Gods, Heroes, Saints, and Friends: Ethical Exemplarism and Practical *Paideia* in Gregory Nazianzen and His Peers



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Fratris sororis amicorum liberis et filiis lustralibus suis

Eugenio Petro · Elisabethae Gaedae · Clarae Evelinae ·
Georgio Valthario · Christiano Gerardo · Adelinae Mariae ·
Mariae Abigail · David Ioseph Martino Thomae · Rosulae ·
parvulo denique Alexio
exsuli a flammis ruinisque patriae Ucrainae

patrinus avunculus patruus
Brennus Martinus Vulpius hoc opusculum dicat

quo exempla semper optima quaerant sequantur
atque olim sua ex parte dent.

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Abstract

In this thesis I analyse the uses of ethical exemplarism in Gregory of Nazianzus and several of his contemporaries: his friends and Cappadocian compatriots, Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nyssa, and Emperor Julian the Apostate. I begin by surveying a selection of their writings and those of other authors active in the fourth-century culture wars, analysing the frequency of exempla (incidents featuring a moral exemplar) found therein, as well as the cultural and historical origins of those exempla (Chapter 1). Besides filling a lacuna noted by Demoen (1996), this chapter indicates our authors' favoured periods of reference and suggests new avenues of analysis. Next, I connect educational practices known from literary sources and recent papyrological finds to the ways in which Nazianzen and others employed exemplars as models of particular virtues and vices (Chapter 2). There I also present a selective analytical catalogue of the gods and mythical heroes of Hellenic culture as found in Nazianzen, Basil, Nyssen, and Julian (Chapter 2). I then turn to the uses they made of a number of secular historical exemplars, selected in part on the basis of appearances in Plutarch's *Lives* and Valerius Maximus' *Facta et dicta* (Chapter 3). I next apply the same method to prominent figures from Scripture, here starting from the virtue-exemplar associations in *Hebrews* 11 and *1 Clement* (Chapter 4). Chapters 2–4 together comprise the most thorough catalogue and analysis to date of heroes and villains in Julian and the Cappadocians. Finally, I assess Nazianzen's presentation of exemplars to reconstruct his vision of how aspiring ethical agents are meant to apply their knowledge of models of virtue and vice in practice, and his thoughts on how ethical exemplarism can go wrong (Chapter 5). Against the backdrop of recent work on exemplars in Roman history (Langlands [2018], Roller [2018]) and contemporary metaethics (Zagzebski [2017]), this last chapter provides a much-needed perspective from the late ancient Hellenic world as well as a new framework for understanding the experience of ethical exemplarism more generally. Taken as a whole, this dissertation illuminates the workings of the moral imagination during a period of crisis in Late Antiquity, provides a novel framework for a developing branch of historical and contemporary ethics, and demonstrates the utility of exemplar analysis as a method for understanding cultural priorities and cultural change.

Keywords: *Gregory of Nazianzus, Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa, Julian the Apostate, Late Antiquity, Patristics, Classical reception, ethical exemplarism, paideia, virtue education, history of education, moral imagination*

Word count: *99,755 at submission*

Abbreviations

Amm. Marc.	*Ammianus Marcellinus*
Anth. Pal.	*Anthologia Palatina*
Ath.	*Athanasius of Alexandria*
Bas.	*Basil of Caesarea*
CT	*Codex Theodosianus*
DGE	*Diccionario Griego-Español*
GNO	*Gregorii Nysseni Opera*
GNOO	*Gregorii Nysseni Opera Online*
Hdt.	*Herodotus*
Hilar.	*Hilary of Poitiers*
Jul.	*Emperor Julian the Apostate*
LSJ	*Liddell, Scott, and Jones*
Lucif.	*Lucifer of Cagliari*
Naz.	*Gregory of Nazianzus*
Nyss.	*Gregory of Nyssa*
PG	*Patrologia Graeca*
PL	*Patrologia Latina*
PLRE I	*Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire, vol. I*
Plut.	*Plutarch*
SC	*Sources chrétiennes*
SEG	*Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum*
Syn.	*Synesius of Cyrene*
Val. Max.	*Valerius Maximus*

Introduction

Τὸν Ἀβραὰμ ἤκουσας πάλαι, ψυχή
μου, καταλιπόντα γῆν πατρῴαν,
καὶ γενόμενον μετανάστην·
τούτου τὴν προαίρεσιν μίμησαι.

You have heard, my soul, how
Abraham of old left his native land
and became a wanderer: do thou
imitate his resolve!

Great Canon of Andrew of Crete
Ode 3, Hirmus, 97.1344 (8th c.)

Every Lent, Byzantine Christians chant the Great Canon of Andrew of Crete (*fl.* 7th-8th c.). This tour through the Old and New Testaments lasts hours and can be physically exhausting, accompanied as it is by hundreds of prostrations. Spiritually, too, it seems meant as a trial: the texts demand comparison between the individual believer and scores of Biblical heroes and villains. Adam, Cain, Judas and so on were bad, but your sins are even worse. Yet the texts move in a hopeful direction. The good done by Abraham, Moses, and others is within reach; David, Paul, and Mary Magdalene repented and found new life in Christ, and so can you.[1]

While it may stand out for its liturgical form, the spirit of Andrew's 'Great Canon' was already well established in Jewish, Christian, and pagan cultures. It is an instance of what we may call 'ethical exemplarism': the presentation, use, and transmission of ethically noteworthy role models—virtuous or otherwise—for the purpose of character formation.

[1] Andreas Cretensis *Magnus Canon* 97.1329 sqq. For analyses of the psychological effects of the canon, see Krueger (2013) and, from a phenomenological perspective, Gschwandtner (2017). Exemplarist literature was still flourishing in the twilight years of Byzantium: Leonte (2018).

Here I present a selective survey of ethical exemplarism in the second half of the fourth century, a period of late ancient history that was crucial for the formation of imperial Christian culture. Gregory of Nazianzus will be our chief guide, accompanied by his Cappadocian *confrères*, Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nyssa, as well as their ill-starred nemesis, Julian the Apostate Emperor. I propose the study as an exercise in exemplar analysis. It is a synchronic documentation of the heroes and villains, sacred and secular, who populate the writings of a group of learned men who grew up in the same province, studied with some of the same teachers, and had ambitions of reshaping the culture of the whole empire. It is an analysis of the virtues and vices with which they associated the great figures drawn from classical and Christian culture, and of the uses to which they put them.

Exemplars in antiquity

Judaism and early Christianity

"Look unto Abraham, your father," says Isaiah, "and to Sarah, who bore you; Abraham was one man, and I called him, and blessed him, and loved him, and increased him in number."[2] More generally, every generation after the Exodus is meant to recall, in ritual and prayer, the passage of Moses and all Israel from slavery to the wilderness and ultimately to the Promised Land. The imitation of God is found in the Decalogue itself: Israel is to keep the Sabbath in imitation of the repose of the Creator. According to James Kugel, by the first century B.C. it was common for Jews to take "the heroes and heroines of Genesis as moral exemplars, whose lives might serve as models for generations to

[2] *Isaiah* 51:2. Gregory of Nyssa takes this passage as a starting point at *De Vita Moysis* 1.5–6. The same sort of exemplarism was at work elsewhere in the Old Testament, particularly in *Ecclesiasticus* and the *Wisdom of Solomon*; Daniélou (1955) 267.

come." In fact, he sees this as the "dominant approach to the book of Genesis from late antiquity almost to the present day."[3] One extra-Biblical textual example is the *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs*, which Kugel dates to the first century B.C. but which ostensibly records the last words of the patriarch Jacob's sons to their own respective sons.[4] Here, patriarch each presents his own life as an exhortation, focusing on his virtues for imitation and confessing his vices for avoidance.[5]

The New Testament likewise contains numerous exhortations to the imitation of exemplars—for instance, of Jesus Christ and of Paul.[6] We also find there the tight association of virtues and vices with particular figures from older scriptures. *Hebrews* 11 features a long concatenation of greats and an illustration of the supreme virtue of faith as the explanation of their greatness, from Abel to David and beyond. Outside the New Testament, we find something similar in the first-century *First Letter to the Corinthians* by Clement of Rome. Clement muses on the nature of exemplars and then presents a number of virtues, vices, and deeds paired with particular Biblical saints and villains. Cain shows envy, Paul shows patience, and so on. The phenomenon continued to develop in both Greek and Latin Christianity.[7] It has been suggested that the connection of exemplars with ethical teaching was so tight that the characters involved became for both Christians and Jews "merely the symbol of a virtue."[8] That is putting it far too strongly, but it is true

[3] Kugel (2006) 2.
[4] Kugel (2006) 38.
[5] Toy et. al. (1906) 113 sqq.
[6] Jesus' *mandatum novum*: ἐντολὴν καινὴν δίδωμι ὑμῖν, ἵνα ἀγαπᾶτε ἀλλήλους· καθὼς ἠγάπησα ὑμᾶς ἵνα καὶ ὑμεῖς ἀγαπᾶτε ἀλλήλους (*John* 13:34; see also *John* 15:12, and various loci encouraging the imitation of God/Jesus in the letters, e.g. *Romans* 15:2–3; *Hebrews* 6:12, 13:7; *Ephesians* 5:1; *1 John* 3:2; *3 John* 1:11. For Paul, the classic locus is his μιμηταί μου γίνεσθε, καθὼς κἀγὼ Χριστοῦ (*1 Corinthians* 11:1; cf. also *1 Corinthians* 3:4–10, 4:1–16, 10:6–11; *2 Cor.* 8:1–7; *Galatians* 4:12; *1 Thessalonians* 1:6, 2:14; *2 Thessalonians* 3:7–9; *Philippians* 3:17.). This has been criticized as self-aggrandizement, especially in a non-divine exemplar, but for an apologia of the virtues of such a stance, see Clarke (1998).
[7] Daniélou (1955), *passim*, but esp. 267–8; see also Luneau (1955) esp. 287–89.
[8] Simon (1954) 99. Simon argues that the role Old Testament figures played here was purely provisional, awaiting replacement by a growing canon of Christian saints.

that our authors regularly made very tight associations between characters and the virtues and vices thought to define them.

Greece and Rome

Parallel to the Jewish and Christian traditions, the Greek and Roman worlds showed a robust culture of exemplarist practices, from the funerary rites of the Republic to the rhetorical norms of Greek oratory. "From the time of Homer," writes Clive Skidmore,

> examples were pointed out for the young to emulate, a practice not confined to youth but maintained throughout life. An educational practice dependent upon such a concept is a product of a particular kind of society, in which imitation and competition were closely connected, and the aim of success was to triumph over one's rivals…[The Homeric ideal of excellence] is dependent upon competition with and imitation of those who have already achieved *arete* as well as one's contemporaries.[9]

From Homer to Plutarch, from Ennius to Tacitus, Skidmore mines literary evidence to show that "the role of examples was dominant as a means of moral guidance, both in historical literature…and in pseudo-historical literature such as poetry and myth."[10] Again we find a close association of exemplars and particular virtues: "Roman heroes became 'canonized', and associated with particular moral qualities, so that rather than struggle with intellectual concepts of justice or moderation, one had merely to think of Camillus or Publicola." Familiarity with such exemplars was an important part of classical παιδεία, or education and culture: they served not only as elements of literacy, but also, and above all, as practical guides to life.[11]

[9] Skidmore (1996) 3. The first two chapters ("Teaching by Examples: Greek" [3–12] and "Teaching by Examples: Roman" [13–21]) comprise the most concise compendium of classical literary sources commending the uses of exempla in character formation of which I am aware. We will have occasion to consider the relation between imitation and competition below, especially in Chapter 5; for now, note that μιμέομαι and *imitari* can both indicate matching or equalling as well as imitating: Hutchinson (2013) 29–30 (on *imitari*).
[10] Skidmore (1996) 12; in his view, poetry assumes a relatively larger role in Greece, history in Rome.
[11] Skidmore (1996) 18.

Three more recent studies of non-Christian Roman ethics have devoted either significant or exclusive attention to the role of moral exemplars in shaping Romans' characters. These are Teresa Morgan's *Popular Ethics in Ancient Rome* (2007), Matthew Roller's *Models from the Past in Roman Culture* (2018), and Rebbeca Langlands's *Exemplary Ethics in Ancient Rome* (2018).

In a taxonomy of the forms in which moral ideas were expressed and transmitted, Morgan (2007)—the only one of the three to consider Greek sources in depth—devotes a chapter to the *exemplum* or χρεία. This she defines as "the short, pithy account of a saying or action" pronounced or performed by philosophers, generals, rulers, orators, or poets. Importantly, *exempla* were employed so that their contents could be imitated or avoided.[12] Found in texts of all kinds, from letters exchanged between friends to orations before the imperial court, exemplary stories were sometimes published in collections, the most famous being the compendious *Facta et dicta memorabilia* of Valerius Maximus, to whom we will return in Chapter 3. While Morgan allows for some fluidity in generic form, the brevity expected of any given exemplum imposes a limitation: thus, in spite of being the famous work on exemplary persons in antiquity, Plutarch's collection of *Lives* falls mostly outside the scope of her study.[13]

Debates in analytic philosophy have also begun to feed a more general interest in the role of exemplars in the moral life. Zagzebski (2010, 2013, 2017) has developed a theory of metaethics according to which our ability to navigate the ethical wilderness is primarily shaped by the examples of persons who in moral terms appear to us as especially

[12] Morgan (2007) 5, 122.
[13] The works by Plutarch she considers are chiefly anthologies of sayings: the (often locally) thematic collections *On the Bravery of Women*, *Sayings of the Spartans, Sayings of Spartan Women*, *Ancient Customs of the Spartans*, *Sayings of the Romans*, and *Sayings of Kings and Commanders* (Morgan [2007] 153–4). The passing reference to the *Lives* is to say that Plutarch is nearly exceptional as a Greek author interested in great Romans. "To the conquered, their conquerors made unappealing role models" (Morgan [2007] 158).

attractive. She defines exemplars as "paradigmatically excellent person[s]"[14] and, with more nuance, "those persons whom we see, on close observation and with reflection, to be admirable in all or most of their acquired traits."[15] Zagzebski identifies the emotion of admiration—fallible though it is—as essential to our capacity to act as ethical agents: it serves the "indexical" function of pointing to something in the world we are inclined to call good, an impulse she believes is prior to any definition of what 'good' may mean. We work our way from real-world particulars, identified with the help of admiration, down to general norms.[16]

Drawing in part on early exemplarist work by Zagzebksi, Langlands (2018) devotes much of her study of Roman exemplarity to the psychological experiences of aspiring moral agents who make use of exemplars. She reconstructs a plausible experiential progression that passes from wonder and admiration to comparison and imitative rivalry in which the agent shapes his or her life on the template of an exemplar. Ethical intelligence and practical prudence are the ideal results.[17] While Roller (2018) does not focus on this moral-psychological aspect of the use of exemplars, he does develop a "general model of Roman exemplarity" to elucidate the cultural processes by which historical actions are evaluated and commemorated by a community which in the process comes to be shaped by the norms encoded in the action thus memorialised. Like Zagzebksi (and Seneca, and others), he holds that we understand better what, for instance, courage is when we look at Horatius than when we try to define the virtue.[18] Both Roller and Langlands highlight the mechanisms of the cultural reception, negotiation, and transmission of exemplary stories,

[14] Zagzebski (2017) 20; see also Zagzebski (2013).
[15] Zagzebski (2017) 65.
[16] Zagzebski (2017) 22, and Chapter 2 *passim*, but esp. 43–4.
[17] Langlands (2018) 87–89. Langlands also addresses problems related to the nature of the case study and the question of what it can actually show, in ways reminiscent of Goldhill (2017). This concern is oblique to Nazianzen's interest in exemplars; see Chapter 5 below.
[18] Roller (2018) 5–8; Seneca *Ep.* 6, 5: *longum iter est per praecepta, breve et efficax per exempla*.

especially the way the same stories may be presented with different emphases so as to produce different morals—morals of the stories, that is, as well as morals of the people who tell, listen, and re-tell them.[19]

These works on Roman exemplarism have not been matched by similar attention to Greek parallels, whether pagan or Christian. The findings on pagan Rome, bolstered by contemporary research into the human propensity to rely on exemplars more generally, suggest that a foray into similar tendencies on the Greek side of the Mediterranean, and in Christian authors, will repay the effort.

Exemplars in the fourth century

Peter Brown has argued that late ancient culture was marked by a concern for particular persons and places as sites of intersection between the eternal and the ephemeral: heaven and earth meet in a holy man or a martyr's shrine. These persons or places are then felt to be charged with a particularly intense, almost palpable sanctity. In a Christian context, saints enter local and sometimes Church-wide memory as intercessors and sources of grace and power. They serve as both *patroni*, on the template of Roman social relationships, and as models of life.[20] While Brown's approach paved the way for a number of studies of such figures, the now-substantial literature on late ancient hagiography (Christian and pagan) has not to my knowledge been set in the context of classical exemplarism.[21] For instance, while much has been written in recent years on the

[19] Roller (2018) 10–14; Langlands (2018) *passim* but e.g. Chapter 9, "The Dynamics of Cultural Memory: Forgetting, Rupture, Contestation," and 12, "Controversial Thinking through Exempla."
[20] Brown (1982) 6 (in the essay "Learning and Imagination"). On the association of grace and power with a holy man, see Brown (1982) 121 (in "The Rise and Function of the Holy Man in Late Antiquity"), where he suggests that imaginative relationships between believers and their saints were in part modelled on real social relations.
[21] See for instance Turner (2011).

literary memorialization of Gorgonia, Nazianzen's sister, the research does not situate her against any deep exemplarist background, in Gregory or otherwise.[22]

Preceding and continuing alongside Brown's revolution in the field of late antiquity there have been a number of small-scale studies of exemplars drawn from history, literature, mythology, and Scriptures in fourth-century pagan, Jewish, and Christian sources.[23] A 1968 dissertation compared a number of secular and chiefly historical exemplars used by Themistius and the authors of the *Panegyrici Latini*.[24] More recently studies of individual characters such as Odysseus have begun to appear.[25]

Far the most thorough study of exemplarism in any fourth-century Christian writer is Kristoffel Demoen's *Pagan and Biblical Exempla in Gregory Nazianzen: A Study in Rhetoric and Hermeneutics* (1996). As the subtitle suggests, the analytical focus is on rhetoric and the interpretation of Scripture, mythology, and literature (to some extent also history). There and in a subsequent article, he presents a very precise method for the identification of exemplary stories on the basis of rhetorical form as well as diction.[26] Building on ancient and modern scholars of rhetoric, his definition of an *exemplum* or παράδειγμα—which distinguishes the exemplum from other rhetorical figures in its neighbourhood, namely metaphor (μεταφορά), simile (παραβολή), maxim (γνώμη), and laudatory comparison (σύγκρισις)[27]—runs as follows:

[22] E.g. Burrus (2006), Elm (2006), Guerri (1994), Hägg (2006), and Van Dam (2003).
[23] Simon (1954), Daniélou (1955), Luneau (1955).
[24] Chambers (1968).
[25] Montiglio (2011) bypasses Christian sources entirely. Moraw (2020) offers a survey of Odyssean motifs (*Polyphem*, *Sirenen*, *Heimkehr*, etc.) in late ancient literature but scarcely scratches the surfaces of the material in our authors: only a single, two-line Nazianzen locus on Penelope is mentioned; none of the other three of my authors has more than two loci mentioned, and while ethical implications are sometimes highlighted (especially concerning authorial views of women), none of these is analysed at any length or from an exemplarist angle.
[26] Demoen (1996) 35–56, Demoen (1997) *passim*.
[27] Demoen (1996) 25–26.

> [An exemplum is] the evoking of a history (from the Bible or from pagan tradition) which has or has not actually occurred, which is similar or related to the matter under discussion, which is implicitly or explicitly connected with this matter as argument (evidence or model) or as ornament, and which takes the form of a narration, a name-mentioning, or an allusion.[28]

Almost every element of this definition becomes a category of classification and analysis to be applied to Nazianzen's corpus, and above all to his poetry (a more limited set is applied to the prose). Amongst Demoen's most important contributions is the sheer documentation of the classical and Biblical exempla to be found in Nazianzen, presented in analytical inventories showing the exemplary stories found in Nazianzen's corpus both work by work and exemplum by exemplum. Demoen's systematic approach also reveals preferences in Gregory's selection of different kinds of exempla in different genres and in different audiences: virtually no Biblical exempla are used for pagan audiences or correspondents, for instance, while pagan exempla appear for both those audiences as well as for educated Christian ones.[29]

Demoen's interests and the scope of the study naturally impose certain limitations on the kinds of questions he asks and answers. Of these limitations, I aim in this study at least to begin addressing the following. For one, the painstaking attention he has shown to the rhetorical form of exempla has made a significant contribution to the history of formal rhetoric, but risks obscuring the ethical valences of the stories so classified. For instance, one requirement is that an exemplum be narrative in character, which rules out several important and explicit non-narrative associations between exemplary persons and their virtues or vices.[30] Even within narrative presentations, the classical distinctions between ornamental, hortatory, and evidentiary exempla on which Demoen relies may not be respected when received by an audience—nor is it clear that those who present the

[28] Demoen (1996) 25.
[29] Demoen (1996) 205.
[30] Demoen (1996) 24; see for instance several of Moses' characteristics at *Or.* 2.41, 45.11, 45.20.

exempla even want those categories to be so respected.[31] Any appearance plays its role in shaping an imagination that is deeply connected to ethical sensibilities. As regards the cultural origins of exempla, Demoen is mostly interested in generic distinctions, and in spite of a few broad divisions in history, his findings will benefit from a more nuanced periodization of source material. Moreover, despite his very helpful discussion of the way hermeneutics shape a relationship between the exemplary past and the lived present, the minting of latter-day exemplars falls outside the scope of his study.[32] Demoen himself wonders whether the exhaustive data set he produced on Nazianzen is significant in the sense that there is nothing comparable on any other Patristic author against which to assess it.[33] Another consequence of Demoen's concern with rhetoric is a partial but significant eclipse of ethics, and there is no attempt to illuminate the persons whose stories feature in the study as representatives of specific virtues and vices.[34] Finally, in the years since his study was published, work on both papyrological and literary evidence has continued to improve our understanding of the educational culture that shaped Nazianzen and his peers, in ways relevant for their exemplarism. Nevertheless, Demoen's work has laid the foundation for new research in fourth-century exemplarism, and it remains indispensable.

Exemplar analysis as a measure of cultural priorities and cultural change

For the present exercise in exemplar analysis I make a basic terminological distinction between *exempla* and *exemplars*. I use the term *exemplum* as any textual reference to an incident or character from mythology, literature, history, or Scripture which can be

[31] Demoen (1997) 129–133.
[32] Demoen (1996) 255–257.
[33] Demoen (1996) 125, including footnote 241.
[34] I have been more interested in questions of ethics and virtue theory than in formal rhetoric, but further research on the rhetorical form of Nazianzen's exempla could easily be carried out by applying Demoen's full analytical schema to the prose, which receives a lighter touch in his inventories; Demoen (1996) 26, note 22.

understood as bearing ethical weight. This use includes but is not limited to the rhetorical definitions of exempla as found in Morgan (2007) and Demoen (1996, 1997). *Exemplars*, by contrast, are those persons or beings with notable personal qualities, whether virtuous, vicious, technical, or circumstantial. Exemplars serve as models for imitation or avoidance. Exempla may be thought of as incidents involving an exemplar. Thus, a Plutarchan *Life* could be said to illuminate the virtues and vices of one person, the primary exemplar (e.g. Alexander), through many incidents or exempla (e.g. boyhood feats, conquests as a general, habits, relations with friends, etc.).

As I will explain in the outline below, I begin this study with a survey of the uses of exempla in Nazianzen's contemporaries, and I close with an attempt to reconstruct the exemplarist experience that Nazianzen envisions for his audiences. The heart of the dissertation, however, is concerned with particular exemplars. Which figures from mythology, literature, history, and Scripture did these authors and socio-political actors—writing at a time of cultural upheaval—take as their heroes, and which as their villains? Whom did they pitch to their audiences as exemplars for imitation and avoidance? Which virtues and vices did they associate with the men and women they thus exemplarised? Did they share their heroes and villains, and if so, did they present them in the same way, attaching the same virtues and vices to them? To what extent did these Christians have a united front in their uses of exemplars and to what extent were their exemplarist practices idiosyncratic? These are questions about popular ethics that are largely although not wholly independent of rhetorical considerations.

To underscore their importance, I use two notions drawn from Edmund Burke: the "moral imagination" and its "wardrobe."[35] The moral imagination has been elaborated by

[35] "All the decent drapery of life is to be roughly torn off [by the Revolution]. All the superadded ideas, furnished from the wardrobe of a moral imagination, which the heart owns, and the understanding ratifies, as

scholars of Burke as the seat of our ethical lives, the faculty by which we conceive of our relations to other human beings. It is thus inseparable from some account of virtues and vices. Yet it is not a storehouse of definitions. Rather, it is "the process by which the self makes metaphors out of images recorded by the senses and stored in memory, which then are employed to find and suppose moral correspondences in experience."[36] The storehouse of such memories, then, is Burke's "wardrobe," from which articles may be readily withdrawn for lived application and returned for later use. Memorable characters, such as the great exemplars populating the pages of this study, occupy a great deal of space in that wardrobe. Burke's fears about what would be lost in a great eighteenth-century revolution made me wonder how the collective wardrobe had fared in the cultural revolution of the fourth.

What ethical models, then, do we find in the late ancient wardrobe, and sporting which virtues and vices? To answer this question and the others above, I developed and applied a rather straightforward method for documenting exemplars and the ways they are used. The digitization of classical texts has allowed for large-scale searches for named exemplars across whole corpora. Alongside readings of selected texts, I carried out such corpora searches on scores of exemplars of various origins in Gregory of Nazianzus, Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa, and Emperor Julian the Apostate. In each instance, I catalogued the virtues or vices associated with the exemplar (with virtues and vices taken broadly, as I will emphasize in the body of the study). The result is a synchronic snapshot of some of the most prominent exemplars used by four of the most prominent culture-shaping writers of the mid- to late fourth century. As a catalogue, the result of Chapters 2–

necessary to cover the defects of our naked shivering nature, and to raise it to dignity in our own estimation, are to be exploded as a ridiculous, absurd, and antiquated fashion." *Reflections on the Revolution in France*: Burke (1999 [1790]) 170–171.

[36] Guroian (2005) 54–55.

4 is not exactly a new Valerius, but it is the most exhaustive compendium of fourth-century exemplars and their characteristic virtues and vices of which I am aware. Taken as a whole, it is an account of the cultural priorities of a set of extremely influential men in a time of flux, a time when the contents of the wardrobe of the late ancient moral imagination were contested.

While I have applied this method principally to a set of authors from just one generation, my glances back at prior exemplarists such as Valerius, Plutarch, Clement, and the author of *Hebrews* will betray an interest in its diachronic applications. Are the virtues in a given hero highlighted the same way in pre-Macedonian Athens as in Plutarch? In Plutarch as in Dio? What about Photius? How and when do the notable qualities shift so dramatically as to transform a hero into a villain or *vice versa*? While similar questions have been raised by other authors (including some I have noted above), and addressed in isolated and anecdotal ways, my method of exemplar analysis has the potential to answer them systematically, diachronically, and with a degree of accuracy that no study has yet been able to approach. The method would have to be applied on a vast scale, but it is simple, and ripe for a digital humanities feasibility study, at the very least.

What I hope we do not lose sight of in any such referential database—or in this study, for that matter—is the fact that exemplars, the ways we present them, and our habits of evaluating them really do shape the way we live. As I carried out research for this dissertation, a vivid illustration of what I mean was unfolding around much of the world. Particularly since 2020, the statues of men whom whom earlier ages had commemorated for certain prioritised virtues have been toppled in the light of newly foregrounded vices, either their own or those of their supporters. Missionary priest-humanitarians, slave-trading philanthropists, patronising abolitionists, and pro-Soviet, anti-Nazi partisans, from California to New England to Britain to Latvia, have seen their monuments crumble. The

phenomenon, while widespread, was not universal. Concurrently, a new aeroport was being opened in Ulaanbaatar, and if today you fly to Mongolia you will most likely arrive via Chinggis Khaan International. (One wonders whether there are direct flights to Samarkand.) But where the statues do fall, remarkably, the plinths often do not stay empty for long: in some cases new ones were erected on the empty slabs almost overnight. The impulse to look for exemplars is clearly a powerful one, and perhaps answers some deep need we have; yet just as clearly it is a complicated process of evaluation and negotiation, for both the individual and the community. Our assessments of Lee and Lenin in part shape and are in part shaped by the way we understand deaths like those of George Floyd and the citizens of Bucha. We should remember this when we see Nazianzen, Basil, Nyssen, and Julian invoking Heracles, Moses, Constantine—and Julian himself. Their feelings and their convictions ran just as deep, and their exemplars played a major role in how they articulated these commitments.

The shape of this study

I begin by attempting to help fill one of the lacunae signalled by Demoen (1996), when he laments the lack of data on exempla used in Patristic authors other than Nazianzen. In Chapter 1: Nazianzen in Context, I present my findings on the volume of exempla (i.e. total count) and density (exempla per unit text), comparing a selection of oratorical works of praise and blame from Nazianzen and seven contemporaries. We will see that Gregory's psogic and panegyric volume and density are above average, but that he is in good company and hardly anomalous. I then look at historical and cultural sources and establish patterns across our set using finer distinctions than Demoen attempts. These

indicate both shared and idiosyncratic preferences in our authors' historical and Biblical periods of reference.

In the first part of Chapter 2: The Gods and Heroes of *Paideia*, I review the ethical component of ancient education and the role that exemplars played within it, drawing on well-known literary evidence as well more recent finds from school papyri or other school texts, some of which show lists of named figures in teachers' or learners' hands. Of these names, some are of gods and mythological heroes. Since Nazianzen, Basil, Nyssen, and Julian certainly received educations resembling what the literary sources and papyrological finds suggest, I devote the second part of the chapter to the overlapping and divergent uses to which they put the gods and mythological heroes. Particularly important in this chapter is the documentation of links between exemplary figures and particular virtues or vices. Each such exemplar contributes a heading, under which the individual authors appear as subheadings. The analysis assesses agreements, disagreements, and silences on these pairings across our set of authors.

Alongside gods and mythic heroes, figures from non-Scriptural history were also used as exemplars of virtues and vices, and these are the focus of Chapter 3: The Great Men of History. I base my case studies and running analyses on a subset of figures I have drawn from the early imperial writers Valerius Maximus and Plutarch, documenting their depictions in (or absences from) some or all of our fourth-century authors under review. The patterns of presentation and analysis will be familiar from Chapter 2. This chapter is also the occasion for a discussion of the continuity of exemplary history through the present, and in a short coda, I highlight some of the ways in which new historical exemplars are minted in Nazianzen and the others, including what I call Julian's 'sarcastic exemplarism'. This also suggests a route by which hagiographical studies in the Brown tradition may be connected with deeper exemplarist practices.

Chapter 4: The Saints of Scripture is the third and final chapter dealing with virtue–exemplar and vice–exemplar pairings. In it I turn to Scriptural figures, and so the discussion is mostly limited to the three Christian Cappadocians, with an occasional snipe from Julian. The subset of figures is drawn from a compilation of several partially overlapping lists found in Nazianzen and Nyssen (which together cover some of the principal lists found in Basil). I find that while Scripture itself—in contrast to much of the secular patrimony—often provides fixed starting points that all share (Phinehas will always be zealous, for instance), individual authors evidently felt perfectly able to stretch these initially canonical virtues to apply them to very different situations in the same way that Langlands and Roller have seen pagan orators do in Roman contexts. This chapter pays heightened attention to what I call 'catalogue texts'. Readers will note that while the exemplars continue to serve as headings, the concern with 'catalogue virtues' has dictated a different arrangement of subheadings, which appear virtue by virtue rather than author by author, as they did in Chapters 2 and 3.

In Chapter 5: Exemplarism for Aspirants: Practical *Paideia* in Action, I argue that by detailed attention to Nazianzen's presentation of certain exemplars it is possible to reconstruct his idealisation of what it is like to use exemplars as tools of ethics, from the perspective of an aspiring ethical agent. While Nazianzen never presents this in a synoptic schema, I attempt to reconstruct it. It is thus an answer from the late ancient Greek world to the contributions that Langlands and Roller have made to our understanding of the experience of Roman exemplarism.

*

This dissertation begins by deepening lines of inquiry opened but not pursued by previous studies and reveals new analytical possibilities for our texts. It is also the first

systematic account of the way prominent exemplars were used for their specifically virtuous and vicious connotations. Of the myriad exemplars populating the corpora which I have examined, I can offer only a limited selection. Nonetheless, this is the most extensive such project that has been undertaken to date, and the findings offer what I hope will be useful contributions to our understanding of the scope and substance of fourth-century exemplarism. I hope the same will be true of my reconstruction of the practical experience of exemplarist ethical formation in Gregory Nazianzen, which to my knowledge has not been attempted elsewhere.

This essay in the history of exemplarism offers a map of the territory between literature, theology, and biography, three streams of Cappadocian scholarship which have often remained disparate. Taken as a whole, this study illuminates the workings of the moral imagination during a period of crisis in Late Antiquity, provides a novel framework for a developing branch of historical and contemporary ethics, and demonstrates the utility of exemplar analysis as a method for understanding cultural priorities and cultural change.

Chapter 1
Nazianzen in Context

Τοσαῦτα ἔχοντες ὑποδείγματα
μιμησώμεθα Θεοῦ φιλανθρωπίαν.

Since we have so many examples, let
us imitate the benevolence of God.

> *Gregory of Nazianzus, Ep. 76 (to Theodorus) (ca. 380)*

In this chapter, I situate the scale of Nazianzen's uses of exempla, as well as their sources, in the context of his fourth-century peers. In so doing, I will begin to fill a lacuna flagged by Demoen (1996), namely the need for comparative data from patristic and contemporary authors.[1] Where he gave some tendencies within a single author, here we have a sample from a set of eight.

I first compare what I call the *volume* and *density* of exempla in Nazianzen's orations to a selection of works by contemporary writers: in addition to Basil, Nyssen, and Julian, who will accompany us for the rest of this study, in this chapter I also consider works by Athanasius of Alexandria, Hilary of Poitiers, Synesius of Cyrene, and Lucifer of Cagliari. *Volume* will refer to a simple count; *density* will give a count per unit of text.

In the second half of the chapter, I analyse the texts in our primary set of authors (Nazianzen, Basil, Nyssen, and Julian) by cultural or religious origin and historical source period. As I do so, I give indications of each author's general preferences, and highlight

[1] Demoen (1996) 125, including footnote 241.

noteworthy uses in the four auxiliary authors. Julian, Nazianzen, Basil, and Nyssen have only their general preferences noted here; details follow in subsequent chapters.

An important distinction to bear in mind is that between *exemplars* and *exempla*.[2] I take *exemplars* to be particular persons or personal beings (such as gods), drawn from literature, mythology, history, or Scripture. *Exempla* are the instances in which exemplars appear. They may be spelled out as full stories or may be as terse as an allusion. While the two are closely intertwined, conceptually they may be analysed separately, and Demoen is concerned chiefly with exempla. Since I take his data on Nazianzen as a starting point and attempt to situate them in the context of other authors' practices, in this chapter I, too, focus on exempla. So, if Zeus (a single *exemplar*) should occur in ten stories or references (ten *exempla*) in a given text, the relevant data count for Zeus would be 10, not 1.

Exemplum volume and density

Data on all of Nazianzen's forty-four orations may be readily derived from Demoen's inventories. While I have produced volume and density figures for all of these (which I report in the Appendix to this chapter),[3] I will here focus on just four: *Orationes* 4 and 5, both invective discourses directed against the deceased Emperor Julian; and *Orationes* 8 and 43, panegyrics in honour, respectively, of Gregory's sister, Gorgonia, and of his friend Basil. The aims of praise and blame motivate my selection of the discourses I have taken for comparison. The other three principal authors all contribute speeches of praise. From Basil himself I take his orations *In Gordium* and *In XL Martyres*, commemorations for the feasts of locally popular martyrs, and from Gregory of Nyssa I take the funeral orations *In*

[2] See Introduction, 10.
[3] See below, 49.

Basilium and *In Meletium*. Julian gives us his *Oratio* 1, for Constantius II—perfectly laudatory in form, although on exemplarist grounds it should in fact be treated as a nasty invective.[4]

As for our auxiliary authors, they give us a heterogeneous set of chiefly invective texts. Blame-speeches or ψόγοι have been defined narrowly as "independent epideictic discourse[s]" of censure. But I agree with recent work on rhetoric in taking invective as a possible quality of at least part of a work in any genre.[5] For anti-imperial invectives, I use Athanasius' *Historia Arianorum*; Hilary of Poitiers's *In Constantium*; and Lucifer of Cagliari's *De non conveniendo cum haereticis*, *De Regibus apostaticis*, *De sancto Athanasio* (*I* and *II*), *De non parcendo in Deum delinquentibus*, and *Moriundum esse pro Dei filio*.[6] All are either invectives from start to finish, or else contain significant invective passages against Constantius II. I also include Athanasius' impersonal but still polemical apologetic treatises *Contra gentes* and *De incarnatione Verbi*. Finally, there is Synesius' *Fürstenspiegel*-type discourse *De regno*.[7] Except in the case of Lucifer's works, for which exempla are tabulated in Tietze (1976), I have come up with the figures for these texts.

Exempla occur in their highest volumes per work in Nazianzen and Athanasius. Starting with the texts with most exempla, our set is as follows:

[4] See Coda to Chapter 3, 178.
[5] Quiroga Puertas (2022) 171; Webb (2010) 132. Modern literary scholarship sometimes distinguishes between 'mode' and 'genre', so that a book written in the genre of the novel may have passages in a satirical mode; see Baldick (2008) s.v. 'form', 'genre', and 'mode'.
[6] For *moriundum* rather than *moriendum* (the latter found in Migne), see Bastiaensen (1981) 446.
[7] Synesius' *De Regno* is an outlier in our sample. It is noteworthy for the pagan historical and mythological exempla in an address to a Christian monarch, the emperor Arcadius, by a Christian philosopher (even if an eclectic one). Cameron, Long, and Sherry (1993) date it to certainly no later than the fall of Eutropius in July 399, but argue for the first half of 398. A section by Long (4.VI) argues that Arcadius was not the audience, and explains thereby the straightforward parrhesia Synesius displays, rather than what she, quoting Dagron (1968), sees as the more typical oratorical strategy of praising emperors "for the qualities they most conspicuously lacked": Cameron et al. (1993) 137–140.

Ranking by volume

1. Naz. *Oratio* 4	170 exempla
2. Ath. *Contra gentes*	131
3. Naz. *Oratio* 43	130
4. Ath. *Hist. Ar.*	108
5. Ath. *De inc. Verbi*	85
6. Naz. *Oratio* 5	79
7. Nyss. *In Basilium*	52
8. Jul. *Oratio* 1	51
9. Nyss. *In Meletium*	40
10. Lucif. *De non parc.*	38
11. Syn. *De regno*	37
12. Hilar. *In Constantium*	21
13. Lucif. *De sanct. Ath. I*	15
14. Lucif. *De reg. apost.*	14
15. Bas. *In Gordium*	13
16. Naz. *Oratio* 8	9
17. Bas. *In XL martyres*	8
18. Lucif. *Moriundum esse*	8
19. Lucif. *De non conv.*	7
20. Lucif. *De sanct. Ath. II*	6

Amongst Nazianzen's extant speeches, the paired *Orationes* 4 and 5 are the texts with the highest and third-highest volumes, together accounting for almost 18% of all exempla used in his oratorical corpus (counting 1409 in total).[8] A further 9% come from *Oratio* 43. Athanasius, Nyssen, and Julian do not reach Nazianzen's levels him, but they are clearly enthusiastic users of exempla. Basil, for his part, appears in the middle of a relatively tepid set that also includes Synesius, Hilary, Lucifer, and—perhaps significantly—an exemplum-scarce oration by Nazianzen.

Comparing these counts in absolute terms has some merit if we think of one text as amounting to one unit. It may, for instance, have been unusual to read or hear more than one oration from one author at a given sitting, in which case 'exempla per text' could be

[8] For the concentration of most of Nazianzen's pagan exempla in *Or.* 4, 5, 39, and 43, and their absence from fully twenty orations, see Demoen (1996) 74.

understood as ‘exempla per session’, such that we would have a consistent basis of comparison.

Alternatively, we may calculate what I am calling the density of exempla by dividing the raw count by the length of each oration as measured in words (or, to keep things manageable, in thousands of words). Here other caveats are in order. Density as a basis of comparison is at least relatively stable within language spheres (Greek or Latin), but it may be that factors other than language—a terse or prolix style, for instance—could be more significant sources of variation. We are, moreover, at the mercy of calculations based on digitised transcriptions. Occasionally, some of those on which I rely for Nazianzen, Basil, and Nyssen erroneously break one word into two by the introduction of a space, increasing the number of words per text slightly, and so artificially deflating exemplum densities for those authors and leaving us with conservative estimates for their texts.[9] So, we should not let the decimal points fool us, nor should we be under any illusions of having found a perfect standard. At the same time, if we accept that the results will be rough and impressionistic, the exercise will give us some general indications of authorial tendencies.

This density method produces a somewhat different ranking to the ranking by raw count or volume.[10] Within the set of contextual authors, our densities are as follows, starting from the most exemplum-rich text (giving first the new rank order based on density, and then, in parentheses, the rank from the volume table above):

[9] See Table 1 (Volume and density of exempla) in the Appendix at the end of this chapter (below, 49). See Bibliography on the digitised corpora.
[10] See again Appendix to Chapter 1, Table 1, and the accompanying note.

Ranking by density (followed by volume rank)

1. (9) Nyss. *In Meletium*	16.2 exempla per thousand words
2. (6) Naz. *Oratio* 5	10.1
3. (1) Naz. *Oratio* 4	9.0
4. (7) Nyss. *In Basilium*	8.3
5. (3) Naz. *Oratio* 43	7.2
6. (2) Ath. *Contra gentes*	7.2
7. (4) Ath. *Hist. Ar.*	5.8
8. (12) Hilar. *In Constantium*	4.6
9. (8) Jul. *Oratio* 1	4.2
10. (5) Ath. *De inc. Verbi*	4.2
11. (15) Bas. *In Gordium*	4.0
12. (11) Syn. *De regno*	4.0
13. (17) Bas. *In XL martyres*	2.8
14. (16) Naz. *Oratio* 8	2.0
15. (10) Lucif. *De non parc.*	1.8
16. (14) Lucif. *De reg. apost.*	1.6
17. (18) Lucif. *Moriundum esse*	0.9
18. (19) Lucif. *De non conv.*	0.8
19. (13) Lucif. *De sanct. Ath. I*	0.7
20. (20) Lucif. *De sanct. Ath. II*	0.4

Gregory Nazianzen's *Oratio* 4 and 5 and Gregory Nyssen's commemorations of Basil and Meletius stand at the head of this list, well above their nearest contender, Athanasius' *Contra gentes*. Based on my arithmetic for the rest of Nazianzen's oratorical corpus, the results of which can be found in Tables 2 and 3 of the Appendix to this chapter,[11] thirteen of his forty-three other orations would join them there. Nazianzen plainly has a significant store of exemplarist material ready to hand, and often enough is willing to deploy it in doses heavier than his contemporaries. Within his corpus of forty-four orations, *Orationes* 5 and 4 are not even at the top: they come in sixth and twelfth place, respectively, for exemplum density. With the median density for his corpus at 6.1 and the mean at 6.5, higher than all the texts compared above save Athanasius' *Contra gentes* and the two eulogies by Nyssen, Nazianzen clearly has a penchant for loading his texts with exempla.[12]

[11] See below, 50–51.
[12] See Appendix to Chapter 1, Tables 2 and 3, below, 50–51.

That said, Nazianzen's practice often coincides with that of his peers. Twenty-seven of his orations have exemplum densities below that of Athanasius' *Contra gentes*; of these, nine have densities below that of *De incarnatione*. Most of his oratorical corpus coincides with the range on display in Lucifer, Hilary, Synesius, and Athanasius. Yet only four Gregorian orations have exemplum densities below Lucifer's maximum. Of these four, only one matches Lucifer's minimum, and none falls below it. However much Gregory has in common with other writers of the day, he tends towards the higher end of the spectrum of exemplum densities.

There are obvious limitations to what may be concluded regarding fourth-century Christian rhetoric on the basis of such comparisons. First, most of the authors are here represented by only a fraction of their corpora, so an analysis of other works may alter my findings. Second, while the entirety of Lucifer's preserved oratorical corpus figures in the analysis, he gives us a relatively small number to work with—six orations as compared to Gregory's forty-four. Third, the non-Gregorian texts in this set are for the most part invectives, or else have polemical intent, whereas Gregory's corpus is generically diverse. An analysis nuanced by heightened generic sensitivities would yield more reliable results: *De Incarnatione*, for instance, may be more naturally grouped with Gregory's so-called Theological Orations. Finally, apart from Julian, these authors are all Nicene Christians. How other pagans and Arian or other non-Nicene Christians used exempla is another direction for further study.[13]

Thus, anything said about the density of exempla in 'fourth-century oratory' will have to come with qualifications. But at the very least, it is clear that one quirky pagan and a

[13] Henck (2001) 177 cites Libanius *Ep.* 12.2 in referring to an oration by the Arian Constantius and sent in writing, in Latin, to be translated into Greek and delivered at Constantinople in September 355. The oration is found between Themistius's first and second orations in Dindorf (1832).

number of at least nominally pro-Nicene Christian bishops often made use of an extensive repertoire of exempla in their invectives against emperors whom they opposed on theological or other grounds.[14] The volumes of exempla and the densities at which they appear vary considerably across orations, and this is true both within a single corpus and across authors. The ranges of almost all other authors' works considered here fall within the range demarcated by Nazianzen's corpus. The two invectives and one of his panegyrics come at or towards the top in terms of volume and density, both within his own corpus and especially as compared to other fourth-century pro-Nicene writers. But he has company: Nyssen, Athanasius, and Julian are never far behind.

While the difference between this group of leaders at one end of the spectrum and Lucifer on the other seems to indicate significantly divergent tastes and tactics in the deployment of exempla, the fact remains that all of our authors do use them. More importantly, data of this kind can only partly reflect the memorable quality and the imagination-shaping force of the characters lurking behind them. To understand these authors as exemplarists more clearly, let us turn to the source periods from which they drew their exempla.

Exempla and their origins

To analyse our authors' preferred periods of reference, I draw on frameworks from Demoen (1996) and Chambers (1968). The chief division in Demoen's study is between Biblical and pagan exempla. The finer breakdown he offers is generic: inventory items are classified as coming from Biblical histories (labelled BH), Biblical parables (BP), pagan

[14] Synesius likely opposed Arcadius on theological grounds, but no such questions are evident in his *De Regno*.

history (PH), pagan mythology (PM), pagan fables or λόγοι (PL), *verisimiles res*, or matter from literature (PV), and Christian history (CH).[15] Two limitations on this framework are the lack of interest in recent or contemporary exemplary stories (in spite of the 'CH' category), and a lack of nuance in the historical periods from which the stories are drawn (so Paul's and Abraham's journeys will both be classified as 'BH,' and Carus' and Alexander's campaigns will be 'PH').

Chambers's study of Themistius and the authors of the *Panegyrici Latini* is concerned almost exclusively with historical figures, the virtues they represent, and the periods from which they are drawn. While he does not present numerical data, he does offer conclusions about the preferences he detects. His method as well as his findings on those authors, who are mostly contemporaries of those in this study, will provide a useful background before we proceed.[16]

Themistius and the Latin panegyrists of Gaul, Chambers reports, differed significantly in their choices of exempla and the uses to which they put them. At the broadest level of generalization, Themistius invoked exempla from Greek history and literature far more than Roman. Alexander is the single most commonly invoked exemplar. But the overall picture is nuanced by the prominence of a number of Romans: Augustus, for instance, is close at Alexander's heels, while Trajan, Hadrian, and especially the Antonines are considered almost flawless whenever they are invoked. Yet the Achaemenids of Persia are cited even more frequently than these emperors. Homeric, archaic, and classical Greek

[15] Demoen (1996) 329–330.

[16] Chambers's interest is in the period from the Tetrarchy through Theodosius, so for the most part he omits Pliny the Younger's panegyric for Trajan. Some exemplarism in Pliny's oration is implicit, and the exemplars he names are relatively few, but see e.g. favourable comparisons to previous named emperors in *Panegyricus* 11, the virtues of certain republican heroes in 13, subjects' imitation of good emperors at 45, the hope that the gods themselves may imitate Trajan at 74, etc. I am grateful to Prof. Gregory Hutchinson for calling my attention to the following lines from *Panegyricus* 45 on the superiority of rule by example over rule by fear: *Nam vita principis censura est eaque perpetua: ad hanc dirigimur, ad hanc convertimur, nec tam imperio nobis opus est quam exemplo. Quippe infidelis recti magister est metus. Melius homines exemplis docentur, quae in primis hoc in se boni habent, quod adprobant quae praecipiunt fieri posse.*

exemplars are well represented; and while Themistius adduces fewer models from royal, republican, or 'revolutionary' Rome (as Chambers calls the several generations leading up to Actium), each of these periods has its occasional exemplarist uses in his corpus. While many of those cited were great military commanders, Themistius tends to emphasize other virtues, less martial and more associated with godlike kingship. The bar is high, and the exemplars presented are implied to be complete in all the virtues; they are ideal types wearing historical masks.[17]

Common to both sets of exemplars is that they are always secular or non-Christian in origin. But the Latin panegyrists show very little interest in or familiarity with Greek culture and history at any stage. A few Homeric heroes, Alexander, and Phalaris comprise nearly the whole set of their Greek exemplars. Whereas in Themistius the Antonine period represented something of a golden age, and Alexander and Augustus figured prominently, in the Latin panegyrists no Roman emperors were especially prominent, and Alexander "seldom appears." Marcus Aurelius is mentioned not at all. Instead of emperors or men with imperial aspirations, soldiers and statesmen of the Roman Republic tended to be invoked, and the martial virtues in the honorands' campaigns were often at the fore. These heroes, Chambers says, were presented by the panegyrists neither as rulers nor as approximations of a well-rounded ideal. Instead, orators focused on particular virtues which their chosen exemplars exhibited, and would often make point-for-point, virtue-for-virtue comparisons with their *laudandi*, frequently declaring their imperial audiences to have surpassed the heroes of the past in such imagined contests.[18]

[17] Chambers (1968) 102, 81–85, 92–97, 104–108, 162–3. He does not give frequency data, but treats Augustus immediately after Alexander and calls him "another preeminent exemplum" (83). Note that Chambers uses 'exemplum' where I use 'exemplar'.
[18] Chambers (1968) 125–128, 133, 140–144, 163–4. He goes so far as to say that "unlike Themistius, they [the Latin panegyrists] never cited *exempla* in any sense of an ideal ruler either positively or negatively" (161).

Returning to the authors under review in this chapter, I take each in turn and note the shares of Biblical and pagan exempla in their works, as well as the source periods from which they tend to draw their exemplarist material. I highlight notable recurring characters and the occasional remarkable usage.

Athanasius of Alexandria

Athanasius of Alexandria employs a mixture of pagan and Biblical exempla. The proportions vary widely: 9.3% of his exempla are pagan in the *Historia Arianorum,* 15.3% in *De incarnatione Verbi*, and 66.4% in *Contra gentes*.[19]

Taking the three orations together, Athanasius' Biblical imagination seems dominated by the period of the divided kingdom (36 exempla), the Gospels (27), and the undivided kingdom (22). Following at a distance are the Babylonian exile (13) and the nomadic patriarchs of Abraham's line, down to the generation of Jacob's sons (12). After the Exodus from Egypt (9), no other period of Biblical history provides more than 6 exempla. Let us look more closely at each oration.

In the *Historia Arianorum* there are no individual mythical figures, only groups: Maenads, Furies, and Giants.[20] With one exception there are no individual non-Christians from secular history, only groups: comedians, actors, Scythians, and the like.[21] Interestingly, the exception is Zenobia, queen of Palmyra; but since Athanasius claims that she supported the heretic Paul of Samosata, her significance for his purposes is in her influence on ecclesiastical and not secular history.[22] Something similar could be said of

[19] See Appendix to Chapter 1, Table 4, 52.
[20] Ath. *Hist. Ar.* 59.3, 74.4.
[21] Ath. *Hist. Ar.* 52.6, 60.1, 60.4.
[22] Ath. *Hist. Ar.* 71.1.

Maximian, being the author of the last great persecution.[23] Others play a similarly confounding role to the orthodox, but always as groups, such as Jews and Manichaeans and Valentinians.[24] Apart from these late and Christian-related examples, we have nothing from Roman history at any period. Apart from the scant mythological references, vague theatrical allusions, and a perhaps Herodotean take on the Scythians, we have nothing from Greece, either.

There are about twice as many negative as there are positive exemplars in the *Historia Arianorum*. The pagan and non-Christian exempla are overwhelmingly negative. Athanasius either likens his contemporary enemies to them,[25] or says that these contemporaries surpass the negative exemplars in their wickedness.[26] Of the few exceptions, two are non-Jews and non-Christians in incidents which are, however, Biblical: Darius, who was grieved to hear any slander, and Pilate, who recognises his injustice. Both outdo Constantius, the resolute persecutor.[27]

A third positive exception to Athanasius' generally negative use of pagans is the group exemplum of the Hellenes during the time of the great persecution under Diocletian and his fellow Tetrarchs. In Athanasius' telling, a great many pagans were horrified at the policy and did their best to protect their Christian friends and neighbours. They are transformed into an unexpected exemplary standard against which the Arian Christians abetted by Constantius are evaluated and harshly condemned. The sting of this exemplum is that Constantius' party of so-called Christians are actually worse to true believers than were many pagans at the time of the most aggressive persecution in the Church's history.[28]

[23] Ath. *Hist. Ar.* 64.2–3.
[24] E.g. Ath. *Hist. Ar.* 66.3–5. Jews of Jesus' time also show up as a different group, with somewhat different connotations, as at 58.1 and 61.4.
[25] E.g. Pharaoh at Ath. *Hist. Ar.* 34.2.
[26] E.g. Zenobia at Ath. *Hist. Ar.* 71.1.
[27] Ath. *Hist. Ar.* 45.3, 68.2–3.
[28] Ath. *Hist. Ar.* 64.2–3.

The fact that elsewhere in the very same discourse Hellenes are invoked as an unambiguously negative mass exemplar only sharpens the sting of their relatively positive depiction in juxtaposition to that of the Arians.[29]

The proportions of negative and positive exempla are rather more balanced in the case of Biblical exempla, though here, too, negative exempla prevail by a ratio of about 5 to 3. Ahab and the Antichrist occur at least six times each; King Saul just trails them, followed successively by Pharaoh, Herod, Jezebel, and Judas. The Jews as a mass exemplar, often but not always meant as the Jews at the time of Jesus, do not fare particularly well, being invoked at least eight times. Far the most common positive exemplar (indeed the most common of any kind) is Jesus, whose guiltless suffering is the subject of about eleven exempla. Naboth is next, with six, whose similarly unmerited maltreatment amounted to martyrdom for the Law of God. Elijah, David, Daniel, and Paul are each explicitly invoked on three occasions. Clearly there are some opposing but linked exempla here: Jesus and Judas, Pilate, the Antichrist, and the Jews; Naboth and Elijah versus Ahab and Jezebel; Saul and David. Interestingly, though Pharaoh and Herod make frequent appearances, Moses and John the Baptist—with whom it would have been natural for Athanasius to identify himself—are present only implicitly. In any case, the pattern is clear: whereas the pagan exempla are overwhelmingly negative, Scripture is a source of both faithless wicked exemplars *and* of the faithful prophetic voices who opposed them and the innocent martyrs who suffered under them. Transposed onto the fourth-century christological controversies, the result is a vivid, character-heavy contouring of Arian-

[29] See e.g. Ath. *Hist. Ar.* 64.1 (immediately preceding the passage in which they appear favourably), 66.3–5, and 71.1.

Nicene battle lines in terms of the long arc of salvation history, from Cain (and an implicit Abel) all the way to the Antichrist and the *parousia*.[30]

Contra gentes gives us much more pagan material. As one would expect of a polemic directed against polytheistic religions, there are many references to gods, demigods, heroes said to interact with gods, and the like. In contrast to Nazianzen's polemical method in *Orationes* 4 and 5, which balances pagan references with heavy barrages of Biblically derived invective exempla, Athanasius gives us almost none of the latter in this text. Zeus and Hera receive nine and eight mentions, respectively (although Zeus's figure explodes if he is taken to be implicit in each of the affairs Athanasius identifies by mentioning the names of his paramours), and so about twice as many as any of the other Olympians (of whom Ares, Aphrodite, and Hephaestus are the most commonly named), and triple the number for Heracles. A number of Homeric heroes, such as Achilles, Hector, and Odysseus, are named once only—as often as we see Jesus, Paul, and Moses in this text.

The historical references in the *Contra gentes*, excluding those relating to pagan religious practice (in the descriptions of cults and allegedly contradictory national pantheons, for instance) are limited to not more than a dozen, of which almost half come from the Archaic period of Greek history (such as Lycurgus and Solon).[31] Plato and Socrates are all we have from classical Athens;[32] Cleopatra, Hadrian, Antinous, and the Roman Senate are all we have of Rome, and it is perhaps noteworthy that these are all connected to Athanasius' native Egypt.[33]

[30] Demoen (1996) 297–8, 307, 310 rightly argues that Nazianzen sacralizes time in part by allowing exempla from the Biblical past to colour the analysis of events in the present.
[31] Ath. *Contra gentes* 1.18.3.
[32] Ath. *Contra gentes* 1.10.4.
[33] Ath. *Contra gentes* 1.9.4, 1.9.5, 1.10.2. Wace's identification of Cleopatra in this last locus is tentative.

De incarnatione, by contrast, presents nearly as stark a religious divide as the *Historia Arianorum*. As far as I can tell, it contains no historical exempla of whatever kind, but only a handful of references to pagan mythology (whether gods or human demigods). There are, however, quite a few references to pagan cults in the context of their cessation, against an overwhelming majority of Biblical exempla.[34] This relative lack of attention to pagan material is no surprise, since the treatise is one of Christian theology. Perhaps most noteworthy in such a work is that all of the figures treated as exemplars are from the Old Testament. Many of them are adduced to show Christ's superiority or singularity, as in the circumstances of his virgin birth,[35] the *pax Christi* (still quite new at the time of his writing),[36] the manner of Christ's death,[37] his miracles,[38] and his general fulfilment of prophecies (in particular Daniel's).[39]

Lucifer of Cagliari

Lucifer of Cagliari is a minimalist with regard to pagan exempla. I do not find a single one in Tietze's inventories. All exempla are Biblical. Lucifer has a predilection for exempla drawn from the periods of the divided kingdoms of Israel and Judah (25), the life of Christ and other Gospel events (14), and the undivided kingdom (8). The patriarchs (Abraham through Joseph) account for 7. All other periods have 6 or fewer.

Beyond exempla, there are almost no allusions to classical pagan culture whatsoever. In his survey of Lucifer's sources, Tietze (1976) notes references to two *loci* from Virgil's

[34] Ath. *De Inc.* 47.1. See also occasional glances back to the argument of the *Contra gentes*, as at *De Inc.* 49.2–3.
[35] Ath. *De Inc.* 35.7–8. The volume of exempla who "came into the world in the usual way"—sixteen in all—seems somewhat superfluous.
[36] Ath. *De Inc.* 36.3.
[37] Ath. *De Inc.* 37.1.
[38] Ath. *De Inc.* 38.5, 45.3.
[39] Ath. *De Inc.* 39.4–39.5.

Aeneid, both in the *In moriundum*, and one to the first line of Cicero's *First Catilinarian*. But of Virgil's lines, one, Tietze believes, is taken from a quotation in the Christian Lactantius; and Cicero's *quousque tandem abuteris* (etc.), he says, was "zur Zeit Lucifers bereits zur Redefloskel geworden."[40] Tietze concludes on the basis of a line in *De sanct. Ath. II* that in general Lucifer deliberately avoided pagan material. At the locus in question Lucifer boasts of a contrast between Constantius and his allies' cultivation of pagan literature and his own camp's scrupulous devotion to Scripture alone.[41] Henck (2001) confirms Lucifer's suggestion that Constantius keenly supported an erudite milieu at court and amongst the imperial elite more generally.

Tietze also notes an alternative hypothesis, namely that the desire to elevate the profile of the Christian Scriptures may have been reinforced or even dictated by a lack of familiarity with pagan literature on Lucifer's part. But since no exclusively Christian schools or curricula of grammar or rhetoric existed at the time our authors, including Lucifer, were being educated, and since grammar and rhetoric were both taught by means of classical pagan works, it is difficult to imagine that Lucifer could have been wholly unversed in pagan culture.[42] Consequently, the fact that he manages to avoid allowing almost anything pagan to escape his pen is the more impressive, indicating as it does a deep commitment, not a default characteristic of his style.

The paucity of non-Biblical historical exempla in Lucifer leaves little to be said by way of a Chambers-style periodized analysis, except for the occasional non-Jewish Old Testament monarch, such as the Seleucid king Antiochus IV (on whom, more below). Within the set of Biblical exempla, it may be worth noting that in *De non conveniendo, De*

[40] Tietze (1976) 78.
[41] Tietze (1976) 79 quotes Lucifer *De sanct. Ath. II* (6.158.1): "*Tu ac tui adiutores litterarum ethnicalium plenam auxistis artem; nos sumus tantum sacras scientes litteras*."
[42] Holder (1992) 396.

regibus apostaticis, *De sancto Athanasio I,* and *De non parcendo,* the share of Biblical exempla drawn from the Old Testament far outweighs the share drawn from the New. Only in *De sancto Athanasio II* and *Moriundum esse* is the reverse true. Moreover, across the corpus negative exempla far outweigh positive exempla, a mark shared with Gregory's invectives; in Lucifer's case the ratio is about two to one.[43]

Many of Lucifer's exemplars are recurring characters. Thus, Ahab is found in all the orations except *De sanct. Ath. II* and *Moriundum,* and along with Jezebel he appears four times in *De sanct. Ath. I* alone.[44] Jews as a mass exemplar—sometimes specified as scribes, Pharisees, or rulers of the Jews—appear more frequently than any other exemplar, singular or mass, and they do so in all orations. Judas is mentioned about ten times and is found in four of the orations (excepting only *De non parc.* and *De reg. apost.*, but occurring three times each in *De sanct. Ath. I* and *Moriundum*). Antiochus IV is mentioned about eight times, but occurs only in *De non conv.* and *De non parc.* King Saul is found once in each of three orations. A handful of others are found twice within single orations and recur in at least one other, including Herod the Great. Of the one third of exempla which are positive, Josaphat appears in four orations, but is not repeated within any. Job is alluded to about four times in three of the six orations. David occurs three times but in only two orations (*De sanct. Ath. I* and *De non parc.*). Thus, almost all positive exemplars are unique occurrences, whereas quite a few of the negative exemplars—of which there are far more in absolute terms, too—are repeated in numerous exempla.

On balance, Lucifer shames Constantius as a would-be Christian for looking outside the Bible, and associates Arianizing tendencies with such worldly, pagan diversions. Had

[43] This ratio includes repeat appearances of the same exempla, but the negatives also outweigh the positives in absolute terms.
[44] The loci are given at Tietze 88–89, 95–97, 111–112, 127–128, 144–146, 157–159.

Constantius but paid more attention to the Scriptures, he would have understood the many clear warnings against apostasy, especially those contained in the Old Testament, and avoided his heresy.[45]

Hilary of Poitiers

Hilary of Poitiers is slightly more adventurous than Lucifer, with about a quarter of the exempla in the invective *In Constantium* being pagan in origin. Hilary's Biblical exempla still outweigh the pagan ones. The Gospels furnish him with 6 exempla, the most of any one Biblical period. Favoured periods from the Old Testament are the Babylonian Exile and the Maccabean revolt (3 each). Other references are isolated, but mostly from incidents in *Acts*, Paul's letters, or the Apostolic age.

None of Hilary's pagan exempla is mythological or literary. To that extent, Hilary and Lucifer are working from the same playbook: educated in a secular tradition replete with stories of pagan heroes and gods, they scrupulously avoided reproducing that culture in their own writings. Where Hilary does use secular exempla, all involve emperors who persecuted Christians, and as such all are decidedly vicious figures.

One might argue that this gesture to cultural points of reference outside the Bible would appeal to Constantius' civil duties as a ruler, and that Hilary is exhorting him not to be ranked amongst rulers whom history did not judge kindly.[46] But the significance of Nero, Decius, and Maximian is ecclesial rather than civil. While far from Lucifer's style, in which we find no mention of a Nero or a Decius even as a persecutor of Christians,

[45] This seems especially clear in *De regibus apostaticis*.
[46] They are Nero, Decius, and Maximian: Hilar. *In Constantium* 4–5, 7a, and 11.

Hilary's inclusion of such exempla probably represents a difference in tactic alone, rather than in strategy or sympathy.

Synesius of Cyrene

Synesius of Cyrene, though a Christian, seems to carry on Themistius' and the panegyrists' preferences for pagan exempla. Of the 37 exempla I find in Synesius' *De regno*, written for the emperor Arcadius, almost all are pagan, none at all are biblical, and no more than two are Christian in origin. Both of these are drawn from very recent history, indeed from Arcadius' own family; both concern one man, Theodosius; and neither relate in any explicit way to his Christianity.[47] The remaining 35 are from pagan history, literature, and mythology, or else from Neoplatonic philosophical theology. He shows a preference for classical Athens (8 exempla) and the classical non-Athenian world more generally (5); the rest are scattered across all categories.

Beginning with the gods, Synesius mentions "Themis of the Senate (βουλαίαν Θέμιν)" alongside "the god of our army (θεὸν . . . στράτιον)." The latter is hard to imagine as other than the Christian one in an empire after the Milvian Bridge, but no name is given and it may indeed be Ares.[48] Hermes appears in Synesius in one of his Egyptian depictions, in which he wears the admirable figure of both an old and a young man, uniting wisdom and

[47] Syn. *De reg.* 4.6–5.1, 21.3–4.

[48] Syn. *De reg.* 20.1; Aujoulat sees this as Ares (note 137). Proverbial uses of e.g. Zeus and Hestia at 11.3, 10.3. Compare Naz. *Or.* 4.66. Themis appears twice in Nazianzen, both in epitaphs for Martinianus, a provincial governor. She is clearly an allegory for Justice and therefore appears in a favourable light, just as she appears in Synesius, in Naz. *Anth. Pal.* VIII, 106.4 [= *Epitaph.* 42.4 (*PG* 38.32)] (here alleged to have departed from the earth with Martinianus' passing; apparently he was a fair judge) and *Anth. Pal.* VIII, 110.1 [= *Epitaph.* 46.1 (*PG* 38.34)] (here addressed in the second person, with Martinianus speaking). On the departure of Justice, see Aratus *Phaen.* 96–136, where the departure of Δίκη is told as an explanation for the decline through the Ages of Man; for that story, see Hes. *Op.* 109–201; but there, although forms of δίκη and θέμις can be found, they are not personified, e.g. at ll. 124, 137, 192. At Hes. *Theog.* 901–906 a personified Δίκη is one of the many daughters of Zeus and Themis.

strength.[49] Finally, there are insistent references to the imitation of God (about five) in *De Regno*.[50] This God or god is framed vaguely enough that the same injunctions could have been just as well at home in a pagan text.

The oration presents the Homeric hero Agamemnon, perhaps somewhat generously, as a sharer in his troops' toils, almost as a servant of the common man.[51] Of the more demonstrably historical figures, most come from classical Greece, with Athens contributing about as much as the rest of the Greek world from that period. The Archaic age, the Macedonian conquest, and the Hellenistic age are lightly represented; likewise the Persians. To Synesius, Cyrus the rebel prince is an exemplar of the ruler who cultivates friendship while avoiding flattery.[52] Epaminondas, for his part, appears as a paragon of endurance, rough living, and military prowess for the sake of one's state.[53]

Rome is present mostly in some of her worst crises, namely of the first century B.C. and the late third century A.D. The episodes invoked all have to do with serious threats to order due to non-Roman elements, whether internal (the largely foreign slaves of the Third Servile War) or external (Persians), and thus urge Arcadius to be another Pompey or barracks emperor.[54]

Darius is the lone possible overlap with Biblical exempla, appearing as he does in e.g. *Daniel* 6, which is probably the source of Athanasius' invocation of the same Persian king

[49] Syn. *De reg.* 7.3; compare this untroubled depiction with Nazianzen's discussion of the gods in Chapter 2 below. For Hermes in the likeness of a young man, see Hom. *Il.* 24.347 and *Od.* 10.278. In sculpture, Hermes can be found as an older bearded man, e.g. the marble Herm of Hermes in the J. Paul Getty Museum (object 79.AA.132 [https://www.getty.edu/art/collection/object/103TQG]), thought to be an imperial copy of the now-lost Hermes Propylaios by Alcamenes, or as a beardless youth, e.g. the similarly Roman marble copy of a Polyclitus Hermes in the New York Metropolitan Museum of Art (accession number: 56.234.15 [https://www.metmuseum.org/art/collection/search/254925]); see also Buitron (1977).
[50] Syn. *De reg.* 8.5, 9.1–5, 11.4, 17.4, 25.5–6, 26.1. See also 9.1–9.5 on beneficence; and 8.5 on the deity's desire for earthly things to mimic those of heaven. Compare Jul. *Or.* 2, 100d–101a.
[51] Syn. *De reg.* 13.6.
[52] Syn. *De reg.* 12.2
[53] Syn. *De reg.* 17.7–8; see also Naz. *Or.* 4.71.
[54] Syn. *De reg.* 20.4 (slave revolt and Pompey); 16.3–17.1 (barracks emperors).

in order to criticize flatterers and slanderers at court.[55] But while silver-tongued courtiers earn Synesius' ire, it is not for this that he invokes Darius against the Arcadian milieu; he appears merely as a ruler of proverbial wealth, almost as an historical Midas.[56] Thus, that point seems less likely to be Scriptural and more likely to have been drawn from Herodotus, whom Synesius explicitly quotes in the section on the "Scythians" (Goths), and on whom he may rely elsewhere without indicating as much.[57]

Synesius, it seems, is addressing an emperor on purely civil terms, and within a conception of civil rule not coloured by any stance or even acknowledgement of the permeation of Christianity through the polity. The maintenance of order, welfare, and borders is essential, and apparently he sees little in matters of religious content to discuss.[58]

The probable answer to a puzzling reference suggests that Synesius' concern for order goes very far indeed: one of the ten or so possible pagan exempla which are found in both Nazianzen's corpus and in *De regno* must be Diocletian. Aujoulat notes this briefly, though without argument.[59] I shall pause here to try to fill in the argumentative gap in support of that conclusion, because if the identification is correct—and if the choice is

[55] Ath. *In Const.* 45.3.
[56] Syn. *De reg.* 12.1–2.
[57] Hdt. 3.89–97 has a list of the revenues allegedly collected by Darius; at the beginning he reports a Persian saying that called Darius a profit-seeking tradesman; Scythians at Syn. *De reg.* 21.1. Przhigodzkaja (2014) argues for Synesius' reliance on Herodotus, though I have only been able to read the English abstract of her Russian text.
[58] If Cameron, Long, and Sherry (1993) 107–111 are right about the date of *De regno* (early 398), then the dearth of comment on religion may be due to the fact that the edict calling for the destruction of pagan temples on a large scale (at least in rural areas) was promulgated only later in Arcadius' reign, on 10 July 399 (*CT* 16.11.1). But laws promulgated by Arcadius (and Honorius) just after the death of Theodosius in 395 made clear that Synesius' own eclectic Christianity, and his sympathies for pagan friends like Hypatia, would hardly win him much favour in Constantinople; see for instance the laws of 13 March (*CT* 16.2.25) and 3 September 395 (*CT* 16.5.28) on the classification of heretics and the curtailment of their rights. But this makes it interesting that he does not feel pressed to prove his orthodoxy by a show of Biblical exempla or Scriptural flourishes.
[59] Lamoureux and Aujoulat (2008) 148, note 101 *ad* 17.1.

knowing rather than confused—it shows just how secular a Christian's choice of exemplars could be, even as late as 398, and in words meant for a Theodosian court.

Synesius never names the man who, "having passed his youth reigning as king (ἐννεάσας τῷ βασιλεύειν), and having voluntarily renounced these toils, spent his old age as a private citizen."[60] He believes that in 16.9 he has concluded a story on Carinus, who reigned 283–285, though it seems he instead meant Probus, who reigned 276–282.[61] Immediately thereafter, he introduces a story "more recent than that one," a story he emphatically expects Arcadius to know. It involves a king who carried out espionage "on enemy ground (εἴσω τῆς πολεμίας)" by feigning a diplomatic mission.[62] Aujoulat says merely that it could be a reference to Galerius (r. 293–305 as Caesar, 305–311 as Augustus). Whether or not it is Galerius, the story should be "more recent" than 282 at the very earliest *terminus post quem*, and, if Synesius were to have dug in his heels about his story meaning Carinus, not Probus, the reconnoitring emperor would have come after 285.

So much for the first unnamed emperor of section 17, the spy. Then Synesius comments that "at that time (τότε)" many men avoided the office of emperor on account of its extreme costs and hardships. It is at this point that, of these many, he refers to the voluntary private retiree noted above.[63] For candidates we are left with Carus (282–283), Numerian (283–284), Carinus (283–285), Diocletian (284–305), the other Tetrarchs (through 324), the Constantinians (306–363), Jovian (363–364), the Valentinianics (364–392), and the Theodosians (379–457, though we will stop at 398, when Synesius composed the text for Theodosius' son Arcadius). Not one of them retired early and

[60] Syn. *De reg.* 17.1.
[61] Syn. *De reg.* 16.7–9. Such is Aujoulat's suggestion, though in pointing to other scholars who have reached that conclusion, he also notes that Carinus' father Carus has been suggested (116, note 98, *ad* 16.7).
[62] Syn. *De reg.* 17.1.
[63] Syn. *De reg.* 17.1.

permanently other than Diocletian, famous for his zeal for growing vegetables (especially cabbages) in his retirement at Split.[64]

We are thus left with Diocletian as the only possibility for this identification. In the context of Synesius' argument that rulers should serve their subjects and not cling to power merely for power's sake, or for the sake of the pleasures it affords, we have an unambiguously positive image of Diocletian as a man doing his duty and then laying his office aside rather than abusing it. The great persecutor of the Christians reappears within a century of his death in an address by a Christian philosopher to a Christian emperor as an exemplar of good governance.

If Synesius was historically aware enough to know that his preferred civil-servant monarch was also a persecutor (as he might not have known, if, for instance, some of the information had come down to him in isolated and nameless anecdotes), he apparently felt able to isolate the man's achievements from his failures and even injustices towards a group with whom Synesius would have identified strongly. If so, then we cannot generalise Chambers's assessment of Themistius as representative of Greek philosophical oratory in proposing perfectly air-brushed exemplars for imitation, as opposed to the earthier Latins, able to isolate imitable traits in individuals with notable vices. For all Synesius' Christianity and concern with philosophical ideals, perhaps he noticed something admirable in Diocletian.

Alternatively, perhaps Synesius is being provocative here. Urging a Nicene orthodox Christian persecutor of pagans and Christian heretics to 'be more like Diocletian' without mention of his vices is not unlike what we will see of Julian's sarcastic praise for

[64] Maximian duly stepped down as Augustus in 305, but bore retirement poorly, and made several attempts to usurp the title for himself, culminating in his forced suicide in 310; see *Epitome de Caesaribus* 40.5. On Diocletian and the cabbages, see *Epitome de Caesaribus* 39, esp. 39.6.

Constantius.[65] For now, let us note that for Synesius, Diocletian is an emperor to be imitated, a standard to which Arcadius' rule ought still to rise.

The Cappadocians and Julian

A close comparison of exemplars used by our four principal authors will follow in Chapters 2 through 4 of this study, so I will mostly skirt the details of particular exempla here. Nonetheless, it will be worth highlighting some broad tendencies in preferred source categories before we proceed.

Gregory of Nazianzus

Demoen has shown that 70% of pagan exempla in Nazianzen's corpus are concentrated in a small set of four orations, of which *Orationes* 4 and 5 unsurprisingly are two—and they alone account for 50%. Twenty orations are entirely without pagan exempla; Biblical exempla, meanwhile, are found in all orations.[66] For the most part, then, while perfectly capable of using pagan exempla, he does so with restraint, and seems to require a good reason—such as a paganizing emperor, or a traditionally educated, literature-loving Christian friend—to deploy secular exempla in a sustained barrage of the sort we see in *Orationes* 4 and 5. A tally of Demoen's inventories shows that pagan and Biblical exempla are used in the invective orations at a ratio of more than 2 to 1, with 121 pagan to 50 Biblical exempla in *Oratio* 4 (71%), and 53 pagan to 26 Biblical exempla in

[65] See Coda to Chapter 3 below, 178.
[66] The others are *Orationes* 39 and 43. Cf. Demoen (1996) 74.

Oratio 5 (67%), for a total of 70% across both orations.[67] Drawing Demoen's finest-toothed comb across the material, I find the following:[68]

	***Or.* 4**	***Or.* 5**	***Or.* 8**	***Or.* 43**
BH	29.4%	31.6%	100%	69.2%
BP	0.6%	1.3%	-	2.3%
PH	27.1%	12.7%	-	10.0%
PM	41.2%	54.4%	-	18.5%
PL	1.2%	-	-	-
PV	-	-	-	-
CH	0.6%	-	-	-

Already from Demoen's figures we can see that pagan mythology has a commanding lead in both invective orations (*Orationes* 4 and 5) over all other categories; *Oratio* 43 and especially *Oratio* 8 are lopsided in the other direction. Let us look more closely at each of these, applying our narrower divisions of Biblical and secular history.

Orationes 4 and 5: Of Biblical exempla in *Oratio* 4, three quarters are drawn from the Old Testament; the figure rises to almost nine tenths in *Oratio* 5. The top periods of choice in *Oratio* 4 are the Exodus from Egypt (18 exempla), the Gospels (10), and the period in the Promised Land from Joshua through *Judges* (6). In *Oratio* 5, the divided kingdom (8) has more than double any other period (it is followed by the Exodus and the Babylonian Exile, each with 4). Perhaps at the climax of Gregory's two-part attack the grand, kingdom-swallowing scale of Old Testament narratives suit his purposes in dancing on an emperor's grave better than would the relatively local and less overtly political stories from the Gospels and *Acts*.

The top sub-groups for *Oratio* 4's pagan exempla are gods or other non-human mythological figures (45), demigods and heroes (25), and in a tie for third place, classical

[67] Based on lists in Inventory 1, Demoen (1996) 361–364.
[68] For his classifications, see above, 25–26.

Athens and archaic Greece (15 each). The priorities in *Oratio* 5 track closely with this: gods (25) and heroes (18) lead the way, before a steep drop to archaic Greece (4). Roman exempla are notable for their almost total absence. A certain Scipio—likely one of the Africani, since this Scipio is named in a martial context alongside Epaminondas for displays of endurance (καρτερία) imitated by Julian on campaign—is the sole Roman exemplar invoked in *Oratio* 4 who was not also a persecutor of Christians. Moreover, of these Roman persecutors, Diocletian is the earliest mentioned.[69] The only exemplum of any origin to interrupt this historical gulf of some four centuries is an anecdote about the Stoic philosopher Epictetus, who, although a sometime resident of Rome, only flourished as a philosopher after returning to the Greek world.[70] *Oratio* 5 contributes four more Romans, all of whom are emperors on military campaign.[71] The historical thinness of *Oratio* 5's exempla may indeed be a result, as Bernardi suggests, of a sudden change in Gregory's priorities and a corresponding haste in composition.[72] But certainly the overwhelming interest in mythology and theology is consistent with *Oratio* 4, as is the relative lack of interest in, and perhaps knowledge of, the Latin part of the Mediterranean at almost any stage of its history.

Oratio 8: Nothing pagan can be pinned to Gorgonia. All of this funeral oration's nine exempla are Biblical. Six are from the Old Testament, three from the New. Most of the former are from *Genesis*: two from the story of the Fall, three from the story of Abraham.

[69] *Or.* 4.71 for Scipio, 4.96 for the persecutors, all of whom are of the Tetrarchate. It seems likely that Nazianzen is referring to the Scipio whom Plutarch pairs with Epaminondas. That pair of *Parallel Lives*, however, is lost, as is a standalone biography of 'Scipio' by Plutarch, so a more precise identification will be tentative. Herbert (1957) surveys the debate and argues at least for the parallel *Life* being that of Scipio Minor. Introducing fragments of the lost *Lives*, the Loeb editor follows earlier scholars in cautiously preferring Scipio Maior, but he also cites the Nazianzen locus in support of this, where it does not seem to me that there is enough evidence to do so; see the introduction in Sandbach (1969) 74–5. Plutarch knows of Scipio Metellus, but presents him as rash, stubborn, and inept in command: *Cat. Min.* 58.
[70] *Or.* 4.70.
[71] Naz. *Or.* 5.8.
[72] Bernardi (1983) 33 sqq.

The last is Job, an important but oblique figure who does not fit easily into any timeline of salvation history. In commemorating his sister, Gregory draws on nothing from the family of Jacob/Israel, the wandering in the desert, the anarchy, monarchy, captivity, restoration, or Hellenic occupation. Jesus and his ministry (including two women whom he healed in different ways) account for all New Testament exempla—nothing from Paul or *Acts*.

Oratio 43: In pagan source material, gods and other non-human beings (12 exempla) lead the way, but are nearly matched by demigods and heroes (11). The historical category with the most exempla is classical but non-Athenian (4). Rome contributes nothing. Biblical preferences in this oration are overwhelmingly for the Gospels (21), the Exodus (19), the patriarchs (14), and the undivided kingdom (12). The divided kingdom (9) and Genesis prior to Abraham (8) are moderate contributors; no other Biblical period offers more than 3.

Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, and Julian

Neither Basil nor Gregory of Nyssa uses any pagan exempla in these orations. Basil's exempla in the oration for Gordius are few, but the Gospels predominate (5 exempla). The Exodus follows with just two, and no other period has more than one. Commemorating the Forty Martyrs of Sebaste, the Gospels and *Acts* are equal contributors (3 each), and the patriarchs offer 1. On the other hand, Basil is a good illustration of a limitation to numerical analysis: in the opening of the relatively exemplum-poor oration for Gordius he gives an eloquent and succinct articulation of the exemplarist ethos and the importance of looking to great figures from the past.[73]

[73] Bas. *In Gordium* 31.492. Similarly, exempla are few in Pliny's *Panegyricus*, but the exemplarism is heavy-handed; see above, 26, note 16.

Basil's brother Gregory is a bit more adventurous in volume, but has similar preferences. Eulogizing Basil, Nyssen draws mostly on *Acts* (14) and the Gospels (11). The divided kingdom (9) and the Exodus (7) are next. For Meletius, the priorities appear to change somewhat. The undivided kingdom (9) takes the lead, followed closely by the Gospels (8) and the Exodus (7).

Julian's interests in *Oratio* 1 could not be more different from those of his Cappadocian coursemates. He uses no discernible Biblical exempla at all. If we exclude figures from the Constantinian dynasty and their rivals, the largest group of exempla come from the Achaemenids (16 exempla). Figures from Tetrarchan history (9) follow, and then classical Athens (8). Figures from all other periods of pre-Imperial Greek history or from outside Athens together account for 10. In contrast to *Oratio* 2, which I have not analysed here, the mythical material in *Oratio* 1 is quite subdued. To understand the prevalence of Persian exempla, however, we need to be especially careful with Julian's texts for Constantius.[74]

Conclusion

This tour of fourth-century oratorical exempla allows us to make a few observations about our authors' preferences, at least in the texts here examined; for a synopsis in tabular form, see the Appendix to this chapter, Tables 6 and 7.[75] In the Biblical material, Synesius excepted, there are striking overlaps. Athanasius and Lucifer have the exact same top three preference periods for exempla from Biblical history: first the divided kingdom, then the Gospels, then the undivided kingdom. These two zealots of the Nicene cause seem to have

[74] See Coda to Chapter 3, 178.
[75] See below, 54.

read the imperial church politics of their times largely through the books of *Samuel*, *Kings*, and *Chronicles*. Hilary agrees in prizing the Gospels as a source of exempla, even taking them in the first place, but his Old Testament points of reference are the exile in Babylon and the Maccabean revolt.

What of our four principal authors? The brothers Basil and Nyssen also have the same top three: the Gospels, *Acts*, and the Exodus from Egypt. Nazianzen gently disrupts this solid bid for Cappadocian unanimity with a heightened interest in the Exodus above all, a slight demotion of the Gospels, and a promotion of the patriarchate from Abraham to Joseph in third place. Like Synesius, Julian has nothing Biblical to add in these orations.

Pagan material is less consistent, with a few exceptions. Lucifer, Basil, and Nyssen give us nothing; from Hilary we have only Roman persecutors. To an extent Athanasius' tendencies coincide with Hilary's, but Athanasius refers first to gods, next to Archaic matter, and then to persecutors. Synesius draws first on classical Athens, then classical but non-Athenian Greece, and finally the barracks emperors through the Tetrarchate. For Nazianzen, it is gods, heroes, and Athens. Julian's points of reference are the Achaemenids, the Tetrarchate, and Athens. These exemplarist findings confirm the impression that the legacy of classical Athenian culture dominated the late ancient literary imagination.

Some caveats bear repeating. I have carried out this detailed analysis on a relatively small scale. Such emergent patterns as I have begun to establish would need to be pursued throughout the rest of the corpora. For instance, adding *Oratio* 2 to Julian's set would immediately boost the share of mythological material substantially, perhaps enough to upset some of the findings here. Nonetheless, there is reason to believe that concordant data from friends, brothers, and allies in the doctrinal wars of the fourth century are not

flukes; shared public crises draw out responses that reflect shared ways of reading the signs of the times through a common hermeneutic of the Scriptural and cultural canons. Sometimes the crises reveal what look like deliberate differences of tactic, such as when Lucifer proves consistently abstemious around pagan matter while Nazianzen moves carefully between that line and a florid barrage of secular exempla.

Significant lacunae in source periods for historical exempla have also emerged in our Christian authors. Nazianzen's interest in history, for instance, seems patchy and mostly confined to the Greek world. We have seen references—often to Persians, an existential interest in the fourth-century east—that suggest a reading of Herodotus, Xenophon, or both. Yet the thread, for Nazianzen, peters out in the Hellenistic age, excepting a few Roman emperors, mostly relevant as persecutors of Christians or famed for military campaigns in the East, and the occasional odd philosopher. If Nazianzen and others in fact knew something about the intervening period, they may have avoided dwelling on it out of a 'high-brow' literary taste for material related to pre-Hellenistic Greece.[76] But another hypothesis is that the study of history in general played no significant part in the rhetorical and philosophical education that Nazianzen and his peers enjoyed at Caesarea, Alexandria, Athens, and elsewhere, and that historical information was transmitted incidentally as material for rhetorical topoi or progymnasmata. Yet Julian's knowledge of the emperors, as evident in his *Caesares*, is thorough. How much of it did he acquire while cooped up with private tutors at *Fundus Macelli*, a stone's throw from where his future Christian opponents were learning their *ΑΒΓ*'s at Caesarea and Nazianzus? Did it belong to a private royal curriculum? Or did it merely reflect his own familial and ultimately vocational

[76] This hypothesis was suggested by Prof. Gregory Hutchinson.

interests, whereas non-devotional, pre-Tetrarchan imperial history could hardly excite men of the Church for whom the true empire began with Constantine?

These are questions which, although opened by the documentation of exemplum usage that I have presented here, take us well beyond the scope of this study. In the next chapter, however, we will delve into the grammatical and rhetorical education in which all of our authors passed many years of their lives. There we will see how the sorts of techniques that students practised on a daily basis laid the groundwork for their careers as practitioners of exemplarism.

Appendix to Chapter 1

Table 1. Volume and density of exempla in selected texts.

	Approximate volume of exempla	**Density (exempla per thousand words)**
Athanasius		
Historia Arianorum	108	5.8
Contra gentes	131	7.2
De incarnatione Verbi	85	4.2
Synesius		
De Regno	37	4.0
Hilary of Poitiers		
In Constantium	21	4.6
Lucifer of Cagliari		
De non conveniendo cum haereticis	7	0.8
De regibus apostaticis	14	1.6
De sancto Athanasio I	15	0.7
De sancto Athanasio II	6	0.4
De non parcendo in Deum delinquentibus	38	1.8
Moriundum esse pro Dei filio	8	0.9
Gregory of Nazianzus		
Oratio 4 (Contra Julianum)	170	9.0
Oratio 5 (Contra Julianum)	79	10.1
Oratio 8 (In Gorgoniam)	9	2.0
Oratio 43 (In Basilium)	130	7.2
Basil of Caesarea		
In Gordium	13	4.0
In XL Martyres	8	2.8
Gregory of Nyssa		
In Basilium	52	8.3
In Meletium	40	16.2
Julian		
Oration 1	51	4.2

Table 2. Nazianzen's orations ranked by exemplum volume and density.

Rank	By absolute count of exempla	By density of exempla
1	Or. 4	Or. 13
2	Or. 43	Or. 39
3	Or. 5	Or. 38
4	Or. 40	Or. 10
5	Or. 45	Or. 36
6	Or. 39	Or. 5
7	Or. 28	Or. 41
8	Or. 14	Or. 45
9	Or. 2	Or. 12
10	Or. 21	Or. 4
11	Or. 32	Or. 11
12	Or. 38	Or. 27
13	Or. 41	Or. 28
14	Or. 18	Or. 33
15	Or. 36	Or. 43
16	Or. 33	Or. 32
17	Or. 16	Or. 14
18	Or. 29	Or. 21
19	Or. 24	Or. 24
20	Or. 06	Or. 34
21	Or. 42	Or. 15
22	Or. 7	Or. 19
23	Or. 15	Or. 40
24	Or. 19	Or. 9
25	Or. 25	Or. 16
26	Or. 27	Or. 44
27	Or. 26	Or. 29
28	Or. 37	Or. 20
29	Or. 31	Or. 25
30	Or. 13	Or. 26
31	Or. 34	Or. 6
32	Or. 11	Or. 42
33	Or. 44	Or. 18
34	Or. 20	Or. 7
35	Or. 22	Or. 37
36	Or. 12	Or. 22
37	Or. 10	Or. 2
38	Or. 8	Or. 31
39	Or. 1	Or. 8
40	Or. 9	Or. 3
41	Or. 17	Or. 17
42	Or. 23	Or. 23
43	Or. 3	Or. 1
44	Or. 30	Or. 30

Table 3. Nazianzen's orations: conventional order, with exemplum volume & density.

Work	Exempla counted	Oration word count (1000s)	Density (exempla per 1000 words)
Or. 1	9	8.380	1.1
Or. 2	50	15.878	3.1
Or. 3	2	1.039	1.9
Or. 4	168	18.815	8.5
Or. 5	79	7.853	10.1
Or. 6	22	4.967	4.4
Or. 7	21	5.554	3.8
Or. 8	9	4.443	2.0
Or. 9	7	1.199	5.8
Or. 10	9	0.797	11.3
Or. 11	14	1.596	8.8
Or. 12	11	1.199	9.2
Or. 13	15	0.628	23.9
Or. 14	58	8.521	6.8
Or. 15	20	3.200	6.3
Or. 16	27	4.672	5.8
Or. 17	4	2.644	1.5
Or. 18	36	9.514	3.8
Or. 19	20	3.263	6.1
Or. 20	12	2.444	4.9
Or. 21	48	7.249	6.6
Or. 22	12	3.504	3.4
Or. 23	3	2.700	1.1
Or. 24	24	3.720	6.5
Or. 25	20	4.357	4.6
Or. 26	18	4.048	4.4
Or. 27	18	2.090	8.6
Or. 28	60	7.426	8.1
Or. 29	26	4.904	5.3
Or. 30	2	4.942	0.4
Or. 31	16	6.274	2.6
Or. 32	45	6.582	6.8
Or. 33	27	3.426	7.9
Or. 34	15	2.375	6.3
Or. 36	28	2.600	10.8
Or. 37	16	4.313	3.7
Or. 38	43	3.512	12.2
Or. 39	63	3.942	16.0
Or. 40	66	10.790	6.1
Or. 41	36	3.711	9.7
Or. 42	22	5.758	3.8
Or. 43	130	17.995	7.2
Or. 44	12	2.194	5.5
Or. 45	64	6.721	9.5

Table 4. Origins of exempla in selected texts.

	Percentage non-Biblical or non-Christian	Percentage Biblical or Christian	Total count of exempla
Athanasius			
Historia Arianorum	9%	91%	108
Contra Gentes	66%	34%	131
De incarnatione Verbi	15%	85%	85
Synesius			
De regno	95%	5%	37
Hilary of Poitiers			
In Constantium	24%	76%	21
Lucifer of Cagliari			
De non conveniendo cum haereticis	-	100%	7
De regibus apostaticis	-	100%	14
De sancto Athanasio I	-	100%	15
De sancto Athanasio II	-	100%	6
De non parcendo in Deum delinquentibus	-	100%	38
Moriundum esse pro Dei filio	-	100%	8
Gregory of Nazianzen			
Or. 4	69%	31%	170
Or. 5	67%	33%	79
Or. 8	-	100%	14
Or. 43	28%	72%	130
Basil of Caesarea			
In Gordium	-	100%	13
In XL martyres	-	100%	8
Gregory of Nyssa			
In Basilium	-	100%	52
In Meletium	-	100%	40
Julian			
Or. 1	100%	-	51

Table 5. Exempla in Naz. *Or.* 4 and *Or.* 5 by source.

Source	***Or.* 4**	***Or.* 5**
All gods, demigods, mythical figures & places	41.2%	54.4%
Humans (demigods included)	*14.7%*	*22.8%*
Gods and all other beings	*26.5%*	*31.6%*
Archaic Greece	8.8%	5.1%
Persians (Achaemenids)	0.0%	2.5%
Classical Greece	10.6%	0.0%
Athens	*8.8%*	*0.0%*
Elsewhere	*1.8%*	*0.0%*
Macedonians (including Alexander)	0.6%	0.0%
Hellenistic age	4.1%	0.0%
Early/mythic Rome	0.0%	0.0%
Republican Rome	0.6%	0.0%
1st-century B.C. Rome ('Roman Revolution')	0.0%	0.0%
Empire, Tiberius to Nerva	0.6%	0.0%
Trajan through Antonines	0.0%	2.5%
Third century through Tetrarchy	1.8%	2.5%
Biblical history	29.4%	32.9%
Old Testament	*21.8%*	*29.1%*
New Testament	*7.6%*	*3.8%*
Christian history	0.0%	0.0%
Post-NT, pre-Constantinian	*0.0%*	*0.0%*
Constantine and later	*0.0%*	*0.0%*

Table 6. Preferred Biblical-historical periods as sources of exempla in the texts considered in Chapter 1.

Author	1st preferred Biblical exemplar source period	2nd preferred Biblical exemplar source period	3rd preferred Biblical exemplar source period
Nazianzen	Exodus	Gospels	Patriarchate
Basil	Gospels	Acts	Exodus
Nyssen	Gospels	Acts	Exodus
Julian	–	–	–
Athanasius	Divided kingdom	Gospels	Undivided kingdom
Lucifer	Divided kingdom	Gospels	Undivided kingdom
Hilary	Gospels	Babylonian Exile	Maccabean revolt
Synesius	–	–	–

Table 7. Preferred 'secular' (non-Judaeo-Christian mythical/historical) periods as sources of exempla in the texts considered in Chapter 1.

Author	1st preferred secular exemplar source period	2nd preferred secular exemplar source period	3rd preferred secular exemplar source period
Nazianzen	Pagan gods	Mythical heroes	Classical Athens
Basil	–	–	–
Nyssen	–	–	–
Julian	Achaemenids	Tetrarchate	Classical Athens
Athanasius	Pagan gods	Archaic Greece	Roman persecutors
Lucifer	–	–	–
Hilary	Roman persecutors	–	–
Synesius	Classical Athens	Classical Greece (non-Athens)	Barracks emperors

Chapter 2
The Gods and Heroes of *Paideia*

Einen zu bereichern, unter allen,
Mußte diese Götterwelt vergehn.

For One alone of all the gods to gain,
This god-filled world was forced to fade away.

Friedrich Schiller, "Die Götter Griechenlandes" (1788)

Οὐ δὴ δίκαιον ἐπαινεῖν μὲν αὐτούς [sc. τοὺς ἥρωας], μὴ μιμεῖσθαι δέ.

It is wrong to praise heroes without imitating them.

Jul. Or. 8, 250ab (ca. 358)

In Chapter 1, we looked at a cross-section of fourth-century authors whose writings varied widely in the volume, density, and sources of the exemplars they contain. I begin this chapter with an account of the educational culture in which these authors participated from earliest childhood and throughout their lives. I consider both handbooks and recent papyrological research, paying particular attention to imitation, rivalry, and other aspects of the curriculum that have implications for exemplarism. There follows an investigation that will be extended over the next three chapters: an examination of the way Nazianzen used his exemplars—divine, heroic, historical, Scriptural, or otherwise—as compared primarily to his Cappadocian Christian peers, and secondarily to his hated erstwhile imperial coursemate. This chapter's contribution to that project focusses on pagan gods and heroes, and includes a look at Homer, their singer.

In documenting and analysing the appearances and uses of more than sixty exemplars over four corpora, I am contributing a new approach to the study of exemplarism in

antiquity.[1] Here and in Chapters 3 and 4, I use two different basic methods, sometimes separately and sometimes applied in tandem. Both involve the documentation of pairings between an exemplary person and his or her noteworthy characteristics. By these characteristics, I mean virtues or vices, virtuous or vicious actions, or else beneficial or harmful circumstantial qualities. Virtues and vices being the predominant focus, for brevity I call all such positive marks 'virtues' and all such negative ones 'vices,' even when these would not meet the strict definition of (for instance) Aristotle.[2] Items printed in boldface are the virtues or vices used for analysis.

The first method, which I term the 'catalogue method' of exemplar analysis, begins with what I call 'exemplar catalogues'. These are passages which present lists of exemplars, to each of whom is attributed one or more relatively distinctive virtues or vices. I say 'relatively' because a single virtue or vice is often shared by multiple persons.[3] The catalogue method starts from one or more such passages, which then serve to establish the headwords of the comparative inquiry that follows. That comparative effort proceeds by attempting to corroborate the pairings established in the initial catalogue or catalogues. For instance, if Nazianzen thinks Achilles is a paragon of wrath, Odysseus of eloquence, and so on, I start by looking for uses of Achilles in Basil, Nyssen, and Julian until I find, in each author, a wrathful Achilles. At its purest and most minimal, this is what the catalogue method shows: whether a trait identified by one author as special enough to make it into a concise list of exemplars as someone's defining feature can *also* be found associated with the same exemplar in another author. This minimal version I call

[1] See especially Langlands (2018) and Roller (2018), as discussed in the Introduction.
[2] "Virtue, then, is a state that decides, consisting in a mean, the mean relative to us, which is defined by reference to reason, that is to say, to the reason by reference to which the prudent person would define it (ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὡρισμένῃ λόγῳ καὶ ᾧ ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν)," Arist. *Eth. Nic.* II, 6, 1106b36–1107a2 (trans. Irwin).
[3] Some lists even take a single characteristic as a headword and then record multiple instantiating exemplars beneath it. In Chapter 4, we will examine Naz. *Oratio* 14's collation of many such virtue lists into a single overarching catalogue.

corroborative. It can detect sharp divergences of reception, as when one author believes some trait is essential to an exemplar, but when that exemplar appears in another author, the trait is nowhere to be found. Taking multiple catalogues as starting points can reveal further nuances. Where one figure appears in multiple authors' catalogues, but shows different traits (whether or not these are corroborated in the corpora beyond the catalogue), we may have grounds for asking whether the differences reflect authorial preoccupation, the dictates of an occasional composition, or some other cause.

Often, however, I put flesh on the bones of the catalogue method in a hybrid with my second approach, which I call the 'exhaustive method' of exemplar analysis. In its purest form, the exhaustive method does what it says: it finds all exemplarist, virtue-associative uses of a given exemplar in each author's corpus. When repeated for several authors' corpora, the character's consistency both within each author and across the authorial set can be analysed thoroughly.

The exhaustive method is the approach that I favour in all cases, but it is necessary when there is no catalogue to hand for the exemplars whom I wish to examine. In those cases, I justify my selection on other grounds, and then apply the exhaustive method to some or all of the authors. Here and in Chapters 3 and 4, I note when my searches are less than exhaustive.

While I have read a number of texts carefully, my methods are reliant on analyses of as much of the corpora as possible, a scale that has required me to use digital searches for the names in question. This is easier for some corpora than others, and for some digitised texts than others.

On the other hand, where I find these exemplars, I do pay closer attention to virtues and vices and their associations with exemplary persons than Demoen does, both in

Nazianzen and in the others; where his tables specify anything other than a name and a locus, it is generally a keyword that refers to the incident shaping the *exempla*, the story, in question, rather than the virtues or vices shaping the *character*, the *exemplar*, in question.

Such is my approach to the Cappadocians' uses of the gods and heroes. For the gods, I pay minimal attention to Julian, whose reformed neo-pagan theology is on the one hand straightforwardly positive in its characterization of the gods, and on the other hand esoteric and baroque in its account of their natures, interrelations, and activity in the world.[4] Then I apply the methods for all our authors to Homer and four heroes: Heracles, Agamemnon, Achilles, and Odysseus. For both gods and heroes, running analyses will flag differences in representation across our authors. Numerical data at the end of each section and at the close of the chapter give some shape to trends that emerge from this discussion. While the exercise that begins here and extends through Chapter 4 is incomplete in taking only a selection of such exemplars, and is not sensitive enough to catch all potentially exemplarist allusions, nonetheless it is the most thorough such exercise that has been undertaken.

This chapter demonstrates a connection between the early education and the mature cultural aspirations of Christian exemplarists who have in some way to deal with a stock of pagan exemplars present both in their minds and in the culture around them—represented in part by the alarming career and haunting legacy of Julian. In showing what these men did with gods and mythical heroes, this chapter also lays the groundwork for Chapter 3, where we will see how pagan historical figures fared, and for Chapter 4, where we treat a number of Scriptural greats.

First, however, we must head back to school.

[4] See Smith (1995).

Paideia

A fourth-century culture war[5]

Παιδεία, education and high or literary culture, was a point of friction in the fourth century, as Christians so grew in numbers and influence in the Roman empire that polytheists assumed, for the first time, a subordinate status. Amongst the questions facing educated persons was how Christians were to engage with their non-Christian cultural patrimony. Already around the turn of the third century, polar positions within the Christian camp had been traced by the abstemious Tertullian (Christians ought to stay away from pagan education and culture, since these have nothing to do with divine revelation) and the inclusivist Clement of Alexandria (Christians have a great deal to gain from pagan education and culture, in part because these are themselves derived from divine revelation).[6] Even then, the minimalist position of a Tertullian—a sceptical view doubtless coloured by an abhorrence for classical education's polytheistic elements and sophistical, seemingly truth-indifferent methods—contained a tension in that the very critique was enabled by and articulated using the tools, content, and other benefits of a traditional education.[7] These tensions are found in and amongst Christian writers after the accession of Constantine, too.[8]

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[5] Analogies with both post-1980s America and the Bismarckian *Reich* strike me as apt: one faction or another, sometimes in alternation, attaches a very high social cost, usually short of state-sanctioned violence, to basic commitments of an opposed faction. The term is used unironically by McLynn (2014) 130.
[6] Rappe (2001) 409. For poetry and the antiquarian elements of education as flashpoints of conflict, as opposed to historiography of contemporary events or of the recent past, see also Momigliano (1963) 98–99.
[7] This included the comparative denigration of certain pagan exemplars: Rappe (2001) 409.
[8] Jaeger (1962) goes on to trace a hypothesis of continuity, from apostolic encounters in first-century Athens through the Cappadocians and especially through Gregory of Nyssa (12); Pelikan (1993) 11–12 nuances this somewhat and highlights more frictions, but in his prefatory remarks still leans more towards the maximalist side of the interpretation of Cappadocian activity than Lemerle (1971) 44–45, who rightly considers the tradition of reading Basil as a humanist or even cut from Clement's cloth to be an "étrange erreur." The optimistic reading can be found as recently as Stenger (2022) 81, where Basil's educational treatise is "an unprejudiced defence of classical literature." On the other hand, as Rappe (2001) 412 points out, and as I will suggest below, he is using a technique of the pagan philosophers to carry out that defence, and in that sense his activity may be understood as standing in a kind of continuity with other elements of earlier *paideia*.

Setting aside outright persecutions (which ended by 313) and general pagan disapprobation (starting from Paul's Greeks, who saw Christianity as "foolishness"[9]), the most notable anti-Christian initiatives in the fourth century came from Emperor Julian. Some of these took the form of divestment and re-allocation of funds, or Christian-irking projects like the reconstruction of the Temple in Jerusalem, but the most famous was the law on Christian teachers.[10]

Julian's law on schools of 17 June 362 implies that he would wish to scrutinise candidates for teaching roles personally and says that, since he cannot be everywhere, municipal authorities are to assume responsibility for the interviewing and selection of local teachers.[11] It does not explicitly mention Christians. A letter written from Ancyra sometime later does show an open concern for keeping Christians out of the teaching profession.[12] This subsequent letter has often been understood as a rescript or explanatory comment on the purpose of the law. McLynn (2014) has argued that the law and the rescript may not be related, and in any case that they are best understood as responses to local and particular circumstances (such as petitions by resentful rival teachers at Ancyra), even if both documents, or at least the law, subsequently did have an empire-wide reception.[13] McLynn further suggests that the rescript's Christian-facing dilemma was not meant to compel them by force of law, and that the two known victims of the law, Prohaeresius and Victorinus, were more or less cornered into voluntary resignations due to their reputations and politics in a way that the vast majority of Christian teachers simply

[9] *1 Corinthians* 1:23: μωρία.
[10] For an assessment of a number of Julian's policies as being intentionally anti-Christian, see Cochrane (1939) 289.
[11] *Codex Theodosianus* 13.3.5: *Magistros studiorum doctoresque excellere oportet moribus primum, deinde facundia. sed quia singulis civitatibus adesse ipse non possum, iubeo, quisque docere vult, non repente nec temere prosiliat ad hoc munus, sed iudicio ordinis probatus decretum curialium mereatur optimorum conspirante consensu. hoc enim decretum ad me tractandum referetur, ut altiore quodam honore nostro iudicio studiis civitatum accedant.*
[12] Jul. *Ep*. 36.
[13] McLynn (2014) 121–126, 129; cf. Teitler (2014) 78–79, esp. note 4.

could not have been. But even if we accept each of these conclusiosn, it is clear, as McLynn himself holds, that Julian's measures were calculated to make life uncomfortable for Christians both by heightening internal ecclesial tensions and by giving pagans imperial sanction to exert discriminatory pressures at the local level.[14]

Whatever Julian's legal measures were, then, it is clear that he did not want Christians teaching classics. The rescript gives several reasons for this position. First, however, he articulates an educational ideal that, formally stated, would have been perfectly acceptable, as far as it went, to Julian's Christian contemporaries: namely that the goal of education is above all a true understanding of good and evil, and at best secondarily any kind of technical expertise. The character of the teacher and his relation to his subject matter is important. If he does not believe what he is teaching, he is not an honest man (ἀπολελεῖφθαι . . . δοκεῖ . . . τοῦ χηρστὸς ἀνὴρ εἶναι). This is bad enough if the matter being taught is relatively trivial, but it becomes grave in proportion to the importance of the subject. Teachers of grammar, rhetoric, and ethics ("sophists") must be of the highest virtue given their influence on the young.

So far, again, there is nothing that a Christian educationist of the day (nor likely at any point since) would take issue with here.[15] But then Julian argues that Christians immediately compromise themselves when teaching works by pagans such as Homer, Hesiod, Demosthenes, or Thucydides. Julian makes the following claims more or less explicitly: (1) such knowledge as these authors had was revealed to them by the gods, and (2) these authors believed themselves to be sacred to the gods. Clearly, anyone who rejects the gods is unable to teach texts featuring those gods, or authors who believed in them, or

[14] McLynn (2014) 131–134.
[15] Cribiore (2013) has pointed out that the law itself was also probably only novel in the suggestion that if possible the emperor should be the one interviewing candidates. Cf. Hughes (2018).

the liberal arts which rely on such texts as raw material for instruction. "I find it strange," writes Julian, "that the interpreters of these men's works should pay no honour to the gods revered by their authors."[16] For Julian, any lesson involving gods whom a teacher rejects will transmit a scepticism deleterious to the religion and character of students who follow those gods. The gods, however, seem to be involved no matter how peripheral they may be to a text: consider Thucydides' place in Julian's list. This is surely almost as striking as it would be for a similarly nostalgic reformer to insist today that only Christians teach Chaucer, Hobbes, Gibbon, or Austen. It seems that the pagan canon which Julian wanted to protect from Christian teachers could be demarcated by a non-textual presumption of piety in the extra-literary life of an author. Julian's offer is for Christians—still not named as such, and identified elsewhere in the letter only as provincial 'Galilaeans'—to continue teaching, but only after a *de facto* renunciation of Christianity and a pagan *auto-da-fé*. If they cannot make such a recantation or profession, Christian teachers must cease teaching on the basis of traditional texts, and instead "head on down to the churches of the Galilaeans and lecture on (ἐξηγησόμενοι) Matthew and Luke." Julian closes with the stipulation that students be admitted to schools regardless of background, and shows ambivalence concerning what sorts of subtle pressures may or may not be used to cure non-pagan students of "this sort of disease (τῆς τοιαύτης νόσου)."[17]

This enraged Nazianzen, so much so that it seems to have been a primary motivation in his polemics against Julian. His first invective is framed as a defence of the universality of the λόγος, which Gregory interpreted capaciously enough to include everything from the second person of the Trinity to the arts of language, access to which Julian would

[16] Jul. *Ep.* 36, 423a: ἄτοπον μὲν οὖν οἶμαι τοὺς ἐξηγουμένους τὰ τούτων ἀτιμάζειν τοὺς ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν τιμηθέντας θεούς.
[17] Jul. *Ep.* 36, 423d–424a.

restrict.[18] There are over 130 uses of λόγος (in any case and number), of a total of about 250 instances of -λογ- (not counting instances of -λεγ- or other forms) in *Oratio* 4 alone.[19] His main line of attack is that it amounts to a kind of genetic fallacy to claim that only those who discover an art have the right to use it. His concern is not first and foremost the ability to talk about the gods; rather, the literature saturated with mythological material was so standard and so pervasive in the technical liberal arts education that the mastery of rhetoric and poetics would scarcely be thinkable without it. If you would use origins to restrict the teaching of Greek literature to pious polytheists, you may as well restrict the teaching of the alphabet to Phoenicians, or poetry to old women who happen to blurt out hexameters when bumped in the street.[20]

Nazianzen's vocation required him to use his voice and his pen effectively in exhortation, praise, and polemic, and to analyse literature carefully (as it happens, mostly Scripture). Clearly his education prepared him for this work. To understand how it did so, and in particular how it provided him with fodder for his exemplarism, as well as the ways in which it could become a flashpoint in the pagan-Christian culture wars, we will take a brief survey of the imperial educational landscape, and especially the rhetorical terrain.

[18] E.g. Naz. *Or*. 4.4–17, 100–17. Libanius evidently made similar claims about the universal scope of λόγος and λόγοι, but Cribiore (2013) 234–235 argues that his total silence on the matter of a law concerning his profession and promulgated by an Emperor who favoured him amounts to a quiet condemnation of the law. I rather suspect that some of Libanius' silence can be accounted for by his prudent reading of the Christian writing on the wall, but the lack of comment in texts from the time of the law's promulgation to Julian's death a year later, assuming we have all relevant sources, would support Cribiore's hypothesis.
[19] For comparison, in *Orationes* 14 and 18, which combined are about the length of *Oratio* 4, show 79 uses of λόγος, out of 160 instances of -λογ- in any forms, again excluding -λεγ-.
[20] Naz. *Or*. 4.107–108. Escalating this polemical approach, at 4.107 Gregory suggests that letters were in fact probably invented by the Hebrews, not by the Phoenicians.

The exemplarist ethos of traditional education

Four elements of educational culture stand out in the literature as particularly worthy of attention for the role they will play in interpreting Nazianzen: (1) memorization, (2) imitation, (3) competition, and (4) ascent. (1) Memory was conditioned by rote training, but also by almost fugal combinations and recombinations of the elements of ordered sequences such as the alphabet or syllabary lists, sometimes by means of song or other mnemonic device. This continued at every level of education. Ultimately, the polished alumnus not only stored contents learned by drill, but also possessed an algorithmic capacity to assimilate and deploy new information by means of the well-honed arts of memory and production.[21] The absence of cheap writing materials on a large scale no doubt provided a significant motivation to practice and inculcate the mental and oral aspects of this art, but the sheer prospect of a mind with such powers must have been even more inspiring.

We have discussed the pervasiveness of (2) a mimetic or imitative ethos in both technical and moral education in the Introduction as concerns literary sources. Raffaella Cribiore's studies of educational papryi and ostraca from Hellenistic and Roman Egypt show that the imitative preoccupation was not merely a literary or theoretical one. Mimesis also shaped the daily practice of education at every stage. Pupils copied alphabets, syllabaries, gnomic statements, and excerpts of epic or tragedy which teachers had written at the top of a 'sheet' as models. Sometimes gnomic sentences were copied even when the hand makes clear to papyrologists that the writer had no comprehension of its moralistic contents. With time and the reinforcement of the inclination to admire—also presumably modelled by the teacher, who would praise great works and their heroes—

[21] Cribiore (2001a) 164–167.

learners eventually seem to have been expected to internalise their model texts' ethical content. At least two axes of imitation were thus practised here: a contemporary imitation of the teacher's technical skills, and an intertemporal imitation of the textual heroes' characters. (The contemporary imitation of the teachers' characters is a possible third.) Moreover, teachers, even if sometimes with mercenary intent, encouraged the imitation of non-scholastic, non-literary models: Isocrates' *Ad Demonicum*, with its exhortations to imitate the addressee's father, is a very popular source text for school exercises in the papyrological remains.[22]

Closely related to the ethos of the imitable model was that of (3) competition. Athletic ἀγῶνες are a recurrent analogy for the experience of learning: in the hard work and preparation required ("Be diligent! Φιλοπόνει!" runs one oft-scrawled mantra), in the glory one may enjoy as a result, and in methods of evaluation.[23] Competition, too, played out on contemporary and intertemporal axes. There were the standards set by the literary models; there were the physical instantiations of those words in the models prepared by teachers; and there were the efforts of the boy (or, perhaps more often than has been thought, the girl) at one's side to measure oneself against.[24] Plato presents the old, pre-sophistic educational formula as consisting of gymnastics and music. Whether or not the share of physical activity receded substantially over the course of the Hellenistic period, as Marrou suggests and others have since questioned, physical training remained the preferred analogy. Schoolroom activities are thought of precisely as exercises: the προγυμνάσματα, "preliminary exercises," form elements of a γυμνασία τῆς ψυχῆς,

[22] Cribiore (2001a) 132, 162, 169, 8, 106. The internalisation of ethical content was important to Quintilian: Cribiore (1996) 123.
[23] Cribiore (1996) 127–8, in which she reviews a number of tablets, exercises, and teachers' models showing this expression. She notes that φιλοπονοῦμεν is also found in a letter found at Oxyrhynchus, addressed by a son to his father to assure him of his diligence in his studies (*P.Oxy.* X.1296). The same letter is discussed by Parsons (2007) in his presentation of the education of Oxyrhynchites; see Parsons (2007) 137–158, and 141 for the letter.
[24] Cribiore (2001a) 246 (on girls); 35, 42, 72, 127–128; Webb (2001) 291.

"gymnastics of the mind." Given the incessant emphasis on character throughout, this phrase may benefit from a rendering somewhere between "mental exercise" and "training for the soul." Were it not so clunky, I might suggest "a training programme for the thinking soul."[25] Paul is another source for the language of competition, and given the acquaintance he had with Greek learning, it is very likely that his influence on Patristic agonists was itself shaped in part by his time in schoolroom conditions similar to theirs.[26]

Finally, the ethos was also one of (4) ascent. Cribiore (2001a) structures her presentation of the papryi using Lucian's image of a learner climbing a mountain, the summit of which affords a breathtaking sight, but which is reached only by a few. It is, moreover, drawn from a Hesiodic metaphor for the life of virtue.[27] She also draws out another dimension of the 'circularity' of the ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία,[28] the "educational circle" embracing all the traditional disciplines of a general education, in pointing out that it is a fundamentally recursive programme: the same authors studied in the final years for literary and rhetorical analysis are the same as those who are copied out to learn orthography. In this way, the curricular ascent is not so much a linear as a spiralling climb, or a climb through concentric circles.[29] Homer, Euripides, Menander and others are with you from start to finish, first as you acquire basic literacy, later as you learn grammar, and

[25] Γυμνασία τῆς ψυχῆς is from Isocrates; so Cribiore (2001a) 1.
[26] *Acts* 20:24, *1 Corinthians* 9:24–25, *2 Timothy* 4:7; also *Hebrews* 12:1–2, which notably follows immediately after a catalogue of faith-exemplars which we will discuss in Chapter 4. Paul's upbringing in Tarsus is likely significant: Strabo, probably writing during Paul's childhood, says that the city's passion for philosophy, rhetoric, and ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία surpasses that of Athens or Alexandria, an enthusiasm reflected in the vitality of its schools (σχολαί). This culture of learning allowed Tarsus to become a net exporter of educated men without compromising the state of its local educational institutions. Strab. *Geographica* XIV, 5.13–15.
[27] Cribiore (2001a) 1 and *passim*; 220, citing Hesiod *Op.* 287–292.
[28] The basis for the unity of these disciplines, and their character, has been debated. Hadot (2005) 293 rejects the claim by Marrou and others that the ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία consists of the seven liberal arts as they later appear in Augustine and Martianus Capella (or in lists found earlier in Varro, Cicero, and Vitruvius), and instead grounds them in the suppositions of intrinsic and so rational interconnections. The distinction she summarizes as follows: "on appelait en fait arts libéraux toutes les occupations dignes d'un homme libre, qu'elles soient intellectuelles, sportives, ou militaires, tandis que la notion d'*enkuklios paideia* se limitait aux « arts fondés sur le raisonnement » et impliquait la représentation théorique de l'unité d'un corps des sciences."
[29] Cribiore (2001a) 129.

eventually in your rhetorical or even philosophical studies.[30] Gregory's invocation of figures who occur in those authors can indeed be explained in part as a reminder to pagans (and to *paideia*-wary Christians) that he knows the traditional literature and the entire curriculum inside and out.

Paideutic techniques in the service of exemplarism

Cribiore lays out the steps of the ascent, theorized in literary sources and reflected in papyrological and ostracological remains, by which a student proceeded from (1) the acquisition of basic literacy, through (2) the analysis of grammar, literature, and probably epistolography, and (3) finally to the mastery of rhetoric. While she resists the conclusions of Marrou (but also of some of his revisionist critics) to fix the stages as corresponding to particular institutions or particular kinds of teacher, Cribiore does maintain that the papyri show appreciably different modes of learning occuring roughly along this tripartite division, even when teaching across such levels was carried out in the same institution or delivered by the same teacher, as it sometimes was.[31]

Of these three stages, I will note some exemplarist elements of the acquisition of literacy as well as grammar, before focussing primarily on what rhetorical training offered the Christian moralist. First, in basic literacy training, a striking find from the papyri is the number of exercises called wordlists: some 60 of 419 exercises in schoolhand fall into that category.[32] Many of these lists are of proper nouns. Of these, some are geographic, such as

[30] Morgan (1998) Table 15 ('Number of texts of the most common authors in schooltexts'), 313; Cribiore (2001a) 179. The few who would study philosophy would be confronted anew by Homer and the playwrights in the books of Aristotle (e.g. *Metaph.* 12.1076a1, quoting *Il.* 2.204) and Plato (*passim* in the corpus and in the spotlight in e.g. *Resp.* II).
[31] The terminology is somewhat technical here, and may be geographically or idiosyncratically variable, but includes: διδάσκαλος (Cribiore [2001] 50–1, 42); γραμματοδιδάσκαλος (51, 170); γραμματικός (53); γραμματιστής (51); and ῥήτωρ and σοφιστής (56–7).
[32] Morgan (1998) 312 (Table 14).

names of rivers; but a number concern persons: heroes, gods, and historical figures. While most such names are drawn from pagan tradition, Biblical names also occur in a seventh-century wooden tablet, written in a teacher's hand (albeit one very prone to mistakes).[33] Another text seems to group names on no principle other than initial letter, and so it would seem a stretch to consider the exercise as having as its primary purpose something other than training in literacy. Nonetheless, while lectures on individual items in declension exercises seem unlikely for the distraction it would pose to the purpose of (say) learning to decline, it would be surprising if such lists passed entirely without oral commentary by the teacher, in such a way that would lay the foundations for the beginnings of a characteristic-exemplar associative framework as part of a larger process of enculturation.[34] These names would have been committed to memory as bite-sized ingredients in a stew of moral maxims and epic and dramatic verses.[35]

When the student advanced to the study of grammar, the curriculum, to judge from transcription exercises, was dominated by epic poetry and drama. Lyric was read more rarely, and prose was limited to fables and maxims. Possibly working from encyclopaedic mythographers, grammarians produced school lists and 'cheat sheets' with glosses on notable characters, evidently for classroom use and perhaps student reference. These lists would be subject to memorization and examination. They could sometimes assume a question-and-answer format; one has been called a "catechism on characters of the *Iliad*."[36] Analysis of poetry, etymologies, technical grammatical analysis including

[33] Cribiore (1996) item 124, p. 202.
[34] Morgan (1998) publishes an extract from *P. Bour.* I ed. Collart in Table 16 (314–315); wordlists at 101–104, 118–119. Cribiore (1996) publishes or catalogues a number of these, e.g. in her items 105 (list including some names from mythology; p. 198); 108 (list of Egyptian gods, p. 199 and plate set XI); 110 (list of gods; p. 199 and plate set XI); 113 (list of Homeric and mostly Iliadic heroes, p. 200 and plate set XII); 119 (various proper names including Achilles and Aeneas, p. 201), and 124 ("many Biblical names" amongst other words, p. 202).
[35] Cribiore (2001a) 178–179.
[36] Cribiore (2001a) 200–201, 208–209, the "catechism" being *P.Oxy.* LVI.3829.

declension and conjugation, epistolography, and the commission of vast amounts of poetry to memory—perhaps including the whole of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*—made up the grammatical curriculum.[37]

Those students who did not end their education at this point to work in various administrative capacities (or fulfil other social functions, as in the case of literate women) might go on to study rhetoric, at perhaps 14 or 15 years old. At Libanius' school, most would stay for two years, enough to begin pleading in law courts, and some would drop out after each subsequent year; only about a sixth of students who began rhetorical studies would stay for five or six years. If, instead of an immediate entry to professional life, further studies awaited the student of rhetoric, these might be in law (at Berytus, for instance), medicine (for which Alexandria was particularly noted), or philosophy (where Athens had pride of place). But "the attainments of *paideia*," i.e. of the phases of education in literacy, grammar, and rhetoric, were not seen as being as intimately connected with or essentially related to any of these subsequent studies. Those earlier attainments, however, shaped the lives and tastes of prosperous men who appreciated them enough to pay for their sons' education in the same traditions.[38]

For those able to pursue rhetoric, daily activities included the study of rhetorical theory, continued attention to poetry (including, in the recursive manner described above, attention to texts familiar from years of grammar study), a vastly expanded canon of prose,

[37] Cribiore (2001a) 210–215; for her assessment of the bulk of Dionysius Thrax as a late addition to the proem, and thus her conclusion that systematic grammatical analysis really only came into education in the first century of this era, see, 211–212. For the commission of the entirety of Homer's epics to memory, Cribiore (2001a) 213 cites Xenophon's *Symposium*, where a father expects this of his son (3.5). Today, against the backdrop of a relatively memorisation-shy educational culture, there seems to be renewed interest and enthusiasm for feats like this: in February 2023 I witnessed an electrifying performance of *Od.* 1 (in Greek) by Joseph Medeiros. The actor also performs Book II, and is purportedly aiming for all twenty-four.
[38] Cribiore (2007) 56, 224. For the diehard sophist, all non-rhetorical studies were of ambiguous merit. Libanius both praised and depended on a prosperous class of cultured men whose means derived from non-rhetorical careers. Simultaneously, however, he complained about how non-rhetorical pursuits would displace from the minds of his alumni everything he had tried to teach them (217).

and the composition and performance of contrived exercises meant to develop eloquence and verbal agility. These exercises were called the προγυμνάσματα, of which textbook-style introductions and sample compositions have survived, as have school texts showing student efforts at the same. Webb (2001) lists the progymnasmasta, which show minor variations across rhetorical authors, as follows, arranged more or less in order of increasing complexity and difficulty (although for each exercise complexity can be added):[39]

Synopsis of late ancient rhetorical progymnasmata	
μῦθος (sometimes λόγος)	fable or moral tale usually involving animals
διήγημα	narrative often taken from mythology
χρεία	discussion of a terse saying or briefly stated action of a notable person
κατασκευή and ἀνασκευή	"confirmation and refutation of a story on the basis of . . . criteria like probability or possibility"
κοινὸς τόπος	"common place . . . a rehearsal of the commonly held opinions about a certain type of stock character, like a murderer, tyrant, or temple-robber"
ἐγκώμιον	praise, amounting to "a panegyric speech in miniature"
ψόγος	blame or invective
σύγκρισις	"a systematic comparison of two things," often a component of panegyric
ἠθοποιία (or, in Theon, προσωποποιία)	"a speech in the words of a character in a certain situation"
ἔκφρασις	"a vividly detailed account of some person, place, time or event" that seems to make it present to an audience.
θέσις	a developed speech systematically discussing a general question, as in ethical scenarios
νόμου εἰσφορά	the argued introduction of a law

Of these, Cribiore finds that while most of the progymnasmata can be found in school texts, they show a disproportionately high number of exercises in ethopoeia and encomium: that is, in the progymnasmata most concerned with inhabiting the psychology

[39] Webb (2001) 294.

of exemplars and of calling attention to their virtues (and explaining away or concealing their vices).[40] In fact, the pervasive moralizing or at least evaluative tendency of virtually all of the exercises fuelled the dilation of an exemplarist ethos. Names drilled into students' heads starting with wordlists in basic literacy training and adorned with attributes and histories in the grammarian's lessons now came to life in the persons of the learners themselves through the rhetorical progymnasmata. In exercises of praise or imitative re-enactment, they were trotted out for straightforward rehearsals of traditional character assessments. Sometimes, however, unusual and controversial matter was found: just as Gorgias had defended Helen, a schoolboy left us a papyrus in "fervent exculpation of Clytemnestra."[41] One second-century AD ostracon, apparently large (though its location according to Cribiore [1996] is uncertain, so particulars beyond what was included in the earliest treatments by Milne are not forthcoming), includes a "prose paraphrase of the argument of *Iliad* 20 with a catalogue of deities."[42] Moreover, lists of divinities have been found in 'notebooks,' longer papyrological remains containing heterogeneous exercise material.[43] Those lists were evidently still useful even when the progymnasmata increased in complexity.

Schoolroom methods were not forgotten at graduation (as it were). Cribiore observes that from the Second Sophistic (ca. 60–230) onward, an audience sufficiently appreciative of the fruits of such education supported a class of professional orators, for whom "all the

[40] Cribiore (2001a) 228–9. Some caution is due here; on Morgan (1998)'s count, only 19 items are classifiable as specifically rhetorical school texts (see Table 14, Morgan (1998) 312); this seems to concur with Cribiore *ad loc*. Although the sample is limited, the preponderance of ethopoeiae within it offers support for both Ludlow (2020)'s approach, which highlights the development of the imaginative faculty through such exercises, and my own argument here; see Ludlow (2020) 5–9, 22.
[41] Cribiore (2001a) 229.
[42] Cribiore (1996) 239, item 274.
[43] Cribiore (1996) 269, item 379. Notebooks form a substantial share of the remains, comprising items 379–412 in Cribiore's compilation. She defines them as "collections of exercises of multifarious content that were sometimes compiled by more than one student," but which present a physical unity and were possibly used as a workbook, then a record and an *aide-mémoire*, Cribiore (1996) 53.

public became a crowd of students." That is, the schoolroom dynamics were extended out into the forum—certainly for the duration of the performance, which, however, presented norms that were prized well beyond the forum, too, in non-performative society. The schoolroom which modelled real or imagined pasts was itself a model for that society.[44]

This is directly relevant to the Cappadocians. The kind of schoolroom experience in which they passed so many years of their lives is reflected in the preaching they brought into the ready-made fora of their own local churches. We find them reworking their school-earned mastery of the content (gods, heroes, *viri illustres*) and methods (taking turns for the encomiastic, psogic, ecphrastic, ethopoetic, etc.) in order to shape not first of all society, but the Church writ very large, plausibly on the model of their schoolroom years.

For the rest of this chapter through Chapter 4, I show how the Cappadocians deployed the exemplarist content of their broad learning. Along the way, we will see some of the exemplarist methods we have just discussed; in Chapter 5 they will be crucial to Nazianzen's vision of how to apply his exemplars in practice.

Paideutic exemplarism in practice: catalogues and associative pairings

In this section I argue that examining a tendency to pair particular exemplars with particular virtues and vices will help us make sense of our authors' repurposing of traditional exemplars.

My starting point is an oblique remark from Nazianzen's eulogy for his father, given in the presence of Basil of Caesarea (*Oratio* 18). He has been singing the many praises of the

[44] Cribiore (2001a) 239.

deceased, but suddenly brings them to a head by looking for the virtue that was "most excellent and most characteristic (ὃ δὲ κάλλιστον . . . καὶ ἰδιώτατον)" of his father. Then he tells why he puts it in this way: "*Each particular person*, whether amongst the ancients or the moderns, *is believed to have been outstanding in some particular respect*, according as each happened to be deemed worthy of a particular grace from God (Ἄλλος μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο τι τῶν παλαιῶν ἢ τῶν νέων κατωρθωκέναι πιστεύεται, ὡς ἕκαστος ἔτυχεν ἐκ Θεοῦ χάριτός τινος ἠξιωμένος)." After running through a list of figures from the Old and New Testament with their associated virtues—Job with patience in misfortune, for instance—he says, "Why should I count them all out? For my oration's audience know this (καὶ τί ἂν καταριθμοίην ἅπαντας; ἐν γὰρ εἰδόσιν ὁ λόγος.)"[45] Likewise, in a long parade of exemplars in the funeral oration for his friend Basil, Nazianzen rhetorically asks after "the noblest thing about Joshua," before giving a few concrete answers.[46] It seems that Nazianzen either expected his audience already to be familiar with Particular Person–Particular Virtue correspondences, or to be at least primed and ready to accept such a schema.

This associative tendency may be an application, on the level of the individual, of the species-specific ἔργον argument in Aristotle, namely that each kind of being has some defining activity or work or function (ἔργον) which is proper to it (ἴδιον) in the sense of being essential to it.[47] It has been suggested that the realist-essentialist tendency in classical Platonic and Aristotelian thought is developmentally related to the intuitions of Homeric epithets, which associate things, persons, and gods with defining qualities, often though not always unique.[48] We can at least see in Nazianzen that a powerful urge to

[45] Naz. *Or*. 18.24.
[46] Naz. *Or*. 43.72: Τί τὸ κάλλιστον Ἰησοῦ; στρατηγία καὶ κληροδοσία, καὶ γῆς τῆς ἁγίας κατάσχεσις…
[47] Aristotle's use of ἴδιον in *Eth. Nic.* 1.6–7, 1097^{b}24-1098^{a}20 is sometimes taken as meaning "unique," but this leaves his argument more flawed than it seems likely to be; a charitable reading favours the 'proper-as-essential-to' interpretation: Whiting (1988).
[48] Benardete (1997) suggests such a Homer–Plato link; see e.g. 84.

associate persons and beings with defining qualities was alive and well, and we will see his alertness to the power of epithets.

This psychological hypothesis may be corroborated by a glance back at the wordlists we discussed in schoolrooms. Morgan (1998) discusses narrative paraphrases on papyri that devote seemingly disproportionate attention to name-lists. Such lists, she writes, would have given students "a certain amount of cultural information in economically compressed form." As to why they were still included in rhetorical exercises for use in mid- to late adolescence, Morgan suggests that either the students were still in the process of acculturation, "or because a habit of making lists had become deeply ingrained." She goes on to suggest that "the habit was surely a useful one for an administrator taking censuses, keeping accounts, collecting taxes and so on."[49] Associative lists in various formats had enjoyed popularity in the polished works of pagan and Christian writers for centuries.[50] These associations have been noted in concise and direct exhortations found in fourth-century pagan epistolography.[51]

Lists of exemplars in Nazianzen have been noted, but left underexamined, particularly as concerns their connection with virtues and vices. Demoen (1996) has discussed certain lists as "exempla in series," occasionally recurrent as "fixed clusters" in Nazianzen. He classifies them as showing either "organic coherence," which all pertain to a single person, place, or kind of event (e.g. Zeus' libido, shown by various depredations); or "functional coherence," which all illustrate a single theme (e.g. wealth, shown by Midas, Croesus, and Cyrus).[52] Demoen's analysis, however, is deliberately limited: on the one hand, to such

[49] Morgan (1998) 215.
[50] In Chapter 3 we will look at Plutarch (albeit *Lives* rather than lists) and Valerius Maximus; in Chapter 4, *Hebrews* and Clement of Rome.
[51] Cribiore (2013) 209–211.
[52] Demoen (1996) 189–192. Note, however, that when the coherence-groupings approach a virtuous or vicious association, as with Zeus' libido or the greed implicit in wealth, they do not contain multiple

groupings as they are found together in individual texts, and on the other hand, to Nazianzen's poetic corpus. He is well aware that there is more to analyse here: in footnotes he offers passing remarks on the limited range of anecdotes reported of Elijah across his many appearances in the poems, and points without analysis to an oratorical passage in *Oratio* 14, to which we will return in Chapter 4. What he does not undertake is a study of how individual characters are variously presented across Nazianzen's corpus, let alone in Nazianzen's contemporaries. But this is necessary in order to test a few hypotheses which he notes have arisen in the literature: on the pagan side, that Gregory may have been working from "collections of paradigmata," and on the Biblical or Christian, that his exemplars "seem based on traditional characterizations" (here Demoen points to *1 Clement*).[53] We can be more precise. We will see that Gregory Nazianzen and his Cappadocian colleagues put exemplars to sometimes very different purposes in ways that should definitively undermine the hypothesis of handbooks, certainly if by that we mean collections that provide authoritative associations. But we will also have reason to doubt the sway of the traditional characterizations to which Demoen appeals.

More generally, I suggest that both the ongoing acculturation and the ingrained, school-learned habits found another form of expression in Nazianzen and his peers. Knowingly or not, they combined culture-reproducing habits (of list-making, for one) and their dual inheritances (Christian and Hellenic) with a sense of responsibility for the character formation of their congregations and their readers.

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exemplars showing multiple virtues or vices. It is that condition which I have tended to use as a criterion for describing a passage as a catalogue text.

[53] Demoen (1996) 191 note 374, 192 note 387 says there is evidence for pagan groupings: Nazianzen "mocks the clusters Marathon and Salamis, Cynegeirus and Callimachus," possibly from handbooks. Many anecdotes from Basil and Nazianzen "can also be found in Plutarch and/or Stobaeus and/or Diogenes Laertius."

One result was that Nazianzen and the Cappodocians produced new associative links. Most obviously, this occurs in what I have called catalogues, a special kind of list in which multiple exemplars may be found illustrating multiple virtues or vices. But associations are also expressed in other ways: in simpler lists (such as the sort Demoen notes, grouped around a single virtue or vice or a single character); in isolated stories foregrounding some such trait; in epithets; in comparisons; in ethopoeiae; in remarks justifying a quotation; and more reflections of their paideutic training.

We now turn to see this in action in the Cappadocians' treatment of the gods.

Götterdämmerung

The gods were long associated with domains of patronage reflecting particular activities, phenomena, or excellences of human character and action. The canonical Homeric epithets reflect this association, doubtless already old by the time the epics were written down. Where virtues and vices are concerned, these gods have famously mixed records. Plato had purged the gods of their legendary vices in the *Republic* and in the *Phaedrus* assigned them patronage over certain dispositions, but not exactly over certain virtues.[54] Plato's *Phaedrus* has Socrates express a belief (not necessarily either of theirs) in diverse patronages of professions and dispositions, if not exactly over virtues: Zeus over philosophers, Apollo over the artistic type, and so on. Most connotations are positive, though things can turn violent with the followers of Ares. The dialogue's concern with

[54] Pl. *Resp.* II, 376e–383c; *Phdr.* 246d–253c, esp. 250b and 252c–253d on different character types following Zeus, Hera, Ares, Apollo, Dionsyius, et al. The gods are perfectly good for Plato and Aristotle, but note that at least for the latter, in his technical definition of virtue, they cannot be virtuous: the absence of potentiality and thus of any susceptibility of change in their essences (see *Metaphysics* Λ) rules this out. The goodness of gods is something better than virtue: καὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ θηρίου ἐστὶ κακία οὐδ' ἀρετή, οὕτως οὐδὲ θεοῦ, ἀλλ' ἢ μὲν τιμιώτερον ἀρετῆς, ἢ δ' ἕτερόν τι γένος κακίας, Arist. *Eth. Nic.* VII, 10, 1145a20; cf. X, 8, 1178b7–32.

rhetoric would make it a good candidate for a higher rhetorical curriculum of the sort our authors followed.

Nazianzen's familiarity with the *Phaedrus* is at least faintly suggested by two other points. The pederasty he attributes to Socrates (which we will see in Chapter 3) has plenty of support in the flirtation and sexual tension between Socrates and Phaedrus in that dialogue, though this is certainly not the only Platonic evidence for such tendencies. The second point is important for this chapter's purposes: Nazianzen produced his own catalogue associations of the gods with particular vices. Those catalogue associations are my starting point. Along the way, I apply the exhaustive method to the gods he catalogues in that locus, documenting their appearances in the rest of his corpus, too. With the exception of a few Olympians, I do not discuss divinities found elsewhere but who are not mentioned in that first catalogue. I then apply the exhaustive method for the same set of divinities to Basil and Nyssen. Finally, I take a non-exhaustive glance at two catalogue passages in Julian by way of contrast.

Nazianzen: At the very climax of *Oratio* 4, his first invective against Julian, Gregory makes each of the major pagan gods claim exemplarist patronage over particular vices.[55] The gods had of course long been associated with definite virtues, or at least impressive and laudatory qualities and actions, and these formed at least part of the basis for their cults. Gregory unambiguously recasts all such traits as vices. But to do so, he draws on names, stories, and practices found in pagan cultural artefacts, from epithets traditional since Homer to the cult worship of gods tied to specific patronages.

The list states some vices straightforwardly and some ironically, in the latter case by naming opposing virtues that the gods are incapable of representing. From it, we have the

[55] Naz. *Or*. 4.119–122.

following vice–exemplar pairings. Kronos exemplifies **filial impiety** (lacking γονέων αἰδώς). His son Zeus shows the same **disrespect for his parents**, alongside **lustful incontinence** (including pederasty)[56] and **gluttony** (γαστριμαργία, in opposition to σωφροσύνη and ἐγκράτεια).[57] Apollo is a paragon of **deceit** (ἀπάτη), probably due to his status as the "Oblique One (Λοξίας)," the giver of oracles. In an ambiguous allusion, he or Hermes may be "the gain-bringer (ὁ κερδῷος), and so possibly also **greed**, thieving, and generally ill-gotten wealth, in opposition to the virtue of scorn for riches (χρημάτων ὑπεροψία). If Apollo is meant, the reason may be related to the fees charged by oracles at (e.g.) Delphi; if Hermes, it is his role as patron of merchants and an association with thieves.[58] Ares is all about war and **anger** (θυμός), Dionysus **drunkenness** (μέθη), and Artemis **inhospitality** (μισοξενία), presumably for her tendency to kill prurient or unlucky hunters, or for her occasional demands of human sacrifice at Pontic or Alban temples. Hephaestus is the **lame** or **limping god** (ὁ καταχωλεύων θεός), unable to stop the other gods—or Nazianzen, for that matter—from laughing at him for his defects.[59] All the gods together represent discord, chaos, and war (an affront to ὁμόνοια), as well as a trivial and immoderate sense of humour (γέλωτος ἀμετρία).[60]

[56] Naz. *Or.* 4.122: Zeus "becomes all things on account of women" (πάντα γινόμενος διὰ τὰς γυναῖκας). Nazianzen seems to needle Zeus further by immediately giving not an example of a woman, but of the boy Ganymede (as the Phrygian, Φρύξ).
[57] Pindar will not attribute γαστριμαργία to the gods: Pind. *Ol.* 1.52. Nazianzen may know this ode; he at least knows about Pelops' shoulder: *Ep.* 38.1 (with thanks to Prof. Gregory Hutchinson for this reference).
[58] *LSJ* s.v. reports that Apollo has the title of κερδῷος in Lycophron 208, and Hermes at Lucian *Timon* 41. But Hermes seems clearly the one implied by the same title at 5.32, where several of his other epithets, Λόγιος (as in Lucian *Pseudologista* 24) and ἐναγώνιος (Pindar *Pythian* 2.10), are also found. For another instance of Gregorian κερδῷος, see also *Or.* 14.29. Compare Apollo's mercenary prophecies at *Carm.* 1.2.10 *De virtute* 375 (Ἄνευ δὲ χαλκοῦ, Φοῖβος οὐ μαντεύεται, 37.707). Hermes has been ridiculed slightly earlier as the deliverer of bad ideas to Julian's head (*Or.* 4.101).
[59] Naz. *Or.* 4.122. If the remark on limping Hephaestus is indeed derogatory, it stands in contrast to Nazianzen's advocacy for disfigured lepers in *Oratio* 14.
[60] Outside of this oratorical catalogue, concise summaries of Nazianzen's ethical charges against the gods may be found at *Carm.* 1.2.2 *Praecepta ad virgines* 494 sqq. (37.617) and 2.2.7 *Ad Nemesium* 86 sqq. (37.1557).

Zeus, Hermes, and others reappear in a list in *Oratio* 5, the second invective against Julian. There, too, we find some of the Olympians absent from the list in *Oratio* 4. Aphrodite, for instance, is an easy target, for she "shamefully was once a **whore** (πόρνη γενομένη)," he says, perhaps in a euhemerism, "and is the handmaid of **shameful 'marriages'** (γάμων αἰσχρῶν ὑπηρέτις)." Athena "is both a virgin and gives birth to a dragon (παρθένος τε ἐστι καὶ τίκτει δράκοντα)," presumably a reference to Hephaestus' assault and the ensuing chthonic birth of the quasi-serpentine Erichthonius.[61] This must be meant to call her virginity into question or to tar her by association with a symbol which in Christian imagery is demonic: rather than a woman (Israel, Mary, or the Church) opposing the dragon (Satan, Herod, sin) in cosmic mortal combat, as in *Revelation* 12, the quasi-virginal goddess herself gives birth to the beast. Athena is a kind of counterfeit Mary. Of the other Olympians, Demeter "wanders about (πλανᾶται)" as if **mad** and celebrates **unseemly rites** (*Or.* 39.4). If Poseidon appears, it is only in oblique allusions. Hestia is not found at all. Hera is just visible in an epithet which Nazianzen lifts from her and applies to Athanasius, as we shall see presently.[62]

Nazianzen's project in these orations is primarily one of demolition: the many gods are given many vices. But there is evidence in the later *Oratio* 21 for Athanasius that this was just the first stage in an appropriative strategy.[63] Here several of the virtues formerly associated with the gods are now attributed to the recently deceased Christian saint. Just as the demotion of the gods occurred at the climax of the invective against Julian, so does the

[61] Naz. *Or.* 5.32.
[62] Poseidon: *Or.* 5.31, 28.15, 31.16; Demeter: 39.4.
[63] Dated to May 2, 379, the sixth anniversary of the Alexandrian bishop's 373 death. Given in Constantinople after the accession of the Nicene Theodosius but before the new emperor's relocation of the court to that city in late 380, and more pressingly, just after the Arian assault on his community of the Anastasia on April 21, the choice of producing such a tribute to the vehemently anti-Arian Athanasius can be seen in part, from a political perspective, as a turning point in Gregory's career for the candor and boldness with which he thereby identifies himself with the cause of Nicene orthodoxy, a cause he had previously been trying to advance more subtly. Bernardi (1968) 155–7, citing Gallay (1941) 149.

elevation of the saint by the transposition of pagan deities' virtues occur at the climax of this panegyric, in the penultimate section. Nazianzen moves from praising Athanasius for his behaviour in the Arian controversy to virtues and habits that were hallmarks of his pastoral career more generally. As he does so, he explicitly advertises his cooptation of the mostly divine epithets and their transformation into Athanasian virtues:[64]

> . . . ἁπλοῦς τὸν τρόπον, πολυειδὴς τὴν κυβέρνησιν· σοφὸς τὸν λόγον, σοφώτερος τὴν διάνοιαν· πεζὸς τοῖς ταπεινοτέροις, ὑψηλότερος τοῖς μετεωροτέροις· *φιλόξενος*, ἱκέσιος, ἀποτρόπαιος, πάντα εἷς ἀληθῶς, ὅσα μεμερισμένως τοῖς ἑαυτῶν θεοῖς Ἑλλήνων παῖδες ἐπιφημίζουσι. Προσθήσω δὲ καὶ ζύγιον, καὶ παρθένιον, καὶ εἰρηναῖον, καὶ διαλλακτήριον, καὶ πομπαῖον τοῖς ἐντεῦθεν ἐπειγομένοις.
>
> . . . [Athanasius was] simple in character, but his skills as a leader were manifold; he was wise in speech, wiser still in his understanding; he was a man of the street to the more lowly sorts, yet of greater dignity than those of more exalted station; he was hospitable, a protector of suppliants, an averter of evils. One man was truly everything that the sons of the Greeks ascribe in parts to their various gods. I will add that he was marital and virginal, peaceful and a conciliator, and an escort for those hastening on from this life.[65]

The first juxtaposition may contain a play at an improvement on Odysseus, famously πολύτροπος: while Odysseus is a man of tricks and turns in both morals and tactics, Athanasius is by contrast simple of *mores* while just as clever in his technical abilities or 'executive virtues'.[66] The gods' epithets begin with Zeus, who is probably meant by φιλόξενος, although this particular term for hospitability seems more often applied to human beings in both pagan and Christian writings.[67] In Homer, Zeus is is called ξείνιος

[64] Demoen (1996) 26, where it receives only a brief mention in a footnote.
[65] Naz. *Or.* 21.36.
[66] The epithet πολύτροπος occurs rarely, first (though significantly) in *Od.* 1.1, and only again at *Od.* 10.330; on the other hand he is adorned with many similar epithets, such as πολύμητις, πολύφρων, πολυμήχανος, ποικιλόμητις; see Merry *et al.* (1886) *ad loc.* The term 'executive virtues' has been used to describe those which may be put to different and even ethically divergent ends, e.g. Williams (1985) 10; but note that for our ancient authors the use of 'virtue' in so instrumental, even mercenary a sense would be unacceptable (consider Aristotle on φρόνησις vs. δεινότης, Arist. *Eth. Nic.* VI, 13, 1144b10 sqq.).
[67] In the *Odyssey*, Homer uses φιλόξεινοι several times, but always in the same formula, and always applied to hypothetical native mortals in the context of arriving on strange shores (*Od.* 6.121, 8.576, 9.176, 13.202). Aeschylus seems to use it similarly, e.g. *Supp.* 926. Pindar uses it of a mortal, but links it with Zeus, in *Isthm.* 2.24. It is treated as a virtue proper to mortals in Ps.-Aristotle (*De virtutibus et vitiis*, 1250b34). Paul uses this virtue of the ideal candidate for ἐπίσκοπος at *Titus* 1:8 and *1 Timothy* 3:2. At *1 Peter* 4:9, the faithful in general are exhorted to practice the same virtue.

with presumably the same meaning, and Julian mentions the appellation as if it is still in use.[68] The tragedians regularly call Zeus ἱκέσιος, and the same epithet can be found in a dedicatory temple inscription.[69] Apollo is called ἀποτρόπαιος in Aristophanes; the term is also used in a general way of all the gods in Plato.[70] Hera is ζύγιος.[71] Artemis or Athena could be παρθένιος.[72] Dionysus is found as the εἰρηναῖος.[73] Words or discourses themselves are διαλλακτήριοι, but Nazianzen may thereby mean the oratorical god Hermes, who is certainly the πομπαῖος, the escort of the dead or dying in the final transposition.[74]

Basil: Appearances of any Olympian gods in Basil and Gregory of Nyssa are extremely scarce. Zeus appears in Basil's *Ad adolescentes* as being especially vile. "We will leave to stage actors the adulteries, passions, and open copulations of the gods, most especially those of the chief of them all, 'Highest Zeus,' as they call him. You would blush even to mention these things if you were speaking of animals."[75] Ares, perhaps the best epitome of the strife between the gods due to his patronage of war, could perhaps be said

[68] E.g. *Il.* 13.624–5, *Od.* 9.271, 14.283–4, and 14.389; Jul. *Fragment of a Letter to a Priest* 291b: Ξένιον ὀνομάζομεν Δία.
[69] *LSJ s.v.*: Aesch. *Supp.* 616, Soph. *Phil.* 484, and Eur. *Hec.* 345. A second-century B.C. temple on Cos was dedicated to Artemis and to the perhaps more welcoming Ζεὺς ἱκέσιος, along with "the gods of our fathers": *SEG* 14.529.1–3 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1874-6772_seg_a14_529).
[70] *LSJ* s.v.: Ar. *Eq.* 1307, *Av.* 61; Pl. *Leg.* IX, 854b.
[71] *LSJ* s.v.: Ap. Rhod. *Argon.* 4.96.
[72] As were the doors of a temple of Artemis: *Anthologia Palatina*, 6.202 (Leonidas epigrammaticus); Athena regularly ἡ παρθένος at Athens; of many examples, cf. Pausanias 5.11.10.
[73] *Diccionario Griego-Español* s.v.: citing Aristides Rhetor, *Or.* 41.5, who, however, in the same breath calls Dionysus πολεμικός.
[74] *LSJ s.vv.*: for διαλληκτήριος of λόγος citing Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 5.31, and for πομπαῖος, the escort, citing Aesch. *Eum.* 91, and the other tragedians.
[75] Bas. *Ad adolescentes* IV.6: Μοιχείας δὲ θεῶν καὶ ἔρωτας καὶ μίξεις ἀναφανδόν, καὶ ταύτας γε μάλιστα τοῦ κορυφαίου πάντων καὶ ὑπάτου Διός, ὡς αὐτοὶ λέγουσιν, ἃ κἂν περὶ βοσκημάτων τις λέγων ἐρυθριάσειε, τοῖς ἐπὶ σκηνῆς καταλείψομεν. At IX.24, Basil mentions gold and ivory statues of Zeus and Hera, but only to make a point about the superiority of art and knowledge over mere matter. In a letter on continence (ἐγκράτεια) to the monk Urbicius (*Ep.* 366), which Courtonne judges doubtful, Basil notes that when considering this virtue it is important to look not only at one form of it, "such as matters related to sex (οἷον ἕνεκεν ἀφροδισίων)," but at everything superfluous that the soul desires wrongly. This is the only occurrence I see of even the hint of a reference to Aphrodite. Perhaps evoking a deity with un-Christian marital habits would sting, but I suspect that by this time the euphemism was dead. I have not documented other divinely derived but common terms such as ἐρωτικά, ἑστία (far more common), or ἑρμηνεύω, words which I doubt conjured up images of their namesake gods.

to overshadow the whole of *Hom.* 38, on the martyrdom of Gordius, as it is during a festival in honour of that "war-loving demon" that the saint—a converted centurion—meets his end.[76]

Nyssen: Nyssen appeals to the Olympians even less frequently than Basil, only referring to one, and even then only to Dionysus, whom he casts as merely semi-divine status he emphasizes: he is a mortal later called a god. Dionysus occurs, along with Heracles and Minos, in one of his polemics against Eunomius as representing the mode of divinisation his Arianizing theological opponent defends for Jesus: a mortal man participates in the being of God so fully that he can be said to be divine. Nyssen claims this mode of 'being' God is only for "poets and myth-makers," citing the three divinised heroes mentioned above, rendering them generically by putting each in the plural. Trinitarian theology is subtle, but no reader could have missed his tactic here nor failed to feel its sting: Eunomius would turn Jesus Christ into nothing more than a latter-day Dionysus, Heracles, or Minos.[77] I find no other uses of the Olympians in Basil or Nyssen.

Julian: As noted above, Julian's theology is such a vast question that I will only touch on it here.[78] Catalogue passages in one of Julian's last works, the fragmentary *Against the Galilaeans*, suffice to show that he is both a pious reactionary and a philosophical reformer in the tradition of Plato. Zeus is the **supreme ruler** (and had been an exemplar for **clemency** in imperial rule even before Julian came out of the pagan closet).[79] Hephaestus is the **patron of craftsmen**, not mocked, as he is in Gregory, for being banausic, let alone for being crippled and a cuckold. Ares (and Enyo) preside over war.

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[76] Bas. *In Gordium* 31.496–697, . . . ἡ πόλις ἑορτὴν ἄγουσα φιλοπολέμῳ δαίμονι . . .
[77] Nyss. *Contra Eunomium* 2.1.619: οὕτω γὰρ οἱ τοῖς μέτροις τοὺς μύθους ἐνείροντες Διονύσους τινὰς καὶ Ἡρακλέας καὶ Μίνωας καὶ ἄλλους τοιούτους ἐκ δαιμονίας εἰς ἀνθρώπινα σώματα συμπλοκῆς διαπλάσσουσι . . .
[78] Athanassiadi-Fowden (1981) and especially Smith (1995) give thorough accounts of Julian's theology.
[79] Jul. *Contra Galilaeos* 235bcd; *Or.* 2.90a. Elsewhere in Julian, on the other hand, Zeus' marriage with Hera is vitiated in the familiar ways and can be surpassed in happiness by mortal unions (*Or.* 3.115b).

Apollo "**trains our souls**" along with the Muses, Asclepius (also patron of **medicine**), and Hermes (god of **eloquence**). Athena, who in another text is used to flatter the empress, his benefactress, is here even granted a share in Zeus' **good governance** over the gods.[80] Their virtues are exposed in their national patronages, too, with national temperaments following corresponding tutelary deities, not unlike Plato's description of affinities between individuals and gods with similar temperaments: Ares for the **martial**, Athena for those who are both **martial** and **prudent**, Hermes for the **clever**. "In the father [Zeus] all things are complete and all things are one," says Julian, "while in the separate deities one quality or another predominates."[81]

While in *Against the Galilaeans* most cases of Julian's pairing of a god with a 'virtue' appears technical, skills such as eloquence or competent rule nonetheless carry ethical weight for Julian and his peers. But some gods have traditional patronages that are neither virtuous nor neutral, and this is where Julian can draw on Plato's reformed theological philosophy: whatever is true of the gods must be good, and if it is not good, it is not true of them, either. Julian can thus criticize the Antiochenes for knowing a false 'Aphrodite' in fornication or adultery rather than marital, procreative sex, and 'Dionysus' in drunken excess. These are a reformer's allegations of religious corruption, but I include them as Julian's acknowledgement of the ways his deities were known, even if he did not believe they corresponded to reality.[82]

[80] Jul. *Contra Galilaeos*, 235bcd; see his speech of thanksgiving to the empress Eusebia, *Or*. 3.104cd; Hermes for rhetoric or eloquence and Athena for wisdom at *Or*. 7, 225ab.
[81] Jul. *Contra Galilaeos* 115de.
[82] Jul. *Misopogon*, 359c.

Analysis: gods

I have examined 11 deities[83] paired with vices in Nazianzen's invectives, and compared them to their appearances in Julian, Basil, and Nyssen. Across the texts in question, they find themselves in some 20 vice–exemplar and 13 virtue–exemplar associations.

Unsurprisingly, all virtue–exemplar pairings are due to Julian; not a single positive association with any of these gods is to be found in the Cappadocians. Despite Julian's acknowledgement that some of his gods are associated with vices, he is eager to brush these aside as corruptions of his own beliefs: there can be nothing intemperate about Dionysus or unchaste about Aphrodite.

Things are different for Julian's Christian rivals. The associations Athena-mentorship and Hermes-eloquence highlight virtuous practices that Nazianzen also cherished, but he will strip the exemplars of their virtues and call attention to their vices. He is levelling charges and he wants to make them stick: and an associative catalogue seems to be the way to do it. Basil's scant references to the gods agree with his friend's, as with the debauchery of Zeus. The outlier here is Nyssen, who did not study with Basil, Nazianzen, and Julian in Athens. He betrays an awareness of the gods but maintains an almost perfect silence on them, mentioning only those who even by pagan lights were sometimes said to have been mortals or demigods later divinised.

Demoen (1996) has observed that amongst the many elements of Greek cultural patrimony the gods in particular fare poorly in Nazianzen's hands.[84] The denigration he

[83] Kronos, Zeus, Apollo, Artemis, Hermes, Ares, Aphrodite, Hephaestus, Athena, Dionysus, Demeter.
[84] This is in spite of the fact that Nazianzen was familiar with and perfectly capable of using an allegorical reading of Homer, for instance in interpreting Hermes' μῶλυ and Helen's νηπενθές as the λόγος in *Carm.* 2.2.5 *Nicobuli patris ad filium* 196–202 (37.1535); it is when the gods are involved that Gregory draws the line, for if real they are demons, and if non-entities, they represent imaginarily divinised men or divinised passions; Demoen (1996) 231.

and Basil show, and Nyssen's silent treatment, are only to be expected at a time when Christianity existed as a newly arrived monotheism in a still-pluralistic world of ambient polytheism. A point-for-point rebuttal of Neoplatonic apologetics seems to have been less interesting to them than a broad discreditation of popular myth and practice. These approaches are the more intelligible in the shadow of Julian's reactionary reign. But it is significant that the way in which Nazianzen in particular demotes the gods is through a vice–exemplar association. That this is meant as part of a call to overhaul the stock of cultural exemplars is suggested by the fact that Gregory's pagan contemporary Libanius still uses virtue-god associations in a very exemplarist key: he obliquely exhorts Themistius to be like Athena in offering the support of a mentor to Dianius, a protégé whom he is commending; in another letter, in which he praises the cultivation of rhetoric, he calls a governor "a Hermes."[85]

Against this backdrop, we should reconsider Demoen's assertion of Nazianzen's works—at least his poetry—that although pagan deities are roundly condemned as idolized passions, demons, or fictions, "nowhere is one of the Olympian gods quoted as a model (not even in the negative sense)."[86] This is partly due to the methodology of formal rhetorical analysis which Demoen applies; if he rules out ornamental and hortatory modelling functions, he is left with the evidentiary function, as we saw in the Introduction.[87] But given that reform-minded pagans had found ways to defend the gods

[85] Libanius *Ep.* 376 (to Themistius) (for Athena) and *Ep.* 226 (to those around Elpidius) (on Hermes). Religion in Libanius' writings is discussed at Cribiore (2013) 182–224, and these gods in particular at 209–211. I think the exemplarism is both clear and strong, but the translation of the relevant part of *Ep.* 376, "'be an Athena'", at Cribiore (2013) 209, is probably too much for the Greek passage, and is far from the author's own translation of the whole letter at Cribiore (2007) 254 (there, letter 49 F376).
[86] Demoen (1996) 221, 226, 228–229. Demoen recognizes that the passages from *Orationes* 4 and 5 have an ethical valence, but he does not address the exemplarist associations at work between the virtues he flags and the particular gods—even though he elsewhere recognizes the broader context as at least protreptic (79). Sometimes he even excludes "explicit treatments" of the gods from consideration as being "not . . . in the exemplary mode" (230).
[87] See above, 9.

against the moral indignation raised by Xenophanes and Plato—at precisely the sorts of stories which Christians later found objectionable—no philosophically educated Christian could think that a similarly philosophical pagan would be much impressed by these exemplars as elements of evidentiary arguments. The pagans would take exegetical detours around the literal reading.

Instead of playing evidentiary roles, Nazianzen's vicious gods, I suggest, serve as moral exemplars in a twofold exhortation. The move is still basically Platonic: pin the enthusiasts of the old myths to the content of the stories at the literal level. Even if they communicate cosmological truth beneath the surface, consider what the surface does to us morally. Nazianzen's approach brings out the specifically exemplarist ways in which the gods mislead, and he turns them to his own project of ethical formation. The effects of his catalogue may be protreptric or paraenetic, depending on the character of the audience. In the protreptic key, he is making the gods repulsive to virtuous pagans, since devotion to the gods would draw the good pagan away from virtue and towards vice. In the paraenetic key, he is making the vices more repulsive to Christians already on the right path, since the vices would draw the believer not only away from virtue and into vice, but also closer to the pagan gods—to idolatry, on top of their more pedestrian sins.

Thus, when viewed from a perspective in which ethical formation is the primary concern, these gods are indeed meant to perform an exemplarist function. Listings like Nazianzen's, if used as models in schools or later in life and in leisurely study, have the result of bringing memorable, epithet-like characteristics to mind when the name of an exemplar-god is mentioned. This associative drive is likely to bring the vice back to mind even when a god is mentioned in another context with fainter exemplarist shades.

The catalogue in *Oratio* 4 is followed by a short celebration of Christian principles that hold believers to an extremely high standard of virtue, but, interestingly, Nazianzen does not replace the discarded exemplars with Christian ones at this locus.[88] The work is one primarily of demolition. The gods have been decisively shifted from the virtue side to the vice side of the 'wardrobe of the moral imagination'. But as we saw in Nazianzen's later treatment of Athanasius, the good things they represented would soon be transferred to Christians. Thus, not only was Athanasius a living collation of the best of the Biblical virtues, he also lived out what was thought best and most divine of the pagan tradition. In so doing, he—or rather Gregory's exemplarism—shows Christians that they may appropriate the best of the pagan tradition and rightfully achieve something of the glory that had once been misdirected to pagan gods. This is, incidentally, a confirmation of the fears animating Julian's school programme in his anticipation of a thoroughgoing cultural replacement on a massive scale.

Heldendämmerung

The treatment of the gods in *Oratio* 4 is the most concentrated association of vices with multiple pagan exemplars in Gregory's corpus. Demoen notes a number of loci in which pagan heroes and historical persons are depicted more positively than the gods; as he puts its, theological untruths are much worse than historical or literary untruths, which have their uses for Gregory.[89] For instance, he uses his own allegorical reading of the Scylla and Charybdis myth to warn readers of the dangers of allegorical readings of myths.

[88] Christian models do, however, occur *passim* in the orations against Julian.
[89] Demoen (1996) 228.

