2), Boethus carefully distinguishes Time from what participates, and is in, Time (τὸ μετέχον χρόνου καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ). The passage runs as follows (tr. Huby):

Boethus supposes that time is one thing, and what partakes in time and is in time is another: and year and month are time, but year-long and month-long
are what partake of time, just as thought (phronēsis) belongs to one category, and what is according to thought (to kata phronēsin), i.e., thinking (phronein), [belongs] to another, and the one belongs to Quality, and the other to Action: likewise, do time and what is according to time (to kata chronon) differ.

Andronicus, as well as Archytas and Plotinus, are said to have substituted the category Time for the category When, and the category Place for the category Where (see in the earlier chapter Andr. T14f, Andr. T14g, Andr. T14x, Andr. T14y). In contrast, Boethus appears to have defended the traditional independent categories When and Where.

Immediately preceding T14y Simplicius presents a lengthy discussion of the problems concerning the When and the Where, concluding in a sequence of questions and answers, where neither the questioner nor the answerer are identified. Pamela Huby\textsuperscript{371} has suggested that the questioner should be identified as Andronicus, and the answerer as Boethus, based on a previously unrecognized fragment of Boethus in a manuscript edited by T. Waitz.

Huby ascribes an excerpted discussion Περὶ τῆς τοῦ ποτὲ κατηγορίας in Laurentianus 71,32 (fos. 84-86) = T22 to Boethus of Sidon. If Huby’s attribution is correct, this passage – which is mirrored, in many cases verbatim, in the full discussion of When and Where at Simplicius, 340-57 – is of great significance. The author of this fragment lays out a sequence of descriptions concerning the nature of Time, drawing heavily on Aristotle’s Physics (Waitz 19,42-21,31). Time is certainly a quantity (20,11-22), as Phys. 220b24-28 describes it. It is relevant when the soul distinguishes two Nows, prior and posterior (20,30-34); Time measures Motion, as the number of motion (21,8-20) and Time also measures Rests, which are in flux, and have their beginning in Time (21,20-7). These views trace, and in places simplify, the Physics of Aristotle, as Huby (400) points out.

The author then turns to explore the category to which Time belongs. It should be regarded, some say, as a Relation and not as a Quantity, because it is measure; but measure can be looked at in both ways, as relation and as quantity (21,35-22,17). Time is not the category under which When falls; When can be defined in terms of the thing and of Time. Indeed, Time and When are readily distinguished by their differentiae (22,18-25): Time is infinite, When is finite (25-27). There are eleven senses of being ‘in’ something (22,28-23,8); of

\textsuperscript{371} P. M. Huby, ‘An Excerpt from Boethus of Sidon’s Commentary on the Categories?’ , CQ n.s. 31.2 (1981), 398-409.
these, When (‘in time’) and Where (‘in space’) are the only cases in which a category arises, because these two cases are independent.

Observing a close verbal similarity with much of the text of Simplicius 340-57, Huby suggests that the passages most closely resembling the Laurentian excerpt are drawn from Iamblichus (402 n. 6), particularly regarding whether Time is a category under which When falls, and Place a category under which Where falls. That view is ascribed to Archytas and Andronicus (342,20-5), and to Plotinus (347,15.19); after this, a series of arguments and counter-arguments is presented, which are not ascribed to anyone. Huby proposes that the ascription of the arguments from 347,19-37 = T14y* should be made to Andronicus, and of the counter-arguments to Boethus. Indeed, the name of Boethus immediately follows these arguments (348,12), introducing the view that ‘time is one thing, and what is in time is another’ (T14y).

T14y* commences as follows, leading into T14y (tr. R. Gaskin, 2000, adapted):

But we must next turn to the problems (aporiai) which have been mooted in connection with the When, and match their solutions (luseis) to them (Ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀπορίας λοιπῶν ἵτεον τὰς φερομένας πρὸς τὸ ποτὲ καὶ τὰς λύσεις αὐτὰς ἐπακτέον). So then:

Q. When the followers of Plotinus (cf. 6.1.13) and Andronicus say that yesterday and tomorrow and last year are parts of time, and on account of this think that they should be arranged together with time,

A. We shall reply that these things are not parts of time, but contain a relationship (skhēsin) of the objects which are in time towards time, and that each of these things is different from the other.

Q. ‘But’, they say, ‘if yesterday is past time, or a measure of time, it will be a kind of composite, given that the past is one thing and time another, and so the [concept] When will be two categories, and not one simple one.

A. Well, by the same reasoning, we shall say that if animate is one thing, rational another, and mortal another, then they will not be simple, but will be three categories. But if in this case we comprehend the three things together in one species [i.e., man], then time and the past, too, contribute to one object, and do not make two categories.

But perhaps yesterday is not past time simpliciter, and [perhaps] in this case it is not that a plurality of concepts coalesce in the same thing: for yesterday is formally constituted just by the relation itself of the [relevant] object to time.

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372 On which see T. A. Szlezák (ed.), Pseudo-Archytas über die Kategorien (Berlin 1972).
Q. ‘But’, they say, ‘if the [concept] When is said to be what is in time, and if you say that this thing which is in time is a particular object, such as Socrates – because Socrates existed last year [for example] – well, he belongs to another category [i.e., ousia]: if, on the other hand, [you say] that [what is in time is] time, this too belongs to another category [i.e., quantity]: and if [you say] that [what is in time is] the composite, then there will not be just one category [of When]’.

A. In fact, neither the objects in time, nor time itself, nor the composite of both of these formally constitute the category of when, but rather the bare relationship of the relevant object towards time. That is why we shall admit into the When neither parts of time, nor the objects [in time], but rather this category too will be simple, just as the other genera are. [T14y] And Boethus indeed hypothesizes that time is a different thing from what partakes of time and is in time… (καὶ Βόηθος δὲ ἄλλο μὲν τὸν χρόνον ὑποτίθεται).

There are indeed good reasons to attach the preceding series of questions and answers to Boethus, as Huby (403-4) proposes based on key correspondences of the Waitz document, together with the named citation at T14y. In addition, the notion that the ‘bare relationship’ (μόνην τὴν σχέσιν) of an entity to time constitutes the category When can be compared to Boethus’ discussion later in Simplicius (T14za) of Rest and Motion as a ‘relationship’ to place and form and time.

P. The Category of Having [T14z]

T14z (Simplic. 373,8) represents a significant fragment of debate with those Stoics who would transfer the category of Having to the category of πῶς ἔχειν (τῶν δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς ἄξιοντων εἰς τὸ πῶς ἔχειν ἀναφέρει τὸ ἔχειν). In reply, Boethus describes ‘having’, not as a relative, but as a kind of ‘relatively dispositional’ category. He distinguishes three kinds of ‘relationship’ (skhēsis): (1) in the thing itself and per se; (2) in relation to something else; (3) of something else in relation to the thing itself. As an example, he cites ‘having practical wisdom’ and ‘being a father’: the owner of the wisdom is a relative, but the ‘owning’ itself is a ‘having’ (ἔχειν); similarly, the father is a relative, but ‘being a father’ is a condition of ‘having’.

Q. Psychology: On the immortality of the soul [T18†]
Eusebius preserves fragments of five lost books by Porphyry entitled *Against Boethus on the Soul*.\(^{373}\) It is probable that the Boethus who is criticized by Porphyry in these books is the same Boethus who contends, as reported by Simplicius in *De An. 247.23 = T18†*, that ‘the soul, like “ensouledness” (empsukhia), is immortal [merely] in the sense of not itself enduring death when it approaches’. This citation is included in *SVF* as a fragment of the Stoic Boethus of Sidon\(^ {374}\) who may have lived approximately one century before the Peripatetic of the same name; his view is often linked to a passage of Macrobius, *in Somn. Scip. 1.14.20*, where Boethus holds ‘that the soul is comprised of fire and air’.

But H.B. Gottschalk has argued\(^ {375}\) that the Boethus criticized by Porphyry in these lost books, and cited with disapproval by Simplicius, was the Peripatetic with whom our study is concerned. If Gottschalk’s hypothesis is correct, the conclusion would bear relevance for our treatment of Boethus’ views on the *Categories*. For instance, the existence of such a work by Porphyry, directed against the psychology of Boethus of Sidon, may alter our views of Porphyry’s attitudes toward and usage of Boethus in the context of the *Categories*.

Porphyry does not identify his opponent in the surviving fragments of his work. But relevant views on the soul maintained by a named ‘Boethus’ may be found, as mentioned, (a) at Macrobius, *in Somn. Scip. 1.14.20* and (b) at Simplicius *in De An. 247.23 (T18†)*. Gottschalk agrees with Morax that (a) the Macrobius passage belongs undoubtedly to the Stoic Boethus, as it ‘stands apart from the rest’ (246, cf. 255). But Gottschalk proceeds to make a careful case, against the traditional attribution, that (b) the Simplicius *in De An.* passage belongs to the Peripatetic Boethus.\(^ {376}\) With only two named citations of Boethus to examine, and the first of these (a) omitted from consideration, Gottschalk’s argument for Boethus

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\(^{373}\) Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica*, with quotations in vol. II. The first four fragments outlined by Gottschalk derive from Porphyry’s first book. On the books, see the catalogue of Porphyry’s works at *Suda* II 2098, 4.178.20 Adler.

\(^{374}\) On whom see Morax, *Aristotelismus* 1, 172 and following, with *SVF* 3.267.


\(^{376}\) In this attribution, Gottschalk parts ways with P. Morax, *Aristotelismus* 1, 173 and following, who argued that the Boethus of T18† was necessarily a Stoic, as his position entails the Stoic doctrine that the soul may survive the death of the person for a certain time, but it will cease to exist independently at the *ekpyrosis*. Gottschalk points out that the argument does not require this (255-256).
Peripateticus’ authorship of the relevant work *On the Soul* is primarily based on (b) the ascription of T18† to the Peripatetic Boethus.\(^{377}\)

That passage runs as follows (tr. Gottschalk, modified):

\[
καλῶς γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἀίδιον προστέθεικεν, ὡς ὁ Πλάτων τὸ ἀνώλεθρον ἐν τῷ Φαίδωνι, ἔτι μὴ ὡς ὁ Βοηθὸς ὁμήθομεν τὴν ψυχὴν ὡσπερ τὴν ἐμφυσέαν ἀθάνατον μὲν εἶναι ὡς αὐτὴν μὴ υπομένουσαν τὸν θάνατον ἐπίσει, ἐξισταμένην δὲ ἐπιόντος ἐκείνου τῷ ζώντι ἀπόλλυσθαι.
\]

Aristotle did well to add ‘eternal’ [to his description of the Active Intellect] as Plato in the *Phaedo* (106c) added ‘indestructible’ [to his description of Soul], so that we should not think, as Boethus does, that the soul, like 'ensouledness' (*empsukhia*), is immortal in the sense of not itself enduring death when it approaches, but that it is not destroyed when leaving [the organism] when death approaches the organism.

Which Boethus might this be? In favour of Peripatetic authorship, Gottschalk observes (250), first, that Strato of Lampsacus criticized the *Phaedo* in terms preserved by Damascius (ps.-Olympiodorus) in *Phaed*. 2, 33 (Westerink). Gottschalk also points out that Alexander, in his *De anima* (2-26) records a theory of the soul that roughly agrees with the position attacked by Porphyry ap. Eusebium. Finally, Gottschalk observes from Galen (*An. corp.* 782,12-783,1 = *Andr. T4*) that Andronicus of Rhodes described the soul as the *dunamis* arising from a bodily mixture, which also, as Gottschalk suggests, may be read as agreeing with the position attacked by Porphyry.\(^{378}\)

A recent study by R. Sharples\(^{379}\) follows this line:

Gottschalk is surely right to argue that Boethus was echoing Strato’s objection to the final immortality argument of the *Phaedo*, namely that it shows only that soul cannot admit death, not that it survives it: that soul does not *die* does not mean that it does not cease to exist, or, putting it another way, there is more than one way for soul not to exist in a dead state.

On the other hand, the Stoic Panaetius also reportedly launched an attack on the *Phaedo* (frr. 83-4 van Straaten); this strengthens the case for Stoic authorship, and particularly for Boethus

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\(^{377}\) Further, but circumstantial, evidence is discussed below.

\(^{378}\) Indeed Andronicus of Rhodes seems to have maintained that (i) the soul is the *dunamis* of the blend of bodily elements and (ii) the inner disposition of natural elements produces movement (254), but Andronicus also, as the earlier chapter points out, held that the soul was the *cause* of that blend, and viewed the soul as self-moving, neither of which views are obviously compatible with Simplicius’ position.

Stoicus, whom Philo associates with Panaetius, but offers no definite conclusion. In addition, the unusual word ‘ensouledness’ (*empsukhia*) is notable and central to the passage. On it, Gottschalk comments that ‘the language of the fragment is very close to Plato’s, but the word *empsukhia* has replaced Plato’s *zôê* (248 n. 10). This is rather interesting, as *empsukhia* is not an Aristotelian word, nor does it occur in classical prose. It does, however, belong naturally to a Stoic setting. Apart from an occurrence in a rather different context in Philo of Alexandria, the first appearance of *empsukhia* is found in Plutarch, *De stoicorum repugnantiis* 1053B4, where it helps to describe a noticeably similar Stoic doctrine concerning the soul. This may constitute further circumstantial evidence in favour of Stoic authorship.

The balance of the evidence is rather inconclusive. Based on these testimonia alone, and the usage of *empsukhia*, I would tend to maintain the traditional ascription to Boethus Stoicus. And there are stronger considerations to bear in mind, which, I think, tell against the ascription to the Peripatetic Boethus.

(1) The later Neoplatonic tradition was exceptionally friendly to the Boethus who commented on the *Categories*: as we have already noticed, Simplicius praises him as an ‘amazing’ commentator (*thaumasios*) and a deep thinker, and when he criticizes Boethus directly at *T14p* (159,14), he softens the criticism with the disclaimer that ‘I will not say he was ignorant, such a respected man’. It is almost certain that Simplicius inherited this positive view from Porphyry and Iamblichus, and it is improbable that the Neoplatonic tradition in general, and Porphyry in particular, would have bestowed such epithets – which are exceptional in their record of the tradition between Aristotle and Plotinus – upon a scholar who denied the immortality of the soul, and attacked the arguments of the *Phaedo* with systematic rigour.

(2) Moreover, this fragment does not fit with any other piece of information preserved about Boethus Peripateticus in the later sources outlined in the appendix of texts, whereas it does match the trace of the Stoic represented by Macrobius, and, as asserted by P. Moraux, it is particularly sensible in the setting of the Stoic *ekpurôsis*, for which compare also the language and the context of Plutarch, *De stoicorum repugnantiis* 1053B.

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To this, we might compare a scholion ascribed to Hermias, *in Phaed.*, where *ἐμψυχίας* are paralleled with *ἐντελεχείας* (119,4).
Considering the balance of the evidence, and particularly on these grounds, I believe that T18† records the thought of Boethus Stoicus, and that the work of Porphyry Against Boethus was not directed against the Peripatetic.

R. On Metempsychosis [T21]

The last fragment noted here references the inclusion of a ‘Boethus’ by the Neoplatonist Christian Aeneas of Gaza in his Theophrastus, composed in the sixth century CE. At p. 12,381 Aeneas announces that Porphyry and Iamblichus ‘reddened with shame’ (ἐρυθριῶντες) at the Platonic theory of metempsychosis into and from animals, preferring to keep the transition of souls within the human realm; that reference is shared with Augustine, Civ. Dei 12.27 and 13.19. Here, this position is ascribed to a ‘Boethus’ and linked with Plotinus, Harpocratian, and Numenius.

Assessment

The status of the evidence

Through this roster of sources, we can draw together a summary of Boethus’s opinions. In psychology, with Andronicus, he holds that pathos is an irrational motion of the soul with magnitude (T2), a view that draws on Stoic antecedents. With Xenarchus, he identifies the goal that we seek (orekton) as our own self, drawing on Nicomachean Ethics 8 as well as later Stoic discussions of oikeiôsis (T3).

Hylê seems to be a thing that could, at some point, become a subject; when it becomes a subject, it is in the Now, and receptive of Form and Deprivation (T5, T15) to become a complete subject (T5). Differentiae are ‘substantial qualities’ (Porhp. 95,18-20 = T4c*) which complement substances (συμπληρωτικαὶ τῶν οὐσιῶν) in this way, just as the differentia ‘rational’ complements the species ‘man’; accidents do not complement substances, and it appears that Boethus may have viewed such ‘complementing’ as the contribution of genera, species, and differentiae to individuals (cf. T10), classing differentiae and forms together (T14n). Boethus’ argument that Socrates is not an accident of place (T14j, T12*) maintains that ‘place’ does not complement Socrates’ essence, but attends ‘as a

shadow goes with someone walking in the light’. Our ‘where’ and ‘when’ are bare relations (skhêseis) of us to place and time.

He recommended commencing the reading of Aristotle from the Physics (T19, T20). He defined Rest as a simultaneous relationship (skhêsis) between factors such as size, place, and time (T14za). We must actively count any measure (T7), but the object measured, or Number, can exist without the Numberer (T6, T16), a comment on Ar. Phys. 4.14. Place, and presumably time, travel with us like ‘shadows’ (T12*) to which we carry a bare relationship (skhêsis, T14y, cf. T14y*) in the categories Where and When. This is also the relationship of the Numberer to Number, like the Perceiver to the Perceived, and they have the relationship of Relatives to one another (cf. T4d*).

With respect to beings, he appears to have ranked the koina as primary among the intelligibles, but the particulars as primary among the aisthêta (cf. T9, T14m); in fact, the more nuanced view, upon which Alexander appears to draw (cf. AL2), is that individual substance (atomos ousia) means all the particulars, perceived both as a universal and particular (T4b*), and as an individual being ontologically prior to each particular as well as the universal (cf. Alex. Quaest. 1.11a, 22,15-20 = AL3). While Boethus recognized the notion of the intelligible, and, perhaps following Speusippus, even intelligible numbers such as the substantial Monad (T14l), it is with the sensible that the Categories is concerned, because significant expressions are primarily applied to sensibles (T4b*, T14m*); thus the skopos, for Porphyry as for Boethus, is περὶ φωνῶν σημαντικῶν ἀπλῶν, καθὸ σημαντικαί εἰσι τῶν πραγμάτων. Conversely, however, Simplicius reports (T14i) that Boethus described all signifieds ‘among the ancients’ as noêseis.

When Lucius argued that Socrates could be better identified by his qualities than by his relatives, Boethus answered (T4c*, T4d*) that the best description is gained, not merely through qualities (οὔτε ποιότης ἐστὶ μόνον), but through the differentiae.

He defended a number of traditional doctrines of the Categories. He contended with innovations in the category of the Relative (T14r, T14t). He maintained the division of Acting and Undergoing as independent categories (T14w). He maintained the categories Where and When rather than Place and Time (T14y), perhaps, as Huby suggests, in the

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382 Cf. Moraux, I, 155.
course of a dialogue with Andronicus (T14y*, cf. T22) which would later undergo revision at the hands of Plotinus. He maintained the category of Having, against the Stoics (T14z). On the other hand, he also seems to have credited some innovations as beneficial, or at least recognized developments outside the bounds of the text: for instance, he suggested that Speusippus, as well as more recent Stoics (τοῖς νεωτέροις), had developed a more complete collection of onymies than that represented at Cat. 1a1-15.

Boethus’ positions are mentioned fairly infrequently, and with impartial objectivity, by Galen, Aspasius, Alexander, Themistius, and Dexippus. Syrianus finds him to have been ‘led astray by false leads’ in one instance, the identity of the genika and ideai. He was regarded with serious respect by Simplicius, and so presumably by his sources, Porphyry and Iamblichus (T14a, T14p). But different strata in Simplicius appear to have treated Boethus differently; for example, shortly after stating that ‘I refuse to call him ignorant (êgnoei), such a respected man’ (οὐ γὰρ δὴ εἴπομι ὅτι ἦγνώει ἐλλόγιμος ἁνήρ γεγονώς, T14p), Simplicius proceeds to do exactly that (ἀγνοεῖν δὲ δοκεῖ, T14r). While it seems probable that Simplicius’ information concerning Boethus derives from Porphyry’s commentary Ad Gedalium, Boethus is sometimes (e.g. T14x) more proximate to Iamblichus, and is allied closely with Iamblichus where Porphyry’s view differs slightly (T14w); there are cases where Porphyry replies directly to, or critiques, a transmitted view of Boethus (T14m). Huby notes that the Waitz fragment (T22) overlaps significantly with Iamblichus in Simplicius’ text, and it is likely that Iamblichus also played a significant role in Simplicius’ value judgements on Boethus.

Boethus’ views are essentially orthodox Peripateticism, drawing in particular upon the Categories, Nicomachean Ethics, and Physics, shot through with innovative interpretations such as his position on differentiae. Quite a few positions are expressed in dialogue with Stoic dogmas, suggesting that Stoic technical language was, in a sense, the philosophical lingua franca, but not the intellectual orthodoxy, of his milieu. He occasionally contends with the Stoics directly, for instance regarding the status of the Relative. In general, while his responses to critics of Aristotle are not tendentious, he is engaged with the task of explicating and resolving aporiai posed concerning the doctrines that he regards as Peripatetic. I discuss the question of Boethus’ relationship with the various schools in general terms below.
At this point, I would stress that Boethus’s ‘responses’ are chiefly about the *Categories* as a work that has something to say about *ousia*, and he does not (in our sources) show a strong interest in defending the *Categories* against criticisms of it as a work about grammar or language, which will surface in the discussion of Athenodorus (ch. 6).

**The Structure of the Commentary: Aporiai and Luseis**

What was the status of Boethus’ commentary by responses to *aporiai*, if such a work existed? An interesting example of his prospective modus operandi is T14y*, the passage of Simplicius that Huby reads as a submerged dialogue between Boethus and Andronicus: if this is correct, it is similar in structure and style to Porphyry’s treatment by Question and Answer, in that it does not appear to represent a one-way criticism of a predecessor’s views, but a dialectic debate. But the clearest instances of *aporiai* to which Boethus responds by name are not credited to Andronicus, but to Lucius, or rather to the ‘followers of Lucius’ (οἱ περὶ τὸν Λούκιον). As we noted above, Lucius is mentioned by name on eight occasions in Simplicius. In each case, Boethus is subsequently cited to deliver a reply. Porphyry is generally on the scene, frequently to boost the view propounded by Boethus, but at occasionally to deliver an additional critique (T14m). Leaving aside the ambiguous cases, some solid examples of Lucius’ *aporiai* are as follows (for what follows see also my chapter on Lucius and Nicostratus):

1. 48,1. The followers of Lucius question how what is in a subject can be so ‘not as a part’. After a solution from Porphyry, and a comment by Simplicius (49,1), the aporia continues, culminating in the famous conclusion (49,31) that Socrates appears, on Aristotle’s argument, to be an ‘accident of place’. Finally, Boethus is cited to offer his distinctive solution to the dilemma.

2. 64,18. The section is headlined by the observation that Cornutus, Lucius, and Nicostratus all objected to the division of the ten categories (62,27). The best manner of response to these critics is ‘by question and answer’. Now, ‘the followers of Lucius’ question why Aristotle omitted conjunctions from the *Categories* ‘if they are also significant expressions’.

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383 There are also unnamed instances, such as T14k, where Boethus ‘gives way’ to an *aporia* (ἐνδοὺς τῇ ἀπορίᾳ, cf. 58,23-27) which may also have been posed by the school of Lucius.

384 Of the eight citations of Lucius ascribed to Simplicius, this list of five omits 1,19 (where he is merely mentioned as the predecessor of Nicostratus) and collapses 62,27 and 64,18 into (2).
Simplicius delivers a reply, to which Lucius again furnishes a rejoinder: ‘what about the one, the monad, and the point?’ Boethus, finally, replies that the monad is twofold.

(3) 73,28. The followers of Lucius, in the company of Nicostratus and Plotinus (6.1), question whether 'Aristotle here divided and enumerated sensible and generated things alone, or whether he did so with all beings... and in general whether the intelligible genera are different from the sensible.' Simplicius replies that ‘he is primarily discussing things of this world… which are those immediately signified by words’ and observes that we should focus on the ‘threefold division’ of form, matter, and the compound (T14y*); a source for this reply is not presently forthcoming, but the same view recurs within a few pages under the name of Boethus (T14y).

(4) 125,16. The followers of Lucius criticize Aristotle on the grounds that he transfers body, which belongs to substance, to the category of quantity. On this occasion, the reply precedes the citation: Lucius' school is 'mistaken' to make this criticism, because 'a body, in so far as it is extended three ways and can by nature be measured, is a quantity; but insofar as it is a substrate, remains the same and one in number and is receptive of the contraries, in that respect it is a substance'. An allusion to Porphyry in Cat. 103,18 ff. follows. But where does this reply come from? Each of the doctrines are maintained by Boethus elsewhere in a manner which suggests a response to this problem: (1) an enmattered quantity can be regarded in two different ways, as substance or as quantity (T14l); (2) it is a substance in so far as it is receptive of the contraries and one and the same in number; (3) it is measurable.

(5) 156,17. The followers of Lucius contend that quality is nearer (more oikeion) to ousia than is the relative, observing that it is better to identify Socrates by his qualities than by his relations. The priority of quality holds, they continue, if one divides the categories into kath' hauto and the pros heteron. To this Porphyry replies that the relative should come next, arguing (in Cat. 111,9-112,5) that (1) when length, depth, and breadth have come into existence, the larger and smaller supervene upon them, and these are relatives; (2) also because Aristotle needs to explain what relatives are, having introduced them in discussing quantity. Porphyry continues to explain what relatives are, concluding with an observation (that the definition given by Aristotle here is Platonic and subsequently corrected) ascribed to Boethus by Simplicius (159,12-15), suggesting, as I have argued above, that Boethus may...
underlie much of this discourse, which is presented more fully by Simplicius at 157.23-158.27, also immediately before a citation of Boethus (159.14 = T14p).

The pattern is consistent, and may be broadly sketched as follows here (but see the ‘table of responses’ in my chapter on Lucius and Nicostratus for a detailed account): (a) ‘the followers of Lucius’, sometimes followed by Nicostratus or Plotinus (see following discussion in ch. 5), present a problem with the text of the Categories, which is taken up in sequence with the kata lexin exegesis; (b) Porphyry provides a response; (c) Simplicius provides a response, which may be his own, but sometimes appears to be a submerged source; (d) Boethus provides a response, with Simplicius typically citing him by name. Elements (b) and (c) are sometimes reversed. I think it is highly probable, in light of the considerations mentioned earlier, that element (c) typically represents the opinion of Iamblichus in his own commentary On the Categories, drawing in places on the text of ‘Archytas’. This pattern integrates and develops a ‘back and forth’ dialectic that sometimes resembles, albeit with greater maturity, the style and content of Porphyry’s commentary by Question and Answer, and the same pattern may also be reflected in the dialogue ascribed to Andronicus and Boethus by P. Huby at T14y*.

This simplified stratigraphy suggests, in my view, several results. First, Simplicius’ most immediate sources are Iamblichus’ commentary On the Categories, the source for element (c), and, beneath it, Porphyry’s commentary Ad Gedalium, as he himself informs us in the preamble to his commentary. Second, the parallel passages in Porphyry’s Ad Gedalium contained at least the following elements: (a) the view taken by the followers of Lucius (sometimes advanced by Nicostratus or Plotinus), (b) views expressed by ‘Porphyry’ himself, perhaps (as I suspect) encapsulating a history of other predecessors’ works, such as those of Herminus, and (d) Boethus, in that order, sometimes followed by (e) a correction of Boethus’ view by Porphyry himself, surviving for us in fragments such as T14m. It may be deduced that Boethus often had the last word in Porphyry’s treatment, at least when Porphyry and Iamblichus were content with his position, a situation which persisted throughout much of Simplicius’ treatment.

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385 The closest referent in Porphyry’s in Cat. answering to the dialogue T14y* is not, in fact, Boethus, but Herminus, who is often mentioned by Porphyry as sharing Boethus’ views. I return to this subject in a subsequent chapter on Herminus.

5. Boethus of Sidon

Why was this structure adopted? So long as the commentators were sympathetic to the solution maintained by Boethus, the stratigraphy in Simplicius suggests that Porphyry’s and Iamblichus’ commentaries successively interpolated content between Lucius’ *aporia* and Boethus’ answer, generating elements (b) and (c), but maintained the integrity of Boethus’ treatment as a *lusis* of the *aporia*, did not amend it, and occasionally added a corrective response when Boethan ἄγχινοια fell short, so to speak, of the Platonic truth.387

I infer that Boethus’ commentary on the *Categories kata lexin* may be the original source both for the Lucian *aporiai* and for Boethus’ responses to them. This commentary, like Porphyry’s, Iamblichus’, and Simplicius’ major works, treated the text in sequence, probably by lemmata, and investigated certain *aporiai* in the form of questions and answers. Many of these *aporiai* were traced by Boethus himself to the Lucian school, which he sought to answer. With Huby, some of these *aporiai* may also have been raised by Andronicus. In general, Boethus’ responses to these *aporiai* generated the content of elements (a) and (d) that survive in Simplicius, and perhaps many sections of unsourced dialogue such as T14y*.

Thus the stratigraphy of the underlying commentaries – each modeled on its predecessor and incorporating some new material – would follow this model:

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387 This is particularly intriguing in the context of Michael Chase’s (2003:94) suggestion that Simplicius ‘admired B[oethus] more than any other pre-Porphyrian exegete’. The epithet *thaumasios* bestowed upon him is exceptional, and in general the attitudes of the commentators imply that he was treated with some of the caution and respect accorded to a genuine Neo-Platonist commentator. One might venture to suggest that Simplicius’ sources’ attitudes differed slightly, as one shies away from a direct criticism of Boethus’ ‘ignorance’ (T14p) while the other is prepared to debunk it (T14r); in general, however, his arguments are left intact.
Did Boethus, like Porphyry, compose two commentaries, one directed to a real or imagined pupil and adopting the Question and Answer form, the other directed against aporiai raised by historical objectors and adopting the kata lexin form of close exegesis? I take it, rather, that these two formats could be contained in a single work. Porphyry’s QA commentary, once it gets underway, develops its comments based on the quotation of individual lemmata, most of which are cited by his interlocutor (see for example 86,33-34), and many of which cite named historical figures such as Athenodorus, Cornutus, and Herminus; conversely, Simplicius’ pattern of presentation demonstrates that a kata lexin commentary can also incorporate a dialogue format presenting aporetic questions and answers; indeed, Simplicius or his source, at 63,2, recommend the genre of ‘debate’ (τὸν τύπον τῆς ἀντιλογίας) to address the aporiai raised by Lucius and his successors.

Porphyry’s commentary by Question and Answer is primarily pedagogical, and represents a work simpler than, but analogous to, his monumental Ad Gedalium. So I have argued above, citing comparanda in Porphyry’s QA commentary under the headings, for instance, T4b*-d*. Both commentaries address interlocutors who are otherwise unknown. ‘Lucius’ is also a figure otherwise unknown: his name is, in fact, markedly generic, and was a favorite of contemporary fiction-writers wishing to portray a ‘John Doe’. One might even speculate that ‘Lucius’, as presented by Boethus in his commentary On the Categories, was an interlocutor comparable to Porphyry’s Gedalius, who may or may not have been an historical figure – or behind whose name some other, perhaps better-known thinker might lie. Such speculation could not easily be supported against the testimony of the later sources, and

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388 The name ‘Lucius’ has been characterized as the ‘Smith’ or ‘Jones’ of the era, particularly with reference to Apuleius: see ch. 4 for notes.

389 But given the poverty of the evidence, such speculation treads into the treacherous territory of replacing Homer with ‘another man of the same name’.

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particularly Simplicius, who evidently views Lucius as an historical figure and the predecessor of Nicostratus (T14a).

**Preliminary Conclusions**

With respect to the *Categories*, the stratigraphy discussed above suggests that Boethus’ responses to *aporiai*, including Lucius’ problems and (perhaps) certain novel interpretations proposed by Andronicus, represent a broad approach to the exegesis of the text that would go on to exercise considerable influence on the structure and content of future treatments. However, our review also suggests that Boethus’ solutions were not immediately adopted; in fact, the shadowy commentators following Boethus, such as Nicostratus, appear to have challenged his answers to ‘Lucius’, and adopted and developed these *aporiai* as increasingly serious challenges. These succeeding philosophers who adopted and pursued the positions ascribed to Lucius may, perhaps, have been broadly characterized as οἱ περὶ τὸν Λούκιον, the group to whom Simplicius ascribes each of the relevant *aporiai* cited above in the *Categories* commentary.

In my chapter on Lucius and Nicostratus, we also considered this tradition of commentary that immediately followed Boethus. The tradition appears to have been defined by engagement with Lucius’ *aporiai* as well as Boethus’ exegesis and solutions, and these responses evolved over time into a positive redefinition of the problem concerning the genera of being, represented in the culminating point of Plotinus’ treatise 6.1-3.

We do not appear to find Boethus engaging with the ‘linguistic’ view of the *Categories* presented by the Stoic Athenodorus, discussed in chapter 6 below. It is possible that their work on the *Categories* occurred in a contemporary period but independently, or that evidence of an engagement between their views simply did not come down to us. However, we have already seen in our review of the *skopos* (I.1) that Herminus did see Boethus as maintaining a view capable of withstanding Athenodorus’s objections, and Herminus himself sought to rebut those objections.

As far as we can tell, Boethus himself defended a view of the *Categories* according to which it had something to say about the structure of being itself, and not merely about language. His most explicit polemical concern is to deal with the objections of the ‘Platonising’ critics such as ‘Lucius’. Later, Herminus would adopt the formula that the *Categories* concerns
‘simple words significant of beings, insofar as they are significant’, and ascribe this formula to Boethus, but deploy it primarily in defense against the ‘linguistic’ criticism promoted by Athenodorus. It is possible, though by no means certain, that Boethus was not obliged to respond to such criticisms directly, aside from the example that is (rightly or wrongly, as we discussed in the preceding chapter on Lucius and Nicostratus) attributed to Lucius (Simplicius 62,28-65,14 = Lucius and Nicostratus T8e).

Boethus does emerge as an historian of philosophy and as an original thinker, with the ability to express Periaptetic ideas in terms that were intelligible to Platonists and Stoics, provoking strong responses among his contemporaries and in the school of later Neoplatonism that followed Porphyry. He developed the thought of certain predecessors, including Andronicus, in certain areas (cf. T2), but his greatest contribution was to maintain and revitalize a strong line of Peripatetic thought in an idiom and an intellectual context which was clearly understood by Stoics and Platonists as relevant, and inspired a re-engagement, sometimes contentious and sometimes familiar, with the esoterica of Aristotle. In short, Boethus transformed the Categories into a rich repository of content that would occupy centuries of discussion. He raised critical challenges of interpretation that remain with us today, such as the problem of reconciling the Categories notion of ousia with the hylomorphism of the Metaphysics (T14m). In that passage, Boethus introduced the puzzle how Aristotle can divide ousia into three kinds in the Metaphysics, namely Form, Matter, and the Compound, yet arrange ousia under one category in the Categories. This passage, while one of Boethus’ most lasting contributions to the tradition, is also one of the most difficult to comprehend. It is discussed in detail above under the heading ‘Ousia and Hylomorphism’, as critical in regard to Boethus’ compatibility with the later Neoplatonic tradition.

Compatibility with Neoplatonism

We have already noted the broad respect that the later Neoplatonists expressed for Boethus: in commenting on the passage T18†, I suggested that this respect would not have been possible if Boethus’ positions were exceptionally hostile to Platonic doctrines such as the immortality of the soul and the substantiality of intelligible eidê, and followed Moraux in believing, partly on these grounds, that a different man, most likely Boethus Stoicus, was the addressee of Porphyry Against Boethus. I have suggested, above, that Boethus’ view on the nature of Form was more subtle than is evident at first sight, and may not have inspired any
greater hostility than the categorical correction applied by Porphyry at T14m, and introduced in his own commentary by Question and Answer. I have also suggested that Boethus and Alexander are cited in the same breath by Dexippus because they hold a view of the universal which, while not strictly identical with the Platonic position, is basically compatible in maintaining a related distinction of the intelligible and the sensible.

This chapter has explored several compatibilities that may have attracted Porphyry to rejuvenate interest in Boethus in the course of the later Neoplatonic tradition. The broader reasons why Porphyry may have found the Categories to be a relevant introductory treatment of reality for the purposes of his philosophical system, as found in the Isagoge, will be treated in the general conclusion to this work. We turn now to explore the tradition of response to Boethus that led up to the systematic treatment of Plotinus and Porphyry.
6. Athenodorus and Cornutus
Seleucus. Well, then, what is the reason that impelled the philosophers of old to engage in disputes of every kind with each other on the subject of this Aristotelian writing which we call the Categories? For as far as I can see, neither have more numerous controversies occurred about any other topic, nor have greater contests been stirred up, not only by Stoics and Platonists trying to undermine these Aristotelian Categories, but even among the Peripatetics with each other....

Dexippus. Because... the subject (skopos) of this book concerns the primary and simple expressions (lexeis) and the realities they signify. So since logos is useful to all branches of philosophy, and the first principles of this are simple expressions and their objects of reference, it is natural that much controversy has arisen....

Dexippus in Cat. 5.16-22 (tr. Dillon, modified)

The Neoplatonic commentators represent ‘Athenodorus’ and ‘Cornutus’ as closely linked figures. Athenodorus is a Stoic (Porphyry in Cat. 86.20 = T1d, cf. Dexippus [in chapter heading] 1.9 = T2a) who criticizes the Categories for failing to analyze its subject (σκοπός). Simplicius depicts Cornutus as following (62.25-27 = T3c) or as amending (128,7; 129,1 = T5, T6) the criticisms of Athenodorus. According to Porphyry, their followers (οἱ περὶ Ἀθηνόδωρον καὶ Κορνοῦτον) maintain that the Categories treats ‘verbal expressions insofar as they are verbal expressions’ (λέξεων καθὸ λέξεις, in Cat. 59.5-14 = T1c), and that the text omits many classes of verbal expression and therefore fails to treat its proper subject comprehensively (οὐ πάσας τὰς λέξεις περιλαβοῦσαν, 6. Athenodorus and Cornutus

Michael Griffin

390 For the following discussion of the historical tradition on Athenodorus, I rely chiefly upon the review in R. Goulet, DPhA (entries 496-98); Moraux II 592-601; B. L. Hijnams, ‘Athenodorus on the Categories and a pun on Athenodorus’, 105-114 in J. Mansfeld and L.M. de Rijk (eds.), Kephalaion: Studies in Greek Philosophy and its Continuation Offered to Professor C. J. de Vogel (Assen, 1975). For bibliography see DPhA entries 496-98, and especially entry 497 on Calvus.

391 For the following discussion of Cornutus as an historical figure, I am indebted to the entry of Pedro Pablo Fuentes González in R. Goulet, DPhA (entry 190); Moraux II (1984); and the overviews of Cornutus’s allegorical practice in G. Boys-Stones (2007 and in id. 2003), in G. W. Most, ‘Cornutus and Stoic Allegoresis’ in ANRW II.36.3 (1989), 2014-2065 (with bibliography) and in A.A. Long, ‘Stoic Readings of Homer’, 53-54 = Stoic Studies, 71-72. For comprehensive bibliography see DPhA entry 190.

392 In this respect they were at variance with Boethus of Sidon, whose alternative account that the skopos of the Categories was ‘significant sounds insofar as they are significant’ (περὶ φωνῶν ομιματικῶν ἀπλῶν καθὸ ομιματικά εἰσι τῶν πραγμάτων, Porphyry in Cat. 58.5-6) would win the day in the Neoplatonic tradition. As I suggest below, however, the notion that spoken words are directly significant of realities is more Stoic than Aristotelian (de Int. 16.3) or Platonic.

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Simplicius 19,1). Athenodorus in particular is said to have rejected the ‘number’ of ten categories, either as too great\textsuperscript{393} or as too small.\textsuperscript{394}

In at least one passage of Simplicius’s commentary (18,22-19,7 = T3a), Athenodorus and Cornutus are also associated with criticisms of the literary composition of the Categories, referring to the text as a poorly organized ‘heap’ of speculations (παντοδαπῶν θεωρημάτων σωφεία, T3a.iii) that opens with ‘logic’ (the onymes) before executing a series of loose disciplinary transitions between theology, ethics, and physics. As I suggest below, it is not entirely clear that this criticism is rightly attributed to both commentators, as the passage in question is disjointed. But modern critics certainly share these misgivings concerning the structural and thematic links of the ‘onymies’ and postpraedicamenta with the core chapters of the Categories.\textsuperscript{395} Simplicius situates this criticism as a failure to recognize the ‘division of chapters according to their natural joints’ (κατ’ άρθρα διῄρηνται, 18,23).

As Athenodorus and Cornutus are claiming that the parts move indiscriminately between logic, ethics, physics, and theology, this imagery may reflect the Stoic application of Plato’s ‘butcher’ analogy (\textit{Phaedrus} 265E) to the articulation of philosophy as compounded of several disciplines, logic, ethics, and physics (DL 7.40 = SVF 2.41).

The fragments of Athenodorus and Cornutus on the Categories raise interesting challenges of interpretation, particularly about their motivations for commenting on this text. L. Annaeus Cornutus is known to have made a speciality out of linguistics and rhetoric (Porph. 86,21-2; Simplic. 62,25-6), especially ‘semantics’, and to have written a monograph on hexeis;\textsuperscript{396} so perhaps his commentary upon the Categories emerged naturally from his own interests. But Cornutus reacted to the commentary of Athenodorus (Simplicius in Cat. 62,25 = T3b), and Athenodorus’s motivation for studying and refuting the Categories is more obscure. Indeed, it is not clear which among several Stoic philosophers of that name should be identified with the Athenodorus of the Neoplatonic commentators.

\textsuperscript{393} Hijmans 108 and following; cf. M. Pohlenz 1984(6), I, 294.

\textsuperscript{394} Moraux II 588-9 and n. 18.

\textsuperscript{395} Contemporary critics who comment on the coherence of the chapters include John Rist (1989:94); Frede (1987:1ff.); Barrington Jones (1972:117); and Oehler (1984:37-119). There is no evidence that the Stoics, like some contemporary critics, were ever led to question the authenticity of the text.

\textsuperscript{396} See J. Barnes, ‘Aristotle and Stoic Logic’, and \textit{Peri Hekton} in POxy 3649; see Hülser, \textit{Die Fragmenten}, 1058-63.
Throughout the following discussion, I seek to support several new claims about the commentaries of Athenodorus and Cornutus on the *Categories*. I propose that the defense deployed by Porphyry (and later by Dexippus and Simplicius) against Athenodorus’s criticism of the *Categories* was itself constructed within the theoretical framework of the Stoic ‘imposition’ of language. Athenodorus, as I suggest, sought to define the subject-matter of the ten categories in terms of the secondary (linguistic) subdivision of Stoic dialectic, facilitating his assessment (as it was subsequently interpreted) that the *skopos* of the work was linguistic expressions-as-such (λέξεις καθὸ λέξεις) and that Aristotle’s analysis fell short of comprehending these. But a second Stoicizing source, as I will seek to show, responded that the ten categories referenced the subject-matter of the primary subdivision of Stoic dialectic, concerning the so-called sayables or *lekta*, then utilized this analysis to build an entirely different argument against the coherence of the *Categories*, according to which the work lacked any unifying *skopos* and the subject-matter of the ten categories could even be viewed as ‘theological’ and not linguistic at all. Simplicius appears to combine both arguments at 18,22-19,7 = T3a, where they can be distinguished based on the structure and sources of the passage and its use of language (analyzed below in the section ‘On the *Categories*’ I). I posit that Cornutus is the second Stoicizing source, and that this difference constitutes the unidentified ‘disagreement’ represented by his entitlement of a commentary *Against Athenodorus and Aristotle* and his occasional objections to Athenodorus’s ‘lexical’ account of certain categories such as the Relative (cf. Simplicius 187,24-34 = T8).

More broadly, I suggest that the criticisms leveled by both Athenodorus and Cornutus against the *Categories* were motivated by the perceived incompatibility of Aristotle’s account of ‘simple’ assertions (terms) with the Stoic account of ‘simple’ assertions (propositions) – in the formulation of which a certain ‘Athenodorus’ played a leading role (cf. D.L. 7.68 = T30). Much like the Stoic opponents of Alexander of Aphrodisias at *An. Pr.* 402,1-405,16 (T44),

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397 See discussion below for discussion and further literature. K. Hülser (1987) collects the Stoic fragments on dialectic.

398 I argue below that the formulation provided by Porphyry in T1b (περὶ τῆς προηγουμένης θέσεως τῶν λέξεων τῆς κατὰ τῶν προγμάτων), as it represents the direct signification of realities by words without the mediation of thoughts (cf. De Int. 16a3), has more in common with the Stoic doctrine of *lekta* than it does with an Aristotelian theory of semantics.
who defended οὐ [Καλλίας περιπατεῖ] against Καλλίας [οὐ περιπατεῖ],\(^3^9^9\) we find that the Stoic critics of the _Categories_ were motivated to dispute the Aristotelian account of ‘simple categorical assertions’ (cf. Dexippus _in Cat._ 12.3-11 = \(T2\)) on just this battleground.

Athenodorus’s line of attack, I believe, was to show that the _Categories_, with its syntax of nouns and verbs, really occupied itself with a linguistic and lexical subject and not with the proper province of logic and dialectic – the *lekta*. Cornutus may have disagreed, and Herminus, the immediate source of Porphyry’s defense, certainly disagreed (cf. Porph. _in Cat._ 59,17-19 = \(T1c\); see my chapter 7). Herminus responded by redefining the *skopos* of the _Categories_ to clarify that it did not concern the kinds of reality (pace Nicostratus and Plotinus) nor *lexeis*-as-such (pace Athenodorus), but instead concerned things that are said (τῶν λεγομένων, 59,22) and their significance (τὴν ἐκάστου οἰκείαν σημασίαν, 59,26-27) – in Stoic terms, neither words nor realities, but the ‘sayables’ between. As I suggest in the following chapter, the views ascribed to Herminus by Porphyry also build on a narrative about the ‘double imposition’ of names that can be attributed to the Stoics and other Hellenistic schools.\(^4^0^0\)

For a general discussion of Simplicius and Porphyry’s presentation of this theory, and its relevance to Herminus, Athenodorus and Cornutus, see chapter 1. A brief survey may, however, be useful here.

The Chrysippean position on etymology was ultimately grounded, we are told, in the position that language, or the elements of language, originally held a direct ‘natural’ meaning (see my discussion of the Porphyrian ‘imposition of names’, above, and e.g. _SVF_ 2.146 = Origen, _Contra Celsum_ 1.24). For Cornutus as for most Stoics, linguistic expressions could understood as imbued with inherent truth or falsehood as ‘sayables’ (*lekta*) that directly signified realities – in contrast to the Aristotelian theory that interposed thoughts or ‘affections of the soul’ between words and things (_De Int._ 16\(^a\)3). This doctrine would be particularly relevant to the reading of the _Categories_, in that assertibles or propositions

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\(^3^9^9\) These understand negation-signs as negating whole sentences such as Καλλίας περιπατεῖ, not merely their component terms such as περιπατεῖ. See Barnes, ‘Aristotle and Stoic Logic’, 41, who suggests based on this passage alone that they may be ‘later Stoics’ such as Athenodorus and Cornutus rather than Chrysippus.

(axiòmata) were understood to be examples of self-complete lekta (cf. Sextus, P.H. 2.104, D.L. 7.63).

The Stoics say that three things are linked to one another: what is signified, what signifies, and what exists. Of these, what signifies is the sound, e.g. the sound ‘Dion’; what is signified is the very thing which is suggested by the sound and which we apprehend to subsist with our thought (the barbarians do not understand although they hear the sound); and what exists is the external object, such as Dion himself. Of these things two are bodies, namely the sound and what exists, one is not a body, namely the thing signified, the lekton, which also is true or false.


Based on this infrastructure, the Stoics (and especially Chrysippus) divided Dialectic into two parts, the first dealing with the lekta or ‘sayables’, the second with the ways in which the human voice is articulated to convey them.⁴⁰¹ A key source for this bipartition is D.L. 7.43 (cf. 7.62-63 for the precise association with the doctrine of lekta):

Dialectic [according to the Stoics] falls under two heads: (a) that concerning signifieds and (b) that concerning vocalizations (τὸν περὶ τῶν σημαινομένων καὶ τῆς φωνῆς τόπων).

(a) And the signifieds fall under the following headings: concerning phantasai and the lekta that arise from these, propositions expressed and their constituent subjects and predicates (katégoraménon) and similar terms whether direct or reversed, genera or species, arguments too, moods, syllogisms and fallacies....

(b) And the second main head mentioned above as belonging to dialectic is that of vocalization (phônê), wherein are included written language and the parts of speech, with a discussion of errors in syntax and in single words, poetical diction, verbal ambiguities, euphony and music, and according to some writers chaptrs on terms, division, and style.

History

Athenodorus

The Athenodorus who commented on the Categories is not precisely identified by Dexippus, Porphyry, or Simplicius. From these sources, we just know that he was a ‘Stoic’ (Porph. in

Cat. 86,20 = T2d) who wrote his commentary before Cornutus composed a rebuttal to it (Simplicius in Cat. 62,26 = T3b). As Cornutus’ lifetime is well documented, this provides a terminus ante quem for Athenodorus and establishes his activity before the second half of the first century CE.

The tradition offers several historical candidates for identification with the Athenodorus described by Porphyry and Simplicius (who name him) and Dexippus (who does not name him). We know of multiple Athenodori of the Stoic school, all of whom appear to have lived prior to L. Annaeus Cornutus, and at least two of whom hailed from the city of Tarsus. One of the two best-documented candidates is the Athenodorus called ‘Cordylion’, a contemporary of Marcus Cato who became librarian at Pergamon and was accused of bowdlerizing Zeno’s Republic (D.L. 7.34 = T30); and the other is Athenodorus ‘Calvus’, identified as the son of ‘Sandon’, a tutor of Augustus and correspondent of Cicero. Strabo (14.5.14) informs us that these two Athenodori are best distinguished by their connections with Cato and Augustus, respectively; the suicide of Cato in 46 BCE establishes a terminus ante quem for the life of Cordylion, while the son of Sandon died in Tarsus at the age of eighty-two, after advising Augustus well into his reign as emperor (cf. [Lucian], Macrob. 21 = T21).

Of the son of Sandon, we know a good deal historically due to his association with the young Octavian and the mature Augustus. (A full and descriptive analysis of the assignment of the biographical ‘Athenodorus’ fragments may be found in Goulet’s Dictionnaire). In addition to his candidacy as the author of a commentary against the Categories, Athenodorus Calvus is credited with a ‘history of his fatherland’; with a work dedicated to Octavia Minor; with a work περὶ σπουδῆς και παιδείας; and with a treatment of at least eight books on ‘Peripatetics’ (e.g. D.L 9.42.4, although it is also plausible that this is Cordylion’s). As the later sources were primarily interested in Calvus’s association with Augustus, many anecdotes about his mentorship have come down to us, several of which may carry hints about his ethical doctrine. There is a famous anecdote that he instructed Augustus to recite the alphabet whenever he became angry, before he took any action. Whoever introduced this anecdote may have intended to reflect, and retroactively explain, certain traditions about the historical Augustus’s clementia. But the anecdote may also reflect some specific interest on
the part of Athenodorus in the Stoic doctrine of ‘first motions’ (on which see my chapters on Andronicus and Boethus).

Of the Athenodorus called Cordylion we know markedly less. Strabo mentions him as a Tarsian Stoic alongside Antipater, Archedemus, Nestor, and Athenodorus Calvus (Strabo 14.5.14, a list which bears comparison to the roster of Stoic logicians at D.L. 7.68). During his tenure as librarian at Pergamon, according to the rhetorician ‘Isidorus of Pergamon’, Cordylion attempted to excise passages from the Republic of Zeno: Isidorus presents the consequences in a rather unflattering light (φωραθέντος τοῦ Ἀθηνοδώρου καὶ κινδυνεύσαντος, D.L. 7.34 = T30). By 67 BCE, Cordylion had won renown as a Stoic, and had also developed a reputation for refusing the patronage of kings and politicians (Plutarch, Cato Minor 10,1-3). But a determined M. Porcius Cato succeeded in winning him over, and subsequently Athenodorus went to live with Cato in Rome (Plutarch 16,1; Strabo 14.5.14). He lived until 50-46 BCE.

Richard Goulet (in Goulet 2000) exercises caution in assigning ambiguous fragments to any single Athenodorus, noting the wide and poorly distinguished field of candidates. But there is some consensus among contemporary specialists, including Goulet, Moraux, and Hijmans, that the Athenodorus who commented on the Categories is the son of Sandon – chiefly because of Calvus’s late dating, taken in association with the date traditionally assigned to the publication of Andronicus’s edition of Aristotle (see, e.g., Moraux I 150). Hijmans presents a list of arguments in favour of this identification, and is followed in the main by Goulet. Hijmans narrows the candidates to the two Tarsians: the alternative candidates, such as the ‘Athenodorus of Rhodes’ mentioned by Quintilian (2.17.15), are said to be too obscure, and the earlier student of Zeno and brother of Aratus, ‘Athenodorus of Soli’, is hardly mentioned in the literature. Second, the Athenodorus cited by Diogenes Laertius (7.68 = T29) as a logician interested in assertion could well be identified with the son of Sandon (Hijmans 105, citing Zeller’s History, 607). Third, it appears probable that Athenodorus Cordylion died before Andronicus’s edition of the Categories was published.

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402 Notably, the logician ‘Athenodorus’ mentioned by Diogenes Laertius 7.68 is also mentioned alongside Antipater and Archedemus.

403 Goulet plainly states that he is unlikely to be the Athenodorus of D.L. 7.68, and he is not even mentioned by Hijmans.
But the strength of these arguments in favour of the candidacy of Calvus is questionable. The
dating of Andronicus’s edition might not be relevant to the problem at hand. Given valid
doubts regarding the true extent of Andronicus' influence and the muddy waters surrounding
that edition’s date of publication, it is problematic to use this event as a valid terminus post
quem for critical activity on the *Categories* (see my chapter on Andronicus). Certainly the
candidacy of the earlier Stoic Cordylion and of other ‘pre-Andronican’ candidates should not
be rejected solely on these grounds. And whatever facts underlie the (perhaps hostile)
tradition that Cordylion tampered with the text of Zeno’s *Republic*, this tradition does imply
that Cordylion exercised some kind of criticism upon Athenian philosophical texts during his
tenure as librarian at Pergamon. Indeed, it is interesting to compare Strabo’s famous
narrative that the library of Aristotle, including the text of the *Categories* that came down to
posterity, was hidden away at Scepsis precisely in order to prevent the Peripatetic texts being
gathered into the library at Pergamon (Strabo 13.1.54). Perhaps sources hostile (for whatever
reason) to Pergamene scholarship were responsible for promoting the story that Pergamon’s
leading critics never had access to the original texts of Aristotle.404

But this is merely speculation and the historical sources are, in this case, much too sparse to
be decisive indicators. I believe it would be much more effective to focus attention upon the
‘Athenodorus’ mentioned by Diogenes Laertius as a pioneering Stoic logician at 7.68 (T29),
and to seek reasons internal to the text to identify this Athenodorus either with Calvus or with
any of the other Athenodori in our record. At 7.68, ‘Athenodorus’ is said to have concerned
himself with the distinction of simple from complex assertion, and to have included
‘categorical’ propositions (καταγορευτικά) within the rubric of ‘simple’ propositions
(7.69-70). Why might this Athenodorus be relevant to the *Categories* commentaries? As I
discuss below (my section I.1), the Athenodorus of D.L. 7.68 held that a ‘categorical’
assertible (cf. 7.70) such as ‘Dion walks’ is a *simple* assertible. The Stoic critic of the
*Categories* mentioned by Dexippus (*in Cat.* 12.3-11 = T2) contended that Aristotle, in the
*Categories*, fails to account for propositions such as ‘Dion walks’ precisely as *simple*,
categorical assertibles; Dexippus's response, of course, is that this is a *complex* proposition
and therefore excluded by the scope of the *Categories*. Of course, the notion of logical
’simplicity’ is fundamental to the *Categories* (e.g. 1.25), but in quite a different way: the

404 Perhaps it was also hostile sources that initially portrayed the critical activity of the librarian
Cordylion in a bad light. But the source of Diogenes Laertius’s story to this effect, Isidorus, is also
himself associated with Pergamon.
atomic units of the *Categories* are simple *terms*, whereas the atomic units of Stoic logic are simple *propositions*.

That distinction appears to have been played upon for polemical ends by both critics and defenders of the *Categories*, as Dexippus testifies. It may also be extremely suggestive of the motives that led Stoic logicians such as Athenodorus and Cornutus to focus a series of commentaries on the problems raised by the *Categories*. J. Barnes points out, for example, Alexander’s essay on negation (*in A.Pr. 402,1-405,16*), focusing on sentences such as Καλλίας περιπατεῖ. 405 For Alexander, a negation-sign modifies the verb περιπατεῖ alone; but for his opponents (evidently Stoic logicians), a negation-sign modifies the entire propositional sentence, which should itself be viewed as ‘simple’. It is generally assumed that Alexander’s opponents here are ‘old Stoics’, but Barnes makes a case that ‘they may... have been later Stoics – Athenodorus and Cornutus, say – who determined to defend the old Stoic doctrine against its resuscitated Peripatetic rival’. 406 Comparing the passage of Dexippus noted above (and discussed in more detail below) adds considerable weight, I believe, to this association.

For our purposes here, this connection is relevant because it links the professional interests of ‘Athenodorus’ at D.L. 7.68 with the criticism broadly ascribed to ‘Athenodorus’ by Porphyry, Simplicius and (implicitly) by Dexippus – namely that the *Categories* omits many types of ‘categorical’ propositions it ought to include, and that a specific sample of its failure – alongside many ‘lexical’ samples such as conjunctions and articles – is its failure to account for simple assertibles among ‘things said without combination’. This, while by no means a decisive link, is at least a textually grounded association between our Athenodorus and the logician of D.L. 7.68. And the connection with the Stoic doctrine about simple assertibles might also offer some motivation for Stoic distrust of the *Categories*’s concept of assertion.

Can D.L. 7.68 offer any useful implications about the identity of ‘Athenodorus’? Diogenes Laertius’s logician is primarily associated with Chrysippus at 7.68, and secondly with a number of second-century BCE philosophers of the Stoic school. In itself, this grouping might appear to cast doubt on the later, first-century date required by Calvus, who does not fit


the temporal associations of the group at 7.68. The philosophers mentioned by Diogenes Laertius at 7.68 are presented as doing seminal work in Stoic logical doctrine. They are, in order, Chrysippus himself (third century BCE), Archedemus (second century BCE), Athenodorus (unknown), Antipater (second century BCE) and Crinis (probably second century BCE, and later than Archedemus: cf. Epictetus, Disc. 3.2.15); compare also the list of notable Tarsian Stoics at Strabo 14.5.14. As far as we can tell, this group follows a rough chronological order. The son of Sandon would be an exceptionally late entry in this list. Indeed, Athenodorus Cordylion (cf. 7.34) would be a better fit for 7.68 in terms of chronology.

There may be a case for dating the Athenodorus of D.L. 7.68 even earlier. At 7.190 = T33 Diogenes Laertius provides a detailed list of the works of Chrysippus, where one book is in fact entitled Περὶ τῶν καταγορευτικῶν πρὸς Αθηνόδορον. The Athenodorus to whom Chrysippus dedicated this book could plausibly be identified with the Athenodorus of 7.68, who also worked on categorical propositions, and is mentioned in association with Chrysippus in this context. Such an association could date the logician to the fourth or third century BCE. Indeed, there is a recorded match for this chronology: Athenodorus of Soli (mentioned earlier at D.L. 7.38 = SVF I 38), who lived slightly earlier than Chrysippus and joined his brother Aratus as a pupil of Zeno (as recounted in the Anonymous Life of Aratus). An interesting argument could be made, if not for Athenodorus of Soli in particular, then at least for a contemporary of Zeno and Chrysippus. Was the Chrysippus-associated Athenodorus of 7.68 (who wrote on categorical propositions, and contended that ‘Dion walks’ is a ‘simple’ categorical proposition) identical with the Athenodorus of 7.190 (to whom Chrysippus dedicated a work on the subject of categorical propositions)? And was the Athenodorus depicted by Porphyry, Dexippus and Simplicius (who criticized the Categories precisely for failing to take into account certain ‘simple’ categorical propositions, in Dexippus giving the example ‘Dion walks’) one and the same with the Athenodorus of D.L. 7.68 and 7.190? Such an identification might be challenged on the grounds that Simplicius mentions ‘Athenodorus and Cornutus’ in the same breath as if they were near contemporaries; but Simplicius elsewhere mentions ‘Xenocrates and Andronicus’ in the same way (63.22), although they, like Athenodorus of Soli and L. Annaeus Cornutus, are separated by some three centuries.
We may also note here that there is little evidence of Boethus responding directly to Athenodorus; this might weigh against him being a very early figure already well established by Boethus’s *floruit*, although this is by no means decisive (particularly given our uncertainty about the chronology of the work of Boethus himself).

Whether the Athenodorus of the commentators is most plausibly identified with Calvus, Cordylion, or another candidate, it is clear that the historical record offers little information of value for augmenting and interpreting the remarks on the *Categories* assigned to Athenodorus. The point that I would like to stress here is that, regardless of historical associations, the Athenodorus of D.L. 7.68 is the only figure of that name in the textual tradition outside the Neoplatonic commentators that we know to have held views about logic that are relevant to and compatible with the criticisms ascribed to ‘Athenodorus’ by Porphyry and Simplicius. Fortunately, we are better served with historical information in the case of Cornutus.

**Cornutus**

In the case of Cornutus, there is only one candidate whose identification is broadly accepted. He is L. Annaeus Cornutus (whose praenomen is noted in Charisius, *Gramm.* 162.9 = T43, and nowhere else). For our purposes in this chapter, this identification will prove especially valuable as it associates Cornutus with the authorship of the *Epidrome* – a work of etymological exegesis (and not of ‘allegory’, as A.A. Long has stressed) – that demonstrates Cornutus’s sensitivity to the Stoic doctrine of linguistic signification, and helps to link the criticisms assigned to ‘Athenodorus and Cornutus’ with the doctrine of linguistic meaning ascribed broadly to ‘the Stoics’ by authors such as Diogenes Laertius and Sextus Empiricus.

Cornutus is chiefly known to the historical tradition as the tutor of the silver-age poet Persius (*Satura* 5 = T35) and as an associate or instructor of the emperor Nero (see Cassius Dio 62.29.2 and following = T36). While Persius’s fifth satire is a well-known idealizing portrait of the philosopher, perhaps the most famous anecdote concerning Cornutus is the story relayed by Cassius Dio in the passage cited above (Loeb translation, slightly modified):

[Nero] was now making preparations to write an epic narrating all the achievements of the Romans; and even before composing a line of it he began to consider the proper number of books, consulting among others Annaeus Cornutus, who at this time was famed for his learning (εὐδοκιμούντα τότε ἐπὶ
παυδεύς). This man he came very near to putting to death and did exile to an island because, while some were urging him to write four hundred books, Cornutus said that this was too many and nobody would read them. And when someone objected, ‘Yet Chrysippus, whom you praise and imitate (ἐπαινεῖς καὶ ἔμπλοις), composed many more’, the other retorted: ‘But they are useful to the conduct of men’s lives’ (ἄλλα ἐκεῖνα χρήσιμα τῷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίῳ ἐστίν). So Cornutus incurred banishment for this.

Among other things, this anecdote points to its source’s respect for Chrysippus, and suggests that Cornutus may have displayed a similar respect. The exile of Cornutus, following this testimony, occurred between 63 and 65 CE. He is known to have published a Ῥητορικαὶ τέχναι and a πρὸς Ἀθηνόδωρον, both of which are mentioned by Porphyry (in Cat. 86.20 f. = T1d) as containing arguments against Aristotle’s Categories. He also composed a Περὶ ἐκπτῶν (title in P.Oxy. 3649, ed. 1984), a Virgil commentary, and (within the ‘secondary’ subheading of Stoic dialectic, which overlaps with the discipline that we might call ‘grammar’) a de figuris sententiarum, and a e enuntiatione vel orthographia. But his major surviving work is the De natura deorum or Ἐπιδρομὴ τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν θεολογίαν (θεωρίαν codd.) παραδεδομένων, which should likely be categorized as a work of Stoic ‘physics’.

G. W. Most has discussed, in broad terms, the value of Cornutus’s Epidrome for the study of Stoic allegory; more recently, George Boys-Stones has explored the historical implications of Cornutus’s allegoresis (2003) and the function of his text as a work of ethical pedagogy (2007). It is a useful complete text and a remarkable example of schoolbook literature in the first century CE.407 A. D. Nock, who studied this text in detail in 1931,408 suggested that the Epidrome was in pressing need of a new edition.409 Nock established the links of the Epidrome with earlier Stoic works, and showed that the text was largely free from

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407 G. W. Most, ‘Cornutus and Stoic Allegoresis’, ANRW II.36.3.
408 ‘Kornutos’, RE Suppl. 5 (Stuttgart 1931), 995-1005.
409 Certainly the writer of the Epidrome is an interesting case of an author widely appreciated by the ancients but largely panned, especially on matters of style, by the modern commentators. For Aulus Gellius (NA 2.6.1) Cornutus was one of the grammatici ... haud sane indocti neque ignobiles; for Macrobius (Sat. 5.19.3) he was tantus uir, Graecarum etiam doctissimus litterarum.
interpolation; work on the manuscript tradition in the 1970s established the text on a firmer footing.\textsuperscript{410}

For our purposes, however, the most relevant aspects of Cornutus’s \textit{Epidrome} revolve around his attitude towards etymology and the use of language. In his paper on ‘Cornutus and Stoic Allegoresis’, Most explores the \textit{Epidrome} from the perspective of Stoic exegetical practice. Cornutus follows Stoic tradition\textsuperscript{411} and relies chiefly on etymological analysis in this text;\textsuperscript{412} like Cleanthes\textsuperscript{413} Chrysippus\textsuperscript{414} and to a lesser extent Zeno\textsuperscript{415} Cornutus frequently explains mythical names and epithets in terms of their alleged etymological derivation. Unlike these earlier Stoics, however, he does not accept a \textit{single} derivation for each word; rather, Cornutus marshals alternatives from the tradition (Most cites 1,1-2,4 and 74,18-21 as examples) and does not characteristically select a single ‘correct’ option or promulgate a specific science of ‘true’ etymology.

Cornutus’s treatment of the poets, as C. Gill puts it, presupposes ‘the Stoic theory that language has “natural” meaning and is not simply a set of conventional symbols’.\textsuperscript{416} We have already encountered this theory in our discussion of the \textit{skopos} (ch. 1). A. A. Long also stresses Cornutus’s dependence on etymology and the doctrine that names have an ‘original meaning’.\textsuperscript{417} One may reasonably ask whether Cornutus’s etymological practice, grounded in a Stoic theory of linguistic signification, is relevant for his treatment of the \textit{Categories}, or whether he may even have contributed to Herminus’s use of that concept (ch. 1, ch. 7). It

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{410} P. Krafft, \textit{Die handschriftliche Überlieferung von Cornutus’ Theologia Graeca = Bibl. der klass. Altertumswiss. N.F., R. 2, Bd. 57} (Heidelberg, 1975).
\item \textsuperscript{412} Most 2027; and see \textit{Epid.} 2,4; 2,9; 65,8 for examples of Cornutus’s own use of \textit{ἐτυμολογία} and cognates.
\item \textsuperscript{413} \textit{SVF} 1.535, 540-43, and 546-47.
\item \textsuperscript{414} \textit{SVF} 2.1021, 1062-63, and elsewhere.
\item \textsuperscript{415} \textit{SVF} 1.103.
\item \textsuperscript{417} ‘Stoic Readings of Homer’, 53-54 = \textit{Stoic Studies}, 71-72.
\end{itemize}
would be useful to review the implications of this problem before we turn to a full review of
the primary sources on the *Categories*.

The Chrysippean position on etymology was ultimately grounded, we are told, in the position
that language, or the elements of language, originally held a direct ‘natural’ meaning (see my
discussion of the Porphyrian ‘imposition of names’, above, and e.g. *SVF* 2.146 = Origen,
*Contra Celsum* 1.24). For Cornutus as for most Stoics, linguistic expressions could
understood as imbued with inherent truth or falsehood as ‘sayables’ (*lekta*) that directly
signified realities – in contrast to the Aristotelian theory that interposed thoughts or
‘affections of the soul’ between words and things (*De Int.* 163) . This doctrine would be
particularly relevant to the reading of the *Categories*, in that assertibles or propositions
(*axiómata*) were understood to be examples of self-complete *lekta* (cf. Sextus, *PH.* 2.104,
Mueller, cited above):

> The Stoics say that three things are linked to one another: what is signified, what
signifies, and what exists. Of these, what signifies is the sound, e.g. the sound
‘Dion’; what is signified is the very thing which is suggested by the sound and
which we apprehend to subsist with our thought (the barbarians do not understand
although they hear the sound); and what exists is the external object, such as Dion
himself. Of these things two are bodies, namely the sound and what exists, one is
not a body, namely the thing signified, the *lekton*, which also is true or false.

Based on this infrastructure, the Stoics (and especially Chrysippus) divided Dialectic into two
parts, the first dealing with the *lekta* or ‘sayables’, the second with the ways in which the
human voice is articulated to convey them.418 A key source for this bipartition, also cited
previously, is *D.L.* 7.43 (cf. 7.62-63 for the precise association with the doctrine of *lekta*):

> Dialectic [according to the Stoics] falls under two heads: (a) that concerning
signifieds and (b) that concerning vocalizations (τὸν περὶ τῶν σημαινόμενων
καὶ τῆς φωνῆς τόπον).

> (a) And the signifieds fall under the following headings: concerning
*phantasiai* and the *lekta* that arise from these, propositions expressed and their

418 On this bipartition in particular, see Frede, Principles of Stoic Grammar and *Die stoische Logik*
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1974). On the *lekta*, see S. Bobzien, ‘Stoic Syllogistic’,
*OSAP* 1996, ‘Logic’ in the *Cambridge Companion* and in K. Algra, J. Barnes, J. Mansfeld, and M.
general, see also K. Döring and T. Ebert (eds) 1993, *Dialektiker und Stoiker – Zur Logik der Stoa und
der ihrer Vorläufer* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner). K. Hülsner (1987) collects the Stoic fragments on dialectic
more broadly.
constituent subjects and predicates (katêgorêmatôn) and similar terms whether
direct or reversed, genera or species, arguments too, moods, syllogisms and
fallacies....

(b) And the second main head mentioned above as belonging to dialectic
is that of vocalization (phônê), wherein are included written language and the
parts of speech, with a discussion of errors in syntax and in single words, poetical
diction, verbal ambiguities, euphony and music, and according to some writers
chaptrs on terms, division, and style.

We know from the Epidrome that Cornutus subscribed to a Stoic doctrine of etymology, and
so it is reasonable to posit that it was within the framework of Stoic signification that
Athenodorus and Cornutus adopted the view that the Categories concerned ‘linguistic
expressions as such’ (λέξεις καθὸ λέξεις). From the standpoint of such an ‘orthodox’ Stoic
theory of dialectic, the locution λέξεις καθὸ λέξεις would imply that the Categories
concerned the secondary, purely ‘grammatical’ aspect of dialectic, not the lekta or ‘sayables’
that are represented by words. (A good example of the kinds of subjects falling under the
first heading is the work-list of Chrysippus at D.L. 7.192, where a number of works that we
might call ‘grammatical’ are headed περὶ τὰς λέξεις). This distinction enabled the Stoics to
critique the Categories as an almost absurdly deficient treatment of ‘pure’ verbal expressions,
in much the same way as other sources such as Lucius, Nicostratus, and Plotinus, who
interpreted its subject-matter as ontological, would question its comprehensiveness as a
treatment of being.

The response of Porphyry to this critique, apparently following Boethus of Sidon and the
Aristotelian Herminus (cf. Porph. 59,16), is that the true subject of the Categories is ‘simple
significant vocalizations, insofar as they are significant of realities’ (περὶ φωνῶν
σημαντικῶν ἀπλῶν, καθὸ σημαντικὰί εἰσι τῶν πραγμάτων). Porphyry, as we shall see
below, justifies this response in terms of a distinction between the ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’
impositions of verbal expressions (58,30-59,2 = T1b; cf. T1a). His distinction in fact
matches perfectly with the twofold framework ascribed to ‘the Stoics’ by Diogenes and
Sextus, with his ‘primary imposition’ corresponding to the use of lekta.

Yet Porphyry ridicules Athenodorus and Cornutus, both Stoics with professional interest in
dialectic, for simply failing to recognize this division at work in the Categories. He suggests
that Athenodorus and Cornutus are actually ignorant of it (59,5-14 = T1c):
Q. Has everyone who has written about the *Categories* been aware of this distinction?

A. Certainly not. Otherwise there would not have been those... who attacked the work and rejected the division of categories as being insufficiently comprehensive.... the followers of Athenodorus and Cornutus, who took the objects of the investigation to be expressions *qua* expressions.

It is possible that Athenodorus and Cornutus, as Porphyry read them, did not mention (or willfully ignored) the distinction of expressions-as-significant and expressions-in-themselves. But they were surely sensitive to it, despite Porphyry’s allegation that Athenodorus and Cornutus were simply ‘ignorant’ of that difference (τὴν διαφορὰν... ἔγνωσαν... οὐδαμῶς, 59,3-5). Based on our knowledge of their works, and not least of Cornutus’s *Epidrome*, it is very unlikely that Athenodorus and Cornutus were simply unaware or naively disinterested in the Stoic division of dialectic into primary and secondary aspects.419

Rather, Athenodorus and Cornutus must have intentionally associated the *Categories* with the secondary or purely verbal species of Stoic dialectic, but left that assumption sufficiently implicit for Porphyry to take advantage of it. Specifically, Athenodorus (for his particular criticism see Simplicius in *Cat.* 62,25 = T3c) or both Athenodorus and Cornutus appears to have analyzed the first chapter of the *Categories* as a purely linguistic or ‘secondary’ treatment of ‘onymies’ (see Simplicius 18,22-19,7 and especially T3a.iii), and then proceeded to paint the entire text with the same brush.

Thus Porphyry’s defense against the Stoic critic Athenodorus is itself, notably, constructed within a Stoic theoretical framework. Perhaps Porphyry (or his source) sought to show that Athenodorus’s criticism was inconsistent with his own school’s positions, and to turn those positions against him. Porphyry’s own source for the defense may well have been Herminus, whom he credits (alongside Boethus of Sidon) with discovering the truth about the *skopos*, and cites at length just following T1c.

It may be useful to ask, therefore, whether the presuppositions of the defense are themselves based in a Stoic or Aristotelian infrastructure. As we explore the primary texts of Porphyry,

419 Cornutus’s use of etymology in the *Epidrome*, and the titles of his other works in grammar, suggest that he was sensitive to – and, in his pedagogical practice, a subscriber to – this differentiation. Moreover, as I noted above, it appears probable that the commentators’ Athenodorus (regardless of his historical identity) is also the logician concerned with simple significant propositions at Diogenes Laertius 7.68; it is highly unlikely that his argumentation regarding the *skopos* of the *Categories* was as unsophisticated as Porphyry suggests.
Dexippus, and Simplicius below, we will find several specific reasons to suggest that the first
defender of the *Categories* against Athenodorus’s critique was operating – at least in certain
aspects – within a Stoic framework. A useful text for comparison is Ammonius *in Anal. Pr.*
17,24-28, contrasting *De Interpretatione* 16a3. Although notoriously difficult, the opening
chapter of the *De Interpretatione* offers a theory of significations that differs markedly from
the semantics ascribed to the Stoics. Aristotle too writes about a ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’
signification of words:

> [Aristotle 16a3]. Now spoken sounds are symbols of affections in the soul, and
written marks symbols of spoken sounds. And just as written marks are not the
same for all men, neither are spoken sounds. But what these are in the first place
signs of – affections in the soul – are the same for all; and what these affections
are likenesses of – actual things – are also the same (tr. Ackrill).

Ammonius contrasts the Stoic doctrine directly:

> [Ammonius *in De Int.* 17,24-28] First, Aristotle teaches us here what are signified
primarily and secondarily by sounds, [primarily] thoughts and [secondarily]
through these intermediaries, things; and [he teaches] that it is not necessary to
imagine anything else between the thought and the thing (μέσον τοῦ τε
νοήματος και τοῦ πράγματος), such as what the Stoics think fit to name a lekton.

Ammonius’s depiction of the Stoic position has been questioned, but he draws attention to a
valid contrast. For Aristotle, the spoken word is significant of a thought or ‘affection in the
soul’, while the thought is in turn significant of the reality. But for a Stoic dialectician, a
word is significant of a lekton, and the lekton is in turn significant of the reality. Now
Porphyry’s defense is that the *Categories* concerns ‘simple significant vocalizations, *insofar
as they are significant of realities*’. This locution, which says nothing about thought, appears
to rely upon the Stoic doctrine of ‘sayables’ that *directly* represent realities, rather than on the
theory of the *De Int.*, which provides for a psychological intermediary – an apparent
incompatibility that may have been later reconciled by constructing Stoic syntactical theory
on an intelligible level.

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420 Ammonius may seem to err in referring to the Stoics’ lekton as ‘intermediary between the thought
and the thing’; in reality, the clearest reports of the doctrine, as cited earlier, suggest that the lekton is
intermediary between the lexis and the thing. But Sextus Empiricus also tells us (*Against the
Logicians* 2.244-45) about a Stoic view that the *sêmeion* was intelligible. See chapter 1 for further
discussion.

421 See Apollonius Dyscolus 1.2 = 2,3 and following, and D. Blank and C. Atherton, ‘The Stoic
Contribution to Traditional Grammar’, in *Cambridge Companion to Stoicism*, 320-21. See also
Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Logicians* 2.244-45.
As we shall discuss below, another direct example of the ‘Stoic’ construction of the defense against Athenodorus’s criticisms is found in the pages of Dexippus (discussed below), where his example of the conjunction as a verbal expression omitted by Aristotle is countered by showing that the conjunction is ‘co-significant of a break in thought’ (ἀπαρτίζον τῆς διανοιας). This ‘break in thought’ is a ‘syntactic’ reality signified by a lekton, and the terminology is Chrysippean (cf. SVF 2.184 and see also Sextus PH 2.176,5 and for the grammatical usage Apollonius Dyscolus De adv. 2.1.121,3 and De const. 2.2.402,2)

Sources

We turn now to the direct sources for the commentaries of ‘Athenodorus and Cornutus’ on the Categories of Aristotle. The main sources are the commentaries of Porphyry, Dexippus, and Simplicius. Dexippus 11,1-12,31 = T2 likely distills Porphyry’s actual reply to Athenodorus and Cornutus in Ad Gedalium. The early passages in Simplicius (rostered under T3) represent Porphyry’s opening discussion of Athenodorus and Cornutus, and specifically his effort to situate their criticisms in the context of the skopos of the Categories, represented also in the commentary By Question and Answer (T1). The appendix of texts also collects a number of biographical fragments associated with Athenodorus or Cornutus but otherwise unassociated with their work on the Categories.

On the Categories

Porphyry, Dexippus and Simplicius ascribe various critical remarks to Athenodorus, to Cornutus, or to both throughout the text of their commentaries On the Categories.

(I) The most widely reported group of comments relates to ‘the division’ or διαίρεσις. However, as I suggest below, διαίρεσις is an ambiguous term that was applied to two distinct lines of criticism, which are preserved in two (possibly independent) traditions but are amalgamated by Simplicius in one passage. It is critical to distinguish (I.1) criticisms of the διαίρεσις of the ten categories from (I.2) criticisms of the διαίρεσις of the Categories as a text into three major sections (namely the onymies, predicables, and postpraedicamenta). The first criticism is reliably attributed to Athenodorus and Cornutus, but it is less clear that they are the source of the second. The word διαίρεσις appears to have been used (though possibly later) in both cases.
(I.1) The first line of criticism is associated with a definition of the σκοπός as ‘verbal expressions qua verbal expressions’, and is rebutted by Porphyry (as reported by Porphyry himself in the QA commentary and also by Dexippus and Simplicius). According to this criticism, the ‘division’ of ten categories is unable to comprehend the entirety of significant verbal expression (τὴν διαίρεσιν, ὡς ἂν μὴ πάσης φωνῆς σημαντικῆς εἰς αὐτὴν περιλαμβανομένης, Porphyry 59,14; τὴν διαίρεσιν, ὡς οὐ πάσας τὰς λέξεις περιλαμβάνοντας, Simplicius 18,30; cf. Simplicius 62,26).

(I.2) The second line of criticism asserts the structural incoherence of the Categories, showing that it combines the disciplines of logic, physics, ethics, and theology, and perhaps lacks any coherent σκοπός; this criticism is rebutted by another source (likely Iamblichus, but possibly Porphyry in the lost commentary Ad Gedalium). This criticism focuses on the division of chapter-headings (εἰς τὰ κεφάλαια διαιρέσεως τοῦ βιβλίου, Simplicius 18,22), i.e. the tripartition of the major sections into three (εἰς μεγάλα μέρη διελείν, τριμερὲς τὸ βιβλίον, Simplicius 19,9). This line of criticism is not ascribed with absolute certainty to both Athenodorus and Cornutus, as the central citation of their names might not be associated with the entire passage.

