Burden-Sharing in Peace Operations: Quantitative Studies on the Global, Regional, and National Level



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Abstract

Increased demand for peacekeeping, rising resource requirements, and capacity constraints threaten to outstrip the willingness of the international community to shoulder the burden of peace operations. Not only has peacekeeping grown in size, but it has also become an increasingly complex undertaking involving a multitude of actors. This thesis addresses this challenge and asks: How does the international community share the burden of peace operations? The thesis argues that the question of peacekeeping burden-sharing emerges and requires exploration at various levels of analysis, most notably the global, regional, and national level. Three research articles explore peacekeeping burden-sharing each at one level of analysis. The first article, 'Partnership Peacekeeping: The Division of Labour Between the United Nations and Regional Organisations', develops and tests a framework for the division of the peacekeeping labour at the global level, specifically between the United Nations, African Union, and European Union, employing a crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis. The second article, 'Negotiating Collective Peace: The Provision of Troops to EU Peace Operations', examines the role of interrelationships between EU member states in the context of troop contributions to regional peace operations by means of panel data regressions on an original dataset of troop contributions to EU operations. The third article, 'Public Attention, Elections, and Peace Operations: Democratising the Making of Peacekeeping Policy', focuses on the national level and analyses whether countries' peacekeeping contributions are adjusted in the run-up to elections contingent upon public attention; the analysis deploys Google search data as a measure for public attention in panel data regression models. This multi-level approach generates a comprehensive understanding of burden-sharing in peace operations and insights into how to increase its efficiency and effectiveness, with the objective to ensure that peacekeeping can succeed as the international community's primary tool for creating and maintaining international peace and security.

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List of Abbreviations

AFISM-CAR African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic.

AFISMA African-led International Support Mission in Mali.

AMIB African Mission in Burundi.

AMIS African Union Mission in Sudan.

AMISEC African Union Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros.

AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia.

ASF African Standby Force.

AU African Union.

BINUB United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi.

BINUCA United Nations Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic.

BNUB United Nations Office in Burundi.

BONUCA United Nations Peace-Building Support Office in the Central African Republic.

CAR Central African Republic.

CIC Center on International Cooperation.

CNDD-FDD National Council for the Defense of Democracy–Forces for the Defense of Democracy.

CNDP National Congress for the Defence of the People.

CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy.

csQCA Crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis.

DDR Disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration.

DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo.

ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States.

ECOMIL Economic Community of West African States Mission in Liberia.

ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States.

EU European Union.

EU Support to AMIS EU Support to the African Union Mission in Sudan.

EUFOR Euroepan Union Force.

EUFOR Artemis/DRC Operation Artemis/European Union Force in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

EUFOR RCA European Union Force in the Central African Republic.

EUFOR RD Congo European Union Force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

EUFOR Tchad/RCA European Union Force in Chad and the Central African Republic.

EUMAM European Union Military Advisory Mission.

EUMAM RCA European Union Military Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic.

EUNAVFOR European Union Naval Force.

EUPOL European Union Police Mission.

EUSEC RD Congo European Union Mission to Provide Advice and Assistance for Security Sector Reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

EUTM European Union Training Mission.

EUTM Mali European Union Training Mission in Mali.

EUTM RCA European Union Training Mission in the Central African Republic.

EUTM Somalia European Union Training Mission in Somalia.

FACA Central African Armed Forces.

FDI Foreign direct investment.

FE Fixed effects.

FINUL United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon.

FNL National Forces of Liberation.

FOC Full Operating Capability.

fsQCA Fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis.

FUC United Front for Democratic Change.

GAERC General Affairs and External Relations Council.

GDP Gross domestic product.

GLS Generalised least squares.

GNP Gross national product.

HIPPO High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations.

ICGL International Contact Group on Liberia.

IFOR Implementation Force.

IGASOM Intergovernmental Authority on Development Peace Support Mission in Somalia.

IGO Intergovernmental organisation.

IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies.

INTERFET International Force East Timor.

INUS 'insufficient but necessary part of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the result'.

IPI International Peace Institute.

ISAF International Security Assistance Force.

KFOR Kosovo Force.

MAES African Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission in the Comoros.

MDJT Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad.

MICOPAX Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central African Republic.

MILINDA Military and Non-Military Interventions Dataset.

MINUAD African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur.

MINUCI United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire.

MINUEE United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea.

MINUK United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo.

MINUL United Nations Mission in Liberia.

MINURCA United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic.

MINURCAT United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad.

MINURSO United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara.

MINUSCA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic.

MINUSMA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali.

MINUSS United Nations Mission in South Sudan.

MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti.

MIP Most important problem.

MISCA African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic.

MISNUS United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria.

MNURCAT United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic.

MONUC United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

MONUG United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia.

MONUSCO United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

OAU Organisation of African Unity.

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

OEF Operation Enduring Freedom.

OLS Ordinary least squares.

OMIB Observer Mission in Burundi.

OMIC Observer Mission in the Comoros.

ONU United Nations.

ONUB United Nations Operation in Burundi.

ONUC United Nations Operation in the Congo.

ONUCI United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire.

PBB United Nations (Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa).

PKO Peace operation.

QCA Qualitative comparative analysis.

RCA Central African Republic.

RDC Rapid Deployment Capability.

RO Regional organisation.

SCR Security Council Report.

SFOR Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

SPLA Sudan People's Liberation Army.

SPLM Sudan People's Liberation Movement.

TCC Troop contributing country.

TFG Transitional Federal Government.

UCDP Uppsala Conflict Data Program.

UIC Union of Islamic Courts.

UK United Kingdom.

UN United Nations.

UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan.

UNAMI United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq.

UNAMIC United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia.

UNAMID United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur.

UNAMIS United Nations Advance Mission in Sudan.

UNAMSIL United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone.

UNDOF United Nations Disengagement Observer Force.

UNEF United Nations Emergency Force.

UNFICYP United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus.

UNIFIL United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon.

UNIOSIL United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone.

UNISFA United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei.

UNMC United Nations Mission in Colombia.

UNMEE United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea.

UNMIH United Nations Mission in Haiti.

UNMIK United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo.

UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia.

UNMIN United Nations Mission in Nepal.

UNMIS United Nations Mission in Sudan.

UNMISET United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor.

UNMISS United Nations Mission in South Sudan.

UNMIT United Nations Integrated Mission in East Timor.

UNMOGIP United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan.

UNOB United Nations Office in Burundi.

UNOCI United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire.

UNOL United Nations Peace-building Office in Liberia.

UNOM United Nations Office in Mali.

UNOMIG United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia.

UNOMIL United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia.

UNOSOM United Nations Operation in Somalia.

UNOTIL United Nations Office in Timor-Leste.

UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force.

UNSMIS United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria.

UNSOM United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia.

UNSOS United Nations Support Office in Somalia.

UNTAC United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia.

UNTAET United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor.

UNTSO United Nations Truce Supervision Organization.

US United States of America.

VAR Vector autoregression.

Chapter 1

Introduction of Three Levels of Burden-Sharing in Peace Operations

1.1 Introduction

Peacekeeping is one of the principal tools available to the international community to manage armed conflicts and promote international peace and security. As of 2018, there are around 140'000 peacekeepers deployed in 60 operations run by an increasingly extensive network of actors.[1] Examples such as the United Nations (UN) mission in South Sudan, the European Union (EU) naval force operation Sophia in the Mediterranean, the Economic Community of West African States mission in the Gambia, or the African Union (AU)-UN hybrid operation in Darfur are just the tip of the iceberg. The vast scale and scope of today's peace operations, accompanied by great financial and personnel burdens, have threatened to outstrip the willingness and, to some extent, capacity of the international community. As former UN Secretary-

[1] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 'Peace Operations and Conflict Management', in *SIPRI Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmaments and International Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 145–81; 2018 is the most updated combined figure available for UN and non-UN operations.

General Ban Ki-moon acknowledged, '[s]ecuring the required resources and troops has consumed much of my energy. I have been begging leaders to make resources available to us'.[2] If the international community is to achieve its peacekeeping objectives and meet the challenges of the twenty-first century, a better understanding of the factors that motivate the UN, regional organisations (RO), and individual countries to provide peacekeeping activities is required. Overall, the situation raises the question of how the international community shares the burden of peace operations. This thesis addresses this question and explores burden-sharing at three levels of analysis – the global, regional, and national level.

The thesis is composed of this introductory chapter, a background and literature review chapter, three research articles examining separate but related aspects of peacekeeping burden-sharing, and a concluding chapter. In the background and literature review chapter, first the evolution of peacekeeping and its implications for burden-sharing in peace operations are demonstrated, followed by a review of the theoretical and empirical literature. The first research article, 'Partnership Peacekeeping: The Division of Labour Between the United Nations and Regional Organisations', develops and tests a framework explaining the division of labour for peacekeeping activities at the global level, specifically between the UN and ROs. The second article, 'Negotiating Collective Peace: The Provision of Troops to EU Peace Operations', examines the role of interrelationships between EU member states in the context of force generation for regional peace operations. The third article, 'Public Attention, Elections, and Peace Operations: Democratising the Making of Peacekeeping Policy', focusses on the domestic side and analyses whether countries' peacekeeping contributions are adjusted in the run-up to elections contingent upon public attention. In the concluding chapter of the thesis, the findings from each article are brought together and implications and avenues for future research are discussed.

[2]Ban Ki-moon, 'Human Protection and the 21st Century United Nations', *Cyril Foster Lecture at Oxford University* (Feb. 2, 2011), Oxford, `https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2011-02-02/cyril-foster-lecture-oxford-university-human-protection-and-21st`, accessed July 13, 2018.

In this introductory chapter, first the overall motivation for this thesis project is presented, namely the challenge of burden-sharing in peacekeeping. Thereupon, the central theme of the thesis is discussed, and it is argued that the question of burden-sharing in peace operations emerges and requires exploration at various levels of analysis. Finally, the three research articles are introduced, including their respective theoretical argument, research design, and a brief summary of the findings.

1.2 Peacekeeping Challenge: Higher Demand, Higher Burden

Peacekeeping refers to the deployment of military and/or civilian forces 'to assist conflict-ridden countries to create conditions for sustainable peace'.[3] A large portion of peace operations is conducted by the United Nations, but regional organisations, security alliances, ad hoc coalitions, and even individual states may deploy peace operations.

Peacekeeping is confronted with a 'changed and changing landscape', as has been highlighted in the report of the 2015 High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations.[4] Particularly since the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping has expanded in size and scope to meet the growing demand and respond to changes in conflict. Figure 1.1 shows the annual number of UN and non-UN peace operations from 1948–2016. While there was only an average of six peace operations deployed each year

[3]UN Department of Peacekeeping and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 'Definitions and Methodology', `https://www.sipri.org/databases/pko/methods`, accessed July 17, 2018.

[4]United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on Uniting Our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People*, A/70/95–S/2015/446, June 15, 2015, `https://undocs.org/en/S/2015/446`, accessed July 31, 2018.

[5]Data sources: United Nations Peacekeeping, 'List of Peacekeeping Operations, 1948–2018', `https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/180413_unpeacekeeping-operationlist_2.pdf`, accessed May 15, 2019; non-UN operations based on Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, 'Trends in Peace Operations, 1947–2013', in Joachim A. Koops et al. (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 13–42; Paul D. Williams, 'Global and Regional Peacekeepers', in *Global Order and the New Regionalism: Discussion Paper Series on Global and Regional Governance*, ed. Miles Kahler et al. (Council on




Figure 1.1: Trends in UN and Non-UN Peace Operations, 1948-2016[5]

until the mid 1980s, a great surge in both UN and non-UN operations began in 1988. Since then, the UN and non-UN actors have each deployed an average of sixteen missions per year, reaching a combined maximum of 39 peace operations in 1999 and again in 2008. While the UN is still the most important single provider of peacekeeping, regional organisations take an increasing share of peace operations. Along with the quantitative changes, peace operations have also become more complex, assuming not only traditional peacekeeping but also multi-dimensional peacebuilding and peace enforcement roles. Now peace operations pursue far-reaching objectives ranging from humanitarian assistance and the repatriation of refugees, over the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of former combatants, to liberal democratic assistance policies, election supervision, and security sector reform.

The increased scale and scope of peacekeeping engender rising demands in resources to successfully launch and deploy operations, including personnel and finan-

Foreign Relations, Sept. 2016), 67–83, `https://www.cfr.org/report/global-order-and-new-regionalism`, accessed Aug. 5, 2019.

cial contributions. In contrast to the, on average, 11'000 combined UN and non-UN peacekeepers engaged annually during the Cold War, 2018 saw more than 140'000 peacekeepers deployed.[6] Apart from the personnel burden, peace operations also involve a considerable financial burden to cover personnel costs, equipment, logistics, and medical expenses, inter alia. UN peacekeeping spending rose over fifteenfold from an annual average of US$208.5 million in the 1980s to US$3.5 billion in the 1990s, and even to US$6.7 billion in 2018/2019.[7]

The increased financial and personnel burden for peacekeeping needs to be shared by the international community. Burden-sharing – 'the distribution of costs and risks among members of a group in the process of accomplishing a common goal'[8] – oftentimes becomes a contentious and cumbersome issue for UN as well as non-UN operations. Difficulties in burden-sharing regularly lead to delays in the provision of peace missions and shortfalls in the amount of resources provided. The 2014–2015 European Union Force in the Central African Republic, for instance, was in jeopardy due to insufficient troop and aircraft commitments, and was only deployed after six so-called Force Generation Conferences and with several months delay.[9] On average, the EU takes six months to respond to peace operation demands,[10] and UN missions take more than ten months to reach their peak deployment.[11] Moreover, UN peace missions only reach an average of 78.4% of their full authorised strength, falling

[6]Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 'Peace Operations and Conflict Management'.

[7]Jyoti Khanna, Todd Sandler, and Hirofumi Shimizu, 'The Demand for UN Peacekeeping, 1975–1996', *Kyklos* 52/3 (1999), 345–68, p. 345; United Nations Peacekeeping, 'How We Are Funded', `https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/how-we-are-funded`, accessed Aug. 9, 2019.

[8]Stephen J. Cimbala and Peter K. Forster, *The US, NATO and Military Burden-Sharing* (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 1.

[9]Adrian Croft, 'Troop, Equipment Gaps Threaten EU's Central African Republic Mission', *Reuters* (Mar. 13, 2014), `http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/13/us-centralafrican-eu-idUSBREA2C27L20140313`, accessed Apr. 12, 2014; Thierry Tardy, 'EUFOR RCA: Tough Start, Smooth End', *European Union Institute for Security Studies Alert* 17 (2015), `https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Alert_17_EUFOR_RCA.pdf`, accessed Mar. 15, 2015.

[10]Heidi Hardt, *Time to React: The Efficiency of International Organizations in Crisis Response* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 36.

[11]Ryan Rappa, 'The Challenges of Full Deployment on UN Peace Operations', *Global Peace Operations Review* (Sept. 7, 2016), `https://peaceoperationsreview.org/thematic-essays/the-challenges-of-full-deployment-on-un-peace-operations/`, accessed Nov. 2, 2016.

short 21.6%.[12] At the same time, research suggests that mission size, personnel and equipment shortfalls, and the composition of peacekeepers have a significant influence on mission effectiveness. Sufficient capacity is decisive for reducing violence against civilians, decreasing battlefield violence, and extending the duration of peace after conflict.[13] Diversity in the composition of peacekeeping personnel has also been shown to reduce violence against civilians.[14] With challenges to sufficiently equip and staff peace operations, resultant consequences on mission effectiveness, and international peace and security at stake, a comprehensive understanding of burden-sharing in peace operations is key for future improvements.

An evolving body of academic literature studies burden-sharing and the motivations shaping countries' contributions to peace operations. The burden-sharing literature has traditionally been strongly influenced by Olson's seminal work on collective action.[15] Collective action is any action that is carried out by a group of individuals – or states – to pursue a common goal. Its success and efficiency strongly hinge on whether the generated benefits resemble a public good with non-excludable and non-rival consumption, or a private good which is excludable and rival. Most studies find that peacekeeping produces a mixture of public and private benefits.[16] Public

[12]Timothy J.A. Passmore, Megan Shannon, and Andrew F. Hart, 'Rallying the Troops: Collective Action and Self-Interest in UN Peacekeeping Contributions', *Journal of Peace Research* 55/3 (2018), 366–79, p. 367.

[13]Lisa Hultman, Jacob Kathman, and Megan Shannon, 'United Nations Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection in Civil War', *American Journal of Political Science* 57/4 (2013), 875–91; Jacob D. Kathman and Reed M. Wood, 'Stopping the Killing During the "Peace": Peacekeeping and the Severity of Postconflict Civilian Victimization', *Foreign Policy Analysis* 12/2 (2016), 149–69; Lisa Hultman, Jacob Kathman, and Megan Shannon, 'Beyond Keeping Peace: United Nations Effectiveness in the Midst of Fighting', *American Political Science Review* 108/4 (2014), 737–53; Andrea Ruggeri, Han Dorussen, and Theodora-Ismene Gizelis, 'Winning the Peace Locally: UN Peacekeeping and Local Conflict', *International Organization* 71/1 (2017), 163–85; Lisa Hultman, Jacob D. Kathman, and Megan Shannon, 'United Nations Peacekeeping Dynamics and the Duration of Post-Civil Conflict Peace', *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 33/3 (2016), 231–49.

[14]Vincenzo Bove and Andrea Ruggeri, 'Kinds of Blue: Diversity in UN Peacekeeping Missions and Civilian Protection', *British Journal of Political Science* 46/3 (2016), 681–700.

[15]Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965); see also Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser, 'An Economic Theory of Alliances', *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 48/3 (1966), 266–79.

[16]Davis B. Bobrow and Mark A. Boyer, 'Maintaining System Stability: Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41/6 (1997), 723–48; Vincenzo Bove and Leandro Elia, 'Supplying Peace: Participation in and Troop Contribution to Peacekeeping Missions', *Journal of Peace Research* 48/6 (2011), 699–714; Hirofumi Shimizu and Todd Sandler, 'Peacekeeping and Burden-Sharing, 1994–2000', *Journal of Peace Research* 39/6 (2002), 651–68.

benefits include the promotion of international peace and security, the spread of international norms, and enhanced stability for international trade. Private, contributor-specific benefits and considerations include conflict proximity, regional stability, a reduction in the influx of refugees, economic interests, a colonial history, and ethnic/language ties.[17] In addition to these international-level factors, the literature also highlights domestic-level determinants of peacekeeping contributions, including resource constraints, financial rewards, the level of democracy, military training and experience, and a reduction in coup attempts.[18] While some studies have tried to combine international- and domestic-level determinants in integrated decision-making frameworks,[19] the literature has so far neglected that burden-sharing decisions are in fact made at different levels, particularly the global, regional, and national level, as will be elaborated in the following section.

A more detailed account of the evolution and relevance of peacekeeping burden-sharing, as well as the major academic literature on burden-sharing and the supply-side to peacekeeping is provided in Chapter 2, 'Background and Literature Review of

[17]Bove and Elia, 'Supplying Peace'; Richard Perkins and Eric Neumayer, 'Extra-Territorial Interventions in Conflict Spaces: Explaining the Geographies of Post-Cold War Peacekeeping', *Political Geography* 27/8 (2008), 895–914; Gary Uzonyi, 'Refugee Flows and State Contributions to Post-Cold War UN Peacekeeping Missions', *Journal of Peace Research* 52/6 (2015), 743–57; Khusrav Gaibulloev, Todd Sandler, and Hirofumi Shimizu, 'Demands for UN and Non-UN Peacekeeping: Nonvoluntary versus Voluntary Contributions to a Public Good', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53/6 (2009), 827–52; Szymon M. Stojek and Jaroslav Tir, 'The Supply Side of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Trade Ties and United Nations-Led Deployments to Civil War States', *European Journal of International Relations* 21/2 (2015), 352–76.

[18]Bove and Elia, 'Supplying Peace'; Jonah Victor, 'African Peacekeeping in Africa: Warlord Politics, Defense Economics, and State Legitimacy', *Journal of Peace Research* 47/2 (2010), 217–29; Khusrav Gaibulloev et al., 'Personnel Contributions to UN and Non-UN Peacekeeping Missions: A Public Goods Approach', *Journal of Peace Research* 52/6 (2015), 727–42; Katharina P. Coleman and Benjamin Nyblade, 'Peacekeeping for Profit? The Scope and Limits of 'Mercenary' UN Peacekeeping', *Journal of Peace Research* 55/6 (2018), 726–41; James H. Lebovic, 'Uniting for Peace? Democracies and United Nations Peace Operations after the Cold War', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48/6 (2004), 910–36; Jacob D. Kathman and Molly M. Melin, 'Who Keeps the Peace? Understanding State Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations', *International Studies Quarterly* 61/1 (2017), 150–62; Magnus Lundgren, 'Backdoor Peacekeeping: Does Participation in UN Peacekeeping Reduce Coups at Home?', *Journal of Peace Research* 55/4 (2018), 508–23.

[19]i.e. David P. Auerswald, 'Explaining Wars of Choice: An Integrated Decision Model of NATO Policy in Kosovo', *International Studies Quarterly* 48/3 (2004), 631–62; Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, 'Explaining the National Politics of Peacekeeping Contributions', in id. (eds.), *Providing Peacekeepers: The Politics, Challenges, and Future of United Nations Peacekeeping Contributions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 417–36; Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Unger, 'Burden-Sharing in the Persian Gulf War', *International Organization* 48/1 (1994), 39–75.

Burden-Sharing in Peace Operations'.

1.3 Levels of Analysis in Peacekeeping Burden–Sharing

The overall aim of this thesis is to demonstrate that burden-sharing in peace operations occurs at various levels of analysis and between different sets of actors, and to illustrate that levels of analysis are a valuable conceptual approach for the study of peacekeeping burden-sharing.

Levels of analysis have been a prominent analytical concept in International Relations since the late 1950s. The level of analysis debate began with Waltz's influential book *Man, the State, and War*, in which he posits three 'images' through which to explain the causes of war: the individual, the state, and the international system.[20] The actual origin of the levels of analysis debate, however, is often seen as Singer's seminal 1961 article 'The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations'.[21] Singer argues that 'several ways [exist] in which the phenomena under study may be sorted and arranged for purposes of systemic analysis', and the level of analysis problem refers to the question whether 'to focus upon the parts or upon the whole, upon the component or upon the system' or, phrased differently, whether to choose 'the micro- or macro-level of analysis'.[22] Singer's understanding of the 'level-of-analysis problem' fundamentally differs from Waltz's. While Waltz views the 'images' or levels of analysis as independent variables to explain state behaviour, Singer views them as different social entities, or aggregations, as targets for analysis.[23] For example, the former understands the state as a category of explanatory factors, such as the type of

[20]Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1959).

[21]Singer also coined the term 'level of analysis', see J. David Singer, 'International Conflict: Three Levels of Analysis', *World Politics* 12/3 (1960), 453–61.

[22]J. David Singer, 'The Level-Of-Analysis Problem in International Relations', *World Politics* 14/1 (1961), 77–92, p. 77.

[23]See James Lee Ray, 'Integrating Levels of Analysis in World Politics', *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 13/4 (2001), 355–88, p. 356; Owen Temby, 'What Are Levels of Analysis and What Do They Contribute to International Relations Theory?', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 28/4 (2015), 721–42, p. 724.

government or modes of production and distribution, and the latter sees it as a subset of the international system. For the purpose of researching burden-sharing in peacekeeping, this thesis follows Singer's representation of levels of analysis as different aggregations as targets for analysis.

This approach offers several conceptual advantages. First, it facilitates studying the manifold and increasingly diverse group of actors involved at different levels of peacekeeping burden-sharing. These include, inter alia, the United Nations, ROs, security alliances, and ad hoc coalitions of states providing peacekeeping; a host of actors within each of these organisations or groups involved in the planning process of peace operations, such as the Council of the European Union, Political and Security Committee, European Union Military Committee/Staff, Operation Commander, and troop contributing countries in the case of the EU; multiple simultaneous peace operations as well as UN agencies, non-governmental organisations, and private security and military companies operating in the conflict area; and the government officials, media, domestic society, career bureaucrats, and military officers influencing the decision-making process within individual troop contributing countries.

Second, the focus on aggregations as levels of analysis allows for the study of not only the attributes of each constituent part, but also the interactions, relations, and interdependences between each one.[24] Actors interact 'when they "take each other into account" in making their choices'.[25] This can either be in the form of actors perceiving each other as part of the decision-making environment, or they can strategically predicate their burden-sharing decision on each other's choices. Particularly the latter is characteristic of the bargaining for peacekeeping contributions. Peacekeeping actors, for instance, are frequently argued to fall short in providing resources at optimal levels because they have an incentive to free ride on the contributions of

[24]What Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); and Barry Buzan, Charles A. Jones, and Richard Little, *The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1993), call the micro- or interaction-level.

[25]Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, p. 148.

others.[26] In other cases, one country's contributions may be complementary to those of other countries, implying that it raises its troop contributions together with other countries.[27] Another example are the increasing interactions and dependences between organisations providing peace operations to procure resources and reach peacekeeping objectives.[28]

Third, levels of analysis are a useful conceptualisation to divide complex burden-sharing processes into smaller, more manageable entities for study. Each aggregation is essentially a layer of the story explaining burden-sharing in peace operations. At the most aggregate level, actors on the international stage decide which existing or arising conflict requires peacekeeping and which international organisation, security alliance, or ad hoc coalition shall provide it. The organisation carrying out the peacekeeping activity structures the processes, dynamics, and negotiations of burden-sharing between its member states. The member states then make their individual decisions regarding their level of contribution to the peacekeeping activity, taking account of the various levels of decision-making in government, other influential groups, and individuals championing the process.

The levels of analysis approach makes it possible to research the complexity of burden-sharing in peacekeeping, both in terms of the actors involved and the interactions amongst them, to expand the range of questions posed to understand this issue, and thereby to broaden the scholarly and policy implications drawn. Therefore, this thesis argues that burden-sharing in peace operations should be studied from (at least) three different levels of aggregation: the global, the regional, and the national level.

Global Level: Research on peacekeeping burden-sharing at the global level in-

[26]Olson and Zeckhauser, 'An Economic Theory of Alliances'; Passmore, Shannon, and Hart, 'Rallying the Troops'.

[27]Gaibulloev et al., 'Personnel Contributions to UN and Non-UN Peacekeeping Missions'; Hugh Ward and Han Dorussen, 'Standing Alongside Your Friends: Network Centrality and Providing Troops to UN Peacekeeping Operations', *Journal of Peace Research* 53/3 (2016), 392–408.

[28]Malte Brosig and Dimpho Motsamai, 'Modeling Cooperative Peacekeeping: Exchange Theory and the African Peace and Security Regime', *Journal of International Peacekeeping* 18/1–2 (2014), 45–68.

cludes issues related to the coordination and cooperation between organisations providing peacekeeping. Questions of interest at this level involve the inter-organisational decision-making regarding the allocation of peacekeeping activities; the relevance of legitimacy and UN Security Council authorisation for peace operations launched by regional organisations, security alliances, or individual states; the relationship and frameworks of cooperation between UN missions and non-UN missions; and the effectiveness of non-UN missions compared to UN peace operations.

Regional Level: In line with the rise in numbers of peace operations undertaken by regional organisations over the last two decades, the topic of regionalisation requires more attention. What empirical and normative implications does the regionalisation of peacekeeping have? How do ROs cope with the increased level of activity and resource demands? What differences between regions exist and how do they affect peacekeeping performance? What institutions, decision-making structures, and processes are set up to solve burden-sharing and collective action problems? How do peace operations, or conflict management more generally, interact with other core pillars of ROs, such as economic cooperation?

National Level: Studies of burden-sharing in peace operations have typically operated at the national level by focussing on factors that influence individual countries' decisions regarding troop contributions. Such studies have become increasingly sophisticated and elaborate, starting from a predominantly economic approach based on collective action theory and extended to include numerous realist and liberal motivating factors. For these studies, both international- and domestic-level motivational factors are of interest.

These are certainly not the only levels of analysis relevant for the study of burden-sharing in peace operations. At the system level, for instance, structural factors such as power dynamics or global economic developments presuppose the way countries and organisations approach negotiations regarding peacekeeping. Further, there are other entities besides the UN and regional organisations that conduct peacekeeping activities and require studying, such as coalitions of the willing or private security

and military companies. At the individual level, stateswomen arguably operate as gatekeepers between the domestic and international arena, which provides them with the opportunity to influence burden-sharing decisions and makes them an influential agent worth studying.[29] Many more levels can be proposed and no single level is necessarily better or more accurate than the others. The question is not one of defining all potential levels of analysis and deciding which one is most valuable, but rather one of identifying levels of analysis as a valuable conceptual approach for the study of burden-sharing in peace operations.

1.4 Three Levels of Analysis, Three Research Articles

Based on the above discussion, the three research articles constituting this thesis each focus on one level of analysis. The article 'Partnership Peacekeeping: The Division of Labour Between the United Nations and Regional Organisations' studies peacekeeping burden-sharing at the global level, the article 'Negotiating Collective Peace: The Provision of Troops to EU Peace Operations' at the regional level, and the article 'Public Attention, Elections, and Peace Operations: Democratising the Making of Peacekeeping Policy' at the national level.

1.4.1 Global Level: 'Partnership Peacekeeping: The Division of Labour Between the United Nations and Regional Organisations'

Regional organisations have become one of the main providers of peacekeeping alongside the United Nations. The amount of regional peacekeeping has expanded immensely since the early 1990s, the UN is increasingly reliant on regional partners to

[29]Robert D. Putnam, 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games', *International Organization* 42/3 (1988), 427–60.

fulfil its objective to maintain international peace and security, and requests to move 'towards partnership peacekeeping'[30] have been made repeatedly. The partnership and division of labour between the UN and ROs, however, has been underspecified theoretically and understudied empirically. Accordingly, this article explores the division of labour between the United Nations and regional organisations in the realm of peacekeeping, asking the question: Which conditions determine whether the United Nations or a regional organisation deploys a peace operation?

The article argues that peacekeeping is situated in an environment of scarce resources and that the heuristic of comparative advantage is used to ascertain an efficient division of labour between the UN and ROs. Resource scarcity refers to the finiteness of personnel, military equipment, logistical/medical support, funding, and other requirements necessary to deploy a peace mission. One approach to mitigate resource scarcity and allocate limited resources efficiently is the principle of comparative advantage. Comparative advantage refers to an organisation's ability to produce specific aspects of peacekeeping at a lower opportunity cost than another organisation. Building on literature on the strengths and weaknesses of ROs in peacekeeping,[31] five conditions are expected to be particularly relevant for the discussion of comparative advantages of the UN vis-à-vis ROs: the stage in the peace process, the scope of the peace operation, the intensity of the conflict, the legitimacy of the peace operation, and the speed of the response.

To investigate which (combinations of) comparative advantages determine whether the UN or a regional organisation deploys a peace operation, the article conducts a crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) of 26 peace operations conducted by the United Nations, the African Union, and European Union in Africa between

[30]United Nations Security Council, *Partnering for Peace: Moving Towards Partnership Peacekeeping – Report of the Secretary-General*, S/2015/229, Apr. 1, 2015, `https://undocs.org/en/S/2015/229`, accessed July 31, 2018.

[31]e.g. Alex J. Bellamy, Paul D. Williams, and Stuart Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping* (2nd edn., Cambridge: Polity, 2010), pp. 310–3; Oldrich Bures, 'Regional Peacekeeping Operations: Complementing or Undermining the United Nations Security Council?', *Global Change, Peace & Security* 18/2 (2006), 83–99; Paul F. Diehl, 'Institutional Alternatives to Traditional U.N. Peacekeeping: An Assessment of Regional and Multinational Options', *Armed Forces & Society* 19/2 (1993), 209–30.

2003–2017. QCA is chosen as it allows for the assessment of complex causation, involving different combinations of causal conditions that can generate regional versus UN peacekeeping, and its suitability for medium-N datasets. The results of the qualitative comparative analysis are triangulated with seven case studies to verify the plausibility of the causal links behind the set-relational patterns and to gain insights on deviant cases.

The analysis confirms that the UN and ROs divide the peacekeeping labour according to their respective comparative advantages. In regard to UN peacekeeping, the findings highlight the UN's comparative advantage in providing large-scale, multidimensional peace operations, that UN deployments are often limited to post-peace agreement conflict environments, and that they have a disadvantage in deployment speed. Two pathways emerge as particularly relevant for regional peacekeeping. The first one is a limited but specialised mission scope in conjunction with other contextual conditions, as is the case for many EU peace operations. The second one is the combination of the absence of a peace agreement and a rapid response or bridging function, i.e. to provide a first response before the UN takes over, which can be seen for AU missions.

This study provides the first systematic, cross-case empirical evidence for patterns characterising the division of the peacekeeping labour between the UN and regional organisations. These patterns of (combinations of) comparative advantages are an important step towards the definition of 'predictable frameworks for cooperation'[32] between UN and regional peace operations.

[32]United Nations General Assembly, 'Peace Operations 2010', in *Overview of the Financing of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Budget Performance for the Period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005 and Budget for the Period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007 – Report of the Secretary-General*, A/60/696 (Feb. 24, 2006), 6–9, `https://undocs.org/en/A/60/696`, accessed July 31, 2018, para. 17.

1.4.2 Regional Level: 'Negotiating Collective Peace: The Provision of Troops to EU Peace Operations'

The international community increasingly relies on regional organisations as providers of peacekeeping, and the European Union is one of the main regional actors involved. In contrast to the substantial number of studies on burden-sharing in the context of UN peacekeeping, systematic and generalisable research on troop contributions to EU peace operations is limited. Existing case studies and anecdotes often ascribe great importance to considerations regarding the relations between EU member states on top of the conflict- and contributor-level determinants for peacekeeping contributions prominent in the literature on UN peace operations, but more theoretical and empirical work needs to be done.[33]

This article argues that a greater degree of interrelationship between an EU country and other EU member states positively influences its participation in and troop contributions to EU peace operations. Interrelation properties include the position of a country within a network of states, the relative distribution of power and dependence, institutional ties, and alignment of policy. Increased interrelations between countries create additional benefits and incentives for contribution, including side payments, status enhancement, influence in future developments of the EU, and other horse-trading practices. Institutional ties and interaction further facilitate negotiation and cooperation by enhancing the flow of information, trust, reciprocity, and shared norms and objectives. The primary causal mechanisms through which interrelational properties influence EU member states' troop contributions to EU peace operations are explored in detail, namely issue linkage, side payments, social capital, information channels, homophily, and dependence.

An original dataset of EU member states' troop contributions to EU peace operations, from 2003–2018, and several variables measuring interrelational properties

[33] A few notable exceptions studying the role of relational variables for UN peacekeeping contributions include Ward and Dorussen, 'Standing Alongside Your Friends'; Gaibulloev, Sandler, and Shimizu, 'Demands for UN and Non-UN Peacekeeping'; Gaibulloev et al., 'Personnel Contributions to UN and Non-UN Peacekeeping Missions'.

of EU countries is compiled for this study. Both a binary version of the dependent variable, measuring participation, and a count version, measuring the number of troops contributed, are analysed in panel regression models. Specifically, country and year fixed effects logit models with cluster-robust standard errors, fixed effects negative binomial models accounting for the over-dispersed distribution of the count variable, and country fixed effects generalised least squares models with a first-order autoregressive disturbance addressing serial autocorrelation are deployed.

The analysis confirms the hypothesis associating higher interrelationship with higher troop contributions to EU peace operations. Particularly countries' dependence on the EU as an export market and states' centrality within the network of intergovernmental organisations, which reflects the strength of their direct and indirect relations with other states, emerge as relevant factors. Additionally, side payments in the form of receipts from the annual EU budget, dependence on the import of major conventional weapons from other EU countries, and, in certain model specifications, EU member states' homophily, operationalised as their position within the network of foreign policy preference, demonstrate a positive, significant relationship. The explanatory power of interrelational variables is more pronounced when studying the level of contributions as opposed to whether a member state participates in a mission or not. The association between interrelational variables and troop contributions is also stronger for EU-15 member states than for new accession states.

This article shifts the attention of peacekeeping research to regional peace operations, particularly EU operations, and provides one of the first quantitative analyses of regional peacekeeping. It further adds a new dimension to the literature on troop contributions to peace operations by focussing on interrelational properties of potential troop contributing countries - properties that can offer a point of leverage to mitigate issues of undersupply and collective action problems in peacekeeping.

1.4.3 National Level: 'Public Attention, Elections, and Peace Operations: Democratising the Making of Peacekeeping Policy'

Do policy makers consider the public when making peacekeeping policy? While existing literature has established that the public holds preferences about foreign policy issues, that they use foreign policy attitudes when making voting decisions, and that, as a result, elections may be accompanied by shifts in foreign and security policy,[34] research has predominantly focussed on the belligerent use of force as a tool of foreign policy. At the same time, the literature on the supply-side to peacekeeping has neglected the role of the public in decisions regarding troop contributions.

This article hypothesises that when elections are upcoming and elected officials face public scrutiny, incumbents adjust peacekeeping policy, specifically troop contributions to peace operations, to increase their re-election chances. Restricted by resource limitations in terms of time and budget, office holders are expected to invest available resources in issue areas that draw a lot of public attention and disinvest from areas with low attention and consequently little accountability. Following, the hypothesis is proposed that the effect of elections on troop contributions to peace operations depends on the level of public attention. If public attention is low, incumbent officials withdraw peacekeepers when elections are upcoming to invest their limited resources in issue areas that generate more attention. If public attention is high, on the other hand, officials invest resources and align peacekeeping policy with public preferences. As public attention gets most commonly activated by grave humanitarian events and existing studies suggest that the public supports humanitarian peacekeeping engagement out of a sense of moral obligation,[35] it is expected that more

[34] John H. Aldrich et al., 'Foreign Policy and the Electoral Connection', *Annual Review of Political Science* 9 (2006), 477–502.

[35] Sarah Kreps and Sarah Maxey, 'Mechanisms of Morality: Sources of Support for Humanitarian Intervention', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 62/8 (2018), 1814–42; Martha Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), pp. 52–84; Nicholas J. Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

troops are deployed before elections when public attention is high.

The hypotheses are tested on troop contributions by 19 electoral democracies to UN peace operations between 2004–2016 in panel data fixed effects regression models with ordinary least squares estimators. The article uses internet search data, specifically Google Trends data, as a measure for public attention in each country over time. An extensive discussion of the advantages, representativeness, and validation of the data, including an analysis of the criterion validity of Google Trends data against news coverage of peace operations in the United Kingdom, France, and Germany by means of vector autoregressive models, is provided.

The results confirm that the effect of elections on troop contributions to peace operations is dependent on the level of attention the public devotes to a peace operation. Peacekeepers are withdrawn when elections come closer if public attention is low; and higher levels of troop deployments can be observed when the public pays a lot of attention to a peace operation.

Overall, the article adds nuance to the current understanding of the relationship between the public, elections, and foreign/peacekeeping policy by introducing public attention as a defining component of the relationship. It further establishes the public as a relevant factor in countries' decisions regarding troop contributions to peace operations. Empirically, the article introduces Google Trends search data, an arguable underutilised data source in political science, as a particularly suited measure of public attention to peace operations.

Chapter 2

Background and Literature Review of Burden-Sharing in Peace Operations

2.1 Introduction

The concept of burden-sharing – 'the distribution of costs and risks among members of a group in the process of accomplishing a common goal'[1] – is a central component of the successful provision of peacekeeping. A rising demand in peacekeepers, difficulties in filling the mandated personnel targets, and the downstream consequences of personnel contributions and composition on mission effectiveness have motivated a body of literature that researches patterns of burden-sharing and motivating factors shaping the supply-side to peacekeeping. The aim of this chapter is to first demonstrate the relevance of burden-sharing in peacekeeping and then provide an overview of and review the theoretical and empirical literature. It thereby provides the context within which the three subsequent articles constituting this thesis are situated. The first section illustrates the evolution of peacekeeping and its implications for burden-sharing, with particular focus on the increased amount and scope

[1] Cimbala and Forster, *The US, NATO and Military Burden-Sharing*, p. 1.

of peacekeeping.[2] The second section presents relevant actors involved in peacekeeping besides the United Nations (UN), specifically regional organisations and the main troop providing countries. Third, the existing literature is reviewed, starting with the origin of the burden-sharing literature in the area of security and defence. Two facets of peacekeeping burden-sharing – financial contributions and troop contributions – are discussed. The latter includes a myriad of international- and domestic-level motivating factors for peacekeeping contributions. The final section outlines the gap in the literature and how this thesis contributes to closing this gap. Specifically, it is highlighted that the existing literature concentrates on motivating factors for peacekeeping contributions on the state level but omits burden-sharing decisions on the regional and global level.

2.2 Evolution of Peacekeeping and Its Implications for Burden-Sharing

In 2018 there were 60 active peace operations with more than 140'000 personnel in the field.[3] More than 120 countries contributed uniformed personnel to these operations.[4] UN peacekeeping spending reached $6.7 billion in 2018/2019.[5] While the United Nations is the primary supplier of peace operations, a range of organisations engage in peacekeeping activities, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, African Union (AU), European Union (EU), Commonwealth of Independent States, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Pacific Island Forum. However, peacekeeping has not always been as widespread and extensive in scope as it is today; and

[2]This section of the chapter draws from Maline Meiske and Andrea Ruggeri, 'Peacekeeping as a Tool of Foreign Policy', in *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics* (2017), `https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-462?rskey=o1eaQe&result=1`, accessed July 13, 2019.

[3]Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 'Peace Operations and Conflict Management'.

[4]United Nations Peacekeeping, 'Military', `https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/military`, accessed Aug. 9, 2019.

[5]United Nations Peacekeeping, *How We Are Funded*.

the organisations and countries involved in sharing the peacekeeping burden have also changed over time. The descriptive statistics presented in this section illustrate the proliferation and expansion of peace operations and, consequently, the increased peacekeeping burden.

2.2.1 Quantitative Evolution of Peacekeeping

Figure 2.1 depicts the annual number of ongoing UN and non-UN peace operations from 1948–2016. The most striking feature of this figure is the considerable rise in peace operations after the end of the Cold War. Up until this point, there were only on average about four UN peace missions and two non-UN operations deployed per year. Thereafter, a rapid surge in peace operations was recorded. Between 1988 and 1993 alone, the United Nations conducted more peace operations than in the previous 40 years combined. Non-UN operations followed a similar pattern and the number of operations increased dramatically after 1992. Overall, the 1990s saw a fivefold increase in concurrent peace missions compared to the Cold War period, and a maximum of 39 UN and non-UN peace operations was reached in 1999 and again in 2008.

This surge in peace operations can be attributed to a rise in demand and a rise in supply, both linked to the systemic changes of the post-Cold War international system. On the demand side, the period around the end of the Cold War saw a surge in intrastate conflicts. Intrastate conflicts rose from an annual average of 18 in 1946–1980 to 39 in the 1980s. 1990 recorded 47 ongoing conflicts, 1991 even 50, and the annual average during the 1990s was 43.[6] This rise in ongoing intrastate

[6]Calculations by author based on data by Nils Petter Gleditsch et al., 'Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset', *Journal of Peace Research* 39/5 (2002), 615–37; Therése Pettersson, Stina Högbladh, and Magnus Öberg, 'Organized Violence, 1989–2018 and Peace Agreements', *Journal of Peace Research* 56/4 (2019), 589–603.

[7]Data sources: United Nations Peacekeeping, 'List of Peacekeeping Operations, 1948–2018', `https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/180413_unpeacekeeping-operationlist_2.pdf`, accessed May 15, 2019; non-UN operations based on Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, 'Trends in Peace Operations, 1947–2013', in Joachim A. Koops et al. (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 13–42, and Paul D. Williams, 'Global and Regional Peacekeepers', in *Global Order and the New Regionalism:*




Figure 2.1: Number of UN and Non-UN Peace Operations, 1948–2016[7]

wars substantiates the need for increased peacekeeping engagement since the late 1980s. Furthermore, successful missions of the late 1980s and early 1990s increased confidence in the utility and effectiveness of peace operations as a foreign policy tool available to the international community and individual countries. Alongside this increase in demand, peace operations were also more readily supplied in the post-Cold War period. Peacekeeping during the Cold War era was marked by superpower politics and reciprocal blockage in the UN Security Council. This obstruction came to an end in the late 1980s and gave way to more cooperation in the Security Council and beyond. Additionally, the new post-Cold War order, marked by an accelerated process of globalisation, entailed a post-Westphalian approach to peacekeeping with a focus on humanitarian engagement and the idea to foster the creation of liberal democracies as a route to stable peace. Finally, the peace dividend of the early 1990s

Discussion Paper Series on Global and Regional Governance, ed. Miles Kahler et al. (Council on Foreign Relations, Sept. 2016), 67–83, `https://www.cfr.org/report/global-order-and-new-regionalism`, accessed Aug. 5, 2019.

freed up military resources from traditional defence spending, which could then be deployed in peace operations.[8]

Rising numbers in peace missions engender rising demands in resources, including financial resources, logistics, and personnel. International and regional organisations rely on their member states to contribute these resources. For financial contributions to UN missions, UN members are assigned a fixed share of the financial costs of a UN peace operation, based on a special scale of assessments under an intricate formula taking into account, among other things, the relative economic wealth of a member state and whether it is one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.[9] Most non-UN missions, on the other hand, are financed on a voluntary basis. The basic rule for those peace missions is that 'costs lie where they fall' – contributing countries send their personnel and equipment and cover the associated costs.[10] The only exceptions are some ECOWAS and AU operations for which the United Nations and EU subsidise the costs. Personnel contributions, which include military, police, and civilian personnel, are voluntary for both UN and non-UN missions. For UN missions, though, contributing countries are compensated at a rate of US$1'428 per peacekeeper per month (as of 1 July 2018).[11]

Figure 2.2 displays the yearly number of UN and non-UN peacekeeping troops sent. Until 1956, few peacekeepers – merely military observers – were deployed. This changed with the Suez Crisis and the launch of the First United Nations Emergency Force in November 1956 and the Organization of American States' Inter-American Peace Force in the Dominican Republic. Thereafter, the average number of deployed

[8]Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, pp. 94–9; Paul F. Diehl and Alexandru Balas, *Peace Operations* (2nd edn., Cambridge: Polity, 2014), pp. 54–5.

[9]United Nations Peacekeeping, *How We Are Funded*.

[10]Thierry Tardy, 'Funding Peace Operations: Better Value for EU Money', *European Union Institute for Security Studies Brief* 38 (2013), `https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief_38_Funding_peace_operations_0.pdf`, accessed Mar. 15, 2015.

[11]United Nations Peacekeeping, *How We Are Funded*; Gaibulloev et al., 'Personnel Contributions to UN and Non-UN Peacekeeping Missions', pp. 729–30, provide estimates for exemplary countries' annual cost per military person in US$.

[12]Data sources: United Nations Peacekeeping, *List of Peacekeeping Operations, 1948–2018*; non-UN operations based on Bellamy and Williams, 'Trends in Peace Operations, 1947–2013', and Williams, 'Global and Regional Peacekeepers'.




Figure 2.2: Number of Troops Sent, 1948–2016[12]

peacekeepers settled at approximately 14'000 per year until the end of the Cold War. Corresponding to the rise in peace missions, the amount of deployed peacekeeping personnel rose sharply in the 1990s, with a high point of almost 70'000 UN personnel in 1993/1994 and 150'000 non-UN personnel in 1995/1996.[13] Since 2000, another surge in deployed peacekeeping forces has arisen. UN deployments reached an all-time high of 106'830 peacekeepers in 2015 and non-UN peacekeeping reached a maximum of more than 250'000 in 2004. Note that the non-UN numbers are predominantly driven by NATO's International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (December 2001–2014) with a size of approximately 130'000 troops.

Apart from the personnel burden, peace operations also involve an enormous financial burden to cover personnel costs (i.e. military, police, and civilian personnel), equipment, logistics, infrastructure, communication, and medical expenses. UN

[13]The surge in UN peacekeepers was caused by the operations in Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia and Somalia, while the rise in non-UN peacekeepers can be traced back to NATO's Implementation and Stabilization Forces (IFOR, 1995–1996; SFOR, 1996–2004) in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

peacekeeping spending rose over fifteenfold from an annual average of US$208.5 million in the 1980s to US$3.5 billion in the 1990s and increased again to US$6.7 billion in 2018/2019.[14] Non-UN peace missions cost at least US$121.591 billion for the period from 1994 to 2006.[15]

2.2.2 Qualitative Evolution of Peacekeeping

The transformation of peacekeeping since the late 1980s has not only been quantitative but also qualitative in nature.[16] Peacekeeping as a tool to manage armed conflict has continuously evolved and adapted to respond to new crises. As a result, peace operations have become more complex, encompassing a broad spectrum of configurations and functions.[17] This increase in scope and complexity has an effect on the overall peacekeeping burden and how the burden is shared.

The evolution of peacekeeping is often described in terms of generations, representing different types of peace operations. Scholars have differed in the number of categories they have ascribed to peacekeeping. Goulding, for instance, presented five types: (a) preventive deployment, (b) traditional peacekeeping, (c) operations to implement a comprehensive settlement, (d) operations to protect the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies, and (e) deployment of a UN force in a country where the institutions of state have largely collapsed.[18] Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin offer

[14]Khanna, Sandler, and Shimizu, 'The Demand for UN Peacekeeping, 1975–1996', p. 345; United Nations Peacekeeping, *How We Are Funded*.

[15]Gaibulloev, Sandler, and Shimizu, 'Demands for UN and Non-UN Peacekeeping', p. 828.

[16]United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations*, A/50/60–S/1995/1, Jan. 3, 1995, `https://undocs.org/en/S/1995/1`, accessed July 31, 2018, para. 8–22.

[17]Gizelis, Dorussen, and Petrova further argue that the referent object of peacekeeping has changed, from negative to positive peace and from global, over national, to local peace; see Theodora-Ismene Gizelis, Han Dorussen, and Marina Petrova, 'Research Findings on the Evolution of Peacekeeping', in *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics* (2016), `https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-25?rskey=4xB97f`, accessed July 13, 2019.

[18]Marrack Goulding, 'The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping', *International Affairs* 69/3 (1993), 451–64.

[19]Source: Author's own coding based on mission statements; originally compiled for Maline Meiske and Andrea Ruggeri, 'Peacekeeping as a Tool of Foreign Policy', in *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics* (2017), `https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-462?rskey=o1eaQe&result=1`, accessed July 13, 2019.




Figure 2.3: Different Types of UN Peace Operations, 1948–2016[19]

seven types based on the general purpose of the operation, and Diehl and Druckman present a taxonomy consisting of 11 categories grounded in specific mission tasks.[20] To provide a concise overview, Figure 2.3 classifies all UN peace operations up to 2016 into three peacekeeping types. For each year from 1948 to 2016, the proportion of traditional peacekeeping, multi-dimensional peacekeeping, and peace enforcement is depicted. While these types are not chronological, more complex missions have proliferated since the end of the Cold War.

Traditional peacekeeping is narrow in scope and range of activities. The focus lies on the monitoring of borders and establishment of buffer zones following ceasefire agreements with the goal to create an environment facilitating efforts of peaceful conflict resolution. The First UN Emergency Force (UNEF I), established in November 1956 and active until June 1967, was a traditional peace operation and the first of its kind. The mission was established to secure and supervise the end of the Suez

[20]Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*; Paul F. Diehl and Daniel Druckman, *Evaluating Peace Operations* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2010).

Crisis, including the withdrawal of the armed forces of the United Kingdom, Israel, and France from Egypt, as well as the establishment of a buffer between Egyptian and Israeli forces. In establishing UNEF I, UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld and UN General Assembly President Lester Pearson defined the three core principles of peacekeeping: (a) consent of the conflicting parties, (b) impartiality, and (c) minimum use of force (for self-defence). These principles have long been the standard of legitimacy guiding and defining (UN) peacekeeping as a tool for promoting international peace and security.

Multi-dimensional peacekeeping gained prominence amid the shifting international context of the late 1980s into the early 1990s. This period saw the rise in intrastate wars while, freed from its previous rivalry, the Security Council could authorise more complex missions with expanded mandates to meet the additional demands of these new wars. The missions in Cambodia (UNAMIC, 1991–1992; UNTAC, 1992–1993), Bosnia (UNPROFOR, 1992–1995), and Somalia (UNOSOM I, 1992–1992) differed qualitatively from earlier operations, merging humanitarian aid and state-building programmes with traditional peacekeeping tasks. Peace operations became multifunctional, including security, humanitarian, and political goals. The tasks typically added to traditional mission mandates include humanitarian assistance, monitoring human rights, the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of former combatants, repatriation of refugees, and liberal democratic assistance policies to facilitate, support, and supervise elections, the rule of law, and legitimate and effective governance institution.

Peace enforcement refers to missions characterised by an increased license to use force and are typically authorised under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This authorisation has profound effects on the three core principles of peacekeeping: enforcement missions do not necessarily require the consent of the conflict parties and while they try to be impartial in dealing with the parties involved, it may be necessary to use force against a conflict party to safeguard the objectives of the mission, protect civilians, and impose peace. Peace enforcement missions usually feature a

range of responsibilities consonant with multi-dimensional peace operations. Notable UN peace enforcement missions include the UN Protection Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNPROFOR, 1992–1995), the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL, 1998–1999), and the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET, 1999–2002). Many peace enforcement missions, though, are not carried out by the United Nations but by regional organisations or ad hoc coalitions. Examples include NATO's involvements in former Yugoslavia, particularly in Kosovo (KFOR, 1999–present), and the Australian-led International Force for East Timor (INTERFET, 1999–2000).

2.3 Actors Involved in Peacekeeping Burden-Sharing

In the wake of the quantitative and qualitative changes in peacekeeping and the resulting demands placed on the international community, more actors got involved in peace operations. Most notable was an increasing shift from UN peacekeeping to peace operations provided by regional organisations. At the same time, the composition of countries contributing troops to peace operations shifted to include more countries form the 'Global South'. Today, an increasing and changing range of actors takes on and shares the peacekeeping burden.

2.3.1 Regional Organisations as Peacekeeping Actors

The United Nations has held the primacy of peacekeeping for most of the second half of the twentieth century. While the UN is still the most important single provider of peacekeeping, regional organisations are conducting an increasing number of peace operations. This development has become particularly evident since the end of the Cold War. As depicted in Figure 2.1, regional organisations deployed more peace operations during the 1990s than they did the previous 40 years combined. A sec-

ond surge in regional peacekeeping emerged in the early 2000s, particularly in Africa. ECOWAS carried out a great number of these operations, most prominently in Liberia (1990–9, 2003), so did the African Union with missions in Sudan (2004–present) and Somalia (2007–present), among others. While regional peacekeeping has grown most in Africa, other continents also saw operations carried out by regional organisations. NATO carried out missions in Bosnia (1995–2003), Kosovo (1999–present), and Afghanistan (2003–present). The EU started conducting peace operations in 2003, launching missions in Bosnia (2004–present) and the DRC (2003, 2006), inter alia. The Commonwealth of Independent States and the Pacific Island Forum are active in the Caucasus and the Pacific region, respectively, with missions such as in Georgia (1993–present), Tajikistan (1993–2003), or on the Solomon Islands (2003–present).

The importance of regional arrangements in matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security was already recognised in the Charter of the United Nations. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter authorises regional organisations to conduct peace operations and outlines that '[t]he Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority'.[21] In practice, the engagement of regional organisations and the cooperation between the UN and regional actors as envisaged by the UN Charter was quickly curtailed by Cold War politics – the East-West divide defined regional allegiances as well as the dynamics in the UN Security Council.[22] It was not until the end of the Cold War that both regional organisations and the international community found a renewed interest in the possibilities of increased regional involvement in peacekeeping.[23] At that time, raised expectations and demands were placed on the UN in terms of the volume and scope of peace operations, as outlined above. These

[21]United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, June 26, 1945, `https://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/`, accessed July 31, 2018, art. 53.1.

[22]Louise Fawcett, 'The Evolving Architecture of Regionalization', in Michael C. Pugh and Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu (eds.), *The United Nations and Regional Security: Europe and Beyond* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 11–30, p. 14.

