Emotions in Negotiations

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ABSTRACT

The chief aim of this thesis was to investigate the effect of emotions on negotiation outcomes. Using the social functional account as a framework (Keltner & Haidt, 1999), I investigated the effect of anger, contempt, sadness, embarrassment, and shame on bargaining outcomes. In addition, this thesis has also investigated the effect of status and relevance of emotions. Chapter 2 presents Studies 1 and 2. Study 1 was a lab study investigating the effect of the other person's status (high vs. low) and emotion (contempt, anger or neutral) on negotiation concessions. As expected, participants gave more concessions to angry partners than to contemptuous partners. Unexpectedly, participants also gave more concessions to low status partners than to high status partners. Study 2 extended study 1 with the inclusion of sadness. The results showed no significant effect of emotion or status on concessions. Chapter 3 presents Studies 3 and 4, which used vignettes and were designed to extend and replicate the findings of Studies 1 and 2. Study 3 investigated the effect of emotion (anger, contempt, sadness, and neutral emotion) and partner status (high vs. low) on concessions. Participants gave more concessions to angry partners (as in study 1) but status had no effect on concessions. Study 4 used a different status manipulation (own status vs. other status). The results showed a similar pattern to Studies 1 and 3, in terms of concessions to angry partners. Like Study 3, Study 4 also showed that perceptions of partner's emotion stability mediated the effect of emotion on concessions. Moreover, more concessions were given to high status partners than low status partners, and perceptions of partners' agreeableness mediated this relationship. Chapter 4 presents two Studies 5 and 6, which were online experiments investigating the effects of emotion (embarrassment and shame) and their relevance to the task (task relevant and irrelevant emotion) on behaviour in an ultimatum game. The results showed that emotion and relevance had a significant interactive effect on participants' satisfaction and fairness ratings. Participants accepted more offers in the task irrelevant condition and made larger offers to proposers in the shame condition. Study 6 included a control condition, and changed the emotion manipulation slightly. The results of this study failed to replicate those obtained in Study 5. To summarise the findings of this thesis, Chapter 5 presents the general discussion, implications, contributions, limitations, and future directions for research. Overall, the results found that partner's emotions affect the perceptions of partner's personality and concessions in negotiations.

DETAILED ABSTRACT

The chief aim of this thesis was to investigate the effect of emotions on bargaining outcomes. It also used other predictors such as status of partner and relevance of emotion. In addition, this thesis attempted to understand the pathways through which emotion, status, and relevance of emotions affect the negotiation outcome by investigating the role of moderators (such as power distance orientation and social dominance orientation) and mediators (such as perceptions of personality variables, prosocial ratings of the partner and the extent to which participants liked their partner). Chapter 1 presents the social functional account, which is the guiding theoretical framework for this thesis. It also reviews the literature pertaining to the research on emotions, highlighting the need to study discrete emotions and discusses two theories of interest to this thesis – social appraisal theory and the emotions as social information model. It also examines the research done in the area of emotions in negotiations and makes the case for studying unique emotions, relevant predictors, and pathways in order to develop a better understanding of the effect of emotions on negotiations. This chapter ends with a brief summary of all the six studies reported in this thesis.

Chapter 2 presents the first two studies investigating the effects of emotions (anger and contempt in Study 1, along with sadness in Study 2) and status of the partner (high vs. low) on concessions. Study 1 was a lab study and used a computer-mediated negotiation task, where participants had to sell mobile phones to a simulated buyer. The results showed that more concessions were made to angry partners than to contemptuous partners, as predicted. However, contrary to expectations, more concessions were made to low status partners than to high

status partners, perhaps because the status manipulation was confounded with group identity. Study 2 was designed with the same aim as study 1, but included another emotion – sadness. It also altered the status manipulation for two reasons – a) to remove the influence of group identity, and b) to investigate the effect of status independently from that of power. Study 2 used a similar computer-mediated task as Study 1, with additions of role play and some additional questionnaires to reflect the altered status manipulation. It also used social dominance orientation along with power distance orientation (which was used in Study 1) as potential moderators of the effect of status on concessions. Results showed that emotion and status did not have any significant effects on concessions, perhaps because of the changes to the task. Moreover, similar to Study 1, neither power distance orientation nor social dominance orientation moderated the effect of status on concessions.

Chapter 3 continued the investigation with the same variables used in Chapter 1, with some changes. Studies 3 and 4 used vignettes instead of lab studies to enable the use of a larger sample size. Study 3 investigated the effect of emotion (anger, contempt, and sadness) as well as status of partner (high vs. low) on negotiation outcomes. It also included perceptions about the Big Five personality factors as potential mediators of the effect of emotions on concessions. As in Study 1, participants gave more concessions to angry partners than to contemptuous partners, and perceptions about emotional stability mediated the effect of emotion on concessions. Status did not have any effect of concessions. Study 4, further extended the findings of the previous three studies, by dropping sadness from the emotion manipulation and changing the status manipulation. Status, in Study 4, was

manipulated to reflect a difference between the status of the participant (high vs. low) and that of the partner (high vs. low). As in Studies 1 and 3, participants gave more concessions to angry partners than to contemptuous partners, and as in Study 3, perceptions of emotional stability mediated the effect of emotion on concessions. The status manipulation worked as intended. More concessions were given to high status partners than to low status partners and perceptions of personality mediated this effect.

Chapter 4 presents Studies 5 and 6, which departed from the studies presented in previous chapters. These two studies investigated the effect of embarrassment and shame along with relevance of emotion (task relevant vs. task irrelevant emotions) on bargaining outcomes. These studies used an ultimatum bargaining task, which was different to the negotiation tasks in Studies 1 – 4. However, the overall aim remained the same – to investigate the effect of emotions on negotiation outcomes. The results of Study 5 showed an interactive effect of emotion and relevance on ratings of satisfaction with offers and fairness of offers. Participants also accepted more offers in the task irrelevant condition and made larger offers to proposers in the shame condition. Study 6 was designed to replicate and extend the results of Study 5 by including a non-emotional control condition and altering the emotion manipulation to control for the situational information across the different emotion conditions. The emotion manipulation did not work as intended and this study failed to replicate the results of Study 5.

Chapter 5 is the final chapter in this thesis and summarises the main findings across all six Studies. This chapter discusses the results pertaining to the aims of the thesis and shows that across three Studies, findings confirmed that more concessions

were made to angry partners than contemptuous partners. The findings also suggest that more concessions were made to high status partners than low status partners. This finding about the effect of status was only found in Study 4, but only in this study was own status manipulated independently of status of partners, and so this could be the reason why status had an effect on concessions. The findings also point to the importance of taking into account the context in which interpersonal interactions take place as shown by the significant interaction between emotion and relevance on satisfaction and fairness ratings. The results also highlighted how perceptions of personality mediated the effect of emotions (and status) on concessions. This chapter includes discussion of these and other findings and concludes by discussing the implications, contributions, limitations, and future directions for research.

CHAPTER 1: EMOTIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS

In this chapter, I review of the literature most pertinent to my thesis, covering the topics of the social functional account of emotion and emotional influences on negotiation. In the first section, I discuss how the social functional tradition defines emotion and give a brief summary of the research previously conducted on the five emotions of interest in the present thesis – anger, contempt, sadness, embarrassment, and shame. Then I review two relevant theories – social appraisal theory and the emotions as social information model. Next, I discuss research concerning how emotions and negotiations come together, by discussing intrapersonal and interpersonal effects of emotions influence negotiation. I conclude the chapter with a concise summary of the six studies presented in this thesis.

Social Functional Account of Emotions

There is a long history of research on emotions as intra-psychic phenomena (see Morris & Keltner, 2000). However, in the last couple of decades, there has been a growing shift to consider emotions as a social phenomenon (Morris & Keltner, 2000; Parkinson, 1996). The social functional account contends that humans are social animals who use emotions to facilitate social interactions and emotions help individuals navigate complex social systems (Keltner & Haidt, 1999). Parkinson (1996) argued that emotions are fundamentally social processes, despite the fact that they are also physiological, involve cognitive pathways, and are relevant to the self. In particular, people make sense of situations, understand motivation, and evaluate different response patterns through the emotions of others. For example, a loved one's anxiety about a potential move might guide one's own feelings and thoughts about this move, making one see this move as more threatening than otherwise. Moreover, most emotions are experienced in a social context, and this can be either imagined or real. For example, one might feel shame by imagining the reactions of others to a transgression and/or while being chastised by others. So, in

this tradition, emotions are considered to be "active and embodied modes of engagement with the social and practical world. They reconfigure relations between people and objects in the shared environment as well as responding to, and conveying information about, these relations" (Parkinson, 2011, p. 409). The social functional account places emotions firmly in the social context and the present thesis fits in this tradition.

Within the tradition of social functionalism, there are different strands of research focusing on the individual, interpersonal, group, or societal/cultural level of analysis (e.g., Parkinson, Fischer, & Manstead, 2005). In my thesis, I have focused on interpersonal aspects of emotion. Most research at this level of analysis has focused on how emotions facilitate social interactions because they communicate attitudes, beliefs and thoughts about important objects or events. For example, Campos and Stenberg (1981) showed how infants made sense of ambiguous social situations by responding to the emotional expressions of parents (social referencing). Researchers have also argued that emotions evoke emotions in others either through primitive emotion contagion (e.g., Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994) or via a more inferential route (Van Kleef, 2009). Two theories within the social functional tradition that have informed my research: social appraisal theory and the emotions as social information model are discussed in detail below.

Another focus of the social functional tradition is its emphasis on the effects of discrete emotions rather than general affect varying along a simple dimension of valence (running from negative to positive). Much of the research focusing on emotions concentrates on the valence of emotions by simply comparing positive, neutral, and/or negative emotions. However, a focus on discrete emotions permits

investigation of differences between states that have the same valence (e.g., embarrassment and anger) based on the specific appraisals thought to be associated with these emotions (e.g., Hareli & Hess, 2004).

Although through the years, researchers have proposed that facial displays corresponding to certain unique emotions exist (Ekman, Sorenson, & Friesen, 1969) and that these emotions can be studied as separate entities (Frijda, 1987; Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, & O'connor, 1987), until about two decades ago there was considerable debate about the number and nature of discrete emotions (see Ekman, 1992; Ortony & Turner, 1990). Furthermore, there was considerable debate regarding the dimensions on which emotions can be understood (see Feldman Barrett & Russell, 1998; Feldman Barrett & Russell, 1999; Larsen & Diener, 1992), with activation and pleasure emerging as the most relevant dimensions to study emotions (Feldman Barrett & Russell, 1999). Although useful in stimulating research in the field of emotions, according to Larsen and Diener (1992) the two dimensional structure of emotions proved to be restrictive in understanding differences between emotions of the same valence and arousal (for example, anger and fear, which were grouped together). So, subsequent research focusing on distinct emotions allowed researchers to unearth the unique information conveyed by different emotions in terms of antecedents, thoughts and feelings, action tendencies, and goals (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994; Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996). In my thesis too, I have focused on five different emotions in different studies – anger, contempt, sadness, embarrassment, and shame.

Discrete Emotions

There are five discrete emotions that I have studied in my research. I chose these emotions because even though all five of these emotions are negative emotions, they each have unique characteristics and I believed that they would lead to different responses in a bargaining context. I will now, briefly enumerate the unique characteristics of each of them.

Anger is elicited upon infringement of individual rights (Rozin et al., 1999), holding someone else responsible for the anger inducing event (Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993) and is also evoked by an examination of self-relevance (Hutcherson & Gross, 2011). Anger leads people to feel like they are going to explode, invokes thoughts about aggression towards their target and unfairness meted out to them, and evokes an action tendency to hit or shout with the intention of hurting or getting even with the target of anger (Roseman et al., 1994). People appraise angry people as tough in a negotiation context (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006), and as having high status (Tiedens, 2001).

The elicitors of contempt are considered to be evaluations of competence, or rather incompetence and status (Hutcherson & Gross, 2011), evaluations of low power (Brewer & Alexander, 2002). It is elicited when people feel that it is not possible or they don't have a desire to change the behaviour of others (Fischer & Roseman, 2007). People appraise someone who displays contempt as having high status (Keltner, Young, Heerey, Oemig, & Monarch, 1998). It is also considered as a means of excluding someone (Melwani & Barsade, 2011). Accordingly, the action tendency that contempt evokes is akin to indifference, where the target is not given much

attention and is held in low esteem and regard (Haidt, 2003) and people intend to avoid the object of contempt (Fischer & Roseman, 2007).

Sadness is associated with feelings of tiredness and elicits thoughts about what was missing in their life, people feel like crying and not doing anything and express a desire to get comforted (Roseman et al., 1994). People attribute their sadness to situational causes (Keltner et al., 1993) and use it as a cry for help (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988). People perceive sad people as less competent but warm (Hareli & Hess, 2010) and as having low status (Tiedens, 2001).

Shame is elicited when people feel that the deficiencies of "core" self have been revealed and shame accompanies feelings of worthlessness and an action tendency to escape or hide (Tangney et al., 1996). Researchers have also found that people feel self-conscious and small, when ashamed (Roseman et al., 1994). Shame has been associated with feelings of immorality, isolation, self-directed anger and a tendency to apologise (Miller & Tangney, 1994). Shame evokes sympathy in others (Keltner, Young, & Buswell, 1997) and a favourable evaluation of moral character (Stearns & Parrott, 2012)

Embarrassment is elicited as a result of minor social transgressions and results from an evaluation of one's "presented" self (Tangney et al., 1996). Embarrassed people feel awkward and clumsy, react by hiding, blushing, and apologising, and embarrassment also evokes reactions in others such as jokes and laughing (Miller & Tangney, 1994). Embarrassment is used as a remedial emotion to repair social relations and maintain harmony by eliciting forgiveness, trust, and light-hearted responses in others (Keltner & Anderson, 2000). Embarrassed people are rated as

more likeable (Semin & Manstead, 1982) and more prosocial (Feinberg, Willer, & Keltner, 2012).

I will discuss these emotions in greater detail in the subsequent chapters. However, the purpose of this short summary is to point out that all of them convey very specific information. Let us consider them in the grouping that I have used in the following chapters. I have investigated the effects of anger, contempt, and sadness in chapters 1 and 2, and chapter 3 deals with embarrassment and shame. Anger, contempt, and sadness are all negative emotions. However, an angry person is considered to be tough but a sad person is thought to be weak. Anger evokes a desire to punish someone whereas contempt evokes a sort of indifference – that the target is not worthy of notice. Therefore, in a negotiation context, it is likely that these three emotions should evoke different reactions. Similarly when considering shame and embarrassment (both belong to the family of self-conscious emotions), it can be observed that shame draws attention to the inadequacies of one's core self, whereas embarrassment to one's presented self. Shame evokes grave reactions such as sympathy but embarrassment evokes laughter. So, the discussion shows that even though these emotions share certain characteristics, they are distinct emotions and are perceived as such. The appraisals and action tendencies of each emotion discussed here have been taken into account while making particular predictions in my studies and will be discussed in more detail in the relevant chapters.

Social Appraisal Theory

Manstead and Fischer (2001) introduced social appraisal theory, which draws attention to the fact that other people's emotions can inform the evaluations made by an individual about a commonly experienced event. In their own words,

"behaviours, thoughts or feelings of one or more other persons in the emotional situation are appraised *in addition to* the appraisal of the event per se" (p. 222). This theory implies that the emotions expressed by others are active ingredients in helping individuals make sense of a situation and define norms for emotion which also affects their own emotions and the way they choose to react to that situation. Thus, the emotions expressed by others affect the emotions experienced by the self. For example, my friend is quite worried about our upcoming exam, so I conclude that the exam must be challenging and this conclusion makes me worried as well. Further, the emotions of others affect the way emotions are expressed when expressers mentally rehearse the potential consequences of expressing their emotion. For example, if I show my friend that I am worried too, that might in turn make her more worried about the exam. So, I will not show her that I am worried.

Social appraisal theory was one of the first theories to discuss how others' emotional reactions are not merely background noise but play a vital role in shaping our own emotions and directing our understanding of a social situation. This theory has spawned research, and experimental evidence exists to support the conclusion that social appraisal mediates the relationship between an event and experienced emotion (Evers, Fischer, Rodriguez Mosquera, & Manstead, 2005) and that social appraisal facilitates the recognition of emotions (Mumenthaler & Sander, 2012). Its central idea that other people's emotions influence our own decisions, emotions and perceptions has been the guiding principle of the present research. However, this theory is not specific about the mechanism underlying emotion's social influence. A theory that directly addresses this issue is discussed in the next section.

Emotions as Social Information Model (EASI)

EASI was proposed by Van Kleef (2009) to account for how others' emotions affect our own emotions and judgements and has been a source of hypotheses generation in my studies. It takes a dual-mode approach, similar to the elaboration likelihood model of attitude change (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), and the more general dual systems of cognitive operations model (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002).

EASI was formulated to explain interactions at an interpersonal level and accounts for how another person's (Person B) emotional expressions can influence someone's (Person A) behaviour via two distinct two routes: 1) by affecting the emotions of Person A directly (affective route), and 2) by providing information to Person A about the situation, Person B or both (inferential route). EASI also postulates two classes of moderators in delineating when either of these two routes would guide social behaviour – information processing ability and social relational factors.

The affective route impacts on interpersonal emotions either through affective contagion (such as mimicry) or by changing the impressions formed about the expresser (such as liking/disliking the expresser). For example, Van Kleef, De Dreu, and Manstead (2004a, 2004b) demonstrated that other people's anger evoked anger, less satisfaction, dislike and unwillingness to meet again, whereas other people's happiness evoked the opposite response in participants. They highlighted the effect of the affective route by distinguishing partners' expressed and experienced emotions (2004a, experiment 3). The authors argue that anger can lead to feelings of fear in a recipient since anger and aggression are closely associated with each other. They showed that when partners expressed anger, it evoked fear in

participants (a complementary emotion through the affective route) and this feeling of fear led participants to ignore the information inherent in the experienced emotions of their partner (that is, pay less attention to information coming through the inferential route). This route was not of central importance in my thesis but was used to predict self-reported emotions in participants in Studies 1 – 4.

The inferential route, on the other hand, covers cases in which observers take into account the information that is conveyed by the emotion being expressed and consequently act on that information. For example, in various negotiation contexts, researchers have demonstrated that anger communicates that the recipient is unhappy with the presented offer, leading the recipient to grant more concessions (Adam, Shirako, & Maddux, 2010; Pietroni, Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Pagliaro, 2008; Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Steinel, Van Kleef, & Harinck, 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004a, 2004b). The assumption behind this formulation is that discrete emotions communicate certain information and observers react to this information. All six studies, presented in this thesis, have been influenced by ideas relating to the inferential route, especially considerations concerning how observers take into account the information communicated by different emotions and react to that information. For example, Study 1 compared two emotions – anger and contempt. Even though both are negative emotions, I had different predictions regarding concessions concerning these two emotions. I predicted that expressed anger would communicate that the expresser is unhappy with the offer, and that this would prompt participants to change their negotiation behaviour by responding with more concessions. By contrast, I predicted that expressed contempt would communicate that the expresser is displeased with the participant, and that this

would not similarly motivate the participant to change their negotiation behaviour, and so fewer concessions would be forthcoming. In other studies too, my predictions were based on the specific information that is conveyed by the emotions investigated.

EASI predicts that the two routes might i) influence one another, ii) contradict one another or iii) strengthen one another. Two sets of moderators are proposed to influence which of these three scenarios is more likely.

The first set of moderators relates to the motivation and ability of observers to process the information inherent in the displayed emotion. For example, Van Kleef et al. (2004b) found that when participants were under low time pressure (and therefore had more ability to process emotional information) and had low power (and therefore had more motivation), they conceded more to angry partners than when they were under high pressure and had high power. In another study, Van Kleef, Oveis, Van Der Löwe, LuoKogan, Goetz, and Keltner (2008) found that people who had more power (lower motivation to process emotion information) felt less sadness and compassion while responding to people who were troubled than those with low power. I did not include this set of moderators in my research because the present research focuses chiefly on the inferential pathway and therefore used situations where participants had sufficient motivation and cognitive resources to process the information provided by the target's emotional expression.

The second set of moderators are social relational factors including those factors that affect the appropriateness of emotional expressions (such as cultural display rules) and their informational value (whether the emotion is directed at the person or the task). For example, Gibson, Schweitzer, Callister, and Gray (2009) found that

when anger was of low intensity and was normatively acceptable, it produced positive organizational outcomes. Adam et al. (2010) also found that fewer concessions were made when cultural display rules about expressing anger were violated than when rules were not violated. However, EASI does not include any personality or attitudinal variables that might affect the way emotions are perceived in a given context. In my opinion, some of these variables might be important and so I have included two such variables that are relevant to my research – social dominance orientation and power distance orientation. For example, in Studies 1 – 4, I used status as a predictor (an aspect of social hierarchy) along with emotion and I assessed social dominance orientation and power distance orientation (which measure attitudes towards social inequality) as potential moderators of its effects.

The EASI model provides a strong starting point for understanding how others' emotions exert an influence on our own thoughts and feelings. There has also been a considerable body of research to support the various aspects of EASI (see Van Kleef, 2014; Van Kleef, Homan, & Cheshin, 2012). My view is that as research continues, this theory will continue to get refined. More moderators may be unearthed (such as relevance of emotions to the task at hand and personality variables such as emotional intelligence). Additional pathways may also be added to this theory (see Parkinson & Manstead, 2015). My own research also investigated discrete emotions which have not been studied before in the context of EASI, such as contempt, sadness, embarrassment and shame in the context of negotiations.

Negotiations

Negotiations are an integral part of our life. As children we negotiate with our parents for extra allowance and later curfews. As adults we negotiate with our partners about household chores and childcare responsibilities. Similarly, as employees we negotiate with our employers for better pay and working conditions. Negotiation is an important avenue through which we assert our rights and acquire what we want while avoiding a full-scale social conflict. It provides a means whereby participants with contrasting interests communicate in order to reach amenable results (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992). Therefore, studying negotiations is extremely important as contrasting interests characterise several aspects of our existence and the study of negotiations can contribute towards the understanding of international policy, business mergers and acquisitions, marital relationships, trade negotiations, salary negotiations and several others areas. It is a process that everyone has participated in at some point or another and so it represents a very practical and dynamic area of inquiry.

Several aspects of communication in negotiation have been investigated by psychologists, including structuring of verbal messages (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982), framing (Neale & Bazerman, 1985), and emotions (Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004a; 2004b). In my thesis, I am interested in studying emotions that are communicated during negotiations and their effects on negotiation outcomes. This is because when we fight for our rights, argue for what we want or persuade others to agree to our wishes, we feel angry at being denied our rights, we feel sad that something has been taken from us and so we use our emotions to negotiate better. A recent article published in the *Harvard Business*

Review discussed practical steps for readers to consider while negotiating (Leary, Julianna, & Wheeler, 2013). It argued that, by eschewing the traditional wisdom of separating emotion and reason, people have started to bring those two together, have begun to "own" their emotions and to use these emotions to negotiate effectively. I am sympathetic to these arguments. Emotions are ubiquitously present in negotiations and this is why I have chosen to study their effects in this context.

Negotiations are usually considered to be of two kinds – distributive bargaining and integrative bargaining (Lax & Sebenius, 1986; Walton & McKersie, 1965). Distributive bargaining is a fixed-pie approach to negotiation. It happens when one negotiator's gain leads to another negotiator's losses (Donohue & Roberto, 1996). For example, in a negotiation involving a car, where the seller wants to sell at as high a price as possible but the buyer wants to pay as little as possible, the seller's bargaining success automatically implies the buyer's bargaining failure and vice versa. The other kind of negotiation, integrative bargaining occurs where someone's gain does not automatically lead to another's losses. It is when joint gains and creative solutions are possible by creating more value at the negotiating table. In integrative bargaining, mutually beneficial goals are possible and the focus can be on many different issues. Negotiators can approach the negotiating table with the intention of reaching consensus and thereby engage in problem solving behaviour such as finding solutions, giving concessions and generally demonstrating more flexibility (Donohue & Roberto, 1996). A classic example is when only one orange is available but two people want the orange. If the two people were engaging in distributive bargaining, the obvious solution would be to divide the orange in half.

However, in integrative bargaining, the solution would be to explore both parties' intentions regarding the orange and then come to a mutually satisfying and creative solution, where one person might be interested in eating it but the other person might be interested in baking with the orange peel. In integrative bargaining, by exploring each other's options, people can come up with better solutions for their needs. These two kinds of bargaining have been explored in my research, in the form of mixed-motive negotiation tasks. Mixed-motive negotiation is the kind of negotiation, which has both competitive and cooperative elements, that is elements from both integrative and distributive bargaining (Walton & McKersie, 1965). Chapters 2 and 3 include tasks where participants could act cooperatively to expand the share and then act competitively to claim their own share. Chapter 4 used ultimatum bargaining task, which also has a mixed-motive component, and is one of the most basic tasks to study bargaining behaviour.

Studying emotions in the context of distributive and integrative bargaining situations can lead to a more well-rounded understanding of the effect of emotions in negotiations. More importantly, the effects of emotions in these two different kinds of negotiation situations might raise different issues. For example, using emotions like shame and embarrassment (which convey apology) in a competitive distributive negotiation may ensure more concessions, but the same emotions may lead to fewer concessions in a collaborative integrative scenario. None of my studies directly compared effects of emotions on these two kinds of negotiations, but the elements of these two kinds of negotiations (in the form of mixed-motive negotiations) were kept in mind while designing my studies.

Emotions in Negotiations

Traditionally, emotions and negotiations have been considered to be mutually incompatible (Druckman & Olekalns, 2008; Kopelman, Rosette, & Thompson, 2006). However, more and more psychologists and economists have warmed to the idea that emotions are an integral part of negotiations and have focused their attention in understanding the dynamics of emotions in negotiations (Barry, 2008; Loewenstein, 2000; Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). The strand of research that has been most influential in raising the profile of emotion in decision making is the work conducted by Damasio and colleagues (Bechara & Damasio, 2005; Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994; Damasio, 1994). These investigators worked with patients suffering from damaged ventromedial prefrontal cortex. These patients had normal cognitive functioning but found it difficult to take into account the future implications of their actions, and to process emotions when making decisions. The researchers found that these patients could think about future consequences (evaluate pros and cons rationally) but still made erroneous decisions that resulted in negative consequences for them.

The somatic marker hypothesis was developed to explain their findings. This hypothesis proposed that certain bioregulatory "somatic marker" aid our decision making. An important source of these somatic markers is emotional experience. For example, if someone loses heavily in a gamble, they might feel regret. Regret can than act as a somatic marker that deters future gambling activities by activating the connection between gambling, loss and the feeling of unpleasantness. In essence, Damasio and colleagues demonstrated that emotions help people to navigate the world by activating relevant markers and helping individuals make better decisions

by making salient good options from unworthy ones. This was a very important finding as it demonstrated that emotions were not always factors that interfered with rational decision making but were often actually an integral part of it. In other words, without emotions, people make inferior decisions. This theory gave a strong impetus to researchers to investigate the link between emotion, decision making, and negotiations. In my research, this theory did not directly generate the research aims. However, I do consider it to be an extremely important theory in making salient the importance of emotions in decision making and negotiations. This theory was instrumental in stimulating more research in this area and directing the focus of researchers in uncovering the myriad ways in which emotions affect our cognitive processes. Therefore, it laid the foundation for raising the research questions in my thesis. Two main strands of the research in emotions and negotiations – intrapersonal emotions and interpersonal emotions are discussed below.

Intrapersonal effects of emotions. In the 1980s and 1990s, research focused mostly on intrapersonal emotions. Following the lead of Damasio and colleagues, it was expected that emotions highlight important issues for us and facilitate decision making during negotiations. Loewenstein (2000) believed that emotions affected decision making more than people believed. In other words, people habitually underestimate the impact of emotions on their decisions. However, Bechara and Damasio (2005) did not believe that emotions always aid decision making. They opined that emotions were helpful only when they were relevant to the decision being made, but not otherwise. This difference of views illustrates the debates characterising the research domain of intrapersonal

emotions. Further, the focus on intrapersonal emotions was fragmented into three different types of emotions that might potentially occur during negotiations: anticipated emotions (emotions that are expected to occur in the future as a result of outcome of current decisions or outcomes, Kong, Tuncel, Mclean Parks, 2011; Zeelenberg, 1999; Zeelenberg, Van Dijk, Manstead, & Van der Pligt, 2000), immediate emotions (emotions evoked in a person that are related to the task that is being performed, Daly, 1991; Ketelaar & Tung Au, 2003; Overbeck, Neale, & Govan, 2010), and incidental emotions (emotions evoked in a person that are unrelated to the task at hand, Andrade & Ariely, 2009; Baron, 1990; Brooks & Schweitzer, 2011; Carnevale & Isen, 1986; Harlé & Sanfey, 2007) . In my research, I have drawn on literature on immediate emotions. However, the chief focus of my research has been on emotions that are evoked as a result of interpersonal interaction. So, the next section will discuss the interpersonal effects of emotion in more detail.

Interpersonal effects of emotions. Since the focus of my research is emotion in an interpersonal context and its influence on the negotiation process, I will concentrate more on research done in the field of interpersonal emotions in negotiations. Interpersonal emotions gained prominence along with the rising interest in social functional perspective (Morris & Keltner, 2000). The idea was to understand how the emotions of others and our own emotions affect the negotiation process.

Among the emotions studied, anger has been given the most importance in research on the influence of emotions in negotiations. One reason for this may be that anger commonly occurs in bargaining situations (as negotiations can get heated quite

often) and is relatively easy to induce. Most research has shown that, contrary to expectations, angry outbursts from others result in more concessions (Pietroni et al., 2008; Tiedens, 2001; Van Kleef et al. 2004a, 2004b). These results have been explained by perceptions of partner's toughness, which mediated the relationship between communication of anger and concessions made (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef & De Dreu, 2010). However, research has also documented that consistent with expectations, participants usually develop a more negative impression of an angry partner (Van Beest et al, 2008; Van Kleef et al., 2004a), and are less satisfied and less willing to engage in future interactions with an angry partner (Van Kleef et al., 2004b).

Further research has identified additional factors that may determine the impact of anger on concessions, showing that concessions are greater when anger is directed at the behaviour of the recipient rather than at the recipient himself or herself (Steinel et al., 2006), when anger is the result of deep acting rather than surface acting (Cote, Hideg, & Van Kleef, 2013), when participants have fewer alternatives (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006), or when participants have a low need for cognitive closure and are under low time pressure (Van Kleef et al., 2004b), when anger expression is normatively acceptable and appropriate (Adam et al., 2010), and when anger is expressed in a balanced negotiation context rather than a cooperative or competitive context (Adam & Brett, 2015). There are also other situations when anger backfires, such as – when angry negotiating partners have low power or do not have vital information pertaining to the task, and the other participants are aware of this lack of information (Van Dijk, Van Kleef, Steinel, & Van Beest, 2008), and when conflicts are about personal values (Harinck & Van Kleef,

2012). Moreover, Van Beest, Van Kleef, and Van Dijk, (2008) found that displaying anger in negotiations with more than two individuals can backfire because others in the group bar angry individuals from forming a desirable coalition.

Researchers have also looked at other emotions such as guilt (Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2006), disappointment (Lelieveld, Van Dijk, Van Beest, Steinel, & Van Kleef, 2011; Lelieveld, Van Dijk, Van Beest, & Van Kleef, 2013; Van Kleef et al., 2006), worry (Van Kleef et al., 2006), regret (Van der Schalk, Bruder, & Manstead, 2012; Van Kleef et al., 2006), happiness (Van Kleef et al., 2004a, 2004b), and pride (Van der Schalk et al., 2012). However, there are still many other discrete emotions to consider such as contempt, embarrassment, sadness and shame, all of which have been investigated in the research reported in this thesis. These emotions are important to consider because they regularly occur in daily life (see Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Pelzer, 2005; Tangney et al., 1996), they have not been studied before in the context of negotiations and studying them together could offer valuable insights. For example, in Studies 2 and 3, sadness, contempt, and anger were investigated at the same time. The intention was that even though all of them were negatively valenced emotions, because each of them conveys different information, their effects would be different. Similarly, in Studies 5 and 6, shame and embarrassment were considered in the context of bargaining, which has not been explored before. The intention was that both signal appeasement but different kinds of self-blame and therefore different outcomes would result for shame and embarrassment. Moreover, in the literature, research examining shame and guilt is readily available (example, Giner-Sorolla, Kamau, & Castano, 2010; Tangney, 1992;

Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, & Gramzow, 1992) but research examining shame and embarrassment together is scant.

As research with anger has shown, there are a host of moderating factors, mediating factors, and boundary condition that affect the relationship between emotions and concessions. My aim in this thesis is also to investigate some of these factors such as power distance orientation, social dominance orientation, personality traits, and prosocial ratings. These factors have not been studied before in the context of emotional influences on negotiations. Moreover, they are all uniquely suited to the present research. For example, social dominance orientation and power distance orientation measure attitudes towards social inequality and it was hoped, that they would prove to be pertinent moderators in the context of status, emotions and negotiations. Also, it was expected that perceptions about the Big Five personality traits of others, prosocial ratings of others and liking the partner would explain the relationship between emotions expressed by others and behaviour of oneself in terms of negotiation results. The rationale behind including these additional moderators and mediators will be discussed in detail in the relevant chapters.

As can be surmised from the above discussion, the present research has these following aims:

1. To contribute to the growing literature of emotions in negotiations by investigating a wider set of commonly occurring emotions – anger, contempt, sadness, shame, and embarrassment.
2. To investigate the effect of other relevant but hitherto not researched factors, such as status and relevance of emotions in the context of emotions in negotiations.

3. To study the effect of a range moderators and mediators not considered before such as power distance orientation, social dominance orientation, and personality factors so as to enhance our understanding of the pathways that connect emotions and negotiation outcomes.

Summary of Chapters

This section summarises the material to be presented in the remaining four chapters of this thesis. In chapters 2 – 4, six studies are reported. All six of these studies investigated effects of different discrete emotions on negotiation outcomes. These studies also include different moderators and mediators. The first four studies (Studies 1 – 4) can be grouped together and include lab studies and studies using online vignettes. These four studies were based on work done by Van Kleef and colleagues (2004a, 2004b). Study 1 was designed with the intention of studying the effects of emotion and status on negotiation outcomes and Studies 2 – 4 were subsequently designed to support and extend the findings of the first study. Because they address similar issues and follow similar procedures, the first two lab studies have been presented together in chapter 2, and the two vignette studies have been combined in chapter 3. Chapter 4 presents the remaining two studies (Studies 5 & 6), which investigated the effect of two emotions different from the first four studies (shame and embarrassment) as well as relevance of emotions as predictors. These last two studies also used a different method of investigation, a version of the ultimatum game (Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982) that was not used in Studies 1 – 4, and were run as online experiments.