Simplicius generally distinguishes these two lines of criticism: for example, I.1 is represented alone at 62,26 = T3b and 359,1 = T3h. But some confusion arises from a single passage where Simplicius amalgamates both criticisms (18,22-19,9 = T3a). Here Simplicius uses διαιρέσεως in three different senses, referring first to the chapter-division (εἰς τὰ κεφάλαια διαιρέσεως, 18,22), then to the tenfold division of categories, quoting Porphyry silently (18,27 and 18,30-19,1), and finally to the internal division of the onymies (διαιρέσεως τῶν ὀνομάτων, 19,1), before returning to the chapter-division at 19,9 (εἰς μεγάλα μέρη διελείν, τριμερὲς τὸ βιβλίον). As I suggest below, this ambiguity arises from the combination of at least two sources in this passage.

(II) Athenodorus and Cornutus are also associated with a number of ‘free-standing’ comments on specific categories such as Quantity and the Relative, and we shall examine these cases separately below.

I.1. ATHENODORUS AND CORNUTUS ON THE ‘DIVISION’ OF THE TEN CATEGORIES

Porphyry
The first main text is found in Porphyry’s smaller commentary *By Question and Answer*, where he expresses his position (58,3-7 = T1a) in the context of a passage justifying the title ‘Categories’. (This text has been discussed in detail in chapter 1, but is given briefly here for context).

The subject of this book is the primary imposition of expressions (περὶ τῆς πρώτης θέσεως τῶν λέξεων), which is used for communicating about things (τῶν πραγμάτων). For it concerns simple significant words insofar as they signify things (καθὸ σημαντικαί εἰσι τῶν πραγμάτων) – not however as they differ from one another in number, but as differing in genus... (12) Since beings are comprehended by ten generic differentiae, the words that indicate them have also come to be ten in genus, and are themselves also so classified. Thus predications (κατηγορίαι) are said to be ten in genus, just as beings themselves are ten in genus.

Porphyry stresses that Aristotle is concerned, in the *Categories*, to describe the primary imposition of expressions, and not the secondary imposition of expressions. He goes on to reiterate this point and to contrast the intention of the *De Interpretatione* (58,30-59,2 = T1b):

Q. But if he here divides significant words into ten genera, why is it that in *On Interpretation* he divides them into two, namely nouns and verbs (εἰς ὄνομα καὶ ῥῆμα)?

A. Because here he is discussing the primary imposition of expressions upon things (περὶ τῆς προηγουμένης θέσεως τῶν λέξεων τῆς κατὰ τῶν πραγμάτων), while in *On Interpretation* he is discussing their secondary imposition (περὶ τῆς δευτέρας), which is no longer concerned with expressions that signify things qua signifying them, but rather with expressions that signify types of words, qua being of such types (περὶ τῶν σημαντικών λέξεων τῶν τύπων τῶν φωνῶν, καθὸ τύποι εἰσὶ τοιούτων). For being a noun or a verb is a type of word, and whether an expression has its proper use (τὸ κυρίαν) or is metaphorical (μεταφορικήν) or is in some other way figuratively used (ἄλλως τροπικήν) also belongs to the second sort of inquiry about words, not to the first.

In itself, the theory of the ‘double imposition’ of words (which I discuss further in the following chapter) does not originate with Porphyry. The theory of two sequential θέσεις of language had been formulated in the Hellenistic schools,422 and within the context of α

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broader debate, building around central passages in Plato’s Cratylus (e.g., 421C-426C), about whether names were imposed by nature (φύσει) or by θέσις in the sense of convention. In the Stoa, at least since Chrysippus, it had been maintained that primary vocalisations signified πράγματα ‘by nature’; so Origen informs us in a widely cited passage of the Contra Celsum (φύσει μιμουμένων τῶν πρώτων φωνῶν τὰ πράγματα: Cels. 1.24 = SVF 2.146 = Hülser FDS fr. 643). For the Stoics, as for Porphyry, the primary θέσις ‘by nature’ transpired in human prehistory.

Boethus of Sidon and Herminus are later cited as originators of this assessment, or at any rate as ‘agreeing’ with the line of interpretation Porphyry has just laid out (καὶ Βόηθος ἐν τοῖς εἰς τὰς Κατηγορίας εἴρηκεν ταῦτα καὶ Ἑρμῖνος βραχέως, 59,17-18). But Porphyry reports that several commentators took a different approach (59,5-14 = T1c), precisely by failing to distinguish the primary from the secondary imposition of expressions upon things:

Q. Has everyone who has written about the Categories been aware of this distinction? A. Certainly not. Otherwise there would not have been those who took the investigation to be primarily about the genera of being [sc. Lucius, Nicostratus, Plotinus] nor those who attacked the work and rejected the division as being insufficiently comprehensive and as failing to include certain items, or again as containing extraneous ones.

Q. Who were the latter? A. The followers of Athenodorus and Cornutus, who took the objects of the investigation to be expressions qua expressions, that is, expressions as used properly and figuratively (τὰ κύρια καί τὰ τροπικὰ) and so forth, for these are differentiae of expressions qua expressions. Fixing upon

423 On the relevance of the Cratylus see Long (2005) and Sedley (1998). The first segment of this part of the Cratylus seems to discuss Porphyry’s ‘first imposition’, but the second segment, where Socrates begins to discuss the theory of language, corresponds to Porphyry’s ‘second imposition’. For the first imposition, see for example τῶν πρώτων ὄνομάτων, 424B; πρῶτον αὐτῷ τὸ χρώματι καὶ τῇ φωνῇ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐσία, 423E.

424 For this formulation of the question, see Sextus, Adv. Math. 1.143-4, cf. 37; Adv. Math. 11.241-42; P.H. 3.267-68; Aulus Gellius 10.4; Simplicius in Cat. 40,6 and 187,7; and Origen, Exh. Mart. 46.

425 Chrysippus had already discussed the θέσις τῶν ὄνομάτων: see Eusebius, PE 6.8.1-10 = SVF 2.914; the phrase, as Allen 2005:18 argues from 6.8,11-24, seems to be Chrysippus’s own.

426 Platonists seem to have adopted this view, presumably (as in late antiquity) as an exegesis of the Cratylus. See Alcinous Intr. ch. 6; Proclus in Crat. 16.18 and 18.14 Pasqualli; Stephanus in Int. 9.19-22 and 10.7; and see Cratylus 390A. The Epicureans also seem to have presented a narrative in which the primordial imposition of language was ‘natural’, although the sense was very different than that applied by the Stoics; perhaps what evolved naturally, like the faculty of speech, did so without ‘purpose’, until we found a use for it. See Lucretius 4.824, and Epic. Ep. Hdt. 75.

427 With references above, see Frede (1989:2088-89) on Stoic ‘prehistory’.
these, they raised the question of what category they belonged to, and finding
none, they complained that the division was incomplete, since it fails to include
every sort of significant expression (ὡς ἀν μὴ πᾶς θῆ φωνῆς σημαντικῆς εἰς
αὐτὴν περιλαμβανομένης).

For a detailed treatment of the arguments offered by Athenodorus and Cornutus to support
this criticism, we must turn to Simplicius (who names them explicitly) and Dexippus (who
does not).

Simplicius

Simplicius uses a similar manner of introducing Athenodorus and Cornutus, situating their
arguments in the context of a debate regarding the skopos of the text. Porphyry certainly lies
behind Simplicius’ treatment, but it is not entirely clear whether Simplicius is primarily
reliant on the Ad Gedalium, or had direct access (as S. Strange suggests) to the commentary
By Question and Answer, or has access to Porphyry via Iamblichus.

In the following section, we shall discuss these questions in the broader context of the
Simplician passage. Here we quote his citation of Porphyry (18.26 = T3a.ii) directly:

What is more (καὶ δὴ καὶ), some contradict Aristotle and reject his division
(ἀθετοῦντες τὴν διαίρεσιν): of these, some claim that it is uselessly redundant
(ὡς πλεονάζουσαν μάτην), others that it omits many things (οἱ δὲ ὡς πολλὰ
παρεῖσαν), like Athenodorus and Cornutus, who believe that the skopos concerns
expressions insofar as they are expressions. They bring forward many
expressions as examples, some literal (κυρίας), some figurative (τροπικάς), and
thereby think they refute the division, since it has not included all possible
expressions (ὡς οὐ πᾶσας τὰς λέξεις περιλαμβανομένης).

The introduction of Athenodorus and Cornutus paraphrases Porphyry, as we find by
comparing the corresponding passage from the Commentary by Question and Answer:428

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428 Notably, this comparison also suggests that the locution οἱ περὶ X was not read as historically or
biographically significant by the commentators, for Simplicius (or Iamblichus before him) has
smoothly reduced Porphyry’s Οἱ περὶ Ἀθηνόδωρον καὶ Κορνοῦτον τὸ Κορνοῦτος καὶ Ἀθηνόδωρος.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Porphyry 59,10-14</strong></th>
<th><strong>Simplicius 18,28-19,1</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>Οἱ περὶ Ἀθηνόδωρον καὶ Κορνοῦτον οἱ τὰ ζητοῦμεν περὶ τῶν λέξεων καθὸ λέξεις, οία τὰ κυρία καὶ τὰ τροπικά καὶ ὡσα τοιαῦτα... ὡς ἄν μὴ πάσης φωνῆς σημαντικῆς εἰς αὐτὴν περιλαμβανομένης...</td>
<td>Κορνοῦτος καὶ Ἀθηνόδωρος, οἵτινες περὶ λέξεων οἴόμενοι τὸν σκοπὸν εἶναι καθὸ λέξεις εἰσίν, πολλὰς λέξεις προβάλλοντες τὰς μὲν κυρίας, τὰς δὲ τροπικὰς, ἐλέγχειν οἴονται τὴν διαίρεσιν... ως ὁ ὅ πάσας τὰς λέξεις περιλαμβάνωσαν...</td>
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Previously at 17,3-7, Simplicius claimed to recite the ‘very words’ of Porphyry, but gave a version slightly different in wording from our text of the commentary *By Question and Answer*. Similarly here at 18,28-19,1 = **T3a.ii**, Simplicius delivers a near-verbatim, but inexact, citation of Porphyry *By Question and Answer*. This may suggest either that he is citing our commentary from memory, or via an intermediary (such as Iamblichus), or that he is citing the *Ad Gedalium*, which might put the same argument in slightly different words.

Simplicius expands substantially on this criticism of the ‘division’ later in his analysis, at 62,25 and following = **T3b**:

Many others disputed [the division into ten], denouncing immediately the division into such a multitude; as did Athenodorus in his book which, although it was entitled *Against Aristotle’s Categories*, only investigated the division into such a multitude. Both Cornutus, moreover, in the work he entitled *Against Athenodorus and Aristotle*, and Lucius and Nicostratus and their followers spoke out against the division, as they did against practically everything else.

In the next lines, Simplicius proposes to ‘take up the opposing arguments in definite terms, making a threefold distinction of them: for some reproach the division with being excessive, others criticize it as being deficient; and a third group is constituted by those who consider that some genera have been introduced in the place of others’ (62,30-31). He proceeds to sketch these three groups of criticism as follows:

1. 63,4-64,12. *Those who accuse Aristotle of excess.* (i) Some [unnamed] argue that Aristotle should have combined *poiein* and *paskhein* under a single heading, *kineisthai*. (ii) Others [Xenocrates and Andronicus] include the ten categories under two: *kath’ hauto* and *pros ti*; others still under substance and accident.
2. 64,13-66,15. *Those who accuse Aristotle of deficiency.* (i) The followers of Nicostratus assert that Aristotle, if he distinguished *poiein* from *paskhein*, should have distinguished *ekhein* from *ekhein* as well. (ii) The followers of Lucius ask why he omitted conjunctions and articles, which are significant *lexeis* [Simplicius answers that they ‘co-
signify’, *sussēmainousin*] and similarly negations, privations, the moods of verbs, and the monad and the point.

3. 66,16-31. *Those who accuse Aristotle of substitution* (*antallagê*). They contend that *kinēsis* should be taken up in place of *poiein* and *paskhein*.

Immediately after this third group is described, Simplicius introduces ‘the Stoics’ (*Oí ðé γε Στωικοί*):

4. 66,32-67,9. ‘The Stoics’ believe that the number of primary genera should be ‘reduced’ (*εἰς ἐλάττονα συστέλλειν*) to four, some of which they take over in an altered form (*ὑπηλλαγμένα*).

Simplicius proceeds (67,9-69,1) to describe how one should go about responding to these critics, and in particular how the tenfold division is validated by Iamblichus and by ‘Archytas’.

Before examining this grouping of critics as a whole, it is worth noting that ‘the Stoics’ do not seem to continue Simplicius’s third class. If anything, their desire to ‘reduce’ the number of categories would seem to belong naturally to Simplicius’s first class of critics, but they are cited out of order and do not really belong to the classification at all. Thus it seems likely that Simplicius has finished with his source for the threefold division of critics, and is now introducing a different source. There is also no reason whatsoever to assume that *οἱ Στωικοὶ* are specifically *οἱ περὶ Ἀθηνόδωρον καὶ Κορνούτον*; rather, the position associated with ‘the Stoics’ here is the position generically associated with the school. This new source for ‘the Stoics’ is quite likely not a Stoic at all; it is obviously a third-hand report of Stoic orthodoxy, and a third-hand observation about how the Stoic school also propounded a doctrine about ‘the number of primary genera’ (*τὸν τῶν πρῶτων γενῶν ἄριθμόν*, 66,32), which they divided into four. This passage does not demonstrate that any particular Stoic actually arrived at this Zenonian view in the course of criticizing Aristotle’s *Categories*, or used it as an instrument to criticize Aristotle with. Thus there is no reason to deduce *from this passage* that Athenodorus’s criticism of ‘the division into such a multitude’ (62,25)

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429 It is true that they alter (*ὑπηλλαγμένα*) Aristotle’s categories, but the main ‘action’ recommended by *hoi Stoikoi* is *εἰς ἐλάττονα συστέλλειν*, not just substitution.

actually referred to an excessive number of categories, viz. ten instead of four;\textsuperscript{431} all other evidence suggests that Athenodorus criticized the ten categories as deficient.

But this does not help us to identify any one of Simplicius’ three main classes of critics with Athenodorus or with Cornutus. As their names were cited explicitly at the outset of the tripartition, we should expect to find their views represented by one of the three groups. Curiously, all three of Simplicius’ groups launch their argument from a shared and rather specific aporia: why did Aristotle not amalgamate \textit{poiein} and \textit{paskhein} into a single category, ‘motion’? The first group introduces this complaint (he should have amalgamated them); the second group, initially identified as the ‘Nicostratans’, elaborates upon it (he is inconsistent in failing to amalgamate \textit{poiein} with \textit{paskhein}, because he does not distinguish \textit{ekhein} and \textit{ekhesthai}); and the third group essentially repeats the question of the first with a trivial change of language (he should amalgamate \textit{poiein} and \textit{paskhein} under \textit{kinêsis}). A number of seemingly independent commentators are classed under this tripartition for pedagogical convenience, including Xenocrates and Andronicus (who seem to have an entirely unrelated reason for reducing the categories to two, substance and accident) and Lucius (who points out various \textit{lexeis} that Aristotle has omitted, such as conjunctions).

Below, we shall return to the question why all three lines of criticism begin from the distinction of \textit{poiein} and \textit{paskhein} in particular. First, however, we should try to identify where within the tripartition of positions Athenodorus or Cornutus can be identified.

If no names were provided, we would almost certainly assign to Athenodorus and Cornutus the view of the second group, expounded from 64,18-65,13 and explicitly assigned to ‘the Lucians’. (1) First, this position holds that the \textit{Categories} is concerned with significant \textit{lexeis}; we are told by Porphyry and by Simplicius that this was the position of Athenodorus and Cornutus, whereas ‘Lucius’ elsewhere seems to maintain the incompatible view that the \textit{Categories} is concerned with the genera of being, an apparent inconsistency for which he has even been reproached.\textsuperscript{432} (2) Second, the examples provided for the omitted \textit{lexeis} are just

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\textsuperscript{431} Indeed, there is no evidence that the Stoics’ fourfold division of primary genera came into the commentaries of Athenodorus and Cornutus at all; if they had, one would hope that Simplicius and his sources would tell us something about that. Instead, I think that Athenodorus introduced an argument, as Porphyry and Simplicius seem to make clear, that the number of categories was \textit{inadequate} to encompass the entirety of verbal expression.

\textsuperscript{432} Moraux suggests that Lucius is in fact being inconsistent (532 f.) See also Chase, ftn. ad loc.
\end{flushright}
the examples supposedly offered by Athenodorus and Cornutus, such as conjunctions, articles, and so on. (3) Third, the very unusual verb *sussêmainousin* used here and first introduced by Plotinus in a related passage (*Enn.* 6.1.5,14) is also found in the answering passage of Dexippus (32,18-29); but it is introduced by Dexippus at 11,11, in a section headed ‘How not to be led astray by the difficulties raised by the Stoics’ and associated with the comments ascribed to Athenodorus and Cornutus by Porphyry and indeed by Simplicius himself. (4) Fourth, the actual structure of Simplicius’s discussion is echoed in Dexippus 32,18-29, where Dexippus’s response is that the use of conjunctions is ‘not a primary, but a secondary, use of language’; so too Simplicius 64,20 (*οὔτε προηγουμένη αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἡ σημασία, ἀλλὰ συσσημαίνουσιν*). To this language compare Porphyry 58,30 and following (περὶ τῆς προηγουμένης θέσεως τῶν λέξεων τῆς κατὰ τῶν προηγμάτων ποιεῖται τὸν λόγον): while is unclear to whom Porphyry is replying in this portion of the *QA* commentary, it is ‘the followers of Athenodorus and Cornutus’ upon whom he next comments by name (59,10 and following), including them among those who can be refuted by this distinction; and Porphyry’s defense is specifically leveled against their description of the *skopos as lexis qua lexis*.434

Despite these considerations, we do find that Simplicius ascribes this comment to οἱ περὶ τὸν Λούκιον. But there are additional curiosities associated with this text. (5) ‘Lucius’ is unusually named *apart* from Nicostratus (see preceding chapter), and most strangely, he is named immediately *after* Nicostratus *with a differing view*. Simplicius does not elsewhere set ‘Lucius’ and ‘Nicostratus’ against one another in this way, nor in this order. (6) Immediately after the ascription to Lucius, but before the Porphyrian answer that is elsewhere associated with the Stoics, our text of Simplicius has a lacuna.435 This lacuna is likely to have contained just the beginning of the argument distinguishing the ‘primary’ meaning of some *lexeis* from the ‘co-signification’ of others, as preserved in Dexippus, and it certainly

433 The chapter-headings, of course, are almost certainly not by Dexippus. But J. Dillon, in his translation, comments that they are reasonably accurate, and in this case the heading is a good guide to the associations assigned by the later tradition to this section.

434 Porphyry observes that this defense also applies to ‘those who take the investigation to be primarily about the genera of being’ (59,5) – but if that is meant to apply to the ‘Lucians’, it is all the stranger for Simplicius to assert, in a corresponding passage, that Lucius believes the *Categories* to be about *lexeis* and not about *genê tôn ontôn* at all.

435 As M. Chase observes, this lacuna was already present in the edition used by Wilhelm von Moerbeke.
need not cast doubt on the soundness of the surrounding text. However, it does show that there may be problems in the manuscript tradition associated with this particular ascription to Lucius, and it is a strange coincidence that the lacuna intervenes *between* that ascription and the argument associated with Athenodorus and Cornutus. Moreover, in the answering passage of Porphyry (86,20-33), where a similar tripartition of views is expressed, only Athenodorus and Cornutus are mentioned explicitly.

Coupling (5) the peculiarity of Lucius’s appearance ‘opposite’ Nicostratus and (6) the uncertainty of the surrounding manuscript tradition with (1) the incompatibility of the position ascribed to ‘Lucius’ at 64,18-65,13 with his views on the *skopos* as recorded elsewhere, and considering the positive identification of the cited view with that elsewhere accorded to Athenodorus and Cornutus, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the name of either Athenodorus or Cornutus or both was originally present alongside, or in place of, or just after, the name of Lucius at 64,18. It is certainly possible that several of the views expressed here – especially those on the monad and the point (which open a new argument about the distinction of intelligible from sensible reality from 65,13 onward) – should be credited to ‘Lucius’, although Dexippus deals with them under the same heading. But those preceding questions which focus on the inadequacy of the ten categories to comprehend all *lexeis*, and which are rebutted by the Porphyrian tradition with reference to the distinction of ‘primary’ from ‘secondary’ impositions of verbal expressions, should probably be ascribed to Athenodorus or to Athenodorus and Cornutus.

The ‘Co-Significant’

Dexippus 11,11 and the related passage 32,17 ff. are relevant in exploring the attribution of Simplicius 64,18-65,13. Dexippus tackles the (evidently Stoic) argument that the *Categories* should include conjunctions among other ‘grammatical’ elements by remarking that the *Categories* considers only what is significant – and conjunctions are ‘co-significant’ (*T2b.2*):

If we take an element of speech which is non-significant in itself, such as *blityri*, or if something is significant by reference to something else, as in the case of so-called ‘pronouns’... or if a term is co-significant (*συσσημαντικὸν*) with something else, as is the case with articles and conjunctions (*τὰ ἄρθρα καὶ οἱ σύνδεσμοι*), in no way would it be proper to include these among the predicates (*ἐν ταῖς κατηγορίαις*).
This term ‘co-significant’ (συσσημαντικὸν) is unusual. In our record, it first occurs in Plotinus’s treatment of the categories (6.1.5,14), where voice is divided into the impact on air and the movement, one of which signifies as the other ‘co-signifies’. It recurs later in Dexippus at 32,17, the passage mirroring the text of Simplicius ascribed to ‘Lucius’ above.

At 11,11, under a chapter-heading dedicated to ‘the Stoics’, Dexippus mentions the term briefly during his defense against the arguments of Athenodorus – presumably an epitome of the arguments of Porphyry in the Ad Gedalium. At 32,17 we are given much more detail about the reason why conjunctions are such ‘co-signifiers’ – they specifically co-signify ‘breaks in thought’ (συσσημαίνουσι τὸ ἀπαρτίζον τῆς διανοιάς, 32,22), but on their own they mean nothing.

In itself, this argument is valuable. It is made within a Stoic theoretical framework. In an Aristotelian framework, following the semantic theory of the de Int., we would expect expressions such as conjunctions to signify thoughts or affections of the soul. But the position that conjunctions ‘co-signify breaks in thought’ (συσσημαίνουσι τὸ ἀπαρτίζον τῆς διανοιάς) is not, as it may initially appear, a suggestion that conjunctions are significant of intelligibles. Instead, this ἀπαρτίζον τῆς διανοιάς is a lekton and the terminology is Chrysippean (cf. SVF 2.184 and see also Sextus PH 2.176,5 and for the grammatical usage Apollonius Dyscolus De adv. 2.1.1.121,3 and De const. 2.2.402,2); the argument is that conjunctions co-signify certain lekta. Thus I believe there is some evidence here, once again, that a primary defense against Athenodorus was made within a Stoic theoretical framework.

**Dexippus**

The commentary of Dexippus helps to complete this picture. Dexippus’s treatment at in Cat. 11,1-16,13 = T2 takes the form of a thorough response to the contention that the Categories concerns lexeis yet omits certain types of expression, such as conjunctions. This treatment may well follow Porphyry’s commentary Ad Gedalium in essentials. Coupled with the introduction of Athenodorus and Cornutus in Porphyry’s commentary By Question and Answer and with Simplicius’s testimony, this text provides the clearest outline of the actual arguments mustered by Athenodorus, Cornutus, or both against the tenfold division of categories.
The chapter-heading assigned to 11,1-16,14 is 'how to identify the categories and not be led astray by the difficulties raised by the Stoics' (Πῶς χρὴ τὰς κατηγορίας εὑρίσκειν καὶ μὴ ύπάγεσθαι ταῖς τῶν Στοιχείων ἀπορίαις; 1,9). Evidently the author of this heading meant it to apply to the entirety of 11,1-16,14, although the section naturally falls into two halves: Dexippus’s long argument from 11,4-12,30, and the independent exchange by ‘question and answer’ from 13,1-16,14.

The opening question concerns how one may identify those expressions (λέξεις) that fall under the ‘categories’ of Aristotle, and so exclude those λέξεις that are not properly predicative. Dexippus approaches the problem by offering a definition of κατηγορία, then demonstrating that certain problematic cases of λέξεις – those raised by the critics as embarrassments for Aristotle’s classification – are excluded by the definition.

Dexippus’s answers to the query posed by Seleucus may be summarized as follows (T2).

**Part I: That certain problematic lexeis are excluded by a proper definition of predication.**

1. (11,4-11) We must first identify (a) the genus of ‘the significant’ (τὸ σημαντικὸν πᾶν γένος) and distinguish this from (b) the non-significant (ἀσημόν), such as ‘blityri’, and from (c) the co-significant (συσσημαντικόν), such as articles and conjunctions.

2. (11,12-17) A true κατηγορία enables us ‘to show the realities to one another’ (τὰ πράγματα δηλοῦν ἀλλήλοις) and is thus distinguished (i) by its relation to a reality (πρὸς τὸ πράγμα σχέσεως), (ii) by its differentiation from realities (τῆς κατὰ τὰ πράγματα διαφορᾶς), and (iii) most properly of all, by its capacity to receive form (εἰδοποιεῖσθαι). This definition excludes the following kinds of lexis.

2.1. (11,18-20) If a lexis draws its defining characteristic from its relation to its own parts (σχηματισθῇ ... τοῖς οἰκείοις μέρεις τὸν ἐπιβάλλοντα χαρακτῆρα ἀφορίζειν) it lacks the primary signification of logos and it is not a κατηγορία. Examples of such excluded lexeis are διόθεν, οἴκοθέν, κάλλιστα, ὀρθότατα, σοφώτατα, and ποιητικώτατα.

2.2. (11,20-25) And if a lexis draws its meaning from the relationship of the objects of thought to each other (κατὰ τὴν τῶν νοημάτων πρὸς ἄλληλα ἐπιπλοκήν) it is again not a κατηγορία. Examples of such excluded lexeis are the consequence of the hypothetical proposition ‘If it is day...’ and the alternative contradiction of the disjunctive proposition, ‘Either it is day...’

2.3. (11,25-30) Non-verbal movement of thought such as groans and roars (ἐπὶ τῶν στεναγμῶν καὶ βρυχημάτων), and indiscernible sounds (ἀφάνταστος φωνῆ), and names that represent no reality (ὄνομα μηδὲν πράγμα δηλώσειν), are not κατηγορίαι.

2.4. (11,30-12,3) There is no higher predicate, neither real nor linguistic (ὅν ἢ λεγόμενον), that may be predicated synonymously of the highest genera of reality nor of the most generic lexeis. Therefore, ‘Being’ (τὸ ὅν) cannot be predicated as common to the highest genera (it is homonymous: 13,5), nor can ‘Motion’ (κίνησις) be predicated as common to ποιεῖν and πάσχειν.
2.5. (12,3-11) The defining characteristic of κατηγορίαι is simplicity (τὸ ἁπλοῦν) and non-compositeness (ἀσύνθετον). Therefore we must exclude composite expressions, quasi-composite expressions, invented words, and other expressions that belong properly to the study of verbal expression, which is secondary and not primary (ἄλλης θεωρίας τῆς περὶ τὴν λέξιν καὶ δευτέρας). Examples of such excluded lexes are Δίων περιπατεῖ and ξυστρόπων (sic: perhaps ξυστροποίει with Dillon?).

2.6. (12,11-19) A κατηγορία must identify the primary signification of utterances (τὴν προηγουμένην σημασίαν, cf. Porphyry 58,30; Simplicius 64,20) and the primary essential commonalities of beings (τὰς προηγουμένας οὐσιώδεις κοινότητας), but not the secondary common concepts of them which are accidentally manifested. These include derivative forms and secondary concepts.

3. (12,19-26) This is the approach of ‘serious students of logos and of ousia’ (σπουδαζομέναι ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦ λόγου τε καὶ τῆς οὐσίας φιλοθεαμόνων). Based on these guidelines, we must omit the following from consideration as categories, and as not conforming to the skopos of the Categories (σκοπῷ τῶν κατηγοριῶν, 12,26):

3.1. (12,20-21) Figurative and metaphorical expressions (τὸ τροπικὸν ἢ μεταφορικὸν ὄνομα) such as τὸ ’ἀνεχαίτισεν’ or ’πόδα νείατον Ἴδης’.

3.2. (12,22-23) Modal expressions (οἱ τρόποι) such as τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης and ἐνδέχεσθαι and ὑπάρχειν.

3.3. (12,23-24) Quantifiers (προσδιορισμοὶ) such as τὸ πᾶς and οὐδεὶς and τὸ τὶς and οὐχί τις.

4. (12,26-31) The Categories are concerned with logos that encompasses truth and falsehood and so with ‘such portions of significant speech as, being taken together to form a simple predicative statement, give proper value to the terms out of which they are constructed’. (Notably this formulation differs slightly from that of Porphyry).

Part II: Various aporiai concerning predications (to what category does X belong?)

5. (13,3-6) Being belongs to no category, but is said homonymously in ten ways.
6. (13,7-10) ‘One’ belongs to no category, but is said homonymously in ten ways.
7. (13,11-15) Plurality belongs to no category, but is said homonymously in ten ways.
8. (13,16-23) Not-being belongs to no category. (i) Proper not-being is non-existent. (ii) Relative not-being is said homonymously in ten ways.
9. (13,24-27) ‘Is’ belongs to no category, but is said homonymously in ten ways.
10. (13,28-14,2) ‘Same’ and ‘Other’ belong to no category, but are said homonymously in ten ways.
11. (14,3-7) Each of the categories is ‘something’ (τι) homonymously in ten ways.
12. (14,8-19) ‘Definition’ (ὁρος) reveals the essence (τὸ τί ἐστι) of a thing by indicating its distinctive characteristic (ἰδιότητας), and this is said homonymously in ten ways.
13. (14,20-31) ‘Genus’ and ‘proprium’ (ἰδίου) are said homonymously in ten ways, as are differentia and species.

13.1. (14,32-15,13) Defense against certain counter-arguments from the text of Aristotle. (i) Q. How can genus be homonymous in ten ways if Aristotle offers a single definition of it (Top. 1.4, 102a31)? A. Because the definition itself may be ambiguous. (ii) Q. How can ‘same’ be homonymous in ten ways if Aristotle defines it as said in only three ways, namely genus or species or number (Top. 7.1, 152b31 and following)? A. Because each of these three is homonymous in ten ways.

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14. (15,14-22) ‘Two ways’, ‘three ways’, ‘in two’, ‘in three’, ‘in four’ (τὸ διχῶς καὶ τριχῶς καὶ τὸ διχθὰ, τριχθὰ, τετραχθὰ) are secondary and not primary significant utterances and therefore need not belong to the categories.

15. (15,23-31) ‘Whole’ and ‘part’ (τὸ ὅλον καὶ τὸ μέρος) also belong to the secondary use of language and therefore need not belong to the categories. (If they do, however, they are relatives).

16. (15,32-16,2) The phrases ‘universal’ and ‘once for all’ and ‘wholly’ (τὸ καθόλου καὶ τὸ καθάπαξ καὶ τὸ ἀρδῆν) are dependent upon the categories, in which they participate.

17. (16,3-11) ‘Same’, ‘other’, ‘proprium’, ‘incompatible’, ‘common’, ‘indefinite’, ‘ambiguity’, ‘synonymy’ (τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ τὸ ἐτερον καὶ τὸ ἰδιον καὶ τὸ ἀλλότριον καὶ τὸ κοινὸν καὶ τὴν ἀδιαφορίαν τὴν τε ἄμφιβολίαν καὶ τὴν συνωνυμίαν) are said homonymously of all the categories, and also, as they describe names and concern the secondary use of language, properly ‘fall outside’ the categories.

18. (16,11-13) Having answered these questions, we may now turn to the study of the categories ‘at the highest level’ (πρὸς τὴν τελεωτάτην ἐπιστήμην).

From this series of thrusts and counter-thrusts, we can derive several important observations. The first useful point is the general context of the argument, which establishes that at least some of the criticisms here originated with Porphyry’s Athenodorus, Cornutus, or both. The general line of attack throughout ‘Part I’ is that a number of ‘significant’ lexē is are omitted from Aristotle’s ‘categories’, including, for instance, articles and conjunctions (11,4-11) and figurative expressions (12,20-21). We know from Porphyry that this was precisely the line of attack adopted by both Athenodorus and Cornutus, and perhaps especially associated with Athenodorus (Simplicius 62,25). The author of the chapter-headings in Dexippus clearly made the same connection. The defense against this argument is also that adopted by Porphyry against Athenodorus and Cornutus: it is critical to distinguish the primary from the secondary imposition of expressions on things (notably itself a Stoic doctrine), and the truly significant from the merely ‘co-significant’ or sussēmantikon. If we do so, the problematic lexē is will be excluded from consideration as predications. Having thus defended against many examples of verbally significant lexē is, Dexippus next tackles a host of philosophical terms that appear to be omitted from the ‘categories’ (13,3-16,13), mostly by pointing out that they are said homonymously in ten ways and belong to no category, occasionally with the aid of a reminder about the secondary and purely linguistic imposition of expressions. This is a broader criticism to defend against.

The second useful point is the actual specifics of the examples given by Athenodorus and Cornutus to support their criticisms of the text. Looking at the examples above, we know
that either or both of them criticized the *Categories* along the following lines (for the scope of Part I above):

- Expressions relating to movement from place, such as διόθεν and οἰκοθέν, are wrongly omitted. (Compare Cornutus at Simplicius 359,1 and following = T3h: should διόθεν at Dexippus 11,18-20 be amended to the rarer Διωνοθέν of Simplicius 359.4?)
- Superlative expressions, such as κάλλιστα, ὀρθότατα, σοφώτατα, and ποιητικώτατα, are wrongly omitted.
- Stoic hypothetical propositions are wrongly omitted, such as ‘If it is day...’ (compare DL 7.69 and Sext. Emp. Adv. Math. 8.223).
- Stoic disjunctive propositions are wrongly omitted, such as ‘Either it is day...’ (compare DL 7.72).
- Stoic categorical propositions are wrongly omitted, such as Δίων περιπατεῖ. (Dexippus refers to this example as ‘composite’, but on the Stoic view such a proposition was in fact ‘simple’. Compare DL 7.70, where Δίων περιπατεῖ is an example of a Stoic simple ‘categorical’ proposition, and see Chrysippus at 7.65).
- The categories Poiein and paskhein are wrongly separated, and should be classed together under kinēsis. (Compare the three groups of critics of the *Categories* at Simplicius 63.4-66.41 and T3b; these two categories are also called by Aristotle ποιοῦν and πάσχον, as at An. Pr. 83a22; and the Stoic arkhai also have these names, as DL 7.134 informs us).
- Metaphorical and figurative expressions are wrongly omitted, such as ‘ἀνεχαίτισεν’ or ‘πόδα νείατον Ἴδης’. (Compare Porphyry 59.5-14 = T1c and Simplicius 18,27 = T3a for the shared criticism by Athenodorus and Cornutus that the *Categories* omits ‘figurative’ expressions).
- Modal expressions are wrongly omitted, such as τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης and ἐνδέχεσθαι and ὑπάρχειν.
- Quantifiers such as τὸ πᾶς are wrongly omitted.

These considerations, and especially the first set of criticisms regarding conjunctions and articles, roughly correspond to Simplicius 64.20-65.12. The second natural division of Dexippus’s treatment (Part II above), which overlaps with the first, is also loosely affiliated with the following section of Simplicius, from 65,13 to 66,31.

- The ten categories fail to comprehend a number of (chiefly logical and metaphysical) entities, including: being, the one, plurality, non-being, ‘is’, same, other, definition, genus, proprium, whole and part, and the overarching (Stoic) category τι.

**Summary**

Combining the sources that we have, we are able to piece together a broad picture of the combined criticisms of Athenodorus and Cornutus against the division of the ten categories.
Through a close examination of the sources, we may also be able to distinguish Athenodorus from Cornutus in the tradition.

Porphyry (58.3-59.14 = T1abc) informs us that ‘Athenodorus and Cornutus’ treated the *skopos* of the *Categories* as ‘expressions *qua* expressions’, and sought to demonstrate that it failed in comprehending this subject. Porphyry also tells us (86.20 = T1d) that their objections were chiefly put forward in three works: Athenodorus’s *Against the Categories of Aristotle* and Cornutus’s *Arts of Rhetoric* and *Reply to Athenodorus*, and Porphyry’s compressed presentation may be taken to suggest that all three of the groups of criticism – excess, deficiency, and substitution – are to be found in these two Stoics. Simplicius (18.26 = T3a.ii) reiterates Porphyry’s assessment, and explicitly distinguishes Athenodorus’s *Against the Categories*, which criticized *only* the number or division of categories, from Cornutus’s *Reply*, which bore a greater resemblance to the wide-ranging (πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα πάντα σχεδόν) critiques of Lucius and Nicostratus (62.24-63.3 = T3b). Simplicius distinguishes Athenodorus’s specific criticism about the number of categories (based on various excluded *lexeis*), on the one hand, from the other criticisms of the text, such as its thematic consistency, which *might* be separately ascribed to Cornutus.

Dexippus then provides specific samples of criticism. I think it is possible that the first long section of criticisms and responses, expressed as a single disquisition by Dexippus and described as Part I above, corresponds to Athenodorus’s criticism of the ‘number’ of ten categories and its inability to comprehend *lexeis*, and so attracts a defense founded chiefly on the distinction of the ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ imposition of *lexeis*. Conversely, I think it possible that the second series of criticisms and responses, expressed as a question and answer dialogue between Dexippus and Seleucus and described as Part II above, may be part of Cornutus’ wider critique, which also includes several factors discussed below under other sections.

The reasoning behind these criticisms is associated with a number of Stoic doctrines. The specific arguments in Dexippus make clear that a strong initial motivation for the criticism of the *Categories* – presumably as undertaken by Athenodorus – was the incompatibility of Aristotle’s notions of predication with those espoused by the Stoics following Chrysippus. Thus the Stoics perhaps found that the *Categories* omitted hypothetical (DL 7.69) and disjunctive (7.72) propositions as well as what their theory regarded as ‘categorical’
propositions (7.70). More specifically, as I suggest above with reference to J. Barnes,²⁴³ later Stoics such as Cornutus may have found particular fault with the ‘simple’ or atomic units of the Categories being terms rather than sentences or propositions (on this, see also M. Frede ‘Stoic vs. Aristotelian Syllogistic’, in Frede, 1987).

It is interesting that Diogenes Laertius ascribes to one ‘Athenodorus’ (among other philosophers) the argument that a Stoic ‘categorical’ proposition such as ‘Dion walks’ is a simple proposition (7.68). The Stoic critic reported by Dexippus claims that the assertion ‘Dion walks’ is wrongly omitted from the ‘categories’; Dexippus responds that this phrase is, in fact, composite. Now we know that Athenodorus’s position was founded on the view that the Categories concerned lexēs qua lexēs (or at least gave Porphyry ample basis to argue that this was his position). It is interesting, therefore, to note that those who argued that the Categories was simply about ‘words’ focused precisely on Cat. 1a16 (‘among things that are said, some are said in combination, some without combination’) – apparently a field of interest to one ‘Athenodorus’ who may potentially be our critic.

But it seems clear that none of these specific arguments, nor the other specific omissions such as metaphorical lexēs and quantifiers, are really driving the Stoic argument. Where Porphyry, Dexippus and Simplicius feel compelled to focus is less on the particulars than on the broad distinction of the so-called ‘primary’ imposition of expressions (qua significant of beings) from the ‘secondary’ imposition of expressions as linguistic elements, in order to associate the Categories with the former. It is important to the defenders of the Categories to establish this distinction, and they appear to suggest that the Stoic critics of the Categories erred in failing to recognize it.

But as noted above in our initial treatment of Cornutus, this language and distinction, as wielded by Porphyry and his followers, is itself Stoic, answering to the Stoic distinction of dialectic into the lekta or ‘what is signified’ from the class of studies concerned with expressions or – for lack of a better word – with grammar (see M. Frede).²⁴⁷ On the orthodox Stoic view, evidently pioneered or at least elaborated by Chrysippus, the signified lekta are separate from verbal expressions or lexēs as such, which mirror the lekta (see DL 7.58). The ‘primary’ impositions with which Porphyry claims the Categories to be concerned might well

²⁴³ ‘Aristotle and Stoic Logic’, 41-43.

be interpreted in a Stoic framework as the *lekta*, while the ‘secondary’ impositions of expression would be just the verbal expressions that signify them.

The Stoic doctrine itself is well studied. Alongside DL, a key text is Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 8.11-12:

The Stoics say that three things are linked to one another: what is signified, what signifies, and what exists. Of these, what signifies is the sound, e.g. the sound Dion; what is signified is the very thing which is suggested by the sound and which we apprehend to subsist with our thought (the barbarians do not understand although they hear the sound); and what exists is the external object, such as Dion himself. Of these things two are bodies, namely the sound and what exists, one is not a body, namely the thing signified, the *lekton*, which also is true or false (tr. Mueller).

If the Stoics following Chrysippus made such a distinction as Porphyry seems to claim they neglected, it seems likely that either (a) Athenodorus ignored that distinction and ascribed a purely ‘verbal’ *skopos* to the *Categories* for polemical reasons, or (b) Athenodorus found reason in the *Categories* for interpreting the text in a purely linguistic scope. Indeed, some modern commentators have adopted the same approach (see my chapter on the modern interpretation). As we find later in the tradition (e.g. Ammonius in *Cat.* 9,1 and following), those who argued that the *Categories* concerned words alone relied on *Cat.* 1a16, ‘of things that are said...’ It is also possible, as we shall find in the following section, that Athenodorus was drawn to this view by the apparently linguistic nature of the onymies and the ‘logical’ structure of the work.

At least some reporters in the tradition contrasted the Stoic position on *lekta* with Aristotle’s theory of signification. Thus Ammonius writes at *in. Ar. An. Pr.* 17.24-28:

First, Aristotle teaches us here what are signified primarily and secondarily by sounds, [primarily] thoughts and [secondarily], through these intermediaries, things, and [he teaches] that it is not necessary to imagine anything else between the thought and the thing, such as what the Stoics think fit to name a *lekton*.

In a Stoic framework, as our sources inform us, the *lekton* is the seat of truth and falsehood; in an Aristotelian framework, truth and falsehood are found in the world of concepts. As

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438 See chapter 1 for discussion, especially drawing on three recent studies in Frede and Inwood (2005): Allen (2005), Long (2005), and Ebbesen (2005); see also Barnes, ‘Saying, Meaning and Thinking’.
Jonathan Barnes has shown, the situation is rather more complicated than a simple equation of concepts with *lekta*.\(^{439}\) While it is difficult to draw any direct conclusions about Athenodorus’s motivations here, it may be the case that such a basic difference about the theory of signification may have helped to motivate these Stoic critics to associate the *Categories* strictly with the linguistic or ‘secondary’ half of the science of dialectic.

I.1. AThENODORUS AND CORNUTUS ON THE DIVISION OF CHAPTERS

As I noted above, there are actually three species of ‘division’ at play in the single passage where Simplicius introduces the problem of διαίρεσις (T3a): (1) the *diairesis* of chapter-headings in the *Categories*, a problem shared with the Alexandrian commentators and associated with Stoic criticisms against the structural coherence of the text of the *Categories*; (2) the *diairesis* of the ten categories and their inability to comprehend all *lexeis*, drawn from Porphyry, and associated with Athenodorus’s and Cornutus’s distinctive position about the *skopos* of the work; (3) the internal *diairesis* of the onymies and the question whether it is a division of names or of things, which is incidentally relevant to the preceding two problems. In this section, I will attempt to distinguish the sources of (1) and (2).

When Simplicius reports on ‘the book’s division into chapter-headings’ (εἰς τὰ κεφάλαια διαιρέσεως τοῦ βιβλίου, 18,22), he remarks that some commentators have failed to notice the ‘division [of the chapters] according to their natural joints’ (κατ’ ἄρθρα διῄρηνται, 18,23) and therefore they suppose that the *Categories* is organized haphazardly like a hypomnemetic work (18,22-26 = T3a.i):

> It remains for us to speak about the book’s division into chapters. Some commentators, paying no attention to how the chapters have been divided according to their natural joints and to how well they fulfil the purpose of the overall subject, nor to how they maintain their mutual continuity, consider that the chapters just lie there in the haphazard manner typical of hypomnemetic writings.

This remark apparently derives from a source common to the Alexandrian scholastic tradition on the ‘chapter-headings’ of the *Categories*. Simplicius will return to that source at 19,9, where, in a passage echoed in Alexandrian commentators such as Ammonius, Philoponus,

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\(^{439}\) See Barnes, ‘Meaning, Saying, and Thinking’ (1993).
and Olympiodorus,\textsuperscript{440} he describes the structural division as ‘tripartite’ (ὡς εἰς μεγάλα μέρη διελείν, τριμερὲς τὸ βιβλίον).

However, Simplicius first diverges into a separate subject and, perhaps, a different source. The divergence begins at 18,26 = \textbf{T3a.ii} and is marked by a shift in the reference of the word ‘division’ (\textit{diairesis}). For the surrounding passages \textbf{T3a.i} and (later) 19,9 and following, the ‘division’ is of chapters (εἰς τὰ κεφάλαια διαιρέσεως) or of major headings (εἰς μεγάλα μέρη διελεῖν). But during this intervening passage, beginning from καὶ δὴ καὶ at 18,26 = \textbf{T3a.ii}, where Simplicius introduces Athenodoros and Cornutus, he turns to discuss the division of the actual categories, not the chapters, with specific reference to the subject (\textit{skopus}) of the work:

What is more (καὶ δὴ καὶ), some contradict Aristotle and reject his division (ἀθετοῦντες τὴν διαίρεσιν): of these, some claim that it is uselessly redundant (ὁς πλεονάζουσαν μάτην), others that it omits many things (οἱ δὲ ὡς πολλὰ παρεῖσαν), like Athenodoros and Cornutus, who believe that the \textit{skopus} concerns expressions insofar as they are expressions. They bring forward many expressions as examples, some literal (κυρίας), some figurative (τροπικάς), and thereby think they refute the division, since it has not included all possible expressions (ὡς οὐ πάσας τὰς λέξεις περιλαβοῦσαν...)

This intervening passage \textbf{T3a.ii} seems to be drawn direct from Porphyry, as we noted above by comparing the \textit{QA} commentary directly. At 19,1, however, the correspondence with Porphyry’s commentary \textit{By Question and Answer} ends as abruptly as it began. Whereas Porphyry proceeds to describe the views of Herminus on the \textit{skopus} of the \textit{Categories}, Simplicius instead returns to the structural coherence of the text and the onymes in particular (\textbf{T3a.iii}):

These people also think that there is a division of names into homonyms, synonyms, and paronyms, and suppose that the book is a motley heap of logical, physical, ethical, and theological speculations. For them, the speculations about homonyms, synonyms, and paronyms are logical, as is, moreover, the one about opposites. Those about movement, they say, are physical, while those about virtue and vice are ethical, just as the philosophical considerations about the ten generas are theological.

\textsuperscript{440} As found in Ammonius 14,3-15,2, Philoponus 13,6-33, Olympiodorus Proleg. 25,5-24, David (Elias) 134,29 and Arethas 138,21-139,12.
This is a different problem and a separate line of criticism than the contention that the *Categories* has omitted certain kinds of *lexeis*. Porphyry’s smaller commentary also covers the affiliation of the onymies to the rest of the work from 59,34 onward. But Porphyry treats the topic quite differently than does Simplicius’ source for T3a.iii. Simplicius’ source discusses the onymies in the context of a division of the *Categories* by its ‘joints’ – namely, the Stoicizing organization of philosophy as an animal into the disciplines of ethics, logic, and physics. This source is interested in the Stoic critics’ views on the relationship of the onymies (which are, according to the Stoics, ‘logical’) with the rest of the work (which is, in their view, ‘ethical’, ‘physical’, and ‘theological’). For Simplicius’s source, the correct reply to the Stoics is that the first chapter of the *Categories* is not concerned with a ‘logical’ or linguistic subject (19,7-9 = T3a.iv):

In fact, however, the truth is otherwise. [Aristotle] is not carrying out a division (*diairesis*) of names [in the onymies], for if he were, he would not have omitted heteronyms or polyonyms.

But this is not Porphyry’s reply. Porphyry’s response to the problem of the onymies, as given in the QA commentary, is that the onymies are a necessary propaedeutic for the rest of the work (Porph. 60,1 and following). In fact, Simplicius cites that very response of Porphyry later in his text (19,27 and following, where the questioners are ‘Lucius and Nicostratus’).

T3a.ii, I think, draws from Porphyry, perhaps via a mediating text: but the passages before and after it derive directly from a different source. I believe this source is Syrianus or Iamblichus. The source contends that the ‘onymies’ do not concern a linguistic subject, because they omit heteronyms and polyonyms. The argument that polyonyms and heteronyms belong to ‘linguistic’ study is directly associated with Syrianus in a later passage (23,13-15: πρὸς λεξικήν <μάλλον> παρασκευήν ὁρᾶν ἢ πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν τῶν προγμάτων ἐπιβλέψιν). Thus it appears likely that Syrianus is the immediate source of the argument at 19,7-9 = T3a.iv. Moreover, Simplicius’s citation of Syrianus distills ideas about the status and scope of the ‘onymies’ which are ascribed by name to Iamblichus (e.g., 23,25-34,5 and earlier at 22,1-2). This association seems well in keeping with Simplicius’s own statement of intent at 3,9, where he remarks that he is reducing Iamblichus much as Syrianus did, but less radically; and also with Simplicius’s comment at 13,17 that Syrianus

441 Diogenes Laertius 7.39-40.
‘clarified’ (σαφηνίζει) Iamblichus on the true subject of the *Categories*, namely that the work treats significant words insofar as they are significant of beings.

For reasons outlined below, I believe it is important to pry these sources apart in the Simplician text. Simplicius’s references are divided as follows:

- 18,23 = **T3a.i**: τινες question the division of the chapter-headings.
- 18,26 = **T3a.ii**: What is more (καὶ δὴ καὶ) τινες speak against the division of the categories. There are two groups, mirroring two of the three groups at 63,4-66,31:
  - 18,27: Some (οἱ μὲν) claim the division is excessive
  - 18,28: Others (οἱ δὲ) such as Athenodorus and Cornutus hold that the division omits many *lexeis*, as the ten categories concern ‘verbal expressions’
- 18,31 = **T3a.iii**: ‘Who also’ (οἳ καὶ) criticize the internal division of the onymies and the disciplinary division of the work as a whole, as the onymies concern a linguistic subject, while the ten categories concern theology, etc.

The criticisms contained in **T3a**, taken together, appear to be inconsistent. The central lines **T3a.ii** contain criticisms explicitly ascribed to ‘Athenodorus and Cornutus’, who hold that the *skopos* of the *Categories* is ‘verbal expressions insofar as they are verbal expressions’, divided into ten categories. But the critics represented in the following part of the passage, **T3a.iii-iv**, complain that the ten categories are *theological* speculations that confusedly follow the ‘linguistic’ onymies; this can hardly agree with the position of ‘Athenodorus and Cornutus’ that the *skopos* is ‘verbal expressions’. For Athenodorus and Cornutus, the *Categories* – and the central list of the ten categories in particular – have a clear linguistic *skopos*; for the critics of the chapter-division, the ten categories are ‘theological’, and the work itself has no single coherent *skopos* at all, treading between logic, physics, ethics, and theology.

The critics of the chapter-division, represented in **T3a.i** and **T3a.iii-iv**, may not be identical with Athenodorus and Cornutus, represented in **T3a.ii**. Indeed, the passage ending at 18,26 could flow directly into 19,1 if the intervening passage **T3a.ii** were removed. The passages 18,22-26 = **T3a.i** and 19,1-8 = **T3a.iii-iv** treat the same subject (the structural coherence of the work) and are consistent with one another in their use of the term *diairesis*. The intervening passage **T3a.ii** is associated with criticisms about the ‘division’ of the ten categories, where Simplicius is primarily drawing on Porphyry for his response; but **T3a.i** and **T3a.iii-iv** are associated with criticisms about the chapter-division, where Simplicius is primarily drawing on Syrianus and Iamblichus for his response.
So who were the critics of the chapter-division in T3a.i and T3a.iii-iv? After all, the criticism of the Categories’s chapter-division as a blended ‘heap’ of philosophical disciplines is not a characteristically Stoic line of attack, at least judging from one report of school orthodoxy. For the Stoics, according to Diogenes Laertius, the disciplines of logic, physics, and ethics are ‘not independent... but all blended together (μεμίχθαι αὐτά)’ in philosophical discourse; indeed, ‘it was not usual to teach them separately’ (7.40). Thus it is not especially obvious that a Stoic would, on doctrinal grounds alone, object to a text that mixed philosophical subjects in this way.

We can establish with confidence that Athenodorus made no such criticism, as Simplicius elsewhere informs us (62,25 = T3c) that Athenodorus criticized only the division of the ten categories and seemingly had nothing to do with the criticism of the structural coherence of the text. But Simplicius clearly sees enough connection – aside from the common word diairesis – to link the lines and senses of T3a together. We do know that Cornutus’s criticisms were broader-ranging in his Against Athenodorus and Aristotle and his Rhetoric. Conceivably Cornutus alone criticised the chapter-division, and the internal inconsistency of the argumentation in T3a is to be explained by a difference of opinion between Athenodorus and Cornutus – for we know that they disagreed, although we do not know what they disagreed about.

Indeed, there is some evidence that Cornutus, in contrast to Athenodorus, understood the ten categories as having non-linguistic content, although he may have presented this interpretation as a function of the text’s poor organization. Simplicius directly compares the views of Athenodorus and Cornutus on the subject of what Aristotle meant by ‘relative’ (in Cat. 187,24-34 = T8). For Cornutus, it is appropriate to understand the Aristotelian Relative directly in terms of its signification of reality (πρὸς τι εἶναι φησιν οἷς συμπροσπίπτει πρὸς ἔτερον ἢ σχέσις, οὐ μέντοι ἡ συντακτική... ἀλλ᾽ ἡ πρὸς ὑπόστασιν...); the language suggests that the Relative is interpreted as a lekton, directly significant of reality, rather than a lexis-in-itself. As discussed below, this passage suggests that Cornutus holds a less ‘linguistic’ view about the subject-matter of Aristotle’s ten categories than does Athenodorus. Indeed, if Cornutus shared the position, presumably Athenodorus’s that the sole subject of the work was λέξεις καθὸ λέξεις, it would be difficult for him to argue coherently that the work also transgressed disciplinary boundaries between physics, ethics, and theology.
Such an interpretation could be coupled with the evidence discussed earlier that the initial
response to Athenodorus’s criticisms was constructed within a purely Stoic framework – in
which Athenodorus’s (presumably intentional) error was to describe the ten categories
without regard for the primary part of dialectic – to suggest that Cornutus, in his Pros
Athenodoron, promoted the argument (against Athenodorus) that the ten categories involved
lekta rather than λέξεις καθὸ λέξεις, but simultaneously promoted the argument (against
Aristotle) that the Categories was accordingly incoherent, crossing boundaries between logic
(in the onymies), theology (in the ten categories), ethics, and physics. This would account for
the discontinuity of T3a, with its two forces of diairesis, as well as Simplicius’s choice to
combine them into a single report of the views maintained by ‘Athenodorus and Cornutus’.

II. OTHER CHALLENGES TO THE CATEGORIES

The categorization of βάρος and ῥοπή

[T5] Simplicius in Cat. 128,7. Athenodorus joins ‘Archytas’ and Ptolemy in criticizing the
category of Quantity for omitting ‘weight’ (βάρος) or ‘downward thrust’ (ῥοπή), which, on
Athenodorus’s view, should be included as a subdivision of Quantity alongside Number and
Size. Simplicius responds that weight belongs to the category of Quality, but the situation is
less clear in the case of ῥοπή. Iamblichus accepts the view that downward thrust ‘possesses
quantity in terms of weight or lightness’ (128,24), and ‘of quantities some have downward
thrust, others do not’.

Athenodorus’s criticism that Aristotle has omitted weight from Quantity is compatible with
the account that he criticized the Categories for its omissions of certain kinds of lexis. This
criticism also suggests that he believed his readership would find it to be an uncontroversial
claim that weight and downward thrust (or lexeis representing weight and downward thrust)
belonged to the category of Quantity, at least within the framework presented by Aristotle’s
Categories.

[T6] Simplicius in Cat. 129,1. Cornutus then appears to challenge Athenodorus’s
interpretation, indicating that ‘downward thrust’ considered in terms of weight and lightness
is a Quality. To this Iamblichus replies that it is the measure of weight and lightness. We are
provided with no specific details about the manner of Cornutus’s argumentation, but it is
reasonable to suppose that this is an example of the amendment or refutation of
Athenodorus’s commentary that led to the entitling of Cornutus’s work on the *Categories* as *Against Athenodorus*.

It is difficult to discern more than this about Cornutus’s methodology or motivations – he is merely mentioned in passing alongside Porphyry, presumably in the *Ad Gedalium*, as disputing Athenodorus’s assessment – but it is fair to deduce that part of his *Pros Athenodoron* worked through the text category-by-category in this way, and challenged some of Athenodorus’s criticisms in particulars while presupposing his argumentation about the *skopos* of the text.

**The status of the Relative**

[T8] Simplicius in *Cat.* 187.24-34. Athenodorus holds that the Aristotelian relative is ‘that for which the *prosêgoria* begs that relating to which it is uttered’ (ἐφ᾽ οὗ ἡ προσηγορία ἐπιζητεῖ τὸ πρὸς ὁ λέγεται), ‘as one looks to a slave-owner when one hears [the word] *slave*’ – a definition which focuses on linguistic value. But Cornutus holds that the Aristotelian relative is ‘that whose condition coincides with something else, not through the condition of [verbal] combination, but essence (*hypostasis*)’ (οἷς ἐπιπροσπίπτει πρὸς ἑτερον ἡ σχέσις, οὐ μέντοι ἡ συντακτική, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ἐχόντων καὶ ἐχομένων, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ πρὸς ὑπόστασιν). Based on this contrast, it does seem that Cornutus and Athenodorus held rather different views about the *kind of thing* that the ‘relative’ would turn out to be for Aristotle, and that Cornutus’s view could be characterized as more ‘ontological’.

Again, this text suggests that Cornutus made specific arguments against Athenodorus’s interpretations or definitions of particular Aristotelian categories. However, it also raises questions as to whether Cornutus definitely maintained the argument that the *Categories* solely concerned a lexical *skopos*, or whether he was the source who maintained that Aristotle’s work traversed a number of *topoi* in a disorganized manner. As I suggested above, it may be the case that Athenodorus strictly criticized the text for omitted some *lexeis* and proving deficient – per *T5* and *T6* – while Cornutus both accepted and expanded upon this argument, suggesting that many of the specific categories stretched into the discipline that he called ‘theology’ (cf. *T3a.iii*).

**Expressions of direction (where and when)**
Simplicius, *in Cat.* 359,1. By contrast, Simplicius’s report of Cornutus’s examples of words omitted by Aristotle’s categories of ‘where’ and ‘when’ is a clear example of Cornutus specifying *lexeis* that Aristotle has omitted from the *Categories*, and arguably the only *specific* sample outside Dexippus for the polemical approach of ‘raising many examples of omission’. As noted earlier in this chapter, Dexippus offers many instances of this kind of argumentation. T10 makes very clear that Cornutus followed the general polemical practice of Athenodorus in raising ‘counter-examples’ to demonstrate the limitations of the ten categories.

**Summary**

Porphyry (and Simplicius following Porphyry) imply that Athenodorus and Cornutus criticize the *Categories* because these Stoics do not recognize the distinction of the primary and secondary imposition of language on realities. But this distinction is itself a fundamentally *Stoic* bipartition of dialectic, as we know from D.L. and Sextus Empiricus, and there is a suggestion from what we know of Cornutus (via the *Epidrome*) and from what we know of Athenodorus (via D.L. 7.68) that the historical figures referred to as ‘Athenodorus’ and ‘Cornutus’ would have written commentaries that were sensitive to this distinction.

Athenodorus, as I suggest, willingly left this decision to the side, or made an intentional argument to identify the subject-matter of the ‘ten categories’ with the second (linguistic) half of Stoic dialectic. I think it was the latter, as Athenodorus clearly contended (T3a) that the onymies were solely linguistic – as have some modern critics – and evidently founded a criticism of the *Categories* as linguistic (and so defective) upon this exegesis.

I suggest that we should assign to Athenodorus and Cornutus the counter-example of conjunctions ascribed to ‘Lucius’ at Simplicius 64,18-65,13 – in light of doctrinal inconsistencies with the views of ‘Lucius’ expressed elsewhere, coupled with the lacuna in Simplicius and the appearance of a similar argument under the ‘Stoic’ banner in Dexippus. I also suggest that it is unlikely that ‘the Stoics’ at 66,32-67,9 are in any direct way related to 'Athenodorus and Cornutus', and they are not related to Simplicius' major threefold partition of critics of the categories in 62,25-31 (T3b). This is important because the Stoic doctrine of four so-called ‘categories’ need not be viewed as a motivation for the criticisms of Athenodorus and Cornutus.
However, there appear to have been differences between the criticisms of Athenodorus and Cornutus, which were sometimes at odds. This is evident not only from the title of Cornutus's book Against Athenodorus... or Reply to Athenodorus... but also from the fact that the arguments contained in T3a (i and iii vs ii) are incompatible. Indeed, I have contended that the well-known passage T3a should be divided based in part upon its incompatible uses of diairesis, one use referring to the division of ten categories (T3a.ii), the others to the chapter-division of the work (T3a.i and T3a.iii-iv); and I propose that Athenodorus criticized only the division of ten categories (thus focusing on the ‘lexical’ omissions of the text, cf. Simp. 62.25 = T3c), whereas Cornutus amended this criticism, suggesting various cases where the Categories appeared to deal with lekta rather than lexeis-as-such. But Cornutus also appears to have challenged the overall literary coherence of the work based on this interpretation. There is some (admittedly limited) evidence for this in Cornutus’s rebuttal of Athenodorus’s exegesis of certain categories.

Broadly, I suggested that the incompatibility of the Stoic doctrine of signification with that of the opening of the De Interpretatione – which are explicitly set at odds by Ammonius in his commentary in De Int. – might be one plausible motivation for Stoic criticism of the Categories. We have seen that Porphyry’s defense of the Categories constructs a defense of the ten categories in terms that a Stoic would find agreeable, by describing their subject-matter as (in effect) lekta rather than λέξεις καθὸ λέξεις: and I have suggested, tentatively, that Cornutus himself may be the source of that defense, based on the inconsistencies in T3a. But most of all, we may find in the testimony of Dexippus and the identification of our Athenodorus with the Athenodorus of D.L. 7.68 evidence for a suggestion previously made by J. Barnes that it was the basic distinction between simple term logic and simple propositional logic that motivated some Stoic criticism of the Categories, at least in the Imperial period: in brief, the Categories account of ‘things said without combination’ may have been viewed (at least from a purely polemical standpoint) as somehow contradictory of the Stoic doctrine of ‘simple assertions’, and an early line of attack against the Categories pointed out that it did not account for the simplicity of sentences such as ‘Dion walks’ (Dexippus in Cat. 12.3-11 = T2).

Thus, as I suggested at the outset of this chapter, the criticisms leveled by both Athenodorus and Cornutus against the Categories were motivated by the perceived incompatibility of Aristotle’s account of ‘simple’ assertions (terms) with the Stoic account of ‘simple’ assertions.
(propositions) such as ‘Dion walks’ (cf. Dexippus in Cat. 12.3-11 = T2) as Athenodoroi helped to define them (cf. D.L. 7.68 = T30). Athenodoroi sought to show that the Categories had a syntactical goal and really occupied itself with a linguistic and lexical subject. Herminos (ap. Porphyry, in Cat. 59.20-33 = T1c), perhaps in some particulars following Cornutus, responded by redefining the skopos of the Categories to clarify that it did not concern the kinds of reality (pace Nicostratus and Plotinus) nor lexeis-as-such (pace Athenodoros), but instead concerned things that are said (τῶν λεγομένων, 59.22) and their significance (τὴν ἑκάστου οἰκείαν σημασίαν, 59.26-27) – meaning in Stoic terms neither words nor realities, but the ‘sayables’ between.442

442 This conclusion, I believe, generates some support for Barnes’s identification of Athenodorus and Cornutus as the opponents of Alexander at in A. Pr. 402.1-405.16 = T44.
7. Herminus
Herminus said what we have said... that the subject of the \textit{Categories} is not
the primary and highest genera in nature (τῶν ἐν τῇ φύσει πρώτων καὶ
gενικοτάτων γενῶν), for instruction in these is not suitable to young
persons; nor the issue of what are the primary and fundamental differentiae of
things said (αἱ πρῶται καὶ στοιχειώδεις τῶν λεγομένων διαφοραῖ), since
in that case the discussion would seem to be about parts of speech. Rather it is
about the sort of predication that will properly belong to what is said in each
of the genera of being \textit{i.e.}, περί τῶν ἑλών λέξεων... καθό σημαντικαί
tῶν πραγμάτων, 59,19.]


Herminus\textsuperscript{443} whose Aristotelian lectures were heard by Alexander of Aphrodisias\textsuperscript{444} was
described by his contemporary Lucian\textsuperscript{445} as a man who ‘praises Aristotle, with a mouth full
of his ten categories’ (T1). Three centuries later, Simplicius introduced Herminus as a
commentator on the \textit{Categories} who ‘touched in moderation on specific lines of
inquiry’ (ζητημάτων ἐφήσαντο μετρίως, T6c), implying that his treatment took the form
of short discursive essays on specific topics or problems in the text.\textsuperscript{446} Although many of
Herminus’s conclusions were rejected by Alexander, by Porphyry, and by Simplicius, there
appears to have been one important exception. From the text of Porphyry (T3b), it is clear
that Porphyry’s influential endorsement of the \textit{Categories} as a useful ‘text for beginners’ was

\textsuperscript{443} On Herminus see Gottschalk (1987), 1158-60 and (1990), 79; Moraux (1984), II, 361-98; and
Goulet (2000), III, 652-54. His fragments were collected by Schmidt (1907). Modern students of
Aristotle’s logic have noted and criticised his views on the \textit{Prior Analytics} and the \textit{Topics}; see for example Łukasiewicz (1951), 30-31; Patzig (1968), 118-22; Smith (1997), 141-42; Barnes et al.
(1991); Flannery (1995); and Bochenski (1947), 64. For earlier studies on Herminus, see Prantl
(1855-70), I, 545-46 (Categories), 584-50, 552-53; 555-57 and Zeller (III 1, 778, 1 and 783, 2).

\textsuperscript{444} Simplicius, \textit{De caelo} 430,32-431,11 = T6b reports a comment of Alexander that Ἑρμίνου δὲ ἠκούσα,
καθὰ ἦν καὶ ἐν τοῖς Ἀσπάσιοι φερόμενον. Simplicius adds ταῦτα μὲν οὖν τὰ τοῦ Ἑρμίνου κατὰ τὸν Ἀσπάσιον εἰρημένα. See also Moraux (1984), II, 361-63. As
I suggest below, Herminus may have been known to the later commentators solely, or chiefly, through
Alexander.

\textsuperscript{445} Life of Demonax 56,1-6: τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη δ’ ἐπαινοῦντα καὶ διὰ στόματος αὐτοῦ τὰς δέκα
κατηγορίας ἔχοντα. Lucian appears to imply that his readership would, like Demonax (εἰδὼς γὰρ..., 56,2), already be familiar with this \textit{Fachgebiet} of Herminus.

\textsuperscript{446} On the force of \textit{zêtêma}, see H. Dörrie (1959:1-6) and M. Chase (2003:93). I take a \textit{zêtêma} to be a
short essay on a specific problem; within the \textit{Categories} commentary tradition, as I show below, there
is ample evidence for Herminus’s \textit{zêtêmata} on differentiae of coordinate genera at \textit{Cat.} 1b16-24 (T6f-
h); on the ‘enumeration’ of ten categories (T6f); and on problems associated with Quantity (T6j).
Similar discussions are found in Alexander; as Barnes et al. (1991:11) put it in the case of Alexander,
such an excursus ‘will often elaborate on issues towards which Aristotle merely gestures. These little
essays, which sometimes draw on later Peripatetic theories and sometimes involve polemics against
the enemies of Aristotelianism, enrich the content of the commentary’.
constructed around Herminus’s reinterpretation\textsuperscript{447} of the aim or skopos of the text; this is a critical point, as Herminus may be the earliest writer on record to declare that the \textit{Categories} belongs early in the \textit{Organon} for pedagogical reasons. The goal of the present chapter is therefore to answer, or at least to clarify, the question of how Herminus arrived at his view about the skopos, and to what extent his own position can be identified among the extant texts of the later commentators.\textsuperscript{448}

Modern students of Aristotle have taken a dim view of the value of Herminus’s contribution to the study of the \textit{Categories}. While he followed Boethus in many respects, ‘das Niveau und die Gründlichkeit des Boethos scheint Herminos nicht erreicht zu haben’ (Moraux 1983:363-64). With regard to his capacity as a commentator on Aristotle’s logic, Herminus already struck Prantl (above, n. 1) as an ‘offenbar höchst bornierter Mensch’. Łukasiewicz (1951), Patzig (1968), and Barnes et al. (1991) agree with Alexander of Aphrodisias that his views on the second figure of the syllogism are a ‘waste of time’ (πρὸς τῷ περιεργίαν ἔχειν, \textit{in An. Pr.} 74,5 \textsuperscript{T2e}). Precisely because of these evaluations, it seems important to establish what it was about Herminus’s positions and transmission that secured his status in the texts of Porphyry and Iamblichus, and his legacy in the tradition that followed them.

\section*{I. Sources and Works}

On the life of Herminus, a handful of sources are directly relevant. Lucian (\textit{T1}) purports to record a meeting of Herminus ‘the Aristotelian’ with the Cynic philosopher Demonax (c. 70-170 AD), perhaps at Athens; this text is discussed below. Simplicius informs us that Alexander of Aphrodisias heard Herminus expound a position of Aspasius on \textit{On the Heavens} 2.6 (Simplic. \textit{in De Caelo} 430.32-431.11 = \textit{T6b}), so that Herminus must have been active as

\textsuperscript{447} As we shall find below, Herminus appears to have maintained and developed the views of Boethus of Sidon regarding the skopos of the \textit{Categories} against the criticisms of Athenodorus and Cornutus, and to have especially maintained the appropriateness of the text for the ‘young’ (cf. \textit{T3b2}).

\textsuperscript{448} The former question (how Herminus arrived at his view) will be considered especially in association with a passage in Alexander \textit{in An. Pr. I} 72,26 ff. = \textit{T2c} (section IV below). The latter question (what was his view, and how is it distinct from those of, in particular, Porphyry and Boethus) will be considered especially in association with a close comparison of early passages in Porphyry \textit{in Cat.} and Olympiodorus \textit{in Cat.} (section III below).
a teacher in the second century AD, and probably later in the century.\footnote{See Moraux II 240-44. Gottschalk (1987), 1159 argues persuasively that the view adopted by Herminus that the heavens are ‘ensouled’ is Aristotelian and Theophrastan. (For example, one could get the idea that the heavens are ‘alive’ and possess an intrinsic source of motion from De Cael. 285a29-30). Zeller had taken this to be a non-Aristotelian view, perhaps tracing its roots to Platonism. See Sharples (1997), 171 n. 39: ‘if it is [startling], it is so as a return to Aristotelian orthodoxy’.

\footnote{Pines (1961), 21-54 suggests amending to ˀrmmws for ˀrmyws. The argument is discussed and endorsed by Rescher and Marmura (1965), Appendix 1. I copy their translation as T2.}} The Arabic text of Alexander’s \textit{Against Galen on Motion} (T2a-b) may, with a small correction proposed by Shlomo Pines in 1961,\footnote{See Rescher and Marmura (1965) and Moraux II 362 n. 6. The text is uncertain, as Thillet (1984:xvlii n. 1) stresses, but if the reading ˀrmmws is correct, it suggests that Galen knew Herminus personally. The Arabic sources suggest that Alexander and Galen were acquainted and hostile to one another, but shared in Herminus a common teacher (on which see Müller, 1897). The context is an attack by Galen on \textit{Physics} 7.1, where Aristotle seeks to establish that everything in motion must be moved by something. Simplicius in \textit{Phys}. 1039,13 and following discusses both Galen’s criticism of the proof, and Alexander’s response; it appears (on Simplicius’s view) that Alexander was not fully successful in refuting Galen’s critique, and Simplicius himself delivers a further defense of Aristotle.}\footnote{See De cogn. an. morb. 41,11-42,2 Kuhn = \textit{De cogn. cur. an. morb.} 8.32,5-7 Marquardt.} preserve parts of a letter addressed to Herminus by Galen (129-\textit{c}. 210 AD), in which Galen criticises Aristotle’s proof that everything moved is moved by a mover (cf. \textit{Phys}. 7.1).\footnote{See Moraux II 240-44. Gottschalk (1987), 1159 argues persuasively that the view adopted by Herminus that the heavens are ‘ensouled’ is Aristotelian and Theophrastan. (For example, one could get the idea that the heavens are ‘alive’ and possess an intrinsic source of motion from De Cael. 285a29-30). Zeller had taken this to be a non-Aristotelian view, perhaps tracing its roots to Platonism. See Sharples (1997), 171 n. 39: ‘if it is [startling], it is so as a return to Aristotelian orthodoxy’.

\footnote{Pines (1961), 21-54 suggests amending to ˀrmmws for ˀrmyws. The argument is discussed and endorsed by Rescher and Marmura (1965), Appendix 1. I copy their translation as T2.}} This same text might also imply that Herminus is the anonymous Ἀσπασίου τοῦ Περιπατητικοῦ μαθητής to whom Galen refers elsewhere.\footnote{See Moraux II 240-44. Gottschalk (1987), 1159 argues persuasively that the view adopted by Herminus that the heavens are ‘ensouled’ is Aristotelian and Theophrastan. (For example, one could get the idea that the heavens are ‘alive’ and possess an intrinsic source of motion from De Cael. 285a29-30). Zeller had taken this to be a non-Aristotelian view, perhaps tracing its roots to Platonism. See Sharples (1997), 171 n. 39: ‘if it is [startling], it is so as a return to Aristotelian orthodoxy’.

\footnote{Pines (1961), 21-54 suggests amending to ˀrmmws for ˀrmyws. The argument is discussed and endorsed by Rescher and Marmura (1965), Appendix 1. I copy their translation as T2.}}

The sources for Herminus’s comments on the \textit{Categories}, \textit{De Interpretatione}, \textit{Prior Analytics}, \textit{Topics}, and \textit{De Caelo} are included in the Appendix of Texts, together with some examples of inexplicit citations of Herminus. The fragments preserved by the later commentators are generally taken to represent a series of published commentaries on the individual works, in the style of his predecessor Aspasius and his student Alexander. For example, the fragments have been assigned as follows:

On the *De Caelo*. See Schmidt 42-44, Moraux 396-98.

It may be pointed out, however, that there is little evidence that Herminus's works were conveyed to the later tradition in the form of such published and circulated commentaries. Alexander reports ‘hearing’ Herminus speak on the *De Caelo*, and relays his views (Ἑρμίνου δέ ἤκουσα, Simplic. *in De Cael.* 430,32 = T6b). Olympiodorus informs us that Alexander, in his commentary on the *Categories*, used Herminus’s position as one of two ‘starting points’ in preparing his own view of the *skopos* (λαμβάνω τὰς ἀφορμὰς κατεσκεύαζε τὸν ἑαυτοῦ λόγον, 19,18-19). But there is no language here or elsewhere to suggest that Herminus’s comments were ever collected and circulated in a published text that Alexander could cite by name. In commenting on the *Prior Analytics* and the *Topics*, Herminus is said to have expressed *doxai* (Alex. *in An. Pr. I*, 72,26; *in Top.* 574,26), or to have ‘spoken’ (*in An. Pr. I* 89,31) the words that Alexander discusses.

Certainly this argument proves nothing by itself, as Alexander can also use language like λέγει and δόκει when he reports on written sources. But against the background of Alexander’s statement that he ‘heard’ Herminus lecture, it is worthy of mention that, throughout the surviving commentaries, he never refers the reader to a text in circulation by Herminus. When reporting Herminus, Alexander delivers extracts interspersed with his own comments and criticisms, such as the single forty-line sentence at *in An. Pr.* 72,26-74,6 = T2c. Based on the study of the fragments that follows below in section IV, I believe that T2c is a good example of Alexander’s criticism of Herminus from his own notes, and that the later tradition, including Porphyry, was primarily reliant on passages like this one for knowledge of Herminus. I am aware that this argument cannot be pushed too far, but I have found it useful in interpreting the stratigraphy of the fragments.

For there is also little language in the later commentators to suggest that any circulated texts by Herminus were known to them, even indirectly. Porphyry, for example, informs us that Boethus of Sidon discussed the *skopos* of the *Categories* ἐν τοῖς εἰς τὰς Κατηγορίας, then immediately adds καὶ ἕρμινος βραχέως [εἰρήκε ταῦτα] – without specifying a text. As

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453 As the other ‘starting point’ of Alexander is a view advocated by *Porphyry*, however, one may wonder how useful this passage is for establishing chronology and dependence. I discuss the report of Olympiodorus as T7 below.

454 Compare, for example, Alexander’s citation of Sosigenes at *in Met.* 143,13: ὁ διδάσκαλος ἰμῶν Σωσιγένης ἐν τῷ ὀγδῷ Περὶ ὀρθωμοσωρίας.
this citation comes just after his reference to the commentary of Boethus by title, and prior to a long and perhaps verbatim quotation of Herminus (in Cat. 59,17), it may be reasonable to infer that Porphyry read this excerpt of Herminus in an intermediate source, such as Alexander’s lost in Cat.;\textsuperscript{455} and that this source also provided no reference to a named source text. This is certainly inconclusive;\textsuperscript{456} but a similar phenomenon may be noted in Simplicius. In contrast to Simplicius’s language about Andronicus, Boethus, Lucius, and Nicostratus;\textsuperscript{457} and especially about Athenodoros and Cornutus (βιβλία γράψας, 86,20-21; Αθηνόδωρος ἐν τῷ Πρὸς τὰς Αριστοτέλους μὲν Κατηγορίας ἐπιγεγραμμένῳ βιβλίῳ, 62,25; Κορνοῦτος δὲ ἐν οἷς Πρὸς Αθηνόδωρον καὶ Αριστοτέλην ἐπέγραψεν, 62,26), Simplicius gives no indication that he knows of a book by Herminus.\textsuperscript{458}

Moreover, whenever a zêtêma of Herminus is cited in the later sources, Alexander's rebuttal is rarely far behind;\textsuperscript{459} a connection that Simplicius may be viewed as acknowledging when he links the ‘inquiries’ of both personae at 1,13 = T\textsuperscript{6c} (ὁ Ἀφροδισιεὺς Ἀλέξανδρος καὶ Ἑρμῖνος). Simplicius also mentions Alexander and Herminus together when he notes their agreement on the skopos of the Categories (13,16 = T\textsuperscript{6d}). Olympiodorus might express the relationship more clearly at Proleg. in Cat. 18,30-19,30, where Herminus’s view on the

\textsuperscript{455} It is abundantly clear from the sources that Porphyry knew the commentaries of Alexander thoroughly, and criticised individual passages one-by-one; see for example the passages of Boethius cited below, and works cited below on the posture of the later commentators to Alexander such as Blumenthal (1993), Luna (2001), and D’Ancona (2002). It bears mentioning that Alexander was studied in Plotinus’s circle.

\textsuperscript{456} For instance, Porphyry might simply expect us to carry over ἐν τοῖς εἰς τὰς Κατηγορίας.

\textsuperscript{457} Lucius and Nicostratus (ἀπορίας γράψαι, 1,18), Boethus (ἐξηγούμενος ... καθ᾽ ἐκάστην λέξιν, 29,30), and Andronicus (παραφράζω, 26,17).

\textsuperscript{458} Again, Simplicius does not refer to a specific work by Herminus throughout the in Cat. Also, as in Alexander, the language associated with Herminus by Simplicius is almost always verbal (λέγει, etc.) rather than written (γράφει, etc.) As we have seen, however, this demonstrates very little, as such language is common for written sources. I have noted only one passage, in Cat. 62,7-23 = T\textsuperscript{6i}, where Simplicius (or any commentator, Greek or Latin) records a comment of Herminus with the verb γράφει; but what is ‘written’ here is just the text from which Simplicius is reading and in which Herminus is recorded (this text may be Iamblichus in Cat., with the report of Herminus deriving from Porphyry; see discussion below). Again, this does not seem to me to imply that Simplicius knows, directly or indirectly, of a book by Herminus, but rather (on the hypothesis I am advancing here) that certain quotations of Herminus came down to him via Iamblichus and Porphyry, and ultimately derive from Alexander’s notes.

