The Austrian State Treaty, achieved after ten years of occupation of Austria by France, Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union, is a frequently cited example of the triumph of painstaking diplomacy between the great powers, but it can more accurately be depicted as the result of unilateral actions by the negotiating countries, particularly the Soviet Union. Careful examination of the records of the negotiations as well as available policy documents of the participants reveals that the highly publicized negotiations gradually became a sophisticated charade for the benefit of European and domestic audiences, while the critical decisions were made elsewhere. Indeed, as Europe grew increasingly polarized very little actual bargaining occurred between East and West; the Austrian negotiations became merely a forum for unilateral action. Thus, in describing the search for Austrian independence, the thesis is not simply a reiteration of the three hundred and seventy-nine meetings of the Foreign Ministers and Foreign Ministers' Deputies for Austria. Rather, it is a uniquely encapsulated version of the course of the Cold War in the ten critical years following the Second World War.

The purpose of the thesis is to study, through the prism of British and American documents, the behaviour of the four great powers in the struggle to determine the future of Austria. Examining allied behaviour towards this small but strategically important country, and understanding how the Austrians came to choose a third way between East and West, sheds light upon the great power arrangements in Europe which have persisted to this day.
THE GREAT POWERS AND
THE STRUGGLE OVER AUSTRIA,
1945-1955

by

Audrey E. Kurth

A thesis
presented to the
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For about 2,000 years now there has been a figure in mythology which symbolizes tragic futility. That was Sisyphus, who, according to the Greek story, was given the task of rolling a great stone up to the top of a hill. Each time when, after a great struggle and sweating the stone was just at the brow of the hill, some evil force manifested itself and pushed the stone down. So poor Sisyphus had to start his task over again.

I suspect that for the next 2,000 years the story of Sisyphus will be forgotten, when generation after generation is told the story, the tragic story, of the Austrian State Treaty. Austria was promised its independence 11 years ago. When our forces moved into Austria 9 years ago they announced that they were there only to liberate. Now, year after year has gone by, when we have repeatedly been almost at the point of concluding an Austrian State Treaty, and always some evil force manifests itself and pushes the treaty back again. So we have to start again at the bottom of the hill.

U.S. Secretary of State
John Foster Dulles,
at the Berlin Conference,
16 February 1954

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INTRODUCTION

Of all the issues arising from World War II, the future of Austria should have been among the easiest for the Allies to settle, for on few such issues was there a greater degree of apparent agreement well before the end of the war. The earliest official reference to the need to liberate Austria from the Nazis was made by British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in a speech on 9 November 1940. Stressing that Great Britain would never forget her obligations towards the chained European countries, Churchill emphasized that Austria was one of the countries for whom Britain had drawn the sword. During the following summer, Churchill and U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the Atlantic Charter, which stated the intention of the United States and the United Kingdom to respect the right of all peoples to choose the government under which they live. The Charter implicitly included the Austrians among the peoples who would have self-government restored to them as the result of an allied victory. More explicitly, in a 9 December 1941 radio message explaining the reasons why the United States must enter the war, Roosevelt listed Austria among the countries which must be liberated from Nazi rule. Joseph Stalin broached the subject of the restoration of the Austrian state later in the same month during his famous meeting in Moscow with British Foreign Secretary
Sir Anthony Eden. With the sound of German artillery punctuating his sentences, the Soviet dictator expressed his determination to restore an independent Austria.

In October 1943, therefore, with the Soviet Army about to liberate Kiev and the Western Allies advancing along the Italian peninsula, the foreign ministers decided to issue a joint statement to formalize their intentions, enlist the support of the Austrian people, and simplify Allied postwar planning. The Moscow Declaration, published at the close of the Conference of Foreign Ministers, explained that the governments of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union did not recognize the 1938 annexation of Austria by Germany, and solemnly promised to re-establish a free and independent Austria after the war. In addition, the declaration indicated Allied willingness to help Austria and her neighbouring states regain political and economic stability. Among the reassuring sentences of the communique, a Soviet amendment, which reminded the Austrians that their participation in the war on the side of Hitlerite Germany could not be completely forgotten, went almost unnoticed. Shortly after the declaration was published, the Free French government also officially subscribed to its tenets. The promises and obligations of the Moscow Declaration were renewed by Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt at Yalta in February 1945. The future of Austria was also discussed at Potsdam, where in the closing hours of the conference the Soviet Union was granted, as reparations for war damage, the right to all external German assets in eastern Austria. The area of
accord between the Allies on Austria was apparently so broad that these hastily arranged legal and economic provisions seemed unimportant. However, both the amendment to the Moscow Declaration and the Potsdam reparations clause later supplied the basis for extensive war damage claims by the Soviet Union, thereby haunting the eight-year negotiations for an Austrian treaty.

From a legal standpoint, it could be argued there was no need for a treaty with Austria. The small state was a victim of aggression, not a defeated enemy, and theoretically the four victorious powers need only have withdrawn their occupation forces and conducted bilateral negotiations with the Vienna government on any unsettled questions. But in reality, there were a number of outstanding problems which had to be settled among the powers themselves. In the years following the war, Austria increasingly became an instrument rather than an object of great power policy. As negotiations fitfully dragged on, the four powers agreed upon the term "Austrian State Treaty" for the subject of their haggling. In the Cold War contest between East and West, Austria's wartime status was irrelevant.

Indeed, Austria's special status at times seemed detrimental to her future; had Austria been declared a belligerent power during the war, she might conceivably have achieved her independence within a few months of the cessation of hostilities. Despite the efforts of U.S. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, Austria

was not included on the agenda of the Paris Peace Conference in the summer of 1946. Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov argued that the agenda was already overburdened, and that it was more important first to conclude treaties with Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Finland and Italy. As a result, the Austrians, nurturing a keen sense of injustice, watched the conclusion of peace treaties with Germany's former allies and waited impatiently for the evacuation of their own territory. Years later, Karl Gruber, Austrian Foreign Minister, wrote that the loss of Romania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia to the Cominform avenged this disregard of logic and justice at the Paris Peace Conference.¹

But to pinpoint Austria's exclusion from the peace conference as the cause of the country's years of occupation by Allied troops is a gross oversimplification. For one thing, Austria's geographic position gave her tremendous strategic importance. Any Austrian settlement would have far-reaching influence on the future of Southern Europe and was therefore of critical interest to the Soviet Union and the Western powers. Vienna was the Soviet Union's forward position in Southern Europe, a military bridgehead in any conflict with the West. Furthermore, the Hungarian and Romanian treaties contained clauses permitting the Soviet Union to keep troops in those countries in order to maintain lines of communication with Austria; the evacuation of Austria would therefore eliminate the legal justification for Soviet occupation of much of

Eastern Europe. The Austro-Yugoslav border gave Austria added importance, both as a source of potential Russian influence in Yugoslavia and later as a military staging area for probes against the "Titoists." For the Western allies, on the other hand, Austria was a crucial link in European defence planning, given its location in the line of communications between Italy and West Germany. Without Austria, the West would have to detour all troops and supplies destined north or south around Austria and Switzerland through France -- clearly a logistical disadvantage. Moreover, Austria's lack of an army would permit Soviet troops to march unimpeded across her northern or eastern plain in launching an attack against the West.

Austria's economic value derived from her historical role as the center of north-south and east-west trade. For the Soviet Union, battered and starving in the aftermath of the German campaigns, eastern Austria's oil and industries represented an important source of economic gain. Moreover, for both sides, Austria was important politically. Evidence indicates that the Soviet Union only reluctantly gave up the idea of rapidly converting the Austrians to Soviet Communism; only when it appeared that the cause of longer-term revolutionary goals could not be served by harassing the stubborn pro-Western Austrians, was hope of an eleventh-hour conversion abandoned. For the West, Austria effectively became a protectorate whose "loss" to Communism would have been a blow to Western unity and a serious loss of prestige, particularly for a fledgling superpower like the United States.
Thus, simply by virtue of her historic and geographic position, Austria was condemned to a prominent role in the post-war plans of both East and West. The disagreement over Austria's future, therefore, often had little to do with Austria herself and much more to do with the course of the Cold War.

The study of the events leading up to the Austrian State Treaty, signed in May 1955, provides a rare opportunity for understanding East-West relations and the establishment of the current situation in postwar Europe. Soviet actions and motivations were more clearly exposed to Western scrutiny in Austria than in any other country. During the course of the eight-year negotiations for an Austrian treaty, Soviet behaviour evolved from hard bargaining to blatant obstructionism. Then, in the space of a few weeks, the Soviet leaders suddenly decided to abandon their obstructionist tactics and, indeed, showed such an eagerness to sign that they settled for terms less favourable than those in the draft treaty they had earlier rejected. The withdrawal of troops shortly thereafter confirmed Soviet willingness to leave Austria an independent and neutral state, and led to great jubilation within both Austria and the West. The treaty, furthermore, inaugurated a brief détente between East and West, leading directly to the Geneva summit conference between leaders of the Soviet Union, the United States, France and Great Britain, and setting off a period of optimism later known at the "Spirit of Geneva," a temporary respite from the tension of the Cold War.
Although the Austrian treaty played a crucial role as a catalyst in East-West relations, many important questions remain unanswered. For example: Did the Western powers, as some writers have postulated, lose an opportunity to end the Cold War in 1955 when they failed to reciprocate a Soviet act of good will? Was the Soviet decision to leave Austria primarily a conciliatory gesture? Or was it the result of a Kremlin calculation that the Russians could profit most, strategically and economically, by leaving? What lessons can be learned about Soviet negotiating behaviour? Did the behaviour of the Western powers directly influence the decision? Or was the decision to sign the treaty merely a by-product of the post-Stalin succession struggle going on in the Kremlin? Studying the economic, military, political and personal reasons why the Soviet leadership suddenly decided to end the occupation of Austria will help to illuminate how Soviet foreign policy is formulated. Today, as another generation of Soviet leaders struggles to come to power and the state of East-West relations seems to be deteriorating, a study of the Austrian State Treaty, concluded under similar conditions, is particularly relevant.

To speak of the Austrian issue as strictly an East-West problem, however, is to ignore a crucial aspect of the postwar negotiations. The Western powers were not always in harmony with one another, and some of the most vehement debates over Austria's future occurred not at the international bargaining table but rather in the cloisters of the American bureaucracy.
Without the benefit of secret British and American records, most previous accounts of the events leading to the treaty have focussed upon obvious Soviet recalcitrance which repeatedly derailed the negotiations. Many questions remain about the role of the Western powers, and particularly the United States, in attaining an Austrian State Treaty. For example: Did the Western powers always negotiate earnestly and in good faith? What were the differences between British, French and American policies? Were all of the Western powers really as deeply disappointed as the Austrians were when progress on the treaty was stymied by the Russians? Were there reasons--military, economic, and political--why each of the Western powers may have secretly wished to forestall the signature of a treaty of neutrality for Austria? Analyzing the evolution of Western policy towards Austria will offer new insights into the development of postwar Western relations, the creation of the present configuration in postwar Europe, and particularly the emergence of the United States as leader of the Western alliance.

Finally, examining the years of frustrating negotiations for a treaty will yield an understanding of how the 1955 formula for Austrian neutrality came to be, and whether that formula relates to the current dilemma which some Europeans claim confronts them in attempting to ensure their own security. Faced with an overwhelming conventional threat from the East, given no long-term security commitments by the West, and determined in any case to avoid partitionment between the two, the Austrians chose to declare their country a permanently neutral state. Since 1955, they have
maintained strict military neutrality even as they have followed a policy of what is loosely termed positive neutrality, by joining international economic and political organizations which the neutral Swiss have traditionally avoided. Some of the reasons behind the 1955 Austrian decision for military neutrality are echoed in the complaints of many other Europeans today: a sense of inability to withstand Soviet conventional attack from Eastern Europe, a desire to assert and maintain an independent foreign policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, and an uncertainty about the strength of the American commitment to defend European territory. In the light of what many political pundits consider to be a growing "neutrality" in Europe, it is useful to understand the reasons why, thirty years ago, the pro-Western Austrians opted for permanent neutrality as a state policy and, more importantly, what the international conditions were which enabled them to pursue such an option.

The emphasis of this thesis is upon the actions of the four great powers between 1945 and 1955 in deciding the future of Austria.¹ Using mainly American and British government documents, the study will examine the problem of Austria in postwar international relations. This is not a study of domestic affairs within Austria, and there is no intention to provide a comprehensive history of the occupation in Austria after the war. Whenever possible and appropriate, the role of the Austrians themselves in

¹The term "great power" is intended to refer specifically to the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and, more loosely speaking, France, between the years 1945 and 1955. It is not intended as a reference to any other states which, then or now, may be considered to fit that designation.
determining their own fate in the international arena will be described; for this purpose, interviews of some of the key Austrian participants will be included. Likewise, events in Austria which bear particular relevance to the policies of the great powers will be examined. However, a fundamental premise of this work is that the struggle over Austria was an integral part of a larger Cold War contest between East and West, and the subject is approached from that perspective.

Newly declassified British documents are one major source of primary information for the thesis. During the early years of the negotiations, Great Britain was the most influential of the Western powers in determining tripartite policy towards Austria; thus, available British documents are an invaluable resource. Recently declassified American documents from the ten years of negotiations are the other major source of primary material for the evolution of Western policy toward Austria. In the later years the Americans came increasingly to dominate the Western position in the negotiations. Most of these government documents are being analyzed for the first time, and they will thus yield answers to questions about Western behaviour which have never been satisfactorily explained. Together the British and the American documents present a balanced perspective on Western policy and also provide some insight into the gradual shift of international influence from the United Kingdom to the United States after the war.
Review of French government documents, even if those documents were available, would likely shed little more light on the evolution of Western policy. The French were a "great power" more in form than in substance during the ten years after the Second World War; most often the French followed the lead of either the British or the Americans in the negotiations. In any case, the thesis is openly oriented towards the British and the American perspective. Examination of declassified British and American documents indicates that they are a sufficiently complete record of the course of Western policy toward Austria.

Unfortunately, Soviet historical documents remain closed to Western researchers. As a result, Soviet opinions and positions must be gleaned from the memoirs of contemporary statesmen (notably Nikita Khrushchev), newspaper and magazine accounts, and available secondary sources.

The Austrian State Treaty, achieved after ten years of occupation of Austria by France, Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union, is a frequently cited example of the triumph of painstaking diplomacy between the great powers, but it can more accurately be depicted as the result of unilateral actions by the negotiating countries, particularly the Soviet Union. Careful examination of the records of the negotiations as well as available policy documents of the participants reveals that the highly publicized negotiations gradually became a sophisticated charade for the benefit of European and domestic audiences, while the critical decisions were made elsewhere. Indeed, as Europe grew
increasingly polarized very little actual bargaining occurred between East and West; the Austrian negotiations became merely a forum for unilateral action. Thus, in describing the search for Austrian independence, the thesis will not be simply a reiteration of the three hundred and seventy-nine meetings of the Foreign Ministers and Foreign Ministers' Deputies for Austria. Rather, it will be a uniquely encapsulated version of the course of the Cold War in the ten critical years following the Second World War.

The purpose of the thesis is to study, through the prism of British and American documents, the behaviour of the four great powers in the struggle to determine the future of Austria. Examining allied behaviour towards this small but strategically important country, and understanding how the Austrians came to choose a third way between East and West, will shed light upon the great power arrangements in Europe which have persisted to this day.
CHAPTER ONE

The 'Liberation' of Austria, 1945-1946

When the Soviet Army first reached the suburbs of Vienna, in early April 1945, the commander-in-chief of the Russian troops in Austria officially proclaimed the Red Army's intention to liberate Austria from the Nazis, to respect the social order of the country, not to appropriate any Austrian territory, and to adhere to the principles of the Moscow Declaration. Naturally, the West felt reassured by this indication of what seemed to be a cooperative Soviet attitude toward Austria. Allied confidence soon faltered, however, when the Soviet Army unilaterally installed a provisional Austrian government in Vienna, and then began systematically pillaging every scrap of useful materiel and industrial equipment from eastern Austria.

Even as the Russians stubbornly insisted that no requisitioning was taking place, private homes were seized for army quarters, vehicles were taken for Soviet use, and food supplies were diverted from a hungry population. The occupation army was impressively


2Message from U.S. Headquarters, Forces in Austria Advanced, Vienna, to War Department, PV 7521, 18 September 1945, Modern Military Records Division, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
thorough, collecting articles of furniture and removing even road and railroad signals for use in the Soviet Republics. Whole factories were dismantled piece by piece and transported on rail cars to the USSR. In the first twelve months of the occupation, approximately 64,000 major items of plant from Austria's metal, machine, and locomotive industries alone were sent eastwards. The Austrian oil industry was still more devastated, losing 80 percent of its oil drilling equipment, worth almost five million pounds, to the Russians. Western complaints, lodged most persistently by the British government, had no effect on the Soviet mass looting of Austria.

Much worse for the inhabitants, the behaviour of Soviet troops as they entered Austria, quickly—and some have claimed irrevocably—turned the Austrian people bitterly against the Russian army.
they had first welcomed as liberators. Apparently in defiance of their superiors, Soviet troops raped and robbed the terrified civilians and indiscriminantly looted and destroyed whatever property they could not transport eastwards. But whether or not supported by the Kremlin, or even by Soviet officers in Austria, the unbridled campaign of destruction stood in glaring contradiction to General Tolbukhin's assurances given as the Red Army first entered the capital. At the end of one year of occupation, the bitter joke circulating in Vienna was that Austria could probably survive a third world war, but she could never endure a second liberation.

The American, French and British armies entered Austria in late April and early May. Although Western forces for the most part abstained from plunder and rape, the early weeks of occupation by Britain, France and the U.S. were far from exemplary. The closely coordinated plans between the British and American commands had called for the British Eighth Army and the U.S. Fifty Army to occupy Austria from the south, moving up from the Italian peninsula.

1 Interview with Professor Stephan Verosta, Professor of International Law (Emeritus), University of Vienna; in Vienna, 6 December 1983.


The Mediterranean forces were unexpectedly delayed, however, because the German army in Italy did not surrender until 8 May. In the meantime, the British Third Army and U.S. Seventh Army drove through Germany and occupied Austria from the north, while the newly formed French unit pushed in from the west. The French army only occupied the western tip of Austria (Voralberg), and for the first eight weeks the United States held a large portion of what was eventually to be the French occupation zone. Unfortunately British and American specialists in Austrian civil affairs were still trapped in northern Italy, and during the early weeks of the occupation the policy of the Western allies was in confusion, with specialists trained for German jobs setting up the British and American military governments, treating the Austrians as vanquished enemies, and making many blunders. It was not until the end of May that the appropriate military authorities arrived from Italy, and began to sort out the anarchical situation in Austria.¹

According to the general outline of plans developed in the European Advisory Commission, Austria was to be divided into four zones of occupation, with the city of Vienna, the seat of federal and administrative power, to be shared jointly among the four allies. Because of controversy over the exact zoning of the city of Vienna, however, the Advisory Commission's plan for Austria

had not yet been finally agreed. This element of indecision contributed to the general confusion at the beginning of the occupation, for although there were no direct conflicts between the four armies, the commanding officers were unsure about the boundaries of each of their territories, and the capital city was occupied solely by Soviet troops.

The Western powers were anxious to establish a presence in Austria's capital for obvious political reasons. In early April, the Soviet Union agreed to permit Western missions to enter Vienna. On 29 April, however, the Soviet government suddenly announced the formation of a Provisional Government for Austria and simultaneously refused to allow the French, British, and American missions to enter Vienna until specific agreement could be reached in the Advisory Commission on city occupation zones and control machinery. The Soviet pronouncement surprised and disturbed the Western allies, particularly Churchill, who feared that Stalin was attempting to establish hegemony in Austria similar to that which the Russians had already secured in Romania, by organising the country and then presenting the allies with a fait accompli.

On 30 April, therefore, Churchill sent an agitated telegram to Truman: "I am very much concerned about the way things are going in Austria. The announcement of the formation of a Provisional Austrian Government together with the refusal of permission to our missions to fly into Vienna makes me fear that the Russians are deliberately exploiting their arrival first into Austria to
'organise' the country before we get there." The Prime Minister emphasised the need to take a strong stand immediately, lest the Americans and British "...find it very difficult to exercise any influence in Austria during the period of her liberation from the Nazis," and asked Truman to join him in sending a message to Stalin, insisting that the dictator instruct the local Soviet commander to allow allied missions to proceed to Vienna. Churchill included a draft of his telegram to Stalin and asked the American President to endorse it. But Truman, who had been in office less than three weeks, declined to endorse the more seasoned leader's message and told Churchill that he had already that day sent a separate protest to Stalin. Truman's message for the Soviet leader expressed the same sentiments as Churchill's draft, but the tone was somewhat more conciliatory, among other things, referring to the "open mind" and "good faith" of the American government, as well as the desire to "collaborate" over Austria with the Soviet authorities.  

As the critical early days of the occupation passed, it became apparent that Truman's perspective on the situation in

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1Telegram from Churchill to Truman, No. 25, 30 April 1945, RG 218, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman's File, Admiral Leahy, 1942-1948, Box #1, Folder #2, Modern Military Records Division, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

2Ibid.

Austria differed slightly from Churchill's. Agreeing that the Western missions must be granted access to Vienna as soon as possible, Truman nonetheless feared that the presence of the Western powers would be used to legitimate the misdeeds the Russians were committing unilaterally. Like Churchill, he also feared that Austria under Soviet "liberation" would go the way of countries like Romania; but Truman seemed more worried that any significant U.S. presence in Vienna would be exploited by Moscow than concerned that the Russians would begin to organise Austria without Western participation. Churchill's original message was dispatched to the Kremlin on 1 May 1945.1 On 3 May, Truman sent another separate message to Stalin and later explained his views to Churchill:

... I am inclined to think that it would be a mistake to have our representatives reside in Vienna or assume any functions or responsibilities there beyond surveying the zones, until full joint control of Austria can be instituted on a basis of full equality among the occupying powers. I fear that the Russians want before then to do things in Vienna that we would not approve, but that they want equally much to do them in our name rather than carry the onus alone. Until we can have equal control it seems desirable to maintain the position that what is done there is done unilaterally; otherwise we might slip into the uncomfortable position we occupy in the Allied Commissions in Rumania and Bulgaria.2

1Telegram from Churchill to Stalin, relayed in a telegram from Churchill to Truman, No. 29, 1 May 1945, RG 218, US Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman's File, Admiral Leahy, 1942-1948, Box #1, Folder #2, Modern Military Records Division, National Archives Washington, D.C.

2Telegram from Truman to Churchill, No. 41, 16 May 1945, RG
The heads of the Western missions were not permitted to enter Vienna until 3 June, nearly two months after Soviet troops first arrived, and Western forces did not occupy the city until late August. The general view among the French, British, and American armies was that the Russians were obstructing their entry into Vienna in order to finish the frenzied fleecing of eastern Austria,¹ and this was probably true during the first weeks of the Russian occupation. Nevertheless, after the chiefs of mission were permitted inside Vienna, it seemed that the local Soviet attitude, at least, had changed. In mid-June, U.S. military sources cabled, "It was evident to heads of mission that Russians are extremely eager to have Allies into Vienna at earliest possible date. Situation in city is deteriorating and Russian prestige is lowered every day we remain away."² The British head of mission also stated that the Russians "showed every desire to have the Allies with them in Vienna without delay."³ Apparently, the local Soviet leaders worried about their inability to feed the

218, US Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman's File, Admiral Leahy, 1942-1948, Box #1, Folder #2, Modern Military Records Division, National Archives, Washington, D.C.


²Message from Allied Forces Headquarters, Caserta, to War Department, F94530, 17 June 1945, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman's File, Modern Military Records Division, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

³The Times, 22 June 1945; also cited by Mair, "Four-Power Control," p. 308.
civilian population, and once they became convinced that the other allies would not be competitors for war booty\(^1\) and that four-power control was a serious concept, they were eager for the arrival of the Western armies. But Stalin's attitude evidently had not changed, for the allied heads of mission were ordered to vacate Vienna after only a week's inspection tour.\(^2\)

The long postponement of Western entry into Vienna had two fundamental causes: Soviet obstructionism and American prudence. Washington's hesitancy to commit U.S. forces to Vienna was not, as some writers have postulated, the result of an American failure to grasp the importance of an independent Austria to the future stability of Europe.\(^3\) Indeed, as early as May 1945 a detailed report by the State Department describing Austria as the meeting point of Russian and Western influence, "a strategic center for which there is bound to be a political struggle,"\(^4\) was forwarded to the President. Instead, it seems that Truman's unwillingness to become entrapped in an inextricable, Soviet-controlled scenario militated against any early desire to rush into Vienna. The President's qualms were shared by the Commander of U.S. Forces in

\(^1\)Ibid.


\(^3\)See, for example, Ferring, "The Austrian State Treaty of 1955 and the Cold War," pp. 653-654.

\(^4\)U.S. Department of State report on the "Political Situation in Austria," forwarded by Joseph C. Grew, Acting Secretary of State, to President Truman, 4 May 1945, President's Secretary File, Harry S Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.
Austria, General Mark Clark, who was not eager to take on the responsibility of feeding the Viennese until the Russians agreed to release some of the food supplies which lay east of the city. Of the situation in the summer of 1945 General Clark later wrote:

[The Russians] sought to utilize for their own purposes most of the supplies that normally would feed the city. Thus, the Americans and British had to import food from home to supply the population. Since at that time we had not been able to move into Vienna, it seemed to me that we could refuse to take up quarters in the capital until the Russians accepted a reasonable settlement on the food question. This course of action would force the Russians to accept full responsibility for the food shortage in the capital, and we knew that they were eager to avoid the adverse political repercussions that would be sure to follow. I suggested this course to Washington, but in reply I was told not to accept such a rigid policy.¹

But Stalin's obstinacy far outlived the American hesitancy, and by the middle of the summer the American President had wholeheartedly joined Churchill in pressing the dictator hard to keep his word. On 4 July 1945, the European Advisory Commission finally concluded an Agreement on Control Machinery in Austria and then five days later completed a more general agreement outlining the zones of occupation and the sectors of Vienna assigned to each of the four powers. Stalin no longer had an excuse to keep the Western allies out of Vienna, but he continued to stall.

With tensions growing between them, Stalin, Churchill and Truman gathered at Potsdam in Germany for the last of the great

¹Clark, Calculated Risk, pp. 414-415.
wartime summit conferences. Midway through the conference, the British electorate removed the veteran Churchill from his seat as Prime Minister and replaced him with the inexperienced Clement Attlee, thus inevitably weakening Britain's voice: it was symbolic of an emerging global power constellation that only Truman and Stalin, leaders of the two nascent postwar superpowers, were present for the entire meeting. The Potsdam conference, held between 16 July and 2 August, was a final salute to the days of collaboration between the allies and a portent of future years of discord between East and West. It was also a fateful meeting in particular for Austria, since decisions taken in haste at Potsdam bedevilled the Austrians and the Western powers during the ten years of occupation which followed.

The great powers took a number of actions during the Potsdam conference which directly concerned the future of Austria. Some of the actions were beneficial and some were detrimental. First and most elementary, the agenda of the conference placed the Italian Peace Treaty before the Austrian treaty, an administrative decision which some have claimed came to have unforeseen significance, since the Russians for almost two years after the meeting refused to discuss a treaty for Austria until the peace treaties with Italy and other states were agreed. Early in the conference President Truman proposed the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers to deal with the terms of peace to be drawn up

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with the enemy states and to work out the details of other territorial settlements yet to be reached in postwar Europe. This suggestion was subsequently accepted, and proved to have positive consequences for Austria. The effect of the proposal, coupled with the dissolution of the European Advisory Commission was, on the one hand, to relegate the practical problems of occupied Austria to the Allied Council in Vienna and, on the other hand, to elevate the abstract questions of Austrian sovereignty to the newly-formed Council of Foreign Ministers.\(^1\) Thus, during the years of occupation when Austria's future status seemed inextricably tangled in the momentous broader issues of the European settlement--and the German settlement in particular--the Allied council continued to operate normally, unimpeded by the fitful starts and stops of negotiations at the higher level. Conditions in Austria were not as adversely affected by the ten years of struggle over her future status as otherwise they might have been.

With respect to the situation at the time in Austria, at the Potsdam Conference Churchill once again pressed the Soviet dictator to allow the British to take up their sector in Vienna. Stalin replied that agreement on the zones of the city had only just been reached the day before--an assertion which was at least partially correct since it took several weeks for each of the powers to ratify the two accords and Truman had signed the two documents

only the previous day. The Western troops could begin moving into Vienna as soon as they wished, Stalin claimed. Satisfied, Churchill and Truman asked Stalin for a commitment to continue to supply food to the population of Vienna for a short time after the Western allies had entered, since the feeding grounds of the city lay to the east and it would take time to devise a more permanent arrangement. Stalin consulted with his subordinates and then agreed. Austrian payment for these food supplies provided by the Soviet Union to the starving Viennese was an issue that dogged the treaty negotiations well into the next decade.

However, the most important decision taken at Potsdam was a last minute, almost careless concession made by the Western powers to the Soviet Union on the question of reparations. Early in the conference, the Soviet delegation on the economic committee demanded that the Soviet Union be granted extensive reparations from Austria. The Western powers countered that Austria was unable to afford any reparations and also stressed that under the terms of the 1943 Moscow Declaration Austria was to be considered a liberated country and thus not obliged to pay reparations. After extended debate, the Soviet delegation agreed to drop its demand for Austrian reparations, and the British and American delegations congratulated themselves on their successful defence of the small country's interests. On the penultimate day of the conference, however, the question of the future ownership of German assets located in Austria arose. By "German assets" the British and Americans meant "war booty"; but under the pressure
of a deadline no one at this late stage in the conference took the
time to work out the definition of the term and include it in the
protocol. When the question of ownership was referred to the heads
of state, Stalin proposed that the German assets in eastern Austria
be assigned to the Soviet Union, while the German assets in each of
the other three zones would be the property of the occupying power
of that zone. To the Western leaders, it seemed as if Stalin were
merely asking for official confirmation of the situation as it
existed in Austria. With little hesitation, Truman agreed; and
Attlee, with considerably more hesitation, soon joined him. As
it turned out, this last minute decision on undefined "German
assets" eventually cost Austria at least twice as much as the two
hundred and fifty million dollars worth of so-called Austrian
reparations which the Soviet Union had so generously renounced.¹

American, British and French soldiers entered the city of
Vienna shortly after the conclusion of the Potsdam Conference,
and the Austrian capital was legally placed under four-power control
on 1 September 1945. According to the zonal agreement, Vienna
was to be divided into five sectors, one for each of the occupying
powers and a fifth sector under joint control. Each country
appointed a high commissioner who was, in the early years, both
the head of the occupation forces in that country's zone and the
representative on the Allied Council, the body empowered to
administer quadripartite military rule which held its first

¹Philip E. Mosely, "The Treaty with Austria," International
meeting on 11 September. The international sector was the old city of Vienna, or Innere Stadt. It is interesting to note that throughout the allied occupation, the international sector was jointly patrolled by four military policemen—one British, one French, one Russian, and one American. Even at the height of the Cold War, this lonely group of four men in a jeep, the symbol of a wartime alliance long since disintegrated, continued its rounds.

While the Western allies were still struggling for access to Vienna, the Russians had established a new Austrian government under Karl Renner, former Austrian State Chancellor and President of the last elected Parliament. It seems that the Russians, who knew of Renner's reputation as a Socialist thinker, intended from the start to use Renner as a puppet, and they gave him their full support. Renner, bowing to Soviet pressure, and also recognizing that Austrian Communists had resisted the Nazis, formed a government consisting of what was an unprecedented proportion of Communists and also granted the Communists two key Cabinet posts, the Ministries of the Interior and of Education. With the Western allies pleading for more time to consider whether or not the government was legitimate, the Soviet authorities decided to force the issue; on 29 April 1945, the Renner government was publicly


2Mair, "Four-Power Control," p. 300.

3The government was composed of ten representatives from the Socialist Party, nine from the People's Party, seven Communists, and three independents.
presented to the Austrian people at a ceremony sponsored by the Russians in the Vienna Rathaus. Only two days later the new government published a declaration of independence for Austria.¹

As might be expected, the Americans had some misgivings about the Renner government, and the British took even a less favourable view. The British objected to the actual make-up of the government, arguing that it was too predominantly Viennese and so did not represent the Austrian provinces fully, and that the position of the Communists in the Renner government was too strong.² U.S. officials, on the other hand, felt that the Renner government commanded as much confidence as any other nonelected group and were not too apprehensive about the number of Communists, but the main American concern was to the Soviet method of unilateral action.³ Publicly the Western powers refused for some months to recognise the Soviet-backed regime.

But to the careful eye, it soon became apparent that Renner, a shrewd seventy-five-year-old veteran politician, did not intend

¹The text of the declaration can be found in Red-White-Red Book: Descriptions, Documents and Proofs to the Antecedents and History of the Occupation of Austria (from Official Sources) (Vienna: Austrian State Printing House, 1947).


³Top secret briefing book, Naval Aide Files of Harry S Truman, Box #1, Folder: Berlin Conference, Vol. I, Agenda Proposed by the Department of State, 30 June 1945, Truman Library. (At the time, the Potsdam Conference was also referred to as the Berlin Conference, because of the proximity of Potsdam to Berlin.)
to allow himself to be manipulated. For one thing, although he granted the Communists two key ministerial posts, he placed powerful deputies from other parties beneath them.\(^1\) To the Ministry of Education (officially, the Ministry of Public Instruction and Worship—an ironic title for an orthodox Communist), Renner appointed Johan Koplenig, a post-1939 convert to Communism and an intellectual who was highly esteemed by persons of contrary political outlooks.\(^2\) At the first opportunity, Renner expanded the government to include representatives from the Western occupation zones, thereby diluting the Communist influence and increasing the provincial voice. Privately the Chancellor assured American officials that the Russian authorities did not interfere with the functioning of his government nor exercise a veto over legislation either before or after its passage.\(^3\) Most important, Renner publicly urged democratic elections as soon as possible. The Red Army's forcible seizure of the oil fields near Vienna, following the Renner government's refusal to enter into an oil agreement with the Soviet Union, was final proof that the regime was not under Soviet control. Shortly thereafter, on 20 October, the


Western allies recognised the provisional Austrian government and gave it civil jurisdiction over the three remaining zones.

The early postwar existence of a national coalition government was a critical factor ensuring the future political and economic unity of Austria. In contrast to Germany, Austria had a civil administration operating even before the Allied Commission began its work; and in contrast to the control agreement for Germany, the agreement for Austria clearly anticipated the formation of a freely-elected, self-governing regime. Paradoxically, the Western powers' reluctance to recognise the Provisional Government was actually beneficial to the new regime. The Russians were anxious for the allies to legitimate the Soviet-sponsored government and wanted to prevent the emergence of a rival Austrian government in the Western provinces. During August, the Western powers had permitted a conference of Austrian political leaders from the Western zones to be held in Salzburg. To assure the predominance of the provisional government, the Soviet leaders allowed Renner to establish contact with the people in the Western zones and, despite the fact that they had previously sealed the city completely from the West, the Russians even permitted the Provisional government to hold a national conference in Vienna during September to which representatives from all regions were invited. Gradually,


the new government gained administrative power and legitimacy. Early in the occupation, for example, the four powers solved the problem of the inequitable distribution of food in Austria by agreeing to pool all food and to entrust its distribution to the Austrian government. The national character of the government and its eventual recognition by all four occupying powers was undoubtedly a significant deterrent to any subsequent plans to partition Austria.

Shortly after Western recognition of the Renner government, the Russians agreed to free elections under impartial control. Apparently the Kremlin believed that the Austrian Communists might come to power by using divisive tactics similar to those used successfully in other parts of Southern Europe—specifically, by driving a wedge between the Socialists and the Christian Socials (now People's Party), absorbing the Socialists into a worker's coalition party, and then infiltrating and undermining the Christian Socials from within. The British, noting calls in the Soviet press for workers unity and other evidence of Soviet activity, were particularly sensitive during the early years to apparent Soviet plans for developing a Socialist Unity Party in Austria.

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2 Barker, Austria 1918-1972, pp. 161-162.

3 See, inter alia, a paper drafted by the German political Department dealing with the future prospects for Austria with particular reference to the question of an Austrian Treaty, cover
But to the extent that such Soviet plans existed, they did not come to fruition. The results of the first election were a grave disappointment to the Kremlin. The Communists received only five percent of the vote, earned only four seats in Parliament, and were forced to relinquish the powerful Cabinet posts they had held in the Provisional Government. The one post the Communists did gain, the Ministry of Electrification, was insignificant and intended merely to placate them. By all accounts, it was a disastrous election for the Austrian Communists and also for their Soviet sponsors. At the time, Stalin's representatives believed the defeat could be reversed; but years later, a Soviet diplomat reportedly confided to Sven Allard, former Swedish Ambassador to Austria, "Only now do we understand that we had already conclusively lost Austria by the election of November 1945."

In the wake of the election, the Soviet and Western attitudes toward the Austrian government began to change markedly. Among the Western powers, any misgivings about the Austrian government vanished and were replaced by enthusiastic support, often taking the form of an insistence upon the new coalition's right to administer internal affairs without allied interference. Less than a year after the American recognition of the Renner government, 

letter signed by J. A. M. Marjoribanks, 24 September 1947, F.O. 371/64101(C12784); final version, F.O. 371/64102(C12938); Public Records Office (Kew), London.

the War Department instructed its representatives in Vienna, "Maximum advantages should be derived for new control machinery agreement for Austria in terms of strengthening government and increasing national independence."\(^1\)

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, rejected its former client and tried to chisel away at the authority of the Austrian government. Following the election, the Soviet Union began to restrict the movements of Austrian officials in the eastern zone and forbid political gatherings without a Soviet observer present.\(^2\) They began a policy of forming "denazification committees" composed of a majority of Communist members and formed on short notice to pass judgment on Austrian officials in the eastern zone whose activities the Soviet leaders disapproved.\(^3\) On the Allied Council, the Soviet representative even attempted to force the passage of a new constitution, challenging the validity of Austrian legislation in all four zones of occupation. After November 1945, relations between the four powers deteriorated, with the Soviet Union frequently opposing the policies of the other three powers in the Council. It was shortly after the election that the Russians

\(^1\)Message from Civil Affairs Division, Operations Division, War Department, to Commanding General, U.S. Forces Austria, Vienna, WAR 88638, 20 May 1946, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman's File, Modern Military Records Division, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

\(^2\)Clark, Calculated Risk, pp. 427-428.

criticised as too weak the allied policies of denazification and the disposition of German assets in Austria. These issues later appeared again and again as a cause of Soviet intransigence in the lengthy treaty negotiations.

In part as a result of the new confidence gained in the Austrian government but also due to strong domestic pressures, the Western allies felt that the first priority after the November election was to reduce the number of occupation troops in Austria. On 28 November, the British Embassy in Washington sent an official note to the State Department suggesting that the four powers agree in principle to reduce each of their occupying forces to an equal level to be determined by the Allied Council.¹ State Department officials called a meeting with British representatives the next day and responded that they agreed it was imperative for the Western powers to take advantage of their present favourable position by seizing the initiative before the Soviet government did so, and thus they concurred in the view that there should be a substantial reduction and equalisation of forces of occupation. Given the discrepancies between zones, however, exact numerical equalisation need not be insisted upon. Furthermore, among other things authority should be transferred from the Allied Military Government to the Austrian Government, and the zonal divisions should be eliminated altogether.²

¹British Embassy, Washington, Note to Department of State, "Proposal for reduction of forces of occupation in Austria," 28 November 1945, F.O. 371/46636(C9325), Public Records Office (Kew), London.

²Telegram from Earl of Halifax (British Ambassador to the
But it seems that the Americans were becoming rather more enthusiastic about the reductions than the British had intended them to be. A few weeks later at an informal meeting in Moscow of the Soviet, American and British foreign ministers, Secretary of State James Byrnes proposed the complete withdrawal of troops from Austria on the grounds that when, as expected, the four powers officially recognized the newly-elected Austrian government, there would no longer be grounds for maintaining troops in Austria.\(^1\) To this, both Molotov and Bevin replied that complete withdrawal would certainly not be a good idea, and only the British foreign minister was willing to state officially that any reductions at all were desirable.\(^2\)

The British were worried that the Austrian government would not survive a complete withdrawal of Western troops from Austria, but they may have been more open to persuasion by their American colleagues if the British zone had not had the unique and serious problem of Yugoslav incursions into Austrian territory. The Americans had a tremendous strategic advantage in that their Austrian zone adjoined their German zone, so even if all the U.S. troops were withdrawn from Austria the forces could quickly be replaced in the event of an emergency. The British enjoyed no

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\(^2\) Ibid.
such advantage and indeed had the disadvantage of occupying the zone which bordered on Yugoslavia. During the first months of occupation, Yugoslav partisan troops raided southern Carinthia and Styria weekly, and nearly a division\(^1\) of British soldiers was required just to protect the southern frontier of Austria.\(^1\)

Still, whatever the situation in Carinthia, the British Foreign Office knew that for domestic political reasons they could not go back on their public policy of urging troop withdrawals at the earliest possible moment. To satisfy the military requirement to have enough British troops to protect the frontier and also respond to the political imperative to reduce the number of Soviet troops to a level more comparable to Western forces, senior officials in London agreed among themselves that a quadripartite reduction between forty and fifty thousand troops would be desirable.\(^2\)

The extent of the dispute over the border was kept relatively quiet for many months, presumably in order to avoid publicly casting doubt on the territorial integrity of Austria. Before agreeing to major troops reductions, the British Foreign Office considered issuing a communication stating that the United Kingdom


\(^1\) A division numbered about 30,000 troops.
recognized the 1937 borders of Austria, and trying to persuade the other three powers to concur with such a statement. It was hoped that a clear statement of interest on the part of the allies would be a deterrent to the would-be invaders south of Austria. But there was some worry about whether this plan would succeed, at least in part because the Foreign Office was not confident that the State Department would agree to even an implicit territorial guarantee of this kind.¹

When the British approached the Americans, however, Foreign Office officials were pleasantly surprised. After some discussion and debate, State Department representatives agreed that a four-power announcement guaranteeing the frontiers of Austria, would be desirable and should accompany the decision on reduction of troops.² The French also supported this proposition.³ Unfortunately the Russian response to the British proposal was much less favourable. In reply to its approach to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, the British Embassy in Moscow was curtly informed that the purpose of the Russian occupation of Austria was to ensure the disarmament of German forces in the country, and as this task was not yet complete, the reduction of Soviet troops was impos-

¹Ibid.
²Telegram from the Acting Secretary of State to the U.S. Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant), No. 623, 19 January 1946; in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Vol. V: The British Commonwealth; Western and Central Europe, p. 298.
³Telegram from U.S. Ambassador (Caffery), Paris, to Department of State, No. 455, 29 January 1946, Ibid., p. 298n.
sible. Moreover, the Soviet Foreign Ministry accused the British of deliberately maintaining some units of the German army in the British zone of Austria, under the command of a White Russian Colonel.\(^1\) Apparently Stalin was unwilling to allow the decision on whether Austria had been sufficiently disarmed to be made by the four powers jointly, especially since he believed that at least one of the powers had hidden anti-Soviet motives; thus, the determination of the necessary level of Soviet troops in Austria was a matter for the Soviet Union alone to decide.

The three Western powers repeatedly attempted to bring up the matter of troop reductions on the Allied Council in Vienna, but the Soviet representative refused to discuss it.\(^2\) Thus, over the first months of the occupation most troop reductions occurred unilaterally and without public acknowledgement. According to British intelligence sources, in November 1945 the Soviet Union had some 180,000 troops in Austria; the British, 75,000; the French, 40,000; and the United States, 70,000.\(^3\) Five months later,

\(^1\)Memorandum by Mr. Riddleberger, U.S. Department of State, regarding meeting with Mr. D.D. Maclean, First Secretary of the British Embassy, conveying Russian reply to British approach in Moscow; in Ibid. [See addendum, next page.]

\(^2\)Telegram from the U.S. Military Commissioner in Austria, General Clark, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, No. P-3605, 26 February 1946, Ibid., pp. 312-314; Also Telegram from the U.S. Military Commissioner in Austria, General Clark, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, No. P-6000, 4 April 1946, Ibid., pp. 324-325.

\(^3\)"Austria: Discussions between Mr. Bevin, General McCreery and Mr. Mack," (with Foreign Office Minutes), Foreign Office, London, 15 November 1945, F.O. 371/46634(C8360), Public Records Office (Kew), London.
Addendum to footnote 1, p. 38:

It should be noted that "D. D. Maclean" was the notorious British spy, Donald Duart Maclean. Maclean was posted to Washington as acting First Secretary in the British Embassy in 1944 and he remained until 1948. The apparent accuracy of Soviet information about Anglo-American communications during those years may not have been coincidental. According to one biography:

Maclean's new position in the Embassy in Washington was that of chief administrative officer. He saw most of the documents received and despatched, and at this time they included a vast amount of correspondence and memoranda of the highest scientific and political importance. British and American scientists had worked in close cooperation on the atomic bomb that blasted Japan out of the war, and in the years that followed, the secrets of that bomb were the subject of delicate diplomatic negotiation between Britain and America, therefore the Soviet agents were making desperate efforts to discover not only the scientific processes but the political policies of the Western atomic powers.