Chapter 2 presents Studies 1 and 2. Study 1 investigated the effect of anger and contempt as well as status on concessions made in a negotiation task. It was a lab

study where the task involved selling mobile phones to a buyer and was based on the task used by Van Kleef et al. (2004a, 2004b). The participants received emotionally laden messages as well status information from a simulated buyer. I also investigated the effect of power distance orientation (Earley & Erez, 1997) as a potential moderator. My prediction was that status would have a greater effect on concessions made by participants with higher levels of power distance orientation because of their greater perceptions of inequality. Study 2 was an extension of Study 1 and was designed with the aim of confirming some of the results of Study 1 (regarding emotion and concessions) and exploring the inconsistent results of Study 1 (regarding status manipulation as well as the relationship between status and concessions). It was also a lab study and used the same task used in Study 1 with minor modifications. These modifications related to the status manipulation which did not work as intended in Study 1. In addition to anger and contempt, this study also investigated the effect of sadness. In addition to power distance orientation, this study also investigated the effect of social dominance orientation (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). This was because I expected social dominance orientation to complement power distance orientation as a moderator since both of them relate to attitudes towards social inequality.

Chapter 3 presents Studies 3 and 4. Study 3 was designed to support the results of Study 1 and also to address some of the discrepancies between Study 1 and 2. It used a different methodology – online vignettes, to investigate the effect of anger, contempt, and sadness along with status (high and low) on concessions made during negotiations. The independent variables were the same as those used in Study 2. The vignette was based on a scenario used by Van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni,

and Manstead (2006) where the participants were required to negotiate the cost of a project. The emotional and status manipulation were embedded in the vignette. Power distance orientation and social dominance orientation were the moderators used, as in Study 2. A novel set of variables, the Big Five personality factors, were used as mediators with the expectation that participants' impressions about their partner's personality would mediate the effect of emotion on concessions. The chief aims of this study were to triangulate the results found in Studies 1 and 2 as well as extend some of the findings. This study used a different technique than the other two studies (vignette instead of a lab experiment) and so it was expected that consistent findings across the studies would give more confidence in the obtained results. Moreover, the mediators were expected to highlight the pathway through which emotions had an effect on concessions. This chapter also includes Study 4, which further built on Study 3 by changing a few aspects of the experimental design. Sadness was dropped as an emotion and status manipulation was altered to reflect a difference between own status and other's status. It also used a different scenario in order to further triangulate the results. It was expected that if consistent results could be obtained by using a different vignette, the results could be interpreted with greater certainty. Therefore, to sum up, it investigated the effect of anger, contempt, participants' own status and status of others on concessions made in negotiations. This scenario was also based a scenario used by Van Kleef et al., (2006) and required the participants to negotiate two different outcomes. The moderators and mediators remained the same as Study 3. This was the final study in the first group of studies and it was designed with the intention of clarifying results and supporting the results of Studies 1, 2, and 3.

Chapter 4 presents Studies 5 and 6. Study 5 was an online experiment to study the effect of emotion (embarrassment and shame) and relevance of emotions on intentions to accept offers and subsequent offers made by participants in a version of the ultimatum game. Ultimatum games have a long tradition of being successfully used in economics to study real life aspects such as justice and fairness (Thaler, 1988). In this study too, the ultimatum game was used because of its simplicity, ease of use and its capacity to offer insights into human behaviour. Participants played an online game with a simulated player, and received information during the game about the emotions experienced by this other player as well as the relevance of these emotions. They then answered a variety of questions designed to measure their intentions to bargain with the other player. Prosocial ratings of the other player and the extent to which the participants liked the other player were used as mediators as it was expected that these ratings would explain the link between emotion and participants' reaction to the offers. The final study to be included in this thesis is Study 6, which was an extension of Study 5. This study was designed to clarify the results obtained in Study 5. In this study, a control condition was added to the emotion condition used in the Study 5 in order to ensure the presence of a comparable condition. Also, both manipulations (emotion and relevance) were modified to reflect the results of Study 5. This study also used the same version of ultimatum game that was used in Study 5. Other moderators and mediators remained the same.

Chapter 5 is the last chapter in this thesis. It provides a general discussion of the findings of all six studies – including consideration of both consistent and

discrepant results. It also discusses the limitations of the present research as well as future directions.

The main aim of my research was to investigate how emotions affect negotiation outcomes and to understand how other variables such as status, relevance of emotions, moderators (power distance orientation, social dominance orientation), and mediators (perception of personality variables, impressions of others) affect this relationship. All the studies included in this thesis were designed with this aim in mind and are discussed in greater detail in the following chapters.

CHAPTER 2: EFFECTS OF CONTEMPT, ANGER, SADNESS AND STATUS ON NEGOTIATIONS

This chapter presents Studies 1 and 2. Study 1 is a lab study investigating the effect of the other person's status (high vs. low) and emotion (contempt, anger or neutral) on negotiation concessions. University of Oxford undergraduate students (N = 90) participated in a computer-mediated negotiation task. As expected, the results showed that participants gave more concessions to angry partners than to contemptuous partners. They also reported higher levels of contempt in the contemptuous partner condition than in the neutral partner condition. Contrary to expectation, participants gave more concessions to low status partners and felt less angry and contemptuous towards low status partners compared to high status partners. This unexpected finding may reflect a potential confound between status and group identity. Neither power distance orientation nor the negotiation partner's limits moderated the effects of status or emotion on concessions. Study 2 extended Study 1 by comparing the effects of contempt and anger with those of another negative emotion, sadness. As in Study 1, I also manipulated status (using a different procedure) and explored its effects and those of partners' emotions on negotiation concessions. The results showed that emotion and status did not have any significant effects on concessions. These null findings may be a consequence of participants' failure to process information relating to the manipulations.

General Introduction

The two studies presented in this chapter investigated the effect of emotions (anger and contempt in Study 1 and anger, contempt and sadness in Study 2) and status on bargaining outcomes. The aim was to understand how emotions are perceived by observers and how participants react to these different emotions in terms of the concessions that they make during negotiations. In this section, I review the research on the two emotions of interest in Studies 1 and 2 – anger and contempt (research on sadness will be reviewed later).

In the literature on negotiation, anger has been accorded due importance (Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004a; 2004b) – which the following discussion highlights. Van Kleef and his colleagues have carried out seminal work studying anger in negotiations. Van Kleef et al. (2004a) found that more concessions were

made to angry partners than to happy partners (see also, Andrade & Ho, 2007). A considerable body of research has investigated various moderators, mediators and boundary conditions of anger's effects on concessions (Adam, Shirako, & Maddux, 2010; Cote, Hideg, & Van Kleef, 2013; Harinck & Van Kleef, 2012; Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Steinel, Van Kleef, & Harinck, 2006; Van Dijk, Van Kleef, Steinel, & Van Beest, 2008; Van Kleef & De Dreu, 2010; Van Kleef et al., 2004b). Based on the social functional approach, researchers have argued that anger leads to more concessions because it communicates toughness (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef & De Dreu, 2010) and less willingness to cooperate or to accommodate the other person's wishes (Andrade & Ho, 2007).

By contrast, no previous studies have been published concerning the influence of contempt on negotiation outcomes. Indeed, as Pelzer (2005) has pointed out, contempt in organizations is ubiquitous but largely neglected by researchers. However, I believe that it is interesting to compare the effects of anger and contempt. On the one hand, both are negative emotions that therefore might be expected to have similar effects on concessions from others. However, because anger and contempt communicate different intentions in the context of negotiations it seems important to tease apart their differential effects.

Rozin, Lowery, Imada and Haidt (1999) have suggested that although anger and contempt both involve disapproving of another's behaviour, they have distinctive features. According to Rozin et al (1999), contempt arises from community norm violations (e.g., when an individual does not carry out his/her duties or does not conform to society's norms) whereas anger results from violations related to self (e.g., when an individual's freedom and rights are infringed). According to Fischer

and Roseman (2007), anger can be a means to change the behaviour of someone over whom one has control but with whom one wishes to reconcile in the long term. By contrast, contempt can be a means of excluding from one's social circle (Melwani & Barsade, 2011) someone who has not achieved expected goals, when there is little control over this person's behaviour. Fischer and Roseman (2007) argue that contempt is associated with social rejection and is expressed in situations that are low in intimacy and where the person expressing this emotion has perception of less control over the other person's behaviour. Therefore contempt can be used as a means of excluding someone rather than changing their behaviour. During a negotiation, attempts at exclusion by showing contempt and attempts at changing the behaviour by showing anger should elicit fewer concessions (when contempt is expressed) but more concessions when anger is expressed from the participants.

Also relevant are the findings of Steinel, Van Kleef, and Harinck (2008) who found that when anger was directed at a person's behaviour, more concessions were given whereas when anger was directed at the person himself or herself, fewer concessions were given. Further, behaviour-directed anger communicated important information about the ongoing negotiation (that the negotiator was tough and wanted more concessions) but person-directed anger did not. Extrapolating from these findings and the earlier discussion about the nature of contempt, the present study predicted that participants in negotiations would make smaller concessions to contemptuous partners than angry partners because contemptuous partners (like those expressing person-directed anger) are likely to be perceived as uninterested in reaching agreement, making concessions futile.

I also predicted that negotiation partners' contempt and anger would have different effects on participants' own emotions. Van Kleef et al. (2004a) found interpersonal convergence of emotions during interaction (i.e., participants felt angry when interacting with an angry partner and happy when interacting with a happy partner), suggesting that participants' emotions were influenced by the affective route of the EASI model. Similarly, in the present Study, I expected that participants would feel more contempt with contemptuous partners compared to angry or neutral partners and more anger with angry partners compared to contemptuous or neutral partners.

In previous studies (Steinel et al., 2008; Van Kleef et al., 2004a), researchers found that participants made more concession to angry partners as a consequence of *tracking*. Tracking is considered as a way in which people infer strategic information about partner's limits (how much the partner is willing to concede) through their emotions in a negotiation. Van Kleef and colleagues have measured tracking by asking participants to indicate the limits of their partner (the lowest offer their partner was willing to make) at the end of the negotiation task. I also expected to find this pathway in the present studies. However, I do think that besides tracking, other processes can mediate the relationship between partner's emotions and concessions made (such as, impressions of the partner, own emotions). In these studies, I also investigated whether participants' own emotions of contempt and anger mediate the relationship between emotion expressed by the partner and concessions made to them. This will be an alternative pathway to tracking where I can see the effect of partner's emotions on concessions made.

Status

In addition to manipulating negotiators' emotions, the present studies also investigated the effects of status on negotiation. In the literature, status is often confounded with power (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). However, according to Magee and Galinsky (2008) and Blader and Chen (2012) status and power are two separate concepts. Status is considered to be the social worth that others confer on an individual whereas power is a property of an individual himself or herself and can be considered as the amount of control that individual has over valuable resources (Magee & Galinsky, 2008).

Status has not been investigated in previous studies of the impact of emotions in negotiations. However, several studies have assessed effects of power. For example, Van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, and Manstead (2006) demonstrated that high power participants were impervious to their partner's emotions whereas low power participants responded to the social functional information inherent in their partner's emotions. Malhotra and Gino (2012) found that high-power individuals behaved more opportunistically in on-going negotiation, and that this effect was mediated by feelings of entitlement and enhanced aspirations. De Dreu and Van Kleef (2004) found that low power negotiators tended to use more diagnostic and belief-congruent questions when negotiating with competitive partners. Although these findings are potentially relevant to the present research, the procedures used in these studies differ from this study in two ways. First, the earlier studies manipulated participants' own power and not the power of their negotiation partners. Second, their focus was on power rather than status, which is the central concern here.

Outside the domain of negotiation, Blader and Chen (2012) investigated the effect of status and power in an interpersonal context involving justice. They found that status and power had differential influences on justice outcomes – such that status was associated with fair behaviour and power with unfair behaviour. The positive effect of status was moderated by participants' dispositional concern with status. Moreover, this effect was only observed when participants had high status and low power but not when they had high status and high power. This finding further highlights the distinction between status and power.

In the present context, there are three reasons why status is of greater interest than power. First, status has not been investigated in the context of negotiations. Second, information about status (e.g., designation) is often readily available during real-world negotiations and therefore there is an obvious practical relevance to its investigation. Third, status has direct relevance to the emotion of contempt, which is a central focus of the current research. As argued above, contempt is used to reinforce status differences and enforce social order and is invoked when there are community norm violations related to hierarchy and respect (Rozin et al, 1999). For this reason, it seems worthwhile to investigate whether contempt has stronger interpersonal effects when negotiation partners are higher in status.

In the present studies, status is defined in terms of a person's standing in the context of an organization (Pearce, 2011). According to Pearce (2011), even though status is conceived through a subjective process, there is a strong element of consensus at the societal level. According to Magee and Galinsky (2008), status provides a "frame" through which individuals perceive, understand, interpret, predict, and evaluate the behaviour of others. Status leads to strong expectations

from others, which in turn influences their behaviour. Previous research has shown that people tend to confer high status on others based their high position within the relevant social hierarchy (Benjamin & Podolny, 1999), their high task performance (Shackelford, Wood, & Worchel, 1996), and the high standing of their occupation (Kanekar, Kolsawalla, & Nazareth, 1989). According to Magee and Galinsky (2008), higher competence and better performance are linked to high status and vice versa. Moreover, previous research has shown that people possessing high status are considered to be more competent and are also conferred with a higher rank (Tiedens, Ellsworth, & Mesquita, 2000). Therefore, it is possible that people concede to high status others more than to low status others in a negotiation setting since high status others are deemed more adept and deserving.

Anger, Contempt and Status

There is some previous evidence to suggest that contempt and anger will interact with status in the present context. Magee and Galinsky (2008) argue that when other people's behaviour deviates from expectations, these others suffer a backlash. For example, a low status employee who tries to control important resources in an organization might be reprimanded by his/her superiors (who wish to maintain their own high status) and also by his/her coworkers (who want to maintain the status hierarchy). I predicted that a similar backlash would also occur in response to a low status person's expression of anger and contempt.

Fischer and Roseman (2007) argued that individuals who express contempt make negative dispositional attributions about the recipient of contempt and consider them to be inferior. Moreover they contended that contempt may be used as a way of asserting superiority over others, particularly when other means of gaining

control are absent. According to Morris and Keltner (2000), contempt is used to maintain hierarchies by reducing the status of the target of contempt, especially if this target person is a subordinate. The target of contempt is perceived to have low status and the person who displays contempt is thought to be superior (Keltner, Young, Heerey, Oemig, & Monarch, 1998). Therefore, a display of contempt by a low status person might be seen as a challenge to one's status and a deviation from norms (Melwani & Barsade, 2011). The resulting backlash could lead to fewer concessions in a negotiation context. Conversely, when a high status person expresses contempt, it may be seen as legitimate and consistent with expectations, leading participants to perceive their own offers as insufficient.

Anger may be affected similarly by status considerations. For example, Tiedens (2001) found that participants conferred more status to angry people. So, it can be argued that anger from low status others would be seen as inconsistent whereas anger from high status others would be seen as consistent. Fitness (2000) found that lower status participants were angered by unfair treatment whereas high status individuals were angered by violations of moral code or incompetence at work. Moreover she found that high status individuals viewed anger episodes to have been successfully resolved and were more likely to confront their target than were low status individuals. Also, Stets and Tsushima (2001) found that low status individuals reported more intense and longer lasting anger than high status individuals. However, Sloan (2004) found that low status individuals were less likely than high status individuals to *communicate* anger. Therefore, similar to contempt, it seems plausible that expressions of anger by high status others are

seen as more normatively appropriate and so high status angry partners (like high status contemptuous partners) are given more concessions.

The above discussion suggests that expressions of contempt and anger by low status partners might be seen as deviations from social norms. Therefore it is possible the interaction between status and emotions will also influence recipients' emotions. In particular, recipients of these two emotions might feel more contempt and anger when negotiating with low status partners than when negotiating with high status partners.

Power Distance

Out of Hofstede's (1980) four dimensions of cultural variability, power distance is most relevant to the present studies and to status concerns more generally. At a societal level, power distance relates to how society views and deals with difference in power. Hofstede believed that his dimensions of cultural variability were intelligible at a societal level and not at an individual level. However, subsequent research (Clugston, Howell, & Dorfman, 2000) has shown that there are considerable individual differences in orientation to cultural dimensions even within a given society. Therefore, in the present context, individual or psychological orientation to power distance will be measured (power distance orientation) to see how the individual views and deals with difference of power.

Individuals scoring high on power distance orientation accept difference in status, agree more with higher status individuals, and are more submissive to authority (Clugston et al., 2000). However, individuals with a low power distance orientation question inequality of power and show less deference to authority figures (Lian,

Ferris, & Brown, 2011). Therefore I expected that power distance would moderate the relationship between status and concessions, such that recipients of contempt and anger who score high on power distance would accept the emotional display of high status negotiators as legitimate and therefore make more concessions to them. On the other hand, recipients of contempt and anger who score low on power distance should question the legitimacy of the emotional display of high status others and make fewer concessions.

Study 1

Study 1 compared effects of anger and contempt communications from the other negotiator on participants' negotiation behaviour in a bargaining task. The other negotiator's status was also manipulated by providing information about their affiliation to an esteemed or less well-regarded institution. In addition, I assessed power distance orientation as a potential moderator of the effect of status on concessions.

Study Aims

Based on the reasoning presented above in the General Introduction, Study 1 assessed seven hypotheses. Participants were expected to make more concessions to high status partners than low status partners (Hypothesis 1), and to angry partners than to contemptuous partners (Hypothesis 2). I also expected to find an interaction between status and emotion such that participants were expected to make fewer concessions to low status contemptuous and angry partners than to low status neutral partners (Hypothesis 3a) but more concessions to contemptuous and angry high status partners than to high status neutral partners (Hypothesis 3b).

In terms of participants' own ratings of emotions, I expected that participants would feel more contempt with contemptuous partners than with angry or neutral partners (Hypothesis 4a) and more anger with angry partners than with contemptuous or neutral partners (Hypothesis 4b). I also expected these emotional reactions to mediate the effects of the emotion manipulation on concessions (Hypothesis 4c). I also expected participants to feel more contempt and anger with low status partners than with high status partners (Hypothesis 5).

Moreover, in accordance with previous literature, I expected that participants would monitor the limits of their negotiation partners and that their perceptions of these limits would mediate the effect of emotion on concessions. In particular, I predicted that angry partners would be seen as having higher limits and would therefore receive more concessions than contemptuous partners (Hypothesis 6).

Finally, I predicted that power distance orientation would moderate the effect of status on concessions, such that participants scoring higher on power distance would make more concessions (Hypothesis 7a), and participants scoring lower on power distance would make fewer concessions (Hypothesis 7b) when negotiating with a high status person.

Method

Participants. Ninety undergraduates (including 64 women) took part in this study. Sixty-three percent of participants were British, 10% were American, 6% were Irish, and the remaining 21% included people with a variety of other nationalities. The mean age of the participants was 19.32 years (*SD* = 1.57). Forty participants were awarded course credits for their participation and 50 participants

were recruited through university-wide advertisements and were paid £7 for their participation. Ten additional participants were dropped from the study because they guessed correctly that they were not genuinely interacting with a real person during the task.

Design. This study used a 2 (Status: High and Low) x 3 (Emotion: Contempt condition, Anger condition, and Neutral condition) between-subjects factorial design. Dependent measures were concessions made by participants and the emotions expressed by participants. Participants were allocated in equal numbers to conditions, with fifteen participants per cell.

Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to different conditions and were seated in a cubicle with a computer. They were given instructions and were told that they would interact with another person through an instant messaging forum (although the "other" participant's responses were always the same and were typed in real time by the researcher in an adjacent cubicle). Participants then performed the negotiation task, as described in the next section, before being debriefed.

Negotiation task. The negotiation task was adapted from Van Kleef et al.'s research (2004a; 2004b; Steinel, Van Kleef, & Harinck, 2008; Van Kleef & Van Lange, 2008). This task has certain elements that mimic real-life negotiation since the participant is unaware of the other person's options and gains and can only make decisions based on their own payoffs (Steinel et al., 2008). Moreover, participants make offers and receive counter-offers that give them the option of choosing based on their own preferences and own requirements. Participants were told that the

study was an attempt to investigate negotiations through computer-mediated tasks since e-communication is an ubiquitous feature of life in the modern world.

According to Sumanth and Cable (2011), belonging to a top ranked organization (in this instance – University of Cambridge) should confer high status on the individual and being a part of a low ranked institution (in this instance – Anglia Ruskin University) should confer low status. Accordingly, participants were told that they would be participating in a collaborative project with three universities – University of Oxford, University of Cambridge, and Anglia Ruskin University (Cambridge). They were led to believe that they were interacting with another person across a computer network. Status was also manipulated using information about high or low levels of performance in previous academic work. Since status is linked with competence, in the present sample of university undergraduate students, it was expected that performance at A level results would provide additional and relatable status information to participants. In the high status condition, participants were told that their opponent was a member of the University of Cambridge (a high status institution) who had attained ten A* GCSEs and 4 A* A levels. In the low status condition, participants were told that their opponent was a member of Anglia Ruskin University, an ex-polytechnic/new university in Cambridge (a relatively lower status institution), with grades in the range of B-C in both GCSEs and A levels. Participants were also asked to record their own GCSE and A level results so that they could be shown to their partner. Thus, this study manipulated status using institutional affiliation coupled with previous qualifications.

The task was computer-mediated and participants were always assigned the role of seller of mobile phones (in an ostensibly random but actually rigged allocation

procedure). Participants chose from 9 options at each stage of negotiation, specifying desired levels on three dimensions (price, warranty period, and duration of service contract) that gave them variable payoffs (Table 1.1). They were told that the other person also had his/her own payoff chart but that their chart was different from participants' own chart. They were also told that different options would give them different payoffs and that their aim should be to maximize their gains and at the same time try to get their offer accepted. For example, level 1 on price, warranty period and service contract gave them the highest payoff and level 9 on price gave them the lowest payoff. They were also told that that at the end of the entire experiment, there would be a lottery and their chances of winning would depend on two factors – their own payoffs (higher payoffs were more desirable) and acceptance of their offers by their negotiation partner. This was done to ensure that participants had competitive as well as collaborative goals during negotiation.

Table 1.1

Participants' payoff chart

Level	Price of phones		Warranty period		Service contract	
	Price	Payoff	Warranty (months)	Payoff	Service (months)	Payoff
1	£150	400	1	120	1	240
2	£145	350	2	105	2	210
3	£140	300	3	90	3	180
4	£135	250	4	75	4	150
5	£130	200	5	60	5	120
6	£125	150	6	45	6	90
7	£120	100	7	30	7	60
8	£115	50	8	15	8	30
9	£110	0	9	0	9	0

Participants were informed that there would be six rounds of offers and counter-offers. The participants were asked to make an offer to the buyer and would then get a counter-offer. The counter offers that the participant received were pre-programmed as 8-7-8 (Round 1 for price-warranty-service), 8-7-7 (Round 2), 8-6-7 (Round 3), 7-6-7 (Round 4), 7-6-6 (Round 5), and 6-6-6 (Round 6). According to Van Kleef et al. (2004a, 2004b), this sequence of counter-offers is believable and has elements of mixed motive negotiation (i.e., it is competitive and cooperative). The participants (sellers) were told that the buyer might give them feedback during the first six rounds, by keying in text using (simulated) instant messaging software. This feedback from the buyer contained the emotion manipulation (contempt vs. anger

vs. neutral). Moreover, the participants were also asked to try to persuade the buyer by writing about the supposed merits of the offer.[1] This was done to enhance the experimental realism of the study so that the participants would accept the emotionally laden feedback as part of a genuine exchange of information between themselves and their partners. They were also told that this above process would continue for another six rounds wherein buyer and seller roles would be reversed. Therefore, they were led to understand that they could give the buyer feedback after the following six rounds (although the experiment always terminated after the first six rounds).

Feedback was given by the supposed other participant during rounds 2, 4 and 6. Participants received (prescripted) contemptuous, angry, or neutral comments (the full script of comments is displayed in Table 1.2).[2] There were also some deliberate typing errors and the comments were provided through an Instant Messaging site to make the manipulation more realistic. Moreover before commencing the task, participants were asked to wait for a few minutes so that the researcher could make a phone call to check that the "other participant" was ready. The whole experiment

[1] The participants wrote about the hypothetical benefits of the phone to the buyer and also how the buyer would benefit from the offer. For example, this phone has many good features and it will be beneficial for you. This was part of the procedure and was only used to enhance the believability of the exchange. The data will not be discussed further.

[2]These statements were pretested using 44 participants (recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk). The participants were asked to segregate ten statements (adapted from Van Kleef et al., 2004a; Melwani & Barsade, 2011) into anger and contempt. They were also asked to rate on a 5-point scale, the extent to which the statements expressed anger or contempt (1 = *very low* to 5 = *very high*). Based on the results of paired samples *t*-test, those statements were selected which were clearly categorized in the target category (*t*s > 2, *p*s < .05). The means of these statements are shown in Table 1.9 (Appendix G).

was also video recorded and the participants were aware and consented to this procedure.[3]

Table 1.2

Feedback given to the participants

Round	Contempt comment	Anger comment	Neutral comment
During Round 2	This does not show quick thinking, given your A level scores. I will give you 8-7-7	This is annoying. I will offer 8-7-7	I think I will offer 8-7-7
During Round 4	This offer is so beneath me!! My offer is 7-6-7	OK!! This is NOT what I want! I will give 7-6-7	I am going to offer 7-6-7
During Round 6	Really!! Take a hint and read a book on negotiation. I will give you 6-6-6	Did you really offer me that??? I will give you 6-6-6	I am going to offer 6-6-6

Measures. The following measures and manipulation checks were completed by participants either during or after the negotiation task.

Role identification and suspicion. I checked how closely participants identified with the role of seller during by asking them "How well were you able to imagine yourself as a "seller of mobile phones" during the task?" on a 9-point scale (9=*very well*, 1=*not at all*). Participants felt that they were able to self-identify with the role of a seller moderately well (M = 5.34, SD = 2.25). To check whether participants were suspicious about the nature of the study, I asked "What do you think the study is testing?" and "Do you have any other comments about this study? If yes, please write them below."

[3] I have not analysed the data from the video recordings because there was missing data and therefore will not discuss this further.

Status manipulation check. Perceptions of the buyer's status were measured using three items rated on a 9-point scale (1=*low* and 9=*high*). One item measured institution status ("How high is the status of the buyer's institution?"). Two items measured performance status ("How good are the buyer's qualifications?", "How good was the buyer's A-level performance relative to your own?"). The correlation between the performance status items was high ($r(90) = .76$, $p < .001$). This measure was included to ascertain the success of the status manipulation.

In-group identification and competitiveness checks. Participants' rated in-group identification and competitiveness on separate 9-point scales ("How aware were you that you are a member of University of Oxford during the task?" and "How competitive did you feel towards the other person during the task?"). These items were used to check the degree of in-group identification and feeling of competitiveness of participants.

Ratings of emotions. Participants were asked to indicate on 7-point scales the emotions that they perceived in the buyer and the emotions that they personally felt after round 2, 4, and 6 (1=*not at all*, 4=*moderately*, 7=*very much*). Participants rated anger, contempt, and 12 other emotions that were included to disguise the study's focus on the two emotions of interest here (anger and contempt).

Limits. Three items were included to measure the buyer's limits. Limits are inversely related to concessions made by the participants. If the buyer's limits are considered to be high, then fewer concessions will be made and vice versa. The limits item for price was "How low an offer do you think the buyer was to prepared to accept on price?" and identically worded items were used for warranty and

service contract. These items were rated on a 9-point scale that corresponded to the participant's payoff chart (1=*extremely low limit*, 9=*extremely high limit*). Cronbach's α for these three items was .79. These three items were averaged to form one score.

Power distance orientation scale. Power distance orientation was measured by an 8-item scale developed by Earley and Erez (1997). High scores on this scale indicate high tolerance or acceptance of power differences. Some examples of the items on this scale are "In most situations managers should make decisions without consulting their subordinates" and "Managers who let their employees participate in decisions lose power". Participants' responses were assessed using a 5-point scale (1 = *strongly disagree* to 5 = *strongly agree*). The reliability of this scale for the present sample was very low (α = .30) but deletion of problematic items did not solve this issue so the original scale was used in analyses.

Results

Manipulation checks. To check if the emotion manipulation was successful, I performed the same analytical procedure that was used by Van Kleef et al. (2004a, 2004b). This involved conducting a mixed design analysis of variance (ANOVA) using emotion (anger vs. contempt vs. neutral) and status as a between-participants factor and rated emotion (participants' rating of partner's anger vs. contempt) as a within-participants variable. This was done to ascertain whether participants' perception of their partner's anger and contempt differed in different ways for different conditions (i.e., with the targeted emotion rated as highest for each condition). The prediction, therefore was that there would be a significant emotion manipulation by rated emotion interaction. I performed these analyses by averaging participants' ratings of perceived anger and of perceived contempt across round 2

and 4. This prediction was confirmed, F (2, 84) = 12.06, p< .001. The status manipulation was involved in no significant effects.

Second, I performed a paired sample *t*-test for the three conditions separately to show that participants differed in the desired direction within each condition (i.e., participants rated target emotions higher in each condition). In the contempt condition, participants reported perceiving more contempt (M = 4.19, SD = 1.55) than anger (M = 3.22, SD= 1.34) in their partners, t(29) = 3.66, p= .001. In the anger condition, participants reported perceiving more anger (M = 4.11, SD = 1.12) than contempt (M = 3.58, SD = 1.43) in their partners, t(29) = 2.72, p = .01. In the neutral condition, participants reported perceiving more contempt (M = 2.19, SD = 1.22) than anger in their partners (M = 1.68, SD = .97), t (29) = 2.47, p = .02. This result was not hypothesized and is discussed further in the next section.

To check the effectiveness of the status manipulation, analysis was done on the two status measures (institution status and performance status) separately. I performed two-way ANOVAs with emotion (anger, contempt, and neutral) and status (high and low) as independent variables and institution status and performance status as dependent variable. Both analyses revealed the expected main effect of status (institution status, F (1, 84) = 114.65, p < .001, η_p^2 = .58; performance status, F (1, 84) = 198.49, p < .001, η_p^2 = .70. Means indicated that participants rated their partners as having higher status in the high status condition (institution status M = 7.93, SD = 1.32; performance status M = 7.17, SD = 1.20) than in the low status condition (institution status M = 4.44, SD = 1.81; performance status M = 3.71, SD = 1.16). Neither the main effect of emotion nor the interaction effect was significant in either analysis.

Concessions. Nine participants reached a consensus before round 6 and five participants reached an agreement before round 5. In order to permit comparable results for all participants, the presented analyses focus on data collected up to round 4[4] . Payoffs were the points that participants scored in each round (see Table 1) and can be understood as the profit that participants would make from the current offer to the buyer and concessions were calculated from these payoffs. *Concessions* refer to the amount participants were willing to cede in each round and fewer concessions (and higher payoffs) were better for the participants. In accordance with Steinel et al, (2006), participants' payoffs (see Table 1) for each dimension were summed for each round. Next, I calculated the average payoffs by averaging the payoffs up to round 4. To obtain concessions, I subtracted the average payoffs from the maximum possible score. I conducted a 2 (status: high and low) x 3 (emotion: contempt, anger and neutral) independent ANOVA with concessions as a dependent variable. There was a significant main effect of status, F (1, 84) = 4.56, p = .036, η_p^2 = .05. The mean concessions implied by offers to high status partners (M = 468.75, SD = 97.39) were smaller than those implied by offers to low status partners (M = 515.61, SD = 117.48). Therefore, the status manipulation had the opposite effect to the one predicted in hypothesis 1.

There was also a significant main effect of emotion, F (2, 84) = 4.14, p = .019, η_p^2 = .10. Pairwise comparison using Bonferroni correction indicated that concessions were smaller in the contempt condition (M = 456.83, SD = 89.88) than in the anger condition (M = 533.46, SD = 119.67). The neutral condition did not differ

[4]Results showed a similar trend even until Round 6.

significantly from either the contempt or the anger condition.. Therefore, hypothesis 2 was confirmed.

There was no significant interaction between emotion and status and therefore, hypotheses 3a and 3b were not confirmed.

Self-reported emotions. Univariate tests revealed a significant main effects of status on self-reported contempt, F (1, 84) = 3.98, p = .049, η_p^2 = .05, and anger, F (1, 84) = 10.03, p = .002, η_p^2 = .11, indicating that participants reported feeling greater contempt and anger when negotiating with high status partners (contempt M = 2.95, SD = 1.42; anger M = 2.79, SD = 1.43) than with low status partners (contempt M = 2.43, SD = 1.14; anger M = 1.91, SD = 1.19). Thus, status had opposite effects on contempt and anger to those predicted by hypothesis 5.

There was also a significant univariate main effect of partner's emotion on self-reported contempt F (2, 84) = 5.28, p = .007, η_p^2 = .11. Participants reported the highest levels of contempt in the contempt condition (M = 3.22, SD = 1.37), the next highest level of contempt in the anger condition (M = 2.67, SD = 1.21), and the lowest level of contempt in the neutral condition (M = 2.18, SD = 1.15). After Bonferroni corrections, the only significant difference was between the contempt and neutral conditions. Therefore, hypothesis 4a was supported partially. There was no significant main effect of partner's emotion on self-reported anger. So, hypothesis 4b was not confirmed.

I also ran a mediation analysis to assess whether self-reported contempt and anger mediated the effect of the manipulation of the other person's emotion on concessions. I conducted separate analyses using two contrast codes for emotion as

a predictor – one comparing the neutral condition with combined anger and contempt conditions (contrast 1) and the second comparing the anger condition with the contempt condition (contrast 2). I used the bootstrapping technique developed by Preacher and Hayes (2004) for these analyses. Analyses for both self-reported contempt and anger showed that these two variables did not mediate the effect of manipulated emotion on concessions. Therefore, hypothesis 4c was not supported.