\textsuperscript{459} While this is not conclusive, this kind of ‘interpunctuated argumentation’ has been adduced in similar cases to demonstrate the presence of an intermediary source, notably in the case of Boethius and Porphyry (see discussion below).
The skopos of the Categories is followed by ‘Alexander’s’ rebuttal (ὁ δὲ Ἑρμῖνος οἰόμενος αὐτὸν περὶ πραγμάτων διαλαμβάνει... ὁ δὲ Ἀλέξανδρος ὑπολαμβάνων αὐτὸν περὶ νοημάτων διαλέγεσθαι, 19,18-19); but this passage (T7) is rather difficult to parse for the purposes of attribution, as we shall find below.

While none of these omissions prove that Herminus did not write books that were later circulated, or even that Simplicius did not know about any books by him, the Greek sources do imply that the later commentators may have known Herminus chiefly through the commentaries of Alexander – some that are extant today (such as those on the Prior Analytics and Topics), others that are lost (such as those on the Categories and De Interpretatione) – and that Alexander preserved Herminus’s views on the Organon, just as he preserved Herminus’s views on the De Caelo, through notes taken from lectures given by Herminus.

Another perspective on these relationships can be found in the Latin tradition. Alexander’s lost commentary on De Interpretatione, which seems to have been used by Ammonius;[460] was also discussed by Boethius in both editions of his Latin commentary on the De Int. In his first edition,[461] Boethius writes of one lemma (2.10, 132,3 = T4c):

Huius sententiae multiplex expositio ab Alexandro et Porphyrio, Aspasio quoque et Hermino proditur. In quibus quid excellentissimus expositorum Porphyrius dixerit, alias dicemus. Quoniam uero simplicior explanatio Alexandri esse uidetur, eam nunc pro breuitate subiecimus.

Here, Boethius is able to compare and contrast Alexander and Porphyry as two closely related sources: in his judgement, whereas Porphyry’s interpretation of this lemma is preferred, Alexander’s has the advantage of brevity and simplicity.[462] But did he know any sources outside Porphyry directly?[463] Boethius himself explains at [2] 7,4: expositionem... quam maxime a Porphyrio, quamquam etiam a ceteris transferentes, Latina oratione digessimus.

In commenting on this passage, Shiel (1990) agrees with Courcelle (1948) that Boethius had

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[461] On the following discussion of Boethius see also Shiel (1990) and Barnes in Gibson (1981).

[462] In general, it seems that Porphyry’s analysis often took its start from Alexander’s, and expanded or corrected what Alexander had said; several passages in the second edition suggest this structure. For example: Ac prius quibus modis affirmationem atque negationem non esse species enuntiationis Alexander putet dicendum est, post vero addam qua Porphyrius haec argumentatione dissoluerit.

no direct knowledge of Alexander, or the *ceteri* before Porphyry; by contrast, Bidez (1922) had argued that he had direct access to Alexander (citing 87,15-16 and 143-44, though not the current passage). But we do notice that where Alexander is cited, Porphyry is rarely far behind with a response; moreover, in several passages where Porphyry is not explicitly mentioned by Boethius, Porphyry’s name appears in parallel passages of other commentators such as Ammonius (see Shiel 1990:358).

In the cases of Aspasius and Herminus, Boethius’s dependence on Porphyry seems even clearer: Boethius passes no judgement at 132,3 – we are not told, for example, whether Herminus is brief or long-winded – save to observe that these commentators also had something to say about the lemma. This too would imply that Boethius had little or no direct textual evidence to comment on their methods, just a notice in his sources (likely Porphyry) that they had expressed views on the text, coupled with occasional excerpts from their positions.

It seems very probable that Boethius has Herminus (and Aspasius) through Porphyry.464 This evidence returns us to our original query: does Boethius’s text provide any evidence as to whether *Porphyry* had direct access to Herminus, or read Herminus via Alexander? Several passages in Boethius’s second edition suggest that (a) Porphyry discussed the views of Herminus and Alexander in isolation from one another,465 especially where they disagreed, *but* that (b) the former may have been mediated by the latter. Again, as in the passages cited above from Olympiodorus, Simplicius, and Alexander himself, the views of Herminus typically come along with discussion or a rebuttal, not only by Porphyry, but by Alexander himself. Consider for example 1.1, 25,22 and following:

> Quorum Hermini quidem a rerum veritate longe disiuncta est. Ait enim idcirco Aristotelen de notis animae passionum interposuisse sermonem, ut utilitatem propositi operis inculcaret....

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464 With examples cited in Shiel and Courcelle for Alexander, compare 25,22; 39,25; 40,2; 157,30; 183,7; 275,4-6. Again, for what it may be worth, throughout the text of Boethius (as far as I have been able to detect) Herminus is cited with vocal language such as *dicit* and *ait*, and the verbs used do not imply a written source, or suggest that Boethius was directly or indirectly aware of any specific book by Herminus.

465 See for example 293,27 = T4c: *dicit autem Porphyrius fuisses quoqdam sui temporis, qui hunc exponerent librum, et quoniam ab Hermino vel Aspasio vel Alexandro expositionibus singulas proferentes multa contraria et expositionibus male ab illis editis dissidentia reperirent, arbitratos fuisses l librum hunc Aristotelis, ut dignun esset, exponi non posse multos que illius temporis viros totam huius libri praeterisse doctrinam, quod inexplicabilem putarent esse caliginem.
Alexander vero aliam huiusmodi interpositionis reddidit causam....

Sed Herminus hoc loco repudiandus est. Nihil enim tale quod ad causam propositae sententiae pertineret explicuit....

Sed Porphyrius ipsam plenius causam originemque sermonis huius ante oculos collocavit, qui omnem apud priscos philosophos de significationis vi contentionem litemque retexuit. Ait namque dubie apud antiquorum philosophorum sententias constitisse quid esset proprie quod vocibus significaretur.

Here we have an example, similar to that in Olympiodorus Proleg. in Cat. 18,30-19,30 = T7, of an apparent exchange of views between Herminus and Alexander. It is possible that the ‘dialogue’ is Porphyry’s own invention from two separate sources, but I suspect that Alexander presented a position of Herminus, criticised it, and moved on to the next one, much as he does from time to time in the surviving in An. Pr. and in Top. It is true that there are several fragments in later sources where Herminus is cited without an explicit response from Alexander, but this hardly shows that Alexander is not somewhere in the vicinity; and we might add that Alexander often cites alternative explanations of an Aristotelian lemma without entering in propria persona to decide between them.466

Regardless of whether this specific hypothesis is correct, I suggest that while we read those remarks of Herminus that survive in the later commentators, we should bear in mind the possibility that they have been selectively recorded and often criticised by Alexander, not only in the case of fragments where this is plainly so (such as Simplic. in De Cael. 430,32 = T6b or Alex. in Top. 569,3-8 = T2g), but also in cases where we might otherwise arrive at the conclusion that the nearest detectable transmitter (who is usually Porphyry) had direct access to Herminus. Thus the structure of Alexander’s lost commentary on the Categories may have had a role in determining which remarks of Herminus were preserved, and thus Alexander’s emphases and interests may have been partially responsible – at least as responsible as

466 See Sharples (1990), 97 for examples. In addition, as we shall see below, Alexander’s name is occasionally detached from his views by Simplicius, whereas the Alexandrians preserve it.
Porphyry’s own – for the selection and the criticism of fragments that have come down to us.467

The ‘Stoic’ Herminus

If indeed Herminus’s commentaries were not in general circulation as published texts, this may appear somewhat unusual, particularly viewed in contrast to the productive activity of Alexander468 and Aspasius. But Porphyry (Life of Plotinus 20.47 = T3a) preserves an interesting excerpt from the lost Περὶ τέλους of Longinus (c. AD 210-272/3), in which Longinus records the names of several Peripatetics, Platonists, and Stoics of the previous generation who refrained from writing, and supposed that they had ‘done enough once they had led their immediate hearers (sunontas) into a state of certainty (katalêpsis) about their views (areskontôn heautois)’ (τοὺς συνόντας προβιβάζειν εἰς τὴν τῶν ἀρεσκόντων ἔκαντος κατάληψιν, 20.28-29). Longinus suggests that these philosophers, whom he is about to list, lived during his own childhood (παρὰ τοὺς πρώτους τῆς ἡλικίας ἡμῶν χρόνους, VP 20.18-19).469

Among those philosophers who adopted this practice, Longinus mentions one Ἑρμῖνος, whom he characterises as a ‘Stoic’. The possibility that this Herminus is identical with the commentator on the Categories has been almost unanimously dismissed.470 After all, Longinus refers to this Herminus as a Stoic, whereas the commentator on the Categories is

467 Moreover, since Alexander frequently adopted a critical posture towards the views advanced by Herminus, we might not necessarily have Herminus at his best or most cogent, and some of his less controversial views may have been silently embedded, with modifications, in several of Alexander’s own exegeses without citation. It is also worth considering that the general attitudes of the later commentators to Alexander may colour their interpretations of Herminus. On the attitudes of the later commentators to Alexander, see for example Sharples (1990 and 1987), Blumenthal (1993), Luna (2001), and D’Ancona (2002).

468 Of course, the question how many of Alexander’s own texts came to be is a far larger problem, and there is considerably better evidence for discussion, including cases where differing views can be compared across texts. See Sharples (1990), 104-5.

469 It is possible that Longinus intends to include Herminus among the philosophers whom he himself ‘met as an adolescent’ (ἐτὶ δὲ μειρακίων ὄντων ἡμῶν οὐκ ὀλόγοι τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λόγων προέστησαν, 20.20-21), although the language does not imply that Longinus personally encountered all of the philosophers he lists.

470 See Schmidt (1907), 7, following whose argument on chronological grounds later treatments have tended to dismiss the possibility that Longinus refers to the commentator. Schmidt’s assessment follows Zeller (III 1 3, 778, 1 and 783, 2), Buhle (1791:302), and Funk (1907:651-52).
elsewhere framed as a Peripatetic and plainly operated as an exegete of Aristotle.\footnote{Although he seems to have occasionally criticised Aristotle, or formulated alternative views. See for example Alexander, in An. Pr. I 89,29-91,33 = T4, discussed below.}

Against this consensus and in favour of the identification, Lynch (1972) contended that Herminus and Sosigenes the ‘Stoics’ have been distinguished from Herminus and Sosigenes the ‘Peripatetics’ ‘only on the grounds that the two latter men were teachers of Alexander of Aphrodisias’ (215), and that the Herminus who taught Alexander and commented on the \textit{Categories} might indeed have been a ‘Stoic’ in Longinus’s eyes. Yet it is not quite true that the commentator Herminus has been distinguished as a Peripatetic \textit{only} due to his relationship with Alexander: the passage of Lucian cited as \textbf{T1} demonstrates that the title ‘Aristotelian’ was explicitly bestowed on him by at least one contemporary.

Nonetheless, it is certainly reasonable to wonder whether a second philosopher called Herminus, active during roughly the same time period, needs to be distinguished \textit{solely} on the grounds that Longinus refers to a ‘Stoic’ while Lucian speaks of an ‘Aristotelian’, and the later sources are largely silent.\footnote{To be clear, I do think that a later commentator would have answered \textit{Ἀριστοτελικός} or \textit{Περιπατητικός} if asked to state Herminus’s school affiliation, purely based on the nature of the texts that were preserved. But third-century sources could have taken a different view of an eclectic philosopher; see below for notes on eclecticism in the Hellenistic schools, and for Herminus’s case in particular. In the present discussion, therefore, I focus primarily on contemporary sources. To come back to the later sources, I am aware of only one instance where Herminus may be explicitly claimed for the Peripatos. This is the Arabic text preserved in the Carullah MS of \textbf{T2a}, where the author alternates between translating Alexander and explaining his dialogue with Galen to the reader. The manuscript refers to \textit{'rmyws} as a ‘Peripatetic’, but in order to regard this as useful for our purposes, we need to accept Pines’s amendment to \textit{'rmw}s, and then we need to get clear about the provenance of the epithet – Alexander, an intermediary, or a later gloss? See Rescher and Marmura (1965), Pines (1961), and Moraux (1983:362).}

Certainly there are contemporaries of Herminus, such as Galen and Aristotle of Mytilene, who are exemplars of contemporary eclecticism (see discussion below). The contemporary texts at least deserve a closer reading.

As I suggest below (under II), Lucian’s label \textit{ὁ Ἀριστοτελικός} in \textbf{T1} is probably unhelpful as a guide to the serious view of contemporary philosophers who were familiar with Herminus’s positions. ‘Aristotelian’ seems to carry the same force here as Lucian’s generic ‘baker’ or ‘senator’ or ‘public speaker’ or ‘cynic’, and is applied for the same reason as those epithets throughout the \textit{Life of Demonax}, namely, to warrant the anecdotal joke that follows at the object’s expense (in this case, a wordplay on \textit{κατηγορία}). It is equally unlikely that Herminus was a notorious unconvicted criminal who got away with countless misdeeds in
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Athens (παγκάκιστον... μυρία κακά ἐργαζόμενον... ἄξιος εἰ δέκα κατηγοριῶν), an allegation for which Lucian does not suggest a specific example here. Rather, Herminus’s misfortune was to achieve a degree of notoriety as a lecturer on ‘the ten categories’ in Demonax’s Athens. Perhaps this was sufficient, for Lucian’s purposes, to make Herminus both ‘Aristotelian’ and παγκάκιστος.

Longinus, on the other hand, was a respectable philosophical writer in his own right. Thus we may place significantly more weight upon his claim that ‘Herminus’ and ‘Lysimachus’ were among τῶν Στοιχεῖων, and that both were alive at the turn of the third century.473 But recent studies on eclecticism in the Hellenistic schools,474 especially on Herminus’s contemporary and associate Galen,475 have raised questions about the applicability of such affiliative labels in this period. Another of Alexander’s teachers, Aristotle of Mytilene, is known to have endorsed ‘Stoic’ positions, despite being otherwise described as an outstanding Peripatetic.476 In such a context, one might argue, it is plausible that Longinus might apply the label ‘Stoic’ where another philosopher, even a Peripatetic student of Herminus, might say ‘Aristotelian’. Longinus’s aim in the present text is to provide a symmetrical subdivision of late second and early third century Aristotelians, Platonists, and Stoics who placed little emphasis on the publication of their works, with each list headed by a pair of two names. The satisfaction of the taxonomy may be nearly as important to Longinus

473 Longinus had certain interests of his own in this text; as I discuss below, he sought to make an interesting classification of philosophers of the previous generation who focused on publishing and those who focused on teaching, then to further divide these two groups into ‘Stoics’, ‘Platonists’, and ‘Aristotelians’. He begins each subdivision in the latter group with a pair: Ammonius and Origen for the Platonists; Herminus and Lysimachus for the Stoics; Ammonius and Ptolemaeus for the Peripatos. There may be a certain degree of artificiality in these symmetrical classifications.

474 See for example Dillon and Long (1988). See also Moraux’s introduction (II), xxi-xxvii and 428-47, particularly with respect to his remarks on Galen’s eclectic methodology. Among older studies on the affiliation of Herminus, see Zeller (III 1 3, 778, 1 and 783, 2), Buhle (1791:302), and Funk (1907:651-52).

475 See for example M. Frede, ‘On Galen’s Epistemology’ in Nutton (1981, reprinted in Frede 1987). The large and rapidly growing literature on Galen’s posture toward Stoicism, which I will only be able to discuss briefly here, is summarised in Gill (2007).

476 See Moraux’s discussion from 399-425, and especially 423 for a wider contextualisation of Aristoteles. See also Donini (1988), 28-29. Moraux summarises in his introductory remarks (II:xxiv): ‘Es dürfte offenkundig sein, daß der Mytilener den Boden der echten aristotelischen Lehre de facto verlassen hatte und eine starke Neigung zu stoischen Positionen aufzeigte’. (Moraux 1967 already argued in detail for the identity of Aristoteles; although Thillet 1984, xi-xxxii argued against the restoration of the reading ‘Aristoteles’, Gottschalk, both in RE and in 1987, judges these arguments to be unpersuasive.

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as the exact balance of views expressed by, say, a philosopher who lectured on Aristotle’s *Categories* but questioned certain aspects of his psychology and adopted elements of Stoicism. We may recall that Athenodorus, although history judged him a ‘Stoic’, was known in later antiquity for his work on Aristotle’s *Categories*; and similar ambiguities, as we have seen in an earlier chapter, arose in the case of Boethus of Sidon.

It is worthwhile to examine the reference in Longinus. As we come to survey the fragments of Herminus below, we will encounter several that *may* be read as evidence of sympathy for certain Stoic views, particularly involving the relationship of names to their objects.\(^{477}\) If indeed Longinus supposed that the same Herminus could be labeled a ‘Stoic’, this would be circumstantially useful in our examination. More broadly, if Longinus’s reference is to the commentator, it would be interesting to establish that Herminus’s commentaries were not (on Longinus’s view) widely circulated, as this would provide some incidental corroboration for the suggestion, presented in more detail below, that Herminus may have been preserved chiefly or entirely through Alexander. Although we cannot be certain that Longinus’s reference is to the commentator, we can examine the strength of previously accepted arguments against the identification.

The first of these arguments is a chronological case against the identification of the commentator on the *Categories* with Longinus’s Herminus, and this argument was stressed by Schmidt (1907:7; my emphasis):

> Peripateticum vero eum fuisse et ex Luciani testimonio et ex commentariis illis praeter dubitationem constat, ita ut cum Buhlio, Brandisio, Funkio facere non possimus qui eundem esse statuerunt hunc atque Herminum Stoicum [...] Sed illum cum Longinus (+ 273) prima adulescentia se vidisse dicat, circa a. 220 in vivis fuisse statuendum est [...]

If indeed (1) Longinus intends to include Herminus among the philosophers whom he met μειρακίων ὄντων ἡμῶν, perhaps just under the age of twenty\(^{478}\) or *circa* AD 220-230; and if (2) this Herminus also studied under Aspasius, who appears to have lived during the first half...

\(^{477}\) For example, we find below that Herminus maintained the primary imposition of names by φύσις (perhaps at Porphyry, *in Cat.* 57.20-59.16 = **T3b1** and at Alex. *in An. Pr.* I 72.26 = **T2c**), raised doubts about the mediating role of ‘concepts’ in the signification of *pragmata* by phônai (Boethius *in Int.* [2] 37.30-4.28 = Porph. fr. 81F Smith = **T4a**, a position that [Ammonius] associates with ‘the Stoics’ *at in An. Pr.* 17.24-28) and questioned the text of the opening of *De Int.* 16a5-8 (Ammon. *in De Int.* 24.18-21 = **T5b**). These fragments are discussed under III and IV below.

\(^{478}\) *LSJ* s.v. μειρακίον.
of the second century AD; and if (3) Herminus was personally acquainted with Galen; then the identification may indeed demand that Longinus ‘saw’ an improbably aged Herminus. But it is not true that Longinus claims to have met each and every one of the great philosophers whom he proceeds to name; rather, his notice of ‘seeing most’ (οὐκ ὀλίγοι) of the personae is clearly non-exhaustive. The real question, therefore, is not whether Longinus could plausibly have met Herminus as a young man (‘illum... Longinus prima adolescetia se vidisse dicat’, Schmidt), but whether Longinus, writing in the 260s, could have accurately described Herminus’s reputed activity as παρὰ τοὺς πρώτους τῆς ἡλικίας ἡμῶν χρόνους (VP 20.18-19). In this latter case, we need not be so strict. In fact, the pieces fall into place if we posit that Herminus was a reasonably close contemporary of Galen (AD 129-c. 216), and at any rate not very much older than Galen. If Herminus too was born c. AD 130, and lived until AD 200 or a little later, he could have heard Aspasius lecture on the De Caelo as early as c. 150, when in his twenties; he might then have met Demonax at Athens at any time before c. 170, when in his forties, by which time he had spent significant time at Athens and gotten his ‘mouth full’, in Lucian’s words, ‘of the ten categories’ (in his lectures?); he might then have lectured to Alexander of Aphrodisias at any time during the second half of the second century; and he might have remained active sufficiently into the early 200s, that is, into his late sixties or seventies, that Longinus could promote the impression, gazing back from his own old age, that Herminus was active παρὰ τοὺς πρώτους τῆς ἡλικίας ἡμῶν χρόνους. This interpretation would not require Herminus to live quite as long as Galen; and the chronology might be further compressed or expanded without straining the bounds of credibility.

A further problem relating to the identification of Longinus’s Herminus with the commentator on the Categories is neither his school affiliation nor the chronology implied by the Vita Plotini passage, but the fact that the Herminus who is mentioned by Longinus apparently left no written works, and was noted (at least by Longinus) for this trait, whereas we appear to possess multiple sources for the writings of the Peripatetic Herminus. This is an interesting problem in its own right. Longinus’s classification scheme is somewhat loose, as he includes among those who were not ‘writers’ (his words are διὰ γραφῆς ἐπεχείρησαν τὰ δοκοῦντα σφίσι πραγματεύσομαι, 20.25-26) several men who indeed published and circulated books,

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479 If we allow, say, for Aspasius to have lectured a little later (say, 160 or 170), or for a younger Herminus to have been accused by Demonax; or for it to have been a middle aged Herminus who lectured to Alexander.
including the Platonist Origen, yet curiously failed to meet Longinus’s criteria for serious writing (μὴ προηγουμένην περὶ τοῦ γράφειν ὁμοία λαβόντον, 20.46-47), just because this was not their primary interest (cf. πάρεργον, 20.45).

As we have already seen, Longinus’s basic criterion for dividing philosophers into ‘writers’ and ‘non-writers’ was, it seems, whether a teacher felt he had ‘done enough once he had led his immediate hearers (sunontas) into a state of certainty (katalēpsis) about his views (areskontôn heautois)’ (τοὺς συνόντας προβιβάζειν εἰς τὴν τῶν ἀρεσκόντων ἑαυτοῖς κατάληψιν). Such a teacher made no further serious effort (cf. σπουδῇ, 20.46) to publish and circulate his works publicly. Herminus, as Longinus thinks, falls into this category, and Longinus also mentions ‘Peripatetics’, such as Ammonius and Ptolemy, among those who did not make a ‘serious effort’ to publish and circulate their work beyond their immediate circles.

As we have seen, this account could describe the Aristotelian commentator Herminus as he is represented by Alexander and by the later tradition; indeed, the way in which the Greek commentators and Boethius introduce and discuss Herminus’s views betwixt Alexander’s own may suggest such a relationship. Reports of Herminus’s views on the Organon in later sources could derive from Alexander, that is, from his notes from verbal lectures, and his comments and criticisms of those notes, just as they explicitly do in the case of the De Caelo. (If this is so, it might be noted that Herminus was not altogether successful in bringing Alexander εἰς τὴν τῶν ἀρεσκόντων ἑαυτοῖς κατάληψιν, at least on several specific points!)

A final point may be worth adding. If the emendation in the Arabic Alexander Against Galen (T2ab) is valid, and Galen did write (and publish) a series of letters addressed to Herminus in which he criticised Aristotle’s proof for the Prime Mover, it may be noteworthy that it was left to Alexander to compose a reply; there appears to be no evidence that Herminus himself circulated a response to Galen’s aporiai.

The tradition, then, does not explicitly demand an interpretation according to which Herminus left behind his commentaries on Aristotle in the form of circulated books, and the sources could allow for the identification of Herminus the commentator on Aristotle with Longinus’s ‘Stoic’ without explicit contradiction. I shall consider below whether the identification is at all persuasive or useful. Through this brief review of the sources, I just hope to have shown that the applicability of Longinus’s report in T7 should not be rejected.
solely on the basis of chronology, reported school affiliation, or the remark of Longinus that Herminus Stoicus bequeathed no autographs for publication and posterity.

II. Life

The available sources agree that Herminus lived and worked in the second century AD. With Moraux, his life is plausibly dated to c. 120-180/190, although I have proposed that these dates may be pushed slightly forward, say by ten years, if one wishes to accommodate more comfortably the citation of Longinus. Of his location of activity, we may make only educated guesses.

We might point to several indications that he was active at Athens. Thus Lucian records, rather tendentiously, a meeting of Herminus with the Cynic philosopher Demonax, presumably in Athens. The meeting is recounted among various other examples of Demonax’s acerbic and cynical wit (T1):

[Demonax’s] remark to Herminus the Aristotelian is equally worth recording. He was aware that this man’s character was vile and his misdeeds innumerable, and yet his mouth was always full of Aristotle and his ten katêgoriai. ‘Certainly, Herminus’, he said, ‘you deserve ten katêgoriai’.

Although we are left entirely in the dark as to the nature of Herminus’s alleged moral turpitude, this anecdote is valuable for at least three reasons.

1. In the first instance, it suggests that Herminus’s interest in the Organon, and especially the Categories, was a marked and perhaps well known feature of his character and reputation. Moreover, while the anecdote does not suggest that Lucian expects his audience to know Herminus and his work, it does suggest that Lucian expects his audience to know what the ‘ten categories’ are and to be familiar with both the philosophical and common (legal) senses of katêgoria, i.e., ‘predication’ and (legal) ‘charge’. (In and of itself popular familiarity

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480 On whom see Funk (1907). Demonax is not mentioned by other contemporary writers aside from Lucian, and it has been suggested that he may be a fictive invention of Lucian himself (a suggestion that is taken up in the Penguin Classics edition, Sidwell 2005:12). Against this, it may be noted that various late sources, including Stobaeus, cite sayings of Demonax that are not found in Lucian (see Mullach 1867, Fragmenta).

481 An interesting comparandum is the On the Criterion of Ptolemy, who uses the analogy of the lawcourt to discuss the λογισμὸν of truth. See Long in Huby and Neal (1989), ch. 10, and ch. 11 for text and translation.
with the legal sense is unsurprising, but perhaps familiarity with the technical and philosophical sense is noteworthy).

2. Secondly, as discussed above, the anecdote is helpful for establishing Herminus’s dates, and also perhaps the geographical setting of his philosophical activity: Demonax was primarily active at Athens, and so it is reasonable to suppose that any meeting of Demonax and Herminus should have occurred at Athens. The anecdote also seems to imply that Demonax knew Herminus for some time – long enough, at least, to pass judgement on his alleged faults of character! In addition, even if Demonax was not an historical persona (as some commentators, mentioned in the note above, have suggested), it is nevertheless clear that Lucian associated Herminus with Athens. Moreover, Alexander of Aphrodisias came to Athens in the later second century to take up the chair of Aristotelian philosophy established by Marcus Aurelius; it is plausible, although by no means certain, that he may have heard Herminus at Athens either before or after his own nomination.

3. Finally, the anecdote’s language (διὰ στόματος αὐτοῦ τὰς δέκα κατηγορίας) might suggest that Herminus occasionally used a title like ‘[On] the Ten Categories’ in referring to the book Categories and its doctrines. Alexander uses such a title (he references the text, for example, as ἐν τῷ Περὶ τῶν δέκα κατηγοριῶν at in Top. 65,15). As we shall see (cf. Porphyry 59,17-33 = T3b2, Simplicius in Cat. 62,7-23 = T6i), Herminus placed special weight both on the enumeration of the ten categories and on the avoidance of a title that might wrongly imply that the work concerned genera of being, and not predications significant of genera. But there is strong testimony that Herminus entitled the text Before the Topics (David [Elias], in Cat. 241,30 = T8b) or Predication (Κατηγορία) (Porphyry in Cat. 59,26 = T3b), which we shall discuss below.

We may speculate that Herminus spent some amount of time at Athens, where he gained a reputation of some kind for his lectures in the logical works of Aristotle, and especially the

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482 It is now clear from new evidence that Alexander did hold the official chair in Athens: see Chaniotis (2004) and Sharples (2005b). Previously this supposition rested on a well-known remark in Alexander’s essay On Fate, addressed to the Emperors Septimius Severus and Caracella, that he was nominated as a teacher of Aristotelian philosophy on their recommendation (164,14-15). This ‘nomination’ refers to one of the four philosophy chairs established at Athens in 176 by Marcus Aurelius; compare Dio Cassius 72.31 for the endowment. For previous discussion see, e.g., Sharples (1987 and 1990) and Lynch (1972). Oliver (1981) offers a brief historical discussion of Marcus’s influence in Athens.
doctrine of categories. Regardless of the historicity of other aspects of Lucian’s account, I take it that Herminus must have been (known to be) active at Athens, as was Demonax, in order for Lucian to suppose that his readership would accept their association. (In this case, thanks to Lucian, we have some contemporary evidence that Herminus really did take a special interest in the ‘ten categories’, and that this focus was not merely an artifact of the interests of the later commentators and the voluminous commentary of Simplicius).

Alexander of Aphrodisias was evidently attracted to the lectures of Herminus, perhaps also at Athens, and discusses several of Herminus’s views on the Organon in detail – presumably, as we have noted, reporting from these same lectures.

As for Herminus’s personality, it is rather unfortunate that the only surviving anecdote made him the butt of witty Cynic abuse. It may be the case that Herminus really was a notorious transgressor of common decency, an ‘unprecedentedly bad man, a wreaker of myriad bad deeds’ (παγκάκιστον μὲν οὖν καὶ μυρία κακὰ ἔργαζόμενον) who smoothly escaped the countless legal charges that everyone knew he deserved (ἄξιος εἰ δέξα κατηγοριῶν, 56,6)

In this case, he might justly stand among the most interesting professors of Peripatetic logic to have lived in his age, or in any age. But Lucian’s rampant hyperbole and lack of specificity suggest otherwise: Lucian provides not a single detail to illustrate Herminus’s alleged villainy, although he delights in explicit narrative elsewhere in the text.

Rather, as I have suggested above, the clue to the passage’s intent may lie in the double meaning of the word κατηγορία, on which Lucian wishes to play. Lucian needs a suitable antagonist for Demonax’s clever abuse. Many of his witticisms depend upon an anonymous interlocutor (‘a friend’, ‘a rhetorician’, ‘a senator’, ‘a physical philosopher’), but in this case Lucian requires an individual who will warrant the rather specialized play on words. He sets on a contemporary personage well known for harping on Aristotle’s κατηγορίαι, who had the ill luck to be a contemporary of Demonax and (perhaps) a cohabitant in second-century

483 Against the association with Athens, we might adduce Longinus (T3a), if that text does apply to our Herminus. For Longinus mentions Herminus alongside two Stoic philosophers living at Athens, but he does not suggest that Herminus himself lived at Athens. But he also does not deny that Herminus lived at Athens, and the pattern of symmetry seems to dictate Longinus’s assertion: he names two Platonists, then two ‘Platonic successors at Athens’; then two Stoics followed by two ‘Stoics at Athens’.

484 For a similar philosophers’ exchange, cf. Lucian’s treatment of the eclectic professor Sidonius, whose words are evidently quoted verbatim (14): “‘If Aristotle calls me to the Lyceum, I follow; if Plato calls me to the Academy, I hurry there; if Zeno, I occupy the Stoa; if Pythagoras, I keep silence’.” —Then rose [Demonax] from among the audience: “Sidonius, Pythagoras calls”...
Athens. If Demonax is himself a fiction, as some have suggested, then this hypothesis seems all the more fair; but I think it is the most plausible explanation regardless of his historicity. (If Demonax is historical, one could try to tease out some sense of an historical rivalry lurking beneath the tale – the Cynic bursting into the Peripatetic’s lecture hall and hurling ironically homonymous abuse at the lectern – but this is likely wishful thinking).

Aside from the passages discussed above, we can deduce little indeed about Herminus’s life. The evidence of the Arabic Alexander Against Galen (T2ab) is certainly suggestive that Galen viewed Herminus as an authority of some kind on Aristotle’s Physics, and perhaps especially the doctrine of motion. It might also be deduced that Herminus was not (in Galen’s view) expected to endorse the views that Galen presented (although as we have seen above, there is also no evidence that he circulated a rebuttal). A special interest in motion may also be detected in Herminus’s views on the De Caelo. Specifically, he asserted that the spheres of heaven, or at least the fixed stars, possess a soul that ensures their eternal rotation (Simplic. 380,1-4 = T6a: τοῦ εἰς ἄπειρον αὐτὸ κινεῖσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν ἔλεγε αἰτίαν). Zeller (III 1: 806 n. and 812 and following) took this view to derive from Plato, but Gottschalk, followed by Sharples (1997:171 n. 39), has persuasively argued that the doctrine could equally well derive from Aristotle (e.g. Cael. 285a29 and 292a18) and from Theophrastus (Met. 5b2), and so represent an authentically Aristotelian position.

III. On the Categories

The general goal of this treatment will be to understand the reason why Herminus advanced for the Categories the skopos, or aim, that he did. This formulation was provisionally accepted by Porphyry (perhaps with subsequent modifications, as we shall find) and, once transmitted by Porphyry, arrived into the mainstream of the later ancient commentary tradition, where it was defended by Dexippus, Ammonius, Simplicius, Philoponus (9,34-10,8; 12,10-11), Olympiodorus (Proleg. in Cat. 21,17-22,1), and David [Elias] (131,15-132,4), among others.\footnote{On the structural role of the skopos in the Alexandrian and Athenian commentaries, see both Hadot (1991) and Chase (2003).} Indeed, as I shall suggest below, these sources all narrate a ‘history of debate’ on the skopos of the Categories that may be viewed as a framework designed by Porphyry to validate Herminus’s view (and, through Herminus, that of Boethus), and to facilitate the representation of Herminus’s view as a just and complete summation of what has gone before. I also suggest that Herminus’s view, mediated through Porphyry and

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Alexander, was significantly reinterpreted by Iamblichus, and that some confusions between
the traditions of Simplicius and the Alexandrians (especially Olympiodorus) arise from this
reinterpretation.

The present section (III) focuses primarily on the fragments explicitly deriving from
Herminus’s remarks on the Categories, which, as we shall find, may have been mediated by
Alexander. The following section (IV) explores Herminus’s approach to Aristotle’s definition
of the second figure of the syllogism, as a proposed case study of his mediation by Alexander
(in An. Pr. I 76,26 and following = T2c) and the practical application of his view that names,
including the outer terms of a syllogism, are ‘naturally’ significant of realities. Section IV will
also consider Herminus’s two recorded statements on differentiae, namely, that only divisive
differentiae are properly ‘differentiae’ (Simplic. in Cat. 55,22 = T6f) and (in commenting on
Cat. 1b16-24) that differentiae may differ with respect to a species yet still be the same with
respect to a genus (Simplic. in Cat. 57,22-58,2 = T6g and 58,20 = T6h).

In section III, we will primarily consider the following ideas that are ascribed to Herminus:

(1) Herminus’s formulation of the skopos of the Categories as concerning ‘spoken sounds
(phônai) that signify realities, insofar as [these expressions] are significant’, following
Boethus of Sidon (Porphyry in Cat. 59,17-33 = T3c; Boethius in Int. [2] 1.1, 37,30-40,28 =
T4b; Ammonius in Int. 8,20 and in Int. 24,18-21 = T5b; Simplicius in Cat. 13,16 = T6d;
Olympiodorus in Cat. 18,30-19,30 = T7; David [Elias] in Cat. 241,30 = T8b; Arethas in Cat.
241,10 = T9). (This discussion was primarily completed in the first sub-chapter to the
general introduction, I.1, and will only be briefly referenced here).

(2) Herminus’s assertion that the ten categories of Aristotle are properly described (perhaps
even defined) by a process of ‘enumeration’ (aparithmêsis), and not as a division under a
genus nor as a partitioning (merismos) (Simplic. in Cat. 62,7-23 = T6i; cf. the anonymous in
Hermogenem, 863,3 = T10).

(3) The title preferred by Herminus for the Categories, namely, ‘Before the Topics’ (cf. David
[Elias] 241,30 = T8b) or Katêgoria (cf. Porphyry, in Cat. 59,17-33 = T3b).

Some fragments included in the Appendix of Texts will not be directly considered here, including
(4) Herminus’s response to the aporia that Quantity admits of contrariety in place and time (Porphyry
in Cat. 107,25-26 = T3d) and (5) Herminus’s view that Aristotle refers to mathematical body at Cat.
5a5, where he states that the parts of a plane are limited by a line, the parts of a solid by a plane
(Porphyry ap. Simplic. in Cat. 124,33 = T6j).

7. Herminus

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Thesis Submitted for the D.Phil.
Herminus’s reading of a text with tès ousias at Cat. 1a2 (Simplic. in Cat. 30,6 = T6e).

1. On the skopos of the Categories

In the first chapter of this study, I reviewed the skopos of the Categories focusing on Herminus as a case-study, and also argued for his important role in its formulation. I compared the language early in Porphyry in Cat. = T3b1 and the subsequent reliance of Herminus (59,17-33 = T3b2) upon its claims, and argued that the forefather of the ‘conceptless’ account of signification (which I referred to as β) was Herminus, resurrecting the view of Boethus against Athenodorus and Cornutus. Herminus, as we note below (T2d), already maintained that the outer terms of the Aristotelian syllogism signified their objects φύσει, and questioned the account of De Int. 1a1-8 and raised aporiai about the role of νοήματα in mediating language (Boethius in Int. [2] 1.1, 37,30-40,28 = Porphyry no 81F Smith), suggesting that he at least considered a position that appeared ‘Stoicising’ in the later tradition (cf. [Ammonius] in An. Pr. 17,24-28). In this case, I have suggested, the original application of the ‘double imposition’ theory to the organization of Aristotle’s text, and especially its defense against the linguistic argument of Athenodorus and Cornutus, may be attributable to Herminus, drawing on an older tradition.

2. The enumeration of ten categories

The enumeration of ‘ten katêgoriai’ sheds some light on the concept of ‘natural significance’ in Herminus, as well as his reasoning for interpreting the Categories as located pedagogically early in the reading of Aristotle, being ‘for the young’ – a view taken over by Porphyry. In brief, Herminus places a great deal of weight on the ‘uncountability’ of particulars, and, therefore, the ‘unknowability’ of particulars. In this he follows Aristotle, or at least a certain interpretation of Aristotle (especially Post. An.) and discusses in detail why ‘the young’ need to study the Organon in order to attain any kind of knowledge at all.

Both in his treatment of the second figure of the syllogism, and in his treatment of the skopos of the Categories, Herminus postulates ten katêgoriai, just because there are ten highest genera of species that these highest genera of predications signify (cf. S. in Cat. 62,7-23 = T6i). For Herminus, simple terms signify beings ‘by nature’ (Alex. in An. Pr. I72,17 = T2c; cf. Porph. in Cat. 59,20), and this signification is one-to-one in the case of individuals.

487 Cf. Adamson (2005) on Avicennan interpretation, which, it seems to me, takes a similar line.
(ἕκαστη γὰρ κατὰ ἀριθμὸν σημαίνει <ἐν> τῶν ὄντων, Porph. 58,9 = T3b1). But individual beings and terms are ‘practically infinite’ (ἀπειρα μὲν σχεδὸν καὶ τὰ πράγματα καὶ αἱ λέξεις κατὰ ἀριθμοῦ, 58,7-8); we may extrapolate that the sum of all particulars cannot be counted in practice (cp. ἀπαρίθμησις, T6i). But ‘what is many in number is one in species and genus’ (58,10). From this, in Porphyry’s report, follows the assertion that ‘the infinity of beings, and [the infinity] of expressions that signify them, are found to be embraced into ten genera, into the written [list]’ (ἡ ἀπειρία τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν σημαινουσῶν αὐτὰ λέξεων εἰς δέκα γένη εὑρεται περιλαμβανομένη εἰς τὸ γράφεσθαι, 58,10-12).

Herminus believed (although he was not, as we shall see, absolutely confident in the number) that the count of ten predications could be licensed by the count of ten genera. So Simplicius preserves a remark of Herminus that appears to state this dependence explicitly (62,17-23 = T6i): 490

ο δὲ Ἑρμῖνος ἀμφιβάλλοντι ἐοίκεν, εἰ τοσαῦτά ἐστιν τὰ γένη· γράφει γοῦν οὕτως· "διὸ εἰ μὲν μόνων τῶν λεχθησομένων εἰσίν αἱ σημασίαι, τοσαῦτα ἄν εἰ ἡ τὰ πρῶτα γένη τοσαῦτα τε καὶ αἱ κατηγορίαι· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα παρ᾽ αὐτά, οὐδὲ ἐξείναι ὁ λόγος διωθεῖται".

Herminus... seems to be uncertain as to where there is [just] this number of genera; at any rate, he writes as follows: ‘Therefore, if meanings (sêmasiai) are only of the things which are going to be mentioned, however many primary genera there may be, there will be [just] that many categories. If, however, there are others besides them, then the line of reasoning (logos) does not reject them, either’.

488 For Aristotle’s own view, see Topics 8.33 (there is ‘a finite number of species subordinate to each genus’) and especially Soph. El. 165a10-12 (‘names are finite, and so is the number of expressions; but objects are infinite in number’). Barnes (2003:126-28) discusses these passages and others, and notes that Porphyry took a different line on the finiteness of names. On my view, Herminus did so as well. The later tradition would continue to take a serious interest in this problem; as Adamson (2005) points out, Avicenna’s claim that there is no such thing as ‘knowledge of particulars’, and that God knows them ‘universally’, is also rooted in the Posterior Analytics.

489 The double εἰς... εἰς troubles me; I am not sure if there is a better translation of the passage, or if something is wrong with it. Strange (1992:34) translates: ‘The infinity of beings and of the expressions that signify them is found to be included under a list of ten genera’, and adds a note: ‘If this is the sense of perilamabanomenê εις to graphesthai at 58,13-14’. I wonder if εἰς δέκα γένη was originally a gloss on the less obvious εἰς τὸ γράφεσθαι, and we should simply render ‘... into the [list, sc. of ten genera] that is written’.

490 On which see Moraux II, 369-70.
But how, as Simplicius inquired, does one arrive at the number of ten? More to the point, how does Herminus believe that Aristotle arrive at this number?\textsuperscript{491} Shortly before this fragment, Simplicius discusses reasons why it cannot be a \textit{diairesis} (neither as a genus into species, nor a whole into parts), because there is nothing common to the ten categories. The justification against \textit{diairesis} is also given by Dexippus (39,13-15), drawing on Iamblichus (see below).

The first view suggested by Simplicius is that the ten categories are divided ‘like soldiers drawn up according to \textit{lokhoi}, so that just as a captain leads a company, so substance is the leader of substances, and each of the other [categories] leads the multitude assigned to it’. Dexippus 39,16-19 reports a similar view. This suggestion is not sourced.\textsuperscript{492}

The second view, which Simplicius associates with Iamblichus, rejects the ‘company of soldiers’ interpretation, on the grounds that commonality must exist between the primary genera, facilitating ‘continuity and interconnection of the cosmic order’. Rather than splitting them up like companies, therefore, it is better to distinguish them by their ‘primary \textit{idiotêtai}’, and liken the genera to things that share a focal meaning (‘from one and in relation to one’) to the extent that their accidents all arise in \textit{ousia} and are arrayed in \textit{ousia}.

At this point, Herminus is cited as maintaining a third position (62,7-9 = \textit{T6i}):

\begin{quote}
\textquote{ὁ δὲ Ἑρμῖνος “ἀπαρίθμησις οὖν ἐστιν, φησίν, καὶ οὔτε διαίρεσις οὔτε μερισμός· οὔδεν γὰρ ὅλον ἐπ’ αὐτῶν οὔτε ὃς γένος οὔτε ἄλλον τρόπον ὅλον”}.
\end{quote}

Herminus, however, says, ‘it is thus neither a division (\textit{diairesis}) nor a partition (\textit{merismos}), but an enumeration (\textit{aparithmēsis}), for there is no whole in their case, neither in the sense of a genus, nor is there any other kind of whole.

\textsuperscript{491} This problem is also discussed by contemporary commentators. Ackrill (1968:78-81) explores several options for how Aristotle arrived at the list. Fraser (2003) places the problem in the context of the commentary tradition, especially with regard to the \textit{order} of the ten.

\textsuperscript{492} The analogy likely is an echo of \textit{Met.} 12.10, 1075a14 and following. In a 1974 paper (repr. in Sorabji 1990), Pierre Hadot argued that the source of the answering passage of Dexippus was Porphyry, and that it would stand to reason for Porphyry to precede Iamblichus here. However, M. Chase (143, comparing 71,17 and 91,14-33) also suggests that this passage and Dexippus may derive from Iamblichus’s interpretation of Archytas.
Herminus would then be the ultimate source, via Alexander and (I think) Iamblichus, of Simplicius’s refutation of the possibility that the ten categories may constitute a ‘division’ or ‘partition’ of a genus or whole. Certainly Herminus argued against these ideas, as this passage shows; and as we noticed above, in the treatment of the second figure of the syllogism ascribed to him by Alexander, his view is broadly founded on the assumption that the highest (ten) predications correspond to the highest genera, and that there are no genera over them.

Curiously, Simplicius passes by Herminus’s view without direct comment, and responds to Iamblichus instead, using Herminus’s language for ‘enumeration’ (ἀπαρίθμησιν, 62,11; see also 68,16, where Iamblichus defends the ‘enumeration’ of ten categories). The shared vocabulary might suggest that Iamblichus is the source for Herminus here, and took his start for the present argument from Herminus’s concept of ‘enumeration’.

Why did Herminus maintain that the ten predications could be described by ἀπαρίθμησις and not by μερισμός? What did the word ‘enumeration’ signify in this context? First, it may be useful to review the uses of ἀπαρίθμησις, and try to get clear about its range of applicability in this context, particularly in the later second century. The verb ἀπαριθμέω has a classical and intuitive force of ‘inventory’ or ‘count’. Its classical uses in philosophical texts are few and far between; it does not appear in Aristotle. It seems to have come into its own as a philosophical term in the second century, and during Herminus’s own lifetime. Compare, for example, the following passage of Hermogenes, who is attempting a schematic taxonomy of types of style, and here discusses ‘distinctness’ or eukrineia (Περὶ ἱδεῶν 1.4, 87-92):

Σχήματα μὴν εὐχρινείας τὸ κατ’ ἄθροισιν ὀρισμένον, οἷον ἕνταυθοι δύο εἶρημε, τόδε καὶ τόδε’. οὔτε γὰρ ἀπήτησεν ὁ ἁκούων πλείονα τῶν

493 Simplicius comments in response to Iamblichus that it is ‘from being’, not ‘from the one’, that the categories describe focally; and he also points out that in the Metaphysics (6.2, 1026a33 and following; see also 12.10) Aristotle has the ten produced ‘as if from one thing’, namely being.

494 Found for example in Thucydides and Xenophon. There is a rather charming sentence in Thucydides 5.20.2 that mentions the ‘signification of the aparitмы̄sis of names’ (σημαινόντων τὴν ἀπαρίθμησιν τῶν ὀνομάτων); alas, there is nothing especially philosophic about the catalogues of archons.

495 Excepting the fragment attributed to Aristotle by Socrates, historian of the church (3,23): ὅν τοὺς ἀφενικός καὶ θηλικώς ἔρωτας καὶ ἀπαρίθμησιμον... In any case, this is not directly relevant to the philosophical force discussed below.
The figures of *eukrineia* [include] being *defined by collection* (*kat’ athroisin hòrismenon*), as [one might say] ‘Here he said two things, *this* and *that*’.... [Two] such figures [sc. figures of definition by collection] are *merismos* and *aparithmèsis*.

Although Hermogenes and Herminus were clearly operating in different contexts,496 I think there is some relevance in Hermogenes’s taxonomic distinction between *μερισμός* and *ἀπαρίθμησις* as two different species of *definition* that can be described under the common genus of *κατ’ ἀθροίσιν ὡρισμένον*. If one could divide figures of style in this way, the same taxonomic approach could, I take it, apply in other fields of study.

A roughly contemporary text from Sextus Empiricus (*PH* 3.262) suggests how one might argue for the applicability of enumeration in our particular case, namely, to find the *full number* of the ten predications by enumeration:

οὐ γὰρ δὴ πῶς τὴν ἐξαρίθμησιν τῶν θεωρημάτων ἑκάστης τεχνῆς ἑπίσταται τις, ὅστε ἀπαριθμησόμενος τα ἐγνωσμένα θεωρήματα, πόσα λείπεται (5) πρὸς τὸν πλήρη τῶν θεωρημάτων τῆς τέχνης ὁριθμὸν εἰπεῖν ἔχειν.

No one, to be sure, has such a knowledge of the *exarithmèsis* of the branches of each art as to be able to say, *by enumerating them* (*aparithmêsantos*), how many are needed to make up the *full number* of the branches of the art (*ton plêrê tôn theôramatôn tês tekhnês*).

Sextus, in this context, suggests that one needs (and cannot have) prior *knowledge* of a vast count of objects in order to conduct an enumeration – as the number is so large. From this point of view, it is interesting to compare the remarks of Porphyry in *Cat.* 58.5-14, which (as I have argued above) seem to reflect Herminus’s views:

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496 Notably, Syrianus (*in Herm.* 35.14-17) comments on this same passage of Hermogenes and mentions predication (*τοιαύτα δὲ σχήματα καὶ ὁ μερισμός καὶ ἡ ἀπαρίθμησις*’ οἶον ’ἐὰν μὲν οὖν περὶ ᾧν ἐδίωκε μόνον κατηγόρησεν Αἰσχίνης’ καὶ ’τρία γὰρ τὰ μέγιστα ὀνείδη κτάται, φθονεροὺς ἀπίστους ὀμοίωσις εἶναι δοκεῖν’). It is perhaps of some very peripheral interest that Herminus is mentioned in one of the anonymous commentaries on the *περὶ ἰδεῶν* (Walz 1834, *Rhetores Graeci* 7.2, Stuttgart: Cotta, repr. 1968: 862,31 = T10), but the citation suggests nothing about Herminus’s interest in Hermogenes; in fact, it is largely a recollection of Herminus’s views on the *De Int.* and *Cat.*, applied to the *skopos* of Hermogenes by the anonymous commentator.
Things and expressions are practically infinite in number (kat’ arithmon). But his intention is not to list expressions one by one – for each one signifies one particular being – but since things that are many in number are one in species or in genus, the infinity of beings and of the expressions that signify them is found to be included under a list of ten genera.

One might imagine Herminus making the case that the highest genera are practically countable, even if the vast array of individuals are not, provided that one has some distinct prolépsis of the highest genera (cf. Porph. in Cat. 59,27, which he ascribes to Herminus).

There is a direct remark from Aristotle that seems to bear on the concern about whether one could possibly find the ‘common term’ (Post. An. 2.13, 97a6-11):

There is no need for one who is defining and dividing to know all the things that are. And yet some say that it is impossible to know the differences between something and each other thing while one does not know each other thing, and without the differences one cannot know each thing, for a thing is the same as that from which it does not differ, and it is other than that from which it differs.

Later than Sextus, we notice the word ‘enumeration’ being used in the Neoplatonic commentaries on Porphyry’s Isagoge and on the Categories itself. In Ammonius, one ‘enumerates’ the significations of ‘dog’, thus dealing with its homonymy (Ammon. in Isag. 49,3). Similarly, one ‘enumerates’ the significations of ‘genus’ (Ammon. 49,5; 53,5; 54,3) or of ‘differentiae’ (Ammon. 92,1). And, most directly relevant to our passage, one ‘enumerates’ the senses of the ten categories (Ammon. in Cat. 25,4). We might deduce from Simplicius that this way of talking can be traced back to Herminus.

Another interesting comparison, and one closer to home, is found in Alexander’s comments on Aristotle’s discussion of definition early in Topics 6 (in Top. 424,21-425,13, on the lemmata ‘Μάλιστα δ’ ἐνδέχεται τὸ τοιοῦτον ποιεῖν λανθανούσης τῆς ὁμωνυμίας’ and ‘ἐν τῷ ὀρισμῷ, συλλογισμὸν ποιῆσαι’, Top. 6.2, 139b27-32). If an interlocutor’s attempt at definition turns on a subject with several homonymous senses, but the homonymy goes undetected by the interlocutor (λανθανούσης τῆς ὁμωνυμίας), one can object that the offered description does not fit all possibilities. Then it is up to the interlocutor himself to attempt a distinction of the possible meanings of the subject in the definition. Alexander remarks on this latter process as an ἀπαρίθμησιν τῶν σημαινόμενον (425,8). This usage may seem rather trivial, but in connection with the Neoplatonic passages and the second-
century passages cited above, I think it is useful for our purposes: we can begin to see a
certain usage of the word *aparithmêsis* for a process of counting that produces a certain kind
of *horismos* of things that are homonymous, provided they are countable. The resulting
force of *aparithmêsis* is not unlike the modern (intuitive and philosophical) sense of a ‘set’ as
*any* collection of unique items that can be *counted*.

Several further comparanda, I think, could be given to support this interpretation, although
most of them are late antique and basically of the character cited among the passages of
Ammonius above. A final *contemporary* comparison for Herminus’s usage comes in a
different passage of Alexander (*in Met.* 466,34 ff. = T2i) in which he is commenting on
*Metaphysics Z* (the lemma is 1029b12: Ὑπὸ πρῶτον εἴπωμεν ἕνα περὶ αὐτοῦ λογικῶς...);
this too concerns (rather famously) the problem of definition. Here Aristotle notes that he has
already distinguished the ways in which *ousia* may be defined (διειλόμεθα πόσους ὁρίζουμεν
τὴν οὕσιαν), and states that he will begin by speaking ‘logically’ (λογικῶς) about the
question how it is defined by *essence* (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι).\(^{497}\) Aristotle goes on to state that ‘there
are compounds in the other categories [sc. aside from *ousia*], as there is a subject for *each*
category, e.g., quality, quantity, time, place, and motion’ (22-25), and inquires whether
compounds like ‘pale man’ (οἷον λευκῷ ἄνθρώπῳ, 27) have an essential formula (Ἄρ’ ἐστι
λόγος τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι ἐκάστῳ αὐτῶν, 25-26). Aristotle goes on to state that essence
belongs only to species (οὐχ ἔσται ἀρα οὖν διὰ τῶν μὴ γένους εἰδῶν ὑπάρχον τὸ τί ἦν
εἶναι, 1030a12-13).

In analysing this passage, Alexander repeats several times that Aristotle calls any definition ‘a
certain statement of a reality (*pragma*) and enumeration (*aparithmêsis*) of its parts’ (ὁ δὲ
ὁρισμὸς ἀνάπτυξις τις τοῦ πρᾶγματος καὶ ἀπαρίθμησις τῶν αὐτοῦ μερῶν, 467,11-12;
cf. ἀνάπτυξις καὶ ἀπαρίθμησις, 471,21; ἀνάπτυξιν καὶ ἀπαρίθμησιν ἔχει τινών
συνιστώντων εἴδος, 471,34; τὴν ἀνάπλωσιν καὶ ἀπαρίθμησιν τῶν εἰς σύστασιν τῶν
ὄριστῶν, 479,23). The ‘parts’ of a species so enumerated (ἀπαρίθμησιν τῶν ἐξ ὧν
σύγχρεται τὸ εἴδος μερῶν νόησιν, 467,9) would be the differentiae that distinguish it within

\(^{497}\) For discussion of the translation ‘logically’, see Bostock (1994) ad loc. Aristotle’s theory of
definition in *Z* is, obviously, an enormous and fruitful field of study; here I will just briefly note some
relevant points in Alexander’s commentary. On the relevant lemmata, Frede and Patzig (1988)
provided a now classic discussion; see also, among many, Bostock (1994, commentary ad loc.),
Frede (1990), and Heinaman (1997), and general discussion in Wedin (2000). It might also be
mentioned that Bonitz, followed by subsequent editors, transposed several lines leading up to 13
before 1; it is not immediately clear to me whether Alexander’s text had the transposition or not.
the genus. Thus one can produce a definition, at least, of a species like ‘man’, by providing the genus and ‘enumerating’ a string of differentiae. While this has nothing to do with counting up *genera*, it shows how ‘enumeration’ might be used simply to count up the differentiae of an entity.

An hypothesis, based on all of these comparisons, might run as follows: Herminus, believing that terms signified beings and the highest categories signified the highest genera, also believed that someone having a *prolēpsis* of the genera themselves (cf. Porphyry, *in Cat*. 59,17-33 = T3c) could ‘count them up’, and that the enumeration arising from the counting would qualify as a kind of definition.

3. Text: *Logos tês ousias*

Simplicius, drawing on Porphyry (cf. 29,29; 30,5), reports that Boethus and Andronicus did not read τῆς οὐσίας at *Cat*. 1a2; Porphyry deduced this from the fact that Boethus makes no mention of it in his ‘word for word’ commentary (ὁ Βόηθος ἔχει αὐτὴν λέξιν τῆς τῆς οὐσίας παραλέλοιπεν ὡς οὐδὲ γεγραμμένον, 30,2-3), and it does not appear in Andronicus’s *paraphrasis* (30,3-4). Simplicius tells us about this omission, again presumably drawing on Porphyry, because Nicostratus (οἱ περὶ τὸν Νικόστρατον, 29,24-25) raised the problem that Aristotle appears to exclude the non-substance categories from his account of homonymy, judging by the definition *logos tês ousias* at 1a2. One solution to Nicostratus’s dilemma, then, would be to follow Boethus and Andronicus in simply omitting *tês ousias*, so that *logos* could apply to any of the categories (on Nicostratus’s line of thinking). But Porphyry objects that we cannot take this easy way out, because Herminus and almost everyone else (καὶ Ἑρμῖνος καὶ σχεδὸν οἱ πλεῖστοι, 30,6) read *tês ousias*, and this compels us to do so as well (ἀναγκαίαν λέγομεν τὴν προσθήκην, 30,7).

This passage raises quite a few interesting points. For one, it seems plain from Simplicius’s language, reporting Porphyry, that Andronicus and Boethus made no explicit argument against the text that had τῆς οὐσίας; it simply makes no appearance in their respective commentaries on the line, and Porphyry or his source deduces, evidently, that such an omission in a commentary *kata lexin* and a *paraphrasis* implies that the words simply didn’t appear. This may tell us something useful about the close textual character of Boethus’s and Andronicus’s respective commentaries. The character of the omission also shows that
Boethus and Andronicus were not aware of the objections promoted by Nicostratus, as we should expect.

Another interesting point is Porphyry’s insistence that the agreement of Herminus and others necessitates the acceptance of τῆς οὐσίας into the canonical text. This very plainly shows that Andronicus’s text was not ‘authorititative’, and indeed there is no special comment from Porphyry or Simplicius on the divergence from Andronicus’s text, as one might suppose if they thought they were elsewhere following his ‘edition’ comprising his readings. Rather it is Herminus who is mentioned as a key authority, speaking for the majority consensus (σχεδὸν οἱ πλείοστοι). We might speculate that it is Alexander, behind Porphyry, who introduces the name of Herminus here in accepting the reading, and again that a lecture of Herminus lies behind the whole story.

4. Title

What did Herminus call our text? The question of the title, as we have seen, carries general significance; Andronicus already believed that it was necessary to defend the title ‘Categories’ against someone who called the text ‘Before the Topics’, perhaps in order to maintain the systematic order of subjects in Cat.–De Int.–Prior Analytics... And Adrastus would later defend the title ‘Before the Topics’ (see the brief sub-chapter on second-century figures and Adrastus), although his view did not prevail. Simplicius records several sides of the debate, which appears to have continued well into the second century.498

David [Elias] states that Herminus entitled the text Before the Topics (David [Elias], in Cat. 241,30 = T8b). But Porphyry appears to state that Herminus called it Predication (Κατηγορία) (Porphyry in Cat. 59,26 = T3c). If the two passages conflict, we might suppose that Porphyry carries more weight. He is, of course, by far the earlier source, and we have reason to suppose that much or all of the information in David and his immediate sources derives from Porphyry’s longer commentary. Moreover, in this passage of Porphyry we have what appears to be the ipsissima verba, or at least a close paraphrase, of Herminus himself, including a detailed argument for why one should call the Categories Κατηγορία (also licensing the title Περὶ δέκα γενών, provided it is correctly interpreted).

That said, there may be a more nuanced interpretation of the Porphyry text (T3c) available to us. The two texts, Porphyry and Elias, stop short of claiming that Herminus endorsed this title and no other, and do not suggest that Herminus proposed either title in the context of refuting some other view about the title. Indeed, the Porphyry passage already shows that Herminus was prepared to entertain more than one title. According to Porphyry, Herminus explained the title ‘Category’ by describing how the Categories is about ‘predications’ (διὰ τούτο δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐπιγραφὴ Κατηγορία, δηλωτικὴ οὐδα τῆς ἐκάστῳ γένει συνημμένης οἰκείας σημασίας); and he subsequently explained the title ‘On the Ten Genê’ (Περὶ δέκα γενών), which he does not take to be incorrect, even if it is a little misleading. Similarly, according to David (T8b), Herminus explained the title ‘Before the Topics’ by describing how the Categories is a ‘dialectical’ work (Ἑρμῖνος δὲ ὁ Πρὸ τῶν τόπων ἐπιγράψας τὰς Κατηγορίας αἰτίας λέγει τοιαύτην διαλεκτικὴν προκειμένην πραγματείαν). It may well be that we have here a fragment of Herminus’s discussion of the different titles proposed for the Categories, perhaps preserved by Alexander; Herminus may well have settled on one himself, but he gives reasons in favour of at least three leading examples, Κατηγορία, Πρὸ τῶν τόπων, Περὶ δέκα γενών.

It may be noted that Alexander references the work as Περὶ τῶν δέκα κατηγοριῶν at in Top. 65,15.

IV. On the Syllogism (Alex. in An. Pr. I 72,26 ff.) and Differentiae

A natural, if daunting, entry point into Herminus’s views on the syllogism is his commentary on Prior Analytics 26b34-39 (specifically on the lemma μεῖζον δὲ ἄκρον τὸ πρὸς τῷ μέσῳ κείμενον at lines 37-38), which is preserved by Alexander of Aphrodisias in a single forty-
Alexander goes on to reject Herminus’s interpretation, and much of the apparatus it entails, as a ‘waste of time’ (πρὸς τῷ περιεργίαν ἔχειν, 74,5). Herminus’s view has been noted by modern commentators on the Analytics and on Alexander, who tend to share Alexander’s assessment of its exegetical and philosophical value; indeed, its elaboration has contributed something to Herminus’s reputation for narrow-mindedness and baroque complexity. But some modern readers have found considerable historical interest in this excerpt. Indeed, Bochenski characterised it as ‘un des passages les plus instructifs sur la mentalité péripatétitienne que nous connaissons’ (1947: 64 n. 218). For our purposes, this passage is especially relevant for its illustration of Herminus’s application of the concepts in his fragments on the Categories, especially the ‘natural’ signification of things by names.

The lemma is the beginning of Prior Analytics 1.5, 26b34-39, in which Aristotle seeks to define the second figure (σχῆμα) of the syllogism. The opening account runs as follows (I give the Greek followed by the annotated English translation in Patzig 1968):

(a) Ὄταν δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ μὲν παντὶ τῷ δὲ μηδενὶ ὑπάρχῃ, ἢ ἕκαστέρῳ παντὶ ἢ μηδενὶ, τὸ μὲν σχῆμα τὸ τοιοῦτον (35) καλῶ δεύτερον, (b) μέσον δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ λέγω τὸ κατηγορούμενον ἀμφὶ, ἄκρα δὲ καθ’ ὅν λέγεται τούτῳ, (c) μεῖζον δὲ ἄκρον τὸ πρὸς τῷ μέσῳ κείμενον· ἐλαττὸν δὲ τὸ πορρωτέρῳ τοῦ μέσου. (d) τίθεται δὲ τὸ μέσον ἔξω μὲν τῶν ἄκρων, πρῶτον δὲ τῇ θέσει.

On Alexander’s commentary on Prior Analytics I, see in general the translation and notes of Barnes et al. (1991) and the broad treatment of Flannery (1995). On this passage, see in particular Barnes et al. (1991) ad loc., Łukasiewicz (1951:30-32), and Patzig (1968:118-22, and generally 100-27). My discussion of the logical problems presented by this specific Aristotelian passage, as will be evident, is indebted to Patzig, while my discussion of Herminus’s reading builds on Barnes et al. and Łukasiewicz. Alternatives to the interpretation of categorial syllogistic shared by Patzig and Łukasiewicz has been expounded by Corcoran (1972, 1974) and Smiley (1973), followed by Corcoran and Scanlan (1982) and Corcoran (1994). For more contrasts to the views of Patzig and Łukasiewicz on the Prior Analytics and their criticism of the ‘ontological’ (and ‘extensional’) interpretation of the syllogism and of Prantl and Meier, I have used Harari (2004), 63-81; De Rijk (2002), 563-64; Smiley (1973); and Corcoran (1974). For our purposes here, however, I will not be primarily exploring the ‘true’ reading of the Aristotelian text, but what light Herminus’s reading of it can shed on his position with respect to the Categories.

Barnes et al. (1991), in commenting on the texts below, bear witness in support of Alexander’s disparagement of Herminus’s complex elaboration. On alternative interpretations of the Aristotelian passage, see Patzig (1968), 118-27.

Patzig (1968), 100, tr. Barnes.

Thesis Submitted for the D.Phil.
(a) But when the same [term] belongs to all the one and none of the other, or to all of both or to none of both [i.e., \(\text{BeA} \& \text{BeC}; \text{BeA} \& \text{BaC}; \text{BaA} \& \text{BaC}; \text{BeA} \& \text{BeC}\)]\(^{502}\) I call such a figure the second. (b) In this figure [I call] middle that [term] which is said of both [the other terms] and outer those [terms] of which it is said. (c) [I call] greater outer that [term] which lies next to the middle, less that which is further away from the middle. (d) But the middle [term in this figure] is outside the outer [terms] and first in position (thesis).

The difficulty discussed by Alexander (72,17-75,9) arose from the phrases marked (b), (c), (d) above. In (b), Aristotle defines the ‘middle’ term as that which is predicated of both premises of the syllogism, while the ‘outer’ terms occur as subjects in the two premises. But how are we to tell the outer terms apart from one another? That is, how can we distinguish which term is major and which is minor? Suppose (to use the example employed by Herminus) that the outer terms are ‘bird’ and ‘man’. It seems that we cannot discern which is the major term, because ‘no bird is a man’ is just as true as ‘no man is a bird’.

Łukasiewicz explains the problem as follows (30-31):

All the moods of this figure have a negative conclusion and the first two moods, called later Cesare and Camestres, yield a universal negative conclusion. From the premisses ‘\(M\) belongs to all \(N\)’ and ‘\(M\) belongs to no \(X\)’ follows the conclusion ‘\(X\) belongs to no \(N\)’, and by conversion of this result we get a second conclusion, ‘\(N\) belongs to no \(X\)’. In both syllogisms \(M\) is the middle term; but how are we to decide which of the two remaining terms, \(N\) and \(X\), is the major term and which is the minor?

In Alexander’s treatment, this problem is surveyed as an aspect of the broader question whether major and minor terms in the second figure exist by nature (φύσει) or merely by convention (θέσις).\(^{503}\) Thus Alexander introduces the lemma, and the problem, as follows (72,17):

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\(^{502}\) In this definition, as Patzig points out, Aristotle appears to be concerned strictly with combinations of universal premises. The premises of Festino and Baroco are absent, while the last two possible examples that could be deduced from the ‘rule’ (26b34-35) are not valid syllogisms.

\(^{503}\) The problem whether names are imposed by nature (φύσει) or by θέσις, which Alexander echoes here, seems to have been formulated by Stoics, Epicureans, and Platonists with reference to the Cratylus (421C-425C). See recently Allen (2005), Long (2005), and Ebbesen (2005). On the Stoic view see also Sedley (1998), Fredé (1989:2088-89 and 1987:301-62), and Boys-Stones (2001). I discuss this issue in more detail below under T3b (Porphyry’s ‘double imposition’ of names in Cat. 57.20-59.33). With respect to the present passage, Patzig (1968), 119 suggests that the very presence of the word θέσις in Aristotle’s definition of the middle term (1.4, 25b36) might have ‘reminded the commentators of the opposition between thesis and physis’.

Thesis Submitted for the D.Phil.
Alexander reports differing views on the question as applied to the second figure, which would go on to a fruitful posterity in later commentators, and especially in John Philoponus (in An. Pr. 67,18-68,8 and 87,10-19).504 But he opens the discussion with a detailed report of Herminus’s solution, which shows, among other things, that Herminus accounted for the majority and minority of terms as natural (φύσει) and not conventional.505 We find a similar view throughout the fragments of Herminus in Cat. (discussed below).

Before proceeding further, it will be useful to outline the text of Herminus’s argument (T2c) in full. The long sentence is often difficult to construe.506 I provide a brief structural outline here.

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<td>Herminus</td>
<td>τὸ μὲν οὖν λέγειν, ὡς Ἑρμῖνος οἴεται, ἐν δευτέρῳ σχήματι τὸν μείζονα ἄκρον εἶναι, ἐὰν μὲν ἀμφότεροι ὁμογενείς ὤσιν, ὥν ὁ μέσος κατηγορεῖται,</td>
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<tr>
<td>(1) If the two outer terms (A, C) belong to the same genus (are ὁμογενεῖς), then:</td>
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504 Łukasiewicz (1951:30-32) discusses Herminus’s solution as well as Alexander’s and Philoponus’s, and suggests that the problem was settled only after Alexander, with Philoponus, adding that ‘what John Philoponus writes on the subject deserves to be regarded as a classic’ (32). On the other hand, as Patzig (1968: 121 n. 41) points out, Alexander (75,11) mentions other contemporaries or predecessors (τινὲς) who arrived at a very similar conclusion; so Philoponus was not the original author of the solution he preserves.

505 Łukasiewicz and Patzig similarly present Herminus as a proponent of the ‘naturalist’ view, which Patzig in particular traces into the later commentary tradition (see below). As we find below, Herminus’s analysis of the skopos of the Categories and the ‘enumeration’ of ten highest genera (e.g., T6i) build upon his ‘naturalist’ view of the imposition of names.

506 Barnes et al. (1991), 10 n. 67, who translate it clearly while retaining its character, suggest that ‘the language hangs like a dense fog over the logical terrain’.
(1.1) If the terms are not equidistant from the common genus, then:

(1.1.1) the term closer to the common genus is the major term.

For example: 'bird' is closer to 'animal' than is 'man', for it lies in the primary division, ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ διαιρέσει [i.e., the first division of animals into ‘winged’ and ‘wingless’].

(1.2) If the terms are equidistant from the common genus (e.g., as are 'man' and 'horse'), then:

(1.2.1) examine the middle term (B). Of which of the outer terms (A, C) is it predicated because of itself, and of which because of another [term] (D) (τίνος μὲν δι’ αὐτὸν κατηγορεῖται, τίνος δὲ δι’ ἄλλον)?

tὸν ἐγγύτερον τοῦ κοινοῦ γένους αὐτῶν (ἂν γὰρ ὃσιν οἱ ἄκροι ὅρνεον καὶ [73] ἄνθρωπος, ἐγγυτέρῳ τοῦ κοινοῦ γένους αὐτῶν, τοῦ ἄμφος, τὸ ὅρνεον τοῦ ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ διαιρέσει, διὸ καὶ μεῖζον ἄκρος τὸ ὅρνεον, καὶ καθόλου ἐν τοῖς ὁμογένεσιν ὁ οὕτως ἔχων πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν γένος μεῖζων),

εἰ δ’ εἶεν ἰσον ἀφεστῶτες ἀμφότεροι τοῦ κοινοῦ γένους ὡς ὦπος καὶ ἄνθρωπος, δεῖν ἐπισκοπεῖν τὸν μέσον τὸν κατηγοροῦμενον αὐτῶν, τίνος μὲν δι’ (5) αὐτὸν κατηγορεῖται, τίνος δὲ δι’ ἄλλον
(1.2.1.1) Take the term (C) of which B is predicated ‘because of another term’ (D). If D is closer to the common genus of A and C, then call C the major term.

For example: if A is horse and C is man; rational (B) is predicated of both, negatively of horse, and affirmatively of man. Now rational is not denied of horse in its own right, but because horses are non-rational (D), yet rational is affirmed of man in his own right. Non-rational is closer than man to their common genus, animal.* Thus horse is the major term.

[Note: the transmitted text at * provides an internal contradiction. Barnes et al. (1991) add ekeino de before enguterô in 14 and delete ho hippos êper anthrôpos in 15 to provide a suitable sense.]

(2) Else if the two outer terms (A, C) do not belong to the same genus, then:

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<td>(2.1) If A and C are not equidistant from their respective genera, then:</td>
<td>μείζονα αὐτῶν θετέον τὸν ἐν τῷ οἰκείῳ γένει (20) ἐγγυτέρῳ ὑπάρχοντα αὐτῶν (οἷον ἂν κατηγορηθῆται τῆς χρώματος καὶ ἀνθρώπου, μείζον ἄκρο τὸ χρώμα· ἐγγυτέρῳ γάρ τὸ τῆς ποιότητος ἢ ὁ ἀνθρώπος τῆς οὐσίας· ἄτομον γὰρ εἶδος ἄνθρωπος, τὸ δὲ χρώμα οὖ).</td>
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<td>(2.1.1) posit as major that which is closer to its own genus.</td>
<td>[For example: if something is predicated of 'colour' and of 'man', colour is the major extreme for colour is closer to Quality than is man to Ousia].</td>
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<td>(2.2) If A and C are equidistant from their respective genera, then:</td>
<td>ἂν δὲ ἴσον πάλιν ἀπέχωσιν ἀμφότεροι τῶν οἰκείων γενῶν, ἐπὶ τὸν κατηγοροῦμενον ἐπανιέναι καὶ ζητεῖν, τίνος μὲν αὐτῶν δι’ αὐτὸν, τίνος δὲ δι’ ἀλλὸν κατηγορεῖται, κἀν ἢ, δι’ ἄν κατηγορεῖται τοῦ ἐτέρου, ἐγγυτέρῳ τοῦ οἰκείου γένους, καὶ τούτων, οὐ δι’ ἐκείνον κατηγορεῖτο, μείζονα ἡγητέον ἄκρον (οἷον ἂν εἴην ὁρός λευκόν καὶ ἀνθρώπος, τὸ μὲν ἐν ποιῷ ἄτομον εἶδος τὸ δὲ ἐν οὐσίᾳ, κατηγοροῖτο δὲ τὸ λογικὸν ἀποφασίζεται· καὶ τὸ λευκόν κατηγορεῖται τοῦ λογικοῦ ἀποφασίζεται, καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τοῦν, καθ’ ὃ ἄνθρωπος, καθ’ ὃ λευκόν ἀποφασίζεται, ἀλλὰ καθ’ ὃ ἄψυχον ἢ σώματος, ἢ ἂν ἄφθονον ἢ ἄψυχον, καὶ τὸν ἄφθονον διὰ τοῦτο μείζον ὅρος τοῦ ἄνθρωπον).</td>
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<td>(2.2.1) ‘Ascend’ to the predicate: of which term (A, C) is the middle term (B) predicated because of that term (A or C), and of which because of another term (D)?</td>
<td>For whichever term D is ‘higher’, that is the major term.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[For example: suppose B = rational. Suppose rational is predicated affirmatively of man qua man but denied of white qua inanimate (D). Inanimate is more common and universal, and closer to inanimate ousia than man to animate ousia, so white is the major term in relation to man].</td>
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**Alexander**

Herminus’s approach, and seeking to find the major extreme in the second figure ‘by nature’, is a waste of time and, in any case, false.

tὸ δὴ ταῦτα λέγειν καὶ ζητεῖν καὶ φύσει διεικνύναι ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ σχῆματι (5) τὸν μείζονα ἄκρον πρὸς τῷ περιεργίαν ἔχειν οὐδὲ ἄληθὲς ἔστι.
To summarize, on Herminus’s view, given any two outer terms A and C that occur under the same genus (ὁμογενεῖς, alternative 1 above), their relative majority or minority is determined by their respective distance from the nearest term that they share in common. Thus the logician needs to ‘ascend’ (ἐπανιέναι, 73,23-24) to a common predicate. For example: the species ‘bird’ is more general than the species ‘man’, because ‘bird’ is produced by the first branching under the genus ‘animal’ (cf. ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ διαιρέσει, 73,2: sc. winged and wingless), while it takes additional divisions (that is, a longer ‘string’ of differentiae divisivae) to arrive at ‘man’. Moreover, the species ‘man’ is indivisible (ἄτομον γὰρ εἶδος ἄνθρωπος); thus infimae species provide the lower limit to this taxonomy. Furthermore, given any two terms that do not occur in the same genus or ‘tree’ (alternative 2 above), their respective generality may still be reckoned by tracing their distance from the highest genus of their own respective ‘tree’, namely, from one of the ten highest genera signified by the ten categories. For example, as Herminus suggests, if fewer differentiae separate ‘colour’ from ‘quality’ than ‘man’ from ‘substance’, then ‘colour’ is the major term relative to ‘man’.

This latter point demonstrates that the degree of universality, or ‘rank’, of any term in Herminus’s taxonomy can, at least in principle, be established relative to all other terms in the hierarchy. For there is an absolute point of reference by which the logician measures the relative ‘distance’ of all terms, namely, the highest genera signified by the ten categories (cf. 73,21-22: ἐγγυτέρω γὰρ τούτο τῆς ποιότητος ἢ ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῆς οὐσίας), which must

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507 See also Herminus ap. Simplic. 57,22-58,2 = T6g.
themselves be coordinate to one another (substance holds the same ‘rank’ as quality). Any term can be said to be more general than, more specific than, or equally general to any other term, based on the number of ‘branchings’ that are required to arrive at A and at B starting from the highest genus to which both belong – unless they belong to different categories, in which case there will be no common genus, but one can still reckon the count from their respective highest genus.

Thus Herminus had in mind a taxonomy of species limited on the upper end by the ten highest genera signified by the ten categories. He imagined that each of these species (and genera) was naturally (φύσει) signified by a simple term, or at least that the relationships inherent in syllogistic reasoning naturally signified real relationships. He posited an ‘upper limit’ to the hierarchy, namely the highest genera and the ‘ten categories’ that signify them. He also, with Aristotle, posited a ‘lower limit’ to the hierarchy, namely what is individual (ἄτομον).

Jonathan Barnes (1991) and Günther Patzig (1968) both discuss the conceptual framework of this passage:

> Herminus clearly wanted to take the words ἐγγύτερον and πορρωτέρω in our text to apply, not to the spatial distance of the two outer terms from the middle term, but to their systematic distance from a superordinate term common to the two outer terms. Since it is not always easy to find such a term common to the two outer terms, and since the criterion is useless if the outer terms are different species of a genus, Alexander rightly rejected Herminus’s theory. (Patzig 119)

> [He posits] a conceptual pyramid of increasing generality (Patzig 122).

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508 Herminus elsewhere makes explicit that there is no genus over the ten categories (Simplic. 62,7-23 = T6i) and that they are described by a ‘counting’ or aparithmêsis; I shall discuss this passage below. That substance and quality hold the same ordinal ‘rank’ is implied by the present passage, where the majority of ‘man’ and ‘colour’ relative to one another can be established by tracing their divisions back to their respective higher genera.

509 Drawing, presumably, on Aristotle An. Po. 1.3, 72b11 and 22; 1.19, 81b32-33 and 36; 1.20, 82a22; 1.21, 82a36-37 and 82b11-35; and 1.22, 83b30-84b1 (with commentary by Barnes). In Herminus’s ‘type theory’, there must be a maximal type; unlike certain modern type theories, he would not entertain the prospect of a hierarchy with no maximal type, as Aristotle rejected any argument that ‘led to infinity’, especially the skeptical argument about knowledge (see An. Po. 72b7, and cf. Barnes, 1994, 104-5).

510 So ἄτομον γὰρ εἶδος ἄνθρωπος. See for example An. Pr. 1.27, 43a25-43 on the ‘lower limit’ in Aristotle himself.
Herminus's view presupposes that every term which may appear in a syllogistic proposition has a unique and fixed position in some 'division' of terms: it represents a node in a Porphyrean tree.\(^{511}\)

(Barnes et al., 140 n. 13)

We may turn to Porphyry for a clearer illustration of the model that Herminus might have had in mind. Indeed, the model with which Herminus operates appears very similar to the diagrammatic model that is presented by Porphyry in the *Isagoge* as the view of 'the ancients' (οἱ παλαιοί, cf. 1,15) concerning species (4,15-20 and following = T3e, tr. Barnes 2003).

καθ’ ἑκάστην κατηγορίαν ἐστὶν τίνα γενικώτατα καὶ πάλιν ἄλλα εἰδικώτατα (15) καὶ μεταξύ τῶν γενικώτατων καὶ τῶν εἰδικώτατων ἄλλα. ἐστὶν δὲ γενικώτατον μὲν, ύπερ δ’ οὐκ ἂν εἰη ἄλλο ἐπαναβεβηκός γένος, εἰδικώτατον δέ, μεθ’ ο’ οὐκ ἂν εἰη ἄλλο ὑποβεβηκός εἶδος, μεταξύ δὲ τοῦ γενικώτατου καὶ τοῦ εἰδικώτατου ἄλλα, ὁ καὶ γένη καὶ εἰδη ἔστι τὰ αὐτά, πρὸς ἄλλο μέντοι καὶ ἄλλο λαμβανόμενα.

In each type of predication there are some most general items and again other most special items; and there are other items between the most general and the most special. Most general is that above which there will be no other superordinate genus; most special, that after which there will be no other subordinate species; and between the most general and the most special are other items which are at the same time both genera and species (but taken in relation now to one thing and now to another)...

Porphyry presents the following ‘example’ in order to illustrate the general rule (4.21 and following); it is this example that is sometimes cited as a genuinely Porphyrian example of the ‘tree of Porphyry’.