Maclean was thus in a unique position to help them, as, many years later, M.I.5 came to suspect that he had done.

the Soviet Union had reduced its troops to approximately 140,000; but the demobilization of Western troops was far more drastic: in April 1946 the British had 28,000 soldiers in Austria, the French had 15,000 and the Americans only 13,000. The number of Western troops had thus dropped significantly below the minimum envisaged by senior officials in the British government only a few months before, and the Red Army actually increased its proportion of the total occupation force. The Soviet leaders continued to demobilize troops over subsequent months, with the force strength reaching 125,000 only a month later, but the minimum number reached was never as low as that of any of the Western powers singly, and indeed during the remainder of the occupation period did not apparently dip below the combined total of Western forces. Certainly the Western suggestion of numerical quadripartite equality was never close to being realized.

The British feared that the Soviet leaders would interpret the rapid Western demobilization from Austria as a sign of a lack of will on the part of the Western powers and would take advantage of this apparent opportunity to try to reassert a Communist hold on Austria. The hardening of Soviet policy in Austria during the early months of 1946 seemed a confirmation of Soviet plans forcibly


to turn the country into a Communist salient in Western Europe. The U.K. Chiefs of Staff warned in ominous tones of the consequences of the extension of Soviet influence to the other zones of Austria, for Italy and particularly for France "... the preservation of which from Russian influence is essential to the security of Western Europe." ¹ The military weakness of the French made their reliability questionable at best. The British were attempting to take a strong stand against the Russians, in the Allied Council and elsewhere, but felt that their own manpower difficulties and economic constraints seriously hampered their efforts. The Americans were the ones who were most capable of supporting the Austrians against the Russians, British officials believed, but the Americans seemed primarily interested in returning home. "It is unfortunate that the American Commander-in-Chief is not a very reliable ally," one senior Foreign Office official wrote. "General Clark is apt to take a most irresponsible line and is mainly thinking of getting back to America as soon as possible."² The British Ambassador in Washington expressed his frustration to State Department officials about the complacent American attitude towards the Communists in Austria, and the State Department agreed

¹"Long-Term Policy Towards Austria--Strategic Implications," Report by the Joint Planning Staff, Chiefs of Staff Committee, United Kingdom, 17 June 1946, F.O. 371/55258(C7116G), Public Records Office (Kew), London.

to instruct the U.S. representative to be more tough with the Soviet Union.¹ In the spring of 1946, few would have predicted that as the years of Austria's occupation continued the British and American roles with respect to the Soviet Union would be sharply reversed.

The Agreement on Control Machinery in Austria, which was completed in July 1945 by the European Advisory Commission, had been intended as an interim arrangement to be superseded, after a freely-elected Austrian government was in place, by a more permanent agreement. Debate over a second control agreement therefore commenced in the Allied Commission for Austria during the spring of 1946.

Very quickly a division appeared between the Soviet Union and the three powers regarding the passage of Austrian legislation. The Western powers were anxious to transfer as much autonomy as possible to the Austrian government and therefore proposed that any legislative motion passed by the parliament would automatically become law after a period of thirty-one days had elapsed, unless the four powers unanimously agreed to veto it. The Soviet Union opposed such an arrangement and preferred that the Allied Council exercise the right unanimously to approve Austrian proposals before they became law. On the subject of commercial agreements,

however, the Americans stood alone in insisting that the principle of quadripartite approval be applied to bilateral agreements between the Austrian government and any one of the four powers. The U.S. position seemed at odds with the policy objective of transferring as much power as possible to the Austrians and it was not supported by the British and the French; but it was most vehemently opposed by the Soviet representatives, who were likely holding out hope of persuading the Austrians to sign a bilateral oil agreement similar to the advantageous bilateral contracts the Soviet Union had already concluded with some of the occupied Eastern European countries. Finally, in May 1946, a compromise was reached. The American agreed that the Council would relinquish all control over bilateral Austrian agreements and the Russians agreed to passage of a slightly different version of the controversial Article 6: while constitutional laws would require the consent of the Allied Council, all non-constitutional laws would automatically go into effect unless the four occupying powers, within thirty-one days, unanimously agreed to veto them. The second Allied Agreement on Control Machinery for Austria was signed by the representatives of the four powers on 28 June 1946.


2 Barker, Austria 1918-1972, pp. 172-173.
Passage of Article 6 of the 1946 control agreement was the second major blunder committed by the Russians in the early years of occupation. Soon after the second control agreement came into effect, it became apparent to the Western powers that the Soviet authorities had not realized how much autonomy the Austrians would gain from having the power to pass their own legislation.\(^1\) The requirement for Council unanimity on any veto action meant that it was very difficult for the Russians to exercise a veto at all, since the Soviet Union was frequently the only power with objections. Between 1946 and 1953, the Soviet Union raised objections to over 550 non-constitutional laws, with very little success. Moreover, even the provision blocking allied interference in bilateral agreements proved to be a disaster for the Soviet Union. Not only was Russia ultimately unsuccessful in her bid for a voluntary oil agreement with Austria, but in 1948 the United States successfully used the regulation to implement the Marshall Plan in Austria without Soviet interference.\(^2\) The clearest evidence that the Russians regretted their mistake in negotiating the second control agreement emerged years later when the U.S. Secretary of State in 1949 proposed that the German control agreement be drafted on the Austrian model, and the Soviet Foreign Minister flatly rejected the idea on the grounds that Article 6 of the Austrian

\(^1\)"Recent Soviet policy in Austria, July-September 1946," draft paper by Lord Jellicoe, Foreign Office, September 1946, F.O. 371/55259(C10458), Public Records Office (Kew), London.

agreement was inappropriate for Germany.\footnote{Mosely, "The Treaty with Austria," pp. 221-222.}

Passage of the second control agreement was an extremely significant event for post-war Austria, since after June 1946 the country gradually gained \textit{de facto} recognition as a sovereign state. In sharp contrast to her neighbour, Germany, Austria now effectively enjoyed freedom and legitimacy in all legislative actions except constitutional laws. The Austrian government had the power to enter into bilateral agreements with the four powers at its own discretion and within a few months gained the right to conclude trade agreements with any country except Germany.\footnote{Barker, \textit{Austria 1918-1972}, pp. 173-175.}

Even regarding the constitution Austria had made gains with the 1946 agreement. While constitutional amendments would be a tricky business, the constitutional basis of the Austrian government was now secure: the Soviet Union could not now hope successfully to press its earlier demand that the constitution be replaced, as it was most unlikely that the four powers would ever agree on a new one. In some ways the growing rift between the great powers proved beneficial to the Austrian government, for in situations where there was four power disagreement or lack of agreement, the Austrian government by default often retained the power to act. Thus, in a strange twist of logic, the so-called control agreement of 1946 actually helped to increase the legislative freedom and international legitimacy of Austria after the war.\footnote{Robert E. Clute, \textit{The International Legal Status of Austria},}
In the meantime, the United States had been attempting at a higher diplomatic level to initiate four power negotiations on an Austrian treaty, but the Soviet Union, obviously reluctant to discuss Austria, kept its foreign minister busy thinking up creative excuses for postponing the start of negotiations. The Council of Foreign Ministers met in Paris from 25 April to 16 May, and again from 15 June to 12 July, in preparation for the Paris Peace Conference of twenty-one nations which sat intermittently from July to mid-October 1946. At the April 1946 Council of Foreign Ministers' meetings in Paris, American Secretary of State Byrnes tried without success to convince Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov to include the Austrian State Treaty on the agenda. First, Molotov argued that the Soviet delegation had not had the opportunity to study the draft the U.S. delegation had submitted. When Byrnes assured him that the U.S. draft, which was actually based on the Hungarian peace treaty, would not be surprising, Molotov retorted that the agenda was too full, anyway: "May God help us to complete the work on the treaties which are now before us." In his book, Clute presents an excellent case for the existence of Austria not merely as a sovereign state (albeit under foreign occupation) after the June 1946 control agreement, but as an independent and functioning political entity. He asserts that the Austrian State Treaty of 1955 was simply a formal recognition of what was internationally considered to be the status quo, as far as Austria's statehood was concerned, after the war. Of course, the fact that this formality led to the withdrawal of the troops of the four occupying powers is a point that must not be overlooked!

I am indebted to Robert Clute for this line of argument. In his book, Clute presents an excellent case for the existence of Austria not merely as a sovereign state (albeit under foreign occupation) after the June 1946 control agreement, but as an independent and functioning political entity. He asserts that the Austrian State Treaty of 1955 was simply a formal recognition of what was internationally considered to be the status quo, as far as Austria's statehood was concerned, after the war. Of course, the fact that this formality led to the withdrawal of the troops of the four occupying powers is a point that must not be overlooked!

session, in June, Molotov's objection was that the status of
denazification and relocation of displaced persons in Austria was
still unsatisfactory from the Soviet point of view; the evacuation
of these people was a necessary prerequisite to Austria's indepen­
dence, he claimed.¹ When Bevin raised the question of the need in
any case to define German assets in Austria, Molotov stolidly
insisted that this issue was not on the agenda and could not be
discussed.²

Even in the face of Soviet intransigence, the Americans in
1946 optimistically—or perhaps naively—continued to believe
that the Russians would sign the U.S. draft of the Austrian
treaty. Indeed, if it had not been for British pressure, the U.S.
representatives to the Allied Commission in Vienna might not
have signed the second control agreement, which was being negotiated


It is interesting to note that the French had also privately
expressed some anxiety to the British about placing the American
draft of the Austrian treaty on the agenda because they were
afraid that it might delay consideration of the German question.
The strength of French concern was never tested, however, because
the Russians ensured that the draft stayed off the agenda. See
letter from Bernard Burrows, Office of the British Delegation to
the Council of Foreign Ministers, Paris, to Jack M. Troutbeck,
Foreign Office, London, 2 May 1946, F.O. 371/55247(C4881), Public
Records Office (Kew), London.

¹U.S. Department of State, Office of Intelligence Coordination
and Liaison, OCL 3521.1A, "Comments on a Draft Treaty for the Re­
Establishment of an Independent and Democratic Austria (Revision),"
8 January 1947, Diplomatic Documents Division, National Archives,
Washington, D.C.

²Telegram from United Kingdom Delegation to Conference of
Foreign Ministers, Paris, to Foreign Office, London, 13 July
1946, F.O. 371/55249(C7960), Public Records Office (Kew), London.
during the time that the Council of Foreign Ministers was meeting, on the grounds that the signature of the control agreement in Vienna could jeopardize the consideration of the treaty in Paris. On 22 June, in the midst of the meetings of the Paris Council of Foreign Ministers, Mr. Bevin wrote to Mr. Byrnes:

...[W]e cannot quite share the view that the signature of the control agreement would prejudice the chances of having useful discussions on the treaty, any more than the signature of the revised Armistice agreement with Italy, which you proposed and we accepted during the last session of the Conference, has interfered with the negotiation of the Peace Treaty with Italy.

Austria is now on the agenda here and as you know we shall support you in pressing for the discussion of a treaty as the most urgent outstanding question relating to that country, but with the best will in the world, it will surely be impossible to do more than have a treaty referred for study to the Deputies or some other body, and as we know, their deliberations are only too likely to be prolonged.1

Shortly thereafter Secretary Byrnes issued new instructions to the U.S. representative in Vienna. The second control agreement was signed less than a week after the letter was written, and it is doubtful that its signature had any effect upon the timing of the opening of the negotiations over an Austrian treaty. Five months later, when the French, British and American foreign ministers collectively urged the appointment of deputies to begin preliminary work on the draft treaty, Molotov finally agreed that

1Letter from Mr. Bevin to Mr. Byrnes, 22 June 1946, F.O. 371/55146(C7165), Public Records Office (Kew), London.
work on the draft treaty might commence in the following year.

The possible explanations of the Soviet stalling tactics during 1946 are many. Officially and in the press, Soviet officials argued that Austria did not deserve to have consideration either of her own predicament or of her claims against enemy states at the Paris peace conference, because despite the incentive of the Moscow Declaration, wherein the four powers had clearly invited Austria to contribute to her own liberation, the Austrians had done nothing to help the allies. To the very end of the war, the Austrians had fought on the side of Hitler's Germany, the Russians argued. Furthermore, as Deputy Foreign Minister Vyshinsky pointed out, the Paris peace conference was for enemy states, and Austria was neither "an enemy of our enemies--nor [is] she an enemy herself." 1

Soviet reluctance to begin treaty negotiations may also have been prompted in early 1946 by the desire to continue extracting war booty from eastern Austria. On 6 July 1946, the Soviet Commander-in-Chief, Colonel General Kurasov, published an order throughout the eastern zone of Austria which included a very comprehensive list of the items located in the zone which were unilaterally claimed to be the rightful property of the Soviet Union. The proclamation warned that, "All persons who under any

pretext whatsoever withhold notification of where the above-named property is found, who attempt to conceal such fact or give misleading information, as well as all persons who through their acts in any way hinder the application of this order or damage the above-named property, are subject to punitive action."¹

Probably in an attempt to exempt the proclamation from the terms of the agreement, the order was dated 27 June 1946, the day before the second control agreement had been signed.² A few weeks later, the Austrians attempted to nationalize all industries to prevent their confiscation, but in the face of Soviet opposition—not to mention in the realization that the Austrian government did not have the resources to compensate foreign interests anyway—the Austrians abandoned the attempt.³ At about the same time, the Soviet leaders began to put together a network of Soviet-run...

¹TASS, 6 July 1946.
²Clute, International Legal Status of Austria, p. 37.
³"Notes on the Political Situation in Austria," Minutes of a conversation between Mr. Marquand, U.K. Board of Trade and Mr. John Hynd, Secretary of State for Trade, transmitted to Mr. Bevin, Foreign Office, 17 September 1946, F.O. 371/53019(UE4337), Public Records Office (Kew), London.

According to the Russians, Austrian allegations that nationalization was prevented by the Soviet Union were unfounded. (See Solodovnikov, "The Austrian Problem," p. 14.) The Soviet representative on the Allied Council opposed the nationalization law and asserted that the law would never be applied in the eastern zone of Austria. But the Austrian realization that they did not have enough resources and that the Western powers were not at all enthused by the idea also contributed to the Austrian decision to reconsider the action. In the end, they did not repeal the law but instead exempted United Nations interests from its effects. Thus, the claim by the Austrians—and the Western powers—that the Soviet Union prevented the nationalization was neither wholly true nor wholly false, but certainly could be faulted for being misleading.
enterprises and retail shops in eastern Austria which later became known as U.S.I.A.—i.e., the abbreviation of the Russian words "Upravleniye Sovietskovo Imuschestva v Avstrii" or Administration of Soviet Property in Austria. Throughout the remaining years of occupation, products from these enterprises were shipped to the Soviet Union and its satellites, in return for goods sold illegally in the shops to finance the enterprises. In later years the network became a valuable source of goods and hard currency for the Soviet Union.

But Soviet motives for delaying the start of negotiations for an Austrian treaty were most likely directly related to Russian postwar activities in Eastern Europe. The years 1945 and 1946 saw the subjugation of Poland, Romania and Bulgaria to Soviet control, and by the end of 1946 Stalin was in the midst of engineering a Communist takeover of Hungary. At this crucial time, Stalin had no desire to discuss the evacuation of Austria; negotiations would be an unwelcome distraction from more important matters and besides, he had no desire to evacuate eastern Austria, a convenient buffer zone between Hungary and the West. Moreover, evidence shows that the Soviet authorities still believed, in 1946, that the conversion of Austria to Communism was possible: the first attempted Communist Putsch in Austria occurred in May 1947.

Considering all of these reasons why the Soviet Union in 1945 and 1946 would not have been anxious to take its place at the bargaining table, it is probably safe to assume that the Russians only agreed to begin negotiating the Austrian treaty when they felt that they could put it off no longer.
CHAPTER TWO

The Negotiations Begin, 1947-1948

At the end of 1946, none of the Western powers regarded the occupation of Austria as a long-term commitment. The rapid demobilization of Western forces from Austria was carried out under the assumption that the remainder of the troops would soon follow. Several apparently deliberate Soviet signals were interpreted by the Western powers, and particularly the British, to mean that Stalin also intended to pull out of the country soon. On the Allied Council in Vienna, the Soviet representative suddenly agreed to accept parity between the four powers in the division of occupation costs. Since the quadripartite level of reimbursement would be lower than that which the Russian commander had been demanding unilaterally from the Austrians, the Soviet change of policy was interpreted to mean that the Russians expected the occupation to end shortly. More significant, in December 1946 the Soviet Union announced that the reduction of Soviet troops in Austria would permit the return of a considerable number of houses to their owners. As the Soviet leaders had not previously acknowledged that they were withdrawing any forces from Austria, the public reference to troop reductions was encouraging in itself.¹

was further enhanced by a remark made in Vienna by Soviet General Kurasov to U.S. General Clark: "I expect that there will be an Austrian Treaty. We have done enough for Austria and it is time we got out." Even the formerly sceptical British Foreign Secretary Bevin considered these signs auspicious, for shortly before the first session of the Deputy Foreign Ministers for Austria he reported to the Cabinet that "[t]here was some reason to hope that the Soviet Government were now prepared to conclude a Treaty with Austria in the fairly near future."

Although the general differences between the Soviet Union and the Western powers had sharpened over recent months, there was reason to hope that the specific case of Austria might be exempted from the widening dispute; and some Westerners thought that an Austrian treaty might perhaps even serve as a symbolic example of a lingering chance for future East-West cooperation.

With a spirit of optimism, therefore, the first session of the foreign ministers deputies opened in London on 14 January 1947. But whatever the hopes or intentions of the great powers and the Austrians, it soon became obvious that the conclusion of the

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1Ibid.


3For example, former Austrian Foreign Minister Gruber has written of his hope in 1947 that Austria might slip through a 'loophole' in the East-West conflict. Karl Gruber, Between Liberation and Liberty: Austria in the Post-War World (London: Andre Deutsch, 1955), p. 102.
treaty would not be an easy task. Shortly after the opening formalities, a number of important and contentious issues began to emerge.

In the initial hours of the deputies conference, a dispute erupted over Austria's frontiers, with the Soviet deputy supporting Yugoslav claims to significant portions of Carinthia. The Austrian delegates, who had been invited to the meetings as observers, firmly denied the Yugoslav claims. Quickly the dispute became emotional, with members of the visiting Yugoslavian delegation at one point attacking an Austrian spokesman ad hominem. In the interest of progress, discussion of the issue was postponed, with the Soviet deputy still staunchly supporting the Yugoslav demands and the three Western deputies recommending rejection of their claims.

After the initial flare-up over frontiers, it became apparent that a more serious problem would be the question of external German assets in Austria. The Russians held that all property in Austria which had belonged to the Germans in 1945, unless obtained by obvious and direct force, could be claimed by the Soviet Union as German assets. Of course, this meant that every factory, railroad or public facility in eastern Austria would now be Soviet property, to be sold back to the Austrians in bilateral agreements at the discretion of the Soviet state. The Western powers rejected this broad interpretation of the term "German assets," on the grounds that such a price to be extracted from a friendly country which could not even afford to feed its own population was absurd,
would prevent the reestablishment of the "free and independent Austria" promised in the Moscow Declaration, and would give the Soviet Union tremendous political and economic leverage in postwar Austria. In addition, the Americans were keenly aware that since Austrian recovery was likely to be financed by the United States, American taxpayers' money would end up in the coffers of the Communists.

One significant point of agreement reached in the deputies meetings concerned the question of what the four-power treaty with Austria should be called. The Austrians were particularly anxious to avoid any inference that the country had willingly fought on the side of Hitler's Germany. During the years of the Anschluss, Austria had ceased to exist as a sovereign state, Austrian delegates argued, and thus the postwar settlement was not really a 'peace treaty' but rather an instrument whereby Austria's statehood and independence would be legally reestablished. Eventually, the representatives of the four powers agreed to name the document the "Treaty for the Re-establishment of an Independent and Democratic Austria," or Austrian State Treaty ("Staatsvertrag") for short. The title later became something of an irony, for as the years of negotiation and occupation passed, the treaty became less concerned with reestablishing Austria's 'statehood'--a status which arguably the country had de facto enjoyed long before the document was signed--than with providing a suitable pretext under which the troops of the four powers could be withdrawn in an honourable way.
Despite the deputy foreign ministers' inability to find solutions to contentious issues other than the title of the treaty, the session was considered a promising beginning. The assigned task had, after all, been completed: by the time the first London deputies' conference had closed on 25 February, a preliminary draft of the Austrian state treaty had been prepared, with about half of its fifty-nine articles unanimously agreed.

Therefore, when the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers opened in March 1947, there was still a certain amount of optimism in Europe, and particularly in Austria, concerning the likelihood of an imminent Austrian state treaty. In his opening statement, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov bolstered these hopes by declaring that he believed the treaty could be completed in the course of the Moscow conference. Indeed, discussion of Yugoslav territorial claims actually gave the Western delegates reason for encouragement. The Russian attitude towards the Yugoslav demands seemed more lukewarm and ambiguous than it had been in London. Despite a very emotional Yugoslav statement about the need to adjust the southern frontier with Austria, Molotov remained impassive and simply asked a few questions. He certainly did not take on the


role of champion of the Yugoslav cause. When the Yugoslav delegation presented a claim for reparations from Austria, Molotov's response was to recommend that the claims "be considered in a favourable spirit." For their part, Britain and the United States argued that Yugoslavia's claims were out of order, since the three great powers had renounced Austrian reparations at the Potsdam Conference. France then irritated her Western allies by suggesting that the Yugoslav representative's claims for reparations be satisfied by reducing comparable Austrian claims for reparations from Yugoslavia. Although Molotov supported the French suggestion, he did not pursue it, thereby uncharacteristically passing up an excellent opportunity to exploit differences between the Western powers.

The shift in the Soviet attitude, from staunch support of the Yugoslavs to near indifference, was not lost on the Western delegates. As the meeting continued, the Americans became so sceptical of the sturdiness of Soviet backing of Yugoslav demands that an official status report to Washington read: "It is uncertain whether the Soviet action represents more than a gesture of support for a loyal ally, or whether the Soviet position will finally be abandoned in favor of agreement with the other delegations.


2Ibid.

3John Foster Dulles Papers, Category VIII, Council of Foreign
On the question of German assets, however, it was soon apparent that both East and West positions had hardened, and the chance for agreement was becoming remote. The relentless demands by Molotov for German assets in Austria struck Western diplomats as unproductive, single-minded attempts to wear down their resolve. Much to the annoyance of the Western delegates, Molotov reiterated over and over again the statement that the Soviet Union renounced all claims to reparations from Austria. Since 'Austrian reparations' and 'German assets in Austria' were defined by the Russians as separate things, Western delegates considered the renunciations meaningless and deceptive.\textsuperscript{1} Later Molotov argued that following the Potsdam Conference the United States and the Soviet Union had entered into an agreement that assets were to be a bilateral concern between the occupying power and the Austrians. The question of the disposal of German assets in the eastern zone of Austria was none of the Western powers' business: "It was thereby decided that the United States Government would not interfere in matters concerning German assets in the rest of Austria. It follows that any kind of quadripartite arbitration is out of the question here...," the Soviet Foreign Minister argued.\textsuperscript{2}

\textsuperscript{1}"Austrian Treaty: 36th Meeting of the CFM," British record of the Thirty-Sixth Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, held at Aviation House, Moscow, on 19 April 1947, F.O. 371/63962 (C6231), pp. 3-4, Public Records Office (Kew), London.

If the uncompromising Russian stance on reparations had been intended to bring forth concessions at the Moscow conference, it failed miserably and accomplished just the opposite: instead of encouraging compromise, it drove the three Western powers closer together in a determination to resist Russian demands. General Mark Clark, who went to Moscow with the U.S. delegation, complained in a letter to his wife:

I feel like I am going to kindergarten every day.... [The Russians] have not given in on a single point since we started. They delay the conferences, drag them out, hesitate on discussions, and are unable to delegate authority. This is all part of their pattern to confuse and wear down all of us and get us to give in.1

The new U.S. Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, was determined to sign no agreements which would turn Austria into an economic "puppet" of the Soviet Union. The British delegation was also firmly resolved not to sign a treaty which would require crippling political and economic concessions. Pierson Dixson, private secretary to Secretary of Foreign Affairs Bevin, wrote at the time:

Never has the shameless rapacity of Soviet policy been so apparent. The division is complete: the Western Powers want Austria to live, Russia wants her to moulder under Soviet domination. Unless the Soviets do a real volte-face, give up their charming double policy of loot and domination,


1Quoted by Martin Blumenson, Mark Clark (New York: Congdon & Weed, 1984), pp. 257-258.
there is not a chance of agreement or of four-power treaty. ¹

As the attitudes of the Soviet Union and the Western powers became increasingly polarized, the battered Austrian delegates tried desperately to keep the Moscow conference from failing over economic issues. The Russians, whose attempts before the opening of the conference to woo the Austrians into a bilateral settlement of the German assets issue had failed, were unsympathetic and no longer carefully maintained in the negotiations their friendly attitude toward the Austrians. Turning to the West, the Austrians begged the three powers not to defend Austrian interests so vigorously and asked them at least to consider the Soviet proposals.² American Secretary of State Marshall replied that the Austrians must be patient; he understood their concerns, and in the future he would do what he could to allay their economic hardships. But for now, Marshall felt very strongly that the U.S. must convince the Soviet Union that its unjust demands would not be tolerated, and must avoid treading the path of appeasement.³

To be understood more fully, the meetings of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers must be placed in the context of the


²John Foster Dulles Papers, Category VIII, Council of Foreign Ministers, Moscow, J.F.D. John Foster Dulles Personal and Miscellaneous Papers, vol. I., p. 98; cited by Bader, Austria Between East and West, p. 189.

³Gruber, Between Liberation and Liberty, pp. 110-112.
general climate of East-West relations in 1947. In March, Ameri­
can concern over possible Soviet designs in Greece prompted Presi­
dent Truman to deliver, before a joint session of Congress, a
speech which called for American support for "free peoples who are
resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside
pressures." Its purpose was to rally U.S. domestic support for
economic aid to Greece, but in a matter of months the so-called
Truman Doctrine effected a major shift in U.S. foreign policy from
earnest negotiation with the Russians, a legacy of Roosevelt's war­
time diplomacy, to positive anticommunism. For the American public,
brutal Soviet takeovers in Eastern Europe were perfect examples of
the subjugation of free peoples, and such actions could be resisted
elsewhere only by Western strength and vigilance. The speech was
delivered just two days after the opening of the Council of Foreign
Ministers, in seeming disregard of its possible consequences for
the negotiations. Clearly, the American position with regard to
the Soviet Union had hardened to some extent even before the talks
began.

On the other hand, Soviet behaviour at the talks could not
have been better calculated to calcify opinions in the West.
"Many were the hours we listened to the same old records, the
same technique, the same fruitless arguments about minor matters,
the same distortions and the same blaring propaganda," complained
one American delegate.¹ But the Soviet leaders were driven, at

¹Quoted in Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of
the Cold War and the National Security State (London: Penguin,
1977), pp. 300-301.
least in part, by personal insecurity and genuine need. During 1946, the Soviet Union had experienced the worst drought of the century; the last comparable drought, in 1891, had been partly responsible for the decline of Tsardom.² Twenty million Soviet people had died in the war against Germany, and Austrian soldiers had been among those who had fought with the Nazis. From a Soviet perspective, it must have been especially galling that Austria, whose citizens—willingly or not—had so recently participated in a campaign of slaughter and destruction in the Soviet Union, enjoyed living conditions which were probably better than they were in many parts of the Soviet Union. To make matters worse, the Western powers seemed to be quibbling over resources which the Soviet Union desperately needed: Stalin began to conclude that the Western powers did not want the Soviet Union to recover. The Soviet people felt justified in demanding exorbitant payment for the losses they had suffered, most of which could never truly be repaid; moreover, Stalin used promises of huge reparations to placate a starving populace and to stem domestic unrest.

Thus, neither side was willing to make significant concessions in the negotiations over Austria, and as a result the split between East and West grew wider. Within the general context of East-West relations, the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers was condemned to failure before it began.

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The Austrians were bitterly disappointed by the results of the conference, but their hopes were not completely dashed. Near the end of the Moscow meetings, U.S. Secretary of State Marshall proposed that, in view of the inability of the ministers to reach agreement on the Austrian treaty because of Soviet obstinacy, the problem should be submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations.\(^1\) Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov replied, once again, that Soviet claims for German assets were in accordance with agreements reached at Potsdam. Certainly these claims could be settled between the great powers in the same way that similar Soviet claims had been settled and incorporated in the peace treaties for Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland. He insisted that there was no need for reference to the United Nations; instead, Molotov proposed that the unresolved articles be referred to an Austrian Treaty Commission which would meet, in closed sessions, in Vienna. Encouraged by the proposal, the other foreign ministers agreed.\(^2\)

The Austrian Treaty Commission met in Vienna eighty-four times over the next five months and studied more than seventy different proposals.\(^3\) Throughout the entire period, the Soviet

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\(^3\)Ibid.
delegates stuck tenaciously to their initial demands regarding German assets in Austria (Article 35), and the British and American delegates refused to make the major concessions required to reach agreement.\textsuperscript{1} The French delegates took pains to appear to be impartial in the East-West stand-off, but on all points of substance they supported the Anglo-American position.\textsuperscript{2} Many of the meetings were taken up by a careful, paragraph-by-paragraph review of the draft treaty and the positions of each power on each issue. This was a useful exercise because it clarified the points of disagreement, but no significant compromises were made.

As the relationship between the Soviet delegates and the Western delegates to the interim commission grew more strained, the partnership between the American delegates and the British delegates seemed to be correspondingly strengthened. According to the head of the British delegation, by the end of the five months of commission meetings, "[O]ur relations with the United States Delegation could not have been closer, better or more fruitful.... The technical branches of the two Delegations were virtually integrated into a single unit..."\textsuperscript{3} The Anglo-American partnership seemed to be the only real beneficiary of the venture:


\textsuperscript{3}Ibid., pp. 4-5.
despite the frequency and intensity of the meetings, the Austrian Treaty Commission seemed to be unable to make progress.

As was so often the case in the Austrian treaty negotiations, however, the exchanges across the bargaining table were a tiny thread in the fabric of the international situation. Reasons for the interim commission's lack of progress despite its numerous meetings were again related to events separate from the negotiations. Indeed, during the month the commission began its meetings, one of the most important events concerning the treaty negotiations occurred literally outside the negotiating room in Vienna. In May 1947, an attempted Communist Putsch strengthened the Western powers' suspicions that the Soviet Union intended to turn Austria into a Communist satellite unless the West took steps to prevent it.

There had certainly been earlier signs of Soviet intentions to incorporate Austria in the eastern bloc. When the Red Army first marched into Vienna, propaganda broadcasts encouraged Austrian nationalism and urged the formation of anti-Nazi coalitions composed of Socialists, Communists, liberals, and conservatives. The same propaganda was used in East European countries, where the resulting "national fronts," composed of activists from both ends of the political spectrum under a nationalist banner, were instrumental in the formation of "people's democracies."¹ Stalin's sponsorship of what he envisioned as a puppet government is another indication of his plans. President Karl Renner's unexpected

betrayal of his patron was not so precipitous as to prevent the
Russians from ensuring that the Minister of the Interior packed the
police force with Communists, later a key factor in the attempted
Putsch. With clever planning, agricultural resources also became a
source of political leverage for the Russians. When Austria was
suffering from severe food shortages, the Soviet authorities
secretly hoarded some of the food in their sector and then supplied
it at their discretion to factory workers in Soviet-run industries.
Naturally, this policy increased Soviet popularity among workers in
the eastern zone and increased the unrest in the other three zones.
Likewise, it was probably not an accident that the Soviet sector of
Vienna contained most of the working class areas, the most likely
sources of support for a Communist takeover. Russian attempts to
set up a series of Soviet-Austrian companies on a "fifty-fifty"
basis failed, but the same tactic was successfully used to gain
control of the economies of Hungary and Romania. Finally, the
Soviet chain of command provides an interesting insight into
Stalin's hopes: the head of the Soviet occupation forces in Austria
was also the head of the occupation forces in neighbouring
Hungary. It is no wonder that postwar events in Hungary echoed

1Message from U.S. Forces Austria, Vienna, to War Department
for JC/S pass to State Department, P-0078, 19 June 1946, Modern
Military Records Division, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

2Philip E. Moseley, "The Treaty with Austria," International

3"Thumbnail Biographic Sketches of Austrian Leaders," undated,
in the Papers of Dean Acheson, July 1952 file of Memoranda of
Conversations, Harry S Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.
loudly through Austria. All signs pointed to Russian hopes of turning Austria into an eastern bloc country, if the opportunity arose.

The first attempted Communist takeover of Austria occurred in the spring of 1947, just after the end of the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference and before the first meeting of the Austrian Treaty Commission. The winter of 1946-1947 had been extremely harsh, with shortages of food, electricity and heat compounding the general misery. Shipments of food from the United Nations ended in May, and Marshall aid did not reach Austria until a year later. Taking advantage of the gap and capitalizing on the bitter disappointment over the failure of the Moscow Conference, on 5 May 1947 the Austrian Communist Party staged a food riot. About five thousand demonstrators besieged the Chancellory, and the Austrian Federal Chancellor, Leopold Figl, was forced to receive a delegation led by the Communist Vice President of the Austrian Trade Union Federation.

Both the demonstrators and the Austrian government leaders knew that the police force was infiltrated by Communists and also that Austrian weaponry and ammunition had been so severely limited by the Allied Council that the police were ineffective in any case. Furthermore, the presence of Russian officers, who were

1Bader, Austria Between East and West, pp. 191-192.


cheered by the crowd as they walked by—and in particular the Assistant to the Soviet military commander, who seemed to be keeping a close watch on the proceedings—was apprehensively noted by the Austrian leaders.¹ For several anxious hours, it was unclear whether the demonstrators might successfully overthrow the government, although it was hoped that the refusal of the Socialist trade union leaders to call a general strike would undermine the strength of the Communists.

With emotions heightening to a pitch, the crowd surrounding the chancellory surged forward and threatened to take the Chancellor's office by force. In desperation, the Austrian government appealed to the Allied Council for help. Apparently the Soviet Union was unwilling to risk a military confrontation of any kind with the Western powers, for the enhanced threat of intervention by the Western powers seems to have compelled the Soviet Union to take action to abort the Putsch. According to an unpublicized account given the British by the Austrian leaders, shortly after the request for assistance was made, a uniformed Russian appeared at the Chancellory and spoke to the leaders of the demonstration.² By the time the Allied Council met to consider


²Ibid. According to British documents, Austrian Foreign Minister Karl Gruber and Austrian Vice Chancellor Adolf Schaerf reported these things to British Political Representative W.H.B. Mack, in Vienna, a few days after the attempted Putsch.
the plea for help, the crowd was dispersing.\(^1\) The \textit{Putsch} had clearly failed.

It has not been proven that the Soviet government had a direct hand in inciting the riots, but evidence indicates that the Soviet leaders certainly encouraged and supported them. Whatever the case, for the purposes of the Austrian treaty negotiations, what mattered was that the Western powers believed that the Soviet Union was behind the 1947 uprising. By increasing the tensions between the Western powers and the Soviet Union, this and subsequent incidents played a part in drawing out the negotiations and extending the period of four-power occupation of Austria.

A week after the riots, when the Austrian Treaty Commission began to meet in Vienna, the Americans and the British were determined to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining the economic leverage to turn an independent Austria into a Communist country. The commission had been meeting for only three weeks when events in neighbouring Hungary redoubled that conviction.

Hungarian Premier Ferenc Nagy had been watching developments in Austria with great concern and had realized, after the Moscow Conference failed to resolve either the Austrian or German problem, that "...new Soviet pressures would follow which might perhaps sap our remaining strength."\(^2\) Indeed, at the end of May 1947, under

\(^1\)Ibid.

pressure from Soviet-supported Hungarian Communists, Nagy was forced to resign and flee to Switzerland. Communist influence in Hungary grew steadily over the next five months. By the time the interim commission adjourned, the Communists had a strong hold on the Hungarian government, and the Smallholders Party was nearly in ruins.

The historical links between Austria and Hungary were probably on the minds of the allies throughout the interim commission's negotiations, causing the Western powers to be still more reluctant to grant concessions to the Soviet Union which might lead Austria to a situation similar to that of Hungary. But there were even more blatant, contemporary links between Hungary and Austria in the economic proposals which the Soviet Union tabled during the commission meetings. For example, an official in the British Foreign Office observed:

The Russians have been careful to admit that the assets they acquire should operate under Austrian law subject to guarantees against expropriation and a provision for the export of profits. This sounds quite innocuous but, in the course of discussion, it has become apparent that what the Soviet really mean is nothing less than the export of gross profits and the produce of the factories into the bargain. This is indeed what is happening in Hungary. Moreover, the Russians have refused to discuss a time-limit for their demands.\(^1\)

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\(^1\)Paper drafted by the German Political Department dealing with the future prospects for Austria with particular reference to the question of an Austrian Treaty, cover letter signed by J.A.M. Marjoribanks, 24 September 1947, F.O. 371/64101(C12784); final version, F.O. 371/64102(C12938); Public Records Office (Kew), London.
From the Soviet perspective, unless the Russians attained these demands and acquired a larger degree of economic control through a treaty, they had little desire to test the strength of the Hungarian Communists by withdrawing Red Army troops from Austria. In addition to the fact that Western influence might thereby reach the border of Hungary, the Soviet Union would lose its legal right to maintain troops in Hungary to protect the lines of communication with Austria. These considerations were unlikely to encourage the Soviet Union to modify its negotiating position.

Meanwhile, the United States began to make its own economic initiatives in Europe. In June 1947, General Marshall announced the massive program of American aid which came to be known as the Marshall Plan. Austria was included on the list of countries to which United States' aid was to be provided. In addition, because Marshall Aid would not begin immediately, the U.S. and Austria on 25 June 1947 signed a separate aid agreement for deliveries of food, medical supplies, fuel and other necessities. The following month the United States announced that it would stop accepting reimbursement of occupation costs in the future and indeed would refund all occupation payments made by the Austrians between April 1945 and June 1947. Taken so quickly after the May riots in Vienna, the latter two decisions were intended to help stabilize the economic situation in Austria.

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The Soviet response to these American actions was to protest in the Allied Council that United States' aid was, among other things, impinging upon Austrian sovereignty. Nevertheless, the Austrian government took the courageous step of accepting the American invitation to participate in the Marshall Plan and to attend the July 1947 discussions in Paris at which the actual European Recovery Program would be drafted. The Soviet Union and its satellites had pulled out of the discussions before Austria announced her decision to attend, so the announcement was made with the full knowledge that the Austrian decision would be seen as a direct snub to the Soviet Union.

In this turbulent atmosphere, it is not surprising that the agenda of the Austrian Treaty Commission was reduced to a meticulous examination of what the points of disagreement in the economic clauses were, and that the commission was unable to resolve any of those disagreements. No significant conclusions had been reached when the Austrian Treaty Commission officially ended its meetings on 11 October 1947.

Thus, by the autumn of 1947, public attention in Europe and the United States was beginning to focus on the differences emerging between the Soviet Union and the Western allies, and the economic difficulties in the Austrian treaty negotiations were seen as a small facet of the growing East-West rift. Quite apart from

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2 Ibid., p. 111.
the publicized East-West disagreements, however, contradictions and controversies within the Western position in the negotiations were quietly occupying a great deal of the time and attention of diplomats, particularly in Washington and London.

One very contentious point was the fact that legally Britain was still in a state of war with Austria. As British diplomats explained over and over to their American colleagues, in 1938 Her Majesty's Government had recognized both de facto and de jure the German-Austrian Anschluss. In British eyes, therefore, Austria had been an integral part of Germany during the war and as such was fully involved in the German defeat, with all its consequences.¹

Unlike the Americans and the French, the British felt that the Moscow Declaration of 1943 had been issued as a statement of intent and did not affect the enemy status of Austria. Likewise, the recognition of the Austrian government following the November 1945 elections had not terminated the state of war between the United Kingdom and Austria.² As far as Britain was concerned, the only way to end the state of war with Austria was to conclude a peace treaty.³


³Minute by M.F. Cullis regarding letter from Mr. Burrows to Mr. Troutbeck, letter dated 15 May 1946, Minute dated 17 May 1946, F.O. 371/55247(C5461), Public Records Office (Kew), London.
Of course, the British position of being "technically at war with Austria" did not accord with the American and French positions. The Americans had never explicitly recognized the Anschluss, and the recognition of the Austrian government had sufficed to sever any connection between Germany and Austria as well as to transfer Austria to a friendly status. The French subscribed to the American interpretation, so the British stood alone. While acknowledging that the British naturally had a right to interpret their foreign policy as they wished, the U.S. State Department nonetheless made it clear that it was dissatisfied with the Foreign Office position. As far as the Americans were concerned, Britain's rigid legal interpretation was a serious political threat to the Western negotiating position, and a possible detriment in the future to Austria's economic position. Labelling Austria a belligerent lent weight to the case for Austrian war guilt and thus could be seized upon by the Soviet Union as a pretext for extracting more resources from the country.\(^\text{1}\) In addition, naming Austria an enemy country was an unnecessary and unwelcome political blow to the Austrian government.\(^\text{2}\) If legal principles were strictly observed, then Stalin could in fact rightfully claim that the Soviet Union was the only one of the great powers actually to have denounced the Anschluss.


The Americans feared that the exposure of these legal technicalities could only be damaging to Austria and to Western interests.

It was for these political reasons, and under pressure from the Americans, that the British had gone along with the other powers in renaming the Austrian peace treaty a state treaty. But in the early months of 1947, the British government stuck to the position that a state of war with Austria still existed, and the debate between the State Department and the Foreign Office, as well as within the Foreign Office itself, continued. Some British officials seemed to feel that there was a kind of moral principle involved by which Austria was at least technically an enemy, and only a treaty could provide her final absolution and full restoration to a peaceful status. Just because the requirement of legal consistency weighed less heavily on the Americans, British experts believed that there was no legal case for following the American lead. Other British officials argued that the case of Austria should be approached with more flexibility, for it was not historically unique. Early in the debate, an official in the German Department of the Foreign Office wrote:

I do not know whether any help can be got from the not dissimilar cases of Abyssinia and Albania. But I have never quite understood wherein their position differed so essentially from that of Austria that, although before the war we recognised the incorporation of both in a country that was subsequently to become our

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1Minute by M.F. Cullis regarding letter from Mr. Burrows to Mr. Troutbeck, Letter dated 15 May 1946, Minute dated 17 May 1946, F.O. 371/55247(C5461), Public Records Office (Kew), London.
enemy, nevertheless no difficulty seemed to result from their automatic reemergence as non-enemy and technically friendly states. Similarly, I understand that the treaties signed with Czechoslovakia and Poland after the 1914-1918 war were not 'peace' treaties in the strict sense. None of this, of course, alters the fact that Austria is at present indubitably enemy territory and that we and the other three powers are in occupation of it by right of conquest. But it does seem to afford some precedent for taking, if it is deemed expedient, a step which would have the effect of putting an end to Austria's enemy status and transferring her to a relatively more favourable position. And I believe it would be expedient....1

In the end, political imperatives overcame legal consistencies.

On 16 September 1947, without a treaty of any kind, the United Kingdom issued a statement officially renouncing the state of war with Austria.

Another disagreement among the Western allies originated in the 1947 American decision to stop accepting occupation costs from Austria. This decision resulted in the removal of a significant financial burden for Austria, and also yielded a lump sum payment to the Austrian government of thirty million dollars as reimbursement for past occupation costs.2 The British and the French were,

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1Minute by M.F. Cullis regarding letter from Mr. Burrows to Mr. Toutbeck, Letter dated 15 May 1946, Minute dated 17 May 1946, F.O. 371/55247(C5461), Public Records Office (Kew), London.

of course, perfectly happy with American generosity towards Austria.

the problem arose when the Austrians, playing upon the sympathies

of the Western governments as well as upon international public

opinion, began to insist that the other occupying powers should

follow the American example.

The Austrian appeals did not seem to bother the Russians par­

ticularly. For the first few years after the American waiver, the

Soviet Union stuck to the argument that Austria was responsible for

her participation in the war on the side of Germany; therefore, she

was obligated to pay for the occupation which was cleansing her of

fascism.¹ But the British and the French were more vulnerable to

the appeals, especially when the U.S. government began to support

the Austrians in asking the two governments to renounce the occu­

pation payments.

The British and the French governments were squeezed awkwardly

between, on the one hand, strong domestic pressures to cut back on

foreign spending so that the poor economic circumstances at home

could be improved, and, on the other hand, negative international

publicity for forcing the Austrian government to pay for an occu­
pation it claimed it did not desire. In response to public and

private petitions, the British were time and time again forced to

say that they were sincerely sorry that the United Kingdom could

not afford to meet the costs of the occupation of Austria in ster-

¹Telegram from the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the

Austrian Government, Reply to Austria's request for reduction of

occupation costs, June 1948, in Foreign Office records, F.O. 371/
70445(C4685), Public Records Office (Kew), London.
The Austrians must not forget that they were receiving military protection by the presence of the Western powers, the British argued, and once the treaty came into effect, the Austrian defence budget might be just as large as the occupation payments. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom would try to economize, but the only alternative to demanding payment of costs was British early withdrawal from Austria. The French offered similar arguments, adding that France already reduced the number of French troops to a minimum, and unless the Austrians wanted the French to withdraw before the other occupying powers, it was in Austria's vital interest to pay for the cost of the occupation.