Demoen resolves the apparent paradox with the explanation that the warning is really about the gods, not myths *per se*.[90]

A systematic character study of the figures who appear in those myths, as they reappear in Nazianzen and his peers, is wanting. Here I will start by looking at what Gregory does with Homer, Heracles, Achilles, Agamemnon, and Odysseus. All of them are found in school texts documented in Cribiore (1996). These texts include evidence of basic literacy training, as when they show teachers offering hyperbolic praise for Homer, the author who will serve as a source for many of their students' activities over the years of education that will follow. Their praises could themselves serve as models for handwriting lessons, and thus be amongst the first sentences drilled into pupils' heads: "Homer was **a god, not a man**," reads a wax tablet in an early-stage learner's hand, one described as "alphabetic". In a different formulation on an ostrakon, in a somewhat more advanced, "evolving" hand, we have "a god, not a man, was Homer."[91]

Many of the texts mentioning the four heroes are rhetorical or progymnastic in form: narrations of Heracles' labours, a proposal by Agamemnon, ethopoeiae based on the *Odyssey*, even hexametric takes on Achilles. These are the sorts of exercises all of our authors would have been undertaking on a daily basis through their formative years.[92] I find that while they are not the objects of the same outright vitriol as the gods, they are

[90] Demoen (1996) 221–2.
[91] The wax tablet is dated to the Roman era by Cribiore (1996), item 200; the ostrakon is of the third century, item 209.
[92] In the inventories of Cribiore (1996), Heracles' name occurs twice in item 216; his labours are narrated in 344; and he is compared with the emperor in item 357. Achilles is found in item 175 in what she calls a "playful hexameter"; the *Iliad* occurs *passim* in the fragments. In item 146, an exercise in orthography, Agamemnon features with Iphigenia; the general is also made to pronounce an 'hypothesis' or proposed action, namely that the Trojans return Helen, in item 356. Odysseus as a character seems not to occur in ethopoeiae in the collection, but the *Odyssey* does, e.g. in items 264 and 279.

rarely cast in an unambiguously positive light—whether in the Christians or in the ex-Christian. It is clearly not just the gods at whom Gregory takes aim.[93]

Under each heading I start with Nazianzen and the qualities he foregrounds in the exemplar. I then turn to Julian; he generally has more to say than the other Christians, who follow. In each case I apply what I have called the exhaustive method.

Homer

Nazianzen: Homer is no god for Gregory. But he occupies an ambivalent place.[94] In the poem on virtue, like so many other pagans, he and his Muse are acknowledged as **limited artistic goods** before being counted **worthless in comparison** to a cultivation of the soul.[95] Homer gets some first-person time on stage in an ethopoeia in the context of Odysseus, whom, with Gregory ventriloquizing, Homer presents as a "**celebration of virtue**." The context for Homer's speech is a charge that Gregory levels at him: namely, that somewhere in his poems he calls virtue a kind of mercenary attendant of wealth (ὀπηδὸν εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν τῶν χρημάτων). In response, Homer denies that the verses in question are meant to convey his own meaning. This is an interesting hermeneutic principle that Gregory seems to be introducing in order to save the author of the central works of the paideutic canon. Once the author is distanced from certain objectionable lines, it seems that in principle he could escape blame for many more, and the air is cleared for the positive portion of Homer's defence to begin. Yet soon thereafter Homer ends up relativised and **inferior in virtue** against the backdrop of an ascendant Christian

[93] In fact, *Or.* 5.32 quickly rehearses grievances against the gods but immediately and seamlessly moves to a criticism of the heroes.
[94] See O'Connell (2019) and Wear (2021).
[95] Naz. *Carm.* 1.2.10 *De virtute* 42 (37.684); inspiration by Muse also at *Carm.* 2.1.41 *Adversus Maximum* 15–16 (37.1340).

culture.[96] He is "your Homer," as if **alien** to Gregory, even when he is quoting him.[97] He is "**illustrious** (κλεινός)" **as a poet**, but is among the "songsters (ἀοιδοπόλοι)" whom Nazianzen, on Christ's behalf, orders to **fall silent** when they mention the gods. He may sing compellingly of "**sufferings** (ἄλγεα)," but even when these approximate truth, they are **not divinely inspired**.[98] Inveighing against Julian, Gregory calls Homer a "comedian," i.e. an **unserious poet**, fond of **lying stories** in the first anti-Julianic invective, just as he was in Plato (though there with less suggestion of demon-worship), and even a petty riddle-solver. His **excessive zeal for knowledge** is made to be the cause of his death.[99] For all that, Nazianzen makes no attempt to hide his delight in using Homeric diction and references, and indeed positively revels in the practice.[100] His **style** is admirable, partly in that he is a very **terse and economical poet** (βραχυλογώτατος), managing to use few words to say a great deal, and so is a model for Laconicizers.[101]

Julian: Of our set, Julian predictably hews closest to the schoolroom line.[102] Quoted with and without attribution in Julian as much as Moses or David is in Christian authors, Homer is the **singer of deeds**, and with Hesiod, the **most venerable poet** and capable of teaching the cosmic order through **allegory**.[103] He is **faithful to the gods**, **divinely**

[96] Naz. *Carm.* 1.2.10 *De virtute* 399–411 (37.709–710). A Migne note *ad loc.* says that Billius noticed that charge against Homer seems mistaken, and that Hesiod should be the target; he quotes *Works and Days* with similar wording. The editors did not give the line numbers; they are Hes. *Op.* 312–313. Demoen (1996) 180 notes the locus in *Carm.* 1.2.10 as an ethopoeia only in passing; Crimi (1995) *ad* 399 sqq. sees Gregory positioning himself as an arbiter of Homer's meaning, and so in a way to identify with the poet: "Si tratta di una risposta, a carattere difensivo, messa in bocca ad Omero: così Gregorio 'segnala' di essere in grado di interpretare correttamente il pensiero del suo autore." But in his comments on the vainglory in the subsequent lines Crimi does not mention that Homer is caught up in Nazianzen's relativisation of pagan virtue. Basil in the *Ad adolescentes* VIII.13 gives Homer the benefit of the doubt where some lines seem to praise sloth; this trick is recommended in Plut. *Quomodo adul.* 19f, 33d–34a.
[97] Ὁ σὸς Ὅμηρος, in which the singular "your" could be complimentary, but the second person somewhat distancing. The same line refers to the way Homer "embellishes his poetry (ποικίλλει τὴν ποίησιν)" in Naz. *Ep.* 71.5 (to Eutropius).
[98] Naz. *Carm.* 2.2.7 *Ad Nemesium* 233–251 (37.1569–1570).
[99] Naz. *Or.* 4.71–2, 115.
[100] E.g. Naz. *Ep.* 5 (to Basil). References to his poetry, of course, are pervasive.
[101] Naz. *Ep.* 54.1 (to Nicobulus): Τὸ λακωνίζειν οὐ τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὅπερ οἴει, ὀλίγας συλλαβὰς γράφειν, ἀλλὰ περὶ πλείστων ὀλίγας.
[102] See Bouffartigue (1992) and Greenwood (2019).
[103] Jul. *Or.* 2, 54c–55a and 8, 250d; *Or.* 4, 136a–137c.

inspired, and **consecrated to the Muses** (alongside, it seems he wants to say, all other authors of the pagan canon).[104] Julian keeps Homer's poems along with Plato's writings as his most valuable possessions, almost treating them as an apotropaic amulet near his person when he does not have the leisure to read from them (an echo of Alexander).[105] Homer's praise of Penelope and others justifies Julian's **reverential gratitude to women** (at least to cousin-in-law Eusebia).[106] He is a **teacher of true kingship** and even a **lawgiver**, the **wise man** who established norms of hospitality.[107] If Homer has vices, they occur only in one text, and are stylistic: he sometimes **invents fantastic scenes**, his eye lingers on too much **trivial detail**; but in spite of the fantasies, he is **more historically trustworthy** than even sympathetic readers like Julian would expect.[108]

Basil: In a letter on Maximus' sudden disgrace Basil says he had once held Homer's poems to be mythical, but, giving an allegorical application of the *Odyssey* to the recent events, purports suddenly to find the poem **more plausible than he had expected**.[109] The same man is elsewhere said to face "an *Iliad* of evils besetting him (τὴν περιστᾶσαν αὐτὸν τῶν κακῶν Ἰλιάδα)."[110] To Nazianzen he describes the beauty of the Pontic retreat in Ogygian terms.[111] Effusive references to Homer and other classical writers and tales abound in the mutually fulsome correspondence with Libanius.[112] Libanius or an imitator even personifies his tongue, who then exclaims of Basil, "This man is Homer (Ὅμηρος

[104] Jul. *Ep.* 4 (to Oribasius); also *Ep.* 36 (*Letter on Christian Teachers*).
[105] Jul. *Ep.* 29, to his uncle, also a Julian; cf. Alexander in Jul. *Ep.* 12 (to Maximus).
[106] Jul. *Or.* 3, 104c–106b.
[107] Jul. *Or.* 2, 50a; *Ep.* 44 (to Eustathius) 416a (Ὅμηρος ὁ σοφὸς ἐνομοθέτησεν . . .). 'Wise' is an epithet, also at e.g. *Ep.* 63 (to Hecebolius) 387a.
[108] Jul. Or. 2, 60d, 52b–d, 55cd.
[109] Bas. *Ep.* 147 (to Aburgius). This sudden fall seems to indicate that he is the Maximus in *Ep.* 147–149, and thus possibly *praeses Cappadociae primae*, as *PLRE I s.v.* (23) would have it; but *PLRE* also identifies him with the tax-hungry church-persecutor of *Ep.* 98.3 (to Eusebius), which sits awkwardly with the sympathetic tone of *Ep.* 147–149. See below, Chapter 3, 139, note 73.
[110] Bas. *Ep.* 148 (to Trajan). The phrase κακῶν Ἰλιάς is standard and can be found at e.g. Dem. *Or.* 19.148 (*De falsa legatione*).
[111] Bas. *Ep.* 14.2 (to Gregory Nazianzen).
[112] We will see *Ep.* 345 in the context of Agamemnon below, 101 sqq. On the spurious letters, see Van Hoof (2016).

οὗτος ἀνήρ)!"[113] This tongue and Basil's seem to be very firmly in cheek, deployed for amusement amongst men of similar education and culture. Writing to a provincial governor, Basil relishes the fact that something akin to sauerkraut (κράμβαι ἐν ὄξει) is found more salutary for gubernatorial guts than the Homeric lotus or Olympian ambrosia.[114] Seeming to grant the poet's moral authority, Basil agrees with the interpreter who holds that "for Homer, all poetry praises virtue (πᾶσα μὲν ἡ ποίησις τῷ Ὁμήρῳ ἀρετῆς ἐστιν ἔπαινος)."[115] Wear (2018) argues that Basil leans on Homer (and Hesiod) when he feels confident that his audience is capable of allegorizing, but avoids or denigrates the epic poets before unsophisticated listeners or readers whom, in his view, the they would corrupt.[116]

Nyssen: This Gregory likes to tar Eunomius by association with paganism. At one point he uses Circe's transformative potion as the Eunomians' beverage of choice, this time effecting a metamorphosis not of bodies but of souls into a "state devoid of reason (ἐπὶ τὸ ἄλογον)" like that of the animals.[117] To correspondents he distances himself somewhat from Homer as from an **alien influence**, "the teacher of your manner of education," he says, even as he makes himself into a Laertes and his correspondents into Odysseus and Telemachus.[118] Lexical borrowings and other allusions have been found in Nyssen's works, epistolary and otherwise; Homer as a figure probably does not escape the ambiguity of having sung about the gods and yet having been the source of poetry that

[113] Libanius to Basil, Bas. *Ep.* 355. There he is also called Plato, Aristotle, and Susarion. See Courtonne (1966) 202 note 1 on the very doubtful character of much of the Basil-Libanius correspondence starting especially *Ep.* 347–356; *Ep.* 336–346 and 358–359 are plausibly authentic, but must be treated cautiously.
[114] Bas. *Ep.* 186 (to Antipatros).
[115] Bas. *Ad adolescentes* V.7. He adds, "for him, everything points to this, except what is incidental (καὶ πάντα αὐτῷ πρὸς τοῦτο φέρει, ὅ τι μὴ πάρεργον)." Odysseus is then singled out.
[116] Wear (2018) 607.
[117] Nyss. *Contra Eunomium* 3.2.77.
[118] Nyss. *Ep.* 11.2 (ad Eupatrium).

Nyssen found delightful. In an echo of his brother, he uses the poems to describe the beauty of Venota to another correspondent.[119]

Summary: If there is a virtue to be attributed to Homer on the basis of our authors' many playful allusions to his works, it is that of **style and aesthetic taste**, and this is a point on which all our authors agree. Basil and Nazianzen take him as a singer of virtue, and while Julian does not spell this out in quite the same way, it is implicit in his deed-singing and lawgiving bard. Homer's flaws are signalled as often as his merits in Nazianzen. Basil, by contrast, does not call attention to his vices directly even when criticizing stories of the immoral gods. Nyssen avoids mentioning him almost entirely, and when he does it is coolly.

On balance, Homer is overwhelmingly positive in Julian, who has only mild criticisms which sometimes agree with Nazianzen's, on e.g. descriptions of trivial things. But note that this is where Basil, Nyssen, and indeed Julian and Nazianzen constantly take delight in Homer: the little details that can be deployed unexpectedly to bring a dash of epic colour to everyday life.

Heracles[120]

Nazianzen: Heracles is a champion of **incontinence** and **promiscuity**. In *Oratio* 4 Nazianzen mocks Heracles' one-night stand with the fifty daughters of Thestius as the hero's 'thirteenth labour', a feat which he cheekily likens to competitive wrestling with the participle ἐναθλεύων. Gregory implies that Heracles' prowess indeed makes him worthy

[119] Nyss. *Ep.* 20 (ad Adelphium scholasticum), *Ep.* 27 (ad Stagirium) (*GNO VIII/2*, 68–72, 85).
[120] Heracles appears in divinised form under the catalogue of the gods from the first oration against Julian, but since all the episodes there justifying his viciousness are drawn from his career as a mortal, I treat him here.

of being called a god, by Greek standards (ἵν' ἐκ τούτων ὀνομάσθῃ θεός).[121] This prodigious exhibition of lust is likely to produce the same vice in others.[122] But Heracles has other vices, too. His epithets show as much. He was conceived on a night the duration of which his father, Zeus, lustfully tripled, and the shame follows the child in his title Τριέσπερος. Another epithet, found in cultic contexts associated with a bull-slaying episode at Lindus, is Βουθοίνας, "Cattle-Feaster," and serves as a testament to his **gluttony**. And surely only a **base and vulgar** man would be called Μελάμπυγος, the "black-bottomed one."[123] The awful **crimes** he committed in his **delirium**, it seems, should count for more in assessing his character than the fact that the madness was sent by Hera.[124] Nazianzen suggests that Heracles' death, however painful and (he imputes) admirable in pagan eyes, was really some combination of bad luck and **punitive justice** for all the wickedness he did on account of his vicious attachment to women (ἐξ ἀτυχήματος καὶ τῶν περὶ γυναῖκας ἀδικημάτων). There is nothing noble about his agonizing demise. By contrast, the Christian martyrs suffer and die because they are faithful to Christ, and therefore genuinely admirable.[125] Heracles is **admired by Cynics**, but Christ supplants him, both in Christians' lives and in Gregory's songs.[126] He is probably the hero meant when **slaying beasts** is mentioned, a feat which, if impressive, is not truly glorious.[127] In general, Heracles plays the **foil to Christian virtue**. In an epitaph and in an epistolary poem, Heracles and several others are told to "drop the myths (λήξατε

[121] Naz. *Or*. 4.77.
[122] Naz. *Or*. 4.122.
[123] Naz. *Or*. 4.77.
[124] Gluttony implied by this epithet or location at Naz. *Or*. 4.77, 4.103, 4.122, and *Carm*. 2.2.7 *Ad Nemesium* 278 (37.1573); delirium at *Or*. 5.32. The story of Heracles' madness is told by e.g. Euripides in *Hercules furens* (and by Seneca in a play of the same name).
[125] Naz. *Or*. 4.70; see also *Carm.* 1.2.15 *De exterioris hominis vilitate* 87–88 (37.772).
[126] Naz. *Carm*. 2.1.11 *De vita sua* 975 (37.1096) (I extrapolate here a bit from the context: his embarrassing duping by the pseudo-Cynic-Christian Maximus); *Carm.* 2.1.34 *In silentium ieiunii* 71–72 (37.1512) (μέλπω . . . οὐ πολὺν Ἡρακλέα).
[127] One of many empty worldly goods at *Carm.* 2.1.88 *Ad suam animam carmen Anacreonticum* 50 (37.1437); also *Epig*. 88.1–2; for the doubtfulness of the virtue suggested in the latter locus see below on Odysseus and the grave-robber, 105 sqq.

μῦθον), for you are mortal, and not blessed in what your soul undergoes (οὐ μάκαρες παθέεσσιν)."[128] Implied is their **false divinisation**. In what was surely meant as an affront to their masculinity, they are surpassed by Gregory's mother, a "thrice-blessed" woman whose manly spirit allows her to scorn the world and chart a sure course through life as a "Christ-bearer and servant of the cross."[129]

Yet in some sense Heracles is **great amongst men**. His greatness is partly because of **friendship**, namely in having Iolaus as a fellow fighter (συναγωνιζόμενος) against the Hydra.[130] Aesthetic feats are sometimes compared to Heracles' **great deeds**; even in the polemical orations, Heracles is not construed as being univocally wicked. Hercules raised (or revealed by smashing an opening between) the two 'pillars' that bear his name and mark the westernmost extremity of the Mediterranean (Gibraltar and Djebel Musa). Gregory's twin invectives against Julian, on the other hand, amount to a "pillar (στήλη)[131] more lofty and more widely visible than the Pillars of Heracles," which, however famous, can be seen only in their proximity. By contrast, Nazianzen confidently declares, his rhetorical feats will make Julian's infamy known everywhere. Heracles' own feats are exemplary in this locus in a way that is neutral or faintly positive, and it is used as a foil for Gregory's surpassing achievement. The discourses are not neutral statements of fact, but like the bounds of the Mediterranean, and with even more at stake, serve an apotreptic function, making Julian into a negative exemplar.[132] Finally, Nazianzen has a ten-line

[128] Naz. *Anth. Pal.* VIII, 29.1–3 [= *Epitaph.* 70.1–3 (*PG* 38.47)]; *Carm.* 2.2.7 *Ad Nemesium* 286–290 (*PG* 37.1573).
[129] Naz. *Anth. Pal.* VIII, 29.4–7 [= *Epitaph.* 70.4–7 (*PG* 38.47)].
[130] Naz. *Ep.* 156 (to Asterius). The chorus in Eur. *Ion* 190–200 sings of the two undertaking these toils together, albeit with different verbs.
[131] Pindar speaks of "raising a pillar whiter than Parian stone (στάλαν θέμεν Παρίου λίθου λευκοτέραν)" with his ode to Callicles. Pind. *Nem.* 4.79–81.
[132] Naz. *Or.* 5.42; also *Carm.* 1.2.28 *Adversus opum amantes* 334–5 (37.880). Sometimes a favour for a friend, he modestly says, is "not Herculean (οὐδὲ Ἡράκλειος)," *Ep.* 52 (to Nicobulus). Demoen sees him at *Carm.* 2.1.32 *De vitae huius vanitate etc.* 20–21 (37.1302) as ἀγῶσι / Κύδιμος, but his glory in these contests is almost immediately relativised.

poem listing ten great things in his life, some of which have happened to him, and some of which he himself has done. Demoen lists this as a possible reference to Heracles, presumably to the originally ten labours (later bumped up to twelve) set him by Eurystheus.[133] If so, however, the allusion is again one in which a Christian churchman surpasses the pagan great.

Julian: For Julian, Heracles is a nearly straightforward exemplar of the **life of virtue**. At least twice in Julian we find nods to the tale reported by Prodicus, in which Heracles, at a crossroads, is confronted by two women who try to persuade him to follow their respective paths. He nobly chooses the haggard and wizened personification of Lady Virtue over voluptuous Courtesan Vice.[134] Heracles also serves as a general exemplar of **good and virtuous deeds**.[135] He is **uncowed by the elements**, **mighty**, and **tireless in his labours**.[136] Wise men saw his **kingly virtue** and called him **divine**; Julian says Zeus "begot him as the **saviour of the world** (τῷ κόσμῳ σωτῆρα ἐφύτευσεν)."[137] In his Saturnalian round-up of his imperial predecessors, Julian employs this divinised Heracles as a model of the **glorious victor** (καλλίνικος), an **exemplar for Alexander**, and a **moderating influence** on the latter.[138] Julian notes that while rivalling Heracles' deeds, Alexander also admired Diogenes of Sinope. Not coincidentally, he emphasizes that Heracles was also a **model for the better sort of Cynics**.[139] Along with a pre-divinised Dionysus, Heracles is a **philosopher-king** whom Themistius has called Julian to imitate by purging land and sea of evildoers, i.e. exercising **martial power for justice**.[140] Julian

[133] Naz. *Carm.* 2.1.93 *Aliud in seipsum* (37.1448).
[134] Jul. *Or.* 2, 56d; 7, 217ab. See Greenwood (2014) on the characters of Julian's 'divine personae'.
[135] Jul. *Or.* 2, 96cd.
[136] Jul. *Or.* 7, 219b–d; 2, 62bc; *Ad Themistium*, 264ab.
[137] Jul. *Or.* 2, 82ac; 7, 219b–220b.
[138] Jul. *Caesares* 324d–325a
[139] Jul. *Or.* 7, 211d; 6, 188bd.
[140] Jul. *Ad Themistium* 253d.

abhors the comedians who mock Heracles on stage.[141] Although his **glory-craving motivation** is a vicious demerit, it seems a slight one for Julian, and one Julian is reluctant to believe can be true; it is the only vice I find in Julian's Heracles.[142]

There is a long and mostly Platonic commentary tradition on a line in the *Odyssey* about Heracles' shade being in Hades while the real Heracles dined on Olympus.[143] Pépin (1971) documents this tradition from Plutarch through Plotinus and Porphyry to Proclus, showing that it features a variety of anthropological interpretations involving parts or aspects of the body and soul: σῶμα, εἴδωλον, ψυχή, and νοῦς, with many variations.[144] Terminological and possibly real differences aside, common to all of these is the notion that the highest such component is identical to our true being; the lower parts are less than what we truly are.[145] A remark in Julian's most theological treatise, *On the Mother of the Gods,* suggests that he is engaging with this tradition. There he says not only that Heracles' soul is "immaculate and pure (ψυχῆς ἀχράντου καὶ καθαρᾶς)," but also that he has returned as a "whole being" to his similarly "whole" father, Zeus.[146] In itself the emphasis on being whole (ὅλος) is tangential to the context, which is meant to show the superiority of the immaterial to the material and the procession and return of the soul. While integration is clearly relevant here, it seems less gratuitous if we suppose that he is taking a side in this question of Homeric philosophical hermeneutics. He either disagreed

[141] Jul. *Or.* 7, 204ab; *Misopogon* 366c.
[142] Jul. *Or.* 2, 96cd.
[143] Hom. *Od.* 11.601–604: Τὸν δὲ μετ' εἰσενόησα βίην Ἡρακλείην, / εἴδωλον · αὐτὸς δὲ μετ' ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι / τέρπεται ἐν θαλίῃς καὶ ἔχει καλλίσφυρον Ἥβην, / παῖδα Διὸς μεγάλοιο καὶ Ἥρης χρυσοπεδίλου. I owe my awareness of the commentary tradition on this passage to a conversation with Prof. Carlos Steel.
[144] Pépin (1971) 171–183. Writers noted by Pépin whose names do not begin with 'P' include Lucian and Servius, each of whom is also marginal in other ways to the tradition highlighted.
[145] Pépin (1971) 186, 190–192 shows that this intuiton can be traced to Plato, or close enough: the possibly pseudepigraphic *Alcibiades I*, 133bc seems to be the source of the equivalence of 'highest' and 'true self'. Pépin hypothesizes that Plato's own ban on Homeric eschatology at *Resp.* III, 386b–387b accounts for his refusal to use the verses that enjoyed such currency in later Platonism to illustrate his anthropology; but he may allude to them in other contexts.
[146] Jul. *Or.* 5, 166d–167b. ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτῷ νῦν *Ἡρακλεῖ ὅλῳ πρὸς ὅλον κεχωρηκότι τὸν πατέρα* ῥᾴων ἡ τούτων ἐπιμέλεια καθέστηκεν ἢ πρότερον ἦν, ὅτε ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις σαρκία φορῶν ἐστρέφετο.

with any dissection of Heracles, or else took an extreme immaterialist stance on that 'highest part' as our real self, a man's αὐτός, totally exclusive of anything else.

Basil: Years after Julian's death, Basil tells the tale of 'Hercules Prodicius' in the highly virtue-centric *Ad adolescentes*. This was evidently something that pagans and Christians could both lay claim to in the same way and put to the same proximate ends. Basil retells the whole story at some length, trying to bring the exemplar as close to his young audience as possible: "When Heracles was quite a young man, and just about the same age that you are now, he was trying to determine which of two paths he would take."[147] The inclusion of Heracles as a **paragon of virtue** is noteworthy enough, given the work he does on the side of vice for Nazianzen; but the fact that Basil includes the detail about Heracles **becoming a god** as a reward for his virtues (ἆθλον δὲ τούτων εἶναι θεὸν γενέσθαι) is striking.[148]

Nyssen: Gregory of Nyssa sees even less use for Heracles than either his brother or his friend, giving him just one mention, which occurs alongside Dionysus and Minos in the jab at Eunomius discussed above, where the three appear as **fictitious demigods, not truly divine**.[149]

Summary: Heracles is a polarizing figure. In spite of showing *camaraderie* in performing great deeds, he is mostly vicious in Nazianzen, and almost entirely virtuous in Julian. Basil mentions a few important virtues but no vices. Nyssen keeps mostly silent. Points of overlap are revealing and mostly concern the virtues: Nazianzen can grudgingly agree with Julian that Heracles is a doer of great deeds. Basil and Julian can agree that he is a symbol of the virtuous life and, strikingly, that there is some sense in his divinisation

[147] Bas. *Ad adolescentes* V.14–16.
[148] Bas. *Ad adolescentes* V.16.
[149] Nyss. *Contra Eunomium* 2.1.619.

on the grounds of this virtue. Clearly not all Christians found the crossroads story apt: after spending so much time highlighting Heracles' vices, Nazianzen may have felt him to be an awkward exemplar of the choice for virtue, and does not make use of this episode, despite writing long poems on virtue and the choice between divergent paths. Nazianzen and Nyssen are both happy to point out that this divinisation is false. Julian is less ready here than we will see him elsewhere to point out the hero's vices, and is silent on the episodes over which Nazianzen is happy to gloat.

Achilles

Nazianzen: Achilles (and Patroclus) may be the exemplars of Homeric heroes showing **friendship in wartime** in one of Gregory's short letters.[150] This is the closest Achilles comes to virtue. Elsewhere he is **wrathful** and of raging hand—the cause of his death.[151] Achilles' sole appearance in Nazianzen's orations is in the eulogy for Basil. There he is the unnamed but probable allusion in an account of the **pedagogy** he received from the centaur—the unnamed Chiron, called διδάσκαλον ἡρώων. Both the rustic setting of Achilles' education and its lopsidedly martial contents are disparaged: "some Thessalian mountain cave (Θετταλικόν τι καὶ ὄρειον ἄντρον)" was "the workshop of [Achilles'] virtue (ἀρετῆς ἐργαστήριον)," and he did little other than train in the **arts of war and hunting**. This is immediately juxtaposed with Basil's upbringing, and contrasted with what Gregory presents as its two pillars: both ἐγκύκλιος παίδευσις and Christian piety, θεοσεβεία, which harmonized with a view to Basil's future perfection (πρὸς τὴν μέλλουσαν τελειότητα).[152] Interestingly, Homer had suggested that one of the most

[150] Naz. *Ep.* 71.5 (to Eutropius).
[151] Naz. *Ep.* 176.3 (to Eudoxius); μαινομένῃ παλάμῃ at *Carm.* 1.2.15 *De exterioris hominis vilitate* 86 (37.772); στερῥοτέρην ἀδάμαντος ἐνὶ φρεσὶ μῆνιν ἔχοντα at *Carm.* 2.2.3 *Ad Vitalianum* 136 (37.1490).
[152] Naz. *Or.* 43.12.

important of the disciplines taught by the centaur to Achilles and others was that of medicine; while Gregory will go on to praise Basil's medical expertise later, here he studiously avoids mention of Chiron's proficiency in the arts of healing, presumably to heighten the contrast archaic learning and that of his Christian friend.[153] This is a juxtaposition also meant to embarrass learned pagans of his day. While they would not have been impressed by Christian θεοσέβεια as an element of the Basilian curriculum, they would have rallied round the ἐγκύκλιος παίδευσις, and may have felt the sting of their archetypical student having much more in common in educational experience with the barbarian warlords who had so recently trounced them at Adrianople than with the culture of παιδεία, the persistence of which was threatened by these awkwardly Achillean hordes. The prime pagan exemplar of traditional education is turned against that very tradition as a glib and unsatisfying allusion that fails on its own terms. Once, Nazianzen lifts Achilles' self-description as "burdensome to the earth (ἄχθος ἀρούρης)"[154] for use in an exhortation to consecrated virgins. While he stops short of attributing that condition to Achilles, it is striking that Gregory Nazianzen feels free to make the captor of Briseis, suitor of Polyxena, admirer of Penthesilea, father of Neoptolemus by Deidamia, and possible lover of Patroclus feature at all in an argument for virginity.[155]

Julian: Achilles' vices are clear from his first appearance, where in **opposing the king** he is **wrathful**, **reckless**, and **savage**. He is plausibly guilty of **dereliction of his duty to fight**.[156] Achilles' **merciless slaughter of captives** counts against him, as does, to a lesser extent, his **motivation by glory**.[157] Yet his virtues are laudable. The facts that Achilles is a **victim of hubris** (Agamemnon's), and that Julian identifies with him, suggest that his is a

[153] See e.g. Hom. *Il.* 11.828–832; Naz. 43.23.
[154] Hom. *Il.* 18.104.
[155] Naz. *Carm.* 1.2.2 *Praecepta ad virgines* 138–140 (37.589–590).
[156] Jul. *Or.* 2, 49cd.
[157] Jul. *Or.* 2, 58b, 96b–d.

righteous anger.[158] He is an exemplar of **martial virtue**: he is invincible in combat, and terrible to behold when wearing Hephaestus' armour.[159] While he may be a shirker for reasons of pride, his coping mechanism—**musical consolation** and the singing of heroes—is an admirable substitute for open opposition to the king.[160] That he is ultimately **penitent** (μεταμελόμενος) for making the conflict worse is to his credit.[161] In *Caesars*, Julian's Achilles is an exemplar for both Alexander and Marcus Aurelius: for the former, of martial prowess, and for the latter, **love of his wife** (perhaps appealing to the depth of Achilles' grief for Briseis).[162] Elsewhere he is blessed with Athena's **divine guidance** and with having his **deeds sung by Homer**.[163]

Summary: Neither Basil nor Gregory of Nyssa appears to have any use for Achilles at all. Nazianzen's Achilles—the ideal of non-Christian Hellenism—is educated to be little more than a barbaric huntsman, a formation surpassed by Christian *paideia*. He and Julian both recall him as wrathful, but Julian gives us more or less the nuanced Achilles of the *Iliad*, with virtues and vices in equal measure.

Agamemnon

Nazianzen: While in Synesius Agamemnon could still appear as a positive model of kingship,[164] in Gregory he turns up as, at best, a positive example of **a son bearing a father's legacy**, and here there is little of ethical commendation. He is an example of the **vain glory of military conquest without virtue**, or the sufferer of a **terrible fate**, or the

[158] Jul. *Or.* 2, 50a.
[159] Jul. *Or.* 2, 60d–61a, 53bc.
[160] Jul. *Or.* 2, 49cd.
[161] Jul. *Or.* 2, 50a.
[162] Jul. *Caesares* 324d-325a, 334d.
[163] Jul. *Or.* 8.249b, 8.250d.
[164] Syn. *De reg.* 13.6.

equal of Irus, the gruel-eating beggar in Odysseus' house: both are nothing more than dust and bones (. . . ἴη κόνις, ὀστέα μοῦνα, / ἥρως Ἀτρείδης, Ἶρος ἀλητοβόρος).[165]

Julian: Julian has very little good to say about Agamemnon. Ostensibly, he deserves **respect for being king**. When he is wrong, he is ultimately just as **penitent** as Achilles.[166] He is **indifferent and unperturbed by rash speech** (namely, that of Thersites).[167] So far, so good, perhaps. Somewhat ambiguous is his function as an exemplar of **vengeance** as he attempts to recover Helen for his brother.[168] But Julian's Agamemnon is overwhelmingly vicious. He himself acts **immoderately** and **uncivilly** (οὐδὲ . . . μετρίως καὶ πολιτικῶς) towards his subordinate general, against whom he **commits hubris**.[169] He shows **ineptitude in reconciliation**.[170] Given the comparison with the hated Constantius II, it is clear that the ostensible praises for legitimate sovereignty and dynastic succession are meant sarcastically. Julian's Agamemnon is a paragon of **arbitrary and unjust rule** as well as **familial disaster**.[171]

Basil: The bishop of Caesarea does not seem to make use of Agamemnon, although in a roundabout request for pardon Libanius recalls the portion of the *Iliad* in which the Greek cause is faring poorly and Agamemnon makes overtures to the sulking Achilles.[172]

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[165] Naz. *Carm.* 1.2.10 *De virtute* 36 (37.683), unnamed, but where his conquest of Troy is counted as nothing; *Carm.* 1.2.15 *De exterioris hominis vilitate* 86 (37.772) (but only if, as Billius suspected, Gregory meant Agamemnon by mistake and made him one of the Ἀιακίδαι, whose fates as Gregory describes them have caused controversy; Caillau rejects the identification with Agamemnon, in *PG ad loc*.); in the same poem, a few lines later, l. 94, as teh ἥρως Ἀτρείδης compared to Irus; and 2.2.4 *Nicobuli filii ad patrem* 127–9 (37.1515) (where he is unnamed, but because of the ivory shoulder and the transmission of the sceptre from fathers to sons, the reference is clearly to Agamemnon, along with Menelaus).
[166] Jul. *Or.* 2, 50a–d (respect due him is implicit in the censure of Achilles).
[167] Jul. *Ep.* 50 (to Nilus) 445b.
[168] Jul. *Or.* 2, 95bc.
[169] Jul. *Or.* 2, 49d–50a.
[170] Jul. *Or.* 2, 75bc.
[171] Jul. *Or.* 2, 50d, 51bc; see below, Coda to Chapter 3, 178 and Greenwood (2019).
[172] Libanius to Basil, in Bas. *Ep.* 345. This letter belongs to the plausibly authentic part of their correspondence: Courtonne (1966) 202 note 1.

Summary: Agamemnon seems to play no role in Nyssen's corpus or in Basil's own writings. With a heaping dose of charity we can find virtues in Julian's Agamemnon. Alongside this, though, we see that he and Nazianzen have a similar view of the man. The second panegyric for Constantius II is the only occasion on which Julian names this son of Atreus, with one epistolary exception. All other comparisons are with Constantius. This offers us a window onto the way Julian reads the *Iliad*.

Odysseus

Odysseus has been recognised as a major exemplar subject to contested interpretation both in intra-pagan and pagan-Christian reception history. But two significant contributions on this question in recent years do not address Nazianzen: Montiglio (2011) methodologically focuses on the pagan reception to the exclusion of Christian material, and Pépin (1982) is more concerned with Clement of Alexandria and even pre-Clementine sources (though as the narrative includes Ambrose, the omission of the Cappadocians is surprising). Our authors' appearances in Moraw (2020) are scant and concern Penelope or monsters more often than they do Odysseus.[173]

Nazianzen: In *Carm.* 1.2.10 *De virtute*, Gregory has Homer present Odysseus as being himself "obviously a **celebration of virtue**." The reasons adduced are his many **travails at sea**; his ability to put Nausicaa at ease in spite of his nudity, in which I would infer a judgement of his **temperance**; and the **honour he held amongst noble people**, namely the Phaeacians.[174] Gregory seems to endorse this statement of the hero's merits at face

[173] Moraw (2020) 52, 88, 124–5, 162, 165–8, 172–3, 178, 224, 246, 253, 262–7.
[174] Οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖ σοι . . . Ὀδυσσεὺς ἐκεῖνος . . . εἶναι προδήλως τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐγκώμιον; Naz. *Carm.* 1.2.10 *De Virtute* 401–406 (37.709). Regarding his temperance, it may be objected that Odysseus is merely being tactful, and that it takes no great measure of temperance not to act badly when discovered naked and shipwrecked by members of a royal household. But he does not reprise his behaviour from earlier island dalliances: he refuses to abandon his mission by exploiting Nausicaa's evident feelings, and in this he

value, at least as far as they go. But when he speaks again in the voice of the poem's narrator and thus implicitly returns to a comparison with Christianity, he has no praise for Odysseus' virtue. "What use to me are foreign tales and teachings (τί μοι ξένων μύθων τε καὶ διδαγμάτων)?"[175] Odysseus recedes as a **negative foil to Christian virtues**.

Odysseus is named explicitly in a letter to Eustochius the sophist, who has blamed Nazianzen for his own protégé Nicobulus' departure for his rival teacher Stagirius. Loss of students, and thus income, often left teachers leading financially precarious existences, as Augustine complained, and as Cribiore has demonstrated was a widespread phenomenon.[176] Gregory alludes to Agamemnon's conciliatory lines at *Iliad* 14.103–108 to mollify his correspondent right from his very salutation, positioning his addressee as Odysseus.[177] Both the direct citation of Homer and the identification of Eustochius with the **paragon of eloquence** seem meant to flatter Eustochius and soften his rage, perhaps so that he might lower his guard ahead of the vehement counterattack which Nazianzen is preparing to unleash a few lines later. His eloquence is also **prudent**, and it is for this prudent speech (μύθοισιν πυκινοῖσιν) that Nausicaa can respect him.[178] Within a few years of leaving Athens Nazianzen can play with a line of Odysseus' to Demodocus (albeit butchering the metre in the process) and write to Basil as to one who knows the interior life.[179] It is possible that, just as Odysseus feigns ignorance of the Trojan horse (the object of his request) and flatters Demodocus with purported knowledge of the matter, so, too, is

paradoxically justifies them. In the context of general virtue, one lexical allusion which could be explored for its exemplarism is *Carm.* 1.2.2 *Praecepta ad virgines* 129–133 (37.589–590), where Alcinous' luxurious lifestyle is a delight for which it would *not* be worth choosing vice. Implicitly, in choosing not to pursue Nausicaa's hand and in returning instead to Penelope, Telemachus, Laertes, and Ithaca, Odysseus makes the choice for virtue, but all this is unstated.

[175] Naz. *Carm.* 1.2.10 *De Virtute* 412 (37.710).

[176] E.g. Cribiore (2001a) Chapter 2, "Teachers and Their Burden," *passim*.

[177] Naz., *Ep.* 190. Migne misidentifies the lines as being pronounced by Menelaus.

[178] Naz. *Carm.* 2.2.5 *Nicobuli patris ad filium* 203–213 (37.1536–1537). The menace of his eloquence is remembered in an allusion to Antenor's speech at *Il.* 3.215 sqq., in Naz. *Ep.* 10.8 (to Candidianus).

[179] Naz. *Ep.* 5 (to Basil), dated to 361: Gallay (1964).

Nazianzen subtly implying that he actually knows more than his friend and rival Basil about the interior life. In another letter, Odysseus' epithet πολύτλας, "**much-suffering**," is lifted and applied to a priest.[180]

Odysseus is also a possible identification in an epigram that sets up a contrast between "one who went down to Hades," along with several other heroes, on the one hand, and a grave-robber on the other. Taken straightforwardly, Nazianzen is using the heroes as virtuous contrasts, exemplars of **impressive deeds**, in order to shame the grave-robber with a bit of sarcasm for having done a deed "not second to [i.e. no less than] theirs by breaching this grave with his impious hands."[181] But two other possibilities deserve mention. For one, it trivialises and thus slightly **denigrates these deeds** even being mentioned in the context of a petty grave-robber. Second, it is possible that Gregory is being more earnest than sarcastic here. Since both Odysseus (or other visitor of the underworld) and all the other heroes alluded to (Daedalus/Icarus, Heracles, Prometheus) all violated some kind of divine order, they in fact stand in appropriate and unironic company with the prosaic workaday grave-robber of fourth-century Cappadocia: the heroes of Hellenic culture are **common crooks**.

Demoen notes that a poem dedicated to Nemesius contains part of Odysseus' journey, namely past Scylla and Charybdis, where it is framed as an unnecessary one full of dangers: Nazianzen makes it represent pagan attempts to make sense of God through their mythologies, which suffer shipwreck in bizarre allegorizations.[182] Demoen does not take Odysseus as being exemplarised here for any vice, but I suggest that behind the pagan

[180] Naz. *Ep.* 209 (to Castor).
[181] See inventory, Demoen (1996) 430. *Epigram* 88 (38.125) runs: Ἤλυθεν εἰς ἀίδην τις· ὁ δ' ἔπτατο, ἄλλος ὄλεσσεν / Θῆρας, ὁ δὲ πλεκτὸν υἱέϊ τεῦξε δόμον. / Τούτων οὗτος ἀνὴρ οὐ δεύτερον ἔργον ἔρεξεν, / Τόνδε τάφον ῥήξας χείρεσιν οὐχ ὁσίαις. Demoen offers Odysseus, Orpheus, Theseus, or Peirithous as identifications for the Hades-goer, then Icarus (I do not see why this could not also be Daedalus), Heracles, and Prometheus (with the son being Deucalion) for the subsequent respective allusions in ll. 1-2.
[182] Naz. *Carm.* 2.2.7 *Ad Nemesium* 148–159 (37.1562–1563); Demoen (1996), 220–221, note 52; also 304.

theological prurience which he criticizes is Odysseus' **vain and dangerous curiosity**. Another poem uses his epithet "of many turns (πολύτροπος)" as an indication of a chamaeleonesque **fickleness** of character, which should disqualify a candidate for the episcopate.[183]

In the second oration against Julian, Gregory identifies Basil and himself with Odysseus as a **threatened but dangerous captive** while comparing Julian to the Cyclops.[184] Julian has not persecuted the two Christian friends yet, but only because he is saving them for last, just as the Cyclops said he would eat Odysseus last after eating all his comrades.[185] The comparison is laboured, and assumes that Julian planned to persecute them with force; there is in fact little evidence of violent persecution during his reign. On Nazianzen's terms, however, he is associating a self-appointed champion of classical Hellenism, Julian, with the classical paragon of barbarism, Polyphemus, who, like other Cyclopes, leads an isolated existence, knows no city or shared social life, is pointedly committed to lawless deeds (ἀθεμίστια[186]), and who moreover violates that most Olympian of virtues, hospitality. As for the figure of Odysseus, it seems likely that here it is more important for Gregory to strip Julian of the possibility of identifying with the hero who, in Neoplatonist allegory, came to represent the soul in search of the One.[187] Julian, at any rate, would have felt the barb, since he also uses the Cyclopes as exemplars of brute strength who, however powerful, are nonetheless ungraced by divine favour.[188]

[183] Naz. *Carm.* 2.1.12 *De seipso et de episcopis* 746 (37.1220).
[184] Naz. *Or.* 5.39. This locus is not listed under 'Odysseus' or 'Cyclopes' in Demoen's inventories, although it is found under 'Polyphemus'.
[185] Hom. *Od*. 9.369.
[186] Hom. *Od.* 9.189.
[187] Pépin (1982).
[188] Jul. *Or.* 8, 250b.

Elsewhere, Gregory refers to stuffing one's ears with wax against vicious speech, while keeping them open to good things.[189] If taken strictly, this allusion to *Od.* XII would mean a kind of censure of Odysseus, who left his ears open to perilous song.[190] But we will presently see that Basil applies the same image, albeit much more audaciously, in a way that would keep Odysseus in the right. Gregory's use is indeterminate on this point.

Julian: For Julian, Odysseus is often presented as a **thoroughly virtuous** figure. He shows **endurance** (καρτερία) in his wanderings as one who **undertook many toils**.[191] Although appearances in Julian's orations for Constantius should raise red flags, the virtues ascribed to Odysseus there—**generalship**, **eloquence**, and **worldly-wise educational experiences** amounting to a well-rounded *Bildung*—are nonetheless traditional enough that their mentions do not seem insincere when applied to the wandering king of Ithaca; they are only suspicious when applied to Constantius.[192] Amongst these Odyssean virtues, Julian says that Odysseus' eloquence is superior to his military skills.[193] The Phaeacians are awed when he tells them his name, roughly as in Nazianzen; but the context praises not so much his general virtue as his **eloquence**, just as in Nazianzen.[194] The wanderer's **respite amongst strangers**, the Phaeacians, is a model for Julian's father on his sojourn in Corinth.[195] His reputation for **intelligence**, **prudence**, or **cleverness** is highlighted with various epithets mostly drawn from Homer: συνετός, πολύφρων, ἐχέφρων, ἀγχίνοος, ἐπητής, even σοφός. What is more, he is a **friend of the**

[189] Naz. *Carm.* 1.2.33 *Tetrastichae sententiae* 65–67 (37.933): Κηρῷ τὰ ὦτα φράσσε πρὸς φαύλους λόγους / ᾠδῶν τε τερπνῶν ἐκμελῆ λυγίσματα· / τοῖς δ' αὖ καλοῖς τε κἀγαθοῖς ἀεὶ δίδου.
[190] Hom. *Od.* 12.165–200.
[191] Jul. *Or.* 8, 249d; 3, 113cd.
[192] Julian's sarcastic point will thus not be that Odysseus as exemplar is not as he is described, but that the one being compared, i.e. Constantius, lacks the traits which Odysseus does have; see below, Coda to Chapter 3, 178. For Julian on Odysseus' generalship and eloquence, see *Or.* 1, 32b and *Or.* 3, 113c; oratorical prowess and shrewd counsel, *Or.* 2, 75bc and *Or.* 3, 113c; wide experience of the world, which functions as a kind of education, *Or.* 1, 12c–13a.
[193] Jul. *Or.* 1, 32bc.
[194] Jul. *Ep.* 67 (to George) 377cd.
[195] Jul. *frag.* 3 (Wright), quoted in Libanius, *Oratio* 14 (to Julian on behalf of Aristophanes), 29–30.

gods (θεοφιλής).[196] His stifling of Eurycleia is invoked to encourage others to keep decorous silence.[197] Apparently virtuous is his even more **vehement silencing** of the free-speaking Thersites in the *Iliad*.[198] A **good wife and his love for her** motivate his return; he can be totally **honest with his wife**, whom he **treats as a partner (κοινωνός)**.[199] Odysseus' *sailors* also serve Julian as cautionary exemplars of men trapped in evils while in pursuit of some good end, both when languishing in beastly form at Circe's and when stranded in opiate indifference in the land of the Lotus-Eaters.[200]

Julian's Odysseus suffers **isolation**.[201] His **deficiencies in beauty** (τὸ κάλλος), **strength** (ἡ ἰσχύ), and **wealth** (ὁ πλοῦτος) are flaws that in no way diminish his virtue.[202] Worse, however, is that his **eloquence is sometimes defective**, exacerbating problems rather than solving them.[203] His other vices are **despair** and **self-pity** as he endures Calypso's indefinite hospitality on Ogygia, and a **vain or excessive concern for glory** as a motivation of his good deeds, heightened by **querulous sensitivity to slander**.[204] But Julian defends him from claims that his pitiful supplication of Nausicaa makes him ignoble and craven (ἀγεννής, δειλός).[205]

Basil: Basil makes significant use of Odysseus, who first appears, somewhat unexpectedly, as a **model student** in an argument for careful reading in *Ad adolescentes*. It is only when the deeds and words of good men are presented that we should love and try

[196] Jul. *Or.* 1, 12c; 2, 52bc; 3, 104d; 8, 250bc. Θεοφιλής is not an Homeric epithet, but it is found in e.g. Hdt. 1.87; Pl. *Resp.* II, 382e; and Pind. *Isth.* 5.62. Philo used it in *De vita Mosis* 2.218; Basil, we will see, uses it of Abraham.
[197] Jul. *Misopogon* 344d.
[198] Jul. *Ep.* 50 (to Nilus) 445b; Hom. *Il.* 2.224–269.
[199] Jul. *Or.* 3, 112b–114c. Julian mostly means these as credits to Penelope's character; Odysseus' merits are manifestations of hers.
[200] Jul. *Or.* 6, 185a.
[201] Jul. *Or.* 8, 241d.
[202] Jul. *Or.* 8, 250b.
[203] Jul. *Or.* 2, 75bc.
[204] Jul. *Or.* 8, 249d–250a; 2, 96cd.
[205] Jul. *Or.* 3, 104d–105b.

to be like, or even rival (ἀγαπᾶν τε καὶ ζηλοῦν), the content of poetry. But when the poets use their (aesthetic) mimesis to present us with scoundrels, we ought to flee and not to listen. This argument is illustrated by a very flawed image drawn from the Sirens episode in the *Odyssey*. The danger is highlighted by the claim that there is a path, presumably a direct and swift one, from words that present foul things or people sympathetically, to foul deeds (presumably performed by the listeners). We must therefore exercise the utmost care over what we take in, lest the bad enter with the appealing—and another not-so-innocent image of honey and poison follows.[206]

Odysseus's role in the argument is innovative. We are to "stop our ears" to poets telling foul things "not less than those men say Odysseus did with respect to the songs of the Sirens."[207] In Homer, the ears blocked are those of the crew. Odysseus' stay open: he has himself bound to the mast and listens to the Sirens because he wants to hear them without hurling himself to certain death. That was the whole point.[208] Basil, however, is doing something quite different: he claims that Odysseus also blocked his own ears so that he would *not* hear the Sirens.[209] Webb has noticed this and argued for Basil's direct

[206] Bas. *Ad adolescentes* IV.1–3.
[207] Bas. *Ad adolescentes* IV.2.
[208] Hom. *Od.* 12.165–200.
[209] Basil's Greek here might just be elastic enough to leave him a way out of the predictable objection that Odysseus did not, in point of fact, stop his ears to the Sirens. It runs: . . . ταῦτα [viz. φαῦλα] δεῖ [ὑμᾶς] φεύγειν ἐπιφρασσομένους τὰ ὦτα οὐχ ἧττον ἢ τὸν Ὀδυσσέα φασὶν ἐκεῖνοι [sc. ποιηταὶ] τὰ τῶν Σειρήνων μέλη. Odysseus here appears in what is most naturally construed as an accusative-with-infinitive construction in indirect speech, but the only infinitive in question is φεύγειν—which Odysseus uncontroversially did. Basil, if he is imitating the polytropic hero, might turn and say that that is all he meant, and that he never claimed that Odysseus stopped his own ears. The only time the relevant verb appears it is in the previous clause, and is there in the plural, in its own accusative-with-infinitive construction in numerical agreement with the implied ὑμᾶς of the listeners, and could not agree with the singular Odysseus. This, though, would be disingenuous. The clause following "not less than . . ." includes no verb, the assumption being that all relevant verbs that appeared in the previous clause be transposed onto the subject of the new A.c.I. clause. The case against a faithful reading on Basil's part gets stronger when we consider again Plutarch's use of the exact same locus with the specific naming of "Ithacans" as the ones whose ears were stopped, and later of Odysseus as the one who kept his ears open (see below).

knowledge of Libanius' *Encomium of Odysseus*, which also allegorizes but without distorting the Homeric text.[210]

A connection to Plutarch has also been noticed, but it deserves closer scrutiny. In *Quomodo adolescens*, the much-allegorized Odysseus is deployed in order to reform Plutarch's relatively liberal programme for reading the poets. Before Libanius, Plutarch had used the image of the stopped ears and Odysseus interacting *somehow* with the Sirens—but had, rightly, not taken the stopped ears as belonging to the king of Ithaca: they are rather those of his crew. Odysseus is thus an image of the reader who finds a way to listen to all poetry.[211] In a parallel twist, Plutarch takes a bee alighting on *all* flowers while collecting only what is profitable as an image for the young reader, while Basil's bees pass certain flowers without alighting at all: some books must simply be rejected outright.[212] Even so, while Basil curtails Plutarchan humanism, he nonetheless subtly employs a Plutarchan trick to do it: Plutarch himself commends simply emending morally difficult passages in classical poetry if no other method can be found to deal with them.[213] It is, moreover, a method which Plutarch also applies to Odysseus, even more subtly, in a narrative-violating transposition of lines on the hero's censorship of the bards, as noted by Saïd (2004).[214] This supports the thesis proposed by Rappe (2001) that Christians used

[210] Webb (2010) 149–152. She cites also Naldini's edition and commentary *ad loc.*, and Demoen (1996) 175. Moraw (2020) 88, 246 features this locus directly and even alludes to its ethical implications: "Auch die Dichtkunst kann, sofern sie moralisch bedenkliche Protagonisten thematisiert, mit der verderblichen Wirkung der Sirenengesänge verglichen werden; so beispielsweise bei Basileios von Caesarea," but that is the extent of her analysis of Basil's framing; she does not notice the wax in the hero's ears. The ear-stopping is mentioned at Wear (2018) 607 and again at Wear (2021) 383, but without noting Basil's distortion of Homer.

[211] Plut. *Quomodo adul.* 15d.

[212] Cp. Bas. *Ad adolescentes* IV.8–10 with Plut. *Quomodo adolescens* 30cd, 32e.

[213] Plut. *Quomodo adul.* 33d–34a.

[214] Saïd (2004) 238. Saïd also notes Basil's use of the Sirens passage and its corresponding locus in Plutarch (15d) where the Ithacans are mentioned, but does not note the difference of subject in the respective references, nor Basil's adaptation of it (Saïd 233). Wilson limits his comments to a reference to the *Odyssey* and to the same Plutarch locus, but does not mention the different presentation there: Wilson (1975) 47, n. 10–11). Wilson does, however, refer to the *Encomium of Odysseus* by Libanius when commenting on *Ad adolescentes* V.28-46, which in turn refers to the encounter with Nausicaa at *Od.* 6.135 sqq.

traditional methods to "subtract" pagan elements from the παιδεία tradition they practised and transmitted.[215]

Another Basilian nod to Homer reintroduces Odysseus. We saw that just as Nazianzen's Homer calls Odysseus τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐγκώμιον, Basil says that all Homeric poetry is ἀρετῆς . . . ἔπαινος.[216] He then highlights Odysseus in his role as a **general** (στρατηγός). Odysseus, though naked and shipwrecked, is resplendently **garbed in virtue**, and thus found attractive by Nausicaa. The **Phaeacians honour him**, abandoning their happy but aimless pleasures in order to model themselves on Odysseus.[217] These incidents on Scheria are also found in Plutarch's *Quomodo adolescens*, just as they are in Libanius.[218] Webb (2010) points out that Odysseus' lifeguard in Basil is not Leukothea, as in Homer and Libanius, but a personified Arete. She also argues for a mature application of Basil's school-learned habits of telling and, by means of προγυμνάσματα, retelling classic stories for new contexts.[219]

This picture is sharpened by Basil's correspondence. His letter to Eustathius shows him addressing the philosopher in flattering tones, saying that he was moved by the man's teaching to leave Athens and the philosophies taught there. On his route he suggests that he avoided the distraction of a "city on the Hellespont," and here he likens himself, albeit tersely, to Odysseus: παρέδραμον δὲ τὴν ἐφ' Ἑλλησπόντῳ πόλιν ὡς οὐδεὶς Ὀδυσσεὺς

[215] Rappe (2001) 413.
[216] Bas. *Ad adolescentes* V.7: Ὡς δ' ἐγώ τινος ἤκουσα δεινοῦ καταμαθεῖν ἀνδρὸς ποιητοῦ διάνοιαν, πᾶσα μὲν ἡ ποίησις τῷ Ὁμήρῳ ἀρετῆς ἐστιν ἔπαινος, καὶ πάντα αὐτῷ πρὸς τοῦτο φέρει, ὅ τι μὴ πάρεργον. Wilson *ad loc.* (V.25–27 in his numbering) identifies the wise but unnamed interpreter as Libanius, given Basil's suggestion that he heard the comment directly. Since ἤκουσα can be used for reading (or listening to others read), it may just as well be Plutarch in the *Quomodo adulescens*. See also the interpretation in McLynn (2010).
[217] Bas. *Ad adolescentes* V.8. I believe Webb (2010) has slightly mistranslated Nazianzen's claim; it is not the *story*, as she has it, but Odysseus himself whom Nazianzen's Homer calls an "encomium of virtue." (*Carm.* 1.2.10 *De virtute* 406.) Both authors give Homer agency as an advocate of virtue.
[218] Plut. *Quomodo adulescens* 27ab (Nausicaa), 27cde (other Phaeacians).
[219] Lib. *Progymnasmata* 8.2.22; see the discussion in Webb (2010) 149–152, citing Naldini *ad loc.* and Demoen (1996) 175.

Σειρήνων μέλη. Translation will involve interpolation. I suggest "I passed by the city on the Hellespont, unlike Odysseus, with his Siren-songs."[220] At any rate, the οὐδείς means that this Odysseus cannot easily be brought into line with the Odysseus of the passage we saw in *Ad adolescentes*. Basil here seems to be acknowledging that Homer's Odysseus really did *not* stop his ears, *did* hear the Sirens' song, *was* troubled, and *did* need the ropes to restrain him. If so, Basil's reimagining of the scene in *Ad adolescentes* seems even more deliberate: the memory of heroes and their virtues may depend in part on the audience, the occasion, and the interpreter's aims.

In a letter to the same Martinianus for whom Nazianzen wrote the epitaphs, Basil tries to obtain his intercession to block Valens' proposed division of Cappadocia into two provinces.[221] Basil echoes the proem of the *Odyssey* and makes Odysseus' knowledge of many cities and men a paradigm for a **well-rounded education** (παίδευσις), just as it is used in Julian. A little further, Basil says he is to Martinianus as Alcinous was to Odysseus when he wanted to listen to all the wanderer had to say; but where Alcinous asks for a year, Basil would wish to listen to Martinianus' wisdom his whole life long.[222] Whatever the nature of their relationship, Basil could rely on Martinianus sharing his education and being comfortable as the recipient of exemplaristic comparisons to Odysseus as the **cultivated wise man as teacher**.

Finally, Basil recounts to Aburgius the disgrace of Maximus, prefect of Cappadocia, applying the **wanderings and trials** of Odysseus to Maximus's woes. Maximus is imagined as the formerly glorious "general of the Kephallenians" slinking back to his

[220] Bas. *Ep.* 1 (to Eustathius). This seems also to be the sense of Courtonne's "comme aucun Ulysse n'a fait pour le chant des Sirènes."
[221] *PLRE I s.v.* (5).
[222] Bas. *Ep.* 74.1 (to Martinianus). As Courtonne points out, Basil's μέγα πρὸς μαρτυρίαν παιδεύσεως τὸ πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων ἰδεῖν ἄστεα καὶ νόον γνῶναι uses Homeric diction from *Od.* 1.3; there we read: πολλῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων ἴδεν ἄστεα καὶ νόον ἔγνω.

home in rags, here pursued by Laestrygonians, there threatened by Scylla, and barely managing to swim his way out of a whirlpool. He has been the object of damning slanders, and Basil's protracted application of Odysseus to his situation suggests that the Homeric hero's involvement would have earned the official some sympathy.[223] On balance, it seems that Basil's Odysseus is a mostly positive figure.

Nyssen: Apart from occasional deployments of Homeric diction, Gregory of Nyssa makes less use of the epic tradition than do his *confrères*, and this is true of Odysseus, too. In one letter, he identifies himself with Laertes when the old man first sees his son and grandson together again. His recipient is likened to Telemachus, and the recipient's father is Odysseus; like Laertes, Nyssen delights in seeing them **compete for virtue**. He has earlier reproved the recipient for preferring secular literature over the study of Scripture and seemed to distance himself from the former by saying the line is "from the teacher of your manner of education (παρὰ τῷ διδασκάλῳ τῆς ὑμετέρας παιδεύσεως)," i.e. Homer. Yet there is nothing dismissive in the actual example.[224] Urban charms risk being a lotus for an in fact very ascetically minded correspondent; the good-natured hyperbole of the metaphor recalls the stupefying narcotic flower of *Odyssey* IX, and the distraction is not meant to be from the life of virtue, but from a hoped-for meeting with Nyssen.[225]

Summary: For all of our authors, Odysseus stands for virtue in general. Such is his only use for Nyssen. Basil, Nazianzen, and Julian, the Athens alumni, are keen to emphasize his wanderings at sea and (often) his endurance of them. Basil and Julian make him a παιδεία-hero in a way that Nazianzen does not; for Basil he plays the role of both student and teacher. Other multiple emphases are his oratorical skills, his generalship, his

[223] Bas. *Ep.* 147 (to Aburgius).
[224] Nyss. *Ep.* 11.2 (ad Eupatrium).
[225] Nyss. *Ep.* 19.20 (ad Ioannem quendam).

prudence, and the esteem in which noble people held him. A subtle divergence on this last is that while the Athenians all note his respect by the Phaeacians, Basil makes this due to virtue directly, whereas Julian and Nazianzen tie it more to eloquence (however virtuous this may be). As is his practice with other figures, Basil calls attention to no flaws—even if it means re-writing parts of the *Odyssey*. Even in Nazianzen, his vices are few. Julian is the most fulsome in Odysseus' praises but also the most ready to highlight his vices. In general, everything in Julian's description seems consistent with a Neoplatonic Odysseus-as-Soul in pursuit of the One.

Analysis: heroes

Let us now take stock of our heroes and their singer. These five mythical or semi-mythical men can be found in 66 virtue–exemplar pairings and 49 vice–exemplar pairings in our corpora. Nazianzen shows 17 virtue–exemplar couplings and 29 with vice; Julian offers a symmetrical contrast, with 54 for virtue and 25 for vice. Basil gives us 11 and 0; Nyssen, just 3 and 2. Nazianzen's almost 2:1 ratio of vice-pairings to virtue-pairings for these pagan heroes is striking, but not surprising, and the same is true for Julian's more than 2:1 ratio in favour of virtues. Nyssen's ratio is the same as Nazianzen's, but his extremely sparing use of these exemplars suggests an even dimmer view of their utility.

Let us look more closely at each hero, first by considering the Cappadocians without Julian. Taking the Cappadocians in aggregate, distinct virtues are outnumbered by vices in three of the heroes: Heracles (5 virtuous to 11 vicious associations), Achilles (1:3), and Agamemnon (0:4). Homer is a doubtful case (7:7). Only for Odysseus is this generally low view unambiguously reversed (13 virtues, 4 vices).

The picture changes again when we drill down within the Cappadocians. For Nazianzen, Odysseus is a net virtue-hero (7:4). Nazianzen gives us all 11 vices that appear anywhere in the Cappadocians for Heracles, against just 3 virtues. Faintly negative on Homer (6:7), he is the only Cappadocian to speak of Agamemnon and Achilles and so accounts entirely for the dismal ratios given above. He is far the most keen of the Christian trio to speak of these characters at all, and when he speaks, he is ready to air plenty of dirt. Something about the alluring Odysseus leaves him alone a net positive pagan hero for Nazianzen.

Remarkably, Basil cannot be found with much bad to say about any of the three pagan heroes of this set whom he draws on: Homer, Heracles, and Odysseus all contribute some virtues to highlight, and where they do not, he is apparently happy to pass over them in silence. Perhaps his explicitly stated method, inherited from Plutarch, of editing inconvenient details in the source material accounts for his sanguine view of the pagans. In this case, his sunny outlook covers a quiet but carefully practised revisionism. It should be said that while many of the sources come from his correspondence, the *Ad adolescentes* is the only discourse or treatise in which I find any of these figures mentioned. Greek literature may be as important as he suggests in that paraenetic, but if so, it is important for the social and political life of a bishop, not for his preaching or doctrinal teaching.

Nyssen applies the silent treatment more thoroughly. Did he feel the sting of Nazianzen's *Ep.* 11, and set aside his passion for secular material? As with the gods, so with the heroes Nyssen at least affects a keen lack of interest in mythical material, and studiously avoids dwelling on its subjects.

For Julian, though, Homer (12:2) and Heracles (13:1) are overwhelmingly positive, Odysseus significantly so (18:10 or 18:7 if one drops his material deficiencies). Achilles is

mixed (7:6). Agamemnon is at best mostly vicious (4:6), as he is in the Cappadocians, and his stock will only fall if the loci are found to be even more sarcastic than I have taken them. Alongside the fact that he is nuanced in some cases—Odysseus and Achilles are hardly perfect men, in his view—we have to remember that he keeps near-total silence where he knows material that he must have found as abhorrent as did Nazianzen. He, too, is reworking the stock of exemplars.

Shared and idiosyncratic assessments

21 pairings are found in more than one of our authors. Of these, there are two found in all four authors ('quadruples') and none found in exactly three ('triples'). The most common 'doubles', or unique overlaps between two authors and not shared by others, are between Julian and Nazianzen (11 associations). The next most common double is Julian and Basil (5). Nazianzen and Basil share 2 pairings, and Nazianzen and Nyssen share 1. Basil and Nyssen do not have any unique pairings.

Within each author, the breakdowns of exemplar–virtue (or –vice) pairings between those shared with at least one other author of our set versus those which seem to be idiosyncratic are as follows:

	Percentage of pairings shared with at least one contemporary	Percentage of idiosyncratic pairings (i.e. unique within our set of four authors)
Nazianzen	30%	70%
Basil	55%	45%
Nyssen	80%	20%
Julian	20%	80%

Within the Cappadocians, and excluding doubled pairings which any one Christian author shares with Julian alone, the creative idiosyncracies of Basil and Nazianzen are thrown in

starker relief, while Nyssen, independent as he was of Julianic sharings, shows the same figures:

	Percentage of pairings shared with at least one other Cappadocian, out of each author's total pairings	Percentage of idiosyncratic pairings (i.e. unique within our set of three Cappadocians), out of each author's total pairings
Nazianzen	11%	89%
Basil	27%	73%
Nyssen	80%	20%

In some ways, when Nazianzen and Basil reach for an exemplar from secular sources, their individual inclinations have more in common with Julian's than with each other's.

Recurrences and divergences

There are some striking agreements. All four can agree on two pairings: Homer's admirable style, and Odysseus' status as a kind of 'all-rounder' in the life of virtue. I do not find any pairings that only three of them share, but of doublings, Odysseus' function as *paideia*-hero in Julian and Basil is of particular interest here. In fact, of the 21 multiples, fully a third concern Odysseus, suggesting that he played an especially important role as an ethical exemplar in the *paideia* that all of these men shared.

Conclusion

The state of research on late ancient educational practices allows us to adduce another factor in the proliferation of exemplars in a rhetorically trained bishop. Accounts of late ancient *paideia* have sometimes provided compelling high-level narratives while being

detached from schoolroom conditions (e.g. Brown [1991]),[226] or have on the other hand brought the school as it was 'on the ground' to life in ways that have nonetheless begged to be connected back to the literary remains of the period (Cribiore [1996, 2001], Morgan [1998], to some extent Demoen [1996]).[227] I suggest that forest and trees can be held in view in our authors: the apparent pervasiveness of schoolroom practices like wordlists and ethopoeia, found in both schoolroom papyri and rhetorical handbooks, equipped Nazianzen and his peers with some of the most important instrumental habits needed for the exemplarism we see on display in their mature public oratory. In his mature writings, in other words, Gregory used exemplars because he had been doing so for almost as long as he could write and speak.

Christian preachers in the fourth century not only used exempla to advance arguments, but also to illustrate and present a Christian moral worldview. Some of the most prominent deities and heroic personages and deities of classical culture see their virtues relativised, their vices foregrounded, and their roles in the moral imagination correspondingly shifted from that of exemplar to be imitated to that of the cautionary tale to be avoided.

It is no surprise that Christians framed pagan gods negatively. Gregory Nazianzen's particularly clear and list-like association of gods and vices, meant to replace their formerly admirable or praiseworthy qualities and patronages, illuminates a wider phenomenon. For a Christian preacher, this tactic could serve as a twofold shorthand device of moral formation: for their pagan listeners or readers not yet resolutely committed to allegorical interpretation, it serves a protreptic function, telling them that the gods should be abandoned, because they are inseparable from vices. For tepid Christian

[226] Brown (1992).
[227] Some have begun to do this; Cribiore (2007, 2013) heads in this direction for Libanius; Webb (2010) has indicated how this may be done for Christian authors (chiefly Basil of Caesarea) even while treating mostly of Libanius.

listeners, in addition to this function, it also performs a paraenetic role: vices should be abandoned, because they are the special preserve of the gods of idol-worship. Yet while we will see the other authors using catalogues with non-divine exemplars, Nazianzen is unique amongst our Christians in the extent of his readiness to speak about the old gods in this or any other way, even in denigrating them. He seems to have felt that the haunting legacy of Julian's apologetic career needed to be met point for point. The linkages in his novel associative lists are an anti-pagan catechetical tool to be recalled whenever the gods are mentioned—whether the reader is encountering Hellenic παιδεία in the wild or turning to the Gregory's own poetry.

In the case of the heroes, too, it is clear that we are meant to remember both their actions and their virtues as points on a moral compass. These authors, Christian or pagan, hardly ever invoke exemplars without moralizing intent. Their methods are different, from Nyssen's stony silence on exemplars he distrusts, to the incessant abuse from Nazianzen, to the occasionally convergent blitheness and sleight of hand found both in Basil and, with unevenly deployed subtlety, in Julian.

In the next chapter, we turn from the heroes and gods of myth to historical personages.

Chapter 3
The Great Men of History

I will learn. But some day I shall have finished learning. And then I will do something. I only pray God that something may happen to me such as happened to Plutarch's men, and I will act as they did. I will do better. Everyone will know me, love me, and be delighted with me.

Nikolai Andreevich Bolkonsky, in Tolstoy, War and Peace, *First Epilogue, Chapter XVI (1869), trans. Maude*

In this chapter, we turn to historical exemplars. This set includes a number of figures whom I have selected on the basis of a comparison with Plutarch and Valerius Maximus, supplemented by a few philosophers, Persian monarchs, and rulers of Rome. The results, even if they cannot exhaust the uses of historical exemplars, will be strongly indicative of exemplarist tendencies in the Julianic and Cappadocian corpora.

In contrast to the gods in Chapter 2 (and the Scriptural figures we will see in Chapter 4), but in keeping with what I have documented on the heroes, I do not find what I am calling 'catalogues' that would serve as useful starting points here. As mentioned in the last chapter, Demoen (1996) has discussed the occasional appearance of groupings or clusters of exempla in Nazianzen, which he classifies as showing either "organic coherence," i.e. all pertaining to a single person, place, or kind of event (the metamorphoses of Zeus, punishments in Hades, Xerxes' deeds, etc.), or "functional coherence," i.e. all illustrating a theme, such as wealth, magical singing, or ascensions

faked for religious hoodwinkery.[1] When figures I have selected occur in such clusters I use them; but even when the coherence-groupings approach a virtuous or vicious association, they are not catalogues in the sense of proposing different strengths (or weaknesses) for particular persons, like Nazianzen's *Oratio* 4 catalogue of the gods or his *Oratio* 14 catalogue of Scriptural saints.[2]

Working without a canon or catalogue, however, and given the vast number of historical personages whom Demoen has documented in Gregory, some method is needed to select a tractable subset and deepen the analysis. I have chosen Valerius Maximus and Plutarch, two early imperial exemplarists, as proxy sources for a cultural canon of historical representatives of virtues and vices.

These may seem *prima facie* remote from the world of the Cappadocians, especially with Valerius Maximus writing in Latin and almost certainly not read by any of our authors (with the possible exception of Julian). Nonetheless, the choice of these two is not haphazard, nor will their comparison be without benefit for understanding Nazianzen. Plutarch enjoyed a lasting popularity in the Greek East, including amongst Christians. His *Parallel Lives*, now considered his best-known work, was already recommended by the late ancient rhetorician Menander in the late third or early fourth century as a source of entertaining and morally edifying educational material.[3] While in the corpus of Eusebius of Caesarea the one reference to the *Parallel Lives* is indirect, Plutarch's *Moralia* appear extensively. In the fifth century, Theodoret of Cyrrhus alludes to the *Lives*.[4] To some extent, a preference for the straightforward ethical treatises of the *Moralia* over the didactic narrative biography of the *Lives* is echoed in the respective volumes of these

[1] Demoen (1996) 189–192; see above, Chapter 2, 74.
[2] See below, Chapter 4.
[3] Xenophontos and Oikonomopoulou (2019) 1–13; on the *Lives'* popularity and Menander Rhetor's recommendation, 1–3. On Plutarch's pagan philosophical reception in Late Antiquity, see Simonetti (2019).
[4] Morlet (2019) 123 (incl. note 12), 129.

works' papyrological remains.[5] It has been shown that Basil of Caesarea engages carefully with Plutarch's (and Pseudo-Plutarchan) educational thought as expressed in those treatises.[6] In Gregory, as we shall see, where he discusses someone who happens to be found in the *Lives*, he often tells a story that Plutarch also reports there. It thus seems likely that the influence is largely direct.

As for Valerius Maximus, not only is he the sole substantially surviving representative of the exemplarist genre in its purest form, but there are also a number of direct overlaps between his set of exemplars and those of Plutarch and Gregory. He remained a popular author at the imperial court and amongst the Latin-reading members of the educated elite into late antiquity, influencing Lactantius, Ammianus Marcellinus, and the *Historia Augusta*.[7] His popularity only increased in the Latin West, where by the later Middle Ages he had become a fixture in school texts and even homiletic resources.[8] Moreover, the Greeks that Valerius himself selected must have been sufficiently well-known figures in Greek culture for him to come across them in the first century, and it is not unlikely that they remained so in the fourth, so that they would have been points of reference in Gregory's own milieu. Finally, his academic reappraisal as an exemplarist author since the 1990s makes him an attractive candidate for comparison with Gregory both on particulars and on some of the broader conclusions of the present study.[9]

It is worth noting here at the outset that Plutarch and Valerius Maximus differ from each other and from Nazianzen in their *modi operandi*. Plutarch's units are individual persons, in whom any number of virtues and vices may be found, while Valerius' units are

[5] Schmidt (2019).
[6] Avdokhin (2019) 108–110; Saïd (2004).
[7] Burgersdijk (2022).
[8] Conrau-Lewis (2022) esp. 318–319.
[9] Murray and Wardle (2022) was the result of a 2017 conference reflecting on the twenty-five years since the publication of Bloomer (1992)'s groundbreaking monograph on Valerius Maximus (Murray [2022]'s Introduction, 2–3).

virtues, vices, and (commonly enough for exemplarists) circumstances or notable events ('wonders', 'unusual deaths', 'coincidences of physical appearance'[10]), under each of which any number of exemplary persons (or events) may be found. Gregory's orations, while borrowing many elements of traditional rhetorical form (in, say, his panegyrics or invectives), owe just as much to the homiletic genre unknown to Plutarch and Valerius.[11] But all three of these authors collected exemplary stories. With their interest in the moral betterment of their audiences, Plutarch, Valerius Maximus, and Gregory belong to the same tradition.

Of the 24 Greeks in Plutarch's *Parallel Lives*, I find at least 8 and as many as 10 in Gregory's corpus (33–42%), with a majority of instances occurring in the explicitly anti-pagan invectives against Julian (*Orationes* 4 and 5) or in the polemical poem 1.2.10 *De Virtute*.[12] For Valerius Maximus, I have taken a selection of 17 of his (or his editors') 94 headwords covering some of the more basic virtues and vices purely as a starting point.[13] Of the figures found under these 17 virtues or vices, I have considered only "foreign" exemplars, most of which are Greek, since Gregory touches on Romans so infrequently. There are 92 in all, and when mass exemplars ('Carthaginians,' 'Etruscans,' etc.) are excluded, we are left with about 68 distinct exemplars. If we remove figures from the Punic Wars as essentially counting as Roman fare, we are left with 64 exemplars

[10] *De miraculis*, Val. Max. 1.8; *De mortibus non vulgaribus*, 9.12; *De similitudine formae*, 9.14.
[11] A later tradition, admittedly Latin, even saw the *Facta et dicta* as a work composed precisely as an aid for preachers; Conrau-Lewis (2022) 317.
[12] I base these assessments on the exemplars recorded in Demoen's inventories of Gregory's corpus. The ten Greeks are Theseus (possibly), Solon, Lycurgus, Aristides, Pericles, Epaminondas, Dion of Syracuse (possibly), Demosthenes, Alexander, and Pyrrhus. At most one of Plutarch's Romans occurs in Gregory Nazianzen: Scipio turns up alongside Epaminondas for exemplary endurance, only to be surpassed in that virtue by Christian ascetics and martyrs (*Or.* 4.71). Plutarch's *Lives* of both Scipio and Epaminondas are lost. On the identity of this Scipio, see above, Chapter 1, 43, note 69. As for other Plutarchan Romans, Julius Caesar will crop up in Nazianzen's peers, as we shall see.
[13] I thus omit more complicated scenarios displaying character or simply remarkable circumstance. The virtues I have chosen are *fortitudo* (3.2), *patientia* (3.3), *fiducia sui* (3.7), *constantia* (3.8), *moderatio* (4.1), *abstinentia et continentia* (4.3), *liberalitas* (4.8), *humanitas et clementia* (5.1), *pudicitia* (6.1), and *iustitia* (6.5); the somewhat uncertain *cupiditas gloriae* (8.14); and the vices *luxuria et libido* (9.1), *crudelitas* (9.2), *ira et odium* (9.3), *avaritia* (9.4), *superbia et impotentia* (9.5), and *perfidia* (9.6).

reasonably likely to have been known to Gregory Nazianzen. Of these, 26—at 41%, almost half—of these figures from Valerius do indeed also occur in Gregory's corpus. This is squarely in line with the figure of 33–42% we saw above for the share of biographized Plutarchan heroes who recur in Nazianzen. Out of these 26 from Valerius, 7 are also found in the set shared by Plutarch and Nazianzen. These will give us a starting point on which to build a set of exemplars for examination.[14]

Those 7 exemplars who are in Nazianzen, have a Plutarchan *Life*, and also occur under the Valerian headwords noted are: Solon, Aristides, Pericles, Epaminondas, Dion of Syracuse, Alexander, and Pyrrhus. While I have analysed Epaminondas and Dion and include their data in the final analysis, I omit their discussion here because of their relatively scant appearances. I then add Lycurgus and Demosthenes, found in Nazianzen and Plutarch; although they do not occur under the Valerian headings taken as a starting point, they do occur elsewhere in the *Facta et dicta*.[15] I further add exemplars regularly encountered in the fourth-century authors: the philosophers Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Zeno of Elea, and Diogenes of Sinope.[16] All of these happen to be found in Valerius but are not the objects of Plutarchan *Lives*. I also take a number of Achaemenid and Roman emperors under consideration. These rulers are patchily covered in Valerius and mostly absent from Plutarch's *Lives*, but their appearances in the writings of Julian and the Cappadocians warrant their inclusion here.[17]

[14] Only Theseus, Lycurgus, and Demosthenes are not found under the Valerian headwords under review in this section.
[15] I omit Theseus, who is never named in Nazianzen: allusions to him are at best indirect, even arguably absent. The two allusions catalogued by Demoen (to a bull in *Or.* 5.5, and to an underworld visit in *Epig.* 88.1) are pretty thin and multiply identifiable. Dion is named but his identification is uncertain; I include his data in the analysis but do not discuss him here.
[16] I have likewise analysed data for Zeuxis and Phidias, but have omitted it from discussion here.
[17] As an early imperial author Valerius could of course not have written of many Roman emperors; those treated by Plutarch are mostly not mentioned in our set of fourth-century writers.

As in Chapters 2 and 4, each exemplar (or occasionally several exemplars together) will constitute a heading. Plutarch and Valerius together form a subheading under which appear the notable virtues and vices which I find in the *Lives* and the *Facta et dicta*. I tend to omit circumstances or omens and the like which are highlighted in Valerius but which say little about the exemplar's character. Usually I draw virtues and vices from the concentrated character assessments in the comparisons that follow each of Plutarch's parallels, where these are extant, but in some cases I have used the individual *Lives*.

The Cappadocians and Julian then give us further subheadings. Character traits printed in boldface are treated as virtues or vices for analysis. The final subheading under each exemplar is a summary which highlights notable agreements and disagreements on the exemplar in question. The chapter concludes with an analysis of broader patterns across this sample of historical models of virtue and vice. A 'coda' to this chapter looks at how historical figures contemporary to our authors, or nearly so, are exemplarised in their works. As I will note there, I generally treat references in Julian's *Orationes* 1 and 2 (to an extent also *Oratio* 3) with caution.[18]

Statesmen and generals of Greece

Solon and Lycurgus

Plutarch and Valerius: Solon, found in Valerius Maximus along with the Seven Sages, is for him an exemplar of **moderation**, **wisdom, diligence, eloquence.** He **suffers ingratitude** from his beloved city.[19] In Plutarch, this **lawgiver** shows **wisdom**, **self-control** when offered tyrannical power, and a combination of **political prudence** and

[18] See below, 178.
[19] Val. Max. 4.1e.7 (where '*e*' = non-Roman exemplars); 7.2e.2; 8.7e14; 8.9e.1; 5.3e.3.

boldness (in e.g. debt forgiveness).[20] Plutarch's Lycurgus is a paragon of **temperance**, **piety**, **good governance**, **teaching**, **pious lawgiving**, and **courage**. Valerius has Lycurgus as a **lawgiver** whose customs endure, and as another victim of his compatriots' **ingratitude**.[21]

Nazianzen: In Nazianzen they appear just once, as **lawgivers**. In a poem in which he grants as much to pagan virtue as he feels he can, before showing its inferiority to Christian virtue, Nazianzen says, "Let Solon or Lycurgus be yielding to you in their laws."[22] The lines come as part of a listing of worldly goods, including martial glory, wealth, and marriage, which a rhetorical ἐρώτημα classifies as the sorts of things that set our hearts aflutter. Of these things, however, there is nothing that compares in true greatness to the act of counting them all inferior (τὸ ταῦτα πάντα ποιῆσαι κάτω) to the glory of contemplating the soul's source and end, as well as how it may move in accordance with reason or indeed the Word (κατ' εὔλογον φορά).[23] In other words, imagine you live in a state in which **the most perfectly just lawmakers** of all time pass laws which are most favourable to you. Since these lines follow an appearance by Demosthenes (see below), whose powers the reader is to imagine possessing, Gregory may even be suggesting that Solon's and Lycurgus' laws would favour the reader due to his hypothetically Demosthenic oratorical prowess. If so, Gregory seems almost to be playing with his exemplars and allowing his imagination to join their storylines in the way that a boy might have put Richard Lionheart on the same stage as King Arthur (or, more recently, in the way a director has pitted Superman against Batman). Then comes his main

[20] Plut. *Comparison of Solon and Publicola* 2.1, 1.2, 2.3, 3.1–2.
[21] Plut. *Comparison of Lycurgus and Numa* 1.1, 2.1; Val. Max. 2.6.1, 5.3e.2.
[22] Naz. *Carm.* 1.2.10 *De virtute* 41 (37.683).
[23] This explanation comes at Naz. *Carm.* 1.2.10 *De virtute* 52–58 (37.684–5).

point: even under optimal conditions or at the height of skills, Gregory warns, this mortal life is as nothing compared to the right direction of your soul to its end in God.

