Diplomatic Procedures at Rome in the second century B.C.

by

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Part 2

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1. For Cicero's remark on Verres, Cic. Verr. ii.2.76. It contains two implicit assumptions: (i) that February was regarded as the month for ambassadorial activity; and (ii) that this activity involved the bribery of senators. See further below, Ch.2.i, 48. The Lex Gabinia is fully treated below, Ch.2.i., passim.


3. On the nature of the Roman Republican calendar and its condition in the second century, see Michels, op. cit., esp. 1-17, 93-103. Three recent attempts have been made to reconstruct calendar movements in the period between 203 and 168: Marchetti, Ant. Class. 42 (1973), 473-96 (for the period 203-190); Derow, Phoenix 27 (1973), 345-56 (for 190-168); Rapsaet-Charlier, Historia 23 (1974), 288-96 (for 203-168). There is insufficient evidence to allow certainty in such reconstructions, but these three studies have produced mutually compatible results by quite different methods; and this agreement goes a long way to confirming the validity of the results. I have accepted them as a close approximation to the truth and presented them as a heavy line on the enclosed graph, which shows the fluctuation of the consuls' inauguration date in Julian terms throughout the period. The dotted line represents a plausible but speculative reconstruction of the calendar movements in the immediately preceding and succeeding periods, in which even less certainty is possible and the results should be regarded as even more approximate.

4. Four changes of calendar policy can be observed in the period from
220 to 150, but not all of these seem to have been deliberately planned.

(i) Intercalation must have been suspended for about 12 years consecutively for the Roman calendar to be 4 months in advance of the astronomical year by the late 190s. This suspension has been plausibly associated with the Roman authorities' commitment to fulfil the ver sacrum vowed by Q. Fabius in 217. See Heurgon, Coll. Latomus 26, iii.47-9; Marchetti, Ant. Class. 42 (1973), 494-6.

(ii) Intercalation was probably reintroduced after the ver sacrum had eventually been carried out in 194: cf. Marchetti, op. cit., 476-7, 495. There were thus two intercalations in the period from 203 to 190, and this agrees with the conclusion of Rapsaet-Charlier, op. cit., 291-2.

It can be deduced from Macr. Sat.i.13.21 that M'. Acilius (cos.191) introduced a law on intercalation. If intercalation had already been re-introduced in consular 193, the law will have regularised its application: for 20 years the system seems to have been stable with the calendar remaining about 4 months in advance of the seasons. If the original intention of the suspension of intercalation had been to deprive the gods of the fruits of the ver sacrum, it was still true that it had had a beneficial effect on Rome's administrative arrangements. M. Cato (cos.195) was able to discharge his consular duties in Rome and still arrive in his Spanish province before the opening of the campaigning season (cf. Heurgon, op. cit., p.48 & n.7). The effect of the Lex Acilia was apparently to maintain this beneficial effect: the consuls of 171 entered office on approximately the same Julian date as did those of 195.

(iii) There was increased amount of intercalation in the years during and after the Third Macedonian War. The reason for this is unknown, but it may be explained by Macrobius' observation that at some time (non numquam) the priests manipulated the length of the year to suit the interests of
the publicani (Sat.i.14.1). The effect of this increased intercalation was to bring the calendar more into line with the seasons and thus to erode the administrative advantage which had been acquired.

(iv) The change of the consuls' inauguration date in 153 had the effect of bringing forward the beginning of the consular year by 2½ months in astronomical terms: the same result could have been achieved (much more slowly) by suspending intercalation for 7 or 8 years. The change was officially planned and was necessitated by the military situation in Spain, where a consul was required before the start of the campaigning season. The need for this emergency measure suggests that the prior retardation of the calendar had not been officially approved: the contrast with the similar situation in 195 is evident.

5. On the advance of the calendar in the years before 46, see Deman/Rapsaet-Charlier, Historia 23 (1974), 278-87. Caesar was obliged to intercalate 90 days in the year 46 to bring the calendar into line with the seasons. This advance is less than that in the period from 191 to 171, but the consuls of 45 probably took office on 13 October 47 (Deman/Rapsaet-Charlier, op. cit., 287), whereas the consuls in the first half of the second century almost certainly never took office earlier than the beginning of November. This would have interfered with the conduct of the previous campaigning season.


8. On the constitutional reform of c.217, see Larsen, Rep. Govt., 86-102;
The Boule will have largely lost its proboulentic function, but will have retained this for the extraordinary meetings of the Ekklesia. At the same time it will have assumed the entire responsibility for the carrying out of ordinary routine business. Again the extension of Achaean authority over the southern Peloponnese in the early second century must have greatly multiplied the extent of the League's business.

The length and number of the Boule's meetings have been variously disputed. Niese, Gesch. Griech. Mak. Staat. iii. 40 n. 3 suggested that there were monthly sessions of 3 or 4 days. De Sanctis, Riv. Fil. 36 (1908) 257 rejected this as invention and postulated 10 days work per year: this enabled him to calculate on the basis of the offer of 120 talents made by Eumenes in 185 for the payment of bouleutai (Pol. 22.7.3) that the Boule numbered 8640. This is rightly rejected by Larsen, Gk. Fed. States, 226 as "fantastic and obviously much too large"; he also recognises that any attempts to do this calculation are doomed to failure because the number of variables is too great. However it is clear that to attain a reasonably plausible figure for the number of bouleutai (i.e. one in the region of 500), the estimates both of the number of days worked and of the amount paid must be revised upwards by a considerable factor. cf. also Larsen, Rep. Govt., 95-6; below n. 13.


11. Jos. Ant. Jud. xii. 2.11/87; Pelletier, op. cit., 167. cf. P. Tebt 1.35.2 for an official letter (c.111BC) addressed to το ο θειτο των Χρηματισμοις. Pelletier holds that Josephus' rendering loses the
impact of the original by failing to reproduce the technical expression: the men dismissed were high-ranking officials who would normally be considered to have priority over foreign ambassadors, and whose access to the royal presence was accordingly more quickly granted.

12. On the volume of administrative work confronting Hellenistic monarchs, cf. (e.g.) Plut. Mor. 790A (on Seleucus I); for the number of embassies received by Antigonus Gonatas, Polyaeus 4.6.2. It was obviously impossible for a single monarch to cope unaided with the foreign affairs of a large kingdom, and he would naturally rely on the advice of the members of his court: cf. Welles, Royal Correspondence, 61, 11.2-13 for Attalus' consultation of his court over intervention in Pessinus. On the importance of the court hierarchy generally, Ehrenberg, Greek State, 163ff.

From the inscriptions in which individuals at the royal courts are honoured by states for assistance given to their embassies, it is apparent that such men exerted considerable influence over the handling of embassies: for examples of such decrees, cf. below Ch.3.i, n.8. It is possible that ambassadors dealt almost exclusively with men such as Diodorus and Eudemus except for a brief formal interview with the king, and that the king's reply was virtually determined by the advice of the courtiers whom the ambassadors had approached. In that case consultation would have been carried virtually to the point of delegation, but this would be necessary for the efficient management of foreign policy.

13. The Achaean League synodos in 185 (described in Pol. 22.7-9) may be seen as an example of such a coincidence. There were simultaneously present on this occasion embassies from Eumenes, Seleucus and Ptolemy, as well as a returning Achaean embassy from Rome. The coincidence of
several important but unrelated embassies at the same synodos might be taken to suggest that the annual number of such synodoi was limited: in that case it would not be a coincidence at all. But there is insufficient evidence to confirm or disprove any speculation on the number of synodoi in the second century (see above, n.7). It should also be remembered that a much greater number of states could be expected to have regular diplomatic contact with the Achaean League. And in any case the frequency of ambassadorial activity between for example the Ptolemaic Kingdom and the Achaean League is known to have been particularly high: the confusion highlighted by Aristaenus over the numerous treaties in existence at this time between the two states (Pol. 22.9.5-12) may be adduced as evidence for this. On coinciding embassies in classical Greece, cf. Mosley, Envoys and Diplomacy, p.17.

14. Polybius was ostensibly describing the Roman constitution at the time of the Battle of Cannae (216), although much of his account must be based on his observations of the years 167-151. In particular the present passage must refer, as Walbank asserts (H.C.P. i, 676 ad loc.) to the conditions of the second century after the build-up of diplomatic traffic to Rome; see below, Ch.1.ii, n. 13.

15. Mommsen, Röm. Staatsrecht iii, 1155.


17. Mommsen, op. cit. iii, 1155. n.4; Büttner-Wobst, De Legationibus, 24-6. This is in fact Büttner-Wobst's conclusion for the category of "socii legati"; but since this category is by far the largest of those considered, the conclusion may virtually be regarded as a general one. Other
conclusions are drawn for the other (mainly juridical) categories of embassies, but this juridical categorisation seems to have no bearing on the question of the timing of diplomatic activity: cf. below n. 30.


20. For example the Illyrian campaigns of 229 and 219 were both very short, but they were probably unusual. (See however Finley, *Ancient Economy*, 108 for the view that third century campaigns could be a profitable sideline for Roman peasants.) A majority of later third century triumphs are dated in the months February to April, indicating that the consuls did not usually return to Rome until the end of their year of office: cf. Degrassi, *Inscr. Ital.* xiii.1, 77-9.

A rough indication of the time at which the consuls generally left for their provinces is given by the dates of the Feriae Latinae in the years 218-2. The holding of the *Feriae Latinae* was usually one of the last functions performed by the consuls in Rome. In each of the above years except 215 the Festival fell between Apr. 14 and May 15, i.e. between one and two months after the consuls' inauguration; in 215 it fell between May 16 and June 13: Degrassi, *op. cit.* xiii.1, 149; cf. Werner, *De Feriis Latinis*, 59-61.

21. This is the view expressed by Bickermann, *R. Phil.* 61(1935) 59-81; it has not been universally accepted, but the arguments for and against it are inseparable from the wider discussion on the causes of the second Macedonian War. For a review of this view and the subsequent discussion,
see Raditsa, *Bella Macedonica*, 569ff.

22. See Holleaux, *Rome, la Grèce*, 1-22 for a rejection of the pre-230 embassies from Apollonia and Acarnania. The diplomatic exchange with Ptolemaic Egypt in 273 is probably a genuine but isolated example of contact with the Hellenistic East in this period: see Neatby, *T.A.P.A.* 81 (1950), 89-98.

23. The bulk of Rome's diplomatic business in the period after 189 concerned the states of the Greek East; the epigraphical evidence is almost entirely of Eastern origin and therefore concerned with Eastern affairs. The earliest epigraphical document to describe an embassy to Rome is the Lampsacene inscription in honour of Hegesias, c.196 (S.I.G. ii, 591).

24. For the embassies of 206, Liv. 28.11.10. 190, Liv. 37.46.9. 201, Liv. 31.2.1-2; Pol. 16.24.3; App. Mac. 4.2; the embassies from Pergamum and Rhodes more or less coincided with an Athenian embassy (Liv. 31.1.10), which had been sent to complain of Macedonian aggression. In 189 the Rhodian and Athenian embassies were sent together with an Aetolian embassy to assist the latter in securing a peace settlement with the senate (Pol. 21.31.1-5; Liv. 38.10.2ff).

25. For the embassies of 203, Liv. 30.17, 21.11-23.8. 198/7, Pol. 18.10-11; Liv. 32.36-7; cf. below n.29. 193, Diod. 28.15.1-4; Liv. 34. 57-9. 189, Pol. 21.18-24; Liv. 37.52-6.

26. For the embassies of 216, Liv. 22.35-8; similarly the embassies from Carthage and Macedon in 202/1 (Liv. 30.40-43) were related in the sense that both were responses to the situation after the Battle of
Zama, but again they were not obviously concerted.

27. For the Athenian embassy early in 200, Liv. 31.5.5; the Ptolemaic embassy, Liv. 31.9.1. Of the two consuls that year, C. Aurelius reached Gaul after a successful campaign had already been waged there by the praetor, L. Furius (Liv. 31.22.3, 47.4f); and P. Sulpicius reached his province of Macedonia _autumno fere exacto_ (Liv. 31.22.4; cf. Walbank, _Philip_, 317).

For the embassies of 199, Liv. 32.1-2; the consul, P. Villius, did not reach Macedonia until virtually the end of the 199 campaigning season. His predecessor, P. Sulpicius, had conducted the campaign which ended at about the time of the autumnal equinox (Liv. 31.47.1-3). The date of the consuls' inauguration in these two years probably fell in Julian terms in about middle to late January, i.e. 8 or 9 months before the end of the campaigning season (see above n.3).

28. The following embassies are known to have arrived early in the consular year: Syracuse and Paestum (216), cf. above n.26; Syracuse (210), Liv. 26.30-1; Placentia and Cremona (206), cf. above n.24; Saguntum (205), Liv. 28.39; Lucris (204), Liv. 29.16-19; Carthage and Macedon (201), cf. above n.25; Pergamum (198), Liv. 32.8.9; Sparta (194), Liv. 34.43.1; Diod. 28.13; Aetolian League (190), Liv. 37.1.1-6; Pol. 21.2; Aetolian League (189), Diod. 29.9; Liv. 37.48-9.

Examples of embassies later in the consular year: Neapolis (216), Liv. 22.32; Tarentum (209), Liv. 27.21: the envoys were given an audience in late 209 but the senate's decision was deferred until Fabius' return to Rome early in 208 (Liv. 27.25.1ff); various Greek states (203), Liv. 30.26.2-4; Numidia and Carthage (203), cf. above n.25; Pergamum and Rhodes (201), cf. above n.24; Pergamum (198), Liv. 32.27.1; Macedon (197), liv. 22.24.5; Pergamum (192), Liv. 35.23.10; Placentia and Cremona (190),
cf. above n.24; Aetolian League, Rhodes and Athens (189), cf. above n.24.

For the other embassies which are known to have been sent to Rome in this period, there is insufficient evidence to determine their date within a year. For example it cannot be determined whether the embassies from Ptolemy Epiphanes (App. Syr.2), Smyrna, Alexandria Troas (Diod. 29.7; App. Syr.2) and Lampsacus (S.I.G. ii, 591), all of which clearly belong to 197/6, should be placed in later consular 197 or early consular 196.

29. For the circumstances of the truce and the embassies to Rome, Pol. 18.10-11; cf. Liv. 32.36-7. Livy's account of the negotiations in Locris and the subsequent truce (32.32.1ff) seems to mistakenly place the events after the 197 campaigning season: cf. Büttner-Wobst, op. cit., 24. n.4 and 28; below n.30.

On the timing of the embassies at Rome before the allocation of consular provinces, Pol. 18.11.1; this was normally among the first things on the senate's agenda at the beginning of a consular year: cf. e.g. Liv. 33.43.1, 42.31.1.

The embassies mentioned by Polybius from the Greek allies are those from the Aetolian and Achaean Leagues, Pergamum and Athens (18.10.9-11). There were probably others which have been omitted from the list: in particular the Rhodians, who participated in the conference at Locris (Pol. 18.2.3-4) and ranked as a major ally, ought to have sent an embassy to Rome on this occasion. On the status of Amynander at Rome, see below Ch.3.iv, 130.

30. Thus Büttner-Wobst, op. cit., 27 is wrong to treat hostium legati as an independent category of embassy which usually came to Rome in the middle of the year. Of the examples which he uses to support this theory
(op. cit., 28) the embassy from Philip in 197 (Liv. 32.36-7) is in fact the same as that in Pol. 18.11 and belongs to the early consular year (see previous note); the embassy from Antiochus in 189 arrived in the summer following his defeat by the Romans; and the Spanish embassies in 151 almost coincided with the beginning of the consular year (see below, Ch.1.ii, 21.

31. In 193 the embassies were not heard until after the consuls had left for their provinces (Liv. 34.57.1-2), and were introduced by the praetor urbanus (Liv. 34.57.3). In 189 the embassies were at Rome ἡ τερεία πριντική (Pol. 21.18.1), by which time the consuls had presumably left Rome: according to Livy Eumenes was brought back into the senate house by the praetor (37.53.1), which suggests that the praetor was the presiding magistrate at the proceedings.

Notes to Ch.1.ii

1. The consuls of 200 and at least one of the consuls of 199 did not leave Rome until late in the campaigning season (cf. Ch.1.1, n.27). But these were exceptional cases and the consuls normally reached their provinces in time to begin the conduct of a campaign. On the tendency for consuls to remain in Rome towards the end of the second century, see below n. 7.

2. It was the normal procedure for senatorial decisions to be communicated to interested parties either verbally or in writing by the presiding magistrate. Theoretically the senate was merely giving advice to the magistrate on a subject on which he had consulted it. Sometimes
the terms of a *senatus consultum* might direct a magistrate away from Rome to take some action. In 169 the senate's reply to a Seleucid embassy was that it would direct Q. Marcius (the consul) to write to Ptolemy as he deemed best (Pol. 28.1.9). This clearly reproduces the language of an original *senatus consultum*, but it is unclear whether Q. Marcius was at this time in Rome (and presiding over the senate) or in his Macedonian province. On this question and the related problem of the embassy's date, cf. below Ch.l.iv, 37. n. 4.

3. For the letter of C. Livius, *S.I.C.* ii,611 (= Sherk, *Roman Documents*, 38). The restoration of the author's name, wholly lost in the inscription, is universally accepted.


5. *S.I.C.*, ii, 688; Sherk, *op. cit.*, 10, pp. 54-8. The date of this audience has been taken as an indication that the *Lex Gabinia* was at this time in operation. It does not however constitute proof of this contention: see below Ch.2.i, n.6.

6. For the text and this identification, Sherk, *op. cit.*, 1 (Document C), pp. 23-4.

7. For the date of the *S.C.* on the Bacchic guilds (a.d. ? id. Iun.112), *S.I.C.* ii, 705 (= Sherk, *op. cit.*, 15), 11.3-4. The second document is appended to the *senatus consultum* on a dispute between Itanus and Hierapytnia (*I. Cret. iii.4.10; Sherk, *op. cit.*, 14). The date of the *S.C.* itself does not survive; but the appended document, in which an
arbitration tribunal is appointed by the consul, is dated a.d. xvii Kal. Quint. (loc. cit., 1.76).

However Piso probably did go to a province during his consulship (Broughton, M.R.R. Suppl., 12-13; cf. Rich, Coll. Latomus 149,55).

8. This assumes that the consuls left for their provinces at the usual time. There is no positive evidence for this but it is a fair assumption in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Livy says only that these consuls did nothing noteworthy at home or in the field (39.44.11). On the joint action of consuls, cf. Mommsen, op. cit. ii, 129-31.

9. This is confirmed by Liv. 39.46.6: priusquam consules in provincias proficiscerentur legationes transmarinas in senatum introdixerunt. Admittedly this is Livy's own chronological connection, but he must have had some reason for making it. Livy has made a similar chronological connection for all the years 184-1 by inserting the account of embassies at Rome (which is derived from Polybius) at the beginning of each consular year along with annalistic material such as military and provincial dispositions and reported prodigies.

As to the use of ἐπὶ στρατηγὸς by Polybius Holleaux, Στρατηγὸς ὑπάτος, 48. n.3 cites the present passage as one of the rare examples in which στρατηγὸς has the meaning of "the consul in his civilian capacity". Another example cited by Holleaux occurs in the next chapter, referring to Demetrius' reception ἐπὶ τῷ στρατηγῷ (Pol. 23.2.9); and we would expect this function to be carried out by a consul, if one or both were present. Holleaux adds the proviso that it is possible that some of these examples might refer to praetors, or praetors and consuls. But he himself points out (op. cit., 51) that Polybius usually distinguishes "praetor" by a circumlocution: e.g. στρατηγὸς ἦν ἐξακαλυκως (33.1.5);
κατὰ πάλιν ὑπὸ στρατηγὸς (35.2.5).

10. For M. Iunius' consultation of the senate, cf. below Ch.2.ii, 58ff. for the introduction of the envoys by a tribune, Ch.2.iii, 66ff.

11. On the arrangement of the audiences in 160/59, Ch.4.ii, 184.

12. The reception of the Seleucid and Achaean embassies forms one excerpt (Pol. 32.2-3). The order of excerpts in the De Legationibus Gentium is as follows: (1) embassies from Asia and Cappadocia dispatched (31.32); (2) Menochares, the Seleucid envoy, dispatched (31.33); (3) reception of Cappadocia envoys and Attalus (32.1); (4) Menochares and Achaean embassy received (32.2-3). The reception of the Cappadocian embassy is dared by Diodorus to the 155th Olympiad (31.28), the first year of which was 160/59.

13. On this question, see Pédech, Méthode, 462; Derow, Phoenix, 27 (1973), 355-6; cf. below Ch.3.i, n.27.

14. Ariarathes' envoys were instructed to inform the senate of his reply to Ti. Gracchus (Pol. 31.32.3), who must therefore have recently been in Cappadocia. Demetrius' envoy, Menochares, met Ti. Gracchus in Cappadocia, and Demetrius sent messages again to him in Pamphylia and Rhodes (Pol. 31.33). After receiving a favourable reply Demetrius sent Menochares to Rome.