[23]S. Neil MacFarlane, 'Regional Organizations and Global Security Governance', in Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson (eds.), *International Organization and Global Governance* (London: Ebook Central, 2014), 429–41.

increased demands, however, outstripped the ability of a single organisation. The failures in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda exposed that the UN was overburdened and lacked the resources and will to undertake the manifold and increasingly complex range of peacekeeping tasks of the post-Cold War environment. Concurrently, the idea of regional organisations as peace and security providers gained salience again. The desirability of greater regional agency and burden-sharing was recognised by the United Nations and outlined in the 1992 *An Agenda for Peace*. It was argued that regional engagement and cooperation could 'lighten the burden of the Council' and that it could create a 'deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs'.[24] The 1995 *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace* expanded on this theme by identifying five forms of cooperation – consultation, diplomatic support, operational support, co-deployment, and joint operations – as well as principles for the relationship between the UN and regional organisations.[25] Since then, the United Nations has further stressed the importance and outlined potential forms of partnership with regional organisations in major reports, such as the *Brahimi Report*, the *2005 World Summit Outcome*, the *Peace Operations 2010* reform strategy, *The New Horizon Initiative*, the *Action for Peacekeeping* initiative, as well as in numerous reports of the Secretary-General.[26] In a special report focussing on the cooperation between the UN and regional organisations from April 2015, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon set the goal of 'moving towards partnership peacekeeping',[27] a notion

[24]United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping – Report of the Secretary-General*, A/47/277–S/24111, June 17, 1992, `https://undocs.org/en/A/47/277`, accessed July 31, 2018, para. 64.

[25]United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*, para. 86, 88.

[26]United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, ('Brahimi Report'), A/55/305–S/2000/809, Aug. 21, 2000, `https://undocs.org/en/S/2000/809`, accessed Aug. 9, 2018; United Nations General Assembly, *Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 16 September 2005 – 60.1 2005 World Summit Outcome*, A/RES/60/1, Oct. 24, 2005, `https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/60/1`, accessed July 18, 2018; United Nations General Assembly, 'Peace Operations 2010'; United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping*, July 2009, `https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/newhorizon_0.pdf`, accessed Aug. 11, 2018; United Nations Secretary-General, 'A4P: Our Core Agenda for Peacekeeping', `https://www.un.org/en/A4P/`, accessed Sept. 30, 2019.

[27]United Nations Security Council, *Partnering for Peace*.

that was later reiterated in the UN Security Council open debate on regional organisations and contemporary challenges of global security,[28] as well as the 2015 *Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations* (HIPPO).[29] Overall, with decades of ad hoc cooperation on the ground, high-level meetings between the UN and regional organisations, and numerous reports, the UN has been and still is pushing to 'establish predictable frameworks for cooperation with regional organizations'.[30]

2.3.2 Troop Contributing Countries

The quantitative and qualitative changes in peacekeeping were also accompanied by shifts in the composition of the main troop contributing countries. As mentioned above, organisations providing peacekeeping rely on their members states for resources, including personnel, technical, administrative, and financial resources. While institutional arrangements differ for financial contributions, personnel contributions are voluntary in all organisations. Countries can decide whether and how many troops they want to contribute to peace operations. Table 2.1 presents the largest personnel contributing countries, including military, police, and civilian personnel, to UN peace missions from 1990 to 2016.

During the Cold War period, peace operations were dominated by Western middle powers, such as Australia, Canada, Norway, and Sweden. While the superpowers of this period disengaged from peacekeeping efforts to keep their tensions and interests out of the 'impartial' peace operations, middle powers hoped that by participating they received special recognition for their engagement and thereby enhanced their standing in the international system.[31] This arrangement continued until the early

[28]United Nations Security Council, *Maintenance of International Peace and Security: Regional Organizations and Contemporary Challenges of Global Security*, S/PV.7505, Aug. 15, 2015, `https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.7505`, accessed July 28, 2016.

[29]United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on Uniting Our Strengths for Peace*.

[30]United Nations General Assembly, 'Peace Operations 2010', para. 17.

[31]Laura Neack, 'UN Peace-Keeping: In the Interest of Community or Self?', *Journal of Peace Research* 32/2 (1995), 181–96; Andrew F. Cooper (ed.), *Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997); Sean M. Maloney, *Canada and UN Peacekeeping: Cold War by Other Means, 1945–1970* (St. Catharines, ON: Vanwell Publishers, 2002).

1990s, as can be seen in Table 2.1. In 1990 and 1991, Canada, Finland, Norway, and Austria were among the three largest contributors. The end of the Cold War also enabled the permanent members of the UN Security Council to send personnel to peace operations, as was done by France, the United Kingdom, and the United States in 1992–1995. France's high ranking in 1992/1993 was driven by their contribution of up to 5'700 troops to the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Croatia; and the US top position in 1995 was driven by their contribution of 2'226 troops to the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). Since then, countries from the 'Global South' have become the main personnel contributors to UN peace missions. The top three contributors regularly include Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India, but also Nigeria in the early 2000s and later Ethiopia. Pakistan contributed large shares of troops to the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL, 1999–2006), the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL, 2003–2016), and the UN Missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC, 1999–2010; MONUSCO, 2011–present). Similarly, Bangladesh focussed its contribution on UNAMSIL, UNMIL, and the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI, 2004–present); and India on the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE, 2000–2008), MONUC/MONUSCO, and the UN Missions in Sudan and in South Sudan (UNMIS, 2005–2011; UNMISS, 2011–present). The rising peacekeeping contributions of countries belonging to the 'Global South' are often explained by referring to the positional or status gains expected from participation in such activities, as well as the financial compensation provided by the UN.[32] From a demand-side perspective, a much larger group of troop contributing countries has been needed to meet the rise in demand for peacekeeping personnel since the 1990s, and countries from the 'Global South' have taken on an increasing share of this burden.

[32]Kabilan Krishnasamy, 'The Paradox of India's Peacekeeping', *Contemporary South Asia* 12/2 (2003), 263–80; Victor, 'African Peacekeeping in Africa'.

Table 2.1: Largest Troop Contributors to UN Peace Operations, 1990–2016[33]

Year (as of December)	**1. Largest (Total) Contributor**	**2. Largest (Total) Contributor**	**3. Largest (Total) Contributor**
1990	Canada (1'002)	Finland (992)	Austria (967)
1991	Finland (1'006)	Norway (973)	Austria (967)
1992	France (6'502)	UK (3'819)	Canada (3'285)
1993	France (6'370)	India (5'902)	Pakistan (5'089)
1994	Pakistan (9'110)	France (5'149)	Bangladesh (4'271)
1995	US (2'851)	India (2'078)	Bangladesh (2'029)
1996	Pakistan (1'712)	Zimbabwe (1'445)	India (1'211)
1997	Poland (1'084)	Bangladesh (1'025)	Austria (831)
1998	Poland (1'053)	India (927)	Bangladesh (889)
1999	India (1'898)	Ghana (1'711)	Nigeria (1'606)
2000	Nigeria (3'525)	Bangladesh (3'258)	India (2'738)
2001	Bangladesh (6'010)	Pakistan (5'552)	Nigeria (3'468)
2002	Pakistan (4'677)	Bangladesh (4'211)	Nigeria (3'277)
2003	Pakistan (6'248)	Bangladesh (4'730)	Nigeria (3'361)
2004	Pakistan (8'140)	Bangladesh (8'024)	India (3'912)
2005	Bangladesh (9'529)	Pakistan (8'999)	India (7'284)
2006	Pakistan (9'867)	Bangladesh (9'681)	India (9'483)
2007	Pakistan (10'610)	Bangladesh (9'856)	India (9'357)
2008	Pakistan (11'135)	Bangladesh (9'567)	India (8'693)
2009	Pakistan (10'764)	Bangladesh (10'427)	India (8'756)
2010	Pakistan (10'652)	Bangladesh (10'402)	India (8'691)
2011	Bangladesh (10'394)	Pakistan (9'416)	India (8'115)
2012	Pakistan (8'967)	Bangladesh (8'828)	India (7'839)
2013	Pakistan (8'266)	Bangladesh (7'918)	India (7'849)
2014	Bangladesh (9'400)	India (8'138)	Pakistan (7'936)
2015	Bangladesh (8'496)	Ethiopia (8'296)	India (7'798)
2016	Ethiopia (8'295)	India (7'710)	Pakistan (7'156)

2.4 Literature on Peacekeeping Burden-Sharing

The expansion of peacekeeping in terms of volume and scope as well as the associated resource commitments has led to increased scholarly interest in the question of burden-sharing and the supply-side to peacekeeping over the last two decades. Early research

[33]Source: Meiske and Ruggeri, 'Peacekeeping as a Tool of Foreign Policy'.

on peacekeeping burden-sharing built upon the alliance burden-sharing literature, both in terms of theory and empirical methods, which is presented in the following section. A growth of data on troop deployments, financial contributions, peacekeeping fatalities, country- and mission-specific characteristics, among others, enabled more recent studies to further examine whether, how much, and why countries contribute to peace operations, which is discussed in the subsequent section. Particular emphasis is placed on international- and domestic-level explanations of peacekeeping participation and contribution.

2.4.1 Alliance Burden-Sharing

The term 'burden-sharing' was first widely used in the 1950s in the context of NATO and debates about how the costs of collective defence should be distributed among its members. When burden-sharing became a research topic in the 1960s, it built on collective action theory and the provision of public goods. In his seminal work *The Logic of Collective Action*, Olson examines whether members of a group sharing a common interest find it in their individual interest to bear the costs of the joint effort.[34] He shows that most organisations produce so-called 'public goods' – goods or services that are non-excludable and non-rival in consumption and hence available to every member, regardless of whether they have shared the costs providing them.[35] Olson then argues that 'rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interest' in the form of public goods, but instead have an incentive to free ride on the efforts of others.[36] Olson's theory of collective action has often been applied to the behaviour of countries within security alliances, particularly NATO. In their influential article 'An Economic Theory of Alliances', Olson and Zeckhauser argue that if defence is purely public among allies, such as NATO's deterrence strategy based on the US nuclear force, then defence burdens are expected

[34]Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action*.

[35]See also Paul A. Samuelson, 'The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure', *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 36/4 (1954), 387–89, which is considered to be the foundation of the modern theory of public goods.

[36]Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action*, p. 2.

to be shared unevenly among them: larger, richer allies tend to bear a disproportionated share of the burden.[37] The terms 'exploitation of the great by the small'[38] and 'free riding' describe this phenomenon. Moreover, Olson and Zeckhauser predict defence expenditures to be at inefficient or suboptimal levels, as allies do not account for the benefits that their defence spending confers on others. Olson and Zeckhauser's article is important not only for its theoretical insights but also for its methodological approach, which has influenced studies on NATO and peacekeeping burden-sharing for decades.[39] Specifically, they examine the Spearman rank correlation between each ally's gross national product (GNP) and the proportion of its GNP devoted to defence in order to test for exploitation. A positive (and significant) correlation signals that richer countries shoulder a greater GNP-adjusted share of the burden.

The pure public good approach has generated important theoretical insights regarding alliance formation, financing, membership size, and stability, but its empirical validity has been put into question since the late 1960s when scholars found that the association between size and defence burden declined to insignificant levels.[40] Later studies, such as by Sandler and colleagues, stressed impure public good properties (i.e. varying degrees of consumption rivalry and/or excludability) of collective defence by considering not only the deterrent but also conventional defence and protective aspects of the NATO alliance.[41] Other scholars, including Oneal, argued that the diminished empirical success of Olson and Zechkauser's theory can be explained by the pursuit of private goods by some countries.[42] A private good is rival and excludable,

[37]Olson and Zeckhauser, 'An Economic Theory of Alliances'.

[38]Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action*, p. 3.

[39]Some recent examples include Shimizu and Sandler, 'Peacekeeping and Burden-Sharing, 1994–2000'; Han Dorussen, Emil J. Kirchner, and James Sperling, 'Sharing the Burden of Collective Security in the European Union', *International Organization* 63/4 (2009), 789–810; Todd Sandler and Hirofumi Shimizu, 'NATO Burden Sharing 1999–2010: An Altered Alliance', *Foreign Policy Analysis* 10/1 (2014), 43–60.

[40]This was first shown by Bruce M. Russett, *What Price Vigilance? The Burdens of National Defense* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1970).

[41]Todd Sandler and Jon Cauley, 'On the Economic Theory of Alliances', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 19/2 (1975), 330–48; Todd Sandler, 'Impurity of Defense: An Application to the Economics of Alliances', *Kyklos* 30/3 (1977), 443–60.

[42]John R. Oneal, 'The Theory of Collective Action and Burden Sharing in NATO', *International Organization* 44/3 (1990), 379–402.

i.e. it is strictly country-specific and not shared among allies. Examples include internal stability, regional security, colonial protection, or economic benefits. The most comprehensive model of alliance behaviour proposed, inter alia by Sandler, is the joint product model: it combines pure public, impure public and private characteristics of a good.[43] The joint product model entails profoundly different predictions than the pure public good model. First, defence burden-sharing in alliances is expected to be shared more in line with the benefits received. The greater the share of excludable (that is, private and impure public benefits) to total defence benefits, the smaller the extent of free riding, independent of economic size. Second, defence expenditures may be nearer to Pareto-optimal levels with the presence of joint products.[44]

2.4.2 Peacekeeping Burden-Sharing

Following the rise in peacekeeping activity after the end of the Cold War, the division of the peacekeeping burden became of increased scholarly interest. Some of the first peacekeeping burden-sharing studies include Bobrow and Boyer's 1997 article 'Maintaining System Stability: Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations' and Khanna and Sandler's 1997 article 'Conscription, Peacekeeping, and Foreign Assistance: NATO Burden Sharing in the Post-Cold War Era'.[45] Similar to the alliance literature, these early studies examine whether peacekeeping resembles a public good, a private good, or the joint product model, as well as the exploitation hypothesis. From the perspective of the public good model, restored peace, security, and stability, including in the economic sphere, not only favour the contributors to a peace mission but also non-contributing countries. Contributor-specific benefits highlighted in pri-

[43]Sandler, 'Impurity of Defense'; James C. Murdoch and Todd Sandler, 'A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of NATO', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 26/2 (1982), 237–63; Todd Sandler and John F. Forbes, 'Burden Sharing, Strategy, and the Design of NATO', *Economic Inquiry* 18/3 (1980), 425–44; Jacques van Ypersele de Strihou, 'Sharing the Defense Burden among Western Allies', *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 49/4 (1967), 527–36.

[44]See also Sandler for a survey of the development of the economic theory of alliances since the late 1960s (Todd Sandler, 'The Economic Theory of Alliances: A Survey', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37/3 (1993), 446–83).

[45]Bobrow and Boyer, 'Maintaining System Stability'; Jyoti Khanna and Todd Sandler, 'Conscription, Peace-Keeping, and Foreign Assistance: NATO Burden Sharing in the Post-Cold War Era', *Defence and Peace Economics* 8/1 (1997), 101–21.

vate good models include greater prestige, trade stability with the conflict country, financial reimbursements, in-field-training, or neighbourhood stability. Most authors find both public and private benefits in peacekeeping, and therefore the joint product model to be most suitable.[46] Sandler provides a formal theoretical model for the joint product model of peacekeeping.[47]

2.4.3 Financial Burden-Sharing

Peacekeeping burden-sharing possesses many facets. It relates to financial contributions and troop contributions, to UN peacekeeping and non-UN peacekeeping. The majority of the literature addresses the topic of troop contributions to UN operations. Financial burden-sharing studies are less common as financial contributions to UN missions are largely determined by the UN assessment accounts, and there is no financial data for non-UN missions.[48] Sandler and a number of associates have been at the centre of the limited literature on financial burden-sharing in peacekeeping. Two findings are consistent throughout their studies: 1) burden-sharing has grown more disproportionate, which indicates a large share of pure public benefits, since the end of the Cold War; and 2) burden-sharing is more disproportionate for UN missions than for non-UN missions. In their study of UN financial contributions for 1976–1996, Khanna, Sandler and Shimizu find no exploitation before 1991;[49] neither do Shimizu and Sandler for 1980, 1985, and 1990.[50] This dynamic changed with increases in the peacekeeping burden and peacekeeping expenditures after the end of the Cold War. Rich countries shoulder a disproportionate financial burden of UN peacekeeping, as

[46]Bobrow and Boyer, 'Maintaining System Stability'; Bove and Elia, 'Supplying Peace'; Shimizu and Sandler, 'Peacekeeping and Burden-Sharing, 1994–2000'.

[47]Todd Sandler, 'International Peacekeeping Operations: Burden Sharing and Effectiveness', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61/9 (2017), 1875–97.

[48]Sandler, 'International Peacekeeping Operations', p.1888; Gaibulloev, Sandler, and Shimizu, 'Demands for UN and Non-UN Peacekeeping', estimate financial contributions to non-UN missions based on the personnel costs incurred for each country.

[49]Jyoti Khanna, Todd Sandler, and Hirofumi Schimizu, 'Sharing the Financial Burden for U.N. and NATO Peacekeeping, 1976–1996', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42/2 (1998), 176–95.

[50]Shimizu and Sandler, 'Peacekeeping and Burden-Sharing, 1994–2000'.

shown in studies covering 1991–1996, 1994–2000, and 2001–2006.[51] For non-UN peace missions, disproportionality of burden sharing does not hold.[52] As Gaibulloev, Sandler, and Shimizu put it, 'peacekeeping missions appear partitioned: UN missions for global public benefits and non-UN missions for peacekeeper-specific benefits'.[53] In their study of UN and non-UN peacekeeping spending between 1994–2006, they find that the key determinant of financial contributions to UN missions is peacekeeping spillins from other countries, i.e. a country's contribution is (mostly positively) influenced by the contributions of others. For non-UN missions, on the other hand, both spillins and contributor-specific interests in the conflict region influence contributions. The latter include trade with the conflict region, financial direct investments in the conflict region, and proximity to the conflict.

2.4.4 Troop Burden-Sharing

Troop contributions to peace operations follow a different dynamic than financial contributions. In their study of troop supply to UN and non-UN missions from 1999–2009, Bove and Elia demonstrate the 'centrality of country-specific benefits in explaining the participation in peacekeeping' and that 'contributor-specific benefits play the same role in UN and non-UN peacekeeping missions'.[54] These contributor-specific motives include proximity to the conflict region, the level of threat to global and regional stability, and the number of displaced people. Gaibulloev, George, Sandler, and Shimizu, on the other hand, stress differing motivations for UN and non-UN peace operations.[55] The results of their spatial panel regressions for the period 1990–2012 show that while non-UN missions are motivated by publicness considerations, reflected in positive personnel spillovers, the opposite or no reaction to personnel

[51] Khanna, Sandler, and Schimizu, 'Sharing the Financial Burden for U.N. and NATO Peacekeeping, 1976–1996'; Shimizu and Sandler, 'Peacekeeping and Burden-Sharing, 1994–2000'; Hirofumi Shimizu and Todd Sandler, 'Recent Peacekeeping Burden Sharing', *Applied Economics Letters* 17/15 (2010), 1479–84.

[52] Gaibulloev, Sandler, and Shimizu, 'Demands for UN and Non-UN Peacekeeping'; Shimizu and Sandler, 'Recent Peacekeeping Burden Sharing'.

[53] Gaibulloev, Sandler, and Shimizu, 'Demands for UN and Non-UN Peacekeeping', p. 827.

[54] Bove and Elia, 'Supplying Peace', p. 172.

[55] Gaibulloev et al., 'Personnel Contributions to UN and Non-UN Peacekeeping Missions'.

spillovers is discernible for UN missions. Instead, UN personnel contributors are motivated by donor-specific financial benefits. Passmore, Shannon, and Hart tested central tenets of collective action theory in the context of UN peacekeeping, particularly implications regarding free-riding and shortfalls in mission personnel.[56] They found that contributors have a greater incentive to free-ride and contribute personnel at suboptimal levels when the number of contributing states increases and when economic benefits are lower. Beyond these articles, a vast literature studying the supply-side to peacekeeping – the question whether and how much countries contribute to peace operations – has developed in recent years. Although studies differ in the countries, organisations, peace operations, regions, and time periods examined, a unified theme is a marked emphasis on contributor-specific benefits motivating peacekeeper contributions. The myriad of contributor-specific motives can broadly be separated into two groups: international- and domestic-level determinants.

2.4.5 International-Level Determinants

International-level determinants are often related to security considerations. The level of threat a conflict poses to global and regional stability is a strong determinant of countries' troop contributions. Using conflict intensity as a proxy for the level of threat, Bove and Elia show that conflicts posing a greater risk receive more peacekeepers.[57] Similar results are obtained for the number of refugees, internally displayed persons, fatality rates, or physical integrity rights as signals of security and humanitarian concerns.[58] While the provision of international peace and security is the most apparent example of public benefits resulting from peacekeeping,[59] it also addresses contributor-specific national security interests. Studies reveal that the proximity of

[56]Passmore, Shannon, and Hart, 'Rallying the Troops'.

[57]Bove and Elia, 'Supplying Peace'.

[58]Bove and Elia, 'Supplying Peace'; Steffi Raes, Cind Du Bois, and Caroline Buts, 'Supplying UN Peacekeepers: An Assessment of the Body Bag Syndrome among OECD Nations', *International Peacekeeping* 26/1 (2019), 111–36; Seung-Whan Choi, 'What Determines US Humanitarian Intervention?', *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 30/2 (2013), 121–39.

[59]Khanna, Sandler, and Schimizu, 'Sharing the Financial Burden for U.N. and NATO Peacekeeping, 1976–1996'; Shimizu and Sandler, 'Peacekeeping and Burden-Sharing, 1994–2000'; Gaibulloev et al., 'Personnel Contributions to UN and Non-UN Peacekeeping Missions'.

a potential troop contributing country raises the likelihood of participation.[60] Negative spillovers from conflict and conflict contagion are more likely to affect proximate countries.[61] At the same time, benefits generated by peacekeeping are also more likely to be experienced by proximate countries, such as conflict containment, revived relations with the disputing parties, and regional balance. Highlighting the influence of spatial proximity and location, Perkins and Neumayer find that countries that are geographically closer or located in the same region as the host country of the peace operation are more likely to provide troops.[62] They further show that the probability of a country participating in a particular peace operation rises when other states in the same region participate, suggesting that location provides a context for interdependence and collective efforts in peacekeeping. Related to conflict proximity, Uzonyi finds that countries are more likely to contribute to UN peace missions (1990–2011) when they receive more refugees from the conflict area.[63]

Economic interests in the conflict region are also widely discussed in the literature as determinants for peacekeeping engagement. In relation to financial contributions, a contributor's trading activity and share of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the conflict region are significant positive determinants of contributions.[64] In relation to peacekeeping personnel, Passmore, Shannon, and Hart find an effect of FDI but not of trading activities on personnel shortfalls in peace missions.[65] Similarly, Perkins and Neumayer find no effect of bilateral trade with the target state on a country's decision to send troops.[66] Focussing on the decision to deploy peace operations, Stojek and Tir show that trade matters: peacekeepers are more likely to be sent to those countries that have greater trade ties with the five permanent members of the UN

[60]Perkins and Neumayer, 'Extra-Territorial Interventions in Conflict Spaces'; Bove and Elia, 'Supplying Peace'.

[61]Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, 'Transnational Dimensions of Civil War', *Journal of Peace Research* 44/3 (2007), 293–309.

[62]Perkins and Neumayer, 'Extra-Territorial Interventions in Conflict Spaces'.

[63]Uzonyi, 'Refugee Flows and State Contributions to Post-Cold War UN Peacekeeping Missions'.

[64]Khanna, Sandler, and Shimizu, 'The Demand for UN Peacekeeping, 1975–1996'; Gaibulloev, Sandler, and Shimizu, 'Demands for UN and Non-UN Peacekeeping'.

[65]Passmore, Shannon, and Hart, 'Rallying the Troops'.

[66]Perkins and Neumayer, 'Extra-Territorial Interventions in Conflict Spaces'.

Security Council.[67] For state-conducted peacekeeping in civil wars (1964–1998), Rost and Greig also find that states are more likely to send peacekeepers to important trading partners.[68] They further highlight the role of shared ethnic linkages, former colonial ties, and military allies in deployment decisions. A positive effect of colonial ties on participation in multilateral peace operations is also confirmed in Perkins and Neumayer's study.[69]

An additional international-level factor motivating troop contributions are alliance ties and dependence. Lebovic's study of UN peace operation from 1993–2001 indicates that countries with stronger security ties to the US, operationalised in terms of US foreign military sales to a country, and NATO membership are inclined toward participating in UN peace operations.[70] Becker and Malesky ascertain that the more a NATO member's strategic culture tends toward Atlanticism, as laid out in national strategic documents between 1994–2012, the more resources they allocate to the alliance's military operations.[71] In their study of the 1991 coalition of the Gulf War, Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger find that alliance dependence, in terms of military and economic ties, allowed the US to exert pressure for contributions on Japan, Germany, and Egypt.[72] Ward and Dorussen further find that countries deploy peacekeepers alongside their friends.[73] Using a network approach, they conclude that countries provide a larger portion of peacekeepers to a particular UN mission (1990–2011) when they are more central in a network of foreign policy preferences, which entails greater foreign policy complementarities with other countries. Countries hope to cooperate with well-trained, disciplined troops, promote common norms, pursue compatible mission objectives, and enhance domestic support if allies join in.

[67]Stojek and Tir, 'The Supply Side of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations'.

[68]Nicolas Rost and J. Michael Greig, 'Taking Matters into Their Own Hands: An Analysis of the Determinants of State-Conducted Peacekeeping in Civil Wars', *Journal of Peace Research* 48/2 (2011), 171–84.

[69]Perkins and Neumayer, 'Extra-Territorial Interventions in Conflict Spaces'.

[70]Lebovic, 'Uniting for Peace?'

[71]Jordan Becker and Edmund Malesky, 'The Continent or the "Grand Large"? Strategic Culture and Operational Burden-Sharing in NATO', *International Studies Quarterly* 61/1 (2017), 163–80.

[72]Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, 'Burden-Sharing in the Persian Gulf War'.

[73]Ward and Dorussen, 'Standing Alongside Your Friends'.

Another group of international-level motivations relates to the standing, reputation, and influence in the international system. Naeck suggests that states whose interests are best served by the continuation of the international status quo and their position in the international hierarchy have dominated UN peacekeeping from 1948–1990.[74] This is particularly relevant for so-called middle powers for whom UN peacekeeping offers a niche domain in diplomacy that provides them with an enhanced status and amplifies their voice in international institutions, especially the UN.[75] Examples include Canada, Sweden, or Australia during the Cold War period, and Pakistan or Bangladesh, who have dominated UN peacekeeping more recently. Do Céu Pinto argues that Portugal's involvement in peacekeeping since 1990 stems from the belief that this activity enhances their socially constructed national interest, status, and influence within the UN.[76] Krishnasamy makes a similar case for Bangladesh's commitment to peacekeeping, with a view to attract economic assistance and foreign investment.[77] He also argues that India, by contributing to peacekeeping, hopes to strengthen its international status and power within the UN, and eventually obtain a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.[78] To provide an overview, Table 2.2 summarises the discussed international-level determinants for contributions to peace operations.

[74]Neack, 'UN Peace-Keeping'.

[75]Cooper, *Niche Diplomacy*; Maloney, *Canada and UN Peacekeeping*.

[76]Maria do Céu Pinto, 'A Small State's Search for Relevance: Peace Missions as Foreign Policy', *International Peacekeeping* 21/3 (2014), 390–405.

[77]Kabilan Krishnasamy, 'Bangladesh and UN Peacekeeping: The Participation of a 'Small' State', *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 41/1 (2003), 24–47.

[78]Krishnasamy, 'The Paradox of India's Peacekeeping'; Alan Bullion, 'India and UN Peacekeeping Operations', *International Peacekeeping* 4/1 (1997), 98–114.

Table 2.2: International-Level Determinants of Peacekeeping Contributions

International-Level Determinant	**Relevant Literature**
International Peace, Security, and Stability	• Bove and Elia 'Supplying Peace'; • Gaibulloev, Sandler, and Shimizu, 'Demands for UN and Non-UN Peacekeeping'; • Gaibulloev, George, Sandler, and Shimizu, 'Personnel Contributions to UN and Non-UN Peacekeeping Missions'; • Khanna, Sandler, and Shimizu, 'Sharing the Financial Burden for UN and NATO Peacekeeping, 1976–1996'; • Raes, Du Bois, and Buts, 'Supplying UN Peacekeepers'; • Shimizu and Sandler, 'Peacekeeping and Burden-Sharing, 1994–2000'.
Standing, Reputation, and Influence in the International System	• Bullion, 'India and UN Peacekeeping Operations'; • Cooper, *Niche Diplomacy*; • Cunliffe, *Legions of Peace*; • do Céu Pinto, 'A Small State's Search for Relevance'; • Krishnasamy, 'Bangladesh and UN Peacekeeping'; • Krishnasamy, 'The Paradox of India's Peacekeeping'; • Maloney, *Canada and UN Peacekeeping*; • Neack, 'UN Peace-Keeping'; • Victor, 'African Peacekeeping in Africa'.
Geographic Proximity	• Bove and Elia, 'Supplying Peace'; • Gaibulloev, Sandler, and Shimizu, 'Demands for UN and Non-UN Peacekeeping'; • Perkins and Neumayer, 'Extra-Territorial Interventions in Conflict Spaces'; • Ward and Dorussen, 'Standing Alongside Your Friends'.
Refugee Flows	• Bove and Elia, 'Supplying Peace'; • Perkins and Neumayer, 'Extra-Territorial Interventions in Conflict Spaces'; • Uzonyi, 'Refugee Flows and State Contributions to Post-Cold War UN Peacekeeping Missions'.

International-Level Determinant	Relevant Literature
Economic Interests (e.g. Trade, FDI)	• Gaibulloev, Sandler, and Shimizu, 'Demands for UN and Non-UN Peacekeeping'; • Khanna, Sandler, and Shimizu, 'The Demand for UN Peacekeeping, 1975–1996'; • Passmore, Shannon, and Hart, 'Rallying the Troops'; • Perkins and Neumayer, 'Extra-Territorial Interventions in Conflict Spaces'; • Rost and Greig, 'Taking Matters into Their Own Hands'; • Stojek and Tir, 'The Supply Side of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations'.
Other Relational Ties (e.g. Colonial, Ethnic, Language)	• Duursma and Gledhill, 'Voted Out'; • Perkins and Neumayer, 'Extra-Territorial Interventions in Conflict Spaces'; • Rost and Greig, 'Taking Matters into Their Own Hands'; • Uzonyi, 'Refugee Flows and State Contributions to Post-Cold War UN Peacekeeping Missions'; • Victor, 'African Peacekeeping in Africa'; • Ward and Dorussen, 'Standing Alongside Your Friends'.
Alliance Dependence	• Becker and Malesky, 'The Continent or the "Grand Large"'; • Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, 'Burden-Sharing in the Persian Gulf War'; • Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, *Friends in Need*; • Lebovic, 'Uniting for Peace'.
Deployment Alongside Friends	• Ward and Dorussen, 'Standing Alongside Your Friends'.

2.4.6 Domestic-Level Determinants

Domestic-level determinants refer to characteristics of the contributing countries. One driver at the domestic level are resource capacities and constraints. States with larger militaries or population have more potential to contribute to peace operations and

deploy more troops at one time.[79] Relatedly, Bove and Elia find that the number of concurrent operations a country engages in constraints their ability to contribute to further engagements.[80] The wealth of a country, most often measured in terms of GDP per capita, could similarly be assumed to have a positive effect on troop contributions, but research suggests that wealth in fact has a negative effect.[81] As shown in Table 2.1, in December 2016, the three top troop contributors to UN peacekeeping were Ethiopia, India, and Pakistan, which are low and middle income countries.[82] Victor, studying the contributions of states of sub-Saharan Africa to UN and non-UN operations in the same region from 1989–2001, finds that poorer countries contribute more to peacekeeping.[83] A widespread explanation is that poorer countries supply personnel to receive the financial compensation provided by the UN – US$1'428 per peacekeeper per month (as of 1 July 2018) – which cannot only cover but exceed their opportunity costs.[84] Financial benefits are in fact one of the most commonly cited private goods of peacekeeping in the academic literature.[85] Recent studies, however, call the 'peacekeeping for profit' narrative into question. Coleman and Nyblade argue that this narrative has been overstated and that instead conditions for profiting from peacekeeping are highly restrictive, including small, inexpensive forces and old but functional equipment.[86] They point out that developing states emerged as the main

[79]Bove and Elia, 'Supplying Peace'; Victor, 'African Peacekeeping in Africa'.

[80]Bove and Elia, 'Supplying Peace'.

[81]Bove and Elia, 'Supplying Peace'; Ward and Dorussen, 'Standing Alongside Your Friends'.

[82]United Nations Peacekeeping, *How We Are Funded*; World Bank, 'GDP (current US$)', `https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.mktp.cd`, accessed Aug. 6, 2019.

[83]Victor, 'African Peacekeeping in Africa'.

[84]United Nations Peacekeeping, *How We Are Funded*.

[85]Eric Berman and Katie E. Sams, *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities* (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2000), pp. 253–4; Bobrow and Boyer, 'Maintaining System Stability'; Bove and Elia, 'Supplying Peace'; Gaibulloev et al., 'Personnel Contributions to UN and Non-UN Peacekeeping Missions'; Kathman and Melin, 'Who Keeps the Peace?'; Khanna, Sandler, and Schimizu, 'Sharing the Financial Burden for U.N. and NATO Peacekeeping, 1976–1996'; Uzonyi, 'Refugee Flows and State Contributions to Post-Cold War UN Peacekeeping Missions'; Victor, 'African Peacekeeping in Africa'; Ward and Dorussen, 'Standing Alongside Your Friends'.

[86]Coleman and Nyblade, 'Peacekeeping for Profit?'; see also Katharina P. Coleman, 'The Political Economy of UN Peacekeeping: Incentivizing Effective Participation', *Providing for Peacekeeping* 7 (2014), International Peace Institute, `https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/180005/ipi_political_economy.pdf`, accessed Mar. 15, 2015; Philip Cunliffe, *Legions of Peace: UN Peacekeepers From the Global South* (London: C.H. Hurst & Co., 2013).

contributors to UN peacekeeping at a time when UN peacekeeping was becoming less financially attractive, and, replicating quantitative studies supporting the peacekeeping for profit narrative, they also show that previous results are sensitive to outliers and functional form assumptions.[87]

Another domestic-level factor widely discussed in the literature is the regime type of a troop contributing country, particularly the motives of democratic countries to supply peacekeepers. Andersson, Lebovic, and Perkins and Neumayer, among others, all find that democratic countries are more likely to contribute to peacekeeping.[88] Reasonings behind this finding include a commitment to shared liberal principles and human rights, greater humanitarian interest, the diffusion of liberal norms and institutions, the signalling of democratic intent and commitment to the international system, and an inclination towards multilateral engagements. In a recent article, Duursma and Gledhill qualify these findings.[89] They compare contributions to UN peace operations in the 1990–1999 period to the period from 1999–2015 and find that while the level of democracy is positively associated with peacekeeping contributions during the 1990s, democracies have become less likely to make large-scale troop contributions since the turn of the century, albeit remaining more likely to make some contributions. Their intuition behind this finding is that democratic leaders, relying on public support, have become more reluctant to contribute to the more robust and risky forms of peacekeeping that emerged in the 1990s. Relatedly, Bennet, Lepgold,

[87]The UN troop cost reimbursement rate was stagnant during much of the past 20 years, rising costs of military personnel have outpaced reimbursement, the UN is in arrears to numerous troop contributing countries, including US$54 million to Ethiopia, US$80 million to India, and US$49 million to Pakistan (as of October 2013), and reimbursements only make up a fraction of the total military expenditure in many cases; see Coleman and Nyblade, 'Peacekeeping for Profit?'; Coleman, 'The Political Economy of UN Peacekeeping'.

[88]Andreas Andersson, 'Democracies and UN Peacekeeping Operations, 1990–1996', *International Peacekeeping* 7/2 (2000), 1–22; Andreas Andersson, 'United Nations Intervention by United Democracies? State Commitment to UN Interventions 1991-99', *Cooperation and Conflict* 37/4 (2002), 363–86; Lebovic, 'Uniting for Peace?'; Perkins and Neumayer, 'Extra-Territorial Interventions in Conflict Spaces'; see also Arturo C. Sotomayor Velázquez, *The Myth of the Democratic Peacekeeper: Civil-Military Relations and the United Nations* (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 2014); Victor, 'African Peacekeeping in Africa'; Ward and Dorussen, 'Standing Alongside Your Friends'.

[89]Allard Duursma and John Gledhill, 'Voted Out: Regime Type, Elections and Contributions to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations', *European Journal of International Relations* 25/4 (2019), 1157–85.

and Unger in their works on the Persian Gulf War, Auerswald in his study of NATO's 1999 intervention in Kosovo, and Mello in his book on participation in military engagements in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq stress the role of domestic institutional structures and political culture.[90] They expect that institutionally strong executives vis-à-vis the public, legislature, and bureaucracy are more likely to deploy troops than weak executives operating under tight constraints and accountability towards opposition forces. Here, partisanship is another relevant factor. Haesebrouck, deploying a fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis, ascertains that governing parties situated at the left of the ideological spectrum were more inclined to support NATO's 2011 military campaign in Libya.[91]

Finally, the role of and motivations relating to the military are discussed in the literature on troop supply to peace operations. Kathman and Melin find that countries facing military coup threats increase their troop contributions to UN peace operations (1992–2010) to keep their military abroad and limit the risk.[92] Reversely, Lundgren shows that countries that commit more military personnel to UN peacekeeping (1991–2013) experience fewer coup attempts, especially when they rely more on peacekeeping revenues.[93] At the same time, peacekeeping participation gives the military opportunities to gain training, operational experience, professionalisation, and expertise, which is particularly relevant for countries that lack the resources to provide these themselves.[94] Peacekeeping exposure can also have an impact on civil-military relations by reorienting the military away from internal to external roles and exposing them to norms that favour civilian control. Sotomayor analyses the effect of

[90]Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, 'Burden-Sharing in the Persian Gulf War'; Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Unger (eds.), *Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf War* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996); Auerswald, 'Explaining Wars of Choice'; Patrick A. Mello, *Democratic Participation in Armed Conflict: Military Involvement in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

[91]Tim Haesebrouck, 'NATO Burden Sharing in Libya: A Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61/10 (2017), 2235–61.

[92]Kathman and Melin, 'Who Keeps the Peace?'; see also Victor, 'African Peacekeeping in Africa'; Bobrow and Boyer, 'Maintaining System Stability'.

[93]Lundgren, 'Backdoor Peacekeeping'.

[94]Kathman and Melin, 'Who Keeps the Peace?'; Bobrow and Boyer, 'Maintaining System Stability'.

UN peacekeeping participation on the civil-military relationship in a number of Latin American countries and finds that this transformational effect depends on existing political institutions and the tasks troops perform during the peace operation.[95] He further highlights the importance of a country's security doctrine and the degree of integration between military and foreign policy, arguing that countries with externally oriented doctrines and integrated foreign and defence policies are more likely to commit troops to the UN.[96] Table 2.3 summarises all domestic-level determinants for peacekeeping contributions.

Table 2.3: Domestic-Level Determinants of Peacekeeping Contributions

Domestic-Level Determinant	**Relevant Literature**
Resource Constraints	• Bove and Elia, 'Supplying Peace'; • Duursma and Gledhill, 'Voted Out'; • Victor, 'African Peacekeeping in Africa'; • Ward and Dorussen, 'Standing Alongside Your Friends'.

[95]Sotomayor Velázquez, *The Myth of the Democratic Peacekeeper*; Arturo C. Sotomayor Velázquez, 'Peacekeeping Effects in South America: Common Experiences and Divergent Effects on Civil-Military Relations', *International Peacekeeping* 17/5 (2010), 629–43.

[96]Arturo C. Sotomayor Velázquez, 'Why Some States Participate in UN Peace Missions While Others Do Not: An Analysis of Civil-Military Relations and Its Effects on Latin America's Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations', *Security Studies* 19/1 (2010), 160–95.

Domestic-Level Determinant	**Relevant Literature**
Financial Rewards	• Berman and Sams, *Peacekeeping in Africa*; • Bobrow and Boyer, 'Maintaining System Stability'; • Bove and Elia, 'Supplying Peace'; • Coleman, 'The Political Economy of UN Peacekeeping'; • Coleman and Nyblade, 'Peacekeeping for Profit'; • Cunliffe, *Legions of Peace*; • Gaibulloev, George, Sandler, and Shimizu, 'Personnel Contributions to UN and Non-UN Peacekeeping Missions'; • Kathman and Melin, 'Who Keeps the Peace'; • Khanna, Sandler, and Shimizu, 'Sharing the Financial Burden for UN and NATO Peacekeeping, 1976–1996'; • Uzonyi, 'Refugee Flows and State Contributions to Post-Cold War UN Peacekeeping Missions'; • Victor, 'African Peacekeeping in Africa'; • Ward and Dorussen, 'Standing Alongside Your Friends'.
Regime Type	• Andersson, 'Democracies and UN Peacekeeping Operations, 1990–1996'; • Andersson, 'United Nations Intervention by United Democracies'; • Duursma and Gledhill, 'Voted Out'; • Lebovic, 'Uniting for Peace'; • Perkins and Neumayer, 'Extra-Territorial Interventions in Conflict Spaces'; • Sotomayor Velázquez, *The Myth of the Democratic Peacekeeper*; • Victor, 'African Peacekeeping in Africa'; • Ward and Dorussen, 'Standing Alongside Your Friends'.
Political Institutional Structure	• Auerswald, 'Explaining Wars of Choice'; • Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, 'Burden-Sharing in the Persian Gulf War'; • Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, *Friends in Need*; • Haesebrouck, 'NATO Burden Sharing in Libya'; • Mello, *Democratic Participation in Armed Conflict.*

Domestic-Level Determinant	**Relevant Literature**
Coup Threats	• Bobrow and Boyer, 'Maintaining System Stability'; • Kathman and Melin, 'Who Keeps the Peace'; • Lundgren, 'Backdoor Peacekeeping'; • Victor, 'African Peacekeeping in Africa'.
Military Training	• Bobrow and Boyer, 'Maintaining System Stability'; • Kathman and Melin, 'Who Keeps the Peace'.
Civil-Military Relationship	• Sotomayor Velázquez, 'Peacekeeping Effects in South America'; • Sotomayor Velázquez, *The Myth of the Democratic Peacekeeper*; • Sotomayor Velazquez, 'Why Some States Participate in UN Peace Missions While Others Do Not'.
Strategic Culture	• Becker and Malesky, 'The Continent or the "Grand Large"'; • Sotomayor Velazquez, 'Why Some States Participate in UN Peace Missions While Others Do Not'.

Some scholars go beyond the analysis of individual determinants and present integrated decision-making frameworks, which focus on the interplay between domestic- and international-level variables. Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger were the first to attempt this integration in their article on the 1991 coalition of the Gulf War.[97] They test five competing models of foreign policy, specifically collective action, balance of threat realism, alliance dependence, state autonomy and domestic society, and bureaucratic politics. After showing that no single hypothesis can explain every country's burden-sharing behaviour, they develop a decision-making model that combines the hypotheses into a single explanatory framework. Auerswald also presents an integrative model, which he illustrates with an analysis of the 1999 Operation Allied Force in Kosovo.[98] His model incorporates core concepts of theories of collective

[97]Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, 'Burden-Sharing in the Persian Gulf War'.
[98]Auerswald, 'Explaining Wars of Choice'.

action, balance-of-threat neo-realism, public opinion, and government institutional structures, presented in a staged, conditional manner. In *Providing Peacekeepers*, Bellamy and Williams offer one of the most systematic and comprehensive frameworks for understanding national politics of UN peacekeeping contributions.[99] They distinguish between five rationales influencing countries' decisions regarding peacekeeping contributions – political, security, economic, institutional, and normative – and outline a framework that emphasises the interplay between a state's pre-disposition towards providing peacekeepers, which emerges from its strategic culture and bureaucratic institutions, and its policy standpoints that together produce the concrete decision whether to contribute UN peacekeepers.

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter has shown that the quantitative and qualitative evolution of peacekeeping, heightened resource demands, a wider range of peacekeeping actors, and shifts in the main troop contributing countries have enhanced the need for an effective and efficient burden-sharing process. Motivated by these developments, the academic literature has increasingly engaged with the question of burden-sharing and the supply-side to peacekeeping. Early research built on the alliance burden-sharing literature, but it soon focussed on contributor-specific benefits of peacekeeping – both at the international and domestic level. While certainly not conclusive, by now the field has a good understanding of a myriad of determinants for countries' contributions to peace operations.

Missing in the existing literature, though, is a more comprehensive view on burden-sharing in peace operations. Currently, the overarching theme of the literature is to determine motivating factors relevant for state-level decisions on troop contributions. This observation is notwithstanding the classification of the determinants for troop contributions into international-level and domestic-level categories. The international

[99]Bellamy and Williams, 'Explaining the National Politics of Peacekeeping Contributions'.

and domestic level, as used by the current literature, represent categories of explanatory factors for state-level behaviour. The literature has, however, not explored levels of analysis as different aggregations as targets for analysis.[100] The empirical trends presented in this chapter suggest that peacekeeping burden-sharing takes place between a diverse set of actors at different levels of aggregation. It was highlighted that following the heightened peacekeeping demands of the post-Cold War environment, a wider range of actors became active and shared the peacekeeping burden, above all regional organisations. Between 1990–2016, the UN launched over 50 new peace missions, while regional organisations deployed around 60 operations.[101] Research on burden-sharing between the UN and regional organisations, however, is very rare, especially systematic and comprehensive empirical analyses.[102] Relatedly, the majority of the literature reviewed in this chapter exclusively studies burden-sharing and countries' troop contributions to UN peace operations. This is mirrored in the wider quantitative literature on peacekeeping, of which 70% study United Nations operations and only 30% study a combination of UN and non-UN operations.[103] More research is needed on burden-sharing dynamics within and between a broader spectrum of peacekeeping actors, including regional organisations.

The aim of this thesis is to address these limitations of the literature on burden-sharing and the supply-side to peacekeeping and extend the current focus from state-

[100]See the previous chapter 'Introduction of Three Levels of Burden-Sharing in Peace Operations' for an introduction to the levels of analysis debate; Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*; Singer, 'The Level-Of-Analysis Problem in International Relations'.

[101]Calculations based on United Nations Peacekeeping, *List of Peacekeeping Operations, 1948–2018*; Bellamy and Williams, 'Trends in Peace Operations, 1947–2013'; Williams, 'Global and Regional Peacekeepers'.

[102]A few exceptions include Muthiah Alagappa, 'Regional Institutions, the UN and International Security: A Framework for Analysis', *Third World Quarterly* 18/3 (1997), 421–41; Malte Brosig, 'EU Peacekeeping in Africa: From Functional Niches and Interlocking Security', *International Peacekeeping* 21/1 (2014), 74–90; Malte Brosig, 'The Interplay of International Institutions in Kosovo between Convergence, Confusion and Niche Capabilities', *European Security* 20/2 (2011), 185–204; Brosig and Motsamai, 'Modeling Cooperative Peacekeeping'; Martin Welz, 'Multi-Actor Peace Operations and Inter-Organizational Relations: Insights from the Central African Republic', *International Peacekeeping* 23/4 (2016), 568–91. See Chapter 3, 'Partnership Peacekeeping: The Division of Labour Between the United Nations and Regional Organisations', for an overview of the limited existing literature.

[103]Evgenija Kroeker, Maline Meiske, and Andrea Ruggeri, 'State of the Art on UN Peace Operations: Data and Findings' (June 2019), Paper Presented at the FBA and UNIGE Research Workshop: State of the Art? The Future of Peacekeeping Data, Genoa.

level determinants to burden-sharing at the global and regional level. In doing so, this thesis is able to study a wider range of actors and approach new research questions reflecting the changed and changing circumstances of peacekeeping. On the global level, the article 'Partnership Peacekeeping: The Division of Labour Between the United Nations and Regional Organisations' develops a framework explaining burden-sharing between the UN and regional organisations, specifically the EU and AU. On the regional level, the article 'Negotiating Collective Peace: The Provision of Troops to EU Peace Operations' explores the role of interrelational dynamics between EU member states in force generation for EU peace operations. The final article, 'Public Attention, Elections, and Peace Operations: Democratising the Making of Peacekeeping Policy', introduces further societal actors and relations to be considered at the national level, specifically the role of public attention and electoral accountability. The goal of this multi-level approach is to generate a more comprehensive understanding of the workings of peacekeeping burden-sharing and ultimately insights into how to increase its efficiency and effectiveness.

Chapter 3

Partnership Peacekeeping: The Division of Labour Between the United Nations and Regional Organisations

3.1 Introduction

Regional organisations (RO) have become one of the main providers of peacekeeping alongside the United Nations (UN). Since 1990 there have been over 80 regional peace operations, while the UN conducted around 60.[1] The United Nations welcomed and encouraged this development. In *An Agenda for Peace*, then UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali first asserted that the capacities of regional organisations in the key areas of 'preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping, peacemaking and post conflict peace-building [...] could not only lighten the burden of the Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratisation in international

[1]Mark Mullenbach, 'Third-Party Peacekeeping in Intrastate Disputes, 1946–2012: A New Data Set', *Midsouth Political Science Review* 14 (2013), 103–33; for his definition of peacekeeping, see p. 107.

affairs'.[2] The request for greater regional engagement and burden-sharing in peacekeeping has been reiterated by the United Nations ever since, and in 2015 former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon as well as the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) established that 'we have entered an era of partnership peacekeeping'.[3] The Secretary-General, however, also accentuated that the expansion of partnership peacekeeping not only entails more efficient mobilisation and leveraging of each organisation's strengths and resources to achieve common peace and security objectives, but also presents challenges with respect to possible fragmentation, duplication of efforts, and competition between actors.[4] Effective and efficient partnership peacekeeping requires 'predictable frameworks for cooperation',[5] but the question of how a global division of labour should be designed has not been sufficiently addressed – neither by the United Nations, ROs, nor the academic literature. Accordingly, this article explores the division of labour between the United Nations and regional organisations in the realm of peacekeeping, asking the question: Which conditions determine whether the United Nations or a regional organisation deploys a peace operation?

The literature on this subject has expanded alongside the rise of regional peacekeeping, but theory-building is still in early stages and systematic and comprehensive empirical analyses are rare. Existing empirical studies provide descriptive trends on the increased volume of peacekeeping carried out by ROs,[6] or single case studies on the successes and failures of regional peacekeeping, such as Howe's seminal article on the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Cease-Fire Monitoring

[2]United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, *An Agenda for Peace*, para. 64.

[3]United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on Uniting Our Strengths for Peace*, para. 53; United Nations Security Council, *Partnering for Peace*, para. 57.

[4]United Nations Security Council, *Partnering for Peace*, para. 7.

[5]United Nations General Assembly, 'Peace Operations 2010', para. 17.

[6]Paul F. Diehl and Young-Im D. Cho, 'Passing the Buck in Conflict Management: The Role of Regional Organizations in the Post-Cold War Era', *Brown Journal of World Affairs* 12/2 (2006), 191–202; Birger Heldt, 'Trends from 1948 to 2005: How to View the Relation between the United Nations and Non-UN Entities', in Donald C. F. Daniel, Patricia Taft, and Sharon Wiharta (eds.), *Peace Operations: Trends, Progress, and Prospects* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 9–26; Bellamy and Williams, 'Trends in Peace Operations, 1947–2013'.

Group in Liberia.[7] Further works highlight the advantages and disadvantages of regional arrangements and assess whether they complement or undermine UN efforts.[8] In the more theoretical strand of the literature, researchers develop typologies of different forms of peacekeeping coordination between the UN and regional organisations, such as sequential, parallel, integrated/hybrid, or standalone peace operations.[9] Other scholars trace the debate on the proper division of labour between ROs and the UN in legal documents and reports of the United Nations, as well as in the context of the continuing institutionalisation of the UN-regional partnership.[10] Alagappa seeks to develop an analytical framework for effective task-sharing between the UN and regional institutions. Acknowledging the difficulty to formulate a division of labour that would be applicable to all cases, he argues that ascertaining which institution is better suited to deploy a mission depends on the regional organisation, its assets and capabilities, and the type of conflict. He highlights several factors, including the depth of interest and consequences, acceptability, institutional capacity, resource availability, consequences for an institution, and accountability.[11] Welz uses the literature on institutional linkages and inter-organisational relations to explore the institutional overlap of the UN, African Union (AU), and sub-regional organisations, as well as its consequences for the emergence and configuration of multi-actor peace operations.[12] In his studies on the interplay of international institutions in Kosovo, as well as European Union (EU) peace operations in Africa, Brosig introduces the concept of niche selection and shows that, when confronted with peacekeeping policy overlap, organisa-

[7]Herbert Howe, 'Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping', *International Security* 21/3 (1996), 145–76.

[8]Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, 'Who's Keeping the Peace? Regionalization and Contemporary Peace Operations', *International Security* 29/4 (2005), 157–95; Bures, 'Regional Peacekeeping Operations'; Diehl, 'Institutional Alternatives to Traditional U.N. Peacekeeping'.

[9]Hikaru Yamashita, 'Peacekeeping Cooperation between the United Nations and Regional Organisations', *Review of International Studies* 38/1 (2012), 165–86; A. Sarjoh Bah and Bruce D. Jones, 'Peace Operation Partnerships: Lessons and Issues from Coordination to Hybrid Arrangements', in Center on International Cooperation (ed.), *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008), 21–9.

[10]Bures, 'Regional Peacekeeping Operations'; Brian L. Job, 'The UN, Regional Organizations, and Regional Conflict: Is There a Viable Role for the UN?', in Richard M. Price and Mark W. Zacher (eds.), *The United Nations and Global Security* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 227–43.

[11]Alagappa, 'Regional Institutions, the UN and International Security'.

[12]Welz, 'Multi-Actor Peace Operations and Inter-Organizational Relations'.

tions develop niche competences to avoid competition.[13] Brosig and Motsamai further introduce resource dependence theory to the study of partnership peacekeeping.[14] Resource dependence theory, which is a branch of organisational theory, proclaims that organisations operate under resource scarcity and interactions between organisations – in this case in the realm of peacekeeping – serve the purpose of resources procurement.[15] Brosig and Motsamai conclude in their study on the African peace and security regime that, while resource scarcity and dependence 'is a necessary condition for interaction, it does not sufficiently explain variant outcomes'.[16]

The present article aims to further elaborate the theoretical framework for the division of labour in peacekeeping and provide a systematic cross-case empirical analysis. To this end, two strands of the existing research are combined: the literature on resource scarcity and resource dependency, and the literature assessing the (dis)advantages of regional peacekeeping. Peacekeeping is situated in an environment of scarce resources, with the requisite personnel, equipment, and funding being in finite supply within each organisation and even the international community as a whole. Resource scarcity necessitates a framework of coordination to allocate and utilise resources as efficiently as possible, and a particularly powerful framework to that effect is the concept of comparative advantage. In fact, the United Nations has itself advertised that the UN-regional partnership should be underpinned by a 'division of labour based on respective comparative advantage'.[17] Comparative advantage refers to an organisation's ability to produce or provide a good or service – in this case peacekeeping – at a lower opportunity cost than other organisations. Several combinations of conditions have to be taken into account to ascertain which organi-

[13]Brosig, 'The Interplay of International Institutions in Kosovo between Convergence, Confusion and Niche Capabilities'; Brosig, 'EU Peacekeeping in Africa'.

[14]Brosig and Motsamai, 'Modeling Cooperative Peacekeeping'.

[15]Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald R. Salancik, *The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1978); Andrew Van de Ven, 'On the Nature, Formation, and Maintenance of Relations among Organizations', *Academy of Management Review* 1/4 (1976), 24–36; Joseph Galaskiewicz, 'Interorganizational Relations', *Annual Review of Sociology* 11/1 (1985), 281–304.

[16]Brosig and Motsamai, 'Modeling Cooperative Peacekeeping', p. 67.

[17]United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on Uniting Our Strengths for Peace*, para. 227.

sation is better placed to undertake a peace operation. Building on the research on the strengths and weaknesses of ROs, five conditions are expected to be particularly relevant for the discussion of comparative advantages of the United Nations vis-à-vis regional organisations: the stage in the peace process, the scope of the peace operation, the intensity of the conflict, the legitimacy of the peace operation, and the speed of the response.

The empirical core of this article is a crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) of United Nations, African Union, and European Union peace operations conducted on the African continent between 2003–2017. QCA is chosen as it allows for the assessment of complex causation, involving different combinations of causal conditions that can generate regional versus UN peacekeeping, and its suitability for medium-N datasets. The results of the qualitative comparative analysis are triangulated with seven case studies to illustrate the plausibility of the causal links behind the set-relational patterns and to gain insights on deviant cases. In regard to UN peacekeeping, the findings highlight the UN's comparative advantage in providing large-scale, multi-dimensional peace operations, that UN deployments are often limited to post-peace agreement conflict environments, and that they have a disadvantage in deployment speed. Two pathways emerge as particularly relevant for regional peacekeeping. The first one is a limited but specialised mission scope in conjunction with other contextual conditions, as is the case for many EU peace operations. The second one is a combination of the absence of a peace agreement and a rapid response or bridging function, i.e. to provide a first response before the UN takes over, which can be seen for AU missions.