Julian: Solon and Lycurgus are exemplars whom Themistius has called Julian to surpass as **lawgivers**, and Julian is overawed by the challenge.[24] Solon is an exemplar of **terseness in speech** and **philosophical detachment from wealth**; he and Lycurgus are used together as paragons of **wisdom**, **political virtue**, **clemency**, and **good rule**. Both are used without irony or relativisation.[25] At one point, the Judaeo-Christian God is surpassed by Lycurgus in **mildness** (πραότης) and Solon in **forbearance** (ἀνεξικακία).[26] The imitation of God, Julian says, is an injunction of philosophy, and a practice which amounts to the contemplation of real beings. But if we take the Hebrew deity as our starting point, all we can learn is "wrath and anger and wild jealousy (ὀργὴ καὶ θυμὸς καὶ ζῆλος ἄγριος)."[27] For Julian, mortal pagan statesman like Solon and Lycurgus are exemplars morally superior to the God of Israel.

Basil: Solon occurs twice through his sayings in Basil's *Ad adolescentes*. The first instance emphasizes the value of **virtue over wealth**, virtue being the one thing that cannot be taken from us; the second points to his **wisdom** about the insatiability of greed.[28] In a letter to Martinianus, Basil invokes an episode from Solon's life as an

[24] Jul. *Ad Themistium* 254a.
[25] Terseness: Jul. *Ep.* 14, 373d–374a (to Prohaeresius); detachment from wealth: *Misopogon* 342c; wisdom and political virtue (with Lycurgus): *Ad Themistium* 262d; clemency and mild rule (with Lycurgus): *Contra Galilaeos* 161a–168b.
[26] Jul. *Contra Galilaeos* 168bc. Perhaps even more provocatively, the Romans—who crucified the principal 'Galilaean' against whom Julian is writing—surpass the Christian God in "decency and kindness towards transgressors (τῇ Ῥωμαίων πρὸς τοὺς ἠδικηκότας ἐπιεικείᾳ καὶ χρηστότητι)." Cf. Liv. 1.28.11: setting aside the brutal execution of the perfidious Mettius, which he has just recounted, Livy notes that *in aliis gloriari licet nulli gentium mitiores placuisse poenas*.
[27] Jul. *Contra Galilaeos*, 168bc. In *Oratio* 1, Lycurgus has a mark against him for not arranging an education for the Heracleidae different from that of the other Spartan boys, in order to prepare them better for kingship, but the exemplarism in this oration and *Oratio* 2 is not straightforward, as I emphasise below in the Coda to this chapter, 178. Note that ζῆλος has connotations that are both positive (zeal) and negative (envy, jealousy). See also δικαία ὀργή under Phinehas in Chapter 4; it seems Julian's *Umwertung* relies on some of the same words and themes he learned as a Christian.
[28] Bas. *Ad adolescentes* V.11, IX.20.

example of noble but doomed **defiance of injustice** by an aging **statesman of principle**. If all goes well and Martinianus succeeds in thwarting Valens' plan to divide Cappadocia into two provinces, so much the better; if not, he will at least have imitated Solon's armoured but impotent protest against the tyrant Pisistratus' seizure of the Acropolis.[29]

Summary: I do not find Lycurgus in Basil; Nyssen seems to lack both Lycurgus and Solon. Each enjoys a reputation for just lawgiving in Nazianzen and Julian. Solon's philosophical aloofness from material things is highlighted in Basil and Julian. Idiosyncratic emphases include the defiance of injustice (Basil) and the polemical comparison with the Jewish and Christian God (Julian). Across the corpora, they are positive exemplars, sometimes surpassing and sometimes surpassed.

Aristides

Plutarch and Valerius: In Valerius, Aristides exhibits **justice** and **suffers ingratitude** from his fellow citizens; in Plutarch, he is a paragon of **general virtue**, **hard work**, **temperance**, **martial prowess**, and **justice**, while his most notable vice, **negligence of finances** and thus the impoverishment of his family, simultaneously admits of a noble interpretation as due to the **loftiness of his mind**.[30]

Nazianzen: These traits find very close echoes in Gregory. In his sole occurrence, Aristides ("the son of Lysimachus") is deemed great in both **political** and **military virtue**, and his sobriquet "**the just**" is recalled. But Gregory would rather focus on the fact that he

[29] Bas. *Ep.* 74.3 (to Martinianus).
[30] Val. Max. 6.5e.2; 5.3e3; Plut. *Comparison of Aristides and Marcus Cato* 2.3–6, 4.1–6, 5.1–2; for his sobriquet, *Aristides* 6.1.

was so **detached from care for wealth** that his family suffered a "noble poverty," which Athens honoured by paying for his funeral and supporting his children.[31]

Julian: Aristides is one of a number of virtuous pagans adduced by Julian in *Contra Galilaeos*. In the manifesto he sent to Athens after his usurpation, Aristides is called "**the just**," and his justice is a credit to Athens as a whole. It is illustrated by his **terse but truthful** denunciation of Themistocles' plan for the Athenians to burn the rest of the pan-Hellenic fleet in what would have been a treacherous sneak attack directly after Salamis.[32]

Summary: Aristides does not occur in Basil or Gregory of Nyssa. Nazianzen and Julian remember the same traits, broadly in keeping with what we find in Plutarch and Valerius.

Pericles

Plutarch and Valerius: In Plutarch, Pericles shows both **civic** and **military virtues**, **temperance**, **foresight**, **scrupulous integrity** (especially resisting corruption), and **magnanimity**, although he is **blamed for the war** with Sparta.[33] Valerius Maximus includes him as an exemplar under **restraint and self-control**, and counts him **wise**, **eloquent**, **culture-loving**, and **composed in grief**; his virtue is recognised by his fellow citizens, yet he **unscrupulously obstructs** an inquiry into his expenditure.[34]

Nazianzen: Pericles only appears in Nazianzen's poem against wrath. There, in an episode drawn from Plutarch,[35] he is a paragon of **patience** and **virtue** in the face of an

[31] Naz. *Carm.* 1.2.10 *De virtute* 341–349 (37.705).
[32] Julian, *Contra Galilaeos* 184b; *Letter to the Senate and People of Athens* 268d, 269cd. On Aristides' justice see. Hdt. 8.79.
[33] Plut. *Per.* 15.1–4, 18.1, 19.1, 5.2–3, 18.2–3, 15.5, 14.2, 29.5; *Comparison of Pericles and Fabius Maximus* 1.1, 2.1–2, 2.3, 3.3–4, 3.1.
[34] Val. Max. 4.3e.1; 7.2e.7; 8.9e.2; 8.11e.1; 5.10e.1; 2.6.5; 3.1e.1.
[35] Plut. *Per.* 5.2–3. Stadter (1989) *ad loc*. does not note whether this episode occurs in later writers (Christian or not).

accuser, bearing the vitriol spewed at him as though it were praise. When his assailant had worn himself out with abuse, he courteously sent him home with a torch-bearing escort.[36]

Julian: Julian's Pericles regularly turns up as both an **outstanding orator** and a representative of virtues. He is **impervious to flattery**. Julian not only emphasizes his **clemency in rule**, but even claims that Pericles never caused the death of any of his fellow citizens. This is a generous view, given Pericles' role in the war, but it allows the Pericles to serve as positive foil to the implicit comparandus, Eusebia's husband, who has the blood of Julian's father and brother (among others) on his hands.[37] He is elsewhere a **free citizen** of a free polis **able to argue philosophically**.[38] In a long ethopoeia he is made to **endure nobly his separation** from a beloved tutor, and thus serve as a model for Julian, who misses his friend Sallustius.[39] In a letter to Prohaeresius, Pericles is both **eloquent** and, in contrast to the positive role he served when Julian was addressing Eusebia, very negatively the **source of Greece's troubles**.[40]

Basil: In Basil's *Ad adolescentes*, as in Nazianzen, Pericles endures a critic's verbal abuse all day long and is even followed home by the man, who heaps insult after insult on him. Pericles does not respond, but escorts the man home with a light after it gets dark. His motivation is that he not destroy his **training in philosophy**, presumably in the sense of **patience**, but the episode is chiefly adduced in support of Jesus' command to **bless one's persecutors**.[41]

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[36] Naz. *Carm.* 1.2.25 *Adversus iram* 278–284 (37.833).
[37] Julian, *Or.* 3.128c–129b.
[38] Julian, *Or.* 8.248bc.
[39] Julian, *Or.* 8.245d–248c. Wright notes *ad loc.* that the ethopoetic speech is actually borrowed from Critoboulos in Xenophon.
[40] Julian, *Ep.* 14.373d–374a (to Prohaeresius). On the icy and sarcastic tone of this letter, see Watts (2006) Chapter 3, esp. 64–68.
[41] Bas. *Ad adolescentes* VII.2, 8.

Summary: Pericles is not found in Gregory of Nyssa. He is infrequently, albeit consistently, recalled in the other Cappadocians for his patience and is connected to Christian virtues, thanks to an episode in Plutarch. Julian highlights many more of the virtues found in Plutarch, as well as his share of the blame for the devastating war.

Demosthenes

Plutarch and Valerius: Demosthenes in Valerius is **lowborn but successful**, as well as **crafty**, **diligent**, and **eloquent**. He is of course an **orator** in Plutarch, who also notes his **thoughtfulness**, **earnestness**, and **modesty**. Plutarch does not omit his **corruption** in his openness to bribes.[42]

Nazianzen: Gregory finds Demosthenes useful most of all as a paragon of **unsurpassed eloquence** across all three genres of classical oratory: "Steer the assemblies at your pleasure [i.e., Aristotle's γένος συμβουλευτικόν[43]], offer panegyrics worthy of crowns [ἐπιδεικτικόν], and breath Demosthenes' indignation at trial [δικανικόν] . . ."[44]

Julian: Demosthenes shows his **eloquence** through his "rhetorical vehemence (τὴν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἰσχύν)."[45] He is amongst those in the *Rescript on Christian Teachers* whom Julian counts as **faithful to the gods**, not just in a general way, but for his oratorical production, the consumption of which then becomes an acknowledgement of the merits of pagan religion.[46] His eloquence is also manifest when he speaks as a mythopoet to the

[42] Val. Max. 3.4e.2; 7.3e5; 8.7e.1; 8.10e.1; Plut. *Comparison of Demosthenes and Cicero* 1.3, 1.6–2.1, 3.5–4.1.
[43] Arist. *Rh.* I, 3.3, 1358b6–19.
[44] Naz. *Carm.* 1.2.10 *De virtute* 38–40 (37.683). For Demosthenes in a school text (with Epaminondas), see Cribiore (1996) 217, item 188.
[45] Jul. *Or.* 1, 32c.
[46] Jul. *Ep.* 36 (*Letter on Christian Teachers*) 422d–423a. See Dem. 18.1 (*De Corona*) for an invocation of the gods.

Athenians (a practice Julian's fourth-century pseudo-Cynics are far from imitating successfully).[47]

Basil: Basil good-naturedly uses Demosthenes as a *comparatus* for the governor Candidianus: where Demosthenes somewhat **boastfully** insisted upon the title of χορηγός or **benefactor**, having provided funds merely for a handful of dancers, Candidianus furnishes supplies to countless soldiers and territories without losing what Basil suggests is their longstanding familiarity. Basil thus has him surpass the orator in both magnificence (in Aristotle's sense) and magnanimity.[48] In the letter collection Basil is himself compared favourably to Demosthenes in the skill of **oratory**, by none other than 'Libanius' (who also says Basil surpasses Plato in wisdom).[49] How earnestly this was meant is a question for a study of their relationship, but the notes attributed to Basil notes are equally fulsome; if the exchange is genuine, presumably he received the comparison in whatever sense it was intended to convey. According to a later historian, Basil humiliated Valens' meddling cook, a namesake of the orator, by calling him an "illiterate Demosthenes" for pronouncing a solecism, and then directing him back to cooking soup, but this is not found in any of the Cappadocians' works.[50]

Nyssen: Gregory Nyssen's Demosthenes is an exemplar of **acerbity** (τὸ δριμύ) and **fiery spirit** (Δημοσθενικῷ . . . θυμῷ), such that Eunomius can appear as a "second" or "new" Demosthenes by imitating these traits in his own invectives against the homoousion faction. In the same context the Athenian orator stands for **forcefulness or vigour**, with Eunomius showing Δημοσθενικὴν εὐτονίαν in attacking Gregory with "hot and fire-

[47] Jul. *Or.* 7, 227b.
[48] Bas. *Ep.* 3.1 (to Candidianus).
[49] Libanius to Basil, in Bas. *Ep.* 352. This letter's authenticity is doubtful; Courtonne *ad loc.* thinks Basil would not have tolerated the outrageous comparisons and implies that Libanius would not have made them.
[50] Theodoret, *Hist. eccl.*, IV. 16.

breathing discourses."[51] The polemical force of Demosthenes' *Philippics* is being remembered here, and his **eloquence** is implicit. As the application to Eunomius is unambiguously negative, a negative verdict on Demosthenes' stand against the Macedonians may be inferred, such that the orator may stand for powerful rhetoric in the service of the wrong cause.

Summary: Demosthenes is first and foremost an orator. To the extent that rhetoric is a virtue, it is really the only one for which the Cappadocians remember him, apart from his civic benefactions in Basil, who, however, takes care to undercut the magnanimity and largesse which the deeds imply by foregrounding his pride. Demosthenes' role in rhetorical education, particularly at Athens, seems to have found its way to Nyssen, who remembers his fiery speeches in much the way Nazianzen seems to, although he takes care to associate them with his opponents' heresies. Julian manages to make him a pious, divinely inspired pagan, importantly so in a text in which he goes on to mock the literary quality of the Christian Scriptures.

Alexander the Great

Plutarch and Valerius: That Alexander remained a household name amongst the literate is clear from school exercises. He appears, for instance, in a long second-century school text, in which the conceit of the purported exercise is a letter sent in the Macedonian's voice to the Carthaginians.[52] In Plutarch, Alexander the Great is praised as being **temperate** and restrained with regard to sensuality, **magnanimous**, **intellectually gifted**, **courageous**, a **trusting friend**, and a **lover of culture and the arts**. But he has

[51] Nyss. *Contra Eunomium* 3.10.50–51, 54.
[52] Cribiore (1996) 238–9, item 275.

vices: he was sometimes **cruel** to those he defeated (or any who happened to be nearby), **self-aggrandizing**, **wrathful**, and perhaps **excessively ambitious**.[53] Valerius Maximus sees him illustrating **steadfastness**, **humanity and decency**, **endurance**, **restraint and self-control**, **friendship**, **patriotism**, **weighty words**, **wisdom**, and **craftiness**; he is also a **man of culture**. Less positively, he is an exemplar of **wrath**, **pride and fury,** and **vengeance**; and finally, he displays the ambiguous **love of glory**.[54]

Nazianzen: In Nazianzen's *Oratio* 4, Alexander appears in an explicit defence of Constantius II against charges of imprudence or recklessness in his decision to elevate Julian to the purple even after having his brother Gallus killed. Even though this decision put an army at the great apostate's back, Gregory turns it to the credit of Constantius' character, and Alexander helps him do it. To spare Constantius the charge of misplaced trust and thus imprudence of evaluation, he argues that what seemed to be Alexander's naïveté in trusting in a proven opponent was in fact more like the virtue of **confidence in his own strength** (τὸ θαῤῥεῖν εἶχεν . . . οὐ τοσοῦτον ἐκ τῆς ἐκείνου πίστεως, ὅσον ἐκ τῆς ἰδίας δυνάμεως): the **successful conqueror** defeated Porus, a king who had dared oppose him on the battlefield, and yet spared him his life and kingdom. The reason was a desire to demonstrate his **magnanimity** (ὡς τὸ μεγαλόψυχον . . . ἐπιδειξόμενος). After noting that Alexander could have beaten Porus again if necessary—an optimistic emphasis, given the real danger that Julian's rebel army posed to Constantius' forces at the time of the emperor's sudden death—Gregory adds that this surfeit of confidence really amounted to liberality or **philanthropy** for the emperor (καὶ ἦν αὐτῷ ἡ περιουσία τοῦ θαῤῥεῖν τὸ φιλάνθρωπον). Gregory hopes Julian's ill-starred cousin will be remembered for

[53] Plut. *Alex.* 21.5, 30.6, 8.1–2, 6.2–6, 45.4, 19.1–5, 26.1–2, 4.1, 72.3, 42.2, 59.4, 28.3, 50.6–51.2, 5.3.
[54] Val. Max. virtues: 3.8e.6; 5.1e.1; 3.3e.4–5; 4.3e3–4; 4.7e.2; 5.6e.5; 6.4e.3; 7.2e.10, 13; 7.3e.1, 4. Vices: 9.3e.1; 9.5e.1; 9.10e.2. Ambiguous: 8.14e.2. Alexander also shows up peripherally in other men's exempla, as when he tests a nobleman's endurance of fire (3.3e.1) or tries to buy the 'abstinent and continent' Xenocrates' friendship (4.3e.3).

magnanimity and philanthropy, too. Notably for this overwhelmingly vituperative oration, Alexander is never relativised here: even in a comparison with a Christian monarch whom, at least in 363, Gregory still finds praiseworthy, Alexander is not outdone.[55]

In *Carm.* 1.2.10 *De virtute*, Alexander shows up as a paragon of **temperance** (ἔχειν τι σῶφρον), here meaning **sexual continence**. Gregory relates an incident found in Plutarch's *Life*, in which, having conquered Darius and taken his daughters captive, Alexander declines to make them his concubines.[56] In Gregory's telling, Alexander considers it "the mark of a wicked man to be unequal to maidens, in spite of being a conqueror of men." Gregory cannot hide his amazement at such an act in those whose "objects of veneration [i.e. the gods] are most full of passion (ὧν γὰρ σεβάσματ' ἐστὶν ἐμπαθέστατα)." This then allows him to tear into the vices of Zeus and other gods. That seems to be the real point of the passage: Alexander is a surprising exception. We might have expected a juxtaposition with, say, Joseph the patriarch (a favourite Biblical exemplar of temperance, as we shall see in Chapter 4). But the only named Christian exemplars to follow in the remainder of the poem are Christ and Thecla, some seventy lines later, and by the time they arrive, Alexander has been forgotten or left behind: he himself is never relativised. Even after Gregory's verdict, then, Alexander keeps his virtue somewhat better than we have seen Homer or Odysseus or Solon do in the same poem.[57]
In *Carm*. 1.2.25 *Adversus iram*, Alexander is goaded by a subordinate to put a city he has conquered to the sword. But he resists this, and instead professes his fondness for **mildness** (τὸ πρᾶον), saying he rather likes it when a city manages to escape such dangers.[58]

[55] Naz. *Or*. 4.39–41.
[56] Plut. *Alex.* 21.4–5.
[57] Naz. *Carm.* 1.2.10 *De virtute* 818–822 (37.739); Christ at l. 897 sqq.; Thecla at l. 916 sqq.
[58] Naz. *Carm.* 1.2.25 *Adversus iram* 270–277 (37.832–833).

One letter begins with a bold call to exemplarist mimesis: "Imitate Alexander for me, you marvellous fellow (Μίμησαί μοι τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον, ὦ θαυμάσιε) . . . !" Nazianzen is writing to Eustochius, a sophist at Caesarea whom he had known in his school days at Athens and with whom he apparently shared some teachers (πρὸς δὲ καὶ τοὺς κοινοὺς πατέρας τῶν λόγων αἰδούμενος), to commend to him the young student Pronoius. The call to imitate Alexander is as follows: Alexander, presumably out of appreciation for the Athenians' culture, wanted to mollify them after conquering them and so called Athens the theatre of his empire. Gregory makes himself Athens. Apparently Eustochius has expressed a favourable view of Gregory's learning, which Gregory tries to downplay (καθ' ἡμᾶς εἶναί τι νομίσας, εἰ καὶ μηδαμῆ) before requesting the equivalent of Athens' appellation as 'theatre' and other benefits of Alexander's munificence towards the city. In particular, he hopes that Eustochius will do him the favour of promoting Pronoius' studies. This is indeed a flourish between two trained rhetoricians, but the exemplar is not without ethical valence: it is a fine and admirable mark in Alexander to have appreciated Athenian culture and to have desired to pay it some tribute in his capacity as **patron of the arts**.[59]

But Nazianzen also has an eye for Alexander's vices. *Carm.* 1.2.15 *De exterioris hominis vilitate* shows Alexander in a less noble light: though he had travelled the whole world and was of unsurpassable strength, **wine and drunkenness** destroyed him. In suffering a pathetic death that robs him of power and riches, he is not alone; Nazianzen includes many other pagan heroes as well as Biblical and Christian exemplars (such as Solomon and Constantine). But although all are equal in death, not all have attention drawn to their vices: Constantine, for instance, is spared such scrutiny, while the shamefulness of Alexander's demise is highlighted.[60]

[59] Naz. *Ep.* 189 (to Eustochius).
[60] Naz. *Carm.* 1.2.15 *De exterioris hominis vilitate* 91–92 (37.773).

Julian: Alexander is one of the most-named exemplars in Julian (more than fifty mentions, in addition to nameless allusions). Here I discuss a few which are representative. Comparisons between the two young rulers began during Julian's lifetime, encouraged by Julian in writing and possibly in coinage, and used even by his enemies. But there has been debate over just how much Julian admired the great conqueror.[61] The evidence suggests that Julian saw him as tragic not merely in his fate but also in his priorities and the way they shaped his character.

Julian himself says that early in life he took Alexander as a model to be imitated.[62] Alexander's **philosophical admiration** for Diogenes is to his credit.[63] Other strengths include a (perhaps martial) "**virtue** of outstanding proportions (μέγεθος ἀρετῆς ὑπερέχον)" and a serious **intellect** (σύνεσις).[64] He is **reverent** towards the gods, and is a **doer of great deeds** with the misfortune of **lacking a singer to immortalise them**—which a Homer-loving general would feel keenly. But it is not to his credit, in Julian's reckoning, that he was chiefly **motivated by glory**.[65] Alexander's courage (ἀνδρεία, θάρσος) suffered from excess (ὑπερβολή) and bled into **shameful pretentiousness** and **arbitrariness** (ἀλαζονεία, αὐθάδεια). He also shows viciousness in character, being at times **harsh and shameless**, more so than the Persian kings whose kingdom he took (χαλεπώτερος καὶ μᾶλλον ἀλαζὼν φανείς),[66] and he **suffers evils** in his fickle fortune. His external conquests contrast unfavourably with his **weak interior life** and pursuit of knowledge when compared to

[61] Smith (2011).
[62] Jul. *Ad Themistium* 253a, along with Marcus Aurelius.
[63] Jul. *Or*. 7, 203bc.
[64] Jul. *Or*. 8, 251b
[65] Jul. *Ep*. 47.432d–433c; *Or*. 2.96; 8.250d; Homer kept under the pillow, *Ep*. 12 (to Maximus).
[66] Jul. *Ad Themistium* 257ab.

Socrates.[67] Alexander's chiefly martial virtues and battlefield fortune are strongly relativised: the philosophical life and true knowledge of the divine are worth far more.[68]

Alexander is also the focus of an extended portrait in Julian's *Caesares*. It is not particularly flattering. There—*Batman vs. Superman* again—Julius Caesar compares himself obsessively to his Macedonian hero, and claims he has outdone him. In return, Alexander is **proud and touchy**, and cannot abide Julius Caesar's boasting. He asserts his place as the exemplar whom Caesar tried to imitate, and whom, he suggests, the Roman failed to equal. Here we have an imagined encounter between two exemplars, one of whom took the other as his own model. The modeller has become an ungrateful rival to his exemplar, who in turn acts as a kind of judge over him, offering a counter-assessment. Note that Caesar is *himself* an exemplar whom many—including the emperors in attendance at this competition—would have striven to imitate or emulate, so that in a way Julian makes Alexander stand at the head of the whole imperial chain of exemplarity, as *the* **exemplar of imperial exemplars**. Alexander goes on to assert his preeminence on the grounds of his **martial success**, and on the grounds of his successful imitation of two semi-divine or divinised exemplars, Achilles and especially καλλίνικος Heracles: "Achilles my ancestor I contended with, but Heracles I always admired and followed, to the extent that a human can follow in the tracks of a god (Ἀχιλλεῖ μὲν ἀμιλλώμενος τῷ προγόνῳ Ἡρακλέα δὲ θαυμάζων καὶ ἑπόμενος, ἅτε δὴ κατ' ἴχνος θεοῦ ἄνθρωπος)."[69] Alexander is additionally tarred as a **hyper-ambitious**, **bibulous**, **megalomaniacal**, **wrathful**, and **murderous sophist**. He is moreover **intemperate**, possibly also with women, to which we will return below.[70]

[67] Jul. *Ad Themistium* 264c. The charge of cruelty is raised again in *Ep.* 50, 446a (to Nilus).
[68] Jul. *Ad Themistium* 265ab.
[69] Jul. *Caesares* 322bc, 324d–325a.
[70] Jul. *Caesares* 331a–331c; 333a.

That image is confirmed even outside of that Saturnalian context, at Julian's most earnest and self-righteous. His cruel murders (ἀπέκτεινε πικρῶς . . .) of some five of his courtiers, including erstwhile friends, are used in a blistering letter of reproach to a senator at the centre of unfavourable rumours and whose relations with Julian were less than cordial.[71] This is the context in which we should read a superficially favourable comparison of Constantius with Alexander on the point of the latter's purported kindness to friends.[72] Notably, Alexander does not seem to appear in Julian as a culture-loving patron of the arts in the way that he does for Nazianzen.

Basil and Nyssen: Writing to a philosopher named Maximus, Basil urges his addressee to visit him, comparing him to Diogenes and himself to Alexander and asking him not to use the Cynic's words to the emperor: that it is as far from Diogenes to Alexander as it is from Alexander to Diogenes. Basil's excuse is poor health, but it is possibly that there is a slight power play, or at least a wry inversion, to be read in his association of himself, a lover of poverty, with a **great conqueror**, and Maximus with the propertyless Cynic.[73] If the addressee is indeed the prefect, the irony would be severe in light of the later reversals in the man's fortune, which Basil describes in e.g. *Ep.* 147.

In three other letters Basil emphasizes Alexander's **just** and **trusting** character. When accusations surface against the father of the bishop of Ancyra, Basil writes to him to request clarification and says that in the meantime he will "do what Alexander did, and

[71] Jul. *Ep.* 50 (to Nilus Dionysius).
[72] Jul. *Or.* 1, 43c.
[73] Bas. *Ep.* 9.3 (to Maximus). Courtonne gives this an early date, 361 or 362. On the identification, see *PLRE I s.v.* (22). Doubtless *PLRE* is correct to distinguish him from Maximus of Ephesus (*s.v.* 21), but was he a philosopher by profession, or a philosophically astute statesman? See the conclusion of the letter, where Basil calls Maximus a "man of the active life, for whom it is right to have peoples and cities to whom to show your virtuous deeds (τοῖς πρακτικοῖς ὑμῖν πρέπουσι δῆμοι καὶ πόλεις, αἷς τὰς κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις ἐνεπιδείκνυσθε). This recalls someone more like *PLRE I* Maximus (23), *praeses Cappadociae primae* in 372–373, found in Bas. *Ep.* 147–149; *PLRE I* has him also in *Ep.* 98.3, but see above, Chapter 2, 91, note 109. This 'philosopher' may thus be a well-educated Christian statesman.

will carefully hold one ear open for the accused."[74] The shoe is on the other foot in a letter to a provincial governor who has caught wind of "some men's accusations (ταῖς διαβολαῖς τινων)" against Basil. Lest he give premature credence to them, Basil tells the governor, "do what Alexander did (τὸ τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου ποίησον)." In a gesture exhibiting his participation in a παιδεία he shares with the governor, and even something like friendship, he describes how, "if any *of his comrades* faced some accusation," Alexander would listen with one ear while putting his hand over the other. Basil draws out the moral: "one who is going to judge correctly ought not be entirely and immediately carried away by the first comers, but he should keep half his attention unspoiled for the defence of the one who is not present."[75] In Plutarch's telling, however, this early practice of Alexander's did not last long. The number of accusations that ended up being true hardened Alexander, such that he became cruel and often erred in his judgements.[76]

A similar Basilian moral from a different Plutarchan story—also in Valerius[77]—appears in a letter to Sophronius, *magister officiorum*, who is told outright to "drop the suspicion . . . [and] imitate Alexander (ὑπόνοιαν ἄφες . . . τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον μιμούμενος)." The story is then told of how a seriously ill Alexander, on the point of drinking a medicine from his trusted doctor, received a letter claiming that the very doctor was planning to poison him. He "refrained from believing the accuser so much that he simultaneously read the letter aloud and drank the medicine."[78] This stays close to the Plutarchan source,

[74] Bas. *Ep.* 24 (to Athanasius, father of the bishop Athanasius of Ancyra).
[75] Bas. *Ep.* 94 (to Elias, a provincial governor): . . . τὸ τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου ποίησον. Καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνόν φασι, διαβαλλομένου τινὸς τῶν συνήθων, τὴν μὲν ἑτέραν τῶν ἀκοῶν ἀνεῖναι τῷ διαβάλλοντι, τὴν δὲ ἑτέραν ἐπιμελῶς ἐπιφράξασθαι τῇ χειρί, ἐνδεικνύμενον ὅτι δέοι τὸν ὀρθῶς κρίνειν μέλλοντα μὴ ὅλον εὐθὺς τοῖς προλαβοῦσιν ἀπάγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἥμισυ τῆς ἀκροάσεως ἀκέραιον διασώζειν πρὸς ἀπολογίαν τῷ μὴ παρόντι.
[76] Plut. *Alex.* 42.2.
[77] Val. Max. 3.8e.6 (*constantia*).
[78] Bas. *Ep.* 272.3 (to Sophronius, *magister officiorum*).

where, in contrast to the other example, Plutarch does not indicate any change for the worse in Alexander's disposition.[79]

Finally, Basil tells of Alexander's **chastity** and **self-control**, reporting the same incident involving the beautiful daughters of Darius that we saw mentioned in Nazianzen. In Basil, the incident is spelled out more amply and claimed as support for the dominical injunction against lust in *Matthew* 5.[80] If Plutarch is the source, there are two notable differences. First, the substantive infinitives in the key line there are different from what we find in the Cappadocians. Plutarch emphasizes the value of self-control (τὸ ἑαυτοῦ κρατεῖν) as more kingly than the conquest of enemies (τοῦ νικᾶν τοὺς πολεμίους), whereas Basil and Nazianzen frame it negatively and in gendered terms, saying that it is shameful for one who has conquered men to be less than or be defeated by maidens or women. In what I suspect is a nameless allusion thus far unnoticed, Gregory of Nyssa uses a similar spin on the Plutarchan Alexander's self-control in his *Life of Moses,* where he appears as a positive foil for the apostate Israelites fornicating with Moabite or Midianite women. The ironic force of Nyssen's verdict depends on the same assessment as that found in his Cappadocian peers: "Those who were stronger than men [i.e. the Israelites who had bested the Midianite army in the field] were weaker than women." Compare:

[79] Plut. *Alex.* 19.1–5.

[80] ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω ὑμῖν ὅτι πᾶς ὁ βλέπων γυναῖκα πρὸς τὸ ἐπιθυμῆσαι αὐτὴν ἤδη ἐμοίχευσεν αὐτὴν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ αὐτοῦ. Εἰ δὲ ὁ ὀφθαλμός σου ὁ δεξιὸς σκανδαλίζει σε, ἔξελε αὐτὸν καὶ βάλε ἀπὸ σοῦ· συμφέρει γάρ σοι ἵνα ἀπόληται ἓν τῶν μελῶν σου καὶ μὴ ὅλον τὸ σῶμά σου βληθῇ εἰς γέενναν. *Matthew* 5:28–29.

Plutarch:	ἀλλ᾽ Ἀλέξανδρος, ὡς ἔοικε, τοῦ νικᾶν τοὺς πολεμίους τὸ κρατεῖν ἑαυτοῦ βασιλικώτερον ἡγούμενος . . .[81]
Nazianzen:	. . . εἶναι γὰρ κακὸν / ἀνδρῶν κρατήσανθ᾽ ἥσσον᾽ εἶναι παρθένων.[82]
Basil:	. . . αἰσχρὸν εἶναι κρίνων τὸν ἄνδρας ἑλόντα γυναικῶν ἡττηθῆναι.[83]
Nyssen:	Καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀνδρῶν κρείττους, τῶν δὲ γυναικῶν ἥττους ἐγένοντο.[84]

Assuming that lines like this were not simply maxims detached from their exemplars, the parallels between the balancing of these phrases in Nyssen, Basil, and Nazianzen, the partial overlap in diction, and the exact coincidence of meaning all suggest that Nyssen is also alluding to Alexander as an exemplar of **chaste temperance** who is comparatively superior to the Israelite men who couple with the foreign women near Peor. The parallels also suggest that the Cappadocian friends shared this gendered reading of the moral of Plutarch's story and were ready to apply it to diverse situations.[85]

That this was a common theme but by no means a universal reading at the time can be seen from Ammianus Marcellinus' use of the story in his praise of Julian:

> Ex virginibus autem, quae speciosae sunt captae ut in Perside, ubi feminarum pulcritudo excellit, nec contrectare aliquam voluit nec videre, Alexandrum imitatus et Africanum, qui haec declinabant ne frangerentur cupiditate, qui se invictos a laboribus ubique praestiterunt.[86]

Ammianus gives his own psychological twist to the story. Julian's imitated models refused to indulge their senses on the beautiful captives "lest they [sc. Alexander and Scipio] who always proved themselves unsubdued by hardships be shattered by lust." This is closer to Plutarch's self-control, but emphasizes more clearly the nature of the hypothetical

[81] Plut. *Alex.* 21.4–5: ἀλλ᾽ Ἀλέξανδρος, ὡς ἔοικε, τοῦ νικᾶν τοὺς πολεμίους τὸ κρατεῖν ἑαυτοῦ βασιλικώτερον ἡγούμενος, οὔτε τούτων ἔθιγεν οὔτε ἄλλην ἔγνω γυναῖκα πρὸ γάμου, πλὴν Βαρσίνης.
[82] Naz. *Carm.* 1.2.10 *De virtute* 821–822; relevant section begins at 818 (37.739).
[83] Bas. *Ad adolescentes* VII.10: Οὐδ᾽ ἂν παρέλθοιμι τὸ τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου, ὃς τὰς θυγατέρας Δαρείου αἰχμαλώτους λαβὼν θαυμαστόν τι οἷον τὸ κάλλος παρέχειν μαρτυρουμένας οὐδὲ προσιδεῖν ἠξίωσεν, αἰσχρὸν εἶναι κρίνων τὸν ἄνδρας ἑλόντα γυναικῶν ἡττηθῆναι. The diction suggests Platonic influence: κἀνταῦθα, ὦ ξένε, τὸ νικᾶν αὐτὸν αὑτὸν πασῶν νικῶν πρώτη τε καὶ ἀρίστη, τὸ δὲ ἡττᾶσθαι αὐτὸν ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ πάντων αἴσχιστόν τε ἅμα καὶ κάκιστον (Pl. *Leg.* I, 626e).
[84] Nyss. *De vita Moysis* 2.136.
[85] Another such allusion, close to Nyssen's usage, may be found in Naz. 36.12, where he laments Constantinopolitan vice: Ὡς ἔστιν αἰσχρόν, τῶν μὲν πόλεων κρατεῖν, τῶν δὲ ἡδονῶν ἡττᾶσθαι.
[86] Amm. Marc. 24.4.27. See Lane Fox (1997) 250.

disintegration. It lacks the spin we find in Nazianzen, Basil, and Nyssen. It would be worth investigating how widespread their version was, and whether it was limited to Christian authors.

There is a further echo in Julian. His Alexander was intemperate and bibulous. But where this emerges we have a further possible allusion to the Plutarchan passage on the Persian women. When in the satirical *Caesares* Julian makes Alexander boast about conquering the whole world (τὸ πάντα νικᾶν), the great conqueror is met with a challenge from the event's caustic commentator, Silenus: "But often you were conquered by my daughters (ἀλλὰ ἐκράτουν γέ σου πολλάκις αἱ ἡμέτεραι θυγατέρες)!" Julian immediately explains that Dionysus' sidekick was speaking not of women at all, but rather in riddling terms of vines, i.e. wine and drunkenness (αἰνιττόμενος τὰς ἀμπέλους . . . τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον οἷα δή τινα μέθυσον καὶ φίλοινον σκώπτων). But the facts that the passage is anchored by the same pair of verbs that structure the parallelism in Plutarch's Alexander (νικᾶν–κρατεῖν), and that daughters are mentioned in both loci (the beautiful daughters of Darius III, in Plutarch), suggest yet another knowing engagement with the biography. In Julian's as in the Cappadocians' lines, κρατεῖν moves from self-control to control by women—although Julian half-retracts this by claiming, if only ironically, that these daughters are metaphorical. Crucially, Julian is the only one to use this line—if I am right that that is what he is doing—to suggest that Alexander is *not* self-controlled.[87] It is his only use of this anecdote, which seems so important for the image of Alexander that the Cappadocians received or developed, and at any rate wished to transmit.

There is a second significant difference in the Cappadocian depiction of Alexander as compared to that of the *Life*, though as it happens another text by Plutarch gives them

[87] Jul. *Caesares* 330a–c.

material for them to work with. The *Life* merely has him keeping his hands off the royal women. While Plutarch does say there that Alexander assured them of respectful treatment, "unaddressed and unseen by other men (ἀπόρρητον ἔχειν καὶ ἀόρατον ἑτέροις)," the Cappadocian inference that he did not even look at them (Nazianzen: εἰς ὄψιν οὐκ ἐδέξατ'; Basil: οὐδὲ προσιδεῖν ἠξίωσεν) is not to be found in this episode from the *Life*.[88] We saw Ammianus agree above: *nec contrectare aliquam voluit nec videre*.[89] It turns out that in *De curiositate*, a minor text in the *Moralia*, suggests that Alexander did not go to see Darius' wife, famed as she was for her beauty (ὁμοίως οὐδ᾽ ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος εἰς ὄψιν ἦλθε τῆς Δαρείου γυναικὸς ἐκπρεπεστάτης εἶναι λεγομένης).[90] As far as the *Life* goes, there is reason to doubt this restraint: in the case of other captive Persian women, Plutarch makes clear that Alexander actually does see them (ὁρῶν ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος) and admires their great beauty, so much so that the conqueror calls them "agony for the eyes." Alexander apparently kept cool and "passed by them as if they were lifeless decorative statuary," but in the biography, at least, Plutarch simply does not say that Alexander kept his eyes off them, as Basil, Nazianzen, and Ammianus would have it.[91] They pass over this remark in the *Life* without comment, and must rely on *De curiositate* to shore up Alexander's temperance.

Alexander's other occurrences in Gregory of Nyssa are minor but interesting. In a letter, Nyssen says, apparently unironically, that "the king of the Macedonians" is more admired amongst the wise for the fact that he reckoned that his real **treasure was in his friends** than for his exploits against the Persians or Indians or his oceanic adventures.

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[88] Plut. *Alex.* 21.3; Naz. *Carm.* 1.2.10 *De virtute* 818–822 (37.739); Bas. *Ad adolescentes* VII.10.
[89] Amm. Marc. 24.4.27.
[90] Plut. *De curiositate* 522a: ὁμοίως οὐδ᾽ ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος εἰς ὄψιν ἦλθε τῆς Δαρείου γυναικὸς ἐκπρεπεστάτης εἶναι λεγομένης, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν μητέρα φοιτῶν αὐτῆς πρεσβῦτιν οὖσαν, οὐχ ὑπέμεινε τὴν νέαν καὶ καλὴν ἰδεῖν.
[91] Plut. *Alex.* 21.5: τὰς δὲ ἄλλας αἰχμαλώτους ὁρῶν ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος κάλλει καὶ μεγέθει διαφερούσας ἔλεγε παίζων ὡς εἰσὶν ἀλγηδόνες ὀμμάτων αἱ Περσίδες, ἀντεπιδεικνύμενος δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἰδέαν τὴν ἐκείνων τὸ τῆς ἰδίας ἐγκρατείας καὶ σωφροσύνης κάλλος, ὥσπερ ἀψύχους εἰκόνας ἀγαλμάτων παρέπεμψεν.

Nyssen here is asking for patronage on behalf of a friend.[92] He also appears with a group of **campaigning generals**—interestingly, from Roman history: Hannibal and (probably Julius) Caesar—to show an apparent paradox of astrological determination. These generals met the same fates as those with whom they had fought, in spite of the fact that they had been victorious precisely when conquering those whose fates they ultimately shared.[93]

Summary: In Nazianzen we find a magnanimous, generous, chaste, mild-tempered, and culture-loving Alexander. With such a résumé of virtues, and perhaps the sole demerit of succumbing to a drinking-bout, Alexander perhaps fares the best of all pagan exemplars in Gregory. Against this backdrop, we may address a locus adduced by Lane Fox (1997) and discussed more fully by Smith (2011). Admitting that the link is "extremely exiguous," Smith cites Nazianzen's account in *Oratio* 5 of Julian's alleged attempt to drown in the Euphrates when he knew he was fatally wounded, so that, for want of a corpse, his followers could declare him thoroughly divinised. Nazianzen does not name Alexander here, nor does Demoen include it as an allusion, but Smith convincingly shows that there is a strong parallel in Arrian's account of the last days of Alexander, an episode to which Nazianzen is pointing as a grim *imitatio Alexandri*.[94] If this is the case, there may be more than sophistical play at work in his avoidance of the conqueror's name: perhaps, for Gregory, Alexander was one of precious few positive pagan exemplars, one on whom he leaned explicitly in the preceding oration to create a laudable foil against which to measure Julian, an exemplarist comparison that would be clouded by naming Alexander at his most shameful in the conclusion of his two-part invective.

[92] Nyss. *Ep.* 8 (ad Antiochianum). Amm. Marc. 25.4.15. reports that this saying was a favourite of Julian's; it was apparently a "commonplace," and can be found in Themistius: Lane Fox (1997) 250, 252.
[93] Nyss. *Contra fatum* 54.
[94] Naz. *Or.* 5.14; Smith (2011) 73–75; he notes Arrian *Anabasis* 7.27, and says that the episode may have been covered in the missing final chapters of Plutarch's *Life*, citing the argument made by Pelling (1973). See also Lane Fox (1997) 249–250.

Basil and Nyssen, too, show a general appreciation for this conquering hero, one that suggests a definite familiarity with Plutarch's biography—as well as a selective reading of it to focus on his virtues, especially his chastity. In highlighting that virtue they reveal definite concerns, not found in the Plutarchan account, about the power of women over men. These concerns seem to be hinted at, though not fully expressed, in Julian, who has the most nuanced view of Alexander. These nuances go so far that I am inclined to suggest that his view was rather more negative than positive, at least where character is concerned.

Pyrrhus

Plutarch and Valerius: Pyrrhus serves Valerius Maximus as an illustration of **humanity and decency**, but he is also **venal** in an anecdote about Roman steadfastness and indifference to wealth.[95] For Plutarch, he combines **martial prowess**, kindness and **clemency** to the defeated, and **courage** as virtues with the vices of **restlessness** and an **insatiable ambition** for pointless conquests.[96]

Nazianzen: When Pyrrhus' plans on the battlefield are thwarted by Fabricius (Πύῤῥου κρατήσας ἐν μάχῃ Φαβρίκιος), the king of Epirus—very similar to the supporting role he plays in the Valerian anecdote about Roman virtue—tries to bribe his Roman foe with gold and intimidate him with an elephant. Fabricius' own martial prowess, combined with his steadfast resistance to bribery and fear, leave Pyrrhus looking **militarily inept** and **pusillanimous**, even **crassly corrupt** by comparison.[97] This also forms part of Plutarch's characterization of Pyrrhus, where the same episodes are reported, although in the *Life* Pyrrhus is at least acknowledged as an often brilliant tactician—and there it is pointed out

[95] Val. Max. 5.1e.3–4; Roman virtue against his failed bribery at 4.3.14; luxury implied at 9.1.4.
[96] Plut. *Pyrrh.* 7.4–5, 11.4, 8.1; 26.1–2, 26.7.
[97] Naz. *Carm.* 1.2.10 *De virtute* 352–364 (37.705–706).

that Pyrrhus actually defeated the Romans at Heraclea, not the other way round, as Gregory would have it, nor did Fabricius have command in any military engagement against Pyrrhus, who met him as a diplomatic envoy.

This passage on Pyrrhus is also notable for its framing. It is introduced as a praise of Roman virtues (τὰ ‘Ρωμαίων καλά): the focus is actually on Fabricius, not Pyrrhus, and the incident is meant to be one of Roman history. Gregory also treats it as one of ‘modern’ history: he does not want to omit it, “lest I make use only of ancient men [as examples of virtue] (ὡς μὴ παλαιοῖς ἰσχυριζοίμην μόνοις).”[98] Roman history, for Gregory, even if it involves a Hellenistic general, already belongs to a time after antiquity. He closes his discussion of pagans who scorned wealth by exhorting his addressee to ignore the wicked things found in the ancient books that have nourished him (Plutarch’s *Lives*?), perhaps during years of rhetorical education.[99]

Julian: Pyrrhus appears only in an outburst of Hellenic nationalism from Alexander’s mouth in *Caesares*, where he serves as a **general** who terrorised the Romans. His defeat goes unmentioned; the implicit argument is that the Romans’ fear of one (and indeed, perhaps one failed) Greek general suggests that they could not have withstood the Greeks when united, namely under Alexander.[100]

Summary: Pyrrhus appears only once in Nazianzen, and I do not find him in Basil or Gregory of Nyssa.

[98] Naz. *Carm.* 1.2.10 *De virtute* 350–351 (37.705).
[99] Naz. *Carm.* 1.2.10 *De virtute* 366–369 (37.706–707): μήτ’ οὖν ἐκεῖνα προσδέχου τὰ μὴ καλὰ / βίβλων παλαιῶν, ὦγαθ’, αἷς ἐνετράφης· / ἔα με κερδαίνοντα κεκλῆσθαι κακόν.
[100] Jul. *Caesares* 325bc.

Philosophers

Socrates

Valerius: The *Facta et dicta* praise Socrates as a paragon of **steadfastness**, **humble birth**, **sternness, wisdom**, **diligence**, and **playfulness**.[101]

Nazianzen: In spite of showing some respect for Socrates' status as the **wisest man**,[102] Gregory Nazianzen tends to cast him in unflattering terms. He is the paradigmatic philosopher in episodes such as his sudden and protracted contemplation while on military campaign at Potidaea; but these anecdotes, drawn from the *Symposium*, seem to retain that dialogue's sense of the **ridiculous** at Socrates' expense without any of the sympathy for the man and the gravity Socrates feels for his philosophical mission.[103] Gregory's next barb, that all Socrates' talk of beauty was really about his **pederastic lusts**, heightens the criticism. Taken together the two characteristics Nazianzen chooses to highlight show a somewhat disingenuous use of the Platonic source material, since a jilted Alcibiades, the source of the remarks about his philosophic rapture, also explicitly complains that Socrates did *not* engage sexually with his young favourite.[104]

Rather more nobly, Socrates is cast as a kind of **courageous martyr** in the poem on virtue, cheerfully proposing a toast (φιλοτησία) as he takes his hemlock. But Gregory will not let his praise go without serious qualification:

> Do you praise this? I do, too, somewhat, except insofar as
> They [Socrates, Epictetus, Anaxarchus, and others] were [merely] courageous in evils that they could not escape;
> Nor do I see salvation for them, desire it though they may.[105]

[101] Val. Max. 3.8e.2; 3.4e.1; 6.4e.2; 7.2e.1; 8.7e.3; 8.8e.1.
[102] Naz. *Carm.* 2.1.11 *De vita sua* 1035–1037 (37.1100).
[103] Behaviour on campaign at Potidaea and Delium, Pl. *Symp.* 219e–221c.
[104] Alcibiades' speech: Pl. *Symp*. 216c–223d.
[105] Naz. *Carm*. 1.2.10 *De virtute* 692–697 (37.730).

In *Oratio* 4 he refers in similar terms to "the hemlock of Socrates . . . whose philosophy was more the result of compulsion than of choice."[106] Forced martyrdom is apparently hardly any martyrdom at all. Yet this is at variance with Plato's depiction of his teacher's death as voluntary: Nazianzen's criticism is that the philosopher's fate was inevitable, and thus hardly meritorious, whereas the *Apology, Phaedo,* and *Crito* are perfectly clear that Socrates could have escaped. As Demoen (1996) has argued, this is a distortion on Nazianzen's part, and so it is perhaps a disingenuous depiction: in a letter, Nazianzen even acknowledges that Socrates had a real choice.[107]

Julian: For Julian, Socrates is a **true philosopher**, free of any impure love of glory.[108] He is a model of the robust and actively searching intellect who **helps inferiors in need** and enjoys **divine guidance**.[109] Remarkably, in addition to being paradigmatically wise, his disciples' virtues are counted as a credit to him: he is an **expert general** through his student Xenophon, **wise** through Plato (though not only by this means), and **courageous** through his student Antisthenes. As a result, he achieved more than Alexander would several generations later.[110]

Basil and Nyssen: Socrates does not occur in Gregory of Nyssa, and is found in just one text by Basil. In Basil's address to youths, Socrates is employed as a pagan practitioner of the Christian injunction to **turn the other cheek**. He is said to have been given a thorough drubbing by some inexplicably enraged man, and to have done nothing to resist him. When the beating was over, Socrates merely wrote the perpetrator's name on his battered face to identify the author of the bruises, as if placing a sculptor's name on

[106] Naz. *Or.* 4.70. Julian does not respect Christian martyrs, while yet admiring the same three mentioned in the poem; he is ὁ τὸ Σωκράτους ἐπαίρων κώνειον, καὶ τὸ Ἐπικτήτου σκέλος, καὶ τὸν Ἀναξάρχου θύλακον, *ὧν ἀναγκαία μᾶλλον ἢ ἑκούσιος ἡ φιλοσοφία . . .*
[107] Demoen (1996) 190 note 384, citing these loci and Naz. *Ep.* 32.8–11 (to Philagrius).
[108] Jul. *Or.* 2.96cd.
[109] Jul. *Or.* 8.241bc, 8.244a, 8.249b.
[110] Jul. *Ad Themistium* 264c.

one of his statues.[111] Later in the same text he displays a proper **disregard for wealth** by refusing to admire a man proud of his riches until he has ascertained whether the rich man in question knows how to use them.[112]

Summary: Absent from Nyssen and an ambivalent figure in Nazianzen, for whom he is a principled but pederastic sage, Socrates shows only virtues in Basil and Julian, although they choose to highlight different ones.

Plato

Valerius: Plato is one of Valerius Maximus' paragons of **moderation**, **wisdom**, **diligence**, and **deference to expertise**.[113]

Nazianzen: Plato often appears in Gregory, especially for his mellifluous and **seductively eloquent prose**. This is acknowledged as a good but relativised against the care of the soul;[114] ultimately such eloquence is to be distrusted.[115] He is the **wisest of men**.[116] Yet his **erroneous teachings** are to be spat upon.[117] In the first invective against Julian, his **corrupting influence** is to blame for the apostate emperor's ingratitude and resentment.[118] There, too, he turns out to be a **glutton** whose lust for food gets him sold into slavery; both his **slavery** and his **ransom by a non-Greek** are then counted against him.[119] He and other philosophers (including Aristotle) have charms that Nazianzen's deceased brother will not enjoy, but also **sophistically persuasive riddles** (πιθανότητας)

[111] Bas. *Ad adolescentes* VII.6–9.
[112] Bas. *Ad adolescentes* IX.23.
[113] Val. Max. 4.1e.2–3; 7.2e.4; 8.7e.3; 8.12e.1.
[114] Naz. *Carm.* 1.2.10 *De virtute* 43–44 (37.683–4).
[115] Naz. *Carm.* 2.1.12 *De seipso et de episcopis* 305 (37.1188).
[116] Naz. *Carm.* 1.2.10 *De virtute* 306 (37.702).
[117] Naz. *Carm.* 2.1.11 *De vita sua* 1033–34 (37.1100).
[118] Naz. *Or.* 4.43.
[119] Naz. *Or.* 4.72. Unusually, this escapes Demoen's inventory, but his gluttony is the subject of scorn at Carm. 1.2.10 *De virtute* 313–316 (37.703).

that he will not have to worry about.[120] Plato's Ideas or Forms (ἰδέαι) are to be attacked, but the context is one in which Plato is counted a **formidable opponent** and a worthy target for the clever who are otherwise wasting their time in vain discussions, in the hopes that, once the vanity of pagan philosophers is understood, they will turn to the contemplation of Christ.[121] Though Gregory sometimes uses Platonic arguments, Plato's own dangerous eloquence recurs towards the end of the theological orations as a trap for Christian intellectuals to avoid.[122]

Julian: In addition to being invoked regularly as an important **philosophical authority** in ideas, Plato is a model for Julian as a ***practitioner* of salutary mythography and philosophy**.[123] Philosophers should attend, for instance, to his exemplary use of metaphors to convey truth.[124] He shows that **piety and philosophy** are compatible.[125] Plato should also be imitated for his **endurance of separation** from loved ones when travelling.[126] Plato is **wiser than Moses** and knows God better than does the Hebrew lawgiver.[127] He is universally admired as a generic paragon of **wisdom**.[128]

Basil: Basil's Plato has few, if any, strikes against him, even if his virtue does not overwhelm. In a letter to Diodorus, Plato is praised for his **powerful style** (τῇ ἐξουσίᾳ τοῦ λόγου), which allows him to make philosophical points while also making his characters engage in entertaining and sometimes biting interactions with each other; but this style even Plato sometimes eschews in order to present his point more directly. It is Plato's direct style, not his more dramatic mode, which Basil asks his correspondent to take as a

[120] Naz. *Or.* 7.20.
[121] Naz. *Or.* 27.10.
[122] Naz. *Or.* 32.25.
[123] Jul. *Or.* 7.215bc, 7.217c.
[124] Jul. *Or.* 7.222b.
[125] Jul. *Or.* 7.236d; echoed in *Ad Themistium* 314, and *Ep.* 2, to Priscus.
[126] Jul. *Or.* 8.245bd.
[127] Jul. *Contra Galilaeos* 330d–341a. Plato is among a group of philosophers and statesmen he praises later, at 370cd.
[128] Jul. *Caesares* 306c; *Ad Themistium* 264c.

model—as if they are still in the schoolroom, with some not-so-subtle hints that if Aristotle wasn't up to it, Diodorus probably isn't, either.[129] Basil appears to accept a few comparisons with Plato on the point of wisdom.[130] In *Ad adolescentes,* Plato is safe enough to be read as the source of **wisdom** on **scorn for the body** (or only enough care to get on with philosophizing) and **justice**.[131]

Nyssen: For Gregory of Nyssa, Plato is associated with **flawed speculations** that fail to acknowledge the Son of God, and is thereby linked to the Jews, who similarly reject Jesus.[132] Plato is **eloquent but not always trustworthy**, and so heretics make use of "dulcet Platonisms (Πλατωνικαῖς καλλιφωνίαις)" to peddle false teachings.[133] Eunomius, perhaps understandably, is "dazed by the beauty of Plato's eloquent style (περικτυπηθεὶς τῇ καλλιφωνίᾳ τῆς Πλατωνικῆς λέξεως)," but errs in daring to "make Plato's theory a doctrine of the Church (δόγμα τῆς ἐκκλησίας τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ποιήσασθαι)": Plato is **pretty but wrong**.[134] On life after death, Scripture must be the rule; Plato's anthropology of the charioteer and horses must be set aside.[135] As for this life, a story Plato told of Herodicus disparages pointless fretting about the body, and so showed **scorn for the corporeal**.[136] Plato has a kind of "inner sanctum (ἄδυτα)," presumably of wisdom or **understanding**.[137] The most favourable assessment may be Nyssen's characterization of him as "Plato, the **wise man** amongst those outside the Church (ὁ σοφὸς ἐν τοῖς ἔξω

[129] Bas. *Ep.* 135.1 (to Diodorus).
[130] Bas. 352 and 355, from Libanius.
[131] Bas. *Ad adolescentes* VI.7 (on justice), IX.12 and 16 (on the body).
[132] Nyss. *Refutatio confessionis Eunomii* 48.
[133] Nyss. *Contra Eunomium* 3.7.34.
[134] Nyss. *Contra Eunomium* 2.1.405.
[135] Nyss. *De anima et resurrectione* 33.
[136] Nyss. *Contra fatum* 50.
[137] Nyss. *Ep.* 27 (ad Stagirium) (*GNO VIII/2*, 84). Cf. Pl. *Theaet.* 162a1–3, where Plato uses the term of Protagoras' book *Ἀλήθεια*.

Πλάτων)," although on the question discussed in the context Plato has nothing directly to contribute.[138]

Summary: Our authors can agree that Plato was wise. The Cappadocians can further agree that while Plato unites beautiful style with a powerful mind, he also mixes error into it. For that reason he is a worthy opponent, but one needs to be careful with him, lest he corrupt his reader. Nazianzen, for his part, is the only one to impute to the philosopher such vices as gluttony and the apparent culpability for such misfortunes as enslavement. Julian will happily agree with every positive assessment found in the Cappadocians, reject every maligning of his character, and add some admirable and imitable virtues besides.

Aristotle

Valerius: Aristotle appears in Valerius Maximus as **patriotic** and **wise**, but unduly **keen on glory**.[139]

Nazianzen: Aristotle makes frequent appearances outside the polemics against Julian, especially in treatments of theology. Like Plato, Aristotle, while mocked for his diminished and **flawed view of a god** with no more than "trifling foreknowledge (τὴν μικρολόγον πρόνοιαν)," is a **serious opponent** worth grappling with.[140] The "**false artifice** of Aristotle's arts (τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους τεχνῶν τὴν κακοτεχνίαν)," rhetoric or logic perhaps being meant, is amongst the plagues wracking the Church.[141] At Nazianzen's most polemical, Aristotle is a natural scientist whose vain **curiosity** about the currents of the Euripus ultimately get him killed.[142] Just like the oratorical prowess of Demosthenes, or

[138] Nyss. *De infantibus praemature abreptis* 70.
[139] Val. Max. 5.6e.5; 7.2e.11; 8.14e.3.
[140] Naz. *Or.* 27.10.
[141] Naz. *Or.* 32.25. He is again the bogeyman of idle controversy at *Or.* 23.12.
[142] Naz. *Or.* 4.72.

Plato's mellifluous style, the **sophistical ability** to "weave labyrinths with the impenetrable discourses of Aristotle (πλέκων λαβυρίνθους δυσδιεξόδοις λόγοις / Ἀριστοτέλους)" is nothing compared to the care of the soul and the worship of its origin.[143] Perhaps the last word belongs to a poem in which Gregory cautions against many pagan philosophers, and on Aristotle simply says, "keep him far away (μακρὰν ὁ Σταγειρίτης)."[144]

Julian: Julian reveres Aristotle as a philosopher for both his ideas (which he often invokes) and his character.[145] Like Plato, he nobly combines **philosophy** with **piety for the gods**, who guide his intellectual life.[146] The two serve as reminders of right action to Julian in moments of crisis.[147] Aristotle's views have weight, but always need to be checked for conformity to Plato's, and he sometimes becomes **ridiculous** (γελοῖος) by **excessive inquiry** (πολυπραγμονῶν), much as in Nazianzen.[148] With Socrates and Plato, Aristotle is himself a **practitioner of exemplarism**, in that he composes praises for others' virtues and exhorts his audiences to become like God.[149] Yet his association can be a source of some disparagement of Alexander, on the grounds of **sophistical logic**.[150]

Basil: From 'Libanius' Basil receives a comparison with Aristotle, presumably as an unironic compliment,[151] though in the authentic correspondence Basil knows that Aristotle counted himself **inferior to Plato** in eloquence.[152] Overt appeals to Aristotle for the sake of virtues or vices his character might show are very scant in Basil. One reason for this

[143] Naz. *Carm.* 1.2.10 *De virtute* 47–49 (37.684).
[144] Naz. *Carm.* 2.1.12 *De seipso et de episcopis* 304 (37.1188).
[145] Jul. *Or.* 7.217c; here the reverence is said to be equal to that for Plato, and just following that for the gods.
[146] Jul. *Or.* 7.237c; Aristotle's opinions of the gods are sound: Jul. *Ad Themistium* 331–332; guided by the gods: Jul. *Fragment of a Letter to a Priest*, 326d.
[147] Jul. *Ep.* 4 (to Oribasius).
[148] Jul. *Or.* 5.258.
[149] Jul. *Or.* 3.104; *Or.* 6.185.
[150] Julian, *Caesares*, 331a–331c; 333a.
[151] Libanius to Basil, in Bas. *Ep.* 352 (of doubtful authenticity).
[152] Bas. *Ep.* 135.1 (to Diodorus).

may be the association of Aristotelian thought with Eunomius. Basil makes this connection in his *Adversus Eunomium*, where he scorns the **misleading syllogisms** of Aristotle and Chrysippus.[153] There Basil finds it useful to show that he knows Aristotle's works and principles, but although he deploys them against Eunomius, he seems to show a preference for using the Psalms to refute his opponent.[154]

Nyssen: The Aristotle-Eunomius link becomes a frequent refrain in Gregory of Nyssa. The association seems meant to tar Eunomius, the implication being that Aristotle is not a good sort to imitate in the Christian intellectual life. Aristotelian syllogisms are Eunomius' weapon;[155] Aristotle is the source of "**false artifice**" or "**wicked skilfulness**" for heretics (ἡ Ἀριστοτέλους κακοτεχνία, the same vice we saw in Nazianzen);[156] he is invoked to tease Eunomius when he leaves his logic-master behind.[157] Aristotle serves as Eunomius' "champion or patron and magisterial ally (ὁ προστάτης αὐτοῦ καὶ σύμμαχος τῶν δογμάτων Ἀριστοτέλης)."[158] The sense is always pejorative. Aristotle is a kind of **proto-heresiarch**, and Nyssen has apparently no other use for Aristotle's name.

Summary: Aristotle is a syllogism-slinging bogeyman for all of our Cappadocians. He is a formidable opponent, like Plato, but unlike his teacher, there is much less to admire about him, in his style or in his character. In Nyssen, the antipathy turns Aristotle into a kind of mentor for heretics, a role he would reprise on one side of the thirteenth-century debates surrounding his revival in Paris and other centres of learning in Western Europe. Julian's admiration does not extend so far as a general *imprimatur* without a prior Platonic

[153] Bas. *Adversus Eunomium* I, 29.516.
[154] Bas. *Adversus Eunomium* I, 29.532.
[155] Nyss. *Contra Eunomium* 1.1.46.
[156] Nyss. *Contra Eunomium* 1.1.55; see note *ad loc.* for the omission of this line from a number of manuscripts.
[157] Nyss. *Contra Eunomium* 3.7.15.
[158] Nyss. *Contra Eunomium* 2.1.411; at 2.1.620, excessive reliance on logic is an "Aristotelian spearpoint (τὴν Ἀριστοτελικὴν . . . αἰχμήν)"; more Aristotelian craftiness at 3.5.6 and 3.10.50.

nihil obstat, and he seems to agree with his Christian counterparts that Aristotle's logical and investigative methods were excessive.

The primarily negative Cappadocian view of Aristotle stands in contrast to Nazianzen's deep rhetorical and philosophical dependence on Aristotle, which Norris (1991) has demonstrated, including in matters of his much-maligned logic. This dependence is so pervasive that an old but doubtful tradition has identified Nazianzen as the author of a treatise on logic and the quadrivium.[159] This is not a study of pagan philosophers' influences on the Cappadocians, but I wish to flag one passage in Basil which bears on the three polemicists' ethical visions and which has not yet been noticed. There is more than a wink at the Stagirite at the opening of Basil's *Ad adolescentes*, where Basil promises his audience the second-best rank in the schema proposed by Hesiod in *Works and Days*. He refreshes their memory: the best is the man who knows and understands what is good; next comes he who, though not knowing, trusts and follows one who does know; and finally is the wretch who neither knows nor follows a good example.[160] Aristotle had also quoted this in the first book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.[161] Since both occur near the beginning of treatises essentially on character formation, I suggest that Basil is quietly acknowledging the debt which his 'developmental psychology' and his character-educational plan, with all their emphases on habituation and the imitation of exemplars, owe to Aristotle's. I do not believe that this Aristotelian parallel has been noted in the literature.[162] Alongside the possibilities of a curricular

[159] Norris (1991) 18–39.
[160] Hes. *Op.* 293 sqq.; Bas. *Ad adolescentes* I.4.
[161] Arist. *Eth. Nic.* I, 4.7, 1095b.
[162] It does not appear *ad loc.* in the commented editions by Wilson (1975) or Naldini (1984), nor does it feature in Edwards (2019), a study of Aristotle in patristic thought. Wilson (1975) flags and cites *Works and Days*, "which [Basil] expects his nephews to have read"; this is suggested, says Wilson, by Basil's emphatic δηλονότι instead of the more tentative που. Naldini (1984) notes (at I.4 in his numbering, p. 142) that the passage must have been "un modello largamente utilizzato," and cites both Julian's *Or.* 8.245a and, more remotely, Livy 22.29 (Minucius to the soldiers). Edwards (2019) is concerned less with ethics and more with metaphysics and logic where it deals with the Cappadocians; the *Ad adolescentes* is not cited in that study.

reading of Hesiod and the passage's transformation into a commonplace, we should add the hypothesis of a broader conscious engagement with Peripatetic ethics than our authors, who balk at Aristotle's alleged atheism, would like to admit. For instance, Basil's take on choosing ethical models for imitation and habituation looks Aristotelian (albeit in a way that could be perfectly Platonic).[163] For his part, Nyssen, in his grand study of the life of virtue, dwells on each virtue being situated between two vices, a hallmark of Aristotelian ethics.[164]

Zeno of Elea

Valerius: Valerius Maximus' Zeno of Elea shows **endurance**.[165]

Nazianzen and Basil: For Basil, speaking through a personified Πενία, Zeno represents **detachment from earthly goods**, in showing gratitude to fortune for shipwreck which deprives him of his possessions.[166] His solitary appearance in Nazianzen is a report of the same incident, though Zeno himself is unnamed. Even though it is in the polemical *Oratio* 4, in a section in which some other philosophers are scorned (including Socrates and Plato), Zeno's virtue is positively affirmed. The rarity of Zeno's nobility amongst the pagans should justify awe at the droves of Christians practicing similar virtues.[167]

Julian: Julian takes him as a **god-fearing** philosopher whose piety both guides his thought and makes those who study him fear god, too.[168] In the *Caesars* he is a kind of

[163] Bas. *Ep.* 2.3 (to Nazianzen) on virtuous habits acquired through imitating virtuous models; cp. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* II, 1, 1103b8; cf. also 9.9, 1169b5 (θεωρεῖν δὲ μᾶλλον τοὺς πέλας δυνάμεθα ἢ ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὰς ἐκείνων πράξεις ἢ τὰς οἰκείας) and 9.11, 1171b4 (μιμεῖσθαι δ᾽ ἐν ἅπασι δεῖ δῆλον ὅτι τὸν βελτίω, albeit in the context of association and friendship with living persons); Pl. *Resp.* III, 395cd.
[164] Nyss. *De vita Moysis* 2.132; with a whiff of Aristotelian teleology applied both to crafts and to life at 2.143 (cf. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* I, 1, 1094a1 sqq.).
[165] Val. Max. 3.3e.2.
[166] Bas. *Ep.* 4 (to Olympius).
[167] Naz. *Or.* 4.72.
[168] Jul. *Fragment of a Letter to a Priest* 300c–301b.

footman of Apollo, summoned as a **moral tutor** to improve Octavian's chameleonesque character at the outset to make him "**wise** and **temperate**" (presumably through his own example), in which task he succeeds, and then never reappears.[169] He is **modest** and devoted to the **pursuit of truth**.[170]

Summary: Zeno is not named in Nyssen. The Athenian alumni all remember him favourably, although Julian emphasizes virtues other than the anti-materialist outlook found with the philosopher in his Christian peers.[171]

Diogenes of Sinope

Valerius: Diogenes in the *Facta et dicta* is a paragon of **restraint and self-control**, elaborated in his simple diet and in his **indifference to wordly goods** offered by Alexander.[172]

Nazianzen: Diogenes is one of several Cynics in an autobiographical poem, where he is invoked in judgement against self-styled Cynics of the fourth century.[173] In a letter against tax officials he accuses them of being so greedy that they would not even keep their hands off Diogenes and his meagre wallet, the Cynic thus being an exemplar of **poverty**, **detachment from wealth**, and, by contextual implication, **innocence**.[174]

Basil: Basil similarly esteems Diogenes for his **detachment from worldly goods**. Πενία personified tells how the philosopher cast aside even his drinking-bowl once he learned how to drink by cupping his hands together.[175] Similarly he teaches that care for

[169] Jul. *Caesares* 309bc.
[170] Jul. *Or.* 6.188bc, 202de
[171] See Krueger (1993) for Diogenes in other Christian thinkers.
[172] Val. Max. 4.3e.4.
[173] Naz. *Carm.* 2.1.11 *De vita sua* 1032 (37.1100).
[174] Naz. *Ep.* 98 (to the administrators of the city of Nazianzus).
[175] Bas. *Ep.* 4 (to Olympius).

the hair or clothes beyond the absolute minimum is a sign of misery or injustice; he judges himself wealthier than Alexander, since he needed less for his life.[176] Yet as we saw above, in his most straightforwardly exemplaristic use of Diogenes, Basil associates the philosopher with his own addressee, and himself with Alexander.[177]

Julian: Although Diogenes is mentioned by name about as often as is Alexander, all but three of his mentions occur in the two invectives against latter-day self-proclaimed Cynics whose performative pseudo-philosophy is just *l'art pour l'art*. **Poverty** is part of the acknowledged ideal of Diogenes, one he himself attained (so he is πένης), and likewise **subjection of the body**.[178] But the main point across both of those orations as concerns Diogenes is to show that his **scandalous behaviour** was always in the service of **true philosophy**—such as eating raw octopus to show the horror of eating any meat. It is for this truly philosophical **scorn for popular opinion** that Julian remembers him, and uses him as a reproach against his addressees.[179] Other virtues praised in pursuit of that end are **greatness of soul** (μεγαλοψυχία), **endurance** (καρτερία), **love of toil** (φιλοπονία), and **piety for the gods** (he is θεοσεβής in word and deed).[180]

Summary: Poverty is Diogenes' key mark for the Cappadocians who mention him (Nyssen does not); Julian can admire this part of his life, as well as some of his more eccentric provocations, which the Christians may find distasteful. The fact that both Nazianzen and Julian use Diogenes against his own ostensible followers is striking.

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[176] Bas. *Ad adolescentes* IX.3, 21. The comparison on the point of wealth is with βασιλέως τοῦ μεγάλου, which classically should mean the king of Persia, but as Alexander assumed this title and used it for himself in conversation with Diogenes, is seems safe to assume that Basil means the Macedonian and not Darius III or one of his predecessors; see Diogenes Laertius, 6.60.
[177] See above, 139, note 73, on Bas. *Ep.* 9.3.
[178] Jul. *Or.* 6, 195b, with a truncation of the quotation at *Ad Themistium* 256d; πένης καὶ χρημάτων ἐνδεὴς at 212c; scorn for the body (ὑπεριδεῖν τὸ σῶμα) 194d–195a.
[179] Jul. *Orationes* 6 and 7 *passim*, but e.g. 6, 192d–193a; τῆς τῶν πολλῶν . . . δόξης . . . ὑπερορᾶν, *Or.* 7, 211bc. The bulk of the latter discourse is actually on acceptable forms of mythopoeia or mythography. Unfortunately, in his model composition, Julian fails to be anything but petulantly self-referential.
[180] Jul. *Or.* 6, 203a; *Or.* 7, 212c–213a.

Persian monarchs

The Achaemenid dynasty of classical Persia plays an important role in Herodotus, Xenophon, and other authors of classical Greece, and it is no surprise that some of its members turn up in Valerius Maximus, Plutarch, Julian, and the Cappadocians. Here I focus on those found most widely in our fourth-century authors.[181] Plutarch takes a back seat. It should be borne in mind that as the Achaemenids are for the most part found in Jul. *Orationes* 1–3 for Constantius and Eusebeia, we need to be alert to multiple layers of meaning, as I will note in the Coda to this chapter.

Cyrus the Great[182]

Valerius: Cyrus the Great shows **diligence** and **vengeance**.[183]

Nazianzen: For Nazianzen, Cyrus is proverbially **wealthy**, inheriting Croesus' former reputation, and this is predictably insufficient for a good life.[184] Neither Croesus nor Cyrus escapes an **evil fate** in spite of their **earthly glory**.[185] Apparently some unscrupulous bishops surpassed these two, as well as Midas, in wealth, yet presumed to preach as if credible leaders of the Church: unacceptable for Nazianzen.[186]

Julian: All references to Cyrus occur in the orations for Constantius and his wife Eusebia. Both Cyrus the Great and his rebellious namesake descendant are noble men

[181] Two historically important Persians who are rare in our corpora are Cyrus the Rebel (the would-be fratricide and usurper of Xenophon's *Anabasis*) and Darius III (the last Achaemenid, defeated by Alexander).
[182] While a Biblical figure, most of his uses come from secular literature, so he belongs here rather than in Chapter 4.
[183] Val. Max. 8.7e16; 9.10e.1.
[184] Naz. *Carm.* 1.2.10 *De virtute* 34–35 (37.683).
[185] Naz. *Carm.* 1.2.15 *De exterioris hominis vilitate* 89 (37.772).
[186] Naz. *Carm.* 2.1.12 *De seipso et de episcopis* 434–435 (37.1197).

whom Xenophon praised (τοὺς ἄνδρας μὲν τοὺς καλούς τε κἀγαθοὺς . . .).[187] Cyrus is twice implicitly **clement or magnanimous** to his murderous grandfather Astyages, though outdone by Constantius in sparing Vetranio (who acts ἄμεινον καὶ δικαιότερον).[188] A third time, however, the usurpation is framed as comparatively **impious for dethroning the usurper's grandfather**.[189] Cyrus shows the virtues of **magnanimity** (μεγαλοψυχία) and **love of honour** (φιλοτιμία).[190] His kingship is **fatherly**, and he is rightly called πατήρ,[191] even if his son is despotic.[192] He is first among the doers of **glorious deeds** (τῶν . . . λαμπρὰ καὶ περιφανῆ πραξάντων) who are said to have received visions (the veracity of which visions Julian doubts).[193] He is a paragon of **royal education**, though of a flawed sort too prone to the cultivation of haughtiness.[194] He is the **dispossessed victim** of his jealous father-in-law (who is also his uncle).[195]

Basil: Cyrus the Great assumes a somewhat **magnanimous** role in a letter of Basil's, where, as in Herodotus, a defeated Croesus is allowed to become his friend and adviser.[196]

Nyssen: In a possibly spurious text, Gregory of Nyssa rejects a potentially anti-Trinitarian reading of the opening of *Ps.* 110, which takes Εἶπεν ὁ Κύριος τῷ Κυρίῳ μου alongside the Λέγει ὁ Κύριος τῷ Χριστῷ μοῦ Κύρῳ of *Isaiah* 45:1. "They say," says Nyssen, speaking of Jewish commentators, "that these things were spoken to Cyrus the Persian. But this is ridiculous. For how does the rest (τὰ λοιπὰ) fit with Cyrus?" We might

[187] Jul. *Or.* 3, 104ab.
[188] Jul. *Or.* 1, 32a. and 2, 77c.
[189] Jul. *Or.* 1, 41c.
[190] Jul. *Or.* 1, 41c.
[191] Cf. Hdt. 3.89.3.
[192] Jul. *Or.* 1, 9a.
[193] Jul. *Or.* 1, 10b.
[194] Jul. *Or.* 1, 13a; the anecdote seems taken from Hdt. 1.114 rather than from Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*, whence one might rather expect stories in a treatment of education.
[195] Jul. *Or.* 1, 44ab, possibly referring to Cyaxares at e.g. Xenophon *Cyropaedia* 4.1.13 (ὑπεφθόνει) and especially 4.3.8 sqq., and again 5.5.8 sqq.; the resentment there, though, is placated, and appropriations come in the form of portions of war booty, as again at 8.5.17; I suspect Julian is being sneaky.
[196] Bas. *Ep.* 112 (to Andronicus, a governor [ἡγεμών]); Hdt. 1.207–208.

expect him to argue that the Psalm cannot mean Cyrus, with its declaration of begetting, and thus potential material for Fatherhood and Sonship: ἐκ γαστρὸς πρὸ ἑωσφόρου ἐξεγέννησά σε (*Ps.* 110:3); or perhaps that Isaiah's Κῦρος cannot mean the Κύριος of the Psalm, since the former is said not to know God (*Is.* 45:5). Instead, Gregory tries to show that Jewish commentators are wrong about Isaiah's identification of Cyrus as Cyrus. He uses Herodotus to do it. Since *Is.* 45:1–4 speaks of the conquests and glorious victories promised by God to the addressee, Nyssen asks, "How will these things correspond to Cyrus, who a little later was shamefully slaughtered in the land of the Massagetae, flayed, and made into a wineskin (τῷ μικρὸν ὕστερον εἰς Μασαγέτας αἰσχρῶς ἀναιρεθέντι καὶ εἰς ἀσκὸν ἐκδαρέντι)?"[197] Note that Herodotus gives us the ἀσκός, but not the flaying:[198] the *Histories* say a wineskin of unspecified and thus probably not human leather is filled with human blood, into which the vengeful Tomyris dunks Cyrus' presumably decapitated head: . . . ἀνάπηκε αὐτοῦ τὴν κεφαλὴν ἐς τὸν ἀσκόν.[199] In Aristophanes' *Clouds*, however, we find a desperate Strepsiades offering up his body to Socrates' pallid sophists for instruction, prepared even for them to "flay it into a wineskin (ἀσκὸν δείρειν)," if only he may escape his debts.[200] Setting aside the questions this raises about Nyssen's use of secular literature for both Scriptural hermeneutics and anti-Jewish apologetics, the locus has him remembering Cyrus, in his lone named appearance in the corpus, as a conqueror who suffered a **miserable death**.

Summary: Cyrus' evil fate is recalled by both Nyssen and Nazianzen; Basil focusses on friendship with a former enemy.

[197] Nyss. *Testimonia adversus Iudaeos* 16 (46.228–229); on its authenticity, Mühlenberg & Maspero *GNOO*.
[198] Taking the relatively rare ἐκδείρω or ἐκδέρω as the source of Gregory's ἐκδαρείς.
[199] Hdt. 1.214.4.
[200] Aristophanes *Clouds* 439. The affinity with Aristophanes was noted by Dr Neil McLynn in conversation.

Darius the Great

Valerius: Darius I is an exemplar of **courage**, **gratitude**, and **craftiness**, but also ***crudelitas*** for Valerius Maximus.[201]

Julian: Julian partly sees him this way, too, associating him with **cruelty** and **outrage**.[202] In the fact that Darius **mourned his wife to excess**, Julian considers him an ἄνδρα **βάρβαρον** καὶ **ἀπαίδευτον**, ἔκδοτον ἡδονῇ καὶ πάθει, a characterization from an anecdote Julian cites to assuage a friend's grief by appealing to learning and Hellenic identity.[203] He is succeeded by **violent and warring sons**.[204] In **gratefully repaying a kindness** done him before he was king, he vastly exceeds the scope of the gift.[205] He, like Priam, is a "**nobleman** and perhaps through virtue or birth (ἀνὴρ εὐγενὴς καὶ τυχὸν δι' ἀρετὴν ἢ κατὰ γένος)" worthy of imperial rule.[206] That Julian believes it is the latter is suggested by his characterization of the **greedy** Darius as "a person not entirely depraved, and yet [he was] shamefully, morbidly obsessed with money (οὐ παντάπασι μοχθηρὸν ἄνθρωπον, δυσέρωτα δὲ αἰσχρῶς εἰς χρήματα)."[207]

Nazianzen: Nazianzen mistakenly links Zopyrus the false and noseless deserter to 'Cyrus,' but this should be Darius I; at any rate, the scenario is one of a false traitor being used to take Babylon. Julian, in a presumably unintentional reverse reenactment of this ungallant ploy, also attempts to take Babylon, but is the object of the deception and fails

[201] Val. Max. 3.2e.2; 5.2e.1; 7.3e.2; 9.2e.6.
[202] Julian, *Ad Themistium* 257ab.
[203] Jul. *Ep.* 69 (to Himerius) 413a–d.
[204] Jul. *Or.* 1, 33bc.
[205] Jul. *Or.* 3, 117b, on the tyranny of Samos given to Syloson to repay the gift of a cloak, with no negative consequences mentioned; they are foregrounded in *Ep.* 6 (to Alypius). In each case Julian has been in a debt of kindness and either has repaid or wishes to repay his benefactor, though in the case of Eusebeia in *Oratio* 3 she (or his readership) may perhaps be expected to remember the fate which Syloson suffered as a result of Darius' gratitude.
[206] Jul. *Or.* 2, 95c.
[207] Jul. *Or.* 2, 85cd. Cf. Hdt. 3.89.3.

where Darius succeeded.[208] Ammianus, too, inverts the Zopyrus incident (though he does not name the Persian king) in describing Antoninus, the opportunistic deserter who duped Julian.[209] But the two nods at Herodotus reveal a problem. Gregory makes his unnamed latter-day 'Zopyrus' the source of Julian's order to burn his ship-bridge and preclude all thought of retreat. Antoninus, in Ammianus' telling, has nothing to do with Julian's burning of the ships, nor would the chronology of his desertion permit as much. When Ammianus describes the destruction of the ships, the order is Julian's alone, with no discernible influence by any traitor.[210] It is possible that Nazianzen is conflating rumours about the treachery that filtered back to Cappadocia in 363 with the doubtless more public story of the burning of the fleet; with the object being Babylon, the unflattering comparison of Julian to Darius ('Cyrus') the **skilled but treacherous general** is too much for him to resist.