Ti. Gracchus was apparently proceeding towards Rome from Cappadocia via Pamphylia and Rhodes curing the summer of 160. His embassy had been authorised in 162 after Demetrius' escape from Rome, and he may well have been waiting for the outcome of Timarchus' rebellion (cf. Ch.3.ii, n.8).
Ariarathes sent his embassy after Gracchus had been in Cappadocia, Demetrius sent his immediately after the interview in Rhodes. Thus Menochares' dispatch was the later of the two, but since Polybius describes Demetrius' attitude at this time as one of extreme urgency (31.33), it was probably not later by very much.

15. On these problems and the senate's reply, see below Ch.4.ii, 167. n.12.

16. The presidency of senate meetings by the urban praetor, Willem's, Le Sénat ii, 130-1; Mommsen, Röm. Staatsrecht ii, 129-31; iii,1155-6.
On the significance of the praetor's presidency in dating the S.C. Popilianum on Pergamum, cf. Magie, Roman Rule ii, 1033-4, n.1; Broughton, op. cit. i, 496-7. n.1; Sherk, op. cit., p.61 n.5.

17. On the embassy's date (i.e. the date of Fannius' praetorship)
Broughton, M.R.R. i. 509. As a patrician Lepidus may have been prevented from leaving Rome by some priestly office, as was P. Licinius Crassus (cos. 131): Broughton, op. cit. i, 500.

18. But in the same year an embassy from Ariarathes seems to have been introduced by the praetor peregrinus, Cn. Sicinius. On this and the domestic crisis, Ch.2.iii,n.2.

19. A. Postumius Albinus (pr. 155) and the Achaean embassy, Pol. 33.1; for his contact with the Athenian embassy of that year, Cic. Acad.2.137; cf. below Ch.2.iii, 74.
Spanish embassies introduced by praetor in 152/1, Pol. 35.2.5;
Bithynian embassy of 149, App. Mith. 6.
20. On the urgency of the Bithynian mission, cf. below Ch.2.iii, 75.


22. The audience given to envoys from Magnesia and Priene (*S.I.G.* ii, 679; Sherk, *op. cit.*, 7) cannot be dated owing to the loss of the relevant lines of the inscription, but they were introduced by the praetor, M. Aemilius. Other epigraphical examples can be dated outside the season: cf. *S.C.* on Thisbe (Oct. 170), *S.I.G.* ii, 646 (= Sherk, 2), 11. 2-3; *S.C.* on Narthacium and Melitaea (July), *S.I.G.* ii, 674 (= Sherk, 9), 11. 9-10; *S.C.* on Ambracia and Athamania (July), Sherk, 4, 11. 12-14; *S.C.* on Delos (intercalary month), *S.I.G.* ii, 664 (= Sherk, 5), 11. 15-19. All these audiences were presided over by praetors.

A Lycian embassy was granted an audience towards the end of summer 178 after the dispatch of the consuls (Pol. 25.4. 1-2; see Derow, *Phoenix* 27 (1973), 350-4 on the chronological setting of the embassy). In 173 the audience of the Seleucid ambassador, Apollonius, was probably presided over by the urban praetor, A. Attilius, since the senate instructed him (as part of its reply to the embassy) to renew the treaty with the Seleucid kingdom (Liv. 42.6.10). When the various Greek embassies of 170 appeared in the senate the consul Hostilius was already in Macedonia (Liv. 43.6.10, 14) and Q. Maenius, the praetor, seems to have presided (cf. Liv. 43.6.10).

Prusias was at Rome shortly after the rebuff to Eumenes at Brundisium at the beginning of winter 167/6 (Pol. 30.19.1, 14). According to Liv. 45.44.6 Prusias approached the urban praetor, Q. Cassius, and it is likely
that the latter also presided at his audience. An embassy from Cotys is described in the immediately preceding fragment (Pol. 30.17) and must also belong to the early part of Ol. 167/6 (i.e. late summer 167); Livy places his account of this embassy after Cn. Octavius' naval triumph on kal. Dec (i.e. probably mid-September 167 (Julian); cf. above Ch.1.i, n. 3) by a few days (Liv. 45.42.2ff.).
Notes to Ch.1.iii

1. On Polybius' narrative structure, Pédech, Méthode, 449ff; Walbank, Polybius, 103,110ff.

2. Pol. 23.1.1. (184/3); Pol. 23.9.1 (183/2); cf. also Diod. 31.28 (160/59).

3. On the date of this embassy and the chronology of related events, see Errington, Philopoemen, 256-61.

4. Since there is nothing particularly noteworthy about those instances which Polybius is known to have recorded, it is likely that they reflect the arbitrary selection of an excerptor.

5. 186/5: embassies from Pergamum, Maronea, Athamania, Perrhaebia, Thessaly and Macedon (Pol. 22.6.1ff).
   185/4: Macedon, Pergamum, Aenus and Maronea, Achaean League, Sparta (Pol. 22.11.1ff)
   183/2: Pergamum, Pontus, Macedon, Achaean League, Sparta, Spartan exiles (Pol. 23.9.1ff).
   182/1: Sparta, Spartan exiles, Achaean League, Pergamum, Cappadocia, Pontus (Pol. 24.1.1ff).
   170: Athens, Miletus, Alabanda, Lampsacus, Carthage, Numidia, Crete, Chalcis (Liv. 43.6.1ff).
   164/3: cf. Pol. 31.1.2ff; Diod. 31.7.2; below Ch.4.ii,184. n.34.
   153/2: Pol. 33.18.1ff. Among these was the embassy of Heracleides
and Alexander Balas who arrived at Rome while it was still the height of summer in 01. 154/3 (Pol. 33.15.1) and spent a long time there before their audience with the senate; cf. below Ch.3.ii, n.13. Polybius' account suggests that this embassy coincided with the visits of the future Attalus III and the young Demetrius, which were considerably briefer.

6. For the Lex Gabinia, Ch.2.i, passim; the order of embassies, Ch.2.iii, 68-73.

7. Pol. 32.10.1ff. On the Julian date of the consuls' inauguration in 157, cf. Ch.3.i, n.27. On the audience and the S.C., Ch.3.i, n.25, Ch.5.iii, 255f.

8. See below Ch.5.iii, 260f ; cf. also Ch.1.iv, n.8.

9. For the diplomatic activity between Rome and Macedon in these years, see Wielbank, Philip, 226-242; and between Rome and the Peloponnese, Errington, op. cit., 165-205. There is a prima facie inconsistency between the chronology of the Livian and the Polybian accounts of these years. See Errington, op. cit., 255ff. for a probable solution to these problems.


11. Pol. 30.5.1-5; Liv. 45.25.7f; cf. below Ch.4.iii, 211-3.

12. Errington, op. cit., 265 argues for a winter date for Callicrates' embassy on the ground that it was a routine annual event and would therefore belong in the usual season; cf. below Ch.4.iii, n.29.
13. On this question, see Gomme, Comm. Thuc. i, 19-20; Casson, Ships and Seamanship, 270ff.

14. cf. Liv. 31.11.18, 41.25.7; Pol. 33.9.3ff. The capacity of a quinquereme in the First Punic War is given by Polybius (1.26.7) as 300 rowers and 120 marines.


16. Achaean envoys in 183/2 were detained at Rome while the senate awaited news of the war in Messene (Pol. 23.9.14). Rhodian envoys in 177/6 and again in 167/6 were kept waiting for the senate's reply (Ch.4.ii, l67-8 ). The shortness of the young Attalus' visit in 153/2 (Pol. 33.18.3-4) seems to be explained by the immediate granting of an audience; on this see below Ch.2.iii, 81-2; see Mosley, Envoys and Diplomacy, 68-73 for the length of negotiations in classical Greece.

17. For the gathering of intelligence and observation of events, see App. 1; on canvassing senators, Ch.3 passim.

Notes to Ch.i.iv

1. For the circumstances of Theaedetus' dispatch and the powers entrusted to him, Ch.4.iii, 211-3.

2. An interesting insight into Attalus' foreign policy in the 150s is given by the document (Welles, Royal Correspondence, 61) which
declares his intention to refer to Rome on all major items of foreign
affairs; cf. Hansen, *Attalids of Pergamon*, 132. This contrasts with
his earlier independent attitude in restoring Ariarathes to the throne
of Cappadocia (Pol. 32.10.12); Hansen, *op. cit.*, 131.

3. Pol. 28.1.6-7; the instructions of the Ptolemaic envoys are
considered below, Ch.4.iii, 204-6.

4. The senate's reply to the Seleucid embassy was that it would instruct
the consul, Q. Marcius, to write to Ptolemy about the matter (Pol. 28.1.9,
here reproducing the genuine official language of the S.C.). This
suggests that Q. Marcius was the presiding magistrate at the audience,
that he was thus still in Rome and that the audience occurred early in
consular 169. But it is not altogether impossible that Marcius was
already in Macedonia and that the senate were instructing him from a
distance as it did with M. Fulvius in its reply to a Delphian embassy
in 189/8 (S.I.G. ii, 611, 11.10ff).

5. Macedonian embassy, Liv. 33.24.5. Aetolian embassy, Pol. 21.31;
Liv. 38.10.3ff.

6. On Prusias' embassy, App. *Mith.* 6; cf. below Ch.2.iii, 75.

7. Rich. *Coll. Latomus* 149, esp. 18-55, where it is shown that the
elaborate procedure for formally initiating wars could only be set
in motion early in the consular year, before the consuls of the year had
become engaged in their allotted provinces. The problems involved in
transferring a consul from one province to another were, in the
conditions of the second century, so great that if an emergency arose
mid-year, the senate had to postpone the whole process until the
following year. This explains the slow Roman responses to the
comparatively urgent situations at Saguntum in 219 and at Cirta in
112.

8. It was almost certainly in this period of the year (i.e. winter)
that the maximum number of senators would be available in Rome, and
a great proportion of routine senatorial business seems to have been
carried out early in the consular year. This is the impression given
for the 50s, for which a large amount of Ciceronian evidence is available:

The reports of returning senatorial legati would also be expected
at this time of the year. In 156 the report of C. Fannius led to the
dispatch of the consul C. Marcius to Dalmatia (Pol. 32.13.1ff.), so that
the report must have been delivered early in the consular year. The
reports of Q. Metellus (185/4) and Q. Philippus (183/2) were made
before the introduction of the embassies early in consular 184 and 182
respectively: Pol. 22.11.1, 23.9.4f; cf. below Ch.5.iii, 260-1.


Notes to Ch.2.i.

1. According to the analysis of Rapsaet-Charlier, Historia 23 (1974), 278-87, only one of the years 56-4 had an intercalary month, and there is thus only a 1:3 chance that 54 was intercalary. Cicero's letter, which was evidently written just before the Quirinalia (Feb 17), is dated a.d. xvi kal. Mart. (= Feb 14). This suggests that there was no intercalary month in 54, but the date may be a later editorial reconstruction and should not therefore be regarded as conclusive proof of this matter.

Cicero predicted that Ap. Claudius' tactics would effectively delay the holding of the comitia until March (O.F. ii.13.3), and this was presumably also the intention of these tactics (cf. Michels, Cal. Rom. Rep., 44). The interval between the Quirinalia and Mar. 1 would be 12 days in an ordinary year and about seven weeks in an intercalary year. It is more likely that Ap. Claudius could achieve and that Cicero would predict the shorter rather than the longer delay.

2. On the significance of comitial days and their distribution in the calendar, see Michels, op. cit., 36-60. On the Lex Pupia and the relationship between comitial days and senate meetings, cf. Michels, op. cit., 42-5.


4. The presiding magistrate's power over the timing of audiences is examined below, Ch.2.iii, 67-78. For the view that the Lex Gabinia
transferred power from magistrates to senate, see Griffin, JRS 63 (1973), 209-10. The transference of powers from the magistrates to the senate is the prevailing trend of the middle republic, but it normally proceeded by gradual usurpation rather than by legislation.

On the adjournment of audiences by senate, see Willems, op. cit. ii, 157. n.3; cf. below n.10.

5. The episode concerning the Bithynian embassy is dealt with more fully below, Ch.2.iii, 75. Since the presiding magistrate was the urban praetor, the embassy probably belonged to a period of the year later than the conventional diplomatic season.

Evidence that magisterial discretion was being abused in the latter years of the second century may also be found in Cicero's anecdote concerning Granius and P. Nasica (cos. 111): on this see below, Ch.2.iii, 76-7.


However these documents amount to no more than scattered references in a poorly documented period and cannot be regarded as proof that the diplomatic season was confined to February by the end of the second century. While this is a probable theory to which the documents lend weight, the only other datable audience in this period is that recorded in the S.C. on the Dionysiac guilds of a.d.? id. lun. 112 (S.I.G. ii,
705; Sherk, op. cit. 15). On the timing of the audiences in 135, 126(?) and 112, see above Ch.1.ii, 15-16, 19-20.

To show that there was an association between diplomatic activity and the month of February before 100 would not in any case affirm the existence of the Lex Gabinia at that date. Such an association is clearly established for the year 70 by references in Cicero's Verrine Orations (see below) but does not even then presuppose legislation: cf. Willems, op. cit. ii., 156-7.

In general the number of datable audiences between 150 and 70 is too small for any significant statistical conclusions to be drawn. At the later end of the period Cicero's allusions in 70 apparently point to a habitual concentration of embassies in February by that time, but examples from the years 81-63 show that exceptions were not uncommon. The S.C. on Stratonicea is dated to a.d. vi(?) kal. Apr. 81 (O.G.I.S. ii, 441; Sherk, op. cit., 18), the S.C. on Oropus to prid. id. Oct. 73 (S.I.G. ii, 747; Sherk, op. cit. 23). The S.C. on privileges for Asclepiades and other Greek individuals (which is admittedly of doubtful relevance to ambassadorial procedure) is dated to a.d. xi kal. Jun. 78. Allobrogan envoys were due to leave Rome on Dec 2 63 (Cic. Cat. iii.4-6), which means that their audience with the senate must have been considerably later than February of that year. This last example shows that embassies were still heard other than in February after 67, but no similar evidence is available for the period from 58 (the latest possible date for the Lex Gabinia) to Caesar's dictatorship.

7. For the view that the references in the Verrines illustrate a standing procedure of the senate which was later reinforced by legislation, see Willems, op. cit. ii, 156. n.5; Stuart Jones, JRS 16 (1926) 169. For the alternative view that they presuppose the Lex Gabinia, see Carcopino,
Mél. Glotz i, 121-2; Hassa/U/Crawford/Reynolds, art. cit., 218. n.27.

8. Ps.-Asconius ad Cic. Verr. ii.1.90 (= Stangl, Cic. Orat. Schol. ii, 244). The mention of the warship (myoparo) is a reference to a scandal involving Verres, on which the Milesians could give evidence.

9. For the dating of the law to 61, see Willems, op. cit. ii, 157. nn.1,3. The date of the Lex Pupia is also in dispute but is often considered to be earlier than the Lex Gabinia (Michels, op. cit. 43. n.20), and little is to be gained by making the two laws contemporary. Gruen (op. cit. 252) describes the Lex Gabinia as a modification of the Lex Pupia, and Michels (op. cit., 43) considers that the terms of the two laws conflicted. Neither of these views is a necessary conclusion from Cic. Q.F. ii.13.3 or Fam. i.4.1; but the justification by Ap. Claudius of his tactics in the former passage is apparently a controversial one, and this suggests that the laws were independently drafted or at least did not belong to a concerted programme.

Willems' interpretation of the two Cicero passages is ingenious but not entirely convincing: it places too much emphasis on the implications of Cicero's exact phraseology, which is understandably casual in the epistolary context. According to Cic. Att. i.14.5 the senate was refusing to hold any discussion on the praetorian provinces, the embassies or any other matters. The allocation of praetorian provinces had been delayed for some time (cf. Cic. Att.i.13.5) and was usually one of the first items of senatorial business in the year: it was thus perhaps regarded as a matter of greater urgency than the embassies, which were less overdue. Since the letter was written on Feb. 13 and none of the embassies had yet been heard, we may deduce
either (as Willems did) that the **Lex Gabinia** was not in operation, or that the embassies had been postponed until later in the month, as was the case in 56 (cf. *Cic. Q.F. ii.3.1*). In *Att. i.18.7* Cicero wrote: "we are prevented from passing any decrees; and I suppose that the embassies will also be put off." There is not really any greater emphasis here on embassies than in the previous passage, and there is no justification for envisaging a different procedural situation which must be explained by the passage of the **Lex Gabinia** during 61.

10. The natural interpretation of "**nisi perfectis aut rejectis legationibus**" in *Cic. Fam. i.4.1* is that the **Lex Gabinia** provided for the adjournment of individual embassies while the bulk of them were heard in February. The postponement for two weeks of the whole batch of embassies in February 56 was presumably a procedure for getting around the law, when senatorial business was behind schedule. But the postponement required a majority vote of the senate, which on the present occasion was not easily obtained; and all embassies received uniform treatment, so that the scope for corruption was limited.


12. For a fuller discussion of the **Piracy Law**, see below Ch.2.iii, 71f. The emergence of an order of embassies in the diplomatic season may be regarded as a natural development, independent of any legislation: see below Ch.2.iii, 68-71.


15. For the early growth of corruption in diplomacy at Rome, see below Ch.3.ii, 105ff.

16. See further below, esp n.19. A parallel second century example of tribunician legislation on an aspect of ambassadorial activity is perhaps provided by the *Lex Rubria Acilia* of which little is known except that its two authors were evidently the pro-Gracchan tribunes who held office either in 123 or 122. The law is mentioned in the *senatus consultum* which authorised the treaty between Rome and Astypalaia in 103: *I.G. xii.3, 173 (= Sherk, *op. cit.*, 16) 1.11. From this context however it is unclear whether the law was concerned with the provisions for sacrifices by foreign envoys at Rome or with the publication of documents in the home community: cf. Tibiletti, *Athenaeum N.S.* 31 (1953), 14-17. If the latter is the case, then the law was not really concerned with diplomatic procedure at Rome; if the former, then it is really too trivial to constitute a valid parallel example.

17. The other *Lex Gabinia*, which is not mentioned until 56 (Cic. *Att.* 5.21.12, 6.2.7), must have been passed after the failure of C. Cornelius' almost identical proposal in 67 (Ascon. 57 = Stangl, *Cic. Orat. Schol.* ii, 47): cf. Griffin, *JRS* 63 (1973), 208-9; cf. also below Ch.3.ii, 120.

influenced in his dating of the laws by his desire to see them as "not the enactments of a rabble-rousing tribune, but consular measures authorised by *senatus consultum*." This qualitative distinction between consular and tribunician legislation is at best a vague generalisation and is insufficiently verified to be of any positive value in dating the law. cf. also Broughton, *op. cit.* ii, 145, 150. n.8.

19. Gruen, *op. cit.*, 259. This argument from probability is perhaps the most reliable indication of the law's date. A tribunician law in the pre-Gracchan period was unlikely to succeed without senatorial support; and if there were senatorial support for a measure to regulate the senate's own procedures, it is far more likely that this would be expressed in a *senatus consultum*. Thus in 67 the senate opposed the need for a Lex Cornelia which would prohibit loans to foreign envoys by referring to its own previous decrees (Ascon. 57; Griffin, *art. cit.*, 208-9). If the senate as a whole was jealous of its prerogative in this aspect of diplomacy as late as 67, it is unlikely that it would have countenanced a much earlier attempt to legislate in this field.

Notes to Ch.2.ii

1. Cic. *Verr.* ii.1.90. According to Ps.-Asconius *ad loc.* the consuls were an object of apprehension, because they still at this stage had the power to determine the timing and character of an audience; cf. above Ch.2.i, 49.

2. The conventional allocation of this part of Livy's narrative is as follows: 42.18-28 and 31-36, annalistic; 42.29-30, Polybian (Nissen,
Krit. Unt. 246-9; cf. Walbank, JRS 31 (1941), 85 for minor amendments). Nissen, op. cit., 247 regarded 42.26.2-6 as dubious, referring to Liv. 42.29.11 and to L. Decimius' mission to Gentius later in 172 (Liv. 42.37.2). Neither of these passages contradicts Liv. 42.26.2-6, and in fact both testify to Gentius' unreliability as an ally of Rome on the eve of war.

3. For Issa's deditio in 229, Pol. 2.11.12. For the diplomatic pressure from Issa in the years before 157, Pol. 32.91ff; Rome's subsequent military intervention, Pol. 32.13.

4. The information on details of senatorial administration and procedure is usually considered to be the most reliable part of the annalistic tradition: cf. Walbank, in Dorey (Ed.), Livy, 51; Briscoe, Comm. Livy 31-33, 10-12; Walsh, Livy, 165 and 286.

5. On the relationship between espionage and diplomacy and the propaganda value of the charge of espionage, see below App.1.

6. Livy's account of the embassy (45.20.4-25.4) diverges widely from Pol. 30.4 (cf. also Diod. 31.5) and must therefore be annalistic in origin (Nissen, op. cit., 274-5). Polybius' account does not appear to be in any way abbreviated, and therefore would not originally have contained any mention of M. Iunius.