The structure of the article is as follows. It first shows how peacekeeping is faced with resource constraints, before introducing the theory of comparative advantage as a strategy for mitigating the problem of resource scarcity and elaborating five specific conditions of comparative advantage expected to be relevant for the division of labour between the UN and ROs. Thereafter, the research design is introduced, including case selection and the operationalisation and calibration of the outcome variable and

the five conditions. The results of the qualitative comparative analysis and robustness tests are presented alongside substantive interpretations of the most relevant causal links. The penultimate section presents and discusses the seven case studies, before the article concludes with a summary and implications for policy and future research.

3.2 Resource Constraints in Peacekeeping

The term 'resource constraints' refers to the finiteness of resources available that are necessary to conduct peace operations. Peacekeeping cannot function without military troops, civilian and police personnel, training, logistical support, military equipment, medical support, and the necessary funds, among other things. These resources are in limited supply and, in principle, finite goods – or, at least, member states restrict the resources they allocate to an organisation at any time – which constraints the amount and scope of peace operations that can be provided. The United Nations, for instance, faces a US$2 billion shortfall in peacekeeping funding as of January 2019 due to member states' arrears and the withholding of assessed contributions, threatening the financial liquidity of active UN peace missions and the financing of future ones.[18] Diehl terms the maximum limit on how many peace operations can be provided the 'carrying capacity' of an organisation.[19] The carrying capacity of the international community for peace operations had to expand considerably in the 1990s and into the twenty-first century. The end of the Cold War and with it the stalemate in the Security Council, as well as the rise in armed conflicts in the first part of the 1990s entailed a heightened demand for peacekeeping. New missions in Iraq, Cambodia, Mozambique, Angola, and El Salvador brought with them excitement and expectations in the UN's newly re-discovered role in providing peace and security. Between 1988 and 1993 alone, the UN conducted more peace operations than in the previous 40 years combined, necessitating a fivefold increase

[18]Mark Leon Goldberg, 'UN Peacekeeping Faces Massive Funding Shortfall', *UN Dispatch* (Jan. 16, 2019), `https://www.undispatch.com/un-peacekeeping-faces-massive-funding-shortfall/`, accessed July 6, 2019; Coleman, 'The Political Economy of UN Peacekeeping'.

[19]Diehl and Balas, *Peace Operations*, pp. 200–3.

in peacekeeping personnel and a fifteenfold increase in peacekeeping spending.[20] Increased expectations and demand were placed on the UN not only in terms of the number of peace operations but also in terms of their comprehensiveness, and the UN struggled to keep up. The failures in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda exposed that the UN was overburdened, overstretched, and lacked the resources and willingness to undertake the increasingly broad and complex range of peacekeeping activities of the post-Cold War environment. At this point, the idea of regional organisations as peace and security providers gained salience.[21] The United Nations provided a first argument in favour of greater regional agency and burden-sharing between the UN and regional organisations in 1992 with the report *An Agenda for Peace*, and elaborated it further in the 1995 *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*. It was proposed that regional engagement and cooperation could 'lighten the burden of the Council' and that empowering regional actors could create a 'deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs'.[22]

The literature on regionalism not only identifies a rise in the demand but also in the supply of regional peacekeeping after the end of the Cold War.[23] Regional organisations tried to actively affirm their identity in this new political and security environment. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), for instance, embarked on new projects, such as an intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to define its role and purpose after the end of the Cold War. At the same time, the UN's mixed record in the 1990s raised doubts about its capacity and effectiveness to maintain international peace and security. In Africa, the experience of disinterest and limitations of the international community in Somalia and Rwanda contributed to a 'crisis of credibility', fostering a strive for greater autonomy and stronger regional represen-

[20]See Chapter 2, 'Background and Literature Review of Burden-Sharing in Peacekeeping'.

[21]Note that regional peacekeeping is not a new concept developed in the 1990s. Legal frameworks, for instance, already existed in the UN Charter, Chapter VIII. The perceived newness lies in the scope of regional engagement and activities.

[22]United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, *An Agenda for Peace*, para. 64; see also United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*.

[23]Fawcett, 'The Evolving Architecture of Regionalization', pp. 17–9.

tation and engagement.[24] Overall, ROs responded to the changes in the post-Cold War period by broadening their scope and activities into the realm of peacekeeping. The number of peace operations conducted by regional organisations rose from an average of less than one per year during the Cold War to more than 20 in the 2000s.[25] A consequence of this expansion of regional organisations and peacekeeping is the challenge of overlapping mandates and memberships. A particularly entangled picture emerged in Africa, where the pan-African AU is accompanied by 14 sub-regional economic organisations, and the African Union's policy areas and membership themselves overlap with the UN.[26] Each organisation relies on its members for resources, creating a competition between the numerous overlapping and nested organisations over the limited resources provided by states – personnel, technical, administrative, and financial resources – but also over legitimacy, areas of responsibility, and relevance. The surge in regional organisations engaged in peacekeeping thus heightens resource scarcity not only in regard to the availability of sufficient resources to launch a peace operation, but also regarding the decision which organisations get to deploy the limited number of peace operations.

3.3 Comparative Advantage in Peacekeeping

Resource scarcity is a fundamental problem of peacekeeping which requires the establishment of a system of coordination to allocate and utilise existing resources efficiently between organisations and peace missions. One approach to mitigate resource constraints is to apply the principle of comparative advantage to determine which organisation should deploy a peace operation. Comparative advantage is a term associated with 19th century economist David Ricardo.[27] He examined which

[24] Alex De Waal, 'Wars in Africa', in Mary Kaldor (ed.), *Global Insecurity* (London: Continuum International Publishers, 2000), 24–52, pp. 49–51.

[25] Calculations by author; based on data by Mullenbach, 'Third-Party Peacekeeping in Intrastate Disputes, 1946–2012'.

[26] Malte Brosig, 'Overlap and Interplay between International Organisations: Theories and Approaches', *South African Journal of International Affairs* 18/2 (2011), 147–67, p. 152.

[27] David Ricardo, *On the Principles of Political Economy, and Taxation* (2nd edn., London: John Murray, 1819).

goods countries should produce and demonstrated that if each one specialises by allocating its scarce resources to produce goods for which it has a comparative advantage, a greater total output is generated. Note that comparative advantage differentiates from absolute advantage. While absolute advantage is the ability to produce a good or service more efficiently using fewer resources than another actor, comparative advantage is the ability to produce a good or service at a lower opportunity, or relative cost than others.[28] This entails that even if one organisation is better at producing every aspect of peacekeeping, it is beneficial to the international community if different organisations specialise according to their comparative advantage.

The United Nations itself recommends to 'harness comparative advantages', as phrased in the 2010 progress report on *The New Horizon Initiative*, in order to determine the division of labour between the UN and regional organisations.[29] The 2015 HIPPO report stresses that 'the United Nations and regional organizations must mobilize their comparative advantages in responding to emerging crises while sustaining support to long-running ones'.[30] Another example is Secretary-General António Guterres' proposed 2017 reform of the UN peace and security architecture, which is based on reviews of major peace operations including each 'operations' comparative advantage vis-à-vis regional, UN and other partners'.[31] While not elaborated in further detail in these reports, the concept of comparative advantage is used as a heuristic, as a mental shortcut, to ascertain which is the appropriate organisation to engage in a conflict and provide a peace mission.[32]

Accordingly, comparative advantage is a powerful cognitive framework for un-

[28]The concept of opportunity cost is related to resource scarcity. When scarce resources are used, actors have to make a choice over using a resource for one purpose and not another. This trade-off, the value of the best possible alternative, is the opportunity cost.

[29]United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, *The New Horizon Initiative: Progress Report No. 1*, Oct. 2010, `https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/newhorizon_update01_0.pdf`, accessed Aug. 11, 2018, p. 6.

[30]United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on Uniting Our Strengths for Peace*, para. 53.

[31]United Nations Peacekeeping, 'Reforming Peacekeeping', `https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/reforming-peacekeeping`, accessed Aug. 11, 2018.

[32]Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, 'Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases', *Science* 185/4157 (1974), 1124–31.

derstanding how to design the division of labour in peacekeeping. Peacekeeping is composed of many activities, including the observation of a ceasefire agreement, facilitation of the political process, protection of civilians, assistance in the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants, support of the organisation of elections, protection and promotion of human rights, and assistance in restoring the rule of law, just to name a few.[33] Each of these activities requires different resources and expertise, and different organisations might be better equipped to perform certain tasks. The degree of equipment relates to the capability and suitability of an organisation in the realm of peacekeeping. Capability is the power or ability to do something, in terms of resources, legal requirements, political will of the member states, institutions, culture, or experience. Suitability, the quality of being the appropriate actor for a particular conflict and the type of peace mission required, builds upon the capabilities and capacities of an organisation and sets them in relation to the conflict in question and other organisations having the capability to conduct a mission. The division of labour along comparative advantages will necessarily depend on the capacity and suitability of the peacekeeping actors as well as on the nature of the conflict.

Existing literature enables the formulation of expectations about the capacity and suitability of the United Nations and regional organisations as peacekeeping actors. Along with the rise of regional peacekeeping, a body of literature emerged that debated the advantages and disadvantages of regional organisations vis-à-vis the UN, as well as the desirability of the regionalisation of conflict management more generally. Common advantages of regional peacekeeping mentioned by scholars including Bures, Diehl, or Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin are a sustained interest in conflict resolution, geopolitical ties, a last resort if the UN declines to intervene, greater legitimacy and support by conflict parties, restraint of third parties, proximity to the conflict zone,

[33]United Nations Peacekeeping, 'What Is Peacekeeping', `https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/what-is-peacekeeping`, accessed Aug. 19, 2018.

and greater consensus within the organisation.[34] Possible drawbacks include limited resources, lack of experience, influence of regional hegemons, negative perceptions by locals, lack of impartiality, and the uneven distribution of regional organisations. Building on and drawing together these strengths and weaknesses debated in the literature, five conditions of comparative advantage can be expected to be particularly relevant for the discussion of the comparative advantage of ROs vis-à-vis the United Nations: the stage in the peace process, scope of the peace operation, conflict intensity, legitimacy of the peace operation, and speed of the response.

3.4 Five Conditions of Comparative Advantage

3.4.1 Stage in the Peace Process

Each organisation has a certain propensity and advantage to intervene in different stages of the peace process. Following Ball, a peace process can be divided into two stages: the first stage is the cessation of conflict, entailing peacemaking activities, negotiations of a ceasefire or peace agreement, and the cessation of hostilities; the second stage addresses peacebuilding with the goal of post-war rehabilitation and the creation of sustainable peace.[35] Following traditional principles of peacekeeping, the UN customarily intervenes in the second stage of the peace process when there is a peace to keep, and not in situations of persistent war. This is reiterated in the 2008 *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* document. It states that when deciding to deploy a new UN peace operation, the Security Council considers whether a ceasefire exists, whether the conflict parties have committed themselves to a path towards a political settlement, and whether the safety and

[34]Bures, 'Regional Peacekeeping Operations'; Diehl, 'Institutional Alternatives to Traditional U.N. Peacekeeping'; Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, pp. 310–3; see also S. Neil MacFarlane and Thomas G. Weiss, 'Regional Organizations and Regional Security', *Security Studies* 2/1 (1992), 6–37; MacFarlane, 'Regional Organizations and Global Security Governance'.

[35]Nicole Ball, 'The Challenge of Rebuilding War-Torn Societies', in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela R. Aall (eds.), *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict* (Washington, D.C.: US Institute of Peace, 2001), 719–36.

security of UN personnel can be ensured.[36] The UN's propensity can be traced back to the high-profile failures of the early 1990s, especially in Angola, Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia, where UN peacekeepers were sent into environments with precarious peace and ceasefire agreements.[37]

A different historical experience and institutional culture allows regional organisations to engage at an earlier stage of the peace process, giving them the comparative advantage to deploy peacekeepers more flexibly. In fact, the failure of the UN in the 1990s and its following retreat from peacekeeping opened the field for and encouraged many ROs to become more engaged in conflict management. The African Union, for instance, set up missions in Burundi, Darfur, and Somalia well in advance of the United Nations, who were weary of the difficult security situations. Additionally, due to their proximity to the conflict, regional neighbours directly experience the consequences of unresolved crises, such as conflict spill-over, refugees, or impaired trading relationships, and hence regional organisations have a higher stake in conflict resolution at an early stage of the peace process.[38] Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali's 1992 *An Agenda for Peace* already acknowledged that regional organisations might be best suited to handle conflict at earlier stages, while it is silent on their role in peacekeeping and peacebuilding at later stages. As Barnett concludes,'[t]his suggests something of a division of labour in peace operations between the UN and regional organizations: regional organizations are decreasingly active, and the UN is increasingly active, as peace operations shift from peacemaking to peace-keeping to peace-building'.[39]

3.4.2 Scope of the Peace Operation

The United Nations has the longest experience in conducting peace operations, the greatest pool of potential troop providers, the largest budget, a sizeable bureaucracy,

[36]United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, Mar. 2008, `https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/capstone_eng_0.pdf`, accessed Aug. 11, 2018, pp. 47–8.

[37]Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, pp. 93–120.

[38]Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, p. 311.

[39]Michael Barnett, 'Partners in Peace? The UN, Regional Organizations, and Peace-Keeping', *Review of International Studies* 21/4 (1995), 411–33, p. 426.

and the administrative, logistical, and command structures necessary to manage large-scale, multi-dimensional peace operations. Compared to the United Nations, ROs have relatively small budgets, bureaucracies, and administrative structures.[40] 'Merely having the authority to carry out a conflict management activity', as Diehl notes, 'is not enough if the organization lacks the requisite resources to take effective action'.[41] Regional organisations further only have limited experience in conducting peacekeeping. The European Union as well as the African Union, for instance, have only conducted peace operations since 2003, totalling in a fraction of the missions undertaken by the UN. Accordingly, ROs cannot and do not want to compete with the United Nations in deploying resource-intense, complex peace operations, but instead find their specialised comparative advantage and fill functional gaps left by the UN. NATO, for example, was crucial in conducting airstrikes in Bosnia and in providing strategic airlift capabilities to deploy African peacekeepers in Darfur or Somalia. Another example is the engagement of the European Union in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 2003, where the EU deployed a rapid reaction force in the Ituri province lasting only three months until the UN could establish itself in the theatre. The EU limited its contribution to support the UN presence over a short time period, in a geographically limited area, and performing very specialised tasks. Brosig first introduced the concept of niche selection, which is based on ecological theories of organisations, to the context of peacekeeping cooperation. It 'assumes that no two organizations will perform exactly the same tasks for a long period of time as this would lead to competition and the consequent search/creation of areas with limited competitive pressure'.[42] The UN has historically been the primary provider of international peace and security with a comparative advantage in conducting large, multi-dimensional peace operations, and regional organisations have accordingly adapted

[40]Marrack Goulding, *Peacemonger* (London: John Murray, 2002), p. 217.

[41]Paul F. Diehl, 'New Roles for Regional Organizations', in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela R. Aall (eds.), *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World* (Washington, D.C.: US Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 535–51, p. 546, as cited in Williams, 'Global and Regional Peacekeepers', p. 9.

[42]Brosig, 'EU Peacekeeping in Africa', p. 76.

the scope of their missions, engaging in smaller, more manageable undertakings, and offering niche activities demanded by the conflict environment.

3.4.3 Conflict Intensity

The importance of regional arrangements in matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security was already recognised in the Charter of the United Nations of 1945. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter authorises regional organisations to conduct peace operations and roughly outlines a division of labour between the UN and ROs. Article 52.2 states that regional organisations should attempt the 'pacific settlement of local disputes' before referring them to the Security Council; and Article 53.1 further defines that 'no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council'. These articles present a picture of how the UN Charter, at least originally, envisaged the division of labour between regional organisations and the United Nations: 'Small crises that could be settled by peaceful means under Chapter VI of the UN Charter should be within the competence of regional arrangements, whereas major crises have to be settled at the world level, including potential resort to Chapter VII enforcement measures', as recapitulated by Pugh and Singh Sidhu.[43] Empirical research indicates that UN peace operations are, in fact, not deployed at random but sent to major crises and 'hard' cases.[44] They are predominantly deployed in protracted conflicts with high casualty levels and unstable institutions.[45] The UN is generally better equipped and has a comparative advantage to handle these major conflicts compared to regional organisations, as it has the legitimacy to authorise the use of force, the resources to deploy large, comprehensive missions, and, by means

[43]Michael Pugh and Wahegure Pal Singh Sidhu, 'Introduction', in id. (eds.), *The United Nations and Regional Security: Europe and Beyond* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 1–7, pp. 3–4.

[44]Virginia P. Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008); Michael Gilligan and Stephen J. Stedman, 'Where Do Peacekeepers Go?', *International Studies Review* 5/4 (2003), 37–54.

[45]Kyle Beardsley and Holger Schmidt, 'Following the Flag or Following the Charter? Examining the Determinants of UN Involvement in International Crises, 1945–2002', *International Studies Quarterly* 56/1 (2012), 33–49; Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).

of their membership in the Security Council, the world's most powerful states are engaged in addressing the conflict.

3.4.4 Legitimacy of the Peace Operation

Several scholars have engaged in conceptualising the legitimacy of peace operations,[46] but one of the main elements of legitimacy is the acceptance by the conflict parties. The acceptance of peacekeeping forces is essential for the success of the mission: it provides the peacekeepers with the necessary freedom of action and cooperation to carry out the mandate, and local ownership of the peace process is key to building a sustainable peace. One of the three core principles of (traditional) UN peacekeeping, established in the context of the First UN Emergency Force in 1956, is indeed the consent of the parties. The UN also draws legitimacy from its status as an outsider, as an impartial institution. As the primary provider of international peace and security, the UN additionally enjoys the greatest international legitimacy.

ROs, in contrast, are insiders with strong connections to the host state based on a shared history, culture, and economic and political ties, which can result in greater acceptance and legitimacy. This notion is based on the argument that governments and people have a natural affinity towards people and organisations from the same region and are suspicious of outside interventions. As Diehl states, 'there are frequent calls for "Arab" or "African" solutions to regional conflicts before international intervention is invoked'.[47] This could be observed in a number of conflicts, for example in Darfur, where only African and not UN peacekeepers were permitted for four years, or in Zimbabwe, where the government preferred regional election observers over personnel from non-African organisations.[48] Insofar as ROs receive greater acceptance and thus legitimacy than UN operations, they have a crucial comparative advantage. Yet, as Diehl points out, regional organisations must clear two hurdles to ensure the

[46]Bellamy and Williams, 'Who's Keeping the Peace?'; Sophia Sabrow, 'Local Perceptions of the Legitimacy of Peace Operations by the UN, Regional Organizations and Individual States – A Case Study of the Mali Conflict', *International Peacekeeping* 24/1 (2017), 159–86.

[47]Diehl, 'Institutional Alternatives to Traditional U.N. Peacekeeping', p. 213.

[48]Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, pp. 310–1.

legitimacy of their peace operations: they must be able to generate sufficient consensus within their organisation to authorise the mission; and they must be accepted as an 'honest broker in the conflict'.[49] Some regional peacekeeping forces, especially if neighbouring countries or regional hegemons are heavily involved, might be too embroiled in the conflict und thus be perceived as pursuing national interests instead of impartiality. Nigeria's dominance within the ECOWAS operation in Liberia in the 1990s, for example, raised concerns about impartiality. While most scholars agree that the advantage of greater acceptance and legitimacy of regional peacekeeping is true in theory, in practice it might depend on the particular relationship with the host state and past experiences.

3.4.5 Speed of the Response

The speed with which a peace operation is deployed is a key factor for the effectiveness of the operation. The longer an organisation takes to send its forces, the higher the potential for violence and the number of deaths.[50] The first weeks following a ceasefire or peace accord are also the most critical period to establish stable peace and security, and credibility and legitimacy are lost when peacekeepers slowly drip into the theatre of conflict.[51] The 2000 *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* ('Brahimi Report') specifies that traditional peace operations ought to be deployed within 30 days of the adoption of the Security Council resolution, and comprehensive operations within 90 days.[52] The rapid deployment of peace operations, however, is a demanding and complex process, and the UN has historically struggled with it. Reasons provided for the UN's difficulties include the complex internal processes and systems, such as the need to seek the support of the member states and the reliance on external personnel and resources.

[49]Diehl, 'Institutional Alternatives to Traditional U.N. Peacekeeping', p. 213.

[50]Hardt, *Time to React*, p. 31.

[51]United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, para. 87.

[52]United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, para. 88.

ROs have a comparative advantage in that they are said to be able to deploy and supply peacekeepers relatively quickly if the situation demands it. Several arguments are usually mentioned. First, due to their (usually) geographical proximity to the area of deployment, their troops and equipment have to travel shorter distances. Second, the authorisation of peacekeeping and the force generation process is often less problematic and therefore quicker for regional organisations than for the UN due to a more homogenous membership based on shared historical, cultural, and/or ethnic roots. While the UN does not have standing forces, some ROs do, often with focus on rapid deployment capabilities. The African Union, for instance, has the African Standby Force, and the European Union the EU Battlegroups – albeit they have so far not seen any military action. The UN has recognised the rapid response capabilities of regional organisations. After the first EU peace operation in the DRC in 2003, then Secretary-General Kofi Annan highlighted the need for a 'coherent and robust over-the-horizon rapid response capability' and suggested that '[r]egional entities may be in a position to respond to those needs'.[53] Similarly, the first priority area listed in the United Nations/European Union document *Strengthening the UN-EU Strategic Partnership on Peacekeeping and Crisis Management: Priorities 2015–2018* is rapid response, more specifically the deployment of EU peace operations as a rapid response force in parallel to a UN operation or as a bridging operation until the UN can deploy.[54]

Table 3.1 provides an overview of the five conditions of comparative advantage discussed above, as well as the operationalisation of each condition, which will be elaborated in the following section. Thus far, it has been argued that the concept of comparative advantage is applied in the division of the peacekeeping labour between the United Nations and regional organisations, and, based on existing literature, con-

[53]United Nations General Assembly, *Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations – Report of the Secretary-General*, A/58/694, Jan. 26, 2004, `https://undocs.org/en/A/58/694`, accessed Aug. 6, 2018, para. 92.

[54]European External Action Service, *Strengthening the UN-EU Strategic Partnership on Peacekeeping and Crisis Management: Priorities 2015-2018*, EEAS 458/15, Mar. 23, 2015, `http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7632-2015-INIT/en/pdf`, accessed Aug. 19, 2018, p. 5.

crete expectations have been formulated for five individual conditions of comparative advantage. In practice, though, each peace operation is a combination of all of these conditions and cannot be defined by any single one. The EU operation European Union Training Mission (EUTM) in Mali, launched in 2013, for example, (a) was deployed in a conflict environment without a comprehensive peace agreement, (b) had a limited scope focussing on military and training advice to the Malian Armed Forces, (c) the conflict intensity was low at the time of the deployment, (d) the mission was requested by the conflict parties, and (e) it was not installed as a rapid response operation. The division of labour, therefore, is to be expected to result from a complex interplay of the aforementioned conditions, and different operations might arise from different sets of conditions of comparative advantage.

Table 3.1: Overview of Conditions of Comparative Advantage

Condition	**Peace Process**	**Mission Scope**	**Conflict Intensity**	**Legitimacy**	**Response Speed**
Expectation	UN - engages after peace agreement in place	UN - deploys multi-dimensional PKOs	UN - engages in major conflicts	UN - lower regional legitimacy	UN - slower response
	RO - engages before peace agreement in place	RO - deploys specialised PKOs	RO - engages in minor conflicts	RO - higher regional legitimacy	RO - faster response
Operationalisation	1 - comprehensive peace agreement	1 - mission mandate is multi-dimensional	1 - >1'000 battle-related deaths	1 - request by host state	1 - need for rapid deployment/ bridging force
	0 – no/ limited agreement	0 - limited/ specialised mandate	0 - <1'000 battle-related deaths	0 - no request	0 - no need rapid/ bridging force

3.5 Research Design

The theoretical framework for the division of labour in peacekeeping is tested by means of a crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis (csQCA). This method is particularly suitable for the analysis of complex causation, involving different configurations of causal conditions that can generate an outcome of interest, given an intermediate number of cases. This section first introduces the fundamentals of csQCA, followed by the case selection and the operationalisation and calibration of the outcome condition and the five conditions of comparative advantage. Subsequently, the results of the qualitative comparative analysis, including robustness checks, as well as seven illustrative case studies are presented and discussed.

3.5.1 Qualitative Comparative Analysis

Qualitative comparative analysis is both a case-oriented comparative research approach and a technique rooted in set theory and Boolean algebra. The main strength of QCA as a technique is that it allows for the assessment of complex causation, particularly in terms of conjunctural causation, equifinality, and asymmetric links: conjunctural causation allows for a combination of causal conditions, rather than a single one, to lead to an outcome; equifinality means that multiple pathways can lead to an outcome; and asymmetric causation implies that the causes of failure are not simply the absence of the causes for success.[55] The ability to detect multiple conjunctural causation makes QCA particularly apt for testing which combinations of conditions of comparative advantage can explain the division of peacekeeping activities between the UN and regional organisations. The article deploys the binary, crisp-set version of QCA due to the dichotomous nature of the outcome variable – UN versus regional peacekeeping.[56] In brief, a csQCA proceeds in three stages: First,

[55]Carsten Q. Schneider and Claudius Wagemann, *Set-Theoretic Methods for the Social Sciences: A Guide to Qualitative Comparative Analysis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 8.

[56]A dichotomous outcome variable requires the use of csQCA. csQCA, in turn, requires the binary coding of all explanatory conditions.

the data is calibrated to crisp sets, meaning that binary set memberships are defined. The second step tests whether any of the explanatory conditions is necessary for the outcome of interest. A condition is necessary if it must be present for an outcome to occur. In the third step, it is examined whether a condition, or combination of conditions, is sufficient for the outcome of interest. These steps are performed by use of the software package 'QCA' for R (version 3.3).[57] The software transforms the set memberships into a truth table, which groups the UN and regional peace operation across all possible configurations of causal sets. Boolean algebra is then used to minimise the truth table. In the process of minimisation, causal conditions that are redundant to an outcome are removed, identifying more and more general combinations of conditions sufficient for the outcome. Two parameters of fit are used to assess the minimised QCA solution formula: consistency and coverage. Consistency refers to the extent to which the relation between a causal configuration and the outcome value holds within a given dataset. Coverage reports for how many cases a configuration is valid, reflecting the empirical relevance of a configuration. For detailed explanations of csQCA as a method and as a technique, see Schneider and Wagemann, or Rihoux and Ragin.[58]

3.5.2 Case Selection

This article focusses on peace operations launched in Africa by the United Nations, the African Union, and the European Union between 2003 and 2017. Africa is site of the bulk of all peace operations, conducted both by the UN and regional organisations. As of 2015, 87% of all UN peacekeepers were deployed in Africa;[59] and nearly three quarters of all peace operations conducted by regional organisations have taken place in the region since the end of the Cold War.[60] Africa is also the continent with the most

[57]Adrian Duşa, *QCA with R: A Comprehensive Resource* (Cham: Springer, 2019).

[58]Schneider and Wagemann, *Set-Theoretic Methods for the Social Sciences*; Benoît Rihoux and Charles C. Ragin (eds.), *Configurational Comparative Methods: Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related Techniques* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2009).

[59]United Nations Security Council, *Partnering for Peace*, para. 3.

[60]Williams, 'Global and Regional Peacekeepers', p. 5.

extensive UN-regional partnership in peacekeeping.[61] The two most active regional organisations are the African Union and the European Union.[62] Both organisations conducted their first peace operation in 2003, which is taken as the starting date for this analysis. The United Nations have recognised the relevance of these two regional actors and have repeatedly stated that partnership peacekeeping is 'focused largely on the partnerships with the African Union and the European Union' and that they 'are currently the closest partners of the United Nations in respect of peacekeeping efforts'.[63] In line with the majority of the peacekeeping literature, this study focusses on military peace missions, omitting civilian and political missions as their core functions often focus on a diplomatic or developmental presence and, more importantly, they experience different dynamics regarding resource requirements and procurement, force generation negotiations, and risk assessments. 26 peace operations are identified and included in the analysis (Table 3.2).

Table 3.2: Membership Scores for 26 Peace Operations, 2003–2017

			Explanatory Conditions					**Outcome**
Cases	**Start Year**	**Location**	(P)	(S)	(I)	(L)	(R)	RO (1), UN (0)
AFISMA	2013	Mali	0	1	0	1	1	1
AMIB	2003	Burundi	0	1	1	1	1	1
AMIS	2004	Darfur	0	0	1	0	0	1
AMISEC	2006	Comoros	1	0	0	1	0	1
AMISOM	2007	Somalia	0	1	1	0	1	1
MAES	2007	Comoros	1	0	0	1	0	1
MISCA	2013	CAR	0	1	0	0	1	1
EU Support to AMIS	2005	Darfur	0	0	1	0	0	1
EUFOR Artemis/DRC	2003	DRC	1	0	0	0	1	1
EUFOR RCA	2014	CAR	0	0	0	0	1	1
EUFOR RD Congo	2006	DRC	1	0	0	0	0	1

[61] Williams, 'Global and Regional Peacekeepers', p. 5.
[62] Notably, the EU deploys peacekeeping operations out of area.
[63] United Nations Security Council, *Partnering for Peace*, para. 2.

Cases	Start Year	Location	Explanatory Conditions					Outcome
			(P)	(S)	(I)	(L)	(R)	RO (1), UN (0)
EUFOR Tchad/RCA	2008	Chad, CAR	1	0	1	0	1	1
EUMAM RCA	2015	CAR	0	0	0	1	0	1
EUTM Mali	2013	Mali	0	0	0	1	1	1
EUTM RCA	2016	CAR	0	0	0	1	0	1
EUTM Somalia	2010	Somalia	0	0	1	0	0	1
MINURCAT	2007	Chad, CAR	1	0	1	0	0	0
MINUSCA	2014	CAR	0	1	0	1	0	0
MINUSMA	2013	Mali	0	1	0	1	0	0
MONUSCO	2010	DRC	1	1	0	0	0	0
ONUB	2004	Burundi	1	1	0	1	0	0
UNISFA	2011	Abyei (Sudan)	1	1	0	1	1	0
UNMIL	2003	Liberia	1	1	1	1	0	0
UNMIS	2005	Sudan	1	1	1	1	0	0
UNMISS	2011	South Sudan	1	1	1	0	0	0
UNOCI	2004	Côte d'Ivoire	1	1	0	1	0	0

Notes: P = peace process; S = mission scope; I = conflict intensity; L = legitimacy; R = response speed

3.5.3 Operationalisation and Calibration

The operationalisation and calibration of the outcome and explanatory conditions are described in the following subsection. The resulting membership scores for all of the 26 peace operations analysed are reported in Table 3.2. The appendix contains more details about the calibration decisions and justifications for the assignment of membership scores.

Outcome Condition: Regional versus UN Peacekeeping

The outcome variable indicates whether a peace operation was conducted by a regional organisation or by the United Nations. All peace operations conducted by ROs (specifically the African Union or the European Union) are assigned a set membership

of 1, while all UN operations receive a membership score of 0.

Explanatory Conditions: Stage in the Peace Process

The condition *Stage in the Peace Process* captures the existence or absence of a comprehensive peace agreement between the main conflict parties.[64] The coding is based on the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset, the PA-X Peace Agreements Database, and case knowledge (all sources are detailed in the appendix).[65] The condition is coded as 1 if the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset or the PA-X Database categorises an agreement as comprehensive and covering the major conflict parties, while a score of 0 is assigned to cases where no peace agreement is in place prior to the deployment of a peace operation, or only a partial or ceasefire agreement. The resulting calibration is cross-checked against coding provided in Mullenbach's Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions Dataset (variable 'PEACE').[66]

Scope of the Peace Operation

The score for the mission scope is determined by the amount of mandates, or goals, a peace operation is intended to perform. Thirteen different types of mandates were identified, and it was determined with how many of those mandates the 26 peace operations were charged at the time of their initial authorisation. Multi-dimensional peace operations that are tasked with multiple mandates receive a score of 1, while operations that focus on a specific or restrictive number of tasks are classified to be limited in scope and assigned a score of 0. The coding decisions are based on the respective UN Security Council Resolutions, AU Peace and Security Council Communiqués, and EU Council Joint Actions and Decisions originally authorising a mission. The scoring is cross-checked against lists of peacekeeping mandates compiled by Brosig and

[64]Following the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset, a comprehensive agreement is defined as one where the parties agree on substantive issues, attempting to resolve the whole in-compatibility.

[65]Pettersson, Högbladh, and Öberg, 'Organized Violence, 1989–2018 and Peace Agreements'; Christine Bell and Sanja Badanjak, 'Introducing PA-X: A New Peace Agreement Database and Dataset', *Journal of Peace Research* 56/3 (2019), 452–66.

[66]Mullenbach, 'Third-Party Peacekeeping in Intrastate Disputes, 1946–2012'.

Sempijja, and Mullenbach.[67]

Conflict Intensity

Conflict Intensity is operationalised in terms of battle-related deaths in a given year. This operationalisation is drawn from the variable 'Intensity Level' in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (version 18.1).[68] The *Conflict Intensity* score is coded as 1 for peace operations deployed in major conflicts (defined as at least 1'000 battle-related deaths in a given year), and as 0 for minor conflicts (between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths per year) as well as for cases of no violence (<25 battle-related deaths). The coding considers the conflict intensity of the year when the peace operation was first deployed (t) as well as the year prior to that (t-1), and either one needs to experience more than 1'000 battle-related deaths for the condition to be coded as 1.[69]

Legitimacy of the Peace Operation

Legitimacy is operationalised in terms of the acceptance of a peace operation by the host country at the time of the conception of the operation. Two levels of acceptance can be distinguished: the host state can either merely give its consent/permission for a peace operation, or it can actively request and invite an operation. The consent of the host state is one of the core principles of UN peacekeeping and also widely applied to regional peacekeeping – in fact, consent is provided in all of the 26 peace operations analysed in this study.[70] To be able to differentiation between peace operations, the

[67]Malte Brosig and Norman Sempijja, 'What Peacekeeping Leaves Behind: Evaluating the Effects of Multi-Dimensional Peace Operations in Africa', *Conflict, Security and Development* 17/1 (2017), 21–52; Mullenbach, 'Third-Party Peacekeeping in Intrastate Disputes, 1946–2012'.

[68]Gleditsch et al., 'Armed Conflict 1946–2001'.

[69]As Andrea Ruggeri, Han Dorussen, and Theodora-Ismene Gizelis, 'On the Frontline Every Day? Subnational Deployment of United Nations Peacekeepers', *British Journal of Political Science* 48/4 (2018), 1005–25, p. 1006, observe, the deployment of a peace operation is a two-step process. In the first stage, the authorisation of the operation is based on country-specific consideration; once in a country, in a second step, a more specific deployment is decided based on the conditions on the ground. As this study considers the first stage of deployment, aggregate characteristics of the conflict are appropriate.

[70]As categorised by the variable 'hcons' in the MILINDA dataset, which indicates whether the target state has given its explicit consent; see Anja Jetschke and Bernd Schlipphak, 'MILINDA:

calibration of the condition *Legitimacy of the Peace Operation* therefore focusses on requests made by the host country for a specific organisation to deploy an operation. If a request or invitation was issued, as mentioned in the authorising resolutions, peace agreements, or letters to the UN/AU/EU, a score of 1 is assigned; if this is not the case, the membership score is 0. Historical narratives of individual missions provided in secondary sources were also taken into consideration.

Speed of the Response

The condition *Speed of the Response* is defined with regard to the rapid deployment requirements for a peace mission as formulated during the conception of the operation. Specifically, *Speed of the Response* is operationalised threefold: explicit statements regarding the need for rapid deployment; references to rapid reaction forces (i.e. EU Battlegroups, African Standby Force); and the specification of a mission as a 'bridging force' until another organisation can generate the resources and support necessary to take over. This threefold operationalisation is based on the definition of the priority area 'rapid response' in the United Nations/European Union document *Strengthening the UN-EU Strategic Partnership on Peacekeeping and Crisis Management: Priorities 2015–2018*.[71] Following, if a peace operation is intended as a rapid deployment or bridging operation, a set membership of 1 is assigned. If this is not the case, the *Response* score is 0. Each resolution authorising a mission was checked for references to the temporal nature, urgency, rapid deployment, and bridging intent of an operation.

A New Dataset on United Nations-Led and Non-United Nations-Led Peace Operations', *Conflict Management and Peace Science* (2019), online first.

[71] European External Action Service, *Strengthening the UN-EU Strategic Partnership on Peacekeeping and Crisis Management*, p. 5.

3.6 Results: Crisp-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis

In order to explain (a) under what conditions regional organisations conduct a peace operation, and (b) under what conditions the UN engages in peacekeeping, csQCA was performed on the membership scores of the 26 peace operations reported in Table 3.2, specifically the analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions.

3.6.1 Peacekeeping Conducted by Regional Organisations

Table 3.3: Analysis of Necessity

	Regional Peacekeeping (O)		**UN Peacekeeping (∼O)**	
	Consistency	**Coverage**	**Consistency**	**Coverage**
P	0.312	0.385	0.800	0.615
∼P	0.688	0.846	0.200	0.154
S	0.250	0.308	0.900	0.692
∼S	0.750	0.923	0.100	0.077
I	0.375	0.600	0.400	0.400
∼I	0.625	0.625	0.600	0.375
L	0.438	0.500	0.700	0.500
∼L	0.562	0.750	0.300	0.250
R	0.500	0.889	0.100	0.111
∼R	0.500	0.471	0.900	0.529

Notes: P = peace process; S = mission scope; I = conflict intensity; L = legitimacy; R = response speed; O = organisation deploying the operation; the tilde indicates the absence of a condition

The analysis of necessity (Table 3.3) reveals that neither the presence nor the absence of any of the five explanatory conditions is necessary for peacekeeping conducted by a RO. The recommended threshold for consistency is 0.9, while a coverage level of >0.5 is recommended to exclude triviality.[72] The absence of a multi-dimensional mission (∼S) or, put differently, a peace mission focussed on a limited number of tasks comes

[72]Charles C. Ragin, 'Set Relations in Social Research: Evaluating Their Consistency and Coverage', *Political Analysis* 14/3 (2006), 291–310.

closest to necessity with a consistency score of 0.75. These tasks can include election support, as in the case of the AU missions in the Comoros, military training for the security and defence sector (EUTM Mali/Somalia/RCA), ceasefire monitoring (AMIS), or support to another peace operation (EUFOR RD Congo, EU Support to AMIS).

The analysis of sufficiency transcends the examination of individual conditions and aims to identify combinations of conditions or causal paths that are sufficient for peacekeeping conducted by regional organisations. The truth table, which lies at the core of the analysis and the minimisation procedure, is reported in the appendix. The 26 cases have been reduced to 19 observed configurations, out of which 12 show the outcome of regional peacekeeping (O) and 7 UN peacekeeping (∼O), leaving 13 logical remainders. The truth table is free of any contradictory configurations. The results of the truth table analysis, in the form of the intermediate solution, are reported in Table 3.4.[73] The analysis yields four configurations of conditions that are sufficient for the outcome of regional peacekeeping.

According to the first causal path, ROs conduct a peace operation if no comprehensive peace agreement exists between the main conflict parties and the operation focusses on a limited number of mandates. This pathway is in line with the expectation that ROs engage at an earlier state in the peace process and that they have a comparative disadvantage in conducting large, multi-dimensional peace operations and instead focus on providing niche activities demanded by the conflict environment. Prevalent cases covered by this pathway are the EU's military training and advisory missions (EUMAM RCA, EUTM Mali/RCA/Somalia). They present an opportunity

[73]Different solution formulae exist based on different treatment of logical remainders. The intermediate solution, which only includes remainders that are consistent with theoretical and/or empirical knowledge, is presented in the main article, in line with Schneider and Wagemann's recommendation that this solution 'should be at the center of the substantive discussion', see Schneider and Wagemann, *Set-Theoretic Methods for the Social Sciences*, p. 279. The complex and parsimonious solutions are reported in the appendix. The following assumptions were made for the generation of the intermediate solution: The absence of a comprehensive peace agreement, a limited scope, a minor conflict, high regional legitimacy, and a rapid response/bridging function are linked to peacekeeping conducted by a regional organisation; the presence of a comprehensive peace agreement, a multi-dimensional scope of activities, high conflict intensity, the absence of regional legitimacy, and the absence of a rapid response/bridging function are linked to peacekeeping conducted by the UN.

for the EU to be an active security provider in some of the direst security situations in Africa without taking part in combat operations. EUTM Somalia, for instance, is aimed at training the Somali security forces and was long stationed in Uganda due to the precarious security conditions in Somalia itself. They often also work in conjunction with larger peace operations. For instance, EUTM Somalia eases AMISOM's training burden, EUTM RCA collaborates with MINUSCA, and EU Support to AMIS provided key operational capabilities for the AU's mission AMIS in Darfur.

Table 3.4: Results of the csQCA (Intermediate Solution): Regional Organisations

Regional Peacekeeping (O)					
	∼P*∼S +	∼P*R +	∼S*∼I +	∼S*R	→ *O*
Consistency	1	1	1	1	
Raw coverage	0.438	0.375	0.500	0.250	
Unique coverage	0.188	0.250	0.188	0.062	
Cases	EUFOR RCA, EUMAM RCA, EUTM Mali, EUTM RCA, AMIS, EU Support to AMIS, EUTM Somalia	EUFOR RCA, EUTM Mali, MISCA, AFISMA, AMISOM, AMIB	EUFOR RCA, EUMAM RCA, EUTM Mali, EUTM RCA, EUFOR RD Congo, EUFOR Artemis/DRC, AMISEC, MAES	EUFOR RCA, EUTM Mali, EUFOR Artemis/DRC, EUFOR Tchad/RCA	
Solution consistency: 1					
Solution coverage: 1					

Notes: P = peace process; S = mission scope; I = conflict intensity; L = legitimacy; R = response speed; O = organisation deploying the operation; the tilde indicates the absence of a condition

The second path to regional peacekeeping combines the absence of a peace agreement with a rapid response or bridging functionality. This finding supports the frequently voiced expectation – by both the UN, ROs, and the academic literature – that regional peace missions act as 'first responders to emerging crises' to rapidly stabilise

a challenging security situation before the UN takes over.[74] The rationale behind this expectation is that regional organisations have a comparative advantage to act rapidly due to their geographic proximity and homogenous membership, and that structural constraints, including complex internal processes and safety and security provisions, restrict the UN's ability to quickly engage in emerging and challenging security situations. The African Union Mission in Burundi, for instance, was a bridging operation until the security 'conditions [were] favourable for the establishment of a UN Peacekeeping mission' (namely, ONUB);[75] MISCA, the African-led International Support Mission in Central Africa, was transformed into the UN mission MINUSCA; AFISMA in Mali was merged into MINUSMA; and AMISOM in Somalia was also deployed 'with a clear understanding that the mission will evolve to a United Nations operation'.[76]

The third combination shows that missions with a limited scope situated in a low-intensity conflict are conducted by regional organisations. This is consistent with the theoretical expectation and existing empirical research that the UN has a comparative advantage in deploying peace operations to major conflicts with >1'000 battle-related deaths, while regional organisations engage in smaller crises. This distinction, however, does not appear as clearly in the analysis of necessity where both regional and UN peacekeeping receive consistency scores of around 0.4 for the condition *Conflict Intensity* and 0.6 for the absence of high *Conflict Intensity*.

According to the fourth causal path, regional organisations engage in peace missions that are limited in scope combined with a rapid response function. This is the

[74] Cedric De Coning, Linnéa Gelot, and John Karlsrud, 'Towards an African Model for Peace Operations', in Cedric De Coning, Linnéa Gelot, and John Karlsrud (eds.), *The Future of African Peace Operations: From the Janjaweed to Boko Haram* (London: Zed Books, 2016), 1–19, p. 2; United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on Uniting Our Strengths for Peace*; European External Action Service, *Strengthening the UN-EU Strategic Partnership on Peacekeeping and Crisis Management*.

[75] African Union Central Organ, *Communiqué of the Ninety First Ordinary Session of the Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution at Ambassadorial Level*, Central Organ/MEC/AMB/Comm.(XCI), Apr. 2, 2003, `http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/comapr03.pdf`, accessed Mar. 20, 2019, para. 5.

[76] African Union Peace and Security Council, *Communiqué of the 69th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council*, PSC/PR/Comm(LXIX), Jan. 19, 2007, `http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/communiqueeng-69th.pdf`, accessed Mar. 6, 2019, para. 9.

third out of four paths with a limited mission scope (∼S) as an INUS[77] condition, underlining its relevance as a characteristic of regional peacekeeping. Examples for regional peace missions that are specialised and fulfil a rapid response function are the EU's mission EUFOR RCA providing security at the Bangui M'Poko International Airport with a handover to the AU's mission MISCA, or the quick and temporary deployment of EUFOR Artemis in the DRC, focussed on stabilising the security and humanitarian situation in Bunia until the UN could 'reinforce MONUC's presence in Bunia'.[78] This configuration relates back to the argument that regional organisations have a comparative advantage in acting as a first responder.

The consistency and coverage scores from the analysis of sufficiency (reported in Table 3.4) can be used to judge the fit between the solution formula and the data. The overall solution, as well as each individual configuration of conditions, has a consistency of 1, meaning they are free of internal contradictions. The solution coverage, which indicates the share of cases covered by the entire solution term, is 1, implying that all cases are covered. Raw coverage is a measure for the empirical importance of a causal path, i.e. the amount of cases of regional peacekeeping that are covered by membership in a single path, while unique coverage expresses how much a single path uniquely covers. The most relevant paths to regional peacekeeping are ∼S*∼I (limited scope and low intensity), with a raw coverage of 50%, ∼P*∼S (absence of a peace agreement and limited scope), with a raw coverage of 44%, and ∼P*R (absence of a peace agreement and rapid response), with 38%. However, the unique coverage scores are low, meaning that a substantial number of cases are covered by multiple configurations.

[77] '[I]nsufficient but necessary part of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the result' (John L. Mackie, 'Causes and Conditions', *American Philosophical Quarterly* 2/4 (1965), 245–64, p. 245). Put differently, INUS conditions are only causally relevant in some cases and in combination with other conditions.

[78] United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1484 (2003) – Adopted by the Security Council at its 4764th Meeting, on 30 May 2003*, S/RES/1484, May 30, 2003, `http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1484`, accessed Mar. 21, 2019, para. 2.

3.6.2 Peacekeeping Conducted by the United Nations

The analysis of necessity for the outcome of peacekeeping conducted by the UN (Table 3.3) reveals that two conditions pass the recommended threshold of 0.9: a multi-dimensional mandate (S) and the absence of a rapid response or bridging function (∼R). The existence of a comprehensive peace agreement between the main conflict parties (P) comes close to necessity with a value of 0.8. The levels of coverage are medium to low for these conditions, and the absence of a rapid response function only just about passes the recommended level of >0.5 to exclude triviality. The two peace operations that are not members in the sets of multi-dimensional operations and the absence of a rapid response or bridging function – MINURCAT and UNISFA, respectively – are deviant cases for consistency and discussed in greater detail in the case studies below.

Table 3.5: Results of the csQCA (Intermediate Solution): United Nations

UN Peacekeeping (∼O)				
	P*S +	S*∼R +	P*I*∼L*∼R	→∼O
Consistency	1	1	1	
Raw coverage	0.700	0.800	0.200	
Unique coverage	0.100	0.200	0.100	
Cases	MONUSCO, ONUB, UNOCI, UNISFA, UNMISS, UNMIL, UNMIS	MINUSCA, MINUSMA, MONUSCO, ONUB, UNOCI, UNMISS, UNMIL, UNMIS	MINURCAT, UNMISS	
Solution consistency: 1				
Solution coverage: 1				

Notes: P = peace process; S = mission scope; I = conflict intensity; L = legitimacy; R = response speed; O = organisation deploying the operation; the tilde indicates the absence of a condition

The analysis of sufficiency yields three configurations of conditions that are sufficient for the outcome of UN peacekeeping (Table 3.5). As was the case for regional peacekeeping, the consistency scores are 1 for all configurations and the overall solu-

tion. The first and second path are particularly relevant in explaining the outcome of UN peacekeeping, covering 7 and 8 out of 10 cases, respectively. The unique coverage is again low, and six cases are covered by multiple causal paths.

According to the first causal path, the UN conducts a peace operation if a peace agreement is existent and multiple mission tasks are required. This result is in line with the expectation that the UN, constrained by past experiences of high-profile failures in the 1990s and restrictive safety and security requirements, deploys in conflicts where there is a 'peace to keep' and that it has a comparative advantage in providing large-scale, multi-dimensional peace operations due to its comparatively expansive resources and longest experience in peacekeeping. Similarly, and in support of this first causal path, Diehl and Druckman find that the UN does not only deploy peace operations with a large number of mandates, but that many of these mandates are 'associated with post-conflict peacebuilding [i.e. after a peace agreement]: Humanitarian, Election Supervision, Human Rights Protection, Local Security, Rule of Law Promotion, Local Governance, and Restoration/Reconciliation'.[79] Examples include the United Nations Operation in Burundi, deployed after the *Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement*, or the United Nations Mission in Liberia following the *Accra Peace Agreement*.

The second path combines multi-dimensionality with the absence of a rapid response or bridging function. This reflects the comparative disadvantage of the United Nations to quickly deploy peace operations. Particularly large-scale, multi-dimensional peace operations require time to procure and deploy the necessary personnel and resources. Six out of the eight cases covered by this path are also covered by the previous configuration (P*S), highlighting the relevance of a multi-dimensional mandate, the existence of a comprehensive peace agreement, and the absence of a rapid response function for causal pathways to the outcome of UN peacekeeping.

The third combination leading to UN peacekeeping is composed of a peace agree-

[79]Paul F. Diehl and Daniel Druckman, 'Multiple Peacekeeping Missions: Analysing Interdependence', *International Peacekeeping* 25/1 (2018), 28–51, p. 33.

ment, high conflict intensity, the absence of legitimacy, and the absence of a rapid response function. The path has a very low raw coverage of 0.200 and only includes the peace operations MINURCAT and UNMISS. MINURCAT is a particularly interesting case as it is the only mission that is not covered by the configurations P*S and/or S*∼P. MINURCAT is discussed in more detail as part of the case studies below to examine the causal processes behind this operation.

In sum, the crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis shows that regional peacekeeping is best explained by configurations including a limited mission scope (i.e. niche activities filling a gap) in conjunction with other contextual conditions, and the combination of the absence of a peace agreement and a rapid response/bridging function (i.e. regional peacekeeping as first responders). The key determinants for UN peacekeeping are a multi-dimensional mandate, the existence of a comprehensive peace agreement, and the absence of a rapid response/bridging function.

3.6.3 Robustness Tests

In line with established standards, four kinds of robustness checks of the csQCA results are performed.[80] First, the frequency threshold of cases linked to the configurations is raised to two, which means that only configurations with at least two case examples are included in the analysis, minimising the effect of measurement errors and outliers (Table 3.6/3.7, line 2). Second, alternative calibrations and operationalisations of the conditions *Stage in the Peace Process*, *Scope of the Peace Operation*, and *Speed of the Response* are employed (Table 3.6/3.7, lines 3–5). Third, the conditions, or explanatory factors, included in the analysis are altered: the condition *Legitimacy* is dropped and the alternative explanation *Previous Engagement*, capturing whether the respective organisation had previously been engaged in the conflict via a peacekeeping or political mission, is added (Table 3.6/3.7, lines 6–7). Lastly, three sets of cases are omitted from the analysis, altering the case selection (Table 3.6/3.7, lines

[80]Svend-Erik Skaaning, 'Assessing the Robustness of Crisp-Set and Fuzzy-Set QCA Results', *Sociological Methods and Research* 40/2 (2011), 391–408; Schneider and Wagemann, *Set-Theoretic Methods for the Social Sciences*, pp. 284–95.

8–10). Tables 3.6 and 3.7 present the robustness checks and alternative solution formulae for regional peacekeeping and UN peacekeeping, respectively. Full descriptions of the theoretical assumptions, operationalisation, data, and calibration decisions can be found in the appendix.

Table 3.6: Robustness Tests: Regional Organisations

	Analysis	**Solution Formula (Regional Peacekeeping)**	**Consistency**	**Coverage**
1	Main Analysis	∼P*∼S + ∼P*R + ∼S*∼I + ∼S*R → *O*	1.000	1.000
2	Frequency Threshold of 2	∼P*∼S + ∼S*∼I*L → *O*	1.000	0.562
3	Alternative *Peace Process* Calibration	∼P*R + ∼S*∼I → *O*	1.000	0.812
4	Alternative *Mission Scope* Calibration	∼P*∼S*(I+L) + ∼P*R + ∼S*∼I*P*∼R + ∼S*R*∼L → *O*	1.000	1.000
5	Alternative *Response Speed* Operationalisation	∼P*I + ∼P*R + ∼S*∼I → *O*	1.000	0.938
6	Excl. *Legitimacy*	∼P*∼S + ∼P*R + ∼S*∼I + ∼S*R → *O*	1.000	1.000
7	Incl. *Previous Engagement*	∼P*∼S + ∼P*R*E + ∼S*∼I*E + ∼S*R + ∼P*∼I*L*R → *O*	1.000	1.000
8	Excl. EU Military Advisory and Training Missions	∼P*∼S + ∼P*R + ∼S*∼I + ∼S*R → *O*	1.000	1.000
9	Excl. All EU Missions	∼P*∼S + ∼P*R + ∼S*∼I*L → *O*	1.000	1.000
10	Excl. All AU Missions	∼P*∼S + ∼S*∼I + ∼S*R → *O*	1.000	1.000

Notes: P = peace process; S = mission scope; I = conflict intensity; L = legitimacy; R = response speed; O = organisation deploying the operation; the tilde indicates the absence of a condition

The solution formulae of the modified csQCA indicate a strong robustness of the results of the main analysis. The solution terms for regional peacekeeping always include configurations with the INUS condition ∼S (a limited mission scope), usually in combination with the absence of a comprehensive peace agreement (∼P*∼S) or with

low conflict intensity (∼S*∼I). The configuration composed of the absence of a peace agreement and a rapid response/bridging function (∼P*R) is also included in most solution formulae except when AU missions are excluded from the analysis and when the frequency threshold is raised to 2. The combination of a comprehensive peace agreement and a multi-dimensional scope (P*S), and multi-dimensionality combined with the absence of a rapid deployment or bridging mandate (S*∼R) are the main components of all of the solution formulae for UN peacekeeping.

Table 3.7: Robustness Tests: United Nations

	Analysis	**Solution Formula (UN Peacekeeping)**	**Consistency**	**Coverage**
1	Main Analysis	P*S + S*∼R + P*I*∼L*∼R →∼O	1.000	1.000
2	Frequency Threshold of 2	S*∼R →∼O	1.000	0.800
3	Alternative *Peace Process* Calibration	S*∼R →∼O	1.000	0.889
4	Alternative *Mission Scope* Calibration	S*∼R + P*I*∼R + P*L*R →∼O	1.000	1.000
5	Alternative *Response Speed* Operationalisation	P*S + S*∼R*∼I →∼O	1.000	0.857
6	Excl. *Legitimacy*	P*S + S*∼R + P*I*∼R →∼O	1.000	1.000
7	Incl. *Previous Engagement*	P*S*E + S*∼R*E + P*I*∼L*∼R*E →∼O	1.000	1.000
8	Excl. EU Military Advisory and Training Missions	P*S + S*∼R + P*I*∼L*∼R →∼O	1.000	1.000
9	Excl. All EU Missions	P*S + S*∼R + P*I*∼L*∼R →∼O	1.000	1.000
10	Excl. All AU Missions	P*S + S*∼R + P*I*∼L*∼R →∼O	1.000	1.000

Notes: P = peace process; S = mission scope; I = conflict intensity; L = legitimacy; R = response speed; O = organisation deploying the operation; the tilde indicates the absence of a condition

3.7 Case Studies

Building on the results of the qualitative comparative analysis, case studies are particularly useful to illustrate the set-relational patterns leading to regional or UN peacekeeping, and to understand deviant cases emerging from the analyses of necessity and sufficiency. Regarding the latter, two deviant cases for consistency emerged from the analysis of necessity: MINURCAT and UNISFA are uniquely not members in the sets of multi-dimensional operations and the absence of a rapid response/bridging function, respectively, while being instances of UN peacekeeping (based on Table 3.3); they are therefore included in the case studies below. The analysis of sufficiency, on the other hand, did not yield any deviant cases, i.e. cases that are contradictory to or left unexplained by the solution formulae. The case studies selected from the analysis of sufficiency instead focus on typical cases, which are particularly useful to examine the plausibility of the causal mechanism connecting the configurations to the outcomes.[81] Case selection follows Schneider and Rohlfing's guidelines for the integration of QCA and case studies, particularly their principles of diverse case selection and unique membership.[82] The principle of diverse case selection bears on the equifinality of QCA solutions and suggests selecting one case from each solution term. As it is common in QCA that one case is covered by multiple solution terms, the principle of unique membership recommends selecting cases that are member of only one path of the solution. Following these guidelines, seven cases are selected and discussed in greater detail; each case illustrates one of the seven solution terms for regional and UN peacekeeping presented above (Tables 3.4 and 3.5), including the two deviant cases for consistency from the analysis of necessity.