Γινέσθω δὲ ἐπὶ μιᾶς κατηγορίας σαφὲς τὸ λεγόμενον. ἡ οὐσία ἐστὶ μὲν καὶ αὐτή γένος, ύπο δὲ ταύτην ἐστὶν σῶμα, καὶ ύπο τὸ σῶμα ἐμψυχον σῶμα, ύφ’ ὁ τὸ ζῴον, ύπο δὲ τὸ ζῷον λογικὸν ζῷον, ύφ’ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ύπο δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον Σωκράτης καὶ Πλάτων καὶ οἱ κατὰ μέρος ἄνθρωποι. ἄλλα τούτων ἡ μὲν οὐσία τὸ γενικώτατον καὶ ὁ μόνον γένος,

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\(^{511}\) See also Barnes's commentary on Porphyry, *Isagoge* 4.21 (2003:109-10), for the example Substance–Body–Living body–Animal–Rational animal–Man–Socrates. Ammonius, in commenting on this passage, called this a 'chain' and not a tree (in *Isag*. 70.13). Barnes points out that the actual expression 'tree of Porphyry' does not appear in the Greek commentators, nor does the celebrated phrase *arbor porphyriana* appear in Boethius (but he compares in *Isag*. 1 78.9-11: 'When you descend from the more general to the more special, every unity of the higher genera will be separated into numerous and branching *[multifidas ramosasque] species*'). The ‘tree’ was drawn in such a way as to create a straight ‘line’ or ‘chain’ from the most specific term to the most general, and not like a traditional ‘family tree’; see Barnes (2003:110). More on *Isag*. 4.21 below.
What I mean should become clear in the case of a single type of predication (ἐπὶ μίας κατηγορίας). Substance is itself a genus. Under it is body, and under body animate body, under which is animal; under animal is rational animal, under which is man; and under man are Socrates and Plato and particular men. Of these items, substance is the most general and is only a genus, while man is the most special and is only a species. Body is a species of substance and a genus of animate body. Animate body is a species of body and a genus of animal. Again, animal is a species of animate body and a genus of rational animal. Rational animal is a species of animal and a genus of man. Man is a species of rational animal, but not a genus of particular men – only a species.

Porphyry concludes by stressing that the ‘bottom rung’ is infima species:


Every item which is proximate before the individuals will be only a species and not also a genus. Thus just as substance, being highest in that there is no genus before it, was the most general item, so man, being a species after which there is no other species nor indeed anything which can be split but only individuals (for Socrates and Plato are individuals), will be only a species and the last species and, as we said, the most special item.

As Barnes (2003) stresses, what is being discussed is not a ‘family tree’ on the pattern of a modern model, but something like the following (Figure 1).
Barnes et al. (1991) state, without further comment, that Herminus has a comparable ‘tree’ in mind. Certainly Herminus’s conception of a sequence of divisions stretching from infima species to highest genus intuitively matches Porphyry’s own, although the concept itself is older.\footnote{The examples, of course, are much older, as is the language of ‘most general’ and ‘most specific’. Cf. D.L. 7.61 for a Stoic comparandum, and Barnes (2003:104).} Barnes, in discussing Porphyry’s remarks on division (Is. 6.13-23) points out a passage of Galen – reporting the fourth-century BCE doctor Mnesitheus\footnote{On whom see ‘Mnesitheus’ in Der Neue Pauly, and Bertier (1972).} – which shows how the ‘Platonic rules’ of division apply:

Mnesitheus requires us to start from the first and highest genera and to split them according to species and genera and differences; then to split the split items in the same way; and the new items again in the same way until we arrive at a sort of species the splitting of which yields items which are one in number and individual. (Galen, \textit{ad Glauc.} 11.3-4, tr. Barnes)
Aristotle himself provides the standard for these rules of division in the *Posterior Analytics* (91b28-32 and 96b15-97b6; see with Barnes’s commentary).

**Applicability**

But how does Herminus seek to apply this procedure? Herminus, like Porphyry later in the *Isagoge* (6.6-11), interprets Aristotle as claiming that the *first thing* one needs to do in determining what anything is is to associate it with the correct type of predication among the ten. Porphyry tells us that Herminus stressed this point. Thus Herminus claims that students need a *prolēpsis* of the ten genera, which the *Categories* provides (59,27 = T3b2), in order to recognise the mode of predication appropriate to any object; and one needs to recognise the mode of predication appropriate to something in order to reduce the infinity of particulars to a finite and knowable number of species and genera, namely the ten (ἀπειρα μὲν σχεδὸν καὶ τὰ πράγματα καὶ αἱ λέξεις κατὰ ἄριθμόν... εἰς δέκα τοῖνυν γενικάς διαφορὰς περιληφθέντων τῶν ὀντων δέκα καὶ αἱ δηλοῦσαι ταύτα φωναὶ γεγόνασι κατὰ γένη καὶ αὐταὶ περιληφθεῖσαι, Porph. *in Cat.* 58,7-14 = T3b1).

Above and beyond these points, however, what makes Herminus’s view especially striking is its underlying assumption that the terms occurring in a correctly constructed Aristotelian syllogism refer *φύσει* to a (somehow) predefined and really existent taxonomy, or ‘tree’, of species that descend *in a rigid hierarchy* from the genera signified by the ten ‘categories’ to

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514 So Aristotle, *De An.* 402a22-25: ‘First, no doubt, it is necessary to determine in what genus a thing is and what it is – I mean whether it is a this such-and-such or a qualified item or a quantified or any of the other predications we have distinguished’ (tr. Barnes 2003, and see 126-27).

515 I have left *prolēpsis* temporarily untranslated, and will discuss its use further below.

516 Genera and species make a unity of a multitude of numerical individuals (ἐπεὶ τῷ ἀριθμῷ πολλά ἐστιν ἐν ὀντα τῷ ἑδει ἦ τῷ γένει, 58,9-10). I argue in the following section that this passage of Porphyry should be ascribed to Herminus alongside the shorter summary explicitly ascribed to him at T3b2, partly because the discussion directly assigned to Herminus relies on the major points set forth by Porphyry *in propria persona*. Barnes (126-27) discusses the sources of the view that there are finitely many most special items, but infinitely many individuals.

517 From other passages is it clear that, on Herminus’s view, one would have to get knowledge of the structure and *contents* of these trees from somewhere else, not from studying logic. Thus he advocates starting with the predications for ‘young’ students, and merely ‘touching’ on the discovery of the genera and species themselves to which the predications correspond (cf. ἀναγραφὸν ἐγένετο ἁμοσερέας ἁμοσερά τῶν γενόν, ἐφ’ ἀπερ ἓ τῶν κατηγορομένων ἄναφορά, Porph. 59,24). The obvious analogy is biological classification, from which Herminus draws most of his examples; that is, Herminus supposes that one can gain *empirical* knowledge of each of the classes of species (man and bird, for example), but expands this approach to encompass not just biological organisms, but concepts like ‘Quality’ as well.
The hierarchy is rigid in that any term could, at least in theory, be assigned an ordinal number representing its ‘degree of generality’ within one of the ten constructed ‘trees’ of species, relative to any other term within any of the ten trees. As Barnes et al. put it, ‘every term which may appear in a syllogistic proposition has a unique and fixed position in some ‘division’ of terms’. This idea is not unique to Herminus; Boethius too (de Div. 878B-C, drawing on Porphyry and perhaps indirectly Andronicus) contends that the terms must follow in the correct order in a proper division of species in a genus (cf. Barnes, 2000, 131 and 182). Aristotle (e.g., An. Post. 91b30) already states that one should begin division from ousia and ‘descend’ from here.

Herminus’s approach to this question may be relevant to his views on differentiae. According to Simplicius (55,22 = T6f), Herminus stated that ‘compleitive’ (sumplêrotikos) or ‘constitutive’ (susstatikos) differentiae should not properly be called ‘differentiae’ at all, a view that had also been maintained by Boethus of Sidon (cf. Simplic. 97,28-34). Barnes (2003:177 and following) discusses the distinction of constitutive and divisive differentiae in the Isagoge. Porphyry does recognise constitutive differentiae (he discusses differentiae as dividing genera and constituting species). But as Barnes points out, if one did not introduce constitutive sets, one can replace a number of ‘trees’ with a single ‘tree’ that demands a particular ordering of its terms. For example, the following two trees:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{animal} \\
\text{mortal} \quad \text{immortal}
\end{array}
\quad \quad
\begin{array}{c}
\text{animal} \\
\text{rational} \quad \text{non-rational}
\end{array}
\]

Can be replaced with one:

![Diagram]

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518 Both the Posterior and Prior Analytics seem to lie in the background of this discussion of upper and lower limits; see An. Po. 1.3, 72b11 and 22; 1.19, 81b32-33 and 36; etc. (with Barnes ad loc.); and for the ‘lower limit’ see An. Pr. 1.27, 43a25-43. Barnes’s commentary on the Isagoge, as cited above, very usefully discusses the sources.

519 In a more modern logic, I take it that one could construct some sort of a basic hierarchical type theory (along the lines of Mendelson, 1997:289-93, simplifying the ramified theory of types in Russell and Whitehead) with ten maximal types and arrive at some such model.
Barnes points out that this kind of ‘amalgamative’ account has two drawbacks: (1) it requires the repetition of a pair – in the above example, rational and non-rational; and (2) it requires the subordination of certain terms to others, as rational and non-rational are (seemingly arbitrarily) subordinated to mortal and immortal. But Barnes points out that Boethius advocates just such a ‘rigid hierarchy’ (as noted above, in *de div.* 878B-C).

One could add Herminus to the sources discussed by Barnes here. In fact, it appears in several other fragments that Herminus sought to answer just those two drawbacks raised by Barnes. First, Herminus too creates a single ‘Porphyrian tree’ by countenancing only divisive differentiae as differentiae (*T6f*), and then arrives at a ‘rigid hierarchy’ of elements in the tree, as we have noticed above – descending from the highest genera signified by the ten categories. Moreover, we might add that Herminus was also concerned with how single differentiae could recur multiple times under a single genus: for example, ‘footed’ under ‘winged’ and ‘non-winged’ (Simplicius *in Cat.* 57,22-58,2 = *T6g*); this is Barnes’s first drawback. And as we have seen above, he was very interested in how one could work with ‘subordinations’ in a large Porphyrian tree, Barnes’s second drawback.

Herminus’s proposal in the passage of Alexander cited above is that the logician can construct such models for any two terms, and so determine which of the two terms is more ‘general’. Because Herminus holds that the species signified by any term can be situated in a ‘tree’ like this one, and that all such ‘trees’ descend ultimately from one of the ten highest
genera signified by the categories, he believes that each ‘term’ has a natural majority or minority or equality relative to every other term.

Why did Herminus take this kind of a view? It is, in a sense, the reality of this taxonomy that commits Herminus to a ‘natural’ view of signification; it is difficult for terms to be imposed merely ‘by convention’ because, for Herminus, their use in a syllogism depends on the actual position of the items they signify in a rigid and predefined hierarchy. The classification of genera generates the classification of terms (cf. Porph. 58,12-14), including, as we see the present fragment, their ‘distance’ from the highest genera. Thus Herminus stressed the impossibility of learning the appropriate mode of predication for anything if the learner has no prolépsis (μηδεμιάζ... προλήψεως, 59,27 = T3b2) of the real genus predicated. The Categories itself, as a beginner’s text, merely ‘touches’ on the discovery of the genera and species to which the predications correspond (ἀναγκαῖον ἐγένετο ἀμωσγέπως ἅψασθαι τῶν γενῶν, ἔφ’ ἀπο τῶν κατηγορουμένων ἀναφορά, Porph. 59,25-27), in order to aid in activating this prolépsis.

Leaving aside for the moment the value of Herminus’s procedure, commentators have questioned its practicality. As Patzig points out, if someone sought to implement this procedure, it would often prove fiendishly difficult to find the term ‘naturally’ common to the two outer terms in many cases. Alexander’s remark about the wasteful nature of the exercise suggests that he also felt this as a difficulty (although, of course, this was not the only difficulty).

We do not know how Herminus supposed this procedure would work, or even if he supposed it would work outside the limited field of examples that he himself provides. Here, and in his extant remarks on the Categories, he draws his examples of genera and species almost exclusively from zoology: he talks mainly about birds, men, horses, sphinxes and griffins, and the procedure works within the contexts provided because he assumes in the audience some shared prior knowledge of a biological taxonomy (compare, for example, the ‘first division’, presumably of winged and wingless, mentioned without further specification at 73,2). If one were to imagine Herminus operating with a visible diagram of the specific taxonomy he has in mind, like a ‘Porphyrean tree’, and restricting his discussion to items that already appear in the diagram, his procedure would be practicable, although it would still seem (at least logically) to be an extraordinary sample of περιεργία.
More abstractly, I take it that the practicability of Herminus’s scheme stands or falls with the availability of some form of prior knowledge about each of the items signified by the verbal terms, and the relationships of those items to each other. I believe Herminus himself makes this clear in other fragments, particularly when he claims at Porph. 59.27 that one needs a ‘preconception’ or prolêpsis of the genera in order to talk about the categories that signify them. Prolêpsis, which may have been introduced by Epicurus in this kind of a context, may have carried some Stoic significance as an indicator of ‘common notions’ (see Sandbach, 1971); for Chrysippus, preconception seems to represent the ‘natural conception’ of universals (DL 7.54), which mediates between passive affections of soul and rational impression.\(^{520}\) For Herminus, some such pre-‘rational’ sense about the natural relationships of the genera is a prerequisite for discussion of the categories.

Although Alexander (and much of the later commentary tradition) rejected Herminus’s specific approach to the problem of determining the respective majority of the outer terms in the second figure of the syllogism, it is clear that the underlying conceptual approach, that is, the signification of such a rigidly hierarchical taxonomic ‘tree’ by logical terms, persisted. Thus Patzig, having argued that the language of ‘distance’ in Aristotle’s definition of the second figure merely reflects the ‘order of occurrence’ of the terms in Aristotle’s ‘standard formulation’,\(^{521}\) goes on to remark (102):

> It is clear that all previous commentators have been hampered by the prejudice that such a procedure is not philosophical enough: nothing else can explain the recurrent attempt to take what are obviously spatial terms as metaphors for some (really intended) ‘inner relationship’ – ‘functional identity’ or ‘similarity of extension’.

Likewise, Herminus’s interpretation of terms such as ἐγγύτερον and πορρωτέρω in our passage is viewed by Patzig as indicative of a more general tendency to seek ‘functional identity’ or ‘similarity of extension’ (102).\(^{522}\) Following Patzig’s analysis, early modern


\(^{521}\) Patzig proposes that Aristotle’s definitions of ‘middle’, ‘outer’, ‘major’ and ‘minor’ change between the first and the second figure, such that in the second figure they are purely spatial terms referring to relative position in a ‘standard formulation’ of the figure, rather than indicators of relative extension (102). On this view, Aristotle defined the major and minor terms ‘by their order of occurrence’ in the standard formulation that he introduced, so that the middle term ‘is unequivocally determined by its position in the same formulation’ (103).

\(^{522}\) Such that – more broadly – ‘Aristotle’s syllogistic depends and is founded on the principles of his so-called conceptual metaphysics’ (Patzig 83).
commentators, and especially Maier (1896-1900), also made this sort of a ‘metaphorical’ move, and similarly ended up with ‘conceptual pyramids of increasing generality’ (122).

V. Conclusions

In the course of this review, we have studied the historical sources for Herminus's life, and stressed the likelihood that his fragments were communicated by Alexander. We have also suggested that the reasons against identifying him with the 'Stoic' mentioned by Longinus may be less strong than is usually supposed. We have suggested that this idea of 'natural' signification is connected with Herminus's focus on 'natural' relationships of terms in his account of the second figure of the syllogism at Alex. in An. Pr. I 72,26 = T2c, and that the 'rigid hierarchy' of terms produced in proto-'Porphyrean trees' also influence Herminus's view that only divisive differentiae are truly 'differentiae' (Simplic. 55,22 = T6f) and his concern to deal with recurrent differentiae in a single genus (Simplicius 57,22-58,2 = T6g). Broadly, we have already sought to distinguish Herminus's views on the skopos of the Categories in Simplicius and Olympiodorus (see also chapter 1), and proposed that he authored the 'conceptless' view of the skopos, which was bipartite rather than tripartite, and reliant on the view that names 'naturally' signify their objects.

Of special importance, we have stressed that his theory of ‘natural’ signification, and his emphasis on the ‘uncountability’ of particulars contrasted with the countability of the ten categories, may have led him to explain the position of the Categories in the Aristotelian catalogue as a pedagogical one — a view that Porphyry thoroughly took over in the Isagoge and his own in Cat., with considerable influence on posterity.
7.1. The Second Century to Galen: Some Notes
This sub-chapter, following the major chapter on Herminus, very briefly introduces major personae of the second century CE for the sake of context. Relatively scarce fragments of relevance for the *Categories* are attested for these figures. A fuller list of the contemporary personae may be found in Sorabji and Sharples (2007).

**Albinus or Alcinous (mid second century CE).** Whether the *Didaskalikos* is compiled by Albinus of Smyrna or by the ‘Alcinous’ named by the MSS,\(^{523}\) it makes some use of the ten categories and the syllogism, as well as touching on the Stoic ‘hypoetical’ syllogism. In particular, the author claims that Plato ‘gave indications’ of the ten categories in the *Parmenides* (although as Dillon 1993:84 points out, the verb *hupedeixen* suggests that Plato is less than explicit). Proclus (*in Parm.* 1083,37) would later explain that certain ‘earlier’ commentators held that the ten categories were denied of the One in the First Hypothesis of the *Parmenides*. See *Did.* 6.10, and Dillon (1977:279 and 1993:84-85 for commentary and list of relevant citations in the *Parmenides* itself). The author of the *Didaskalikos* follows the earlier Platonising tradition, then, of claiming the categories for Plato.

**Atticus (later second century CE).** Atticus, who was active under Marcus Aurelius, takes a decidedly polemical line, from a Platonic standpoint, towards Aristotelianism. He wrote a polemical tract ‘Against those who interpret Plato’s philosophy by means of Aristotle’, some of which is preserved by Eusebius (*Praep.* Ev. bks. 11 and 15).\(^{524}\) With respect to the *Categories*, Atticus is said by Simplicius (*in Cat.* 30,16; 32,19 = frr. 41-42 Des Places) to have offered two comments on the definition of homonyms and synonyms at the outset of the *Categories*. In the first, he elaborates the objection of Nicostratus; the second focuses on the relationship of analogical and metaphorical uses of terms. Atticus represents an approach different to that of, say, the author of the *Didaskalikos*, who seeks to show that Plato is the source of what is useful in Aristotle. In taking this line, Atticus appears to follow L.

**Calvinius Taurus** (second quarter of the second century), who wrote ‘on the doctrinal differences’ of Plato and Aristotle (*Suda* T 166, v. iv p. 509.12 Adler).\(^{525}\)

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523 See Dörrie and Baltes (III, 1993), 341; Dillon (1993); Whittaker in *ANRW* II 36 1; and bibliography in *Der Neue Pauly* for Albinus and Alcinous.

524 Broadly, he argues against Aristotle’s doctrine of the *telos*, his alleged disbelief in *pronoia*, his teaching on the eternity of physical world, on the fifth *ousia* and motion of the heavens, and his supposed denial of the immortality of human soul, in addition to Aristotle’s denial of the Platonic world-soul and *eidê*.

Aspasius (early second century CE). Aspasius – who taught Herminus, who in turn lectured to Alexander of Aphrodisias – authored a series of commentaries, on the Categories, De Int., Physics, De Caelo, Metaphysics and Nicomachean Ethics. Of these, just the last is (in significant portions) extant today. For our purposes, he is a key source for the ‘pathology’ of Andronicus and Boethus, for which see the discussion in their chapters above.

Adrastus of Aphrodisias (early second century CE). We know from Galen (De libr. propr. 42) that Adrastus wrote a commentary on Categories, and from Simplicius (in Phys. 122,33) that he wrote a commentary on Physics. An important position associated with Adrastus is the decision to place the Topics immediately after the Categories at the head of the Aristotelian corpus; he appears to have defined their relationship in a work entitled ‘Concerning the Order of Aristotle's Treatises’ (Simplicius, in Cat. 16. 1-4). He also revived the title ‘Before the Topics’ for the Categories – this may suggest that he was responding to Andronicus, who explicitly rejected the placement of the Categories (with the postpraedicamenta) before the Topics, and with it the title Ta pro tôn topôn. Adrastus also discussed a second ‘version’ of the Cat.526

Sosigenes (later second century CE).527 Sosigenes appears to have been a contemporary of Herminus, and is also a teacher whom Alexander heard in the lecture hall (Alex. in Meteor. 143,13: ὁ διδάσκαλος ἡμῶν Σωσιγένης). He wrote on optics, as Alexander tells us, and he wrote a detailed account of the theory of Eudoxus and Aristotle and Callippus about the planetary spheres, explaining the use of epicycles (see Simplic. in De Cael. 493-510; also Alex. in Met. 703-706). He raised an important question for the Categories, inquiring what is meant by ‘what is said’ (to legomenon): ‘word’ (phônê), ‘thought’ (noêma) or ‘object’ (pragma) (cf. Simplic. in Cat. 7.4-9,24; Dexippus 7.4)? As we have found in the early discussion of the skopos (in the sample discussion of Simplicius and Olympiodorus and broadly in the chapter on Herminus), this inquiry would have a far-reaching impact. Sosigenes himself did not choose between the three arguments (Dexipp. 7.4; cf. Moraux, Hermes 95 (1967), 169 on Alexander).

526 On A. cf. Simplic. in Phys. 4.11, 6.4 ff; in Cat. 15.36, 18.16 ff.; Anon Prol in Cat. 32b36 Brandis; cf. Zeller III 1, 809 n. 3; Moraux Listes 58 ff.

527 On him see Zeller III 1, 813; Rehm RE III A 1, and of course Moraux I.
Aristoteles (later second century CE). The third known teacher of Alexander of Aphrodisias, whose existence was proven by Moraux (but see now Opsomer and Sharples, 2000), is mentioned by Galen as ‘a man preeminent in Peripatetic philosophy’; Syrianus also mentions him as ‘the younger Aristotle, interpreter of Aristotle the philosopher’ (Galen *Peri eth.* 11,4 Müller; Syrianus in *Met.* 100,6). Notably Aristoteles appears to take up a position that the active intellect always exists in all matter as a fully active substance (so Alex. *in Met.* 112,5). Alexander notes (113,12) that the idea that a divine mind existing in association with all matter is Stoic, and criticises this view; and modern commentators have suggested similarly that Aristoteles’s view is an example of syncretism with Stoicism. But we have already noted above that Pythagoreans like Archytas held a similar view, that the One and Matter were two principles represented by Monad and Dyad, or Absolute and Relative, and that this viewpoint could be applied exegetically to the *Categories*. It may be possible, although this is mere speculation, that Aristoteles had access to some such arguments as these, and drew on them alongside, or rather than, Stoic arguments.

Alexander of Aigai. It is worth noting that on one occasion Simplicius ascribes to this Alexander the same view as Alexander of Aphrodisias about the *skopos* of the *Categories* (*in Cat.* 10,19-20), and at *in Cat.* 13,11-18 again refers to the view of ‘the Alexanders’ (cf. Moraux II, 222). Simplicius at *in de Cael.* 430,32 states that the Aphrodisian Alexander cited Alexander of Aigai on Aristotle’s argument at *de Cael.* 2.6, 288b22; see Moraux II, 223-25.

Galen (129-c. 216 CE). We have already met Galen in the preceding chapters on Andronicus (for Andronicus’s psychology) and Boethus (for his views on the syllogism). With respect to the syllogism, of course, Galen has considerable fame due to the traditional ascription of the ‘discovery of the fourth figure’ to him, although in reality he does not even seem to have accepted the fourth figure (cf., e.g., Patzig). We will discuss Galen in further detail in the chapter on Herminus, but unfortunately we are only able to note in passing from his prodigious output a handful of points of direct relevance to the *Categories*.

First, Galen tells us of his own commentary on the *Categories* which does not survive, but demonstrates an interesting attitude towards his predecessors – an attitude of respect, which

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528 He is mentioned in Simplicius *in de cael.* 153,16; Alex. *De an.* II (Mantissa) 110,4; Moraux discusses him in ‘Aristoteles, der Lehrer des Al. v. Aphr.’, *Arch. Gesch. Philos.* 49 (1967), 169-82. See also P. Accattino, ‘Allessandro di Afrodisia e Aristotele di Mitelene’, *Elenchos* 6 (1985), 67-74, who suggests (73) that Alex *in Met.* 166,19-67,1 follows one of Aristoteles’s lost discussions.
urges the reader to privilege the earlier works. We also meet this attitude in Simplicius when he enjoins us to prefer the commentaries of Iamblichus and Porphyry to his own. Galen writes (On My Own Books 19.42 Kuhn):

τοῦ δὲ τῶν δέκα κατηγοριῶν οὐκ ἐποιησάμην οὔτ’ ἐμαυτῷ τι τοιούτου ὑπομνήμα πρόσθεν οὔθ’ ἐτέρους ἔδωκα καὶ διὰ τούτ’ ὑστερὸν ποτε τῶν ἑταίρων τινὶ δεηθέντι ὑπομνήματ’ (15) ἔχειν <περιέχονθ’>, ὅσα [κατὰ τὸ βιβλίον] <ἄν> ἱρκουσινείς τάς τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ζητουμένων λύσεις ***, κοινοὶ νεῖν ἐκέλευσα τῶν ὑπομνημάτων ἑκείνως μόνος τοῖς ἀνεγνωκόσι παρὰ διδασκάλῳ τὸ βιβλίον ἢ πάντως γε προεισηγημένοις δι’ ἑτέρων ἐξήγησικών, ὥσποῦ τα’ τ’ [43] Ἀδράστου καὶ Ἀσπασίου ἐστίν.

On Aristotle’s work on The Ten Categories I had not previously written any commentary, either for myself or for others; when subsequently somebody asked me for something on the solution posed on that work, <I wrote a commentary> with the firm instruction that he should only show it to students who had already read the book with a teacher, or at least made a start with some other commentaries, such as those of Adrastus and Aspasius (translation after Singer).

Second, some fragments of Galen’s own views on the categories do survive. In the first place, we know that he retained the ‘ten’ categories, but also added an eleventh, ‘synthesis’, which he asserts that Aristotle omitted in error (Inst. Log. 13; cf. on Composition 11, 31,14 Kalbfleish); thus, from Simplicius’s standpoint, Galen would stand among those who, like Athenodorus, judged the tenfold division of the categories deficient. David (in Cat. 160,20) also ascribes a list of five categories (ousia, poion, poson, pros ti, pros ti pòs echon) to Galen, although Prantl (I 564 n. 85) takes this to be an error.
Conclusion
— Well, then, what is the reason that impelled the philosophers of old to engage in disputes of every kind with each other on the subject of this Aristotelian writing which we call the *Categories*? For as far as I can see, neither have more numerous controversies occurred about any other topic, nor have greater contests been stirred up, not only by Stoics and Platonists trying to undermine these Aristotelian *Categories*, but even among the Peripatetics with each other...

— It is because... the subject (*skopos*) of this book concerns the primary and simple expressions (*lexeis*) <and the realities> they signify. So since *logos* is useful to all branches of philosophy, and the first principles of this are simple expressions and their objects of reference, it is natural that much controversy has arisen....

Dexippus, *On the Categories* 5,16-22 (tr. after J. Dillon), 4th century CE

In the course of this study, I have sought to show the influence of the question of the *skopos* or ‘aim’ of the text upon many aspects of commentary on the *Categories* from the first century BCE to the early third century CE. At the beginning, I laid out a complex case-study in the presentation of early views on the *skopos* in Simplicius and Olympiodorus, and sought to build on this case-study an argument that it is possible to find some pre-Porphyrian basis in the very structure of the story that Porphyry tells. I followed this discussion with examples of some ‘echoes’ of the early views in modern scholarship on *Categories* 1-2, showing how the key inquiry whether the *Categories* concerns ‘words, concepts, or beings’ – in our near analogy, linguistic expressions, their intensions, and their extensions – continues to exercise scholars today.

I have endeavoured to ‘tell a story’ that broadly, but not slavishly, includes Porphyry’s story, and helps to explain its historical foundations and origins. On one interpretation of the evidence that I have collected, first-century ‘Academic’ readers of the *Categories* such as Eudorus viewed it as a primarily ontological or metaphysical document, a partial account of the Pythagorean doctrine of the Decad descending from the One – which, nevertheless, failed to take adequate account of intelligible being, and should be read strictly as a document of the sensible world (so Eudorus and ‘Archytas’). By contrast, Andronicus of Rhodes saw in the *Categories* and the *Organon* more generally an opportunity to dethrone the Chrysippean ‘dialectic of the gods’ and to instate, or reinstate, a Peripatetic dialectic in its place; his endeavour to treat the *Categories* as a work of dialectic shifted the focus away from its adequacy as an account of being with ontological implications, even as Boethus of Sidon undertook a careful defense of the work against the sharpened Platonising critique represented by ‘Lucius’.

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But Andronicus’s endeavour, expressed in a Stoicising framework, also opened the way for a Stoic critique of the *Categories* as an inadequate account of the second compartment of Stoic dialectic (grammar, *lexeis* as such), with Athenodorus leading the charge. Boethus of Sidon had little or nothing to say about this in the surviving fragments, but as I have suggested, the Stoic Cornutus furnished a reply in defense of the *Categories* (against this charge, but not necessarily against others), demarcating it as a work of the first compartment of dialectic (logic, *lekta*).

Later, this may have influenced Herminus in his influential distinction of the ‘first’ and ‘second’ imposition of language, itself constructed around earlier Hellenistic theories of language – the ‘second’ imposition, after all, concerns discussion of linguistic expressions in themselves (the second compartment of Stoic dialectic), while the ‘first’ imposition concerns discussion of the entities that they signify, insofar as the linguistic expressions signify (the first compartment of Stoic dialectic). Herminus’s defense against the Stoic attacks on the *Categories*, and his revitalization of Boethus’s formulation of the *skopos*, may (as discussed in chapter 1) represent the inauguration of the ‘story’ told by Porphyry, where some historical figures were partisans of the *Categories* as a (poor) account of being, others of the *Categories* as a (poor) account of language, and only Boethus and Herminus got it right as a (good) account of both. Certainly Herminus conveyed, and perhaps inaugurated, the view that the *Categories* was a pedagogically suitable introduction to the quest for knowledge. But even as Herminus lectured, Sosigenes discussed an alternative ‘history’, namely, a ‘tripartition’ of historical sources that included a mediating ‘conceptual’ (we might say ‘intensional’) view of the subject-matter of the *Categories* – although, unlike Herminus, Sosigenes did not take a position on which of the sources was correct.

Alexander of Aphrodisias, on the theory that I have sketched, incorporated both his lecturers’ views and criticised Herminus for the omission of mediating concepts (for Herminus, as discussed in chapter 1, questioned the account of *De Int.* 16a – possibly sharing a common discomfort, if not a common remedy, with Andronicus of Rhodes, who athetised the *De Int.* altogether). Porphyry, then, adopted Alexander’s account wholesale in his own commentary in *Cat.*, including both Herminus’s defense (a ‘bipartite’ view of the subject-matter) and Alexander’s critique or development of it (including a ‘tripartite’ view of the subject-matter). It is fair to presume that Porphyry added and subtracted considerable detail and innovation, perhaps partly motivated by the approach taken toward the *Categories*, or rather toward the
exegetical tradition on the *Categories*, in the school of Plotinus. In the longer commentary *ad Gedalium* that served as a basis for future commentators, there was room for a comprehensive discussion of the positions reported and taken by Alexander; in the shorter commentary *in Cat.* that has survived, there was room only to report Herminus’s position, and (in keeping with Porphyry’s own practice of simplification, discussed early in the *Isagoge*) to omit difficulties about the real nature of the entities discussed in the *Categories*.

Iamblichus, as discussed in chapter 1, then came to add both ‘noeric theôria’ and the views of ‘Archytas’ to Porphyry’s commentary; in so doing, we might note, Iamblichus was in many ways reverting to an alternative, non-dialectical reading of the *Categories* that originated in the first century BCE, at least as early as the Andronican reading, with Eudorus, ‘Archtyas’, and Lucius, and which is preserved in Plutarch (*An. Proc.*) and Philo, among others who also viewed Plato as an early proponent of this use of the ‘ten categories’. But Iamblichus re-applied this exegetical approach to the history of scholarship on the *Categories* as well as the text itself, describing the ‘tripartition’ of views on the *skopos* as significant of three ‘levels’ of interpretation, with his own commentary serving as a corrective to Porphyry’s in drawing the reader ‘upward’ to the truest and most genuine interpretation – as he himself puts it, ‘leading the simples to the Ten, as did Archytas, with whom Plato was in agreement’ (τὰ δὲ ἁπλὰ εἰς δεκάδα συνήγαγον οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι ὡς Ἀρχύτας, ὃς Πλάτων συγγέγονεν, 13,22).

Although Iamblichus’s approach appears to be a dramatic change of style and emphasis in the treatment of the *Categories*, it would also go on to contribute to the later Neoplatonic respect for the ‘usefulness’ of the *Organon*. And finally Simplicius, drawing Iamblichus’s lofty and noeric exegesis to a level ‘accessible to the multitude’ (3,6-7), came to produce the exhaustive commentary that we now possess, in which the stratigraphy above, or something like it, is still encoded.

I hope to have to shown that the exploration of that encoded stratigraphy, and the comparison of the views recounted in Simplicius and the other late sources with the historical and intellectual context of their putative proponents, is an interesting, valuable, and (at least potentially) profitable enterprise. I hope that this survey has successfully supported at least some of the claims sketched in each chapter, and surveyed under ‘Goals and Structure’ in the general introduction. And I hope that this discussion, and the original fragments and testimonies collected in the Appendix of Texts, will provide a useful body of evidence for future study.
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3. Andronicus of Rhodes


Among them are the forebears of Panaitios the philosopher. Among the statesmen and those specialising in rhetoric and philosophy are Panaitios himself; Stratokles; Andronikos the Peripatetic; and Leonides the Stoic.

[T2] Strabo, Geographica 13.1.54

Many men worthy of remembering, military commanders and athletes, were born [on Rhodes]. Among them are the forebears of Panaitios the philosopher. Among the statesmen and those specialising in rhetoric and philosophy are Panaitios himself; Stratokles; Andronikos the Peripatetic; and Leonides the Stoic.
From Scepsis came the Socratic philosophers Erastus and Coriscus and Neleus the son of Coriscus, this last a man who not only was a pupil of Aristotle and Theophrastus, but also inherited the library of Theophrastus, which included that of Aristotle. At any rate, Aristotle bequeathed his own library to Theophrastus, to whom he also left his school; and he is the first man, so far as I know, to have collected books and to have taught the kings in Egypt how to arrange a library. Theophrastus bequeathed it to Neleus; and Neleus took it to Scepsis and bequeathed it to his heirs, ordinary people, who kept the books locked up and not even carefully stored. But when they heard how zealously the Attalic kings to whom the city was subject were searching for books to build up the library in Pergamum, they hid their books underground in a kind of trench.

But much later, when the books had been damaged by moisture and moths, their descendants sold them to Apellicon of Teos for a large sum of money, both the books of Aristotle and those of Theophrastus. But Apellicon was a bibliophile rather than a philosopher; and therefore, seeking a restoration of the parts that had been eaten through, he made new copies of the text, filling up the gaps incorrectly, and published the books full of errors.

The result was that the earlier school of Peripatetics who came after Theophrastus had no books at all, with the exception of only a few, mostly exoteric works, and were therefore able to philosophize about nothing in a practical way, but only to talk bombast about commonplace propositions, whereas the later school, from the time the books in question appeared, though better able to philosophise and Aristotelise, were forced to call most of their statements probabilities, because of the large number of errors.

Rome also contributed much to this; for, immediately after the death of Apellicon, Sulla, who had captured Athens, carried off Apellicon’s library to Rome, where Tyrannio the grammarian, who was fond of Aristotle, got it in his hands by paying court to the librarian, as did also certain booksellers who used bad copyists and would not collate the texts—a thing that also takes place in the case of the other books that are copied for selling, both here and at Alexandria. However, this is enough about these men. (Loeb translation)
use the library of Apellicon the Teian, in which were most of the works of Theophrastus and Aristotle, then not in general circulation. When the whole was afterwards conveyed to Rome, there, it is said, the greater part of the collection passed through the hands of Tyrannion the grammarian, and that Andronicus the Rhodian, having through his means the command of numerous copies, made the treatises public, and drew up the catalogues that are now current. The elder Peripatetics appear themselves, indeed, to have been accomplished and learned men, but of the writings of Aristotle and Theophrastus they had no large or exact knowledge, because Theophrastus bequeathing his books to the heir of Neleus of Scepsis, they came into careless and illiterate hands. (Loeb translation)

[T4] A Galen, *Quod animi mores corporis temperamenta sequantur* 782.14. <Andronicus declared the οὐσία of soul to be a χρώσις or a δύναμις of the body. The insertion of Andronicus’s name in this passage, supported by the Arabic text of Biesterfeldt (1973), was maintained by Marquardt, Müller and Helmreich (1884-1909). See Moraux I, 132-34 and 134 n. 1; also Gottschalk, 1113.>

[[T4]](https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/homeric/ils/799.0014) ὡς ἐλεύθερος ἄνηρ ἀνεύ ἀσαφῶς, ἐπεινᾷ τε πᾶν καὶ ἀποδέχομαι τὴν προαίρεσιν τάνδρος (εὐρίσκω γὰρ αὐτὸν καὶ κατ’ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιούτων); [783] ὅτι δ’ ἤτοι κρᾶσιν εἶναι φήσιν ἢ δύναμιν ἐπομενήν τῇ κρᾶσει, μέμφομαι τῇ προαιρετείᾳ τῆς δυνάμεως. εἰ γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ πολλάς ἐχει δυνάμεις οὐσία τις οὕσα καὶ τοῦτ’ ὀρθῶς Αριστοτέλεi λέλεκται οὐσία τις οὕσα καὶ τοῦτ’ ὀρθῶς Αριστοτέλει λέλεκται καὶ τούτῳ διώριστα καλώς ἡ ὁμωνυμία—λεγομένης γὰρ οὐσίας καὶ τῆς τῆς θυμοειδὲς ἡ, κατ’ ἄλλα τοιοῦτον’· ἠτίον δῆπον κρᾶσις μὲν ἡ καὶ ἔχει τις πολλὰς εἰ κράσει ή ὡς ἔτολμησεν ἡ κρᾶσιν ἀποφήνασθαι τὴν οὐσίαν δύναμις ὅλως τῆς, ὡς ἔτολμησεν ἡ κρᾶσις ἀποφήνασθαι τὴν οὐσίαν δύναμις ὅλως τῆς, ὡς ἔτολμησεν ἡ κρᾶσις ἀποφήνασθαι τὴν οὐσίαν δύναμις ὅλως τῆς.

The blend of the heart is the thumotic form of the soul, while the [blend] of the liver is called by Plato ‘epithumotic’, but ‘nourishing and growing’ <by Aristotle>. And I praise <Andronicus the Peripatetic>, since he dared to show forth fully the essence (οὐσία) of the soul, <declaring it a blend (χρώσις) or a potentiality (δύναμις) of the body.> [...]

[T5] B Aspasius, *in Ethica* 44.18-45.5. <Andronicus maintained that ‘affection is an irrational kinêsis of the soul produced through hupolêpsis of evil or good’. The second repetition of Andronicus’s statement and vocabulary, ὢ δὲ Ἀνδρόνικος εἴπων, δῦ ὑπόληψιν… (44.33-45.1), may suggest that the sentence is near to the ipsissima verba of Andronicus, at least as Aspasius found them presented in his source.>

<ὅτι δὲ ἦστι τι ὀρθετικὸν καὶ παθητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς, σκεπτέον ἐν ἄλλοις· τῶν δὲ ἐν τού Περιπάτου τῶν μὲν παλαιῶν παρ’ οὐδενὶ εὑρίσκομεν (20)>

Appendix of Primary Texts  
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Andronicus the Peripatetic divided the works of Aristotle and Andronicus of Rhodes into ten parts. Andronicus claimed that the primary texts of the ancient Peripatetics were divided by brief oikeiôseis to people or estrangements (allotrioseis) from them. He thought that those movements accompanied by brief affections were not worthy of the name pathê… 

Andronicus said, ‘pathos arises through (dia) a supposition (hupolèpsis) of good or bad things’, first of all, perhaps, because he did not know that some pathê arise merely out of imagination (phantasia), apart from assent (sunkatathesis) and supposition. (Tr. D. Konstan)
Hippolytus’s language that he believes the Sethian position on blending has certain affinities with Andronicus the Peripatetic. Although expressed in Gnostic terminology, we may infer from adopt a theory (logos) of blending and mixture, a subject which has been studied especially by [T9]

Thus Cat. [T8] B Porphyry, in Cat. 125.14-23. <Andronicus states that ‘relatives are those things for which being is a disposition toward something different’. Thus Cat. 8a32, but there we read pros ti instead of pros heteron.>

[4] These [claims], and others like them, are asserted [by the Sethians] in their interminable commentaries. And they persuade their students to get familiar with the theory (logos) of blending (krasis) and mixture (mixis). In fact, this [theory] has been treated by quite a few [thinkers], in particular (allois kai) Andronicus the Peripatetic.

The Sethians, then, state that the theory about krasis and mixis is constituted as follows: the luminous ray from above is blended into, and the smallest spark is finely mixed into, the dark waters beneath. And these are made into a unity, and are formed into one compound mass, just as one savour (osmê) arises from the mixture of many incense offerings in the fire. And the knowledgeable [adept], who has as his criterion an acute sense of smell, needs to discern finely each of the mixed offerings in the fire, like storax and myrrh and frankincense, or whatever else might be mixed in.

[...] Thus, they say, though all things are mingled together (συγκεκραμένα) they are distinguishable (διακρίνεται).

[T10] A Themistius, in De An. 31,1-5. <Andronicus claims that Aristotle sought to refute Xenocrates’s definition of the soul merely by arguing against the use of the word ‘number’. See Moraux I, 132.>

Μετὰ δὲ ταύτα διελέγχει τὸν Ξενοκράτους ὄρισμόν τῆς ψυχῆς, οὐ πρὸς τούνομα τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ μαχόμενος, ὡς φησίν Ανδρόνικος καὶ Πορφύριος, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντα τὴν διάνοιαν ἐπιζητῶν τὴν Ξενοκράτους, ὡς δὴ λόγον ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν Περὶ φύσεως αὐτῶ γεγραμμένων, ἐν οἷς ἂν δῷξει μοναδικὸν ποιεῖν ἀριθμὸν τὴν ψυχῆν ὁ Ξενοκράτης.

Next [Aristotle] refutes Xenocrates’ definition of the soul, not by contesting the term ‘number’, as Andronicus and Porphyry say, but by really inquiring into Xenocrates’ meaning, as is clear from the latter’s books On Nature where he would seem to make the soul a unit-like number. (Tr. Todd)

[T11] B Themistius, in De An. 32,19-34. <On DA 408b32-409a30. Andronicus explains the construction of Xenocrates’ definition of the soul, and further asserts in propria persona that the soul is the cause of the blend of primary elements in the body of the living being according to certain logoi and arithmoi. On Andronicus’s view here, see also Donini (1971), 98, nn. 46, 47.>
The soul, as Aristotle states in De Int. 16a5-8, that it appears to have read the phrase "τῆς οὐσίας". It seems that Andronicus, the eleventh successor to the scholarchate counting from Aristotle, read Aristotle's remark at De Int. 16a5-8 that noēmata are 'affections of the soul’, together with Aristotle’s cross-reference to further discussion in his works.

Such, then, are the problems that Aristotle raises for Xenocrates' definition of the soul. It would take another lecture to scrutinize those [raised by] the [philosopher] who termed Aristotle’s [arguments] 'inconceivable' and who himself paraphrased the correct and apposite arguments of others in a way that was neither correct nor apposite. Instead, we ought to contrast Andronicus' [arguments] with those of that [critic], inasmuch as they offer at once a clearer and more plausible reconstruction of Xenocrates’s theory.

[Andronicus] says: ‘They called the soul number because no living being was derived from an uncompounded body, but [only] where the primary elements were blended in accordance with specific ratios and numbers. So they made essentially the same claim as those who posit the soul as an attunement, except that they more clearly formulated their theory by adding in their definition that the soul was not every number, but [just] the self-moving number, as if those that they more clearly formulated their theory by adding in their definition that the soul was not every number, but [just] the self-moving number, as if those who composed. (Tr. Todd)

[Cat.] 21,18-19. <The full phrase λόγος τῆς οὐσίας (1a2) did not occur in the manuscripts of the Cat. read by Boethus and Andronicus (who, as we learn elsewhere, do not appear to have read the phrase τῆς οὐσίας).>

[De Int.] 5,28 and 7,13. <Andronicus, the eleventh [successor to the scholarchate counting] from Aristotle, read Aristotle’s remark at De Int. 16a5-8 that noēmata are ‘affections of the soul’, together with Aristotle’s cross-reference to further discussion in his works>
Περὶ ψυχῆς (16a8-9). As the promised discussion does not occur in the De Anima, Andronicus supposed that either De Int. or De Anima must be spurious, and athetized De Int. The claim that A. was eleventh scholarch has been questioned, especially as [Ammonius] elsewhere claims this status for Boethus: cf. in An. Pr. 31,11.

[All critics agree that the De Interpretatione is authentic] πλὴν Ἀνδρόνικου τοῦ Ῥοδίου, ὃς ἐνδέκατος μὲν ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους, ἀκούσας δὲ αὐτοῦ καλούντος ἐν τοῖς προομίσοις τοῦ βιβλίου τὰ νοήματα παθήματα τῆς (30) ψυχῆς καὶ προστιθέντος ὡς περὶ τούτων εἰρήται ἐν τοῖς Περὶ ψυχῆς,’ διὰ [6] τὸ μὴ συνιδεῖν ὅπου τῆς Περὶ ψυχῆς πραγματείας τὰ νοήματα παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκάλεσεν ὁ φιλόσοφος, ἀναγκαῖο ἄρα ἄφαιρε τῆς Περὶ ψυχῆς, καὶ δεῖ ἐνόμισε ταύτην αὐτοῦ καλοῦντος ταύτῃ τῇ πραγματείᾳ τῶν δύο, ταύτης τε καὶ τῆς Περὶ ψυχῆς, τὴν ἑτέραν νόθον ἀποφήνασθαι τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους, καὶ δεῖν ἐνόμισε ταύτῃ ἀθετεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ Περὶ ψυχῆς... [7] (13) οὐκ ἄρα δικαίως ὁ Ἀνδρόνικος νόθον ὑπώπτευσεν εἶναι τοῦ φιλοσόφου τὸ βιβλίον.

[T14a] B Simplicius, in Cat. 21.21-24. <Nicostratus suggests that it is inconsistent for the text Categories to begin with the ‘onymies’. Simplicius, following Porphyry, replies. The necessity of having a πρόληψις about homonyms is demonstrated by Andronicus, who made the initial phrase of the Categories read as follows: ‘Of things said, some are said without combination, others with combination. Of those without combination, those which have the name alone in common are called homonyms’. (Thus A. transposes 1a16-17 to the beginning. There followed a combination of 1a17 ff. and 1a1. Shortly after this point is made, Iamblichus points out that the ‘categories’ themselves are homonymous.)>

ὅτι δὲ χρειώδης ἐστὶν ἢ τῶν ὁμωνύμων πρόληψις, ἐδήλωσεν Ἀνδρόνικος προτάσας “τῶν λεγομένων τὰ μὲν ἀνευ συμπλοχῆς λέγεται, τὰ δὲ μετὰ συμπλοχῆς καὶ τῶν ἀνευ συμπλοχῆς ὁμώνυμα μὲν λέγεται, ὧν ὅνομα μὸνον κοινὸν”.

[T14b] A Simplicius, in Cat. 26.17 <‘Common’ is said in many senses. The name is common to the homonyms, belonging to all at once, while belonging to other things, remaining indivisibly the same. Therefore Andronicus in his Paraphrase of the Categories says that those things are called homonyms of which the name is identical – just as both the name and the logos are present to many indivisibly, in virtue of their asomatic nature, are present to many indivisibly. Nicostratus and his followers object that ‘dog’ alone does not yet signify anything, as it has many meanings, so it is not a name: and so it cannot be a homonym, as homonyms have their name in common.>

διὸ καὶ Ἀνδρόνικος παραφράζον τὸ τῶν Κατηγοριῶν βιβλίων ὁμώνυμα φησιν λέγεσθαι, ὃν ὅνομα ταύτων· καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ὅνομα καὶ ὁ λόγος διὰ τὴν ἀσώματον φύσιν ἀμερίστως πάρεις τοῖς πολλοῖς.

[T14c] B Simplicius, in Cat. 30.3. <Nicostratus has reproached Aristotle for appearing to say that homonymy is only to be found in the first category when he states that in the case of homonyms ‘the logos of ousia is different’. Yet homonymy is also in the poion (white is both the colour and the noise), etc. Porphyry notes that the offending phrase (tês ousias) was not read by all of the earlier commentators. Boethus did not know it, and Andronicus, in his paraphrase, says ‘of those things which are said without combination, those things are called homonyms of which only the name is
according to them, the multitude of ten are superfluous. Others make a similar division into ousia and


Again they say, if a body is white, and white is a coloured; and it is 'coloured' that is predicated of 'body'.>  

And whatever is predicated of these, when we say the things where we say that Socrates is something (he is walking, but that does not mean he is 'to walk'),  

And this may be true of those things where we say that Socrates is something (he is walking, but that does not mean he is 'to walk'), but we do say he is Athenian and a philosopher. And whatever is predicated of these, when we say the former is the latter, will also be said of the subject. Again they say, if a body is white, and white is a colour, then body will also be a colour. But white signifies two things: the quality and what is coloured; and it is 'coloured' that is predicated of 'body'.>  

The followers of Xenocrates and Andronicus' appear 'The followers of Xenocrates and Andronicus’ appear to include all the categories in [the opposition] ‘by itself’ (kath’ hauto) and ‘relative’ (pros ti), so that, according to them, the multitude of ten are superfluous. Others make a similar division into ousia and sumbebēkos.>  

[i]διατέμνουσιν εἰς ἄλλοι τῶν· πλῆθος δὲ οὐσίαν καὶ γενῶν συμβεβηκὸς καὶ 'τοσοῦτον τὸ κατπεριττὸν αὐτοὺς δοκοῦσιν ὥστε εἶναι, περιλαμβάνει τῷ πάντα Ξενοκράτη περὶ οἱ καὶ αὑτὸ καθ' 'πρὸς καὶ γὰρ Ἀνδρόνικον τι χρῶμα τοῦ, κατηγορηθήσεται ἀλλὰ σώματος τὸ κεχρωσμένον. ὥστε ἀλλ, τὸ χρῶμα', ἢ δὲ Πορφύριος ὡς ὁ παραφράζων ὡς τὸ οὐδὲ γεγραμμένον παραλέλοιπεν λέξιν ὁ ἐξηγούμενος τῆς τὸ Βόηθος δὲ καθ ἑκάστην οὐσίας'.  

[14d] A Simplicius, in Cat. 54.8-21. <Andronicus and some others (cf. Moraux I, 104) say that it is not only things predicated en tōi ti estin which are said to be predicated of a subject, but others as well, such as ‘musical’ of Aristoxenus, and ‘Athenian’ of Socrates. And this may be true of those things where we say that Socrates is something (he is walking, but that does not mean he is ‘to walk’, but we do say he is Athenian and a philosopher. And whatever is predicated of these, when we say the former is the latter, will also be said of the subject. Again they say, if a body is white, and white is a colour, then body will also be a colour. But white signifies two things: the quality and what is coloured; and it is ‘coloured’ that is predicated of ‘body’>  

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Appendix of Primary Texts  

Primary Texts: 3. Andronicus of Rhodes  

Michael Griffin

[T14f] A Simplicius, *in Cat.* 134,5. <Perhaps Andronicus was correct to make place and time their own categories, to which ‘where’ and ‘when’ are subordinated (hupotaxas). Cf. 342,21 and 63,21.>  

... αὐτάς τὸ ποὺ καὶ τὸ ποτέ.

[T14g] A Simplicius, *in Cat.* 142,34-143,1. <Perhaps Place admits of contrariety in up and down? Andronicus’s answer is that up and down do not signify place, but Where, just as yesterday and today do not signify time, but When, which is according to time.>  

... ἀνωτέρων ὡς τὸ ἄνω καὶ κάτω οὐ τὸ πόσον σημαίνει, ἀλλὰ τὴν ποτο κατηγορίαν, ὡσπερ τὸ (35) χθές καὶ σήμερον οὐ χρόνον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ποτέ, τούτους τὸ κατὰ χρόνον. [143] ταύτα γὰρ καὶ τῷ Ἀνδρόνικῳ δοξεῖ.

[T14h] A Simplicius, *in Cat.* 144,7-14. <Iamblichus, following (kata<kolouthon>) Andronicus, suggests that great and small, much and few, are not only relative to something, but also indeterminate quantities. For whenever we say ‘great’, we point out an indeterminate quantity; but when we say ‘greater’ or ‘smaller’ then they are considered in terms of their relation to each other. Simplicius subsequently adds that both Aristotle and Plotinus held the view that what is great relative to something else is called ‘great’.>  

... ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τούτους ὑποτέλειον ὡς τὸ ἄνω καὶ κάτω οὐ πούν ἡμέρα, ἀλλὰ λέγεται μέγεθος, ὡσπερ τὸ ποτέ, ὡσπερ τὸ ποτέ κατὰ χρόνον. [143] Πλούτων κατὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς μόνον· τὸ γὰρ πρὸς τί μέγα αὐτῶν τότε ἐξελέγηται φησιν.

[T14i] A Simplicius, *in Cat.* 150,31-151,7. <Even if the Caucasus is more great, and Athos less great, and Hymettus even less great, one might agree that because of the indeterminacy (aoristos) even quantity admits more and less as if it were a contrariety; for what is said to be great not in relation to something but per se is opposed to what is said to be small per se. That is Andronicus’s position. But Plotinus denies that great is said in relation to anything at all, but says that we often say ‘great’ instead of ‘greater’ improperly (6.3.11, 11).>  

... ἐν τούτῳ πολὺ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἦττον θεωροῦμεν (μᾶλλον γὰρ μείζουν τὸν Ὁμηρόν οὗ Καύκασος ἢ ὁ [151] Ἀθώς, καὶ μᾶλλον πλείον τῶν τριῶν τὰ ἐπτά ἢ ταῖς πέντε), κατὰ τὸ πρὸς τὰ αὐτών τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἦττον υπάρχειν εὑρετήσει, εἰ δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον μέγας ὁ Καύκασος, ἦττον δὲ ὁ Ἀθώς καὶ ἦττον ὁ Ὁμηρός, κατὰ τὸ ἦττον συγχωρήσοι τίς ἐπεδιέχεσθαι καὶ τὸ ποὺν τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἦττον, ὡσπερ καὶ ἐναντίωσιν τὸ γὰρ μῆ πρὸς τὸ λέγομεν μέγα, ἀλλὰ (5) καθ’ αὐτὸ ἀντίκειται τῷ καθ’ αὐτὸ λεγομένῳ μικρῷ. καὶ οὕτως Ἀνδρόνικος διατάττεται. Πλούτων δὲ οὕτε εἶναι ὅλως...
Appendix of Primary Texts

Primary Texts: 3. Andronicus of Rhodes

Michael Griffin

The following discussion is presented in the course of resolving the aporia how the unit and the point belong to Quantity when they cannot be said to be equal or unequal. Some answer that the unit and the point are principles (arkhai) of quantities, and not quantities themselves. Porphyry endeavours to follow Andronicus in articulating the concepts of *hen*, *monades* and *stigme* not according to ‘idea’ but according to ‘sensation’ and ‘discursive reasoning’ [perhaps Iamblichus’s judgement of Porphyry’s approach]. The ensuing fragment of Porph. is presumably drawn from the *Ad Ged*. Porphyry remarks that we must ask in what sense we mean ‘one’ of a length, breadth, or depth. He provides a threefold account: (1) A continuous body is *hen*, its continuity *henosis*. (2) When it is not only one in this way, but also unique (exists in the absence of anything else of the same genus or species), then it is *monon*. (3) The unit and the point are fundamentally different, and the point is not just the unit ‘with position’; we can conceive of the point by reducing dimensions from a three-dimensional body>
Appendix of Primary Texts

For instance, there is no name for a quality of 'boxerhood' a quality which has no name in itself –

followed by Boethus and Ariston, but Achaicus sought to show that the change wasn't needed.>

A definition contains the definiendum, and proposed to substitute

defines

Achaicus and Sotion for failing to recognise that 'relative' should always be used in the plural.>

Iamblichus as the source, or the intermediary, for this citation.

categories, as a

Primary Texts: 3. Andronicus of Rhodes

Andronicus of Rhodes

“ἔχειν πως ἕτερον Ἀρίστων καὶ ὁρισμὸς λέγων Ἀνδρόνικος ἀποδίδωσιν. [...]

τὸ πέρας αὕτης οὐδὲ τούτο ἔξει, ὡστε ἀδιάστατον τε καὶ ἀμεπές ἐσται”.

[T14k] A Simplicius, in Cat. 157,18-22. <Andronicus places the relative in order after the other categories, as a skew and paraphasia. The citation of Archytas as taking this view identifies Iamblichus as the source, or the intermediary, for this citation.>

άλλα’ οὕδε Ἀνδρόνικος ἀποδεκτέων τά πρός τι μετὰ πάσας θέντα τάς κατηγορίας, διότι σχέσις ἐστίν καὶ παραφινεῖται ἦπερ ἢ συμφύς τῶν πρός τι σχέσεως τῶν ἐπικτήτων (20) σχέσεων, ὡς καὶ τῷ Ἀρχάτῳ δοξεί. ταύτα μὲν οὖν ἰσοτιμήσω περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν τάξιν διαφόρων δογμάτων.

Nor must one follow Andronicus who puts those items which are in relation to something after all the other categories, on the grounds that [relation] is a skew and a sidegrowth (dioti σχέσις estin kai paraphuaidi eoiken); for the skew of the items which are in relation to something, connatural as it is, takes the lead compared to the acquired skheseis, which is also Archytas’ view. (Tr. T. Reinhardt, 2007)

[T14m] A Simplicius, in Cat. 159,32. <Andronicus, among other commentators, is criticized by Achaicus and Sotion for failing to recognise that ‘relative’ should always be used in the plural.>

tαύτα δὲ ἐπιστήμαντες οὕτω τοὺς παλαιοὺς τῶν κατηγοριῶν ἔξηγητας αἰτιωντα, Βόηθον καὶ Ἀρίστωνα καὶ Ἀνδρόνικον καὶ Εὐδώρον καὶ Αθηνόδωρον, καὶ ἐπιστήμαντας μήτε ἐπισημηναμένους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τόσο ὅνωμαι [160] συγκεχυμένοις χρησιμένους καὶ ἐνικός ἐκφέροντας ἐνίοτε τὸ πρός τι, τοῦ Ἀριστέτους πληθυντικώς ἢ προφερομένου.

[T14n-o] A Simplicius, in Cat. 202,5. <Referring to Cat. 8a31 and following, where Aristotle defines ta pros ti as hois to einai tauto esti toi pros ti pōs ekhein. Andronicus observed that the definition contains the definiendum, and proposed to substitute heteron for ti (cf. Cat. 6a37). He was followed by Boethus and Ariston, but Achaicus sought to show that the change wasn’t needed.>

ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀσαφή τὴν ἀπόδοσιν ἐποίησατο, ώς καὶ Βοήθῳ καὶ Ἀρίστωνι δοξεί, ὅπερ καὶ αὐτὸ καιρὰ όριομον ἐστίν, διότερ ὁ Ἀρίστων ώς ἐπι σαφέτερον μεταλαμβάνων “τὰ πρός τι πως ἔχοντα, φησίν, ταύτα ἐστίν, οἷς τὸ εἶναι ταυτὸν ἐστίν τῷ πῷς ἔχειν πρός ἔτερον”. [καί] οὕτως δὲ καὶ Ἀνδρόνικος ἀποδιδοσιν. [...] [203] (4) σαφέτερον δὲ ταύτην τὴν ἔννοιαν δηλούσιν ὁ τοῦ Ἀχαϊκοῦ ὀρισμὸς λέγων “οἷς τὸ εἶναι ταυτὸν ἐστίν τῷ πρός ὃπιον πως ἔχειν” καὶ ὁ Ἀρίστωνος καὶ Ἀνδρόνικον ὁ λέγων “οἷς τὸ εἶναι ταυτὸν ἐστίν τῷ πρός ἔτερον πως ἔχειν”.

[T14p] A Simplicius, in Cat. 214,22. <It is pointed out that some human beings are named from a quality which has no name in itself – for instance, there is no name for a quality of ‘boxerhood’

Appendix of Primary Texts
paronymously derived from the ‘boxer’. Andronicus suggests that naming of qualities should occur around future potentiality, not around current potentiality.

πρόχειρον δὲ εἶπεν ὅτι εἰ καὶ μὴ ὠνόμασται, οὐ διὰ τοῦτο ἢ τῶν πραγμάτων φύσεως ἐπιλέξουσιν, καίτοι καὶ ὄνομάσιν δυνατόν ἢ ὠνομάζως τὸ δυνάμει τῷ κατ’ ἐνέγρειαν, (20) πυκτικὴν καὶ πυκτικὸν ἁμέσῳ λέγοντας, ἢ εἰ φυλαττομίθεα τῇ ὠνοματίμη, ἀλλὰ ποιήσωμεν ὠνόματα. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἀνδρόνικον ἦσσον οὐκ ἂρ’ ἤ ἦσσον δυνάμεως ὠνομάσθαι αὐτοῦ, ἂλλ’ ἂρ’ ἤ ἦσσον· τοὺς γὰρ εὐ πρὸς τὰς μελλόντας ἔξεις διαχειμένους οὐτός καλεῖσθαι. καὶ οἱ Στωικοὶ δὲ κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ὑποθέσεις τὴν αὐτήν ἄν ἀποφάσας προσάγαγοιν τῷ λέγοντι (25) λόγῳ κατὰ ποιότητα πάντα τὰ ποιὰ λέγεσθαι.

[Τ14q] B Simplicius, in Cat. 258,15. <Andronicus did not distinguish affective qualities into those that generate affections and those that are constituted from affections, but held all affective qualities were constituted from affections (cf. Cat. 9a35-b11).>

Ἀνδρόνικος δὲ ἢσσον μὴ διαφεύγεισαι τὰς παθητικὰς ποιότητας εἰς τὸ (15) ἐμπεῖν παθή καὶ εἰς τὸ ἐκ πάθους συνισταθαι, ἀλλὰ πᾶσας ὡς ἐκ πάθους συνισταμένα παθητικὰς εἶναι, τὸ δὲ πάθους ποιήσωμεν τὸ εἶναι συμβαίνειν αὐτὰς· “τὸ γὰρ θερμοῦν θερμαίνειν δύναται· ἀλλὰ καθ’ ὅσον εἰς ἄλλα ποιεῖ, οὐ ποιά ἀλλὰ ποιητικὰ καλοῦμεν αὐτά, οἷον οὐ θερμά ἀλλὰ θερμαντικα, ἀπερ ἧδη πρός τι, καθάπερ τὸ καυστικὸν καὶ τὸ καυστόν καὶ τὰ ὅμοια. διὸ (20) θερμών μὲν ἔστιν καὶ μηδενὸς ὄντος θερμαντοῦ, θερμαντικὸν δὲ οὐκέτι ποιά γὰρ κατὰ τὸ πῶς ἔχειν, ἀλλ’ οὐ κατὰ τὸ πρός τι λέγεται”.

‘For heat has the power to heat: but insofar as it acts upon others, we call [those others] not ‘suches’ (poia) but ‘productive [of such]’ (poiētika) – for example, not ‘heats’ (therma) but ‘heaters’ (thermantika). That is because they are already relative (pros ti), just like the burner and the burned (kaustikon…kauston), and similar things. For that reason, heat (thermon) does not belong to the heatable object (thermantou) unless it is producing heat (thermantikon). For ‘suches’ (poia) are said in accordance with the state (to pós ochein), and not in accordance with the relative (to pros ti).’

[Τ14r] B Simplicius, in Cat. 263,19-22. <Andronicus made a special genus for the fine, the dense, and such things (cf. Plotinus 6.1.11, 30 ff.), that is, a fifth kind of quality.>

Ἀνδρόνικος δὲ πέμπτον εἰσάγει γένος, ἐν ὧν τά τετείλει μανότητα πυκνότητα, κινούμενη βαρύτητα, λεπτότητα (20) παχύτητα, ὡς τὴν κατὰ τὸν ὄγκον, ἀλλὰ καθ’ ἀδέρ λέγομεν λεπτὸν εἶναι καὶ τοῦ ὑδατος λεπτότερον· “ποιὰ γάρ, θερμά, λέγομεν πάντα τὰ τοιαύτα τῷ ἀπὸ ποιότητα εἶναι αὐτά, ὄμοιος δὲ καὶ τὸ διαφανὲς καὶ τὸ σκοτεινόν, ὡστε, φησιν, ἢ ἄλλο τι γένος ποιότητος τούτῳ θετεόν ἢ συζευκτέον αὐτά ταῖς παθητικαῖς· τῷ γάρ παθεῖν τι τὸ σώμα τούτων ἐκαστον τοιοῦτο (25) γέγονεν, διαφέρει δὲ ἐκείνων, ὅτι πάθους οὕτω εἰσίν ἐμποιητικαί αὐταί”.
<Andronicus does not believe that shape exists because of qualified figure. But many editors and translators believe, based on marginalia and context, that we should read ‘Aristotle’ for ‘Andronicus’ here>.

οὔτε γὰρ τῷ Ἀνδρόνικῳ δοξεῖ τοῦτο οὔτε ἄλληθές ἦστιν. οὐ δοξεῖ μὲν γὰρ, διότι τὸ σχῆμα ἀπλῶς εἰπὼν τὴν μορφήν οὐχ ἄπλως εἶπεν, ἄλλα τὴν περὶ ἐκαστὸν ὑπάρχουσαν μορφήν.

<Andronicus puts rarity and density under ‘affective qualities’, but Achaicus does not>.

οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἀχαίκὸν παρατιθένται καὶ εἰς τὸ πρῶτο τι ἄναγεν τὴν μανότητα <καὶ πυκνότητα> καὶ εἰς ἕπειτα τῷ πέμπτῳ εἴδος ποιότητος, ἄλλ’ (20) οὐδὲ εἰς τὰς παθητικὰς αὐτὰς τιθέσαιν, ὡς Ανδρόνικος, ἄλλ’ εἰς τὰς ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ γένει, λεπτότητα μὲν καὶ κοχλύτητα ἐπεσθαὶ μανότητι λέγοντες, παχύτητα δὲ καὶ βαρύτητα πυκνότητι.

<Andronicus and Plotinus add a fifth genus of quality>.


<Andronicus held that poiein and paskhein are contraries (enantia). Others state that this is impossible, for it would entail a contrary arising as a product of a contrary; instead, others believe they are said antithetōs.>


<Although Aristotle put time and place in the [category of] quantity, but established when and where as two separate categories, Archytas, and following Archytas, Andronicus, arranged when together with time, and where with place, and posited two categories in this way, so that they too preserved the number of ten genera…. But Plotinus, in arranging the concept when together with time, and claiming that there are five categories in all, namely ousia, quantity, quality, relative, and movement (6.3.3, applying to the aesthetic world), ought to have shown that time belongs either to quantity or to some one other of these five categories, if time was not to be completely thrown out of the [class of] existents. But [he does not want it to be a quantity]; Simplicius later suggests (343,22) that it may be observed in ousiai; or perhaps it is under Motion.>

ἀλλὰ τῷ χαρακτῆρι καὶ τῷ [270] ποιῳ, πότερον ἐν ἄλλῳ εἰδεί τάττεται παρὰ τὰ εἰρήμενα τέταρτα τῆς ποιότητος, ὥσπερ Ανδρόνικος τε καὶ Πλωτῖνος υπολαμβάνοντο, ἢ ἐνεστὶν ψ’ ἐν αὐτὰ τῶν τεττάρων προσβιβαζειν;

Τοῦτο δὲ τὶς πρὸς ἄλληλα αὐτῶν σχέσεως ζητούντες λέγουν ὅτι ἀντιθέτως μὲν λέγεται, ἑναντία δὲ οὐκ ἦστιν, ὥσπερ Ανδρόνικος φώθη πῶς γὰρ οἶον τε εἰς ἑναντίον ἀποτέλεσμα τοῦ ἑναντίον γένεσθαι;

Τοῦτο δὲ τὶς πρὸς ἄλληλα αὐτῶν σχέσεως ζητούντες λέγουν ὅτι ἀντιθέτως μὲν λέγεται, ἑναντία δὲ οὐκ ἦστιν, ὥσπερ Ανδρόνικος φώθη πῶς γὰρ οἶον τε εἰς ἑναντίον ἀποτέλεσμα τοῦ ἑναντίον γένεσθαι;

Τοῦτο δὲ τὶς πρὸς ἄλληλα αὐτῶν σχέσεως ζητούντες λέγουν ὅτι ἀντιθέτως μὲν λέγεται, ἑναντία δὲ οὐκ ἦστιν, ὥσπερ Ανδρόνικος φώθη πῶς γὰρ οἶον τε εἰς ἑναντίον ἀποτέλεσμα τοῦ ἑναντίον γένεσθαι;
Archytas and Andronicus posited as a particular separate nature of time, and they arranged the concept when together with it, since it subsists in connection with time. For [Archytas] proposes to construe the primary and first genera of reality around which the others subsist as the principle ones. Since therefore time has been treated as prior to when, and place as prior to where, in respect of their very existence, he reasonably regards [time and place] as primary [genera] passing over the things included in them as being secondary to them. Accordingly it has been shown in what has been said how on the one hand Ar., paying heed to the differences in their meanings, puts the concept when in another category [from time]; and how on the other hand Archytas, having regard to the kinship in respect of their objects, arranged the [concept] when together with time; and how finally Plotinus, in reducing the primary genera to the smallest number, and in not granting much significance to the parallagai between the conceptions and meanings [of time and when], did away with the category of when.>
measure of time, it will be a kind of composite (past and time), two categories.

(Tr. Gaskin)

[A Simplicius, in Cat. 357.28. <Archytas and Andronicus place when with time, and where with place, whilst Aristotle puts time and place in the category of quantity, and sets up separate categories of when and where. Plotinus goes further in allocating place and time both to the category of quantity or relative (358,10-11).>]

eἰρηται δὲ ἢδη, ὅτι Αρχύτας μὲν καὶ Ανδρόνικος συνέταξαν τῷ μὲν χρόνῳ τὸ ποτέ, τῷ δὲ τόπῳ τοῦ ποιοῦ, καὶ οὕτως ἔθεντο τὰς δύο κατηγορίας, Αριστοτέλης δὲ τὸν μὲν χρόνον καὶ τὸν τόπον τοῦ ποσοῦ τέθεικεν διὰ τὰς (30) εἰρημένας ἔμπροσθεν αἰτίας, τοῦ δὲ ποτέ καὶ τοῦ ποιοῦ ἕως ὑποκείμενον κατηγορίας. Αὐτοῖς δὲ τὰ πρὸς τι προϋποκείμενοι ἀλλοις γένεσιν παρεφύετο οἶν τῇ οὐσίᾳ καὶ τῷ ποσῷ τῆς ἀντιστρεφοῦσας κατ' ἀντιστρεφοῦσας σχέσιν· ὡς τὰ πρὸς τι προϋποκείμενοι ἀλλοις γένεσιν, οὕτως καὶ τὸ ποτὲ καὶ τὸ ποῦ ἀλλοις ἐπισυνίσταται· οὐ δὲ ιδίας αὐτῶν κατηγορίας ὑποτίθεσθαι, εἰ μόνον ἵδια τινα τὰ σημαινόμενα ἔχουσιν.

[Pálιν δὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος τὸ πόρρω καὶ εἰς τὸ πρὸς τι ἀνάγει (15) ἀξιοῖ τοπικὸν ἔχοντα τὸ ὑποκείμενον, Ανδρόνικος δὲ εἰς τὸ ποῦ τίθησιν αὐτὰς ἀόριστον κατὰ τὸν τόπον ὑποκείμενα· καὶ ἐἴπερ ή τοῦ τόπου διαφορά ἐπικρατοῦσα φαίνεται ἐν αὐτοῖς, εἰς τὸ ποῦ μᾶλλον ἀνεκτέα, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰς ἔτερον γένος· οὐ γὰρ τὴν ἀντίστροφον σχέσιν ἐχει πρόχειρον, ὡς τὸ πορρώτερον καὶ ἐγγύτερον, ἀλλὰ τὴν τοῦ τόπου διάστασιν.

[Conru tus] thinks one should refer far and near to the relative, since they have a spatial subject, but Andronicus places them in the category of where, since they are indefinite in respect of place. Since the difference of place manifestly predominates in their case, they are indeed to be referred to the where rather than to another genus. For they do not obviously evince a reciprocating relation, as do farther and nearer, but rather separation of place.

[Andronicus holds that the postpraedicamenta were appended against the purpose of the book. (Note, despite the often repeated claim that Andronicus ‘athetized’ the postpraedicamenta, that Andronicus does not plainly claim they are not by Aristotle, only that they are ‘against the purpose’ of this book and do not belong here). He believes the person who added them was also responsible for the title ‘before the Topics’. Adrastus placed Top. after Cat. and may have favoured the name, whilst Herminus is also said to have favoured the name. But they cannot have originated it. See Moraux I, 99-101.>
Species of Movement; and On the Homonymy of Having] have been appended by someone against the purpose of the book, namely the man who inscribed the book of the Categories with the title Before the Topics.

[A] Simplicius, in Cat. 385.3-9. <Andronicus claimed that acting and undergoing are not merely opposites but also contraries. Cf. T14v. Aristotle said that acting and undergoing admit of contraries, but are not contraries, but he demonstrates contariety within each of them, e.g. whitening and blackening, being whitened and being blackened.>

Ἀνδρόνικος δὲ οὐκ ἀντίθετα μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναντία τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πάσχειν ἀπεφήνατο, καὶ τούτῳ δὲ ἐπιστήμας ἄξιον, ὅτι τὰ μὲν πρὸς τι πρὸς ἄλληλα λέγεται, τὰ δὲ ἐναντία αὐτὰ (5) μὲν ἄπερ ἐστὶν ἐναντία, τούτῳτιν τὰ τῇ ἐναντίωσε περιχόμενα, ὡσπερ τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν, πρὸς ἄλληλα οὐ λέγεται, τὸ δὲ ἐναντίον αὐτό καὶ οὐχὶ τὰ περιχόμενα ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ κατὰ τὰ πρὸς τι λέγεται καὶ οὐχὶ κατὰ τὸ ἐναντίον· ἀντεισάγει γὰρ ἄλληλα καὶ συνυφέστηκεν.

[B] Simplicius in Phys. 440,13

ιστέον δὲ ότι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χωρίῳ οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ σαφέστερον οὕτω γράφουσι ταύτην τὴν λέξιν· ἐντελέχεια γάρ ἐστι τούτου ὑπὸ τοῦ κινητοῦ, ὁ δὲ Ἀνδρόνικος οὕτως· ἐντελέχεια γάρ ἐστι τοῦ κινητοῦ καὶ ὑπὸ τούτου. καὶ ἔξηγεῖται ότι κἂν ἔξωθεν (15) τὸ κινοῦν, ἐκ τῆς ἐνούσης δυνάμεως εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἀγόμενον, ὑφ’ ἑαυτοῦ κινεῖσθαι δοκεῖ τὸ κινοῦμεν.

And it should be known that in this area most write this passage more clearly as follows: ‘for it is the actualization of this by the source of change’; but Andronicus writes as follows: ‘for it is the actualization of the changed and from it’. He gives the interpretation that, even if the changer be eternal, the changed seems to be changed by itself, since it is brought to actuality through its inherent potentiality’.


ἡ δὲ φύσις καὶ προδιατιθεμένη διατίθησι τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἐνδοθεν καθ’ ἐκαστὸν κινήσεως εἶδος, ὡς καὶ ὁ Ἀνδρόνικος ἔλεγε. κἂν γὰρ θεμαίρεται ὑπὸ πυρὸς τὸ ὕδωρ, ἀλλ’ ἡ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι φύσις πρώτη θερμή γενομένη, οὕτως θεμαίρεται η συνθερμαίνει τὸ ὑποκείμενον. δυνάμει οὖν κινητοῦ εἶπεν, ὡς δυνάμει κινητοῦ (20) ἔλεγε πρότερον τὸ μένοντος τοῦ δυνάμει κινούμενον, οὕτως οὖν τὸ μένοντος τοῦ δυνάμει κινοῦν.

Eίρηται δὲ καὶ πρότερον, ὅτι τὰ μὲν πέντε βιβλία τὰ πρὸ τοῦτον Φυσικὰ καλοῦσιν, τὰ δὲ ἐντεύθεν τριὰ Περὶ κινήσεως· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ Ἀνδρόνικος ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ τῶν Αριστοτέλειος βιβλίων διατάττεται, μαρτυροῦντος τῶν πρῶτων καὶ Θεοφράστου γράψαντος Εὐδήμου περὶ τινὸς (10) αὐτῷ τῶν ημαρτημένων ἀντιγράφον κατὰ τὸ πέμπτον βιβλίον· “ὑπὲρ ὢν, φησίν,
ἐπέστειλας κελεύων με γράψαι καὶ ἀποστεῖλαι ἐκ τῶν Φυσικῶν, ἦτοι ἕγω οὐ ξυνήμη ἢ μιχρόν τι παντελῶς ἤφει τὸ ἀνά μέσον τοῦ “ὅπερ ἱρεμεῖν χαλὰ τῶν ἁκινήτων μόνον ἐναντίον γὰρ ἱρεμία κινήσει, ὅπερ στέφης ἂν εἰπ τοῦ δεκτικοῦ,” ὅπερ καὶ τὸ πέμπτον βιβλίον „ἐκ τῶν Φυσικῶν“ ὥστε προσεχρήσατο Θεόφραστος νομίζει.


καὶ Ἀνδρόνικος δὲ ταύτην τὴν τάξιν τούτοις τοῖς βιβλίοις ἀποδίδωσι, καὶ μέντοι (20) καὶ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης τοῖς ἐν τῷ πέμπτῳ βιβλίῳ προδιδαχθεῖσι, τῷ συνεχεῖ καὶ ἀπτομένῳ καὶ ἐφεξῆς, εὐθὺς ἐν ἄρχῃ τούτου τοῦ βιβλίου προσεχρήσατο.


Quam magnos studiosis afferat fructus scientia diuidendi quamque apud peripateticam disciplinam semper haec fuerit in honore notitia, docet et Andronici, diligentissimi senis de diuisione liber editus; et hic idem a Plotino grauissimo philosopho comprobatus et in libri Platonis, qui Sophistes inscribuit commentariais a Porphyrio repetitus, et ab eodem per hanc introductionis laudata in Categorias utilitas. Dicit enim necessarium fore generis, speciei, differentiae, proprii, accidentisque peritiam, cum propter alia multa tum propter utilitatem quae est maxima partiendi.


Posterior quidem Peripateticae sectae prudentiae differentias diuisionum diligentissima ratione perspexit et per se diuisionem ab ea quae est secundum accidentis ipsasque inter se disiunxit atque distribuit, antiquiores autem indifferenter et accidente pro genere et accidentibus pro speciebus aut differentiis utebantur, unde nobis peropportuna utilitas uisa est et communiones harum diuisionum prodere et eas propriis differentiis disgregare. Et de diuisione quidem omni quantum introductionis breuitas patiebatur diligenter expressimus.

[T17] A Philoponus, in Cat. 5,19. <Boethus says that one should begin the study of Aristotle from physics; Andronicus, from logic. Andronicus was ‘teacher’ (didaskalos) of Boethus>
[T18-19] A Philoponus, in Cat. 27.18-26 and 45.8-12. <Andronicus athetized the De Int. Cf. T6, T13>.