Basil: *Homily* 4 of Basil's *In Hexaemeron*, entitled *On the Gathering of the Waters*, shows Darius alongside Pharaoh Sesostris abandoning attempts to "gather the waters" by joining the Red Sea to the Nile by means of a canal; an imputation of **hubris** can be read both in the efforts and in their failure: theirs is an incomparable finitude compared to the power of God.[211]

Summary: For Julian and Basil, as for Valerius, Darius is an hubristic monarch, remembered in Valerius and Julian in particular for his cruelty. Nazianzen fails to distinguish him properly from 'Cyrus,' but he takes the Persian king in the episode in question to be a successful military leader, and in that sense as a foil for Julian.

[208] Naz. *Or*. 5.11; compare Hdt. 3.150–160.
[209] Amm. Marc. 18.5.1 sqq., Zopyrus named at 18.5.3; see also McLynn (2022).
[210] Amm. Marc. 23.5.5.
[211] Bas. *In Hexaemeron IV*, 3 (29.84).

Xerxes

Valerius: Darius I's son Xerxes shows up with many vices in Valerius Maximus, such as **tyrannical rule** (in opposition to Leonidas' courage), **decadence and lusts**, **pride and fury**, and **attachment to his own life**.[212]

Nazianzen: In the funeral oration for Basil, these vices and others are on full display: Xerxes is not only **swollen with pride**, **tyrannical**, **wrathful**, and even **blasphemous**: his deeds in making a new land and sea by dragging ships overland and marching men over bridgeless straits are the works of a usurpative "new creator (τοῦ νεοῦ δημιουργοῦ)." Xerxes here is the **model of vice** whom Emperor Valens followed.[213] This generally negative characterization, in keeping with what we find in Herodotus, does not prevent Gregory from whimsically comparing his own feat in digging a nice little garden to that of Xerxes' transportation of a whole army over the Hellespont into Thrace.[214]

Julian: The relevant point of his appearance in the second of Julian's orations for Constantius seems to be his **threat to the Greeks** (or its successor in the Roman empire).[215] He is straightforwardly an exemplar of **cruelty** and **outrage** in the letter to Themistius.[216] His **defiance of nature** and her elements in marching over the Hellespont's water and forcing ships over the earth by a massive canal at the Athonite isthmus are recalled along with his **vast army** and general marks of **imperial despotism**, which Socrates, says Julian, was right not to praise.[217] What's more, his numbers and his long preparations didn't help him: he was a **military failure**.[218]

[212] Val. Max. 3.2e.3; 9.1e.3; 9.5e.2; 9.13a.e1.
[213] Naz., *Or.* 43.45.
[214] Naz. *Epig.* 1.3–4 (38.81–82).
[215] Jul. *Or.* 2.63ab.
[216] Jul. *Ad Themistium* 257ab.
[217] Jul. *Or.* 2, 79b.
[218] Jul. *Or.* 1, 28a–d, 42cd.

Basil: Xerxes makes a brief and unnamed appearance as "the **barbarian**" in one of Basil's letters to Libanius, where Basil claims that people are more surprised at the generous review the sophist has given a letter of the bishop's than they would have been if he had led Xerxes "under sail over Athos," a reference to the canal apparently dug through the isthmus of Athos during the invasion.[219] Libanius, a champion of classical Greek culture, is imagined as a wartime guide for the king nearly killed that culture in the cradle.

Nyssen: Xerxes appears somewhat unexpectedly in Gregory of Nyssa in a display of **gratitude** for simple things. Though marching with the biggest army the world had ever seen, Xerxes was delighted to receive the gift of a poor man which consisted only of the water he could carry in the hollow of his hand.[220] This is Nyssen's only use of a non-Biblical Achaemenid.

Summary: From inept tyrant to whimsical gardener, Xerxes is put to a surprising range of uses in our authors. His depiction as an hubristic but failed conqueror prevails in Julian, Basil, and Nazianzen. But in Nazianzen's and in Nyssen's uses we find that image softened, once in little more than a learned witticism, and once in an earnest illustration of a virtue a Christian author would consider central to his faith.

Rulers of Rome

Far the most historically alert author of our set, certainly when it comes to imperial history, is Julian, who devotes an entire Saturnalian dialogue to a contest of virtue between some of his all-time favourite imperial heroes and villains. There we chiefly find the virtues and vices of Alexander, Julius Caesar, Octavian/Augustus, Trajan, Marcus

[219] Bas. *Ep.* 339 (to Libanius). Courtonne takes the letter as plausibly authentic.
[220] Nyss. *De infantibus praemature abreptis* 70.

Aurelius, and Constantine compared, as well as, not so subtly, those of Julian himself. Many other emperors show up to have sport made of their memorable misdeeds, but are not dwelt on at any length. There is much fascinating exemplarist material here, and in some sense it could be considered an extended catalogue, although it is far more nuanced than any of the other passages to which I have applied that name in this study. One could see it as a halfway point, in form, between the expansive Plutarchan biographies and the bite-sized virtue–exemplar lists in the Cappadocians (more of which will be presented in Chapter 4).

Alexander we have covered, and Augustus and Marcus Aurelius are of virtually no interest to the Cappadocians (the first emperor manages to earn a mention only when Nyssen is dating the birth of Christ, and then it is surely only because Augustus is mentioned for the same reason in *Luke*).[221] Constantine and Julian, meanwhile, as 'moderns,' will be considered briefly in the coda at the end of this chapter. Of Julian's set we are thus left with only Julius Caesar and Trajan. To these I will add a few Christian-persecuting emperors, chiefly Diocletian, to provide context for a puzzle addressed in Chapter 1.

Julius Caesar

Plutarch and Valerius: Plutarch's Julius Caesar is a man of **power** and **military competence**, but even as he rules the world and reshapes its map, he is **ruled by his own passions**.[222] Valerius uses him to illustrate **courage**, in which context he also calls him

[221] Nyss. *Contra Eunomium* 3.4.48 (ἐπὶ Καίσαρος Αὐγούστου); perhaps, though, it is worth noting that when he immediately recalls the Word being God in the beginning (cf. *John* 1:1), the λόγος is emphasized as both θεὸς and βασιλεύς; *Luke* 2:1.
[222] Plut. *Caes.* 4.4, 26.2, 48.3.

"shining glory of the stars, clearest model of true virtue," where it seems *vera virtus* has both martial and general connotations. Other Valerian virtues found in Caesar are **steadfastness**, **humane feeling**, and **eloquence**; he is **reckless** (if often favoured by fortune) and brings **justice** to Italy.[223]

Julian: When discussing Alexander's virtues and vices in Julian, we saw him alongside Julius Caesar, where both take **excessive pride** in their **martial prowess** (which is, however, very real). Julian's Caesar is also **power-hungry** and a **demagogue**.[224] When at the end of the dialogue they choose their deities, Alexander follows Heracles, while Caesar chases both Ares and Aphrodite, suggestive of vices of **belligerence** and **lust**.[225]

Nyssen: **Military success** links Julius Caesar with Alexander—as well as Hannibal—in Gregory of Nyssa.[226] It is possible, though ahistorical, that Julius is the distinguished king of powerful impulses whom Nyssen mentions when describing the re-naming of the city that Thaumaturgus would call home. That would be the former Cabira, subsequently Neocaesarea, which

> …a certain king, noteworthy amongst those who have held power over the Romans, Caesar by name, seized by **passion** and **desire** for the place, judged the city worthy of being called by his own name.
>
> …ἦν βασιλεύς τις ἐπίσημος τῶν τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις κρατυνομένων Καῖσαρ τοὔνομα ἔρωτι καὶ πόθῳ τῆς χώρας ἁλοὺς ἐπὶ τῷ ἰδίῳ ὀνόματι καλεῖσθαι [τὴν πόλιν] ἠξίωσεν.[227]

Augustus would be a better historical candidate both for Mazaca's change of name to Caesarea and Cabira's to Neocaesarea, but his cultivated reputation for an abstemious disposition sits uneasily with Nyssen's characterization, for which, in the early first

[223] Val. Max. 3.2.19: *siderum clarum decus, divum Iulium, certissimam verae virtutis effigiem*; also 3.2.15, 3.3.22–23. The other virtues at 3.8.7; 5.1.10; 8.9.3; 9.8.2; 9.15.5.
[224] Jul. *Caesares*, 331c–332b.
[225] Jul. *Caesares*, 335d.
[226] Nyss., *Contra fatum* 54.
[227] Nyss. *Vita Gregorii Thaumaturgi* 7.

century, the scandalously libidinous Tiberius may be a better fit.[228] To answer the question we would need to know which Romans were thought of in fourth-century Cappadocia as actually being *named* Caesar rather than simply bearing the name as a title. Nyssen himself calls the historical background οὐδὲν . . . πρὸς τὸν σκοπὸν τὸν ἡμέτερον, so I will tentatively suggest that he has read his Plutarch and projected Julius Caesar's personality on to a bit of quaint local history.

Summary: If that is correct, we have a consistent view of the man in Julian and Nyssen. He plays no role in Basil and Nazianzen.

Trajan and the emperors on campaign

Nazianzen: One category of emperors who do appear in Nazianzen is that of the military campaigners. He gives us Trajan and Hadrian, whose military merits are contrasted with the failures of Carus and Valerian. Trajan and Hadrian are unproblematically assessed as competent military commanders showing **martial virtue** and **generalship**, with no comment on their anti-Christian religious policies. They also appear in the plural, made to represent the kinds of leaders to whom Julian was looking for his model—both for being **courageous** and for surviving **unscathed**, jeers Gregory (πρὸς τοὺς Τραϊανοὺς βλέπων ἐκείνους καὶ τοὺς Ἀδριανούς, ὧν οὐχ ἧττον τῆς ἀνδρείας τὸ ἀσφαλὲς ἐθαυμάζετο). Carus and Valerian are **incompetent** military commanders whose battlefield failures lead to their **disgraceful deaths**. Julian, of course, is said to have imitated the latter two rather than the former.[229]

[228] *The Concise Dictionary of World Place-Names*, 'Kayseri,' 'Niksar'.
[229] Naz. *Or.* 5.8.

Julian: Gregory seems to have mistaken Julian in his views of Trajan. For Julian, the emperor who saw Rome's borders reach their greatest extent is **lazy**, shouts rather than speaks, and is **intemperate**, even if eloquent; but he is credited also with **mild rule** and surpassing **clemency**, **military success** in putting Rome's enemies to flight, and even **reverence for philosophy**. Under cross-examination he is the slave of **base passions** and **ignoble pleasures**. The 'god' he chooses to follow is the divinised Alexander.[230] Hadrian is not an elaborated contender in Julian's Christmas edition of 'Rome's Got Talent,' but he is nominally in the running, remembered as a **cultured stargazer** busy with all sorts of mysteries. Yet Julian allows Silenus, the irreverent commentator in the *Caesares*, to mock Hadrian's **pederastic love** for Antinous.[231] Carus is not invited, but sneaks in, until he is driven away by Justice (Δίκη) personified; **injustice** is his only mark here, but his **military failure** is recalled in another text.[232] Valerian shows up with **military failure** just as in Nazianzen, albeit indirectly: Silenus greets him with a remark from the *Phoenissae* about Hippomedon, a captain doomed to be killed in battle at the Ogygian Gate later in the play.[233]

Summary: Military success is something both Nazianzen and Julian recall about Trajan, and both share dim views of Carus and Valerian, though Nazianzen recalls only the military failures, not the injustices. But they diverge on Trajan's character, which

[230] Jul. *Caesares* 327a–328b; 333a; 335d.
[231] Jul. *Caesares* 311d.
[232] Jul. *Caesares* 315a; *Or.* 1, 17d.
[233] Jul. *Caesares* 315a, quoting Euripides *Phoenissae* 119–126; the jab is oblique, in that Hippomedon's death occurs a thousand lines later, at *Phoenissae* 1113–18 (though note that these later lines may be among the many interpolations in the play; see Goff [1988]). In the context of παιδεία, note that the *Phoenissae* was a particularly popular text for classroom purposes, including in the teaching of rhetoric: see Morgan 1998 (115–116), Cribiore (2001a) 196, 198–199, and especially Cribiore (2001b) 244–245 *et passim*; this last article accounts for the play's popularity in education and ancient readership more generally by arguing *inter alia* that its author's diction was simpler than that of Aeschylus; that it provided a 'panoramic' view of the royal house of Thebes from its foundation to its fall; that it foregrounded a familiar feeling of exile and yearning in troubled Polyneices, and offered a better exemplar for students in patriotic Menoeceus; and that it contained many memorable maxims or γνῶμαι. In a grammarian's pedagogical context the play could thus serve as a linguistic and cultural primer, and adult 'graduates' of such an education might return to it with relative ease and enjoyment.

Julian seems to have found repugnant. The other authors do not mention any of these emperors.

Diocletian and the persecutors

The Cappadocians: For Nazianzen, Diocletian and his junior tetrarchs Maximian and Maximin Daza are persecutors; in texts which may be spurious, Basil and Nyssen seem to allude to Diocletian as a persecutor.[234] Diocletian is unequivocally a menace and a persecutor for them as much as for Nazianzen, and the fact that Julian has managed to sink *below* his grim standard is a sure warrant of the Apostate's wickedness. This sinister emulation, Nazianzen says, occurs at the level of intention and design, not actual persecution; Julian is accused of plotting "things of which Diocletian never dreamed," being thwarted only "by the hand of God, and by the tears of Christians."[235] The curious role Diocletian played for Synesius—if he realised whom he was talking about[236]—warrants comparison with the Cappadocians here. For Synesius, Diocletian was, or can be mentioned as, a responsible, service-oriented monarch, and a perfectly viable exemplar for a Nicene Christian ruler. Whether Synesius was nuanced, flippant, or forgetful in his recollections of old 'Jovius', the Cappadocian friends—some of whose family suffered under his handpicked heirs—could allow themselves to be none of these things.[237] But

[234] Naz. *Or.* 4.96. See also the unnamed persecutors placed in a succession going back to the oppressors of the prophets, stretching through Herod and the Sanhedrin, and reaching to Nazianzen's day: διῶκται / πρόσθεν καὶ μετέπειτα, καὶ ὑστατίοισι χρόνοισι . . . *Carm.* 1.2.1 *In laudem virginitatis* 451–456 (37.556). Diocletian seems meant by τύραννος at Bas. *In Barlaam* 31.485; in Nyss. *Inventio imaginis in Camulianis* 3, Diocletian's persecution is again in the background. But *In Barlaam* may be spurious (*PG* 31.11–21); *Inventio* has been judged certainly so (Mühlenberg & Maspero, *GNOO*).
[235] Naz. *Or.* 4.96.
[236] See Chapter 1, 37–40.
[237] Cf. Naz. *Or.* 43.5–8. Nazianzen specifically names Maximinus as the instigator of the persecution under which Nyssen and Basil's grandparents suffered. Hilary and Athanasius, we saw in Chapter 1, made use of Maximian, and at least Hilary, a Latin, still had Nero and Decius in view. From Julian, Maximinus and Decius are absent. Nero is only teased for being a poor imitator of Apollo, who spurns him (*Caesares* 315b–d); Nero's exile of Musonius is recalled in order to praise Musonius' virtue (*Ep.* 16, to Theodorus the priest).

apart from Nazianzen's mention of Trajan and other emperors on campaign, and the occasional dating of Christ's birth to Augustus, we see nothing of any earlier emperors in Nazianzen or his friends, not even earlier persecutors.

Julian: Diocletian has been recognised as the object of an allusion about the emperor who **stabilises the empire**, partly through trusting the tetrarchs, and later as "ruler of all the inhabited world."[238] He enters Julian's game show as the leader of the pack of tetrarchs, Constantius and the two Maximians (which allows him to use the Atticizing dual). The procession enters in "decorous array (ἐν κόσμῳ)." Rather than walking, the junior rulers hold hands and dance as a χορός. What the **humble** emperor won't let them do is act as special bodyguards (δορυφοροῦντες) for him, "for he did not think he had a right to have anything more (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἠξίου πλεονεκτεῖν)" than his colleagues. He is self-aware enough to recognise his fatigue and to step aside, handing everything over to them, and admiring their initial unity. [239] At least one of the Maximians is criticized for **intemperance**, and he and his namesake are ultimately blamed for the **civil wars** that followed. They are duly banished by Justice.[240] In no case is there any mention of the persecutions.

Summary: Our Cappadocian authors will only remember the Christian-persecuting emperors for being just that, and even then the extent to which they recall or wish to name any such rulers varies. Julian is content to pass over the persecutions in silence; where he has criticisms, as he does not seem to have in the case of Diocletian, it seems to be for other reasons. Given his own much-trumpeted policy of abstention from violent persecution, one wonders whether some of the 'injustice' attributed to the vicious tetrarchs

[238] Jul. *Or.* 1, 7a, where the civil wars that followed should be recalled (. . . τοῦ τῆς οἰκουμένης ἁπάσης ἄρχοντος . . .): 1, 18a.
[239] Jul. *Caesares* 315ab.
[240] Jul. *Caesares* 315b–d.

could indicate a kind of limited disapproval of his pagan predecessors for the fact that they resorted to such base tactics. If this is the animating regret, however, it is a gentle one, and only ever tacit.

Gregory Nazianzen shows nothing like Julian's interest in or knowledge of past emperors; his Cappadocian colleagues show, if possible, even less. Julian, for his part, enjoying a bilingual education, probably had access to sources such as Tacitus, Suetonius and others. He displays a deep interest in the characters of his predecessors and is willing to present both virtues and vices, in a Plutarchan key, although the editorial slant is very heavy-handed indeed.

Analytic conclusion

Plutarch and Valerius

Because this is a synchronic rather than a diachronic study, a thorough hunt for traces of Plutarch or Valerius in Julian and the Cappadocians is beyond its scope. Nonetheless, a broadly indicative points bear mention. For the Greeks, virtues highlighted in Plutarch's Solon, Lycurgus, Aristides, Pericles, Demosthenes, Alexander, and Pyrrhus are often found in the Cappadocians; on the Roman side, Julius Caesar (not in Nazianzen, but in Nyssen and Julian) also sees some of his Plutarchan traits recalled. But many of these overlaps in virtue-pairings are narrow. Thus, Lycurgus is well remembered for lawgiving, Demosthenes for oratory, and Pericles for patience, but in Cappadocian hands, each shows little else of Plutarchan provenance. Solon and Alexander are the best represented with Plutarchan traits, Dion the worst. Thus, while there is some overlap, and while the influence in the form of the memorable, virtue-revealing anecdote is undeniable and often significant, overall it would be wrong to conclude that our authors felt bound to hew to

Plutarch's line. While Valerius cannot be counted a direct influence on any except possibly Julian, characterization in the *Facta et dicta* and in our authors often highlight the same virtues or vices.

Julian and the Cappadocians

I have analysed data for 26 exemplary historical persons in this chapter. They appear in 145 discrete, non-overlapping pairings with imitable virtues (or virtuous, favourable circumstances) and 87 with imitable vices (or vicious, evil circumstances), 232 pairings in all. Nazianzen has 29 virtuous and 31 vicious pairings for the figures in question; Julian, 78 and 43; Basil, 25 and 6; and Nyssen, 8 and 10.

A comparison to the semi-divine mythical heroes of Chapter 2 is instructive. Nazianzen's mythical heroes weighed in at 1 virtue for every 2 vices, so the historical characters' ratio of more than 1:1 is a shift. Julian's have moved in the opposite direction, from about 3:1 for the heroes to a more sober ratio of under 2:1 for those drawn from history. Basil is ready to admit some vices, but at more than 4 virtuous for every 1 vicious pairing, he is still our class optimist.[241] His brother Nyssen is the critic, the only one whose ratio remains tipped towards vices.

Of our set of 232 pairings, 31 (13%) are 'multiples,' i.e. found in more than one of our authors (21 are virtues, 10 are vices). Just one pairing is found in all four authors: military conquest—which seems to be taken as admirable at least insofar as it is awe-inspiring—is a special feature of Alexander the Great. No vice-pairing enjoys that currency. 8 virtue pairings and 2 vice-pairings are triples, found in three authors; 12 virtue-pairings and 8

[241] As was the case for his use of the gods and heroes, Basil makes the most use of historical figures in his correspondence and in the *Ad adolescentes*, although there are appearances in a few homiletic and polemical contexts.

vice-pairings are found in two. This leaves us with a striking 92 and 68 idiosyncratic virtue- and vice-pairings, respectively.

Of our triples of any kind, virtuous or vicious, the most common configuration of authors is the Athens alumni, with 5 shared associations. Just behind is the squad of Cappadocian bishops, with 4. The biological brothers and the erstwhile royal ward of Macellum trail at 1. I found no pairings in common for the trio of Nazianzen, Julian, and Nyssen.

The plot thickens when we turn to doubles, i.e. pairings found in exactly two authors. Nazianzen and Julian share 11 associations. Every other duo can boast only 2 virtue- or vice–exemplar pairings between them (or only 1, in the case of Basil and Nyssen). Julian and Nazianzen not only remember more of the same exemplars, they also have more in common with each other when making such pairings than either one of them does with anyone else.

Shared vs. idiosyncratic assessments within each author

Within each author, the breakdown of exemplar-virtue (or -vice) pairings between those shared with at least one other author of our set versus those which seem to be idiosyncratic are as follows:

	Percentage of pairings shared with at least one contemporary	Percentage of idiosyncratic pairings (i.e. unique within our set of four authors)
Nazianzen	42%	58%
Basil	52%	48%
Nyssen	39%	61%
Julian	17%	83%

I would suggest that this is evidence of a significant degree of flexibility and individual taste and creativity across all of our authors. Lest the plausibility of that hypothesis seem due to the predictably dissenting apostate outsider, let us see how the Cappadocians fare regardless of whether any of their shared pairings occur in Julian: perhaps, amongst themselves, the Christians overlap closely and use exemplars uncreatively?

	Percentage of pairings shared with at least one other Cappadocian, out of each author's total pairings	Percentage of idiosyncratic pairings (i.e. unique within our set of three Cappadocians), out of each author's total pairings
Nazianzen	23%	77%
Basil	45%	55%
Nyssen	50%	50%

In fact, only for Nyssen does the percentage of shared exemplar pairings increase, and even for him, fully half of his pairings are not shared with the other Cappadocians. Basil's exemplar pairings are now more than half idiosyncratic. Nazianzen, for his part, now stands out as a significantly more idiosyncratic exemplarist than his Christian friends.

We can certainly see that some have a stronger inclination to be creative with respect to their peers' usages—Nazianzen and Julian stand far above Basil and Nyssen. But even these latter two set out on their own, as it were, as much as they share their assessments with others.

Recurrences and divergences

Amongst associations enjoying strong consensus, Alexander is the exemplar made to do the most work; his generalship is universally remembered. Plato is wise. Cyrus the Great is magnanimous; Diogenes scorns the body; Solon is a just lawgiver (Nazianzen, Julian, and Basil). There is nearly universal agreement about Demosthenes' eloquence, but

I have split the tallies on this point: it is triply shared by Nazianzen, Julian, and Basil, but I exclude Nyssen, who acknowledges the skill but always counts it vicious rather than virtuous, whereas the others make clear that they also admire this technical ability. The three Cappadocians remember Alexander as chaste and temperate, Plato as eloquent (virtuously now), Aristotle as a sophist, and Diocletian as a persecutor.

Amongst the Cappadocians, there tends to be something of a consensus about the net virtue or vice of an exemplar. First, a great majority are net positive. Clear negatives are only Aristotle, Darius, Xerxes. Split characterizations are Socrates, Plato, Demosthenes, and Cyrus. The rest are largely positive.

Most striking is the case of Alexander. Amongst the three of them, the Cappadocians can find only about one vice, his drunkenness, hardly noticeable against the 10 virtues they pin on him. Compare this to the 6 virtuous and 12 vicious associations I have found pinned to Alexander in Julian.

In concluding this review, we can say that, like the gods and heroes discussed in Chapter 2, these figures from secular history are generally either dismissed or relativised in the extant writings of Nazianzen and his Cappadocian peers. Nonetheless it seems important to Nazianzen to acknowledge their virtues as virtues and their deeds as good, whether to do justice to his own experience of admiration for them, or to heighten the drama of their rejection in favour of superior Christian virtues and feats, or some combination thereof. At any rate, where the pagan exemplars do survive, it is certainly not always in continuity with their traditional roles, nor generally with those given them by a contemporary traditionalist like Julian, but often in a thoughtful cooptation.

*

Coda to the great men of history: friends into exemplars

Exempla in Demoen's sense belong to a remoter past, and his approach is more concerned with the application of a stock of exempla than with its replenishment and development. Exemplarist history for our authors, however, did not end with the Tetrarchate, but rather extended into the historical present. Recent work has shown how often pagan writers of the time drew on their own friends and turned them into models. For instance, Libanius does this with Thalassius in an exemplarist enumeration of virtues. Themistius does something similar with his father, Eugenius, as a supremely educated man concerned with educating others in turn. Himerius offers similarly laudatory treatment of Hermogenes the proconsul of Greece.[242] Our authors, too, regularly created new exemplars by drawing on prominent figures from their own century, their own lifetimes, and even their own circles of friends.

Many of these figures are imperial. For Nazianzen, Constantine does not loom large. He is at one point among the "lovers of Christ," even though elsewhere this distinction, along with his power, does not spare him the fate of all mortals.[243] Julian remembers things differently. Constantine earns one mythological and one satirical treatment in Julian, who flags his avarice, injustice, ignorance, impiety, and hedonism.[244]

Constantius II plays an important role as a pious, if ill-advised Christian foil to Julian in *Orationes* 4 and 5. While Constantius is ascribed some vices, they are mostly confined to the circumstances of Julian's elevation: imprudence, vulnerability to deceit, ignorance, misplaced humanity and magnanimity. In any event, these vices—some of which are framed as pardonably excessive virtues—are meant to recede in an apologia for the

[242] Stenger (2022) 148–159.
[243] Naz. *Or.* 4.3; *Carm.* 1.2.15 *De exterioris hominis vilitate* 95 (37.773).
[244] Jul. *Or.* 7, 227c–228d, and *Caesares*, 335a–336b.

emperor whom Nazianzen repeatedly casts as a paragon of surpassing fervour, zeal for Christianity, simplicity, reasonableness, and forethought.[245] In a poem he is "most pious (εὐσεβέστατος)," but also wise and temperate, refusing to let his wrath by kindled against "us" by a sycophant.[246] This stands in stark contrast to Constantius' equally exemplary but extremely negative presentation in Hilary, Lucifer, and Athanasius, where he is routinely associated with the apostate kings of the divided kingdom of Israel or with the Roman emperors who persecuted Christians.

For different reasons, Julian also memorialises the impiety and brutality of Constantius and Constantine's other sons, his cousins, through mythopoeia and satire.[247] His first two orations, both for Constantius, long taken as classic examples of panegyric, albeit insincerely delivered, have come under increasing scrutiny for their "ambitious and subversive" character.[248] A strong case can be made that much of the subversion is driven by what I call Julian's 'sarcastic exemplarism,' particularly in comparisons of the Constantinian dynasty with Homeric and Persian ruling families. Constantius is exemplarised for virtues his *laudator* does not believe he has, not insincerely, but sarcastically, and so is in fact exemplarised for the opposite vices. While I do not have space to develop the point here, I intend to do so in another context.

Gallus, Julian's despotic brother, is perhaps too wrathful and rash for Nazianzen, but even he is also made into a paragon of princely Christian piety.[249] Julian, however, is

[245] E.g. *Or.* 4.3 (which sets up the contrast with Julian's career), 4.21 (to emphasize Julian's ingratitude), 4.37 sqq. (an extended apologia for Constantius), 4.88 (highlighting the contrast between the Christian Marcus's life under Constantius and under Julian), 5.17 (contrasting the genuine mourning for the pious Constantius with Julian's disgraceful and riotous cortège). We saw Nazianzen deploy Alexander in defence of Constantius above, Chapter 3, 134–135.
[246] Naz. *Carm.* 1.2.25 *Adversus iram* 290–303 (37.833–834).
[247] Jul. *Or.* 7, 227c–228d, and *Caesares*, 335a–336b.
[248] Tougher (2012) on Jul. *Oratio* 1; see Curta (1995) for a similar approach to *Oratio* 2. For the traditional view, which can be found up to the present, see Wright (2002 [1913]) 2–3, 131; Athanassiadi-Fowden (1992); Ross (2018) 183–184; Schorn (2008) 245.
[249] *Or.* 4.24, 4.33.

stripped of all virtues, even in his youth (when he only wore the 'mask' of piety), and his vicious associations are too numerous to recount here. Clearly he is being made into a new and negative exemplar. Outside these invectives, the "dreadful reign of Julian, destroyer of souls (ψυχῶν ὀλετῆρος)," is remembered in a poem as "the latest and the foremost (πύματον πρῶτόν τε)" of all wicked and persecuting regimes from Pharaoh through Ahab to Herod. Julian is enshrined as the persecutor *par excellence*.[250]

Other exemplars from outside the dynastic family abound. In Nazianzen's invectives against Julian, the Christian near-martyr Marcus of Arethusa earns a potted martyrdom account; Maximus of Ephesus is a swindling, magic-dealing perversion of the true mentor; a prefect, possibly Sallustius Secundus, is a virtuous pagan who dares oppose Julian's persecutions; Jovian is pious, kingly in aspect, courageous; and certain unnamed contemporary youths become anonymous exemplars of piety and idoloclasm.[251]

Some new Christian heroes from the third or early fourth century earn their own hagiographic texts. For instance, Gregory Thaumaturgus is honoured by Gregory Nyssen with a hagiography;[252] Gordius, the Forty Martyrs of Sebaste, Mamas, and Julitta are each praised in commemorative orations by Basil; and 'Cyprian,' a conflation of two homonymous saints, is honoured by Nazianzen on one of the two men's feast days (*Oratio* 24). Nazianzen uses a memorial address to rally his faction around the ardently pro-Nicene Athanasius, and in Chapter 2 we saw that he used the opportunity to consolidate his hero's Christian exemplarity through a bold appropriation of the traditional pagan titles. He is not the only Nicene superstar whom the Cappadocians glorify after death. Meletius, a stalwart

[250] Naz. *Carm.* 1.2.1 *In laudem virginitatis* 451–460 (37.556–557). The line of succession overlaps almost entirely with that given him in *Or.* 5.3.
[251] See the episodes at Naz. *Or.* 4.55 and 88–91 for Maximus, Marcus, and the prefect; *Or.* 5.15 for Jovian; and *Or.* 5.40 for the youths.
[252] Gray (2021) analyses this tribute to Thaumaturgus along with Nyssen's lives of Macrina and Moses, in part for the way those writings are meant to shape the lives of their readers.

Nicene claimant to the see of Antioch, receives such treatment from Gregory of Nyssa. Maximus the Cynic, a bit of a charlatan as a churchman, earns Nazianzen's trust and with it an oration lauding him in his presence (*Oratio* 25). That was clearly a case of mistaken admiration, but it underscores how earnestly Nazianzen sought to provide his people with current and even living exemplars.

The study of the rise of hagiography in the early Church has been a rich field of inquiry in the last fifty years. What I wish to highlight here is the way this tendency also embraces the commemoration of much closer acquaintances: our authors apply many of the same techniques to their own friends and family, too. Nazianzen's brother Caesarius (*Oratio* 7) and his sister Gorgonia (*Oratio* 8) are each exemplarised in funeral orations, Gorgonia more enthusiastically than Caesarius. The siblings' parents, Gregory and Nonna, are highlighted in those orations as a latter-day Abraham and Sarah, and they receive even more attention in the eulogy for the elder Gregory's death (*Oratio* 18). Nonna does not have an oration of her own, but like her husband she is the object of much epitaphic commemoration.[253] In an oration addressed to Nyssen (*Oratio* 11), Nazianzen, even in the midst of a remonstration, tells his friend that he took him as the model of his whole life.[254] His farewell address in Constantinople (*Oratio* 42) has been read as a delineation of everything a bishop should *not* be, with the oration on his friend Basil (*Oratio* 43) as the sequel supplying the perfect ideal for church leadership.[255] Basil—the only one of the three who does not devote whole works to any family or friends, apparently preferring more remote models for exemplarism on such a grand scale—had previously been eulogized by his own brother, Nyssen, who also devoted a hagiography to one of their

[253] Naz. *Anth. Pal.* VIII, 12–23 (Gregory senior); 24–74 (Nonna); 75–77 (both) [= *Epitaph.* 55–65 (Gregory *père*); 66–100 (Nonna); 101–102 (both) (38.38–64)].
[254] Naz. *Or.* 11.3.
[255] Bernardi (1968) 238 sqq.; see also Norris (2000) 143–144.

sisters, Macrina.[256] Macrina further plays the part of a Christian Socrates in Nyssen's dialogue *De anima et resurrectione*. Various members of this family are remembered in epitaphs by their admiring friend Nazianzen.[257]

More rarely, some of these new exemplars are presented as offering themselves as exemplars, like Jesus and Paul, in what I call 'self-exemplarisation'.[258] Nazianzen's father, for instance, is said to have used this tactic as a means of evangelization and catechesis, while his sister Gorgonia offers herself as a model of virtue to her children.[259] Nazianzen cannot resist making himself into an exemplar for his own flock.[260] Julian does it, too, rather grandly: he is the boy-hero chosen for greatness by Helius in a model story for would-be mythmakers. Julian's virtuous avatar in the *Caesares* is rewarded with the special protection of his father, "Mithras," while his self-portrait in *Misopogon* is a celebration of his own virtues, which, he sarcastically suggests, count as vices by the depraved standards of his Antiochene audience.[261]

When they keep their eyes off the mirror and on their friends, however, our Christian authors tend to highlight their virtuous qualities by comparison to those of more established exemplars, whom the new exemplars are said to admire, imitate, rival, and surpass. Sometimes, Christians take the best of what the pagan gods have to offer and make it their own, as with Athanasius. Other times, a search of established exemplars comes up short, and the honorands are said to show virtuous Christian practices that are

[256] The exemplarist dimensions of the two Gregorys' orations for Basil have been acknowledged in Konstan (2000) 164–169, but he does not observe that each text thereby also makes Basil himself an exemplar.
[257] E.g. Basil in Naz. *Anth. Pal.* VIII, 1–11 [= *Epitaph.* 119 (*PG* 38.71–75)]; his sister Macrina in *Anth. Pal.* VIII, 163 [= *Epitaph.* 120 (*PG* 38.75–76)]; their sister Theosebia in *Anth. Pal.* VIII, 164 [= *Epitaph.* 123 (*PG* 38.77)]; their brother Naucratius in *Anth. Pal.* VIII, 156–158 [= *Epitaph.* 1–3 (*PG* 38.11–12)]. Their parents are commemorated in several of these. The family are the focus of *Or.* 43.3–10. See also Motia (2021a), esp. Chapter 6, 155–179.
[258] See Introduction, 3, note 6.
[259] Naz. *Or.* 18.16; 8.8, 8.12. The ethopoeia of the Maccabean mother at *Or.* 15.9 does something simliar.
[260] Naz. *Or.* 16.13, 19.2, 33.10, 40.45.
[261] Jul. *Or.* 7, 228d–234c; *Caesares* 336c; *Misopogon* is a celebration of his virtues.

virtually unprecedented, as in Gorgonia's case.[262] Most often, however, when turning their friends and loved ones into exemplars, our Christian Cappadocians will draw on the men and women of salvation history to do the job. It is therefore to the saints of the Christian Scriptures that we now turn.

[262] Some but far from all of these unprecedented practices relate to marriage and celibacy.

Chapter 4
The Saints of Scripture

Τοιγαροῦν καὶ ἡμεῖς, τοσοῦτον ἔχοντες περικείμενον ἡμῖν νέφος μαρτύρων, ὄγκον ἀποθέμενοι πάντα καὶ τὴν εὐπερίστατον ἁμαρτίαν, δι' ὑπομονῆς τρέχωμεν τὸν προκείμενον ἡμῖν ἀγῶνα.

Wherefore seeing we also are compassed about with so great a cloud of witnesses, let us lay aside every weight, and the sin which doth so easily beset us, and let us run with patience the race that is set before us.

Hebrews *12:1 (KJV)*

We have seen that Nazianzen and his peers often retold similar stories about mythical (Chapter 2) and historic (Chapter 3) exemplars, attesting to a shared παιδεία filled with the ancient authors who dominated non-Judaeo-Christian literary antiquity. The Cappadocians and Julian also displayed substantially idiosyncratic interests and aims in their uses of these figures. In this chapter, I turn to the heroes of the Biblical tradition as the Cappadocians received and interpreted it. It would be reasonable to expect that in the case of Scriptural heroes, drawn from a tradition in which a divinely inspired and written canon is essential, the exemplarism would be static and narrow. Yet we will see that while there are limits to the degree of repurposing which is open to exemplarist Christian writers, our Cappadocians displayed flexibility and idiosyncracy in their selection and use of Biblical exemplars.

Nazianzen considers the whole Bible to be "one large collection of paradigmata," in Demoen paraphrase.[1] To keep the set of exemplars manageable I have down-selected by culling distinct persons from several Cappadocian catalogues of virtue–exemplar pairs. While lists of multiple exemplars often occur to illustrate one particular vice, virtue, action, or circumstance, rarer are lists with multiple exemplars as well as multiple virtues and vices. I will take such lists from Nazianzen's *Oratio* 14 and *Oratio* 18, Basil's *Ep.* 2 to Nazianzen, and Gregory of Nyssa's *Contra Eunomium* and *In Meletium episcopum*.[2] The set that results consists of the following twenty: Enosh, Noah, Abraham, Lot, Joseph (the patriarch), Moses, Phinehas, Rahab, Samuel, David, Solomon, Elijah, Job, Daniel, John the Baptist, Jesus, Peter, Zacchaeus, Stephen, and Paul.[3] Some of these are quite rare outside the lists, while others are amongst the exemplars most frequently invoked in the corpora.

My observation of exemplar-groupings in Nazianzen's orations and in Nyssen's texts is not novel. In a footnote to a section on *exemplum*-clusters chiefly in Gregory's poems, Demoen refers to *Or.* 14.2–4 as "a sort of mini-collection of paradigmata, grouped around some fifteen virtues," and suggests comparing it with Clement's *Epistle to the Corinthians*, but offers no analysis. In the body of his text, Demoen notes the likelihood that many such associations were "already traditional" by Gregory's time, but rejects as superfluous the hypothesis that "a Christian collection of paradigmata," on which Gregory could have drawn, was in circulation in the fourth century but has since been lost.

[1] Demoen (1996) 80–81, commenting on *Or.* 2.104–106.
[2] Nyss. *Contra Eunomium* 2.1.322 and *In Meletium* 449–450.
[3] This overlaps with but does not coincide with the list of the twenty most frequently cited Biblical exemplars found in Nazianzen, which can be derived from Demoen's inventories as follows, starting with the most frequent: Moses, Jesus, Elijah, Adam, Paul, David, Lucifer (or the serpent), Abraham, John the Baptist, Peter, Elisha, Samuel, Jacob, Aaron, Amalek (as an enemy of Moses), Job, Daniel, Judas, the three young men in the furnace, and Joshua. If we include incidents from the life of Jesus, which have other headings in the inventories, then Jesus will jump to the top ahead of Moses; each of those two will occur about twice as often as Elijah. If we include the Sodomites and Egyptians as collective exemplars, they will take the 10th and 12th places, respectively.

Nazianzen's knowledge of the Bible would have been enough.[4] Daniélou draws attention to the loci in Nyssen, but he mentions them only in passing and is chiefly concerned with Moses.[5]

In this chapter I show that in many cases we can establish a relationship between Nazianzen's catalogue-like associations of virtues and exemplars and the exemplaristic associations in his contemporaries and earlier Christian texts. To do this, I first present the Cappadocian micro-catalogues in their contexts. Then I discuss two early Christian catalogues of exemplars: the eleventh chapter of the *Letter to the Hebrews* and the extra-canonical *1 Clement*, pairings from which will provide a running backdrop to the analysis of Cappadocian exemplarism. The rest of the chapter takes us through the twenty unique exemplars gleaned from the micro-catalogues of Nazianzen, Basil, and Nyssen discussed above. The headwords proceed in approximate order of appearance in salvation history.[6] (1) When an exemplar appears in (a) Nazianzen, I present him (or rarely her) first, along with the virtue or virtues with which the exemplar is associated *in the catalogue* from Nazianzen. Alternatively, (b) in a minority of cases the exemplar does not appear in one of Nazianzen's lists, but does appear in Basil or Nyssen, and in these cases I begin with the catalogue appearance in the respective author. (2) After establishing that primary catalogue association, I report other non-catalogued instances of the exemplar in the author in whom the established association appears. In most cases, I then proceed directly to the other two Cappadocians to document instances of the same virtue being connected to the same exemplar and foregrounded anywhere in their corpora; the method there is

[4] Demoen (1996) 188, esp. note 372.
[5] Daniélou (1955) 269.
[6] My placement of the wild-card Job between Elijah and Daniel reflects no stance on the dating of the eponymous book or of his putative appearance in history.

exhaustive. I apply the corroborative rather than the exhaustive method to seven of the twenty exemplars; these will be marked with an asterisk (*) in the headings.[7]

The major headwards here are exemplars, as they were in Chapters 2 and 3. In those chapters, however, the subheadings were authors, under which the qualities each attributed to the exemplar appeared; by contrast, in this chapter I find that the overlap in characteristics is often substantial enough to warrant taking the virtues (very rarely vices) as headwords, with evidence from each author appearing under each subheading. I retain an author-heading for Julian alone and report his views on the eight exemplars in this set whom I find in exemplarist usages in his extant works. In order to be sure the characterizations are his own, I do not include anything found only in Cyril of Alexandria's paraphrases. Because these views are almost always deeply at variance with those of the others, I do not tally the virtues and vices he reports in the concluding general analysis.

I do two things to show that the exemplarist practice of our Christian preachers is not merely mechanical. First, I report where I have not been able to find the catalogue-foregrounded virtue in association with the listed exemplars, and thus where the use is idiosyncratic. Second, in some instances I go beyond the parameters noted above to show the same exemplar being used by peers and coreligionists to highlight different virtues (or vices).

Several important limitations must be borne in mind. I emphasize that for many of the exemplars listed below, produce a full Cappadocian compendium of associated virtues and vices, as I aimed to do with the non-Scriptural exemplars of Greco-Roman culture in the previous chapter, for the simple reason that our three bishops' corpora are drenched in

[7] They are: David, Elijah, Job, John the Baptist, Jesus, Peter, and Paul.

Biblical characters. The volume is overwhelming, even omitting the countless nameless allusions not caught by my trawling. I have also omitted phenomena such as the philosophical uses of Biblical figures like Abraham, David, Luke, and Stephen: they are recognizable names taken to make philosophical points entirely independent of their Biblical-historical roles and (almost all) personal characteristics, just as Aristotle had used Cleon, Callias, Socrates, and Coriscus to discuss πρῶται οὐσίαι and συμβεβηκότα.[8] These names carry little more significance in their immediate contexts than do alphabetic variables in algebra. But insofar as the habit keeps one set of names familiar and leaves another set obscure, the use of Judaeo-Christian exemplars for philosophical argumentation rather than pagans is a noteworthy development in the history of philosophical culture: the philosophical imagination, too, can change its wardrobe. This change may well predate Nyssen, but that story is not for this study to tell.

For Nazianzen, I leaned on Demoen's inventories, but I found a number which either slipped through his dragnet or were excluded based on his method; I have noted where some of these occur for e.g. Moses. Thus, while I can be fairly confident of covering most references for the thirteen exemplars in question, I can make no claims to total comprehensiveness. Notably, vices are somewhat subdued in this chapter: except where they occur in primarily virtuous characters, or in their adversaries, I do not treat vice-exemplars, since they generally do not appear in the lists I present. Finally, we simply do not have a very large share of the Cappadocians' everyday homiletic output, all things considered, for priestly and episcopal careers that would have had them preaching at least one sermon weekly for decades.

[8] E.g. Nyss. *Ad Ablabium* 40; *Contra Eunomium* 1.16, 1.38, *et passim*. Cp. Arist. *Metaphysics* VII (Z) 1032a, 1033b, 1037ab, 1040b, *et passim*.

Such are the limitations. What I will have been able to do, however, in addition to establishing certain particular pairings, is to show that the mere fact of a strong canon which itself assigns some virtues and vices to particular characters did not prevent pious exemplarist authors from developing these associations in idiosyncratic ways.

By the end of this chapter, we will thus be able to see that the uses of exemplars vary amongst the Cappadocians less than their divergent recyclings of certain mythical and pagan heroes. They will, however, be seen to vary enough for us to find no support for any hypothesis of a lost, once canonical collection of Biblical paradigmata—a Christian *Facta et dicta memorabilia*—and certainly not of any such collection which held non-negotiable authority. At the same time, the shared tendency our authors show to associate specific moral agents with specific virtues and vices, sometimes in groups, suggests that these authors wished for their preferred associations to be remembered far beyond the context of the arguments in texts in which they are found, and thus to serve as instruments for navigating the late imperial landscape.

Micro-catalogues in Nazianzen, Basil, and Nyssen

Naz. Or. *14.2–4 and* Or. *18.24*

Gregory Nazianzen's *Oratio* 14, *On Love for the Poor*, was likely delivered in 368, in Nazianzus.[9] The oration begins by announcing the titular theme (14.1). It proceeds in quest of the most important virtue through a long catalogue, likened to flowers in a

[9] Bernardi (1968) 104–105. Against the hypothesis of a delivery in Caesarea during or after the construction of Basil's hospital, Bernardi points out that Gregory makes no mention of being a guest, and no nod to Basil as host bishop, let alone to the hospital project which Basil had probably not yet undertaken. The familiarity which Nazianzens shows the congregation would not be expected were he visiting as a guest preacher, compare the *captationes* we find in his *Oratio* 43 or Nyssen's *In Meletium*, where each is definitely from out of town. But Basil and Nazianzen may well have shared hopes and plans for charitable projects of the kind most famously realised in the 'Basiliad'.

meadow, of which it is difficult to find the most beautiful and the most fragrant (14.1–14.5).[10] This crowning virtue will turn out to be charity,[11] but to get there, Gregory first presents more than a dozen other virtues or virtuous practices, alongside men (and one woman) who presumably best represent them. The result is correspondence of fourteen virtues and exemplars, with each virtue introduced anaphorically: "A fine thing is faith…A fine thing is hospitality… (Καλὸν πίστις…Καλὸν ἡ φιλοξενία…)."[12] The anaphoric catalogue recalls a Stoic subset of a catalogue of philosophers in the first invective against Julian, where the anaphora is Μέγας ὑμῖν ὁ Κράτης…Μέγας ὁ [Διογένης]…Μέγας ὁ Ἀντισθένης…[13] Years later, after Basil's death, Nazianzen seems to gesture at this earlier oration when pays tribute to his friend's hospital project: καλὸν φιλανθρωπία καὶ πτωχοτροφία καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ἀσθενείας βοήθημα.[14] After confirming that charity is the supreme virtue, Gregory says it must be made real in practice. It assumes reality by and in our actions towards the poor, and especially the leprous (14.6), whose evident bodily frailty is really a vivid reminder of the frailty of all flesh (14.7–8). But their plight is especially grievous and is outlined at great length (14.9–14.14). Contrasts with the wealthy and the healthy—presumably in the congregation—are driven home (14.15–14.17), until it is clear that it is the wealthy who are the truly diseased (14.18). They may, however, be healed by scorning material well-being and helping to care for the physically ill (14.19–14.22); thanksgiving to God and reverence for his commandments further enjoin charity on those able to show it (14.23–25).[15] Relativisation of bodily well-being, responsibility to God and neighbour, and the precarious character of

[10] Naz. *Or*. 14.1.
[11] Naz. *Or*. 14.5.
[12] Naz. *Or*. 14.2–4.
[13] Naz. *Or*. 4.72.
[14] Naz. *Or*. 43.63.
[15] God also shows up as an exemplar at the end of 14.23 and the beginning of 14.24.

earthly life recur as motivations for helping the poor and sick (14.26–14.39), in whom, ultimately, we serve Christ himself (14.40).

The exemplars from *Oratio* 14 each receive a heading in the cross-section of Cappadocian catalogues which I have produced below. I likewise draw two additional headings—Job and Samuel—from a much smaller catalogue which Nazianzen delivered for his deceased father in the spring of 374.[16] The passage is introduced by a telling line which we saw in Chapter 2 about the exemplaristic lens through which Gregory and others read Scripture.[17] Not only is the Bible a vast collection of paradeigmata, but also "*each particular person*, whether amongst the ancients or the moderns, *is believed to have been excellent* (κατωρθωκέναι πιστεύεται) in some particular respect (ἄλλο τι)."[18] Nazianzen's presentation is such as to indicate the general currency of this belief. We will see that it seems to have been shared with his Cappadocian colleagues, who did not, however, always choose the same ἄλλο τι—nor did any of them limit themselves to just one for each exemplar. We will also see the same virtues recurring across exemplars—a necessity for the practice of comparative exemplarism.

Bas. Ep. *2.3 (to Gregory Nazianzen)*

A letter in Basil's collection addressed to his friend Gregory Nazianzen is full of advice on the ascetic life. It is thought to have been written from Basil's rural retreat at

[16] Bernardi (1968) 124. Somewhat arbitrarily, I omit "the sons of Zebedee" to focus on the virtues of individually named persons in this passage.
[17] See above, 72–74.
[18] "The noblest thing of all his [sc. Nazianzen's father's] virtues, and what was most distinctive about him, albeit not known by many, was his simplicity, and how guileless and unresentful of character he was. For each particular person, whether amongst the ancients or the moderns, is believed to have been excellent in some particular respect, according as each happened to be deemed worthy of some particular grace from God. (Ὃ δὲ κάλλιστον τῶν ἐκείνου [sc. Γρηγορίου τοῦ πατρὸς ἐμοῦ] καὶ ἰδιώτατον, καὶ οὐδὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀγνοούμενον, ἡ ἁπλότης, καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἤθους ἄδολόν τε καὶ ἀμνησίκακον. Ἄλλος μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο τι τῶν παλαιῶν ἢ τῶν νέων κατωρθωκέναι πιστεύεται, ὡς ἕκαστος ἔτυχεν ἐκ Θεοῦ χάριτός τινος ἠξιωμένος). Naz. *Or.* 18.24.

Annisi, near Neocaesarea, in 358,[19] not more than two years after each had finished studying in Athens, and before either man had been ordained a priest.[20] Basil speaks as if he is an authority on the life he describes, offering practical advice to Nazianzen on how he, too, ought to live it. The letter is relatively long, suggesting it may have been intended for circulation, to encourage others to take up the ascetic life. It contains one strongly exemplaristic passage in which several exemplars are paired with unique virtues and a method is suggested for the moral aspirant. In brief it is this: someone conscious of a given moral deficiency should take as a model a Biblical hero preeminent for a virtue opposed to the vice in question. The exemplars he gives to illustrate what he means are Joseph, Job, David, and Moses, all of whom are found in Nazianzen. But Joseph does not appear in Gregory's micro-catalogues, and the virtues found in the other three are accented differently in Basil, as we shall see. Although apart from Joseph I will not use this passage (or any other Basilian micro-catalogue[21]) as a structuring element in this chapter, the locus is extremely valuable for the method prescribed and the fact that this is an intra-Cappadocian memorandum on ethical exemplarism. It is worth noting that I borrow the term 'catalogue,' too, from another line of Basil's: in one set of rules for monks he says that "Jesus and the entire catalogue of saints (πᾶς ὁ τῶν ἁγίων κατάλογος)" testify to the wisdom of subordinating the body but also keeping it in a sufficiently functional condition

[19] Courtonne (1957) 5 note 2 on the date of 358. It was the same year, or at the start of 359, that from distant Gaul Julian dedicated his *Oratio* 8 to Sallust, in which he, too, speaks of the importance of imitating exemplars: Bidez (1932) 187.

[20] Basil left Athens in 356, Nazianzen following some time after him: Daley (2006) 7. Nazianzen was ordained by his father at the very end of 361 or in the new year of 362: Daley (2006) 9; Basil was ordained later that year by Eusebius of Caesarea: Rousseau (1998) 67; also Hildebrand (2018) 12.

[21] Another is at Bas. *In Gordium* 31.492. Basil is also the source of the only micro-catalogue of virtues paired with female exemplars, which I regret not being able to analyse properly at this point. Commenting on Isaiah's prophecy on the Lord's withdrawal of ἰσχύοντα καὶ ἰσχύουσαν from Israel (*Isaiah* 3:1), Basil, without calling attention to the choice, produces a catalogue of ἰσχύουσαι but not ἰσχύοντες, and pairs particular feats and virtues with every "woman of strength" whom he adduces, ὁποία ἦν Σάῤῥα, ἰσχύουσα καὶ ἄρχουσα τοῦ τηλικούτου Ἀβραὰμ, κατὰ πρόσταγμα τοῦ Κυρίου εἰπόντος· Πάντα ὅσα ἐρεῖ σοι Σάῤῥα, ἄκουε αὐτῆς. Ὁποία Ῥεβέκκα, διὰ φιλοξενίαν ἀντλοῦσα καὶ ἐνισχύουσα διὰ τὴν ἀρετήν· Δεββῶρα στρατηγοῦσα· Ἰαὴλ ἀριστεύουσα· Ἄννα εἰσακουομένη· καὶ Ἐλισάβετ προφητεύουσα, Bas. *Enarratio in prophetam Isaiam* 3.99 (30.280). Another list we will often see of Basil's is at *Ep.* 42.5 (to Chilo).

to be ready for good works, rather than letting it perish through fasting.[22] The force of κατάλογος here seems to be an almost military-grade roll of registered exemplars, the approved saints who have already run the race and can show the ropes to the new recruits whom Basil would enlist in the same army.

Nyss. Contra Eunomium *2.1.322 and* In Meletium *9.449–550*

In the middle of Nyssen's theological treatise *Against Eunomius* there appears a catalogue of unique virtues paired with unique Old Testament exemplars. It is part of an argument against Eunomius' stance on the nature of God and the way we speak of it. Eunomius takes a hard line against the Nicene presentation of the Son as being ὁμοούσιος—consubstantial, one in being—with the Father. Eunomius evidently holds unbegottenness (τὸ ἀγέννητον, ἡ ἀγεννησία) to be an essential characteristic of the οὐσία of God. This Nyssen seems to accept, but Eunomius further holds that unbegottenness is so essential as even to *be* God (τὴν ἀγεννησίαν εἶναι θεόν).[23] If so, it is clear that the very much begotten Son cannot have this same essence: He and the Father will not be one in being, after all. The Cappadocian response is to understand unbegottenness by ἐπίνοια, or 'conceptual thought,' a notion developed by Origen.[24] As a faculty and action, conceptualisation will thus be crucial for this debate about God's nature. Both Eunomius and Nyssen will use Scripture to frame their respective attacks on and defences of ἐπίνοια.

[22] Bas. *Constitutiones asceticae* 4.7 (31.1360).
[23] Nyss. *Contra Eunomium* 2.1.177.
[24] Says Hall in a note on his translation of this and related words: "The central term ἐπίνοια is rendered by variations on 'concept', 'conception', 'conceptual, or 'conceptual thought'. It can be used both of the mental activity which conceives, and the thought or attribute which is conceived. Similaly the verb ἐπινοεῖν is rendered 'conceive', with or without an adverb such as 'mentally'." Hall (2007), note 10, to 2.1.11. Winling (2013) likewise opts to render ἐπίνοια as "pensée conceptuelle" (e.g. at 2.1.299) or similar. For the background in Origen, see Radde-Gallwitz (2009) 59–66.

On the basis of Nyssen's *Contra Eunomium* 2.1.292–300, Eunomius seems to have held that one cannot apply Scriptural terms like 'bread,' 'vine,' or 'lion of Judah' to Christ "as concepts (κατ' ἐπίνοιαν)," in the way that Basil and Nyssen would do, since there is no indication in the Scriptures that it authors are employing such 'conceptualisation'.[25] Naming should either designate an essence ontologically, or be admitted as arbitrary: the rest is equivocity (ὁμωνυμία), and there is no room for that.[26] Nyssen responds first by arguing that neither do the Scriptures prohibit the 'conceptual' reading. Secondly, in spite of Eunomius' qualms about equivocity, univocal readings of predicates are often impossible, since (for instance) Christ, though called a cornerstone, is obviously not so ontologically, in any literal architectural sense; moreover, since he is called many other things, a literal ontological reading of all of them together would indicate a great multiplicity of natures in the Son—something neither side of this debate could accept. The only alternative, Nyssen says, is to interpret these titles otherwise than ontologically, whether one calls this alternative approach 'conceptual' or something else.[27] In Gregory's view, conceptual or analogical interpretation makes sense of Scriptural names for God: these names indicate the various forms of God's beneficence (ἕκαστον εὐεργεσίας εἶδος) towards mankind, in providence and in action (πρόνοια, ἐνέργεια).[28]

Instead, Nyssen suggests that Eunomius tries to avoid the traps of equivocity and ontological literalness by asserting that the names God gives to other beings in the

[25] Nyss. *Contra Eunomium* 2.1.295, 305 (trans. Hall).
[26] Nyss. *Contra Eunomium* 2.1.306. For a reconstruction of Eunomius' arguments, in which divine simplicity and the ability to know God play a central role, see Radde-Gallwitz (2009) 96–112. Here I do no more than touch on some of the issues that arrive in the context of the exemplarist catalogue which we will presently encounter.
[27] Nyss. *Contra Eunomium* 2.1.298–304.
[28] Nyss. *Contra Eunomium* 2.1.298. While I follow Hall's lead in taking ἐπίνοια as concept or faculty of conceptualisation (see above), Soskice (1985)'s argument on what she calls *metaphor* in Scriptural naming is also directly relevant: 'poetic' names for God should be taken as neither entirely univocal descriptions nor as wholly arbitrary conventions. Rather, they reveal something true that could not be conveyed, or conveyed easily, in any other way, not even by e.g. substituting a literal, definitional attribute for the image. But her case for the irreducibility of such language and against substitution theories of metaphor may go beyond what is suggested here by Nyssen (who does not figure into her study).

Scriptures are often simply arbitrary. Against Eunomius' remark that God sometimes gives lofty names to lower things "without conferring on them equality of dignity (μὴ συμμεταδοὺς τῆς τῶν ἀξιωμάτων ἰσομοιρίας)" and *vice versa*, Nyssen argues that there is sense to the names given in Scripture to non-divine beings.[29] For "as they are in truth and nature, so are things judged and named by God, not named in contradiction to what they are, but described by their proper denotations in whatever way they may be most clearly displayed."[30]

This is where our miniature exemplar-catalogue appears. Nyssen argues against the arbitrariness of titles given to creatures in part by adducing pairs of exemplars and virtues: "Noah was just, says Scripture, Abraham faithful, Moses gentle, Daniel wise, Joseph temperate, Job blameless, and David proficient in endurance." Perhaps in part because these are not essential definitions, if Eunomius is right, then these virtue-assignations are arbitrary and these men are not the exemplars we think they are. Dung-born creatures could just as well be called virtuous and holy and so on. This conclusion is implausible, so Eunomius' point falls to a *reductio ad absurdum*.[31]

For our purposes, Nyssen's *Contra Eunomium* indicates here that Scripture is itself a source of virtue–exemplar associations. Note also that in each of these cases Scripture associates multiple virtues with each figure, and that Nyssen selects just one for each. In addition to the exemplars we have gleaned from Nazianzen and Basil, this passage gives us Noah and Daniel as new entries in our combined catalogue.

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[29] Nyss. *Contra Eunomium* 2.1.315.

[30] . . . ὡς ἔχει φύσεως τε καὶ ἀληθείας, οὕτω τὰ ὄντα παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ κρίνεται τε καὶ λέγεται, οὐκ ἐναντίως τοῖς οὖσιν ὀνομαζόμενα, ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν μάλιστα καταφανῆ γένοιτο τὰ σημαινόμενα ταῖς οἰκείαις προσηγορίαις ἐξαγγελλόμενα. Nyss. *Contra Eunomium* 2.1.323 (trans. Hall).

[31] Δίκαιος ἦν ὁ Νῶε, φησὶν ἡ γραφή, πιστὸς Ἀβραὰμ καὶ πραὺς Μωϋσῆς καὶ σοφὸς Δανιὴλ καὶ σώφρων ὁ Ἰωσὴφ καὶ ἄμεμπτος ὁ Ἰὼβ καὶ μακροθυμίαν κατωρθωκὼς ὁ Δαβίδ. Nyss. *Contra Eunomium* 2.1.322). This is followed (2.1.323) by the negative exemplars Nabal, Pharaoh, and Abimelech, but as they are all connected in a quite general way with wickedness or vice (τὸ χεῖρον, κακία) rather than with particular vices, I am not going to consider them here.

With that, we can set the linguistico-metaphysical Trinitarian debate between Eunomius and Nyssen aside, and carry on our hunt for ethical exemplars in one last Cappadocian text. Four of the set of exemplars from *Contra Eunomium* are also found in another of Nyssen's catalogues, this one in the eulogy for Meletius, Nicene bishop of Antioch. Delivered in 381 in Constantinople, in the Church of the Holy Apostles and in the presence of Emperor Theodosius during the ecumenical council of which Meletius had been president, the discourse could hardly have had a wider audience, and its immediate reach must have far exceeded that of any of the other texts mentioned above.[32] We are far, moreover, from the linguistic and metaphysical arguments that were the primary focus in the *Contra Eunomium*. Here as in the eulogy for Nazianzen's father, the point is to compare, in the tradition of the panegyric and the funeral oration, the virtues of the recently departed to the established greats of the past. Over the course of the oration Meletius is compared to a number of Scriptural saints. One passage in particular offers a dense concentration of them, with pointed virtue-pairings:

> When that prudent church [i.e. of Antioch] first saw the man, she saw a face truly formed in the image of God. She saw love springing forth, she saw grace falling from his lips, she saw the highest bounds of humility beyond which no more may be conceived. She saw David's gentleness, Solomon's understanding, Moses' goodness, Samuel's severity, Joseph's temperance, Daniel's wisdom; she saw him in the zeal of his faith, like the great Elijah; in the mortification of his body, like the lofty John[; and in his unsurpassed love, like Paul.][33]

Here the virtue–exemplar pairs are strongly inflected with the ethics of exemplarism. Joseph, Moses, Samuel, David, and Daniel reappear from *Contra Eunomium*, though the first two are sporting different virtues, as we shall soon see. Of the remaining five, Solomon is the passage's unique contribution to this study. While other catalogues pairing

[32] Bernardi (1968) 315.

[33] Nyss. *In Meletium* 449–450: . . . ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον εἶδεν ἡ σώφρων ἐκκλησία ἐκείνη τὸν ἄνδρα, εἶδε πρόσωπον ἀληθῶς ἐν εἰκόνι θεοῦ μεμορφωμένον, εἶδεν ἀγάπην πηγάζουσαν, εἶδε χάριν περικεχυμένην τοῖς χείλεσιν, ταπεινοφροσύνης τὸν ἀκρότατον ὅρον, μεθ' ὃν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπινοῆσαι τὸ πλέον· κατὰ τὸν Δαβὶδ τὴν πραότητα, κατὰ τὸν Σολομῶντα τὴν σύνεσιν, κατὰ τὸν Μωϋσέα τὴν ἀγαθότητα, κατὰ τὸν Σαμουὴλ τὴν ἀκρίβειαν, κατὰ τὸν μέγαν Ἠλίαν ἐν τῷ ζήλῳ τῆς πίστεως, κατὰ τὸν ὑψηλὸν Ἰωάννην ἐν τῇ ἀφθορίᾳ τοῦ σώματος[, κατὰ τὸν Παῦλον ἐν τ[ῇ] ἀνυπερθέτ[ῳ] ἀγάπ[ῃ]].

exemplars with virtues or favourable circumstances such as actions of God's grace are to be found in the corpora, I have limited my study to testing those just noted.[34]

Early Christian virtue catalogues: *Hebrews* 11 and *1 Clement*

As mentioned in the Introduction, there is deep Christian precedent for the association of particular virtues or vices with particular persons from the Scriptural canon. For a start, many impulses come from the Scriptural stories surrounding the characters in question, often lexically, as with some of the virtues attributed to Job in the opening of the eponymous book which are later remembered almost verbatim in some of our authors. Often their stories will include motifs that take our authors beyond the narrative, such as Moses' posthumous career as a contemplative ascetic. I flag many of the former as they arrive, while the latter will often arise naturally as I report how our authors justified their attributions of various virtues and paradigmatic achievements.

For the most part, however, our analogues here to the role played in Chapter 3 by Plutarch and Valerius Maximus will be two first-century texts: *Hebrews* and the extra-canonical *First Clement*. *Hebrews* 11 has a catalogue of more than twenty-five heroic exemplars, all of the virtue of faith, and so bears parallels to single-virtue catalogue groups which I have mentioned but on which I am not focussing in this study. Some eighteen of these (counting pairs or groups singly) are named explicitly: Abel, Enoch, Noah, Abraham, Sara, Isaac, Jacob, Joseph, Moses' parents, Moses, the Israelites crossing the Red Sea, Rahab, Gideon, Barak, Samson, Jephthah, David, and Samuel (11:4–32).[35] Of

[34] E.g. Naz. *Or.* 28.18; his *Carm.* 1.2.10 *De virtute* can be taken as a protracted catalogue, and many of the exemplars discussed below and in preceding chapters are drawn from it. See also Bas. *Enarratio in prophetam Isaiam* 3.99 (30.280) and *Ep.* 42 (to Chilo).
[35] *Hebrews* 11:4–38.

these, Abraham receives the most attention, while Gideon through Samuel are mere mentions. A number of others occur in allusions, some of which seem to point to precise exemplars: Joshua and his army (11:30), Daniel, the three young men in the furnace, the widows of Zarephath and Shunem, and the Maccabean martyrs (11:33–35). Another half dozen clauses read more like category headings under one of which almost any Old Testament great could be entered (e.g. "the prophets," 11:32; this is especially the case in the conclusion, 11:34–38).[36]

In *Hebrews* 11, any great works or blessings for which the exemplars are known are themselves traced back to their faith. This is a part of the author's theological argument that Christ has fulfilled the Old Testament heroes' trust in the promises of God. But the linking of exemplars with this theological virtue goes beyond its argumentative function. Whether appearing with developed stories, in limited descriptions, or even in nameless allusions, the passage's author encourages reflection on inspirational figures from the history of salvation, a framework which embraces both those figures and the letter's readers (καὶ οὗτοι πάντες . . . οὐκ ἐκομίσαντο τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν . . . ἵνα μὴ χωρὶς ἡμῶν τελειωθῶσιν).[37] This passage and the all-encompassing framework it evokes is cited by Gregory of Nyssa to suggest that Abraham and the rest are still hoping for salvation, and perhaps have not yet attained it.[38]

In the catalogue at the opening of Gregory Nazianzen's *Oratio* 14, we find only four of the exemplars from *Hebrews* 11: Abraham, Moses, Rahab, and David. Of these, and of all the other exemplars Gregory there adduces, only Abraham is given as an exemplar of

[36] Several peculiarities merit comment. No exemplar of vice is named, except Cain, and even then the focus is not on his resentfulness and murderous wrath. He rather appears by way of mild contrast to Abel, whose faith exceeded his (Πίστει πλείονα θυσίαν Ἄβελ παρὰ Κάϊν προσήνεγκεν τῷ Θεῷ) (*Hebrews* 11:4). Jephthah's inclusion is eyebrow-raising on a literal reading of *Judges* 11:31, but perhaps indicative of the popularity of the interpretation by which the ὁλοκαύτωμα of his daughter is figurative.
[37] *Hebrews* 11:40.
[38] Nyss. *De hominis opificio* 22 (44.208).

faith. If *Hebrews* did influence Gregory by suggesting the form of exemplar-virtue pairings, he was not interested in merely repeating its contents. More evidence that he is not just working from the *Hebrews* list comes from Jephthah, who occurs only negatively or ambivalently in Gregory. In *Or.* 15.11, the mother of the Maccabean martyrs surpasses Jephthath in making a sacrifice of her children both "less reckless and more noble" than his of his daughter. In the epitaphic verses of *Anth. Pal.* 51, Nazianzen says that "Abraham offered his son, just as famous Jephthah did his daughter, both of them making a great sacrifice to God." Jephthah's epithet is neutral enough to cover his victories as a conquering judge while remaining consistent with the negative evaluation Gregory gave his sacrifice in *Oratio* 15.[39]

1 Clement more closely resembles the Cappadocian catalogues, in that we find a much wider variety of virtues. In fact, we start with vices, chiefly envy (ζῆλος καὶ φθόνος).[40] Over the course of the whole epistle, faith, repentance, obedience, hospitality, piety, hope, justice, humility, and courage all find their Scriptural exemplars. Besides significantly coinciding with figures from *Hebrews*, the catalogue also takes us just barely into the era of the New Testament, with appearances by Peter and Paul. Given the wide range of virtues and exemplars discussed in this letter, I will withhold comment now, and treat it as I proceed through the exemplars I have chosen to highlight below. It will emerge that in the case of the many virtues of *1 Clement*, as much as in the case of faith in *Hebrews* 11, in spite of any influence this text may have had on our fourth-century authors' exemplarist

[39] Naz. *Anth. Pal.* VIII, 51 [= *Epitaph*. 94 (*PG* 38.58)], Δῶκε Θεῷ θυσίην Ἀβραὰμ πάϊν, ὣς δὲ θύγατρα / Κλεινὸς Ἰεφθᾶε, ἀμφότεροι μεγάλην. / Μῆτερ ἐμὴ, σὺ δ' ἔδωκας ἁγνὸν βίον, ὑστάτιον δὲ / Ψυχὴν εὐχωλῆς, Νόννα, φίλον σφάγιον. We should take μεγάλην as referring to the magnitude of the sacrifice without any hint of the positive assessment of the ethical character of the act sometimes highlighted by commentators who would see a consecration of perpetual virginity in what otherwise looks like a regressive act of human sacrifice and a repudiation of Moriah. At any rate, the magnitude of both men's offerings seems to be surpassed in scope and quality in the next lines by Gregory's exemplary mother, Nonna, with her offerings of her holy life and finally, in death, her devout soul.
[40] *1 Clement* 4:7.

hermeneutic, the Cappadocians felt at liberty to move beyond its virtue–exemplar pairings both by adding or subtracting virtues and by adding exemplars.

We may now begin our whirlwind tour of the Scriptures, from *Genesis* to the letters of Paul, with the Cappadocians' chosen exemplars as our guides.

A Cappadocian catalogue of Old Testament heroes

Enosh

Nazianzen casts Enosh as a model of the virtue of **hope** (ἔλπις) in *Oratio* 14, as he is the first to hope to call upon the Lord. *Genesis* ties him to this virtue and says little else. Nazianzen has him reprise this role in two other places, and these exhaust his appearances in the corpus.[41]

Hope (catalogue virtue): Enosh is not found in either *Hebrews* 11 or *1 Clement*, nor does Basil ever directly name him. A text commemorating Ephraim and long attributed to Gregory of Nyssa tells us that the deceased bishop "was zealous for the hope of Enosh, and not only called upon the name of the Lord God, but also taught others to do so with him."[42] The *Genesis* locus says nothing of Enosh as a teacher, so along with the adversative framing (οὐκ ἐπικέκληται μόνον . . . ἀλλὰ καὶ . . . ἐδίδαξεν), we might take Nyssen as implying that Ephraim surpasses Enosh by being a teacher at all. But Enosh reappears in a magisterial role in Nyssen's commentary on the *Song of Songs*. Scripture is said to teach us that "every pursuit (ἐπιτήδευμα) begins with one man and is thence transmitted to many." Almost all of the examples that follow are craftsmanlike

[41] Naz. *Or.* 14.2; *Or.* 28.18 and *Or.* 43.70; cf. *Genesis* 4:26.
[42] Nyss. *In sanctum Ephraim* 46.844. Migne prints Ἐνὼχ, but this must be Ἐνὼς, given both the reference to calling upon the Lord, and the fact that the next named exemplar, presented as if a new person, is printed as Ἐνὼχ. The text has been judged spurious: Mateo-Seco and Maspero (2010) xxii.

Kulturhelden: metalwork is due to Tubal, shepherdry to Abel, agriculture to Cain, hunting to Nimrod, and viticulture to Noah. Then, however, Nyssen turns to hope, the only virtue in the list bracketed by claims about Scripture's teaching on the origin of human endeavours, and attributes it to Enosh, the one who "started hoping in God."[43]

Summary: Enosh is a minor exemplar. Absent from *Hebrews* 11, *1 Clement*, and Basil, his only Scriptural virtue-association is the one we find in the Gregorys. But his early appearance in Genesis as the first to hope in God also gives Nyssen material for working him, somewhat unexpectedly and certainly idiosyncratically in our corpora, into a compendium of exemplary craftsmen. It is as if Nyssen lifts the hypothesis about justice as a craft from *Republic* I (where Socrates tests its coherence and finds it wanting)[44] and applies it to other virtues.

Noah

Noah is found in one of Gregory of Nyssa's miniature catalogues as an exemplar of **justice** (δίκαιος ἦν ὁ Νῶε), an attribution drawn from *Genesis*.[45] Elsewhere in Nyssen, we read that whereas Noah **saved a small number** of our race in the ark, Ephraim kept his own soul safe over the seas of life and never lost the delights of virtue.[46] He offers sacrifices to the Lord and invents **viticulture**;[47] but this last leaves him "pitiful and ridiculous" due to the indecorous **drunkenness** that results.[48] His vexation at Ham is remembered as a cause for caution, and Shem and Japheth's approach as correct treatment

[43] Nyss. *In canticum canticorum* XV, 453. The closing bracket is: καὶ πολλὰ τοιαῦτα παρὰ τῆς ἁγίας ἔστι διδαχθῆναι γραφῆς, ὅτι ἑνός τι ἐπιτηδεύσαντος εἰσῆλθε κατὰ μίμησιν εἰς τὸν βίον τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα. Thereafter the list turns to other virtues, Elijah following with zeal (see below).
[44] Pl. *Resp.* I, 332c sqq.
[45] Nyss. *Contra Eunomium* 2.1.322; *Genesis* 6:9: Νῶε ἄνθρωπος δίκαιος, τέλειος ὢν . . .
[46] Nyss. *In sanctum Ephraim*, 46.844.
[47] Nyss. *In canticum canticorum* IX, 266; XV, 453.
[48] Nyss. *In Ecclesiasten Or. III* 328.

of an **elder worthy of respect**, when Nyssen opens his parents' crypt and lays Macrina's body to rest.[49]

Justice (catalogue virtue): In Basil's rules for ascetics, Noah has the epithet "the just (ὁ δίκαιος)."[50] Noah's Nyssenian catalogue-virtue is otherwise not found as such in our authors.

Salvation of a few: Absent from Nazianzen's catalogues, Noah appears elsewhere in his corpus connected with piety (εὐσέβεια) and the salvation of a few from the cataclysm.[51] A local church can be such an ark, so that a bishop may imitate the "father of this second world."[52] Christians are buoyed above the world like philosophers amongst the non-philosophical just like the ark above the flood.[53] For his role Noah enjoys some satisfaction (εὐαρέστησις).[54] Basil tends instead to apply this salvation allegorically to the soul of the individual, as we shall see below, and as we saw his brother do with Ephraim.

Viticulture and drunkenness: Basil attributes Noah's inebriation to his inexperience with wine as a warning to the young.[55] The episode is not mentioned in the sermon *Against Drunkards*, but elsewhere it receives a terse allusion in a recitation of several gluttonous or bibulous Old Testament figures ruined by their pleasure-loving ways: "Noah is ridiculed, and Ham is cursed."[56] Neither Basil nor Nazianzen discusses his role as the first vintner.

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[49] Nyss. *Vita sanctae Macrinae* 409.
[50] Bas. *Constitutiones asceticae* 21.3 (31.1397).
[51] Naz. *Or.* 4.18, *Or.* 6.10, *Carm.* 1.2.1 *In laudem virginitatis* 309–311 (37.545–546); 2.1.13 *Ad episcopos* 205–206 (37.205–206); 2.2.2 *Ad Julianum* 2 (37.1478); 2.1.30 *De seipso* 39 sqq. (37.1291); the world Noah carried ἐν τοῖς σπέρμασι Nazianzen calls κόσμον τὸν ὀρθόδοξον, *Carm.* 2.1.11 *De vita sua* 1083 (37.1103).
[52] Naz. *Or.* 18.17 on his father; similarly with Basil and heretics at *Or.* 43.70.
[53] Naz. *Or.* 25.6.
[54] Naz. *Or.* 28.18.
[55] Bas. *De ieiunio I*, 5 (31.169).
[56] Bas. *Sermo asceticus et exhortatio* 31.640. The curse is also at *Enarratio in prophetam Isaiam* 13.268 (*PG* 30.612). In that work he also shows up as especially old (3.104 [30.285–288]) and likely to have known the location of Adam's grave at Golgotha (5.141).

Elder worthy of respect. For Nazianzen, as we saw, a bishop saving souls in his church imitates Noah as the "father of this second world," an honorific title that gestures at Noah's status.[57] But he draws no decalogical implications out of the incident with Ham, Shem, and Japheth.

Other associations: Noah is called **faithful** in both *Hebrews* and *1 Clement*; in the latter he also functions as a **preacher of repentance**, unique in our set.[58] For Basil, Noah faces crises with his "**athletic and noble** spirit (ἀθλητικῶς καὶ γενναίως)," in that he does not ask God to remove him from the world due to the presence of wicked men in it, but instead **perseveres**: "amidst an abyss of evil he kept his **piety** (εὐσέβειαν) unbattered, in no way rebelling against his Master, and steered his ship to safety amidst the waves of impiety by means of his **patient endurance and steadfastness** (ὑπομονῇ καὶ καρτερίᾳ)."[59] Nazianzen, we saw just above, emphasizes the connection between Noah's ark and piety, too.

Summary: Noah admits of lively and versatile application. Nowhere in the Cappadocians is Noah an explicit exemplar of faith, as he is in both *Hebrews* and *1 Clement*. Moreover, Nyssen's catalogue virtue of justice, found in Basil, seems not to occur in Nazianzen—a surprise, given that the virtue is associated with Noah in his first Scriptural appearance. Likewise, his roles as viticultural *Kulturheld* and venerable elder seem of interest chiefly to that Gregory. While Nyssen, treating the ark (the site of most overlap), both alludes to his saving of others and admits of an allegorical application to individual salvation, Nazianzen seems to prefer thinking of Noah as the leader who saves

[57] Naz. *Or*. 18.17 on his father; similarly with Basil and heretics at *Or*. 43.70.
[58] *Hebrews* 11:7; *1 Clement* 7:6, 9:4.
[59] Bas. *Constitutiones asceticae* 21.3 (31.1397).

others, while Basil dwells on Noah as the allegory of the individual's soul. But both Basil and Nazianzen highlight other virtues in Noah, including piety.