But as the years of negotiation and occupation passed, the Austrian government became increasingly persistent in its requests for relief from occupation costs, and the Americans also pressured the other Western allies more steadily. As a result, after 1947 it seems that whenever the Allied Council met to agree on the quad-

1See, for example, Foreign Office Minute from Mr. P. Dean, "Austrian Occupation Costs: British attitude and future action," addressed to Mr. M. Dean, 8 June 1948, F.O. 371/70446A(C5825), Public Records Office (Kew), London.

2Telegram from the Foreign Office to the Austrian government, June 1948, F.O. 371/70445(C4721), Public Records Office (Kew), London.

3Telegram from the French government to the Austrian government, reply to Austrian government's request for reduction in occupation costs, June 1948, in Foreign Office records, F.O. 371/70445(C4766), Public Records Office (Kew), London.

4See, for example, Foreign Office Minute by Mr. Mallet, "Extract from a record of a meeting with Mr. George Perkins of the U.S. State Department," 16 February 1951, F.O. 371/936002(CA1071/12), Public Records Office (Kew), London.
ripartite level of occupation costs to be levied during the year, there was a minor crisis among the three Western powers.

Crucial to the evolving relationship between the three Western powers in the treaty negotiations was the precarious position of France after the war. Despite her relative geographical proximity to Austria, it seems that France was unable to devote her primary attention to the Austrian problem. The French government moved from one domestic crisis to another throughout the years of the negotiations for an Austrian treaty. The Fourth Republic was characterized by political and economic instability, with periodic strikes, ministerial resignations, changes of government and constitutional crises. The French delegates to the Austrian treaty negotiations did not have a firm base on which to devise an Austrian policy; thus, apart from a few initiatives, the policy tended to be reactive. While often trying to maintain the appearance of being an objective intermediary between the other two Western powers and the Soviet Union, France nonetheless tended to follow the lead of the United States and the United Kingdom when it came to votes on substantive issues.

Perhaps more important, after the war French defence policy became increasingly oriented towards staving off the imminent collapse of the French colonial system. As a result, there were few remaining resources to be devoted to missions of relatively less importance, such as the occupation of the French zone of Austria. As early as June 1947, the Governor of the French zone complained of the situation to his British colleague:
Monsieur Voizard said that he was hampered... by the difficulty of keeping his staff and by the reduction in the number of the French forces. He did not think that in the Zone and Vienna there were many more than 6000 French troops in all. As for his own staff the Ministry of War found it difficult to spare serving officers and they were constantly posting those whom he had elsewhere to meet the demands of North Africa, Madagascar, Indo-China, etc.¹

The conflicts in French colonial areas, particularly Indo-China, intensified to the extent that as each year of the occupation of Austria passed, the interests, foreign policy and resources of France were still further diverted from the problem of Austria.

The Foreign Ministers' Deputies for Austria convened in London in November 1947 and continued to meet during the fifth session of the Council of Foreign Ministers. The main stumbling block in the London meetings was, as always, the fundamental disagreement over the meaning of the term "German assets." It was impossible to make progress in the negotiations when the representatives could not decide exactly what they were negotiating. In the early days of the London Foreign Ministers' meeting, for example, Molotov made the ostensibly generous offer to accept ten percent less than the amount he had originally demanded, but Bevin wryly retorted that it would be rather difficult for the Council to calculate ten percent of an unknown quantity.²


²U.S. Department of State, The Austrian State Treaty: an Account
To solve the dilemma, the French raised a suggestion which they had unsuccessfully proposed to the Austrian Treaty Commission a few months earlier. Instead of arguing over the definition of the term German assets, the foreign ministers should try to enumerate the specific Austrian resources which the Russians would require. German assets would be divided into two groups: first, oil resources and shipping, concerning which the Soviet Union would receive a set percentage of production; and second, other German assets in eastern Austria, for which the Soviet government would receive a lump sum payment from the Austrian government. The French delegation also specified the business interests and percentage of production involved.\(^1\)

The French proposal appealed to the British and the American foreign ministers, but Molotov refused to consider it a basis for negotiation. U.S. Secretary of State Marshall became exasperated by the Soviet position and asked Molotov just how he proposed to reconcile the differences between the Soviet and American positions. Molotov once more simply repeated his familiar refrain about the legality under the Potsdam agreement of Soviet claims to German assets in Austria.

\(^{1}\)The French proposal granted the Soviet Union half of Austria's oil production, one third of the exploration rights in oil prospecting areas, and the external assets of the Danube Shipping Company. Grayson, "Austria's International Position," p. 141.
Recognizing that the foreign ministers conference had reached an impasse with regard to an Austrian treaty and was in even sharper discord over the future of Germany, Secretary of State Marshall moved for an adjournment of the council on 15 December 1947.\footnote{"The London Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers: November 25-December 15, 1947," Report by George C. Marshall, Secretary of State; Broadcast on 19 December 1947; reprinted in Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XVII, No. 443 (28 December 1947), pp. 1244-1249.} British Foreign Minister Bevin supported the motion, but asked his colleagues whether the treaty might be sent again to the deputies; this request was approved without opposition.\footnote{Ibid.} Thus, the conference adjourned without evidence of progress towards a treaty.

The Western allies were understandably frustrated by Soviet intransigence at the London Conference of Foreign Ministers, but regardless of the impression they conveyed publicly, the Americans and the British were not at all surprised by the Soviet position. Before the conference opened, British Foreign Office officials had coached Secretary of State Bevin on the best tactics and timing he could use when the foreign ministers reached a deadlock, to refer the treaty to the deputies.\footnote{Memorandum from Oliver Harvey to the Secretary of State [Bevin], Subject: "Tactics for Austrian Treaty at Council of Foreign Ministers, 18 November 1947, F.O. 371/64146(C14790), Public Records Office (Kew), London.} In the event, that is exactly what he did. In consultations before the conference, American and British diplomats considered the possibility of proposing a withdrawal of troops without a treaty, provided a quadripartite guarantee of
Austria's borders could be agreed first.\textsuperscript{1} The Western delegates may have been hoping for an Austrian treaty at the London Conference of Foreign Ministers, but they were not really expecting one.

Most interesting, the Austrians did not necessarily want a treaty in late 1947—at least, not at an exorbitant Soviet price. Indeed, a month before the opening of the London conference, the Austrian President quietly communicated to the Western powers his unwillingness to accept an unsatisfactory treaty. In a meeting with the British political representative in Vienna, Austrian President Karl Renner stated calmly but firmly that if a treaty granting the Russians what they demanded were signed by the four powers, the Austrian government would not abide by it. After the meeting, the British representative, Mr. Mack, reported Renner's position to Bevin:

\begin{quote}
The Austrian Government could not agree to such a treaty and would prefer the occupation to continue indefinitely. The cost of the occupation to Austria would be far less than the assets which the Russians were claiming. I asked Dr. Renner why he supposed that the three Western Powers would agree to continue to maintain troops in Austria if the Austrian Government rejected a treaty which they had approved and recommended to the Austrian Government for acceptance. Dr. Renner replied that Austria was of such importance that the Western Powers could not afford to walk out and leave the Russians in sole possession of the field.\textsuperscript{2}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{1}Foreign Office Memorandum by James Marjoribanks, 24 November 1947, Subject: "Report of informal conversations with American and French experts on Austrian Treaty," F.O. 371/64147(C16375); final official version of the memorandum, for distribution within Foreign Office, F.O. 371/64147(C15293), Public Records Office (Kew), London.

\textsuperscript{2}Letter from Harry B. Mack, U.K. Political Representative,
The British representative further informed the Foreign Secretary that he believed that these views were not exceptional in Austria, but were held by the majority of the members of the Socialist and People's parties.¹ Contrary to popular belief and contemporary accounts, the views of the Austrian leaders, rather than adding to the pressure to sign a treaty at any cost, in 1947 may have added to the Western powers' incentives to hold out for a treaty more favourable to Austria.

As for the Soviet Union, the incentives for signing an Austrian treaty at the end of 1947 were few, and events developing outside the negotiations provided ample reason to delay. As the London conference opened, France was just emerging from a series of general strikes led by the French Communists and (it was believed by the Western delegates as well as the Austrians) instigated by the Cominform.² During the conference, the French government was undergoing a constitutional crisis, brought on by the November election of a national assembly consisting of nearly an equal number of Communists and members of the Mouvement Républicain Populaire. Meanwhile, in the United States, the Congress was debating an Interim Aid Bill


¹Ibid.

²Gruber, Between Liberation and Liberty, p. 143. The Cominform was established in October 1947 with the purpose of the coordinating Communist Party activities throughout Europe.

At this time of unrest in Europe, the Cominform was seen as a particular threat to the West European democracies.
which could provide an additional six hundred million dollars in emergency aid for Austria, Italy, China, and France. In Soviet eyes, the economic and political status of Europe was still unclear. The traditional centers of influence in Europe had been devastated by the war; instead, imminent American economic influence was vying with potential Soviet political influence to determine the postwar configuration of the continent. The international position of both Austria and Germany was particularly subject to change. As has more than once been the case in Soviet foreign policy, uncertainty beget paralysis in the Soviet negotiating position: unless the economic advantages of signing a treaty for Austria were overwhelming, Stalin and Molotov were resolved not to take the risk of giving up what might later prove useful in the contest over Europe.

Halfway through the London Foreign Ministers' Conference, Bevin confided to Marshall that he believed the Russians wanted to break off the discussions in order to avoid signing any treaty on Austria; therefore, Bevin believed that the Western powers should deprive the Soviet Union of the opportunity to do so. When Molotov subsequently proved himself to be completely inflexible in the negotiations, it was probably not a coincidence that Marshall actually proposed the adjournment and Bevin seconded it. The negotiations ended, but the wider contest continued: on 15 December,

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the day the London conference adjourned, Congress passed the Interim Aid Bill.

Although the London conference had not made any real progress towards an Austrian treaty, there was one unanticipated sign of hope for future progress. As so often happened in the course of the negotiations, the Soviet Union did not want to exclude the possibility that an economic agreement over Austria might be reached. To the surprise of the other foreign ministers, at the closing session of the London conference Molotov suddenly reversed his earlier position and announced that the Soviet Union would be willing to discuss the general objective of the French proposal and would present its own counter proposal as well. Since adjournment had already been proposed, the foreign ministers did not open debate on this unexpected proposition, but turned the matter over to the deputy foreign ministers.

With the French and Soviet proposals as a basis for compromise, the deputies convened in London on 20 February 1948. Meetings of the deputies carried on for three months, with some encouraging signs of progress. For the first time, the Soviet Union showed a willingness to bargain over the specific economic assets it would require of Austria. By May 1948, concessions on specific items had been made by both the Soviet Union and the Western powers, and the

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gap between the opposing positions on German assets had been narrowed significantly. However, just when it appeared that there might be grounds for a treaty, the Soviet delegation raised the question of Yugoslav reparation claims and territorial claims, and the 1948 London deputies session adjourned in failure.

To the Western powers, Soviet mention of Yugoslav reparation claims was ludicrous. It was difficult enough to agree to Soviet claims to "German external assets" existing in Austria; regardless of who made them, claims to reparations from Austria herself had been specifically prohibited by the Potsdam agreement. More to the point, Austria had technically never been at war with Yugoslavia, so there was no legal basis for claiming war damages. As for territorial demands, the Western powers had long ago made clear their unwillingness and inability to sign a treaty which altered Austria's 1937 borders. The Western powers had hoped that Yugoslavia's concern over minorities in Austria's southeastern territory could be accommodated in bilateral agreements between the two countries, after the four powers had withdrawn from Austria.\footnote{Grayson, "Austria's International Position," pp. 144-145.} In light of the clarity and firmness of the Western position, the Soviet Union's stubborn support for the Yugoslav position seemed deliberately calculated to put off agreement on a treaty.

The firm Soviet backing of the Yugoslavs surprised the Western powers. In the London deputies meetings of February-March 1948, the Russians had shown some reservations about Yugoslav claims. Karl

\footnote{Grayson, "Austria's International Position," pp. 144-145.}
Gruber reported: "[The Yugoslav delegate's] remarks were so violent that a Russian diplomat openly stared at him and tapped his forehead. This tiny gesture made us [the Austrians] feel for the first time that things were not going so smoothly between Russia and Yugoslavia as we had hitherto assumed." Moreover, the Americans had been sceptical of Soviet support for Yugoslavia for at least a year, ever since the Moscow conference in March 1947. Even as the delegates met during 1947 and 1948, sparks were flying between Moscow and Belgrade. Why, the Western delegates wondered, were the Russians suddenly so moved by the merit of Yugoslav claims? Perhaps the enthusiastic show of loyalty was a last-ditch effort to avoid the final split with the Yugoslavs, but this is unlikely. Later it was revealed that Stalin had privately informed the Yugoslavs during the Moscow conference of spring 1947 that he intended to drop their claims, and indeed when he did eventually decide that it was in the Soviet interest to conclude a treaty, Yugoslavia was abruptly abandoned.

In fact, the reason for the Soviet change of attitude had very little to do with Yugoslavia. Just before the talks between the deputies broke down, Austria became a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation (OEC), the permanent body created by the Western powers to facilitate the distribution of Marshall aid funds. Although some analysts have argued that Russia needed the treaty in 1948 in order to forestall Austria's actual participation in the

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1 Gruber, Between Liberation and Liberty, p. 149.
Marshall Plan, \(^1\) precisely the opposite is true: the treaty's reparations payments would have further impoverished Austria and increased her need for Western aid. Beginning in April 1948, the massive influx of European Recovery Program money convinced the Soviet leaders that the participation of an independent, united Austria in the Marshall Plan would absolutely guarantee Austria's integration into the Western economic system and would likely prompt her political and military integration as well.

For Stalin, furthermore, Austria's situation was particularly sensitive: it was the only country partially occupied by the Soviet Union that had participated in the Marshall Plan.\(^2\) As such, it was located in an extremely disadvantageous place, in Soviet terms. Five days after the London deputies session began, the Soviet Union helped to stage a Communist coup in neighbouring Czechoslovakia; over the months the deputies were meeting, a drastic purge was ridding the country of its Western democratic government and converting Czechoslovakia into a people's democracy. Austria, a Western state receiving Western money, was a bad influence on the new Soviet satellites across the border, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, not to mention unruly Yugoslavia.

Besides, in 1948 Stalin still entertained some hope of converting Austria into a Communist state, and he certainly did not


want to hand Austria over to the West. During the first year of 
Marshall aid, Austria received more money per capita than any other 
country. In the face of so many American dollars, only the Rus­
sian presence in eastern Austria could prevent the country from 
joining the Western camp and threatening the freshly consolidated 
Soviet 'protective' zone. Stalin therefore decided to use the 
Yugoslav issue deliberately to put off an Austrian treaty.

There is no question that the ostensible cause of the breakdown 
of the London deputies' talks was the Soviet position with regard to 
Yugoslavia's territorial claims. This is the explanation which the 
newspapers publicized and the Western public quite justifiably 
believed. However, there is some evidence that the Soviet Union had 
not been intending actually to force the breakdown of the talks, only 
to use the Yugoslav issue as a convenient means to keep the negoti­
ations going indefinitely. It seems that the strength of the Western 
reaction and the breaking off of the talks were not expected by the 
Soviet Union. The British Deputy, James Marjoribanks, was the one 
who actually precipitated the adjournment of the negotiations, by 
pressing the Soviet representative for an answer to the question 
whether the Soviet Union envisioned the cession of any Austrian 
territory to the Yugoslavs. When the Soviet delegate said "Yes," 
the three Western powers declared that they could not negotiate 
over Austria's frontiers, and the meeting adjourned sine die.

1K.W. Rothschild, The Austrian Economy since 1945 (London: Royal 

2Gruber, Between Liberation and Liberty, pp. 154-155.
As already mentioned, Stalin had a number of good reasons in 1948 to wish to put off the signing of the Austrian treaty. More interesting, perhaps, is the fact that behind the transcript of the negotiations lies evidence of second thoughts on the part of the Western powers about signing a treaty as well.

Although the United States, leader of the Western powers, always outwardly maintained its support of all efforts to get a treaty, there is evidence that significant portions of the American bureaucracy were opposed to the treaty and tried to stall the talks. In 1948 and 1949 particularly, there were a few voices of relief amidst the general Western chorus of disappointment whenever the treaty negotiations broke down.

The loudest voice was that of Lt. General Geoffrey Keyes, Commander of U.S. forces in Austria. In February 1948, while the London discussions were in progress and agreement on a treaty seemed possible, the General met with the American delegation and expressed his serious doubts about the wisdom of signing a treaty which would require Western withdrawal when the Austrian economy was still in a shambles, and when there was no Austrian army to resist possible Soviet aggression. Undoubtedly, his worries were heightened by the abrupt Communist takeover that month in Czechoslovakia, a shock to the West and an ominous precedent for Austria. In a top secret message to Washington, the U.S. delegation requested clear instructions regarding the desirability, from a strategic viewpoint, of concluding an Austrian treaty.¹ The Secretary of State, Dean

¹Message from U.S. Delegate to London Deputy Foreign Ministers'
Acheson, forwarded the request to the Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, and a study was commissioned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to determine the military implications of a treaty.

Completed in March 1948, the report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff came out while the London negotiations were still proceeding. Noting that the current draft treaty called for the evacuation of Austria within ninety days, the study pointed out that an indigenous army could never be organized, trained and equipped in such a short time. An unprotected Austria would be highly vulnerable to Soviet attack. Moreover, "...once these forces were withdrawn, even if hostilities did not develop, it would require a major effort to reoccupy this area, an effort which the Western Powers would not have the immediate capability to undertake successfully. Therefore, to withdraw from Austria without provision being made for her continued security would obviously create a military vacuum which the U.S.S.R. could readily fill."\(^1\)

If it was absolutely necessary, for other than strategic reasons, to sign the treaty, the Western powers must at least extend the period of withdrawal and obtain Soviet agreement to allow the Austrians to begin organizing an army.

The misgivings of the Defense Department must have had some

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influence upon the American negotiators in London. In the winter of 1948, it was not in U.S. strategic interests, as articulated by the military, immediately to conclude a treaty. Without doubt, the direct cause of the breakdown of the London deputies conference was Soviet obstinacy with regard to Yugoslav claims; however, there is room for speculation about whether the Western powers might have helped to provoke the Soviet Union to its unequivocal stance.\(^1\) Austrian Foreign Minister Gruber claims that the British delegate, Marjoribanks, told him in advance that he had instructions to break up the conference if the Soviet government did not give a favourable answer on the frontier question.\(^2\) It cannot be denied that such an explanation does fit with subsequent Western policy. Following the report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the United States began clandestinely assembling the equipment necessary for a gendarmerie regiment in Austria.\(^3\) By December 1948, an active programme was being carried out in the Western zone to form police battalions and units in the future Austrian army.\(^4\) And while all this was going on, the negotiations were suspended.\(^5\)


\(^2\) Gruber, *Between Liberation and Liberty*, p. 150.

\(^3\) A Report to the National Security Council by the Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, on "Future Course of U.S. Action with Respect to Austria," 16 June 1949, NSC 38/1, President’s Secretary File, Harry S Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

\(^4\) Letter from Robert A. Lovett, Undersecretary of State to James Forrestal, Secretary of Defense, 14 December 1948, Office of the Secretary of Defense Files, Military Documents Division, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

\(^5\) In 1961, William Bader suggested a connection between the breakdown of the London negotiations and the equipping of the army, but at
More interesting yet is the available evidence that even the Austrians, who appeared the disappointed victims of the great power game and argued publicly that they only wanted a treaty, may have secretly applauded the breakdown of the London negotiations. In his memoirs, first published in Vienna in October 1953, Austrian Foreign Minister Gruber wrote of the "terrible dilemma" in which the British delegate's alleged plans to close the negotiations had put the Austrians, by confronting them with two possibilities: "either to assume responsibility for the violation of our frontiers or to risk the postponement of the conference." But British Foreign Office documents indicate that Gruber at the time may not have been nearly as unhappy about the British policy as he would have had his countrymen believe:

I asked Dr. Gruber whether he had any criticism of the way in which Mr. Marjoribanks had broken off the treaty negotiations. He said on the contrary that the timing had been quite admirable and that it had been fully concerted with himself and with the Austrian experts. His only complaint was that not nearly enough publicity had been given to the reasons for the rupture and we had missed an admirable chance of putting the Russians 'on the spot'. He said that, in his opinion, the sudden breakdown of negotiations had been a very painful surprise to the Soviets, whose plan, he thought, was to keep the negotiations ticking over for as long as possible (meanwhile exploiting their position as an Occupying Power particularly in the economic sphere) but on no account to have a treaty this year....

the time he did not have access to secret American documents. Study of newly-declassified documents suggests that he might well have been right. Bader, Austria Between East and West, 1945-1955, p. 195.

1Gruber, Between Liberation and Liberty, p. 150.

2Record of a conversation with Dr. Gruber, by P.A. Wilkinson,
This was not an isolated statement. Several weeks after the London negotiations broke down, Gruber was reportedly telling the British representatives in Vienna "...that there was no hurry about a treaty but that there must be activity of some kind or people would despair."\(^1\) He stressed the Communist threat in the elections to be held the following year and warned that "[e]ven a small Communist gain would be fatal."\(^2\) The Austrian Foreign Minister's message seemed to be that in 1948 protection from the Communist threat was a higher priority than completion of a treaty; and the behaviour of the Western powers in the negotiations certainly reflected this view.

Although they expressed their disappointment publicly, the Austrian leaders had reason to be relieved in 1948 when the treaty negotiations broke down. A treaty with enormous reparations payments for the Soviet Union, or territorial concessions for Yugoslavia, would have threatened the survival of the Austrian government after the withdrawal of the occupying powers. In 1948, the Western powers understood this vulnerability; it seems that the Soviet Union recognized it also. When a satisfactory treaty protecting Austria's sovereignty appeared to be impossible to attain, the Western powers with the full support of the Austrian Foreign Minister deliberately broke off the negotiations. Nonetheless it must be emphasized that

\(^1\)Telegram from Sir B. Jerram, Vienna, to Foreign Office, 19 June 1948, F.O. 371/70460A(C4869), Public Records Office (Kew), London.

\(^2\)Ibid.
although the British proved themselves to be more skillful tacticians in the negotiations, it was the Soviet strategy of support for the Yugoslav territorial claims which prevented the attainment of a satisfactory treaty and was thus ultimately responsible for the breakdown of the talks.

From a Soviet perspective, the breakdown of the negotiations had forestalled Austria's complete integration into the Western economic system, but it was worrisome that the magnetic pull of Marshall aid funds for Austria continued. More alarming to the Soviet Union, the influence of Western economic power had also begun to creep across the occupation lines in Germany. In June 1948, only a few weeks after the Austrian negotiations in London ended in failure, the Soviet Union continued its process of consolidation and instituted a blockade of the city of Berlin. The Russians could not compete with the attraction of American wealth, and thus they used their best resource—military power—to turn eastern Europe into a fortress.

Subsequent events proved that Stalin had not yet given up hope of easing Austria into that fortress. But with the failure of the Communist Putsch of May 1947, the best policy at present seemed to be to continue the occupation of Austria, taking advantage of the revenues earned from factories in eastern Austria operating under Soviet management, to negotiate when necessary to placate Austrian and international public opinion, and to avoid a treaty settlement except on terms so advantageous to the Soviet Union as to be more attractive than maintaining the status quo.

Thus the negotiations process continued, stalling, stopping and
starting again, always apparently because of Russian intransigence, but usually as a result of incidents occurring outside the negotiations rooms and outside of Austria. International attention to the negotiations faded, leaving the frustrated negotiators with a sense of isolation and unimportance. At one point in the London negotiations of 1948, the representatives had even been forced out of their meeting place, Lancaster House, to make room for what was considered a much more important conference—the newly-founded Brussels Union.\(^1\) At times the Austrians did not feel that even the Americans were taking the discussions quite seriously enough. In 1948, when the Austrian Foreign Minister expressed relief that a career diplomat had been appointed to head the American delegation, he was jokingly told: "Our first Deputy was a general, then we had a banker. After that we looked for a bishop but as we couldn't find one, we had to fall back on a diplomat."\(^2\)

After the London deputies conference of 1948 failed, the problem of Austria was completely submerged in a storm of East-West events. The negotiations were suspended for the remainder of 1948, while the breakdown of four-power control of Germany and the imposition of the Berlin blockade, as well as the public expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform, increased the tenor of the Cold War and dimmed the prospects for an Austrian state treaty.

\(^1\)Gruber, Between Liberation and Liberty, p. 146.
\(^2\)Ibid.
CHAPTER THREE

The Paris Initiative, 1949

The Western powers came to believe, before 1949, that even if they made concessions the Soviet Union would not agree to a reasonable treaty. The only treaty the Soviet Union wished to sign during 1947 was an agreement with such uncompromising, draconian economic penalties for Austria that the Western powers did not consider it reasonable. In 1948, when on the basis of the French proposal both sides made compromises and for a while a reasonable treaty seemed possible, the Soviet Union seized upon the Yugoslav border claims to disrupt talks. Quite apart from reservations the Western powers had concerning the treaty, it seemed that whenever progress was being made and a compromise treaty taking shape, the Soviet Union used an extraneous argument to break down the negotiations.

During the first two years of the negotiations, it seemed obvious to the Western powers that Stalin did not want a treaty unless his demands were granted in their entirety and Austria became another Soviet vassal state. The events surrounding the negotiations—the coups in Eastern Europe, the foibles of four power control in Germany, the problems of Soviet-Yugoslav relations—foocussed Stalin's attention on the task of consolidating a European empire and encouraged him to grasp tightly to every inch
of European territory gained in the war. Indeed, at times it seemed as if the Soviet Union did not really have an Austrian policy, in the positive sense that Western diplomats used the word, but only a negative idea of what the Soviet Union did not want to give up or concede in a treaty.¹

The Western powers themselves showed signs of ambivalence towards signing a treaty before 1949. At the end of the war, Austria had been left in such a battered condition that it was feared the unarmed, destitute Alpine state would be easy prey to a Communist coup—whether organized from within Austria or orchestrated from the Kremlin. The Western powers needed some time to help Austria regain her economic footing and become a less vulnerable target for the Soviet threat. Officially everyone in the West wanted a treaty; secretly, some feared that they might actually get one. Thus, when the Soviet Union used a pretext to destroy the talks, many in the West quietly reacted with relief rather than outrage. They had doubts about the wisdom of signing a treaty which conceded Soviet demands which they considered rapacious, and they were satisfied when the Soviet Union made itself responsible for a breakdown.

Even the Austrian government had qualms about signing a treaty. As each of its neighbours to the east succumbed to a Communist takeover, the Austrian government quite naturally

imagined a similar fate and did not relish the prospect of facing Soviet pressures without visible Western support.

Given the conditions in Austria, the dogmatic inflexibility of the Soviet negotiating position, the concerns of the Western powers, and the events occurring in Europe, there was little realistic chance for an Austrian treaty during the first two years of negotiations. During 1949, because of a change in Soviet foreign policy, this was apparently no longer true. The first promising opportunity to negotiate a treaty for Austria, albeit on terms which were still most favourable to the Soviet Union, occurred between June and November 1949. This fleeting opportunity for a treaty and the Western response to it reveal a great deal about the motivations of the Soviet Union and the relations between the Western powers. Apart from 1955, when the treaty was actually signed, 1949 was the most interesting and important year of the negotiations for an Austrian state treaty.

When the year began, the talks were still suspended, and no date for resumption had been set. Throughout the second half of 1948, the great powers had been preoccupied with the Berlin blockade, and the international atmosphere had not been conducive to talks on Austria. Moreover, any hope of progress in the negotiations had been stultified by Soviet support of Yugoslav territorial claims, because the Western powers were determined that there would be no discussion of altering Austria's borders. In January 1949, however, there were signs that circumstances might be changing. Clear evidence of a split between Tito and
Stalin led to speculation in the West that the Soviet Union might drop the Yugoslav cause in the treaty negotiations. As the year opened, furthermore, the Kremlin launched a "peace offensive" in the Soviet press, urging worldwide conciliation in glowing terms and encouraging public hopes that Stalin might be willing to sign a treaty.

Although sceptical of Soviet motives, Western diplomats felt that it was time to try to reopen the negotiations over Austria and offer the Soviet Union a chance to prove its peaceful intent. Therefore, when the Austrians suggested that the talks might be started again in early 1949, the Western powers agreed. With the concurrence of the Soviet Union, the talks between the Deputy Foreign Ministers were scheduled to reopen in London in February 1949.

Western policy towards Austria had evolved somewhat over the eight months the talks were suspended. In particular, during the lull in talks, the U.S. Department of State had produced a report entitled, "The Austrian Treaty in the Council of Foreign Ministers" which discussed in straightforward terms United States policy as it related to the signing of an Austrian state treaty. While emphasizing that "[o]ur primary objective in an Austrian treaty

1In a note to Secretary Acheson, Chip Bohlen interpreted the Soviet campaign as a propaganda maneuver to affect U.S. public opinion and not a serious move towards settlement. "U.S.S.R. Communist Peace Offensive," Note to Secretary Acheson from Chip E. Bohlen, Records of C.E.B., 1942-1952, R.G. 59, Box 4 Folder: Memos (C.E.B.), 1949. Diplomatic Documents Division, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
should be [a] viable, independent state free from alien domination,"¹ the report concluded that for the sake of a stable and economically viable Austria, an early treaty should be sought. Labelled NSC 38, the report was submitted to the National Security Council on 8 December 1948. The cover letter stated that NSC 38 was intended to clarify and explain U.S. policy towards Austria, in the hope "...that the report will be useful to our military and diplomatic representatives both abroad and in Washington."²

The American delegate to the deputy foreign ministers talks, Sam Reber, certainly found NSC 38 useful and even encouraging. According to his British colleagues, in a meeting just before the talks began, Reber reported:

The U.S. Government had now come definitely to the view which they understood had been ours all along, but as to which they themselves had been undecided, that an Austrian treaty was desirable. It was therefore his clear instruction to work for one. Mr. Reber thought that there still might be some differences of emphasis as between U.K. and U.S. views on the danger on the one hand of indefinitely prolonging the occupation of Austria and on the other hand the risk of an Allied withdrawal. But the U.S. Government had now cleared up their mind on the principal question.³


²Ibid.

Thus in January 1949, members of the State Department were optimistic about the prospects for a quick treaty and confident of a clear American policy to seek one.

The deputy foreign ministers' talks opened on 9 February 1949, with thirty-five articles agreed and eighteen outstanding. Because of the progress which had been made the year before towards a settlement of the German assets question (Article 35) the focus of the negotiations shifted from the Soviet economic claims to the Yugoslav claims. To the disappointment of the Western powers, the Soviet Union did not alter its position on Yugoslav territorial and reparations claims; the discussions floundered whenever the articles recognizing the sanctity of Austria's prewar frontiers (Article 5) or the renunciation of all reparations from Austria (Article 34) were examined.

Still, the talks continued for fifty-three meetings, with the four powers repeatedly and exhaustively reviewing the unagreed articles and the three Western powers holding out hope that the Soviet delegate would receive new instructions from the Kremlin.

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When the Yugoslav delegation modified its demand from requiring a border change to requesting an autonomous area for the Carinthian Slovenes, the Western delegates considered it a favourable sign; nonetheless the Soviet position of unconditional support remained unchanged.1 By April the British deputy, James Marjoribanks, wrote that his Soviet counterpart, Georgi Zarubin, seemed embarrassed that he had no new instructions on the Soviet position.2

Finally, after consulting among themselves, the three Western delegates decided that since all their arguments had been expended to no avail they had better move for an adjournment. The discussions were suspended from 6 to 10 May, to allow the Soviet delegate one last chance to receive new instructions from Moscow. When nothing happened on 10 May, the talks were formally adjourned until the opening of the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in late June. After the adjournment, the American deputy, Reber, informed the State Department that he was convinced that the Yugoslav claims were again being used as a pretext by the Soviet delegate to prevent conclusion of a treaty at a time considered inopportune by the Kremlin.3

1 Ibid., p. 146.

2 Foreign Office Minute by J. Marjoribanks, 6 April 1949, F.O. 371/76439(C3102/G), Public Records Office (Kew), London.

There was indeed a very important reason why the Soviet Union might have considered spring 1949 an inopportune time for an Austrian treaty. On 4 April the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington by the foreign ministers of twelve western nations. The pact was designed to provide mutual assistance against aggression within the North Atlantic area. As such, it strengthened the Western position in the treaty negotiations by ensuring that a Soviet military action not only against the actual territories of the signatory nations, but also "on the occupation forces of any party in Europe,"\(^1\) would be treated as an action against all of them. Thus, the likelihood that Stalin would try to force political change in Austria and thereby risk a confrontation with the Western powers was significantly reduced.\(^2\)

At about the same time, plans were moving forward in the West to equip a special Austrian gendarmerie force. Measures had already been taken by each of the Western powers to train and equip the Austrian police within each of the three zones, and to make preliminary arrangements for an Austrian army.\(^3\) In early February 1949, the American government decided to make available from stocks in Germany the military equipment necessary for a

\(^{1}\)Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

\(^{2}\)Minute of the treaty negotiations by James Marjoribanks, 13 April 1949, F.O. 371/76439(C3302/G), Public Records Office (Kew), London.

The Western powers hoped that this special force could deal with threats to the Austrian government, preclude the need for direct Western involvement, and eventually form the nucleus of the Austrian army after the four powers had withdrawn.

In February the Commander of U.S. Forces in Austria, General Keyes, was thus directed by Washington to discuss the possible issue of American equipment first with the British in Vienna, then with the French; if all three powers were in agreement, he was then to approach the Austrians.

The British and the French quickly gave their preliminary approval to the plan, and the Austrians also seemed favourably disposed to the idea, so the United States began to stockpile the equipment in Austria for the special gendarmerie force. The headquarters of the force was to be in the U.S. zone, with one battalion in the French zone and one in the British zone.

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1A Report to the National Security Council by the Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, "Future Course of U.S. Action with Respect to Austria," NSC 38/1, 16 June 1949, President's Secretary File, Harry S Truman Library, Independence, Missouri, p. 7; and Telegram from Mr. Cheetham, Vienna, to Foreign Office, 11 February 1949, F.O. 371/76470(CL252/G), Public Records Office (Kew), London.

2Telegram from Mr. Cheetham, Vienna, to Foreign Office, 11 February 1949, F.O. 371/76470(CL252/G), Public Records Office (Kew), London.


4Foreign Office Minute by Mr. Mallet addressed to the Secretary of State, 14 June 1949, F.O. 371/76470(C5305/G), Public Records Office (Kew), London.
in late March, the French suddenly began to have misgivings about the stockpiling, arguing that the Soviet Union might use evidence of a military build-up as an excuse for taking counter measures in the Soviet zone.\textsuperscript{1} To minimize this possibility, the three western powers agreed that no heavy equipment which the Soviet Union might object to as inappropriate for a gendarmerie force would be collected at the present time.\textsuperscript{2} The Austrians also decided that they would man the force only with current members of the gendarmerie, not new recruits.\textsuperscript{3} By June, most of the equipment for the force had been assembled in Austria, but pending final approval of the plan by the three Western governments and a definite request on the part of the Austrian government, the equipment had not yet been issued to the Austrians.\textsuperscript{4}

Evidence indicates that the Soviet leaders knew that military equipment for the Austrian gendarmerie was being collected in western Austria. It certainly cannot have been a tremendous surprise. On 8 May 1947, directly after the 1947 attempted Communist coup, Austrian Chancellor Figl had written to the Allied Council stressing the urgent need for improvement in the police

\textsuperscript{1}Telegram from Sir B. Jerram, Vienna, to Foreign Office, 25 March 1949, F.O. 371/76470(C2569/G), Public Records Office (Kew), London.

\textsuperscript{2}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{3}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{4}A Report to the National Security Council by the Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, "Future Course of U.S. Action with Respect to Austria," NSC 38/1, 16 June 1949, President's Secretary File, Harry S Truman Library, Independence, Missouri, p. 7.
forces. The Western powers had initially hoped that quadri-partite action might be taken in response to the request, but it proved impossible to reach agreement. In any case, beginning in March 1949, reports of a military build up in Austria began appearing in the Soviet press. In April, Soviet articles even accused the Western powers of delaying the treaty talks to allow the United States time to turn the western zones of Austria into a U.S. military base. Thus by spring 1949 the Western powers knew that their joint programme to equip the gendarmerie was probably known to the Soviet Union. Any remaining doubts were removed on 26 April, when the Soviet representative to the Military Directorate of the Allied Council submitted a resolution urging the prohibition of the militarization of training in Austrian gendarmerie schools. Still, there was no real East-West con-

1Letter from Federal Chancellor Figl to the Allied Commission for Austria, regarding the urgent need for an improvement in the equipment of the police forces and submitting proposals by the Federal Ministry of the Interior, 8 May 1947, F.O. 371/64033(C7167), Public Records Office (Kew), London.


4Allied Commission for Austria, Executive Committee, Report by the Soviet Element of the Military Directorate, "Militarization of Training in Austrian Gendarmerie Schools," 1 June 1949, F.O. 371/76470(C4997), Public Records Office (Kew), London; and Proceedings of the Allied Commission, EXCO/P(49)86; EXCO/M-(49)140, pp. 3-4; ALCO/M(50)121, pp. 2-4; cited by William B. Bader,
frontation, for the Western powers did not respond to the charges and, to the Western delegates' surprise, the Soviet delegate did not insist that the charges be referred to the full Allied Council.¹

Obviously the Western powers had supplied the Soviet Union with a number of incentives to stall in the deputy ministers meetings during the spring of 1949. The signing of the North Atlantic Pact and the developments in the Western zones of Austria gave the Western powers the upper hand in both general strategic policy for Europe and specific military measures in Austria. But there were also events occurring in the Soviet Union which help to explain a delay in the arrival of new instructions for the Soviet delegate.

In the weeks before the Paris Conference of Foreign Ministers, Stalin apparently decided that it was time for a change in Soviet foreign policy. The failure of the Berlin blockade was an embarrassment for him, and Tito's now widely known heresy was intolerable. In March 1949, therefore, he executed a major shake up of the Politburo, and veteran Foreign Minister Molotov was among those who fell from grace. Molotov remained a member of the Politburo and Council of Ministers, but he lost his position as Foreign Minister and his wife was exiled. Molotov did not regain the Foreign Minister's post until after Stalin's death.²


Tired of struggling with "old lead bottom" Molotov, the Western powers considered the Politburo shuffle a positive sign. It was hoped that Soviet policy towards Austria might now change at the Paris conference, and that the revised Soviet negotiating instructions which all four deputies to the Austrian treaty negotiations had anticipated for months, might be carried out personally by the new Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Vyshinsky.*

In the meantime, Austrian Foreign Minister Gruber was becoming impatient. During the time between the suspension of the Deputy Foreign Ministers talks in May and the discussion of Austria at the Paris Conference of Foreign Ministers in June, Gruber began publicly intimating that a change in Western negotiating tactics should be made. He arranged a meeting with British Foreign Secretary Bevin on 7 June 1949 in order to put forth an idea which he had been unofficially suggesting to the Western delegates for some time.²

Gruber was convinced that the Soviet Union would not agree to a treaty soon. Thus, he felt that the Western powers should take action without a treaty. After publicly blaming the Soviet

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¹As early as February 1949, the British had evidence of Soviet intentions to drop Yugoslav claims. Sir C. Peake, British Ambassador to Yugoslavia wrote: "At a lunch party yesterday the Political Director at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who talked to me with less of his customary reserve, betrayed considerable nervousness about Soviet attitude towards Yugoslav claims on Carinthia and even went so far as to ask me my opinion as to whether the Soviet Government would now throw Yugoslavia over. "I told Mr. Prica that I did not think he would have long to wait before finding out." Telegram from Sir C. Peade, Belgrade, to Foreign Office, 11 February 1949, F.O. 371/76436(C1255), Public Records Office (Kew), London.

²Conversation between the Secretary of State (Bevin) and the Austrian Foreign Minister (with attached Foreign Office Minutes),
Union for the delay, the three Western powers should propose that the Austrian government be allowed to create its own security force and then insist that all four powers withdraw eight months after that force had been established. Since the draft treaty was not a particularly happy economic prospect in Austrian eyes anyway—except to the extent that it might rid the country of Soviet occupation—Gruber envisioned his proposal as a means whereby Soviet withdrawal might be achieved quickly and without great penalty. Treaty negotiations could then continue under conditions more felicitous to the Austrians. As in 1948, therefore, the Austrian Foreign Minister was arguing that the top priority was not the treaty itself, but rather the establishment of an Austrian army and the evacuation of the occupied powers. According to this reasoning, a country with an elected government need not and should not endure a military occupation; after the occupation was ended the other issues could be resolved.¹

Bevin asked Gruber whether his proposal might not lead to an East-West partition of the country, but the Austrian diplomat seemed convinced that the national government with a national armed force could maintain the integrity of the country. Bevin also mentioned the German assets problem and asked whether it might not be wise to settle it before the Western powers pulled out. Gruber responded that the terms of the settlement were not as important as the advantages which would be gained from the

¹Ibid.
immediate evacuation of Austria. Bevin's subordinates sympathized with the motivations which gave rise to Gruber's suggestion; yet they worried that the Soviet Union would not be willing to withdraw from Austria until its economic claims had been assured and until a general European settlement had been reached. Still, there was a surprising amount of feeling in the Foreign Office that if the deadlock on the treaty continued, it might be worthwhile to put forward the Austrian proposal in the negotiations. In any case, shortly thereafter, new developments in the Foreign Ministers Conference superseded Gruber's suggestions.

The Paris Conference of Foreign Ministers met from 23 May to 20 June, but the Austrian question was not discussed until 12 June 1949. Aware of the vitriol which had been flying between Belgrade and Moscow for months, the Western powers decided to test Soviet loyalty to the Yugoslavs. Largely on American initiative, the three Western powers offered a compromise on the first day of the Austrian discussions: if the Soviet Union would stop supporting the Yugoslav claims, the Western powers would agree to substantial satisfaction of Soviet economic demands. In a major reversal of Soviet policy, Foreign Minister Vyshinsky abruptly abandoned Yugoslav claims and agreed that Yugoslav reparations claims could be satisfied by the Austrians ceding their Austrian property in Yugoslavia. In return, the Western powers

agreed to a lump sum payment by Austria of $150,000,000 for German assets, accepted the Soviet claim for sixty percent of the oil exploration areas of Austria, and granted the Soviet Union all of the former property of the Danube Shipping Company in eastern Austria. The issue which had stymied the Foreign Ministers' Deputies for months was thus resolved within a few hours.

At the Paris conference the Yugoslavs were apparently abruptly forsaken by the Soviet Union in return for economic gains. In publicly explaining the change of policy, the Soviet leaders claimed that secret negotiations over Yugoslav claims had been going on between the British government and the Yugoslav government, and had been clandestinely undermining the Soviet position—an allegation which officials in the British Foreign Office privately admitted was true enough. Stalin's representatives therefore argued that they had been sincere in their support for the Yugoslav cause in the Austrian treaty negotiations, but had been betrayed by the wily deceitfulness of Tito's regime.

The Yugoslavs had another, more interesting interpretation of the events of the previous two years which was disclosed to

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the British Foreign Office by a member of the Yugoslav delegation to the treaty talks. During the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, the Yugoslav delegation was summoned to the Kremlin and informed that an agreement on the Austrian treaty was going to be reached and that the Soviet Union was intending to reject Yugoslav claims. To avoid the appearance of a breach between the two countries, the Soviet government asked the Yugoslav government to retract its claims and give the Soviet Union a modified Yugoslav position within forty-eight hours.

With this ultimatum, the Yugoslav delegation to the 1947 conference hurriedly consulted Belgrade and was instructed by its home government to reduce the demands essentially to the compromise position which was reached by the four powers at the Paris conference in 1949. Hastening to inform the Soviet leaders of the new position before the forty-eight hour time limit elapsed, the Yugoslav delegate attempted to deliver his government's message in person to Molotov or Vyshinsky or Gousev, the Soviet Deputy for the Moscow conference. The Yugoslav was curtly informed that this was impossible. Eventually, the Yugoslav emissary was forced to deliver the proposal to a low level minion in the Soviet Foreign Ministry. As he turned over the proposal, however, the irritated Yugoslav shrewdly insisted that the Soviet official give him a written receipt, acknowledging both that he had received the document and that it was a Soviet request which had prompted its delivery.

The Yugoslav government heard no more about the message until two years later at the Paris conference. In the negotiations
over Austria Vyshinsky reduced the Yugoslav claims to the fallback position which they had long ago conceded, and in return the Soviet Union received hefty economic compensation from the Western powers and on behalf of Austria. Later, when the Soviet government publicy asserted that the Yugoslav demands had been dropped as a result of the discovery of treacherous secret dealings engaged in by the Yugoslav government, the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry produced the receipt as proof that the claims had been reduced two years before, explicitly at Soviet demand. Although the Yugoslav press reportedly publicized the document, nothing came of it.