τὸ γὰρ ὅλον ὑώς ἐστίν ὃπερ τὸ ἔν, ἑπείδη τὸ ὅλον τῶν μερῶν ἔστιν ὅλον, τὰ δὲ μέρη πολλά καὶ ὑώς ἐν ὃς τὴν ὅλον, εἰ γε ἐν πολλοῖς ἔχει τὸ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πεπονθός ἔχει τὸ ἐν πέπονθε (20) δὲ τὸ ἐν τῷ οὐδείᾳ τελείότητα ἁπάλαβον. ἐκ τοῦ χωρίου δὲ τούτου ἐλέγχου τὸν Ἄνδρόνικον τὸν Ὁδίου νοθεύσαντα τὸ Περὶ ἐμφημείας: εἰπόντος γὰρ ἔκει τοῖς Ἀριστοτέλοις ὅτι τὰ νομίματα παθήματα ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἄσοπον εὑρίηται ἐν τῷ Περὶ ψυχῆς, φησίν ο Ἄνδρόνικος ὅτι τούτο οὐδαμοῦ εὑρίηται ἐν τῷ Περὶ ψυχῆς, ὅστε ἀνάγκη ἢ τῇ Ἀθηναίων. [25] νοθεύσαι ἢ τὸ Περὶ ἐμφημείας ἀλλὰ μὴν ἢ Περὶ ψυχῆς ὁμολόγηται τοῖς Ἀριστοτέλοις εἶναι νόθον ἀρα τὸ Περὶ ἐμφημείας. [...] [45] (8) καὶ φοβουμένων, καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων συνδιάτισθαι καὶ συγκεῖται τὸ σῶμα ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὰ ἀι ἐνεργέοις τῶν παθῶν τοιοῦτοι περὶ (5) σώματά εἰς. ὡστε τοῦ συναμφιτέρου καὶ σύν ἑαυτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς τὰ τωιαίτα. [403a7] Μάλιστα δ᾿ ἔστειν ἰδίῳ τὸ νοεῖν. (6) Ἰδοῦ πάλιν πάθος τὸ νοεῖν ἐκάλεσε. τούτῳ ὡς πρὸς Ἄνδρόνικον τὸν Ὁδίου νοθεύσαντα τὸ Περὶ ἐμφημείας διὰ τὸ ἔκει μὲν εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη τὰ νομίματα παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς, ὃς εὑρίηται ἐν τῷ Περὶ ψυχῆς, μηδαμοῦ δὲ φαίνεσθαι ἐν τῷ Περὶ ψυχῆς, ὡς ἐνόμισον ὁ Ἄνδρόνικος. (10) τὰ νομίματα παθήματα εἰπηκότα. ἰδοὺ ὑώς καὶ ἐνταῦθα φησίν ὅτι μάλαστα δὲ ἔστειν ἰδίῳ τὸ νοεῖν ἰδίῳ γὰρ πάθει δηλονότι.

[T21] A Olympiodorus Proleg. in Cat. 6,7-16.

λαμβάνεται, ὃτι ἐπικατάσταται, φέρε καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ δεύτερον κεφάλαιον ὕδευσομεν, ἐπὶ τὴν διαίρεσιν τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους συγγραμμάτων φημι. τῶν τοίνυν συγγραμμάτων Ἀριστοτέλους τὸν μὲν ἄλλο ταῖα καὶ τὰ μέρη ταῦτα δὲ καθὸλος ταῦτα δὲ μεταξὺ τοῖς καθὸλου καὶ τὸν κατὰ μέρος. καὶ ἐστὶ μερικὰ μὲν ὡς πρὸς τινας ἕνα γέγραπται, οἷα ἐστὶν αἱ ἐπιστολαί Ἀνδρόνικος τοῖς Αριστοτέλοις τοῖς τῶν καθολίκων καθολίκων ταῦτα δὲ καθὸλος ταῦτα δὲ καθὸλος ταῦτα δὲ καθὸλος τοῖς καθὸλου τοῖς καθὸλου τοῖς τῷ τοῖς τῷ τῷ... Περὶ νόθον τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ...
Andronicus was the eleventh ‘successor’ after Aristotle. Where Boethus recommended starting the study of Aristotle from physics, Andronicus recommended starting from logic.

ταῦτα δὲ ζητοῦμεν οὐ μόνον διὰ τὸ πλῆθος αὐτῶν ἄλλα καὶ διὰ τὴν διαφωνίαν τῶν ἄρχαιων· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἔλεγον ὅτι δεῖ ἀπὸ τῆς φυσικῆς άρξασθαι, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς λογικῆς (20), ἄλλοι δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἱδικῆς, ἄτεροι δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς μαθηματικῆς. Βοηθὸς γὰρ ὁ Σιδώνιος ἁπὸ τῆς φυσικῆς λέγει, Ανδρόνικος δὲ ὁ Ῥόδιος ὁ Περιπατητικὸς ὁ ἑνδέκατος διάδοχος τῆς Ἀριστοτέλους σχολῆς ἀπὸ τῆς λογικῆς ἔλεγε, τὸν δὲ Πλατωνικὸν οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ἱδικῆς οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν μαθηματικῶν. καὶ πάντες τὰς οἰκείας δόξας κατεσκεύαζον.

Τρεῖς τοίνυν δόξαι γεγόνασι περὶ τῆς τάξεως αὐτῶν· Ἀνδρόνικος μὲν μὲν γὰρ ὁ Ῥόδιος τελευταίαν ἀπονέμει τοῖς πρός τι τάξιν, λέγων αἰτίαν τοιαύτην· τὰ πρός τι ὕλην οἰκείαν οὐκ ἔχει (παραφυάδι γὰρ ἔοικεν οἰκείαν (20) φύσιν μὴ ἐχούσῃ ἄλλα παραπλεκομένη τοῖς ἔχοσιν οἰκείαν ῥίζαν), αἱ δὲ ἐννέα κατηγορίαι οἰκείαν ἔχουσιν· εἰκότως οὐν τάξιν ὀφείλον ἔχειν τάξιν. Ἀρχύτας δὲ ὁ Ταραντῖνος τετάρτην ἀπονέμει αὐτοῖς τάξιν, ἐπειδή οὐσία καὶ ποιὸν καὶ ποσὸν καθ’ αὐτὰ εἰσὶ, τὰ δὲ πρός τι σχετικά εἰσί, προηγεῖται δὲ τὰ καθ’ αὐτὰ τῶν ἐν σχέσει· πρῶτον γὰρ γίνεται τίς (25) ἀνθρώπους καὶ τότε πατήρ, πρῶτον γίνεται ἁρμιθμός καὶ τότε διπλάσιος ὡς ἁρμιθμός.
3.1.1. Eudorus of Alexandria


Ἀλλ’ ἡώ ταῦτα, πολλῶν εἰρηκότων, ἃν ἀνακέσει δύο μηνύσαι τοὺς ποιήσαστας καθ’ ἡμᾶς τὸ περὶ τοῦ Νείλου βιβλίον, Εὐδώρος τε καὶ Ἀρίστωνα τὸν ἐκ τῶν Περιπάτων· πλὴν γὰρ τῆς τάξεως τά γε ἄλλα καὶ τῇ φράσει καὶ τῇ ἐπιχείρησι (10) ταῦτα ἐστὶ νεῖμεν παρ’ ἀμφιτέροις. Ἐγὼ γοῦν ἀπορούμενος αντιγράφων εἰς τὴν ἀντιβολήν, ἐκ θατέρου θάτερον ἀντέβαλον· πότερος δ’ ἦν ὁ τἀλλότρια ὑποβαλλόμενος, ἐν Ἀμμωνίου εὐροὶ τις ἂν. Εὐδώρος δ’ (15) ἠτιᾶτο τὸν Ἀρίστωνα· ἡ μέντοι φράσις Ἀριστόνειος μᾶλλον ἐστιν.

But I dismiss this subject, since it has been discussed by many writers, of whom it will suffice to report only the two who in my time have written the book about the Nile, I mean Eudorus and Ariston the Peripatetic philosopher; for except in the matter of arrangement everything found in the two writers is the same as regards both style and treatment. I, at any rate, being in want of copies with which to make a comparison, compared the one work with the other; but which of the two men it was who appropriated to himself the other's work might be discovered at Ammon's temple! Eudorus accused Ariston; the style, however, is more like that of Ariston. (Tr. Jones)


[T3a] A Plutarch, *An. Proc.* 1013B5. <Eudorus holds that neither Xenocrates nor Crantor are entirely wrong; Dörrie, *Hermes* 79 (1944), 27-28 argues that Eudorus reconciled Xenocrates’s symbolic exegesis with Crantor’s more ‘literal’ exegesis. Xenocrates held that soul was ‘a number set in motion by itself’, while Crantor described it as a mixture of noêtê ousia with ‘that which forms impressions of perceptible objects by means of opinion’>

[T3b] A Plutarch, *An. Proc.* 1019E-1020C. <How the means are to be found. Eudorus appears to be Plutarch’s source for what follows. At 1020C3, he follows Crantor>


Not only do the souls of mortal beings possess the capacity to know the sensible (*gnōstikên tou aisthêtou dunamin*), but [Plato] adds that the soul of the cosmos – whenever she touches the scattered being or the undivided being of anything – is moved throughout her entire being and announces what the object is identical with, and from what it is different, and in what relation (*pros ti*), and where and how, and when, it comes about that each thing exists (*einai*) and is acted upon by others (*paschein*), both in the sphere of becoming and in that of the ever-one. In these words he is also giving an outline of the ten categories; likewise in what follows, he makes the case more clearly...

1969, vol. 2, 592-504. Bonitz had proposed to amend the variant quotation at 59,1-2 to print eidesi for eidosi (cf. Met. 988a10-11), but eidesi does not seem compatible with what Alexander says next. Moraux would take kai têi hulêi as outside the variant reading, to read something like: ‘it is clear that [Plato] used only two causes, the essence (for the Forms are causes of the essence for the other things, [and], for those who know, the One), and matter’. If that reading is right, Eudorus did not attempt to interpret Aristotle’s account of Plato according to a more ‘Middle Platonic’ view; Moraux 503). But Dillon suggests (1977:128 n. 1) that Eudorus intentionally makes the One the cause of Hyle as well as the Eide, noting that this ‘Eudoran’ monism appeals to Philo and appears later in the Chaldaean Oracles (e.g. fr. 34 Des Places and Psellus Hypot. 27).

Some manuscripts have this reading: ‘For the Forms are the causes of the essence for the other things, and for those who know, the One [is the cause of the essence] even for matter’. [Read thus] the text must be informing even those who do not know Plato’s doctrine about the principles that the One and the underlying matter are principles, and that the One is the cause of the essence for the Idea too. The first reading, however, is better; this makes it clear that the Forms are the cause of the essence for the other things, and the One for the Forms. Aspasius relates that the former is the more ancient reading, but that it was later changed by Eudorus and Euharmostus. (Tr. Dooley).

[T5a] A Achilles Tatius, Isagoga excerpta 2.1. <Dillon, 1977: 129 suggests that Eudorus may be the authority for Diodorus and Posidonius throughout, and generally held with the Stoics that the heavens were composed of pure fire (40,15), that there is no void (38,11).>

The philosopher Eudorus says that the astronomer Diodorus of Alexandria said that Astronomy differs from Physics in this respect, that Astronomy is concerned with the attendant circumstances (parhepomena) of Substance [e.g. ‘From what cause and how do eclipses come about?’], whereas Physics concerns Substance itself [e.g. ‘What is the nature of the Sun?’...]. But although these sciences are different in the questions they ask, they are interconnected, since one needs the other.


[T6a] A Simplicius, in Cat. 159,32. <Simplicius lists Eudorus among the ‘ancient exegetes’ of the Categories, with Boethus, Ariston, Andronicus, and Athenodorus.>

[T6b] A Simplicius, in Cat. 174,14. <Eudorus complains (ad. Cat. 6a36) that Aristotle, having contrasted the absolute and relative categories, discusses the relative, but makes no further mention of the absolute. These two ‘Platonic categories’ can be traced to Xenocrates>
A. Simplicius, in Cat. 187,10. <Eudorus the academic objects that wing is not coordinate with winged; for the wing is spoken of in actuality, and the winged in potentiality, as having the potential for wings... in the case of the rudder: that is, it should be spoken of in relation not to he ruddered, but to that which possesses a rudder and the head to that which possesses a head. But each is spoken of in two ways....>

Εὔδωρος δὲ ὁ Ἀκαδημαϊκὸς ἐγκαλεῖ ὡς οὐ συντάττεται τὸ πτερόν (10) τῷ πτερωτῷ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πτερόν ἐνεργείᾳ λέγεται, τὸ δὲ πτερωτὸν δυνάμει, ὡς δυνάμενον πτερωθῆναι· εἰ δὲ ἑνεργείᾳ γένοιτο, οὔτε πτερωτόν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς πεπτερωμένον ἀν λέγοιτο, καὶ ἡ κεφαλή πρὸς κεκεφαλωμένον.

A. Simplicius, in Cat. 206,10. <Eudorus reorders the categories, placing Quality after ousia, then Where and When, which he identifies with space and time. Eudorus’s explanation that ousia is in Space and Time suggests that he takes the Categories to be concerned with the sensible world. In this, at least in Simplicius’s presentation, ‘Archytas’ seems to follow Eudorus as Szlezak (1972) suggests. Archytas takes it as given that the categories concern just the sensible world (cf. 22,31 and 31,5 Thesleff; also Dillon 134-35 for discussion). He agrees with Andronicus in separating the postpraedicamenta, and with And. and Ariston in changing Aristotle’s definition of Relation (Simplic. 202,2). Archytas also differs from Eudorus on the ranking of Relation, Space, and Time. He puts Relation fourth, after Quality and Quantity, and Space and Time at the end of the list, in which he is followed by Philo. The order of the categories may reflect Eudorus’s Pythagorean metaphysics: thus if the One represents ousia, the Monad and Dyad may be represented by Quality (Form or Logos) and Quantity, Relation by the immanent logos; thus Moderatus regards the indefinite element in the intelligible world as Quantity (cf. Simplic. in Phys. 230,41. For Dillon, Philo’s comments (Fug. 12-13) might suggest that Eudorus made these equivalences; moreover, we might point to the passage of Plutarch cited above as T3c. Eudorus and Archytas will also be followed by ‘Lucius’ in several respects.>

Ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἀρχύτας, ὡς καὶ πρότερον εἰρήται, μετὰ τὴν οὐσίαν εὑρίσκει τάττει τὴν ποιότητα λέγον· “δευτέρα δὲ ἀ ποιότας· ἀνευ γὰρ τῷ τί ἦσθιν ἤμεν ἀδύνατον ποιοῦ τι ἤμεν. τρίτα δὲ, φησίν, ἀ ποσότας”. καὶ Εὔδωρος (10) δὲ τῷ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας λόγῳ τὸν περὶ τῆς ποιότητος λόγον καὶ μετὰ τοῦτον τὸν περὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ συνεζεύξκει φησίν· τὴν γὰρ οὐσίαν ἀμα τῷ ποῖῳ καὶ ποσῷ συνυφίσταται, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τὴν χρονικὴν τε καὶ τοπικὴν.
κατηγορίαν παραλαμβάνεσθαι: πᾶσαν γάρ οὐσίαν ποῦ τε εἶναι καὶ ποτε, δηλονότι τὴν αἰσθητήν.

Eudorus declares that the account of Quality is to be subjoined to that of Substance, and after that should come the discussion of Quantity. For Substance exists only in conjunction with quality and quantity, and after these should be taken the categories of Time and Space. For every substance is ‘somewhere’ and ‘at some time’. [...] (tr. Dillon)

[B6e] B Simplicius, in Cat. 236.28. <Eudorus challenges Aristotle’s account of condition (diathesis) on the grounds that ease-of-change (eukineton) will no longer be an idion of condition if a state (hexit) is also eukinetos and every state is a condition>

Εὐδωρὸς δὲ ἐγκαλεῖ ὅτι εἰπὼν ἴδιον εἶναι τῆς διαθέσεως τὸ εὐκίνητον φησὶν πάλιν † εἴπερ εἴδη αἱ ἐξεῖς καὶ διαθέσεις. “οὐκέτα γάρ ἴδιον ἐσται τὸ εὐκίνητον τῆς διαθέσεως· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἐξεις εὐκίνητος ἐσται· καὶ (30) γὰρ εἰ ἴδιον ἔσων ἡ τὸ λογικόν, οὐκ ἢν ἢν ὁ κύων ἡμῶν ἔλαχος ὄν. καὶ εἰ πάσα ἐξεις καὶ διαθέσεις, οὐδεμία δὲ διαθέσεις ἐξεις, πῶς οὐ συναχθήσεται τὸ τὰς ἐξεις μή εἶναι ἐξεις;”

[B6f] B Simplicius, in Cat. 246.22. <Eudorus finds that natural capacities will be conditions if they are eukinetos, otherwise states. Thus he finds that this species of Quality is the same as the preceding species.>

Ὁ δὲ Εὐδωρὸς αἰτιᾶται ὡς τῷ πρῶτῳ ταύτῃ τὸ τὸ εἶδος τῆς ποιότητος· ‘αἱ γὰρ φυσικαὶ δυνάμεις, εἰ μὲν εὐμετακίνητοι τύχωσιν, διαθέσεις ἔσονται, εἰ δὲ μόνιμοι, ἐξεῖς’.

[B6g] A Simplicius, in Cat. 256.16. <Eudorus inquires why Aristotle lists warming, chilling, disease and health among conditions in discussing the first species of Quality, but later ranks them under ‘affective quality’>

Ἀλλὰ πῶς, φησίν Εὐδωρος, ἐν μὲν τῷ πρώτῳ εἰδει τῆς ποιότητος θερμότητας καὶ ψύξεις καὶ νόσον καὶ ύγείαν ἐν ταῖς διαθέσεις κατηθύμησαν, ἐνταύθα δὲ ὠς εἰς ἀλλο εἴδος τὴν παθητικὴν ποιότητα αὐτὸς καταλέγει; ἢ φησιμεν ὃς ἔκει μὲν κατά τὸ διακεῖσθαι οὕτω καὶ πῶς ἐχειν θέσεως κατὰ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν ἔλαμβάνει, ἐνταύθα δὲ κατά τὸ πάθος (20) ἐμποιεῖ εἰς ἄλλο ἡ παθητικὴ ποιότης θεωρεῖται.

[B6i] A Simplicius, in Cat. 263.27. <Eudorus posts thickness and thinness as another genus of quality>

Εὐδωρὸς δὲ τὴν παχύτητα καὶ λεπτότητα εἰς ἔτερον τάττει γένος, τάς δὲ ἄλλας οὐ. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Αχαϊκὸν τάττεις μὲν εἰς τὸ τέταρτον γένος τάπτουσιν συνεπομένας τῷ μανῷ καὶ πυκνῷ, ἐκείνας δὲ μᾶλλον αἰνίττεσθαι τὸν Αριστοτέλη φασιν ἐν τῷ ἱδως δὲ καὶ ἄλλο γένος, ἃς ἐν τῇ Περὶ (30) γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τῷ θεμῷ καὶ ύγρῷ καὶ ψυχρῷ καὶ ξηρῷ
Eudorus states that the Pythagoreans posit a One above the duality of Monad and Dyad, and he describes this One as principle of matter as well as of all created things; it is the huperanô theos. He may draw on Phileb. 26E-30E.

Καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν φυσικῶν μόνων ἄλλα καὶ πάντων ἄπλως μετὰ τὸ ἔν, ὁ πάντων ἀρχήν ἔλεγον, ἀρχὰς δευτέρας καὶ στοιχεῖδος τὰ ἐναντία ἔτθεσαν, αἷς καὶ τὰς δυό συνοικίας ὑπέταττον σύκετε κυρίως ἀρχὰς ὑποστάσεις.

γράφει δὲ περὶ τούτων ὁ Ἐυδόρος τάδε: "κατὰ τὸν ἄνωτάτω (10) λόγον φατέον τοὺς Πυθαγόρειους τὸ ἐν ἀρχήν τῶν πάντων λέγειν, κατὰ δὲ τὸν δεύτερον λόγον δύο ἀρχὰς τῶν ἀποτελούμενων εἶναι, τὸ τε ἐν καὶ τὴν ἐναντίαν τούτῳ φύσιν. ὑποτάσσεσθαι δὲ πάντων τῶν κατὰ ἐναντίωσιν ἐπινοούμενον τὸ μὲν ἀστεῖον τῷ ἔν, τὸ δὲ φαῦλον τῇ πρὸς τούτῳ ἐναντιομενῇ φύσει. διὸ μὴν εἶναι τὸ σύνολον ταύτας ἀρχὰς κατὰ τοὺς ἀνδρας. (15) εἰ γὰρ ἡ μὲν τῶν ἡ δὲ τῶν ἔστιν ἀρχὴ, σύν εἰσί καὶ πάντων ἀρχαὶ ὑπερέτηθον τὸ ἔν". καὶ πάλιν "διὸ, φησί, καὶ κατ’ ἄλλον τρόπον ἀρχὴν ἔφασαν εἶναι τῶν πάντων τὸ ἔν, ὡς ἂν καὶ τῆς ὄλης καὶ τῶν ὄντων πάντων ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεγενημένων. τούτῳ δὲ εἶναι καὶ τὸν ὑπεράνω θεόν".

καὶ λοιπὸν ἀκριβολογοῦμενος ὁ Ἐυδόρος ἀρχὴν μὲν τὸ ἐν αὐτοῦ τίθεται λέγει, στοι χεία (20) δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ συνὸς γενέσθαι φησίν, ἀ πολλοῖς αὐτοὺς ὅνομασαν προσαγόρευειν. λέγει γὰρ: "φημὶ τοῦν τοὺς περὶ τὸν Πυθαγόραν τὸ μὲν ἐν πάντων ἀρχὴν ἀπολιπεῖν, κατ’ ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον δύο τὰ ἀνωτάτω στοιχεῖα παρεισάσχειν. καλεῖν δὲ τὰ δύο ταύτα στοιχεῖα πολλαίς προσογορίαις: τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν ὄνομαζεσθαι τεταγμένον ὄρισμένον γνωστὸν ἄρρητον δεξίον φῶς, τὸ δὲ ἐναντίον τούτῳ ἀτάκτων ἀόριστον ἀγνωστὸν θήλη ἀριστερὸν ἄρτιν σχότος, ὡστε ὡς μὲν ἀρχὴ τὸ ἔν, ὡς δὲ στοιχεία τὸ ἔν καὶ ἡ ἀόριστος δυσ, ἀρχαι ἄμφω ἐν ὄντα πάλιν. καὶ δήλων ὅτι ἄλλο μὲν ἐστὶν ἐν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῶν πάντων, ἄλλο δὲ ἐν τῇ δύαδι ἀντικείμενον, ὁ καὶ μονάδα καλοῦσιν".
It must be said that the Pythagoreans postulated on the highest level the One as a First Principle, and then on a secondary level two principles of existent things, the One and the nature opposed to this. And there are ranked below these all those things that are thought of as opposites, the good under the One, the bad under the nature opposed to it. For this reason these two are not regarded as absolute first principles by this School; for if the one is the first principle of one set of opposites and the other of the other, then they cannot be common principles of both, as is the (supreme) One. (tr. Dillon).
3.1.2. Ariston of Alexandria


Ἀλλ' ἐώ ταῦτα, πολλών εἰρηκτῶν, ὃν ἄρκεσε δύο μηνύσαι τοὺς ποιήσαντας ἑαυτὸν' ἣμας τὸ περὶ τοῦ Νείλου βιβλίον, Εὔδωρόν τε καὶ Αρίστωνα τὸν ἐκ τῶν Περιπάτων· πλὴν γὰρ τῆς τάξεως τὰ γε ἄλλα καὶ τῇ φράσει καὶ τῇ ἐπιχειρήσει (10) ταῦτα ἐστὶ καίμενα παρ’ ἀμφοτέρους. Ἐγὼ γοῦν ἀπορούμενος αὐτὸν ἀντιγράφων εἰς τὴν ἀντιβολήν, ἐκ θατέρου θάτερον ἀντέβαλον· πότερος δὴ ἦν ὁ τἀλλότρια ὑποβαλλόμενος, ἐν Ἀμμώνος εὗροι τις ἄν. Ἐγὼ γοῦν ἀπορούμενος ἀντιγράφων εἰς τὴν ἀντιβολήν, ἐκ θατέρου θάτερον ἀντέβαλον· πότερος δὴ (15) ἤτιότα τὸν Αρίστωνα· ἡ μέντοι φράσις Ἀριστώνειος μᾶλλον ἐστιν.

But I dismiss this subject, since it has been discussed by many writers, of whom it will suffice to report only the two who in my time have written the book about the Nile, I mean Eudorus and Ariston the Peripatetic philosopher; for except in the matter of arrangement everything found in the two writers is the same as regards both style and treatment. I, at any rate, being in want of copies with which to make a comparison, compared the one work with the other; but which of the two men it was who appropriated to himself the other's work might be discovered at Ammon's temple! Eudorus accused Ariston; the style, however, is more like that of Ariston. (Tr. Jones)


Ps.-Apuleius, De Int. 13, 193,16-20 Thomas (fr. 4). Ariston introduced five ‘subaltern’ moods of the syllogism, three in first figure, two in second, by substituting particular for universal conclusions in those moods which can yield universal conclusions. He seems to imply knowledge of the indirect moods of the first figure discovered by Theophrastus; he is probably not the author of the list of nineteen valid moods in the last ch. of Apuleius’ books; cf. Moraux I, 190 f.; see also Mariotti 59, Prantl I 557, M. W. Sullivan, Apuleian Logic, 1967, 96 f. and 165f.

Diogenes Laertius 7.164.

Γέγονε δὲ καὶ ἄλλος Ἀρίστων ... ἕκτος Ἀλεξανδρεὺς Περιπατητικός.

Porphyry, De Fac. ap. Stobaeum 1,49,24; p. 347,19-349,17 Wachsmuth. Grilli proposes to assign to Ariston this passage concerning at least two distinct faculties of soul, one concerned with intellation and the other concerned with sensation.

Marius Victorinus, Ars. Gramm. 1.

'Ars', ut Aristoni placet, 'collectio est ex perceptionibus et exercitationibus ad aliquem vitae finem pertinens, id est generaliter omne quicquid certis praeeptis ad utilitatem (5) nostram format animos'. [...] Ut Aristoni placet, 'grammatice est scientia poetas et historicos intellegere, formam praecipue loquendi ad rationem et consuetudinem dirigens'.

Simplicius in Cat. 188,31 ff = fr. 2 Mariotti. Ariston inquires whether kosmos may be a relative term. See Zeller III 1, 649; Prantl I 546; Moraux I 181-93; Mariotti (1966) 48-57.

Simplicius in Cat. 201,34 ff. Ariston altered ti to heteron in the definition of the relative at Cat. 8a31 f. to avoid circularity. Andronicus appears to have done the same (Simplicius subsequently states οὕτως δὲ καὶ Ανδρόνικος, although it is not clear who follows whom). Tarán, ‘Aristotelianism’ 742, suggests Stoic influence on Ariston; Gottschalk, 1106 n. 138, points to Aristotelian sources instead.
4. Lucius and Nicostratus

A. Lucius and Nicostratus: Simplicius in Cat.

[T1] A 1,19. <Nicostratus followed Lucius in raising eristic and tendentious difficulties about the Categories, with some benefit to subsequent philosophical discussion.>

[100x699]<Nicostratus followed Lucius in raising eristic and tendentious difficulties about the Categories, with some benefit to subsequent philosophical discussion.>

[T2] A 21,2-25,9 <The associates of Nicostratus raised problems concerning the opening of the text: (A) Aristotle claims to speak about ‘categories’, but opens with the discussion of homonyms, synonyms, and paronyms. (B) Thus while he claims to speak about ‘expressions’ (lexeis), he opens by discussing pragmata. (C) Homonymy is said to apply only to nouns (onomata), but should also refer to verbs.> Speakers: Hoi Peri N., cont. 


[A. 21,2-4] Ἀποροῦσιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Νικόστρατον, τί δήποτε περὶ τῶν κατηγοριῶν εἰπεῖν προθέμενος οὐ περὶ αὐτῶν εὐθὺς, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων διδάσκει τῶν τε ὁμωνυμίων καὶ συνονυμίων καὶ παρωνυμίων.

[B. 24,6] Ἀποροῦσι δὲ καὶ διὰ τί, καίτοι περὶ λέξεων προθέμενος εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων, ὅμως περὶ ὁμωνυμίας μὲν οὔδὲν λέγει, περὶ δὲ τῶν ὁμωνυμίων διδάσκει, καίτοι προηγούμενης τῆς κατὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν ἐννοίας, ἐπείρ ἄπτ᾽ ἐκείνης τὰ ὁμώνυμα. καὶ λέγουσιν καλῶς, ὅτι ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων γίνεται δῆλα τὰ ὁμώνυμα, ὅταν τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὄνοματος (10) ὢγνὸν μὲν ἄλλην ἐννοιαν, οὐ δὲ ἄλλην περὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος προβαλλόμεθα, ὡσπερ τοῦ κύων ὄνοματος ὢγνὸν ἄλλην ἐγὼ μὲν τῶν χερσαίων, οὐ δὲ τὸν διαλλάττων ἐννοεῖσαι.

[C. 25,9] Ἀποροῦσι δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, πῶς ὁμώνυμα ἐστίνα μόνον εἶπεν, ὅν ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, καίτοι τῆς ὁμωνυμίας καὶ ἐν ὑμᾶς ὁμασίᾳ, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ ἑνδορποῦστα, καὶ ἐν μεταχεί, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ ἑνδορφοῦσμον, καὶ ἐν συνδέσμοις καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἓ καὶ τοῦ ἕτοι πολλάς διαφοράς οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ παρειδόσωσιν. λέγουσι δὲ πρὸς τοῦτο, ὅτι τὸ ὄνομα τριχῶς λέγεται· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἠλλοὶ τὸ κύων, τὸ δὲ τὸ προσηγορικόν, τὸ δὲ τὸ κοινός ἐπὶ πᾶν μέρος λόγου διατείνοι, καθό Πλάτωνα μὲν καλοῖς, Ξενοφόντα δὲ κοινοὶ ὀνόμασι νεφεληθάδι φαίμεν. οὐδὲν οὖν ἄτοπον νῦν λέγεσθαι τὸ κοινός ἐπὶ πάντα τοῦ λόγου τὰ μέρη διατείνον.
Primary Texts: 4. Lucius and Nicostratus

Michael Griffin

[T3] A 26.21-28.1. <The associates of Nicostratus claim (A) that homonyms are not proper ‘names’ because they are not significant; (B) to the anonymous defense that not all ‘names’ (onomata) are significant, they would reply (it is not clear that they actually did reply) that the definition furnished by Aristotle requires onoma to be significant (sēmainei tī) in this context.> Speakers: Hoi peri N., cont. φατέν ἄν.

Respondents: τινες.

[A. 26.21-27.15] Ἀποροῦσι δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τὸ ὄνομα τῶν ὀμονύμων λέγοντες οἱ περὶ τὸν Νικόστρατον, ὅ γὰρ εἰπὼν χῦνα ὅτι μὲν μὴ βοῦν μηδὲ ὑπὸν ἢ ἄλλο τι λέγει τῶν τοιούτων ἐξήλωσεν, ὅ δὲ βούλεται σημαίνειν, οὐπό δεδηλωκέντα γὰρ τῶν κυνῶν, πότερον τὸν ἀστράφον ἢ τὸν χερσάιν ἢ τὸν θαλάττιον ἢ τὸ περὶ τὴν γνάθον συμβαίναν σκαπαμόδες πάθος, οὕτω (25) δήλων. εἰ οὖν μηδὲν σημαίνει, οὐδὲ ὄνομα ἀν εἰ, ὡστε οὔδε ὀμώνυμον· τὰ γὰρ ὀμώνυμα κοινὸν ἔχειν ὄνομα ἑλέγετο. εἰ δὲ προσθήκης δεῖται τινος πρὸς τὸ σημάνει τί τῶν παλλῶν ἐκείνων ἐστι τὸ ὕθελην, οἷον ὅτι τὸν ἀστράφον λέγει ἢ ἄλλον τινά τῶν κυνῶν, οὐκέτι κοινὸν μένει τὸ ὄνομα· τῇ γὰρ προσθήκῃ, καθ’ ἣν μάλιστα σημαίνει ὁ βούλεται, ἱδοθεῖται· ὡστε (30) εἰ μὲν μὴ σημαίνει τι, οὐχ ἐστιν ὄνομα τὸ ἐπὶ τῶν ὡς ὀμώνυμων ἀποδοθέντων λεγόμενον· εἰ δὲ τῇ προσθήκῃ τῇ ἱδον ἐκάστου ποιούσθη τὸ ὄνομα σημαίνει, οὐκέτι καθ’ κοινὸν ὄνοματος μετέχει ὀμώνυμα ἐστίν, ὡστε τὸ μετὰ τῆς [p. 27] προσθήκης οὐκέτι οὔτε ὄνομα μόνον ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ λόγος. ὡστε κἂν μὴ σημαίνη τι, οὐχ ἐστιν ὄνομα· τὰ γὰρ ὄνομα σημαντικὰ εἶναι βούλεται· κἂν σημαίνη μὲν μετὰ τῆς προσθήκης δὲ, πάλιν οὐκ ἐστιν ὄνομα ἀλλὰ λόγος διὰ τὴν τῆς διαφορᾶς προσθήκην, ἀλλ’ οὔδε κοινὸν ἐπὶ δία τῆς διαφορᾶς. ὅλως δὲ κατ’ οὐδὲν τῶν τοῦ κοινοῦ σημαινόμενον εἰ ἂν ὄνομαν (5) τὸ τῶν ὀμώνυμων λεγόμενον ὄνομα· οὔτε γὰρ κατὰ τὸ διαμετέριον κοινὸν· ἂλλο γὰρ ἀλλής συλλαβής τοῦ ὀμώματος μετέχον οὐκέτι ἃν εἰ ὀμώνυμον· οὔτε κατὰ τὸ ὄνομα μὲν ἄλλοτε δὲ ἐν ἄλλου χρήσει γνώμενον· ἂμα γὰρ ἐκάστῳ τῶν ὀμώνυμων λεγομένων ὑπάρχει τὸ ὄνομα· οὔτε κατὰ τὸ ἐν προσκαταλήψει καὶ ἱδοτήτι ἅμα, καὶ διότι ἐμελέν ἐκάστον ἄλλοτε ἄλλο (10) μεταλαμβάνειν ὄνομα, ὡς ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ τούτῳ τόπῳ καί, οὐκέτι πάλιν ὀμώνυμα· ἀλλὰ μὴν οὔτε ὡς ἡ φωνή· ἢ μὲν γὰρ φωνὴ τὴν αὐτήν πᾶσιν ἐμποιεῖ διάδημα τοῖς ἀκούοντιν, τὸ δὲ ὀμώνυμυν ἄλλην ἄλλης ἄλλης ἄλλῃν παρέχεται, εἶπερ ἄρα τι σημαίνει, εἰ δὲ μὴ ἄλλην ἄλλῃς, ἀσχημαντον μένει καὶ οὐκέτι ἐστὶν ὄνομα.

[B. 27.25-28.1] ἀλλ’, ἀδύνατον, φαίειν ἂν, τοιοῦτον εἶναι τὸ ἐν τῷ ὄρῳ τῶν ὀμώνυμων παρελλημένων ὄνομα· τὸ γὰρ ὃν ὑπέθεν ἄφοροι θεῖες εἰς οὐχ κατετάχθη, τὸ δὲ τῷ χαρακτῆρι μόνον ὄνομα ὁ κατατάθηται. εἰ σὺν ἄκαμπτασθον, οὐκ ἂν ὑπάγοντο τῷ ορισμῷ, ἢ εἰ κατατεταγμένον εἴη, οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινὸν· οὔτε γὰρ κοινὸν εἶναι ἢ κατάταξις δύναται. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ὃ δὲ κατὰ τοῦνομα λόγος ἔτερος ὡς κατατεταγμένον πάντως ἐστίν· τὸ γὰρ τῷ χαρακτῆρι (30) μόνον ἐχον οὔτε λόγον ἔχει τινά· τῇ γὰρ ἂν εἴη λόγος τοῦ βλάτυρι, μηδὲν σημαίνοντος· εἰ δὲ κατατάτασθαι, οὐχ ἐστὶ κοινὸν, ὡς οὔτε οἱ ὀροί κατὰ τὴν διάφορον κατάταξιν τὸ διάφορον ἐχοντες.
[T4] A 29,23-30,5. <The associates of Nicostratus reproach Aristotle for appearing to say that homonymy is only to be found in ousia (1a1-2), as homonymy is also found in, e.g., Quality and Position. Porphyry replies that tès ousias is omitted in some MSS and observes that neither Boethus nor Andronicus read it: as included in most MSS, however, it means just that Aristotle includes both horos and hypographè in logos.> **Speakers:**
Hoi peri N. **Respondent:** Porphyry. NB: The Nicostratus comment clearly postdates [T4].

Primary Texts: 4. Lucius and Nicostratus

Michael Griffin

[48,1-11] Ἀποροῦσι δὲ οἱ πειρὰς τὸν Δούκιον καὶ τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ μή ὡς μέρος λέγεσθαι τὸ ἐν ύποκειμένῳ. εἰ γὰρ τὰ συμπληρωτικὰ τῆς ύσιάς, φασί, μέρη αὐτῆς εἶναι λέγονται, συμπληροὶ δὲ ἄλλως μὲν τοῦ σώματος τοῦ αἰθητοῦ τὸ εἶναι χρώμα σχῆμα μέγεθος καὶ ἄλλως πόσης καὶ ποσότης (ἐχρον γὰρ καὶ ἀγχημάτων οὐκ ἄν εἰς ύσιά, τούτες δὲ τοῦ σώματος οἰον χίνου λευκότης καὶ ψυχρότης, ἀνάγκη δυοῦν θάτερον, ἢ μὴ λέγειν ταῦτα ἐν ύποκειμένῳ ἢ μὴ καλῶς ἀποφάσιεθαν τὸν ἐν ύποκειμένῳ τὸ μή ὡς μέρος εἶναι. πῶς δὲ καὶ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ὄλως τὰ συμπληρωτικὰ δυνατὸν λέγεσθαι, ὥστε ἡ Σωκράτους μορφῆ ἐν ύποκειμένῳ ἐστιν τῷ Σωκράτει, ἀλλ᾽ εἰπὲν ἄρα, τὰ τοῖς ἡδί τελείους ἐξωθὲν ἐπεισίν, ταῦτα ἀν εἰ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ αὐτῶς.
Appendix

Hoi peri ton Loukion

Simplicius elsewhere introduces a view of Nicostratus’ school and then continues the position to subject of Herminus mentioned at 58,20, if Boethus’ ‘reply’ at 58,28 is chronologically correct: rather, the privations, moods of verbs, (associates of Nicostratus) declare the division deficient, suggesting that it lacks an division of the objectors into those who reproach the division with being deficient. Rather, the to the mén of the toú toú, pántos ev allwóstai, wós epi tis eudidás elégeto. Álla to mén apó toú toú louaiin ó Bóthos édoxen eipwvn ta xainóymena mē einai òllos ev òn òn toú toú.

T7 A 58,14-28. <The associates of Nicostratus rather tendentiously suggest (A) that Aristotle is indulging in unnecessary verbiage (mataiologia) when he observes that ‘two-footed’ is not a differentia of knowledge. Simplicius responds that Aristotle’s point is not self-evident (πρόχειρος) without examples, citing a perceived error of Herminus. (B) They also object to the statement that the substrate has all the differentiae of the predicate: how can ‘rational animal’ inherit both ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’ from ‘animal’? Boethus amended the text, but Simplicius proposes to solve the aporia by distinguishing divisive from constitutive differentiae.> Speakers: Hoi peri N., cont. aitíowntai (sc. hoi peri L).1 Respondents: Boethus, Simplicius.

A. 58,14-22 Oi dé peri tôn Nīkóstpaton matapolojían exkalouvsin ev toútois: tis gýar, phíain, úgnwseis òti epistýmè evplúèmes ouk òn pote toú dúptoi dievngrh òi tetragópodi, óskerá to òswos; allá proótow mén, kán toúto safex, oukèti kai éxeivn ómooiés dhlon, òti toûn upálallhla oudévn xwliwei tás autás einai diáforas édei dé peri amfóv òma toûn antíkeimewn eipwvn. Óstheita òrfh òti oí peri tên Émgwvn to étéra kai mē upálallhla ou küalos éxeidéxantov, (20) nómósmawtis dýunatov einai kai mē upálallhla ónta òfri ev anángkesthai genvos: òútwos ouk òn próchéirous ou lógos, kán ta paraðeîmata kalwos lýfhtia safhi tôn lówon poi.".

B. 58,23-28 aitíowntai dé kai <dte> ev tois upálallhlas gênesin ôsai toû kataporoiméon fíain diáforai, tósoaitai kai toû upókeiméon ésoanta: òntos gýar upálallhlon toû òswos kai toû logikou òswos, (25) épeidh toû òswos diáforai eis to te logíon kai to álogon, póws oíw de toû logikou òswos to mén einai logikón, to de álogon; allì, ò mén Bóthos éndos òi ápória metagráfei òjíou tìn léxi ouwos:

T8 A 62,28-65,14. <(A) Those who opposed the division of the categories included Herminus, Athenodorus, Cornutus, Lucius, and Nicostratus (in a rather curious order). Simplicius makes a threefold division of the objectors into those who reproach the division with being excessive, those who criticize it as deficient, and those who declare that some genera have been introduced in the place of others. (B) ‘The associates of Nicostratus’ declare the division deficient, suggesting that it lacks an ekhesthai answering ekhein. (C) ‘The associates of Lucius’ claim that Aristotle wrongly omitted conjunctions, (D) articles, (E) negations, privations, moods of verbs, (F) the monad and the point. Simplicius replies directly to all but the final point (F), where Boethus is the main respondent.> Speakers: Hoi peri L. and Hoi peri N. Respondents: Simplicius, Boethus.

1 The plural can properly reference neither Nicostratus’ associates nor the intervening school of Herminus mentioned at 58,20, if Boethus’ ‘reply’ at 58,28 is chronologically correct: rather, the subject of aitíówneta must be the associates of Lucius. This would not be unprecedented, as Simplicius elsewhere introduces a view of Nicostratus’ school and then continues the position to hoi peri ton Loukion as if it makes no difference (e.g., 64,13-20).
Primary Texts: 4. Lucius and Niscostratus

[A. 62.28-30] Ἀλλοι δὲ πολλοὶ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἀμφισβητήσαν, αὐτὸθεν καθηγοροῦντες τῆς εἰς τούτον πλήθος διαφέρεσις, ὅσπερ Αὐρηνόδωρος ἐν τῷ Πρὸς τὰς Ἀριστοτέλεος μὲν Κατηγορίας ἐπιγεγραμμένῳ βιβλίῳ, μονὴν δὲ τὴν εἰς τούτον πλήθος διαιρεῖται αἰσχραίνοντες καὶ Κορντύτους δὲ ἐν ὀίς Πρὸς Αὐρηνόδωρον καὶ Ἀριστοτέλην ἐπέγραψεν καὶ οἱ περὶ τὸν Λούκιον δὲ καὶ τὸν Νίκόστρατον, ὅσπερ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα πάντα σχεδόν, ούτως καὶ πρὸς τὴν διαφαίνει ἀντιπήμαιν. λῃπὲον δὲ ἐν ὀργὴς ὀφραμένους τὰς ἀντιλογίας τριχῇ διασταλεμένους αἰσθάνεται, καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν ὡς πλεονάζουσιν αἰσθάνεται τὴν διαφάνειαν, ἔτεροι δὲ ὡς ἑλληπτικαὶ κατακαμένοιν, τρίτοι δὲ εἰσὶν οἱ ἄλλα ἀντ᾽ ἄλλουν εἰσῆχθαι γένεν νομίζουσιν. ... 

[B. 64.13-18] Οἱ δὲ ἐλλείπειν ἀποφαίνομενοι τὴν διαφάνειαν, ώς οἱ περὶ τὸν Νίκόστρατον, διὰ τί, φασίν, τῷ μὲν ποιεῖν τὸ πᾶσχειν, τῷ δὲ ἔχειν οὐκ ἀντέθεθην τὸ ἔχεσθαι; ἢ ἐχθρὶν ἐφιστάνειν τοὺς ταύτα λέγοντας, ὅτι τὸ ἔχεσθαι εἰς τὴν τοῦ κείσθαι κατηγορίαν ένεππετεν ἠδὶ διωρισμένην ἕχει μὲν γὰρ τὶς τὴν ἀσπίδα, ἐχεῖται δὲ ἢ ἀσπίς ἐν τῷ οὕτω περικείσθαι· θεός οὖν ἐστὶν τότε. 

[C. 64.18-20] ἄλλα διὰ τί, φασίν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην, τοὺς συνδέσμους παραλέλουσιν, εἰ λέξει καὶ οὕτωι σημειώσαν· οὗ γὰρ δὴ ἄσθενε, ἤ ὅτι ἀσθενείν διὰ τοῦ ἀσθενείν, ὅσπερ τὰς διὰ τὰς εἰσώθησε ταξιγράφοι καὶ τὰς σχολικίδας, εἶναις μετὰ τῶν γεγραμμένων σημαίνουσιν τι, αἰτία δὲ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὰς οὐδὲν σημαίνουσιν. ... 

[D. 64.28] ἐπιζητοῦσι δὲ καὶ τὰ ἀρθρὰ ποια ταχθήσεται. 

[E. 65.2-3] ἄλλ᾽ αἱ ἀποφάσεις καὶ αἱ στερῆσεις αἱ τε διάφοροι τῶν ἡμάτων ἐγκλίσεις ἐν τίνι ταχθήσονται; 

[F. 65.13-14] ἄλλα τὸ ἐν, φασί, καὶ ἡ μονάς καὶ τὸ σημεῖον πῶς οὐκ ἔξω πάπτει τῶν κατηγοριῶν; 

[T9] A 73.15-76.16. < (A) Do the ten categories distinguish only the sensible beings, or both the sensible and the intelligible beings? If the former, then Aristotle has omitted the intelligible world altogether. If the latter, then how can they have commonality? These problems are raised by Plotinus (sc. Enn. 6.1.), Lucius, and Niscostratus. Simplicius, following Boethus and others, responds that Aristotle speaks here only about sensibles, and is not speaking about ‘beings’ at all, but words significant of beings (B). The position of Niscostratus and Plotinus is reiterated apart from Lucius: how can ousia be one genus embracing the intelligible and the sensible? Simplicius replies that this is validly Platonic, Aristotelian, and Pythagorean (citing Archytas), while Boethus holds that the question is redundant, as Aristotle is addressing only sensible oussia. Porphyry corrects Boethus. > 

Speakers: Plotinus, Hoi peri L. and Hoi peri N. Respondents: Simplicius (likely relying Iamblichus), Boethus, Porphyry (correcting Boethus). 

[A. 73.15-32] Εἰ δὲ τὰς ἀποφαίνει, πότερον τὰ αἰσθήματα μόνα καὶ γενητὰ διείλευν ἐν (15) τούτοις ὁ Ἀριστοτέλεος καὶ ἀποθυμήσατο ἢ πάντα τὰ όπωσον οὖντα, καὶ ἄλλως πότερον ἄλλα ἐστὶ τὰ νοητὰ γένη ἢ τὰ αἰσθητά, ἢ τινα μὲν τὰ αὐτὰ, τινὰ δὲ ἔτερα· καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὲν ἄλλα, παραλείπεται πάντη ἐκείνη· εἰ δὲ τὰ αὐτὰ, συνώνυμα ἐσται τὰ αἰσθητα τοὺς νοητος· καὶ ποῖς ἐσται κοινωνία τῆς αὐτής σύνσχης, ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον ἐστιν καὶ τὸ ύστερον, καὶ τὸ μὲν (20) παράδειγμα, τὸ δὲ εἰκών; εἰ δὲ ὀμοιότητας λέγοντα ἐπὶ τῶν νοητῶν αἱ δέκα κατηγορίας, οὕτω ἐσονται αἱ αὐται, εἰπερ όνοματος μονὸν τοῦ αὐτοῦ κοινωνοῦσιν, ἄλλα πλεῖον ἐσται τὰ γένη, ὡς πέριφρηθέντων τῶν νοητῶν. ἔτι δὲ πὼς οὐκ ἀπείθανον ἐν ἑκείνοις ἄτρέπτοις οὕσιν

Appendix
Primary Texts: 4. Lucius and Nicostratus

Michael Griffin

... Respondent: Simplicius, Porphyry, Iamblichus, Plotinus (6.3).

[72x46]Appendix                                                                                                            Page


[72x353]ταῦτα, οὐδὲ τόπος χρόνος ἐστὶν ἕτερον τόπος οὐδὲ ὁ ὀὖν ἄξιον τὸ οὐσίας εἰς.

δὲ οὐ οὐσία δεκτικόν ἐστίν ἀριθμῷ μετρεῖσθαι, ποσὸν πέφυκεν καὶ μὲν ἄξιον τὸ οὐσίας...

**INCIPIT ΠΕΡΙ ΟΥΣΙΑΣ (76,23)**

[B. 76,14-17] Απορούσας δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὸν περὶ τῆς οὐσίας λόγον ὡς το Πλοτίνος καὶ οἱ περὶ τὸν Νικόστρατον, πῶς ἐν γένος ἡ οὐσία· εἶ γὰρ καθόσον τι καὶ τῆς νοητῆς καὶ τῆς αἰσθητῆς ἐνίκει, πρὸ ἀμφοῖν ἐσταὶ καὶ ἀμφοῖν κατηγορηθησάται, καὶ ὅπως ὅτι οὔτε σῶμα οὔτε ἀσώματον ἐσταῖ, ἵνα μὴ τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἀσώματον γενήται καὶ τὸ ἀσώματον καὶ σῶμα.

[710] Α 125,16. <The associates of Lucius object that Aristotle transfers body to Quantity rather than ousia. Simplicius replies that body is both a quantity and a substance.>

**Speakers: Hoi peri L.**

**Respondent: Simplicius.**

Τὸ δὲ σῶμα, καθόσον μὲν τριχῇ διαστατόν καὶ μετείσθαι πέφυκεν, ποσὸν ὑπάρξῃ καθόσον μὲντοι ὑποχειμενὸν ἐστίν καὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐν ἀρίθμῳ μένον ταῖς ἐναντίων ἐστὶ δεκτικόν, καθαῦτο ὁ σῶμα ἐστὶν· ὡστε ἢ μὴ δὲκτικόν ἡ ἀσώματος ἑνὸς τοῦ οὐσίας ἐνεργεῖν καὶ μὲν ἕτερον τὸ οὐσίας ἐφασμένην. Εἰπτισάμεν δὲ ἄξιον, ὅπως εἶπεν ἐτὶ δὲ παρὰ ταῦτα χρόνος καὶ τόπος ἐστὶν ποσᾶ, διότι οὐχ ἦν νομίσει τῷ σῶματι ὅτι ὁ χρόνος οὐδὲ ὁ τόπος, ἀλλὰ ἔξωθεν ταῦτα ἐπαχολουθεῖ.


(A) Plotinus asks: how can both the continuous and discrete be quantity? What is common to both? (cf. Enn. 6.1.4.5) Plotinus himself responds in 6.3.13 that the ‘so much’ is common to both, viewed as measure and limit.

(B) The associates of Lucius and Nicostratus object against Aristotle that magnitude is not a quantity at all, but a ‘so much’, as only Number is Quantity.

(C) They also criticize the division of Quantity into only Number and Size, as he should also have established weight, with Archytas, Athenodorus, and Ptolemaeus.

(D) They find problems with each species of Quantity, distinguishing Number into two kinds.

(E) Plotinus asks why Number in the sensible world is not substance, whereas intelligible number is.

(F) Plotinus asks whether Number is inherent or acts as a measure by being apart.

(G) ‘They’ also are puzzled about the inclusion of speech in Quantity, as it has combination and is quantity only per accidens.

(H) Moreover, they say, why did Aristotle say that speech was measured by syllables and not written characters?

(I) And why, they ask, is speech measured by long and short syllables?

(J) And why, they ask, does Aristotle say ‘if five is part of ten’ (Cat. 4b28).

(K) ‘The same person’ (sc. Plotinus, cf. Enn. 6.1.4.11) raises questions about the continuous, observing that body, surface, line, and generally magnitude are not *per se* quantities, but are said to be so because they

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share in being ‘so much’ and in number: only number is Quantity. He resolves this in 6.3.13 by describing it as the forward progression of the point to line to plane to solid.

(L) They ask why Aristotle introduces ‘place’ and ‘time’ without explaining the terms.

(M) They suggest that Andronicus did better by making place and time categories on their own.

(N) They question whether place is really Substance or Relative.

(O) ‘The same people’ question whether anything has ‘position’ on Aristotle’s doctrine.

[A. 127,11] "Επὶ δὲ ὁ Πλωτίνος ἵπτει ἐν τῷ πρῶτῳ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος· 'εἰ τὸ συνεχές ποσόν ἐστιν, οὐχ ἐστιν τὸ διωμομένον ποσόν· εἰ δὲ ἁμφότερος οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ ἁμφότερος καίνιν'. καὶ λῦει τὴν ἠμηκτὴν ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ λέγων ὅτι καὶνὲν αὐτοῖς ἐστίν τὸ τοᾶδε, δηλονέτοι τὸ ὄς μέτρον καὶ ὡς πέρας θεωροῦμεν, καθ' ὁ ποσόν ἐκαστὸν γινώσκεται.

[B. 127,30] Ἡγαλούσιν δὲ οἱ περὶ τοῦ Δούκιον καὶ Νικόστρατον τῇ διαφέρει πρῶτον μὲν ὡς μὴ δεόντος καὶ τὸ μέγεθος ποσὸν λέγουσιν· πηλίκον γὰρ ἐδεί τοῦτο λέγειν, ποσὸν δὲ τὸν ἁμφότερον, τὸ δὲ καίνιν οὐ ἀλλὰ τὶ ὡς ὁμοιώμος τῇ ἐνὶ τῶν εἰδῶν ποσόν καὶ αὐτὸ ὁμολιθεῖται. ἀλλ' επεὶ δὴ κἀκεῖνα κατὰ τὸ πλείστον τὸ μὲν συνεχές πηλίκον, τὸ δὲ διωμομένον ποσόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπιπλασσίτες πολλὰς (τὸ γοῦν ὄντως συνεχῆς ὄν ποσόν λέγουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πηλίκον· πολὺ γὰρ καὶ ὑπάρχει καὶ τὸν χρόνον ποσὸν λέγουμεν), εἰκότως οὔτε δύο πεπόθηκεν κατηγορίας τὸ ποσὸν καὶ πηλίκον οὔτε κατὰ τὸ πηλίκον καὶ ποσὸν διεϊλεύεται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ συνεχές καὶ διωμομένον, ἀπερ οὐδέποτε ὑπαλλάττει.

[C. 128,5] Ἀιτίονται δὲ καὶ τὸ εἰς δύο γενεσθαι τὴν τυχάνειν· ἐδει γὰρ μετὰ τὸν ἁμφότερον καὶ τὸ μέγεθος τρίτον εἴοδος τάττειν τὸ βάρος ἢ τὴν ὑφήν, ὡς Ἀρχόντας καὶ ὡς ὑπεροχόν Αἰθηνόδωρος ἐπεκέφαλεν καὶ Πτολεμαῖος ὁ μαθηματικὸς. ἀλλὰ ὁτιοῦν ὡς ἡ βαρύτης ποιότητος ἐστίν, ὡς ἡ πυκνότης καὶ παχύτης ύποϑετατο κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν, καὶ τὰ τοῦτος ἀντικείμενα.

[D. 129,8] Κατ' ἑδίκαν δὲ περὶ ἐκαστοῦ τῶν εἰδῶν τοῦ ποσοῦ διαπορούντες περὶ τοῦ ἁμφότερον πρώτων διαμομένων λέγουσιν ὡς ἀλλήλη μὲν τὶς ἐστίν τοῦ ἁμφότερον φύσις, καθ' ὃν ἐστίν ὁμοιώμος καὶ πόσος ἁμφότερος, ἀλλήλη δέ, (10) καθ' ὃν τὸ ποσὸν αὐτῷ ἀφορίστως καὶ ἀξιότως ὑπάρχει· καὶ τοῦτον εἰναι τὴν δηλομημένην, ὅταν ποσὸν τὸν ἁμφότερον εἰναι λέγουσιν, τὴν δὲ ἐτέραν παραλειφθαι τοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ διαλεξεῖσθαι.

[E. 129,27] Ἀλλὰ διὰ τί, φησίν ὁ Πλωτίνος, οὐσιώδους ὄντος ἐκεῖνου τοῦ ἁμφότερον ὃ ἐνταῦθα οὐχ ἐστιν ὑπάρχειν;
ἀμφισβητούμενων οὐχὶ τέλους γνωρίζεται λόγος τῶν γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἀλλὰ της διαμεμερισμένης ἡμαμελοῦσιν, πάθος τοῦ μέγεθος οὐδὲν ύπομένει τούτῳ ἀπὸ τὸν περὶ τὸν κατὰ τὴν πάσχειν ω志强 ἡ περὶ τῆς ἑπίσκεψεις μάλιστα καταληκτικοῦ τῷ ἀριθμῷ, ω志强 τὶς ἡν τῇ φωνῇ ἑαυτὸς τῆς διασχίσεις τῆς, τὸν ποιήσαι οὐδὲν ἐν τῇ ἑπισκεψι, ὡ志强 ὃ ἕν ἔν τῷ ἀριθμῷ, ὡ志强 τῶν περὶ τῆς ἑπισκεψις ἐν τῇ πάσχειν; ἀλλὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὰ παρεχόμενα τῶν Διὰ τότε, ἐνδοιαζόμενοι ἐπὶ πάντα τῶν περὶ τῶν μέρων;

Relative: for example, Socrates can be better identified by his qualities than his relatives. Cf. Boethus at 163,6-9

Aităta dé ὁ Νικόστρατος, ὅτι εἰπὼν ἐν εἴδος ποιότητος σὺν ἐν ἐπήγαγεν, ἀλλὰ δύο, τὴν τε ἐξίν καὶ τὴν διάθεσιν. ἄγνοε δέ, φασίν, ὅτι τὸ ἐν εἴδος τὴν διάθεσιν λαμβάνει, υφ’ ὁ τάττει τὴν ἐξίν καὶ τὴν διάθεσιν τὴν ὁμόνυμον τῷ κοινῷ, ὁσίερ ὑπὸ τὴν κοινὴν δικαιοσύνην ἢ τε μερικωτέρα δικαιοσύνη τέτακται καὶ ἢ ὁσίωτης.

Légonitos dé τοῦ Αριστοτέλους ὤσπερ τὰ ὅλιγοχρώνα χρώματα ἄπο τάθεις γίνεται, οὐτως καὶ τὰ πολυχρώνα ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ συμβαίνειν, ἀλογον νομίζουσιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Νικόστρατον τὸ πάντα τὰ χρώματος πάθους ἐγγυμομένον γίνεσθαι καὶ μάλιστα τὰ σύμφυτα καὶ σωφρωνίαν, ὁσίερ τὸ τῆς χώνος εν γάρ τοῖς παραδείγμασίν τοῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ φόρμου καὶ τῆς αἰσχρῆς ὡς ἐπηγαγόμενα τὰ ἐπὶ πάθη παρέθετο, ὡστε καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων οὐτῶς ἔοικεν δοξάζειν.

Oἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Νικόστρατον καὶ τὴν μανότητα καὶ πυκνότητα ποιότητας φιλοσοφοῦσιν δεικνύναι, τὸ πῶς μανὸν εἶναι παρατιθέμενοι καὶ τὸν ἀέρα, τὴν δὲ γῆν πυκνήν οὐ κατὰ θέσιν, ἀλλὰ κατα ποιότητα. ἤθελον δὲ πρὸς αὐτούς, ὡς καὶ ἐν τούτοις κατὰ τὸν θείον ΙΑΜΒΙΧΟΝ "ἐκατέρων τούτων δύο σημαίνει, καὶ θέσιν μαρίαν καὶ ποιότητα, θέσιν μὲν ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ύψαμμῶν, ποιότητα δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ ἄερος, διακρίνειν δὲ τάττει ἐν εἰσαγωγῇ σὺν ἐν αὐξανῷ. καὶ γὰρ ὀλοκληρωμένον ὡς τὰ μόρια ἀφετέρου αὐτῶν, ὡς ἐκ τῶν χρώματα ἐπηγαγόμενα, ὡς εἰς τοιούτοις ὠλλ’ Ὀ τῶν κατὰ θέσιν. τὸ δὲ τοιούτω μανὸν, φησὶν ΙΑΜΒΙΧΟΝ, ὡς τὸ πυκνόν ὡς τὸ στερεὸν αντιτάσσομεν, ὃ τὸν δοιδαίτερον ὑπάρχει καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μὲν τοιούτου κατὰ ποιότητα ἐστα, τὸ δὲ κατὰ θέσιν ύπὸ τὸ πρὸς τί ἀναφηγήσεται’’.

Questions about the category ‘having’. (A) Plotinus questions whether all the categories will be referred back to ‘having’ if it is ‘said in many ways’. (B) Nicostratus, in a long and
Appendix

Speaker: Νικόστρατος

Σαφῶς οὐδὲν ἔχειν γὰρ δὲ δηλοῦν ὁμωνύμως μήτε ἔχειν τὸ ἁπτόμενον ἢ τὸ τούτων παρῃτήσατο ὡς ἐν δὴ ὁτι ἐγὼ γυναῖκα ἢ τοῦ οὐθὲν ῥηθεὶς γὰρ . . . ἀλλοτριώτατος γυναῖκα ἔοικεν οἰκίας ἢ καὶ ἀγρὸν καὶ κτῆμα χεῖρα ἢ ὡς ἢ . . . μορίῳ ἐν μέρος πόδα ἢ χείρι χιτῶνα, ὡς ὡς τὰ ἔχων τυγχάνει ἔχειν καὶ . . . λεγόμεθα γὰρ διάθεσιν ἢ τινὰ ἕξιν ἔχειν προκείσθω γένος δὲ τὸ τῶν τὸ ἐκκειμένων ἔχειν οὐδὲν, κατηριθμημένω δέκατον ἐὰν τοῦτο (15) γὰρ τῶν νῦν, . . . διαιρούμενοι τί ὅπερ φωνὴν οἱ οὐκ διὰ, ἐν ἔχειν καὶ . . . πατήρ ποιόν ὅτι ἔχει, ὁ τὸ καὶ, ὁ χρῶμα τί εἰς τὴν ἀναχθήσονται Ἀπορίαι γεγόνασι

Speakers: (A) Plotinus, (B) Nicostratus, (C) Plotinus. Respondents: (A') Simplicius, (B') Iamblichus, (C') Simplicius. In addition, Simplicius adds a second reply to Nicostratus at 371,15 (D) and concludes the long section with a cap sentence (E).

[A. 368,1-6: Plotinus suggests that all the categories will be referred back to the category of ‘having’, as Aristotle defines it.] Ἀπορίαι δὲ πολλῶν καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο γεγόναι τὸ γένος, καὶ γάρ Πλοτίνος ἀπορεῖ λέγον [6.1.23] “περὶ δὲ τοῦ ἔχειν, εἰ τὸ ἔχειν ποίλαχος, διὰ τί οὐ πάντες οἱ τρόποι εἰς ταύτην τὴν κατηγορίαν ἀναχήρισονται; ὡστε καὶ τὸ ποσόν, ὃτι ἔχει μέγεθος, καὶ τὸ ποιόν, ὃτι ἔχει χρώμα, καὶ ὃ πατήρ, ὃτι ἔχει υἱόν, καὶ ὁ υἱός, ὃτι ἔχει πατέρα, καὶ ὃ κτήματα”.

[Ar. 368,6-11: Simplicius replies that there cannot be a single category of homonyms.] πρὸς ὅ (5) ἦτεν ὃτι οὐχ οἶον τε τὸν ὁμονύμων καὶ κατὰ γένος ἐξιπλαγμένον μίαν εἶναι κατηγορίαν καὶ ἐν γένος, οὐ μέντοι οὔτε τὸ ποσόν ἐν τῷ ἔχειν τούτῳ ἔστιν, διότι ἔχει μέγεθος, οὔτε τὸ ποιόν, ὃτι ἔχει χρώμα· ἀσώματα γὰρ τὸ ποιόν καὶ τὸ ποσόν, ἢ δὲ κατηγορία αὐτὴ τῶν περί ἡμᾶς ἐπιστήμης σωμάτων ἢν. ὁ δὲ πατήρ, ἐν μὲν καθὸ σώμα, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ περιτεθές ἢν· (10) εἰ δὲ καθὸ σχέσιν ἔχει πρὸς υἱόν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀσώματος ἢ σχέσις.

[B. 368,12-369,14: Nicostratus objects that the definition of the category ‘having’ here does not clearly belong to any of the meanings of ‘having’ provided in ch. 15. He suggests, constructively, that Aristotle should have separated off the irrelevant significations of ‘having’ here.] Ο ὁ Νικόστρατος ἐγκαλεῖ “διὰ τί, φησίν, οὐχ ξύνης τὰ ὁ κτῶν σημαινομένα τοῦ ἔχειν, ἀπερ ἐν τέλει τοῦ βιβλίου δημιουργήσω, καὶ διὰ τί οὐκ ἀπέχρινας τὰ ἀλλότρια τῆς προσεκμένης κατηγορίας, ὥσπερ ποιοῦσιν οἱ πολύποςμοι φωνῆς διαμοίρασιν; εἰ γὰρ ἵππεις νῦν, τί ποτέ ἐστιν τῶν κατηγοριών ἐνν (15) τὸ δέκατον τούτο γένος, ἐάν γὰρ ἀριθμοῦλο γῆται τις, οὔδὲν τῶν ἔκκειμένων τὸ ἔχειν τὸ ὡς γένος σημαινεῖ προκειόμενον διὰ τῆς ἡπειρίδος ἐντεύξει τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους ὃς οὕτως ἔχοναι: “τὸ ἔχειν κατὰ πλείους τῶν πολλῶν λέγεται. ἡ γὰρ ύς ἔξειν καὶ διάθεσιν ἢ ἄλλην τινα ποιότητα· λεγόμεθα γὰρ ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν καὶ ἀρετήν. ἡ ύς ποσόν, οἷον οὔ τυχάναι τις ἔχων (20) μέγεθος· λέγεται γὰρ τρίτης χείρι, ἢ ως τὰ περὶ τῶν σώματος, οἷον ἤματον ἢ χιτῶνα. ἢ ως ἐν μορφῇ, οἷον ἢ χείρι δακτύλιου. ἢ ὡς μέρος, οἷον πόδα ἢ χείρα. ἢ ως ἐν ἀγγείῳ, ἦν ἢ μέδιμνος ποιοῦν. ἢ ως χτήμα· ἔχειν γὰρ οἰκίας καὶ ἀγγόν λεγόμεθα. λεγόμεθα δὲ καὶ γνωσικα ἔχειν καὶ ἢ γνώση ἀνδρα. ἐκεῖνον ἐν ἀλλοτριώτατος ὃν νῦν θέρεις τρόπου τοῦ ἔχειν (25) εἶναι· οὕτων γὰρ ἄλλο τὸ ἔχειν ἐν γνωσικα σημαινομένον ὃ ὡστε συνοιεῖ”.

ἐν δὴ τούτως τὸ μὲν ὄνομον τὸ ἔχειν γνωσικα ἢ ἀνδρα καὶ αὐτὸς παρηθήσατο ως μίτα τοῦ ὁμονύμου λεγομένου ἔχειν ἀπόμενον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ συνεῖναι δηλοῦν, τὸ δὲ πρῶτον σαφῶς ἐστιν τοῦ ποιοῦν γὰρ ἔχειν καὶ διάθεσιν οὐδέν ἄλλο, φησὶν ὁ Νικόστρατος, σημαινεῖ, ἐὰν μετέλαβομεν (30) [p. 369] εἰς τὸ τί ἐστιν, ἢ τὸ ἐπιστήμωνα

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eīnai kai ēktikōn eīnai, ἀπερ ἐστὶν τοῦ ποιοῦ. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ μέγεθος ἔχειν καὶ τρύπησιν εἰναι τοῦ ποιου, καὶ τὸ τρίτον δὲ καὶ τέταρτον καὶ τὸ ἐβδομον του ἐχειν σημαινόμενον σαφὼς ἔκαστον ἐστὶν ἐν τη του προς τι καταγορια· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἰματιον, φησιν, ἔχειν καὶ διατύπων ἔχειν ἰδιον ἐστὶν τοῦ οἰκίαν ἔχειν καὶ κεκτηθείη, καὶ (5) ἐστὶν των προς τι· το γὰρ κτήμα του κτήμορος καὶ το κτήμορ του κτήματος. καὶ τὸ πέμπτον δὲ, τουτεστὶν το τόμοσιν ἔχειν οὐκ ἄδηλον ότι καὶ των προς τι ἐστιν, εἰπερ μέρος προς ὅλον, καὶ ἄλλος της κατα την οὐσιαν ἐστὶν καταγορια· ἔαν γὰρ μεταλαβὴν εὔπης, τι ἐστὶν το ἔχειν πόδας καὶ χειρας, ἔφει κατά τον ἀκριβὴ λόγον, κἀν ἀσύνησης ή, το πεποδωθα καὶ (10) λεγεινοδόθαι καὶ κοινὸς το οὐσιοθα, ἀψεις ον και τουτο διαλεκτικω δι ουχ ουτος συνθειας ως ἀκριβειας μεκε. ἡμαρτεν ουν, φησιν, μὴ ἀποκρινας τα ἄλλα σημαινομενα, ως ειδειμεν, τις ποτε ἐστιν η του ἐχειν καταγορια".

[BR: 369,14-370,11: Iamblichus replies that this was precisely the reason why Aristotle differentiated the any significations of having later in ch. 15, in order to differentiate them from the strict category so described here. He gives examples and suggests that N. is wasting his time with this criticism; perhaps Aristotle should have specified in ch. 15 which senses answered to the category of ch. 9, but this would be out of sorts with his 'concession'.] πρὸς δὴ τοῦτο ϕησιν Ιαμβλίχος, ὅτι "διὰ τοῦτο ἐν το τέλει διέχωρεν το του ἐχειν σημαινομενα, ἵνα αυτα χωρια της του ἐχειν καταγοριας. (15) εν μὲν ἀρχῃ καὶ τεν μέσῳ, ότε προ των ΕΞ άμα γενον ελεγεν, δια των παραδειγματων εδηλωσεν· καὶ γαρ σύνηθες τοις διαλεκτικοι το ἀφορίσει τα παραδειγμα, ως το τοτο μή όντα παραπλησια ἀποφρενοθα. οι γον εν της Ακαδημίας οριζομενοι το εκτον το οιον τε εχεθα, προς τους ζητουντας, κατα τι του εχειν σημαινομενον λεγουσιν, ἐπειδε πολλαχως (20) το ἐχειν, ως καὶ Αριστοτέλης διωμισε—προς τοιουτοις ουν παρακειμενοι επηγιν, εκτον λεγοντες ειναι το οιον τε εχεθαι ουτως ως η φρονησις εχεται υπο του φονιμου, δια των παραδειγματος τη τον υπογραφην ποιομενοι και άμα τα άλλοτρα σημαινομενα του εχειν αποκρινοντες και ο Αριστοτέλης ουν όταν του εχειν πολλαχως λεγομεν νοιτουτον το κατα γενος εχειν υπολιμβανη (25) οιον το υποδεδεσθαι καὶ υπιλιθθαι, δια του παραδειγματος παν το ἄλλο πληθος των ομωνοις λεγομενων ἀπεσκευαστο.

καὶ γὰρ χωρὶζεται ἀπὸ κτηματων· οὐ γὰρ περικείμεθα ἐκείνα· καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ΕΞΕΟΝ καὶ τῆς ποσότητος· συμβεβηκασα γὰρ αὕτα καὶ αὕτα εἰσὶν ἀισθητα. χωρίζεται δὲ καὶ τῶν ως μορίων ἐχομένων, ὃτι ἐκείνα μὲν συμφύνη, ταῦτα δὲ ἐπίκτητα, (30) καὶ ἐτι τῶν χτυμάτων, ὃτι πάντως ἐξεσθεν ταῦτα καὶ οὐ περικείμενα. χωρίζεται δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐν ἀγχοί, ὃτι ἐκείνα ἀπλώς κεῖται ὡς ἐν τόπῳ. μόνα δὲ ἐστὶν ἐν τοις ἀπηρισμενοις τῆς του ἐχειν καταγοριας το τε τρίτον καὶ το τέταρτον, το μὲν ἰματιον ἔχειν κατα τὸ ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ σώματι, τὸ δὲ δακτυλίον κατα τὸ ἐν μέρει. καὶ δήλων ὃτι εὐσύνηπτα ταῦτα ήν (35) δια την προς το υπιλιθθαι καὶ υποδεδεσθαι ὑμοίοτα, ἀπερ τῆς του ἐχειν καταγοριας ὁ Αριστοτέλης παραδείγματα προεβάλλετο.

μάτην οὖν ὃ [p. 370] Νικόστατος ἐγκαλεί ως ἐν τοῖς του ἐχειν σημαινομένος μὴ ἀποκρινόντο το κατα το γένος ἔχειν, εἰ μὴ ἀρα ὃτι μὴ προεσήθην ὃ Αριστοτέλης τῷ τρίτῳ καὶ τετάρτῳ ὃτι ταῦτα ἐστιν κατα τὸ γένος, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἐκτὸς ἀποβλητέον· ἀλλ’ οὖν εἰσίν αἱ τοιαύτα προσθήκαι συνήθεις τῆ Ἀριστοτελική συντομία. τὸ δὲ καὶ εἰς μέσῳ θείναι τὰ τῆς καταγοριας.
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ἡ ἕξις δὲ τὸ τὴν κατὰ, ἕξιν
τί κλίνης καὶ τὸ κατηγορίαν ἀλλὰ κατὰ γε τὴν πείθεσιν καὶ τὸ ἐξεσθαὶ προχείρως διαφέροντα τῶν ἄλλων κτημάτων, ὡς καὶ τῷ Πλάτωνι δοσκεῖ τῆς τοῦ ἐχεῖν γίνεσθαι (10) κατηγορίας’.

[C1]. 370,11-14: Plotinus questions why, if the division of somatic and asomatic ‘having’ makes the category distinct, actions are not distinguished in the same way.] ‘Ἀλλ’ εἰ τὸ τὰ σωματικά, φησιν ὁ Πλωτίνος [6.1.23], ἐχεῖν περὶ τὸ σώμα καὶ μὴ σωμάτω σύνθην ποιεῖ κατηγοριάς, διὰ τί καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν πολλῆς οὐσίας διαφοράς οὐκ ἄλλη μὲν κατηγορία γίνεται κατὰ τὸ τέμενυν, ἄλλη δὲ κατὰ τὸ κάκεῖν ἢ κατορύττειν ἢ ἀποβάλλειν;

[C1']. 370,14-21: Simplicius replies that the category of having is unlike acting in this respect: the somatic-asomatic distinction is the sole and entire feature that makes it unique.] ἢ μὲν τοῦ ποιεῖν ἐνέργεια (15) μία ἐστὶν καὶ ἑκάτερον λόγον καὶ οὐδὲν δεομένη τῆς διαφορᾶς ὑποδοχῆς τῶν τοῦ ποιεῖν ἐπιδεχομένων· καὶ τὸ τέμενυν γὰρ καὶ τὸ κάκεῖν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οὐδὲν κατὰ τὸ ποιεῖν διαφέρουσιν· ἢ μέντοι τοῦ ἐχεῖν κατηγορία ἐν τούτῳ τὴν ὀλίγην ἔχει ἰδίότητα εἰς τὸ μὴ ἀσώματον, σῶμα δὲ εἶναι τὸ προκειμένου, ἢ οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς τυχοῦσας σχέσεως χαρακτηρίζεται, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῆς πρὸς ἄλλο εἰς (20) ἐαυτὸ κυρίῳ συνείσηθαι.

[C2]. 370,21-22: If a cloak is on a bed rather than a person, asks Plotinus, will this not create an additional category? ] ‘Ἀλλ’ εἰ τὸ προκειμένου, φησιν, ἰμάτιον ἄλλην κατηγορίαν ποιεῖ, διὰ τί μὴ καὶ τὸ κείμενον ἐπὶ κλίνης ἄλλην ποιήσει;

[C2']. 370,22-30: Simplicius replies that the cloak on the bed is in the keisthai category, and the bed is not animate.] ἢ τὸ μὲν κείσθαι ἰμάτιον ἐπὶ κλίνης τῆς τοῦ κείσθαι ἐστὶν κατηγορίας ἢ τῆς ἐν τῷ πείθει: οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐνέργειαν παρέχεται ἡ κλίνη εἰς τὸ ἐχεῖν· ἔχει γὰρ καὶ κράτησιν ἐμφαίνει τινὰ ἢ τοῦ ἐχεῖν κατηγορία, ἄλλα σωμάτων (25) ἐπικτήσεως. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἀληθές, ἐπὶ μόνον τῶν ἐμφύσων τὸ ἐχεῖν ἐπαληθεύεται, ὦτε καὶ ἀγάλματι κόσμος περιέχεται, ὦτε μὲν ἁλίθῳ ὀὐκ ἕνεκα ἐχεῖν τὸ ἀγάλμα, ἄλλα κείσθαι ἐν τῷ ἀγάλματι ὁ κόσμος· εἰ δὲ ὄς ἐμφυσόν τι θεωρεῖτο, κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ ἐμφύσων ἀναφοράν ἐχεῖν ἐν λέγοιτο τῶν κόσμων.

[C3]. 370,30-31: Plotinus suggests that having is a state of possession, and so a quality.] ‘Ἀλλ’ εἰ κατὰ τὴν κάθεξιν τὸ ἐχεῖν χαρακτηρίζεται, (30) εἰς ἕξειν ἀναχωθήσεται, φησιν, ἢ δὲ ἕξεις ἐν τῇ ποιήσει’.

[C3']. 370,32-371,1: Simplicius replies that the having which answers to a ‘state of possession’ is homonymous with the category: the category describes control of acquired bodies, whereas the state of possessing a quality is the containment of non-bodily things.] ἢ ὄμοιόνισσα αὐτή ἢ ἕξεις· ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἦν ὁσωμάτων συνοχή, αὐτῇ δὲ ἐπικτήσεως σωμάτων κράτησις, καὶ μὲν τοῦ ἐχεῖν δι’ ἐνεργείας τῶν ἐχοῦντων παρασχέται, ἢ δὲ ποιητήσεων ὡς δι’ ἐνεργείας οὐτέ τῶν μετεχομένων οὐτε τῶν μεταλαμβανόντων. διαφέρουσιν δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰ ἐχόμενα, ὦτε ἐκεῖ μὲν

Appendix
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Primary Texts: 4. Lucius and Nicostratus

Michael Griffin

(35) ἀσώματα ἐστίν, ἐνταύθα δὲ σώματα, καὶ κατὰ τὰ ἔχοντα, ὅτι ἔχει μὲν ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ, ἐνταύθα δὲ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἔξωθεν.

[C4. 371,1-3: Plotinus points out that if having a quality is not categorical ‘having’ because quality is already accounted for, it follows that having a weapon is not categorical ‘having’, because a weapon is ouσία, which is already accounted for.] ἂν’ εἰ ποιοτίται, φησίν, οὐ δεὶ λέγειν ἔχειν, ὅτι ἡ ἐν οἰκήμαν ποιοτίται, οὖτε ποιοτίται ἔχειν εἰρήμενης ποιοτίτης οὐδὲ μέρη ἔχειν εἰρήμενης οὐσίας, διὰ τί τὸ ὁπλαῖ ἔχειν ἄλλης δεὶ λέγειν κατηγορίας καῖτος εἰρήμενης οὐσίας, ἐν ἣ τὰ ὁπλαὶ;

[C4r. 371,3-9: Simplicius replies that it is not the weapon, but the control of the weapon, that generates the category of ‘having’.] ἢ ὅτι οὐ τὰ οἴσα ἢ τὰ υποδήματα καθ’ αὐτά εἰρήνεται εἶναι τῆς τοῦ ἔχειν κατηγορίας οὔτε ἡ κτήσις αὐτῶν, εἰ τις κεχωρίσεως αὐτά ἵθησαι αὐτῶν (5) μὴ ποιήσατο, ἂν’ ἡ κράτησις αὐτῶν καὶ ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἔχειν αὐτὰ λεγομενή ἔξω, αὐτὴ γορίη τήν του ἔχειν κατηγορίαν. ἄλλο δὲ ἢ τὸ ποιοτίτη ἔχειν καὶ ποιοτίτη, ἄλλο τὸ ὁπλαῖ ἔχειν καὶ υποδήματα: ἔκει μὲν γὰρ αὐθάμιτον ἢ ἔξω, ἐνταύθα δὲ αὐθαμικών, καὶ ἔκει μὲν ἀλλοιωτικά ἐστι τῶν μετεχόντων τὰ μετεχόμενα, ἐνταύθα δὲ περιείσαιται μόνον.

[C5. 371,9-10: Plotinus asks: how can an entire genus arise for such a limited number of cases?] ἄλλα τὸ ἐν ὀλίγοις, φησίν, πῶς γένος;

[C5r. 371,11-14: Simplicius replies that this genus obtains only for the most extreme cases (eskhostois), and that it is irrelevant that there are few instances, as some species have only one member]. ἢ ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἐσχάτοις ἐστί τούτο τὸ γένος καὶ περὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν ὑπάρχει, καὶ διὰ τούτο εἰς βραχύτατον συνεπτάλβαται, καὶ οὐ διὰ τούτο ὄν ἢ εἰ ἡ γένος· καὶ γὰρ ὃ φοίνικας εἰς ὃν τὸ εἶδος ὀλον ἔχει ἐν ἐαυτῷ.

