The Honesty of Thinking:

Reflections on Critical Thinking in Nietzsche's Middle Period

and the Later Heidegger

by

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In Memory of My Teacher

Randall John Kinavey

Who Let Me Learn to Think
Author's Note

All translations are mine unless otherwise indicated. I have tried, when translating and paraphrasing, to maintain typographical and stylistic details that appear in the original texts.
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List of Abbreviations

Heidegger

GA - Gesamtausgabe
G - Gelassenheit
H - Holzwege
IuD - Identität und Differenz
N I/II - Nietzsche I/II
SvG - Der Satz vom Grund
SuZ - Sein und Zeit
VuA - Vorträge und Aufsätze
WhD - Was heißt Denken?
W - Wegmarken
UzS - Unterwegs zur Sprache
Z - Zollikoner Seminare
ZSdD - Zur Sache des Denkens

Nietzsche

KSA - Kritische Studienausgabe
WzM - Der Wille zur Macht
**Introduction**

This dissertation critically engages prevailing contemporary interpretations of Nietzsche and Heidegger, focusing in particular on the issue of *self-knowing*. It argues that revisions that the two philosophers make during the course of their intellectual careers to their understandings of, in Nietzsche's case, *honesty* and, in Heidegger's, *authenticity* lead both thinkers to a constitutively social conception of how we know ourselves. I will be showing how this socially oriented reading of both Nietzsche and Heidegger transforms our understanding not only of the work of the two philosophers individually, but also of the role that Heidegger's prolonged engagement with Nietzsche played in the development of his thought.

It has been, for some time now, the generally recognized position of modern readings of Nietzsche,\(^1\) as well as Heidegger,\(^2\) that some sort of reckoning with the concepts of honesty and authenticity was in order for any endeavor to make sense of their developing paths of thought. Coming to terms with what being *honest* or *authentic* entailed presented a task of crucial methodological importance,\(^3\) insofar as both notions were seen to exert a lasting influence on the trajectory of their respective philosophical projects.\(^4\) But while studies of Nietzsche and Heidegger were more or less unanimous on the significance of these concepts for the purposes of interpretation, closer examination revealed great diversity of opinion on why it was they mattered. These disparities, of which the following four

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paragraphs provide a sketch, appeared to stem from a topic of especially widespread disagreement: on what measure of truth the activity of genuine self-knowing fundamentally turned.

Such dissent in secondary literature over a final point of reference for truth's measure seemed to follow on account of conflicting hypotheses concerning the sense of subjectivity/objectivity sustained in a truthful unfolding of the subject/object relation. For example, amongst readers of Nietzsche like Bernard Williams, who attributes to him a form of absolute correspondence theory committed to an extra-moral understanding of the object's objectivity,\(^5\) Nietzsche's call to honesty consists in an appeal to a practice of historico-philosophical reflection that achieves the object's adequate representation by exposing the confounding effects of merely relative forms of evaluation. Genealogical reflection, so construed, unfolds in an archeological gesture that sweeps away the accumulated sediment precipitated by such evaluation to unearth the material bedrock in which all human life supposedly takes root, in the interest of providing an account of man's "natural" wants and needs;\(^6\) of humanity "prior to ideas of the ethical"; of the way "human beings are 'anyway.'"\(^7\) Honesty is thus made a matter of paying vigilant attention to the ways in which the powerful conceal the hard facts when imposing their values on others. One is honest by virtue of one's


personal willingness to acknowledge the oftentimes ugly truths of the objective world, covered over by the comfortable falsehoods of ideology.\(^8\)

Even for readers more receptive to Nietzsche's controversial statements regarding the epistemological significance of the practices of evaluative judgment, the activity of self-knowing remains founded upon principles of a similar form: to be honest is to will oneself into alignment with an ultimate measure for the subjectivity/objectivity of the subject/object. Coming from the direction of a very different tradition of thought, Jean-Luc Nancy's reading of Nietzsche, for example, characterizes "honesty as such" as "that valuing, which acknowledges the valuing and lawgiving physis" itself.\(^9\) Honesty is said to "come out of nature itself in its chaos" of constant becoming,\(^10\) as that sort of "moral knowing which consists in nothing other than correspondence to the law of physis."\(^11\) It is, as it were, the "truth of physis" itself "that announces itself in honesty,"\(^12\) which therefore manifests in keeping with one's "subjection to the necessity of this valuing physis."\(^13\) For Nancy, honesty, which is to be "identified with Becoming itself," consists in an act of "recognition" on the part of the subject whereby "Being" is acknowledged as "Becoming"--which is to say, that being honest calls for being the becoming that one supposedly is. By virtue of such recognition, the subject/object relation is ostensibly transformed.\(^15\) From this perspective, Nietzsche's "imperative of honesty"--whose "absolute" character Nancy reads in the light of


\(^10\) Ibid., 245.

\(^11\) Ibid., 240.

\(^12\) Ibid., 240.

\(^13\) Ibid., 239.

\(^14\) Ibid., 232.

Kant's categorical imperative\(^1^6\)--appears, in the end, an appeal to a personal task of which the subject can and should strive to be "worthy."\(^1^7\) How one corresponds to this demand is made a question one must ultimately pose for oneself.

On the Heidegger side of things, the measure of truth from which an account of the activity of self-knowing derives is established in accordance with an hypothesis on the subjectivity of the subject. In the context of *Sein und Zeit*, the subject in question takes the form of the peculiar being called *Dasein*, for whom the subject/object relation presents itself as a problem. Provided that the hypothesis holds, authentic *Dasein* may be understood as wielding the potential to work out the measure of truth for itself. To realign oneself with the deep structures of subjectivity revealed by fundamental-analysis is, on such grounds, to authentically know oneself; to retrieve the "self" that one supposedly already is, reasserting one's ownmost capacity to endow oneself with the sense of one's proper becoming. What sense of selfhood this self to be known entails is hereby posited in advance. Indeed, the analytic's formal suppositions on the structural coherence of the subject are what render defensible the version of authenticity presented by readers of the early Heidegger like Denis McManus. To be authentic is, on such a reading, tantamount to not falling into a mode of "self"-forgetfulness that neglects to reflect on the significance of the measure to which one has already committed as appropriate;\(^1^8\) to be inauthentic is to forget to bear in mind one's own previous choices as regards such measures being properly carried out--to fail to ensure of one's own accord the proper determination of this measure on the basis of one's prior

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\(^1^6\) Nancy, "«Unsre Redlichkeit!»," 242.

\(^1^7\) Ibid., 246.

Self-knowledge supposedly follows by virtue of one's willingness to remember one's overarching beliefs, as an achievement of clarity on what one already knows and understands. According to this line of argument, the authentic "endure what [they] take to be the facts about [themselves]" by "making [their] own judgment decisive in their lives"; by "choosing [themselves] and their [choice]," i.e., their having-chosen; by "subjecting every concern to an original choice," henceforth acting on the belief that they alone made that choice themselves. Such are the terms on which McManus describes authentic Dasein's 'call-of-conscience' as "a call to bring to bear one's understanding of what must be done. . . . One is oneself . . . precisely by bringing one's judgment to bear in one's life. . . . Those who fail to hearken to the call lack . . . a readiness to do what they are already in a position to know must be done." In the end, one is, oneself, personally responsible for one's attunement to the fundamental significance of this call.

For those readers of Heidegger who venture an interpretation of his later work, its characteristic methodological turn (Kehre) away from Dasein is most often construed as amounting to little more than a mere inversion of the questionable presuppositions on truth's measure upon which Sein und Zeit's project had relied—a rhetorical strategy that personifies and elevates the mysterious thing called "Being itself" to a meta-subject of absolute power that decides the appropriate belonging together of subject and object for itself, in accordance

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19 Ibid., 194.
20 Ibid., 205.
21 Ibid., 221.
23 Denis McManus, "Being-towards-death and Owning One's Judgment" (lecture paper presented for the Post-Kantian Seminar Series in the Ryle Room of Oxford University's Faculty of Philosophy and Theology, November 19, 2013), 20.
24 Ibid., 24.
25 Ibid., 23.
with the destined world-historical conditions of their respective epochal unfolding. On such a view as this, Heidegger retreats from the ontological implications of the human subject's 'will-to-have-a-conscience' only to defer to the omnipotent divine will manifest in the course of Being's history. On Jürgen Wagner's reading, for example, man's true place in Being's destinal unfolding is reduced to one of pure passivity in the face of its supreme power and authority; an authentic response to its fateful imposition calls upon him/her to obey the command of its transcendent will, which appropriates man in the sense of incorporating him/her into its subjectivity. True knowledge of this transcendent subject would supposedly require one's attunement to the fate of thought about Being itself, which only the likes of the world-historical genius (such as Martin Heidegger) might foresee. This conception of authenticity leads commentators of a similar interpretive bent, like Maria Perrefort, to read into the later Heidegger's position an appeal to "powerlessness and [the] pious inaction of all men," whereby all "claims to validity" are "displaced to another plane" for their justification--that of Being's own hegemonic historical dominion. According to this notion, one must be willing to wait and listen for the guiding voice of the gods and their chosen heroes to arrive at knowledge of oneself. For only these chosen few of highest rank, who voluntarily abandon themselves to the historical necessity of inaugurating Being's epochal turn toward its providential renewal, are graced with genuine openness for the task of bringing to light its manifest destiny.

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29 Ibid., 24.
Despite the diversity of opinion on the fundamental measure of truth for the activity of self-knowing, the interpretive playing field in contemporary Nietzsche and Heidegger studies remains quite unilaterally polarized on the issues most relevant to this dissertation. Indeed, there is one aspect on which readers of the two thinkers agree almost unanimously. For all of their discord on the measure of truth, all are in accordance with respect to the domain of its accomplishment: being honest or authentic is conceived as a primarily personal task--achieved by virtue of one's will to knowledge; one's "self"-determined willingness to critically reflect on whatever "it" is that one holds to be true. As conscious, self-sovereign beings it is, in principle, up to us, whoever we are, to know and so master our "selves"--if only we would want to. And yet, it is precisely such grounding presuppositions which are called into question in the course of each thinker's revisions to their respective long-standing endorsements of conceptions of honesty or authenticity that turned on one's 'will to truth' or 'will-to-have-a-conscience'.

For Nietzsche, this process of revision unfolds in the context of what is commonly identified as his "middle period," following upon his great disentanglement from his former educators (cf. KSA 2: 14-17), in whose name he once appealed to the absolute sincerity of a heroic form of truthfulness (cf. KSA 1: 337-338, 371-374), of whose conditions and potentially dangerous consequences he would only later come to know and warn (cf. KSA 4: 380-385). It was only once his trust in morality had begun to undermine itself (cf. KSA 3: 12), that it appeared to him superficial, and indeed something completely impossible, to want to search for truth for its own sake (KSA 9: 466, 477)-- an exhortation of

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30 For one broadly recognized account of the range of texts entailed by this chronology, cf. Thomas H. Brobjer, Nietzsche's Philosophical Context (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2008), 61-89.
symptomatic significance that gave expression to diverse underlying motivational factors. The issue of just what it was in us that wanted to know the truth; of who it was that led one to the question's posing; of the sense of value that gave weight to this will to know could not be addressed (cf. KSA 5: 15), so long as one assumed a simple and undifferentiated conception of willing--so long as one subscribed to the common prejudices sustaining the "self"-deceiving, but nonetheless empowering belief in the notion that this "will," which has unity only in name, stood always idly by, as the compliant instrument of the mind's powers of intention (cf. KSA 5: 31-34), whose conscious workings seemed to Nietzsche to obey a quite different hierarchical order of command (cf. KSA 4: 39-40). As alluring as these suppositions were, the question of what it was one wanted to know in seeking knowledge of oneself, and of what kind of wanting was involved in this endeavor (cf. KSA 3: 307-308) was, in his view, of a sort which the hollow appeal to one's "self"-sovereign will to know oneself had hardly begun to sound out (cf. KSA 3: 53). It appeared a question of moral-historical dimensions, before which all such epistemological platitudes fell flat, and which only subterranean work might bring to light (cf. KSA 3: 11).

On such grounds, **Chapter 1** takes as its point of departure the transitional 1881 text *Morgenröthe* (cf. KSA 6: 329), where the problem of what motivates the phenomena of willing is first explicitly addressed (cf. KSA 3: 98-99). The thoughts on prejudice which it presents initiate Nietzsche's investigation of the contending moral-historical forces entailed in all conscious expressions of will--including those involved in attempts to lay bare the causes and effects of ethically sanctioned falsehoods, or to extricate one's "true" self from their influence altogether. The work of Bernard Williams and Richard Rorty introduce this discussion, as prominent interpreters of Nietzsche's notion of self-knowing whose respective
readings of the 'will to truth' and the 'will to self-overcoming' obscure what significance Morgenröthe's equivocations on honesty hold for the subsequent course of Nietzsche's philosophical projects. A closer look at these equivocations sets the stage for a reading of honesty more consistent with the drive-psychological problematization of self-identity that features in Nietzsche's succeeding texts. Chapter 2 shows how his contemporary work (1880-1882) on moral judgment, feeling, disposition, and evaluation paves the way for revisions that broaden one's understanding of the domain of epistemological activity, and of the sociological structures which give it shape; revisions that led Nietzsche to look back on the poor taste and youthful madness of his absolute will to knowledge with great reserve (KSA 3: 352). According to the position that emerges, honesty is itself to be construed as a complex of competing drives that respond to the momentary demands of one's interpretive situation (cf. KSA 3: 470), whose moral-historically contingent determination one's will to knowledge cannot coerce.

Meanwhile, the "later" Heidegger's revisions follow from his mounting misgivings about the presumptions entailed by the figures of voluntarism to which he had long appealed in accounting for Dasein's appropriate relation to itself--figures which had underpinned his conception of an authentic response to the address supposedly issued by one's ownmost sense of self. These revisions unfold in the context of the essays and presentations on language written during the 1950s, after a number of ultimately unsuccessful efforts to re-appropriate a grounding conception of the will during the 1930s and '40s (cf. GA 40: 24; GA

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32 The term "later" is used more loosely in Heidegger studies than is the case with Nietzsche, at times signifying the works emerging from the post-War period, at others, applied to those as early as the "Rektoratsrede" (1933). The essay entitled "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes" (1935-36) provides a generally recognized chronological landmark.
This process is already underway in 1951, as evinced by the critique of the notion of will conceived as 'primal Being' presented in the reading of Nietzsche that concludes the first half of *Was heißt Denken?* (cf. *WhD* 77)--a text that addresses anew the question of what *calls* one into a thinking relation to Being to problematize certain formal suppositions made by the preliminary analyses of Dasein's 'call-of-conscience' (cf. *SuZ*: 271, 444). The determining factors for one's authentically hearing this 'call' have been since re-construed in accordance with the discursive conception of the historical unfolding of ontological difference that the latter half of *Was heißt Denken?* articulates in dialogue with Parmenides (cf. *WhD*: 126, 139-141)--a shift which marks this text's departure from the transcendental-ontological approach to the issue of identity proposed by *Sein und Zeit* (cf. *WhD*: 134-135, 175). The 'call' now issues not on account of whatever it is only the individual thinking subject *knows* better to acknowledge, but rather according to a reciprocal relation of need into correspondence with which one's thinking is brought as the circumstances demand (cf. *WhD*: 114-115)--which is to say that the determination of the respective matter in question unfolds as the needs of conversation require (cf. *WhD*: 110). These investigations into the call's linguistic determination expressly prepare Heidegger's subsequent work on the volume *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (cf. *WhD*: 148), providing a first indication of his reconsideration of what *motivates* the questioning of thought's respective matter, and of what constitutes the authentic gesture of thinking (cf. *UzS*: 175-176; *VuA*: 40), if not one's personal willingness to question--which, in fact, threatens to preemptively impose upon, and so disrupt the course of genuine conversation in seeking to establish the domain of the question-worthy for itself (cf. *UzS*: 100).

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33 Martin Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1978).
For these reasons, the discussion of authenticity presented in Chapter 3 is oriented on a reading of Was heißt Denken? (1951-52), a transitional text whose lingering commitment to the philosophical priority of the existential modality of questioning is undermined in the course of an investigation of what calls forth one's inquiry into the identity of the matter at issue. The discussion is introduced by the work of Denis McManus and Thomas Sheehan--prominent interpreters of Heidegger's notion of self-knowing who insist on appealing to the will to "own up to one's own judgment" and carry out "the grounding question of Being" for oneself, obscuring what significance Was heißt Denken?'s equivocations on authenticity hold for the subsequent course of Heidegger's philosophical projects. A closer look at these ambivalent moments sets the stage for a reading of authenticity more consistent with the linguistic problematization of the essence of identity that appears in Heidegger's succeeding texts. The reading of Unterwegs zur Sprache (1950-59) presented in Chapter 4 traces the development and eventual resolution of these tensions in argument, with particular respect to this volume's re-conception of the figure of authentic correspondence (Entsprechen). This is done in dialogue with Jacques Derrida, whose critique of Heidegger's work on language in the Geschlecht series selectively reads those passages conducive to his project of reducing Heidegger's reconsideration of the authentic gesture of thought to a mere higher-order iteration of the appeal to undertake the question of Being for oneself. The limits of Derrida's critique are shown by a closer reading of the interpretation of Stefan George that follows from this reconsideration of Heidegger's--which transforms one's conception of what 'correspondence' entails, and of the linguistic determination of the hermeneutic conditions structuring all personal endeavors to identify what it is that begs the question. According to the position that emerges, the figure of
authentic correspondence no longer invokes a metontologically-founded behavioral imperative to will one's attunement (sich bestimmen) to the task of questioning a matter whose proper determination one supposedly knows in advance, and only need personally acknowledge. For such questioning is not, to begin with, a means for arriving at, but rather an expression of one's authentic relation to a matter whose determination (Bestimmung) resists and withdraws from all such unilateral interpretive impositions (cf. UzS: 180, 236). Correspondence invokes the way in which thought is first endowed with its respective task in the course of a conversation that, to this extent, we ourselves always already are (cf. UzS: 266). In the end, authenticity is conceived not in terms of privileged existential modalities of Being, but rather as a structural feature of language, whose discursive movement first clears the paths upon which one's thinking of the matter in question unfolds (cf. UzS: 261-262).

That it is precisely Nietzsche who sets Heidegger's process of revision in motion makes a joint reading of these two thinkers' respective re-conceptions of the domain of the activity of self-knowing especially pertinent. All the same, any interpretation of their relation must beware the methodological difficulties that arise when posing the question from the perspective opened by the proliferation of literature taken up in response to Heidegger's "Nietzsche"--a figure as amorphous as the purposes to which he was put over the course of their decade-long confrontation.34 There is, after all, no Nietzsche's "Heidegger" to provide a relative frame of reference for checking the often dubious philological strategies employed in the interest of speculating on the superiority of this or the other philosophical apparatus. Rather than pit one thinker's working vocabulary against

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Chapter 5 focuses on "Nietzsche's" contribution to the evolution of Heidegger's position on the issues relevant to this dissertation--more specifically, to the latter's ongoing efforts to rethink the historicity of critical thought, and the way of one's proper involvement in its unfolding. Heidegger's stance on these matters is shown to develop in accordance with the specific Nietzschean foil constructed at various junctures of their encounter, giving way to a quite different appraisal of the latter in the end than was presented at the start,--a progression obscured by readings of their relation that fixate on the now-canonical but sanitized Neske edition of the original lecture series held in the late 1930s at the expense of later interpretations, which partially re-vindicate the thinker who once inspired the young Heidegger to associate phenomenology with the practice of gaya scienza. After a preliminary assessment of the scope and stakes of the encounter, the chapter therefore takes as its point of departure the one lecture series excluded from the Neske volumes, which interprets Nietzsche's second Unzeitgemässe Betrachtung: Vom Nutzen und Nachtheil der Historie für das Leben, and which explicitly prepares Heidegger's contemporaneous work on the monograph Besinnung (cf. GA 46: 295-296). This approach not only allows one to situate the original lectures within Heidegger's concurrent developing projects, and to more clearly distinguish the various models of authenticity that structure his respective conceptions of the historicity of critical thought (cf. GA 66: 45-80; WhD: 121-122), but also to respond to those who would rely on the Neske volumes as a broadly representative

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37 For more on the early Heidegger's proximity to Nietzsche, cf. Rita Casale, "Die hermeneutische Phänomenologie als »Fröhliche Wissenschaft«," in Heideggers Nietzsche: Geschichte einer Obsession (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2010), 125.
account of the later Heidegger's argument,\textsuperscript{38} or refer to them as principally defining for his interpretation of Nietzsche.\textsuperscript{39} In particular, it allows one to trace how Nietzsche helped Heidegger to wean himself off of his penchant for the kind of world-historical heroism that characterizes the model of authenticity shared by the work of the late 1930s and \textit{Sein und Zeit}--an issue which the revised form of the essay "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes" (1936) had brought to a head,\textsuperscript{40} but which volumes like \textit{Besinnung} fail to address, in the end. A closer reading of the notion of will attributed to Nietzsche in the first half of \textit{Was heißt Denken?}, and of its relation to the latter half's formulations, yields a discursive conception of critique and its authority more consistent with the claims that emerge from the interpretation of Stefan George discussed in Chapter 4--an interpretation which the encounter with Nietzsche prepares in manifold ways (cf. \textit{GA} 74: 129), and which ultimately displaces decisive control over the domain of truth's authentic event from the hands of the world-historical hero (cf. \textit{UzS}: 225-228).

The exposition of Heidegger is throughout presented in dialogue with Hans-Georg Gadamer, not only as a reliable and sympathetic reader of Heidegger's later projects who recognizes his eventual rejection of a model of authenticity built on world-historical heroism,\textsuperscript{41} but because the account in Chapter 5 sheds further light on the path that Heidegger himself took to resolve the issues which had constituted the point of departure for

\textsuperscript{38} Cf. Paul Catanu, \textit{Heidegger's Nietzsche: Being and Becoming} (Montreal: 8th House, 2010), 75.
\textsuperscript{40} For an illuminating account of the redrafting process, cf. Tracy Colony, "Time and the Work of Art: Reconsidering Heidegger's \textit{Auseinandersetzung} with Nietzsche," \textit{Heidegger Studies: Vol. 19} (Berlin: Dunker & Humblot, 2003), 81-94.
Gadamer's work on *Wahrheit und Methode*, revealing a substantive amount of philosophical overlap, albeit one to which two quite different forms of argumentation had led. Gadamer insights also contribute to the discussion of Nietzsche's drive-psychology, which, in fact, challenges and undermines the lingering prejudices exhibited by the nineteenth-century historist response to philosophical idealism that the former recognizes as the breeding ground for the latter's projects.

The concluding Chapter 6 refers to one later text by each philosopher to recapitulate the key developments in argument traced by this dissertation on the issue of the activity of self-knowing, so as to show what additional aspects to the problem the intervening years had revealed. A review of Heidegger's emendations to *Sein und Zeit* in the *Zollikoner Seminare* (1959-72)--held in collaboration with Dr. Medard Boss and several other leading psychologists, psychiatrists, sociologists, and medics--provides a unique perspective on what remained amenable to the linguistic conception of authenticity to which his dialogue with Nietzsche gave way. This discussion prepares a review of the fifth Book that Nietzsche added to *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft* in 1887, which exposes what further insights were gained by Nietzsche's drive-psychological problematization of honesty. For the sake of demonstrating the interdisciplinary significance of the positions at which each thinker arrives, and of acknowledging their respective decisions to engage the discourse of modern

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social science at the end of their careers, mutually illuminating parallels are drawn, in
closing, with recent work on the 'adaptive unconscious' by behavioral psychologist Timothy
D. Wilson, and on cognitive- and neuro-scientific approaches to the 'biology of
consciousness' by philosopher Alva Noë. A broadened understanding of the socio-historical
dimensions of the activity of self-knowing emerges in the end; one that calls into question
prevailing readings of Nietzsche and Heidegger which reduce the figures of honesty and
authenticity to an appeal to a "self"-conscious reflective exercise of the will to knowledge
that continuously questions behind itself, in the interest of protecting and removing itself
from the potential deceptions and leveling effects of public persuasion—a strategy which
only serves to reassert its own solution to the issues that it proposes to address, deciding in
advance for itself the metric of self-identity, and what it is that determines the "self" there is
to be known. Each thinker's reconsideration of the motivating forces of inquiry yields an
understanding of the domain of epistemological activity that transforms one's conception of
the dynamics proper to the historical unfolding of the metric of truth's measure.

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45 Manuel Knoll, "Nietzsches Kritik am wissenschaftlichen Willen zur Wahrheit und seine Tugend der
intellektuellen Redlichkeit," in Nietzsches Wissenschaftsphilosophie: Hintergründe, Wirkungen und Aktualität,
eds. Helmut Heit, Günter Abel, and Marco Brussoti (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2012), 266.
46 Erik Thomann, "Die Sprachhörigkeit des Erkenntnissubjekts," in Die Entmündigung des Menschen
durch die Sprache: und die Suche nach authentischer Subjektivität (Wien: Passagen Verlag, 2004), 73.
Chapter 1: Of Will to Truth and Self-Overcoming: Self-Knowing in Conscious Reflection

Two prominent figures with very different conceptions of self-knowing, Bernard Williams and Richard Rorty, have strongly influenced the trajectory of Anglo-American Nietzsche scholarship in recent years. Both refer to Nietzsche in their discussion of what it means to truly know oneself, and neither seems quite right. In what follows, I will discuss:

the weak philological basis of their appropriations of Nietzsche, what these two readings have in common with respect to the issue of self-knowing, and what support they find in transitional texts like Morgenröthe--where 'honesty' is distinguished from the Christian-Socratic virtue of 'truthfulness' (cf. KSA 3: 72, 456), and where the 'will to truth' associated with these notions becomes a question in its own right, which will continue to occupy Nietzsche throughout the remainder of the 1880s (cf. KSA 3: 470; KSA 4: 37; KSA 5: 162, 410). In Chapter 2, I propose an account of Nietzsche's notion of honesty more consistent with the drive-psychological problematization to which the will to truth is made subject in the course of his later work. As I hope to show, when one approaches self-knowing as a moral-historical problem from the perspective of Nietzsche's philosophy of the unconscious (cf. KSA 5: 20, 38-39, 247-49, 255)--a strategy whose origins may be traced back to the late 1870s and early '80s (cf. KSA 5: 248, 251)--it appears less a detached, reflective exercise of conscious will, and more the expression of situationally driven practices of social adaptation.

