The Passions of Power Politics:
How Emotions Influence Coercive Diplomacy

Robin Markwica
Nuffield College
University of Oxford

Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DPhil in International Relations at the University of Oxford

Trinity Term 2014

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Abstract

In coercive diplomacy, actors employ the threat of force to get targets to change their behavior. The goal is to achieve the opponent’s compliance without waging war. In practice, however, the strategy often falls short—even when coencers enjoy substantial military superiority. This finding inspires the central question of this thesis: What prompts leaders to reject coercive threats from stronger adversaries, and under what conditions do they yield? I argue that target leaders’ affective reactions can help to explain why coercive diplomacy succeeds in some cases but not in others. Combining insights from psychology and social constructivism, this thesis presents a theory of emotional choice to analyze how affect enters into target leaders’ decision-making. Specifically, it makes the case that preferences are not only socially but also emotionally constructed. The core of the theoretical framework outlines how five key emotions—fear, anger, hope, pride, and humiliation—help to constitute target leaders’ preferences. This represents the first attempt to explore how a spectrum of emotions influences leaders’ foreign policy decision-making. To test the analytic utility of emotional choice theory, the thesis examines nine major decisions by Nikita Khrushchev during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 and ten main decisions by Saddam Hussein in the course of the Gulf conflict in 1990-91. The analysis yields mixed results: In the case of about a third of all decisions, the five key emotions exerted only minor effects or no impact at all. Another third of the decisions were influenced by one or more of these emotions to a degree similar to the impact of other factors. In the case of the final third of decisions, however, some of these emotions became the primary forces shaping the construction of preferences. Overall, emotional choice theory has thus advanced our understanding of the target leaders’ decision-making in the missile crisis and the Gulf conflict, offering a more comprehensive explanation of why coercive diplomacy succeeded in one case but not in the other.
To my parents
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Abbreviations

AFP  Agence France-Presse
AP  Associated Press
AVPRF  Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation
BCE  Before the Common Era
CC  Central Committee
CIA  US Central Intelligence Agency
CPCz  Czechoslovak Communist Party
CPSU  Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CRRC  Conflict Records Research Center
CWIHP  Cold War International History Project
DCI  US Director of Central Intelligence
DEFCON  US Defense Condition
FBI  US Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBIS  US Foreign Broadcast Information Service
fMRI  functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging
FRUS  Foreign Relations of the United States
GHWBL  George H. W. Bush Presidential Library
INA  Iraqi News Agency
IR  International Relations
IRBM  intermediate-range ballistic missile
JFK  John F. Kennedy
JFKL  John F. Kennedy Presidential Library
KCLMA  King’s College London Military Archives
KGB  Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (Committee on State Security)
NARA  US National Archives and Records Administration
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSC  US National Security Council
NSF  National Security Files
OAS  Organization of American States
OPEC  Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PLO  Palestine Liberation Organization
RCC  Iraq’s Revolutionary Command Council
RFK  Robert F. Kennedy
RGANI  Russian State Archive of Contemporary History
UN  United Nations
UPI  United Press International
US  United States of America
USSR  Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WMD  weapons of mass destruction
1. Introduction

1.1 The puzzle, the research question, and the main argument

“Ultimate excellence lies not in winning every battle but in defeating the enemy without ever fighting,” the Chinese philosopher and military strategist Sun-Tzu noted in his classic *The Art of War* around 500 BCE. His dictum finds its contemporary expression in the strategy of compellence or coercive diplomacy, according to which an actor employs the threat of force to get targets to change their behavior. The goal is to achieve the opponent’s compliance without waging war. If targets concede to the demands, the strategy has been successful. If they ignore or defy the threat, and the coercer responds by retreating or fighting, the strategy has failed. In practice, attempts at coercive diplomacy have often fallen short. Analyzing cases from 1823 to 1973, Walter Petersen puts the success rate at a mere 24 percent. Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan find that the strategy succeeded in only 18 percent of instances of US compellence between the 1940s and the 1970s. Peter Viggo Jakobsen’s review of cases of Western coercive diplomacy from 1990 to 2008 shows that coercers achieved their goal in just 17 percent of cases. When threats went unheeded, as they often did, actors generally ended up going to war.

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2 For more precise definitions of “compellence” and “coercive diplomacy,” see section 1.4.1 below.
Conventional wisdom suggests that actors should be prepared to bend to the will of more powerful coercers to avoid harm.\textsuperscript{7} Quantitative studies, however, raise doubts about this assumption. For example, in an analysis of 77 cases, Peter Karsten, Peter Howell, and Artis Frances Allen find that weaker targets are no more likely to yield to threats than stronger ones. They are intransigent just as often.\textsuperscript{8} Moreover, Todd Sechser’s dataset of compellent threat episodes in the twentieth century indicates that major powers target minor ones in 85 percent of instances. Paradoxically, however, coercers that have higher military expenditures than targets are less likely to succeed at coercive diplomacy than those with lower military expenditures than targets.\textsuperscript{9}

There are numerous prominent examples of this curious association between military might and compellence failure. As early as in the fifth century BCE, Thucydides recounted how the inhabitants of the small island of Melos in the Aegean Sea rebuffed imperial Athens’ demand to give up their neutrality in the Peloponnesian War.\textsuperscript{10} In 200 BCE, King Philip V of Macedonia repudiated a Roman ultimatum to leave the Greek cities in peace, only to be defeated at the Battle of Cynoscephalae.\textsuperscript{11} The might of the British fleet failed to persuade Tsar Nicholas I of Russia to withdraw his troops from the Danubian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, resulting in

\textsuperscript{7}A recent proponent of this conventional wisdom is Branislav L. Slantchev: “The stronger an actor is, the worse the expected war outcome for the adversary, and the more that adversary should be prepared to concede in order to avoid it.” See Slantchev, “Feigning Weakness,” \textit{International Organization} 64:3 (2010), 360.

\textsuperscript{8}See Karsten, Howell, and Allen, \textit{Military Threats}, 55.


the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1853. During the last two decades, the sole remaining superpower also had to learn how intransigent considerably weaker actors can be. Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević, for example, ignored US calls to end his repression of Kosovo Albanians in 1998. Saddam Hussein and Muammar al-Gaddafi refused to step down and go into exile in 2003 and 2011, respectively.

In all of these instances, the coercers enjoyed military superiority. The targets, however, defied their threats—and had to pay dearly for it. This puzzle inspires the central research question of the thesis: What prompts leaders to reject coercive threats from stronger adversaries, and under what conditions do they yield? I argue that the emotions of target leaders can help to explain why compellence succeeds in some cases but not in others. Combining insights from psychology and social constructivism, this study presents a theory of emotional choice to analyze how affect enters into target leaders’ decision-making. Specifically, the thesis makes the case that preferences are not only socially but also emotionally constructed. The core of the theoretical framework outlines how five key emotions—fear, anger, hope, pride, and humiliation—help to constitute target leaders’ preferences. To test the theory’s analytic utility, it is applied in two case studies: Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s response to the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 and Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s decision-making during the Gulf conflict in 1990-91.

Why does this matter? Given the large number of unstable states in the world, the United Nations (UN) will continue to be confronted with inter- and intranational conflicts. Article 39 of the UN Charter stipulates that the UN Security Council shall

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14 The thesis uses the words “emotion” and “affect” interchangeably. For a more detailed definition of these and related terms, see section 1.6.2.1 below.
decide how to maintain or restore international peace and security.\textsuperscript{15} Furthermore, a growing number of states recognize that the UN has the responsibility to protect populations from crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and genocide, if national authorities fail to do so.\textsuperscript{16} When the UN Security Council needs to rein in aggressors, coercive diplomacy represents an attractive strategy because it offers a chance to achieve the objective with less cost and less bloodshed than military intervention.\textsuperscript{17} Explaining failures and successes of coercive diplomacy is thus an important task.

1.2 The logics of consequences, appropriateness, and affect

The abstract notion of coercive diplomacy is based on the assumption that target leaders are purely rational actors. They are supposed to process information correctly and to identify all available courses of action readily. Once they have calculated the expected costs and benefits of each option, they select the alternative that maximizes their utility.\textsuperscript{18} The concept of rationality can be a powerful analytic tool because it explains a large number of outcomes in decision-making with a few simple assumptions about the goals that agents are seeking to achieve.\textsuperscript{19} At the same time,

\textsuperscript{19} See John Harsanyi, “Some Social Science Implications of a New Approach to Game Theory,” in Kathleen Archibald and Morton Deutsch, eds., \textit{Strategic Interaction and Conflict: Original Papers and
however, both history and experimental work have shown that humans frequently violate rational choice precepts. To account for these deviations, scholars have used the notion of bounded rationality, which takes into consideration that biases, heuristics, and misperceptions may influence decision-making.\textsuperscript{20}

Even this revised model, however, often fails to explain human choice behavior. One prominent example from experimental social science is the Ultimatum Game. In this experiment, two participants need to agree on the division of a sum of money provided by the experimenter according to the following procedure: Player 1, the proposer, makes a suggestion as to how the money should be split. Player 2, the responder, then either accepts or rejects the proposal. If she accepts it, the money will be distributed as the proposer suggested. If she rejects it, neither player will receive anything.\textsuperscript{21} The participants play the game only once and maintain their anonymity throughout. Consequently, there is no point in punishing proposers to encourage them to be more generous the next time around.\textsuperscript{22} Standard rational choice models would thus predict that responders will accept any offer greater than zero, even the smallest amount, because some money is better than none. Yet, experiments have consistently


shown that responders reject about half of all offers below 20% of the total.\textsuperscript{23}

These rejections in the Ultimatum Game and other phenomena that are difficult to account for on the basis of rational choice have led scholars to employ alternative approaches to solve these puzzles. A particularly promising explanation has been proposed by theorists of social constructivism. They have argued that preferences or interests are not fixed, as standard rationalist accounts assume. Rather, people go through a process of constructing them in the course of decision-making. This preference construction is shaped by inter-subjective ideas, norms, and identities. How actors define their interests is influenced by who they think they are and what they believe is right. Arising from social interactions, these beliefs legitimate some interests and make others inconceivable.\textsuperscript{24} According to this constructivist perspective, many responders in the Ultimatum Game reject low offers because they obey social norms about the fair distribution of goods. In an anonymous setting like this experiment, where responders do not know about the needs of the proposers, the default fairness rule is frequently to share the money equally.\textsuperscript{25} When proposers violate this norm of equal division by making low offers, responders reestablish it by rejecting the offers. That way, they ensure that both parties ultimately receive the same, i.e. nothing.\textsuperscript{26}

\begin{itemize}
    \item \textsuperscript{25}Fairness rules are dependent on context. If responders believed that the proposer is a hard-working but poor single mother of four children, for example, they might consider it fair to accept low offers.
    \item \textsuperscript{26}See Bicchieri, \textit{The Grammar of Society}, 100, 102, 112; Daria Koch et al., “Diminishing Reciprocal
Proponents of rational choice regard humans as utility maximizers, who select the most cost-efficient course of action. Constructivists, by contrast, view people as rule-followers, who act according to the norms and identities they have acquired in the course of their socialization. Whereas rationalists expect that actors follow a logic of consequences in their decision-making, constructivists assume that they adhere to a logic of appropriateness. The logics of consequences and appropriateness have dominated International Relations theory during the last two decades. In his opus magnum *Economy and Society*, Max Weber, however, presented not only these two but four logics of choice. Besides instrumental rationality and value rationality, he proposed the logic of tradition and the logic of affect. If social actions are based on tradition, they are determined by “ingrained habituation,” Weber argued. If they are based on affect, they are shaped by emotions and “feeling states.” Drawing on research in neuroscience and experimental psychology, this thesis examines the logic of affect and its impact on decision-making.

Rationalists and constructivists generally treat choice behavior as a cold cognitive process. From the 1990s onward, however, neurological brain studies have indicated that actors’ construction of preferences is often critically shaped by emotions. Research with the Ultimatum Game again serves as a useful illustration. To

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recall, numerous experiments have demonstrated that about half of all offers from proposers that are lower than 20% of the total sum of money to be divided are rejected by responders. In those cases, neither player receives anything. To get an idea of the cognitive microprocesses of decision-making, scientists have scanned responders’ brains with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) as they learned about the proposer’s offer. They have found that rejections of low offers were associated with heightened activity in the responders’ anterior insula and dorsal striatum, two brain regions related to the processing of affect. Specifically, responders were showing signs of anger, disgust, and anticipated satisfaction. Subsequent questionnaires showed that these players had been put off by low offers and expected to gain gratification from punishing the proposers.31

Further research with the Ultimatum Game suggests that emotions do not merely accompany perceptions of unfairness but are directly relevant to choice behavior. When responders accepted low offers, they tended to experience increased activation in the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex—a brain area related to emotion regulation. Neuroscientists have inferred that these players were better than others at reducing their anger in response to low offers in order to cash in on the material benefit.32 Conversely, individuals with defects in emotion regulation because of brain

damage have been found to reject low offers more often than healthy people.\textsuperscript{33} These neurological studies have attributed emotion a leading role. Their converging results suggest that affect does not only precede conscious decision-making; it also predicts subsequent choice behavior. The more intense affect was, the more likely responders were to reject a given proposal in the Ultimatum Game. The intensity of affect turned out to be a stronger predictor of rejections than the amount of the offer itself. This supports the hypothesis that these rejections are driven primarily by emotional responses.\textsuperscript{34}

At first sight, these findings seem to confirm the traditional view of emotions as irrational impulses that disrupt logical thinking. For centuries, scholars in Western societies believed that the “passions” had to be suppressed to prevent them from exerting their unruly influence on behavior.\textsuperscript{35} From the 1990s onwards, however, scientists have critically examined this conventional wisdom. Some of the pioneering work was carried out by neuroscientist Antonio Damasio and his colleagues, who noticed an unusual pattern of symptoms in patients who had suffered damage to a part of the brain that is responsible for managing emotions. These patients did not show any deficits in their reasoning abilities, but they could look at the most cheerful or


gruesome photos and feel nothing.\textsuperscript{36} Given that the brain damage had virtually erased their emotionality, the traditional perspective on affect would predict that they should now be able to make highly efficient decisions on the basis of pure logical thinking. As it turned out, however, they performed disastrously in gambling tasks, betraying indecisiveness and poor judgment.\textsuperscript{37} This led Damasio and his team to draw the conclusion that feeling is an integral component of reasoning. The emotions triggered by a given situation help people to narrow down the options for action by approving the advantageous ones and and by abandoning those that are dangerous.\textsuperscript{38}

For a while, Damasio’s work had a divisive effect on psychologists. On the one hand, many of them were building on his argument by highlighting the constructive role of affect in decision-making. They maintained that emotions function as heuristic short-cuts, helping individuals to navigate rapidly through a complex and often dangerous world. From this point of view, following affective intuitions can be easier and more efficient than weighing the costs and benefits of various courses of action, especially when the decision task is complex and time is short.\textsuperscript{39} On the other hand, some psychologists have stressed that the historically negative reputation of affect has some empirical grounding. Emotions are by no means always useful. They may hurt rather than help if they are of the wrong type, if they get triggered at the wrong time, or if they occur at the wrong level of intensity.


Under these circumstances, they can distort judgments, override deliberation, and produce decision errors. More recently, scholars have reached a consensus that both the traditional view that emotions subvert cognition and the revisionist perspective that sees them as crucial guides to decision-making capture important aspects of reality. On some occasions, the absence of affect may result in poor choice behavior, and its presence can structure cognition in adaptive ways. On other occasions, it may be a source of biased judgment and cognitive chaos. Emotions can thus improve or distort decision-making. They can cause reckless action, and they can save people’s lives.

1.3 Emotional choice theory: A summary

The summary of research in neuroscience and psychology in the previous section has shown that affect can exert a powerful influence on human decision-making. Psychologists have recognized that emotions are often vital components of choice behavior. In the field of International Relations, however, few scholars have systematically incorporated affective processes into foreign policy decision-making. The theory of emotional choice developed in this study serves as an analytic tool to examine whether and, if so, how affect helps to constitute the preferences of target leaders during episodes of coercive diplomacy. These preference dynamics are, in

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42 For a detailed summary of the existing International Relations literature on the role of affect in world politics in general and in foreign policy decision-making in particular, see section 2.2 below.
turn, key to understanding why compellence fails in some cases but not in others. The term “emotional choice” may give the impression that the theoretical framework focuses on emotion to the exclusion of reason, but this is not the case. The thesis conceives of decision-making as a cognitive-affective process. It recognizes findings in neuroscience that the mechanisms of cognition and emotion are closely interrelated from early perception to choice selection. As a result, purely cognitive or purely emotional states rarely come about. The extent to which each mechanism contributes to choice behavior depends largely on the intensity of the respective emotion.

Given that affect and reason are so closely connected, an alternative approach would have been to integrate emotions into a rationalist model. After all, one of the forefathers of rational choice in the eighteenth century, Jeremy Bentham, assigned affect a primary role in decision-making, defining utility as the balance between “pain and pleasure.” For three reasons, this thesis nevertheless develops an independent emotional choice framework that incorporates insights from social constructivism rather than rational choice. First, psychologists have found that affect is closely intertwined with ideas, norms, and identities—concepts that constructivists have explored for many years. On the one hand, ideas, norms, and identities help to

43 Cognition is used as a general term for all forms of mental processes, including conscious ones, such as perception, thought, and memory, as well as nonconscious ones, such as grammatical construction or the neural control of physiological processes. See David Matsumoto, ed., The Cambridge Dictionary of Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 114. For a detailed definition of emotion and affect, see section 1.6.2.1 below.


determine when and how people experience and express emotions. Whether a person feels sympathy or pleasure at the sight of someone else’s misfortune, for instance, will depend, in part, on which of these two emotions he or she considers morally appropriate in any given situation. On the other hand, emotions influence how actors perceive ideas, norms, and identities. If they feel strongly about norms, for example, they are more likely to adhere to them. Psychologists can thus benefit from constructivist insights and expertise, but constructivist scholars can also profit from findings in emotion research.

The second reason for developing a framework independent of rational choice relates to the growing consensus among social scientists that preferences are neither fixed nor easily retrieved, as standard rationalist models assume. Rather, humans go through a process of constructing them. Having recognized this long ago, social constructivists have explored in-depth how interests arise, evolve, and change in the course of social interactions. This is why their work serves as a useful foundation for this study. What they have neglected, however, is that preferences are not only socially but also emotionally constructed. It is this process of how affect helps to constitute interests and decisions that the thesis seeks to illuminate.

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The final reason for keeping rational choice separate is that it can serve as a useful alternative model, whose explanatory power can be compared with that of the emotional choice framework. To put human decision-making into perspective, it is helpful to know how purely rational actors would in theory choose. The thesis will thus make use of a rationalist baseline that is grounded in realism’s basic principles. According to this alternative model, target leaders are assumed to compare the expected consequences of alternative courses of action and to select the option that maximizes their utility. Realist precepts dictate that they are supposed to pursue a strategy that best serves their security and survival on the basis of the information available to them at the time. On some occasions, this rational choice perspective will offer the most persuasive and parsimonious explanation of decision-making. In other instances, rationalist models and emotional choice theory will make similar predictions about behavior and thus complement each other. In yet other cases, the predictions of the emotional choice framework will diverge from those of rationalist approaches. The framework would then offer a competing account.

Drawing from research in experimental and cross-cultural psychology, the core of emotional choice theory outlines how five key emotions—fear, anger, hope, pride, and humiliation—can influence how and what target leaders think and do during episodes of coercive diplomacy. If their internal state is dominated by fear of a military attack by a coercer, and if they believe that they can avoid this attack by complying with the coercer’s demands, this increases the likelihood that they will give in. However, if target leaders’ emotions center primarily on anger at the coercer,

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52 Fear is the only emotion that some (bounded) rationalist accounts of coercive diplomacy take into
pride at the original behavior that the coercer considers objectionable, or hope that they will get away with it, they are less likely to yield. For these emotions tend to promote defiance and perseverance. Finally, if target leaders feel humiliated at the hands of the coercer, their response may go either way. If they assume that it is due to their moral transgression that they are being humbled, and if they feel mentally or physically incapacitated, they are likely to withdraw. Yet, if they believe that the coercer’s perceived degrading behavior is unjustified, and if they are strong enough to resist, they are likely to defy the coercer’s demands and seek revenge for the humiliation. Figure 1.1 below provides a summary of these expected effects.

The characteristics of the five key emotions in this framework shed some light on the puzzle of why coercive diplomacy fails so often. For coercers face a challenge: They need to produce enough fear of a military attack in target leaders to get them to change their behavior. At the same time, however, they need to avoid eliciting anger on the part of the target leaders. This is no easy feat because people typically get angry at demands to do or undo something against their will. Coercers can take measures to assuage this anger by communicating respect, for example. Such measures, however, may prompt target leaders to feel pride or hope that the opponents are not as resolved as presumed and that it may not be necessary to comply with their demands. The thesis hypothesizes that coercers’ failure to meet this challenge is an important reason why coercive diplomacy frequently falls short.

Moreover, the combination of threat and demand to change their behavior may trigger humiliation in target leaders. As noted above, the experience of humiliation tends to lead people to withdraw if they are mentally or physically incapacitated, or if they believe that it is due to their moral transgression that they are being humbled. Pursuing a policy of extreme humiliation may thus be a tempting option for some
coercers. Besides the problematic ethical implications, however, the deliberate production of humiliation in targets can also be counterproductive. Psychologists have found that individuals who perceive degrading treatment as unjustified are likely to seek revenge for the debasement. The use of humiliation as a tool of coercive diplomacy thus carries great risks.

To summarize, coercers need to walk a fine line: On the one hand, they need to frighten targets, dash their hope that they will get away without complying, and refrain from any behavior that could trigger their pride. On the other hand, coercers must avoid eliciting anger and a sense of unjustified humiliation. To do so, they need to have a good understanding of the target leaders’ mindsets and emotional constitution. This requires not only intelligence information but also empathy: the capacity to imagine how someone is feeling by adopting his or her perspective.53 Experiments, however, suggest that high-power individuals tend to be less sensitive to the emotions of others than those with low power. Psychologists have argued that this is because people who see themselves as powerful believe that they are less dependent on others and hence do not require an accurate understanding of how they feel. Moreover, since power typically entails increased demands on attention, power holders are thought to have limited cognitive and emotional resources to analyze the perspectives of subordinates.54 If this finding about subjects in experiments can be transferred to leaders of states, this sheds some light on the puzzle of why heads of great powers often fail in their coercive diplomacy toward weaker states. A limited

capacity or willingness to empathize with weaker targets prevents coercers from taking their emotions into consideration.

In sum, the thesis makes four main contributions: First, it elucidates under which emotional conditions coercive diplomacy is likely to fail or to succeed. Second, it sheds some light on why the strategy often falls short. Third, it specifies how affect influences actors’ preference construction and decision-making. Finally, it advances our understanding of the interplay between emotions on the one hand and ideas, norms, and identities on the other. The value of emotional choice theory ultimately depends on whether it improves our explanations of coercive diplomacy outcomes. To test the framework’s analytic utility, it is applied to Nikita Khrushchev’s response to the missile crisis in 1962 and to Saddam Hussein’s decision-making in the course of the Gulf conflict in 1990-91.

The remainder of this Introduction is divided into four sections: After denoting the study’s level of analysis in section 1.4, section 1.5 provides a definition of coercive diplomacy and summarizes the existing explanations for its success in the missile crisis and its failure in the Gulf conflict. Section 1.6 discusses the research design, including case selection, methodology, as well as sources, and section 1.7 gives an overview of the thesis.

1.4 The level of analysis

The role of affect can be studied at various levels of analysis including individuals, groups, peoples, nations, states, as well as international and transnational organizations. This thesis concentrates on the emotions of the top political leaders of states that are targeted by threats from external coercers. It assumes that these individuals play a key role in shaping their governments’ foreign policy at times of
international crisis.\footnote{For accounts about the relevance of individual leaders in international relations, see Bueno de Mesquita, \textit{The War Trap}, 27-29; Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, “Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In,” \textit{International Security} 25:4 (2001), 107-46; Richard Ned Lebow, \textit{Forbidden Fruit: Counterfactuals and International Relations} (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010), 103-4; Bruce Russett, Harvey Starr, and David Kinsella, \textit{World Politics: The Menu of Choice} (Belmont, Calif.: Thomson Wadsworth, 2006), 163-192.} Presidents, prime ministers, and other rulers rarely devise policies on their own, however. Advisers often provide crucial support and guidance, and their emotions may influence their leader’s internal state. If the documentary record reveals signs of such affective dynamics between leaders and their counselors, the thesis will thus take them into consideration.

1.5 Coercive diplomacy

After providing a conceptual definition of coercive diplomacy, this section summarizes the existing explanations of its success in the Cuban missile crisis and its failure in the Gulf conflict.

1.5.1 A conceptual definition

Scholars of security studies have failed to agree on a common definition of coercive diplomacy. In his classic study *Arms and Influence*, Thomas Schelling equated it with his notion of “compellence,” which he defined as a strategy that forces a change in a target’s behavior by threatening an action that “can hurt enough to induce compliance.”\(^59\) Whereas deterrence aims at preventing an opponent from “starting something,” compellence and coercive diplomacy seek to “to make an adversary do something”\(^60\) without using “brute force.”\(^61\)

Alexander George introduced a distinction between two subcategories of compellence. On the one hand, the “defensive” use of threats is supposed to stop or reverse an encroachment already initiated by an actor, such as an invasion of a neighboring country or atrocities against an ethnic minority within its own territory. In this scenario, the opponent has made the first move, and the coercer reacts. In George’s view, only this defensive use of threats deserves to be termed “coercive diplomacy.”\(^62\) On the other hand, the “offensive” use of threats aims at intimidating a status quo target to do something it would otherwise not do, such as giving up land or

\(^{59}\) Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966), 80. For Schelling’s reference to coercive diplomacy, see p. 3.

\(^{60}\) Ibid., 69.

\(^{61}\) Ibid., 3. Deterrence and compellence can sometimes be difficult to distinguish in practice. What one state regards as deterrence may be interpreted as compellence by the other. See Karsten, Howell, and Allen, *Military Threats*, 17; Patrick M. Morgan, *Deterrence Now* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 2.

\(^{62}\) See George, “Coercive Diplomacy,” 7.
power. In this situation, the coencer makes the first move. George regarded the offensive use of threats as illegitimate and called it “blackmail.”

This juxtaposition between coercive diplomacy and blackmail has been criticized by some experts. According to Lawrence Freedman, for example, the assumption that coercive diplomacy needs to be limited to the defensive use of threats is “neither tenable in practice nor useful analytically.” What matters, he notes, is what is being defended. If it is territory, the distinction between defensive and offensive may still be possible, but if it is allies or trade routes, some offensive projection of power will be required. Finally, if “honor” or some national mission is protected, then it will be hard to differentiate between defense and offense. Robert Art is just as skeptical about George’s distinction between the defensive and offensive use of threats. “What is defensive lies in the eyes of the beholder,” he points out. In many instances, both coercers and targets will view themselves as acting defensively. Coercers see their attempt to change a target’s behavior as defensive because they view that behavior as objectionable. The target, on the other hand, may regard its actions as legitimate and defensive because it seeks to rectify a situation that it perceives as unacceptable or unjust. Peter Viggo Jakobsen criticizes that George’s distinction rests on the assumption that the status quo is by definition legitimate and that changes are inherently illicit. Rejecting this status quo bias, Jakobsen does not regard the defensive use of threats as any more legitimate than the offensive use.

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65 See ibid., 326, n. 16.
67 See ibid.
Whether coercive diplomacy is justified or not needs to be decided case-by-case, in his opinion.68

Freedman’s, Art’s, and Jakobsen’s criticisms of George’s conceptualization are well-taken. A careful reading of George’s works suggests that his distinction between the defensive and offensive use of threats was ultimately based on ethical considerations. As a pioneering scholar of coercive diplomacy, he sought to avoid a situation in which his research would be misused by the powerful to blackmail the weak. This is valid concern, for which George deserves respect. Nevertheless, his critics are right that his distinction is difficult to operationalize in practice. As a consequence, this study adheres to Schelling’s original assumption that coercive diplomacy can include both defensive and offensive uses of threats.

George’s definition of coercive diplomacy includes an important additional component: Actors may employ not only threats but also an “exemplary use of quite limited force” to strengthen their diplomatic efforts at persuasion.69 By “exemplary” he meant “just enough force of an appropriate kind […] to give credibility to the threat that greater force will be used if necessary.”70 Despite the vagueness of George’s terms, scholars have accepted the possible use of limited force as an integral component of coercive diplomacy.71 In practice, however, it is not clear what amount of force is required to cross the threshold from limited force—i.e. coercive diplomacy—to full-scale force—i.e. war.72 This lack of clear benchmarks has led to confusion among experts. To give an example, NATO’s bombardment of Serbian

68 See Jakobsen, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War, 13-14.
69 George, Forceful Persuasion, 5.
70 Ibid., “Coercive Diplomacy,” 10.
forces in 1999 is seen as a use of limited force by Daniel Byman, Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Michael Manulak, and Matthew Waxman.\(^73\) These authors classify the air campaign as a success in coercive diplomacy because it allegedly led to Slobodan Milošević’s capitulation. Robert Art and Steven Burg, however, argue that the damage inflicted by the bombing reflects the full-scale use of force. Consequently, they code this episode as a failure of coercive diplomacy.\(^74\) The problem is that the threshold between the use of limited and full-scale force tends to be blurred in practice. Rather than representing distinct categories, the two are connected on a continuum. This thesis avoids this predicament by excluding the limited, exemplary, or any other use of force from its definition of coercive diplomacy. It radically departs from the existing scholarship in limiting the strategy to the issuance of threats of force. A threat can involve a verbal warning or the mobilization of military forces or both.\(^75\) Yet, once coercers begin with the actual use of force, as limited and exemplary as it may be, they move beyond coercive diplomacy to employ actual coercion.\(^76\)

Schelling stresses that a threat can be effective only if the coercer couples it with credible assurances that the opponent will not be harmed if it gives in. Otherwise,

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\(^75\) See Art, “Introduction,” 9.

\(^76\) This thesis follows Robert Art in that it defines coercion as warfare. See Art, “Introduction,” 9. Other scholars, however, define coercion differently. For example, Freedman distinguishes between war and “strategic coercion,” which he defines as “the deliberate and purposive use of overt threats to influence another’s strategic choices.” See Freedman, “Strategic Coercion,” 15. In his view (ibid., 17), “coercion is really only taking place to the extent that force is being threatened rather than used, to warn in order to influence.” See also Daniel Byman and Matthew C. Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 3; Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996).
the target will not recognize the benefits of compliance. Moreover, coercers may offer positive incentives to encourage actors to give in. As George points out, forceful persuasion seeks to “induce” enemies to do or undo something rather than “bludgeon” them into doing so. In sum, this thesis thus defines coercive diplomacy as the issuance of military threats and assurances, which may be complemented with positive incentives, to get a target to change its behavior.

1.5.2 Existing explanations of coercive diplomacy outcomes

1.5.2.1 The Cuban missile crisis, 1962

The missile crisis erupted when President John F. Kennedy (JFK) discovered that the Soviet Union had clandestinely furnished nuclear rockets to Cuba. After seven days of secret deliberations with his advisers, he announced a naval quarantine of the island calling for the withdrawal of these “offensive” weapons. Analysts have taken four main approaches to explain why Soviet Chairman Nikita Khrushchev ultimately decided to comply with the US demand. First, some argue that it was JFK’s credible threat to attack Cuba that led him to back down. According to Alexander George, for example, the president “had impressed upon Khrushchev—by deeds and well as words—his determination and resolve.” The underlying assumption is that he gave in because he felt intimidated by Kennedy’s willpower. The case study below,

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78 George, *Forceful Persuasion*, 5.

79 Non-military coercive attempts, such as economic sanctions, are excluded from this definition of coercive diplomacy.


however, will show that this interpretation does not reflect the Soviet premier’s perception at the time. He was impressed less by JFK’s willingness and ability to fight than by the belief that the president was losing control over the hardliners in his administration.

Second, some political scientists assert that an uneven “balance of interests” between Moscow and Washington can account for this success in coercive diplomacy. They assume that the party with more at stake can muster more resolve. Stephen Cimbala, for instance, contends that “the United States was defending a vital interest and the Soviets were not.” This allegedly prompted Khrushchev to accept Kennedy’s terms. It is questionable, however, whether this assessment corresponds with the Russian premier’s view during the crisis. After all, he did regard the protection of Cuba as one of his and the USSR’s core interests. America’s national security, on the other hand, was not affected directly, in his opinion, because he saw the missile installations as purely defensive. Consequently, it is unlikely that he ever believed that the US government had more at stake in this conflict.

Third, several scholars posit that Khrushchev’s decision to remove the rockets was facilitated by Kennedy’s concessions. James Davis, for example, makes the case that the president succeeded because he combined the threat of escalation with a public pledge not to attack Cuba in future. According to Michael Dobbs, JFK’s additional secret promise to take US missiles out of Turkey as a quid pro quo “clearly

82 See, for example, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), 320.
sweetened the proposed deal." The case study below concludes that the president’s guarantee of Cuba’s territorial integrity did indeed help Khrushchev to retreat. The secret promise to remove American rockets from Turkey was less relevant, however, because the premier knew that he would not be able to exploit it politically.

Finally, some analysts maintain that Kennedy’s ability to empathize with the Soviet leader played an important role in the resolution of the crisis. Laurence Freedman argues that the president put himself in Khrushchev’s shoes to assess the effect of a particular course of action on him. Don Munton and David Welch claim that this approach led him to realize that the chairman was looking for a dignified way out of the crisis. The available evidence confirms that JFK’s cautious approach helped Khrushchev to change his perspective on the crisis. Yet, Russian sources also indicate that the Soviet ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin, played a critical role in this respect because he filtered some of the information that the president and his brother, Robert Kennedy, passed on to the Kremlin. It is unlikely that Khrushchev would have complied with US demands so readily, if the ambassador had not chosen the words in his messages to him so carefully, as the case study below will show.

Some of the existing studies on the missile crisis note that the Soviet premier was afraid, angry, or humiliated at one point or another during those tense days.

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85 Michael Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War (London: Hutchinson, 2008), 323.
None of them, however, provides a systematic analysis of the influence that these emotions exerted on his decision-making. Such an analysis is important because it sheds light on why coercive diplomacy worked out in this case. Chapter 3 of the thesis will argue that emotional choice theory advances our understanding of Khrushchev’s behavior. His anger at Kennedy’s sea blockade and his hope that he would ultimately get away with the missile operation influenced his decision to reject US demands during the first two days of the crisis. During the last four days, however, his growing fear that JFK would lose control of the situation and the absence or low level of hope, pride, anger, and humiliation shaped his preference for compliance.

1.5.2.2 The Gulf conflict, 1990-91

On August 2, 1990, Saddam Hussein shocked the world by sending his troops to invade and occupy Kuwait. President George H. W. Bush and his international allies employed coercive diplomacy to get him to withdraw from the emirate. When the Iraqi leader did not pull his troops out by the United Nations deadline of January 15, 1991, the US coalition carried out a large-scale attack against his forces and Iraq’s infrastructure. Scholars have cited a myriad of factors to shed light on why Saddam Hussein refused to comply. Their accounts fall into three groups:

First, numerous analysts argue that he assumed that the United States would ultimately not attack Iraq. Within this group, three different explanations have been advanced: Some experts maintain that the Iraqi president thought that the military threats by Washington and its allies were mere bluff.\(^89\) Others claim that he believed

that he could deter a US assault. Yet others argue that he operated under the assumption that the enemy coalition would fall apart before the UN deadline and that France or the Soviet Union would dissuade the United States from attacking.

The second group of explanations rests on the premise that Saddam Hussein did believe that Washington and its allies would strike out at Iraq, but that he thought his troops would ultimately prevail over them. This group can be further divided into four categories: First, several scholars make the case that the Iraqi president underestimated America’s military capability and overestimated that of his own troops. Second, numerous analysts contend that he overrated the United States’ sensitivity to casualties and failed to appreciate its determination to prevail in a war.


Third, according to some experts, he believed that he would be able to mobilize the people in the Middle East and North Africa to such a degree that they would topple Arab governments aligned with Washington and join the war in Kuwait as volunteer fighters. This would, in turn, lead the Bush administration to abandon the war.⁹⁴ Lastly, a number of scholars make the case that Saddam Hussein’s sycophantic advisers did not have the courage to warn him that the Iraqi military was too weak to impose substantial losses on the US armed forces.⁹⁵

The third set of explanations is based on the assumption that the Iraqi leader believed that he could or should not withdraw from Kuwait for various reasons. These accounts can be sorted into five categories: First, numerous scholars claim that he was concerned that he would get overthrown by his military or other domestic groups if he pulled his troops out of Kuwait without fighting.⁹⁶ Second, some analysts assert that

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he believed he would win politically if he battled the United States, even if he lost militarily.97 Third, according to a few experts, he was ready to resist because he believed that the Bush administration and its allies would not be willing or able to go so far as to remove him from power.98 Fourth, some authors argue that he kept his forces in Kuwait because Washington and its allies did not provide him with any positive incentives to take them out.99 Finally, some writers claim that Saddam Hussein stayed in the emirate because he thought that the United States was determined to destroy his regime no matter what he did.100

Some of these factors are not mutually exclusive. It is likely that they interacted in complex ways. Others seem to contradict each other. Did Saddam Hussein expect or did he doubt that the Bush administration and its allies would attack Iraq after the UN deadline? Did he think that they would not go so far as to unseat him, or did he believe that they were bent on overthrowing him? Given the large number of variables cited in the existing literature, it would be important to get an idea of their relative significance. How did the Iraqi leader weigh domestic

99 See, for instance, Jakobsen, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War, 56.
100 See ibid., 54, 56-58; Post, “Saddam Hussein of Iraq,” 351; Stein, “Deterrence and Compellence in the Gulf, 1990-91,” 177-78; Yetiv, Explaining Foreign Policy, vii-viii.
political considerations against regional and international considerations, for example? Almost all of the above-mentioned authors had to rely on media accounts and interviews with eyewitnesses. They did not have access to internal Iraqi government files, which became available to scholars only in the late 2000s. The release of this material provides an opportunity to find new answers to these questions and to compare how conventional factors and emotions shaped Saddam Hussein’s decision-making.\textsuperscript{101} Chapter 4 of this thesis will assert that the Iraqi leader’s preference for holding on to Kuwait was not objectively derived but emotionally constructed. His pride at his successful invasion of the emirate, his hope that he might be able to deter the United States from attacking, and his anger at the Bush administration’s perceived injustice shaped his refusal to withdraw his troops. Moreover, his intransigence in the face of all adversity was facilitated by his identity as a daring Arab knight who was not supposed to be afraid of threats.

1.6 Research design

The thesis employs the method of structured, focused comparison and a modified form of process tracing to analyze the role of affect in target leaders’ decision-making. While such a qualitative small N research design is not able to generate any estimates about how frequently emotions exert effects, it permits an in-depth examination of their role in each case.\textsuperscript{102} This section is divided into three parts: The first part outlines the criteria for the selection of cases. The second part presents the method employed to identify emotions as well as their effects on the construction of

\textsuperscript{101} A few scholars have taken into consideration Saddam Hussein’s anger and humiliation as important variables in his decision-making. None of them, however, have explored his emotions systematically. See Freedman and Karsh, \textit{The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991}, 62; Stanley A. Renshon, “The Gulf War Revisited: Consequences, Controversies, and Interpretations,” in ibid., ed., \textit{The Political Psychology of the Gulf War}, 344; Stein, “Deterrence and Compellence in the Gulf, 1990-91,” 179.

preferences, and the last part gives an overview of the sources on which the case studies are based.

1.6.1 Case selection

Harry Eckstein has advised that a theory can be shown to be strong if its hypotheses are tested successfully with “hard” cases that seem least likely to confirm them.103 Since both the Cuban missile crisis and the Gulf conflict are commonly associated with high emotional tension, some readers may regard them as “easy” tests for a theoretical framework about the role of affect in strategic interaction. This would indeed be so if the aim of this thesis were to demonstrate merely that emotions matter in coercive diplomacy. The primary goal of this study, however, is to show how they matter.104 The two crises can thus serve as productive cases because they are likely to bring into sharp relief the operation of emotions.

The missile crisis and the Gulf conflict have been selected as cases for four reasons. First, both conflicts are regarded as classic instances of coercive diplomacy in the International Relations literature. Scholars have used the missile crisis as a foundational case study to theorize strategic interaction between states. Thomas Schelling referred to the episode at length to illustrate his concept of compellence, for instance, and Alexander George used it to develop the notion of coercive diplomacy.105 Both authors viewed Kennedy’s approach as an example par excellence of a success in forceful persuasion. Over the years, students as well as practitioners of security policy have regularly turned to this apparent role model to learn lessons about

the formulation of threats and the provision of incentives.\textsuperscript{106} In the Gulf conflict, on the other hand, the Bush administration and its international allies did not manage to get Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait without the use of force. The crisis has become a standard example of compellence failure in the strategic studies literature.\textsuperscript{107} Precisely because both cases have achieved such a canonical status, it is useful to investigate whether and, if so, how affect can account for some of the difference in outcomes and to see to what extent the findings confirm the lessons drawn in existing studies. Second, tracing the emotions of leaders requires a substantial source base that includes not only eyewitness accounts but also records of their confidential deliberations at the time of the crisis. Unfortunately, it is generally difficult to obtain this material for targets of coercive diplomacy. The missile crisis and the Gulf conflict are rare exceptions in this respect because valuable archival sources about Nikita Khrushchev’s and Saddam Hussein’s decision-making have been released. Third, both crises have been subject to numerous scholarly studies. These works set a bar against which the explanatory power of emotional choice theory can be measured.\textsuperscript{108} Finally, in both cases, leaders made a series of decisions as the conflicts unfolded over time. This results in substantial within-case variation, which is useful for the in-depth assessment of the role of affect and alternative explanations.\textsuperscript{109} Following Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba’s advice to generate as many observable implications of the theory’s hypothesis as possible, the thesis has

\textsuperscript{106} See Lebow and Stein, \textit{We All Lost the Cold War}, 291; Jutta Weldes, \textit{Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis} (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 16.


\textsuperscript{108} See Hall, “We Will Not Swallow This Bitter Fruit,” 523.

broken the two cases down into nine and ten decisions, respectively. This has allowed more tests of the theoretical framework with a greater variety of data.\textsuperscript{110}

It needs to be acknowledged that this research design has certain limitations. A comparison of the cases has to control for the fact that the two episodes are separated by a number of differences: First, while the missile crisis took place in a bipolar system at the height of the Cold War, the Gulf conflict erupted at a time when the East-West confrontation had just come to an end and the United States was at the peak of its “unipolar” moment. The Kennedy administration confronted another superpower, whereas the Bush administration faced a regional power. Moreover, while Cuba is situated within the United States’ immediate sphere of influence, Iraq is located halfway across the world from Washington. It took the Bush administration several weeks to project its force by transporting US troops to the Persian Gulf.\textsuperscript{111}

The two cases are nevertheless comparable because they share some important similarities: Both the Soviet Union of the early 1960s and Iraq of the 1990s were highly centralized and personalized state systems, in which power was concentrated in the hands of a top leader.\textsuperscript{112} Moreover, in both instances, the coercers are US administrations with broadly similar decision-making structures. Finally, it is necessary to point out that the scope conditions of this thesis are limited. Rather than aiming for generalizability, the study seeks to explain the particular coercive diplomacy outcomes in the two crises under investigation.\textsuperscript{113}

\textsuperscript{111} See George and McKeown, “Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making,” 33; King, Keohane, and Verba, \textit{Designing Social Inquiry}, 222.
\textsuperscript{113} See George and Bennett, \textit{Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences}, 110.
1.6.2 Methods

Even though emotions have caught the attention of some political scientists, there has been only limited discussion about how one might go about studying them.\textsuperscript{114} Identifying a person’s affect poses challenges that IR scholars mostly ignore.\textsuperscript{115} After all, emotions are among the least tangible aspects of the human experience. They are private, internal, and subjective phenomena that cannot be directly observed by others. To deal with this methodological problem, psychologists and psycholinguists have developed some useful techniques, from which political scientists can borrow.\textsuperscript{116}

This section is divided into four parts: After providing definitions of “emotion” and other key terms in the first part, it outlines the most important psychological techniques to identify affect in the second part. The third part discusses some of the methodological limitations, and the last part summarizes the method used to gauge the effects of emotions on decision-making.

1.6.2.1 Defining emotion, feeling, mood, sentiment, and affect

The terms emotion, feeling, mood, sentiment, and affect are often used interchangeably in everyday language, but they carry distinct meanings in...
This section clarifies each of them in turn. “Emotions” are defined as transient physiological and psychological processes that help us make decisions with minimal conscious awareness. They are physiological because they involve responses from the central and autonomic nervous systems, and they are psychological because they rely on mental processes to elicit and regulate reactions. Emotions have both a qualitative dimension—people may feel happy, angry, or surprised, for instance—and a quantitative dimension—they may experience these emotions at different degrees of intensity, ranging from mild to overwhelming. The duration of emotions varies, as does the speed of their onset and decline. Sadness, for example, tends to rise and fall slowly, whereas disgust generally reaches its peak rapidly and then quickly dissipates. The term “feeling” refers to the direct and subjective experience of emotion. Even in controlled lab experiments, it is difficult to determine the border between emotion and feeling because of the rapid speed with which the former turns into the latter. Compared to the relatively transient and short-lived character of emotions and feelings, “moods” are longer-lasting and diffuse states. Whereas emotions are triggered by something or someone, moods are not necessarily related to


a specific stimulus. In practice, emotions and moods are often closely intertwined. They can alternate, occur simultaneously, reinforce, or contradict each other. “Sentiment” refers to a long-term emotional attitude that may persist over a lifetime. Being frightened by a nearby dog differs from being afraid of dogs, for instance. The former is a momentary emotional reaction, while the latter is an ongoing emotional attitude. Finally, “affect” is an umbrella term that encompasses all of the above notions. The thesis focuses primarily on emotions. For stylistic reasons, the terms emotion and affect are used interchangeably.

1.6.2.2 Identifying emotions

Psychologists have developed five main techniques to identify emotions indirectly by studying their external representations and bodily manifestations. Some of these methods are useful for IR scholars, and the thesis will borrow aspects of them. The first approach is based on the assumption that people’s affective experiences are reflected by the expressions in their faces. Researchers thus gauge emotions by tracking the movements of subjects’ facial muscles. The second technique explores the physiological conditions related to emotions. After measuring individuals’ heart rate, blood pressure, or skin conductance, their cardiovascular, respiratory, or

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electrodermal activity is assessed.\textsuperscript{128} Third, since the 1990s, psychologists have increasingly become interested in brain-based measures of emotion representations. They make use of functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI), where a person’s head is placed inside a magnetic coil and pictures are produced of the active parts of the brain. These images provide indirect evidence of the affect that she or he may experience.\textsuperscript{129}

None of these three methods is likely to be practical for political scientists who seek to examine the emotions of leaders in the course of their decision-making. There are two further psychological techniques that are more useful for our purpose, however: self-reports and observer reports of emotions. The first approach identifies emotions by assessing subjects’ self-reports of their affective experience. Psychologists obtain concurrent self-reports on a moment-by-moment basis as affect is being experienced or retrospective self-reports about emotions at some point in the past.\textsuperscript{130} It would be difficult to get leaders to systematically document their emotions as they are deliberating about issues of war and peace, but they may consciously or unconsciously provide self-reports about their emotions in their communications. An analysis of their language is thus a useful method to draw inferences about their internal states. To do so, the thesis focuses on policymakers’ verbal expressions during episodes of coercive diplomacy. The starting point is a qualitative analysis of textual sources, such as leaders’ speeches, media interviews, and comments in press conferences. Spontaneous remarks are generally more reliable\textsuperscript{131} than prepared speeches because they are likely to be a more immediate reflection of a policy-

\textsuperscript{128} See ibid., 52. 
\textsuperscript{131} Reliability here refers to the degree to which observed emotion representations reflect the “real” emotions being measured. Because we never have access to “real” emotions, we can only estimate reliability. See ibid., 43.
maker’s emotions.\textsuperscript{132} Self-reports documenting concurrent emotions tend to be more reliable than self-reports about past affective experience.\textsuperscript{133} Finally, spoken language is generally more “involved” and hence better suited to gauge a person’s internal state than written words.\textsuperscript{134} The thesis, therefore, pays particular attention to utterances recorded in minutes of meetings and transcripts of taped conversations.

The second psychological technique to gauge emotions that is useful for IR scholars is the collection of observer reports. These reports are obtained from observers of a target person, such as relatives, colleagues, or even strangers, who make judgments about his or her likely affective state.\textsuperscript{135} Although emotions are internal events, experiments indicate that there is a public aspect that can be captured by spectators. When psychologists asked subjects to sign up for an affect measurement experiment with an acquaintance, they found mostly significant correlations between self-reports and observer reports from peers.\textsuperscript{136} The thesis will thus make use of eyewitness reports about decision-makers’ emotions in memoirs and published interviews.

The use of self-reports and observer reports relies on the assumption that subjects are able and willing to accurately detect and inform about their emotions or someone else’s affective experience. In practice, however, this is often not the case. To begin with, emotions may be so subtle and fleeting that people fail to notice them.