[81] Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005).

[82] Carsten Q. Schneider and Ingo Rohlfing, 'Combining QCA and Process Tracing in Set-Theoretic Multi-Method Research', *Sociological Methods & Research* 42/4 (2013), 559–97.

African Union Mission in Sudan (∼P*∼S)

The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was deployed in Darfur from 2004 to 2007. The war in Darfur started in early 2003 between the Sudanese government and two Darfur rebel groups and quickly developed into a violent conflict and major humanitarian crisis. While the international community, including the UN and other major powers, called for enquiries on the genocide in Sudan, they were unwilling to intervene.[83] Instead, when the Sudanese government and the two rebel groups signed the *N'djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement* on 8 April 2004, the AU was mandated to monitor compliance. A Ceasefire Commission with AMIS as its operational arm was launched on 28 May and the first observers arrived in early June. The AU first deployed 60 military observers, but as the ceasefire was not respected by the parties, a protection force of 300 soldiers was deployed. The deterioration of the humanitarian and security situation led the African Union to further increase the troop strength of AMIS in the following months, up to about 7'000 peacekeepers by mid-2005.[84] The African Union deployed the, originally, limited observer mission AMIS into a major security and humanitarian crisis in Darfur when the UN was unwilling to intervene. After 4.5 years AMIS was merged into the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) at the end of 2007.[85]

[83]William G. O'Neill and Violette Cassis, 'Protecting Two Million Internally Displaced: The Successes and Shortcomings of the African Union in Darfur', in *Brookings Institute–University of Bern: Project on Internal Displacement* (Nov. 2005), `https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/B0673F3DC85A2950492570B600091845-bi-sdn-11nov.pdf`, accessed June 23, 2019, p. 5; United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1564 (2004) – Adopted by the Security Council at its 5040th Meeting, on 18 September 2004*, S/RES/1564, Sept. 18, 2004, `http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1564`, accessed June 23, 2019.

[84]African Union Peace and Security Council, *Communiqué of the Seventeenth Meeting of the Peace and Security Council*, PSC/PR/Comm.(XVII), Oct. 20, 2004, `http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/communiqueeng-17th.pdf`, accessed Mar. 20, 2019, para. 4–7.

[85]Seth Appiah-Mensah, 'AU's Critical Assignment in Darfur: Challenges and Constraints', *African Security Studies* 14/2 (2005), 7–21; Arvid Ekengard, 'The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS): Experiences and Lessons Learned' (2008), Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), `https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R--2559--SE`, accessed Aug. 13, 2018; Human Rights Watch, 'Imperatives for Immediate Change: The African Union Mission in Sudan', *Human Rights Watch* 18/1 (2016), `https://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/sudan0106/sudan0106web.pdf`, accessed June 5, 2019.

African Union Mission in Burundi (∼P*R)

The first AU peace operation was deployed in Burundi in 2003. The *Arusha Accords* were signed in August 2000 to end the Burundian Civil War, but the main rebel groups rejected the agreement and violence continued. The agreement originally called for a UN mission to oversee its implementation, but the UN was reluctant to get involved in a situation where there was no peace to keep. Persisting violence led to individual ceasefire agreements between the government and different rebel groups in October and December 2002, which ultimately provided for the African Union to monitor and verify the agreements. The changing request from a UN to an 'African mission', in conjunction with the unwillingness of the UN to deploy a peace operation into the precarious security situation, resulted in the deployment of AMIB in April 2003.[86] South Africa's Deputy President Jacob Zuma further specified that AMIB was intended as 'a bridging instrument, opening the situation for the United Nations to come in when we have perfected the conditions'.[87] Accordingly, AMIB was mandated to oversee the implementation of the ceasefire agreements, support the DDR process, contribute to the political and economic stability in Burundi, and create favourable conditions for the establishment of a UN peace mission.[88] Despite financial and logistical challenges, AMIB contributed to the necessary stability in Burundi, enabling the UN to take over in June 2004 with the United Nations Operations in Burundi (ONUB).[89]

[86]Emma Svensson, 'The African Mission in Burundi: Lessons Learned from the African Union's First Peace Operation' (2008), Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), `https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R--2561--SE`, accessed Aug. 13, 2018, p. 11.

[87]Jacob Zuma, quoted in United Nations Security Council, *United Nations Security Council 4655th Meeting*, S/PV.4655, Dec. 4, 2002, `https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.4655`, accessed June 13, 2019, p. 4.

[88]African Union Central Organ, *Communiqué of the Ninety First Ordinary Session of the Central Organ*, para. 5.

[89]Thomas G. Weiss and Martin Welz, 'The UN and the African Union in Mali and Beyond: A Shotgun Wedding?', *International Affairs* 90/4 (2014), 889–905, pp. 892–3; Paul D. Williams and Arthur Boutellis, 'Partnership Peacekeeping: Challenges and Opportunities in the United Nations-African Union Relationship', *African Affairs* 113/451 (2014), 254–78, p. 265.

EUFOR RD Congo (∼S*∼I)

EUFOR RD Congo was a four-month deployment in 2006 to support the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) during the election period. War in the DRC formally ended in 2002 with the signing of the *Global and All-Inclusive Agreement in Pretoria*, albeit instability remained in the eastern provinces of the country. Prior to the elections in July 2006, set out in the *Global and All-Inclusive Agreement*, the UN was concerned about the possibility of violence and recognised the maintenance of order in the capital Kinshasa as a key element for the success of the electoral process.[90] At the same time, the UN was experiencing a shortage of soldiers with many peacekeepers engaged in the more conflictive East, and the Security Council did not meet Secretary-General Annan's request to send more troops to the Western regions, including Kinshasa. Annan circumvented this constraint by sending a request for support to the EU in December 2005. The EU accepted in April 2006 and established EUFOR RD Congo for four months following the elections. Composed of about 2'300 mainly French and German troops, it was mandated to support MONUC to stabilise the situation during the election process, protect civilians, and protect the airport in Kinshasa. Around 1'000 troops were stationed in and around Kinshasa, while the rest were deployed 'over the horizon' in Gabon. With EUFOR RD Congo, the EU engaged in a limited mission – limited in terms of conflict intensity, space, time, and mandate – to support the UN and fill a functional gap the UN did not have the capacity and willingness to fill.[91]

[90] United Nations Security Council, *Letter Dated 12 April 2006 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council*, S/2006/219, Apr. 13, 2006, `https://undocs.org/en/S/2006/219`, accessed Mar. 22, 2019; Gorm Rye Olsen, 'The EU and Military Conflict Management in Africa: For the Good of Africa or Europe?', *International Peacekeeping* 16/2 (2009), 245–60, p. 253.

[91] Claudia Morsut, 'Effective Multilateralism? EU-UN Cooperation in the DRC, 2003–2006', *International Peacekeeping* 16/2 (2009), 261–72, p. 264–5.

United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (P*S)

The 2005 *Comprehensive Peace Agreement* (CPA) ended the decades long conflict between the government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/SPLA). When its implementation period came to a close in July 2011, key provisions had not been implemented, including agreements on the contested area of Abyei. After the parties failed to agree on the modalities for a referendum on the status of Abyei, the area witnessed a build-up of armed forces and renewed hostilities, culminating in violent clashes between the Sudan Armed Forces and the SPLA in May 2011, and the displacement of 100'000 Abyei residents.[92] After AU-facilitated high-level meetings, the *Agreement on Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area* was signed on 20 June 2011. It called for the demilitarisation of Abyei and the establishment of a civilian administration; and it provided for the deployment of an Interim Security Force for Abyei under the authorisation and mandate of the UN. Based on the agreement, the UN Security Council established UNISFA a week later. The mission was mandated to monitor the demilitarisation, provide security, protect the borders, participate in relevant Abyei Area bodies, protect civilians, assist de-mining, strengthen the Abyei Police Service, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid, and protect UNISFA and humanitarian personnel.[93] The UN also respected the provision that the force was to be formed by an Ethiopian contingent as Sudan would not accept non-African forces, ensuring legitimacy and support by deploying regional peacekeepers within the UN setting. The establishment of UNISFA was an 'urgent response'[94] to the outbreak of violence in May and the deployment of troops for UNISFA 'has happened significantly more quickly than is usually the case'.[95] As the analysis of necessity has shown, UNISFA is the only

[92]Center on International Cooperation (ed.), *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2012* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2012), pp. 69–78.

[93]United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1990 (2011) – Adopted by the Security Council at its 6567th Meeting, on 27 June 2011*, S/RES/1990, June 27, 2011, `http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1990`, accessed Mar. 21, 2019, para. 2–3.

[94]United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1990 (2011)*, para. 4.

[95]United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Abyei*, S/2011/741, Nov. 27, 2011, `https://undocs.org/en/S/2011/741`, accessed June 23, 2019, para.

UN operation with a rapid response (R), constituting a deviant case. Reasons for the quick response and deployment of UNISFA include the UN's long-standing commitment to and engagement in the conflicts in Sudan (including the special political mission UNAMIS, UNMIS following the 2005 CPA, the hybrid mission UNAMID in Darfur, and UNMISS in South Sudan), the possibility to use existing UNMIS facilities, and that troops were mainly drawn from one neighbouring country, Ethiopia, which were already ready to be deployed.[96] This shows the relevance of contextual factors for the establishment of each peace operation, in this case previous engagements and the troop contributing country for the speed of the response. Overall, though, UNISFA is an example for multi-dimensional missions deployed following a peace agreement – a highly relevant causal pathway covering seven out of the ten UN missions studied.

United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (S*∼R)

The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) is a multi-dimensional peace operation authorised in April 2013. The mission succeeded the AU's African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA). When the security situation in Mali deteriorated in early January and following requests from the Malian government, France launched the expeditionary force Operation Serval on 11 January and the AU urgently deployed AFISMA at the end of January 2013. At the same time, the Malian transitional government requested that AFISMA be transformed into a UN operation and the UN Secretariat initiated the planning process.[97] Presented with the option of either establishing a multidimensional political presence alongside AIFSMA, thereby enhancing its operational

28.

[96]Holger Osterrieder, Johannes Lehne, and Vladimir Kmec, 'United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)', in Joachim A. Koops et al. (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 818–29, pp. 821–2.

[97]United Nations Security Council, *Letter Dated 25 February 2013 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council*, S/2013/113, Feb. 26, 2013, `https://undocs.org/en/S/2013/113`, accessed Mar. 22, 2019, annex.

capability, or a multi-dimensional integrated stabilisation mission under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which would support the political process and carry out security-related stabilisation tasks, the Security Council decided to deploy the latter.[98] With an authorised strength of 12'640 uniformed personnel, MINUSMA is one of the largest UN peace operations, mandated to stabilise key population centres and support the re-establishment of state authority, support the implementation of the transitional roadmap, including the national political dialogue and electoral process, protect civilians and UN personnel, promote and protect human rights, support humanitarian assistance, support cultural preservation, and support national and international justice.[99] Due to the precarious security situation on the ground, the UN mission could not operate in isolation but needed France's Operation Serval as a parallel force to 'intervene in support of elements of MINUSMA when under imminent and serious threat'.[100] On 1 July 2013, around 6'500 AFISMA personnel were re-hatted as MINUSMA personnel. As Weiss and Welz assessed, the UN Security Council envisaged the African Union, in this case alongside France, to act as a first responder with peace enforcement capabilities and the UN to deploy a multi-dimensional mission to keep the peace, once established.[101]

United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (P*I*∼L*∼R) and EUFOR Tchad/RCA (∼S*R)

Since the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) and EUFOR Tchad/RCA were authorised in the same UN Security Council resolution and set up to work in tandem, they are discussed together here. In particular MINURCAT warrants itself for further analysis as it is a deviant case regarding

[98]Walter Lotze, 'United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)', in Joachim A. Koops et al. (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 854–64, p. 859.

[99]United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 2100 (2013) – Adopted by the Security Council at its 6952nd Meeting, on 25 April 2013*, S/RES/2100, Apr. 25, 2013, `http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2100`, accessed Mar. 21, 2019, para. 12, 16.

[100]United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 2100 (2013)*, para. 18.

[101]Weiss and Welz, 'The UN and the African Union in Mali and Beyond', p. 897.

consistency for the necessary condition of a multi-dimensional mandate (S), and the only UN operation that is not covered by the two most relevant solution terms for UN peacekeeping, P*S and S*∼R. Established in September 2007, MINURCAT was a response to the thousands of refugees from the Darfur region of Sudan who fled into eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic. It was tasked with the protection of civilians, including refugees, provision of humanitarian assistance, and promotion of human rights and included a maximum of 350 police and military liaison officers.[102] Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon had originally proposed the deployment of a multi-dimensional UN peace operation, composed of a total force of 6'000 to 10'900 troops, including a military component.[103] Chad, however, was reluctant and would only consider a civilian UN presence: 'At the conclusion of the assessment mission, President Déby [...] stressed that Chad had asked the Security Council in November 2006 to deploy a "civilian force" to the [refugee] camps in eastern Chad, [but] that the Government of Chad had not requested the deployment of a military force'.[104] France convinced the Chadian government to accept the deployment of an UN operation focussed on humanitarian relief.[105] MINURCAT received the minimum consent from Chad required to launch the operation, but it did not operate under broad legitimacy. At the same time, the UN was also sceptical, worrying about overstretch, the limited consent granted by Chad, and deploying an operation into a precarious security environment.[106] Since the government of Chad rejected the recommendation of the Sectary-General to deploy a robust, multi-dimensional peace operation in this security

[102]United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1778 (2007) – Adopted by the Security Council at its 5748th Meeting, on 25 September 2007*, S/RES/1778, Sept. 25, 2007, `http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1778`, accessed Apr. 15, 2019, para. 2–3.

[103]United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on Chad and the Central African Republic*, S/2007/97, Feb. 23, 2007, `https://undocs.org/en/S/2007/97`, accessed Apr. 15, 2019, para. 47–87.

[104]United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on Chad and the Central African Republic*, para. 33.

[105]John Karlsrud, 'United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad I and II (MINURCAT I and II)', in Joachim A. Koops et al. (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 791–802, p. 792.

[106]United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on Chad and the Central African Republic*, S/2006/1019, Dec. 22, 2006, `https://undocs.org/en/S/2006/1019`, accessed Apr. 15, 2019, para. 84; Karlsrud, 'United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad I and II (MINURCAT I and II)', p. 798.

environment, France instead proposed the deployment of a temporary 'bridging' EU military force alongside the limited MINURCAT operation, composed of up to 3'700 peacekeepers, to protect civilians, facilitate humanitarian assistance, and protect UN personnel.[107] One year after the initial deployment of EUFOR Tchad/RCA and after lengthy negotiations with the government of Chad, the authority for the military force was transferred from EUFOR to MINURCAT on 15 March 2009.[108] Overall, while MINURCAT is a deviant case in terms of its limited scope, it is not contradictory to the finding that a broad, comprehensive mission scope is a highly relevant condition for UN peacekeeping. The United Nations proposed the deployment of a robust, multi-dimensional peacekeeping force to Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic, but was constrained by several contextual factors, including a lack of legitimacy and high conflict intensity. The EU, on the other hand, deployed a mission small in scope to fill a niche left by the UN on a temporary, bridging basis until the military force could be subsumed under the UN mission.

3.7.1 Discussion

The seven case studies provide support for the causal paths suggested in the qualitative comparative analysis. For the outcome of UN peacekeeping, they reiterate the importance of the INUS conditions *Scope of the Peacekeeping Mission*, *Stage in the Peace Process*, and *Speed of the Response*. The United Nations has a comparative advantage in conducting large, multi-dimensional operations and accordingly deploys operations with a broad mission scope. Most of its operations since 2003 fall under this category. While MINURCAT is a deviant case, it does not contradict this finding. The UN, in fact, proposed the deployment of a robust, multi-dimensional peacekeeping force in the Central African Republic and Chad, but was constrained by

[107]United Nations Security Council Report, 'July 2007 Monthly Forecast, Chad/CAR' (June 28, 2007), `https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2007-07/lookup_c_glkwlemtisg_b_2876599.php`, accessed Apr. 15, 2019.

[108]United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1861 (2009) – Adopted by the Security Council at its 6064th Meeting, on 14 January 2009*, S/RES/1861, Jan. 14, 2009, `http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1861`, accessed Apr. 15, 2019; Karlsrud, 'United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad I and II (MINURCAT I and II)', p. 794.

a lack of legitimacy, high conflict intensity, and the possibility to have a temporary EU bridging military operation deployed alongside MINURCAT. In general terms this means that, while the UN has a comparative advantage and preference for large peace operations, the decision whether the UN deploys a multi-dimensional mission is shaped by other contextual conditions. The other case studies of UN peacekeeping, as well as cases where a RO engaged instead of the UN, draw attention to the UN's focus on post-peace agreement deployments and its comparative disadvantage in deployment speed. The UN, for instance, declined to intervene in Sudan in 2004 and Burundi in 2003 – situations without a comprehensive peace agreement in place. In the case of MINUSMA, the UN engaged a few months after the AU urgently deployed AFISMA and France Operation Serval, relied on the re-hatting of AFISMA personnel into MINUSMA, and still lacked a significant share of its authorised strength 1.5 years after its first deployment.[109] Regional organisations often step in, fill gaps, and support the UN in these cases, such as with AMIS in Sudan, AMIB in Burundi, and AFISMA in Mali.

Confirming the results of the csQCA and following the theoretical expectations of comparative (dis-)advantages, the case studies show that regional peace operations are the outcome of some combination of the following conditions: a small mission scope, a rapid reaction/bridging function, and the flexibility to engage early in the peace process, i.e. without a comprehensive peace agreement. On top of that, the case studies further refine these results, demonstrating different patterns for EU and AU peace operations. With regard to the EU, its missions are generally small in scale and scope and tailored to specific gaps or niches left by another organisation. EUFOR RD Congo provided support to MONUC in Kinshasa during the elections in July 2006 when the UN did not have enough peacekeepers; EUFOR Tchad/RCA added a military component to MNURCAT after Chad did not grant consent to a robust UN presence; EU Support to AMIS provided key operational capabilities to AMIS; or

[109] Lotze, 'United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)', p. 862.

EUTM Somalia eases AMISOM's military training burden. Existing literature lends further support to these findings, such as Brosig who concludes that 'EU missions can best be characterized as targeted and carefully tailored operations',[110] or Morsut who asserts that 'in the case of a UN deficit, the EU may intervene as supporting organization'.[111] The AU, on the other hand, shows a greater willingness to deploy larger operations in terms of the number of peacekeepers and mission scope,[112] but 'favour[s] explicitly interim missions that are a prelude rather than an alternative to UN peacekeeping', as assessed by Coleman.[113] The UN explicitly supports this assessment in the 2015 HIPPO report: 'these first responder capabilities can also serve as a "bridging force", as they have done in the past, until the UN can mobilize and deploy a follow-on UN peace operation'.[114] The case studies demonstrate the AU's tendency to act as a first responder in an emerging crisis, often situations without a comprehensive peace process, before the UN takes over, such as AMIS, which was transformed into the hybrid mission UNAMID, AMIB, which was deployed as a bridging operation before ONUB, and AFISMA, which was re-hatted into MINUSMA.

3.8 Conclusion

Gaining a better understanding of the partnership and division of labour between the UN and regional organisations is highly relevant in times of steady proliferation and expansion of regional peacekeeping and the dependence of the UN on regional partners to fulfil its duty to maintain international peace and security. The partnership and division of labour between the UN and ROs, however, has been underspecified theoretically and understudied empirically. Following, the aim of this article was twofold: solidify a theoretical framework for the division of labour between the UN

[110]Brosig, 'EU Peacekeeping in Africa', p. 74.
[111]Morsut, 'Effective Multilateralism?', p. 261.
[112]The only exceptions are the electoral assistance missions in the Comoros, AMISEC and MAES.
[113]Katharina P. Coleman, 'Innovations in "African Solutions to African Problems": The Evolving Practice of Regional Peacekeeping in Sub-Saharan Africa', *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 49/4 (2011), 517–45.
[114]United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on Uniting Our Strengths for Peace*, para. 193.

and regional organisations in the realm of peacekeeping, and conduct one of the first systematic, cross-case empirical analyses. Regarding the former, the article built on and integrated existing literature on resource scarcity/dependency and assessments of the strengths and weaknesses of UN versus regional peacekeeping. It argued that peacekeeping is situated in an environment of scarce resources – such as peacekeeping personnel, operational capabilities, financial resources, or political will – and that one way to efficiently mitigate the problem of resource constraints is to establish a division of labour based on the principle of comparative advantage. Comparative advantage refers to an organisation's ability to produce specific aspects of peacekeeping at a lower opportunity cost than another organisation. Five domains of comparative advantage – functions of either the organisation deploying an operation or the corresponding conflict – were discussed and tested in relation to the division of labour between the UN and ROs: the stage in the peace process, the scope of the peace operation, the intensity of the conflict, the legitimacy of the peace operation, and the speed of the response. To establish which combinations of advantages determine whether the UN or a regional organisation deploys a peace operation, this article conducted a crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis; the results were triangulated with seven case studies representing typical cases from the analysis of sufficiency, including two deviant cases from the analysis of necessity. The analysis confirmed that the UN and ROs divide the peacekeeping labour according to their respective comparative advantages. Specifically, the United Nations conducts large, multi-dimensional peace operations, albeit potential deployments are constrained by its focus on conflicts with existing comprehensive peace agreements and its usually slow response and deployment speed. Regional organisations, on the other hand, provide small, specialised peace operations, often filling gaps left by the UN (these are particularly relevant conditions for EU peacekeeping); or provide the first response until the UN is capable and/or willing to take over (a particularly relevant modus operandi for AU missions). The intensity of the conflict and the legitimacy of the peace operation did not emerge as particularly relevant conditions for the division of labour between the UN and ROs.

This study provides some of the first cross-case empirical evidence for patterns characterising UN versus regional peacekeeping. These patterns of (combinations of) comparative advantages are an important step towards the definition of 'predictable frameworks for cooperation'[115] and a rationalisation of the division of labour in future peacekeeping cases. A number of implications for policy and future research can be drawn to further the effective and efficient division of labour. First, the patterns of UN versus regional peacekeeping, as established by this article, could be leveraged to strengthen a clear methodology and mechanisms for crisis response. Enhanced political coherence in defining the role of each organisation in conflict management combined with stronger channels and mechanisms of consultation can facilitate decision-making and the efficient use of resources.[116] Second, the QCA and particularly the case studies have shown a prevalence of sequential and simultaneous deployments between the UN, AU, and EU. As a result, the issue of transition between different operations is a vital component for an effective and efficient partnership peacekeeping. Joint strategic and operational planning, lessons learned from past transitions,[117] and theoretical specifications and systematic empirical research can enhance this process. Third, research on partnership peacekeeping should be extended to sub-regional actors. Each actor possesses different capabilities and suitability in the realm of peacekeeping, allowing for an even more specific division of labour. Sub-regional organisations active in peacekeeping in Africa beyond the UN, AU, and EU include the Economic Community of West African States, Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa, Economic Community of Central African States, Intergovernmental Authority for Development, Southern African Development Community, and Community of Sahel-Saharan States, as well as a number of ad hoc coalitions of states. Finally, while international organisations have been treated as coherent actors of

[115]United Nations General Assembly, 'Peace Operations 2010', para. 17.

[116]See United Nations Security Council, *Partnering for Peace*, for an assessment and recommendations of coordination and consultation mechanisms at the strategic and operational level.

[117]For lessons learned from the transitions from AU to UN peace operations in the CAR and Mali see United Nations Security Council, *Letter Dated 2 January 2015 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council*, S/2015/3, Jan. 5, 2015, `https://undocs.org/en/S/2015/3`, accessed June 28, 2019.

crisis management in this study, their inter-governmental nature must be borne in mind. Member states not only provide organisations with the resources required to engage in peacekeeping, as discussed in regard to resource constraints above, but also impose their own preferences on the decision-making in intergovernmental organisations. Partnership peacekeeping and the efficient division of labour between the UN and regional organisations is to a large extent influenced by decisions made within the UN, regional organisations, and in domestic politics. Addressing and integrating these multiple levels of decision-making can be a valuable addition to the current understanding of partnership peacekeeping.

3.9 Appendix

Table 3.8: Calibration of Condition *Stage in the Peace Process*

Peace Operation	**Details Peace Agreements**	**Peace Process Score**
AFISMA	Transitional government was installed and mediator initiated peace talks in 2012; comprehensive peace agreement was only reached in 2015.	0
AMIB	*Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement* (28/08/2000), but agreement was rejected by two major opposition groups, the CNDD-FDD and the FNL; *Ceasefire Agreement between the Transitional Government of Burundi and the CNDD-FDD* (02/12/2002).	0
AMIS	*N'djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement on the Conflict in Darfur* (08/04/2004); *Agreement with the Sudanese Parties on the Modalities for the Establishment of the Ceasefire Commission and the Deployment of Observers in the Darfur* (28/05/2004) – no comprehensive peace agreement.	0
AMISEC	Partial *Fomboni Framework Agreement* (26/08/2000) and *Fomboni II Agreement* (17/02/2001), both signed by all parties involved; comprehensive *Maroni Agreement* (20/12/2003) reaffirming Fomboni Agreements.	1
AMISOM	Initial (reconciliation) agreements among some factions.	0
MAES	Partial *Fomboni Framework Agreement* (26/08/2000) and *Fomboni II Agreement* (17/02/2001), both signed by all parties involved; comprehensive *Maroni Agreement* (20/12/2003) reaffirming Fomboni Agreements.	1
MISCA	*Libreville Agreement* (11/01/2013) covering ceasefire provisions, but no comprehensive peace agreement.	0
EU Support to AMIS	*N'djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement on the Conflict in Darfur* (08/04/2004); *Agreement with the Sudanese Parties on the Modalities for the Establishment of the Ceasefire Commission and the Deployment of Observers in the Darfur* (28/05/2004); *Declaration of Principles for the Resolution of the Sudanese Conflict in Darfur* (05/07/2005) – no comprehensive peace agreement.	0

Peace Operation	**Details Peace Agreements**	**Peace Process Score**
EUFOR Artemis/DRC	*Global and Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in DRC* (16/12/2002), a comprehensive peace accord; *Inter-Congolese Political Negotiations – The Final Act* (02/04/2003).	1
EUFOR RCA	*Libreville Agreement* (11/01/2013) covering ceasefire provisions, but no comprehensive peace agreement.	0
EUFOR RD Congo	*Global and Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in DRC* (16/12/2002), a comprehensive peace accord; *Inter-Congolese Political Negotiations – The Final Act* (02/04/2003).	1
EUFOR Tchad/RCA	Tensions with Sudan: comprehensive *Tripoli Agreement* (08/02/2006) and other agreements between the Governments of Sudan, Chad, and the Central African Republic on the settlement of the Darfur issue and restoration of relations (i.e. *Cannes Declaration on the Regional Dimension of the Darfur Crisis* (15/02/2007), *Accord de Riyad* (03/05/2007)); Internal divisions (Chad): comprehensive *Yebibou Agreement* (18/08/2005) between the government of Chad and the MDJT; comprehensive *Tripoli Accord* (24/12/2006) between the government and FUC.	1
EUMAM RCA	Ceasefire agreements, i.e. *Libreville Agreement* (11/01/2013) and *Brazzaville Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities* (23/07/2014), but no comprehensive peace agreement.	0
EUTM Mali	Transitional government was installed and mediator initiated peace talks in 2012; comprehensive peace agreement was only reached in 2015.	0
EUTM RCA	Ceasefire agreements, i.e. *Libreville Agreement* (11/01/2013) and *Brazzaville Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities* (23/07/2014), but no comprehensive peace agreement.	0
EUTM Somalia	*Djibouti Agreement* (19/08/2008, 26/10/2008), a partial agreement between the Transitional Federal Government and ARS including ceasefire and power-sharing provisions.	0

Peace Operation	**Details Peace Agreements**	**Peace Process Score**
MINURCAT	Tensions with Sudan: comprehensive *Tripoli Agreement* (08/02/2006) and other agreements between the Governments of Sudan, Chad, and the Central African Republic on the settlement of the Darfur issue and restoration of relations (i.e. *Cannes Declaration on the Regional Dimension of the Darfur Crisis* (15/02/2007), *Accord de Riyad* (03/05/2007)); Internal divisions (Chad): comprehensive *Yebibou Agreement* (18/08/2005) between the government of Chad and the MDJT; comprehensive *Tripoli Accord* (24/12/2006) between the government and FUC; partial peace agreement *Accord de Syrte* (25/10/2007) between the government and the four main armed opposition groups.	1
MINUSCA	*Libreville Agreement* (11/01/2013) covering ceasefire provisions, but no comprehensive peace agreement.	0
MINUSMA	Transitional government was installed and mediator initiated peace talks in 2012; comprehensive peace agreement was only reached in 2015.	0
MONUSCO	*Global and Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in DRC* (16/12/2002), a comprehensive peace accord; *Inter-Congolese Political Negotiations – The Final Act* (02/04/2003); comprehensive *23 March 2009 Agreement* (23/03/2009) between the government of DRC and CNDP.	1
ONUB	*Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement* (28/08/2000; rejected by the CNDD-FDD and FNL), in conjunction with the *Global Ceasefire Agreement* (16/11/2003) between the transitional Government and CNDD-FDD; the ceasefire was holding in 16 of Burundi's 17 provinces.	1
UNISFA	*Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement* (09/01/2005) between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and SPLM/A, in conjunction with the partial *Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM on Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area* (20/06/2011).	1
UNMIL	*Accra Ceasefire Agreement* (17/06/2003); comprehensive *Accra Peace Agreement* (18/08/2003) reached by Liberia's Government, rebel groups, political parties, and civil society leaders.	1
UNMIS	*Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement* (09/01/2005) between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and SPLM/A.	1

Peace Operation	Details Peace Agreements	Peace Process Score
UNMISS	*Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement* (09/01/2005) between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and SPLM/A; partial *Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM on Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area* (20/06/2011); partial *Framework Agreement between Government of the Sudan and the SPLM-North on Political and Security Arrangements in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan States* (28/07/2011); *Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Government of South Sudan on Border Security and the Joint Political and Security Mechanism* (29/06/2011).	1
UNOCI	Partial *Linas-Marcoussis Peace Accord* (23/01/2003); *Accra II* (07/03/2003), reaffirming the former; parties declared the end of the conflict and reaffirmed the Linas-Marcoussis and Accra agreements in the *Joint Declaration of the Defence and Security Forces of Côte D'Ivoire and the Armed Forces of the Forces Nouvelles* (04/07/2003).	1

Sources: based on UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset, Version 19.1; PA-X Peace Agreements Database; UN Security Council Resolutions; UN Secretary-General Reports to the Security Council; UN Security Council Reports, 'Monthly Forecast'; AU Peace and Security Council Communiqués; EU Council Joint Actions; EU Council Decisions; Koops et al., 'The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations'; Fisas, 'Yearbook on Peace Processes'; CIC, 'Annual Review of Global Peace Operations'.

Table 3.9: Calibration of Condition *Scope of the Peace Operation*

Peace Operation	CM	SEC	SP	SM	SSR	DM	CP	PPP	HA/R	RL	POL	EA	SS	Scope Score
AFISMA			x	x			x	x	x				x	1
AMIB	x	x		x		x			x					1
AMIS[118]	x													0
AMISEC		x										x		0
AMISOM		x		x		x		x	x		x			1
MAES[119]		x		x								x		0
MISCA		x			x	x	x		x				x	1
EU Support to AMIS		x	x	x										0
EUFOR Artemis/DRC[120]		x					x	x	x					0
EUFOR RCA[121]		x					x		x					0
EUFOR RD Congo[122]		x					x	x				x		0
EUFOR Tchad/RCA							x	x	x					0
EUMAM RCA[123]					x									0
EUTM Mali				x										0
EUTM RCA[124]					x									0
EUTM Somalia				x										0
MINURCAT[125]		x	x				x		x	x				0
MINUSCA		x	x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	1
MINUSMA		x	x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	1
MONUSCO		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	1
ONUB	x	x	x	x		x	x	x	x	x		x	x	1
UNISFA		x	x			x	x	x	x		x			1
UNMIL	x	x	x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	1
UNMIS	x	x	x			x	x	x	x	x	x	x		1
UNMISS		x	x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	1
UNOCI	x	x	x			x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	1

Sources: author's own compilation based on mandates outlined in resolutions establishing each peace operation, incl. UN Security Council Resolutions, AU Peace and Security Council Communiqués, and EU Council Joint Actions and Decisions; mandate categories are based on categories in the 'Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council'.
Notes: CM = ceasefire monitoring/implementation; SEC = security provision, incl. (border) monitoring; SP = support to police; SM = support to military, incl. training; SSR = Security Sector Reform; DM = demilitarisation, incl. DDR, mine action; CP = civilian protection; PPP = protection of peacekeeping/humanitarian personnel; HA/R = humanitarian assistance and human rights; RL = rule of law/judicial matters; POL = political process, incl. good office, peace agreement monitoring/implementation; EA = electoral assistance; SS = support to state institutions and authority.

[118]Note: initially authorised strength of only 150 personnel (AMIS I).
[119]Note: initially authorised strength of only 350 personnel.
[120]Note: area of deployment limited to Bunia.
[121]Note: area of deployment limited to Bangui.
[122]Note: area of deployment concentrated in Kinshasa.
[123]Note: area of deployment concentrated in Bangui.
[124]Note: area of deployment concentrated in Bangui.
[125]Note: initially authorised strength of only 300 police and 50 military liaison officers.

Table 3.10: Calibration of Condition *Conflict Intensity*

Peace Operation	**Intensity Level UCDP (t)**	**Intensity Level UCDP (t-1)**	**Conflict Intensity Score**
AFISMA	minor	minor	0
AMIB	minor	major	1
AMIS	major	major	1
AMISEC	inactive	inactive	0
AMISOM	major	minor	1
MAES	inactive	inactive	0
MISCA	minor	minor	0
EU Support to AMIS	major	major	1
EUFOR Artemis/DRC	inactive	inactive	0
EUFOR RCA	inactive	minor	0
EUFOR RD Congo	minor	inactive	0
EUFOR Tchad/RCA[126]	minor	minor	1
EUMAM RCA	inactive	inactive	0
EUTM Mali	minor	minor	0
EUTM RCA	inactive	inactive	0
EUTM Somalia	major	major	1
MINURCAT	minor	major	1
MINUSCA	inactive	minor	0
MINUSMA	minor	minor	0
MONUSCO	inactive	inactive	0
ONUB	minor	minor	0
UNISFA	minor	inactive	0
UNMIL	major	minor	1
UNMIS	minor	major	1
UNMISS	minor	major	1
UNOCI	minor	minor	0

Source: based on UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, Version 18.1.

[126]Note: as EUFOR Tchad/RCA (launched in January 2008) was authorised together with MINURCAT in S/RES/1778 in September 2007, the same *Conflict Intensity* score is assigned to EUFOR Tchad/RCA as MINURCAT.

Table 3.11: Calibration of Condition *Legitimacy of the Peace Operation*

Peace Operation	**Request Made by Host Country**	**Legitimacy Score**
AFISMA	Request: 'Recalling the letter of the Transitional authorities of Mali dated 18 September 2012 addressed to the Secretary-General, requesting the authorization of deployment [...] of an international military force [...]' (S/RES/2085 (2012), p. 2); 'Foreign Minister Traoré Rokiatou Guikine [of Mali] also addressed the Council, pleading for its authorisation of AFISMA [...]'. (UN Security Council Report (SCR), 'Mali, January 2013 Monthly Forecast')	1
AMIB	Request: Shift in preference from UN peacekeeping in *Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement* (28/08/2000) to AU peacekeeping in *Ceasefire Agreement Between the Transitional Government of Burundi and the CNDD-FDD* (02/12/2002): 'The African mission shall be responsible for monitoring and verifying the ceasefire'. (art. 3)	1
AMIS	Consent: In agreeing to the *Agreement with the Sudanese Parties on the Modalities for the Establishment of the Ceasefire Commission and the Deployment of Observers in the Darfur* (28/05/2004), the conflict parties accepted an offer from the AU to monitor ceasefire compliance (Human Rights Watch, 'Vol.18, No.1 (A)'); 'The operational arm of the Ceasefire Commission shall be the African Union Monitoring Mission [...]'. (para. 4)	0
AMISEC	Request: '[...] President Azali [of the Union of the Comoros] requested the AU, in conjunction with the UN and the international community, to take full charge of the electoral process in his country'. (PSC/PR/2(XLVII), para. 1); 'All the Comorian parties expressed the desire for the AU to make the necessary arrangements for such deployment [...]'. (PSC/PR/2(XLVII), para. 23)	1
AMISOM	Consent: While President Yusuf of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia requested an AU peacekeeping force, the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) opposed the mission, particularly the deployment of peacekeepers from neighbouring states (Williams, *Fighting for Peace in Somalia*, p. 21–47); 'The UIC has indicated that it would view any IGASOM deployment as a hostile foreign intervention'. (UN SCR, 'Somalia, December 2006 Monthly Forecast')	0

Peace Operation	Request Made by Host Country	Legitimacy Score
MAES	Request: 'Authorizes the Chairperson of the Commission, in response to the request of the Comorian Government, to take the necessary steps to provide the security assistance needed to facilitate the smooth running of the elections of the Presidents of the autonomous islands'. (PSC/MIN/Comm.1(LXXVII), para. 5)	1
MISCA	No request by CAR, instead call for cooperation: 'Calls upon the Transitional Authorities and all other parties in the CAR to cooperate fully with the deployment and operations of MISCA [...]'. (S/RES/2127, para. 36)	0
EU Support to AMIS	At the request of the AU, not Sudan: 'In a letter dated 29 April 2005, Mr Alpha Oumar Konaré, President of the AU Commission, indicated [...] he hoped to be able to count on the substantial support of the EU and its Member States to the efforts of the AU and to the reinforcement of AMIS II'. (2005/557/CFSP, para. 11)	0
EUFOR Artemis/ DRC	At the request of the UN, consent of DRC: 'Following the request by the Secretary-General of the United Nations [...]' (2003/423/CFSP, para. 2); '[...] taking note also of the support for this request expressed in the letter to the Secretary-General from the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and also by the Ituri parties on 16 May 2003 in Dar es Salaam [...] for the deployment of a multinational force in Bunia'. (S/RES/1484, p. 1)	0
EUFOR RCA	Consent: 'Taking note of the letter from the Transitional authorities of the Central African Republic dated 22 January 2014 approving the deployment of an operation by the European Union'. (S/RES/2134, p. 3)	0
EUFOR RD Congo	At the request of the UN, consent of DRC: 'I [Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations] should be grateful if the European Union could consider the possibility of making available a deterrent force that, if necessary, could be deployed to the Democratic Republic of the Congo during the electoral process'. (S/2006/219, annex 1); 'the Supreme Defence Council [of the DRC] recommended endorsing the initiative for the establishment of a European Union force to reinforce the security arrangements for the electoral process'. (S/2006/203)	0

Peace Operation	Request Made by Host Country	Legitimacy Score
EUFOR Tchad/RCA	Consent: The Chadian government was reluctant to accept a peacekeeping force and only significant political pressure from France ensured that EUFOR Tchad/RCA was deployed; 'On 19 July, President Idriss Deby of Chad, after a meeting with French President Nicolas Sarkozy, said he "agreed in principle" to the presence of an EU military component'. (UN SCR, 'Chad/CAR, August 2007 Monthly Forecast')	0
EUMAM RCA	Invitation: 'By letter dated 10 September 2014, the Chef de l'État de Transition of the Central African Republic (CAR) invited the Union to prolong the European Union military operation in the Central African Republic (EUFOR RCA) and to a post-EUFOR engagement [...]' (2015/78/CSFP, para. 1); 'By letter dated 16 January 2015, the Chef de l'État de Transition of the CAR invited the Union to deploy an EU military advisory mission in the CAR'. (2015/78/CSFP, para. 4)	1
EUTM Mali	Request: 'By letter dated 18 September 2012, the President of the Republic of Mali requested Union support with a view to restoring the Malian territorial integrity'. (2013/34/CFSP, para. 2)	1
EUTM RCA	Invitation: 'By letter dated 8 October 2015, the Chef de l'État de la Transition of the CAR invited the Union to further support the Central African Armed Forces (FACA) through a reinforced operational training structure [...]' (2016/610/CSFP, para. 3); 'By letter dated 30 March 2016, the President of the CAR invited the Union to deploy a Union CSDP military training mission in the CAR (EUTM RCA)'. (2016/610/CSFP, para. 6)	1
EUTM Somalia	Consent: 'By letters dated 18 November 2009 and 23 January 2010 respectively, the TFG expressed its appreciation for the Union's efforts to coordinate the training of the Somali security forces and its efforts towards peace and stability in Somalia [...]'. (2010/96/CSFP, para. 5)	0

Peace Operation	Request Made by Host Country	Legitimacy Score
MINURCAT	Consent: The Chadian government was reluctant to accept a peacekeeping force and only significant political pressure from France ensured that MINURCAT was deployed; 'Chad has blocked the deployment of the UN advance mission approved by the Council on 16 January and so far opposes a UN operation with a robust military component'. (UN SCR, 'Chad/CAR, April 2007 Monthly Forecast'); 'Welcoming the letter from the authorities of Chad dated 11 September 2007 (S/2007/540) and the letter from the authorities of the Central African Republic dated 17 September 2007 (S/2007/551) approving the deployment of an international presence provided by the United Nations and the European Union'. (S/RES/1778, p. 2)	0
MINUSCA	Request: 'Taking note of the letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Central African Republic dated 27 January 2014 requesting the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation to stabilize the country and address the civilian aspects of the crisis'. (S/RES/2149, p. 4)	1
MINUSMA	Request: 'Taking note of the letter, dated 25 March 2013, addressed to the Secretary-General by the transitional authorities of Mali, which requests the deployment of a United Nations operation to stabilize and restore the authority and the sovereignty of the Malian State throughout its national territory'. (S/RES/2100, p. 3; see also S/2013/113)	1
MONUSCO	Consent: 'Reaching an agreement with the government on MONUC's eventual withdrawal and its role in security sector reform are key unresolved issues'. (UN SCR, 'DRC, May 2010 Monthly Forecast'); 'Reaffirming that MONUSCO's priority was protection of civilians, the resolution nonetheless responded to calls from the DRC government to draw down the UN presence in the DRC and authorised the withdrawal of up to 2,000 troops by 30 June 2010'. (UN SCR, 'DRC, October 2010 Monthly Forecast')	0
ONUB	Request: 'Acting on instructions from my Government I have the honour to reiterate that the Government of Burundi hopes that the Security Council will authorize the sending of a peacekeeping mission to support the implementation of the Arusha Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Burundi [...]'. (S/2004/208, annex)	1

Peace Operation	Request Made by Host Country	Legitimacy Score
UNISFA	Request in *Agreement Between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM on Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area* (20/06/2011): 'The Government of Sudan and the SPLM will request the UN Security Council to approve the deployment and mandate of the ISFA [...]'. (para. 29)	1
UNMIL	Request in *Accra Peace Agreement* (18/08/2003): '[...] the Parties hereby request the United Nations in collaboration with ECOWAS, the AU and the ICGL to facilitate, constitute, and deploy a United Nations Chapter VII force in the Republic of Liberia [...]'. (art. IV.1)	1
UNMIS	Request in *Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement* (09/01/2005): 'The Parties agree to request the United Nations to constitute a lean, effective, sustainable and affordable UN Peace Support Mission [...]'. (para. 15.1)	1
UNMISS	Consent: '[...] the Government of Southern Sudan has indicated it would welcome continued UN engagement in support of peace consolidation, institutional capacity-building and border management'. (UN SCR, 'South Sudan, March 2011 Monthly Forecast')	0
UNOCI	Request: 'Taking note of the message addressed to the Security Council on 10 November 2003 by the President of the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, in which he requested the transformation of the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI) into a peacekeeping operation' (S/RES/1528, p. 2); 'For Côte d'Ivoire, the only desirable option is for MINUCI to be turned into a United Nations peacekeeping operation [...]'. (S/2003/1081, annex)	1

Sources: based on UN Security Council Resolutions; AU Peace and Security Council Communiqués; EU Council Joint Actions and Decisions; Peace Agreements; UN Security Council Report, 'Monthly Forecast'.

Table 3.12: Calibration of Condition *Speed of the Response*

Peace Operation	**Reference to Rapid Deployment or Bridging**	**Response Score**
AFISMA	Need for rapid deployment, African Standby Force Rapid Deployment Capability: 'Stresses the need to expedite AFISMA's deployment and to ensure its efficient running' (PSC/AHG/COMM/2.(CCCLIII), para. 7); 'Stresses the need for the early operationalization of the African Standby Force (ASF) Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC) [...]' (PSC/AHG/COMM/2.(CCCLIII), para. 14); Letter from Mr. Dioncounda Traoré, interim President of the Republic of Mali: 'I request your support for the rapid deployment of AFISMA [...]'. (S/2013/113, annex)	1
AMIB	Bridging: 'Mandates the deployment of the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) for an initial period of one (01) year subject to renewal by the Central Organ, and pending the deployment of the UN Peacekeeping Force to be mandated by the UN Security Council as envisaged in the Agreements; [...] Strive towards ensuring that conditions favourable for the establishment of a UN Peacekeeping mission' (AU Central Organ/MEC/AMB/Comm. (XCI), para. 5); Deputy President of South Africa, Jacob Zuma: 'We consider the introduction of the African mission as a bridging instrument, opening the situation for the United Nations to come in when we have perfected the conditions'. (S/PV.4655, p. 4)	1
AMIS	n/a	0
AMISEC	n/a	0
AMISOM	Bridging, rapid deployment: 'AMISOM shall be deployed for a period of six (6) months, aimed essentially at contributing to the initial stabilization phase in Somalia, with a clear understanding that the mission will evolve to a United Nations operation [...]' (PSC/PR/Comm(LXIX), para. 9); 'Requests the United Nations and its Security Council to provide all the support necessary for the speedy deployment of AMISOM [...]'. (PSC/PR/Comm(LXIX), para. 13)	1
MAES	n/a	0

Peace Operation	Reference to Rapid Deployment or Bridging	Response Score
MISCA	Bridging: 'Takes note of the position of the AU and ECCAS that MISCA may require eventual transformation into a United Nations peacekeeping operation and in this regard welcomes the Secretary-General's intention to undertake the necessary preparations for the possible transformation of MISCA into a United Nations peacekeeping operation'. (S/RES/2127, para. 46)	1
EU Support to AMIS	n/a	0
EUFOR Artemis/ DRC	Bridging, rapid deployment: '[...] Interim Emergency Multinational Force is to be deployed on a strictly temporary basis to allow the Secretary-General to reinforce MONUC's presence in Bunia [...]' (S/RES/1484, para. 2); 'I [Secretary-General] should like to request that the Security Council urgently consider my proposal for the rapid deployment to Bunia of a highly trained and well-equipped multinational force [...]'. (S/2003/574)	1
EUFOR RCA	Bridging, rapid deployment: 'The Union shall conduct a military bridging operation in the CAR, EUFOR RCA, [...] with a handover to the African-led International Support Mission in the CAR (AFISM-CAR) within four to six months of Full Operating Capability' (2014/73/CFSP, art. 1.1); 'EUFOR RCA should deploy as rapidly as possible to Full Operating Capability (FOC) in order to contribute to the stabilisation of the situation'. (2014/73/CFSP, para. 7)	1
EUFOR RD Congo	n/a	0
EUFOR Tchad/RCA	Bridging: '[...] consider a EU military bridging operation in support of such a multidimensional UN presence with a view to improving security in those areas'. (2007/677/CFSP, para. 3)	1
EUMAM RCA	n/a	0
EUTM Mali	Need for rapid deployment: 'In its conclusions of 15 October 2012, the Council requested that work on planning a possible Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) military mission be pursued and extended as a matter of urgency [...]'. (2013/34/CFSP, para. 4)	1
EUTM RCA	n/a	0
EUTM Somalia	n/a	0
MINURCAT	n/a	0

Peace Operation	Reference to Rapid Deployment or Bridging	Response Score
MINUSCA	n/a	0
MINUSMA	n/a	0
MONUSCO	n/a	0
ONUB	n/a	0
UNISFA	Need for rapid deployment: 'Recognizing that the current situation in Abyei demands an urgent response [...]' (S/RES/1990, para. 4); 'Underscores the imperative of expeditious deployment of UNISFA and urges the Secretary-General to take necessary steps to ensure rapid and efficient implementation'. (S/RES/1990, para. 6)	1
UNMIL	n/a	0
UNMIS	n/a	0
UNMISS	n/a	0
UNOCI	n/a	0

Sources: based on UN Security Council Resolutions; AU Peace and Security Council Communiqués; EU Council Joint Actions and Decisions.

Table 3.13: Truth Table

Conditions						Outcome	
P	**S**	**I**	**L**	**R**	**Consistency**	**O**	**Peace Operations**
0	0	0	0	0	-	?	
0	0	0	0	1	1.00	1	EUFOR RCA
0	0	0	1	0	1.00	1	EUMAM RCA, EUTM RCA
0	0	0	1	1	1.00	1	EUTM Mali
0	0	1	0	0	1.00	1	AMIS, EU Support to AMIS, EUTM Somalia
0	0	1	0	1	-	?	
0	0	1	1	0	-	?	
0	0	1	1	1	-	?	
0	1	0	0	0	-	?	
0	1	0	0	1	1.00	1	MISCA
0	1	0	1	0	0.00	0	MINUSCA, MINUSMA
0	1	0	1	1	1.00	1	AFISMA
0	1	1	0	0	-	?	
0	1	1	0	1	1.00	1	AMISOM
0	1	1	1	0	-	?	
0	1	1	1	1	1.00	1	AMIB
1	0	0	0	0	1.00	1	EUFOR RD Congo
1	0	0	0	1	1.00	1	EUFOR Artemis/DRC
1	0	0	1	0	1.00	1	AMISEC, MAES
1	0	0	1	1	-	?	
1	0	1	0	0	0.00	0	MINURCAT
1	0	1	0	1	1.00	1	EUFOR Tchad/RCA
1	0	1	1	0	-	?	
1	0	1	1	1	-	?	
1	1	0	0	0	0.00	0	MONUSCO
1	1	0	0	1	-	?	
1	1	0	1	0	0.00	0	ONUB, UNOCI
1	1	0	1	1	0.00	0	UNISFA
1	1	1	0	0	0.00	0	UNMISS
1	1	1	0	1	-	?	
1	1	1	1	0	0.00	0	UNMIL, UNMIS
1	1	1	1	1	-	?	

Notes: P = peace process; S = mission scope; I = conflict intensity; L = legitimacy; R = response speed; O = organisation deploying the operation

Table 3.14: Results of the csQCA (Parsimonious Solution): Regional Organisations[127]

Regional Peacekeeping (O)					
	∼P*∼S +	∼P*R +	∼S*∼I +	∼S*R	→O
Consistency	1	1	1	1	
Raw coverage	0.438	0.375	0.500	0.250	
Unique coverage	0.188	0.250	0.188	0.062	
Cases	EUFOR RCA, EUMAM RCA, EUTM Mali, EUTM RCA, AMIS, EU Support to AMIS, EUTM Somalia	EUFOR RCA, EUTM Mali, MISCA, AFISMA, AMISOM, AMIB	EUFOR RCA, EUMAM RCA, EUTM Mali, EUTM RCA, EUFOR RD Congo, EUFOR Artemis/DRC, AMISEC, MAES	EUFOR RCA, EUTM Mali, EUFOR Artemis/DRC, EUFOR Tchad/RCA	
Solution consistency 1					
Solution coverage: 1					
Notes: P = peace process; S = mission scope; I = conflict intensity; L = legitimacy; R = response speed; O = organisation deploying the operation; the tilde indicates the absence of a condition					

Table 3.15: Results of the csQCA (Parsimonious Solution): United Nations

UN Peacekeeping (∼O)				
	P*S +	S*∼R +	P*I*∼R	→∼O
Consistency	1	1	1	
Raw coverage	0.700	0.800	0.400	
Unique coverage	0.100	0.200	0.100	
Cases	MONUSCO, ONUB, UNOCI, UNISFA, UNMISS, UNMIL, UNMIS	MINUSCA, MINUSMA, MONUSCO, ONUB, UNOCI, UNMISS, UNMIL, UNMIS	MINURCAT, UNMISS, UNMIL, UNMIS	
Solution consistency: 1				
Solution coverage: 1				
Notes: P = peace process; S = mission scope; I = conflict intensity; L = legitimacy; R = response speed; O = organisation deploying the operation; the tilde indicates the absence of a condition				

[127]For the parsimonious solution term, all logical remainders which lead to a less complex solution are included.

Table 3.16: Results of the csQCA (Complex Solution): Regional Organisations[128]

Regional Peacekeeping (O)							
	∼P*S*R +	P*∼S* ∼L*R +	∼P*∼S* I*∼L*∼R +	∼P* ∼I*R +	∼P*∼S* ∼I *L +	P*∼S*∼I* ∼R	→ *O*
Consistency	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Raw coverage	0.250	0.125	0.188	0.250	0.188	0.188	
Unique coverage	0.125	0.125	0.188	0.062	0.125	0.188	
Cases	MISCA, AFISMA, AMI-SOM, AMIB	EUFOR Artemis/ DRC, EUFOR Tchad/RCA	AMIS, EU Support to AMIS, EUTM Somalia	EUFOR RCA, EUTM Mali, MISCA, AFISMA	EUMAM RCA, EUTM RCA, EUTM Mali	EUFOR RD Congo, AMISEC, MAES	
Solution consistency: 1							
Solution coverage: 1							

Notes: P = peace process; S = mission scope; I = conflict intensity; L = legitimacy; R = response speed; O = organisation deploying the operation; the tilde indicates the absence of a condition

Table 3.17: Results of the csQCA (Complex Solution): United Nations

UN Peacekeeping (∼O)					
	P*S*∼R +	P*S*∼I*L +	P*I*∼L*∼R +	S*∼I*L*∼R	→∼O
Consistency	1	1	1	1	
Raw coverage	0.600	0.300	0.200	0.400	
Unique coverage	0.300	0.100	0.100	0.200	
Cases	MONUSCO, ONUB, UNOCI, UNMISS, UNMIL, UNMIS	ONUB, UNOCI, UNISFA	MINURCAT, UNMISS	MINUSCA, MINUSMA, ONUB, UNOCI	
Solution consistency: 1					
Solution coverage: 1					

Notes: P = peace process; S = mission scope; I = conflict intensity; L = legitimacy; R = response speed; O = organisation deploying the operation; the tilde indicates the absence of a condition

[128]For the complex solution, no simplifying assumptions are allowed and no remainders are included.

Robustness Tests

In this section, the theoretical assumptions, calibration decisions, and data used for the robustness tests of the main analysis are described. The different QCA specifications and their corresponding results are reported in Table 3.6/3.7 in the main article.

1) Frequency Threshold Raised to 2

Following Skaaning and others, the robustness of the QCA results is examined by using a higher frequency threshold.[129] Raising the frequency threshold alters the cases included in the truth table and thus in the analysis. Specifically, only configurations with at least two case examples are included, as reported in Table 3.18. Excluding rare combinations of conditions is a first strategy against measurement error and outliers.