According to the Yugoslav interpretation of events, therefore, the Soviet Union had been biding its time in the Austrian treaty negotiations for two years to reap the maximum economic benefits from a change of policy which the Soviet government had already compelled the Belgrade regime to make.1

At the end of the Paris conference, the Foreign Ministers issued a communique describing the terms of the compromise reached between the four powers on Yugoslav claims and German assets, and directing the Deputy Foreign Ministers to reach agreement on the treaty as a whole by 1 September 1949. Certainly there were promising signs emerging from Austria of Soviet intentions to sign a treaty by that date. In June the Soviet High Commissioner,

1"Austrian Treaty: Soviet Policy in 1947," Foreign Office Minute by M.F. Cullis, German Political Department, 16 August 1950; Minute concerns an account given to Cullis by M. Milutinovic, First Secretary of the Yugoslav Embassy in London, regarding Soviet policy towards the Austrian Treaty in general, and the Yugoslav claims on Austria in particular, during the Moscow Conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers in April 1947; F.O. 371/84907(C5213), Public Records Office (Kew), London.
General Tikhomirov, imposed a ban on credit from the Soviet bank in Vienna, thereby implying that he expected the occupation to end soon. Likewise, Soviet-run factories in Austria stopped accepting orders which would require more than a few months to fulfill.\textsuperscript{1} To comply with their instructions the deputy foreign ministers decided to begin meeting on 1 July 1949 in London, and hopes in Austria were high that the Soviet Union was planning to sign a treaty during the London deputies session.

In the meantime, however, developments within the United States had been taking a very different course. The Department of State's December 1948 policy report on the treaty negotiations, NSC 38, as well as subsequent policy bulletins had not been well received by the Department of Defense. There were considerable reservations within the Defense Department about the wisdom of quickly reaching a treaty settlement on the State Department's terms. For months, the question of what U.S. policy should be wandered the corridors of the American bureaucracy, with Pentagon policy makers increasingly taking exception to the optimistic programme of the Foggy Bottom diplomats.

The Paris meeting of the Foreign Ministers prompted Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson to submit an opposing report on Austria to the National Security Council. Completed during the Paris negotiations, NSC 38/1 took exception to NSC 38 and faithfully echoed the conclusions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff report of

\textsuperscript{1}"Austrian Hopes Fade," \textit{Scotsman}, 7 February 1950.
March 1948. Dated 16 June 1949, NSC 38/1 was actually published in the midst of Secretary of State Dean Acheson's negotiations over Austria (12-20 June). Clearly the Defense Department was pressed into action by concern that Acheson was making compromises in the four power negotiations which might not be compatible with U.S. security interests. "[T]his appears to be a situation in which the integration of foreign and military policies is required[,] for our military security interests as well as the conduct of political relations with the Austrian Government are involved," Defense Secretary Johnson wrote.¹ In his memorandum to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, Johnson urged that the State Department be requested to submit its views on the future course of U.S. policy with respect to Austria, taking greater account of the military aspects of the situation there.²

The heart of Johnson's argument was contained in his 14 June letter to Acheson, a copy of which was attached to NSC 38/1:

...[I]t is apparent that, if a treaty is arranged at the current meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, it will be impossible for Austria to have reasonably adequate security forces prior to the withdrawal of all occupation

¹Memorandum for the Executive Secretary, National Security Council, from Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, Subject: "Future Course of U.S. Action with respect to Austria," 16 June 1949; part of NSC 38/1, "A Report to the National Security Council by the Secretary of Defense on Future Course of Action with Respect to Austria," 16 June 1949, President's Secretary File, Harry S Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

²Ibid.
forces within ninety days after the treaty comes into effect, which is called for in the present treaty draft. It is recognized that political and economic considerations may dictate the conclusion of a treaty for Austria now. However, from the strategic point of view, withdrawal of occupation troops before Austria can organize, train, and equip reasonably adequate security forces would create a military vacuum in central Europe in which the communists, following their common practice, may be expected to seize power and dominate the country, thus creating a Soviet salient in the East-West line.

Regardless of the method employed, the National Military Establishment considers that the peace treaty for Austria should become effective only after the United States is assured that Austrian armed forces are reasonably adequate to perform all tasks envisaged in the treaty.\(^1\)

When informed of the Defense Department's firm stance, an irritated Secretary of State Acheson sent a message from Paris, trying both to allay the anxiety of the military and to shore up his own negotiating position by emphasizing that the final details of a treaty would probably take a long time to work out anyway. Only the main issues were being determined at the Paris talks, he wrote. The earliest a treaty could actually be signed would be September or October, after which ratification by all the governments would take about six months. Then contained in the treaty itself was a ninety day grace period before the withdrawal was to be completed. Surely this would be enough time to create adequate

\(^1\)Letter from Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, 14 June 1949; Attachment "B" of NSC 38/1, "A Report to the National Security Council by the Secretary of Defense on Future Course of Action with Respect to Austria," 16 June 1949, President's Secretary File, Harry S Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.
Austrian security forces. Even if it were not, Acheson argued, the ratification of the treaty could be delayed in order to prevent the creation of a military vacuum.¹ Acheson obviously did not want his negotiating position on the Austrian treaty to be cut away from beneath him in the middle of the foreign ministers' meeting.

Back in Washington, Acheson tried to have NSC 38/1 stricken from the agenda of the National Security Council by arguing that there was certainly no disagreement on the fundamental need to complete a satisfactory treaty. In his own letter to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, Acheson insisted that there was no significant difference in the views of the Defense and State departments. The problem was simply a matter of implementing an agreed programme, he argued. If a treaty were successfully completed by the deputy foreign ministers, then the military would be consulted about the adequacy of Austrian security forces prior to the coming into effect of the treaty.² If indeed a treaty were achieved, then perhaps the National Security Council

¹Telegram from Secretary of State Acheson, Paris, to [Department of State], Washington, No. DELSEC 1916, 18 June 1949; Attachment "A" of NSC 38/2, "A Report to the National Security Council by the Secretary of State on Future Course of U.S. Action with Respect to Austria," 1 July 1949, President's Secretary File, Harry S Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

²Letter to Admiral Sidney W. Souers, Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, from Secretary of State Dean Acheson, 1 July 1949; part of NSC 38/2, "A Report to the National Security Council by the Secretary of State on Future Course of U.S. Action with Respect to Austria," 1 July 1949, President's Secretary File, Harry S Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.
would need to concern itself with U.S. policy with respect to Austria. In the meantime, however, nothing had really changed and the State Department would continue with the process of trying to achieve a treaty. NSC 38/1 should be removed from the agenda of the National Security Council.¹

But Acheson was not to be permitted to close the Pandora's box. Once doubts about U.S. policy had been raised by the Secretary of Defense and placed before the National Security Council, the bureaucratic process dictated that the State Department would no longer have a monopoly on the formulation of plans for an Austrian treaty. Acheson's letter was duly labelled NSC 38/2 and coupled with NSC 38/1 under "Items for Consideration" on the agenda of the forty-third meeting of the National Security Council, to be held on 7 July 1949.²

The Department of Defense was concerned about the very poor state of security in Austria after the Western powers withdrew. Since February, equipment for the gendarmerie regiment had been collected in the Western zone; but the assembled supplies had been sitting unused for months. It seems that the Austrian government, although initially desiring help from the Western powers, had hesitated to put forth the final request that the equipment be issued to Austrians and had also hesitated to provide a programme

¹Ibid.

²Agenda for the National Security Council's 43rd Meeting, The White House, Agenda dated 1 July 1949, Meeting held on 7 July 1949, President's Secretary Files, Harry S Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.
for the organization and training of the regiment. The delay was probably caused by Austrian government concern about what the Soviet reaction to the training and equipping of the gendarmerie regiment would be. The French were nervous enough about the proposal; the Russians were likely to be even more disturbed.

By the time the official Austrian request finally came and the formal approval of the British and French governments was received, it was mid-June, and the actual training of the regiment did not begin until July. The U.S. Defense Department had thus found the readying of a single Austrian gendarmerie regiment to be a long drawn out struggle, with political and financial pitfalls all along the way. It is not surprising that military experts considered State Department plans for forming a complete Austrian army—with or without Soviet agreement—in the months between the signature of a treaty and its coming into effect, completely unrealistic.

At the National Security Council meeting, the military representatives argued that one newly trained Austrian gendarmerie regiment would never be sufficient to maintain internal order and offset the danger of the overthrow of the Austrian government by

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1 Letter from Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, 14 June 1949; Attachment "B" of NSC 38/1, "A Report to the National Security Council by the Secretary of Defense on Future Course of Action with Respect to Austria," 16 June 1949, President's Secretary File, Harry S Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

2 Foreign Office Minute by Mr. Mallet addressed to the Secretary of State, 14 June 1949, F.O. 371/76470(C5305/G), Public Records Office (Kew), London.
Senior defense experts believed that organizations capable of executing a successful coup would likely have been created by the Soviet commander within the eastern zone before the Soviet force was withdrawn. It was therefore only prudent that sufficient national security arrangements be made for the whole of Austria, to offset the possibility of an attempted Putsch after Western troops were withdrawn.

The obvious solution would be to train a full Austrian army before Western troops were evacuated, but there were a number of problems with this proposal. First, by the summer of 1949 no agreement had been reached between the four powers in the Allied Council regarding the establishment of an Austrian security force. If the Western powers went ahead with preparations only in the Western zones on the scale required for any army, the Soviet Union would undoubtedly react with its own major military preparations in the eastern zone. The result would be an escalation of tensions between the four powers and partition of the country—certainly not the enhanced Austrian security which the exercise would have been intended to provide.

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1 Memorandum [of Conversation at the National Security Council Meeting of 7 July 1949], "Training of Austrian Army," [by Secretary of State Dean Acheson], 7 July 1949, Papers of Dean Acheson, Harry S Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

2 Ibid.

Second, if a treaty were signed within the next few months, even allowing an extra interval for the ratification of the agreement, there was not likely to be time to complete the logistical arrangements for the army. According to U.S. Air Force General McNarney, at the time of the July 1949 National Security Council meeting the United States had no definite plans for training an Austrian army.¹

Finally, because of previous delays in the treaty negotiations, there was no money available in the summer of 1949 for equipping an Austrian army. Defense Secretary Johnson wrote in NSC 38/1:

The Foreign Military Assistance Program initially contained an item for 100 million dollars for aid to Austria in order to equip an Austrian armed force of approximately 53,000 (including one gendarmerie regiment of approximately 1,500). When it appeared unlikely that any treaty for Austria would be concluded during the Fiscal Year 1950, this amount was reduced by the Bureau of the Budget to approximately $11,620,000, an amount sufficient for equipment of the gendarmerie regiment only. Thus, additional funds would be necessary if a treaty for Austria were to be concluded this year and if the materiel for the balance of the 53,000 Austrian armed forces were required. Further, even after the additional funds were available, it is doubtful if the bulk of the additional equipment could be furnished within one year.²

¹Memorandum [of Conversation at the National Security Council Meeting of 7 July 1949], "Training of Austrian Army," [by Secretary of State Dean Acheson], 7 July 1949, Papers of Dean Acheson, Harry S Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

²Letter from Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, 14 June 1949; Attachment "B" of NSC 38/1, "A Report to the National Security Council by the Secretary of Defense on Future Course of Action with Respect to Austria," 16 June 1949, President's Secretary File, Harry S Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.
At no point did the military representatives on the National Security Council suggest that the security aspects of signing an agreement be considered paramount. But the Defense Department strongly believed that vital financial and strategic problems related to withdrawal from Austria were not being sufficiently taken into account by the State Department in its single minded quest for an Austrian treaty.

The members of the National Security Council studied the positions of both the State Department and the Defense Department regarding future courses of action with respect to Austria, but no decisions could be reached. The dispute was referred to the N.S.C. Staff for the preparation of a study. Thus, only a week after the deputy foreign ministers had begun negotiating in London, U.S. policy towards an Austrian treaty was thrown into a state of limbo.

As instructed by the Foreign Ministers, the Foreign Ministers' Deputies for Austria had convened in London on 1 July 1949 and set about trying to reach agreement on a treaty based on the terms of the Paris communique. When a number of articles were quickly agreed, it looked as if the deputies might be able to reach agreement by the 1 September deadline. However, the deputy ministers' negotiations soon bogged down over the interpretation

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1 Minutes of the 43rd Meeting of the National Security Council, The White House, 7 July 1949, President's Secretary File, Harry S Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

of the Paris communique with respect to the precise assets the
Soviet Union was to receive.

The Soviet deputy insisted that the communique be followed
word-for-word in determining what the Soviet Union would receive
from Austria, whereas the Western powers, and particularly the
United States, maintained that the communique was intended as a
guideline for the deputies, not an edict. The difference in
interpretation led, for example, to a disagreement over the oil
exploration rights to be ceded to the U.S.S.R. Under the terms
of the Paris communique, the Soviet Union was entitled to sixty
percent of the oil exploration lands in eastern Austria. To the
Soviet Union, this meant that the section of eastern Austria
which had virtually all of the untapped sources of oil, but which
was coincidentally approximately sixty percent by area of the
eastern zone, was for the U.S.S.R. to exploit. The United States,
in turn, protested that although this arrangement matched the
letter of the communique, it did not suit the purpose of the
settlement, because the Russians would control virtually all of
Austria's future production.¹

As had happened so many times before, the momentum towards
agreement was lost in the East-West bickering over economic

¹United States Department of State, The Austrian State
Treaty: an Account of the Postwar Negotiations Together with the
Text of the Treaty and Related Documents, released April 1957,
European and British Commonwealth Series 49, D.O.S. Publication
6437, pp. 16-17; and Memorandum by the Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, E. Bevin, to the Cabinet, 11 April 1950, C.P.
(50) 66, Cabinet Office Papers 129/39, Public Records Office
(Kew), London.
issues. In a personal letter to a Washington colleague, a disillusioned American delegate, Coburn Kidd, wrote:

On the first day Mr. Mallet, the British Deputy, said that he felt we must all be optimistic this time, and I suppose he continues to be optimistic, like Job, with gritted teeth. If you ask me, however, I should say that you need have no hope, anticipation, or apprehension that you will awaken one morning to find the Treaty on your doorstep. I am aware that any such judgment is colored by temperament, and that for aught I know the Russians may be nine months along and ready to give birth to an agreement. There are certain signs. But I am a sceptical midwife....

In its description of British determination and American scepticism during the negotiations, the letter foreshadowed a divergence in the American and British approaches to the treaty which occurred over the subsequent three months.

In August 1949, when the American bureaucracy was still battling over the desirability of a treaty under present conditions, the British began to believe that as distasteful as it would be the Western powers should grant the Russians all their demands for German assets (Article 35) in order to get a treaty. From private conversations with Soviet Deputy Zarubin, Mr. Mallet concluded that if the Western powers would grant in their entirety Soviet demands under Article 35, the Russians would agree to all

other unsettled articles and a treaty would be signed.1 On the same day as his meeting with Zarubin, Mallet wrote to the British legation in Vienna to ask whether Austria would be able to fulfill the obligations of a treaty incorporating the Soviet version of Article 35 and if so, whether the Austrians would want such a treaty.2 Likewise, Mallet wrote to Bevin's Personal Secretary, informing him of the change in his point of view regarding the treaty, and warning him that if the British mission in Austria answered his queries in the affirmative, "I shall have to ask the Secretary of State to decide the question...and to point out that, if his decision is to seek a settlement now, we shall probably have to put considerable pressure on the Americans before they will agree...."3

A week later, Sir B. Jerram, British Political Representative in Vienna, informed Mr. Mallet that in his opinion the Austrian economy would be no worse off with a treaty concluded on Soviet terms than it was under Soviet occupation—with the important caveat that Austria's dependence on foreign aid be increased and prolonged.4

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1 Telegram from Foreign Office to Vienna, 6 August 1949, F.O. 371/76446(C6274), Public Records Office (Kew), London.

2 Ibid.; and Letter from Mr. Mallet, British Deputy to the Austrian treaty talks, to E.E. Tomkins, Private Secretary to the Secretary of State, 6 August 1949, F.O. 371/76446(C6353), Public Records Office (Kew), London.

3 Letter from Mr. Mallet, British Deputy to the Austrian treaty talks, to E.E. Tomkins, Private Secretary to the Secretary of State, 6 August 1949, F.O. 371/76446(C6353), Public Records Office (Kew), London.

4 Telegram from Sir B. Jerram, Vienna, to Foreign Office,
position of the British military was also clear. The Chiefs of Staff had firmly stated eighteen months before that, assuming the Foreign Office had done its job in obtaining a comprehensive settlement and ensuring that no treaty was signed before a stable Austrian government was in control, it was definitely in British interests to withdraw the troops from Austria. The process of getting an adequate treaty and determining whether the Austrian government was strong enough to resist Communist infiltration was left to the Foreign Office.

Therefore with confidence that he had the backing of the local Foreign Office representative and the military, Mallet met with Foreign Secretary Bevin to ask him to decide what the British policy should be and, still more important under the circumstances, whether the United Kingdom would be able to convince the Americans to go along with that policy. After considering Mallet's arguments, Bevin said that he was personally in favour of signing the treaty, on Russian terms, by 1 September. However, if the Americans still wanted to hold off signing the treaty he would follow their lead, as long as the onus of such a decision were placed entirely on them.

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1 Letter to the Foreign Office from the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, 13 December 1947, F.O. 371/70388(C199/G), Public Records Office (Kew), London.


3 [Record of Conversation between Mr. Mallet and the Secretary]
A few days later, Mallet met with the French deputy Berthelot and the American deputy Reber and informed them that the Foreign Secretary wanted an early treaty for three reasons: first, because it would allow him to cut down on British expenditures; second, because the effect of a treaty on the general political environment would be favourable; and finally, because the Austrians themselves wanted a treaty and would suffer politically and economically if the deputy foreign ministers meetings again ended in failure. Reber and Berthelot promised to convey the British Foreign Secretary's views to their respective governments.

Thus, during the time that American Secretary of State Acheson's support for a treaty was dissolving beneath him, British Foreign Secretary Bevin was deciding that the Western powers should double their efforts to pursue the treaty. The Yugoslav claims obstacle was out of the way, and for the first time the Russians seemed genuinely willing to sign a treaty if the Western powers would pay a high enough price. The British Foreign Secretary's determination to get a treaty was strengthened by a meeting with Austrian Foreign Minister Gruber, who informed him that Austrian experts were working out detailed plans for payment of the German assets debt. Gruber asked the Foreign Secretary

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1 Foreign Office Minute to the Secretary of State [Bevin] by Mr. Mallet, 22 August 1949, F.O. 371/76447(C6731/G), Public Records Office (Kew), London.

2 Ibid.
to use his influence with the Americans to get them to yield a bit to Soviet demands so that a treaty might be signed.1

Bevin began to apply pressure to the Secretary of State in order to try to move the State Department towards the early signature of an Austrian treaty, at precisely the time when the State Department no longer had a grip on American policy and certainly could not take any initiatives in the deputies' negotiations.

With the deadline for the completion of the treaty by the foreign ministers' deputies approaching, Bevin called the U.S. Ambassador into his office and put before him the case for concessions to the Soviet demands and rapid signature of the treaty. As far as the financial aspects were concerned, Dr. Gruber had assured him that the Austrians would be able to pay. In any case, the Americans must look at the wider political significance of the treaty. Early conclusion of an Austrian treaty would give encouragement to Tito by removing Soviet troops from his border, would enable the Western powers to bring Austria into the Council of Europe and other international organizations, and would have a good effect on Western Germany, Bevin argued. Surely the small price the Russians were demanding was worth these advantages.2

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1Conversation between the Secretary of State [Bevin] and the Austrian Foreign Minister [Gruber], 25 August 1949, F.O. 371/76496(C8543), Public Records Office (Kew), London; and Telegram from Foreign Office [Bevin] to Vienna, 25 August 1949, F.O. 371/76447(C6771), Public Records Office (Kew), London.

In lieu of new instructions from Washington, U.S. Ambassador Douglas was forced to repeat the position which the United States had held since the beginning of the deputies' meetings. Granting the Soviet Union the concessions it demanded would be a departure from the agreement made in Paris and would give the U.S.S.R. dangerous economic influence over Austria. The Senate would never ratify such an agreement. Austrian claims that they might somehow find the resources to pay for the treaty were implausible, and as soon as the country found itself in trouble, the United States would be called upon to rescue it. It was easy for the British to argue that the economic aspects of the treaty were not of primary concern when it was not the British who would in the end be financing such an agreement.¹

Undeterred, Bevin decided to bypass formal diplomatic channels to make a personal appeal to Acheson. On the same day that he met with the U.S. Ambassador, Bevin dispatched a telegram to the State Department reiterating his arguments and concluding, "I spoke to the United States Ambassador on these general lines this morning, but I should be grateful if you would convey a personal message from me to Mr. Acheson in the above sense as the Deputies have to terminate their discussions by September 1st and there is very little time."²

¹Ibid.
²Telegram from Foreign Office [Bevin], to Washington, 26 August 1949, F.O. 371/76447(C6771/176/3), Public Records Office (Kew), London.
But whatever Acheson's personal reaction to Bevin's personal message, he was powerless to effect any major change in U.S. policy. The question what the future course of U.S. action with respect to Austria should be was still tied up in the National Security Council. Acheson could do nothing until there was some agreement over the desirability of the draft treaty. The State Department still hoped that the Soviet delegates would stop insisting on extracting their pound of flesh from Austria. Any moderation of Soviet demands might help the State Department achieve a consensus in U.S. foreign policy for a treaty.

But the State Department's hopes were disappointed. The deadline for the conclusion of the treaty came, and there were still nine articles outstanding. On 1 September the United States proposed that the four powers recess the talks for three weeks and then reconvene in New York on 22 September. The French and the British deputies agreed. The Soviet deputy would not commit himself to attend a New York session, but he promised to refer the proposal to Moscow.

During the recess, the buzz of consultations in and between Vienna, London and Washington particularly intensified. In Vienna, the Austrian Vice Chancellor confided in the British High Commissioner that the Austrians knew that they could force the Americans to agree to a treaty by publicizing Austria's frustration.

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2Ibid.
over the inflexible U.S. position in the talks; however, his government would not do this because it could not afford to jeopardize American aid and good will.¹ In another meeting, Austrian Foreign Minister Gruber claimed that the refusal of the Americans to make concessions was encouraging the growth of Pan-German ideas in Austria.² The reservations the Austrians had had in previous months about the treaty vanished. All of the senior Austrian officials were nervous about the effect the stalemate in the talks would have on the results of the Austrian elections planned for the following month.

In London, Foreign Office officials were absolutely convinced that the Russians wanted to sign a treaty and that it was only American stubbornness over the German assets issue which was preventing agreement. Formal and informal meetings with Soviet representatives seemed to confirm this view:

...the Soviet Ambassador asked the Minister of State to lunch yesterday. He spent almost all of his time complaining that we did not wish an Austrian Treaty. The Minister of State formed the impression that the Soviet were genuinely anxious to have a treaty now but that Z rubin was greatly afraid to stir beyond the Soviet interpretation of the Paris directives to deputies. The Minister naturally made no offers to the Ambassador since

¹Record of conversation between Major General Winterton and Vice Chancellor Dr. Schaerf, 1 September 1949, F.O. 371/76448(C7067/G), Public Records Office (Kew), London.

²Telegram from Sir B. Jerram, Vienna, to Foreign Office, 7 September 1949, F.O. 371/76448(C7043), Public Records Office (Kew), London.
it is our view that the three Western powers must be completely agreed.¹

During September, Bevin and his subordinates became increasingly exasperated by the inflexibility of the American position. The French, on the verge of another governmental crisis, apparently supported the British view. But the Americans seemed to diverge even further from the conciliatory approach to the Soviet Union which the Foreign Office favoured. When the three powers tried to agree on a joint message to the U.S.S.R. intended to state the Western position and to encourage the Soviet Union to return to the bargaining table in New York, the U.S. seemed more interested in responding to recent inflammatory Soviet press statements² than ensuring progress in the negotiations. "The [American draft of the] request to the Soviet Government to agree to the New York proposal is no longer put in a clear and objective manner, but is lost in a welter of recrimination," a British official complained. "And the statement of position is so accusatory and unyielding as to achieve the opposite of what we and the French (at any rate) intended by it."³

In Washington, the State Department remained embroiled in a struggle with the Senate and the Pentagon over what American policy

¹Telegram from Foreign Office to Vienna, 25 August 1949, F.O. 371/76447(C6771), Public Records Office (Kew), London.


³Foreign Office Minute by M.F. Cullis to Sir I. Kirkpatrick, 9 September 1949, F.O. 371/76448(C7901), Public Records Office (Kew), London.
should be. Members of Congress were quietly but firmly expressing their reluctance to support any treaty which would require major payments to the Russians.\(^1\) Whatever the abstract arguments for a treaty might be, a withdrawal without Senate ratification of an agreement and the continuance of U.S. aid to Austria would greatly imperil Austria's independence. Acheson could not move without support from Congress, and with daily reports of Communist victories in China, the Congress was not particularly well disposed towards Communists of any kind. The economic difficulties in Western Europe seemed to be prompting an increasingly belligerent and confident attitude on the part of the Soviet leadership. News during September that the Soviet Union had exploded its first atomic device removed whatever traces might have remained of Congressional willingness to make concessions to the Russians for any purpose. Indeed, there was a growing body of American opinion in Congress and elsewhere which was opposed to withdrawing U.S. troops from Austria at a time of such enhanced danger.\(^2\) The British kept arguing that American policy should be made with a view to the wider implications of an Austrian settlement. But


\(^2\)Telegram from Foreign Office to Washington, 14 September 1949, F.O. 371/76449(C7204), Public Records Office (Kew), London; and Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [Bevin], to the Cabinet, 11 April 1950, C.P. (50) 66, Cabinet Office 129/39, Public Records Office (Kew), London.
most Congressmen felt they were focussing on the widest possible perspective of American foreign policy in arguing that it was simply ludicrous further to imperil Austria with a draconian agreement by which only the Soviet Union would benefit—at American expense.

Meanwhile the view in the Pentagon was being fortified by the persistent messages of the U.S. Commander in Vienna, General Keyes, who did not believe that the treaty in its current form would be to the benefit of Austria, because Austrian security was woefully inadequate and the Austrian economy was too weak to take on the burden of payments to the U.S.S.R. General Keyes' viewpoint strengthened Johnson's determination to resist a dangerous agreement. To the frustration of the State Department, Johnson took the position that he would not support any treaty the State Department signed until he had eighty-eight million dollars from Congress for small arms and ammunition for Austria. Furthermore, in lieu of a treaty, Johnson would not agree to any changes in the occupation force negotiated by the State Department unless he had personally approved them in advance.¹

Clearly Acheson was losing the bureaucratic battle for control of U.S. policy toward Austria. By now, as one of his subordinates reported, the Secretary of State was "slightly burned

up about the whole procedure and had expressed himself in no uncertain terms concerning the military attitude.\textsuperscript{1}

But the situation was to become still more difficult for Acheson, for he was forced to defend a confused and almost nonexistent American policy to the British and the French. The British eschewed the American argument that a treaty containing so many concessions to the Russians would never get through the Senate. Bevin believed that the Soviet occupation constituted a worse drain on the Austrian economy than the treaty terms would be, and the Americans were presently subsidizing the Austrian economy.\textsuperscript{2} The occupation itself was too expensive; the French and British governments were unsure about their own abilities to continue to maintain troops in Austria. More important, Bevin believed the greatest danger was that the Soviet Union might force occupied Austria to be partitioned like Germany, and it was worthwhile going to great lengths to preclude that possibility.

In a tripartite foreign ministers' meeting held in Washington, Bevin told Acheson that in order to avoid the danger of partitioning Austria he would be willing to accept any treaty that simply got rid of the Russians; if the Western powers held out for better terms, chances were they would just be forced to give in anyway in the end, he said.\textsuperscript{3}

\textsuperscript{1}bid., p. 1171.

\textsuperscript{2}Telegram from Foreign Office to Washington, 14 September 1949, F.O. 371/76449(C7204), Public Records Office (Kew), London.

\textsuperscript{3}Memorandum of Conversation, "Tripartite Position on Austrian
Having eventually obtained the cooperation of the Soviet Union, the four deputy foreign ministers began to meet in New York on 22 September 1949 as planned. During the time the deputies were in session, the four foreign ministers also met informally on 26 and 28 September and 5 October, to try to break the deadlock over the few remaining points of disagreement in the treaty. Acheson tried, in each of the meetings, to persuade Vyshinsky to modify his economic demands. But the Soviet Foreign Minister would not make the slightest compromise.¹

Between the quadripartite meetings, the three Western foreign ministers consulted. Because of an economic crisis in France, the French Premier was forced to resign in early October, so during almost the entire month of October French Foreign Minister Schuman and his Deputy Foreign Minister Berthelot had no government. As a result, French policy with regard to Austria was, in effect, to follow the British lead.² Acheson still lacked a consensus in the American bureaucracy, so his position was completely inflexible. Only Bevin had the freedom to maneuver.


²"As for the French, you can imagine that Berthelot, without a Government, is not a very constructive colleague...." Letter from Mallet, New York, to Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, 24 October 1949, F.O. 371/76451(C8274), Public Records Office (Kew), London.
politically, and in the tripartite meetings he continued his role as protagonist for a treaty on Soviet terms.

Convinced that it was now up to the West to secure the treaty, the British Foreign Secretary developed some new arguments to try to persuade his reluctant American colleague. To his fears that Austria would end up a partitioned state, Bevin added the speculation that a united Austria might become disgusted with Western behaviour and make its own peace with the Soviet Union.\(^1\) Or, if such a notion were too distasteful to the anti-Communist Austrians, the government might look north again to Germany.\(^2\) Either possibility would be disastrous for Western interests and, indeed, for world peace. When geopolitical and historical arguments failed to evoke a change in Acheson's position, Bevin tried a more personal, political approach. If the negotiations broke down again now, how could Bevin explain it to his party and to the Cabinet, both of which strongly favoured a treaty?\(^3\) There was also a powerful group in Parliament that would force him to explain why the Western powers were delaying a treaty.\(^4\) Most important, however, he believed that his own public support rested upon his

\(^1\) British Record of a Meeting of the Three Western Foreign Ministers to discuss the Austrian Treaty, held at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel at 4:00 p.m. on Thursday, 29 September 1949, F.O. 371/76451(C7755), Public Records Office (Kew), London.

\(^2\) Letter from Mr. Bevin to Dean Acheson, 1 October 1949, F.O. 371/76451(C7962), Public Records Office (Kew), London.

\(^3\) British Record of a Meeting of the Three Western Foreign Ministers..., 29 September 1949, F.O. 371/76451(C7755), Public Records Office (Kew), London; and Ibid.

\(^4\) Ibid.
ability to demonstrate that even against formidable odds he always resolutely pursued a treaty. Within the next few weeks there would likely be industrial problems in Britain as a result of the devaluation of the pound, and the Soviet Union would undoubtedly try to exploit such discontent. Thus "...it would do no harm if an agreement were reached with the Soviet on the Austrian Treaty and the situation calmed down somewhat for a fortnight or so. They were agreed as to the diagnosis of the evil. There could be no harm in applying/conciliatory bedside manner for a short period!"  

The whole case for Western concessions, of course, rested upon the conviction that the Soviet Union really wanted to sign an Austrian treaty now and that it was a unique opportunity for the Western powers. Bevin certainly believed this, and following a meeting with Vyshinsky the British Foreign Minister felt even more certain. On 1 October 1949, Bevin wrote in a personal letter to Acheson: "I came to the conclusion that the Russians desire a Treaty. I cannot ascertain the reason, but it appears to me quite clear that Stalin has instructed that, within reason, an effort should be made to clear up this matter..."  

Subsequent signs of Soviet intentions were still more favourable: Vyshinsky eventually told the other three foreign ministers that if the

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1 British Record of a Meeting of the Three Western Foreign Ministers..., 29 September 1949, F.O. 371/76451(C7755), Public Records Office (Kew), London.

2 Letter from Bevin to Acheson, 1 October 1949, F.O. 371/76451(C7962), Public Records Office (Kew), London.
Western powers agreed to the Soviet version of Article 35, the remaining articles would present no difficulties.¹

But Acheson still could not take the responsibility for making concessions to the Soviet Union. He finally admitted to his Western colleagues that whatever his personal feelings, there was no way he would agree to conclude a treaty on Soviet terms unless he had the approval of the National Security Council, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the President.²

By mid-October 1949, therefore, apparently the greatest obstacle to the signature of an Austrian treaty incorporating Soviet economic demands was the American bureaucracy. Wearied by French and British pressure and impressed by evidence of Soviet intentions to sign a treaty, Acheson returned to Washington determined to forge a consensus one way or another in U.S. policy.

The National Security Council met on 20 October 1949 and again considered American policy with respect to Austria. Presenting the case for the signature of the Austrian treaty, Acheson argued that failure to achieve a treaty would precipitate the permanent division of Austria and enhance the danger that the


Austrians would tend towards either pan-Germanism or Communism.\(^1\) Above all, the breakdown of the negotiations now, after so much progress had been made and so many hopes raised, would shatter Austrian confidence in the United States and convince the world that it was the Americans' fault.

The Department of Defense in turn reemphasized that it would be foolish for the United States to sign a treaty without adequate provision for the security and defense of Austria. The progress which had been made since the war toward Austrian recovery and stability would all be lost. It was possible that money could be requested by the National Security Council to finance an Austrian army, and it was even possible that last minute arrangements could be made for the training of the army. All of these things might make a treaty more feasible. Also perhaps the State Department could negotiate a longer time period for the withdrawal of U.S. forces and thereby make the treaty more attractive for the military. Defense representatives realized that the State Department had primary responsibility for the economic and political aspects of the treaty, and thus they stressed that the Defense Department did not actively oppose the State Department's position. But the most important reason why it absolutely could not concur in the recommendations of the Department of State was that the local military representative, a man in whom the Defense

\(^1\) "Notes on the Security Council Meeting Relative to Austrian Peace Treaty," 20 October 1949, dictated by Tracy S. Voorhees, Under Secretary of the Army, R.G. 330, Records of the Secretary of Defense, Military Documents Section, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
Department had a great deal of confidence, was adamantly opposed to the treaty as it now stood.\(^1\) To the annoyance of State Department officials,\(^2\) the Under Secretary of the Army referred over and over to the following message received from General Keyes on the day before the meeting of the National Security Council:

> If we assume that all concessions are acceptable and that the four powers and Austria sign ratify and deposit the treaty it is felt here that Austria cannot withstand Soviet domination any more than her neighbors Czechoslovakia and Hungary were able to ward off communist inroads. Austria cannot pay the cost of the present treaty. Soviet penetration in the economic field is assisted by the concessions agreed in Article 35. Those can and will lead to political crisis and assist in political penetration. The lack of provision for an adequate security force in being at the time of ratification of the treaty will lessen Austrian will to resist the imminent inclusion of Austria in the Soviet sphere of influence. From my local point of view I feel that if the treaty as presently proposed and further modified by the concessions suggested in your [telegram] is concluded it can only be interpreted as a Soviet victory. A victory won by typical methods of stubbornness and intransigency; won by advancing exorbitant demands and gaining their ends through minor and relatively unimportant concessions.\(^3\)

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1 Memorandum from Tracy S. Voorhees, Deputy to the Secretary of Defense as to Occupied Areas, to the Secretary of Defense, 20 October 1949, Subject: "Austrian Treaty Negotiations--NSC/38, 38/1 and 38/2," R.G. 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, National Archives, Washington, D.C.


3 Statement by General Keyes contained in Memorandum from
The meeting of the National Security Council ended inconclusively.

Apparently Harry Truman's fabled desk sign, "The Buck Stops Here," was accurate, for when the National Security Council still could not agree upon the question of whether or not the United States should agree to the treaty, Johnson and Acheson decided to present their respective positions to the President and ask him to decide. Describing the upcoming meeting in a personal letter, a State Department member observed, "This puts the President in a rather difficult spot and if he were not an amiable man I believe he would get very mad with his Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense for bad staff work, and ask them to go back to the NSC to work out an agreed recommendation."1 But this indeed did not happen, and when Johnson and Acheson met with the President on 26 October 1949, Truman made the final decision: "The President stated that he had given the problem careful consideration and felt without question that the Treaty should be concluded in order to obtain the withdrawal of Soviet military forces from Austria and to gain the general political advantages which will be derived from this action. He considered that steps can and

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Tracey S. Voorhees, Deputy to the Secretary of Defense as to Occupied Areas to the Secretary of Defense, 20 October 1949, Subject: "Austrian Treaty Negotiations--NSC/38, 38/1, and 38/2," R.G. 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

should be taken by the Department of State and the Department of National Defense prior to the withdrawal of the occupation forces to establish an adequate Austrian security force."¹ After four months of inter-departmental wrangling, the United States finally had a clear policy.

The President's decision was a turning point in Western policy toward Austria, for it enabled the three Western powers to make the economic concessions which the Soviet delegates had indicated were the final prerequisite to the signature of the treaty. Two days after President Truman decided that a treaty should be concluded, the United States Deputy, speaking on behalf of the Western powers, presented a compromise proposal to the Soviet delegation in New York. If the Soviet Union would agree to the Western version of the five remaining unsettled articles of the treaty, the Western powers would agree to virtually all of the Russian demands under Article 35. But the Soviet deputy flatly refused to consider a package approach to the disputed articles. First the four powers must reach agreement on Article 35, he insisted; then the other disputed articles could be considered.²

In Washington, a few weeks later, President Truman signed

¹Memorandum of Conversation, Meeting of the Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, and President Truman, "Austrian Treaty," 26 October 1949, in the Papers of Dean Acheson, Harry S Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

²Minute addressed to the Private Secretary by Mr. A.G. Gilchrist, 26 November 1949, F.O. 371/76453(C9155), Public Records Office (Kew), London.
NSC 38/4, a document officially instructing that "the President has determined that it should be United States policy to agree at an early date to a draft Austrian treaty on the best terms available."¹ On the same day, 18 November 1949, events took a dramatic turn at the deputy's meetings in New York. With the French yet reserving the right possibly to make future conditions, the three Western deputies gave way completely to the Soviet demands for German assets in Austria. The Western powers entirely conceded Soviet terms under Article 35, in the belief that the signs since June of Soviet plans to leave Austria were accurate, and that the assurances made by Vyshinsky and Zarubin in the negotiations were reliable. The capitulation was potentially so controversial in the West that the French, British and American representatives kept it a secret:

The three Western Deputies agreed to avoid announcing our surrender on Article 35 until progress had been made on the other articles. We agreed to say merely that progress had been made in the discussion about Article 35 in connexion with other articles.²

The Western powers had finally, reluctantly taken the step which the British had advocated for months.

¹A Report to the President by the National Security Council on "Future Courses of U.S. Action with Respect to Austria," NSC 38/4, 17 November 1949; Approved by the President on 18 November 1949; President's Secretary File, Harry S Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

But by mid-November 1949, the Soviet Union had obviously decided it did not now want a treaty. To the dismay and indignation of the Western powers, the Soviet deputy accepted the concessions and offered nothing in return.¹ Three days later, Zarubin announced that he could not negotiate the remaining articles of the treaty until bilateral talks between the U.S.S.R. and Austria regarding payment for postwar relief supplies were completed. The Austrians were willing to pay for these supplies, which they explained had been mostly dried peas taken from the German Wehrmacht stores in Vienna and distributed to the starving Austrian population immediately after the liberation.² But in the bilateral exchanges the Soviet Union apparently refused to settle on a price. In Vienna, the Soviet Foreign Minister invited the Austrians to submit their proposals for payment in writing. The Austrians did so, but there was no Soviet response. Undaunted, the Austrians dispatched one letter after another proposing terms of payment, but Moscow offered no reply. Asked repeatedly about the letters, the Deputy Russian High Commissioner in Vienna gave the Austrians a standard response: "We are studying the matter."³

The "dried pea debt" negotiations were allegedly held in


²Ibid., p. 18.

³Gruber, Between Liberation and Liberty, pp. 174-175.
Vienna, but little was heard of them. As the months went by, the Soviet Union either spoke in ambiguous terms of 'difficulties' in the negotiations, or else refused to comment at all about their progress. It was clear to the Western powers that the Soviet Union was not interested in expediting the conclusion of the bilateral talks. The four power negotiations were effectively made hostage to Soviet behaviour in an arena in which the Soviet Union exercised complete control.

The deputies met intermittently over the subsequent months, but they made no further progress towards an Austrian treaty. The dried pea debt was the first in a long series of excuses extraneous to the treaty itself which were used by the Soviet Union to obstruct progress in the negotiations. The momentum of the Paris agreements was lost completely; after November 1949, the Soviet Union showed no desire to sign an Austrian treaty, even on attractive financial terms. Indeed, 1949 was the last year of genuine four power negotiation for a treaty.

Through bureaucratic inefficiency and domestic disagreement, the United States had delayed the evolution of the Western negotiating position by putting off the economic concessions which

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1 Minute addressed to the Secretary of State by I. Kirkpatrick, 12 December 1949, F.O. 371/76457(C9642), Public Records Office (Kew), London.


3 Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [Bevin], to the Cabinet, 11 April 1950, C.O. (50) 66, Cabinet Office Papers 129/39, Public Records Office (Kew), London.
the British felt were inevitable. For a short period of five months, the Soviet Union seemed to be offering an unprecedented opportunity for a treaty. By the time the American State Department had received the mandate required to pursue that opportunity, it was too late and the opportunity was gone. But how genuine had the fleeting opportunity been? Had the Russians actually wanted a treaty in the spring of 1949? Or were the Western powers simply tricked into believing they did?

Every indication is that the apparent willingness of the Soviet Union to sign a treaty immediately after the Paris Conference was genuine. Soviet actions in Austria certainly implied that the occupation would soon be withdrawn. The refusal to issue bank credits and the decision to take only short term orders in Soviet-run factories were both signs of an imminent Soviet departure.

Moreover, the Soviet delegates would not likely have bargained so hard over economic issues if they had not been intending to sign a treaty. The Soviet Union could have used extraneous issues long before November 1949 to prevent agreement on a treaty. Besides, with the concessions the West eventually made under Article 35, the treaty would have granted the Soviet Union economic advantages comparable to those they had while in occupation, without the presence of Western troops.

If the treaty had been signed in 1949, Stalin would probably have had even greater economic leverage over the Austrian government than he had while the country was occupied. In the autumn of 1949,
The Austrian parliament was not sure it could make even the first payment of the debt it would owe the Soviet government under the treaty. Inability to pay the debt could have had serious consequences. As Acheson pointed out to Bevin, the first payment was due two months after the treaty's signature, and four power troop withdrawals were slated for three months after signature. Stalin could have used Austria's failure to meet the payment as a reason to keep Soviet troops in Austria, if he wished to do so. Even if the Western powers had then also decided to keep troops in Austria to offset Soviet troops, the situation would have been similar to that which existed before the treaty was signed, with the important difference that the U.S.S.R. would have legal justification for its exorbitant economic demands. In any case, the Soviet Union would have been in a very strong economic position after the treaty was signed.

Greater economic control over Austria would have been an attractive asset to Stalin's plans in Europe. By mid-1949, Stalin was just completing the process of economic consolidation in Eastern Europe, and increased economic leverage over Austria could only help in that consolidation. Britain and especially France were experiencing major economic difficulties following the war, and such economic instability could only be helpful to

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1 British Record of a Meeting of the Three Western Foreign Ministers to discuss the Austrian Treaty, held at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel at 4:00 p.m. on Thursday, 29 September 1949, F.O. 371/76451(C7755), Public Records Office (Kew), London.

2 Ibid.
the international Communist cause. Signing an Austrian treaty would be one way to decrease the stabilizing influence of the United States in Europe by ensuring American withdrawal from Austria. Furthermore, the Soviet Union was quite aware that following the signature of a treaty, U.S. dollars used to aid Austria could be funnelled into the U.S.S.R. through German asset payments. For these reasons, the Soviet delegates seemed very willing to sign a treaty and squeezed every possible economic concession from the Western powers.

But this negotiating tactic changed in the autumn of 1949. There is no reason to believe that Foreign Minister Vyshinsky overstepped his authority when he gave assurances in October that the remaining articles of the treaty would present no difficulties if the Western powers would agree to Soviet economic terms. Vyshinsky was a shrewd politician, best known for his role as Prosecutor General of the U.S.S.R. in the great purge trials of the 1930's.\(^1\) After Vyshinsky returned home to the Soviet Union he remained in Stalin's favour and continued as Foreign Minister until the leader's death. Clearly Vyshinsky enjoyed Stalin's confidence—to the extent that such a thing was possible. When Vyshinsky and his deputy, Zarubin, changed their negotiating tactics at the Austrian treaty negotiations from hard bargaining to obvious obstructionism, it can only have been with Stalin's blessing.

Indeed, there is really only one remaining explanation of the change in Soviet negotiating behaviour in 1949: Stalin changed his mind. When it finally became apparent that the Western powers were going to sign the treaty, Stalin was no longer interested. By November, the rationale for signing an agreement was no longer convincing, and the economic assets which had been so enticing in previous months were no longer of primary importance. In the autumn of 1949, there were four things which prompted a major change in Soviet foreign policy, and the decision not to sign a treaty and not to withdraw from Austria was only a minor part of that change.

The Soviet Union's sudden decision not to continue negotiations for an Austrian treaty was in the first place directly related to Soviet policy in Germany. After the announcement of the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany on 23 May 1949, Stalin had still held out hope that the practical formation of the western state might be averted. At the Paris Conference, Vyshinsky had tried and failed to negotiate a return to four power control. When the West German Bundestag convened in September, the Soviet Union quickly established the German Democratic Republic, and the likelihood of East-West reconciliation with respect to Germany was small.¹

On her own, Austria had not been vital, and in early 1949 her greatest usefulness to the Soviet Union had seemed to be the

economic assets the country would provide under the treaty. But events in Germany coupled with developments in the Austrian negotiations had cast the smaller country in a new light. By October 1949, the best possible source of political leverage for the Soviet Union in the deteriorating German situation was Austria.\(^{1}\) Ironically, by their large economic concessions in the negotiations the Western powers had indicated to the Soviet Union that they were indeed strongly interested in getting an Austrian treaty and that therefore it might be wise to hold on to the only position in Western Europe in which the Soviet Union now clearly controlled the outcome of East-West negotiations.