\textsuperscript{133} If leaders prepare their speeches personally, however, these texts may still serve as an indicator of their feelings. See Brian Dille, “The Prepared and Spontaneous Remarks of Presidents Reagan and Bush: A Validity Comparison for At-a-Distance Measurements,” \textit{Political Psychology} 21:3 (2000), 573, 583.
\textsuperscript{135} See Niko Besnier, “Language and Affect,” \textit{Annual Review of Anthropology} 19 (1990), 432.
\textsuperscript{136} See ibid., 50.
Even if they become aware of their own or someone else’s emotions, they may have difficulty describing them.\(^\text{137}\) Furthermore, subjects may not be willing to report accurately on their or other persons’ emotions. In the realm of politics, actors may misrepresent their emotions in different ways.\(^\text{138}\) First, they may try to conceal or downplay them to give the impression of a rational decision-making process. Second, they may exaggerate their feelings, for instance by overstating the affective tension in the reflections on their most challenging moments in office. Third, they may portray their feelings in a way that conforms to social norms. In that case, expressions of emotions reflect more what people believe they should feel in a given situation than what they actually feel, as Todd Hall points out.\(^\text{139}\) Finally, policymakers may express emotions without actually experiencing them as part of a strategy to attain a goal. They may simulate anger to underline their resolve, for example, or they may feign sadness and disappointment to elicit sympathy and support from others.\(^\text{140}\)

To ascertain whether leaders’ affective expressions are likely to be authentic, the thesis pays particular attention to their confidential utterances. If they communicated emotions in diaries, personal letters, or internal discussions with close advisers, it is less probable that they displayed them for strategic purposes.\(^\text{141}\) Yet, decision-makers may employ affect instrumentally in confidential settings as well. They may use it to persuade, motivate, or manipulate their political associates, for instance. This is why the thesis triangulates information from multiple sources wherever this is possible. If emotions manifest themselves across different channels,
this suggests that their expression may have been genuine. The problem of differentiating between the authentic experience of affect and the instrumental use of feigned emotions is compounded by two additional factors: Psychologists have found that actors who simulate an emotion often come to feel it. If a person initially pretends to be angry, for example, she may well end up genuinely experiencing anger. Moreover, the instrumental use of emotions does not necessarily need to be based on the pretense of affect. Actors may purposefully enter a genuine emotional state to achieve a goal. For example, they may deliberately induce anger in themselves to come across as more determined in a bargaining situation.

To identify emotions, this study analyzes what psycholinguists call “emotion terms” in policymakers’ self-reports and in observer reports from eyewitnesses. The thesis distinguishes between two types of emotion terms: Descriptive emotion terms describe the emotions they signify. Words like “afraid,” “hope,” and “humiliated” belong into this category and are especially relevant for this study. Figurative emotion terms also describe emotions but do not literally name them. Examples in English include the phrases “to hold one’s head high” for pride or “having a heavy heart” for sadness. Cross-cultural statistics show that most emotion terms fall into the category of figurative expressions. The expression of affect in texts is not limited to

emotion terms, however. It may also be weaved into the context of discourses.\textsuperscript{147} If the transcript of an internal meeting quoted Saddam Hussein as saying “How dare Bush treat me like that!” for instance, one possible interpretation would be that the Iraqi leader felt insulted by the American president. The thesis thus examines not only emotion terms but also contextual indicators of affect. Table 1.1 below provides a systematic overview of how this method helps to identify the framework’s five key emotions fear, anger, hope, pride, and humiliation.

Some psychologists use content analysis software to quantify emotion terms in texts. Based on the frequency with which certain words appear, they draw inferences about the speakers’ internal states.\textsuperscript{148} This study refrains from employing such statistical methods because their coding procedures have difficulty capturing figurative expressions and implicit references to feelings. What is more, quantitative approaches do not take into account the specific context of each emotion term. This context, however, is important because it shapes the meaning of affect. That is why this thesis uses qualitative hermeneutics to evaluate the content and context of explicit and implicit references to emotions.

\textsuperscript{148} See Wierzbicka and Harkins, “Introduction,” 18.

Table 1.1 Identifying the five key emotions in coercive diplomacy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key emotion</th>
<th>Descriptive emotion terms</th>
<th>Figurative emotion terms</th>
<th>Contextual indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fear</td>
<td>afraid, anxious, fear, panic, frightened</td>
<td>getting wet feet, soiling one’s pants</td>
<td>references to threats, danger, vulnerability, high risks, trembling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>angry, anger, resentment, annoyance, furious, rage, wrath, irritation, indignation, outrage</td>
<td>heat, boiling, seething, blowing up, being mad at someone</td>
<td>references to desire to lash out against perceived source of anger; short sentences, aggressive language, repetitions, rhetorical questions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hope</td>
<td>hope, yearning, aspiration, longing, craving, expectation, wishing for something</td>
<td>“Every cloud has a silver lining”; “it’s always darkest before the dawn”; “there is a light at the end of the tunnel”; “keeping one’s spirits up”; “grasping at straws”; “taking heart”</td>
<td>references to illusions, expectations, goals, likelihoods, possibilities, chance, optimism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pride</td>
<td>pride, proud</td>
<td>holding one’s head high</td>
<td>references to respect, esteem, honor, valor, glory, heroism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humiliation</td>
<td>humiliation, abasement, demeaning, attain, condescending, debasement, degradation, disrespect</td>
<td>being pushed down, lowering</td>
<td>references to perceived insults, affronts, hurt pride, honor, or dignity; complaints about perceived mistreatment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.6.2.3 Methodological limitations

The method that this thesis employs to infer emotions from textual sources is far from perfect. There are at least four psychological complexities to which it cannot do justice:149 First, a person’s expression of emotion is rarely congruent with his or her experience of emotion. Rather, an intricate feedback dynamic is at play: expressions

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shape experiences and vice versa.\textsuperscript{150} An individual who states “I’m angry with you” may find that, just by saying this, he or she has caused the anger to dissipate, for example. Conversely, the articulation of anger may intensify his or her emotion or trigger additional thoughts and emotions.\textsuperscript{151} Since this study relies solely on verbalized self- and observer reports, it captures only a fraction of actors’ affective experiences.

Second, an emotion elicited in one situation may have an impact on a person’s judgment and behavior in another situation. As a result, it can be hard for people to ascertain whether their current emotions are reactions to the situation at hand—what psychologists call “integral” emotions—or “incidental” emotions carried over from other unrelated events.\textsuperscript{152} The thesis will, therefore, make the simplifying assumption that the emotions under consideration are generally integral, unless there are clear signs that they may be incidental.

Third, it can be difficult to correctly interpret the cultural and personal idiosyncrasies of decision-makers. Certain words or expressions may carry affective connotations with which the analyst is not familiar. Scholars may miss out on instances of irony or sarcasm that give emotion terms a special meaning, for example. Finally, emotions expressed in words are only one part of an overall message. Left out are nonverbal expressions, such as tone of voice and facial movements, which tend to be important means to communicate affect.\textsuperscript{153}

\textsuperscript{150} See Parkinson, Fischer, and Manstead, \textit{Emotion in Social Relations}, 28.
1.6.2.4 Gauging the effects of emotions on decision-making

Once a leader’s emotions are identified, the question arises whether and, if so, how they influenced her or his decision-making. Some readers may wonder whether emotions are not too fleeting and short-lived to shape choice behavior in any sustained way. Neurological brain scans do, indeed, suggest that the intensity of an emotion can fade away in a matter of seconds and generally does not last more than a few minutes. This does not necessarily mean that the impact of people’s overall affective experience on decision-making is also brief, however. After all, emotions evolve and change over time. They intensify, dissipate, and intensify again in a dynamic process. It is through their cumulation that emotions shape choice behavior.\(^{154}\)

Psychologists assume that emotions influence decision-making through two pathways that are not mutually exclusive: They can exert causal and/or constitutive effects.\(^{155}\) A causal effect describes a relationship in which a condition X generates an effect Y. It is about the relation between events and changes in properties. The assumption is that X is temporally prior to and thus independent from Y. Since causation takes time, it is conceived as a process. According to this logic, every cause is brought about by something else. In theory, this chain of causation can be traced back indefinitely.\(^{156}\) When emotions have a causal impact, they occur prior to the effect they exert on the process of preference construction and are independent from it. Constitutive effects, on the other hand, relate to the properties that make up an entity.

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That entity is dependent on the ingredients that constitute it.\textsuperscript{157} The constitutive effects of properties may be said to vary on the basis of their constituting conditions, but the relationship reflected in this variation is conceptual rather than causal.\textsuperscript{158}

According to this logic, any part of an entity can be further decomposed into its own constitutive components.\textsuperscript{159} When emotions exert a constitutive effect on the process of preference construction, that process contains emotions as component parts. It is imbued with emotions and conceptually dependent on them.\textsuperscript{160}

In practice, it is difficult to distinguish between the causal and constitutive effects of emotions. The thesis therefore makes the simplifying assumption that they generally exert constitutive effects. It is assumed that emotions shape choice behavior by constituting the preferences of agents. Serving as cues in decision-making, emotions make some preferences possible and others not. They define the boundaries of the kind of decisions that actors consider taking.\textsuperscript{161} According to this perspective, emotions permeate social life. Together with ideas, they give material factors the explanatory role that they have for actors by investing them with meaning.\textsuperscript{162}

In light of the intangible nature of affect, it is hard to demonstrate, let alone “prove,” its impact on the construction of preferences. To assess if emotion exerted any influence, the thesis employs Karin Fierke’s modified form of process tracing. While the original technique seeks to reconstruct the links between causes and


\textsuperscript{159} See Ylikoski, “Causal and Constitutive Explanation Compared,” 10.


\textsuperscript{162} See Fearon and Wendt, “Rationalism v. Constructivism,” 60.
observed outcomes, Fierke’s version is geared toward the analysis of constitutive relationships. Her revised approach aims to identify changes in meaning attached to norms, identities, and emotions by analyzing the language of the actors involved. If the self- and observer reports mentioned above provide converging evidence that emotions figured before and during critical junctures of the decision process, this would increase our confidence that they may have exerted a constitutive effect on the formation of preferences.

It is not my intention to construe a one-dimensional explanation in which affect represents the single overriding driving force of decision-making. Once triggered, it is always one element among many that all play some role and that are often related in complex ways. The degree of its influence varies from decision to decision. In many instances, affect will function as a minor contributing factor. In some cases, it may not exert any effect at all. Even if people experience and express affect, it may not necessarily influence their choice behavior. Occasionally, however, affect may be so intense that it becomes the primary force shaping decision-making.

The thesis relies on a fourfold typology to assess the relevance of the five key emotions anger, fear, hope, pride, and humiliation in target leaders’ construction of preferences. This makes it possible to weigh the explanatory power of the emotional choice framework against that of conventional accounts. First, if there is no evidence that any of these emotions had any impact, they are considered irrelevant. Second, if

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165 To indicate the tentative nature of such findings, the thesis deliberately uses terms like “seems,” “appears,” “may,” “likely,” and “probably.”
166 See, for example, Hall, “Sympathetic States,” 382.
one or more of them constrain or reinforce a process of preference construction that is primarily motivated by other factors, they are seen as relevant secondary variables. Third, if any of the five key emotions influence preference construction to a degree that is similar to the impact of other factors, they are regarded as important variables that provide a complementary explanation. Finally, if one or more of these emotions are themselves the primary factors shaping the construction of preferences, they are viewed as critical variables that present an alternative explanation to existing accounts.  

Table 1.2 Typology of the relevance of the five key emotions in comparison with existing explanations of preference construction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role of emotions</th>
<th>Relevance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) emotions do not exert any effect on preference construction</td>
<td>irrelevant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) emotions constrain or reinforce preference construction that is primarily shaped by other factors</td>
<td>relevant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) emotions influence preference construction that is shaped by other factors to a similar extent</td>
<td>important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) emotions are the primary factors influencing preference construction</td>
<td>critical</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.6.3 Sources

For both the Cuban missile crisis and the Gulf conflict there is a rich body of sources available to explore top-level decision-making. The Russian material ranges from autobiographical reflections by Nikita Khrushchev and his political associates to

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167 I thank Louise Fawcett and Rosemary Foot for the idea of developing a typology.

168 Khrushchev started recording his memoirs in 1966-67. During the next decades, various parts of his autobiographical reflections were smuggled to the West and published in different editions in 1971, 1974, and 1990. In the second half of the 2000s, Khrushchev’s son, Sergei Khrushchev, released a three-volume edition of his father’s memoirs. See Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers (London: Andre Deutsch, 1971); ibid., Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament (London: Andre Deutsch, 1974); ibid., Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and
oral history interviews with eyewitnesses\textsuperscript{170} and archival records. The Kremlin archives have released important government files, such as protocols of the Presidium of the Central Committee, the Soviet Union’s top decision-making body, some cable traffic between Moscow and the Russian embassies in Havana, New York, and Washington, D.C., as well as some of the correspondence between Fidel Castro and the Soviet premier.\textsuperscript{171} The Russian sources are complemented with American material from the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library in Boston, where the National Security Files have been fruitful. Moreover, the thesis makes use of the government documents printed in the State Department’s \textit{Foreign Relations of the United States} volumes\textsuperscript{172} and of JFK’s secret recordings of the discussions with his adviser during the crisis.\textsuperscript{173}


To reconstruct Saddam Hussein’s perspective, the study relies on internal Iraqi regime files that were captured by US armed forces from government buildings in and around Baghdad during the early phase of the War in Iraq in 2003. This material was first examined by the Institute of Defense Analysis on behalf of the US Department of Defense. Electronic copies of about 1,200 records filling around 34,000 pages were then passed on to the Conflict Records Research Center (CRRC) at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C. Of the CRRC records, Saddam Hussein’s audio and video collections have been especially useful. The Iraqi leader frequently taped his meetings with advisers and foreign visitors. These recordings of policy-making at the heart of power in Baghdad provide an extraordinary opportunity to explore the thinking and feeling of Saddam Hussein and his associates. The study benefits greatly from the CRRC’s transcripts and translations.

As insightful as this Iraqi material is, it comes with certain limitations. Some of Saddam Hussein’s most important meetings were not recorded, some tapes are incomplete, and some of the information in the files cannot be taken at face value. Just because the Iraqi president or his advisers made a claim in a meeting does not mean that it is true or even that they believed it to be correct, as Kevin Woods, David Palkki, and Mark Stout point out. Aides sometimes misinformed Saddam Hussein because they feared he would punish messengers of unwanted news, for example. On other occasions, they may have misrepresented facts because they wanted to withhold them from their peers or because they may themselves have been misinformed or

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175 Whether the participants in these sessions knew that they were being taped is often not clear. See Woods, Palkki and Stout, The Saddam Tapes, 2, 3-5, 8.
confused. It would thus be misleading to assume that these sources fully reveal the beliefs, motives, and emotions of the Iraqi leader and his advisers.\footnote{See ibid., 11. See also Jervis, “Images and the Gulf War,” 173; Lebow, Forbidden Fruit, 32; Kevin M. Woods, The Mother of All Battles: Saddam Hussein’s Strategic Plan for the Persian Gulf War (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2008), xv.}


To place these sources into a wider context, the study also makes use of Iraqi and regional news reports collected by the US Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and of the global media coverage of the conflict. Finally, the case study draws from declassified US government documents about the Gulf conflict from the George H. W. Bush Presidential Library in College Station, Texas. This material includes reports from the American embassy in Baghdad that provide an outside perspective on Saddam Hussein and his regime. Among the most valuable collections are the papers of National Security Council (NSC) staffers Richard Haass and Roman Popadiuk.

1.7 Overview of the thesis

The remainder of the thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 develops a theory of emotional choice to analyze how target leaders’ affect influences their decision-making during episodes of coercive diplomacy: After a review of the constructivist and general IR literature on the role of emotions in world politics, the chapter lays the
ontological ground for a combination of social constructivism and research in psychology. The core of the framework outlines how the five key emotions fear, anger, hope, pride, and humiliation may influence target leaders’ construction of preferences.

The framework is then applied in two case studies. Chapter 3 examines nine major decisions by Nikita Khrushchev during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. It finds that an analysis of the Soviet premier’s emotions advances our understanding of his overall choice behavior. His anger at John F. Kennedy’s sea blockade and his hope that he would ultimately get away with the missile operation influenced his decision to defy US threats during the first two days of the crisis. During the last four days, however, Khrushchev’s growing fear that the American president would lose control of the situation and the absence or low level of pride, hope, anger, and humiliation constituted his preference for complying with US demands.

Chapter 4 investigates ten major decisions by Saddam Hussein in the course of the Gulf conflict in 1990-91. It asserts that the Iraqi leader’s preference for holding on to Kuwait was not objectively derived but emotionally constructed. His pride at his successful invasion of the emirate, his hope that he might be able to deter the United States from attacking, and his anger at the Bush administration’s perceived injustice shaped his refusal to withdraw his troops. Moreover, his intransigence in the face of all adversity was facilitated by his identity as a daring Arab knight who was not supposed to be afraid of threats. Chapter 5 summarizes the principal findings of the study and suggests how future research could build on the theoretical and empirical work of the thesis.
2. A theory of emotional choice

During the last two decades, psychologists have found that emotions shape our decision-making in important ways: They inform us what we like and what we loathe, what is good and bad for us, and whether we do right or wrong. They give meaning to our relationships with others, and they generate impulses to act.¹ Drawing from research in experimental and cross-cultural psychology, this chapter presents a theory of emotional choice to analyze the ways in which target leaders’ affect enters into their decision-making during episodes of coercive diplomacy. The theory is developed in eight steps, which move from the general to the specific: Sections 1 to 3 provide the foundation of the theoretical framework. The first section focuses on the role of emotions in mainstream IR constructivist work, while the second section reviews the general literature on the impact of affect on world politics. The third section lays the ontological ground for a combination of social constructivism and emotion research.

Sections 4 to 8 encompass the core of the framework. Drawing on research in psychology, the fourth section shows that the elicitation, experience, and regulation of emotions are strongly related to people’s cultural ideas, norms, and identities. While the fifth section summarizes the two general mechanisms through which affect helps to constitute preferences, the sixth section sketches the characteristics of five specific emotions, namely fear, anger, hope, pride, and humiliation. The seventh section establishes the link between these findings in psychology and the decision-making of leaders who are targets of coercive threats. Even when emotions produce powerful

impulses, humans will not necessarily act on them. The last section thus incorporates culture, agency, and individual dispositions as important mediating factors.

2.1 International Relations constructivism and emotions

Constructivist IR scholars have argued persuasively that ideas, norms, and identities influence how humans act. While conventional rationalists adhere to a logic of consequences, where agents weigh costs and benefits, constructivists assume a logic of appropriateness, according to which rules and self-conceptions affect thinking and behavior. What people and states do is shaped by who they think they are and what they believe is right.²

Preoccupied with the role of ideas, thoughts, and beliefs, constructivists long neglected the impact of emotions on international relations. Nicholas Onuf, for example, briefly refers to “love” and “esteem” as “basic human needs” in his classic *World of Our Making*, but he does not explain what that might mean for people’s attitudes or behavior.³ In his study on Middle Eastern diplomacy during the twentieth century, Michael Barnett makes the interesting point that the Arab League and other institutional expressions of Arab nationalism were “founded on sentiment and emotions and not on interests.” Yet, he does not elaborate on this apparent role of affect any further.⁴ Alexander Wendt’s argument that interests are “not ideas *all the way down*” seems to be more promising at first sight.⁵ According to his “rump materialist ‘theory’ of human nature,” human beings have five fundamental material

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⁵ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 132, emphasis in original.
needs: physical security, ontological security, sociation, self-esteem, and transcendence. When these needs are met, people experience “the emotion of satisfaction.” When they are denied, “we experience anxiety, fear, or frustration.” He notes that these “unconscious processes” in world politics “need to be considered more systematically,” but he does not make any effort to explore them. He ultimately treats identities and interests as “cognitive phenomena,” and emotions remain locked up in his rump materialism.

Other prominent constructivists simply ignore affect. Peter Katzenstein and the contributors of his path-breaking volume The Culture of National Security omit them from their analyses. Ted Hopf, Ian Hurd, Jeffrey Legro, Christian Reus-Smit, Nina Tannenwald, and Jutta Weldes do not pay any attention to them in their important works, either. Some scholars go so far as to negate the role of emotions. John Ruggie, for instance, conceptualizes the “we-feeling” among members of a security community not as an affective phenomenon but as a purely “cognitive bond.” In Emanuel Adler’s eyes, these communities develop “more from knowing ‘who I am’ and ‘who the other is’ than from some mutual ‘feeling’ that people […]

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6 See ibid., 131-32.
7 Ibid., 132.
8 Ibid., 278.
9 Ibid., 319.
10 See Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security. An exception in this volume is Martha Finnemore, who takes into consideration that “identification emphasizes the affective relationships between actors” and “is an ordinal concept, allowing for degrees of affect as well as changes in the focus of affect.” See Finnemore, “Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention,” in Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security, 160.
may have towards one other.” Consequently, he conceives of the evolution of security communities “not as a matter of feelings, emotions, and affection, but as a cognitive process through which common identities are created.”

Only a few mainstream constructivists have taken issue with this disregard of affect. According to Friedrich Kratochwil, it is “hardly excusable that the question of what role sentiments play in the constitution of the social and moral world has been so neglected.” This leads him to call for a “much-needed corrective” to the tradition of examining political and social phenomena solely through cognitive lenses. For “leaving unanalyzed the feelings behind the thoughts, the issues of sympathy and approbation, of solidarity, and, unfortunately, also of hate, is not simply an omission,” he notes. “It is to fail in the very effort of providing a coherent account of social reality.” Similarly, Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink criticize that “affect and empathy have been swept under the carpet in recent decades.” The result is “politics without passion or principles, which is hardly the politics of the world in which we live.” Another eminent constructivist, Neta Crawford, calls on IR scholars to use findings in psychology and neuroscience to investigate the influence of emotions on international phenomena. “How we think and feel about ourselves and others is as important as the brute facts of anarchy or military technology,” she points out.

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15 Ibid., 197.


17 See Crawford, “The Passion of World Politics,” 116-56. A couple of scholars anticipated some of the recent work about the relationship between emotions and politics as early as in the 1970s. Irving L. Janis and Leon Mann incorporated “hot cognitions,” such as stress, into their theory of decision-
2.2 The emotional turn in International Relations

Crawford’s call has been eagerly taken up by a younger generation of IR scholars. Since the early 2000s, the field has seen an upsurge of research into the role of affect in world politics across different issue areas and from diverse theoretical perspectives. A number of scholars explore the workings of specific emotions. Ken Booth, Nicholas Wheeler, and Omar Shahabudin McDoom, for example, identify fear as a critical factor inhibiting the resolution of inter-group conflict. David Wright-Neville examines how anger motivates terrorist behavior, while Cigdem Sirin and her colleagues explore how this emotion influences US public opinion regarding intervention in civil wars. Todd Hall sheds light on Beijing’s behavior in the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995-96 by analyzing its “diplomacy of anger” after Washington’s perceived violation of the “One-China” policy. Alex Danchev and Paul Saurette maintain that the experience of humiliation after the attacks at the United States on September 11, 2001, contributed to US torture practices in the “war on terror.” According to Khaled Fattah, Karin Fierke, and Victoria Fontan, feelings of degradation have also served as a powerful motivation for political violence on the


21 See Hall, “We Will Not Swallow This Bitter Fruit,” 521. Drawing on Erving Goffman and Robert Jervis, Hall’s PhD dissertation develops the notion of “emotional idioms” to analyze state-level displays of anger, guilt, and sympathy. See Hall, “Emotional States?”

part of extremists in the Middle East. Finally, some studies explore the ways in which humiliation inflicted by foreign powers has shaped Chinese national identity.

The role of positive emotions has been taken into account, too. Todd Hall identifies sympathy with America’s plight after September 11 as an important factor to explain why China and Russia tolerated US military operations in their Central Asian backyard. Reinhard Wolf makes the case that feelings of respect promote solidarity and facilitate international cooperation. Martha Nussbaum argues that love can foster a commitment to shared goals in societies, inspiring individuals to sacrifice for the “common good.”

While these works are instructive, their focus on a single emotion covers only a small part of the affective spectrum. Research in psychology indicates that our feelings are in constant flux. To capture this dynamic experience, it is useful to include more emotions in the analysis and to explore the effects of their interaction.

Jacques Hymans concentrates on fear and pride to elucidate why state leaders acquire nuclear weapons. Daniel Bar-Tal explores the relationship between fear and hope to

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shed light on the evolution of inter-group conflict. Blema Steinberg compares to what extent shame and humiliation affected the Vietnam decisions of US presidents from the 1950s to the 1970s. Conceiving of emotions as resources similar to weapons, Roger Petersen investigates how political groups in the Balkans have made strategic use of anger, fear, resentment, contempt, and hatred to influence European and US policy. Some political scientists have moved beyond such a focus on discrete emotions to investigate the role of emotional beliefs, concepts, practices, and discourses.

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31 See Blema S. Steinberg, Shame and Humiliation: Presidential Decision Making on Vietnam (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996). See also ibid., “Shame and Humiliation in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” 653-90.
32 See Petersen, Western Intervention in the Balkans, 16, 23, 24, 60, 297.
33 The term “discrete emotion” refers to a single emotion like anger, for example. See Izard, “Forms and Functions of Emotions,” 372.
The great majority of IR studies on the role of emotions concentrate on the level of large groups or states. Only a few scholars have analyzed how affect influences individual actors. Jonathan Mercer asserts that President Harry S. Truman’s decision to defend South Korea in 1950 was critically shaped by emotion. Stephen Rosen makes the case that affect-based pattern recognition can help to account for important US national security decisions, such as President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s intervention on the side of Great Britain during World War II. Using Israeli prime ministers as case studies, Brent Sasley posits that leaders who feel strongly about a foreign policy object are more likely to rely on an affect heuristic when making decisions regarding that object.38

The accounts reviewed in this section shed light on a wide array of affective phenomena across different issue areas and levels of analysis. Collectively, they represent the first phase of an “emotional turn” in International Relations that establishes affect as a key variable. This study builds on some of these efforts to examine the workings of the “passions” in world politics. Especially the scholarship on the role of discrete emotions and on the impact of affect on the decision-making of individual policymakers provides a useful foundation. What distinguishes this thesis from the existing accounts is that it presents the first attempt to systematically explore how a wider spectrum of emotions influences leaders’ choice behavior in the course of a foreign policy crisis.

2.3 Laying the ontological ground

The aim of this chapter is to develop a theoretical framework that can be applied to political leaders in different societies. The structure and make-up of such a framework is contingent on how emotions are conceptualized. If they are treated as universal entities with the same characteristics across the world, the theory would gain in parsimony. If emotions are viewed as culturally specific phenomena, the framework would gain in complexity because the socio-cultural background of each actor would need to be taken into account.

Psychologists have long debated whether emotions are universal entities. Naturalists have argued that all humans share a set of at least six “basic” emotions that are close to the English notions of joy, fear, anger, disgust, sadness, and surprise. Having conducted studies in dozens of countries on several continents, they found that the facial expressions of these emotions are universally produced and recognized. Since these expressions appear to have consistent meanings across cultures, naturalists have assumed that the underlying emotions are biologically innate. 39

Culturalists, on the other hand, have contended that even the most basic emotions are cultural constructions that are anything but predetermined by nature. In their eyes, we need to explore the culture-specific meanings of emotions to explain how people behave during affective experiences. For example, the closest counterpart of the Anglo-American emotion “anger” in another culture may be something that is closer to what Americans would call “irritation” or “moral outrage.” Rather than carrying a universal semantic content, emotions are deeply embedded in their social contexts,

according to culturalists. More recently, psychologists David Matsumoto and Linda Juang have made the case that naturalist and culturalist approaches can be reconciled. They propose that humans are born with the capacity to experience, express, and perceive emotions. At least six basic emotions are similar across the world. At the same time, however, cultural ideas, norms, and identities influence when, where, and how people feel emotions. This thesis adopts this synthetic view. To analyze the mutual constitution of emotions on the one hand and ideas, norms, and identities on the other, a constructivist framework is particularly suitable.

Some readers may be skeptical about this effort to combine research in psychology and social constructivism because the two fields are based on different ontological premises. Psychologists have traditionally regarded affect as intra-subjective. Since it depends on an individual’s personal beliefs and perceptions, different subjects are likely to respond to the same event with distinct emotions. Constructivists, in contrast, view actors as products of social interactions. They assume that people’s and states’ preferences and behavior are shaped by the collectives to which they belong. Drawing on European social theory, they argue that


41 See Matsumoto and Juang, *Culture and Psychology*, 259.

actors cannot be understood apart from the milieux in which they live.\textsuperscript{43} According to Alexander Wendt, constructivism’s emphasis on social structures is difficult to reconcile with the individualism of psychology.\textsuperscript{44} This has led some scholars to draw the conclusion that the two fields are incompatible.\textsuperscript{45}

Such pessimism is not warranted, however. On the one hand, constructivism is not a purely structural approach. Michael Barnett, for example, remarks that “[a]ctors are not simply the bearers of social roles and enactors of social norms; they also are artful and active interpreters of them.”\textsuperscript{46} James March and Johan Olsen stress that the logic of appropriateness “is explicitly a logic of individual action,” which is “as individualistic […] as […] the logic of consequences.”\textsuperscript{47} A number of constructivists examine the role of individual political leaders, policy experts, and norm entrepreneurs in bringing about change.\textsuperscript{48} Kathryn Sikkink, for instance, proposes a


\textsuperscript{44} See Fearon and Wendt, “Rationalism v. Constructivism,” 58; Wendt, \textit{Social Theory of International Politics}, 335.

\textsuperscript{45} Andrew A. G. Ross, for instance, argues that “common presuppositions in orthodox constructivism in fact obstruct the study of affect and its role in social and political life” and that “constructivism needs to rethink its attachments to reflective agency, ideational processes, and symbolic meaning.” See Ross, “Coming In From the Cold: Constructivism and Emotions,” \textit{European Journal of International Relations} 12:2 (2006), 197. Likewise, Todd H. Hall and Andrew A. G. Ross contend that “one cannot concede an affective dimension to rationalist or constructivist concepts and leave their models of actorhood intact – affective dynamics entail properties that defy integration into existing approaches.” See Hall and Ross, “Affected Actors: Theorizing Affective Politics After 9/11,” Paper presented at the International Relations Colloquium, University of Oxford, November 21, 2013, 6.

\textsuperscript{46} Barnett, \textit{Dialogues in Arab Politics}, 27. See also Adler, \textit{Communitarian International Relations}, 92.


\textsuperscript{48} See, for example, Thomas M. Dolan, “Unthinkable and Tragic: The Psychology of Weapons Taboos in War,” \textit{International Organization} 67:1 (2013), 37-63; Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink,
framework of “agentic” constructivism to explore how actors promote new ideas and practices. This fits with what Christian Reus-Smit and others call “unit-level” constructivism, which focuses on the norms and identities of individuals. On the other hand, it is misleading to characterize emotion research as purely individual-oriented. In the late 1990s, some psychologists started questioning the assumption that affect is a strictly individual phenomenon. Their experiments have indicated that most of the issues that persons get emotional about are social in one way or another. Consequently, they have conceived of emotions as socio-cultural phenomena that originate in relationships between people. Bringing together emotion research and social constructivism is thus not as difficult as some scholars suggest. Emotion research can help to uncover the affective micro-foundations of preference formations, while constructivism can contribute a rigorous analysis of the social and cultural factors that shape emotions.

2.4 The process of emotion

Appraisal theories in psychology conceive of emotions as processes rather than states. To comprehend how emotions influence decision-making, it is necessary to gain a


51 See Parkinson, Fischer, and Manstead, Emotion in Social Relations, 10.


basic understanding of these processes. Appraisal theorists assume that each emotion process is made up of various components, whose sequence may vary and which may overlap. These components include the elicitation, experience, and regulation of emotion as well as its appraisal tendencies and action tendencies. Each of these components is shaped by a person’s norms and identity. The remainder of this section provides some information about how emotions are elicited, experienced, and regulated. This background knowledge will be useful when the framework is later applied in the empirical case studies. The next section will then outline how the appraisal and action tendencies of emotions influence decision-making.

2.4.1 The elicitation of emotion

According to appraisal theories, most emotions are elicited as we identify events that are positively or negatively relevant to our wellbeing. This process can be rapid and automatic or more or less conscious. The underlying assumption is that our affective responses depend not on the objective characteristics of stimulus events but on the way we interpret the meaning of these events. Cultural ideas, norms, and identities help to define what qualifies as a relevant occasion for emotion. Similar situations may thus trigger distinct emotions in individuals from different cultural backgrounds. For example, experiments have shown that the experience of failure generates different emotions in Americans and Japanese. While Americans tend to get angry


and blame external factors, Japanese are more likely to feel shame and blame themselves.57

2.4.2 The experience of emotion

The experience of emotions is also subject to cultural variation. To analyze the impact of culture on emotions, the sociologist Arlie Russell Hochschild developed the notion of “feeling rules.” These are socially learned culture-specific norms that specify what type, extent, and duration of emotion is appropriate or inappropriate in a given situation.58 Hochschild found that different societies propagate distinct feeling rules. In British culture, feeling rules stipulate that one should be sad at funerals, for instance. If a person attends a memorial service of a distant relative and is initially in a good mood that day because she just won the lottery, these norms will suggest a change in her affective state to experience sadness.59 Evolutionary psychologists assume that feeling rules facilitate social coordination and enable groups to function effectively.60 Moreover, people’s experience of emotions is also influenced by their identities. Following Richard Ned Lebow, identity is defined as a set of beliefs about who we are, which connect us to and differentiate us from others.61 Gender role identities, for example, influence when and how people feel sad. Males who have

60 See Matsumoto and Hwang, “Culture and Emotion,” 95.
internalized the admonition “Big boys don’t cry” have been found to experience this emotion at a lower level of intensity.62

2.4.3 The regulation of emotion

When we appraise events as relevant to our wellbeing, we cannot simply decide what to feel or what not to feel. We do not have full control over what we become emotional about. That does not mean that we are slaves of our passions, however. As the notion of feeling rules above has indicated, it is possible for us to try and regulate what elicits our emotions and how we experience and express them.63 In a Western cultural context, many examples of emotion regulation that come to mind involve decreasing the experience of negative emotions, such as fear, anger, or sadness. Emotion regulation is not limited to down-regulation, however, as psychologist James Gross points out. It can also involve maintaining or increasing feelings. When we share good news with others, for instance, we prolong its pleasant effects.64

Emotion researchers have identified various strategies that people across different cultures use to regulate their affect. For the purpose of this framework, three of these strategies are particularly relevant. First, “expressive suppression” refers to more or less conscious efforts to inhibit the expression of feelings, such as facial mimic, gestures, or verbal utterances. People may seek to hide the anger that they feel toward a superior or the anxiety they experience in the course of an oral exam, for example. While this strategy may help to conceal the emotion from others,

64 See Gross, “Emotion Regulation,” 500.
researchers have found that it generally does not reduce the underlying affective experience. Second, “attentional deployment” relates to conscious or unconscious attempts to redirect attention in a way that alters the trajectory of an emotional episode. By regulating affect through distraction, this strategy aims to engage in thoughts and feelings that are unrelated to the emotion-eliciting event. This can result in wishful thinking—or rather, wishful feeling—in that people may imagine themselves to be in a different situation in order to regulate their affect. They may use humor to distract themselves from the experience of fear, for instance. A third strategy to regulate emotion is “situation selection” or “modification.” This refers to efforts to select or modify situations in a way that increases or decreases the likelihood that certain feelings will arise. For example, individuals may choose situations that they believe will trigger feelings they would like to have, or they may avoid situations that might bring about feelings that they would prefer not to experience.

2.5 The impact of emotions on decision-making

Having outlined the process of emotion in the previous section, this section sets out how affect influences decision-making. According to rational choice theorists, a decision process consists of three main stages: When confronting a decision task, actors first identify alternative options. Then they calculate the expected costs and

benefits of each option, and, finally, they choose the course of action that best advances their interests.\textsuperscript{68}

Constructivists have rightly argued that this rationalist perspective leaves a central component of the decision process unexplained: Individuals generally do not simply “have” interests or preferences but go through a process of constructing them in the course of decision-making. This process is shaped by a variety of factors, such as inter-subjective ideas, norms, knowledge, memory, and identities.\textsuperscript{69} What constructivists have neglected, however, is that preferences are not only socially but also emotionally constructed. Psychologists have found that affect may exert critical effects on the formation of interests. They suggest that it does so through two general pathways: Affect shapes \textit{how} people think through its “appraisal tendencies,” and it influences \textit{what} they think through its “action tendencies.”\textsuperscript{70} This section outlines these two mechanisms in the abstract. The subsequent section will then illustrate how they operate in the case of five specific emotions.

\textbf{2.5.1 Appraisal tendencies}

In the course of their research into the impact of affect on decision-making, psychologists Jennifer Lerner and Dacher Keltner found that specific emotions influence how individuals think through specific “appraisal tendencies.” These are innate predispositions to organize cognition in a way that puts humans in a position to

\textsuperscript{68} See Allison and Zelikow, \textit{Essence of Decision}, 27; Alex Mintz and Karl DeRouen, \textit{Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 4.


deal with the event that evoked the emotion. An appraisal tendency shapes how people think in at least three ways: First, it can affect what information they pay attention to. Experiments suggest that subjects who are induced to be angry, for instance, tend to be particularly receptive to cues implying that another individual is to blame for an issue. Sad participants, on the other hand, are more open to information indicating that non-human situational forces are responsible. Second, appraisal tendencies may alter the quality and quantity of information processing. A series of studies has shown that the experience of happiness, for example, tends to result in shallow processing, whereas feelings of hope are associated with more systematic and complex thinking. Finally, appraisal tendencies can influence decision-makers’ risk perceptions. Sad persons have been found to be biased in favor of high-risk and high-reward preferences, for instance, while anxious people are predisposed to low-risk and low-reward options.

2.5.2 Action tendencies

While the appraisal tendencies of emotions shape how we think, their action tendencies influence what we think. Action tendencies are impulses to take certain actions that have proved to be evolutionarily adaptive responses to universal

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74 See Rajagopal Raghunathan and Michel Tuan Pham, “All Negative Moods Are Not Equal: Motivational Influences of Anxiety and Sadness on Decision Making,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 79:1 (1999), 56.
experiences. They can mobilize energy and give direction to decision-making because they are often supported by physiological changes. A heightened heart rate or releases of hormones, for example, prepare the body for certain responses, such as escaping imminent danger or striking out against an unavoidable menace.

It is important to note that action tendencies, such as wanting to flee, differ from actions, like running away. Psychologists stress that the former does not necessarily lead to the latter. There is no law-like relationship between emotions and behavior because human beings generally interpose a process of preference construction. This process is influenced by many other factors besides affect, such as situational constraints, conflicting attitudes, or countervailing imperatives. Fear, for instance, generally leads mice to flee, but human beings tend to have more flexibility in that they can try to analyze the situation and to regulate their feelings. The experience of anxiety may thus prod actors to define their interests in a way that broadly conforms to the action tendency of the emotion. When people experience fear of war, for example, they will rarely run out of their homes—unless they believe that the building they are in is about to be bombed—but they are likely to develop a preference for preventing, avoiding, or reducing the danger.

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The extent to which an action tendency influences decision-making is largely a function of the intensity with which the respective emotion is experienced. At low and moderate levels of intensity, affect tends to play an “advisory” role. At higher levels, it can have an increasingly powerful impact up to the point that it becomes the primary factor driving the construction of preferences. At the most extreme end of the spectrum, emotions may exert direct effects on behavior circumventing conscious decision-making altogether.

2.6 Five key emotions in coercive diplomacy

The previous section has outlined the two general mechanisms—appraisal and action tendencies—through which affect can shape actors’ thinking as they construct their preferences. This section develops the core of the theoretical framework by synthesizing the psychological scholarship on five key emotions that leaders may feel during episodes of coercive diplomacy, namely fear, anger, hope, pride, and humiliation. This focus on specific emotions is in line with the dominant perspective in psychology that regards emotions as discrete entities with specific appraisal and action tendencies. It is of note, however, that this paradigm has recently been criticized by some emotion researchers. Lisa Feldman Barrett, for example, argues that it is futile to explore the characteristics of individual emotions like anger, sadness, or fear because these categories do not exist as real natural entities. While this study

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81 See Ekman, Emotions Revealed, xiii; Loewenstein and Lerner, “The Role of Affect in Decision Making,” 620, 627.
adheres to the dominant view of emotions as discrete entities, it does take some of this
criticism on board. Feldman Barrett is right that affective experience often transcends
emotion categories. After all, emotions develop and fluctuate over time. They rise,
decline, and transform themselves depending on environmental stimuli and intra-
psychic changes. Such a dynamic perspective suggests that humans can experience a
wide range of emotions, with transitional states between discrete emotion
categories.\(^{84}\)

As a result, the thesis conceives of the five key emotions under investigation
as “prototypes.” Introduced by Eleanor Rosch, a prototype is defined as the clearest
example of a category (e.g. chair) that lies between a superordinate category (e.g.
furniture) and subordinate categories (e.g. kitchen chair, living room chair, etc.). To
judge whether other entities (e.g. baby chair, table, car) fit into that category, they are
compared with that prototype.\(^{85}\) Each of the five emotions under consideration in this
thesis constitutes a category with a set of prototypical characteristics. They all share
the superordinate category of “emotion,” and they have various sets of subordinate
categories, which include affective experiences of varying intensity. Anger, for
instance, comprises irritation, annoyance, frustration, fury, and rage among others as
subordinate categories.\(^{86}\) According to Rosch, most categories do not have clear-cut

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\(^{84}\) See Phoebe C. Ellsworth and Klaus R. Scherer, “Appraisal Processes in Emotion,” in Davidson,
Scherer, and Goldsmith, eds., *Handbook of Affective Sciences*, 574; Allan Filippowicz, Sigal Barsade,
and Shimul Melwani, “Understanding Emotional Transitions: The Interpersonal Consequences of
Peter Kuppens, Zita Oravecz, and Francis Tuerlinckx, “Feelings Change: Accounting for Individual
(2010), 1042; Marwan Sinaceur, Hajo Adam, Gerben A. Van Kleef, and Adam D. Galinsky, “The
Advantages of Being Unpredictable: How Emotional Inconsistency Extracts Concessions in

\(^{85}\) See Eleanor Rosch, “Principles of Categorization,” in George Mather, Frans Verstraten, and Stuart

\(^{86}\) See Williams, “Developing a Functional View of Pride in the Interpersonal Domain,” 9; David Yau-
faï Ho, Wai Fu, and S. M. Ng, “Guilt, Shame and Embarrassment: Revelations of Face and Self,”
boundaries.\textsuperscript{87} A chaise longue, literally a “long chair,” for example, illustrates the overlap between the prototypes chair, sofa, and bed.\textsuperscript{88} The fact that different emotions can co-occur and meld is an indicator of the porousness of emotional prototypes. Individuals may simultaneously experience two or more emotions that are complementary, disparate, or contradictory in terms of their valence.\textsuperscript{89} Winning a painting at an auction may elicit relief and happiness, for instance. At the same time, the successful bidder may harbor growing concern about how his partner will respond, once she learns that he spent the equivalent of their monthly salaries on the artwork.\textsuperscript{90} Such mixed feelings are likely to vary in intensity and duration. As a consequence, their combined appraisal and action tendencies are hard to predict.\textsuperscript{91}

The remainder of this section outlines how the five key emotions fear, anger, hope, pride, and humiliation may shape the construction of preferences through their respective appraisal and action tendencies.

\textbf{2.6.1 Fear}

Fear is an aversive emotion that arises when people sense a physical or psychological threat and when they are uncertain if they can cope with it.\textsuperscript{92} It can be aroused

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{87} See Rosch, “Principles of Categorization,” 259.
\end{footnotesize}
Fear is closely related to anxiety. Both emotions get triggered in response to perceived danger. However, whereas fear tends to be elicited by an identifiable stimulus, anxiety is based on a more diffuse threat whose source and nature remain obscure.\(^94\)

The experience of fear can have strong effects on how people think in the course of decision-making. Experiments indicate that it has four main appraisal tendencies: First, it generally puts people in a hyper-vigilant mode giving priority to processing information about potential threats in the environment.\(^95\) On the one hand, this attentional bias toward danger cues increases the ability to detect additional threats. On the other hand, it concentrates cognitive resources and diverts attention away from non-threatening stimuli in the environment. As a result, fearful people tend to adhere to known procedures and are less open to new ideas. Second, the experience of fear has detrimental effects on the performance of tasks involving working memory, such as reading comprehension or word recall.\(^96\) Third, fear is associated with appraisals of low certainty and low control.\(^97\) Finally, fearful people generally perceive higher levels of risk and are biased in favor of low-risk options, even if they offer lower rewards.\(^98\)


\(^{95}\) See Bar-Tal, “Why Does Fear Override Hope in Societies Engulfed by Intractable Conflict, as It Does in the Israeli Society?,” 604.


The primary action tendencies of fear include impulses to avoid the danger and to seek a safe environment. This orientation is reflected in the physiological symptoms of fear. Increased heartbeat and the release of metabolic energy to the muscles in the legs help people to flee. The function of fear is thus to maximize the probability of surviving in a dangerous situation. Research suggests that fear elicits an impetus to evade, rather than confront, the source of danger in most cases. However, when fearful individuals perceive conflict as unavoidable, they may engage in preventive aggression to avoid harm. In extreme forms, fear may result in phobias, paranoia, or anxiety disorders.

2.6.2 Anger

Anger is typically elicited when people feel that someone or something prevents them from attaining a goal, or when they believe that someone has violated a norm that they care about. The emotion can range from irritation, annoyance, and frustration to wrath, fury, and rage. How an anger episode unfolds depends in part on actors’ evaluation and assignment of responsibility. If they reach the conclusion that a person who they initially deemed responsible for a goal obstruction or norm violation is, in fact, not responsible, their anger generally lessens. Conversely, if they continue to

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regard the individual as responsible, the emotion tends to be sustained or intensified.\footnote{104} Studies indicate that the experience of anger influences people’s preference construction through three appraisal tendencies. First, it increases their confidence in their ability to gain control of a situation because it is associated with a sense of power and invulnerability.\footnote{105} Second, angry subjects are inclined to make optimistic risk estimates playing down the potentially negative impact of future events.\footnote{106} Finally, anger has been shown to activate heuristic processing. It can lead individuals to pay less attention to the quality of arguments in persuasion experiments and to rely instead on superficial cues.\footnote{107} The action tendency is an impulse to confront the source of anger with the aim of removing the obstacle or punishing the norm offender.\footnote{108} This is also reflected in the common physiological characteristics of the emotion. A rise in testosterone, accelerated heartbeat, and increased blood flow to the hands prepare the body to fight.\footnote{109} While anger creates an impetus for aggression, this does not necessarily translate into a violent response. Angry people may desist from aggressing, and aggression can occur in the absence of anger. The emotion is thus not necessary to cause aggression, but it may nevertheless exert a critical influence on the construction of preferences.\footnote{110}

\footnote{105}See Lerner and Tiedens, “Portrait of the Angry Decision Maker,” 130, 132; Schieman, “Anger,” 508.
\footnote{107}See Lerner and Tiedens, “Portrait of the Angry Decision Maker,” 124, 132.
\footnote{110}See Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall, and Zhang, “How Emotion Shapes Behavior,” 176; Rejesh Kumar,
According to evolutionary psychologists, anger has two main adaptive functions. First, it can help to mobilize the necessary energy to rectify norm violations and to put perceived wrongs right. Second, it may enable an individual to render other people’s behavior more consistent with his or her personal needs and desires. Anger can also have counterproductive effects, of course. The sense of confidence and power associated with it may lead persons to lose sight of their abilities, norms, and dependence on others. If angry people are bent on fulfilling their antagonistic urges, they may incur long-term costs.

2.6.3 Hope

Hope arises from a wish to reach a valued goal and from the belief that its attainment is possible as a result of one’s own efforts or due to external forces that may be beyond one’s control. That the objective will be met is never a matter of absolute confidence. Søren Kierkegaard thus aptly defined hope as “the passion for the possible.” Its intensity can range from a faint desire to a deep yearning.
Emotion researchers treat hope as an emotion because it is difficult to control, it affects people's thinking, and it influences their behavior. Yet, they also point out that it differs from other emotions in that it includes a strong cognitive component. It requires the ability to visualize a goal and to imagine an as yet not existing reality. Hope is closely related to optimism. Both focus on the future attainment of an objective. However, while optimism represents a generalized expectation that it will be achieved, hope tends to be associated with an underlying anxiety that the ultimate outcome could also be negative. The opposite of hope is hopelessness, which can range from apathy to despair. Individuals who are hopeless have resigned themselves to the conclusion that they won’t be able to accomplish their desired goal.

Psychologists have not found any significant cultural, gender, or ethnic differences in the overall conceptualization of hope. Their experiments suggest that the experience of hope influences how people think about their preferences via three main appraisal tendencies: First, it tends to facilitate creative thinking and

imagination about how the aim in question can be achieved. Second, it heightens cognitive flexibility and improves the ability to develop alternative pathways to overcome obstacles. Finally, it often leads individuals to focus selectively on positive information that confirms and sustains the belief that it is still possible to attain the goal in question.