Table 3.18: Truth Table, with Frequency Threshold of 2

Conditions						**Outcome**	
P	**S**	**I**	**L**	**R**	**Consistency**	**O**	**Peace Operations**
0	0	0	1	0	1.00	1	EUMAM RCA, EUTM RCA
0	0	1	0	0	1.00	1	AMIS, EU Support to AMIS, EUTM Somalia
0	1	0	1	0	0.00	0	MINUSCA, MINUSMA
1	0	0	1	0	1.00	1	AMISEC, MAES
1	1	0	1	0	0.00	0	ONUB, UNOCI
1	1	1	1	0	0.00	0	UNMIL, UNMIS

Notes: P = peace process; S = mission scope; I = conflict intensity; L = legitimacy; R = response speed; O = organisation deploying the operation

[129]Skaaning, 'Assessing the Robustness of Crisp-Set and Fuzzy-Set QCA Results'.

2a) Alternative Calibration of the Condition *Stage in the Peace Process*

The condition *Stage in the Peace Process* identifies whether a comprehensive peace agreement exists between the main conflict parties. The main coding is based on peace agreements listed in the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset and the PA-X Peace Agreements Database and is cross-checked against scoring provided in Mullenbach's Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions Dataset. While broadly similar, this article made different coding decisions in five cases based on the peace agreements datasets and primary sources. For robustness, the analysis is repeated with the coding provided by Mullenbach, specifically his binary variable on the question 'Did the parties sign a formal peace agreement (beyond a ceasefire agreement) prior to the deployment of peacekeeping personnel?'.[130]

Table 3.19: Alternative Calibration of Condition *Stage in the Peace Process*

Peace Operation	**Peace Process Score 2**	**Peace Operation**	**Peace Process Score 2**
AFISMA	0	EUTM Mali	0
AMIB	0	EUTM RCA	0
AMIS	0	EUTM Somalia	0
AMISEC	0	MINURCAT	0
AMISOM	0	MINUSCA	0
MAES	1	MINUSMA	0
MISCA	0	MONUSCO	1
EU Support to AMIS	0	ONUB	1
EUFOR Artemis/DRC	0	UNISFA	n/a
EUFOR RCA	0	UNMIL	1
EUFOR RD Congo	1	UNMIS	1
EUFOR Tchad/RCA	0	UNMISS	0
EUMAM RCA	0	UNOCI	1

Source: based on Mullenbach's 'Third Party Peacekeeping Missions Dataset, 1946–2014 (Version 3.1)'.

[130]Mark Mullenbach, 'Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions Coding Manual (Version 3.1)' (2017), `https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/P7GYTS`, accessed July 18, 2019, p. 4; the EU military advisory and training missions are not included in Mullenbach's dataset, but the coding could be estimated based on other missions in the CAR, Mali, and Somalia; no coding is provided for UNISFA.

2b) Alternative Calibration of the Condition *Scope of the Peace Operation*

The condition *Scope of the Peace Operation* captures whether a mission is set out to perform multiple mandates or tasks. Thirteen different mandates were identified for this article and each case was calibrated based on the number of mandates outlined in the respective resolution authorising a mission. The results were cross-checked against listings compiled by Brosig and Sempijja, but, again, different decisions were made in five cases. Brosig and Sempijja list all peace missions in Africa since 2000 that they deem multi-dimensional, which is used as an alternative calibration and robustness test for the condition *Scope of the Peace Operation*.[131]

Table 3.20: Alternative Calibration of Condition *Scope of the Peace Operation*

Peace Operation	**Scope Score 2**	**Peace Operation**	**Scope Score 2**
AFISMA	0	EUTM Mali	0
AMIB	1	EUTM RCA	0
AMIS	0	EUTM Somalia	0
AMISEC	0	MINURCAT	0
AMISOM	1	MINUSCA	1
MAES	0	MINUSMA	1
MISCA	0	MONUSCO	1
EU Support to AMIS	0	ONUB	1
EUFOR Artemis/DRC	0	UNISFA	0
EUFOR RCA	0	UNMIL	1
EUFOR RD Congo	0	UNMIS	0
EUFOR Tchad/RCA	0	UNMISS	0
EUMAM RCA	0	UNOCI	1

Source: based on Brosig and Sempijja, 'What Peacekeeping Leaves Behind', p. 24.

2c) Alternative Operationalisation of the Condition *Speed of the Response*

The alternative operationalisation of the condition *Speed of the Response* measures the actual speed of the response, i.e. the time between the authorisation of the mission and its deployment. While this measure can only be observed after the

[131]Brosig and Sempijja, 'What Peacekeeping Leaves Behind', p. 24.

decision whether the UN or a regional organisation shall deploy a peace mission, it is still a useful indicator for the response capabilities of an organisation in the respective conflict/region – a relevant factor in the decision-making process. The Brahimi Report defines the 'rapid and effective deployment' of traditional peace operations as to occur within 30 days of the adoption of the resolution authorising it, and within 90 days for complex peace operations.[132] Thus, a peace mission is assigned a *Response* score of 1 if the time between the authorisation of the mission, as issued in a UN Security Council Resolution, EU Council Joint Action or Decision, or AU Peace and Security Council Communiqué, and its deployment is less than 3 months. Two caveats are considered in the scoring process. First, while some operations achieve a quick deployment of initial forces, they take considerably longer to reach Initial Operational Capability or any meaningful level of deployment. To account for this, the time between the authorisation of the mission and the deployment of 50% of its authorised strength is taken into consideration. Second, some peace operations achieve a quick deployment of initial forces by re-hatting peacekeepers already in theatre. Peace operations that have received a significant share of their contingent from the re-hatting of a previous peace operation (i.e. MONUSCO and UNMISS) are dropped from the analysis to not distort the results. All calibrations are detailed in Table 3.21.

[132]United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, para. 87–8.

Table 3.21: Alternative Operationalisation of Condition *Speed of the Response*

Peace Operation	**Time Authoris. – 1st Deploy.**	**Time Authoris. – 50% Deploy.**	**Comment**	**Response Score 2**
AFISMA	1 month	2 months		1
AMIB	2 months	3 months	The December 2002 Ceasefire agreement envisaged the deployment of an African mission by the end of 12/2002 but logistical and political difficulties delayed its arrival; AMIB wasn't fully operational until 10/2003	0
AMIS	1 month	1 month		1
AMISEC	<1 month	<1 month		1
AMISOM	2 months	2 years	<25% of authorised troops in first year; 50% of deployment after 2 years	0
MAES	<1 month	<1 month		1
MISCA	<1 month	1 month	Re-hatting of MICOPAX (19/12/2913, appr. 1'300/3'652); > 50% after 1 month; 5'400 after 2 months	1
EU Support to AMIS	<1 month	<1 month		1
EUFOR Artemis/ DRC	<1 month	1 month		1
EUFOR RCA	2 months	n/a	FOC after 4 months	1
EUFOR RD Congo	2 months	3 months	UN request for EU support in 12/2005; several months delay in authorisation of mission	0
EUFOR Tchad/RCA	3 months	5 months	Initial Operational Capability was only reached after 5 months	0
EUMAM RCA	2 months	2 months		1
EUTM Mali	1 month	1 month		1
EUTM RCA	3 months	5 months	Re-hatting of EUMAM RCA (appr. 60/180); 50% after 5 months	0
EUTM Somalia	2 months	3 months		1

Peace Operation	Time Authoris. – 1st Deploy.	Time Authoris. – 50% Deploy.	Comment	Response Score 2
MINURCAT	<1 month	9 months	3 observers in first 3 months; 50% after 9 months	0
MINUSCA	1 month	5 months	<10% of personnel in first 4 months; re-hatting of MISCA (15/09/2014, appr. 6'000/10'000)	0
MINUSMA	3 months	7 months	Re-hatting of AFISMA (appr. 6'500/12'640); 50% after 7 months; 10'000 after 2 years	0
MONUSCO	2 months	2 months	Re-hatting of MONUC (appr. 20'000/22'016)	n/a
ONUB	1 month	3 months	Re-hatting of AMIB (appr. 2'500/5'770); 50% after 3 months; full deployment after 5 months	1
UNISFA	2 months	4 months	'[...] timely deployment of the mission, which has happened significantly more quickly than is usually the case' (S/2011/741, para. 28)	1
UNMIL	1 month	4 months	Re-hatting of ECOMIL (01/10/2003, appr. 4'000/16'115); 50% after 4 months; FOC after 8 months	0
UNMIS	<1 month	10 months	<10% of personnel in first 3 months; 20% after 6 months; deployment competed after 1.5 years	0
UNMISS	1 month	1 month	Re-hatting of UNMIS (appr. 7'000/7'900)	n/a
UNOCI	1 month	4 months	Re-hatting of MINUCI (appr. 75) and ECOWAS forces (04/04/2004, appr. 1'500/6'590); 50% after 4 months; deployment competed after 6 months	0

Sources: author's own compilation based on UN Security Council Resolutions; AU Peace and Security Council Communiqués; EU Council Joint Actions and Decisions; AU Reports; EU Press Releases; SIPRI Yearbooks; IPI Peacekeeping Database; secondary literature.

3c) Condition *Legitimacy of the Peace Operation* Excluded

As stated in the main article, two levels of acceptance can be distinguished: the host state can either merely give its consent for a peace operation, or it can actively request and invite an operation. The main analysis operationalises the condition *Legitimacy of the Peace Operation* in terms of the latter. A mere consent or permission, on the other hand, is unsuitable as an alternative operationalisation as explicit consent is granted for all of the 26 peace operations analysed in this study, which prevents any differentiation between the operations.[133] Additionally, the condition *Legitimacy* hardly features in the results of the sufficiency analysis of the csQCA. For these reasons, the condition is excluded from the analysis for robustness checks.

3b) Condition *Previous Engagement* Added

As an alternative explanation, the condition *Previous Engagement* is tested. The expectation underlying this condition is that, if applicable, the organisation with previous engagement in the conflict or the host state more generally has a comparative advantage in deploying the peace operation. The comparative advantage is twofold. First, 'learning' and 'emulation' – mechanisms coined by the diffusion literature – play a role in the decision whether the UN or a regional organisation deploys a peace operation.[134] Peacekeeping as a tool for conflict resolution is characterised by uncertainty, and for this reason the conflict parties and peacekeeping actors rely on past experiences to estimate the likely consequences of a peace operation – a process termed 'learning'. Alternatively, according to the 'emulation' mechanism, actors pursue policies that have been deemed appropriate in the past. Second, and related to the process of emulation, decision-making can be restricted by path dependence.

[133] Jetschke and Schlipphak, 'MILINDA', see variable 'hcons'.

[134] David Dolowitz and David Marsh, 'Learning From Abroad: The Role of Policy Transfer in Contemporary Policy-Making', *Governance* 13/1 (2000), 5–24; Fabrizio Gilardi, 'Transnational Diffusion: Norms, Ideas, and Policies', in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons (eds.), *Handbook of International Relations* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2012), 453–77; as referenced by Tobias Böhmelt, 'The Importance of Conflict Characteristics for the Diffusion of International Mediation', *Journal of Peace Research* 53/3 (2016), 378–91, p. 380, who deploys the concepts to the diffusion of international mediation.

Path dependence implies that the decision whether the UN or a regional organisation shall deploy a peace mission is not (only) based on the respective advantages of the UN and regional organisations, the current conditions of the conflict, and the design of the peace operation, but instead on previous decisions and missions. As Diehl asserts, 'peace missions are more likely when there was prior involvement by the UN or a regional organization'.[135] This prior involvement can include a previous peace operation, civilian mission, political mission, or office. Following, the condition *Previous Engagement* receives a score of 1 if the respective organisation was previously engaged in the host state.

Table 3.22: Calibration of Condition *Previous Engagement*

Peace Operation	**Previous Peace Operations**	**Engagement Score**
AFISMA	n/a	0
AMIB	OMIB (OAU) (1994–1996)	1
AMIS	n/a	0
AMISEC	AU Liaison Office in the Comoros (1997–present), OMIC I–IV (OAU) (1997–2003)	1
AMISOM	AU Liaison Office in Somalia (2005–present)	1
MAES	AU Liaison Office in the Comoros (1997–present), OMIC I–IV (OAU) (1997–2003), AMISEC (2006)	1
MISCA	AU Liaison Office in the Central African Republic (2010–present)	1
EU Support to AMIS	n/a	0
EUFOR Artemis/ DRC	n/a	0
EUFOR RCA	EUFOR Tchad/RCA (2008–2009)	1
EUFOR RD Congo	EUFOR Artemis/DRC (2003), EUPOL Kinshasa (DRC) (2005–2007), EUSEC RD Congo (2005–2015)	1
EUFOR Tchad/RCA	n/a	0
EUMAM RCA	EUFOR Tchad/RCA (2008–2009), EUFOR RCA (2014–2015)	1

[135]Diehl and Balas, *Peace Operations*, p. 59.

Peace Operation	Previous Peace Operations	Engagement Score
EUTM Mali	n/a	0
EUTM RCA	EUFOR Tchad/RCA (2008–2009), EUFOR RCA (2014–2015), EUMAM RCA (2015–2016)	1
EUTM Somalia	EUNAVFOR Somalia/Atalanta	1
MINURCAT	MINURCA (1998–2000), BONUCA (2000–2009)	1
MINUSCA	MINURCA (1998–2000), BONUCA (2000–2009), BINUCA (2009–2014)	1
MINUSMA	UNOM (2012–2013)	1
MONUSCO	ONUC (1960–1964), MONUC (1999–2000)	1
ONUB	UNOB (1993–2004)	1
UNISFA	UNAMIS (2004–2005), UNMIS (2005–2011)	1
UNMIL	UNOMIL (1993–1997), UNOL (1997–2003)	1
UNMIS	UNAMIS (2004–2005)	1
UNMISS	UNAMIS (2004–2005), UNMIS (2005–2011)	1
UNOCI	MINUCI (2003–2004)	1

Sources: UN, AU, and EU websites.

4a–c) EU Military Advisory and Training Missions/All EU Missions/All AU Missions Excluded

The last robustness tests change the cases included in the analysis. First, the EU's military advisory and military training missions (EUMAM RCA, EUTM Mali, EUTM RCA, and EUTM Somalia) are excluded from the analysis. These missions are with 60–500 peacekeepers a lot smaller in scale and solely focus on advising and training defence and military personnel, which differentiates them from other peace missions in terms of resource requirements and risk levels. Second, ROs, including the EU and AU, are not a homogenous group and there is great variation in respect to their capabilities, style of conflict management, and relationship with the United Nations. The EU stands out as a well-organised crisis management actor with vast resources and their partnership with the UN is mutually reinforcing and reciprocal. The AU, on the other hand, is 'a peacekeeping actor whose capacities need first to be reinforced'

and the UN has invested immensely in training and capacity-building programmes, as well as technical and financial assistance to the AU.[136] While the main analysis treats the African Union and the European Union as a homogenous group, the exclusion of all EU missions and all AU missions, respectively, allows to examine whether differences between the two organisations influence the causal conditions explaining the division of labour between the United Nations and regional organisations.

[136]Joachim A. Koops and Thierry Tardy, 'The United Nations' Inter-Organizational Relations in Peacekeeping', in Joachim A. Koops et al. (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 60–77, p. 64.

Chapter 4

Negotiating Collective Peace: The Provision of Troops to EU Peace Operations

4.1 Introduction

The European Union (EU) has undertaken 13 military operations and 23 civilian missions in 25 countries spanning the Balkans, Mediterranean, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East since 2003. On average, the EU has deployed 3'000 military and 1'500–2'000 civilian personnel per year.[1] Despite the EU's ambition and increasing relevance as a global peace and security actor, it has regularly experienced serious difficulties in staffing its operations, with cumbersome force generation processes, material shortcomings, and delays during the planning process being the norm rather than the exception. The 2008–2009 European Union Force in Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFOR Tchad/RCA), for instance, required six so-called force generation conferences and the mission-critical supply of helicopters from Russia before a suf-

[1] Ulrich Krotz and Katerina Wright, 'CSDP Military Operations', in Hugo Meijer and Marco Wyss (eds.), *The Handbook of European Defence Policies and Armed Forces* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 870–87, p. 870.

ficient level of troops and material resources were assembled.[2] The anti-pirate naval mission off the Horn of Africa and in the Western Indian Ocean can only cover a limited area of operations and narrower tasks owing to inadequate assets.[3] Further, the 2014 launch of EUFOR RCA in Bangui, Central African Republic, was delayed on several occasions due to insufficient troop and logistical contributions from EU member states.[4]

In contrast to the substantial number of studies on burden-sharing in the context of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and on the supply-side to United Nations (UN) peacekeeping, systematic and generalisable research on troop contributions to EU peace operations has been limited. This constitutes a major gap in the literature on European security and defence cooperation as well as in the literature on peacekeeping, which mostly focusses on UN operations. While the UN is still the largest individual provider of peacekeeping, regional organisations and security arrangements now, in fact, deploy the majority of all peace operations.[5] This article shifts the attention to regional peace operations, particularly EU operations, and provides one of the first quantitative analyses of regional peacekeeping.[6] The article further adds a new perspective to the literature on troop contributions to peace operations by focussing on relational properties of potential troop contributing countries (TCC), including the dependence of states and the interaction among states. The peacekeeping literature predominantly focusses on conflict–level and contributor–level determinants of troop contributions, although anecdotes and accounts by practition-

[2]Alexander Mattelaer, 'The Strategic Planning of EU Military Operations – The Case of EUFOR Tchad/RCA', *Institute for European Studies Working Paper* 5 (2008), `http://aei.pitt.edu/60824/1/2008.5.pdf`, accessed Sept. 11, 2019; David Styan, 'EU Power and Armed Humanitarianism in Africa: Evaluating ESDP in Chad', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 25/4 (2012), 651–68, p. 661.

[3]Trineke Palm, 'Cooperative Bargaining in the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy: EUNAVFOR Atalanta', *Contemporary Politics* 25/2 (2019), 129–49, p. 139; Damien Helly, 'EU NAVFOR Somalia: The EU Military Operation Atalanta', in Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly, and Daniel Keohane (eds.), *European Security and Defence Policy: The First 10 Years (1999-2009)* (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2009), 391–402, p. 401.

[4]Tardy, 'EUFOR RCA'.

[5]Meiske and Ruggeri, 'Peacekeeping as a Tool of Foreign Policy'.

[6]The EU lends itself for analysis as it has conducted more peace operations than any other regional organisation.

ers underline the role of interrelationships in the negotiations of the force generation process.[7]

The article argues that a greater degree of interrelationship between an EU country and other EU member states positively influences its troop contributions. Increased interrelations between countries create additional benefits and incentives for contribution, including side payments, status enhancement, and influence in future developments of the EU. Institutional ties and interaction further facilitate negotiation and cooperation by enhancing the flow of information, trust, reciprocity, and shared values and objectives. The effect of interrelational characteristics on troop contributions is argued to act through several causal mechanisms, including issue linkage, side payments, social capital, information channels, homophily, and dependence, which are explored in greater detail. The argument is tested in panel data regressions on EU member states' troop contributions to EU military peace operations, from 2003–2018. For this purpose, an original dataset of troop contributions and variables measuring interrelational properties is compiled. The findings demonstrate that dependence on the EU as an export market and countries' position within a network of intergovernmental organisations (IGO) are particularly relevant explanatory variables, but also receipts from the annual EU budget, dependence on arms imports from other EU countries, and, in certain specifications, countries' position within the network of foreign policy preference.

4.2 Existing Accounts of Burden-Sharing in EU Peace Operations

Existing accounts of burden-sharing in peace operations have predominantly focussed on UN peacekeeping. Much of this literature explores the different goods or benefits states can obtain from participating in peace missions. Peacekeeping produces

[7] A few notable exceptions include Ward and Dorussen, 'Standing Alongside Your Friends'; Gaibulloev, Sandler, and Shimizu, 'Demands for UN and Non-UN Peacekeeping'; Gaibulloev et al., 'Personnel Contributions to UN and Non-UN Peacekeeping Missions'.

a mixture of public and private goods. Public goods, which are non-excludable and non-rival,[8] include the promotion of international peace and security, the spread of international norms, and enhanced stability for international trade. The provision of public goods is affected by collective action problems. Particularly non-excludability entails that a country cannot be prevented from consuming a good and hence many countries fail to contribute because they get the good for free once it is provided by others. This led scholars to two conclusions: first, that bigger and richer countries carry a disproportionately large share of the burden of a public good compared to smaller ones as the latter have an incentive to free ride, for which the term 'exploitation effect' has been coined; and second, that peace missions suffer from an undersupply of resources.[9]

Private goods, on the other hand, are rival and excludable, i.e. they are contributor-specific. Because an operation is located in a certain geographic region, contributor-specific benefits might arise for countries within that region or with special interest in it. These benefits include regional stability, a reduction in the influx of refugees, economic interests, a colonial history, or ethnic/language ties.[10] On top of these conflict-level determinants of deployment, the literature on (UN) peacekeeping burden-sharing also highlights contributor-specific characteristics. Contributor-specific determinants of peacekeeping contribution include resource constraints, financial rewards, military training and experience, and a reduction in coup attempts.[11]

The existing literature on European security and defence cooperation has devoted relatively little attention to burden-sharing in EU peace operations and determinants

[8]Goods are non-excludable when actors cannot be excluded from use; and they are non-rival when the use by one actor does not reduce availability to others.

[9]Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action*; Olson and Zeckhauser, 'An Economic Theory of Alliances'.

[10]Bove and Elia, 'Supplying Peace'; Perkins and Neumayer, 'Extra-Territorial Interventions in Conflict Spaces'; Uzonyi, 'Refugee Flows and State Contributions to Post-Cold War UN Peacekeeping Missions'; Gaibulloev, Sandler, and Shimizu, 'Demands for UN and Non-UN Peacekeeping'; Stojek and Tir, 'The Supply Side of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations'.

[11]Bove and Elia, 'Supplying Peace'; Victor, 'African Peacekeeping in Africa'; Gaibulloev et al., 'Personnel Contributions to UN and Non-UN Peacekeeping Missions'; Coleman and Nyblade, 'Peacekeeping for Profit?'; Kathman and Melin, 'Who Keeps the Peace?'; Lundgren, 'Backdoor Peacekeeping'.

of member state participation/contribution. While EU operations have occasionally been included in studies on contributions to UN and non-UN peacekeeping,[12] hardly any study focusses solely on the EU. One notable exception is a study by Dorussen, Kirchner, and Sperling on EU burden-sharing in security governance.[13] Deploying rank correlation tests, they find that EU military operations are mostly not affected by uneven burden-sharing, implying that EU peacekeeping is best characterised by a mixture of public and private goods. Similar results are obtained by Haesebrouck and Thiem in their study on EUFOR RD Congo and EUFOR Tchad/RCA.[14] By means of a multi-value qualitative comparative analysis, they further discern that EU countries somewhat overcontribute when they have a strong peacekeeping tradition and elections are distant, but undercontribute when a weak peacekeeping tradition is combined with small trade volumes with the area of operations.

Apart from these articles, case studies on single operations and a limited number of EU member states indicate determinants of member states' troop contributions. Similar to studies on UN peacekeeping, they highlight conflict-level determinants such as regional stability, trade, and colonial ties. Howorth and Bertin, for instance, argue that EU operations in the Balkans are driven by a desire to stabilise the European periphery and support countries on their way to EU membership.[15] Economic and commercial interests, as argued by several scholars, have mobilised EU member states to launch the naval mission EUNAVFOR Atalanta off the Horn of Africa and in the Western Indian Ocean, particularly the desire to secure international shipping lanes and to protect vessels against Somali pirates.[16] The significance of trade motives for

[12]Gaibulloev et al., 'Personnel Contributions to UN and Non-UN Peacekeeping Missions'; Tim Haesebrouck, 'EU Member State Participation in Military Operations: A Configurational Comparative Analysis', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 30/2-3 (2017), 137–59.

[13]Dorussen, Kirchner, and Sperling, 'Sharing the Burden of Collective Security in the European Union'.

[14]Tim Haesebrouck and Alrik Thiem, 'Burden Sharing in CSDP Military Operations', *Defence and Peace Economics* 29/7 (2018), 748–65.

[15]Jolyon Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Thomas Bertin, 'The EU Military Operation in Bosnia', in Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite (eds.), *The European Security and Defence Policy: An Implementation Perspective* (London: Routledge, 2008), 61–77.

[16]Basil Germond and Michael E. Smith, 'Re-Thinking European Security Interests and the ESDP: Explaining the EU's Anti-Piracy Operation', *Contemporary Security Policy* 30/3 (2009), 573–93;

contributions by the United Kingdom (UK) and France are also invoked in the case of EUFOR RD Congo. While the UK had little economic stakes in the country (and did not contribute), France had an interest in uranium exploration and was a large exporter to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (and the largest contributor to the operation).[17] Further, it is frequently argued that particularly France, but also the UK, use and contribute to EU peace mission to legitimise their engagement in former colonies on the African continent by 'replacing the *tricolore* [emphasis in original] and the Union Jack [with] the EU flag'.[18] On the domestic level, a number of authors suggest that existing military commitments abroad, particularly in Afghanistan and Iraq, and military overstretch have prevented countries from contributing to EU missions.[19] Another domestic constraint is domestic opposition, which is particularly influential in German decision-making, as noted by Gross and Matlary.[20]

On top of these conflict- and contributor-level determinants for peacekeeping contributions, case studies on EU operations often ascribe great importance to considerations regarding a country's standing and influence in the EU, and direct or indirect pressure exerted on member states. For the case of Germany's contribution to EUFOR RD Congo, for instance, Brummer highlights chancellor Merkel's desire

Palm, 'Cooperative Bargaining in the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy'.

[17]Gordon D. Cumming, 'Burying the Hatchet? Britain and France in the Democratic Republic of Congo', *Journal of Modern African Studies* 49/4 (2011), 547–73.

[18]Frédéric Mérand, *European Defence Policy: Beyond the Nation State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 125; see also Bruno Charbonneau, 'What is so Special about the European Union? EU-UN Cooperation in Crisis Management in Africa', *International Peacekeeping* 16/4 (2009), 546–61; Giulia Piccolino, 'A Litmus Test for the European Union? The EU's Response to the Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo from 1996 to the 2006 Elections', *European Foreign Affairs Review* 15/1 (2010), 115–36; Catherine Gegout, 'EU Conflict Management in Africa: The Limits of an International Actor', *Ethnopolitics* 8/3-4 (2009), 403–15.

[19]Klaus Brummer, 'The Reluctant Peacekeeper: Governmental Politics and Germany's Participation in EUFOR RD Congo', *Foreign Policy Analysis* 9/1 (2013), 1–20; Eva Gross, *The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy: Continuity and Change in European Crisis Management* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*; Mattelaer, 'The Strategic Planning of EU Military Operations'; Benjamin Pohl, 'To What Ends? Governmental Interests and European Union (Non-) Intervention in Chad and the Democratic Republic of Congo', *Cooperation and Conflict* 49/2 (2014), 191–211; Luis Simón, 'Command and Control? Planning for EU Military Operations', *European Union Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper* 81 (Jan. 2010), `https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Planning_for_EU_military_operations_1.pdf`, accessed July 17, 2019.

[20]Gross, *The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy*; Janne H. Matlary, *European Union Security Dynamics: In the New National Interest* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

to display solidarity with other EU member states, to show commitment to the development of the EU as a security actor, and to ensure Germany's influence in the European integration process.[21] Similarly, Matlary argues that EU member states 'need to *participate in order to shape decisions* [emphasis in original] and institutions and in order to gain international standing' – a dynamic she terms 'new national interests'.[22] EU member states that do not participate in EU missions remain outside the core group of countries in charge of the development and future direction of European security and defence policies, as well as related issue areas. In addition, references to direct pressure exerted on member states are common in the literature, particularly in regard to Germany's participation in EUFOR RD Congo. Pressured by its peers, above all France, Germany accepted to lead the operation; it contributed one third of the troops and the Operational Headquarters.[23]

These existing studies on EU peace operations suggest that not only conflict- and contributor-level characteristics determine troop contributions, but also relational properties of member states. However, much more theoretical and empirical work needs to be done. Most of the aforementioned studies are case-based and rely on the example of Germany's contribution to EUFOR RD Congo. A cross-national and/or longitudinal design would help to reduce the problem of generalisability. Relational characteristics have also largely been overlooked in studies on UN peacekeeping contribution, with a few notable exceptions. Gaibulloev, Sandler, Shimizu, and George examine spillins from other countries, i.e. the degree to which a country's financial or personnel contributions are influenced by the contributions of others.[24] Additionally, Ward and Dorussen find that countries contribute alongside their friends with

[21]Brummer, 'The Reluctant Peacekeeper'.

[22]Matlary, *European Union Security Dynamics*, p. 128.

[23]Claudia Major, 'EUFOR RD Congo', in Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly, and Daniel Keohane (eds.), *European Security and Defence Policy: The First 10 Years (1999-2009)* (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2009), 311–23, p. 315; see also Gross, *The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy*, pp. 145–53; Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, p. 159; Piccolino, 'A Litmus Test for the European Union?', pp. 131–4.

[24]Gaibulloev, Sandler, and Shimizu, 'Demands for UN and Non-UN Peacekeeping'; Gaibulloev et al., 'Personnel Contributions to UN and Non-UN Peacekeeping Missions'.

similar foreign policy preferences.[25] What is missing is, on the one hand, a representative study of contributions to EU peace operations, and, on the other hand, a systematic and comprehensive examination of the role of relational characteristics in peacekeeping force generation.

4.3 Theoretical Framework: The Role of Interrelationship Between EU Member States in Burden-Sharing

This article argues that relational properties of EU member states affect their participation in and level of contribution to EU peace missions. Relational properties include both the position of states within the EU and the interaction among states. The former involves the relative distribution of power and dependence, and the latter institutional ties, cooperation in different issue areas, and the alignment of policy and preferences. The interrelations between countries are highly relevant to overcome the collective action and burden-sharing problems of peacekeeping by creating additional private benefits and incentives for countries to participate. Incentives or benefits can include side payments, status enhancement, influence in the integration process, log rolling, and other horse-trading practices. Institutional ties can also enhance the flow of information, trust, reciprocity, and shared values and objectives, which all facilitate cooperation. The primary causal mechanisms through which relational properties positively influence EU member states' troop contributions to EU peace operations, namely issue linkage, side payments, social capital, information channels, homophily, and dependence, are discussed in the following paragraphs.

[25] Ward and Dorussen, 'Standing Alongside Your Friends'.

4.3.1 Issue Linkage

A wide range of institutional ties, interaction, and cooperation among EU member states allows for the inclusion of multiple different issues in the force generation negotiations for peace operations. Issue linkage has long been recognised by the academic literature and negotiators as a core function of intergovernmental organisations and as a routinely-employed strategy in international negotiations.[26] Following Sebenius, issues are linked 'when they are simultaneously discussed for joint settlement'.[27] Issue linkages encompass side-payments, log-rolling bargains, a formal agenda on a broad range of issues, or the tactical linkage of unrelated issues that do not require joint settlement. They can be explicit or implicit in negotiations; and they can occur simultaneously or intertemporal. The objective of linking issues is 'to obtain additional bargaining leverage, to extract a quid pro quo not obtainable if the discussion remains confined to a single issue'.[28] The more connections exist between countries and the stronger established connections are, the more opportunities exist to link different issues and apply the tactic of issue linkage in troop contribution negotiations. '[M]ore potential quids are available for the quo', to put it in Keohane's words.[29] The institutional context of the EU facilitates cross-sector issue linkages due to its engagement in a wide range of 'quids', such as trade, monetary affairs, agriculture, regional development, justice and home affairs, environment, development aid, or foreign and security policy. Heisenberg, for instance, highlights the role of issue linkage and log-rolling

[26]Robert D. Tollison and Thomas D. Willett, 'An Economic Theory of Mutually Advantageous Issue Linkages in International Negotiations', *International Organization* 33/4 (1979), 425–49; James K. Sebenius, 'Negotiation Arithmetic: Adding and Subtracting Issues and Parties: Negotiation Arithmetic', *International Organization* 37/2 (1983), 281–316; Arthur A. Stein, 'The Politics of Linkage', *World Politics* 33/1 (1980), 62–81; Michael D. McGinnis, 'Issue Linkage and the Evolution of International Cooperation', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 30/1 (1986), 141–70; Christina L. Davis, 'International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization', *American Political Science Review* 98/1 (2004), 153–69; Paul Poast, 'Does Issue Linkage Work? Evidence from European Alliance Negotiations, 1860 to 1945', *International Organization* 66/2 (2012), 277–310.

[27]Sebenius, 'Negotiation Arithmetic', p. 287.

[28]Ernst B. Haas, 'Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes', *World Politics* 32/3 (1980), 357–405.

[29]Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 91.

for the prevailing consensus in the Council of the EU: 'consensus in this context is shorthand for "selling" preferences that are not strongly held for advantages in other issue areas or in future negotiations ("favor bank")'.[30] Similarly, Schneider finds that during EU enlargement reforms, states that face disadvantages from enlargement can expect side-payments in other policy areas.[31] These issue bargains cannot only be struck within the EU but favours in one organisation can be exchanged for favours in another one.

4.3.2 Side Payments

Side payments are a specific type of issue linkage, a form of compensating payments or financial incentives that are not part of the transaction, i.e. the participation in peace operations, itself. They can include foreign, economic, and military aid, as well as debt relief, sanction relief, trade and investment agreements, and refunds for deployment expenses.[32] In the case of the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), for instance, the United States (US) offered Nigeria assistance with its debt relief in exchange for UNAMID troop contributions; and they further offered Rwanda approximately US$20 million as well as pre-deployment training to enable and enhance deployment.[33] For their participation in the Iraq War, the US rewarded Romania and Bulgaria with efforts to portray them as attractive investment sites by declaring them 'market-based economies' and by sponsoring US trade delegations.[34] An example of side payments spanning different issue areas and

[30]Dorothee Heisenberg, 'The Institution of 'Consensus' in the European Union: Formal versus Informal Decision-Making in the Council', *European Journal of Political Research* 44/1 (2005), 65–90, p. 69.

[31]Christina J. Schneider, 'Weak States and Institutionalized Bargaining Power in International Organizations', *International Studies Quarterly* 55/2 (2011), 331–55; see also Andrew Moravcsik, 'Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community', *International Organization* 45/1 (1991), 19–56; Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht* (London: Routledge, 2013).

[32]Marina E. Henke, 'Buying Allies: Payment Practices in Multilateral Military Coalition-Building', *International Security* 43/4 (2019), 128–62, p. 137.

[33]Marina E. Henke, 'Great Powers and UN Force Generation: A Case Study of UNAMID', *International Peacekeeping* 23/3 (2016), 468–92.

[34]Randall Newnham, 'Coalition of the Bribed and Bullied? US Economic Linkage and the Iraq War Coalition', *International Studies Perspectives* 9/2 (2008), 183–200, p. 192.

international organisations is provided by Mikulaschek, who shows that EU members that hold a temporary seat on the UN Security Council obtain side payments from the EU budget.[35]

4.3.3 Social Capital

Interrelationships between EU member states further create forms of social capital. Social capital, as argued by Coleman, resides in the structure of relations between actors.[36] Social relations create capital resources in the form of trustworthiness in the social environment that obligations will be met, the flow of information, and norms accompanied by sanctions, which facilitate behaviour that is in the interest of the collective and restrain behaviour that is not. Coleman perceives social capital as a resource for action, to facilitate collective action. In the same vein, Putnam, famously employing the example of organised bowling leagues, explores the consequences of declining social capital in American society for civil and political engagement.[37] He understands social capital as features of social structures: the social networks, trust, and norms of reciprocity that facilitate cooperation. Social capital also inheres in the connections and networks of states. Ward, applying this line of argument, finds that countries in central positions within networks of intergovernmental organisations are more likely to act sustainably.[38] Frequent encounters between countries (in the form of state representatives) enhance familiarity with and an understanding of other countries' policy positions, attitudes, and conduct. Stronger interaction and ties between countries also increase the trust necessary to expect that obligations are met and concessions reciprocated. Moreover, embeddedness in the international system and networks can lead to shared norms and negotiation practices, which in turn enhance

[35]Christoph Mikulaschek, 'Issue Linkage Across International Organizations: Does European Countries' Temporary Membership in the UN Security Council Increase Their Receipts from the EU Budget?', *The Review of International Organizations* 13/4 (2018), 491–518.

[36]James S. Coleman, 'Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital', *American Journal of Sociology* 94 (1988), 95–120; James S. Coleman, *Foundations of Social Theory* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), pp. 300–21.

[37]Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone* (London: Simon and Schuster, 2000).

[38]Hugh Ward, 'International Linkages and Environmental Sustainability: The Effectiveness of the Regime Network', *Journal of Peace Research* 43/2 (2006), 149–66.

international cooperation and collective action, including in EU peacekeeping.

4.3.4 Information Channels

Information flows are an important aspect of social capital but worth being discussed as a separate mechanism. Coleman notes that information provide a basis for action but that the acquisition thereof is costly.[39] Social ties, regardless of their purpose, facilitate the acquisition of information. One highly relevant forum for the exchange of information is intergovernmental organisations.[40] Membership and participation in international organisations enhance the level of information available to states or, to put it in game-theoretic terms, transform games with incomplete information into games with more complete information where new outcomes become possible. Here, the breadth of institutions spanning different issue areas matters in order to acquire as much information as possible for successful bargaining and issue linkage, as argued by Henke in her study on US coalition building.[41] For the case of burden-sharing in EU peace operations, this means that not only information acquired at Force Generation Conferences or the EU's Foreign Affairs Council matter, but also information obtained through institutional ties in the economic, agricultural, or social sphere, and even through intergovernmental organisations beyond the EU. Dorussen and Ward further note that in a network of institutional ties, not only direct but also indirect links can transmit information and enhance communication.[42] Information obtained via institutional ties include the capabilities and resource availability of other countries, past reciprocities and fulfilment of obligations, preferred forms of interaction, the intensity of preferences regarding peacekeeping participation, as well as economic, political, or other preferences that can be used in the bargaining process on troop contributions to EU peace missions.

[39]Coleman, 'Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital', p. 104.

[40]Bruce Russett and John R. Oneal, *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations* (New York, NY: Norton, 2001).

[41]Marina E. Henke, 'The Politics of Diplomacy: How the United States Builds Multilateral Military Coalitions', *International Studies Quarterly* 61/2 (2017), 410–24.

[42]Han Dorussen and Hugh Ward, 'Intergovernmental Organizations and the Kantian Peace: A Network Perspective', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52/2 (2008), 189–212.

4.3.5 Homophily

Affinity, aligned policies, and shared objectives provide incentives for countries to engage in peace operations with like-minded states.[43] Irish security actors, for instance, often partner with like-minded countries once on the ground. During their deployment in the UN Mission in Liberia, the Irish formed a battalion with the Swedes; in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon as well as in EUFOR Tchad/RCA, they cooperated with the Finns; and Ireland participates in the Nordic Battlegroup.[44] Existing research shows that democratic countries are more likely to participate in peacekeeping than non-democracies.[45] Drawing on liberalism, this involvement is often ascribed to shared liberal principles, including individual rights and humanitarian objectives, economic freedom, the opportunity to spread democracy, and a shared commitment to multilateral engagement. Ward and Dorussen further argue that many incentives of peacekeeping are conditional on the participation of specific other states.[46] Countries with similar foreign policy preferences and goals might find it easier to agree on the mission mandate, rules of engagement, and overall objectives, which are all crucial for the outcome and effectiveness of a peace operation. The norms and values a peace operation promotes, i.e. the liberal principles listed above, also hinge on the countries providing the peacekeepers. Additionally, domestic support might be easier to secure if the peacekeeping burden is shared with allies and like-minded countries. Using a network approach, Ward and Dorussen find that countries provide a larger portion of peacekeepers to UN missions when they are more central in the network of foreign policy preference. At the same time, alliances and affinities between states can evolve in response to shared institutional memberships and interactions. This 'international socialisation' can assume the form of learning the rules of the game or can go deeper and change the interests and, ultimately, the

[43]Ward and Dorussen, 'Standing Alongside Your Friends'.

[44]Frédéric Mérand and Antoine Rayroux, 'The Practice of Burden Sharing in European Crisis Management Operations', *European Diplomacy in Practice* 25/4 (2016), 442–60, p. 451.

[45]Lebovic, 'Uniting for Peace?'

[46]Ward and Dorussen, 'Standing Alongside Your Friends'.

identity of countries.[47] International institutions are both the 'promoters [and] sites of socialization'.[48] They induce change by offering incentives and rewards, role playing, and normative suasion.[49] Empirical research has shown that membership in international organisations makes member states more similar over time and enhances policy and interest convergence.[50] Countries that are joint members of more international organisations show a greater convergence of interests than countries with fewer joint memberships.

4.3.6 Dependence

Finally, dependences can be used to incentivise EU member states to contribute to peace missions. The EU and other member states can include issue areas in which a member experiences dependence in the force generation negotiations and thereby increase their bargaining leverage. Conversely, a member state's relative dependence on the EU impacts its vulnerability to external pressure. The challenge of dependence can also be understood in the terms of the alliance security dilemma.[51] A firm commitment to the European Union and EU peace operations secures defence, economic, and political ties, but at the same time raises the risk of losing autonomy and getting drawn into undesired out-of-area operations. Non-participation, on the other hand, increases self-determination but also raises the risk of abandonment in areas of dependence in the future. States need to balance the two fears of the alliance security dilemma, 'entrapment' and 'abandonment'. While the EU engages in security and defence policy and deploys out-of-area peace operations, it is ultimately an economic and political union. Therefore, the most relevant dependences lie in the economic realm, such as trade, economic support from the European Structural and

[47] Alexander Wendt, 'Collective Identity Formation and the International State', *American Political Science Review* 88/2 (1994), 384–96, p. 385.

[48] Jeffrey T. Checkel, 'International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework', *International Organization* 59/4 (2005), 801–26, p. 806.

[49] Checkel, 'International Institutions and Socialization in Europe', pp. 808–13.

[50] David H. Bearce and Stacy Bondanella, 'Intergovernmental Organizations, Socialization, and Member-State Interest Convergence', *International Organization* 61/4 (2007), 703–33.

[51] Glenn H. Snyder, 'The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics', *World Politics* 36/4 (1984), 461–95.

Investment Funds, or intra-EU foreign direct investments, and in the realm of politics, including status within the EU and influence on current and future developments.

The interrelationship of countries, including their position, dependence, and status amongst other EU members, as well as their interaction and institutional ties with other countries are suggested to bear a positive influence on countries' troop contributions to EU peace operations. Not only the relations within the peacekeeping Force Generation Process or even the European Union are expected to affect troop contributions, but the entirety of relations between EU member states. Information, negotiation practices, shared values and norms, bargaining leverage, side payments, and dependences can be derived from all ties and relations spanning different issue areas and international organisations, and, ultimately, enhance peacekeeping cooperation. This leads to the following hypothesis:

> *Hypothesis: The greater the interrelationship between an EU member state and other EU member states, the more likely it is that this state participates in EU peace operations and the higher its troop contributions.*

4.4 Plausibility Probe: The Force Generation Process in EU Peace Operations

The EU Force Generation Process involves extensive political negotiations and a steady back and forth between EU officials and EU member states over the course of eight to nine months to recruit and bargain member states into participating in EU peace operations.[52] It provides ample opportunities for relational ties, positional and status considerations, side payments, and direct and indirect pressure to shape countries' deployment decisions.

Force generation is the entire process of negotiation over the troops, military

[52]Pierre Vimont, former Executive Secretary-General of the European External Action Service, cited in House of Lords, European Union Committee, *Brexit: Common Security and Defence Policy Missions and Operations*, 16th Report of Session 2017–2019, May 14, 2018, `https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldeucom/132/132.pdf`, accessed Sept. 8, 2018.

assets, and capabilities pledged by member states to EU peace missions. Early, informal talks with member states take place parallel to the planning process of a new military operation. During this first phase, which is called force sensing, the EU Military Staff or the Operation Commander[53] conduct indicative contribution meetings or consultations via other formal and informal ways (i.e. exchange of letters, visits) to assess member states' capabilities and intentions for possible contributions. These early indications are non-binding. The force sensing phase not only provides early information for and influences the planning of the operation, but also allows member states to gauge one's standing and contribution relative to others. The force generation process is formally initiated after the Concept of Operations is adopted. The Operation Commander forwards a provisional statement of requirements to potential troop contributing countries. TCCs respond with offers, including the level and specificities of the contribution, which are confirmed at Force Generation Conferences. Sometimes up to six Force Generation Conferences are necessary until the entire list of requirements is met by voluntary contributions.[54] Once the offers meet the requirements and a draft statement of requirements is developed, TCCs are requested to formally commit to the force contributions and to specify any caveats (i.e. geographical, temporal, logistical, rules of engagement). Following the receipt of all formal commitments, more Force Generation Conferences can be conducted to balance contributions and address any shortfalls or surpluses.[55] When the statement of requirements is met, the Operation Commander distributes the EU Force List, confirming the commitments of the TCCs and completing force generation. In the case of longer-term operations, Force Generation Conferences are continued on a half-yearly basis and ad hoc conferences are conducted when major new/additional tasks

[53]The Operation Commander is appointed by the Council of the European Union (which is composed of the executive governments of the EU member states). He/she is usually from the lead nation or the main troop/capabilities contributing country. The Commander is responsible for the overall design of the operation, including force generation, and acts as a politico-military interface during the planning and conduct of the operation.

[54]Mattelaer, 'The Strategic Planning of EU Military Operations', p. 32.

[55]At this stage, invited third states can offer their contributions and fill shortfalls in subsequent Force Generation Conferences.

or capabilities are introduced.[56]

During the force generation process, EU bodies and member states, in particular their foreign and defence ministries as well as the offices of the heads of state or government, are in constant interaction via formal communications, informal dialogues, and a number of multinational conferences. All of these meetings are supported by email correspondences from the level of desk officers to heads of government, as well as capital-to-capital phone calls.[57] Accounts of practitioners and official diplomatic cables support the contention that relational ties, relative standing to other countries, issue linkages, and pressure are significant considerations and leverage used in these interactions and negotiations. A former German military representative to the UN explained: 'If and when we decide to contribute, we base our contribution on a comparison with France and Britain'.[58] France, in turn, is conscious about its status and obligations resulting from its permanent seat on the UN Security Council. A French general asserted that '[w]e have to be active to earn our status, especially because it is contested'.[59] Middle powers or smaller states, on the other hand, use troop contributions to enhance their status and influence. As an official of the Norwegian Ministry of Defence explained in relation to Norway's contribution to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, '[p]art of Norway's policy is to try to be relevant. We have been very dependent on NATO for our security. We have a seat at the table. We're well represented in the command structure'.[60] Here, expected benefits might be deferred in time: 'We have credit that we can use when we need it in special situation'.[61] At the same time, as an official from Ireland's Department of

[56]European External Action Service, *EU Concept for Force Generation*, EEAS(2015) 1237 REV 6, Nov. 11, 2015, `http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14000-2015-INIT/en/pdf`, accessed Nov. 12, 2016.

[57]Mérand and Rayroux, 'The Practice of Burden Sharing in European Crisis Management Operations', p. 446.

[58]Cited in Mérand and Rayroux, 'The Practice of Burden Sharing in European Crisis Management Operations', p. 449.

[59]Cited in Mérand and Rayroux, 'The Practice of Burden Sharing in European Crisis Management Operations', p. 452.

[60]Cited in Mérand and Rayroux, 'The Practice of Burden Sharing in European Crisis Management Operations', p. 453.

[61]Cited in Mérand and Rayroux, 'The Practice of Burden Sharing in European Crisis Management Operations', p. 453.

Foreign Affairs put it, these small and middle powers often 'have no vested interests in Africa, or Lebanon, or Kosovo, or any of the places where we go'.[62]

Cables from the US Mission to the European Union as well as the one to NATO, published on WikiLeaks, further expose the 'intense lobbying' happening so that sufficient troops are secured and operations can go forward.[63] A cable on force generation for ISAF from 2007 emphasises that allies should be 'push[ed]', 'with special emphasis on underperformers', and 'Washington [should] turn up the political heat'.[64] Similarly, a cable on force generation for the EU mission EUFOR Tchad/RCA states: 'If Member States are not more forthcoming today, there will likely be more "offensive tackling" at the meeting of the EU Chiefs of Defence on November 15 and the November 19 General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC)'.[65] In regard to the same GAERC meeting, Václav Bálek, Director of the Department of Common Foreign and Security Policy of the Czech Republic, noted that although they 'do not have historic or strategic ties to the [African] continent', the Czechs decided to deploy three troops to EUFOR Tchad/RCA 'in order to increase cooperation and strengthen their ties with France'.[66] This was particularly relevant 'since [the Czech Republic, France, and Sweden] form an upcoming EU Presidency troika'. These accounts indicate that decisions regarding troop contributions are not only based on conflict- or contributor-specific factors, such as resources, distance to the conflict region, or economic interests, but are at least as much based on the interrelationships between potential TCCs. The next part of the article introduces and presents a systematic

[62]Cited in Mérand and Rayroux, 'The Practice of Burden Sharing in European Crisis Management Operations', p. 451.

[63]US Embassy France, Paris, *Chad/C.A.R. PKO: France to Provide Missing Elements*, WikiLeaks Cable: 08PARIS72_a, Jan. 11, 2008, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08PARIS72_a.html, accessed Mar. 24, 2016.

[64]US Mission to NATO, *NATO-Afghanistan: Pressing Allies on ISAF Force Generation*, WikiLeaks Cable: 07USNATO610_a, Nov. 19, 2007, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07USNATO610_a.html, accessed Mar. 24, 2016.

[65]US Mission to European Union, *Latest Force Generation for ESDP Mission to Chad*, WikiLeaks Cable: 07BRUSSELS3346_a, Nov. 16, 2007, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07BRUSSELS3346_a.html, accessed Mar. 24, 2016.

[66]US Embassy Czech Republic, Prague, *Czech Comments in Advance of the EU GAERC*, WikiLeaks Cable: 07PRAGUE1233_a, Nov. 16, 2007, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/pdf/?df=80757, accessed Mar. 24, 2016.

test of this argument.

4.5 Research Design

4.5.1 Case Selection

Since the launch of its first peace mission in 2003, the EU has evolved into one of the most important regional organisations providing peacekeeping with 13 military and 23 civilian missions by 2019. The EU operations studied in this article are only those with a military context – pure military operations and military training and advisory missions. Not included are civilian missions, as these are financed by the Common Foreign and Security Policy budget and not directly by TCCs, do not involve the deployment of military forces, and consequently follow different burden-sharing considerations than military missions. The study further excludes the two EU naval force missions, EUNAVFOR Atalanta in Somalia and EUNAVFOR Med in the Mediterranean. No national breakdowns of troop contributions are available for these missions; and, more importantly, naval operations hinge on the contribution of vessels and aircraft, which alters the burden-sharing considerations. As an Irish official put it, '[w]hen you're a small country, right, there are certain capabilities ... it's just ... not feasible for you to have. [...] You can't have a half a submarine, or a quarter of an aircraft carrier'.[67] The European Union Support to the African Union Mission in Sudan is further omitted due to data limitations. Accordingly, ten EU peace operations are included in the analysis, which are listed in Table 4.1.

4.5.2 Dependent Variables

The dependent variables measure EU member states' troop contributions to EU peace operations from 2003 to 2018. The unit of analysis is EU member state-mission-year. Thirteen new member states joined the Union between 2003 and 2013 and hence the

[67] Cited in Mérand and Rayroux, 'The Practice of Burden Sharing in European Crisis Management Operations', p. 452.

number of EU member states increases during the timeframe of the study.[68] Two versions of the dependent variable are analysed: First, a binary variable capturing whether a member state participated in a peace operation or not; and second, a discrete variable counting the exact number of troops provided by each country. Data are retrieved and compiled from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Military Balance and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbooks.[69]

Table 4.1 provides an overview of the total troops contributed to each EU peace operation per year. In total, just over 51'000 troops have served under the EU flag between 2003–2018.[70] Compared to the UN's 100'000 peacekeepers deployed in 2018 alone,[71] EU operations have been small in scale and scope.[72] Operation Concordia, for instance, was only ten months long and 150 troops strong. EU military training and advisory missions (EUTM, EUMAM) deployed on average 285 troops per mission-year. European Union Force missions tend to be larger, with EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina being the largest and longest mission to date. It has been ongoing since December 2004 and saw up to 11'443 troops deployed in 2005, although it has decreased in size since then. Table 4.1 further lists the number of EU states participating in each mission-year, which varies between six out of 28 member states for EUMAM RCA (in 2015) and 25 out of 27 for EUFOR Althea (in 2007).

[68] Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined in 2004, Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, and Croatia in 2013.

[69] International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2003–2019); Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmaments and International Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003–2019); IISS figures, which account for the bulk of the assembled data, are assessments as of 1 August for 2003–2005 and 1 November for 2006–2019.

[70] Note that this includes EU and third state contributions.

[71] United Nations Peacekeeping, 'Data', `https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/data`, accessed June 6, 2019.

[72] See Chapter 3, 'Partnership Peacekeeping: The Division of Labour Between the United Nations and Regional Organisations.'

Table 4.1: Total Troops and EU Member States' Participation by EU Peace Operation

	2003	**2004**	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2013**	**2014**	**2015**	**2016**	**2017**	**2018**	**Total**
EUFOR Concordia	150 (13)																150
EUFOR Artemis	1'968 (11)																1'968
EUFOR Althea			11'443 (23)	6'289 (23)	2'619 (25)	2'174 (21)	1'972 (20)	1'794 (21)	1'387 (21)	1'124 (20)	928 (17)	861 (15)	957 (17)	806 (15)	760 (14)	968 (13)	34'082
EUFOR RD Congo				2'275 (16)													2'275
EUFOR Tchad/RCA					2'990 (9)	3'467 (23)											6'457
EUTM Somalia								147 (14)	154 (12)	133 (13)	123 (12)	153 (11)	165 (10)	178 (11)	180 (11)	168 (8)	1'401
EUTM Mali											551 (20)	608 (22)	613 (22)	550 (23)	532 (22)	625 (21)	3'479
EUFOR RCA												677 (11)					677
EUMAM RCA													68 (6)				68
EUTM RCA														138 (7)	170 (9)	162 (7)	470
Total	2'118	0	11'443	8'564	5'609	5'641	1'972	1'941	1'541	1'257	1'602	2'299	1'803	1'672	1'642	1'923	51'027
# Missions	2	0	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	3	4	4	4	4	4	10
# EU States	15	25	25	25	27	27	27	27	27	27	28	28	28	28	28	28	

# of participating EU member states in parenthesis

Turning to the participation and contribution rates of individual member states, Figure 4.1 displays the frequency of participation as well as the average number of troops (per mission-year) contributed by each country. As a general observation, the most frequent and largest contributors come from the EU-15, the countries in the EU prior to the 2004 enlargement (blue columns; yellow columns for accession states), with Hungary, Poland, and Romania being notable exceptions. Considerable variation exists between countries, with participation ranging from 0% (Croatia) to 95% (Spain), and the average number of troops deployed from 0 (Croatia, Cyprus, and Denmark) to 204 for France. The next biggest contributors are Austria and Germany with 107 troops – almost half of France's average deployment. The maximum amount of contributions to a mission (per year) is 1'711 troops (France, EUFOR Tchad/RCA, 2008) and the mean across all EU member states is 40 troops per mission-year. The troop contributions variable is strongly skewed to the right with a skewness of 7.2. For illustrative purposes, density plots can be found in the appendix (Figures 4.2–4.3).




Figure 4.1: Frequency of Participation and Average Troop Contributions to EU Peace Operations (in Mission-Years) by EU Member State, 2003–2018

4.5.3 Independent Variables

Seven independent variables are constructed to measure the interrelationship between EU member states. EU member states' receipts from the annual EU budget are investigated as a potential form of side payments; states' centrality within the network of intergovernmental organisations is deployed to capture the influence of social capital and information channels; homophily is assessed in the network of UN voting cohesion as well as in regard to voting results in the Council of the European Union; and finally, member states' dependence on the EU is measured in the economic, financial, and security realm.

First, over-time changes in countries' receipts from the EU annual budget are utilised to investigate whether contributions to EU peace missions are associated with greater receipts from the budget. The budget for year t+1 is drafted by the European Commissions by 1 September of year t and then reviewed, amended, and adopted by the Council of the EU and the European Parliament by December of year t.[73] The annual budget has to fit within the expenditure limits set in the Multiannual Financial Framework, the EU's long-term spending plan. According to the European Commission, this means that longer-term financial decisions are not made during the annual budgetary procedure, but 'that the annual discussion on the budget can [instead] focus more on the necessary political negotiations and on effective allocation of available resources'.[74] Data on the EU budget are obtained from the European Commission Directorate-General for Budget.[75] The change in member states' receipts from the EU budget (in hundred millions of constant 2003 Euro) is calculated by the

[73]The Parliament has a much more limited impact on the budget as it is harder to get a majority in the Council than in Parliament. See Heikki Kauppi and Mika Widgrén, 'What Determines EU Decision Making? Needs, Power or Both?', *Economic Policy* 19/39 (2004), 222–66, pp. 224–5.