7. The alternative reconstruction is that the consul was informed of the Rhodian envoys' approach and consulted the senate in advance of his interview with them. This would correspond to the action of L. Bestia in 111, when it was decided that Jugurtha's envoys should not (as enemies)
be admitted to the city and should leave Italy at once: Sall. Iug. 28.2; cf. below Ch.2.iii, n.3.

However it is unlikely that in 167 the Rhodian envoys entered Rome and came to the comitium during the short period of time when the consul was actually consulting the senate.

8. In the Livian version of the embassy the senate's reply is described as "such that the Rhodians neither became enemies nor continued as allies" (45.25.4). This summarises their position well, although it does not exactly correspond to the reply reported by Polybius (30.4.7-9) and the Rhodians had not juridically been socii.

9. The surviving Polybian version of this embassy (30.18) is concerned only with denigrating Prusias' behaviour and not with ambassadorial procedures. Livy's account does not contradict it but is clearly derived from a different (i.e. annalistic) source: cf. Nissen, op. cit., 91.

10. For Eumenes' reception in 189, Pol. 21.18.1ff; cf. Liv. 37.52.1ff; On the audience given to Euergetes and Menyllus in 162 (Pol. 31.10), see below Ch.5.iii,259-60. For honours to ambassadors of royal blood, cf. the reception of Demetrius (184/3), Pol. 23.2.9; of Attalus and his brothers (181/0), Pol. 24.5.5-6; Diod. 29.22; and of Masgaba (168), Liv. 45.13.12ff.

Members of royal families were frequently sent as ambassadors to Rome on missions of quite routine nature. Büttner-Wobst, op. cit., passim regarded kings and their relatives as effectively a separate juridical category of ambassador, but it was only in the honorific sphere that there appears to have been any difference of treatment.
11. Prusias' embassy is located shortly before Eumenes' journey to Italy (Pol. 30.19.1) and the latter's departure from Italy is dated by Polybius (30.19.4) to the beginning of winter. Thus Prusias' brief visit could not have been much earlier than the late summer of 167, by which time both consuls would certainly have gone to their provinces in North Italy; cf. Ch.1.ii, n. 22.

12. For other examples, cf. Cagnat, Legatio, 1034. n.9. According to Valerius Maximus (5.1.1e) it was the senate which sent the quaestor to Prusias at Capua; for the senate's failure to send a quaestor to escort Ptolemy Philometor in 164/3, Val. Max. 5.1.1f. Valerius was frequently inaccurate and the latter passage in particular should not be regarded as entirely trustworthy. (The Polybian version of Philometor's visit is preserved in Diod. 31.18; here Demetrius appears to have known in advance of Philometor's arrival - and if Demetrius, why not the senate?) However Valerius had access to a number of annalistic sources, which must ultimately depend on archival material for information of this kind. In addition the dispatch of a quaestor on such a mission apparently involved a considerable disbursement from the treasury (cf. Liv. 45.13.12); this makes it more likely that the senate as a whole were involved in taking the decision. On such extraordinary expenses, Willems, op. cit.ii, 431.


15. cf. above Ch.1.ii, n.8.
16. Plutarch does not actually state that the process of registration existed in republican times (τὸ παραμένειν), but by saying that it survives he implies that it was part of the original functions of the questor, which also included the provision of hospitality. A similar process of registration (ὦμορφα) appears to be attested for second century Rhodes as a preliminary requirement for visiting embassies (I.v.Magn. 55, 11.4ff). Kienast however (Presbeia, 553) equates this with the meeting with the magistrates at which the ambassadors handed over their documents (cf. Pol. 27.4.3).

17. On the takeover of the quaestor's functions by more experienced praefecti, see Mattingly, *Imperial Civil Service of Rome*, 18-19.

As evidence for the continuation of the official provision of hospitality until the end of the Republic, see the S.C. on Mytilene of 46: S.I.G. ii, 764 (= Sherk, *op. cit.*, 26) 11.23-6; cf. below Ch.2.iv, n. 20.

18. The traditional formula preserved in senatus consultum well illustrates this subordinate role: the presiding magistrate is to order the quaestor to provide hospitality to the ambassadors. For numerous examples of this, see below Ch.2.iv, n.15.

19. Varro's use of the pluperfect implies that he was writing about a practice which had been discontinued. The *De Lingua Latina* is usually considered to have been published before the death of its dedicatee, M. Cicero, in December 43: cf. Collart (Ed.), *Varron: De Lingua Latina* V, ix-x.

Notes to Ch.2.iii

1. Willems, Le Sénat ii, pp 130-1; Mommsen, Röm. Staatsrecht ii, 129-31; iii, 1155-6.

2. For the reception of Cappadocian embassy, Liv. 42.19.3-6. The consuls of 172 had proclaimed that they would handle no public business other than what pertained to the provinces (Liv. 42.10.15). Thus if they had been at Rome, they would not have presided at an ambassadorial audience. Both the domestic praetors were charged with supervising the restoration of the Ligurians enslaved by M. Popilius (Liv. 42.22.5), and presumably both would not have been absent at once.

3. Thus Jugurtha's envoys in 111 were forbidden access into the city (Sall. Iug. 28.2) and ordered to leave Italy. The Aetolian embassy of 189 was dismissed with the warning that any future embassies would be treated as enemies, unless sent with the consent of the Roman commander (Liv. 37.49.8). When enemy embassies did arrive at Rome (having obtained such consent and usually with the intention of negotiating), they were not admitted within the walls but were given audience outside: eg. Liv. 34.43.2 (embassy from Nabis, 194): Pol. 35.2.3-4 (Aravacae, 151); cf. Fremerstein, Legatus, 113 for other examples; below Ch.2.iv, 89 and n. 17.

4. The opposition of the two tribunes, Liv. 45.21.3ff; Polybius (30.4.6) mentions only Antonius. The introduction of the envoys by Antonius is mentioned only by Polybius (loc. cit.); there is a lacuna at this point in Livy's narrative. On the sources, cf. above Ch.2.ii, n.6.

5. According to Willems, op. cit. ii, pp 139-42, it was unusual for a
tribune to preside over the senate in the pre-Gracchan period, and this would invariably happen only when a higher magistrate had convened the senate. Willems can cite only three instances of tribunes convening the senate, and all of these are in exceptional circumstances in the first century.

6. Ps.-Aristeas 175; cf. above Ch.1.i, 4-5.


8. Pol. 23.1-4; Liv. 39.46.6-48.3. The arrangement of the audiences is discussed in greater detail below, Ch.4.ii, 181ff.

9. Pol. 21.18-24; Liv. 37.52-55; Diod. 29.11; cf. below Ch.5.ii, 233ff.

10. According to Diod. 29.7 Smyrna, Lampsacus and Alexandria Troas were the first of the Asian Green states to send embassies to the senate; cf. App. Syr.2. The embassy from Lampsacus may be dated to 197/6 by the evidence of S.I.G. ii, 591. On the establishment of the cult of Roma at Smyrna in 195, Tac. Ann.4.56.1.

11. Apart from considerations of etiquette the order of audiences might materially affect the outcome of the embassies concerned. Thus in 172 the senate was predisposed by Eumenes' speech to reject the defence made by Perseus' envoy, Harpalus (Liv. 42.14.2-3). Similarly in 154 Neolaides and Andromachus, the envoys of Ptolemy Philometor, did not receive a proper hearing from the senate because Euergetes had spoken first and influenced the senate's attitude (Pol. 33.11.4-5).

Speaking first would thus appear to carry a clear advantage, but it is not clear if this was always so. At the Achaean League meeting of
198 which abandoned the Macedonian alliance in favour of Rome the Roman legatus spoke first, followed by the ambassadors of Attalus and the Rhodians. The Macedonian envoys were then heard, but the Athenian envoys were left to speak last "so that they could refute the words of the Macedonians" (Liv. 32.19.11-12).

12. Pol. 30.30-2. Rhodian friendship with Rome dates from at least 201/00 when a Rhodian embassy sought Roman help against Philip V. The view that friendship between Rome and Rhodes had lasted 140 years by 167 was rejected by Holleaux, Rome, la Grèce, 30-44. This rejection however requires rather unconvincing amendments to the text of Pol. 30.5.6 as it stands, and it is possible that some long-standing connection did exist. Thus Holleaux's view has in turn been generally rejected: cf. Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos, 1-49. Achaean friendship dates from the synkletos of 198 (Liv. 32.19.1ff).


For the provision for Stratonicean embassies, O.C.I.S. ii, 441 (= Sherk, op. cit., 18), 11.66 and 131.

14. Hassall/Crawford/Reynolds, art. cit., 218 discuss the possibility that the law belongs to the month of February, "when a hearing according to the συνεδρία would be possible" (for the Rhodian envoys). It is not clear exactly what kind of institution is envisaged by this use of words, but it is apparently connected with the Lex Gabinia. The connection between the Lex Gabinia and the Piracy Law is discussed and
rejected in an earlier section: cf. above Ch.2.i,50-1.

15. For Greek practice, see Kienast, Presbêia, 555f.

16. Plut. Cato Maior 22; a shorter account is provided by Gell. Noct. Att. vi.14.8-10 (= Pol. 33.2). Cato's words, as reproduced by Plutarch, were to the effect that the senate should give its reply to the ambassadors as soon as possible. This suggests that it was for this reply that the ambassadors had been kept waiting, but the rest of Plutarch's narrative implies that it was the original audience which had been delayed. It is apparent from both Plutarch and Gellius that the ambassadors public rhetorical performances preceded their audience with the senate. Plutarch's vagueness may be explained in terms of his biographer's anecdotal style and his lack of interest in procedural details.

17. Plut. Cato Maior 12.5. This does not necessarily suggest that the two men were political opponents, although that is a plausible inference. Apart from their possible disagreement over the handling of the Achaean ambassadors, Cato and Postumius also seem to have disagreed over the policy to be followed with regard to the Achaean detainees. In 155 Postumius deployed his magisterial powers to prevent the senate from consenting to their release (Pol. 33.1.3-8). When the detainees were finally released in 151/0 this was due partly to Cato's intervention on their behalf (Plut. Cato Maior 9.2-3 = Pol. 35.6).

18. These philhellenic leanings cannot of course be translated into political terms. Scullard, Rom. Politics, 238 regards Postumius' attitude towards the Achaean detainees (on which see previous note) as
"curious since he was a philhellene". However his opposition to their return probably reflects a policy of support for Callicrates' party in Achaea and not hostility towards the Achaean League or Greek states generally: there is nothing surprising in a measure of understanding between Roman philhellenes and Greek pro-Romans. It is more understandable that philhellenism would influence the attitude of Postumius and of other Roman senators towards the intellectual Athenian envoys of 156/5, and this factor may even have determined their selection for the mission; cf. below Ch.5.i, 227-8.

19. For the situation in Bithynia at this time, Will, Hist. Politique ii, 323-4. Rome's diplomatic intervention is mentioned in a number of sources, but invariably the centre of interest is Cato's remark on the outgoing Roman ambassadors (for sources, Broughton, M.R.R. i, 460). Only App. Mith. 6 preserves a full account of the treatment of Prusias' embassy.

20. For the senate's decision, App. Mith. 6: τοῖν οἰκείον αὐτοῖν ἐλέοσκει. Appian's use of αὐτοῖν suggests that there was something unusual in this procedures, and that the members of an embassy would not usually be selected by a single magistrate. In the first century the procedure was certainly different (cf. Cic. Att. i.19.2-3) and evidence for the second century is scarce, although the present passage is cited as a typical example; cf. Willems, op. cit. ii, 492-4; Premerstein, art. cit., 1134.

In any case the senate seems to have expressed confidence in the praetor's handling of the situation so far by entrusting the selection of envoys to him (whether or not this was an accepted procedure), and it quite possibly expected that the embassy would be either pro-Attalus or, as was the case, quite ineffective. Incidentally it is not really
clear whether Cato's remark shows that he disapproved of the composition
of the embassy, and thus also of the praetor's pro-Attalus policy. This
is perhaps the most likely explanation; but Cato's attitude in the
clash between Attalus and Prusias has been variously interpreted,
and the remark itself is not conclusive one way or the other (cf. Scullard,
Rom. Politics, 238 and 271).

21. Another (contemporary) manifestation of the presiding magistrate's
powers is the manoeuvre by which A. Postumius Albinus, the praetor of
155, thwarted the proposed restoration of Achaean detainees (Pol. 33.1.3-8).

22. The conduct of the consuls of 173-1 in defiance of the senate is
illuminating but not of course typical: cf. Scullard, Rom. Politics,
194-8. The senate's collective attempts to curb the individual excesses
of its members in the second century is discussed by Toynbee, Hannibal's
Legacy ii, 486ff.

23. The identification of this P. Nasica with the consul of 111 is
more or less certain, since Granius' other famous contemporaries (mentioned
by Cicero, loc. cit.) also belong to the years around 100. Nasica is
described as ἀρχηγός throughout his life (Diod. 34.33.8) and seems
to have had a virtuous reputation. On the iustitium, Mommsen, Rom.
Staatsrecht i, 263.

24. C. Memmius' first intervention occurred late in 112 before the
election of the consuls for 111 (Sall. Iug. 27.2). The acceptance of
gifts by Roman nobles from their foreign clients could be regarded at
this time as an extension of a legitimate traditional practice or it
might be construed as corruption: no precise dividing line can really be

25. Liv. 42.48.1-4 follows Pol. 27.6.1-4 where the ambassadors are named as Solon and Hippias. An annalistic version of the same embassy appears at Liv. 42.36.1-6: cf. Nissen, *op. cit.*, 249; Walbank *JRS* 31 (1941), 89. n.56.

26. On these dates, Walbank, *art. cit.*, 89.


For Rome’s lack of military preparations as a factor influencing Marcius’ agreement to a truce with Perseus, cf. esp. Liv. 42.43.2-3. The extent to which Perseus was incapacitated by the truce is well illustrated by his inability to intervene on behalf of his partisans in Boeotia (Pol. 27.5.5-8).

28. For the simultaneous dispatch of the two Rhodian embassies, Pol. 29.10.4. The arrival of the envoys at Paullus' camp, Liv. 44.35.4f. The news of Pydna was officially announced at Rome on a.d. vi. kal. Oct. 168 (Liv. 45.2.2-6): this is equivalent to a Julian date early in July.

Even if this chronological argument fails to stand up, it is clear from Pol. 29.19.1. that the senate had chosen to wait for news from Macedonia before granting an audience to the Rhodians.

29. Liv. 45.10.2-3. Popilius was dispatched as an immediate response to the appeal of a Ptolemaic embassy (Liv. 44.19.13-14). This embassy was heard at the beginning of consular 168 (Liv. 44.19.5ff), and left Rome together with Popilius' embassy (Liv. 44.20.1).
For the importance of the Roman victory in the fulfilment of Popilius' mission, Pol. 29.27.12-13.

During the interval between his dispatch and the actual interview with Antiochus in Egypt, Popilius was engaged in military activities in the Aegean (Liv. 44.29.1-5, 45.10.2). It is thus perhaps not surprising that Polybius (29.27.1) refers to him as "the Roman strategos" and not as "the Roman envoy".


31. On this procedure, cf. above Ch.1.iv, n.9.

32. The Polybian embassy, Pol. 27.3.1-5, 27.6.1; Liv. 42.45.1-7 (Nissen, op. cit., 15 and 252); Broughton, op. cit. i, 412-3 (172B.C.: Legates, Ambassadors 5) and 415. n.4.


33. The audience for Solon and Hippias seems to coincide with the opening of the 171 campaigning season (i.e. March 171): cf. Walbank, art. cit. 89. n.56.

   The Rhodian embassy apparently reached Rome at about the same time as the returning Roman embassy (Liv. 42.26.9), but this was still before the end of consular 172. The consuls of 171 probably entered office in December 172 (Julian): cf. above Ch.1.i, n.3; Walbank, art. cit., 89.

34. Liv. 42.14.6-9. This passage is generally reckoned to be of Polybian origin: cf. Nissen, op. cit., 245. It has recently however been rejected by Gruen, art. cit., 68 as an annalistic fabrication. The
latter however does not make clear how much of the rest of Liv. 42.11.2 - 17.9 should also be regarded as annalistic.

35. On this, see Gruen, _art. cit._, 60ff. Thus the statement in Pol. 27.3.1-2 that the Rhodians did not require the attention of the Roman envoys might reflect this polemic; so too might the favourable account of Hagesilocharus' activities which follows (Pol. 27.3.3-5). Gruen himself however rejects the annalistic embassy (cf. above, n.32).

The fact that the Roman envoys spent most of their time at Rhodes (Pol. 23.1.2; Liv. 42.45.2-3) may indicate that the situation there was unstable. Admittedly Livy (_loc. cit._) gives as the reason that the Rhodians were considered by the Romans to be of the greatest importance in everything; but this again may reflect Rhodian propaganda derived ultimately from Rhodian sources through Polybius.

36. Broughton, _op. cit._, 415. n.5 is able to list three possible identifications for this Ti. Claudius. All three have the _cognomen_ Nero which is the _cognomen_ given by Livy in the annalistic version of the dispatch of the embassy (42.19.7).

37. Eumenes at Aegina, Liv. 42.16.6-7, 18.4. The Roman envoys' meeting with Eumenes there, Liv. 42.26.7.


39. Sall. _Iug._ 28.2; cf. above Ch.2.ii, n.7; 2.iii, n.3.

40. On the number of embassies, Pol. 23.1.1. The introduction of the accusing embassies, Pol. 23.1.6-9.
Notes to Ch.2.iv.

1. cf. Mosley, Envoys and Diplomacy, 79; Kienast, Presbeia, 566f.

2. Aesh. 3. 250, where he is complaining specifically of Demosthenes. But in later times men would be thanked for providing such unofficial hospitality: cf. Wilhelm, Jahr. Öst. Arch. Inst. 17 (1914) 46-7 for texts in which Greek statesmen are thanked for their reception of visiting Romans.


4. Liv. 42.1. 7-11.

5. Liv. 28.39.


7. On this see Ch.3.iv, 130-1.


9. cf. Pol. 16.21.8 (Tlepolemus' generosity to ambassadors in 202/1); Pol. 18.54.3 (Epiphanes' court in 197/6).

10. It was an unusual honour for Lucullus to be offered hospitality in the royal palace in c.84 (Plut. Luc. 2); similarly it was unusual for Antiochus to move out of his court for Ti. Gracchus' embassy in
11. For grants of *proxenia* and other honours for Hellenistic courtiers, cf. (e.g.) *O.G.I.S.* i, 81 (Oropus honours ἱλασμός of Ptolemy IV); *O.G.I.S.* i, 241 (Delphi honours ἱλασμός of Antiochus III); *I.G.* xi. 4.631, 679, 765 (Delian decrees); cf. also above Ch.3.i, n.8; Kienast, *op. cit.*, 583ff.

12. Liv. 45.22. 1-2; cf. Ch.5.ii, 249-50.

13. For (mainly literary) examples, see table in Büttner-Wobst, *op. cit.*, 48; for other second century *senatus consultae* conferring *munera*, see Sherk, *op. cit.*, 9, 10, 15, 16.

14. On this see Büttner-Wobst, *op. cit.*, 51ff; cf. also Ch.2.ii, n. 12.

15. The exception is the first of the *senatus consultae* on the dispute between Samos and Priene in the 130s (Sherk, *op. cit.*, 10 A).

   Lines 9-11 of the decree, as restored by Hiller von Gaertringen, *I.v. Priene*, 40 read "(it was decreed) that the quaestor send gifts to them (the envoys) to the value of 125 sesterces for each embassy". However it is not certain that the 11 belongs to the same document as 11. 9-10 (cf. Sherk, *op. cit.*, p. 54 citing Hicks, *Anc. Gr. Inscr. Brit. Mus.* iii, CCCCV, p.20); and if it is assumed not to, the end of the document can be restored in the manner of 11. 12-14 of the second *S.C.* (Sherk, *op. cit.*, 108): "the consul Ser. Fulvius is to instruct the quaestor to send ἔπιτιμον to each embassy to the value of 120 sesterces". This formula is otherwise standard throughout the surviving *senatus consultae*: for other examples, Sherk, *op. cit.*, 9,
16. Sherk, op. cit., 22, ll. 25-6 (Greek) and 13 (Latin); cf. 15, l. 64; 16, l. 10; 18, l. 90. The _S.C. de Asclepiade_ does not strictly speaking refer to ambassadorial practice, since the senate was giving audience to private individuals who did not represent any particular state. Thus the grant of hospitality, which is included with the _munus_ in the decree, was not standard for ambassadors. However the decree resembles the other relevant documents in other respects, and the grant of hospitality and gifts resembles the similar third and second century _S.C.s_ recorded by Livy (Büttner-Wobst, _op. cit._, 48).