47 For commentary that rejects this distinction, cf. Laurence Lampert, Nietzsche's Teaching: an Interpretation of Thus spoke Zarathustra (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 3, 205.
Symptoms of Interpretive Agenda: Williams and Rorty on Nietzsche

The notion of self-knowing invokes an understanding of the truth. During the 1990s and early 2000s, Williams and Rorty were engaged in a debate over how 'truth' is manifest—whether it is something we "find" or "make." This is reflected in their respective accounts of the sense in which the concept of truth mattered to Nietzsche—both enlist his help against the other. Rorty, who gives priority to politics over philosophical questions, appeals to Nietzsche in suggesting that we focus on securing the political conditions for individual freedom, and drop the concept of truth on account of its metaphysical baggage—its typical idealization as a surrogate form for super-sensual conceptions of 'God', 'Nature', and 'Reason'. Nietzsche's concern for truth is hereby made subordinate to his task of "striving for private perfection," on which grounds he may serve as a figurehead for Rorty's liberal platform of "ironist pragmatism." How an interpretation that views 'truth' as a non-problem for Nietzsche can be reconciled with his explicit exhortations to the contrary (cf. KSA 3: 244), Rorty does not endeavor to explain. On the other side of the interpretive spectrum, Bernard Williams rightfully rejects Rorty's claim that Nietzsche is not interested in the 'truth', but defends a position that appears nonetheless dubious. In contrast to Rorty dismissing the concept of truth in favor of creating one's own "truths" in the practice of

55 Williams, Truth and Truthfulness, 16.
aesthetic self-realization proper to the private ironist, Williams holds that Nietzsche advocates an "unconditional will to truth"—a notion which he identifies with an unbroken conviction of Nietzsche's: his unshakeable "faith in science," to which he allegedly remains committed until the end of his productive career.⁵⁶ How one would reconcile such an interpretation with passages where Nietzsche expressly rejects the blindly passionate youthful madness of his earlier love for truth--what he calls the bad taste of his former will to truth at any price--Williams likewise fails to explain (KSA 3: 352). It is hard to see what one is then to make of moments in Nietzsche's work where falsehood appears the necessary condition for his understanding of the phenomenon of truthfulness (KSA 2: 14). Either way, it is evident from Nietzsche's own testament that he is not, as Williams would like to think,⁵⁷ one of the cold, thinking English frogs whose unconditional sacrifice to truth is made the object of Nietzsche's psychological critique at the beginning of Zur Genealogie der Moral (KSA 3: 349; cf. KSA 5: 258). On matters such as these, one does well to keep Zarathustra's words in mind: "Niemals noch hängte sich die Wahrheit an den Arm eines Unbedingten," (KSA 4: 66).⁵⁸ Since I take issue with Williams and Rorty on primarily philological grounds, it seems appropriate that I take a closer look at the textual material that their arguments rely on--including especially that which gets emended or excised from the text in the process. This will serve to prepare an account of their respective positions on the activity of self-knowing.

Williams's interpretation of Nietzsche, to his credit, stands on a significantly broader textual basis than Rorty's, and this makes it easier to engage him directly. In order to

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⁵⁶ Ibid., 14-15.
⁵⁷ Ibid., 16.
demonstrate Nietzsche's faith in the unconditional value of truth, and in the interest of distancing him from the "smug" self-satisfaction of Rortyan "truth-deniers." Williams first draws on Die fröhliche Wissenschaft's §284, where two different kinds of 'belief' are under discussion. There are those whose belief stems from a weak-minded useful blindness, and those whose activity is singularly motivated by their will to secure their beliefs against the encroachments of the skeptic that dwells within (KSA 3: 527). Williams chooses to read the passage as Nietzsche's endorsement of the latter class of believers. In the process, he overlooks the paragraph's ironic tone and obscures its psychological intent. As Williams puts it: Nietzsche "prizes [my emphasis] those who have to have an argument against the skeptic inside of themselves--'the great self-dissatisfied people.'" In fact, neither class of believers appears worthy of Nietzsche's esteem. On the one hand, I agree with Williams on Nietzsche's eventual rejection of philosophical skepticism, which he identifies as an early form in honesty's evolutionary refinement (cf. KSA 3: 470). But Nietzsche would sooner diagnose the behavior of such apparently disinterested "believers" as an expression of repressed fearfulness--a symptom of the neurotic decay described in Morgenröthe's §477, Von der Skepsis erlöst (KSA 3: 284). It is significant that both sections characterize skepticism as an ailing condition; in both cases, the well-being of the afflicted is very much at stake.

One can read this example as trend-setting for Williams's interpretive habits. In his interpretation of the third section in the Foreword to Ecce Homo, he emphasizes the

59 Williams, Truth and Truthfulness, 5-7, 18.
60 Ibid., 13.
62 Williams, Truth and Truthfulness, 15-16.
supposed selflessness of the philosophical will to truth by excluding from his citation

Nietzsche's psychological problematization of the great names who practiced it (cf. KSA 6: 259)—an issue which had constituted the primary aim of the first Chapter of *Jenseits von Gut und Böse* (cf. KSA 5: 20). Nietzsche's decision at the end of this passage to reference Ovid's *nitimur in vetitum* on the play of courtship reveals how interested indeed the desire for truth proves to be (cf. KSA 3: 350). A similar pattern emerges when Williams reads §59 of *Der Antichrist*, where he registers Nietzsche's praise for the antique sense for the facts while silencing the implications of its subsequently described methodological presuppositions—i.e., how the aim of inquiry was, in fact, seen not impartially, but rather under the optic of the greater glory of *imperium Romanum* (KSA 6: 248; cf. KSA 3: 69; KSA 5: 286). This aphorism's distortion is, however, well underway when Williams decides to read it as a reflection upon the "prerequisites for all systematic knowledge"—a phrase which is cited as the translation for what appears in the original text as the "Voraussetzung zur Tradition der Cultur," (KSA 6: 247). An iteration of such careful tailoring of the text appears in Williams's reading of *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*'s §344, where the "will to truth"—i.e., "the truth at any price"—is identified as a moral ground upon which Nietzsche too ultimately stands: "folglich bedeutet 'Wille zur Wahrheit' nicht 'ich will mich nicht täuschen lassen', sondern -- es bleibt keine Wahl -- 'ich will nicht täuschen, auch mich selbst nicht': -- und hiermit sind wir auf dem Boden der Moral," (KSA 3: 576). Omitted from Williams's account is the moment in the aphorism where this "will to truth" is called instead a destructive principle hostile to life, and a concealed will to death. So too are the paragraph's final words, which are meant, in fact, to call into question the *fundamentum inconcussum* that the will to truth had been first
made out to be: "Aber wie, wenn dies gerade immer mehr unglaubwürdig wird, wenn Nichts sich mehr als göttlich erweist, es sei denn der Irrthum, die Blindheit, die Lüge, -- wenn Gott selbst sich als unsre längste Lüge erweist? --“ Indeed, there are still other contexts where Nietzsche, in a rather anti-Kantian spirit, encourages his interlocutor to honesty precisely by deceiving him/her--who had, after all, declared s/he would ten times over rather let him/herself be deceived, than once know the truth in his way (cf. KSA 3: 207-208).

It is clear, in any case, that Nietzsche's interest in the 'will to truth' goes beyond what Williams recognizes as its necessary involvement in Christian morality's own undoing. Nietzsche's psycho-genealogical approach is more concerned with accounting for and potentially revitalizing the motivating forces of its manifestation, than with salvaging "truthfulness as an ideal." This explains his at least conditional support in Jenseits von Gut und Böse's §10 for the stronger and more lively instincts of the skeptical anti-realist over those of the metaphysician, i.e., the puritan fanatic of conscience, who would sooner lay him/herself to die upon a certain nothing than an uncertain something, and whose desperate will to truth Nietzsche identifies as a symptomatic expression of his/her dead-tired soul (KSA 5: 23-24). This is another aphorism that Williams invokes in support of his interpretation,67 but which seems upon closer examination to resist his interpretive advances. His reductive reading of Nietzsche's decision in Zur Genealogie der Moral to honor the candor of the ascetic historical nihilist over his/her clownish Doppelgänger, the "modern"

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66 Williams, Truth and Truthfulness, 16.
67 Ibid., 15.
historical idealist, amounts to the same effect (KSA 5: 406). At issue, time and again, is an analysis of what motivates the "will to truth" (cf. KSA 4: 146, 148), wherever Williams seeks out, instead, its programmatic affirmation. With regard to all of the above examples one might say, with Nietzsche: "wer hier im Hintergrunde nur einen 'Willen zur Wahrheit' und nichts weiter hört, erfreut sich gewiss nicht der schärfsten Ohren," (KSA 5: 23).

Let us turn now to Rorty, whose reading of Nietzsche almost always takes as its point of departure a single citation from the unpublished work, "Ueber Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinne" (1873). On his account, Nietzsche "wanted us to be able to think of truth as: 'a mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms -- in short a sum of human relations, which have been enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically and which after long use seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people.'" Although Rorty would like to draw a continuous line between this early text and Nietzsche's final ruminations in the Nachlass, there are good reasons to doubt that it should be seen as broadly representative of Nietzsche's thought. Williams, who shares these reservations, rightfully points out the metaphysical principles that structure its claims. The text is haunted throughout by the twin specter of Schopenhauer and Wagner--i.e., the former's pessimist representationalism, and the latter's mythological cult of tragedy. In spite of these influences and their clear implications for a proper understanding of its argument, Rorty refers to this work as evidence for Nietzsche's having already done away with the

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68 Ibid., 15.
71 Williams, Truth and Truthfulness, 16-17.
"reality-appearance distinction." Instead of interpreting Nietzsche's decision to abandon "the whole idea of 'representing reality' by means of language" within the context of his contemporaneous philosophical orientation, it is made to reflect his critique of metaphysics, which would only first follow in the course of the 1880s. With respect to this early phase in Nietzsche's oeuvre, and to all attempts to generalize its position, it is worth mentioning what he will say in a note from roughly three years later, between the end of 1876 and the summer of 1877. In his own words: "Lesern meiner früheren Schriften will ich ausdrücklich erklären, daß ich die metaphysisch-künstlerischen Ansichten, welche jene im Wesentlichen beherrschen, aufgegeben habe: sie sind angenehm, aber unhaltbar. Wer sich frühzeitig erlaubt öffentlich zu sprechen, ist gewöhnlich gezwungen, sich bald darauf öffentlich zu widersprechen," (KSA 8: 463). Indeed, Nietzsche's so-called convalescence during his great disentanglement from the influence of Schopenhauer and Wagner becomes the framework in 1886 for his retrospective assessment of texts like Menschliches, Allzumenschliches (KSA 2: 15; cf. KSA 3: 345-46).

Rorty relies on his Nietzschean strong-man to support his suggestion "that we drop the whole idea of 'knowing the truth.'" Against the 'will to truth' Rorty posits his reading of Nietzsche's 'will to self-overcoming', which Rorty conceives as a private exercise in ironist self-redescription. According to Rorty's Nietzsche, self-overcoming means becoming the commander of one's own personal "mobile army of metaphors," which are to be enlisted in the service of an autonomous practice of aesthetic self-realization. Rorty believes that Nietzsche had hoped we would become "that peculiar sort of dying animal who, by

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describing himself in his own terms, had created himself. More exactly, he would have created the only part of himself that mattered by constructing his own mind. To create one's mind is to create one's own language, rather than to let the length of one's mind be set by the language other human beings have left behind." Without going into detail on all the attending philosophical *aporiai*, one can first point out how philologically inconsistent this reading is with Nietzsche's developing stance on the 'mind'. In *Also Sprach Zarathustra*, e.g., claims to its paramount importance are seen as mere testament to its own vanity (*KSA 4*: 39). To say, as Rorty does, that the mind is the "only part of oneself that matters" flatly contradicts Zarathustra, who calls it the small plaything of the body's great reason (*KSA 4*: 39). It is clear, in this context, that the "mind" is not conceived as the object of its own creative endeavor. Nor, for that matter, is the 'self' to be simply identified with the 'mind'. Indeed, *presiding over* the "I" is the 'self', i.e., the 'body', which *lies behind* the "mind" (*KSA 4*: 39-40). Or, as Zarathustra puts it: "Der schaffende Leib schuf sich den Geist als eine Hand seines Willens," (*KSA 4*: 40).

Rorty would condemn passages like these as "the bad side of Nietzsche"—"that side of Nietzsche which Heidegger rightly condemned as one more example of inverted Platonism -- the romantic attempt to exalt the flesh over the spirit, the heart over the head, a mythical faculty called 'will' over an equally mythical one called 'reason.'" This is the Nietzsche who "ran together his diagnosis of philosophical realism as an expression of fear and resentment with his own resentful idiosyncratic idealizations of silence, solitude, and

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75 Rorty, "The Contingency of Selfhood," 27.
77 Rorty, "Solidarity or Objectivity?" 33.
violence."\(^{79}\) For Rorty, Nietzsche's "inverted Platonism" amounts to the "suggestion that a life of self-creation can be as complete and as autonomous as Plato thought a life of contemplation might be."\(^{80}\) That is to say, Rorty's evil Nietzschean "madman" has gone overboard on his philosophy, and lacks a good measure of liberal-democratic political awareness.\(^{81}\) This caricature stands in juxtaposition to Rorty's idea of a "good" Nietzsche, i.e., a Nietzsche who would fulfill the civic duties that make "private irony" a possibility—a Nietzsche "for whom solidarity was enough."\(^{82}\) Rorty is clearly—and explicitly—building his model of the "self" around preconceived "moral identities."\(^{83}\) In his schismatic reconstruction of the thinker, Nietzsche appears a noble misfit recluse—the sort of person who saw humanity's greatest existential triumph in a poetic escape from one's "inherited descriptions";\(^{84}\) a radical individualist, who longs for the kind of privacy that supposedly affords one the space necessary to make up one's own "mind," and to set the terms of one's own "vocabulary." Rorty is himself in full support of such an endeavor, provided one relinquishes claims to its metaphysical justification. His emphasis on politics is precisely his interest in making this sort of life a possibility for the common man. As Rorty himself says: in his "ideal society, discussion of public affairs will revolve around . . . how to equalize opportunities for self-creation and then leave people alone to use, or neglect, their opportunities."\(^{85}\) The merits of this program of action aside, Rorty's attempt to make Nietzsche his spokesperson on questions of the mind, its conscious capacities, and their relation to the origins of language appears weakly supported in the light of sections like *Die

\(^{79}\) Rorty, "Solidarity or Objectivity?," 32-33.
\(^{80}\) Rorty, "The Contingency of Selfhood," 43.
\(^{82}\) Rorty, "Solidarity or Objectivity?," 32.
\(^{83}\) Rorty, "The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy," 192.
\(^{84}\) Rorty, "The Contingency of Selfhood," 29.
\(^{85}\) Rorty, "Private Irony and Liberal Hope," 85.
Nietzsche's moral-genealogical understanding of the formation of speech communities leaves little room for equivocation on these matters; one's "mind" and one's working "vocabulary" are never the result of a unilateral "imposition of one person's idiosyncratic chosen metaphoric," as Rorty suggests. It is never "by one's own sheer strength," that one "breaks out of one perspective, one metaphoric, into another." In the Foreword to *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches*, e.g., Nietzsche stresses the motivating social forces involved in the process of his own self-recovery and -re-creation; the unfolding of his philosophical project in response to a communicative need; the importance of his belief, that one *neither* is, *nor sees* individually (*KSA* 2: 14). He reiterates this point in the course of his psychological considerations on the genealogy of his own thought in the Foreword to *Zur Genealogie der Moral*: "Wir haben kein Recht darauf, irgend worin *einzeln* zu sein: wir dürfen weder einzeln irren, noch einzeln die Wahrheit treffen," (*KSA* 5: 248).

It is, in fact, the feminine figure of life itself who shares with Zarathustra the wisdom of her will to power; who speaks to him of the secret of her self-overcoming (*KSA* 4: 148)--which Rorty, in contrast, conceives as a private existential achievement. Rorty's Janus-faced portrait of Nietzsche is, in large part, the result of his reductive reading of Zarathustra's speech on redemption, as it appears in *Von der Erlösung* (*KSA* 4: 177-182). Here, as before, what gets left out speaks loudest. Rorty avoids all discussion on this section's problematization of the phenomenon of willing to secure his ironist understanding of self-overcoming as a function of the will's deliberate conscious exercise. "Thus I willed it"
becomes a byword for the individual's successful act in reflective self-redescription. There is, of course, no mention of what it might mean to learn of the will's perpetual imprisonment (KSA 4: 179)--i.e., to learn of the moral history of evaluation that conditions its situated expression (cf. KSA 5: 31-34). Also excluded from Rorty's reading of this passage are the series of questions that Zarathustra poses to his audience at the end of his oration (cf. KSA 4: 181)--which are, in fact, meant to call into question the socio-historically contingent processes involved in the will's manifestation. Nor does the formal aspect of the section's concentric dialogical structures appear to interest Rorty. Although it was only in the course of such dialogue that Zarathustra arrived at the object of inquiry, Rorty fixates on his eventual horrified reticence as further evidence for Nietzsche's "idiosyncratic idealizations of silence [and] solitude." He seems to entirely miss how the end of this scene relates to Zarathustra's prophetic statement at the end of Von der Selbst-Ueberwindung: "Reden wir nur davon, ihr Weisesten, ob es gleich schlimm ist. Schweigen ist schlimmer; alle verschwiegenen Wahrheiten werden giftig," (KSA 4: 149). Indeed, so it became--the snake of wisdom crawled down into Zarathustra's mouth to suffocate him; to silence him forever with its poison (cf. KSA 4: 274). And even once he clears his throat, sheds his shepherd's mask with inhuman laughter (cf. KSA 4: 202), dances the roundelay of eternity (cf. KSA 4: 285-286), and sings the so-called seven seals in praise of life (cf. KSA 4: 287-291)--in solitude he sits, unfulfilled, before his cave, for months and years on end (cf. KSA 4: 295). It is only in response to the cry of need (cf. KSA 4: 300-303), whose echoes resound in Zarathustra's own voice throughout the work's first three Books; only in dialogue with his chorus of higher men, who come to share in drink and song atop his lonely mountain, that

89 Ibid., 29.
90 Rorty, "Solidarity or Objectivity?," 32-33.
the Satyr play of Zarathustra's final Book finds closure--his tragic downfall overcome, and brought full circle. It is only then, that Zarathustra rises again, reborn, from the darkness of his mountains like a morning sun, to which he reiterates the words that had first bound him to his fate: "'Du grosses Gestirn, sprach er, wie er einstmal gesprochen hatte, du tiefes Glücks-Auge, was wäre all dein Glück, wenn du nicht Die hättest, welchen du leuchtest!'" (KSA 4: 405). Indeed, the fourth Book of Also Sprach Zarathustra is itself wrought by the need for such dialogue--the manuscript is sent to Nietzsche's closest friends first, in 1885. Chapter 6 will provide a further opportunity to discuss how this same thematic of need orients Nietzsche's position on the revelation of the soul (cf. KSA 3: 568-569).

Rorty's interpretation of Nietzsche cannot be reconciled with any of the above evidence without compromising the integrity of his public/private distinction, and its attending "post-philosophical" presuppositions,\(^91\) they leave him especially ill-suited for a philologically sound understanding of Nietzschean self-overcoming, redemption, or indeed, the very aesthetic coherence of the Zarathustra text. On these matters, I share Claus Zittel's assessment, and reaffirm, against the likes of both Rorty and Martin Heidegger:

"Kunstwerke wie Also Sprach Zarathustra sind deshalb schwerlich als Beleg für eine gelungene ästhetische Manifestation eines selbstmächtigen Individuums vorzuzeigen, das mit überlegenem Gestaltungswillen dem Material seinen Stempel aufdrückt, sondern dienen allenfalls zu dessen ästhetischer Fundamental-Kritik."\(^92\) Rorty's private ironism and Nietzsche's aesthetics do not belong together. As Nietzsche says himself, in a

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Having shown Williams's and Rorty's interpretive ticks--i.e., what they tend to exclude, what they are eager to emphasize, and what constitutes the explicit or unspoken (post)-philosophical grounds for their textual selections--we are now in a position to draw out some parallels between their respective stances on the question of self-knowing in Nietzsche's work. For there is, at least, one major hermeneutic trend common to both. Despite the great polemical tension that divides the two on the matters of 'truth' and 'truthfulness', both understand self-knowing as a primarily reflective, personal exercise in being true to oneself. For Williams, this involves the will to not deceive ourselves about the immutable facts;⁹³ for Rorty, this involves the will to not deceive ourselves about there not being any such "facts" to begin with.⁹⁴ Neither takes seriously Nietzsche's problematization of the moral character of willing. For the former, the 'will to truth' is simply reaffirmed, and elevated to an absolute "ethical necessity";⁹⁵ for the latter, it is simply dropped in exchange for the relativist instrumentalism of the 'will to self-overcoming'.⁹⁶ To this extent, both uphold the notion that self-knowing is foremost a function of the individual's conscious will. This is clear from the way in which Williams portrays one's personal commitment to the unconditional value of truthfulness, giving exceptional weight to the task of "find[ing] out the truth . . . hold[ing] on to it, and . . . tell[ing] it--in particular, to oneself"--no matter how ugly, or detrimental to one's own well being it may be.⁹⁷ To Williams, arriving at the truth is ultimately a matter of consciously wanting it for oneself. Rorty is equally adamant when it

⁹⁵ Williams, Truth and Truthfulness, 15.
⁹⁷ Williams, Truth and Truthfulness, 13.
comes to the conscious element of the individual's will to self-overcoming. He endorses political theorist John Gray's account of his strategy as a form of "ironical self-reflective awareness"—or, as Rorty elsewhere calls it, a form of being "continually dubious." Rorty believes that Nietzsche "saw self-knowledge as self-creation," which is, in his view, a process of "recognizing" or "confronting one's contingency, tracking one's causes home . . . [and] inventing a new language -- that is . . . thinking up some new metaphors." The individual's aim in this endeavor is to succeed in doing to the past "what the past tried to do to her . . . : to make the past itself, including those very causal processes which blindly impressed all her own behavings, bear her impress. Success in that enterprise -- the enterprise of saying 'Thus I willed it' to the past -- is success in . . . 'giving birth to oneself." It is unclear how this image would correspond to Nietzsche's description of the so-called free-spirit's being unconsciously pregnant with the necessity of his/her task long before s/he has envisaged or contemplated it (KSA 2: 21). Either way, the end effect remains the same. To Rorty no less, creating the truth is ultimately a matter of consciously wanting it for oneself.

*Nascent Perspectives on Autophilosophical Strategy: Morgenröthe in Transition*

In the remainder of this Chapter, I will turn to *Morgenröthe* itself, and in a series of closer readings, gather together what evidence stands in support of Williams's and Rorty's interpretations, to contextualize conceptual developments discussed in Chapter 2 which emerge with a keener perspective on the constraints peculiar to the models of self-knowing that they endorse. For indeed, part of what makes this text such an interesting moment in

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98 Rorty, "The Continuity Between the Enlightenment and 'Postmodernism',' 32.
101 Ibid., 29.
Nietzsche's oeuvre is that there are, despite what has been said above, a number of places where their approaches to the problem find some validation. Self-knowing does appear, at times, the aim of a cold, disinterested rationalism, whose unconditional will to truth serves to undermine the self-deceptions wrought by the influence of moral affectation (cf. KSA 3: 59). It does appear, at other times, the aim of an ardent personal 'will to self-overcoming', whose sublime realization depends upon one's retreat from the vulgarizing influence of society (cf. KSA 3: 259-260). That is to say, self-knowing appears, from both of these directions, the function of an isolated exercise in reflective self-mastery; an endorsement of the Stoic disposition that had so inspired Nietzsche during the late 1870s (cf. KSA 3: 205)\textsuperscript{102} - a valorization of the withdrawn "Epictetic man," whose careful, tireless, inwardly turned eye testifies to the utmost rigor of his/her bravery (KSA 3: 316). At the same time, the transitional status of the Morgenröthe text offers the reader tell-tale signs of the impending critique to which Nietzsche will subject these conceptions of self-understanding and personal autonomy-- i.e., his "fundamental" critique of the Judeo-Christian moral prejudices that employ them (cf. KSA 3: 11; KSA 5: 279-281). As the Chapter nears its conclusion, I will focus on those aphorisms especially which present both interpretive tendencies. These are passages which seem, on the one hand, to fortify the positions defended by Williams and Rorty, and on the other, to mark the beginnings of Nietzsche's drive-psychological problematization of all such 'will to truth' and 'self-overcoming'--moments where the motivating moral-historical forces that situate their conscious expression appear themselves matters worthy of further questioning. This approach provides one with a glimpse into how Nietzsche hones his position on these matters, and puts into perspective the strategies that he

\textsuperscript{102} Cf. Thomas H. Brobjer, \textit{Nietzsche's Philosophical Context} (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2008), 75-76.
develops to address their implications. A discussion of these developments features in Chapter 2, where the evidence against Williams's and Rorty's readings prepares a deeper consideration of the ways in which morality necessarily structures the activity of self-knowing, \(^{103}\) in conjunction with an exposition of the terminology that Nietzsche is crafting at the time to shed light on these issues.

Although the evidence supporting Williams's and Rorty's respective positions is distributed fairly equally, I will start again with a few passages in support of the former for the sake of consistency. A good starting point is Morgenröthe's §101 (KSA 3: 90), insofar as it provides the reader with an indirect glimpse into the history of Nietzsche's interest in a now familiar category of concepts: *Wahrhaftigkeit*, *Ehrlichkeit*, and *Redlichkeit*. This paragraph, entitled *Bedenklich*, consists in a brief consideration on the preconditions for one's genuine participation in the customs of ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*). Nietzsche suggests that, most of the time, we take on the beliefs associated with the customary for the mere sake of social convenience--either out of cowardice before what consequences our conduct would otherwise yield, or indeed, out of sheer laziness in the face of the difficulties which we would otherwise encounter (cf. *KSA* 3: 141). These forms of behavior Nietzsche identifies as characteristically dishonest. Such acquiescence cultivates a false sense of security at the great cost of self-ignorance. Although it is here not entirely clear whether Nietzsche takes issue with the conscious or unconscious acceptance of customary belief, it would seem that both are to be made subject to the scrutinizing eye of honesty. From this assessment of what 'honesty' entails, one can, in fact, draw a relatively straight line back to the third

Unzeitgemässe Betrachtung: Schopenhauer als Erzieher (1874), where the notions of Wahrhaftigkeit and Ehrlichkeit are still used more or less synonymously. In this context, Nietzsche juxtaposes his idealized "Schopenhauerian man," who willingly takes upon him/herself the sufferings of truthfulness (cf. KSA 1: 371), to the lowly masses, whose fearfulness and laziness shields them from the dangers and discomforts of genuine self-knowing. The commoner conceals his/her individuality like a bad conscience out of fear before his/her neighbor, who likewise shrouds him/herself in the veil of the conventions s/he demands of others: "Aber was ist es, was den Einzelnen zwingt, den Nachbar zu fürchten, heerdenmäßig zu denken und zu handeln und seiner selbst nicht froh zu sein? . . . Bei den Allermeisten ist es Bequemlichkeit, Trägheit, kurz jener Hang zur Faulheit . . . . [D]ie Menschen sind noch fauler als furchtsam und fürchten gerade am meisten die Beschwerden, welche ihnen eine unbedingte Ehrlichkeit . . . aufbürden würde," (KSA 1: 337). To distinguish oneself from the slothful, cowardly mob, and to achieve the greatness reserved to one who aspires to the early Nietzsche's heroism of truthfulness (KSA 1: 374), one need only cease being so easy on oneself, and willingly confront what one knows but fails to recognize: ". . . er folge seinem Gewissen, welches ihm zuruf: 'sei du selbst! Das bist du alles nicht, was du jetzt thust, meinst, begehrst,'" (KSA 1: 338). When Morgenröthe's §101 is read in the light of passages like these, honesty does indeed seem a matter of willing reflective attunement to one's personal conscience.