[D. 371,15-23: Simplicius, in an interlude which appears to respond again to Nicostratus (B), explains why Aristotle offers the second discussion of the ‘homonymy’ of having in ch. 15.] ἄλλα διὰ τί μὴ συνήθει τῶν περὶ τοῦ ἔχειν λόγον ταῖς ἄλλαις κατηγορίαις, (15) ἄλλα’ ἄνσωρ ἐς μετανοιάς μετὰ τοῦ περὶ τῶν ἄντικειμένων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀγα καὶ περὶ κινήσεως λόγον περὶ τοῦ ἔχειν ἐμνήμονεσθαι; ἢ οὕτως ὅτι τὸν περὶ τῶν κατηγορίων λόγον, ἐπειδὴ τινος κατὰ παραδοσοῦν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐμνήμησθη, ἐξεργάζεται καὶ ἐκείνα. τελευταίας δὲ ὀσίας τῆς τοῦ ἔχειν κατηγορίας, φροντίζουν τάξιας εἰκότως τελευταίας <τής> τοῦ ἔχειν ὁμοιομοίας (20) ἐμνήμονεσθαι, οὐ μόνον αὐταῖς ταῖς κατηγορίαις τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀποδιδοῦσι τάξιν, ἄλλα καὶ τοῖς ἔξωθεν ἐπιλεγόμενοις καὶ ἐξεργάζομαινοις τὴν αὐτὴν ἀποδιδοῦσι.

[C6. 371,23-24: It is absurd, Plotinus suggests, for Aristotle to omit ‘having a wife’ from the later homonymy in ch. 15.] ἄλλα’ ἄτοπος, φησίν, ἀποδοσιμαύζον τὸ λέγειν ἐχεθαί γυναῖκα συνήθες ὅν’.

[C6r. 371,24-26: Simplicius replies that it would have been equally absurd to pass over a customary phrase, rather than classifying it as a dialectician should.] ἄλλα’ εἰ μὲν μὴ ἐμνήμησθαι, ἄτοπος ἢ παρεῖ τὸ ἐν τῷ ἔθει, ὃ δὲ μηνεθεὶς καὶ ἐπιχώνας διαλεκτικοῦ ἔργον ἐποίησεν, φ. (25) μάλιστα διαφέρει ἡ τῆς ἀληθείας χρίσις.
ὁ ἐπισημήνασθαι ὅτι οἱ ἀπὸ Στοᾶς αὐτὸν παλαιὸς παραλαβόντες τῆς ἐν περί τοῦ τῷ ὅρῳ τοῦτῷ μετὰ δὲ τῷ χρησαμένῳ λόγῳ ἐστί θαύματι ἔοικεν οὐδὲν οὐδὲ ἐναντία εἶναι δὲ ἐναντία καθὸ ὀνταὶ ἐστὶ τι τὸ πρὸς ἧλιως εἰναι γὰρ τῷ τῶν ἐναντίον αὐτῶν ἐναντία ἐστιν οὐκ, τὰ καθὸ μὲν ἐναντία τῶν πῶς συνυπάρχοντα αὐτὰ ὡς τὰ ἐναντίον δὲ τὰ πρὸς ἐστί τι ποσά ἴσον μὲν ἐστιν ὑπὸ οἷς τῶν καὶ τὰ οὕτως οὖν ἀπεφήνατο ἄξιον καὶ ὅτι λέγεται ἀλλὰ οὐκ ἀντίθετα τὸ ἐναντία Ἀνδρόνικος καὶ δὲ ἄλλως τοῖς ἐν, δὲ πρὸς τὸ δύνασθαι ὁ λόγος ἂντικεῖσθαι γὰρ τὴν ἑσθεν· ἐπεὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον αὐτὸ δὲ περὶ τὸ ὄντος ὁμωνυμίαν· ἡ ἐφαρμόζει οὐ τῶν τοῖς εἴδεσιν λόγος· ἔπειτα μὲν τὰς ἀπορίας εἰρήσθω.
έχρησαντο, τό μὲν σαθρὸν αὐτοῦ παραδεικνύοντες, πειρώμενοι δὲ ὁμως λύει τά
dοκοῦντο ἀτοπως. οἱ μὲν Νικόστρατος αἰτάται, ὅτι μὴ μόνον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει <..>
tο τὸ χρώματο τὸ λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν, καὶ γλυκὺν καὶ πικρὸν ἐν τῷ χρώματι, διακαιούντα δὲ καὶ 
adικαία εἰς ἐναντίων γένος τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἁρπή, τῆς δὲ κακία τὸ γένος, αυτῇ δὲ ἡ 
ἀρετή καὶ ἡ κακία τρόπον μὲν τινα ἐν τοι τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένος (ἐξεταράμοις τό γένος καὶ ποιώμενοι), τρόπον δὲ ἄλλον εἰς ἐναντίων γένος (τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἁρπής τὸ γένος τὸ 
ἀγαθόν, τῆς δὲ μοχθήρως τὸ κακόν, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν (10) αὐτὰ γένει δοξεῖ, εἰ 
μὴ ἄρα ἐν ποιώμενῳ καὶ τάντα ως γένει· οἱ μὲν τοι νεογίστος πολλαχοῦ φαίνεται 
tὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν μὴ ως γένει ἂνν· ὡς ὁμοιόμοιος φωνάς τιθείς).

[Τ20] B 390.14-19. < Νικόστρατος doubts that the intermediates are characterized by the negation of the 
extremes, contra Cat. 11b33-12a25. > ΣPEAKERS: Νικόστρατος. ΡΕSPONDENTS: Σιμπλίκιος.

Διελόντος δὲ τοῦ Ἀριστότελος τὰ ἐναντία εἰς τέ τὰ ἁμασια καὶ τὰ ἐμμεσα καὶ ἁμεσα 
mὲν λέγοντος εἰςεναι ὅν εἰς ἀνάγκης θάτερον υπάρχει το δεκτικῷ καὶ αὕτα μέρος 
πάρευσιν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ, εἰ μη τῶν συμφωνῶν εἰς ὅς ή θερμός τῷ πυρί, ἀλλά τῶν 
συμβεβηκτῶν, χίνεται λόγου τῶν ἁμέσων τοιούτου, ὅτι ἐστιν ἁμέσα ἐναντία ἐν οἷς τὸ 
ἐπέρεων ἐξ ἀνάγκης υπάρχει περὶ τὸ δεκτικὸν, ἁμέσα δὲ ὅν οὐχ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ 
ἐπέρεων. εἰπόντος δὲ Ἀριστοτέλους τῇ τῶν ἁμέσων ἁπόφασι τῷ μέσῳ χαρακτηρίζεσθαι, 
ἀντίλεγε Νικόστρατος, ὡς ἴς ἐποφήσι τὸ μέσον ἡμίλιον τε καὶ τὸ οὐκ (15) ἀνθρώπος 
καὶ οὐχ ἠπόστη μεσότητα δηλόουν· δει οὖν, φησιν, προσεχθείσα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει 
λαμβανομένου τοῦ μέσου, ἐν ὑπέρ ἐστιν αὐτοῦ τὰ ἀκρα’”.

[Τ21] B 402.11-403.5. < (A) Νικόστρατος questions the definition of the differentiation between the 
opposition of contraries and that of possession and privation; (B) Νικόστρατος further argues that privation can 
change into possession as well as vice versa. > ΣPEAKERS: Νικόστρατος. ΡΕSPONDENTS: Σιμπλίκιος.

Τοῦτων δὲ προελημμένων θάδιον λοιπὸν καὶ τὰς Νικόστράτου ἄπορίας διαλεύειν, ὡς 
φήσαν μὴ ἠκριβῶς ταύτην ἀποδέδοθαι τὴν διαφοράν· μήτε γὰρ τὰ ἐναντία εἰς 
ἀλλήλη πάντως μεταβάλλειν, διότι ἀπὸ σπουδαίου φαινός οὐ γίνεται, μήτε πάσαν 
στέρησιν ἀμεταβλήτην εἶναι εἰς ἔξιν· “καὶ φαινός οὐ γίνεται, μήτε πάσας στέρησιν 
ἀμεταβλήτην εἶναι εἰς ἔξιν· καὶ γὰρ ἐκ πεφωτισμένου καὶ ὑπακοῆς καὶ 
ἡμερομεσόν γένοιτο ὁν ἐσποτιζόμενο καὶ ἀναπτυχθῆναι καὶ γυμνόν, καὶ ἐκ τῶν 
στερήσεων αὐτῆς ἐξ ἔξιν· ἄποστολον οὖν τὰ ἀμφότερα ὑπάρχοντα διασφίλεσθαι καὶ τὰ 
μὲν προσνέμειν τῷ ἐπέρεω, τὰ δὲ τῷ λοιπῷ”.

[Τ23] B 406.5-407.14. < Νικόστρατος says that dividing the true and false is not the idion 
of contradictories, citing oaths and expressions of wonder and blame. > ΣPEAKERS: Νικόστρατος. 
ΡΕSPONDENTS: Σιμπλίκιος.

'Ὁ δὲ Νικόστρατος αἰτάτα αἵνα ταῦθα λέγων μὴ ίδιον εἶναι τῶν κατὰ ἀντίφασιν 
ἀντικειμένων τὸ διαχρακτὴν τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ πειράζοντο, ‘οὔτε γὰρ μόνον ὡστε πᾶσι 
αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχει· οὐ μόνος μὲν, ἃ καὶ τοῖς ὁμοτικοῖς καὶ τοῖς ὁμοτικοῖς λόγοις 
ὑπάρχει τὸ ἀνάγκης θάτερον, οἷον ‘η τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν ἐπραξα τάδε’· ‘οὐ μᾶ τὴν 
Ἀθηνᾶν οὐκ ἐπραξα’· ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς (10) ὁμοτικοῖς, φησί, τὸ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει· ὡς 
καλός γε ὁ Ποιεωτικός, καὶ τοῖς ποιεωτικοῖς, οἷον ‘φαινός εἴσπου’· ‘οὐ φαινός εἴσπου’· 
οὖκ ἀρα μόνος ὑπάρχει τοῖς κατὰ ἀντίφασιν τοῦτο, ἀλλ’ οὔτε πᾶσιν, φησιν· αἱ γὰρ 
εἰς τὸν μέλλοντα χρόνον ἐγκατελεῖμένα προτάσεις οὔτε ἀληθὲς εἰσίν οὔτε πειράζει διὰ 
tὴν τὸν ἐνδεχομένου φώσι· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ‘ἔσται ναυμαχία’ ἀληθὲς οὔτε τὸ ‘οὔτε ἔσται’,
All’ ὀπότερον ἔτυχεν’. “πρὸς δὴ ταύτα ἐνεστὶ μὲν, φασὶ, λέγειν ὅτι τεττάρων ὄντων ἀντικειμένων τοῦ ἐνὸς ἱδιον τούτῳ οὐ πρὸς πάντα ἀλλ’ ως πρὸς τὰ τρία ἀποδέδοξεν- ο γὰρ εἰπὼν ὅτι τῶν τεττάρων τὸ ἐν μερίζει τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψευδός, οὐ καθάπαξ τούτῳ ἀπέφηγον, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ μόνῳ τῶν ἀντικειμένων τούτῳ ἐποίησεν. χορὶς δὲ τούτων, φασίν, πάλαι (20) λέλυται ταύτα ἐν ταῖς εξήγησεν τοῦ ὅρου τοῦ ἀξιώματος τοῦ ἀφοριζομένου τὸ ἀξίωμα ὁ ἐστὶν ἀληθὲς ἢ ψευδός. οὔδε γὰρ τὸ ὁμοτικὸν οἷον ταῦτα ἀληθὲς εἰναι ἢ ψευδός, ἀλλ’ εὐφραίνει καὶ ἐποφθεῖν ἐν τοῖς ὀρκοῖς εἰσὶν, ἀληθεύει δὲ ἢ μετάθεται ἐν αὐτοῖς οὐχ ὅτι τέ, καὶ πείρι ἀληθῶν ὁμοίως τις ἢ ψευδόν. καὶ τὸ ὀμφαστικὸν δὲ πλεοναζόν τὸ θαύματι παρὰ τὸ ἀξίωμα (25) καὶ τὸ πεπτικὸν τῷ μόσῳ οὔτε ἀληθές ἐστιν ἢ ψευδές, ἀλλὰ ὀμοῖο ἀληθέςν ἢ ψευδέσων’.

[T24] A 410,25-411,28. < (A) Nicostratus censures Aristotle for an incomplete division of the contraries, not noting that adiaphoron is opposed to adiaphoron. (B) Nicostratus accuses Aristotle for also not including the division of good as contrary to good, as prudent walking is contrary to prudent rest. > Speakers: Nicostratus. Respondents: Simplicius.
σοφείςν βούλεται τά χρήματα, ἢ δὲ προκείθηκα, ἀλλ’ ἀμφό τοῦ καιροῦ στοχαζόμεναι συνάπτονται κατά τό ἀγάθον· θρασύτης δὲ καὶ δείλα μέχρινται.

[T25] B 414,23-415,15. < Nicostratus objects to 14a19-25, stating that there are no contraries which are genera and not also species of a genus. ‘The students of Porphyry’ (hoi peri ton P.) reply that some of the categories are homonymous and said of many things despite not being under one genus, and so are themselves genera, such as the good and the bad. Theophrastus is cited next, and Lambichus replies to him. > Speakers: Nicostratus. Respondents: ‘The associates of Porphyry’.

Τέταρτον θεώρημα παραδίδουσιν ὅτι πάντα τά ἔναντια ἢ ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτό γένος ἐστίν, ὥσπερ τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν ὑπὸ τὸ χρῶμα, ἢ ὑπὸ ἐναντία γένην, ὥσπερ διακαιούνται καὶ ἀδικία, εἴπερ τὸς μὲν ἄρετά, τῆς δὲ κακία τὸ γένος, ἢ αὐτὰ γένη ἐστίν, ὥσπερ τὸ ἀγάθον καὶ τὸ κακόν, ἢ οὐχ ἔστιν ἐν γένει ἄλλο, ἀλλ’ αὐτὰ τυγχάνει γένην οὖν. ταύτης δὲ τῆς διαφέρον (25) ὁ Νικόστρατος λαμβάνεται, ἀνύπαρκτον λέγων τὸ τρίτον ἐν αὐτῷ τίμημα, μὴ γὰρ εἶναι τίνα ἐναντία, ἀπερ ἐστὶν μόνον γένειν, συχί δὲ καὶ εἴδη τινὸς ἢ τινῶν. “αὐτίκα γοῦν τὸ ἀγάθον καὶ τὸ κακόν ὑπὸ τήν ποιητήσα τάττεται, καὶ ἤτοι τὴν διάδοχον ἢ τὴν ἐξήν. ἄλλους δὲ πᾶν ἐναντίον ἤτοι ὑπὸ τοῦ δέκα γενός ταχθησάτα, καὶ ἔστιν υπό τὸν ἐναντίον γένος καὶ μάτιν εἴρηται (30) τὸ αὐτά γένη εἶναι, ἢ ἐξὸν τῶν δέκα κατηγορίων ἐστίν καὶ ἀτελῆς ἐσται ἢ εἰς δέκα διαφέρεις”. ταύτην δὲ τὴν τάπορον χαλῶς ὁμοπαθήσαι οἱ περὶ τὸν Πορφύριον λύσεις λέγετε τῶν ἐναντίων τὰ μὲν ὁμόνυμα εἶναι, τὰ δὲ (p. 415) οὐ ποιόν, καὶ ὅτι “τὰ μὲν μὴ ὁμόνυμα διείλεις εἰς τὰ τῷ ὑπὸ γένος τῷ ἐναντίον γένει, τὸ δὲ γε ωμόνυμος μὴ ὑπ’ ἐν γένος οὖν, κατά πολλῶν δὲ λεγόμενα, διότι ἔστιν τὰ γένη τοῖς ἀφ’ ἑνὸς ὁμόνυμοις, αὐτὰ γένη φησίν εἶναι. τοιούτων δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀγάθον καὶ τὸ κακόν· ὁμόνυμον γὰρ τὸ ἀγάθον καὶ γάρ ἐν οὐσία, ὡς θεὸς, καὶ ἐν (5) ποιήτητα, ὡς ἄρετή, καὶ ὡς ποιόν δὲ, ὡς τὸ σύμμετρον, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀλλα ὁμογενείαις”. ἀλλ’ οἱ οὕτως λέγοντες πρώτον μὲν τὸ γένος ἀκάρως εἰρήσαται ἐπί ὁμονύμων φωνῆς λέγουσιν, ἐπειτα σον προσποιούνται τῷ ποιητήσα εἶναι τὸ ἀγάθον καὶ τὸ κακόν. ἀλλοι δὲ ἰδιοτάτως τὴν λέξιν ἐξηγούνται λέγοντες μηδὲν ἄλλο διηλύσθαι ἐν τῷ ἀγάθον δὲ κακόν οὐκ ἔστιν (10) ἐν γένει, ἀλλ’ αὐτὰ τυγχάνει γένη τινὸς οὖν ὅτι τὸ ἀγάθον καὶ τὸ κακόν ἐστιν ὑπὸ ἐναντία γένη, ἀλλ’ αὐτὰ γένη ἐστίν ἐναντία· καὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ τὸ ποιόν ἔστιν, τὸ ποιόν οὖν ἔστιν ἐναντίον ἄλλω γένει. βεβαιάσται δὲ καὶ αὐτή ἢ λέγει, ἠν οὖν γὰρ διοίκει ἤ τρίτη διαφόρα τῆς προίτης, ἀπερ ἐναντία ὅταν τὸ ἀγάθον καὶ τὸ κακόν ὑπ’ ἐν ἐστί γένος.

[T26] A 428,3-13. < Nicostratus observes that in the Physics (225a20 ff.) Aristotle does not make generation and destruction movements, but here at Cat. 15a13-33 he enumerates them among movements. Simplicius replies that this is appropriate based on the place of the Categories as an introduction. > Speakers: Nicostratus. Respondents: Simplicius.

ἐγκαλεὶ δὲ ὁ Νικόστρατος, ὅτι ἐν μὲν τῇ Φυσικῇ ἀχροαίσι τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν φθοράν οὐ βούλεται εἶναι χινήσεις, ἐναντία δὲ καὶ αὐτώς εἰς τὰς χινήσεις συγκαταρθημεῖν. καὶ τῶν γάρ διὸν ἢ συνορᾶν ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν εἰκός (5) ἢν κοινὸς ἐναντίατα τῷ ὁνόματι χρησάθηκα τῆς χινήσεις ἀντὶ τῆς μεταβολῆς, ἐπεὶ [τιμὰν] ἐναντίον ὡς ἐν εἰσαγωγῇ κατά τὰν κειροτημίαν συνήθειαν ἔχοσα τοῦ ὁνόματι χρησάθηκα νοῦσεν ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ ἀρνοῦσαι προσηγοφένον περὶ τοῦτο ποιούμενον λόγον τὸ ἀγάθος ἐναντίον δοξάζεται, τὰ γενομένα καὶ φθειρόμενα μὴ αξίων λέγεναι κειροτημεία, διὸ ἢ κάρσις τῶν (10) ύψιστάτων εἰς, μεταβαλλεῖ δὲ καὶ ταύτα καὶ ἑκείνα, διὸ κοινὴν ἐθέτο τὴν μεταβολὴν ἐκεῖ καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ φθοράν οὐκέτι χινήσεις ἀλλὰ μεταβολὰς ἀφορισμοῖς.
Nicostatus states that Aristotle is incorrect to use the example of the ‘square’ with the gnomon (15a30-31) as something increased in size but not altered: if it is an immaterial square, it is unalterable and unmoveable, beyond quality and matter; if it is an enmattered square, it will be altered as increased in size. > Speakers: Nicostatus. Respondents: Simplicius.

Λαμβάνεται δὲ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους ὁ Νικόστρατος ὡς οὐ καλῶς διάφορον τῆς αὐξήσεως τὴν ἀλλοίωσιν διὰ τοῦ παραδείγματος ἀποδείξαντος τοῦ κατὰ τὸ τετράγωνον καὶ τὴν τοῦ γνώμονος περίθεσιν ὡς αὐξομένου (15) μὲν, οὐ μέντοι ἀλλοιουμένου. διπλὰ γὰρ φησιν εἶναι τὰ σχήματα, “τὰ μὲν σωματικὰ καὶ ἐνυλα, τὰ δὲ μαθηματικὰ καὶ ἄυλα, καὶ εἰ μὲν περὶ τοῦ ἀύλου λέγω τετραγώνου, οὔτε ἀλλοιοῦται οὔτε αὔξεται ἕκεινο, ἀτρεπτὸν δὲ ἐξαίτητο φησιν, ὡσεὶς, ἐνυλα, τὸν τὸν δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἐνυλου, φησι, λέγοι τούτο, ὡσεὶς αὔξεται, οὔτω καὶ ἀλλοιοῦτα”. ὁ δὲ ταῦτα (20) λέγων οὐκ ἐξερεύνησεν κατὰ Ἀριστοτέλη τὴν μὲν ἀλλοίωσιν ἐπὶ τῆς κατὰ ποιότητα μεταβολῆς, τὴν δὲ αὐξήσιν ἐπὶ τῆς κατὰ ποιότητα, ἀλλ’ ὡς εἰρήνη πρότερον, πάσαν τὴν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος μεταβολῆς μένοντος τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ἀλλοίωσιν καθεῖ, διότι καὶ τὸ αὔξανόμενον εὐθὺς ἀλλοιοῦσθαι φησιν. ἐδει δὲ ἐννοεῖν ὅτι καὶ αὐξάνεσθαι δυνατὸν ἐπὶ τῇ αὐτῇ μορφῇ (25) μένον καὶ τῇ αὐτῇ ποιότητι, κατὰ μέγεθος μόνον γινομένης τῆς δια- φορᾶς, ὡς ὅταν τὸ Ἀλεξάνδρου εἶδος καὶ ἐν σφενδόνῃ δακτυλίῳ γένοιτο καὶ ἐν τῷ Ἀθῶ εἰς κολοσσὸν Ἀλεξάνδρου σχηματισθέντι, διό καὶ ὁ ἰδίως [p. 430] ποιός ἐν νηπίῳ μέχρι γῆς ὁ αὐτός διαμένειν λέγεται τοῦ ποσοῦ ἀμειβομένου, τοῦ δὲ εἴδους μένοντος, καὶ αὐτῶν πάλιν τοῦ αὐτοῦ μένοντος μεγέθους οὖθεν κωλύει μεταβάλλειν κατὰ ποιότητα, ὡσπερ ὁ οἶνος τραπεῖς μετέβαλε μὲν κατὰ τὸ ποιόν, μένει δὲ τῷ ποσῷ ὁ αὐτὸς.
5. Boethus of Sidon

Named Testimonia

[Strabo, Geographica. Chapter 16 part 2 section 24. <Notice of Strabo’s ‘study with’ Boethus of Sidon, in the context of a general discussion of Sidonian art and science.>]

The Sidonians, according to tradition, are skilled in many beautiful arts, as the poet also points out; and besides this they are philosophers in the sciences of astronomy and arithmetic, having begun their studies with practical calculations and with night-sailings; for each of these branches of knowledge concerns the merchant and the ship-owner; as, for example, geometry was invented, it is said, from the measurement of lands which is made necessary by the Nile when it confounds the boundaries at the time of its overflows. This science, then, is believed to have come to the Greeks from the Aegyptians; astronomy and arithmetic from the Phoenicians; and at present by far the greatest store of knowledge in every other branch of philosophy is to be had from these cities. And if one must believe Poseidonius, the ancient dogma about atoms originated with Mochus, a Sidonian, born before the Trojan times.

However, let us dismiss things ancient. In my time there have been famous philosophers from Sidon; Boethus, with whom I studied the Aristotelian philosophy, and his brother Diodotus; and from Tyre, Antipater, and, a little before my time, Apollonius, who published a tabulated account of the philosophers of the school of Zeno and of their books. Tyre is distant from Sidon not more than two hundred stadia; and between them lies a town called City of Ornithes; and then one comes to a river which empties near Tyre, and after Tyre, to Palae-Tyre, at a distance of thirty stadia. (Tr. Jones).

ἀναπόδεικτοι συλλογισμοί, τούτους οὐκ ἔτι πρῶτους ὄνομάζειν συγχωροῦσι·

[... ] Some of the Peripatetics, among them Boethus, call the syllogisms which are based on leading assumptions [i.e. certain hypothetical syllogisms] not only unproved but also primary; but they are not prepared to call primary those unproved syllogisms which depend on predicative propositions. (Tr. Barnes, 2007b)


Βόηθος δὲ τὸ πάθος τῆς ψυχῆς κίνησιν ἔχουσαν τι μέγεθος, ἔχουσαν μὲν λαμβάνων καὶ αὐτός τὴν τοῦ ἄλογου τῆς ψυχῆς μορίου κίνησιν, τὸ δὲ μέγεθος προστίθει, ἐπειδή γίνονται τινὲς καὶ ἄλλαι κινήσεις τοῦ ἄλογου τῆς ψυχῆς μετ’ οἰκειώσεως τῆς πρὸς τινὰς καὶ ἄλλοτριώσεως βραχείας· τὰς οὖν μετὰ βραχείας οὐκ ἄξιον ἑκεῖτο ὄνομάζειν πάθη.

Boethus defined pathos as an irrational motion of the soul that has a certain magnitude; he too took ‘irrational’ as a motion of the irrational part of the soul, but he added magnitude, since there are also some other motions of the irrational part of the soul accompanied by brief oikeiôseis to people or estrangements (allotrîôseis) from them. He thought that those movements accompanied by brief [affections] were not worthy of the name pathê…

[T3] Alexander, De anima libri mantissa. Page 151 line 8. <Alexander cites a number of thinkers who define the first and primary ‘appropriate’ goal (oikeion) for each of us as ‘our own selves’ (hêmas autous), which are the object of our desire (orekton). Boethus is primary in the list. Similarly, Boethus’ name is associated by Damascius (in Phileb. 147,6 and 148 = T13) with a view that the self is the goal sought (telos… orekton) by each of us.>

catâ δὲ Ἀριστοτέλη οἱ μὲν φασίν εἶναι πρῶτον οἰκεῖον ἡμῖν ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, εἰ γὰρ τὸ φιλητὸν όρεκτὸν ἔστι (φιλοῦμεν δὲ οὐδένας πρὸ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, οὐδὲ ὡς εὑρομεθα πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα οὕτως· καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ἀντιποιούμεθα καὶ φιλοῦμεν τινὰ κατὰ τὴν ἐφ’ ἡμᾶς ἀναφοράν), εἰ ἂν τὸ πρῶτον οἰκεῖον ἐκαστὸς αὐτῷ κατὰ τούτο. ταύτης τῆς δόξης οἱ περὶ Ξέναρχον εἰσάγων καὶ Βοηθόν, τὴν άρωμιν λαβόντες ἀπὸ τῶν περὶ φιλιας εἰρημένων ἐν τῷ ὄρθῳ τῶν Νικομαχείων, οὐ ὡς ἃ τὴν λέξεως· ‘τάχα δ’ ἂν γένοιτο περὶ αὐτῶν φανερὸν, γνωρισθέντος τοῦ φιλητοῦ’ ἔως· ‘διοίκει δ’ οὐδέν· ἔσται γὰρ τὸ φιλητὸν φαινόμενον’· καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐνάτῳ δὲ ὀμοίως λέγει· ‘τοῖς λόγοις δὲ τούτοις τὰ ἔργα διαφανεῖ’ ἔως· ‘φιλητόν δὴ μάλιστα ἐαυτὸν’. [T4] Porphyry, in Cat. Page 59 line 17. <Porphyry’s account of the skopos of the Categories derives from Boethus and Herminus.>

– Ἀρα οὖν πάντες ἔσφαλμαν περὶ τὴν πρόθεσιν τῆς τῶν κατηγοριῶν γνώσεως;
– Οὐδαμῶς· ἀλλὰ καὶ Βόηθος ἐν τοῖς εἰς τὰς Κατηγορίας εἰρημένα ταύτα καὶ Ἐρμίνος βραχείως.

[cf. 58,4-7: ἡ πρόθεσις τοῦ βιβλίου περὶ τῆς πρώτης θέσεως τῶν λέξεων τῆς παραστατικῆς τῶν πραγμάτων· ἐστιν γὰρ περὶ φιλιῶν σημαντικῶν ἄπλων,
καθό σημαντικά εἰσί τῶν πραγμάτων, οὐ μήν τῶν κατὰ ἀριθμόν ἄλλης
diaφερόντων ἄλλα τῶν κατὰ γένος.

and becomes a ‘subject’ as soon as form comes upon it.>

ὅταν δὲ διορισθῇ τῇ μορφῇ, οὐκεθ’ ὑλή ἄλλη ὑποκειμένον.

numberer – thus time can exist apart from soul.>

εἰ δὲ μὴν ἄλλο πέφυκεν ἀρίθμησιν οὐκ, οὐκ οὐ δυνάμει...

nature.>

ὡς πόρος γὰρ ψυχή Βοηθός, οὐδέν μέτρον ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως γίνεται...

phrase λόγος τῆς οὕσιας in the opening chapter of the Categories.>

Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἐν ἀπασί τοῖς ἀντιγράφοις τὸ ὁ δὲ λόγος τῆς οὕσιας πρόσκειται, ως καὶ Ἡρῴδος μημονεύει καὶ άνθρωπως. Εἰ δὲ καὶ προσειμένον εἴη τὸ ὁ δὲ λόγος τῆς ὦσιας ἐτέρως, διότι παρά τοῖς πλείστοις οὕσις εὔφραστεται γεγραμμένον, ἀλλ’ ὀρθῶς γε ἦχε προσ-
Primary Texts: 5. Boethus of Sidon


— Περὶ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ ᾠδήμα καίεινο στρέφεται, διὰ τὶ ἐν μὲν τοῖς Φυσικοῖς τὰ κοινὰ προτάττει ὡς πρῶτα, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὰ καθ’ ἔκαστα.... (12) Άλλα τί ἐὰν εἴποιμεν πρὸς τοὺς περὶ αὐτὸν τούτου διαμισμὴ τοῦντας, μήπως οὐδὲ φύσει πρὸτερα ἢ τὰ καθόλου τῶν καθ’ ἔκαστον ἄλλα ἔστερα;

— Ἡ σκοποῦντες ἀκριβῶς εὑρομεν ἃν τὰ ἀμφιβοτούμενα ὡς ὑμολογούμενα (15) αὐτοῖς λαμβάνοντας· ὅταν γὰρ ἔνος ἐκάστου πρῶτα φύσει λέγοσι τὰ καθόλου, πάντως δὲ πάλιν ἔστερα, ὑποτεθέμενοι τὰ καθ’ ἔκαστα εἶναι καὶ τὴ φύσει πρότερα, ὦ καλῶς ὡς ἐν ἀρχῇ λαμβάνονσαν αὐτὸ ὑπὲρ δεῖται ἀποδείξεως. ἐπιπόλαια δὲ ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ τοιαύτα ἐπικείμενα· κοινοῦ μὲν ὄντος ἀνέγκα ἄτομον εἶναι (ἐν γὰρ τοῖς κοινοῖς τὰ ἀτομα περιέχεται), (20) ἄτομον δὲ ὄντος ὦ πάντως τὸ κοινόν, εἰ γε τὸ κοινόν ἐπὶ πολλοῖς ὑπάρχει, δῆλον γὰρ τὶ τὸ καθ’ ἔκαστον καταταχθέντος εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ καὶ συμπληρούντος αὐτοῦ τὴν ὀυσίαν ἐστὶν ἄτομον· ὃ γὰρ τὶς ἀνθρωποὺς καὶ ἄνθρωπος ἐστιν. ψεῦδος δὲ καὶ τὸ λέγειν, ὡς ἀναφοροῦμεν τοῦ κοινοῦ ὦ πάντως τὸ ἄτομον ἀναρέεται· εἰ γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ ἔχει τὸ κοινὸν τὴν (25) ὀυσίαν ἐν τῷ διατείνειν ἐρ’ ὧλα τὰ ὑπ’ αὐτὸ τεταγμένα, ὀ ταύτῃ ἀναφορὰν ἀνήρημεν εὐθὺς καὶ τοῦ κοινοῦ τὴν ὀψίαν ἐπικρατεῖ. οὐτὸς μὲν οὖν τοῖς περὶ Αλέξανδρον καὶ Βοήθον τοῖς τὸ ἀλλὸς Περιπατητικοῖς ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἀποχρίνεσθαι χρή, δεικνύει δὲ ἐξήγουμένους τὰ Μετὰ τὰ φυσικά προσῆκεν, ὅτι τὰ κοινὰ Αριστοτέλεις προτάττει καὶ ἐν τῇ τῶν (30) αἰσθητῶν θεωρία.

— [W]hy is it that in the Physics (cf. 1.1, 184a23) [Aristotle] gives prior ranking to common items (ta koina) as primary, whereas here [in the Categories] he ranks particulars first? (45,1-4) … What could we say to those who dispute [that universals are prior by nature]… claiming that in fact universals are not prior by nature to particulars, but posterior to them?

— If we were to take the question carefully, we would find that they actually take as agreed what they are disputing. For when they say that the universals are prior in nature to each thing taken in particular, but on the other hand posterior in nature to all of them (pantôn), they are postulating that particulars are also (kai) prior by nature, and are proceeding invalidly in taking as a first principle the very thing that requires demonstration…

It is obvious that the particular (to kath’ ekastoun) can be an individual (atoumon) only if a common item (koisoun) is immanent in it and completes (sympleroountos) its essence, for a particular man is also Man. And it is also false to say that, when the common item is eliminated, the individual is not always eliminated also; for if the common item possesses its essence in its extension over all those things that fall under it, one who eliminates this eliminates straightaway also the whole reality (upostaseos) of the individual as well.

It is on these lines that one must reply to the school of Alexander and Boethus and the rest of the Peripatetic arguments in their attempts at explanation, and one should show, in interpreting the Metaphysics, that Aristotle takes common natures (ta koina) as prior also (kai) in his theory of sensibles (tow aisthetow). (Tr. Dillon).

[T10] Syrianus, in Met. Page 106 line 5. <Boethus identified the idea as ‘generic’ (genika)>

παραφέρεται δὲ καὶ Βοήθους ὁ περιπατητικὸς ἐκ τῶν παρά τῷ Αριστοτέλει κατηχήσεων εἰς ταύτων ἄγων τοῖς γενικοῖς τὰς ἤδεις· ὃ καὶ τὸν Κορνοῦτον συντάττειν εὐλογον, οὐ πόρφω καὶ αὐτὸν ταύτης ὑπενεχθέντα τῆς δόξης·

οἶον ὁ εἰρημένος ἐν δευτέρῳ σχήματι συλλογισμὸς ἀντιστροφὴς δέεται πρὸς τὸ ἀναχθῆναι εἰς τὸ πρῶτον σχήμα· εἴναι γὰρ τὴν δευτέραν πρότασιν τὴν λέγουσαν ἵνα θεωρήσῃ καὶ εἴπῃς ’όν τότε λογικὸν ἀντιστρέψῃς, ἀναχθῆναι εἰς τὸ πρῶτον σχήμα. ἰστέον δὲ ὅτι ὁ μὲν Ἀριστοτέλης ταύτης ἐγένετο τῆς δόξης, ὅτι οἱ ἐν δευτέρῳ καὶ τρίτῳ σχήματι συλλογισμοὶ πάντες ἀτελεῖς εἰσιν, ὁ δὲ Βοηθὸς ἐνδείκτως ἀπὸ Ἀριστοτέλους γενόμενος ἐναντίως τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει περὶ τούτου ἐδοξαζαν, καὶ καλῶς ἐδοξαζον καὶ ἀπεδείχθη εἰς πάντες οἱ ἐν δευτέρῳ καὶ τρίτῳ σχήματι τέλειοι εἰσιν. τούτῳ ἦκολονθηκαν Πορφύριος καὶ Ἰαμβλίχος, ἔτι μέντοι καὶ ὁ Μάξιμος, ὃς ἀκροατίς ἦν Ἰερώνου τοῦ Ἰαμβλίχου ἀκροατοῦ, καὶ Θεμίστιος δὲ ὁ παραφραστὴς τῆς ἐναντίας ἐγένετο δόξης τῆς καὶ τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει δοκούσης. τούτοις οὖν τοῖς δύο, τῷ τε Μάξιμῳ καὶ τῷ Θεμίστῳ, ἐναντία περὶ τούτου δοξάζοντας καὶ κατασκεύαζον, ἢς ἔστω, τὸ δοξοῦν αὐτοῖς [καὶ] δήμητον αὐτῷ ὁ βασίλειος Ἰουλιανὸς, καὶ δέδωκεν τὴν σῆμαν Μαξίμῳ καὶ Ἰαμβλίχῳ καὶ Πορφύρῳ καὶ Βοηθῷ. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ Θεοφράστου ὁ Ἀριστοτέλεος αὐτοῦ ἀκροατίς τῆς ἐναντίας αὐτῷ περὶ τούτου δοξαζαν έχον. τούτοις δὲ τοῖς ἀπὸ Βοηθοῦ ἦκολονθηκαν καὶ ὁ μέγας Πρόκλος καὶ ὁ τούτου διδάσκαλος καὶ ἡμέτερος πατίρι, ὅτι καὶ οἱ ἐν δευτέρῳ καὶ τρίτῳ σχήματι πάντες τέλειοι εἰσιν. τινὲς δὲ, ὡς εἰρήσῃ, ἀποβλέποντες εἰς τὸ παρ’ αὐτοῦ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλεος λεγόμενον, ὅτι ἀτελεῖς οὔτε εἶναι τοὺς ἐν δευτέρῳ καὶ τρίτῳ σχή-ματι, εἰρήσῃν ὅτι τὸ τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι εἴπεν διὰ τοῖς ἐν δευτέρῳ καὶ τρίτῳ σχήματι ἐξαίλλον αὐτοῦς τῆς τῶν συλλογισμῶν ἐστίς· οὖ γὰρ διὰ τὸ εἶναι καὶ ὀρολογηθῆναι ταῦτα τὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὁμολογήματα συμβαίνει τὸ συμπέρασμα, ἀλλὰ δέονται ἐξωθέν ἀποτελείας πρὸς τὸ γενέσθαι τὸ ἀναγεννήτων, οἷον τῆς ἀντιστροφῆς ἢ τινὸς ἀλλὰς τῶν τριῶν τῶν εἰρημένων. ἣμεῖς δὲ φαμεν ὅτι οὐ διὰ τούτο εἴπεν τὸ τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι.

[Τ13] Damascius, in Philebum. Section 147 line 6. <According to Boethus, the self is the goal sought (ilos... orekton) by each of us.>

"Ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἐλπίδες δόξαι τινὲς, θάρρος δὲ καὶ φόβος πάθη τῆς ζωῆς, διήρητα δὲ πάντα τῷ κακῷ τε καὶ ἁγάθῳ. οἱν ἔλπιζομεν τι αγαθὸν εἰσόμενον ἢ κακὸν μὴ εὐσεβομεν, θάρσῃς ἐπὶ τούτως· πάλιν ἐλπίζομεν τι κακὸν εὐσεβομεν ἢ ἁγαθὸν μὴ εὐσεβομεν, φόβος ἐπὶ τούτως· καλεῖσθαι δὲ οὐκ ἔλπις ἢ δόξα, ἀλλὰ δυσελπίσται. οὕτω χρὴ διαφερεῖν ἀμείναιν εἰσόμενοι τῷ Πλάτωνι, ἀλλὰ μὴ τῷ Βοηθῷ. […]

[148] Ὅτι τὸ ὀρεκτόν πρόκειται ὡς τέλος, τὸ δὲ ὀρεγόμενον φύει δυσερετρον καὶ οἱν ἐσόμενον τοῦ διειχόντος· ἐν μέσῳ δὲ ἡ γνώσις ἐγείρουσα τοῦτο πρὸς ἐκεῖνο. διὸ καὶ ἡ φαντασία προτείνει τὸ ὀρεκτόν τῇ ἀλλὸς ὀρέξει· ἀνάλογον ἄρα καὶ ἡ λογική γνώσις τῇ λογική ὀρέξει προτείνει τὸ ὀρεκτόν.

[Τ14a] Simplicius, in Cat. Page 1 line 18.

tινὲς μέντοι καὶ βαθυτέρας περὶ αὐτὸ διανοίας κατεχομένος, ὅσπερ ὁ θεωμάσιος Βοήθος. ἀλλὰς δὲ ἔρεβεν ἀπορίας μόνας γράφει πρὸς τὰ λεγόμενα, ὅπερ Λούκιος τῆς πεποίηκε καὶ μετ’ αὐτὸν Νικόδηματος τὰ τοῦ Λούκιου ὑποβαλλόμενος..."
Some commentators, however, also applied deeper thoughts to the work, as did the admirable Boethus....

[T14b] Simplicius, in Cat. Page 11 line 23. <Boethus explains the Categories as concerning significant expressions, but the division is applicable just so far as spoken words (lexeis) have a relation to beings, of which they are significant.>

[Porphyry] προστίθησιν δὲ καὶ τὰ τοῦ Βοήθου ὁ Πορφύριος πολλῆς ἄγχινοις γέμοντα καὶ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ τείνοντα τοῖς εἰρημένοις. λέγει γὰρ καὶ ἐκεῖνος, ὅτι κατὰ μὲν τὸ ὄνομα καὶ τὸ ἤδη ἡ διαίρεσις εἰς τὰ τοῦ λόγου γίνεται στοιχεία, κατὰ δὲ τὰς κατηγορίας ἡ διαίρεσις γίνεται, καθὸ σχέσιν ἔχουσιν τὰ λέξεις πρὸς τὰ ὄντα, σημαντικαὶ τούτων οὖσαι. “διό, φησίν, οἱ σύνδεσμοι ἐν μὲν τῇ λέξει εὑρίσχονται, τῶν δὲ κατηγοριῶν ἐκπίπτουσιν οὖν ἀρ γὰρ τῶν ὄντων δηλοῦσιν, οὔτε οὐσίαν οὔτε ποιὸν οὔτε ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον”.

[T14c] Simplicius, in Cat. Page 13 line 16. <The skopos of the Categories is about simple, primary, generic words (phônai) insofar as they are significant of beings; this view, adopted by Simplicius himself, is ascribed to a list of commentators of whom Boethus appears to be chronologically earliest.>

ἔστιν οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων δήλων, ὅτι ἐστὶν μὲν ὁ σκοπὸς οἰκεῖος τῇ λογικῇ πραγματείᾳ περὶ τῶν ἁπλῶν καὶ πρώτων καὶ γενικῶν φωνῶν, καθὸ σημαντικαὶ τῶν ὄντων εἰσίν, συνδιδάσκεται δὲ πάντως καὶ τὰ σημαινόμενα ὑπ' αὐτῶν πράγματα καὶ τὰ νοήματα, καθὸ σημαίνεται τὰ πράγματα ὑπὸ τῶν φωνῶν. καὶ ταῦτα καὶ τοῖς Ἀλεξάνδροις καὶ Ἑρμίῳ καὶ Βοήθῳ καὶ Πορφυρίῳ δοκεῖ καὶ ὁ θεῖος Ἰἀμβλίχος ἐπιψηφίζει καὶ Συριανὸς σαφηνίζει καὶ οἱ ἡμέτεροι διδάσκαλοι ἀποδέχονται.


Βόηθος δὲ διχῶς φησιν τὸ ὄνομα λέγεσθαι, τὸ τε πρόταξιν ἄρθρου λαμβάνον, ὡς καὶ ἰδίως ὄνομα λέγεται, καὶ τὸ ἐφ' ἀπάντες τὰ τοῦ λόγου στοιχεία διατεῖνον· ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἐν τῷ ζητεῖν ἐφ' ὁποιασοῦν λέξεως, εἰ ὁμώνυμός ἦστιν, προτάττομεν τὸ ἄρθρον ὁμοίως ἐπὶ τοῦ κυρίως ὄνοματος καὶ τῶν ἀλλών λέξεων, λέγοντες 'τὸ τῶν ὁμώνυμον ἦστιν' καὶ 'τὸ ἱδραπόδιστα ὁμώνυμον ἦστιν' (σημαίνει γὰρ καὶ τὸ ληφθῆναι αὐτὸν αἰχμάλωτον καὶ τὸ λαβεῖν ἄλλον), εἰσότως τὸ ὄνομα τῶν ὁμώνυμων κοινὸν εἶναι φησιν, διότι τὸ ἰδιὸν τοῦ ὀνόματος ἱσχύσι πάντα τῷ προτάττεσθαι αὐτῶν ἄρθρον.

Boethus says that ‘name’ has two meanings: one in which it takes a preceding article, which is called ‘name’ in the more particular sense, and one which extends to all the elements of logos. When, therefore, we ask of any expression whatsoever whether it is homonymous, we place the article first, just as much in the case of names in the proper sense of the word as in that of other expressions. We say ‘dog is homonymous’ and ‘he was enslaved (to endrapodistai) is homonymous’ (for [this phrase] signifies both ‘he was taken prisoner’ and ‘taking someone else prisoner’). Boethus is thus right to say that homonyms have the name in common, for they all have the proprium of names, insofar as they are preceded by the article. (Tr. Chase).
πρὸς γὰρ ταύτην τὴν ἀπορίαν [sc. that homonymy is in every category, rendering the phrase λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ap. Cat. i inaccurate] ὑπάντων ὁ Πορφύριος πρῶτον μὲν φησιν μηδὲ ἐν πᾶσι τούτῳ γεγράφθαι τοῖς ἀντιγράφοις· μήτε γὰρ Βόηθον εἶδέναι, ζὺς φησι δευκάνυν τὸν Αριστοτέλη τίνα ἐστίν τὰ ὁμονύμια λέγοντα. Ὄμονύμια λέγεται ὁν ὄνομα μόνον καίνον, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοῦνομα λόγος ἕτερος· καὶ ἐξηγούμενος δὲ ὁ Βόηθος καδ’ ἐκάστην λέξην τὸ τῆς οὐσίας παραλέλοιπεν ὃς οὐδὲ γεγραμμένον.

[Typo: instead of "tēs ousias at Cat. 1a2, as it does not appear in his commentary."

[By Boethus, like Andronicus, omitted tēs ousias at Cat. 1a2, as it does not appear in his commentary.]

[Simplicius, in Cat. Page 29 line 30. <Boethus, like Andronicus, omitted tēs ousias at Cat. 1a2, as it does not appear in his commentary.>]

[By Boethus, like Andronicus, omitted tēs ousias at Cat. 1a2, as it does not appear in his commentary.]

[By Boethus, like Andronicus, omitted tēs ousias at Cat. 1a2, as it does not appear in his commentary.]

[Simplicius, in Cat. Page 36 line 28. <Boethus claims that Aristotle has omitted what ‘recent’ writers (presumably Stoics) call synonyms, which are what Speusippus used to call polyonyms. Via Porphyry, ad Gedalium.>]

[By Boethus, like Andronicus, omitted tēs ousias at Cat. 1a2, as it does not appear in his commentary.]

[Simplicius, in Cat. Page 38 line 19. <Boethus reports that Speusippus’s division of onomata was exhaustive, organised into tautonyms (including homonyms and synonyms) and heteronyms (proper heteronyms, polyonyms, and paronyms). Via Porphyry, ad Gedalium.>]

[Simplicius, in Cat. Page 41 line 14. <Boethus thinks that ‘what is said’ should be understood in three ways in combined expressions.>]

[Simplicius, in Cat. Page 41 line 28. <According to Boethus, the only things said or signified ‘among the ancients’ were intelllections. Cf. Dillon 1990, 28 n. 16; cf. Dexippus in Cat. 9.26; source is Porphyry via Iamblichus.>]

Appendix
ο δὲ Βόηθος μόνα λεγόμενα καὶ σημαίνόμενα τὰς νοῆσεις εἶναι φησι παρά τοῖς ἀρχαῖοις οὐ γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ἀλλήλες καὶ τὸ ψευδὸς ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν, ἀλλ’ ἐν διανοίας καὶ ταῖς τοῦ νου διεξόδοις, ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς Αριστοτέλης ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ τῆς Περὶ ψυχῆς λέγει: ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ διάνοια διὰ τοῦ λόγου σημαίνεται.

[T14j] Simplicius, in Cat. Page 50 line 2. <Boethus’s answer to the aporia that Socrates may appear to be an accident of place and time.>

アルバム τὸ μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ τόπου λύειν ὁ Βόηθος ἔδοξεν εἰπὼν τὰ κανονύμενα μὴ εἶναι ὀλοκλήρως ἐν ὑς ἢν τόπῳ· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐν τοῖς περὶ κατηγορεῖται, τὸ δὲ αὐτῷ λόγῳ οὔτε ἐν χρόνῳ εἰπε τὸν μὲν εἰρηνευτικὸν γένος δέξιον τοῦ χρόνου, ὀλοκλήρως ἐν δὲ καὶ ὀλοκλήρως ἐστίν, ὅστις εἰπείρα, ἐν τῷ καθάλου χρόνῳ ἐστιν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο λύειν ὁ Βόηθος πρῶτον μὲν οὔτε εἶπεν τὸ καθάλου ἐν υποθέσει κατὰ τὸν Αριστοτέλη φησιν, εἰ δὲ καὶ εἰπέν, οὕτως εἰπε οὐ δύναται τὸ ἐν τοῖς τῷ καθάλου εἶπεν. ἔτιδώς δὲ εἰ ἀι τιαύτα ἀποτύχει διαλύειτο, εἰ τὸ ἐν τῷ ύπάρχων συντάξομεν τὸ γὰρ συμβεβηκὸς ἐνυπάρχει τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ, οὐτε δὲ τὰ ἐν τῷ τόπῳ οὔτε τὰ ἐν χρόνῳ ἐνυπάρχειν λέγεται.

[T14k] Simplicius, in Cat. Page 58 line 27. <At Cat. 1b23-24, Aristotle proposes that ‘however many differentiae there are of the predicate (κατηγορομένου), there will be just as many differentiae of the subject (ὑποκειμένου)’. This position, as Simplicius reports (58,27 = T14k), is critiqued by the school of Nicostratus (cf. 58,15). As Simplicius outlines the problem, ‘animal and rational animal are subordinate one to the other; since rational and irrational are differentiae of animal, how is it possible for one part of rational animal to be rational, while the other is irrational?’ (58,25-27). Boethus of Sidon ‘gives in’ to the problem and proposes to read ὡστε τὸ ὑποκειμένου διαφοράς, τοσοῦτον καὶ τοῦ κατηγορομένου ἐσονται, thus transposing the words κατηγορομένου καὶ ὑποκειμένου. Simplicius expresses ‘gratitude to Boethus for pointing the way towards the solution of this problem’ (59,5), and develops a solution that distinguishes constitutive (sustatikai) from divisive (diairetikai) differentiae (cf. Porph. Is. 10,1-21).>

アルバム ὁ μὲν Βόηθος ἔνδοις τῇ ἀπορίᾳ μεταγράφειν ἡξίου τὴν λέξιν [cf. Cat. 1b23-5] οὕτως· ὡστε, ὡσαὶ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου διαφοράς, τοσοῦτον καὶ τοῦ κατηγορομένου ἐσοντα· “αὐτῷ γὰρ τοῦ μερικωτέρου διαφοράς καὶ τοῦ ὀλικωτέρου ἐσοντα· ἀτε τοῦ μερικωτέρου περιέχοντα, εἰ καὶ μὴ ὁμοίως καθάλου ἐπὶ τοῦ κατηγορομένου, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου λέγοντα· τὸ γὰρ λογικὸν ἀνθρώπου μὲν παντὸς κατηγορεῖται, ἡμιπο οὐκέτι παντὸς, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἦον τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν λογικὰ, τὰ δὲ ἐλγομ. εἰ δὲ μένοι, φησιν, ἡ αὐτῇ ἡγέσει ποσεκτικῶς τὸ οὐδὲν κωλύει τὰς αὐτὰς εἶναι διαφοράς· συμπέπτει γὰρ ποτε τοῦτο· τὸ γὰρ θνητὸν καὶ τοῦ ἦον διαφορά ἐστιν καὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου”. καὶ χάρις τῷ Βοήθῳ τὴν ἄρχην τῆς λύσεως ύποδειξαντι. ‘... For the differentiae of the more particular shall also belong to the more universal, since the latter contains the more particular, even though the differentiae are not said as universally in the case of the predicate as they are in the case of the subject. “Rational”, for example, is predicated of every man, but not of every animal; rather, of animals, some are rational and others irrational. If we were to retain the same reading, we should have to take into consideration Aristotle’s remark that “there is nothing to prevent the differentiae from being the same” (1b20-1). For this does sometimes occur; “mortal”, for example, is a differentia both of “animal” and of “man”.'
ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν, φαίστε, καὶ ἢ μονάς καὶ τὸ σημεῖον πῶς οὐκ ἔχω πίπτει τῶν καταργομένων: οὔτε γὰρ ποσὸν ἐστὶν, ὡς ἄν τῷ δόξειν· οὔτε γὰρ συνεχές ἐστιν, ἣτε ἀμερεῖς ὃν, οὔτε διωσμένον· πάντα δὲ ποσὸν ἢ συνεχὲς ἢ διωσμένον εἶναι προσήκει, καὶ εἰ διωσμένον, ή πεπροτόν ἢ ἅρτον. ή καὶ ὡς ἀρχή τῶν ἀριθμῶν καὶ ὡς μέτρον ἐν τῷ πρὸς τὸ κατασταχθήσεται, ὡς καὶ τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ δοκεῖ. εἰ δὲ δικτὸς ὁ ἀγριμίας, ὁ μὲν ἀριθμός, ὁ δὲ συμμετοχας, ἐστιν, ὡς καὶ ὁ Βόηθος ἐν φαί, καὶ ἢ μονάς δικτή, ἢ μὲν οὐσία, ἢ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ ἀριθμῷ (τοῦτο δὲ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλει δοκεῖ), ἢ δὲ πρὸς τι ἢ ποσὸν. ὡστερον δὲ φησιν ὁ Βόηθος μῆποτε ἰμείναι ποσὸν πάντα· ὡς γὰρ λευκότης ἔχει πρὸς λευκόν, οὔτως καὶ ἢ δυάς πρὸς τὰ δύο· εἰ οὖν ἐκεῖνα ἀμφότεροι ποσοῦ, καὶ ταῦτα ποσὸν. ἀντιλέγουσιν τῷ τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ συναψον λέγοντι μέρος τοῦ ποσοῦ τὴν μονάδα τιθέναι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐν τῷ ποσῷ καταργηθοῦντι αὐτήν· ἀριθμός γὰρ ἐστιν τὸ ἐν μονάδων συγκείμενον πλῆθος.

[14m] Simplicius, in Cat. Page 78 line 4. <Boethus holds that the Categories is concerned with sensible and not intelligible ousia. Instead of discussing aporiai around the Categories' account of intelligible and sensible ousia, he suggests that we should compare the Categories' and Metaphysics' account of what ousia is.>

Τὸ μὲν τοῦ Βόηθους ταῦτα [cf. 77,27-78,4] μὲν παρέλειπεν ἐνταῦθα τὰ ξητήματα βούλεται· μὴ γὰρ εἶναι περὶ τῆς νοητῆς οὐσίας τὸν λόγον· μᾶλλον δὲ ἐδει, φησίν, προσαπορεῖν ὅτι ἐν ἀλλοις τὴν οὐσίαν διελόμενος εἰς τρεῖς ἄλλως μὲν τὴν ύλην, ἄλλως δὲ τὸ εἴδος, ἄλλως δὲ τὸ συναγωγοτέρον οὐσίαν λέγεσθαι εἰπεν, ἐνταῦθα δὲ μὲν τὴν πρῶτην οὐσίαν λόγον καὶ τῇ ύλη καὶ τῷ συνθέτῳ εφαρμόστειν φησίν. ἐκατέρω γὰρ αὐτῶν ὑπάρχει τὸ μήτε καθ’ ὑποκείμενον τὸν δέ τὸν ὑποκείμενον τοῦ ὑποκείμενον λέγον τὸν ύποκείμενον τὸν οὐσίας λόγον καὶ τῇ ύλη καὶ τῷ συνθέτῳ. τὸν δὲ καταργηθοῦσα ἐν τῷ τῇ ύλη καὶ τῷ συνθέτῳ τῇ ὑποκείμενῳ τῇ ὑλῇ καὶ τῷ συνθέτῳ τῇ ὑλῇ καὶ τῷ συνθέτῳ τῇ ὑλῇ καὶ τῷ συνθέτῳ τῇ ὑλῇ. μέν εἰς τοῦ ὑποκείμενον μὲν ἑνὸς τῆς χαθον τὴν δὲ τῆς ποιήστη τῇ ποιήστη τῇ οὐσίας.
ο μέντοι Βόθθος πρὸς τὸ εἶδος χωρίὸς συντάττεσθαι φησιν τὴν διαφοράν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πρὸς τὸ γένος, διότερ οἱ πολλάκις ἀντὶ τοῦ εἴδους παραλαμβάνονται αἱ διαφοραί. καὶ σύμμασα μὲν ὁμοῦ ὤηθεν ἐν περὶ τοῦ γένους, καθ᾽ ἐκαθην᾽ ἐκαθὴν δὲ ἐκαθήνεσθαι κατὰ μὲν τὸν ὑφ᾽ ἐκαθητήν, καθ᾽ ὑπὸν λέγεται, κατὰ πάντων ὦθηθεν ἐκαθήνεσθαν καὶ δὲ τοῦ γένους οὐδαμώς· οὐδὲ γὰρ μορφωτικὴ ἐστὶν ἐκαθήνεσθαι τοῦ γένους. διενήργηθεν δὲ τοῦ εἴδους, ὅτι η διαφορά ἐστιν μετὰ τοῦ γένους, καὶ ἐστὶν ἡ μὲν διαφορὰ μορφή τις τοῦ γένους, τὸ δὲ γένος ὄσπερ ὑποκείμενον προσπάρχει. ἐστὶν οὖν ἡ διαφορὰ συμπληρωτικὴ ὑπὸ εἰσπλοῦσθαι φαινόμενον ὡς τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ γένη συμπληρωτικὰ ὑπὸισίας λέγεται· συμπλήρωσι γὰρ τὸν ἀνθρώπινον καὶ τὸ ζῴον καὶ τὸ λογικόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ζῷον μεθ᾽ ὑποκείμενον καὶ διαφορὰς, τὸ δὲ λογικὸν ὡς ἀπλῆ ποιήτης· κἀκεῖνον τὸν Βόθθος προστεθήκη μετὰ τοῦ ζώου, τὸ μὲν εἶ ἀμφοῦ ἑστιν ὡς σύνθετον, τὸ δὲ προστεθέμενον σύνθετον, οἰον τὸ ὃντην, ὡς ἀπλῆ ποιήτης.

[T14o] Simplicius, in Cat. Page 104 line 27. <Boethus determines unity by means of the ‘this’ (tode)>

ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὶ λέγομεν τόδε τι τήν ἄτομον οὕσιαν, πότερον κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ή τήν ὑλήν ἡ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῦ· ἡ φήσεων κατὰ πάντα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μὲν την ὑλὴν, καθὸςον ὑπόκειται καὶ εἰς ενεργεῖαν ἠρέτο τοῦ δέχεσθαι τὸ εἴδος, κατὰ δὲ Πλάτωνα καὶ μῆ ν ὡς ἐξοπλισμένην τῆς οἰκείας φύσεως· κατὰ δὲ αὐ τὸ εἴδος, καθὸςον ὄριστα καὶ καὶ ἐν ἐστὶν ἀριθμῷ καὶ γὰρ ὁ Βόθθος τὸ ἐν κατὰ τόδε ἀροφικά, εἶ δὲ τις τήν ἔλεν ἀροιστον ὁπλαῖον μηδαμώς τόδε τι εἶναι φησιν· ανάμνησθαι αὐτοῦ, ὡς εἰς τὶς ἡσυχίου ὑλῆς ἐστιν ὁ παρὼν λόγος, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἡς σχέσεως ἔχουσις πρὸς τὸ εἴδος, τὸ δὲ σύνθετον δηλονότι ὀπερ ἑστιν τὸ ἄτομον ἐπιδείχεται τὸ τόδε.

[T14p] Simplicius, in Cat. Page 159 line 14. <Boethus suggests that Aristotle, in his first definition of the Relative, follows Plato. Simplicius questions Boethus’s account of Plato’s definition, but states: ‘Boethus seems that he did not know, since he was held in high regard...'>

καὶ τοῦτο ποιεῖ τῷ Πλάτωνι κατὰ τὴν ἀπόδοσιν τῆς πρώτης ἀκολουθοῦν, ὡς φησιν Βόθθος· λέγεται γὰρ καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ὦστις ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἀποδοῦσθαι περὶ τῶν πρὸς τί· ὁς αὐτὰ ἅπαντι ἐστὶν ἐτέρων λέγεται” [Cat. 6b7; cf. Porph. In Cat. 112.1; 118.15]. καὶ ὡς ἐσθειν ἐπέλειπται τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος εἰρημένον τοῦ Βόθθος (οὐ γὰρ δὴ εἴποιμι ἃ ὁ Πλάτων ὑποκείμενον τοῦ Βόθθος· ὃς ἂν τῷ ἐλεγομένῳ ἀνήρ γεγονός· ὃς καὶ τῷ ἀριστοτελέις, δηλοὶ μὲν καὶ καὶ ἐν Πολυτεία λέγων ἃλλα μὲντοι, ἴνα εἴ ἐγὼ· ὃσα γὰ ρέστην τοιαύτα ὃς εἶναι ἀπό τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν ποιά ἄττα ποιοῦν τῖνος”, καὶ ἐν Ὁσιουτι ἐν θεῆθηκα τὸ ἐτέρων τῶν πρὸς τί ὃν ἐπιδείξει συντέχειν ὧς ἀνάγκης ἐτέρω τοῦτο αὐτὸ ὡς ἄνατε ποιῆσιν· ὃτε ἐν τῷ ἀρίστοτηλικῷ ὡς ἀναλογία ἐτέρω τοῦτο αὐτὸ ὡς ἆνατε ἑστιν εἰναι”.

τὰ γὰρ πρὸς ἀλληλαίαν ωστὶ ἑστιν ἐν ωὐδ᾽ ἄν τις εἰποι τὸ πρὸς ἀλληλαίαν, ἀλλὰ μόνον τὰ πρὸς ἀλληλαία· ωστὶς οὐκ ὡς τὸ πρὸς τί, ἀλλὰ μόνοις τὰ πρὸς τί, ταύτα δὲ ἑπιστήμοντες ὑπὸ τοὺς παλαιοὺς τῶν καθηγορίων εξηγητᾶς αἰτιώναι, Βόθθον καὶ Ἀριστότελες καὶ Ανδρόνικον καὶ Εὐδοφον καὶ Αθηνόδωρον, μήτε ἑπιστήμονας μήτε ἑπιστήμονας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς συγγεγεγραμμένοις καὶ ἑρμηνεύοντας ἑνικῶς ἑσφέροντας ἑνίοτε τὸ πρὸς τί, τοῦ ἀριστοτελεῖσαν πληθυντικῶς ἀπὶ προφερομένον·
Appendix

Boethus argues, perhaps in reply, that the Relative is not posterior to the relatively disposed. But Achaicus and Sotion thought that we should only use the plural.

Boethus wrote a ‘whole book’ about the Relative and the relatively disposed (pros ti pòs ekhon). He held that Plato’s definition was ‘are said to be just what they are [as being] of other things’, but the rest of Aristotle’s definition was added to correct Plato. (b) But Boethus also criticises the full definition – the relatively disposed, when defined, should not have included that which is relatively disposed to something other.

Boethus proved that for things that are relatively disposed, some character should necessarily inhere in the subjects.
Appendix

κίνησιν προϋποτίθεσθαι ἔν δοκεῖ Πορφύριος τὴν τοῦ "ἐπί τισι ποιεῖν τε κίνησιν πάσχειν ποιεῖν τὴν ἀξιοῦσαν τοῦ ἓν γένος τε καὶ τὴν ἐνέστησαν Βόηθος οὕτως καὶ διέστησεν Ἰάμβλιχος πρὸς οὖν καὶ ἀπορίαν Ἀριστοτέλης, ὡσπερ, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς χρή δύο ἓν ἀφορίζεσθαι καὶ ἕν 'ὑπάρχειν ἄμφω τέτακται γένος ὥστε κεχώρισται αὐτῷ παρ οὐχ τὸ τοῦτο κινοῦν πρώτως εἶναί διὰ ἀκίνητο καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐκεῖνος ποιοῦν τὸ φησιν ὡσπερ προσχρῶνται Πλωτῖνος ταῖς ὦν, ὃς Ἀριστοτέλους οἱ ταῦτα ἄλλες λέγοντες.

[Τ14u] Simplicius, in Cat. Page 188, lines 3-6. <Boethus reconciles the two treatments of head, as relative and substance, by saying that it is only qua part of a whole, not qua head, that Aristotle described 'head' as relative. So also Plotinus 6.3.28. See Sorabji (2004), vol. III, 3(i) for discussion.>

καὶ ὀρθῶς οὐδὲν ὁ Βόηθος τὴν χείρα καὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν καθ’ ὅσον μέρη συνεχώρει τῶν πρὸς τι εἶναι, οὐ μὴν καθ’ ἐπικεφαλῆς χείρα καὶ οὐ καθ’ ἐπικεφαλῆς οὐδὲ οὐ καθ’ ἐπικεφαλῆς, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τοῦτο ὑπάρχειν εἶναι. νῦν οὖν τὸ πρὸς τι αὐτὸν θεωρεῖσθω ὡς μεροῦς πρῶς ὅλα, καὶ οὐδὲν ἀδύνατον συμβαίνει.

[Τ14v] Simplicius, in Cat. Page 202 line 1. <According to Boethus and Aristotle, Aristotle made his second definition of the Relative insufficiently clear, because it contains the definiendum (pros ti). Arístotēleis ēdēi kínēsin thēsai ἐν γένος ἐν ταῖς κατηγορίαις, 302,8], ὥσπερ Πλωτῖνος, οὐ ταῖς Ἀριστοτέλους ὑποθέσεις προσχρονίζεται. οἰκείαν διαφορὰν τοῦτον ἐποιήσατο Βοήθῳ τῷ ὅσον τῶν καθ τὴν κεφαλὴν συνεχώρει ὀρθῶς καθὸ, ὡσπερ καὶ αὐτὸ κατὰ ὑπάρχειν μετὰ ὁποῖα ὡς συνακολουθεῖ. ὡσπερ οἱ τὸ, δὲ τί τι ἡπέται λέγουσιν πρὸς Στωικοὶ μὲν πρὸς οὐκέτι τι τῷ ἔχοντι, πρὸς περὶ ἐκ τὶ ὡς ἄλλα ποιοῦ τὸ πρὸς δεύτερον πρὸς, καὶ, ὡς ἂν συνακολουθῆσαν αὐτὰ χωρὶς διεστῆσαν. οὗτος μὲν οὖν καὶ Βόηθος καὶ Ἐμβλιχὸς πρὸς τὴν ἀποφανίσαν ἐνέστησαν τὴν ἐν γένος ἀξιοῦσαν την τοῦ τε ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦ πάσχειν προϋποτίθεσαν. Πορφύριος δὲ φησιν· ἐν τῷ δοκεῖ τὴν κίνησιν ἐπί τε τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ

[Τ14w] Simplicius, in Cat. Page 302 line 16. <Boethus and Iamblichus object to the difficulty that movement should be a single genus before 'acting' and 'undergoing'. They point out that the prime mover (prime actor) is unmoved (not acted upon), and thus 'acting' and 'undergoing' must belong to different genera.>

ἀλλ’ οἱ ταῦτα λέγοντες [sc. ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ἔδει κίνησιν θέσαθαι ἐν γένος ἐν ταῖς κατηγορίαις, 302,8], ὥσπερ Πλωτῖνος, οὐ ταῖς Ἀριστοτέλους ὑποθέσεις προσχρονίζεται. ἐκείνος γὰρ τὸ πρώτος χαίνει καὶ ποιοῦν αὐξήσεως εἰναι φηται· διὰ τούτο καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν παρ’ αὐτὸ κεχωρίσται τοῦ πάσχειν καὶ οὐκ ὄργ’ ἐν ἀμφώ τέτακτα γένος, ὡσπερ οὗτος εἰς ἐν ἀμφώ ταῦτα ἀνέγειρε χαί, ἀλλ’ διὸ ἀφορίζεσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης αὐτὸ χωρὶς διεστῆσαν. οὗτος μὲν οὖν καὶ Βόηθος καὶ Ἐμβλιχὸς πρὸς τὴν ἀποφανίσαν ἐνέστησαν τὴν ἐν γένος ἀξιοῦσαν τὴν τοῦ τε ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦ πάσχειν προϋποτίθεσαν. Πορφύριος δὲ φησιν· ἐν τῷ δοκεῖ τὴν κίνησιν ἐπὶ τε τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ
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tοῦ πάσχειν μίαν καὶ συνεχῇ εἶναι, ὦς ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ πληγήν χινήσεων, οίον ὑψεῖς καὶ ὑσεῖς.

[T14x] Simplicius, in Cat. Page 339 line 19. <Boethus believes that one must define the category ‘being-in-a-position’ precisely, to be those in whose case neither acting nor undergoing is additionally present [merely] in virtue of the position in which they are positioned or in virtue of the order in which they are arranged – for instance, standing or sitting said of a statue, or an image being set up.>

[Τ14y] Simplicius, in Cat. Page 348 line 2. <Boethus hypothesises that time is a different thing from what partakes of time and is in time: for example, a year and a month are time, while yearly and monthly partake of time.>

καὶ Βόηθος δὲ ἄλλο μὲν τὸν χρόνον ὑποτίθεται, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ μετέχον χρόνου καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ, καὶ εἶναι μὲν ἐνιαυσίαν καὶ μήνα χρόνον, ἐνιαυσιαίον δὲ καὶ μηνιαίον μετέχον χρόνου, ὡσπερ ἄλλης κατηγορίας φράσις καὶ τὸ κατὰ φράσιν, οἴον ἔστι τὸ φρόνειν, ἄλλης, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐστὶ ποιήσεως, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ποιεῖν· οὕτως καὶ ὁ χρόνος καὶ τὸ κατὰ χρόνον διέστηκεν.

[T14z] Simplicius, in Cat. Page 373 line 8. <The Stoics hold that one should refer ‘having’ to the category of ‘being a certain way’ (pós ekhein), but Boethus contends that ‘having’ must be its own category. (For on Boethus’s view it is a ‘relatively dispositional’ (skhêtokos) category, which could refer to some entity (i) in itself, e.g., ‘a man with his guard up’; (ii) in relation to something else, e.g., the father and the man to the right; (iii) from something else towards the entity, e.g., an armed or shod man (because this is a relative disposition of the weapons towards the armed man or shoes towards the shod man). Boethus discusses other cases, including having anything at all (hotioun), and control.>

Τὸν δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοάς Ἀναλύουσθαι εἰς τὸ πῶς ἔχει τινὲς ἄναφθείνῃ τὸ ἔχειν ὁ Βόηθος ἐναντιούται, οὔτε εἰς τὸ πῶς ἔχειν ἕγονυμονος δείν οὔτε εἰς τὰ πρὸς τι ἀνάγειν αὐτό, ἵδιαν δὲ εἶναι κατηγορίαν· εἶναι μὲν γὰρ σχετικὴν αὐτῇν, τριχῶς δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ ὑμονόμος τὴν σχεσὶν λέγεσθαι· τὴν μὲν γὰρ εἶναι ἐν ἐστὶν καὶ καθ’ ἐαυτὸ, τὴν δὲ πρὸς ἐτερον, τὴν δὲ ἐτερον πρὸς ἐαυτό· ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐν ἐστὶν θεωρεῖται κατὰ τὸν πῶς ἔχοντα, οίος ὁ προβεβλημένης· σχέσεις γὰρ ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ πρὸς ἐστὶν· ὡς ὡς ἐτερον ἐν ἐστὶ̃ν· τὸν λεγομένον πρὸς τι· ὁ γὰρ πατὴρ καὶ ὁ δεξιός κατὰ σχεσίν λέγεται· τὴν δὲ πρὸς ἐστὶν· ὧς ἐτερον πρὸς ἐστὶν· ἡ τῶν ὑποδημάτων· σχέσις ἐστὶν· τὸν μὲν ἐτερον πρὸς αὐτὸν· τῶν μὲν ὑποδημάτων· τῶν δὲ ὑποδημάτων· δοκεῖ δι’ ἀκριβείας ὧν· γὰρ ἤκρανον ἄγρος
same relation of the subject to time and size there is movement, but whenever whenever 
the relation to time is never the same, while the place is always the same, so that this relation to time and place, being differentiated, becomes sometimes a state of rest, and sometimes a movement.

And in the other cases (he goes on) we shall say, in the same way, that whenever there is the time is never the same, while the place is always the same, so that this relation to time and place, being differentiated, becomes sometimes a state of rest, and sometimes a movement.

... For", he says, 'Time seems to be of such a nature as to be always flowing and changing into other kinds, and because of this it accompanies every movement and state of rest. But movement is similarly related to time and place (for instance, in the case of motion, he says that it is similarly related to time and place on account of its continuously coming about in respect of different places), whereas rest (he says) is contrarily related to place and time, for the time is never the same, while the place is always the same, so that this relation to time and place, being differentiated, becomes sometimes a state of rest, and sometimes a movement. And in the other cases (he goes on) we shall say, in the same way, that whenever there is the same relation of the subject to time and place there is movement, but whenever [the relation to
time] is contrary to that in respect of size, there is rest. And the same has to be said about alteration too, so that it is clear from these considerations ([Boethus] claims) that rest is neither the size itself nor the form itself nor the place itself, but is rather the simultaneous relation towards each of these and towards time. And so the varieties of states of rest are the same as those of the [corresponding] movements, for in each instance a contrariety of the relation itself was shown applying to things which are moved and things at rest.’

These are the differentiations that Boethus makes, thanks to his sharpness of mind. But perhaps neither movement nor rest is a relation towards time, since time is the number of movement.


ἡ φαμέν ἐνεργεία ύποκείμενον αὐτῷ εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ δὴ καὶ τούτῳ δυνάμει ἔχει· συμβέβηκε δὲ αὐτῷ τὸ δύνασθαι κοινοῦνει τοῖς εἰδείς· ὦστε καὶ ἡ στέρησις τῶν εἰδῶν, ὥν μὲλλει δέχεσθαι, συμβεβηκὼς ἀν αὐτῷ εἴη. “ὅταν γὰρ, φησίν Ἀλέξανδρος, ὡς ὑλή τινος λαμβάνεται, τότε ἐστὶ μετὰ στερηθέος· ὅταν δὲ αὐτῷ καθ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ύποκείμενον, οὐ μετὰ στερηθέος”. ὁ μέντοι Βόθθος ἔλεγεν ὅτι “ἄμορφος μὲν οὐσία καὶ αἰνείδες ὑλή λέγεται· ἡ γὰρ ὑλή πρὸς τὸ εὐόμενον ὑνομόσχημα δοκεῖ· ὅταν δὲ δέχεται τὸ εἰδός, οὐκύτε ὑλή ἀλλ’ ύποκείμενον λέγεται· ύποκείσθαι γὰρ τι λέγεται τῷ ἡδί ἐνόντι”. μήποτε δὲ ὑλή μὲν ὡς ἑσάχη λέγεται, ύποκείμενον δὲ ὡς πρὸς τὸ εἰδός, εἰτε ἔχει ἡδί τὸ εἰδός εἰτε μέλλει δέχεσθαι αὐτῷ. “ἄποιος δὲ, φησίν ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος, κατὰ τὸν εὐαίσθητον λόγον ἡ ύλή, οὐκ ὡς ἐν στερηθῇ οὐσία ποιήτης (καὶ γὰρ ἡ στέρησις ποιήτης), ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐν ἀποφάσει· ὠσπερ γὰρ τῶν εἰδῶν οὐσίας καὶ τῆς στερηθεσίας ἐστι δεκτική”.


eἰ οὖν τὸ μὲν ἀριθμῆσαι ψυχή κατὰ τὸν εὐαίσθητον νοῦν· ὁ δὲ χρόνος ἀριθμός· ὑπὸ οὐσίας ψυχῆς ὡς ἐν εἰπὶ χρόνος. Ἐν πάση δὲ πρὸς τὸν λόγον τούτον ὁ Βόθθος λέγων μηδὲν κωλύειν τὸ ἀριθμητὸν εἶναι καὶ δίχα τοῦ ἀριθμούντος· ὠσπερ καὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν δίχα τοῦ αἰσθηθομένου.


ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ μέτρον καὶ τὸ ἀριθμὸν λέγειν τὸν χρόνον τοιαύτην ἐστὶν ὑπόνοιαν ἐνδιδόντος, ὠσπερ καὶ Βόθθος φησίν· ὅτι οὐκ ἐπίκτησεν ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως γίνεται, ἀλλ’ ἠμέτρον ἐργον ἐστὶ τὸ μετρεῖν καὶ ἀριθμεῖν.” [Cit. Themistium: cf. T7]


tούτῳ μὲν οὖν ἐναργῶς, οὕτως, καὶ ἀναγκαῖος συνήκτεται, τὸ ὅσον ποιοῦν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀθάνατον τε ὁν καὶ ἀιδίον. καθ’ ὅσον γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἀιδίον προστεθεὶσθαι, ὡς ὁ Πλάτων τὸ ἀνώλεθρον ἐν τῷ Φαιδοντι, ἦν μὲν ὡς ὁ Βόθθος οἰκεῖος τῆς ψυχῆς ὠσπερ τῆς ἐμφασίας ἀθάνατον μὲν εἶναι ὡς αὐτῇ μὴ ὑπομένουσαν τὸν ἀθάνατον ἐπίοντα.
Τοῦτον ἦν ἐφεξῆς κεφαλαίον τὸ πόθεν δεί ἀρχεθαι τῶν Ἀριστοτελίκων συγγραμμάτων. Βόθθος μὲν οὖν φησιν ὁ Σιδώνιος δεῖν ἀπὸ τῆς φυσικῆς ἀρχεθαι πραγματείας ἣτε ἡμῖν συνηθεστέρας καὶ γνωριμών, δεῖν δὲ ἂν ἀπὸ τῶν σαφεστέρων ἀρχεθαι καὶ γνωριμών. ο ὁ δε τούτῳ διδάσκαλος Ἀνδρόνικος ὁ Ῥόδιος ἀκριβέστερον ἔλεγεν χρήναι πρότερον ἀπὸ τῆς λογικῆς ἀρχεθαι, ἢτις περὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν καταγίνεται.