[74]European Commission, *European Union Public Finance* (5th edn., Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014); see also Kauppi and Widgrén, 'What Determines EU Decision Making?', who argue that budget negotiations are shaped by power politics in the Council.

[75]European Commission, 'EU Expenditure and Revenue 2014–2020', `https://ec.europa.eu/budget/graphs/revenue_expediture.html`, accessed June 6, 2019.

author.[76] The change in budget receipts data for year t is the difference between the budget receipts in year t+1 – which are negotiated during year t – and the receipts in year t.

The second independent variable measures EU member states' connectedness within a network of intergovernmental organisations.[77] Memberships in IGOs create social relations between joint members, enhance mutual trust and reciprocity, and facilitate the exchange of information. Joint IGO memberships can be modelled in the form of a network, with EU member states as the nodes and the number of joint IGO memberships the edges connecting states. Countries' eigenvector centralities in IGO networks are computed as a measure of the strength of their direct and indirect ties to other countries. Eigenvector centrality calculates the centrality of a node as a function of the centralities of its neighbours and, in essence, captures how well a country is connected to other well-connected countries. Data on shared IGO memberships for each country dyad is drawn from the Correlates of War International Governmental Organizations Data Set, Version 3.0.[78] The eigenvector centrality of each EU member state for each year is calculated using the igraph R package.[79] Figure 4.4 in the appendix provides a visualisation of the variability of member states' centrality over time, ranking them from most to least central. In the subsequent analysis, IGO eigenvector centrality is expressed as a percentage for ease of interpretation.

Similarly, EU member states' eigenvector centrality in networks of foreign policy similarity is calculated as an estimate of their homophily. The measure of policy similarity draws on Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten's policy ideal-point positions, which are based on UN General Assembly roll-call voting data.[80] Following Ward and Dorussen's

[76]Constant Euros were calculated using Alioth Finance, '€100 in 2003 → 2019 | Euro Inflation Calculator', U.S. Official Inflation Data, `https://www.officialdata.org/eu/inflation/2003?amount=100`, accessed June 6, 2019.

[77]See Ward, 'International Linkages and Environmental Sustainability'; Dorussen and Ward, 'Intergovernmental Organizations and the Kantian Peace', who first applied this variable.

[78]Jon Pevehouse, Timothy Nordstrom, and Kevin Warnke, 'The Correlates of War 2 International Governmental Organizations Data Version 2.0', *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 21/2 (2004), 101–19; IGO membership data is only available until 2014.

[79]Gabor Csardi and Tamas Nepusz, 'The igraph Software Package for Complex Network Research', *InterJournal, Complex Systems* 1695/5 (2006), 1–9.

[80]Michael A. Bailey, Anton Strezhnev, and Erik Voeten, 'Estimating Dynamic State Preferences

research design of their study on network centrality and UN peace operations, policy similarity is calculated as the inverse of the (normed absolute) difference between the ideal-point positions of two member states for each year.[81] The policy similarity scores for each country dyad are again applied to network graphs and countries' eigenvector centrality within them is calculated. Figure 4.5 in the appendix presents EU member states' rankings in the network of policy similarity. A further visual inspection of the relationship between the foreign policy centrality variable and the dependent variable, troop contributions, suggests that the relationship is positive but non-linear, which is in line with Ward and Dorussen's research (see Figure 4.6 in the appendix). For this reason, the squared term of the policy centrality variable is added in the analysis.

As a further measure for member states' policy alignment, voting results in the Council of the European Union are examined. The Council is composed of government ministers from each EU country and is the EU's primary decision-making body. Voting results in the Council of the European Union are published in monthly summaries of Council acts, which were consulted to calculate each EU member state's percentage of opposition votes per year.[82] Opposition votes were defined as 'Against' as well as 'Abstaining' votes, as abstentions represent a deviation from the majority.[83]

Three independent variables are constructed to capture member states' dependence on other EU member states. The literature on alliance bargaining and issue linkage particularly stresses the connection between economic and security agreements with the expectation that failing to fulfil military obligations puts commercial exchange in danger (and vice versa),[84] which is why dependence is measured in the

from United Nations Voting Data', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61/2 (2017), 430–56.

[81]For more detailed steps see Ward and Dorussen, 'Standing Alongside Your Friends', p. 398.

[82]Council of the European Union, 'Monthly Summaries of Council Acts', `www.consilium.europa.eu/register/en/content/out?PUB_DOC=%5C%3E0&DOC_SUBJECT_PRIM=PUBLIC&i=ACT&ROWSPP=25&ORDERBY=DOC_DATE+DESC&DOC_LANCD=EN&typ=SET&NRROWS=500&RESULTSET=1&DOC_TITLE=2019`, accessed July 9, 2019.

[83]See Sara Hagemann, Sara B. Hobolt, and Chrisopher Wratil, 'Government Responsiveness in the European Union: Evidence from Council Voting', *Comparative Political Studies* 50/6 (2017), 850–76, pp. 856–7.

[84]Andrew G. Long and Brett A. Leeds, 'Trading for Security: Military Alliances and Economic Agreements', *Journal of Peace Research* 43/4 (2006), 433–51; Edward D. Mansfield and Rachel Bronson, 'Alliances, Preferential Trading Arrangements, and International Trade', *American Political Science Review* 91/1 (1997), 94–107.

realm of international trade, international investment, and security. For the realm of international trade, each member state's exports to other EU countries vis-à-vis its total exports is calculated. Data is drawn from the European Commission's Eurostat.[85] Regarding international investments, countries' inward foreign direct investments (FDI) from all other EU states are measured as a share of their gross domestic product (GDP). Bilateral FDI financial flows are retrieved from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and Eurostat, and GDP data from the World Bank's World Development Indicators.[86] Finally, dependence in the security realm is based on a member state's share of imports of major conventional weapons from other EU countries relative to its total weapons imports. The data is based on SIPRI's Arms Transfers Database, specifically the Trend Indicator Values.[87] All three dependence variables are lagged by one year to reflect the information available to EU and national leaders at the time of the negotiations on troop contributions to EU peace operations.

4.5.4 Control Variables

Additionally, a number of control variables are included in the analysis to account for further conflict- and domestic-related private benefits and constraints motivating countries' participation in and contributions to EU peace operations. These include the distance between each EU member state and the recipient states of EU peace missions, a binary variable capturing historical colonial involvement of an EU state in a recipient state, and the share of an EU country's exports to the host country relative

[85]Eurostat, 'EU Trade since 1988 by CN8 [DS-016890]', Datafile, `https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database`, accessed May 12, 2019.

[86]Eurostat, 'EU Direct Investment Flows, Breakdown by Partner Country and Economic Activity (BPM6) [bop_fdi6_flow]', Datafile, `https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database`, accessed May 12, 2019; Eurostat, 'EU Direct Investment Flows, Breakdown by Partner Country and Economic Activity (NACE Rev. 2) [bop_fdi_flow_r2]', Datafile, `https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database`, accessed May 12, 2019; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 'Bilateral FDI Statistics', `https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/FDI%5C%20Statistics/FDI-Statistics-Bilateral.aspx`, accessed May 11, 2019; OECD exchange rates data and the Alioth Finance's inflation calculator were consulted to convert all figures into millions of constant 2003 Euro.

[87]Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 'SIPRI Arms Transfers Database', Datafile, `https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers`, accessed May 9, 2019.

to its total exports as measures of conflict-level private benefits. Data on the distance between capitals in hundred kilometres is drawn from Gleditsch's distance between capital cities dataset and trade data from Eurostat.[88] The number of concurrent EU and UN missions a country is involved in, the size of its military (in thousand armed forces), and its GDP per capita are included to control for resource constraints limiting contributions to EU peace missions. Data is drawn from the International Peace Institute Peacekeeping Database, the IISS Military Balance, and the World Bank's World Development Indicators, respectively.[89] Finally, the size each operation, operationalised in terms of the total number of troops deployed by all EU and third countries, is added to control for different scales of EU peace operations. Data is drawn from SIPRI Yearbooks and the IISS Military Balance.[90] Summary statistics of all dependent, independent, and control variables are available in the appendix.

4.5.5 Estimation Strategy

This new dataset is used to run panel regression models with the aim to examine the relationship between EU member states' degree of interrelationship and their participation in and contribution to EU peace operations. For the binary dependent variable (participation), logit regression models are conducted with cluster-robust standard errors to mitigate possible heteroskedasticity. The models include (EU) country fixed effects and year fixed effects (FE). For the second dependent variable, i.e. the number of troops contributed by each country, negative binomial models are deployed to account for the over-dispersed distribution of the count variable.[91]

[88]Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, 'Distance between Capital Cities', `http://ksgleditsch.com/data-5.html`, accessed May 10, 2019; Eurostat, *EU Trade since 1988 by CN8 [DS-016890]*.

[89]International Peace Institute, 'IPI Peacekeeping Database', Datafile, `www.providingforpeacekeeping.org`, accessed Jan. 9, 2019; International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*; World Bank, 'World Development Indicators', Datafile (May 2019), `https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators`, accessed June 12, 2019; OECD exchange rates data and the Alioth Finance's inflation calculator were consulted to convert GDP data into constant 2003 Euro.

[90]Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Yearbook*; International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*.

[91]Overdispersion, where the conditional variance exceeds the conditional mean, has been confirmed; the likelihood ratio test for overdispersion suggests that the negative binomial model is more

Again, country and year fixed effects are included. Additionally, generalised least squares (GLS) random effects regressions with a first-order autoregressive (AR(1)) disturbance are run of the log of troop contributions. The log transformation is deployed as an alternative method to correct for the highly skewed data. Note that the transformation omits all cases where countries contribute zero troops to a mission-year.[92] The AR(1) correction addresses problems of serial autocorrelation.[93]

4.6 Results and Discussion

The results of the logistic regression of participation are shown in Table 4.2. Model 1 includes country fixed effects and Model 2 additionally adds year fixed effects. In both models, the change in EU budget receipts is positive and significant (although only at the 0.1 level), indicating that EU member states that negotiate and are granted an increase in receipts from the EU budget are more likely to participate in EU peacekeeping. While this finding is correlational and not causal, it nevertheless lends support to the expectation that countries can be offered side payments from the EU annual budget. Additionally, the independent variable Council opposition is positive and significant at the 5% level throughout all models. Countries that oppose a greater percentage of legislative acts in the Council of the EU appear to participate in more peace operations, a finding that is contrary to the expectation that policy alignment and affinity, as opposed to opposition, incentivise countries to engage in peace operations. A detailed discussion of this contradictory result is provided below.

appropriate than the Poisson model.

[92]Peacekeeping contributions can be thought of as a two-stage decision: a country must first decide whether to participate in an operation or not, and thereafter decide on the number of troops to contribute in case of participation (see Lebovic, 'Uniting for Peace?'). By excluding zero contributions, only the latter decision is examined.

[93]The Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data confirms the presence of serial correlation.

Table 4.2: Regression Results for Participation in and Troop Contributions to EU Peace Operations

	Participation: Fixed Effects Logit Models		Troops: Fixed Effects Negative Binomial Models	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Interrelational Variables				
Change EU Budget Receipts	0.043*	0.035*	0.008	0.006
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.006)	(0.007)
IGO Centrality	-0.252	-0.348	0.067	0.152***
	(0.230)	(0.225)	(0.042)	(0.044)
Policy Centrality	-0.030	0.017	-0.001	-0.020
	(0.278)	(0.252)	(0.043)	(0.040)
Policy Centrality (Squared)	0.001	-0.029	-0.014	-0.002
	(0.177)	(0.163)	(0.029)	(0.028)
Council Opposition	0.302**	0.268**	0.065**	0.081***
	(0.126)	(0.121)	(0.029)	(0.030)
Trade Dependence (t-1)	-0.054	-0.154	0.064***	-0.004
	(0.114)	(0.126)	(0.021)	(0.029)
FDI Dependence (t-1)	-0.005	-0.005	-0.001	-0.002
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Arms Dependence (t-1)	0.002	0.003	0.001	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Other Private Benefits & Constraints				
Distance (in h km)	-0.025	-0.027	0.025***	0.007
	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.007)	(0.009)
Colonial Link	3.120	3.274	0.744*	0.899**
	(2.091)	(2.292)	(0.410)	(0.361)
Trade with Host Country	8.841	7.900	1.146***	1.234***
	(9.079)	(9.515)	(0.262)	(0.245)
# PKOs	0.839***	1.089***	0.118***	0.093*
	(0.248)	(0.350)	(0.039)	(0.047)
Armed Forces (in t)	0.090**	0.118***	0.006**	0.004*
	(0.036)	(0.042)	(0.002)	(0.002)
GDP pc (in 2003 Euro)	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Mission Size	0.001***	0.001	0.000***	0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	26.126	30.002	-10.784**	-12.384***
	(23.002)	(19.172)	(4.616)	(4.436)
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	NO	YES	NO	YES
No. Groups	178	178	181	181
No. Observations	544	544	549	549

*(Cluster-robust) standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.*

Models 3 and 4 report the results of the regressions on troop contributions to EU peace operations. In Model 3, which includes country FE, trade dependence has a positive and significant (at the 1% level) association with troop contributions. On average, EU member states send 66.8% of their total exports to other EU countries, with a minimum of 38.27% for Cyprus in 2017 and a maximum of 90.30% for Luxembourg in 2004.[94] Increasing trade dependence from its observed minimum to maximum value increases the expected number of troops contributed by 3.3 on average, holding all other variables at their observed values. Considering that the mean of troop contributions is 40 and the median 2, this is a small but not insignificant effect. In Model 4, which adds year FE, a positive and significant relationship (at the 1% level) is displayed between IGO centrality and troop contributions. On average, a standard deviation change in IGO centrality (i.e. 9.63 percentage points) increases a country's troop contributions per mission-year by 1.4 troops. Note that the inclusion of the IGO centrality variable in the models reduces the number of observations retained in the analysis, as data for joint IGO memberships is only available until 2014. For robustness, the variable was omitted from analysis, extending the number of observations to around 850, with no substantive changes to the results (see Table 4.6 in the appendix).

In line with the results of the participation models, Models 3 and 4 show the unexpected positive relationship between Council opposition and troop contributions. Several possible reasons for obtaining this unanticipated sign can be conceived. First, concerns arise from the impact of the 2004 and 2007 enlargement on the functioning of the Council. Finding a common position in a larger and more heterogenous Council changed the rules of the game: the atmosphere of the work process changed from a familiar tone to more formal procedures and negotiations; 'an increasing emphasis on the need for compromise and negotiation' was perceived; and the new member states needed time to adapt to the work in the Council.[95] The volume of legislation dropped

[94]Other countries with a high trade dependence are Slovakia, Czechia, and Hungary, and further countries with a low dependence are Malta, the UK, and Greece.

[95]Sara Hagemann and Julia De Clerck-Sachsse, 'Old Rules, New Game: Decision-Making in the

during the enlargement and the average share of opposition votes was only 1.25% from 2004–2009, compared to 2.57% in other years. Accession states still record a lower share of opposition votes than old member states, with 1.45% compared to 2.44%, on average. Further, different voting rules apply in different policy areas with unanimity applied in matters which member states consider sensitive (including foreign and security policy), and other decisions made by a weighted qualified majority system, which was superseded by a double-majority system in 2014 – all of which impedes comparison over policy areas and time. The assumption of the time-varying nature of Council votes and differences between EU-15 and accession states are confirmed in robustness tests performed below. Finally, the positive coefficient estimate can also be an indication that the variable does not capture policy alignment and affinity as intended. Given the strong consensus culture of the Council – in fact, EU member states vote on average 97.89% of the time in favour of a legislative act – voting results might not be the best measure for policy differences between member states. Instead, more informal operations, including 'corridor bargaining', dynamics within working groups, or formal statements to register opposition might be more suitable.[96]

Models 1–4 in Table 4.2 also report coefficient estimates for the control variables. Similar to the main independent variables, fewer of the control variables have a significant effect on peacekeeping participation compared to troop contributions. The number of peace operations a country is involved in has a positive and significant effect. This is contrary to the expectation that countries face resource constraints and have fewer resources available to join a new mission when the number of concurrent missions increases.[97] Instead, the variable could indicate a country's propensity to participate in peace operations. The number of armed forces is positive and significant, implying that larger militaries with fewer troop constraints participate more often and contribute more troops to peacekeeping. GDP per capita, on the other

Council of Ministers after the 2004 Enlargement', *CEPS Special Reports* (Mar. 2007), `https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/old-rules-new-game-decision-making-council-ministers-after-2004-enlargement/`, accessed Aug. 3, 2019, pp. 12, 15, 14.

[96]Hagemann and De Clerck-Sachsse, 'Old Rules, New Game', pp. 9, 14.

[97]Bove and Elia, 'Supplying Peace', p. 705.

hand, is insignificant. In Models 3 and 4, colonial ties and trade with the host country additionally have positive and significant coefficients, as to be expected. Finally, Model 3 also shows that countries contribute more troops the further the distance to the peace operation, a finding that could be influenced by the high occurrence of EU out-of-area operations, oftentimes on the African continent, instead of regional missions where spillover and other proximity-related effects come into force.

4.6.1 Robustness Tests

Four sets of robustness tests were conducted. Models 5–12 in Table 4.3 report the results of the robustness models for the dependent variable troop contributions; results for the binary dependent variable participation are reported in the appendix (Table 4.7).[98] The first set of tests restricts the cases to EUFOR peace operations. EU force and EU military training/advisory missions differ in scale and scope (as could be observed in Table 4.1), warranting this model specification. Model 5 includes country fixed effects, and Model 6 country and year FE. The direction of the results is very similar to the main models, but more pronounced. Trade dependence is still positive and significant, as is IGO centrality, which now even shows a significant relationship in both model specifications. Model 5 additionally shows a positive and significant (although only at the 10% level) relationship between the change in receipts from the EU budget and troop contributions. Next, Models 7 and 8 exclude France from the analysis. As was discernible in Figure 4.1, France is the single biggest contributor to EU peace operations; it is further frequently argued that France uses EU mission to legitimise its engagement in former colonies on the African continent; and France often spearheads efforts to launch and staff EU peace operations. As the results show, omitting France form the analysis does not change the results, ensuring that the findings are not driven by this special case.

[98]The results for participation are not discussed in the following as similar trends can be observed for both specifications of the dependent variable.

Table 4.3: Regression Results for Troop Contributions to EU Peace Operations (Robustness Tests 1)

	Troops: Fixed Effects Negative Binomial Models							
	EUFOR Only		Excl. France		EU-15		Accession States	
	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Interrelational Variables								
Change EU Budget Receipts	0.014*	0.014	0.011	0.009	0.007	0.009	0.010*	0.006
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.007)
IGO Centrality	0.085*	0.188***	0.055	0.115**	0.354***	0.367***	-0.126**	-0.155
	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.042)	(0.046)	(0.101)	(0.107)	(0.052)	(0.113)
Policy Centrality	-0.020	-0.024	0.056	0.046	0.001	-0.024	-0.768	-0.707
	(0.050)	(0.043)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.052)	(0.046)	(0.675)	(0.715)
Policy Centrality (Squared)	-0.004	-0.003	-0.051*	-0.044	-0.017	-0.001	0.366	0.333
	(0.035)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.036)	(0.032)	(0.361)	(0.384)
Council Opposition	0.086**	0.123***	0.061**	0.073**	0.078**	0.095***	0.033	-0.019
	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.044)	(0.077)
Trade Dependence (t-1)	0.069***	0.020	0.057***	0.028	0.060**	0.028	0.100***	0.063
	(0.023)	(0.031)	(0.021)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.041)	(0.033)	(0.039)
FDI Dependence (t-1)	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.004	-0.003	0.014	0.014
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Arms Dependence (t-1)	0.002	-0.000	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.004*	0.004*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Other Private Benefits & Constraints	Results not reported							
Constant	-13.961***	-15.768***	-11.607**	-15.020***	-36.792***	-32.628***	42.190	37.414
	(5.095)	(4.739)	(4.581)	(4.596)	(10.081)	(10.259)	(31.458)	(35.602)
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
No. Groups	126	126	173	173	117	117	64	64
No. Observations	384	384	526	526	337	337	212	212

*Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.*

Finally, the EU-15 and accession states are analysed separately to acknowledge their different contribution patterns identified in Figure 4.1. While the results are robust for the EU-15 member states, again highlighting the role of IGO centrality and trade dependence, they differ for the case of the accession countries. Model 11, which analyses the accession states and includes country FE, confirms the positive association between trade dependence and troop contributions. It further shows positive and significant (although only at the 10% level) coefficient results for the change in EU budget receipts and the dependence on arms imports from the EU. When adding fixed effects (Model 12), only arms dependence stays significant at the 0.1 level. Council opposition is insignificant in the regression models analysing the accession states. This supports the assumption that EU Council voting behaviour differs for old and new member states, with new members needing time to adapt to the institution and voicing fewer opposition votes. Additionally, IGO centrality turns negative for accession states. Two reasons can be conceived for the reduced explanatory power of the interrelational variables for the case of accession states. First, more recent EU members demonstrate lower levels of participation in and contribution to EU peace operations, which suggests generally lower motivation for peacekeeping. And second, Central and Eastern European countries are in a continuing process of building social capital, including trust, familiarity, and information flows, after the independence from Soviet dominance and rule, especially in the first years after the accession to the EU.

Additionally to the four sets of robustness tests, GLS regressions with an AR(1) disturbance are run of the natural log of troop contributions to account for serial autocorrelation (Table 4.4). Model 13 is the full model and Models 14–17 replicate the robustness tests of Table 4.3. All models include country fixed effects. The results are very consistent between models, with the exception of Model 17 which only analyses EU accession states.

Table 4.4: Regression Results for Troop Contributions to EU Peace Operations (Robustness Tests 2)

	Log(Troops): GLS Fixed Effects Models with AR(1) Disturbance				
	Full Model	EUFOR Only	Excl. France	EU-15	Accession States
	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)
Interrelational Variables					
Change EU Budget Receipts	-0.001	-0.001	0.000	-0.005	0.006
	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.010)
IGO Centrality	0.184***	0.171**	0.171***	0.545***	-0.046
	(0.057)	(0.068)	(0.057)	(0.131)	(0.073)
Policy Centrality	-0.028	-0.040	0.038	-0.020	0.138
	(0.048)	(0.064)	(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.672)
Policy Centrality (Squared)	-0.001	0.003	-0.041	-0.007	-0.098
	(0.034)	(0.045)	(0.036)	(0.040)	(0.362)
Council Opposition	0.012	-0.009	0.002	0.042	0.026
	(0.034)	(0.045)	(0.034)	(0.040)	(0.070)
Trade Dependence (t-1)	0.056**	0.079**	0.040	0.093***	0.028
	(0.026)	(0.033)	(0.026)	(0.032)	(0.050)
FDI Dependence (t-1)	-0.000	0.001	-0.001	0.000	-0.002
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.010)
Arms Dependence (t-1)	0.005***	0.006**	0.005***	0.009***	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Other Private Benefits & Constraints					
Distance (in h km)	-0.005	-0.004	-0.009	0.003	-0.013
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.012)
Colonial Link	1.332***	2.072***	1.373***	0.979**	2.333**
	(0.448)	(0.639)	(0.496)	(0.492)	(1.099)
Trade with Host Country	0.787**	0.812*	0.703*	4.245*	0.679*
	(0.394)	(0.452)	(0.378)	(2.363)	(0.362)
# PKOs	0.089*	0.072	0.089*	0.088	0.129
	(0.047)	(0.060)	(0.049)	(0.057)	(0.102)
Armed Forces (in t)	0.007**	0.008*	0.008*	0.005	0.004
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.020)
GDP pc (in 2003 Euro)	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Mission Size	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-18.873***	-18.666**	-19.785***	-52.497***	-0.019
	(6.051)	(7.434)	(6.089)	(12.577)	(32.015)
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
R-Squared (within)	0.503	0.541	0.468	0.584	0.422
R-Squared (between)	0.527	0.545	0.472	0.526	0.635
R-Squared (overall)	0.538	0.564	0.570	0.562	0.662
No. Groups	129	92	121	98	31
Observations	376	280	354	262	114

*Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.*

IGO centrality and trade dependence are positively and significantly associated with troop contributions.[99] Additionally, arms dependence has a positive and significant (mostly at the 1% level) relationship with troop contributions. For every one percentage point increase in IGO centrality, troop contributions increase by 20.2%; every one percentage point increase in trade dependence is associated with an increase of troop contributions by 5.8%; and for every percentage point increase in arms dependence, a 0.5% increase in troop contributions is expected (calculations are based on Model 13). Further, Council opposition does not have a significant effect on EU member states' troop contributions in any of the models with first-order autoregressive correction, which underlines the assumption that voting behaviour in the Council varies over time due to the impact of the enlargement and changing voting rules, inter alia. Finally, Model 17 shows that none of the interrelational variables are significant in the regression focussing on the accession states, which again accentuates the difference in contribution levels and motivations for old and new EU member states.

Two interrelational variables have not been found to have a significant relationship with participation in and troop contributions to EU peace operations in any of the models presented above: FDI dependence and policy centrality. FDI dependence measures EU member states' inward foreign direct investments from all other EU countries as a share of their GDP. One reason for the lack of a significant effect can be an underlying problem of data quality of FDI statistics, as discrepancies exist between countries' data sources, collection methods, and dissemination.[100] Another reason can be the influence of outliers. A partial regression plot (Figure 4.7 in the appendix) shows that Luxembourg can be identified as an extreme outlier. When excluding Luxembourg from the analysis, the variable FDI dependence has a positive and significant (with a p-value of 0.089 and 0.056, respectively) coefficient in fixed

[99] Trade dependence is also significant (with a p-value of 0.053) for the model excluding France when a random effects estimation is performed.

[100] United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, *UNCTAD Training Manual on Statistics for FDI and the Operation of TNCs, Volume III, Collecting and Reporting FDI/TNC Statistics: Institutional Issues*, New York and Geneva: United Nations, 2009, `https://unctad.org/en/Docs/diaeia20094_en.pdf`, accessed May 11, 2019, p. 3.

effects logit regression models of participation in EU peace operations (see Table 4.8 in the appendix).

Policy centrality is deployed as a measure of EU member state's homophily and operationalised as countries' eigenvector centralities in the network of (UN) foreign policy similarity. Ward and Dorussen, who first use the measure, demonstrate by means of a network game that the proportion of contributions to UN peace missions increases with a country's centrality in the network of foreign policy similarity.[101] For this reason, the non-results of the policy similarity variably are actually in line with previous research. When following Ward and Dorussen's research design and regressing on the proportion of troops contributed by an EU member state to a mission-year, both policy centrality variables are significant (at the 5% and 1% level), suggesting a non-linear relation and confirming that the proportion of troops contributed increases with policy centrality (as reported in Table 4.9 in the appendix).[102]

4.7 Conclusion

The international community increasingly relies on regional organisations as providers of peacekeeping, and the European Union is one of the main regional actors involved. At the same time, force generation has been identified as the 'Achilles heel of the credibility of [EU operations] as a vehicle for military crisis-management'.[103] The purpose of this article was two-fold. First, it provided one of the first quantitative studies on regional peacekeeping, using the case of EU peace operations. Second, it examined in particular interrelational properties of potential TCCs as explanatory factors for troop contributions, adding a new dimension to the literature on the supply-side to peacekeeping. Interrelation properties include the position of a country within a network of states, the relative distribution of power and dependence, institutional ties,

[101] Ward and Dorussen, 'Standing Alongside Your Friends'.

[102] All other interrelational variables lose statistical significance when performing a GLS random effects regression with an AR(1) disturbance on the proportion of troops. Taking the proportion of troops disregards different orders of magnitude in mission size and consequently troop contributions, which in turn masks variation in the dependent variable.

[103] Mattelaer, 'The Strategic Planning of EU Military Operations', p. 32.

and alignment of policy. It was argued that these characteristics are highly relevant to overcome problems of force generation and burden-sharing by generating additional private benefits for countries to participate in EU peace operations. Benefits can include side payments, status enhancement, log rolling, or future influence. Interrelational ties can further facilitate cooperation by enhancing the flow of information, trust, reciprocity, and shared norms and goals. A comprehensive overview presented seven causal mechanism through which interrelational properties can influence peacekeeping participation and troop contributions, namely issue linkage, side payments, social capital, information channels, homophily, and dependence.

An original dataset of troop contributions to EU peace operations and variables measuring interrelational properties of EU member states was compiled for this study. The data was deployed in multiple panel regression models with the aim to test the relationship between EU member states' level of interrelationship and their participation in and contribution to EU peace operations. Particularly trade dependence, operationalised as countries' exports to other EU states as a share of their total exports, and states' centrality within the network of intergovernmental organisations, which represents the strength of their direct and indirect relations with other states, emerged as relevant interrelational factors. The relevance of trade dependence is not surprising in the context of the European Union. The EU, in line with its predecessors, is at its core a peace project realised by means of economic interdependence and cooperation, and free trade among member states is one of its founding principles.[104] The finding of a positive and robust relationship between IGO centrality and troop contributions, in turn, is in line with existing literature on the effect of IGO co-memberships or countries' centrality in the IGO network on environmental sustainability, the probability of war, and US military coalitions, and highlights the significance of information exchange, mutual trust and reciprocity, familiarity, and shared norms.[105] Yet also financial compensations or side payments in the form of

[104] Alan S. Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945–51* (London: Methuen, 1984).

[105] Ward, 'International Linkages and Environmental Sustainability'; Russett and Oneal, *Triangulating Peace*; Dorussen and Ward, 'Intergovernmental Organizations and the Kantian Peace'; Henke,

receipts from the annual EU budget, as well as dependence on the import of major conventional weapons from other EU countries are relevant interrelational factors. Interestingly, the analysis also showed that the explanatory power of interrelational variables and benefits is more pronounced when studying the number of troops contributed to a peace operation as opposed to whether a member state participated in a mission or not. On top of that, a clear division emerged between EU-15 member states and new accession states, with EU-15 countries contributing more troops and demonstrating higher susceptibility to interrelational dynamics. A possible explanation is the ongoing integration and socialisation of the accession states.

Overall, this study confirms that the greater the degree of interrelationship between an EU member state and other EU countries, the higher its troop contributions to EU peace operations. While this analysis is correlational in nature and does not claim causality, its systematic cross-sectional, longitudinal design offers a more comparative and generalisable approach to existing anecdotes on the role of dependence, pressure, and institutional ties in EU force generation. In order to confirm the causal mechanisms presented in this study, future research could monitor and track force generation processes of EU peace operations. For this purpose, several limitations would have to be overcome, including prolonged access to private meetings and correspondence. EU force generation negotiations are iterative, occur at multiple locations and over an extended period of time, involve in person, by telephone, and written exchanges, include actors at different levels within the EU and national governments, and are hard to predict.[106] Another worthwhile path for future research could be the extension of the research on interrelational factors to other regional organisations providing peacekeeping, as well as the UN. The African Union, the second major regional organisation active in peacekeeping, similarly faces difficulties in supplying the funds, forces, and force enablers for its missions. And case studies from the United Nations also attribute a role to positional and status goods. India, for instance, hopes

'The Politics of Diplomacy'.

[106]Mérand and Rayroux, 'The Practice of Burden Sharing in European Crisis Management Operations', p. 446.

to strengthen its international status and power within the UN and eventually obtain a permanent seat in the UN Security Council by contributing to peacekeeping.[107] A better understanding of interrelational dynamics in any organisation providing peace operations is not only a useful addition to scientific knowledge about the supply-side to peacekeeping, but can also constitute a point of leverage or incentive for practitioners to mitigate issues of undersupply and collective action problems in peacekeeping.

[107]Krishnasamy, 'The Paradox of India's Peacekeeping'; Bullion, 'India and UN Peacekeeping Operations'.

4.8 Appendix




Figure 4.2: Density Plot of Troop Contributions, per Country-Mission-Year




Figure 4.3: Density Plot of Troop Contributions with Log Scale, per Country-Mission-Year



Figure 4.4: EU Member States' Ranking of Eigenvector Centrality in the IGO Network, 2003–2014




Figure 4.5: EU Member States' Ranking of Eigenvector Centrality in the Network of Foreign Policy Similarity, 2003–2018




Figure 4.6: EU Member States' Troop Contributions to EU Peace Operations per Mission-Year by Policy Centrality




Figure 4.7: Partial Regression Plot for FDI Dependence

Table 4.5: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	**Mean**	**SD**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**N**
Dependent Variables					
Participation	0.582	0.493	0	1	1'046
Troop Contributions	39.713	139.232	0	1'711	1'046
Interrelational Variables					
Change EU Budget Receipts	0.531	7.557	-33.167	33.193	934
IGO Centrality	86.813	9.626	64.721	100	598
Policy Centrality	91.219	14.057	31.118	100	1'046
Council Opposition	2.255	2.805	0	16.279	1'046
Trade Dependence (t-1)	66.959	11.144	38.275	90.304	1'046
FDI Dependence (t-1)	9.051	44.235	-101.877	474.987	1'024
Arms Dependence (t-1)	50.323	39.265	0	100	1'046
Other Private Benefits & Constraints					
Distance (in h km)	37.539	21.576	2.99	73.75	1'046
Colonial Link	0.058	0.234	0	1	1'046
Trade with Host Country	0.142	0.886	0	12.313	988
# PKOs	6.196	3.579	0	16	1'046
Armed Forces (in t)	59.691	70.992	0.900	352.771	1'046
GDP pc (in 2003 Euro)	29'372.65	18'484.33	5'616.456	97'106.24	1'046
Mission Size	1'265.048	1'990.857	68	11'443	1'046

Table 4.6: Regression Results for Participation in and Troop Contributions to EU Peace Operations (Excluding IGO Centrality)

	Participation: Fixed Effects Logit Models		Troops: Fixed Effects Negative Binomial Models	
	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)
Interrelational Variables				
Change EU Budget Receipts	-0.004	-0.003	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.004)	(0.005)
IGO Centrality		omitted		
Policy Centrality	-0.122	-0.084	-0.037	-0.026
	(0.216)	(0.189)	(0.034)	(0.033)
Policy Centrality (Squared)	0.053	0.028	0.010	0.006
	(0.135)	(0.119)	(0.022)	(0.023)
Council Opposition	0.201**	0.212**	0.051**	0.062***
	(0.097)	(0.092)	(0.020)	(0.022)
Trade Dependence (t-1)	0.055	-0.022	0.046***	0.037*
	(0.101)	(0.093)	(0.016)	(0.020)
FDI Dependence (t-1)	-0.001	-0.002	-0.000	0.000
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Arms Dependence (t-1)	-0.001	-0.001	0.002	-0.000
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Other Private Benefits & Constraints				
Distance (in h km)	-0.034	-0.033	0.033***	0.039***
	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Colonial Link	7.090***	7.148***	0.552*	0.274
	(2.248)	(2.303)	(0.302)	(0.313)
Trade with Host Country	4.948	5.165	0.849***	1.006***
	(7.242)	(8.047)	(0.241)	(0.253)
# PKOs	0.662***	0.871***	0.053*	0.087**
	(0.185)	(0.253)	(0.029)	(0.034)
Armed Forces (in t)	0.073***	0.067***	0.010***	0.007***
	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.002)	(0.002)
GDP pc (in 2003 Euro)	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000**	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Mission Size	0.001**	0.001*	0.000***	0.000***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	12.221	11.683	-0.319	-1.498
	(11.319)	(10.807)	(2.027)	(2.437)
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	NO	YES	NO	YES
No. Groups	227	227	232	232
No. Observations	849	849	866	866

*(Cluster-robust) standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.*

Table 4.7: Regression Results for Participation in EU Peace Operations (Robustness Tests)

	Troops: Fixed Effects Negative Binomial Models							
	EUFOR Only		Excl. France		EU-15		Accession States	
	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)	(29)
Interrelational Variables								
Change EU Budget Receipts	0.079***	0.078**	0.050**	0.040*	0.062*	0.030	0.028	0.030
	(0.030)	(0.036)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.041)
IGO Centrality	-0.194	-0.104	-0.265	-0.344	-0.169	-0.215	-0.243	-0.736*
	(0.197)	(0.221)	(0.243)	(0.233)	(0.411)	(0.561)	(0.324)	(0.447)
Policy Centrality	0.290	0.211	-0.045	-0.009	0.035	0.007	-5.166	-2.132
	(0.242)	(0.197)	(0.298)	(0.265)	(0.280)	(0.274)	(3.550)	(2.025)
Policy Centrality (Squared)	-0.158	-0.111	0.006	-0.017	-0.037	-0.010	2.841	1.106
	(0.161)	(0.134)	(0.198	(0.170)	(0.177)	(0.176)	(1.919)	(1.110)
Council Opposition	0.393**	0.404*	0.324**	0.289**	0.304**	0.306**	0.400	0.470
	(0.181)	(0.215)	(0.132)	(0.124)	(0.134)	(0.135)	(0.344)	(0.334)
Trade Dependence (t-1)	-0.019	-0.190*	-0.057	-0.145	-0.166**	-0.377**	0.023	0.072
	(0.092)	(0.113)	(0.120)	(0.130)	(0.084)	(0.181)	(0.230)	(0.177)
FDI Dependence (t-1)	-0.019**	-0.020**	-0.005	-0.006	-0.016***	-0.019***	0.032	0.028**
	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.022)	(0.012)
Arms Dependence (t-1)	0.006*	0.007**	0.002	0.003	-0.008	-0.004	0.014**	0.017***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Other Private Benefits& Constraints	Results not reported							
Constant	-1.118	-0.741	28.820	31.638	21.127	29.598	252.609	137.680*
	(20.396)	(18.430)	(24.363)	(19.879)	(38.504)	(50.023)	(156.638)	(73.922)
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
No. Groups	103	103	170	170	109	109	61	61
No. Observations	321	321	521	521	311	297	207	207

*Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.*

Table 4.8: Regression Results for Participation in EU Peace Operations (Excluding Luxembourg)

	Participation: Fixed Effects Logit Models, Excl. Luxembourg	
	(30)	(31)
Interrelational Variables		
Change EU Budget Receipts	0.041*	0.033*
	(0.023)	(0.019)
IGO Centrality	-0.234	-0.334
	(0.234)	(0.233)
Policy Centrality	-0.026	0.012
	(0.277)	(0.254)
Policy Centrality (Squared)	-0.001	-0.026
	(0.177)	(0.164)
Council Opposition	0.299**	0.269**
	(0.127)	(0.124)
Trade Dependence (t-1)	-0.054	-0.154
	(0.119)	(0.133)
FDI Dependence (t-1)	0.017*	0.019*
	(0.010)	(0.010)
Arms Dependence (t-1)	0.001	0.004
	(0.004)	(0.004)
Other Private Benefits & Constraints		
Distance (in h km)	-0.017	-0.017
	(0.024)	(0.026)
Colonial Link	2.957	3.046
	(2.086)	(2.297)
Trade with Host Country	10.227	9.522
	(9.376)	(9.649)
# PKOs	0.803***	1.082***
	(0.247)	(0.357)
Armed Forces (in t)	0.089**	0.117***
	(0.038)	(0.044)
GDP pc (in 2003 Euro)	-0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Mission Size	0.001***	0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	24.361	30.465
	(23.132)	(19.743)
Country FE	YES	YES
Year FE	NO	NO
No. Groups	170	170
No. Observations	522	522
*Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.*		

Table 4.9: Regression Results for Proportionate Troop Contributions to EU Peace Operations

	Prop_Troops: GLS Random Effects Model with AR(1) Disturbance
	(32)
Interrelational Variables	
Change EU Budget Receipts	0.000
	(0.000)
IGO Centrality	0.001
	(0.001)
Policy Centrality	0.004**
	(0.002)
Policy Centrality (Squared)	-0.003***
	(0.001)
Council Opposition	-0.001
	(0.001)
Trade Dependence (t-1)	0.001
	(0.000)
FDI Dependence (t-1)	0.000
	(0.000)
Arms Dependence (t-1)	0.000
	(0.000)
Other Private Benefits & Constraints	
Distance (in h km)	0.000
	(0.000)
Colonial Link	0.098***
	(0.023)
Trade with Host Country	0.002
	(0.006)
# PKOs	0.001
	(0.001)
Armed Forces (in t)	0.000***
	(0.000)
GDP pc (in 2003 Euro)	-0.000
	(0.000)
Mission Size	-0.000
	(0.000)
Constant	-0.238**
	(0.094)
Country FE	NO
Year FE	NO
R-Squared (within)	0.030
(between)	0.388
(overall)	0.319
No. Groups	181
No. Observations	549
*Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.*	

Chapter 5

Public Attention, Elections, and Peace Operations: Democratising the Making of Peacekeeping Policy

5.1 Introduction

'Domestic politics and international relations are often somehow entangled', as Putnam establishes in his seminal article on the logic of two-level games.[1] He goes on to ask 'When?' and 'How?' domestic politics determine foreign policy (and vice versa). This article aims to answer these questions in the context of peacekeeping policy. Do policy makers consider the (voting) public when deciding how many troops to deploy to a peace operation? Anecdotal evidence suggests that governments consider public opinion on potential peacekeeping deployments and that the topic of peacekeeping features in some election campaigns. Japan's Cabinet Office, for instance, has been polling public attitudes towards Japan's participation in United Nations (UN) peace operations yearly since 1994 with the objective to use this data for future policy decisions.[2] In the 2015 Canadian federal election, the Liberal party under Justin Trudeau

[1] Putnam, 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics', p. 427.

[2] Public Relations Office, Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 'Overview of the Public Opinion Survey on Diplomacy' (Dec. 2017), `https://www.gov-online.go.jp/eng/pdf/summaryg17.pdf`,

promised to revive Canada's peacekeeping tradition and deploy 600 troops and 150 police to a UN peace operation.[3] At the same time, anecdotes also suggest that large sections of the public can be unaware of potential or ongoing peace operations. A poll conducted by the Public Opinion Foundation, for example, found that merely half of Russians were aware of the idea of a UN peace operation in Donbas.[4] In short, this article argues that elected officials have an incentive to adjust troop deployment levels to peace operations before an election, but that this effect crucially depends on the level of attention the public pays to peacekeeping.

A substantial amount of research has been devoted to the relationship between the public and foreign policy. While early research was sceptical about the influence of the public on foreign affairs,[5] the majority of recent literature agrees that the public holds preferences about foreign policy issues, that foreign policy issues play a role in electoral campaigns, and that, as a result, elections may be accompanied by shifts in foreign and security policy.[6] The existing literature, however, almost exclusively focusses on warfare, neglecting other relevant areas of foreign policy. This article extends the research to the principal tool of foreign policy for the maintenance international peace and security: peace operations.[7]

Scholars studying the supply-side to peacekeeping – the question whether and how much countries contribute to peace operations – have similarly mostly ignored the role of the public in peacekeeping policy. The level of threat to global and regional

accessed May 7, 2019, p. 22.

[3]Geoffrey York, 'Canada Returns to Peacekeeping Tradition', *The Globe and Mail* (Aug. 27, 2016), `https://www.theglobeandmail.com`, accessed July 5, 2019; Peter MacKay, 'Peacekeeping Is Not Suited to Today's Conflicts', *Policy Options – Institute for Research on Public Policy* (Jan. 24, 2018), `https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/january-2018/peacekeeping-is-not-suited-to-todays-conflicts/`, accessed July 5, 2019.

[4]Interfax, 'Corridors of Power: Half of Russians Aware of Idea of Deploying UN Peacekeepers to Donbas – Poll', *Russia and CIS Military Daily* (Nov. 27, 2017), `https://en.interfax.com`, accessed July 5, 2019.

[5]Gabriel A. Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York, NY: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960); Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion* (New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1922).

[6]John H. Aldrich, John L. Sullivan, and Eugene Borgida, 'Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting: Do Presidential Candidates "Waltz before a Blind Audience?"', *American Political Science Review* 83/1 (1989), 123–41; Aldrich et al., 'Foreign Policy and the Electoral Connection'.

[7]Meiske and Ruggeri, 'Peacekeeping as a Tool of Foreign Policy'.

stability, large refugee flows, conflict proximity, or alliance politics – these and related international-level factors have been widely discussed and found relevant for a country's decision to engage in peace operations.[8] In regard to domestic-level considerations, particular attention has been paid to the effect of regime type on peacekeeping contributions. Andersson, Lebovic, and Perkins and Neymayer find that democracies contribute more troops to UN peace operations than non-democracies.[9] They explain this greater democratic involvement by a commitment to shared liberal principles, humanitarian objectives, the diffusion of liberal norms and institutions, and a preference for multilateral engagements. Duursma and Gledhill, comparing democratic and non-democratic contributions over different time periods, qualify these findings.[10] They confirm that the level of democracy is positively associated with peacekeeping contributions during the 1990s, but while democracies have remained more likely to make some contributions between 1999–2015, they have become less likely to make large-scale troop contributions, especially preceding elections. Their intuition behind this finding is that democratic leaders, relying on public support, are concerned that the public has become more sceptical of robust and risky peace operations with higher levels of casualties. Similarly, Marinov, Nomikos, and Robbins, examining allied troop contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan, find that when elections are proximate, democratic leaders underinvest in troop contributions, fearing the cost of casualties.[11] What is missing in these studies, though, is the micro-foundation of the causal mechanism linking the public, elections, and peacekeeping contributions. They also rest on two arguably questionable assumptions: that the public always has information on and pays attention to peace operations, and that democratic leaders do

[8]Bove and Elia, 'Supplying Peace'; Gaibulloev, Sandler, and Shimizu, 'Demands for UN and Non-UN Peacekeeping'; Uzonyi, 'Refugee Flows and State Contributions to Post-Cold War UN Peacekeeping Missions'; Ward and Dorussen, 'Standing Alongside Your Friends'.

[9]Andersson, 'Democracies and UN Peacekeeping Operations, 1990–1996'; Lebovic, 'Uniting for Peace?'; Perkins and Neumayer, 'Extra-Territorial Interventions in Conflict Spaces'.

[10]Duursma and Gledhill, 'Voted Out'.

[11]Nikolay Marinov, William G. Nomikos, and Josh Robbins, 'Does Electoral Proximity Affect Security Policy?', *The Journal of Politics* 77/3 (2015), 762–73.

not consider the opportunity costs of their policy actions.

This article argues that when elections are upcoming and elected officials face public scrutiny, anticipation of not being re-elected leads incumbents to adjust policy. Restricted by limited resources, however, office holders have no incentive to invest time and money when they anticipate little public attention to certain issues and consequently little accountability for their decisions. Following, the hypothesis is proposed that the effect of elections on troop contributions to peace operations depends on the level of public attention. When public attention is low, elected officials do not react to public preferences regarding peacekeeping deployment levels, but instead shift their limited resources away from peacekeeping and into an issue area that generates more attention. When public attention is high, on the other hand, policy-makers are expected to invest resources and align peacekeeping policy with public preferences. As public attention is particularly activated by grave humanitarian events and existing studies suggest that the public supports humanitarian peacekeeping engagement out of a sense of moral obligation, it is expected that more troops are deployed before elections when public attention is high. The hypotheses are tested on levels of troop contributions by 19 democratic countries to UN peace operations between 2004–2016; panel data fixed effects models are estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). The article uses internet search data, specifically Google Trends data, to measure public attention to peace operations in each country over time. It is ensured that the timing of the elections in the sample is exogenous from decisions regarding peacekeeping commitments. Further, exogenous events, specifically peacekeeping casualties and civilian deaths, are controlled for. The results indicate that when elections are considered individually, fewer troops are contributed to UN peace operations the closer elections come. A more nuanced picture, though, emerges when an interaction with public attention is added. The findings show a negative effect of upcoming elections on contribution levels when public attention is low, but a positive one when attention is high.

This article makes three major contributions. First, it fills the gaps in the lit-

erature outlined above: it extends the literature on the relationship between the public and foreign policy to the issue of peacekeeping policy; and it establishes the public as a relevant factor in questions regarding the supply-side to peacekeeping. Second, it makes a theoretical contribution by showing that the crux of the relationship between the public and foreign policy decisions, particularly in the realm of peacekeeping policy, is the level of attention the public devotes to an issue. Different effects on foreign/peacekeeping policy can be expected for cases of low versus cases of high public attention. Third, this article makes an empirical contribution by deploying internet search data, specifically Google Trends data, as a measure of public attention and the salience of peace operations. Google Trends data provides a fine-grained, dynamic measure of the public's attention to peace operations and thereby overcomes many of the weaknesses associated with traditional measures of public attention and issue salience. Internet search data has been used in health-care epidemiology and econometrics but is so far arguably underutilised in political science research. An extensive discussion of the advantages, representativeness, and proxy validity of the data, including an analysis of the criterion validity of Google Trends data against news coverage of peace operations in the United Kingdom (UK), France, and Germany by means of vector autoregressive models, is provided.

The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. First, building on existing literature, the relationship between the public, electoral accountability, and foreign policy is discussed, and four strategies incumbent officials pursue to increase their re-election chances are presented. In the second section, the significance of public attention is highlighted and expectations for cases of low public attention to peacekeeping and cases of high attention are formulated. Next, the research design, with particular focus on the representativeness and validity of Google Trends data, is introduced. The results are subsequently presented and discussed, including a discussion of casualty aversion as an alternative expectation. The article concludes by summarising the findings and proposing topics for future research.

5.2 The Public, Elections, and Peacekeeping Policy

A considerable amount of scholarship has been devoted to the relationship between the public, elections, and foreign policy. For the purpose of this article, the 'public' refers to all people in a country who have the right to participate in choosing the country's political leaders, which corresponds to most adult citizens in democracies.[12] Early research claimed that the public was uninterested in and incapable to form stable opinions on foreign policy issues,[13] but this view has been superseded by numerous studies showing that mass opinion on foreign policy issues is coherent and influential. Scholars found the public to be characterised by a strong and stable mood toward international affairs,[14] to respond rationally to external events and new information,[15] and to follow coherent heuristics for organising their political thinking.[16] They further established that public opinion has an impact on foreign policy-making. Aldrich and colleagues, in a 1989 research article based on survey data and a 2006 comprehensive review of 50 years of scholarly literature, establish that a) the public possesses information and coherent attitudes on foreign and security policy; b) the public uses these attitudes to make voting decisions when events and candidates make foreign policy issues salient and when parties provide voters with a choice; and c) this electoral connection induces policy makers to consider public opinion when making foreign policy decisions.[17]

Elections are the main mechanism available to the voting public to hold officials

[12]This definition is based on Bueno de Mesquita and colleagues' category of the 'selectorate'; see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., *The Logic of Political Survival* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005).

[13]Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy*; Lippmann, *Public Opinion*.

[14]William R. Caspary, 'The "Mood Theory": A Study of Public Opinion and Foreign Policy', *American Political Science Review* 64/2 (1970), 536–47, p. 546.

[15]Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, *The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans' Policy Preferences* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Robert Y. Shapiro and Benjamin I. Page, 'Foreign Policy and the Rational Public', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 32/2 (1988), 211–47.

[16]Eugene R. Wittkopf, *Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990).

[17]Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida, 'Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting'; Aldrich et al., 'Foreign Policy and the Electoral Connection'.

accountable for their (foreign) policy choices. Holding political office entails a number of benefits, including the salary, the power to change policy, and other perks of office, and the anticipation of not being re-elected at the next election leads incumbents to adjust policy to incorporate the public's preferences.[18] Research has shown that the responsiveness of policy makers to the public varies within the election cycle.[19] Gaubatz, Stoll, Fordham, or Smith, for instance, find that the use of force by democratic leaders is influenced by the timing within the electoral cycle and their re-election prospects.[20] Faced with accountability to the voting public on election day, re-election-seeking office holders become more responsive when elections are proximate. Here it is presumed that voters base their decision whether or not to retain an incumbent at least partially on the basis of her past policy decisions, so-called 'retrospective voting'. Retrospective voting based on economic performance has been widely acknowledged in academic studies. Fiorina finds that performance evaluations of matters of war and peace also relate to voting decisions.[21] Events that occur closer to election time are assigned greater weight, as they are considered to be better predictors of future performance, while events that happened early in the electoral cycle are discounted, creating a recency bias.[22]

Elected officials pursue a range of strategies in the realm of foreign and security policy to increase their re-election chances. Four broad categories, with particular

[18]Scott Ashworth, 'Electoral Accountability: Recent Theoretical and Empirical Work', *Annual Review of Political Science* 15 (2012), 183–201.

[19]Electoral cycle theories relate to political business cycle models, where office holders use macroeconomic policy to stimulate the economy prior to an election, thereby hoping to improve their re-election chances; see William D. Nordhaus, 'The Political Business Cycle', *The Review of Economic Studies* 42/2 (1975), 169–90.

[20]Kurt T. Gaubatz, 'Election Cycles and War', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35/2 (1991), 212–44; Richard J. Stoll, 'The Guns of November: Presidential Reelections and the Use of Force, 1947–1982', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28/2 (1984), 231–46; Benjamin Fordham, 'The Politics of Threat Perception and the Use of Force: A Political Economy Model of US Uses of Force, 1949–1994', *International Studies Quarterly* 42/3 (1998), 567–90; Alastair Smith, 'Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems', *International Studies Quarterly* 40/1 (1996), 133–53.

[21]Morris P. Fiorina, *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981).

[22]Kenneth A. Shepsle et al., 'The Senate Electoral Cycle and Bicameral Appropriations Politics', *American Journal of Political Science* 53/2 (2009), 343–59; Giacomo Chiozza, 'Presidents on the Cycle: Elections, Audience Costs, and Coercive Diplomacy', *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 34/1 (2017), 3–26.

emphasis on implications for peacekeeping policy, are identified. The first strategy is to evade electoral retribution in cases where the public has specific and pronounced foreign policy preferences. This strategy is the most straightforward representation of the aforementioned mechanisms of electoral accountability. Elected officials are sensitive to public opinion on salient foreign policy issues and make policy accordingly out of fear of losing office at the next election. Some of the most influential theories on foreign policy choices are premised on this electoral retribution mechanism. Bueno de Mesquita and colleagues' 'selectorate theory', for instance, argues that democratic officials' goal to stay in power affects their foreign policy decisions (i.e. regarding national defence), as they need to ensure the support of a winning coalition.[23]

The second strategy is signalling.[24] Incumbents try to signal their competence, including in matters of foreign and security policy, before an election. According to this strategy, office holders do not react to existing public preferences but instead want to reaffirm their competence. If no distinguishing information exists to separate the foreign policy resolve of the incumbent from that of the opposition, incumbents could initiate or engage in international disputes to signal their abilities. Hess and Orphanides even argue that leaders might initiate a war to show their war-handling ability, if their personal expected benefits from winning are large enough.[25] In fact, peacekeeping might be a particularly suitable area of engagement as it is a less costly method, compared to other military deployments, to show foreign policy resolve and an ability to negotiate in the international arena.

A third strategy is to act cost- and risk-aversely. Policy-makers – and the public – evaluate the potential benefits of a policy, including the probability of success, and weigh those against its financial and possibly human costs.[26] Casualties are a

[23]Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., 'An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace', *American Political Science Review* 93/4 (1999), 791–807; Bueno de Mesquita et al., *The Logic of Political Survival*.

[24]Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith, 'Domestic Explanations of International Relations', *Annual Review of Political Science* 15/1 (2012), 161–81, p. 171; Gregory Hess and Athanasios Orphanides, 'War Politics: An Economic, Rational Voter Framework', *American Economic Review* 85/4 (1995), 828–47.

[25]Hess and Orphanides, 'War Politics'.

[26]Eric V. Larson, *Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties in Domestic Sup-*

particularly relevant, albeit not sole, factor in this calculation. Ever since Mueller's seminal work on the negative relationship between public support for the Vietnam War and casualties,[27] policy-makers have been cautious to engage in risky military situations, such as the humanitarian crises in Rwanda and Sudan. Marinov, Nomikos, and Robbins add a time dimension to this argument in their study of allied troop contributions to missions in Afghanistan, arguing that when the costs of a policy are paid before an election but the benefits are only realised after an election, incumbent politicians refrain from said policy.[28] Peacekeeping produces relatively few observable outcomes in the short-term but negative costs, most importantly casualties, can be observed immediately. According to this strategy, policy-makers will choose to decrease contributions to peace operations prior to an election to minimise costs and risks.