According to evolutionary psychologists, hope helps humans to cope with situations in which their needs are not met and to accomplish objectives that improve their wellbeing. Yet, they also point out that there is a fluid transition between hope and denial. Rather than just focusing on positive information, subjects who experience hope may consciously or unconsciously suppress negative information suggesting that the achievement of the aim is unlikely or impossible. Persons who deny adverse evidence may distort information to the extent that they become delusional about the probability of success. This psychological phenomenon may have led Friedrich Nietzsche to refer to hope as “the worst of evils because it lengthens [people’s] agony.” The experience of hope is not associated with any specific physiological reactions or action tendencies. Studies indicate that it has a more general effect by


124 See Korner, “Hope as a Method of Coping,” 136.


127 See Averill, Catlin, and Chon, Rules of Hope, 46; Bar-Tal, “Why Does Fear Override Hope in Societies Engulfed by Intractable Conflict, as It Does in the Israeli Society?,” 604.
motivating individuals to strive toward their desired goals. It reinforces their willpower and sustains their energy in the face of adversity.\textsuperscript{128}

\subsection*{2.6.4 Pride}

According to the psychologists Michael Mascolo and Kurt Fischer, pride is a pleasurable emotion that is triggered by a belief that one is “responsible for a socially valued outcome or for being a socially valued person.”\textsuperscript{129} Individuals can be proud both of a specific accomplishment—he is proud of what he did—and of their global self—she is proud of who she is.\textsuperscript{130} They can also feel vicarious pride at the achievement of a close other, such as a child or a partner, or about the success of groups with which they identify, such as teams, ethnicities, or nations.\textsuperscript{131} Experiments suggest that the presence of an audience is not a necessary condition for the experience of pride. It can come about in solitude upon reflecting on an accomplishment. Studies have also shown, however, that pride is elicited most

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strongly when others are present. In recent years, a number of experiments have indicated that a non-verbal expression of pride is displayed and recognized by individuals across different cultures: a small smile, the head slightly tilted back, hands on hips, or arms raised above the head. This led some psychologists to conclude that pride is a universal and biologically innate emotion.

The main appraisal tendency of pride relates to judgments of the self in relation to others. Subjects who feel proud are prone to self-enhancing biases, which elevate the self in comparison to others. They display tendencies to see themselves as different from perceived weaker groups and similar to apparently stronger groups. Pride has two main action tendencies. First, individuals who felt proud after successfully completing a task have been found to be more likely to persevere at a subsequent similar task. This suggests that the experience of pride engenders determination to further succeed in the domain in which this emotion has been felt.

Second, people induced to feel pride prior to participating in a group problem-solving

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task were perceived by outside observers as behaving in a more dominant manner than other participants in that task. Some researchers assume that this action tendency is related to the increase in testosterone that is triggered by the experience of pride.

Moreover, psychologists have investigated how the experience of excessive pride, also called hubris, may influence decision-making. Viewing themselves as infallible, individuals who are excessively proud tend to ignore their shortcomings and weaknesses. As a result, the emotion’s appraisal tendencies become more extreme. Subjects who experience extreme pride tend to be overconfident about their abilities and interpret any positive event as confirmation of their alleged greatness and superiority to others. This grandiose self-perception may, in turn, reinforce feelings of pride. Since its experience is pleasurable, some people consciously or unconsciously distort information to boost this emotion. Regarding the action tendencies, experiments indicate that individuals who feel excessive pride are more likely to experience impulses to behave in an aggressive and intimidating manner. They tend to have little patience or empathy with those who contradict their views, which can result in abusive behavior toward critics.

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2.6.5 Humiliation

Humiliation refers to the painful experience associated with the perception of being demeaned, degraded, or put down in a way that injures one’s self-worth.\textsuperscript{142} There is evidence that this definition is broadly shared across different cultures. In many languages around the world, the equivalent of the English word humiliation includes a downward spatial orientation. \textit{Humiliare} in Latin, \textit{eihana} in Arabic, \textit{abaissement} in French, and \textit{Erniedrigung} in German all signify that someone is “brought low” or “pushed down.”\textsuperscript{143} Similar metaphors exist in Chinese, Hindi, Hungarian, Polish, Russian, and Urdu.\textsuperscript{144}

Feelings of humiliation can range from a sense of being disrespected to wounded pride and the experience of degradation. This study takes as the defining factor not the humiliator’s aim or behavior but the target’s subjective perception and experience. Even if an offending party has no intention to humiliate, a recipient may feel humiliated by its behavior.\textsuperscript{145} Representing an attack on identity, humiliation strikes at the very essence of a target’s sense of being. It typically takes place in an unequal relationship, in which the tormentor has power over the target.\textsuperscript{146} Humiliation is often not limited to this dyad but may occur in a social or public context. The


\textsuperscript{143} See Lindner, \textit{Making Enemies}, 5; Shultziner and Rabinovici, “Human Dignity, Self-Worth, and Humiliation,” 111.


presence of an audience is not a necessary condition, but it tends to intensify the experience of humiliation. Elicitors of humiliation range from perceived verbal slights to physical mistreatment. They can also be based on passive behavior, such as abstention from contact or ignoring a person, for example.

Research in psychology indicates that the experience of humiliation is associated with two different action tendencies, which may follow in sequence: an impulse to withdraw or an impulse to harm the humiliator. Withdrawal can take the form of physical or psychological retreat. It may be accompanied by feelings of worthlessness and hopelessness that can plunge people into depressions and suicidal states. Aggressive responses, on the other hand, can manifest themselves verbally or physically and are often associated with feelings of anger, resentment, and hatred. People may try to restore their self-worth by taking revenge against the perceived tormentor. The impetus to fight can become active long after the event because memories and grudges about the experience of humiliation tend to endure. As Avishai Margalit notes, “we can hardly remember insults without reliving them.”

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Which factors determine whether individuals experience impulses to withdraw or to fight? Psychologists have identified two main mediating variables: The first is a person’s psychological and physical state. People can respond with aggression only if they are sufficiently strong to strike back. If they feel incapacitated by the humiliation they will seek to retreat. The second variable is an individual’s normative assessment of the situation. The greater the sense that degrading treatment is unjust, the more aggressive targets tend to become. Conversely, if they think that their debasement is justified, they are more likely to withdraw.

2.7 The link to state leaders and coercive diplomacy

The last three sections of this chapter have specified the main features of the emotional choice framework. After outlining the process of emotion, it was delineated how affect in general and five emotions in particular may influence actors’ cognition. This section will establish the link between these findings in psychology on the one hand and the decision-making of leaders who are targets of coercive threats on the other.

A comparison of the appraisal and action tendencies of the five key emotions: fear, anger, hope, pride, and humiliation indicates that they push into different directions. If target leaders’ feelings center primarily on fear of a military attack by a coercer and if they believe that they can avoid this attack by complying with the coercer’s demands, this increases the likelihood that they will give in. For the experience of fear is linked with a bias in favor of low-risk options, and its action

tendency is to avoid the danger. However, if target leaders’ emotions are dominated by anger at the coercer, pride at their behavior, or hope that they will get away with it, they are less likely to yield. Anger is associated with a sense of power, invulnerability, and a bias in favor of high-risk options. Its experience may prompt target leaders to defy and even lash out against the coercer. Feelings of hope often entail a selective focus on positive information confirming the belief that it is possible to attain a desired goal. They tend to reinforce target leaders’ willpower and sustain their energy to persevere in the face of adversity. The experience of pride typically engenders a determination to further succeed in the domain in which this emotion has been felt. If target leaders are proud of their behavior, they are thus likely to hold on to the resulting benefits and may even commit further acts along similar lines. Finally, if target leaders feel humiliated at the hands of the coercer, their response may go either way. If they assume that their debasement is justified or if they feel mentally or physically incapacitated, they are likely to withdraw. However, if they believe that the perceived degrading treatment is unjust and if they are strong enough to resist, they tend to defy the coercer and seek revenge for the humiliation. Table 2.1 provides a systematic overview of the elicitors, appraisal tendencies, and action tendencies of these five key emotions.
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2.8 Agency and disposition

The available research suggests that the general outlines of the appraisal and action tendencies of the five key emotions delineated above tend to feature in different societies across the globe. At the same time, however, there is bound to be some variation in how people in distinct cultures experience and act on these emotions. Different ideas, norms, and identities lead to different feeling rules. Any analysis of the role of affect in decision-making, therefore, needs to be sensitive to the cultural context of the actors involved.154

Cultural norms set boundaries to the experience of emotions, but they do not determine it. Rather than being passive rule operators, humans tend to exercise some leeway over their interpretation of and adherence to norms.155 Likewise, people are not slaves of their passions. Although they are rarely, if ever, able to fully control their emotions, they can make efforts to regulate them. This is why actors’ individual agency and disposition are crucial variables mediating their compliance with feeling rules and their experience of affect.

Agency is defined as a person’s ability to recognize and act on his or her will and desires.156 That ability is always restricted to some degree by material, social, and political constraints, and by an actor’s own cognitive and emotional limitations.157 A disposition is a recurrent tendency to think, feel, act, or react in a particular way that

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is unique to a person. Closely related to an individual’s personality, values, and worldview, a disposition is formed to a large extent by his or her past experiences. Furthermore, dispositions can include a wide range of personality traits, such as optimism or pessimism, extroversion or introversion, neuroticism, narcissism, and paranoia, for instance, all of which may influence the generation of affect.

2.9 Conclusion

This chapter has developed a theory of emotional choice to analyze how target leaders’ affect influences their decision-making during episodes of coercive diplomacy. After a review of the standard constructivist and general IR literature on the role of affect in world politics, the chapter laid the ontological ground for a combination of social constructivism and emotion research. The core of the framework first outlined the close relationship between the process of emotion and people’s cultural ideas, norms, and identities. A description of the two general mechanisms through which affect constitutes preferences—appraisal and action tendencies—was followed by a summary of the characteristics of the five key emotions fear, anger, hope, pride, and humiliation. Next, the chapter established the link between these findings in psychology and the decision-making of leaders who are targets of coercive threats. Even when emotions produce powerful impulses, this does not necessarily mean that persons will give in to them. This is why the chapter concluded by highlighting individual agency and dispositions as important mediating factors. The next two chapters will apply this framework to target leaders’ decision-making in the Cuban missile crisis and the Gulf conflict, respectively.

3. The Cuban missile crisis, 1962

On October 16, 1962, President John F. Kennedy learned that the Soviet Union was clandestinely furnishing nuclear missiles to Cuba. After a week of secret deliberations with his senior advisers, he announced a naval quarantine of the island, demanding the removal of the weapons. Chairman Nikita Khrushchev’s response was defiant. He refused to withdraw the rockets and accused the US president of precipitating a third world war. The ensuing confrontation between the two superpowers is widely seen as the most dangerous moment in recorded history.¹ Five days later, however, the Soviet premier agreed to take out the missiles. What prompted him to change his mind?

As noted above, the main argument of the thesis is that the five key emotions—fear, anger, hope, pride, and humiliation—can shape the preference construction of target leaders in important and occasionally even critical ways. If their emotions center primarily on fear of a military attack by the coercer, and if they believe that they can avoid this attack by complying with the coercer’s demands, this increases the likelihood that they will give in. However, if target leaders’ emotions are dominated by anger at the coercer, pride at the original behavior that the coercer considers objectionable, or hope that they will get away with it, they are less likely to yield. For these emotions tend to promote defiance and perseverance. Finally, if target leaders feel humiliated at the hands of the coercer, their response may go either way. If they believe that their debasement is justified, or if they are mentally or physically incapacitated, they are likely to withdraw. However, if they regard the perceived

¹ See, for example, Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, ix; Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 180; Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight, xiv; Odd Arne Westad, Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), 15.
degrading treatment as unjust, and if they are strong enough to resist, they are likely
to defy the coercer and seek revenge for the humiliation.

The chapter investigates nine major decisions by Khrushchev during the
missile crisis. These are, first, his decision in May 1962 to place nuclear missiles into
Cuba; second, his decision on October 22 to prohibit his troops on the island from
using nuclear weapons in defense against a potential US attack; third, his decision on
October 23 to defy Kennedy’s call to remove the missiles and to escalate the crisis
with a series of confrontational steps; fourth, his decision that same day to order most
of the arms-carrying ships on the way to Cuba to turn around; fifth, his decision on
October 24 to pursue a strategy of deterrence and delay toward the US administration;
sixth, his decision on October 25 to suggest to his colleagues in the Soviet leadership
to remove the missiles in return for an American pledge not to attack Cuba; seventh,
his decision on October 26 to offer this trade to Kennedy; eighth, his decision on
October 27 to add the withdrawal of US missiles from Turkey as a further demand;
and finally, his decision on October 28 to remove the Soviet rockets in exchange for
JFK’s public guarantee of Cuba’s territorial integrity and his secret promise to take
the American missiles out of Turkey. Table 3.1 below provides an overview of these
decisions. Each of them will be examined in a separate section in this chapter.

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2 Since this chapter analyzes this crisis from Khrushchev’s perspective, it would have been appropriate
to entitle it “The Caribbean crisis,” which is how the Soviet premier referred to this episode (See
Khrushchev, Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, vol. 2, 520, and vol. 3, 230). I have nevertheless opted for
the term “Cuban missile crisis” because this is the standard description in the academic literature with
which this study engages. The first section of this chapter, however, will outline why Khrushchev
conceived of this episode as the “Caribbean crisis” and why, from his perspective, this crisis had
broken out as early as in the spring of 1962.

3 Khrushchev’s decision to place missiles into Cuba predates the period of US coercive diplomacy.
Since it set the stage for the premier’s decision-making during the missile crisis, however, it is worth
exploring it in some depth at the outset of this case study.
Table 3.1 *Nikita Khrushchev’s major decisions during the Cuban missile crisis, 1962*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decision</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) decision to place nuclear missiles into Cuba</td>
<td>May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) decision to prohibit the Soviet troops on the island from using nuclear weapons in defense against a potential US attack</td>
<td>October 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) decision to defy Kennedy’s call to remove the missiles and to escalate the crisis with a series of confrontational steps</td>
<td>October 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) decision to order most of the arms-carrying ships on the way to Cuba to turn around</td>
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<tr>
<td>5) decision to pursue a strategy of deterrence and delay toward the US administration</td>
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<td>6) decision to suggest to his colleagues in the Soviet leadership to remove the missiles in return for an American pledge not to attack Cuba</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) decision to offer this trade to Kennedy</td>
<td>October 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) decision to add the withdrawal of US missiles from Turkey as a further demand</td>
<td>October 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) decision to remove the Soviet rockets in exchange for JFK’s public guarantee of Cuba’s territorial integrity and his secret promise to take the American missiles out of Turkey</td>
<td>October 28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3.1 Missiles to Cuba

In his memoirs, Khrushchev noted that the plan to secretly deliver nuclear missiles to Cuba had been solely his idea.4 This has been confirmed by eyewitness accounts of Russian policymakers and by internal government documents.5 The chairman’s trusted associate, Deputy Prime Minister Anastas Mikoyan, had advised against such a “dangerous” undertaking early on. He argued that the Americans were bound to find

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out about the operation because the rockets would be difficult to hide on the island.⁶ Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko later claimed that he had also expressed his doubts, warning the premier that the delivery of such weapons to America’s backyard would result in a “political explosion” in Washington.⁷ In his autobiography, Khrushchev noted that he had recognized from the beginning that his plan “verged on adventurism.” Nevertheless, he was prepared to “risk everything” to carry it out.⁸

What led the chairman to make this hazardous choice? Some scholars have maintained that his primary goal was to create a defensive deterrent against the US intervention in Cuba that he believed to be looming.⁹ Others have asserted that his main aim was to increase the number of Soviet nuclear missiles that could hit the United States.¹⁰ More recently, analysts have recognized that both of these factors played an important role in his thinking.¹¹ What existing accounts have neglected, however, is that Khrushchev’s decision to furnish Cuba with rockets was strongly charged with affect.¹² This section argues that it was not so much the protection of the Caribbean state and the improvement of Russia’s nuclear attack capability as such

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⁶ Mikoyan, quoted in Mikoian, The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis, 91. Mikoyan’s account is confirmed by Khrushchev: “Comrade Mikoyan spoke with some reservations. [...] The point he made amounted to this: we would be taking a dangerous step.” See Khrushchev, Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, vol. 3, 328.
⁹ See Allyn, Blight, and Welch, Back to the Brink, 7; Mastry, “Soviet Foreign Policy, 1953-1962,” 331-2; Mikoian, The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis, 93.
¹¹ See Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight, 344; Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars, 162; Johnson, Overconfidence and War, 111; Munton and Welch, The Cuban Missile Crisis, 26.
¹² Partial exceptions include Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight, 45; Lebow and Stein, We All Lost the Cold War, 91.
than the powerful emotions triggered by these issues and US policy in general that prompted him to embark on this risky operation.

Historically, the USSR had not been much interested in Latin America, let alone Cuba. Located less than a hundred miles away from southern Florida, the Caribbean island had established close relations with the United States. During Fulgencio Batista’s military rule in the 1950s, it provided an attractive environment for US business. This changed when a peasant uprising under the leadership of 32-year old Fidel Castro overthrew the dictator in December 1958. Cuban-US relations deteriorated as the new regime started expropriating American property and redistributing the country’s wealth. The Soviets, on the other hand, became ever more intrigued by the young revolutionaries and eagerly provided them with economic and military assistance. In May 1960, Havana and Moscow established official diplomatic relations.

Washington was watching the Kremlin’s growing influence in Cuba with increasing concern. When Castro in September 1960 proclaimed his plan to liberate all of Latin America from US dominance by exporting his revolution, the alarm bells in the White House started ringing. President Dwight D. Eisenhower ordered the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to organize an invasion force of Cuban exiles to topple the revolutionary regime. Shortly before leaving office in January 1961, he

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13 See Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight, 46.
14 See ibid., 13; Stern, The Week the World Stood Still, 14.
16 See Munton and Welch, The Cuban Missile Crisis, 16; Sheldon M. Stern, Averting “the Final Failure”: John F. Kennedy and the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003), 10.
terminated diplomatic relations with Havana. The newly elected US president, John F. Kennedy, approved the invasion plan of his predecessor. Consequently, about 1,500 Cuban exiles landed at the island’s Bay of Pigs on April 17, 1961, only to be captured or killed by revolutionary forces. Castro thanked the Soviets for their supply of weapons and openly declared his dedication to socialism.

President Kennedy’s determination to oust the Cuban leader did not lessen after the failed invasion attempt at the Bay of Pigs. In November 1961, he authorized Operation Mongoose, a covert action program under the leadership of his brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, to undermine the revolutionary regime through sabotage, subversion, and assassination attempts. When none of these clandestine measures came to fruition by early 1962, the US administration arranged Cuba’s ejection from the Organization of American States (OAS) and imposed an economic embargo on the country. In April 1962, the Pentagon carried out the largest military maneuvers ever conducted in the Caribbean. Well publicized in the US media, amphibious assault exercises on a Puerto Rican island caught Moscow’s attention right away.

Khrushchev came to believe that another invasion of Cuba was “inevitable.” In his opinion, Kennedy would strike again in the “near future,” this time using well-
trained US troops. The available evidence indicates that this caused him considerable fear and distress. In his memoirs, he frankly recounted how he was “haunted” by the idea that the Americans would move against the island. When he was on a state visit in Bulgaria for a week in May 1962, “one thought kept hammering away at my brain,” he recalled: “What will happen to Cuba? We’re going to lose Cuba!” The fate of the young revolutionary regime in the Caribbean “preoccupied me even when I was busy conducting the affairs of state in Moscow.” The premier “didn’t tell anyone” about his anxiety. “I kept my mental agony to myself.”

His emotional upheaval did not remain unnoticed by his staff, however. Oleg Troyanovksy, his assistant for foreign affairs, for example, got the impression that his boss “constantly feared” that the United States would compel him to “retreat” in some region of the world and especially in Cuba.

The chairman’s fear had complex origins: The island state was the first Latin American country to take a revolutionary path along socialist lines. Castro’s overthrow by the United States would deal a “terrible blow” to the Soviet Union’s international reputation, Khrushchev believed. For people around the world would think that the Kremlin could do nothing more than make “empty statements of protest” against US actions. This view would not only “undermine the will for revolution” in other countries. It would also raise criticism at home in Russia at a time when the premier was facing some domestic political challenges, such as popular discontent

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29 Ibid., *Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev*, vol. 3, 324.
over his failing agricultural reform and the resulting rise in food prices. Moreover, the “loss” of Cuba would provide ammunition to his competitor for the helm of international Communism, Mao Zedong. Opposed to Moscow’s doctrine of “peaceful coexistence” with the West, the Chinese leader had long berated Khrushchev for being too “soft” on imperialism.

The chairman’s fear of losing the new socialist ally prompted him to think about how he could prevent a US attack. In May 1962, he reached the conclusion that the best way to deter the Kennedy administration from intervening was to present it with a fait accompli in the form of fully operational nuclear missile installations in Cuba. He acknowledged in his memoirs that the protection of Castro’s regime was not his only motivation to embark on the secret missile operation. An additional goal was to improve the USSR’s position in the balance of nuclear power. Whereas the United States possessed 172 intercontinental ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads in 1961, the Soviet Union had only 20. Moscow, however, owned an abundance of medium- and intermediate-range rockets with a reach of 1,300 to 2,500 miles. Deployed in the vicinity of America, these weapons could serve as a quick and cheap means to reduce the gap in long-range missiles.

What scholars have generally neglected is that Khrushchev’s desire to establish a nuclear outpost in Cuba was driven by a deep sense of humiliation at the

30 Ibid., 322. For an account of Khrushchev’s failed agricultural reforms, see Anatolii Strelianyi, “Khrushchev and the Countryside,” in Taubman, Khrushchev, and Gleason, eds., Nikita Khrushchev, 113-137.
34 See Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars, 162, 172.
hands of the United States. To understand why Khrushchev felt so humiliated, it is necessary to take his complicated identity as a parvenu into account. Parvenus are individuals from a disadvantaged background who have risen in society and assumed high positions. The awareness of their humble origins often leads them to question whether they are fit enough for their demanding roles. This is why they require the regular recognition of their status and excellence by significant others.

Khrushchev’s self-conception as a parvenu had its roots in the socio-economic environment of his family. Born to impoverished peasants, he had grown up in a small village in the province of Kursk in western Russia. To supplement his parents’ income, he worked as a farm laborer in his early teenage years. After an apprenticeship as a metalworker, he found a job in a coal mine. He joined the Bolsheviks after the October Revolution and quickly moved up in the hierarchy of their local and regional organizations. According to his comrade Dmitri Shepilov, he “didn’t like talking about his peasant origin, and in fact carefully avoided” doing so. In his speeches, he generally identified himself as a worker, not as a peasant.

Joseph Stalin recognized Khrushchev’s talent and appointed him as leader of the Communist Party in Ukraine in 1938. A year later, he became a member of the ten-man Politburo of the Communist Party’s Central Committee, the top decision-making body of the Soviet Union. During World War II, he served as a lieutenant

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36 Exceptions include Lebow and Stein, We All Lost the Cold War, 90; Steinberg, “Shame and Humiliation in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” 664, 668.
40 Shepilov, quoted in Taubman, Khrushchev, 661.
41 See Taubman, Khrushchev, 28.
general in the Red Army, for which he organized the partisan resistance in Ukraine. His meteoric rise had complex effects on his identity. On the one hand, he was proud of his accomplishments as a self-made man. On the other hand, he remained acutely aware of his modest background. “I had graduated only from a workers’ school, and I kept feeling a great yearning to obtain a higher education,” he noted in his memoirs, but he “didn’t get the chance” to attend university. His identity as a parvenu was confirmed by significant others. Stalin, for example, once asked his advisers: “Whom shall we appoint to head the government after me?” Deputy Chairman Vyacheslav Molotov was too old, Central Committee Secretary Georgy Malenkov was too weak, secret police chief Lavrentiy Beria was Georgian, and Vice-Premier Lazar Kaganovic was a Jew. And Khrushchev? “No,” said Stalin, “he’s a worker. We need more of an intellectual.”

Like so many others, the Soviet ruler underestimated Khrushchev. After Stalin’s death in 1953, he became first secretary of the Communist Party’s Central Committee. During the next years, he was so successful at eliminating his competitors that he also took up the post of premier and chairman of the Council of Ministers in 1958. Stalin’s lack of confidence in his suitability as leader of the USSR continued to haunt him, however. In his autobiography, he noted that the dictator “kept drilling it into our heads that we, his comrades-in-arms of the Politburo, were really unfit” and

42 See Khrushchev, Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, vol. 1, 707; Lebow and Stein, We All Lost the Cold War, 51.
43 See Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War, 38.
44 Khrushchev, Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, vol. 1, 30, 8.
45 Stalin, quoted in Taubman, Khrushchev, 332.
that “we didn’t understand anything.”

Time and again Stalin had warned them that when he was gone, the United States would strangle them “like little kittens” because they were “not capable of defending the dignity of our country.” These words would “echo in [his] consciousness” for many years, Khrushchev later remembered.

The premier’s identity as a parvenu who might not be able to meet the requirements of his new position shaped his emotions. On the one hand, he continued to crave for recognition. When he received an invitation from President Eisenhower to visit the United States in 1959, for example, he felt exhilarated: “Who would have guessed, twenty years ago, that the most powerful capitalist country […] would invite me, a worker?” he proudly told his associates. On the other hand, he was harboring a deep fear of being humiliated. For instance, when he learned that Eisenhower planned to take him to Camp David, a place unknown to him and his advisers, he was mortified. Was this “some sort of quarantine facility” where he would be put in “humiliating circumstances?” In the end, Khrushchev was relieved to hear that Camp David was the president’s country residence and that it was a “special honor” to stay there. “You see how fearful we were then that we might be humiliated?” he frankly acknowledged in his memoirs.

Khrushchev’s identity as a parvenu was closely related to the Soviet Union. Like himself, the USSR had ascended from a disadvantaged position. Communism had transformed it from “a ruined, backward, and illiterate country into one that

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48 Ibid., 14, 101. See also Taubman, Khrushchev, 331.
51 Khrushchev, Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, vol. 3, 97-98. Khrushchev’s desire for recognition from foreign leaders and his corresponding fear of humiliation also manifested themselves before his visits to Egypt and France, for example. See Mohamed Heikal, Sphinx and Commissar: The Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence in the Arab World (London: Collins, 1978), 135; Khrushchev, Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, vol., 3, 199.
52 For a similar interpretation, see Lebow, A Cultural Theory of International Relations, 552.
amazed the world with its successes,” in his opinion. The Soviet Union had defeated the German invaders, broken America’s nuclear monopoly, and sent the first satellite into space. Nevertheless, the US government refused to recognize it as an equal superpower, Khrushchev believed. Since he strongly identified with the USSR, he took any perceived slights against the country personally. In his eyes, two aspects of US policy exemplified Washington’s general disrespect: America’s illegal U-2 flights and its opening of new military bases near Soviet territory.

The Eisenhower administration had started to authorize secret flights of U-2 reconnaissance planes over the USSR in 1956. Since the Soviet air defense was not able to reach the high altitude of the U-2 for some years, Moscow had no option but to issue statements of protest. According to Khrushchev, the Americans “replied to us mockingly that no such flights had occurred.” They “gloated over our impotence and continued to violate the sovereignty of the USSR by flying over our territory.” This “arrogance” drove the chairman into a state of “white-hot fury,” he later recalled. The second bone of contention was Washington’s opening of new military bases near the Soviet Union. In 1957, the Eisenhower administration had publicly offered to place intermediate-range ballistic missiles in the territory of its European allies. Despite Moscow’s strong objections, President Kennedy proceeded with the deployment of the rockets to Great Britain, Italy, and Turkey in 1961 and 1962. Khrushchev was “deeply angered” by these activities, which he regarded as attempts to “intimidate” him, according to the Russian diplomat Leonid Zamyatin.

54 Ibid., 572.
55 Ibid., 236, 238.
57 Quoted in Lebow and Stein’s interview with Leonid M. Zamyatin, quoted in Lebow and Stein, We All Lost the Cold War, 90.
The premier was convinced that Washington was using these new military outposts and the U-2 flights to “wound our pride and humiliate us.” By May 1962, he was no longer willing to tolerate such degradation. His son-in-law, Aleksei Adzhubei, later remembered that Khrushchev was “itching for revenge.” This impression is confirmed by the chairman’s autobiographical reflections: “The Americans had surrounded our country with military bases,” he noted, “and now they would learn just what it feels like to have enemy missiles pointing at you.”

This section has shown that Khrushchev furnished Cuba with nuclear missiles to deter the Kennedy administration from toppling Castro and to improve the Soviet position in the balance of nuclear power. Above all, however, he acted in response to the intense emotions that these issues and US policy in general had triggered in him. This has been confirmed by some of his associates: General Anatoli Gribkov, the deputy secretary of the Soviet Defense Council, for example, found that the premier’s action sprang from “both his heart and his head.” Kremlin adviser and speechwriter Fyodor Burlatsky got the impression that the dispatch of nuclear missiles to the Caribbean was “more an emotional than rational decision.”

Khrushchev’s affective spectrum ranged from fear of losing Castro’s regime to anger at Washington’s missile deployments in Europe and a sense of humiliation by America’s illegal U-2 flights. These emotions tend to influence the construction of preferences in different ways. The emotional choice framework suggests that the experience of fear is associated with a bias in favor of low-risk options. Its primary

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59 Quoted in Lebow and Stein’s interview with Aleksei Adzhubei, quoted in Lebow and Stein, We All Lost the Cold War, 90.
60 Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers (London: Andre Deutsch, 1971), 494.
62 Burlatsky, quoted in Blight and Welch, On the Brink, 235.
action tendency is to avoid the danger and to seek a safe environment. In Khrushchev’s case, however, his fear of losing Cuba pushed him to find a way to protect the fledging socialist ally. His memoirs indicate that his anguish became so intense that it verged on panic. This sense of dread and the resulting distress seem to have canceled out the element of caution that is usually inherent in fear. The action tendency of anger, on the other hand, is to punish perceived offenders. Angry people are generally confident and biased in favor of high-risk options. The chairman’s repeated experiences of fury at the US bases near Soviet borders would thus explain why he dismissed Mikoyan’s warnings that the missile outpost in Cuba would be difficult to conceal from the Americans. Finally, feelings of humiliation can produce impulses to harm the tormentor if the treatment is seen as undeserved. By taking revenge, a debased individual may try to restore his or her self-worth. In the case of Khrushchev, his identity as a parvenu reinforced his sense of humiliation by the United States. He concluded that this degradation could only be rectified with the deployment of Russian missiles to the US backyard. Once the mission was accomplished, they would at last be able to “talk to the Americans as equals,” he confided to his ambassador in Havana, Alexander Alekseyev.

On May 21, 1962, Khrushchev presented his proposal to secretly furnish Cuba with nuclear missiles to the Soviet Presidium, the successor institution of the Politburo. Even though he had established himself as the unrivalled leader of the USSR by then, he had to make some efforts to obtain his colleagues’ consent. Deputy

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63 See section 2.6.1.
64 See section 2.6.2.
65 See Anastas Mikoyan, quoted in Mikoian, The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis, 91.
66 See section 2.6.5.
67 Quoted in Alexander Alekseyev’s testimony, GB99, KCLMA, 28/65, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College London, cited in Haslam, Russia’s Cold War, 203.
Prime Minister Mikoyan and other members of the party elite voiced their reservations. It was only after three more days of lobbying that Khrushchev persuaded his colleagues to endorse his scheme. Once Fidel Castro had agreed as well, the Presidium gave its final approval on June 10.69

The resulting “Operation Anadyr”70 involved shipping 36 medium-range missiles with a 1,300-mile reach and 24 intermediate-range missiles with a 2,500-mile radius. Once set up in Cuba, the medium-range rockets would be able to target cities like Atlanta, Houston, and Washington, D.C., while the intermediate-range versions could reach as far as Los Angeles.71 Eyewitness accounts have revealed that the Soviet Union also dispatched dozens of short-range nuclear missiles with a radius of 30 to 100 miles, which were able to repel any invading force.72 The Kremlin’s military planners organized a fleet of 85 ships to transport this material and about 45,000 Russian soldiers and technicians.73 The USSR was to retain custody over the weapons at all times. Khrushchev’s aim was to complete the entire operation by the US midterm congressional elections in November and to make it public during a visit to the UN headquarters in New York shortly thereafter.74 In early September—unknowingly to anyone in the United States, including the Soviet ambassador—the first medium-range rockets arrived in Cuba.75

70 The Soviets named the missile operation after the Siberian river Anadyr in order to mislead Western intelligence.
72 See Gribkov and Smith, Operation Anadyr, 62; Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War, 469; Stern, Averting “the Final Failure”, 149.
73 See Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight, 26.
74 See Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars, 163; Lebow and Stein, We All Lost the Cold War, 63, 76.
75 See Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 203; Stern, Averting “the Final Failure”, 28.
3.2 Limiting the confrontation, Monday, October 22

Khrushchev had just returned from an after-dinner walk around the house with his 27-year-old son Sergei on Monday, October 22, 1962, when he was urgently called to the phone. His office notified him that President Kennedy would be addressing the American people on a matter of “the highest national urgency” in a live broadcast at 7:00 P.M. Washington time. Given the time difference of seven hours, it would then be 2:00 A.M. the following day in Moscow. The chairman instructed his aides to summon the members of the Presidium for an emergency meeting at the Kremlin in one hour. “They’ve probably discovered our missiles,” he explained to his son after he hung up the phone. “We can’t assume anything else. In Berlin everything’s quiet.”

A substantial amount of military materiel had been delivered to Cuba by October 22. While the 24 intermediate-range missiles were still en route, all of the 36 medium-range nuclear missiles and dozens of short-range nuclear rockets had arrived. To make the weapons operational, the Soviet technicians had been building launch sites on the island since mid-September. The available sources indicate that at least some of the short- and medium-range nuclear missiles were ready for use by October 22. The protocol of the Presidium meeting that night shows that Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky was aware of this.

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77 See Dobbs, *One Minute to Midnight*, 32.
78 See Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower*, 555.
79 Khrushchev, quoted in ibid., 554.
80 See Gribkov and Smith, *Operation Anadyr*, 62.
81 See Fursenko and Naftali, *Khrushchev’s Cold War*, 468-69. The next day, October 24, the Aleksandrovsk would deliver 6 intermediate-range missiles. The other ships carrying the remaining rockets were not even halfway to Cuba at that time. See ibid., 469.
82 Since virtually all of the Soviet military documents related to the missile operation are still classified, it is necessary to rely on eyewitness accounts to establish at what stages the missiles became ready to be fired. Khrushchev’s son Sergei claims that “one regiment of [medium-range] R-12 ballistic missiles had been operational and nuclear capable for five days already [i.e. since October 20]. It was joined on
This raises a puzzle: In their discussion prior to Kennedy’s speech, the Presidium members reached the “conclusion” that “an attack is being organized against Cuba.” Why did they not publicly acknowledge the presence of nuclear rockets on the island to deter any US assault? Existing accounts have struggled to find a convincing answer to this question. In their authoritative study of Soviet decision-making during the missile crisis, Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali merely note that “for reasons he did not explain at the meeting, Khrushchev believed that the 36 R-12 [medium-range] nuclear-tipped missiles that were already on the island were not enough of a deterrent to protect the Cubans.” This prompts them to raise a further riddle that they find difficult to solve: “Curiously, as Khrushchev explained himself that night, he never appeared to consider using Soviet power anywhere else in the world to prevent an attack on Cuba. At no point, for instance, did he suggest threatening NATO’s vulnerable outpost in West Berlin.”

Khrushchev’s decision-making remains a mystery to these scholars because they neglect the role of his emotions that night. Based on Mikoyan’s recently released memoirs and other sources, this section will demonstrate that the chairman’s behavior was strongly influenced by his fear of a nuclear escalation between the superpowers.

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83 Malinovsky stated: “I think that we will not end up in a situation in which the missiles are placed on high alert.” See Presidium Protocol no. 60, October 22-23, 1962, RGANI, F. 3, Op. 16, D. 947, L. 36-41, in CWIHP Bulletin 17/18 (2012), 306. I thank Svetlana Savranskaya for her advice on this point.


85 Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev's Cold War, 470. In their original text, Fursenko and Naftali erroneously refer to 24 medium-range R-12 missiles that had reached Cuba. At this point, however, 36 had already arrived on the island. See Gribkov and Smith, Operation Anadyr, 62.

86 See Mikoian, The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis, 157.
This fear led him to reduce the risk of a nuclear clash, and it constituted his preference for limiting Cuba’s defense to conventional means.

The session of the Presidium began at 10:00 P.M. Moscow time, four hours before Kennedy was to deliver his speech. Besides Khrushchev, the most important participants included Deputy Prime Minister Anatas Mikoyan, Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky, President of the Supreme Soviet Leonid Brezhnev, Secretary of the Central Committee Leonid Ilychev, and Chairman of the Committee on State Security (KGB) Aleksandr Shelepin.

“It has become known,” Khrushchev opened the meeting, “that Kennedy has prepared some kind of speech.” The Kremlin had received intelligence updates about unusual activity at the Pentagon and White House. The Soviet news agency TASS had reported a concentration of US Navy ships in the Caribbean. To the premier, all this indicated that the Americans were about to attack Cuba. Minister of Defense Malinovsky, an experienced officer who had commanded the units that defeated the Germans at the Battle of Stalingrad during World War II, sought to reassure Khrushchev: “I do not think that the USA right now could embark on blitzkrieg operations.” In his eyes, Kennedy’s speech would be merely a “pre-election stunt” without any substance. Even if the Americans were to declare an invasion of Cuba, “this will not be after another 24 hours has passed in order to get ready.” He believed

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89 Khrushchev, quoted in Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War, 468.
90 See Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight, 32.
91 See Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War, 468.
that they would “not end up in a situation in which the missiles are placed on high alert.”

“I agree with Comrade Malinovsky’s conclusions,” Khrushchev noted, but the defense minister’s assessment failed to calm him down. If anything, the prospect of a US intervention in 24 hours seems to have increased his worries. The “point” of Operation Anadyr had been to “intimidate and restrain the USA vis-à-vis Cuba,” he explained. “We do not want to unleash a war.” There are no emotion terms as such in the protocol of the Presidium session. The chairman’s statements, however, indicate that he was afraid of the prospect of a nuclear clash. “The tragic thing” was that the United States “can attack, and we will respond,” he remarked gloomily. “This could escalate into a large-scale war.” The continuation of the meeting shows that his fear influenced the construction of his preferences. When the Presidium members moved on to a discussion about the instructions that should be sent to the Soviet commander in Cuba, General Issa Pliyev, Malinovsky requested their approval of an order he had prepared. His draft text read that Pliyev should use “all means” at his disposal to defend the island.

According to existing accounts of this episode, Khrushchev was prepared to authorize the defense minister’s directive. They contend that it was only due to Deputy Prime Minister Mikoyan’s sharp protest against any permission to use nuclear weapons that the chairman finally agreed to allow only the employment of

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94 Khrushchev, quoted in ibid.
conventional arms. Yet, Mikoyan’s recently released memoirs reveal that it was not himself but the chairman who objected to Malinovsky’s draft order: “Khrushchev at that point noticed that all means without any sort of qualification would include missiles, that is, the beginning of thermonuclear war. How could that be?” The defense minister apparently “couldn’t respond” because he recognized that his suggestion had been “extremely reckless on his part,” according to Mikoyan.

Khrushchev’s fear of a nuclear war helps to account for his cautious approach that night. According to emotional choice theory, fear puts people in a hyper-vigilant mode in which they give priority to processing information about potential threats in the environment. This would explain why he immediately detected the danger in Malinovsky’s recommendation to authorize the use of “all means” for Cuba’s defense. Moreover, fear is associated with appraisals of low control and a bias in favor of low-risk options. This goes some way toward solving the puzzle why the chairman refrained from publicly declaring the presence of nuclear weapons on the island to deter a US attack. Having been caught off guard by the announcement of Kennedy’s upcoming speech, he was afraid that a precipitous acknowledgment of the half-finished missile operation could escalate the situation to a level that was beyond his control. Khrushchev’s affective state would also explain why he did not appear to contemplate instigating a crisis over Berlin to distract the Americans from Cuba. His

97 See Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War, 472; Zubok, Failed Empire, 147.
98 Anastas Mikoyan, printed in Mikoian, The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis, 157. Fursenko, Naftali, and Zubok wrongly attribute this quote to Anastas Mikoyan. Fursenko and Naftali write: “Mikoyan stood up to Khrushchev and pleaded for moderation. Mikoyan did not like what he was hearing. ‘Doesn’t using these missiles mean the start of a thermonuclear war?’ he sternly asked Malinovsky.” They quote Mikoyan’s alleged sentence from a copy of Mikoyan’s unpublished memoirs that they examined for their research. See Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War, 472; Zubok, Failed Empire, 147. The recent publication of Mikoyan’s autobiographical reflections, however, indicate that it was Khrushchev who made this statement.
100 For a summary of the action and appraisal tendencies of fear, see section 2.6.1.
fear exerted a constitutive effect by ruling out such high-risk options and steering him
toward a path of caution.

The premier decided to issue a carefully worded order that would reduce the
danger of a nuclear clash: 101 “In connection with the possible landing on the island of
Cuba of Americans conducting exercises in the Caribbean,” General Pliyev was to
“take immediate steps to raise combat readiness and to repulse the enemy together
with the Cuban army and with all the power of the Soviet forces, except Statsenko’s
means and all of Beloborodov’s cargoes.” 102 Major General Igor Statsenko
commanded the missile division, and Colonel Nikolai Beloborodov was in charge of
the nuclear material. In other words, the Soviet troops in Cuba were supposed to resist
a US assault, but only with conventional means. They were prohibited from using any
missiles or nuclear arms. 103 Without these weapons of mass destruction, however,
they were not in a position to meet a strike by superior American forces. To prevent
what he feared most—nuclear war—Khrushchev was thus willing to accept the risk
that the Cuban and Soviet troops on the island might be annihilated in a surprise
attack by the United States.

The order was telegraphed to Cuba at around 11:30 P.M. Moscow time. 104 At
1:00 A.M., one hour before Kennedy would go on air, a representative of the US

102 Quoted in Gribkov and Smith, Operation Anadyr, 62.
103 See Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight, 44; Gribkov and Smith, Operation Anadyr, 62.
104 See Gribkov and Smith, Operation Anadyr, 62. See also Presidium Protocol no. 60, October 22-23,
protocols were authored mostly by Vladimir Malin, chief of the Central Committee’s General
Department, and, to a lesser extent, by Aleksei Kapitonovich Serov, head of the first sector of the
CPSU General Department. See Presidium Protocol no. 61, October 25, 1962, History and Public
wilsoncenter.org/document/115136 (accessed March 3, 2014). Rather than providing a verbatim record
of the meeting, the Presidium protocols are highly fragmentary. They frequently list only a few key
words and often do not identify the name of the person who spoke. This has led even some of the top
experts of the Cuban missile crisis to make misinterpretations. In his otherwise excellent account,
Sheldon Stern, for example, claims that “the Presidium [on October 22] hesitantly authorized General
Issa A. Pliyev, commander of the Soviet forces in Cuba, to protect his nearly 43,000 troops, missiles
and other weapons by using Luna tactical nuclear weapons, without a direct order from Moscow, if
embassy finally delivered an advance copy of the presidential speech and a cover letter to the Russian Foreign Ministry. The English texts were immediately relayed to the Kremlin, where Khrushchev’s assistant for foreign affairs, Oleg Troyanovsky, translated the most important sentences. The Presidium members learned that Kennedy was “determined that this threat to the security of this hemisphere be removed.” He hoped that the Soviet government would “refrain from any action which would widen or deepen this already grave crisis” and proclaimed “a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba.”

Khrushchev was the first to speak: “It seems to me that by its tone, this is not a war against Cuba but some kind of ultimatum,” he told his colleagues. After hours of excruciating uncertainty, the members of the Presidium reacted with “relief” to this news, according to Troyanovsky. They agreed that the US quarantine provided some breathing space. To give everyone the opportunity to get some sleep, the premier adjourned the meeting until 10:00 A.M. in the morning.

3.3 Escalating the crisis, Tuesday, October 23

The Presidium members decided to stay in the Kremlin over night. By the time required to blunt an American invasion.” See Stern, Averting “The Final Failure”, 149. See also 384. Soviet sources, however, show that this is a misreading of the Presidium protocol. The Kremlin leaders, in fact, explicitly prohibited Pliyev from using any nuclear weapons in defense of the island. See Gribkov and Smith, Operation Anadyr, 62. To avoid such misinterpretations, the protocols ideally need to be checked against other archival documents and eyewitness accounts.

106 See Taubman, Khrushchev, 562.
107 Kennedy to Khrushchev, October 22, 1962, in FRUS, 1961-63, vol. 11, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, doc. 44.
110 Troyanovsky, “The Making of Soviet Foreign Policy,” 236. See also Khrushchev, Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower, 559.
111 See CWIHP Bulletin 17/18 (2012), 306, n. 25; Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War, 474; Munton and Welch, The Cuban Missile Crisis, 66.
Khrushchev rose from the sofa in his office, the Foreign Ministry had completed a
translation of Kennedy’s entire speech. He started reading the full text right away.\textsuperscript{112}
The president maintained that American history—“unlike that of the Soviets since the
end of World War II—demonstrates that we have no desire to dominate or conquer
any other nation.” Describing past US policy toward Cuba as “one of patience and
restraint, as befits a peaceful and powerful nation,” he argued that his goal was “not
the victory of might, but the vindication of right.”\textsuperscript{113}

These assertions “angered” Khrushchev, as he remembered in his memoirs.\textsuperscript{114}
To begin with, Kennedy’s claim that he had “no desire” to dominate Cuba struck him
as the pinnacle of duplicity. After all, his administration had been waging a covert
war against the Caribbean republic for almost two years.\textsuperscript{115} Moreover, the premier
was appalled by JFK’s emphasis on the “vindication of right.” The transfer of nuclear
missiles to Cuba was perfectly legal, in his eyes. It was the US president who was
breaching international law by imposing a blockade on the high seas. Identifying with
the Soviet Union, Khrushchev took this form of “piracy” personally. He started to
“seethe” when he imagined American soldiers rummaging through Ru-
sian vessels, his son Sergei later recalled.\textsuperscript{116} For this would violate the sanctity of the Soviet flag
and “humiliate” the entire USSR.\textsuperscript{117}

Khrushchev’s anger at Kennedy’s behavior went deeper, however. To
understand his emotional reaction, it is again useful to take the chairman’s
complicated identity as a parvenu into consideration. According to Iver B. Neumann,

\textsuperscript{112} See Khrushchev, \textit{Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev}, vol. 3, 328.
\textsuperscript{113} JFK, “Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba,”
n.p.
\textsuperscript{114} Khrushchev, \textit{Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes} (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and
Company, 1990), 175.
Miscellaneous Messages, 10/62,” box 64A, Countries Series, NSF, Papers of President Kennedy,
JFKL.
\textsuperscript{116} Khrushchev, \textit{Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower}, 565.
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., 579. See also ibid., 572.
“identity does not reside in essential and readily identifiable cultural traits but in relations, and the question of where and how borders towards ‘the Other’ should be drawn therefore becomes crucial.”\textsuperscript{118} For Khrushchev, the US president was a critical significant other. On the one hand, Kennedy provided a useful foil against which the chairman could forge his self-conception. “I was a former mine worker, a machinist, an industrial worker, who, by the will of the party, became prime minister, whereas he was a millionaire and the son of a millionaire,” he remarked in his autobiography.\textsuperscript{119} The contrast between his modest roots and JFK’s privileged background made his stellar rise to the top look even more impressive.

On the other hand, comparisons with the American president threw into sharp relief what Khrushchev saw as his personal shortages. Kennedy was widely seen as having established his intellectual credentials by studying at Harvard University and writing a Pulitzer Prize-winning book. Khrushchev, however, “had graduated only from a workers’ school,” as he noted in his memoirs.\textsuperscript{120} When he was asked in old age what he regretted in his life, he replied: “I had no education and not enough culture.”\textsuperscript{121} This perceived deficiency regularly raised doubts in his mind about whether he was fit enough to lead the world’s foremost Communist power. For “[t]o govern a country like Russia, you have to have the equivalent of two academies of science in your head. But all I had was four classes in a church school.”\textsuperscript{122} Compared to JFK and his council of advisers, who were often portrayed as the “best and the


\textsuperscript{119} Khrushchev, \textit{Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev}, vol. 3, 354.

\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., vol. 1, 30.

\textsuperscript{121} Khrushchev, quoted in Taubman, \textit{Khrushchev}, 43.

\textsuperscript{122} Khrushchev, quoted in Fursenko and Naftali, \textit{Khrushchev’s Cold War}, 38.
brightest,” Khrushchev often seems to have felt like the “baldest and the boldest,” as Andrei Bitov has pointed out.\textsuperscript{123}

As a parvenu, Khrushchev was particularly dependent on the regular recognition of his achievements and status as leader of a superpower from significant others. Given that he was more than 20 years older than Kennedy and that he had experienced a revolution, a civil war, and two world wars, he felt especially entitled to respect from the US president. JFK’s public demand that the Soviet government withdraw its missiles from Cuba, however, betrayed his “arrogant” attitude, according to Khrushchev.\textsuperscript{124} It confirmed the premier’s long-held suspicion that this “young man” wanted to deny him his recognition and make him “dance to his tune.”\textsuperscript{125} He viewed this as a challenge to his status as the leader of a superpower. Reinforced by his parvenu identity, his wrath thus led him to conceive of the crisis as a battle of wills against Kennedy.