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[lines 42-43] Μετὰ δὲ ταύτα περὶ τῆς ποτε κατηγορίας δίκαιον ἂν εἴη διαλαβεῖν πρὸτερον περὶ χρόνου τὰ χρήσιμα ἐκθέμενοι διὰ τὸ οίκειον εἶναι τὸν χρόνον τῇ τοιαίτη φωνῇ. ἦστιν οὖν ὁ χρόνος ποιῶν· ἰσωρότης [Waitz p. 20] γὰρ ἐδείχθη τῶν μορίων αὐτοῦ τού τε παρεληλυθότος καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος κατὰ τὸ νῦν συνημμένων. ὁσπερ δὲ ἐκαστὸν τῶν ὑπὸ τὸ ποσὸν ἀναγεμένων, εἰτε διωρισμένον λέγεις εἰτε ἰσωρότης, τὰ μὲν ὑπὸ τοὺς ἐνός τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς μετρεῖται, ὡς ἀνθρωποὶ δέκα ὑπὸ τινὸς τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς, τὰ δὲ ἰσωρότης θεμένων τι μέτρον ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἦμων οὖν πόδα ἢ τι ἐτερον κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον· καὶ ὁ χρόνος ἐν τί γε ὑπὸ τῶν ἰσωρότων ποσῶν τοῖς ἐν αὐτοῖς μέτρεσι μετρεῖται θεμένων ἦμων ἐλάχιστον πρὸς αἰσθήσιν χρόνον οὖν ὑπὸ ἦμασις ταύτης ἢ καὶ ἐτερον μέρος. ἦστι δὲ ὅτι καὶ μείζων τινι μετρεῖται οὖν ἡμέρα καὶ νυκτὶ καὶ τῇ ἐξ ἀμφοῖ τοῦ ἡλίου περιόδῳ καὶ μηνὶ καὶ ἐνιαυτῷ. [11] ἦτα τριῶν ὄσων, μεγάθους, οἷον στάσιον φέρει εἰπεῖν, ἐφ᾽ οὐ ἡ κινήσις γίνεται, καὶ κινήσεως καθ᾽ ἦν τὸ κινοῦμεν κινεῖται, καὶ χρόνου, ἐν ζωτὸ τὸ κινοῦμεν κινεῖται, ταύτα μετροῦσιν ἀλληλα καὶ ὑπ᾽ ἀλλήλων μετροῦνται. μετρεῖ γὰρ καὶ ὁ χρόνος τὴν κινήσιν· ἐρωτηθέντες γὰρ, πόση τις ἡ κινήσις, φαμέν ἡμερισία καὶ αὔθα ἡ κινήσις τῶν χρόνων· πόσος γὰρ χρόνος; γνωρίζωμεν ὅτι πολὺς, ἐὰν πολλὴ ἡ κίνησις· καὶ αὔθα τὸ μέγεθος ἡ κίνησις μετρεῖ καὶ ἀντιμετρεῖται γε ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ· πολλὴ γὰρ φαμέν ὄσον ἢ τῇ πορείᾳ πολλῇ, πολλὴ δὲ πάλιν πορείαν, ὅταν ἡ ὅδε μήκος ἵκανον ἔχῃ. τριῶν οὖν ὄσων τούτων, διὰ μὲν τὸ μέγεθος ὁ διερχόμεθα, ὅτι ποσῶν καὶ ὅτι τοσοῦνδε, καὶ ἡ κίνησις δήλη ὅτι ποσῇ καὶ ὅτι τοσῇ, διὰ δὲ τὴν κίνησιν ὁ χρόνος δήλῳ ὅτι ποσῶν καὶ τοσοῦνδε. [23] ἦτα δὲ δήλον καὶ ἐκ τῶν, ὅτι ἰσωρότης ποιῶν ὁ χρόνος, ἔκ του πάν τὸ λαμβανόμενον ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ μέρος διαιρετῶν εἶναι. οὔ γὰρ διαιροῦντες τὸν χρόνον εἰς ἀδιαιρετῶν τι λήγομεν ὁσπερ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄριστον εἰς τὴν μονάδα ἀδιαιρετῶν οὖν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μεγέθει καὶ τῇ κίνησις ἀκόλουθε ἀπερ ἰσωρότης ὑπά τις ἐρεί. [27] ἦτα δὲ ἐν τῷ μεγέθει ἐστὶ τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ύστερον, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν κινήσει εἶναι τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ύστερον διὰ τὸ μέγεθος. ἦτα γε μὴ καὶ ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ διὰ τὴν κίνησιν· [30] ὄριζομεν δὲ τὸν χρόνον τῷ ἀλλο καὶ ἀλλο ὑπολαβεῖν τὸ τε πρότερον νῦν καὶ τὸ ύστερον καὶ τὸ μεταξὺ αὐτῶν ἐτερον· ὅταν γὰρ ἔτερα τὰ ἅρμα τοῦ μέσου νοησομεν καὶ δύο εἴη ἡ ψυχή τὰ νῦν, τὸ μὲν πρότερον τὸ δὲ ύστερον, τὸτε φαμέν χρόνον εἶναι. [34] τινὲς μὲν οὖν χρόνον τὴν τοῦ παντὸς
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περιφοράν εἰρήκασιν, οί δὲ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς σφαίραν, ἔστι δὲ οὐδέτερον ἀληθές. περιφοράς μὲν γὰρ τὸ μέρος οὐκ ἔστι περιφορά, χρόνου δὲ μέρος χρόνος· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ χρόνος ἡ τοῦ παντὸς σφαίρα, ὡς τινες ὤνθησαν ἐκ τοῦ ἀμφότερα πειρεματικά εἶναι. οἱ γὰρ οὕτω λέγουσιν πρῶτον μὲν οὐς συνελεύσονται, ἔπειτα καὶ ἐτέρως ἀμαρτάνουσιν, τὸ γὰρ περιέχειν πρὸς τι ὁν ὁικείως ἐν ἀμφότερος ἀποδέδοται. οὐ γὰρ ἀπλῶς ἢ τοῦ παντὸς σφαίρα πειρεματική σωμάτων πάντων, ὁ δὲ χρόνος πειρεματικός τῶν ἐν γενέσει καὶ φθορά πραγμάτων. [43] δόξειε δὲ ἀνάλογον κίνησις εἶναι καὶ μεταβολή ὁ χρόνος, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ. ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἐκάστου [Waitz p. 21] μεταβολὴ καὶ κίνησις ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ μεταβάλλοντι μόνον ἔστιν, ἡν εἰ ἅπαν κινοῦμαι καὶ εἰ ἅπαν κήνησις, οὐ μὴν δὲ καὶ ἢ σοι, ὁ δὲ χρόνος ὑμώς καὶ πανταχοῦ καὶ παρὰ πάνω. ἐτείς κίνησις μὲν λέγεται καὶ κάτωνκαὶ καὶ βραδυτέρα, χρόνος δὲ οὐκέτι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ καὶ ὁλίγος. τὸ δὲ βάττων καὶ βραδυτέρων ἐν χρόνῳ μετρεῖται· ταχύ μὲν γὰρ λέγομεν τὸ ἐν ἀλήθει χρόνον πολύ κινούμενον, βραδὺ δὲ τὸ ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ὁλίγον διάστημα κινούμενον, ὡς τοῖς οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ χρόνον κίνησις ἢ μεταβολῆ, [8] ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἀριθμὸς οὐ μὲν ἀριθμὸν, ὁ δὲ ἀριθμούμενος. ζητήθηκεν δὲ φαμέν τὸν χρόνον ἀριθμόν κινήσεως, ἀρα ὡς ἀριθμοῦντα τὴν κίνησιν ἢ ὡς ὑπ’ αὐτῆς ἀριθμούμενον. φαμέν δὲ τὸν χρόνον ἀριθμεῖται μὲν ὑπὸ τῆς πρώτης καὶ πρώτης κινήσεως τῆς κυκλοφορίκης, ἀνταρθεῖν δὲ πάλιν αὐτήν. εἰ μὴ γὰρ ὑπὸ χρόνου ἢ τοιαύτη κίνησις, ὑπὸ τίνος ἀριθμηθείν ἂν; τὴν πρώτην οὖν καὶ κυριωτάτην τῶν κινήσεων τὴν κυκλοφορίκην τὸ χρόνον μετρεῖν κατ’ ἐκείνην καὶ τὰς ἀλλὰς μετρεῖ, ὡς τῆς μὲν κυκλοφορίκης κινήσεως ἀριθμός ἔσται τὸ χρόνος καὶ ἀριθμοῦμεν καὶ ὁ δὲ λοιπῶν κινήσεων ἀριθμὸν μόνον οὐ μὴν καὶ ὡς ἀριθμούμενος· οὐ γὰρ τῆς ἐμῆς βαδίσεως ἀριθμός ἔσται τὸ χρόνος ὡς ἀριθμοῦμεν. [20] οὐ μόνον δὲ τῶν κινήσεως μετροῦν χρόνος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἡρεμίων· καὶ αὐτὰ γὰρ ὑπὸ χρόνου μετροῦνται πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οὐ γὰρ καθὸν ἡρεμίαι, ἀλλὰ καθὸ καὶ ἡρεμίαι καὶ ἐν ῥοή εἰς διηνεκεί μεθ’ εἰς τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἑστάσεως. ἀν οὖν τε, εἰ ἀρχὴν ἔχῃ χρονικὴν ἡ ἡρεμία καὶ τέλος, δὴ δλων ὅτι χρόνως καὶ αὐτὴ μετρεῖται, ὡς τε συνελόντα εἰςεῖτε μέτρον ἔστιν ὁ χρόνος τῆς ἐν γενέσει ῥοής, ἡτὶ εἰς κοινή κινήσεως καὶ ἡρεμίας. [27] διαιρεῖται δὲ ὁ χρόνος εἰς παρελθόντα καὶ μέλλοντα, διαιρεῖται δὲ κατὰ τὸ νῦν, καὶ ἔστι τὸ νῦν πέρας μὲν τοῦ παρελθόντος ἀρχὴ δὲ τοῦ μέλλοντος, ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἐν γραμμῇ τὸ σημεῖο καὶ τὸ κίνημα ἐν κινήσει, τούτῳ καὶ (τὸ) νῦν ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ. [31] τὴν δὲ χρείαν ἢ τὸ χρόνος τῷ παντὶ παρέχεται δίκαιον αὖ εἰς προσθείναι περὶ χρόνου λέγοντα. φαμέν δὲ ὡς ἡ γένεσις διὰ τοῦ χρόνου ἐν τάξει διακέκριται, ὡς, εἰπή μὴ ἢ χρόνος, σύγχυσαι αὖ ἢ καὶ τῶν γενέσεων καὶ τῶν πράξεων ὡς συγκεχύσατο τοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν Τρωίκων τὰ ἐν. 

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[Waitz p. 21, line 35] *Tineis mèn o dh ywanon wósper dh kai to ton tópopo oú tó pousó, tois de pròs tì sunetaxan diá to mév to ywanon métron elnav kiníasas, tov de tópopo periektikón swmatoj kai peras tou periékontos, en schêsai de elnav tauta kai dia tauta upokeiai tois pròs tì. fámen dh' ois to métron eite épi' áribbou tov lógon ékdej eite épi megebou diittan estin, ë gar autò kabh' autò theoreitai ë katab thn pròz to metropiomenon anaforàn kai ois mév kabh' autò, pousoj kai twon pouson panta tì arkh, wò de pròs to metropiomenon, pròs tì an eip. òsautes de kai to th òn kiníasas métron o ywanon, ois mév kabh' autò kai diástejma óchon, pousoj an eij tì, wò de pròs thn kínnias, pròs tì, kai oudèn aytòpou kath' allas kai allas ènvoias eis diaforous kathgorias anageiésai. òsautes de kai peri tov (Waitz p. 22) tópopon òti kata méon thn diástaian epifaneiá esti kai kata touto pousoj, katab de thn pròs to periexoménon schéseis oudèn thaimastoon eí kai o tópopos eis th pròs tì anágyosto wósper kai o ywanon. ouk éstov ouv o ywanon h tov poué kathgoria, all' oudè th an ev ywono. o mév gar ywanon pousoj, to de th ev ywono ou sia toyv: all' oudè th sunvedoton èx òmboi: áplh yar h kathgoria, philh de móno h schésis tov prágmatos pròs tov ywanon eidopoiei thn tov poué kathgorian, olon th ev ywono einai toutéstov autò to ywonojìzov. wósper de alllo mév esti thronis, alllo de th kata thronis, toutéstov to fronein, kai to mév esti poistis, to de th pouein, ouvai kai th ywanoj kai to th ywono einai diéastikhe. kai o mév esti pousoj, to de th th tov poué kathgorias dhliotikon: òtan gar th prágma ëteron thn th ywanon kai ouv ois méros ywono laimbañomevon schéseis ëch the pròs tov ywanon kai dia touto ev ywono estin, ò wósper h ev Xalami naiamachia ev tòde th ywonoj, ths allh kathgoria ginétai, ë th tov poué allh ouia para th pousoj eidopoioymén th mév th diaiptasa tov ywonoj theoriomén dh [o mév] ëv th ywono.

[18] Ká ywanoj mév diaforái paralelýthous ènastwos méllon, tov de potè th xhēs airown týmeron, tov mév oikéwv óchon pròs to pareldon to de pròs to mellos to de pròs to ènastwos, ei pròs to yvobhýmeron apoblēmias: ei de pròs thn hýliou kýklou, ãnti mév pareldóstov to pérsou, ãnti de th melloynov to eis néwta, ãnti de ènastwostov th týmes. loiptov de kai ãorístos esti lábei diaforás tov potè pròs mév th paron th ýkai kai ãrtoi, pròs de th pareldon th páli, pròs de th mellos th òtopo. [25] kai o mév ywanoj ãpeirous, éipexer ë geýneas suxejhs, th de potè pepérasatai, òti kai ëv autw prájzis pepérasaménh kai o mév ywanoj ouk ev ywonoj, to de potè th ev ywonoj einai òhloi.
[28] Τὸ δὲ ἐν τινὶ ἐνδεκακός λεγομένου λέγεται γὰρ ἐν τινὶ ός τὸ συμβεβηκός ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ καὶ ός τὰ μέρη ἐν τῷ διόν καὶ τὸ διόν ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι καὶ ός τὸ εἴδος ἐν τῇ υλή καὶ ἐπὶ μέντοι ὡς τὸ γένος ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσι καὶ τὰ εἴδη ἐν τῷ γένει καὶ πρὸς τούτους τὰ τῶν ἀρχομένων ἐν τῷ ἄρχοντι καὶ τὰ τὸ ἄρχοντος ἐν τοῖς ἀρχομένοις καὶ τὸ ός ἐν τῷ ἄγγελῳ καὶ τὸν τόπον καὶ χρόνῳ τοσοουσίως όν καθομένου τοῦ ἐν τῶν ἄξιων ἀπορρήσαται διὰ τι κατὰ μόνας τὰ δύο σχέσεις ταῦτας ἰδιαί κατηγορίαι αὐσπιστίσατο. λεγομένων δὴ τά μὲν ἄλλα σημαίνομεν τοῦ ἐν τοῖς συμπληρωματικά ἐστιν ἀλλήλων ός τὰ μέρη καὶ τὸ ἄρχον καὶ τὰ γένει καὶ τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὸ ἄρχον καὶ τὸ ἀρχόμενον, τά δὲ όυ δυνάμενα χωρὶς ὑποστᾶται ός ἐν τῷ ἐλθὲν καὶ ός τὸν ὑποκειμένως συμβεβηκός, ὦπερ καὶ μαρτή τοῦ ὑποκειμένου γίνεται διὸ καὶ καλεῖται κατ’ ἐκείνῳ τὸ ὑποκειμένου ὁλοκληρωμένοι καὶ πρὸς ἄλλων κατηγοριῶν τῶν τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὑπαρχοῦσιν. πῶς οὖν ἔν εἴη ἐν τούτοις τὸ έτερον ἐν έτερῳ κυρίῳ, ὃτε μήδε εἶδεν ἀπόλος έτερα ἀλλήλων καθορισμένα καθ’ υπόστασαν, ἀλλὰ κατ’ ἐπίνειαν μόνην καθ’ ἴνα γενέσθαι συν άριστομένων, διὰ τούτο μὲν οὖν οὐδὲ κατηγορίας ἰδικῆς ἐκαστοῦ τῶν τοιούτων ἐκρίθη σύνεν, τά [Waitz p. 23] μέντοι ἐν χρόνῳ καὶ ἐν τόπῳ ἐν τούτοις γὰρ μόνοις, ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν περιέχει τὸ δὲ περιέχεται, ἐκατέρω τὴν ἐκαστοῦ φύσιν διασώζοντος καὶ μηδέτερον μέρους τοῦ έτερον γινομένοι μηδὲ συμπληρωμένος τὸ έτερον. ἐν γὰρ τούτοις μόνοις αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν τοῖς φύσις τοῖς ἀφωρισμένοις γίνεται κατὰ τὴν σχέσιν υφεστώσας. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ κατηγορίας ἰδιαίς ἐκάστορ τούτων ἔξωθαραν φανερώτατα γὰρ τὰ ἐν χρόνῳ καὶ ἐν τόπῳ ὑπερ’ ἐτερά ἐστι τοῦ χρόνου καὶ τοῦ τόπου τοιγαρωθοῦν καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἀλλοτε καὶ ἀλλοτε ἐν ἄλλῳ γίνονται τόπῳ καὶ χρόνῳ.

Unnamed References (Working Collection)

[T4b*] Porphyry, In Aristotelis categorias expositio per interrogationem et responsionem. (A.D. 3) Page 90 line 30. [unnamed; cf. T9]

– Ὅτι περὶ Σωκράτους μόνον πεποίησαι τὸν λόγον, οὐ ἀναφεθέντος ὁ ἀνθρώπος καὶ τὸ ζῷον μένει, δει δὲ οὐκ ἐρ’ ἐνος ποιεῖσθαι τὸν λόγον, ἀλλ’ εὐ εἰδέναι, ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶν ἄτομος οὐσία ὁ εἰς τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἄλλ’ οἱ καθ’ ἐκαστοῦ ἀνθρώποι πάντες, ἐξ όν καὶ ὁ κοινῆς κατηγοροομένως ἀνθρώπως ἐπενόησθη, καὶ τὰ καθ’ ἐκαστοῦ ζώωα, δι’ αὐτὸ τὸ κοινῆς κατηγοροομένως ἐνομίσαι ζώωαν, ἀλλ’ καὶ αἰτία τοῖς κοινῆς κατηγοροομένοις ἐστὶ τοῦ εἶναι παρὰ γὰρ τὰ καθ’ ἐκαστοῦ οὐκετείνην οὐκαίνην οὐκ εἶναι τοῖς εἶναι ζώωαν. εἰ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν καθ’ ἐκαστοῦ αἰσθήσεως ἐστὶ τὸ κοινῆς τῇ διανοίᾳ ἀφικνὸμεθα, ὡς ἐυκτένει τὰ διὰ τοῖς κοινῶς πρῶτον, εἰ τὰ καθ’ ἐκαστοῦ ἀναφεθή ζώωα, συνέκτησι οὖν τὸ κοινῆς κατηγοροομένως κατ’ αὐτῶν ἔσται, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ αἱ σημαντικαὶ λέξεις τῶν ὅντων ἐπὶ πρῶτοι τὰ ἀτομα κατωνομασμένα, εἰσὶν ἀπὸ τούτων ἐπὶ τὰ κοινὰ ἡ διάνοια μετηλθεν. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν περὶ λέξεων σημαντικών ἡ πρόθεσις, αἱ δὲ λέξεις ἐπὶ πρῶτα τὰ αἰσθήτα ἐπετέθησαν (τούτοις γὰρ πρῶτοι κατ’ αἰσθήσεως ἐνυπηγιαίνομεν), ταῦτας καὶ πρῶτας ἐθετο ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης εἶναι οὐσίας κατὰ τὴν πρόθεσιν, ὡσπερ πρῶται αἱ αἰσθήται κατωνομάσθησαν, οὕτως ὡς πρὸς τὰς σημαντικὰς λέξεις πρῶτας τιθεῖς τὰς ἀτόμους οὐσίας.

[T4c*] Porphyry, In Aristotelis categorias expositio per interrogationem et responsionem. (A.D. 3) Page 95 line 16-38. [unnamed; cf. T12, T14n]
ἀλλὰ, οὖν ὡσπερ οὐκ πρὸς τῶν οὕτως ἄλληλα πρὸς τοῦ πρὸς οὐ ἀλλὰ εἴποις τι οὐ τῶν τοῦτο ῥηθείη. μὴν πρὸς ἑνὸς ὅντος τι ἀλλὰ πρὸς . καὶ τι δὲ ὅντων, ἐπὶ τι τινῶν ὅτι πρὸς πρὸς μὲν τὰ ὡσανεὶ ἀποδόσεως τῆς οὖν παραστῆσαι διὰ βούλεται ταύτης ἕτερον. (20) ἅπερ πρὸς εἶναι αὐτὰ, ὁπωσοῦ ἑτέρων ἐστὶν ἄλλως ὅσα ταῦτα εἶναι λέγεται ἀποδοῦναι καὶ ἐπίνοια πεποίηκεν πρὸς εἰπὼν Ἀριστοτέλης τι συλλαβόντας, ὃ ποιήσασθαι ἐπὶ οὐδ Ὄρον αὐτῶν οὐκ—γενικώτατον μὲν ὡς δὲ, τὴν τῶν οὖν τι; πρὸς τὰ ποτὲ Τίνα ἐστὶ τίνα πρὸς διδάξαι ποτέ, ὀλίγον τι τὰ ἐυθὺς μέγα γενέσθαι καὶ καὶ πολὺ πῶς τὸ τὸ εἴρηται τὸ ἐὐσύνοπτα καὶ εἰς διότι μὲν ἐν τῷ ἐδεί—καὶ τῶν, ἐμνήσθη Καὶ ποσῷ πρὸς αἰτίαν τὴν. (10) ἅπερ τι εστὶ—προϋφεστηκότος μεῖζον καὶ, ἐπιγίνεται, πλάτους, τὸ βάθους ἔλαττον μήκους ὅτι τὸ τὸ ποιόν Ἰ—μὴ μᾶλλον τῶν Ἡ πρὸς . (7) κατηγορία τρίτη τῇ ἐστι—responsionem. (A.D. 3) Page 111 line 5 – 112 line 7. [unnamed: cf. T14p, T14r]

ἀναλογίᾳ

νοητά προσχρώμενος, ἂν ἐπὶ τῶν. οὖν ἀπὸ ἄνθρωπον φιλοθεάμων παρεγκλίνοντες πρώτως. διὸ αὐτοάνθρωπον καὶ ήρθι ήτοι ἐκείνα ὅτι αἰσθητῶν καὶ δὲ ἐγνώσθη νοητὰ ἀθέατα οἱ, διαλέγεται τῶν σημαινόμενα τοιῶνδε τῇδε, εἴπερ ᾗ μὲν φωνῶν τῶν τὸν λόγον ἐπαγγελλομένου προηγουμένως διδάσκειν οὕτως, φιλοσόφου τῶν δὲ ὡς ὡς ἐοίκασιν ταῦτα. οὖν ταῦτα τὸν καὶ ἀπορεῖ Λούκιον περὶ οἱ.

[Τ12*] Ammonius, In Aristotelis categorias commentarius Page 27,1. 16-27 [unnamed: cf. T14j]

οἱ ἐν τῶν ἀποδεδομένων ὀρισμών μὴ πάσι τοῖς συμβεβηκόσιν ἐφαρμοζείτεν. οἱ δὲ καὶ ἐτέρους τοὺς παρὰ τὰ συμβεβηκόσια· λέγουσι γὰρ ὅτι ὁ Σωκράτης ἐν τόπῳ ἄν ἐν τινὶ ἐστὶ καὶ σὺν ὡς μέρος ἐν ὅλῳ (οὐ γὰρ μέρος ἐστὶ τοῦ τόπου) καὶ ἀδύνατον χωρὶς αὐτὸν εἶναι τοῦ ἐν ὃ ἐστι (ἀδύνατον γὰρ χωρὶς εἶναι τόπου), ὡστε κατὰ τούτον τὸν λόγον ὁ Σωκράτης συμβεβηκὸς ὑπάρχει, ὅπερ ἂτομον. φομὲν οὖν ὃς δυνατὸν χωρὶς εἶναι τὸν Σωκράτην τοῦ ἐν ὃ ἐστι· κἂν γὰρ ύπολογίζει αὐτὸν καταλαμίσαντα τὸν τόπον, ἐν ὃ ἦν πρότερον, πορευθῆναι εἰς ἐτέρον τόπον, οὐδὲν ἤτοι ὁ Σωκράτης ἐστι· τὸ δὲ συμβεβηκὸς χωρισθὲν τοῦ ὑποχειμένου ἐφαρμόζεται. ἵστεν δὲ ὃτι παρέτεται τῷ Σωκράτι τοῦ τόπος οὐχ ὡς συμπληρωθὲν αὐτοῦ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀλλʼ ὡς παρακολούθημα, ὥσπερ τῷ ἐν φωτὶ βαδίζοντι ἢ σκιὰ παρέτεται μηδαμῶς αὐτοῦ συμπληρωθῇ τὴν οἰκείαν οὐσίαν.

[Τ14m*] Simplicius, In Aristotelis categorias commentarium. (A.D. 6) Page 73,28-74,29. [unnamed: cf. T14m]

ταύτα μὲν οὖν καὶ ὁ θειότατος Πλωτῖνος ἀπορεῖ καὶ οἱ περὶ τὸν Λούκιον καὶ Νικόστατον.

οἱ δὲ ταύτα ἀποροῦντες ὑπαλλάττειν ἐοίκασιν τὴν ὑπόθεσιν. ὥς γὰρ περὶ τῶν ὠντων προφητευμένων τοῦ φιλοσόφου διδάσκειν ἐπηγεγελλομένου, οὕτως προφήτευσι τὴν ἀπορίαν· λέγομεν δὲ ὅτι (30) οὐ περὶ τῶν ὠντων ἢ ὠντα ποιομένων τῶν λόγων, ἀλλʼ εἰπὲ ἄρα, ἢ ὑπὸ τοιοῦτον συμμετέχει φωνῶν, προφητευμένως μὲν περὶ τὸν τήδε διαλέγεται· ταύτα γὰρ ἔστων τὰ προσεχῶς ύπὸ τῶν φωνῶν σημαινόμενα, διότι ταύτα καὶ ἐγνώσθη πρῶτα καὶ χρώσι τῶν ὄνομάτων τετυχθηκαν, τὰ δὲ νοητὰ ἄδεατα. καὶ οἱ θεασάμενοι δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ὀρμηθέντες ὅτι ἁρρητὰ (35) [p. 74] ἐξείηνε κατέλαβον· διὸ καὶ παραγγελίνοντες ἐλέγον ἀνθρωπότητα ἢ αὐτοανθρωπον ἢ πρῶτως ἀνθρώπων, ὁ σύν τῶν ὠντων φιλοθεάμων ἀπὸ τούτων μεταβαίνοι ἢ ἀδίδως ἐπὶ τὰ νοητὰ, τῇ ἀναλογίᾳ προσχρώμενος.

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ἐπεὶ ὁτὲ περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν διελέγεται, περὶ ὁνὶ καὶ ὁ πολὺς ἀνθρώπως τήν ἐπίσχεσιν ποιεῖται, δὴλὸν ἐστι πρῶτον μὲν ἐκ τοῦ τήν παρὰ πάσῳ λεγομένην οὐσίαν (5) προχωρίσσοθα, ἐπείτη ἐξ ὧν δὲλὸν οὐσίαν μηνομενοῦσα, αἰσθητής τε καὶ διανοητής, εἰς δέ τήν ὑπέρ ταύτας μιθὴ ἀνελβίνης ὅλως τήν αἰσθητήν κυριωτέραν εἶναι τῆς διανοητῆς φησιν, ὡς ἐν τῷ περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν σχέματος προκύψαν σφής. ἐπεὶ δὲ τῆς διανοητῆς ἀναβάσεις τοῦ προς τῇ τούτῳ, (10) καθ’ ἡν καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀπὸ μὲν τῆς αἰσθητῆς εἰς τῆς διανοητῆς ἀναβάσεις δυνάμεθα, ἀπὸ δέ τῆς διανοητῆς τήν αἰσθητήν κατοί πολλῆς ἀπειρίας καὶ ἀοριστίας ἀναπληθείσαις ἄρα περιλαμβάνομεν. οὐ μόνον δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων πράγματι τὰ αἰσθήμα τα καὶ μερικὰ τῶν καθόλου καὶ διανοητῶν προστάτευον, καὶ τούτου εἰκότως ποιεῖ, κατὰ τάς σημαντικῶς φωνᾶς τήν διαφοράν μετετέθαι, αἱ πρώται καὶ χωρίς ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐτάξεθαν καὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπως εἰσὶ γνώκιμαι, καὶ διὰ τούτῳ, ὃς ἑοικεν, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τριτήν τήν οὐσίαν ἑοικεν, τήν μὲν περὶ τῆς ὑπήρχησας, τήν δὲ κατά τὸ εἰδός, τήν δὲ κατά τὸ συναφέστερον, ἐν τούτοις **, ἐπειδή κατὰ τάς σημαντικῶς ἐξείς τάς τοῖς πολλῶς γνωρίσιμαις μέτεια τήν (20) θεωροῦμα, ἡ δὲ ὅπη ϕιλοσόφου δεῖται διανοιακός καὶ τὸ εἰδός τοῦ τοιουτών ὡς συμβεβηκός δοξεί τοῖς πολλῶς.

οτὶ δὲ ἡ κατὰ ἀναλογιάν αὐτὴ μετάβασις ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐπὶ τὰ νοητὰ ταύτα προσέρχεται τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει, δῆλον, εἰπὲν ὢρνη καὶ εἰδος προϋποθέσεως ἀρχἶς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς καὶ ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς πάλιν κατὰ ἀναλογιάν τάς αὐτῆς ἀποφαίνεται εἶναι καὶ ἐτέρας δὲ (25) τὸ τρόπο τῆς ὑποστάσεως διαφεροῦσας. τί ὅπως κυλίεις καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δέκα γενών τήν κατὰ ἀναλογιάν ταυτότητα ἐπὶ τὲ τῶν νοητῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν μετὰ τῆς ἐτερόπητος διαφόρεσθα; 


ὅταν οὖν οἱ περὶ Πλωτίνων καὶ Ἀνδρόνικον τὸ χθὲς καὶ αὐρίον καὶ πέρασιν μέρη χρόνον λέγωσιν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἄξιόσαν (20) τῷ χρόνῳ ςυντητέσαται, φήσομεν οὐκ εἶναι αὐτὰ μέρη χρόνου, ἀλλὰ σχέσει περιέχειν τῶν ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ ὄντων πραγμάτων πρὸς τὸν χρόνον, ἄλλο δὲ ἐστὶν τούτων ἐκάστερον. ’ἀλλ.’ εἰ χρόνος, φαινώ, παρελήψις τὸ χθὲς ἡ μέσον χρόνου, σύνθετον τι ἔσται, εἰ ἔτερον τὸ παρεληψιαν καὶ ἔτερον ὁ χρόνος, καὶ δύο κατηγορία ϭεσουντας καὶ οὔ εἰς τὸν ἕπειτα. ἢ τῷ αὐτῷ (25) λόγῳ φήσομεν, εἰ ἔτερον τὸ χρόνον καὶ ἔτερον τὸ λογισμὸν καὶ ἔτερον τὸ θνητόν, οὐχ ἀπλοῦν ἔσται, ἀλλὰ τρεῖς κατηγορία: εἰ δὲ ἐπὶ τούτου ἐν τῷ εἰδώ τρία συλλαμβάνομεν, καὶ ὁ χρόνος καὶ τὸ παρεληψιαν εἰς ἐν πράγμα συντελεῖ καὶ οὐ ποιεῖ δύο κατηγορίας. μήποτε δὲ οὐδὲ χρόνος ἀπλώς παρεληψιαν ἐστι οὔτε χθὲς οὔτε ἡννοια πλείονες εἰς ταῦτα συντρέφουσιν (30) ἐπὶ τούτου· κατ’ αὕτην γὰρ μόνην τήν σχέσιν τοῦ πράγματος πρὸς τὸν χρόνον τὸ χθὲς εἰσδοποιεῖται. ‘ἀλλ.’ εἰ τὸ ποτέ, φαινώ, τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ λέγεται, τούτῳ τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ, εἰ μὲν πράγμα τί φασί, οίον τὸν Σωκράτην, ὁτι οὕτως καὶ τὸν Σωκράτην. ἀλλής ἐστι κατηγορία: εἰ δὲ τὸν χρόνον, καὶ οὕτως ἄλλης· εἰ δὲ τὸ σύνθετον, οὐχ ἔσται μία κατηγορία. ’. ἢ οὕτω τὰ πράγματα τὰ ἐν (35) χρόνον οὕτω αὐτὸς ὁ χρόνος οὕτω τὸ σύνθετον ἐξ ἄμφοιν εἰσδοποιεῖ τὴν τοῦ ποτέ κατηγορίαν, ψιλὴ δὲ ἡ σχέσις τοῦ πράγματος πρὸς τὸν χρόνον· διό (p. 348) οὕτω μέρη χρόνου

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Sensation recognizes (krinei) enmattered sensible forms in one way, and mind (nous) in another.... [E]verything sensed is a specific ‘this’ and a particular, since a composite is that sort of thing. Mind, in contrast, is for studying the form and the definition in virtue of which it is a specific ‘this’.

Hence, [mentation] is not of a ‘this’, but rather of a ‘such’, that is, not of the particular, but rather of the universal (katholou). [It is universal] because everything which is the same in form as one another is the same in form in virtue of the definition, since the definition is the same [for all of them], and the mind is for studying this.

In those cases, then, where the ‘this’ and the what-it-is-to-be for ‘this’ are different, one power for apprehension is of the ‘this’ (namely, sensation), while another is of what-it-is-to-be for ‘this’ (namely, mind).

But in those cases where the ‘this’ and what-it-is-to-be for ‘this’ are the same — that is, with forms separate from matter — only the mind is for studying them. For nothing of this kind is sensible, since every sensible is enmattered and compound.

[AL2*]. Alexander, DA 90,2-14. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἐνύλων εἰδῶν, ὡσπερ εἶπον, ὅταν μὴ νοήται τὰ τοιαύτα εἶδη, οὐδὲ ἔστιν αὐτῶν τι νοῦς, εἰ γε ἐν τῷ νοεῖσθαι αὐτοῖς ἢ τοῦ νοεῖσθαι εἶναι ὑπόστασις. τὰ γὰρ καθόλου καὶ κοινὰ τὴν μὲν ὑπάρχειν ἐν τοῖς καθέκαστά τε καὶ ἐνύλως ἔζει. νοούμενα δὲ χωρὶς ὑλῆς κοινά τε καὶ (5) καθόλου γίνεται, καὶ τότε ἐστὶ νοῦς ὅταν νοήται. εἰ δὲ μὴ νοοῖτο, οὐδὲ ἔστιν ἔτι. ὡστε χωρισθέντα τοῦ νοούμενος αὐτά νοῦ φθείρεται, εἰ γε ἐν τῷ νοεῖσθαι τὸ εἶναι αὐτοῖς. ὄμοια δὲ τούτως καὶ τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως, ὁποῖα ἐστὶ τὰ μαθηματικά. φθαρτός ἄρα ὁ τοιοῦτος νοῦς, τουτέστι τὰ (10) τοιαύτα νοήματα.

ἐν οἷς δὲ τὸ νοούμενον κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἐστὶ τοιούτοις, οἷον νοεῖται (ἔστι δὲ τοιούτον ὅν καὶ ἄφθαρτον), ἐν τούτοις καὶ χωρισθέν τοῦ νοεῖσθαι ἄφθαρτον μένει, καὶ ὁ νοῦς ἄρα ὁ τοιοῦτο νοεῖσθαι ἄφθαρτός ἐστιν...

With enmattered forms, I said, when such forms are not currently being thought, none of them is nous either, since what-it-is-to-be for noeta exists for them while they are thought. For universal, common [characteristics] inhere in enmattered particulars, but they become common and universal when they are thought separate from matter, and they are nous at the moment when they are thought. But if they are not currently being thought, they are not [nous] any longer either. Consequently, they perish once they have been separated from the
nous thinking them, since their being consists in being thought. (Abstractions, such as mathematical objects, are like these.) This kind of nous, therefore, is perishable, that is, these sorts of concepts are.

In cases, on the other hand, where what is thought is such as to be thought in virtue of its own nature — and it is imperishable because it is of this sort — it remains imperishable even after it has been separated from being thought.

[AL3*]. Alexander, Quaest. 1.11a, 22,15-20. That [the genus] is posterior to the thing (πρᾶγμα) is clear. For given the existence of animal, it is not necessary that the genus animal exist... but if the genus animal should exist, it is necessary also for animal to exist. And if ‘ensouled substance capable of sense perception’ were removed, then the genus animal would not exist either... But if the genus animal were removed, it would not be necessary that ‘ensouled substance capable of sense perception’ would also have been removed, for it might be... in just one thing...

Although posterior to the thing of which it is an accident (ὧ συμβέβηκεν), nevertheless it comes to exist as prior to each of its parts, i.e. each of the items under it.... Removing (ἀναιρουμένῳ) one of the items under the common item does not remove the common item as well, because it exists in many. But if the common item should be removed, there would not exist any of the items under the common item, since their being lies in having that [common item] in them.

[AL4*]. Alexander, DA 90,2-8. In the case of enmattered forms, as I said, when such forms are not being thought, none of them is intellect (nous), if their being intelligibles has its being in their being thought. For the things that are universal and common have their being in the enmattered particulars, but when they are thought apart from matter they come to be common and universal, and they are intellect just when they are thought. If they are not thought, they are no longer. So when they are separated from the intellect that thinks them, they perish, if their being is in being thought.

[AL5*]. Alexander, Quaest. 8,22. The common items are indestructible, in virtue of the fact that the particulars they are in are everlasting by succession (ek diadokhes aidioteti).

[AL6*]. Alexander ap. Simplicium, in Cat. 85,13. But he [Alexander] says that the common item can be nothing apart from the individual, but the individual exists apart from the common item, for example, the sun, the moon, and the universe.

[AL7*]. Alexander, Quest. 8,8-16. For the definition of man, two-footed pedestrian animal, is common since it is in all the particular men (pasin on tois kathekasta anthrôpois), and is complete (holoklêron) in each; it is common in virtue of being the same in many, not by each man sharing a part in it. Therefore, definitions are not of common items qua common, but rather of those to which it is an accident to be common in respect of each nature. For even if there is just one man in concrete existence, the same definition of man [applies]....

[BO1*]. Boethius, in Isagoge 166,8-167,3. Therefore, when genera and species are thought (cogitantur), from the singulars (ex singulis) in which they exist their likeness

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(similitiudo) is gathered, for example a likeness of humanness (hominibus) is gathered from singular humans who are dissimilar from each other. This likeness when thought by the mind (cogitata animo) and accurately sensed (perspecta) becomes the species. Again when a likeness of these different species has been considered (considerata), which likeness can exist only in those species or their individuals, it creates a genus.

Thus these certainly exist in singulars, and are thought as universals (universalia): a species is to be considered nothing other than a thought (cogitatio) gathered from a substantial likeness of individuals numerically dissimilar, and a genus a thought gathered from a likeness of species. But this likeness becomes sensible when it is in singulars; when it is in universals, it becomes intelligible. In the same way when it is sensible it persists in singulars; when it is understood, it becomes universal. Therefore, they subsist in association with sensibles (circa sensibilia), but are understood over and above bodies (intelliguntur autem praeter corpora).

For it is not precluded that two things in the same subject are diverse in definition… Thus it is also with genera and species, i.e. singularity and universality. Certainly there is one subject, but in one way it is universal, when it is thought (cum cogitatur), in another way singular, when it is sensed in those things in which it has its being.
6. Athenodorus and Cornutus

[T1a] Porphyry, in Cat. 58,3-7. <The subject of the Categories according to Porphyry.>

(3) ἔστι τοῖνυν ἡ πρόθεσις τοῦ βιβλίου περὶ τῆς πρώτης θέσεως τῶν λέξεων τῆς παραστατικῆς τῶν πραγμάτων· ἐστιν γὰρ περὶ φωνῶν σημαντικῶν αἰτίων, καθὸ σημαντικὰ εἰσὶ τῶν πραγμάτων, οὐ μή τῶν κατὰ ἀριθμὸν ἀλλότρων διαφερόντων ἀλλὰ τῶν κατὰ γένος.... (12) εἰς δέκα τοῖνυν γενικὰς διαφορὰς περιληφθέντων τῶν ὄντων δέκα καὶ αἱ δηλοῦσαι ταῦτα φωναὶ γεγόνασι κατὰ γένη καὶ αὐταὶ περιλήφθεισα. δέκα οὖν λέγονται κατηγοροῦμαι τῷ γένει δηλοντὶ ὡσπερ καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ ὄντα δέκα τῷ γένει.

[T1b] Porphyry, in Cat. 58,30-59,2. <The distinction of primary and secondary imposition.>

Ἐ... Ἀλλ᾽ εἰ ἐνθάδε δέκα γένη διείλετο τὰς σημαντικὰς φωνὰς, πῶς ἐν τῷ Περὶ ἑρμηνείας εἰς δύο, εἰς όνομα καὶ ὠνῆμα;

Ἀ... Ὁτι ἐνθάδε μὲν περὶ τῆς προηγουμένης θέσεως τῶν λέξεων τῆς κατὰ τῶν πραγμάτων ποιεῖται τὸν λόγον, ἐν δὲ τῷ Περὶ ἑρμηνείας περὶ τῆς δευτέρας, ἢ γνώσται εἰς τοῦ πραγματικῶν λέξεων τῶν πραγμάτων, καθὸ εἰσὶ τούτων σημαντικαί, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν σημαντικῶν λέξεων τῶν τύπων τῶν (35) φωνῶν, καθὸ τύποι εἰσὶ τοιούτων· τύπος γὰρ τῆς φωνῆς τὸ εἶναι ἢ ὄνομα ἢ ὠνῆμα, καὶ τὸ κυρίαν δὲ εἶναι τὴν λέξην ἢ μεταφορικὴν ἢ ἄλλος [p. 59] τροπικὴν τῆς δευτέρας ἢ εἰς τῶν φωνῶν πραγματείας καὶ οὐκ ἐκ τῆς πρώτης.

[T1c] Porphyry, in Cat. 59,5-19. <Not all commentators on the Cat. recognize the distinction between expressions qua expressions, and expressions qua significant of beings. For example, some see the division of categories as too limited or superfluous. Among these are the followers of Athenodorus and Cornutus, who took the subjects of the Cat. to be expressions qua expressions. As there are many expressions that do not belong to a category, they complained that the division was incomplete.> Speaker: hoi peri A. and K. Respondent: Porphyry (favouring Boethus and Herminus).

Ἐ... Ἰρα ὅπιν τὴν διαφορὰν ταύτην πάντες ἐγνωσαν οἱ περὶ τῶν κατηγοριῶν τι γράψαντες;

Ἀ... Ὡθαμώς οὐ γὰρ ἢν οἱ μὲν περὶ τῶν γενῶν τῶν ὄντων προηγουμένως ὑστερο ἐνταύθα πραγματεύεσθαι, οἱ δὲ ἀντέλεγον ἀθετοῦντες αὐτῶν τὴν διαίρεσιν ὡς πολλὰ παριέισαν καὶ μὴ περιλαμβάνουσαν ἢ καὶ πάλιν πλεονάζουσαν.

Ἐ... Τίνες εἰσίν οὐτοὶ;

Ἀ... Οἱ περὶ Αθηνόδωρον καὶ Κορνοῦτον οἱ τὰ ζητοῦμενα περὶ τῶν (10) λέξεων καθὸ λέξεις, οία τὰ κύρια καὶ τὰ τροπικά καὶ δοκα τοιαῦτα, (διαφοραί γὰρ ἔστι λέξεων καθὸ λέξεις εἰς) τὰ τοιαῦτα οὖν προφέροντες.
καὶ ποίας ἐστὶ κατηγορίας ἀποροῦντες καὶ μὴ εὑρίσκοντες ἐλλιπὴ φασιν εἶναι τὴν διάφορων, ὡς ἂν μὴ πάσης φωνῆς σημαντικῆς εἰς αὐτὴν περιλαμβανομένης.

Ἐ. Ἀρα οὖν πάντες ἐσφάλησαν περὶ τὴν πρόθεσιν τῆς τῶν κατηγοριῶν γνώσεως;

Α. Οὐδαμῶς· ἄλλα καὶ Βόηθος ἐν τοῖς εἰς τὰς Κατηγορίας εὑρίσκειν ταῦτα καὶ Ἐρμίνος βραχέως.

Ἐ. Εἰπὲ τὰ Ἐρμίνου, ἐπείπερ αὐτὰ φῆς διὰ βραχέων εἰρήσθαι.

Α. Λέγει τοίνυς ὁ Ἐρμίνος προσκείσθαι οὔτε περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ φύσει πρώτως καὶ γενικωτάτως γενῶν (οὐ γὰρ νεός προσήκουσα ἢ τῶν τοιούτων διδασκαλία) οὔτε τίνες αἱ πρώται καὶ στοιχείωδεις τῶν λεγομένων διαφορῶν, ὡς τὸν λόγον εἶναι δοκεῖν περὶ τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν, ἄλλα μᾶλλον περὶ τῆς καθ ἕκαστον γένους τῶν ὁμοίων σημασίας· διὸ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον ἐγένετο ἀμωβήσθαι τῶν γεγονός, ἐφ' ἄλλως· Πῶς χρὴ τὰς κατηγορίας εὑρίσκειν καὶ μὴ ὑπάγεσθαι ταῖς τῶν Στωϊκῶν ἀπορίαις;

[1d] Porphyry, in Cat. 86,20. <A. and C. object to the division in their works.>

(‘Ε.) Ἀρα οὖν πάντες συγχωροῦσι τὴν εἰς τὰ αὐτὰ γένη καταρίθμησιν τῶν σημαντικῶν λεξών πρῶτως καὶ προηγομένως τῶν πραγμάτων:

(Α.) Οὐδαμῶς· Ἀθηνόδωρος γὰρ ἠττῆσατο ὁ Στώικός βιβλία γράφοντας Πρὸς τὰς Ἀριστοτέλειος κατηγορίας Κορνοῦτός τε ἐν ταῖς Ἡθορικαῖς τέχναις καὶ ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἀθηνόδωρον ἀντιγραφῇ καὶ ἀλλοι πλείστοι.

(Ε.) Ἀρα οὖν ὀρθῶς ἀντιλέγομαι;

(Α.) Οὐδαμῶς.

[T2a] Dexippus, in Cat. 1.9 [chapter heading].

[δ. Πῶς χρή τὰς κατηγορίας εὑρίσκειν καὶ μὴ ὑπάγεσθαι ταῖς τῶν Στωϊκῶν ἀπορίαις;]


[1] Ἀλλὰ δὴ πῶς μέλλομεν διαγνώσκειν τὰς προτιθεμένας λέξεις πότερον ὑπὸ τὰς κατηγορίας πίπτουσιν ἢ οὔ; δὸς οὖν τι κριτήριον, ἵνα τὰ μὴ ὑποπίπτοντα τῇ τῶν κατηγοριῶν διαφέρει διαχρίνομεν.
[2] Φημὶ δὴ ὅτι τὸ σημαντικὸν πᾶν γένος προϋπάρχειν δεῖ ὡς ὑποχείμενον καὶ ἐν ἄρχας τάξα ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ διαμείζεσι· οὐ γὰρ οἶν τيبة (5) οὐδέποτε ἄνω τοῦ τοιουτοῦ τρόπου τῆς φωνῆς κατηχορεισθαι τι ώς ἐτέρων καθ’ ἐτέρου, οὕκοιν εἰ τι ἀσμένον ἐστὶ μόριον καθ’ αὐτό ὦν τὸ βλάβη τῆς κατά ἀναφορὰν ἐφ’ ἐτέρων σημαντικὸν ὡς αἱ οὔτως ἀναφέρεσθαι ἐπαναφοραί, αἰτίνες κατὰ τὴν ἐπὶ τὰ ἀόριστα μόρια ἀναφοράν δηλοῦσι τι ώς ἢ ἐξείνοις φωνή ἐπὶ τὶς ᾑ ἀναγομένη· ἢ ἐτὶ συνεσμανηκὼν εἴπο ἐτέρου (10) ὡς τὰ ἄρθρα καὶ οἱ σύνδεσμοι, οὐδαμῶς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐν ταῖς κατηχορίαις θείαν ᾑ τὶς δικαιῶς· πάλιν τοῖνος μετὰ τῆς πρὸς τὸ πράγμα σχέσεως καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὰ πράγματα διαφοράς βουλεῖται κατηχορία χωρίως εἰδοποιεῖσθαι· ἐπειδὴ προηγομένους ἢ σημαντικὴ λέξεις τῆς πρώτης ἴνα τὴν ἄρχη τοῦ λόγου, καθ’ ἂν τὰ πράγματα δηλοῦσιν ἀλλήλους ἐφεμέθαι, οἶν ἢ μὲν ἀνθρώπους λέξεις πρὸς οὕσιν ἔχει τὴν σχέσιν, ἢ δὲ λευκότης πρὸς ποιῶν, καὶ αἱ ἄλλα ὅμως.

[2.1] ἐὰν οὖν λέξεις οὕτως σχηματίζῃ, ὡς μὴ τῆς πρώτης εἶναι σημασίας τοῦ λόγου, ἀλλὰ τοῖς οὐσίοις μέρεσιν τὸν ἐπιβάλλοντα χαρακτῆρα ἀφορέζειν, ὡς διόθεν, οὔκοθεν, κάλλιστα, ὀρθότατα, σοφότατα, ποιητικώτατα.

[2.2] ἢ κατὰ τὴν τῶν νοημάτων πρὸς ἀλλήλα (20) ἐπιπλοκήν, ὡσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀκολούθιας τοῦ οὐδέπειν οἶν τοῦ ‘εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστὶ’, καὶ τῆς μάχης τοῦ διαφημικοῦ οἶν θὺ ἡμέρα ἐστίν’, οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο λέξεις οὕτ’ ἴσησον τούτων προσήκοιοι ταῖς κατηχορίαις· ἀπασαι γὰρ αἱ τοιαύτη χρεία τοῦ λόγου παντάπασιν ἀφιστανταί τῆς τῶν κατηχορίων προηγομένης πρὸς τὰ πράγματα συντάξεως.

[2.3] πάλιν εἰ τῆς ἄροφης εἰς κίνησις τῆς διανοίας (25) ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν στεναχωμάτων καὶ βρυχημάτων, ἢ ἦτε τῆς ἀναρθοῦς φόρος ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ποστερισμῶν, ἢ ἦτε τῆς αφάνταστος φωνῆς ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν τερετισμῶν, ἢ ἦτε τὸ όνομα μηδὲν πράγμα δηλοῦσεν, οὐδαμῶς οὐδὲν τούτων ἐστὶ κατηχορία· οὐδαμὴ γὰρ διαδοθοῦσα τὴν ιδιότητα τῆς κατηχορικῆς οὐσίας.


[2.5] καὶ τὸ ἀπλόν καὶ ἀσύνθετον, ἐὰν τὶς ἐν τοῖς τῶν ὄντων γένεσιν αὐτὸ ἐπισκόπη, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν γενικωτάτων σημαντικῶν λέξεων, ένας καὶ συναμφότερός ἡ (5) πανταχῇ οὕτως τῷ χαρακτῆρα ἀφοριζεῖ τῶν κατηχοριῶν· οὕτε οὖν τὰ σύνθετα οἶνον Δίων περισσατε οὕτε τὰ ὕποσυνθετα οἴνον ἤ ξυστροφῶν οὗτον τὰ κατὰ συγκοπήν ἢ ἀποκοπήν λέγοντα οὕτε τὰ παρεχθημένα ἄνομα οὕτε τὰ παρεχθημένα ἄνομα οὕτε τὰ ἐπάθετα οὐθ’ ὡς ποιητικής ἢ ὀρθογραφίας ἢ δια τιθεῖσαν οὐδαμοί προσηκεῖ τι ταῖς κατηχορίαις· ἀλλ’ γὰρ συγκοπή (10) τῆς περὶ τὴν λέξιν καὶ δευτέρας τὰ τοιαῦτα γνώρισεν.

[2.6] ἢ δὲ κατηχορία τὴν προηγομένην σημασίαν βουλεῖται θηρεύνει τῶν λέξεως καὶ τὰς προηγομένας ὅσιώδεις κοινότητας τῶν ὄντων, αἰτίνες ἐν τοῖς ἀνωτάτως γένεσι θεωροῦνται, ἀλλ’ οὕτῳ τὰς κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἄλλως θεωρομέναις δευτέρας κοινάς...
ἐπινοίας. οἱ μὲν σχηματισμοί καὶ αἱ ἐπίνοια ἐπ’ ἀπειρόν δυνάμεναι (15) προϊέναι ἄχρηστοι εἰς πρὸς ἐπιτήμεν, αἱ δὲ γενικαὶ σημαντικαὶ λέξεις ἢ αἱ τῶν πρώτων γενών περιλήψεις ἐν ἀπειρῷ τὸ πεπεσμένον παραδίδουσι ἐμποίουσιν εἰδήσιν ἀκριβῆ τοῦ τε λόγου ἐν ταύτῃ καὶ τῶν ὀντων.


[3.1] οὗτε ἄρα τὸ τροπικόν ἢ (20) μεταφορικὸν ὅνομα ως τὸ ‘ἀνεχαίτισεν’ ἢ ‘πόδα νείατον Ἰδης’.

[3.2] ἀλλ.’ οὔδε οἱ τρόποι οἶνον τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ἐνδέχεται καὶ ὑπάρχειν,

[3.3] οὗτε οἱ προσδοκομοι ζήσερ τὸ πᾶς ἢ οὐδεὶς ἢ τὸ τίς ἢ οὐχί τις ὑπὸ τάς κατηγορίας ταχθηκέντα· οὐδὲν γὰρ ὅ τι τῶν τοιούτων ἀφορισμένην ἱδιαν πραγμάτων ἔχει φύσιν· διόπερ ἂν τις αὐτά εὐλόγως ἀποδοκιμάσειν ὡς οὐκ ἐφαρμόζοντα (25) τῷ τῶν νῦν προειρήμενων σχοπί τῶν κατηγοριών.


[T2c] Dexippus, in Cat. 32.17-29. <On the omission of conjunctions and punctuation from the Categories as ‘co-significant’>.

Ἀλλὰ διὰ τὶ τοὺς συνδέσμους παρέλιπεν, ἀποροῦσιν. Ἐπειδή, φαμὲν ἡμεῖς, οὗτο προηγουμένη εστὶν αὐτῶν ἢ χρεία τοῦ λόγου ἀλλὰ δευτέρα, οὗτε τελεία ἄλλ.’ ἀτελῆς, οὔτε λεπτική συμβολὴ δὲ μᾶλλον, ἄλλ.’ οὔδε σημαίνει προηγουμένος συσσημαίνει δὲ μᾶλλον, ὃσος τὰς δυπλάς εἰσθαμεν παραχώραειν, αὕτεις μετὰ τῶν γεγραμμένων μὲν συσσημαίνουσι τὸ απαρτίζειν τῆς διανοίας αὐταὶ δὲ καθ’ ἕαυτας οὐδὲν ὑμΐλουσι, καὶ οἱ συνδέσμοι τοῦν συσσημαίνουσι μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων μερῶν τοῦ λόγου, αὐτοὶ δὲ καθ’ ἕαυτος ὀνεὶ σημαντικοί, ἄλλ.’ ἐφίκαι τῇ κόλλη διόπερ οὔδε λόγου στοιχεία αὐτοὺς τιθέμεθα, ἄλλ.’ εἶπον ἄρα μέρη λέξεως, κἂν σημαίην δὲ οὕτως, κατὰ σύνταξιν σημαίνουσι, ὃσον ἥ δια συλλαβή, τὸν δὲ λόγον εἴναι φαμεν περὶ τῶν ἄνευ συντάξεως καὶ καθ’ αὐτὰς σημανιοῦσιν λέξεων κατὰ τὰς προηγουμένας χρήσεις τοῦ λόγου, οὐ μέντοι κατὰ τὰς ἐπομένας.


Τὴν δὴ κάνονα ταύτῃ κατὰ τὴν πληγὴν ποίησεν μᾶλλον ἢ εὐλόγως τις θείος, τὴν δὲ ἀντικειμένως πάθος, ἢ ἐκάστῃ ἄλλου μὲν ποίησιν, ἄλλου δὲ πάθος, ἢ ποίησιν εἰς τὸ ὑποκειμένον, πάθημα δ’ ἐν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ. Εἰ δὲ μὴ κατὰ τὴν πληγὴν ἢ φωνή, ἄλλα καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἄερα, δύο ἂν εἴη καὶ οὐ μία ἡ κατηγορία ἐκ τῆς σημαντικῆς, εἰ συσσηματικοῦ ἐκείνης τῆς κατηγορίας.

Apud Simplicium in Cat.
(i) Some reject Aristotle’s division of chapters. (ii) Moreover, some claim that the division of categories is redundant, such as Cornutus and Athenodorus, who believe that the skopos concerns lexeis in so far as they are lexeis. (iii) They believe that the onymies are linguistic, and that the text combines physics, ethics, and theology. 

Respondents: Simplicius.

(i) Λοιπὸν δὲ τὸ περὶ τῆς εἰς τὰ κεφάλαια διαιρέσεως τοῦ βιβλίου λέγειν υπολείπεται, ἃ τινες μὴ ἐπιστήσαντες ὅπως τε κατ’ ἄρθρα διήρησαν καὶ ὅπως τὴν τε πρὸς τὸν ὅλον σκοπὸν χρείαν ἀποτλημοῦσι καλῶς καὶ τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλα συνέχειαν διασώζουσιν, στοιβηδὸν κείσθαι νομίζουσι τὰ κεφάλαια κατὰ τὸν ὑπομνηματικὸν τρόπον.

(ii) καὶ δὴ καὶ ἀντιλέγουσιν αὐτῷ τινες ἀθετοῦντες τὴν διαίρεσιν, οἱ μὲν ὡς πλεονάζουσαν μάτην, οἱ δὲ ὡς πολλὰ παρεῖσαν ὡσπερ Κορνοῦτος καὶ Ἀθηνόδωρος, οἵτινες περὶ λέξεων οἰόμενοι τὸν σκοπὸν εἶναι καθὸ λέξεις εἰσίν, πολλὰς λέξεις προβάλλοντες τὰς μὲν κυρίας, τὰς δὲ τροπικάς, ἐλέγχειν οἴονται τὴν διαίρεσιν, ὡς οὐ πᾶσας τὰς λέξεις περιλαβοῦσιν·

(iii) οἳ καὶ διαίρεσιν τῶν ὅνομάτων οἴονται ποιεῖσθαι εἰς ὁμώνυμα καὶ συνώνυμα καὶ παρώνυμα καὶ εἶναι τὸ βιβλίον παντοδαπῶν θεωρημάτων σωρείαν ὑπολαμβάνουσιν λογικῶν τε καὶ φυσικῶν καὶ ἡθικῶν καὶ θεολογικῶν· εἶναι γὰρ τὰ μὲν περὶ ὁμώνυμων καὶ συνώνυμων καὶ παρωνύμων σχέματα λογικά, ἐτι δὲ καὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων, τὰ δὲ περὶ κινήσεως φυσικά, ἡθικά δὲ τὰ περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας, ὡσπερ θεολογικά τὰ περὶ τῶν δέκα γενών φιλοσοφήματα. 

(iv) In fact, however, the truth is otherwise. [Aristotle] is not carrying out a division (diairesis) of names [in the onymies], for if he were, he would not have omitted heteronyms or polyonyms.

[T3c] Simplicius in Cat 62.25. <Athenodorus (a) wrote a book ‘Against Aristotle’s Categories’, whose subject was in fact the organization ‘into such a number’, eis tosoton plethos exetazonti. [As M. Chase 144 n. 680 observes, this may be interpreted as meaning that Athenodorus saw too many categories, with B. L. Hijmans 1975, 108 and following, and followed the Stoic view that there were only four (cf. M. Pohlenz 1984(6), I, 294). But with Moraux 588-9 and n. 18, this may mean ‘into this particular number and no other’; since Athenodorus viewed the Categories as words (Preachter 1922, 508-10) he may consider the number as too small.] (b) Cornutus in his ‘Against Athenodorus and Aristotle’ also argued against the division. He is listed alongside Lucius and Nicostratus, which may imply that Simplicius perceives some sympathy with their positions. Respondent: Simplicius.

(a) Άλλοι δὲ πολλοί πρὸς αὐτὴν ἀμφεσβήτησαν, αὐτόθεν κατηγοροῦντες τῆς εἰς τοσοῦτον πλήθος διαιρέσεως, ὡσπερ Αθηνόδωρος ἐν τῷ Πρὸς τὰς Ἀριστοτέλους μὲν Κατηγορίας ἐπιγεγραμμένῳ βιβλίῳ, μόνην δὲ τὴν εἰς τοσοῦτον πλήθος διαιρέσεων ἔξεταξαν.
Appendix

δὲ τῶν καὶ αὐτῷ δοκεῖ Ἀριστότελει πρὸς οὐσίας οὐσία ὡς, τῷ οὐδεμία τι οὐσία διότι ἕκαστον πρὸς, ἐστὶν τῶν εἶναι ἀποδίδοσθαι ὅλως· μηδὲ αὐτῶν τι δεόντως κεφαλήν καὶ τὴν ἀντικείμενα διορισμὸν λέγουσιν γὰρ Ἀριστοτέλει τοῦ ἐκφέροντας καὶ προφερομένου· πρὸς ἐκφέροντας Ἀριστοτέλους ἐνίοτε πληθυντικῶς τὸ χρησαμένου ἐπισημηναμένου καὶ συγκεχυμένως τοῖς ἑνικῶς, καὶ ὀνόμασι ἀλλὰ Ἀθηνόδωρον Ἀνδρόνικον ἐπιστήσαντας μήτε Εὔδωρον καὶ καὶ κατηγοριῶν, παλαιοὺς Ἀρίστωνα αἰτιῶνται Βόηθον τῶν ἐξηγητὰς καὶ τὰ πρὸς ὁπὸς τὰ, δὲ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ οὖν τοὺς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπιστήσαντες μόνως τοῖς ἐπ!
Simplicius in Cat. 359.1 23. <Cornutus appears to have adopted a relatively ‘Pythagorean’ view about Time as inherent in the spermatikoi logoi, or (Simplicius), in prior principles. Simplicius favours this, it seems, over a more orthodox Stoic position that it is ‘the extension of movement’ >

Κορνούτος ἐν τῇ ἐκείνης, εἰ τοῦ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον κατά τὸν χαρακτηρισμὸν τῶν λέξεων διενηοχότα κατά τὸν κατὰ τὴν ὁρισμὸν τὸν παραλαμβάνειν, συντακτικά ὡς ἐν τῇ, καὶ, συμπροσπίπτει ὁ, ἢ δόξα συρρικτικά κατὰ τὸν, ἢ δέσπορον ὡς τὸν κατὰ τὸν συμπαρίστησιν, καὶ αὐτῷ τῷ ὡς τῆς πρὸς ἐντός ἔχον τὸν χρόνον ὁποῖον διάστημα, ἢ δέσπορον ὡς τῆς πρὸς ἐντός ἔχον τὸν χρόνον ὁποῖον διάστημα, ἢ δέσπορον ὡς τῆς πρὸς ἐντός ἔχον τὸν χρόνον ὁποῖον διάστημα, ἢ δέσπορον ὡς τῆς πρὸς ἐντός ἔχον τὸν χρόνον ὁποῖον διάστημα, ἢ δέσπορον ὡς τῆς πρὸς ἐντός ἔχον τὸν χρόνον ὁποῖον διάστημα, ἢ δέσπορον ὡς τῆς πρὸς ἐντός ἔχον τὸν χρόνον ὁποῖον διάστημα, ἢ δέσπορον ὡς τῆς πρὸς ἐντός ἔχον τὸν χρόνον ὁποῖον διάστημα, ἢ δέσπορον ὡς τῆς πρὸς ἐντός ἔχον τὸν χρόνον ὁποῖον διάστημα, ἢ δέσπορον ὡς τῆς πρὸς ἐντός ἔχον τὸν χρόνον ὁποῖον διάστημα, ἢ δέσπορον ὡς τῆς πρὸς ἐντός ἔχον τὸν χρόνον ὁποῖον διάστημα, ἢ δέσπορον ὡς τῆς πρὸς ἐντός ἔχον τὸν χρόνον ὁποῖον διάστημα, ἢ δέσπορον ὡς τῆς πρὸς ἐντός ἔχον τὸν χρόνον ὁποῖον διάστημα, ἢ δέσπορον ὡς τῆς πρὸς ἐντός ἔχον τὸν χρόνον ὁποῖον διάστημα, ἢ δέσπορον ὡς τῆς πρὸς ἐντός ἔχον τὸν χρόνον ὁποῖον διάστημα, ἢ δέσπορον ὡς τῆς πρὸς ἐντός ἔχον τὸν χρόνον ὁποῖον διάστημα, ἢ δέσπορον ὡς τῆς πρὸς ἐντός ἔχον τὸν χρό

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στηκότα τήν τοῦ ποῦ· πλεονάζει γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡ πρὸς τὸν τόπον σχέσις τῶν χωρίς ὄντων καὶ τῶν διεστηκότων. τὰ μέντοι παρακείμενα καὶ ὑπο- κείμενα τῆς τοῦ κατηγορίας· προηγεῖται γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡ σχέσις καὶ ἐξοθεὶν ἡ σχέσις ἐπισυμβαίνει, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δὲ οὕτως χρὴ (30) διαχρίνειν τῷ πλεονάζοντι καὶ ἐπιχρατοῦντι καὶ τὴν ἐννοιαν προβάλλοντι πρόχειρον, τούτῳ τὸ βραβεῖον τοῦ γένους ἀπονέμοντας.

Nec mehercule aliter vidi existimare vel Cn. Pompeium, quem omnibus, qui umquam fuerunt, vel P. Lentulum, quem mihi ipsi antepono: tu si aliter existimas, nihil errabis, si paullo diligentius, ut, quid sit eugeneia, quid sit nobilitas, intelligas, Athenodorum, Sandonis filius, quid de his rebus dicat, attenderis. Sed, ut ad rem redeam, me tibi non amicum modo, verum etiam amicissimum existimes velim: profecto omnibus officiis meis efficiam, ut ita esse vere possis iudicare. Tu autem si id agis, ut minus mea causa, dum ego absim, debere videaris, quam ego tua laborarim, libero te ista cura:

[T12] Cicero, *ad Att.* 16.11.4

ta peri tou kathekontos quatenus Panaetius, absolvi duobus. illius tres sunt; sed cum initio divisisset ita, tria genera exquisiendi offici esse, unum, cum deliberemus honestum an turpe sit, alterum, utile an inutile, tertium, cum haec inter se pugnare videantur, quo modo iudicandum sit, qualis causa Reguli, redire honestum, manere utile, de duobus primis praeclare disseruit, de tertio politicur se deinceps sed nihil scripsit. Eum locum Posidonius persequutus est. ego autem et eius librum arcessivi et ad Athenodorum Calvum scripsi ut ad me ta kephalaia mitteret; quae exspecto. quem velim cohortere et roges ut quam primum, in eo est Peri tou kata peristasin kathekontos. quod de inscriptione quaeris, non dubito quin kathikon ‘officium’ sit, nisi quid tu aliud; sed inscriptioni plenior ‘de officiis.’ Prospono autem Ciceroni filio. visum est non anoikeion.


Athenodorum nihil est quod hortere. misit enim satis bellum upo/mnhma.


ημείς δὲ τὸν μὲν πλείω λόγον περὶ τοῦ ὠκεανοῦ καὶ τῶν πλημμυρίδων εἰς Ποσειδόνιον αναβάλλομεθα καὶ Ἀθηνόδωρον, ἢκανός * διακρατήσαντας τὸν περὶ τούτων λόγον· πρὸς δὲ τὰ νῦν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον λέγομεν, ὅτι πρός τε τὴν ὁμοιοπάθειαν οὕτω βέλτιον νομίζοις, πάρει τέσσαρα συνέχεται ἄν κρεῖττον ταῦτα ἐνεώθησαν ἀναθυμιάσεις, εἰ πλείον εἴῃ τὸ υγρὸν περικεχυμένον.


Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πλημμυρίδων καὶ τῶν ἀμπώτεων εἰρήκασιν ἢκανός Ποσειδόνιος τε καὶ Ἀθηνόδωρος· περὶ δὲ τῆς τῶν πορθμῶν παλιρροίας, ἔχοντο καὶ αὐτῶν φυσικῶτερον λόγον ἢ κατὰ τὴν νῦν ὑποθέτων, τοσοῦτον εἰπεῖν ἀπόχρη, ὅτι οὔτε εἰς τρόπον τοῦ ῥόδικας εἶναι τοὺς πορθμοὺς, ὅ γε κατ’ εἶδος ...

[Other passages in Strabo: 3.5.7; 14.5.14; 16.4.21].

[T15] Seneca *De Tranq.* 3
Optimum erat, ut ait Athenodorus, actione rerum et rei publicae tractatione et officiis ciuilibus se detinere. Nam, ut quidam sole atque exercitatione et cura corporis diem educunt athletisque longe utilissimum est lacertos suos roburque, cui se uni dicauerunt, maiore temporis parte nutrire, ita nobis, animum ad rerum ciuilium certamen parantibus, in opere esse nostro longe pulcherrimum est: nam, cum utilem se efficere ciuibus mortalique propositum habeat, simul et exercetur et proficit qui in mediis se officiis posuit, communia priuataque pro facultate administrans.

[T16] Seneca Ep. Mor. 10.5

Sed ut more meo cum aliquo munusculo epistulam mittam, verum est quod apud Athenodorum inveni: 'tunc scito esse te omnibus cupiditatibus solutum, cum eo perveneris ut nihil deum roges nisi quod rogare possis palam'.


Ἀθηνοδώρῳ δὲ τῷ φιλοσόφῳ διὰ γῆρας εἰς οἶκον ἀφεθῇναι δεηθέντι συνεχώρησεν. ἐπεὶ δ’ ἀσπασόμενος αὐτὸν ὁ Αθηνόδωρος εἶπεν ὅταν ὀργισθῇς, Καίσαρ, μηδὲν εἴπῃς μηδὲ ποιήσῃς πρῶτον ἢ τὰ εἴσως καὶ τέτταρα γράμματα διελθεῖν πρὸς ἑαυτόν’, ἐπιλαβόμενος αὐτοῦ τῆς χειρὸς ἔτι σοῦ παρόντος’ ἐφη ἡ χειρίσθην ἐξω.

[T18] Plutarch Publicola 17.8.3.

toῦτον τὸν ἄνδρα Μοῦιον ὁμοῦ τὶ πάντων καὶ Σκαιόλαν καλούντων, Αθηνόδωρος ὁ Σάνδιονος (FHG III 487) ἐν τῷ πρὸς Ὀκταουίαν τὴν Καίσαρος ἀδελφὴν καὶ Ὀψίγονον ὄνομασθαι φησίν.

[T19] Plutarch Quaest. conv. 634E10.

καὶ πρὸς Αθηνόδωρον τὸν φιλόσοφον, ‘εἰ φυσικὴ ἢ πρὸς τὰ <ἐγγόνα> φιλοστοργία.’

[T20] Pliny the Younger, Letters 7.27. <The “ghost story” about one Athenodorus.>

Venit Athenas philosophus Athenodorus, legit titulum auditoque pretio, quia suspecta vilitas, peruncatus omnia docetur ac nihil minus, immo tanto magis conducit. Ubi coepit advesperascere, iubet sterni sibi in prima domus parte, poscit pugillares stilum lumen, suos omnes in interiora dimittit; ipse ad scribendum animum oculos manum intendit, ne vacua mens audita simulacra et inanes sibi metus fingeret. 8 Initio, quale ubique, silentium noctis; dein concuti ferrum, vincula moveri. Ille non tollere oculos, non remittere stilum, sed offirmare animum auribusque praetendere. Tum crebrescere fragor, adventare et iam ut in limine, iam ut intra limen audiri. Respicit, videt agnoscitque narratam sibi effigiem. 9 Stabat innuebatque digito similis vocanti. Hic contra ut paulum exspectaret manu significat rursusque ceris et stilo incumbit. Illa scribentis capiti catenis insonabat. Respicit rursus idem quod prius innuentem, nec moratus tollit lumen et sequitur. 10 Ibat illa lento gradu quasi gravis vinculis. Postquam deflexit in aream domus, repente dilapsa deserit comitem. Desertus herbas et folia concerpta signum loco ponit. 11 Postero die adit magistratus, monet ut illum locum effodi iubeant. Inveniuntur ossa inserta catenis et implicita, quae corpus aevo terraeque putrefactum nuda et exesa reliquerat vinculis; collecta publice sepeliuntur. Domus postea rite conditis manibus caruit.

Appendix

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Lucian, Macrobr. 21.2

Ἀθηνόδωρος Σάνδωνος Ταρσεύς Στοϊκός, ὃς καὶ διδάσκαλος ἔγενετο Καίσαρος Σεβαστοῦ θεοῦ, ὡς ἐγένετο Καίσαρος Σεβαστοῦ διδάσκαλος γενόμενος καὶ διδάσκαλος οὗ ἡ Ταρσέων πόλις καὶ φόρων ἐκουφίσθη, δύο καὶ ὀγδόηκοντα ἐτη βιοὺς ἐτελεύτησεν ἐν τῇ πατρίδι, ...

Lucian, Macrobr. 23.17

Ἀπολλόδωρος δὲ ὁ Περγαμηνὸς ῥήτωρ, θεοῦ Καίσαρος Σεβαστοῦ διδάσκαλος γενόμενος καὶ διδάσκαλος οὗ ἡ Ταρσέων πόλις καὶ φόρων ἐκουφίσθη, δύο καὶ ὀγδόηκοντα ἔτη ἐτελεύτησεν ἐν τῇ πατρίδι. ...

Herodian de pros. cath. 320,29.

ἔστι δὲ κτίσμα Ἀγχιάλης τῆς Ἰαπετοῦ θυγατρὸς, ὡς Ἀθηνόδωρος περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πατρίδος γράφων καὶ παρατιθεὶς Διόδωρον τὸν γραμματικὸν (30) συμφωνοῦντα Πτολεμαίῳ βασιλεῖ «γίνεται δ’ Ἰαπετοῦ θυγάτηρ Ἀγχιάλη, καὶ κτίζει πόλιν Ἀγχιάλην, Ἀγχιαλέα τε τὸν παρακείμενον ποταμόν. γεννᾷ δ’ υἱὸν Κύδνον, ἀφ’ οὗ ποταμὸς Κύδνος ἐν Ταρσῷ, ὃ δὲ Κύδνος υἱὸν Παρθένιον, ἀφ’ οὗ ἡ πόλις μετωνομάσθη Παρθενία.

Athenaeus, Deip. 16.22

καὶ Ἀθηνόδωρος δὲ ἐν τῷ περὶ Σπουδῆς καὶ Παιδιᾶς Ἀρχύταν φησὶ τὸν Ταραντῖνον πολιτικὸν ἀμα καὶ φιλόσοφον γενόμενον πλείστους οἰκέτας ἔχοντα αἰεὶ τούτοις παρά τὴν δίαιταν ἀφιεμένοις εἰς τὸ συμπόσιον ἠδεσθαι.

Clement of Alexandria, Protrepticus 4.48.4

Ἀλλ’ ὁ γε Ἀθηνόδωρος ὁ τοῦ Σάνδωνος ἄρχαῖος τὸν Σάραπιν βουληθεὶς οὐκ οἶδ’ ὅπως περίτετεν, ἐλέγξας αὐτὸν ἀγαλμα εἶναι γενητόν·

Diogenes Laertius 3.3.11. <The Peripatoi of Athenodorus.>

ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐχορήγησεν Ἀθήνησι Αἵνων αὐτοῦ ἀναλύσκοντας, ὡς φησιν Ἀθηνόδωρος ἐν η’ Περιπάτων.

Diogenes Laertius 5.36.2. <The Peripatoi of Athenodorus.>

Θεόφραστος Μελάντα Ἐρέσιος κναφέως υἱός, ὡς φησιν Ἀθηνόδωρος ἐν ὁγδόῃ Περιπάτων.

Diogenes Laertius 6.81.9 <The Peripatoi of Athenodorus.>

πέμπτος Ταρσεύς, γεγραφός περὶ ποιητικῶν ζητημάτων ἡ λίειν ἐπεχειρεῖ. Τὸν δὴ φιλόσοφον Ἀθηνόδωρος φησιν ἐν ὁγδόῃ Περιπάτων αἰεὶ στιλπνὸν φαινεσθαι διά τὸ ἀλείφεσθαι.
Diogenes Laertius 7.34. <According to Isidorus of Pergamon, Athenodorus Cordylium expunged some passages of Zeno’s *Republic* during his tenure as librarian.>

ءσιδώρῳ τῷ Περγαμηνῷ ῥήτορι · ὃς καὶ ἐκτιθῆναι φησιν ἐκ τῶν βιβλίων τὰ κακῶς λεγόμενα παρὰ τοῖς στοιχείοις ὑπ’ Ἀθηνόδωρον τοῦ στοιχείου πιστευθέντος τὴν ἐν Περγάμῳ βιβλιοθήκην· εἰτ’ ἀντιτιθῆναι αὐτὰ, φωραθέντος τοῦ Ἀθηνόδωρου καὶ καινούργιαντος, καὶ τοσαῦτα μὲν περὶ τῶν ἄθετουμένων αὐτῶν.

Diogenes Laertius 7.68.8. <Citation of the logician Athenodorus.>

Τῶν ἀξιωμάτων τὰ μὲν ἐστίν ἁπλᾶ, τὰ δ’ οὐχ ἁπλὰ, ὡς φασιν οἱ περὶ Χρύσιππον καὶ Ἀρχέδημον καὶ Ἀθηνόδωρον καὶ Ἀντίπατρον καὶ Κρῖνιν. ἁπλὰ μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὰ συνεστῶτα εἰς ἀξιώματος μὴ διαφοροῦμεν δὴ ἢ ἐξ ἀξιωμάτων, οἷον τὸ "ἡμέρα ἐστίν"· οὐχ ἁπλὰ δ’ ἐστὶ τὰ συνεστῶτ’ εἰς ἀξιωμάτος διαφοροῦμεν ἢ ἐξ ἀξιωμάτων.

Diogenes Laertius 7.121.2 καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἑκατὸν σταδίους ἀπέχων Κανώβου καὶ ὁ ἕνα ἐπὶ σιδῆς οὐκ ἐσὶν ἐν Κανώβῳ· οὕτω καὶ ὁ πλέον καὶ ὁ ἐλαττὸν ἁμαρτάνων ἐπίσης οὐκ ἐσὶν ἐν τῷ κατορθῷ. Ἡρακλείδης μέντοι ὁ Ἀθηνόδωρος ἄνισά φασί τὰ ἁμαρτήματα.

Diogenes Laertius 7.149.9. <Athenodorus on the mantic art.>

καὶ μὴν καὶ μαντικὴν υφεστάναι πᾶσάν φασίν, εἰ καὶ πρόνοιαν εἶναι· καὶ αὐτὴν καὶ τέχνην αὐτοῦ ἀναφέροντοι διὰ τινὰς ἐξάσεις, ὡς φησί Ζήνων τε καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ Ἡρακλείδης μέντοι ὁ Ταρσεύς, Ἀντιπάτρου τοῦ Ταρσεύς γνώμονα, καὶ Ἀθηνόδωρος ἄνισά φασί τὰ ἁμαρτήματα.

Diogenes Laertius 7.190. <Book of Chrysippus addressed to Athenodorus.>

Περὶ τῶν καταγορευτικῶν πρὸς Ἀθηνόδωρον α´.

Diogenes Laertius 9.42.4 Φησί δ’ Ἀθηνόδωρος ἐν ὁγδόῃ Περιπάτων, ἐλθόντος Ἰπποκράτους πρὸς αὐτόν, κελεῦσαι κομισθῆναι γαλῶν ἡμέρας: ἡμέρας, τὸ γάλα εἰπεῖν εἶναι αἰγὸς πρωτοτόκου καὶ μελαίνης· θεῖν τὴν ἀκρίβειαν αὐτοῦ θαυμάσαι τὸν Ἰπποκράτην.

Other Sources on L. Annaeus Cornutus

Cum esset annorum XVI, amicitia coepit uti Annaei Cornuti ita ut nusquam ab eo discedere; a quo inductus aliquatenus in philosophiam est. Amicos habuit a prima adulescentia Caesium Bassum poetam et Calpurnium Staturam, qui vivo eo iuvenis decessit. Coluit ut patrem Servilium Nonianum. Cognovit per Cornutum etiam Annaeum Lucanum quaevum auditores Cornuti.

Appendix
[...] Usus est apud Cornutum duorum convictu doctissimorum et sanctissimorum virorum acriter tunc philosophantium, Claudi Agathurni medici Lacedaemonii et Petroni Aristocratis Magnetis, quos unice miratus est et aemulatus, cum aequeales essent Cornuti, minor esset ipse.

[...] Cornuto rogavit ut daret sestertia, ut quidam dicunt, C, ut alii, L et argenti pondo viginti et libros circa septingentos Chrysippi sive bibliothecam suam omnem. Verum a Cornuto sublatis libris pecunia sororibus, quas heredes frater fecerat, relicta est.

[...] Leviter correxit Cornutus et Caesio Basso petenti, ut ipse ederet, tradidit edendum.

[...] Omnia ea auctor fuit Cornutus matri eius ut aboleret.

[...] Cuius versus in Neronem cum ita se haberet "auriculas asini Mida rex habet," in eum modum a Cornuto ipso tantum nomine mutato est emendatus "auriculas asini quis non habet?" ne hoc in se Nero dictum arbitretur.


ὁ δὲ Νέρων ἄλλα τε γελοῖα ἔπρατε, καὶ ποτε καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ θεάτρου ὀρχήστραν ἀλλὰ περί γε τῶν Ὀρφανῶν πράξεων ἀπάσως συγχρῆσαι ἔκ τε ἐπεισοδαίμονας, καὶ ποτε τοῖς ζήλοις ὑπενθύμισεν (5) ἀπεκρίνατο ὅτι "ἀλλʼ εἰς τὸν παλαιὸν ἐκεῖνον, τοῖς μὲν οὖν ἔνδειξιν, ἀλλὰ ξένοις, ὑπενθύμισεν τὸν Μίδα ἄριστον εἰς τὸ ἀνθρώπων πολὺ εὐρήκατο, αὐτὸς δὲ τὸν Μενάχων συντάττειν εὔλογον, ὅπως δὴ Λουκανὸς ἐκκληρίηθη ποιεῖν, ἐπειδὴ ἱσχυρῶς ἐπὶ τὸν Μενάχων ἐστίν". οὐκ ἄλλοιος ἄλογος, οὐκ ἄλογος, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν οὖν ἐν τῇ Ὀρχήστρᾳ τοιοῦτος ὄφει, ὁ δὲ Λουκανὸς ἐκκληρίηθη ποιεῖν, ἐπειδὴ ἱσχυρῶς ἐπὶ τῇ Ὀρχήστρᾳ ἐστίν, ἐπειδὴ ἱσχυρῶς ἐπὶ τῇ Ὀρχήστρᾳ ἐστίν, ἐπειδὴ ἱσχυρῶς ἐπὶ τῇ Ὀρχήστρᾳ ἐστίν.