The second cause of a major change in Soviet foreign policy in the fall of 1949 was the reason most often cited by political pundits of the day: the successful testing of a Soviet atomic weapon in late August 1949.\(^{2}\) The belief at the time that the Soviet Union had developed the bomb in order to frighten the West into submission or force Western Europe to appease Stalin's designs was exaggerated, but it is no doubt true that the possession

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\(^{1}\)There had also been a great deal of speculation in the press about a Truman-Stalin summit meeting. It might have crossed Stalin's mind that he should retain Austria as a bargaining counter with which to extract concessions from Truman. Philip E. Mosely, "The Treaty with Austria," *International Organization*, Vol. IV, No. 2 (May 1950), p. 219.

of "the secret of the atomic bomb" enhanced Soviet self-confidence. Certainly in popular perceptions, the breaking of the U.S. atomic monopoly brought the U.S.S.R. a stronger international position of power and formalized the emerging political and military standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the U.S.S.R. the year 1949 also marked the beginning of a series of new programmes to modernize and improve the Soviet armed forces. The period of conciliation in Soviet foreign policy had lasted only a few months and by the end of 1949 was replaced by a vigorous national effort to build up the Soviet conventional—and, eventually, nuclear—arsenals. It was not a time conducive to the signing of treaties, the withdrawal of forces, and the ceding of territory.

A third major change in Soviet foreign policy was the launching of the anti-Tito witch hunts in Eastern Europe. The economic consolidation of a Soviet empire was essentially completed, with numerous agreements and cooperative industrial ventures intact by 1949; but in Stalin's eyes, Eastern Europe had not yet been politically purified. On 27 September 1949 the U.S.S.R. repudiated its treaty of friendship with Yugoslavia, and Stalin used the threat of "Tito-ism" as an excuse for a wave of terror and purges throughout the new satellite states which lasted from mid-1949 through 1951.

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1Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, p. 38.
2Ibid., pp. 38-49.
The Soviet-sponsored campaign began in the countries bordering Yugoslavia and continued north through Eastern Europe until each of the new satellites had undergone a purge reminiscent of the pervasive and horrifying Soviet purges of the 1930's. Romania underwent a series of trials in 1949 designed to rid the country of "deviationists." In June, Albania's Communist Vice Premier, among others, was convicted of being a Yugoslav agent and executed. Bulgaria's Communist Deputy Premier was found guilty of ideological deviation and executed in December. In Hungary, the Communist Foreign Minister Rajk and other leaders were arrested, tried and also executed in December, after which a huge number of other Hungarian Communists met the same fate. Poland's Central Committee expelled a number of senior members for "Titoist" sympathies. Czechoslovakia had already been undergoing purges since February 1948; however beginning in 1950 a new series of political trials began wherein members of the government were accused of anti-Soviet, pro-Western sympathies, and most Westerners were barred from the country.

It is likely that Stalin planned this wave of purges months before and decided in late 1949 that it was not desirable to withdraw Soviet troops from such a convenient location and thereby risk Western encroachments up to the borders of Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Moreover, it is quite possible that the new Eastern

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2Bader, Austria Between East and West, 1945-1955, pp. 198-199.
European Communists were themselves worried about the effect a Soviet withdrawal from Austria would have on their tenuous positions. As the Austrian negotiations moved closer to the signing of a treaty, Stalin's new Eastern European minions may have reminded him of the deep historical connections between Austria and Eastern Europe, particularly between the peoples of Austria and Hungary. In late 1949, the fragile Communist regimes in Hungary and Czechoslovakia could never have withstood the pressure of an independent Western state on their borders, and the new Communist leaders probably expressed their concerns to the Kremlin. When the treaty was finally agreed years later, it was certainly no coincidence that the Warsaw Pact treaty was signed on the day before the Austrian State Treaty.

Finally, in late 1949 there was a shift of focus in Soviet foreign policy from Europe to Asia. Europe still retained its importance for the Soviet Union, but Soviet policy there was now a process of consolidation rather than change. With the exception of Austria, the lines of East-West division in Europe had become clear by autumn 1949, and events in China held far more interest and opportunity for the Soviet Union.\footnote{Alvin Z. Rubinstein, ed. The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union (New York: Random House, 1960), p. 247.} The Chinese Communists under Mao Tse-tung had taken power without Soviet help. Indeed, throughout most of the Chinese civil war the U.S.S.R. had maintained proper diplomatic relations with the Kuomintang, and it is probably fair to say that Stalin did not expect Mao to win.\footnote{Ibid., p. 249.}
an important sense, then, Stalin was forced to pay attention to developments in the East, or else risk the appearance in Communist ranks of a rift of such massive proportions that it would make Tito-ism look insignificant.

The People's Republic of China was founded on 1 October 1949. By December, Mao had come to Moscow for a visit which lasted two months. During this time, Stalin's attention was clearly diverted from Austria. The Sino-Soviet consultations were a portent of events in the Far East which would soon monopolize Western attention as well.

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1Ibid.
In the late autumn of 1949, after four years of tough negotiations, the goal of Austrian independence began to appear not only elusive but futile. In November, the same month that President Truman signed NSC 38/4 and clarified the importance of a quick settlement, the Russians had begun to show diminishing interest in an Austrian treaty. Although the Western allies had made important concessions on the question of German assets, it soon became obvious that, regardless of the terms, the Soviet Union had no intention of signing a treaty. Before 1950, the Soviet Union seemed to be willing to accept a treaty if the economic terms were so advantageous as to be preferable to the status quo. Despite Soviet recalcitrance, therefore, the negotiations process was undertaken with at least some sincerity; if the terms had been good enough, the Russians might well have been bribed by the West. After 1950, however, this was no longer true. The Soviet position at the negotiations changed from stubborn hard bargaining to blatant obstructionism. Indeed, between November 1949 and March 1953, the Russians employed one pretext after another to ensure a breakdown of the negotiations.

The disturbing thing about the issues raised by the Soviet Union after November 1949 was that they evolved from an economic to
a political nature. Beginning in the late autumn, articles appeared in the Soviet press warning of resurgent fascism in Austria and accusing the Austrian government of being militarist in nature. The attack on the fundamental nature of the Austrian government boded ill for prospects of an Austrian treaty. Indeed, as the months progressed, complaints about the "dried pea debt" were gradually replaced by ominous warnings of dangerous militarism in Austria. Held in reserve for months, Soviet knowledge of the stockpiling of military equipment in the Western zones and plans for arming the Austrian gendarmerie now emerged as a justification for putting off the treaty. The Western powers no longer wondered why the Russians had stifled their formal complaint at the Allied Council in the spring of 1949, for Soviet accusations about Western military activities appeared in 1950 with the accumulated proof and self righteous justification that would have been impossible in earlier months.

In casting aspersions on the very nature of the Austrian government and the character of Western support for that government, the Soviet leaders employed arguments of such a general nature that no specific Western concessions or treaty proposals could be sufficient to offset them. Thus there was soon no common basis for negotiations; and the prospects for an Austrian State Treaty which had seemed so bright during 1949 evaporated after 1950.

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1 Telegram from Sir Harold Caccia, Vienna, to Foreign Office, 3 May 1950, F.O. 371/84903(C2985), Public Records Office (Kew), London.

The erosion of the basis for negotiation could not, however, be blamed solely upon the Russians. No sooner had the British begun to congratulate themselves upon their success in "persuading" the Americans to make the concessions necessary to pursue a treaty in late 1949 but the French began to show signs of reversing their apparent willingness to sign. The French based their objections to the treaty upon two specific matters: the paragraph dealing with displaced persons in Austria (Article 16, paragraph 5), and the question of Austrian rearmament. Discussions between the British and French foreign offices soon revealed, however, that French reservations about signing the treaty had much deeper roots.

Beginning in late November, the French deputy to the Austrian treaty negotiations, M. Berthelot, informed his British and American colleagues, Mr. Mallet and Mr. Reber, that he could not agree to the Soviet draft of the treaty article dealing with displaced persons. By the terms of the proposed draft, the Austrians would not be permitted to provide relief to persons who had collaborated with the Nazis or who were engaged in activities hostile to their countries of origin. While the Americans had also had serious qualms about this article, American Deputy Sam Reber was now under instructions to accept the Soviet draft in order to reach agreement on the treaty. But regardless of extremely strong British pressure both in New York and in Paris, the Quai d'Orsay refused to authorise French deputy Berthelot to agree to the article until the Russians somehow proved that they really wanted a treaty. On 26 November, the exasperated British delegate sent a message to the Foreign Office:
I hope you will intervene with Schuman himself if necessary in order to get the French Government to withdraw their opposition to Article 16 paragraph 5. No one likes this paragraph, least of all the Americans who have for months strenuously fought the Soviet over this Article but they have withdrawn their opposition in order to make a treaty possible. How do the French expect to have proof that the Russians really want a treaty when the whole point of the operation is that it is we who are trying to get the Treaty for reasons which M. Schuman appeared to consider adequate when the Secretary of State exposed them to him and Mr. Acheson here in New York. Surely it is a little late to decide now that no further concessions can be made to the Russians. It is just petty-mindedness to insist that it is now the turn of the Russians to make a concession....

Discussions were held the next day in Paris between the British Ambassador to France, Sir. O. Harvey, and French Foreign Minister Schuman, but the results of the talks were disappointing to the British. Schuman claimed that for strong personal reasons he could not agree to the article. "[H]e considered that the Vichy Government's surrender of political refugees to the Germans had been one of their most reprehensible acts, [and] he found it difficult to condone a like act," the British Ambassador reported. According to M. Schuman, the adoption of the Soviet draft of Article 16(5) would raise the number of displaced persons subject to possible return to the Soviet Union from four to forty thousand, and the French Foreign Minister


2 Telegram from Sir O. Harvey, Paris, to Foreign Office, 27 November 1949, F.O. 371/76453(C9092), Public Records Office (Kew), London.
objected to such a prospect.\footnote{Ibid.} Officials in the British Foreign Office recognized the argument on humanitarian grounds, but maintained that it was a meagre excuse for delaying the treaty. Whatever the merit of the French case, the British were angered by the last minute nature of this attempt to abrogate the agreement reached between the three foreign ministers that an early treaty was essential.\footnote{Telegram from Sir A. Codogan, United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations, New York, to Foreign Office, 28 November 1949, F.O. 371/76453(9128), Public Records Office (Kew), London.}

At the same time, the second French objection to the treaty emerged and threatened to fracture the Western negotiating position. In the end of November, the French Foreign Office began to insist that the subject of Austrian rearmament be raised with the Russians in New York and the terms settled to Western satisfaction in advance of the completion of the treaty. But British and American diplomats were extremely averse to this suggestion. The time to approach the Russians regarding an Austrian army was right \textit{after} the signature of the treaty, they argued; otherwise the treaty would be indefinitely delayed.\footnote{Minute by I.F. Porter, 28 November 1949, F.O. 371/76454(C9228), Public Records Office (Kew), London.} This time the Americans pointed out that the French proposal was in direct contradiction to an agreement reached on 15 September between the three foreign ministers, and that it also contradicted the general tripartite understanding regarding early agreement to a treaty.\footnote{Telegram from Sir A. Cadogan, United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations, New York, to Foreign Office, 28 November 1949, F.O. 371/76453(9128), Public Records Office (Kew), London.} However, the French continued to insist that the arrangements
be agreed in advance, arguing that if for some reason no agreement were reached and the Western powers took their own separate action in the Western zones, the Soviet Union might use that action as a pretext for refusing to ratify the treaty.¹

Both issues raised by the French were familiar to the British and the Americans, and most of the Western diplomats recognized that there was at least some merit in the French arguments. But the timing was poor. Acheson, Bevin and Schuman had agreed, in their meetings in New York, that an early treaty was the first priority and that the concessions necessary to achieve that treaty would simply have to be made. The sudden French reversal was a surprise to the other Western powers and it particularly frustrated the British, who blamed the French military for sabotaging the treaty negotiations. Some months later, British Foreign Secretary Bevin presented the Cabinet with the following explanation of French behaviour:

The attitude of the French Government towards the conclusion of the Austrian Treaty had never been a factor of prime importance, and they were generally content to associate themselves with agreed Anglo-American policy. However, no sooner had we at last got American agreement in New York than the French Government raised fundamental objections to concluding the treaty at all. This eleventh-hour initiative was mainly the work of the French military authorities and their supporters, who regard the continued presence of American troops in Austria as a guarantee of French security. The French opponents of the treaty also exploited the personal preoccupation of M. Schuman with the problem of displaced persons and

refugees which arises on Article 16, a matter with which he appeared to come in contact for the first time in New York, although it had been before us for nearly three years. I do not doubt that M. Schuman's qualms were perfectly genuine, although we ourselves consider them to be exaggerated.¹

The British belief that the French military were behind efforts to sabotage the treaty was apparently justified. At the end of 1949, the weakness and volatility of the French government encouraged French military interference in foreign policy. Indeed, during October, shortly after the Queuille government collapsed, M. Berthelot had confided in Mr. Mallet that he feared the French militaires would undermine the Austrian treaty at a time when there was no French government to defend it.² It seems that Berthelot's fears were a few weeks premature, but accurate. The French military were sceptical of Austria's ability to maintain her independence after the withdrawal of Western—and particularly American—forces. According to British sources, French military officials were particularly concerned about the status of the Austrian Tyrol in the event of war. French strategists considered the buffer zone of northern Italy and the Austrian Tyrol to be vital to the defence of France from any threats coming from the East.³ The withdrawal of Allied troops would increase

¹Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [E. Bevin] to the Cabinet, 11 April 1950, C.P. (50)66, Cabinet Office Papers 129/39, Public Records Office (Kew), London.

²Letter from Mr. Mallet, c/o the United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations, New York, to P.H. Dean, German Political Department, Foreign Office, F.O. 371/76452(C8709), Public Records Office (Kew), London.

³Foreign Office Minute, FP/BRIEF/6, Top Secret, "Four-Power
the threat of a Communist takeover in Austria similar to that which
had occurred recently in Czechoslovakia, and would also discourage
anti-Communist forces in the Soviet satellite countries and in Western
Europe.¹

Underlying the logical political and strategic arguments about
the occupation of Austria, however, was a deep French distrust of the
Austrians themselves and particularly of the Austrians' determination
to protect their own independence. This lack of confidence in the
Austrians was not confined to the French military but pervaded much
of the French government, from the Foreign Office to the French
Assembly.² Citing Austrian behaviour between the wars, many French
officials believed that the Austrians would never have the conviction
and unity to withstand the Russian pressure which would be exerted
through the economic terms of the treaty; and they predicted that an
independent Austria would eventually end up as another Soviet
satellite.³ Thus, when General Bethouart, High Commissioner of the
French zone in Austria, began lobbying in Paris at the end of 1949
against immediate conclusion of the treaty, the doubts he planted

¹Talks Preliminary Conference: Brief on the Austrian Treaty," 27
February 1951 (distributed in Foreign Office by E.J.W. Barnes), F.O.
371/93602(CA1071/15), Public Records Office (Kew), London.

²Foreign Office Minute by Mr. Mallet to Lord Henderson and Sir
D. Gainer, 11 December 1950, F.O. 371/84911(C8022), Public Records
Office (Kew), London.

³Letter from Mr. W. Hayter, U.K. Embassy, Parris, to Mr. P.
Dean, German Political Department, Foreign Office, 21 December 1949,
F.O. 371/76458(C9899), Public Records Office (Kew), London.
apparently grew in fertile soil.\textsuperscript{1} At the time of the reversal of French policy in the negotiations, it was far from clear that the French government would have been able to muster the votes required to ratify an Austrian treaty anyway.\textsuperscript{2}

General Bethouart explained his views to Sir Harold Caccia in Vienna. After the withdrawal of the Western powers, the survival of Austria would be the responsibility of the Austrians, General Bethouart observed:

And there, as Bethouart sees it, is the rub. They are, he said, a female race and they are ready to be violated. Last time it was the Germans. The next time it may be the Russians. They are not only female, he went on, but in many ways oriental in their fatalism and readiness to accept what they feel is an irresistible force....\textsuperscript{3}

Even at such a time as it might be wise to agree to an Austrian treaty, Bethouart argued, the following measures should be taken to ensure the continuing independence of France's neighbour:

What, he said, do you do if you want to make a rape more difficult? You keep the woman under constant observation and never allow her alone with her intending despoiler. So, immediately after the implementation of the Treaty, the Austrians should be brought into the Council of Europe and as soon as possible thereafter the permanent seat of the

\textsuperscript{1}Foreign Office Minute by Sir I. Kirkpatrick [concerning a meeting with the French Ambassador], F.O. 371/84895(C58), Public Records Office (Kew), London.

\textsuperscript{2}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{3}Letter from Sir H. Caccia to Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, 19 December 1949, F.O. 371/76458(C9969), Public Records Office (Kew), London.
Council should be moved to Vienna. That would make the Austrians and Russians behave more cautiously. At any rate, the main Austrian political parties might hesitate to repeat the follies of the years between the wars and destroy Austria in their battles with each other. It might also make the Russians risk less.\textsuperscript{1}

The British countered French reservations about the treaty with four arguments. First, while it might be true that the Austrians were not very strong at the moment, continued Soviet occupation would likely weaken the Austrians economically and politically still further. In any case, there was certainly no guarantee that in one or two years' time the Austrians would be more self-sufficient. Second, the prestige of the pro-West Austrian government would be seriously damaged by any hint of Western stalling in the negotiations; again, this would not enhance Austria's ability to withstand Soviet pressure. Third, widespread disillusionment could lead to the resurgence of national socialism in Austria. If the economic and political status of western Germany continued to improve while that of Austria deteriorated, there could be a rebirth of pan-Germanism in Austria and even a movement towards another Anschluss. Obviously such a development would be extremely damaging to French interests, the British argued.\textsuperscript{2}

By January 1950, the British and the Americans had apparently once again persuaded the reluctant French that it was in their

\textsuperscript{1}Ibid. It is interesting to note that years later, after they had achieved independence, the Austrians themselves implemented a similar plan, by building a huge complex on the outskirts of Vienna designed to supplement or even supersede New York and Geneva as the United Nations headquarters.

\textsuperscript{2}Foreign Office Minute by Sir I. Kirkpatrick, 4 January 1950, F.O. 371/84895(C58), Public Records Office (Kew), London.
interests to sign a treaty. But also by this time the Russians had stopped negotiating and were clearly obstructing the negotiations. Indeed, the first indication that the French placed their objections to specific clauses of the treaty above the Western powers' goal of seeking an early treaty had emerged in late November, at about the same time that Soviet policy in the negotiations changed. The qualms of the French government had threatened the cohesiveness of the Western negotiating position and had irritated the Americans and especially the British, but they had not in themselves prevented the completion of the Austrian treaty in 1949. Soviet behaviour in the negotiations clearly indicated that the opportunity of the Paris initiative had already been lost.

Nevertheless, throughout this period Austrian officials ruefully observed the behaviour of the Western powers and became increasingly disillusioned. The Austrians continued to blame primarily the Soviet Union for the delay in the treaty's signature, but they believed that the bickering and disunity among the Western powers was contributing to the delay by destroying the cohesiveness of the Western position and removing any potential for leverage with the Soviet Union. Plainly speaking, in the negotiations the Austrians had expected the Russians to be obstreperous, but they had had much higher hopes for the Western allies. In 1949, at least, Austrian hopes were disappointed. In a private interview with a French official, Austrian President Renner, the aged politician who was largely responsible for Austria's postwar national government, curtly responded to the French...
criticisms and delivered the following scathing critique of Western policy:

...[Y]ou have sacrificed the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1919 and have abandoned Austria in 1938 for Czechoslovakia which in turn you abandoned also. These are bad precedents.

Besides, you are weak, you do not agree with one another and you declare that, in the event of an aggression by the Russians, you would defend yourselves on the Rhine, which means that you would abandon us once more.

In these conditions, and even though 90 percent of the population feels, by its culture and its traditions, tied to the Western Powers, how do you want us to adhere to an organization such as the European Union which answers all of our wishes and my own in particular? As a responsible leader of this country I can ... only recommend a policy of strict neutrality between the two allied blocs.

But the day when I will see the French and the British High Commissioners come into my office and assure me of their agreement between themselves and of their common support and, when behind them, the U.S. High Commissioner guarantees me that he supports them, then I will sign with both hands the request for adherence to the European Union.¹

This statement was an interesting portent of events to come.

In January 1950, the Soviet Union maintained the position that no progress could be made toward an Austrian treaty until the Soviet-Austrian negotiations regarding postwar relief supplies were concluded. Although the foreign ministers' deputies met in London on 9 January 1950, the Soviet deputy had received no information or new instructions from Moscow regarding the "dried pea debt" negotiations, so progress toward an Austrian treaty was impossible.

¹Memorandum given by French High Commissioner [General Bethouart] to General Galloway, Vienna, [October 1949], F.O. 371/76496(C8543), Public Records Office (Kew), London. (Translated from French.)
Annoyed by the Soviet Union's apparent aim of delaying the talks, the Western powers instructed their ambassadors in Moscow to lodge a formal protest with the Soviet government. The French, British, and American ambassadors tried to arrange an audience with Foreign Minister Vyshinsky but were informed that he was ill. Instead, they were received by Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. Gromyko was apparently acting under instructions not to be drawn into a lengthy conversation; but the three ambassadors succeeded in keeping him under cross examination for fifty minutes. Nonetheless, Gromyko gave only evasive replies to their queries. Finally, U.S. Ambassador Admiral Alan Kirk got to the heart of the matter: "How long, Mr. Minister, before we can hope to reach an agreement? This has gone on now for some time." Gromyko replied, "That depends on the value you place on time."  

Subsequent meetings of the four deputies also failed to yield any progress. The Soviet delegate refused to discuss any of the few remaining articles of the treaty until the issue of Austrian post-liberation debts had been settled. But he also refused to give any indication of how the negotiations were progressing or when they would be finished. In April the Russians tried a different approach, maintaining that an imminent resurgence of Nazism in Austria required


2 Ibid.

the inclusion in the treaty of an amendment to Article 9 containing measures to prevent the rise of Fascist organisations. The amendment mandated the Austrian government to take action against all bodies "of a Fascist type," and thus was so loosely worded as to permit broad Soviet interpretation of the term "Fascist."

Only eight days later the Russians demanded that the signature of an Austrian State Treaty be contingent upon the resolution of Soviet grievances about allied policy in Trieste. The allies were turning Trieste into an Anglo-American base, Soviet delegate Zaroubin charged. With such a precedent, how could the Western powers expect the Soviet Union to trust their word with regard to Austria?

Some Western observers believed that the real reason for Soviet concern about Trieste was its strategic importance in relation to Austria and Eastern Europe. In occupying Trieste, the Western powers held a Mediterranean port with direct access to central Europe. A Soviet withdrawal from Austria would complete the consolidation of Western power on the southern flank of Europe, thereby enhancing the political and military threat to Soviet East European allies as well as complicating any Soviet adventure towards the Rhine.1

In any case, this time the Soviet government had deliberately chosen an issue which would stall the talks indefinitely, for the Trieste controversy had reached an almost impossible impasse. Meetings during the remainder of 1950 were characterized by the repeated Soviet contention that the Trieste question must be solved to Soviet

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satisfaction before the Austrian treaty could even be considered. Western protests that Trieste was completely irrelevant to the Austrian treaty were ignored.\textsuperscript{1} Even the most optimistic observers were discouraged by Soviet behaviour. At the end of May 1950, British deputy Mr. Mallet informed Foreign Secretary Bevin that "[t]he Soviet Union had now made it abundantly clear that they had no intention of concluding the treaty...."\textsuperscript{2}

If during 1950 the Russians appeared to be deliberately seeking a breakdown of the Austrian negotiations, there were a number of reasons Stalin might want to do so. With four-power control of Austria operating reasonably well, the Soviet Union was holding a forward strategic position at Vienna with very little risk of war. A Soviet presence also gave Stalin political leverage with the Austrian government and some control over the destiny of the country; as later evidenced by an attempted Communist Putsch in September 1950, the dictator had not yet abandoned hope of turning Austria into a Soviet satellite. Furthermore, as mentioned in the preceding chapter, controlling the frontiers just beyond Russia's newly converted satellites minimized Western meddling in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and helped to guarantee that the Eastern bloc countries would not lightly consider the heresy of counter-revolution. Yugoslavia had recently severed ties with the Soviet Union, and eastern Austria was therefore a convenient base both for exerting political and military

\textsuperscript{1}Grayson, "Austria's International Position, 1938-1953," p. 149.

\textsuperscript{2}Minute for the Secretary of State by Mr. Mallet, 23 May 1950, F.O. 371/84904(C3578), Public Records Office (Kew), London.
pressure against Tito and checking the spread of "Titoist" influence. Indeed, an argument advanced by some observers in mid-1950 was that Stalin would not withdraw his troops until Tito had been overthrown.¹

Although the significant economic concessions made by the Western powers in 1949 had greatly increased Stalin's temptation to sign a treaty, nothing was lost by putting off the conclusion of the negotiations temporarily, since the resources collected by the Soviet Union in the interim were not subtracted from the Austrian reparations bill. Besides, Vienna had become the center for Soviet black market activity in Europe and was hence a lucrative outpost not to be surrendered easily.²

But many of these Soviet justifications to remain in Austria had existed for several years, and none of them adequately explains why in mid-1949 Stalin had seemed willing to sign a treaty if the price was right, and in 1950 he was not. The critical factor was Germany. The convening of the West German Bundestag in September 1949 had been followed a month later by the establishment of the German Democratic Republic, and within a few weeks the Soviet position in the negotiations had become blatantly obstructionist. The rapid sequence of events indicated that, in Stalin's eyes at least, there was a clear political connection between the two states which had outlived the Anschluss.

¹Gordon Shepherd, "Why Soviet Troops Are Still on Austrian Soil," The Daily Telegraph, 22 May 1950. (Shepherd cites the argument in order to rebuff it.)

²Telegram from Minister in Austria to Acting Secretary of State, No. 13, Vienna, 10 January 1949, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Vol. III.
Shortly after the founding of the Federal Republic, the Western allies began to believe that maintaining the security of Western Europe would be impossible without the rearmament of West Germany. This was a prospect that alarmed Stalin, and much of Russian foreign policy in the early 1950's focussed on preventing a remilitarized Germany. Sometime between October and November 1949, Stalin had decided that Austria's value as a bargaining chip in the struggle for the future of Germany far exceeded her economic and political attractiveness; therefore he hoped to use Austria as a quid pro quo to induce the Western powers to abandon, or at least to limit, West Germany's rearmament.\(^1\) Thus, throughout the early 1950's, Austria was in a sense held hostage to allied policy in West Germany.

During 1950, relations between the four military regimes in Austria became increasingly tense. In tripartite meetings during May, the Western powers decided to try to ease the situation in Austria by instituting a number of reforms, including replacing the military high commissioners with civilian diplomats and making determined efforts to reduce the burden of occupation costs.\(^2\) Although invited to

\(^1\)Allard, *Russia and the Austrian State Treaty*, pp. 91-93.

do so, the Russians refused to do the same.1

Western uneasiness about Soviet plans for Austria began to intensify in the first few months of 1950. One prominent item at that time was high-level consideration of measures to be adopted by the United States in the event of a Soviet blockade of Vienna. The members of the U.S. National Security Council feared that the Soviet Union could employ a blockade as a means of putting pressure on the Austrian government and driving the Western powers out of the country. A top secret report on the subject, NSC 63/1, instructed American forces in Austria to exercise fully all existing U.S. rights in the Soviet zone, to protest vigorously any interruption of those rights, to consult with British and French colleagues, and to make no threat of force. Finally, the directive warned: "Caution must be taken in preserving the security of these instructions and no steps should be taken which would lead the Soviet authorities or the Austrian population to believe that we are taking precautionary measures in anticipation of their action, thereby providing a pretext for aggressive or probing measures on their part."2 President Truman approved NSC 63/1, "U.S. Policy in the Event of a Blockade of Vienna," on 17 February 1950.

The Truman Administration apparently feared that what had happened in Berlin might well occur in Vienna. Moreover, in Vienna the Russians


2A Report to the President by the National Security Council on "U.S. Policy in the Event of a Blockade of Vienna," 16 February 1950, NSC 63/1, President's Secretary File, Harry S Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.
had a much stronger strategic position than they held in Berlin. The
airfield near Vienna which had been allotted to the United States was
located in Tulln, seventeen miles outside of the city and deep within
the Soviet zone. In the early years of the occupation, the Russians
had frequently blocked the road leading from Vienna to Tulln, and
even after a direct railway was established the route was constantly
subject to Soviet disruption.¹ To get to the airport, American planes
had to fly through a narrow corridor of Soviet-controlled air space.²
Even if they had wanted to do so, it would have been extremely
difficult—if not impossible—for the Americans to organise an airlift
for Vienna similar to that which they had arranged for Berlin.
Indeed, American leaders apparently recognised the disadvantaged
Western strategic position in Vienna as well as the city's reduced
importance as a Western interest compared to Berlin: the U.S. National
Security Council report had no specific prescriptions for breaking a
Soviet blockade and stressed above all that no force or threat of
force be employed. On the other hand, evidence indicates that the
Soviet leaders also understood the strategic circumstances in Vienna.
Years later, during the April 1955 Austro-Soviet negotiations in
Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov mentioned to the Austrians
that the Russians had long before recognized that it would be easy
enough to cut off Vienna.³

¹Mark Clark, Calculated Risk (London: Hamilton & Co., Panther
²Ibid.
³Interview with Professor Stephan Verosta, Professor of
Thus, according to available documents, in February 1950, at least some Western policymakers considered the division of Austria a possible result of deteriorating East-West relations. For a number of reasons, the Western powers did not consider the partitioning of Austria to be in their interests, and they would do nothing which might encourage such an outcome. Austrian Foreign Minister Gruber several times repeated his suggestion that the Western powers openly take unilateral action in lieu of a treaty, for example by bringing the agreed articles of the treaty into force and then withdrawing from the Western sectors, but the Western powers resisted the proposal. Without a treaty, there was no reason to believe that the Soviet Union would also withdraw, and the result would likely be a partitioning of Austria. It was true that compared to the Eastern zone alone, the three Western zones of the country were probably more capable of surviving together economically, with more natural resources (apart from oil), more industry, and more favourable trading prospects than existed in the east. But conditions in a Western rump state would nonetheless be very difficult.

International Law (Emeritus), University of Vienna; in Vienna, 6 December 1983. Professor Verosta was Head of the International Law Section of the Foreign Office and the Austrian Government Delegation's Legal Advisor in Moscow, April 1955.

1See Chapter 3.

2Letter from Sir H. Caccia (Vienna) to Mr. Mallet regarding paper drawn up by the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, containing suggestions as to the handling of the Austrian Treaty question at a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, 28 February 1951, F.O. 371/93603(CA1071/19G), Public Records Office (Kew), London.

3George W. Hoffman, "Austria: Her Raw Materials and Industrial
More to the point, Western analysts believed that Austria, unlike Germany, was a culturally fragmented nation that would never survive partitioning. A truncated eastern Austria would quickly be swallowed into the Soviet system, and would then be a continual fount of unrest and supplier of a stream of refugees to the West. Western Austria, separated from its eastern half, would likely dissolve under the strains of provincialism, with the central provinces drawn towards Germany, Vorarlberg towards Switzerland, and Carinthia towards Yugoslavia. The result would be dangerous instability on the continent of Europe, and a possible rebirth of the kinds of tensions which had already helped to bring about two major wars. As one British expert observed, "...Such an act of dissection is economically undesirable, but it would be a historical disaster." ¹

Thus, Western policy towards Austria in the early 1950s was a process of trying to strike a delicate balance between on the one hand taking actions which would improve conditions in the Western sectors, encourage the Austrian people and thereby enhance the status of the pro-Western Austrian government; and, on the other hand, avoiding any wide-reaching reforms which might evoke a defensive Soviet reaction and thereby precipitate a partitioning of Austria.


Western policy for Austria was largely based upon the political and economic tactics intended to strengthen Austria itself, as well as the deterrent effect of stationing American, British and French troops in the Western zones. Contrary to what most Austrians believed, in 1950 the United States and the United Kingdom had no intention of militarily defending Austria against major Soviet attack. Declassified top secret British documents indicate that in the event of a sudden assault from the east, British and American military plans before early 1951 called for the evacuation of occupation forces into Italy as quickly as possible.¹ The Americans and the British apparently believed that northern Italy provided a better strategic position for the defence of Western Europe than did western Austria. It was difficult to defend Austria at the front lines; and in making their plans, British and American military representatives tacitly admitted that in the event of a military emergency, western Austria was not vital enough to Western interests to devote major military resources to a front-line defence.

But the economic influence which the Western powers—and particularly the United States—now exerted in Austria was an indirect contributor to Austrian defence. Austria's trade with her eastern neighbours had declined in the postwar years, to be replaced largely by trade to the West and also to the south.² Between 1945 and 1949,


the portion of Austria's trade with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia declined 5.6 percent, from 25.1 percent to 19.5 percent. As a result of Marshall funds and other aid, the role of the United States in Austrian economic policy was tremendous, with the Americans practically holding a veto power over important Austrian economic agreements. In October 1950, for example, when the Austrian government was considering the desirability of concluding a Soviet-Austrian trade agreement, Austrian Foreign Minister Gruber consulted Secretary of State Acheson for the American viewpoint, "...with [the] assurance," Acheson later reported, "that no action w[ou]ld be taken until US views were known." By 1950 Austria's economy was clearly oriented towards the West and subject to the influence of the Western powers, a fact which may have acted as a deterrent to Soviet military action.

Indeed, Soviet leaders were extremely unhappy about the gradual reorientation of the Austrian economy to the West, in particular the burgeoning trade between Austria and western Germany. Citing the maxim, "Diplomacy follows trade," Soviet analysts warned that the growing economic cooperation between Austria and Germany would encourage pan-


German sentiments and eventually lead to another Anschluss. The export of raw materials from Austria to Germany and the building of electrical facilities in the western zone to be shared by the two countries, were particularly worrisome to the Russians. The Americans, however, were far less worried about trade between Germany and Austrian than they were about trade between East and West blocs; in fact, U.S. restrictions on Austrian exports to the east became so annoying to the Austrians that a few years later the Austrian Chancellor felt compelled to complain to the British about the American regulations. But whatever the terms, as was the case in many countries of Western Europe, American economic power with all its political and military implications was the single most important factor in the strengthening of Austria after the war.

As for Soviet economic policy in Austria, the cessation of Soviet investment in eastern Austria which had been the cause of hopeful expectations in 1949 was reversed in 1950. Soviet obstruction of the negotiations was accompanied by an increase in the level of investment in securities and properties in eastern Austria. To the

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2 Ibid.
3 "Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Austrian Chancellor," record sent by Mr. Anthony Eden to Mr. Adams, H.M. Charge d'Affaires, Vienna, 8 May 1952, F.O. 371/CA10111/5(98045), Public Records Office (Kew), London.
5 Ibid.
extent that financial policy was a barometer of Soviet intentions, Stalin clearly expected to leave troops in occupation of eastern Austria for some time to come.

The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 sharply diminished any Western incentive to reach an accommodation with the Russians over Austria. Although there is today considerable controversy concerning the extent to which the Soviet Union was responsible for the North Korean invasion, the United States clearly believed at the time that Stalin had instigated the attack. Throughout 1950, American military leaders were preoccupied with the Far East, and they dared not withdraw from Austria and risk a Soviet attack on Europe as well. Even many Austrians saw a correlation between the stiffening of the Soviet position in the treaty negotiations and what they thought was period of Russian military planning for the Korean campaign; some concluded that they could not expect an Austrian State Treaty until after the signing of a Korean armistice.¹ In any case, the Korean War, following recent Soviet attempts to influence Finland's elections, repeated partial blockades of Berlin, and Moscow's support for the Communist Chinese,² promoted the general impression in the West that

¹U.S. Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research, Report No. 6403, "Austria Attempts Independent Foreign Policy," 31 August 1953, Diplomatic Documents Division, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

the Soviet Union was untrustworthy, expansionist, and belligerent—certainly not an attractive negotiating partner in settling the future of a small, strategically important but nearly indefensible state.

During the summer of 1950, neither the Soviet Union nor the Western powers desired or expected progress on the Austrian treaty. A meeting scheduled for 10 July 1950, only a few weeks after the outbreak of the Korean War, went ahead as planned, and all the delegates carefully avoided the subject of Korea. However, the Soviet Union again raised the subject of Anglo-American troops in Trieste and no progress was made. With East-West relations as bad as they were, there was simply no incentive or reasonable prospect for an Austrian treaty. Even Austrian government officials recognized that negotiations were a casualty of the East-West stalemate. In August, now British Ambassador to Austria Sir Harold Caccia reported a pessimistic conversation he had had with Austrian Foreign Minister Gruber: "[Gruber] said that while things were as they are over Korea, not even the most rabid Treaty enthusiast would reasonable expect progress with the Russians. Certainly he did not."  

1Although the Americans and the British had qualms about meeting the Russians so soon after the hostilities began, they did not feel they could cancel the meeting without giving the Soviet Union an opportunity to accuse them of not desiring an Austrian treaty. Minute from Mr. Mallet to Sir W. Strang and Sir D. Gainer, 3 July 1950, F.O. 371/84906(C4371), Public Records Office (Kew), London.


3Letter from Sir Harold Caccia, Vienna, to W.D. Allen, German Political Department, Foreign Office, 1 August 1950, F.O. 371/84907 (C509), Public Records Office (Kew), London.
In the meantime, conditions within Austria were becoming increasingly tense. A cutback in Marshall aid funds in the autumn led the Austrian government to increase the price of food, coal, and electricity by approximately thirty percent, while wages were increased by only thirteen percent.\(^1\) The resulting reduction of the standard of living in Austria was introduced without warning and without any preparation of Austrian public opinion.\(^2\) Widespread anxiety over economic conditions, compounded by extremely low Austrian morale following the breakdown of four-power negotiations, provided the perfect opportunity for a second and more serious attempt at an uprising by the Soviet-backed Communist Party. Beginning on 26 September 1950, the second Communist Putsch attempt caught the Western powers at a time when they were preoccupied with Korea and considered Austria safe from the threat of revolution.

The Putsch attempt began with a mass demonstration in Vienna, organised by the Austrian Communist Party, in protest of the wage/price agreement. A group of approximately six thousand demonstrators gathered in the international sector of Vienna near the Ministry of the Interior, overran police lines and marched to the Federal Chancellory. The Austrian police unsuccessfully attempted to repel the demonstrators with fire hoses, but the large number of demonstrators overwhelmed them. At the Chancellory, the four hundred police guarding


\(^2\)Telegram from the U.S. Charge in Austria (Dowling) to the Secretary of State, Vienna, 1 October 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Vol. IV, p. 406.
the building were stoned by the protestors.1

From within the Chancellory, Austrian Federal Chancellor Dr. Leopold Figl, urgently requested U.S. assistance. In response, the U.S. High Commissioner placed American troops in Vienna on alert and then called a meeting of the Allied Council;2 but the Soviet representative did not attend the meeting. Following the tripartite session, the British and the French also placed their troops on alert. Although Chancellor Figl repeated his original request for assistance three times, the Minister of the Interior insisted that the Austrian police could handle the situation and the Western powers took no action. A few hours after the demonstrations had begun, the protestors dispersed in response to instructions given by their Communist leaders.3

On the following day, the Communist shop stewards sent an ultimatum to the Austrian government threatening a general strike if the government did not "re-examine" the wage and price agreement.4 The threat was made more convincing by the fact that major factories in several large towns in Austria were already on strike.5 The Austrian government issued a proclamation begging

1Telegram from the U.S. High Commissioner for Austria, General Keyes, to the Department of the Army, Vienna, 26 September 1950; in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Vol. IV, pp. 404-405.

2The U.S. High Commissioner was rotational Chairman of the Allied Council for the month of September 1950. Ibid.

3Ibid.

4Gruber, Between Liberation and Liberty, p. 179.

5Ibid.
the Austrian people to resist the Communists' subversive attempts to overthrow Austrian democracy, and asking them not to participate in the strikes and demonstrations. A general strike was nonetheless declared by the Communist shop stewards on 4 October 1950. A short time later there were scattered strikes throughout Austria, which were particularly serious in the region of Vienna and also in some parts of the Soviet zone. In addition, within the eastern zone workers from Soviet-run factories were loaded onto lorries and transported to other, non-striking factories to pressure other workers to join the strike.

For several days, the Austrian government was once again afraid that the situation could not be controlled by the Austrian police; but the Western powers hesitated to use occupation soldiers to intervene and thereby risk an East-West confrontation. In particular, General Keyes warned the Austrian government that if U.S. troops were employed to control the situation, their small numbers would force them to rely heavily upon their weaponry, and the result would undoubtedly be bloodshed. Torn between a fervent desire for Western help and a deep fear of the consequences should that help be received, the Austrian government continued to

1 Ibid., p. 180.
2 Ibid., pp. 180-183.
3 Ibid., p. 181.
depend upon its own small, ill-equipped police force to deal with the disturbances.

To make matters worse, the efforts of the Austrian police were severely hampered by the Soviet occupation authorities. The 1950 Communist Putsch attempt was more serious than the thwarted takeover of 1947 because for the first time the Soviet Union interfered directly with the specific operation of the Austrian police, thereby violating the control agreement and paving the way for the intended takeover. The U.S. Charge d'Affaires in Austria, Mr. Dowling, informed the Secretary of State on 1 October 1950: " Strikes and demonstrations [during the] past week in Vienna and Eastern Austria, which represent first tangible success of Communists since food riots of 1947, were marked by two salient factors: Overtness of Soviet instigation and assistance..., and lack of effectiveness of [the] Austrian police."  

On the day before the disturbances began, the Soviet occupation authorities issued orders restricting the movement of Austrian police in the Soviet zone and preventing the Austrian police from moving the police force around to its best advantage. The commandant of the Soviet sector of Vienna, Colonel Pankratow, ordered that no police would be permitted to leave the Soviet sector without the consent of the Soviet authorities, and no dismissals or transfers of police officers would occur without Soviet permission.  

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1 The Charge in Austria (Dowling) to the Secretary of State, Vienna, 1 October 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Vol. IV, p. 406.

2 The U.S. High Commissioner for Austria (Keyes) to the
result, Austrian Minister of the Interior Oscar Helmer was prevented from using the significant reserves of Austrian police located in the Soviet zone, and he complained bitterly to the Americans.¹

Evidence of a Soviet hand in staging the events had ominous overtones within Austria. Wild rumours of Czechoslovakian troops amassing at the border, Russian tanks moving towards Vienna, and low-flying Russian aircraft approaching the border added to the general panic.² The Austrian Communist Party was weak, but the Romanian Communist Party had been even weaker when the Russians placed it in power.³ In a heightened state of alarm, the Austrian government on 5 October addressed an appeal to the Allied Council "to take, immediately, the appropriate measures to enable the Federal Government to accomplish its constitutional duties," and concluded with a "fervent appeal" to each of the four occupying powers to support the Austrian government "...in its efforts to maintain order in the country."⁴

¹Ibid.


Ministers immediately issued firm declarations of support for the Austrian government in its measures to control the unrest, but the Soviet government gave no reply.

By 6 October, order was finally restored by the Austrians themselves, and the general strike ended. There were two reasons why the 1950 Communist Putsch attempt ended in failure. First, the Austrian Federation of Trade Unions did not support the strike, and the anti-Communist Austrian workers refused to participate in the Communist-backed general strike. The proclamation issued by the Austrian government had met with some success among a people which had recently witnessed the transformation of neighbouring Czechoslovakia and Hungary to Communist, Soviet-satellite status. Second, with the Western presence in Austria, Stalin dared not send the full military support necessary to ensure the success of the Putsch. It was one thing to encourage the activities of the Austrian Communist Party and even to interfere with the administration of the Austrian government; it was quite another to commit Soviet troops to take action which might lead to military confrontation with the Western powers.¹

More generally, the two Soviet-supported attempts at a Communist Putsch in the postwar years together indicate that Stalin had had some hope of turning Austria into a Communist state. However, there are a number of reasons why Soviet plans for a Communist Austria were unsuccessful and finally abandoned or at

¹Bader, Austria Between East and West, p. 179.
least postponed. First, the indigenous support for Russian Communism and the Communist Party was quite low. This is partly explained by the Western orientation of the Austrian people, but is still more attributable to Austrian resentment towards the Soviet Union which began as a result of the "liberation," increased under heavy-handed Soviet occupation, and later reached a high pitch in response to blatant Soviet obstructionism at the treaty negotiations. In addition, postwar Soviet antipathy to the German-speaking Austrians also played a role: with respect to the Austrian Communists, the Russians first remembered that they were Austrian and only incidentally that they were Communists.¹

Second, Austria did not become a Communist state because the failure of the Communists to enlist the support of the Socialist Party, in particular the primarily Socialist trade unions,

¹After the 'liberation,' Austrian Communists had been relieved of their valuables as thoroughly as were members of any other party. See "Conditions in Styria during the Russian Occupation," U.S. Army OSS Report, 4 August 1945, R.G. 226, Report #XL14014, Military Documents Division, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

Austrian officials today claim that without direct military Soviet intervention, the Austrian Communist Party never really had a chance in Austria, and the Soviet Union did not consider Austria important enough to risk such an intervention. Federal President Dr. Kirchschlager explains the failure of the Austrian Communist Party in the following way:

Once I said to Gromyko, when he said some negative words about the Austrian Communist Party, "Don't blame the Austrian Communist Party. The Austrian Communist Party is a good party. But you intervened in Hungary and you lost the seats in Parliament at the next election.... I think that it means that the [Austrian] people have good judgment.