In his autobiography, Khrushchev recalled that the president’s behavior “angered us and we agreed that we would continue to pursue this policy [of setting up missiles in Cuba].”\textsuperscript{126} This suggests that his emotions once again influenced the construction of his preferences. The night before, his fear of a nuclear escalation had made him cautious. Now, his anger spurred him on to complete Operation Anadyr. When the Presidium reconvened at 10:00 A.M., he made a series of quick and bold decisions.\textsuperscript{127} He put the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact into a state of combat readiness.\textsuperscript{128} He directed four nuclear-armed submarines to proceed to

\textsuperscript{125} Khrushchev, quoted in Khrushchev, \textit{Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower}, 442.
\textsuperscript{126} Khrushchev, \textit{Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes} (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Company, 1990), 175.
\textsuperscript{127} See Fursenko and Naftali, \textit{Khrushchev’s Cold War}, 476.
Cuba in order to protect his ships.\textsuperscript{129} He released a public statement warning that the US government was “recklessly playing with fire” and risking the outbreak of “a thermonuclear world war.”\textsuperscript{130} He dictated a letter to Kennedy, in which he noted that it was “self-understood” that he rejected any attempt to gain control over Russian armaments that were destined “exclusively for defensive purposes.”\textsuperscript{131} And finally, he sent an assuring telegram to Fidel Castro.\textsuperscript{132}

How influential was Khrushchev’s experience of anger in comparison with other factors shaping the construction of his preferences? The existing literature refers to potential domestic and foreign policy costs to account for his confrontational decisions that day. According to Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, for example, the premier was aware that he would face criticism at home and abroad if he came across as indecisive in response to Kennedy’s public challenge. Opponents would call him weak, and the Chinese leadership would brand him as a “paper tiger.”\textsuperscript{133} The available sources indicate that such considerations did indeed play an important role. For instance, we know from Troyanovsky that Khrushchev was “exasperated” by the prospect of being criticized by Beijing.\textsuperscript{134} He believed that such criticisms would negatively affect his authority at home in Russia at a time when he was confronted with domestic discontent over his agricultural policy.\textsuperscript{135} This is why this section restricts itself to the limited claim that his anger was an important

\textsuperscript{130} “Official Soviet Government Statement,” October 23, 1962, folder “Cuba, Subjects, USSR Miscellaneous Messages, 10/62,” box 64A, Countries Series, NSF, Papers of President Kennedy, JFKL.
\textsuperscript{131} Khrushchev to Kennedy, October 23, 1962, in \textit{FRUS, 1961-63}, vol. 11, \textit{Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath}, doc. 48. According to Khrushchev, all his correspondence with Kennedy during the missile crisis had been formulated by him. See Khrushchev, \textit{Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev}, vol. 3, 340.
\textsuperscript{133} See Lebow and Stein, \textit{We All Lost the Cold War}, 115-16.
\textsuperscript{134} See Troyanovsky, “The Making of Soviet Foreign Policy,” 238.
\textsuperscript{135} See Strelianyi, “Khrushchev and the Countryside,” 113-137.
additional factor egging him on to take these bold measures on October 23. In practice, his emotions were closely intertwined with his reputational considerations. To fully explain his decision-making that day, however, it is necessary to take his affective state into consideration, as the remainder of this section will demonstrate.

Lebow and Stein go on to assert that Khrushchev’s hostile stance was part of a calculated bargaining strategy. He allegedly recognized on October 23 that he would not be able to keep his rockets in Cuba. “By appearing tough and uncompromising, he tried to extract concessions from Kennedy in return for withdrawing the missiles,” they claim.136 This suggests that he used the expression of anger merely as a strategic tool to strengthen his negotiating position. The available evidence, however, does not support this part of Lebow and Stein’s argument. First, there are no signs that the chairman recognized at this early stage of the crisis that he would eventually have to accept the US demands. On the contrary, the documentary record of October 23 and 24 shows that he was still determined to keep the weapons in Cuba. Reports from Havana informed him that it was only a matter of days until all the rockets would be operational. At this point, Kennedy would “be forced to think things over,” he believed. Consequently, he ordered his troops to work day and night to speed up the construction of the missile launch sites on the island.137

Second, eyewitness accounts indicate that Khrushchev’s anger on October 23 was not only authentic, but that it had an impact on his decision-making. In his autobiographical reflections, Troyanovsky argued that the sober strategy that Lebow and Stein attribute to the chairman would have been the optimal way forward to resolve the crisis: A “more thoughtful analysis” should have led him to recognize that the discovery of the half-completed missile operation put him “at a disadvantage from

136 Lebow and Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War*, 116.
137 Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower*, 562-63.
the outset.” Khrushchev “should have [...] realized at that early stage” that he “eventually would have to give up the plan to deploy nuclear missiles to Cuba” and that “the issue would boil down to bargaining over what could be gained in exchange for their removal.” His anger, however, stood in the way, Troyanovsky remembered: “At that time, in the heat of the confrontation,” the premier was not ready to draw that conclusion.¹³⁸

Third, Khrushchev’s decision on October 23 to send a daring telegram to Castro is difficult to explain from a rationalist perspective that focuses on political considerations. If Lebow and Stein were right that the premier was at this stage merely trying to maximize his benefits from a removal of the missiles, one would expect him to have signalled to his Cuban allies that Moscow might in the end need to reach a compromise with Washington. There was not the slightest hint of this in his message to Castro, however. Instead, Khrushchev declared not only his “firm certainty” that the “aggressive plans of American imperialism” would “fail” but also his “determination to fight actively” against the United States. He assured the Cuban leader that the Soviet Union was “completely ready for combat.”¹³⁹ Since the telegram was confidential and not intended for publication, propaganda considerations cannot explain its audacity. This weakens Lebow and Stein’s claim that the premier was at this stage pursuing a calculated strategy to obtain the best possible price for the ultimate withdrawal of the missiles.

Emotional choice theory can account for the absolute and unconditional determination to complete Operation Anadyr that Khrushchev expressed in his message to Castro. Due to his identity as a parvenu, Khrushchev was particularly sensitive to perceived slights. The strong language in the telegram reflects the

chairman’s fury at what he saw as Kennedy’s lack of respect. He condemned the president’s “brazen demands” and his “pirate-like, perfidious, and aggressive actions.” The sense of confidence and invulnerability that is generally associated with anger would explain why he was so “certain” that the US government’s plans would “fail.”140 His wrath empowered him to “maintain his courage,” as Mikoyan noted in his memoirs.141

3.4 Turning around the arms ships, Tuesday, October 23

At first sight, Khrushchev’s anger and his confrontational decisions on the morning of October 23 appear to confirm the image of an impulsive personality that some of his contemporaries painted of him. In the course of his first term as Eisenhower’s secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, for example, got the impression that the chairman was “not a coldly calculating person, but rather one who reacted emotionally.” As a result, he viewed him as “the most dangerous person to lead the Soviet Union since the October Revolution.”142 On the side of the Russians, Foreign Minister Gromyko complained that Khrushchev had “enough emotion for ten people—at a minimum.”143 Since he was so “emotional,” he did “not necessarily think through all possible permutations,” according to his speechwriter Fyodor

140 Ibid.
141 Anastas Mikoyan, cited in Mikoian, The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis, 151. Another example of a decision that is difficult to explain from a rationalist perspective is Khrushchev’s order to dispatch four nuclear-tipped submarines to Cuba. He made this decision in the face of strong warnings from Deputy Prime Minister Mikoyan and the commander-in-chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral Sergey Gorshkov. The admiral pointed out that the submarines were bound to be tracked down by US naval forces, which could create a major confrontation at sea. See ibid., 157-58.
143 Gromyko, quoted in Allyn, Blight, and Welch, Back to the Brink, 50.
Likewise, Troyanovsky found that his boss tended to “get carried away” by the feelings that dominated him at any particular moment.\(^{145}\)

On October 23, however, Khrushchev took an important additional decision that was not consistent with his impulsive personality and his angry mood that morning. When it came to the question of what instructions to give to the weapons-carrying vessels that were still on the way to Cuba, he did not order them to defy the US blockade, as the emotional choice framework would have predicted. Rather, he issued a “command for the return of [arms] ships.” Only the freighter closest to the island, the Aleksandrovsk with its intermediate-range missiles, was to “head to the nearest [Cuban] port.”\(^{146}\) Since most Russian military documents about the crisis are still classified, it is necessary to rely on American intelligence files to estimate the timing of the turnaround. Drawing on US Navy records, the CIA later found that sixteen vessels had, indeed, reversed course by 7:00 P.M. Moscow time on October 23.\(^{147}\)

How is Khrushchev’s decision to be explained? One possibility is that his anger at Kennedy had lessened by the time he dealt with the arms ships. Another is that he was able to manage his emotion in the course of the Presidium meeting. Some of his colleagues had pointed out that there was already enough military materiel in Cuba to destroy Chicago, New York, and Washington, D.C. They maintained that it was not worth risking an escalation over additional weapons that were ultimately not

\(^{144}\) Burlatsky, quoted in Blight and Welch, *On the Brink*, 234.
\(^{145}\) Troyanovsky, “The Making of Soviet Foreign Policy,” 221.
necessary to deter an attack against the island.\textsuperscript{148} Moreover, they were reluctant to give the US Navy an opportunity to seize Soviet military technology.\textsuperscript{149} These considerations may have resonated with Khrushchev and led him to down-regulate his anger. While this hypothesis sounds plausible, there is currently no evidence in the primary sources to confirm it. This is why this section concludes that emotional choice theory fails to account for the premier’s decision to turn around the arms ships. Rational choice explains it persuasively as the product of a classic cost-benefit analysis.

According to Sergei Khrushchev, the decision to order the return of the freighters with military cargo had “not been easy” for his father. The chairman was aware that this could be seen as de facto compliance with the US quarantine. This would not only make him vulnerable to accusations that he was giving way to the “imperialists;” it would also weaken his bargaining power vis-à-vis Kennedy. He, therefore, resolved that the order was to remain secret.\textsuperscript{150} This lends further credence to Lebow and Stein’s argument that considerations of domestic and foreign policy costs played an important role in Khrushchev’s decision-making. However, there are also some indirect signs that issuing the directive had been emotionally difficult for him. Even in old age, he apparently denied that he had instructed the ships to reverse.\textsuperscript{151} In his memoirs, he claimed that they had sailed “right through” the blockade.\textsuperscript{152} This suggests that the decision was too painful for him to admit to it.

In the course of October 23, armed forces across the world moved into a state

\textsuperscript{148} Khrushchev, \textit{Khrushchev Remembers} (London: Andre Deutsch, 1971), 496.
\textsuperscript{149} See Fursenko and Naftali, \textit{Khrushchev’s Cold War}, 477.
\textsuperscript{150} See Khrushchev, \textit{Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower}, 573.
\textsuperscript{152} Khrushchev, \textit{Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes} (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Company, 1990), 172.
of combat readiness. Bombers of the US Strategic Air Command were circulating over Alaska, ready to carry out nuclear strikes against specific targets in the USSR. The Warsaw Pact’s air defense units, submarine fleets, and strategic rocket forces were on alert. In Cuba, Fidel Castro ordered the full mobilization of his army. After reading Khrushchev’s bellicose telegram, he thanked the Soviet ambassador for the Kremlin’s assistance, expressing his “complete trust” in the measures it had taken to protect his country. In a televised address to the nation, he insisted on the republic’s national sovereignty and vowed that any attackers would be “exterminated.”

3.5 Deterring the US administration, Wednesday, October 24

Scholars have advanced different interpretations of Khrushchev’s behavior on October 24. James Hershberg and Shelton Stern, for instance, highlight his belligerence, citing as evidence a confrontational letter to Kennedy that day. As noted above, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein assert that he sought to come across as uncompromising in order to maximize US concessions in return for the removal of the missiles. Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali contend that an offer by Khrushchev to meet JFK to resolve the crisis marked “a softer line.” These seemingly contradictory signals led William Taubman to conclude that the

154 See Stern, Averting “the Final Failure”, 176.
157 Castro, quoted in Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight, 75.
158 See Hershberg, “The Cuban Missile Crisis,” 77; Stern, Averting “the Final Failure”, 207.
159 See Lebow and Stein, We All Lost the Cold War, 116. See also Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 348.
160 Fursenko and Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble”, 256. For a similar view, see Munton and Welch, The Cuban Missile Crisis, 71.
premier was “torn” between hostility and diplomacy, and ultimately “unsure” how to proceed.\(^{161}\)

This section posits that these conventional accounts misjudge Khrushchev’s intentions on October 24 because they underestimate the significance of a key source: the records of his three-hour conversation with the American businessman William Knox that day. These documents indicate that Khrushchev’s main goal at this stage was to gain enough time to get the missile launch sites in Cuba finished.\(^{162}\) Once all nuclear rockets were operational, they would serve as an independent deterrent vis-à-vis the United States, he believed. To buy this time and to prevent a US attack against Cuba, he pursued a relatively coherent and systematic strategy of deterrence and delay.\(^{163}\) Combining threats, assurances, and an offer to resolve the crisis at a Soviet-US summit, the chairman’s approach was largely based on a rational calculation about how to maximize his gains and successfully complete Operation Anadyr.

The nature and level of Khrushchev’s emotions that day facilitated the pursuit of this strategy. While his fear of a nuclear clash had been intense before the presidential speech on October 22, it diminished with Kennedy’s announcement of a quarantine. On the morning of October 24, his fear was further reduced: When he learned that the arms-bearing ship *Aleksandrovsk* had safely arrived in Cuba, he “calmed down somewhat,” his son Sergei recalled.\(^{164}\) Given that the two superpowers remained in crisis mode, the premier’s fear was probably still at an elevated level, but there are no signs that it dominated his decision-making at this point.

\(^{161}\) Taubman, *Khrushchev*, 566.

\(^{162}\) My argument is supported by Sergei Khrushchev, who recalled that “Father remained firmly convinced that the best policy was to play for time in order to complete the installation of the missiles.” See Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower*, 578.

\(^{163}\) See ibid., 536, 569.

\(^{164}\) See ibid., 564.
According to Sergei Khrushchev, his father now “nourished some hope” that
the Americans were only making “empty threats” and that they might in the end
tolerate the presence of his nuclear missiles in Cuba.\textsuperscript{165} The emotional choice
framework suggests that the experience of hope tends to facilitate creative thinking
about how the goal in question can be achieved. Heightening cognitive flexibility, it
improves the ability to develop alternative pathways to overcome obstacles.\textsuperscript{166} These
appraisal tendencies may well have helped the chairman to devise his strategy of
deterrence and delay on October 24. This section thus treats his emotions as minor but
nevertheless relevant contributing factors in his decision-making that day.

Khrushchev chose an unusual channel to communicate his threats and
assurances to Kennedy. After skimming a list of current US visitors in Moscow, he
opted for what he thought was a prominent representative of America’s capitalist
class: William Knox, the president of the Westinghouse Electric International
Company.\textsuperscript{167} The businessman was summoned to the premier’s office for 3:15 P.M.\textsuperscript{168}
To begin with, Khrushchev flatly acknowledged to Knox what the Kremlin still
officially denied: Russia had “[short-range] anti-aircraft missiles in Cuba as well as
[medium-range] ballistic missiles with both conventional and nuclear warheads.”\textsuperscript{169}
Next, he issued his deterrent threat: “You cannot now take over Cuba.” If Kennedy
did not believe this, he should attack and find out by himself. He argued that he was
“not interested in the destruction of the world,” but if they all wanted “to meet in hell,”
it was up to the Americans.\textsuperscript{170}

\textsuperscript{165} See ibid.
\textsuperscript{166} See section 2.6.3.
\textsuperscript{167} See Dobbs, \textit{One Minute to Midnight}, 85; Hilsman, \textit{To Move a Nation}, 214.
\textsuperscript{168} See William E. Knox Oral History Interview, 12, JFKL.
\textsuperscript{169} See Roger Hilsman to Dean Rusk, “Khrushchev’s Conversation with Mr. W. E. Knox, President
W estinghouse Electrical International, Moscow, October 24,” October 26, 1962, folder “Cuba General,
10/26/62-10/27/62,” box 36A, Countries Series, NSF, Papers of President Kennedy, JFKL.
\textsuperscript{170} Khrushchev, quoted in Knox Oral History Interview, 6. See Roger Hilsman to Dean Rusk,
“Khrushchev’s Conversation with Mr. W. E. Knox, President Westinghouse Electrical International,
The chairman then tempered his warning with some assurances. He promised that the nuclear missiles would remain under strict Soviet control. They would never be fired, except in defense of Cuba or the USSR, and then only on the personal instructions from himself as commander-in-chief.\footnote{Khrushchev, quoted in Roger Hilsman to Dean Rusk, “Khrushchev’s Conversation with Mr. W. E. Knox, President Westinghouse Electrical International, Moscow, October 24,” October 26, 1962, folder “Cuba General, 10/26/62-10/27/62,” box 36A, Countries Series, NSF, Papers of President Kennedy, JFKL.} “You are not happy about it,” he told the businessman, “but you’ll learn to live with it,” just like he had to live with US missiles next door in Turkey.\footnote{Khrushchev, quoted in Roger Hilsman to Dean Rusk, “Khrushchev’s Conversation with Mr. W. E. Knox, President Westinghouse Electrical International, Moscow, October 24,” October 26, 1962, folder “Cuba General, 10/26/62-10/27/62,” box 36A, Countries Series, NSF, Papers of President Kennedy, JFKL. See also CIA, “Memorandum – The Crisis USSR/Cuba,” October 27, 1962, folder “Executive Committee Meetings, Meetings 6-10, 10/26/62-10/28/62,” box 316, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSF, Papers of President Kennedy, JFKL.} Finally, he signaled his goodwill by offering to meet with Kennedy. He would be “delighted” to visit the president in Washington, to receive him in Moscow, or to arrange a “rendezvous” elsewhere.\footnote{Khrushchev, quoted in Roger Hilsman to Dean Rusk, “Khrushchev’s Conversation with Mr. W. E. Knox, President Westinghouse Electrical International, Moscow, October 24,” October 26, 1962, folder “Cuba General, 10/26/62-10/27/62,” box 36A, Countries Series, NSF, Papers of President Kennedy, JFKL.} That way, some of the “major problems” between their “two great countries” could be resolved “without fanfare.”\footnote{Khrushchev, quoted in W. E. Knox, “Close-up of Khrushchev During a Crisis: An American Industrialist who talked with the Russian Leader in the midst of the Kennedy-Khrushchev confrontation over Cuba reports on a revealing conversation,” \textit{New York Times Magazine}, November 18, 1962, 128. See also Khrushchev, \textit{Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower}, 578.} Khrushchev was being “somewhat devious,” according to his son Sergei, because he knew that it would take at least a few days to organize such a summit—precisely the time that he needed to have the work on the construction sites in Cuba finished. Once all the missiles were operational, it would be a meeting “between equals,” he believed.\footnote{Khrushchev, quoted in W. E. Knox, “Close-up of Khrushchev During a Crisis: An American Industrialist who talked with the Russian Leader in the midst of the Kennedy-Khrushchev confrontation over Cuba reports on a revealing conversation,” \textit{New York Times Magazine}, November 18, 1962, 128. See also Khrushchev, \textit{Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower}, 578.}

During Khrushchev’s harangue, Knox’s participation was limited to nodding and interjecting brief comments. One remark he managed to make was that President Kennedy was “infuriated” by Moscow’s “lies” that there were no offensive weapons
in Cuba. The chairman replied with a half hour monologue on the distinction between offensive and defensive arms.\textsuperscript{176} Taking up Knox’s point, he noted his impression that “emotion and not reason” dictated Kennedy’s policy.\textsuperscript{177}

The Soviet leader’s own affective state during this three-hour session seemed to be moderate. “During the entire meeting, Premier Khrushchev was calm, friendly and frank—without any histrionics—although he did appear very tired,” Knox noted afterwards.\textsuperscript{178} This does not mean that he was also calm inside, of course. He may simply have concealed his fear. In his autobiographical reflections, Khrushchev stated his belief that the “enemy can sense it immediately if you’re afraid of the threat of war.” Since the perception of fear would “stimulate the enemy’s appetite,”\textsuperscript{179} he generally went to great lengths to “disguise” his “anxiety.”\textsuperscript{180} According to Knox, the premier did not express any anger during their meeting, either. This suggests that the wrath he had felt at Kennedy the day before had subsided or that he made an effort to hide it. Given that he was treading a fine line—both threatening and assuring the Americans—he may have concluded that any display of agitation might disrupt his strategy of deterrence.

At the end of the conversation, Khrushchev informed the businessman that there were no restrictions on what he might wish to tell the press about his impressions.\textsuperscript{181} The good citizen that he was, Knox refrained from making any

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{176}{See Roger Hilsman to Dean Rusk, “Khrushchev’s Conversation with Mr. W. E. Knox, President Westinghouse Electrical International, Moscow, October 24,” October 26, 1962, folder “Cuba General, 10/26/62-10/27/62,” box 36A, Countries Series, NSF, Papers of President Kennedy, JFKL.}
\footnotetext{177}{Khrushchev, \textit{Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev}, vol. 3, 328.}
\footnotetext{178}{Khrushchev, \textit{Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev}, vol. 3, 328.}
\footnotetext{179}{Ibid., \textit{Khrushchev Remembers} (London: Andre Deutsch, 1971), 497.}
\footnotetext{180}{See Knox Oral History Interview, 10.}
\footnotetext{181}{See Knox Oral History Interview, 10.}
\end{footnotes}
comments to the journalists who were awaiting him outside the Kremlin. Instead, he took the next available flight to Washington in order to inform the US government.¹⁸²

3.6 Contemplating a trade, Thursday, October 25

Khrushchev’s decision-making on Thursday, October 25, presents the biggest puzzle of the missile crisis. The day before, he had pursued a strategy of deterrence and delay to gain the time to have all rocket launchers in Cuba completed. He had insisted that the Americans “learn to live” with the nuclear weapons in their backyard.¹⁸³ Rather than following through with this approach, however, he now undertook a complete volte-face. He suggested to his colleagues in the Presidium to end the crisis by removing the missiles in return for a US pledge not to attack Cuba. What brought about the chairman’s change in preferences?

Representing the conventional perspective, Alexander George maintained that Kennedy “had impressed upon Khrushchev—by deeds as well as words—his determination and resolve” to “use force if necessary to remove the missiles.”¹⁸⁴ Similarly, William Taubman claimed that the premier revisited his confrontational strategy when he was informed that JFK had raised the alert of the US Strategic Air Command from Defense Condition 3 to DEFCON 2, one level short of general war.¹⁸⁵ This argument, however, is weakened by the fact that on October 25 Khrushchev had not yet learned about Washington’s escalation of the military alert state, as Aleksandr

¹⁸² See ibid., 11. The argument that Khrushchev was following a deliberate strategy is supported by the fact that he used a second channel to communicate his threats and assurances to Kennedy in the form of a public letter to the British philosopher Bertrand Russell that day. See “Khrushchev Cable, Moscow, TASS in English,” October 24, 1962, folder “Cuba General, 10/17/62-10/27/62,” box 48, Classified Subject Files, 1961-1964, Theodore C. Sorensen Papers, JFKL; Bertrand Russell, Unarmed Victory (London: Allen & Unwin, 1963), 39-46.
¹⁸³ Khrushchev, quoted in Knox, “Close-up of Khrushchev During a Crisis,” 128. See also Khrushchev, Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower, 578.
¹⁸⁴ George, “The Cuban Missile Crisis,” 114, 118.
¹⁸⁵ See Taubman, Khrushchev, 565, 567. See also See Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight, 95; Zelikow and May, eds., The Presidential Recordings, vol. 3, 183.
Fursenko and Timothy Naftali have found out. At this point, he had not received any alarming intelligence reports about an imminent US invasion of Cuba, either. Based on their in-depth research in Russian archives, Fursenko and Naftali conclude that “no single piece of information seems to have moved Khrushchev to his new position.” What ultimately “impressed him most,” in their opinion, was “a general sense of the military inferiority of the Soviet Union.” He had “tried to achieve some measure of parity with the United States to defend the Soviet interests in the region; but clearly he had failed.”

Fursenko and Naftali’s assessment is in line with the views of some US officials who were involved in the crisis. Air Force General Jack Catton, for example, later claimed that “the concept of strength was absolutely proved” in the missile crisis. “Khrushchev was looking down the largest barrel he had ever stared at.” Confronted with America’s “absolute superiority,” he had “no alternative” but to back down, Catton asserted. McGeorge Bundy, JFK’s national security adviser at the time, came to agree with this perspective. In his autobiography, he noted self-critically that it had been a “serious failure” on his and the president’s part “not to recognize the strength of our position.” Likewise, political scientist Stephen Cimbala concluded that “there was little the Soviet Union could do to prevent the United States from using its conventional force superiority to overthrow Castro.”

The available sources, however, raise doubts about this received wisdom. There is converging evidence that dozens of short-range nuclear rockets were installed along Cuba’s coast and ready to be fired by October 25. These tactical

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188 Bundy, Danger and Survival, 457.
189 Cimbala, Military Persuasion in War and Policy, 80.
battlefield weapons had a radius of only 30 to 100 miles, but they could, in principle, have defeated any conventional invading force.\textsuperscript{190} Moreover, eyewitness accounts and government files indicate that Khrushchev’s original plan to buy enough time to complete the launch sites for the medium-range nuclear missiles worked out. The day before, on October 24, he had been informed about significant progress in construction.\textsuperscript{191} In the course of October 25, all of the remaining medium-range missiles became operational, according to the deputy commander of combat training of the Soviet forces in Cuba, Lieutenant General Leonid Garbuz.\textsuperscript{192} This is independently confirmed by photographs from a US aerial reconnaissance mission over the island that day.\textsuperscript{193} Khrushchev seems to have been aware of the rapid advancement on the island. “Supremacy is a relative thing,” he noted in his memoirs. “The missiles that we had made operational could still do their job. They could wipe New York off the face of the earth.”\textsuperscript{194} Soviet inferiority was thus not as absolute as Bundy, Catton, Cimbala, Fursenko, and Naftali claim. Based on the readiness of the medium-range nuclear rockets in Cuba, the chairman could have made a credible public threat that US cities on the East coast would be obliterated if the United States moved against the island.

This section posits that Khrushchev’s emotions on October 25 help to shed some light on the reversal of his preferences. Any pride or hope that he may have felt at the completion of the missile launchers in Cuba was eclipsed by his growing fear of a nuclear escalation. This fear played a critical role in dissuading him from his strategy of deterrence. It was not so much triggered by Kennedy’s alleged resolve to

\textsuperscript{190} See Gribkov and Smith, \textit{Operation Anadyr}, 63. See also Lebow, \textit{Forbidden Fruit}, 15.

\textsuperscript{191} See Khrushchev, \textit{Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower}, 579.

\textsuperscript{192} See Garbuz, cited in Mikoian, \textit{The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis}, 135.

\textsuperscript{193} The photos shot during the reconnaissance flight on October 25, 1962, confirmed that the Soviets had deployed short-range nuclear weapons and that medium-range nuclear missiles were becoming fully operational. See Zelikow and May, eds., \textit{The Presidential Recordings}, vol. 3, 323-24.

\textsuperscript{194} Khrushchev, \textit{Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev}, vol. 3, 339.
attack Cuba, however, or by a perception of US military superiority, as conventional accounts imply. Rather, it was elicited by an increasing number of hints that the American president might not be able to control his emotions. If JFK’s fear, fury, or panic were to impel him to invade the island, this could escalate into nuclear war between the superpowers, Khrushchev believed. It was ultimately his anxiety that Kennedy might “give way to passion” that led him to advocate the withdrawal of the missiles in exchange for a US pledge not to attack Cuba in the Presidium meeting, as the remainder of this section will show.\textsuperscript{195}

Thursday, October 25, brought two additional pieces of news for Khrushchev. The first was a copy of an appeal that UN Secretary General U Thant had addressed to him and President Kennedy during a meeting of the UN Security Council in New York the evening before. What was at stake in this crisis was not just the interests of the parties involved but “the very fate of mankind,” the secretary general warned.\textsuperscript{196} In a paragraph that caught Khrushchev’s attention, he recalled a statement that the Cuban President, Oswaldo Dorticós Torrado, had made in the UN General Assembly a couple of weeks before, on October 8: “If the United States could give assurances, by word and deed, that it would not commit acts of aggression against our country, we solemnly declare that there would be no need for our weapons and our armies.”\textsuperscript{197} U Thant suggested that such an agreement could provide a way out of the impasse and

\textsuperscript{195} Khrushchev to Kennedy, October 24, 1962, in FRUS, 1961-63, vol. 11, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, doc. 61.
\textsuperscript{197} Ibid., 240. See Khrushchev, Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, vol. 3, 332.
pleaded with Kennedy and Khrushchev to place “good sense and understanding” above the “anger of the moment or the pride of nations.”

The second piece of news was another letter from the US president, which was delivered by a representative of the American embassy in Moscow at 1:30 P.M. JFK ignored both Khrushchev’s threats and his offer to arrange a summit from the day before. Instead, he focused on the issue of deception. Since he had relied on the premier’s assurances that no offensive weapons were being sent to Cuba, he had “urged restraint upon those in this country who were urging action in this matter”—only to learn that all these assurances had been “false.” Kennedy expressed his “regret that these events should cause a deterioration in our relations,” concluding with the hope that the Soviet government would “take the necessary action to permit a restoration of the earlier situation.” The substance of the president’s letter did not differ from his previous messages. According to Sergei Khrushchev, his father was apparently “touched” by its “sincere tone,” however.

Besides JFK’s letters, reports from the Soviet ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin, became the chairman’s most important source of information about developments in Washington during the crisis. Dobrynin later recalled that he used his cables to Moscow as an opportunity to convey the “genuine state of agitation” of Kennedy and his inner circle of advisers. His aim was to put Khrushchev in a

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199 According to a cable from the US embassy in Moscow, Kennedy’s letter was delivered to the Soviet Foreign Ministry at 1:30 P.M. (Moscow time). See US Embassy Moscow to Secretary of State, October 25, 1962, folder “Cuba, Subjects, USSR Miscellaneous Messages, 10/62,” box 64A, Countries Series, NSF, Papers of President Kennedy, JFKL.


201 Khrushchev, Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower, 580.
position to “visualize” the atmosphere in the White House.\footnote{Dobrynin, In Confidence, 82.} In a message on October 22, for instance, the ambassador had emphasized Secretary of State Dean Rusk’s “nervous and agitated mood.”\footnote{Dobrynin to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 22, 1962, AVPRF, in CWIHP Bulletin 5 (1995), 70.} Two days later, he highlighted Attorney General Robert Kennedy’s “excited condition.”\footnote{Ibid., 71.} Taking note of Dobrynin’s observations, Khrushchev drew the conclusion that the US president and his advisers were “afraid of war.”\footnote{Khrushchev, quoted in “Minutes of Conversation between the Delegation of the CPCz and the CPSU,” October 30, 1962, File “Antonín Novotný, Kuba,” box 193, Central State Archive, Archive of the Central Committee (CC) of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CPCz), Prague, in CWIHP Bulletin 17/18 (2012), 401.}

The chairman shared his thoughts and feelings about these latest pieces of information with the other members of the Presidium in the afternoon. In his introductory statement, he pointed out that Kennedy was “sleeping with a wooden knife.”\footnote{Khrushchev, quoted in Presidium Protocol no. 61, Serov notes, October 25, 1962, RGANI, F. 3, Op. 16, D. 165, L. 170-173, in CWIHP Bulletin 17/18 (2012), 308.} His colleagues were used to his colorful sayings. On this occasion, however, they were mystified.\footnote{See Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight, 112.} “Why with a wooden one?” Deputy Prime Minister Mikoyan enquired. “When a man goes bear hunting for the first time,” Khrushchev explained, “he takes with him a wooden knife so that it will be easier to clean his trousers.”\footnote{Quoted in Presidium Protocol no. 61, Serov notes, October 25, 1962, RGANI, F. 3, Op. 16, D. 165, L. 170-173, printed in CWIHP Bulletin 17/18 (2012), 309.}

Convinced that Kennedy had become “frightened,” the premier wondered whether the president would be able to control his emotions.\footnote{Khrushchev, quoted in Presidium Protocol no. 61, Serov notes, October 25, 1962, RGANI, F. 3, Op. 16, D. 165, L. 170-173, in CWIHP Bulletin 17/18 (2012), 308.} Could the Kremlin’s strategy of deterrence provoke JFK to carry out the very attack against Cuba that it was supposed to prevent? Khrushchev argued that it was now time to give Kennedy “a sense of calm.” Rather than “inflame” the situation, the Presidium should conduct a
“reasonable policy.” Foreign Minister Gromyko concurred that it was not worth getting into “a petty exchange of insults” with Washington. Taking up U Thant’s proposal, Khrushchev suggested that the US administration “give a commitment not to touch Cuba, and we will give our consent to the dismantling” of the missiles. “This is not cowardice,” he hastened to add. It was merely a “fallback position.”

Khrushchev went to great lengths to demonstrate to his associates that his policy reversal was based on his “reasonable” reassessment of the USSR’s expected costs and benefits. Later in the Presidium meeting, however, he gave away that Kennedy was not the only one who had slept with a “wooden knife”: “We began and got cold feet,” he pointed out, but now “the initiative is in our hands.” He was reassuring not only his colleagues but also himself when he told them that there was “no need to be afraid.”

Toward the end of his life, Khrushchev would speak more openly about his internal state at the time: “[Like the Americans,] we were also afraid of war. Only a fool would not be. I’m not afraid to say this. We were afraid of war, because it would bring ruin and destruction to our country.” It was above all this experience of fear that had led Khrushchev to change his perception of Kennedy and to reverse his preferences. Two days before, the premier’s anger had spurred him on to defend the Cuban revolutionaries. Now his fear that JFK could lose control over his emotions led him to change his priorities. “It is not to our benefit to fight” on their behalf, he explained in the Presidium session. For “the future depends not on Cuba but on our country.” Having led the superpowers into the most dangerous crisis of the Cold War, he sought to highlight the “positive” side of the situation: Thanks to the

210 Khrushchev, quoted in ibid., 309.
213 Khrushchev, quoted in ibid.
missile operation, the Caribbean republic was now the “focus of the world’s attention.” That would make it harder for the Americans to intervene in the future. If the Soviet leadership managed to obtain a US guarantee of Cuba’s territorial integrity, it would save Castro’s regime “for two to three more years.”

Leonid Brezhnev, Aleksei Kosygin, Frol Kozlov, Anastas Mikoyan, Boris Ponomarev, and Mikhail Suslov all agreed that the chairman had proposed a “correct and reasonable tactic.” At the end of the meeting, everyone “endorse[d] and support[ed]” his plan. They left it up to Khrushchev to decide at what point in time he would offer Kennedy to withdraw the missiles in return for a US pledge not to attack Cuba. At this stage, the premier’s fear was not intense enough to prompt him to get in touch with Washington. “We have to play,” he explained to his colleagues, “but we should not get out and lose our heads.”

Some readers may wonder why it matters whether Khrushchev’s fear was triggered by a perception that Kennedy was determined to attack or by the impression that the president was about to lose control over his emotions. The difference is relevant because it helps to shed light on the chairman’s affective transformation between October 23 and 25. When he assumed that JFK was trying to bend his will by imposing a blockade on October 23, he was indignant and angry. He considered the president directly responsible for what he saw as a provocation and transgression. It was due to these beliefs and feelings that he perceived the confrontation as a battle of wills between himself and Kennedy.

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215 Khrushchev, quoted in ibid.
218 See Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War, 484.
According to emotional choice theory, the experience of anger depends on an evaluation of responsibility. If people reach the conclusion that a person who they initially deemed responsible for a goal obstruction or norm violation is, in fact, not responsible, their anger tends to lessen.\textsuperscript{220} By October 25, the additional letter from the White House and Dobrynin’s reports gave Khrushchev the impression that JFK wanted to avoid war but that a loss of control over his emotions might push him to attack Cuba. As a consequence, he came to believe that Kennedy was not directly responsible for the US military threat to intervene on the island. His new perception would explain why there are no signs of anger at the president at this stage of the crisis. It is thus open to question whether the premier would have contemplated a withdrawal of his missiles as readily if he had assumed that JFK was in full control of his emotions and determined to bend his (Khrushchev’s) will. This would likely have sustained or intensified his anger at Kennedy, which might have spurred him on to continue to defy US demands.

3.7 Trading away the missiles, Friday, October 26

Until Friday morning, Khrushchev was still “playing.”\textsuperscript{221} This changed, however, when he received another telegram from Dobrynin. The ambassador reported that the Pentagon had brought its armed forces “into maximum battle readiness, including readiness to repulse nuclear attack,” by raising the alert state to DEFCON 2.\textsuperscript{222} He pointed out that the Americans were “rather nervous” because they did not know about the exact number and kinds of Soviet missiles in Cuba.\textsuperscript{223} According to two

\textsuperscript{220} See section 2.6.2.
\textsuperscript{222} Dobrynin to Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 25, 1962, AVPRF, in \emph{CWIHP Bulletin} 8/9 (1996/1997), 286.
\textsuperscript{223} Ibid., 287.
prominent US correspondents, the administration had “supposedly taken a decision to invade Cuba today or tomorrow night.” Dobrynin noted that “different sources in the journalist and diplomatic corps in Washington agree that currently the probability of a US armed intervention against Cuba is great.” When Khrushchev read the ambassador’s cable he “dropped a load in his pants,” Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaly Kuznetsov later claimed. In theory, the experience of intense fear, shock, and panic could have prompted the chairman to take rash action. In light of the recent news that all the medium-range missiles in Cuba were now operational, he could have gone on air to threaten a retaliatory nuclear strike against the United States if the Kennedy administration were to attack the island, for example. Or he could have warned that he would strike against West Berlin.

One reason why he refrained from making such confrontational moves relates to the policy guidance and the expressions of respect that Dobrynin conveyed in his message. The ambassador was concerned that his disturbing report might lead Khrushchev to overreact. To calm him down and to reduce any anger that he might feel about Washington’s escalation, he added some reassuring information with clear policy implications. “At the same time, today in political and diplomatic circles and in the comments of American press, radio, and television began appearing rays of hope for a peaceful settlement of the Cuba issue.” He stressed that this optimism was based on “the quiet, restrained behavior of the Soviet government and its readiness for negotiations with the USA.” Moreover, Dobrynin made a point of mentioning that

224 Ibid., 286.
225 Ibid., 288.
228 See Dobrynin, In Confidence, 87.
he was “receiving quite a number of cables and letters from ordinary Americans in which they express their gratitude to the Soviet government and N. S. Khrushchev for their position in the current situation.”\textsuperscript{230} Finally, he ended his telegram to Moscow with a somewhat disingenuous compliment that contained a hardly veiled recommendation: “As it is recognized nearly by everybody here, a very important role is played by the self-possessed and constructive position of the Soviet government,” which, he claimed, was “restraining the hottest heads in Washington.”\textsuperscript{231}

The available sources suggest that Khrushchev took these words to heart. As he later recalled, “the presence of our missiles provoked [the Americans] too much.” It was “necessary to act quickly” because “we really were on the verge of war.”\textsuperscript{232} Without reconvening the Presidium, he rushed to implement Dobrynin’s guidance by sending a de-escalating message to the White House: “I see, Mr. President, that you too are not devoid of a sense of anxiety for the fate of the world,” he pointed out, indirectly acknowledging his own fear of nuclear escalation. He vowed that he was against war because “war ends when it has rolled through cities and villages, everywhere sowing death and destruction.” Then, he appealed to Kennedy: “I don’t know whether you can understand me and believe me. But I should like to have you believe in yourself and to agree that one cannot give way to passions; it is necessary to control them. [...] If, however, you have not lost your self-control,” Khrushchev admonished him, “you ought not now to pull on the ends of the rope in which you have tied the knot of war, because the more the two of us pull, the tighter that knot will be tied.” Finally, he came to the point: If the US government were to give

\textsuperscript{230} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{231} Ibid., 288. See also Dobrynin, \textit{In Confidence}, 87.

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assurances not to attack Cuba, then “the question of armaments would disappear.”

Several handwritten changes that the chairman made on the final copy indicate his haste. He did not think that there was enough time to retype the letter.

Khrushchev’s intense fear that Kennedy might lose control over his emotions thus drove him to offer the president the trade on which he had agreed with his Presidium colleagues the day before. His fear also sheds some light on why he did not play the “one good card in his hand,” as Dobrynin later put it. It did not occur to him to demand the removal of the US bases in neighboring Turkey. The emotional choice framework predicts that fear’s attentional bias toward danger cues concentrates cognitive resources, diverting attention away from other stimuli in the environment. As a consequence, anxious subjects tend to be less open to new ideas than people in a neutral state. This would account for the chairman’s rigid focus on the missiles in Cuba and his neglect of potential bargaining chips in other parts of the world.

What is also important, however, is what Khrushchev did not feel at this stage. Even though his identity as a parvenu made him highly sensitive to perceived degradation, there are no signs that he experienced any anger or humiliation when he offered to withdraw the rockets from Cuba. It is impossible to provide any incontrovertible explanation for the apparent absence or low intensity of these emotions. Any attempt to shed light on this issue needs to take into account two factors, however: The first is the kind of coercive diplomacy that Kennedy had been practicing. After his announcement of the quarantine on October 22, he tried to avoid any measures that might provoke the chairman. He neither issued an ultimatum for

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233 Khrushchev to Kennedy, October 26, 1962, printed in FRUS, 1961-63, vol. 6: Kennedy-Khrushchev Exchanges, doc. 65. The message was delivered to the American embassy in Moscow at 4:43 P.M. local time.

234 See Khrushchev, Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower, 588; Taubman, Khrushchev, 569.

235 Dobrynin, In Confidence, 79.

236 See section 2.6.1.
the removal of the missiles from Cuba; nor did he order the US military to stop and search any Soviet ships.\textsuperscript{237} That these vessels remained untouched appears to have been important to Khrushchev. In his memoirs, he stressed that “we never let the Americans actually set foot on our decks.”\textsuperscript{238} This suggests that he cared deeply about the inviolability of the Soviet flag. JFK’s moderation was one reason why the premier’s initial anger at the blockade on October 23 did not flare up again during the subsequent days.

A second factor is Dobrynin’s coverage of events in Washington. The ambassador was aware that his reports were a critical source of information about US behavior for the chairman. As a result, he chose his words carefully, always with an eye to how they would influence his readers in Moscow. While highlighting the circumstances that were pushing Kennedy to take action against Cuba, he sought to give Khrushchev the impression that he was recognized and respected in the United States as a strong and responsible statesman. In light of his identity as a parvenu, such recognition was important to the premier. It explains why there are no signs that he experienced any humiliation for taking the path of diplomacy in the face of US belligerence.

### 3.8 Adding a further condition, Saturday, October 27

The available sources indicate that Khrushchev’s intense fear receded somewhat after he sent his conciliatory letter to Kennedy in the late afternoon of October 26. The Iranian ambassador to Moscow, Ali Qoli Ardalan, for instance, found the premier to

\textsuperscript{237} The US Navy stopped and searched a ship for the first time at 7:00 A.M. (Washington time) on Friday, October 26. The vessel Marucla was a freighter registered in Lebanon, owned by a Panamanian, and bound for Cuba under a Soviet charter. See Robert F. Kennedy, \textit{Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis} (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969), 60; Munton and Welch, \textit{The Cuban Missile Crisis}, 98.

\textsuperscript{238} Khrushchev, \textit{Khrushchev Remembers} (London: Andre Deutsch, 1971), 499.
be “friendly and calm” when they met that evening. Sergei Khrushchev recalled that his father became “a little upset” and “somewhat ashamed” that night. The chairman now believed that he had “given way to nerves” by offering the trade to JFK so soon. This confirms once more that his emotions were closely intertwined with considerations about his domestic and international reputation. He knew that if people came to regard him as a pushover, his authority at home and abroad would erode.

The next morning, just as Khrushchev’s doubts about his overture to Kennedy were growing, he learned about an op-ed piece by Walter Lippmann in the *Washington Post*. The American columnist proposed to resolve the crisis through a “face-saving agreement” to dismantle the Soviet missiles in Cuba in return for the removal of US rockets from Turkey. Intrigued by this suggestion, Khrushchev consulted with Andrei Gromyko about the idea of sending another letter to JFK. As so often, the foreign minister’s opinion coincided with that of the premier. They agreed to raise this issue at the upcoming Presidium session.

When the Soviet leadership convened at noon on Saturday, October 27, Khrushchev presented his latest assessment of the situation. “We must take into account that the US did not attack Cuba,” he noted. “Could they attack us right now? I think they will not bring themselves to do it.” Gromyko explained that the Kremlin’s offer the day before to remove the missiles in return for a security guarantee for Cuba made it “almost impossible” for Kennedy to launch an invasion.

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239 Ardalan, quoted in US embassy Moscow to Secretary of State, October 27, 1962, folder “Cuba, Subjects, USSR Miscellaneous Messages, 10/62,” box 64A, Countries Series, NSF, Papers of President Kennedy, JFKL.

240 Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower*, 591, 610. “Shame” and “upset” are not part of the five key emotions highlighted in the theoretical framework. They are mentioned here nevertheless because they were relevant (but not necessarily critical) in this situation.

241 See ibid., 591.


243 See Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower*, 595.

For the president and his advisers knew “very well” that an intervention at this point would “brand them as aggressors” and “hold them up to shame as enemies of peace.”

Khrushchev believed that this new constellation gave the Presidium some room to maneuver. If they could achieve not only a US guarantee of Cuba’s territorial integrity but also the elimination of the American missiles in Turkey, they would “end up victorious.” According to the protocol of the meeting, “all the comrades [spoke] in support” of this idea. The chairman thus quickly composed a letter to convey his additional demand to the White House. None of the five key emotions fear, anger, hope, pride, and humiliation are discernible in the run-up to this choice. The thesis thus treats them as irrelevant at this point of the crisis. Khrushchev’s decision to add a further condition to the proposed deal with Kennedy is best explained with rational choice: At a time when his fear had abated, the premier focused on reducing his costs and maximizing his gains.

### 3.9 Accepting Kennedy’s terms, Sunday, October 28

On October 28, Khrushchev accepted Kennedy’s proposal to resolve the crisis. The United States would openly guarantee Cuba’s territorial integrity in return for the removal of all “offensive” weapons from the island. While the president refused to agree publicly to the withdrawal of American rockets from Turkey, he gave a secret promise to take them out within four to five months.

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248 See Hershberg, “The Cuban Missile Crisis,” 82.
Three main explanations have been advanced to account for Khrushchev’s decision. First, many analysts argue that he consented to the US offer once he was confronted with JFK’s credible threat that he was about to attack Cuba.249 Stephen Cimbala, for example, posits that “only the additional pressure of an ultimatum that the missiles had to be removed within twenty-four hours, with the warning that if the Soviets could not do so the United States would, finally forced Khrushchev’s hand.”250 This section, however, will show that this explanation does not reflect Khrushchev’s perception at the time. He was impressed not by Kennedy’s alleged resolve but by the belief that the president was losing control over the hardliners in his administration. What conventional accounts term JFK’s “ultimatum” was perceived by Khrushchev as a desperate call for “help” from the president to avert a coup d’état.

Second, several scholars maintain that Kennedy’s pledge not to attack Cuba and his secret promise to remove the US missiles from Turkey provided important incentives for the chairman to yield.251 This section concludes that JFK’s guarantee of Cuba’s territorial integrity was, indeed, an important factor because it made it easier for Khrushchev to retreat. The secret promise to remove American rockets from Turkey was less significant, however, because the premier knew that he would not be able to exploit it politically.


250 Cimbala, Military Persuasion in War and Policy, 102.

251 See Art, “Coercive Diplomacy,” 396; Davis, Threats and Promises, 13; Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight, 323; Garthoff, Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 87; George, Forceful Persuasion, 35; ibid., “The Cuban Missile Crisis,” 121; Greffenius and Gill, “Pure Coercion vs. Carrot-and-Stick Offers in Crisis Bargaining,” 51; Dominic D. P. Johnson and Dominic Tierney, Failing To Win: Perceptions of Victory and Defeat in International Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), 105, 108; Lebow and Stein, We All Lost the Cold War, 140; Leng, “Reagan and the Russians,” 351-52.
Finally, some experts assert that Kennedy’s ability to put himself into the shoes of his opponent enabled him to provide Khrushchev with a dignified way out of the crisis.\textsuperscript{252} It is correct that the premier reached the conclusion that he could withdraw the missiles from Cuba with his honor intact. This section will make the case that this was due less to JFK’s empathy, however, than to the psychological skill of Ambassador Dobrynin, who chose his words carefully when he reported about a critical meeting with Robert Kennedy.

What all these conventional accounts underestimate is the impact that events on October 28 had on Khrushchev’s emotions and the effects that these emotions, in turn, exerted on the construction of his preferences. An understanding of this process is necessary, however, to explain why coercive diplomacy succeeded in this case. The chairman’s decision to accept US terms was not only shaped by his growing fear that he or Kennedy were about to lose control over the situation and inadvertently bring about a nuclear escalation. It was also influenced by the absence or low intensity of anger and humiliation, as the remainder of this section shows.

On the morning of Sunday, October 28, Khrushchev received some alarming news. To begin with, a telegram from his ambassador to Havana, Alexander Alekseyev, alerted him that an American U-2 reconnaissance plane had been shot down over Cuba.\textsuperscript{253} While the Soviet commander on the island had been authorized to use (conventional) force in the event of a large-scale aerial attack, he did not have permission to fire at an isolated plane.\textsuperscript{254} Khrushchev expected the loss of the aircraft to cause an “uproar” in the United States. “We were concerned that President

\textsuperscript{252} See Freedman, \textit{Kennedy’s Wars}, 207; Houghton, \textit{Political Psychology}, 231; Munton and Welch, \textit{The Cuban Missile Crisis}, 5, 100.


\textsuperscript{254} See Fursenko and Naftali, \textit{Khrushchev’s Cold War}, 489.
Kennedy wouldn’t be able to stomach the humiliation,” he later remembered. “We feared that America’s patience would be exhausted and war would break out.” To get to the bottom of the U-2 incident, he instructed Defense Minister Malinovsky to find out who had given the order to fire at the aircraft.

Next, he learned about an urgent message from Castro. The Cuban leader warned that the US armed forces would invade during the “next 24 or 72 hours,” appealing to Moscow to carry out a preemptive atomic strike against the United States. “We were completely aghast,” Khrushchev later recalled. “Only a person who has no idea what nuclear war means, or who has been so blinded […] by revolutionary passion, can talk like that.” Finally, Foreign Minister Gromyko gave the chairman a copy of a letter from Kennedy that the White House had just released to the press. The president expressed his willingness to trade the removal of “offensive” weapons from Cuba for a US pledge not to invade the island, but he did not mention a word about the American missiles in Turkey.