For readers of Nietzsche like Williams, our non-reflective attitude toward customary belief becomes the leitmotif for an extended elegy on reason's demise at the hands of Christian dogmatism. Such is the concern of §89, e.g., Zweifel als Sünde, on the bad moral conscience one incurs when striving to ground one's beliefs through reflection on their
provenance. For the Christian mentality as here described, it is not reason, but a miraculous event of inspiration which justifies belief; to suppose, or conduct oneself otherwise invites damnation: "Man merke doch, dass damit die Begründung des Glaubens und alles Nachdenken über seine Herkunft ebenfalls schon als sündhaft ausgeschlossen sind. Man will Blindheit und Taumel und einen ewigen Gesang über den Wellen, in denen die Vernunft ertrunken ist!" (KSA 3: 83). In Nietzsche's view, this blind devotion to our beliefs, and to the reassuring feelings of moral probity that sustain them, runs so deeply that we may fail to notice our having given them up already. In this sense, we are, as §99 suggests, all irrational: "Wir ziehen immer noch die Folgerungen von Urtheilen, die wir für falsch halten, von Lehren, an die wir nicht mehr glauben, -- durch unsere Gefühle," (KSA 3: 89). Our dependence on such comforting feelings appears a hindrance to intellectual progress, in this way. Nietzsche claims to recognize this reactionary tendency in several forms of nineteenth-century German culture. In §197, e.g., Die Feindschaft der Deutschen gegen die Aufklärung, he speaks of the cult of feeling erected by the intelligentsia in place of the cult of reason, and of the dangerous subjection of knowledge to feeling when the course of history itself is made to speak for the ultimate triumph of the Christian moral worldview (cf. KSA 3: 171-172). By Nietzsche's assessment, Germany is home to a people especially susceptible to unconditional feelings of a higher order (KSA 3: 148). All of this he takes as evidence for a general lack of honesty (cf. KSA 3: 150), and as testament to the inebriation of the German spirit in an age of moral, religious, and artistic decadence: ". . . [S]o ist die Menschheit im Ganzen und Grossen langsam und gründlich durch die geistigen Feuerwässer trunken machender Gefühle und durch Die, welche die Begierde darnach lebendig erhielten, verdorben worden: vielleicht geht sie noch daran zu Grunde," (KSA 3: 55). Amongst the
victims of such corruption Nietzsche includes its very perpetrators. Christian sentimentality becomes the vehicle for the self-deception of its own fiercest proponents; against their ecstatic rush of faith Nietzsche juxtaposes another, more sober morality, demanding the sangfroid of self-possession, austerity, and obedience—requiring a sense of duty and rationality that raises its finger against the rush of their spiritual excess (KSA 3: 192).

These are the tropes of Stoic self-control that readers like Williams value in Nietzsche—a mindset that sneers at fine feelings,\(^\text{104}\) in which passion is made tantamount to false judgment (cf. KSA 9: 134); a symptom of illness to be looked upon with disdain and enmity, which only an artificial anaesthetization and the vice grip of self-imposed will can remedy. By the fall of 1881, Nietzsche will call this way of thinking repulsive to him, insofar as it underestimates the value of passion, and leaves one unresponsive to conditions of need (KSA 9: 653). There are, in fact, places in Morgenröthe where Nietzsche identifies honesty as a passion itself (cf. KSA 3: 286). Nonetheless, there remain clear traces of his regard for the practice of intentional self-desensitization in the interest of knowledge (cf. KSA 3: 51). Indeed, it had proven a useful methodological strategy for carrying out the strictly comparative cultural historicism of Menschliches, Allzumenschliches—a project which Williams takes up in defining the scope of his own work,\(^\text{105}\) and which one finds apparently reiterated in Morgenröthe’s §61, where Nietzsche speaks of grounding one's judgment in historical comparison: "Die zukünftigen Menschen werden es einmal so mit allen Werthschätzungen der Vergangenheit machen; man muss sie freiwillig noch einmal durchleben, und ebenso ihr Gegenheil, -- um schliesslich das Recht zu haben, sie durch das Sieb fallen zu lassen," (KSA 3: 62). On the other hand, it is precisely this emphasis on the

\(^{104}\) Williams, Truth and Truthfulness, 13.
\(^{105}\) Ibid., vii.
casting of judgment *through lived experience* that makes *Morgenröthe* appear a departure from the cold disposition of detachment which had characterized *Menschliches*, *Allzumenschliches* (cf. KSA 3: 16; KSA 2: 343). It is hardly clear how one could remain unaffected by that to which one only does justice by *living through* it. The living enactment of moral judgment appears a necessity to Nietzsche in §195, where the reader is given to believe that mere historical reflection on morality fails on its own to suffice, when it comes to the task of genuine criticism: "Fehlte nicht überhaupt das ganze Nachdenken über Moral in unserer Erziehung, um wieviel mehr gar die einzig mögliche Kritik desselben, jene strengen und muthigen Versuche, in dieser oder jener Moral zu leben?" (KSA 3: 169).

Ambiguous claims like these, however, are just as easily appropriated by the opposing interpretive camp, and read in support of a personal form of life-philosophy, in which value judgments and the search for knowledge are made the private concern of the individual (cf. KSA 3: 274). With this in mind, we turn again to Rorty.

For Williams and his 'will to truth', knowledge is attained through an historical reflection which strips away the sediment of moral evaluation that muddles one's sober-minded view of the cold, hard (i.e., natural-scientific) facts. Meanwhile, for Rorty and his 'will to self-overcoming', knowledge is created through an ironist’s reflection which extricates itself from morality's reach in the interest of instilling values of one's own. This project pans out as an antagonistic struggle for personal freedom from the overbearing


107 Cf. the importance of such enactment to the interpretation of Vom Gesicht und Rätsel presented by: Michalski, *The Flame of Eternity*, 181-182.

influence of one's society--what Rorty would call a struggle for the right to one's private
pursuit of perfection. Morgenröthe's consistent privileging of the individual over and against
the hostile encroachments of moral prejudice gives some substance to a reading like Rorty's.
One such example is found in §9's lamentations over the herd mentality's bedevilment of
individual innovations in thought and action, where Nietzsche depletes the bad conscience
with which originality of every kind is laden when brought to expression under the
dominion of moral custom (cf. KSA 3: 24). In the herd-building instincts of morality, and in
the claim that individual betterment first follows from the ego's self-sacrifice, Nietzsche sees
only a treacherous, self-interested fearfulness at work:

Es scheint jetzt Jedermann wohlzuthun, wenn er hört . . . dass das Glück und
zugleich das Opfer des Einzelnen darin liege, sich als ein nützliches Glied
und Werkzeug des ganzen zu fühlen . . . . Man will nichts Geringeres -- ob
man es sich nun eingesteht oder nicht --, als eine gründliche Umbildung, ja
Schwäschung und Aufhebung des Individuums . . . man hofft wohlfeiler,
ungefährlicher, gleichmässiger, einheitlicher zu wirthschaften, wenn es nur
noch grosse Körper und deren Glieder giebt. (KSA 3: 124)

To the dull conformity and simple security of modernity Nietzsche juxtaposes the vibrant,
competitive health of ancient Greek society, whose greatness he attributes to their
appreciation for the value of individual action:

Je höher also eine Zeit, ein Volk die Individuen achtet und je mehr man
ihnen das Recht und Übergewicht zugesteht, um so mehr Handlungen jener
Art werden sich an's Lich wagen -- und so breitet sich zuletzt ein Schimmer
von Ehrlichkeit, von Ächtheit im Guten und Schlimmen über ganzen Zeiten
und Völkern aus, dass sie, wie zum Beispiel die Griechen, nach ihrem
Untergange noch Jahrtausende lang gleich manchen Sternen fortleuchten.
(KSA 3: 303)

Such favoring of the individual goes beyond a merely eudaimonic concern for the
well-being of exceptional persons; for Nietzsche, it seems to carry some sort of
epistemological significance (cf. KSA 9: 237, 457). His words in §173--on the element of
fearfulness in contemporary society's esteem for work ethic--suggest that the further development of reason itself depends upon this danger of all dangers which the individual supposedly embodies, whose bondage to the yoke of labor Nietzsche views as the far greater threat (cf. KSA 3: 154). The same suggestion features in §107, where he muses as to whether morality was not itself responsible for the stunted growth of reason (cf. KSA 5: 253), whose highest instance of authority it had claimed to represent: "Und wenn die Vernunft der Menschheit so ausserordentlich langsam wächst, dass man dieses Wachsthum für den ganzen Gang der Menschheit oft geleugnet hat: was trägt mehr die Schuld daran, als diese feierliche Anwesenheit, ja Allgegenwart moralischer Befehle, welche der individuellen Frage nach dem Wozu? und dem Wie? gar nicht gestattet, laut zu werden?" (KSA 3: 95).

Nietzsche clearly thinks it a narrow-minded prejudice to suppose that reason necessarily follows the trajectory of "moral progress"; the opposite appears to him quite possible: "Es ist nicht wahr, dass die Moralität, wie das Vorurtheil will, der Entwicklung der Vernunft günstiger sei als die Unmoralität," (KSA 3: 96). This explains his recurrent valorization of prototypical figures of individualist strength who, for one reason or another, have found themselves in transgression of moral law (cf. KSA 3: 55, 147). When viewed in the light of Nietzsche's immoralist stance on rationality, even criminals and evil-doers may appear the vanguards of reason--the heroes of the moral order's possible future (cf. KSA 3: 89), capable of subjecting themselves to trial in a willful act of self-lawgiving that personally assumes the role of judge, jury, and executioner: "Diess wäre der Verbrecher einer möglichen Zukunft, welcher freilich auch eine Gesetzgebung der Zukunft voraussetzt, des Grundgedankens: 'ich beuge mich nur dem Gesetze, welches ich selber gegeben habe, im Kleinen und Grossen.' Es
müssen so viele Versuche noch gemacht werden! Es muss so manche Zukunft noch an's Licht kommen!" (KSA 3: 160).

The social alienation to which these quasi-heroic malefactors are customarily exposed appears, to the likes of Rorty's private ironist, a small price to pay for the kind of autonomy that such self-righteous independence promises. Nietzsche does not, in any case, discount the possibility that realizing one's individual potential by living according to one's own aims may entail a form of voluntary exile (cf. KSA 3: 191; KSA 9: 354). He weighs the merits of banishing himself to a difficult life of solitude against becoming estranged from himself amidst the comforts of society in §491:


When consumed by a thirst to fathom one's personal possibilities, the constraints of community may come to represent an insufferable test of patience. To those addicted to the feeling of power that independent self-rule engenders (cf. KSA 3: 63, 202), Nietzsche therefore recommends migration: "[Es] sollte doch Jeder bei sich denken: 'lieber auswandern, in wilden und frischen Gegenenden der Welt Herr zu werden suchen und vor Allem Herr über mich selber; den Ort so lange wechseln, als noch irgend ein Zeichen von Sclaverei mir winkt . . . nur nicht länger diese unanständige Knechtschaft . . . .'" Diess wäre

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die rechte Gesinnung," (KSA 3: 184). All of this corroborating evidence indicates Nietzsche's having seriously entertained--without having explained the possible enactment of--a self-cultivating, self-governing, personally formed way of life outside the jurisdiction of moral authority (cf. KSA 3: 31). This individualist ideal seems quite compatible with one working model for Nietzsche's contemporaneous 'experimentalism'--which, in this case, signifies the notion that one might independently isolate, manipulate, and implement the controlled conditions necessary for making one's own life an experiment in reflective self-realization. Such is the task that §501 seems to envision: "Wir haben den guten Muth zum Irren, Versuchen, Vorläufig-nehmen wieder erobert . . . und gerade deshalb können Individuen . . . Aufgaben von einer Grossartigkeit in's Auge fassen, welche früheren Zeiten als Wahnsinn und Spiel mit Himmel und Hölle erschienen sein würden. Wir dürfen mit uns selber experimentieren!" (KSA 3: 294). By 1886, Nietzsche would attribute his endorsement of this strategy to a wanton foolishness brought on by a sudden return to health from his youthful convalescence during the late 1870s; he accordingly tailors his experimental method to the psychological insights that the intervening years had revealed (cf. KSA 3: 346-349)--a matter to which we will return in Chapter 2. Meanwhile, in 1880, there remain undeniable traces of his lingering commitment to the notion that genuine self-knowing unfolds as a personally assumed task of intentional self-grounding. Such commitment is manifestly clear in sections like §105, where Nietzsche juxtaposes the weakness of the self-ignorant masses--who live in a cloud of impersonal, half-personal opinions and arbitrary evaluations--to the strength of judgment displayed by certain powerful individuals, who fathom themselves in an act of autonomous self-positing that dispels the pallid, fictional phantasm of the "self" conjured up by the moral majority: ". . . [A]lle diese sich selber
unbekannten Menschen glauben an das blutlose Abstractum 'Mensch', das heisst, an eine Fiction . . . -- Alles aus dem Grunde, dass jeder Einzelne in dieser Mehrzahl kein wirkliches, ihm zugängliches und von ihm ergründetes ego der allgemeinen blassen Fiction entgegenzustellen und sie damit zu vernichten vermag," (KSA 3: 93). In the eyes of Rorty's Nietzsche, these weaklings have "failed as human beings" by "accepting somebody else's description of them";¹¹⁰ they lack the will to take personal responsibility for their own self-overcoming.

As a means of foregrounding the need to re-evaluate Williams's and Rorty's claims about Nietzsche, and in the interest of reconciling my previous reconstruction of their positions in the context of *Morgenröthe* with the more broadly based critique of their readings that began this Chapter, I would like, in what follows, to bring matters to a close by drawing on a few examples which highlight the transitional status of the *Morgenröthe* text--examples which seem to reinforce an argument for the 'will to truth' and 'self-overcoming', while at the same time revealing what implicit determining factors may be involved in the conscious expression of these endeavors. These passages speak to the will's motivations, and cast a first shadow of doubt on our autonomic control over our reflective powers of self-criticism--be they employed in the service of neutralizing the influence of moral affectation (Williams), or in the service of manipulating such influence to suit the purposes of a private practice in value-setting (Rorty). In effect, these considerations--which will carry over into, and orient my discussion of Nietzsche's moral-historical drive-psychology in Chapter 2--build upon the arguments presented by Hans-Georg Gadamer's positive reception of Nietzsche in his "Philosophische Bemerkungen zum Problem der Intelligenz," which call

into question the dogmatic notion of self-critical insight as following from a spontaneous exercise of free-will capable of assuming adequate distance for the unfolding activity of conscious reflection, stressing the peculiar ways in which these capacities are bound to the totality of a person's shared life-situation:

Gewiß zeichnet es den Menschen aus . . . daß er sich seines Könnens jeweils bewußt ist und daher die erstaunliche Fähigkeit besitzt . . . Freiheit auch noch seinen Künsten gegenüber zu betätigen. Dennoch ist solche Freiheit wie überhaupt die der reflexiven Distanz zu sich selber ein problematisches Ding. Ihr zu folgen ist nicht selbst wieder ein freier Akt, sondern ist motiviert, hat Bedingungen und Beweggründe, die nicht selber aus freiem Können verwaltet werden. So ist es nur eine formale Ähnlichkeit, die solches Können mit dem Werkzeug hat, das man nach freiem Belieben ergreift und welegt. Jedes Können ist Sein.¹¹¹

A reassessment of the domain, measure, and accomplishment of genuine self-criticism, conceived as a life-situated capacity of being that exceeds, resists, and withdraws from the powers of individual conscious willing, likewise features in Chapter 5's discussion of Heidegger's confrontation with Nietzsche (cf. GA 46: 212). For the time being, the following passages of contention shall provide a first indication of there being more to the activity of Nietzschean self-knowing than an intentional instrumentalization of our reflective faculties in the interest of historico-philosophical, or ironist critique.

An appropriate point of departure is found in Morgenröthe's §270, Anscheinende Toleranz, where it seems as though Williams's 'will to truth' has taken on a life of its own. The aphorism is addressed to those who shield their fine feelings of moral prejudice behind a wall of half-hearted tolerance for the truth claims of natural science. An audibly agitated

Nietzsche rejects their conciliatory gesture, denying them the right to this indulgent exercise—but for reasons other than one might expect. So he claims:

Es fehlt euch jenes strenge Gewissen für Das, was wahr und wirklich ist, es quält und martert euch nicht, die Wissenschaft im Widerspruch mit euren Empfindungen zu finden, ihr kennt die gierige Sehnsucht der Erkenntnis nicht als ein Gesetz über euch waltend, ihr fühlt keine Pflicht in dem Verlangen, mit dem Auge überall gegenwärtig zu sein, wo erkannt wird, Nichts sich entschlüpfen zu lassen, was erkannt ist. Ihr kennt Das nicht, was ihr so tolerant behandelt! (KSA 3: 212)

In this context, the workings of the will to truth appear anything but an impartial, detached, dispassionate exercise of conscience—for this will to truth is suffered; it is torture and martyrdom, without promise of salvation. Knowledge is described as the aim of an affective force—an avid longing, whose higher authority overrules the dictates of prevailing moral law. The ulterior motives for the 'law-proofing reason' of Kantian moral conscience are hereby exposed (cf. KSA 3: 13-14).\(^{112}\) For duty is, to Nietzsche, by no means disinterested—it is itself an inclination, driven by need (cf. KSA 3: 236). In the end, what irritates Nietzsche in this paragraph about the apparent tolerance of his interlocutors are not the "fine feelings" which it serves to protect. Indeed, in his view, it is the dressing up of their apathetic indifference as a magnanimous act of self-sacrifice that merits reproach. Their tolerance amounts to little more than empty slander in Nietzsche's eyes precisely insofar as they remain unaffected by that to which they claim the right to pass judgment—they know not what they tolerate, because they know not what they see.\(^ {113}\) They are only able to assume the graceful demeanor of tolerance before the projected phantom of science that they envisage, because they feel no need to face up to its demands (cf. KSA 9: 265-266).

\(^ {112}\) For an account of the philosophical history behind this response to the rigors of Kantian formalism, cf. Gadamer, "Über die Möglichkeit einer philosophischen Ethik," 183-184.

\(^ {113}\) Cf. (KSA 3: 308): "Gehört nicht Wärme und Schwärmerei dazu, einem Gedankendinge Gerechtigkeit zu schaffen? -- \emph{und das eben heisst Sehen}!"
The motivations channeling the search for knowledge become the subject of another ambivalent passage that foreshadows the dangers of the will to truth identified by the third Treatise of Zur Genealogie der Moral. In §429, *Die neue Leidenschaft*, Nietzsche attributes our moral aversion for the wanton excesses of barbarism not to any rationally founded preference for the more civilized conduct of sober self-possession--but to the influence of yet another affective force. Our lust for truth is said to follow the impulses of an irresistible *drive to knowledge*, whose inhibition brings us pain (*KSA* 3: 264). We are enamored with knowing; titillated by the unrest of discovery like unhappy lovers, who cherish their sweet suffering over the serene states of apathy--fervent as they are for what they can no longer do without. On Nietzsche's assessment, knowledge has transformed itself in us into a passion, with a demonic will of its own, of potentially tragic consequences. Inflamed with desire for fulfillment, this passion fears no sacrifice, save that which consists in its own extinction:

> Vielleicht selbst, dass die Menschheit an dieser Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis zu Grunde geht! -- auch dieser Gedanke vermag Nichts über uns! Hat sich denn das Christenthum je vor einem ähnlichen Gedanken gescheut? Sind die Liebe und der Tod nicht Geschwister? Ja, wir hassen die Barbarei, -- wir wollen Alle lieber den Untergang der Menschheit, als den Rückgang der Erkenntnis! Und zuletzt: wenn die Menschheit nicht an einer Leidenschaft zu Grunde geht, so wird sie an einer Schwäche zu Grunde gehen: was will man lieber? (*KSA* 3: 265)

A passion of this sort, no doubt, would sooner will its own demise than want no longer. Visions of the nihilist fate that awaits its tyrannical rise to power will temper Nietzsche's enthusiasm in good time (cf. *KSA* 5: 412).

There seems to be, in any case, no clear way of displacing this *drive to knowledge* from the situated life-interests which motivate it. For 'life' does not, in Nietzsche's view, run

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parallel to 'knowledge', like some moody bass that disagrees with the melody (KSA 3: 276).

It is not from the lofty heights of the stylite's ivory-tower that the will to truth unfolds. Nor is it pure, disinterested self-sacrifice which chooses of its own free-will to confront the worldly perils and pains entailed by one's ventures in self-knowing (KSA 3: 237). It only appears the case, to begin with, that one can--by stroke of genius and sheer strength of mind alone--separate oneself or raise oneself above the influence exerted by one's world-situation upon the variable contents of character and the capricious stirrings of temperament (KSA 3: 292-293). This perspective casts a rather different light on Rorty's valorization of the existential genius supposedly displayed in reflectively crafting one's own life-work from the vantage point of a private, neutral space.115 As Zarathustra's speech on redemption has shown (cf. KSA 4: 178), a much more cautious construal of the workings of "genius" will emerge from that which appears in the likes of Morgenröthe's §548:


We have seen already, in the context of Von den Verächtern des Leibes (cf. KSA 4: 38-39), what Nietzsche comes to think of the mind's being both hand and handle of its own instrumentalization (cf. KSA 3: 13). The mind is made the hand of the body's creative will; it is the instrument and plaything of the body's great reason (KSA 4: 39-40), which drives the process of its intellectual empowerment. Indeed, this conception of the mind/body relation is

already at work in the suspicion that Nietzsche raises in *Morgenröthe's* §553, where he speaks of the instincts that drive one's philosophical interests:


The personal character of these drives--which might seem to validate and encourage a form of 'private irony'--becomes, in fact, the subject of Nietzsche's psychological investigations on the inexorable moral prejudices of philosophers in Chapter 1 of *Jenseits von Gut und Böse* *(cf. KSA 5: 17-20)*. Such drives respond, and give expression to the unfolding of one's respective socio-historical context;\(^{116}\) they do not, in any case, invoke fanciful Romantic suppositions on the loss of an originary natural state,\(^{117}\) in return to which one restores some innate "mythical faculty."\(^{118}\)

> From this perspective, exercising the freedom to order one's drives in the interest of epistemological growth appears a more complicated matter than any will to reflection can account for--dependent on conditions of need which reflect not merely one's personal interests *(cf. KSA 3: 326)*, but which also vary with the vicissitudes of one's socio-environmental situation *(cf. KSA 3: 267)*. As readers, making sense of such freedom--of Nietzsche's suggestion that we tend to our drives as the gardener does his/her garden *(KSA 3:*

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\(^{116}\) Cf. *(KSA 9: 212): "Welche Triebe hätten wir, die uns nicht von Anfang an in eine Stellung zu anderen Wesen brächten . . . ?"

\(^{117}\) Cf. *(KSA 9: 511): "Unsere Triebe Affekte werden uns da erst gelehrt: sie sind nichts Ursprüngliches! Es giebt keinen 'Naturzustand' für sie!"

\(^{118}\) Rorty, "The Contingency of Selfhood," 33.
that we wield the ploughshare for the ground in which we root (cf. KSA 3: 248)--seems to require a deeper agronomical knowledge than we have yet been exposed to (cf. KSA 3: 11). Following Nietzsche down the paths of his subterranean work on moral prejudice involves a closer look at the drive-psychological vocabulary that he develops in the process of coming to terms with the genealogy of his own philosophical project. This task appears all the more pressing in light of the fact that honesty (Redlichkeit) is itself conceived as a driven form of behavior (cf. KSA 3: 470; KSA 9: 229); as a complex of drives with the power to motivate the pangs of conscience to speak against one's fidelity--one's attachment (Wahrhaftigkeit) to the truth (cf. KSA 3: 244). For these reasons amongst others, Chapter 2 will approach the question of self-knowing as a problem of moral-historical dimensions.
Chapter 2: Will to Power Hermeneutics and the Drive-Psychology of Self-Knowing

The previous Chapter threw into relief the transitional status of *Morgenröthe*—where the so-called youthful madness of Nietzsche's unconditional love for truth begins to undermine itself, as well as his trust in what had once appeared its inconcussible moral grounds (*KSA* 3: 352, cf. 12, 16, 350, 576). By the fall of 1881, "truth for its own sake" appears to him something *entirely impossible* (*KSA* 9: 477)—an affective superficial self-deception (*KSA* 9: 466; cf. *KSA* 3: 576); a symptomatic response to pressing socio-environmental demands (cf. *KSA* 3: 313-314). Our critical encounter with Williams and Rorty corroborated this shift in Nietzsche's stance on the notion of truthfulness, providing a first indication of the implicit determining factors at play in the exercise of all 'will to truth' and 'self-overcoming'. In what follows, I pursue the question concerning the motivated character of epistemological activity to build upon the evidence supporting these developments in Nietzsche's argument. A *drive-psychological* approach to the problem of *self-knowing* appears all the more pertinent in light of Nietzsche's decision to discuss both the nature of identity and the exercise of intellect in terms of driven processes of interpretation. *Who one is*, and how one thinks, he traces back to fluctuations in the ranking-order of one's drives, and to the sociological conditions that regulate their actualization (*KSA* 5: 20; cf. *KSA* 9: 213, 229).

To clarify these claims, we must heed Nietzsche's advice and view the matter from the moral-historical perspective of his groundwork on prejudice. *Morgenröthe* and its surrounding texts represent the origins of this methodological strategy. It is here that one finds Nietzsche's first sustained attempts at articulating how the phenomena of moral judgment, feeling, disposition, and evaluation are involved in the animation of one's drive-
psychology, and in situating the living relation to the things of experience in which self-knowledge is said to manifest (cf. KSA 3: 53). These considerations render intelligible Nietzsche's genealogical account of *honesty* as an intellectual drive-complex (cf. KSA 3: 470-471), and what distinguishes it from the conscientious critical questioning of the autonomous subject, characteristic of the 'will to truth' and 'self-overcoming' (cf. KSA 3: 626-627). They also shed light on the ambiguous assertions that he makes in subsequent years regarding the limits of reflective understanding (cf. KSA 5: 247; KSA 4: 179), and the conditions of need to which the activity of self-knowing unconsciously responds (cf. KSA 2: 21; KSA 3: 347-350; KSA 4: 40; KSA 5: 248-249). All of this bears on how one conceives the unfolding of the task of ordering one's drives in the interest of epistemological growth (cf. KSA 3: 347-349; KSA 6: 293-295). In the end, knowing oneself appears less the function of an individual will to reflection, and more a moral-historically situated process of social adaptation, driven by the interaction of contingent 'will to power' differentials in interpretive contention (cf. KSA 4: 146-149).