18. Plut. _Ti. Gracch._ 14.2 (cf. above Ch.3.iii, n. 9); Cic. _Att._ 13.2.2.


20. cf. the _S.C._ on Mytilene of 46/5, Sherk, _op. cit._, 26, Col B, l. 23-20: "C. Caesar _αὐτουράωρ _... is to order the quaestor to provide τόπως _χορήγια_ for them (the envoys) _κατὰ τῶν προγόνων_ _θῶν_." This last phrase presumably translated the Latin "more _maiorum_", but it is not clear whether this refers to an old practice (perhaps early second century) which has been discontinued or to a
traditional practice still current. When Livy uses the phrase in the context of the senate's appointment of a decemviral commission in 196 (33.24.7), he refers to a practice followed only 5 years previously and for which no earlier examples are attested. But this may simply reflect Livy's knowledge of examples later in the second century when it did become a traditional practice.

At any rate the provision of ὑποσσὺσ ἄσφαλτος (accommodation and expenses) is not attested in the examples cited in nn. 15-16 above or elsewhere. A contemporary edict of Julius Caesar (or S.C. ? - cf. Viereck, Sermo Graecus, 97ff.) recorded by Josephus provides for the Jewish ambassadors (Ant. Jud. 14.10.3/198), and this probably represents the normal practice of the period. The S.C. on Mytilene may be making special provision for the envoys of a favoured ally (cf. Sherk, op. cit., pp. 154-5), and such treatment may have been more common in the disturbed conditions of the late Republic.

21. On this evidence, cf. above, Ch.2.iii, 84; cf. also S.I.G. ii, 591, li. 9-11 on the expense of Lampsacus' 197/6 embassy to Rome (above Ch.4.iii, n. 28).
Notes to Ch.3.i.


2. On the effectiveness of ambassadorial speeches in the senate, see below Ch.5.i and ii.

3. For the procedure followed in the discussion, see Mommsen, *Röm. Staatsrecht* iii, 962ff. esp. 978f.

4. On junior senators, Mommsen, *op. cit.* iii, 962; the order of seniority, *ibid.*, 965f. In the second century *censorii* ranked above other *consulares* (*ibid.*, 967. n.1); most senior of all was the *princeps senatus* who spoke first on all issues (*ibid.*, 969f).

5. The number of surviving *consulares* naturally fluctuated. In a sample year (185) there were 29 who were definitely alive and 9 possibly alive. The effect of the *Lex Villia* (180) was probably to raise the average age of consuls to mid-40s. In the long run this would tend to reduce the number of *consulares*, but by prohibiting frequent re-election the same law would also act in the opposite direction. If the average age of a consul at the end of his year of office was 45, a mean life expectancy of 60 would give a figure of 30 *consulares* while one of 65 would give 40. We may thus accept 30-40 as a plausible estimate of the *consulares* in the second century senate. On the
question of life expectancy in antiquity, see Burn, Past and Present 4 (1953), 1-31; Jones, Ath. Democracy, 82-3.

A much smaller number of consulares is attested at the end of the third century. Scullard (Rom. Politics, 280) lists only 16 certainly or probably alive in 201. This smaller number is explained by the conditions of the Hannibalic War, which not only shortened life expectancy but encouraged the frequent re-election of consuls: there were only 9 new consuls out of the 22 elected in the years 217-207.

6. Mommsen, op. cit., 981. The final shape of a senatus consultum would invariably reflect the original sententia of a consularis or a compromise between conflicting consular sententiae.

7. cf. Thuc. 5.45.1-2: Alcibiades in 420 privately offered Spartan ambassadors in Athens an agreement whereby he would support them if they denied that they had come with full powers. The offer was accepted by the ambassadors, although Alcibiades had no intention of honouring the agreement himself.

8. An Athenian decree of 168/7 honours Diodorus, a ὕλος of Eumenes, for various services including assistance rendered to Athenian ambassadors sent to Eumenes: τὸν ὑλὸν ἐργασμένον ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου πρεσβευτὴς συνηγγυσάμενος (S.I.G. ii, 651, 11.14-15).

    cf. also the monument at Seleucia, on which several states (including Rhodes and Byzantium) honour Eudemus for the assistance he had given their ambassadors at the court of Antiochus Epiphanes (S.I.G. ii, 644-5).

    This kind of assistance was not confined to the royal courts. A decree of Ionian Erythrae (c.260) honours an Aetolian, Neoptolemus, for taking the part of their ambassadors to the Aetolian League: τῶν πρεσβευτῶν οἰκονόμων, ἔμφασις ἐν τῷ περί τῶν ἡσαν ἱκανοπλήρως,
σωβρεύσας τε και συνετέρατεν φιλοτήμως ε'ν χρήμα την πόλις.
(S.I.G. i, 412, ll.4-6). For similar honours to P. Farsuleius, a Roman, cf. below Ch.3.ii, nn16-7.


10. S.I.G. ii, 656, ll. 19-28. The circumstances of the embassy have been the subject of disagreement. Robert, B.C.H. 59 (1935), 510ff. rejected the generally held view that Cotys had claimed sovereignty over Abdera and that the continued autonomy of the city was at stake. This view reflected a misunderstanding of the phrase πρεσβευόν χώρα (l.5), which in fact shows, as Robert pointed out, that the situation was one of a conventional territorial dispute.

The origin of the embassy is explained in ll.5-10 of the decree. The Thracian king, Cotys, had laid claim to a part of Abdera's territory and had sent his son, Bithys, with an embassy to Rome to press this claim. There was thus a need for a counter-embassy from Abdera to oppose Cotys' claim. Bithys had been held as a hostage by the Romans after the defeat of Perseus in 168, but was released by the senate as a gesture of magnanimity in 167 (Pol. 30.17.1-4; Liv. 45.42.5-12).

The date of the embassy is given as c.166 by Dittenberger, S.I.G. ii, p.223 and Colin, Rome et la Grece, 494; but it is not made clear why the embassy should have been so soon after 167 (Bithys' release).

11. On the scale of honours and the probable success of the mission,
References to the later status of Abdera are quite irrelevant in determining the success or otherwise of the mission, if it was concerned merely with a territorial dispute: cf. Robert, *art. cit.*, 513.


13. Robert, *art. cit.*, 509 rejects τούς πρώτους Ρωμαίων in favour of the term τούς ήγουμένους Ρωμαίων which is more common in epigraphical documents. But this is no ordinary inscription and the more common reading does not appear to be appropriate. To support his emendation Robert refers to inscriptions cited by Wilhelm, *Jahr. Öst. Arch. Inst.* 17 (1914), 46-7, but in these the term clearly refers to Roman magistrates. Magistrates are inappropriate in the context of the Abdera decree, which is concerned with unofficial contacts with individual Roman senators. Moreover ήγουμένους would require ten letters to be supplied in 1.21, whereas πρώτος requires only seven: the latter conforms more nearly to the average length of spaces to be filled in the other lines of the inscription.

14. For example the men who pressed the accusation against Alcibiades in 415 hoped by eliminating him to become πρώτοι (Thuc. 6.28.10). This must refer to a power struggle among a handful of men at the top.

15. For the identification of these men as the patrons of Teos and not of Abdera, Robert, *art. cit.*, 513.

The Roman concept of patronage came to be identified in the Greek world with the indigenous institutions of ἱκέργεσις and προτευσία.
cf. Bowersock, op. cit., 12-13. The acknowledgement of a Roman patron in the second century (before the general adoption of the word τερπεύ) often took the form of an honorary decree conferring the status of one or both of these institutions. Some of the Romans thus honoured were very illustrious, e.g. M. Lepidus (S.E.G. i, 147) and P. Scipio Africanus (S.I.G. ii, 617). Cn. Octavius, honoured as proxenos and benefactor by Argos in 169 (Moretti, I.S.E., 42) was of a praetorian family and had not as yet himself obtained the praetorship. Other recipients of these honours were more obscure, e.g. P. Farsuleius (F.D. 3.i, 42; cf. below Ch. 3.i, n. 6.) and Q. Βρότιος (S.I.G. ii, 585, 1.16-17). The range of Romans who might be considered the patrons of Greek states was thus extensive.

16. On the grammatical independence of the second main clause and the logical separation of the third from the second group, Robert, art. cit. 512-3. Robert thus disposes of the unnecessary and unexplained opinion of Dittenberger, S.I.G. ii, 656, n.7 that Group 3 are Abderite patrons who originally favoured Cotys.

17. This is implicit in 11.5-10 of the decree, where the original purpose of the embassy is explained. It appears that Cotys had already sent an embassy to uphold his territorial claim.

18. (i) It is likely that the brief account of Cephisodorus' achievements by Pausanias (1.36.5-6) approximately reproduces the wording on the monument to which he refers (cf. McDonald/Walbank, JRS 27 (1937), 198-9). This second-hand synopsis mentions only that Cephisodorus sailed to Italy with other envoys and that his mission was successful.

An extant inscription in which Cephisodorus, sailing to Italy with other
envoys, is honoured by the Athenians refers even more briefly to his
ambassadorial activity: καὶ πρεσβείας παπρεσβεϊνης ὑπὲρ τῶν μεγίστων
εἰς διάπερ τὸς πύλας καὶ τῇ χώρᾳ (Meritt, Hesperia 5 (1936),
419ff. (= Moretti, I.S.E., 33), 11.22ff).

(ii) The decree of Lampsacus in honour of Hegesias (196/5) mentioned
only the audience which the senate granted him together with Massilian
ambassadors and summarises the speech which he made on that occasion
(S.I.G. ii, 591, 11.51ff).

(iii) A decree of Alabanda in honour of Pyrrha (kos?) (c.187)
commemorates two embassies to Rome undertaken by him (Diehl/Cousin,
B.C.H. 10 (1886), 299ff). The execution of each of these missions
is treated with the greatest brevity in the decree (11.21-22 and 28-31);
cf. Holleaux, R.E.G. 11 (1898), 258ff.


21. The main source is Pol. 30.1-3; cf. Liv. 45.19.1-20.3. Livy follows
Polybius here, but omits the senate's reversal of its decision over
Aenus and Maronea and in other ways "improves" Polybius' account: cf.
Nissen, op. cit., 31 and 274.

On Polybius' interest in the embassy, Gelzer, Kl. Schr. iii, 170-1.

22. Pol. 30.17-9: ἐνέβαλεν τὸν Ἀτταλον ἐπὶ πάνω μετέβηκα ταύταν καὶ
συγκατανεύειν ἐν ταῖς μὲν ἰδιαν ὁμιλίαις τοῖς ἐις τὸ ὅτῳ τὸ μέρος αὐτῶν
παραρθήσαν.

23. Pol. 30.3.6-7. The senate assumed that Attalus would request a
separate audience in which he would speak about his intended disloyalty.
towards his brother and the possible partition of the Pergamene kingdom. Polybius speaks here of the expectations and actions of the senate as a whole, but he has made it clear that the agreement which Attalus broke was made with a handful of influential senators who could virtually control the senate's decisions.

24. On the dispute between Ariarathes and Orophernes, see Will, Hist. Politique ii, 312-4. The main source for the events at Rome is Pol. 32.10; cf. App. Syr. 47.

25. Polybius' account of these events breaks off at 32.10.8, but we know from 32.11.3 that Polybius went on to describe the sequel. Here he apologises for interrupting his usual narrative sequence and dealing with Asiatic affairs before those of Greece. He had been unable to separate Ariarathes' restoration from his departure from Italy. If these events are included in the Italian affairs section of 158/7, it is evident that Polybius had also described the events in which Ariarathes was involved before his departure from Italy, and this will have included his audience with the senate.

On the significance of the senatus consultum and the related question of Orophernes' expectations, see the discussion below Ch.5.iii, 255-6.

26. Ariarathes was brought to Rome in 172 (Liv. 42.19.3), but it is not known how long he resided there. Charops of Epirus had taken advantage of a similar opportunity to establish important contacts in Rome and thereby secure his own advancement in Epirus (cf. below Ch.3.ii, n.19). A third example is provided by Nicomedes of Bithynia, who was brought to Rome by his father Prusias II in 167: cf. below Ch.3.iv, 133ff.
27. Ariarathes arrived at Rome ἐν θερόισιν φόνοισ (Pol. 32.10.1); cf. Pédech, Méthode, 461-4 for Polybius’ use of seasonal terms. Pédech however draws the wrong inference from the present passage about the relationship between the astronomical and consular years (op. cit., 462). Derow, Phoenix 27 (1973), 355-6 is correct to insist that there was an interval between Ariarathes’ arrival and the beginning of consular 157, and that the Ides of March 157 was not significantly earlier than it had been in the earlier years of the century.

Notes to Ch.3.ii.

1. This ambivalence was not a new feature in diplomatic practice. In fourth century Athens regular payments could be made to politicians from abroad, which were tolerated by public opinion and not necessarily regarded as systematic bribery (Jones, Ath. Democracy, 128-9).

At Rome the activities of Cineas as Pyrrhus’ ambassador in 279 had probably made a deep impression (Plut. Pyrrh. 18-19). It may have been this embassy which led to the restrictions (in force by 251 – Dio Cass. fr. 43.27) on the freedom of movement of enemy envoys, especially the requirement that they lodge outside the walls.

2. On Timarchus, Ziegler, Pauly-W. ii.11, 1237f. (= Timarchos Nr.5). On Heracleides, Otto, Pauly-W. 8, 465-8 (= Herakleidos Nr.32); Olshausen, Prosop. der Hell. Königsgesandten, 212.


3. For the embassies, Pol. 28.1.1-9 and 28.22.1-3. Polybius records the
same personnel for both embassies, i.e. Meleager, Sosiphanes and Heracleides.


5. Polybius' friendship with Demetrius is evident from the part he played in Demetrius' escape from Rome in 162 (Pol. 31.11-15). His hostility towards Heracleides is apparent from his account of Heracleides' embassy to Rome: cf. 33.15.2 and 33.18.10f.

6. Just. 34.3.2: coluerat inter ceteros Popilium Antiochus, cum obses Romae esset. It was this C. Popilius who in 168 communicated to Antiochus in an uncompromising fashion the senate's demand that he should evacuate Egypt. This might be regarded as contradicting Justin's claim that the two men were privately connected. But Polybius' account of the interview does partially corroborate Justin's statement. Popilius handed a copy of the senatus consultum to Antiochus and told him to read it before making "the sign of friendship" (Pol. 29.27.2-3). When Antiochus agreed to do whatever the Romans demanded, Popilius and his entourage "took his hand and greeted him cordially" (29.27.6).

7. For these events, Pol. 28.1.1-9; Diod. 30.2. The senate's reply to Meleager's embassy expressed no judgement of its own but left the matter to the discretion of the consul, Q. Marcius (Pol. 28.1.9; cf. above Ch.1.ii,n.2. On the use of the word ἱντευκός see below App. 3.

8. According to App. Syr. 47 Demetrius disposed of Heracleides and Timarchus, who rebelled against him, and when he had secured his position
sent to Rome the embassy which brought the crown and the murderer of Cn. Octavius. This embassy arrived in Rome in the winter of 160/59, and it is therefore probable that Timarchus' rebellion was suppressed in the summer of 160. This makes 161/0 the most likely date for Timarchus' embassy to Rome.

Ti. Gracchus seems to have been in the East during the years 162-0: see for his dispatch Pol. 31.15.9ff. In the late summer of 160 Gracchus gave some kind of official recognition to Demetrius (Pol. 31.33.3) and this was immediately prior to the dispatch of Demetrius' 160/59 embassy. According to Polybius Gracchus was very well-disposed towards Demetrius and helped him to secure the throne (Pol. 31.33.4), but official recognition was clearly delayed until after the defeat of Timarchus, who did have the senate's official backing (as given in the S.C. in Diod. 31.27a).

9. Pol. 33.15.1-2. Alexander's claim was backed by Attalus II apparently in retaliation for Demetrius' intervention in Cappadocia: Diod. 31.32a (but here Eumenes is wrongly given the text instead of Attalus); cf. Will, Hist. Politique, ii, 315ff.


11. Scipio was definitely a senator by the time of the Celtiberian debate in 152/1, when his offer to serve under Lucullus was made in a speech in the senate (Pol. 35.4.9f.). Since his date of birth was c.185, he was probably enrolled into the senate by the censors of 154: this is made virtually certain by Gelzer, Kl. Schr. iii, 174.

Scipio ought to have held the quaestorship by 152/1, since he was allowed to speak (cf. Mommsen, Röm. Staatsrecht iii, 962). But his
influence in the senate cannot have been significant at this time;
cf. Astin, *Scipio Aemilianus*, 41. esp. n.3.

For differing views on the date of Gracchus' death, Astin, op.
cit., 36. n.1.

12. For Polybius' collusion in Demetrius' escape, Pol. 31.11ff.
Gracchus' favourable attitude to Demetrius, Pol. 31.33.3-4; cf. above
n.8. The existence of a pro- Demetrius party in the senate would not
be atypical of the Romans' attitude to foreign policy in the mid-
second century (cf. below n.23); and he could expect to receive support
from connections established during his period as a hostage at Rome
(175-162).

13. On the length of Ariarathes' stay, cf. above Ch.3.i, n.27.
Ariarathes arrived at Rome "while it was still summer", Heracleides
"while it was still the height of summer". This probably reflects
the margin by which Heracleides' stay was the longer. On these seasonal

14. Pol. 32.6.3. On Myrton, cf. Pol. 32.5.9-10, where he is described
as a friend of the Romans. On the date of the embassy, cf. below n.20.

For Polybius' antipathy towards revolutionary politics, Pol. 20.5-7 with

16. For the reaction of the Greeks, Pol. 32.6.6: πάντες ἐγνώρησαν
πρὶς ἡμερῶν. Polybius frequently criticises the senate for its
Machiavellianism: e.g. 31.10.7 (on the Ptolemies); 31.2.7 and 31.11.11
(on Demetrius); 31.21.5-6 (on Carthage); cf. Walbank, Polybius, esp. 170f.

17. Scullard, _JRS_ 35 (1945), 59f.

18. On this phrase, cf. above Ch.3.i, nn.13-14. The other senators of censorian rank, apart from Lepidus and Paullus, who were certainly alive at this time are M. Cato (cos. 195, cens. 184), Ti. Gracchus (cos. 177 and 163, cens. 169). A probable survivor is Q. Philippus (cos. 186 and 169, cens. 164) and the other possibility is A. Postumius Albinus Luscus (cos. 180, cens. 174).

19. For Charops' education at Rome and his acquisition of important contacts there, Pol. 27.15.5; Diod. 30.5. On the importance of Charops' Roman connections in establishing his power in Epirus, Pol. 32.5.9. Charops' position was obviously strengthened by the general deportation of political opponents in 167 (cf. Pol. 30.13). Scullard, _art. cit._ 62f. suggests that the Charops was able to use his influence at Rome to bring about the S.C. of 167 authorising the massacre in Epirus, and that this helped to establish his internal domination. Scullard is perhaps too concerned with senatorial factions and with shifting the blame for the massacre from L. Paullus to the group of "cruel unprincipled newcomers" (ibid., 63), and this factional analysis could be regarded as somewhat naive.

20. The chronology of Charops' death and of his earlier embassy to Rome is problematical. In Polybius' narrative the embassy is part of a recapitulation of Charops' career attached to his obituary notice. From the position of the fragments this obituary notice and that of Lyciscus which belongs to the same year (Pol. 32.54.) may be placed either in
160/59 or 159/8: they follow the embassy from Demetrius which brought to Rome the crown and the murderer of Cn. Octavius, and precede the obituary notice on Eumenes which cannot be later than 159/8. The Seleucid embassy was contemporaneous with a Cappadocian embassy which is securely placed in 160/59 by Diod. 31.28. On the death of Eumenes and Attalus' co-regency in his final years, Hansen, *Attalids of Pergamon*, 127.

The embassy itself must certainly precede the death of L. Paullus in 161/0; but it is also preferable that it should not be too long before Charops' own death on the attempted second embassy to Rome, since the situation after his rebuff was evidently intolerable. A Roman embassy was due to investigate (Pol. 32.6.8), and the real nature of the *senatus consultum* could not be concealed for ever; thus the necessity for the second trip to Rome should have come sooner rather than later. The embassy should perhaps be placed in the same year as Paullus' death (161/0); in that case the heavy preoccupation in the Italian affairs section of 161/0 with the eulogia of Paullus and Scipio Aemilianus would explain why the account of Charops' embassy has been displaced from that year to an anecdotal position accompanying his obituary notice one or two years later.


The fact that Sallust's polemic reflects the contemporary *popularis* tradition of the Jugurthine War period means that the question of his *credibility* in insisting on senatorial corruption is not simply a *historiographical* one. Sallust did not blindly follow the *popularis* reaction in 109 (cf. below n.25).
The habitual ambivalence between acceptable gifts and unacceptable bribes left the way open for polemical distortion. The populares, led by Memmius and Mamilius and followed by Sallust, chose to regard Jugurtha's gifts to his Roman patrons as bribes, which led the corrupt Roman nobility to sacrifice the national interest in his favour. Some modern authors dismiss this interpretation and regard Jugurtha's dealings with his patrons in the years before the war as normal second century practice: Allen, C. Phil. 33 (1938), 90-2; Badian, For. Clientelae, 193 and Rom. Imperialism 25, 59; Gruen, Rom. Politics and Crim. Courts, 143-4. The interpretation of Jugurtha's activity and the issue of treachery/patriotism on the Roman side really depend on the whole conception of the war: on this cf. the discussion in Syme, op. cit., 173ff. (and 174.n.51 for bibliography).