At 10:00 A.M., Khrushchev met with the other Presidium members. All participants were “on edge from the outset,” as the premier’s assistant Troyanovsky later remembered. After collecting more information about the U-2 incident, Malinovsky reported to the group that the plane had been shot down by a Soviet anti-

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259 Castro to Khrushchev, October 26, 1962, printed in Blight, Allyn, and Welch, Cuba on the Brink, 509.
263 Oleg Troyanovsky, Cherez Gody y Rastoyaniya (Moscow: Vagrius, 1997), 250, quoted in Taubman, Khrushchev, 574.
aircraft regiment.\(^{264}\) Khrushchev was now in a “state of extreme agitation,” according to Mikoyan.\(^{265}\) Only two days before, he had written to Kennedy that neither of them should “pull on the ends of the rope” in which the “knot of war” was tied, and now one of his own officers had given that rope a forceful tug.\(^{266}\) He hurried to send instructions to General Pliyev in Cuba not to take orders from anywhere but Moscow. Only in the event of a US attack was he to coordinate his actions with Castro’s forces in order to defend the island with conventional means.\(^{267}\)

Early on in the meeting, Troyanovsky was summoned to the phone. Gromyko’s secretary was calling from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to read out a newly received cable from Dobrynin about a recent meeting with Robert Kennedy. Once Troyanovsky finished taking notes, he shared them with the Presidium members:\(^{268}\) RFK had told the ambassador that the shoot-down of the U-2 plane was putting “strong pressure on the president to give an order to respond with fire if fired upon when American reconnaissance planes are flying over Cuba.” The attorney general stated further that the US government was “determined to get rid of those bases—up to, in the extreme case, of bombing them,” but he recognized that the Kremlin would “undoubtedly respond with the same against us.” Consequently, “a real war will begin, in which millions of Americans and Russians will die.”\(^{269}\)


\(^{265}\) Mikoyan, quoted in Mikoian, The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis, 149.

\(^{266}\) Khrushchev to Kennedy, October 26, 1962, in FRUS, 1961-63, vol. 6: Kennedy-Khrushchev Exchanges, doc. 65. See also Bundy, Danger and Survival, 446.


\(^{269}\) Quoted in Dobrynin to Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 27, 1962, AVPRF, in CWIHP Bulletin 5 (1995), 79.
Robert Kennedy professed that “we want to avoid that any way we can, I’m sure that the government of the USSR has the same wish.” Time, however, was “of essence” because there were “many unreasonable heads among the generals, and not only among the generals,” who were “itching for a fight.” The situation could “get out of control,” he cautioned. In addition to US “assurances that there will not be any invasion of Cuba” in return for the removal of the missiles from the island, the president was willing to give a secret promise that he would withdraw the American rockets from Turkey within four to five months. Finally, RFK asked the Kremlin to give an answer “if possible within the next day (Sunday).” The “‘request for a reply tomorrow,’ stressed R. Kennedy, ‘is just that—a request, and not an ultimatum.’” According to the cable, Dobrynin pointed out that “it went without saying that the Soviet government would not accept any ultimatums and it was good that the American government realized that.”

270 Quoted in ibid., 79.
271 Quoted in ibid., 80. Scholars disagree about the impact of Dobrynin’s report on Khrushchev’s decision to end the crisis on US terms. The discovery of Malin’s protocol of the October 28 Presidium meeting led Fursenko and Naftali to assert that Dobrynin’s message reached Khrushchev too late to influence his decision. See Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War, 490. In Malin’s protocol, Dobrynin’s report is listed after references to the decision to “dismantle the missile installations” and to Khrushchev’s “letter to US President Kennedy” See Presidium Protocol no. 63, October 28, 1962, RGANI, F. 3, Op. 16, D. 947, L. 45-46 ob., in CWIHP Bulletin 17/18 (2012), 310. As a result, they infer that the premier finished dictating his letter to JFK before he learned about Dobrynin’s report.

I argue that Fursenko and Naftali read too much into Malin’s highly fragmentary Presidium protocol. Rather than providing a verbatim record of the discussion that lasted a few hours, the protocol summarizes the meeting in a total of merely nine sentences. Malin thus left out most of the discussion. This is why it is entirely possible that Dobrynin’s report was brought to the Presidium’s attention early in the meeting and that Malin failed to record this in his minutes. Moreover, the protocol appears to be out of order. Malin listed only items 1, 5, 2, 3, and 9 (in that sequence). Items 4 and 6 to 8 are omitted. The fact that he referred to Dobrynin’s report under item 3 suggests that the participants knew about it earlier rather than later in the meeting.

Naftali recently softened his earlier claim by acknowledging that without more information Malin’s notes “do not make clear” at what point in time Khrushchev learned about Dobrynin’s report See Naftali, “The Malin Notes,” 302. The additional information that Naftali asks for is, in fact, available. Eyewitness accounts of the Presidium session suggest that the ambassador’s message arrived early in the meeting. In his memoirs, Khrushchev, for example, claimed that he learned about Dobrynin’s message before he drafted his letter to Kennedy. See Khrushchev, Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, vol. 3, 340. What is more, Oleg Troyanovsky recalled that the Presidium received the ambassador’s report “as the meeting started.” See Sherry Jones’s interview with Oleg Troyanovsky, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB400/docs/Interview%20with%20Oleg%20Troyanovsky.pdf, 15 (accessed January 12, 2014). The premier’s assistant for foreign affairs has generally been regarded as a reliable eyewitness. I agree with Dobbs’ view that Troyanovsky’s autobiographical
In his memoirs, Khrushchev described the ambassador’s report as the “culminating moment” of the Presidium session.\(^{272}\) Troyanovsky later called it the “climax” of the meeting.\(^{273}\) Why was the cable so important to them? The reference to Kennedy’s willingness to provide a public guarantee of Cuba’s territorial integrity cannot have been a critical piece of information at this point because the chairman had already learned about it when he read the president’s letter earlier on. JFK’s secret promise to remove the US rockets from Turkey appears to have left only a minor impression on the premier. In his memoirs, Khrushchev claimed that he had known “perfectly well” that the promise was of a “symbolic nature” because these weapons were technically obsolete. What is more, he was aware that Kennedy’s insistence on non-disclosure would prevent him from openly exploiting the withdrawal of the American missiles as a personal achievement. The value of the promise was thus limited from a strategic and political point of view.\(^{274}\)

The documentary record suggests that Dobrynin’s message was so important to Khrushchev and Troyanovsky because it elicited intense emotion on their part. RFK’s warning that the situation could “get out of control” heightened their fear of a nuclear escalation. As Troyanovsky later recalled, the ambassador’s cable “added to the general tension” in the Presidium meeting. “Robert Kennedy said very directly that there were people around the president who were looking for a fight, and that unless something was done within a very short time, it might lead to very, very, very serious consequences,” the premier’s assistant remembered. As a result, Khrushchev

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was in a “very nervous mood.” As during the previous days, the chairman’s fear was not triggered by a perception that the president was resolved to attack. Rather, it was now elicited by his concern that either he or Kennedy was about to lose control over the situation. The unauthorized shoot-down of the American reconnaissance plane over Cuba indicated to him that he was not in full command of the events on the island. The information from Dobrynin suggested that belligerent US generals were about to “overthrow” JFK, invade Cuba, and start a spiral of escalation that could result in nuclear war. In his autobiography, Khrushchev remarked that he had “felt there was a danger that the president would lose control of his military.”

There is a further indicator that the chairman was genuinely worried about the pressure from American hardliners. In a confidential letter to Kennedy two days later, on October 30, he noted that “my role was simpler than yours because there were no people around me who wanted to unleash war.” RFK’s message confirmed the impression that Khrushchev had gained from Dobrynin’s cables during the previous three days: The Kennedys were just as “frightened by all this” as he was. This shared fear of nuclear escalation exerted a critical constitutive effect on his preference for accepting the president’s proposal.

It is again important to take into consideration what Khrushchev did not feel when he decided to remove the missiles from Cuba. Even though his identity as a parvenu made him highly sensitive to perceived degradation, there are no signs that he experienced any anger or humiliation. The absence or low intensity of these emotions was likely related to his interpretation of Dobrynin’s report from

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277 Khrushchev to Kennedy, October 30, 1962, in *FRUS, 1961-63*, vol. 11, *Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath*, doc. 120. See also Freedman, *Kennedy’s Wars*, 217.
279 For a similar focus on the role of fear, see Freedman, *Kennedy’s Wars*, 222.
Washington. The ambassador had quoted RFK as saying that if Washington bombed Cuba, Moscow was in a position to “respond with the same,” which would result in the deaths of “millions of Americans.”

Khrushchev took this to mean that the Kennedys had finally “admitted” that “the USSR was equal to the United States in its capacity for military confrontation.” Moreover, Dobrynin had passed on the attorney general’s “request” to reply within a day. Khrushchev interpreted this as an “appeal” for his “help” to resolve the crisis and to avert a coup d’état by administration hardliners. He drew the conclusion that the Kennedys were at last expressing the due respect for him as the leader of a co-equal superpower that his identity as a parvenu had made him crave so much and that he had so far found lacking in his relations with the president and his predecessor. Khrushchev’s “satisfaction” at this recognition from the Kennedys enabled him to completely reframe the situation. Instead of being forced into a degrading capitulation, he was now helping the president to avert a nuclear war. He came to believe that they had a “common cause” in saving the world from “those pushing us toward war.”

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282 Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers (London: Andre Deutsch, 1971), 498. See also Khrushchev, Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower, 622.  
283 A comparison between Dobrynin’s and Robert Kennedy’s respective reports of their discussion suggests that the Soviet ambassador portrayed the president’s brother as more respectful than he actually was. In Dobrynin’s cable, RFK seemed to express his recognition of Soviet power and his worry about the prospect of millions of American and Russian war casualties. In his own memorandum, however, this sentence sounds more like a threat to Khrushchev: “[The premier] should understand that if they did not remove those bases then we would remove them. His country might take retaliatory actions but he should understand that before this was over, while there might be dead Americans there would also be dead Russians.” See Robert Kennedy, “Memorandum for Dean Rusk on Meeting with Anatoly F. Dobrynin on October 27, 1962,” October 30, 1962, President’s Office Files, JFKL, in CWIHP Bulletin 8/9 (1996/1997), 346.  
285 Khrushchev, quoted in Khrushchev, Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower, 630.
belief explains why he did not seem to experience any anger or humiliation as he was accepting the withdrawal of his missiles.\(^{286}\)

In his autobiographical reflections, Troyanovsky concluded that the Kennedys had built a “golden bridge” over which Khrushchev was able to “retreat.”\(^{287}\) A careful analysis of the documentary record, however, suggests that it was above all Dobrynin who had enabled the chairman to save his face in retreat. RFK comes across as pushy and threatening in his own memorandum of the meeting with the ambassador. He reported that he had informed Dobrynin that “we had to have a commitment by at least tomorrow that those bases would be removed.”\(^{288}\) So “he had better contact Mr. Khrushchev and have a commitment from him by the next day to withdraw the missile bases […] for otherwise, I said, there would be drastic consequences.”\(^{289}\)

It is, of course, possible that the attorney general had, in fact, been more respectful and that he exaggerated his toughness in his own memo, perhaps because he wrote it for the historical record. This seems less likely, however. The transcripts of the discussions between the president and his advisers that day do not indicate that Robert Kennedy showed much empathy with the Russian leadership. For instance, shortly before he went to see Dobrynin, he still dismissed the advice from the US representative to the UN, Adlai Stevenson, to avoid giving the Soviets the impression that the administration was setting an ultimatum.\(^{290}\) In another conversation with his colleagues immediately after his meeting with the ambassador, the attorney general


\(^{287}\) Troyanovsky, “The Making of Soviet Foreign Policy,” 238.


\(^{289}\) Ibid., 347.

\(^{290}\) See RFK, quoted in “Executive Committee Meeting of the National Security Council on the Cuban Missile Crisis,” October 27, 1962, 4:00-7:45 P.M., in Zelikow and May, eds., *The Presidential Recordings*, vol. 3, 436.
harbored a desire for revenge. “I’d like to take Cuba back,” he confided to them. “That would be nice.” The deferential tone that Dobrynin attributed to RFK thus appears to be out of place. The toughness of Robert Kennedy’s own report is more in line with his mood that day.

The more likely scenario is that the ambassador overstated the attorney general’s expression of respect in his cable to make it easier for Khrushchev to maintain his dignity in retreat. As Dobrynin noted in his autobiography, the memo about his meeting with Robert Kennedy was an opportunity to “signal” Khrushchev that he could “save face” while giving in. This is consistent with his attempts in previous reports to give the premier the impression that he was respected in the United States. Ultimately, we will never know what exactly was said in the meeting between Dobrynin and RFK. What is clear, however, is that the ambassador’s careful formulations influenced Khrushchev’s emotions, which, in turn, shaped the construction of his preferences.

After Troyanovsky read out Dobrynin’s message, the chairman suggested, and the other Presidium members agreed, to dismantle the missile installations in Cuba. Khrushchev urgently dictated a letter to Kennedy. “I very well understand your anxiety,” he informed the US president. To “calm the American people,” he was issuing an order to return the “weapons which you describe as ‘offensive’” to the USSR. Finally, he wrote that he regarded with “respect and trust” his pledge not to

291 See Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight, 313; Stern, “The Cuban Missile Crisis,” 613.
292 RFK, quoted in “Executive Committee Meeting of the National Security Council on the Cuban Missile Crisis,” October 27, 1962, 9:00-9:45 P.M., in Zelikow and May, eds., The Presidential Recordings, vol. 3, 510. See also Stern, Averting “the Final Failure”, 383.
293 Dobrynin, In Confidence, 86.
attack Cuba. Radio Moscow broadcast the letter at 5:00 P.M. local time. Nuclear catastrophe was averted.
4. The Gulf conflict, 1990-91

On August 2, 1990, President Saddam Hussein caught the world off guard by sending his troops to invade the neighboring emirate of Kuwait. The United States and its allies pursued a strategy of coercive diplomacy to get the Iraqi leader to withdraw his forces from the emirate. They forged an international coalition of 28 states, assembled more than 700,000 troops in the Persian Gulf region, and threatened to attack if Baghdad did not pull out by the UN deadline of January 15, 1991. Nevertheless, Saddam Hussein refused to comply, and the US-led coalition went to war. Why did he not back down in the face of this array of military power?

As noted above, the main argument of the thesis is that the five key emotions fear, anger, hope, pride, and humiliation can shape the preference construction of target leaders in important and occasionally even critical ways. If their emotions are dominated by fear of a military attack by the coercer, and if they believe that they can avoid this attack by complying with the coercer’s demands, this increases the likelihood that they will give in. However, if target leaders’ emotions center on anger at the coercer, pride at their behavior, or hope that they will get away with it, they are less likely to yield. For these emotions tend to promote defiance and perseverance. Finally, if target leaders feel humiliated at the hands of the coercer, their response may go either way. If they assume that their debasement is justified, or if they are mentally or physically incapacitated, they are likely to withdraw. However, if they

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view the perceived degrading treatment as unjust, and if they are strong enough to resist, they are likely to defy the coercer and seek revenge for the humiliation.

This chapter explores the role of Saddam Hussein’s emotions around ten decisions during the Gulf conflict. These are, first, his decision on August 1, 1990, to invade Kuwait the next day; second, his decision during the subsequent days to keep his forces in the emirate; third, his decision to formally annex Kuwait on August 8; fourth, his pursuit of a strategy of deterrence and delay toward the United States and its allies from August 8 onward; fifth, his suggestions in November to solve the conflict through negotiations with the US government; sixth, his decision in mid-December to turn down President George H. W. Bush’s offer to hold meetings with each other’s foreign ministers; seventh, his decision to defy US and allied coercive diplomacy in late December; eighth, his decision in early January to reject the UN ultimatum; ninth, his offer on February 23—five weeks into the air war—to leave Kuwait in return for the abolition of all UN resolutions related to Iraq; and finally, his decision on February 25 to unilaterally withdraw his troops from the emirate. Table 4.1 below provides an overview of these decisions. Each of them will be investigated in a separate section in this chapter.

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2 The first four decisions under investigation predate the period of US and allied coercive diplomacy, which began in November 1990. Since they set the stage for Saddam Hussein’s subsequent decision-making, however, it is worth exploring them in some depth in this case study.

3 The last two decisions are not strictly within the scope of this study because Saddam Hussein took them after the United States and its allies had abandoned coercive diplomacy in favor of war. This chapter examines them nevertheless because they place the Iraqi leader’s decision-making and emotions into a broader context.
Table 4.1 *Saddam Hussein’s major decisions during the Gulf conflict in 1990-91*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decision</th>
<th>Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>1) decision to invade Kuwait</td>
<td>August 1, 1990</td>
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<tr>
<td>2) decision to keep Iraqi forces in Kuwait</td>
<td>August 3-5, 1990</td>
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<tr>
<td>3) decision to formally annex Kuwait</td>
<td>August 8, 1990</td>
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<tr>
<td>4) pursuit of a strategy of deterrence and delay toward the United States and its allies</td>
<td>August 8, 1990, onward</td>
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<tr>
<td>5) suggestions to solve the conflict through negotiations with the US government</td>
<td>November 1990</td>
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<tr>
<td>6) decision to turn down President Bush’s offer to hold meetings with each other’s foreign ministers</td>
<td>December 15, 1990</td>
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<tr>
<td>7) decision to defy US and allied coercive diplomacy</td>
<td>second half of December 1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) decision to reject the UN ultimatum of January 15, 1991</td>
<td>first half of January 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) offer to leave Kuwait in return for the abolition of all UN resolutions related to Iraq</td>
<td>February 23, 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10) decision to unilaterally withdraw Iraqi troops from Kuwait</td>
<td>February 25, 1991</td>
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### 4.1 Invading Kuwait

What led Saddam Hussein to invade Kuwait? This section posits that affect exerted a critical influence on his decision-making. While conventional studies struggle to account for the timing of his order to attack, the emotional choice framework sheds some light on why he reached this decision on August 1, 1990. The documentary record indicates that his anger at Kuwait’s ruling al-Sabah family kept building up in the final days before the invasion. When the emirate’s representatives refused to comply with Iraqi demands on July 31, his emotions boiled over, prompting him to carry out his fateful strike.\(^4\) After summarizing the existing literature, this section will

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\(^4\) So far, only few scholars have taken Saddam Hussein’s anger and humiliation into consideration as important variables in his decision-making, and none of them have explored this issue systematically.
trace Saddam Hussein’s decision-making in the run-up to his order to attack.

Scholars generally distinguish between two major long-term conditions and three main immediate causes to explain why the Iraqi president invaded Kuwait. The first long-term condition relates to Baghdad’s long-standing land claims against the emirate. Ever since Iraq’s independence from Great Britain in 1932, its leaders challenged Kuwait’s existence as an autonomous entity. They argued that it had been a district governed from the province of Basra during the Ottoman Empire. As the British had incorporated Basra into Iraq, Kuwait should also be ruled by Baghdad, they claimed. The emirate’s rulers retorted that they had already achieved autonomy by the time London turned their land into a protectorate in 1899. Once Kuwait became independent in 1961, it was recognized by many countries and two years later became a member of the United Nations. The second long-term condition facilitating the invasion relates to Baghdad’s geo-strategic considerations. Successive Iraqi governments had regarded access to the Gulf as a vital economic and security requirement for the country. The way the British Colonial Office had drawn the borders, however, Iraq ended up with a narrow coastline of only 35 miles, while Kuwait received a sea frontage four times as long.


Of the three main immediate causes of the invasion, Iraq’s dire financial situation in 1990 figures most prominently in the existing scholarship.\(^{10}\) In the course of the eight-year war against Iran, the country had accumulated war debts of about $40 billion to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and over $50 billion to Western lenders and the Soviet Union.\(^{11}\) Baghdad’s financial problems were compounded by sharply declining oil revenues. Between January and June 1990, the price of oil per barrel plummeted from $20 to $14. As a result, Iraq earned barely enough to cover its imports of necessities.\(^{12}\) The fall of the oil price was partly related to the Gulf states’ over-production of oil. Kuwait, for example, was known to exceed its OPEC quota by more than a third in the late 1980s.\(^{13}\)

Growing discontent among the Iraqis has been identified as a second immediate cause behind Saddam Hussein’s decision to invade. The moribund economy, unemployment, and an inflation rate of about 45 percent in 1990 took a heavy toll on the population, increasing the likelihood of social unrest.\(^{14}\) Scholars generally agree that the president came to see an occupation of Kuwait as the cure of all his financial, economic, and domestic political woes. The emirate’s monetary assets would satisfy his budgetary needs. Its oil would enable him to double Iraq’s share of world oil reserves to 21 percent, and a quick victory would distract his people from their hardships and discontent.\(^{15}\)


\(^{14}\) See Long, *Saddam’s War of Words*, 12; Pollack, *The Threatening Storm*, 27.

The third immediate cause motivating Saddam Hussein to attack relates to his perception of US policy. Students of the conflict, however, disagree about how he perceived the Bush administration and how this perception influenced his decision-making. Proponents of the traditional view argue that he felt encouraged to invade Kuwait by what he saw as Washington’s timidity. Revisionists assert that he moved against the emirate not because he felt emboldened by the Americans but because he perceived them as a potentially mortal threat. Hal Brands and David Palkki, for instance, claim that he had been “haunted” by the “specter of a US-Israeli-Kuwaiti conspiracy to strangle Iraq and topple his regime.” Consequently, he allegedly viewed the invasion as a pre-emptive strike to break the hostile encirclement and to put his regime in a stronger economic and geopolitical position vis-à-vis the United States.

Internal Iraqi government documents do indeed suggest that Saddam Hussein had long regarded the US government with suspicion and hostility. His perception was strongly shaped by the Iran-gate scandal in 1986. Even though the Reagan administration had confidentially assured him that it was supporting Baghdad in the

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17 Brands and Palkki, “‘Conspiring Bastards,’” 627.

Iran-Iraq War, it had secretly provided Teheran with a substantial amount of arms.\textsuperscript{19} The recording of a meeting between Saddam Hussein and his ministers at the time indicates that he was shocked and hurt when he learned about Washington’s double-dealing: The American “conspiracy” was a “painful thing,” an “injury,” and a “stab in the back,” he told his associates.\textsuperscript{20} He felt betrayed and wronged by Ronald Reagan, who had “a cold heart,” he believed.\textsuperscript{21} In his eyes, there was “no excuse” for this duplicity after Iraq had established diplomatic relations with the United States in 1984.\textsuperscript{22} “We won’t forget,” he vowed at the time.\textsuperscript{23}

The Ba’ath leadership’s suspicions continued after George H. W. Bush assumed the presidency in January 1989. When Foreign Minister Tariq ‘Aziz visited Washington in October that year, he told Secretary of State James Baker that the Iraqi intelligence service had found out that “some American agencies” were “trying to destabilize” Saddam Hussein’s regime.\textsuperscript{24} Baker assured him that the US government was not involved in any such efforts.\textsuperscript{25} In the spring of 1990, however, Baghdad started receiving hints from various sources, including King Hussein of Jordan, that Israel was planning an attack against Iraq with the tacit approval of the Bush administration.\textsuperscript{26} Saddam Hussein protested against the “US-British-Israeli conspiracy”

\textsuperscript{20} Saddam Hussein, quoted in “Meeting between Saddam Hussein and Ba’ath Party Cabinet ministers regarding the Iran-Contra Affair and American foreign policy, including America’s relationship with Israel and Iran,” circa July 1986 to 1987, 7, SH-SHTP-D-000-609, CRRC.
\textsuperscript{21} Saddam Hussein, quoted in ibid., 8.
\textsuperscript{22} Saddam Hussein, quoted in ibid., 13.
\textsuperscript{23} Saddam Hussein, quoted in ibid., 7.
\textsuperscript{26} See Tariq ‘Aziz’s comment that “King Hussein said at lunch today that there is a possibility that Israel would attack us,” quoted in “Meeting between Saddam Hussein and Iraqi officials regarding the Arab Summit,” circa 1989 to 1990, 6, SH-SHTP-A-000-732, CRRC. The CRRC puts down circa 1989/1990 as the date. References to an ongoing Arab summit, however, suggest that it may have taken place during the meeting of the Arab Cooperation Council in late February 1990.
to “undermine” his rule in a meeting with a visiting delegation of American lawmakers led by Senator Bob Dole in April 1990.  

By the early summer of 1990, the Iraqi president’s worries about foreign conspiracies had widened beyond the United States and Israel to include Kuwait. The transcript of a meeting between Saddam Hussein and his Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) from mid-July 1990 sheds some light on the leadership’s attitude toward the emirate at this point. As the regime’s top decision-making body, the RCC exercised executive and legislative authority, giving orders to the cabinet of ministers and the bureaucracy. Saddam Hussein wielded supreme and unquestioned power over its members whom he appointed and changed at his will. In 1990-91, the RCC included eight of his closest associates: Vice Chairman ‘Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, Vice President Taha Muhyi al-Din Ma’ruf, First Deputy Prime Minister Taha Yassin Ramadan, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Tariq ‘Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister Sa’dun Hammadi, Secretary General Khaled ‘Abd al-Moneim Rashid, as well as the presidential advisers Hassan Ali Nassar al-Amiri and Sa’dun Shaker Mahmoud.

In the RCC meeting in mid-July, Saddam Hussein and his advisers discussed a draft letter that Foreign Minister Tariq ‘Aziz had written to the secretary general of the Arab League. The document charged that the Kuwaiti rulers had used the Iran-Iraq War as an opportunity to expand their territory onto Iraqi soil and to “steal” oil in the amount of $2.4 billion from Iraq’s al-Rumaylah oil field along the border. Moreover, it alleged that the al-Sabah clan was pursuing an “intentional scheme” to

28 See Dawisha, Iraq, 214; Sassoon, Saddam Hussein’s Ba’th Party, 230.
“destroy” the Iraqi economy by pushing down the oil price. A participant named Muhammad, who was normally not an RCC member, pointed out that the Iraqi economy was “going through rough times.” If they limited themselves to sending the foreign minister’s letter, the country’s “loss [would] continue” because the other Arab leaders would play it down. He suggested two alternative options. First, they could send an envoy to the Kuwaiti government to “threaten” it directly. “If you do not behave correctly” and stop “plotting to starve our people,” then “we will beat you.” Second, they could capture the emirate’s oil wells in a “surprise incursion” and use them as a bargaining chip in subsequent negotiations. Vice President Taha Ma’ruf expressed his reservations about a surprise attack: “Your Excellency Mr. President, I think we have a lot of debt internationally, regionally, and to the Arab countries, and we will be regarded as aggressors if we carry out such an action before we clarify it to the world.” RCC Vice Chairman ‘Izzat Ibrahim, one of Saddam Hussein’s oldest comrades-in-arms, counted on diplomacy: If the al-Sabah family could be “dissuaded” from its anti-Iraqi policy, then there would be “no problem between Kuwait and Iraq.”

There are no signs in the recording of this RCC meeting from mid-July 1990 that Saddam Hussein or his advisers contemplated a permanent annexation of Kuwait. The most forceful scenario they discussed and then discarded was a surprise seizure

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31 Muhammad, quoted in “Meeting between Saddam Hussein and Iraqi officials regarding the Iraq-Kuwait diplomatic situation before the First Gulf War,” shortly before July 15, 1990, 2-3, SH-SHTP-A-000-894, CRRC. The CRRC puts down July 17, 1990, as the date of this meeting. The discussion, however, suggests that the session took place shortly before Tariq ‘Aziz dispatched his memorandum to the Secretary of the Arab League on July 15, 1990.
33 Taha Ma’ruf, quoted in ibid., 202.
34 ‘Izzat Ibrahim, quoted in ibid., 203.
of the neighbor’s oil wells in order to exert pressure to yield to Iraqi demands. Ultimately, they settled on a strategy of coercive diplomacy. By threatening the use of force, they sought to get the Kuwaiti rulers to write off Iraq’s debts, to reduce their oil production, and to provide Baghdad with a generous loan. This threat had three components: First, Saddam Hussein authorized the dispatch of Tariq ‘Aziz’s letter of complaint about the emirate to the Arab League. Second, he accused the al-Sabah clan of inflicting “excessive harm” on Iraq in a speech on July 17. “If words fail to afford us protection, then we will have no choice but to resort to effective action to put things right,” he warned. Finally, he ordered some units of his Republican Guard to move toward the border with Kuwait.

What prompted Saddam Hussein to abandon this strategy of coercive diplomacy in favor of outright coercion between mid-July and August 2, 1990? Two factors highlighted by rationalist accounts—the Ba’ath regime’s financial predicament and the specter of domestic political unrest—played an important role in Saddam Hussein’s change in preferences. Yet, they cannot explain the timing of his shift in strategy. While the oil price had been as low as $14 per barrel in June, it rose to $20 by mid-July and reached $24 by the end of the month. Moreover, the Kuwaiti leaders would offer Baghdad a loan of $9 billion at a summit in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on July 31. This cash injection would have eased Iraq’s financial problems in the short- and medium-term. The argument that it was above all financial pressure that drove Saddam Hussein to invade on August 1 thus loses some of its explanatory

37 See Freedman, A Choice of Enemies, 216.
power. Similarly, the risk of domestic political unrest did not seem to have been as acute as some scholars claim. There is no evidence in the available Iraqi government files from the second half of July that the regime was especially concerned about internal turmoil. In a 2010 interview, Tariq ‘Aziz noted that Saddam Hussein “should have waited and should have been patient until the situation could have gone back to normal because Iraq wasn’t the only country harmed by lower prices.”\(^{40}\) This suggests that the deputy premier did not believe that the risk of domestic discontent had demanded immediate action. The remainder of this section will show that the Iraqi president’s emotions help to shed some light on the timing of his decision to invade.

On July 25, 1990, Saddam Hussein still pursued his strategy of coercive diplomacy. In light of Kuwait’s ongoing refusal to comply with his demands, however, he started to wonder whether Washington was encouraging the emirate in its intransigence. To get an idea of the Bush administration’s attitude, he summoned US Ambassador April Glaspie. A combination of American and Iraqi sources make it possible to reconstruct their two-hour discussion. Saddam Hussein had the conversation secretly recorded and later released a shortened transcript, which the State Department acknowledged as substantially accurate.\(^{41}\) Some of the gaps can be filled with the help of Glaspie’s recently declassified cables about the meeting.

At the outset of the discussion, Saddam Hussein conveyed a message to President Bush: “Iraq wants friendship, but does the US?”\(^{42}\) He spoke at length about some of the past crises in the bilateral relationship: “The worst of these was in 1986, only two years after establishing relations, with what was known as Irangate.” More

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recent events gave him the impression that Washington’s “old mistakes” were “not just a matter of coincidence.” His “suspicions” began to “surface anew” when he learned about alleged US attempts to dissuade various Gulf states from giving economic aid to Iraq.\(^43\) Yet, “despite all these blows,” he still hoped that the two governments could develop a “good relationship,” he claimed.\(^44\)

Next, Saddam Hussein outlined his grievances against Kuwait. During the war against Iran, Iraqis had “bled rivers” and suffered hundreds of thousands of casualties to “protect” the Arab neighbors against the fundamentalist Islamic menace from Teheran, he argued.\(^45\) Now, however, the emirate would not even agree to abide by its OPEC production quota.\(^46\) Glaspie noted in her cable that Saddam Hussein expended “considerable emotion” to convey how “wrong” it was for the rich Kuwaitis to deny any support when Iraq was so financially strapped that he would soon have to cut the pensions of widows and orphans of dead soldiers.\(^47\) At this point, the Iraqi interpreter and a note-taker “broke down and wept,” according to the US ambassador.\(^48\) Saddam Hussein remarked that these staff members felt “bitter like all other Iraqis” because the al-Sabah clan had been “mean beyond belief.”\(^49\) Their weeping appears to have come across as authentic. In her report, Glaspie commented that they had probably lost relatives in the war.\(^50\)

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\(^{43}\) Saddam Hussein, quoted in “Excerpts From Iraqi Document on Meeting With US Envoys,” 19.


\(^{45}\) Saddam Hussein, quoted in US Embassy Baghdad to State Department, “Iraq/Kuwait: Ambassador’s meeting with Saddam Husayn,” July 25, 1990, folder “Iraq Pre 8/2/90 [1]” box 43, Richard Haass Files, NSC, Bush Presidential Records, GHWBL.


\(^{49}\) Saddam Hussein, quoted in “Excerpts From Iraqi Document on Meeting With US Envoys,” 19.

\(^{50}\) US Embassy Baghdad to State Department, “Iraq blinks – provisionally,” July 26, 1990, folder “Iraq Pre 8/2/90 [1]” box 43, Richard Haass Files, NSC, Bush Presidential Records, GHWBL.
After a “pause for recuperation,” the Iraqi leader listed all the diplomatic initiatives he had pursued to persuade Kuwait to change its policy. He claimed he had “tried everything” and even “begged” the al-Sabah family for support. In the end, however, neither his letters nor his envoys had made any difference, he argued. As a result, he felt humiliated by his neighbors. “Iraqis have a right to live proudly,” he stressed. The Kuwaiti government, however, was “trespass[ing]” on their “dignity” by engaging in economic warfare. If Iraq continued to be “humiliated,” he would “respond,” he warned.

Saddam Hussein informed Glaspie that Iraqi and Kuwaiti representatives would meet in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on July 31. It seems that he was still counting on his strategy of coercive diplomacy at this point. “When we meet and when we see that there is hope, then nothing will happen,” he assured the ambassador. “But if we are unable to find a solution, then it will be natural that Iraq will not accept death.” Skeptics might argue that he merely pretended to be open to a negotiated settlement. Once the talks failed, he would then be able to use his efforts as a public justification for his invasion of Kuwait. Yet, there are signs that he genuinely wished his coercive diplomacy to succeed. He vociferously criticized the Pentagon for announcing some minor naval maneuvers with the United Arab Emirates the day before, for instance, because this would “encourage” the Kuwaiti government “to ignore conventional

diplomacy.” These kinds of actions would make it believe that Washington was “support[ing]” its “aggression,” which would, in turn, undercut Iraq’s coercive threats.

Glaspie gave a nuanced response to Saddam Hussein’s monologue. On the one hand, she sought to allay his concern about a US conspiracy by assuring him of Washington’s goodwill. “I have a direct instruction from the president to seek better relations with Iraq,” she stressed. “We have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait. […] All that we hope is that these issues are solved quickly.” On the other hand, she issued a polite warning. Noting that Iraq had deployed “massive troops” along the border to the emirate, she stated that the United States could “never excuse settlement of disputes by other than peaceful means.” The ambassador informed the State Department about Saddam Hussein’s sense of humiliation. She also mentioned the conditional character of his assurance. He would refrain from the use of force only if the Kuwaiti government complied with his demands. Nevertheless, her final assessment of the meeting was optimistic. The Iraqi leader’s “purpose in summoning me seemed to be to assure President Bush that his intensions are peaceful,” she reported to her colleagues. His desire for a diplomatic settlement was “surely sincere” because the Iraqis were “sick of war.” Consequently, she recommended that the administration “ease off on public criticism

60 US Embassy Baghdad to State Department, “Iraq/Kuwait: Ambassador’s meeting with Saddam Husayn,” July 25, 1990, folder “Iraq Pre 8/2/90 [1]” box 43, Richard Haass Files, NSC, Bush Presidential Records, GHWBL. See also Hassan, The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, 48.
of Iraq until we see how the negotiations [in Jeddah] develop.”

Revisionist scholars posit that Saddam Hussein decided to attack Kuwait not because he felt encouraged by the United States but because he felt threatened by it and its alleged conspiracy. According to Shibley Telhami, for example, there is “no evidence supporting the claim that his decision to invade was significantly affected by an absence of American resolve.” A careful reading of the documentary record, however, suggests that the Iraqi leadership did not take US warnings seriously. On July 28, for instance, the State Department transmitted a relatively mild message from George Bush to Saddam Hussein: “I was pleased to learn of the agreement between Iraq and Kuwait to begin negotiations in Jeddah to find a peaceful solution,” he pointed out. “We believe that differences are best resolved by peaceful means and not by threats involving military force.”

Iraq’s deputy foreign minister, Nizar Hamdun, later recalled that Saddam Hussein took note of the “positive tone” of Bush’s letter. Its “conciliatory” nature gave him the impression that the administration’s desire for good relations with Baghdad would override its concerns about the regime’s use of force against Kuwait. That same day, the Iraqi ruler informed the US embassy that he was “very pleased” with Washington’s response. According to the deputy head of Iraq’s General Military Intelligence Directorate at the time, Wafiq al-Samarrai, the US government did “not take a decisive and tough line” to “deter” Saddam Hussein. He

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64 Shibley Telhami, “The Arab Dimension of Saddam Hussein’s Calculations: What We Have Learned from Iraqi Records,” in Engel, ed., Into the Desert, 149.
remembered that even during the final hours before the invasion, the Iraqi president did not think that the United States would jeopardize his regime in any serious way. The most forceful US response that he contemplated was a short aerial attack. It was thus not necessarily feigned naiveté when Saddam Hussein complained about the Bush administration’s unexpectedly hostile reaction to his invasion in a later interview: “What was the problem? They had said that they would not intervene.”

Possibly due to the US assurances, Saddam Hussein’s fear of a Washington-led conspiracy to overthrow his regime appears to have somewhat receded by late July. His emotions now came to be dominated by increasing anger at Kuwait’s refusal to comply with his demands. On July 25, the emirate’s crown prince, Sa‘d al-‘Abdallah al-Sabah, announced that “the sons of Kuwait” were “people of principle and integrity,” who would “by no means […] yield to threats and extortion.”

Saddam Hussein regarded this stance as the epitome of hypocrisy. While the al-Sabah were insisting on their “integrity,” they refused to show inter-Arab solidarity and to relieve some of the Iraqis’ financial woes. During a visit to Baghdad shortly thereafter, the prime minister of Jordan, Mudar Badran, observed that this was the “only occasion” on which he had ever seen the Iraqi president “truly angry,” threatening to “throw sand in the eyes” of the Kuwaiti leaders.

Saddam Hussein’s fury would explain why he gave strict instructions to ‘Izzat Ibrahim for his negotiations with Kuwaiti Crown Prince Sa‘d in Jeddah on July 31.

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72 Quoted in Nigel Ashton’s interview with Mudar Badran, Amman, May 20, 2001, quoted in Ashton, King Hussein of Jordan: A Political Life (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2008), 266.
The RCC vice chairman was to insist that the emirate provide a $10 billion loan to Iraq without any conditions. What happened at the Jeddah meeting is still a matter of controversy.  

Kuwait’s foreign minister, Sabah al-Ahmad al-Sabah, later claimed that his family had agreed to forgive Iraq’s debt of $14 billion and to lease the Gulf island of Warbah. He attributed the breakdown of the negotiations to Baghdad’s determination to prepare the ground for an invasion. This led some scholars to conclude that Saddam Hussein merely used the talks as a smokescreen to justify his impending military operation.

According to the Iraqi version of events, ‘Izzat Ibrahim demanded the credit of $10 billion. After hours of negotiations, the Kuwaiti delegation agreed to lend $9 billion, and the Saudi king offered to provide the remaining $1 billion. After dinner, however, Crown Prince Sa’d apparently insisted that he would authorize the loan only if Baghdad recognized the disputed border between their countries. ‘Izzat Ibrahim refused to accept this condition and warned that the Iraqi leadership knew “perfectly well how to get the money we need from you.” “Don’t threaten us,” the crown prince reportedly shot back. “Kuwait has very powerful friends.” If Saddam Hussein were not careful, he would “be forced to pay back all the money” he owed the emirate. The negotiations ended in failure.

Upon his return to Baghdad a day later, on August 1, ‘Izzat Ibrahim reported to the Revolutionary Command Council right away. Both Saddam Hussein and Tariq ‘Aziz claimed in later interviews that they had still hoped up to this point that their

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73 See Heikal, Illusions of Triumph, 191.
75 See Kostiner, “Kuwait,” 113.
76 See Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, 214; Alan Munro, Arab Storm: Politics and Diplomacy Behind the Gulf War, 2nd ed. (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2006), 38.
78 Quoted in Salinger, Secret Dossier, 74.
diplomatic efforts and threats would succeed.79 ‘Izzat Ibrahim, however, informed them that the Kuwaitis had behaved in an “arrogant” and “provocative” manner seeking to exploit Iraq’s financial hardship.80 “Thereafter, the matter could only be discussed and decided upon in favor of military action,” Saddam Hussein recalled in an interrogation with the FBI after his capture in 2003.81 When he proposed to invade Kuwait in the RCC meeting, a number of his advisers supported the idea.82 “Crush them!” the dictator’s cousin and minister of local government, ‘Ali Hassan al-Majid, for instance, exclaimed.83

Both Hamid Yusuf Hammadi, the president’s former personal secretary, and Taha Ramadan, the first deputy prime minister at the time, later confirmed independently that Tariq ‘Aziz was the only participant of the meeting to express substantial reservations.84 Formerly editor of the regime’s Al-Thawra newspaper and minister of information, Tariq ‘Aziz had become foreign minister in 1983. As a member of Iraq’s small Christian minority, he had no independent ethnic power base in the country. His career and survival thus hinged on Saddam Hussein’s goodwill

and fortune.\textsuperscript{85} In the RCC session, the foreign minister not only predicted that an invasion would entail “adversarial responses” from the Arab League and the United Nations.\textsuperscript{86} He also warned that it would “lead to a war with the US.” The president, however, “didn’t like what I said,” Tariq ‘Aziz later remembered.\textsuperscript{87} After 30 minutes, Saddam Hussein concluded the meeting and decreed that the attack would take place the next morning.\textsuperscript{88}

Several analysts have noted that the planning for the invasion was haphazard and rushed.\textsuperscript{89} What prompted the Iraqi leader to push his decision through in such haste? There is converging evidence from various sources that his fury at the al-Sabah family played a critical role. To begin with, some of his own associates have hinted at the influence of affect. Tariq ‘Aziz, for example, noted in 2010 that Saddam Hussein “wasn’t patient.” The “way he made the decision” was “not normal.”\textsuperscript{90} According to the intelligence official Wafiq al-Samarrai, the Iraqi ruler was “hot tempered” on the eve of the invasion.\textsuperscript{91} Asked what finally pushed the president to attack the emirate, Sa’d al-Bazzaz, the former director of the Iraqi Radio and Television institution, responded that “in large part, he did it out of anger” at the Kuwaiti government.\textsuperscript{92}

Jordan’s King Hussein, one of Iraq’s closest allies at the time, also testified to Saddam Hussein’s emotional upheaval. When they spoke on the phone on the night

\textsuperscript{88} See FBI, “Prosecutive Report of Investigation Concerning Saddam Hussein,” 65.
\textsuperscript{89} See, for example, Bin Sultan, \textit{Desert Warrior}, 165; Marr, \textit{The Modern History of Iraq}, 217; Mohamedou, \textit{Iraq and the Second Gulf War}, 177.
before the invasion, the Iraqi leader was “furious with the Kuwaitis.” After he hung up, the king was so concerned that he summoned the US ambassador to warn that Saddam Hussein’s “anger” was making him “irrational.” Likewise, the American deputy chief of mission in Baghdad, Joseph Wilson, assumed in retrospect that the order to invade was “an emotional response to the tone of the failed negotiations in Jeddah.” Saddam Hussein himself suggested as much when he claimed in an FBI interrogation in 2004 that the “arrogance” of the Kuwaiti rulers had made them “stupid” and “ignited” the attack.

This section has shown that the Iraqi president’s anger at the al-Sabah family’s perceived haughtiness and obstinacy had been building up over the second half of July. By the end of the month, his mood had become so explosive that a minor incident sufficed to tip him over the brink. Crown Prince Sa’d’s insistence at the Jeddah talks that he would only agree to provide a loan if Baghdad recognized their common border seems to have been the ultimate trigger. That this small country defied his demands and sought to use Iraq’s financial weakness to push through its territorial interests added insult to injury. It violated his understanding of inter-Arab solidarity and his self-conception as a strong leader who had to be treated with respect. In his anger, frustration, and humiliation, Saddam Hussein decided to lash out against the emirate.

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93 King Hussein, quoted in Wilson, The Politics of Truth, 124.
94 Ibid.
96 See Bin Sultan, Desert Warrior, 165.
4.2 Staying in Kuwait

At 1:00 A.M. local time on August 2, 1990, about 140,000 Iraqi troops began attacking Kuwait. The emirate’s 20,000 soldiers were overpowered within a few hours, and the al-Sabah family fled to Saudi Arabia. The Ba’ath regime claimed in a radio announcement that the Kuwaiti rulers had been toppled in a domestic coup d’état. A newly formed “Provisional Free Government” had “appealed” to the “chivalrous Arab warrior, President Saddam Hussein” for support.

The first major attempt to resolve the conflict was undertaken by King Hussein of Jordan, who flew to Baghdad a day after the invasion. Several scholars assert that the monarch succeeded in securing Saddam Hussein’s agreement to reach a negotiated settlement of the crisis at an Arab mini-summit. Iraqi troops would start leaving Kuwait within days, as long as the members of the Arab League refrained from condemning the Ba’ath regime. Was Saddam Hussein genuinely prepared to pull his army out under the cover of such an Arab solution? The best evidence in support of the argument that his commitment was sincere is an announcement by the RCC on August 3 that “a plan has been drawn up to begin the withdrawal” on August 5. That alleged plan, however, was never carried out. Instead, the Iraqi leader left his troops in place and assumed full control of the emirate.

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98 Baghdad time was seven hours ahead of Washington time. See Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, 219.
100 “Communique No. 3,” Baghdad Voice of the Masses, August 2, 1990, FBIS-NES-90-149, 30. See also Aburish, Saddam Hussein, 285.
The existing literature has advanced three main explanations for Saddam Hussein’s decision to stay in Kuwait. First, some scholars argue that the Jordanian king’s diplomatic solution was thwarted by US interference in the conflict. Pierre Salinger, for instance, asserts that “the Arab world tried desperately to solve the problem quickly […], only to find its efforts undercut by pressure from the United States” to condemn Iraq.104 Similarly, Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi posit that “the American decision to take irrevocable action to commit itself to the restoration of the pre-invasion situation caused Saddam to shift his strategy.” For an “unconditional pullout” due to pressure from Washington would be an “admission of weakness and failure which he felt unable to afford.”105 The Bush administration was indeed among the first governments to deplore Iraq’s “blatant use of military aggression.”106 On August 2, it froze all of Iraq’s and Kuwait’s overseas assets and persuaded fourteen of the fifteen members of the UN Security Council to pass Resolution 660 demanding Iraq’s “immediate and unconditional withdrawal.” Only Yemen abstained.107

Second, some analysts maintain that King Hussein’s plan was sabotaged by President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt. According to Mohammad-Mahmoud Mohamedou, for example, the Jordanian initiative “failed because the Iraqi condition agreed to by the king—namely, that no Arab public condemnation occur before the pull back—was not met when Egypt issued a separate statement [on August 3] denouncing the invasion.”108 Majid Khadduri and Edmund Ghareeb conclude that “the Arab League

104 Salinger, Secret Dossier, viii.
105 Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, 221. See also Khadduri and Ghareeb, War in the Gulf, 1990-91, 137, 259.
106 Quoted in “US Condemns Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait,” Associated Press (AP), August 1, 1990. Due to the time difference, it was still August 1 in the United States.
108 Mohamedou, Iraq and the Second Gulf War, 135.
had failed to provide a face-saving formula which Iraq had requested in order to
justify its withdrawal from Kuwait.”