Χριστιανῶς ζῶν καὶ παρανόμως, κατὰ δὲ τὰς περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ τοῦ θείου δόξας Έλληνίδων τε καὶ τοῖς Έλληνισμοῖς ὑποβαλλόμενοις κυθώς. συνήν τε γὰρ ἂν τῷ Πλάτωνι, τὸς τοῖς Νομισμάτωι καὶ Κρονίου Απολλοφάνους τε καὶ Λογγίων καὶ Μοδεράτου Νικομάχου τε καὶ τοῖς ἐν Πυθαγορείοις ἐκκληρίησον ἀνθρώπων ὑμείς ὑπενθύμισατε ἐξήγητο καὶ Χαιρήμον τοῦ Στωϊκοῦ Κορνούτου τε καὶ τὰς βιβλίας, παρὰ ἄν τὸν μεταλητικὸν τοὺς παρ᾽ Ἕλληνισμοῖς μυστηρίων γνῶν τρόπον ταῖς Ιουδαϊκαῖς προσῆφεν γραφαῖς.

[T38] Syrianus, in Met. 106.7. <Cornutus may be classed with Boethus the Peripatetic in identifying ideai with generic concepts (genika)>.

παραφέρεται δὲ καὶ Βοηθὸς ὁ περιπατητικός ἐκ τῶν παρὰ τῷ Αριστοτέλει καταχθῆσαι εἰς ταῖς ἀρχαῖοι τοὺς γενικοὺς τάς ἑπειδὴ ὃ καὶ τὸν Κορνούτον συντάττειν εὐλόγων, οὐ κόροω καὶ αὐτὸν ταύτης ὑπενεχθέντας τῆς τοῦ Κορνούτου.
[T40] Syrianus, in Herm. 201.8. <Cornutus on ambiguity>.

Τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν Κορνοῦτος προτήν τῶν ἄλλων ἀξίοι τάττεσθαι στάσεων, δι’ ἣν κατ’ ἀρχὰς ἐφαμεν αἰτίαιν· δύο γὰρ εἶναι φησιν ἐν ταῖς στάσεισι ἀμφιβολίας, τὴν μὲν ἐν πράγμασι τοῦ στοχασμὸν λέγων, τὴν δὲ ἐν ὶῃτοις τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν, πρότερα δὲ τὰ ὶῃτα τῶν πραγμάτων, προτέραν ἀρα καὶ τὴν νομικὴν ἀμφιβολίαν ταχτέον·


Κορνοῦτος δὲ ο ὕλοσοφος τήν Ἑλληνικὴν θεολογίαν ἠνυντέεικε·


[ἐκ δὲ τῆς Λιβυκῆς Κορνοῦτος φιλόσοφος Θεστίτης χρηματίζων.]

[T43] Charisius, Gramm. 162.9 <First name of Cornutus documented.>


Ἀριστοτέλης μὲν οὖν τῆς Ὁσικράτης ἂστι λεικός’ καταφάσεως ἀπόφασιν λέγει τὴν Ὁσικράτης οὐκ ἂστι λεικός’, οὗ τὴν Ὁσικράτης ἂστιν οὐ λεικός. εἰσὶ δὲ, οἷς δοκεῖ μηδέπο μήδε ὦτοις λαμβανόμενη ἀπόφασις εἶναι. μὴ γὰρ ὄφελειν τὸ ἀποφασικὸν πρὸ τοῦ ἂστι μηδὲ πρὸ τοῦ κατηγορομένου τίθεσθαι μόνον, ἀλλ’ εἶναι ἀπόφασιν τὴν τὸ ἀποφασικὸν (5) πρὸ πάσης τῆς καταφάσεως τα καὶ προτάσεως ἐχούσαν κειμένον τῆς γὰρ Ὁσικράτης ἂστι λεικός’ ἀπόφασιν εἶναι τὴν ὦτῆς Ὁσικράτης ἂστι λεικός’ ἀλλ’ οὗ τὴν Ὁσικράτης οὐκ ἂστι λεικός’. φασὶ γὰρ διττὸν εἶναι τὸ μὴ περιπατεῖν Καλλίαν, ὅτε μὲν ὠλοὶ τῷ περιπατεῖν Καλλίαν προστεθείμενον τὸ ἀποφασικὸν μορίου, ὃ καὶ ἀπόφασιν εἶναι, ὅτε δὲ μόνῳ (10) τῷ περιπατεῖν προστεθειμένου, ὃ φασὶν οὐδὲν ἢττον καταφασικῶν εἶναι λόγον [Καλλίας οὐ περιπατεῖ]. πιστεύουσαι δὲ τούτῳ τῷ ἀμα μὲν δύνασθαι γενήθη ποτε εἶναι τὸ τέ Καλλίας περιπατεῖ καὶ τῷ ‘Καλλίας οὐ περιπατεῖ’, μηδέποτε δὲ τὰ ἀντισυμβαίνειν ἀντιφασικῶς ἂμα γίνεσθαι γενήθη. μὴ γὰρ ὄντος Καλλίου οὐδὲν ἢττον φασὶν τῆς ‘Καλλίας περιπατεῖ’ γενήθη, εἴναι τὴν ‘Καλλίας οὐ περιπατεῖ’ ἐν ἀμφιτεχέραις γὰρ αὐταῖς εἶναι τὸ συμμανόμενον ἢττοι τῆς Καλλίας, τούτῳ δὲ ὑπάρχει ἢ τὸ περιπατεῖν ἢ τὸ μὴ περιπατεῖν, τὸ μέντοι ‘οὐ Καλλίας περιπατεῖ’ οὐδέποτε δύναις γενέθους ὦτῆς τῆς καταφάσεως τῆς ‘Καλλίας περιπατεῖ’ γενόδος εἶναι καὶ αὐτό. ἐτι τοῦ μὴ δείν οὕτως τὴν ἀπόφασιν ποιεῖσθαι πιστόν καὶ τοιαύτῃ τῇ προφή· (20) φουσίν οὐτοῦ περιπατεῖ, οὕτος οὐ περιπατεῖ δεικνυμένῳ θήλεις· ὁμώς γὰρ πάλιν τὰ οὕτως λαμβανόμενα γενήθη γίνεσθαι φασὶν, εἴτε περιπατοῦ τὸ
ἀλλὰ θανεν τὸ οὗτος ἡ τοῦτον, διὰ ἀληθὴς ἦν γὰρ· ἀποθνήσκει, ἐστὶ τὸ ἀποθνήσκει τῷ γὰρ ἀπέθανεν ἐν οὐκ ἐγκέκλιται τὸ θάτερον σημαίνει ταὐτὸν.

Σωκράτης ὄνομα ἀποφαντικὸς, δὲ ἡ ἔγκλισις ὅλου ἀποφαντικὸς οὐκ θῇ.

Σωκράτης τοῦθ’ ὀνόματα ὥστε δὲ ἐξ οὐδὲνατα τῇ σημαντικῷ μὴ, γὰρ οὐ τὰς χρόνους, ὑγιῶς τοὺς ἐγκέκλιται καὶ ὅλον ἀποθνήσκει ὃ ἀπὸ ματος μὲν ῥήματος τὸ δὲ καὶ ὃς ἐστι κἀκείνη ἡ τοῦτο διὰ τὸ ἀπέθανεν Σωκράτης· οὐ θὰ τὸ ἐστὶν τις Σωκράτης λέγων· ήτοι τις οὐκ ἔτι εἶναι δὲ οὐκ ὡς ὡς ἀλλήλης οὐκ ὡς ἀλλήλης οὐκ ἔτι εἰσίν κατὰ ὁσίᾳν·

Primary Texts: 6. Athenodorus and Cornutus

Michael Griffin
μὴ ἀὐτοῦ μὲν τὸ οὗτος οὐχ, ἀλλ' κατάφασι, οὐδὲ λεγομένη μὲν ὥς ἐστιν, ἐκείνου, τὸ γὰρ ὁμοῦ αὐτῷ καθ' αὐτὸ λεγόμενον [ὑπ' αὐτοῦ] οὔτε τὸ εἶναι σημαίνει οὔτε τὸ μὴ εἶναι τὸ γὰρ σημαίνομεν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ οὔτε τὸ μὴ εἶναι προσσημαίνει οὔτε τὸν ὄντος μάλλον ἡ γεγονός ἢ ἐσομένου δηλωτικὸν (5) ἐστι καθ' αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' αὐτῷ τοῦτο μόνον σημείων ἐστι πράγματος, εἰ ἢ ἐστιν ἢ ἢ ἐσται τὸ συντασσόμενον αὐτῷ δηλο. οὗτος τοῖνε καὶ τὸ 'ἐξης Σωκράτης ἢ ἀπέθανεν ἢ ἐφιλοσόφησε' πάντα πρὸς ἀναφορὰν λέγεται τὰ τὸ ποιηθέμενα τὸ ὁνόματι δηλοῦν, ὅτι τὸ σημαίνομεν ὕπ' του ὄνοματος πρότερον ἦν. διὸ ἐπεὶ ἐποίησαν τοὺς ἀλλήλες, ψεῦδος τὸ ἀντι-(10) κειμένον τὸ ἢ οὔς ἀπέθανεν' ἢ οὔς ἐξηκέρασαν' ἢ οὔς ἐφιλοσόφησεν'. ἦτ' δὲ ἀλλήλες μὲν ἐστὶ τὸ 'ἐστι τὸ ὄν', ἀδιανόητον δὲ τὸ 'ὁν κατ' τούτῳ ἐστιν'. εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτῳ ἰσον ἐσται τὸ 'ἐστι τὸ ὄν', οὐδὲ τὸ μὴ ὥς ἐστιν' ἰσον ἐσται τὸ 'ἐστι τὸ μὴ ὄν', ὅ μὴ ἐστιν'. οὔδ' ὅλως γὰρ ἡ κατάφασις τούτῳ λέγει, ὅτι ἐστι τόδε, ὃ τὸδε ὑπάρχει, οὔδε ἐφ' ὃν κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι γίνει (15) τα ἡ κατηργοία, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ τὸ ὄν ἐστιν' καὶ 'ὕπτας ξησ' καὶ 'ὑπτός ἐστιν' καὶ 'θεὶα εἰσιν' πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαύτα ἀλλήλῃ μὲν οὔτω λεγόμενα, μεταλαμβανόμενα δὲ ἄτοπα καὶ ἀδιανόητα. ἦτ' αλλήλες μὲν τὸ εἰπεὶν 'τὸ ἐστι', παντελῶς δὲ ἀδιάνυκτον τὸ εἰπείν, ὅτι εἰπεῖ τὸ ἐστιν, ὃ ὑπάρχει τὸ 'ἐστι'. καὶ ἀλλήλες μὲν τὸ ἀδιάνυκτον ἀδιάνυκτον εἰναι, ψεῦδος δὲ τὸ (20) ἐστι τὸ ἀδιάνυκτον, ὃ υπάρχει τὸ ἀδιάνυκτον αὐτὸ εἰναι'. καὶ ἀναγκαῖον μὲν πάντα τὰ τρέχοντα κινεῖται, οὐκέτι δὲ ἀναγκαίον τὸ εἶναι τίνα τρέχοντα, ὃς κινεῖται ἐξ ἀνάγκης. καὶ ἀναγκαῖον μὲν πάντων τὸν τρωθέντα καρδίαν ἀποθανεῖν, οὐκ αναγκαῖον δὲ τὸ εἶναι τίνα τὴν καρδίαν τετρωμένον. καὶ γὰρ εἰ τὸ ὄνοματα ἐν ταῖς προτάσεις τούτου σημαίνει, καὶ καθ' αὐτὰ (25) λεγόμενα τὸ αὐτὸ ἄν σημαίννι, οὗτος δὲ καὶ πας ὁ νομος λέγων πρότασιν ἂν λέγοι καταφατικῶν. ἐπὶ <εἰ> ὁ λέγων 'Σωκράτης περιπατεῖ' ἰσον λέγει τῷ 'ἐστι τῇ Σωκράτῃ, κάκεινος περιπατεί', καὶ ὁ λέγων 'Σωκράτης οὐκ ἐστι' λέγω τὸ ἰσον τῷ 'ἐστι τῇ Σωκράτῃ, κάκεινος οὐκ ἐστιν', ὅπερ ἀδιανόητον. καὶ τὸ μὲν 'Σωκράτῃ οὖς ἐστιν' ἀλλήλῃς, τὸ δὲ εἶναι τίνα Σωκράτης, δ' (30) οὖς ἐστιν, ψεῦδος. καὶ τὸ 'οὗτος δὲ περιπατεῖ' καὶ 'οὗτος οὐ περιπατεῖ' ἀμφο τοι δοξεῖ ψευδῆ εἶναι θήλεις ὄντος τοῦ δεινυμενοῦ διὰ τὸ ἀνοιχτον θείνας τῆς παρεμβεβουσώ καὶ τὸ δοκεῖ τὸν λέγοντα 'οὗτος οὐ περιπατεῖ' ἰσον λέγειν τῷ 'ὁ ἀνήρ οὗτος διὰ τοῦ οὗτος' ἐστιν ὁ δεινυμενος, ὃς οὐ περιπατεῖ. ταῦτα δ' οὖς ἂν ἐλεγον, εἰ συνίεσαν οἱ λέγοντες, τῷ σημαίνει ἢ ἀπόφασις (35) σημαίνει γὰρ τὸ 'ὁ λέγεται τὸν υπάρχειν, μὴ υπάρχειν. λοιπὸν εἴτ' ἐστι (405.) τοῦτο, εἴτ' καὶ μὴ, ἀμφοτέρους τυγχάνει. εἴτ' γὰρ ἐστιν, ψεύδος, τὸ υπάρχει ὀτὲ καὶ τῷ μὴ υπάρχειν μὴ υπάρχον αὐτῷ ἢ ἀπόφασις, οὗ προςσημαίνουσα ή τὸ εἶναι ἢ τὸ μὴ εἶναι τοῦ ὑποκειμένου. οὐδὲ οὗτος μὲν λεγομένη ἀλλήλης, ἐκείνος δὲ οὐ, ἀλλ' ἀμφοτέρους ἀλλήλης, εἰ κατάφασις ψευδῆς. ὠστε καὶ εἰ περιπατεῖ, (5) ἀλλ' τῷ οὗτος οὐχ υπάρχει, ψεύδος, τὸ δεινυμενόν οὗτος ἔστι, τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ 'οὗτος ὁ γραμματικὸς περιπατεῖ' μὴ οὗτος αὐτῷ γραμματικοῦ· καὶ γὰρ εἰ περιπατεῖ, αὐτὸ μὲν ψευδός
τὸ τῆς καταφάσεως, ἀληθὲς δὲ τὸ ὅπου ὁ γραμματικὸς οὐ περιπατεῖ'· ὅ
gὰρ φησιν ὑπάρχειν τὸ περιπατεῖν, ἐκεῖνος οὐχ ὑπάρχει. τὸ δὲ 'Σωκράτης (10)
περιπάτησέ' καὶ 'Σωκράτης οὐ περιπάτησεν' ἀμφοτέρων ἀλήθη οὐκ ἐν τῷ
αὐτῷ χρόνῳ, ὥστ' οὐκ ἀντικείμενα· οὐ γὰρ τοιούτοις ἡ ἀντίφασις, καὶ
οὐδὲν γε μᾶλλον ἀμα ἀληθὲς τὸ 'Σωκράτης περιπάτησε' καὶ τὸ 'Σωκράτης
οὐ περιπάτησε'· καθ' ὅν γὰρ τὸ ἀόριστον ὅνομα, τούτων τις περιπάτησεν.
οὐ ψυχεῖς δή οἱ ἑνστάχοις οἱ πρὸς τὸ δεῖν τὸ ἀποφατικὸν ἐν ταῖς (15)
tῶν καθ' ἑξακτα ἀποφάσει τῷ κατηγοροῦμένῳ συντάσσεσθαι γινόμενα.

Primary Texts: 6. Athenodorus and Cornutus

Michael Griffin
7. Herminus

[T1] Lucian, *Life of Demonax* 56.1-6. <The Cynic philosopher Demonax (c. 70-170 AD) abused the Aristotelian philosopher Herminus as a villainous character (a characterisation that Lucian appears to endorse: εἰδώς...παγκάκιστον...όντα), and therefore deserving of ten κατηγορίαι in the homonymous legal sense. The joke turns on the recognition that Herminus ‘was always full of Aristotle’s ten κατηγορίαι’. Is it reading too much into the passage to suppose that the equivocation of κατηγορία is itself part of the self-reference to Cat.?>

Καὶ μὴν τὸ πρὸς Ἐρμῖνον τὸν Ἀριστοτελικὸν ἄξιον ἀπομνημονεύσαι· εἰδὼς γὰρ αὐτὸν παγκάκιστον μὲν ὄντα καὶ μυρία κακὰ ἐργαζόμενον, τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη δ’ ἐπαινοῦντα καὶ διὰ στόματος αὐτοῦ τὰς δέκα κατηγορίας ἔχοντα, Ἐρμῖνε., (5) ἐφη, ἀληθῶς ἄξιος εἶ δέκα κατηγοριῶν.


In the seventh Book, however, he [Aristotle] showed this at its beginning by a different argument, more suited to the way of dialectic. But a certain man (rajulun min al-nās) blamed Aristotle concerning this proof, [maintaining] that it is most ignorant and remote from what is correct to a degree unimaginable, and wrote a book about it (wa wada’a fi dhālika kitāban). Thus we see no harm if we ourselves should clarify this matter and summarise it. For it is characteristic of the person who wrote the Peripatetic Herminus the skeptical things about [Aristotle’s proof], asking him to inform him how the things Aristotle used in the exposition of it could be anything but excessively bad and repugnant, to have made such a demand (bi an yakūna qad istad’ā).


It may be that he [Galen] does not remember what this philosopher [Aristotle] said and declared to us repeatedly, despite the claim he makes for himself as having excellent memory and powers of retention. Had he indeed attained [these powers] to begin with, he would not have originally found it necessary to write the things he wrote to Herminus.


τὸ μὲν οὖν λέγειν, ὡς Ἐρμῖνος οἴεται, ἐν δευτέρῳ σχήματι τὸν μεῖζονα ἄκρον εἶναι, ἐὰν μὲν ἀμφότεροι ὤμογενεῖς ὄνων, ὄν οἱ κατηγορείται, τὸν ἐγγύτερον τοῦ κοινοῦ γένους αὐτῶν (ἀν γὰρ ὡσιν οἱ ἄκροι ὤρνεον καὶ [73] ἀνθρώπων, ἐγγύτερον τοῦ κοινοῦ γένους αὐτῶν, τοῦ ἄνθρωπου, τὸ ὤρνεον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ διαμέσει, διὸ καὶ μείζων ἄκρος τὸ ὤρνεον, καὶ καθόλου ἐν τοῖς ὤμογενεῖσιν ὁ οὕτως ἔχων πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν γένος μείζων), εἰ δὲ εἰὲν ἴσον ἀφεστῶτες ἀμφότεροι τοῦ κοινοῦ γένους ὡς ἵππος καὶ ἀνθρώπως, δεῖν
μέσος, τούτῳ, ἢ γίνεται τινος· ἴσον τοῦ μέσου ἐπὶ πλέον αὐτὸ ὡς, λογικὸν ἢ τῷ μέσῳ διότι τὸ ἀντιδιῃρημένον αὐτῷ, ἀποφασκόμενο, οὐχ μείζονα μὴ γινόμενος ἀποφάσκεται ἔσται ὁρός ἢ ἀπ ἐν αἰεὶ οὐχ μείζων ὑπάρχει ληφθέντας ὁροὺς ἐφ ἀκρόν τὸ γὰρ ἐν καὶ σχήματι ταῦτα τοῦτο ἄνθρωπος ἐμψύχου τῆς, ὁρός ὁ τῆς καθολικώτερον λευκοῦ ἀποφάσκεται ἐπεὶ ἐστιν καταφάσκεται ἀλλὰ τοῦ, δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἀποφατικῶς μὲν δὲ, οἷον ἄτομον εἶεν (δὲ λευκὸν μείζονα οὗ κατηγορεῖτο οἰκείου κατηγορεῖται ἄλλον ἐγγυτέρω, ἐπανιέναι, δι αὐτῶν τίνος κατηγορούμενον πάλιν ἀμφότεροι οἰκείων γενῶν, ὁ δὲ, ποιότητος ἄτομον ἀκρός τὸ χρώματος τῆς οἰκείως τῷ, ἀκροῖ οἱ εἶεν, οὐχ τὸ ἵππου οἰκείου ὃν, Barnes, Bobzien, Flannery, and Ierodiakonou (1991) add ἐκείνο de before enguterō in 14 and delete ho hippos ἐπέρ anthrōpos in 15 to provide a suitable sense] ἔσται δὴ καὶ ὁ (15) ἵππος μείζων τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἄκρος καίτοι ἵσον ἀφεστώτος τοῦ ἱπποῦ ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ἄλλον αὐτὸν εἶναι, τὸ ὃν καθ' αὐτὸ ἀποφάσκεται τοῦ ἵππου ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ἄλλον αὐτὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἰππόν δ’ αὐτὸ καταφάσκεται τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἐγγυτέρῳ του ἱπποῦ γένος αὐτῶν ἐστι, τοῦ ζῷου, ὃ ἵππος ἤπερ ὁ ἀνθρώπος: [Note: the transmitted text provides an internal contradiction. Appendices of Texts 7. Herminus Michael Griffin 480
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Primary Texts: 7. Herminus  Michael Griffin

περιφράσκεται τινος τό γάρ άρχη τώ ἐμφυσώ ἰσων υψ’ τό το λογικόν μείζων ὃν του ἑπέρου οὗ καταφάσκεται ἐπεί γαρ ὁ κατηγοροῦμενος (20) καταφατικώς μείζων του ύποκειμένου αὐτῷ οὗ ἀποφάσκεται ὁ μέσος ή οὗ καταφάσκεται ὁ μέσος, εἰ γε ή αἰτία, δι’ ἣν ἀποφάσκεται ίσως ή μείζων αὐτοῦ του μέσου, δὲ μείζων ἐστι του ύποκειμένου αὐτῷ ἐν τῇ καταφατικῇ προτάσῃ. ὡςτε καὶ ἡ ἀποφατικὴ πρότασις οἵ μείζων ἐσται τῆς καταφατικῆς. ἀλλὰ μὴν λέγει Αριστοτέλης καὶ πρὸς το ἐλάσσον το (25) ἀποφασικόν τίθεσθαι ὁ γοῦν δεύτερος συλλογισμόν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ σχήματι τὴν ἐλάσσον ἔχει ἀποφατικήν. ἐτι διὰ τι ἐπὶ μόνον τῶν ἀποφασικῶν ἢ μετάληψις καὶ ἡ ἐξής ἐσται τού, δι’ ἣν κατηγορεῖται ἀποφασικῶς καὶ γαρ ἐπὶ τῆς καταφάσεως το αὐτό ζητηθήσεται. τό γαρ λογικὸν τον ἀνθρώπου εἰ καὶ καθ’ αὐτό, ἀλλ’ οὐ πρότου, οὔδε ἢ ἀνθρωπός ἀλλὰ λογικός· ὡςτε (30) εἰ τοῦ μὲν ἰππου διὰ τὸ ἀλογον το θ άνθρωπον διά τὸ λογικὸν, ἰσων δε ἐκ το [75] τὸ ἀλογον το λογικῷ (ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς γαρ διαφέρουσας), οὔδεπο οἱ μείζων εὐθηται καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐκπειρήσην μέθοδον. διὸ οὔτως μὲν οὐ χρὴ τὴν χρίσιν συνειδεῖ τῆς προτάσεως τῆς ἐν τῷ δεύτερῳ σχήματι μείζων. καθόλου γαρ τὸ δύνασθαι καὶ τὸ καταφασικόν εἶναι πρὸς τὸ μείζον όρο καὶ τὸ ἀποφασικόν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ σχήματι, οἵ ποῖος ἢν ὁρὸς εὐφθῆ κατὰ τὴν (5) προειρήμενην μέθοδον μείζων, οὔτος καὶ ως μείζων καὶ ως ἐλαττὸν λαμβανόμενον ποιήσει τὴν συζυγίαν συλλογιστικήν· ὁ πάσχον οὐκετέ ἢν εἰ μείζων ἐν τούτῳ τῷ σχήματι· οὗ γαρ ἀπλώς μείζων ὁρὸν ἡ ἐξής ἐσται ἀλλά τοῦ ἐν τούτῳ μείζων.


Ἀριστοτέλης μὲν οὖν οὕτως διεβαλε τὰς προειρημένας συζυγίας, ὅτι ἀσυλλογιστοί, τῷ εὑροῦμενσιν ύλὴ τοῦ παντὶ καὶ τοῦ μηδενί· ισανήν (30) γαρ ταύτην ἦρεται διαβολὴν ἀσυλλογιστοῦ συζυγίας. τὸ δὲ ἦρεσθαι δύνασθαι διαβάλλονσαι τὰς προειρημένας συζυγίας, κἂν δεῖξῃ τις, ὅτι μηδενι καὶ τινὶ τὸ Ν το Σ, διὸ το αὐτός συνάγεται, ὡς ἀλλ’ οὐ τὶς τῶν ἀρχαίων καὶ ἔμμος δὲ λέγει, (“ἐφ’ ἂν γαρ συζυγίας, φησι, τὴν ἄντιφασο τούτῳ συναγομένην [90] δεῖξαι, εὐλογον ταύτῃ μηδεντ ἀσυλλογιστον λέγεται τῆς, ἐν ἢ τὰ εὐνατία συσχίσεται· ἀναφοράσης γάρ καὶ ταῦτα ὁμοίως ἐκείνος”) καὶ παρατίθεσθαι ὅρους τοῦ τινὶ άρχην, ἐμφυσῶ, σῶμα σαρκικόν (τὸ γαρ άρχην ἐμφυσῷ οὔδεν, σώματι δε σαρκίνον ἢ καὶ ἀπλώς σώματι τινὶ οὔ ὑπάρχει, τὸ ἐμφυσὸν τινὶ σαρκίνῳ σώματι καὶ ἀπλώς τινὶ σώματι ὑπάρχει), (5) τούτῳ δὴ οὐδαμῶς ἤγες οὔδε αὐτόριξις εἰς συζυγίας διαβολὴν. υγιορθηθῆσαι μὲν γαρ τούτων μηδετερών συνάγαγεται συλλογιστικῶς, διὸτι ἐστὶν ἀνάλημα ναυτικετικά, ἑρεὶ μεντοι τις, ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς κειμένοις, δύνασθαι συνάγαγεται ἐπὶ μέρους ἀποφασικὸν· τὸ γαρ ἐπὶ μέρους ἀποφασικὸν ὑπ’ οὐδέτερον τῶν προειρημένων ἀναρεῖται. τὰ γάρ εἰς ἑλεγχον ἀσυλλογιστοῦ (10) συζυγίας παρατίθεμεν οὔ μόνον αὐτὰ δει μὴ δύνασθαι συνεπάρχειν ἀλλήλους ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντων εἶναι ἀναφετικὰ τῶν συλλογιστικῶς δεύκυνυσθαι δυναμένων.
Ἡ δείξις οὖν, ἣ χρῆται Ἑρμῖνος, οὐχ ἰκανὴ διαβάλλειν συζυγίαν καὶ ἀσυλλογισμὸν ἀποφήγηναι, διὸ εὐλόγως Ἀριστοτέλης ἐλέγχει τάς ἀναφερόμεναις μόνῃ τῇ τοῦ παντὶ καὶ μηδενὶ παραθέσειν· ώς γὰρ τούτους οὐδὲν οἰόν τε δείγνουσι συλλογισμὸς τῷ παντὸς τοῦ λαμβανομένου συνάγεσθαι συλλογιστικῶς εὑρίσκεσθαι τὸ ἀναφερόμενον καὶ ἀντικείμενον ἕφ’ ὅλης τινὸς γινόμενον (25) ἀληθῆς. καθόλου δὲ, ἐν αἷς συζυγίαις συλλογιστικαῖς τοῦ ἐπὶ μέρους ἄστι καθολικῶς συμπέρασμα, τῷ τῷ μέρους ἀριστίτος ἀληθὲς εἶναι (καὶ γὰρ μετὰ τῆς καθόλου, ὅτι ἐστίν, ἀληθῆς ἢ ἐπὶ μέρους καὶ μετὰ τῆς ἑαυτῇ ἡ ἐπὶ μέρους) καθ’ ἐκατέρους τοὺς τρόπους ἀληθῆ λαμβάνοντες αὐτὴν ποτὲ μὲν εὐπορήσομεν ὅτι τῇ τῆς ἑαυτῇ εἰλημμένης καὶ συνηγμένης ἐπὶ μέρους, ὁ συνεποιόμενος ἀναφερόμενον ἄστι συνηγμέντα τοῦ ὑπεναντίον αὐτῷ ἐπὶ μέρους.


Τὸ μὲν οὖν λέγειν μηδὲ Ἀριστοτέλην ἑνταῦθα εἰρηκέναι ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις μίξεσιν ἀναγκαῖον γίνεσθαι τὸ συμπέρασμα, ἀλλ’ ἐφ’ ἥν οἷόν τε δείκνυσθαι συλλογιστικῶς ἀριστίτος καὶ πιστοῦσθαι ἐκ τοῦ ὑπεναντίου τῷ ἑαυτῷ καθολικῶς. ὅτι τούτῳ ἐπὶ μέρους, ὁ ποτὲ ἄναιρετικός καὶ ἀντικείμενος, ἵνα καθολικῶς ἐπὶ μέρους καὶ μετὰ τῆς ἑαυτῇ ἐπὶ μέρους καθ’ ἑκατέρους τοὺς τρόπους ἀληθῆς λαμβάνοντες αὐτὴν ποτὲ μὲν εὐπορήσομεν ὅτι τῇ τῆς ἑαυτῇ ἐπὶ μέρους, ὁ ποτὲ δὲ τῷ ὑπεναντίων τῷ εἰλημμένῳ καὶ συνηγμένῳ ἐπὶ μέρους, ὁ ὑπενάντιος ἀληθῆς λαμβάνοντες αὐτὴν ποτὲ μὲν εὐπορήσομεν ὅτι τῇ τῆς ἑαυτῇ ἐπὶ μέρους, ὁ ποτὲ δὲ τῷ ὑπεναντίων τῷ εἰλημμένῳ καὶ συνηγμένῳ ἐπὶ μέρους, ὁ συνεποιόμενος ἀναφερόμενον ἄστι τῷ ὑπεναντίῳ αὐτῷ ἐπὶ μέρους.


[T2g] Alexander, in Top. 569,3-8. <Referencing Topics 161b19-34, where Aristotle describes five lines of criticism (ἐπιτιμήσεις) against an argument; the first line of criticism occurs when no conclusion is reached because most or all premises are false or unacceptable, and the addition or subtraction of no premises can make the conclusion possible. Herminus thinks the criticism where the addition or subtraction of no premises can help is one epitimesis, but the criticism where the premises are false or not generally accepted is another epitimesis. So he makes the second and the fourth the same. (?) The result is an analysis of levels of deficiency: I. No deduction at all (fails 1); II: a deduction, wrong conclusion (fails 2 but not 1); IIIa. A deduction of the right conclusion, but a premiss left out (fails 3 but not 1 or 2); IIIb. A deduction of the right conclusion with a superfluous premiss (fails 4 but not 1 or 2); IV. A good deduction with premises less acceptable than the conclusion (fails 5 but not 1,2,3,4; V. A good deduction with premises not less acceptable than the conclusion, but harder to establish than it (fails only 6). This reconstruction treats superfluous and missing premises as subdivisions of the same vice; it is due to Herminus here. See R. Smith, Aristotle: Topics I and VIII, Oxford: Clarendon 1997, 141-42.>

Ἐρμῖνος μέντοι τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς προσθέσεως καὶ τῆς ἀφαίρεσεως ἐπιτύμησιν μίαν φησὶν εἶναι, τῇ δ’ ἀπὸ τοῦ δι’ ἀδοξοπρότερον ἢ δι’ ἂληθῶν πλείονος.
δεομένων λόγου εἰς δύο ἐπιτιμήσεις διαμεῖ. τούτῳ δὲ ποιοῦν ποιεῖ καὶ τήν (5) δευτέραν ἐπιτιμήσειν τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ τετάρτῃ. ἤ δὲς παραλαμβανόμενον τὸ ἐξ ἀδοξετέρων· καὶ γὰρ ἢ δευτέρα τούτο εἰχεν, εἰ καὶ μὴ τὸ προκείμενον συνλογίζεται ἀλλ᾽ ἄλλο τι.

[T2h] Alexander, in Top. 574.26-575.11. <How an argument is called false, and reduction to absurdity.>

 iota oyn touto legei, ois ΄Ερμίνον δοκεί, ἢ μᾶλλον, ως ἄπασι, λέγει συμβαίνειν μάλιστα τοῖς εἰς ἀδύνατον ἀπάγουσι τὸ μηδὲν πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον συνλογίζεσθαι πολλάσις, ὡς ἄλλοτριά τις τῆς ὑποθέσεως (575.) προτάσεις λάβῃ καὶ συμπερανάμενός τι ἀδύνατον ἀξιώσῃ, ἐπεὶ τούτῳ ἀδύνατον, τὸ ἀντικείμενον τῆς ὑποθέσεως λαμβάνειν· τῷ γὰρ μὴ παρὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν γεγονέν τὸ ἀδύνατον (καὶ γὰρ χωρὶς ταύτης ἐκ τῶν καταλειμμένων τὸ αὐτὸ ἀδύνατον συνάγεται) οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον τούτῳ ὅ ἢν τὸ ἀντικείμενον τῆς ὑποθέσεως κατασκευάσα. εἰτε δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς (5) Ἀναλυτικοῖς ὦτι “τὸ μὴ παρὰ τούτο” ἐν τοῖς <εἰς> ἀδύνατον λέγουσι λόγοις, τρίτους τοῦ ψευδοῦς λόγου τρόπος, ὅταν τὸ λαμβανόμενον μὲν συνάγη τὸ προκείμενον, μὴ ἢ δὲ οἰκεία τὰ λαμβανόμενα τῷ δεικνυμένῳ, ὁδὸν εἰ γεωμετρικόν τι δεικνύει μὴ δία γεωμετρικών ἢ ιατρικῶν μὴ διὰ ιατρικῶν, καὶ τούτῳ ὦμοις, ἢν τε ἄλλῃς ἢ τὸν συναγωγόμενον· ἢ γὰρ (10) αἰτία τοῦ λόγου τὸ μὴ διὰ οἰκείων γίνεσθαι τῷ προκείμενῳ.

[T3a] Longinus ap. Porphyrium, Life of Plotinus 20.47-57. <‘Herminus’ was a Stoic who did not publish his work.>

Τὸν δὲ Στυπικῶν ἸΕρμίνον καὶ Λυσίμαχος οἰ τε ἐν ἄστει καταβιώσαντες Αθηναίος καὶ Μουσώνιος, καὶ Περιπατητικῶν Αμμώνιος καὶ Πτολεμαίος φιλολογύσται μὲν τῶν καθ᾽ ἑαυτοῦς ἄμφω γενόμενοι καὶ μᾶλιστα ὁ Ἄμ- (50) μόνιος· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ὅτις ἐκεῖνο γέγονεν εἰς πολυμαθίαν παρεξελήσιοι· οὐ μὴν καὶ γράφαντες γε τεχνικὸν οὐδέν, ἄλλα σοιματα καὶ λόγους ἐπεδεικνύοις, ἀπερ οὖν καὶ σοθῆναι τῶν ἀνδρῶν τούτων ὑπκόντων εἰς ἀδύνατον οἰκείον· μὴ γὰρ ἢν αὐτοῖς δέξασθαι διὰ τοιοῦτον βιβλίων ὀπότερον γενε- (55) σαβείς γνωρίμους, ἀφέντας σπουδαιότεροις συγγράμμασι τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀποθησαυρίζει διάνοιαν.


{Ε.} Δείξον τούν τὴν οἰκείαν πρόθεσιν τῆς τοῦ βιβλίου πραγματείας.
{Α.} Φησί τούν ὅτι τῶν πραγμάτων ἐκκείμενων δηλωτικὸς γενόμενος (20) καὶ σημαντικός αὐτὸς ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἢθεν ἐπὶ τὸ καὶ διὰ τῆς φωνῆς κατονο- μάζεσι καὶ δηλοῦν ἔκαστον· καὶ γέγονεν αὐτῷ ἢ πρώτη χρήσις τῶν λέξεων εἰς τὸ παραστῆσαι ἔκαστον τῶν πραγμάτων διὰ φωνῶν τῶν λέξεων, καθ᾽ ἢν δὴ σχέσιν τῶν φωνῶν τὴν πρὸς τὰ πράγματα τόδε μὲν τὶ πράγμα βάσθον λέξεις, τόδε δὲ ἄνθρωπον, τόδε δὲ κύνα, ἡμιόν δὲ τόδε, καὶ (25)
Primary Texts: 7. Herminus

Michael Griffin

πάλιν τόδε μὲν τὸ χρώμα λευκόν, τόδε δὲ μέλαν, καὶ τόδε μὲν ἀριθμὸν, τόδε δὲ μέγεθος, καὶ τόδε μὲν δύσην, τόδε δὲ τρίσην, καὶ οὕτως ἐκάστῳ πράγματι λέξεις καὶ ὀνόματα τέθειεν σημαντικά αὐτῶν καὶ μηνυτικὰ διὰ τῶν τοιούτων τῆς φωνῆς ψῆφων. τεθείσον δὲ τοῖς πράγμασι συμβολικῶς τινῶν λέξεων προηγούμενοις, πάλιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος κατὰ δευτέραν ἐπιβολὴν (30) ἐπανελθὼν αὐτὰς τὰς τεθείσας λέξεις θεωρήσας τὰς μὲν τοιούτον φέρε τύπων ἐγώνας, όστε ἄρθροις συναπτεῖσθαι τοιούθεν, ὀνόματα κέλχυρε, τὰς δὲ τοι- αύτας οὖν τὸ περιστατικά, περιστατικες, περίπατοι, ὀμίμητα, δηλοματα τῶν ποιῶν τύπων παρατάσις τῶν φωνῶν διὰ τοῦ τὰς μὲν ὀνόματα καλέσας τὰς δὲ οἶματα. όστε τόδε μὲν τι τὸ πράγμα καλέσαι χροσόν καὶ τὴν τοι- (35) (58) αὐτὴν ἂλην τὴν οὖτω διαλάμμουσαν προσαγορεύεισαι ἥλιον τῆς πρώτης ἣν θέσεως τῶν ὀνόματος, τὸ δὲ τὴν χροσόν λέξειν εἰπεῖν εἶναι ὀνόμα τῆς δευτέρας θέσεως καὶ τοὺς τύπους τῆς ποιῶς λέξεως σημανούσις. ἐστι τοιῶν ἣ πρόθεσις τοῦ βαθίου περὶ τῆς πρώτης θέσεως τῶν λέξεων τῆς παραστατικῆς τῶν πραγμάτων- ἐστιν γὰρ περὶ φωνῶν σημαντικῶν ἀριθμῶν, (5) καθο σημαντικά εἰσι τῶν πραγμάτων, οὐ μὴν τῶν κατὰ ἀριθμὸν ἀλληλῶν διαφερόντων ἀλλὰ τῶν κατὰ γένος- ἀπειρα μὲν σχεδον καὶ τὰ πράγματα καὶ αἱ λέξεις κατὰ ἀριθμὸν. ἀλλʼ οὐ τὰς κατὰ ἀριθμὸν πρόκειται διεθνεῖν λέξεις- ἐκαστῇ γὰρ κατὰ ἀριθμὸν σημαίνει τῶν ὀντῶν- ἀλλʼ ἔπει τῷ ἄρι- θμῳ πολλα ἐστὶν ἐν οὖν τῷ εἰδε ἢ τῷ γένει, καὶ ἡ ἀπειρία τῶν ὀντῶν (10) καὶ τῶν σημανοῦσιν αὐτά λέξεις εἰς δέκα γένη εὑρίσκει περιλαμβανομένη εἰς τὸ γράφεσθαι. εἰς δέκα τοῖν περὶ γενικὰς διαιροσις περιληθέντων τῶν ὀντῶν δέκα καὶ αἱ δηλούσαι ταῦτα φωναι γεγονασι κατὰ γένη καὶ αὐτα τοι ἔλθεν. δέκα οὖν λέγονται κατηγορια σῷ γένει δηλούσα, ὅσπερ καὶ αὐτά τα ὀντα δέκα τῷ γένει. οὖν ἐπει περὶ φωνῶν σημαντικῶν η πρό- (15) θείας καθο σημιαίνουσιν τῶν κατὰ γένος διαιρόσων ὀντῶν, τὸ δὲ ἀγορεύειν τὰ πράγματα κατὰ τι σημαινούμενον κατηγορεύει έλεγον καὶ ὅλος τὸ λέξιν σημαντικὴν κατὰ πραγμάτων λέγειν, εἰκότως Κατηγορίας ἐπέγραψεν τὴν περὶ τῶν ἀριθμῶν λέξεων στοιχείσαν τὴν καθο σημαντικά τῶν πραγμάτων εἰσι προηγομενοσ κατὰ γένος ἐκαστον θεωρομενην.

[T3c] Porphyry, in Cat. 59,17-33. <Discussed in detail in the chapter on Herminus. This section follows Porphyry’s comment that those who think Cat. is about genera of being, or attack Cat. as insufficiently comprehensive or extraneous – respectively Nicostratus and Plotinus (not named here) and Athenodorus’ and Cornutus’ followers – are mistaken. The subject is not the primary and highest genera in nature (which would not be suitable for young persons), nor what are the primary and fundamental differentiae of things said (i.e., language qua language), but the sort of predication that will properly belong to what is said in each of the genera of beings. Thus one must touch on the genera to which the predications correspond (one needs a prolepsis, or preconception, of the genus to talk about the categories). This justifies the title Category; the discussion reveals that the genera are ten in number, so the number of predications is ten; on the en genera would be a fine title assuming it is taken to refer to the correspondence between predications and genera). Discussion of place of homonymy, etc. comes next. Compare David [Elias] below.>

— Ὑδαμώς ἄλλα καὶ Βόηθος ἐν τοῖς εἰς τὰς Κατηγορίας εὑρίσκεν

Appendix of Texts
ταύτα καὶ Ἑρμίνος βραχέως.
— Εἰπὲ τὰ Ἑρμίνου, ἐπείπερ αὐτὰ φής διὰ βραχέων εἰρήθαι.
— Λέγει τοίνυν ὁ Ἑρμίνος προσκείεθα ὦτε περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ φύσει (20)
πρώτων καὶ γενικωτάτων γενῶν (οὐ γὰρ νέοις προσήκουσα ἢ τῶν τοιούτων
dιδασκαλία) ὦτε τίνες αἱ πρώται καὶ στοιχείδες τῶν λεγομένων διαφοραῖ,
ὡς τὸν λόγον εἶναι δοκεῖν περὶ τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερών, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον περὶ
tῆς καθ’ ἐκαστὸν γένους τῶν ὄντων οἰκείας ἢ ἐσομένης τῶν λεγομένων
cατηγορίας· διὸ καὶ ἀναγκαίον ἐγκέντρω· ἀμοιβάτα τῶν γενῶν, ἐφ’ (25)
ἀπερ ὄτι τὰ κατηγορομένων ἀναφορὰ: ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὴν ἐκάστου οἰκείαν
σημαίναν γνώριμον εἶναι μηδεμίας αὐτῷ προλήψεως προσποκεμένης. διὰ
tοῦτο δὲ καὶ ἢ ἐπιγραφὴ Κατηγορία, δηλωτικὴ ὑστα τῆς ἐκάστω γένει
συνημμένης οἰκείας σημαίας. ὅτι δὲ αὐτά τὰ γένη τὸν ἀριθμον δέκα,
προϊν ὁ λόγος δηλώσει· ταύτη δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀριθμος ὁ τῶν κατηγοριων δέκα. (30)
ὁ δὲ εἰπεράφων Περὶ δέκα γενῶν οὐδὲ αὐτὸς ἀπεικότως, εἰ μόνον πρὸς τὴν
ἐπὶ τὰ γένη ἀναφορὰν ποιοῖτο τὴν ἐπιγραφήν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὅτι προηγομένοις
περὶ τῶν δέκα γενῶν νομίζοι.

not signify place but pou, as yesterday and tomorrow pote. (Thus above and below belong to where).
When exists in virtue of time, where in virtue of place; to be something belonging to a quantity and to
be a quantity are different. Thus Herminus too eliminates contrariety from quantity. (Simplicius
mentions this solution as due to Andronicus, 143,1; see Moraux I 114); the information there came
from Ad Gedalium? Buss suggests we restore Andronicus’s name here 107,29. Alla kai would have its
adversative force at the outset of the sentence.>

— Άλλα πῶς ὁ Ἑρμίνος ἀπήντημεν; (25)
— Λέγον ὅτι τὸ ἄνω καὶ τὰ κάτω οὐ τότον σημαίνει ἀλλὰ ποῦ,
ὡσεὶν οὐδὲ τὸ χθές οὐδὲ τὸ αύριον χρόνον ἀλλὰ ποτέ· ἔστι δὲ ως τὸ
ποτὲ κατὰ χρόνον, οὔτος καὶ τὸ ποῦ κατὰ τόπον· ἔτερον δὲ ποσοῦ εἶναι
τι, ἐτερον δὲ τὸ ποσόν. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ Ἑρμίνος οὕτως ἄφηρε τοῦ ποσοῦ
τήν ἐναντίωσιν. (30)
— Ἀρα οὖν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ποσοῖς οὐχ ἢν εἰς ἐναντίωσιν;
— Ἐν μὲν τοῖς ωφικομένως οὔδαμώς, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀορίστοις ποσοῖς
δοξεῖν ἢν εἰς ἐναντίωσιν.
— Τίνα οὖν ἔστι τὰ ἀόριστα ποσά;
— Τά οὗτοι ἐκφερόμενα οἷον πολύ ἢ ὀλγον, μέγα ἢ μικρόν· πο· (35)
σὸν γάρ τι ὁν πολύ ἢ ὀλγον ἔστι καὶ μέγα ἢ μικρόν.


καθ’ ἐκάστην κατηγορίαν ἐστὶν τινα γενικότατα καὶ πάλιν ἀλλά
eidikóstata (15) καὶ μεταξύ τῶν γενικώτατος καὶ τῶν eidikóstaton
ἀλλα. ἐστὶν δὲ γενικώτατον μὲν, ὑπὲρ ο νοί ἢς εἰς ἄλλο ἐπαναβεβηκὸς
gένος, eidikóstaton δὲ, μεθ’ ο νοί ἢς εἰς ἄλλο ὑποβεβηκὸς εἶδος,
μεταξύ δὲ τοῦ γενικώτατος καὶ τοῦ eidikóstaton ἀλλα, ἢ καὶ γένη καὶ
eidὴ ἐστὶ τὰ αὐτὰ, πρὸς ἄλλο μέντοι καὶ ἄλλο λαμβανόμενα.
In each type of predication there are some most general items and again other most special items; and there are other items between the most general and the most special. Most general is that above which there will be no other superordinate genus; most special, that after which there will be no other subordinate species; and between the most general and the most special are other items which are at the same time both genera and species (but taken in relation now to one thing and now to another)...


[T4b] Boethius in Int. (2) 1.1, 37,30-40,28 = Porphyry no 81F Smith, for Herminus 39-40: [on 16a5-8]. < Herminus contends that the thoughts which expressions signify are not the same among all, since in homonymy it happens that the same form of expression signifies more than one. Thus Herminus reads: ‘Yet that first, of which these are signs, these are affections of the soul, and that of which these are likenesses, these are also things’. That what expressions signify are affections of the soul, and that of which what is in the mind are likenesses are things. Porphyry disagreed (so Boethius) and supported Alexander that Aristotle’s assertion applies to equivocation. See Ebbesen, S. Porphyry’s Legacy to Logic, in Aristotle Transformed, 162 ff. and Int. 5, 17a15-17, with Ammonius. Also compare David [Elias] and Porphyry. >


[T4c] Herminus elsewhere in Boethius [collected samples]: I 132, 4. II 25, 22.39, 25. 157, 30. 183, 7 sqq. 273, 1. 275, 5. 293, 29. 307, 29. II 275,31–276.8. Sententiam Aristotelis non sequitur....: I 183, 15. Ordinem turbat....: II 310,16. <Porphyry responds: (a) the speaker has in his mental discourse a certain concept that signifies one thing only. (b) when he talks he intends that one thing only. (c) the recipient expects a message about one thing and interprets the message in one sense, but it may be other than intended (i.e. the two related the utterance to different concepts corresponding to different significata.) (d) When the difference is discovered, the speaker must formulate more clearly, and then 9e) the speaker and recipient share the same concept. Ammonius like Porphyry omits the mention of nous/noemata as the medium (Shiel, AT 15, 357).>

[T5a] Ammonius in Cat 8,20.

[T5b] Ammonius, in De Int. 24,18-21. <Thoughts and things by nature, vocal sounds and letters by imposition; Herminus would read with the circumflex on the penultimate; see note on Boethius above. Here too the tauta in the phrase pragmata ede t’au ta (things are also the same) must be read
with the accent on the last syllable, and not with circumflex on the penultimate as Herminus read, in order that A’s teaching appear complete in establishing that letters and vocal sounds are by imposition from their not being the same among all peoples, and that thoughts and things are by nature from their being the same among all peoples.

dio καὶ ἑνταῦθα τὸ ΤΑΥΤΑ ἐν τῷ πράγματα ἦδη ταὐτά ὀξύτόνος ἀναγνωστέων, καὶ οὖ προσεφυσισμένον, ὦσπερ Ἕρμινος, ἵνα τελεία φαινήται τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους ἢ διδασκαλία τὰ τῇ γράμματα καὶ τὰς φωνὰς ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ παρὰ πᾶσιν εἶναι τὰ αὐτὰ θέσει εἶναι κατακευαζοῦσα, καὶ τὰ νοήματα (20) καὶ τὰ πράγματα φύσει ἀπὸ τοῦ τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι παρὰ πᾶσιν.

[T5c] Ammonius, in De Int. 52,27-53,8. < On 16b6ff.: A verb additionally signifies time... specifically present time, not surrounding time. Verbs are present, those additionally signifying past and present are ‘cases’. A verb properly speaking is said of present and signifies something definite. But was the initial definition deficient as Herminus believed (why did he not add all these distinctions to the definition at the beginning)? Ammonius responds that the definition at the beginning is one sense, but there is another sense described b the present additions. >

ei δὲ κανταύθα τις ἀποροιή διὰ τί µή ἐξ ἀρχής τὰς διαφορὰς ταύτας προσετίθει τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ ὀμήματος ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης, οὐκ ἐλλιπῇ εἶναι φήμομεν ἤµεις, καθάπερ Ἕρμινος, τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀποδιδόμενον λόγον, ἀλλὰ πλεῖον εἶναι παρὰ τῷ φιλοσόφῳ καὶ τοῦ ὀμήματος τὰ σημαινόμενα, (30) καὶ ἄλλου µὲν εἶναι σημαινομένου τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀποδιδόμενον λόγον, ἀλλο δὲ τι διὰ τῶν νυνι προστιθεμένων τοῦ φιλοσοφοῦ ἐπιγράφειν· τριχώς γὰρ τὸ ὀμήμα παρὰ τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει λεγόμενον εὐφήμες· ἤτοι πᾶσαν φωνὴν [53] προσημαίνουσαν χρόνον, ἢς µέρος οὐδὲν σημαινεῖ χωρίς· ἅτε καθ᾽ έτέρου λεγομένην, ὦσπερ εξ ἀρχῆς ὀφιστο, καθ᾽ ὁ σημαινόμενον εἶναι ἀν ὀμήματα καὶ τὰ ὄριστα ὀμήματα καὶ αἱ πτῶσεις τοῦ ὀμήματος, ἢ πᾶσαν φωνὴν προσημαίνουσαν τὸν ἐνεστώτα µόνον χρόνον καὶ ωρισμένον τι δηλούσαν, ὁ σημαινόμενον παραδίδοσα ἤµιν διὰ τῶν νυνι λεγομένων, ἢ πᾶσαν φωνὴν (5) κατηγοροῦμεν ἐν προτάσει ποιοῦσαν, ὡστε κατὰ τούτο τὸ σημαινόμενον τὸ καλὸς καὶ δύσκαιος καὶ λευκὸς καὶ σῶμον, ὅταν κατηγοροῦμεν ληφθῇ, ὀμήματα λέγον, ὥσπερ κατ᾽ οὐδέτερον ἡν τῶν προτέρων σημαινόμενον.

[T5d] [Ammonius], in An. pr. 39,31-38

‘Ερμίνος δ᾽ ἔλεγεν ἀναγκαίον γίνεσθαι τὸ συμπέρασμα οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τινὸς ὀλίγη· εὶ µέν γὰρ λάβωμεν ζῶον, ἀνθρωπον, περιπατοῦν, ἀναγκαίον συνάγεται· εἰ δὲ ζῶον, ἀνθρωπον, κινούμενον, [χεύεται ἑ] ἐνδεχόμενον. δι᾽ ὁ καὶ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐξῆ συμβαίνει δὲ ποτὲ. ἄλλα διώμουσιν τοῦτο ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐπαγγείλων πλὴν οὐχ ὀπότερας ἔτυχεν, ἀλλὰ τῆς (35) [40] μείζονος ἀναγκαίας οὐσίας. καὶ ἐπὶ στοιχείων τὴν δεῖξιν ἐποίησατο ἂτε καθόλου ταύτην ποιοῦμενος. οἱ δὲ περὶ Θεόφραστον δικαιολογοῦνται οὔτως· τις ὃς ἀποκλήρωσις µὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τρόπων τῇ χείροις ἔπεσθαι τὸ συμπέρασμα;
Ἡ Ἑρμῖνος δὲ τοῦ εἰς ἀπειρον αὐτὸ χινείσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐλεγεν αἰτίαν: μηδὲν γὰρ σῶμα πεπερασμένον ἔχειν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει δύναμιν τῆς ἐπ’ ἀπειρον κινήσεως”. καὶ τούτῳ μὲν ἐπέσκηψεν ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος (5) ἔλεγον τοῦ ἐπ’ ἀπειρον χινείσθαι μὴ τὴν οἰκείαν ψυχὴν αἰτίαν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ κινοῦν πρῶτον.


Ἀσαφεστέρα δὲ, φησίν, ἢ λέξεις ἐστὶ τῷ μὴ θείναι τὴν διαίρεσιν ὑπόστας. καὶ οὐκοῦ τοῦτο τῷ ἐκ διαφέρουσε εἰλιφθαι τὴν ἀπόδειξιν πρῶτος αὐτός ὁ Ἀφροδισιεὺς Ἀλέξανδρος ἐπιστήμη: τὴν γοῦν προειρήμενην ἐξήγησιν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν ἐπ’ ἀπειρον ἀνέσιν διὰ τῷ μὴ (30) εἶναι τὸ ἀναληφήμονον τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ πρῶτον κινοῦντος καὶ διορθώσον τὴν ἀδυναμίαν ὡς Ἀλέξανδρον τοῦ Αἰχαίου παρετίθεται. “Ἡ Ἑρμῖνος δὲ”, φησίν, “ήκουσαν καθὰ τὴν καὶ ἐν τοῖς Ασπασίῳ φερόμενον, εἰ ἐστὶν ἀνέσις περὶ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ κόμωμα, ἡ ἐπίταξιν πρὸ τοῦ πάσα γὰρ ἀνέσις ἐπιτάξεως. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ ἐν ἐπίταξιν πρὸ τῆς ἀνέσεως, ἐπ’ ἀπειρον ἢ ἀνέσιν ὅ ἄλλα τῇ ἐπίταξιν διὰ τῷ (35) γὰρ μέχρι τοῦτο ἦν καὶ οὕτω καὶ πρὸ ἀπειρον τἀς κινήσεως οὐσίας, οὐκ οἷον τὸ εὐλογημεν εἰπεῖν αἰτίαν. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ καὶ ἀνέσις ἐστιν, εἰπ’ ἀπειρον πάλιν ἐπείν αὐτή τῇ γάρ το ἀποτύχη τὴν ἀνέσιν ἀναληφήμονον ταύτην καὶ διὰ τῷ μέχρι τοῦτο ἄνεσιν, οὐκ οἷον τὸ αὐτίν ἀποτύχην εἰς ἀπειρον πεπερασμένον τὸ σῶματος, ὡστε εἰπ’ ἀπειρον καὶ ἢ ἄνεσις ἐστιν. (5) ἐπιτάξεως μὲν γὰρ ἡ ἀνέσις ἄνεσις, ἀπειρον δὲ ἐπιτάξεως ἀπειρον ἡ ἀνέσις διὰ τῇ γάρ μέρους τῆς ἐπιτάξεως ἡ ἀνέσις ἔσται, οὐ πάσης δὲ ἀλλὰ μὴ ἡ ἀνέσις κατὰ ἀδυναμίαν, τοῦτο δὲ παρὰ φύσιν, τὸ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν οὐχ οἷον τῷ ἐστὶν τῷ κατὰ φύσιν· ὀδὸς γὰρ ἐπὶ φθοράν τὸ παρὰ φύσιν· ὡστε οὐκ ἐν ἐπὶ ἄνεσις· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἄνεσις, οὐδὲ ἐπιτάξιν· ταῦτα (10) μὲν οὖν τὰ του Ἑρμῖνου κατὰ τὸν Ἀσπασίου εἰρημένα.

[T6c] Simplicius in Cat. 1,14. <Herminus, like his student Alexander, touched moderately on zetemata (excursus into specific topics in the text).>

ὡσπερ Θεμιστίος τὸ εὐφραδής καὶ εἰ τὶς ἄλλος τοιοῦτος, οἱ δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐννοίας (10) μὲν, αὐτὰς δὲ μόνας πυλὰς τὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους προειρημένας συντόμως ἀποκαλύπτειν ἐσπούδασαν, ὡσπερ ἐν τῷ κατὰ πεύκην καὶ ἀπόχρουςς βιβλίῳ πεποίηκεν ὁ Πορφύριος, ἀλλὰ δὲ πρὸς τούτος καὶ ἐπιτήμιμον ἐφημενον μετρίως, ώς ὁ Ἀφροδισιεὺς Ἀλέξανδρος καὶ ᾿Ερμῖνος καὶ ὁ Αἰδεσίος τοῦ ἅμια χειραποτὴν, ἐν (15) δὲ τῷ εἰς τὰς Κατηγορίας ὑπομνήματα πάντα σεβασάν τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον συνόψαντα· τινὲς μὲντοι καὶ βαθυτέραις περὶ αὐτὸ διανοιαῖς καταχορήσαντο, ὡσπερ ὁ Θαυμάσιος Βόθος. ἄλλος δὲ ἤρεσεν ἀπορίας μόνας γραφεῖ πρὸς τὰ λεγόμενα, ὡσπερ Λουκίος τε πεποίηκε καὶ μετ’ αὐτὸν Νικόστρατος τὰ τοῦ Λουκίου ...

[T6d] Simplicius in Cat. 13,16. <Herminus is among those who take the view that the Cat. concerns simple, primary and generic phònai in so far as they are significant of beings. Cp. Porph. 59,17-33, where Herminus expresses this view brakheös following Boethus. [Cf also Philop.>
Appendix of Texts: 7. Herminus

9.34-10.8; 12.10-11; Olymp 21,17-22,1; David 131,15-132,4]

τῶν εἰρημένων δήλον, ὅτι ἐστὶν μὲν ὁ σκοπὸς οἰκείος τῇ λογικῇ πραγματείᾳ περὶ τῶν ἁπλῶν καὶ πρώτων καὶ γενικῶν φωνῶν, καθὸ σημαντικὰ τῶν ὀντῶν εἰσίν, συνδιδάσκεται δὲ πάντως καὶ τὰ σημανόμενα ὑπ’ αὐτῶν πράγματα καὶ τὰ νοηματα, καθὸ σημαίνεται τὰ πράγματα ὑπὸ τῶν φωνῶν. καὶ (15) ταῦτα καὶ τοὺς Ἀλέξάνδρους καὶ Ἐρμίνου καὶ Βοῆθου καὶ Πορφυρίου δοκεῖ καὶ ὁ θείος Ἱάμβλιχος ἐπισημαίνει καὶ Συριανὸς σαφηνεῖ καὶ οἱ ἡμέτεροι διδάσκοντο ἀποδέχονται. ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ δεδεικτα περὶ φωνῶν ὁ σκοπός, τῶν δὲ φωνῶν αἱ καὶ μὲν εἰσὶν ἁπλαί, αἱ δὲ σύνθεται, περὶ τῶν ἁπλῶν ἐστὶ φωνῶν τῶν πρώτων καὶ τὰ πρώτα καὶ γενικώτατα τῶν ὀντῶν σημανούσων διὰ (20) μέσων τῶν ἁπλῶν καὶ πρώτων νοημάτων.

[T6e] Simplicius in Cat 30.6. <Porphyry remarks that Herminus ‘and almost everyone else’ read τίς οὐσίας at Cat. 1a2, although Boethus and Andronicus appear to have been unaware of the words. This is noted by Porphyry in the course of responding to a criticism raised by the followers of Nicostratus, namely, that Aristotle appears to suggest homonymy is found in substance alone; Porphyry believes we must read ‘of substance’ nevertheless based on Herminus’s inclusion of it (and general consensus); logos τες οὐσίας simply signifies that this is definition, not another sense of logos.>

έξηγούμενος δὲ ὁ Βόηθος καὶ ἑκάστην λέξιν τὸ τῆς οὐσίας παραλέλοιπεν ώς οὐδὲ γεγαμμένοι. καὶ ὁ Ἀνδρόνικος δὲ παραφράζων τὸ βιβλίον ‘τῶν ἀνεύ συμπλοκής, φησί, λεγομένου ὁμώνυμα μὲν λέγεται ὡς ὀνόμα τόνον ταῦτόν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς ἁπλοὺς λόγος ἐτερος’. ‘ἡμεῖς δὲ, φησίν οἱ Πορφύριος, (5) ἐπείδη καὶ Ἐρμίνος καὶ σχέδον οἱ πλείοντες ώς προσκειμένου τῷ ὀρῷ ἑκατοντάρθιαν τοῦ τῆς οὐσίας ὀνόματος, καὶ ἀναγκαίως λέγομεν τὴν προσφήμην τοῦ γὰρ λόγου καὶ τὴν ἐπαγωγὴν σημαίνοντο καὶ τὸν συλλογισμὸν καὶ πάσαν κατάφασιν καὶ ἀπόφασιν, εἰ μὴ προσέκειτο τῆς οὐσίας, πῶς ἂν ἀπεκρίνετο τοῦ ὀρισμοῦ καὶ τῆς ὑπογραφῆς τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ λόγου σημανόμενα;

[T6f] Simplicius in Cat. 55.22. <Herminus does not regard it as correct to call sumplêrotikos (‘completive’) differentiae – that is, those without which the substrate cannot exist – ‘differentiae’; he reserves ‘differentiae’ for divisive differentiae.>

For Porphyry, a ‘completive’ differentia is ‘an essential quality ... properties the loss of which destroys their subjects. properties that can be gained and lost without the subject being destroyed would not be essential. For example, heat is a property of hot water as well as fire. But it is not an essential property of water... and differentiae are indeed like this: they are essential qualities. For if rational is taken away from man, man is destroyed... hence the differentia is included under the definition of ousia, and the complements of ousiai are ousiai’ (Porph. in Cat. 95,21-96,2 - as these are essential parts of ousiai: cf. Cat. 3a29-32).

Simplicius notes Herminus’s view after commenting that ‘many differentiae contribute to one species’; he continues to discuss the matter in detail in his own voice. Simplicius discusses systatikai (‘those said universally’) and dialectikai ‘those which, taken separately, are not said of it, but are all said of it simultaneously’). The view that only divisive differentiae were ‘differentiae’ also held by Boethus (cf. Simplicius 97,28-34): ‘...some believe the differentia to be something which by nature separates what are under the same genus, and clearly in this way the differentiation from its genus is
Appendix of Texts

Primary Texts: 7. Herminus

Michael Griffin

given. Boethus however says that, properly speaking, the differentia should be classed with the species, not with the genus, because the differentiae are often substituted for the species. Indeed, all [differentiae] together may be said with respect to the genus, but each differentia in itself can be said of everything ranked below it of which it is said, though by no means of the genus. For each [differentia] is not constitutive (morphotike) of the genus. And the differentia is different from the species, because it exists together with the genus, and the differentia is a kind of form of the genus while the genus pre-exists like a subject. (See Moraux I 153-59). See also Porph. Is. 9.24 and following: divisive differentiae are exemplified as ‘mortal/immortal’, ‘rational/irrational’; they are combined to divide zoon into ‘man’, ‘god’, ‘animal’. Constitutive examples are ‘animate’ and ‘sensitive’: they can give us ‘animal’ or ‘plant’. As Chase (2003:136) explains, ‘in Simplicius’ terms, ‘animate’ and ‘sensitive’ are predictable of each member of the class animal... whereas the divisive differentiae mortal, rational, etc., while they can all be predicated of the genus animal at the same time, cannot all be predicated of any individual animal’. Another way of stating the point would be to say that the genus contains its differentiae potentially but not in actuality: cf. Is. 11,1-5 Busse.>

[The6] Simplicius in Cat. 57.22-58.2. <This passage (cf. Dexippus 29,29-30,9; discussing Cat. 3, 1b16-17) occurs in the context of explaining why Aristotle wrote that differentiae of differing, coordinate genera are different from each other in species (τῶ εἴδει, Cat. 1b17). Herminus, who is quoted here (φησίν), points out that some non-subordinate genera fall under a single head – for example, ‘winged’ and ‘footed’ differentiate ‘animal’, but some of the differentiae of ‘footed’ (two-footed, four-footed) are also differentiae of ‘winged’, in that winged creatures can vary in their number of feet (sphinxes, griffins); ‘footed’ also differentiates ‘winged’. [In other words, the sets of, say, winged and two-footed creatures are overlapping, if sphinxes are included in the mix]. These differentiae differentiate species – sphinxes from griffins, for example – but are the same in genus (‘animal’).

In brief, Aristotle only excludes the chance of differentiae of distinct, coordinate genera belonging to the same species – they may belong to the same genus.

Porphyry also defends the phrase τῶ εἴδει (58.8) but differently (likely responding directly to Herminus – see 58,20 below); he proposes that, if genera are not subordinate, the differentiae of the species under them must be different. Thus ‘two-footed’ in the case of winged things and ‘two-footed’ in the case of footed things are different differentiae. Simplicius adds that Porphyry considers a different possibility later, namely that Aristotle is discussing eidopoiai differentiae.

See Moraux II 368 on Herminus’s position. Moraux finds Herminus’s view misleading at best, and Simplicius also thinks that H. is wrong to talk about ‘winged’ and ‘footed’ when Aristotle is talking about genera that cannot be brought under the same genus, like ‘animal’ and ‘knowledge’.

The Emíνος τῶς των Ïδως Ïγνον, Ïύτως Ïπλλήληγεν Ïνντ, επέφων, ‘Ιδα Φησίν Πνήμη Εών Ώόν Πνήμη Εών Αμφε ΄ν Ανάγωμεν, κς τό πτηνόν καὶ τό πεζόν άμφω ύπό τό ζων, καὶ τούτων είδον τίνες αἰ αύτα (25) διαφοράς καὶ γαρ τό πτηνόν τό μέν δίπου εστίν, τό δὲ τετράπον, ως
γρὺψ ἱστορεῖται καὶ σφίγξ, καὶ τοῦ πεζοῦ ὁμοίως. ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ τῷ εἴδει αἱ αὐταί εἰσιν αὕτα διαφορά, ἀλλὰ γένει· ἥδι τῶν ἄλλων διαφορά, διὰ τούτο, θητοί, τῶν μη ὑπάλληλα οὐχ ἄλλως ἑτέρας, ἀλλὰ τῷ εἴδει ἑτέρας εἰσπ ἐπεν τὰς διαφοράς· καὶ γάρ αὕτα τὸν μη ὑπάλληλα οὖσαι, κἀ̄ν [58] αἱ αὐταί δοκοῦσαι, ἀλλ’ οὐ τῷ εἴδει εἰσιν αἱ αὐταί, ἀλλὰ τῷ γένει’.

Herminus will have it that the reason that differentiae of genera which are not subordinate but different are different in species is ‘because’, he says, ‘there are some genera which are not subordinate, but are nevertheless both referred under one genus, as ‘winged’ and ‘footed’ are both under ‘animal’. Of these, some of the differentiae are the same: for instance, one part of ‘winged’ is ‘two-footed’, the other ‘four-footed’ (as is said of the griffin and the sphinx), and the same is true of ‘footed’. Yet these differentiae are not the same in species but in genus, for they are primarily differentiae of ‘animal’. This is why’, he continues, ‘Aristotle did not say that the differentiae of non-subordinate genera are simply ‘different’ (heteras), but ‘different in species’. After all, these are differentiae of non-subordinate genera, but even though they seem to be the same, they are not the same in species, but in genus’.

[T6h] Simplicius in Cat. 58.20. <This passage occurs in response to a criticism of Nicostratus, though there is no evidence that Herminus is responding to them directly. The ‘Nicostrateans’ complain that Aristotle indulges in mataiologia in providing examples around 1b19-20; for who would not intuit that forms of knowledge do not differ by being two-footed? Simplicius, likely reporting Porphyry, points out that Herminus’s followers (οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἑρμῖνον) did not have a good understanding of the phrase έτέρα καὶ μη ὑπάλληλα, as they supposed that even the differentiae of non-subordinated genera could be referred under the same genus (as ‘two-footed’, though said of winged and footed animals, is thought by Herminus to mean the same thing under the genus animal). Thus the examples Aristotle gives are needed, as they make the truth clear.

Presumably this point and response belong to Porphyry, as in the preceding passage.>

ἔπειτα ὅρας ὅτι οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἑρμῖνον τὸ έτέρα καὶ μη ὑπάλληλα οὐ καλῶς ἐξεδέξαντο, (20) γομίσαντες δυνατὸν εἶναι καὶ μη ὑπάλληλα ὅντα ψή ἐν ἀνάγεσθαι γένος· οὕτως οὖν ὃν πρόχειρον ὁ λόγος, κἀ̄ν τά παραδείγματα καλῶς ληφθέντα σαφῆ τὸν λόγον ποιή.

[T6i] Simplicius in Cat 62.7-23. <This passage reports Herminus’s important view that the tenfold organisation of categories is not a division but an ‘enumeration’ (aparithmesis), followed by his statement that the number of ‘ten’ is not necessarily canonical.

The passage occurs early in the discussion of the ‘division’ of the ten categories, before Simplicius recounts various objections to the division. Before this passage, Simplicius has just described two views on the division.

The first view is that the ten categories are divided ‘like soldiers drawn up according to lokhoi, so that just as a captain leads a company, so substance is the leader of substances, and each of the other [categories] leads the multitude assigned to it’. Dexippus 39,16-19 reports a similar view. The analogy likely is an echo of Met. 12.10, 1075a14 and following; in a 1974 paper (repr. in Sorabji, 1990) Pierre Hadot argued that the source of the answering passage of Dexippus was Porphyry, and it would stand to reason for Porphyry to precede Iamblichus here. However, M. Chase (143, comparing
71,17 and 91,14-33) also suggests that this passage and Dexippus may derive from Iamblichus’s interpretation of Archytas.

The second view, which Simplicius associates with Iamblichus, rejects the ‘company of soldiers’ interpretation, on the grounds that commonality must exist between the primary genera. Rather than splitting them up like companies, therefore, it is better to distinguish them by their ‘primary idiotêtai’, and liken the genera to things that share a focal meaning (“from one and in relation to one”) to the extent that their accidents all arise in ousia and are arrayed in ousia.

At this point (a, where the fragment below begins) Herminus is cited as holding a third position: the ten are neither a diairesis nor a merismos, but an ‘enumeration’ (aparithmêsis); for there is no whole over them, neither as genos nor in any other sense of ‘whole’.

Curiously, Simplicius simply passes by this view without direct comment (as he does elsewhere in reporting Herminus), and responds to Iamblichus instead (b), using Herminus’s language for ‘enumeration’ (άπαριθμημένον, 62,11; see also 68,16, where Iamblichus defends the ‘enumeration’ of ten categories). (The shared vocabulary might suggest that Iamblichus is the source for Herminus here, and took his start for the present argument from Herminus’s concept of ‘enumeration’; but this in turn is already mirrored in ‘Archytas’, 31,32-32,33 Thesleff). Simplicius comments in response to Iamblichus that it is ‘from being’, not ‘from the one’, that the categories describe focally; and he also points out that in the Metaphysics (6.2, 1026a33 and following; see also 12.10) Aristotle has the ten produced as if from one thing, namely being.

After responding to Iamblichus, Simplicius returns to Herminus in the next section (c) with a brief quotation (see Moraux II 369-70). Herminus states that the number of ten categories is established by the ‘significations’ or ‘meanings’ of primary genera (σημασίαι – an interesting word, given the role ascribed to Herminus in establishing the ‘semantic’ interpretation of the skopos of the Categories). If there are just as many genera as are represented by the examples Aristotle gives in the text, namely ten, there are also this many significant categories. If there are more genera than those given in the text, the number of categories can change fluidly with them. This fluidity represents a standpoint very different from the strong defense of ten categories which Simplicius subsequently mounts in response to the aporiai of Lucius, Nicostratus, Athenodorus, Cornutus, and others; as Simplicius points out, Aristotle may present a less flexible position, as he uses ‘this same number of genera everywhere’.>
Simplicius, in Cat. 124,33. <The context is the discussion of Quantity which is continuous, and specifically Aristotle’s remark (Cat. 5a5) that the parts of a plane or solid are, respectively, limited by a line or by a plane.

Simplicius notes a variant reading according to which Aristotle bounds the parts of a plane or solid by ‘a line and a plane’; Simplicius believes this reading is based on the fact that ‘the shared limit of bodies is always a plane’, as the line is of the plane, and the point of the line.

Simplicius adduces Porphyry, who comments that ‘some solid bodies have continuity according to line’, and goes on to remark that Herminus takes ‘body’ here to mean mathematical body (a quantity), not natural body (a substance).

But Simplicius remarks that mathematical bodies are divided by a mathematical plane, not by a line; he speculates that he (Herminus?) referred to solid angles.>

τῶν <đ> διαφόρων αἱρέσεων τοῦτον μεριδουσιν τρεῖς γεγόνασι αἱρέσεις περὶ τοῦ σκοποῦ τοῦ Κατηγορίων, ἀλλὰ τοσάκτως μὲν ἔλεγεν τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη, εἰς ἣν ἦν οὐκ ἠπέπεδον, ἄλλ’ ἐγείρθησαν ἢ κατὰ καθ’ ἑαυτὸν συνάρχοντά τινα. ὡς οὖν ἦν ὁ Αριστοτέλης τὸν Αριστοτέλη, εἰς ἄλλα μέν ὕπερ τοῦ Πορφύριον Πορφύριος ἤτοι τετράγωνον ἐποίησεν ὡς ἔρχεται, τὸν δὲ καθ’ ἑαυτῷ καταλαμβάνεται τὰ δὲ ἑαυτῶν. ὥσπερ καὶ ἐρὼν τῆς τούτων συναρχίας ἐποίησθαι.
ο δέ Ἕρμινος οίμενος αὐτὸν περὶ πραγμάτων διαλαμβάνειν πιστοῦτα τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ ἐκ τοῦ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη πανταχοῦ τῷ ἐστι προορίσματι κεχρήθαι, ὅπερ ἐπὶ πραγμάτων εἰσῆλθε λέγεσθαι. καὶ οὔ μόνον, φημι, ἐν τούτῳ ἐστὶ πιστώσασθαι τὸν λόγον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῆς διαφώτισις τῆς παραδεδομένης ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ περὶ τῶν ὀντων, ἐνάθα φημι (10)

tὸν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, τὰ δὲ καθ’ ὑποκειμένῳ τινὸς λέγεται, ως δήλων ὅτι περὶ πραγμάτων ἐστίν αὐτῷ ὁ σκοπός. καὶ μήτις ἀπορήθη πρὸς τὸν Ἕρμινον λέγων ὅτι ὄνοι ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ συμβήκεται εἶναι τὸν σκοπὸν τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους περὶ φωνῶν, τῶν φωνῶν αὐτῶν οὐσῶν· ἐρεί γὰρ ἱσώς τις πρὸς αὐτόν, ὑπέρ Ἕρμινον τὸν λόγον ποι- (15) οίμενον, ὅτι αἱ φωναὶ καὶ οἱ λόγοι οὐ λέγονται κυρίως εἶναι, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ γίγνεσθαι τὸ εἶναι ἐχοῦσιν, ὡς μαθησόμεθα. ὁ δὲ Ἀλέξανδρος ὑπολαμβάνων αὐτὸν περὶ νοημάτων διαλέγεσθαι, εἴ ἐκατέρων λαμβάνων τὰς ἀφορμὰς κατασκευὰς τῶν ἐναυτοῦ λόγων· φημι γὰρ ὅτι ἀμφότεροι έμοι νικάτε, ως ἐν διαφώτισις δεξιόμενον· τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν μόνον ἀγγέλλει, τὰ δὲ (20) μόνοις ἀγγέλλεται, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἀγγέλλει καὶ ἀγγέλλεται. μόνος μὲν οὖν ἀγγέλλουσιν αἱ φωναὶ, μόνος δὲ ἀγγέλλουσι τὰ πράγματα, ἀγγέλλει δὲ καὶ ἀγγέλλεται τὰ διανοημάτα· ἀγγέλλει μὲν γὰρ τὰ πράγματα, ἀγγέλλεται δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν φωνῶν· οὐκοῦν μέσα ἐστὶ τὰ νοηματα τῶν τε φωνῶν καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων. λέγετε δὲ χρὴς ὅτι περὶ φωνῶν καὶ περὶ πραγμάτων ζητεί, (25) μέσα δὲ τούτων τὰ νοηματα, ὁ δὲ περὶ τῶν ἄρχων διαλαμβάνων περὶ τῶν μέσων διαλαμβάνει· περὶ νοημάτων ἄρα αὐτῷ ὁ σκοπός, εὐπορεῖ δὲ ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος καὶ ἄλλου λόγου τοιούτου· τοσούτον φημι ὅτι περὶ νοημάτων ἐστίν αὐτῷ ὁ σκοπός, ὅτι ἐν τῷ τέλει τῶν Κατηγοριών φησὶν ὑπὲρ μὲν οὖν τῶν προτεθέντων γενῶν ἰκανὰ ταύτα.

[T8a] David [Elias] in Cat. 129,11

χρῆσομαι καὶ τὰ ἔξης. οὖν εἰς τούν ἐδοξοῦν εἶναι ὁ σκοπὸς τῶν Κατηγοριών, ἀλλὰ πλείους· ὡς γὰρ τὰ ὄντα, τοσοῦτοι φέρονται καὶ σκοποί. τριτά δὲ τὰ ὄντα, νοηματα καὶ πράγματα. οἱ μὲν οὖν περὶ φωνῶν εἰρήκασι τὸν σκοπόν, ὡς Ἀλέξανδρος καὶ Εὐστάθιος, οἱ δὲ περὶ νοημάτων, (10) ὡς Πορφύριος, οἱ δὲ περὶ πραγμάτων, ὡς Ἕρμινος· πάντες μὲν γὰρ συνεφώνησαν περὶ τῶν δέκα κατηγοριών εἶναι τὸν σκοπὸν, ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν ως ἐκφωνούμενον μόνον, οἱ δὲ ως υφεστοσοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ ως νοσημένους. καὶ οὖν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν ὅτι νόμιμα μὲν τρεῖς οἱ σκοποί, ἔργῳ δὲ εἰς· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄκολοθεί ταῦτα ἀλλήλους· οὐ γὰρ ὅποι φωναί, καὶ νοηματα πάντως, διὰ τάς (15) ἀσήμων φωναίς, οὐδὲ ὅποι νοηματα, ἐκεῖ καὶ πράγματα, διὰ τὸν τραγέ-


μέντοι ἀντικειμένων ἐν πάσῃ κατηγορίᾳ ἐδεήθη· ἐφ’ ἐκάστῃ γὰρ κατηγορίᾳ ἐξητούμεν εἰ ἔχει ἐναντίον ή οὐ. καὶ διαφορὰς ἐναντίων δὲ ἐδείχθησαν ἐν τῷ περὶ ποσοῦ λόγῳ, ὅτε τὸ μέγα καὶ μικρὸν καὶ πολύ καὶ ὀλὸν οὐκ ἀνήχομεν ύπὸ τὰ ἐναντία, ἀλλ’ ὑπὸ τὰ πρὸς τι· τὰ δὲ ἐναντία
καὶ τὰ πρὸς τι εἰδή ἀντικειμένων. Ἐρμῖνος δὲ ὁ Πρὸ τῶν τόπων ἐπιγράφας τάς Κατηγορίας αὕτην λέγει τουαύτην, ὅτι διαλεκτικὴ ἤ προκειμένη πραγματεία, ἔργον δὲ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς περὶ τὸν ἀποφαντικὸν εἰλείσθαι λόγον τῷ συνηγορεῖν τῇ ἀντιφάσει καὶ τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις· διὰ τούτο σὺν καὶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα τῶν λοιπῶν προέταξε.

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