22. On this connection, Badian, op. cit., 164. n.5, 192f; cf. Allen, op. cit., 90-2; Earl, Political Thought of Sallust, 67f.

23. On Attalus' connections, Pol. 24.5.5 (190-89); 30.1.4 (171-68).

The senate often seems to have been divided on the dynastic issues of the eastern kingdoms. In 163/2 there was disagreement in the senate over the brothers Ptolemy: Philometor was supported by the Roman legati who had recently returned from Egypt, but the majority of the senate decided in favour of Euergetes (Pol. 31.10.4-6; cf. below Ch.5.iii, 259-60. Euergetes continued to enjoy the majority support of the senate throughout the 150s, but Philometor had at least one partisan in Cato (Malcovati, Ο.Ρ.Ρ., 46; cf. Scullard, Rom. Politics, 236f.; Will, op. cit. ii, 305-6).

In 158/7 Ariarathes and Orophernes seem to have commanded more less equal support in the senate, and this was probably reflected in the S.C. prescribing joint rule (App. Syr. 47; cf. below Ch.5.iii, n.3). In
153/2 a majority of the senate supported Alexander Balas' claim to the Seleucid throne but a minority (designated by Polybius as "moderates") opposed it (Pol. 33.18.10f.). Their opposition is best explained as reflecting support for the incumbent king, Demetrius (cf. above, n.12).

Similarly Adherbal had a body of support in the senate, as we would expect, although it was less extensive than Jugurtha's. Adherbal's supporters consistently upheld his cause and opposed Jugurtha's ambitions until Adherbal's death (cf. Sall. Jug. 15.3, 25.1). Sallust's polemical account naturally focuses on these men as upholders of justice and integrity to provide a schematic contrast with the corrupted partisans of Jugurtha, but a less contentious account might have presented them as the fautores of Jugurtha.

24. Sall. Jug. 11-13. On Micipsa's death the Numidian kingdom was divided between his three heirs. Of these Hiempsal and Adherbal were natural sons, the eldest, Jugurtha, was adopted. Almost immediately Jugurtha began to pursue his policy of eliminating his rivals and becoming sole ruler.


26. Diod. 36.15. Nothing further is known of the ambassadors' activities: the quoted passage is merely introductory to Diodorus' account of Saturninus' involvement with the ambassadors.
27. For Cornelius' bill and the two senatus consulta, Ascon. 57 (= Stangl, Cic. Orat. Schol. ii, 47); Griffin, JRS 63 (1973), 208-9.


29. On the Lex Gabinina, Griffin, JRS 63 (1973) 209-10; cf. Broughton, M.R.R. ii, 145 and 150 n.8; above Ch.2.i, 52-3.

30. For an account of Ptolemy Auletes' political "investments" at Rome, see Badian, Rom. Imperialism, 73-4.

Notes to Ch.3.iii

1. Pol. 31.22.1ff. Paullus' poverty is adduced to demonstrate his integrity: few other Romans would have profited so little from such a command. But such opportunities were few, and after Pydna the number of triumphs obtained diminished significantly.

2. On the exaggeration of Paullus' poverty and for modern views on this, see Shatzinan, Senatorial Wealth, 143-4. n.12. Allowance should also be made for Polybius' upper-class outlook and his comparatively distorted view of wealth and poverty. On the Polybian origin of Diod. 31.27a, cf. above Ch.3.ii, n.4.

3. Lepidus' advice, Pol. 28.1.8. On the nature of the relationship between Lepidus and the Ptolemaic dynasty, see Heinen, Auf. u. Nied. I.i, 647-50 (a recent and useful review of discussion on this subject).
4. For the reading of τῶν πρώτων ἱερατῶν in 1.21 of the decree, cf. above Ch.3.i, n.13. The original restoration of προσκυνήσεως ("obeisance") in 1.22 has also been rejected as inappropriate by Robert, R.E.A. 62 (1960), 327. n.2, who suggested instead ἐπανήσεως (here translated "interviews"). προσκύνησις is a ceremonial act of abasement before monarchs or gods, and seems far too extreme for a serious description of the ambassadors' routine activities in Rome.

5. See above Ch.3.i, n.8; cf. Ch.1.i, n.12.


7. For the restoration, F.D. 3.iii, p. 110. n.1; the restoration is made by comparison with the Erythraean decree in honour of Neoptolemus (S.I.G. ii, 412; above Ch.3.i, n.8).

8. On the provision of hospitality for ambassadors, cf. above Ch.2.iv, passim.

9. Plut. Ti. Gracch. 14.2: in the senate Pompeius claimed that as a neighbour of Gracchus he had been able to see Eudemus offering Gracchus a crown and purple robe. Eudcmus thus spent some time at Gracchus' house and it is reasonable to suppose that he lodged there.

10. On Charops' connections, Ch.3.ii, n.19. References for Attalus' connections, Ch.3.ii, n.23.


Notes to Ch.3.iv.

1. On this see Rawson, JRS 65 (1975), 152.

2. On the significance of Amynander and the strategic importance of the Athamanian principality, see Oost, C. Phil. 52 (1957), Iff. Oost concludes that Polybius' assessment of Amynander as ἀβύγγυς (18.10.7) is not strictly accurate.

3. On this question see below Ch.4.ii, n.19 for bibliography and other references.

4. The senate παρίσκουσιν the Aetolian ambassadors (Pol. 21.31.5). For the importance of the Rhodian and Athenian envoys (and particularly the Athenian envoy Leon) in securing a settlement, see below Ch.5.ii, 239-40.

5. For the cooperation between Philip and Africanus in 190, Liv. 37.7.15f.; App. Syr. 23. That this developed into a more permanent friendship is suggested by Polybius' reference to a letter in which Africanus explained to Philip the calculations on which he based his strategy in his Spanish campaigns (10.9.4). For the beneficial effect of Demetrius' presence in 184/3 on relations between Rome and Macedon, Pol. 23.3.4. The senate was favourably disposed to Demetrius (Pol. 23.2.2), and it was for this reason that Philip sent him to Rome (Pol. 22.14.10).
6. This seems to have been the case with the 181/0 mission (cf. Pol. 24.5.5-6; Diod. 29.22). In 160/59 Attalus' presence encouraged the senate to dismiss the anti-Pergamene accusations of the Galatians and other envoys; but the senate's cultivation of Attalus was on this occasion (as in 168/7) motivated by its hostility to Eumenes (Pol. 32.1.5-7).

7. Pol. 32.16.2-4.

8. Prusias had married Perseus' sister, Apame, in the 170s (Liv. 42.12.3-4); in 171 he decided to remain neutral in the war between Rome and Perseus (Liv. 42.29.3). Livy records an embassy from Prusias to Rome in 169 which sought to bring an end to the war (44.14.5ff). His ambassadors on that occasion claimed that he had taken the Roman side, and Perseus' communication to Gentius in 168 confirms that Prusias had by then joined the Roman side (Liv. 42.24.3).

9. Pol. 32.16.7. But this oddly seems to be contradicted by Diod. 31.15.3, which in other respects follows Polybius' account closely. The account of Prusias' visit in Liv. 45.44.4-21 is wholly different from Polybius', thus betraying the annalistic origin of the former: cf. Nissen, op. cit., 91.

10. On the extent of Attalus' influence in the closing years of Eumenes' reign, see Magie, Roman Rule ii, 774. n.77.

11. The embassy's audience was delayed by the urban praetor as a favour to Attalus (App. Mith. 6); and his action seems to have been approved of by the majority of the senate (cf. above Ch.2.iii, n.20).
12. For the rôle of Rhodes' patrons and hospites in 172 and in 168/7, see below App. 3.
Notes to Ch.4.i.


2. ibid., 90-1

3. ibid., 19.

4. Thuc. 5.45. 2-4. The envoys were probably not expecting to be asked specifically about their instructions, since they had already stated to the Boule that they were fully-empowered; and their agreement with Alcibiades was that they should not mention the matter at all in the Ekklesia; cf. Mosley, *Envoys and Diplomacy*, 31-2.

5. Aesch. 3.72. It is apparent from the context that the question was whether Philip would accept peace without an alliance.

6. The question of competence is discussed more fully in Section iii of this chapter.

7. Liv. 30.22.5


10. Pol. 27.6. 2-3; Liv. 42.48. 2-3. Polybius has all Macedonians expelled whereas Livy mentions only the envoys; cf. Nissen, *op. cit.*, 252.
11. Other examples: Aetolian envoys in 190 (Liv. 37.1.6) and 189 (Liv. 37.49.7), 15 days; Ptolemaic envoys in 162/1, 5 days (Pol. 31.20.3); Jugurtha's envoys in 111, 10 days (Sall. Jug. 28.2)

12. cf. Pol. 15.1. 3-4, which states that Scipio had been informed by dispatches that the Roman people had ratified the treaty with Carthage; cf. above Ch. 1.iv, 40.

13. For Flamininus' truce, Pol. 18.10.4. on the alleged deception of Flamininus by Philip at the private meeting, Holleaux, Etudes v, 60ff; cf. Balsdon, Phoenix 21 (1967), 183f; Walbank, H.C.P.ii, 559-60.


15. For this view and the "conference atmosphere" of the audiences, cf. below Ch.4.ii, 169-71.

16. Pol. 21.2; cf. Diod. 29.4: Nissen, op. cit., 188.

17. Diod. 22.9; cf. Ch.3.ii, n.4.

18. For the rumour, Liv. 37.48.1ff. Livy seems to disbelieve the existence of the rumour, his source for which he names as Valerius Antias. According to Antias' account the Aetolian ambassadors were asked in the senate about the rumour, where they did not discount it (Liv. 37.48. 6-7).

19. Pol. 23.3. 1-3. Philocles' mission was quite distinct from the simultaneous one of Demetrius, and the senate's treatment of them was quite separate: see below Ch.4.ii, 181-3.
20. On the Illyrian embassy, cf. above Ch. 2.i, ii, 55-8. On the motif of espionage, see App. 1.

21. The Cretan embassy at Rome, Liv. 43.7. 1-4; the other embassies of 170, Liv. 43.6. 1ff. Stasis in Crete in the 170s had led to the dispatch of the legatus Q. Minucius with 10 ships in 174 (Liv. 41.25.7).

22. For the sequence of events, Pol. 21.18. 4-10.

23. Pol. 23.2. 1-5.

24. Sherk, Roman Documents, 7-8; Welles, Royal Correspondence xlii - xliii.

25. Pol. 30.3. 4-7; of Ch. 3.i, n. 23.


27. S.I.G. ii. 645 (= Sherk, op. cit., 2, pp. 26-31). For the background to the inscription and its interpretation, Sherk, op. cit., 28-9. The procedure of the committee seems to have been agreed upon in advance, since the envoys at their first audience did not present their mission, but simply requested an "opportunity to explain the matters concerning them".

28. The rejected proposal was that permission be given to fortify the city (I. 31).

29. The 194/3 committee, Liv. 34.57.4; Diod. 28.15.1; the 184/3 committee, Pol. 23.4.7.
30. On the element of publicity and the purpose of the committee, see further below Ch.4.ii, 171-4.

31. For practical purposes it was only the second S.C. with its substantive decisions that one would expect to be inscribed publicly. The first S.C. authorising the committee is really only included for the sake of completeness.

32. For the audiences of Adherbal and Jugurtha's envoys in 117/6, Sall. Jug. 13.9-16.1; cf. below Ch.5.iii, 257-8.

33. cf. above Ch.3.iii, n. 3.

34. The friendship between Polybius and Philometor's ambassador, Menyllus, is attested by Pol. 31.12.8.

35. For the senate's dependence on the reports of senatorial legati, Ch.5.iii, 258ff; for its evasion of issues, Ch.4.ii, 166-8. That the senate's indifference was affected rather than genuine is suggested by Polybius' analysis of its devious treatment of the 183/2 Achaean embassy. (Pol. 23.17.4).

36. Aesch. 2.18ff. (the only surviving account of the embassy); cf. Cawkwell, *Philip of Macedon*, 98f. on the events leading up to the Peace of Philocrates.

37. For the S.C. authorising the treaty with Astypalaea, I.G. xii.3, 173 (= Sherk, *op. cit.*, 16). For similar theoretically "equal" treaties, *Magie, Roman Rule* i, 115-6 and ii, 967-8, n. 89.
Notes to 4.ii.

1. For Eumenes' visit and associated diplomatic activity, the sources are Liv. 42.11. 2-15.1; App. Mac. 11. 1-3; Diod. 29.34. The purpose of Eumenes' visit was to convince the senate that Perseus was a dangerous enemy and should be eliminated militarily: Eumenes thus hoped to rid himself of an irksome neighbour and rival. Eumenes' speech was a comprehensive denunciation of Perseus' activities since 179 and of his hostile intentions (Liv. 42.11. 3-13.12; App. Mac. 11. 1-2). That the speech is based on a contemporary source (i.e. Polybius) and not the imagination of a later historian is strongly indicated by the close correspondence between the versions of Livy and Appian and a contemporary Roman propaganda document, preserved in inscriptive form at Delphi: see F.D. 3.iv, 75 (= Sherk, op. cit., 40). For other indications of the Polybian origin of Liv. 42.11ff., Nissen, op. cit., 245-6.

2. Rome's military unpreparedness is a recurrent motif in the narrative of events leading up to the outbreak of the Third Macedonian War, especially in Livy's account of the embassy of Q. Marcius to Greece (cf. Liv. 42 43.3, 42.47.2): this account is clearly based on Polybius (Nissen, op. cit., 249ff.). The principal reason was the senate's deliberate decision not to declare Macedonia a province for the consuls of 172 on account of their unsuitability and insubordination (Liv. 42. 10.11). This effectively postponed the possibility of a war with Macedon until consular 171, since the senate could not usually reverse its decision on the consular provinces: cf. Walbank, J.R.S. 31 (1941), 82ff.; Scullard, Rom. Politics, 195-6; Rich, Coll. Latomus 149, 26 and 88-99.

3. The senatus consultum in which Eumenes was honoured with various gifts...
was apparently passed after the audiences of Harpalus and the Rhodian envoy (Liv. 42.14.10; Diod. 29.34). If this was the same S.C. as that in which the senate replied to Eumenes' speech (as would be normal practice), then it was evidently deferring its reply until after the Macedonian delegation had been heard. The tangible gifts of hospitality which the senate voted to Eumenes could hardly be kept secret, even though the text of the S.C. was. The secret reply and the honorific paraphernalia may have been contained in separate senatus consulta. Although this would be unusual, there would be nothing unusual in the senate suspending its judgment until other relevant embassies had been heard.

The senate's reply to Eumenes obviously included some vague commitment to war at some unspecified future date, since otherwise the need to preserve secrecy would not exist. Livy's admittedly muddled narrative seems to suggest that the senate went a stage nearer to a commitment to war, when news of the attempt on Eumenes' life at Delphi and C. Valerius' report were received later in 172. War was then definitely projected for the next consular year (Liv. 42.18. 1-2), so that war was thereafter "declared but not yet declared" (Liv. 42.19.3). It follows that the senate's earlier reply to Eumenes constituted a less specific commitment; cf. Rich, op. cit., 23.

4. According to Val. Max. 2.2.1 the S.C. was kept secret until Perseus was captured. It is possible that these references reflect a deliberate campaign by the Romans to emphasise the part played by Eumenes in causing the war. By 167 Eumenes was out of favour at Rome, and by advertising his belligerent pre-war attitude the Romans may have hoped to undermine his popularity with the Greeks, which in other respects increased as a result of Rome's hostility towards him (cf. Pol. 31.6.6).

For mistranslations in Livy, see Walsh, Livy, 143-4.
5. cf. Ch.3.i, n. 19; also Ch. 2.ii, n. 2.

6. Pol. 22.7.5; on the date of the embassy, Errington, Philopoemen, 255ff.

7. Charops' mission to Rome, Pol. 32.6. 3-9; cf. above Ch.3.ii, 111-5. Polybius explicitly mentions the impact made by the rebuff to Charops of M. Lepidus and L. Paullus on the Greek community in Rome (32.6. 4 and 6). It may safely be assumed that the senatus consultum was similarly publicised among the community, since it evidently had such a beneficial effect on Rome's public image.

8. The notable second century exceptions are the preliminary decisions on the Third Macedonian and Third Punic Wars: cf. Val. Max. 2.2.1.


10. Errington contends (Philopoemen, 186-7) that Polybius' account of this embassy is distorted by anti-senatorial prejudice and that the senate's reply was not intended to reach Greece, "although knowledge of it may have become current unofficially". But this concession effectively undermines the whole contention: the senate could not have been unaware that the process of unofficial leakage would take place. There seems to be no other way of explaining why the senate issued its first reply, if we do not accept Polybius' explanation, i.e. that it was intended to be publicised. If the senate had not wished to make its position public, it would have made no reply at all until the news from Messene reached Rome (cf. below 166-8).

11. Pol. 31.11. 1-3. This does not of course make clear what actually happened. The senate may have refused altogether to grant an audience,
but this would be highly unusual in peacetime. It is more likely that Polybius is referring to the senate's refusal to give an answer to the embassy after its audience.

12. Demetrius' embassy brought Cn. Octavius' assassin, Leptines, to Rome with the intention of absolving the Seleucid crown of responsibility for the crime. The senate refused either to accept Leptines or to make an explicitly friendly reply to the embassy, saying that its attitude towards Demetrius would depend on his future conduct (Pol. 32.3.13).

13. For the senate's deferment of its reply, Pol. 30.21.2. The S.C. on Caunus and Stratonicea was communicated to Rhodes by the envoys Philophron and Astymedes, who had remained in Rome since the previous year (Pol. 30.21.4; 30.5.1).


15. This concern is occasionally attested by Polybius: c.f. the treatment of Charops c.161/0 (Pol. 32.6.4-6); the senate's concern over a suitable casus belli for war against the Dalmatians in 157/6 (Pol. 32.13.9); and a similar concern over the war against Carthage (Pol. 36.2)

16. For the audiences at Rome, Pol. 18.11.2-4; the senate's treatment of Philip's ambassadors has been examined above Ch.4.i, 145-7.

17. On the personnel of the embassies which sent to Rome in 198/7, see Walbank, H.C.P. ii, 561-2. The Aetolian and Athenian representatives
were clearly important statesmen, the Achaean "relatively unimportant" and the Pergamene envoy "unknown". No Rhodian envoys are mentioned.

18. Philip's request in Pol. 18.7.1. elicited no response from Flamininus. The next day Philip requested a private meeting with Flamininus "to avoid the mere battle of words". This request was repeated several times before Flamininus responded, and even then he asked the advice of his Greek allies before acting (Pol. 18.8. 4-6). Similarly the decision to transfer the negotiations to Rome was taken by Flamininus only with the consent of the allies (Pol. 18.9. 6-10.2).

19. This is the problem stated by Balsdon, Phoenix 21 (1967), 181, contesting the view held by Holleaux, R.E.G. 36 (1923), 167ff. that Flamininus intended to make peace only if his command was not prorogued. Balsdon was counter-attacked by Briscoe, Latomus 31 (1972) 22ff., but the latter does not seem to explain satisfactorily this particular problem and effectively abandons Holleaux's position with the statement that "if Flamininus' manoeuvre had failed, and a successor had been appointed to continue the war, he would have been no worse off than if he had not made the attempt" (art. cit., 29); cf. also Walbank, H.C.P. ii, 559-60.

20. For the diplomatic activity in Rome in 194/3, Liv. 34.57-9; Diod. 28.15. 1-4. The accounts in Diodorus and Livy evidently both derive from the same Polybian original (cf. Briscoe, art. cit., 35). Diodorus' version is considerably briefer than Livy's and may be distorted as a result. It was the senate according to Diodorus that announced to Antiochus' envoys the ultimatum which in Livy's version was delivered by Flamininus. In view of the compression in Diodorus' narrative the Livian

Badian, C. Phil. 54 (1959), 81ff. likens the relations between Rome and the Seleucid kingdom to a state of cold war, which is a helpful analogy in that it recognises that in Hellenistic politics war was not the invariable alternative to friendly relations.

21. Notably Badian, art. cit., 98. esp. n. 70. This is rightly contested by Balsdon, art. cit., 188-9; Briscoe, art. cit., 35-6 in his counter-attack on Balsdon’s article abandons Badian’s contention.

22. Liv. 34.59.3; Diod. 28.15.4. For the restricted competence of Menippus on this mission, cf. Ch.4.iii, 215-6.

23. Liv. 42.12.4.

24. For the disadvantage faced by Perseus’ ambassadors in appearing after Eumenes, Liv. 42.14.2; cf. Pol. 33.11.4ff. where Philometor’s envoys speak to a senate already swayed by Euergetes.