In-group identification. I suspected that a possible explanation for the unexpected status effect was that the high-status condition involved negotiation with a Cambridge University undergraduate, who was a member of a potential competing group for Oxford University undergraduate participants. This may have increased the salience of participants' identification with Oxford University, and the increased salience of this social identity may have contributed to the obtained status effect. To assess this possibility, I conducted exploratory analysis to investigate the role of in-group identification. There was a significant univariate main effect of status on in-group identification, F (1, 84) = 12.07, p = .001, η_p^2 = .13. Participants reported higher in-group identification when negotiating with high status partners (M = 6.22, SD = 2.21) than with low status partners (M = 4.47, SD = 2.62). There was no significant effect of emotion or interaction between status and emotion. I also performed a mediation analysis to check if in-group identification mediated the effect of status on concessions, but the effect was not significant.

Limits. I did mediation analysis to check if limits mediated the effect of emotion on concessions. The limits measure was used to check perceptions about the buyer's negotiation behaviour, which was reflected in the participants'

concessions. I followed the same procedure for mediation as mentioned in the analyses for self-reported emotions. The results showed that limits did not mediate the effect of emotion on concessions. Therefore, hypothesis 6 was not supported.

Power distance orientation. Power distance orientation did not moderate the relationship between status and concessions. Therefore hypotheses 7a and 7b were not supported.

Discussion

Research in the area of emotions and negotiation has uncovered many different facets of their relationship. This study focused on effects of status and two emotions (anger and contempt) on negotiation outcomes. This is the first study that has explored the effects of either status or contempt on negotiation outcomes. In line with predictions, I found that participants made more concessions to angry partners than to contemptuous partners, and that participants felt more contemptuous when interacting with a contemptuous partner. However, the status manipulation had effects that were contrary to predictions: participants made more concessions and experienced less contempt and anger when negotiating with low status than high status partners. These results are discussed below.

Effects of emotion manipulation. As predicted, participants made more concessions to angry partners than to contemptuous partners. This finding supports the reasoning presented in the General Introduction section above. In particular, the effect may reflect the fact that contempt indicates complete exclusion of the person when behaviour cannot be controlled, whereas anger signifies that offending behaviour can be changed. This is consistent with Fischer and Roseman's

(2007) finding that anger signals goal blockage and a desire to get a favourable outcome. Therefore it is possible that participants inferred that angry partners would not accept unfavourable offers and so the participants changed their behaviour (their offers) by giving angry partners more concessions. While dealing with contemptuous partners, participants may have considered changing their behaviour as futile when dealing with partners who had expressed deeply felt disapproval and disrupted relationships beyond repair, and therefore, they did not bother to give more concessions. Partners' contempt was probably perceived as indicating that they were unhappy with the participants as people rather than simply with the participants' offers. In that case, there would be little point in participants increasing concessions.

It is worth noting that the effect of emotion on concessions was obtained despite the fact that the focus of feedback statements was matched across emotion conditions: statements used to convey both anger and contempt conditions were directed at the offer, not at the person. Therefore the obtained result illuminates the difference in the specific quality of anger and contempt and how these emotions communicate different expectation from the target. Also worth noting here is that participants rated neutral partners as expressing more contempt than anger. Although this result was not hypothesized it is possible that neutral partners are not perceived as such by others and neutral expressions are perceived as communicating disinterest, which could be the reason why participants rated neutral partners as expressing contempt.

Interestingly, conspicuous by its absence is the empirically documented mediation of the effect of partner's anger on concessions by perceived partner limits, referred

to in the literature as *tracking* (Steinel et al., 2008; Van Kleef et al., 2004a). In the present study, it seems that although participants inferred that their partners were dissatisfied with their offers and responded by giving concessions, this effect did not depend on tracking. It could be that participants wanted to put an end to an encounter with an unpleasant negotiator as soon as possible while trying to reach a consensus in order to have a successful negotiation. Consistent with this account is my finding that participants reported feeling more contemptuous when interacting with contemptuous partners. However, I found no evidence that self-reported contempt mediated the effect of emotion on concessions.

Although participants reported feeling more contemptuous with contemptuous partners, they did not report feeling more angry with angry partners. It is possible that contemptuous remarks made by partners made participants feel contemptuous as they might have felt that only an unworthy person would express contempt towards them in this kind of situation. By contrast, they may have thought that there was some justification for anger given that they were not offering as good a deal as they could have offered. However, these self-reported feelings did not mediate the relationship between emotion and concessions.

Effects of status. The results revealed an effect of status that was the direct opposite of the one predicted by hypothesis 1. Participants made more concessions to low status partners than to high status partners. This finding also conflicts with results of previous literature indicating that low-power people make more concessions compared to high-power people (Van Kleef et al., 2006).
Moore, Kurtzberg, Thompson, and Morris (1999) found that in a negotiation, in-group members were favoured more than out-group members and more impasses

were reached with out-group partners than in-group partners. In this study, it seems that participants had higher in-group identification when interacting with high status partners, suggesting that they were more aware of their group membership. This effect may be a result of the traditional rivalry between the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge (the supposed high status group). Therefore, it is possible that they viewed high status partners as rival out-group members and conceded less to them for this reason rather than because of their high status. However, the mediation analysis was not significant, suggesting that in-group identification cannot wholly account for the unexpected effect of status.

A potentially more directly relevant mediator may have been attitudes to out-group members. Participants may have felt more favourably disposed towards students from a less prestigious institution than towards students from a directly competing institution. However, I did not assess this variable directly in the present study and therefore have no data to support this interpretation. Since the focus of this thesis is on status and not intergroup relations, subsequent studies will manipulate status in a way that is unrelated to social identity in order to avoid the apparent confounds of the present study.

Another reason for the unexpected results relating to status may relate to the specific nature of the manipulation. When I asked the participants to rate the status of their partner, I did not ask them to rate their partner's status compared to themselves. Therefore, it is possible that participants rated the status of their partner as high but did not consider it to be higher than their own status. This may have led participants to interact more competitively in the high status condition

because they believed that their status was comparable to that of their negotiation partner.

Blader and Chen (2012) found that high status people behaved more fairly compared to high-power people when distributing justice to others. Therefore it is also possible that participants behaved more generously toward low status partners by giving more concessions. Also, it is possible that participants inferred that Cambridge students could afford to pay more and accept worse deals than Anglia students when buying phones and therefore gave more concessions to low status others.

The results also indicated that participants were more contemptuous and angry with high status partners than with low status partners, which is again contrary to my predictions. Again, high status partners could have been perceived as having similar status and therefore being potential competitors, which in turn could have resulted in greater feelings of contempt and anger towards them.

In summary, the surprising effect of the status manipulation may have reflected greater group differentiation, higher competitiveness, or lower fairness in the high status condition. The present study did not measure any of these potential mediators directly, so it is unclear which of them may have been most influential. Study 2 attempts to address this issue by using a different status manipulation that only highlights the competence of the other person.

Interaction effects. I did not find the predicted interaction between status and emotion. This may have reflected the unanticipated effects of the status manipulation considered above relating to the salience of in-group identity. My next

study therefore uses a different manipulation of status that avoids implications for intergroup competition.

There was also no support for the hypothesis that power distance would moderate the effect of status on concessions. This hypothesis will be investigated further in the next three studies, using revised procedures for manipulating status that reduce its unintended effects on other variables. The sample size in this study was also not large enough to test moderation and I use bigger samples in Studies 3 and 4. Also, another possible reason for the lack of effects of power-distance was the low reliability of the scale in this study. In the literature, most studies have found the reliability of this scale to be around .67 (see Blader & Chen, 2011). So, the low reliability of this scale may have been specific to the present sample. In Study 2, the same hypothesis will be tested using the same measure. Also, as a related measure, social dominance orientation will be used in Study 2, as power distance orientation and social dominance orientation both measure attitudes towards hierarchy.

Study 2

Study 2 differed from Study 1 in the following three ways. Firstly, it used a different manipulation of status since the status manipulation did not work as intended in Study 1. In Study 1, inter-group dynamics contaminated the status manipulation. Therefore in this study, participants were made aware that other participants were from the same university and the only information provided about their partner concerned task performance. Also, since the concepts of power and status are closely related (Magee & Galinsky, 2008), I employed two items to measure power, to enable me to distinguish the effect of status from that of power. Further details about the status manipulation are provided in the method section. Secondly,

sadness was used as an additional emotion in this study and the neutral condition was omitted. Sadness is not an emotion that has been studied extensively in the context of negotiations. In the literature, there have been some studies assessing the effect of disappointment (a emotion related to sadness) on negotiation outcomes. Research has shown that disappointment conveys that the disappointed person has not received enough concessions (Van Kleef & Van Lange, 2008), and evokes guilt when directed at the person and therefore leads to greater concessions (Lelieveld et al., 2011). Although sadness and disappointment share certain similarities, they are different emotions because disappointment is a counterfactual emotion that occurs in the absence of an expected positive event (Van Dijk, Zeelenberg, & Van der Pligt, 1999). Sadness, as will be evident from the discussion below, is accompanied by feelings of helplessness and is also a result of negative outcomes. Therefore, I considered sadness to be an interesting emotion to investigate in this context. Thirdly, a self-report measure of social dominance orientation (SDO) was used to complement the power-distance orientation scale included in Study 1. SDO was used as an alternative measure of attitudes towards societal inequalities (similar to PDO).

Sadness

Sadness is an emotion that is encountered quite frequently in our daily lives (see Scherer & Tannenbaum, 1986). Many of us have experienced sadness while waving goodbye to a loved one at the airport, while watching an emotional scene in a movie, when our favourite team loses an important game, or when we have an 'empty nest' when our children leave for college. Researchers such as Roseman, Wiest, and Swartz (1994) have investigated unique characteristics of different discrete

emotions and found that sadness was associated with a distinctive feeling of having a lump in their throat and feeling tired, thoughts centering around what was missing in their lives, a desire to not do anything to rectify their situation and crying about it, and a need to be put at ease by an external agent.

Ellsworth and Smith (1988) found that when people experienced sadness, they appraised the situation to be beyond their control and used their emotion as a plea for help from onlookers. Keltner, Ellsworth, and Edwards (1993) supported and extended the preceding finding. They found that people experiencing sadness attributed situational influences as influencing ambiguous events in contrast to angry participants, who attributed ambiguous events to human agency. Raghunathan and Pham (1999) found that people experiencing sadness were willing to take more risk to get more rewards (and thereby soothe themselves) than anxious people. Forgas (1991) found that participants experiencing sadness chose partners with better interpersonal skills than competence for an activity, compared to happy participants.

There have also been studies about how people perceive others who express sadness. Researchers such as Hareli and Hess (2010) have found that people expressing sadness were perceived as less competent but warmer than people expressing anger. Tiedens, Ellsworth, and Mesquita (2000) found that angry characters in a vignette were considered to have higher status than sad characters. Tiedens (2001) also supported this finding by investigating participants' perceptions of competence and status when others expressed either anger or sadness at a third party. They found that sad others were seen as having lower status and competence than angry others. Tiedens (2001) believed that sad people

are evaluated positively in terms of personality but negatively in terms of task ability, whereas the opposite pattern applies to angry people. Barnett, King, and Howard (1979) found that children responded to other people's sadness with empathy and altruism. Also, Clark, Oullette, Powell, and Milberg (1987) found when people are communally inclined (i.e., concerned about others rather than engaging in a transactional business-like relationship with them), they help sad people more than people with a neutral expression. This chimes with the above discussion that people expressing sadness are well liked and considered nice, are shown empathy and helped in some way.

In sum, when individuals feel sad, they feel incapable of helping themselves, perceive their sadness as a result of situational influences, and would like someone else to make them feel better. Further, those expressing sadness are perceived as helpless, having low status, and lacking in confidence. However, on the positive side they are considered warm. Responses to negotiators who express sadness are likely to be affected by these associations.

The results of Study 1 showed that participants made more concessions to angry partners than contemptuous partners, felt more contemptuous with contemptuous partners than angry partners, gave more concessions to low status partners than high status partners and were contemptuous and angry with high status partners than low status partners (although the manipulation of status did not work as planned). Therefore, in the present study, I predicted that participants would offer the most concessions to angry partners and the least concessions to contemptuous partners, with sad partners in the middle. The predictions for sad partners are based on the assumption that sad participants will be liked more than angry and

contemptuous partners (such that contemptuous partners are liked least, then angry partners and sad partners are liked most), but perceived as weaker than angry and contemptuous partners. For these reasons, I hypothesized that sad partners would be given fewer concessions than angry partners but more concessions than contemptuous partners in a competitive negotiation scenario. I also expected that sad partners would be liked more and therefore participants would feel sympathy towards their sad partner. Since people expressing sadness are considered to have low status, I expected that when high status others express sadness, there would be an incongruence between status and emotion. Therefore, high status partners expressing sadness would be considered weaker and given fewer concessions than low status partners.

Social Dominance Orientation

Social dominance orientation (SDO) has its roots in social dominance theory (see Sidanius, Pratto, Van Laar, & Levin, 2004), which is a theory about how inequality in society is perpetuated and maintained. Social dominance orientation was then developed as a personality variable that measured the difference between individuals in desiring and maintaining the hierarchies that are present in society (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). High scorers on this scale are described as people who prefer inequality and hierarchy in society in favour of their own group(s) and low scorers are described as people who prefer an equal and flat society.

Ratcliff, Bernstein, Cundiff, and Vescio (2012) found that individuals who were high on SDO were better at recognizing angry faces on high status others than low status

others. This pattern of behaviour was not shown by those who were low on SDO, thereby providing evidence that people high on SDO are more attuned to social hierarchy cues. Oldmeadow and Fiske (2007) found that individuals who have high SDO judge high status others as more able than low status others, perhaps because this helps high SDO individuals to legitimise hierarchies.

In the present study, SDO was used as an additional measure to complement the power distance orientation (PDO) scale. PDO measures the extent to which individuals accept inequalities in the distribution of power in their lives (e.g., in their workplace, at home). Relatedly, SDO measures the extent to which people favour their own group's dominance over other groups. Therefore, it seems likely that power distance orientation and SDO should be positively correlated.[5] In Study 1, PDO did not moderate the relationship between status and concessions as predicted and the reliability of the PDO scale was also very low. Therefore, it also makes sense to include SDO as a measure of interest as it might be more appropriate in the present context and may pick up things that PDO does not. So, because the two measures are conceptually similar, I expected SDO to show similar effects to PDO, by moderating the relationship between status and concessions, where low status participants who score high on SDO would make more concessions to high status partners but low status participants who score low on SDO would make fewer concessions to high status participants.

[5] To the best of my knowledge, no study has investigated the relationship between PDO and SDO. Simmons, Duffy and Alfraih (2012) found an interaction between SDO and PDO on attitudes towards women managers, but only in high power distance cultures. They found that people with low PDO and low SDO had favourable attitudes towards women managers but those with high PDO and/or high SDO had unfavourable attitudes. However, from the results of this study it seems like these two concepts are related but also independent, since some participants were high in one and low in another. Guimond et al., 2007) investigated gender difference in self-construals in low and high power distance cultures. They used SDO as well but the focus was on self-construals and the authors did not discuss any results about the relationship between SDO and PD.

Study Aims

Study 2's hypotheses were similar to those of Study 1 and are as follows. First, I predicted that participants would make more concessions to high status partners than low status partners (Hypothesis 1). Second, I predicted that the negotiation partner's anger would lead to the highest level of concessions followed by partner sadness, with partner contempt leading to the lowest level of concessions (Hypothesis 2). Third, I expected to find an interaction between status and emotion, such that – participants interacting with high status partners would make more concessions to angry and contemptuous partners than sad partners (Hypothesis 3a) and participants interacting with low status partners would make fewer concessions to angry and contemptuous partners than sad partners (Hypothesis 3b).

Regarding self-reported emotions, I expected that participants would feel more contempt with contemptuous partners than angry or sad partners (Hypothesis 4a), more anger with angry partners than contemptuous and sad partners (Hypothesis 4b), and more sympathy with sad partners than contemptuous and angry partners (Hypothesis 4c).

I also expected power distance orientation and social dominance orientation to moderate the effects of partner status on concessions, such that low status participants who scored high on power distance orientation and social dominance orientation would make more concessions (Hypothesis 5a), and low status participants who scored low on power distance orientation and social dominance orientation would make fewer concessions (Hypothesis 5b).

Method

Participants. Ninety participants (including 57 women) took part in this study. Forty-six percent of the participants were British, 16% were American, 7% were Indian, and the remaining 31% were from 20 different countries. The mean age of the participants was 21.31 years (*SD* = 3.76). Twenty-nine percent of the participants were given course credits for participating in this study and 71% were recruited through university-wide advertisements and were paid £7 for their participation. Fourteen additional participants were dropped from this study. These were participants who did not understand the instructions properly (3 participants), guessed correctly that they were not actually interacting with a real person (7 participants), or reached an agreement before round 4 (4 participants).

Design. This study used a 2 (Status: High and Low) x 3 (Emotion: Contempt, Anger and Sadness) between-subjects factorial design. The experimental conditions were the same as in Study 1, except that the sadness condition replaced the neutral condition. Dependent measures were also the same as Study 1 – concessions made by the participants and the emotions expressed by the participants. Fifteen participants were randomly allocated to each of the six conditions yielded by factorial combination of the manipulated independent variables.[6]

Procedure. The procedure and negotiation task used in this study were the same as those used in Study 1. In a departure from the previous study, the participants were told that all participants were from Oxford and that they had to sell mobile phones to another person in a different room. Also, in this study, the

[6] I could not get a larger sample size than the one used in Study 1 because of time constraints and a limited participant pool.

participants were asked to read the following description about their imagined persona in the negotiation: “You are an employee of a telecom company - MOC. You work in the Sales department and your job is to sell mobile phones. Your job is to sell phones based on three criteria – price, warranty and service contract (mentioned in your payoff chart, Table 2.1). In order to further your own goals, you want to maximize your own gains (payoffs). At the same time, you also want to get an offer accepted – because if you fail to reach a deal, you will not gain anything. Therefore both aspects of negotiation are important for you – getting an offer accepted as well as securing maximum payoffs”.

Table 2.1

Participants' payoff chart

Level	Price of phones		Warranty period		Service contract	
	Price	Payoff	Warranty (months)	Payoff	Service (months)	Payoff
1	£150	400	1	120	1	240
2	£145	350	2	105	2	210
3	£140	300	3	90	3	180
4	£135	250	4	75	4	150
5	£130	200	5	60	5	120
6	£125	150	6	45	6	90
7	£120	100	7	30	7	60
8	£115	50	8	15	8	30
9	£110	0	9	0	9	0

***Status manipulation*.** Since the status manipulation used in Study 1 apparently made participants' in-group identity salient by using a rival university, a different manipulation was used in Study 2. Participants were told that previous research has indicated that the competence of a buyer made a significant difference to the quality of negotiations. Therefore each potential buyer was asked to take an ability test so that their results could be shared with the participant (seller). Participants were then asked to fill in a demographic form and answer some questions while the buyer (supposedly) took the ability test. After a brief delay (supposedly to permit the test feedback to be extracted), participants were provided with the buyer's supposed results in the ability test, thereby manipulating

status. In the high status condition, the information provided to participants specified that "Person X is someone who has demonstrated high ability and competence. He/she has scored very well and should be in the top 5% of all test takers. He/she has demonstrated high cognitive ability and reasoning skills. This person has shown a lot of promise and aptitude to become a buyer. Moreover he/she is the president of their common room and has a Blue in chess. Therefore this person is someone who would command a great deal of respect and esteem." In the low status condition, a similar passage was used but the references to high status were replaced with low status equivalents (see Appendix D for the full text). Once participants had read this information, they were asked to start negotiating with the buyer using an instant messaging site.

Emotion manipulation. During negotiations, in round 2, 4, and 6, participants were given contemptuous, sad or angry feedback which is displayed in Table 2.2[7]. The anger and contempt statements were very similar to those used in Study 1 and the sadness statements were developed for this study. Again, there were deliberate typing and punctuation errors to enhance experimental realism. The entire procedure was video recorded and the participants gave their consent and were aware that they were being video recorded.[8]

[7] As in Study 1, these statements were pretested with Amazon Mechanical Turk participants (N = 56). There were five statements for anger and contempt conditions and seven for sadness condition. I developed the sadness statements which were similar to contempt and anger statements, by using synonyms of sadness that seemed to indicate sadness. Participants were asked to select which emotion each statement signified; and also rate on a 5-point scale (1 = very low, 3 = somewhat, 5 = very high) the degree to which the statement indicated the emotion that they had selected. Those three statements were selected in each emotion condition, which clearly selected in the target category by at least 40% of the participants (Ms > 3).

[8] Similar to Study 1, I did not analyse data from video recordings. Therefore, I have not discussed them further in this study.

Table 2.2

Feedback given to the participants

Round	Contempt comment	Anger comment	Sadness comment
During Round 2	This does not show quick thinking. You MUST be negotiating for the first time. I will give you 8-7-7	This is annoying. My offer is 8-7-7	Bummer! This is so disappointing. My offer is 8-7-7
During Round 4	This offer is so beneath me!! My offer is 7-6-7	OK!! This is NOT what I want! My offer is 7-6-7	Should I go on? I feel so discouraged. My offer is 7-6-7
During Round 6	Were you actually selected to participate? Wait! Dont bother to answer that. I will give you 6-6-6	This is making me so mad. Did you really offer me that??? I will give you 6-6-6	No…no…please don't make me lose hope. I will give 6-6-6

Measures. The following measures and manipulation checks were used

Ratings of emotions. Participants were asked to rate on 7-point scales both the emotions that they perceived in the buyer and the emotions that they personally felt after round 2, 4, and 6 (1=*not at all*, 7=*very much*). The emotions that they rated were the same as those in Study 1, except for sadness and sympathy, which were new to this study. Similar to Study 1, the emotions of interest were anger, contempt, sadness and sympathy and the other emotions were used to disguise the aim of the study.

Status manipulation check[9]**.** Perceptions of the buyer's status were measured using three items on a 9-point scale (1=*low* and 9=*high*) - "How high/low is the buyer's status?", "How much prestige, do you think, the buyer has?", and "How competent do you think the buyer is?" I used these three items to check if the status manipulation succeeded or not. Cronbach's α for the scale based on these three items was .83. There were also two other 9-point items assessing participants' perceptions of buyer's power, which were included to check if I was successful in manipulating status independently of power. The items were "How much power does the buyer have?" and "How much control do you think the buyer has over the negotiation outcome?" The correlation between these two items was $r(90) = .61$, $p < .001$, and they were combined into a scale for analysis purposes.

Filler activity. While participants waited for the results of the buyer's ability test, they were asked to answer the following open-ended questions. "Could you describe some of your notable achievements?", "What culture do you identify with? (For example: your nationality might be British but you might identify yourself as a Chinese/Korean/Indian, etc. so please mention the culture you identify with, irrespective of your nationality", "What is more important during negotiations – cooperation or competition?", and "What would you like to know about negotiating partner, before you start negotiating?" These questions were not only included to conceal the hypotheses of the study but also served as a filler activity while the participant's partner was supposedly taking an ability test.

[9] Statements measuring status were pretested using Amazon Mechanical Turk participants. Participants were asked to read the description of Person X ($n = 31$) or Person Y ($n = 28$) and then to rate Person X/Y on the five statements used for status manipulation (1 = very high, 7 = very low). Person Y was rated as having lower status and lower power than Person X ($ts > 6$, $ps < .001$).

Appropriateness of emotional reactions. Participants were also asked to indicate on a 9-point scale (1=*not at all*, 5=*moderately*, 9=*very*) "How appropriate were the buyer's emotional reactions?" This item was included for exploratory purposes.

Role identification check and competitiveness check. This study asked participants to imagine themselves in the specific role and persona of a seller (unlike Study 1 which asked participants to negotiate as themselves). However, the same item was used to check how well participants could identify themselves as a seller during by asking them "How well were you able to imagine yourself as a "seller of mobile phones" during the task?" on a 9-point scale (9=*very well*, 1=*not at all*). Participants felt that they were able to identify themselves with the role of a seller moderately well (M = 4.30, SD = 2.12). This item checked the degree to which participants could relate to the task. I also assessed participants' feelings of competitiveness by asking them to rate on a 9-point scale, "How competitive did you feel towards the other person during the task?" Participants reported feeling moderately competitive (M = 4.38, SD = 2.16). I also had an open-ended question inquiring about the aim of the study. No participant included in the analysis correctly guessed the hypotheses.

Limits. The same three items that were used in Study 1 were again used to measure the buyer's limits. Cronbach's α for the scale based on these three items was .65 in Study 2.

Power distance orientation scale. As in Study 1, power distance orientation was measured by an 8 item scale developed by Earley and Erez (1997). High scores on this scale indicate high tolerance or acceptance of power differences.

Participants' responses were assessed using a 5 point scale (1 = *strongly disagree* to 5 = *strongly agree*). For this scale, Cronbach's α was .51[10].

Social dominance orientation (SDO) scale. The SDO scale measures the degree to which people prefer inequality in group relations (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). Sixteen items are rated on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 = *Very negative* to 7 = *Very positive*, including "Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups" and "Group equality should be our ideal". Cronbach's α for this scale was .23. However, after removing six items from this scale (items 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 16), the reliability improved to .77.

Results

Manipulation checks. The following manipulation checks were carried out.

Emotion manipulation check. To check if the emotion manipulation was successful, I performed the same analysis that was used in Study 1. This involved conducting a mixed design ANOVA using emotion (anger vs. contempt vs. sadness) and status as a between-participants factor and rated emotion (participant's rating of partner's anger vs. contempt vs. sadness) as a within-participants variable. This was done to ascertain whether participant's perception of their partner's anger, contempt and sadness differed in different ways for different conditions (i.e., with the targeted emotion rated as highest for each condition). The prediction therefore was that there would be a significant emotion manipulation by rated emotion interaction. I performed these analyses by averaging participants' ratings of perceived anger, contempt, and sadness separately across round 2 and 4. This

[10] Cronbach's α did not improve beyond .51 even if items were removed from the scale.

prediction was confirmed, F (4, 168) = 36.08, p< .001. The status manipulation was involved in no significant effects. As the next step, I performed three separate ANOVAs with emotion and status as independent variables and the target's perceived emotion as a dependent variable.[11] The only significant effect across all three analyses was the main effect of emotion, and pairwise comparisons using the Bonferroni correction showed that the targeted emotion was significantly higher in the relevant condition than in either of the other conditions in all three cases (see Table 2.3 for relevant means and standard deviations)

Table 2.3

Manipulation check for emotion

	df	F	Contempt condition	Anger condition	Sadness condition
Ratings of contempt	2, 84	12.34***	*M* = 4.25 *SD* = 1.97	*M* = 3.12 *SD* = 1.48	*M* = 2.20 *SD* = 1.27
Ratings of anger	2, 84	20.65***	*M* = 3.75 *SD* = 1.63	*M* = 4.70 *SD* = 1.34	*M* = 2.35 *SD* = 1.26
Ratings of sadness	2, 84	27.38***	*M* = 1.40 *SD* = .62	*M* = 1.62 *SD* = .99	*M* = 3.37 *SD* = 1.49

Note: *** p < .001

Status manipulation check. To check if the status manipulation was successful, I ran an ANOVA with status and emotion as independent variables and the status measure as the dependent variable. As predicted, results showed only a

[11] Study 1 used paired samples *t*-test for the corresponding manipulation check but the emotion factor had three levels in the present study meaning that the required repeated t-tests would increase the chance of Type 1 error. I therefore used ANOVAs instead when checking the current manipulation.

significant main effect of status, F (1, 84) = 48.91, p< .001. Means indicated that high status partners were judged to have higher status than low status partners (high status M = 5.94, SD = 1.54 and low status M = 3.76, SD = 1.40). However, high status partners were also judged to have higher power, F (1, 84) = 9.67, p = .003 (high status M = 6.72, SD = 1.55; low status M = 5.59, SD = 1.85). Therefore, the manipulation of status was unintentionally confounded with power.

Concessions. Two participants reached an agreement before round 5 and 16 participants before round 6. Similar to Study 1, the results of all participants were analysed using data up to round 4 to ensure comparability. Similar to Study 1, concessions were calculated by averaging the payoffs up to round 4 (see Table 2.1) and then subtracting the average payoffs from the maximum possible score. I ran a 2 (status: high and low) x 3 (emotion: contempt, anger and sadness) between-subjects ANOVA with concessions as a dependent variable. There were no significant effects (all ps > .67). Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 were not supported.

Self-reported emotions. Univariate tests revealed a significant main effect of emotion on self-reported contempt, F (2, 84) = 3.37, p = .039, η_p^2 = .07. Contempt was highest in the contemptuous partner condition (M = 2.55, SD = 1.29) followed by the angry partner condition (M = 2.51, SD = 1.29) with the lowest score for the sad partner condition (M = 1.82, SD = 1.06). The pattern of results supports hypothesis 4a. However none of the differences between these means was significant after using the Bonferroni correction.

There was also a significant univariate main effect of emotion on self-reported anger, F (2, 84) = 6.90, p = .002, η_p^2 = .14. Anger was significantly higher in the

contempt condition (M = 2.83, SD = 1.61) than in the sad condition (M = 1.57, SD = .86), but was not significantly higher in the anger condition than in either of these other conditions (M = 2.18, SD = 1.36). Hypothesis 4b was therefore not supported.

Emotion also had a significant univariate main effect on self-reported sympathy, F (2, 84) = 6.49, p = .002, η_p^2 = .13. The results indicated that participants felt significantly more sympathy with sad partners (M = 2.80, SD = 1.47) than with either angry (M = 1.83, SD = .99) or contemptuous partners (M = 1.85, SD = .99). Hypothesis 4c was supported.

Power distance orientation and social dominance orientation. PDO and SDO did not moderate the relationship between status and concessions. Therefore, hypotheses 5a and 5b were not supported. I also ran exploratory analysis to check the correlation between SDO and PDO which was low to moderate in size (r(90) = .29, p = .005). The correlations between SDO and concessions and PDO and concessions were not significant.

Discussion

This study extended Study 1 by including a sadness condition instead of a neutral control condition, altering the status manipulation, and adding a measure of social dominance orientation as a potential moderator of status effects. Only hypothesis 4c was supported and the results confirmed that sympathy was felt most by the participants when dealing when sad partners. As discussed in the introduction, this could be because sadness in others evokes empathy and this was reflected as sympathy for the sad partner. The results for self-reported contempt show a similar

pattern to those found in Study 1. Further, the partner's contempt increased self-reported anger in addition to self-reported contempt in this study.

The manipulation check shows that the manipulations used in the study worked as intended (although when status was manipulated, participants' perceptions of power were also influenced). Although the task was essentially the same as used is Study 1 (and used by other researchers such as Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004a; Adam, Shirako, & Maddux, 2010), I made some modifications to adapt it to this study. First, due to a different kind of status manipulation, the role of the participant as a seller was more elaborate. The participant was asked to imagine themselves in the role of an employee of an organization, they were given additional information about the status of the participant and were asked to fill questions (filler questions) before the negotiation even started. During debriefing, some participants also mentioned that they found the task quite challenging because they had to remember a lot of things in a short span of time and felt pressured to finish the task. This could be because even though the task in the study was essentially the same as Study 1, there were more things to do (e.g., the inclusion of role play and additional questions). However, since the time allotted to the participants was the same as in Study 1, and the participants were students who completed this study in between classes, they could have felt pressured to finish the entire task within a certain time frame. According to the EASI model (Van Kleef, 2009) people do not fully process the information conveyed by other people's emotions when their motivation is low, such as when they are under high time pressure. In support of this proposition, Van Kleef, De Dreu and Manstead (2004b) found that participants were only able to process the intent of their partner's angry expressions when the

time pressure was low but not when it was high. So, it is quite possible that participants in the present study did not take into account the cues given by their partners' emotions because they felt rushed. However since this was not an intent of the present study, I did not measure time pressure and this explanation can only be considered as a probable explanation. It is also possible that the element of imagination (due to role play) could have made the participants see the negotiation as less consequential and see the other participants' responses as reflecting their playing an assigned role rather than personally decided positions in a negotiation. However, since the focus of this thesis is not to explore the constraints under which negotiation decisions are made, the next study will use a different methodology to address the same aims. Another explanation for the failure to detect significant differences could be due to this study being low-powered.

The reliability of both SDO and PDO in this study was quite low (without removing the items). This could be a result of the nature and size of the sample used in this study. So, the next two studies will test the same hypotheses as the ones in Studies 1 and 2 using different methods and larger and more diverse samples.

General Discussion

The results of study 1 showed that participants made more concessions to angry partners than contemptuous partners. Participants also felt more contemptuous with contemptuous partners. In regard to status and contrary to predictions, participants gave more concessions to low status partners than high status partners and were contemptuous and angry with high status partners than low status partners. As discussed, the reason why the results of status manipulation

contradicted predictions may have been that the status manipulation did not work as intended. In Study 2, the status manipulation was improved to eliminate inter-group comparisons. Also, in Study 2, sadness was used as an emotion condition and neutral condition was dropped. By using a comparative negative emotion condition, I expected to separate the effects of the specific quality of the emotion from the effect of emotions (anger and contempt) being unpleasant states. However, the results of Study 2 found significant effects of the emotion manipulation on emotion but not on concessions, which could be due to the simulated nature of the task used. The status manipulation also worked better than in Study 1, although it was confounded with power. The status manipulation did not have the hypothesized effect on concessions suggesting that participants may not have factored in the status information during this relatively complex negotiation conducted under time pressure. However in the next two studies, the relationship between emotions, status and concessions will be further explored. The aim is to substantiate Study 1's findings using larger samples and different tasks.

Conclusion

These two studies are the first studies in this thesis to explore the effects of emotion and status on concessions. The findings suggest that emotions do convey social information which is then used to make strategic decisions. The next two studies will extend the findings of these studies.