*Fateful Confusions of Conflicting Interest: Moral Instinct and Motivated Understanding*

An appropriate preliminary step consists in gathering together moments of the text which speak to the tacit motivations of epistemological activity. We will find that this recurrent theme in *Morgenröthe* anticipates much of Nietzsche's later commentary. Paragraph 26, e.g., entitled *Die Thiere und die Moral*, may be read as a precursor to §344 of *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*. The former traces the moral character of our intellectual habits back through humanity's animal history. All that we designate with the names of *Socratic virtue*--justice, cunning, temperance, courage, and indeed, truthfulness: that sense for the truth which is fundamentally a sense for security (cf. KSA 4: 146)--Nietzsche views in terms
of the fulfillment of biological needs; as the consequence of drives (KSA 3: 37), whose satisfaction and inhibition structure the patterns of behavior that we assume. In effect, the section carries out the same critique that Bernard Williams overlooks in Die fröhliche Wissenschaf't's account of what motivates the ostensibly unconditional will to truth (cf. KSA 3: 576-577). In Morgenröthe's iteration of the problem, Nietzsche undermines the absolute moral grounds discerned in the will to not deceive oneself (KSA 3: 576)--i.e., the will to not let oneself lead oneself astray (KSA 3: 37)--by exposing the contingent life-interests which motivate that very disposition. For it seems to him that the god-like self-less sacrifice required by the will to truth, in fact, responds to diverse incentives of its own; this much, at least, the lowly masses have in common with the heroic "Schopenhauerian man" of truthfulness that we encountered before in the third Unzeitgemässe Betrachtung (cf. KSA 1: 371). No less than s/he who is driven by fear to conceal his/her individuality under the established general conception of "humanity" (KSA 1: 337; KSA 3: 36), one whose sense for the truth inhibits such (self)-deception now appears to Nietzsche similarly driven by a need for self-control (cf. KSA 3: 37). His/her mistrust for the misleading voice of his/her passions remains an affective behavioral response to socio-environmental conditions (KSA 3: 37). For it is, to Nietzsche, certainly a drive that motivates one's will to not be duped by the influence of affect (KSA 9: 229)! He thus dissolves the gap that traditionally distinguished humanity's divine commitment to truth from the base domain of bestial bodily desire. In no other world than this one does the will to truth take root (cf. KSA 3: 577; KSA 5: 400); it had always been, as Zarathustra says, the earthly body's desperation which willed the heavenly nothingness of "that world" (KSA 4: 36). As evinced by the rise of the priestly caste (cf. KSA

5: 396), such lofty love for truth unfolds no less in the interest of its own this-worldly empowerment (cf. KSA 3: 349), even to the point of a dangerous, degenerate excess that precipitates its own demonic dissolution (cf. KSA 4: 147; KSA 3: 201)--testament to the potentially destructive life-force of the will to power, which walks upon the feet of the will to truth (KSA 4: 148; cf. KSA 11: 699; KSA 12: 352). It is on such all-too-human grounds that Nietzsche refers to humanity's animal history when characterizing the entire moral phenomenon manifest in the emergence of the practices involving the virtues of knowledge (KSA 3: 37; cf. KSA 9: 268)--not merely as a form of naturalist explanation, but indeed, to call into question the tenacious metaphysical faith that elevates the will to truth to an "ideal" of "intrinsic value" (cf. KSA 5: 400-401).

As his psychological investigations hope to prove, the "will to truth" is not a moral force in and of itself, but rather, a form of the will to power: "Dies wäre damit zu beweisen, daß er [der Wille zur Wahrheit] sich aller unmoralischen Mittel bedient: der Metaphysik voran --," (KSA 13: 282).

The driven character of our epistemological activity likewise features in Morgenröthe's §233, Die "Gewissenhaft"en", on the virtues of conscientiousness and duty. The section consists in a brief psychological consideration on just what sort of person values stringent conscientiousness most (KSA 3: 198). In Nietzsche's view, it is not any sense of dutiful compunction, but foremost a latent fearfulness which incites the pangs of conscience in such persons: "Die, welche sich vieler erbärmlicher Empfindungen bewusst sind, ängstlich von sich und an sich denken und Angst vor Anderen haben, die ihr Inneres so sehr wie möglich verbergen wollen, -- sie suchen sich selber zu imponiren, durch jene Strenge der Gewissenhaftigkeit und Härte der Pflicht, vermöge des strengen und harten Eindrucks,

\[\text{\underline{Ibid., 16, 58-60.}}\]
den Andere von ihnen dadurch bekommen müssen (namentlich Untergebene)," (KSA 3: 198). In varying degrees of self-awareness, such persons compensate with rigorous austerity for their susceptibilities; for the many pathetic sentiments they feel before themselves and their society, so as to secure their sense of proper station (cf. KSA 3: 198). In the words of a contemporaneous note from the spring of 1880, "Sittlich sein heißt: in hohem Grade der Furcht zugänglich sein," (KSA 9: 83). In this case, their subordinates and their own feelings of weakness have come to represent the kind of fear-instilling power with the potential to inspire their moral conduct (cf. KSA 9: 29). To Nietzsche, the highest forms of conscientious self-restraint still find their basis in social relations of an earthly order. Indeed, he accounts for what makes Kant's categorical imperative so attractive to the Christian mentality with reference to the same motivational force of fear (cf. KSA 9: 100); the power that this imperative maintains in the form of an imaginary abstraction he explains in terms of a cultural refinement of its more rudimentary expression (KSA 9: 29, 85).

The same principles structure Nietzsche's understanding of the socio-historical conditions behind the intellectual practice of sincerity, described in Morgenröthe's §248, Verstellung als Pflicht. This mode of behavior also seems to Nietzsche driven by the need for a sense of security in the face of a potentially destructive countervailing force (KSA 3: 204, cf. 133-135). As he sees it, the exercise of sincerity originates as a form of deceit which works to ensure the trust of one's own adversaries, and to centuplicate the effective sum of one's physical power (KSA 3: 204). Such dissimulation need not necessarily be the object of conscious intention. Indeed, "Der allergrößte Theil dieser Verstellung ist schon in Fleisch Blut und Muskel übergegangen," (KSA 9: 53). It represents to Nietzsche the likes of an

121 Such an account sounds little like the history of sincerity construed in the course of Bernard Williams's "State-of-Nature" story. Cf. ibid., 96-100.
adaptive response, regulated by processes of communal habituation that extend back for generations. To this extent, we embody an inherited history of dissemblance and fear that lies behind what may now appear an isolated instance of good-heartedness (cf. KSA 3: 226; KSA 4: 148). Such is the meaning of the paragraph's final words on the organization and instinctualization of intellectual habit (KSA 3: 204). More often than not, our enactment of these habits is not the result of autonomous deliberation on the highest rational good; it rather follows in response to social stimuli to which we have grown accustomed and receptive on account of our involvement in the history of evaluation incorporated in their practice. This seems to be the upshot of Nietzsche's thoughts on what motivates integrity of character as well (cf. KSA 3: 223). And it explains his skeptical response to the groundless rationale of those who flatter their powers of judgment in obscuring the value-historical premises of their own disinclinations, which they instead present in the form of free-standing syllogisms: "Du hast eine Abneigung gegen ihn und bringst auch reichliche Gründe für diese Abneigung vor, -- ich glaube aber nur deiner Abneigung, und nicht deinen Gründen! Es ist eine Schönthuerei vor dir selber, Das, was instinctiv geschieht, dir und mir wie einen Vernunftschluss vorzuführen," (KSA 3: 241).

At this point, it has become unclear what distinguishes the dynamics of moral judgment from those which characterize the instinctual interpretive activity of one's drives--an ambiguity that Nietzsche registers himself (cf. KSA 3: 113). In light of our discussion on what motivates the virtues of knowledge, there seems to be no simple way to contrapose the latter to the former. The exercise of moral judgment is driven by the demands of social adaptation. And one's drive-life gives expression to an incorporated history of moral evaluation. From the perspective opened up by this reciprocal relation, the question
concerning the possible motivations for the ordering of one's drives has been revealed in the vast breadth of its dimensions. If we accept Nietzsche's proposition that one is, oneself, essentially constituted by relative fluctuations in the functioning totality of one's competing drives (KSA 3: 111), there is, for the "self-" of self-knowing, no neutral space left in the unfolding of its intellectual activity; no displacing oneself from their sphere of influence. There is no standing wholly over and against the forces of affectation in the name of some pre-determinate rational good. On these grounds, the exercise of self-knowledge can no longer be reduced to the task of restoring what had once appeared one's cold, impartial, clear-minded view. For in Nietzsche's "mind," the traditional boundaries of the cerebral-corporeal distinction have collapsed. As we noted before, in the context of Zarathustra's discourse Von den Verächtern des Leibes, the "self-" of self-knowledge is none other than the body; the "I" of self-identity, i.e., the mind, remains its plaything, and the instrument of its own doing (KSA 4: 40).

These claims become all the more significant when one bears in mind what sets apart Nietzsche's assessment of the practice of self-mastery and moderation from Williams's and Rorty's own. As he says in the conclusion to Morgenröthe's §109: "... dass man aber überhaupt die Heftigkeit eines Triebes bekämpfen will, steht nicht in unserer Macht, ebenso wenig, auf welche Methode man verfällt, ebenso wenig, ob man mit dieser Methode Erfolg hat," (KSA 3: 98). To invoke Hans-Georg Gadamer words once more, the processes which govern this practice remain bound to the person they concern in the totality of his/her life-situation, in a way difficult to describe.\textsuperscript{122} They are themselves driven by a host of other socio-environmentally contingent interpretive forces. To this extent, the intellect is never

"Vielmehr ist unser Intellect bei diesem ganzen Vorgange ersichtlich nur das blinde Werkzeug eines anderen Triebes, welcher ein Rival dessen ist, der uns durch seine Heftigkeit quält." (KSA 3: 98). This view of the matter leaves in perpetual flux the identity of the one engaged in the movement of self-understanding—which has already begun by the time that the task of modulating its course reveals itself to the workings of conscious perception. Such are the conditions presupposed by the disclosure of the problem. In Nietzsche's own words: "Während 'wir' uns also über die Heftigkeit eines Triebes zu beklagen meinen, ist es im Grunde ein Trieb, welcher über einen anderen klagt; das heisst: die Wahrnehmung des Leidens an einer solchen Heftigkeit setzt voraus, dass es einen ebenso heftigen oder noch heftigeren anderen Trieb giebt, und dass ein Kampf bevorsteht, in welchem unser Intellect Partei nehmen muss," (KSA 3: 98-99). For Nietzsche, this struggle testifies not to the disunity of some underlying psychological weakness, but indeed, to the very whetting of the intellect; a process in the course of which it sharpens itself (KSA 9: 229). According to this account, the last motive for the activity of self-mastery and moderation does not at all consist in an aim of the subject's conscious intention (KSA 3: 96), whether conceived in terms of an intellectual triumph in historical consciousness (Williams), or as the existential achievement of private perfection (Rorty). For such an understanding would repeat, in Nietzsche's view, the same fateful confusion that has long shaped the history of moral reasoning: ". . . [so] sind wir gewohnt . . . uns die Vorbereitung einer That nur so weit zu denken, als sie bewusst ist: und so verwechseln wir den Kampf der Motive mit der Vergleichung der möglichen Folgen verschiedener Handlungen," (KSA 3: 119-120). It is not with a view to its possible benefits that the activity of self-mastery and moderation first unfolds. For Nietzsche, the genuine "struggle of motives" in question is, for the most
part, rather something unconscious and completely invisible for us (KSA 3: 119); a conflict of drives in polemic contention for interpretive sway over the situation at hand--drives that are said to lie in wait for the right opportunity for the discharge and exercise of their power, viewing each event of the day according to their need for satisfaction (KSA 3: 112). These are motives of which we either know nothing, or know only very little (KSA 3: 119), whose actuation and suppression correspond to momentary variations in circumstance (cf. KSA 3: 111-113), and whose influence and relative force, for that reason, we may never calculate in advance (KSA 3: 119). Generally speaking, their number and strength, their ebb and flow, their play and counterplay, and above all, the laws of their nurture remain totally unknown to the one engaged in the practice of self-knowledge--dependent on the peculiar conditions of their instantiation (KSA 3: 111). In light of these considerations, a drive-psychological approach to the question of self-knowing must proceed by clarifying Nietzsche's stance on the phenomena of moral judgment, feeling, disposition, and evaluation, insofar as they condition the interpretive activity of one's drives. This will bear on how one construes the dynamics of the determining forces involved in the historical unfolding of one's respective hermeneutic situation--i.e., the concretion of the moment of self-understanding. It prepares a discussion of the dangers to one's honesty entailed by the tyrannical imposition of the subject's conscious will on the event of understanding (cf. KSA 3: 321, 308; KSA 4: 147); a diagnosis of the pathological character of its absolute authority (cf. KSA 3: 347-350; KSA 4: 37-38). Willing is itself a moral phenomenon for Nietzsche (cf. KSA 5: 33-34); at play in its conscious expression are a diverse range of motives with potentially disparate value-historical origins. Our very poor knowledge of these must factor into all attempts to appropriate their influence. The premature assertion of conscious will upon the organizing
process in the ranking-order of one's drives threatens to obscure at least as much as it reveals (cf. KSA 2: 20-21; KSA 6: 294); a single quantum of its constitutive force is prone to usurp an indefinite interpretive hegemony, of which one may know nothing, nonetheless.

*Genealogies of "Human Nature": the Value-Historical Determination of Primal States*

To question how *morality* structures the interpretive activity of one's *drives*, one must come to grips with the perplexing manner of the reciprocal relation described above. An important part of this process consists in challenging the idea that one can unravel the riddle of their mutual determination by reducing the former to a function of the latter. Insisting on the equiprimordial character of this relation is tantamount to rejecting any final point of reference for the execution of genealogical critique. It is to challenge the possibility of absolute interpretations of the grounding text *homo natura* (KSA 5: 169; cf. KSA 12: 132). It is to call into question the notion of a pleistocene state of humanity that entirely preceded its involvement in moral concerns, with respect to which one may account, by means of naturalist explanation, for the way that human beings supposedly "are 'anyway.'" For there is no philological basis to suggest Nietzsche's belief in there ever being a way we were "anyway." This much is clear when one traces his thoughts in the sketches preparing *Morgenröthe's* composition in the winter of 1880-81. A note from the beginning of 1880 indicates what Nietzsche had learned since the time of his work "Ueber Wahrheit und Lüge

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123 As commentator Jakob Dellinger rightly points out in his account of the critical strategies employed in the work *Jenseits von Gut und Böse*, Nietzsche recognizes the very attempt to attribute the 'will to power' to the "nature of man" as yet another perspectival expression of its willing. On these matters, I share Dellinger's, Paul von Tongeren's, and Eckhard Heftich's skepticism in relation to attempts to "sanitize" Nietzsche's argumentation with the instruments of "scientific naturalism." Cf. Jakob Dellinger, "Sanizing Nietzsche?: Bemerkungen zur Tendenz eines 'naturalistischen' Nietzsche-Bildes," in *Nietzsche Heute, Vol. 4: "Einige werden posthum geboren,"* eds. Renate Reschke and Marco Brusotti (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2012), 161.


125 Cf. (KSA 11: 578) from June-July 1885 for revealing commentary on the relation between "Morality and Physiology."
im aussermoralischen Sinne" (1873): that his attempt to postulate an extra-moral worldview had taken too lightly the issues entailed (KSA 9: 31). By the summer of 1880, it seems to him that when one tries to construe the evaluations of an historical people in terms of their "natural" needs and desires one approaches the matter too simply (KSA 9: 130). In fall of the same year, he forbids himself to speak of "the true nature of man" (KSA 9: 235), and by year's end, he warns of the deceptions which underlie the notion of amoral knowledge: ". . . (wir verwenden hier eine uns natürlich gewordene Moralität, als ob diese etwas Natürliches und Außermoralisches wäre!),' (KSA 9: 333). Indeed, Nietzsche's line of argument begs the question of the sense in which morality belongs to our very "nature."

Paragraphs 38 and 134 of Morgenröthe are particularly well suited for laying out the scope of the problem under discussion. The focus of the former is the ways in which moral judgments modify our existing drives (KSA 3: 45); i.e., drives which are already there before their respective modulation (KSA 9: 226). It is said that the same drive can develop, under the influence of this or the other set of mores, such that it becomes associated with feelings of pleasure or pain when active, thus appending to itself a sense of either good or bad conscience. This straightforward consideration is succeeded by a more equivocal claim: "An sich hat er, wie jeder Trieb, weder dies noch überhaupt einen moralischen Charakter und Namen, noch selbst eine bestimmt begleitende Empfindung der Lust oder Unlust: er erwirbt dies alles erst, als seine zweite Natur, wenn er in Relation zu schon auf Gut und Böse getauften Trieben tritt, oder als Eigenschaft von Wesen bemerkt wird, welche vom Volke schon moralisch festgestellt und abgeschätzt sind,' (KSA 3: 45). At first glance, the

\[\text{\footnotesize{126 Cf. (KSA 9: 233): "Aber die dadurch modificirten Triebe wollen ihre Befriedigung, und dies treibt Moralysysteme auch heraus, immer neue Versuche, diese Triebe nachträglich mit der Wahrheit im Einklang zu finden."}}\]
passage conveys the impression that our drives represent originary natural phenomena, essentially devoid of moral character, until they are laden with value in accordance with secondary ethical impositions for which our society holds us responsible. From this perspective, knowing oneself would involve the task of exposing this second nature for what it is; a gaining of insight into one's true primordial state. Paragraph 134, on the drive of sympathy, might be read with a similar interpretive slant: "An sich hat es [Mitleid] so wenig einen guten Charakter wie irgendein Trieb: erst dort, wo es gefordert und gelobt wird -- und dies geschieht dort, wo man das Schädigende an ihm nicht begreift, aber eine Quelle der Lust darin entdeckt --, hängt sich ihm das gute Gewissen an, erst dann gibt man sich ihm gern hin und scheut nicht seine Kundgebung." (KSA 3: 128).

However, this reading starts to lose ground when one considers the significance of the an sich appearing in both paragraphs. These paragraphs seem, instead, to support Nietzsche's critique of the insane notion of an absolute ethical world-order (KSA 3: 328; cf. KSA 9: 261), according to which this or the other drive is deemed, already and in itself, good or bad--possessing inherent moral qualities, meriting unanimous praise or reproach. Indeed, it makes little sense, in Nietzsche's view, to speak of one's "natural" propensities as though they had not stood in some form of relation to our fellow beings from the very beginning: "Welche Triebe hätten wir, die uns nicht von Anfang an in eine Stellung zu anderen Wesen brächten . . . ?" (KSA 9: 212). On these terms, he rejects all static conceptions of a "natural condition" for these drives; the respective course of their genealogical inheritance he traces back to developments in the peculiar existential conditions for the communities which cultivate their expression (KSA 9: 511). According to this account, it is under the auspices of various forms of social organization that our drives, our affects are first taught: "... sie sind
nichts Ursprüngliches! Es giebt keinen 'Naturzustand' für sie! Als Theile eines Ganzen nehmen wir an dessen Existenzbedingungen und Funktionen Antheil und einverleiben uns die dabei gemachten Erfahrungen und Urtheile," (KSA 9: 511). Our drives give testament to an inherited affective disposition whose complex "natural" origins may lie generations behind us--the slowly evolving cumulative effect of social conditions with their own discrete forms of moral practice; conditions which continue to shape our habitual patterns of behavior (cf. KSA 3: 226). This explains Nietzsche's decision to call our drives the after effects of a long history of moral evaluation: "Alle menschlichen Triebe, wie alle thierischen sind unter gewissen Umständen als Existenz-Bedingungen ausgebildet und in den Vordergrund gestellt worden. Triebe sind die Nachwirkungen lange gehegter Werthschätzungen, die jetzt instinktiv wirken, wie als ein System von Lust- und Schmerzurtheilen. Zuerst Zwang, dann Gewöhnung, dann Bedürfniß, dann natürlicher Hang (Trieb)," (KSA 11: 135). At the same time, the exercise of moral evaluation is viewed, in turn, as a product of such drives. A note from the end of 1880 registers this feedback: "Es giebt nichts 'Moralisches an sich': es sind Meinungen von Trieben erzeugt und diese Triebe wieder beeinflussend," (KSA 9: 365). In contemporaneous commentary on the impossibility of living outside of morality, Nietzsche suggests that it is once again our drives which inspire morality's capacity to act as a regulative force in their relation to one another (KSA 9: 348, cf. 290). Such are the constraints inherent to the reciprocal relation at hand; each factor gives way to the other. We are faced with the problem of tracing the course of this conceptual circle.

As it happens, §110 of Morgenröthe sketches out a rough example of, and means for conceptualizing this relation. In this context, Nietzsche describes the development of a drive
from the moment of its initial sensory perception until its assimilation to the schematics of
an inherited moral disposition and system of evaluation. On the one hand, this process
reflects what he sought to articulate before: the notion that our drives are already there and
at work, before their appropriation within some prejudicial framework. Nietzsche suggests
that a drive assumes its moral character according to what opposes the satisfaction of its
urging (KSA 3: 99)—the effects of a multitude of other competing drives that impinge on the
domain of its interpretive activity (cf. KSA 10: 321-322). All that stands in opposition to its
fulfillment is factored into the sense of value which it eventually acquires. If the demands of
a drive outweigh those imposed upon us by its rivals; if it becomes more urgent to satiate its
longing than to accommodate competing incentives, we tend to find a way to moralize our
judgment accordingly:

Nun kommt es darauf an, was diesem Verlangen sich widersetzt: sind es
Dinge und Rücksichten gemeinerer Art, auch Menschen, welche wenig in
unserer Achtung gelten, -- so umkleidet sich das Ziel des neuen Verlangens
mit der Empfindung "edel, gut, lobenswert, opferwürdig," die ganze vererbte
moralische Anlage nimmt es nunmehr in sich auf, legt es zu ihren als
moralisch empfundenen Zielen -- und jetzt meinen wir nicht mehr nach einer
Lust, sondern nach einer Moralität zu streben. . . . (KSA 3: 99)

This traces out the first half of the conceptual circle under discussion. Like paragraphs 38
and 134, the passage may convey the impression that our drives constitute the originary
element from which all evaluation follows. Although a drive is ultimately taken into an
inherited moral disposition, it is, after all, the drive's appetite, its dominance over concurrent
restraints, which seems to set the whole process in motion. It is the overruling feeling of
pleasure (cf. KSA 3: 99), derived from the potential satisfaction of desire, that gives occasion
for its eventual moralization within a determinate system of values. However, if one takes
seriously Nietzsche's stance on the socio-historical conditions which lie behind the
interpretive activity of our drives, one must consider their very emergence in an instance of sensory pleasure to be a moment in the unfolding of a longer genealogical process that we now embody.\footnote{Cf. (KSA 9: 487): "Unsere Triebe und Leidenschaften sind ungeheure Zeiträume hindurch in Gesellschafts- und Geschlechtsverbünden gezüchtet worden (vorher wohl in Affen-Heerden)."} In this sense, we stand under the law of history, as Nietzsche says: "Jede Lust und Unlust ist jetzt bei uns ein höchst complicirtes Ergebnis, so plötzlich es auftritt; die ganze Erfahrung und eine Unsumme von Werthschätzungen und Irrthümern derselben steckt darin," (KSA 9: 572). It is according to long-held moral evaluations, which now work instinctively as a system of judgments on pleasure and pain (KSA 11: 135; cf. KSA 9: 505), that a drive is first felt as pleasurable. The experience of pleasure or displeasure is already a consequence of such judgments and their incorporation (KSA 9: 544); judgments which underlie all of our activity occurring on the basis of sensory experience (KSA 9: 567; cf. KSA 3: 474). On these grounds, the moralization of a drive is conceived as a modification of its existing place in a given prejudicial framework--not merely as the post hoc consecration of desire. In Nietzsche's view, moralization is an organizing of our drives within a constantly evolving system of evaluation involved in determining the way we feel they are at work upon us. In this sense, the process was already underway before any express attempt was made to convince ourselves as to the moral character of our striving (cf. KSA 3: 99).

This reading of the connection between moral evaluation, judgment, and feeling corresponds to Nietzsche's account of the matter in Morgenröthe's §35, entitled Gefühle und deren Abkunft von Urtheilen. Here, we are warned of the potential deceptions wrought by the invocation to trust our feelings (KSA 3: 43)--issued in the same voice which would have us believe that all is guilt which is felt as such (KSA 3: 328). We are told that our feelings of pleasure or pain, affinity or aversion, are nothing final and original; that they are not to be
viewed as ultimate criteria for thought, insofar as they stem from a host of other judgments and evaluations which have forever preceded them: "Gefühle sind nichts Letztes, Ursprüngliches, hinter den Gefühlen stehen Urtheile und Werthschätzungen, welche in der Form von Gefühlen (Neigungen, Abneigungen) uns vererbt sind," (KSA 3:43-44). To this extent, our feelings consist in an inheritance of ancestral origins. In the words of a supplementary note from the fall of 1880: "Da seit uralters moralische Urtheile gefällt worden sind . . . so haben sich daraus jedenfalls moralische Empfindungen, Neigungen Abneigungen gebildet," (KSA 9:272). Evident, in any case, is Nietzsche's mistrust of what motivates the expression of moral feeling. We are, for the most part, the born apes of the system of values into which we are brought; we uphold a set of mores whose origins may have very little to do with the reasons we give for feeling as we do about them (KSA 3:43; cf. KSA 9:386). Nonetheless, when it comes to the moral determination of aesthetic experience, Nietzsche's insistence on universality appears to be unwavering: "Es giebt gar keine anderen als moralische Erlebnisse, selbst nicht im Bereiche der Sinneswahrnehmung," (KSA 3:474). Morality conditions all forms of our cognitive activity. Such is his view on the moral-historical determination of the contents of sensory perception delineating the domains of self-knowledge (cf. KSA 3:53). For such reasons, our discussion of morality's bearing on our drive-life activity must abandon hope of escaping the hermeneutic circle that it entails.