For Harpalus’ tactlessness, Liv. 42.14.3ff.

25. Not all senators supported Eumenes’ belligerent attitude. According to App. Mac. 11.3 “many senators blamed Eumenes for causing so great a war”. And it is probably to this visit that the hostile remarks of Cato against Eumenes are to be dated (Plut. Cato Maior 8. 7-8). Thus there was some hostility to Eumenes in 172 which became the majority senate view after the events of 168.

26. Liv. 45.20. 6-8; cf. above Ch. 2.ii, 58ff.
27. The meeting at Tempe, Liv. 39.34. 14-36.14; Thessalonica, Liv. 39.37. 1-39.2. For the forensic imagery, Liv. 39.35.1:

'ibi cum Romani legati disceptatorum loco, Thessali Perrhaebique et Athamanes haud dubii accusatores, Philippus ad audienda crimina tamquam reus consedissent ...'

28. The debate at Neapolis, D. Hal. 15. 5-6; Sicyon, Liv. 32.19. 6-13.

29. Pol. 23. 1-4 (an unusually long excerpt from the De Legationibus Gentium); cf. Liv. 39.46. 6-48.4 for a condensed version.

30. Polybius quotes the actual words which Demetrius read from Philip's memorandum (Pol. 23.2. 5-7), and such verbatim knowledge ought to derive from an eye-witness who was present on the occasion. If this source was a Greek ambassador whom Polybius subsequently met, then Polybius' precise knowledge could be regarded as evidence for a collective audience in which other ambassadors were present during Demetrius' defence, as Demetrius must have been during their accusations. This is anyway likely on grounds of general probability.

However Polybius' informant may equally have belonged to Macedonian court circles, so that this line of argument should not be pressed. For Macedonian court personages as sources of information in Polybius, cf. Gelzer, Kl. Schr. iii, 170-1; Walbank, Polybius, 75. Greek (and especially Achaean) ambassadors were important sources for events in Rome before 167: Gelzer, op. cit. iii, 173, Pedech, Methode, 272-3; Walbank, H.C.P. i, 33-4.

31. μήν εποιήσατο πρ’ αὐτῶν διάλεγμα (Pol. 23.2.8): the substance of
this was that it accepted Demetrius' word on all disputed points (23.2.9).

32. Pol. 23.3. 2-3; cf. above Ch. 4.1, 149-50.

33. In other words little more was achieved by personal diplomatic contact than could be achieved by an exchange of letters owing to the reluctance of diplomats to take advantage of the opportunities to discuss issues in detail. For illustrations of this tendency, see above Ch.4.1, 159ff.

34. Pol. 31.1. 2-5; Diod. 31.7.2. Diodorus states explicitly that Attalus was given the first audience. Diodorus also says that Attalus and his colleagues defended themselves "against each of their accusers"; but this does not suggest that the charges were dealt with separately. The minor variations between Polybius and Diodorus may be explained either by Diodorus' paraphrasing or by compression in the process of excerption to which they were subsequently subjected.

35. Pol. 32.1. 5-7: this account is extremely compressed, presumably by the excerpter.

36. On the institution of arbitration, see Tod, International Arbitration; Martín, La Vie Internationale, 487-576.

37. Tod, op. cit., 96f.

38. ibid., 179-80
39. cf. Pol. 23.17.4.

40. Tod, op. cit., 98ff., 181f.


42. The dispatch of the embassies, Pol. 23.18. 3-5. For a detailed discussion of the circumstances, Errington, Philopoemen, 197-8.


44. ibid., 11. 36-7. The wording is exactly parallel with that in the letter of P. Blasio to Corcyra, S.E.G. iii, 451 (= Sherk, op. cit., 4.). The similarity was used by Holleaux, B.C.H. 48 (1924), 384-6 to restore the mutilated text of M. Aemilius' letter. Only the opening lines of the S.C. enclosed with P. Blasio's letter have been preserved, but Holleaux was able to reconstruct the situation on the analogy of the fuller Magnesia document (art. cit., 387-8).

45. These letters contain almost no information at all and leave the senatus consultas to speak for themselves; this contrasts with, for example, the letter of Sp. Postumius to Delphi (S.I.G. ii, 612; Sherk op. cit., 1) which reproduces the informative style characteristic of the Hellenistic royal chanceries. On the nature of the documents, see App. 2.


47. Examples in Polybius, Pol. 32.14, 31.20.2. For its usage in
senatus consultum, see Sherk, op. cit., p. 15 (where he gives its Latin
equivalent as coram senatu).

48. Arbitration proceedings in Greece normally resembled ordinary civil
trials. On the procedure in general, see Tod, op. cit., 107-131.

49. The two cases are the territorial disputes between (1) Samos and
Priene (I.v. Priene, 41-2; S.I.G. ii, 688; Sherk, op. cit., 10) and
(2) Melitaea and Narthacid (I.G. ix.2, 89; S.I.G. ii, 674; Sherk, op. cit.,
9). Tod seems to disregard these examples when he implies (op. cit., 98-9)
that the senate never made any proper arbitral judgements but always
delegated this responsibility. But it is likely that the senate found
a majority of such cases beyond its competence and thus delegated them.

50. The Prienian claim, I.v. Priene 41, 11. 9-10; the senate's decision,
ibid., 11. 10-12. Narthacid's claim, I.G. ix. 2, 89, 11. 50-2; the
senate's decision, ibid, 11. 63-5.

51. Pol. 31.10: Euergetes came to Rome to repudiate the settlement
imposed by Roman legati in 163 as being inequitable, and demanded the
addition of Cyprus to his share of the kingdom.

52. Pol. 31.10. 6-7. For Polybius' criticism of Machiavellian senatorial
decisions, especially after 167, cf. Walbank, J.R.S. 55 (1965), esp. 4-6;
Polybius, 168-73.

53. On the procedure followed in this audience, Ch.5.iii, 259-60.

54. Other examples: Athens and Achaean League over Delos in 159/8 (Pol.
Pergamum and Bithynia over Bithynian aggression 157/6 (Pol. 32.16); Ariarathes and envoys of Orophernes and Demetrius in 158/7 (cf. Pol. 32.10-11); Ptolemaic and Seleucid envoys in 170/69 (Pol. 28.1) and 168/7 (Liv. 45.13.2ff.).

55. Pol. 28.2.6.

56. For a full account of these events, see Ste. Croix, *Origins of Pel. War*, 178ff. (on the undertaking to Thasos) and 200-3 (on Samos).


Notes to Ch.4.iii

1. For general works on Greek ambassadorial practice, see Poland, De Legationibus Graec. Publ; Kienast, Presbeia; for the fifth and fourth centuries, Mosley, Envoys and Diplomacy.

2. Poland, op. cit., 34-5; Mosley, op. cit., 21 and 25.


4. ibid., 25. n. 43.

5. Dem. 19. 184-6: cited by Nicolson, Evol. Dipl. Method, 13 as illustrating the inefficiency of the Athenian (i.e. archetypal Greek) diplomatic system.

6. Poland, op. cit., 36-9; Kienast, op. cit., 564-5; Mosley, op. cit., 30-7. Poland interpreted the phrase to refer generally to envoys authorised to conclude treaties and to take oaths on behalf of their state (op. cit., 37). But Mosley has shown that by the fourth century its usage had become debased and that it represented little more than a complimentary gesture towards the receiving state (op. cit., 36).

8. _I.G._ iv. 1, 68 (= _Staatsv._ iii, 446).

9. Poland, *op. cit.*, 40-3 asserts that documents assumed a greater importance in the Hellenistic period, but admits that they must have existed in the earlier period.

10. An early example is provided by the letter of Lysimachus to Priene (c.285):

> οἱ παρ' ὑμᾶς προσβαλὺς ... τὸ τε ψήφισμα ὑμῶν ἄπειρον ὑμῖν ἀλλ' ... διελέγοντες παραλαὶως τοὺς ἐν τῷ ψηφίσματι γεγραμμένοις, ...

(_O.G.I.S._ 12 (= Welles, *Royal Correspondence*, 6), 11. 2-9).

This formula is particularly familiar in royal letters but is not uncommon in the decrees of city states: cf. for example the late-third century dossier of decrees passed by various states in response to diplomatic initiatives on the part of Magnesia-on-the-Maeander (_S.I.G._ ii, 558-62). cf. also the mid-third century decree of Messene (_S.I.G._ i, 472, 11. 1-5) and _S.I.G._ i, 457, 11. 8-13, 32-4.

Poland, *op. cit.*, 41-2 contends that decrees of the Hellenistic period assumed an epistolary form under the influence of the letters from the royal chanceries. This epistolary character presumably refers to (1) the greater wordiness of Hellenistic decrees and (2) to the new prominence given to documents in them. It is likely that both these features derived from the methods of the new royal bureaucracies.

11. The exact nature of the relationship between the decree and the accompanying speeches must have varied according to circumstances. For
example in *Inschr. v. Erythrai u. Klagomenai*, 504 (= O.G.I.S. i, 222),
11. 14-20 the ambassadors are instructed in some detail what to say when they hand over the decree to Antiochus I; on the other hand these instructions might be much vaguer: cf. Holleaux, *Etudes* iii, 118f.


13. In particular Kienast wrongly holds (*loc. cit.*) that the Seleucid ambassador, Hegestratus, was not an ambassador. He was sent not only to deliver a letter to the people of Miletus but also to address them on the matters contained in it; this information derives from the document itself, Welles, *op. cit.*, 14, 11. 14-15.


15. S.I.C. ii, 611 (Sherk, 38), 11. 3-5.

16. On the nature and continuity of these documents, see App. 2.

17. The inscriptions quoted above speak of the envoys handing over (*ἀνέβαναν*, *ἐπέδωκαν*) their documents but do not say to whom or when.


20. The decision to send the embassy, Pol. 29.10. 1-5. For the
treatment of the embassy at Rome, Pol 29.19; Diod. 30.24; Liv. 45.3.
3-8; cf. also Schmitt, Rom u. Rhodos, 150; Gruen, C.Q. N.S. 25 (1975),
58ff.

21. Other states could be expected to follow Rhodes' lead, if Polybius' analysis of the attitudes of contemporary politicians (30.6.1ff.) is correct. Moreover it was the timing of Rhodes' initiative, when Rome's strategic position was favourable, that particularly angered the Romans (Pol. 29.19.7ff.). It was the time lag, allowing the news of Pydna to reach Rome, which really put the Rhodians on the spot, and this seems to have been contrived by the Romans; on the timing of the audience, see Ch.2.iii, 78-9.

22. Pol. 29.19.5: τάδη μὲν οὖν... εἰπόντες βραχέως ἐπεκυρίηθον.

23. Gruen, C.Q. N.S. 25 (1975), 76 says that Hagepolis did not conceal the purpose of the embassy and apparently implies that he did not wish to do so. But it is clear from the foregoing that he had not choice.

24. For the instructions of Timotheus' embassy, Pol. 28.1.7. The first two parts of the mission are specific tasks which evidently reflect the official instructions which were given to the ambassadors. The phrase beginning with μάλιστα εἶ has on the other hand every indication of being an additional note of explanation by Polybius, giving to his readers the benefit of what may have been inside information. For similar watching briefs, see App. 1; and on the meaning of ἐνευγαζόμενος in this passage, App. 3.
25. The timing of the attempted Rhodian mediation in 168 was a major factor influencing the senate's harsh reaction - but Rome's superiority complex in any case made her habitually unwilling to recognise the right of any third party to arbitrate in her disputes. This was made particularly clear when Pyrrhus offered to arbitrate between Rome and Tarentum in 280.

26. This interpretation might suggest that the Ptolemaic authorities were being implausibly paranoid about the mission. But in fact Eulaeus and Lenaeus, the regents of Philometor, had every reason to avoid incurring the antagonism and suspicion of Rome at the time of their offensive against the Seleucid kingdom. Timotheus had possibly therefore been instructed to test the propriety of this part of the mission before officially submitting it, and the provision of two documents would allow for its possible withdrawal.

Double instructions (διπλή ἰντολή) were also given to an Athenian embassy of 167/6, which will be considered shortly. On that occasion however the two sets of instructions became officially known to the senate.

27. On this see Mosley, op. cit., 39ff.

28. See for example the opening lines of the important decree of Lampsacus passed c. 196 in honour of the ambassador Hegesias (S.I.G. ii, 591, ll. 1-15): "some men were actually appointed and had themselves released because of the size of the undertaking and the expense involved" (ll. 9-11); "Hegesias ... thought nothing of the dangers associated with the journey (ll. 11-13). See also Kienast, op. cit., 589.
29. Pol. 24.8. 1-6. This debate was occasioned by a letter from the Romans on the restoration of Spartan exiles: the letter was brought before the synodos by the strategus, Hyperbatus, whose year of office is generally agreed to be 181/0 (cf. Errington, Philopoemen, 301). Errington, op. cit., 263-5 places Callicrates' embassy in the winter of 180/79 and his subsequent strategia in 179/8. This forms a coherent pattern if we assume the letter from Rome to be later than the letter mentioned in Pol. 24.2.1. Derow, Polybios and the Embassy of Kallikrates, 15. n. 2 contests this and suggests that the embassy could belong to midsummer 180 and Callicrates' strategia to 180/79. But Errington, op. cit., 265 raises two objections to this view which seem to me to be sound: (i) this would require too much compression of events in the year 180; and (ii) the Achaean embassy to Rome was by now an annual routine event of little importance and would be received in the normal diplomatic season. cf. Ch. 1. iii, n. 12.


31. Thus Badian, For. Clientelae, 91; Errington, op. cit., 202-3; cf. Derow, art. cit., 17-18; and on the rehabilitation of Callicrates, Raditsa, Auf. u. Nied. I. i, 587-8. Errington suggests implicitly that Callicrates is innocent of Polybius' charge of disobeying instructions. He is surely wrong to say (op. cit., 202) that the embassy was authorised to inform the senate of the Achaean's disagreement on the issue. This cannot be taken as the natural meaning of τοις ἀχαῖοις ἔδοξε τοῖς Ἀχαῖοις ... (Pol. 24.8.7), particularly when this is immediately followed by a phrase specifically referring to the instructions (τοὺς καθ' οὗς ἄνωρτας λέγει). Errington further says (loc. cit.) that the Achaeans were
foolish to choose Callicrates for the mission. No one could have predicted that Callicrates would openly disobey his instructions, since this was obviously such an exceptional occurrence in Greek diplomacy. There may also have been good reasons for Callicrates' selection (see next note).

32. It would be reasonable to expect Lycortas to be selected for the mission, if his views were to be represented. He had been selected for the abortive embassy to Ptolemy Epiphanes earlier in 180 (Pol. 24.6.3f.) and should thus have been available. Errinton rightly shows (op. cit., 263-4) that the embassy to Rome could not have been contemplated at the same time as the Egyptian embassy, since Aratus was a member of both.

However Callicrates as a pro-Roman may have been considered a good choice on account of his greater familiarity with contacts in Rome, and because he could be expected to present the Achaeans' case in a more tactful and deferential manner than, for example, Lycortas. It was after all an ambassador's manner and style of speaking which was the most variable factor to be considered in his selection.


34. cf. above Ch. 1. iii, 32-5.


37. For the circumstances of its dispatch, Pol. 30.5. 1-5; Liv. 45.25.7f.;
cf. Schmitt, *Rom u. Rhodos*, 155f. The embassy was sent as soon as the senate's reply to Philoptron and Astymedes became known at Rhodes. The terms of this reply as given by Livy are "ut (Rhodii) nec hostes fierent nec socii permanerent" (45.25.4). Polybius merely says (30.4. 7-8) that while removing the threat of war the senate bitterly reproached the Rhodians for their conduct. (cf. also on this S.C. below Ch. 5. ii, 242f). Despite this discrepancy over the terms of the S.C. it is clear that Rhodes' relations with Rome were in a precarious state and needed to be regularised.

38. Pol. 30.5.5: τέτω δ' ἐποίησαν βουλήματος καὶ προσβείς ἐποτυχεῖν, ἵνα ἐλεύθερος ἔφυκεν, δι' ἀδράς ἐπεφυκοί, δι' ἀδυνήσεις δ' ἦσαν οἱ ναυάρχοι προκρίμενοι τὴν ναυάρχειαν ποιῆσασθαι. τὴν γὰρ ἤξον ἔξομαιν ἐξε παύειν ὧ διανεφέρατο ἐν τῷ νόμῳ.

39. Liv. 45.25. 7-8: Theodotum praefectum classis in eam legationem miserunt. societatem ab Romanis ita volebant peti ut nullum de ea re scitum populi fieret aut litteris mandaretur, quod nisi impetrarent, maior a repuisa ignominia esset. praefecti classis id unius erat ius ut agere de ea re sine rogatione ualla perlata posset. cf. Nissen, *op. cit.*, 275f.

40. This passage may represent a liberal interpretation by Livy of a Polybian passage which was difficult to understand. Obscurity on Polybius' part would explain the textual slippage at this point (which is more likely to have occurred in the period since Livy than before). Livy's translations/paraphrases of Polybius are in any case never wholly reliable (cf. Walsh, *Livy*, 39ff.). The reference to public humiliation may be a word of explanation interpolated by Livy himself, but it may also reflect the Polybian original and is in no way implausible.
41. On the navarch's powers and for other occasions when the navarch served as ambassador, Pauly-W. 16, 1895. Theadetus' plenipotentiary powers were not invested permanently in the navarch but were granted for special occasions. As a pro-Roman and the chief executive, Theaedetus will have played a part in the decision to send an embassy and no doubt saw to it that he was fully empowered.

42. Pol. 18.11. 12-14; Liv. 32.37.5; cf. above Ch.4.i, 145-7.

43. cf. above Ch.4.ii, n. 19.

44. Liv. 34.59.3: nos vero .... nec volumus nec possumus pacisci quicquam quo regnum Antiochi minuatur. cf. Diod. 28.15.4.


46. Liv. 34.59.7: Tempus et sibi sumerent et regi ad cogitandum darent; cogitaturum, cum renuntiatae condiciones essent, et impetraturum aliquid aut pacis causa concessurum.

47. Liv. 35.137-10 stresses the part played by Eumenes in encouraging war; cf. Badian, art. cit., 128 on the breakdown of negotiations at Ephesus. Pressure was being exerted on the Romans by Eumenes and on Antiochus by the Aetolians; and there seems no reason to doubt that the death of the younger Antiochus was an unforeseen occurrence which adversely affected the negotiations. See Will, op. cit., 168 for the view that Seleucid intransigence was based on the expectation that the Roman settlement in Greece would soon be seriously disrupted and the Roman's
bargaining position made considerably weaker.

48. Liv. 37.49.4; Diod. 29.9; on this audience, cf. also Ch.4.i, 148-9.

49. Another desperate situation was that which faced Carthage in 150/49 after the deditio of Utica. After a secret discussion in the synedrion the Carthaginians appointed ἐπεκτικός τοῦ χρύσου to do whatever seemed best for their country in the present circumstances (Pol. 36.3.7). At Rome they were able to perform the act of deditio on behalf of Carthage (36.3.9).

50. Liv. 42.36. 1-7. This passage almost certainly describes the same embassy as that in Liv. 42.48. 1-3 (of Polybian origin): cf. Nissen, op. cit., 249 and 252; Walbank, J.R.S. 31 (1941), 89. n. 56; above Ch.4.i, 141-3. In the Polybian version of the embassy there is no mention of questioning the ambassadors or of their lack of instructions.

51. Consideration may be given here to the refusal of the Seleucid envoys in 189 to make any further concession once the S.C. on Asia had been passed. At this stage the Rhodian envoys appeared again before the senate on behalf of Soli in Cilicia. The senate then summoned the Seleucid envoys and tried to secure their assent to the evacuation first of Cilicia and then of Soli alone; but the envoys (whose mission had been to secure the ratification of the peace arranged with the Scipios) refused to concede anything beyond the existing agreement (Pol. 21.24. 10-14).
Notes to Ch. 5. i.

1. For the senate as a court, see above Ch. 4. ii, 180. On the international importance of senatus consulta, cf. above xi.

2. Other factors which influenced the senate's decisions on aspects of foreign policy are dealt with in section iii of this chapter. On the decision-making process in the senate, see above Ch. 3. i, 93f.

3. It is with Greek-speaking ambassadors that I am principally concerned, and these comprise a large majority of those who came to Rome. But all extra-Italian embassies (and some Italian ones as well) would share the disadvantage of not speaking Latin, and the problems of intelligibility would, for those who did not speak Greek either, be considerably worse.

4. For the evidence on language and interpretation generally in the ancient world, Gehman, Interpreters of For. Languages; and with special reference to Rome, Snellman, De Interpretibus Romanorum.

5. Plut. Cato Maior 22. 1-5; Gellius, Noct. Att. 6. 14. 8-10; cf. also Paus. 7. 11. 4-8; Ferguson, Hellenistic Athens, 324-8; Kennedy, Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World, 53-4.