CHAPTER 3: VIGNETTE STUDIES – EFFECTS OF CONTEMPT, ANGER. SADNESS AND STATUS ON NEGOTIATIONS

This chapter presents Studies 3 and 4, and continues to investigate the effect of emotions and status on negotiation outcomes. Following up Studies 1 and 2, Study 3 investigated the effect of anger, contempt, sadness, and neutral emotion conditions and partner status (high vs. low) on concessions. In a departure from the previous two studies, Study 3 used a vignette method and a different sample and assessed participants' perceptions of their partner's personality as a potential mediator of effects. Online participants (N = 213) read a vignette and answered questions based on that scenario. The results showed that participants gave more concessions to angry partners than contemptuous partners (as in Study 1) but status had no effect on concessions. Regression analysis suggested that perceptions of partners' emotional stability mediated the effect of the emotion manipulations on concessions. Study 4 was designed to extend and support the findings of the previous three studies by using two independent status manipulations (own status vs. other status). Online participants (N = 364) again responded to vignettes to assess the effect of anger, contempt and neutral emotion conditions, partner's status (high vs. low) and participants' own status (high vs. low) on concessions. The results showed a similar pattern to Studies 1 and 3, with more concessions made to angry partners than contemptuous partners. Similar to Study 3, the results showed that perceptions of partner's emotional stability mediated the relationship between emotion and concessions. However, as a departure from the other studies, the results of Study 4 showed that participants gave more concessions to high status partners than low status partners and perceptions of partners' personality characteristics mediated this relationship. The results are discussed with respect to the social functionalist account of emotions and the active ingredients of high (vs. low) status conditions.

The main aim of the two studies presented here was to extend and triangulate the findings found in Studies 1 and 2. The studies presented in this chapter used a different method (vignettes) and a larger sample, and made a few alterations to the experimental design to investigate the research aims. I also used the Big Five personality factors to measure participants' impressions of their partner's personality and to assess whether perceptions of these personality characteristics mediate the effect of emotions on concessions. Study 4 extended the methods used in Study 3 by employing a different status manipulation whereby own status was distinguished from partner's status.

Study 3

Study 3 investigated the effect of three emotions – contempt, anger, and sadness – and of status on the concessions given by participants in a negotiation. This study replaced the directly involving negotiation task used in Studies 1 and 2 with a vignette describing a similar interaction, in order to widen the scope for participant recruitment using on-line data collection, thus boosting sample size. Study 3 had four main aims. First, it was intended to replicate the differential effects of anger and contempt that were found in Study 1. In particular, participants in Study 1 gave more concessions to angry partners than to contemptuous partners and Study 3 sought to confirm this pattern. Second, Study 3 attempted to investigate the relationship between status and concessions using a different manipulation of status from Study 1 (but similar to Study 2). This is because the status manipulation in Study 1 was confounded with in-group identification. However, in Study 2, which avoided this confound, the manipulations did not have any predicted effects. To clarify this apparent discrepancy, Study 3 used status manipulations that were similar to those used in Study 2 but delivered using different experimental materials. Third, Study 3 made an additional attempt to investigate the influence of power distance and social dominance orientation on the relationship between status and concessions using a larger sample than used in Studies 1 and 2. The sample size in Study 1 and 2 was too small to test moderation reliably. Lastly, Study 3 assessed the big five personality variables in order to explore whether perceptions of partner's personality affect the negotiation process. This is a novel aspect of this study and is discussed in more detail below.

Big Five Personality Factors

Psychologists have long been interested in finding out ways in which the many differences in personality can be explained by a restricted number of traits (e.g., Eysenck, 1950; Gray, 1981). A five-factor model of personality (Costa and McCrae, 1992) is currently popular and there is a reasonable amount of evidence that the so-called Big Five personality dimensions can account for many of the most important general differences in individuals' behavioural tendencies (e.g., the words used in everyday language to describe people, behaviour and personalities can be reduced to the Big Five dimensions at a macro level, which can then be used to describe personality) (John & Srivastava, 1999). The big five personality factors are – extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability and openness to experience. These five factors can be considered to be the broadest classification of personality and each contains within it more distinct traits (John & Srivastava, 1999). According to John and Srivastava (1999), these five factors capture both intra-personal and inter-personal characteristics and can be understood in the following terms.

1. Extraversion – refers to how individuals like to interact with others in their world. High scorers are talkative and sociable whereas low scorers are quiet and reserved.
2. Agreeableness – refers to whether people are helpful and community oriented. High scorers are cooperative and trustful whereas low scorers are cold and quarrelsome.

3. Conscientiousness – refers to whether people can delay gratification to achieve their goals. High scorers are responsible and orderly and are good at impulse control whereas low scorers are careless and irresponsible.
4. Emotional Stability – refers to whether people are even tempered or not. High scorers are calm whereas low scorers are nervous and high-strung.
5. Openness to Experience – refers to whether people have a rich and stimulating life. High scorers are imaginative and curious whereas low scorers have narrow interests.

There has been some research to investigate how the big five factors affect negotiation outcomes. Barry and Friedman (1998) found that in competitive negotiation scenarios or distributive bargaining, extraversion and agreeableness led to fewer concessions. Morris, Larrick and Su (1999) found that people attributed negotiation behaviour to personality traits rather than bargaining positions of their opponent. An opponent offering inconsistent offers was considered to be emotionally unstable, an opponent who haggled was considered less agreeable even while being aware of the situational constraints, thereby showing a correspondence bias. Therefore, these results indicate that in a negotiation setting people do make personality attributions and these attributions affect the subsequent concessions made to their partners. In the present study, I predicted that partners expressing different emotions and with different levels of status would be seen as having different personality characteristics and that perceptions of their personality would mediate the effects of the manipulations on bargaining outcomes. More specifically, I wished to investigate how personality impressions may help explain the effect of emotion and status on concessions. In this study, I was chiefly interested in

investigating the effects of emotional stability and agreeableness out of the Big Five factors. However, I decided to retain the other three factors – extraversion, conscientiousness and openness to experience – for exploratory purpose.

With respect to emotion, I predicted that participants would make assumptions about the personality of the proposers based on the emotions that they display. Asch's (1946) studies have shown that the way a stimulus is presented in an experiment can affect impressions about personalities, for example, by changing the order of six personality traits, Asch (1946) demonstrated that participants made very different assumptions about the personality of the target. Similarly, in this study, I predicted that because of the salience of the proposer's emotions, the participants would use this information about emotions and make attributions about the personality characteristics of the proposers. So, while dealing with neutral partners, it is possible that neutral partners are considered as more agreeable. Subscribing to lay theories of negotiation, which argue that more benefits would accrue to those who do not display any emotions (see Kopelman, Rosette, & Thompson, 2006), it can be argued that participants might infer that neutral partners subscribe to the lay theory of "keeping a poker-face" and a rational outlook (Kopelman et al., 2006) and so, when compared to emotional negotiators, neutral partners would be perceived to be most agreeable (as people adhering to rational behaviour and most amenable to reaching a consensus). In relation to sadness, Hareli and Hess (2010) showed that people expressing sadness were considered warm, and Tiedens (2001) showed that sad people are considered helpless. Therefore, I predict that sad partners would also be perceived as agreeable but less so than neutral partners. Research has demonstrated that angry partners in a

negotiation context are considered to be tough (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef & De Dreu, 2010) and less willing to cooperate or to accommodate the other person's wishes (Andrade and Ho, 2007), and so they should be perceived as less agreeable than neutral and sad partners. Lastly, Gottman (1995) argued that in the context of close intimate relationships, expressions of contempt are perceived as belittling and demeaning. However, in the present context contempt could be considered as a distancing emotion and therefore the person exhibiting it could be perceived as least agreeable. Therefore, I expected that neutral partners would be rated highest in agreeableness, followed by sad partners, then angry partners, with contemptuous partners receiving the lowest ratings. Also, I expected that perceptions of agreeableness would mediate the effect of the emotion expressed by the partners on the concessions given to them by participants.

Similarly, for emotional stability, neutral partners would be considered as most emotionally stable as neutral partners would be considered as behaving in a matter of fact way, which is commensurate with the lay view of negotiation behaviour (Kopelman et al., 2006). I also expected that sad partners would also be considered emotionally stable but less so than neutral partners because sadness conveys helplessness and an inability to cope with the situation (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988). For contemptuous partners, I expect that they would be perceived as less emotionally stable than sad and neutral partners but more emotionally stable than angry partners. This is because even though contempt is a distancing emotion to express low esteem and regard for the target (Haidt, 2003), it could still be attributed to a more stable disposition than anger. Anger can be viewed as a volatile emotion because of its link to aggressive behaviour (Lochman, Barry, Powell, &

Young, 2010), and so, I expected that angry partners would be considered least emotionally stable. Therefore, I expected neutral partners to be rated as most emotionally stable, then sad partners, then contemptuous partners and angry partners to be considered least emotionally stable. I also expected perceptions of emotional stability to mediate the effect of emotion on concessions.

With respect to status, Russell and Fiske (2008) found that people in high status positions are perceived to be more competent than people in low status positions. Ratcliff, Hugenberg, Shriver, and Bernstein (2011) showed that people are more motivated to perceive high status others positively than low status others. They do this by expending more cognitive resources while perceiving high status others' faces compared to low status others. These studies show that high status others are perceived more favourably and therefore, in the present study, I expected that high status partners would be rated as more agreeable and emotionally stable than low status partners. I also expected these perceptions of personality to mediate the effect of status on concessions.

Study Aims

This study investigated the following hypotheses (the first five of which are similar to those investigated in Studies 1 and 2). First, I predicted that participants would make greater concessions to high status partners than to low status partners (Hypothesis 1). Second, I predicted that participants would make the greatest concessions to angry partners, then to sad partners, then to neutral partners and the least to contemptuous partners (Hypothesis 2). I also expected to find an interaction between status and emotion, such that participants interacting with high

status partners would make more concessions to angry and contemptuous partners than to sad or neutral partners (Hypothesis 3a) but participants interacting with low status partners would make fewer concessions to angry and contemptuous partners than to sad or neutral partners (Hypothesis 3b).

For self-reported emotions, I expected that participants would feel more contempt with contemptuous partners than with angry, sad or neutral partners (Hypothesis 4a), and more anger with angry partners than with contemptuous, sad, or neutral partners (Hypothesis 4b).

I also expected power distance orientation and social dominance orientation to moderate the relationship between status of recipient and concessions, such that low status participants (participants who interact with high status partners) who score high on power distance orientation and social dominance orientation would make more concessions (Hypothesis 5a), and low status participants who score low on power distance orientation and social dominance orientation would make fewer concessions (Hypothesis 5b).

I also predicted that participants would rate high status partners as more agreeable and emotionally stable (Hypothesis 6a), and that these perceptions would mediate the effect of status on concessions (Hypothesis 7a). Similarly, I predicted that participants would perceive neutral partners to be most agreeable, then sad partners, then angry partners, with contemptuous partners perceived to be least agreeable (Hypothesis 6b), and that these perceptions of agreeableness would mediate the effect of emotion on concessions (Hypothesis 7b). Similarly, I expected that participants would rate neutral partners as most emotionally stable, then sad partners, then contemptuous partners and angry partners as least emotionally

stable (Hypothesis 6c) and this rating to mediate the effect of emotions on concessions (Hypothesis 7c). I have included the other three dimensions of the Big Five personality factor – extraversion, conscientiousness and openness to experience for exploratory purposes.

Method

Participants. Two hundred and thirteen participants (including 77 women) took part in this study. Sixty-three percent of participants were Indian, 30% were American, and the remaining 7% included people from 13 different countries. The mean age of the participants was 34.29 years (*SD* = 10.82). Seventy-five percent of the participants were in full-time or part-time work, 14% were self-employed, 5% were students and 6% were unemployed at the time of participation. All participants described themselves as moderately (or very) proficient in written English. Eight percent of the participants had 1 year of work experience, 44% had 2-7 years of work experience, 27% had 8-15 years of work experience, and 21% had more than 16 years of work experience. All participants were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk. There were attention checks and comprehension checks in the study and participants who failed to complete these successfully were automatically dropped from the study and were barred from taking the study again. [12]

Design. This study used a 2 (Status: High and Low) x 4 (Emotion: Anger, Contempt, Sadness and Neutral) between-subjects factorial design. Dependent measures were the concessions given by the participants and the emotions that

[12] The total number of participants who took part on this study 344. However 131 participants (38% of total participants) were dropped from the study because they failed to complete attention checks and comprehension checks.

they reported. The numbers of participants in each cell created by the factorial design varied (due to the random allocation procedure) from 23 – 29.

Procedure. Participants were recruited online through a website. They were given a link to the study and then asked to follow the instructions presented on the screen. They were asked to take part in this study only if they had at least one year of prior work experience in order to ensure that they would be able to relate to the organizationally based vignette used in the study. They were asked to read the vignette carefully, imagine themselves as the buyer, and to answer questions as if they were personally faced with the situation. The vignette was adapted from the one used by Van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, and Manstead (2006). I added a status manipulation and two additional emotion manipulations (contempt and sadness). The anger manipulation was the same as that used by Van Kleef et al. (2006). In the vignette, each participant was told that he/she was a project manager assigned with the task of hiring an IT company to update and professionalize his/her company's website. Participants were also told that they were in charge and the company would prefer to spend no more than £90,000 for this assignment. Then they were given the status manipulation, which was embedded in the vignette.

Status manipulation. The status manipulation was achieved by varying the description of the person that participants would have to deal with in the vignette. The participants were told that the seller that they would deal with was a salesperson (J) working in a company called ABC. As part of background information about J, in the high-status condition they were told that J was considered to be quite competent in the position and was largely admired within the company. In the low-status condition, they were told that J was not considered

to be entirely suitable for this position and therefore not admired very much within the company.

Emotion manipulation. After reading about the status of their negotiating partner, participants were told that J made an offer of £120,000. Then they were told that the project manager (whose role participants were taking in the vignette) called J to negotiate the price of the contract. During this conversation but before J could make an offer, a mobile phone rang at the other end, J apologised and unsuccessfully tried to put the participant on hold, and the project manager overheard a conversation that began as follows: "Hey, I'm sorry, I don't have time right now, I'm in the middle of a negotiation with a client ..." How the conversation proceeded from this point constituted the emotion manipulation. In the anger condition, the negotiation partner said: "I just received an offer that makes me really mad. I'll call you back . . . Yeah, you're right, I'm pretty angry. Bye!" In the contempt condition, the negotiation partner said: "I just received an offer that is so beneath us. I'll call you back . . . Yeah, you're right, I feel quite scornful about this. Bye!" In the sadness condition, the negotiation partner said: "I just received an offer that is so disappointing. I'll call you back . . . Yeah, you're right, I feel quite discouraged. Bye!" Finally, in the neutral condition, the negotiation partner simply said: "I just received an offer from them. I'll call you back. Bye!"

Measures. The following measures and manipulation checks were used

***Offer and concessions*.** After reading the vignette, participants were asked to indicate the offer that they would make to their negotiating partner ("Unaware that you have overheard the above conversation and after the interruption, J asks you for an improved offer. Please indicate below what your offer would be –").

These ratings were made on a sliding scale and could range from 70,000 to 150,000. Higher offers indicated more concessions in this study. There were also three questions about intention to concede to the negotiating partner. These questions were: "How much would you concede to J in this situation?", "To what degree would you comply with J's wishes?", and "How much would you give in to J?" These three questions were answered using a 9-point scale (1 = *Not at all*, 5 = *Somewhat*, and 9 = *Very much*), and together formed a reliable scale (α = .96).

***Self-rated emotions*.** Participants were asked to indicate on a 7-point scale, the extent that they felt fourteen different emotions after reading the vignette (1=*not at all*, 4=*moderately*, 7=*very much*). These emotions are mostly the same as those used in Study 2.[13] The main emotions of interest here were contempt and anger and the other emotions were used to disguise the aim of the study.

Emotion manipulation check. Participants were also asked to indicate on 7-point scales the emotions that they perceived in their partner. The same 14 emotions that were used for self-ratings were used as checks. As in Study 1 and 2, the items of interest in this study were anger, contempt, and sadness. The other emotion items were used as filler items to disguise the research interests. Participants were also asked on a 9-point scale to indicate the appropriateness of J's emotional reactions (1 = *Not at all appropriate*, 5 = *Moderately appropriate*, and 9 = *Very appropriate*), similar to Study 2.

Status manipulation check. In order to ascertain the success of the status manipulation, perceptions of the buyer's status were measured using three items on a 9-point scale (1=*low* and 9=*high*), which was the same as that used in Study 2.

[13] Sympathy was removed from this study

These items were combined, forming a reliable scale (α = .90). Two additional 9-point rating scales were included to assess participants' perceptions of the power of their negotiating partner in order to provide a check whether the status manipulation was confounded with power. The items were the same as those used in Study 2. The correlation between these two items was $r(213) = .70$, $p < .001$, and they were combined into a scale.

Fairness of transaction. Participants rated the fairness of their negotiating partner on a sliding scale ranging from 0 = *Not fair at all*, 50 = *Moderately fair*, and 100 = *Very fair*.

Ten-item personality inventory (TIPI). This inventory is a shortened 10 item measure of the Big Five personality dimensions – extraversion, emotional stability, conscientiousness, openness to experience and agreeableness (Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003). The items are pairs of personality descriptors measuring each of the five dimensions (two pairs of descriptor per dimension). The participants were asked to rate the personality of J rather than their own on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 = *Disagree strongly* to 7 = *Agree strongly*. Sample items include "Dependable, self-disciplined", "Sympathetic, warm". There were significant positive correlations (ranging from $r(213) = .31$ to $r(213) = .48$) between the two items intended to assess each dimension except for extraversion ($r(213) = -.03$, p = ns). The dimensions of interest in this study are emotional stability and agreeableness and even though they were two-item measures, their correlations indicate that they were measured reliably enough to permit the use of these two-item scales in this study.

Power distance orientation scale. Power distance orientation (PDO) was measured using an 8 item scale that was also used in Studies 1 and 2. Cronbach's α for the power distance orientation measure in the present sample was .78.

Social dominance orientation (SDO). This is a 16 item measure of the degree to which people prefer inequality in group relations and was the same scale that was used in Study 2. Cronbach's α for this measure was .90.

Attention checks and comprehension checks. To check if the participants were paying attention, I asked them "If you are reading this question, mark 7 on the scale". This question was embedded within a range of questions. To check if the participants read the vignette carefully or not, I asked them three questions – "What was your role in the scenario that you just read?", "What was the role of the person (J), you had to deal with?", and "How much was your first offer for?" These questions had three options and the participants had to select the correct option and the participants had to get all of these answers correctly to complete the test. If they failed to answer these questions correctly, they were dropped from the study and were barred from taking the test again. The exclusion criteria was kept stringent deliberately to allow exclusion of non-serious participants.

Additional questions. I also asked an open-ended question about what the study was testing to check if the participants guessed the hypotheses, and participants who guessed the hypothesis were dropped from the study. No participant was able to guess the hypotheses correctly. I also asked them two questions on a 9-point scale (1=*not at all*, 4=*moderately*, 7= *Very*), "How competitive did you feel towards J in the scenario?" and " How well you were able to imagine yourself as a project manager negotiating on behalf of your company during the

scenario?" Participants reported that they were moderately able to imagine themselves as project managers (M = 6.96, SD = 1.92) and that they felt moderately competitive towards their negotiating partner (M = 5.73, SD = 1.90).

Results

Manipulation checks. The manipulation checks are described below.

Emotion check. I performed three ANOVAs to check if the participants rated the targeted emotion higher in the different emotion conditions. This was confirmed in all cases. Participants negotiating with an angry partner rated their partners as significantly higher in anger in the angry condition than in to all other conditions, F (3, 205) = 44.69, p < .001, η_p^2 = .39, (anger M = 5.27, SD = 1.77, contempt M = 2.39, SD = 1.32, sadness M = 2.85, SD = 1.57, and neutral M = 2.19, SD = 1.58), participants rated contemptuous partners as significantly higher in contempt in the contempt condition than in all other conditions, F (3, 205) = 12.40, p < .001, η_p^2 = .15, (contempt M = 4.46, SD = 1.80, anger M = 3.64, SD = 1.49, sadness M = 3.28, SD = 1.62, and neutral M = 2.53, SD = 1.54), and participants rated sad partners as significantly higher in sadness in the sadness condition than in all other conditions, F (3, 205) = 13.07, p < .001, η_p^2 = .16, (sadness M = 4.15, SD = 1.83, anger M = 2.89, SD = 1.78, contempt M = 2.79, SD = 1.86, and neutral M = 2.02, SD = 1.41).

Status check. As intended, participants rated partners as having higher status in the high status condition than in the low status condition, F (1, 205) = 77.58, p < .001, η_p^2 = .27, (high status M = 6.72, SD = 1.37 and low status M = 4.72, SD = 1.87). However, participants also rated partners as having more power in the high status condition than in the low status condition, F (1, 205) = 20.41, p < .001, η_p^2 =

.09, (high status M = 6.47, SD = 1.41 and low status M = 5.42, SD = 1.84). Therefore, as in Study 2, the status manipulation was also to some extent an inadvertent manipulation of power.

Offers and concessions. I ran an ANOVA to assess the effects of status and emotion on offers made by participants. Results showed a significant main effect of the emotion manipulation on participants' offers to their partners, F (3, 205) = 2.94, p = .034, η_p^2 = .04. Pairwise comparison using Bonferroni corrections indicated that offers were higher in the anger condition than in the contempt condition (anger M = 97818.18, SD = 12276.28 and contempt M = 92280.70, SD = 11804.59). This means that concessions (since higher offers means more concessions) were also higher in the anger condition than in the contempt condition. The neutral and sadness conditions did not differ significantly from the other conditions. Thus, hypothesis 2 was partially supported.

There was no significant main effect of status on offers, and no significant interaction between emotion and status. An additional analysis including power as a covariate yielded similar results. Thus, there was no support for hypotheses 1 and 3. A similar ANOVA revealed no significant effects on intentions to concede.

Self-reported emotions. Significant univariate effects of emotion were found for anger and contempt. Significant means of these item for each condition are presented in Table 3.1 As this Table shows, anger was the highest in the anger condition, and contempt was the highest in the contempt condition. For self-reported contempt, a significant difference was observed only between the contempt and neutral conditions. For self-reported anger, there was a significant difference between the angry and neutral conditions, and also between contempt

and neutral conditions. No other differences were significant. Hypothesis 4a and 4b were partially supported.

Table 3.1

Self-reported emotions in the emotion condition

	Df	F	Contempt condition (Mean)	Anger condition (Mean)	Sadness condition (Mean)	Neutral condition (Mean)
Contempt	3, 205	3.72*	3.54	3.35	3.09	2.49
Anger	3, 205	4.82**	3.40	3.56	3.22	2.28

Note: *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$

TIPI

Emotional stability. Univariate tests revealed that there was a significant main effect of emotion on assessments of emotional stability of the participants' partner, F (3, 205) = 9.42, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .12$, such that participants rated neutral partners as most emotionally stable (M = 9.13, SD = 2.40), then contemptuous partners (M = 7.95, SD = 2.79), then sad partners (M = 7.46, SD = 2.88) and angry partners as least emotionally stable (M = 6.45, SD = 2.62). The neutral condition differed significantly from both the anger and the sadness condition. The anger condition also differed significantly from the contempt condition. Bonferroni correction was applied to all these comparisons. Hypothesis 6c was partially supported.

There was also a main effect of status, F (1, 205) = 11.80, $p = .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .05$, such that high status partners were rated as more emotionally stable (M = 8.36, SD =

2.79) than low status partners (M = 7.15, SD = 2.75). Hypothesis 6a was partially supported.

There was also a significant interaction F (3, 205) = 3.27, p = .022, η_p^2 = .05. Simple effects analysis showed a significant difference in the ratings of emotional stability between high status and low status partners only in contempt and sadness conditions, such that participants rated high status contemptuous and sad partners as more emotionally stable than low status contemptuous and sad partners. Also, within the high status condition, there were significant differences such that angry high status partners were perceived as least emotionally stable, then neutral partners and contemptuous high status partners were seen as most emotionally stable. However, within the low status condition, significant differences were seen only between neutral and other three emotion conditions, such that neutral partners were seen as most emotionally stable compared to other three conditions. There were no other significant differences. The results of simple effects analysis are displayed in Figure 3.1 and 3.2.

Figure 3.1: Mean Ratings of Emotional Stability. Error bars represent standard error





Figure 3.2: Mean Ratings of Emotional Stability. Error bars represent standard error



Agreeableness. Univariate tests showed a main effect of status, F (1, 205) = 15.33, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .07$, such that participants rated high status partners as more agreeable (M = 8.28, SD = 2.59) than low status partners (M = 6.90, SD = 2.72). There was no significant effect of emotion. Therefore hypothesis 6a was supported and hypothesis 6b was not supported.[14]

There was also an interaction effect, F (3, 205) = 5.62, p = .001, η_p^2 = .08. Simple effects analysis showed significant difference in the ratings of agreeableness between high status and low status partners only in contempt and sadness conditions. The interaction between emotion and are displayed in Figure 3.3 and 3.4.

[14] Results about the effect of status on perceptions of emotional stability and agreeableness remained significant even when power was used as a covariate.

Figure 3.3: Mean Ratings of Agreeableness. Error bars represent standard error.





Figure 3.4: Mean Ratings of Agreeableness. Error bars represent standard error



Extraversion. There were no significant main effects or interactions. No predictions were made for this dimension.

Conscientiousness. There was a significant main effect of status, F (1, 205) = 43.03, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .17$, such that high status partners were seen as more conscientious than low status partners (high status $M = 9.67$, $SD = 2.43$ and low status $M = 7.32$, $SD = 2.75$). There was no effect of emotion or any significant interactions. No predictions were made for this dimension.

Openness to experience. There was a significant main effect of status, F (1, 205) = 16.09, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .07$, such that high status partners were seen as more open to experience than low status partners (high status $M = 8.88$, $SD = 2.08$ and low status $M = 7.59$, $SD = 2.54$). There was no effect of emotion or any significant interactions. No predictions were made for this dimension.

Fairness. There was a main effect of status on ratings of partner's fairness, F (1, 205) = 8.65, $p = .004$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$, such that participants rated high status partners as fairer ($M = 54.55$, $SD = 22.41$) than low status partners ($M = 44.60$, $SD = 26.26$). There was no significant effect of emotion or interaction between emotion and status. After entering power as a covariate, the effect of status on ratings of partner's fairness was no longer significant, F (1, 204) = 1.86, $p = .174$. The effect of power as a covariate was significant F (1, 204) = 29.31, $p < .001$.

Mediation. I conducted mediation analysis using the bootstrapping procedure developed by Preacher and Hayes (2004) to investigate the relationship between emotion and concessions given/offers made. For emotion as a predictor, I used three different contrast codes – one comparing the neutral condition with anger, contempt, and sadness (contrast 1, neutral condition was coded as -3 and the other three conditions were coded 1), second, comparing anger and contempt condition with sadness condition (contrast 2, sadness condition was coded as -2 and anger and contempt conditions were coded as 1), and third, comparing the anger condition with the contempt condition (contrast 3, anger condition was coded as 1 and contempt condition was coded as -1). In all mediational analyses, one contrast code was entered as a predictor and other two were entered as control

variables. All analyses used a bootstrap test with 5000 iterations and yielded a 95% bias corrected confidence interval. The data are presented in Table 3.2

Table 3.2

Results of mediation by ratings on emotional stability

	Coefficients				SE	Bootstrapping Bias Corrected Confidence Intervals	
	Path a	Path b	Path c	Path c'		Lower	Upper
Contrast 1	-.46***	811.82**	346.99 (ns)	720.30 (ns)	144.62	-713.02	-145.97
Contrast 2	-.08 (ns)	811.82**	257.22 (ns)	328.12 (ns)	132.05	-371.97	161.92
Contrast 3	-.75**	811.82**	2768.74**	3374.69**	267.90	-1276.31	-192.26

Note: *** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$

As can be seen from Table 3.2, only the effects of contrast 1 and contrast 3 on offers made were mediated by ratings on emotional stability (only in these cases did the confidence interval not contain zero). Moreover this seems to be a case of inconsistent mediation (Mackinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007; Rucker, Preacher, Tormala, & Petty, 2011). Inconsistent mediation or a suppression effect occurs when at least one mediated path has a different sign than other mediated paths (Mackinnon, et. al, 2007), as can be seen in both contrasts 1 and 3. Participants rated contemptuous partners as more emotionally stable but gave them fewer concessions compared to angry partners and the opposing valence between the mediating path and the direct path can be seen in terms of suppression effect.

However, because the confidence interval does not contain zero in both these instances, it can be taken as evidence that mediation occurred. Ratings of the partner's emotional stability did not mediate the relationship between contrast 2 and offers as the confidence interval did contain zero. Therefore hypotheses 7c was partially supported. Perceptions of agreeableness did not mediate the effect of emotion on concessions, so hypothesis 7b was not supported. Emotional stability and agreeableness also did not mediate the effect of status on concessions, thereby not supporting hypothesis 7a.

Power distance orientation and social dominance orientation. PDO and SDO did not moderate the relationship between status and concessions. Therefore, hypotheses 5a and 5b were not supported.

Discussion

This study extended the findings of the previous two studies by using a different method and a different participant pool, by changing the status manipulation, and by including three emotions along with a control condition. The results showed that participants gave more concessions to angry partners than contemptuous partners. The status manipulation did not work as well as intended and was confounded with an inadvertent manipulation of power. Participants reported more anger with angry partners and more contempt with contemptuous partners. High status partners were perceived to be more emotionally stable, agreeable, conscientious, and open to experience. Emotional stability was found to mediate the effect of emotion on concessions. These results are discussed below.

Effects of emotion manipulation. This study provided support for Study 1's finding that participants made more concessions to angry partners than contemptuous partners. However there was no effect of sadness on concessions. There has been some discussion that disappointment sometimes leads to more concessions, when guilt is evoked and sometimes leads to fewer concessions, when no guilt is evoked (see Van Doorn, Van Kleef, & Van der Pligt, 2014) and it is possible that sadness also elicits similar contradictory reactions. This might be a reason why the sadness manipulation did not yield the hypothesized effects. Another reason could be that the vocabulary used for manipulating sadness ("disappointing" was used in this study) could have also confused participants, as sadness and disappointment are distinct emotions. Because exploring the boundary conditions under which sadness has an effect on concessions is not a central aim of this project, this emotion manipulation will be dropped in Study 4.

Effects of status manipulation. This study did not find support for the hypothesis that participants would make more concessions to high status partners than low status partners. Moreover, similar to what I found in Study 2, status manipulation also made participants aware of power inequalities. The manipulations used in this study have been used before successfully (see Blader & Chen, 2012). However it seems that in a competitive negotiation scenario, when participants are trying to manage impressions about their own control over the negotiating process and trying to get their partner to comply with their wishes, their schemas about power are triggered along with status. Also, it is possible that there is a need to tease apart the influence of status of one's own self versus the status of their partner's, which I attempt to do in Study 4. Juxtaposing the status of

self versus status of other will make the status manipulation more salient allowing firmer conclusions to be drawn.

Self-reported emotions. The results supported previous findings that participants experienced more contempt in the contempt condition (found in Study 1). It also found that more anger was experienced in the anger condition. These two results show that when confronted with a contemptuous partner, more contempt was felt and with an angry partner, more anger was felt. This pattern of result is consistent with Van Kleef et al. (2004a) finding that angry outbursts from partners led to more anger in participants. The same hypotheses will again be tested in Study 4.

Big Five personality factors and status. This study found evidence that high status partners were considered to be more agreeable, more emotionally stable, more conscientious and more open to experience. With respect to extraversion, there were no reported differences. High status partners are considered to be more competent and good performers (Magee & Galinsky, 2008; Tiedens, Ellsworth & Mesquita, 2000) and therefore it is probable that participants rated them more favourably in terms of their personalities.

Big Five personality factors and emotion. Partners' emotional stability was rated as higher in the neutral condition than in the other emotional conditions. This was predicted and could be because lack of emotional response of neutral partners implies greater emotional stability. Angry partners were considered least emotionally stable and this could be because their emotional response was considered more volatile compared to contempt and neutral conditions. Sad

partners were considered to more emotionally stable than angry or contemptuous partners but less than neutral partners as predicted.

This study also found evidence that emotional stability mediated the effect of two emotion manipulation comparisons on concessions. Firstly, participants gave more concessions in the emotion conditions than in the neutral condition and this effect was mediated by emotional stability. In other words, emotional partners tended to solicit greater concessions partly because of their perceived relative emotional instability. Secondly, participants gave more concessions to angry participants than contemptuous participants and this effect too was mediated by emotional stability. In other words, the perception of angry negotiators as less emotionally stable may have led participants to offer them greater concessions.

Power distance and social dominance orientation. The results showed that PDO and SDO did not moderate the relationship between status and concessions. In this study, the reliability of both these scales was robust and the sample was larger than in Studies 1 and 2. Since the status manipulation will be altered in the next study, I hoped that this change would allow detection of the moderating effects of PDO and SDO on the effect of status on concessions.

Study 4

The first aim of Study 4 was to extend the findings of Studies 1 and 3. In both these studies, I found that angry partners were given more concessions than contemptuous partners. However, Study 2 did not support this hypothesis. So, in the present study, I wanted to investigate the same hypothesis using a different vignette, to increase confidence in the results obtained in Studies 1 and 3. The

second aim was to extend the manipulation of status. The status manipulation in both Studies 1 and 3 did not work as intended and the reasons have been discussed in previous sections. It is possible that in the context of negotiation, it is more useful to distinguish between status of self (own status) and status of others (other status). This differentiation has the advantage of making manipulation of status more salient (especially while reading a vignette) as well as providing an opportunity to study the interaction between own and other status. It is possible that in the previous three studies, participants rated the status of others as high but did not consider their own status as low. By directly comparing own status with other status, I can predict the effect of status on concessions more confidently. Therefore, in Study 4, I manipulated the participant's status and the status of the participant's partner independently. As in previous studies, I expected that high partner status would encourage more concessions from participants than low partner status. Based on the reasoning that lower status individuals are more sensitive to other people's status, I also predicted an interaction between own status and partner's status such that there would be a stronger effect of other status on participants with low own status than on participants with high own status. In other words, I expected that when own status was low, more concessions would be given to high other status than low other status. However, when participants had high own status, the difference in concessions given to low other status and high other status would be smaller. Unlike Studies 2 and 3, Study 4 did not attempt to manipulate partner's sadness because this emotion failed to show predicted effects in the earlier studies. In sum, Study 4 investigated the effect of emotion (contempt and anger) and status (own – high and low and other – high and low) on concessions given by participants in a negotiation.

Study Aims

This study investigated the following hypotheses which are mostly similar to those investigated in Study 3. Participants were expected to make more concessions to high-status partners than to low-status partners (Hypothesis 1). Participants were expected to make the most concessions to angry partners, then to neutral partners and the least to contemptuous partners (Hypothesis 2).