Abraham

In keeping with his presentation in *Genesis*, where he trusts in God's promise, Abraham appears in Nazianzen's *Oratio* 14 catalogue as a paragon of **justification by faith** (δικαιωθεὶς ἐκ πίστεως).[60] Nazianzen invokes God's blessing and Abraham's **wanderings** in about a dozen loci in poetry and prose. A further dozen recall Abraham's **obedient sacrifice** of Isaac as **total devotion to God**, including once when he is "the standard of virtue (ὁ τῆς ἀρετῆς κανὼν)." Often, though not always, his justification by faith is recalled in this context.[61] We also find him showing hospitality—though the virtue is suggested only periphrastically, so I will treat it under 'other virtues', below.[62] He models **fatherhood** (both of Isaac and of "cities and nations").[63] Only once does Nazianzen cite Abraham's self-description as "earth and ashes," though he is ascribed a "**simple manner** (ἁπλοῦς τὸν τρόπον)."[64] He was "the patriarch, beholder of God, driven from hearth, family, and homeland, a stranger whom the Steward of the highest mysteries

[60] Naz. *Or.* 14.2; also *Or.* 33.10, *Or.* 42.7. Cf. *Genesis* 15:6, *Romans* 4:3, and *James* 2:23. Abraham's role in *Romans* brings us to the threshold of a major theological point. For purposes of analysis, I acknowledge here, but avoid engaging with, the possible distinctions between two renderings of δικαιοσύνη, namely 'justice' and 'righteousness'. Any distance between the two is, I think, at any rate meant to be resolved, on a Christian account of salvation and renewal in Christ.
[61] Naz. *Or.* 1.7 ("rule of virtue"); 17.10 and 43.71 (sacrifice as consecration); called τὸν πίστει δικαιωθέντα at *Or.* 8.4.
[62] Naz. *Or.* 28.18: θεὸν δὲ οὐχ ὡς θεὸν εἶδεν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἄνθρωπον ἔθρεψε, καὶ ἐπηνέθη, σεβασθεὶς ὅσον κατέλαβεν.
[63] Naz. *Or.* 4.18, 33.10, *Carm.* 1.2.1 *In laudem virginitatis* 311–312 (37.546).
[64] Naz. *Carm.* 1.2.25 *Adversus iram* 432 (37.843). Throughout the corpus Gregory's father is compared to Abraham, e.g. 8.4, 43.37; as his father's unwilling ordinand, he makes himself something of an Isaac. But in another poem he traces this to his mother's desire and in an ethopoeia has her offer him just as Abraham offered Isaac, as a sacrifice to God: *Carm.* 2.1.1 *De rebus suis* 439–450 (37.1002–1003).

led easily (εὐκόλως) to a strange land, peregrine, homeless, wandering," says Nazianzen in summary, before underscoring Abraham's primary virtue: "For faith drew him on."[65]

Faith and justification thereby (catalogue virtue): Faith defines Abraham in *Hebrews* and *1 Clement*.[66] In Basil, faith and trust in God (e.g. πίστις, πιστεύω) are regularly associated with Abraham. Basil directly exhorts his reader to imitate Abraham's faith in the first chapter of his rules for ascetics.[67] Abraham is "blessed (μακάριος)" and at least once Basil notes that his trust is reckoned to him as righteousness (δικαιοσύνη).[68] Nyssen, like Nazianzen, highlights Abraham's faithfulness as his principle virtue (πιστὸς Ἀβραάμ) in one of his catalogues of virtue–exemplar pairs.[69] Unlike Basil, Nyssen frequently links this to the patriarch's righteousness or justice (though not in that catalogue).[70] In the last judgement, the just, too, will struggle (καὶ οἱ δίκαιοι ἐναγώνιοι), and "even Abraham will be anxious (καὶ Ἀβραὰμ ἀγωνιάσει)"—albeit not about damnation, as he trusts in God, but whether he will be placed "in the first, second, or third rank of the just."[71] One is tempted to see the spirit of paideutic competition tinting soteriology and eschatology.

Purposeful wandering: Sometimes Basil suggests that we can imitate not just Abraham's virtues but also his experiences with a near literalness. For instance, Abraham

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[65] Naz. *Carm.* 1.2.10 *De virtute* 489–495 (37.715–716): . . . τὸν Ἀβραὰμ / Τὸν πατριάρχην, τὸν θεόπτην τὸν μέγαν / Οἴκου, γένους τε, πατρίδος ἐξελκύσας / Ὁ τῶν μεγίστων οἰκονόμος μυστηρίων / Εἰς γῆν μετήγαγ' εὐκόλως ἀλλοτρίαν / Ξένον, πάροικον, ἄστεγον, πλανώμενον. / Πίστις γὰρ εἶλκεν ἐλπίδων τῶν μειζόνων. At *Or.* 21.5 there may be an allusion to Abraham's plea for Sodom, and thus to intercessory prayer, as Demoen's inventory suggests, but it is faint.
[66] *Hebrews* 8:11–19; *1 Clement* 10 and 31; cf. *Genesis* 15:6, *Romans* 4:3.
[67] Bas. *Constitutiones asceticae* 1.5 (31.1336): μιμοῦ τὴν πίστιν τοῦ Ἀβραάμ. See also *Homilia de paenitentia* 31.1480 and *De fide (Prologus)* 31.679–80.
[68] Bas. *Adversus Eunomium* V, 29.752–753, though Books IV and V are probably spurious: Sesboüé *et al.* (1982) (*SC* 299) 61–64. Cf. also faith as a form of worship in Bas. *Ep.* 236.3 (to Amphilochius).
[69] Nyss. *Contra Eunomium* 2.1.322. He is the "father of (our) faith" at e.g. ibid. 2.1.84–85 and *In Flacillam* 489.
[70] E.g. Nyss. *Contra Eunomium* 2.1.92, *De instituto christiano* 76–77; also *De deitate filii et spiritus sancti* 129–140, where Abraham's steadfast commitment never wavers throughout a long and pathos-drenched ecphrasis of the miraculous birth and near-sacrifice of Isaac.
[71] Nyss. *De creatione hominis (sermo alter)* 58. NB: This text is spurious, but I include it since it is thought to have come from the milieu of Basil and Nyssen, possibly even from Basil's notes; see Mühlenberg and Maspero in *GNOO*; Dörrie's preface in *GNO suppl.* viii–ix; and Smets and Van Esbroeck (1970) (*SC* 160) 13–26.

undertook ascetic journeys into the wilderness, there to beheld God as his friend (θεοφιλής); we may do the same.[72] More analogically, Nyssen takes both Abraham and Sarah in their faithful wanderings as exemplars especially for "those who float listless on the sea of life, pilotless in their understanding." He makes them sex-specific: men should follow Abraham and women Sarah.[73]

Obedience and total devotion to God: For Basil, as for *1 Clement*, one practical manifestation of faith is prompt obedience to God (εὐπείθεια, ὑπακοή), as when Abraham leaves everything behind to wander in the wilderness and risk dangers of all kinds when commanded so to do.[74] It is the faith manifested in this obedience that earns Abraham the title "**friend of God**" in Basil, just as in Clement. One of Basil's variants, θεοφιλής, is the epithet Julian uses of Odysseus.[75] Elsewhere, Basil uses this title and set of virtues to bludgeon Eunomius, contrasting the patriarch as a faithful, obedient friend of God (φίλος Θεοῦ . . . διὰ πίστιν . . . δι' ὑπακοὴν Θεοῦ) with the heretic as a faithless, disobedient enemy (ἐχθρὸς διὰ ἀπιστίαν καὶ παρακοὴν Θεοῦ).[76] Basil interprets Abraham's most famous act of obedience, the offering of Isaac, as a test of his heart.[77] His obedience to God is also once said to make him obedient to his wife, Sarah, who (by God's sanction) rules over him, at least in a few instances.[78] As with Basil's Abraham, Nyssen's is a

[72] Bas. *Ep.* 42.5 (to Chilo); see pagan and Jewish precedents above in Chapter 2 under Odysseus.
[73] Nyss. *De vita Moysis* 1.5–6. Cf. *Isaiah* 51:2. By contrast, see Nazianzen's association of Abraham with both his father and his mother, above, 199, note 39, and 204, note 64.
[74] Bas. *Constitutiones asceticae* 22.2 (31.1404), Πῶς οὖν οἱ ἅγιοι τῷ Δεσπότῃ τὴν εὐπείθειαν ἐπεδείξαντο; Σκόπησόν μοι τὸν Ἀβραὰμ κελευόμενον καταλιμπάνειν οἶκον . . . ; *1 Clement* 10:2.
[75] Bas. *Ep.* 42.5 (to Chilo); Jul. *Or.* 8, 250bc; cf. Pl. *Euthyphro* 7a and *passim*.
[76] Bas. *Adversus Eunomium* V, 29.752–753, though probably spurious: Sesboüé *et al*. (1982) (*SC* 299) 61–64.; *1 Clement* 10:1.
[77] Bas. *Homilia in Psalmum 7*, 29.244.
[78] Bas. *Enarratio in prophetam Isaiam* 3.99, 3.104 (*PG* 30.280, 288). Curiously, though he admits the spouses were coeval, Basil thinks "Abraham was older, since virtue turned his soul gray (διὰ τὴν πολιώσασαν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀρετήν)."

symbol not just of trust and righteousness, but also of asceticism and renunciation, leaving Mesopotamia and offering his son for the sake of the kingdom of heaven.[79]

Simplicity (and adjacent virtues): Without calling it simplicity, as Nazianzen does, Basil nonetheless highlights simplicity-adjacent virtues. One of his most common quotations from Abraham's life emphasizes **humility**. As Abraham's piety grows, his humility and **awareness of his own weakness** (ἀσθένεια) also increase: he calls himself "earth and ashes." Basil takes Abraham's experience as typical of a general paradox: "no one who is worthy of gazing into the wisdom and goodness of God will be able to attribute goodness or power to himself or anyone else."[80] In fact, one of two times Basil mentions justice (δικαιοσύνη) in connection with Abraham he suggests it is precisely due to the "earth and ashes" confession.[81] Nyssen names Abraham's simplicity but embeds it in a host of other virtues that take us well beyond the catalogue (see below).

Other virtues: Basil generalises Abraham's earthy self-knowledge into an imperative: making it our own can **curb wrath**.[82] We should take as if in stewardship such things as Abraham experienced (health, sickness, wealth, poverty), for by nature they are neither good nor evil, but revelatory of character.[83] He is among the **pure** (καθαροί) who are made disciples of the Holy Spirit directly, without human mediation.[84] Basil gives him an almost Stoic **coolness** in an exhortation to asceticism, where Abraham "unfeelingly

[79] Nyss. *De deitate adversus Evagrium* 337; *Adversus eos qui baptismum differunt* 368.
[80] Bas. *De fide (Hom. XV)* 31.464; cf. *Genesis* 18:27; *Enarratio in prophetam Isaiam* 2.87 (*PG* 30.261): Καὶ Ἀβραάμ, ὅτε Θεὸν εἶδεν, ἑαυτὸν γῆν καὶ σποδὸν ὡμολόγει. Οὐδεὶς οὖν ἀξιούμενος ἐνορᾷν τῇ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἀγαθότητι καὶ σοφίᾳ, δυνήσεται ἢ ἑαυτῷ, ἢ ἄλλῳ σοφίαν ἢ δύναμιν μαρτυρῆσαι. The "earth and ashes" line occurs at least twice more in the commentary, at 6.182 and 6.185 (30.428, 433).
[81] Τί γὰρ ἡμῶν ἡ δικαιοσύνη; Μέγας ἦν ὄντως Ἀβραάμ. Οὕτως ἦν μέγας, διότι γῆ ἐστι καὶ σποδός. Ὁ γὰρ γινώσκων ὅσον μεταξὺ Θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπων, οἶδεν ἑαυτόν. Bas. *Homilia de paenitentia* 31.1484.
[82] Bas. *Homilia adversus eos qui irascuntur* 31.360. Abraham's self-description as "earth and ashes," recurrent in Basil, is almost as rare in Nyssen as it is in Nazianzen, and seems to be invoked as a general insight into the paltry value of purely human things rather than the source of any greatness: Nyss. *Orationes VIII de beatitudinibus*, Or. 7, 44.1279.
[83] Bas. *Ep.* 236.7 (to Amphilochius). On his hardships, see also *Homilia in Psalmum 14*, 29.252.
[84] Bas. *Enarratio in prophetam Isaiam* 7.198 (*PG* 30.460).

sacrifices his only son (τὸν μονογενῆ θυσιάζων ἀσυμπαθῶς)." Yet this is the reason for his exaltation by God, to whom he keeps the doors of his tent open, ever ready to show warm **hospitality**, another virtue emphasized in *1 Clement*.[85] So virtuous is Abraham that on balance, for Basil, he (along with his son and grandson) is credited with perfection in **every virtue,** partly on account of which (διὰ τὸ εἰς πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν τελεῖν) God names himself the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.[86]

Nyssen says Abraham's readiness to offer timely sacrifice μετὰ φοβοῦ καὶ πίστεως comes from a life of **prayer** and praise, which allows us, too, to be nourished by grace and receive power to make pleasant the contest for **justice** (ἡδὺν ποιοῦντες τὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἀγῶνα). It is also the route to the perfection of the moral life—not necessarily by acquiring one particular virtue after another in an exact sequence, but allowing them to work together: the life is marked by simplicity, but "simplicity gives way to faith, faith to **hope**, hope to justice, justice to **service**, service to **humility**; **gentleness** receives of this and goes on to **joy**, joy to **love** and love to prayer"—and so Abraham's virtues come full circle.[87] We find an echo of this panoply of virtues in the catalogue of comparative exemplars deployed to eulogize Ephraim. There Gregory of Nyssa says that the bishop was a μιμητής of Abraham not just in faith (πίστις) or in other virtues such as gentleness (πραότης) or love of God (εἰς τὸν Θεὸν ἀγάπη)—virtues also highlighted near simplicity above—but especially in the ascetic flight from the world (μάλιστα δὲ τῇ τοῦ κόσμου φυγῇ), manifest (again) in the wanderings and in the sacrifice of his 'only' son, Isaac. Perhaps consistent with the sense implied in the other Cappadocians, in this sacrifice he

[85] Bas. *Sermo asceticus et exhortatio* 31.628. I base this remark concerning his exaltation on my suspicion that Migne's *ἐμεγαλαύχει* (boasted) should be *ἐμεγαλύνθη* (was exalted), but I have not investigated the MSS. Basil has nothing negative to say about Abraham in this or any context and I doubt boasting can be meant. Hospitality also at *1 Clement* 10:7; indirectly at Nyss. *In sanctum Pascha* 261.
[86] Bas. *Adversus Eunomium* I, 29.543–544.
[87] Nyss. *De instituto christiano* 76–78.

showed an ascetic mortification of his earthly cares.[88] But when slave-born Ishmael is acknowledged, it is he who, for Nyssen, represents the practical life, whereas free-born Isaac is the contemplative.[89] While Mamre is the site of a theophany, Nyssen uses it in his Paschal meditations not to show hospitality but to muse on the movement from winter to spring, and in a bucolic key, he shows Abraham **delighting** (ἐπαγαλλόμενος) in the shade of the spreading oak leaves.[90]

Abraham and those with him show a **love for the things of heaven**.[91] He is the exemplar whom Nyssen believes the bride in the *Song of Songs* is imitating when she bids her attendants behold the bridegroom.[92] Further allegorizing Abraham's clan, slaves, and attendants into good deeds allows us to enter into a **relationship with Scriptural saints** more generally: "Those who do the works of Abraham become children of the patriarchs, being fashioned into their kinsmen through virtue."[93] In a similarly near-genealogical sense, he stands at the head of a succession of saints (ἡ τῶν ἐφεξῆς ἁγίων διαδοχή) leading through to the Christian era.[94] God's response to his prayerful supplication on behalf of the Sodomites gives hope even in the present.[95] He "endures in a hopeful spirit (ἐγκαρτερῶν τῇ ἐλπίδι).[96] In a possibly spurious text, he shows patient long-suffering (μακροθυμία) at the hands of "atheist barbarians" in Egypt when Pharaoh takes Sarah, such that "the glory of [his] piety (τὸ τῆς εὐσεβείας . . . δόκιμον)" was made manifest.[97]

[88] Nyss. *In sanctum Ephraim* 46.844.
[89] Nyss. *In Canticum canticorum*, Prologus 6.
[90] Nyss. *In sanctum Pascha* 261.
[91] Nyss. *De opificio hominis* 22 (44.208).
[92] Nyss. *In Canticum canticorum* VII, 215.
[93] Nyss. *In inscriptiones Psalmorum* I, cap. 8, 51.
[94] Nyss. *In sanctum Stephanum I* 86.
[95] Nyss. *In XL martyres II* 169. The very posture of prayer matters: Abraham's prostrations lend legitimacy to the veneration of the Holy Spirit: Nyss. *Adversus Macedonianos de Spiritu sancto* 111.
[96] Nyss. *De deitate filii et spiritus sancti* 131.
[97] Nyss. *De occursu domini* 46.1172.

The promise God makes him concerning his countless descendants is fulfilled in the swelling ranks of the Church.[98] His bosom is remembered as a place of rest.[99]

Finally, in hagiographic texts, Nyssen's Abraham is an exemplar for **secular education**, in each case called "Chaldean philosophy" (i.e. astrology) and associated with the order and motion of the stars. He uses this "knowledge (γνώσει)" or "education (παιδεύσει)" as if it is a "step stool (ὑποβάθρῳ)" to reach the higher world beyond sense-perception. This in turn leads him to reject false worship and ultimately find God. Nyssen will have Thamaturgus and Basil in turn doing something similar with their mastery of and then departure from Greek philosophy.[100] This story of Abraham's education is not in *Genesis*, but is likely drawn from Philo, where Abraham is told by the Word to "be rid the stargazers and Chaldean learning (παραπεμψάμενος οὖν τούς τε κατ᾽ οὐρανὸν περιπολοῦντας καὶ τὴν Χαλδαϊκὴν ἐπιστήμην)" so he can be taught the truth about the God beyond the cosmos.[101]

Julian: Julian says he has always revered the "God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob." Rather than rejecting Abraham as an exemplar, he quotes *Genesis* on his righteousness or justice (δικαιοσύνη) and tries to co-opt him for his cause. He directly takes up the idea of Abraham as a *paideia*-hero and inverts it: that family "were themselves Chaldeans, belonging to that holy people who practised theurgy."[102] In Julian's telling, the theurgy continues: he elaborates the sacrifice of the animals in *Genesis* 15 as evidence of Abraham's skill in divination and augury.[103] Julian reproaches Christians for their failure to imitate him in this regard.[104]

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[98] Nyss. *De tridui inter mortem et resurrectionem domini nostri Jesu* 274.
[99] Nyss. e.g. *De anima et resurrectione* 61 (Macrina), *In Meletium* 452. Cf. *Luke* 16:22–23.
[100] Nyss. *Vita Gregorii Thaumaturgi* 9; similar diction at *In Basilium fratrem* 111–112.
[101] Philo *De Abrahamo* 15.68–72.
[102] Jul. *Contra Galilaeos* 354b.
[103] Jul. *Contra Galilaeos* 356e–358e.
[104] Jul. *Contra Galilaeos* 354b–356e.

Summary: Abraham's catalogue-virtue of faith is found in all of the Cappadocians. His status as an obedient wanderer willing to give everything to God is found in Clement and all three Cappadocians. Nazianzen associates him with fatherhood to a unique degree, and he early (and subsequently, often) links him with his own father (and mother) in a way that his friends Basil and Gregory of Nyssa do not seem to have done with theirs. For Basil, simplicity is most manifest in humility, driven home by an earthen-and-ashen refrain, whereas Nyssen embeds it in a chain of other virtues. Basil's emphasis on hospitality and friendship with God have Clementine precedent. All three Cappadocians can agree that Abraham is a true all-rounder when it comes to virtue, but Nyssen spells out his many admirable qualities at the greatest length. Nyssen, amongst his other idiosyncracies, is the only one to showcase Abraham as a paragon of secular learning—a theme to which we will return.

Lot

For receiving two angelic strangers and defending them against the men of Sodom, Gregory of Nazianzus counts Lot "a Sodomite, yet not a Sodomite in his way of life." He explains that he is exemplary for **hospitality** (φιλοξενία) "among the **just** (ἐν μὲν δικαίοις)," hospitality relating to his harbouring the angels in Sodom and justice apparently drawn from *2 Peter*.[105] He is otherwise scarcely present in Nazianzen: in a poem he parts ways with Abraham, more or less peacefully, to **avoid conflict**.[106]

[105] Naz. *Or.* 14.2; *Genesis* 19; *2 Peter* 2:6–9.
[106] Naz. *Carm.* 2.1.11 *De vita sua* 1762 sqq. (37.1152); *Genesis* 13:5 sqq.

Hospitality and *justice (catalogue virtues)*: Hospitality is a special mark of Lot in *1 Clement*.[107] For Basil, Lot is not linked with hospitality by that virtue's name, but he is called "Lot of the just judgements" for deciding to help his guests.[108]

Peacemaking: In Basil's rules for monks, Lot's example is to **foster peace** amongst the spiritual brethren: even living amongst intemperate guest-murderers, he "kept his virtue unsullied" and "his holiness undefiled," while "teaching others what is noble (τὸ καλὸν ἐκπαιδεύων) by his deeds rather than by his words."[109]

Other associations: Alongside hospitality, *Clement* adds that Lot shows piety (εὐσέβεια) and being hopeful in God (ἐλπίζων).[110] He is absent from *Hebrews*. Piety is not developed elsewhere, but Basil uses Lot as a **hopeful** exemplar of a faithful remnant when encouraging a group of monks who are being harassed by local Arians who seem to be numerically superior.[111] The surprisingly rosy picture is not the only one Basil paints of Lot, who is the most developed exemplar in another ascetical text. There, **drunkenness** leaves him "his daughters' bridegroom, his own son-in-law and father-in-law—the father is the husband, the grandfather is the father, and from each side he violates the bounds of nature."[112]

The lone reference I find to Lot in Gregory of Nyssa concerns neither hospitality nor justice, as in Basil and Nazianzen, but precisely these infamous acts of **incest**. Brought on by immoderate drinking, the real target of the long passage, the incident is introduced by a catalogue of woes, elaborated through a series of eight erotemata swiftly followed by four desperate ecphoneses. Themes of pollution (ἄγος) and shame pervade the text, and with at

[107] *1 Clement* 11:1–2.
[108] Bas. *Enarratio in prophetam Isaiam* 1.23 (*PG* 30.161): . . . τὸν τὰ δίκαια κρίνοντα Λὼτ . . .
[109] Bas. *Constitutiones asceticae* 21.3 (31.1397).
[110] *1 Clement* 11:1–2.
[111] Bas. *Ep.* 257.2 (to monks mistreated by the Arians).
[112] Bas. *Sermo asceticus et exhortatio* 31.640. Cf. Soph. *OT* 1403–1408 and *OC* 534–5.

least three references to "tragedy" (τραγῳδία, τραγικόν), Gregory evidently finds Lot something of an inverted Biblical Oedipus. Uniquely among the Cappadocians, Nyssen has nothing good to say about the man.[113]

Summary: He is neglected wholly by *Hebrews*. Admitting a liberal periphrasis, we may find Lot's hospitality in Basil, as we do in *1 Clement* and Nazianzen, and peaceableness, albeit with a different justifying episode (coexistence with the Sodomites rather than parting with Abraham). Clement and Basil have him showing hope. Nazianzen and Basil add justice to Lot's credentials, following *2 Peter*. The Clementine virtue of piety seems lost. Lot is only of interest to Nyssen for his tragic sin of incest, an illustration of the evils of drink, commented on by Basil but overlooked by Nazianzen. But an easy target, Lot's earlier offering of his daughters to the men of Sodom, goes mentioned by all of them.

Joseph

"The lover of **temperance**" (σωφροσύνη), says Basil in his letter to Nazianzen, "attentively studies the story of Joseph and thoroughly learns from him temperate deeds (τὰς σωρφονικὰς ἐκδιδάσκεται πράξεις). He finds him not only continent in resisting pleasures (ἐγκρατῶς πρὸς ἡδονὰς ἔχοντα), but also positively disposed by habit towards virtue."[114] Elsewhere, Basil recalls his whole life as a "protreptic to temperance."[115] Considering the merits of time in the wilderness, Basil recalls "Joseph who, though temperate, was sold into slavery."[116] Reprimanding a runaway nun, Basil spells out the

[113] Nyss. *In Ecclesiasten Or. III* 329–330.
[114] Bas. *Ep.* 2.3 (to Nazianzen).
[115] Bas. *In Gordium* 31.492.
[116] Bas. *Ep.* 42.5 (to Chilo): Ἔγνων γὰρ . . . Ἰωσὴφ τὸν σώφρονα διαπιπρασκόμενον . . .

incident with Potiphar's wife from which Joseph's temperate reputation is chiefly derived (though the virtue itself is not named in *Genesis* at the locus where it is most visibly displayed).[117] Elsewhere this episode is framed as a test of Joseph's heart, or kidneys (νεφροί), as the case may be.[118] The "scheme against Joseph the virtuous (ἐναρέτου)" once appears in a litany arguing that "from beginning to end, all evil things come about because of womankind."[119]

Basil also has Joseph as an antidote to envy and greed. He reproduces the Clementine Joseph as a **victim of envy** (φθόνος), specifically that of his brothers. This is nonetheless folded into a divine plan.[120] In a homily given during a famine, Joseph is a paragon of **brotherly love** (φιλαδελφία) and is also to be imitated for his **care for his father**: "if you should see an old man hungry, call him to you and feed him, as Joseph did Jacob." **Love your struggling enemies**, says Basil, as Joseph did even for the brothers who had sold him. Then the iconically sexual Joseph-moment returns, with a non-sexual twist: Basil transforms the incident with Potiphar's wife from an iconic moment of lust (her own lust, extrinsic to Joseph, and a trial of Joseph's own inclination to that vice) to one of greed (πλεονεξία). Greed, says Basil, "drags you by your garments so that you may scorn the commandment and instead cherish gold-loving and world-loving [greed]." Basil accordingly allegorizes Joseph's lust-temperance as **greed-temperance**: when greed comes stalking, "Rip your shirt off, too; get angry and run away, and stay faithful to the Lord, as Joseph was faithful to Potiphar."[121] Note his **faithfulness** in this connection, too.

[117] Bas. *Ep.* 46.4 (to a fallen virgin); *Genesis* 39.
[118] Bas. *Homilia in Psalmum 7*, 29.244.
[119] Bas. *Sermo de contubernalibus* 30.816.
[120] Bas. *De invidia* 31.377. Cp. *Homilia in Psalmum 29*, 29.312.
[121] Bas. *Homilia dicta tempore famis et siccitatis* 31.325. Basil sometimes uses Joseph's precedent to justify acts downstream of virtues, such as swearing oaths (*Homilia in Psalmum 14*, 29.261) or weeping for the dead (*In Barlaam* 31.484, though this may be spurious, 31.11). The prophetic charism of dream-interpretation is likewise not a virtue, but as an indication of God's favour it can be counted to Joseph's credit: Bas. *Enarratio in prophetam Isaiam*, Prologue, 6 (*PG* 30.128).

Temperance or chastity (catalogue virtue): Across the Cappadocian corpora, as in Basil, it is temperance that is most associated with Joseph. Gregory of Nyssa also makes it Joseph's catalogue virtue.[122] Chastity is the subtext of nearly every presentation of Joseph as σώφρων.[123] Sometimes this aspect is named more explicitly, as when Ephraim is like Joseph in "bodily chastity and purity (ἐν τῇ τοῦ σώματος ἁγνείᾳ καὶ καθαρότητι)."[124] In one extended passage on sexual sin, Gregory dwells at length on "the temperate youth who bested Egyptian fornication by his flight." The line "Lie with me (κοιμήθητι μετ' ἐμοῦ)," which in the Scriptures is spoken only once to Joseph on the day he lost his clothing, occurs five times in Gregory's meditation.[125] "The dart of her fornication was ablaze," he writes, "but found no kindling in his soul." His paraphrase of the sequel changes some details and to the woman's deception Nyssen adds her falsely claiming that she "temperately" kept her husband's marriage-bed safe. The account becomes much more lurid than the original, the repetition serving as a kind of seductive incantation against which Gregory's praises for temperance or for the "sobriety of temperance (τῆς σωφροσύνης ἡ νῆψις)" are meant to stand in higher and perhaps more visceral relief. Joseph is clearly a model for "the army of the temperate," for whom virtuous words are easier than flesh-tested deeds, and shows that perseverance is worth it: "Joseph rules over the Egyptians; a slave-boy is master of the barbarians."[126]

While Joseph (the patriarch and son of Jacob) does not appear in Gregory Nazianzen's catalogues in *Oratio* 14 or *Oratio* 18, Nazianzen elsewhere remembers Joseph "sold off,

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[122] Nyss. *In Meletium* 445. Speakers other speakers than Nyssen who depended on Meletius as a father are called Ephraim and Manasseh (Joseph's sons); see also the catalogue, 449–450; "the bones of [our] Joseph," 456.
[123] Nyss. *Contra Eunomium* 2.1.322.
[124] Nyss. *In sanctum Ephraim* 46.844.
[125] *Genesis* 39:7–23.
[126] Nyss. *Contra fornicarios* 214–217. His reimagining of the scene may be in the tradition of Josephus *Antiquitates* 2.4 (esp. 2.4.3–2.4.5) and Philo *De vita Josephi* 9(40)–11(57), the latter especially emphatic on temperance. Those loci have extended ethopoeiae of Potiphar's wife, but they lack Nyssen's distinctive anaphora.

and lusted after yet temperate (σωφρονῶν), and enlightened with God's wisdom, and liberated, and regnant, and a dispenser of food in a higher office."[127] We find a similar concatenation in Nazianzen's praise of 'Cyprian,' there with the addition that, as in Basil, the seduction by Potiphar's wife is read as God testing Joseph (ὁ τὸν Ἰωσὴφ . . . ἐν γυναικὶ δοκιμάσας).[128] The fixity of his association with chastity is such that Constantinopolitans can be reprimanded for the scale of their partisan fickleness with the accusation that a man counted "yesterday's Joseph is today [thought to be] a whore of a man (πόρνος)."[129]

Victim of envy: In *1 Clement* Joseph is no more than an object of his brothers' envy or jealousy (there, ζῆλος rather than φθόνος).[130] As Jacob's "most temperate son, made a slave, and condemned to live in prison," temperance warrants his inclusion in a discussion of unjust suffering attributed, if spuriously, to Nyssen.[131] Like Basil, Nyssen specifies the injustice done him as envy, but it was the means by which God led him to virtual kingship.[132] Nazianzen's Joseph is also a victim and a much-lamented son.[133]

Other associations: Joseph, honoured for **faith** in *Hebrews*, does not appear to display that virtue in the Cappadocians other than Basil.[134] Nazianzen says Basil is a "second Joseph" in alleviating a famine; both excelled in **kindness towards and love of their fellow man**, τὸ φιλάνθρωπον, but where Joseph's benefits were limited to Egypt, to one point in time, and to bodily needs, Basil served πάντων καὶ ἀεὶ καὶ πνευματικῶς.[135] Even

[127] Ἰωσήφ τε πιπρασκόμενος, καὶ ἐρώμενος, καὶ σωφρονῶν, καὶ παρὰ Θεοῦ σοφιζόμενος, καὶ ἐλευθερούμενος, καὶ δυναστεύων, καὶ σιτοδοτῶν ἐπ' οἰκονομίᾳ μείζονι. Naz. *Or.* 4.18; cf. his stewardship at *Or.* 16.19.
[128] Naz. *Or.* 24.13.
[129] Naz. *Or.* 22.5; Bernardi (1968) 143–144.
[130] *Hebrews* 11:21–22; *1 Clement* 4:9.
[131] Nyss. *De occursu domini* 46.1172; Mühlenberg and Maspero, *GNOO*.
[132] Nyss. *De vita Moysis* 2.122; *Ep.* 16.4 (to Strategius) τῶν ὁμογενῶν ἡ κακία ὁδὸς αὐτῷ πρὸς τὴν βασιλείαν ἐγένετο; the listener is exhorted to remind any potentially persecuted 'Joseph' that he will be blessed by God in *Orationes VIII de beatitudinibus, Or. 8* 44.1296.
[133] Naz. *Or.* 22.1 (cp. 33.10).
[134] *Hebrews* 11:21–22.
[135] Naz. *Or.* 43.36, 72.

more than in chastity, says Nyssen, Ephraim resembled Joseph in this role as distributor—Ephraim replacing grain with the divine Word.[136] When the infamous episode with Potiphar's wife is elaborated in the *Life of Gregory Thaumaturgus*, Nyssen adds the Platonic thought concerning justice—one also approximated in Flavius Josephus' account of the incident—that Joseph "preferred *seeming* bad to becoming so, and enduring the deeds of the wicked to becoming a wicked man." This preference, generalised as a guide to **right action in difficult circumstances**, serves as an introduction to the life of the text's titular wonder-worker.[137] In Nyssen Joseph exhibits a kind of **justifiable deception** when he tricks his brothers "out of compassion," which cannot be compared with the way they deceived him.[138]

Summary: On balance, the Cappadocian debt to early Christian catalogues is limited to envy. All agree on this point, as they do, above all, in keeping Joseph tied to temperance, his Basilian (and Nyssenian) catalogue virtue. But they also show idiosyncratic uses, especially when the virtue is lifted from its originally sexual context and applied metaphorically to other domains. Most notable are Nyssen's flagging of justifiable deception (which Basil discusses without drawing on Joseph[139]), and Basil's transposition of Joseph's temperance from resistance to lust (chastity) to resistance to greed. Besides pecuniary temperance, brotherly love, care for one's elders, and love of one's enemies are Basilian virtues in Joseph not flagged in the other Cappadocians. As large as he looms for the two brothers, Joseph is a relatively minor exemplar in Nazianzen's corpus.

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[136] Nyss. *In sanctum Ephraim* 46.844.
[137] Nyss. *Vita Gregorii Thaumaturgi* 12–13; cf. Flavius Josephus *Antiquitates* 2.4.4, and in general Glaucon's challenge to Socrates in *Republic* II.
[138] Nyss. *Contra Eunomium* 1.1.108: ἐψεύσατο καὶ Ἰωσὴφ ἐν φιλανθρωπίᾳ τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς διαπαίζων. Other items of interest: Education by God, dream-reading and other incidentals, *De hominis opificio* 13 (44.172); Joseph being led like a sheep by God, *Refutatio confessionis Eunomii* 221; προσκύνησις offered him by his brothers, *Adversus Macedonianos de Spiritu sancto* 111.
[139] Bas. *In principium proverbiorum* 31.411–412.

Moses

Gregory Nazianzen's catalogues in *Orationes* 14 and 18 take Moses as an exemplar of **meekness** (πραότης, τὸ πρᾶον), drawing on an association in *Numbers*.[140] With similar, if slightly different shades, he is elsewhere restrained (φειδός) in his dealings with Pharaoh.[141] Like Abraham he is a foreigner and **sojourner abroad** (πάροικος, ξένος).[142] He is an exemplar of **prayer**, especially in war against the Amalekites, and therefore of intercessory prayer.[143] His **vision of God** comes after much prayer and purity (including sexual abstinence), and is in accord with his place at the height of **virtue in general** (ἀρετή) as well as his **education** (παίδευσις); the latter, however, is not developed.[144] For these things he is "worthy of the vision of God."[145] Nazianzen does not call Moses humble, but he emphasizes his lack of distinction and his **reluctance** to answer God's call as points to his credit.[146] He is one of the **wise sages of old** (σοφῶν τις τῶν πάλαι); his shoelessness is a sign of **living philosophically** and without excess (φιλοσόφως καὶ ἀπερίττως) in a kind of voluntary poverty.[147] Most prominently, however, he is a **lawgiver** (νομοθέτης) and a **leader** (ἐξηγούμενος, προστάτης, ἄρχων), once honoured as ἄρχων ἀρχόντων καὶ ἱερεὺς ἱερέων.[148] Sometimes his leadership is connected with generalship (στρατηγία), prophecy (προφητεία), and ministry (ὑπουργία).[149]

[140] Naz. *Or.* 14.2, *Or.* 18.24, in both cases with David, and in the former also with Jesus.
[141] Naz. *Carm.* 1.2.25 *Adversus iram* 190–195 (37.826–827), where he and Aaron φειδοῖ προσήγονθ' ὡς τὸ Φαραὼ θράςος.
[142] Naz. *Or.* 42.7.
[143] E.g. Naz. *Or.* 2.88, 18.29; he hopes his father will be a second Moses so as to intercede to end the hail, 16.20. God hears him even when he is silent, *Or.* 16.4
[144] Prayer at Naz. *Or.* 32.16; purity and abstinence, *Carm.* 1.2.3 *Exhortatio ad virgines* 23 (37.634); 2.1.13 *Ad episcopos* 117–118 (37.1236–1237); worthy at *Or.* 27.9; virtue and education (not catalogued by Demoen), 45.11; see also *Or.* 37.3; and 45 *passim*.
[145] Naz. *Or.* 27.9: θεοφανείας ἠξιωμένος; cf. 4.18.
[146] Naz. *Or.* 1.1, 2.114, 18.14.
[147] Naz. *Carm.* 2.1.13 *Ad episcopos* 117–118 (37.1236–1237); *Or.* 45.19.
[148] Naz. *Or.* 2.41, 4.18, 7.3, 11.2 (including "ruler of rulers," etc.); 21.3, 21.20, 42.5.
[149] Naz. *Or.* 2.52, 45.11, 45.20.

In Moses' case, the virtues are so tightly interwoven that I not only include multiple virtues in a single subheading, I also include some new virtues not found in Nazianzen's accounts where his peers use them in support of Nazianzenian virtues. Where these arise, I print them in bold.

Gentleness (catalogue virtue): In one of Nyssen's catalogues as in Nazianzen's, meekness or mildness (πραΰς, elsewhere πρᾷος), a trait highlighted in *Numbers*, is given as Moses' distinguishing mark. This is sometimes spelled out as the ability to control anger.[150] Moses appears as similarly meek (πραότατος πάντων ἀνθρώπων) in Basil, and with an even more emphatic connection to anger. In several places he argues that "it is possible to be both meek . . . and reasonably incensed" (ἔνι καὶ πρᾶον ὄντα σὺν λόγῳ διαθερμαίνεσθαι and σὺν λόγῳ διαγανακτεῖν), and cites Moses' killing of "his kinsmen (τῶν ὁμοφύλων)" after the Golden Calf incident not as exceptional to his meekness but as consistent with it: at some point, not being moved belongs not to meekness but to "the nature of sloth." The same locus affirms that true meekness begets patience with others' wrongdoing (ἀνεξικακίας μήτηρ) as well as goodness (χρηστότης). When the Levites' slaughter of the unfaithful is treated elsewhere, spirited anger (θυμός) is made a weapon against idolatry.[151] In *Ep.* 2 to Nazianzen, Basil explains how Moses can at once be meek (πρᾶος) and righteously angry (μεγαλόθυμος): Moses "stood with great anger (μεγάλῳ . . . τῷ θυμῷ) against those who sinned against God, while bearing with meek soul (πραείᾳ . . . τῇ ψυχῇ) the slanders made against himself."[152] It seems that for Basil, if Moses is to be emphasized as meek, his harder edge ought simultaneously to be foregrounded.

[150] Nyss. *Contra Eunomium* 2.1.322; e.g. *De anima et resurrectione* 36; cf. *Numbers* 12:3.
[151] Bas. *Constitutiones asceticae* 13 (31.1376–1377); sim. at *Homilia adversus eos qui irascuntur* (*Hom.* X) 31.368, but patience with Aaron and Miriam as conspirators, 31.360.
[152] Bas. *Ep.* 2.3 (to Nazianzen).

General virtue and titles of praise: Moses' eminently imitable life and general zeal for virtue, alongside his famous meekness, make him a prime example not only of good character for Basil, but also of moral exemplars more generally.[153] Moses is an even more towering figure in the works of Gregory of Nyssa, with some four hundred namings in the corpus, a third of which unsurprisingly come in the *Life* dedicated to him (for comparison, Abraham is named 83 times in the corpus, and Elijah 60). I will not attempt an analysis of that work here, but it is tantalizing to imagine Nyssen's project as a long development of his friend Nazianzen's thought that all the details of the Scriptures have significance "visible only to those who are like Moses in virtue, or who have come closest to his education."[154] Nyssen's Meletian catalogue has him represent goodness (ἀγαθότης).[155] This quite general virtue is specified throughout Nyssen's corpus by epithets such as ὁ μέγας, πολύς, θεσπέσιος, ὑψηλός, φίλος τῷ Θεῷ, μακάριος, θαυμάσιος, ἄνθρωπος τοῦ Θεοῦ, a range I have not observed for other figures.[156] For Nyssen, everything is imitable about Moses: the choice to be virtuous, in defiance of the temptation to vice, is even an imitation of Moses' birth, which defied the order of Pharaoh.[157] In sum, Moses' whole life represents virtue, in particular Nyssen's idiosyncratic take on it as a never-ending process as infinite as God's nature.[158]

Prayer: Basil's Moses shows similar perseverance in prayer and gives a pattern (τὸ σχῆμα τῆς προσευχῆς) even for its physical posture when he raises his hands against the

[153] Bas. *In Gordium* 31.492–493. There are limits: he is of course a "god to Pharaoh" only metaphorically, Bas. *Ep.* 189.8 (to Eustathius the physician).
[154] Naz. *Or.* 45.11: . . . μόνοις εἶναι θεωρητὰ τοῖς κατὰ Μωϋσέα τὴν ἀρετὴν, ἢ ὅτι ἐγγυτάτω τῆς ἐκείνου παιδεύσεως.
[155] Nyss. *In Meletium* 449–451.
[156] Nyss. e.g. *Orationes VIII de beatitudinibus* 3, 44.1229; *Refutatio confessionis Eunomii* 69; *De creatione hominis sermo primus (recensio C)* 28 (on this spurious text, however, see Mühlenberg and Maspero in *GNOO* and Dörrie's preface in *GNO suppl.* viii –ix); *In inscriptiones Psalmorum* I, cap. 7, 43; *In Ecclesiasten Or. VI* 378; *De occursu Domini* 46.1160 and 1175 (likewise probably spurious, *GNOO*); *In inscriptiones Psalmorum* II, cap. 1, 71.
[157] Nyss. *De Vita Moysis* 2.33–35.
[158] Nyss. *De Vita Moysis* 2.113–114; see also *In canticum canticorum* XII, 354.

Amalekites,[159] and on being heard by God even without speaking.[160] Like Moses at that battle, bishops should persevere in prayer.[161] The same is found throughout Nyssen.[162]

Reluctance to answer God, or humility: Basil's Moses has a surpassing eagerness for piety (τῇ δὲ περὶ τὴν εὐσέβειαν προθυμίᾳ) and the knowledge of God, but the more he advances, the more he knows himself to be weak and impotent, and grows in **humility**. His oft-cited refrain, echoing Abraham's "earth and ashes," is calling himself "a stammerer and slow of speech," the same line being used for the same virtue, along with submission, in *1 Clement*.[163] Even in youth, Basil's Moses loves humility (τὸ ταπεινόν), while also hating tyranny, pursuing **justice**, and resisting the allures of courtly life—this last, even though he is naturally **charming** (ἀστεῖος).[164] It also makes him worthy of contemplating God.[165] The same trust is evident when "Moses himself," amongst other holy men, does not find his prayers for good things answered.[166] For Nyssen, humility is among the merits of Moses' approach to education, which, in his curriculum, defeats arrogance.[167]

Lawgiver and leader: In spite of being "in all ways **trusting** and readily **obedient** (εὐπειθὴς καὶ εὐήκοος)," says Basil, Moses' humility and ready confession of his weakness (ὁμολογία τὴς ἀσθενείας) make him reluctant to accept leadership, and this paradoxically makes him worthy of it.[168] The humility which Basil loves so much also

[159] Bas. *Enarratio in prophetam Isaiam* 1.35 (*PG* 30.189).
[160] Bas. *Homilia in Psalmum 114*, 29.487.
[161] Bas. *Ep.* 241 (to Eusebius, bishop of Samosata).
[162] Nyss. *De tridui inter mortem et resurrectionem domini nostri Jesu* 275; *De vita Gregorii Thaumaturgi* 49; *De vita Moysis* 1.18–19.
[163] Bas. *De fide* (*Hom. XV*) 31.464–5; Bas. *Enarratio in prophetam Isaiam* 1.57, 6.182, 6.185 (*PG* 30.220, 428, 433); *1 Clement* 19:1.
[164] Bas. *In Hexaemeron I*, 1 (*PG* 29.5).
[165] Bas. *Enarratio in prophetam Isaiam* 4.135 (*PG* 30.337–340).
[166] Bas. *Regulae brev.* q. 161 (31.1188).
[167] Nyss. *De vita Moysis* 2.37; cf. *In Basilium fratrem* 125–127. Only once have I found Nyssen alluding lexically to Moses' humility as expressed in his plea that he is ἰσχνύφωνός τις ὢν . . . καὶ βραδύγλωσσος, the line so recurrent in Basil: Nyss. *In XL martyres Ia* 141.
[168] Bas. *Enarratio in prophetam Isaiam* 3.112 (*PG* 30.300).

makes Moses a good leader by helping him to heed an elder's advice, namely when he takes counsel from his father-in-law, Jethro. The resulting establishment of subsidiary authorities shows Moses as a practictioner of good governance (διακόσμησις).[169] For Basil, Moses exemplifies the unjustly grumbled-against leader, a role which reprises some of his characterization in *1 Clement*.[170] Moses is the guardian of a wandering people (ἐπετρόπευσε).[171] Though he first flees from Pharaoh, his time spent as a shepherd (ποιμαίνων) makes him worthy of God's company, and he becomes known as "the great lawgiver (ὁ μέγας νομοθέτης)." Expressing a Platonic and Philonic sentiment, Basil holds that Moses and Mamas, the latter imitating the former in both shepherdry and governance, demonstrate that the two arts are "sister skills (ἀδελφαί)."[172] He is a lawgiver whose precepts guide us to God and to the vision of the truth, says Basil without mention of any tension between old and new law.[173]

Nyssen's Moses, too, is a leader and a lawgiver who himself represents the precepts of the law.[174] He is the greatest of shepherds, a "gentle and caring ruler who came to be everything for his people, a nurturer, general, priest, true father, deliverer in wartime, benefactor supplying good things in the desert without sowing or ploughing, conscientious judge, unwandering guide," and yet is unjustly defied and is a victim of envy who triumphs by prayers for mercy.[175] This loving and intercessory leadership echoes what we

[169] Bas. *Enarratio in prophetam Isaiam* 1.57, 3.105 (*PG* 30.220, 288).
[170] Bas. *Regulae brev.* resp. 27 (31.1101); *1 Clement* 4:10–12, where the envious include Pharaoh, Abiram, Dathan, Aaron, and Miriam.
[171] Bas. *Homilia dicta tempore famis et siccitatis* 31.307–8.
[172] Bas. *In Mamantem* 31.593. Pl. *Resp.* I, 343a–e; Philo *De vita Mosis* 1.11 (60–62).
[173] Bas. *Enarratio in prophetam Isaiam* 5.162 (*PG* 30.385); see also 1.26 (30.168–169), 2.72 (30.240–241), and *passim*.
[174] Nyss. *De vita Moysis* 2.82–83; also e.g. *In canticum canticorum* I, 25–26, with dense repetition of νομοθέτης and related participles.
[175] Nyss. *Adversus eos qui castigationes aegre ferunt* 331: Τίς κρείττων ποιμὴν Μωσέως; τίς δὲ ἄρχων ἐμμελὴς οὕτω καὶ ἤπιος, πάντα γινόμενος τῷ λαῷ, τροφεύς, στρατηγός, ἱερεύς, αὐτοπατήρ, ἐν πολέμοις σώζων, ἐν ἐρήμῳ ἄσπαρτα καὶ ἀνήροτα χορηγῶν ἀγαθά, δικάζων ἐμμελῶς, ἁπλανῶς ὁδηγῶν; Envy overcome by prayer for mercy: *De vita Moysis* 2.122–124.

find in *1 Clement*.[176] He gives his followers **hope**, fed by his heart's communion with God.[177] He is to be imitated by others who would lead their fellows to a life of freedom, not least in attempting to speak with authority only after earning the right to preach by a long and arduous spiritual preparation.[178] In Chapter 2, I mentioned an implicit reference to Alexander in *De vita Moysis*. The fact that the conquering general is invoked at a decisive moment in Moses' career as a leader may suggest an implicit and mutually favourable comparison between the two men.[179] Even Moses' apparent shortcomings and vices are to be explained away by his role as leader. He seems afraid while approaching Sinai, but this fear turns out to have been purely sympathetic, and when the Israelites ask him to go alone, he is **courageous.**[180]

Moses as paideia-*hero: wandering, wisdom, and philosophy, or education for the vision of God*: Education, I noted, is present but not very significant for Nazianzen's Moses. But its place and purpose are so essential to Moses' role in the other Cappadocians' imaginations that it absorbs his wilderness living, his wisdom, and his philosophical disposition, ordered as it is to the vision of God—all of which we find in Nazianzen—in such a way that it will be useful to treat them all together here.

Basil stands in a long tradition that regularly presents Moses as a paragon of a pagan cultural education which is then turned to divine wisdom, just as we saw Nyssen presenting Abraham and as we will see Basil himself present Daniel. There is little by way of educational material in *Exodus* 2–3, but an impetus comes from *Acts*, where Stephen says that Moses was "educated in all the wisdom of the Egyptians, and was powerful in

[176] *1 Clement* 53–54.
[177] Nyss. *De vita Moysis* 2.69–70.
[178] Nyss. *De vita Moysis* 2.48–49, 2.60.
[179] See Chapter 3, 135.
[180] Nyss. *De Vita Moysis* 1.20–22.

his words and deeds."[181] After discussing what we might call 'character education'—the *vir bonus* half of Cato Maior's ideal, the other being *dicendi peritus*[182]—Basil says, "But since παιδεία also means the acquisition of the intellectual disciplines (ἡ τῶν μαθημάτων ἀνάληψις), in keeping with what has been written of Moses, that 'he was educated in all the wisdom of the Egyptians,' it is of no little value for salvation to avoid throwing oneself haphazardly at these disciplines and instead to recognise what kind of education is the most valuable."[183] In *Ad adolescentes*, Moses' mind was first well trained (ἐγγυμνασάμενος τὴν διάνοιαν) in Egyptian learning, and only then in the study of Him Who Is (τοῦ Ὄντος). This produces wisdom as a defining characteristic, and so the same course should be followed by fourth-century Christians with respect to Hellenic learning.[184]

Basil's emphasis on preeminent wisdom suggests an interplay with a line in *Numbers*, which Nazianzen, too, will exploit. The *Numbers* passage as well as Nazianzen emphasise Moses' mildness "beyond" or "ahead of all other men," with slight differences in framing; Basil uses a similar framing but replaces mildness with wisdom, and says he is known for this "among all men." Here are the loci, including one in which Basil quotes the *Numbers* passage *verbatim*:

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[181] *Acts* 7:22: καὶ ἐπαιδεύθη Μωϋσῆς ἐν πάσῃ σοφίᾳ Αἰγυπτίων, ἦν δὲ δυνατὸς ἐν λόγοις καὶ ἔργοις αὐτοῦ. Josephus *Antiquities* 2.9.5–7; Philo *De vita Moysis* 1.2(5), 1.5(18–24), where his learning is at its widest extent, including the best of Greek, Assyrian, and Chaldean learning besides Egyptian; Justin Martyr, *Cohortatio* 10 (citing Philo and Josephus explicitly); Clement of Alexandria *Stromata* 1.23. Whiston (in his 1737 translation) suggested in a comment to *Antiq.* 2.10.2 that Stephen (or the author of *Acts*) may have drawn on this extra-Biblical tradition, in particular for the mighty ἔργα during Moses' Egyptian phase, which in Josephus involve commanding armies.

[182] The succinct expression of the classical educational ideal is addressed to his son: *Orator est, Marce fili, vir bonus, dicendi peritus*: Cato Maior frag. 14 (Jordan [1860] 80). This is taken up by Quintilian, who immediately after quoting Cato insists that it is the first half, the *vir bonus*, that is the more important: *Sit ergo nobis orator quem constituimus is qui a M. Catone finitur vir bonus dicendi peritus, verum, id quod et ille posuit prius et ipsa natura potius ac maius est, utique vir bonus* (Quint. *Inst.* 12.1.1).

[183] Bas. *In principium proverbiorum* 31.397–400, quoting *Acts* 7:22. The whole passage is an interesting discussion of the various disciplines, from geometry to rhetoric. While consistent with a strongly censorious reading of *Ad adolescentes*, it strikes me as much less liberal than even that text.

[184] The education is elaborated at Bas. *In Hexaemeron I*, 1 (29.5).

Numbers 12:3:	. . . Μωυσῆς πραΰς σφόδρα *παρὰ πάντας τοὺς ἀνθρώπους* τοὺς ὄντας ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς.
Naz. *Or.* 14:	Moses (and David) *πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων* μαρτυρηθέντες [ὅτι καλὸν ἡ πραότης].[185]
Bas. *Hom. in Ps. 33*:	Διὸ καὶ Μωϋσῆς μεμαρτύρηται πραὺς εἶναι *παρὰ πάντας ἀνθρώπους* ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς.[186]
Bas. *Ad. adolescentes*:	Moses is he οὗ μέγιστόν ἐστιν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ *παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις* ὄνομα.[187]

The same virtue appears elsewhere as an epithet (ὁ σοφὸς Μωϋσῆς).[188]

Basil reconstructs a curriculum for the education that produces such wisdom as having consisted of forty years in "the things of the Egyptians" and then of forty years "in the wilderness ostensibly herding sheep," while in fact "pursuing the contemplation of the things which really exist [τῶν ὄντων]." This is followed by a third stage in which, though as unwilling (ἄκων) as the contemplative liberated from Plato's cave (a point he does not make explicitly), he is similarly compelled to go back πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπιμέλειαν, down to Egypt to serve the Israelites. A tripartite formation in profane learning, contemplative philosophy, and practical service (this last recalling Clement's ὑπηρεσία and Nazianzen's ὑπουργία) illustrate the purity of life and disposition towards learning that is necessary for the right interpretation of the Scriptures—or rather, in what stretches the analogical applicability of Basil's exemplar, their composition.[189] Moses is not quite the μύθων ῥητήρ and ἔργων πρηκτήρ of Homer's paideutic ideal,[190] but he does "approach God through manly deeds and good works (δι' ἀνδραγαθήματα καὶ πράξεις ἀγαθὰς ἐγγὺς γίνεται τοῦ Θεοῦ)."[191] He sees God.[192]

[185] Naz. *Or.* 14.2.
[186] Bas. *Homilia in Psalmum 33*, 29.356–7.
[187] Bas. *Ad adolescentes* III.3.
[188] Bas. *In Hexaemeron I*, 7 (29.17).
[189] Bas. *Enarratio in prophetam Isaiam*, Prologue, 6 (*PG* 30.128–129); later at 1.57, 6.182 (30.220, 428) (where he surpasses the Egyptians in nature and understanding), 7.194 (40.452). Cf. *1 Clement* 17:5.
[190] Hom. *Il.* 9.443.
[191] Bas. *Homilia in Psalmum 33*, 29.377.
[192] Bas. *Enarratio in prophetam Isaiam* 2.85 (*PG* 30.257).

As in Basil, Moses' education in both intellect and character, in both profane and sacred learning, is a recurrent theme in Nyssen. The basket keeping Moses safe is already an indication of right education. He is educated by the Egyptians, learning moral and natural philosophy, geometry, astronomy, dialectic, "and everything studied by those outside the Church"; the time will come "for the divine and sacramental temple to be made beautiful by the wealth of the mind."[193] The princess herself represents worldly philosophy, right down to her childless sterility; Moses remains grounded in God by having his own Hebrew mother as wetnurse. This "seems to teach that if in the moment of our education we spend time with secular disciplines, we must not distance ourselves from the nourishing milk of the Church, i.e. her norms and practices." An important image for Nyssen is the plunder of the Egyptians, an image used since Origen (if not Irenaeus) to express the deployment of profane learning for divine purposes.[194] When it occurs in Nazianzen, on the other hand, the loot does not have obvious curricular connotations.[195] Perhaps the sense propounded by his predecessors and peers was so obvious from their preaching and his own emphasis on secular learning (in e.g. the eulogy for Basil[196]) that it was not of interest to Nazianzen to spell out how exactly pagan culture was to be appropriated. It is even possible that this enthusiast of secular learning found the image too instrumentalizing, or that the theft it implies, even divinely sanctioned, would compromise the legitimacy of the Christian use of the classics, for which he argues so passionately in *Oratio* 4. As for Basil, I have not found him using this exact image, though he has natural opportunities to apply it.[197]

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[193] Nyss. *De vita Moysis* 1.7–8, 2.34–36, 2.68.
[194] Origen *Epistula ad Gregorium (Thaumaturgum)* 2; less directly in Irenaeus *Adversus Haereses* 4.30.3; Nyss. *De vita Moysis* 2.68–69. Cf. also Augustine *De doctrina christiana* 2.40 (60). The *loci classici* are *Exodus* 11:2, 12:35–36. It does not have this sense in Philo *De vita Mosis* 58 (317).
[195] Naz. *Or.* 45.20.
[196] Naz. *Or.* 43.10–25.
[197] Bas. *Ad adolescentes* III–IV.

Moses' rejection by his kin and solitary flight signal, in Nazianzen's telling, the end of one phase of his education, and the beginning of the next, namely philosophy. In the wilderness he shows selfless courage and virtue in his philosophical poverty.[198] This integrated education makes him a philosopher able to behold God's manifestations.[199] Nyssen often illustrates this by quoting *Genesis* or *Exodus* as cosmological and metaphysical texts,[200] but in one instance God's πρόσεχε σεαυτῷ to Moses, meant to prepare him to listen to an angel, is seamlessly joined to the γνῶθι σεαυτόν of Delphi, without attribution and as if the words are Moses' own.[201] He is made to teach a very Aristotelian (but similarly unattributed) doctrine of the mean (τὸ μέσον).[202] As in Basil's third phase of formation, Moses serves the people, but Nyssen also highlights his transcendence of both the corporeal and the intelligible on Sinai, where he receives further "instruction in virtue, of which the most important is piety, i.e. having the right understandings about the divine nature (ἀρετῆς διδασκαλία, ἧς τὸ κεφάλαιον ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡ εὐσέβεια καὶ τὸ τὰς πρεπούσας ὑπολήψεις περὶ τῆς θείας φύσεως ἔχειν)."[203] He then passes this on as a **teacher** in his own right, often through images, and leading his students to God by way of moral purity.[204]

Other associations: For Basil, the ascetic formation, **fasting** in particular, allows him to approach Sinai and both to receive and to give the law, even while gluttony turns his

[198] Nyss. *De vita Gregorii Thaumaturgi* 10; *De vita Moysis* 1.8–9. Whether alone or with his people he endured (ἐνεμόχθει) terrible things in the desert: *Adversus eos qui baptismum differunt* 368.
[199] Nyss. *In inscriptiones Psalmorum* II, cap. 9, 106.
[200] Nyss. *De hominis opificio* 8 (44.144), *De professione Christiana* 136.
[201] Nyss. *De mortuis* 39–40.
[202] Nyss. *De vita Moysis* 2.131–133. Every virtue lies between two vices, each analogically treated as excess (πλεόνασις) or deficiency (ἔλλειψις) of some constituent element of the virtue. Nyssen illustrates with σοφία (between δεινότης and ἀκεραιότης) and σωφροσύνη (between ἀκολασία and καυτηριάζειν τὴν συνείδησιν). Cp. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* II, 1106a14–1107a8.
[203] Nyss. *De vita Moysis* 1.46; cf. Naz. *Or.* 37.3.
[204] Nyss. *De oratione dominica*, Oratio II, 20; IV, 53; V, 66; at least once as διδάσκαλος, e.g. *In sanctum Ephraim* 46.844.

people to idolatry.[205] His abstinence from food tames all fleshly desires, both above and below the belt, and more generally makes him an exemplar for the "**lover of toil** (φιλόπονος)."[206] Moses is not only **God's servant** (θεράπων), but also a **friend** (φίλος) of God, a title which Basil says is awarded to very few.[207] This not being the worst of friendship groups, Basil wants to join it: he tells Libanius that he spends his time with Moses and Elijah, namely through the Scriptures.[208] **Justice** or **righteousness** and **self-control** also find expression in Nyssen's Moses.[209]

For Nyssen, too, the whole point of our lives is to live so as to merit being called "servants of God (τοῦ θεοῦ οἰκέται)" in the sense that Moses attained.[210] He is not alone, but his standard is exacting to a virtually prelapsarian degree: "In Moses and those like him, the form of the image [of God] was kept pure (ἀλλ' ἐν Μωϋσῇ καὶ τοῖς κατ' ἐκεῖνον καθαρὰ διεφυλάχθη ἡ τῆς εἰκόνος μορφή)."[211] But the reward for its attainment is great indeed: in the last exhortation of the work, which calls the reader to imitate Moses so as "to be known by God and to be **God's friend** (γνωσθῆναί τε ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ φίλον γενέσθαι αὐτοῦ)," which just is the "perfection of life (ἡ τελειότης τοῦ βίου)."[212]

A conduit of divine revelation, Moses is an important authority invoked against Eunomius, but also by him, and so Nyssen must rule him out of bounds for the heretic: Nyssen digs his trenches around the Pentateuch and its orthodox interpretation by

[205] Bas. *De ieiunio I*, 5 (31.169); Moses endured hunger "no less" than Christ did, *Constitutiones asceticae* 4.7 (31.1357).
[206] Bas. *Enarratio in prophetam Isaiam* 1.31, while fasting from food and drink again prepares him for the contemplation of God, 1.32 (*PG* 30.181–184).
[207] Servant at e.g. Bas. *Enarratio in prophetam Isaiam* 3.103 (*PG* 30.103); friend at ibid. 1.57 (30.221) and *Adversus Eunomium* II, 29.609; God's few friends at *Homilia in Psalmum 44*, 29.392.
[208] Bas. *Ep.* 339 (to Libanius): Μωσεῖ καὶ Ἠλίᾳ καὶ τοῖς οὕτω μακαρίοις ἀνδράσι σύνεσμεν ἐκ τῆς βαρβάρου φωνῆς διαλεγομένοις ἡμῖν τὰ ἑαυτῶν. Courtonne takes the letter as plausibly authentic.
[209] Nyss. *De vita Moysis* 2.37.
[210] Nyss. *De Vita Moysis* 2.141–142. Οἰκέτης is only used in this final section; Moses is more often called God's θεράπων, e.g. at 2.74, 2.80, as in Bas. *In Hexaemeron IX*, 1 (29.188); and *Joshua* 1:2, *Hebrews* 3:5.
[211] Nyss. *De hominis opificio* 18 (44.193–196).
[212] Nyss. *De Vita Moysis* 2.143–145.

suggesting that Eunomius must have "some Moses of his own (ἴδιον κέκτηταί τινα Μωϋσέα)."[213]

Basil recalls Moses' unspecified but **vicious muttering**, for which he is barred from the promised land, as an indication of a moment of culpable distrust, which we, too, must avoid; even one as righteous as he may fall and must face the consequences.[214] For Basil, the grumbling at the rock is his one real failing; his brother hardly notes the incident at all, and then only favourably, as in Nazianzen, for the fact that water did ultimately spring forth.[215]

In our early Christian writings, Moses is a **faith-hero** of *Hebrews* 11 and *1 Clement*.[216] He is this for Basil, for whom his life even illustrates faith in Christ (ἡ εἰς Χριστὸν πίστις), though he does not yet know it: as in Nyssen, Christ turns out to be the rock where Moses hides to see God.[217]

There are many other instances in which Moses is glorified or receives a revelation of God, and in which the emphasis is above all on the divine action. Basil's flock in a time of drought are "new Israelites seeking a new Moses and his wonder-working staff," and the pastor, looking for a literal imitation of a miracle, yearns for someone to "care for the needs of a thirsty people by means of the stricken rock."[218] These miracles, as well as his vision of God, are not without ethical valence: one implication is that righteousness of character and consistent trust, manifested (generally) in practical fidelity to commandments, are necessary conditions, albeit insufficient, for receiving such a revelation.[219] The divine favour showed in these incidents is a ratification of Moses'

[213] Nyss. *Contra Eunomium* 2.1.263.
[214] Bas. *Homilia de paenitentia* 31.1477; *Homilia in Psalmum 48*, 29.440; *Ep.* 42.2 (to Chilo).
[215] Nyss. *De vita Moysis* 1.16, 2.113.
[216] *Hebrews* 11:24–29 (his parents, too, at 11:23); *1 Clement* 17:5.
[217] Bas. *Enarratio in prophetam Isaiam* 2.85 (*PG* 30.257); Nyss. *Vita Moysis* 117–122; Naz. *Or.* 45.21.
[218] Bas. *Homilia dicta tempore famis et siccitatis* 31.307–8.
[219] Bas. *Enarratio in prophetam Isaiam* 12.252 (*PG* 30.564) (face made radiant).

character and also lays out the template of a 'Mosaic philosopher-bishop' who wants to contemplate truth and also lead a flock.

Julian: Moses, in Julian, is a mediocrity in both teaching and leadership when compared to pagans, and is a useful challenge to Christian claims of continuity with the Old Testament. He is a monotheist who did not prophesy Jesus at all, and he surpasses Jesus in seeing God directly.[220] His God is a divine craftsman who arranges existing matter, not a Creator *ex nihilo* (κοσμήτωρ rather than ποιητής). Even here Moses' account is patchy and inept compared to Plato's description of the Demiurge in the *Timaeus*.[221] He tells fictions less believable than those of pagan myth, and which, far from glorifying God, make him look timorous and weak.[222] On the other hand, he is a sensible practitioner of sacrifice, a point Julian underscores (as with Abraham) presumably to make the persistence of pagan sacrifice more palatable.[223]

Julian also remembers Moses as a lawgiver, but not as a particularly good one. There is nothing remarkable about the Decalogue, except that some of the laws are worse than those found in pagan legal codes. Moreover, Moses slanders God by suggesting that he could be envious, an emotion unworthy of a god.[224] In an allusion to *Romans* 5:20–21, Julian suggests that Moses' lawgiving was counterproductive, worsening the problem of sin.[225] Most damningly, Moses is outdone as a statesman by all kinds of pagan generals and statesmen, all of whom acted "more decently (ἐπιεικέστερον) to the worst wrongdoers than Moses did to those who had not sinned in any way."[226] As for Moses' battlefield

[220] Jul. *Contra Galilaeos* 253de; Jul. *Contra Galilaeos* frag. 2.
[221] Jul. *Contra Galilaeos* 49e, 66a.
[222] Jul. *Contra Galilaeos* 134d–137e, 148bc.
[223] Jul. *Contra Galilaeos* e.g. 299bc, 305b.
[224] Jul. *Contra Galilaeos* 141cd, 152d–159e; cf. Pl. *Phdr.* 247a.
[225] Jul. *Contra Galilaeos* frag. 6.
[226] Jul. *Contra Galilaeos* 178b–184b.

performance, it is worth noting that Julian dares the Christians to show him "amongst the Hebrews even one general like Alexander, or just a single Caesar."[227]

Summary: Moses' catalogue virtue of meekness is well attested in the Cappadocians, prompted by the attribution made in *Numbers*. Of his other virtues in Nazianzen, wisdom, prayer, the vision of God, philosophical living, leadership, and a position near or atop the summit of all virtue are the best attested in Basil and Nyssen. While Mosaic education receives some lip service in Nazianzen, it is taken in such elaborate and developed directions by his colleagues that I would have treated it is a non-corroborative distinction in their works, were it not for the fact that they use it to tie together so many of the virtues that Nazianzen finds in Moses. In Basil and Nyssen, Moses' reluctance to lead is drawn out in ways that emphasize humility much more strongly than we find in Nazianzen. One wonders whether the Cappadocian emphasis on Moses' generalship is in part an attempt to take up Julian's competitive challenge about the unimpressive quality of Hebrew leaders, an attempt bolstered by an apocryphal Jewish hagiographic tradition reflected in Philo.[228]

Pretty well everything found in Nazianzen can be found in his peers and predecessors, and they go farther than he does. He does not emphasize faith in the way that *Hebrews* or Basil does. Besides the development of Moses' education, Basil highlights fasting and asceticism, and more than the others—though even this faintly—his mild but consequential lapse. Nyssen, for his part, the most extravagant of our Moses-enthusiasts, adds far more honorific titles than those found in his brother and his friend, as well as the further virtues of justice and self-control. Ultimately, however, Moses is an all-rounder in virtue for all our Cappadocians, a paradigm of paradigmatic virtue-heroes.

[227] Jul. *Contra Galilaeos* 218b.
[228] Jul. *Contra Galilaeos* 218b; Philo *De vita Mosis*.

Phinehas

In both *Oratio* 14 and *Oratio* 18, Nazianzen takes Phinehas as an exemplar of **zeal** (ζῆλος), while *Oratio* 14 also praises his "**resolve** (προαιρέσεως)." It is his skewering of the copulating Israelite and Midianite that wins him his name (ὀνομασθείς, ὀνομάζεται), and this is indeed where *Numbers* associates him with God's zeal.[229] The Maccabean martyrs look forward to being ranked as ζηλωταί with him (μετὰ Φινεὲς ταχθησόμεθα).[230] In a crisis, Gregory poignantly asks his father—whose authority he at other times resented—to take decisive, zealous action: "Be a Moses for me, or a Phinehas, *today*."[231]

Zeal: Like Nazianzen, Basil calls Phinehas "the zealot" (ὁ ζηλωτής).[232] His zeal against specifically sexual sin is employed only once, though there it is severe: Phinehas is made to regret that he can no longer grab a spear to run it through Basil's wayward addressee.[233] Gregory of Nyssa likewise latches onto Phinehas' zeal as an expression of the wrath (ὀργή) of God, who is so satisfied with this zeal that Phinehas can, without hint of blame, play "juryman and executioner."[234]

Other associations: Basil's uses of Phinehas are often general or metaphorical. Phinehas serves to illustrate **righteous anger** (ἡ δικαία ὀργή) in general.[235] The reward (μισθός) for zeal will be received by those who would correct drunkards. Basil himself will analogically reenact the scene by thrusting the spear of a single pious refutation through both Aetius and Eunomius.[236] This last use allows Basil to level the charges of

[229] Naz. *Or.* 14.3, *Or.* 18.24; *Numbers* 25:6–15, esp. 11–13.
[230] Naz. *Or.* 15.9.
[231] Naz. *Or.* 16.20: γενοῦ μοι Μωσῆς ἢ Φινεὲς σήμερον.
[232] Bas. *Adversus Eunomium* I, 29.500–501.
[233] Bas. *Ep.* 46.1 (to a fallen virgin).
[234] Nyss. *De vita Moysis* 1.32, 2.136 (δικαστὴς ἅμα καὶ δήμιος); cp. *De anima et resurrectione* 38.
[235] Bas. *Adversus eos qui irascuntur (Hom. 10)* 31.368.
[236] Bas. *In ebriosos* 31.464; *Adversus Eunomium* I, 29.500–501.

impiety and heresy against those antagonists, but perhaps also to imply unseemly sexual relations between teacher and student.

Nyssen has similar uses for Phinehas' anger (θυμός). It is laudable because it is ordered to what is superior (πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον) and shows how piety may justly punish intemperance (ἀκολασία).[237] Sinfulness is likened to Zimri, the promiscuous Israelite man, and baptism to Phinehas.[238]

Other passages suggest that 'Phinehas' may have become something of a family nickname for Basil. Picking up, presumably, on Basil's own self-description in his polemic against Eunomius, the letter to Nyssen from their brother Peter of Sebasteia exhorts him to "imitate your real father [i.e. Basil], who, like Phinehas the zealot, with the single thrust of his refutation pierced the student together with the teacher."[239] Nyssen runs with it, too, calling Basil "Phinehas' true zealot (ὁ κατ' ἀλήθειαν τοῦ Φινεὲς ζηλωτής)." But instead of emphasising the disputational slaughter of both pupil and master, Gregory takes the twofold function of his older brother's sword as being both the destruction of a heresy and the healing of a soul.[240]

Julian: Notably, starting from the same Scriptures, Julian agrees that Phinehas demonstrates zeal, precisely through the imitation of an angry God; he roundly rejects, of course, that this is anything virtuous.[241] The apostate emperor asserts that both Phinehas' zeal and God's general behaviour at Baal-Peor are unworthy of any gods. In fact, in this respect the Hebrew God is inferior both to pagan statesmen and to Julian himself.[242]

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[237] Nyss. *De anima et resurrectione* 38–39, *De vita Moysis* 2.140–141.
[238] Nyss. *In diem luminum* 240; cp. *Contra Eunomium* 1.1.86–88, where it is implied that Zimri is a type of all heresy or apostasy.
[239] Nyss. *Ep.* 30.4 (Petri epistula ad Gregorium).
[240] Nyss. *Contra Eunomium* 1.1.86–88: τὴν ἰατικὴν μὲν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀναιρετικὴν δὲ τῆς ἀσεβείας ἐπήγαγε μάχαιραν, τὴν ἀντίρρησιν λέγω τῆς βλασφημίας.
[241] Jul. *Contra Galilaeos* 171e–172a.
[242] Jul. *Contra Galilaeos* 160d–161a, 171de.

Summary: Phinehas is absent from our two early Christian sources, but zeal is unanimously assigned to Phinehas in the Cappadocian (and Julianic) corpora. Nazianzen is the only one to specify this by appeal to προαίρεσις. But all of these pastors are ready to apply his memorable image to moral, ecclesial, and dogmatic controversies—as well as, it seems, to peculiarly strong personalities within their families or circles of friends.

Rahab

In Nazianzen, "Rahab the prostitute (ἡ πόρνη)," so called in her first appearance in *Joshua*, shows up as a witness to the excellence of the virtue of φιλοξενία or **hospitality** "among **sinners** (ἐν δὲ ἁμαρτωλοῖς)," the counterpart to Lot amongst the just. "She was not a prostitute with respect to her principles (καὶ οὐ πόρνη τὴν προαίρεσιν), and because of her hospitality she was both praised and saved."[243]

Hospitality as a sinner (catalogue virtue): In all our authors, Rahab's epithet is ἡ πόρνη. In *1 Clement* she is this, but is also ἡ . . . φιλόξενος Ραὰβ, saved by both **faith** and hospitality: διὰ πίστιν καὶ φιλοξενίαν. Προφητεία is later added as another special mark.[244]

Other associations: The Rahab of *Hebrews* is saved from Jericho's destruction "by **faith** (πίστει)." While a causal participial clause nuances this and implies hospitality as a secondary virtue that both demonstrates and springs from the primary virtue of faith (δεξαμένη τοὺς κατασκόπους μετ' εἰρήνης), hospitality is nowhere mentioned as such.[245] Clement adds **hope**.[246]

[243] Naz. *Or.* 14.2; consistent with this is her depiction in *Carm.* 1.2.17 *Variorum vitae generum beatitudines* 37 (37.784). Cf. *Joshua* 2:1.
[244] *1 Clement* 12:1–8.
[245] *Hebrews* 11:31
[246] *1 Clement* 12:7.

Rahab occurs just once in Gregory of Nyssa. "In the city of God, Babylon is settled down and the prostitute Rahab is remembered," he writes in his commentary on the *Song of Songs,* alluding to the reference to Rahab in *Psalm* 86 (87): 4–5 as part of an argument about how all nations will belong to Zion and sinners will be redeemed, Rahab included: "the prostitute," says Nyssen, "becomes a virgin" in Jerusalem.[247] It is her movement from prostitution to a **renewed virginity** that he emphasizes, not hospitality.

In Basil's sole reference to Rahab, hospitality is not mentioned, and it is at best only present faintly and implicitly. Instead, she demonstrates a **legitimate use of trickery** in that she "practised wickedness nobly (καλῶς ἐπανουργεύσατο 'Ραάβ)," since she thereby "rescued the scouts" of Joshua.[248]

Summary: A range of virtues is associated with Rahab: noble trickery, conversion of life, prophecy, faith, and hospitality. Interestingly, in the only other oratorical mention that Nazianzen makes of her, he is emphatic that "only one thing justified Rahab the whore, and that was her hospitality. She wasn't praised for anything else."[249] If he has the *Hebrews* or Clementine passages in mind, he does not see them as contradicting this statement—nor, if he is aware of the other uses made of her by his peers, is he much impressed. Conversely, amongst the Cappadocians, he is the only one to emphasize her φιλοξενία. He might have blushed to find himself alone, as it were, with the explicitly hospitable Rahab.

[247] Nyss. *In Canticum canticorum* II, 49.
[248] Bas. *Homilia in principium proverbiorum* 31.411–412.
[249] Naz. *Or.* 40.19: Ῥαὰβ τὴν πόρνην ἓν ἐδικαίωσε μόνον, ἡ φιλοξενία, τἆλλα οὐκ ἐπαινουμένην.

Samuel

In the *Oratio* 18 catalogue, Samuel shows "oracular **prophecy** and foresight (τὸ χρηματίσαι, βλέπων πρὸς τὸ ἔμπροσθεν)," as he does in the Biblical books bearing his name.[250] Elsewhere Gregory makes Basil imitate Samuel in standing tall amongst the holy, both **uncowed by royal power**.[251] Though of **humble origins**, he is a **leader** who anoints royalty[252] but can also reproach the assembled people.[253] He is consecrated by his prayerful mother to be **holy** or **pure** (ἱερός, ἁγνός) from his conception or birth.[254] Samuel offers **intercessory prayer and sacrifice** (προσευχόμενος, προθυόμενος) for the people.[255] In direct contradiction to the sense I find in *1 Samuel* 15:24–35, Nazianzen makes him an exemplar of swift and thorough **forgiveness**.[256]

Prophecy: Both Basil and Nyssen recall Samuel's gift of prophecy.[257]

Leadership: Eulogizing Basil, Nyssen places his brother in the long line of virtuous men of God, including Samuel. There Samuel models good governance, securing obedience (τὸ ὑπήκοον) from the people and their abstention from non-Israelite marriages amidst anarchy and "democratic confusion," and becoming a νομοθέτης by anointing a king.[258] Basil himself takes Samuel as an exemplary and beloved leader, much mourned at his passing.[259] In correspondence, Basil accordingly urges Athanasius to "put forward

[250] Naz. *Or.* 18.24; a seer again at 43.26. In the Old Testament, e.g. *1 Samuel* 2:27–35, 3:19–21.
[251] Naz. *Or.* 43.52. Valens plays a delinquent Saul (*1 Samuel* 19:20).
[252] Naz. *Or.* 33:10 (from lowly Ramah); 43.73; *Carm.* 1.2.1 *In laudem virginitatis* 319 (37.546).
[253] Naz. *Or.* 42.19 (as Gregory does the assembled bishops).
[254] Naz. *Or.* 2.49, 40.17; *Carm.* 1.2.1 *In laudem virginitatis* 319 (37.546); *Carm.* 1.2.10 *De virtute* 535–539 (37.718–719); *Anth. Pal.* VIII, 27 [= *Epitaph.* 68.4–5 (*PG* 38.46)].
[255] Naz. *Or.* 2.88.
[256] Naz. *Carm.* 1.2.25 *Adversus iram* 197–201 (37.827–828).
[257] Bas. *Enarratio in prophetam Isaiam* 1.8 (*PG* 30.132); Nyss. *In Canticum canticorum* VII, 217.
[258] Nyss. *In Basilium fratrem* 112.
[259] Bas. *In Barlaam* 31.484 (possibly spurious, 31.11).

some means of relief, become a Samuel for the churches, feel the pain of the struggling people."[260]

Holy from birth: Basil has Samuel as the pious fruit of Hannah's fasting.[261] For Nyssen, Ephraim is like Samuel in being dedicated to God from infancy and in hearing God's call.[262] Basil and Samuel are both the fruit of pious parents, though in fulfilling a father's wish rather than a mother's, Basil rivals and may slightly outdo Samuel, just as he does in combating heresies rather than those who mingle Israelite and foreign blood.[263]

Other associations: A **faith-hero** in *Hebrews*, but not elsewhere, Samuel does not appear in *1 Clement*.[264] Samuel is in one of Gregory of Nyssa's virtue–exemplar lists, where he specialises in **severity** (ἀκρίβεια).[265] Basil uses him in a similar vein to illustrate **righteous anger**.[266] Elsewhere in Nyssen it is **piety** and **reliance on God** that make Samuel stand out.[267] Rather than being one who forgives, even Samuel, while great, is also fallen and in need of forgiveness.[268] Finally, Basil sees him modelling the **renunciation of worldly goods**.[269]

Summary: The Cappadocians agree in seeing Samuel as a prophetic leader. In spite of a consensus on the holiness of his birth, Nazianzen is the only one to emphasize its lowliness. He is also unique in stressing his intercessory prayer and forgiveness. Basil and

[260] Bas. *Ep*. 66.1 (to Athanasius).
[261] Bas. *De ieiunio II*, 6 (31.193).
[262] Nyss. *In sanctum Ephraim* 46.844. Samuel's and Christ's nativities compared: *Oratio in diem natalem Christi* 252–253, *Contra usurarios* 200. Not only saints imitate Samuel; in a very different way, demons "act out his words" and "imitate" him at the witch's behest: *De pythonissa* 106.
[263] Nyss. *In Basilium fratrem* 125.
[264] *Hebrews* 11:32.
[265] Nyss. *In Meletium* 449–450.
[266] Bas. *Adversus eos qui irascuntur (Hom. 10)* 31.368.
[267] Nyss. *In Inscriptiones Psalmorum* I, cap. 4, 37; II, cap. 5, 106.
[268] Nyss. *De oratione dominica* V, 302.
[269] Bas. *Sermo asceticus et exhortatio* 31.628.

his brother, for their part, tend to emphasize a severity less evident in their friend from Nazianzus.

*David**[270]

In Nazianzen's *Oratio* 14 as well as *Oratio* 18, David is an exemplar of **mildness** (πραότης), justified in the former by his prayer in the *Psalms* that the Lord remember him for as much.[271] In *Oratio* 14 he is also an exemplar of **self-restraint or continence** (ἐγκρατεία) for his refusal to drink water drawn from the well behind enemy lines, lest the blood of those who drew it be on his hands.[272]

Mildness (catalogue virtue): Basil frequently mentions David in connection with mildness (πραότης, πραΰτης).[273] This is "the greatest of the virtues," and Basil quotes the line on David from the same psalm mentioned by Nazianzen.[274] In Basil's epistolary catalogue to Nazianzen, David combines being great-hearted or righteously spirited (μεγαλόθυμος) and noble (γενναῖος) in war, with being immovable (ἀκίνητος) and gentle regarding vengeance.[275] He endures Shimei's insults gently (πράως).[276]

In his Meletian catalogue Nyssen pairs David with πραότης, which he elsewhere calls a mark of divine beauty, along with justice.[277] Nyssen also justifies this with allusions to

[270] As noted, the asterisk (*) indicates an exemplar for whom I have only corroborated catalogue references, but to whose appearances I have not applied what I am calling the exhaustive method. See above, 186–187. I have applied the corroborative method to David, Elijah, Job, John the Baptist, Jesus, Peter, and Paul, and the exhaustive method to the other thirteen Biblical exemplars.
[271] Naz. *Or.* 14.2, 18.24; *Psalm* 131:1 (132:1).
[272] Naz. *Or.* 14.3; *2 Samuel* 23:15–17.
[273] Bas. *Enarratio in prophetam Isaiam* 1.52 (*PG* 30.213).
[274] Bas. *Homilia in Psalmum 33*, 29.356–7, quoting *Psalm* 131:2 (132:1).
[275] Bas. *Ep.* 2.3 (to Nazianzen); *Enarratio in prophetam Isaiam* 1.52 (*PG* 30.213). But Basil's letters often show David not acting πράως (e.g. *Ep.* 130.2, 160.1, where metaphorical wartime seems to call forth his μεγαλοθυμία).
[276] Bas. *Adversus eos qui irascuntur* (*Hom.* 10) 31.364.
[277] Nyss. *In Meletium* 449; Nyss. *In Canticum canticorum* XV, 444–445.