The fourth strategy follows the diversionary war argument. The diversionary theory of war suggests that democratic leaders utilise war as a diversionary political tool to distract from domestic problems and instead rally the public 'round-the-flag' in support of their leaders.[29] The empirical evidence for the diversionary use of force is, however, mixed. Trying to reconcile previous diverging findings, Kisangani and Pickering find that democratic leaders prefer 'socioeconomic interventions', such as humanitarian relief or peaceful operations to safeguard minorities, when they attempt to clear the domestic policy agenda, as opposed to 'politico-strategic military interventions' launched over high politics issues such as territory, strategy, or power.[30] Following the diversion argument, politicians utilise the use of force, preferably low-cost peace operations, to shift the public agenda away from a domestic crisis and secure votes before an election. Table 5.1 summarises the four strategies.

port for U.S. Military Operations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996).

[27]John E. Mueller, *War, Presidents, and Public Opinion* (New York, NY: Wiley, 1973).

[28]Marinov, Nomikos, and Robbins, 'Does Electoral Proximity Affect Security Policy?'

[29]Hess and Orphanides, 'War Politics'; Mueller, *War, Presidents, and Public Opinion*.

[30]Emizet F. Kisangani and Jeffrey Pickering, 'Diverting with Benevolent Military Force: Reducing Risks and Rising above Strategic Behavior', *International Studies Quarterly* 51/2 (2007), 277–99.

Table 5.1: Foreign/Peacekeeping Policy Strategies Pursued by Incumbents Prior to Elections

Strategy a – **Electoral Retribution**	*Compliance with public opinion on salient issues*
Strategy b – **Signalling**	*Signalling of foreign policy competence*
Strategy c – **Cost Avoidance**	*Cost/risk limitation to avoid negative public opinion*
Strategy d – **Diversion**	*Diversion of attention from another policy area*

In sum, the existing literature expects a connection between the public, elections, and foreign and peacekeeping policy. Incumbents have incentives to adjust policy before elections and they pursue a range of different strategies to increase their re-election chances. This leads to the first hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1: Troop contributions to peace operations are adjusted before elections.

Previous research has made various – mostly implicit – assumptions with regard to the incumbent's opportunity and cost calculation to act upon her anticipation of voters' preferences and with regard to the issue salience voters ascribe to peace operations. Governments and individual elected officials face resource constraints when making policy decisions, particularly regarding time and space on the agenda, political goodwill, and budgetary limitations. Research on so-called 'guns-versus-butter' models highlights the trade-off between military and social spending within a set total budget (or production-possibility frontier). Increased spending on military deployments, including peacekeeping, comes at the expense of the civilian sector of the economy and social systems.[31] Studies have also found a shift in the composition of government spending at election times, often with a bias towards spending on the civilian and social sector over 'guns'.[32] Faced with resource constraints, it is improbable to expect office holders to base their resource allocation or policy decisions

[31]Bruce Russett, 'Defense Expenditures and National Well-Being', *American Political Science Review* 76/4 (1982), 767–77; Alex Mintz, 'Guns versus Butter: A Disaggregated Analysis', *American Political Science Review* 83/4 (1989), 1285–93.

[32]Vincenzo Bove, Georgios Efthyvoulou, and Antonio Navas, 'Political Cycles in Public Expenditure: Butter vs Guns', *Journal of Comparative Economics* 45/3 (2017), 582–604.

on public opinion when they anticipate little public attention to certain issues and consequently little accountability for their decisions. This is particularly relevant for the topic of peacekeeping. Compared to warfare, which is the subject of the majority of the literature on the public-foreign policy link, peacekeeping is expected to generate lower levels of attention from the public, media, and consequently policy makers, as it presents a lower-stakes environment for the troop contributing country and involves fewer risks and costs, including casualties. The poll conducted by the Public Opinion Foundation cited above showed that only half of Russians were aware of a potential UN peace operation right at their doorstep in Donbas.[33] Similarly, in the 2017 wave of the Latinobarómetro, 23% of Uruguayans indicated that they do not know the United Nations, despite Uruguay contributing around 1'000 troops to UN peace operations, mostly to the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).[34] Public knowledge and attention is an essential but often overlooked variable when trying to understand the relationship between the voting public and their elected officials.

5.3 Public Attention and Peacekeeping Policy

Access to information, exposure to international affairs, and attention to specific foreign policy issues are prerequisites for the electoral accountability outlined above. If a peace operation is not on the public agenda due to a lack of information and attention given to it, office holders will not have an incentive to adjust troop deployments according to the public's preferences prior to an election. The relevant measure in this context is public attention. Public attention, following Newig's definition, denotes the resources that people dedicate towards an issue.[35] As such, public attention can be understood and measured as an intensity – as resource deployment, time or other,

[33]Interfax, 'Corridors of Power'.

[34]Latinobarómetro Corporation, 'Latinobarómetro 2017', `http://www.latinobarometro.org/lat.jsp`, accessed Feb. 3, 2019.

[35]Jens Newig, 'Public Attention, Political Action: The Example of Environmental Regulation', *Rationality and Society* 16/2 (2004), 149–90, pp. 153–4.

per unit of analysis. Different subjects and issues are competing for it, making public attention a scarce resource. Note that public attention, although related, is not the same as public opinion. In contrast to public attention, public opinion refers to the collective preferences and/or value judgments of the public. Public opinion is 'what people think', whereas public attention is 'what people think about'. For instance, the public might have a strong opinion about the deployment of troops to the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), but after having formed this opinion, they do not need to spend any more time thinking about the issue and might shift their attention to other policy questions. While public opinion, reflecting deeply seeded values and belief systems, is generally found to be relatively stable in the absence of radical changes in the international environment,[36] public attention can be more volatile, mapping the ups and downs of the public agenda without changing underlying value systems or belief structures. Policy makers are therefore particularly attentive to changes in public attention when re-evaluating peacekeeping policy and contribution levels to peace operations.[37]

Public attention can be activated in a number of ways, including grave international events, like humanitarian disasters, attacks against civilians, suffering refugees, or the killing of peacekeepers, and through debates among foreign policy elites. Foreign policy elites include governments, members of parliament, organised interest groups, commentators and experts in the media, academia, and other research institutions.[38] These events and debates among elites are traditionally transferred through the media. Media coverage provides the information people use when holding elected officials accountable and raises public attention levels. As Cohen said, 'the press may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think *about*'.[39] Past research has confirmed

[36]Page and Shapiro, *The Rational Public*.

[37]Bryan D. Jones, *Reconceiving Decision-Making in Democratic Politics: Attention, Choice, and Public Policy* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

[38]Philip J. Powlick and Andrew Z. Katz, 'Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus', *Mershon International Studies Review* 42 (1998), 29–61, p. 34.

[39]Bernard C. Cohen, *The Press and Foreign Policy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 13, emphasis in original.

that voters living in areas with a higher press coverage, i.e. through newspapers or radio, have more knowledge of and pay more attention to politics, and that policy-makers pander more to their constituents.[40] At the same time, public demand (or the lack thereof) of specific news topics guides media attention, creating a feedback loop between the two. When the public loses interest in a topic and stops consuming news, the media will shift their focus to a new issue.[41] Notably, the expansion of the internet since the 1990s has introduced a dramatic transformation of the media landscape. Instant and unlimited information through the internet and social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter have altered the way news are distributed and consumed. Individual foreign policy elites, e.g. interest groups, advocates, politicians, or experts, have direct access to the public without the traditional media as a mediating actor, and the public gains awareness and induces government responsiveness at a much faster pace.[42]

Public attention passes through systematic issue-attention cycles by which the public gains and loses interest in a particular issue over time, a process introduced by Downs.[43] In the pre-problem stage, public attention is dormant and only a few individuals pay attention to, in this case, an ongoing peace operation or conflict. Mass public attention can then be activated in the ways described above. When public attention remains below a certain threshold and is not expected to affect politicians' popularity and re-election chances, politicians will not react and change peacekeeping

[40] James M. Snyder Jr. and David Strömberg, 'Press Coverage and Political Accountability', *Journal of Political Economy* 118/2 (2010), 355–408; David Strömberg, 'Radio's Impact on Public Spending', *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 119/1 (2004), 189–221; Matthew A. Baum and Philip B.K. Potter, *War and Democratic Constraint: How the Public Influences Foreign Policy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015); Timothy Besley and Robin Burgess, 'The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India', *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 117/4 (2002), 1415–51.

[41] A similar reciprocal relationship exists between the media and decision makers; see Matthew A. Baum and Philip B.K. Potter, 'The Relationships between Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis', *Annual Review of Political Science* 11 (2008), 39–65.

[42] Limited research has been done so far to understand these changed dynamics; see Douglas Foyle, 'Public Opinion and Foreign Policy', in *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics* (2017), `https://oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-472`, accessed July 13, 2019.

[43] Anthony Downs, 'Up and Down with Ecology: The Issue-Attention Cycle', *Public Interest* 28/ Summer (1972), 38–50.

policy according to public preferences. Having already spent much attention on this issue, the public will gradually turn away from it because of decreasing (marginal) benefits. This process is accelerated once new issues arise, capturing increasingly more public attention. When, however, public attention is high enough to exert pressure on office holders to react unless they wish to risk loss of popularity and office, political measures will be taken and peacekeeping policy will be adjusted accordingly. Following, the argument suggests that different levels of electoral accountability and responsiveness by office holders prior to elections emerge when public attention to a specific peace operation is low versus when it is high. This leads to the second hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2: The effect of elections on troop contributions to peace operations depends on the level of public attention.

Different expectations can be derived for cases of low public attention to peacekeeping and cases of high attention. When public attention remains below a certain threshold, elected officials do not react to public preferences regarding troop deployment levels to a peace operation. Instead, faced with resource constraints, incumbents can be expected to shift resources away from peacekeeping and into an issue area that generates more attention. The literature on 'guns-versus-butter' models has shown that incumbents try to signal their competence by investing their limited resources in the most 'visible' public goods.[44] Moreover, by decreasing the number of peacekeepers deployed in conflict regions, policy-makers reduce the risk of casualties and thereby a potential backlash in public approval before the election – a common assumption made in existing studies.[45] This gives rise to the following expectation.

Expectation a: When public attention is low, fewer peacekeeping troops are deployed before elections.

[44]Bove, Efthyvoulou, and Navas, 'Political Cycles in Public Expenditure'.

[45]Marinov, Nomikos, and Robbins, 'Does Electoral Proximity Affect Security Policy?'; Duursma and Gledhill, 'Voted Out'.

By contrast, when public attention to a peace operation is high enough, policy-makers are expected to invest limited resources and align peacekeeping policy with public preferences before elections to increase their re-election chances. As discussed above, public attention is activated by grave events and elite debates reported in traditional and new forms of media. Reporting and the public's sensitivity to new information is influenced by what psychologists call 'negativity bias'.[46] People assign greater weight to negative events. As Pinker asserts, '[w]e never see a journalist saying to the camera, "I'm reporting live from a country where a war has not broken out"'.[47] At the same time, the public is more likely to select negative stories to consume.[48] The types of stories most likely to generate high attention – in the realm of international politics – include outbreaks and deterioration of civil conflicts, attacks against civilians, large flows of refugees, humanitarian disasters, and natural disasters with humanitarian consequences. Public attention to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, for instance, surged in July and August 2006 in the wake of the 2006 Lebanon War, which killed as many as 1'200 people, most of whom were civilians; attention to the conflict in the Central African Republic rose along with the escalating violence in December 2013, which left at least 1'000 civilians dead in the capital Bangui alone; and attention to the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea peaked in December 2005 amid increasing tensions at the border between Eritrea and Ethiopia, leaving some to fear a resumption of war.[49] Studies on public opinion and humanitarian interventions suggest that the public supports peacekeeping and humanitarian action out of a commitment to normative principles or even a moral

[46]Paul Rozin and Edward B. Royzman, 'Negativity Bias, Negativity Dominance, and Contagion', *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 5/4 (2001), 296–320.

[47]Steven Pinker, 'The Media Exaggerates Negative News. This Distortion Has Consequences', *The Guardian* (Feb. 17, 2018), `https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/feb/17/steven-pinker-media-negative-news`, accessed Feb. 5, 2019.

[48]Marc Trussler and Stuart Soroka, 'Consumer Demand for Cynical and Negative News Frames', *The International Journal of Press/Politics* 19/3 (2014), 360–79.

[49]Assessments are based on internet searches as reported by Google Trends and news coverage as recorded in Factiva; calculations of death toll made by author based on the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset, Global Version 19.1.; see Ralph Sundberg and Erik Melander, 'Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset', *Journal of Peace Research* 50/4 (2013), 523–32.

obligation.[50] Often cited examples for this prospect include the response and public pressure to the famine in Somalia in 1991–1992 and the support for the use of air power in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s.[51] Using a series of survey experiments, Kreps and Maxey find that support for humanitarian objectives is driven by moral obligations, rather than instrumental mechanisms such as strategic or cost-benefit calculations, and that civilian harm is the most salient mechanism driving morality.[52] Elected officials are expected to react to this sentiment in times of high public attention before elections to increase their re-election chances, leading to the second expectation.

Expectation b: When public attention is high, more peacekeeping troops are deployed before elections.

5.4 Research Design

To test the relationship between public attention, elections, and peacekeeping deployments, troop contributions to UN peace operations by 19 electoral democracies from 2004 to 2016 are analysed. During this timeframe, 58% of all UN troops were provided by democracies.[53] The 19 cases were selected based on data availability for the measure of public attention; specifically, all countries with sufficient data are included in the analysis.[54] Despite this limitation, the countries examined cover a wide and comprehensive range of troop providing countries. They provided 22% of all peacekeepers, and 37% of all UN peacekeepers sent by democratic countries; and they include members of the Security Council that decide when, where, and how a

[50]Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention*, pp. 52–84; Wheeler, *Saving Strangers*.

[51]Piers Robinson, 'The CNN Effect Reconsidered: Mapping a Research Agenda for the Future', *Media, War & Conflict* 4/1 (2011), 3–11.

[52]Kreps and Maxey, 'Mechanisms of Morality'.

[53]Calculations by author based on data by International Peace Institute, *IPI Peacekeeping Database*; any regime with a Polity-2 score of six or higher was classified as a democracy, all others as non-democracies; see Monty G. Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jaggers, 'Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2018', `http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2018.pdf`, accessed June 18, 2019.

[54]Data on public attention, specifically Google Trends data, is not available if the 'search doesn't have enough data to show here'. This implies a bias towards country cases that see more public attention to peacekeeping. As the fixed effects model specifications deployed in this study only use within-country-mission unit variation, the effects of the selection bias are mitigated.

UN peace operation is deployed, such as the United States (US), UK, and France; Western middle powers, like Australia, Canada, Norway, and Sweden, that dominated peace operations during the Cold War and into the early 1990s; and some of the biggest troop contributors today, such as India, Indonesia, and South Africa. All contributing countries examined in this study are listed in Table 5.2.

Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics for Country Cases

Country	**Number of Peace Operations (2004–2016)**	**Average Number of Troops (Mission-Month)**	**Number of Elections (2004–2016)**	**% of Population Using the Internet (2016)**[55]
Australia	12	24	5	88 %
Austria	19	137	6	84 %
Belgium	10	86	3	87 %
Brazil	21	287	3	61 %
Canada	18	13	5	90 %
Denmark	20	20	4	97 %
France	17	225	4	86 %
Germany	14	88	3	90 %
India	24	1'473	3	30 %
Indonesia	16	381	6	25 %
Italy	18	777	3	61 %
Netherlands	15	74	3	90 %
Norway	22	21	3	97 %
South Africa	10	861	3	54 %
Spain	16	491	5	81 %
Sweden	27	57	3	90 %
Switzerland	21	2	3	89 %
UK	25	86	3	95 %
US	23	5	7	76 %

[55]Source: World Bank, 'Individuals Using the Internet (% of Population)', `https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.ZS`, accessed Sept. 6, 2018.

5.4.1 Troop Contributions

The dependent variable of this study is troop contributions to UN peace operations.[56] Peacekeeping deployment decisions consists of two sequential questions: first, whether to contribute troops to a peace mission; and if so, how many troops to contribute. This analysis focusses on the latter question in order to trace troop changes within one peace operation over a period of time comprising multiple elections and variation in public attention. Following, only cases are included where a country contributes a positive number of troops to a peace operation. Data on actual troop contribution levels to UN peace operations – per (contributing) country-mission-month – is drawn from the International Peace Institute (IPI) Peacekeeping Database.[57] The variable troop contributions has a right-skewed distribution; it has a mean of 320 troops per contributor-mission-month and a median of six, while the maximum number of troops sent is 4'392. Figure 5.6 in the appendix illustrates the distribution of the data. Solution approaches to the skewed distribution are discussed along with the estimation strategy.

5.4.2 Elections

Information on all national-level elections in the 19 countries under study during the 2004–2016 period are obtained from Bormann and Golder's Democratic Electoral Systems dataset (Version 3.0).[58] National-level legislative (lower house) and, if applicable, presidential elections are included in the analysis.[59] The election dates for each

[56] As a robustness test, the analysis was repeated using total contributions, which not only includes troops but also police and observers, as the dependent variable. The results hold, as can be seen in Figure 5.5 in the appendix.

[57] International Peace Institute, *IPI Peacekeeping Database*.

[58] Nils-Christian Bormann and Matt Golder, 'Democratic Electoral Systems around the World, 1946–2011', *Electoral Studies* 32/2 (2013), 360–9.

[59] The theoretical argument of this article, in line with previous literature, suggests that incumbent politicians have the opportunity to adapt the number of troops deployed in peacekeeping before elections. Depending on the system of government, the legislature and executive possess different levels of authority in the foreign and security policy-making process. In the UK and France, for instance, the executive is traditionally very strong vis-à-vis the legislature, allowing them to decide on troop deployments without seeking the approval of parliament prior to the deployment. In Germany or Italy, on the other hand, parliamentary approval is needed to deploy troops. In either case, though, the executive represents parties in parliament and close links of ratification and oversight

country in the dataset, including some relevant background information, are listed in the appendix. Particular attention was paid to ensuring that the timing of and call for all elections was exogenous from decisions regarding troop commitments to peace operations. In total, 75 elections took place in the 19 countries studied between 2004–2016. The majority of those were held at fixed dates, and just twelve were snap elections called by the government. Most of these snap elections were called for domestic political reasons, such as the economic situation or attempts at reform. Only the Netherlands and Italy had snap elections due to disagreements within the ruling coalition over foreign policy reasons, specifically their military presence in Afghanistan. All calls for elections, though, were independent from any peacekeeping deployments. The exogeneity of election timings allows for the identification of the effect of electoral proximity on peacekeeping policy.[60]

The election variable is coded counting down the months to the next election with 0 being the month of the election, 1 the previous month, 2 two months before the election, etc. To facilitate interpretation, the variable was multiplied by -1. Following the theoretical expectations and considering the inverted sign, a positive relationship between the election variable and changes in the level of troop contributions is expected. Additionally, a binary election (year) variable was coded for robustness checks, capturing the twelve-months period leading up to an election. This type of coding has been used in previous studies,[61] but the binary nature conceals a lot of potential variation regarding the proximity to elections. The robustness checks show that the overall direction of the results holds, but that the confidence intervals of the election variable increase, losing statistical significance (see Figure 5.7 in the appendix).

exist between the two branches of government. This ensures that both branches are involved in foreign policy-making, which in turn has implications for the decision-making by elected officials of either branch prior to elections.

[60]See Marinov, Nomikos, and Robbins, 'Does Electoral Proximity Affect Security Policy?', who also stress the exogeneity of elections for their estimation strategy.

[61]i.e. Duursma and Gledhill, 'Voted Out'; Marinov, Nomikos, and Robbins, 'Does Electoral Proximity Affect Security Policy?'

5.4.3 Public Attention – Google Trends

Public attention has traditionally been operationalised in terms of two proxies: 'most important problem' (MIP) surveys and media coverage.[62] Neither proxy is an appropriate measure for public attention to peacekeeping in the run-up to elections. MIP polls are usually limited to a small number of pre-determined issues that respondents can choose from, and they are only administered at long, often inconsistent intervals. Both drawbacks make MIP surveys unsuitable to study the dynamic nature of public attention to specific peace operations and conflicts. In comparison, media coverage is a more dynamic and accessible measure of public attention to specific issues, but it comes at high theoretical costs as it combines two theoretically separate concepts. For one thing, public and media attention work in a reciprocal relation; and for another thing, a media-based measure captures the (trends in) information available to the public, but not the information that is actually processed. To remedy these limitations, a different measure is implemented: internet search data.[63] Internet search data are measures of the frequency of web searches that include a given word or group of words, such as 'Congo peace operation'. This search data is a plausible measure of public attention as defined above. If somebody is willing to invest scarce time and resources into searching the internet for information about a particular issue it can be assumed that she is attentive to and interested in that issue.[64] Data from internet searches (conducted with the search engine Google) is available between 2004 and today for almost every country and any possible search term on a daily, weekly, or

[62]Joseph T. Ripberger, 'Capturing Curiosity: Using Internet Search Trends to Measure Public Attentiveness', *Policy Studies Journal* 39/2 (2011), 239–59, pp. 241–2.

[63]Internet search data as a measure for issue salience and public attention has first been used in health-care epidemiology to track the spread of infectious diseases (see Gunther Eysenbach, 'Infodemiology: Tracking Flu-Related Searches on the Web for Syndromic Surveillance', in *AMIA 2006 Annual Symposium Proceedings* (2006), 244–8). While it has since reached the social sciences (e.g. Krzysztof J. Pelc, 'Googling the WTO: What Search-Engine Data Tell Us about the Political Economy of Institutions', *International Organization* 67/3 (2013), 629–55; Seth Stephens-Davidowitz, 'The Cost of Racial Animus on a Black Candidate: Evidence Using Google Search Data', *Journal of Public Economics* 118 (2014), 26–40; Curtis Ellis, Colin Swearingen, and Joseph T. Ripberger, 'Examining the Impact of Public Attention on Fundraising in US Senate Elections', in *APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper* (2011)), it is still a rather novel and arguably underutilised data source.

[64]Ripberger, 'Capturing Curiosity', pp. 242–3.

monthly basis. This allows for a fine-grained, dynamic measure of public attention to specific peace operations.

This article turns to internet search data provided by Google Trends. Google Trends is based on Google Search and shows the relative popularity of a search query. To derive these results, the Google algorithm uses an unbiased sample of Google search data: it only uses a share of all Google searches and eliminates repeated searches from the same person over a short period of time. The resulting estimates then represent the likelihood that a random user looks up a certain search query from a specific location at a particular point in time.[65] The data provided by Google does not show the absolute search volume for the search term of interest, but instead, Google scales the results (from 0–100) relative to the highest search volume for the search query during the specified region and time period. This normalisation of the data is important as the number of people searching on Google varies temporally and spatially, and the normalisation allows for a comparison between different time periods and regions.

Google Trends data were scraped for every country-mission combination from the month of their first contribution to the mission (01.2014 if the contribution started before 2004) to the withdrawal of their last troops (or 12.2016 if the contribution continued after 2016).[66] Several combinations of search terms were tested to find the most reliable and accurate indicator of public attention to a given peace operation. The acronym for each peace operation (i.e. 'MONUSCO') proved to be the most reliable search query. For robustness checks, Google Trends data on further possible search terms were collected and tested, specifically, 'host country war', 'host country conflict', and 'host country UN'.[67] The regression results hold for the search term 'host

[65]Ripberger, 'Capturing Curiosity', p. 245.

[66]Data was scraped from Google Trends on 28 April 2018. The Google algorithm provides data either on a daily, weekly, or monthly basis, or no data if the 'search doesn't have enough data to show here'. Daily data is provided for searches within a time frame of less than three months and weekly data for longer time periods, unless it is of lower popularity, when monthly data is provided. The data for this study was either provided on a monthly- or weekly-basis. In the latter cases, monthly averages of the weekly data were calculated and re-scaled to a scale from 0–100.

[67]If applicable, the search terms were translated to different languages. In the case of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, for instance, the acronym 'UNMISS' was searched for the UK

country war', but are less reliable for the other two specifications (see Figures 5.8–5.10 in the appendix). A possible reason could be that Google Trends did not provide data for a majority of those search queries due to low popularity of the search terms. The number of data points collected for the acronym-indicator is 9'527, whereas this number drops to 7'265 for 'host country war', 4'557 for 'host country conflict', and even 1'584 for 'host country UN'. As a further robustness test, a three-month moving average of the Google Trends variable (based on the search term 'acronym') was used to smooth outliers. As Figure 5.11 in the appendix shows, the results are not driven by outliers in the Google Trends data. Note that the first lag of the public attention variable is used in the analysis. An extensive discussion about the appropriate lag structure follows below.

5.4.4 Representativeness and Validation of Google Trends Data

The internet search-based measure for public attention is not without its challenges. Mellon and Ripberger provide comprehensive discussions of a number of methodological questions.[68] Two questions of particular relevance are discussed here: representativeness and proxy validation.

Representativeness ensures that the sample of users of the Google search engine is sufficiently representative of the population in question – of the potential voting public influencing politicians and their peacekeeping policy decisions. Google is by a large margin the most popular search engine worldwide with a market share of up to

and Germany, and 'MINUSS' for France; in the case of Norway, the search terms were 'Libanon krigen', 'Libanon konflikten', and 'Libanon FN' for the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. See Table 5.6 in the appendix for a full list of the specific search terms used to download the relevant Google Trends data.

[68] Jonathan Mellon, 'Internet Search Data and Issue Salience: The Properties of Google Trends as a Measure of Issue Salience', *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties* 24/1 (2014), 45–72; Jonathan Mellon, 'Making Inferences about Elections and Public Opinion Using Incidentally Collected Data', in Justin Fisher et al. (eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Elections, Voting Behavior and Public Opinion* (London: Routledge, 2017), 522–33; Ripberger, 'Capturing Curiosity'.

90% in recent years.[69] For selected countries, this share ranges from 79% in the US, to 82% in the UK, 85% in Canada, 86% in Germany and France, 88% in Australia, 90% in Spain and Italy, and even 94% in Brazil and India.[70] Accordingly, Google Trends can be said to provide a representative sample of all internet users. As for internet usage, while the majority of adults worldwide are internet users, they tend to be younger, more educated, and have a higher income.[71] Data on internet users in the UK from 2016 provided by the Office for National Statistics shows that, on average, 87.9% of adults in the UK have recently used the internet.[72] Almost everybody aged 16–44 regularly uses the internet (98.8%), but this number decreases to 88% for the age group 55–64, 74% for 56–74-year-olds, and even 39% for the generation 75+. There is virtually no difference in internet usage between men and women except for the older population aged over 75. Table 5.2 provides data on the percentage of the population that uses the internet in each country examined in this article. In most countries, the wide majority of the population regularly uses the internet; in 13 out of 19 countries this number is over 80%. Only in India, Indonesia, and South Africa, a potentially problematically low percentage of the population uses the internet. These three countries were omitted from the analysis for robustness checks, with no changes to the results (see Figure 5.12 in the appendix).

Proxy validation refers to the extent to which Google Trends data adequately represent and measure public attention to specific peace operations. First, the degree to which public attention is accurately operationalised is assessed, specifically its face validity and content validity. Then the Google Trends indicator is compared to other existing measures, i.e. its criterion validity is tested.

[69]Statista, 'Global Market Share of Search Engines 2010–2018', `https://www.statista.com/statistics/216573/worldwide-market-share-of-search-engines/`, accessed Sept. 5, 2018.

[70]Statista, 'Google: Search Engine Market Share in Selected Countries 2018', `https://www.statista.com/statistics/220534/googles-share-of-search-market-in-selected-countries/`, accessed Sept. 5, 2018.

[71]Ripberger, 'Capturing Curiosity', p. 252; Mellon, 'Internet Search Data and Issue Salience', p. 50.

[72]Office for National Statistics, 'Statistical Bulletin: Internet Users in the UK: 2016', `https://www.ons.gov.uk/businessindustryandtrade/itandinternetindustry/bulletins/internetusers/2016`, accessed Sept. 5, 2018.

Face validity refers to whether or not a Google Trends search term initially looks plausible as a measure for public attention to peace operations. The acronyms of peace operations seem to fulfil this criterium. As a second check for face validity, changes of Google Trends results over time are examined. As expected, and reinforcing face validity, search queries for specific peace operations tend to react to grave events occurring in the peace operation or conflict country. Illustrative case studies are documented in the appendix (see Figures 5.13–5.16).

Content validity examines the extent to which a search query accurately reflects the domain of an issue, in this case a specific peace operation. Google Trends provides lists of the top related topics and queries for each search term, which were consulted to assess the content validity of all search terms used in this study. The assessment, for instance, showed that the top related topic to the search query 'UNAMA' is not the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, but the Universidade da Amazônia in Brazil.[73] Following this method, all invalid terms are omitted from the analysis, only leaving relevant searches fulfilling content validity.[74]

Lastly, criterion validity refers to the degree to which Google Trends data correspond to another measure of public attention/issue salience that is already held to be valid. Given the sparseness of survey data, Google Trends search data are instead compared to media coverage of peace operations. For the comparison, data from LexisNexis were collected, specifically the number of articles about each peace operation published in UK publications, French language news, and German language news per month from 2004–2016.[75] Criterion validity was then tested using vector autoregressive (VAR) models. VAR models are particularly powerful when analysing multiple time series variables that are theoretically expected to affect one another.

[73]The lists of top related topics/queries for 'UNAMA' and 'MONUSCO' are exemplarily reported in the appendix, see Figures 5.17–5.18.

[74]Search terms that do not fulfil the criterium of content validity and which were consequently omitted from the analysis are marked with an asterisk in Table 5.6 in the appendix. Of the 347 search queries using the mission acronym, 31 were rejected for lacking content validity.

[75]The sources include newspapers and web-based publications, but exclude newswires, press releases, and news transcripts.

Table 5.3: VAR Estimations of Google Trends Data and News Coverage of Peace Operations in the UK, France, and Germany, 2004–2016

Dependent Variable	**Independent Variables**	**VAR Coefficient**
Google Trends	Google Trends.l1	0.32*** (0.00)
	News coverage.l1	0.05** (0.00)
	Constant	11.91*** (0.00)
	Adjusted R-Squared	0.12
News Coverage	News coverage.l1	0.47*** (0.00)
	Google Trends.l1	0.01 (0.58)
	Constant	4.82*** (0.00)
	Adjusted R-Squared	0.22

*Standard errors in parenthesis. ˆ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.*

Table 5.3 presents the vector autoregressive estimates.[76] As expected, the VAR models suggest a positive relationship between the Google Trends searches and news coverage; this relationship is significant when Google Trends data is the dependent variable. These results are confirmed with Granger causality tests, which attempt to determine whether one time series is likely to influence changes in the other one and vice versa.[77] The tests show that news coverage Granger causes the Google search data – which confirms the expectation that news coverage activates public attention. No significant relationship exists the other way around. The vector autoregression and Granger causality results indicate that, while differences exist, the Google search index and the news coverage measure indeed converge upon each other and Google Trends data hence fulfil criterion validity.[78]

Figure 5.1 exemplarily brings together the three main variables of this study: troop contributions, elections, and public attention. It depicts Brazil's contribution to the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti between 2004 and 2016 (blue line), the elections held during this time period (grey, vertical lines), and public attention to the operation, i.e. Google Trends data for the search query 'MINUSTAH' (red

[76] Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests confirm that the time series are stationary.

[77] Granger test results are reported in the appendix, Table 5.7.

[78] See appendix Figures 5.19–5.20 for graphical representations of the relationship between Google Trends data and news coverage.




Figure 5.1: Brazil's Troop Contributions and Public Attention to MINUSTAH, 2004–2016

line). On average, Brazil deployed 1'437 troops to MINUSTAH. Particularly notable is the increase in deployment of 910 troops in March 2010 and troop withdrawals of up to 350 troops per month in the second half of the deployment. Public attention was on average twice as high in the first half of the deployment as in the second half. Internet searches peaked in the beginning of the mission, when Brazil first deployed troops, and in January 2010. On 12 January 2010, Haiti was struck by a devastating earthquake and much of the public interest and coverage in January 2010 centred around the immense death toll and humanitarian tragedy. This included the deaths of 21 Brazilians, amongst them 18 peacekeepers dispatched to MINUSTAH.[79] Following, on 25 January, Brazil's Congress decided to dispatch 900 more troops to Haiti at the end of February.[80]

[79] JianXin Zhou, 'Brazilian President Pays Tribute to Soldiers Killed in Haiti Quake', *Xinhua News Agency* (Jan. 22, 2010), `http://en.people.cn/90001/90777/90852/6876379.html`, accessed Feb. 5, 2019.

[80] Reuters Staff, 'Brazil OKs Doubling Its Haiti Force to 2,600 Troops', *Reuters* (Jan. 25, 2010),

5.4.5 Controls

Three groups of controls are added to the analysis. The first one includes the gross domestic product (GDP) of the contributing countries as well as the number of UN peace operations a country is involved in. Data for the variable GDP (in constant 2010 US$ billions) is drawn from the World Bank's 'World Development Indicators May 2018';[81] and the number of peace operations each country is involved in is calculated based on the IPI Peacekeeping Database.[82] Both control variables are based on the expectation that troop contributions are limited by resource constraints, including material and personnel capabilities. The second group of control variables encompasses exogenous events data. Specifically, the number of casualties suffered by a contributing country in a peace operation and the number of civilians killed in the host country to a peace operation are included. Both variables are lagged one month. These events are relevant exogenous reasons that can induce policy makers to adjust troop deployment levels, independent of public attention. Data on civilian deaths occurring in the countries hosting a peace operation is extracted from the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset, Global Version 19.1, and aggregated to the host country-month level.[83] Peacekeeper casualties data is drawn from Henke and is available at the contributor-mission-month level up until June 2015.[84] By including the latter variable in the analysis, the casualty aversion hypothesis frequently invoked in previous studies can be additionally tested.[85] The casualty aversion hypothesis or 'body bag syndrome' assumes that politicians adapt foreign policy according to the belief that an aversion to casualties negatively affects public support of military missions. The final group of variables controls for time trends and structural changes

`https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN25183943`, accessed Feb. 5, 2019.

[81]World Bank, 'World Development Indicators', Datafile (May 2018), `https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators`, accessed July 1, 2018.

[82]International Peace Institute, *IPI Peacekeeping Database*.

[83]Sundberg and Melander, 'Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset'.

[84]Marina E. Henke, 'UN Fatalities 1948–2015: A New Dataset', *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 36/4 (2019), 425–4.

[85]Marinov, Nomikos, and Robbins, 'Does Electoral Proximity Affect Security Policy?'; Duursma and Gledhill, 'Voted Out'; Christopher Gelpi, Peter D. Feaver, and Jason Reifler, 'Success Matters: Casualty Sensitivity and the War in Iraq', *International Security* 30/3 (2006), 7–46.

within a peace mission. First, the size of the mission, operationalised in terms of the total number of troops deployed by all countries, is added to control for shifts in mission size (data is drawn from the IPI Peacekeeping Database).[86] Second, the duration of the mission (in months) is included. Third, the lagged version of troop contributions is included in the analysis to account for the expectation that the current level of troop deployments is heavily determined by its past level. And fourth, year-month fixed effects are introduced. Table 5.8 in the appendix provides descriptive statistics for all variables.

5.4.6 Estimation Strategy

The aim of this article is to determine whether troop contributions to peace operations change when elections are upcoming, depending on the level of public attention to the operation. It is expected that fewer troops are deployed to a peace operation before an election when public attention is low; and more troops when attention is high. Following, the focal point of this study is the interaction between elections and public attention. The data for the study is organised in panels of (contributing) country-mission pairings over year-months. Linear fixed effects models with OLS estimators are used for the analysis. Fixed effects have three distinct advantages for this study: first, they are particularly suitable for the nature of Google Trends data, specifically the normalisation and scaling of the data within a given country and time period; second, they provide a way to control for contributor- and mission-specific time-invariant characteristics; and third, county-mission fixed effects and additionally year-month fixed effects are used to address the skewed distribution and overdispersion of the dependent variable troop contributions. As an additional robustness test, fixed effects negative binomial regressions are conducted to model the over-dispersed count outcome variable. The negative binomial models strongly confirm the results of the linear fixed effects models (see Table 5.9 in the appendix).

[86] International Peace Institute, *IPI Peacekeeping Database*.

5.5 Findings and Discussion

A series of regressions of the outcome variable troop contributions on the proximity to the next election and the level of public attention to each peace operation were run. Starting with bivariate regressions of the number of troops on the election indicator and on the public attention indicator, the interaction effect, control variables, and year-month fixed effects are successively added. All models include country-mission fixed effects. Figure 5.2 presents the coefficient estimates of all five models for the election, public attention, and interaction variables. The full results of the most comprehensive model are reported in Table 5.4; the remaining ones are reported in Table 5.10 in the appendix.




Figure 5.2: Coefficients of Linear Fixed Effects Regression Models of Troop Contributions[87]

[87]Thick line segments are 95% confidence intervals; thin ones are 99% confidence intervals; coefficients of controls are not reported.

Table 5.4: Coefficients of Linear Fixed Effects Regression of Troop Contributions

	Interaction + Controls, FE + Time FE
Election	-0.17*
	(0.08)
l.Public Attention	0.42***
	(0.08)
Election*l.Public Attention	0.01**
	(0.00)
GDP	0.01*
	(0.01)
# PKOs	1.24
	(0.95)
l.Casualties	-2.39
	(2.50)
l.Civilian Deaths	0.02
	(0.02)
Mission Size	0.00**
	(0.00)
Mission Duration	0.06
	(0.14)
l.Troop Contributions	0.94***
	(0.00)
Year-Month Effects	not reported
Constant	-64.12*
	(31.35)
R-Squared	0.95 (within)
	0.99 (between)
	0.99 (overall)
No. Groups	91
No. Observations	4'645
*Standard errors in parentheses. ˆ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.*	

In all models, the results suggest that fewer troops are contributed to UN peace operations the closer elections come. This finding is significant at the 5% level for the bivariate model as well as the full models including the interaction effect, control variables, and time fixed effects. Specifically, on average, every 2.5 months approaching an election, one soldier fewer is deployed per country and peace operation (based on the bivariate election model). Put differently, ceteris paribus, a country holding a national-level election contributes five fewer troops to a peace operation than the same country one year before the election. Considering that the median of troop contributions is six, this is a small but non-negligible effect. The finding confirms the

first hypothesis that peacekeeping policy is adjusted before elections: elections are the main mechanism available to the voting public to hold officials accountable, and incumbents adjust policy before an election to increase their re-election chances. It further confirms the results of previous studies on the impact of elections on peacekeeping contributions. Duursma and Gledhill find that democratic governments are less likely to initiate large-scale troop contributions to UN peace operations in the year before an election;[88] and Marinov, Nomikos, and Robbins find lower troop contributions to OEF and ISAF near elections.[89] Neither of the two studies, however, considers the effect of public attention.

Turning to the effect of public attention individually before examining the interaction between upcoming elections and public attention, the results show that the attention variable is positive in all and significant at the 1% level in most of the models presented in Figure 5.2. With more attention being paid to a peace operation and more Google searches entered, more troops are contributed. This is in line with the expectation that higher public attention is often activated by outbreaks or deterioration of conflicts and humanitarian crises, and that the public is positively inclined towards humanitarian and peacekeeping engagement out of a sense of moral obligation. As examined in the face validity check of the Google Trends data, search queries for peace operations tend to rise in the wake of acute, grave events occurring in the host country of an operation. For the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), for instance, the highest interest was recorded in November 2008 when the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) experienced renewed violent fighting; for MINUSTAH, the catastrophic earthquake in Haiti on 12 January 2010 created a massive rise in attention to the peace operation; and search queries for the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) peaked in December 2013 when violent conflict erupted in South Sudan, marking the beginning of a civil war (see Figures 5.13–5.16 in the appendix for the Google Trends

[88]Duursma and Gledhill, 'Voted Out'.
[89]Marinov, Nomikos, and Robbins, 'Does Electoral Proximity Affect Security Policy?'

graphs).

Note that the first lag of the Google Trends data is used in the regression analysis. The number of lags to include in the models was determined based on methodological, theoretical, and empirical considerations. Methodologically, a number of diagnostic tests, including the Akaike information criterion and the Bayesian information criterion were used to decide the appropriate lag order. The tests indicate that the lag order of one is appropriate. Theoretically, while regular deployments are often made in six-month periods, smaller, political adjustments to the number of troops deployed can be made at a faster pace. Here, an important distinction has to be made between the authorised maximum number of troops as defined in the troop mandate and the actual deployment numbers, the troops on the ground. The latter is the measure used in this study. Governments have some leeway to make smaller adjustments to the troop numbers when public attention shifts without having to go through lengthy renegotiations of the mandates. Agenda-setting researchers have debated how long it takes for public (and media) attention of an issue to transfer to governmental attention. Wanta and Hu examine the time lag between different news media and their agenda-setting effects and find that, on average, the optimal time lag is three weeks.[90] In his memoir, former United Nations' Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations Jean-Marie Guéhenno alludes to the same timeframe: 'aside from the United States, even the most efficient military has great difficulty deploying and sustaining a full battalion in less than three weeks'.[91] When Brazil increased its troop contributions to MINUSTAH after the earthquake, it took four weeks from Congressional approval (25 January 2010) to the dispatchment of 900 troops in late February.[92] Empirically, Figure 5.3 presents the regression coefficients and confidence intervals (99% and 95%) of different lags of the public attention variable, ranging from 0 to 6 months. The fig-

[90] Wayne Wanta and Yu-Wei Hu, 'Time-Lag Differences in the Agenda-Setting Process: An Examination of Five News Media', *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 6/3 (1994), 225–40.

[91] Jean-Marie Guéhenno, *The Fog of Peace: A Memoir of International Peacekeeping in the 21st Century* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2015), p. 17.

[92] JianXin Zhou, '145 Million Dollars Needed to Send 900 More Troops to Haiti: Brazil', *Xinhua News Agency* (Jan. 29, 2010), `http://english.news.cn`, accessed Feb. 5, 2019.




Figure 5.3: Lag Structure of Public Attention

ure shows that the regression coefficient of the non-lagged variable is not statistically significant. The first and second lags, on the other hand, are statistically significant. This trend lends support to the expectation that the level of troop contributions is a reaction to public attention and not vice versa. The regression coefficients of the third to sixth lag of the Google Trends data are also insignificant. This is to be expected as politicians react to current and recent public attention, and not issues that were on the public agenda three months ago. All things considered, a lag order of one (month) seems appropriate from a methodological, theoretical, and empirical point of view.

Now turning to the interaction between approaching elections and public attention to peace operations, the coefficient estimates of the interaction term as presented in Figure 5.2 and Table 5.4 are positive and significant at the 0.01 level for the two most comprehensive models. This finding lends strong support to the second hypothesis that the effect of elections on troop contributions depends on the level of public attention. To explore this finding further, the Stata margins command was

used to compute the marginal effects of approaching elections on troop contributions at different levels of public attention. The computation is based on the most comprehensive model including control variables, fixed effects at the country-mission, and at the year-month level. Figure 5.4 presents the conditional marginal effects graphically. The plot shows that the marginal effect of one month closer to an election on troop contributions is negative when public attention is low – but positive when public attention is high. The effect is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level for public attention values below 4; the turnover point from a negative to a positive effect is at a value of 19; and the positive effect turns statistically significant at the 5% level at an attention value of 39. To recall, the scale for public attention ranges from 0–100 in accordance with the format of the underlying Google Trends data. This confirms the theoretical expectations that fewer troops are deployed when elections come closer and public attention to a peace operation is low; and that more troops are deployed when public attention is high. Faced with resource constraints, elected officials are expected to invest limited resources into issue areas that are high up the public's agenda and disinvest from issues that generate low attention. The results again support the assumption that public attention, often activated by humanitarian disasters, is linked to a positive attitude towards more peacekeeping engagement. Figure 5.4 also plots the distribution of public attention, highlighting that most of the time attention levels remain low. Around 70% of all observations have a value below 19, which corresponds to a negative marginal effect of elections on troop contributions.[93] In line with theoretical expectations, most of the time the issue of peace operations remains in 'pre-problem' latency, as phrased by Downs, before mass public attention gets activated as a result of a grave event, triggering office holders to take action.[94] Overall, the interaction term brings out variation in the effect of elections on peacekeeping deployments that the individual variable cannot.

[93] 48% of observations have a value below 4 (which corresponds to a statistically significant negative effect), 30% a value of 19 or above (positive effect), and 14% a value of 39 or higher (statistically significant positive effect).

[94] Downs, 'Up and Down with Ecology'.




Figure 5.4: Conditional Marginal Effects of Election on Troop Contributions with 95% Confidence Intervals; and Distribution of Public Attention

In regard to the control variables, the results for the controls dealing with resource constraints and time trends/structural changes within peace operations are largely unsurprising. The relationship between GDP and troop contributions is positive and significant (at the 5% level), which supports the assumption that countries operate under resource constraints. With more resources available, i.e. a higher GDP, they can invest more in peacekeeping. As to mission trends, when a peace operation grows in size, individual country contributions, on average, also increase. Further, the lagged value of troop contributions has a highly significant and substantive positive relationship with the outcome variable, as was to be expected. The results are less conclusive for the number of UN peace operations a country is involved in as well as the mission duration, possibly due to the tight constraints of the country-mission as well as time fixed effects model specifications.

Turning to the controls for exogenous events, the number of civilians killed in a conflict has a positive coefficient estimate but is insignificant in the most restrictive model including time fixed effects. In the model without time fixed effects, on the

other hand, it is significant at the 5% level, suggesting increased peacekeeping engagement in the wake of humanitarian tragedies. Finally, while the coefficient for the number of casualties a country has suffered in a given mission-month is negative, as expected based on previous literature, it is insignificant in all model specifications. A possible explanation for this is the very small number of casualties in peace operations, especially compared to conventional wars or US- and NATO-led missions in Afghanistan. In total, 196 fatalities have occurred amongst the 19 contributing countries studied between 2004 and 2015. The maximum was 20 fatalities suffered by Brazil in Haiti, but the average number of casualties is only 0.01 per country-mission-month and therefore too rare to significantly affect contribution levels. Beyond this explanation, the case of Brazil's deployment to MINUSTAH suggests that the public's attitude towards and aversion of casualties is much more nuanced than commonly assumed. Brazil suffered 20 casualties in its deployment to MINUSTAH as a result of the earthquake on 12 January 2010, but instead of decreasing its troop deployment, Brazil decided to increase its contribution by 900 peacekeepers by the end of February. Relatedly, in their study on casualty sensitivity in the Iraq War, Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler find that the (US) public tolerates fatalities dependent upon their belief about the rightness or wrongness of the war, and about the prospects for success.[95] In relation to peacekeeping, Raes, Du Bois, and Buts also find no evidence on the 'body bag syndrome' for contributions by OECD countries to UN peace operations between 1996–2014.[96] Burk, reviewing the assumption that (American) public support to the peace operations in Lebanon (1982–1984) and Somalia (1992–1994) plummeted in the face of American casualties, finds that public support did not decline following fatalities.[97] Instead, it declined when the objectives of the operations switched from a humanitarian focus to an intervention focus. Burk's assessment, highlighting the relevance of a humanitarian stance over casualty aversion, corresponds to the findings

[95]Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler, 'Success Matters'.

[96]Raes, Du Bois, and Buts, 'Supplying UN Peacekeepers'.

[97]James Burk, 'Public Support for Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia: Assessing the Casualties Hypothesis', *Political Science Quarterly* 114/1 (1999), 53–78.

of this article.

5.6 Conclusion

Past literature has established that the public holds preferences about foreign policy issues, that they use foreign policy attitudes when making voting decisions, and that, as a result, elections may be accompanied by shifts in foreign and security policy.[98] The question whether and how this can be translated to the topic of peacekeeping has mostly been left unanswered. This article has contributed to answering this question by testing the effects of elections and public attention on levels of troop contributions by 19 countries to UN peace operations between 2004–2016. It found that elections are accompanied by shifts in peacekeeping deployment levels, a finding that aligns with previous studies by Duursma and Gledhill, and Marinov, Nomikos, and Robbins.[99] However, this article further demonstrated that this effect is dependent on the level of attention the public devotes to a peace operation. Contingent on whether a peace mission is high on the public agenda or not, office holders follow different strategies to increase their re-election chances. When public attention is low, incumbent officials shift their limited resources away from peacekeeping and into issue areas that generate more attention when elections come closer, resulting in fewer troops deployed to peace operations. When public attention is high, on the other hand, office holders are expected to invest resources and align peacekeeping policy with public preferences. The results showed that more troops are deployed leading up to elections when public attention is high. Public attention is activated by grave humanitarian events and existing studies suggest that the public supports humanitarian peacekeeping engagement out of a feeling of moral obligation.[100] Overall, this article added nuance to our understanding of the relationship between the

[98] Aldrich et al., 'Foreign Policy and the Electoral Connection'.

[99] Duursma and Gledhill, 'Voted Out'; Marinov, Nomikos, and Robbins, 'Does Electoral Proximity Affect Security Policy?'

[100] Kreps and Maxey, 'Mechanisms of Morality'; Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention*, pp. 52–84; Wheeler, *Saving Strangers*.

public, elections, and peacekeeping/foreign policy by introducing public attention as a defining component of the relationship.

Further research is required to develop a better understanding of the dynamics behind public attention to peacekeeping, and foreign policy more generally. One topic for future research relates to the activation of public attention. The VAR models and Granger causality tests conducted in this article showed that news coverage influences internet search trends for peace operations; and selected case studies indicated that peaks in public attention relate to grave humanitarian events. Missing is an understanding of everyday variation in public attention to peacekeeping, which news is actually processed by the public, and which specific information activates public attention. A content analysis of news coverage of peace operations, set in relation to public attention data, could shed more light on this. Studying the role of social media in shaping public attention to peacekeeping, or foreign policy in general, would also be a fruitful endeavour. Additionally, little systematic research and data exist on public opinion on peacekeeping. The findings of this article question the casualty aversion hypothesis presumed in previous studies. A favourable attitude and feeling of moral obligation towards humanitarian engagement emerged as a more fitting assumption. Developing a more nuanced understanding of the public's tolerance for casualties in peace operations and survey experiments evaluating levels of and mechanisms behind public preferences in peacekeeping are potential avenues for future research.

This study additionally illustrated the use of internet search data, specifically Google Trends data, as a measure of public attention. Internet search data overcomes many of the data limitations of previous measures of attention and issue salience in terms of temporal disaggregation, geographic coverage, and issues covered. An elaborate discussion of the advantages, representativeness and validity of the data, including an analysis of the criterion validity of Google Trends data against news coverage of peace operations in the UK, France, and Germany, demonstrated the suitability of internet search data for research on public attention. While internet search data has been used in health-care epidemiology and econometrics, it is so far

arguably underutilised in political science research. Research on other areas of foreign policy, such as foreign aid allocation, environmental policy, or trade policy could benefit from this data source. Internet search data or social media data could also be used in the study of local dimensions of peacekeeping, particularly the responses of the local population, including awareness, engagement, and perception of the peace operation.[101] In summary, this study highlighted the significance of public attention for the peacekeeping policy-making process as well as the advantages of Google Trends data to conduct fine-grained temporal analyses of a broad range of issue areas.

[101]Séverine Autesserre, 'Going Micro: Emerging and Future Peacekeeping Research', *International Peacekeeping* 21/4 (2014), 492–500.

5.7 Appendix




Figure 5.5: Coefficients of Linear Regression Models of Total Contributions




Figure 5.6: Density Plot of Troop Contributions, per Country-Mission-Month




Figure 5.7: Coefficients of Linear Regression Models of Troop Contributions, with Binary Election (Year) Variable




Figure 5.8: Coefficients of Linear Regression Models of Troop Contributions, with Public Attention ('Host Country War') Variable




Figure 5.9: Coefficients of Linear Regression Models of Troop Contributions, with Public Attention ('Host Country Conflict') Variable




Figure 5.10: Coefficients of Linear Regression Models of Troop Contributions, with Public Attention ('Host Country UN') Variable




Figure 5.11: Coefficients of Linear Regression Models of Troop Contributions, with Three-Month Moving Average of Public Attention Variable




Figure 5.12: Coefficients of Linear Regression Models of Troop Contributions, Excluding India, Indonesia, and South Africa




Figure 5.13: Google Trends Results for 'MONUC' to Assess Face Validity[102]

The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was active from 1999 to 2010. A spike in interest was recorded in November 2008 when the DRC experienced renewed violent fighting. Searches for MONUC dropped in 2010 when the mission was renamed MONUSCO.

[102]Source: Google, 'Google Trends', `https://www.google.com/trends`, accessed Apr. 28, 2018.




Figure 5.14: Google Trends Results for 'MINUSTAH' to Assess Face Validity[103]

The United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti was deployed from 2004 to 2017. The first search queries were recorded in June 2004 when the mission started. The catastrophic earthquake in Haiti on 12 January 2010 created a massive rise in attention to the peace operation.

[103]Source: Google, 'Google Trends', `https://www.google.com/trends`, accessed Apr. 28, 2018.




Figure 5.15: Google Trends Results for 'UNMISS' to Assess Face Validity[104]

The United Nations Mission in South Sudan was established in July 2011. Earlier search queries for UNMISS might stem from searches intended for the 2005-2011 mission UNMIS. A clear rise in interest can be seen in July 2011 with the start of the operation. Interest peaked in December 2013 when violent conflict erupted in South Sudan.

[104]Source: Google, 'Google Trends', `https://www.google.com/trends`, accessed Apr. 28, 2018.




Figure 5.16: Google Trends Results for 'MINURCAT' to Assess Face Validity[105]

The United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) was active from 2007–2010 – which also marks the period of main interest in the search term MINURCAT. A first surge in interest occurred in March 2009 when MNURCAT was enhanced with a transfer of authority from the European Union Mission EUFOR Tchad/RCA to the UN operation. In February 2010, the second spike, Chad requested the withdrawal of UN peacekeepers, and activists and interest groups subsequently declared concerns about the consequences of MINURCAT's withdrawal, especially for Darfuri refugees in the region.

[105]Source: Google, 'Google Trends', `https://www.google.com/trends`, accessed Apr. 28, 2018.




Figure 5.17: Google Trends Related Queries for 'MONUSCO' to Assess Content Validity[106]

'MONUSCO' accurately reflects the domain of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.




Figure 5.18: Google Trends Related Queries for 'UNAMA' to Assess Content Validity[107]

'UNAMA' does not reflect the domain of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan.

[106]Source: Google, 'Google Trends', `https://www.google.com/trends`, accessed Apr. 28, 2018.
[107]Source: Google, 'Google Trends', `https://www.google.com/trends`, accessed Apr. 28, 2018.