*An Evil Fit of Reason: Neurotic Fear and the Subject/Object Distinction*

Having oriented ourselves within this circle, we are now in the position to probe these matters on the level of the historical unfolding of one's respective hermeneutic situation--i.e., the ways in which prejudice continues to shape our interpretive encounter with the things of experience, in curbing and actuating driven responses to contingent
environmental stimuli. For this view of our dynamic relation to the inexorable forces of history affects our understanding of the limits imposed on all attempts to appropriate their influence in the interest of epistemological growth. In particular, it calls into question the model of self-knowledge espoused in Rorty's existential exhortation "to make the past . . . bear [the] impress" of the subject's conscious will, in an exercise of autonomous self-overcoming which asserts full knowledge of all that has happened (cf. KSA 4: 20), declaring in the face of one's history: "thus I willed it!" According to Nietzsche, the activity involved in the appropriation of one's history depends on the incalculable vicissitudes of the moment, occurring under the guidance of stimuli, and the drives that respond to their moral-historically contingent determination (KSA 10: 323). One has hardly scratched the surface of this problem when making the apparently spontaneous declaration: "l'effet c'est moi!" (KSA 5: 33). With respect to the question of knowing one's drives, the pre-emptive assertion of conscious will upon the hermeneutic process merely enforces a unilateral constraint on the unfolding of the event of understanding. It artificially restricts the course of their interaction in elevating a single quantum of their will to power to an instance of absolute authority (cf. KSA 11: 661), impinging on the force of their polemic contention upon which the intellect is said to thrive (cf. KSA 9: 259). It amounts to a reduction in the dimensions of potential interpretations on the identity of the self; a reduction which proclaims in advance the final

aims of its unfolding--a 'last-man's' diminution of world-historical possibility (cf. *KSA* 2: 20; *KSA* 4: 19).\(^{130}\)

An example of how moral prejudice can engender such perspectival myopia will help us to pursue these issues further. Paragraph 210 of *Morgenröthe* attests to the moral character of a latent *fear* to which one's encounter with the Kantian 'thing-in-itself' may give rise--a subject of lasting concern in this text (cf. *KSA* 3: 110-111, 268, 283, 287). The paragraph takes leave of previous philosophical attempts to determine the quality of a property on the presupposition of the independent appearance of things as such. In Nietzsche's words:

> Man hat sich besonnen und endlich festgestellt, dass es nichts Gutes, nichts Schönes, nichts Erhabenes, nichts Böses an sich giebt, wohl aber Seelenzustände, in denen wir die Dinge ausser und in uns mit solchen Worten belegen. Wir haben die Prädicate der Dinge wieder zurückgenommen, oder wenigstens uns daran erinnert, dass wir sie ihnen geliehen haben: -- sehen wir zu, dass wir bei dieser Einsicht die Fähigkeit zum Verleihen nicht verlieren, und dass wir nicht zugleich reicher und geiziger geworden sind. (KSA 3: 189-190).

We have since learned, so Nietzsche suggests, to re-include ourselves in the activity that brought about the thing's meaningful manifestation; its appearance as the sort of thing that it is. But the crux of the passage lies in its closing words of caution. We must see to it that with this insight we do not slip back into our old habits and lose our *capacity* to do what we already had been--out of fear that the evaluations and "interests" entailed in the act of predicating have forever displaced us from the true and originary character of things-in-themselves (cf. *KSA* 3: 51-52). For this is a fear driven by a persistent moral penchant for transcendental justification--a fear wrought by an evil fit of reason (cf. *KSA* 3: 287),

\(^{130}\) Cf. also (*KSA* 9: 197): "Wir können immer nur Ziele so weit sehen, als wir Triebe vorher haben. Wie weitunsre Tibe wachsen können, weiß niemand."
condemned to reinstate an absolute subject confined to an epistemological prison of its own design (cf. KSA 3: 52, 110). The respite from such fear which one seeks in abstracting the supposed distortions of "interested" sentiment is, by Nietzsche's assessment, the expression of yet another drive's ascendance to the interpretive helm of one's psychology;\textsuperscript{131} such moralization serves to ensure its "interests,"\textsuperscript{132} and the course of its utmost empowerment. It is a drive with its own peculiar value-historical conditions, whose sphere of influence far exceeds that manifest in any isolated instance of personal feeling. In this sense, such efforts testify to the competing claims of a complex moral history,\textsuperscript{133} of which one knows only very poorly at best.

Exposing the groundless nature of this \textit{fear} is the aim of a supplementary note from the fall of 1881 on the broader dimensions of our "personal" past.\textsuperscript{134} It begins by advancing the same principal assertion made in \textit{Morgenröthe}'s §210, while playing with its diction: "Meine Aufgabe: alle die Schönheit und Erhabenheit, die wir den Dingen und den Einbildungen geliehen, zurückfordern als Eigenthum und Erzeugniß des Menschen," (KSA 9: 582). The properties of things are thus declared the property of man (cf. KSA 3: 53), who is characterized as a bard living in admiration of his/her own story--a thinker of divine powers and sympathetic inclinations, who has forgotten the work of his/her creation: "Der Mensch als Dichter, als Denker, als Gott, als Macht, als Mitleid. O über seine königliche

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\textsuperscript{131} Cf. \textit{(KSA 10: 243)}: "Seit Kant ist alles Reden von Kunst, Schönheit, Erkenntniß, Weisheit vermanscht und beschmutzt durch den Begriff 'ohne Interesse'."
\textsuperscript{132} Cf. \textit{(KSA 9: 211)}: "Zwar gibt es kein interesseloses Anschauen, es wäre die volle Langeweile."
See also: \textit{(KSA 10: 293)}.
\end{flushright}
Freigebigkeit, womit er die Dinge beschenkt hat, *um sich zu verarmen* und elend zu fühlen!

Das ist seine größte 'Selbstlosigkeit', wie er bewundert und anbetet und nicht weiß und wissen will, daß er *schuf*, was er bewundert," (*KSA* 9: 582). But the product of such poetic labor, the *peinture* of his/her lived experience does not represent the handiwork of any single master craftsman: "Es sind die *Dichtungen* und *Gemälde* der Ur-Menschheit, diese 'wirklichen' Naturszenen -- damals wußte man noch nichts anders zu dichten und zu malen, als indem man in die Dinge *hineinsah*. Und diese *Erbschaft* haben wir gemacht," (*KSA* 9: 582). In this way, we are brought into a meaningful relation to things as heirs to the legacy of our forefathers; we live as the curators of their oeuvre.\(^{135}\) In all aspects of our sensory experience we write the unfinished stories of our fellow beings. Such is the significance of Nietzsche's enigmatic claim: "... dass die alte Mensch- und Thierheit, ja die gesamte Urzeit und Vergangenheit alles empfindenden Seins in mir fortichtet, fortliebt, forthasst, fortschliesst," (*KSA* 3: 416-417). The respective horizons of our aesthetic existence give testament to the values thus instilled into the world we now inhabit. "Es ist diese erhabene Linie, dies Gefühl von trauernder Größe, dies Gefühl des bewegten Meeres alles *erdichtet* von unseren Vorfahren. Dies Fest- und *Bestimmtsehen* überhaupt!" (*KSA* 9: 582).

In Nietzsche's view, we live in the remnants of ancestral sensation--"... gleichsam in Versteinerungen des Gefühls," as a related sketch from the spring-fall of 1881 puts it. "... [E]rst in ungeheuren Zeitstrecken ist das Alles so *fest* vererb't," (*KSA* 9: 537).

On this account, the object of the *fear* described above--i.e., our evaluations and "interests" (*KSA* 3: 51)--belonged to the unfolding of the very perspective from which our

relation to the things of experience first appeared uncertain. Our values and interests are themselves brought to expression in the fear over their somehow getting in the way. The will to disinterested beholding of the 'thing-in-itself' is already a self-negating concept--an indication of the long-term effects of value-historical conditioning; the symptom of a potent moral prejudice in its rise to interpretive hegemony (cf. KSA 3: 14-15). Its fears are engendered by the supposition of pre-conceived moral identities, relying on a static formal point of departure for adjudicating the inadequacies of perception. It thereby entangles itself in the same false oppositions that characterize the most general history of knowledge (KSA 3: 202-203; cf. KSA 9: 309). For it is not man's displacement from an ultimate truth which Nietzsche has in mind when he attributes to him/her the concealment of the things of experience (KSA 3: 268), as commentator Krzysztof Michalski rightly points out. It is not the limits of his/her organs of sensory perception that somehow stand in the way of his/her genuine grasp of reality (KSA 3: 287, 268), as Maudemarie Clark, on the other hand, suggests in attributing a lingering penchant for the Kantian 'thing-in-itself' to the Nietzsche of the early 1880s. In Nietzsche's view, it is nonsense to entertain the conception of "absolute relations" (KSA 9: 311); to think of true knowledge as grounded in a form of sensory perception without a "how far," "how strong," "with respect to this and that," (KSA 9: 312). According to his drive-psychological model for our powers of cognition, knowledge remains forever bound to the constraints of its hermeneutic context;

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understanding unfolds with respect to the domains of its potential interpretation: "Ebenso hat jede Kraft ihre Sphäre, sie wirkt so weit und so stark und nur auf das und jenes, auf anderes nicht, eine Sphäre der Beschränktheit. Ein eigentliches Wissen um alle diese Sphären und Beschränktheiten ist ein unsinniger Gedanke . . . . Also die Beschränktheit der Kraft, und das immer weiter in Verhältniß Setzen dieser Kraft zu andern ist 'Erkenntniß'," (KSA 9: 312). A constituent drive first ekes out its own differential region of intelligibility in contention with the interpretive forces of its local working complex: "Sodann sind die meisten Wahrheiten thatsächlich nur negative Wahrheiten 'dies und das ist jenes nicht' (obschon meist positiv ausgedrückt.) Letzteres ist die Quelle alles Fortschrittes der Erkenntniß," (KSA 9: 312). These epistemological considerations transpose the metaphysical undertones of the ambivalent claim appearing in Morgenröthe's §438: "Warum sieht der Mensch die Dinge nicht? Er steht selber im Wege: er verdeckt die Dinge," (KSA 3: 268). On Nietzsche's understanding of phenomenality, it is the reciprocal movement manifest in the moral-historically situated setting of interpretive power-relations which determines man's concealment of the things of experience. Man "stands in the way of things," only insofar as s/he stands him/herself in perpetual flux, while this or the other drive vies for its place of precedence in his/her encounter with the respective matters in dispute. To this extent, the concealment of a given interpretive orientation reflects the potential revealment of a nascent perspectival shift, indicating a process of re-organization in the momentary ranking-order of one's drives.

This drive-psychological critique of the traditionally recognized precepts of epistemology is consistent with Nietzsche's sustained hostility throughout the 1880s toward the atomistic dogmatism underlying popular conceptions of the "subject" counterpart to the
elusive Kantian 'thing-in-itself' (KSA 5: 280, cf. 33). In dismantling subjectivist models of selfhood, Nietzsche also undermines the notion of a stable point of reference for the unfolding of an individual's relation to his/her drives. As an illuminating note from the fall of 1880 describes it:

das Ich ist nicht die Stellung Eines Wesens zu mehreren (Triebe, Gedanken usw.) sondern das ego ist eine Mehrheit von personenartigen Kräften, von denen bald diese, bald jene im Vordergrund steht als ego und nach den anderen, wie ein Subjekt nach einer einflußreichen und bestimmenden Außenwelt, hinsieht. Das Subjekt springt herum, wahrscheinlich empfinden wir die Grade der Kräfte und Triebe, wie Nähe und Ferne und legen uns wie eine Landschaft und Ebene aus, was in Wahrheit eine Vielheit von Quantitätsgraden ist. Das Nächste heißt uns "ich" mehr als das Entferntere, und gewöhnt an die ungenaue Bezeichnung "ich und alles andere, tu, " machen wir instinktiv das Überwiegende momentan zum ganzen ego und alle schwächeren Triebe stellen wir perspektivisch ferner und machen daraus ein ganzes Du oder "Es." . . [W]ie die Triebe im Kampfe sind, ist das Gefühl des Ich immer am stärksten dort, wo gerade das Übergewicht ist. (KSA 9: 211-213)

This passage sheds light on a diverse realm of sub-atomic quanta (cf. KSA 5: 279-280). The individual is, in fact, a plurality (KSA 10: 324); the unified ground of the 'I-subject' amounts to little more than an ancient, vulgar superstition (KSA 5: 11). His/her "soul" incorporates a complex "social structure of drives and affects" which bind him/her to unique value-historical conditions (KSA 5: 27). The highest-valued and most dominant of these drives is not determined by choice on the part of some pre-determinate subject as the instrument of conscious will, but rather presents itself according to the demands of one's respective situation--according to the environment and the conditions of our lives (KSA 11: 282-283). Insofar as one's prevailing sense of identity corresponds to quantitative shifts in the relative power-relations of one's drives, there is no individual left of which to speak (KSA 9: 502). Indeed, it seems to Nietzsche, ". . . daß im kleinsten Augenblick es etwas Anderes ist als im
nächsten und daß seine Existenzbedingungen die einer Unzahl Individuen sind," (KSA 9: 502). For concentrated within each individual is the entire pensum of drives peculiar to the forms of social organization from which it first emerged as the functionary of a greater organic whole (KSA 9: 604, 518); drives with the power to generate affective orientations that structure one's experiential encounter with the momentary circumstances. According to this model, the individual appears anything but the likes of a consummate, full-fledged fact (KSA 3: 326). We are to think of ourselves as an interpretive force of variable magnitude, fluctuating in response to its surroundings (KSA 3: 232). The influence of circumstance not only modulates the effects of one's individual potential, but the very basis for, and the range of its determinate expression: "Die Umstände verbergen und zeigen uns dieselbe [Kraft] nicht nur, -- nein! sie vergrössern und verkleinern sie," (KSA 3: 232).

**Diagnosis of a Danger: the Pathology of the Will to Power**

From this perspective, it does indeed seem to be mere moral prejudice which invokes the notion of the subject as an indifferent substrate for the conscious exercise of that makeshift lying concept called "free-will" (KSA 6: 331)--be it for the purpose of imposing order on one's own instinctual inclinations, or on the forms of conduct assumed in one's society at large. In any case, it is a prejudice which Nietzsche unequivocally rejects. As he famously claims in *Zur Genealogie der Moral*: ", . . . es gibt kein solches Substrat; es gibt kein 'Sein' hinter dem Thun, Wirken, Werden; 'der Thäter' ist zum Thun bloss hinzugedichtet, -- das Thun ist Alles," (KSA 5: 279; cf. KSA 3: 115). On his assessment, humanity's belief in this indifferent free-choosing "subject" was itself borne of its own necessity, in response to pressing socio-environmental demands; borne of the same instinct of self-preservation and -assertion that drove the antagonistic forces feared by the
representatives of 'slave-morality' (cf. KSA 5: 280). According to Nietzsche, this belief originates in a sublimated lie that dresses up its weakness in the pomp of moral virtue--as though it were a free-willing achievement, something wanted, something chosen, a deed of merit (KSA 5: 280-281). The implicit motives for such moralization are disguised by its claims to an ostensible higher good. Again, self-interest dons the garb of sacrificial selflessness, practiced in the greater glory of a superior instance of authority, which, as it happens, promises protection.

This is significant to our discussion, insofar as it reflects the same deluded strategy that Nietzsche criticizes in distinguishing the concept of truthfulness from that of honesty. In the context of Morgenröthe's §456, Nietzsche exposes the hypocrisy of the moral prejudice underlying the Christian-Socratic tradition's allegations of the blessings promised to those whose conscientious striving for virtue unites them with a higher power:

Solche Behauptungen und Verheissungen . . . sind nie mit voller Redlichkeit, und doch immer ohne schlechtes Gewissen, gemacht worden: man stellte solche Sätze, deren Wahrheit man sehr wünschte, keck als die Wahrheit gegen den Augenschein auf, und empfand dabei nicht einen religiösen oder moralischen Gewissensbiss -- denn man war in honorem majorem der Tugend oder Gottes über die Wirklichkeit hinausgegangen und ohne alle eigennützigen Absichten! Auf dieser Stufe der Wahrhaftigkeit stehen noch viele brave Menschen: wenn sie sich selbstlos fühlen, scheint es ihnen erlaubt, es mit der Wahrheit leichter zu nehmen. (KSA 3: 275)

The passage points out the self-serving motivations at work behind the feeling of selflessness experienced in willing the truth of a supposedly immutable ideal. For it seems hardly clear to Nietzsche how such voluntary subservience could remain itself unaffected by the influence of earthly wants and needs. As he says elsewhere, in the context of his commentary on the origins of duty: "Wir suchen unsere Lust, wenn wir jetzt den Bereich [solcher] Macht anerkennen und unterhalten," (KSA 3: 236). Indeed, the truth-value of the
claims at stake are described as the object of unspoken *desires*; auguries of after-worldly spiritual reward only further incite their this-worldly wish for fulfillment. Mere mortal concerns are cause enough to take the truth somewhat lightly here and there, if it means continued protection from one's enemies. Should transcendental remuneration fail to present itself as promised, such persons have at least secured a living by performing their duty—in this case, by brow-beating the so-called blonde beast for its menacing transgressions (cf. *KSA* 5: 277). Any number of underlying life-situated interests may be responsible for animating their conscious exercise of will, and Nietzsche has his doubts as to their *also knowing what they want*, when they will the truth of the ideal that they envision. That is to say, he doubts their *also knowing what it is that drives* their very wanting—in other words: 

"... *xṭ for ein Wille hinter [ihrem] Sehen wartete,*" (*KSA* 3: 308). And full of secret predeterminations on *how* the truth must be, that they, precisely they may embrace it (*KSA* 3: 308, cf. 260), they nonetheless presume an indifferent substrate for their willing; they feel as though they stand upon an inconcussible ground, frozen and dry like a clear winter morning, as though nothing lay upon their hearts (*KSA* 3: 308). Such delusional dogmatic insistence Nietzsche diagnoses as the indication of an ailing drive-motility—the symptom of a worsening psychological illness. In his view, the real threat posed by the forces of dogma consists in its self-reinforcing, drive-psychological leveling effects, which are brought to expression when one such predetermination lays an indefinite claim to this apparently inconcussible ground—i.e., when a singular tyrannical *drive* (cf. *KSA* 3: 176), over-nourished by an empowering rationalization, usurps its lasting control over the subject-conglomerate. In once and for all proclaiming the sublime object of all inquiry, one works to ensure this drive's predestined victory over the more fundamental motivational struggle from which one
thereby seeks relief (*KSA* 3: 310). For this imperious gesture of conscience secures the subsequent empowerment of the predominating drive that brought one to that very same conclusion, giving rise to a circle of continuous positive feedback. In effect, one unconsciously sanctions the absolute authority of one of many 'will to power' quanta, suppressing their potential for mutual enhancement in interpretive contest. Its own peculiar needs are thus imposed upon the world as representing the intrinsic structures of an ultimate reality. Enthralled by the prospective realization of its consummate power, it instills its own values into the nature of 'things-in-themselves', extinguishing the very agonal force of perspectival difference that is said, by Nietzsche, to set the intellect in motion; the kindling competitive tension from which *honesty* is said to result (cf. *KSA* 9: 259).

This is precisely Nietzsche's concern in the context of *Morgenröthe*'s §550, where he speaks of the danger to one's honesty that threatened several thinkers of the metaphysical tradition (*KSA* 3: 321). For the *enjoyment* derived from the exclusive satisfaction of a regent grounding drive could lead them to unconsciously project its wants upon the final aims of existence (cf. *KSA* 12: 385); to make panegyric proclamations on the "natural" beauty of the things disclosed under its now comprehensive optic (*KSA* 3: 321; cf. *KSA* 5: 20-22). It is such self-delusion which warrants Nietzsche's final words of caution:

Inzwischen gedenken wir einer alten Erfahrung: zwei so grundverschiedene Menschen, wie Plato und Aristoteles, kamen in dem überein, was das höchste Glück ausmache, nicht nur für sie oder für Menschen, sondern an sich, selbst für Götter der letzten Seligkeiten: sie fanden es im Erkennen . . . . Ähnlich urtheilten Descartes und Spinoza: wie müssen sie Alle die Erkenntniss genossen haben! Und welche Gefahr für ihre Redlichkeit, dadurch zu Lobrednern der Dinge zu werden! -- (*KSA* 3: 320-321)

This warning is echoed by the suspicion voiced in Nietzsche's later commentary on the persistent prejudices of philosophers: "In der That, man thut gut (und klug), zur Erklärung
davon, wie eigentlich die entlegensten metaphysischen Behauptungen eines Philosophen zu Stande gekommen sind, sich immer erst zu fragen: auf welche Moral will es (will *er* --) hinaus? Ich glaube demgemäss nicht, dass ein 'Trieb zur Erkenntnis' der Vater der Philosophie ist, sondern dass sich ein anderer Trieb, hier wie sonst der Erkenntnis (und der Verkenntniss!) nur wie eines Werkzeugs bedient hat," (*KSA* 5: 20). In this case, the *danger* to one's honesty looms also over Nietzsche's former educator. For insofar as he lays claim to solving the "world-riddle" of the *meaning of existence* behind the "veil of appearance" (*KSA* 3: 318, 283, cf. 600), even Schopenhauer's ostensibly unconditional honest atheism testifies to the prejudice of underlying irremediable dogmatic inclinations,\(^{140}\) i.e., to his remaining stuck in Christian-ascetic moral-perspectives (*KSA* 3: 601; cf. *KSA* 5: 252)--a symptom of his deep *misunderstanding of the body* (*KSA* 3: 348, cf. 276; *KSA* 5: 253), wrought by the unconscious workings of a tyrannical interpretive force which has enlisted the "drive to knowledge" in its service.

In Nietzsche's view, it is the likes of such demonic grounding drives that *inspire* all philosophical appeals to higher forms of knowledge lying beyond, behind, unshadowed by the influence of earthly "interests" (*KSA* 5: 20). For him, the genuine *danger* that such an overpowering force exhibits lies not in its capacity to hinder recognition of some immaculate eternal truth, but in the all-consuming tendency of its absolute empowerment, which precipitates a destructive course of self-annihilation without bounds--i.e., an ever-growing desertification of the soul (cf. *KSA* 4: 385; *KSA* 6: 387). Hence, Zarathustra's words of warning to the wisest of the wise, whose selfless will to truth, in fact, attempts to bend the world to their desires: "Nicht der Fluss ist eure Gefahr und das Ende eures Guten und Bösen,\(^{140}\) Cf. (*KSA* 10: 346): "Um an den Schopenhauerschen Willen zu glauben -- dazu gehört ein sehr guter *Wille zum Glauben.*"
ihr Weisesten: sondern jener Wille selber, der Wille zur Macht, -- der unerschöpfte
zeugende Lebens-Wille," (KSA 4: 146-147). For its insatiable life-force would sooner will
its own demise than bear to cease its self-destructive willing: "'Nur, wo Leben ist, da ist auch
Wille: aber nicht Wille zum Leben, sondern -- so lehre ich's dich -- Wille zur Macht! Vieles
ist dem Leben höher geschätzt, als Leben selber; doch aus dem Schätzen selber heraus redet
-- der Wille zur Macht!' -- Also lehrte mich einst das Leben: und daraus löse ich euch, ihr
Weisesten, noch das Räthsel eures Herzens," (KSA 4: 148-149). Indeed, this very same life-hostile
danger of all dangers stands at issue in Nietzsche's theses on the culmination of the
will to truth in nihilism (KSA 1: 18-19); its degenerate final forms had brought about the
downfall manifest in Christian morality's own self-overcoming: "Alle grossen Dinge gehen
durch sich selbst zu Grunde, durch einen Akt der Selbstaufhebung: so will es das Gesetz des
Lebens, das Gesetz der nothwendigen 'Selbstüberwindung' im Wesen des Lebens, -- immer
ergeht zuletzt an den Gesetzgeber selbst der Ruf: 'patere legem, quam ipse tulisti.' Dergestalt
gieng das Christenthum als Dogma zu Grunde, an seiner eigenen Moral," (KSA 5: 410).
Nietzsche himself had braved the wasteland that this devastating force had left behind (cf.
KSA 2: 17)--for it had also cleared the ground for the practice of his moral-historical
ploughmanship in Morgenröthe (cf. KSA 3: 138, 178; KSA 9: 409). To him, this Untergang
had been a fading twilight symbol, promising return of a new dawn. For him, i.e., in him,
such self-sublation opened up the realm of questioning with which his psychological
investigations were concerned:

. . . dergestalt muss nun auch das Christenthum als Moral noch zu Grunde
going, -- wir stehen an der Schwelle diesen Ereignisses. Nachdem die
christliche Wahrhaftigkeit einen Schluss nach dem andern gezogen hat, zieht
sie am Ende ihren stärksten Schluss, ihren Schluss gegen sich selbst; dies
aber geschieht, wenn sie die Frage stellt "was bedeutet aller Wille zur
Wahrheit?" ... Und hier rühre ich wieder an mein Problem, an unser Problem,

Clearly, this 'becoming-conscious' of the will to truth gave expression to a problem of fundamental significance for Nietzsche's developing drive-psychology (*KSA* 5: 410).

By pursuing this matter, one sheds further light upon the difference between honesty and its potential culmination in the dogmatic will to truth. A revealing case for this distinction is found in *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*’s §110, on the origins of knowledge, where Nietzsche provides one possible genealogical account of how the will to truth becomes-conscious of itself, as a problem worth questioning in its own right. In this context, he describes how the phenomenon of honesty relates to an ever-growing need to strive for truth (*KSA* 3: 470). On the condition that this drive to truth has itself *proven* to be a life-maintaining power, its interpretive weight may then eventually achieve a point of critical mass that maintains the momentum of its own perpetual self-empowerment (*KSA* 3: 471). Though its development remains contingent on its fulfillment of life-situated interests, in the form of the conscious will to truth it appears to assume a life of its very own, with the potential to level off the underlying struggle that brought about its rise to power within the thinker's drive-psychology. It thus lays claim to sole authority to pose the final question on the condition of all life--and for Nietzsche, a surviving convalescent of this ill-conceived endeavor (cf. *KSA* 2: 17-18; *KSA* 4: 35-37), this begs the further question of its problematic end-effects.

Bearing this in mind, a central criterion for what distinguishes the phenomenon of honesty lies in its differential dynamics--its dependence on the sustained interaction of
countervailing power-quanta. Hence, Nietzsche's portrayal of the ways in which honesty originates, and of the course of its intellectual refinement: "Jene feinere Redlichkeit und Skepsis hatte überall dort ihre Entstehung, wo zwei entgegengesetzte Sätze auf das Leben anwendbar erschienen, weil sich beide mit den Grundirrthümern vertrugen . . . als Aeusserungen eines intellectuellen Spieltriebes, und unschuldig und glücklich gleich allem Spiele," (KSA 3: 470). Honesty thus represents a kind of drive-complex which thrives upon the competition of its constitutive quanta. Its activity is brought to expression in the interpretive contention of their ongoing interplay.\(^\text{141}\) But with the absolute determination of the condition of life as such, an end is put to the playful movement of this interaction; the domain of all applicable interpretations on the truth is pre-established; the fundamental errors on which the will to truth itself relies appear an inconcussible, incontestable ground (KSA 3: 470-471, cf. 576-577). It was first under the pressure of the illness wrought by this worsening pathological form of honesty that, for Nietzsche, life itself became a problem, compelling him to further probe these fundamental depths (KSA 3: 347, 350); forcing him to free himself from the suffocating influence of the will to truth's all-powerful control (KSA 3: 350; cf. KSA 2: 17; KSA 4: 274). It was in response to the great pain of an imminent life-necessity that the question concerning the ranking-order of its motivating factors first presented itself (KSA 3: 350; KSA 2: 21); a deeper inquiry into the will to truth had imposed itself upon him.\(^\text{142}\) On Nietzsche's account, the need for a shift in drive-psychological

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organization was mounting long before he was aware of it, or its significance for his philosophical projects (cf. KSA 2: 21). Hence, the limits acknowledged by his retrospective self-assessment in the 1886 Foreword to *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches*:

\[\ldots [J]etzt, in dem Mittage unsres Lebens, verstehen wir es erst, was für Vorbereitungen, Umwege, Proben, Versuchungen, Verkleidungen das Problem nöthig hatte, ehe es vor uns aufsteigen *dürfte*, und wie wir erst die vielfachsten und widersprechendsten Noth- und Glücksstände an Seele und Leib erfahren mussten \ldots bis wir endlich sagen durften, wir freien Geister: "Hier -- ein *neues* Problem! Hier eine lange Leiter, auf deren Sprossen wir selbst gesessen und gestiegen sind! -- die wir selbst irgend wann *gewesen* sind! Hier ein Höher, ein Tiefer, ein Unter-uns, eine ungeheure lange Ordnung, eine Rangordnung, die wir *sehen*: hier -- *unser* Problem!" -- -- (KSA 2: 21-22)

Such was the unfolding of the multifaceted scope of the *problematic* in which the will to truth consists.