David's performance in war, emphasizing the firmness of gentleness, as it were.[278] Though without any illustrating example, David's πραότης is once swiftly followed by μακροθυμία towards enemies.[279]

Other associations: David shows faith in *Hebrews*.[280] In *1 Clement*, David is a **victim of envy** (Saul's) and a man after God's heart who **confesses and repents** of his sins. **Humility** (τὸ ταπεινόφρον) and **submission** (τὸ ὑποδεές) are attributed to all of Clement's chosen exemplars, at least in chapters 16–18, but as David and his psalm of confession conclude the series and immediately precede the naming of these virtues, they are especially pronounced in his characterization.[281]

Summary: David's mildness can be corroborated across the corpora. The same is not true of his other Nazianzenian catalogue-virtue, self-restraint or continence, even though it is kindred to virtues highlighted by Nazianzen's peers. Considering David's various virtues in *1 Clement*, to say nothing of his prominent role in Scripture, an application of the exhaustive method would surely yield many other ethically exemplarist uses in the Cappadocians.

Solomon

Solomon's catalogue virtue is **understanding** (σύνεσις) in Nyssen's tribute to Meletius, and he appears elsewhere in Nyssen with the epithet **ὁ σοφός**, generally when introducing a quote from the wisdom literature.[282] Forms of both words occur in his prayer

[278] Nyss. *De beatitudinibus* 2, 44.1213.
[279] Nyss. *In ascensionem Christi* 327.
[280] *Hebrews* 11:32 (possibly also escaping the sword at 11:34).
[281] *1 Clement* 4:13, 18, 19:1; also 52:2.
[282] Nyss. *In Meletium* 449 and *In Flacillam* 467; *De hominis opificio* 19 (44.197).

or God's answer in *1 Kings*.[283] Once, Nyssen quotes him in praise of wisdom personified in a very extraordinary place: Solomon's hundreds of wives or concubines are quietly overlooked and he is made to exhort the reader to **virginity**.[284]

Understanding & wisdom (catalogue virtue): Basil nowhere associates σύνεσις as such with Solomon, but like his brother, Basil almost always gives him the epithet ὁ σοφός, or even σοφώτατος.[285] As in Basil and Nyssen, he is tied to wisdom in Nazianzen as "made wise beyond all other men, whether before him or in his time (ὁ σοφισάμενος περισσὰ ὑπὲρ πάντας τοὺς γενομένους ἔμπροσθεν καὶ καθ' ἑαυτόν)."[286]

Other associations: Solomon is not in either of Gregory Nazianzen's oratorical catalogues, and is likewise omitted from both *Hebrews* 11 and *1 Clement*. Basil says that the episode with the *mater incerta* is recalled to show that it was the divine wisdom's notions of **justice** within Solomon that allowed him to judge justly.[287]

Nazianzen alone emphasizes Solomon's famous sins, and he does so repeatedly. Solomon is the only one of the list of Scriptural greats in the opening of Nazianzen's eulogy for Athanasius from whom the bishop of Alexandria is said to learn "up to a point (λέγω . . . τὸν Σολομῶντα μέχρι τινὸς)," but not more.[288] Solomon's **philandery** is doubtless the limit. It is the object of a *praeteritio* in Nazianzen's eulogy for Basil, and shows that even one who is initially σοφός can turn out κάκιστος. But even when his philandery is recalled, he is remembered for "largeness of heart" (**πλάτος καρδίας**), wisdom (σοφία), and **contemplation** (θεωρία) (compare this to the φρόνησις, σοφία, and

[283] *1 Kings* 3:5–14.
[284] Nyss. *De virginitate* XX, 327.
[285] Bas. e.g. *Adversus Eunomium* I, 29.537; *Regulae brev.* resp. 67 (31.1130), 113 (31.1158).
[286] Naz. *Or.* 28.21; cf. 20.5, 43.73. The diction recalls *1 Kings* 5:11 (where Solomon **ἐσοφίσατο ὑπὲρ πάντας** τοὺς ἀνθρώπους) and 3:12 (where God says to Solomon, ἰδοὺ δέδωκά σοι καρδίαν φρονίμην καὶ σοφήν, ὡς σὺ οὐ **γέγονεν ἔμπροσθέν** σου καὶ μετὰ σὲ οὐκ ἀναστήσεται ὅμοιός σοι).
[287] Bas. *In principium proverbiorum* 31.404.
[288] Naz. *Or.* 21.3.

χύμα καρδίας attributed to Solomon in Scripture).[289] His wise words stand in spite of his ultimate fall (τὴν τελευταίαν παράπτωσιν).[290] One should heed (πειστέον) what he says, for his advice is beneficial (ὠφέλιμος . . . ἡ παραίνεσις).[291]

Julian: Solomon is mocked for being called the wisest (σοφώτατος) of the Israelites while failing to be at all comparable to Greek wise men like Phocylides or Theognis or Isocrates. He must be an *unwise* hedonist who slips into idolatry because he is "deceived by a woman (ὑπὸ γυναικὸς ἠπατήθη)." Or, adds Julian in a provocative alternative, Solomon is indeed wise and it is no such delusion that led him to worship, but precisely his good judgement and deep understanding (κρίσις, σύνεσις).[292]

Summary: Solomon's Nyssenian catalogue virtue of understanding (σύνεσις), if we take σοφία or θεωρία as adequate proxies, is thus found throughout the Cappadocians. Nyssen's association of Solomon with virginity is isolated. But he and his older brother both seem loath to call attention to the great contradiction in Solomon's life, one which Nazianzen feels a duty to recall: that the builder of the great Temple and the wise minister of God's justice should be a wreck of a family man and a practical apostate. Julian relishes both of Solomon's most famous associations, using them to set up a polemical dilemma.

*Elijah**

In Nazianzen's *Oratio* 14 catalogue Elijah is an exemplar of three virtues or virtuous practices. The first is **zeal** (ζῆλος), due to his fidelity amidst widespread apostasy. Nazianzen himself quotes *1 Kings*: "I have been zealous with zeal for the Lord (ζηλῶν

[289] Naz. *Or.* 43.73; cp. 1 *Kings* 4:29, as well as πλάτος καρδίας at 2:35a; Solomon's downgrading at *Carm.* 1.2.1 *In laudem virginitatis* 496–497 (37.559).
[290] Naz. *Or.* 30.2.
[291] Naz. *Or.* 40.14; cf. 40.27.
[292] Jul. *Contra Galilaeos* 224c–e.

ἐζήλωκα τῷ Κυρίῳ).”[293] Second is **solitude and quiet** (ἐρημία καὶ ἡσυχία), shown by Elijah’s sojourn on Carmel, where he heard the voice of God.[294] Third is **simplicity or thrift** (εὐτέλεια), shown by Elijah’s decision to stay at the home of a poor widow.[295]

Zeal (catalogue virtue): Basil’s Elijah, as ὁ ζηλωτής, defeats the priests of Baal.[296] Gregory Nyssen recalls Elijah “in the zeal of faith (ἐν τῷ ζήλῳ τῆς πίστεως)” in the major catalogue for Meletius.[297]

Solitude and simple living (catalogue virtues): Basil also depicts Elijah as a lover of the contemplative life in the wilderness.[298] Nazianzen’s catalogued Elijah, with his thrift and isolation, is at least implicitly ascetical, while Basil’s is more explicitly so: he endures an extended ἀσιτία (and is one of a great number of exemplars sporting leathern clothes). Yet Basil makes the moderating point that Elijah (and Jesus and Moses) each practised a great fast only once.[299] Elijah is a practitioner of holy poverty.[300] Nyssen also says that Elijah lived as a hermit (ἰδιαστής), relatively close to Nazianzen’s solitude and quiet, in “scorn for the care of the body (ἐν ὑπεροψίᾳ τῆς θεραπείας τοῦ σώματος),” right down to the clothes of animal hides.[301] He is ascetical in *1 Clement*, taking his place among those who “walked about in goatskins and sheepskins announcing Christ’s coming,” and is used to show humility and submission in that context.[302] This could be the same as the εὐτέλεια employed by Nazianzen, illustrated differently.

[293] Naz. *Or.* 14.3, quoting 1 Kings 19:14.
[294] Naz. *Or.* 14.4; see 1 Kings 18:42.
[295] Naz. *Or.* 14.4; see 1 Kings 17:9–24.
[296] Bas. *Homilia adversus eos qui irascuntur* 31.368; imitated as such by Gordius, *In Gordium* 31.496.
[297] Nyss. *In Meletium episcopum* 449.
[298] Bas. *Ep.* 42.5 (to Chilo); *Enarratio in prophetam Isaiam*, Prologue, 6–7 (*PG* 30.129).
[299] Bas. *Constitutiones asceticae* 4.7 (31.1357); *Regulae fus.* resp. 23 (31.981).
[300] Bas. *Enarratio in prophetam Isaiam* 3.122 (*PG* 30.316).
[301] Nyss. *In Basilium fratrem* 112–113; also a major comparison with Elijah in other respects at 15–18. More ascesis at *In Canticum canticorum* XV, 452.
[302] *Hebrews* 11:35; *1 Clement* 17:1.

Julian: Elijah is made to be a violator of the law in sacrificing on Mount Carmel instead of Jerusalem.[303] Yet he sees God (apparently even face to face, more than *1 Kings* 19:9 sqq. gives him), and in this he outdoes Jesus.[304]

Summary: While the widow of Zarephath shows faith in *Hebrews*, Elijah himself does not appear there, nor is his zeal emphasized in that text or in *1 Clement*. But, allowing for generous periphrasis, the catalogue virtues Nazianzen assigns to Elijah are found across the Cappadocian corpora.

*Job**

Job is included in Nazianzen's *Oratio* 18 catalogue, where he shows **unconquered endurance or patience** in misfortune (τὸ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καρτερικὸν καὶ ἀνάλωτον)."[305] While this is evident in the eponymous book, I do not find either of the operative adjectives there; most notably they are absent from his initial characterization.[306]

Endurance or patience: Basil seems to mean something similar when he writes about exemplarism to Nazianzen, but there he describes Job's preeminent virtue with a different name: courage (ἀνδρεία), one of the cardinal four.[307] The same courage or manful spirit Basil sees in Job is elsewhere explained as either ὑπομονή or in terms of endurance close to Nazianzen's (τὴν ἀνδρείαν ἐπιδεικνύμενος τῷ ἐγκαρτερεῖν τοῖς δυσφορωτάτοις πάθεσιν). In the latter locus, however, Job's manful silence is invoked only for the afflicted man to break it by his righteous speech against his friends, silence and then

[303] Jul. *Contra Galilaeos* 351d, 324cd.
[304] Jul. *Contra Galilaeos* frag. 2.
[305] Naz. *Or.* 18.24.
[306] *Job* 1:1.
[307] Bas. *Ep.* 2.3 (to Nazianzen).

reprimand being used together to justify Basil's epistolary rebuke of Eustathius.[308] In a lavish and gory reimagining of the scene of the death of Job's children, Gregory of Nyssa turns the patriarch into a teacher of patience and courage (ὑπομονή and ἀνδρεία)—the same virtues his brother had highlighted in Job—for the bereaved Theodosius and Flacilla.[309]

Other associations to explore: *Hebrews* passes over Job, but his mention in *1 Clement*, while terse, is packed with virtues other than the patience ascribed him in Nazianzen's list. Clement has him, in a slight re-ordering of the words of *Job* 1:1, as "just and blameless, truthful, pious, and abstentious from all evil (δίκαιος καὶ ἄμεμπτος, ἀληθινός, θεοσεβής, ἀπεχόμενος ἀπὸ παντὸς κακοῦ)," and notes that in spite of this he still declares that he is unclean, thereby showing humility and submission.[310] Job appears somewhat before the principal catalogue in Nyssen's oration for Meletius, but his virtues there, transposed onto the deceased bishop, are those of *Job* and *1 Clement*. Nyssen arranges them in yet a different order, so it is unclear whether Clement is an intermediating influence.[311]

Summary: We can confirm that all the Cappadocians saw Job as a figure of endurance. It would be worth seeing whether any of the other virtues which Nyssen draws from *Job* 1 and *1 Clement* 17 and 19 are taken up in Basil and Nazianzen.

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[308] Bas. *Ep.* 212.2 (to Hilarius), *Regulae brev.* resp. 262 (31.1260); *Ep.* 223.1 (to Eustathius of Sebasteia). Elsewhere Job teaches philosophy, distinguishing οὐσία from ὑπόστασις (*Ep.* 38, to Nyssen) and, being righteous, may provide Basil with a contrast to the octopus or squid (πολύπους), a fickle and pliable operator: *In Hexaemeron VII*, 3 (29.153–156), where, however, the editors note that his description as ἄπλαστος instead confirms other MSS that have *Ἰακώβ* rather than *Ἰώβ* (cf. *Genesis* 25:27).
[309] Nyss. *Oratio consolatoria in Pulcheriam* 470.
[310] *1 Clement* 17:3–4, 19:1. *Job* 1:1 has ἀληθινός, ἄμεμπτος, δίκαιος, θεοσεβής, ἀπεχόμενος ἀπὸ παντὸς πονηροῦ πράγματος. All the exemplars in the context show humility and submission; cf. *1 Clement* 16, 19:1.
[311] Nyss. *In Meletium* 445–6: Ἄμεμπτος, δίκαιος, ἀληθινός, θεοσεβής, ἀπεχόμενος ἀπὸ παντὸς πονηροῦ πράγματος.

Daniel

Daniel, absent from Nazianzen's virtue–exemplar catalogues, appears in both of Gregory Nyssen's with **σοφία** as his special mark, an association found in *Daniel* 1.[312] Nyssen additionally invokes his genuflection as an indication of **supplication** (ἱκεσία) and **humility** (ταπεινότης) in **intercessory prayer**.[313] Platonizing the ἀνὴρ ἐπιθυμιῶν of *Daniel* 10:11, he also recalls Daniel's **appetitive desire** as praiseworthy in a discussion of parts of the soul.[314] Nyssen calls him **divine** or divinely inspired (θεσπέσιος) when relating how his **endurance** (καρτερία) **of unjust persecution** in starvation was rewarded by God.[315] Similarly, providence even turned the Assyrian king into Daniel's benefactor.[316] Nyssen uses the language of **pedagogy** to describe how Daniel, Joseph, and others like them in handling dreams "were educated by divine power (θείᾳ δυνάμει . . . προεπαιδεύοντο)."[317]

Wisdom (catalogue virtue): Nazianzen takes his excellence in wisdom (σοφία) as "Daniel's great wonder (τὸ μέγα θαῦμα τοῦ Δανιήλ)."[318] Basil uses σοφός as an epithet for Daniel, too.[319]

Prayer: For Basil, he who does not seek God out with continous industrious prayer will not be ranked with Daniel.[320]

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[312] Nyss. *In Meletium* 449; σοφὸς Δανιὴλ at *Contra Eunomium* 2.1.322, *idem* at 2.1.331. Cf. *Daniel* 1:17.
[313] Nyss. *Adversus Macedonianos de Spiritu sancto* 112.
[314] Nyss. *Dialogus de anima et resurrectione* 38, Gregory speaking: Τῷ τε γὰρ Δανιὴλ ἔπαινος ἦν ἡ ἐπιθυμία. See also 46 (Macrina).
[315] Nyss. *In XL martyres II* 164. Cf. Nyss. *De beneficentia* 98, alluding to Habbakuk's aerial visit.
[316] Nyss. *In XL martyres II* 168 (εὐεργέτης).
[317] Nyss. *De hominis opificio* 13 (44.172).
[318] Naz. *Or.* 28.11.
[319] Bas. *Ad adolescentes* III.4.
[320] Bas. *Prooem. Reg. fus.* 31.897: Πῶς μετὰ τοῦ Δανιήλ, ὁ μὴ μετ' ἐγκρατείας διηνεκοῦς καὶ δεήσεως φιλοπόνου τὸν Θεὸν ἐκζητήσας;

Divine inspiration and education: Daniel and Joseph are paired in Basil, as they were in Nyssen, to comment on divine illumination, though without educational connotations; things are merely "shown (ἐδείκνυτο)" to them in visions.[321]

Endurance of persecution rewarded: Clement highlights the vice of having no fear before God by blasting those "hateful and thoroughly wicked men (στυγητοὶ καὶ πάσης κακίας πλήρεις)" who cast Daniel into the pit; Daniel is by implication a righteous and wrongly persecuted man of God.[322] Like his brother (and Clement), Basil highlights his persecution and God's providence for him throughout it.[323] In Nazianzen's telling, Daniel, while still in the pit, showed the endurance (καρτερία) that Basil imitated, and faced struggles or contests (ἆθλοι) which the Maccabean martyrs would later echo.[324]

Other associations: Daniel's **faith** shuts the lions' mouths in *Hebrews*, our only locus for that virtue in connection with him.[325] Nyssen does not develop why he thinks Daniel's desires (ἐπιθυμίαι) are praiseworthy, but his brother may provide a clue. Basil has him as among the exemplars of fasting as a means of taming bodily desires.[326] Daniel, for Basil, is a man of many virtues: "the man of desires, having mastered his belly, **ruled** over the king of the Chaldeans, becoming a **purifier** of idols and destroyer of the dragon, the **teacher** of lions (λεόντων παιδαγωγὸς), who foretold God's incarnation and interpreted hidden mysteries."[327] In contrast to almost all modern Bible translations, which for ἀνὴρ ἐπιθυμιῶν or the Vulgate's *vir desideriorum* generally offer something like the King James Version's "a man greatly beloved," Basil, like Nyssen, takes the phrase as

[321] Bas. *Enarratio in prophetam Isaiam*, Prologue, 4 and 6 (*PG* 30.125, 128).
[322] *1 Clement* 45:6.
[323] Bas. *Ep.* 42.5 (to Chilo).
[324] Naz. *Or.* 43.74, 15.11. Surviving the lion's pit is how he most commonly appears in the orations and the poems; see Demoen (1996) 401.
[325] *Hebrews* 11:33.
[326] Bas. *Enarratio in prophetam Isaiam* 1.31 (*PG* 30.181).
[327] Bas. *Sermo asceticus et exhortatio* 31.641.

indicating the desires within Daniel's soul, rather than external to him as a sign of others' (or one big Other's) favour. This allows them to develop a portrait grounded in Platonic anthropology. Basil also notes Daniel's **self-mastery** (ἐγκράτεια).[328]

Whereas Nyssen hints at Daniel's special experience of education, his is a divine curriculum. By contrast, Basil plainly declares Daniel to be an exemplar of the man who takes the best of **secular learning** and **turns it to the service of God**, a role we have seen Abraham performing with the Chaldeans (Nazianzen) and especially Moses with the Egyptians (Basil, Nyssen, and, at least faintly, Nazianzen).[329] He is not a hero of παιδεία for Nazianzen as he was for Basil and (at least by implication) for Nyssen.

Daniel's wisdom is implicit in the *Daniel* 13 story, recalled by Nazianzen, by which he was made a **judge** (κριτής) in his youth. But, cautions Gregory, the divine favour shown him there does not mean that every young man should think himself a judge.[330] Basil also draws on the Susannah incident to indicate that a youth may be deemed wise—"gray in wisdom (πόλιος δὲ τὴν φρόνησιν)"—and **more just** (δικαιότερος) than his intemperate elders. He does not emphasise the judicial function highlighted by Nazianzen, but rather his place amongst elders (τὸ πρεσβυτέριον).[331] But Nazianzen does hail him as the unnamed **δίκαιος** being rescued from lions by a pre-incarnate Christ.[332]

Summary: Daniel's Nyssenian catalogue virtue, wisdom, is well attested in his brother's and his friend's corpora. So, too, is his experience of persecution and divine

[328] Bas. *Prooem. Reg. fus.* 31.897.
[329] Bas. *Ad adolescentes* III.4: Παραπλησίως δὲ τούτῳ [sc. Μωϋσῇ], κἀν τοῖς κάτω χρόνοις, τὸν σοφὸν Δανιὴλ ἐπὶ Βαβυλῶνός φασι τὴν Χαλδαίων σοφίαν καταμαθόντα, τότε τῶν θείων ἅψασθαι παιδευμάτων. The same epithet recurs, e.g. *Adversus Eunomium* I, 29.545.
[330] *Or*. 39.14; cp. 41.14; *Carm.* 2.1.12 *De seipso et de episcopis* 419 (37.1196).
[331] Bas. *Enarratio in prophetam Isaiam* 3.104 (*PG* 30.288); likewise he shows φρόνησις and σύνεσις but is not called κριτής in *In principium proverbiorum* 31.413.
[332] Naz. *Or*. 24.10; cf. 18.30 and *Carm.* 1.2.2 *Praecepta ad virgines* 181 (37.592) for the miracle meal courtesy of God and Habakkuk in *Daniel* 14.

protection, found also in Clement.[333] While prayer is found with Daniel in both Nyssen and Basil—and in the former is specified in terms of humility, supplication, and intercession—Basil does not elaborate on it, and instead couples it with the less contemplative virtue of self-mastery. Nyssen's appeal to the man's desires is terse, allowing the discussion of philosophical anthropology at that locus to advance, but Basil supplies some of what may inform that discussion. Daniel's education is more divisive for the two brothers: both can agree that he is illuminated by God, but Nyssen highlights this as a kind of tutelage, whereas for Basil, it is from the secular world that Daniel draws his learning, before offering it to God—who then apparently appoints him as a tutor for lions. In general, Nazianzen has the least of the three to say about him, but presents him as a judge and a just man, seconded in this latter point by Basil. *Hebrews'* emphasis on his faith is not reprised anywhere else in our set.

A Cappadocian catalogue of New Testament heroes

*John the Baptist**

For Gregory of Nazianzus, John the Baptist shares two of Elijah's hallmarks: **solitude and quiet** (ἐρημία καὶ ἡσυχία), and **simplicity or thrifty living** (ἡ εὐτέλεια), for his camel-hair clothing, traits suggested by his appearances early in *Matthew* and *Luke*.[334]

Basil draws on John's wilderness asceticism, but when he does so, he emphasizes his **diet** and his **bold preaching of repentance** rather than solitude and quiet.[335] Gregory Nyssen has John in his Meletian catalogue as "lofty" (ὑψηλὸς) and living "in

[333] His justice is at least implicit in his persecution by the unjust at *1 Clement* 45; the same could be said of Nyssen.
[334] Naz. *Or*. 14.4; *Luke* 1:80, *Matthew* 3:4.
[335] Bas. *Ep*. 42.5 (to Chilo).

mortification of the body (ἀφθορία τοῦ σώματος)," the latter being the closest we come to Nazianzen's εὐτέλεια.[336] Other exemplarist passages recall his desert sojourn, and note, as Basil did, his bold exhortations to repentance. Although Nyssen mentions John trading "inhabited parts" for the desert, he does not emphasise this as a particularly solitary time for the great forerunner, who seems no sooner to quit town life than he returns to it.[337]

New Testament saints are very few in *Hebrews* 11 and *1 Clement*, and John the Baptist is not one of them.

Summary: While virtues not unrelated to those found in Nazianzen's lists also occur in the other Cappadocians' depictions of John, the catalogue virtues themselves are not stressed. To round out our picture, it would be worth pursuing through Nazianzen's corpus the several virtues which Basil and Nyssen do mention.

*Jesus**

Jesus is made the exemplar of some twelve virtues or virtuous practices in Nazianzen's *Oratio* 14: solitude and quiet (ἐρημία καὶ ἡσυχία), humility (ταπεινοφροσύνη), poverty and contempt for wordly goods (ἀκτημοσύνη καὶ χρημάτων ὑπεροψία), patient endurance (μακροθυμία), clemency or love of mankind (φιλανθρωπία), brotherly love (φιλαδελφία), meekness (πραότης), zeal (ζῆλος), mortification of the body (ὑποπιασμὸς σώματος), prayer in general and vigils in particular (προσευχὴ καὶ ἀγρυπνία), purity and virginity (ἁγνεία καὶ παρθενία), and love or charity (ἀγάπη).[338]

[336] Nyss. *In Meletium* 449–550.
[337] Nyss. *In sanctum Ephraim* 46.844; *In Basilium fratrem* 113, 120.
[338] Or. 14.4, through the end of the table.

Solitude and quiet: In a letter from Basil to a disciple, Christ is one of several solitude-loving exemplars, being a "friend of the wilderness (ὁ τῆς ἐρήμου φίλος)." It is, moreover, outside of the city that Jesus "prayed, thus teaching us to pray (προσηύχετο ἡμᾶς διδάσκων προσεύχεσθαι)."[339]

Humility: Jesus introduces *1 Clement*'s theme of humility and submission, and is the foremost of the humble (ταπεινοφρονούντων). The paradoxes of his greatness and lowliness occupy a chapter in that early Christian letter, which ends with an exemplarist exhortation to imitate the model (ὁ ὑπογραμμός) of Christ's humble-mindedness.[340] In a Basilian exhortation to the ascetic life we also find the Christ-exemplar associated chiefly with the process of being humbled or becoming humble, which just is the imitation of Christ (ταπείνωσις Χριστοῦ μίμησις).[341] Nyssen, too, emphasizes Christ as ταπεινός.[342]

Poverty and contempt for worldly goods: In Basil, Christ's call requires the abandonment of worldly hopes, be they many or few: a visitor to Caesarea quotes a conversation with Basil in which the saint has Jesus endorse a minimal wardrobe, with not even a single extra cloak, for the sake of monastic ἀκτημοσύνη.[343] Without using the same words as Nazianzen, Nyssen highlights the poverty of Jesus in the Incarnation (τί πτωχότερον . . . ; τί ταπεινότερον . . . ;). Nyssen makes ἀκτημοσύνη and χρημάτων ὑπεροψία an integral part of the heroic Christian life.[344]

Patient endurance: For Basil, teaching ὑπομονή is one of Jesus' central goals: he "was crucified to bring us to life and to coach us all for endurance and draw us to it (ὁ Σωτὴρ ἐσταυρώθη ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, ἵνα τῷ ἑαυτοῦ θανάτῳ ἡμᾶς ζωοποιήσῃ καὶ πάντας ἡμᾶς πρὸς τὴν

[339] Bas. *Ep.* 42.5 (to Chilo).
[340] *1 Clement* 16.
[341] Bas. *Sermo asceticus et exhortatio de renuntiatione mundi (11)* 31.648.
[342] Nyss. *In Canticum canticorum* IV, 126, quoting Μάθετε ἀπ' ἐμοῦ, ὅτι πρᾷός εἰμι καὶ ταπεινὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ (*Matthew* 11:29).
[343] Heraclides to Amphilochius, in Bas. *Ep.* 150.3.
[344] Nyss. *Orationes VIII de beatitudinibus* 1, 44.1201; *In Basilium* 133–134.

ὑπομονὴν ἀλείψῃ καὶ ἑλκύσῃ)."[345] Lexically even closer to Nazianzen's emphasis on long-suffering, Basil has Jesus showing both μακροθυμία and ταπεινοφροσύνη—in the context, for Paul to imitate in both life and death.[346] Nyssen teaches that Jesus, "through great long-suffering (ἐν πολλῇ μακροθυμίᾳ)," decided not to leave human nature permanently alienated from him, but to restore it to life.[347]

Brotherly love: Basil insists that brotherly love is not to be imperiously abused, and so recalls one of Jesus' injunctions (μὴ σπεύσῃς κελεῦσαι ἀδελφότητι).[348] More explicitly, he elsewhere names φιλαδελφία and justifies it by appeal to Jesus in the *Longer Rules*.[349]

Meekness and clemency or love of mankind: Basil links Jesus to πραότης and calls him φιλάνθρωπος, in a strongly imitative key, where the alternative in each instance is the imitation of a vice of the Devil or the Antichrist.[350] For Nyssen, meekness is, with humility, chief among Christ's virtues.[351] He also takes Jesus as "the lover of mankind (φιλάνθρωπος), our saviour"; it is φιλανθρωπία that effects the Incarnation.[352]

Mortification of the body: Without using the term ὑποπιασμὸς σώματος, Basil nonetheless defends ascetic scorn for the body by saying that monks are men who carry about in their bodies the dying of Jesus, and has Jesus enjoin fasting on believers in two discourses on the subject.[353] In Nyssen, scorning the body through hunger (τὸ πεινᾷν) is "most blessed" because Jesus did it.[354]

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[345] Bas. *Ep.* 42.5 (to Chilo). Basil's ἀλείφω is evocative of gymnastic training, being the act of anointing with oil for training or competing.
[346] Bas. *Liber de spiritu sancto* 15.35 (32.128–129); *Ep.* 150.3 (to Amphilochius from Heraclidas).
[347] Nyss. *Antirrheticus adversus Apolinarium* 221; cf. *De perfectione christiana* 196–7.
[348] Bas. *Sermo asceticus et exhortatio* 31.648. Cf. *Matthew* 20:25.
[349] Bas. *Regulae fus.* resp. 42 (31.1025).
[350] Bas. *Sermo asceticus et exhortatio* 31.648.
[351] Nyss. *In Canticum canticorum* IV, 126; see also above under humility.
[352] Nyss. *In sanctum Pascha* 9.248; *De perfectione christiana* 195.
[353] Bas. *Ep.* 223.2 (to Eustathius of Sebasteia) and 207.2 (to the clergy of Neocaesarea), using 2 *Cor.* 4:10; *De ieiunio I* and *II passim* but e.g. *De ieiunio I* 1.1–2 (31.164–165).
[354] Nyss. *Orationes VIII de beatitudinibus* 4, 44.1240.

Prayer and vigils: Quotes from the Gospels on Jesus' prayer and vigils (ἀγρυπνεῖτε οὖν . . .) illustrate one of Basil's precepts for monks.[355]

Purity and virginity: In one letter—whether implicitly suggesting a doctrine of divine simplicity, or merely speaking rhetorically—Basil actually identifies Jesus and God with continence (ἐγκράτεια δοκεῖ ὁ Θεὸς εἶναι . . . Ἰησοῦς ἐγκράτεια ἐφάνη . . .). There, self-control includes ἀφροδίσια, although it is emphatically not limited to such impulses.[356] Jesus addresses lust directly with his injunction of the *custodia oculorum*.[357] In *De virginitate* Jesus' conception shows that "only purity (καθαρότης) is adequate for welcoming the arrival and presence of God." The fullness of divinity shines in Christ "through his virginity."[358]

Love or charity: Finally, Jesus' ἀγάπη is expressed by his teaching on laying down one's life for a friend, and by his doing just that.[359] Christ is the "law-giver of patient endurance" and of loving (ἀγαπᾶν) one's enemies.[360]

Julian: Julian boasts of "making war on the *Chi* (πολεμῶ τῷ Χῖ)," i.e. on Christ, and Jesus' exemplarist depictions elsewhere in his corpus certainly serve that end.[361] In a letter, the emperor would have Alexandrians remember that Jesus contributed nothing to Egypt's greatness and that his followers are hated by the gods.[362] In the *Contra Galilaeos* Julian considers him a fraud and counterfeit, not a true son of God.[363] Julian seems to

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[355] Bas. *Moralia* def. 56, 31.784–785: Ὅτι δεῖ προσκαρτερεῖν ταῖς προσευχαῖς καὶ ταὶς ἀγρυπνίας; *Luke* 21:36.
[356] Bas. *Ep.* 366 (to Urbicius the Monk on Continence); Courtonne doubts the authenticity. The question of God's status as an exemplar considered apart from the Incarnation is a major one; I touch on it only briefly in Chapter 5 and in the Conclusion.
[357] Bas. *Sermo de contubernalibus* 30.816.
[358] Nyss. *De virginitate* II, 254.
[359] Bas. *Regulae brev.* resp. 186 (31.1206–1207) (teaching on laying down life); *Homilia de Spiritu sancto* 31.1437, quoting 2 *Cor.* 5:14.
[360] Nyss. *In sanctum Stephanum I* 88; more on Jesus' ἀγάπη *passim* but e.g. *In Canticum canticorum* XV, 461, there and elsewhere citing *Romans* 8:35–39.
[361] Jul. *Misopogon* 360d.
[362] Jul. *Ep.* 47 (to the Alexandrians).
[363] Jul. *Contra Galilaeos* 155c–e.

admit Jesus' miracles of healing but considers these provincial and insignificant: "as long as he lived he achieved nothing worth hearing about (ἐργασάμενος παρ' ὃν ἔζη χρόνον οὐδὲν ἀκοῆς ἄξιον)."[364] Politically, Jesus is Caesar's subject; to his own kinsmen he confers no benefit whatsoever, and they sensibly reject him.[365] Although he fasts, he gets nothing for his trouble, and cannot measure up even to Moses, whose law and monotheism he rejects.[366] Jesus is a poor lawgiver, since his commands (e.g. on selling everything) cannot be practised by everyone.[367] He approaches his fate as a miserable coward, afraid of death.[368]

Finally, like Moses, not only did Jesus fail to end sin, he made it worse—and here it gets personal for Julian—by inducing men to kill their fathers and their children.[369] In that connection, one of the more fascinating glimpses of the Jesus-exemplar in Julian's imagination occurs in the *Caesars*. There, Jesus is the tutelary deity to whom Constantine and sons go running at the competition's end. In Jesus' sole ethopoeia he bids all seducers, murderers, sacrilegious and other vile types to come to him and be washed clean, and to repeat the procedure if they prove to be repeat offenders. A kind of limitless forgiveness is thus attributed to Jesus, and for Julian it is a negative thing. Ultimately Jesus is unable to stop the avenging gods from punishing the Constantinians in his care.[370]

Summary: The theological argument of *Hebrews* places Jesus at its centre, but in *Hebrews* 11 he is more the object of faith than its subject, and so is not exactly an exemplar; yet the next chapter opens by setting the "cloud of witnesses" as spectators to our own race, which we are to run by looking at Jesus, who holds the whole event together

[364] Jul. *Contra Galilaeos* 191de.
[365] Jul. *Contra Galilaeos* 213a–c; cf. *Luke* 4:14–30.
[366] Jul. *Contra Galilaeos* frag. 2; 291a, 351a–d.
[367] Jul. *Contra Galilaeos* frag. 5.
[368] Jul. *Contra Galilaeos* frag. 4.
[369] Jul. *Contra Galilaeos* frag. 6.
[370] Jul. *Caesares* 336ab, with the inefficacious nature of baptism again at *Contra Galilaeos* 245cd.

and draws the athletes on.[371] The three Cappadocians, however, can agree: Jesus is an exemplar of humility, meekness, love of mankind, mortification of the body, endurance, purity and virginity, and agapaic love—more than half of the catalogue virtues Nazianzen gives us in *Oratio* 14. The odds improve slightly if we count poverty and contempt for worldy goods, a marginal case for Nyssen, who uses different words to show Christ's poverty, and uses Nazianzen's wording in a different context. Humility stands out as also being a central feature of his appearance in Clement.

Basil can be found associating almost all of these virtues with Jesus. No virtues are found in Nyssen's and Nazianzen's list but not in Basil, but Basil corroborates some for Nazianzen that Nyssen misses: solitude and quiet, prayer and vigils, and brotherly love. Nyssen has opportunities for mentioning Jesus when other Biblical greats are adduced to show the merits of trusting God in the silence of the desert or in solitude, but Jesus does not appear in them.[372] Brotherly love (τὸ φιλάδελφον), for Nyssen, should follow the love of God, and although where named this is not directly linked to Jesus' example in his earthly mission, in strongly mimetic contexts it is constitutive of becoming like God (Θεῷ οὖν ὅμοιος ἐγένου διὰ . . . τοῦ φιλάδελφος καὶ φιλάλληλος εἶναι).[373] Prayer, fasting, and sleepless vigilance feature in an important list of Nyssen's Christian virtues, but I have not found Jesus specifically connected to either prayer or vigils in his corpus.[374]

There is only one virtue I find on Nazianzen's list that I have not been able to find corroborated by his peers, whether directly or periphrastically: zeal. While ζῆλος occurs frequently (in positive and negative senses in Nyssen, for instance), it is not connected

[371] *Hebrews* 12:1–2.
[372] E.g. Nyss. *Adversus eos qui baptismum differunt* 368–369.
[373] Nyss. *De instituto christiano* 74. The mimetic context extends to the attribution to Nyssen of texts which are spurious: *De creatione hominis sermo primus* 36, *De creatione hominis sermo primus (recensio C)* 32a; on these two texts, see Mühlenberg and Maspero in *GNOO* and Dörrie's preface in *GNO suppl.* viii –ix.
[374] Nyss. *In sanctum Ephraim* 46.825; also at *De vita Gregorii Thaumaturgi* 20–21.

with Jesus.[375] This is the more peculiar given that there is a strong Scriptural prompt in that direction.[376]

If the Cappadocians disagree on when to brandish their 'W.W.J.D.?' bracelets,[377] the grounds will have to be sought in another study: here they agree on almost everything, and there can be no doubt that Jesus is the supreme exemplar for each of the three. Nyssen can speak for them in taking Jesus as "model and pattern (τύπος καὶ χαρακτήρ)" for all humanity.[378] "In himself," he writes, "he offered examples of all good forms of conduct (πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν πολιτευμάτων)."[379]

*Peter**

Nazianzen's catalogue commends Peter for **simplicity or thrift** (ἡ εὐτέλεια) due to his diet of lupines, an anecdotal report that has been traced to apocrypha.[380] In *Oratio* 18, possibly drawing on the Pentecostal preaching in *Acts* 2, Gregory adds "**eagerness in evangelization** (τὸ σύντονον τοῦ κηρύγματος)" as a distinguishing mark.[381]

Simplicity and thrift (catalogue virtue): Basil sees Peter as a poor man (πένης).[382] On the grounds that an angel told Peter to gird himself, Peter is made one of at least half a dozen exemplars of belt-wearing; however thrifty he may have been, Basil does not have

[375] Nyss. *In Basilium fratrem* 122–123; ζηλόω negatively at e.g. *De deitate adversus Evagrium* 334–5.
[376] *Psalm* 69:9, *John* 2:17: Ὁ ζῆλος τοῦ οἴκου σου καταφάγεταί με.
[377] The abbreviation for 'What would Jesus do?', a phrase with a colourful history in the nineteenth-century writings of Baptists and Christian socialists, but which, along with the wristbands, became ubiquitous in the youth groups of American Christianity in the 1990s.
[378] Nyss. *In diem luminum* 223–4.
[379] Nyss. *In Canticum canticorum* IV, 126.
[380] Vinson (2003) 41 traces it to the Pseudo-Clementine author's *Homily* 12.6.
[381] Naz. *Or.* 18.24; *Acts* 2:14–42.
[382] Bas. *Consolatoria ad aegrotum* 31.1720.

him economizing on this particular accoutrement.[383] Peter can be found in Nyssen as a lowly fisherman who is yet superior to all the senators of Rome.[384]

Eagerness in teaching (catalogue virtue): Basil has the Peter of *Acts* preaching boldly, although he does not stress this as his distinction.[385] In Nyssen he shows a missionary spirit (ἀποστολικὸν πνεῦμα) and prophecy, and even if there are more unconverted than converted after his preaching, he is not to blame.[386]

Other associations: Peter is absent from *Hebrews* 11, but Clement presents his predecessor at Rome as a victim of envy (ζῆλος ἄδικος) who endures suffering, persecution, and a martyr's death, for which he is glorified.[387]

Julian: Peter's reform of the Mosaic law is illicit, and he is untrustworthy.[388]

Summary: Peter's peculiar virtues in Nazianzen, neither of which are drawn from our early catalogues, are attested across the Cappadocians. If they disagree about this apostle, it will be on other points of his character or on where his example should be applied.

Zacchaeus

In one of Nazianzen's catalogues, Zacchaeus shows "**poverty and contempt for wordly goods** (ἀκτημοσύνη καὶ χρημάτων ὑπεροψία)." Gregory derives this from the fact that he "yielded nearly everything" (μικροῦ πάντα καρποφορήσας)" when Jesus came to

[383] Bas. *Regulae fus.* resp. 23 (31.981). The volume of exemplars deployed to support belt-wearing suggests that this may have been a source of grumbling amongst Basil's monks.
[384] Nyss. *Ep.* 17.11–14 (ad sacerdotes Nicomedienses).
[385] Bas. *Adversus Eunomium* V, 29.720, though probably spurious: Sesboüé *et al*. (1982) (*SC* 299) 61–64.
[386] Nyss. *In Basilium fratrem* 109; *Oratio catechetica magna* 75; drunk with the Gospel, *In Canticum canticorum* X, 309–310; a preacher and pillar of the church, ibid. XIV, 405, 419.
[387] *1 Clement* 5:4. Martyr's death by inverted crucifixion at Nyss. *Orationes VIII de beatitudinibus* 8 44.1299: τὸν ἐπὶ κεφαλὴν ἀνασκολοπισμὸν [δέχεται] ὁ μακάριος Πέτρος.
[388] Jul. *Contra Galilaeos* 314de, 351a.

him in *Luke* 19.[389] Elsewhere, speaking in favour of baptism, Nazianzen has him as a **magnanimous** or **generous-spirited convert** and wants his listener to "become" him (Γενοῦ Ζακχαῖος, ὁ χθὲς τελώνης, καὶ σήμερον μεγαλόψυχος).[390] In climbing the sycamore—symbolically leaving the earth for heaven—he kills off his worldly self in order to see Jesus prior to his acts of atonement.[391]

Conversion: Basil has Zacchaeus illustrate (over-) compensation for sin and wickedness, as well as the principle of atoning for one's injustices before receiving Christ at the altar (or, in the tax collector's case, at his house). Most generally, Basil says he shows conversion (μετάνοια).[392] Nyssen uses Zacchaeus to focus on this Christ-induced conversion (μεταβολὴ τοῦ βίου), but his framing is so vivid as to have Zacchaeus again slaying the tax collector in him, this time by his compensatory largesse (and with a different verb to that used by Nazianzen).[393] The thoroughness he shows is a reproach to the baptized but complacent, and his example supports Gregory's exhortation to swift and resolute baptism.[394]

Summary: Zacchaeus features in neither *Hebrews* 11 nor *1 Clement*. His catalogue-virtue of 'poverty and contempt for worldly goods' is not directly taken up by Nazianzen's peers. In spite of the fact that the dramatic return of his ill-gotten gains is always present in or behind Zacchaeus' Cappadocian appearances, Basil and Nyssen do not use this in support of their various arguments for asceticism, preferring to highlight the sincerity and

[389] Naz. *Or.* 14.4; *Luke* 19:1–9, esp. 8.
[390] Naz. *Or.* 40.31. He is a reproach to the complacent at *Carm.* 2.1.12 *De seipso et de episcopis* 457 sqq. (37.1199).
[391] Naz. *Or.* 20.4, and almost the same at 39.4, drawing on the death of the earthbound in *Colossians* 3:5, and with the same verb (νεκρόω). Compensation is the theme at *Carm.* 1.2.10 *De Virtute* 574–578 (37.721–722); Zacchaeus is third of a triad of famous tax-collectors, which Gregory would join as a quartet, *Carm.* 2.1.19 *Querela de suis calamitatibus* 93 (37.1278).
[392] Bas. *Regulae brev.* resp. 5 (31.1085) and 271 (31.1269); *Homilia de misericordia et iudicio* 31.1711.
[393] Nyss. *In diem luminum* 238: ὁρᾷς ὅπως καὶ ὁ Ζακχαῖος τῇ μεταβολῇ τοῦ βίου τὸν τελώνην ἀπέκτεινε πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ζημιωθέντας ἀδίκως τετραπλῆν ἐπανάγων τὴν ἀπόδοσιν. Matthew, "involved in the same trade (ὁμότεχνος)," "changed his life like some kind of mask (ὥσπερ τι προσωπεῖον ἤμειψε τὸν βίον)."
[394] Nyss. *Oratio catechetica magna* 104.

thoroughness of his conversion. Nazianzen is alone in highlighting the generous spirit or magnanimity revealed by the tax-hustler's signal act of compensation. Interestingly, while the applications are different, he and Nyssen both use the Pauline imagery of killing what is earthly in connection with Zacchaeus; one imagines them reading *Colossians* and *Luke* together, then parting and allowing the exemplar to ferment independently.

Stephen

In *Oratio* 14, Nazianzen takes the protomartyr as an exemplar of **patient endurance** (μακροθυμία) when as a "disciple of Christ he prayed for those who were stoning him to death (λιθαζόντων)."[395] He also appears in *Oratio* 18, where his particular speciality is said to be the same as the deceased elder Gregory: **harmlessness or innocence** (τὸ ἀπόνηρον γνώρισμα), probably to be taken in connection with the virtues of **simplicity, guilelessness, and inability to bear a grudge** (ἡ ἁπλότης, καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἤθους ἄδολόν τε καὶ ἀμνησίκακον) noted of his father at the start of the passage.[396] In poetry and prose, Nazianzen remembers the forgiveness and blessing he spoke on his persecutors as he died.[397] This is not out of softness: he is an **ἀγωνιστής**.[398] Implicit in the aforementioned virtues, **martyrdom** is elsewhere as if his chief mark, and it is for failing to achieve this that Basil "was prevented from becoming a Stephen, though he was eager for it."[399]

[395] Naz. *Or.* 14.2; *Acts* 7:58–60.
[396] Naz. *Or.* 18.24.
[397] Naz. *Carm.* 1.2.25 *Adversus iram* 230 sqq. (37.830).
[398] Naz. *Or.* 4.69.
[399] Naz. *Or.* 43.76.

Patient endurance (catalogue virtue): Nyssen's Stephen exhibits μακροθυμία rather than anger (θυμός) in his trials, a virtue he has been taught by Christ as by a lawgiver.[400] The ὑπομονή of martyrdom glorifies the martyr's other teachers, the Apostles.[401]

Forgiveness in the ἀγών of martyrdom: Fighting the good fight (τὸν καλὸν ἀγωνισάμενος ἀγῶνα), Nyssen's "great Stephen" joyfully falls under the stones. He truly understood the Gospel and therefore blesses his persecutors, perceiving hope (ἐλπίς) even in the apparent horror of his death.[402] Admittedly with different framing, this is a clear echo of the inability to bear a grudge we find in Nazianzen's Stephen.

Other associations: Basil's references to Stephen are few, and do not emphasize any of this, stressing instead the divine **grace**, **power**, **faith**, and **Spirit** (χάρις, δύναμις, πίστις, Πνεῦμα ἅγιον) that filled him.[403] But in this, Basil does little more than quote *Acts* 6:5–8 and never elaborates on Stephen. Stephen appears in neither *Hebrews* 11 nor *1 Clement*.

The lack of elaboration of the few instances in which Basil refers to Stephen stands in contrast to his younger brother's interest in the martyr. Besides echoing Nazianzen in the points noted above, Nyssen devotes two encomia to Stephen, a μιμητής of Christ who was filled with the Spirit, "great in wisdom and grace (πολὺς τῇ σοφίᾳ καὶ τῇ χάριτι)," and full of faith and power (πίστις, δύναμις).[404] A **good man** (ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός), he himself becomes an **educator by his speech** (λόγῳ παιδεύων)—and thus a kind of *vir bonus dicendi peritus*.[405] Nyssen softens the horror of Stephen's martyrdom: the rocks that killed him fell

[400] Nyss. *In sanctum Stephanum I* 84–85, 88.
[401] Nyss. *In sanctum Stephanum II* 99. Ὑπομονή is a feature of martyrs generally, a virtue through which God reverses the fall of Adam and Eve: *In XL martyres Ib* 151.
[402] Nyss. *In sanctum Stephanum II* 101–102; *Orationes VIII de beatitudinibus* 8, 44.1296; cf. 44.1297.
[403] E.g. Bas. *Enarratio in prophetam Isaiam* 1.25 (*PG* 30.168); *Moralia* 71.2 (31.846).
[404] Nyss. *In sanctum Stephanum I* 75, 92, 78 and *In sanctum Stephanum II* 98.
[405] Nyss. *In sanctum Stephanum II* 98.

like dewfall or flowers, and he counted his death not harmful but lifegiving.[406] If any further virtue were sought, this "wonderful" man showed **piety** (εὐσέβεια).[407]

Summary: Our early Christian sources and our remains of Basil thus give us very little to work with on a figure who looms large for Nazianzen and especially Nyssen.[408] The catalogue virtue of patience is attested in Nyssen, as is the extra-catalogue virtue of the forgiveness of one's persecutors. Guilelessness and innocence are peculiar to Nazianzen's Stephen; Nyssen makes him a good and pious teacher. Stephen's representation in the Cappadocians is thus uneven, and where he appears we find both common ground and authorial innovation.

*Paul**

The highest virtue attributed to Paul in Nazianzen's catalogue at *Or.* 14.2–5 is **self-giving love** (ἀγάπη), for daring to wish the greatest evil on himself, namely, that he be separated from Christ—were it but possible that by that self-sacrifice all Israel would be saved.[409] In the same catalogue he is also ascribed **zeal** (ζῆλος), for his keenness for the well-being of the Corinthians; **scorn for the body** (ὑποπιασμὸς σώματος), practised for Israel's correction; and the pair **purity** and **virginity** (ἁγνεία and παρθενία), since he is the lawgiver (νομοθετῶν) for such a life, while judging both marriage and celibacy justly.[410]

[406] Nyss. *In sanctum Stephanum I* 84–85 and *In XL martyres II* 168.
[407] Nyss. *In sanctum Stephanum II* 97, 100.
[408] As noted in the introduction to this chapter, Nyssen's encomia are homilies showing that the feast of Stephen was kept the day after the feast of the Nativity, and it is all but certain that Basil and Nazianzen, as his senior bishops in the Cappadocian church, would have preached entire homilies on Stephen, too.
[409] Paul's declaration of this intense love is at *Romans* 9:3. Nazianzen links Paul with ἀγάπη at *Or.* 14.2 and again at 14.5.
[410] Zeal at *2 Cor*. 11:2; mortification at *Romans* 11:17–25 and *1 Corinthians* 9:27; and purity and virginity at *1 Corinthians* 7:25–39.

To the virtues of Peter and Paul found in the *Oratio* 14 list, *Oratio* 18 adds "**eagerness in preaching** (τὸ σύντονον τοῦ κηρύγματος)" as a distinguishing mark.[411]

Love: Basil takes Paul as an exemplar of ἀγάπη using the same justification as Nazianzen used.[412] Nyssen compares his brother to Paul for his love.[413] Paul's relation to love in Nyssen takes us directly to an interesting textual problem in his Meletian catalogue. *GNO IX* ends the catalogue of exemplars with John. But after John, some manuscripts add that Meletius imitated "Paul in his unsurpassed love (κατὰ τὸν Παῦλον ἐν τῇ ἀνυπερθέτῳ ἀγάπῃ)."[414] Elsewhere, speaking for his deceased brother, Nyssen recalls Paul as a "lover of divine beauty (ἐραστὴς τοῦ θείου κάλλους," and, with a different lexical starting point, says he "loved God (ἠγάπησε τὸν Θεὸν)."[415]

Zeal: Although Basil mentions Paul's ζῆλος, I have only found him doing so when Paul calls himself a persecutor κατὰ ζῆλον.[416] "The divine Apostle's" zeal (ζηλοῦν) for the higher graces is invoked by Nyssen; in another text, in spite of a rocky start he chases after the highest progress in accordance with God (τὸ ἀκρότατον τῆς κατὰ Θεὸν προκοπῆς).[417]

Endurance and asceticism: Basil has Paul and Plato agreeing on the importance of scorning the body.[418] Nyssen says Paul shows such a spirit in being crucified to the world as the world is crucified to him, and in bearing terrible trials and sufferings like those of

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[411] Naz. *Or.* 18.24.
[412] Bas. *Regulae fus.* resp. 4 (31.919); his teaching on the body of Christ is also linked to charitable love at q. 35 and 175.
[413] Nyss. *In Basilium* 116.
[414] *GNO IX*, 449–450, esp. 450.1 and Spiro's comment: "post σωμ. add κατὰ τὸν παῦλον ἐν τῇ ἀνυπερθέτω ἀγάπη [*sic*, without subscripts], MOTv fort recte, cf I Cor 13." In the preface (384–385) Spiro says of these *verba* that "*haud facile diiudicantur, genuina sint an spuria*," but argues that transmission history suggests an addition by an editor shortly after Nyssen's death. Given the uncertainties, however, the line's uncommented excision from *SC 606* seems unwarranted.
[415] Nyss. *In Basilium fratrem* 113, 116.
[416] Bas. *Adversus Eunomium* II, 29.580, quoting *Philippians* 3:5; there and elsewhere he atticizes Paul's neutered κατὰ ζῆλος, e.g. *Regulae fus.* resp. 8 (31.937).
[417] Nyss. *Orationes VIII de beatitudinibus*, 5, 44.1249; *In Basilium fratrem* 113.
[418] Bas. *Ad adolescentes* IX.12; also *Regulae fus.* resp. 8 (31.936).

Christ.[419] There are at least echoes of this in *1 Clement*, though the virtues are not quite the same: Paul, like Peter, is a victim of jealousy and strife (ζῆλος, here in a negative sense, and ἔρις), and through his many trials and travails he showed patience (ὑπομονή), of which he is even called "the greatest model (μέγιστος ὑπογραμμός)."[420]

Chastity: Paul is an important witness whom Basil makes to speak for chastity against the ascetic woman who has fallen from monastic life through some kind of sexual affair.[421] Paul endorses chastity in Nyssen's treatise on virginity.[422]

Preaching: Basil has Paul as a minister of the word in whom Christ speaks.[423] As for Nyssen, Paul may be a "true minister of the word"; at any rate, he manages to supplant secular greats such as Libanius to become Gregory's ostensible teacher of rhetoric.[424]

Other associations: Paul, the putative author of *Hebrews*, is not made a faith-hero in Chapter 11 (though he does make himself an exemplar in a letter of surer authorship[425]). Clement reminds us that Paul taught justice or righteousness (δικαιοσύνη) to the whole world, enjoyed fame for his faith, and was courageous before rulers.[426]

Julian: Paul "surpasses all the magicians and quacks of all time, everywhere."[427] He is a panderer to circumstance and audience, and so is like the colour-changing octopus or

[419] Nyss. *In diem luminum* 239–240; *In sanctum Ephraim* 46.844.
[420] *1 Clement* 5:5–7.
[421] Bas. *Ep.* 46.3 (to a fallen virgin); illustrating a point about inspiration at *Adversus Eunomium* V, 29.765, although this latter text is probably spurious: Sesboüé *et al*. (1982) (*SC* 299) 61–64.
[422] Nyss. *De virginitate* XX e.g. 327.
[423] Bas. *Liber de Spiritu sancto* 13.29 (32.120); *Adversus Eunomium* I, 29.540.
[424] Nyss. *Contra Eunomium* 1.1.18 has Παῦλος as ὁ γνησίος ὑπηρέτης τοῦ λόγου only in the Paris *textus vulgatus Morelli*, where most manuscripts read Βασίλειος; his preaching is implicit in the context surrounding a passage at 1.1.304 in which he is called ὁ τῶν θείων δογμάτων ἐξηγητὴς; we are listen to "Paul's great voice (τῆς μεγάλης τοῦ Παύλου φωνῆς)" at 3.2.40, etc. As a rhetorician, *Ep.* 10 (to Libanius).
[425] *1 Corinthians* 11:1.
[426] *1 Clement* 5:5–7.
[427] Jul. *Contra Galilaeos* 99e–100a: ἐπιδείξω . . . καὶ τὸν πάντας πανταχοῦ τοὺς πώποτε γόητας καὶ ἀπατεῶνας ὑπερβαλλόμενον Παῦλον.

squid, a strong pejorative for deviousness and fickleness of character in Julian and others, including Basil.[428] With Jesus, he carries out an illegitimate reform of the Mosaic law.[429]

Summary: With the exception of Basil on zeal, and allowing for periphrasis in Nyssen's echo of the mortification of the body, all of Nazianzen's catalogue virtues are found in his Cappadocian peers.

Analytic conclusion

Catalogue virtues found elsewhere in the corpora

The selection above contains 20 exemplars: 16 from Nazianzen, 1 from Basil, and 3 from Nyssen. They find themselves in some 63 pairings with what I have called *catalogue virtues,* namely, virtues that appear tightly associated with these exemplars in the texts I identified at the start of this chapter as *catalogue texts*: Naz. *Or.* 14.2–5 and 18.24, Bas. *Ep.* 2.3, and Nyss. *Contra Eunomium* 2.1.322 and *In Meletium* 449–450. In this total, I count duplicate pairs in different authors as discrete pairings, but not duplicate pairs within the same author.[430] Including both the catalogues and the other sources which I have used in the three corpora, the same exemplars occur in 172 virtue-pairings in total (to which we will return below). It is important at this point to recall that for seven exemplars I merely corroborated catalogue virtues, without exploring further associations exhaustively.[431]

[428] Jul. *Contra Galilaeos* 106a–c; cf. Jul. *Misopogon* 349d; Bas. *Ad adolescentes* IX.29 and *In Hexaemeron VII*, 3 (29.153–156); Plut. *Quomodo adul.* 15b.
[429] Jul. *Contra Galilaeos* 319de.
[430] E.g. Nyssen's Daniel is wise in both of the two Nyssen catalogues I use, and this gives us only 1 discrete pairing, but Joseph's link with temperance in both a Nyssen catalogue and a Basil catalogue gives us 2 discrete pairings.
[431] They are the exemplars whose headings are starred (*) above as they appear: David, Elijah, Job, John the Baptist, Jesus, Peter, and Paul; see also the introduction to this chapter, 186–187. For these seven I only searched Nyssen's and Basil's corpora to corroborate the catalogue headword virtue-associations which I found in Nazianzen's catalogues. Even when the exemplars occurred in Basil's or Nyssen's catalogues with different assigned virtues, I did not attempt to corroborate those catalogue virtues in the remainder of their corpora or in Nazianzen's.

Of the 63 total catalogue virtue–exemplar pairings (e.g. ‘gentleness – Moses’), I have found 33 (52%) occurring anywhere in the corpora of all three Cappadocians and 17 (27%) occurring anywhere in the corpora of two Cappadocians, leaving 13 (21%) occurring in just one. This is already enough to indicate that, while a strong consensus in just over half of our cases was shaped by Scriptural nudges (both lexical and narrative) and consolidated by shared reading of the sacred texts, divergences were almost as common, both in subsets of our group and individually.

Of the 42 catalogue virtue–exemplar pairs for which I began from Nazianzen’s catalogue virtues, 22 (52%) are found in all three Cappadocians, 13 (31%) are found in Nazianzen and one other (of which 6 are in Basil, and 7 in Nyssen), and 7 (17%) seem to be unique to Nazianzen.[432]

Of Basil’s 6 catalogue pairings, 3 (50%) are attested in all three Cappadocians and 2 (33%) are in Basil and at least one other (both with Nyssen), leaving just 1 idiosyncratic (17%). The two shared between Basil and Nyssen are Job’s courage or manfulness and Moses’ righteous anger; David’s righteous anger is the outlier. But as I applied only the corroborative method to David and Job, it seems plausible that the shares of idiosyncratic pairings or only partial overlaps with other Christian authors is inflated, and would be reduced further upon application of the exhaustive method. It is thus possible that none of Basil’s *Ep.* 2 pairings is totally idiosyncratic.

Of Nyssen’s 15 catalogue pairings, 8 (53%) also occur in both Basil and Nazianzen, 1 (7%) is only corroborated (by Basil), and 6 (40%) seem thus far idiosyncratic to Nyssen. 5 of the last group which I am classifying as provisionally unique to Nyssen require further

[432] Of the three catalogue pairs I took from Nyssen, 2 associations are attested in all three colleagues, while the last is corroborated by Basil but not Nazianzen. Basil’s sole catalogue contribution, temperance–Joseph, is attested in all three Cappadocians.

attention, as they involve exemplars of whom I have only corroborated Nazianzen's pairings without scouring the corpora exhaustively.

Catalogue virtues found in other authors' catalogues

We find another picture if we consider which of the catalogue virtues are found not just anywhere in another corpus, but *as catalogue virtues* selected by another author for special emphasis in his own catalogue. Since, as I noted at the beginning of this chapter, there are a few Cappadocian catalogues which I have not investigated, this is a somewhat tentative finding, but it is as follows: of the 63 catalogue pairings, 8 (13%) occur in all three authors' catalogues presented in this study, 6 (9%) in two authors' catalogues, and 49 (78%) are idiosyncratic *as* catalogue virtues.

Of Nazianzen's 42, just 3 (Moses' meekness, David's meekness, and Elijah's zeal) are found as catalogue virtues in all our catalogues (7%). Only 2 are found in two other catalogues (Abraham's faith and Paul's love), both in Nyssen (5%). The remaining 37 catalogue pairings that Nazianzen makes are unique to him precisely as catalogue pairings (88%). This means that even though, outside of catalogues, we often see the same virtues linked with the same exemplars, when it comes to generating catalogues, Nazianzen displays considerable independence.

Of Basil's 6 catalogue pairings, 2 (33%; Moses' and David's meekness) are catalogue pairings in all three Cappadocians, while 1 (17%; Joseph's temperance) also occurs in a Nyssenian catalogue. The remaining 3 (50%; Moses' and David's righteous anger, Job's courage) are peculiar, as catalogue pairings, to Basil. Given that this catalogue is from a letter to Nazianzen, who would go on to produce memorable catalogues, we might have expected more overlap, but this is not what we find. The omission of these anger-pairings

from Nazianzen's *Oratio* 18 catalogue is striking, since his father's anger is highlighted in this speech; but by that occasion—when Basil himself was present—perhaps Gregory had had enough of both his father's anger and his friend's, and did not want to encourage more of it in others within his orbit.

Of Nyssen's 15 catalogue pairings, 3 (Moses' and David's meekness, Elijah's zeal) are found as catalogue pairings in all three authors (20%); 3 are found in at least two (Abraham, Elijah, and Paul with Nazianzen, and Joseph with Basil, as above) (20%); and the remaining 9 are unique to Nyssen as virtue–exemplar pairings in our catalogues (60%).

Of those *exemplars*—not exemplar–virtue pairs—who are catalogue exemplars in multiple authors, sometimes their associated catalogue virtue is always the same, such as Abraham's faith (in Nazianzen and Nyssen) or Joseph's temperance (in Basil and Nyssen). But sometimes we find interesting variations. Moses has his universal meekness spiced up with some righteous anger in Basil's catalogue, only to see the calmingly bland 'goodness' attributed to him in one of Nyssen's. David, similarly meek in all three, nonetheless finds his endurance additionally singled out in Nyssen, his righteous anger or spiritedness in Basil, and his self-restraint in Nazianzen. Elijah is zealous in all three authors, but is also identified as solitary and ascetically simple in a *catalogue* presented Nazianzen, who at least professed at times to want nothing more than a contemplative life of retreat from the world.[433] To Paul's love, found in Nazianzen and Nyssen, the former adds virtues that can be summarised as asceticism and evangelical zeal.

[433] E.g. Naz. *Or.* 2.6.

Early Christian texts

What of our authors' relation to the early Christian texts? Of the two dozen or so named or identifiable faith-heroes in *Hebrews* 11, eight are found in our set of twenty Cappadocian exemplars.[434] Of these eight, all but one (Samuel) also show faith in *1 Clement*. But only two, Abraham and Moses, are emphasized as exemplars of faith in the Cappadocian corpora, though all three Cappadocians agree on these two. While faith is peripheral for Moses, our principal catalogues in Nazianzen and Nyssen make that virtue into Abraham's catalogue virtue. All of this suggests that the argument of *Hebrews* did not have a significant effect on the Cappadocian production of virtue–exemplar pairings.

1 Clement gives us almost three dozen exemplars, of whom 13 reappear anywhere in our Cappadocian catalogues. Clement uses these 13 to build some 46 virtue–exemplar pairings. These were, in principle, available to our fourth-century authors. Of these 46 pairings, I have found 15 in all three Cappadocians, 3 in two, and 9 in just one. 19 do not seem to have made the cut. Clement—or, often enough, the Scriptural impulses behind him—is a more plausible candidate for having an effect on our authors' exemplarism than was the author of *Hebrews*. But it is far from a determinant role.

This becomes more nuanced when we look at the catalogue virtues. Only 7 of Clement's 46 relevant pairings make it into Cappadocian catalogue pairings. Of these, 6 are in Nazianzen (one of which is shared with Nyssen), and the remaining one occurs only in Nyssen. Other things being equal, and with an exclusively exemplarist focus, I would conjecture that Nazianzen was a keener reader of Clement than the others.

[434] Noah, Abraham, Joseph, Moses, Rahab, Samuel, David, and Daniel.

All virtues

Roughly 172 virtue–exemplar pairings can be found in the material I have presented in this chapter, including both catalogue and non-catalogue sources. This total consists of the intersection of some 91 virtue–exemplar couplings in Nazianzen, 103 in Basil, and 114 in Nyssen. Of the set of 172 couplings, 52 occur in all three authors (30%), 31 in two (18%), and 89 in a single Cappadocian (52%).

Of the 31 occuring in two authors, 9 (29%) are in the close but conflicted friends Nazianzen and Basil, 8 (26%) in the more distant friends Nazianzen and Nyssen,[435] and 14 (45%) in the fraternal pair Basil and Nyssen.

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Where Nazianzen's catalogues (primarily) or Nyssen's or Basil's (secondarily) have virtues paired with various Scriptural heroes, I have tried to document instances in each others' corpora and in *Hebrews* 11 or *1 Clement* where the exemplar in question is shown to have similar virtues. It turns out that this is almost always possible. Much of this must be due to the fact that the Scriptures themselves suggest the virtues in question, as with Abraham's faith or Noah's justice or righteousness or Solomon's wisdom. Even with such an impetus, however, there is at no point any necessity for these writers to dwell on any of these Scriptural figures as exemplars of virtues, even if their stories cannot avoid being told. Their exemplarisations reflect deliberate choices by the authors.

Moreover, there are instances in which the virtues highlighted are divergent in our authors, or presented in different ways and applied to different situations by varying degrees of metaphorical extension. Consider how, for Basil alone amongst the

[435] On the relationship between the Gregorys, see McLynn (2018).

Cappadocians, Joseph's great act of sexual restraint can become an antidote to greed for wealth; or how Nazianzen alone calls attention to Solomon's vices. Nyssen stood out for his interest in Abraham, Moses, and Daniel as *paideia*-heroes, and where Nazianzen and Basil make similar remarks, differences can sometimes be discerned in their framings of the right place of secular learning in the ideal curriculum. These may represent their own attempts to come to terms with the shock produced by Julian's reign and the schools law they found so threatening.

Julian, for his part, was always going to be an outlier, but his dextrous employment of Scriptural figures for anti-Christian ends is noteworthy. Sometimes, while admitting certain biographical details, he rejects assessments of net virtue; such would be the case with Phinehas, Peter, Paul, and Jesus. Elijah and others are played against Moses, who is cast as a provincial brute whose low standards Christians do not manage to reach. Most interestingly, Julian often affirms assessments of character traits and manages to extract from them lessons directly opposed to Jewish and Christian interpretations, as when he makes Solomon and Abraham his allies in theurgy, augury, or even idolatry.

The three churchmen are, to be sure, working with what appears to be, and almost certainly is, a much more stable canon of exemplars than their pagan peers: Odysseus may be either a scoundrel or the ideal of a soul *en route* to the One, but David, whatever his flaws, is always going to be, on balance, a hero. Yet within the bounds set by their commitment to the arc of salvation history, and within what appears to be their shared understanding of the Scriptures as *inter alia* a trove of exemplars, the Cappadocians do show a sufficient independence of interpretation and flexibility of application of their saintly heroes for us to deem their Biblical exemplarism fully cognate with the phenomena which Roller and Langlands have documented in pagan Rome.

Chapter 5

Exemplarism for Aspirants: Practical *Paideia* in Action

Ubique profectum tuum capies ut si bona exempla videas vel audias de imitandis accendaris.

Everywhere you shall take your improvement in hand, so that if you see or hear of any models of virtue, you will ardently desire to imitate them.

Thomas à Kempis, De imitatione Christi, *I.25.5*.

We have seen in Chapters 2–4 how Gregory Nazianzen and his peers treated inherited exemplars, both secular and Christian, and even minted new ones for imitation. But how exactly do they imagine their listeners and readers acting on these exemplars, or even interacting with them? To what extent can some kind of idealised, ordered experience be discerned in their presentation of exemplars? While I sometimes note perspectives from the other authors, the focus in this chapter is on Nazianzen. I attempt to reconstruct what Nazianzen hoped his audience would experience in his exemplarism and how he imagined they would apply it to their lives.

Nowhere does Nazianzen systematize his thoughts on ethical exemplarism as philosophers and historians have begun to do with other sources over the last twenty years. By paying close attention to his framing of exemplars, however, we find a series of of hints about how to use them. My method here has been to gather insights on exemplarism scattered throughout Nazianzen's corpus and piece them together so as to form a continuous progression through a number of situational and psychological stages. Many of

these stages overlap and even extend throughout the process simultaneously with others, but they can be analysed discretely, in the manner of an Hegelian *Moment* or an Aristotelian cause. Where that is the case, their place in the ordered sequence reflects my attempt to locate where they first occur.

I first outline the paradigmatic experience of exemplarist imitation. This is followed by a brief adjustment of that outline to show the paradigmatic experience of exemplarist *avoidance*. Then I note ways in which exemplarism can go wrong—that is, how it can result in ethical damage through vice rather than flourishing through virtue. I also flag moments where exemplarism as Nazianzen conceived it may be connected to an important focal point in his vision of theological anthropology, namely, with θέωσις, the process of becoming divine. What emerges is a synoptic view of the way a prominent fourth-century churchman with aims of cultural transformation thought individual *persons* could be transformed by means of the right exemplars. This will allow us to advance the project announced in Chapter 2 of analysing how the Cappadocians applied the content and methods of their παιδεία to practical ethical life.

The paradigmatic experience of exemplarist imitation

The exemplarist experience in Gregory Nazianzen can be represented as consisting of the following stages, with names I derive from phrasing found in Gregory or his close interlocutors:

1) Βλέψις (Presentation and encounter)
2) Θαῦμα (Admiration and awe)
3) Εὕρεσις (Discernment, diagnostics, and selection)
4) Σύγκρισις (Comparative assessment of self and exemplar)
5) Μίμησις (Imitation by analogy)
6) Ὁμοίωσις (Emulative likening)
7) Ὑπερβολή (Surpassing)
8) Δρόμος (Pursuit of other exemplars)
9) Τὸ γενέσθαι παράδειγμα (Becoming a new exemplar)

Many of these echo phases identified in the exemplarist schemata produced by Roller, Langlands, and Zagzebski.[1] But no single schema advanced in recent years quite captures the moments of the experience that Nazianzen's preaching and poetry suggest, and so the framework I propose here is novel.

Not every exemplarist experience can pass through each of these phases. As we shall see, for instance, the exceptional natures of some exemplars make it impossible to surpass them. Nonetheless, for most models presented by Nazianzen for imitation, this seems to be

[1] The most elaborate, and the closest to what I find in Nazianzen, is from Langlands, who sees the following progression in the experience of Roman exemplarism (with Nazianzen's phases in brackets): (1) admiration and wonder (Naz. [2]); (2) comparison of self to exemplar (Naz. [4]); (3) *aemulatio* between learner and hero (Naz. [5]–[6]); (4) modelling, the derivation of templates from the hero and their application in the learner's life (Naz. [5]); (5) cognition, an understanding of the virtues gained in the preceding steps; (6) discernment, a more general development and autonomy in the learner's practical wisdom (Naz. [3], prior to imitation); see Langlands (2018) 87–89. Nazianzen is concerned with competitive outcomes (Naz. [6]–[9]) in a way that is hard to capture with her schema. Roller's schema is especially concerned with the reception of actions that become exemplary and normative, and so is most relevant for elements of Naz. (9) and, starting the process over again, Naz. (1). Roller gives us : (1) the original action; (2) its observation and evaluation by witnesses; (3) its memorialisation in cultural monuments, be they textual, oratorical, ritual, or otherwise artistic; (4) its norm-setting function for secondary audiences beyond the original witnesses; see Roller (2018) 5–14. Zagzebski's meta-ethical theory—which inspired much of this dissertation—is above all concerned with the phenomenon of admiration as a guide to ethical formation and norm-adherence, as well as the need to interrogate this emotion in order to select exmemplars prudently; as such it has most to do with Naz. (1)–(3). See Zagzebski (2017) 21–2, 43–4, 65–66, and (2010) 41–47.

approximately the trajectory of the moral aspirant's experience. Let us take each phase in turn.

Phase 1: Βλέψις (Presentation and encounter)

Every artistic, literary, or oratorical appearance of an exemplar presupposes a presentation and an encounter, an instance in which an author, speaker, artist, work, or event offers an exemplar for consideration by a viewer, reader, or listener. These are encounters which need not have occurred, certainly not with the frequency or vividness they enjoy in Nazianzen.

Nazianzen is aware that this stage of presentation and encounter, however preliminary and trivial, is not inevitable. We may take Demoen's catalogue of words regularly used to introduce exempla in the poems, consistent with rhetoricians' guidelines, to serve more broadly as an indication of conscious efforts to present exemplars.[2] In the orations we find similar exhortations to consider exemplars, often with verbs of seeing. For instance, in an oration on peace and concord following a local schism in Gregory's church, he exhorts his congregation to "gaze unswervingly" at "God and things divine," which they are to imitate.[3] Encounters sometimes requires explicit encouragement, and Gregory is ready to provide it.

This is indirectly evident in the special purpose Nazianzen sees in every detail in the Scriptures. The reason they are there is exemplarist: it is "so that we may have reminders and instructions for discerning similar things when the right time comes, so that we will

[2] Demoen (1996) 154 sqq.
[3] Naz. *Or.* 6.14: . . . ἡ Θεοῦ καὶ τῶν θείων μίμησις· πρὸς ἃ βλέπειν ἀσφαλὲς . . .

avoid some of them and choose others, following the examples of those who have gone before as if they are models and rules for life."[4]

Phase 2: Θαῦμα (admiration and awe)

Nazianzen often emphasizes the wonder that we ought to feel in the presence of some notable and praiseworthy quality in an exemplar. Words connected with perception play an important role.

The Maccabean martyrs, their mother, and Eleazar the priest appear very explicitly as the objects of admiration. Eleazar teaches by both speech and "silent exhortation (σιωπῶσα παραίνεσις)," i.e. his example. The sacrifice of Eleazar's life is "both more splendid (λαμπροτέραν) and more pure than all the sacred rites of the law."[5] Interjections, in which Gregory models appropriate or desired reactions to the events he is recounting, express wonder. The keenness for martyrdom elicits a cry of "How wondrous (ὢ τοῦ θαύματος)!"[6] Their mother's sacrifice, too, is a marvel to behold: "What a wondrous, generous, and magnanimous offering (ὢ θαυμασίας ἐπιδόσεως καὶ μεγαλοψύχου)!" Re-imagining the brothers' words of encouragement to each other, Gregory breaks off his ethopoeia and asks his audience to envision "the sight that they presented to view, how beautiful and full of sanctity they were for those who love God, how sweeter than any sight or sound!" Gregory then offers himself as a model of the idealised reaction to this sight: "You know, I myself am filled with delight as I speak of them, and in my mind I am

[4] Naz. *Or*. 2.105: ἀλλ' ἵν' ἡμεῖς ἔχωμεν ὑπομνήματα καὶ παιδεύματα τῆς τῶν ὁμοίων, εἴ ποτε συμπέσοι καιρός, διασκέψεως· ὥστε τὰ μὲν φεύγειν, τὰ δὲ αἱρεῖσθαι, οἷον κανόσι τισὶ καὶ τύποις, τοῖς προλαβοῦσιν ἑπόμενοι παραδείγμασι. See Demoen (1996) 284, 287.
[5] Naz. *Or*. 15.3.
[6] Naz. *Or*. 15.3.

with them in their contest; and by the narration of it I am ennobled."[7]Antiochus, their persecutor, appears as another stimulus for the listeners, since his threats were transformed into wonder (μεταβαλὼν εἰς θαῦμα τὴν ἀπειλήν).[8]

In the oration on 'Cyprian,' Gregory again finds his theme to be a source of wonder. His conflationary honorand is "wondrous for his conversion no less than for his virtue (τὴν μεταβολὴν οὐχ ἧττον ἢ τὴν ἀρετὴν θαυμάσιος)." Gregory goes on to describe the relatively lesser glory of persisting in virtue (the object of paraenetics) as opposed to the more glorious path of abandoning vice in order to pursue virtue (the object of apotreptics and protreptics).[9] Contemplation of the glory of certain kinds of deeds should, in a rightly ordered soul, generate the emotion of admiration.

Gregory again models an admiring response to exemplars in his oration for Basil. Not only was the man possessed of a "divine soul," but he was also "for me, in all ways, an object of reverence (πάντ' ἐμοὶ σεβασμία)."[10] In Basil, the object of admiration also draws feelings of piety. But Basil the exemplar was himself once a moral aspirant with admirable models of his own. The boy had the advantage of having the father he did, since Basil Senior was such a good model that even looking at him "immediately" made his son "most virtuous."[11] In the context, the excellence in question is both in his character and in his literary education, in both of which Basil Senior was preeminent. Gregory details other

[7] Naz. *Or.* 15.7: Ἔγωγ' οὖν αὐτὸς ἡδονῆς ἐμπίμπλαμαι μνημονεύων, καὶ μετ' αὐτῶν ἀθλούντων εἰμὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ, καὶ τῷ διηγήματι καλλωπίζομαι.
[8] Naz. *Or.* 15.11.
[9] Naz. *Or.* 24.16.
[10] Naz. *Or.* 43.2. This sort of wonder we find at this stage is of course distinct from the sense of wonder or surprise which Nazianzen anticipates some listeners may feel at his long delay in offering an oration for Basil: μηδεὶς θαυμαζέτω (*Or.* 43.2). Cp. Alexander's reverence for Heracles (and emulation of Achilles) at Jul. *Caesares* 324d–325a.
[11] Naz. *Or.* 43.12: Ὅπερ οὖν ἐκείνῳ συμβέβηκεν εὖ ποιοῦν οἴκοθεν ἔχοντι τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸ παράδειγμα, πρὸς ὃ βλέπων εὐθὺς ἄριστος ἦν.

ways in which the elder Basil saw to his children's education, but the crucial first step is that admiring sight which he offered them.[12]

Phase 3: Εὕρεσις (Discernment, diagnosis, and selection)

Nazianzen's works are full of exemplars. This is due in part to his recognitions that his audience is made up of different kinds of characters, and that not all exemplars can be profitably taken as models in all ways at all times. It is a didactic preoccupation of his that one ought to appeal to different sorts of audiences in different ways. In a passage from the second apology, written at the very beginning of his priesthood, he draws on Paul and (more subtly) Aristotle to lay out the approach that we see in his exemplarism. He compares the Church to an unruly animal made up of warring elements. Anyone who leads it must be simple of character and upright in all things, and yet nuanced and sensitive in ministering to the diverse individuals under his care in order to find what is fitting and beneficial for each of them as well as for the assembly as a whole.[13] When addressing a relatively homogenous Christian audience it is clear that Nazianzen is keenly aware of distinctions in his listeners, and of the burden that places on him as a pastor.[14] Later in the same oration, he returns to a few Old Testament exemplars he has invoked already in the

[12] Zagzebski (2017) 42 says admiration is elicited by a "strong display of virtue" and "leads to distinctive physical feelings, including the feeling of dilation or opening in the chest" as well as a sense of elevation. This experience motivates imitation.

[13] *Or.* 2.44: οὕτως ἐκ πολλῶν καὶ διαφόρων καὶ ἠθῶν καὶ λόγων, καθάπερ ἑνὸς ζώου συνθέτου καὶ ἀνομοίου, τοῦ κοινοῦ τούτου τῆς Ἐκκλησίας συγκειμένου σώματος, πᾶσα ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸν προστάτην ἁπλοῦν τε εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν κατὰ τὴν ἐν πᾶσιν ὀρθότητα· καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα παντοδαπὸν καὶ ποικίλον κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ἕκαστον οἰκείωσιν, καὶ τὸ τῆς ὁμιλίας πρὸς πάντας ἐπιτήδειόν τε καὶ πρόσφορον. The next section is an elaboration of the Pauline 'milk or meat' pedagogy. But it is also possible to see Gregory's reading of Aristotelian ethics in the lines quoted. The man who lives by the mean, which may demand different actions even in superficially similar situations, is like an athletic trainer who prescribes different amounts of meat for different athletes to eat, depending on their fitness level and body types, even though the goal (presumably health or athletic success) will be the same. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* II, 6, 1106a36–b5.