Interview with Bundespräsident Dr. Kirchschlager at the Hofburg Palace, Vienna, 5 December 1983.
undermined both the May 1947 and the September 1950 attempts at a Communist takeover. Third, and most important, the presence of the Western powers, providing support for the Austrian government and supplying aid to the Austrian people, was a blow to the Communist cause. As a result of that presence, finally, Stalin was not willing to challenge the West directly and dared not provide the open military support necessary to place a Communist government in power.

When attempts to turn Austria into a Communist state finally seemed fruitless, the Soviet leader might have considered dividing the country and converting eastern Austria into a separate state like the German Democratic Republic. While the Western powers had come to the conclusion that partitioning Austria would not be in their interests, there is no reason to assume that the Soviet leaders also felt that way. Given Stalin's aversion to the idea of withdrawing from any Soviet-conquered territory, partition may have seemed a logical outcome in terms of Soviet interests.

But even in Soviet eyes there were serious economic and political difficulties with this plan. The Soviet-dominated sector contained the agricultural heartland of Austria, but represented only about 41 percent of the total Austrian production.1 Separated from western Austria, the Soviet zone could not obtain industrial raw materials and electrical power without shifting

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its demand eastwards to the overwrought economies of the Soviet satellites;\(^1\) interestingly enough, power stations in the Western zones built with American aid were supplying electricity to the factories in the Soviet zone.\(^2\) With grave problems in its own economy, the Soviet Union simply did not have the resources to shore up a struggling rump state. Austria's participation in the Marshall Plan was a serious embarrassment to the Soviet Union, but in another sense, it was easier for the Soviet Union to let Western money rebuild the entire Austrian economy and then to worry about somehow changing the government.

But the existence by 1950 of a strong Austrian national government was also a deterrent to any Soviet plans for partitioning Austria. Formation of an eastern Austrian state would have cleaved the government right down the middle. In light of the Soviet Union's early responsibility for forming that government and ensuring its national character, a smooth transition to support of a Communist government representing only half of the country would be extremely difficult, especially since the government would earn only meager indigenous support.

For these reasons, the Soviet Union would neither attempt directly to force Austria to join the growing ranks of its East European satellites, nor to split the country in two and claim the eastern half. Germany was a country of absolutely vital strategic

\(^1\)Bader, Austria Between East and West, 1945-1955, pp. 190-191.

and political interest to the USSR, worth the economic and political sacrifices; Austria was not. The two situations were integrally related, but fundamentally different.

In the wake of the 1950 Putsch attempt, prospects for an Austrian treaty had gone from bad to worse. The Foreign Ministers' deputies met for the 258th time on 15 December 1950, but the session soon degenerated into a review of the same Soviet complaints regarding Anglo-American troops in Trieste and Austrian denazification actions which had characterized previous meetings during 1950. The Western powers requested that the meeting be adjourned for three months.¹

In the meantime, the Soviet Union had requested a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers to discuss Germany.² The Foreign Ministers' deputies gathered in Paris in March 1951 and spent four months trying to work out an agenda for the foreign ministers meeting. At this point, the Western allies seemed even less anxious to compromise than was the Soviet Union. As Charles Bohlen, a junior member of the U.S. delegation in 1951, observed, "[I]t was quite obvious that the Western side was not particularly interested in a conference while a war was on in Korea."³ Although the British delegate at one point expressed his desire to "go very


far in meeting Gromyko,\(^1\) the Western allies were plainly unwilling to go far enough, and in June the four power session adjourned \textit{sine die} without an agenda. There were no more meetings of the foreign ministers' deputies on Austria for the remainder of the year.

In early 1951, the domestic difficulties of both the British and the American government militated against any strong desire to take the extraordinary measures which would have been necessary to pursue a treaty. In the British general election held the year before, Attlee's Labour government had earned an extremely small margin of victory. Without a convincing mandate from the British electorate, the government lost confidence in its foreign policy. To make matters worse, veteran Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, long-time champion of an Austrian treaty, became ill and was forced to resign in March 1951. Bevin was replaced by Herbert Morrison, who was inexperienced and held the post of Foreign Secretary for only a few months. With regard to Austria, then, British foreign policy from the period of Bevin's illness in mid-1950 to the general election of October 1951 was uninspired.\(^2\) Although still desiring a treaty, the British were no longer able to exert the pressure they had in the past applied to their French

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and American colleagues. Since the British, and Bevin in particular, had been the prime supporters of the treaty (apart from the Austrians themselves), it is not surprising that no progress toward a treaty was made during 1950 and 1951.

The Truman Administration, on the other hand, was facing its own unique, but very serious domestic challenge. In February 1950, Senator Joseph McCarthy announced that there were fifty-seven Communists and two hundred and five Communist sympathizers in the State Department. Although never proved, the allegation set off a series of witch-hunts in the State Department and other branches of government, fueled in part by the Republican Party's angry conviction that the Truman Administration had "lost" China to the Communists. The suspicion of Communist sympathy was directed at every significant member of the government, from the lowliest administrator to Secretary of State Acheson himself. As a result, between 1950 and 1952, the foreign policy of the Truman Administration was subject to a unique kind of paralysis, prompted by fear that the policy-makers would be accused of cooperating with the Communists. In the climate of McCarthyism, no self-interested American diplomat was willing to be responsible for offering the Soviet Union any concession whatsoever; indeed, there was a tendency to be polemically anti-Communist in order to prove loyalty. Even if the Soviet Union had been interested in a treaty, the U.S. State Department was in no position to negotiate one. Certainly no American diplomat—including Acheson—would have wanted to be responsible for "losing" Austria.
By the autumn of 1951, the State Department's position with regard to the treaty had hardened considerably. On 4 October 1951, the British Ambassador in Washington sent the following message to the Foreign Office:

[The State Department's] mention of the Senate makes us suspect that they are now receding from the position to which we pushed them with so much difficulty two years ago. It is difficult to be sure of their motives..., but whereas previously they have agreed with us that broadly speaking any treaty would be better than none, their present position seems to come very close to believing that it is better not to have a treaty at all than one on the lines of the present draft.¹

In the meantime, the stockpiling of American military equipment in western Austria had been continuing at an accelerated rate. Under the 1951 U.S. Military Assistance Program for Austria, funds were allocated to equip an initial Austrian security force of approximately 28,000.² The equipment was to remain under U.S. control until the coming into force of an Austrian treaty and the granting of Congressional authority to transfer it to the Austrians.³ In October 1950, the Army had assigned the stockpiling

¹Telegram from Sir O. Franks, Washington, to Foreign Office [and for Foreign Office and Whitehall Distribution], 4 October 1951, F.O. 371/93606(CA1071/92), Public Records Office (Kew), London.


³Ibid.
program the highest priority for foreign military assistance, and assured the Secretary of Defense that the program would be completed by 1 September 1951.1

The Soviet Union's complaints about the 'remilitarization' of Austria steadily increased in frequency and tone throughout 1951. The charges were met by American assurances that no remilitarization was taking place. In addition, the U.S. pointed to larger scale Soviet military activity in eastern Austria. On 12 October 1951, Ambassador Walter Donnelly, now civilian U.S. High Commissioner in Vienna, met Soviet accusations with a list of counter-accusations at an Allied Council meeting.2 The United States and the Soviet Union had reached a stalemate in Austria; the atmosphere of charges and counter-charges was clearly not conducive to progress toward an Austria treaty.

Nonetheless, moved by a request from the Austrian government, the United States in its role as rotational chairman of the deputy foreign ministers for Austria, arranged a meeting of the deputies for 21 January 1952 in London. Invitations to the meeting were issued on 28 December 1951, but three days before the scheduled

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conference, the Soviet Union announced that its representative would attend the talks only if the implementation by the Austrian government of demilitarization and denazification measures in all four zones, as well as the withdrawal of Anglo-American troops from Trieste, were to be discussed. When the Western allies refused to agree to any preconditions, the Russians boycotted the talks. Thus the first attempt since December 1950 to discuss an Austrian treaty was a failure.

The refusal of the Russians to attend the January 1952 meeting gave the Americans an opportunity to redouble their efforts to persuade the British and the French to agree to a proposal the Americans had been advocating for months. The State Department wished to put aside the draft treaty on Austria and present to the Soviet Union a new, abbreviated treaty. Beginning in September 1951, the U.S. State Department argued that a shortened treaty, consisting of only a few general articles granting Austria her independence and omitting any detailed economic restrictions, would be an attractive alternative to the current draft treaty. The shortened draft would not break the continuity of treaty negotiations and would take into account the need for Austrian independence, the State Department argued. More to the point, in American eyes, the old draft no longer represented Western objectives in Austria and was not a satis-

factory basis for a settlement.¹

Secretary of State Acheson had first presented this suggestion to the British and the French in tripartite discussions in Washington 13 September 1952.² The European allies had reacted first with surprise, then scepticism. They argued that it was most unlikely that the Soviet Union would ever accept a shortened treaty as the basis for negotiation. Instead of jolting the Russians into making progress in the talks, such a démarche by the Western powers would only anger the Soviet leaders and perhaps worsen the situation in Austria. The French in particular feared that the abbreviated treaty would so anger the Soviet Union that it would disrupt the four power arrangements in Austria, arrangements which the French above all wished to perpetuate as long as there was no treaty.³ Moreover, the treaty itself would not only omit the articles of concern to the Soviet Union, such as Article 35


on German assets, Article 9 on denazification and Article 48bis on Austrian postwar debts, but would also leave out economic and political clauses of concern to the Western powers. The French particularly objected to the omission of Article 3, a recognition by Germany of Austrian independence, Article 4, a prohibition of Anschluss, and Article 17, limitations on Austrian armed forces.1

The British argued that the short draft was simply not a serious proposal, and that it would be seen internationally as a provocative move. In a brief written for the new British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, a Foreign Office member summed up the British view of the situation as follows:

We, the French and the Austrians have serious doubts about this gambit. On points of detail in the existing draft little separates us from the Russians. If they remain unwilling to conclude a Treaty, this will be due to their general policy, which will not be altered by any initiative we may make.2

In more blunt terms, one Foreign Office representative elsewhere complained: "[The Americans] certainly claim that their proposal is a constructive move and not a mere propaganda stunt and I think they have persuaded themselves that this is so, but in their rather woolly state of mind it is not a far cry one to the other."3


2Foreign Office Minute by G.W. Harrison, prepared at the request of the Secretary of State, 20 November 1951, F.O. 371/93608(CA1071/137), Public Records Office (Kew), London.

3Letter from B.A.B. Burrows (Washington) to W.D. Allen,
Nonetheless, when the Russians refused to meet with the Western powers in January 1952, the need for the Western powers to take some action was increased, and so the American case was strengthened. In addition, the Austrians changed their minds about the abbreviated treaty and began to support the American position. Under pressure from the Americans, the French were apparently placated by promises of measures to be taken by the Western powers to supplement an abbreviated treaty, such as an Allied-Austrian declaration against Anschluss to which Germany would adhere.\(^1\) Only the British remained set against the short draft, and when faced with American pressure combined with Austrian lobbying, the British also began to waiver.

A decision to propose the short draft treaty was finally made in tripartite discussions during the meeting of the NATO council in Lisbon, on 26 February 1952. Secretary of State Acheson conceded in the discussions that the status of the old treaty would remain deliberately blurred and that the new draft would be presented as an alternative, not necessarily a replacement. On this basis, the British and the French agreed to the American proposal. To separate the tripartite démarche from any direct association with NATO, the Western powers waited a few weeks

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after the NATO council meeting.

On 13 March 1952, the United States, Britain and France, in identical notes to the Soviet Union, proposed the immediate signature of an abbreviated treaty as "...an important step toward the consolidation of peace."¹ The treaty consisted of eight articles, seven of which the Russians had already accepted. However, the remaining article was the critical one, for it proposed that the Soviet Union and the Western powers renounce all claims to German assets in Austria. As had been expected by the British, the French, and perhaps also the Americans, the Soviet Union rejected the abbreviated treaty and refused to consider it a basis for negotiation.

Those historians who have suggested that the abbreviated treaty was never a serious proposal but was simply an attempt to lay the blame for delay directly on the Russians,² are at least partially correct. Only the most optimistic or naive Western negotiators expected that after so many years of negotiations the Soviet Union would sweepingly renounce its economic claims to Austria. Whether deliberately calculated by the Americans or not, the result of the Soviet rejection of the abbreviated treaty was to focus public disapproval on Russia. In fact, the Russians


themselves probably anticipated this unfavourable public reaction when they delayed the rejection of the short draft for five months, presumably while they tried to find a way to avoid or mitigate their political embarrassment. In a sense, then, the so-called "propaganda stunt" was a great success.¹

But stopping at this explanation would distort the evidence revealed by declassified American documents. In addition to being an attempt to gain favourable publicity at home and abroad, the abbreviated treaty was a genuine—if futile—attempt by the U.S. to get rid of the long draft Austrian treaty. Some members of the U.S. State Department believed that the long draft treaty contained too many concessions to the Russians, and they hoped to begin afresh with a shortened treaty based on the essentials. Perhaps Secretary of State Acheson was personally motivated by a desire to escape the assault of the McCarthyists by getting rid of a document he knew they would despise. Or perhaps the proposal was a delayed American reaction to the British pressure which had led to major Western capitulations to Soviet economic demands in late 1949. Whatever the origin, it is clear that as useless as the short treaty démarche proved to be, it had not been intended

¹It is interesting to note that in the months following the introduction of the short draft treaty, Austrian Federal Chancellor Figl made a lengthy, extended visit to the United States, touring seven American cities. Shortly thereafter, Secretary of State Acheson returned the compliment by making a highly publicized visit to Vienna.

by the Americans merely as a cynical exercise. For the Americans, the short draft treaty represented a hope that the four powers might extricate themselves from the mire of the Austrian treaty negotiations and start over again.

The British, the French, and the more realistic of the Americans had a related, but more shrewd purpose in mind when they agreed to propose the short treaty: namely, to force the Russians to yearn for the earlier, longer treaty. This tactic was the most successful of all, for in its 4 August reply to the Western powers the Soviet government adamantly insisted that the new treaty be withdrawn and that negotiations resume only on the basis of the original treaty.\(^1\) Indeed, evidence of the Soviet attitude to the short draft treaty was surprisingly graphic. In an effort to align Austrian public opinion with current Soviet interests, the Russians plastered the streets of Vienna with propaganda posters contrasting the long and short treaties. The message was rather crudely portrayed, with a symbol of peace hovering daintily over the long treaty and the Grim Reaper wielding his scythe over the short treaty.\(^2\)

In September, the United States offered to modify the short draft treaty by adding four articles from the old treaty to the new one. The U.S. then proposed another meeting of the Foreign Ministers' deputies in London for 29 September. Demonstrating an


\(^2\) Gruber, Between Liberation and Liberty, p. 203.
unwillingness to negotiate constructively on the basis of any draft, the Soviet Union stated that the Western proposals were unsatisfactory, then pointed again to the Trieste question and refused to attend the meeting.

Meanwhile, when the Soviet government was still considering its response to the abbreviated treaty, Austrian Foreign Minister Gruber determined that the time had come to extricate Austria from the East-West stalemate and attempt to bring international pressure to bear on the treaty negotiations. After consulting with the American, French, and British governments, Gruber flew to Rio de Janeiro in July 1952 to ask the Brazilians to sponsor a United Nations resolution demanding the conclusion of a treaty. Brazil was independent enough of the four powers, the Austrians believed, to act as an unbiased observer, and therefore might be able to sway international opinion. Since Austria's application for membership had been vetoed by the Soviet Union, Austria herself had no voice in the United Nations. The Brazilians agreed to present the Austrian case, and on 20 December 1952, despite Soviet attempts to prevent the General Assembly from considering the plight of "an enemy country," a resolution urging the rapid conclusion of an Austrian State Treaty was passed overwhelmingly.

According to the personal papers of Dean Acheson, Foreign Minister Gruber had confided to the American Secretary of State that he did not think the U.N. resolution would lead to the conclusion of a treaty. The important thing, Gruber claimed, was to keep the public eye on the Austrian dilemma, to shore up morale
in his own country, and, he later added, to make the Russians feel as uncomfortable as possible about their position in Austria.\(^1\)

If these were the goals, it seems that the U.N. resolution accomplished precisely what it was intended to accomplish, and nothing more. The pressure of public opinion probably helped to induce the Soviet Union to attend a meeting of the deputies in February 1953, but when the Western allies refused to withdraw the abbreviated treaty, the talks adjourned. Attempts to meet in May and August were fruitless, because the Russians insisted that the short draft be withdrawn as a prerequisite to their attendance and the Western powers refused to accept preconditions. The U.N. resolution had provoked a temporary flurry of diplomatic activity, but it had left the substance of the negotiations unchanged. The deadlock between the great powers persisted in spite of the attempt to focus international attention on the Austrian problem.

At the end of 1952, then, the Austrian treaty negotiations were completely paralyzed. Indeed, the situation had never been worse: with the Americans insisting that the short draft treaty not be withdrawn and the Soviet Union refusing even to consider the abbreviated draft, the great powers could not even agree about what they were negotiating. Having been forced against their better judgment to agree to the abbreviated draft treaty in the first place, the British and the French found their influence on American policy toward Austria waning. And in the meantime,

\(^1\)Memorandum of Conversation, 5 December 1952, Papers of Dean Acheson, Harry S Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.
the positions of the Acheson State Department, handicapped by McCarthyist hysteria and preoccupied by the Korean conflict, and Stalin's Foreign Ministry, determined above all not to surrender any territorial conquests, left no room for compromise over Austria.
CHAPTER FIVE:

Signs of Change, 1953-1954

In January 1953, the "lame duck" presidency of Harry S Truman was replaced by a Republican Administration under former General Dwight D. Eisenhower. By the end of 1952, the Truman Administration's foreign policy had been "lame" not only because the incumbent was not running for reelection, but also in part because frequent assaults by McCarthy and his followers had taken a heavy toll. The junior Senator from Wisconsin had personally attacked Secretary of State Dean Acheson, among others, labelling him the "Red Dean of Fashion" and demanding at various times that he resign, be fired, or be impeached.1 Furthermore, the domestic and legislative support for the Truman Administration's foreign policy had crumbled in controversy, because of the perceived "loss" of China, the stalemate in Korea, and, perhaps above all, the abrupt dismissal of General Douglas MacArthur. Even if he had wished to do so, Acheson had neither the Congressional support nor the popular approbation at the end of the Truman Administration to make any controversial initiatives in American foreign policy. In January 1953, the worn and dissipated Acheson was replaced by a vigorous new Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles.

By 1953, earlier Western concern about Austria's capacity to

maintain internal security and protect her own territory had been somewhat alleviated as a result of a successful programme for training and equipping the Austrian gendarmerie, and the completion of the stockpiling of U.S. military equipment in western Austria. The more important consideration for the West, therefore, was what relationship an independent Austria would have to the new North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It seems that American defense planners had long envisioned the small country as a nominal member of NATO, unlikely to be a major participant in joint military exercises, but vital to the organization simply by virtue of her geographic location. In fact, only a year after the formation of the pact, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had suggested, "[i]nclusion of Austria in the protective interest of NATO and the best possible uses of her resources in the common defense."1 In 1948 and 1949, the U.S. Defense Department had concentrated on the danger that the hasty conclusion of a treaty when Austria had little means of protecting herself could lead to Soviet encroachments into Austria and even a gradual conversion to satellite status. In the early 1950's, however, after two attempted Communist takeovers had failed and the Austrian gendarmerie had been strengthened, Western apprehension shifted to the possibility that the obviously pro-Western Austria would be prevented from participating somehow in the defense of Western Europe. In fact, 

1 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Report by the Director to the JCS on Further Action by NATO Deputies with a View to Immediate Strengthening of Defense Forces, 16 August 1950, Modern Military Records Division, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
especially after the Eisenhower Administration took office in January 1953, the American fear that Austria would be "lost to Communism" was replaced by the fear that it would be "lost to neutralism."

Although a Communist Austria was still the worst prospect in the Western view, there were important strategic reasons for the West to oppose a treaty which might make Austria a neutral state, particularly if that neutrality precluded NATO's use of Austrian territory. Most important, the movement of men and supplies between Germany and Italy would be greatly complicated by the necessity to detour them through France. A neutral Austria adjacent to neutral Switzerland would drive a wedge through the heart of the Western defence pact, and would certainly be a serious logistical handicap in any East-West conflict. With only a small army, furthermore, an independent Austria without any additional Western troops or security guarantees would be a tempting target for a Soviet invasion. Postwar political realities dictated that the Austro-German and Austro-Italian borders remain virtually unfortified, and a Soviet force of sufficient strength could therefore easily expand both north and south from an Austrian salient. Finally, western Austria was for years the source of the best American intelligence information concerning the Balkan

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1One issue of concern at the time was the status of U.S., French, and British troops in Austria with respect to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Declassified American documents indicate that French, British and American defence planners agreed that in time of war, the forces of all three Western nations stationed in Austria would pass to the operational control of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). It was, of course, only prudent that contingency plans for wartime operational control of these forces be made, to avoid stranding Western forces
area; for this reason, the U.S. position was an asset which no prudent security planner could afford to lose.

Throughout the period, the U.S. Defense Department officially deferred in all policy statements to the overriding political considerations involved in the treaty negotiations. But regarding strategic matters, a secret memorandum from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense left little doubt as to the position of the American military:

> By virtue of its geographical location, Austria is an important strategic link in the defense of Western and Southern Europe. Any weakening of our present military position in Austria, such as would be brought about by a substantial 'neutralization' of Austria, the creation of a military vacuum in Austria, or, as the most adverse possibility, the communization of Austria, would have a serious impact upon the entire NATO defense concept. Therefore, maintenance of the status quo would be preferable to acceptance of a treaty which would deny to the United States its security objectives with respect to Austria.¹

Once again, although the official U.S. position, as propounded by the State Department, remained strongly in favour of a treaty, during

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¹Memorandum from Arthur Radford, Chairman of the U.S. Joint
the early years of the Eisenhower Administration, significant pressure was exerted by the Defense Department to reconsider the wisdom of concluding an Austrian treaty--particularly a treaty which would require Austria's military neutrality.

But even as strategic concerns were pushing the American bureaucracy away from support of an Austrian State Treaty, financial concerns were nudging the British and the French bureaucracies in the opposite direction. The cost of the occupation of Austria was becoming a serious burden for Britain and France. The economies of the two European powers had not yet fully recovered from the devastation of the war, and funding soldiers in a relatively peaceful, remote country such as Austria seemed an outrageous luxury when social services and recovery programmes were suffering at home. Most important, the cessation of Marshall aid funds in 1952 had removed the security of incoming U.S. dollars; asking the British and the French even to approach the military and economic commitment of wealthy America in Austria seemed to them unreasonable. In the fall of 1953, therefore, the governments of Britain and France each informed the United States that they wished to withdraw two-thirds of their troops from Austria.

Pentagon analysts were horrified.1

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Chiefs of Staff, to the Secretary of Defense, 9 October 1953, Records of the Secretary of Defense, Modern Military Records Division, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

1See Memorandum from Vice Admiral A.C. Davis, Deputy U.S. Representative to the Standing Group of the North Atlantic Military Committee, to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9 September 1953; and Memorandum from the JCS to the Secretary of Defense, 11 September 1953, in the Secretary of Defense Files, Modern Military Records Division, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
Thus, by 1953, disparate political pressures, strategic interests, and economic realities were causing conflicts among the Western powers. The British and the French gradually began to favour any treaty which could get them (and of course the Russians) gracefully and permanently out of Austria, while the United States began more firmly than ever to oppose signing a treaty which required Austrian military neutrality or excessive economic burdens.

Yet, even as these disagreements were developing among the Western allies, the Soviet Union continued its obstinate refusal to negotiate an Austrian treaty. The pressure of the United Nations resolution of December 1952 had compelled the Soviet Union to attend a meeting of the deputy foreign ministers of Austria in February 1953; however, the meeting soon deadlocked because the Soviet deputy refused to proceed until the short draft treaty was completely withdrawn. The Western powers were therefore conveniently spared both the embarrassment of appearing to stall on the Austrian treaty and the necessity of settling their differences under pressure, while the onus for delay remained firmly on the Russians.

The difficulties among the Western allies were insignificant, however, compared to the upheaval occurring in the Kremlin at the same time. On 5 March 1953, Stalin died, and with him passed an era in Russian history in which one vozhd would exercise complete and direct control of Soviet foreign policy. With the death of the Soviet generalissimo, new hope emerged that there might now
be a revision of Soviet policy towards the Alpine state. The death of Stalin, combined with the promise of a confident new Administration in the United States and a strong government in Britain, led to a surge of optimism in Austria. For the first time in three years, it seemed possible that the deadlock in the negotiations between the great powers might soon be broken.

Upon Stalin's death, the Soviet government was temporarily thrown into disarray; but from the initial scramble for power emerged the collective leadership of Georgii Malenkov as Prime Minister, Molotov as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Khrushchev as Communist Party Secretary. The contest for power among these leaders continued for three years, and most of the details of that succession struggle remain a mystery to this day. However, between March 1953 and May 1955, Soviet policy towards Austria, a country in which Soviet leaders were less careful to protect appearances than they were in eastern Germany, provides a unique insight into the contest for power in the Kremlin.

In the months following Stalin's death, the collective leadership ordered a relaxation of the more rigorous policies of the Soviet regime in Austria. The local Soviet authorities waived nearly all controls at the East-West demarcation line, declared an amnesty for Austrian political prisoners, officially ended censorship of the mail, telephone and telegraph services, and even allowed the resumption of air mail service with Germany and Japan.1

More remarkably, the Russians agreed for the first time to cover the costs of their own occupation troops in Austria and, after a delay of three years, followed the lead of the Western powers in replacing the military high commissioner with a Russian civilian administrator. These Soviet actions in Austria were accompanied by other surprising moves in both domestic and foreign policy. The new leaders reorganized the top Communist Party and Soviet government organs, declared a general amnesty for the whole of the Soviet Union, and endorsed the Chinese Communist proposals to reopen the Korean armistice talks. By April 1953, Western observers were already cognizant of a major change in Soviet foreign policy and questioned only the permanence of the new approach.1

At the same time, secret plans for an initiative in Western policy were being made. In late April, the Western powers gathered for a meeting of the NATO ministerial council and discussed, among other things, the best tactics to follow to ensure the ratification of the European Defense Community (EDC) treaty and the rearmament of West Germany. After the NATO meeting, Dulles returned to the United States, and on 28 April he briefed the President and the National Security Council about the situation

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in Europe. Although generally pleased by the NATO discussions, Dulles spoke of a growing concern among European governments that the ratification process might not be moving rapidly enough. The Western powers must secure ratification of the EDC treaty quickly, he emphasized, before the post-Stalin Soviet leadership had a chance to interfere and complicate matters. Dulles argued that the West must therefore preempt the negotiating field in Europe by moving ahead with the Austrian treaty.¹

Claiming that the British and the French agreed with his assessment and proposal, Dulles suggested that in order to achieve progress in the Austrian treaty negotiations, the Western powers and Austria should agree to return to the long draft treaty as the basis for negotiations. Tactically, the best way to proceed would be to reopen negotiations between the Foreign Ministers' deputies on the basis of the short draft, and then to shift to the long draft when compelled to do so. The record of the discussion continues:

We must, however, hurry to give the British and French the green light on resuming the meetings of the Deputy Foreign Ministers. The objective, continued Secretary Dulles, was to stave off a Russian initiative for a Foreign Ministers meeting on the German problem. The

Austrian treaty offered the best means to avert this. Time, therefore, was of the essence.¹

Shortly thereafter the Western powers proposed that the Foreign Ministers’ deputies meet on 27 May. In preparation for the meeting, the State Department decided that the short treaty would if necessary be withdrawn at the meeting in order to ensure progress in the negotiations.² Indeed, progress in the negotiations was given such a high priority that the U.S. deputy was authorized to go a long way in compromising with the Soviet Union. In a top secret communication, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State instructed the U.S. deputy to go beyond the official tripartite policy directive issued earlier:

Paragraph 4 of our telegram indicates that if attempts to revise the long draft negotiations grind to a halt a new tripartite position will be sought. Actually we continue to have the authority to sign the long draft with Article 35 and the Soviet version of the unagreed articles but we are committed in the Government to make every effort to obtain better terms. For obvious reasons it would therefore be best not to communicate our final position to the French, British and especially the Austrians at the present time.³

Thus the Soviet Union was not the only power which determined

¹Ibid.

²Letter from Livingston T. Merchant, [U.S. Assistant Secretary of State], to Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr., U.S. High Commissioner for Austria [for passage to Dowling], Vienna, 6 May 1953, R.G. 84 (Post Records of Vienna, Austria), Declassification Review Project NND 842433, Box #3, 320 Austria-US, Diplomatic Documents Division, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

³Ibid.
Austria's fate by calculating the state of affairs in Germany. The rearmament of Germany was considered the most important goal of U.S. policy in Europe. If necessary to preempt a Soviet démarche directed towards Germany, U.S. policy makers in the spring of 1953 planned to act against their better judgment and sign an Austrian treaty on Soviet terms.

However, Western fears that the change in Soviet foreign policy would lead to Soviet initiatives in European negotiations were premature. In May the Russians refused even to attend the scheduled meeting of the foreign ministers' deputies, and the Western contingency plan for signing a treaty on Soviet terms became irrelevant.

Austrian hopes for a treaty were not completely dashed, however, as the Russians left open the possibility of negotiating via other channels. In part to avoid the publicity surrounding meetings of the deputies, the Malenkov leadership complained that the four power council was "not the most suitable instrument" for treaty negotiations and proposed that all future contacts regarding Austria occur through normal diplomatic channels. Although this seemed an unconstructive complaint after seven years of negotiations between the deputies, it was at least directly relevant to the treaty talks. On 12 June, the Western powers asked the Kremlin to produce a draft treaty which it felt would be negotiable, but notes from Moscow in July and August responded that the short

treaty must be withdrawn first and that any solution to the Austrian problem was inextricably linked to a solution of the German problem.\textsuperscript{1} By August, no new Soviet negotiating initiatives had emerged and the Soviet relaxation of controls in Austria still remained to be translated into progress towards a treaty.

Meanwhile, as a result of the Austrian elections of 22 February 1953, Dr. Leopold Figl had been replaced by a new Chancellor, Julius Raab, who was anxious to try new measures to break the deadlock over Austria. Whatever the schemes clandestinely developing in the French, British or American foreign offices, the public positions of the three allies remained largely unchanged and seemed inflexible; therefore, the Austrians were becoming increasingly frustrated by what many of them perceived to be Western inertia. In the spring of 1953, the Western powers seemed to be missing a golden opportunity to coax the Russians into agreeing to a treaty. The death of Stalin and the subsequent liberal policies in the Soviet zone held new promise for Soviet cooperation, and by now many Austrians felt that the principal goal must be to force the Russians to withdraw from Austria, almost regardless of the terms of the withdrawal. There was, according to this view, no need to fear a Soviet attack, for once the Russians had withdrawn their troops, an invasion of Austria would mean the start of a major war between East and West. American interests were sufficiently entangled in the future of this small Western-

\textsuperscript{1}TASS reports of 30 July 1953 and 4 August 1953; cited in Stearman, \textit{The Soviet Union and the Occupation of Austria}, p. 144.
oriented country to deter any plan of Soviet attack, the argument continued. Although the Austrians acknowledged that the Western powers had been far more sincere in their attempts to conclude a treaty than the Soviet Union had been, they believed that both sides had tended to become mesmerized by calculations of the East-West power balance and, thus, to overlook true Austrian interests.

As a result, the new Austrian government began an attempt at independent, bilateral negotiations with the Russians. On 30 June, without consulting any of the Western powers, the Austrians discreetly sent a memorandum to the Kremlin. The memorandum, in addition to statements made by leading Austrian politicians, strongly suggested that the Austrians would be willing to agree to some form of military neutrality, in addition to significant East-West trade concessions, if the Soviet Union would sign a treaty. The Austrians had been encouraged by a recent series of articles in the local Communist press to believe that neutrality was in Soviet eyes a sine qua non for a State Treaty, and that a

1U.S. Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research, Intelligence Reports, Nos. 5990 and 6403, "Possible Austrian Reactions to a Genuine Soviet Treaty Offer," 19 August 1952, and "Austria Attempts Independent Foreign Policy," 31 August 1953, Diplomatic Documents Division, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

2U.S. Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research, Report No. 6403, "Austria Attempts Independent Foreign Policy," 31 August 1953, Diplomatic Documents Division, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

3Foreign Service Dispatch from American Embassy, Vienna, to Department of State, Washington, 30 September 1953, R.C. 59, 763.00/9-3053, Diplomatic Documents Division, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
clear demonstration of Austrian willingness to be neutral would be the breakthrough needed in the negotiations.

But the Austrians were disappointed by the Soviet response. According to information gleaned by the American State Department, Molotov was uninterested in an Austrian offer to make a declaration of neutrality. Molotov reportedly told the Austrians that a neutrality declaration was mere words and that the Soviet Union wanted more concrete things.¹

In independently approaching the Soviet Union, the Austrians probably gambled that since the Western powers were publicly committed to supporting Austria, they were unlikely to use their considerable political and economic leverage to control the Austrian Foreign Ministry.² A State Department intelligence report candidly commented upon the hidden strength of the Austrian position, in relation to the paradoxically powerless Western powers:

In pursuing their new Eastern policy, the Austrians have deliberately proceeded without consulting the Western powers. Realizing that the West is, for political and propagandistic reasons, unable to flout policies the Austrians themselves developed to attain important national aspirations, they have practically committed the West to an unqualified support of their

¹State Department Memorandum (from Mr. R.B. Knight to Mr. Merchant and Mr. MacArthur), 9 July 1953, R.G. 59, 763.00/6-953, Diplomatic Documents Division, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

²U.S. Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research, Report No. 6403, "Austria Attempts Independent Foreign Policy," 31 August 1953, Diplomatic Documents Division, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
policies. Moreover, they may rationalize that the West would be extremely reluctant to apply its already very limited economic aid leverage against Austria. The new policy affords them an opportunity to find out to what extent the U.S. is prepared to underwrite Austria's economic future. Austrian policy makers are, therefore, risking little by their actions. If the new approach succeeds, they can claim credit for having brought about a detente in the cold war. If it fails, the Western powers, in view of their strategic commitments in Central Europe, are judged to be unwilling and unable to castigate the Austrians for their deviation.¹

This may also have been the Kremlin's assessment of the situation, for one goal of Soviet policy in Austria as in Germany was to lure the Austrians away from the Western powers in order to deal separately with the Vienna government. Bilateral relations between Vienna and Moscow enabled the Russians to wield more influence with the Austrians, and thereby exert more pressure on the West. The Russians must have known that the threat of a separate agreement, without Western involvement, provided a strong incentive for new Western concessions. Indeed, if Austria's independent approaches to the Kremlin had any effect at all, it was upon Washington, not Moscow. The Western powers soon began publicly to show greater flexibility in their approach to Austrian independence, but the Russians continued to demand better terms from the Austrians and to refrain from entering into negotiations with the Western powers on the future of Austria.

Throughout the summer of 1953, Western Kremlinologists con-

¹Ibid., pp. 5-6.
continued an intense scrutiny of Soviet behaviour in an effort to divine the future course and nature of post-Stalin Soviet foreign policy. On 26 July 1953, a Korean armistice agreement was signed, and the Western powers saw the agreement as an indication of good will on the part of the Soviet Union. Soviet motivations proved not to be so obliging to Western interests, however. On 8 August, Malenkov declared in a speech before the Supreme Soviet that the current Soviet policy of relaxation in foreign affairs would soon lead to the disintegration of the Western alliance by exploiting the inherent contradictions in the capitalist bloc. It soon became apparent that Malenkov's stridency had its underpinnings not only in a fresh interpretation of Stalinist ideology but also in an unprecedented confidence in Soviet strategic strength. In his speech, a strong, surprising advocacy of negotiations in Europe was coupled with the announcement that the Russians had successfully tested a hydrogen bomb.

This was the post-Stalin Soviet démarche which the West had anticipated. The Western powers, compelled by the desire to retain (or regain) Austrian confidence—but more importantly by the need to recover the initiative in European negotiations—on 17 August offered to withdraw the short treaty from the negotiations if the Soviet government would agree not to introduce any extraneous issues. By prohibiting "extraneous issues," the Western allies especially meant to preclude questions regarding the future of Germany. Once again, the Western powers hoped to separate the Austrian and German issues, and thereby to offset Soviet inter-
ference in the delicate process of ratifying the European Defense Community treaty and rearming West Germany.

But to the men in the Kremlin, it might well have seemed that there were a number of reasons to avoid negotiations limited strictly to Austria at this point. First of all, the Soviet policy of relaxation in Austria was bearing fruit: discord among the Western allies was evident in the independent Austrian approach to Moscow, and in the British and French movements to withdraw their troops from Austria. Indeed, if anything, pressure seemed to be mounting on the United States to make compromises in order to keep the Austrians satisfied and to maintain harmony among the Western powers. In Soviet eyes, the course of events in Austria likely indicated that it was not yet the most opportune time to try to strike a bargain. Any discord among the Western powers could serve broader Soviet interests in Europe. Second, during the summer of 1953 strikes and riots had broken out in Czechoslovakia and on a much larger scale in East Germany. The disturbances had been so serious that Soviet troops had been called in to restore order. With such a heightened sense of unrest in Eastern Europe, August 1953 would not be an appropriate time for the Soviet Union to negotiate a withdrawal from Austria. Third, it seems that in late 1953 Malenkov was losing ground in the power struggle to Molotov, a hard-liner who insisted that it would never be in the interest of the Soviet Union to consider the Austrian and German questions separately. Molotov was reputedly adamant that no territory bought with Russian lives in wartime be surrendered
in peacetime. Finally and most important of all, Malenkov's public advocacy of negotiations in Europe had been primarily aimed at Germany, and negotiations strictly limited to Austria—-a country which for the above reasons the Soviet Union had no desire to evacuate anyway—would be counterproductive.

Thus the Soviet leaders refused the Western offer to negotiate strictly about Austria, and the meetings scheduled for late August 1953 were cancelled. The Western powers had recovered the initiative in European negotiations, but ironically enough progress toward an Austrian treaty was stymied. The foreign ministers' deputies, whose last session had been held in February 1953, did not meet for the remainder of the year.

On 26 November, the Soviet Union suggested a foreign ministers' conference to be held in Berlin. At first, the collective leadership tried, as in the past, to impose preconditions on the meeting, including stipulations that the agenda not include the Austrian State Treaty and that the Western powers abandon the rearmament of West Germany. These demands provoked such unified public resentment in the West, however, that the Soviet Union finally proposed that the conference begin without a firm agenda.¹ On this basis, the Western powers finally agreed to attend, and publicly expressed their hopes that the Berlin Conference, to be held in the Allied Control Council building during the early

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months of 1954, would lead to the reunification of Germany and to the conclusion of an Austrian State Treaty.¹

There is every indication that the Western powers, particularly the United States, did not actually believe that these ambitious goals would be achieved and were reluctant to attend the Berlin Conference. On the surface, January 1954 seemed a good time for the West to come to an accord with the Soviet Union regarding the future of Europe. The United States, still enjoying overwhelming nuclear superiority, was bargaining from a position of strength and thus could afford to make concessions to the Russians. The Soviet Union had apparently adopted a more cooperative approach in foreign relations, and it seemed to be a propitious time for the West to take advantage of the post-Stalin atmosphere of accommodation.

But appearances were deceiving, for when the Berlin Conference opened there was no secure basis for negotiations between the great powers, particularly the Soviet Union and the United States. As later events confirmed, the Soviet Union was still in the throes of a succession struggle. In subsequent months, the resignation of Malenkov proved Western suspicions that at the time of the conference no one was firmly enough in control of the Soviet government to come to an accord with the West. And

although the United States may have been militarily powerful in early 1954, the political position of the Eisenhower Administration at home and abroad was unenviable. On the domestic front, the hysteria of the McCarthyist era was still in force, and thus any significant concessions to the Communists would be exceedingly difficult for the president to sell at home. In Europe, however, the apparent inflexibility of the American position on Austria and Germany had been widely criticized, and many Europeans were beginning publicly to blame the inflexible United States foreign policy for the lack of progress. In such a difficult position, the United States had only limited freedom to negotiate, and yet it could not afford to be seen to refuse to enter into negotiations. As mentioned above, State Department documents indicate that the U.S. had actually for some months been deliberately avoiding a foreign ministers' conference on Germany until the European Defense Community treaty could be ratified. During the weeks before the opening session of the Berlin Conference, the growing optimism in Vienna was certainly not felt in the corridors of the American State Department.

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was extremely sceptical about the upcoming conference and would probably have refused to participate if he had not believed that, for the sake of the Western alliance and its own international image, the United

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States could not appear to be unwilling to negotiate.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 111-112.} Several days before the session began, he candidly discussed his expectations with President Eisenhower over breakfast. Dulles felt that there was virtually no chance of achieving Germany's reunification at Berlin, but that an Austrian State Treaty might be a possibility. Still, it is clear from Dulles' note of the conversation that his hopes lay in strengthening Western unity, not in the prospect of an East-West agreement:

I told the President that I was going to try to play a somewhat inconspicuous role at the conference, giving the leadership to the French so that the French, thus primed, might feel that they had independently arrived at the final conclusions and not been forced into them by the U.S. or that the U.S. was responsible for the failure of the conference.\footnote{John Foster Dulles, "Memorandum of Breakfast Conference with the President," 20 January 1954, Papers of John Foster Dulles, 1951-1959, White House Memoranda Series, Meetings with the President 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.}

Thus, even before the conference began, Dulles expected failure. In Dulles' terms, the true objectives of the United States at the Berlin Conference were to keep the Western allies together, to sign an Austrian treaty if reasonable terms were possible, and, if they were not possible, to place the blame for the failure of the conference on the Soviet Union.

The Berlin Conference began on 25 January 1954. On Dulles' initiative, the three Western powers decided to throw the Soviet delegation off balance by agreeing almost immediately to accept
the Soviet Union's agenda, which placed a proposal for a five-power conference (including China) on Indo-China and consideration of the German situation before discussion of an Austrian State Treaty. Since Austria was the last item on the Soviet agenda, discussions about the treaty did not begin until 12 February. The fact that Austria was discussed so late in the conference in itself dimmed the prospects for an Austrian treaty, because sharp disagreements between the great powers over the future of Germany had already set a very negative tone. On the first day of the talks, Molotov presented a proposal wherein Austria would be prohibited from joining any military alliances or allowing any foreign bases on her territory and "in order to prevent any attempt at a new Anschluss" Allied occupation forces would remain in Austria until the German peace treaty was signed. Molotov's two conditions were the main focus of the debate for the remainder of the discussions on Austria.

Regarding the first condition, that Austria refrain from joining military alliances, there seemed to be room for negotiation. On the day following Molotov's proposal, U.S. Secretary of State Dulles went so far as to commit himself to the principle of neutrality on the Swiss model, as long as that neutrality was


freely chosen by the Austrians. To the surprise of the Austrian delegates, who had been permitted for the first time to be full participants in the negotiations, Dulles stated:

A neutral status is an honorable status if it is voluntarily chosen by a nation. Switzerland has chosen to be neutral, and as a neutral she has achieved an honorable place in the family of nations. Under the Austrian State Treaty as heretofore drafted, Austria would be free to choose for itself to be a neutral state like Switzerland. Certainly the United States would fully respect its choice in this respect, as it fully respects the comparable choice of the Swiss nation.

However, it is one thing for a nation to choose to be neutral. It is another thing to have neutrality forcibly imposed on it by other nations as a perpetual servitude.1

For the Austrians, Dulles' statement proved to be an especially significant outcome of the Berlin Conference,2 for the leader of the Western powers had now gone on the record as supporting Austrian neutrality as long as that neutrality was freely chosen. According to his personal secretary, Austrian Chancellor Raab privately concluded after the conference that only a legal commitment to neutrality freely undertaken by Austria would provide the four great powers with the reassurance necessary to induce


2 Interview with Professor Stephan Verosta, Professor of International Law (Emeritus), University of Vienna; in Vienna, 6 December 1983.
them to withdraw their troops.\textsuperscript{1} Whatever his personal feelings about neutrality, Dulles had publicly insisted at the Berlin Conference that the choice belonged to the Austrians alone.

But that is not to say that Dulles did not want to try to influence the Austrian choice. During the conference, the Austrians thought that in order to prevent the Soviet Union from using the neutrality issue at Berlin to postpone the negotiations again,\textsuperscript{2} they would formally declare their willingness not to become involved in any foreign military pacts. When he got wind of the plan, Dulles had a late night meeting with Austrian State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Bruno Kreisky and Austrian Foreign Minister Leopold Figl. Dulles argued that an Austrian declaration of neutrality would be senseless and even dangerous, for it would invite Soviet interference in Austrian affairs. Only the help of the Western powers could prevent the Soviet Union from taking advantage of the Austrians.\textsuperscript{3}

In return, the two Austrian officials told Dulles that the Austrians had no choice but to make some declaration of military neutrality, in order to avoid partitioning their country. Kreisky remembers the conversation as follows:

So I said, "Yes, I admit that I am ready to accept the idea that a small country has to have strong friends.