*Psychological Fieldwork: the Experiment in Truth's Incorporation*

Nietzsche's only answer to the final question of the condition of life is echoed in Zarathustra's only answer to the question of who he is: an interpretive iteration of the posing of the self-same question (cf. KSA 3: 470; KSA 4: 179). How one knows one's "self" appears as wide-open a question as what is to be known; here, the question of the *how* repeats the question of the *what*--the "self" thus implicated in the question's very posing.\(^{143}\) Given Nietzsche's drive-psychological characterization of honesty, and his juxtaposition of the idea to the dangers of the conscious will to truth, it seems clear, in any case, that there are limits to the arm-chair reflection of all historical reconstructions of the "self" from sideways on.

\[^{143}\text{As Heidegger once posed the riddle inherent to the question of 'who we are': "[D]ie Art, wie in der Frage das Befragte angesetzt wird: »wir«, enthält schon eine Entscheidung über das Wer. \ldots [W]ir können nicht, unberührt durch die Wer-frage, das »wir« und »uns« ansetzen gleichsam als ein Vorhandenes, dem nur noch die Bestimmung des Wer abgeht," (GA 65: 48-49).}\]
Hence, the reservations Nietzsche expresses in questioning the genealogy of his own philosophical project:

\[\ldots\ W]ie ein Göttlich-Zerstreuter und In-sich-Versenkter, dem die Glocke eben mit aller Macht ihre zwölf Schläge des Mittags in's Ohr gedröhnt hat, mit einem Male aufwacht und sich fragt "was hat es da eigentlich geschlagen?" so reiben auch wir uns mitunter hinterdrein die Ohren und fragen, ganz erstaunt, ganz betreten "was haben wir da eigentlich erlebt? mehr noch: wer sind wir eigentlich?" und zählen nach, hinterdrein, wie gesagt, alle die zitternden zwölf Glockenschläge unsres Erlebnisses, unsres Lebens, unsres Seins -- ach! und verzählen uns dabei ... (KSA 5: 247; cf. KSA 4: 285-286)

In the Foreword to Zur Genealogie der Moral, Nietzsche is unable to trace back the peculiar course of his intellectual development to any determinate point of origin or primary cause. It seems to have unfolded unsolicited, of its own accord, by the same necessity with which a tree bears its fruit, in response to some latent imperative (KSA 5: 248-249), of which he had no conscious knowledge at the time, and so could not himself free-willingly impose (cf. KSA 2: 21; KSA 6: 294). To this extent, his encounter with the task of becoming who he was appeared to him a destined confrontation, long kept secret by the workings of some unconscious instinct (KSA 6: 293; cf. KSA 2: 18). For it had not been by virtue of some self-sovereign act of willpower that Nietzsche came to realize his calling; as Zarathustra suggests, his will to know himself had always been ensnared in the vicissitudes of a history whose interpretation resisted final claims to apodictic evidence (cf. KSA 4: 179-181).

Indeed, in Ecce Homo, he fails to recall his calling ever having been an object of intention in the process: "\ldots ich [habe] in keinem Falle auch nur geahnt \ldots, was in mir wächst \ldots. Es fehlt in meiner Erinnerung, dass ich mich je bemüht hätte, -- es ist kein Zug von Ringen in meinem Leben nachweisbar, ich bin der Gegensatz einer heroischen Natur. Etwas 'wollen', nach Etwas 'streben', einen 'Zweck', einen 'Wunsch' im Auge haben -- das kenne ich Alles
nicht aus Erfahrung," (KSA 6: 294-295).\textsuperscript{144} For even in his most intentional acts he had, perhaps, done nothing more than play the game of necessity (KSA 3: 122). By his own account (provided that one takes it at face value),\textsuperscript{145} Nietzsche had been unconsciously pregnant with the unfolding of his task (KSA 2: 21); its evolution had been, for the most part, out of his hands--he could determine neither its value, nor its hour. It was, perhaps, as Morgenröthe's §552 puts it: ". . . es wächst, es tritt an den Tag . . . . Und sei das Erwartete ein Gedanke, eine That, -- wir haben zu allem wesentlichen Vollbringen kein anderes Verhältniss, als das der Schwangerschaft und sollten das anmaassliche Reden von 'Wollen' und 'Schaffen' in den Wind blasen!" (KSA 3: 322-323). He therefore issues words of caution before the self-deceptive dangers of invoking big words and putting on big attitudes in the name of conscious self-determination (KSA 6: 294).\textsuperscript{146}

This view of how self-knowing unfolds affects our understanding of what Nietzsche then means by the question (that is also already the expression) of the experiment in truth's incorporation (\textit{Einverleibung}) (KSA 3: 471)--if not some intentional undertaking in the artificial implementation of myriad possible life conditions (cf. KSA 10: 655). No doubt, there are innumerable contingent, non-manipulable constraints on one's ability to reorganize the ranking-order of one's drives in the interest of epistemological growth. Drives demarcate a differential happening, necessitating correspondence--there is no pre-determinate when or where or how for such experimentation; no telling what stimuli the momentary circumstance


\textsuperscript{145} ". . . [und] dazu thut Noth, tapfer bei der Oberfläche, der Falte, der Haut stehen zu bleiben, den Schein anzubeten, an Formen, an Töne, an Worte, an den ganzen Olymp des Scheins zu glauben!" (KSA 3: 352).

\textsuperscript{146} Cf. (KSA 10: 654): "Wir lernen von allem Bewußtsein \textit{geringer denken}: wir verlernen uns für unser Selbst verantwortlich zu machen, da \textit{wir} als bewußte, zwecksetzende Wesen nur der kleinste Theil davon sind."
might bring (cf. KSA 3: 111-112). Despite these procedural constraints, Nietzsche demands that one recognize his conception of psychology as queen of the sciences, ". . . zu deren Dienste und Vorbereitung die übrigen Wissenschaften da sind. Denn Psychologie ist nunmehr wieder der Weg zu den Grundproblemen," (KSA 5: 39)--although its practice bears little resemblance indeed to the conduct of the laboratory technician. We have seen already how the principal methodological claim to disinterested neutrality has been withdrawn (cf. KSA 3: 266). For Nietzsche looks with great suspicion upon the putative impartiality of contemporary science; his value-historical analyses seek to divine its grounding prejudices (KSA 9: 396)--i.e., "...Vorurtheile, [welche] tief in die geistigste, in die anscheinend kälteste und voraussetzungloseste Welt gedrungen [sind]," (KSA 5: 38). It seems to him that the men of science let themselves be led by their respective predominating drives, to scientifically confirm their wishes (KSA 9: 390). His own drive-psychological science leaves no room for their pretentious love of truth for its own sake:

"Wissenschaft" angeblich auf der Liebe zur Wahrheit um ihrer selber willen! Angeblich beim reinen Schweigen des "Willens"! In Wahrheit sind alle unsere Triebe thätig, aber in einer besonderen gleichsam staatlichen Ordnung und Anpassung an einander, so daß ihr Resultat kein Phantasma wird: ein Trieb regt den anderen an, jeder phantasirt und will seine Art Irrthum durchsetzen: aber jeder dieser Irrthümer wird sofort wieder Handhabe für einen anderen Trieb (z.B. Widerspruch Analyse usw.). (KSA 9: 483)

The very notion of unmotivated understanding appears to Nietzsche an impossible delusion;\(^ {147} \) science is itself to be conceived in terms of a modulated working drive-complex--a driven practice of knowing one's drives: "Wissenschaft! Was ist sie! . . . Die Erfahrung der Menschheit aus ihren Trieben, und ein Trieb, von den Trieben zu wissen," (KSA 9: 381). The attainment of scientific "objectivity" depends not on the elimination of

\(^ {147} \) Cf. (KSA 9: 342): "Uns trieblos und ohne Lust und Unlust verhalten, mit einer künstlichen Anaesthesie -- das kann kein Verstehen geben, sondern dann fassen wir eben mit dem Rest von Trieben, der noch nicht todt ist, die Erscheinung auf."
their affective influence, but on nurturing the epistemic potential wrought by the forces of their perspectival difference. For there is, as Nietzsche asserts in Zur Genealogie der Moral, *only* perspectival seeing, *only* perspectival "knowing": ". . . und je mehr Affekte wir über eine Sache zu Worte kommen lassen, je mehr Augen, verschiedene Augen wir uns für dieselbe Sache einzusetzen wissen, um so vollständiger wird unser 'Begriff' dieser Sache, unsre 'Objektivität' sein. Den Willen aber überhaupt eliminiren, die Affekte sammt und sonders aushängen, gesetzt, dass wir dies vermöchten: wie? hiesse das nicht den Intellekt castriren? ". (KSA 5: 365). On this view, to see things as they are is to be able to see them out of a hundred eyes (KSA 9: 466), from the perspectives opened by the contention of myriad affective forces. In this sense, *all* of one's humours, tempers, and moods are necessary for a science of Nietzsche's sort (cf. KSA 9: 484). We are to let that which affects us articulate itself, to raise the question—not consciously impose a single optic on the event of understanding in advance. For the experiment in truth's incorporation is not a matter of assimilating a concrete set of immutable natural-scientific facts (Williams), or of manipulating those "facts" in whatever way suits the big picture of our personal projects (Rorty), but is rather the expression of ongoing evolutionary responses to environmental stimuli—an embodied, life-situated genealogical process without determinate origin or aim. "Oder vielmehr: es werden hunderttausende von Experimenten gemacht, die Ernährung, Wohnart, Lebensweise des Leibes zu verändern: das Bewußtsein und die Werthschätzungen in ihm . . . sind Anzeichen dieser Veränderungen und Experimente," (KSA 10: 655). Hence, Nietzsche's procedural statement in his initial sketch on the eternal recurrence of the same: ". . . möglichst aus vielen Augen in die Welt sehen, leben in Trieben und Beschäftigungen, um damit sich Augen zu machen, zeitweilig sich dem Leben überlassen, um hernach zeitweilig
über ihm mit dem Auge zu ruhen: die Triebe unterhalten als Fundament alles Erkennens, aber wissen, wo sie Gegner des Erkennens werden: in summa abwarten, wie weit das Wissen und die Wahrheit sich einverleiben können," (KSA 9: 494-495). Knowledge is brought to bear in the embodied encounter of momentary pressing demands. Such epistemological strategies allow the aims of inquiry in Nietzsche's drive-psychological science of the self to include its own motivating forces.

So Nietzsche leaves us with a keener sense for the potential dangers wrought by the dogmatic suppositions that sustain the notion of self-knowing construed as the function of one's autonomous will to know. Knowledge and truth are not, for Nietzsche, the object of some unmediated reflective endeavor in self-sovereignty, but a perspectival value-historical process to which one adapts and corresponds. One does not simply choose to live in drives by virtue of free-will. Their inheritance, actuation, and suppression give expression to unfolding genealogical relations, defining the prevailing features of one's hermeneutic situation; demarcating the locus of their respective intelligibility. Their understanding remains contingent on the determining factors of their unique instantiation. One can only wait and see just what the momentary circumstance demands, and what surprises one finds thereby (KSA 2: 19), as one catches the mind in the act: "... man lernt nach einer derartigen Selbst-Befragung, Selbst-Versuchung, mit einem feineren Auge nach Allem, was überhaupt bisher philosophirt worden ist, hinsehn," (KSA 3: 347-348). Bearing this in mind, our critical eye now turns toward Martin Heidegger, whose confrontation with Nietzsche from the 1930s to the early 1950s gradually put into perspective the grounding conception of conscious will on which his account of Dasein's authentic relation to itself turned in the 1920s (cf. SuZ: 271, 444; WhD: 77), bringing to an end his repeated endeavors to re-
appropriate the concept unscathed by the dangerous dogmatism diagnosed by Nietzsche (cf. GA 65: 15; GA 66: 63-64, 153; GA 77: 109)—a progression that led Heidegger to reconsider, near the end of their encounter in Was heißt Denken?, what called forth the activity of critical questioning with which the will to knowledge had long been identified (cf. GA 40: 24; UzS: 100). This text's peculiar equivocations on the issue of such questioning are introduced by the next chapter's discussion of authenticity.

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In what follows, the subject of self-knowing is broached from the perspective of the later Heidegger's re-conception of authenticity. This is done in dialogue with commentators Denis McManus and Thomas Sheehan, for whom authenticity remains the function of one's will to self-critical questioning. My engagement with these commentators prepares a reading of Was heißt Denken? (1951-52)—a text which addresses the issue of what motivates (bewegt) such critique (cf. WhD: 82, 121-122), and which initiates Heidegger's subsequent work on Unterwegs zur Sprache (cf. WhD: 148), where authenticity is conceived not in terms of a prescriptive modality of thinking to be undertaken by the existential subject, but as a structural feature of language, whose discursive movement (Be-wegung) unfolds in correspondence to the demands of a matter-to-be-thought (cf. UzS: 261-262). This approach allows a response, in Chapter 4, to the criticism of the concept of authenticity leveled at Heidegger by Jacques Derrida, who attempts to identify in Heidegger's later work the same problematic presuppositions that we will find adhere to its early conception, nonetheless defended by Denis McManus and Thomas Sheehan.¹⁴⁸ Chapter 5 will trace the ways in which Heidegger's re-conception of authenticity was led by his Auseinandersetzung with

Friedrich Nietzsche, to whom is dedicated the first half of Was heißt Denken?--a transitional
text that simultaneously exhibits characteristics of the version of authenticity endorsed by
McManus/Sheehan and eschewed by Derrida, as well as the version emerging from
Heidegger's discussion of the essence of language in the late 1950s; a notion of authenticity
for which none of the above commentators provide a sufficient or reconcilable account.
Chapter 3: Discourse on the Domain of the Question-Worthy: Self-Knowing as Existential Undertaking

The notion of *self-knowing* in the work of Martin Heidegger is addressed as a question of *authenticity*; a question of thinking's appropriate relation to its matter (*Sache*)--i.e., to Being, in the sense of the Being of beings--in the historical unfolding of ontological difference, which Heidegger calls the clearing (*Lichtung*) of Being itself. What this question (and indeed, the *questioning* of this question) entails,\(^{149}\) differs according to Heidegger's developing understanding of the manner of one's involvement in the disclosure of the clearing: from the early work of *Sein und Zeit* (1926-27), where *Dasein*, as yet synonymous with 'man',\(^ {150}\) is said to be the clearing itself (*SuZ*: 133), --to the 1946 *Brief über den Humanismus*, where Heidegger, fending off misinterpretations of *Sein und Zeit*’s intent, now asserts that man only dwells in the clearing of a "there" which s/he does not him/herself produce (W: 336-337), --to the final years of Heidegger's career (1965), where he concedes to the shortcomings of *Sein und Zeit*’s conception of this question-worthy issue:


On Heidegger's eventual assessment--reiterated in the essay from which this quotation is drawn, entitled "Zur Frage nach der Bestimmung der Sache des Denkens"--the *questioning* of this question is conceived as an *expression of*, not a means for arriving at thinking's

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\(^{150}\) Contra: (*GA 65*: 433-434; *GA 66*: 322).
appropriate relation to its matter; it is an *indication* of one's own involvement in the matter's determination. Thus, the will to question, once construed as a privileged modality of the subject's capacity for self-determining activity, is divorced of its former existential import. Indeed, all *existentiell* meaning of the authentic--the hallmark of *Sein und Zeit*’s unspoken prescriptivism--has been effaced, along with its fundamental role in the execution of the transcendental analytic.\footnote{151} According to the later Heidegger's view, the *question* is itself brought to bear by way of the linguistic determination (*Be-stimmung*) of a respective matter-to-be-thought. This is to say that *discussion* is what gives way (*be-wegt*) to the posing of the appropriate question--discussion conceived as genuine conversation (*Gespräch*), where one-sided willful impositions with regard to the question's proper determination have no place.\footnote{152}

These developments testify to the later Heidegger's critique of the insufficiencies of transcendental-ontological inquiry into the disclosure of one's authentic self-relation--a process of revision which Hans-Georg Gadamer describes as a gradual broadening of the domain of the problematic; as a widening of its optic; as an opening of the dimensions of the clearing of Being, and so of the selfhood of self,\footnote{153} beyond those revealed by the analysis of man's pursuit of his/her own(-most) personal concerns. For indeed, "Das Sich-Lichten des Seins im 'Da', das im Menschen ist, 'ist' aber nicht nur in ihm."\footnote{154} The famous 'turn' (*Kehre*) of which Heidegger speaks to mark the insufficiencies peculiar to his transcendental

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conception of the self in *Sein und Zeit* Gadamer therefore likens to a guidepost at the onset of a continuous methodological climb, "... bei dem sich alle Blicke und Aussichten untentwegt verschieben ..."155 Hence the image he invokes to describe the subsequent trajectory of Heidegger's work: "Nachdem 1926 'Sein und Zeit' eine Frage gestellt und in sie eingeleitet hat, sind alle späteren Arbeiten Heideggers überhaupt nicht mehr auf eine einheitliche Ebene zu beziehen. Sie gehören je verschiedenen Ebenen an."156 Nonetheless, this progression in Heidegger's point of view on the dimensions of the problem has been instead consistently interpreted by more recent commentators as terminating in an "eclipse of the self," in deference to a transcendent mythologico-destinal power,157 whose behest only those initiated by the grace of wisdom proper to certain world-historical heroes--i.e., Spirit's chosen "poets, thinkers, and statesmen"158--might come to understand.159 The later Heidegger's methodological turn (*Kehre*) is thus cut down to a mere shift in emphasis to the *apriori* Being of Dasein's transcendence, signifying a retreat before the overwhelming forces of history beyond one's control. From the perspective of this now canonical interpretation of the later Heidegger, one's authenticity consisted in subjecting one's own will to the will of a higher power;160 one had to acquiesce to destiny, not run forth toward one's death--an ominous suggestion indeed, in light of Heidegger's complicity with the Nazi regime.

155 Ibid., 206.
156 Ibid., 206.
160 Cf. (*GA 66*: 144): "Weil man die Seinsfrage noch nicht begreift und damit auch nicht das Da-sein, weil man dieses immer noch als »Subjekt« nimmt, gelangt man zu den komischen Forderungen, das Einzelsubjekt (in »Sein und Zeit«) müßte jetzt durch das Volkssubjekt ersetzt werden. Die armen Tröpfe!"
The canonization of this reading has rendered the later Heidegger's notion of authenticity untenable to the likes of Denis McManus and Thomas Sheehan, two prominent figures in contemporary Anglo-American Heidegger studies whose interpretations the current Chapter confronts. The former is therefore keen to maintain that *Sein und Zeit's* principal "metaphilosophical vision" of intellectual progress survives in Heidegger's later work, giving way to an evermore definite form of questioning into the meaning of Being, from which the "Question of the Being of Questioning" itself derives. The latter likewise proclaims that the later work presents a mere "exfoliation" of *Sein und Zeit's* question-worthy point of departure—a groomed form of existential questioning into its "true Grundfrage." It seems that neither commentator is prepared to view what follows upon Heidegger's famous *Kehre* as an ongoing problematization of the formal suppositions employed by transcendental-ontological inquiry into the essence of ground (cf. *SvG*: 84)—along with the metontologically-founded privilege that such an approach bestows upon the existential modality of questioning. Indeed, neither commentator registers the significance of his eventually having called into question the grounding character of the activity of questioning (cf. *UzS*: 175, 256). This would require a view of what this so-called grounding question entails from the perspective afforded by the later Heidegger's often dizzying methodological climb—what Gadamer rightfully identifies as the process that gives way to

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161 Contra: (*ZsdD*: 64).
his reconsideration of "... was vor allem, was Gegenstand der Erkenntnis werden kann, Erkennen selbst, Fragen selbst, Denken selbst möglich macht."\textsuperscript{165}

In what follows, I offer a critique of McManus's and Sheehan's accounts of authenticity to demonstrate the necessity of a discussion of the 1951-52 text Was heißt Denken?, a central juncture in the later Heidegger's oeuvre, where the notion of what calls thinking into appropriate relation to its matter--for which Dasein's own 'call-of-conscience' had been at first made formally responsible (cf. SuZ: 274-280)--appears itself a matter worthy of questioning anew (cf. WhD: 152). Guiding us along the way will be the criticism of authenticity put forward by Jacques Derrida, who sees no development in Heidegger's understanding of the concept throughout the entirety of his work,\textsuperscript{166} and hears naught but the same rhetoric of absolute intentionality,\textsuperscript{167} according to which authenticity is made the function of one's intent to self-critically question; the function of one's will to recognize what one supposedly already knows, "before and after all"\textsuperscript{168}--a position that McManus and Sheehan, on the other hand, both endorse. The close reading of Was heißt Denken? that follows our encounter with these two thinkers will begin with the evidence supporting their positive reception of the version of authenticity that features in Heidegger's early work. These are moments of the text where it does indeed appear the case that thinking's appropriate relation to its matter turns on whether one willingly "betakes oneself" in self-critical questioning to the matter-to-be-thought (WhD: 164).\textsuperscript{169} It will conclude with the

\textsuperscript{165} Gadamer, "Martin Heidegger," 211.
\textsuperscript{168} Derrida, "Heidegger's Hand (Geschlecht II)," 52.
evidence supporting a version of authenticity which anticipates the form that it assumes in the final three presentations included in the volume Unterwegs zur Sprache, discussed in Chapter 4. These are moments of the text where discussion (Gespräch) is described as the reciprocal movement by way of which one is first brought to an understanding of one's appropriate relation to the question posed by a respective matter-to-be-thought (cf. WhD: 110). This approach allows one to render intelligible what Heidegger means when authenticity is presented as a structural feature of thought's linguistic determination (cf. Chapter 4; UzS: 190, 208), or when critique is conceived as the unfolding of a discursive process (cf. Chapter 5; WhD: 122). We are left, in the end, with a notion of self-knowing manifest in correspondence to a relation of mutual need whose identity remains at issue, begging the question of one's proper involvement in its determination.

_Inquiries into Earthly Measure: Authenticity as "Owning One's Own Judgment"

Drawing primarily on the work leading up to and including Sein und Zeit, McManus's reading of the concept of authenticity proposes what has become by now a familiar model of self-knowing,\(^\text{170}\) conceived as an "achievement" on the part of the human subject--an existential "feat" that "demands of us a kind of self-awareness," a kind of "self-imposed," "self-disciplined attention to what we do and to its place within our lives as a whole."\(^\text{171}\) Authenticity is described in terms of our intentionally adopting a "critical perspective towards what our particular forms of disclosive practices reveal."\(^\text{172}\) It is defined


\(^{171}\) McManus, Heidegger and the Measure of Truth, 161-162, 177.

\(^{172}\) Ibid., 173.
as a "kind of 'critical consciousness'"--a condition in which one does not simply have, but rather possesses "conscience," by virtue of one's will to personally appropriate an "overarching sense of what matters to us about the domain investigated." "Forgetting" the significance of this overarching sense is made tantamount to one's "failure" to pose the "question of Being" for oneself--a failure which McManus "symbiotically ties" to a kind of "self-obscurity" that fails "to make our own' the understanding that we have." In other words, "failing to recognize" this overarching sense "corresponds to a failure in our self-understanding"--a condition characteristic of Dasein in the mode of inauthenticity, which the rigorous practice of philosophy is said to "combat" and "free us from." For "the distinguishing feature of the enlightened philosopher," who struggles against the "ruination" ostensibly wrought by the inauthentic, consists in the "form of attention that she pays to what she says and does." On the view that McManus thus proposes, self-knowledge follows according to one's willingness to remember one's overarching "beliefs"; to question the matter at hand with a view to what one already asserts as one's position. One knows oneself in the express undertaking of what one has acknowledged as appropriate in advance. The criteria for the proper exercise of such questioning are, in this sense, pre-determinately established--laid out by the formal structure of Dasein's apriori. It is only the weak of will, so it would seem, who know not when, nor in what way to pose the question of Being that one must always ask--oneself. In such self-determined questioning, Dasein hearkens to the call of its own conscience with a sense of absolute resolve--a conscience

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173 Ibid., 174.
174 Ibid., 160.
175 Ibid., 196-197.
176 Ibid., 217.
177 Ibid., 206.
178 Ibid., 206.
179 Ibid., 221.
180 Ibid., 205.
which bids it heed the call of an absolute certainty (*Gewissheit*) (cf. *SuZ*: 226): its fundamental confrontation with its own death. On such grounds as these, we are to rest assured (*gewiss*) that we *know*, in fact, what it is we *should* be doing--it is up to us to decide (to decide) to make it so (cf. *SuZ*: 287-288).  

McManus proposes his reading of the authentic/inauthentic distinction in the context of a reflection on the 'measure of truth'--a concept of Husserlian origins that he presents in a manner consistent with the apparent trajectory of *Sein und Zeit*'s never-completed project, in the course of which authentic *Dasein* is conceived as this measure's grounding constitutive force, meting out its metric by existing as the *clearing* of Being itself; as the disclosure of the dimensions of this measure's manifestation. For these are, indeed, the ultimate consequences of the claim that the human subject called *Dasein* itself constitutes the unfolding of its own Being-in-the-world--provided, of course, that Being's temporality pans out in the way that the analysis of *Dasein*'s temporality anticipates (cf. *SuZ*: 39). It is on such terms that McManus's can subscribe to the notion that resolute *Dasein* personally undertakes the enactment of its ongoing "self-disclosure," in "the continuing 'appropriation' of that 'disclosure' through what he [the early Heidegger] calls 'authenticity'." To be *authentic* is to not "'fall' into a mode of 'self-forgetfulness' that neglects to 'reflect on the significance' of the measure to which one has committed as appropriate." To be *inauthentic* is to forget to bring to bear our previous choices as regards

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181 Hence, Derrida's misgivings about how "the Heideggerian analytic of *Dasein*" is "regulated by the norms of an absolute intentional meaning." Cf. Derrida, "Heidegger's Ear: Philopolemology (*Geschlecht IV)*," 217.


such measure's being properly carried out;\(^{185}\) it is to fail to ensure of one's own accord the proper determination of such measure on the basis of one's prior decision, for which one assumes individual responsibility in sustaining one's will to self-critically question. Although a viable interpretation of one of the major competing trends in Heidegger's argument that survive the thought experiments of the late 1920s, it neglects many of the period's more convincing formulations on how our relations to others give expression to determinations (Bestimmungen) of mood (Stimmung) that structure the interpretive situation in which the individual decision-making process unfolds.\(^{186}\) Such an interpretation is equally difficult to reconcile with the later Heidegger's assertion that Being is, in fact, never to be thought on the basis of ontic determinations of measure,\(^{187}\) as done by McManus's "strategy . . . of taking Heidegger's measurement motif . . . literally";\(^{188}\) that such measure is only worthy of questioning to begin with, insofar as 'Being itself' clears and carries out the essence of the being called Dasein--a relation which man does not him/herself determine,\(^{189}\) and of which s/he is by no means the "master," as McManus suggests.\(^{190}\) Nor can one say how this reading would hang together with what Heidegger is struggling to articulate in decade-long dialogue with Hölderlin on the issue of the absence of earthly measure for the manner of man's 'dwelling.'\(^{191}\) Indeed, it remains entirely unclear what is yet at stake for

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\(^{185}\) Ibid., 194.