6. Sherk, Roman Documents, pp. 13-19 argues from the consistency of the Greek translations of senatus consulta that a permanent staff of scribes in the aerarium was responsible for them, but cf. Hassal/Crawford/Reynolds, J.R.S. 64 (1974), 199-200.

to Cn. Publicius Menader whose citizenship rights were guaranteed by a special senatus consultum. From this and from his selection for the embassy it appears that he must have had influential senatorial connections.

8. On Apollonius Molon, Pauly-W. 2, 141-4. The embassy is apparently referred to by Cicero (Brut. 307, 312). For the date (81), see Douglas, Comm. Brutus, 221. n. 15, 224. n. 23; Magie, Roman Rule ii, 1111. n. 3.


10. Embassy to Neapolis, D. Hal. 15. 5-6; cf. Liv. 8.22.8ff; embassy to Tarentum, see Broughton, M.R.R. i, 189-90 for references.

11. On Rome's identification with the Greek world in this period, see Grimal, Hellenism and the Rise of Rome, 121-3.

12. The Greek language was used by all Roman historians before Cato: cf. Peter, H.R.R. i, lxix - c, 5-39 (Pictor)
   ci - cxvi, 40-43 (Cincius Alimentus)
   cxxi - cxxiii, 49-52 (Acilius)
   cxxiv - cxxvi, 53-4 (Albinus)

For Postumius' contract with the Athenian envoys, Cic. Acad. 2.137; cf. above Ch.2.iii, 74.

13. Flamininus' fluency, Plut. Flam. 5.5. On the language of the letter and the assumption that it was written by Flamininus, Sherk, op. cit., p. 199.

15. On Cato's opposition to Greek culture, Colin, op. cit., 349-56; and on the inconsistency of his position, ibid., 356-60. There are numerous hints in Plutarch's Life of Cato that his knowledge of Greek culture was considerable: adaptation of a saying of Themistocles (8. 2-3); quotation from Aristotle (8.7); allusion to Homer (9.3); quotation from same (27.4); and Plutarch says that he was capable of speaking in Greek at Athens (12.4). The Origines and the De Agri Cultura both reflect familiarity with Hellenistic models; on the latter, cf. Fraenkel, Leseproben aus Reden Ciceros u. Catos, 130 (on Cato frag. 20).

16. That senators were able to understand ambassadorial speeches in Greek is suggested by the pattern of senatorial interruptions. The Macedonian envoys in 198/7 and in 184/3 were interrupted because of senatorial disapproval of their speeches (see above Ch.4.i, 146, 149-50). It is unlikely that this refers to an interruption of the Latin translation after the Greek speech had been heard in its entirety. For the view that the requirement of interpreters was a formality, Sherk, op. cit., 198. n. 13. This accords with contemporary diplomatic usage, where translators are used for reasons of formal dignity and also to allow time and room for manoeuvre in negotiations.

17. The alternative is that the translation ran concurrently with the original speech, as in some modern practice. This is suggested by Plutarch's account of Cato's speech in Athens, the translation of which proved to be considerably longer than Cato's concise original, and particularly by Plutarch' use of the imperfect ἔχει (Plut. Cato Maior
12.5). But this is a slender assumption, and although ancient interpreters
were doubtless of a high enough standard to work in this way, the effect would
be to break up the flow of an ambassador's rhetoric. Since ambassadorial
speeches were prepared in advance, it is likely that translations of them
would also be prepared and the text of these read out after the delivery
of the original.

18. Cato's hostility forms part of reaction to Greek culture expressed
in 173 and 161 with expulsions of philosophers and rhetoricians. The
156/5 embassy was perhaps a watershed, since Cato's voice was now that of
a minority. The embassy may conceivably have been a device to allow the
philosophers legitimate access to Rome's intellectual market; cf. also

If there is any personal hostility in Cato's remarks, it is probably
directed against the praetor, A. Albinus, with whom the envoys associated
(cf. Ch.2.iii, 74). For the disagreement of these men over the question
of the Achaeans detainees, Ch.2.iii, n. 17.

mention of mourning, 30.4.5.

20. Pol. 30.18.5. Polybius' contempt for Prusias is not reflected in
Livy's otherwise fuller account (45.44.4ff.) and may not have been shared
by the majority of Roman senators who may have appreciated his behaviour.
On this and the discrepancy between Polybius and Diodorus at this point,
 cf. Ch.3.iv, 134. n. 9.

21. On this see below Ch.5.ii, 238.
22. Pol. 25.4. 4-5. The success of the Lycian envoys is reflected in the fact that the senate's decision was a definite reversal of its 189-8 settlement (Pol. 21.24. 7-8, 22.5.4.). For the date of the embassy, Derow, Phoenix 27 (1973), 350-4.

Notes to Ch.5.ii.

1. On Polybius' treatment of speeches in general, Walbank, Speeches in Greek Historians, 7-8, 11-18; H.C.P. i, 13-14; Polybius, 43-6; Pédech, Méthode, 254-302; Ziegler Pauly-W. 21, 1524-7.


4. Bickermann recognises the serious implication that his case had for the reliability of Polybius as a historical source. He alludes (art. cit., 234) without full explanation to Polybius' source as in some way providing the most likely solution to the problem. He also postulates that Polybius' source for the S.C. on Asia was Pergamene and that this accounted for his error in recording it, but he does not contend explicitly that the same source accounted for the "contaminated" speeches. Gelzer, art. cit., 24 concludes that the episode was reproduced from a Rhodian historian, probably Zeno, by Polybius. The rest of Gelzer's article tends towards the view that Polybius was not usually dependent on written sources for second century events. If Polybius' account does derive from
Zeno, then there are reasonable grounds for doubting the authenticity of the speeches, since Polybius himself draws attention at some length to Zeno's unreliability (16. 14-20). But this would itself imply that Polybius was unlikely to use Zeno much, and Gelzer's case is anyway unconvincing at this point and appears to rest on the presence in the narrative of circumstantial details such as the late arrival of one of the Rhodian envoys (Pol. 21.22.2). However it is surprising (if the source is Rhodian) that the Rhodian ambassadors are anonymous whereas the Seleucid ambassadors, for example, are named. There seems to be no adequate reason for assuming that Polybius must have based his account on a single written source or even on a single informant, particularly when the event in question occurred in his own lifetime and would immediately have been of universal interest.

5. Bickermann, art cit., 234. His extreme scepticism on both speeches is followed by Magie, op. cit., i, 108 who dismisses them as "apocryphal", but no apparently by Schmitt, op. cit., 82. n. 1; Will, op. cit., ii, 190; Walbank, art. cit., 16.

6. On the embassy from Smyrna, Pol. 21.22. 3-4; the embassy from Alabanda, cf. above Ch.3.i, n. 18 (iii); Magie, op. cit. ii, 994-5 n. 32.

7. Walbank, art. cit.,

8. If the Rhodians' speech appears to be somewhat academic, this is only to be expected in a speech which argued for Greek autonomy, which had been for 250 years not merely a political slogan but the basis of academic political theory. Moreover the senate had for 10 years not merely flirted but had a serious affair with the cause of Greek autonomy. Nor
were the Rhodians themselves motivated exclusively by idealism, as Eumenes explained to the senate and as their future relations with Lycia demonstrated. Their speech was not excessively idealistic in tone and made frequent reference to Rome's self-interest.

9. For the senatus consultum on Asia, see Bickermann, art. cit., 217-232; Magie, op. cit., i, 108-9, ii, 950-1.

Eumenes spoke in favour of Rome rewarding her allies, the Rhodians in favour of extending the autonomy principle to include all Asian Greek states. The S.C. gave autonomy to those states which had not gone over to Antiochus and were not already subject to Eumenes, and divided the rest between Pergamum and Rhodes.

10. After the Roman victory at Myonnesus early in 190, Antiochus sued for peace. At this point the Scipios demanded the evacuation of the cis-Tauric possessions (Pol. 21.14.8).

11. Scipio and Regillus arrived at Brundisium as the 10 legati and Greek ambassadors were setting off and entered Rome in triumph a few days later (21.24. 16-17). The date of the triumphs are given by Fast. Triumph. as kal. Feb. 188 (Regillus) and ? prid. kal Mart. 188 (Scipio); cf. Degrassi, Inscr. Ital. xiii. 1, 80-1, 554. Allowing for calendar advance of about 3½ months these dates would fall around October-November 189 (cf. above Ch.1.i, n. 3).

12. On Rome's preoccupation with the Asian cities in the 190s, Pol. 18. 47.1 (197); Pol. 18.50.7 (196); Diod. 28.15.4 and Liv. 34.59.5 (194/3); Liv. 35. 16-17 (193).

Thus it is plausible that Greek autonomy should have figured as a
major factor in the discussions of 189. For the view that the senate would not have totally abandoned the autonomy principle at this date, cf. Magie, op. cit., i, 108.

13. Pol. 21.24.4: ἐπίστευσαν δὲ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐλέεις ἐπίκρισιν. This probably means "they gave the same answer to each embassy" and not "they gave one single answer to all the embassies", as was the case in 170/69 (cf. above Ch.4.ii, 191-2). The senate would not be economising on diplomatic etiquette at this early stage.

14. On the name of the envoy the reading of Polybius' text is uncertain at this point (21.31.6); Livy's version (which is at least intelligible) is "Leon Hicesiae" (38.10.4). But see Shuckburgh, Histories of Polybius ii, 288. n. 1 for an alternative reading. For the activities of Philip's "friends" at Rome, cf. Ch.3.iv, 131-2.

15. The terms granted by Fulvius, Pol. 21.30. 1-5. The senate would not normally overrule a consul, although a would-be successor might often vigorously oppose (and in 137 the senate disowned Mancinus' terms with the Celtiberi; cf. Pol. 35.3.1ff. for a similar situation in 152/1). In 189 Rome had nothing to gain except the formal submission of the Aetolian League, and the terms eventually granted were more lenient than those offered earlier.

16. For a fuller treatment of Callicrates' embassy and his exceptional conduct in departing from his instruction, cf. Ch.4.iii, 206-7.

17. For this embassy, Pol. 30.31; Schmitt, op. cit., 160ff.
18. Notably the family of Aemilius Paullus, to which Gracchus himself was attached via the Cornelii Scipiones.

19. Pol. 23.9.4ff.; cf. below Ch.5.iii,261-2.

20. The attempt to secure an alliance was only made with the appointment of Theaedetus' embassy in 167/6, at which point Polybius digresses on Rhodes' customary avoidance of alliances (30.5.4ff.).

21. For factors influencing the selection of envoys in Classical Greece, Mosley, Envoys and Diplomacy, 43ff. On Callicrates' selection, cf. above Ch.4.iii, n. 32.


23. M'. Iuventius' activities, Pol 30.4.4ff; Liv. 45.21.1ff. For the hostility towards Rhodes in the senatorial debate, Liv. 45.25.2.

24. Kennedy, op. cit., 59-60 seems to overstate the importance of Cato's speech in comparison with the speeches of the Rhodian envoys. As a senior senator Cato's views would naturally be respected, but he was only one man, and there is really no evidence on which to judge how effective the respective speeches were. The senate's reply does however seem to have contained some kind of commendation of the ambassadors (Pol. 30.4.9). On Philophron's speech, cf. below 249.

25. On the publication of speeches in Greece, see Kennedy, Art of Persuasion in Greece, 204-6; cf. Kienast, op. cit., 593-4.

27. Demetrius must have appeared to the senate in 164/3 as a far more able and therefore dangerous candidate for the Seleucid throne than his cousin, Antiochus V, who was a minor. With hindsight Demetrius' reign accelerated the long slide of the Seleucid kingdom into anarchy and disintegration (to which the senate's policy must also have contributed). But Polybius must have been reproducing the contemporary thinking of the senate. For the events of Demetrius' reign, Will, op. cit. ii, 306-17.


30. On this see above Ch.4.ii, 163-4.

31. For this view see above Ch.4.ii, 175-6.

32. Liv. 37.49.1; Diod. 29.9. After following Polybius for his account of the audience, Livy appears to revert to an annalistic source for the senatus consultum, probably beginning at 37.49.7 (see Nissen, op. cit., 197-8).

33. Walsh, Livy, 232; Walbank in Dorey (Ed.), Livy, 63-4.

34. The Livian speech, 45. 22-4; cf. Nissen, op. cit., 275; Walsh, op. cit., 232; Walbank, op. cit., 63.
35. For Livy's use of public and private documentary records, Walsh, op. cit., 110-4.

36. The Locrian embassy, Liv. 29.16-18; cf. above Ch.2.ii, 62; Ch.5.i, 228-9.

37. The embassy from Saguntum, Liv. 28.39. The guilt felt by Rome over Saguntum is one of the factors distorting Livy's account of the outbreak of war in 218; cf. Rich, Coll. Latomus 149, 28ff.


39. For the audience, Liv. 30. 22-3; above Ch.4.i, 143ff. For the ratification of the peace, Pol. 15.1. 3-4; cf. above Ch.1.iv, 40.

Notes to Ch.3.iii.

1. S.I.G. ii, 656, esp. 11. 19-28; for a fuller treatment of this embassy, cf. above Ch.3.i, 95ff.

2. On the purpose of the embassy, Robert, B.C.H. 59 (1935), 510ff.; cf. also Ch.3.i, n.10.

3. For these embassies, Pol. 32.10; cf. above Ch.3.i, 102-4. On the omission of the audience(s) from Polybius' surviving narrative, Ch.3.i,
4. Polybius seems to have shown an understandable interest in the unofficial activities of royalty. The visit of Philometor to Rome in 164/3 must have received some attention in Polybius' narrative to judge from Diod. 31.18. 1-3. The story of Demetrius' escape is also extensively treated (Pol. 31. 11-15), although this might be mainly due to Polybius' personal interest.

5. Logically the S.C. on Cappadocia should reflect either (i) a majority in favour of joint rule or (ii) a compromise solution to accommodate evenly split groups for Ariarathes and Orophernes. That the adoption of a compromise resolution was a common procedure is suggested by Polybius' account of the debate on the Achaean detainees in 150/5 (33.1. 3-8), when such a resolution was formulated but not put to the vote by the presiding magistrate, A. Postumius Albinus.

On the other hand joint rule had been in existence in the Ptolemaic kingdom since 170, but although it suited Rome's interests, it had not been imposed by the senate. Indeed senatorial opinion seems to have been split between the Ptolemies, with the majority supporting Euergetes and a minority (including Cato) Philometor: cf. Scullard, Rom. Politics, 236-8.

6. After supporting Antiochus against Rome Ariarathes IV made peace with Manlius Vulso (Pol. 21.40ff.) he sent his son to Rome in 172 (Liv. 42.19.3). Ariarathes V sent envoys to Rome after his accession in 164/3 (Pol. 31.3) and again in 160/59 (Pol. 32.1. 1-4; Diod. 31.28), and on both occasions met with a friendly reception owing to the report of Ti. Gracchus. In 163 two Roman embassies visited Cappadocia and were favourably impressed with his goodwill to Rome (Pol. 31.8).
The origin of the dynastic dispute with Orophernes appears to have been conflated with folk-tale motifs: see Will, op. cit. ii, 313f.

7. Ariarathes will have been in a position to make the same kind of appeal to pathos as Demetrius had made tellingly but not successfully in 164/3: Pol. 31.2.5; cf. above Ch.5.ii, 245.

8. Pol. 30. 1-3; cf. above Ch.3.i, 100-2.

9. Sall. Iug. 13. 5-16.1; cf. above Ch.3.ii, 116ff.

10. On the simplification of the audience proceedings, Ch. 4.i, 152ff. For the effect of Gracchus' report on Astymedes' mission, Pol. 30.31.19; cf. Ch.5.ii, 241. Gracchus and the Cappadocian embassy, Pol. 31.3. 4-5.

11. cf. above Ch.4.i, 143.

12. There is a similar uncertainty in Polybius' account of the Ptolemaic embassies of 162/1 (31.20. 1-3; cf. Diod. 31.23). After a heated argument between the envoys in the senate the legati Torquatus and Merula "testified and confirmed Euergetes' contention with great zeal". This evidence could have been given either during the audience or in the course of the senatorial debate, but apparently not before the audience when the legati would be expected to make their original report.

13. It was Marcius who advocated the senate's original response to the embassy, which had "the character of a proclamation" and which encouraged disaffection within the Achaean League (Pol. 23.9. 8-14).
This does not seem to have been regarded as the senate's official reply, since the senate detained the envoys at Rome until news came from Messene and then issued a different reply (Pol. 23.17.3; cf. above Ch.4.ii, 166). Marcius may also have suggested this devious manoeuvre; for his role in these events, see Briscoe, J.R.S. 54 (1964), 66-7; cf. also Errington, Philopoemen, 185-7.

14. For the sequence of events, see Ch.1.iii, 31.

15. cf. Ch.2.iii, n. 11; Ch. 4.ii, n.24.
Appendix I

An interesting problem is raised by the Illyrian embassy of 172, other aspects of which have been considered above. The senate's treatment of the embassy seems to have been determined by the allegations of espionage brought against it by envoys from Issa, who claimed that Illyrian spies were at Rome at Perseus' instance specie legatorum. When the latter were summoned into the senate they stated a quite plausible mission (that they had come to defend Gentius against any charges made against him by the Issaeans), but were evidently disbelieved by the senate which drew attention to their failure to follow the correct procedure (Liv. 42.26.2-6). I do not intend to rehearse the arguments on the authenticity of this annalistic passage, except to say that the motive for fabrication is not obvious, and that in any case the procedural details can be regarded as plausible.

But it is clear that our information on the incident is inadequate to explain the senate's reaction to the Illyrians. In particular we do not know how long the Illyrians had been at Rome without approaching a magistrate. They might simply have been slow to follow the established procedure or misinformed about it, in which case the senate was able to take advantage of this to embarrass the envoys in the senate. Again Gentius may have instructed them to observe the situation at Rome before committing themselves to any precise mission. But one explanation which is surely inadequate is that the Roman authorities' interpretation was correct and that the envoys really were spies. Any state wishing to do so, providing it was not at war with Rome, could send an embassy there under any spurious official pretext to observe what was going on: this was quite common practice. Why then should Gentius have sent spies pretending to be envoys rather than envoys who could also do the job of spying?

The answer is surely that the reference to espionage is mere propaganda.
Livy ascribes it to the Issaean envoys, and it is easy to believe that they used it as a rhetorical device in their speech against Gentius in the senate. It was not an original accusation to make. When in 203/2 Carthaginian envoys failed to impress the senate with their sincerity, one senior senator, M. Laevinus, is said by Livy to have claimed that "spies not envoys had come to them" (Liv. 30.23.5). This annalistic incident is also in dispute, since the Carthaginians did in fact succeed in their mission; but Laevinus' remark has all the hallmarks of a commonplace which would be suitable in any such situation. Once it was assumed that the envoys were not genuinely seeking peace, then in a war situation the only alternative explanation for their presence was espionage. This is relevant to the situation in 172, since although Rome was not at war with Gentius, it was the purpose of the Issaean envoys to convince the senate that Gentius was planning (with Perseus) to attack Rome; and war against Perseus had already been decided upon.

The motif of espionage also seems to have been a commonplace in Classical Greek diplomacy. Aeschines says of Demosthenes that he accused Philip of slighting Athens when he did not send ambassadors and of infiltrating spies when he did. And Aeneas Tacticus presumably voices a contemporary neurosis about ambassadors when he suggests that for security purposes citizens should have as little contact with visiting embassies as possible.\(^2\)

The reports of envoys had always been a useful means of collecting information and an embassy could always be sent on some spurious pretext to find out what was happening. It is probably too much of a coincidence that Athenian envoys should have been at Sparta in 431 at the time of the Spartan assembly which decided on war against Athens.\(^4\) At Rome in the second century it seems to have been common for embassies to be sent for the purpose of observation; and usually (but not invariably) an official
pretext was alleged for the mission.

In 184/3 an Achaean embassy was at Rome "partly to renew the alliance and partly to watch (προσεβρότευν) the dispute of the Spartans". Thus when a measure of agreement had been reached between the four sets of Spartan envoys then in Rome under the chairmanship of a senatorial committee, Achaean envoys were available to be asked to put their seal to this agreement. Little more is known about this embassy, but it immediately raises the question of the ambassadors' instructions and whether they were actually competent to give official Achaean League approval to the agreement. Certainly their principal object seems to have been to await the outcome of the Spartan embassies, and the renewal of the alliance was apparently an official pretext to justify their presence in Rome.

A similar pretext was used by Ptolemaic envoys in 170/69. The renewal of ἡ φίλωσβρωτη was perhaps appropriate in the context of recent governmental changes at Alexandria, but Polybius states that the main object of their mission was to watch (παρατηρεῖν) the activities of the Seleucid embassy under Meleager. Another part of their mission concerning mediation between Rome and Macedon was dropped, so that the renewal of friendly relations was the only part of their mission which the Roman authorities would have known about officially. In 172 at the time of Eumenes' visit to Rome Livy says that "all the states of Greece and Asia" were interested in what Eumenes and the Macedonian ambassadors had said in the senate and "miserant pleraeque civitates alia in speciem praeferentes legatos".