I also expected to find an interaction between other status and emotion, such that participants interacting with high status partners would make more concessions to angry and contemptuous partners than to neutral partners (Hypothesis 3a) but participants interacting with low status partners would make fewer concessions to angry and contemptuous partners than to neutral partners (Hypothesis 3b). I also predicted an interaction between own status and other (partner's status) with greater positive effects of other status on concessions for low (own) status participants than for high (own) status participants (Hypothesis 3c), which is a novel hypothesis in this study.

For self-reported emotions, I predicted that participants would feel more contempt with contemptuous partners than with angry or neutral partners (Hypothesis 4a), and more anger with angry partners than with contemptuous or neutral partners (Hypothesis 4b).

I also expected power distance orientation and social dominance orientation to moderate the effect of status of recipient on concessions, such that low status participants who score high on power distance orientation and social dominance orientation would make more concessions (Hypothesis 5a), and low status

participants who score low on power distance orientation and social dominance orientation would make fewer concessions (Hypothesis 5b) to their high status partners.

Similar to Study 3, I also predicted that participants would rate high-status partners more favourably on the Big-Five personality dimensions (more agreeable and emotionally stable) (Hypothesis 6a), and that these ratings would mediate the effect of status on concessions (Hypothesis 7a). Similarly, I predicted that participants would rate neutral partners as most agreeable followed by angry partners, with contemptuous partners rated least favourably (Hypothesis 6b), and that agreeableness would mediate the effect of emotion on concessions (Hypothesis 7b). Similar to Study 3, I predicted that neutral partners would be considered most emotionally stable, then contemptuous partners, and angry partners as least emotionally stable (Hypothesis 6c), and emotional stability would mediate the effect of emotion on concessions (Hypothesis 7c). As in Study 3, I included the other three dimensions of the Big Five personality factor – extraversion, conscientiousness, and openness to experience – for exploratory purposes.

Method

Participants. Three hundred and sixty four participants (of whom 41% were women) took part in this study. Sixty-three percent of participants were Indian, 30% were American, and the remaining 7% included people from 20 different countries. The mean age of the participants was 34.17 years (*SD* =10.94). Seventy-one percent of the participants were employees, 17% were self-employed, 3% were students and 9% were unemployed at the time of participation. All participants described themselves as moderately (or very) proficient in written

English. Eight percent of the participants had 1 year of work experience, 46% had 2-7 years of work experience, 26% had 8-15 years of work experience, and 20% had more than 16 years of work experience. All participants were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk. There were attention checks and comprehension checks in the study and participants who failed to complete these successfully were automatically dropped from the study[15].

Design. This study used a 2 (Own Status: High and Low) x 2 (Other Status: High and Low) x 3 (Emotion: Anger, Contempt, and Neutral) between-subjects factorial design. Dependent measures were the concessions given by the participants and the emotions that were expressed by the participants. The concessions given by the participants were inversely related to the offers made by them and were measured using two items – the department budget and hours of labour. The minimum number of participants in a cell was 21[16].

Procedure. Participants were recruited online through a website. They were given a link to the study and then asked to follow the instructions on the screen. They were asked to take part in this study only if they had at least one year of work experience. They were asked to read the vignette carefully, imagine themselves as the training manager, and to answer questions as if they were personally faced with the situation. The vignette was adapted from the one used by Van Kleef, et al. (2006,

[15] The total number of participants in this study was 515, and 151 (29% of total participants) were excluded because they failed to answer the attention checks and comprehension checks correctly. These participants were also barred from participating again.

[16] The cell sizes were unequal in this study (ranging from 21 to 45) because of the way the study was administered online. When participants could not answer the attention checks and comprehension checks correctly, they were automatically asked to discontinue and were barred from doing the study again. However, the questionnaire was designed in such a way that each condition was randomly presented to all the participants. The smaller cell size indicates that more participants in those cells were disqualified compared to the bigger cell sizes. The attention checks and comprehension checks were not related to the different conditions and therefore I have chosen to treat the variation in cell size simply as a result of chance. Moreover, non-significant chi-square tests revealed that cell variation was not systematically related to any experimental manipulations.

Study 5). There were three independent variables – own status, other status and emotions. Each participant was told that he/she was a training manager assigned with the task of designing a training program for the employees in their organization. They read that they had to negotiate with another employee (J) of a participating department about two issues – department budget and hours of training. They were told that they want J's department to contribute 10% of the budget and 300 hours of labour. However, J's department only wanted to contribute 4% of the budget and 100 hours of labour.

Status manipulation – own. The status manipulation was achieved by varying the description of participants' own status in the vignette. The participants were told that the training program that they were going to design would pick out star performers in various departments and groom them for leadership positions within the organization. High own status participants read that:

You have reached the level of training manager by getting promoted quite quickly. This shows that you are good at your job and command high status within ABC. You are aware that you – like others who get promoted rapidly -- are really admired within the organisation

Low status participants read the following about themselves:

It took a long time before you were promoted to the level of training manager. This reflects the fact that your work performance has not been outstanding and you do not command high status within ABC. You are aware that you – like others whose promotion is not rapid -- are not admired as much as others within the organisation.

Status manipulation – other. After reading the description about themselves, the participants read that they would have to negotiate with another participating department. High (or low) other status was manipulated using the following description about the person whom they would interact with:

You are going to interact with J, who is a senior manager in another department and is considered to be quite (not very) suitable for this position and is held in high esteem (possesses little esteem) within the company. You get the impression from others that J is well respected (not respected a lot) and enjoys a really good (has a somewhat negative) reputation within ABC.

Emotion manipulation. Immediately before the emotion manipulation, participants read that while thinking about responding to J's offer, they read an accidentally copied email from J about their own offer. The email was as follows: "D., we recently spoke about the new training program that is being developed. I am still discussing some lingering issues with the training manager in your department. I will not bother you with all the details right now, (*angry condition* – but I can tell you that I am quite mad about the offer that I have received. I'm really fed up and angry to go on with the negotiations, and I would like to hear your opinion. *Contempt condition* – but I can tell you that I am quite contemptuous about the offer that I have received. It is quite beneath me and frankly insulting to go on with the negotiations, and I would like to hear your opinion. *Neutral condition* – but I would like to hear your opinion). Do you have time for lunch?"

Measures. The same items that were used in Study 3 to check fairness of transaction. TIPI, SDO (α = .72) and PDO (α = .81) were also used here, similar to Study 3. For the TIPI items, there were significant positive correlations (ranging

from $r(364) = .30$ to $r(364) = .57$ between the items corresponding to each dimensions, except for extraversion ($r(364) = -.16$, $p = 002$), as in Study 3. In both Studies 3 and 4, the correlation between the two items of extraversion was negative. This could be because these two items were not suitable for the scenarios used in these studies. The other measures mentioned below were adapted slightly from those used in Study 3 to reflect the changed vignette and status manipulation.

***Offer and concessions*.** After reading the vignette, participants were asked to indicate the offer that they would make to their negotiating partner ("Unaware that you know about the email that J sent to your boss, J asks you for an improved offer. Please indicate below what your offer would be on department budget") on a sliding scale ranging from 4 to 10 (in percentage). The other question was ("Please indicate below what your offer would be on hours of labour") on a sliding scale running from 100 to 300 (in hours). These two questions were a measure of the actual behaviour of the participant. The correlation between these two measures was quite high, $r(364) = .76$, $p < .001$, so these two scores were combined together to form one dependent variable – combined offers[17]. Then I reverse coded scores to make the measure one that assessed combined concessions (since offers and concessions are inversely proportional to each other in this study). There were also three questions about intention to concede to the negotiating partner, which were the same as those in Study 3. Cronbach's α for these three questions was .93.

[17] Combined offers was calculated by rescaling the two variables to a common metric that ranged from 0 to 6.

Self-rated emotions. Similar to Study 3, 13 emotions were used to assess self-reported emotions.[18] The emotions of interest were anger and contempt and the rest of the emotions were used as filler items.

Emotion manipulation check. Similar to Study 3, participants were also asked to indicate the emotions that they perceived in J.[19] The only items of interest were anger and contempt, the rest were used as filler items, similar to the previous three studies. Participants were also asked on a 9-point scale to indicate the appropriateness of J's emotional reactions (1 = *Not at all appropriate*, 5 = *Moderately appropriate*, and 9 = *Very appropriate*), similar to Studies 2 and 3.

Other status and own status manipulation check. Perceptions of J's status (and own status) were measured using three items on a 9-point scale (1=*low* and 9=*high*) - "How high/low is J's (your) status?", "How much prestige, do you think, J (you) has (have)?", and "How competent do you think J (you) is (are)?" These three items were combined into a single scale (other status: $\alpha = .89$; own status: $\alpha = .87$) which permitted us to assess the success of the status manipulation. Besides these three items, two items were included to check the participants' ratings of the power of their negotiating partner (and their own power). This was done to check the extent to which the status manipulation was confounded with power. These were also on a 9-point scale and they were – "How much power does J have (do you have)?", and "How much control do you think J has (you have) over the negotiation outcome?" These two items were combined into composite measures of power (other power: $r\ (364) = .78$, $p < .001$; own power: $r\ (364) = .74$, $p < .001$).

[18] Sad and excited were excluded from this study.
[19] Pleased and sad were excluded from this study

Attention checks and comprehension checks. To check if the participants were paying attention, I asked them to respond to the direct instruction: "If you are reading this question, mark 7 on the scale". This item was embedded within a range of questions. To check if the participants read the vignette carefully or not, I asked them three questions – "What is the name of your organization, in the scenario that you just read?", "What was your first offer for allocation of department budget, in the scenario?", and "What was your first offer for the number of training hours required from J's department, in the scenario?" These questions had three options and the participants had to select the correct option. Participants were excluded if they gave incorrect answers on any of these items (N = 151). Similar to Study 3, a stringent exclusion criteria was used to discourage non-serious participants.

Additional questions. I also asked an open-ended question about what the study was testing to check if the participants guessed the hypotheses (no one guessed it correctly). I also asked them two questions on a 9-point scale (1=*not at all*, 5=*moderately*, 9= *Very*), "How competitive did you feel towards J in the scenario?" and "How well you were able to imagine yourself as a training manager negotiating on behalf of your company during the scenario?" The participants mentioned that they were able to imagine themselves as project managers quite well (M = 7.21, SD = 1.47) and they felt moderately competitive towards their negotiating partner (M = 6.43, SD = 1.78).

Results

Manipulation checks. The following manipulation checks were carried out.

Emotion check. I performed two ANOVAs to check that the participants rated the targeted emotion higher in the different emotion conditions. The results showed that the manipulations worked. Participants with an angry partner rated their partner as significantly more angry than those in the other two conditions, F (2, 352) = 55.16, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .24$ (anger $M = 4.69$, $SD = 1.84$; contempt $M = 3.93$, $SD = 1.79$; and neutral $M = 2.26$, $SD = 1.46$). However, unlike the previous three studies, participants rated low status partners as showing more anger compared to high status partners, , F (1, 352) = 12.97, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$ (low status partner $M = 4.07$, $SD = 1.90$; and high status partner $M = 3.18$, $SD = 1.96$). There was also a significant three-way interaction between own status, other status and emotion, F (2, 352) = 4.88, $p = .008$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$. Means relevant to the significant three-way interaction are presented in Figure 4.1 and 4.2 and suggest that the anger manipulation was least successful when other status was high and own status was low and most successful when other status was low and own status was also low.

Figure 4.1: Mean anger scores in high own status condition. Error bars represent standard error.





Figure 4.2: Mean anger scores in low own status condition. Error bars represent standard error.



For contempt, there was only a significant main effect of emotion, F (2, 352) = 22.43, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .11$, such that participants rated their partners in the contempt condition as exhibiting significantly more contempt compared to the other two conditions (contempt $M = 4.79$, $SD = 1.77$; anger $M = 4.09$, $SD = 1.64$; and neutral $M = 3.23$, $SD = 1.71$).

Status check. Participants' ratings of their own status showed that they rated their own status as higher in the high status condition than in the low status condition, F (1, 352) = 69.44, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .16$ (high status $M = 6.54$, $SD = 1.53$ and low status $M = 5.18$, $SD = 1.56$). This manipulation of status also inadvertently manipulated power F (1, 352) = 24.22, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .07$ (high status $M = 6.01$, $SD = 1.65$ and low status $M = 5.13$, $SD = 1.69$). For other status, participants rated their partners as having higher status in the high status condition than in the low status condition, F (1, 352) = 134.88, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .28$ (high status $M = 6.92$, $SD = 1.37$ and low status $M = 4.77$, $SD = 1.99$). However, similar to the results in Study 3 and own status, as mentioned above, this manipulation of status was also unintentionally

confounded with power. Participants rated partners in high status condition as having more power compared to that in low status condition, F (1, 352) = 85.38, p < .001, η_p^2 = .19 (high status M = 6.84, SD = 1.39 and low status M = 5.19, SD = 1.91).

Offers and concessions. I ran an ANOVA to assess the effect of emotion and (own and other) status on combined concessions. There was a significant main effect of other status on combined concessions, F (1, 352) = 10.54, p = .001, η_p^2 = .03, such that participants made higher concessions to high status partners compared to low status partners (high status M = 2.29, SD = 1.31 and low status M = 1.89, SD = 1.62). Hypothesis 1 was therefore supported.

There was a significant main effect of emotion on combined concessions, F (2, 352) = 4.44, p = .012, η_p^2 = .02. Pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni correction indicated that most concessions were given in the anger condition, then in the neutral condition and least in the contempt condition (anger M = 2.42, SD = 1.24, neutral M = 1.99, SD = 1.49, and contempt M = 1.91, SD = 1.63). There was a significant difference between the anger and neutral conditions, and the anger and contempt conditions. Contempt and neutral conditions did not differ significantly from each other. Hypothesis 2 was partially supported. There was also a marginally significant three-way interaction between own status, other status and emotion, F (2, 352) = 2.85, p = .059, η_p^2 = .01. There was no significant main effect of own status and no other significant interaction between any combination of factors. Hypotheses 3a, 3b, and 3c were therefore not supported.

Since power was also inadvertently manipulated, I also re-ran the above analysis with own power and other power as covariates. Other power did not have a significant effect but own power was significantly related to concessions F (1, 350)

= 6.69, p = .010. The effects of other status and emotion remained significant, (other status, F (1, 350) = 6.66, p = .010, η_p^2 = .02 and emotion F (2, 350) = 4.33, p = .014, η_p^2 = .02). However the three-way interaction between own status, other status and emotion that was marginally significant in the previous analysis was now significant, F (2, 350) = 3.22, p = .041, η_p^2 = .02. Figure 4.3 and 4.4 show this three-way interaction. The graphs indicate the most concessions were made in the anger condition, when own status was low and other status was high, whereas the least concessions were made in the neutral condition, when own status was high and other status was low. Also, the concessions in the contempt condition for both high and low own status shows an interesting pattern. The pattern of differences between mean concessions across other status conditions is similar regardless of own status for both anger and neutral conditions (as in all cases there were more concessions in the high other status condition). However, for contempt condition, concessions were only higher in the high other status condition than low other status condition when own status was low, and not when own status was high. Thus the effect of other status on concessions depended both on own status and emotion (in interaction).

Figure 4.3: Mean concessions given by high own status participants. Error bars represent standard error.





Figure 4.4: Mean concessions given by low own status participants. Error bars represent standard error.



A similar ANOVA revealed only the main effect of other status on intentions to concede F (1, 352) = 6.74, p = .010, η_p^2 = .02, such that participants expressed a greater likelihood to concede to high status partners than low status partners (high status: M = 5.26, SD = 1.68; low status: M = 4.72, SD = 2.09).

Self-reported emotions. Significant univariate effects of emotion were found for contempt and anger. Means of these two self-reported emotions are presented in Table 4.1. For self-reported contempt, there was a significant difference between contempt and neutral condition. The results show that hypotheses 4a and 4b were partially supported.

Table 4.1

Self-reported emotions in the emotion condition

	F (2, 352)	Contempt condition (Mean)	Anger condition (Mean)	Neutral condition (Mean)
Contempt	4.77**	3.75	3.46	3.03
Anger	9.95***	3.53	3.91	2.82

Note: *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$,

For self-reported anger, there was a significant difference between the anger and neutral conditions, as shown in Table 4.1. There was also a significant interaction between own status and emotion F (2, 352) = 5.08, p = .007, η_p^2 = .03, as well as a three-way interaction between own status, other status and emotion F (2, 352) = 3.31, p = .038, η_p^2 = .02. Figures 4.5 and 4.6 shows this three-way interaction. As with perceptions of partner's anger reported in the emotion manipulation check, the anger manipulation had the least effect when own status was low and other status was high and it had the most impact when own status was low and other status was also low.

Figure 4.5: Self-reported anger in the high own status condition. Error bars represent standard error.





Figure 4.6: Self-reported anger in the low own status condition. Error bars represent standard error.



TIPI. I did five separate ANOVAs to investigate the effects of other status, own status and emotion on the five personality dimensions measured by TIPI – emotional stability, extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness and openness to experience.

Emotional stability. There was a significant main effect of emotion F (2, 352) = 46.97, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .21$. Pairwise comparisons using the Bonferroni correction indicated significant differences between all three conditions such that

participants viewed neutral partners to be most emotionally stable, followed by contemptuous partners and lastly angry partners (neutral M = 9.37, SD = 2.61, contempt M = 7.06, SD = 3.09, and anger M = 6.01, SD = 1.99). Hypothesis 6c was supported. There was also a significant main effect of other status, F (1, 352) = 29.17, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .08$, such that participants regarded high status partners as more emotionally stable compared to low status partners (high status M = 8.38, SD = 3.01 and low status M = 6.55, SD = 2.58). So, hypothesis 6a was partially supported.[20]

Extraversion. Univariate tests showed a main effect of other status, F (1, 352) = 13.03, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$, such that participants rated higher status partners as more extraverted than lower status partners (high status M = 9.15, SD = 2.07 and low status M = 8.43, SD = 1.86). There were no other significant effects.

Agreeableness. Univariate tests showed a significant main effect of emotion, F (2, 352) = 13.22, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .07$. Pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni correction showed that participants rated neutral partners as more agreeable compared to both angry and contemptuous partners (neutral M = 8.46, SD = 2.90, contempt M = 6.54, SD = 3.16, and anger M = 6.72, SD = 2.80). There was no significant difference between angry and contemptuous partners. There was also a significant main effect of other status F (1, 352) = 13.30, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$, such higher status partners were perceived as more agreeable than lower status partners (high status M = 7.90, SD = 3.08 and low status M = 6.54, SD = 2.92). There were no

[20] The effect of other status on perceptions of personality (ratings of emotional stability, agreeableness, conscientiousness, extraversion, and openness to experience) remained significant even when power was used as a covariate

other significant effects. So, hypothesis 6b was partially supported and hypothesis 6a was supported.

Conscientiousness. Results showed a significant main effect of emotion, F (2, 352) = 4.46, p = .012, η_p^2 = .02. Pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni correction showed that participants regarded neutral partners as more conscientious than contemptuous partners (neutral M = 9.49, SD = 2.93; contempt M = 8.15, SD = 2.92). The anger condition did not significantly differ from either of the other emotion conditions. There was also a significant main effect of other status, F (1, 352) = 80.19, p < .001, η_p^2 = .18, such that participants considered higher status partners as more conscientious than lower status partners (high status M = 9.91, SD = 2.64; low status M = 7.31, SD = 2.50). There were no other significant effects.


Openness to experience. ANOVA revealed significant main effects of both emotion and other status. For emotion, F (2, 352) = 5.34, p = .005, η_p^2 = .03, the results showed that participants rated neutral partners as significantly more open to experience than contemptuous partners, using Bonferroni correction (neutral M = 8.53, SD = 2.69; contempt M = 7.17, SD = 2.73). Anger condition did not significantly differ from the other two conditions. For status, F (1, 352) = 35.48, p < .001, η_p^2 = .09, results showed that high status partners were perceived to be more open to experience than low status partners (high status M = 8.61, SD = 2.53; low status M = 6.91, SD = 2.52). There were no other significant effects. These results showed the hypothesis 6a and 6c were supported and that hypothesis 6b was partially supported.

Power distance orientation and social dominance orientation. I did moderation analysis using Hayes (2012) PROCESS macro to investigate whether

PDO and SDO moderated the effect of other status on concessions. Other status (coded -1 low status and +1 high status) was entered as the independent variable, mean SDO (and mean PDO separately) as moderator, and combined concessions as dependent variable. Other status, PDO and SDO were centred. The results showed that PDO did not moderate the effect of other status on concessions.

There was a significant interaction between other status and SDO (b = -.174, SE = .07, t (86) = -2.43, p = .015). The SDO moderation analysis also showed a significant main effect of other status, b = -.435, SE = .15, t (358) = -2.81, p = .005, but not of SDO, after controlling for the interaction term. Simple slopes (shown in Figure 4.7) showed that the effect of other status on concessions was greatest at low levels of SDO (-1 *SD*), t (358) = 3.53, p < .001, followed by medium levels of SDO (mean), t (358) = 2.58, p = .010. However, there was no significant effect of other status on concessions at high levels of SDO (+1 *SD*). This pattern of results is in the opposite direction to that predicted by hypothesis 5a and 5b, as other status had a greater effect on concessions for participants who reported low or medium SDO than for participants who reported high SDO.

Figure 4.7: Simple slopes showing the effect of status on concessions for different levels of SDO



Fairness. ANOVA revealed significant main effects of other status and emotion on rated fairness of the negotiating partner. Participants rated high status partners as fairer than low status partners, F (1, 352) = 7.98, p = .005, η_p^2 = .02 (high status M = 45.37, SD = 24.29 and low status M = 36.74, SD = 26.31). The main effect of emotion condition was such that participants perceived neutral partners as significantly fairer than contemptuous partners, F (2, 352) = 4.10, p = .017, η_p^2 = .02 (neutral M = 46.00, SD = 24.84 and contempt M = 36.39, SD = 25.64). There were no other significant effects

Mediation. The mediation results are shown below.

***Emotion and concessions*.** I performed mediation analysis using the bootstrapping procedure developed by Preacher and Hayes (2004) to investigate if ratings of emotional stability and agreeableness, mediated the effect of emotion on concessions given. The mediation analyses for the dependent variable – combined concession is given below. I did two mediation analyses using two different contrast codes – one comparing the neutral condition with anger and contempt (contrast 1, neutral condition was coded as -2 and the other conditions were coded as 1), and the other comparing the anger condition with the contempt condition (contrast 2, anger condition was coded as 1 and contempt condition was coded as -1). In all these analyses, one contrast code was used as predictor and the other one was used as control and the bootstrap test was done with 5000 iterations which yielded a 95% bias corrected confidence intervals.

Table 4.2

Results of mediation by ratings on emotional stability

	Coefficients				SE	Bootstrapping Bias Corrected Confidence Intervals	
	Path a	Path b	Path c	Path c'		Lower	Upper
Contrast 1	-.94***	.10***	-.05 (ns)	-.15**	.03	-.16	-.04
Contrast 2	-.53***	.10***	.25**	.31**	.02	-.11	-.02

Note: *** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$

As can be seen from Table 4.2, ratings of emotional stability mediated the effects of emotion on concessions. Also, similar to Study 3, here too, there is evidence of inconsistent mediation or a suppressor effect. Hypothesis 7c was supported.

Table 4.3

Results of mediation by ratings on agreeableness

	Coefficients				SE	Bootstrapping Bias Corrected Confidence Intervals	
	Path a	Path b	Path c	Path c'		Lower	Upper
Contrast 1	-.61***	.08**	.06 (ns)	.11*	.02	-.09	-.02
Contrast 2	.09 (ns)	.08**	.25**	.25**	.02	-.02	.05

Note: *** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$

As can be seen from Table 4.3, only the effect of contrast 1 on concessions was mediated by ratings on agreeableness as only in this case did the confidence interval not contain zero. So, hypothesis 7b was partially supported.

Other status and concessions. I performed mediation analysis using the same procedure to find out if ratings of emotional stability and agreeableness mediated the effect of status on combined concessions. Other status was the independent variable (coded -1 low status and +1 high status) and own status was used as a control. The bootstrap test was done with 5000 iterations which yielded a 95% bias corrected confidence intervals. The results are shown in Table 4.4. As can be seen from this table, agreeableness mediated the effect of other status on concessions.[21] However, emotional stability did not mediate as the confidence interval contains zero. Hypothesis 7a was partially supported.

Table 4.4

Results of mediation by emotional stability and agreeableness on the effect of other status on concessions

	Coefficients				SE	Bootstrapping Bias Corrected Confidence Intervals	
	Path a	Path b	Path c	Path c'		Lower	Upper
Emotional stability	.86***	.04 (ns)	.22**	.18*	.02	-.01	.09
Agreeableness	.67***	.06*	.22**	.18*	.02	.00	.09

Note: *** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$

[21] The mediation by agreeableness on the effect of other status on concessions remained significant even when power of the partners was used as a covariate

Discussion

This study supported and extended the findings of the previous three studies, using a more advanced manipulation of status that independently varied the status of the participant and partner. The results showed that participants made more concessions to angry partners than contemptuous partners. They also gave more concessions to high status partners than low status partners. Participants also reported feeling more contempt with contemptuous partners and more anger with angry partners. Furthermore, results showed that perceptions of agreeableness mediated the effect of other status on concessions. Perceptions of emotional stability mediated the effect of emotion on concessions. There was also evidence that SDO moderated the effect of other status on concessions. These results are discussed below.

Effects of emotion manipulation. This study replicated the findings of both Studies 1 and 3 showing that participants made more concessions to angry partners than contemptuous partners. This interesting and novel finding is now supported by three (out of four) different studies. However, none of these studies showed significant differences between the neutral condition and the other emotion conditions (except for Study 4 which showed a significant difference between anger and neutral conditions). This could be because the statistical power was not high enough in these four studies to detect this relatively small effect of the impact of neutral condition on concessions. Another issue with not finding a difference between the effects of neutral condition compared to the other emotion conditions is that I cannot be completely certain that the effects of emotion on concessions depend on anger, contempt, or both. Thus, it would be useful if future studies could

use a larger sample to detect this difference. However, here I would like to point that the absence of a difference between neutral and other emotions conditions has also been an issue for other researchers (Van Kleef et al., 2004a, 2004b).

Study 4 also found evidence that the manipulation of emotion interacted with the revised other status manipulation such that participants rated low status partner as showing more anger compared to high status partner. People usually confer high status on angry others (Tiedens, 2001). It therefore seems possible that anger displays from low status others were more salient and therefore considered more intense, as usually, people do not associate low status people with angry displays. A significant three-way interaction between emotion, own status and other status also affected ratings of the other participant's anger. This interaction showed that the anger manipulation was least successful when other status was high and own status was low and most successful when other status was low and own status was also low. It is again possible that angry expressions of low status others were considered unexpected and therefore their angry outbursts were given more attention compared to those of high status others. It is also possible that when participants' own status was low, they found it easier to empathise with the angry displays of a similar status other.

Effects of status manipulation. This study found support for the hypothesis that participants made more concessions to high status partners than to low status partners. This is the first of my studies to obtain this result possibly because of the more differentiated manipulation of status. People confer competence and higher rank (Tiedens, Ellsworth, & Mesquita, 2000) to people of higher status and therefore it is possible that this is why high status partners were given more

concessions. As in Studies 2 and 3, status was unintentionally confounded with power. This could reflect the nature of the task. The scenario used in the study involved competitive bargaining and it is possible that concept of power is more intuitively linked to competitive situations. Moreover, in lay theory, concepts of power and status are sometimes confused with each other (Magee & Galinsky, 2008), and this could be one such situation. In order to deal with the issue of confounding, I reran the analysis controlling for power and the main effect of other status remained significant. Thus, even though power was inadvertently manipulated, there was still a power-independent effect of partner status on concessions. This means that even though power is intuitively linked to negotiation situations, participants made a distinction between status and power. Participants gave more concessions to high status participants irrespective of power connotations. This could be because they considered high status partners to be more competent, or due to favourable personality evaluations, as found in this study (which is discussed below). Study 4 also showed that participants demonstrated a stronger intention to concede to high status partners than low status partners, which is corroborated by their actual behaviour of conceding more to high status partners than to low status partners.

Results also showed a significant three-way interaction between emotion, own status, and other status (after controlling for power), such that most concessions were made in the anger condition when own status was low and other status was high. In the same pattern, participants also reported most anger in themselves and least anger in partners, when other status was high and own status was low. These three results together indicate that even though low status participants rated high

status others as showing less anger but felt more angry themselves, they gave most concessions to them. These factors in combination may have contributed to this effect: a) low status people may associate high status with anger and therefore they did not register anger from high status others as very intense while rating it; b) low status participants may have felt angry themselves with dealing with high status angry partners because they thought it was unjustified, and were more acutely affected by this due to their own low status; or c) low status participants gave more concessions to angry high status others because anger is associated with high status (Tiedens, 2001) and high status is usually associated with competence (Tiedens et al., 2000). This three-way interaction was marginally significant when power was not controlled.

Self-reported emotions. This study found support for the finding that more contempt was experienced by participants in the contempt condition (found in Studies 1 and 3) and more anger was experienced by participants in the anger condition (found in Study 3). There was also a three-way interaction between emotion, other status, and own status such that most anger was reported by participants when other status was high and own status was low, and least anger was reported when other status was low and own status was also low. This interaction relates to the three-way interaction reported above between own status, other status and emotion on anger ratings. Participants reported least anger in themselves and most anger in their partner when other status was low and own status was also low whereas they reported most anger in themselves and least anger in their partner when other status was high and own status was low. This could be because even though anger and high status are closely associated, people

might consider anger from high status others as unjustified and therefore respond by feeling angry themselves, especially when their own status was low. However, with low status others, it is possible that people might consider angry displays from low status others as unexpected but also justified (because of a belief that low status others do not usually display anger but do so when prompted beyond control) and therefore respond by not getting angry themselves. Furthermore, when participants' own status was low, they may have empathised more with other low status partners, and so felt least angry with them.

Big Five personality factors and status. As in Study 3 and consistent with predictions, participants rated high status partners as more emotionally stable, agreeable, and conscientious than low status partners. Participants also rated high status partners as more extraverted (not found in Study 3) and open to experience (found in Study 3). Again, this could be due to status being associated with competence (Magee & Galinsky, 2008; Russell & Fiske, 2008) and thereby casting a halo-effect such that high status partners were perceived as more emotionally stable, agreeable and conscientious.

Unlike Study 3, perceptions of agreeableness mediated the effect of other status on concessions. In other words, it seems possible that participants gave more concessions to high status partners than low status partners partly because they considered them to be more agreeable. Emotional stability did not mediate this relationship. Ratcliff et al. (2011) found that when evaluating high status partners, people are more willing and driven to use extra cognitive resources in order to positively evaluate them compared to low status partners. Therefore, it seems that participants were willing to perceive high status partners as more agreeable, even

though this personality dimension were not directly discernible and gave more concessions to high status participants based on these impressions.

Big Five personality factors and emotion. The predictions about personality factors and emotion were partially confirmed. Confirming predictions and similar to the results of Study 3, participants rated neutral partners as more emotionally stable, conscientious and agreeable than partners in other emotion conditions. This could be because according to lay theories not showing emotion equates to being more rational and an ability to make better decisions (see Kopelman, Rosette, & Thompson, 2006). Therefore, lack of emotional expressions in neutral partners led to these perceptions. Also, as found in Study 3 and contrary to predictions, contemptuous partners were found to be more emotionally stable than angry partners. This could be because of the appraisals related to expressions of anger and contempt. Contempt is related to appraisals that the expresser does not wish to associate with the target anymore, and therefore is likely to be perceived as a less volatile emotion than anger, which is related to appraisals that the expresser blames the target person for something blameworthy. Contempt can be considered to involve attributions of stable factors whereas anger can be considered to involve attributions of temporary factors. Therefore it is possible that contemptuous partners were considered more emotionally stable than angry partners. However, the differences in ratings of agreeableness and conscientiousness between anger and contempt conditions were not very clear. Similar to Study 3, extraversion was not related to emotion but unlike Study 3, participants rated neutral partners to be more open to experience and conscientious than contemptuous partners. This finding was not predicted.

As in Study 3, mediation analysis showed that emotional stability mediated the effect of emotion on concessions. First, more concessions were made in the emotion conditions (anger and contempt) than neutral condition and this effect was mediated by ratings of emotional stability (this relationship was also mediated by ratings on agreeableness and was not found in Study 3). Second, more concessions were made to angry participants than contemptuous participants and this effect was also mediated by emotional stability, similar to Study 3. This means that partners showing emotion were considered to be emotionally unstable and therefore given more concessions.

Fairness. There were no predictions regarding rating of fairness but results suggested that high status partners were considered fairer than low status partners. Also, neutral partners were considered fairer than contemptuous partners.

PDO and SDO. PDO did not moderate the relationship between status and concessions. SDO, on the other hand, did moderate the relationship between status and concessions but not in the direction that was expected. When participants expressed low SDO (had a preference for an equal society) and medium SDO, higher status led to more concessions. However, when participants expressed high SDO (had a preference for an unequal society), participants did not differentiate between high status partners and low status partners, in term of concessions. This pattern of result was not predicted. It may have arisen because low SDOs were more attentive to status differences making them more susceptible to the influence of stereotypes about the association between status and competence. Oldmeadow and Fiske (2007) found that even when people were low in SDO, they still associated high status with competence. So, low SDO scorers, even when displaying a liking for an

equal society, might still believe in a meritocratic status system implying that high status people enjoy more privileges because they are more adept. This could be a reason why other status had a greater effect on concessions for low and medium SDOs than for high SDOs. People scoring high on SDO may have paid less attention to status differences because they accept status differences, and so for high SDOs, other status had the least effect on concessions.

General Discussion

Studies 3 and 4 were designed to support and extend the findings of the previous two studies. They used vignettes as a method of investigation and online data collection to permit larger samples. They also used perceptions of personality traits to test for mediational pathways. Across both studies, more concessions were made to angry partners than to contemptuous partners, which add to the literature and is consistent with theoretical predictions. These two studies have also demonstrated that more anger was felt with angry partners and more contempt was felt with contemptuous partners than other partners as predicted. With respect to personality evaluations, these two studies showed that high status partners were evaluated more favourably than low status partners, and neutral partners were evaluated more favourably than contempt and angry partners. Moreover, both studies found evidence that ratings of emotional stability of the partner mediated the effect of emotional manipulation on concessions. Taken together, these results show consistent results that add to the literature. Studies 3 and 4 also had some discrepant findings. Study 3 did not find any effect of status manipulation on concessions. However, Study 4 did. The reason was that Study 4 employed an altered status manipulation differentiating own status from other status. This

changed manipulation was the key to finding proposed effects, which were that more concessions were made to high status partners than low status partners. Also, Study 3 did not find any support for the proposed moderation by SDO and PDO, whereas Study 4 found evidence for moderation by SDO. This could also be due to the altered status manipulation although the results showed that SDO moderated the effect of status on concessions in the opposite direction to that predicted. More concessions were made to high status partners when participants' SDO was low than when it was high. Study 4 also found evidence that personality impressions mediated the effect of other status on concessions. This finding was also novel and future research could explore the relationship between status and concessions more thoroughly.