\textsuperscript{1}Ambassador Ludwig Steiner, MP, [Formerly Secretary to Federal Chancellor Julius Raab], "Was It A Miracle?" \textit{Austria Today}, Vol. VI (Spring 1980), p. 10.

\textsuperscript{2}Interview with former Chancellor Dr. Bruno Kreisky, Vienna, 2 December 1983.

\textsuperscript{3}Ibid.
But [in] the case of Austria, it would only be possible for half of Austria. Because if we would accept a pact or military alliance with the West, we could only get it for half of Austria. The other half would be aligned with the East. And and the main goal of our policy is to preserve the unity of Austria. Therefore we cannot envisage such a development.

And it was astonishing for me to see that Dulles could be convinced it was possible.¹

Thus, without opposition from Dulles, the Austrians stated several times during the course of the Berlin Conference that they would not join any military alliances and they would not allow foreign bases on their territory. In order to avoid compromising their sovereignty within the terms of the treaty they avoided actually using the word "neutrality." Still, Austria conformed exactly to the terms of Molotov's first condition when Foreign Minister Leopold Figl stated: "I have stated unambiguously that Austria will do everything to keep herself free from foreign military influence."² To the disappointment of the Austrians, however, the statement seemed to have no effect upon the Soviet position at the Berlin Conference.

It was not the issue of neutrality but the issue of troop withdrawals which caused the breakdown of the conference. All of the Western powers were incensed by Molotov's second condition, that occupation troops remain in Austria until a German peace treaty

¹Ibid.

was signed; and even the Austrians felt that it was intolerable. Since there was no reasonable prospect of a German peace treaty, the second condition meant that the Russians could maintain their garrisons on Austrian soil indefinitely. Molotov's argument that the troops were necessary to prevent the possibility of an Anschluss seemed to the Western powers to be illogical: after a German treaty was signed, a united Germany with its own national army would be a far greater threat (or inducement) to Austria than would be a divided, disarmed Germany without a treaty.¹

In the context of the Austrian treaty negotiations, furthermore, the proposal did not make sense. The Soviet Union seemed to be saying that whether or not an Austrian treaty was signed, the Soviet Union would maintain its position in Austria as a safeguard until the fate of Germany was settled to Soviet satisfaction. With such a caveat, the treaty would be useless to the Austrians; indeed, most of the Western delegates and other observers could hardly believe that the Soviet Union was serious about the suggestion.

Khrushchev later confided to Bruno Kreisky that Molotov had been personally responsible for the Soviet non-withdrawal proposal. In consultations in Moscow before the Berlin Conference, Khrushchev said that Molotov had not been opposed to the Austrian treaty exactly, but that the Soviet Foreign Minister insisted that the

Soviet Union could not afford to give up a country which it had conquered in war. Khrushchev claimed that he eventually stopped trying to convince Molotov otherwise and said, "All right, you go to the Berlin Conference and try to give the Austrians the state treaty while keeping Soviet soldiers there." As a result, according to Khrushchev, Molotov was trying to do exactly that when he proposed that Soviet troops remain in Austria until a German peace treaty was signed.¹

Whether or not Khrushchev's self-serving explanation is true, the Soviet proposal was unacceptable to the West. In a top secret telegram sent to Washington on the morning after Molotov's original proposal, Dulles informed the President:

Molotov's original presentation last night regarding Austria seemed to destroy [the] last lingering hope of any substantial agreement here. It turned the clock back on Austria and cut [the] heart out of [the] proposed treaty by providing for indefinite Soviet occupation so that [the] treaty would not be [a] treaty of liberation but of servitude.²

In the telegram, Dulles did not even mention the neutrality issue.

The next day, 14 February, the United States made an unusual attempt to gain Soviet approval of what the West would consider

¹Interview with former Chancellor Dr. Bruno Kreisky, Vienna, 2 December 1983.

to be a reasonable Austrian treaty. Secretary Dulles, with the support of the Austrian, French, and British foreign ministers, offered to accept the long draft treaty as last negotiated in 1949, including the Soviet version of the five remaining unagreed articles, on the condition that the treaty be signed within four days. Internationally the offer was seen as an impressive move. Although a few pointed to American recklessness in offering a treaty which would leave Austria under a considerable economic burden, most observers applauded the Western powers for their earnest attempt to reach an accommodation with the Russians. Initially, Molotov seemed to be stunned by the proposal; but by falling back on the old worn-out references to the "dried pea debt," Anschluss, and Trieste, in addition to the new neutrality and withdrawal conditions, he flatly rejected the offer.²

Destroyed by the intransigence of the Russians, the Berlin Conference ended in failure.

Although the United States delegation may have been disappointed by the failure of its bold initiative, a close examination of recently declassified American records indicates that the outcome of the proposal might well have been expected and even planned. An internal working document entitled "Austrian Tactical Considerations," for example, recommends that if the


2Stearman, The Soviet Union and the Occupation of Austria, p. 146.
United States were unable to get a suitable Austrian treaty, its alternative course should be to "[o]ffer to sign the long draft treaty including the Soviet version of the unagreed articles on condition the offer is accepted at the Conference and no additional difficulties are raised and exploit advantage to full when Molotov refuses." ¹ It therefore seems unlikely that the Americans actually believed that their surprising proposal would be accepted; thus, the proposal was intended primarily for domestic, Austrian, and Western European audiences, and less so as a true basis for an agreement.

Considerable attention has also been focussed on the Western attitude towards neutrality. One important interpretation of the Berlin Conference claims that the offer by the Austrians to assume a neutral status was the crucial breakthrough in the struggle for a treaty, because neutrality was the vital basis for agreement which the Soviet Union had long awaited. ² Indeed, the argument often continues so far as to assert that had it not been for Western pressure on the Austrians to refuse a written neutrality commitment, the treaty might have been signed in 1954. The strength of this hypothesis is that it is easy to document Western, and especially American, opposition to the idea that Austria should


²Waldheim, The Austrian Example, p. 76.
be "neutralized."\textsuperscript{1} State Department briefing papers written before and during the Berlin Conference speak candidly of the need to reject Soviet efforts to include a "neutralization" article in the treaty,\textsuperscript{2} or even to bring up the "extraneous issue" of Austrian "neutralization."\textsuperscript{3}

However, this evidence is somewhat misleading. The true position of the Eisenhower Administration is not entirely clear. Even as some lower level American planners opposed the idea of a neutral Austria, others accepted it as a final bargaining chip in the negotiations.\textsuperscript{4} Policy directives drawn up before the Berlin Conference indicate that the official position of the State

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\item \textsuperscript{2}U.S. Department of State, "Austrian Tactical Considerations," Draft #1, by Rutter, undated, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.

\item \textsuperscript{3}U.S. Department of State, "Points on Austria for Tripartite Ministerial Discussion (First Draft)," 9 February 1954, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.

\item \textsuperscript{4}See "Tripartite Preparations in Paris, December 1953," Paper prepared by the Department of State, 12 December 1953, R.G. 84 (Post Records of Vienna, Austria), Declass. Review Project NND 842433, Box #4, Diplomatic Documents Division, National Archives, Washington, D.C. This paper calls for the acceptance by the Western powers of an Austrian declaration of neutrality as a fall back position in the negotiations.

The proposal was disputed by U.S. Department of State, Top Secret Telegram from Paris to Vienna, 17 December 1953, R.G. 84, Declass. Review Project NND842433, Box #4, Diplomatic Documents Division, National Archives, Washington, D.C. This document argues that altering the U.S. opposition to Austrian neutrality would demoralize the British and the French, who had been showing "commendable firmness on this point."
Department on neutrality was ambiguous. More important, at the highest levels of American foreign policy making, surprising flexibility was being shown. For example, in his notes from a breakfast conference with Eisenhower which occurred a few days before the start of the conference, Dulles recorded the following policy statement:

With reference to the Austrian Treaty, the President said he could see no objection to the neutralization of Austria if this did not carry with it the demilitarization. If Austria would achieve a status somewhat comparable to Switzerland, this would be quite satisfactory from a military standpoint.¹

If the Berlin Conference had depended on the question of neutrality alone, the records of Eisenhower and Dulles' secret strategy session imply that, as a price for the treaty, neutrality might well have been accepted in 1954, as it was indeed eventually accepted in 1955.

It is surely no coincidence that the formula for neutrality which Dulles presented at Berlin followed closely the President's views regarding Austrian neutrality; whether or not Dulles had personal reservations, he conformed to the wishes of the president during the conference. And according to available documents, the British and the French were following the American lead with respect to the issue of neutrality at the Berlin Conference. Western

¹"Memorandum of Breakfast Conference with the President," 20 January 1954, Papers of John Foster Dulles, 1951-1959, White House Memoranda Series, Meetings with the President 1953 Folder, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.
policy with respect to Austrian neutrality did not prevent the signing of the Austrian State Treaty at the Berlin Conference.

More to the point, the question of Western intentions regarding neutrality was actually irrelevant to the outcome of the conference, for neutrality was not the crucial issue at Berlin. The Austrian Foreign Minister's statement of his willingness to keep Austria from foreign military influence may have been more explicit than the Western powers wished, but it was not a stunning breakthrough. Leading Austrian politicians had for years been advocating Austria's military neutrality. Moreover, hints of a willingness to be neutral had been dropped in Austria's attempts at independent bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union a few months before the conference opened, and the Russians had certainly not responded to them. Whether or not the Western powers had reservations in the matter, the Russians did not pursue the issue of neutrality in the negotiations. With respect to Austria, the failure of the Berlin Conference was caused not by Western refusal to agree to Austrian neutrality, but by disagreement on the question of troop withdrawals.

Nonetheless, the impending failure of the session certainly did not seem to discourage Dulles; indeed, if anything, the spirits of the entire American delegation were extremely high during the Berlin Conference. In a personal letter, C.D. Jackson, a member of the American delegation, made the following observations: "...[John] Foster [Dulles] has been absolutely superb. I suspect that this is the kind of existence he loves and because he is
enjoying it, his personality is blossoming. He has supplied real
generalship to the group—he works harder than anyone else. He
has stiffened the wavering spines of Bidault and Eden time after
time. I think he has proved a more formidable adversary than
anyone Molotov has met in a long time."¹

In fact, strictly speaking, the Berlin Conference was a
limited success for Dulles personally, as well as for the United
States. The State Department's first priority, that of bringing
the Western allies together, had certainly been achieved. British
Foreign Minister Anthony Eden later wrote, "The efforts of the
Western powers at the Berlin Conference...had been closely co­
ordinated and well worked out. Despite some difficult periods,
we managed always to keep in line."² The French Foreign Minister,
Georges Bidault, even reportedly defended Dulles' behaviour at
the meetings: "He was considerably more moderate than was generally
understood. It is true that he was very firm on principle. He
was also sometimes very rough and rigid. But the truth is that
he carefully avoided being the one to close the door to Molotov."³

Indeed, in 1954 Western unity was not an easy goal to attain.
The Berlin Conference was the apex of the cooperation between

¹Letter from C.D. Jackson (at the Berlin Conference) to
General Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President, 9
February 1954, in C.D. Jackson Papers, 1934-67, Time Inc. File,
Berlin--Basics and Working Papers Folder, Dwight D. Eisenhower
Library, Abilene, Kansas.


Dulles and Eden.¹ The U.S. Secretary of State and the British Foreign Secretary did not like each other personally, and their mutual antipathy helped to put an end to the era of wartime British-American cooperation.² With regard to Austria, Britain's influence on American policy in the postwar years never regained the strength it had achieved under Foreign Secretary Bevin. The pressure exerted by the British during the 1949 Paris initiative (See Chapter 3), for example, could not be repeated in subsequent years. After Bevin's resignation in March 1951, American policy with respect to the Austrian treaty had grown increasingly independent of British policy. By the time Dulles had taken full control of the State Department, the British were no longer exercising the avuncular advisory role they had so deftly filled in the earlier years. Therefore, in the context of Anglo-American relations—dominated by two personalities as strong and as uncomplementary as Dulles and Eden—the appearance of Western unity at the Berlin Conference was no small achievement.

The United States' second goal, that of signing an Austrian State Treaty, regrettably had not been possible, but the Russians could be blamed for this disappointment. The Western position on neutrality had never been put to the test, because the suggestion that the Red Army remain in Austria beyond the signature of the treaty was clearly objectionable. Thus, the third goal—to place

²Ibid.
the onus for failure squarely on the Soviet Union—had been easily accomplished. United States interests may have benefitted indirectly, but with respect to Austria, the Soviet Union was responsible for destroying the Berlin Conference. In February 1954, the Russians decided that it was not in their interest to give up Austria. Promise of a new approach in Soviet foreign policy evaporated, as the old arguments and the old rhetoric surfaced once again. At Berlin, Molotov was in control of the Soviet position, and Dulles may have been "a formidable adversary," but the Austrians unfortunately did not profit by it.

Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov's insistence at the Berlin Conference that troop withdrawals from Austria be dependent upon a German peace treaty satisfactory to Moscow erased any remaining doubts about the link between Austria and Germany in Soviet foreign policy. During the remainder of 1954, the question of the future of Germany occupied most of the attention of the Soviet Union and the Western allies alike, with Austria's grievances eclipsed by the security problems of her larger neighbour. Indeed, as matters stood at the close of the Berlin Conference, there seemed to be little promise for negotiations about Austria. Molotov still demanded that Soviet troops remain in Austria even after an Austrian treaty was signed, and Dulles declared that until the Soviet Union set a specific date for its withdrawal, further negotiations were useless. With two of the world's most stubborn negotiators now publicly committed to contrary positions,
an Austrian treaty seemed distant.

Talk of Austria's independence on the basis of Austria's own considerations now seemed sadly irrelevant in the West. It became increasingly obvious during 1954, as the Russians launched a vigorous propaganda crusade, that an Austrian treaty was to be used as part of an effort to cajole the Western electorate not to rearm West Germany. Until some lasting solution on Germany or some change in Soviet leadership dramatically altered East-West relations in Europe, the Soviet Union was unlikely to surrender Austria, its valuable bargaining chip.

Political conditions within Austria degenerated in the months after the conference, as local bitterness over Soviet intransigence at the Berlin Conference caused increased tension between the Russians the Austrians. The improvements in Soviet occupation policy instituted in 1953 were reversed after the conference ended. By the spring of 1954, for example, film controls had been reintroduced, Soviet unilateral actions against the press had increased, and spot checks on traffic crossing the demarcation line had begun anew. The crackdown in Soviet policies included deliberate intimidation of the Austrian government. On 17 May, 

1Gruber, Between Liberation and Liberty, pp. 12-14.

2Foreign Service Despatch from American Embassy Vienna to U.S. Department of State, 21 July 1954, Subject: Study of Possible Soviet Moves in Austria Aiming at Partition and Western Counter-measures Thereto," R.G. 59, 763.00/7-2154, Diplomatic Documents Division, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

3Stearman, The Soviet Union and the Occupation of Austria, p. 146n.
the Soviet High Commissioner summoned the Austrian Chancellor and Vice Chancellor to his office and delivered a lengthy condemnation of the Austrian government, ending with the threat that if the Austrians did not take action to stop anti-Soviet behaviour in Austria then the Soviets themselves would be forced to take the necessary measures. By the end of May, articles in the Soviet press contained increasingly scathing attacks on the Austrian government. To the alarm and disappointment of the Austrians, the post-Stalin thaw in Austria appeared to have ended.

Meanwhile, the foreign ministers of Britain, France, the United States, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China were meeting in Geneva to discuss Indo-China and Korea. The Geneva Conference had been planned during the Berlin Conference and was one of the only obvious by-products of Berlin. On 20 July 1954, the Geneva Conference settled the terms of armistice for Vietnam and divided the country into two parts, split by the seventeenth parallel. The Geneva Agreements evoked a very mixed reaction in Austria. Although the Austrians were encouraged by the hope of a slight relaxation in East-West relations, there was also some concern among Austrian officials that the formula applied by the great powers to Indo-China might be contemplated for Austria.

On the day of the announcement of the Geneva Agreements, Austrian

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1 Telegram from Yost, Vienna, to Secretary of State, 17 May 1954, R.G. 59, 763.00/5-1754, Diplomatic Documents Division, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

Vice Chancellor Dr. Schaerf curtly stated that any attempt at a solution of the Austrian question by partition would bring with it the danger of a fresh war.¹

Immediately after the Geneva Agreements were signed, the Austrian government attempted to take advantage of the apparent improvement in East-West relations and to break the post-Berlin deadlock in the negotiations over Austria by suggesting the formation of a five-power commission (including Austria) in Vienna. In part to avoid offending the Americans, whose Secretary of State had publicly refused to negotiate until the Russians modified their demands, the Austrians asked that the commission deal with "alleviation of the current situation in Austria" rather than the question of a treaty. By side-stepping the controversial question of a treaty, the Austrians hoped to separate their own problems from the larger East-West controversies in Europe.

The Austrian government seemed to be desperate to get discussions going, even if only about collateral issues, in order to provide some sign of progress for its discouraged constituents. Only too aware of the precedent of Indo-China, the government may also have felt compelled to try to increase its hold on all four zones of Austria. In any case, the originator of the plan, Bruno Kreisky, believed that through a five member commission, Austrian national sovereignty might be incrementally restored, even without a treaty.²

²Allard, Russia and the Austrian State Treaty, pp. 123-126.
Although always inclined publicly to support measures to improve the situation for the Austrians, the Western powers were concerned that the five member commission might undercut the authority of the Allied Council and thereby weaken the Control Agreement. All four great powers had from the beginning of the occupation deliberately avoided measures which might undercut the legal instrument of control in Austria and thereby increase the degree of uncertainty and the danger of confrontation between them. The Americans, furthermore, felt that in the current climate of East-West tension it was not likely that the five member commission would accomplish anything substantive. Nevertheless, in order to demonstrate to the Austrian government and people that every effort was being made on their behalf, as well as to forestall bilateral Austo-Soviet negotiations, the Western powers decided that the Austrian proposal for 'five-power' negotiations in Vienna must be supported. ¹

But the Soviet Union refused to participate in the Vienna commission, arguing that the Russians remained quite willing to sign a treaty as long as discussions continued on the basis of the Russian proposal at the Berlin Conference. By the summer

Allard, a close friend of Kreisky, was the Swedish Ambassador to Vienna from 1954 to 1964. His personal contacts, observations, and recollections of the years 1954 and 1955 are a unique and unparalleled source of information about the incidents leading up to the treaty.

¹Top Secret Foreign Service Dispatch, American Embassy, Vienna, to Department of State, Subject: "U.S. Policy in Austria," 23 July 1954, R.G. 59, 611.63/7-2354. Diplomatic Documents Division, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
of 1954, encouraged by Soviet-sponsored Communist propaganda, many Austrian intellectuals were beginning to suspect that the Soviet Union had been prepared to sign a state treaty at Berlin but the Austrians, subservient to the whims of the Western powers, had missed their opportunity. The fact that such a treaty would have provided for occupation troops to remain indefinitely "to prevent an Anschluss," was scarcely mentioned. By the fall of 1954, the Austrian government had lost almost all hope for a treaty, and in the pervasive climate of pessimism, Chancellor Julius Raab reportedly gave serious consideration to the possibility of allowing a few Soviet regiments to remain on the soil of an independent Austria. The idea was apparently rejected, for the Chancellor soon declared his unwillingness to sign any treaty which did not call for the complete evacuation of Austria. Still, the Russians must have considered their diplomatic and propaganda tactics a success, for the deepening despondency of the Austrians increased the pressure on Britain, France, and the United States to conclude a treaty immediately, on Soviet terms.

In the meantime, most international attention was directed to the question of Western Europe's future defence needs and, in particular, the rearmament of West Germany within the European Defense Community (EDC). The European Defense Community charter had not yet been endorsed by the French National Assembly. To halt

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1Allard, Russia and the Austrian State Treaty, pp. 127-130.

2Ibid.
the momentum toward French ratification of the EDC, the Soviet Union urged the convening of a conference on a collective security system for all of Europe,¹ and then proposed a September four-power meeting to lay the groundwork for the security conference.² As an incentive, the Russians even modified their position regarding the Austrian State Treaty, conceding that West Germany's adherence to an all-European collective security treaty—that is, one with the stabilizing influence of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe—would be as satisfactory a prerequisite to Soviet evacuation of Austria as signature of a German peace treaty.

This combination of offering alternatives to German rearmament and hinting at future Soviet concessions seemed to have some effect, for on 30 August 1954, the French Chamber of Deputies rejected the European Defense Community treaty. The Soviet leaders took the rejection as proof of the success of its propaganda and diplomatic campaign, and barely disguised their contentment with the setback to Anglo-American diplomacy.

Soviet satisfaction was short-lived, however, for within two months a new set of treaties was drafted to replace the abortive European Defense Community. The Paris agreements, signed in October 1954, provided for the direct admission of the Federal Republic of Germany to full membership in NATO, a prospect that was


even worse, in Soviet eyes, than Germany's restricted membership in the EDC. Once again, however, the treaties were not to take effect until the signatory governments ratified the agreements; thus, the Soviet Union initiated a new drive against ratification, directed particularly at the French and German legislatures.

The Soviet crusade took a form very similar to the summer campaign, except that offers of alternative all-European security arrangements and other incentives were this time coupled with threats of the detrimental consequences of ratifying the Paris Accords. On 23 October, the day the Paris Agreements were signed, the Soviet government proposed a conference in Vienna of the foreign ministers of the four great powers plus Austria, to examine questions connected with the conclusion of an Austrian State Treaty.1 Anxious to take advantage of any opportunity for progress, the Austrian government had already indicated to the Soviet Union its willingness to take part in the Vienna meeting. Austria's agreement placed added pressure on the Western powers; nonetheless, they did not respond immediately to the Soviet note.

The Soviet government on 13 November 1954 sent another note to the U.S., Great Britain and France, this time proposing a conference to begin two weeks later, on creating a system of collective security in Europe.2 Again the Western powers did not immediately respond.

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The Austrians, always anxious to encourage negotiations between the four great powers, viewed the Soviet proposals with some hope. Austrian Chancellor Raab visited the United States on 21 November, and he broached the question of the Western response to the Soviet démarche and its implications for Austria. According to the State Department record of a meeting held with the Austrian Chancellor, Dulles assessed Soviet policy and outlined a Western response in the following terms:

Once the London and Paris accords are complete to the point where it is clear that there will be no turning back, the Secretary said, it will be more useful to have a conference with the Soviets. He said it is the main Soviet objective to prevent the ratification of those accords and so long as that is possible any conference on any subject would be used by the Soviets only as a means of blocking ratification. After ratification, the Secretary believed that a useful conference on Austria and Germany would be possible.¹

In line with this strategy, the United States, Britain and France simultaneously answered the two Soviet notes on 29 November, insisting first, that a quadripartite conference would be pointless. The Western powers had already indicated their willingness to sign the long draft treaty, and thus they could not understand what questions the Soviet Union could wish to discuss. With regard to the second Soviet proposal, the Western powers questioned

¹Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: The Secretary's Meeting with the Austrian Chancellor, Participants: Dr. Julius Raab, Chancellor of Austria, Dr. Karl Gruber, Ambassador of Austria, (2 others); The Secretary, Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson, Mr. Livingston T. Merchant, EUR, (3 others), 22 November 1954, R.G. 59, 611.63/11-2254, Diplomatic Documents Division, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
Soviet motives in proposing a collective security conference, claiming that the Soviet Union "openly and explicitly aimed at delaying or preventing the ratification of the Paris agreements."1 Clearly the Western powers were determined not to take the risk of meeting with the Soviet Union while the question of German rearmament still hung in the balance, unless they could be certain that some positive result would be achieved by the meeting. To throw the responsibility for progress in East-West relations back upon the Soviet leaders, the Western powers asked the Soviet Union to give them a guarantee of good intentions in advance of any meeting. The foremost sign of good faith requested by the Western powers was a Soviet commitment to sign the Austrian State Treaty.2

On the same day that the Western powers responded to the two Soviet notes, the Soviet leaders carried out their plans and convened a European Security Conference in Moscow. Although all European powers and the United States were invited, only Eastern bloc countries attended. When the conference ended, the Soviet Union publicly announced that the participants had agreed to form their own security organization to offset NATO if the Paris Accords were ratified. Having now shifted from incentives to threats, the Russians also warned that they would abrogate the Anglo-Soviet and Franco-Soviet treaties of 1942 and 1944 if the


2Ibid., p. 902.
Paris agreements came into effect.¹

During the ratification debate, the Western powers eliminated one of the issues which had for years been a pretext for Soviet refusal to sign an Austrian treaty. In the autumn of 1954, the long-awaited conclusion of negotiations over Trieste resulted in the division of the city between Yugoslavia and Italy. The settling of the Trieste issue enabled the withdrawal of British and American troops shortly thereafter, and belied Soviet accusations that the city had become a permanent Anglo-American base.

December 1954 brought more vehement Soviet threats specifically tying the future of Austria to the result of the ratification debate. A Soviet note to the Western powers on 9 December stated that ratification "could not contribute to achievement of agreement" on the Austrian question. On 17 December another note warned that the plans for rearming Germany would result in "new impediments for the final settlement of the Austrian question."² Later that month, the Soviet government made the most serious threat to the future of Austria. On 21 December, the Soviet High Commissioner took the unprecedented step of requesting a special session of the Allied Control Council. When the other three commissioners had assembled, he launched an attack on the United States for


jeopardizing Austrian unity by stationing troops in the French zone. The complaint stunned the Western powers, for the three hundred American soldiers, who were occupied with administrative duties on the lines of communication between Italy and the American zone in Germany, had been in the French zone for eight years without Soviet objection.¹ Suddenly the Russians were pointing to the offense as if it were tantamount to deliberate partition of Austria. The unanticipated harangue seemed a scarcely veiled attempt to indicate that partition was being considered in Moscow and would likely be implemented if West Germany were rearmed.²

This time, Soviet tactics were apparently less successful, for on 30 December, the French Chamber by a small margin endorsed the Paris Accords. However, ratification by the more capricious French Council of the Republic was still needed. The Soviet Union redirected its efforts to persuade the members of the Council that German rearmament was no longer necessary. Threats became incentives once again, as the Soviet government offered to discuss the reunification of Germany and, in a surprising turnabout, even suggested the possibility of holding free all-German elections and beginning atomic disarmament if only the West would refrain from enacting the Paris agreements.³


²Allard, Russia and the Austrian State Treaty, pp. 140-142.

By this time, Soviet pleas had been received favourably among intellectuals in France, Germany, and even Great Britain. Leading political figures in the Socialist parties and in liberal circles began to argue that ratification of the Paris Accords should be postponed, at least until a conference between the heads of government could meet to be certain that there was not a more peaceable solution to the dispute between the Soviet Union and the Western powers. At the same time, voices from more conservative Western quarters countered that the Russians had already proven to be disingenuous negotiators in both Germany and Austria, and that the only hope of a peaceful future lay in Western unity and a Western European defence system. Moreover, concern that the United States might reduce its role in Western Europe if the Paris agreements were not passed—a fear heightened by Dulles' ominous warning that failure to ratify the agreements would force the Americans to conduct an "agonizing reappraisal" of their role—strongly militated against any further negotiations with Soviet officials. The arguments continued through the early months of 1955, and Austria's future hung in the balance, paradoxically entwined with the fate of a state with which she was forbidden to align herself.

\[^{1}\text{Allard, } \text{Russia and the Austria State Treaty, pp. 134-135.}\]
CHAPTER SIX

The Soviet Reversal, 1955

As controversy over the Paris agreements continued in the West, evidence of a leadership struggle was emerging in the East. Soviet policies towards Austria, which had been waverering between a reasoned accommodation and scathing rhetoric during 1953 and 1954, even led to Western speculation that the military may have actually taken command in Moscow. In 1955, while the Western powers were still trying to determine the nature of the new leadership in Moscow, a policy change instigated by the Kremlin had a profound effect upon the future of Austria.

Although the facts about events in the Kremlin will probably always remain a mystery to outsiders, by 1954 it appears that there were three protagonists in the power struggle who had a significant influence on post-Stalin Soviet foreign policy: Premier Malenkov, apparently Stalin's chosen successor, whose foreign policy speeches of 1953 and 1954 confirmed him as an advocate of relaxation on the international front; Foreign Minister Molotov, a seasoned veteran of the Stalin era and orthodox Soviet Communist, with a visceral aversion to giving up any military positions; and Communist Party leader Khrushchev, a

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2 Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, pp. 545-547.
skillful opportunist, probably temperamentally in favour of international coexistence but willing to suit his ideology to his goals.

During 1954, it seems that Malenkov gradually began to lose control of foreign policy. Molotov's insistence at the Berlin Conference that Soviet troops remain in Austria seemed inconsistent with the more moderate Soviet policies introduced in Austria and supported by Malenkov immediately after Stalin's death. Indeed, the uncertain and sometimes incoherent policies during the remainder of the year seemed to reflect a dispute in the Kremlin over how best to use Austria in the heightening conflict with the West. One course of action was to offer incentives to the Western powers, including eventually an Austrian treaty, as a token of Soviet desire for détente. Austria was politically, historically, and militarily much less important to the Soviet Union than was Germany, and a concrete sign of Soviet willingness to accommodate the West might forestall the nightmarish prospect of an armed Germany in control of a unified Western Europe. This course seems to have been advocated initially by Malenkov and later by Khrushchev.1 The other course of action was to hold onto gains already achieved, to threaten the West with dire consequences if an anti-Soviet defence organization was formed and, in particular, to use Austria as a hostage to be ransomed only by appropriate Western behaviour. This was the course of action apparently

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supported by Molotov. Throughout the year, these two approaches had been used alternatively, and sometimes even together, much to the confusion of the Western governments.

By September, it had become apparent to the West that Malenkov was losing the battle over control of Soviet policy. Among other indicators, Malenkov's weakness was demonstrated by his absence from an important delegation to China, led by Khrushchev and his crony Nikolai Bulganin. Premier Malenkov's demise was likely caused as much by the jealousies of his colleagues and his own ineptitude in the struggle for power as by his specific domestic and foreign policies. Nonetheless, he seems to have lost ground rapidly to Molotov in the debate over Soviet policy towards Europe, for Malenkov's decaying position coincided with the shift from mainly offering incentives to the West in October and November, to issuing threats and even considering partition of Austria in December. In late 1954, Khrushchev shrewdly allied himself with Molotov and other hard-line forces in order to bring down his rival Malenkov. The alliance was more than the Premier could withstand, for soon Molotov's hawkish approach began to prevail.2

The veteran foreign minister, nicknamed the "iron behind" by Lenin, clung to his belief that Austria would never be truly neutral and feared most of all that after the Russians withdrew,

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1Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, p. 556.

the small country would be wholly incorporated in the anti-Soviet defense system. Although the Austrians had formally announced at the Berlin Conference their intention not to join any military alliances or allow foreign bases on Austrian territory, Molotov reportedly argued that such an offer of neutrality from Austria was worthless. The Austrian people had already shown themselves to be economically and politically oriented towards the West, and during a crisis would most likely become militarily integrated as well. What good were promises which could be easily circumvented by secret basing and transit agreements, operative in times of war? Only a small amount of pressure from the United States would be necessary to induce the Austrians to allow the Western allies to reoccupy her country, the argument continued. With few friends in Austria, the Soviet Union, on the other hand, could only enter Austria forcibly if the need arose. A Western presence would be a violation of the treaty, but a Soviet presence would be an invasion of the country. The rearmament of West Germany would only exacerbate the problem by making Austria's northern neighbour a major source of pressure against Austria and aggression against the U.S.S.R. For these reasons, Molotov and his sympathizers had vehemently opposed the evacuation of Austria, regarding the continued occupation by Soviet soldiers and the threat of a partition of Austria as the only true guarantees the Russians could have against complete military incorporation of the country into the Western bloc.¹

¹Allard, Russia and the Austrian State Treaty, pp. 144-150. These
By the early months of 1955, however, the campaign of threats against German rearmament seemed to be helping to bring about just what it had been designed to prevent. Ratification of the 1955 Paris Accords appeared likely and Austria's incorporation into NATO was an increasingly distinct possibility. Once the marriage of convenience was no longer useful, Khrushchev began to challenge Molotov's foreign policy. Confronted by the apparent failure of his hard-line approach to the West, Molotov was forced to yield to Khrushchev, who was disturbed by the deteriorating trend of relations between the Soviet Union and the West. Ideology and external interests aside, Khrushchev needed a period of international relaxation in order to introduce the economic and military programmes that would help consolidate his own domestic power. Furthermore, Khrushchev argued that Soviet interests must be defined in terms broader than the East-West struggle in Europe. He thus began to advocate a course more bold than anything Malenkov had dared espouse: to use an Austrian agreement primarily as a relatively cheap price for an East-West rapprochment, secondly as a

arguments are largely based upon a conversation between Allard and a senior Soviet diplomat Allard calls "K." in Vienna. Allard discloses at the end of his account: "It was only some years later when Khrushchev and Mikoyan during their visits to Vienna had revealed to Kreisky the background of their conflict with Molotov about Austria that I fully understood to what extent K. had told the truth. The arguments he had advanced during the conversation with me in December 1954 reflected as a matter of fact the reasons which had prompted Molotov to oppose the evacuation of Austria. The conversation consequently proves that as late as the end of the year, he still exercised a considerable influence in Soviet foreign policy."

1Ibid.
last-ditch attempt to prevent German rearmament, and finally as the symbolic beginning of a new Soviet approach to the 'uncommitted' nations of the Third World.

The surprising Soviet about-face on Austria was announced by Molotov himself on 8 February 1955 in a speech before the Supreme Soviet. After fulminating against the deplorable situation in international relations, Molotov announced that the Soviet Union was willing to consider signing an Austrian State Treaty even without a German peace treaty, provided that there was a firm guarantee against an Anschluss and that a conference on both Germany and Austria would be convened without delay. In parts, Molotov's address was confusing and inconsistent, probably reflecting last-minute editing forced upon him by Khrushchev.\footnote{Vojtech Mastny, "Kremlin Politics and the Austrian Settlement," Problems of Communism, Vol. XXXI (July-August 1982), pp. 37-51.}

At the same session of the Supreme Soviet, Malenkov tendered his resignation from the position of Soviet Premier, citing particularly his inexperience in "local work," an area which just happened to be Khrushchev's \textit{forte}.\footnote{Linden, Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, p. 31.} The session was obviously a victory for Khrushchev, and in detaching the German and Austrian treaties it provided the first break in the deadlock over Austria.

Aside from using Austria in the latest twist of Kremlin intrigue, Khrushchev and his supporters thought there might be a chance to delay passage of the Paris agreements. By holding out the prospect of an Austrian treaty but requiring that a four-
power conference on Germany and Austria must meet first, the Soviet leaders calculated that the Austrians would pressure the Western powers to agree to a conference. Ideally, the question of German rearmament would then simply be buried in allied squabbles over the Western negotiating position. The goal, in any case, was to entice the Austrians immediately to lobby for the conference before the Paris Accords could be ratified by the French Council of the Republic.¹

To the disappointment of the Soviet leaders, however, the immediate Western reaction to the speech was surprisingly subdued. It has been argued that Western speculation about Malenkov's resignation overshadowed any interest in Molotov's statements about Austria.² More likely, as available documents from the months before indicate, Western leaders (particularly Dulles) had long before gleaned Soviet motivations and were determined to try to frustrate them. Coming as late as it did in the movement towards ratification of the Paris Accords, Molotov's proposal was probably not considered a tremendous threat; however, as had been the case since the Berlin Conference, the goal of Western policy was to put off Soviet negotiating initiatives in Europe until German rearmament was completely assured.

In any case, the Soviet Foreign Minister found it necessary a week later to summon the Austrian Ambassador, Norbert Bischoff, to his office and reemphasize the relevant portions of the address.

¹Allard, Russia and the Austrian State Treaty, pp. 156-163.
Molotov particularly stressed the need for a strong guarantee against Anschluss. Two days later, while Bischoff was consulting with his government, the German Bundestag ratified the Paris agreements. With a new sense of urgency, Molotov again met with Ambassador Bischoff on 2 March. The Ambassador expressed gratitude for the Soviet initiative, informed Molotov that the Austrian government could not enter into unilateral negotiations about a guarantee, and asked the Russians to clarify their position. An indignant Molotov claimed that the Soviet position was quite clear and asked the Austrians, in turn, to clarify their own position. The Ambassador left somewhat perplexed and once again contacted Vienna.

While the Austrians were consulting amongst themselves and with the Western allies, Molotov became increasingly frustrated by the lack of progress. His speech had not elicited the desired response; the momentum towards ratification of the Paris Accords continued, and there was as yet no sign of a four-power conference or any other change of plans. To push the issue still further, on 12 March Molotov summoned the entire press corps of Moscow to his office for an important announcement and once again reiterated the proposal he had made in his speech of a month ago.\(^1\)

By now there was virtually no possibility of forestalling the vote on the Paris Accords by the French Council, which had been scheduled for later that month. Too much time had elapsed, and any thought of organizing a conference before the question

\(^1\)Ibid.
was decided was plainly futile. Available documents neither prove nor disprove this hypothesis, but it is quite possible that during the month after Molotov's speech, the Western powers secretly discouraged the Austrians from reacting quickly to the Soviet initiative. It is in any case quite clear that the allies, particularly the United States, deliberately muted their own response to suggestions of a four-power conference until French ratification of the Paris Accords had become a foregone conclusion.

The Austrian government finally gave an official response to Molotov's speech in a note dated 14 March. Welcoming every guarantee for their independence, the Austrians repeated their intentions not to join any military alliances or allow foreign soldiers on Austrian soil. For a number of reasons, however, they still avoided mentioning the word "neutrality." First of all, the Russians had in the past shown hostility towards neutral states, and there was no firm indication at the time that the Soviet aversion to neutrality had been reversed. Second, the Western powers, particularly Britain and the United States, as a matter of principle continued to oppose the idea of including a neutrality clause restricting Austria's sovereignty in a treaty of independence. Indeed, the Austrians themselves were worried that such a restriction of their sovereignty might eventually prove to be a threat to the Austrian state.

More generally speaking, the concept of neutrality was an ambiguous one, and the Austrians had at that point no way of determining that their understanding of the term matched that of
the Soviet leaders. The Austrian government had been for some time willing to become militarily neutral, strictly in the sense that Austria would deliberately avoid joining any military alliances and would refuse to allow foreign actors to establish bases upon Austrian soil. But the Austrians had no desire to be "neutralized," that is, barred from establishing political and economic ties with whatever nations they chose and prevented from developing a strong national army capable of defending Austrian rights and territory. Particularly aware of the precedent of Finland, the Austrians were afraid to allow the Soviet Union to define what their neutrality would be. When the Austrians stated in their note to the Soviet Union their willingness to avoid joining any military alliances or allow any foreign bases on their territory, they were describing their own conception of the word neutrality, without using the term.

The Soviet government studied the Austrian note and, after some uncertainty apparently regarding the issue of neutrality, responded favourably. In a letter of 24 March, Molotov dropped the prerequisite of a four-power conference and invited Austrian Chancellor Raab to Moscow for bilateral discussions on a treaty. Three days later, when the French Council of the Republic ratified the Paris agreements, the Russians simply continued to make plans

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1Foreign Service Dispatch, American Embassy, Vienna, to U.S. Department of State, 3 February 1954, Subject: "Views of a People's Party Functionary on Current Issues," 763.00/2-354, Diplomatic Documents Division, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

2Interview with former Chancellor Dr. Bruno Kreisky, Vienna, 2 December 1983.
for an Austrian visit in April.

Those historians who argue that the Russians could not have intended their **volte-face** on Austria directly to prevent the ratification of the Paris Accords have a very strong case.¹ Molotov's crucial speech probably came too late to have a significant effect on what had begun to seem an irreversible process. If the Soviet Union had announced its initiative a few months earlier, the concession on Austria may well have caused irresolution to take hold of the governments of the European powers. As it was, by February 1955 the momentum of European opinion was already firmly set in the direction of German rearmament.

Still, Molotov's unprecedented and almost frantic reiterations of the new Soviet terms for an Austrian treaty—terms which he himself would have adamantly opposed a few months earlier—reveal something about Kremlin activities. Molotov's own post in the Politburo was becoming increasingly tenuous during the early months of 1955. On 10 March, two days before he summoned the Moscow press corps to his office, Molotov was openly attacked in **Pravda**.² Ratification of the Paris Accords was sure to weaken his position further, since Molotov's earlier hard line would be

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(and was) blamed for the foreign policy failure. Aware that he might well become Khrushchev's scapegoat, Molotov pursued the new Soviet line on Austria with a tenacity which could only be ascribed to a desperate man. It is unlikely that Khrushchev ever intended an Austrian treaty or a four-power conference primarily to forestall German rearmament; indeed, his support for the treaty had more to do with his need for a relaxation of international tensions in order to gain a breathing space in which to launch his own internal reforms. Khrushchev was willing to let Molotov take the risks, for it was not until well after the treaty was signed that Khrushchev began to take credit for the Soviet initiative. But Molotov had staked his reputation on the prevention of German rearmament, and in the face of overwhelming evidence that he had failed, he was willing to try anything, including offering an Austrian treaty.

Of course, his last-minute efforts were of no use, and in the months after the passage of the Paris Accords there was increasing evidence of Molotov's demise. Career Soviet Ambassadors in Eastern Europe, supporters of Molotov, were one by one replaced by Communist Party functionaries, Khrushchev's men. In May, Molotov was excluded from the Soviet delegation to Yugoslavia and his place was taken by Dmitri Shepilov, who later succeeded him. By July, Molotov was openly attacked at the Central Committee meeting and blamed for all previous failures in Stalinist foreign policy.
Khrushchev's idea of using Austria as the first of a series of relatively easy Soviet concessions to initiate an East-West détente, or what he called "peaceful coexistence," was a prominent rationale for a treaty. However, Molotov's hope that he might be able to save himself and avert German rearmament must also be recognized. The irony is that both leaders' primary motives, self-centered and self-serving as their origins were, ultimately benefitted the Austrians most of all.

On 11 April, a delegation led by Austrian Chancellor Raab of the People's Party arrived in Moscow. Molotov immediately expressed the Soviet Union's desire to come to a quick agreement on the Austrian problem and stressed that the negotiations in Moscow would be preliminary to an accord between the four powers. As talks progressed, there was no doubt that Molotov, confirmed Stalinist though he was, now earnestly desired a treaty. He seemed anxious to appear to be responsible for the Soviet turnaround and concentrated upon the positive aspects of the talks. Molotov's demand for a guarantee against Anschluss was deemphasized and instead the question of Austrian neutrality was given central importance.

1Khrushchev's memoirs do not specifically describe the decision to withdraw from Austria. However, in discussing generally the reasons for trimming the Warsaw Pact and withdrawing Soviet forces from Finland, Austria, and Romania, Khrushchev explains the rationale in the following way: "Even if we couldn't convince [the Western powers] to disarm themselves and give up the idea of war as a means of political pressure, at least we could demonstrate our own peaceful intentions and at the same time free some of our resources for the development of our industry, the production of consumer goods, and the improvement of living standards." Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, p. 251.
For both sides, the stumbling block seemed to be the precise words to be used to express Austria's future non-aligned status. The Soviet Union conceded that the neutrality pledge could come as a separate Parliament declaration, enacted after the signing of the treaty, in order to protect Austrian sovereignty and demonstrate that the decision to become neutral was freely chosen. That declaration, however, must contain the word "neutrality" or it would be unacceptable to Moscow. Since the Austrians had already effectively stated their intention to remain apart from military alliances, Chancellor Raab could see no objection to calling this condition "neutrality"; but Vice Chancellor Adolf Schaerf and State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Kreisky, who were both members of the coalition Socialist Party, opposed the term because its vagueness might later be exploited by the Russians to make false accusations against some future Austrian government. Would not, they asked, the expression, "freedom from alliances" do? Molotov rejected it firmly. Would Molotov accept a "foreign policy based on the principles of neutrality"? Once again, the Soviet response was a firm negative. Finally, the Austrian delegates reneged and agreed to use the term "neutrality," on the condition that it be clarified within the declaration. "Neutrality after the Swiss model" became the agreed formula, and from the time the phrase was approved, negotiations proceeded smoothly.1

With the question of neutrality settled, Molotov seemed more pliable than ever on the issue of Soviet troop withdrawals. First

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1Allard, Russia and the Austrian State Treaty, pp. 187-189.
proposing a time limit of six months on the withdrawal process, Molotov allowed the Soviet position to inch progressively closer to the Austrian delegation's position, until the two sides agreed that all troops should be withdrawn ninety days after the treaty came into force, or 31 December 1955 at the latest. The remaining economic issues were somewhat more difficult to settle, but after some very hard bargaining by Deputy Prime Minister Mikoyan the Soviet Union agreed to decrease the Austrian oil deliveries and financial obligations to a mutually satisfactory level. A date was also set for the repatriation of the hundreds of Austrian prisoners of war who still remained in Soviet camps. In the course of the negotiations, the Austrian delegation had the clear sense that the Politburo had resolved that a treaty would be signed; thus the Austrians pushed for all the Soviet concessions they could get. In the space of a few days, all the disagreements which had for years seemed impossible to resolve were satisfactorily settled between the Austrians and the Russians.

For the most part, the Austrians were pleased by the course of the negotiations in Moscow; however, some members of the delegation still had a few reservations about the neutrality arrangements. At the end of a day of talks, Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Mikoyan approached Bruno Kreisky and asked, "Why are you

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1The terms included ten million tons of petroleum over ten years and $150,000,000 in goods for the USIA concerns; "Austrian-Soviet Communique of April 15," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXII, No. 827 (2 May 1955), pp. 734-735.