But such pretexts were not essential. In 182/1 two Macedonian envoys, Philocles and Apelles, came to Rome not on any official business with the senate but to investigate the allegations made by Perseus about Demetrius' intrigues with the Romans and with Flamininus in particular. And in 167
when Philophron and Astymedes had received an answer, they stayed behind to await developments (Pol. 30.5.1) and eventually took back the S.C. on Caunus and Stratonicea after the death of Theaedetus on his 167/6 embassy (Pol. 30.21.4). Philophron and Astymedes had had a valid mission, but this had been completed and they were really staying at Rome in an unofficial capacity. The distinction between legitimate observation and "espionage" was really that between friend and foe. Rhodes was not on good terms with Rome at this time, but the two states were not at war. The unofficial presence of Rhodian ambassadors could therefore be tolerated.

And generally in peacetime conditions the Romans would not have objected to such information-gathering embassies. Not only was this standard diplomatic practice, but the senate depended on the presence of numerous embassies at Rome to disseminate information about its decisions and intentions. Normally this was done on an unofficial basis, but in the Piracy Law of 101-00 provision was made for the letters of the consul to various Eastern kings to be transmitted by the Rhodian ambassadors who were then in Rome.

Related to the question of espionage in diplomatic activity is the incident which brought about the revolt of Tarentum in 212. According to Livy Philias of Tarentum had been in Rome for a long time per speciem legationis, and during this period he managed to procure the escape of the Tarentine hostages interned there. Here we have an example of an ambassador whose ulterior purpose was not merely to watch events but actually to participate in them. Again insufficient details are known about the incident, such as whether Philias really was an ambassador who had completed his mission, and whether he acted on his own initiative, and why he had been at Rome for so long. And how could he possibly have spent a long time at Rome pretending to be an ambassador? Of course after his mission and the unsuccessful escape of the hostages Tarentum was at
war with Rome, and Philias' activities could be described retrospectively by the Romans as "espionage".

This case brings to mind a later incident when Menyllus, the ambassador of Ptolemy Philometor, helped to bring about Demetrius' escape from Rome in 162. Menyllus was unquestionably a bona fide ambassador and appeared in the senate to speak against Ptolemy Euergetes on the question of Cyprus. It would be interesting to know how far Menyllus' collusion in Demetrius' escape conditioned the senate's rather harsh attitude to him when he again appeared in the senate the next year. Philometor may have given some tacit approval to the escape of Demetrius, but such activity could not possibly have been mentioned in his official instructions, which were to be handed over to the Roman authorities. But whereas Philometor could have given secret instructions to Menyllus, it is inconceivable that Philias could have been in any way instructed on the Tarentine hostages. His instructions would represent the public decision of the Tarentine assembly, and the Tarentines would hardly wish to provoke Rome unnecessarily or jeopardise the lives of the hostages by making any public decision.

Theoretically in both the above instances the ambassadors concerned were acting on their own initiative, but in practice they must have felt that their actions would be approved of by the authority which sent them. These cases really relate to the question of ambassadorial competence and dependence on instructions, but since the activities in which they engaged were peripheral to the diplomatic process, I have not considered them in that context above.

Classical Greek parallels may be adduced for this kind of para-ambassadorial activity. Athenian ambassadors to Sitalces in 430 could hardly have been instructed to intercept and capture the Peloponnesian envoys en route to Persia (Thuc. 2.67): they must have been seizing an
opportunity to act in a way which they felt was bound to meet with
approval in Athens. Similarly the Athenian envoys who happened to be
in Sparta on other business at the time of the crucial debate on the
war, seem to have been acting on their own initiative in contributing to
this debate (Thuc. 1.72.1ff).
Appendix 2

I have frequently mentioned that as far as second century embassies to Rome were concerned, their principal object was to obtain a favourable senatus consultum. This reflected the political supremacy of the senate in Rome and of Rome in the oecumene. The supremacy of the senate in this period was however due in part to the overseas expansion over which it presided and which increased the volume of its responsibilities. Before 200 senatus consulta seem to have been of less significance; and this is not simply a reflection of the fact that after 200 a large number of senatus consulta(particularly of those which survive) relate to the affairs of the Greek East. The growing importance of senatus consulta is reflected by the usages in the official documents of this period which relate to embassies at Rome. And these usages may also reflect qualitative changes in the senate's attitude to incoming embassies and to its own rôle in world affairs.

In 193 the Seleucid envoy Menippus undertook an embassy on behalf of Tecs at Rome, and the official Roman response to this was the letter of the praetor, M. Valerius. The structure of the document is roughly as follows: "Menippus came to us as your envoy, presented your decree and spoke in accordance with it. We received him amicably and .... we judge your city and land to be inviolable". There is no mention of the senate except that it is included with Valerius himself and the tribunes in the opening salutation. There is no record of the envoys asking for a senatorial audience or of any decree being passed by the senate. The Romans are referred to throughout by the First Person Plural, and the letter is generally reminiscent of the standard phraseology of official Hellenistic letters (cf. Sherk, op. cit., p. 200).

Four years later the praetor, Sp. Postumius, wrote a letter to Delphi in response to an embassy which was seeking similar privileges to those
earlier granted to Teos (asylia, etc.). The difference is that the Romans were closely involved in the settlement of Greece, whereas Valerius' letter had been a gesture of goodwill towards a state on the periphery of Rome's sphere of influence. Postumius' letter runs as follows: "Delphian envoys spoke concerning asylia, etc; know therefore that it has been decreed by the senate that ....". The S.C. is thus summarised in indirect speech, although the actual text of it is not included. ²

The letter of C. Livius (also to Delphi) written in the following year is similar: "the Delphian envoys spoke ....; and the senate directed its attention and decreed that ....". Again the content of the S.C. is summarised in the magistrate's letter. ³ However the letter goes on to say: "we have handed over (διέστηκαν) the replies (συνάψεως ) which were given to the previous embassy". ⁴ Evidently some document was changing hands here, but it is not called an S.C. Presumably by "the senate's replies" is meant the relevant extract of the S.C. rather than its full text, which may at this stage have been considered unnecessarily lengthy; but this cannot be verified.

The letter of Licinius to the Amphictionic League (possibly in 186) may also be considered here: "your envoys came into the senate and spoke on the matters about which you sent them, and the senate received them amicably. On the question of the votes, it was decreed that ....". ⁵

In these letters the role of the senate is much more clearly defined than in Valerius' letter. It is unfortunate that there is no way of telling whether the latter was exceptional, or whether there was in fact some development in the period covered by the letters. But in all the examples it is the magistrate's letter which constitutes the official reply to the incoming embassy; and in none of the cases does a full text of the S.C. appear to have been enclosed.
By the middle of the second century however the style of the magisterial letters appears to have changed. The fluency and politeness characteristic of the Hellenistic chanceries has gone, and the letters do no more than to introduce the *senatus consultum*. The full text of the S.C. is included and it is on to this that the emphasis has been shifted. This more terse and business-like style, which has reduced the document to the minimum essential for a covering letter, may be illustrated by the letter of P. Cornelius Balsio to Corcyra (dated by Holleaux to the period 175-60): "envoys from Ambracia and Athamana approached me, so that I might grant a senatorial audience to them. I did so. This is the decree of the senate: ······" The same formula is used in the letter of M. Aemilius to Mylasa. Both these letters were written to third parties who had been selected to arbitrate in a dispute. In L. Calpurnius' letter to Itanus the same formula is used to refer to the envoys of the state concerned (Itanus); and this suggests that the formula was in fact generally used in replies to embassies.

One result of this more concise style of letter is that the customary reference to an ambassador's instructions is dropped from the answering document. But this should not be taken to indicate that such instructions did not continue to be required. The old formula with its more fluent style reappears in documents of the late Republic. The letter of Julius Caesar to Mytilene (probably written in 48) begins as follows: "your ambassadors came to me, handed over your decree and spoke on the matter of honours ...." This is the letter of a Roman commander in the field, and is not the response to an official embassy to the senate in Rome. Similarly Octavian's letter to Rhosus (31) was written in response to an embassy which met him personally in Ephesus: it too has the conventional Hellenistic answering formula which goes back at least until the early third century. \(^5\)
It is possible that the letters of Roman magistrates and promagistrates away from Rome had always been more informative and contained more conventional politeness than the covering letters which enclosed senatus consulta. But the letters of Q. Scaevola to Ephesus and Sardis for example (written in the 90s) are business-like in tone and do not appear to waste words.

The abbreviation of Roman magisterial letters in the second century left the senatus consultum to speak for itself. It usually had a lengthy preamble which explained the circumstances of the case and recapitulated the statements of the ambassadors. The change in the style and composition of the letters' style must reflect a recognition of the importance of the S.C. as a document which is also apparent in the literary sources. For example Timarchus in 161/0 could consider that his mission was successful when he was able to return to Syria with a S.C. recognising his claim to the Seleucid throne. Similarly Charops of Epirus evidently thought that by forging an S.C. which approved of his actions, his position in Epirus would (at least for a time) remain secure.

On the other hand when a Spartan embassy went to Rome in 188/7, Polybius refers to the success of their mission by saying that eventually they obtained a letter from the consul, M. Lepidus, which disapproved of Achaean policy towards Sparta (Pol. 22.3). There is no reason to believe that this letter was written on Lepidus' own initiative, and that the embassy was not granted an audience. Polybius (or the excerptor) is probably telescoping the process by which the senate gave the embassy an audience and instructed the presiding magistrate, M. Lepidus, to write to the Achaeans expressing Roman dissatisfaction. But it is interesting that Polybius should refer to the consul's letter rather than to the senate's actual decision. For it implies that in Greece the senatus consultum had not by this time come to be regarded as the essential document by which...
Roman wishes and demands were expressed. And this in fact confirms the impression given by the documents of the 190s and 180s which have been considered above. It was by the personal letters of Roman magistrates (writing in the style of Hellenistic monarchs) that Roman policy was originally communicated to the states of the Greek East.

At the end of the Republic the senate's authority broke down in the face of powerful individuals who did actually assume the role of Hellenistic kings. And this trend, taken together with the situation of prolonged civil war which weakened Rome's international position, should explain the reversion to a more personal and conciliatory tone in some of the documents of the age of Caesar and Augustus.
Appendix 3

I have attempted above (Ch.3.iii) to establish a pattern to accommodate the evidence on unofficial diplomatic activity at Rome. It might be expected that some progress would be made in this direction by an examination of the language used to describe such activity. But in fact there is insufficient consistency of language for this to be of much help. The word which is frequently used in the context of private diplomatic contacts is ἐντευξις, but by itself it has only the general meaning of "meeting": it is widely used by Polybius in a number of different contexts. There are certain promising indications that the word is specifically applied to private interviews. For example it is consistently used of the activities of Ariarathes and the envoys of Orophernes and Demetrius in 158/7 (cf. below n.7).

A more significant passage is that in which Polybius apologises to his readers for having to record τὰς ἐντευξις τῶν πρεσβειῶν καὶ τῶν χρηματισμῶν before the circumstances of their dispatch. Of these words χρηματισμὸς and its cognate verb χρηματίζω have a wide range of meanings but are regularly used of official audiences; in the present context χρηματισμὸς can only have the meaning of "audience". It follows then that ἐντευξις is intended to convey another activity undertaken by embassies in Rome, and it seems that this activity can only be the private interviews. The apparent use of ἐντευξις in deliberate contrast to χρηματισμὸς and without any further explanation suggests that both words have a specific application and are not interchangeable.

However this impression is mistaken, since ἐντευξις is elsewhere used by Polybius in a context in which it can mean only the senatorial audience. The occasion of this is the visit of Attalus and his brothers to Rome in 181/0, who were given a cordial reception both in private and in public. The senate provided them with generous hospitality.
The picture is further confused by Polybius' account of the Rhodian embassy to Rome in 168/7: the ambassadors noticed hostility and suspicion. The word ἐντεύξεις applies here to all contact with both authorities and private individuals; but since the senatorial audience had not taken place (and was in fact unlikely to occur at all), it cannot be among the ἐντεύξεις referred to in this passage. It is quite possible that the public contact mentioned here is the ambassador's interview with the consul, M. Iunius, in which they unsuccessfully sought to obtain an audience.

Thus the scheme which is hinted at in Pol. 28.16.10 is quite invalid, and it may be that there Polybius was merely using two words which he regarded as virtually synonymous for stylistic effect. Certainly his use of ἐντεύξεις is surrounded by inconsistency and ambiguity. Another example is the embassy sent to Rome by the regents of Ptolemy Philometor in 170/69 to renew friendly relations, to offer mediation in the war against Perseus and above all to παρατηρεῖν τὰς τῶν περὶ τῶν Μελέαγρον ἐντεύξεις. Were the ambassadors to keep an eye on the private negotiations or on the result of the official audience? The use of the plural suggests either the former or both, since more than one official audience would be both unusual and unnecessary. From Diod. 31.27a it is known that Heracleides was at this time assisting his brother Timarchus in the systematic corruption of senators, presumably on the orders of Antiochus Epiphanes. Heracleides was a member of Meleager's embassy in 170/69, and it is probable that the embassy engaged in a certain amount of private activity.

The idea of a private interview can only be unambiguously conveyed by using a word such as ἐντεύξεις with the limiting adjectival phrase μαρτίων. Polybius resorts to this periphrasis in the case of Ariarathes and his opponents in 158/7. It also appears in his account of negotiations between
Antiochus and Roman ambassadors in 196. These took the form of a public conference and the main proceedings are contrasted with the earlier "private meetings of the king and the Romans". The identical construction is used with another word of general application (ἐμπλήκω): Attalus in 168/7 gave his consent to those who were urging him on ἐν τὴν ἐμπλήκω ἐμπλήκω (Pol. 30.1.9).

The word ἐντευχεῖται is used by Diodorus to refer to the contact between the Rhodian embassy and Roman patrons in 168/7, although it is not used in the corresponding passage of Polybius which in other respects is almost identical: κατὰ τὰς παραμεθόρεσις μνήμει ταχαλεύειν μηδ' ἀτάκως τοὺς φίλους,.... (Pol. 30.4.5)

κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἐντευχεῖται τῶν φίλων μνήμει ταχαλεύειν μηδ' ἀτάκως,.... (Diod. 31.5.3)

Evidently Diodorus was closely paraphrasing Polybius' words here, and either he has provided a general word for "meeting" or "contact" which suits an ambassadorial context, or he is using ἐντευχεῖται in its more specialised sense of "petition".

The "friends" to whom the ambassadors appealed were presumably the patrons and hospites of Rhodes. On a less critical occasion five years previously another Rhodian embassy had called on these men for assistance. Then the Rhodian envoy had sought the opportunity of refuting any anti-Rhodian charges made by Eumenes in the senate. In 172 the Rhodians' patrons failed to achieve what was desired; in 168/7 they were successful in that the imminent declaration of war was averted. The identity of Rhodes' patrons is largely unknown, but one senior senator who is known to have defended their cause in 168/7 is M. Cato. Earlier he had spoken out against Eumenes and criticised the warmth of the reception given to him at Rome (Plut. Cato Maior 8). While this might have occurred in 189, it more probably belongs to the situation of 172, when Eumenes and Rhodes were
at odds. The decision not to allow Rhodian envoys to confront Eumenes in the senate on that occasion was taken principally on grounds of secrecy; but it must also have owed something to the consideration of Eumenes' dignity, a consideration which Cato would have vigorously opposed.\textsuperscript{11}

It is clear from Polybius' account that Philophron and Astymedes were obliged to adopt an extremely humble and deferential approach towards their so-called "friends". After the long period in which Rhodes had enjoyed the position of a leading ally of Rome there would be many senators who had become committed in some way to representing Rhodian interests; and among these patrons of Rhodes there would doubtless be a number of senior senators. But after the events of 169-8 these men may have considered that their duties of patronage had lapsed, and they would require some positive demonstration of the submissive attitude of their Rhodian clients before discharging any of these patronal obligations. It was apparently after several days of such activity that Philophron and Astymedes were able to enter the senate and obtain a comparatively favourable \textit{senatus consultum}.\textsuperscript{11}
Notes to Appendix 1

1. On this embassy see above Ch.2.ii, 55-8 (with discussion on the authenticity of Liv. 42.26.2ff) and Ch.4.i, 150-1.

2. On the reliability of Liv. 30.21.11ff., see above Ch.4.i, 144-5.

3. Aesch. 3.82; Aen. Tact. 10.11; cf. Mosley, Envoys and Diplomacy, 9.

4. Thuc. 1.72.1ff; cf. Mosley, op. cit., 6f.

5. Pol. 23.4.11ff.

6. On the nature of the envoys' instructions, see above Ch.4.iii, 204ff. Timotheus may have been instructed not merely to watch the Seleucid envoys' activities, but to refute any accusations which they might bring against the Ptolemaic government. In that case the embassy would belong to the category of counter-embassies and would present a close parallel with the Illyrian embassy in question. This would also mean that the third part of their mission would be reflected in their official instructions; but Polybius' words do not suggest that this was so, and there is no mention in Polybius' account of Timotheus making any defence against Seleucid allegations.

On the governmental change of late 170 (which established the joint rule of Philometor, Cleopatra and Euergetes), see Skeat, J.E.A. 47 (1961), 107ff.

7. Liv. 42.14.5; cf. above Ch.2.iii, n. 34.

9. P.D.3.iv, 37b, 11. 12-13. It was for this reason that the Rhodian ambassadors were to be admitted to the senate ἐκτὸς τῆς συντάξεως (ibid., 11. 17-18; cf. above Ch.2.iii, 71f.).

10. Liv. 25.7.11ff.


**Notes to Appendix 2**

1. See Sherk, *Roman Documents*, 34 (pp. 214-6) for text and bibliography. (This work is extensively cited in the following notes and will be referred to by the author's name only).

2. Sherk, 1 (pp. 21-5), A and B. The text of the letter as given in Dittenberger, *S.I.G. ii*, 612 concludes as follows: "for your information we send you a copy (i.e. of the S.C.)". The next document is then restored on the assumption that it was this S.C. However the presiding magistrate in this document (Document C) should be read as Octavius, so that its date is unlikely to be earlier than 165 (Sherk, p. 24). Sherk's text follows Holleaux, B.C.H. 54 (1930), 38-9.


5. Sherk, 39 (pp. 229-32).

6. For Blasio's letter, Sherk 4 (pp. 34-6); for Aemilius' letter, Sherk 7 (pp. 44-7). On both documents see Holleaux, B.C.H. 48 (1924), 381-98; cf. above Ch.2.ii, 61-2.

7. Calpurnius' letter, Sherk 14 (pp. 78-85), ll. 89-97.


9. For the letters of Scaevola, Sherk 47 (pp. 256-9).

10. On Timarchus, Diod. 31.27a; above Ch.3.ii, esp. 108-9. Charops' "forgery" of the S.C., Pol. 32.6.9.

11. cf. above Ch. l.ii, 14-15.

Notes to Appendix 3

1. Mauersberger, Polybios - Lexicon, 816.

2. Pol. 28.16.10 (referring to the Rhodian embassy of 170/69); on the chronological implications, cf. above Ch.1.iii, 25.

3. Liv. 45.20.6-8; cf. above Ch.2.ii, 58ff.

4. Pol. 28.1.7; cf. Ch.4.iii, 204ff.; on Meleager, Olshausen, Prosop. der Heil. Königsgesandten, 213ff.
5. But it was not altogether unparalleled. Of the embassies at Rome in the summer of 189 both the Rhodian embassy (Pol. 21.24.10) and the Seleucid embassy (Pol. 21.24.13) had a second audience. Attalus was expected to appear in the senate a second time in 168/7 (Pol. 30.3.5); and it is likely that the Athenian embassy of 167/6 had two audiences (see above Ch.4.iii, 210).

6. On this see above Ch.3.ii, 108.

7. Pol. 32.10. 2 and 5.

8. Pol. 18.50.4.

9. Liv. 42.14.7; cf. above Ch.3.iii, 125-6.


12. For the senate's reply, Pol. 30.4. 7-9; cf. above Ch.4.iii, n. 37; Ch.5.ii, 242-3.
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Abbreviations

Auf. u. Nied. I. i - Aufsteig und Niedergang der romischen Welt


F.D.3 - Fouilles de Déphes, Tome III (Epigraphie) (1909-43).

F.I.R.A. i - see bibliography under Riccobono, S.

I. Cret. - see bibliography under Guarducci, M.

I.G. - Inscriptiones Graecae (1873 --- ; 2nd Ed. 1923 --- ).

I.v. Magn. - see bibliography under Kern, O.

I.v. Priene - see bibliography under Hiller von Gaertringen, F.

Pauly-W. - Pauly-Wissowa, *Real Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft* (1893 --).

O.C.I.S. - see bibliography under Dittenberger, W.

S.E.G. - *Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum* (1924 --).

S.I.G. - see bibliography under Dittenberger, W.

Staatsv. - see bibliography under Schmitt, H.H.