Conclusion

These two studies showed that more concessions were made to angry partners than contemptuous partners. Participants also reported more contempt when negotiating with contemptuous partners and more anger when negotiating with angry partners. Unlike previous studies, the status manipulation worked as intended in Study 4, and results showed that more concessions were made to high status partners than low status partners. Studies 3 and 4 also showed that ratings of personality mediated the effect of emotion on concessions and Study 4 showed that ratings of personality mediated the effect of status on concessions. Finally Study 4 showed that SDO moderated the effect of status on concessions.

CHAPTER 4: EFFECTS OF EMOTIONS AND RELEVANCE ON ULTIMATUM GAME BEHAVIOUR

This chapter presents two online experiments (Study 5 and 6) investigating the effects of emotions (embarrassment and shame) and their relevance to the task (task relevant and irrelevant emotion) on behaviour in an ultimatum game. In Study 5 (N = 161), participants played an online ultimatum game. The results showed that emotion and relevance had a significant interactive effect on participants' satisfaction and fairness ratings. Participants accepted more offers in the task irrelevant condition and made larger offers to proposers in the shame condition. One possible explanation is that participants considered offers in the task irrelevant condition to be more authentic and proposers in the shame condition to be more apologetic. Study 6 (N = 203) made two modifications to Study 5's procedures: 1) inclusion of a non-emotional control condition; and 2) the use of better matched situational information across emotion conditions. The results of this study failed to replicate those obtained in Study 5. The emotion manipulation did not work as intended as participants failed to distinguish between shame and embarrassment conditions, perhaps because participants did not process information about the emotions to a sufficient extent.

Introduction

Studies 5 and 6 explored the effects of two emotions (shame and embarrassment) and of their perceived relevance to behaviour in an ultimatum game (task relevant and task irrelevant) on bargaining outcomes. The overall aim was to investigate the effect of emotions (shame and embarrassment) as well as relevance of emotions (task relevant vs. task irrelevance) on bargaining outcomes.

Shame and Embarrassment

These two studies compared the effects of shame and embarrassment in a bargaining situation. These two emotions have certain similarities since they both belong to the family to self-conscious emotions and arise when certain rules are broken (Keltner & Buswell, 1997; Tangney & Fischer, 1995). However, they also have distinct defining characteristics (Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996).

According to Keltner and Buswell (1997) embarrassment is caused by minor social infractions and awkward social interactions which are violations of conventions. They also point out that the experience of embarrassment is usually mild and brief and is associated with one's public or presented self and therefore more intense with acquaintances and strangers than with family and friends. Embarrassment is more likely to occur in public than in private and is attributed to accidents or external causes rather than personal failings. Miller and Tangney (1994) found that embarrassment resulted in laughter and feeling foolish and awkward with an inclination to hide and withdraw. Keltner, Young, and Miller (1997) found that embarrassment evokes affiliative reactions from others which are light-hearted (such as amusement) thereby increasing interpersonal liking and forgiveness and repairing the embarrassed person's social identity. This discussion highlights that the embarrassed people are perceived as socially awkward and are mostly considered endearingly foolish. Embarrassment is seen as a response to events that are potentially damaging to one's public persona, and embarrassment about these events prompts the person experiencing the emotion to apologize and to attempt to repair his/her public standing.

According to Tangney, et al. (1996), shame results from a negative appraisal of one's "core self", is triggered by more severe norm violations than embarrassment, and is very often experienced in private. Miller and Tangney (1994) found that shame makes salient the fundamental flaws in one's personality which results in a desire to apologize. By contrast to embarrassment, shame is more likely to occur in private than in public and is a result of violations of morality (Keltner & Buswell, 1997). According to Miller and Tangney's (1994) findings, shame makes people feel

immoral whereas embarrassment makes people feel awkward. Tangney et al. (1996) also found that shamed people felt more responsibility for their actions than embarrassed people. According to Keltner et al. (1997) shame also elicits affiliative reactions, but these are graver (such as sympathy) and contribute towards making the ashamed individuals feel better about themselves. This discussion highlights that ashamed people are perceived as moral individuals who take responsibility for their personal failings. Shame also results in apology, but the nature of the apology is much graver than that resulting from embarrassment.

So, shame is attributed to core personality, is due to moral transgressions and evokes sympathy from others. Embarrassment, however, is attributed to situational forces, is due to minor social transgressions, and evokes light-hearted responses such as laughter and jokes. Also, Stearns and Parrott (2012) found that participants evaluated people who expressed shame more favourably in terms of their moral character and desire to make amends than people expressing no emotions. It therefore seems reasonable to predict that ashamed others will be considered more moral and apologetic than embarrassed others, in the present research. In sum, these studies tested the prediction that participants in a bargaining situation would accept more offers from and make larger offers to partners expressing shame than embarrassment. Since the above discussion also highlights that shame evokes sympathy in others, I expected self-reported sympathy to mediate this relationship.

Keltner et al. (1997) found that embarrassed people are liked and forgiven more and also evoke light-hearted feelings in others. In line with these findings, I predicted that participants dealing with embarrassed partners would be more satisfied with their offers and consider those offers to be fairer than those made by

ashamed partners. These predictions suggest that ashamed partners would be given more generous offers than embarrassed partners, but embarrassed partners would be liked more compared to ashamed partners. This is because I expected shame to convey a more sincere apology than embarrassment, which would translate into more generous offers for ashamed partners. However, I expected that ashamed partners would also draw attention to unfavourable aspects of their "core" self whereas embarrassed partners would evoke more light-hearted reactions from participants, which would result in embarrassed partners being liked more than ashamed partners.

Relevance

Steinel et al.'s (2008) study (discussed in chapter 2 above) compared the effects of anger and happiness under two different conditions – either these two emotions were directed at the participant or they were directed at the offer made by the participant in a negotiation context. They found that people made larger concessions to partners expressing offer-directed anger than to partners expressing offer-directed happiness but smaller concessions to partners expressing person-directed anger than partners expressing person-directed happiness. They reasoned that when emotion was directed at the offer, participants paid more attention to it as it communicated information about the offer in a competitive negotiation context (anger communicated that the other person wanted a better offer and happiness conveyed that the person was content with the offer, which was reflected in participants' concessions). However, person-directed anger did not convey anything useful about the offer and so participants reacted competitively with angry partners but cooperatively with happy partners. The present two studies manipulated

different emotions to the ones used by Steinel et al. (2008) and used a different manipulation of task relevance that compared offer-related (task relevant) emotions with emotions experienced due to events occurring prior to the experiment rather than emotions directed specifically at the participant. In other words, our control condition preserved emotional quality but did not confound task relevance with person-directedness. However, similar to the offer-directed emotion condition in Steinel et al's (2008) study, I predicted that the emotions (shame and embarrassment) would have more implications for the participants in the task relevant condition than in the task irrelevant condition. Therefore, I expected that participants would react to the apology conveyed by either shame or embarrassment in the task relevant condition by accepting more offers, making larger offers, being more satisfied, and considering the offers to be fairer than in the task irrelevant condition.

Interaction between Emotion and Relevance

I also predicted an interaction between the emotion and relevance manipulations. Let us consider a similar manipulation of task relevance that was implemented by De Hooge, Breugelmans, and Zeelenberg (2008) in a study assessing intrapersonal effects of shame (in contrast to the present two studies' focus on *inter*personal effects of emotions). These investigators induced task relevant or task irrelevant shame in participants and found that when shame was relevant to the task at hand, it motivated prosocial behaviour. This result was only found for pro-selfs (those people who have a predilection to act more selfishly) but not for prosocials (who the researchers reasoned were naturally inclined towards behaving prosocially). The researchers explained their findings by saying that shame acts as a

commitment device that encourages short-term prosocial behaviour for a better long-term outcome. However, in my opinion, de Hooge et al.'s findings could equally be explained by the action tendency associated with feeling task relevant shame – that the shamed proselfs wished to apologise as a result of feeling ashamed and therefore acted prosocially to make amends for their behaviour. This would not apply to task irrelevant shame, because in this condition, being apologetic was not useful for making amends. Thus, based on de Hooge et al's (2008) reasoning, I predicted that task relevant shame would communicate a stronger apology and desire to make amends (after making a low offer) than task relevant embarrassment, and so I expected that participants in the task relevant shame condition would be more satisfied with offers and rate those offers as fairer than participants in the task relevant embarrassment condition. This is because I expected that embarrassment would signal a concern for saving face (Keltner & Buswell, 1997) but shame would signal apology. Extending this prediction, I also expected the difference between shame and embarrassment to be greater in the task relevant condition than in the task irrelevant condition. This is because I expected that emotions would be more directly significant to the participants in the task relevant condition than in the task irrelevant condition as discussed above.

Mediators

Two mediators were assessed in these studies – prosocial ratings of the proposer and the extent of like/dislike towards the proposer. Feinberg, Willer and Keltner (2012) demonstrated that embarrassed people were rated as more prosocial, were trusted, cooperated, and affiliated with more by observers than were people expressing less intense embarrassment, pride or neutral expressions. Feinberg et al.

also found that prosocial ratings mediated the relationship between embarrassment and trust.

Shame does not appear to have the same implications about prosociality as embarrassment. Shame communicates apology, but also signifies some kind of moral transgression (Tangney et al., 1996). Thus, it is likely that observers attribute some positive traits to individuals expressing shame (e.g., they are capable of feeling sorry, and have a desire to make good), but do not trust them or perceive them as prosocially inclined in their actions more generally. For these reasons, I predicted that participants would consider embarrassed others to be more prosocial than shamed others and that their ratings of prosociality would mediate the effect of emotion on satisfaction with offers (and fairness of offers). In the same vein, I expected that participants would like the embarrassed partners more and that liking would mediate the effect of emotion on satisfaction with offers (and fairness of offers).

Study 5

Study Aims

Based on the above rationale, Study 5 investigated the following hypotheses:

1. I predicted that participants would accept more offers (Hypothesis 1a), express more satisfaction with offers (Hypothesis 1b), rate offers as more fair (Hypothesis 1c), and make larger offers when it was their turn to be proposers (Hypothesis 1d) in the task relevant condition than in the task irrelevant condition.

2. I predicted that participants would be more satisfied (Hypothesis 2a) and consider the offer to be fairer (Hypothesis 2b) in the embarrassment condition than the shame condition. However, I predicted that participants would accept more offers (Hypothesis 2c) and make bigger offers (Hypothesis 2d) to partners in the shame condition than in the embarrassment condition.
3. I predicted that the effects of relevance and emotion would interact such that the difference between shame and embarrassment would be greater in the task relevant condition than in the task irrelevant condition. Specifically, I predicted that participants in the task relevant condition would be more satisfied with (Hypothesis 3a) and consider offers fairer (Hypothesis 3b) when dealing with shameful partners than embarrassed partners, and this difference would be greater in the task relevant condition than task irrelevant condition (Hypothesis 3c).
4. I predicted that participants would rate embarrassed partners more favourably (i.e., rate them as more prosocial and like them more) than partners expressing shame. I also predicted that participants' ratings of prosociality would mediate the effect of emotion on satisfaction with offers (Hypothesis 4a) and fairness of offers (Hypothesis 4b), and that participants' ratings of liking would mediate the effect of emotion on satisfaction with offers (Hypothesis 5a) and fairness of offers (Hypothesis 5b).
5. I predicted that participants' self-reported sympathy would mediate the effect of emotion on participants' acceptance of the offer (Hypothesis 6a) and on participants' own offer (Hypothesis 6b).

Method

Participants and experimental design. This study was conducted as part of a block practical class for final-year undergraduate psychology students at the University of Oxford, who recruited participants. One hundred and sixty one people took part in this study (96 women and 65 men). Seventy-six percent of participants were British, and the rest were from 15 other countries. The mean age of participants was 21.44 years (*SD* = 4.61). Eighty-two percent of the participants were in full time education, 12% were employed part time, and 6% were unemployed. The participants were recruited through university wide advertisements and through direct emails sent by the block practical students. They were entered into a lottery for £50. Participants who suspected that the other player was a preprogrammed agent were excluded from analyses (N = 21).

Design. Study 5 had a 2 (Emotion: Embarrassment *vs*. Shame) x 2 (Relevance: Task relevant *vs.* Task irrelevant) between subjects design. The main dependent measures assessed acceptance or rejection of offer, satisfaction with the offer, fairness of offers, and participant's offer to the proposer. The numbers of participants in each cell created by the factorial design varied (due to the random allocation procedure) from 39 to 42.

Procedure. Participants were given a link to the study and each was asked to access the link at a prespecified time during the day. The purpose of this procedure was to enhance the plausibility and experimental realism of the task by making it seem more likely that other participants had also signed in simultaneously. Participants were told that they would play a game with another person online (simulated partner) called "Divide it up". They were then made to

wait for a few seconds before the computer supposedly paired them with a randomly selected partner for the game.

The game. The game "Divide it up" was an adapted version of the ultimatum game (Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982). Participants were told that one person would be a "proposer" and the other one would be a "recipient". One hundred points would be given to the proposer to divide in whichever way he/she chose, between the proposer and the recipient. Once the proposer made an offer, the recipient could accept or reject the offer. If the recipient rejected the offer, then nobody would get any points and if the recipient accepted the offer, then the points would be distributed in accordance with the proposer's offer. To increase motivation to maximise points, participants were told that five points would be equal to one lottery ticket and that the more points the participant earned, the better their chances would be to win a lottery that would take place at the end of the study.

Manipulations. Participants were informed of the rules of the game, and then completed a brief questionnaire. They were asked to indicate how much would they give (out of 100 points) to the other person if they were given the role of proposer. Then they were asked to select out of ten emotions (embarrassed, happy, angry, guilty, proud, ashamed, satisfied, sympathetic, apologetic and anxious), the emotion that they were feeling at that moment ("I am feeling _____ right now"). They were also asked to indicate why they were feeling the way that they did. Then they were asked a few more filler questions such as "If you are the receiver, what kind of offer would you like to receive? Why?", "Do you know anything about games such as these? And if so, what do you know about them?",

"Does the recipient or the proposer have more status (respect, esteem) in games such as these. Why do you think so?", and "Does the recipient or the proposer have more power (control over resources) in games such as these. Why do you think so?"

These questions were included to increase the experimental realism of the manipulations, as the participants were informed (after filling out these questions) that some of their partner's answers to these questions would be shown to them, so that they could get some information about their partner.

All participants received the following statement, purportedly from their partner – "I've read about such games and usually people make offers favourable to themselves." All the manipulation statements were typed in lower case and without punctuation to make them more believable. After the participants were shown the statements according to different conditions, they were told that they have been randomly selected to be the recipient and would therefore receive an offer from the proposer. The manipulation statements that were presented to the participants included statements that conveyed the emotion being experienced by the other player and the relevance of those emotions, which varied depending emotion condition as indicated in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1

Statements used for emotion manipulation that were shown to the participants

	Embarrassment condition	Shame condition
Task relevant	I am feeling embarrassed right now. I am embarrassed and uncomfortable about making an unfair offer but if I am the proposer I will still make it.	I am feeling ashamed right now. I am ashamed about making an unfair offer but if I am the proposer I will still make it.
Task irrelevant	I am feeling embarrassed right now. On my way here I tripped and fell down in front of a bunch of people. I am still feeling embarrassed and uncomfortable.	I am feeling ashamed right now. I handed in an essay late again – 3 times in a row. I am still feeling ashamed about it.

After the manipulations, the participants answered additional questions and measures, which are mentioned below. During debrief, they were given a full explanation of the purpose of the study and the deception was revealed. They were then told that all of them were eligible for the lottery, irrespective of whether they had accepted or rejected the supposed other player's offer.

Measures. The following measures and manipulation checks were used.

***Emotion manipulation check*.** Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which the proposer felt the following ten emotions – ashamed, anxious, apologetic, embarrassed, angry, proud, happy, satisfied, sympathetic, and guilty on a 9-point scale (1=*not at all*, 5=*moderately*, 9=*very much*). The wording of the

question was “Based on this interaction, how do you think the proposer felt while making this offer?” The main items of interest here were embarrassed and ashamed and the other items were used to disguise the study’s main research focus.

Relevance manipulation check. Participants were asked to rate the extent to which the proposer felt the way that they did because of four possible factors: “the offer they made, unrelated incidents or events, their mood, possibility of confrontation with you” on 9-point scales (1=*not at all*, 5=*moderately*, 9=*extremely*). The third and fourth items were filler items. Items 1 and 2 correlated significantly (r (161) = -.41, $p < .001$) and so the task irrelevance item was reverse coded and averaged with the task relevant item to form a two-item scale measuring relevance.

Self-reported emotions. Participants were asked to rate their own emotions in response to receiving the offer using the adjectives: anxious, embarrassed, angry, frustrated, guilty, ashamed, uncomfortable, sympathetic, satisfied, compassionate, disappointed, and happy on a 9-point scale (1=*not at all*, 5=*moderately*, 9=*very much*). Predictions were made only for self-reported sympathy. Self-reported embarrassment and shame were also analysed for exploratory purpose. Other items were included to disguise the purpose of the study.

Main dependent measures. There were four main dependent measures – acceptance of offers, satisfaction with offers, fairness of offers, and participants’ own offer. Participants were asked one question concerning whether they would accept the offer - “Do you accept the proposer’s offer?” (*Yes/No*). They were also asked to indicate their satisfaction with the offer - “How satisfied are you with the offer?” on a 100-point scale (0=*very dissatisfied*, 100=*very satisfied*). They were also asked to indicate fairness of offer - “Do you think the proposer’s offer was justified?

(0=*not justified at all*, 100=*completely justified*). Towards the end of the study, participants were told that they would be the proposer and the other person would be the recipient. They were asked "As proposer you have 100 points, how many points will you offer the recipient?"

Perceived prosociality of proposer. Participants were asked to indicate on a 9-point scale, the extent to which the following words described the proposer (1=*not at all*, 5=*moderately*, 9=*a whole lot*). The prosocial items were generous, cooperative, morally upright, follows rules and norms of society, and trustworthy (α = .80). These words were taken from Feinberg, Willer and Keltner (2012). There were a few more filler items.

***Additional measures*.** Participants were also asked the extent to which they liked or disliked the proposer – "How much did you like/dislike the proposer?" (1=*dislike*, 5=*ambivalent*, 9=*like*). Another question was "How likely do you think is that the recipient will accept or reject your offer?" (1 = *very unlikely to accept*, 9 = *very likely to accept*)[22], which was included for exploratory purposes.

Results

Manipulation checks. The following manipulation checks were carried out.

***Emotion*.** To check if the emotion manipulation worked, I ran two separate ANOVAs on participants' ratings of proposer's embarrassment and shame. As expected, there were significant main effects of emotion on both embarrassment, *F*

[22] Participants were also asked "How would you ideally like to feel about the offer that you have made?", "How do you think the recipient will feel about this offer?" "How do you feel about the offer that you have made?", "Based on this interaction, in your opinion how appropriate were the proposer's emotional reactions?" These questions were a part of another project and so will not be discussed here.

(1, 157) = 4.51, p = .035, η_p^2 = .03, and shame, F (1, 157) = 7.97, p = .005, η_p^2 = .05. Participants rated proposers as showing more embarrassment in the embarrassment condition (M = 5.48, SD = 2.54) than in the shame condition (M = 4.70, SD = 2.37), and more shame in the shame condition (M = 5.30, SD = 2.34) than in the embarrassment condition (M = 4.27, SD = 2.39). However, there were also main effects of relevance on both embarrassment, F (1, 157) = 10.49, p = .001, η_p^2 = .06, and shame, F (1, 157) = 16.27, p < .001, η_p^2 = .09. Both embarrassment and shame were greater in the task relevant condition (embarrassment M = 5.70, SD = 2.26; shame M = 5.51, SD = 2.02) than in the task irrelevant condition (embarrassment M = 4.49, SD = 2.55; shame M = 4.05, SD = 2.56). In other words, although the emotion manipulation was successful, relevance too increased perceptions of both embarrassment and shame. There were no significant interaction effects.

Relevance. The only significant effects in the analyses of relevance manipulation check item were the intended main effects of relevance, F (1, 157) = 63.08, p < .001, η_p^2 = .29. Means indicated that participants reported that the proposer's offer was more influenced by events related to the task in the task relevance condition than in the task irrelevance condition (task relevance M = 6.55, SD = 1.45 and task irrelevance M = 4.52, SD = 1.77). Thus, the manipulation of relevance was successful and was not confounded with the emotion manipulation.


Dependent measures

Acceptance of offers. I did two separate chi-squares to assess the effect of emotion and relevance on acceptance of offers. Participants accepted more offers in the task irrelevant condition (74%) compared to task relevant condition (54%),

$\chi^2(1, N = 161) = 7.21$, $p = .007$. Based on the odds ratio, the odds of participants accepting more offers in the task irrelevant condition was 2.46 times higher than in the task relevant condition. This effect was in the opposite direction to that predicted by hypothesis 1a, which was therefore rejected. Acceptance of offers did not differ significantly in the different emotion conditions, so hypothesis 2c was not confirmed.


Satisfaction with offers. I ran an ANOVA to assess effects of relevance and emotion on satisfaction with offers. The results indicated that there was no main effect of either emotion or relevance. Thus, hypotheses 1b and 2a were not confirmed. There was, however, a significant interaction between emotion and relevance, $F(1, 157) = 7.11$, $p = .008$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$. There was a significant simple main effect of relevance, such that satisfaction was significantly higher in the task relevant shame condition than in the task relevant embarrassment condition, $F(1, 157) = 4.31$, $p = .040$ but there was no significant difference between the emotions in the task irrelevant condition (see Figure 5.1 for the means). Thus, hypotheses 3a and 3c were supported. The analysis also showed that satisfaction with offers was significantly higher in the task irrelevant embarrassment condition than in the task relevant embarrassment condition, $F(1, 157) = 4.67$, $p = .032$, which was not predicted. Other comparisons were not significant.

Figure 5.1: Interaction between Emotion and Relevance on Satisfaction with Offers. Error bars represent standard error.



Fairness of offers. There was no main effect of either emotion or relevance on fairness of offers, so hypotheses 1c and 2b were not supported. However, as with satisfaction with offers, there was a significant interaction between emotion and relevance, F (1, 157) = 5.02, p = .026, η_p^2 = .03. The means relevant to this interaction are shown in Figure 5.2. The simple main effects of relevance was not significant so hypotheses 3b and 3c were not supported. However, as with satisfaction, fairness was rated higher in the task irrelevant embarrassment condition than the task relevant embarrassment condition, but lower in the task irrelevant shame condition than the task relevant shame condition. Other comparisons were not significant.


Figure 5.2: Interaction between Relevance and Emotion on Fairness of Offers. Error bars represent standard error.



Participants' offers. There was only a main effect of emotion on participants' subsequent offer to proposers such that participants offered more to proposers who expressed shame than embarrassment, F (1, 157) = 6.39, p = .012, η_p^2 = .04, (embarrassment M = 41.36, SD = 14.18, and shame M = 48.43, SD = 20.44), supporting hypothesis 2d. There was no main effect of relevance and no interaction so hypothesis 1d was not supported.


Liking the proposer. There was no main effect of either emotion or relevance on liking/disliking the proposer, so hypothesis 4 was not supported. However, similar to satisfaction and fairness of offers, there was a significant interaction, F (1, 157) = 5.17, p = .024, η_p^2 = .03. Simple effects analysis of the means showed that participants liked partners in the task relevant shame condition significantly more than in the task relevant embarrassment condition, F (1, 157) = 4.97, p = .027. Other comparisons were not significant. This interaction was not predicted but the pattern of results is similar to that of satisfaction with offers and fairness of offers. Means relevant to this interaction are shown in Figure 5.3.

Figure 5.3: Interaction between Relevance and Emotion on Liking the Proposer. Error bars represent standard error.



Prosocial ratings. Univariate tests revealed no significant main effects of either emotion or relevance on prosocial ratings, so hypothesis 4 was not supported. There was a significant interaction between emotion and relevance, F (1, 157) = 6.40, p = .012, η_p^2 = .04, but it was not predicted. The pattern of results was similar to the one found for liking the proposer, satisfaction and fairness of offers. Simple effects analysis showed that the simple main effect of relevance was only significant in the task irrelevant condition, as participants rated partners in the task irrelevant embarrassment condition to be more prosocial than those in the task irrelevant shame condition, F (1, 157) = 6.90, p = .009 but there was no significant difference between shame and embarrassment in the task relevant condition. This interaction was not predicted. Means relevant to this interaction are shown in Figure 5.4.

Figure 5.4: Interaction between Relevance and Emotion on Ratings of Proposer's Prosociality. Error bars represent standard error.



Self-reported emotions. Univariate analysis showed no significant effect of emotion, relevance, or interaction effect on self-reported sympathy, embarrassment, or shame, the emotions of interest in this study.

Mediated moderation. I conducted mediated moderation analysis using the bootstrapping procedure developed by Preacher and Hayes (2004) to investigate the effect of emotion and relevance on satisfaction with offers. I did this analysis for exploratory purpose since I did not have any predictions about the mediators (liking and prosocial ratings) mediating the interaction (I only predicted a simple mediation). So, I performed these analyses on the two dependent variables which showed an interaction – satisfaction of offers and fairness of offers. I used orthogonal contrasts to code the independent variables (embarrassment was coded as 1 and shame as -1, and task relevance was coded as 1 and task irrelevance was coded as -1). Then I obtained a product of emotion and relevance which was used as an independent variable in all calculations. All analyses used a bootstrap test with 5000 iterations and yielded a 95% bias corrected confidence interval. The data are presented in Table 5.2.

Table 5.2

Results of mediated moderation by liking the proposer and prosocial ratings on satisfaction with offers

	Coefficients				SE	Bootstrapping Bias Corrected Confidence Intervals	
	Path a	Path b	Path c	Path c'		Lower	Upper
Liking the proposer	-.25*	2.96**	-4.33**	-1.19 (ns)	.49	-2.19	-.11
Prosocial ratings	-.24*	5.33***	-4.33**	-1.19 (ns)	.67	-3.00	-.29

Note: *** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$

As can be seen from Table 5.2, liking the proposer and prosocial ratings do seem to mediate the effect of the predictor (interaction term between emotion and relevance) on satisfaction of offers (the confidence interval does not contain zero).

Table 5.3

Results of mediated moderation by liking the proposer and prosocial ratings on fairness of offers

	Coefficients				SE	Bootstrapping Bias Corrected Confidence Intervals	
	Path a	Path b	Path c	Path c'		Lower	Upper
Liking the proposer	-.25*	7.56***	-4.66**	-2.76 (ns)	.91	-3.88	-.30
Prosocial ratings	-.24*	7.16***	-4.66*	-2.90 (ns)	.80	-3.72	-.47

Note: *** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$

As can be seen from Table 5.3, liking the proposer and prosocial ratings also mediate the effect of the predictor (moderator term of emotion x relevance) on fairness of offers.

Null effects. There was no effect of emotion or relevance on likelihood that the proposer would subsequently accept the participants' offer. There was no evidence of mediation by self-reported sympathy, prosociality or liking, therefore hypotheses 4a, 4b, 5a, 5b, and 6 were not confirmed.

Discussion

The results showed that the manipulations worked well. Participants accepted more offers in the task irrelevant condition than task relevant condition. They also offered more to partners in the shame condition than in the embarrassment condition. The same pattern of results was found for satisfaction with offers, fairness of offers, liking the proposer, and prosocial ratings of the proposer, which showed that participants were more positive in the task irrelevant embarrassment and task relevant shame conditions than in the task relevant embarrassment and task irrelevant shame conditions. Exploratory analysis showed that prosocial ratings and liking the proposer mediated the effect of emotion x relevance on satisfaction of offers (and fairness of offers). All these results and interesting interactions are discussed below.

Relevance. Results showed that participants accepted more offers in the task irrelevant condition than in the task relevant condition; an effect that runs in the opposite direction to my hypothesis. This could be because participants considered the emotional expression in the task irrelevant condition to be more

authentic. It is also possible that participants considered emotional displays in the task relevant condition to be more strategic. During the course of the study, participants were told that a random selection of the proposer's answers (the manipulations) would be shown to the participants. It was implied that the proposers did not know that their answers (manipulations) would be shared but it is possible that the participants did not remember this information. Also, I did not include any measure of whether participants retained this information or not. So, in Study 6 the same hypotheses regarding relevance was tested with one change – it was highlighted that proposers did not know that their responses (the manipulations) would be shared with anyone at the time of writing. This enables me to rule out the possibility that participants accepted more offers in the task irrelevant condition because they were suspicious of the intentions behind the proposers' emotional displays.

The results showed no effect of relevance on other dependent variables – satisfaction of offers, fairness of offers and the offers made by the participants. It is possible that there is no direct effect of relevance on any of these variables and the effect exists only in terms of interaction with emotion. However, since I do have strong theoretical reasons to predict these effects, the same predictions will be investigated in Study 6 as well.

Emotion. Results showed that participants made bigger offers to ashamed partners than to embarrassed partners. This was expected and could be because making bigger offers was participants' way of acknowledging and absolving the proposers of their shame. Keltner et al. (1997) found (in Studies 3 and 4), that expressions of shame elicited sympathy in two different situations (tripping in

public in Study 3 and failing in a class presentation in Study 4). They theorized that sympathy in response to shame could motivate helping behaviour in observers as it could help alleviate the more serious flaws related to shame. Although sympathy did not mediate this relationship, it could be that participants still acknowledged the proposers' ashamed reaction but by another means (such as acceptance of the apology). Here it is important to keep in mind that the emotion manipulation was affected by relevance, such that participants rated the target emotion higher in the task relevant condition than task irrelevant condition.

Emotion did not have any hypothesized significant effects (other than on participants' offer). One possible explanation is that the effectiveness of the emotion manipulation was moderated by relevance. Further, there was no control condition in this study, which made comparisons with a baseline condition impossible. Moreover, there was also another issue with emotion manipulation in this study. The contextual information for the task relevant condition was identical across both emotion conditions. However, this was not the case for the task irrelevant condition (as for task relevant embarrassment, the situation was about tripping in public and for task irrelevant shame, the situation was about failing to submit work on time). Therefore, there is a possibility that respondents judged these two situations differently – one involving attribution to external factors (embarrassment situation) and the other involving attribution to internal factors (shame situation). Study 6's relevance manipulation was therefore altered so that the contexts for both task-irrelevant emotions were identical. I also included a control condition in addition to the two previous emotion conditions involving shame and embarrassment.

Interaction between emotion and relevance. The results also showed that participants in task relevant shame condition were more satisfied with offers than task relevant embarrassment condition, supporting my prediction. This could be because task relevant shame conveyed a stronger apology and desire to make amends following low offers than task relevant embarrassment. There were also similar significant interaction effects between emotion and relevance affecting both satisfaction with offers and fairness of offers, in a pattern that was unpredicted. Exploratory analysis using liking the proposer and prosocial ratings as dependent variables also showed similar results. This suggests that participants were more satisfied with, liked their partners more, rated their partners as more prosocial and rated offers as fairer in the task irrelevant embarrassment and task relevant shame conditions than task relevant embarrassment and task irrelevant shame conditions.

Leary, Landel, and Patton (1996) found that embarrassment is used to project a desirable social image. If hindered from expressing it, people use direct impression management tactics in order to show sensitivity to social norms. Thus, embarrassed people seem to be conscious of their public image. Correspondingly, it is possible that observers infer that embarrassed others are concerned about their social standing. If so, it is possible that participants evaluated partners in the task irrelevant embarrassment condition more favourably because they were showing sensitivity to social norms. However, in the task relevant condition, being concerned about social standing (as conveyed by embarrassment) could have been considered as an inadequate response to the harm that partners had directly caused to participants. Embarrassment may have communicated that the partner was more concerned about their public image than repairing the damage inflicted on the

participant himself or herself. This would explain why participants were not favourably inclined towards partners in the task irrelevant embarrassment condition.

Previous research has shown that shame conveys apology (Miller & Tangney, 1994; Stearns & Parrott, 2012). Shame also communicates that a person is repentant about his or her actions and feels accountable for the shame-inducing event (Tangney et al., 1996). Thus, it seems possible that participants in the task relevant shame condition were more understanding towards ashamed proposers who apparently held themselves accountable for low offers and felt sorry about those offers. Shame may have indicated that the proposer acknowledged his or her earlier unfair behaviour and felt remorseful about it, which could have prompted a more positive evaluation of that proposer. However, in the task irrelevant shame condition, shame may have communicated that the proposer was dissatisfied with himself or herself more generally and may therefore have drawn participants' attention to possible personal failings of the ashamed person. This could have happened because the ashamed expression was neither related to the context nor had any relevance to the participants (since it was about an unrelated event). Instead attention would have been drawn to the shameful acts and unfavourable aspects of the proposer's personality, which could have led to a more negative evaluation. Another reason could be that the statements used to communicate task relevant shame could have implied moral wrongs (of being unfair) whereas the task irrelevant shame condition could have implications about the competence of the person (of submitting essays late). So, participants could have reacted more favourably to proposers in the task relevant shame condition as shame is a

congruent response for moral transgressions (Keltner & Buswell, 1997) but not for incompetent behaviour.

This pattern accorded with predictions based on the idea that participants would pay less attention to the distinction between emotions in the task irrelevant condition (since it was not useful in the given context) than in the task relevant condition. There was no significant difference between shame and embarrassment in satisfaction with offers or perceived fairness of offers in the task irrelevant condition. However, there was a significant difference between emotions in satisfaction with offers, but not in fairness of offers, in the task relevant condition. Thus, the predicted interaction was confirmed for one out of two dependent variables. These results increase confidence in my assumption that the interpersonal effect of emotions is due to the informational content of these emotions. Study 6 provides another test of the hypothesis that emotion has relatively stronger effects when it is relevant to the task.