\(^{187}\) Cf. (GA 66: 318): "Das Seyn aber ist nie Maß, denn seine Wahrheit sagt dieses allem zuvor: daß es im Seienden nirgends ein Maß gibt, weil es als Eigentum er-eignet ist in die Fragwürdigkeit der Entscheidungen (Ereignis), die allein die Nähe und Ferne der Götter gewähren und aus ihnen den stillen Kampf um die Wesensverwandlung des Menschen."

\(^{188}\) McManus, Heidegger and the Measure of Truth, 136.

\(^{189}\) Cf. (GA 74: 33): "Ein solches Maß als Innehalt im Zugewiesenen ist nur fragwürdig, weil und wo das Seyn selbst lichtend das Wesen eines Seienden trägt. Dieses aber ist dem Menschen bestimmt."

\(^{190}\) McManus, Heidegger and the Measure of Truth, 1. Cf. (WhD: 142).

Heidegger's understanding of authenticity when he describes man's involvement in the unfolding of the dimensions of Being's clearing as a perpetual undertaking already underway, due to which s/he is first able to conduct his/her being in a mode in keeping with (gemäß) his/her essence (VuA: 189).\(^\text{192}\)

One should note that McManus's investigations on 'measure' are hoping to understand most of Heidegger's central claims about truth without explicit reference to those reflections dedicated to an understanding of the concept of time;\(^\text{193}\) i.e., without reference to the unsolved problems posed by the unfinished Second Division of Sein und Zeit--problems whose presentation the later Heidegger consistently identifies as insufficient (cf. W: 328). For one must admit that addressing these reflections would require a more "thorough examination of Heidegger's concept of 'authenticity'" than McManus's recent book provides,\(^\text{194}\) which has only "begun to think" about these "most difficult topics in Heidegger's early work."\(^\text{195}\) McManus makes good on this promised examination in a subsequent essay on "Being-Towards-Death and Owning One's Judgment," where many of the underlying claims which readers of his monograph must infer from passing suggestions are brought to explicit expression. In this essay, the discussion of self-knowing is framed within a reading of Heidegger's interpretation of St. Paul in texts like the 1920-21 lecture series on Die Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens (GA 60). On McManus's reading of these lectures, authenticity is accomplished by virtue of a process of "self-acknowledgement," in which one accepts "the challenge of standing before . . . what one


\(^{\text{193}}\) McManus, Heidegger and the Measure of Truth, 187.

\(^{\text{194}}\) Ibid., 222.

\(^{\text{195}}\) Ibid., 210.
takes to be the facts about oneself" in accepting the "challenge of being willing to stand before God," i.e., His righteous Final Judgment. By committing to this model of 'self-acknowledgement', one finds oneself suspended in between two formal suppositions, which in Sein und Zeit take on the form of Dasein's certain death and factical thrownness: the belief that God's Final Judgment is indeed righteous, and the belief that one is justified in assuming what one takes to be the facts about oneself. Hence, the scope of the twin claims only mentioned in passing in McManus's monograph: that "self-knowledge" is the achievement of "clarity" on what one already knows and understands, and that "self-obscurity" is the result of "lack of clarity" on what one knows must come to pass. The implications of these suppositions reveal themselves when read in the light of McManus's interpretation of inauthentic Dasein's self-relation in the face of death. Here, inauthenticity is made tantamount to Dasein's "self-evasion"; to its "refusal to love the truth" about itself. It is the "suppression" of such truth, in a mode of "self-estrangement," which seeks "the freedom not to be what [one has only emptily said] one wants" to be, in full knowledge of what one genuinely wants to be instead. In fleeing death, the inauthentic are therefore said to "hide themselves" from themselves--from "a truth [that they] 'refuse to love' enough to seek"--so as not to be "forced to see for [themselves] what [they] are." In

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196 Denis McManus, "Being-towards-death and Owning One's Judgment" (lecture paper presented for the Post-Kantian Seminar Series in the Ryle Room of Oxford University's Faculty of Philosophy and Theology, November 19, 2013), 1.
197 McManus, Heidegger and the Measure of Truth, 221.
198 Ibid., 206.
201 Ibid., 13.
202 Ibid., 11.
203 Ibid., 14.
204 Ibid., 19.
contrast, the authentic "endure what [they] take to be the facts about [themselves]" by "making [their] own judgment decisive in their lives"; by "choosing [themselves] and their [choice]." i.e., their having-chosen;\(^{205}\) by "subjecting every concern to an original choice"\(^{206}\)-in other words, by choosing to have been the one who chose their previous decisions, henceforth acting on the belief that one had known what one was doing (in forgetting to do what one should have been doing) all along.\(^{207}\) For the authentic are "absolutely resolute" in "get[ting] on with doing the right thing,"\(^{208}\) i.e., with "what they believe to be right"; with what they genuinely want--a personal fact of the matter to which McManus sees no further question posed: "Why should I want to do what I want? . . . 'Go figure.'"\(^{209}\) After all, knowing that is surely something one must determine for oneself.

And it is, in fact, precisely the phenomenon of Dasein's wanting-to-have-a-conscience that unifies, and lays bare the assumptions on which McManus's reading operates; assumptions which the later Heidegger undermines when claiming that there is no knowing our own essence absolutely--an essence of which one only has knowledge according to the way that one's thinking is called (WhD: 152). These are the same assumptions called into question when Heidegger suggests that the absoluteness of unconditional belief and the question-worthiness of thinking are two abysmally different domains--assumptions demanding elucidating discussion (WhD: 110). In McManus's faithful reading of the early Heidegger, the 'call-of-conscience' is described as "a call to bring to bear one's understanding of what must be done. . . . [O]ne is oneself . . . precisely by

\(^{205}\) Ibid., 20.
\(^{206}\) Ibid., 24.
\(^{207}\) A line of argument to which Derrida, in afterthought, retorts: "Ne feignons pas de savoir ce que c'est que l'oubli." Cf. Derrida, Eperons, 121.
\(^{209}\) Ibid., 20.
bringing one's judgment to bear in one's life. . . . [T]hose who fail to hearken to the call lack . . . a readiness to do what they are already in a position to know must be done." For it is "a call to 'resolution', a call to live by what one thinks is right." From this perspective on authentic Dasein's self-sequestered questioning, what is called for by the 'call' is one's doing what one already thinks holds true. It is a self-determined call to "repeatedly bring [one's] own judgment to bear and act upon it"; a call which issues in accordance with one's own willingness to consider a choice that one supposedly faces at every moment: a choice that "choos[es] between 'being conscientious' . . . and 'not being conscientious'." On these grounds, one can most certainly argue that to want-to-have-a-conscience is to want-to-be-one'self--on the assumption that it is, in fact, none other than authentic Dasein whence the call to be oneself must always issue; on the assumption that one is already solely responsible for the thought that one gives to what one has, or has not become; that one's ability to respond to such a call fundamentally turns on one's own determination to carry out one's decisions in self-critical reflection. Indeed, it is this valorization of willing personal responsibility on which a most questionable, and most critical claim is founded in Sein und Zeit: "Dasein kann nur dann eigentlich es selbst sein, wenn es sich von ihm selbst her dazu ermöglicht," (SuZ: 263)--a claim of which the later Heidegger is notably no longer quite so certain: "Selbst-sein -- damit meinen wir zunächst immer: das von sich aus Tun und Lassen und Verfügen. Aber das »Von sich aus« ist täuschender Vordergrund. Von sich aus kann bloßer »Eigensinn« sein, dem alle Zu-eignung und Übereignung aus dem Ereignis abgeht," (GA 65: 321). After declaring Sein und Zeit's fundamental-ontological point of

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210 Ibid., 23.
211 Ibid., 21.
212 Ibid., 23.
213 Cf. similar reservations expressed by: Derrida, Éperons, 95.
departure from the being called *Dasein* insufficient, Heidegger's thoughts "Zur Frage: wer sind wir?" in his *Beiträge zur Philosophie* (1938) provide a more cautious appraisal of the question of one's way of being oneself (*GA 65*: 48). In this context, it seems to him that the demand that we should, in action, be ourselves, already answers the question of who we are before it has even been posed. That is to say: "Der Wille zum Selbst-sein macht die Frage hinfällig," (*GA 65*: 49). For truth be told, it is not at all clear:


Questions upon questions, to which one's most determined will to self-critical questioning yields no answers;\(^{214}\) questions which appear to require a broader consideration of what motivates such questioning than even Heidegger's *Beiträge zur Philosophie* are themselves able to articulate. We shall see, in Chapter 5, that these *Contributions* give way to a high-philosophical, world-historical re-appropriation of the will to self-reflection in his succeeding text from 1939, *Besinnung* (*GA 66*: 63-64, 153),\(^{215}\) after having eerily ended in postulations on the silent manipulation of language as the grounding setting-of-measure (*GA 65*: 510).\(^{216}\) Before turning to the work of Thomas Sheehan, one can, for the moment, only point to a first indication of the re-conception of the historicity of authentic selfhood still underway at this juncture in Heidegger's methodological turn (*Kehre*). For it would seem,

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\(^{214}\) As Nietzsche might say: "-- das kann, wie billig, auch durch die fleissigste und peinlich-gewissenhafteste Analysis und Selbstprüfung des Intellekts nicht ausgemacht werden," (*KSA 3*: 626).


\(^{216}\) An argument imported into, and imposed upon the text *Was heißt Denken?* in the reading presented by: Derrida, "Heidegger's Hand (*Geschlecht* II)," 41-42.
during these and the following dangerously ambivalent years, that one's own calling had
gotten out of hand; it now appears to him, in any case, "... [daß] das Wesen des Seins als
solchen, nicht das des Menschen, in sich den Zuruf an den Menschen als den zur Geschichte
ihn bestimmenden enthält," (GA 65: 51).

Thought's Pietas: Authenticity as "Existentiell Becoming"

Thomas Sheehan's reading of Heidegger's conception of self-knowing relies upon the
same questionable principles of selfhood which had formed the basis of McManus's
interpretation of authenticity as the existentiell accomplishment of one's appropriate relation
to the clearing of Being. Likewise taking the early Heidegger's metontological
prescriptivism to heart, Sheehan claims that "the best that the human being can do is to
existentially become its existential becoming, that is, to personally assume its own thrown-
open-ness" in self-critical questioning--a process by way of which authentic Dasein
"becomes whole... in an act of resolve," achieving sovereignty over its own existential
totality in "returning to itself"--i.e., in recovering the sense of originary self-presence from
which it falls from grace in the mode of the inauthentic. To willingly undertake the
restitution of such self-presence is to reestablish one's authentic involvement in the clearing.
That is to say, the restoration of one's ownmost possibility turns on one's determination to

\[\text{217} \text{ Cf. the description of the defining terms for the discipline of metontology provided by: David}
\text{ Webb, Heidegger, Ethics, and the Practice of Ontology (London: Continuum, 2009), 42. See also: (GA 26: 199).}
\[\text{218} \text{ Cf. (GA 66: 144): "Man »kann« »Sein und Zeit« -- alles Entscheidende übersehend -- als}
\text{ »Anthropologie« und als eine Art »existenzieller Ethik« und dergleichen »lesen« und benützen; nur hat dies}
\text{ alles dann nichts zu tun mit dem einzigen denkerischen Willen dieses Versuchs... Das Wesentliche der}
\text{ Entschlossenheit liegt nicht in einer vermeintlichen »subjektiven« »Aktivität« des Einzelnen."}
\[\text{219} \text{ Sheehan, "Man, Meaning, and the Thing Itself," 19.}
\[\text{220} \text{ These are the Heideggerian "ethics of presence" whose presuppositions Derrida's criticism}
\text{ consistently targets. Cf. Alwin Letzkus, Dekonstruktion und ethische Passion: Denken des Anderen nach}
\text{ Jacques Derrida und Emmanuel Levinas (München: Fink, 2002), 313.}
return to oneself, whoever one supposedly is—a claim which rests upon the hypothesis grounding the coherence of Sein und Zeit's ultimately abandoned project: that "the clearing is human being [man]"; that Dasein "... selbst die Lichtung ist," (SuZ: 133). Provided that this hypothesis holds, such consummate self-presence exists as a formal possibility on the terms laid out by the transcendental analytic, to which Sheehan unconditionally subscribes when he asserts, "that Heidegger's extensive corpus from beginning to end remained a hermeneutics of Dasein or an analytic of human existence"; "that all the key terms in Heidegger's lexicon -- Ereignis, ἀλήθεια, Lichtung, even Seyn -- are existentials precisely in the sense that the early Heidegger gave this term." According to Sheehan's reading, on which Dasein and human being (man) are made synonymous, Dasein does not merely 'dwell' in the clearing of a "there" which s/he does not him/herself produce, as the later Heidegger insists (cf. W: 336-337; SuZ: 442). S/he is him/herself, "both [the] disclosed and disclosive" force which carries out the disclosure of the clearing of his/her own accord—i.e., according to his/her peculiar modes of intentional self-comportment, as the singular "place" and provenance for the unfolding of ontological difference. To this extent, the mode of Dasein's "self-presence" is itself made responsible for "generat[ing] the 'as' of sense-making," i.e., the "as" of 'Being-as-such'--an argument whose final consequence is drawn by Heidegger's short-lived 'metaphysics of Dasein' construed during

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221 Cf. (GA 66: 155): "Weiβ denn der Mensch überhaupt »unmittelbar« je von ihm selbst?"
227 Ibid., 3.
228 Ibid., 16.
the late 1920s (cf. GA 26: 171, 175, 214, 239), where he claims, in contrast to later revisions (cf. WhD: 116), that existing Dasein gives itself Being (GA 26: 195).\(^{229}\) For when conceived as the means of his/her own "'self-enabling' act of becoming," the living being called Dasein does, indeed, appear endowed with the potential to "pro-duce [his/her] own ability to achieve [his/her] Wozu",\(^{230}\) to determine, in and of him/herself, what it means to be him/herself, within pre-determinate factual constraints.\(^{231}\) Dasein is thus identified as being the product of his/her own apriori will to be him/herself, on the grounds that s/he is him/herself the autonomous "source of the movement" manifest in his/her own becoming\(^{232}\)-a "movement" which defines his/her "'self-like character' or 'ownness' throughout change",\(^{233}\) i.e., a movement by way of which the essence of Dasein's self-identity is established. Thrownness and death are inevitable facts of life--but it would seem that what one becomes is a question which Dasein must ultimately decide for him/herself.

By committing to the early Heidegger's stance on man's appropriate relation to the clearing, Sheehan also commits to a number of attending arguments which fundamentally affect how one conceives the dynamics of the activity of self-knowing--arguments which prove irreconcilable with the later Heidegger's work.\(^{234}\) Of particular relevance to our current discussion is the claim, taken from a 1924 lecture series on Aristotle, that "the primary openness of human being [Dasein] is grounded in voûç," (GA 18: 326)--a notion


\(^{230}\) Sheehan, "Astonishing! Things Make Sense!," 5.


\(^{233}\) Sheehan, "Astonishing! Things Make Sense!," 6.

\(^{234}\) Cf. Chapters 4 and 5 on the sense of movement (Be-wégung) proper to the linguistic determination of the essence of identity. See also: (UzS: 213-214).
which Sheehan associates with the concepts of the "clearing; world; ἀλήθεια; λόγος; the 'as'; Inzwischen; Austrag; . . . 'time'," and with Dasein him/herself, as a form of ψυχή. All is referred back, in Sheehan's reading, to "the a priori fact that meaning is ever possible within the world of νοῦς", referred back to man's "astonishing" capacities of "mind"; to the nature of peculiar beings like ourselves, who "draw things together into unities of meaning" with the power of thought--i.e., "insofar as they are connected with ourselves as the final point of reference." Things are themselves brought to stand, and persist in the openness of their proper meaning according to our own capacity to "mind" their meaningfulness. For thought itself is said to ground the disclosure of the clearing; the unfolding of the world-thing relation--i.e., "das Inzwischen, the 'space between' a thing and its meaning that allows for the combination of the two." According to Sheehan's interpretation, it is none other than "human νοῦς that gathers (λέγει) things into unities of sense." As Derrida might ask, does the Phenomenology of Spirit say anything different?

In true Hegelian spirit, such a reading as Sheehan's posits the noetic activity proper to the form of ψυχή called Dasein as the singular element of logical speculation--i.e., it posits thought's capacity for meaning as the "ground of language", voćiν as the absolute

238 Ibid., 11.
240 Cf. the criticism of Heidegger's lingering metaphysical prejudice against animal life that appears in: Derrida, "Heidegger's Hand (Geschlecht II)," 40.
241 Contra: (UzS: 28-30). See also: Chapter 4.
243 Ibid., 10.
244 Cf. Derrida, "Heidegger's Hand (Geschlecht II)," 35.
245 Contra: (WhD: 146).
mediating movement in which the momentary gathering (λέγειν) of meaningful presence manifests. According to this argument, once stripped of all pretense, thought itself begets the clearing in Spirit's movement toward absolute knowledge.\(^n\) This conflicts with the later Heidegger's characterization of one's thinking relation to the clearing's disclosure as being linguistically mediated--manifest according to a need for correspondence, thus called into relation to its respective matter (cf. WhD: 126, 110).\(^m\) That is to say, the so-called essence of thinking, with which both λέγειν and νοεῖν are identified (cf. WhD: 146), remains the unfolding of a discursive happening, motivated by necessity, in the interest of determining a mutual matter-to-be-thought. In Heidegger's discussion of what calls 'thinking' (λέγειν, νοεῖν) into relation to its matter, the concept of λέγειν assumes priority over that of νοεῖν, in a reversal of his initial understanding of the issue, whose sufficient articulation would not follow for several decades, by Heidegger's own account (cf. UzS: 93; WhD: 100). He draws on Parmenides's sixth fragment (χρῆ τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τ᾽ ἐὼν ἐμμεναι), which mentions speech before thought, to elucidate such priority:

Das Vorliegenlassen [λέγειν] muß uns überhaupt etwas zubringen, was dann als ein Vorliegendes in die Acht genommen [νοεῖν] werden kann. Das λέγειν geht dem νοεῖν auch nicht nur insofern voraus, als es zuerst vollzogen werden muß, damit das νοεῖν etwas vorfinde, was es in Acht nehmen kann. Vielmehr geht das λέγειν über das νοεῖν auch schon hinweg, insofern es das, was das νοεῖν in die Acht nimmt, zugleich wieder sammelt und als Versammeltes verwahrt. . . . (WhD: 125)

On Heidegger's reading of the fragment, one's involvement in the gathering (λέγειν) of meaningful presence is not simply to be referred back to Dasein's own capacities of mind


(voeiv), as Sheehan suggests. On the contrary: "Das λέγειν, das Vorliegenlassen, entfaltet sich von sich her zum vœîν," (WhD: 125). Indeed, "... nur insofern der Mensch spricht, denkt er: nicht umgekehrt, wie die Metaphysik noch meint," (WhD: 51). This is not, of course, to endorse the equally dubious post-idealist argument that it is man's subjective capacity for speech, rather than thought, which determines the disclosure of the clearing. For Heidegger further argues that the essence of thinking, brought to expression in the structural reciprocity of speech (λέγειν) and thought (νοεîν), is insufficiently defined with reference to either the one or the other alone (WhD: 126-127). Both singularly manifest in equiprimordial correspondence to the disclosure of a clearing which they do not themselves produce, but rather, bring to full articulation—a process elsewhere described in terms of φάσις. "Das λέγειν sowohl als auch das vœîν, beide aus ihrem Gefüge, vollbringen das, was . . . ἄληθεύειν genannt wird: entbeugen und entborgenhalten das Unverborgene. Das verhüllte Wesen von λέγειν und vœîν beruht darin, daß sie dem Unverborgenen und seiner Unverborgenheit entsprechen," (WhD: 126). The essence of thinking—its very structure (Gefüge)—is such, that it corresponds to the clearing's disclosure, regardless of one's peculiar capacities of mind; discerning how so requires a deeper consideration of the essence of language (WhD: 148), which Heidegger undertakes in the process of writing his volume Unterwegs zur Sprache (1950-59). For now, it is only said that the structural coherence of man's capacities for thought and speech is first brought to its articulation in reference to something which neither determines on its own (WhD: 126-127): the historical unfolding of ontological difference (cf. WhD: 136). What Heidegger had once understood as a matter of

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252 Cf. (VuA: 236): "In φάσις liegen: anrufen, rühmend nennen, heißen; all dies jedoch deshalb, weil es west als erscheinenlassen. . . . [Φ]άσις ist die Sage; sagen heißt: zum Vorschein bringen. . . . Das vœîν, das in-die-Achtnehmen und das, was es vernommen, sind ein Gesagtes, zum Vorschein Gebrachtes."
Dasein's own transcendent Being-in-the-world, he now identifies with the world-historical signification of the Parmenides fragment's closing words, ἐὸν ἔμμεναι (cf. WhD: 135, 174-175), which invoke the essence of the twofold cohesion of the Being of beings (WhD: 136-137), whose linguistic determination unfolds in correspondence to a need (χρή) that calls thinking (λέγειν, νοεῖν) into relation to its matter (WhD: 146). What had once appeared a function of the "world-forming" potential of Dasein's ability to give thought (νοεῖν) to its own sense of meaning, is now understood as an expression of the world-historical collision of correspondent speaking traditions (cf. GA 74: 136, 138, 150). That is to say, one's own capacities for thought and speech are no longer considered a means for arriving at one's appropriate relation to the unfolding of the Being of beings, but are themselves an articulation of the encounter of disparate instantiations of Being's differential 'two-fold', designated by a doubling of the figure of difference organizing the later Heidegger's 'fourfold' world-structure, and marked in Was heißt Denken? by a revision of the fragment's final words, now reading: "ἐὸν ἐὸν" (WhD: 132). The differentiation of ontological difference is thus rendered a linguistic occurrence of world-historical dimensions. Thought is no longer deemed the mediating movement of Being's clearing; interlocution is conceived as the eventuation (Ereignis) of the clearing itself.

When thought, as manifest in correspondence, no longer "grounds" the disclosure of the clearing, the dynamics governing the activity of self-knowing undergo essential change, such that it appears questionable whether it is at all fitting to speak of the selfhood of self as being grounded in the way that Heidegger's fundamental-ontology suggests. For if

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255 Ibid., 8.
it is the case, as Hans-Georg Gadamer says, that we are, in all knowing of ourselves and all knowing of the world, always already encompassed by, and involved in shared forms of communicative practice; that we grow up, learn of the world, of each other, and in the end, of ourselves, in learning such language,\textsuperscript{256} one can no longer be so certain in positing a formal substrate of self-possession to which one may refer in exercising the will to self-knowledge. No doubt, in the end, all understanding is self-understanding, "... aber nicht in der Weise eines vorgängigen oder schließlich erreichten Selbstbesitzes."\textsuperscript{257} One knows oneself with respect to a matter whose discursive determination one does not carry out in utter isolation: "Denn es verwirklicht sich dieses Sichverstehen immer nur im Verstehen einer Sache und hat nicht den Charakter einer freien Selbstverwirklichung. Das Selbst, das wir sind, besitzt sich nicht selbst. Eher könnte man sagen, daß es sich geschieht."\textsuperscript{258} And one cannot will the course of the conversation concerning this matter in the same way that one might will knowledge of what one truly thinks; to constantly prey on the discussion with one's own questions brings about no genuine understanding. Discussion unfolds in an interpretive exchange on a matter in question whose determination resists all such unilateral impositions: "Wie man miteinander ins Gespräch kommt und nun von dem Gespräch gleichsam weitergetragen wird, darin ist nicht mehr der sich zurückbehaltende oder sich öffnende Wille des Einzelnen bestimmend, sondern das Gesetz der Sache, um die es im Gespräch geht, und die Rede und Gegenrede hervorlockt und am Ende aufeinander einspielt."\textsuperscript{259} Heidegger's work from the late 1950s shares Gadamer's position regarding the

\textsuperscript{256} Gadamer, "Mensch und Sprache," 96.
\textsuperscript{257} Gadamer, "Zur Problematik des Selbstverständnisses," 78.
\textsuperscript{258} Ibid., 78.
\textsuperscript{259} Gadamer, "Mensch und Sprache," 99.
linguistic determination of the question's posing. The activity of questioning—once identified with authentic Dasein's fundamental will to knowledge in 1935 (cf. GA 40: 24)—is led by, and responds to a discussion without pre-determinate origin or aim, brought to its articulation in the reciprocal exchange of call and answer characteristic of conversation. In this sense, the origin (ἀρχή) of questioning is itself without absolute ground (ἀρχή) (cf. SvG: 182-185). It is on such groundless grounds that Heidegger proposes the following reconsideration of the ontological implications of the question in 1959: "Worin beruht, d.h. gründet das Sprachwesen? Vielleicht fragen wir, nach Gründen suchend, am Sprachwesen vorbei" (UzS: 256), thereby retracting the fundamental claim on which Sheehan's interpretation, as well as Derrida's criticism both rest: that in the subjective self-critical existentiell possibility of questioning—the so-called "piety of thinking" (cf. VuA: 40)—authentic Dasein carries out the grounding of the clearing itself, as the sole determining factor of the matter-to-be-thought. For it now appears to Heidegger, that the way of the matter's determination does not, in fact, exhibit the character of a "grounding," foreign as it is to the discursive movement proper to the essence of language (cf. UzS: 256); that one's own involvement in the manner of such movement, in fact, unfolds upon perpetually shifting terrains, better likened to the swaying tidal swell of an endless sea (cf. WhD: 169; UzS: 230). Arriving at this view of the matter had entailed an elucidating engagement with Nietzsche regarding the 'carrying out' (Austrag) of ontological difference, "... [welcher] nicht begriffen werden kann, wenn wir ihn formal als »Unterscheidung« denken und für diese

260 Cf. Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, 368.
261 Cf. Derrida, De l'esprit, 71.
264 Cf. Derrida, De l'esprit, 149. See also: (UzS: 176) and Chapter 4 for a response to Derrida's unconvincing rebuttal to these revisions.
Unterscheidung einen »Akt« eines unterscheidenden »Subjekts« ausfindig machen wollen. . . [Da der] Gedanke des »Grundes« ungemäß dem Ereignis [ist]," (N II: 187). The same revisions in argument are at work when Heidegger rejects his early transcendental understanding of the essence of ground (cf. W: 127), in the context of his 1956 treatise on Leibniz, where he claims that the nothingness of Being itself is without ground (SvG: 86)--a nothingness which, in Sein und Zeit, authentic Dasein potentially grounded in a personal undertaking of absolute resolve (cf. SuZ: 305-306). From these revisions duly follows a re-conception of the notion of time (cf. UzS: 213-214), to whose essence ontological analysis no longer attains (cf. ZSdD: 16, 24), as it once had—a matter that Chapter 5 will address in greater detail.