Finally, some experts contend that Saddam Hussein’s professed willingness to
recall his forces was mere propaganda. In reality, he was never prepared to accept any
agreement that would give Kuwait genuine independence. Nigel Ashton, for instance,
argues that the Jordanian king “placed too much faith both in Saddam’s assurances
about his intention to withdraw and in his own ability to mediate a resolution of the
dispute.” To Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, the idea that Mubarak’s
condemnation aborted Iraq’s departure from the emirate seems “fanciful.” The
documentary record corroborates this critical view. Even before the condemning
statement by the Egyptian government was released, the Iraqi government announced
that “there can be no return to the defunct regime.” Between August 3 and 5,
Saddam Hussein sent personal envoys to numerous countries in the Middle East and
North Africa to justify his invasion and to explain that the al-Sabah family would
“never” again rule Kuwait. It is thus safe to conclude that Cairo’s and

109 Khadduri and Ghareeb, War in the Gulf, 1990-91, 140. See also Aburish, Saddam Hussein, 286;
110 Ashton, King Hussein of Jordan, 270.
112 “Statements on Iraqi Withdrawal from Kuwait,” Baghdad Domestic Service, August 3, 1990, FBIS-
NES-90-151, 39.
113 This is how Iraq’s Deputy Prime Minister Taha Ramadan apparently put it to President Turgut Ozal
of Turkey on August 5, 1990. See “Memorandum of telephone conversation between George Bush and
43, Richard Haass Files, NSC, Bush Presidential Records, GHWBL. See also “Ramadan Goes to
Turkey With Message on Relations,” Iraqi News Agency (INA) (Baghdad), August 5, 1990, FBIS-
NES-90-151, 37. Likewise, RCC Vice Chairman ’Izzat Ibrahim told the Saudi rulers on August 3 that
“Kuwait was past history.” Quoted in Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh’s interview with a Saudi
diplomat, in Freedman and Karsh, The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991, 71. Other Iraqi envoys were
dispatched to Mauritania, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia, and Yemen. See
“Ramadan Returns from Yemen Visit 3 Aug,” INA (Baghdad), August 3, 1990, FBIS-NES-90-151, 37;
“Sa’dun Hammadi Returns from Cairo 4 Aug.” Baghdad Voice of the Masses, August 4, 1990, FBIS-
NES-90-151, 37; “Saddam Envoy Leaves for Maghreb Countries,” INA (Baghdad), August 5, 1990,
FBIS-NES-90-151, 38; “Envoy Returns From Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti,” INA (Baghdad), August 5,
Washington’s indictment of Baghdad merely served as a convenient excuse for him to postpone the withdrawal of his troops indefinitely.\footnote{114}{See Munro, \textit{Arab Storm}, 50.}

This does not explain why Saddam Hussein decided to keep his forces in Kuwait, however. A materialist rational choice account would suggest that he did so to get his hands on the emirate’s funds and oil wealth. Unfortunately, there are currently no records of internal deliberations of the Ba’ath leadership for the relevant time period. Scholars thus have to rely on the taped conversation between Saddam Hussein and a foreign visitor, President ‘Ali ‘Abdallah Salih of Yemen, from August 4 to get an idea of his decision-making at this point. At first sight, the dialogue between the two heads of state appears to indicate that Saddam Hussein’s preference for staying in Kuwait was shaped by conviction and emotion. He outlined his belief that this territory was historically “part of Iraq,” and complained bitterly about the perceived mistreatment by the al-Sabah family. Their behavior had “pained our hearts.”\footnote{115}{Saddam Hussein, quoted in “Meets With Yemeni Leader,” [Minutes of Meeting between Saddam Hussein and the Yemeni President, ‘Ali ‘Abdallah Salih, August 4, 1990], \textit{INA} (Baghdad), February 21, 1993, FBIS-NES-93-036, 28, 30.} They had not only “mock[ed]” the Ba’ath leadership; they had also striven “to drop Iraq to the level of what they [had been] doing with some other Arab countries,” he complained. “By God! I will not allow this,” he exclaimed defiantly.\footnote{116}{Saddam Hussein, quoted in “Minutes of Meeting between Saddam Hussein and the President of Yemen, ‘Ali ‘Abdallah Salih,” August 4, 1990, 3, SH-MISC-D-000-652, CRRC.}

Saddam Hussein’s imagery and interjection suggest that he still felt angry at and humiliated by the Kuwaiti rulers. The circumstances of this conversation, however, indicate that he employed these emotions strategically to justify his attack on a fellow Arab country as a legitimate act of self-defense to the Yemeni leader. After all, President Salih’s attitude in this conflict was important to Iraq. He had already tilted toward Baghdad by abstaining from the vote on UN Resolution 660 two
days before. His ongoing diplomatic support would be useful because Yemen would continue to be a temporary member of the UN Security Council until the end of 1991.\footnote{See F. Gregory Gause III, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 106.}

What is unclear is whether Saddam Hussein’s instrumental use of anger and humiliation was based on pretense or on his authentic affective experience. If he merely feigned these emotions, they are unlikely to have shaped his decision-making in any sustained way. If he genuinely felt them, however, they may have helped to constitute his preference for keeping his troops in Kuwait. It is difficult to assess this issue on the basis of the limited source base. That Saddam Hussein’s display of anger and humiliation in the meeting was consistent with his affective state shortly before the invasion can be read as a sign that these emotions may have been authentic. In the absence of further corroborating evidence, however, it is not possible to settle this issue. This section thus remains agnostic about the question of whether Saddam Hussein genuinely experienced anger and humiliation on this occasion. It restricts itself to the limited claim that he employed these emotions instrumentally to justify his invasion.

In his meeting with Salih, the Iraqi ruler expressed another emotion—pride—which he less likely used strategically in this case. When he reflected on his invasion, he appears to have calmed down. “We attacked them and restored our dignity,” he explained to the Yemeni president. “We are feeling better now.”\footnote{Saddam Hussein, quoted in “Minutes of Meeting between Saddam Hussein and the President of Yemen, ‘Ali ‘Abdallah Salih,” August 4, 1990, 7, SH-MISC-D-000-652, CRRC.}

The successful military campaign made him proud. Many years later, he would still boast that the operation was “accomplished within two and a half hours.”\footnote{Interview with Saddam Hussein, conducted by George L. Piro, March 3, 2004, FBI Records, http://vault.fbi.gov/Saddam%20Hussein/Saddam%20Hussein%20Part%202%20of%202/view (accessed...\footnote{}}
theoretical framework, pride is a pleasurable emotion that is triggered by a belief that one is responsible for a socially valued outcome. Associated with an increase in testosterone, the experience of pride tends to motivate people to behave in a more dominant manner and to further succeed in the domain in which the emotion has been felt.\textsuperscript{120} Saddam Hussein’s pride seems to have reinforced his desire to hold on to Kuwait. Rather than carrying out a temporary punitive incursion against the al-Sabah family, he wanted to keep the prize that generations of Iraqi leaders had coveted but failed to win. He became so emotionally attached to his conquest that he was even prepared to accept the risk of a confrontation with the United States and its allies. “We considered that America and Israel may attack us […] with planes and missiles,” he pointed out to Salih. “We are ready for that.”\textsuperscript{121}

In sum, this section has confirmed that Saddam Hussein’s professed willingness to recall his forces from Kuwait in early August was mere propaganda. The available sources suggest that he was not prepared to accept any agreement that would leave the emirate genuinely independent. What precisely motivated the Iraqi ruler to keep his troops in Kuwait was more difficult to establish. In his meeting with the Yemeni president, Saddam Hussein did not mention any financial or economic motives. Rather, he referred to his conviction that the emirate belonged to Iraq historically and invoked feelings of anger, humiliation, and pride. Given that Saddam Hussein probably did not speak his mind openly in this meeting with a foreign visitor, these findings do not invalidate the standard rational choice explanation of his decision. In light of Iraq’s severe debt problem, it would be unrealistic to assume that he did not have his eyes on Kuwait’s wealth at this point. The section has thus made

\textsuperscript{120} See section 2.6.4.
\textsuperscript{121} Saddam Hussein, quoted in “Minutes of meeting between Saddam Hussein and the President of Yemen, ‘Ali ‘Abdallah Salih,” August 4, 1990, 5, SH-MISC-D-000-652, CRRC.
he limited claim that he used anger and humiliation instrumentally to justify his
invasion to the Yemeni president. His pride at the successful military operation and
his belief that Kuwait was historically part of Iraq reinforced his desire to gain control
over the emirate’s fortune.

4.3 Annexing Kuwait

Throughout the first seven days after the invasion, Baghdad sought to uphold the
fiction that Kuwait was being run by an independent “provisional government.” On
August 8, 1990, however, it all of a sudden announced that this interim administration
had requested to “return to great Iraq, the mother homeland.”122 As a result, the
provisional government was dissolved, and Saddam Hussein proclaimed the formal
annexation of the emirate.123 While military clashes over border disputes had not been
uncommon since the founding of the United Nations, this was the first time that an
entire UN member state was taken over by another.124

What prompted Saddam Hussein to make this momentous decision? Scholars
have cited three main explanations: First, some posit that his seizure of Kuwait was a
reaction to George Bush’s televised announcement of Operation Desert Shield on
August 8. When he learned that the United States was deploying troops to Saudi
Arabia in order to deter a potential Iraqi attack, he allegedly sought to express his
resolve to stay in the emirate by announcing the annexation.125 Second, some experts
maintain that he opted for the takeover to win popular support at home. In light of the
widespread belief among Iraqis that Kuwait was supposed to be part of their country,

123 See Adib-Moghaddam, The International Politics of the Persian Gulf, 54.
124 See Malone, The International Struggle over Iraq, 62.
of the Middle East, 220; Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, 222; Salinger, Secret Dossier, 156-57;
Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 244; Yetiv,
Explaining Foreign Policy, 74.
he apparently assumed that the seizure would improve their morale and thus stabilize his rule. Finally, some analysts contend that he was in favor of annexation because he believed that his troops would be more strongly motivated to defend the Kuwaiti territory against a potential US attack if they saw it as part of Iraq.

These conventional explanations can now be critically assessed on the basis of a recently released tape of a discussion between Saddam Hussein and his advisers from August 7, the day before the annexation. The recording demonstrates that he gave the order to incorporate Kuwait in the course of these deliberations, before he learned about the deployment of US troops to Saudi Arabia. The annexation was thus not a response to Bush’s announcement of Operation Desert Shield, which came a day later. Furthermore, there is no evidence in this source that the communication of resolve toward the United States was a motive for him at this point. Nor are there any signs that the issue of the fighting morale of his soldiers was on his mind. The tape shows that certain domestic political considerations did play a role for Saddam Hussein. If he were to grant the Kuwaitis some autonomy, the Kurdish minority in Iraq would demand self-rule as well, he claimed. The recording also reveals that his preference for a formal annexation was highly controversial among his advisers. Four of the most senior members of the leadership expressed serious reservations. The president, however, dismissed their concerns. This section argues that his rigid approach and his preference construction were influenced to an important degree by his anger at the Kuwaiti rulers and the resulting desire to punish them.

128 See “Saddam Hussein and Iraqi officials discussing Turkish, Russian, and Chinese perceptions of Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait,” August 7, 1990, SH-SHTP-A-001-233, CRRC.
On August 7, 1990, Saddam Hussein assembled his top advisers to discuss the international response to the invasion and the next steps of Iraqi policy. He opened the meeting with an optimistic assessment of the current situation. “Everything happened in 24 hours, and now we sit and relax,” he noted with satisfaction. Washington’s response to his invasion struck him as contemptible: “Pathetic, pathetic, [the Americans’] money is pathetic, their situation is pathetic.” He claimed that George Bush and his allies were so scared that they were “going to frighten even the stones they use to sit on.” Was that the “Western power?” he asked with disdain. “Right now the lowest individual must not wish to be in the American president’s shoes.” In his view, all that Bush could do was to order an air strike against Iraq. “Boom, boom, boom, boom, boom! So what? Nothing will happen; we will give them hell. Give me one instance when an airplane has settled any situation.” He was confident that his regime would be able to weather any air attack and did not expect the US administration to deploy any ground troops.

Next, Saddam Hussein raised the question of what kind of relationship Iraq should establish with Kuwait—a loose association, a partial integration, or a complete annexation—inviting his advisers to “discuss the subject in a democratic manner.”

One of the first persons to speak was Interior Minister Samir Muhammad ‘Abd al-Wahhab, who had acquired wide-ranging experience in his previous positions as an

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130 Saddam Hussein, quoted in “Saddam Hussein and Iraqi officials discussing Turkish, Russian, and Chinese perceptions of Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait,” August 7, 1990, 9, SH-SHTP-A-001-233, CRRC.
132 Saddam Hussein, quoted in “Saddam Hussein and Iraqi officials discussing Turkish, Russian, and Chinese perceptions of Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait,” August 7, 1990, 13, SH-SHTP-A-001-233, CRRC.
official at the foreign ministry, as mayor of Baghdad, and as minister of higher education.133 “Sir, I do not think that [the emirate] should be integrated.” Otherwise, Iraq would “lose” the Kuwaitis.134 Vice President Taha Ma’ruf argued that he was “for a full union” between Iraq and Kuwait in the long run. For the time being, however, the emirate should remain “its own entity.” Deputy Prime Minister Sa’dun Hammadi concurred.135

Foreign Minister Tariq ‘Aziz noted that a quick annexation would entail grave risks because the “great powers” would “not acknowledge” it.136 “What worries me is that […] they might mobilize their forces against us under the flag of the United Nations.” Even the Soviet Union, with which Iraq had signed an alliance treaty in 1972, could not be counted on for support in the present situation, he warned. On the contrary, he did “not feel comfortable” with the Kremlin’s attitude because it had not only voted in favor of the UN resolution condemning the invasion but also imposed an arms embargo on Baghdad. The foreign minister feared that Russia might join the US alliance against Iraq. Consequently, he advised to “break the wave of hostility.” Rather than “grab it all at once,” they should seize Kuwait “gradually.”137 “If in one, two, or three weeks, we can guarantee some loopholes in the economic boycott,” he noted, “then we should take the next step.”138

133 See “Iraq’s New Ministers of Interior and Trade Appointed,” Xinhua General Overseas News Service, August 4, 1987. The original transcript provides only the first name of the speaker: “Samir.” The only person by that name in the Iraqi leadership at that time was Minister of the Interior Samir Muhammad ‘Abd al-Wahhab. See “Meeting between Saddam Hussein and his senior advisors discussion the future of Kuwait,” August 7, 1990, SH-SHTP-A-001-475, CRRC.
134 Samir Muhammad ‘Abd al-Wahhab, quoted in “Meeting between Saddam Hussein and his senior advisors discussion the future of Kuwait,” August 7, 1990, 5, SH-SHTP-A-001-475, CRRC.
135 Taha Ma’ruf, quoted in ibid., 7.
136 Tariq ‘Aziz, quoted in ibid., 8.
138 Tariq ‘Aziz, quoted in “Meeting between Saddam Hussein and his senior advisors discussion the future of Kuwait,” August 7, 1990, 10, SH-SHTP-A-001-475, CRRC.
Saddam Hussein was not amused. “What is this talk, Comrade?” he snapped at Tariq ‘Aziz. “This time frame you are requesting is not an option.” He claimed that practical issues, such as the current lack of electricity and clean water in the emirate, dictated an immediate annexation. Otherwise, the Kuwaitis would stage riots and possibly even an uprising. “Let us have a quick solution and rely on God.” The foreign minister replied that they were “not in disagreement.” “We are more than being in disagreement,” Saddam Hussein retorted angrily.139 If they were to grant Kuwait some autonomy, its elite would take this as an opportunity to organize resistance against the Iraqi overlords. To prevent this, “we want to form a union with them quickly.”140 The president became increasingly impatient. “I will stop the meeting now,” he announced. “Go ahead, go to Kuwait and form a government.” If its citizens refused to join Iraq, he would “cut off their heads.”141

Taken aback by Saddam Hussein’s brutal approach, Interior Minister Samir Muhammad once more registered his concerns: “Sir, I do not want to see a time come when we rule the Kuwaiti people by force,” he pleaded. “We must truly gain people’s approval in Kuwait in the long-term.” This is why they should have an “autonomous form of government” with the exception of the ministries of defense, exterior, and petroleum. Saddam Hussein countered that the Kurds in Iraq would then demand self-rule as well.142 Unconvinced by this argument, the interior minister made one last attempt to change the president’s mind: “Let us not forget what we are after. The Kuwaiti oil resources will be produced in Kuwait but will become part of Iraq.” As a

139 Quoted in ibid., 10.
140 Saddam Hussein, quoted in ibid., 11.
141 Saddam Hussein, quoted in ibid., 12.
142 Samir Muhammad ‘Abd al-Wahhab, quoted in ibid., 16.
result, there was no need to govern the entire emirate, which “would lead Kuwaitis […] to turn against us.”

Saddam Hussein, however, remained firmly set on annexation. “The Kuwaiti society is a thwarted society,” he pointed out. “I know what type of corruption and luxury this society lives in. […] I don’t understand why you misinterpret it,” he reprimanded his associates. “Who do [the al-Sabah] think they are? They think they are better than any other Arab country and they look down at everybody else.” In his opinion, the Kuwaiti rulers’ misdemeanor went beyond corruption and haughtiness, however. “What made us target them except [their] abuse [of Iraq],” he asked his advisers, implying that the country had been humiliated by the al-Sabah family. “Clearly, clearly no self-governance!” he exclaimed. He ordered his officials to carry out an “integrated union” the next day. “You tell them, ‘You are Iraqis now,’ and if anyone opens his mouth or makes any noise, you need to empty all bullets in his throat.” Remaining true to his dictatorial credentials, he made sure to leave no doubt among his subordinates that his commands were to be executed to the letter: “If I hear that you did not cut the tongue of anyone talking there deep from the esophagus, I will replace you all!”

The transcript of this meeting indicates that Saddam Hussein expressed anger at the Kuwaiti rulers and their alleged misdeeds. It seems obvious that he used this emotion instrumentally to stifle the discussion with his advisers and to push through

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143 Samir Muhammad ‘Abd al-Wahhab, quoted in ibid., 17.
144 Saddam Hussein, quoted in ibid., 22.
146 Saddam Hussein, quoted in “Meeting between Saddam Hussein and his senior advisors discussion the future of Kuwait,” August 7, 1990, 18, SH-SHTP-A-001-475, CRRRC.
147 Saddam Hussein, quoted in ibid., 22.
his will. At least two possible interpretations follow from this: First, one could argue that the Iraqi leader merely feigned his affect in order to persuade his subordinates. This interpretation would be supported by the fact that he invoked the anger at the al-Sabah family only once he ran out of substantive arguments in support of annexation. In that case, his emotion would less likely have influenced his decision-making. His preference for annexation would thus have been based on the political considerations he cited in the meeting: If Kuwait were to retain some autonomy, its elite would be in a better position to organize resistance against Baghdad, and the Kurds in Iraq would feel encouraged to demand self-rule as well.

A second, more plausible interpretation is that Saddam Hussein felt genuinely angry at the Kuwaiti elite and that this feeling influenced his preference construction. According to this perspective, his anger and lust for revenge served as an important complement to the political considerations he put forward. This line of argument is supported by his repeated orders to impose cruel punishment on recalcitrant Kuwaitis, by his absolute determination to subdue the emirate, and by his reaction to his advisers’ concerns. Four of his most senior associates—the vice president, the deputy prime minister, the foreign minister, and the interior minister—were not persuaded by his rationale for annexation. They raised serious reservations and pleaded with him to wait. Cooler heads might have taken these warnings into consideration. Saddam Hussein, however, remained bent on taking over the emirate. His growing impatience and irritation with his advisers and their objections indicate that he was not prepared to carry out a sober cost-benefit analysis of alternative courses of action. His affect explains why he dismissed their concerns and threw caution to the wind.
4.4 Peace initiative and hostage-taking

On August 12, 1990, Saddam Hussein surprised the world by presenting a “peace initiative” to resolve the crisis along with the other major disputes in the Middle East. If Israel withdrew from all occupied Arab territories, and Syria pulled out of Lebanon, he would then take his troops out of Kuwait, he suggested.\(^{149}\) Scholars have hotly debated what prompted him to make this proposal. Some classify the initiative as mere propaganda to exploit anti-Israeli sentiment in the region and to portray himself as the protector of all Arabs.\(^{150}\) Others view it as a genuine endeavor to settle the region’s conflicts and to retreat from Kuwait with his honor intact.\(^{151}\)

Captured Iraqi government sources now shed some light on Saddam Hussein’s original motivation. He raised the “peace initiative” for the first time in an internal meeting on August 7: “This morning I had an idea,” he informed his advisers.\(^{152}\) He would offer “to discuss a timeframe with whoever is authorized to reach an agreement where the Jews leave Palestine, and […] the Iraqis will leave Kuwait.”\(^{153}\) The way he further explained this idea shows that he conceived of it as a shrewd strategy to retain long-term control over the emirate. “Let the world be occupied with such a dilemma, let them discuss and argue with the Jews,” he declared. “We don’t mean that we are going to give up, because it is impossible for the Israeli forces to leave Palestine.”\(^{154}\)

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\(^{151}\) See, for example, Heikal, *Illusions of Triumph*, 253, 250; Mohamedou, *Iraq and the Second Gulf War*, 137.

\(^{152}\) Saddam Hussein, quoted in “Saddam Hussein and Iraqi officials discussing Turkish, Russian, and Chinese perceptions of Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait,” August 7, 1990, 12, SH-SHTP-A-001-233, CRRC.

\(^{153}\) Saddam Hussein, quoted in ibid., 13.

\(^{154}\) Saddam Hussein, quoted in ibid.
He regarded his proposal merely as a means “to deceive and confuse the media.”\textsuperscript{155} There are no signs in the archival record that he was influenced by any emotions at this point. Rational choice thus convincingly explains his “peace initiative” as an attempt to maximize his chances of keeping Kuwait.

In the meantime, Iraq’s General Military Intelligence Directorate sent alarming reports to Saddam Hussein. On August 12, it warned that “the aggressive intentions against Iraq are considerably serious, especially when it comes to the air operations at this time.”\textsuperscript{156} Two days later, it noted that “in spite of the fact that the United States gave defensive justification for its military concentration in the region, it is quite probable that this allegation is only for reasons of tactical deception.” The intelligence service assumed that “the attack against Iraq would begin once the required preparations are ready.”\textsuperscript{157} It appears that Saddam Hussein took these warnings seriously. In a later meeting with his advisers, he remembered that the situation started getting “complicated” on August 14, when it “became clear to us that we are facing a military battle instead of sanctions.”\textsuperscript{158} This prompted him to take three measures to prepare for and, if possible, deter an American attack. First, he sent an open letter to the Iranian president, ‘Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, in which he offered to conclude a peace treaty.\textsuperscript{159} Next, he transferred Iraqi troops from the Iranian border to Kuwait, where they prepared for a US air- and seaborne assault.\textsuperscript{160} Finally, he had a spokesman announce on August 17 that Iraq would “play host” to all citizens from “aggressive nations” residing in Iraq—including about 3,000

\textsuperscript{155} Saddam Hussein, quoted in ibid., 12.
\textsuperscript{156} General Military Intelligence Directorate report, August 12, 1990, 37, SH-GMID-D-000-513, CRRC.
\textsuperscript{157} General Military Intelligence Directorate report, August 14, 1990, 37, SH-GMID-D-000-513, CRRC.
\textsuperscript{158} Saddam Hussein, quoted in “Meeting between Saddam Hussein and the Soviet Delegation regarding the Persian Gulf conflict,” October 6, 1990, 12, SH-PDWN-D-000-533, CRRC.
\textsuperscript{159} See “‘Text’ of Saddam Peace Proposal Sent to Iran,” Baghdad Domestic Service, August 15, 1990, FBIS-NES-90-158, 22; Long, Saddam’s War of Words, 121.
\textsuperscript{160} See Freedman, A Choice of Enemies, 226; Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, 219.
Americans—as long as the country was under threat by the United States and its allies. Placed in important strategic locations, some of these foreign “guests” would be used as “human shields” against air attacks.

The peace offer to Iran and the hostage-taking suggest that Saddam Hussein was worried about a US military strike in mid-August. Yet, the documentary record again yields only limited information about his emotional state at this point in the crisis. “The Americans believe that we will be afraid if they come by plane,” he remarked in a meeting with a government delegation from Yemen on August 20. He denied any anxiety, however. “I say to my comrades, when we were six years old in the countryside and our families sent us at night from village to village and when a bird flew in front of us on the road, our hearts flew with it out of fear, but our fear has left us since that time.”

Emotional choice theory suggests that a person’s experience of emotion is strongly shaped by her or his culture. One of the central features of Saddam Hussein’s cultural background was the salience of honor norms. Prevalent in many regions of the world, such as the southern United States, the Mediterranean, or the Middle East, honor codes prohibit males from experiencing and expressing fear. Experiments in cross-cultural psychology have shown that men who adhere to such codes do indeed

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163 Saddam Hussein, quoted in “Proceedings of the meeting of Mr. President, the Leader, God save him, with Mr. Salim Salih Muhammad, a member of the Presidency, and Mr. Hasan Makki al-Na‘ib, [former] Prime Minister of the Republic of Yemen,” August 20, 1990, 50, SH-PDWN-D-000-997, CRRC.
display less fear than others who do not follow these norms. The finding that they expressed fear to a lesser degree does not necessarily mean that they also experienced it less intensely. They may just have used better techniques to conceal their anxiety. In principle, however, it is possible that they developed more effective strategies to down-regulate their experience of fear. Iraqi sources indicate that Saddam Hussein had deeply internalized honor norms forbidding the experience of fear. “Neither fear nor submission is proper for the Arab nation,” he declared in a meeting with a government delegation from Mauritania in September, for example.

Furthermore, the Iraqi president’s experience and expression of emotion was influenced by his identity. Valor and bravery were important components of his self-conception. The fact that his parents named him Saddam, meaning “the one who confronts,” helped to instill an attitude into him that it was inappropriate to be afraid and to run away in dangerous situations. In the course of the 1980s, he started portraying himself as a “daring and bellicose knight” (al-faris al-mighwar), who was defending the honor of the “Arab nation” against Iran. He began to identify himself with King Nebuchadnezzar II of Babylonia, who had destroyed Jerusalem in the sixth century BCE, and with Sultan Saladin, who had conquered the holy city after defeating the European crusaders in the twelfth century. That his identity shaped...

166 See Parkinson, Fischer, and Manstead, Emotion in Social Relations, 79.
167 Saddam Hussein, quoted in “Meeting between Saddam Hussein and Sheikh Sidi Ahmad Walad Baba, the Mauritanian Minister of Interior, regarding his support for Iraq,” September 30, 1990, 7, SH-PDWN-D-000-467, CRRC.
his emotion became apparent in internal meetings after the invasion of Kuwait. “How can one say that I, the leader of the masses, am afraid?” he pointed out to his Yemeni guests on August 20, 1990, for instance. “When one holds a position of authority, even at the lowest level, one cannot be afraid.” In an FBI interrogation in 2004, he still insisted that he was “afraid of no one. I am only afraid of God.”

Finally, Saddam Hussein’s communication of his alleged fearlessness played an important structural role in his governance of Iraq. His state apparatus brutally repressed any opponents, real or apparent. This reign of terror, in conjunction with a system of rewards for loyal supporters, sustained his regime for more than three decades. Fear of Saddam Hussein and his executioners was constitutive of Iraq’s body politic, as Kanan Makiya demonstrates in his classic study Republic of Fear. This system, however, worked only so long as people were in awe of the dictator. The Iraqi president was convinced that only leaders who were making decisions “without fearing anyone but God” could “command the respect of people,” as he noted in an interview. Once a ruler came across as afraid, his authority at home and abroad would be shattered and his reign would disintegrate, he believed. As a consequence, he had strong incentives to mask any anxiety that he may have felt. His avowals of fearlessness thus cannot be taken at face value.

171 Saddam Hussein, quoted in “Proceedings of the meeting of Mr. President, the Leader, God save him, with Mr. Salim Salih Muhammad, a member of the Presidency, and Mr. Hasan Makki al-Na’ib, [former] Prime Minister of the Republic of Yemen,” August 20, 1990, 50, SH-PDWN-D-000-997, CRRC.
174 Makiya, Republic of Fear, xi. See also xiv. See also Hinnebusch, The International Politics of the Middle East, 20.
176 See Rubin, “The United States and Iraq,” 269.
In the absence of evidence about Saddam Hussein’s affective state in mid-August 1990, however, this section treats emotions as irrelevant for this period. It relies instead on rational choice to explain his peace offer to Teheran, the withdrawal of his troops from the Iranian border, and the hostage-taking of foreign citizens. The Iraqi ruler’s analysis of the international environment led him to the conclusion that the US armed forces in Saudi Arabia posed a greater threat than Iran at this point. In his eyes, the benefits of making peace with Teheran and of relocating his troops from the Iranian border to Kuwait thus outweighed the costs. His use of foreign hostages as “strategic shields” was supposed to maximize the regime’s security by deterring the United States from conducting air raids.177

4.5 Establishing a dialogue with Washington

Existing accounts of the Gulf conflict date the beginning of US coercive diplomacy to November 8, 1990.178 That day, George Bush announced the dispatch of more than 150,000 additional American troops to Saudi Arabia in order to ensure an “adequate offensive military option should that be necessary.”179 According to Alexander George, this marked the shift from purely diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions to forceful persuasion.180 Iraqi sources, however, reveal that statements from senior US officials had led Saddam Hussein and his associates to regard the agglomeration of American and allied troops in Saudi Arabia as an acute threat already two weeks before. On October 25, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney noted in a series of TV

177 Saddam Hussein’s hostage strategy turned out to be counterproductive in the long-run. Western public opinion was outraged by the detention of civilians, which helped the Bush administration to legitimize its uncompromising stance and subsequent military action against Iraq.
178 See, for example, George, Forceful Persuasion, 60.
180 See George, Forceful Persuasion, 60.
interviews that the administration was prepared “to deal with any contingency.”

Four days later, Secretary of State James Baker remarked on CNN that there was “a limit to the international community’s patience.” He would “not rule out a possible use of force.”

The Iraqi leader responded by putting his army in a state of high alert. A newly released tape of an internal meeting of the Revolutionary Command Council from November 1 sheds some light on his and his advisers’ thinking and feeling at that point. The recorded discussion indicates that they believed a US assault to be imminent. This perceived threat led them to draw radically different conclusions, however. Whereas Deputy Prime Minister Taha Ramadan advocated a diplomatic resolution of the conflict, RCC Vice Chairman ‘Izzat Ibrahim suggested confronting the US military head-on. The remainder of this section will demonstrate that their divergent recommendations were shaped by their differing emotions.

At the outset of the RCC meeting on November 1, Tariq ‘Aziz alerted his colleagues

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181 Richard Cheney, quoted in “Cheney Suggests 100,000 More US Troops May Head for Mideast,” AP, October 25, 1990. See also Baram, “Calculation and Miscalculation in Baghdad,” 50.
184 See “Meeting between Saddam Hussein and the Revolutionary Command Council regarding Iraqi foreign policy after invading Kuwait and the likelihood of an American attack,” November 1, 1990, SH-SHTP-A-000-670, CRRC. The CRRC put down October 11, 1990, as the date of this meeting. There are three indicators, however, that the session took place on November 1, 1990. First, on p. 11 of the transcript, Saddam Hussein notes that when Soviet envoy “[Yevgenni] Primakov left Saudi Arabia, he went to Cyprus, and it was broadcast that he met with the Cypriot president, and spent the night there.” According to the international media coverage, Primakov’s two-day stay in Cyprus took place on October 30 and 31, 1990. See “Soviet Envoy Leaves Cyprus,” Xinhua General News Service, October 31, 1990. Second, on p. 21, Aziz notes that “yesterday, the British commander of the Desert Rats said that he would be ready for strike on November 15.” This is in line with another news report from October 31, according to which the commander of the British forces in the Gulf, Air Chief Marshal Sir Paddy Hine, informed the media that “British forces would be ready by mid-November to support any action to remove Iraq from Kuwait.” See “Britain Preparing for Gulf Military Operation,” Xinhua General News Service, October 31, 1990. Finally, Baghdad’s news service INA reported that Saddam Hussein chaired a meeting on November 1, 1990, with senior RCC members. See “Saddam Discusses Issues With Senior Officials,” INA (Baghdad), November 1, 1990, FBIS-NES-90-213, 22.
that “the American position these days [was] dangerous.” He expected Washington to embark on an attack against Iraq “tomorrow, Saturday, and until the day of the [US Congressional mid-term] elections” on November 6. In his eyes, Bush had an incentive to start a war a few days before the ballot because his party would benefit from the resulting surge in patriotism. Nobody objected to the foreign minister’s bleak assessment of the situation. In early August, Saddam Hussein had still ridiculed the American president in a meeting with his advisers, claiming that he was too scared to intervene in Iraq. Now, three months later, he was more cautious. He called on his comrades to monitor developments closely, so that there would be “enough time to give our troops, our organizations, and our people the signal to be ready.” Everyone had to “be aware of the danger around us, especially in the coming few days,” he warned.

Next, the Iraqi ruler asked the first deputy prime minister for his view. A graduate of Baghdad’s Military Academy, Taha Ramadan had been a member of Saddam Hussein’s inner circle from the 1960s onward. “If [the Bush administration] thinks the economic sanctions won’t make a difference, then it will strike quickly,” he opined. In his eyes, the “decisive time” would be between

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186 Tariq ‘Aziz, quoted in ibid., 2.
187 See ibid., 26.
188 See Saddam Hussein, quoted in “Saddam Hussein and Iraqi officials discussing Turkish, Russian, and Chinese perceptions of Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait,” August 7, 1990, 9, SH-SHTP-A-001-233, CRRC.
189 Saddam Hussein, quoted in ibid., 8.
190 See Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, 187; Sassoon, Saddam Hussein’s Ba’th Party, 171.
November 5 and 15.\textsuperscript{193} The US assault would “most likely take place at night,” he pointed out and proposed taking civil defense measures “to protect and defend ourselves during this vulnerable time.”\textsuperscript{194}

Tariq ‘Aziz, Saddam Hussein, and Taha Ramadan did not use any emotion terms. Their references to the “danger” emanating from the US bases in Saudi Arabia and to Iraq’s “vulnerability,” however, suggest that they were afraid of an American attack. The experience of fear would explain why Taha Ramadan thought about ways to avoid war: “How do you calm the big commotion and also save face?” he summarized the dilemma of the Ba’ath regime, as he saw it. On the one hand, it was in Iraq’s interest to “calm the big commotion” and to resolve the crisis peacefully. On the other hand, a departure from Kuwait under US pressure would entail a loss of “face,” which would harm the government’s reputation at home and abroad. He concluded that negotiations with the enemy were the only way out. It was thus “very important” to “establish or encourage a [communications] channel with two sides, the US and Saudi Arabia.” This could then lead to an agreement enabling the Bush administration to “slowly withdraw, even if it kept its forces [in the Gulf] for a certain period of time.”\textsuperscript{195}

RCC Vice Chairman ‘Izzat Ibrahim agreed with his colleagues that the United States would “strike these days and not in two or three months.”\textsuperscript{196} He presumed that Bush was “willing to enter into a full-fledged war,” which could last between three to four years.\textsuperscript{197} In contrast to Taha Ramadan, such a scenario did not prompt him to think about ways to resolve the crisis diplomatically, however. Instead, he relished the confrontation with Washington: “Since World War II no nation in the world has stood

\textsuperscript{193} Taha Ramadan, quoted in ibid., 25.
\textsuperscript{194} Taha Ramadan, quoted in ibid., 26-27.
\textsuperscript{195} Taha Ramadan, quoted in ibid., 31.
\textsuperscript{196} ‘Izzat Ibrahim, quoted in ibid., 33.
\textsuperscript{197} ‘Izzat Ibrahim, quoted in ibid., 35. See also 33.
in the face of the US and threatened it, except the Soviet Union,” he pointed out.198 “Bush is losing his mind, he is going crazy, and he can’t figure out where this little country [Iraq] has come from and made such a bold move, wanting to do such a thing. He is wondering: Are they mentally stable? Are they crazy? Are they bluffing? Will they really fight or not? The US is stunned… stunned! The whole world is stunned at the situation.”199 His passionate speech indicates that he felt proud about the Iraqi leadership’s courage to stand up to the United States. Emotional choice theory predicts that individuals who experience pride will be prone to self-enhancing biases, which elevate the self in comparison to others. They tend to view themselves as different from perceived weaker groups and similar to stronger ones. Moreover, excessive pride may lead people to ignore their shortcomings and weaknesses. As a result, they are often overconfident about their abilities and interpret events as confirmation of their alleged superiority to others.200

These psychological mechanisms also seem to have played a role in the case of the RCC vice chairman. They would explain why he was so optimistic that the Ba’ath regime would prevail in a battle against America. Once the US troops invaded, the Iraqis would “fight for every inch of this country, from the south of Kuwait to [the town of] Zakho” in the north of Iraq, he declared. He even thought it “possible” that the United States would “use nuclear bombs to strike two or three cities,” because Bush “cannot fathom how a little country stands in defiance in front of the US and dares to challenge it to a fight and to win.” If need be, the Ba’ath leadership would “go into the mountains and fight either officially or in gang wars.” Iraq would triumph in the end, he vowed, “tearing” the American nation “apart,” just like in Vietnam

198 ‘Izzat Ibrahim, quoted in ibid., 33.
199 ‘Izzat Ibrahim, quoted in ibid., 34.
200 See section 2.6.4.
twenty years before. In the meantime, he was eager to target Saudi Arabia with terrorist operations. He explained to his comrades that Iraqi agents had explored several sensitive locations in the kingdom. “It took us two months to reach this point!” Now, the mission was ready to be carried out.

While Taha Ramadan had been motivated by his fear of America’s destructive power, ‘Izzat Ibrahim was driven by his pride at the alleged bravery of the Iraqi government. Saddam Hussein, however, did not share the vice chairman’s excitement on this occasion. He neither delighted in the prospect of conducting guerilla warfare from the mountains; nor was he eager to stage terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia. “I would rather not carry out anything at this time,” he curtly informed the group. He did not justify his restraint, and he did not verbalize his thoughts and feelings. Hence, it is not possible to shed light on his motivation at this point.

Saddam Hussein’s behavior during the next days and weeks, however, indicates that he took up Taha Ramadan’s proposal to try and reach a diplomatic settlement of the conflict. He refrained from provocations and stressed his readiness to negotiate with Washington in an interview with British television on November 11. “If the US administration were to show a desire for dialogue, it would discover new realities that are impossible to see with an angry eye or a furious mind,” he assured ABC news anchor Peter Jennings four days later. He also noted that he would

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203 Saddam Hussein, quoted in ibid., 121.
204 Saddam Hussein, quoted in ibid., 122.
“not beg” for talks because he hailed from a “people with dignity.” However, “if President Bush should call me, I would take the call,” he promised.

Jennings was aware of the possibility that the Iraqi ruler proposed this dialogue merely to play for time or to sow dissent between the United States and its allies. Yet, in his view, there were signs that Saddam Hussein was making a “genuine plea” to “negotiate an end to the Iraqi occupation,” and that he was motivated by fear. The ABC journalist got the impression that the prospect of war with the United States was causing him “enormous concern.” He did not hear “a word of the usual bravado about sending American boys home in boxes or plucking out the eyes of their enemies.” Instead, he sensed that Saddam Hussein had a “fervent desire” to talk to the US government. “I do feel very strongly, and I think others do as well, that he is quite desperate,” he noted after the meeting with the dictator.

There are further signs that Saddam Hussein was sincerely looking for a way out during this period and that he followed Taha Ramadan’s suggested approach. In November, he sent several letters to King Fahd of Saudi Arabia requesting a meeting, for instance. In the second half of the month, some Iraqi envoys visited Ankara to inform the Turkish president, Turgut Ozal, that Saddam Hussein was prepared to “pull out and accept conditions.” What is less clear is what the Iraqi leader was demanding in return for a withdrawal from Kuwait. The available government files from Baghdad remain silent on this issue, and reliable eyewitness accounts are sparse.

206 Saddam Hussein, quoted in “INA Reports Saddam Interview with ABC,” INA (Baghdad), November 17, 1990, FBIS-NES-90-223, 14. ABC correspondent Peter Jennings conducted the interview on November 15, 1990.

207 Saddam Hussein, quoted in ibid., 16.


211 Turgut Ozal, quoted in “Memorandum of telephone conversation between George Bush and Turgut Ozal,” November 30, 1990, 12:48-12:57 P.M., folder “Presidential Telephone Calls – Memorandum of Conversations 10/11/90-12/31/90,” box 6, Presidential Correspondence Files, Scowcroft Collection, GHWBL.
The Soviet President, Mikhail Gorbachev, who maintained some contacts to the Ba’ath regime, informed George Bush on November 19 that Saddam Hussein was willing to recall his troops from the emirate in exchange for more access to the Gulf.\(^{212}\) In principle, this could have been arranged through a transfer or lease of the Kuwaiti islands of Bubiyan or Warbah. If the American president and his allies had been prepared to provide this positive incentive in November, the Iraqi ruler might thus have pulled out of Kuwait. Bush and King Fahd, however, rejected all of these apparent or real proposals from Baghdad. They insisted that there could only be negotiations after Saddam Hussein had taken his forces out of the emirate.\(^{213}\) On November 29, the US administration persuaded a large majority of UN Security Council members to adopt Resolution 678, authorizing the use of “all necessary means,” if Iraq did not comply with all previous UN resolutions by January 15, 1991.\(^{214}\)

### 4.6 Cancelling Iraqi-US talks

The UN ultimatum fueled a debate in the United States about whether the administration had become locked into a military logic while a diplomatic resolution of the crisis was still possible.\(^{215}\) To rebut these charges, President Bush announced on November 30, 1990, that he would “go the extra mile for peace.” He invited Foreign Minister Tariq ‘Aziz to Washington and offered to dispatch Secretary of State James Baker to Baghdad in order to make sure that Saddam Hussein understood the

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\(^{213}\) See ibid.


American position. The Iraqi leader accepted Bush’s proposal the next day. After a month of lobbying for direct Iraqi-US talks, he had finally reached his goal. Two weeks later, however, he suddenly cancelled the bilateral meetings. What prompted him to perform this volte-face? There is a broad consensus among analysts that he interpreted Bush’s willingness to talk as a sign of weakness and fear of war. Having reached the conclusion that the Americans would not dare attack, he allegedly demonstrated his aplomb by calling off the talks. This section seeks to revise this dominant view. There are signs that Saddam Hussein was at this stage not dismissive of America’s ability and willingness to fight. It was above all his growing belief that he would not reap any benefits from the bilateral meetings that led him to cancel. This impression was strongly reinforced by his increasing anger and sense of humiliation at the hands of the Bush administration in the course of the first half of December, as the remainder of this section will show.

On December 6, the Iraqi president surprised the world when he announced that all foreign “guests” were about to be released. This included close to 600 hostages at installations of strategic importance in Iraq and about 1,200 Americans and Britons in Kuwait. Most scholars regard this move as confirmation of Saddam Hussein’s self-confidence. Since he was already convinced that the Bush administration had no stomach for war, there was no need to rely on the hostages anymore. A careful

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reading of the documentary record, however, suggests that he took Washington’s military threat seriously at this point. As he explained in a later interview, he believed that “keeping the foreign guests here would, in fact, itself lead to the war,” while their discharge might de-escalate the crisis and enable the White House to reciprocate with a constructive step.\textsuperscript{220} His announcement of the release was surprisingly self-critical for a dictator who rarely, if ever, admitted to having made a mistake. He acknowledged that the capture of foreign nationals “may not have been correct from the humanitarian and practical standpoints” and offered his “apologies for any harm done.”\textsuperscript{221} His hope for a positive response from Washington was disappointed, however. At a press conference on December 6, Bush stressed that the freeing of the hostages would not change his demand that Baghdad “comply 100 percent, without condition, to the UN resolutions.” Asked whether he could find a way to make it easier for the Iraqi leader to save his face in retreat, he replied: “I don’t care about face; he doesn’t need any face. He needs to get out of Kuwait.”\textsuperscript{222} Secretary of State Baker added that Saddam Hussein “deserve[d] no thanks” for releasing the foreign nationals.\textsuperscript{223}

By mid-December, all Western citizens wishing to leave Iraq and Kuwait had done so.\textsuperscript{224} A \textit{CBS} correspondent in Baghdad observed that members of the Ba’ath leadership were “confused and even hurt” by the lack of gratitude from Washington.\textsuperscript{225} In an interview with \textit{CNN}, Saddam Hussein expressed “annoyance”

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{221}Saddam Hussein, quoted in “Saddam Husayn Calls for Release of all Foreigners,” December 6, 1990, printed in Bengio, \textit{Saddam Speaks on the Gulf Crisis}, 154-55.
\item \textsuperscript{224}See Wilson, \textit{The Politics of Truth}, 144.
\item \textsuperscript{225}Quoted in “Iraq’s Cultural Clash with US,” \textit{CBS Morning News}, December 20, 1990.
\end{itemize}
about Bush’s cool response to the freeing of the hostages. It struck him not only as ungrateful but also as offensive.  

He reached the conclusion that the US administration would not allow him to come away with any gains from the planned bilateral meetings. After all, Bush had stated openly that the sole purpose of the talks was to communicate his resolve to Baghdad. On December 15, the Iraqi leader thus called the meetings off. His foreign minister would “not go to the United States to receive orders,” he declared in an interview.  

The available sources show that his preference for cancellation was strongly reinforced by his growing anger at the Bush administration. Since Washington refused to acknowledge the release of the hostages, he would refuse to arrange any talks, he told his associates in a meeting on December 15—“even if we have to sacrifice our blood.” He complained about what he regarded as the moral corruption of the US government. “America purchased the positions of the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia,” he charged. The United Nations was “not international anymore;” it was an “organization […] for Bush” and his “filthy game.” He insisted that subjugation by Washington was not acceptable for a proud nation like Iraq. “Everything you see in Baghdad we have built […], but these buildings have no meaning if we are slaves,” he pointed out to his advisers. “My brothers, we are looking for justice. […] We are good people asking for justice.”

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229 Saddam Hussein, quoted in “Meeting between Saddam Hussein and senior advisors regarding Iraq’s historical rights to Kuwait and the US position on international issues,” December 15, 1990, 3, SH-SHTP-D-000-557, CRRC.
230 Saddam Hussein, quoted in ibid., 3-4.
231 Saddam Hussein, quoted in ibid., 6.
Saddam Hussein’s monologue indicates that his anger was compounded by a sense of humiliation. According to the emotional choice framework, the experience of anger is associated with a sense of power and invulnerability. Its action tendency is to punish the offender.\textsuperscript{232} Feelings of humiliation tend to trigger similar impulses if people view their degradation as unjust and if they are sufficiently strong to respond.\textsuperscript{233} These psychological mechanisms help to account for the Iraqi president’s defiance and buttressed his preference for calling off the Iraqi-US meetings.

4.7 Defying coercive diplomacy, December 1990

During the rest of December 1990, Saddam Hussein continued to reject the UN resolutions. Scholars have cited a myriad of factors to shed light on his behavior. Their explanations fall into three groups: First, numerous analysts argue that Saddam Hussein assumed that the United States would ultimately not attack Iraq. Within this group, three different interpretations have been advanced: Some experts maintain that the Iraqi ruler thought that the military threats by Washington and its allies were mere bluff.\textsuperscript{234} Others claim that he believed that he could deter an assault.\textsuperscript{235} Yet others argue that he operated under the assumption that the enemy coalition would fall apart before the UN deadline and that France or the Soviet Union would dissuade the United States from attacking.\textsuperscript{236}

The second group of explanations rests on the premise that Saddam Hussein did believe that Washington and its allies would strike out at Iraq, but he thought his

\textsuperscript{232} See section 2.6.2.

\textsuperscript{233} See section 2.6.5.


\textsuperscript{235} See, for example, Cigar, “Iraq’s Strategic Mindset and the Gulf War,” 2-3.

troops would ultimately prevail over them. This group can be further divided into four categories: First, several scholars make the case that the Iraqi president underestimated America’s military capability and overestimated that of his own troops. Second, numerous analysts contend that he overrated the United States’ sensitivity to casualties and failed to appreciate its determination to prevail in a war. Third, according to some experts, he believed that he would be able to mobilize the people in the Middle East and North Africa to such a degree that they would support his troops in Iraq and topple Arab governments aligned with Washington. This would, in turn, lead the Bush administration to abandon the war. Lastly, a number of authors make the case that Saddam Hussein’s sycophantic advisers did not have the courage to warn him that the Iraqi military was too weak to meet an attack from the United States and its allies.

The third set of explanations is based on the assumption that Saddam Hussein believed that he could or should not withdraw from Kuwait for various reasons. These accounts can be sorted into five categories: First, numerous scholars claim that he was concerned that the Iraqis would overthrow him if he pulled his troops out of Kuwait.

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240 See Aburish, Saddam Hussein, 265; Baram, “The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait,” 28; Dawisha, Iraq, 227; Hassan, The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, 100; Duelfer and Dyson, “Chronic Misperception and International Conflict,” 92; Hinnebusch, The International Politics of the Middle East, 219; Post, “The Defining Moment of Saddam’s Life,” 50; Sassoon, Saddam Hussein’s Ba’th Party, 8; Seliktar, The Politics of Intelligence and American Wars with Iraq, 52; Woods and Stout, “Saddam’s Perceptions and Misperceptions,” 36; Woods, with Pease, Stout, Murray, and Lacey, Iraqi Perspectives Project, 8, 13.
without fighting. Second, some analysts assert that he believed he would win politically if he battled the United States, even if he lost militarily. Third, according to a few experts, he kept his forces in Kuwait because Washington and its allies did not provide him with any positive incentives to take them out. Fourth, some authors argue that he was ready to resist because he believed that the United States and its allies would not be willing or able to go so far as to remove him from power. Finally, some writers claim that Saddam Hussein stayed in the emirate because he thought that the United States was determined to destroy his regime no matter what he did.

Some of these explanations seem to contradict each other; others are not mutually exclusive. It is likely that different variables played a role at different stages between mid-December 1990 and January 15, 1991. The release of Iraqi government files provides an opportunity to compare the value of some of these existing explanations with that of the emotional choice framework. Among other things, these documents suggest that Saddam Hussein’s advisers were not quite as sycophantic as conventional studies claim. For example, in late December, the General Military

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243 See, for example, Jakobsen, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War, 56.


245 See Jakobsen, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War, 54, 56-58; Post, “Saddam Hussein of Iraq,” 351; Stein, “Deterrence and Compellence in the Gulf, 1990-91,” 177-78; Yetiv, Explaining Foreign Policy, vii-viii.
Intelligence Directorate and some of the president’s most trusted associates informed him of their deep concern about America’s destructive power and Iraq’s inability to meet a US attack. Why did Saddam Hussein nevertheless cling to his conviction that he could not let go of Kuwait? This section asserts that his preference was not objectively derived but emotionally constructed. In late December, his high levels of pride and hope, and his relatively low level of fear critically shaped his desire to hold on to his 19th province in the face of all adversity.

In December 1990, Saddam Hussein launched a large-scale civil defense program to underline Iraq’s resolve to fight and prevail in a war. According to a confidential document from his office, the purpose of this scheme was “to instill fear in the enemies.” The document read, so that the Americans would be discouraged from intervening. During the second half of December, dozens of training centers were opened across the country to instruct the population how to respond to potential American biological, chemical, or nuclear attacks. Moreover, officials carried out a series of well-publicized evacuation drills in Baghdad involving up to 1.5 million citizens.