I also performed exploratory analyses to check if liking the proposer and prosociality ratings mediated the interactive effect of emotion and relevance on satisfaction with offers (and fairness of offers). The results supported this mediational account, suggesting that participants were more satisfied with proposers' offers and rated them as fairer in the task irrelevant embarrassment and task relevant shame conditions because they liked the proposers more in those conditions and considered them to be more prosocial. Although this result was not predicted, it suggests interesting questions for future research. Study 6 attempted to replicate these effects and thereby increase confidence in the validity of my conclusions. It is important to acknowledge that prosocial ratings and liking did not

mediate the effect of emotion on satisfaction of offers or fairness of offers, as hypothesized. This could be because the mediation applied to the moderated effect of the emotion manipulation rather than its direct effect. However, this prediction will be investigated again in Study 6.

Self-reported emotions. Self-reported sympathy did not mediate the effect of emotion on acceptance of offers and participants' own offer, as predicted. It is possible that self-reported sympathy is not a strong mediator in this context, and so it will not be investigated in Study 6.

Study 6

Study 6 was an extension of Study 5 and was designed principally to replicate the results. However, Study 6 also differed from Study 5 in a number of ways. First, I added a control condition to help assess whether any differences between shame and embarrassment conditions depend on the effect of shame, embarrassment or both. Second, I changed the emotional manipulation statements. In Study 5, to manipulate both shame and embarrassment in the task irrelevant condition, different situations were used. Although the manipulations worked, the background information used for both shame and embarrassment was different. For task irrelevant embarrassment, the participants learned that the proposer tripped and fell down in front of a few people, and for task irrelevant shame, the proposer was described as being late in submitting assignments. Therefore, I cannot be entirely sure whether differences between these conditions depended on the emotion or the situation. So, in Study 6, the same situation was used in both task irrelevant embarrassment and task irrelevant shame conditions and only the emotion words

were altered. I hoped that this would allow me to draw firmer conclusions regarding the efficacy of emotion manipulations.

In Study 6, as already mentioned, a control condition was also added. In the control condition the emotional expression was neutral. Since lay theories about negotiations imply that competitive bargaining situations requires a lack of emotion (see Kopelman, Rosette, & Thompson, 2006), I hypothesized that participants in the control condition would rate the proposer as most likeable, most prosocial and would also be most satisfied with them and consider them to be most fair, compared to the other two conditions. Although, both shame and embarrassment evoke affiliative reactions from observers (Keltner et al, 1997), people expressing these emotions in bargaining situations are likely to provoke less positive reactions. Keltner et al., (1997) have shown that embarrassment evokes more playful responses from observers (such as jokes and laughter) and shame evokes sympathy. However, I think that both these emotions still communicate that certain norms have been violated or social transgressions have occurred. Therefore, I predicted that controls would be rated most favourably, embarrassed partners next and ashamed partners least favourably in terms of liking and prosociality. I also predicted the same pattern for satisfaction with offers and fairness of offers. In addition, I predicted that liking and prosocial ratings would mediate the effect of emotion on satisfaction with offers (and fairness of offers), as in Study 5.

However, while accepting offers and making offers to others, I expected that control partners would be favoured the least, then embarrassed partners and ashamed partners would be favoured the most. This is because, I expected that control

partners would not signal any apology for making low offers, so their offers would be rejected more and they would be made smaller offers.

Study Aims

The aims of Study 6 are the same as those in Study 5, with minor modifications to reflect the addition of the control condition.

1. Similar to Study 5, I expected that participants in the task relevant condition would accept more offers (Hypothesis 1a), express more satisfaction with offers (Hypothesis 1b), rate offers as more fair (Hypothesis 1c) and make larger offers when it was their turn to be proposers (Hypothesis 1d) than participants in the task irrelevant condition.
2. Again, similar to Study 5, for satisfaction with offers, I expected participants to be most satisfied with control participants, then embarrassed participants and least satisfied with ashamed participants (Hypothesis 2a). For fairness of offers (Hypothesis 2b), I expected the same pattern as with satisfaction with offers. For acceptance of offers, I expected that participants would accept most offers from ashamed partners, then embarrassed partners and least with control partners (Hypothesis 2c). I expected the same pattern as acceptance of offers, for making bigger offers too (Hypothesis 2d).
3. Similar to Study 5, I also expected an interaction between emotion and relevance such that participants in the task relevant condition would be more satisfied with offers (Hypothesis 3a) and rate offers as more fair (Hypothesis 3b) when dealing with ashamed partners than embarrassed or partners in neutral condition, and I expected this difference to be greater in

the task relevant condition than in the task irrelevant condition (Hypothesis 3c).

4. Similar to Study 5, I predicted that participants would rate control partners most favourably, then embarrassed partners and ashamed partners least favourably (Hypothesis 4) – in terms of prosociality and liking their partners. I also expected that the ratings of prosociality would mediate the effect of emotion on satisfaction with offers (Hypothesis 4a) and fairness of offers (Hypothesis 4b). I also expected that liking will mediate the effect of emotion on satisfaction with offers (Hypothesis 5a) and fairness of offers (Hypothesis 5b), similar to Study 5.

Method

Participants and experimental design. This study was conducted online and participants were recruited from universities in Oxford and Hong Kong. Two hundred and three people participated and 141 were female and 62 were male. Forty-one percent were Chinese, 27% were British and the rest were from 13 other countries. The mean age of participants was 21.24 years (*SD* = 3.92). Eighty-five percent of participants were in full time education, 9% were employed part time, and 6% were unemployed. They were entered into a lottery for five £20 prizes. Participants who guessed the hypotheses of the study or who guessed correctly that the other player was not a genuine person were dropped from the study (n = 40).

Design. This study had a 3 (Emotion: Embarrassment, Shame, and Control) x 2 (Relevance: Task relevant and Task irrelevant) between subjects design. The main dependent measures were the same as Study 5 – acceptance or rejection of offer, satisfaction with the offer, fairness of offer and participant's offer to the proposer.

The numbers of participants in each cell created by the factorial design varied (due to the random allocation procedure) from 29 to 36.

Procedure. The procedure was the same as that used in Study 5. The only difference was that the emotion manipulation had three rather than two levels because a control condition was added to the shame and embarrassment conditions used in Study 5. Four different filler questions were used before the participants received the manipulations: "If you are the receiver, what kind of offer would you like to receive? Why?", "Do you know anything about games such as these? And if so, what do you know about them?", "What were you doing just before starting this game?" and "What are your thoughts about the game that you are going to play?" These questions were used to enhance the experimental realism of the task in the light of the slightly altered manipulations.

Manipulations. The manipulations used in Study 6 were in the form of statements that contained information about the emotion felt by the proposer as well as relevance of the emotion, similar to Study 5. They are described in detail in Table 6.1. All the statements included punctuation errors to enhance experimental realism.

Table 6.1

Statements used for emotion manipulation that were shown to the participants

	Embarrassment condition	Shame condition	Control condition
Task relevant	I am feeling embarrassed right now. I am thinking about the offer that I have proposed and feel so embarrassed and uncomfortable about it. However it is done now.	I am feeling ashamed right now. I am thinking about the offer that I have proposed and feel so ashamed and uncomfortable about it. However it is done now.	I am thinking about the offer that I have proposed. However it is done now.
Task irrelevant	I am feeling embarrassed right now. Just before starting this game I accidentally sent some personal pictures of myself to an acquaintance instead of my friend. I feel so embarrassed and uncomfortable right now about what was there in the picture.	I am feeling ashamed right now. Just before starting this game I accidentally sent some personal pictures of myself to an acquaintance instead of my friend. I feel so ashamed and uncomfortable right now about what was there in the picture.	Just before starting this game I sent some pictures of myself to a friend.

Measures. The measures used in Study 6 were identical to those used in Study 5 except for a few changes that are highlighted here. As in Study 5, the two relevance check items significantly correlated (r (203) =- .35, $p < .001$) and so a single score was obtained (by reverse coding the task irrelevant item and combining it with the task relevant item). The alpha value for prosocial items was .81. The same eleven emotions except for guilty were used in this study to assess self-reported emotions as in Study 5.

Results

Manipulation checks

***Emotion*.** Similar to Study 5, I ran two separate ANOVAs on ratings of shame and embarrassment. Results indicated a significant main effect of emotion on embarrassment, F (2, 197) = 7.41, p = .001, η_p^2 = .07. Paired comparisons using Bonferroni's correction showed that participants only distinguished control from the other two conditions (control M = 3.76, SD = 2.18, embarrassment M = 5.19, SD = 2.25, and shame M = 4.52, SD = 2.29), but there was no significant difference between the shame and embarrassment conditions. The results also showed that participants rated proposers in the task relevant condition as showing more embarrassment than those in the task irrelevant condition, F (1, 197) = 11.69, p = .001, η_p^2 = .06 (task relevant M = 5.03, SD = 2.29, and task irrelevant M = 3.98, SD = 2.21). There was no significant interaction effect.

The ANOVA of shame ratings revealed a similar pattern of results. Participants reported that proposers expressed less shame in the control condition than either of the other two conditions, F (2, 197) = 6.91, p = .001, η_p^2 = .06, (control M = 3.40,

SD = 2.26, embarrassment *M* = 4.53, *SD* = 2.16, and shame *M* = 4.69, *SD* = 2.36). However, there was no significant difference between shame and embarrassment conditions. Therefore, the results suggest that the emotion manipulation did not successfully distinguish participants' perceptions of shame and embarrassment.

Relevance. Participants reported that the proposer's emotions were more influenced by events related to the task in the task relevant condition than in the task irrelevant condition, F (1, 197) = 32.04, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .14$ (task relevant *M* = 6.20, *SD* = 1.47 and task irrelevant *M* = 5.02, *SD* = 1.64). There was no significant effect of emotion or any interaction effect. Thus, the relevance manipulation was successful. The neutral condition was excluded from this analysis since no emotions were expressed in the neutral condition.


Dependent variables. Results showed no significant effect on acceptance of offers, satisfaction with offers, fairness of offers, or participants' offers to the proposer. Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 were not supported. There were no significant effects on liking or disliking the proposer, or on prosocial ratings and no evidence of prosocial ratings and liking mediating the effect of emotion on satisfaction with offers (or fairness of offers). Thus, hypotheses 4 and 5 were not supported.

Self-reported emotions. There were no significant univariate effects of emotion on self-reported embarrassment or shame.

Likelihood of acceptance/rejection of participants' offer. I ran an ANOVA to test the effect of emotion and relevance on the perceived likelihood that the proposer would accept/reject their offer. There was no main effect of emotion or relevance on the likelihood of acceptance/rejection. However, there was an

interaction effect, F (2, 197) = 7.34, p = .001, η_p^2 = .07 (see Figure 6.1 for relevant means). Simple effects analysis showed that participants in the task irrelevant shame condition felt that the likelihood of acceptance of their offers was significantly higher than in the task irrelevant embarrassment condition, F (2, 197) = 5.64, p = .004.

Figure 6.1: Interaction between Relevance and Emotion on Ratings of Likelihood of Acceptance. Error bars represent standard error.



Discussion

The results showed that the emotion manipulation did not work as intended, and that participants distinguished shame and embarrassment conditions from the neutral conditions but did not distinguish shame and embarrassment from each other. However, the relevance manipulation worked well. There were no effects of emotion and relevance on the dependent variables – acceptance of offers, satisfaction with offers, fairness of offers, and participants' offers to the proposers. Further, there were no significant main effects on liking the proposer or prosocial ratings. However, a significant interaction between emotion and relevance affected the likelihood of acceptance of offers. This interaction showed that participants were more confident about their offers being accepted in the task irrelevant shame

condition compared to the task irrelevant embarrassment condition. These results are discussed below.

Emotion manipulation. In contrast to Study 5, Study 6's manipulation check items assessing participants' perceptions of the other player's shame and embarrassment failed to distinguish between shame and embarrassment conditions, although they did distinguish both of these conditions from the control condition. This could reflect the nature of the sample used in this study. In Study 5, participants were personally recruited by people they knew (since the study was conducted as part of a teaching module and students were required to collect data), whereas in Study 6, participants were recruited anonymously. Thus, participants in Study 5 may have been more motivated and attentive than those in Study 6. This could have resulted in Study 6 participants not reading the manipulation carefully or not recalling them later, which could explain the failure to distinguish between shame and embarrassment conditions. It is also possible that participants did not fully understand the distinction between the different emotions, as participants were also recruited from Hong Kong, where English is not the first language. In Study 5, all the participants were students at British universities.

Relevance manipulation. The relevance manipulation worked well since participants did rate partner's emotions being more relevant in the task relevant condition than in the task irrelevant condition. However, the relevance manipulation did not have the predicted effect on most of the dependent variables. This could be because as seen in Study 5, the most consistent pattern of results was an interaction between emotion and relevance. In this study the participants failed to distinguish between the different emotions and so, it is possible that in the

absence of the salience of emotions, relevance of emotions did not have any predicted effect. The significant interaction between emotion and relevance on likelihood of acceptance of offers (discussed below) suggests that participants did distinguish between shame and embarrassment at some level. However, since this interaction was only significant in this study and there was no other significant result, this result should be interpreted cautiously.

Likelihood of acceptance of offers. Results showed an effect of the interaction between emotion and relevance on the likelihood of participants' offers being accepted. Participants felt more confident that their offers would be accepted in the task irrelevant shame condition than the task irrelevant embarrassment condition. It is possible that participants in the task irrelevant shame condition felt that someone who has a low opinion of themselves (as indicated by their shame) would be more willing to accept offers from them compared to the other condition. However, it would be prudent to exercise caution in interpreting this result as the emotion manipulation check did not confirm full differentiation of the two emotions. More research will be needed to confirm this finding.

There was no effect of emotion or relevance on acceptance of offers, satisfaction with offers, fairness of offers, participants' own offers, liking the proposer, and prosocial ratings. This could be because the participants did not differentiate between shame and embarrassment and so the predicted effects were not confirmed.

General Discussion

Studies 5 and 6 represent the first attempt to investigate the effects of shame, embarrassment, and the relevance of these emotions on bargaining outcomes. The results of Study 5 showed that participants accepted more offers in the task irrelevant condition than the task relevant condition, and made larger offers to proposers in the shame condition than the embarrassment condition. There was also a significant interaction between emotion and relevance showing that participants were more satisfied, considered proposers' offers to be fairer and more prosocial, and liked proposers more in the task irrelevant embarrassment condition and the task relevant shame conditions. These results point to the different appraisals and action tendencies conveyed by these two emotions, which along with the contextual information regarding relevance of emotion, had promising effects on various measures. The emotion manipulation in Study 6 did not work and this may explain why the results of Study 5 were not replicated.

Conclusion

These two studies were the first studies to attempt to explore the effect of shame and embarrassment on bargaining outcomes. Although the results of Study 6 were not very encouraging, Study 5 showed some interesting findings which could be useful for future inquiry.

CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In this final chapter, I summarise and draw conclusions about the research presented in this thesis. I discuss the key findings in terms of the research aims of this thesis. First, I discuss results pertaining to the five emotions investigated here – anger, contempt, sadness, embarrassment, and shame. Second, I consider results relating to status and relevance – the other two predictors used. Third, I examine the mediation and moderation pathways investigated in my studies. Finally, I review limitations of the studies reported in this thesis and suggest future directions for research in the field of emotions in negotiations.

This thesis has investigated the effect of emotions on negotiation outcomes. As discussed in chapter 1, my research has been influenced by the social functional view and especially by the emotions as social influence (EASI) model. The aim of this thesis was to extend the literature on emotions in negotiation by investigating novel emotions, new variables related to the emotions of interest, and pathways that might explain the effects of these emotions on negotiation decisions.

The studies presented in this thesis may be grouped into two clusters, based on the methodology deployed and the emotions studied. Studies 1-4 form one cluster and Studies 5 and 6 form another. In the six studies presented here, I have investigated effects of five emotions (contempt, anger, sadness, shame, and embarrassment), and of status and relevance of emotions on negotiation outcomes. In addition, my research has addressed the relationship between emotions and other variables such as power distance orientation, social dominance orientation, Big Five personality factors, liking and prosocial ratings. The following section will discuss the results according to the research aims distinguished in chapter 1, which are:

1. Research Aim 1: To contribute to the growing literature of emotions in negotiations by investigating a wider set of commonly occurring emotions – anger, contempt, sadness, shame, and embarrassment.
2. Research Aim 2: To investigate effects of other relevant but hitherto under-researched factors, such as status and relevance of emotions in the context of emotions in negotiations.
3. Research Aim 3: To study the effects of a range of moderators and mediators not considered before such as power distance orientation, social dominance orientation, prosocial ratings, liking and personality factors so as to enhance our understanding of the pathways that connect emotions and negotiation outcomes.

Findings regarding Emotions

Effects of Emotions on Concessions

The first aim of this thesis was to study a wider range of commonly occurring emotions, than those that have been previously researched. So, in the first set of studies, I investigated the effects of anger, contempt, and sadness and in the second set of studies, I investigated the effects of embarrassment and shame. The guiding assumption was that anger, sadness, contempt, embarrassment, and shame are unique emotions with their own distinct appraisals and action tendencies, which are perceived as such by the observer.

Contempt, anger, and sadness. The main consistent finding across the first four studies was that more concessions were made to angry partners than to contemptuous partners. Study 1 was the first study to report it and Studies 3 and 4

replicated this finding. To my knowledge, no previous research has demonstrated this effect. This finding was predicted and is consistent with the core tenets of the social functionalist account regarding action tendencies and appraisals that different emotions convey. Anger signals that a desirable goal cannot be reached and contempt signals a disapproval of the person (Fischer & Roseman, 2007). In the context of the present research, anger communicated that the negotiating partner was dissatisfied with the offers and therefore the partners responded by giving more concessions. However, contempt signalled that the partner was dissatisfied with the person, which could not be remedied by providing more concessions, and so fewer concessions were made. This pattern of results is also consistent with the EASI's model inferential route – that participants paid attention to the information communicated through emotions. Here, it is important to mention that study 2 did not replicate this result, probably because participants were under too much time pressure to process the emotional information thoroughly (see chapter 2).

Sadness did not have any significant effect on concessions compared to anger and contempt conditions as evident from the pattern of results in Studies 2 and 3. Studying contempt, sadness, and anger together in the same study gave me an opportunity to study the unique effects of each of these negatively-valenced emotions in the same setting, with the idea that differences between the emotions would point to emotion-specific effects rather than effects that depend only on certain aspects of the emotion that are shared with other emotions (for example, person or offer directedness of the emotion). However, the failure of sadness to show any significant effect on concessions point towards the context-dependence of emotions in interpersonal setting. It seems that the difference (or lack of difference)

in the effect of sadness from those of anger and contempt may reflect the fact that the difference between anger and contempt depended, to a certain extent, on the person-directedness of contempt. However, sadness can be either person or behaviour directed, and so the difference of the other emotions compared to sadness was not as pronounced as was expected. In future, a more powerful study could be used to detect this difference. It is also possible to explore the boundary conditions of the effect of sadness on negotiation outcomes, by investigating the context in which sadness is expressed. It seems probable that akin to disappointment (see Van Doorn et al., 2014), sadness also evokes contradictory reactions from observers. For example, sadness signals a plea for help (Clark et al., 1987), and so in competitive bargaining situations, it could lead to fewer concessions whereas in cooperative bargaining situations, it could lead to more concessions. It is also possible to use other comparison emotions that draw out the differences between the emotions in a particular context. Previous studies have used disgust as a comparison emotion to study economic decision making (Lerner, Small, & Loewenstein, 2004; Moretti & Di Pellegrino, 2010) because of the different action tendencies associated with sadness and disgust (sadness is associated with withdrawal but disgust is associated with a desire to expel the cause of disgust, Lerner et al., 2004). In summary, the absence of the effect of sadness on negotiation outcomes compared to other emotions, draws attention to the importance of context in which emotions are communicated. I would argue that discrete emotions do provide unique information (as shown by the difference between anger and contempt on concessions), but the effects cannot be isolated from the wider setting in which the emotions unfold.

Shame and embarrassment. Studies 5 and 6 explored the effects of shame and embarrassment on bargaining outcomes. The predictions were again rooted in the social functionalist tradition that both shame and embarrassment convey different information and the observers would understand and react to that distinctiveness. Although the findings of Study 5 were promising, Study 6 failed to replicate most of them, probably because the manipulation of emotion information was unsuccessful (as revealed by manipulation checks). The discussion here therefore mainly focuses on the results of Study 5, which will need to be confirmed by future research.

The most interesting and consistent set of findings from Study 5 was that participants were more satisfied with their partners, liked them more, rated them as more prosocial and rated the offers as fairer in task irrelevant embarrassment and task relevant shame conditions than in task relevant embarrassment and task irrelevant shame conditions. In other words, the interpersonal effects that I found were not specific to the emotion but depended on both on the emotion and its object in a context-dependent fashion. Although these specific results were not predicted, they seem to fall into a meaningful pattern. As already discussed, participants may have reacted more favourably to task irrelevant embarrassment because they thought the embarrassed person showed sensitivity to social norms outside the experimental situation. However, partners in the task relevant embarrassment condition could have seemed overly concerned with social norms rather than showing sincere apology for an act directly conflicting with participants' own goals, and therefore may not have been evaluated favourably. As for task relevant shame, participants may have reacted more favourably to the apology for

the personally relevant misbehaviour conveyed through shame whereas in the task irrelevant shame condition, participants' attention could have been drawn to the shameful things that the partner had apparently done outside the laboratory. To assess this specific interpretation, it is important to conduct further research collecting more detailed information about the inferences participants' draw (and attributions that they make) about their partners' emotions and behaviour in and outside the laboratory.

The pattern of results also illustrates the importance of focusing on contextual information as shame and embarrassment seem to have an impact on bargaining outcomes, but only when contextual information (relevance of emotions) is also provided. Future research could also investigate the effects of other such factors including culture, intensity of emotional expressions, and intensity of emotions.

Study 5's results also supported the prediction that bigger offers would be made to ashamed partners than embarrassed partners. This finding was predicted but not replicated in Study 6. However, it does seem to reflect the distinct appraisals that these two emotions generate as shame could have communicated a stronger apology than embarrassment. Further research will be needed to confirm or reject this finding.

In sum, the results presented in this thesis about the effect of emotions on negotiation outcomes add to the literature, and show that some of these effects are context-dependent, while others may be more consistent across contexts.

Effects of Emotions on Self-reported Emotions

There were also some other consistent findings about self-reported emotions across the first cluster of studies. Studies 3 and 4 found that more contempt was experienced with contemptuous partners (also found in Study 1 but not in Study 2) and more anger was experienced with angry partners (not found in Studies 1 and 2). This result is consistent with Van Kleef et al. (2004a) finding that angry outbursts from partners led to more anger in participants. In contrast, in the second set of studies (Studies 5 and 6), participants did not report feeling ashamed or embarrassed when dealing with ashamed and embarrassed partners respectively. So, the affective route mentioned in the EASI model, (Van Kleef, 2009) that has been used as an explanation for previous such findings when self-reported emotions matched the emotions conveyed by the partner (Van Kleef et al., 2004a, 2004b), cannot account for the absence of self-reported shame and embarrassment in Studies 5 and 6.

A more integrated theory to explain the discrepant findings about the presence and absence of self-reported emotions is the appraisal theory of empathy (Wondra & Ellsworth, 2015), which implies that participants could have appraised the situation of their partner rather than emotional experience of the partner. This means that participants interpreted the information that emotions conveyed about the situation rather than simply matching their affective response to that of their partner's. In the current context, both anger and contempt in others produced a similar response in the participants but embarrassment and shame in partners did not produce embarrassment and shame in participants. So, according to the appraisal theory, for contempt, it is possible that participants inferred that their

partners viewed them as worthless (by expressing contempt) and so they too viewed their partner as worthless by feeling contempt for them. They could have felt that only an unworthy person would express contempt for them during a negotiation situation and so they too could have felt contempt in turn for their partner. Similarly, for anger, participants might have considered that their partner's anger indicated frustration about getting a good bargain and they might have felt that their partner too, was hampering them from reaching their goal, and therefore felt anger themselves. However, for embarrassment and shame, it is possible that participants understood why their partners were embarrassed and ashamed but they themselves did not evaluate the situation as embarrassing or shameful and therefore did not feel those emotions. So, for shame (as for embarrassment), the participants could have inferred that the partner was ashamed about an unrelated event or the offer that they made, but there was no reason for the participant to feel ashamed about the task, and so they responded by not feeling ashamed.

In summary, the findings regarding self-reported emotions point to the evaluations and impressions that people make regarding the intentions and situation in which the interaction takes place.

Findings regarding Status and Relevance

Results about Status

The second research aim was to investigate other relevant predictors that are associated with the emotions of interest but have not been researched before. The first such factor that I investigated was status. The assumption was that since people bestow high status others with many favourable attributes such as

competence (Tiedens et al., 2000), better performance (Magee & Galinsky, 2008), expertise and trustworthiness (McKee & Smouse, 1983), this positive effect would also extend the granting of more concessions to high status partners than low status partners in negotiation and bargaining tasks.

The results about status were mixed through the four studies. However, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, this could be due to the way status was manipulated in the first three studies. Study 1 found that more concessions were in fact made to low status partners than to high status partners, contrary to my predictions. However, in this study the status manipulation seemed also to make the institutional identity of the sample (University of Oxford students) salient and this confounded manipulation may explain the reversed pattern of results. In Study 2, the status manipulation was enhanced to remove the unintentional manipulation of identity in Study 1. However, in this study there was no effect of status on concessions. In Study 3, I used a different methodology (based on vignettes instead of direct interaction with a simulated partner) and the status manipulation was adapted accordingly. However, again this study found no effect of status on concessions. Moreover, similar to Study 2, along with status, power was also unintentionally manipulated in this study. So, finally in Study 4, I changed the status manipulation again, to allow independent manipulation of own and partner status. Checks revealed that these manipulations were successful, and the study found evidence of an effect of other status on concessions, such that more concessions were made to high status partners than to low status partners. In this study too, power was unintentionally manipulated, with high status partners also rated higher in power. However, the effect of status on concessions remained significant, even

after controlling for power. In Study 4, then, high status others received more concessions than low status others, which, as mediation analysis showed was because high status others were perceived as more conscientious and agreeable. This finding is potentially important because status is often very easily noticeable in a negotiation setting (for example, through official designation of the partner, location of an office, etc.) but it has not been studied before. Moreover, this result is consistent with my predictions and adds to the literature. These results also show the importance of studying the effects of other status in relation to that of own status rather than define status as a fixed characteristic of the other person. The first three studies manipulated only the status of partner and failed to find any impact on negotiation outcomes but Study 4, which investigated the effect of partner's status relative to the status of the participant, found a significant effect of status on concessions.

Again, consistent with research that demonstrate that high status others are perceived differently, Studies 3 and 4 found that participants perceived high status partners as more emotionally stable, agreeable, conscientious, and open to experience than low status partners (even while controlling for power). Study 4 also found that high status partners were rated as being more extraverted than low status partners. These results add to the literature by extending the positive dimensions on which high status others are rated. Moreover, Study 4 found evidence that agreeableness mediated the effect of status on concessions, while controlling for power. In other words, the results suggest that more concessions were given to high status others because they were perceived to be more agreeable. This shows that not only are high status others perceived more positively, but also

that these perceptions about personality result in better outcomes for them. This finding has wider implications as it seems that status is often considered to be based on a meritocratic system, where high status others are supposed to have desirable personality traits (like being more emotionally stable, agreeable, and conscientious), and fairer than low status others. So, it seems that even in competitive situations where ability and effort should ideally determine outcomes, perceptions about status and hierarchy bias the results in favour of the high status others.

These studies are the first to demonstrate the effect of status on concessions and these additional findings highlight the nature of impressions that high (and low) status people generate. These results also point to the necessity for manipulating status independently of power in order to demonstrate their separate and interactive effects.

Interaction between Status and Emotion

There was no evidence of an interaction between the effects of status and emotion on concessions in the first three studies. However, Study 4 found a significant three-way interaction between the effects of the own status, other status and emotion manipulations. Most concessions were made in the anger condition when own status was low and other status was high. The least concessions were made in the neutral condition when own status was high and other status was low. Although these results are only from one study (out of four), they are still very promising, as only in Study 4, did the status manipulation work as intended. It was only in Study 4 where own and other status was manipulated independently and so the previous studies were not capable of showing this three-way interaction. Literature from

research into in-group bias and status indicate that high status groups are more discriminatory towards low status groups but low status groups show favouritism towards high status groups (see Bettencourt, Charlton, Dorr, & Hume, 2001; Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1987). This is similar to the pattern of results found in Study 4 (although at an interpersonal level) and can be investigated further to help understand conflict resolution and negotiation success. Our attitudes towards status and hierarchy seem to affect our judgements and these judgements can play a vital role in the success and failure of negotiations.

Relevance of Emotions

Relevance of emotions was used as a new independent variable in Studies 5 and 6, based on the assumption that emotions that were related to the task would be seen as more directly relevant and so the apology conveyed by both shame and embarrassment would be attended to more compared to the emotions in task irrelevant condition. However, the results of Study 5 were in the opposite direction to this prediction. This could be because emotions in the task irrelevant condition were considered more authentic. Future research should attempt to clarify this finding. However, irrespective of the direction of the finding, the results do highlight the importance of including relevance as a predictor. Relevance provided contextual information, which added to the richness of the manipulation.

In sum, the findings add to the literature two relevant predictors – status and relevance of emotions, while studying the effect of emotions on negotiations. Suitable and related predictors enhance the experimental realism of studies, while enabling detection of relationships that exist in the real world, as was shown in my studies.

Moderators and Mediators

The final research aim was to discover the pathways through which emotions influence negotiation outcomes. The mediators that I investigated were evaluations of personality factors, prosocial ratings of the other person, and the extent to which partners were liked or disliked. The moderators that I investigated were power distance orientation and social dominance orientation.

Big Five Personality Factors

My research investigated mediational pathways that might explain the effect of emotion on concessions, and Studies 3 and 4 investigated the effect of Big Five personality factors, particularly perceptions of emotional stability, agreeableness, and conscientiousness. Studies 3 and 4 showed that perceptions of emotional stability of the partner mediated the effect of emotions on concessions. This essentially means that participants rated angry partners least emotionally stable, then contemptuous partners and neutral partners as most emotionally stable. These ratings in turn affected the concessions made by the participants. This is the first time that perceptions of personality characteristics have been found to mediate the effect of emotions on concessions. Previous studies have investigated the mediational roles of tracking the opponent's limits and participants' own emotions (Van Kleef et al., 2004a), impressions about competence (Tiedens, 2001), and perceptions of toughness (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006). My thesis adds to this list of mediators by showing that in a negotiation situation, people perceive others in certain way and these evaluations drive the effect of emotions expressed by others on concessions.

Power Dominance Orientation and Social Dominance Orientation

The first three studies found no evidence of moderation by power distance orientation (PDO) or social dominance orientation (SDO). However, Study 4 showed that SDO did moderate the relationship between status and concessions, but in the opposite direction than what was predicted. The results showed when participants reported low SDO (i.e., had a preference for an equal society) and medium SDO, other status had the most effect on concessions. However, when participants expressed high SDO (had a preference for an unequal society), other status had the least effect on concessions. This means that people who had high SDO paid less attention to status differences, which could be because they simply accepted status differences. However, for low and medium SDOs, it is possible that they were more attentive to status differences making them more susceptible to the influence of stereotypes about the association between status and competence. So, even though they gravitated towards equality in society and preferred it, they could still have believed that status was related to competence, which was then reflected in other status having a stronger effect of concessions, for low and medium SDOs.

It is interesting that the moderating effect of SDO was only observed in Study 4 but not in the other studies. It could be that the changed status manipulation, comparing own status versus other's status, allowed the moderating effects of SDO to be detected. However, more work would be needed to further support this finding.

There was no evidence that PDO moderated the effect of status on concessions. I still think that PDO is conceptually aligned with SDO, which is related to attitudes towards hierarchy. It is possible that some studies could have had a restricted range

of values which in turn might have reduced the chance of finding evidence of moderation in the studies. So in future, participants with a wider range of values could be recruited or PDO could be experimentally manipulated to check whether it moderates the effect of status on concessions.

Prosocial Ratings and Liking the Partner

Studies 5 and 6 found no evidence of mediation by prosocial ratings (or liking the partner) of the effects of emotion on satisfaction with offers or perceived fairness of offers. However, there was unexpected but interesting evidence of mediated moderation by prosocial ratings and liking the partner, which showed that these two mediators explained the interactive effect of emotion x relevance on satisfaction with offers and fairness of offers. Participants were satisfied with and considered offers fairer in the task irrelevant embarrassment condition and task relevant shame condition because they considered partners in these two conditions as more prosocial and liked them more than task relevant embarrassment and task irrelevant shame condition. This is an interesting pattern of results and needs further corroboration from future studies. However, this result highlights the usefulness of studying emotion in context and shows how perceptions of partners affect the strength of emotion's influence on concessions. This result, when considered alongside the demonstrated mediation by personality factors, draws attention to the impressions and evaluations that people make while dealing with others. Future research could benefit from insights contained in the rich literature on impression management when further investigating how emotions and impression management can enable people to negotiate effectively.

Implications and Contributions

This thesis has presented results pertaining to four different emotions – anger, contempt, embarrassment, and shame. The first four studies showed that participants gave more concessions to angry others than contemptuous others. Study 5 showed that bigger offers were made to ashamed partners than embarrassed partners. These results together, show that in spite of all these emotions being negative emotions, people differentiated between them. This supports the core assumption of social functional account that emotions are distinct states. A large part of the previous literature has compared positive versus negative emotion, where the possibility of finding a difference is greater (for example, Andrade & Ariely, 2009; Pietroni et al., 2008; Steinel et al., 2008; Van der Schalk et al., 2012; Van Kleef et al., 2004a, 2004b). In my studies, the reported differences in effects of different negative emotions cannot be explained by valence alone.

However, it remains possible, that differences in the perceived intensity of the different negative emotions contributed to their differential effects. For example, contempt may have been perceived as a more intensely negative emotion than anger, and this greater intensity may have led to the reported differences in participants' concessions. Future research needs to find a way of matching the perceived intensity of emotions to permit more direct comparisons between them. Alternatively, intensity of each emotion could be independently manipulated so that its effects could be assessed in addition to those of emotional quality.

This thesis also adds to the EASI model by specifying another pathway through which others' emotions affect our behaviour. The research presented here shows that perceptions about the emotional stability of negotiating partner affect the way

we react in negotiation situations. This is a novel finding and has implications for practice, as expressed emotions are a useful way of forming impressions, attitudes and evaluations about negotiating partners, which in turn affect the negotiation process.