Figure 5.19: Scatter Plot of Google Trends Data and News Coverage of Peace Operations (UK, France, and Germany, 2004–2016)




Figure 5.20: Scatter Plot of Google Trends Data and News Coverage of Peace Operations (UK, France, and Germany, 2004–2016); Limited to Max. 150 News Articles

Table 5.5: All Elections Included in Dataset, Incl. Details about Snap Elections

Country	**Elections**
Australia	10.2004 11.2007 8.2010 9.2013 7.2016
Austria	4.2004 10.2006 9.2008 4.2010 9.2013 4.2016
	Notes: incl. legislative and presidential elections; snap election in 2008 (reasons included disagreement within the coalition, incl. European policy)
Belgium	6.2007 6.2010 5.2014
	Notes: snap election in 2010 (reasons included conflict over state reforms and the electoral arrondissement of Brussels Halle-Vilvoorde)
Brazil	10.2006 10.2010 10.2014
	Notes: incl. legislative and presidential elections (held on the same day)
Canada	6.2004 1.2006 10.2008 5.2011 10.2015
	Notes: Parliament has a maximum term of 5 years before 2009 and 4 thereafter, but prime ministers regularly called for snap elections, usually following a motion of non-confidence against the (minority) government, but unrelated to foreign policy issues
Denmark	2.2005 11.2007 9.2011 6.2015
	Notes: snap election in 2007 (reasons included welfare reform; Prime Minister Rasmussen also took advantage of strong economic growth and high approval ratings)
France	4.-5.2007 6.2007 4.-5.2012 6.2012
	Notes: incl. legislative and presidential elections
Germany	9.2005 9.2009 9.2013
	Notes: snap election in 2005 (reasons included domestic reform policies and changed balance of power in the upper house)
India	4.-5.2004 4.-5.2009 4.-5.2014
Indonesia	4.2004 7./9.2004 4.2009 7.2009 4.2014 7.2014
	Notes: incl. legislative and presidential elections
Italy	4.2006 4.2008 2.2013
	Notes: snap election in 2008 (reasons included economic policies, position towards the US, Italian military presence in Afghanistan, a corruption scandal, among others)
Netherlands	11.2006 6.2010 9.2012
	Notes: snap election in 2006 (reasons included the treatment of Hirsi Ali); snap election in 2010 (reason was the contribution of Dutch soldiers to the War in Afghanistan); snap election in 2012 (reasons included austerity measures)
Norway	9.2005 9.2009 9.2013
South Africa	4.2004 4.2009 5.2014
Spain	2.2004 3.2008 11.2011 12.2015 6.2016
	Notes: snap election in 2011 (reasons included deteriorating economic situation); repeat election in 2016 after no governing coalition could be formed
Sweden	9.2006 9.2010 9.2014
Switzerland	10.2007 10.2011 10.2015
UK	5.2005 5.2010 5.2015
	Notes: Fixed-term Parliaments Act introduced in 2011
US	11.2004 11.2006 11.2008 11.2010 11.2012 11.2014 11.2016
	Notes: incl. legislative & presidential elections

Table 5.6: Google Trends Search Terms

Country	Mission	Start Date	End Date	Search 1	Search 2	Search 3	Search 4
Canada	UNMIK	01.2004	02.2004	UNMIK	Kosovo war	Kosovo conflict	Kosovo UN
Canada	UNMIS	04.2005	06.2011	UNMIS	Sudan war	Sudan conflict	Sudan UN
Canada	UNMISET	01.2004	04.2004	UNMISET	East Timor war	East Timor conflict	East Timor UN
Canada	UNMISS	08.2011	12.2016	UNMISS	South Sudan war	South Sudan conflict	South Sudan UN
Canada	UNMIT	12.2006	01.2010	UNMIT	East Timor war	East Timor conflict	East Timor UN
Canada	UNOCI	04.2004	09.2013	UNOCI	Ivory Coast war	Ivory Coast conflict	Ivory Coast UN
Canada	UNTSO	01.2004	12.2016	UNTSO	Middle East war	Middle East conflict	Middle East UN
Denmark	MINURCAT	03.2008	08.2008	MINURCAT	Tchad krigen	Tchad konflikten	Tchad FN*
Denmark	MINURSO	09.2005	09.2007	MINURSO	Vestsahara krigen	Vestsahara konflikten	Vestsahara FN
Denmark	MINUSMA	01.2014	12.2016	MINUSMA	Mali krigen	Mali konflikten	Mali FN
Denmark	MONUC	01.2004	06.2010	MONUC	Congo krigen	Congo konflikten	Congo FN
Denmark	MONUSCO	07.2010	11.2011	MONUSCO	Congo krigen	Congo konflikten	Congo FN
Denmark	UNAMA	01.2004	11.2013	UNAMA*	Afghanistan krigen	Afghanistan konflikten	Afghanistan FN
Denmark	UNAMI	01.2006	08.2012	UNAMI*	Irak krigen	Irak konflikten	Irak FN
Denmark	UNAMSIL	01.2004	07.2005	UNAMSIL	Sierra Leone krigen	Sierra Leone konflikten	Sierra Leone FN
Denmark	UNIFIL	10.2006	10.2011	UNIFIL	Lebanon krigen	Lebanon konflikten	Lebanon FN
Denmark	UNMEE	01.2004	06.2008	UNMEE	Eritrea krigen	Eritrea konflikten	Eritrea FN
Denmark	UNMIK	01.2004	11.2011	UNMIK	Kosovo krigen	Kosovo konflikten	Kosovo FN
Denmark	UNMIL	01.2004	12.2015	UNMIL	Liberia krigen	Liberia konflikten	Liberia FN*
Denmark	UNMIN	05.2007	10.2008	UNMIN	Nepal krigen	Nepal konflikten	Nepal FN
Denmark	UNMIS	04.2005	06.2011	UNMIS	Sudan krigen	Sudan konflikten	Sudan FN
Denmark	UNMISET	01.2004	04.2005	UNMISET	Østtimor krigen	Østtimor konflikten	Østtimor FN
Denmark	UNMISS	08.2011	12.2016	UNMISS	Sydsudan krigen	Sydsuden konflikten	Sydsudan FN
Denmark	UNMOGIP	01.2004	09.2009	UNMOGIP	Kashmir krigen	Kashmir konflikten	Kashmir FN
Denmark	UNOMIG	01.2004	05.2009	UNOMIG	Georgien krigen*	Georgien konflikten*	Georgien FN*
Denmark	UNSMIS	05.2012	07.2012	UNSMIS	Syrien krigen	Syrien konflikten	Syrien FN
Denmark	UNTSO	01.2004	12.2016	UNTSO	Mellemøsten krigen	Mellemøsten konflikten	Mellemøsten FN
France	MINURCAT	09.2007	11.2010	MINURCAT	Tchad guerre	Tchad conflit	Tchad ONU*
France	MINURSO	01.2004	12.2016	MINURSO	Sahara occidental guerre	Sahara occidental conflit	Sahara occidental ONU

Country	Mission	Start Date	End Date	Search 1	Search 2	Search 3	Search 4
France	MINUSCA	06.2014	12.2016	MINUSCA	Centrafrique guerre	Centrafrique conflit	Centrafrique ONU
France	MINUSMA	07.2013	12.2016	MINUSMA	Mali guerre	Mali conflit	Mali ONU
France	MINUSTAH	05.2004	12.2016	MINUSTAH	Haïti guerre	Haïti conflit	Haïti ONU
France	MONUC	01.2004	06.2010	MONUC	Congo guerre	Congo conflit	Congo ONU
France	MONUSCO	07.2010	12.2016	MONUSCO	Congo guerre	Congo conflit	Congo ONU
France	UNAMID	12.2007	11.2009	MINUAD	Darfour guerre	Darfour conflit	Darfour ONU
France	UNIFIL	01.2004	12.2016	FINUL	Liban guerre	Liban conflit	Liban ONU
France	UNMEE	01.2004	07.2008	MINUEE	Érythrée guerre	Érythrée conflit	Érythrée ONU
France	UNMIK	01.2004	12.2008	MINUK	Kosovo guerre	Kosovo conflit	Kosovo ONU
France	UNMIL	01.2004	03.2016	MINUL	Libéria guerre	Libéria conflit	Libéria ONU*
France	UNMIS	08.2007	12.2007	UNMIS	Soudan guerre	Soudan conflit	Soudan ONU
France	UNOCI	03.2004	12.2016	ONUCI	Côte d'Ivoire guerre	Côte d'Ivoire conflit	Côte d'Ivoire ONU
France	UNOMIG	01.2004	05.2009	MONUG	Géorgie guerre*	Géorgie conflit*	Géorgie ONU*
France	UNSMIS	05.2012	07.2012	MISNUS	Syrie guerre	Syrie conflit	Syrie ONU
France	UNTSO	01.2004	12.2016	UNTSO	Moyen-Orient guerre	Moyen-Orient conflit	Moyen-Orient ONU
Germany	MINURSO	11.2013	12.2016	MINURSO	Westsahara Krieg	Westsahara Konflikt	Westsahara UN
Germany	MINUSMA	07.2013	12.2016	MINUSMA	Mali Krieg	Mali Konflikt	Mali UN
Germany	MINUSTAH	07.2016	01.2017	MINUSTAH	Haiti Krieg	Haiti Konflikt	Haiti UN
Germany	UNAMA	09.2004	12.2016	UNAMA*	Afghanistan Krieg	Afghanistan Konflikt	Afghanistan UN
Germany	UNAMID	11.2007	12.2016	UNAMID	Darfur Krieg	Darfur Konflikt	Darfur UN
Germany	UNAMSIL	01.2004	11.2005	UNAMSIL	Sierra Leone Krieg	Sierra Leone Konflikt	Sierra Leone UN
Germany	UNIFIL	10.2006	12.2016	UNIFIL	Libanon Krieg	Libanon Konflikt	Libanon UN
Germany	UNMEE	02.2004	07.2008	UNMEE	Eritrea Krieg	Eritrea Konflikt	Eritrea UN
Germany	UNMIK	01.2004	12.2016	UNMIK	Kosovo Krieg	Kosovo Konflikt	Kosovo UN
Germany	UNMIL	12.2004	12.2016	UNMIL	Liberia Krieg	Liberia Konflikt	Liberia UN*
Germany	UNMIS	05.2005	06.2011	UNMIS	Sudan Krieg	Sudan Konflikt	Sudan UN
Germany	UNMISS	08.2011	12.2016	UNMISS	Südsudan Krieg	Südsudan Konflikt	Südsudan UN
Germany	UNOMIG	01.2004	05.2009	UNOMIG	Georgien Krieg*	Georgien Konflikt*	Georgien UN*
Germany	UNSOM	02.2016	12.2016	UNSOM*	Somalia Krieg	Somalia Konflikt	Somalia UN
India	MINUCI	01.2004	02.2004	MINUCI	Ivory Coast war	Ivory Coast conflict	Ivory Coast UN
India	MINURSO	09.2014	12.2016	MINURSO	Western Sahara war	Western Sahara conflict	Western Sahara UN
India	MINUSTAH	10.2008	12.2016	MINUSTAH	Haiti war	Haiti conflict	Haiti UN

Country	Mission	Start Date	End Date	Search 1	Search 2	Search 3	Search 4
India	MONUC	01.2004	06.2010	MONUC	Congo war	Congo conflict	Congo UN
India	MONUSCO	07.2010	12.2016	MONUSCO	Congo war	Congo conflict	Congo UN
India	ONUB	06.2004	11.2006	ONUB	Burundi war	Burundi conflict	Burundi UN
India	UNAMA	05.2013	12.2016	UNAMA*	Afghanistan war	Afghanistan conflict	Afghanistan UN
India	UNAMI	05.2014	04.2015	UNAMI*	Iraq war	Iraq conflict	Iraq UN
India	UNAMSIL	01.2004	11.2005	UNAMSIL	Sierra Leone war	Sierra Leone conflict	Sierra Leone UN
India	UNDOF	01.2006	12.2016	UNDOF	Golan Heights war	Golan Heights conflict	Golan Heights UN
India	UNFICYP	01.2004	12.2016	UNFICYP	Cyprus war	Cyprus conflict	Cyprus UN
India	UNIFIL	01.2004	12.2016	UNIFIL	Lebanon war	Lebanon conflict	Lebanon UN
India	UNIOSIL	01.2006	07.2008	UNIOSIL	Sierra Leone war	Sierra Leone conflict	Sierra Leone UN
India	UNISFA	08.2011	12.2016	UNISFA	Abyei war	Abyei conflict	Abyei UN
India	UNMEE	01.2004	07.2008	UNMEE	Eritrea war	Eritrea conflict	Eritrea UN
India	UNMIK	01.2004	02.2009	UNMIK	Kosovo war	Kosovo conflict	Kosovo UN
India	UNMIL	07.2006	12.2016	UNMIL	Liberia war	Liberia conflict	Liberia UN*
India	UNMIS	03.2005	07.2011	UNMIS	Sudan war	Sudan conflict	Sudan UN
India	UNMISS	08.2011	12.2016	UNMISS	South Sudan war	South Sudan conflict	South Sudan UN
India	UNMIT	01.2007	11.2012	UNMIT	East Timor war	East Timor conflict	East Timor UN
India	UNOCI	03.2004	12.2016	UNOCI	Ivory Coast war	Ivory Coast conflict	Ivory Coast UN
India	UNOMIG	07.2005	07.2006	UNOMIG	Georgia war*	Georgia conflict*	Georgia UN*
India	UNSOM	02.2016	08.2016	UNSOM*	Somalia war	Somalia conflict	Somalia UN
India	UNTSO	12.2015	12.2016	UNTSO	Middle East war	Middle East conflict	Middle East UN
Indonesia	MINURSO	12.2013	12.2016	MINURSO	Sahara Barat perang	Sahara Barat konflik	Sahara Barat PBB
Indonesia	MINUSCA	06.2014	12.2016	MINUSCA	Republik Afrika Tengah perang	Republik Afrika Tengah konflik	Republik Afrika Tengah PBB
Indonesia	MINUSMA	03.2015	12.2016	MINUSMA	Mali perang	Mali konflik	Mali PBB
Indonesia	MINUSTAH	07.2010	12.2016	MINUSTAH	Haiti pergan	Haiti konflik	Haiti PBB
Indonesia	MONUC	01.2004	06.2010	MONUC	Kongo perang	Kongo konflik	Kongo PBB
Indonesia	MONUSCO	07.2010	12.2016	MONUSCO	Kongo perang	Kongo konflik	Kongo PBB
Indonesia	UNAMID	03.2008	12.2016	UNAMID	Darfur perang	Darfur konflik	Darfur PBB
Indonesia	UNAMSIL	01.2004	11.2005	UNAMSIL	Sierra Leone perang	Sierra Leone konflik	Sierra Leone PBB
Indonesia	UNIFIL	11.2006	12.2016	UNIFIL	Lebanon perang	Lebanon konflik	Lebanon PBB
Indonesia	UNISFA	05.2012	12.2016	UNISFA	Abyei perang	Abyei konflik	Abyei PBB

Country	Mission	Start Date	End Date	Search 1	Search 2	Search 3	Search 4
Indonesia	UNMIL	01.2004	08.2016	UNMIL	Liberia perang	Liberia konflik	Liberia PBB*
Indonesia	UNMIN	02.2007	12.2010	UNMIN	Nepal perang	Nepal konflik	Nepal PBB
Indonesia	UNMIS	05.2005	06.2011	UNMIS	Sudan perang	Sudan konflik	Sudan PBB
Indonesia	UNMISS	08.2011	12.2016	UNMISS	Sudan Selatan perang	Sudan Selatan konflik	Sudan Selatan PBB
Indonesia	UNOMIG	01.2004	05.2009	UNOMIG	Georgia perang*	Georgia konflik*	Georgia PBB*
Indonesia	UNSMIS	04.2012	07.2012	UNSMIS	Suriah perang	Suriah konflik	Suriah PBB
Italy	MINURCAT	05.2009	05.2009	MINURCAT	Ciad guerra	Ciad conflitto	Ciad ONU*
Italy	MINURSO	01.2004	02.2015	MINURSO	Sahara Occidental guerra	Sahara Occidental conflitto	Sahara Occidental ONU
Italy	MINUSMA	07.2013	12.2016	MINUSMA	Mali guerra	Mali conflitto	Mali ONU
Italy	MINUSTAH	03.2008	12.2010	MINUSTAH	Haiti guerra	Haiti conflitto	Haiti ONU
Italy	MONUC	09.2008	11.2008	MONUC	Congo guerra	Congo conflitto	Congo ONU
Italy	UNAMA	06.2010	12.2013	UNAMA*	Afghanistan guerra	Afghanistan conflitto	Afghanistan ONU
Italy	UNAMID	06.2008	03.2012	UNAMID	Darfur guerra	Darfur conflitto	Darfur ONU
Italy	UNFICYP	09.2005	12.2016	UNFICYP	Cipro guerra	Cipro conflitto	Cipro ONU
Italy	UNIFIL	01.2004	12.2016	UNIFIL	Libano guerra	Libano conflitto	Libano ONU
Italy	UNMEE	01.2004	11.2005	UNMEE	Eritrea guerra	Eritrea conflitto	Eritrea ONU
Italy	UNMIK	01.2004	12.2016	UNMIK	Kosovo guerra	Kosovo conflitto	Kosovo ONU
Italy	UNMIL	03.2009	07.2009	UNMIL	Liberia guerra	Liberia conflitto	Liberia ONU*
Italy	UNMIS	04.2005	12.2007	UNMIS	Sudan guerra	Sudan conflitto	Sudan ONU
Italy	UNMISS	04.2012	11.2013	UNMISS	Sudan del Sud guerra	Sudan del Sud conflitto	Sudan del Sud ONU
Italy	UNMIT	06.2009	11.2009	UNMIT	Timor-Est guerra	Timor-Est conflitto	Timor-Est ONU
Italy	UNMOGIP	01.2004	02.2015	UNMOGIP	Kashmir guerra	Kashmir conflitto	Kashmir ONU
Italy	UNSMIS	05.2012	07.2012	UNSMIS	Siria guerra	Siria conflitto	Siria ONU
Italy	UNTSO	01.2004	02.2015	UNTSO	Medio Oriente guerra	Medio Oriente conflitto	Medio Oriente ONU
Netherlands	BINUB	03.2007	06.2009	BINUB	Burundi oorlog	Burundi conflict	Burundi VN
Netherlands	MINUSMA	10.2013	12.2016	MINUSMA	Mali oorlog	Mali conflict	Mali VN
Netherlands	MONUC	02.2005	01.2007	MONUC	Congo oorlog	Congo conflict	Congo VN
Netherlands	ONUB	09.2004	08.2005	ONUB	Burundi oorlog	Burundi conflict	Burundi VN
Netherlands	UNAMA	11.2011	12.2016	UNAMA*	Afghanistan oorlog	Afghanistan conflict	Afghanistan VN

Country	Mission	Start Date	End Date	Search 1	Search 2	Search 3	Search 4
Netherlands	UNAMID	01.2008	05.2012	UNAMID	Darfur oorlog	Darfur conflict	Darfur VN
Netherlands	UNDOF	09.2013	12.2016	UNDOF	Golanhoogten oorlog	Golanhoogten conflict	Golanhoogten VN
Netherlands	UNFICYP	01.2004	01.2011	UNFICYP	Cyprus oorlog	Cyprus conflict	Cyprus VN
Netherlands	UNIFIL	12.2006	02.2008	UNIFIL	Libanon oorlog	Libanon conflict	Libanon VN
Netherlands	UNMIK	10.2004	06.2007	UNMIK	Kosovo oorlog	Kosovo conflict	Kosovo VN
Netherlands	UNMIL	01.2004	01.2004	UNMIL	Liberia oorlog	Liberia conflict	Liberia VN*
Netherlands	UNMIS	03.2006	06.2011	UNMIS	Sudan oorlog	Sudan conflict	Sudan VN
Netherlands	UNMISS	03.2012	12.2016	UNMISS	Zuid Soedan oorlog	Zuid Soedan conflict	Zuid Soedan VN
Netherlands	UNSMIS	05.2012	07.2012	UNSMIS	Syrie oorlog	Syrie conflict	Syrie VN
Netherlands	UNTSO	01.2004	12.2016	UNTSO	Midden-Oosten oorlog	Midden-Oosten conflict	Midden-Oosten VN
Norway	MINURCAT	03.2009	11.2010	MINURCAT	Tsjad krigen	Tsjad konflikten	Tsjad FN*
Norway	MINUSMA	09.2013	12.2016	MINUSMA	Mali krigen	Mali konflikten	Mali FN
Norway	MINUSTAH	10.2010	12.2016	MINUSTAH	Haiti krigen	Haiti konflikten	Haiti FN
Norway	MONUC	03.2009	06.2010	MONUC	Kongo krigen	Kongo konflikten	Kongo FN
Norway	MONUSCO	07.2010	07.2013	MONUSCO	Kongo krigen	Kongo konflikten	Kongo FN
Norway	UNAMA	07.2004	09.2014	UNAMA*	Afghanistan krigen	Afghanistan konflikten	Afghanistan FN
Norway	UNAMID	01.2008	09.2011	UNAMID	Darfur krigen	Darfur konflikten	Darfur FN
Norway	UNAMSIL	12.2003	10.2005	UNAMSIL	Sierra Leone krigen	Sierra Leone konflikten	Sierra Leone FN
Norway	UNFICYP	08.2014	09.2016	UNFICYP	Kypros krigen	Kypros konflikten	Kypros FN
Norway	UNIFIL	08.2006	08.2009	UNIFIL	Libanon krigen	Libanon konflikten	Libanon FN
Norway	UNIOSIL	01.2006	02.2007	UNIOSIL	Sierra Leone krigen	Sierra Leone konflikten	Sierra Leone FN
Norway	UNMC	09.2016	01.2017	UNMC*	Colombia krigen	Colombia konflikten	Colombia FN*
Norway	UNMEE	01.2004	07.2008	UNMEE	Eritrea krigen	Eritrea konflikten	Eritrea FN
Norway	UNMIK	01.2004	06.2014	UNMIK	Kosovo krigen	Kosovo konflikten	Kosovo FN
Norway	UNMIL	01.2004	12.2016	UNMIL	Liberia krigen	Liberia konflikten	Liberia FN*
Norway	UNMIN	04.2007	03.2008	UNMIN	Nepal krigen	Nepal konflikten	Nepal FN
Norway	UNMIS	03.2005	06.2011	UNMIS	Sudan krigen	Sudan konflikten	Sudan FN
Norway	UNMISET	01.2004	04.2005	UNMISET	Øst-Timor krigen	Øst-Timor konflikten	Øst-Timor FN
Norway	UNMISS	08.2011	12.2016	UNMISS	Sør-Sudan krigen	Sør-Sudan konflikten	Sør-Sudan FN
Norway	UNMIT	09.2008	11.2008	UNMIT	Øst-Timor krigen	Øst-Timor konflikten	Øst-Timor FN

Country	Mission	Start Date	End Date	Search 1	Search 2	Search 3	Search 4
Norway	UNSMIS	04.2012	07.2012	UNSMIS	Syria krigen	Syria konflikten	Syria FN
Norway	UNTSO	01.2004	12.2016	UNTSO	Midtøsten krigen	Midtøsten konflikten	Midtøsten FN
South Africa	BINUB	04.2007	03.2008	BINUB	Burundi war	Burundi conflict	Burundi UN
South Africa	MONUC	01.2004	06.2010	MONUC	Congo war	Congo conflict	Congo UN
South Africa	MONUSCO	07.2010	12.2016	MONUSCO	Congo war	Congo conflict	Congo UN
South Africa	ONUB	06.2004	11.2006	ONUB	Burundi war	Burundi conflict	Burundi UN
South Africa	UNAMID	11.2007	12.2016	UNAMID	Darfur war	Darfur conflict	Darfur UN
South Africa	UNMEE	01.2004	07.2008	UNMEE	Eritrea war	Eritrea conflict	Eritrea UN
South Africa	UNMIL	01.2004	03.2005	UNMIL	Liberia war	Liberia conflict	Liberia UN*
South Africa	UNMIN	04.2007	06.2009	UNMIN	Nepal war	Nepal conflict	Nepal UN
South Africa	UNMIS	10.2006	12.2007	UNMIS	Sudan war	Sudan conflict	Sudan UN
South Africa	UNMISS	02.2012	12.2016	UNMISS	South Sudan war	South Sudan conflict	South Sudan UN
Spain	MINURCAT	01.2008	05.2009	MINURCAT	Chad guerra	Chad conflicto	Chad ONU*
Spain	MINUSCA	12.2016	12.2016	MINUSCA	Centroafricana guerra	Centroafricana conflicto	Centroafricana ONU
Spain	MINUSTAH	09.2004	12.2016	MINUSTAH	Haití guerra	Haití conflicto	Haití ONU
Spain	MONUC	01.2004	06.2010	MONUC	Congo guerra	Congo conflicto	Congo ONU
Spain	MONUSCO	07.2010	04.2012	MONUSCO	Congo guerra	Congo conflicto	Congo ONU
Spain	ONUB	06.2004	05.2005	ONUB	Burundi guerra	Burundi conflicto	Burundi ONU
Spain	UNIFIL	08.2006	12.2016	UNIFIL	Líbano guerra	Líbano conflicto	Líbano ONU
Spain	UNIOSIL	03.2007	07.2008	UNIOSIL	Sierra Leona guerra	Sierra Leona conflicto	Sierra Leona ONU
Spain	UNMC	11.2016	01.2017	UNMC*	Colombia guerra	Colombia conflicto	Colombia ONU*
Spain	UNMEE	01.2004	07.2008	UNMEE	Eritrea guerra	Eritrea conflicto	Eritrea ONU
Spain	UNMIK	01.2004	06.2012	MINUK	Kosovo guerra	Kosovo conflicto	Kosovo ONU
Spain	UNMIS	04.2004	11.2005	UNMIS	Sudán guerra	Sudán conflicto	Sudán ONU
Spain	UNMISET	01.2004	04.2005	UNMISET	Timor Oriental guerra	Timor Oriental conflicto	Timor Oriental ONU
Spain	UNMIT	10.2006	11.2012	UNMIT	Timor Oriental guerra	Timor Oriental conflicto	Timor Oriental ONU
Spain	UNOCI	09.2008	06.2016	ONUCI	Costa de Marfil guerra	Costa de Marfil conflicto	Costa de Marfil ONU
Spain	UNOTIL	07.2005	04.2006	UNOTIL	Timor Oriental guerra	Timor Oriental conflicto	Timor Oriental ONU
Sweden	MINURCAT	09.2007	02.2010	MINURCAT	Tchad kriget	Tchad konflikten	Tchad FN*

Country	Mission	Start Date	End Date	Search 1	Search 2	Search 3	Search 4
Sweden	MINUSCA	12.2016	12.2016	MINUSCA	Central-afrikanska republiken kriget	Central-afrikanska republiken konflikten	Central-afrikanska republiken FN
Sweden	MINUSMA	07.2013	12.2016	MINUSMA	Mali kriget	Mali konflikten	Mali FN
Sweden	MINUSTAH	04.2010	12.2016	MINUSTAH	Haiti kriget	Haiti konflikten	Haiti FN
Sweden	MONUC	01.2004	06.2010	MONUC	Kongo kriget	Kongo konflikten	Kongo FN
Sweden	MONUSCO	07.2010	12.2016	MONUSCO	Kongo kriget	Kongo konflikten	Kongo FN
Sweden	UNAMA	01.2004	06.2015	UNAMA*	Afghanistan kriget	Afghanistan konflikten	Afghanistan FN
Sweden	UNAMID	11.2007	04.2011	UNAMID	Darfur kriget	Darfur konflikten	Darfur FN
Sweden	UNAMSIL	01.2004	11.2005	UNAMSIL	Sierra Leone kriget	Sierra Leone konflikten	Sierra Leone FN
Sweden	UNIFIL	10.2006	07.2007	UNIFIL	Libanon kriget	Libanon konflikten	Libanon FN
Sweden	UNIOSIL	01.2006	08.2008	UNIOSIL	Sierra Leone kriget	Sierra Leone konflikten	Sierra Leone FN
Sweden	UNISFA	08.2011	10.2011	UNISFA	Abyei kriget	Abyei konflikten	Abyei FN
Sweden	UNMC	11.2016	01.2017	UNMC*	Colombia kriget	Colombia konflikten	Colombia FN*
Sweden	UNMEE	01.2004	07.2008	UNMEE	Eritrea kriget	Eritrea konflikten	Eritrea FN
Sweden	UNMIK	01.2004	12.2008	UNMIK	Kosovo kriget	Kosovo konflikten	Kosovo FN
Sweden	UNMIL	01.2004	12.2016	UNMIL	Liberia kriget	Liberia konflikten	Liberia FN*
Sweden	UNMIN	03.2007	12.2010	UNMIN	Nepal kriget	Nepal konflikten	Nepal FN
Sweden	UNMIS	03.2005	06.2011	UNMIS	Sudan kriget	Sudan konflikten	Sudan FN
Sweden	UNMISET	01.2004	04.2005	UNMISET	Östtimor kriget	Östtimor konflikten	Östtimor FN
Sweden	UNMISS	08.2011	12.2016	UNMISS	Sydsudan kriget	Sydsudan konflikten	Sydsudan FN
Sweden	UNMIT	12.2006	04.2010	UNMIT	Östtimor kriget	Östtimor konflikten	Östtimor FN
Sweden	UNMOGIP	01.2004	12.2016	UNMOGIP	Kashmir kriget	Kashmir konflikten	Kashmir FN
Sweden	UNOCI	07.2009	11.2009	UNOCI	Elfenbenskusten kriget	Elfenbenskusten konflikten	Elfenbenskusten FN
Sweden	UNOMIG	01.2004	05.2009	UNOMIG	Georgien kriget*	Georgien konflikten*	Georgien FN*
Sweden	UNSMIS	06.2012	07.2012	UNSMIS	Syrien kriget	Syrien konflikten	Syrien FN
Sweden	UNSOM	03.2016	12.2016	UNSOM*	Somalia kriget	Somalia konflikten	Somalia FN
Sweden	UNTSO	01.2004	12.2016	UNTSO	Mellanöstern kriget	Mellanöstern konflikten	Mellanöstern FN
Switzerland	BINUB	10.2007	12.2010	BINUB	Burundi Krieg	Burundi Konflikt	Burundi UN
Switzerland	BNUB	01.2011	12.2012	BNUB	Burundi Krieg	Burundi Konflikt	Burundi UN
Switzerland	MINURSO	09.2014	12.2016	MINURSO	Westsahara Krieg	Westsahara Konflikt	Westsahara UN
Switzerland	MINUSMA	10.2013	12.2016	MINUSMA	Mali Krieg	Mali Konflikt	Mali UN

Country	Mission	Start Date	End Date	Search 1	Search 2	Search 3	Search 4
Switzerland	MINUSTAH	07.2009	11.2009	MINUSTAH	Haiti Krieg	Haiti Konflikt	Haiti UN
Switzerland	MONUC	01.2004	06.2010	MONUC	Kongo Krieg	Kongo Konflikt	Kongo UN
Switzerland	MONUSCO	07.2010	12.2016	MONUSCO	Kongo Krieg	Kongo Konflikt	Kongo UN
Switzerland	UNAMA	06.2004	06.2004	UNAMA*	Afghanistan Krieg	Afghanistan Konflikt	Afghanistan UN
Switzerland	UNAMID	07.2009	10.2009	UNAMID	Darfur Krieg	Darfur Konflikt	Darfur UN
Switzerland	UNMEE	01.2004	09.2007	UNMEE	Eritrea Krieg	Eritrea Konflikt	Eritrea UN
Switzerland	UNMIK	01.2004	01.2009	UNMIK	Kosovo Krieg	Kosovo Konflikt	Kosovo UN
Switzerland	UNMIL	04.2010	12.2016	UNMIL	Liberia Krieg	Liberia Konflikt	Liberia UN*
Switzerland	UNMIN	02.2007	12.2010	UNMIN	Nepal Krieg	Nepal Konflikt	Nepal UN
Switzerland	UNMIS	04.2005	06.2011	UNMIS	Sudan Krieg	Sudan Konflikt	Sudan UN
Switzerland	UNMISS	10.2011	12.2016	UNMISS	Südsudan Krieg	Südsudan Konflikt	Südsudan UN
Switzerland	UNMOGIP	01.2014	12.2016	UNMOGIP	Kaschmir Krieg	Kaschmir Konflikt	Kaschmir UN
Switzerland	UNOCI	04.2006	10.2016	ONUCI	Elfenbeinküste Krieg	Elfenbeinküste Konflikt	Elfenbeinküste UN
Switzerland	UNOMIG	01.2004	05.2009	UNOMIG	Georgien Krieg*	Georgien Konflikt*	Georgien UN*
Switzerland	UNSMIS	04.2012	07.2012	UNSMIS	Syrien Krieg	Syrien Konflikt	Syrien UN
Switzerland	UNTSO	01.2004	12.2016	UNTSO	Naher Osten Krieg	Naher Osten Konflikt	Naher Osten UN
UK	MINUSMA	07.2013	12.2016	MINUSMA	Mali war	Mali conflict	Mali UN
UK	MINUSTAH	01.2014	01.2016	MINUSTAH	Haiti war	Haiti conflict	Haiti UN
UK	MONUC	01.2004	06.2010	MONUC	Congo war	Congo conflict	Congo UN
UK	MONUSCO	07.2010	12.2016	MONUSCO	Congo war	Congo conflict	Congo UN
UK	UNAMA	05.2007	05.2010	UNAMA*	Afghanistan war	Afghanistan conflict	Afghanistan UN
UK	UNAMI	01.2006	09.2014	UNAMI*	Iraq war	Iraq conflict	Iraq UN
UK	UNAMID	11.2007	09.2009	UNAMID	Darfur war	Darfur conflict	Darfur UN
UK	UNAMSIL	12.2003	11.2005	UNAMSIL	Sierra Leone war	Sierra Leone conflict	Sierra Leone UN
UK	UNFICYP	01.2004	12.2016	UNFICYP	Cyprus war	Cyprus conflict	Cyprus UN
UK	UNIOSIL	01.2006	09.2008	UNIOSIL	Sierra Leone war	Sierra Leone conflict	Sierra Leone UN
UK	UNISFA	08.2011	11.2011	UNISFA	Abyei war	Abyei conflict	Abyei UN
UK	UNMC	01.2017	01.2017	UNMC*	Colombia war	Colombia conflict	Colombia UN*
UK	UNMEE	01.2004	06.2004	UNMEE	Eritrea war	Eritrea conflict	Eritrea UN
UK	UNMIK	01.2004	12.2008	UNMIK	Kosovo war	Kosovo conflict	Kosovo UN
UK	UNMIL	01.2004	11.2016	UNMIL	Liberia war	Liberia conflict	Liberia UN*
UK	UNMIN	02.2007	08.2008	UNMIN	Nepal war	Nepal conflict	Nepal UN
UK	UNMIS	03.2005	06.2011	UNMIS	Sudan war	Sudan conflict	Sudan UN

Country	Mission	Start Date	End Date	Search 1	Search 2	Search 3	Search 4
UK	UNMISET	01.2004	04.2004	UNMISET	East Timor war	East Timor conflict	East Timor UN
UK	UNMISS	08.2011	12.2016	UNMISS	South Sudan war	South Sudan conflict	South Sudan UN
UK	UNMOGIP	12.2004	12.2004	UNMOGIP	Kashmir war	Kashmir conflict	Kashmir UN
UK	UNOMIG	01.2004	05.2009	UNOMIG	Georgia war*	Georgia conflict*	Georgia UN*
UK	UNSOM	02.2016	12.2016	UNSOM*	Somalia war	Somalia conflict	Somalia UN
UK	UNSOS	09.2016	01.2017	UNSOS	Somalia war	Somalia conflict	Somalia UN
US	MINURCAT	03.2009	10.2010	MINURCAT	Chad war	Chad conflict	Chad UN*
US	MINUSCA	10.2014	12.2016	MINUSCA	Central African Republic war	Central African Republic conflict	Central African Republic UN
US	MINUSMA	07.2013	12.2016	MINUSMA	Mali war	Mali conflict	Mali UN
US	MINUSTAH	06.2004	12.2016	MINUSTAH	Haiti war	Haiti conflict	Haiti UN
US	MONUC	01.2010	06.2010	MONUC	Congo war	Congo conflict	Congo UN
US	MONUSCO	07.2010	12.2016	MONUSCO	Congo war	Congo conflict	Congo UN
US	UNAMA	04.2010	06.2013	UNAMA*	Afghanistan war	Afghanistan conflict	Afghanistan UN
US	UNAMI	01.2009	11.2011	UNAMI*	Iraq war	Iraq conflict	Iraq UN
US	UNAMID	02.2008	07.2008	UNAMID	Darfur war	Darfur conflict	Darfur UN
US	UNAMSIL	01.2004	06.2004	UNAMSIL	Sierra Leone war	Sierra Leone conflict	Sierra Leone UN
US	UNIOSIL	03.2006	09.2008	UNIOSIL	Sierra Leone war	Sierra Leone conflict	Sierra Leone UN
US	UNMEE	01.2004	07.2008	UNMEE	Eritrea war	Eritrea conflict	Eritrea UN
US	UNMIK	01.2004	11.2008	UNMIK	Kosovo war	Kosovo conflict	Kosovo UN
US	UNMIL	01.2004	12.2016	UNMIL	Liberia war	Liberia conflict	Liberia UN*
US	UNMIS	10.2005	06.2011	UNMIS	Sudan war	Sudan conflict	Sudan UN
US	UNMISET	01.2004	04.2005	UNMISET	East Timor war	East Timor conflict	East Timor UN
US	UNMISS	08.2011	12.2016	UNMISS	South Sudan war	South Sudan conflict	South Sudan UN
US	UNMIT	08.2006	04.2007	UNMIT	East Timor war	East Timor conflict	East Timor UN
US	UNMOGIP	12.2004	12.2004	UNMOGIP	Kashmir war	Kashmir conflict	Kashmir UN
US	UNOMIG	01.2004	05.2009	UNOMIG	Georgia war*	Georgia conflict*	Georgia UN*
US	UNOTIL	11.2005	03.2006	UNOTIL	East Timor war	East Timor conflict	East Timor UN
US	UNSMIS	07.2012	07.2012	UNSMIS	Syria war	Syria conflict	Syria UN
US	UNTSO	01.2004	12.2016	UNTSO	Middle East war	Middle East conflict	Middle East UN

Notes: * marks search terms that do not fulfil content validity (and were omitted from the analysis).

Table 5.7: Granger Causality Tests of Google Trends Data and News Coverage of Peace Operations (UK, France, and Germany, 2004–2016)

Dependent Variable	**Independent Variable**	**F-Statistics**	**P-Value**
Google Trends	News Coverage	9.71	0.00**
News Coverage	Google Trends	0.30	0.58

*Notes: the vectors contain one lag. ˆ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.*

Table 5.8: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	**Mean**	**SD**	**Median**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**N**
Troop Contributions	319.97	703.70	6	1	4'392	7'994
Total Contributions	150.43	500.23	7	1	4'698	19'103
Election (Months to)	23.11	15.25	21	0	60	19'103
Election (Year)	0.28	0.45	0	0	1	19'103
Public Attention (Acronym)	15.48	22.77	4	0	100	9'527
Public Attention (Acronym, 3-Month Moving Average)	15.26	16.54	9.67	0	98.33	9'250
Public Attention (Host Country War)	21.67	23.75	15	0	100	7'265
Public Attention (Host Country Conflict)	19.67	24.24	12	0	100	4'557
Public Attention (Host Country UN)	18.83	23.15	10	0	100	1'584
News Coverage	8.01	22.79	3	0	825	3'353
GDP (in US$ Billions)	2'141.56	3'273.48	1'352.36	306.03	16'920	19'103
# PKOs	7.34	2.32	7	1	14	19'103
Casualties	0.01	0.21	0	0	20	17'119
Civilian Deaths	18.01	54.43	0	0	1'051	19'103
Mission Size	7'696.50	5'636.51	7771	1	19'567	13'310
Mission Duration (in Months)	205.01	242.99	88	1	824	19'103

Table 5.9: Coefficients of Negative Binomial Fixed Effects Regression Models of Troop Contributions

	Interaction, FE	**Interaction + Controls, FE + Time FE**
Election	-0.00	-0.00**
	(0.00)	(0.00)
l.Public Attention	0.01***	0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Election*l.Public Attention	0.00**	0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)
GDP		0.00***
		(0.00)
# PKOs		-0.02***
		(0.01)
l.Casualties		-0.00
		(0.01)
l.Civilian Deaths		-0.00
		(0.00)
Mission Size		0.00***
		(0.00)
Mission Duration		0.00***
		(0.00)
l.Troop Contributions		0.00***
		(0.00)
Year-Month Effects		not reported
Constant	0.67***	0.20
	(0.03)	(0.16)
No. Groups	97	91
No. Observations	5'603	4'645

Standard errors in parentheses. ˆ *p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.*

Table 5.10: Coefficients of Linear Fixed Effects Regression Models of Troop Contributions

	Bivariate Election, FE	**Bivariate Attention, FE**	**Interaction, FE**	**Interaction + Controls, FE**
Election	-0.41*		-0.35	-0.17*
	(0.19)		(0.30)	(0.08)
l.Public Attention		0.55**	0.48	0.45***
		(0.18)	(0.31)	(0.08)
Election*l.Public Attention			-0.00	0.01***
			(0.01)	(0.00)
GDP				0.02**
				(0.01)
# PKOs				1.02
				(0.83)
l.Casualties				-3.67
				(2.44)
l.Civilian Casualties				0.04*
				(0.02)
Mission Size				0.00***
				(0.00)
Mission Duration				-0.16***
				(0.05)
l.Troop Contributions				0.94***
				(0.00)
Constant	310.26***	419.75***	411.42***	-26.24ˆ
	(5.22)	(4.84)	(8.79)	(15.38)
R-Squared	0.00 (within)	0.00 (within)	0.00 (within)	0.95 (within)
	0.03	0.05	0.02	0.99
	(between)	(between)	(between)	(between)
	0.02 (overall)	0.01 (overall)	0.00 (overall)	0.98 (overall)
No. Groups	175	99	99	91
No. Observations	7'994	5'605	5'605	4'645

*Standard errors in parentheses. ˆ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.*

Chapter 6

Conclusion of Three Levels of Burden-Sharing in Peace Operations

6.1 Introduction

The question of burden-sharing is of great significance for the successful provision of peace operations. As detailed in Chapter 2, 'Background and Literature Review of Burden-Sharing in Peace Operations', peacekeeping has undergone a quantitative and qualitative evolution, particularly since the end of the Cold War. Peacekeeping has become more numerous, increasing fivefold since the late 1980s, and more comprehensive, performing not only traditional peacekeeping but also multi-dimensional peacebuilding and peace enforcement tasks. The rising demands placed on peacekeeping entail a surge in required resources, including military, police, and civilian personnel, financial resources, and other logistical and organisational capabilities. Securing the resources necessary to successfully deploy a peace operation has often been challenging and cumbersome. '[M]any Member States are saying "no" to deploying formed military units to United Nations-led peacekeeping operations, far more often than they are saying "yes"', as assessed in the *Report of the Panel on United Nations*

Peace Operations.[1] This has regularly led to delays and commitment gaps for peace operations. The European Union (EU), for instance, takes on average six months to respond to demands in peace operations.[2] Similarly, United Nations (UN) peace operations only reach peak deployment after more than ten months, and personnel contributions to UN missions are, on average, 21.6% below the authorised level.[3] These challenges raise the question of how the international community shares the burden of peace operations – a question that is essential for the efficient and successful provision of peacekeeping. This thesis advanced the theoretical and empirical understanding of burden-sharing in peace operations. In three research articles, it generated new insights on different aspects of peacekeeping burden-sharing, while, as a whole, demonstrating that burden-sharing emerges and requires exploration at various levels of analysis.

The concluding chapter first recapitulates and connects the findings of the three research articles. It then elaborates on the implications of the levels of analysis approach for the study of burden-sharing in peace operations and offers avenues for future research, before providing concluding remarks.

6.2 Connecting Three Levels of Analysis in Peacekeeping Burden-Sharing

Each of the three articles constituting this thesis explored burden-sharing in peace operations at a different level of analysis. Levels of analysis, understood as different aggregations as targets for analysis,[4] proved to be a useful conceptual approach to divide the complex process of peacekeeping burden-sharing into more manageable research topics. Peacekeeping burden-sharing can neither be understood without

[1] United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, para. 103.

[2] Hardt, *Time to React*, p. 36.

[3] Rappa, 'The Challenges of Full Deployment on UN Peace Operations'; Passmore, Shannon, and Hart, 'Rallying the Troops', p. 367.

[4] Following Singer, 'The Level-Of-Analysis Problem in International Relations'.

regarding the manifold actors involved at different stages of the process, such as the United Nations, regional organisations (RO), individual troop contributing countries, and the multitude of stakeholders within each actor; nor without the interactions between them, their relations, and interdependences; nor without the multiple stages of the negotiation and decision-making process. Focussing on different aggregations as targets for analysis helped to break down this complexity into separate but related research topics.

The first article, 'Partnership Peacekeeping: The Division of Labour Between the United Nations and Regional Organisations', focussed on the global level and provided a first systematic, comparative empirical study of burden-sharing between the UN and ROs. It argued that peacekeeping is situated in an environment of scarce resources and that the heuristic of comparative advantage is used as a method to find the most effective allocation of resources. A crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis of 26 peace operations by the United Nations, African Union, and European Union in Africa between 2003–2017 found that the UN and regional organisations divide the peacekeeping labour according to (combinations of) their respective comparative advantages. The results were verified and refined by seven case studies. A comparative advantage of the United Nations is a large, multi-dimensional mission scope, albeit constrained by the existence of a comprehensive peace agreement and a disadvantage in deployment speed. Key advantages of ROs are limited, specialised missions in conjunction with other conditions, including the absence of a peace agreement and low conflict intensity, and the combination of the absence of a peace agreement and a bridging/rapid response function. The patterns of UN vis-à-vis regional peacekeeping established by this article are a step towards the definition of efficient mechanisms of crisis response and 'predictable frameworks for cooperation'.[5]

The second article, 'Negotiating Collective Peace: The Provision of Troops to EU Peace Operations', focussed on the regional level, specifically the burden-sharing dynamics within a regional organisation providing peacekeeping. It constitutes one

[5]United Nations General Assembly, 'Peace Operations 2010', para. 17.

of the first quantitative analyses of regional peacekeeping in general and EU operations in particular. It was theorised that the greater the interrelationship between an EU member state and other EU member states, the more likely it is that this state contributes to EU peace operations. Interrelationship includes the interactions, institutional ties, dependences, homophily, and other linkages between the member states. Panel regression analyses were run on an original dataset of EU member states' troop contributions to EU peace operations from 2003–2018. The analyses confirmed that dependence on the EU as an export market and a country's position within the network of intergovernmental organisations are particularly relevant interrelational variables, but also receipts from the annual EU budget, dependence on arms imports from other EU countries, and a country's position within the network of foreign policy preference. Interrelational dynamics are additional motivating factors for potential troop contributing countries, on top of the conflict- and contributor-level factors prominent in the current literature on peace operations, and they offer a new perspective on the success of burden-sharing and collective action problems in peacekeeping.

The last article, 'Public Attention, Elections, and Peace Operations: Democratising the Making of Peacekeeping Policy', examined the national level and studied the role of the public in peacekeeping policy, specifically decisions regarding the level of troop contributions. It was argued that elected officials have an incentive to adjust troop deployment levels to peace operations before an election, but that this effect depends on the level of public attention to peacekeeping. The argument was tested by means of linear fixed effects regressions of troop contributions from 19 democratic countries to UN peace operations between 2004–2016. Internet search data, specifically Google Trends data, was used as a measure for public attention. The article found that fewer troops are deployed when elections are upcoming, if public attention is low; if, however, the public pays a lot of attention to a peace operation, higher levels of troop deployments can be observed. The examination of public attention contributes more nuance to the current understanding of the interplay between the

public, elections, and foreign/peacekeeping policy. The article further drew attention to the arguably understudied range of actors and stakeholders involved in peacekeeping policy decision-making at the national level.

On top of the individual contributions and implications of each research article, which were discussed in greater detail in the respective chapters, the thesis as a whole highlighted that actors and their interactions at different levels of analysis constitute burden-sharing in peace operations. The thesis thus contributed a more comprehensive perspective on burden-sharing and the supply-side to peacekeeping to existing academic research, which primarily focusses on specific international- and domestic-level factors motivating countries' troop contributions. It further established levels of analysis as a useful conceptual approach for the study of burden-sharing in order to manage the complexities that inevitably arise from interactions among diverse sets of actors within multiple entities.

After addressing one level of analysis per research article, the three levels examined in this thesis are brought together. A stylised depiction of the combined burden-sharing process is provided in Figure 6.1. On the global level, the United Nations and regional organisations have to decide which organisation shall conduct an upcoming peace operation. Faced with an environment of resource scarcity, they divide the peacekeeping labour according to their respective comparative advantages. The member states of the, in this case, regional organisation carrying out the peace operation then have to collectively provide the resources and troops required for the operation. Burden-sharing considerations at this level include interrelational dynamics between member states, amongst other conflict- and domestic-related private benefits and constraints. Finally, within an individual troop contributing country, decisions on troop contributions are not only made by elected government officials, but depend on a range of domestic actors, amongst them the public. Contingent on the public's attention to and interest in a peace operation, officials adapt troop contributions to incorporate public preferences before elections.

[6]MS = member state; Gov. = government




Figure 6.1: Connecting Three Levels of Peacekeeping Burden-Sharing[6]

Combining the theoretical arguments and findings from the three levels of analysis examined in this thesis into one process constitutes a first approach to a more comprehensive depiction of burden-sharing in peacekeeping. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that each research article operated within the limits of its respective level of analysis. While this approach offered the advantage of simplifying a complex process and dividing it into manageable research topics, it came at the cost of not incorporating the relations, links, and interdependences between the different levels of analysis. The international community cannot allocate a peace operation to a regional organisation if its members are not willing to provide any troops and bear the costs of the operation. Conversely, individual countries' willingness to provide the resources for a peace operation is (in most cases) meaningless without a higher entity providing legitimacy to the operation, as well as organisational and coordina-

tion capacities. Building on this acknowledgement, the following section discusses further implications of the levels of analysis approach for the study of burden-sharing in peace operations.

6.3 Levels of Analysis in Peacekeeping Burden–Sharing: Implications and Future Research

In order to successfully integrate different levels of analysis and achieve an even more comprehensive understanding of burden-sharing in peace operations, all conceivable influences on burden-sharing must be taken into account and each constituent part of the process – including actors, aggregations, and interactions – must be comprehended with all its ties and relations. This integration, however, is not without its challenges.

First, a staggering number of actors influence burden-sharing in peace operations, far exceeding the ones examined in this thesis. Regional organisations, security alliances, ad hoc coalitions of states, specialised agencies of the UN, non-governmental organisations, the host country and the parties to the conflict, individuals sponsoring the peace process, bureaucratic and military agents, and civil society are just a few examples requiring more scholarly attention. Future research should first gain a better understanding of these actors individually and in relation to other actors of the same aggregation before integrating different levels of analysis. Promising research topics that would build on and extend recent academic works include, but are not limited to: What explains the division of peacekeeping tasks between multiple simultaneous peace operations within the same conflict?[7] How do different UN bodies engaged in conflict prevention and crisis management coordinate their activities?[8] What influence do different types of domestic audiences (e.g. citizens, civilian leaders, military

[7]See Diehl and Druckman for a research note on multiple mandates within one peace operation: Diehl and Druckman, 'Multiple Peacekeeping Missions'.

[8]First examinations of related questions build on the new United Nations Peacemaking Initiatives (UNPI) data; see Han Dorussen and Govinda Clayton, 'Political Initiatives and Peacekeeping: Assessing Multiple UN Conflict Resolution Tools', *Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy* 24/4 (2018), 1–5.

leaders) have on troop contribution decisions in democratic versus non-democratic regimes?[9]

A second major challenge concerns the interdependences between levels of analysis as addressed above. Actors take each other's actions into account, both within a level of analysis as well as between levels. Oftentimes, burden-sharing decisions within one level are dependent on the decisions made at another level, with negotiations going back and forth between international and regional organisations, troop contributing countries, and domestic constituents. A potentially useful approach for future research to address these interdependent, multi-level bargaining games is Putnam's two-level game model.[10] The model conceives bargaining between states as consisting of simultaneous negotiations at the international and domestic level conducted by a chief negotiator; strategies and preferences at one level affect those at the other. It has frequently been extended to a three-level game and to include different negotiators linking the levels, which increases its applicability to the question of peacekeeping burden-sharing.[11] While not a fully developed theory, it might be applied as a dynamic framework for the analysis of empirical cases of multi-level burden-sharing in peace operations.

A third challenge relates to data limitations. Both quantitative and qualitative studies on burden-sharing in peacekeeping require data on the resources committed to a peace operation, including financial and personnel commitments, relevant statistics on the composition of peacekeepers, their deployment location and assigned tasks, as well as access to the bureaucratic and political apparatus involved in the planning and force generation process, and access to closed-door negotiations, inter alia. Data

[9]For recent research on the relationship between regime type and troop contributions, see Dursma and Gledhill, 'Voted Out'.

[10]Putnam, 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics'; and further developed by Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam (eds.), *Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993).

[11]e.g. Jeffrey W. Knopf, 'Beyond Two-Level Games: Domestic-International Interaction in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Negotiations', *International Organization* 47/4 (1993), 599–628; Sarah Collinson, ''Issue-Systems', 'Multi-Level Games' and the Analysis of the EU's External Commercial and Associated Policies: A Research Agenda', *Journal of European Public Policy* 6/2 (1999), 206–24.

availability, quality, and access, however, differ widely between peacekeeping actors. Particular data asymmetries exist between UN and non-UN peacekeeping. Data on UN peace operations are considerably more comprehensive, providing increasingly disaggregated statistics on the composition of peacekeepers. These include mission- and contributor-level data, disaggregation by personnel types, gender-disaggregation, fatalities, and increased temporal and spatial disaggregation.[12] Non-UN operations, however, lack this depth of information, predominantly only providing yearly statistics on the troop strength of the mission. In order to extend research on peacekeeping burden-sharing to a broader group of actors and different levels of analysis, more systematic data collection on peacekeeping from non-UN organisations is needed.

Overcoming these challenges will lead to a more integrated, comprehensive understanding of burden-sharing and the supply-side to peace operations. This understanding is of particular relevance as the success of peacekeeping heavily relies on the resources contributed. Scholarly literature has shown that the number, quality, type, and composition of peacekeeping personnel impact mission effectiveness. Greater numbers of troops, particularly military troops as opposed to police or observers, have been shown to reduce the number of civilian victims, reduce battlefield violence in civil wars, extend the duration of peace after conflict, and increase cooperation with local actors.[13] Additionally, diversity in mission composition, in terms of fractionalisation and polarisation based on the countries of origin of peacekeepers, decreases the level of violence against civilians.[14] Great potential exists to further combine the study of burden-sharing with that of peacekeeping effectiveness, particularly when taking a multi-level perspective. Relevant avenues for future research include the effectiveness of UN versus regional peacekeeping, the impact of disproportionate con-

[12]Govinda Clayton et al., 'The Known Knowns and Known Unknowns of Peacekeeping Data', *International Peacekeeping* 24/1 (2017), 1–62.

[13]Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon, 'United Nations Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection in Civil War'; Kathman and Wood, 'Stopping the Killing During the "Peace"'; Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon, 'Beyond Keeeping Peace'; Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis, 'Winning the Peace Locally'; Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon, 'United Nations Peacekeeping Dynamics and the Duration of Post-Civil Conflict Peace'; Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis, 'On the Frontline Every Day?'

[14]Bove and Ruggeri, 'Kinds of Blue'.

tributions by one country on mission goals, conduct, and outcome, or the influence of domestic politics and actors on the rules of engagement for their peacekeeping forces.

6.4 Concluding Remarks

Peace is the Best Investment - António Guterres, UN Secretary-General

UN Secretary-General António Guterres has repeatedly instanced peacekeeping as multilateralism in action.[15] It is a demonstration of how the international community can come together to collectively manage armed conflicts and create conditions for sustainable peace. Peacekeepers from around 160 countries have taken part in more than 200 UN and non-UN peace operations since 1948.[16] Not unlike other instances of collective action, peacekeeping has often faced challenges of undersupply, shortfalls, and delays in the procurement of resources. But, as this thesis has shown, these challenges are met by an increasingly manifold and interconnected set of actors at different levels of analysis. The United Nations and regional organisations strive towards partnership peacekeeping on a strategic and operational level, as well as in the realm of capacity building and training. Ties, relations, and associations with other countries incentivise states to contribute to regional peacekeeping, which gives hope for the success of collective action in increasingly connected regional and global communities. And public interest and attention to peacekeeping positively influences the level of troop contributions to peace operations, offering a favourable perspective on public sentiments toward peacekeeping and humanitarian action, as well as a point of leverage for civil society actors to influence peacekeeping policy by raising public attention.

In a similar vein, the international community has stressed the engagement and

[15]António Guterres, 'Remarks to Security Council High-Level Debate on Collective Action to Improve UN Peacekeeping Operations', United Nations Secretary General (Mar. 28, 2018), `https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2018-03-28/collective-action-improve-un-peacekeeping-operations-remarks`, accessed Sept. 30, 2019.

[16]Calculations by author based on data by International Peace Institute, *IPI Peacekeeping Database*; Mullenbach, 'Third-Party Peacekeeping in Intrastate Disputes, 1946–2012'.

collaboration of a wide range of actors from different levels and renewed its commitment to collective engagement with peacekeeping as part of the *Action for Peacekeeping* initiative (2018). The UN and other international organisations, regional and sub-regional arrangements, troop and financial contributors to peace operations, host states, and UN bodies have endorsed 45 shared commitments, amongst them integrated political solutions to conflict at the regional and national level, engagement with the host government, civil society, and local population, the integration of women in the peacekeeping process, enhanced cooperation and planning between the UN and regional partners, and greater coherence between peacekeeping aspirations, as outlined in mandates, and resources.[17]

All told, the international community and academic research alike have recognised that the provision of peacekeeping is a multi-level, multi-actor process situated in a 'changed and changing landscape'.[18] It is only by broad collective action and joint burden-sharing between global, regional, and national actors that peacekeeping can succeed as the international community's primary tool for creating and maintaining international peace and security.

[17]United Nations Secretary-General, *A4P*.

[18]United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on Uniting Our Strengths for Peace*, p. 9.

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