In late December, however, Saddam Hussein was confronted with increasing evidence that his deterrence strategy was not working. His General Military Intelligence Directorate warned him on December 26 that the UN ultimatum should

246 “Correspondence between the Presidential Diwan and several other Iraqi authorities, discussing an emergency evacuation plan of different Iraqi cities in case of a nuclear attack,” December 29, 1990, 41, SH-IDGS-D-001-431, CRRC.
247 Ibid., 41, 29.
be taken seriously. If Iraq did not withdraw from Kuwait by the deadline, the United States would launch “intensive air and missile strikes” against the country’s “air force and the air defense resources, the main command posts, radio and TV stations, alternative stations, wire and wireless communications centers, refineries, main warehouses, power stations, scientific institutes, military industrializations establishments, […] [and] other targets such as major bridges, field command posts, artillery posts, and weapons stocks.” In sum, America’s advanced air power would “severely endanger” the country’s “vital” infrastructure. Moreover, the intelligence agency informed Saddam Hussein that the bombing would be followed by a ground attack, in which US land forces would carry out a “rapid advance into the depth of Iraqi territories.”

Despite this alarming intelligence assessment, the Iraqi president clung to his deterrence strategy. At the beginning of a meeting with his advisers two days later, on December 28, he expressed his hope that Washington might not go to war if “it checks us out and sees that our preparation is high.” His associates were not as sycophantic as the existing literature claims, but they hesitated to share their doubts and concerns with him because they confronted a potentially deadly dilemma: If they told Saddam Hussein about all the problems that had come to their attention, he might get angry and punish them for their alleged incompetence, defeatism, or criticism, as he was prone to do. However, if they were too optimistic, he might castigate them for their apparent ineptitude later on, once he found out that their positive assessments had been misplaced. Neither scenario was very appealing. To deal with this quandary,
his associates often applied the same strategy: When they reached the conclusion that there was no way around notifying him about some unwelcome news, they would combine the negative information with a positive report so as to appease him.

Presidential adviser ‘Abd al-Ghani ‘Abd al-Ghafur, for example, summoned his courage halfway through the meeting on December 28 to raise the “topic of rumors.” When false allegations were circulating, a “direct response” was required, he noted. He reported that he had participated in a meeting with Ba’ath Party leaders from the country’s southern branches three days before to halt “the spread of [these] rumors.” At this point, however, ‘Abd al-Ghani seems to have lost his nerve. Rather than elaborating on the content and nature of the claims, he interrupted his account to reassure Saddam Hussein: “We are your comrades and your soldiers, and, God willing, you will only see what is good from us.” He then proceeded to inform the dictator that the enlistment of volunteer fighters had made “great progress.”

‘Abd al-Ghani was not the only member of the Iraqi leadership who was concerned about the spread of rumors in the country, however. When the commander of Baghdad’s popular army, Sa’di Mahdi Salih, took the floor, he confided that this issue had been tormenting him. A few days before, he had started “receiving information about a rumor from all over Baghdad… this rumor is very cunning… it is an American rumor,” he explained. “I was restless the whole night from midnight until the morning.” He had become “so worried” that he summoned all his subordinates to distribute copies of a refutation. Nevertheless, the rumor “appears to have spread all over Iraq by now,” he noted with growing despair. “The truth of the

matter, Sir, is that we started to bleed from the start of the week.”\textsuperscript{256} If these allegations were not suppressed in due course, the regime would be “defeated.”\textsuperscript{257}

Like ‘Abd al-Ghani before him, Commander Sa’di Mahdi Salih lacked the courage to specify the content of this ominous rumor. Instead, he hastened to add some good news: “With regards to the other issue concerning volunteering and the morale in general, in my opinion, the morale is very high.”\textsuperscript{258} Next, he also made sure to affirm his allegiance to Saddam Hussein. “Sir, we are your soldiers, I mean, it is a matter of, uh, we break and are not broken, we bend and are not bent.” Finally, he professed that he was animated by purely idealistic motives. “Our gain is not what we eat, what we drink, and what we wear, Sir. […] We need to work so that the values that you are calling for and cherish become reality, not just in this country, but throughout the Arab world,” he declared. “And if we do so, will we win this fight? Yes, we will win; we will win it for sure.”\textsuperscript{259} Later in the meeting, however, he called into question his optimism when he reported further bad news about the state of his popular army. Having earlier highlighted the allegedly “high” morale of the volunteer fighters, he now admitted that hardly any of the supposed two million members he had recruited were fit for military service. He detailed how he had tried to identify 400 able combatants in this large pool. In the course of a selection process, however, only 175 individuals were deemed suitable. “I will not be able to bring you fighters who have the characteristics of a true fighter,” he finally confessed.\textsuperscript{260}

\textsuperscript{256} Sa’di Mahdi Salih, quoted in ibid., 16. For more information about Sa’di Mahdi Salih’s background, see Saddam Hussein, Taha Yasin Ramadan, Tariq ‘Aziz, Dr. Sa’dun Hammadi, Latif Jasim, and Saadi Mahdi Salih, \textit{Iraq Speaks}, 92.

\textsuperscript{257} Sa’di Mahdi Salih, quoted in “Saddam Hussein reprimanding an official,” circa December 28, 1990, 17, SH-SHTP-A-001-230, CRRC.

\textsuperscript{258} Sa’di Mahdi Salih, quoted in ibid., 16.

\textsuperscript{259} Sa’di Mahdi Salih, quoted in ibid., 17.

\textsuperscript{260} Sa’di Mahdi Salih, quoted in ibid.
It is clear that some of the regime’s senior officials were deeply worried about Iraq’s ability to meet a US attack. Saddam Hussein, however, did not respond to their concerns. He neither enquired about the content of the rumor that they found so alarming; nor did he share his thoughts about the lack of volunteer fighters. Instead, he terminated the meeting. The documentary record suggests that he did not make any efforts to obtain more information about these worrisome issues. From a purely rationalist perspective, it is difficult to comprehend why Saddam Hussein did not follow up on reports of his advisers that his regime was in apparently mortal danger. Emotional choice theory, however, helps to shed some light on his behavior. It suggests that “feeling rules” influence how people experience affect. These socially learned culture-specific norms stipulate what type, extent, and duration of emotion is or is not appropriate in a given situation. The Iraqi leader had internalized particularly strict feeling rules with regard to fear. Given his identity as a “daring and bellicose knight,” he considered it “unacceptable” to “tremble.” To bring his internal state in line with this feeling rule, he consciously or unconsciously ignored, suppressed, and denied information that might cause him to be afraid.

It was difficult for Saddam Hussein to carry on applying this technique of denial, however. When he met his associates again the next day, on December 29, 1990, Vice President Taha Ma’ruf also expressed his concern about some “rumors.”

261 My claim that Saddam Hussein did not follow up on his advisers’ concerns about the “rumors” after the meeting is based on my interpretation of the leadership session the next day, on December 29, 1990. In that meeting, he did not solicit any information about this issue. The recording suggests that Vice President Taha Ma’ruf raised the topic of rumors on his own initiative. There are no signs that he had been tasked by Saddam Hussein to investigate this matter. This supports my argument that the Iraqi ruler sought to ignore any worrisome news that might elicit fear on his part. See below for a more detailed analysis of that meeting. For a pioneering analysis of the psychological phenomenon of “defensive avoidance,” see Janis and Mann, Decision Making, 50, 58, 64, 87.

262 See section 2.4.2.

263 Quoted in “Communique No. 3,” Baghdad Voice of the Masses, August 2, 1990, FBIS-NES-90-149, 30. See also Aburish, Saddam Hussein, 285; Davis, Memories of State, 188; Makiya, Republic of Fear, 110.

The way he raised this topic indicates that he either did not know or pretended not to know that two of his colleagues had already brought it up the day before: “There are some matters and rumors” that “have been going on now for three days,” he told the group. He presumed that they originated from *Voice of America*, the US government’s official external broadcast institution. Once again, Saddam Hussein refrained from enquiring about the substance of these allegations. Unlike his comrades, the vice president, however, had the self-confidence to volunteer a description of their content: The rumors suggested that the Iraqi ruler had launched a secret initiative to get his citizens to stage public demonstrations begging him to withdraw from Kuwait in order to avoid war and to save his rule, he explained. Seemingly spontaneous public chants of “Saddam, yes; Kuwait, no!” were supposed to enable the Iraqi leader to maintain his honor as he was pulling out his troops. According to Taha Ma’ruf, this rumor had “spread throughout the country.” It was “irrefutable” because “almost everyone is convinced of this.” And it was effective because “there are demonstrations throughout all the cities of Iraq calling on the president to withdraw from Kuwait to avoid war.”

Saddam Hussein did not respond to Taha Ma’ruf’s report. Instead, the dictator’s cousin and minister of local government, ‘Ali Hassan al-Majid, took the floor. He was widely known as “Chemical Ali” in the West because he had been in charge of chemical attacks killing tens of thousands of Kurds in 1987 and 1988.

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266 See ibid., 10. See also the coverage of these rumors in “Iraqis’ Christmas: Joy and a ‘Weight,’” *New York Times*, December 26, 1990, A18.
269 Taha Ma’ruf, quoted in ibid., 10. These rumors were also noted by Western embassies and journalists. See “Diplomacy Resumed by US and Iraq,” *New York Times*, December 27, 1990, A12.
Between August and November 1990, he had acted as military governor of Kuwait, ruthlessly suppressing the local population.270 “I can assure Your Excellency that we have great hope in God that our position is strong and our situation is according to your wishes,” he stated.271 “Praise be to God that we are living in this era and we are in a glorious position under the leadership of a great and brave man.”272 After this adulatory preface, ‘Ali Hassan al-Majid voiced some concern over the impact of the civil defense measures on the Iraqi people. The regime’s large-scale evacuation exercises came with graphic descriptions of the effects and likely death toll of potential US nuclear attacks. This “scare tactic” was deeply problematic, in his opinion. “It frightens the children, it frightens their parents, and it frightens the fighter. […] I urge you to stop it!” he told Saddam Hussein.273

‘Ali Hassan al-Majid’s point was seconded by ‘Izzat Ibrahim: “Your Excellency Mr. President, what Comrade Ali has explained […] is correct.” The civil defense program had put the Iraqi society in a “state of fear,” which was weakening the morale of the troops. Hence, he advised to delete any references to the effects of potential American WMD attacks from their propaganda.274 ‘Ali Hassan al-Majid went a step further, however, by acknowledging that this “fear factor” had affected not only ordinary Iraqis but also the top political leadership, himself included. There were fifteen days left until the UN deadline of January 15, 1991, he pointed out. “We have to have some peace of mind and calm down, to ease our psyche during this

274 ‘Izzat Ibrahim, quoted in ibid.
period, because if we approach this period and we are in a state of fear, then our hand will not be balanced and will be shaken.”

It was only now that Saddam Hussein entered the discussion. Given that his most senior lieutenants confronted him with their anxieties so directly, he could no longer ignore them. “Give me leeway to speak frankly with you,” he opened his monologue. “What are we—a bunch of kids?” He reprimanded his advisers for their trepidation and stressed that each of them had undergone the eight-year Iran-Iraq war. It was thus not appropriate for them to be scared by US threats. Now that Saddam Hussein’s technique of denial no longer worked, he resorted to what psychologists call “situation modification” and “attentional deployment” to regulate his emotions. As outlined in the theory chapter, situation modification refers to efforts to modify situations in a way that increases or decreases the probability that certain emotions will arise. To reduce the likelihood that he would become afraid, Saddam Hussein ordered his associates to keep their fear to themselves from now on: “He who does not want to raise the morale, I urge him not to lower the morale.”

Attentional deployment is a conscious or unconscious strategy to direct attention away from an unwanted emotion by engaging in unrelated thoughts and emotions. The Iraqi ruler sought to eschew the experience of fear by invoking hope and anger. For instance, he appealed to his associates that it was “possible” that they “might win the war without fighting, […] even if you give it one percent, one permille.” Shortly thereafter, he scolded them: “I am not satisfied with civil defense

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275 'Ali Hassan al-Majid, quoted in ibid.
276 Saddam Hussein, quoted in ibid., 14.
277 See section 2.4.3.
279 See section 2.4.3.
measures that contribute to such low morale.” If you spoil the population, you might as well throw it away in the garbage.” He became increasingly irritated by his advisers and their failure to recognize earlier on that the regime’s warnings about potential American WMD attacks would scare the citizens. “What is wrong with you? Don’t you listen to the people?”

A member of the Revolutionary Command Council, Hassan Ali Nassar al-Amiri, sought to calm the dictator down. “Sir, be confident of the method that we are following. I assure you that…”—“I swear that I am not confident,” Saddam Hussein exploded. “How can we feel assured if the people of Baghdad are frightened? […] I do not feel comfortable. How can I feel assured?” His rage was intensified by his impression that his associates were wavering in their commitment to the “19th province.” “One time you say, ‘we want Kuwait,’ and after that, if something happens […], then you adopt another opinion.” For him, however, relinquishing the emirate was not an option. “We will not protect the security of Iraq if we give back Kuwait. We will not protect the economy of Iraq if we give back Kuwait. We will not protect the morale of Iraqi society if we give back Kuwait,” he hammered his thinking home to his advisers at the end of the meeting.

At first sight, this justification appears to suggest that Saddam Hussein’s preference for holding on to the emirate was based on economic, domestic political, and national security considerations. This section, however, contends that his

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281 Saddam Hussein, quoted in ibid., 15.
282 Quoted in ibid., 23. In the transcript, the speaker is identified only by his first name, “Hassan.” The only person in Iraq’s leadership by this name who would attend RCC meetings was RCC member Hassan Ali Nassar al-Amiri. See Saddam Hussein, Taha Yasin Ramadan, Tariq ‘Aziz, Dr. Sa’dun Hammadi, Latif Jasim, and Saadi Mahdi Salih, Iraq Speaks, 92.
284 Saddam Hussein, quoted in ibid., 21.
preference was not objectively derived but emotionally constructed. Three emotions played a particularly critical role at this stage of the crisis: fear—or, rather, a lack thereof—hope, and pride. While some of his top officials became increasingly frightened by the regime’s lack of military preparation, the president continued to down-regulate his anxiety. His identity and feeling rules prohibited the experience of fear. He took these cultural imperatives so seriously that he rebuked his advisers for expressing their worries and forbade them to do so in future. Heightened fear of a US attack might have provided him with an impetus to recall his forces from Kuwait. Its down-regulation, however, facilitated his intransigence.

Hope, on the other hand, was an emotion that Saddam Hussein’s feeling rules permitted. Even though he recognized that the probability of preventing a US attack was miniscule—he put it at between one percent and one permille—he for a long time clung to the belief that his deterrence strategy might work out in the end. The emotional choice framework predicts that the experience of hope will motivate people to strive toward a desired objective by reinforcing their energy and willpower. It will lead them to focus selectively on information that sustains the belief that it is still possible to achieve their aim.\textsuperscript{285} The tendency of the president’s advisers to combine negative with positive news made it easier for him to close his eyes to disconcerting reports and to focus on information that appeared to confirm his hope.

Finally, the emotion of pride seems to have exerted a constitutive effect on the formation of Saddam Hussein’s preferences as well. Generations of Iraqi rulers before him had dreamt of annexing Kuwait, but he was the one who summoned the courage to return the “branch” to the “tree.” He was convinced that he had “gained something big.” The conquest was not only his “glory” but also his “children’s glory,” he told his

\textsuperscript{285} See section 2.6.3.
advisers in the meeting. He had developed an emotional attachment to his “19th province,” which served as a continuous source of pride for him. Emotional choice theory suggests that individuals who experience excessive pride are more likely to behave in an aggressive and intimidating manner. They tend to have little patience or empathy with those who contradict their views. These characteristics would help to explain why Saddam Hussein chastised his associates, rather than taking their concerns seriously. In sum, his high level of pride and hope, and his relatively low level of fear were critical factors constituting his preference for holding on to his conquest in the face of all adversity in December.

4.8 Defying coercive diplomacy, January 1991

In the new year, Saddam Hussein continued to keep his troops in Kuwait to reject the UN deadline of January 15, 1991. Why did he remain defiant in this final phase of US and allied coercive diplomacy? As outlined in the section before, the conventional explanations of his behavior can be separated into three groups. First, numerous analysts maintain that he assumed that the Bush administration and its allies would ultimately not wage war. Second, several scholars make the case that he did believe that they would attack, but he thought his troops would ultimately prevail over them. Finally, according to many authors, he concluded that he could or should not withdraw from Kuwait for various reasons. These include mistrust of Washington’s assurances that he would not be attacked in retreat, potential domestic political

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287 See section 2.6.4.
opposition to such a “capitulation,” or Washington’s perceived determination—or inability—to remove him from power.288

This section argues that Saddam Hussein’s refusal to give up on his “19th province” is best explained by a combination of regional and international as well as cognitive and affective factors that were intertwined in complex ways. In the run-up to the UN deadline, his emotions came to be dominated by growing anger at George Bush’s perceived arrogance, injustice, and humiliation of his regime. His wrath and his ongoing down-regulation of fear helped to constitute his determination to punish the Americans and to prevail over them in “the mother of all battles,” as the remainder of this section will demonstrate.

In early January 1991, President Bush was facing renewed charges from members of Congress and the media that he had not made enough efforts to achieve a diplomatic resolution of the conflict. To pacify these critics, he announced on January 3 that he was offering a meeting between his secretary of state and Iraq’s foreign minister in Geneva between January 7 and 9 in “one last attempt” at peace.289 Baghdad accepted the proposal, and the two governments arranged the talks for January 9.

Television crews from all over the world broadcast the arrival of Tariq ‘Aziz and James Baker at the Intercontinental Hotel in Geneva five days later.290 Since the Iraqi delegation secretly recorded the meeting, it is possible to analyze the discussion. Baker opened by outlining the strength of the US forces in Saudi Arabia: “We possess absolute technological superiority.” America’s “smashing destructive powers” would destroy the Iraqi troops. In his view, the “only question,” therefore, was: “Are you

288 For a more detailed summary of these conventional explanations, see section 4.7 above.
going to leave Kuwait peacefully or are you going to be forced to do so?”291 Next, the secretary of state provided Tariq ‘Aziz with assurances. “You will not be attacked if you respond positively to [the] Security Council resolutions.”292 Finally, he issued two contradictory threats: “If the withdrawal happens as a result of the use of force, others will decide […] the future of Iraq,” he warned at first.293 This implied that the United States would seek to oust Saddam Hussein if he did not pull his troops out of the emirate by the UN deadline. A few minutes later, however, he stated that if the Iraqis were to use biological or chemical weapons against coalition forces, “our objective would not be only the liberation of Kuwait, but also the toppling of the present regime.”294 This suggested that Washington would allow Saddam Hussein to stay in power as long as he limited himself to the use of conventional arms.295

Tariq ‘Aziz felt particularly provoked by the first threat. “You said that if Iraq does not do so and so, then the current leadership will not be able to decide the future of Iraq, that there will be others,” he summarized Baker’s statement. In his eyes, this represented an “insult.”296 The foreign minister looked “visibly angered,” Baker later remembered.297 Tariq ‘Aziz insisted that Saddam Hussein would continue to rule the country “now and in the future.”298 Lastly, he issued a counter-threat: “We feel that

293 James Baker, quoted in ibid., 26.
294 James Baker, quoted in ibid., 27.
295 This is the interpretation that has generally been advanced by scholars. See, for example, Freedman, A Choice of Enemies, 233.
we are victims of injustice. This is our feeling, and when people have such a feeling and when a war is imposed on them, they will fight.” This would lead to many American casualties, he warned.\(^{299}\) The meeting ended in disagreement.

Tariq ‘Aziz no doubt used his anger at Baker’s threat and the US administration’s perceived injustice instrumentally to underline the regime’s resolve to fight and prevail against the United States. Yet, the available evidence indicates that he and the Iraqi president felt genuinely offended by Washington’s practice of coercive diplomacy. In an FBI interrogation in 2004, Saddam Hussein recalled that Baker had offered “no solutions for the Kuwaiti situation.” Instead, “the strong side (United States) dictated to the weak side (Iraq).” The US administration had shown no “respect” for the Ba’ath leadership, he complained.\(^{300}\) Anger at Bush’s “unjust” treatment of the Iraqi regime would continue to be one of Saddam Hussein’s key themes in the run-up to the UN deadline.

The impasse in Geneva and Washington’s repeated warnings during the first half of January that it would attack if Iraqi troops did not leave Kuwait by the UN deadline finally dampened Saddam Hussein’s hope that he would be able to deter the United States, which had been his main strategy to retain Kuwait. In an internal discussion at some point in early January, for example, he cautioned his advisers that “there should not be any laxity” because the Americans had “begun to pave the way” for an assault against Iraq. As a result, he modified his approach. He focused on

\(^{299}\) Tariq ‘Aziz, quoted in ibid., 41.

preparing the country for war so as to prevail against the US military in the long run.301

Saddam Hussein’s recognition that his holding on to Kuwait would make war inevitable became apparent in a meeting with Yasser Arafat and other officials from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which most likely took place at some point between January 12 and 14.302 During the past few years, the PLO chairman had become Baghdad’s closest international ally. Saddam Hussein had provided the indebted organization with funds, and Yasser Arafat had given the Ba’ath regime political support.303 “I swear to God, we are ready. We are ready to fight America,” the Iraqi ruler told the PLO delegation in the meeting. “With the help of God, we will fight them and kick them out of the entire region.” He acknowledged that the United States had “a lot of planes,” and Iraq’s planes were “humble and few.” He recognized that the enemy had “a lot of rockets,” and his rockets were “humble and few.” Yet, he believed that once the Arab public saw that the Iraqis were willing to die for their country, it would help to “fight America everywhere.”304 “I swear to God that we will fight! We will fight!” he exclaimed.305 Even though he was aware that the United States had superior military capabilities, he thus appears to have assumed that his regime would ultimately triumph over the US troops. This confirms existing scholarship according to which the Iraqi ruler overrated the determination and resolve

301 Saddam Hussein, quoted in “Conversations between Saddam Hussein and Iraqi officials regarding the alert condition of the Army in response to US threats to begin operations,” circa January 1991, 3, SH-SHTP-D-000-818, CRRC.
304 Saddam Hussein, quoted in ibid., 6.
of his forces. Moreover, his reference to the role of the Arab public corroborates accounts that highlight his overestimation of the support that he would receive from foreign volunteer fighters.

What these studies do not explain, however, is why Saddam Hussein made these miscalculations. This is where emotional choice theory adds value. This section argues that affect once again had an impact on his perception and preferences. His growing anger at the US government and his down-regulated fear of an American attack helped to constitute his belief that his troops would prevail against the enemies, as the remainder of this section shows. The next two sections will then demonstrate how the experience of hope sustained his confidence that volunteers from across the Middle East and North Africa would join his jihad against the invading infidels.

Saddam Hussein’s anger boiled up when he invoked long-held grievances about Washington’s perceived injustice and hypocrisy in his meeting with Yasser Arafat’s delegation. For decades, the Israelis had occupied Palestinian land, and “now we are the oppressors?” he asked indignantly. The Americans had not only “shut down” the “door of hope” for the Palestinians; they had also pitted Muslims against Muslims. “For eight years, they tried to keep the [Iran-Iraq] war going while rivers of blood [were] being spilt, and now we are the oppressors?”

The theoretical framework suggests that the experience of anger is associated with a sense of power.

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308 Saddam Hussein, quoted in “Meeting between Saddam Hussein and Yasser Arafat regarding military and diplomatic confrontation between Iraq and the United States before the Gulf War,” circa January 1991, 6, SH-SHTP-D-000-611, CRRC.
and invulnerability. Its action tendency is to confront and punish the offender.\textsuperscript{309} These features also applied to Saddam Hussein. “Hopefully, America will bring its army,” he continued his speech. “Let them bring their American army and come and occupy Iraq. Let them start with Al-Faw” in the southeast.\textsuperscript{310} “Let them do it so that we can kill them all! Finish the Americans. Finnish them period!” He prophesied that the Iraqis would resist like “beasts.”—“Beasts indeed!” Yasser Arafat interjected.\textsuperscript{311}

Given that the Iraqi leader had only recently still expressed his hope that he would be able to deter the United States, his professed desire to fight the Americans could be dismissed as mere rhetorical bravado. One might also argue that he only simulated his anger at the United States to mobilize his Palestinian allies for the upcoming battle and to convey his confidence of victory. After all, some of the more militant members of the PLO had acquired special competence in the area of irregular warfare. Saddam Hussein was aware that these fighters could be useful for terrorist operations against US establishments in the region.\textsuperscript{312}

Even if the Iraqi ruler were to have only pretended to be furious in his meeting with the Palestinians, there are signs that he genuinely experienced anger at the United States in the run-up to the UN deadline. For he also expressed it in conversations with his closest confidants in the Iraqi leadership, where his need to simulate emotions should have been less pronounced. One example is a confidential meeting with his trusted son-in-law, Hussein Kamel al-Majid, in the second week of January. As minister of industry and military industrialization, Hussein Kamel was in

\textsuperscript{309} See section 2.6.2.
\textsuperscript{310} Al Faw is an Iraqi port town on the Shatt al-Arab river in the south-east of Iraq.
\textsuperscript{311} Quoted in “Meeting between Saddam Hussein and Yasser Arafat regarding military and diplomatic confrontation between Iraq and the United States before the Gulf War,” circa January 1991, 7, SH-SHTP-D-000-611, CRRC.
\textsuperscript{312} See ibid., 7.
charge of Iraq’s biological and chemical weapons programs. Saddam Hussein instructed him to put these arms into a state of readiness: “I need these germs to be fixed on the missiles, and tell [the missile units] to hit, because starting the 15th [January], everyone should be ready for the action to happen at any time,” he noted. Then he specified the targets for the WMD attacks: “I want Riyadh and Jeddah,” the “big gatherings” of US forces, and “all the Israeli cities, all of them.”

A comment that Saddam Hussein added suggests that his order was shaped by anger: “We will never lower our heads as long as we are alive, even if we have to destroy everybody.” His defiant vow indicates that he felt humiliated by Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. The resulting wrath seems to have egged him on to strike against the perceived offenders. Moreover, the force of emotions would account for his absolute determination to avoid any degradation. Cooler heads might have hesitated to accept the destruction of “everybody,” which would presumably also include Iraq. Hussein Kamel forwarded the dictator’s order right away. Almost 200 missiles carrying biological and chemical agents were put into a state of readiness.

According to the emotional choice framework, anger has three main appraisal tendencies. First, it increases people’s confidence in their ability to gain control of a situation. Second, it is associated with optimistic risk estimates. Finally, it leads individuals to pay less attention to the quality of arguments and to rely instead on

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315 Saddam Hussein, quoted in ibid., 100.

superficial cues.\textsuperscript{317} All three of these cognitive patterns are discernible in Saddam Hussein’s thinking before the UN deadline. On January 13, for instance, the General Military Intelligence Directorate warned him that America’s advanced military power would “destroy the country.” Its deputy head, Wafiq al-Samarrai, who later defected from the regime and fled Iraq, remembered in an oral history interview that this assessment “really mandated that [Saddam Hussein] should withdraw.”\textsuperscript{318} The president, however, brushed the warning aside in a meeting that day: “[US] computers are not yet programmed for this battle.” He was confident that the enemy’s missiles would be led astray by smokescreens that his army was going to create by burning oil.\textsuperscript{319} “Would the Americans be able to do anything if we captured 20,000 of them?” he noted triumphantly.\textsuperscript{320} His anger at the US government and his ongoing down-regulation of fear provided the affective foundation for his confidence that he would prevail against the opponents in “the mother of all battles.”

The release of internal Iraqi government files offers an opportunity to re-evaluate some of the existing explanations of Saddam Hussein’s refusal to withdraw from Kuwait. This section has already shown that the Iraqi leader did not think that the US military threats were mere bluff, as some scholars contend.\textsuperscript{321} He came to take them seriously and prepared for war. Did he think that Washington would strike him, even if he were to pull his troops out of the emirate by the deadline, as other experts

\textsuperscript{317} See section 2.6.2.
George Bush, British Prime Minister John Major, and UN Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar all provided public assurances that Iraqi troops would not be attacked if Baghdad complied with the UN resolutions. We do not know whether Saddam Hussein believed these guarantees, but there are no signs in the released regime files that he expected to be attacked if he were to withdraw.

Some authors assert that the Iraqi president was prepared to fight because he was certain that the United States and its allies would not be willing or able to go so far as to remove him from power. As this section has demonstrated, Baker did threaten regime change if Iraqi forces stayed in Kuwait beyond January 15, and Tariq ‘Aziz took note of this warning. Eyewitness accounts by Hussein Kamel and Wafiq al-Samarrai, however, suggest that Saddam Hussein believed that the Americans would not be able to remove him from power. This belief most likely helped him to decrease his fear of a US assault. His perception changed only in the final days of the ground war, as section 4.10 below will show.

Finally, numerous scholars claim that Saddam Hussein thought that he would get overthrown by the Iraqis if he abandoned the “19th province” without fighting.

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To support their claim, they often cite a remark by the dictator in a conversation with UN Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar from January 13: He noted that the "Iraqi people would not allow us to remain in power for a single day if they thought that we would give in to intimidation."\(^{327}\) His ruthless pursuit of plotters real and imagined indicates that he was indeed highly sensitive to potential internal opposition to his rule. Nevertheless, scholars should not place too much weight on this statement in his meeting with the UN secretary general. There are no references to such a concern in the currently available recordings of internal meetings between Saddam Hussein and his associates. On the contrary, as noted above, his advisers informed him that there were demonstrations in all Iraqi cities pleading for a withdrawal from Kuwait.\(^{328}\) This suggests that domestic public opinion pushed into the opposite direction. Saddam Hussein’s claim in his discussion with Pérez de Cuéllar that his people would topple him if he pulled out of the emirate was thus likely an attempt to underline his determination.

The Iraqi ruler refused to yield to coercive threats, and the UN deadline of January 15, 1991, passed. The next day, before the beginning of the US and allied attack, he released an open letter to George Bush that communicated some of the emotions that had animated him during the last days and weeks. He complained about the US president’s threats of “aggression and destruction if Iraq fails to comply with your terms of capitulation.”\(^{329}\) He declared that he would “reject injustice and refuse to bow to the unjust tyrants.”\(^{330}\) With his “arrogant style,” Bush had “pushed matters


\(^{328}\) See section 4.7 above.


\(^{330}\) Ibid., 167-68.
to a personal showdown.” Coercive diplomacy had failed.

4.9 Accepting the Soviet cease-fire plan

At 3:00 A.M. Baghdad time on January 17, 1991, the United States-led coalition of 28 countries embarked on an air war against Iraq. American cruise missiles and stealth aircraft crippled Baghdad’s air defense system within the first 24 hours. Once the US alliance controlled the skies, it started destroying “strategic targets” in Iraq, including the presidential palaces, military and intelligence facilities, WMD research and storage sites, Ba’ath Party headquarters, power stations, refineries, roads, and bridges.

With the beginning of the bombing, Saddam Hussein stayed away from his palaces and bunkers. Assuming that the Americans would not attack Baghdad’s civilian districts, he kept moving between a number of smaller places in residential areas. On January 18, 1991, he assembled the members of the Revolutionary Command Council in one of these suburban houses to take stock of the first two days of the war. A military aide reported that the enemy had so far lost five planes and Iraq 27. Saddam Hussein considered this a “good number.” “God loves us,” Vice Chairman ‘Izzat Ibrahim noted. “God loves us very much,” the military aide

331 Ibid., 164, 170.
332 Ibid., 166.
333 See Woods, The Mother of All Battles, 3.
335 See Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, 223.
affirmed. What he did not tell the leadership was that only a small number of Iraqi planes had taken off in the first place. Due to the enemy’s overwhelming air power, Saddam Hussein’s air force had given up early on.

Next, Saddam Hussein enquired if there had been any pro-Iraqi demonstrations in the region since the beginning of the war. An assistant reported about rallies in Jordan, Algeria, and Tunisia. To further “instigate the believers,” the president ordered missile attacks against Israel that same day. “Let us break the bones of America’s daughter,” he exclaimed. “Let the entire West roar and relay the deaths that will occur.” That way, the battle would be “a bit exciting.” He expected that Tel Aviv would “reciprocate by attacking us with missiles.” The resulting Iraqi-Israeli war would then enable him to mobilize support from people all over the Middle East and North Africa, he believed. When his advisers asked what type of warheads should be used, he specified that they ought to employ only conventional ones and leave the biological and chemical agents aside for the time being. Tariq ‘Aziz indicated in later interviews that he had convinced the president that any employment of WMD would prompt Washington to topple the regime. In this respect, US deterrence in the form of James Baker’s warning at the meeting in Geneva in early January thus appears to have been effective. Saddam Hussein

341 Saddam Hussein, quoted in ibid., 11.
explained to his associates that he would follow a policy of strategic reciprocity: “We will use the same type of [war]heads against the ones they are using.”

That day, on January 18, the Iraqi armed forces fired four missiles at Tel Aviv and three at Haifa. There was no serious damage; only a few Israelis were lightly wounded. The response in the Middle East and North Africa, however, was overwhelming. From Mauritania to Pakistan people organized demonstrations to celebrate Saddam Hussein’s attack against the Jewish state. In Amman, the mood on the streets was “euphoric,” Queen Noor of Jordan later remembered. The Iraqi leader was hailed as an “Arab hero.” In the Lebanese city of Sidon, tens of thousands of protesters gathered chanting “Saddam, Saddam, wipe out Israel!” The Sudanese capital Khartoum saw the largest demonstrations in recent memory as hundreds of thousands expressed their solidarity with Iraq. In Algiers, an estimated 400,000 people staged rallies in support of Saddam Hussein. Even in Riyadh, there was an unprecedented demonstration by Islamic students against the presence of Western troops in Saudi Arabia.

The available sources suggest that these protests filled Saddam Hussein with pride. He was gratified by the expressions of solidarity and hoped that many of the demonstrators would come to Iraq and Kuwait to support his troops in the battle. On

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345 See Brent Scowcroft’s report, quoted in “Memorandum of telephone conversation between George Bush and Brian Mulroney,” January 18, 1991, folder “Presidential Telephone Calls – Memorandum of Conversations 1/1/91-1/28/91,” box 6, Presidential Correspondence Files, Scowcroft Collection, GHWBL.
350 See Munro, Arab Storm, 134.
January 19, he had his minister of information announce that Baghdad had “won the opening round” of the war and that it was “heading toward victory.” Two weeks later, he vowed in an interview that the enemies would be “defeated” because he was “winning the hearts of the people” in the Muslim world.

Some of Saddam Hussein’s associates reinforced his pride and hope. “All Arab nations are on our side,” an adviser asserted in a meeting in early February, for example. People from the Maghreb to the Hindu Kush “wish they were like us” and wanted to “benefit spiritually” from “your great leadership and wisdom,” he told the president. Deputy Prime Minister Sa‘dun Hammadi confirmed that “every Arab sympathizes with our current situation.” In due course, Muslims from all over the region would be “gladly offering their sacrifices, heroism and martyrs.” Saddam Hussein was highly receptive to such flattery and optimism. “We hope [that], after a while, [the Americans] will admire us” and “our […] strong faith to fight monsters.” His hope and pride were two main reasons why he sustained his resistance and endured the devastating US air war for more than five weeks.

In a “message to Iraqis, Arabs, and Muslims” of February 10, Saddam Hussein announced his “special greetings” to the all the “beloved brothers” in the Middle East and North Africa, encouraging them to join the war against “Bush and his henchmen.” During the next two weeks, millions of people in the region responded by taking to the streets and demonstrating in support of Iraq. Despite Saddam Hussein’s incitement, however, they did not go so far as to topple any of their pro-

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353 Quoted in “Saddam Hussein and His Inner Circle Discussing the United States, Leaders of Gulf States, the 1991 Gulf War, and Other Issues,” early February 1991, 10, SH-SHTP-D-000-674, CRRC.
354 Sa‘dun Hammadi, quoted in ibid., 20.
355 Saddam Hussein, quoted in ibid., 5.
American rulers in 1991, and only few protesters made their way to Iraq and Kuwait to take part in the fighting.357

On February 11, Mikhail Gorbachev dispatched his senior Middle East specialist, Yevgeny Primakov, to Baghdad to sound out Saddam Hussein about a possible withdrawal and cease-fire.358 When Primakov arrived, the Iraqi leader “looked composed” and stressed the firmness of his position.359 The Soviet envoy warned that the Bush administration was making preparations to launch a ground war. “Your troops in Kuwait will be wiped out.”360 To avoid “total defeat,” he advised him to pull his forces out as soon as possible. Saddam Hussein replied that he would “consider” these ideas and dispatch his foreign minister to Moscow in about a week’s time. “I was completely bewildered,” Primakov remembered in his memoirs. “Didn’t Hussein understand that time was short? Was he still hoping for something?”361

Six days later, on February 18, Tariq ‘Aziz finally flew to Moscow. Since he did not bring along any proposals, it was again the Russians who took the initiative. Gorbachev and Primakov put together a plan, according to which Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait would be followed by a security guarantee for the Ba’ath regime, an end to sanctions, and an international conference on the Palestinian question.362 Saddam Hussein pondered the Soviet proposal for another four days. The available sources do not provide any information about his internal state at this point. As a result, we do not know whether and, if so, how affect shaped his decision to consent to the Soviet

361 Primakov, *Russian Crossroads*, 68.
plan on February 23. He agreed to pull his troops out of the emirate on the condition that the UN Security Council arrange an immediate cease-fire and cancel all of its resolutions against Iraq.\textsuperscript{363}

The then-deputy head of the General Military Intelligence Directorate, Wafiq al-Samarrai, later suggested that his pessimistic view of Iraq’s situation may in part have motivated Saddam Hussein to perform this volte-face. At some point between February 18 and 23, the president asked him for his assessment of the war. The deputy director of intelligence was “very much in pain” and “almost desperate.” On the one hand, he was aware of his boss’s tendency to impose harsh punishment on the messengers of unwelcome news. On the other hand, he knew that the dictator might take revenge later on if he found out that he had not received accurate information. He ultimately shared his honest opinion that the “outcome of this battle is devastating.” “How?” Saddam Hussein asked. “Well, look at the army,” Wafiq al-Samarrai replied. It was “deteriorating”; there was “no equity or balance between the two fighting parties.”\textsuperscript{364}

In the absence of information about the Iraqi leader’s emotions at this point, rational choice provides the best available explanation of his consent to the Soviet cease-fire plan. On the basis of the new information from his deputy chief of intelligence, he decided to minimize his losses on the battlefield. To save some of his armed forces, he accepted the forfeiture of Kuwait and gave up his role as champion of the Palestinian cause.\textsuperscript{365} The Soviet proposal nevertheless fell short of US and UN requirements because it was not unconditional. George Bush rejected it immediately.


and stuck to an ultimatum that he had set on February 22: If the Iraqi government did not initiate the withdrawal of its troops from Kuwait within 24 hours, the United States and its allies would initiate a ground attack.366

4.10 Withdrawing from Kuwait

Saddam Hussein did not respond to Bush’s ultimatum, and the deadline passed. At 1:00 A.M. Baghdad time on February 24, 1991, the US coalition launched the land war.367 Existing accounts of the conflict struggle to explain the Iraqi leader’s behavior. Richard Herrmann, for instance, finds it “difficult to understand” why he did not seek a cease-fire before his troops were routed on the battlefield. He presumes that he miscalculated the enemy’s military power.368 Alan Munro is likewise baffled by his “dogged refusal to save his army and his face by withdrawing intact from Kuwait” under the umbrella of Soviet mediation.369 Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi argue that he did not pull out because he believed that such a “capitulation” would lead his subordinates to oust him.370

A series of tapes of Saddam Hussein’s meetings on February 24 now makes it possible to shed some light on his thinking and feeling on this first day of the ground offensive. These recordings indicate that he did not “refuse to comply” with the US ultimatum, as scholars have assumed.371 Rather, he and his advisers were puzzled when they convened early in the morning of February 24. “I did not know […] about the attack,” the president admitted.372 The speaker of the National Assembly, Sa’di

367 See Woods, The Mother of All Battles, 6.
368 Herrmann, “Coercive Diplomacy and the Crisis over Kuwait, 1990-1991,” 250. See also 254.
369 Munro, Arab Storm, 41.
370 Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, 261.
371 See, for example, Jakobsen, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War, 54.
Mahdi Salih, said that he had expected a change in Washington’s position, given that Iraq had agreed to Gorbachev’s cease-fire plan the day before.\textsuperscript{373} According to Deputy Prime Minister Taha Ramadan, they had all gone to bed last night “without realizing that there would be a ground attack.”\textsuperscript{374} The beginning of the land war had thus taken the Iraqi leadership by surprise.

The group proceeded to assess the new situation. Saddam Hussein’s perspective alternated between sober pragmatism and defiant optimism. On the one hand, he pointed out that military experts knew exactly what would happen when a nation like Iraq fought the troops of the United States and more than two dozen other countries.\textsuperscript{375} “If I believed we could withdraw our forces and equipment without losing half of them as a result of airstrikes, I would have them withdrawn today.”\textsuperscript{376} On the other hand, he still nourished some hope that the pro-Iraqi demonstrators in the Middle East and North Africa would be inspired to join the battle by the “sense of honor and passion” of his soldiers. Their support might enable his regime to prevail in the long run, he believed.\textsuperscript{377}

This was too much for Deputy Prime Minister Sa’dun Hammadi, who had lost his patience with Saddam Hussein and his hopes. “I am going to be honest with you,” he told his boss and explained that there was an “enormous backlash” among the Iraqi troops due to their “demoralization and fear of the war.”\textsuperscript{378} “Mr. President, you have

\textsuperscript{373} See “Meeting between Saddam Hussein and advisors regarding the American ground attack during First Gulf War and a letter to Mikhail Gorbachev regarding support,” February 24, 1991, early morning, 1, SH-SHTP-A-000-931, CRRC. The speaker, who is identified in the recording merely by his first name “Sa’di,” was most likely the speaker of the National Assembly, Sa’di Mahdi Salih, who regularly attended RCC meetings. See Saddam Hussein, Taha Yasin Ramadan, Tariq ’Aziz, Dr. Sa’dun Hammadi, Latif Jasim, and Saadi Mahdi Salih, \textit{Iraq Speaks}, 92.

\textsuperscript{374} Taha Ramadan, quoted in “Meeting between Saddam Hussein and advisors regarding the American ground attack during First Gulf War and a letter to Mikhail Gorbachev regarding support,” February 24, 1991, early morning, 1, SH-SHTP-A-000-931, CRRC.

\textsuperscript{375} See ibid. 11.

\textsuperscript{376} Saddam Hussein, quoted in ibid., 8.

\textsuperscript{377} Saddam Hussein, quoted in ibid., 6.

\textsuperscript{378} Sa’dun Hammadi, quoted in ibid., 8.
to take measures for our people and army to increase their morale,” he demanded, “especially after what I am hearing about the army’s disorders and the soldiers who have not come back to their bases.”

“We have to affirm that we are pleased and that we welcome the war.” In his eyes, it was “extremely important” that the Iraqis believed that their leadership was “at ease and not afraid.”

At this point, the head of the General Military Intelligence Directorate, Sabir ‘Abd al-Aziz Hussein al-Duri, provided an update about the battle. “For now, things are under control,” he claimed. There was “nothing unusual” on the frontline, apart from a report that the French were suffering “major losses” near the town of Al-Busayyah in southern Iraq. This piece of news let Saddam Hussein’s hope soar and provided an excuse for him to ignore Sa’dun Hammadi’s stern appeal. “Great job,” he lauded the intelligence chief. “I have said this many times before the war started, and I will say it again: If only 20 percent of our forces use their fire power, the enemy will not be able to accomplish anything.”

Saddam Hussein was in a good mood when the group was joined by Tariq ‘Aziz, who had just returned from his trip to Moscow. “Good morning, Sir,” he greeted the Iraqi ruler. “What a pleasant surprise!” Saddam Hussein exclaimed. “Are you up to surprises like Bush?” he asked in jest and laughed. “God willing, Sir,” the foreign minister replied, “you and Iraq will be victorious and proud.” Once they

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379 Sa’dun Hammadi, quoted in “State Command and Council meeting regarding the Russian peace proposal and communications between Saddam Hussein and Mikhail Gorbachev,” February 24, 1991, 22, SH-SHTP-A-000-630, CRRC.
380 Sa’dun Hammadi, quoted in ibid., 9.
381 Sabir ‘Abd al-Aziz Hussein al-Duri, quoted in “Meeting between Saddam Hussein and advisors regarding the American ground attack during First Gulf War and a letter to Mikhail Gorbachev regarding support,” February 24, 1991, early morning, 11, SH-SHTP-A-000-931, CRRC. The speaker is referred to by his first name “Sabir.” The only person by that name in the upper echelons of the Iraqi government is Sabir ‘Abd al-Aziz Hussein al-Duri, the Director of Military Intelligence.
382 Saddam Hussein, quoted in ibid.
383 Quoted in “Meeting between Saddam Hussein and Iraqi officials regarding the US-led attack on Faylakah Island and the condition of the Iraqi Army,” morning of February 24, 1991, 1, SH-SHTP-A-000-666, CRRC.
started reviewing the outcome of the Iraqi-Soviet negotiations, however, the president became bitter about Gorbachev’s failure to carry out the cease-fire plan. He believed that the Russian leader had “betrayed” him.\textsuperscript{384} Tariq ‘Aziz quickly picked up on his boss’s mood swing and adapted accordingly. “These people are dogs. If we did not squeeze them, we would not have gotten any results,” he reflected on his discussions with Gorbachev and his aides. Iraq’s chief diplomat was known to follow the international news coverage on a daily basis. During his stay in Moscow, his interlocutors had most likely provided him with some up-to-date Soviet intelligence about the war. Nevertheless, he discounted the devastation caused by US bombing and the dire situation of the Iraqi army: “It has been thirty-eight days since they began striking us, and they have not inflicted any losses on us. We inflicted many financial losses on them,” Tariq ‘Aziz boasted. “Let them lose and perish.”\textsuperscript{385}

At this moment, a military aide entered the room to report that American troops were now entering Iraq and attacking. “Attacking or sitting in front of the division and crying?” Saddam Hussein joked.\textsuperscript{386} The aide suggested pulling back the Republican Guard forces “out of fear of this situation.”\textsuperscript{387} The president, however, seems to have been infected by his foreign minister’s optimism and belligerence: “I say let us lure [the enemies] so that they will come,” he declared. “Let them come to Karbala [in central Iraq].”\textsuperscript{388} He prophesied that “it [would] become their cemetery.”\textsuperscript{389} When the military aide confessed that he “fear[ed]” the “momentum” of the US troops, Saddam Hussein briefly acknowledged that “their air superiority limits

\textsuperscript{384} Saddam Hussein, quoted in ibid., 3.  
\textsuperscript{385} Tariq ‘Aziz, quoted in ibid., 4.  
\textsuperscript{386} Saddam Hussein, quoted in ibid., 5.  
\textsuperscript{387} Quoted in ibid., 9.  
\textsuperscript{388} Karbala is a city in central Iraq, located about 60 miles southwest of Baghdad.  
\textsuperscript{389} Saddam Hussein, quoted in “Meeting between Saddam Hussein and Iraqi officials regarding the US-led attack on Faylakah Island and the condition of the Iraqi Army,” morning of February 24, 1991, 9, SH-SHTP-A-000-666, CRRC.
our movements a bit.” Yet, a few minutes later, he proclaimed: “By God, our units remain excellent.” Soon thereafter, international news tickers reported that Iraqi soldiers were surrendering by the thousands. Tariq ‘Aziz dismissed these accounts as US propaganda fabrications. The Western media was “dirty,” another participant pointed out. In Saddam Hussein’s opinion, the Americans were announcing “things that they hope would occur.” The foreign minister provided some comic relief: “The French division attacked [the] Al-Dlayb Brigade, and during their leave, they went to the market to have a French-style haircut.” The group broke out in laughter.

Saddam Hussein and his associates simply discarded the reports about US advances that the military aide found so disturbing. The tape of the meeting reveals a surreal juxtaposition of the fearful aide on the one side and the cheerful leadership on the other. What appears to be a bizarre situation at first sight can be illuminated with emotional choice theory. In light of the severe US threat, the joking and laughing of Saddam Hussein and his associates served as a technique to manage their fear. The theoretical framework suggests that people can make conscious and unconscious attempts to focus attention in a way that influences their internal state. By distracting themselves with positive thoughts and emotions, such as humor, they can down-regulate their level of fear.

The president and his advisers sought to maintain their wishful thinking and feeling even as reports about Iraqi losses started coming in from the front lines. When an assistant informed them that the “enemy was able to defeat” the 1st Regiment of the

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390 Quoted in ibid., 12.
391 Quoted in ibid., 13.
392 Tariq ‘Aziz, quoted in ibid., 22. The transcript of the recording indicates that “all [were] laughing.”
393 See section 2.4.3.
14th Infantry Brigade at 8:43 A.M., Saddam Hussein reassured his comrades.\textsuperscript{394} “The situation is good and under control.”\textsuperscript{395} There was “nothing to worry about.” He claimed that he was “certain” that his forces would “immediately counterattack.” His cousin, ‘Ali Hassan al-Majid, presumed that the overall US assault had “failed” because the Bush administration had not made any public announcement, yet. The Iraqi ruler vowed that the Americans would be “defeated.” “God willing,” the others replied in unison.\textsuperscript{396}

During the next hours, however, the group received more and more reports from the Directorate of General Military Intelligence about defeats of Iraqi regiments. By 10:30 A.M. local time, US and allied troops had advanced more than 100 miles into Iraqi territory.\textsuperscript{397} As a result, it became difficult for the participants to maintain their courage. The first person to acknowledge the worrisome turn of events was Vice President Taha Ma’ruf. He drew the conclusion that the Bush administration’s goal was “not only to free Kuwait, but also to occupy Iraq, remove the regime, and destroy everything we have worked for.” In his view, the Ba’ath leadership had the “duty to fight to the end. […] As they say, ‘welcome death.’” This is where the recording of the session ends.\textsuperscript{398}

The Iraqi army offered little resistance and surrendered en masse.\textsuperscript{399} Since there are currently no tapes of Saddam Hussein’s meetings between February 25 and 27, it is difficult to trace his emotions during these last three days of the Gulf War. Wafiq al-Samarrai, however, has provided a description of how he perceived the

\textsuperscript{394} Quoted in “State Command and Council meeting regarding the Russian peace proposal and communications between Saddam Hussein and Mikhail Gorbachev,” February 24, 1991, 4, SH-SHTP-A-000-630, CRRC.