Table 7.1 shows the four different emotions investigated in this thesis, that can be understood in a slightly different grouping compared to how it was grouped here. Shame and contempt can be considered to involve attributions of stable factors. For example, shame results when a person holds their core self responsible for the shame inducing event (Tangney et al., 1996) and contempt results when the object of contempt is deemed inferior and needs be excluded (Melwani & Barsade, 2011). Anger and embarrassment, on the other hand, could be thought of as invoking attributions of temporary factors. For example, embarrassment is a result of temporary social transgressions (Keltner & Buswell, 1997) and anger results when a current goal is blocked and another person is responsible for it (Fischer & Roseman, 2007). So, future studies could look at different combinations of emotions (example, shame and contempt together) or study all of them at the simultaneously to understand how these emotions relate to each other. For example, while comparing shame and contempt together, it is possible that ashamed others get more concessions than contemptuous others, because shame signals that the partner is apologetic whether contempt signals that the partner is unhappy with the person and does not wish to interact with them.

Table 7.1

Table showing the emotions investigated in this thesis

	Attributions involving stable factors	Attributions involving temporary factors
Self focused emotion	Shame	Embarrassment
Other focused emotion	Contempt	Anger

This thesis has also made use of different bargaining tasks. First, in Studies 1 and 2, games involving a mixed-motive element were chosen, where participants could cooperate and compete and had to consider many different alternatives while negotiating. In Studies 3 and 4, vignettes were used, which also employed a bargaining situation. In the last two studies, an ultimatum bargaining game was used. Ultimatum games are one of the most basic ways of studying bargaining behaviour (Güth & Tietz, 1990) and players' behaviour in these games often contradicts the dominant rational actor model often favoured by economists. Although considered to have mixed-motive elements of bargaining (Komorita & Parks, 1995), these games are considered to be one of the most primitive forms of bargaining, thereby helping study negotiations at the most basic level. Other than supporting the chief premise of this thesis, that discrete emotions convey unique information and observers can distinguish between them, these methodologies also helped investigate other factors of importance – status and relevance of emotions.

Another area for future investigation involves systematically investigating whether the emotions have different effects on negotiation outcomes reached in different kinds of task. For example, future studies might compare effects of the same emotions when communicated in a distributive or integrative bargaining task. Such

investigations might potentially reveal that the effects of some emotion depend on the task being undertaken when they are expressed differences. For example, Adam and Brett (2015) demonstrated that anger lead to more concessions in a mixed-motive negotiation context (because it communicated toughness) but fewer concessions in both purely distributive and purely integrative negotiation situations (by eliciting reciprocal anger and/or competitive behaviour).

I also used a budding new platform of data collection that is becoming extremely popular with psychologists – Mturk. Although research has demonstrated that data obtained from MTurks is just as reliable as that obtained from more traditional sources (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Goodman, Cryder, & Cheema, 2013; Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeitrotis, 2010), in my research, 38% of the total participants were excluded from Study 3 and 29% of the total participants were excluded from Study 4. These high exclusion rates suggest that MTurk participants do not always pay a great deal of attention to experimental materials (see also Goodman et al., 2013). For this reason, it is important to include stringent attention and comprehension checks in studies that use participants recruited via MTurk or similar sources. MTurk can be a useful platform that permits rapid and inexpensive data collection – a fact that helps to explain its growing popularity among social psychologists. However, it is also important to exercise caution when designing, conducting, and interpreting studies using Mturk.

Limitations and Future Directions

There are some limitations to my research findings. The research presented here was done either in a laboratory or online and there was no face-to-face interaction between participants in either case. So, even though the aim of this research was to

study interpersonal dynamics of emotions, I had to limit myself to studying the emotions and experiences of individual participants who responded privately. Doing so helped save time, provided experimental control and made recruitment of participants easier. However, future research could benefit from studying emotions in more directly interpersonal settings, where participants are face-to-face. Different techniques such as qualitative methods could be used to gain a deeper understanding of emotions and then traditional quantitative methods can be used to test specific predictions. Researchers could also use other novel techniques such as experience sampling methods (Beal & Weiss, 2003) to understand how emotions in different parties unfolded in real time and in relation to one another. One limitation is also that in the first four studies, participants were from different cultural groups and I did not check if there were any cultural differences in participants' responses, as splitting the sample into different groups would have resulted in very small cell sizes making reliable comparisons difficult. There is a possibility that people from different cultural backgrounds (for example, Indians compared to Americans) respond differently to the same emotional stimuli and so future research should use more homogenous samples to study the effects of emotions on negotiation outcomes.

Another limitation, specifically pertaining to the last two studies, is that data in the sixth study was not replicated. Study 6 did not work and because of time constraints, additional research to replicate the results of Study 5 could not be undertaken. More work with high-powered samples needs to be undertaken to be more confident in the results of Study 5.

A future direction for the investigation of emotion in the context of negotiations could be to study negotiations in real life settings, such as studying a team while they are negotiating. For example, Totterdell and colleagues have investigated the relationship between mood and performance in professional cricketers (Totterdell, 1999; Totterdell & Leach, 2001). This could provide valuable insights into the dynamics of negotiation processes and help determine first-hand the emotions that are expressed and interpreted by others. This kind of research would undoubtedly be quite challenging to pursue. However, with the use of technology (such as video recording) and advanced statistical techniques (such as multilevel analysis) it could be done, and the results from such kinds of research could help triangulate findings from more traditional kinds of research.

Another area could be to study the effects of interpersonal emotions in different negotiation contexts such as marital life, teacher (or parent) – child interactions, employer-employee discussions, etc. The negotiation process in different contexts is bound to be characterised by different rules of engagement and therefore expressing the same emotion in different contexts should have different implications. For example, Gottman and Krokoff (1989) found that expressions of anger during marital conflict were conducive to long-term satisfaction in marriage. In impersonal business negotiations, on the other hand, anger expressions are linked to lower satisfaction and less willingness to have a long-term relationship with the angry person (Van Kleef et al., 2004b). Therefore, studying emotions in varied settings should give us a richer understanding of the socio-relational context that affects the role of emotions in negotiations. This in turn, could be broadened to

study different cultures as well (for example, Adam & Shirako, 2013; Adam et al., 2010)

More research in the area of emotions in negotiations could also help with practical insights into the negotiation process that can help people become better negotiators. In popular media, there have been a few articles about using one's emotions to become better negotiators (such as, Kopelman, 2014; Leary, Pillemer, & Wheeler, 2013). However, currently there is a need for a review article that can consolidate the research done in this area and dispense practical advice on how one can best use their emotions in negotiation contexts. This kind of advice can have a wide audience of entrepreneurs, leaders and even the common person, who can learn to negotiate effectively.

Lastly, more research could be done in identifying other discrete emotions that affect the negotiation process. For example, people could be fearful that their jobs are in danger, a parent could be anxious about the company that his child is keeping, a patient could be hopeful of getting her doctor to switch to a new treatment plan, an entrepreneur could be proud of her start-up while negotiating to sell to another, and each of these emotions might strongly influence the negotiation process. Therefore, it would be useful to expand the purview of emotions being considered for investigation and study the unique characteristics of different discrete emotions. Moreover, studying different emotions in negotiations would also mean that moderators and mediators specific to those particular emotions can be considered to better understand the entire process.

Summary and Conclusion

The research reported in this thesis was undertaken to investigate how emotions affect negotiation outcomes. Emotions and negotiations are both integral parts of our daily lives, and the research produced here show that people use emotions for various purposes. People draw inferences about the personality of their partners, to understand what their partners want in terms of concessions, to understand the context of the negotiation and maybe even to adjust their own goals in a negotiation. This is an extremely dynamic area of enquiry with numerous implications for research and practice. This thesis has investigated and extended the literature to a certain extent by examining different emotions, other relevant predictors and identifying pathways through which emotions affect negotiation decisions.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Power Distance Orientation Scale

This questionnaire was used in Studies 1 – 4.

Instructions: The following questions reflect opinions that you may or may not hold. *Think about your own feelings concerning each of these statements and answer for yourself, not how you think other people would answer.* For each question, place a number in the blank at the right.

1= I strongly disagree with this statement
2 = I slightly disagree with this statement
3 = I neither disagree nor agree with this statement
4 = I slightly agree with this statement
5 = I strongly agree with this statement

1. In most situations managers should make decisions without consulting their subordinates
2. In work-related matters, managers have a right to expect obedience from their subordinates
3. Employees who often question authority sometimes keep their managers from being effective
4. Once a top-level executive makes a decision, people working for the company should not question it
5. Employees should not express disagreements with their managers
6. Managers should be able to make the right decisions without consulting with others
7. Managers who let their employees participate in decisions lose power
8. A company's rules should not be broken, not even when the employee thinks it is in the company's best interest

Appendix B: Social Dominance Orientation Scale

This questionnaire was used in Studies 2 – 4.

Instructions: Which of the following statements do you have a positive or negative feeling towards? Beside each statement, place a number from' 1' to '7' which represents the degree of your positive or negative feeling." The scale was labelled very positive (7), positive (6), slightly positive (5), neither positive nor negative (4), slightly negative (3), negative (2), and very negative (1)

1. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.
2. In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups.
3. It's OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others.
4. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.
5. If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems.
6. It's probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom.
7. Inferior groups should stay in their place.
8. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.
9. It would be good if groups could be equal.
10. Group equality should be our ideal.
11. All groups should be given an equal chance in life.
12. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.
13. Increased social equality.
14. We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally.
15. We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible.
16. No one group should dominate in society.

Items 9-16 were reverse-coded.

Appendix C: Ten Item Personality Inventory (TIPI)

This questionnaire was used in Studies 3 and 4

Instructions: Here are a number of personality traits that may or may not describe J. Please choose a number next to each statement to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with that statement. You should rate the extent to which the pair of traits applies to J, even if one characteristic applies more strongly than the other.

1. _____ Extraverted, enthusiastic.
2. _____ Critical, quarrelsome.
3. _____ Dependable, self-disciplined.
4. _____ Anxious, easily upset.
5. _____ Open to new experiences, complex.
6. _____ Reserved, quiet.
7. _____ Sympathetic, warm.
8. _____ Disorganized, careless.
9. _____ Calm, emotionally stable.
10. _____ Conventional, uncreative.

TIPI scale scoring ("R" denotes reverse-scored items):
Extraversion: 1, 6R;
Agreeableness: 2R, 7;
Conscientiousness: 3, 8R;
Emotional Stability: 4R, 9;
Openness to Experiences: 5, 10R.

Appendix D: Status Manipulation used in Study 2

Person X is someone who has demonstrated high ability and competence. He/she has scored very well and should be in the top 5% of all test takers. He/she has demonstrated high cognitive ability and reasoning skills. This person has shown a lot of promise and aptitude to become a buyer. People in this category usually command a great deal of respect and esteem.

Person Y is someone who has demonstrated low ability and competence. He/she has scored quite low and should be in the bottom 25% of all test takers. He/she has demonstrated low cognitive ability and reasoning skills. This person has shown limited promise and aptitude to become a buyer. People in this category usually command relatively little respect and esteem.

Appendix E: Vignette used in Study 3

This vignette was adapted from Van Kleef et al., (2006, Study 3). Below is a description of a negotiation situation. Please read this description carefully, imagining yourself as the buyer. There will be questions about it afterwards, and you should try to answer them as though you were personally faced with this situation in real life.

You are a project manager assigned with the task of hiring an IT company to update and professionalise your company website. For this particular deal, you are in charge and you have been told that your company prefers to spend no more than £90,000 to obtain this service.

(High Status) The IT company you are going to deal with is called ABC and you will deal with a senior sales person, J (Sales Manager), who is considered to be quite competent for this position and is largely admired within the company.

(Low Status) The IT company you are going to deal with is called ABC and you will deal with a senior sales person, J (Sales Manager), who is considered to be not entirely suitable for this position and therefore is not admired very much within the company.

After you contact ABC, you discover that they are willing to accept the assignment for £120,000 (their offer). You then decide to contact them to negotiate the price, and accordingly, call J and propose to pay them £90,000 (your offer). Just as J is about to respond to this offer, a mobile phone rings, J apologises for the disturbance, and tries (unsuccessfully) to put you on hold.

(Anger manipulation) You then overhear the following conversation: 'Hey, I'm sorry, I don't have time right now, I'm in the middle of a negotiation with a client...I just received an offer that makes me really mad. I'll call you back . . . Yeah, you're right, I'm pretty angry. Bye!'

(Contempt manipulation) You then overhear the following conversation: 'Hey, I'm sorry, I don't have time right now, I'm in the middle of a negotiation with a client . . . I just received an offer that is so beneath us. I'll call you back . . . Yeah, you're right, I feel quite scornful about this. Bye!'

(Sad manipulation) You then overhear the following conversation: 'Hey, I'm sorry, I don't have time right now, I'm in the middle of a negotiation with a client . . . I just received an offer that is so disappointing. I'll call you back . . . Yeah, you're right, I feel quite discouraged. Bye!'

(Neutral condition) You then overhear the following conversation: 'Hey, I'm sorry, I don't have time right now, I'm in the middle of a negotiation with a client . . . I just received an offer from them. I'll call you back. Bye!'

Appendix F: Vignette used in Study 4

This vignette was adapted from Van Kleef et al., (2006, Study 5). Below is a description of a negotiation situation. Please read this description carefully, imagining yourself as the buyer. There will be questions about it afterwards, and you should try to answer them as though you were personally faced with this situation in real life. If you fail to answer those questions correctly, you will NOT be paid.

You are the training manager working in a company called ABC. You are in charge of developing a training program for employees of your organisation. The training program that you have designed will pick out the star performers in various departments and groom them for leadership positions within the organization.

(Own High Status) You have reached the level of training manager by getting promoted quite quickly. This shows that you are good at your job and command high status within ABC. You are aware that you - like others who get promoted rapidly - are really admired within the organisation.

(Own Low Status)It took a long time before you were promoted to the level of training manager. This reflects the fact that your work performance has not been outstanding and you do not command high status within ABC. You are aware that you - like others whose promotion is not rapid - are not admired as much as others within the organisation.

In order to go forward with this training program, you have to negotiate two things with another participating department – allocation of budget and personnel hours.

(Other High Status)You are going to interact with J, who is a senior manager in another department and is considered to be quite suitable for this position and is held in high esteem within the company. You get the impression from others that J is well respected and enjoys a really good reputation within ABC

(Other Low Status)You are going to interact with J, who is a senior manager in another department and is considered to be not very suitable for this position and possesses little esteem within the company. You get the impression from others that J is not respected a lot and has a somewhat negative reputation within ABC

During the negotiation, you want to talk about two issues – first, the proportion of the department budget that J is willing to give you, and second, the number of hours of training that J is willing to promise you. You want J's department to contribute 10% of the department budget, and approximately 300 hours of labour. However, J's department wants to contribute only 4% of the budget and 100 hours of labour.

(Anger condition) You have decided to think about J's offer before responding. While you are still thinking about how to proceed, your boss forwards some information about J's department that accidently includes the text of an email from J about the offer that you have made – "D., we recently spoke about the new training program that is being developed. I am still discussing some lingering issues with the training manager in your department. I will not bother you with all the details right now, but I can tell you that I am quite mad about the offer that I have received. I'm really fed up and angry to go on with the negotiations, and I would like to hear your opinion. Do you have time for lunch?"

(Contempt condition) You have decided to think about J's offer before responding. While you are still thinking about how to proceed, your boss forwards some information about J's department that accidently includes the text of an email from J about the offer that you have made – "D., we recently spoke about the new training program that is being developed. I am still discussing some lingering issues with the training manager in your department. I will not bother you with all the details right now, but I can tell you that I am quite contemptuous about the offer that I have received. It is quite beneath me and frankly insulting to go on with the negotiations, and I would like to hear your opinion. Do you have time for lunch?"

(Neutral condition) You have decided to think about J's offer before responding. While you are still thinking about how to proceed, your boss forwards some information about J's department that accidently includes the text of an email from J about the offer that you have made –"D., we recently spoke about the new training program that is being developed. I am still discussing some lingering issues with the training manager in your department. I will not bother you with all the details right now, but I would like to hear your opinion. Do you have time for lunch?"

Appendix G: Additional results for Study 1

Table 1.3

Means and standard deviations of dependent variables for Study 1

Dependent variables	Emotion			Status	
	Contempt	Anger	Neutral	High status	Low status
Concessions	456.83 (89.88)	533.46 (119.67)	486.25 (107.44)	468.75 (97.39)	515.61 (117.48)
Self-reported contempt	3.22 (1.37)	2.67 (1.21)	2.18 (1.15)	2.95 (1.42)	2.43 (1.14)
Self-reported anger	2.66 (1.53)	2.10 (1.18)	2.31 (1.42)	2.79 (1.43)	1.91 (1.19)
In-group identification	5.17 (2.68)	5.80 (2.72)	5.07 (2.30)	6.22 (2.21)	4.47 (2.62)

Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses

Table 1.4

The effect of status on concession moderated by PDO

	b	SE	*t*	*p*
Status	45.22	22.37	2.02	.046
PDO	-4.62	3.58	-1.29	.199
Status x PDO	-13.45	7.15	-1.88	.063

Table 1.5

Results of mediation by self-reported anger on the effect of emotion on concessions

	Coefficients				SE	Bootstrapping Bias Corrected Confidence Intervals	
	Path a	Path b	Path c	Path c'		Lower	Upper
Neutral vs. anger and contempt	.02 (ns)	-9.66 (ns)	2.96 (ns)	3.18 (ns)	1.25	-3.92	1.78
Anger vs. contempt	.27 (ns)	-9.66 (ns)	-38.31**	-35.62**	2.92	-12.33	.72

Note: The bootstrap test was done with 5000 iterations which yielded a 95% bias corrected confidence interval. **$p < .01$

Table 1.6

Results of mediation by self-reported contempt on the effect of emotion on concessions

	Coefficients				SE	Bootstrapping Bias Corrected Confidence Intervals	
	Path a	Path b	Path c	Path c'		Lower	Upper
Neutral vs. anger and contempt	.25**	-11.18 (ns)	5.80 (ns)	-35.33*	2.47	-9.87	.63
Anger vs. contempt	.26 (ns)	-11.18 (ns)	-38.31**	-35.33*	3.01	-12.06	.82

Note: The bootstrap test was done with 5000 iterations which yielded a 95% bias corrected confidence interval. $^{**}p < .01$, $^{*}p < .05$

Table 1.7

Results of mediation by limits on the effect of emotion on concessions

	Coefficients				SE	Bootstrapping Bias Corrected Confidence Intervals	
	Path a	Path b	Path c	Path c'		Lower	Upper
Neutral vs. anger and contempt	.08 (ns)	40.12**	2.96 (ns)	-.30 (ns)	2.75	-.61	10.96
Anger vs. contempt	-.11 (ns)	40.12**	-38.31**	-33.85*	4.90	-16.51	3.53

Note: The bootstrap test was done with 5000 iterations which yielded a 95% bias corrected confidence interval. $^{**}p < .01$, $^{*}p < .05$

Table 1.8

Results of mediation by in-group identification on the effect of status on concessions

	Coefficients				SE	Bootstrapping Bias Corrected Confidence Intervals	
	Path a	Path b	Path c	Path c'		Lower	Upper
In-group identification	.88**	5.81 (ns)	-23.43*	-28.53*	4.35	-1.62	15.96

Note: The bootstrap test was done with 5000 iterations which yielded a 95% bias corrected confidence interval. $^{**}p < .01$, $^{*}p < .05$

Table 1.9

Mean ratings of anger and contempt statements in the pilot Study

Statements used in Study 1	Mean rating of anger in the statement	Mean rating of contempt in the statement
This does not show quick thinking, given your A level scores.	1.61	2.18
This offer is so beneath me	1.64	2.64
Really!! Take a hint and read a book on negotiation	1.64	2.59
This is annoying	2.70	1.14
OK!! this is NOT what i want!	2.95	1.16
Did you really offer me that???	3.18	1.66

Appendix H: Additional results for Study 2

Table 2.4

Means and standard deviations of dependent variables for Study 2

Dependent variables	Emotion			Status	
	Contempt	Anger	Sadness	High status	Low status
Concessions	546.42 (134.79)	540.75 (136.32)	559.21 (117.82)	542.89 (118.82)	554.69 (138.94)
Self-reported contempt	2.55 (1.29)	2.51 (1.29)	1.82 (1.06)	2.20 (1.31)	2.39 (1.19)
Self-reported anger	2.83 (1.61)	2.18 (1.36)	1.57 (.86)	2.13 (1.41)	2.25 (1.40)
Self-reported sympathy	1.85 (.99)	1.83 (.99)	2.80 (1.47)	2.07 (1.22)	2.25 (1.27)

Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses

Table 2.5

The effect of status on concession moderated by PDO

	b	SE	*t*	*p*
Status	-6.03	13.48	-.45	.656
PDO	-3.76	3.44	-1.09	.278
Status x PDO	5.19	3.44	1.51	.134

Table 2.6

The effect of status on concession moderated by SDO

	b	SE	*t*	*p*
Status	-6.05	13.56	-.45	.656
SDO	16.02	14.54	1.10	.273
Status x SDO	19.35	14.54	1.33	.186

Appendix I: Additional results for Study 3

Table 3.3

Means and standard deviations of dependent variable for emotion condition in Study 3

Dependent variables	Contempt	Anger	Sadness	Neutral
Concessions	92280.70 (11804.59)	97818.18 (12276.28)	94277.78 (7413.44)	93404.25 (8412.36)
Self-reported contempt	3.54 (1.68)	3.35 (1.75)	3.09 (1.69)	2.49 (1.64)
Self-reported anger	3.40 (1.87)	3.56 (1.87)	3.22 (2.02)	2.28 (1.69)
Emotional stability	7.95 (2.79)	6.45 (2.62)	7.46 (2.88)	9.13 (2.40)
Agreeableness	7.68 (3.22)	6.81 (2.86)	7.83 (2.31)	8.00 (2.32)
Extraversion	8.81 (2.29)	9.31 (1.95)	9.00 (2.16)	9.21 (2.26)
Conscientious	8.49 (3.32)	8.31 (2.44)	8.18 (2.80)	9.02 (2.73)
Openness to experience	8.59 (2.86)	8.14 (2.20)	7.87 (2.52)	8.29 (1.83)
Fairness	44.37 (27.32)	48.42 (24.91)	50.44 (23.49)	55.94 (22.44)

Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses

Table 3.4
Means and standard deviations of dependent variable for status condition in Study 3

Dependent variables	High status	Low status
Concessions	94857.14 (8891.90)	94083.33 (11760.96)
Self-reported contempt	2.97 (1.67)	3.31 (1.77)
Self-reported anger	2.99 (1.80)	3.31 (2.02)
Emotional stability	8.36 (2.79)	7.15 (2.75)
Agreeableness	8.28 (2.59)	6.90 (2.72)
Extraversion	9.08 (2.37)	9.07 (1.95)
Conscientious	9.67 (2.43)	7.32 (2.75)
Openness to experience	8.88 (2.08)	7.59 (2.54)
Fairness	54.55 (22.41)	44.60 (26.26)

Table 3.5

The effect of status on concession moderated by PDO

	b	SE	*t*	*p*
Status	-800.06	1405.50	-.56	.569
PDO	3170.04	1013.00	3.13	.002
Status x PDO	501.83	2027.17	.24	.804

Table 3.6
The effect of status on concession moderated by SDO

	b	SE	*t*	*p*
Status	-404.66	1396.84	-.28	.772
SDO	2454.27	678.85	3.61	.000
Status x SDO	1862.25	1355.18	1.37	.170

Table 3.7

Results of mediation by emotional stability and agreeableness on the effect of status on concessions

	Coefficients				SE	Bootstrapping Bias Corrected Confidence Intervals	
	Path a	Path b	Path c	Path c'		Lower	Upper
Emotional stability	.63**	230.12 (ns)	386.90 (ns)	-134.16 (ns)	223.89	-247.70	661.18
Agreeableness	.71***	530.01 (ns)	386.90 (ns)	-134.16 (ns)	245.40	-18.71	982.13

Note: The bootstrap test was done with 5000 iterations which yielded a 95% bias corrected confidence interval. $^{***}p < .001$, $^{**}p < .01$, $^{*}p < .05$

Table 3.8

Results of mediation by agreeableness on the effect of emotion on concessions

	Coefficients				SE	Bootstrapping Bias Corrected Confidence Intervals	
	Path a	Path b	Path c	Path c'		Lower	Upper
Neutral vs. anger, contempt and sadness	-.13 (ns)	792.89**	346.99 (ns)	456.95 (ns)	91.18	-331.32	35.85
Anger and contempt vs. sadness	-.19 (ns)	792.89**	257.22 (ns)	411.08 (ns)	124.16	-466.81	41.30
Anger vs. contempt	-.43(ns)	792.89**	2768.74**	3112.07**	262.18	-994.32	69.47

Note: The bootstrap test was done with 5000 iterations which yielded a 95% bias corrected confidence interval. $^{**}p < .01$, $^{*}p < .05$

Appendix J: Additional results for Study 4

Table 4.5

Means and standard deviations of dependent variable for emotion condition in Study 4

Dependent variables	Contempt	Anger	Neutral
Concessions	1.91 (1.63)	2.42 (1.24)	1.99 (1.49)
Self-reported contempt	3.75 (1.81)	3.46 (1.61)	3.03 (1.69)
Self-reported anger	3.53 (1.93)	3.91 (1.89)	2.82 (1.74)
Emotional stability	7.06 (3.09)	6.01 (1.99)	9.37 (2.61)
Agreeableness	6.54 (3.16)	6.72 (2.80)	8.46 (2.90)
Extraversion	8.81 (1.91)	9.01 (1.81)	8.63 (2.24)
Conscientious	8.15 (2.92)	8.37 (2.60)	9.49 (2.93)
Openness to experience	7.17 (2.73)	7.71 (2.36)	8.53 (2.69)
Fairness	36.39 (25.64)	41.38 (25.59)	46.00 (24.84)

Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses

Table 4.6

Means and standard deviations of dependent variable for status conditions in Study 4

Dependent variables	Own status		Other status	
	High status	Low status	High status	Low status
Concessions	2.02 (1.48)	2.18 (1.47)	2.29 (1.31)	1.89 (1.62)
Self-reported contempt	3.44 (1.67)	3.38 (1.79)	3.40 (1.79)	3.43 (1.65)
Self-reported anger	3.27 (1.82)	3.56 (1.98)	3.28 (1.86)	3.56 (1.94)
Emotional stability	7.90 (3.17)	7.09 (2.65)	8.38 (3.01)	6.55 (2.58)
Agreeableness	7.45 (3.15)	7.05 (2.99)	7.90 (3.08)	6.54 (2.92)
Extraversion	8.88 (2.15)	8.74 (1.84)	9.15 (2.07)	8.43 (1.86)
Conscientious	8.97 (2.99)	8.37 (2.72)	9.91 (2.64)	7.31 (2.50)
Openness to experience	7.94 (2.76)	7.66 (2.55)	8.61 (2.53)	6.91 (2.52)
Fairness	42.48 (26.22)	40.00 (24.91)	45.37 (24.29)	36.74 (26.31)

Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses

Table 4.7

The effect of status on concession moderated by PDO

	b	SE	*t*	*p*
Status	-.40	.15	-2.61	.009
PDO	.002	.01	.16	.874
Status x PDO	-.002	.02	-.09	.921

Appendix K: Additional results for Study 5

Table 5.4

Means and standard deviations of dependent variable for Study 5

Dependent variables	Emotion		Relevance	
	Shame	Embarrassment	Task relevant	Task irrelevant
Satisfaction with offers	35.53 (20.02)	34.71 (21.73)	34.45 (22.19)	35.76 (19.55)
Fairness of offers	41.48 (25.39)	41.80 (27.71)	41.32 (28.31)	41.96 (24.79)
Participants' offers	48.43 (20.44)	41.36 (14.18)	46.05 (18.18)	43.62 (17.52)
Liking the proposer	4.97 (1.41)	4.78 (1.42)	4.90 (1.38)	4.85 (1.45)
Prosocial ratings	3.98 (1.20)	4.21 (1.28)	4 (1.22)	4.20 (1.25)
Self-reported shame	1.70 (1.39)	1.65 (1.53)	1.59 (1.37)	1.75 (1.55)
Self-reported embarrassment	1.61 (1.17)	1.88 (1.66)	1.56 (1.20)	1.93 (1.63)
Self-reported sympathy	3.28 (2.34)	3.28 (2.19)	3.15 (2.29)	3.41 (2.23)
Likelihood of acceptance of	6.57 (1.96)	6.61 (1.89)	6.65 (2.01)	6.53 (1.84)

Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses

Table 5.5

Results of mediation by self-reported sympathy, prosociality, and liking the proposer on the effect of emotion on satisfaction with offers

	Coefficients				SE	Bootstrapping Bias Corrected Confidence Intervals	
	Path a	Path b	Path c	Path c'		Lower	Upper
Self-reported sympathy	.001 (ns)	1.05 (ns)	-.41 (ns)	-.77 (ns)	.22	-.47	.47
Prosociality	.11 (ns)	6.41***	-.41 (ns)	-.77 (ns)	.63	-.43	2.12
Liking	-.09 (ns)	3.94***	-.41 (ns)	-.77 (ns)	.46	-1.52	.39

Note: The bootstrap test was done with 5000 iterations which yielded a 95% bias corrected confidence interval. $^{***}p < .001$, $^{**}p < .01$, $^{*}p < .05$

Table 5.6

Results of mediation by self-reported sympathy, prosociality, and liking the proposer on the effect of emotion on fairness of offers

	Coefficients				SE	Bootstrapping Bias Corrected Confidence Intervals	
	Path a	Path b	Path c	Path c'		Lower	Upper
Self-reported sympathy	.001 (ns)	.43 (ns)	.16 (ns)	.18 (ns)	.18	-.37	.37
Prosociality	.11 (ns)	4.93**	.16 (ns)	.18 (ns)	.54	-.28	1.91
Liking	-.09 (ns)	6.14***	.16 (ns)	.18 (ns)	.73	-2.33	.65

Note: The bootstrap test was done with 5000 iterations which yielded a 95% bias corrected confidence interval. $^{***}p < .001$, $^{**}p < .01$, $^{*}p < .05$

Appendix L: Additional results for Study 6

Table 6.2

Means and standard deviations of dependent variable for Study 6

Dependent variables	Emotion			Relevance	
	Shame	Embarrassment	Control	Task relevant	Task irrelevant
Satisfaction with offers	38.43 (21.74)	34.28 (20.82)	36.69 (21.65)	36.43 (21.81)	36.40 (21.03)
Fairness of offers	40.25 (23.79)	38.67 (23.74)	39.32 (24.53)	38.63 (24.02)	40.07 (23.92)
Participants' offers	44.23 (19.30)	49.31 (25.31)	44.22 (19.98)	45.44 (22.27)	46.47 (21.44)
Liking the proposer	5.17 (1.65)	4.94 (1.70)	4.66 (1.68)	4.85 (1.71)	4.98 (1.67)
Prosocial ratings	4.37 (1.19)	4.44 (1.32)	4.16 (1.39)	4.29 (1.36)	4.36 (1.25)
Self-reported shame	2.11 (1.68)	2.56 (1.88)	2.10 (1.72)	2.30 (1.77)	2.23 (1.77)
Self-reported embarrassment	2.34 (1.88)	2.84 (2.15)	2.51 (2.04)	2.60 (2.02)	2.55 (2.05)
Likelihood of acceptance of offers	6.10 (2.38)	5.75 (2.37)	6.35 (2.24)	5.88 (2.30)	6.24 (2.36)

Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses

Table 6.3

Results of mediation by prosociality on the effect of emotion on satisfaction with offers

	Coefficients				SE	Bootstrapping Bias Corrected Confidence Intervals	
	Path a	Path b	Path c	Path c'		Lower	Upper
Control vs. shame and embarrassment	.08 (ns)	4.67***	-.11 (ns)	-1.21 (ns)	.33	-.18	1.17
Shame vs. embarrassment	.03 (ns)	4.67***	-2.07 (ns)	-1.60 (ns)	.52	-.88	1.25

Note: The bootstrap test was done with 5000 iterations which yielded a 95% bias corrected confidence interval. $^{***}p < .001$, $^{**}p < .01$, $^{*}p < .05$

Table 6.4

Results of mediation by liking the proposer on the effect of emotion on satisfaction with offers

	Coefficients				SE	Bootstrapping Bias Corrected Confidence Intervals	
	Path a	Path b	Path c	Path c'		Lower	Upper
Control vs. shame and embarrassment	.13 (ns)	5.51***	-.11 (ns)	-1.21 (ns)	.46	-.14	1.69
Shame vs. embarrassment	-.11 (ns)	5.51***	-2.07 (ns)	-1.60 (ns)	.81	-2.37	.90

Note: The bootstrap test was done with 5000 iterations which yielded a 95% bias corrected confidence interval. $^{***}p < .001$, $^{**}p < .01$, $^{*}p < .05$

Table 6.5

Results of mediation by prosociality the proposer on the effect of emotion on fairness of offers

	Coefficients				SE	Bootstrapping Bias Corrected Confidence Intervals	
	Path a	Path b	Path c	Path c'		Lower	Upper
Control vs. shame and embarrassment	.08 (ns)	3.96**	.04 (ns)	-1.02 (ns)	.30	-.16	1.08
Shame vs. embarrassment	.02 (ns)	3.96**	-.79 (ns)	-.24 (ns)	.45	-.78	1.07

Note: The bootstrap test was done with 5000 iterations which yielded a 95% bias corrected confidence interval. $^{***}p < .001$, $^{**}p < .01$, $^{*}p < .05$

Table 6.6

Results of mediation by liking the proposer on the effect of emotion on fairness of offers

	Coefficients				SE	Bootstrapping Bias Corrected Confidence Intervals	
	Path a	Path b	Path c	Path c'		Lower	Upper
Control vs. shame and embarrassment	.13 (ns)	5.72***	.04 (ns)	-1.02 (ns)	.50	-.12	1.90
Shame vs. embarrassment	-.11 (ns)	5.72***	-.79 (ns)	-.24 (ns)	.84	-2.52	.93

Note: The bootstrap test was done with 5000 iterations which yielded a 95% bias corrected confidence interval. ***$p < .001$, **$p < .01$, *$p < .05$