2Interview with former Chancellor Dr. Bruno Kreisky, Vienna, 2 December 1983.
looking so sorry? Are you sorry? What's happened? We had a good day."

Kreisky ruefully answered, "Yes, but I am wondering what our Western friends may say."

And Mikoyan retorted, "Listen, they cannot say no, because they [have] promised you the State Treaty for such a long time, now that the State Treaty will come, they cannot say no."¹

On 15 April 1955, the Austrian delegation and the Soviet government issued a declaration summarizing their agreements which thereafter became known as the Moscow Memorandum. In the memorandum, both governments stated the desirability of the earliest conclusion of the state treaty. Furthermore, the Austrians "gave assurances that the Austrian Republic, in the spirit of the declaration made at the Berlin Conference in 1954, intends not to join any military alliances or permit military bases on her territory and will pursue a policy of independence in regard to all states which should insure the observance of this declaration." The Soviet Union agreed that the occupation forces of the four great powers would be withdrawn by 31 December 1955, and that the oil refineries and other properties currently held by the Soviet Union would be transferred to Austria under the terms they had bilaterally agreed.²

¹Ibid.

Khrushchev, in a state of buoyant good humour at the close of the negotiations, gave Chancellor Raab this advice: "Follow my example and turn Communist.... But if I really can't convince you then for God's sake stay as you are!" 1

The Soviet-Austrian meeting in Moscow, which led to the rapid conclusion of an Austrian State Treaty, was the result of a shift in Soviet policy. It was not caused by any proposals made by the Western powers in the treaty negotiations or by evidence of Austria's unwillingness to become neutral on the Swiss model. 2

Between 1949 and 1955, the Soviet Union did not really negotiate over Austria at all, because the Soviet leaders had no intention of withdrawing from Austrian territory unless wider considerations indicated clearly that such an uncharacteristic action was in broader Soviet interests. Eisenhower had first called for an Austrian treaty as a concrete example of peaceful Soviet intentions in his famous "Chance for Peace" speech two years earlier, and the Soviet leaders had taken note. In 1955, Khrushchev and his supporters decided that the time had come to oblige the President and initiate a thaw in the Cold War. The startling reversal of

1Waldheim, The Austrian Example, pp. 66-67. The quote was recalled by Walter Kindermann, the Austrian delegation's interpreter.

2Former Chancellor Dr. Bruno Kreisky, although widely considered to be responsible for the neutrality formula devised by the Austrians, insists that neither the Austrians nor the Western powers can claim credit for persuading the Russians to sign the treaty in the first place. The nature of the treaty was to their credit; the actual achievement of a treaty was the result of a change of Soviet foreign policy.

Interview with former Chancellor Dr. Bruno Kreisky, Vienna, 2 December 1983.
Soviet policy was apparently the result first, of Khrushchev's desire to initiate an East-West détente in Europe; second, of the Soviet need to take some measure to offset German rearmament; and third, of Khrushchev's plan to initiate a new Soviet policy with respect to the Third World.

The decision to sign an Austrian treaty signalled a doctrinal change in Soviet foreign policy with respect to the concept of neutrality. As Harold Macmillan remarked in his memoirs, the Swiss must have been wryly amused by the sudden elevation of "neutrality after the Swiss model" to a Soviet-supported political principle. During the war, the Soviet Union had repeatedly denounced the "pro-fascist," "cowardly" Swiss. Indeed, the Moscow Memorandum was ironically the first official Soviet document to recognize and confirm Swiss neutrality. It seems that the Russians, having failed in their attempt to prevent German rearmament, now tried to make the best of a difficult situation by acknowledging that there was a legitimate third approach to the East-West conflict. In Europe, the sudden change of Soviet policy was largely a defensive response, designed to limit the political effects of the new Western alliance.

The specific goal in Europe, difficult as it might have been, was to try to convince the Germans that military neutrality


was the only means whereby German reunification could ever be achieved. Although both outcomes were undesirable in Soviet eyes, a neutral, reunified Germany was certainly a slightly less undesirable prospect for the Russians than an anti-Soviet, Western supported, belligerent West Germany. In 1955 the Soviet fear that the Western powers would rearm West Germany and in alliance with Germany launch an attack on the U.S.S.R. was apparently more immediate than the fear that a reunified and militarily neutral Germany would alone threaten Russia in the future. There is no doubt, judging by the Soviet propaganda after the signature of the treaty, that the Soviet leaders hoped that a neutral Austria would serve as an example for Germany.

Indeed, the most optimistic Soviet thinkers might have even conceived that the new policy would result in a neutral corridor protectively flanking the Western frontier of the Soviet Union, from Finland to Sweden, through Germany, Austria, and Switzerland, down to Italy and Yugoslavia.\(^1\) It was certainly not a coincidence that the signing of the Austrian State Treaty was followed closely by Soviet attempts to improve relations with neutral or 'uncommitted' states in Europe, including a Soviet trip to Yugoslavia, the return of the Porkkala Naval Base to Finland, and the invitation to Adenauer to visit Moscow. At the very least, the Soviet leaders probably calculated that over a long period of time, the Austrian example

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would weaken Western resolve, encourage rifts in the Western alliance, and pave the way for good diplomatic relations with West Germany.¹

But the truth was that in Europe Soviet policy, whose primary aim had been to prevent German rearmament, had already failed miserably. Khrushchev hoped that the new Soviet position on neutrality would be favourably received in the Third World, where, unlike Western Europe, many young countries still reserved judgment on Soviet communism. Stalin's war campaign and subsequent brutal takeovers in Eastern Europe had convinced many uninvolved observers that the Soviet Union was nothing more than Mother Russia with a new name. With its East European empire now intact, the Soviet Union under Khrushchev began to propagate a new peace-loving image; the change in attitude toward neutrality added a touch of reasoned conciliation to an ideology which had begun to seem little more than ancient Russian expansionism. Eventually, of course, the Soviet leaders hoped to convince neutrals that only through cooperation with the Soviet Union could true peace be achieved.²

Of course, there was always a risk that the countries of the Third World would view the Soviet reversal as a setback to Soviet Communism and would conclude that the wisest action to take would


² Ibid., p. 665.
be an alliance with the more successful Western 'imperialist' powers. But in 1955, Khrushchev was willing to take that gamble, and the unprecedented success of Soviet Third World policies in subsequent years proved that it was a worthwhile risk.

Another risk which the Soviet leaders took in reversing their policy and signing the Austrian State Treaty was the possibility that countries already under Soviet rule might take note of the Austria example and wonder why they, too, might not become independent neutral countries. Indeed, the Warsaw Pact was formed with this in mind, not only to be a counterpart to NATO but also to ensure that Soviet troops would remain in Hungary and Romania beyond the date of the treaty. By their presence, Soviet troops emphasized that Eastern Europe, proclaimed by the U.S.S.R. a socialist fortress against 'Western hostility', was entirely different from capitalist Austria. As events in Hungary during the following year apparently indicated, however, Khrushchev's calculations in this regard were less accurate.


2 Ibid., pp. 70 and 76.

3 Imre Horvath, Hungarian Foreign Minister, made the following statement on Budapest Radio 3 June 1957:

The neutrality of a socialist country must be assessed not only from the point of view of peace but also from that of the cause of socialism. While a true neutrality on the part of a capitalist country [i.e., Austria] means standing apart from the conquerors and those ready to go to war, the neutrality of a socialist country represents an underhanded attack on the cause of peace and socialism and its betrayal.
Aside from these considerations related to the change in Soviet policy, there were a number of more mundane factors militating against continuation of the Soviet occupation. By 1955, the Russians had already extracted most of the benefits they could expect to gain from controlling Austria. Thus, when the Soviet leaders decided to grant the small state independence under a pledge of neutrality, they were actually sacrificing very little.¹

For another thing, it had long become apparent that in giving up Austria, the Soviet Union would not be compromising any Communist ideological principles. The Austrians had convincingly demonstrated that they were not inclined to become Communists, and only a major military intervention by the Soviet Union could ultimately bring the country into the Eastern bloc. With Western occupation troops sharing the country, the Russians dared not risk a direct conflict. The failure of two Communist takeovers, the obviously Western orientation of the Austrians, and the extreme unpopularity of the Russians troops, had for several years indicated that a Communist Austria was, for all practical purposes, a lost cause.

Strategic calculations also favoured a Soviet withdrawal in 1955. Although the Russians had been threatening for months that the enactment of the Paris agreements would make negotiations on Austria impossible, in fact the opposite proved to be true. With

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¹Bader, Austria Between East and West, p. 200.

German participation in NATO virtually assured, the Russians had a greater incentive than ever to ensure that the Austrians would remain militarily neutral. As William Lloyd Stearman observed, "What the Paris Agreements had joined together, the State Treaty, at least partly, put asunder." The Russians were entirely aware of the anxiety among the American Joint Chiefs of Staff that a neutral Austria would form a wedge in the center of NATO. In the wake of their failure to stave off the formation of the Western defence pact, the Soviet leaders sought to hinder NATO's logistical capabilities as much as possible. For the Russians, it was hardly a sacrifice to split NATO's northern and southern flanks.

Moreover, the topography of Austria was such that once the eastern zone was evacuated, it would be logistically easy for the Soviet Union to reoccupy it in time of war. Unlike the mountainous western regions of Austria, eastern Austria is a wide open plain, extremely difficult to defend. Unofficially, Austrian officials even today admit that if the Soviet Union really wanted to reclaim the Soviet zone, it could do so in half a day.

Another strategic argument frequently cited in the West at the time was the fact that by 1955 the Austrian occupation was no longer needed as a legal rationale for keeping Soviet troops in Hungary and Romania. The original legal pretext for stationing troops in the two Eastern European countries had been to maintain lines of communication with Soviet troops in Austria. With the apparent

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1 Stearman, The Soviet Union and the Occupation of Austria, p. 163.
consolidation of Communist control in Hungary and Romania, however, the pretext was unnecessary. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, in case Soviet military leaders (or, indeed, the satellite countries themselves) had any doubts, the formation of the Warsaw Pact on the day before the final signing of the Austrian State Treaty supplied an even better rationale for stationing Soviet troops on the territory of all of the Eastern European satellites.¹

In his memoirs, Khrushchev describes the Soviet desire to "give our comrades the benefit of all reasonable doubt" in settling economic terms with Austria and other countries.² But any suggestion that the Soviet Union magnanimously forfeited economic advantages when it signed the Austrian treaty is erroneous. In 1955, the Soviet Union had more to gain economically in signing the treaty than in continuing the status quo.

The Soviet-controlled USIA factories in Austria, for example, were no longer yielding the tremendous profits they had originally afforded the Russians and had become more of a liability than an asset. Part of the decline was due to poor management. The

¹Bader, *Austria Between East and West*, p. 204.


The entire quote is: "...Stalin had created bad feeling in Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Rumania, Hungary, China and Austria as well as Poland by setting up international organizations to exploit our allies' natural resources. We had been meaning to terminate these organizations ever since Stalin's death. But liquidating them wasn't enough. We had to change the whole picture of our economic relations with our allies. We had to give our comrades the benefit of all reasonable doubt. This meant scrupulously analyzing all past treaties and contracts, then rectifying all the mistakes...."
factories were run by Communist Party functionaries who rarely had any technical expertise, and thus the plants were rife with inefficiencies. As early as 1947, the Austrians secretly informed the American government that under Austrian management, they estimated that the current total production of $61 million from Soviet-run factories could easily be increased to $109 million.¹ In addition to management problems, the industries suffered from the Soviet Union's refusal to install new plant equipment or carry out any form of capital investment. What little capital that was available in the U.S.S.R after the war was consigned to industries within the Soviet Union. The Soviet leaders obviously planned to extract as much from the Austrian factories as they could, without investing any resources in return. By early 1953, this shortsighted policy had begun to take its toll, for the USIA empire began to decline, and the downturn continued until the occupation was ended. The Soviet-run concerns could not compete with neighbouring Austrian factories, and even a system of illegal black market USIA stores dealing in smuggled East European goods failed to salvage the network. By the last year of operation, the USIA industries were operating with a deficit of 240 million schillings, which represented about 40 percent of their total production.² Bankruptcies had become commonplace. Thus, when


the Austrian government undertook in Moscow to buy back the entire USIA complex for $150 million worth of goods, a figure almost four times its estimated worth of $40 million not including necessary repairs and investments, it was hardly against Soviet interests to agree.¹

As for the Austrian oil industry, the Soviet Union had already been extracting two-thirds of the total oil output for its own purposes and selling the remainder back to the Austrians at a hefty profit. Under the terms of the treaty, the Russians were entitled to ten million tons of oil over ten years, a figure that represented one-third of the total capacity if the high production rate could be continued (which was doubtful).² Thus, if the rate of production flagged because of diminishing oil resources, the Soviet Union would still be permitted its allotment, regardless of how little remained. By 1955, moreover, the Russians had developed their own domestic oil industry to the point where Austrian oil was not particularly needed.³ Giving up Soviet control of the Austrian oil industry was therefore not a major concession.

One of the important incentives to sign an Austrian treaty pertained to the subsidiary benefits for the Soviet Union's relationship with Yugoslavia. Although Molotov was strongly

¹Ibid.
²Ibid., p. 207.
³Bader, Austria Between East and West, pp. 204-205.
apprehensive of the plan, Khrushchev was very interested in achieving a reconciliation with Tito. In the ten years since the war, Austrian-Yugoslavian relations had evolved rapidly. From the initial animosity over the territorial issues of the early negotiations, the two countries had progressed to a state of friendly relations. Shortly after the Cominform denounced Yugoslavia in 1948, the Austrians and the Yugoslavs signed a trade agreement and began discussions on the issues of frontiers and reparations. In 1951, Yugoslavia declared an end to its state of war with Austria and restrictions along the border were relaxed. The next year the Austrian Foreign Minister visited Belgrade. Inspired by the friendly ties, and undoubtedly compelled by the desire to remove Soviet troops from her northern flank, Yugoslavia made it clear in early contacts with the U.S.S.R. that an Austrian State Treaty would enhance prospects for future Soviet-Yugoslav relations. It was likewise significant that in October 1954 the Trieste dispute had been resolved and American and British troops subsequently withdrawn, thereby eliminating another of the Soviet Union's former excuses for delaying the Austrian treaty. It was certainly not an accident that under


3Barker, Austria 1918-1972, pp. 197-198.
Article 23 of the final four-power treaty on Austria only Yugoslavia was granted the right to seize Austrian property rights within its territory; by the fall of 1955, the Austrians and the Yugoslavs were busy conducting independent negotiations for the return of Austrian assets. It was also no coincidence that shortly after the signing of the Austrian State Treaty, Khrushchev, Bulganin, and Shepilov—not Molotov—paid an unexpected and highly publicized visit to Belgrade. Khrushchev's desire to enhance his own prestige via the Yugoslav capital certainly played a part in the Soviet decision to invite the Austrians to Moscow.¹

The Moscow Memorandum was a breakthrough in the deadlock over the Austrian State Treaty, but the Western allies' suspicions, especially Secretary of State Dulles' personal misgivings, were not entirely assuaged. According to the American Ambassador in

¹Khrushchev's personal coup was complete when Molotov was later forced to admit publicly that he had erroneously obstructed the Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement. Through Khrushchev's accusations, Molotov's guilt was extended to include hindering Soviet efforts for an Austrian treaty, even though available sources imply that Molotov bore the major responsibility for the success of the actual Soviet démarche. Khrushchev was a clever opportunist, protecting himself to the last. At the close of the negotiations in Moscow, Khrushchev said of the Soviet-Austrian agreement, "We shall examine it, and if it has been done wrong we shall take comrades Molotov and Mikoyan to task." But in his memoirs, Khrushchev wrote, "The Austrians gave me credit for having played a leading role in the decision to pull out of Austria, and they were quite right. They didn't have any idea what sort of internal struggle had taken place before we signed the peace treaty, and I don't deny it was on my initiative that the correct decision was finally made." Only in retrospect, long after the treaty had been signed, did Khrushchev boast of his personal pursuit of Austrian independence.

Moscow, Charles Bohlen, Dulles was particularly wary of Foreign Minister Molotov's desire for quick action on the treaty and maintained that the Western powers must not be "stampeded" into a premature peace conference.¹ Dulles personally insisted on a preliminary meeting at a lower level, to prevent the Russians from manipulating the Western powers in the public spotlight of a four-power conference.² In addition, although this aspect was never widely publicized, French, British and American companies had their own economic interests in Austria, and all three of the Western governments wanted to ensure that their companies would receive adequate compensation under the terms of the treaty. Thus, when the Soviet government proposed a foreign ministers' conference to sign the treaty, the Western powers agreed but insisted that the four ambassadors in Vienna plus the Austrians meet first, to scrutinize the final terms. The Soviet Union complied with the request, and on 2 May 1955 the Ambassadors' Conference convened.

During his two years in office, Dulles had slowly come to accept the fact that the solution to the difficult situation in Austria would almost certainly have to be Austrian neutrality. Indeed, by 1955 Dulles must have recognized that realistically he had little choice but to underwrite Austrian neutrality: the French had almost completely withdrawn their forces from Austria in 1954, and the British had cut their strength down to one battalion.³ The

²Ibid.
³U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States surely could not singlehandedly occupy all three Western zones without risking a dangerous confrontation with the Russians. He therefore resigned himself to some form of Austrian neutrality. Dulles may have been more famous for his brinksmanship, but in Austria the stakes were not high enough.

In Germany, however, the states were substantial, and Dulles' major concern in accepting Austrian neutrality was that the formula might somehow prove attractive to the Germans. The Western powers, before agreeing to the foreign ministers' conference, had sought assurances from the Bonn government—and Dulles personally from his close friend Adenauer—that Austrian neutrality would not have an undue effect upon West Germany.¹ On 26 April 1955, Adenauer had even gone so far as to state at a foreign press banquet that Western misgivings about Germany's position in light of the Austrian State Treaty were unfounded.² After the treaty was signed, Dulles particularly stressed that Austria's status was one of armed neutrality, and that Germany's situation was entirely different: "It is all well to talk about neutrality for a country such as Austria, a small country with 7 million people," he said. "But I do not believe that anybody realistically believes that the German people, 70-
odd million of them, are destined to play the role of a neutral country."

Even after he signed the Austrian treaty, Dulles showed no sign of endorsing the abstract concept of neutrality, except in cases where Soviet-controlled countries might be encouraged to become neutral. Like Khrushchev in this regard, mutatis mutandis, it seems that Dulles saw the greatest legitimacy of the concept as its usefulness in luring East European satellites out of the Soviet camp. In a closed session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Dulles asserted, "I do think [the treaty] is going to have a very profound effect upon the adjacent satellite countries, such as Czechoslovakia, where it opens up a new border with freedom, and in Hungary, where it opened up for the first time a border with freedom; and I believe there is a chance, at least, that the Soviets must know that and are reconciling themselves to granting a larger measure of freedom and independence to some of these satellite countries." Apparently Dulles considered the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Austria as an encouraging example of the success of his "rollback" policy in central Europe. When


3Interview with former Chancellor Dr. Bruno Kreisky, Vienna, 2 December 1983.
asked at a news conference whether the United States would favour armed and non-committed states running down from the Baltic to the Adriatic to the east of Germany, Dulles replied: "Well, I couldn't say we are committed to any such policy; but anything which increases the national independence of the satellite states is along the lines of U.S. policy."¹

Dulles reluctantly acknowledged neutrality as a policy of survival for small countries such as Austria and Sweden, whose proximity to overwhelming Soviet military strength, Dulles felt, made an openly anti-Soviet stance inadvisable. But lest this imply that he fully accepted the concept of neutrality, Dulles' statement at the Senate hearing on the Austrian State Treaty proves otherwise: "...I think that one can recognize that in the case of small countries such as Austria and her neighbor, Switzerland, there is a legitimate place for independent neutrality. I do not think the principle is a sound one for general application."²

The Vienna Conference of Ambassadors began cordially, but soon degenerated into open disagreements. Acting upon Austria's request, the Western powers opposed Article 16, which provided for the repatriation of displaced persons; and on their own initiative they pressed for the elimination of Article 17, which limited the size of Austria's Army. Both articles had been


included in the long draft treaty. There is no doubt that the
Russians, now committed to the success of their treaty initiative,
were for the first time seriously thrown off balance during the
negotiations. After lengthy and heated debate, the Soviet
Ambassador, acting on fresh instructions from Moscow, suddenly
agreed to eliminate the two articles. Other arguments erupted
over the date of departure for allied troops, the restitution of
British, American, French and Dutch oil concerns, and the disposal
of United Nations property in Austria. In all cases, the Western
powers obtained compromises or concessions either from the
Russians, or, as in the case of their oil interests, from the
Austrians themselves. When word came of the final ratification
of the Paris Accords on 14 May, the negotiations in the Ambassador’s Conference
continued uninterrupted.

The most serious disagreement concerned the infamous and
long-contested Article 35, which dealt with the issue of German
reparations. The Western powers wanted to include in the treaty
the economic agreements which had been reached between the Russians
and the Austrians in Moscow, thereby to ensure that the Soviet

1 U.S. Congress, Senate, "Austrian State Treaty: Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the State

2According to Bundespräsident Dr. Kirchschläger, who was
a junior member of the Austrian negotiating team, the Austrians
ended up paying for the same assets several times over—sometimes
for the benefit of both the Russians and the Western companies
who held a legal claim.

Interview with Bundespräsident Dr. Kirchschläger at the
Hofburg Palace, Vienna, 5 December 1983.
leaders would not renege on the promises made in the Moscow Memorandum. The Russians, however, angrily pointed out that the existing provisions of Article 35 had earlier been accepted by the Western powers and that the bilateral terms arranged between the Austrians and the Russians were a private matter.\(^1\) By now it was 10 May and the imminent foreign ministers' meeting, with its treaty ceremony scheduled for 15 May, added urgency to the Soviet imperative not to allow the treaty initiative to fail. To increase the pressure, Dulles, informing Eisenhower that "[t]he Soviets are very sticky and following their usual tactics of holding out to the last in hopes of getting some slight dividend,"\(^2\) made it clear that he would not fly to Vienna until the economic issues were settled.\(^3\)

Finally, on Friday the 13th the Russians broke the suspense by agreeing to state in the treaty that Article 35 had been amended by the economic provisions of the Moscow Memorandum. With this, Dulles flew to Vienna and the final ceremonies went ahead. At the end of the Ambassadors' Conference, the four powers had deleted eleven articles from the treaty, eliminated three annexes, 

\(^1\)Stearman, *The Soviet Union and the Occupation of Austria*, pp. 151-152.

\(^2\)Telegram from Dulles to Eisenhower, 12 May 1955, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.

\(^3\)According to a U.S. publication, he decided that, "...he would not sign a treaty under which the Soviet Union would have the legal right to undertake an economic reoccupation of Austria." U.S. Department of State, *European and British Commonwealth Series 49*, Publication 6437, April 1957.
and modified three other articles. The final Austrian State Treaty was far more favourable to the Austrians than the draft which had been quibbled over by the great powers for eight years.

With a treaty finally assured, the five foreign ministers assembled in Vienna for last-minute discussions on 14 May. In a gesture of good will, foreign ministers Macmillan, Molotov, Pinay, and Dulles agreed to grant Austrian Foreign Minister Figl's request that the anachronistic war guilt clause, which reminded Austria that she bore some responsibility for fighting on the side of the Nazis, be deleted from the treaty. Molotov then proposed that the four great powers sign a declaration guaranteeing the territorial integrity of neutral Austria. The proposal seemed to be a final attempt by Molotov, albeit indirect, to achieve his long-sought guarantee against Anschluss. But although the Austrians supported the idea of a four-power guarantee which

1The eliminated articles were: Article 6: "Naturalization and Residence of Germans in Austria"; Article 11: "War Criminals"; Article 13: "Liquidation of League of Nations"; Article 14: "Bilateral Treaties"; Article 15: "Restoration of Archives"; Article 16: "Displaced Persons"; Article 17: "Limitation of Austrian Armed Forces"; Article 19: "Prohibition of Military Training"; Article 25: "Prohibition of Excess War Material"; Article 36: "Restitution by Austria"; and Article 48-bis, which was the so-called "Dried Pea Debt" clause.

The three articles modified were: Article 18: "Prohibition of Service in the Austrian Armed Forces of Former Members of Nazi and Other Organizations" (became Article 12 in final treaty); Article 42: "United Nations Property in Austria" (became Article 25 in final treaty); and Article 48: "Debts" (became Article 28 in final treaty).


might reduce the possibility of Soviet interference in Austria after the treaty was signed, neither the British nor the Americans were willing to risk a repetition of the Polish guarantee of 1939.1 Molotov let the proposal die without a protest.

Meanwhile, a separate treaty ceremony took place in Poland, where the Soviet Union and its six Eastern European satellites signed the Warsaw Pact agreements. And on the evening of the same eventful day, Molotov informally agreed on the first postwar four-power summit conference, to be held in Geneva during July. Far from the Americans being the sole practitioners of carrot-and-stick diplomacy, the Russians were now employing their own foreign policy of incentives and disincentives.

The next morning, 15 May 1955, the treaty ceremony commenced at the Belvedere Palace in Vienna. The streets of the capital city were lined with over 500,000 joyful Austrians, and Dulles later remarked that the outpouring of emotion was one of the most moving experiences he had ever had. Each of the Western foreign ministers made a very brief statement after affixing his signature, but Molotov, much to Dulles' special distaste, spoke for half an hour. After the signing of the Austrian State Treaty, Figl suggested that Macmillan, Dulles, and Pinay each separately appear on the balcony of the palace to acknowledge the deafening cheers and applause of the crowd below. Molotov, apparently trying to avoid measuring the Soviet Union's relative popularity in decibels,

1Ibid.
bounded to the side of each of his colleagues and appeared on the balcony three times.¹ The Americans noted it,² but the inelegant behaviour of the Russian Foreign Minister went unnoticed by most. Good will was abundant in Vienna that day, for the Austrians had finally come to the end of a ten-year struggle for independence.


²Ibid.
CONCLUSION

The signing of the Austrian State Treaty in 1955, after eight years of frustrating and nearly fruitless negotiations between the four powers, was hailed at the time as a great success in Western diplomacy. Yet as much as the diplomats deserve credit for their heroic tenacity in the negotiations, the final breakthrough for a treaty had very little to do with what was happening at the bargaining table. The Soviet decision to sign the treaty could not have been based upon Western negotiating proposals, for the final treaty was much more favourable to Austria than the draft treaty which had long been the subject of passionate debate. Among other things, the Russians agreed to drop the limitation on the size of the Austrian army and accepted more liberal economic terms than any which had previously been considered. The end of the Soviet obstruction of the negotiations for an Austrian treaty was principally the result of internal Soviet considerations and the influence of events outside Austria, not skillful Western diplomacy.

Critical to the Soviet decision was the course of events in postwar Germany. Stalin and his successors were preoccupied by events in Germany, and, particularly after the founding of the Federal Republic in November 1949, they hoped to use Austria as a bargaining chip to induce the Western powers not to rearm West
Germany. The Soviet campaign against ratification of the Paris Accords specifically tied Austrian independence to the outcome of the rearmament debate; enactment of the Paris agreements would impede the settlement of the Austrian question, the Russians claimed. Moreover, Soviet insistence that a German peace treaty be a prerequisite to an Austrian treaty made the link between Austria and Germany in Soviet foreign policy absolutely clear. Had the Soviet policy of threats concerning the future of Austria succeeded in putting off German rearmament, it is unlikely that the Austrian State Treaty would have been signed in May 1955. But Soviet tactics failed to achieve their aim. Instead, the campaign of threats helped to unify the West and paradoxically facilitated passage of the Paris Accords. Austria lost her usefulness to the Russians as a hostage to be ransomed only by appropriate Western behaviour.

With German rearmament virtually assured, a Kremlin struggle over Soviet policy towards Austria ensued. Evidence indicates that Molotov was responsible for the uncooperative Soviet stance in the treaty negotiations during 1954 and for the campaign of threats against the West. The imminent passage of the Paris agreements almost certainly weakened Molotov's position on the Politburo and enabled Khrushchev to assert a greater influence on Soviet foreign policy. The decision to sign the Austrian State Treaty was directly a result of Khrushchev's plan to use the treaty as a conciliatory gesture to initiate an East-West détente in Europe. Such a period of "peaceful coexistence" would enable
Khrushchev to launch the domestic reforms which, he hoped, would consolidate his position as leader of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, a lessening of East-West tensions would permit the new Soviet leader to shift the focus of Soviet diplomacy from the problematical European theatre to more promising regions in the Third World.

Molotov, realizing that he was soon to become Khrushchev's scapegoat in the struggle for power, personally announced the turnaround in Soviet foreign policy towards Austria and then pursued rapid signature of a treaty. The veteran foreign minister may have nurtured some hope that the momentum of German rearmament could yet be halted; but if so, he was greatly disappointed. In the months following the enactment of the Paris Accords Molotov was attacked in the Central Committee and held accountable for all failures in Stalinist foreign policy. Khrushchev, on the other hand, through signature of the Austrian treaty and other conciliatory measures, succeeded in obtaining a breathing space for the introduction of his domestic reforms and consolidated enough power to meet the leaders of the three Western powers at the Geneva summit conference in July 1955.

Thus, the rearmament of West Germany removed the most compelling Soviet rationale for holding onto Austria; but the specific decision to sign a treaty seems to have been an unusual consequence of a post-Stalin power struggle between Molotov and Khrushchev, of Khrushchev's need to seek an East-West détente, and of his desire to institute a new Soviet approach to the Third World. The four-power treaty negotiations were irrelevant to the
Kremlin decision to sign a treaty.

Other, more specific factors contributed to make signature of the Austrian State Treaty an attractive option for Soviet policy makers. The failure of two Communist takeovers, the Western orientation of the people, and the extreme unpopularity of Soviet troops had already convinced Soviet leaders that the Austrians were not inclined to become Communists. Only a Soviet military intervention could bring Austria into the Eastern bloc, and the Russians were unwilling to risk a direct conflict with the West. The Soviet Union thus did not sacrifice a potential convert to Communism by signing an Austrian treaty. Indeed, a pact of neutrality was a convenient solution to a difficult political situation for the Russians. Strategic arguments favoured signature of a treaty. Ensuring Austria's military neutrality prevented her incorporation into Western defence plans and drove a wedge between the northern and southern flanks of NATO. Shortly before the treaty was signed, furthermore, formation of the Warsaw Pact reduced the Soviet need for a forward strategic position in Austria. Economically, the Soviet Union probably gained more than it lost by signing a treaty. In 1955, Soviet-controlled industries in Austria were running huge deficits and frequently going bankrupt. The $150 million the Russians charged the Austrian government for those industries was more than three times their estimated worth. Under the terms of the treaty the Austrian oil industry was still required to turn over one-third of its production to the Soviet government. And that was apart from the ten years'
worth of Austrian goods and services which the Russians had already extracted and which were not accounted for in the final treaty. Based upon political, strategic, and economic considerations, the signing of the Austrian State Treaty was certainly not a great sacrifice for the Russians.

The Austrian State Treaty signified an important doctrinal shift in Soviet ideology to open acceptance of the concept of neutrality for states outside the Soviet Communist realm. In the wake of the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the formation of NATO, and the rearming of West Germany, the Soviet Union was on the defensive in Europe. By endorsing Austrian neutrality, the Soviet leaders first of all hoped to convince the Germans that military neutrality was the only means whereby German reunification could be achieved. It was no coincidence that within a month of the signing of the Austrian State Treaty, the Soviet government invited Chancellor Adenauer to Moscow and suggested the establishment of diplomatic relations between West Germany and the Soviet Union.

Second, the Soviet Union hoped to strengthen its position in Europe by improving relations with other 'neutral' or 'uncommitted' states. The return of the Porkkala naval base to Finland and the overtures to Yugoslavia were additional elements of the new conciliatory policy instituted by Khrushchev.

But even if the Germans and the other Europeans ignored the Austrian treaty and subsequent Soviet actions, the new official Soviet attitude toward neutrality was likely to be favourably received outside of Europe. Convincing the West Europeans of the
benefits of Soviet Communism seemed to be hopeless, for the Berlin blockade and the Prague coup in particular had poisoned the cause of Soviet Communism west of the Berlin Wall. However, the peoples of the less developed countries, many of whom were alienated from their former imperialist masters, were more receptive to new ideas. Recently the Chinese Communist revolution of 1949, an exciting successor to the Bolshevik Revolution, had begun to capture the admiration of many nonaligned countries. Acknowledging a third way between East and West added a new touch of reasoned conciliation to post-Stalin Soviet ideology. Taking advantage of the East-West détente, Khrushchev and his followers had by the end of 1955 effected a dramatic Soviet démarche, including state visits to India, Burma and Afghanistan, flamboyant denunciations of Western "colonialism," and offers of technical and agricultural assistance to any underdeveloped Arab or Asian country. The signing of the Austrian State Treaty was the first step in a long-term international campaign to project a fresh, peace-loving image of the Soviet Union to the Third World.

In the long term, the difficulty for Khrushchev was that the fresh new Soviet image and attitude toward neutrality in some cases proved to be attractive to the wrong people. The Hungarians, for example, could not help but be culturally and historically tied to the Austrians, with whom they had at one time shared an empire. An Hungarian uprising occurred in the year following the signature of the Austrian State Treaty, almost exactly twelve months after the Austrian declaration of permanent neutrality.
To what extent it is true that, as some Austrians believe, the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the subsequent neutrality of independent Austria contributed to the incentives for a Hungarian uprising can only be speculated. Clearly, however, the crushing of the Hungarian revolt by Soviet troops in November 1956 made clear the limits of the new Soviet approach to independence and neutrality; and the repeated condemnation by the United Nations of the Soviet action in Hungary tainted the new peace-loving image of the Soviet Union in Europe and elsewhere.

The quadripartite negotiations were not decisive in the settlement of the Austrian problem; nonetheless, the behaviour of the Soviet Union during the eight years of talks encourages a number of observations about Soviet negotiating tactics, how effective or ineffective they were, and how they differed generally from those of the Western powers. First of all, Soviet representatives had a tendency to avoid making concessions in order to save up bargaining points for future use. Eventually, when the smallest concession or change of policy was made, it looked more significant than it was and the Soviet Union gained maximum benefit from it. Unlike the Western delegates, Soviet negotiators were quite willing to appear publicly to be unreasonable, if it served this long-term plan. The Western powers, responding much more directly to public pressure, tended to make concessions as demonstrative gestures, regardless of whether or not it was likely that the concession would be matched in the negotiations by the Soviet Union.
Secondly, the Soviet Union seemed to enter each session of talks with a preconceived notion of the outcome it considered to be in the best Soviet interest. Before the end of 1949, the outcome the Soviet Union considered acceptable was closely tied to the economic provisions Stalin hoped to gain from Austria itself; after 1949, the outcome was more closely connected to the long-term political uses the Soviet Union hoped to make of its Austrian occupation. When, particularly after 1949, the inflexible Soviet stance bore no relation to a negotiable position, the Soviet delegates preferred to take the blame for causing the negotiations to fail rather than alter their preconceived position. Having a successful round of negotiations was not in itself a Soviet goal. Only in 1955, after a unilateral Soviet decision had been taken to sign a treaty, was the Soviet Union concerned to have successful negotiations. The unusual concessions the Russians made to the Austrians in Moscow were evidence of that concern. By contrast, the Western powers concerned themselves much more with the imperative of not appearing to be responsible for the failure of the negotiations, and in instances where failure was imminent they were more likely than the Soviet Union to try to avoid the blame by compromising their predetermined negotiating position.

Finally, as mentioned above, the negotiations were not a catalyst to Soviet action. By clearly bearing the responsibility for the continued oppression of Austria, the Soviet leaders paradoxically maneuvered themselves into a position of strength
with regard to Austria. The Western powers had no involvement in the Soviet débandé which led to the treaty; the decisive negotiations occurred bilaterally between the Austrians and the Russians in Moscow, without the Western powers. Soviet negotiating intransigence in the end gave Soviet leaders the power to determine when the treaty would be signed.

Indeed, specifically with regard to the negotiations, the underlying truth was that Mikoyan's candid assessment of the Western powers' predicament in 1955 was correct: once the Soviet Union decided to invite the Austrians to Moscow and to sign a treaty on the understanding that Austria would be militarily neutral, the three Western powers really had little choice but to sign it also. Britain, France and the United States had been publicly endorsing the treaty for years, laying full blame for delay at the feet of the Soviet Union, presenting themselves as champions of Austrian independence, and enjoying the public approbation which accompanies a valiant effort against an obvious villain. The irony was that once the Soviet Union decided to change its policy and the Austrians went along with that change, the Western powers were powerless to resist the consequences—even if they had wanted to do so. By refusing to make concessions in the negotiations and behaving unreasonably for many years, the Soviet leaders eventually ensured that they held all the cards. Apart from handing Austria over to permanent Soviet occupation, the Western powers simply had no more concessions to make in the negotiations. They had already in late 1949 agreed to accept Soviet economic terms for
the treaty. In a curious twist of logic, by 1955 the intransigent Soviet Union was in control of the negotiations over Austria.

Once the Soviet Union announced in the Moscow Memorandum its intention to sign the treaty, however, the negotiating advantage shifted back to the Western powers. Britain, France and the United States could not refuse to sign the Austrian Treaty or oppose the Austrian declaration of neutrality; but they could, and did, try to ensure that the specific terms of the treaty itself were as favourable as possible to Western and Austrian interests.

The actual achievement of a treaty in May 1955, therefore, was the result of an abrupt change in Soviet foreign policy. The specific nature of the treaty was the result of the policies of the Austrians and of the Western powers.

Unlike that of the Soviet Union, the policies of the three Western powers toward Austria underwent a traceable evolution over the eight years of negotiations. Western claims to have been always religiously seeking a treaty since the start of the negotiations in 1947 were not entirely true. The public image of the unified Western powers, repeatedly stymied in their earnest quest for Austrian independence, was carefully cultivated but not always accurate. The British came closest to that image by supporting a treaty throughout the years of the negotiations; but that support was increasingly motivated by domestic economic and political needs rather than sober calculations of Austria's long-term interests. Bearing the lion's share of the responsibility
for Austria's security and economic recovery, the American bureaucracy in particular harboured secret misgivings about signing a treaty of independence for Austria, first in the late 1940's, because Austria had no indigenous army and would not be able to protect herself from Soviet encroachments, and later in the mid-1950's, because a treaty of neutrality would seriously complicate NATO defence planning. Indeed, it was primarily because of American misgivings that an Austrian treaty was not signed on Soviet terms in 1949. And while the United States Defense and State departments were haggling over American policy, the British and the French were facing economic realities which undercut their interest in political and strategic issues. The position of the Western powers diverged in the later years of the negotiations as the British and the French withdrew most of their troops from Austria without a treaty, leaving still more of the burden of the occupation on the United States.

Events outside of Austria also preoccupied the Western powers and reduced their interest in a treaty. The Korean War helped to bring negotiations to a standstill, as the Western powers were unwilling to negotiate with the Russians when their attention and resources were devoted to the "Soviet-sponsored" invasion of South Korea. American domestic considerations, particularly the anti-communism of the McCarthy era, also limited both the Truman and the Eisenhower Administrations' freedom to compromise with the Russians. Furthermore, in 1954 and early 1955, the Western powers were primarily concerned with events in Germany, for they
hoped to accomplish West German rearmament before Soviet conciliatory gestures in Austria and elsewhere could weaken Western unity and resolve.

Perhaps most interesting of all is the evidence of what the Austrian government was telling the Western powers during the years of occupation. Despite their public statements, the Austrians themselves were not always unreservedly in favour of a treaty. The economic terms negotiated between the four powers in the late 1940's would have been extremely burdensome for Austria and may have precipitated the downfall of the government. British and American documents contain clear evidence of Austrian reluctance at times to take on the responsibility of meeting Soviet economic payments alone. Sometimes the Austrians pressed the Western powers not for immediate signature of the treaty, but rather for changes in the occupation policy which would strengthen the Austrian government and encourage the Austrian people.

Only during the early 1950's, when the complete lack of progress in the negotiations encouraged fears that Austria might be partitioned, were the Austrians clearly telling the Western powers that they had to have a treaty immediately. And at that point, it is not surprising that the Austrians' frustration with the slow pace of negotiations and Western preoccupation with other international problems led them to initiate independent bilateral contacts with the Soviet Union. Interestingly, these contacts seemed at the time to have far more effect on the Western powers than on the Soviet Union, encouraging Britain, France and
the United States to make fresh overtures in the negotiations. Signs of Austrian discontent were a serious embarrassment to the Western powers, whose international image as champions of the beleaguered Austrians was itself several times challenged. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the Western powers realized that bilateral discussions between the Austrians and the Russians gave the Soviet Union increased control over Austria's fate. It was, after all, through just such bilateral channels that the Soviet Union eventually initiated the events which led directly to the treaty.

Happily for the Western powers, the Soviet Union did not initiate the movement towards an Austrian treaty until German rearmament was essentially an assured thing. Thus, at the time the treaty was signed, the Soviet withdrawal from Austria could be hailed as a success in Western diplomacy without seriously threatening to undermine other Western defence goals in Europe. After giving varying degrees of support over the years to the avowedly Western diplomatic effort, France, Britain and the United States in 1955 finally clearly came to a consensus for an Austrian State Treaty.

Approaching the subject from a wider perspective, the postwar negotiations over Austria are an interesting example of twentieth century great power diplomacy reminiscent of the nineteenth century Concert of Europe. An alternative to the years of fruitless negotiations by the four great powers theoretically might have been the referral of the problem of Austria's future to United Nations arbitration. Indeed, at the 1947 Moscow Council of Foreign
Ministers, U.S. Secretary of State Marshall went so far as to propose turning the problem of Austria over to the United Nations Organization, and during the early years of the negotiations, there were quite a few members of the American State Department who supported this course of action. However, for a number of reasons the action was never taken. None of the four great powers showed any sincere belief that U.N. arbitration would be superior to the four-power negotiations, and all of them apparently feared a loss of control over the final outcome. It seems that even the American support for U.N. involvement was influenced in no small part by the belief that any U.N. solution would accord most closely with U.S. interests, and that U.N. involvement would be popular domestically. The British and the French, according to available documents, were never enthusiastic about the idea; the British privately considered even Austrian Foreign Minister Gruber's 1953 brief resort to the U.N. more of a propaganda stunt than a useful contribution to the negotiations. The Soviet Union publicly resisted all suggestion of U.N. involvement in the negotiations over Austria's future. The Russians were responsible for vetoing the 1947 Austrian application for U.N. membership, and they kept the Austrians out of the organization until after the treaty was signed. The fact that Austria was not a member of the United Nations during all the years of great power bickering over her future prevented the Austrian government itself from appealing for greater U.N. involvement.

The Austrian negotiations were just the sort of great power morass that the new international organization might have been
expected to help untangle. The irrelevance of the U.N. to the Austrian treaty negotiations helped to demonstrate the inadequacy of that organization in a situation where the interests of the major powers conflicted.

Another broad issue related to the struggle over Austria is the question to what extent the Austrian solution could in the future be generally applicable to the plight of other states caught in conflicts of interest between major powers. The Austrian State Treaty was an instrument whereby Austrian statehood and independence were legally formalized and whereby the troops of the four powers were withdrawn. On 5 November 1955, after the last foreign soldier had left Austrian soil, a constitutional law establishing Austria's permanent neutrality came into effect. The Austrians thus demonstrated that they had themselves chosen military neutrality as a state policy and that it had not been forced upon them by any of the four great powers.

There is no question that the Austrians acted of their own free will in choosing permanent neutrality. However there were unique circumstances which enabled the Austrians to make such a choice. Three conditions were necessary before Austria could declare herself a neutral state. First, the territorial boundaries of the small state had to be clearly agreed by all the great powers and by the small state itself. The early agreement upon the 1938 boundaries for Austria by the great powers, and the clear lack of

expansionist ambitions or capabilities on the part of the Austrians themselves, satisfied this requirement. Second, the small state could not allow foreign actors to use its territory for military purposes. This condition was satisfied by the withdrawal of the troops of the four powers, by Austria's undertaking not to participate in foreign military alliances and by the development of an Austrian army to deter, at least, the ambitions of any stronger power. Finally, the country itself could not be of such absolutely vital strategic, historic or economic importance to any or all of the great powers that they would risk going to war over it. By 1955, Austria fit this description; Germany did not.

The study of the struggle over Austria provides insights into the behaviour and motivations of the four great powers after the Second World War. There is no question that Soviet intransigence was primarily responsible for the lengthy occupation of Austria and the delay in signing a treaty. However, more than once during the course of the negotiations Soviet intransigence provided a not unwelcome excuse to the Western powers for postponing the problem of Austrian independence and laying the blame on the Russians. Had the Soviet Union accepted more moderate terms for the future independence of Austria, particularly on the issues of reparations payments and troop withdrawals, the Western powers would likely have disregarded their misgivings and signed a treaty in 1949. But the ten-year delay between the end of the war and

1Ibid.
Austria's independence enabled the Western powers to help the Austrians form a small defence force and rebuild their shattered economy.

Years later, Austrian Foreign Minister Gruber contended that the Communist takeovers in Romania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia avenged Austria's unjust exclusion from consideration at the Paris Peace Conference of 1946. More to the point, Austria's years of occupation by the four great powers, as unhappy and unjust as they were, ensured the conditions necessary for Austria's permanent neutrality and helped to guarantee her long-lasting independence.
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