\textsuperscript{395} Saddam Hussein, quoted in ibid., 5.

\textsuperscript{396} Quoted in ibid., 6.

\textsuperscript{397} See Woods, The Mother of All Battles, 6.

\textsuperscript{398} Taha Ma’ruf, quoted in “State Command and Council meeting regarding the Russian peace proposal and communications between Saddam Hussein and Mikhail Gorbachev,” February 24, 1991, 12, SH-SHTP-A-000-630, CRRC.

president in a later oral history interview. His account suggests that Saddam Hussein oscillated between two sets of emotions. On the one hand, he seems to have felt humiliated by what he came to see as his devastating defeat against the United States. He came across as “very upset” by the low performance of his troops. His men were “becoming women,” he complained to the deputy director of intelligence.\(^{400}\)

According to emotional choice theory, feelings of humiliation can prompt target leaders to defy the coercer, if they view the perceived degrading treatment as unjustified, and if they are strong enough to resist. However, if they assume that they are being humbled for good reasons, or if they are mentally or physically incapacitated, they are likely to withdraw.\(^{401}\) Wafiq al-Samarrai’s observations indicate that Saddam Hussein’s experience of humiliation was consistent with the second response pattern. He appeared to be “deeply depressed,” “almost in tears,” and “virtually collapsing.”\(^{402}\)

On the other hand, Saddam Hussein came across as “very tense” and “anxious.” During most of the conflict, he had apparently not believed that the United States would be able to overthrow him. In the final stage of the ground offensive, however, he asked Wafiq al-Samarrai if he thought that the Americans would “come as far as Baghdad.” The deputy intelligence chief responded that he did not think that the Bush administration would order the conquest of the capital because its announced objective had been to drive the Iraqi forces out of Kuwait. This assessment failed to calm the Iraqi president down, however. He continued to be “frightened” and “quite

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\(^{400}\) Interview with Wafiq al-Samarrai, Frontline documentary, “The Gulf War,” PBS, 1996, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/samarrai/1.html (accessed March 1, 2014). Some readers may wonder how reliable Wafiq al-Samarrai’s account is, given that he later defected from the regime, fled the country, and joined the Iraqi opposition in exile. Did the former deputy intelligence chief portray Saddam Hussein unfavorably because he had an axe to grind and because he wanted to tarnish his reputation? Such motives cannot be ruled out. His descriptions of Saddam Hussein, however, do not come across as exaggerated or one-sided.

\(^{401}\) See section 2.6.5.

desperate,” Wafiq al-Samarrai recalled. Saddam Hussein’s desperation indicates that he had finally lost all hope that he could still prevail against US forces. He was afraid that his “downfall” was “near.”\footnote{Ibid. Richard Ned Lebow has documented a similar psychological reaction in the case of Kaiser Wilhelm II and other German policymakers during the July crisis in 1914. When they were inescapably confronted with the reality of war, they recognized their prior illusions and went into shock. See Lebow, \textit{Between Peace and War}, 135, 283.} The intensity of his fear of being ousted by the invading US forces led him to discard his feeling rules. It was at this point—when his fear and humiliation reached a pitch—that he finally backed down. At 1:30 A.M. at night Baghdad time on February 25, he had a spokesman announce that all Iraqi troops were “to withdraw in an organized manner to the positions held prior to August 1, 1990.”\footnote{“Official Spokesman Says ‘Withdrawal Order’ Given,” \textit{Baghdad Domestic Service}, February 25, 1991, FBIS-NES-90-038, 16.} The next day, Baghdad informed the president of the UN Security Council that it “agree[d] to abide by” Resolutions 660, 662, and 674, which had condemned the invasion, annexation, and hostage-taking.\footnote{Tariq ‘Aziz to the President of the UN Security Council and the UN Secretary General, February 26, 1991, printed in “Saddam Chairs Meeting; Message Sent to UN,” \textit{Baghdad Domestic Service}, February 27, 1991, FBIS-NES-91-039, 19. However, the Iraqi government still refused to accept UN Resolutions 661, 665, and 670, which had imposed economic sanctions, the freezing of Iraq’s financial assets, and the air embargo, respectively. See ibid.}

If Wafiq al-Samarrai’s account is reliable and Saddam Hussein was really so afraid that the Americans would unseat him, why did he not threaten to use his biological and chemical weapons for that eventuality? Since the documentary record of the last three days of the war is scant, we do not know whether he considered this option. Political scientist Avigdor Haselkorn argues that the Iraqi leader issued precisely such a threat in a non-verbal way when his troops fired a missile with an unusual concrete-filled warhead at Israel on February 25. According to Israeli sources, this warhead was a WMD model that would normally contain chemical or biological poison. Haselkorn assumes that this represented a warning shot by Saddam Hussein to indicate that real mass destruction would follow if US and allied troops were to
approach Baghdad.\footnote{See Haselkorn, \textit{The Continuing Storm}, xviii, 73-74.} This hypothesis sounds plausible, but the available Iraqi government files do not contain any evidence to confirm it.

On February 27, after 100 hours of ground war, President Bush announced the end of combat operations.\footnote{See George Bush, “Address to the Nation on the Suspension of Allied Offensive Combat Operations in the Persian Gulf,” February 27, 1991, printed in Office of the Federal Register, NARA, \textit{Public Papers of the Presidents}, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 27, doc. 224.} Experts estimate that between 25,000 and 100,000 Iraqi soldiers and around 15,000 to 35,000 Iraqi civilians perished during the war.\footnote{At the conservative end of the spectrum, William Thomas Allison estimates that about 25,000 Iraqi soldiers and 15,000 Iraqi civilians were killed. Mohamed Heikal assumes that between 30,000 and 60,000 Iraqi soldiers and over 22,000 civilians died. At the higher end of the spectrum, Hal Brands reckons that total Iraqi deaths were in the neighborhood of 100,000 soldiers and 35,000 civilians. See Allison, \textit{The Gulf War, 1990-91}, 111, 144; Heikal, \textit{Illusions of Triumph}, 316; Brands, \textit{From Berlin to Baghdad}, 64.} The United States and its allies lost 475 combatants.\footnote{See Allison, \textit{The Gulf War, 1990-91}, 144.}
5. Conclusion

In coercive diplomacy, actors employ the threat of force to get targets to change their behavior. The goal is to achieve the opponent’s compliance without waging war. In practice, however, the strategy often falls short—even when coercers enjoy substantial military superiority. This finding prompted me to investigate the conditions under which coercive diplomacy fails or succeeds. I have argued that the emotions of target leaders can play a critical and hitherto neglected role in this respect. Combining insights from psychology and social constructivism, the thesis has developed a theory of emotional choice to analyze how affect enters into policymakers’ decision-making. Specifically, it has made the case that emotions constitute target leaders’ preferences. The resulting preference dynamics are key to understanding why coercive diplomacy works in some cases but not in others.

Only few studies in International Relations have examined how affect enters into foreign policy decision-making, and none of them have done so systematically and in-depth. Some political scientists have ignored the role of emotions because they were busy exploiting the findings of cognitive psychology. Others apparently found the task too daunting. Robert Jervis, for example, has noted that he “came to see the importance of emotions” and that he “would very much like to produce a study that shows how emotions and cognitions interact in politics.” Yet, the methodological challenges of identifying affect are “simply too great,” in his view.¹ This thesis has presented the first attempt to explore how a spectrum of emotions influences leaders’ choice behavior in the course of a foreign policy crisis. The remainder of this

conclusion summarizes the main features of emotional choice theory, recapitulates the central findings of the case studies, and suggests how future research could build on the thesis.

5.1 Emotional choice theory

The abstract notion of coercive diplomacy is based on the assumption that target leaders are purely rational actors. They are expected to readily identify all available options, calculate the expected costs and benefits of each alternative, and select the course of action that best advances their interests. Social constructivists have rightly criticized that this rational choice perspective leaves a central component of the decision process unexplained: Agents generally do not have fixed interests or preferences but go through a process of constructing them in the course of decision-making. Inter-subjective ideas, norms, and identities influence this process to an important degree. What constructivists have long neglected is that a person’s preferences may also be critically shaped by his or her affect. Research in psychology indicates that affective reactions to stimuli often provide the first informational input that sets the stage for the subsequent preference construction. In the ensuing process, emotions influence how and what people think about their interests, making certain courses of action more and others less appealing. Preferences are thus not only socially but also emotionally constructed.

Psychologists have also found that affect is closely intertwined with culture. On the one hand, cultural ideas, norms, and identities shape when and how people

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experience and express emotions.\textsuperscript{5} On the other hand, emotions influence how individuals perceive and act on ideas, norms, and identities.\textsuperscript{6} To shed light on this mutual constitution, the emotional choice framework presented in this thesis has incorporated insights from psychology and social constructivism. The constructivist perspective has helped to analyze the socio-cultural context shaping affect, while psychological research has served to uncover the emotional micro-foundations of preference formations.\textsuperscript{7}

A key contribution of emotional choice theory has been to demonstrate not merely \textit{that} affect matters but \textit{how} it matters in the preference construction of target leaders during episodes of coercive diplomacy. The core of the theoretical framework has outlined the appraisal and action tendencies of five key emotions, namely fear, anger, hope, pride, and humiliation. These emotions tend to shape the decision-making of target leaders as follows: If their affective state is dominated by fear of a military attack by a coercer, and if they believe that they can avoid this attack by complying with the coercer’s demands, this increases the likelihood that they will give in. However, if target leaders’ emotions center primarily on anger at the coercer, pride at the original behavior that the coercer considers objectionable, or hope that they will get away with it, they are less likely to yield. For these emotions tend to promote defiance and perseverance. Finally, if target leaders feel humiliated at the hands of the coercer, their response may go either way. If they assume that their debasement is justified, and if they feel mentally or physically incapacitated, they are likely to withdraw. Yet, if they believe that the coercer’s perceived degrading

\textsuperscript{6} See Chentsova-Dutton and Tsai, “Self-Focused Attention and Emotional Reactivity,” 508; Gregg, \textit{The Middle East}, 104, 374; Matsumoto and Juang, \textit{Culture and Psychology}, 230.
\textsuperscript{7} See McDermott, \textit{Political Psychology in International Relations}, 13.
behavior is unjust, and if they are strong enough to resist, they are likely to defy the coercer’s demands and seek revenge for the humiliation.

The characteristics of the five key emotions highlighted in the theoretical framework have shed some light on the puzzle of why powerful states often fail in their coercive diplomacy. For coercers face a challenge: They must produce enough fear of a military attack in target leaders to get them to change their behavior. At the same time, however, they need to avoid eliciting anger on the part of the target leaders. This is no easy feat because people typically get angry at demands to do or undo something against their will. Coercers can take measures to assuage this anger by communicating respect, for example. Such measures, however, may prompt target leaders to feel pride or hope that the opponents are not as resolved as presumed and that it may not be necessary to comply with their demands. The thesis has suggested that coercers’ failure to meet this challenge is an important reason why coercive diplomacy frequently falls short.

Moreover, the combination of threat and demand to change their behavior may trigger humiliation in target leaders. As noted above, the experience of humiliation tends to lead people to withdraw if they are mentally or physically incapacitated, or if they believe that their debasement is justified. Pursuing a policy of extreme humiliation may thus be a tempting option for some coercers. Besides the problematic ethical implications, however, the deliberate production of humiliation in targets can also be counterproductive. Psychologists have found that individuals who perceive degrading treatment as unjust are likely to seek revenge for the debasement. The use of humiliation as a tool of coercive diplomacy thus carries great risks.

In sum, coercers need to walk a fine line: On the one hand, they must frighten targets, dash their hope that they will get away without complying, and refrain from
any behavior that could trigger their pride. On the other hand, coercers need to avoid eliciting anger and a sense of unjustified humiliation. To do so, they need to have a good understanding of the target leaders’ mindsets and emotional constitution. This requires not only intelligence information but also empathy: the capacity to imagine how someone is feeling by adopting his or her perspective.8

Experiments, however, suggest that high-power individuals tend to be less sensitive to the emotions of others than those with low power. Psychologists have argued that this is because people who see themselves as powerful believe that they are less dependent on others and hence do not require an accurate understanding of how they feel. Moreover, since power typically entails increased demands on attention, power holders are thought to have limited cognitive and emotional resources to analyze the perspectives of subordinates.9 If this finding about subjects in experiments can be transferred to leaders of states, this sheds some light on the puzzle of why heads of great powers often fail in their coercive diplomacy toward weaker states. A limited capacity or willingness to empathize with weaker targets may prevent coercers from taking their emotions into consideration.

5.2 Application of the theoretical framework

The value of emotional choice theory ultimately depends on whether it enhances our understanding of target leaders’ decision-making during episodes of coercive diplomacy. To test its analytic utility, it has been applied in two case studies: Nikita Khrushchev’s response to the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 and Saddam Hussein’s policy-making during the Gulf conflict in 1990-91.

5.2.1 The Cuban missile crisis

The ability of the theoretical framework to explain the Soviet premier’s nine major decisions under investigation has varied considerably. Regarding his choice in May 1962 to furnish Cuba with nuclear rockets—the first main decision—emotional choice theory performed well. The available evidence suggests that it was not so much the protection of the Caribbean republic or the improvement of Russia’s nuclear attack capability as such than the powerful emotions elicited by these issues and by US policy in general that prompted him to make this risky decision. These emotions ranged from fear of losing Castro’s regime to anger at Washington’s missile deployments in Europe and a sense of humiliation by the US government’s illegal U-2 flights. The theoretical framework suggested that a person’s experience of affect is strongly shaped by her or his identity. Khrushchev’s self-conception as a parvenu, who craved the recognition of his status as leader of a superpower from significant others, made him particularly sensitive to perceived slights. This heightened the intensity of his sense of humiliation by the United States.

Existing accounts assume that Khrushchev held a belligerent attitude in the Presidium meeting before Kennedy’s announcement of Cuba’s quarantine on October 22. Given that some of the nuclear rockets on the island were operational by then, they consider it puzzling that the premier did not openly declare their presence to deter the US intervention that he believed to be looming. These studies struggle to explain why he instead decided to prohibit the Soviet troops in Cuba from using nuclear weapons in defense against a potential American intervention—the second decision under investigation. Drawing from Anastas Mikoyan’s recently released memoirs and other sources, the case study has demonstrated that Khrushchev was, in
fact, intensely afraid that a clash over the island would escalate into nuclear war between the superpowers. This fear constituted his preference for the relatively low-risk option of limiting Cuba’s defense to conventional means.

Khrushchev’s rejection of Kennedy’s call to remove the missiles and his escalation of the crisis with a series of confrontational steps the next day, on October 23, were combined as the third major decision to be explained. An analysis of the sources has supported conventional accounts that refer to the premier’s reputational considerations to elucidate his behavior. It has also shown, however, that his newly sparked anger at the perceived slight from JFK represented an important additional factor pushing him to escalate the crisis. His anger was important because it emboldened him to stand his ground and to defy the president’s demands. Furthermore, it has explained the absolute determination to bring his missile operation to a successful conclusion that he expressed in his telegram to Fidel Castro that day. This has weakened the rationalist claim that Khrushchev was at this stage soberly seeking to maximize US concessions in return for the removal of the missiles from Cuba. The theoretical framework has thus provided a more comprehensive explanation of this decision.

That day, on October 23, Khrushchev took an important additional decision—the fourth choice under investigation—that was inconsistent with his angry mood in the morning. When it came to the question of what instructions to give to the weapons-carrying vessels that were on the way to Cuba, he did not order them to defy the US blockade, as emotional choice theory would have predicted. Rather, he directed them to turn around. The premier’s anger may have lessened by the time he dealt with the arms ships, or he may have been able to down-regulate it in the course of the Presidium meeting. Since there is currently no evidence to support these
assumptions, however, the case study has concluded that the theoretical framework fails to account for Khrushchev’s decision to have these vessels reverse course. Rational choice explains it persuasively as the product of a classic cost-benefit analysis.

Existing accounts have portrayed Khrushchev’s behavior the next day, October 24, as aggressive, moderate, or confused. This study, however, has found that he pursued a relatively coherent strategy of deterrence and delay vis-à-vis the Kennedy administration—the fifth decision—to gain enough time to make all nuclear rockets in Cuba operational. Combining both threats and assurances, the chairman’s approach was largely based on a rational calculation about how to maximize his gains and complete the missile operation. His pursuit of this strategy was facilitated by his reduced levels of fear and anger and by his newly sparked hope that the Americans might in the end tolerate the presence of his weapons on the island. The thesis has thus treated these emotions as minor but nevertheless relevant contributing factors.

The sixth decision presented the biggest puzzle of this case study. Rather than following through with his strategy of deterrence and delay, Khrushchev on October 25 proposed to his Presidium colleagues to remove the rockets in return for a US pledge not to attack Cuba. The existing literature has trouble to explain this volte-face. In their authoritative study of Soviet decision-making during the missile crisis, Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali have concluded that “no single piece of information seems to have moved Khrushchev to his new position.” Based on a fresh reading of the available sources, however, the thesis has shown that the premier’s change in preferences was motivated by his growing fear of a nuclear escalation. There is no evidence that this fear was produced by a perception that

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Kennedy was resolved to attack Cuba, as some conventional accounts imply. The documentary record suggests that it was elicited by an increasing number of hints during the previous 24 hours that the US president was about to “give way” to his “passions” and that this would impel him to invade the island.

Some readers may wonder why it matters what exactly generated Khrushchev’s fear. The thesis has argued that the nature of the trigger is important because it helps to shed light on the chairman’s affective transformation between October 23 and 25. When he assumed that JFK was trying to bend his will by imposing a blockade on October 23, he was indignant and angry. He considered the president directly responsible for what he saw as a transgression and a deliberate insult. It was due to these beliefs and feelings that he perceived the confrontation as a battle of wills between himself and Kennedy. By October 25, however, the reports from the Soviet Ambassador to Washington, Dobrynin, gave Khrushchev the impression that JFK wanted to avoid war, but that a loss of control over his emotions might push him to attack Cuba. As a consequence, he came to believe that the president was not directly responsible for the US military threat. His new perception has helped to explain why he does not seem to have felt any anger at Kennedy at this stage of the crisis. It is open to question whether the premier would have contemplated a withdrawal of his missiles as readily if he had assumed that JFK was in full control of his emotions and determined to bend his (Khrushchev’s) will. This would likely have sustained or intensified his anger at the president, which could have spurred him on to defy American demands.

It was only when Khrushchev’s fear reached a pitch the next day, on October 26, that he finally offered Kennedy to trade the removal of the missiles from Cuba for a US pledge not to intervene on the island—the seventh decision. The intensification
of his fear had been brought about by another telegram from Dobrynin. The ambassador warned that the Pentagon had brought its armed forces into maximum battle readiness. What is also important, however, is what Khrushchev did not feel at this stage. Even though the Soviet technicians had succeeded in making all missiles operational by then, there are no signs that he experienced any pride at this apparent accomplishment or any hope that he would be able to keep his weapons in Cuba. Nor is there any proof that he felt any anger or humiliation when he offered the president to withdraw the rockets.

It is ultimately impossible to provide any watertight explanation for why these emotions did not seem to have been elicited in this situation. There are some indicators that JFK’s behavior played an important role. Between October 23 and 26, the president was treading carefully. He neither ordered any searches of Soviet vessels; nor did he set any ultimatum for the removal of the missiles, for example. This moderation was one reason why Khrushchev’s initial anger at the blockade on October 23 abated over time and did not flare up again during the subsequent days. A second reason was Dobrynin’s coverage of events in Washington. As the ambassador described the circumstances that were pushing Kennedy to attack Cuba, he stressed that the chairman and his alleged determination to find a peaceful solution were regarded with the greatest respect in the United States. This recognition was important to Khrushchev. It most likely helped him to avert or reduce any sense of humiliation when he suggested a negotiated solution in the face of US pressure.

Once Khrushchev had transmitted his offer to withdraw the missiles from Cuba, his fear of an American attack against the island receded. This gave him the confidence to up the ante the next day, on October 27, by setting the removal of US missiles from Turkey as an additional condition for the proposed deal—the eighth
decision. None of the five key emotions fear, anger, hope, pride, and humiliation are discernible in the run-up to this choice. The thesis has thus treated them as irrelevant at this point of the crisis. Khrushchev’s decision to add a further condition appears to be best explained with rational choice: At a time when his fear had abated, the premier focused on reducing his costs and maximizing his gains.

The last decision under investigation in this case study was Khrushchev’s order on October 28 to take out the missiles on US terms. Scholars have advanced three main explanations to make sense of it: First, many have argued that the chairman backed down once JFK had communicated his resolve to attack Cuba through a 24-hour ultimatum. Second, several analysts have maintained that the president’s pledge to guarantee Cuba’s inviolability and his secret promise to remove the American missiles from Turkey provided important incentives for Khrushchev to yield. Finally, some experts have contended that Kennedy’s ability to put himself into the shoes of his opponent enabled him to give the premier a dignified way out of the crisis.

These explanations, however, capture only a part of Khrushchev’s state of mind at the time. What they underestimate is the impact that the events of October 28 had on his emotions and the effects that these emotions, in turn, exerted on the construction of his preferences. An understanding of this process is necessary, however, to explain why coercive diplomacy succeeded in this case. The thesis has shed light on this issue in two respects: First, it has obtained evidence suggesting that it was primarily Khrushchev’s intense fear that prompted him to accept the US proposal. As during the previous days, his fear was not triggered by a perception that Kennedy was resolved to attack. Rather, it was now generated by his concern that either he or Kennedy was about to lose control over the situation and that the resulting
escalation would lead nuclear war. What conventional accounts have termed a US “ultimatum” was perceived by the premier as JFK’s desperate call for “help” to avert a coup d’état in Washington. Second, the thesis has made the case that it is again important to take into consideration what Khrushchev did not feel on October 28. Even though his identity as a parvenu made him highly sensitive to perceived degradation, there are no signs that he experienced any anger or humiliation as he ordered the removal of the missiles. This is relevant because the presence of these emotions could have prompted the chairman to stall or to defy US demands. What explains the absence or low intensity of anger and humiliation on the part of Khrushchev? While conventional accounts have referred to Kennedy’s alleged empathy and willingness to preserve the premier’s dignity, this study has highlighted Dobrynin’s psychologically skillful reports from Washington.

Throughout the last four days of the crisis, the Soviet ambassador sought to ensure that Khrushchev would not feel any sense of humiliation for taking the path of diplomacy in the face of US belligerence. In his summary of his meeting with RFK, he purposefully put signals of deference into the attorney general’s mouth. Dobrynin insinuated that the Kennedy brothers recognized the destructive capability of the Soviet Union and that they were asking for the premier’s cooperation to avert a nuclear war. This message of respect struck a chord with Khrushchev. He drew the conclusion that the Kennedys were at last granting him the recognition as the leader of a co-equal superpower that he had been craving so much. This perception helped him to reframe the situation: Instead of being forced into a humiliating capitulation, he was following JFK’s call for help to save the world.

In sum, Khrushchev’s intense fear of war and Kennedy’s public pledge not to attack Cuba represented critical factors leading him to define compliance with US
terms as his preference. The president’s secret promise to remove the American rockets from Turkey was less significant because the premier knew that he would not be able to exploit it politically. Finally, the absence or low intensity of anger and humiliation on the part of Khrushchev was an important additional factor that made it possible for him to accept the withdrawal of the rockets. Table 5.1 below provides a systematic overview of the relevance of affect in the premier’s decision-making during the missile crisis.

Table 5.1 The relevance of the five key emotions in Nikita Khrushchev’s decision-making during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decision</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Key emotion(s)</th>
<th>Relevance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) decision to place nuclear missiles into Cuba</td>
<td>May</td>
<td>fear, anger, humiliation</td>
<td>critical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) decision to prohibit Soviet troops on the island from using nuclear weapons in defense against a potential US attack</td>
<td>night of October 22</td>
<td>fear</td>
<td>critical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) decision to defy Kennedy’s call to remove the missiles and to escalate the crisis with a series of confrontational steps</td>
<td>October 23</td>
<td>anger</td>
<td>important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) decision to order most of the arms-carrying ships on the way to Cuba to turn around</td>
<td>October 23</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) decision to pursue a strategy of deterrence and delay toward the US administration</td>
<td>October 24</td>
<td>hope</td>
<td>relevant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) decision to suggest to his colleagues in the Soviet leadership to remove the missiles in return for an American pledge not to attack Cuba</td>
<td>October 25</td>
<td>fear</td>
<td>critical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>absence or low level of anger, hope, pride, and humiliation</td>
<td>important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) decision to offer this trade to Kennedy</td>
<td>October 26</td>
<td>fear</td>
<td>critical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) decision to add the withdrawal of US missiles from Turkey as a further demand</td>
<td>October 27</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>irrelevant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) decision to remove the Soviet rockets in exchange for JFK’s public guarantee of Cuba’s territorial integrity and his secret promise to take the American missiles out of Turkey</td>
<td>October 28</td>
<td>fear</td>
<td>critical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>absence or low level of anger and humiliation</td>
<td>important</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.2.2 The Gulf conflict

The second case study investigated ten major decisions by Saddam Hussein in the course of the Gulf conflict in 1990-91. As in the case of the missile crisis, the ability of the theoretical framework to explain these choices varied. Rationalist accounts have persuasively argued that Iraq’s financial problems and the specter of domestic unrest constituted major long-term conditions for Saddam Hussein’s order to invade Kuwait—the first decision under investigation. Since the salience of these factors was relatively constant over the spring and summer of 1990 and even receded in the course of July, however, they cannot explain why Saddam Hussein made this fateful choice on August 1. Emotional choice theory, on the other hand, was able to account for the timing of his order to attack. Converging evidence from multiple sources has suggested that the dictator’s anger at the Kuwaiti al-Sabah family’s perceived arrogance and refusal to comply with his demands was building up over the second half of July. By the end of the month, his mood had become so explosive that a minor incident sufficed to tip him over the brink. When a Kuwaiti delegation sought to take advantage of Iraq’s financial weakness in order to push through the emirate’s territorial interests at a meeting on July 31, Saddam Hussein’s emotions boiled over. It was this outburst of anger that prompted him to lash out against Kuwait.

Several scholars assert that King Hussein of Jordan managed to persuade the Iraqi president on August 3 to withdraw his troops from the emirate. In their eyes, it was only due to Cairo’s and Washington’s confrontational responses to the invasion that Saddam Hussein reneged on this agreement and kept his forces in place—the second decision. The thesis, however, has shown that his professed willingness to retreat was mere propaganda. He was not prepared to accept an independent Kuwait.
An instrumental rational choice account would suggest that the Iraqi leader kept his troops in the emirate to establish his control over its wealth. The available sources have not yielded any substantial information to invalidate this argument. The thesis has thus made the limited claim that Saddam Hussein’s pride at his successful invasion, which he displayed in a meeting with President Salih of Yemen at the time, merely reinforced his determination to keep his forces in Kuwait. It was also found that the Iraqi ruler used anger and humiliation instrumentally to justify his invasion toward the Yemeni leader. On the basis of the available sources, it was not possible to gauge if these emotions were authentic or feigned. The case study thus remained agnostic about the question of whether they influenced his decision-making.

On August 8, Saddam Hussein went a step further by formally annexing Kuwait—the third decision under investigation. Existing studies view his move as a reaction to George Bush’s announcement of Operation Desert Shield that day, as an attempt to win popular support in Iraq, or as part of a strategy to motivate his troops to defend the conquered territory against a potential US attack. Drawing from a recently released recording of a meeting between Saddam Hussein and his advisers from the day before, however, the thesis has shown that he made the decision to incorporate Kuwait before he learned about the deployment of US troops to Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, the tape has contained no signs that the fighting morale of his soldiers was on his mind at this stage.

The recorded discussion has indicated that certain domestic political considerations seem to have played a role for Saddam Hussein. If he were to grant the Kuwaitis some autonomy, the Kurdish minority in Iraq would demand self-rule as well, he claimed. The tape has also revealed that the idea of a formal annexation was highly controversial among his advisers. Four of the most senior government
officials—the vice president, the deputy prime minister, the foreign minister, and the interior minister—expressed serious reservations and pleaded with the dictator to hold off on the annexation for the time being. These advisers were thus not as sycophantic as conventional accounts of the Iraqi leadership suggest. Saddam Hussein, however, summarily dismissed their concerns. Emotional choice theory has suggested that his rigid approach and his preference construction were again influenced to an important degree by his anger at the Kuwaiti rulers and the resulting desire to punish them. Rather than carrying out a sober cost-benefit analysis of alternative courses of actions, Saddam Hussein was bent on annexing Kuwait. The theoretical framework has thus provided a persuasive explanation in this instance.

In the remainder of August, Saddam Hussein pursued a seemingly contradictory strategy. On the one hand, he presented a “peace initiative.” He would take his forces out of Kuwait, if Israel withdrew from all occupied Arab territories and Syria pulled out of Lebanon. On the other hand, he took about 3,000 Americans and other foreigners in Iraq and Kuwait hostage to use them as “human shields” against a potential US attack. The case study has summarized these initiatives as the fourth decision. The small number of Iraqi files available for this period has not yielded any information about Saddam Hussein’s emotions. While some scholars view his “peace initiative” as a genuine attempt to settle the conflict, the thesis has used the recording of one of his internal meetings to show that he conceived of it as a shrewd strategy to stay in Kuwait indefinitely. In the absence of evidence about Saddam Hussein’s internal state in mid-August 1990, rational choice has explained his approach persuasively as an attempt to maximize his chances of keeping Kuwait while minimizing the risk of US military intervention.
Existing accounts of the Gulf conflict date the beginning of American coercive diplomacy to November 8, the day that George Bush publicly invoked his “offensive military option.” A newly released tape of an internal meeting, however, has demonstrated that Saddam Hussein and his associates believed a US assault to be imminent as early as November 1. Their distinct emotional reactions to this perceived threat led them to draw radically different conclusions. Fearful of America’s destructive power, Deputy Prime Minister Taha Ramadan, for example, advocated a diplomatic resolution of the conflict. RCC Vice Chairman ‘Izzat Ibrahim, on the other hand, was energized by his pride at what he saw as Iraq’s courage to stand up to the US hegemon and suggested confronting the Bush administration head-on.

On this occasion, Saddam Hussein did not share the vice chairman’s excitement, however. Eyewitness accounts indicate that he was afraid of the prospect of war at this point. His fear seems to have led him to take up Taha Ramadan’s proposal to reach a negotiated settlement during the next three weeks—the fifth decision. He refrained from provocations and repeatedly stressed his readiness to enter into a dialogue with Washington. Conventional accounts generally view this as empty rhetoric. Based on the available sources, however, the thesis has argued that the Iraqi leader may have been willing to withdraw from Kuwait in November, if the Bush administration and its allies had been prepared to help him save his face by granting him more access to the Gulf. Yet, the US government insisted that there would be no negotiations until Saddam Hussein’s troops had left the emirate.

To rebut charges that he was locked into a military logic, President Bush on November 30 invited the Iraqi foreign minister to Washington and offered to dispatch his secretary of state to Baghdad. Saddam Hussein accepted the proposal the next day. Two weeks later, however, he cancelled the bilateral meetings—the sixth decision
under investigation. Scholars generally agree that he regarded Bush’s willingness to talk as a sign of weakness. Having reached the conclusion that the White House would not dare attack, he allegedly sought to demonstrate his aplomb by calling off the talks. The thesis has sought to revise this dominant view by presenting evidence that Saddam Hussein was at this stage not dismissive of America’s willingness and ability to fight. It was above all his growing belief that he would not reap any benefits from the bilateral meetings that led him to cancel. This belief was buttressed by his increasing anger at what he saw as the Bush administration’s arrogance and injustice as well as a sense of humiliation at the hands of the Americans.

Saddam Hussein continued to reject the UN resolutions throughout December, which the case study treated as the seventh decision. To shed light on his behavior, existing accounts cite a myriad of factors. One group of scholars argues that he assumed that the United States would ultimately not strike out at Iraq. Another group contends that he did believe that Bush administration would attack, but he thought his troops would ultimately prevail. Both perspectives capture parts of his complex psychology. What they neglect is that his thinking was closely intertwined with his emotions. To fully explain his decision-making, it is necessary to take this affective dimension into consideration. Emotional choice theory has suggested that Saddam Hussein’s preference for holding on to Kuwait was not objectively derived but emotionally constructed. His feelings of hope, lack of fear, and experience of pride played a critical role at this stage of the crisis. From mid-December onward, he started to nourish the hope that he might be able to avert a US attack. This hope led him to devise an elaborate deterrence strategy, including large-scale civil defense exercises across Iraq.
Toward the end of the month, however, he was given more and more hints that his strategy was not working out. Some of his top officials became increasingly frightened by America’s military preparation. Rather than follow up on their concerns, Saddam Hussein scolded them for expressing their fear. From a purely rationalist perspective, it is difficult to comprehend his behavior. The theoretical framework, however, has suggested that his identity as a daring Arab knight prohibited him from being scared. He took this feeling rule so seriously that he consciously or unconsciously employed various techniques to down-regulate his fear. One of these techniques was to deny information and to avoid situations that might trigger this emotion.

Finally, feelings of pride exerted a constitutive effect on the formation of Saddam Hussein’s interests as well. Several Iraqi rulers before him had dreamt of annexing Kuwait, but he was the one who had summoned the courage to do so. As a result, he felt proud about his conquest and developed an emotional attachment to his “19th province.” His pride and hope thus shaped his preference for holding on to Kuwait in the face of all adversity. A heightened level of fear of a US attack might have provided him with an impetus to recall his forces. His relatively low level of fear, however, facilitated his obstinacy.

These findings raise the question of why Saddam Hussein was afraid of a US attack in November but apparently not in late December or January. His changing perception of American policy during this period helps to explain this difference. In early and mid-November, his fear was triggered by his belief that the United States was about to intervene in Iraq. This urgency was reduced by the UN resolution of November 29, however, because it set an ultimatum of six weeks and because its mandate focused on the removal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait rather than an invasion.
of Iraq itself. As Saddam Hussein’s advisers’ fear of war in late December indicated, there were still ample grounds to be afraid of America’s military might. By this time, however, the dictator’s growing anger at the Bush administration had hardened his position and heightened the salience of his feeling rule prohibiting the experience of fear in the face of what he perceived as insulting threats.

In the new year, Saddam Hussein continued to keep his troops in Kuwait, rejecting the UN deadline of January 15, 1991—the eighth decision. The thesis has shown that his refusal to give up on the emirate at this point is best explained by a combination of regional, international, and emotional factors that were intertwined in complex ways. An analysis of the documentary record has confirmed existing studies according to which the Iraqi president overrated the determination of his troops to prevail against the United States. Moreover, it has corroborated the conventional view that he vastly overestimated the support he would receive from volunteer fighters from the Middle East and North Africa.

What this scholarship does not explain, however, is why he made these miscalculations. This is where emotional choice theory has added value. The Bush administration’s repeated warnings during the first half of January that it would attack if Iraqi troops did not leave Kuwait by the UN deadline finally diminished Saddam Hussein’s hope that he would be able to deter the United States. In the run-up to the UN deadline, his emotions came to be dominated by growing anger at Bush’s perceived arrogance, injustice, and humiliation of his regime. His wrath and his ongoing down-regulation of fear constituted his preference for defying US threats and his belief that Iraqi troops would prevail against the enemy in the “mother of all battles.” Coercive diplomacy had failed.
The thesis has demonstrated that the large-scale pro-Iraqi demonstrations that erupted across major cities in the region after the beginning of the air war filled Saddam Hussein with pride and hope. He was proud that his speeches and missile attacks against Israel elicited such a vocal response, and he hoped that many of these protesters would come to Iraq to support his troops in the battle. The theoretical framework has suggested that these emotions helped him to sustain his determination to weather the US and allied bombing campaign for more than five weeks.

Yet, on February 23, Saddam Hussein suddenly accepted a Soviet cease-fire plan—the ninth decision. He offered to recall his troops from Kuwait in return for the abolition of all UN resolutions related to Iraq. Since the available sources have not provided any information about his internal state at this point, it has not been possible to establish whether and, if so, how affect shaped his decision. Under these circumstances, rational choice has provided the better explanation. The documentary record has suggested that a pessimistic assessment from his deputy chief of intelligence led him to redefine his priorities. To minimize his losses on the battlefield, he finally gave up on his “19th province” and on his role as champion of the Palestinian cause.

George Bush rejected the Soviet cease-fire proposal, ostensibly because it was not unconditional. Instead, he announced that he would initiate the ground war if Iraqi troops had not started withdrawing from Kuwait by February 23. Existing accounts argue that Saddam Hussein did not comply with this US ultimatum because he miscalculated the enemy’s military power or because he believed that such a “capitulation” would lead his subordinates to oust him. Based on tapes of internal discussions, however, the thesis has demonstrated that the reason behind his inaction was much less complex: He assumed that his consent to the Soviet cease-fire plan
would avert a US land campaign. When the Americans sent their tanks into battle in the morning of February 24, he was thus taken by surprise.

The recorded conversations between Saddam Hussein and his associates from February 24 made it possible to trace their thinking and feeling on this first day of the ground operation. They revealed a surreal emotional divide between the president and his senior associates on the one hand and a military aide on the other. The aide expressed his growing fear as he kept providing the group with the latest news about Iraqi defeats on the battlefield. Saddam Hussein, however, not only denied these reports. He also joked and laughed about the allegedly low performance of the enemy troops. What appeared to be a bizarre situation at first sight has been illuminated by emotional choice theory. In light of the severe US threat, the Iraqi leader used his humor as a strategy to reduce and distract himself from his fear.

The theoretical framework has also provided a convincing explanation of Saddam Hussein’s withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait on February 25, 1991—the final decision under investigation in the case study. It was only once he was flooded with reports about the defeat and surrender of his troops from the late afternoon of February 24 onward, that he started to recalibrate his emotions. Eyewitness accounts have suggested that he came to oscillate between feelings of intense fear and humiliation. His fear of being ousted by the invading American forces grew to such an extent that he had to discard his feeling rules. He was no longer able to suppress and down-regulate his anxiety. His sense of humiliation about the low performance of his soldiers was reportedly so profound that he temporarily lost all energy to resist against the United States. It was at this point—when his fear and humiliation reached a pitch—that he finally ordered his troops to return from
Kuwait. Table 5.2 below provides a systematic overview of the relevance of affect around Saddam Hussein’s ten decisions under investigation.

Table 5.2 *The relevance of the five key emotions in Saddam Hussein’s decision-making during the Gulf conflict in 1990-91*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decision</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Key emotion(s)</th>
<th>Relevance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) decision to invade Kuwait</td>
<td>August 1, 1990</td>
<td>anger, humiliation</td>
<td>important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) decision to leave Iraqi forces in Kuwait</td>
<td>August 3-5, 1990</td>
<td>anger, humiliation</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>pride</td>
<td>relevant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) decision to formally annex Kuwait</td>
<td>August 8, 1990</td>
<td>anger</td>
<td>important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) pursuit of a strategy of deterrence and delay toward the United States and its allies</td>
<td>August 8, 1990, onward</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) suggestions to solve the conflict through negotiations with the US government</td>
<td>November 1990</td>
<td>fear</td>
<td>critical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) decision to turn down President Bush’s offer to hold meetings with each other’s foreign ministers</td>
<td>December 15, 1990</td>
<td>anger, humiliation</td>
<td>relevant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) decision to defy US and allied coercive diplomacy</td>
<td>second half of December 1990</td>
<td>hope, pride, relatively low level of fear</td>
<td>critical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) decision to reject the UN ultimatum of January 15, 1991</td>
<td>first half of January 1991</td>
<td>anger, humiliation, relatively low level of fear</td>
<td>important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) offer to leave Kuwait in return for the abolition of all UN resolutions related to Iraq</td>
<td>February 23, 1991</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10) decision to unilaterally withdraw Iraqi troops from Kuwait</td>
<td>February 25, 1991</td>
<td>fear, humiliation</td>
<td>critical</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In sum, the analyses of Nikita Khrushchev’s and Saddam Hussein’s decisions during these conflicts have yielded mixed results. In the case of about a third of all decisions, the five key emotions exerted only minor effects or no effect at all. Another
third of the decisions was influenced by one or more of these emotions to a degree similar to the impact of other factors. In the case of the final third of decisions, however, some of these emotions became the primary forces shaping the construction of preferences. Overall, the theoretical framework has thus advanced our understanding of the target leaders’ decision-making in the missile crisis and the Gulf conflict, offering a more comprehensive explanation of why coercive diplomacy succeeded in one case but not in the other.

5.3 Comparing the case studies

A comparison of the two case studies reveals some interesting similarities. To begin with, both Nikita Khrushchev and Saddam Hussein felt intense anger and humiliation before they embarked on their Cuba and Kuwait missions, respectively. These emotions were the affective origins of the two conflicts and set the stage for the ensuing crises. Furthermore, in both cases, the emotional experiences of the leaders were strongly conditioned by their identities. Khrushchev saw himself as a parvenu who had risen from a small farm in western Russia to assume the highest political office in the Soviet Union. Insecure about his fitness for this demanding role, he craved the recognition of his achievements and status as the leader of a superpower from significant others. His identity as a parvenu increased his sensitivity to perceived slights and made experiences of humiliation particularly intense.

Saddam Hussein, on the other hand, conceived of himself as a “daring and bellicose knight” (al-faris al-mighwar), who was defending the honor of the “Arab nation.” He identified himself with King Nebuchadnezzar II of Babylonia, who destroyed Jerusalem in the sixth century BCE, and with Sultan Saladin, who

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11 See “Communique No. 3,” Baghdad Voice of the Masses, August 2, 1990, FBIS-NES-90-149, 30; Makiya, Republic of Fear, 110. See also Aburish, Saddam Hussein, 285; Davis, Memories of State, 188.
conquered the holy city after defeating the European crusaders in the twelfth century. As in Khrushchev’s case, Saddam Hussein’s self-conception made him sensitive to insults. His identity demanded that the Arab knight be respected at all times. Conversely, both leaders were highly receptive to admiration and flattery. Social identity theory suggests that humans require the recognition of their status by significant others. These significant others provide a meaningful context for their existence by reinforcing or eroding their identities. For both Khrushchev and Saddam Hussein, the president of the United States represented a critical significant other. As a result, his behavior could exert strong effects on their emotions.

Finally, both the Soviet and the Iraqi leader had internalized social norms about the experience and expression of fear. The precise content of these feeling rules, however, brings us to some of the crucial differences between the two cases. Khrushchev was convinced that he must not express any fear in public because enemies would see this as a sign of weakness and exploit it. Nevertheless, his feeling rules permitted him to experience fear and to display it in moderate form in the presence of trusted associates. In some of the confidential meetings with his Presidium colleagues, for example, he indicated that he was afraid of a nuclear clash with the United States. His fear influenced his decision-making through its appraisal and action tendencies. This was the main reason why he ultimately removed his missiles from Cuba.

Saddam Hussein, on the other hand, had internalized strict feeling rules prohibiting the experience and expression of fear at all times. This rigid approach was strongly related to his identity. The fact that his parents named him Saddam, meaning “the one who confronts,” helped to instill an attitude into him that it was inappropriate

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13 See Tsygankov, Russia’s Foreign Policy, 15.
to be afraid and to run away in threatening situations. His self-conception as a daring Arab knight embraced honor and bravery as important personal attributes. Even in private deliberations with his most trusted subordinates, the Iraqi president denied any anxiety. His feeling rules led him to suppress and down-regulate his fear of a US attack in the winter of 1990-91. The documentary record suggests that he was mostly successful in this respect. This is why he was not susceptible to US and allied coercive threats in the run-up to the UN deadline.

Another critical difference between the two crises relates to the leverage of the two target leaders. Khrushchev possessed the firepower to cause massive devastation to some American cities, whereas Saddam Hussein was not in a position to significantly harm the United States. The US presidents knew this and devised their policies accordingly. Kennedy treaded carefully and sought to avoid any unnecessary provocation. His moderation and Ambassador Dobrynin’s claims that JFK was at last respecting Khrushchev as the leader of a co-equal superpower helped the premier to reframe the situation. He overcame his perception of Kennedy as an arrogant aggressor and came to view him as a political partner with whom he could collaborate to resolve the crisis peacefully. His perception of the president’s recognition also helped to explain the relatively low level or absence of anger and humiliation on his part. This enabled him to take the path of conciliation and to terminate his missile operation.

In the Gulf conflict, however, George Bush not only refused to show any respect toward the Iraqi leader; he also sought to actively humiliate him. There was

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14 See Makiya, Republic of Fear, 118.
15 For example, in a meeting with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, Bush remarked: “We must also avoid giving Saddam the opportunity to save face. You don’t give face saving to a kidnapper or rapist or murderer.” See “Minutes of Bilateral Meeting with King Fahd,” November 21, 1990, 11:05 P.M.-12.57 A.M., folder “Iraq – November 1990 [1],” box 45, Richard Haass Files, NSC, Bush Presidential Records, GHWBL.
no mediator like Dobrynin, who was familiar with the cultural sensitivities of both sides. Apart from the meeting between the Iraqi foreign minister and the US secretary of state in early January 1991, the Bush administration rejected any direct contact with the Iraqi regime during the conflict. This approach intensified Saddam Hussein’s feelings of anger and degradation and helped to lock him into an attitude of defiance.

5.4 Suggestions for further research
To conclude with, I would like to suggest three broad avenues for future research to build on the theoretical and empirical work of this study. The first relates to the strategy of coercive diplomacy. Given that the thesis is based on only two case studies with a single preeminent target leader in each of them, it has not claimed that its findings are generalizable. Emotional choice theory’s hypotheses about the impact of affect could thus be tested with other instances of forceful persuasion, in which a group of more or less equals interact. Such collective decision-making is bound to generate more complex emotional dynamics. Envy, rivalry, and duplicity are likely to play a more important role when some policymakers stand to gain from the failure of others. In such instances, crises can be great opportunities for the second rank to see a leader make a terrible decision, after all.16

Moreover, the thesis has restricted its focus to leaders of states that are targets of coercive threats in order to analyze the emotions of these actors in-depth. Since the coercers in the case studies are Americans and the opponents Russians and Iraqis, respectively, some readers may wonder whether this study is reproducing Euro-

16 I thank Steve Hopgood and Neil MacFarlane for this point. See also Janice Gross Stein, “Psychological Explanations of International Decision Making and Collective Behavior,” in Carlsnaes, Risse, and Simmons, eds., Handbook of International Relations, 204-7.
American stereotypes about overly emotional or irrational non-Westerners.\textsuperscript{17} My reading of US sources for this project—such as the recorded deliberations between Kennedy and his advisers or the transcripts of Bush’s telephone conversations—however, indicates that the Western leaders felt just as strongly about these conflicts as their counterparts in Moscow and Baghdad.\textsuperscript{18} An interesting line of enquiry would thus be to analyze the affect of both coercers and targets and to explore how they shape their interaction. Furthermore, while the thesis concentrated on the role of fear, anger, hope, pride, and humiliation, future studies could explore how other emotions, such as joy, guilt, shame, or hatred, influence outcomes in coercive diplomacy.

The second possible avenue for future research relates to the field of decision-making and emotions. Although psychologists have examined various ways in which affect influences the process of preference construction, there is still much to be explored. For example, it would be worth investigating in more detail how leaders’ emotions interact with those of their advisers or of the public at large. How do affective group dynamics and emotional contagion influence decision outcomes? How do individuals respond to affective signals, real or feigned? And how does emotion regulation shape their reactions? Such questions and the role of affect in general become even more salient in light of the acceleration of policy-making that instant communication has brought about. Given the general increase in distraction, time pressure, and cognitive load, leaders are more likely to be under the influence of emotion when they assess potential courses of action. Further research into the

\textsuperscript{17} For a classic account critical of such Western ethnocentrism, see Catherine A. Lutz, \textit{Unnatural Emotions: Everyday Sentiments on a Micronesian Atoll and Their Challenge to Western Theory} (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1988).

\textsuperscript{18} See, for example, Naftali and Zelikow, eds., \textit{The Presidential Recordings}, vol. 2; “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between George Bush and Turgut Ozal,” August 30, 1990, 3:40-3:51 P.M., folder “Presidential Telephone Calls – Memorandum of Conversations 8/22/90-10/5/90,” box 6, Presidential Correspondence Files, Scowcroft Collection, GHWBL; “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between George Bush and Helmut Kohl,” November 11, 1990, 1:38-1:48 P.M., folder “Presidential Telephone Calls – Memorandum of Conversations 10/11/90-12/31/90,” box 6, Presidential Correspondence Files, Scowcroft Collection, GHWBL.
interaction between affect and decision-making is thus an important task that psychologists and political scientists should tackle collaboratively.

Finally, this study has used insights from psychology and social constructivism to shed light on a puzzle in coercive diplomacy. The application of the resulting emotional choice framework need not be limited to the field of strategic studies, however. It can also be employed to investigate the mutual constitution of emotions, ideas, norms, and identities in other domains of international relations. These could include trade negotiations, international cooperation, transnational terrorism, human rights, humanitarian interventions, or development aid, for instance.

To give a specific example, at present, we still do not know enough about the circumstances under which international norms become meaningful to actors. Why do some people and states obey a certain norm and others do not? Research in psychology indicates that ideas turn into forces for change in part due to the affective reactions that they elicit in us. The high or low intensity of these emotions could thus help to explain why and when ideas and norms become salient—or irrelevant. To better understand this world of our making, it is necessary to take into account that international relations are not just socially but also emotionally constructed.
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