[14] Demoen discusses differences in audience types to show that in addressing pagans, Gregory uses only pagan and no Biblical exempla; in addressing Christians, both Biblical and pagan exempla may be used, depending on the audience's level of education: Demoen (1996) 205. He treats these mostly as questions of style.

first apology and emphasizes that while all answered God's call, they did so in different ways and with differing degrees of readiness.[15]

In that context, Nazianzen has a defensive aim: to evaluate his own fugitive behaviour, a would-be critic would have to have the diagnostic sensitivity to be sure they were measuring him against the right exemplar.[16] But we find similar insights in his later orations, too, animated both by pastoral concern and cultural-political strategy. One of Nazianzen's goals is a standing army of fervent Christians: "I yearn to have athletes for any moment and condition, of every kind, every age, both attacked openly and facing secret schemes; I yearn to have tales both old and new come to my assistance." He wants diverse exemplars in the first instance. He goes on, in an image that is found in Basil in a significantly different sense, to say that he wishes "to gather what is most useful from all sources, just like the bees do, [to form it] into the ingenious structure and sweet delight of one single honeycomb, so that God may be honoured in us through both the Old Testament and the New."[17] A variety of personal outcomes is therefore to be expected from Nazianzen's moral education, partly related to the diversity of personal starting-points and partly due to his strategic pastoral objectives.[18]

This also implies that a moral aspirant must identify him- or herself as a particular kind of person in need of a particular kind of exemplar. The letter from Basil to Nazianzen discussed in Chapter 4 frames the strategy very succinctly.[19] Recall that this was dated to

[15] Naz. *Or*. 2.114.
[16] Compare Zagzebski's remarks on the need for a multiplicity of exemplars: "It is important to have many stories of exemplars because they follow so many different paths, and different persons need different models." Zagzebski (2017) 25.
[17] Naz. *Or*. 15.12: Ποθῶ γὰρ ἀθλητὰς ἔχειν, κατὰ πάντα καιρὸν καὶ τρόπον, καὶ γένος ἅπαν, καὶ ἡλικίαν ἅπασαν, καὶ φανερῶς πολεμουμένην, καὶ ἀφανῶς ἐπιβουλευομένην· καὶ βοηθεῖσθαι μὲν τοῖς παλαιοῖς διηγήμασι, βοηθεῖσθαι δὲ καὶ τοῖς νέοις, καὶ πανταχόθεν, ὥσπερ αἱ μέλισσαι, συλλέγειν τὰ χρησιμώτατα εἰς ἑνὸς κηρίου φιλοτεχνίαν καὶ γλυκασμὸν, ἵνα καὶ διὰ Παλαιᾶς καὶ Νέας εὐδοκιμῇ Θεὸς ἐν ἡμῖν. Cf. Bas. *Ad adolescentes* IV.8–11 on bees; for Scriptural figures as diversified by type of person, see the sex-based interpretation Nyssen gives to Abraham and Sarah as Isaiah's exemplars at *De vita Moysis* 1.5–6.
[18] Naz. *Or*. 15.12.
[19] See above, 191.

358, before either were ordained priests. It succinctly expresses an ethos which, if deeply held, would account for the exemplarism we see throughout the Cappadocian corpora and beyond:

> The best way to figure out what we are meant to do is by paying attention to the divinely inspired Scriptures. For there we find practical guides to our actions, and there, too, the lives of blessed men—which are as if living icons of the orderly life lived in accordance with God—have been written down, transmitted, and set before us for the imitation of their good deeds. So wherever someone feels he is lacking something, by spending time with it, he will find, as if from some public pharmacy, a drug to treat what ails him.[20]

Basil then elaborates the medicinal benefits of spending time with Joseph (temperance), Job (courage), or David and Moses (both of them meek and great-souled).

Nazianzen puts this into practice in the catalogues we saw him produce in *Oratio* 14 and *Oratio* 18 to highlight particular exemplars' special marks. Elsewhere, too, he emphasizes self-diagnosis on the basis of station in life, circumstances, and character. He includes contemplation and action as ways of life within the anaphoric structure (καλὸν θεωρία, καὶ καλὸν πρᾶξις) framing the virtues he highlights in the *Oratio* 14 catalogue.[21] While he does not give them exemplars there, ways of life structure his approach to the contemplation of God in other orations, along with intellectual capacity, temperament, and the degree of virtue or vice found in a person.[22] Often this coaching involves a prescription of self-diagnosis. To this end Nazianzen makes heavy use of *Exodus* 24, where Moses ascends the mountain, while Aaron and various other named or grouped Israelites either follow at varying distances, or else remain below. Gregory, the theology lecturer and leader of the Nicene faction in Constantinople, casts himself as Moses, and ascends the mountain of theology "to enter within the Cloud, and hold converse with God." Then

[20] Bas. *Ep.* 2.3 (to Nazianzen): Μεγίστη δὲ ὁδὸς πρὸς τὴν τοῦ καθήκοντος εὕρεσιν ἡ μελέτη τῶν θεοπνεύστων Γραφῶν. Ἐν ταύταις γὰρ καὶ αἱ τῶν πράξεων ὑποθῆκαι εὑρίσκονται, καὶ οἱ βίοι τῶν μακαρίων ἀνδρῶν ἀνάγραπτοι παραδεδομένοι, οἷον εἰκόνες τινὲς ἔμψυχοι τῆς κατὰ Θεὸν πολιτείας, τῷ μιμήματι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἔργων πρόκεινται. Καὶ τοίνυν περὶ ὅπερ ἂν ἕκαστος ἐνδεῶς ἔχοντος ἑαυτοῦ αἰσθάνηται, ἐκείνῳ προσδιατρίβων, οἷον ἀπό τινος κοινοῦ ἰατρείου, τὸ πρόσφορον εὑρίσκει τῷ ἀρρωστήματι φάρμακον.
[21] Naz. *Or.* 14.4.
[22] Naz. *Or.* 32.25, 32.

begins another anaphoric catalogue with repetitions of "If anyone be a … (εἰ μέν τις . . . εἰ δέ τις . . .)," followed by figures from *Ex.* 24. This establishes a diagnostic palette for listeners' self-assessment. I count four major groups, some of which have sub-differentiations. In order of diminishing holiness or other aptitude for the study of theology, and so of increasing distance from the summit, we have: Aaron; Nadab, Abihu, or the Elders; the people, consisting of the wholly impure or the temporarily purified; and wild beasts (of at least six different species).[23] In another oration, Moses, too, is back in play, with the same introductory formula, followed by a similar hierarchy at staggered distances from the cloud. There he asks, "Have you not understood from my mention of Moses that there is an ordering of gifts, and a rule in their ranking?"[24] The listener must then ask: am I an Aaron—say, a bishop? An elder and priest? One of the many, a member of the congregation? A "beast," perhaps a heretic or apostate? I need to answer that diagnostic question before I know what I am to do.[25]

In *Oratio* 45, Gregory uses a similar anaphoric structure to lay out a catalogue of exemplars. The formula is 'If you are an X, be or do Y' (e.g. εἰ μέν τις εἶ Ῥαχὴλ, ἢ Λεία ... τὰ εἴδωλα κλέψον, οὐχ ἵνα φυλάξῃς, ἀλλ' ἵν' ἀφανίσῃς). Initially there are only two major classes: the daughters of Laban, and then "a wise Israelite," apparently meaning

[23] Naz. *Or.* 28.2. Nazianzen makes a similar point at *Or.* 27.3 and also makes use of Moses, Aaron, and others at *Or.* 20.2. On this passage, Demoen (1996) 263 notes the debt to Origen's teaching on ascent through degrees of Christian gnosis. A quirky detail here deserves comment. Demoen (1996) 237 suggests in passing that the inclusion of Nadab and Abihu may be a mistake, given their later disobedience and punishment by God (*Leviticus* 10:1–2). We should consider the possibility that it is deliberate. Gregory would then be offering a subtle warning alongside his more patent one: let those who have the calling to do so approach the mysteries of theology, but let them mark well whether they do so as those who will stay faithful to God or as those who will disobey and suffer divine wrath.

[24] Naz. *Or.* 32.16: Ἐπεὶ δὲ Μωϋσέως ἐμνήσθην, οὐκ ἔμαθες ἐντεῦθεν χαρίσματος ἀκολουθίαν καὶ νόμον τάξεως;

[25] Nyssen takes a very similar line in *De vita Moysis* 2.83–86. Those who self-diagnose as beasts need to drop those exemplars and convert: the exercise is protreptic. Those more human can take it as paraenetic. If they belong to the common people, they need virtues appropriate to that type, such as obedience. The elders should be humble but also strong in leadership. The combination of protreptic and paraenetic is at its most universal in Nazianzen's homily on the Nativity. Adam (diagnostic) and Christ (normative, and also diagnostic for the baptized) are exemplars capacious enough for everyone: Naz. *Or.* 38.4, 38.12. Part of Christ's peculiarity as an exemplar is that he also saves and heals his imitators, something other exemplars cannot do or cannot do independently.

Jacob/Israel.[26] After concluding a discussion of Old Testament symbolism, he resumes his diagnostic-prescriptive catalogue, this time turning to events surrounding the crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus. The formula changes slightly, from indicative protasis followed by aorist imperative in the passage above, to the slightly more tentative subjunctive protasis followed by aorist imperative, e.g. "If you are a Simon of Cyrene, take up the cross (Ἂν Σίμων ᾖς Κυρηναῖος, τὸν σταῦρον ἆρον)."[27] Here there are seven major classes, some which are again subdivided: Simon of Cyrene; the crucified thieves (in particular, the good thief); Joseph of Arimathaea; Nicodemus; the pious women at the cross or the empty tomb, namely Mary (presumably Jesus' mother), Mary Magdalene, Salome (traditionally the mother of James and John[28]), and Joanna, with Mary Magdalene receiving special attention; Peter and John (differentiated by their responses in racing to the empty tomb); and Thomas the doubting apostle (along with unnamed alternatives to Thomas' post-Resurrection posture).[29] The situational exemplarism in these passages is necessarily remote from the listeners' lives and calls for an imaginative moral allegoresis.[30] What does it mean to be a "nocturnal worshipper of God" like Nicodemus,

[26] Naz. *Or*. 45.21. Though Gregory makes nothing of it here, Rachel and Leah become types of the action–contemplation dyad he knows well, much as do Martha and Mary; see Catapano (2012) 215–228. The debate about the superiority of the contemplative or the active life is at least as old as Plato, whose form-gazing philosophers are not only compelled to attend to mundane affairs, but even must do so in order to attain the highest happiness possible for them; Pl. *Resp.* VII, 516c–517a.

[27] The *ἄν* is an Attic contraction of *εἰ ἄν*. The subjunctive that opens this paragaph provides a contrast with the conditional protasis in the indicative, with explanatory and nearly causal force, of the subsequent line, which affirms as a fact Christ's being counted a sinner for the sake of sinners: εἰ κἀκεῖνος μετὰ ἀνόμων *ἐλογίσθη* διὰ σὲ καὶ τὴν σὴν ἁμαρτίαν, σὺ γενοῦ δι' ἐκεῖνον ἔννομος. Gregory returns to the subjunctive for the rest of this diagnostic anaphora.

[28] By comparison of *Mark* 15:40–41 and *Matthew* 27:56.

[29] This pair alone are introduced by the imperative γενοῦ.

[30] Demoen (1996) 315 furthermore observes an "allegorical (moral or anagogical) interpretation of the Bible" in *Or*. 28.2, "with its a-historical, individual-psychological slant," and calls it "the clearest example of an *anagogic* allegory" in Gregory's corpus. By anagogical he means that it contains persons and events who function as types or prefigurations of persons or events later in history, whether in the New Testament, or subsequent history, or the eschaton. The things prefigured are particular. By contrast, a *moral* allegory draws general principles on e.g. sin and repentance in stories such as the liberation from slavery in Egypt, without explicitly tying them to particular events in the way anagogy would. This passage is presumably called anagogical because in 28.3 Gregory affirms that this is something he has actually experienced. Nonetheless, in the way Nazianzen sets out the types in an address to an indeterminate but vast audience, it is clear that the exemplars must be multiply instantiable, and thus general in a way that may be taken as moral allegory. I would reserve anagogy for singular events such as the Incarnation or the Last Judgement

let alone to "bury him [Jesus] with spices"? In a subsequent step, an analogical exercise of the moral imagination enables us to discern which exemplars fit our own situations best.

The diagnostic mindset of this therapeutic exemplarism also helps us make sense of the one-to-one catalogues of virtue-heroes. At the end of Nazianzen's *Oratio* 14 catalogue he says that all the virtue–exemplar pairings form "one path of salvation," and noting the varying degrees of merit in different persons, he says of Christians, "Let one man be outstanding for one virtue, someone else for another, a third for several virtues, and another for all of them, if possible: just let him walk the path . . ."[31] This is exactly what Nazianzen says Athanasius did when he picked exemplars from Scripture:

> Some of these men he imitated in their power of speech and reason, others in their active lives; some in meekness, others in zeal, or others in the perils they faced; some he imitated in most respects, and others still in every way. From each one he took what was beautiful, like those who paint forms to perfection, and conscientiously worked them into a single form of virtue.[32]

Self-diagnosis in exemplar selection drives this process and is a precondition for its success.

Phase 4: Σύγκρισις (Comparative assessment of self and exemplar)

At this point comes a comparison between the exemplar chosen and the aspiring virtuous agent. In fact, of course, some comparison will have been inevitable in order to make the selection in the first place, and perhaps at a more or less conscious level will

(though perhaps keeping my life's events anagogical has a way of tying my story into that of salvation history more closely). The step of discerning the allegorized moral framework as it applys to an individual's life is then what I am calling an analogical one.

[31] Naz. *Or.* 14.5.

[32] Naz. *Or.* 21.4. καὶ τῶν μὲν τὸν λόγον, τῶν δὲ τὴν πρᾶξιν, τῶν δὲ τὸ πρᾶον, τῶν δὲ τὸν ζῆλον, τῶν δὲ τοὺς κινδύνους, τῶν δὲ τὰ πλείω, τῶν δὲ τὰ ἅπαντα μιμησάμενος, καὶ ἄλλο ἀπ' ἄλλου κάλλος λαβὼν, ὥσπερ οἱ τὰς μορφὰς μεθ' ὑπερβολῆς γράφοντες, καὶ εἰς μίαν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ψυχὴν συναγαγὼν, ἓν ἀρετῆς εἶδος ἐκ πάντων ἀπηκριβώσατο. The remark about painters recalls not only Basil's elaboration of his mimetic ethos to Nazianzen in *Ep.* 2 (see above), but also the story about Zeuxis the painter and his quest for the perfect woman to sit as a model for Helen: failing to find a single model beautiful enough in all ways, he created a kind of a single portmanteau using the best features he found in five different women of Croton (Cic. *Inv. rhet.* 2.1). I have not found a Greek source for this story.

even have influenced the feelings of awe or admiration, or the propensity to encounter exemplars to begin with. But something different begins here: the aspirant measures him- or herself against a determinate standard provided by an exemplary person. The exemplar's most noticeable, admirable virtues initially far surpass those of the aspirant. If martial prowess is my aim, and Achilles my standard, I have a lot of work to do to close the vast perceived gap between the two of us. Even though Nazianzen does not belabour the point, the conscious recognition of this need is an important intermediate result of the encounter with exemplars and a prerequisite for the stages that will follow.

Nazianzen begins his awkwardly laudatory oration for Maximus the Cynic with a comparison between Maximus and himself. Maximus is a true philosopher, a true lover of Wisdom, whereas Gregory, in spite of all his education, is her mere servant.[33] Though Gregory was wrong about his honorand's virtue, he is clearly presenting Maximus as a noble individual exemplifying virtue and achievement for the benefit of others.

The oration *On Holy Baptism* exhorts listeners not to put off Christian initiation indefinitely and encourages them to see the challenge of Christian living as one that can be met. He asks them to compare themselves to the Queen of Sheba (assimilated to the Queen of Ethiopia, close on the heels of an exemplum involving Philip's baptism of the Ethiopian eunuch[34]): "What effort will you exert that could be as great as what the Queen of Ethiopia did? For she set out from the ends of the earth in order to see the wisdom of Solomon, while 'Behold, there is something greater than Solomon here,' for those who can think straight."[35] A τοσοῦτον–οἷον pairing drives the comparison here, and the following sentence raises the stakes and frames it as an *ex minore* comparison between Queen and

[33] *Or.* 25.1.
[34] *Or.* 40.26.
[35] Naz. *Or.* 40.27: Τί τοσοῦτον πονήσεις, οἷον ἡ τῶν Αἰθιόπων βασίλισσα, ἐκ τῶν περάτων τῆς γῆς ἀπαναστᾶσα, ἵνα ἴδῃ τὴν σοφίαν Σολομῶντος; *Καὶ ἰδοὺ πλεῖον Σολομῶντος ὧδε*, παρὰ τοῖς τελείως λογιζομένοις, quoting *Matthew* 12:42 or *Luke* 11:31.

aspirant: the Queen undertook a great work for a limited good; you have a greater good before you (and less work to do for it); so you can do it, and you should.

In another case encouraging comparison, Nazianzen warns would-be theologians to attend to their conduct and moral aptitude for approaching things divine before letting their intellectual prowess get the better of them. He first encourages comparison to Paul, who provides us with a measure which he implies no man can equal.[36] Since even Paul admitted he could only see "through a glass darkly," no one else should presume the ability to do better. Lest this leave room for excuses, Nazianzen then escalates dramatically, saying that if you count yourself more adept at philosophical argument or indeed more intelligent than other humans, you should just remember that you are "in all ways inferior to God" and come "as far short of the truth as your very existence is short of the existence of God."[37] God's mind is infinitely above our own. But understanding, the shared virtue that differs in degree between exemplar and aspirants, is not the virtue that the comparison will primarily develop. That role falls to humility, which shapes right conduct and secures a moral aptitude for the life of contemplation. All of these together are prerequisites for bridging the intellectual gap between aspiring theologians and Paul (to say nothing of God).

Basil sums up the thought here in an ascetical work. "How," he asks, "am I to be ranked with Job, if I have not welcomed with gratitude even ordinary affliction?" He asks similar questions of how he measures against David and Daniel.[38]

[36] Ἆρά τίς ἐστιν ἀνθρώπων, ὃς ἀρθῆναι τοσοῦτον δύναται, ὥστε εἰς τὸ Παύλου μέτρον ἐλθεῖν; *Or.* 20.12.
[37] Naz. *Or.* 20.12.
[38] Bas. *Prooem. Reg. fus.* 31.897: Πῶς ἔσομαι μετὰ Ἰὼβ, ὁ μηδὲ τὴν τυχοῦσαν θλίψιν μετὰ εὐχαριστίας δεξάμενος; Julian's satires *Misopogon* and especially *Caesares* show him measuring himself against standards and exemplars.

Phase 5: Μίμησις (Imitation by analogy)

A desire to imitate the exemplar—to walk or even run to catch up with him or her on the path, to adapt Nazianzen's image from selection (Phase 3)—may begin during the moment of admiration. Nonetheless, the contents of the intervening moments are prerequisites for the phase of imitation to proceed consciously.

Gregory's exhortations to imitation are many, usually but not always involving forms of μιμέομαι. Here are just a representative few. Scripture's good figures are meant for imitation.[39] Paul is an exemplar for the imitation of Christ.[40] Christian history is glorious for the number of people striving to imitate Christ, by asceticism or martyrdom or other deeds.[41] Monks going barefoot imitate the apostles.[42] The "imitation of God and things divine" is necessary for human concord; even the cosmos imitates God in an exemplary way, so we must imitate Christ.[43] Gorgonia's children are meant to imitate her, and she herself imitated two women in the Gospels in her trust in God during an illness and in her tears.[44] The imitation of God fulfills human nature.[45] The Maccabean martyrs, whose sacrifice was surely impressive, would have achieved even more if they could have known about and therefore imitated Christ.[46] Nazianzen's father imitates Moses.[47] Manasseh's tears and other Biblical acts of repentance are to be imitated as a kind of baptism.[48] Figures from parables or beneficiaries of Jesus' ministry are to be imitated in their gratitude.[49] John's "girdle," asceticism, is also profitably imitated.[50] The competitive effort

[39] Naz. *Or.* 2.105; see also 26.9 for the personal significance of these figures for all of us.
[40] Naz. *Or.* 2.55: μιμεῖται Χριστὸν . . .
[41] Naz. *Or.* 4.73, 15.11, 40.18, 43.35, 43.63. (e.g.).
[42] Naz. *Or.* 6.2.
[43] Naz. *Or.* 6.14 (ἡ Θεοῦ καὶ τῶν θείων μίμησις), 6.21; see also 11.6.
[44] Naz. *Or.* 8.12, 8.18.
[45] Naz. *Or.* 14.26.
[46] Naz. *Or.* 15.1: μιμούμενοι.
[47] Naz. *Or.* 18.29.
[48] Naz. *Or.* 39.17.
[49] Naz. *Or.* 40.31, 40.34.
[50] Naz. *Or.* 45.18.

involved is sometimes signalled by ζηλόω, as when the Maccabean martyrs, whom Nazianzen treats as pre-Incarnate would-be imitators of Christ, are themselves to be emulated by the new aspirants in the audience. Gregory praises exemplars "so that those who are listening will be jealous for their virtue."[51] His praise leads listeners to be "roused by their remembrance as if by a goad" towards performing similar actions (ὥσπερ κέντρῳ τῇ μνήμῃ πρὸς τὰ ἴσα διανιστάμενοι).[52]

Ethical mimesis runs through Nazianzen's oratorical corpus from one end to the other.[53] In fact, the entire process I am reconstructing can fairly be called 'imitation'. But just as the term δικαιοσύνη in Aristotle means the whole of being virtuous in general as well as a particular social virtue, so, too, can imitation mean something more particular, as I suggest it does at this phase: namely, the practical efforts to do the things that someone else has done, or to acquire the kinds of character traits observed in someone else. Since this stage is central and expressive of the whole, it is worth thinking about its mechanics more closely.

Sometimes imitation is straightforward. When I am learning a technical skill, such as a dance, I replicate the steps demonstrated by the instructor as exactly as I can; apart from the agent, only the time and the location have changed. Any apprenticeship works in this way. On the other hand, the imitation of exemplars for their grand actions and heroic virtues rather than dance steps requires another application of the analogical faculty we saw in the moment of discernment and diagnosis: I will never fight in the same wars or in the same conditions as anyone else, certainly not as Achilles, and yet somehow I have to

[51] Naz. *Or.* 15.2: ἵνα . . . ζηλώσωσι τὴν ἀρετὴν οἱ ἀκούοντες.
[52] Naz. *Or.* 15.2. Another aim of praising the Maccabean martyrs, Gregory quite clearly and unbashfully states *ad loc*., is to bring glory to those who sing their praises (ἵνα δοξασθῶσιν οἱ εὐφημοῦντες).
[53] It is equally pervasive in Julian, who modelled himself on Alexander and Marcus Aurelius (*Ad Themistium* 253a) and insisted that it would be wrong to praise Homer's heroes without imitating them (*Or.* 8, 250ab). As we have seen from many of the uses to which he puts his models, exemplarism constitutes an evaluative framework by which to assess and guide conduct in the present.

have both a similarly courageous internal disposition as well as the technical skills to act on it effectively wherever I find myself.

Nyssen agrees with Nazianzen that the imitation of prior examples orders one's life to the good. He addresses the problem of literal imitation squarely with an imagined objection that unlike, say, Abraham, I cannot be born a Chaldean, to say nothing of the rest. Nyssen's response emphasizes analogical application: being a Chaldean is irrelevant to our virtue or vice, and to see which elements of the great lives do matter, "we need a finer kind of understanding and a sharper vision" when we approach these stories. The main thing is to focus on the universal virtues and vices displayed in variable circumstances.[54]

Nazianzen, for his part, was sensitive both to the literal character of virtue-imitation and the (usually) analogical character of act-imitation. The gratitude of the healed lepers and the repentance of Manasseh are to be carefully imitated by Gregory's listeners, for instance, regardless of what physical diseases may or may not have afflicted them, and even though they cannot have been temporarily imprisoned kings of Judah.[55] The same goes for the virtues catalogued with corresponding exemplars in *Oratio* 14. On the other hand, acts cannot be imitated literally. Even though sometimes this is to be praised—say,

[54] Nyss. *De vita Moysis* 1.5–6: ἀλλά τινος λεπτοτέρας ἡμῖν χρεία τῆς διανοίας καὶ ὀξυτέρας τῆς ὄψεως. Motia (2021b) looks at imitation in Pseudo-Dionysius, Chrysostom, and Nyssen. In Nyssen's case, Motia highlights an emphasis on virtue, but assumes rather than analyses the need for analogical thinking (97). He gives a term to the kind of imitfation he finds in each of his three case studies: *ekstasis* is described as a transcendence of self through placement in a hierarchy, characteristic of Pseudo-Dionysius; Chrysostom's *ekphrasis* is an affective practice that bears fruit by sweetening discipline; and Nyssen's *epektasis* involves endless striving and virtue-instantiation. Motia does not intend to exhaust the ways of imitation he finds in late antiquity with these three terms, which he proposes as idiosyncratic glosses on the meaning of imitation for each of these three authors (102). From the theory of virtue education, another recent schema for understanding exemplarisms uses a tripartition into those of 'Platonic form' (which seeks perfection and conformity to abstract ideals), 'Socratic saint' (who is to be imitated as literally as possible), and the 'Aristotelian φρόνιμος' (whose life indicates virtuous practices, the lessons of which must be understood and applied analogically); see Vaccarezza (2020). While Basil also emphasizes likeness in virtue, I have not found him stressing the analogical dimension. See his words on moral agents as painters replicating the image they see in the lives of the saints, again at *Ep.* 2.3 (to Gregory Nazianzen).
[55] Naz. *Or.* 40.34 and 39.17.

in going barefoot[56]—this often misses the point, as with those who strive for feats of asceticism or grow their beards out like Basil did, whereas the essential thing was his soul and the virtues he cultivated there. The result is "many Basils as far as the appearance goes" who nonetheless mistake the nature of his internal life: their seriousness propagates gloom and melancholy instead of a fitting solemnity.[57] Likewise, while fasting as an act can be good, and while we should do it in an imitation of Christ, we have to do so understanding that we cannot imitate Jesus' fast in every respect: many parts of the Gospels differ significantly from what we are able to do today, Nazianzen says.[58] Here as elsewhere, the moral imagination must be capable of sensitivity and analogy.

Phase 6: Ὁμοίωσις (Emulative likening)

If imitation is like trying to catch up with someone walking down a path, there may come a point where we succeed, and find ourselves side by side with that person. The language in our authors, however, informed as it is by both Scriptural and paideutic emphases on competition, tends towards the agonistic, and so the path often appears more like a race course.[59] Being shoulder to shoulder is then being neck and neck, and the condition is one of emulation or rivalry. Nazianzen recognises that sometimes rivals cross the finish line together and often draws attention to this kind of successful imitation.

Key words Nazianzen uses to indicate emulation are: ἀμιλλάομαι, φιλοτιμία, ζηλόω, ἀγών, and ἀθλητής.[60] They are not necessary or exclusive indicators of it; sometimes

[56] Naz. *Or.* 6.2.
[57] Naz. *Or.* 43.77: Καὶ πολλοὺς ἂν ἴδοις Βασιλείους ἄχρι τοῦ ὁρωμένου, τοὺς ἐν ταῖς σκιαῖς ἀνδριάντας.
[58] Naz. *Or.* 40.30.
[59] See above, Chapter 2, 65–6, incl. note 26; cf. *Hebrews* 12:1–2, where, immediately after the catalogue of faith-heroes we discussed in Chapter 4, the author encourages us to finish running the race by "looking unto Jesus": δι' ὑπομονῆς τρέχωμεν τὸν προκείμενον ἡμῖν ἀγῶνα, ἀφορῶντες εἰς τὸν τῆς πίστεως ἀρχηγὸν καὶ τελειωτὴν Ἰησοῦν.
[60] Naz. e.g. *Or.* 18.21, 21.4, 43.67.

μιμέομαι, too, reappears in a sense that looks more indicative of rivalling, as when Basil imitates Peter and Paul and their performances, equal or unequal, are evaluated.[61]

Gorgonia, her brother writes, "fell in no way short" of her parents in the practice of virtue. Nazianzen qualifies this by saying that because her parents were her source, they enjoy a certain kind of pride of place over her and to that extent remain above her in virtue; but he says this is the only way, and that in others, she at least matched them.[62] Just thereafter, Gorgonia shifts from representing an aspirant to representing an exemplar. Gregory approaches this obliquely in his lament. "Who so made the sanctuaries so beautiful with gifts, both others and this one, of which I know not whether it will be so fair after her? And even more, who has made himself such a living sanctuary for God?"[63] Besides honouring his sister, he is surely hoping that someone in the congregation listening to the eulogy will come forward and rise to the challenge to match the exemplarised Gorgonia both in piety and in munificence towards the church.

Basil is said to have equalled or rivalled many of the Biblical exemplars in the comparative crescendo of Nazianzen's *Oratio* 43. Those from the Old Testament who are equalled include Moses, Aaron, Joshua,[64] Elijah, Elisha, the three young men in the furnace, Jonah, Daniel, and the seven Maccabean martyrs;[65] and from the New Testament, Peter, Paul, and the sons of Zebedee (together as well as with John taken separately).[66] Of several of this set he says, "Having rivalled their patient endurance, Basil also won their glory."[67] The implication here is that Basil did indeed equal his Old Testament predecessors in the quality of his patience. Nazianzen elsewhere says of Basil and himself

[61] Naz. *Or*. 43.76.
[62] Naz. *Or*. 8.11: . . . ὧν οὐδὲν ἐλαττουμένη τὴν ἀρετὴν . . .
[63] *Ibid*.
[64] Naz. *Or*. 43.72.
[65] Naz. *Or*. 43.74.
[66] Naz. *Or*. 43.76.
[67] Naz. *Or*. 43.74: ὧν ἐκεῖνος ζηλώσας τὴν καρτερίαν καὶ τὴν δόξαν ἠνέγκατο.

that "we were no less noble than the young men who were cooled by dew in the fire or who defeated wild beasts through their faith."[68]

The result, where possible, is the attainment of a similar ethical, technical, cognitive, or ontological status to an exemplar. Sometimes this is indicated descriptively by praise in which the *laudandus* is simply labelled a latter-day instance of an established exemplar. "Who does not know the new Abraham and the Sarah in our midst? I mean Gregory and his wife Nonna."[69] Basil's pastoral achievements make him a "second Joseph" (son of Jacob), a "new Abraham," and so on.[70] Likewise, at a time of division in the local church (not helped by his own flight), Gregory calls for a Noah, a Job, or a Daniel to be contemporary men of prayer and to call the rest of the people away from being "Rehoboam and Jeroboam."[71]

The possibility of equalling the greats is also present in Nazianzen's normative exhortations to "be" or to "become" the exemplars he put forward. "Let us be (γενώμεθα) Ninevites, not Sodomites," Gregory urges when calling his congregation to prayer and penitence after a harvest-devastating hailstorm.[72] This is the context of crisis in which we earlier heard Gregory tell his father, whom he judged to be insufficiently active, "Be a Moses or a Phinehas for me, *today*!"[73] If you are not intellectually gifted, own your status and "be the Corinthian" who is content to be fed on milk.[74] In an exhortation to baptism, we hear, "Let us become Peter and John (γενώμεθα Πέτρος καὶ Ἰωάννης)."[75] We are asked

[68] Naz. *Or.* 5.40.
[69] Naz. *Or.* 8.4.
[70] Naz. *Or.* 43.36–37.
[71] Naz. *Or.* 2.89. Here one hoped-for outcome is ἵνα γενώμεθα ἡμῶν αὐτῶν. The latter-day instantiation of the Biblical heroes is meant to result in the members of congregration somehow becoming more self-possessed or self-controlled, as a prerequisite for healing tensions in the community. There is a similar, though less exemplarist, usage of γενώμεθα ἡμῶν αὐτῶν at 5.34.
[72] Naz. *Or.* 16.14.
[73] Naz. *Or.* 16.20. See above, Chapter 4, 232.
[74] Naz. *Or.* 32.13
[75] Naz. *Or.* 40.25.

not to *be like* Peter and John (as one translation has it), but to *be* or to *become* them.[76] His next sentence spells out the need for an analogical application of the idea: "as they hastened to the tomb and to the Resurrection, let us hurry to the baptismal font." The pair return elsewhere: "Be Peter or John," Nazianzen says in an exhortation to respond earnestly to the Resurrection during a sermon for that feast.[77] In the exhortation to baptism, Gregory situates himself and his individualised, second-person singular listener in the *Acts of the Apostles* and says, "I am Philip. Become Candace's eunuch!"[78] Even with the disjunction implicit in any analogy, such wording at least suggests an imitative relationship that successfully issues in a parity between aspirant and exemplar.

Aspirants do not always manage to catch up with their exemplars, but even minor deficiencies of this kind are praiseworthy when the exemplars pursued are good. Thus, without any evident slight to his honour, Athanasius rivalled some of his Scriptural heroes, while falling a little short of others.[79] Where Basil falls short, it is no vice: consider living up to the great Stephen or to John the Baptist. The reasons differ for each. "Although eager for it, he was prevented from becoming a Stephen, since he kept stone-throwers at bay through the awe [which he inspired in them]."[80] This looks like a mostly circumstantial difference, so that intrinsically, perhaps, Basil was closer to equalling Stephen than their disparate fates would otherwise suggest. The difference with John the Baptist, however, is substantial. Nazianzen pauses before even making his comparison and feels the need to justify himself to his audience. He makes clear that he does not rank Basil above John, nor even suggest any equality, since John is "above all those born of

[76] Browne and Swallow.
[77] Naz. *Or.* 45.24. He also instructs his listeners to "be one of the angels" escorting Jesus into heaven at 45.25. There are limits to identification with exemplars, particularly if they threaten the primacy of Christ and Christian unity; see *Or.* 37.17, where he refuses to be called a "Petrian" or a "Paulian" because he is a "Christ-ian." This is a riff on Paul at *1 Corinthians* 1:12–15 and 3:4–7.
[78] Naz. *Or.* 40.26. Soon after we have also a γενοῦ Ζακχαῖος (40.31).
[79] Naz. *Or.* 21.4: Τούτων Ἀθανάσιος, τοῖς μὲν ἡμιλλήθη, τῶν δὲ μικρὸν ἀπελείφθη.
[80] Naz. *Or.* 43.76. Στέφανος μὲν γὰρ ἐκωλύθη γενέσθαι, εἰ καὶ πρόθυμος ἦν, ἐπισχὼν αἰδοῖ τοὺς λιθάζοντας.

women."[81] Instead, he highlights Basil's motivation and desire to imitate John as much as possible: "he was an eager emulator and bore in himself something of that man's character." This is laudable even when the effort fails, as it inevitably must, "for the imitation of the greatest men, even in small ways, is no small thing for the good."[82]

Phase 7: Ὑπερβολή (Surpassing)

Another possible outcome in our race analogy is that we pull ahead of our exemplars and cross the finish line ahead of them. This is most often found in descriptive rather than directly hortatory contexts in Nazianzen, with ὑπερβάλλω and ὑπερέχω as key verbs.

Athanasius and Basil have not only equalled or come close to rivalling certain greats, but, "if it is not rash to say so," they have actually surpassed some of the models who had once inspired them.[83] Basil outdoes his father, who is said to yield first place in virtue to no one save Basil himself.[84] He further surpasses Adam, Enosh, Enoch, Noah, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Joseph, and Samuel.[85] Notably, although we see many New Testament figures being equalled or rivalled, none appears here to be surpassed. Nazianzen's brother Caesarius is said to outdo exemplars in virtues for which they were almost proverbial, such as the simplicity of Crates.[86] When praising his sister through their parents, Nazianzen says that his mother surpassed her Old Testament model, Sarah, in at least one

[81] Naz. *Or.* 43.75–76.
[82] Naz. *Or.* 43.75: . . . μὴ προτιθεὶς μηδὲ εἰς ἶσον μετάγων τὸν ἄνδρα τῷ ἐν γεννητοῖς γυναικῶν ὑπὲρ ἅπαντας, ταύτην ποιοῦμαι τὴν παρεξέτασιν· ἀλλὰ ζηλωτὴν ἀποφαίνων καί τι τοῦ χαρακτῆρος ἐκείνου ἐν ἑαυτῷ φέροντα. Οὐ γὰρ μικρὸν τοῖς σπουδαίοις καὶ μικρὰ τῶν μεγίστων ἡ μίμησις. Cf. *Matthew* 11:11.
[83] As with the equalling and rivalling, in Athanasius' case it is not entirely clear which exemplars are surpassed. Naz. *Or.* 21.4: ἔστι δὲ οὓς καὶ ὑπερέσχεν, εἰ μὴ τολμηρὸν εἰπεῖν . . . λόγῳ μὲν τοὺς εὐδοκίμους ἐν λόγῳ, πράξει δὲ τοὺς πρακτικωτάτους ὑπερβαλών
[84] Naz. *Or.* 43.10.
[85] This occurs throughout Naz. *Or.* 43.70–77, where surpassing is sometimes indicated by adversative conjunctions and sometimes by comparative adjectives (e.g. Joseph at 43.72) or the comparative adverb μᾶλλον modifying verbs of praise (e.g. Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob at 43.71).
[86] Naz. *Or.* 7.10.

significant respect: whereas Sarah's greatness lay largely in her fidelity to her husband, whom she followed, Nonna was the occasion of her husband Gregory's conversion from the Hypsistarian sect and for his development as a Christian leader in Nazianzus.[87]

The aspirant may not always know when rivalry or surpassing has been successful, especially if the finish line is death. Gregory nevertheless shows that he expects his ethical aspirants to have surpassing his exemplars as a conscious goal. For instance, he concludes the oration *On Love for the Poor* by recalling the ways in which figures from the New Testament—the Magi, Mary Magdalene, Joseph of Arimathea, and Nicodemus—showed their love for Christ, namely by material gifts of gold, oils, and necessities for burial. Then he contrasts these with what he believes is the superior way his listeners may show their devotion to Christ in the present: by showing mercy and compassion to the poor.[88] By loving the poor as Christ taught us, we can outdo and surpass even the famous figures who loved him during his earthly sojourn.

Phase 8: Δρόμος (Pursuit of other exemplars)

I rely on inference for the existence of this stage more than for others. The opening sections of the oration of Athanasius emphasize an ascent through virtue to God, and are immediately followed by a list of exemplars who allegedly espoused this ascent as their "philosophy." It is only after this that we have the claim of Athanasius' selection of different virtues and their notable exemplars from among that list.[89] His education shortly thereafter is presented as a sequence, and while the process of selecting exemplars is not, it

[87] Naz. *Or.* 8.4.
[88] Naz. *Or.* 14.40.
[89] Naz. *Or.* 21.1–3, 4.

is difficult to see how the process of combining all the virtues, as he is said to do, could be done all at once.[90]

Basil, too, shows an ascent. He began with just his father, impressive man though he was,[91] and later we hear that when he is made bishop he begins something new, i.e. "ever surpassing himself by as much as he has been shown to have surpassed others up to this point" (τοσοῦτον ἑαυτὸν ὑπερβάλλων ἀεὶ ὅσον πρὸ τούτου τοὺς ἄλλους ἐδείκνυτο)." Nazianzen's claim that Basil set ever higher standards for himself as he rose in ecclesiastical office is reminiscent of Nyssen's framing of the moral life as the perpetual unfolding of an ever-deepening friendship with God.[92] His exhortation for us all to take Moses as an exemplar suggests that the groups (priests, elders, Hebrews, beasts) identified in the diagnostic model of Sinai—which the two Gregorys share—should not be taken too statically. There may be movement between exemplars.

Carm. 1.2.7 *De castitate* begins with the claim that "every virtue, if you are just, brings you one step higher."[93] No sequence is specified, and the context gives us more of an intensification of the virtue of chastity corresponding to different stations of life than it does a progression through different virtues. Nonetheless, it is certainly an ascent with discreet modes of virtuous living occupying discrete steps on a ladder. In the light of Gregory's association of particular virtues with particular exemplars, it seems that exemplars, too, are meant to be consulted by turns.[94]

For Christian exemplarists like Nazianzen and his friends, a structuring τέλος to this process of looking for new exemplars is found in the imitation of God, both in Jesus Christ

[90] Naz. *Or.* 21.6, 4.
[91] Naz. *Or.* 43.9–12.
[92] Naz. *Or.* 43.38; Nyss. *De vita Moysis* 2.141–145.
[93] Naz. 1.2.7 *De Castitate* 37.648–649. Ἀρετὴ πᾶσα δικαῖοις / ἕνα βαθμὸν προβιβάζει.
[94] Julian professes not to have equalled his exemplars, but at least to have progressed and improved himself at *Misopogon* 353cd.

and in the Godhead. This super-exemplar seems meant to be at the heart of all exemplarist striving, both that of aspirants in any present moment and that of historic sub-exemplars the aspirants would imitate; and this super-exemplar serves both as a conscious goal and as a quietly enabling agent of the aspirant's efforts and transformation. Elucidating the relation between this super-exemplar and all other sub-exemplars was an initial motivation for the present study; as it happens, I have only been able to clear the ground for it.[95]

Phase 9: Τὸ γενέσθαι παράδειγμα (Becoming a new exemplar)

I noted in the Coda to Chapter 3 that Nazianzen and Nyssen in particular are keen to 'canonize' certain of their contemporaries—family members, friends, and other churchmen—as exemplars in their own right.[96] This regularly proceeds by comparisons with established exemplars, some of which have been noted throughout this study. Commemoration is an indication that one has 'made it,' regardless of whether one has matched one's models in every respect, fallen short by a little, or indeed surpassed them. Thus, at the end of the footrace, becoming an exemplar is a further possible outcome and can be a goal for aspirants. As in a race, the aspirant may not realise where he or she has finished; it is usually for others to judge.

That it is possible even in post-Scriptural times to become an exemplar is evident from Nazianzen's justification for martyr cults. He first outlines Scriptural stimuli to virtue, but then places more recent martyrs on their level: the Scriptures give us many lessons (παιδεύματα) in virtue, in the form of both teachings and exemplars, "but no less

[95] One wonders whether the Christian focus on one supreme and imitable exemplar in Jesus left its mark on Julian's exemplarism, e.g. in the way the other gods' virtues and patronages are but facets of or participations in those of Zeus. Cf. Jul. *Contra Galilaeos* 115de and above, Chapter 2, 83.
[96] See above, 178.

instructive for us are the martyrs (οὐδὲν ἔλαττον ἡμῖν εἰς παιδαγωγίαν οἱ μάρτυρες)," i.e. those who have suffered for Christ after the end of the New Testament.[97] To take another case, those of Basil's family who survived the last pagan persecutions did so in such a way as to live on as "coaches in virtue, living martyrs, breathing monuments, silent proclamations."[98] Their silent teaching must be by their example. Moreover, listeners are meant to think of these nearly martyred confessors—Basil's most formative exemplars—as people who were formerly moral aspirants, as he was and as Gregory's audience is: they have been crowned by Christ, for they "imitated his contest for our sake."[99] Thus, perseverance in the work of imitating a great exemplar results in the attainment of exemplary status.[100]

Gorgonia's father and mother, while equalling and in some ways surpassing Abraham and Sarah, also become exemplars for men and women, respectively, just as these Old Testament models had been for Nyssen.[101] Such exemplars not only help other people in the ethical life, but can also make them exemplary in turn. The very mention of their names is an "exhortation to virtue (ἀρετῆς παράκλησιν)."[102] For another instance, Basil's parents are praised as being preeminent in virtue not only on their own account, but also on account of the fact that their children are so outstanding—children who, as Nazianzen has taken pains to show, became outstanding in part by imitating their parents.[103] Exemplary persons make others exemplary—and become more exemplary for it. This is a special function of exemplars like Basil, who, upon becoming public figures, also become

[97] Naz. *Or.* 24.4.
[98] Naz. *Or.* 43.5.
[99] Naz. *Or.* 43.5: στεφανοῖ Χριστὸς τοὺς τὴν ἐκείνου μιμησαμένους ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἄθλησιν.
[100] Julian polemically implies that a universally beneficial exemplarism is an integral part of pagan παιδεία; anyone who spends his time in the study of Greek literature becomes a boon to all humanity, even turning out ἡρωικός: Jul. *Contra Galilaeos* 229c–e.
[101] Naz. *Or.* 8.5; Nyss. *De vita Moysis* 1.11.
[102] Naz. *Or.* 8.4.
[103] Naz. *Or.* 43.9.

responsible for making those under their authority more virtuous, precisely by dint of their own virtue.[104] Basil's own presence is morally transformative both in memory and in literary encounter.[105]

Ἄθλησις: Rivalry between aspirants

The agonistic rivalries that play out between an aspirant and his or her models are not the only ones envisioned in Nazianzen's ethical exemplarism: aspirants are meant to contend with each other, too. This is a recurring theme found throughout Nazianzen's orations, and here we should recall from Chapter 2 the pervasively competitive spirit of ancient education.[106]

Nazianzen's parents enjoyed a marriage that was exemplary in many ways, including in mutual emulation: "they beat all the rest, but they cannot beat each other, because they were equally balanced and dignified in virtue."[107] Similarly, "husband and wife had in common both their wealth and their eagerness to give it away in their mutual rivalry to attain what is noblest."[108] Elsewhere they are "each others' rivals (κατ' ἀλλήλους ἀμιλλωμένους)" in the pursuit of virtues.[109]

Nazianzen presents the apostles Peter and John as exemplars who compete with each other in their pursuit of Christ and who should therefore be imitated in their competitive headlong sprint towards Jesus' empty tomb. "Let us hurry, let us run together, let us *race* there together, competing against each other to reach this good thing first (σπεύδωμεν,

[104] Naz. *Or.* 43.38.
[105] Naz. *Or.* 43.67.
[106] See above, Chapter 2, 65–6.
[107] Naz. *Or.* 18.7: ἐπεὶ τῶν ἄλλων κρατοῦντες, ἀλλήλων κρατεῖν οὐκ εἶχον, διὰ τὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἰσόῤῥοπον καὶ ὁμότιμον.
[108] Naz. *Or.* 18.21: Τὰ μὲν γὰρ χρήματα κοινὰ, καὶ ἡ προθυμία τοῦ παρέχειν, αὐτῷ τε καὶ τῇ ὁμοζύγῳ πρὸς τὸ κάλλιστον ἀμιλλωμένοις.
[109] Naz. *Or.* 8.5.

συντρέχοντες, ἀντιτρέχοντες, ὅπως ἂν τὸ ἀγαθὸν προλάβωμεν ἀγωνιζόμενοι)."[110] The verbs of hastening and running, the replacement of a cooperative with a competive prefix in the τρέχω verbs, and the language of the ἀγών accentuate the urgency of Gregory's exhortation. Similarly, in his praise of the contemplative life he describes the monks who practice it as having died to normal human concerns, "for they are each other's whole world, and they hone their virtue by mutual comparison (ἀλλήλοις δὲ κόσμος ὄντες, καὶ τῇ παραθέσει τὴν ἀρετὴν θήγοντες)."[111]

Praising an exemplar benefits the *laudator*, and this, too, can be turned into a competition. Exhorting his audience to join in praising Athanasius, he asks them to compete with each other to offer the most lavish praise. After claiming in extremely bold terms that Athanasius is the fulfillment of New Testament templates (not only of the ideal bishop outlined in *1 Timothy*, but also of the Christological high priest in *Hebrews*[112]), he asks for help in praising his Alexandrian hero. There are too many virtues for one man to praise, he says, and he can hardly keep track of them all, so stunningly beautiful is one after another. "So come, divide up his noble traits, as many of you as have praised him and witnessed him, and strive in a noble contest against each other, men together with women, young men and maidens, old men with younger, priests and people, those who live alone and those in the thick of things, men of simplicity and men of precision, men of contemplation and men of action." Nazianzen draws special correspondences between walks of life and the diverse virtues exhibited by Athanasius, with each virtue or virtuous action-type benefitting a particular group of people in a particular way. Each category is

[110] Naz. *Or.* 40.25.
[111] Naz. *Or.* 21.19. My translation of παράθεσις as "mutual comparison" is interpretive but warranted by the context; strictly a juxtaposition, it can nonetheless have comparative force, and is used alongside σύγκρισις simply to mean comparison by e.g. Polybius at 16.29.5.
[112] Naz. *Or.* 21.10. Gregory dares as much "because Scripture is able to call 'Christs' those who live in accordance with Christ (ἐπειδὴ Χριστοὺς οἶδε καλεῖν ἡ Γραφὴ τοὺς ζῶντας κατὰ Χριστόν)." Browne and Swallow suggest *Psalm* 105:15; no comment from Mossay (1980).

apparently represented by members of the audience who are exhorted to praise their patronal virtue in Athanasius so as to outdo their peers.[113]

Competition can also take place between people pursuing different exemplars. Relating the stories of Basil's family during the last persecution, when they survived in the woods of Pontus on miraculously self-offering game, Nazianzen apparently turns to pagans in his audience and challenges them to tell their best hunting-related stories, to very grim representatives of which he then alludes derisively. Tell the stories, he dares them, if that sort of thing "is a stimulus to ambition for you (εἴ τι τοσοῦτον εἰς φιλοτιμίαν ἔστι σοι)."[114] Here Gregory takes it almost as self-evident that a good story should spur the hearer on to ambition (φιλοτιμία, often with a competitive sense). The ambition is in the first instance a pursuit of and eventually a competition with the exemplar of one story (or several from a set of stories), but it is also a competition between contemporaries in the present working with very different exemplarist narrative frameworks. Put simply, let the pagan set of characters inspire you to rivalry for excellence, if they can; but just see how they, and their fruits in your life, stack up against the inspiration drawn from and the achievements provoked by the Christian set of stories in the lives of their listeners.

Gregory's exemplarised heroes model for his audiences what he believes it is to pursue virtue, and they do so in large part by competing with each other, their moral outcomes being treated like successes in an athletic competition. But for Nazianzen as for Nyssen, Basil, and the author of *Hebrews*, this is not exemplarism for exemplarism's sake: that exemplary status will be beneficial only insofar as exemplars and aspirants alike are drawn onward to strive after Christ.[115]

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[113] Naz. *Or.* 21.10.
[114] Naz. *Or.* 43.8. The addressee of the remarks is "one who marvels at myths (ὁ τοὺς μύθους θαυμάζων)."
[115] *Hebrews* 12:1–2; Naz. 21.1–2, where praising Athanasius means praising virtue, which means praising God, which is then connected to θέωσις; cf. Nyss. *De vita Moysis* 2.174, 2.143–145; Bas. *Adversus*

Φυγή: The paradigmatic experience of exemplarist avoidance

A significant amount of Nazianzen's exemplarism is devoted to the avoidance of negative exemplars. The mass examplars of errant Israelites and the Jews of the contemporary diaspora may be just as helpful to the moral aspirant as the positive ones are. He wants to ask his audience, who know the answer, "what caused these disasters, so that we may learn concord through other people's vices."[116] He hopes that discord amongst the Jews will lead his schism-prone congregation to avoid that negative example and so develop the opposing virtue, concord. Reproaching the congregation for their own vices, he implies that they have exceeded the viciousness of this consistently discordant group exemplar by first practicing peace and then abandoning it. The result is that the congregation will be at once dissuaded by the example of others and shamed by the fact that their own example is worse.[117] Sodom and Gomorrah, Lot's vacillating wife, the nine lepers ungrateful for their healing, and the deceitful Ananias and Sapphira are amongst Gregory's other apotreptic resources in Scripture.[118]

Julian, however, is Nazianzen's most vividly depicted negative exemplar, being the object of two long invectives. In addition to drawing out of his accuser a number of Biblical exemplars, especially of wicked Old Testament kings, Julian elicits a declaration that Nazianzen has composed the diptych as a lasting memorial to the apostate emperor and a warning to future generations:

> This [textual monument] cannot but be borne abroad and known by all men everywhere. Future ages will receive it, I know well, as a memorial of you and your deeds, and it will teach all other men not to attempt any such rebellion against God, lest, by similar deeds, they run up against the same consequences.[119]

Eunomium V, 29.737, probably spurious: Sesboüé *et al*. (1982) (*SC* 299) 61–64. In a pagan Neoplatonic key, Jul. *Or*. 1, 48ab; *Or*. 2, 100d–101a; *Caesares* 333bc; imitation of the gods, *Contra Galilaeos* 171d.
[116] Naz. *Or*. 6.16.
[117] Naz. *Or*. 6.19.
[118] Respectively, Naz. *Or*. 21.7, 16.14, 40.33, 14.24.
[119] Naz. *Or*. 5.42. From the start of *Oratio* 4, Nazianzen has had a wide readership in view.

Whatever someone may find alluring in Julian's record, Gregory hopes that his own exemplarisation of the fallen emperor as a wicked man will serve to jolt a potential admirer's conscience by the purported reality of the emperor's character and the prospect of an unrepentant demise.

There is a competitive sense of rivalry here, too. In Julian and his faction Nazianzen gives Christians a hortatory foil: by their lives, his listeners are meant to show the world that they are better than their pagan peers, proving the emptiness and evil of Julian's doctrine against the truth and practical superiority of their own.[120]

Sometimes Gregory tries to demolish other exemplars and declare them negative, or even inapplicable. Once he takes Novatian, the namesake of the rival Novatianist sect, as a hypothetical exemplar—as Novatianists presumably did—only to explode his credibility. "What kind of law should I take Novatian's hatred of mankind to be? This man did not punish greed, a second idolatry, but sharply judged fornication as harshly as if he were not himself flesh and body."[121]

Exemplarist avoidance thus modifies the schema above. The encounter (Phase 1: βλέψις) is meant not to trigger admiration and awe (Phase 2: θαῦμα), but revulsion or even terror (ἀποστροφή, φόβος). When the negative exemplar is properly settled upon for consideration (Phase 3: εὕρεσις), it provides a standard of comparison (Phase 4: σύγκρισις) adequate to fuel virtuous activity opposed to the vices which the negative exemplar displays (Phase 5: μίμησις and onward).

[120] Naz. *Or.* 5.36, from γενώμεθα τούτῳ κρείττους τῶν ἠδικηκότων καὶ ὑψηλότεροι.
[121] Naz. *Or.* 39.19.

Exemplarism gone wrong

For all the utility Gregory seems to find in exhorting his audiences to imitate exemplars, he nevertheless highlights the ways this may go wrong. There are at least two: (1) the failed imitation or even avoidance of good exemplars, and (2) the imitation of bad exemplars. We will look at each of these briefly.

Ἀπόλειψις: The failed imitation and avoidance of good exemplars

A well-meaning but insufficiently self-aware engagement with good exemplars may result in their misapplication or even rejection. Admonishing young would-be theologians to stay humble and not attempt their discipline's heights before they are truly ready to scale them, Gregory anticipates the exemplarist objection that Daniel and others were judges as young men. But the "examples on their tongues (τὰ παραδείγματα ἐπὶ γλώσσης)" are to be dismissed, "for every doer of injustice is ready to defend himself."[122] It is an act of arrogance and a failure of self-knowledge to take the wrong exemplars as one's role models at the wrong times, or to do so incompletely, not taking, for instance, Daniel's humility alongside his youth. This is also the sense of the passages on Sinai we saw above, and of identifying with the right sort of Israelite so as to know how, or even whether, to approach the study of theology. Here there is no disagreement about the positive character of the exemplars; instead the failure occurs at the level of discernment, diagnostics, and selection (Phase 3).

The results can be as destructive as if one had imitated a vicious exemplar from the start. Arguing for late baptism on the grounds of Christ's majority at the time of his

[122] Naz. *Or.* 39.14.

encounter with John in the Jordan is a failure to apply a good exemplar analogically, and even jeopardises the catechumen's soul.[123] Imitating other exemplars too superficially can result in a sickly pseudo-monasticism, "many Basils in appearance" who miss the point of their exemplar's ascetic life.[124] Julian and his co-religionists failed in a policy-level instance of envious distortion of the Christian preoccupation with acts of charity as well as sacramental unity, in that they tried to coordinate and enliven the myriad pagan cults of the empire by imitating the Church. For Nazianzen, the inept aping practised by these men was bound to fail, since, on a grander and more perverse scale than the would-be Basils, they get the foundations hopelessly wrong.[125] This could be due to a constricted, slightly misdirected admiration (Phase 2), or a failure of discernment (Phase 3), or a bungled comparison of self and exemplar (Phase 4).

Zagzebski highlights the ways in which a perceived inability to attain to virtue can spiral into resentment and rejection of the virtues initially pursued.[126] Nazianzen knows this phenomenon from the Gospels and warns of where it leads. Taking the parable of the kind master and the wicked servant in exemplarist terms, he says that the servant "does not follow the magnanimous example (οὐδὲ . . . τῷ τῆς μεγαλοψυχίας ἑπόμενος ὑποδείγματι)" that he is shown.[127] In spite of having his debts forgiven, he is cruel to his own debtors. Nazianzen elsewhere presents the rest of the story as a hypothetical for his listeners' own lives. If you live out the tale of *ressentiment* to its grim conclusion, he warns, you will be accountable to God, whose benevolence "you did not imitate by taking it as your model (ἣν οὐκ ἐμιμήσω λαβὼν ὑπόδειγμα)."[128] The phenomenon of jealousy stimulating not

[123] Naz. *Or*. 40.30.
[124] Naz. *Or*. 43.77. Incidentally, the remark shows that even without Nazianzen's encouragement the desire to imitate contemporary exemplars was alive and well.
[125] Naz. *Or*. 4.111.
[126] Zagzebski (2017), 58–9.
[127] Naz. *Or*. 17.11.
[128] Naz. *Or*. 40.31.

emulation but rejection occurs in one of Nazianzen's invectives (if the passage is not wholly sarcastic): "For since he [Julian] could not surpass him [Constantius] in virtue and better deeds, he took pleasure in distinguishing himself for the opposite, namely through intemperate impiety and ambition for what is worse."[129] In both the elaborated parable and the invective, the exemplars were actually well chosen. The failure in both cases has instead to do with a flawed affective response, and something like revulsion is felt instead of admiration (Phase 2), possibly after a regression from an unsatisfactory comparison (Phase 4) or attempted application (Phase 5).

Κακομίμησις:[130] *The imitation of bad exemplars*

More worrisome is the imitation of flatly vicious exemplars. Nazianzen claims that Julian himself got where he was by way of imitation, as if it were an obvious fact. "What kind of model was he following when he made himself well-known for impiety, and, what is even more bizarre, contended against the man who had promoted him?"[131] This focusses the audience's attention on the barrage of wicked exemplars and warns them to be alert to the models they themselves follow. Behaviour is to be explained by recourse to the models it imitates.[132]

Years later, the moral development of Julian still haunted Gregory, and in his oration for Athanasius, he describes the apostate emperor not simply as rejecting his cousin's path, but in fact as "imitating in manifold craftiness the evil one [i.e. Satan] who lived inside

[129] Naz. *Or*. 4.38: Ἐπειδή γε ὑπερβάλλειν οὐκ ἦν ἀρετῇ καὶ τοῖς κρείττοσι, διὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου φανῆναι φιλονεικήσας τῆς εἰς δυσσέβειαν ἀμετρίας, καὶ τῆς περὶ τὸ χεῖρον φιλοτιμίας.
[130] This term I have not derived from Nazianzen or his peers. Κακομιμήτως, however, is found in Arist. *Poet.* 25.10, 1460b30 sqq. (although there the sense is of ineptitude rather than wickedness).
[131] Naz. *Or*. 4.38: ποίῳ δὲ καὶ ἀκολουθῶν ὑποδείγματι, γνωριμώτατον ἑαυτὸν ἐξ ἀσεβείας κατέστησε, καὶ καινότερον τρόπον ἠμιλλήθη τῷ ἀναδείξαντι;
[132] A similar interpretation is given the wise and foolish maidens at Naz. *Or*. 40.46.

him."[133] Just as God can be imitated, so, too, can the devil. Similarly, Nazianzen says the emperor Valens imitates an evil spirit.[134]

When discussing the precariousness of virtue, in a passage that may be taken as criticizing either himself, Basil, or both, Gregory invokes a negative exemplar. King Saul, he says, shows that "maintaining one's worthiness and moral fitness is just as difficult as the possession of these qualities in the first place."[135]

The builders of the tower of Babel are negative exemplars who are unfortunately, if unwittingly, imitated by theologians who unsystematically memorise a few verses of Scripture pulled out of context. Worse, haphazardness in theological inquiry leads us to "senselessly turn against Moses and become Dathan and Abiram, those outrageous and godless men. But let us avoid their overboldness, and neither imitate their madness nor suffer their fate."[136] Here, a failure to act well has led to good exemplars being replaced with bad ones.

Just as it is possible to outdo positive models in attaining levels of virtue higher than theirs, so, too, can one outdo negative models in vice. A particularly grim case occurs towards the end of the second oration against Julian. Before anticipating the sorts of tortures that await the apostate emperor in hell, he names Tantalus, Tityos, and Ixion as famous mythological inhabitants of the underworld. "Julian, the king of this clan of yours, is going to be counted among them, indeed ahead of the rest, as I reckon it." He runs through the mythical figures' famous torments, then adds darkly, "but we will see with what means and in what ways, and how much worse than all the rest he is punished."

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[133] Naz. *Or.* 21.32.
[134] Naz. *Or.* 43.44.
[135] Naz. *Or.* 9.2.
[136] Naz. *Or.* 32.17: καὶ ἀπονοηθῆναι δεῖ κατὰ Μωϋσέως, καὶ γενέσθαι Δαθὰν καὶ Ἀβειρὼν τοὺς ὑβριστὰς καὶ ἀθέους. Ὧν φύγωμεν τὴν αὐθάδειαν, καὶ μηδὲ τὴν ἀπόνοιαν μιμησώμεθα, μηδὲ τὸ τέλος δεξώμεθα. Cf. *Exodus* 2:13–15; *Numbers* 16.

Notably, Tantalus, Tityos, and Ixion are all guilty of some arrogant offence against the gods. Julian is like them in offending against heaven, though this time, of course, against the Christian God, which will merit a punishment far worse.[137]

Conclusion

Gregory of Nazianzus nowhere presents a systematized ethical exemplarism. But his corpus is shot through with descriptive comparisons and normative exhortations that rely on exemplars, and in the ways he presents these exemplars we can glimpse the outlines of a coherent schema. He shows how models may serve as guides to the ethical landscape, how they help us to acquire and practise the virtues and to root out and avoid vices. Debts to the methods of παιδεία are discernible: Nazianzen has transferred not just *what* he has learned from his schoolmasters but also the *techniques by which* he has learned the material from the 'classroom' to the church. At the same time, he and his Christian peers give a focus and an ordering end to that host of exemplars and the toolkit of their methods, in prizing above all the imitation of an ultimate exemplar, the God-Man Jesus.

[137] Naz. *Or.* 5.38. He chastises Constantinopolitans for following bad examples at *Or.* 22.5–6. Mercifully, sometimes we can follow bad exemplars in less harmful ways, e.g. by admiring real virtues in people who do not in fact have them, as Nazianzen experienced in admiring Maximus the confidence man; see Naz. *Orationes* 25 and 26. Christians are bad exemplars not to be imitated at Jul. *Or.* 7, 224a sqq.

Conclusion

Histories of Lives are seldom entertaining, unless they contain something either admirable or exemplar.

'*Mrs Silence Dogood' (Benjamin Franklin), Letter 2 (1722)*

Nazianzen, Basil, Nyssen, and Julian give us a glimpse of a fascinating moment of cultural upheaval. Their roles in that story have proved fertile for important studies in literary, theological, and biographical history. Yet since methodological choices necessary for these studies risk fuelling interdisciplinary incomprehension, it is important to consider material that keeps the thread from unravelling.[1] Exemplarism provides such a link. As this exercise in exemplar analysis draws to a close, let us survey its principal findings.

In Chapter 1, I provided quantitative context for Demoen's work on Nazianzen's use of exempla by noting the incidence of exempla in absolute terms, which I called volume, and in occurrences per unit of text, which I called density. It turns out that Nazianzen tends to be towards the higher end of the set of eight authors whose selected works I considered, but he does not top every list. This shows that even if he is not entirely typical, he is very far from idiosyncratic in the number of exemplars he employs and the rate at which he presents them to his readers. Far from refuting anything in Demoen, these results make his findings all the more significant as indications of fourth-century practices. By nuancing the historical divisions applied to the exempla used in Nazianzen and others, I

[1] Paradigmatic of the three directions would be the mostly literary approach in Demoen (1996) *passim*, the theological in Zachhuber (2020) 15–71, and the biographical in Van Dam (2003) *passim* but e.g. 18–24.

have furthermore been able to show some shared tendencies in the periods of reference. Athanasius and Lucifer display very similar preferences (in the divided kingdom and the Gospels above all), whereas Hilary's Old Testament interests diverge; Julian has most in common with Synesius (Athens and the Tetrarchate); the brothers Basil and Nyssen are in tight agreement (the New Testament and the Exodus). Like this last pair, Nazianzen draws many exempla from the Gospels, but prefers the Exodus. Small sample sizes render these findings tentative, but this framework may be easily applied to the rest of Demoen's Nazianzen inventories and to any inventories produced subsequently for other authors to complete our picture.

The first half of Chapter 2 brought the background of Cappadocian educational culture up to date by highlighting recent research on schoolroom practice, including papyrological remains, in which particular exemplars were compiled in lists, in support of long-studied literary accounts of classroom exercises with mimetic, exemplarist overtones. This set the stage for a clearer understanding of how exemplars learned from schooldays could figure in the practical *paideia* that Julian, Basil, Nyssen, and Nazianzen promoted throughout their professional careers as polemicists, teachers, preachers, and leaders.

The second half of Chapter 2 through the end of Chapter 4 gives us an analytical compendium of some of the principal exemplars associated with virtues and vices in the writings of these four men. The results are of course incomplete, but they amount to the broadest and deepest such collection of which I am aware. In it we saw our authors take many shared but more often idiosyncratic approaches to gods, heroes, saints, and even their own friends. The findings as a whole allow us to dispense with the notion that they were working from an absolutely canonical set of virtue–exemplar associations from which they did not deviate. This is as true of the Christian authors as it is of Julian, and for Biblical figures as much as for secular ones, in spite of the canonicity that one might

expect these characters' appearances in Biblical history to confer, and in spite of the fact that all of our authors are deeply invested in associating exemplars with virtues and vices for imitation and avoidance. Along the way, we saw recent predecessors, acquaintances, friends, and even family members undergo similar processes of exemplarisation. Amongst idiosyncracies worth recalling, Nazianzen certainly remains the most enthusiastic user of pagan exemplars, but he highlights their vices as much as he does their virtues. He is the only one to use the gods as exemplars on a large scale and to transpose their virtues onto Christian exemplars. Basil, partly charting a course he subtly lays out in *Ad adolescentes*, stays more sanguine about the smaller number of pagan exemplars he uses. Nyssen is the most abstemious regarding pagan stories, but he, too, partakes.

In Chapter 5, we we saw that in Nazianzen it is possible to find a robust Hellenic Christian answer to recent frameworks proposed for understanding Roman exemplarism. While certain aspects of the developmental moral psychology I outline may be found in Langlands and Roller (and Zagzebski), my documentation of the process outlined in Gregory goes beyond their analytical frameworks and offers a new contribution to the study of ancient exemplarism.

The resulting picture of exemplarism in the fourth-century moral imagination is a complex one. To take up Burke's image, let us suppose a single, public wardrobe of this moral imagination. It is already stocked. Four men arrive, each with his own trunk. A tense scene ensues: the first looks inside the wardrobe, pulls a few articles out, and discards them. He opens his trunk and adds some items he has brought with him. Another does similarly. A third picks up what he can from the discarded heap and puts it back in the wardrobe; perhaps he has time to dust or re-dye some of the cloth. Articles that never leave the wardrobe get pushed from side to side; one contestant's coveralls will be another's Sunday best. There is a general scramble to stock, empty, and restock the

wardrobe until its contents reflect the "decent drapery of life" as each of these men saw it. As far as exemplars in Julian and the Cappadocians are concerned, my study has shown that this is very far from being a simple three-against-one effort. A zealous provincial bishop and a notorious imperial apostate may sometimes find themselves reaching for the same item and for similar reasons.

Such a scene at the wardrobe of the contested public moral imagination results in our set as a whole showing competition between pagan and Christian exemplars for patronage of the same virtues or vices. For instance, Jesus and Joseph can be found as representatives of clemency and love of mankind alongside Zeus, Solon, Lycurgus, Alexander, Trajan, and Pericles. Moses and Job show courage alongside Odysseus, Lycurgus, Pyrrhus, Epaminondas, Julius Caesar, Alexander, and others. The god Dionysus is a binge drinker like Noah and Lot. Endurance is found in Odysseus, Epaminondas, Pericles, Zeno, and Diogenes as well as David, Job, Daniel, Jesus, Stephen, and Paul. Of lawgivers and governors we have exemplars in Zeus, Athena, Homer, Solon, Lycurgus, Moses, Samuel, and Diocletian. Plato and Alexander the Great are found to be just, as are Noah, Solomon, Paul, and many others. The meek or mild include Abraham, Moses, David, and Jesus, but also Solon, Alexander the Great, and Trajan. While pagans provide the great share of successful military conquerors, from Athena and Ares through Achilles to Alexander, Caesar, Trajan, and more, Moses and David, too, jostle for such recognition, lonely Judaeo-Christian contenders for the title before the Constantinian dynasty. *Paideia*-heroes, those exemplars of giving or receiving a good education, include Apollo, Chiron, Achilles, Odysseus, Abraham, Moses, Daniel, Cyrus the Great, Socrates, and Zeno of Elea. Achilles, Moses, and David can show righteous anger. The Cynics share with Elijah, Jesus, Zacchaeus and others a love of simplicity and poverty. Heracles, Diogenes, and Moses are lovers of toil. Temperance is hotly contested: notable names include Odysseus,

Solon, Aristides, Plato, Alexander, Joseph, Moses, David, and Daniel. So, too, is wisdom: Odysseus, Homer, Lycurgus, Solon, Demosthenes, Socrates, Plato, and Zeno run up against challengers in Moses, Solomon, and Daniel. Abraham, Moses and Odysseus are friends of God, or the gods; they, along with Heracles, Aristides, Pericles, Job, and Stephen, are found at times as all-rounders in virtue. Solomon's idolatry is a deviation from his wisdom or the very proof of it; Abraham and Moses, monotheists though they be, can be trotted out as theurgists and augurs. One man's God-Man is another man's loser. Some virtues, like magnanimity or, as we saw, martial virtue, are still dominated by pagans.[2] Others, such as humility, faith, hope, and love (especially φιλαδελφία and ἀγάπη), and practices such as celibacy, have virtually only Christian exemplars, and room has to be found for them.[3] (For a tabular summary of these sample findings at a glance, see the Appendix to the Conclusion, Table 1.[4])

An old question that lingers in the background is why, once there were no more Julians in the fray at the wardrobe, the thing was not emptied entirely of all pagan exemplars. Setting aside apologetic and theological accounts of pagan virtue, it has been suggested that one reason for the material being transmitted even by ardent anti-pagan Christian polemicists may have been the utility of having "non-controversial matter for controversy."[5] If some elements of pagan educational culture were worthwhile, and involved students having to take opposing sides in arguing for the virtues or vices of characters without caring in the first instance about the truth of the person, it was better, perhaps, to use stories that no one could take too seriously. In learning to hone both sides

[2] Zacchaeus is the only Christian exemplar I found showing magnanimity.
[3] We saw a humble Diocletian in Julian, doubtless trolling Christian readers; but as a pagan showing humility he is, in this study, virtually alone in a sea of the Christians he persecuted or their Israelite forebears.
[4] See below, 315.
[5] This hypothesis as well as its felicitous characterisation were suggested by Dr Emma Greensmith in conversation.

of an argument, it is presumably less destabilizing to the faith of a pious Christian student to learn to attack or defend the character of an Odysseus than, say, of a Moses. If the scepticism of the clever schoolboy is to set in, let it be about pagan myths, not salvation history.[6]

This may explain some of the persistence of pagan exemplars, though I have not found evidence to support it in the texts reviewed in this study. Even if there is such evidence, however, we will have to account differently for the eventual emergence of Biblical exempla in school or school-like contexts, too. Remaining within the explanatory framework of *paideia*, one answer to this question would be that some rhetorical exercises could be used to apply praise and blame to the right objects: the Biblical and Christian exempla give us the set of characters with determinate evaluations of heroes and villains. On this hypothesis, Biblical and Christian material would not appear in schooling, at least not as matter for progymnastic controversy; it would be as if, to take up the old formula, the pagan material were confined to the training of the man *dicendi peritus*, whereas the Christian material were confined to the training of the *vir bonus*. But we do now have evidence of ethopoetic material of a Biblical character from much earlier than previously believed: a poem on what Cain would have said upon killing Abel opens with a τί ἂν εἴποι characteristic of ethopoetic exercises. It has been dated to the late fourth or the early fifth century, forcing a revision of the view that such exercises with Christian characters began in the twelfth century, and incidentally taking us to the years of the Cappadocians' celebrity and early legacy.[7] Although not ethopoetic, much other Biblical and otherwise Christian school material survives, too, in what must be seen as a partial replacement of

[6] This therefore is a 'home front' move for the benefit of Christians rather than a stand against the pagans. Nazianzen explicitly takes aim at Christians who doubt the value of secular learning in his long description of Basil's exemplary erudition in his eulogy (*Or.* 43.10–25, esp. 11).
[7] Fournet (1992) 253–4 and 264. Alongside Biblical material, Nazianzen's own writings were eventually used as model texts in Byzantine schools: Simelides (2009) 75–79.

standard pagan school books: students would perhaps learn their letters not by copying Menander and friends, or at least not only that set, but also by means of the Psalms, prayers, and Paul's epistles. Thus, Cribiore reports that *Psalm* 1:1 is a source of orthography exercises and has, for instance, been found divided into syllables as early as the third century.[8] In a text attached to a document dated to 316, there is a similar school exercise involving the *Epistle to the Romans*.[9] While these exercises do not foreground exemplars, they are mimetic, training the student to imitate both Christian literary material and the hand and habits of a Christian teacher. By the eighth or ninth century, when Andrew of Crete would have been learning his letters, hymns to Christ and Mary, necessarily exemplaristic, could be found in school exercises, too.[10]

As for the pagan material, however, there is an explanation nearer to hand, simpler if less deliberate and programmatic. It is the same reason many of us begin reading any kind of ancient or foreign literature in the first place: the stories, however alien to our sensibilities, are exciting. For Nazianzen, Basil, and Nyssen, we might reformulate it as follows, and with apologies to 'Mrs Dogood' in the epigraph to this Conclusion: I suggest that exemplars are seldom employed to present something admirable or imitable unless they also contain something entertaining. Stories of pagans as well as tales from the Scriptures were found to have an undeniable charm, and that may have sufficed—especially where ethics could be found in them or inserted into them, to justify their preservation and transmission.

This dissertation has prepared the ground for asking further questions about the nature of exemplarism in late antiquity and beyond. One would involve more Demoen-style

[8] Cribiore (1996) 244, item 295, a papyrus tentatively dated to the third century.
[9] Cribiore (1996) 246–7, item 302. Other examples include *Psalm* 50 in a probable dictation exercise (251, item 317, probably sixth century) and the *Pater noster* (252–253, item 322, probably seventh century).
[10] Cribiore (1996) 253, item 324.

inquiries, as I attempted in Chapter 1, across the complete corpora of the authors in question. Another would be the comparison of ideal modes of imitation as found in different authors and at different times, by analogy with what we saw in Chapter 5. Sometimes I hint at the sarcasm that characterizes much of Julian's exemplarism, and work I have undertaken in another context shows that this runs very deep in his oratory; I was able to present just a few episodes here. It is possible that similar practices are to be found in other authors.

Further research along the lines I followed in Chapters 2–4 would improve our understanding of how old ethical exemplars fell and new ones arose. The method is simple and repeatable across the limitless material stretching from Homer to the present day. A peer-reviewed open-entry platform for the collection of this data would give us a more than impressionistic understanding of who the heroes and villains were, and when, and which virtues or vices they stood for, and in which authors. With sufficient data for a given linguistic or political sphere, diachronic videographic timelines could show the rise and fall of heroes and villains in the moral imagination. Such an experiment would be a useful tool for understanding historical changes in ethical and cultural priorities.

A final line of inquiry—in fact, my initial goal in undertaking this project, and one for which I did not realise I would only be carrying out preliminary research—would be an investigation of the relation between the imitation of finite exemplars of the sort we have seen in this study, and the imitation of the Godhead. This would be of particular interest in authors such as these, who posit some form of theosis as the goal of the ethical life. Tantalizing leads cropped up everywhere in my research, but time and space have not permitted me to explore this question here.

Nevertheless, I hope that this exercise in exemplar analysis has offered a glimpse of the late ancient moral imagination at a time of revolutionary flux, and that those who read it will find matter for reflection on the exemplars in their own lives.

Appendix to the Conclusion

Table 1. Sample set of some virtues and vices represented by pagan and Judaeo-Christian exemplars, as found in Nazianzen, Basil, Nyssen, and Julian.

Virtue or vice	Pagan exemplars	Judaeo-Christian exemplars
Courage	Odysseus, Lycurgus, Pyrrhus, Epaminondas, Julius Caesar, Alexander, et al.	Moses, Job
Justice	Plato, Alexander the Great, Aristides	Noah, Solomon, Paul, et al.
Temperance	Odysseus, Solon, Aristides, Plato, Alexander	Joseph, Moses, David, Daniel
Wisdom	Odysseus, Homer, Lycurgus, Solon, Demosthenes, Socrates, Plato, and Zeno	Moses, Solomon, Daniel
Drunkenness	Dionysus	Noah, Lot
Endurance	Odysseus, Epaminondas, Pericles, Zeno, Diogenes	David, Job, Daniel, Jesus, Stephen, Paul
Lawgiving & governing	Zeus, Athena, Homer, Solon, Lycurgus, Diocletian	Moses, Samuel
Meek / mild	Solon, Alexander the Great, Trajan	Abraham, Moses, David, and Jesus
Military might / generalship	Athena, Ares, Achilles, Alexander, Caesar, Trajan	Moses, David (later: Constantinians)
Paideia / education	Apollo, Chiron, Achilles, Odysseus, Cyrus the Great, Socrates, Zeno of Elea	Abraham, Moses, Daniel
Righteous anger	Achilles	Moses, David
Love of simplicity, poverty	Cynics	Elijah, Jesus, Zacchaeus
Loves of work	Heracles, Diogenes	Moses
Friends of God / gods	Odysseus	Abraham, Moses
General virtue	Odysseus, Heracles,	Abraham, Moses, Job, Stephen
Theurgy / pagan piety	Any great author	Abraham, Moses (!)
Humility	Diocletian (!)	Jesus
Zeal	–	Phinehas
Faith	–	Abraham
Hope	–	Enosh
Love	–	Paul, Jesus
Chastity	Alexander	Paul, Jesus

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Many of Basil's writings are still only readily available in Migne, which I list here; individual entries will show only the *PG* number and pagination. Where I use a title in my text or footnotes which is shorter or other than the title in edition from which I drew it, the footnoted title appears first in the lists below, followed by '= *Title in edition*.'

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Cf. *GNO Suppl.* (below).

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PG 29.497–572.

Adversus Eunomium II–III:

Sesboüé, Bernard, Georges-Matthieu de Durand, and Louis Doutreleau (1983) *Basile de Césarée : Contre Eunome [II & III], suivi de Eunome : Apologie*, t. II. *SC* 305. Paris: Cerf.

II: *PG* 29.573–652*; III*: *PG* 29.653–670.

Adversus Eunomium IV–V (probably spurious):

IV: *PG* 29.671–710; *V*: *PG* 29.710–774.

Homiliae in Psalmos:

Homilia in Psalmum 7: PG 29.227–250.

Homilia I in Psalmum 14: PG 29.249–264.

Homilia in Psalmum 29: PG 29.305–324.

Homilia in Psalmum 33: *PG* 29.350–386.

Homilia in Psalmum 44: *PG* 29.387–414.

Homilia in Psalmum 48: *PG* 29.431–460.

Homilia in Psalmum 114: *PG* 29.483–494.

Enarratio in prophetam Isaiam: PG 30.118–667.

Sermo de contubernalibus: *PG* 30.812–827.

De ieiunio I = De ieiunio homilia I: PG 31.163–184.

De ieiunio II = De ieiunio homilia II: PG 31.185–198.

Homilia dicta tempore famis et siccitatis: PG 31.303–328.

Adversus eos qui irascuntur = Homilia X – Adversus eos qui irascuntur: PG 31.353–372.

De invidia = Homilia XI – De invidia: PG 31.371–386.

In principium proverbiorum = Homilia XII – In principium proverbiorum: PG 31.385–424.

In ebriosos = Homilia XIV – In ebriosos: PG 31.443–464.

De fide (Hom. XV) = Homilia XV – De fide: PG 31.463–472.

In Barlaam = Homilia XVII in Barlaam martyrem: PG 31.483–490.

In Gordium = Homilia XVIII – In Gordium martyrem: PG 31.489–508.

In XL martyres = Homilia XIX – In sanctos quadraginta martyres: PG 31.507–526.

In Mamantem = Homilia XXIII – In sanctum martyrem Mamantem: PG 31.589–600.
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Homilia de paenitentia: PG 31.1475–1488.
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Prooem. Reg. fus. = Prooemium in Regulas fusius tractatas: *PG* 31.889–902.
Regulae fus. = Regulae fusius tractatae: PG 31.889–1052.
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Gregory of Nazianzus

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Or. 4–5
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Or. 24–26

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Ep. 103–249:

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Gregory of Nyssa

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Contra Eunomium 1–2: GNO I
Contra Eunomium 3: GNO II
Contra fatum: GNO III/2
Contra fornicarios: GNO IX
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De deitate filii et spiritus sancti et in Abraham: GNO X/2
De infantibus praemature abreptis: GNO III/2
De instituto christiano: GNO VIII/1
De mortuis oratio: GNO IX
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Emperor Julian the Apostate

My numbering for Julian's works always refers to Cave Wright's Loeb edition. While Bidez's is superior, Cave Wright's was all I had to hand during the height of the pandemic, when I did most of my research on Julian. Concordances for the letters can be found at the end of Cave Wright's vol. III, and for the orations in Bidez, t. I (1932). I did not use Nesselrath's edition, but it should now be consulted for the works Julian composed during his reign:

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