The above evidence is important for my argument insofar as it denotes developments in Heidegger's understanding of how authenticity happens. The prescriptivist valorization of the will to self-knowledge, conceived as a practice of existentiell becoming in reflective self-critical questioning, is founded on claims which collapse in the later Heidegger's work on the essence of language. In Unterwegs zur Sprache, discussion concerning the phenomena of the will to knowledge (cf. UzS: 100), the will to question (cf. UzS: 175), and the will to the provisional sense of self-security achieved in personally appropriating one's existential totality (cf. UzS: 229), gives way to an immanent critique that calls into question the very point of departure for the fundamental-ontological form of inquiry carried out in Sein und Zeit (ZSdD: 61). The remainder of this chapter is dedicated to a close reading that gives an account of these developments in Heidegger's argument in the context of Was heißt Denken?--a transitional work which points in two directions. The reading first draws on the

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266 Sheehan, "Astonishing! Things Make Sense!," 17.
evidence supporting the version of authenticity to which McManus and Sheehan both subscribe, before presenting indications of a transformation in the concept, which prepare the position that Heidegger adopts in the course of composing his work on language in the 1950s, discussed in dialogue with Jacques Derrida (Chapter 4).

Invocations of the Authentic: Questions of Correspondence in Was heißt Denken?

In Was heißt Denken?, the notion of authenticity no longer features as a subject of transcendental-ontological analysis, but nonetheless organizes the structure of Heidegger's argument.267 The notion is addressed as an issue of one's correspondence to what calls thinking into relation to its matter, of how such correspondence is carried out, and of what one's proper place consists in with respect to the unfolding of this relation. How one conceives the manner of such correspondence bears on how one conceives the activity of self-knowing; on how one arrives at one's sense of self, to whose essence one is exposed according to what calls one to think of that which it entails (WhD: 152). Our confrontation with McManus and Sheehan has yielded one possible understanding of this issue which identifies man him/herself as its principle determining factor: on whom the way of such correspondence ultimately turns, and from whose willingness to question his/her knowledge of him/herself supposedly follows, as an existentiell accomplishment of his/her own undertaking. When this line of argument is taken to its formal conclusion, the questioning carried out in the fundamental will to knowledge incurs responsibility for clearing the channels by way of which the call to think thenceforth issues--a dynamic which culminates in an identification of the called with the final origin and aim of its own calling, as per Sein

*und Zeit's* analysis of *Dasein's* 'will-to-have-a-conscience' (cf. *SuZ*: 276). In the consumption of such fundamental questioning, thought itself gives way to what calls it into relation to its matter as the medium of its own manifestation, in a reflective self-mediating movement that puts man in the position to assume authority over the determination of the question-worthy. Man's authenticity is thus construed as an intellectual achievement of his/her own doing--conditional upon his/her willingness to question; to correspond in questioning to a matter-to-be-thought of whose identity s/he is already fundamentally aware--a matter which s/he is therefore called upon to acknowledge as appropriate, and to take personal responsibility for in absolute resolution. In what follows, we encounter moments where this notion appears to take on a ready sense (cf. *WhD*: 164). These are juxtaposed to still other moments, where Heidegger suggests that arriving at a relation of correspondence to the matter in question is never the result of autonomous decision (*WhD*: 121); that thinking is solely brought to its expression in relation to a matter-to-be-thought "spoken unto" (*zugesprochen*) thinking in interlocution (*WhD*: 105, cf. 108-110)\(^{268}\)--i.e., a matter to which one's thinking is called, in whose determination it is involved, which unfolds in the course of the conversation that it responds to (cf. *WhD*: 110), in accordance with the mutual needs of the parties concerned (cf. *WhD*: 114-115). Bearing this juxtaposition in mind, the phenomenon of *questioning* proves to be of particular importance for an interpretation of authenticity in this text, whose great ambivalence nonetheless points toward impending conceptual revisions (cf. *WhD*: 121-122; *UzS*: 261).

In its most dogmatic formulations, *Was heißt Denken?* gives the reader to believe that one first properly thinks in managing to address the matter in question as Heidegger

\(^{268}\) I opt for the archaic formulation "unto" where it more clearly maintains Heidegger's emphasis on the structures of hermeneutic transmission that shape the way we think (about thinking). Cf. (*WhD*: 139).
himself dictates. At one point he programatically contends that we are only able to think, insofar as we first attempt to unfold the question of "what calls thinking" in the way described by his preliminary methodological considerations (WhD: 140)--a question whose unfolding one follows by way of its questioning (WhD: 165)--a questioning which one maintains and withstands (Aushalten) in unrelenting pursuit of the way into the question-worthy. For it is said that one's thinking of the matter is just (sachgerecht), insofar as it remains on its way toward what is worthy of question (WhD: 128). Indeed, there are moments when it appears as though one's worthiness of the question-worthy matter entailed by this question relies on one's own very capacity for questioning. This is the basis on which Heidegger makes the following assertion, in introducing his thoughts on what heretofore has been called "thinking" according to the precepts of metaphysical logic:

Wir müssen uns schon, um der Frage, was nach der bisherigen Lehre «Denken» heiße, gewachsen zu sein, darauf einlassen, die Frage zu fragen. Darin liegt: wir müssen uns eigens in das Geheiß das uns heißt, nach der Weise des logos zu denken, schicken. Solange wir nicht selbst von uns her uns aufmachen, d.h. solange wir nicht selber uns dem Geheiß aufschließen und uns so fragend auf den Weg zu ihm begeben, solange bleiben wir gegen das Geschick unseres Wesens blind. (WhD: 103)

So it would seem that we do not yet measure up to the dimensions of the matter in question, if we have not yet let ourselves in on, and so involved ourselves in the task of questioning what it has hitherto entailed. Heidegger thus calls upon his audience to reconcile themselves with the historical inheritance issuing from the Occidental tradition which they inhabit. For it is said, that we are blind to our essential involvement in its destiny, so long as we do not, by way of questioning, betake ourselves to this calling of our own accord;\footnote{Et le propre de l'homme n'advient qu'en cette réponse ou en cette responsabilité. Il le fait du moins et seulement quand l'homme acquiesce, consent, se rend à l'adresse qui lui est adressée; c'est-à-dire à \emph{son} adresse, celle qui ne devient proprement la sienne qu'en cette réponse." Cf. Derrida, \emph{De l'esprit}, 154. See also: Chapter 4.} that we only
hear the claim levied upon us by this destiny such that we think of, and so bear in mind in questioning the essential calling thus entailed: "Diesen Anspruch des Welt-Geschickes hören wir . . . nur so, daß wir auf das einfache Geheiß unseres Wesensgeschickes achten, um es zu bedenken. Der vorläufigste Versuch zu solchem Achten ist die Frage, »Was heißt uns denken?« Wohlgemerkt: die Frage," (WhD: 104). Apparently, we only hear such destined calling on the condition that we intend to heed its demands. The call is heard, provided that we undertake to think of the question thusly posed—a relation of correspondence whose understanding is later overturned, once all thinking is conceived as a manner of hearing (cf. SvG: 86); a relation whose authentic gesture therefore lies not in the endeavor to question (cf. UzS: 175, 180), but in the hearing of what lets-itself-be-heard as that which needs be said by those whose thinking it involves (cf. UzS: 252, 255), who are thus called upon to bring the respective matter in question to its proper articulation (cf. UzS: 257). Depending on how one conceives of this call and its way of being heard, one's thinking appears either a means to, or an expression of a relation of correspondence to its matter.

Nowhere in Was heißt Denken? does the former conception seem more strongly supported than in the Stundenübergang that precedes Heidegger's reading of Parmenides. At this juncture, the text provides the clearest evidence for a notion of authenticity existentiell accomplished by way of questioning. Indeed, the reader is here led to believe that one's thinking first properly occurs when one undertakes to question the question-worthiness of its matter (WhD: 164). Thinking is thereupon conceived as the medium of its own questioning correspondence to itself; thinking is said to be itself a way (ein Weg), to which we correspond only such that we remain amidst it, underway (unterwegs) toward its matter in questioning—an activity which we are to set about doing (sich anschicken) of our own
accord (*WhD*: 164). So the reader encounters the same prescriptivism which had characterized Heidegger's appeal to correspond to the claim of destiny issuing from one's inheritance of the Occidental tradition: "Um in das Unterwegs zu gelangen, müssen wir uns freilich aufmachen . . . einmal so, daß wir uns der sich öffnenden Wegaussicht und Wegrichtung selber aufschließen, zum anderen so, daß wir uns auf den Weg begeben, d.h. die Schritte tun, durch die der Weg erst ein Weg wird," (*WhD*: 164). Thought itself thus paves the way of its own calling--giving way to its own articulation; bringing about the way of its own relation of correspondence to its matter, whose undertaking follows according to one's willingness to question. In Heidegger's words: "Erst und nur das Gehen, hier das denkende Fragen, ist die Be-wegung. Sie ist das Aufkommenlassen des Weges," (*WhD*: 164). It is, in this sense, first and foremost the questioning of thinking by way of which one sets about addressing the issue of its calling--a line of argument revoked in *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, where Heidegger asserts that one's thinking must rescind claim to such priority, as the manifestation of a discursive happening that first opens the paths upon which the issue of its authentic articulation may be pursued (*UzS*: 261). Hence, his contemporaneous suggestion that the manner of thought's relation to its matter is determined in accordance with the discourse which motivates (*be-wègt*) its expression, and which gives shape to the domain of an intelligible response (cf. *UzS*: 215). To this extent, one's way of correspondence to the matter in question is displaced from the purview of one's own doing (cf. *UzS*: 261).

These revisions are presaged by a parallel line of argument in *Was heißt Denken?* which conflicts with the notion that thinking paves the way of its own correspondence to its matter--arguing that what calls thinking into correspondence issues according to the
respective needs of the discussion in which it is involved. On this view, one's way of correspondence does not turn on one's own capacity for questioning, insofar as the matter in question is first brought to bear as such in keeping with what the current conversation calls for. This is to say that one's way of correspondence is led by the demands of one's interpretive situation; that one is given to think of a matter whose determination stands in contention amongst the parties it concerns. Hence, the hermeneutic scope of Heidegger's claim that thinking is only brought upon its way such that what gives one to think is spoken unto (zugesprenchen) thinking as the matter-to-be-thought (WhD: 105)--a thinking which itself remains, in every case, a saying and a speaking of language (WhD: 155); a speaking spoken though (durchgesprochen), i.e., mediated by one's linguistic relation to the intelligible (WhD: 87; cf. UzS: 31). In this sense, all questioning moves within the playing field of the spoken (cf. WhD: 91)--a playing field within which the activity of thinking plays out (cf. WhD: 171). For indeed, such questioning is always wagered in response to the reciprocal movement of play peculiar to the essence of language (WhD: 87)--movement which defines and gives expression to the unfolding of the question-worthy (cf. WhD: 111; UzS: 214-215). But to say that the demands of discussion dictate the way that one thinks is not at all to dismiss the need to question (cf. UzS: 180), only to indicate that the activity of questioning is motivated by a sense of need which characterizes thought's linguistic relation to its matter--a relation of need to which such questioning corresponds, and which it articulates, but may not assume responsibility for in the way supposed by the formal coherence of transcendental-ontological inquiry (cf. WhD: 175). For the determination of

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this relation of need turns not upon the axis of one's own questioning (cf. WhD: 114-115; Chapter 5), no more than the matter-to-be-thought may be conceived as the product of one's autonomous decision (cf. WhD: 158). Hence, Heidegger's insistence on the following methodological reversal: "Das so zu denkende Brauchen ist nicht mehr und nie Sache menschlichen Tuns und Bewirkens. Indessen gehört umgekehrt das sterbliche Tun und Lassen in den Anspruchsbereich des χρή," (WhD: 119). It is a need whose very identity remains under continuous discussion (cf. WhD: 146), brought to its proper expression in keeping with the event of truth's disclosure (cf. WhD: 126; UzS: 261).

This understanding of the linguistic determination of one's way of correspondence is reflected in Heidegger's reconsideration of the notion that the essence of thinking is grounded in man's subjective capacity for remembrance, or indeed, that such remembrance is something peculiarly "human" in the first place, in the sense of arising from his/her own spontaneous powers of mind (cf. WhD: 97)--claims which had featured centrally in the accounts of authenticity encountered above. According to the version of authenticity that eventually emerges (cf. UzS: 264), one's subjective capacity for remembrance is not a means for arriving at, but an expression of one's essential relation to the unfolding of the matter-to-be-thought, indicating one's perennial involvement in its 'convocation' (Versammlung) (cf. WhD: 92). Remembrance is testament to the codetermination of its way of 'gathering' (Versammlung) the domain of the intelligible--a gathering in which one 'dwells', but does not oneself produce (WhD: 97, 156). For it is a gathering which we ourselves are only "in a manner of speaking"--i.e., in a way which one does not solely determine for oneself (WhD: 157). Its way of gathering overtakes and clears the paths of all attempts at its retrieval; to the later Heidegger, it is ". . . die alles Tun und Lassen überholende Botschaft dessen, dem wir
 schon angeboten sind." (WhD: 157). On this view, it is only because we are already essentially involved in such gathering that we may persist in recollection of that which it entails (cf. WhD: 157). Indeed, we are called into recollection in accordance with what remains at issue in the speaking traditions to which we belong. From this perspective, all endeavors in remembrance of the memorable already dwell preserved in convocation of the question-worthy with which one's thinking is in this way bestowed. In Heidegger's own words:

Die Versammlung des Andenkens gründet nicht in einem Vermögen des Menschen, gar in dem des Erinnerns und Behaltens. Alles Andenken an das Gedenkbare wohnt selber bereits in jener Versammlung, durch die im voraus alles geborgen und verborgen ist, was zu bedenken bleibt. . . . Das Gedächtnis im Sinne des menschlichen Andenkens wohnt in dem, was alles, das zu denken gibt, verwahrt. Wir nennen es die Verwahrnis. Sie verbirgt und birgt das, was uns zu denken gibt. Die Verwahrnis allein gibt das zu-Bedenkende, das Bedenklichste, als Gabe frei. Die Verwahrnis ist jedoch nichts neben und außer dem Bedenklichsten. Sie ist dieses selber, ist seine Weise, aus der es und in der es gibt, nämlich sich, das selbst je und je zu denken gibt. (WhD: 97)

Thus, the 'giving' of the question-worthy is a 'gift' which one no longer gives oneself, in the way that Dasein once supposedly gave Being to itself (cf. GA 26: 195)--a gift which it no longer assumes responsibility for sending on its own. For indeed, thinking does not endow itself with the way in which the matter in question is pursued (cf. WhD: 86). Interlocution gives way to the clearing in which thinking and the matter-to-be-thought persist, as the convocation by way of which the posing of the question of their appropriate belonging together is carried out: "... alles Denken und jedes Erscheinen des zu-Denkenden finden das Offene in das sie an- und zusammenkommen, nur dort, wo die Verwahrnis des

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271 A development in argument which hangs together with the later Heidegger's claim that ontological analysis fails to attain to the essence of authentic temporality. Cf. (ZSdD: 16, 24) and Chapter 5.
Bedenklichsten sich ereignet. Der Mensch be-wohnt nur die Verwahrnis dessen, was ihm zu
denken gibt. Der Mensch erzeugt die Verwahrnis nicht," (WhD: 97). In this way, thinking
remains carried by the conversation that brings the matter in question into relation to
oneself--a conversation that one thus, i.e., "in a manner of speaking," always already is (cf.
UzS: 266). This conception of one's correspondence to the matter in question Heidegger
inscribes into the hermeneutic structure of the saying (Spruch) relayed by the sixth fragment
of Parmenides, unto whom it had been also spoken (zugesprochen), and whose
correspondence likewise follows from a call to conversation (WhD: 108). It is a saying
which is said to lead one to the clearing of the essence of thinking (WhD: 129)--a saying by
way of which we are brought into the activity of questioning (WhD: 175).

Was heißt Denken? thus leaves its reader with competing conceptions of one's way
of correspondence to what calls thinking, each yielding disparate notions of how authenticity
happens, and of what follows from these considerations when the matter in question is
oneself--which, in fact, it does not fail to be for the later Heidegger (cf. UzS: 213-214),
insofar as one already finds oneself implicated in the question of what calls thinking in its
very posing (WhD: 152); insofar as the selfhood of self, i.e., the essence of identity, is what
remains at issue in the question's posing, brought to its expression in accordance with
mutual need (cf. WhD: 146). For indeed, it is first with respect to the naming of such need
by way of the discussion in which one's thinking is involved that the question of what calls
thinking lets itself be posed (cf. WhD: 146, 139). In this way, the question of what calls
thinking invokes further discussion on the essence of identity (cf. UzS: 213), as the question

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272 In Gadamer's words: "Gerade auf dem Wege über die Endlichkeit, die Partikularität unseres Seins . . . öffnet sich das unendliche Gespräch in Richtung auf die Wahrheit, das wir sind," Cf. Hans-Georg
Gadamer, "Die Universalität des hermeneutischen Problems," in Kleine Schriften I: Philosophie, Hermeneutik
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1967), 111.
of a calling which entrusts one to one's own essence in relegating its need for articulation (cf. *WhD*: 152). To this extent, the dimensions of the matter in question exceed the scope of even the most provisional and circumspect of clear-sighted thinking (cf. *WhD*: 161; *UzS*: 236-237)---a matter whose discursive endowment overcomes and overtakes one's own endeavors to undertake its questioning (*WhD*: 173); a matter which indeed first gives one to think of what one is given to remember, as the gift of a giving that gives one to oneself (cf. *ZSdD*: 16; *UzS*: 258). The following Chapter traces the resolution to the ambivalent tension peculiar to the conception of authenticity presented in *Was heißt Denken?*, with particular respect to its apex in Heidegger's reading of Georg Trakl in "Die Sprache im Gedicht" (1953)---a reading which constitutes the fulcrum on which Jacques Derrida's criticism turns, and for good reason. A defensible response to such criticism first follows from an account of the line of argument that emerges from Heidegger's reading of Stefan George in "Das Wesen der Sprache" (1957-58) and "Das Wort" (1958), after having revoked his claims regarding the authentic character of questioning carried out in the will to knowledge (cf. *UzS*: 100, 175; *GA 40*: 24). Once it is conceived as a structural feature of language (cf. *UzS*: 190), we arrive at a notion of authenticity that no longer depends first and foremost upon the voluntary exercise of one's own powers of thinking (cf. *UzS*: 261)---a claim of consequence for Heidegger's understanding of the historicity of self-knowing (cf. *UzS*: 264-267).
Chapter 4: Of the Ineffable Event: Self-Knowing in Authentic Correspondence

The previous chapter revealed a conception of authenticity in transition in *Was heißt Denken?*, a text whose insistent privileging of the existential modality of questioning (cf. *WhD*: 164) competes with an understanding of thought's appropriate relation to its matter conceived not in terms of one's willingness to pose the question of Being, but rather in terms of its linguistic determination (cf. *WhD*: 148), by way of which the matter in question is first brought to bear as such (cf. *WhD*: 110, 146). On the latter conception, the activity of questioning no longer signifies a *condition for*, but an *articulation of* a relation of correspondence in which one's thinking remains (cf. *UzS*: 180). These are indeed the consequences of Heidegger's eventual concession that *questioning* is not, in fact, the authentic gesture of thinking as once supposed (cf. *UzS*: 176). Its authentic gesture is said to consist in a *hearing* of what *lets-oneself-say* that into relation to which one's thinking is brought in accordance with the demands of the conversation it responds to (cf. *UzS*: 180, 255); to consist in a "letting-be-said" (*Sichsagenlassen*) what has been told, whose way of saying unfolds in, and as correspondence to the discursive happening of the inaugurating event in whose determination one's thought is thus involved, and to which one so belongs (cf. *UzS*: 264-267). This is to say that one is *called into* one's thinking relation to a matter whose proper articulation requires further discussion. On these terms, the figure of 'correspondence' (*Entsprechen*) no longer invokes a metontologically-founded behavioral imperative; an appeal to the fulfillment of a pre-determinate task to be undertaken in privileged modalities of thought. It rather invokes the way in which thinking is first *endowed* with its respective task (*Aufgabe "des" Denkens*)--how it is *given over* to the questioning of that into relation to which it is called (cf. *UzS*: 258-259). Insofar as this conceptual shift calls
into question the fundamental authority of the questioning attitude characteristic of thinking as heretofore construed (cf. UzS: 175; WhD: 136, 162), one can discern in Was heißt Denken? initial signs of impending revisions that render untenable the conception of authenticity to which commentators like Denis McManus and Thomas Sheehan subscribe—a notion of the authentic ostensibly measured by the "attention" (Achtung) that one dedicates to the pursuit of the question of Being; accomplished by virtue of the "respect" (Achtung) that one pays to the philosophical pietas of thinking qua questioning. In the interest of undermining the scope and significance of these revisions, Jacques Derrida's critical engagement with Heidegger is instead dedicated to demonstrating how they amount to no more than an appeal to a higher-order iteration of the question of Being, rendered a question of the proper—of propriating, and of propriation: (eigen, eignen, ereignen, Ereignis above all)—that the question's infinite legitimacy is, in fact, not suspended, but rather sustained by this other piety—this faith of Heidegger's in what is called an arché-originary event, to which one first and alone relates authentically when one undertakes of

274 Such might interpreted from a hermeneutic standpoint as an indication of the thinking traditions to which McManus and Sheehan belong. See also: ibid., 151-153.
279 Derrida, De l'esprit, 147.
280 Ibid., 152.
281 Ibid., 149.
one's own accord "to pay attention (achten)" to its call to correspondence, thus brought to expression.\(^282\)

\textit{On the Propriety of the Question Posed: Derrida's Heidegger on the Issue of Identity}

According to Derrida's critique of Heidegger's merely metastasized question of Being, the 'proper' of man only arrives when s/he acquiesces, consents, turns toward, i.e., betakes him/herself (se rend à) to the address of Being, which first properly becomes his/her own in such response.\(^283\) Man first authentically corresponds to this address when s/he lends a questioning ear to its call\(^284\)--i.e., only when s/he \textit{wants to hear} it;\(^285\) to listen to, and obey that which it ordains;\(^286\) to thus take upon him/herself such responsibility.\(^287\) These are the conditions on which one's thinking is said to maintain fidelity to itself; the terms on which it becomes what it allegedly should be.\(^288\) This \textit{will to the hearing} of one's address--this hearing in the authentic sense per Jacques Derrida\(^289\)--is read as the process of appropriation;\(^290\) of gathering and recollecting oneself toward what one supposedly already is.\(^291\) Appropriation is read in terms of a primal will for essence,\(^292\) which unrelentingly pursues the fulfillment of a nostalgic desire for return to the arche-original,\(^293\) achieved by the knowing struggle for the essential of those who choose to question \textit{(das Wählen des}

\begin{footnotes}
\item 283 Derrida, \textit{De l'esprit}, 154.
\item 284 Derrida, "Heidegger's Ear: Philopolemology \textit{(Geschlecht IV)}," 179.
\item 285 Ibid., 200.
\item 286 Ibid., 205.
\item 287 Ibid., 190.
\item 288 Derrida, \textit{De l'esprit}, 150-151.
\item 289 Derrida, "Heidegger's Ear: Philopolemology \textit{(Geschlecht IV)}," 188.
\item 290 Ibid., 180.
\item 291 Ibid., 203.
\item 292 Ibid., 199.
\item 293 Ibid., 212, 191.
\end{footnotes}
wissenden Kampfs der Fragenden). The questioning in which these spiritual elite engage is said to carry out, and so itself give rise to the question-worthy. For these few are identified as the destined representatives of a higher order, to which one first belongs when one obediently heeds its command--its behest to do what one already knows should be done; to be what one is, in principal, aware that one is; to strive in advance for what one must, in this way, ensure is brought to pass. Such questioning constitutes the authentic unfolding of an essential will to knowledge that Spirit's poetic holy vanguard preserves as its chosen functionaries.

On Derrida's reading of the voluntarism characteristic of Heidegger's work from the early 1930s--with reference to which all other texts are interpreted--authenticity remains a matter of one's own willingness to question; to hear with what is called "an interior ear" one's proper address. One is authentic when one willingly undertakes to correspond in questioning to what one fundamentally already knows that one is--the recourse to voluntarism here signifying that the return to one's essential "pure originary possibility" turns on one's own will to oneself; that it depends upon "us" to be us: to be thus what we are, and must be. Derrida intimates the implications of this position for the question concerning the activity of self-knowing when highlighting the following translated passages:

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294 Ibid., 201.
295 Ibid., 211.
296 Ibid., 174.
297 Ibid., 189.
298 Ibid., 190.
299 Ibid., 184.
300 Ibid., 210-211. Cf. Derrida, De l'esprit, 71.
301 Derrida, "Heidegger's Ear: Philopolemology (Geschlecht IV)," 199-200.
302 Ibid., 185.
304 Derrida, "Heidegger's Ear: Philopolemology (Geschlecht IV)," 203.
from Heidegger's 1933 rectoral address: "Do we, or do we not, will th[is] essence . . . ? It is up to us whether, and to what extent, we concern ourselves (uns bemühen) with self-examination (Selbstbesinnung) and self-assertion (Selbstbehauptung) not just casually, but penetrating to their very foundations." As Derrida suspects, this notion of the "foundations" of self-identity serves only to rhetorically substantiate a number of troubling, and most questionable "self"-assured assumptions, along with the militant ideological platform of self-assertion prescribed by the Nazi regime. Self-knowing here remains foremost an exercise in the empowerment of the practices of resolute self-examination (Selbstbesinnung)--the function of one's willing struggle for what one has, in fact, already asserted that one is, in deciding how one should be. For such is the grounding of self-identity as here construed--grounds whose abyssal depths only the penetrating ear of the clairvoyant few who struggle to secure the path of Germany's spiritual destiny may sound, and in whom the call of this destiny forcefully resounds, as the premier channels for the endowment of the essential, granting to those who follow their own proper force. In light of such ominously politicized essentialist concern for selfhood, Derrida is for his part concerned that the knowing struggle which it entails asserts in advance what "self" there is to be examined--a struggle whose "more originary" spiritual modalities are imperiously invoked as the ground-laying force for its authentic determination; for a struggle of this kind " . . . alone implants . . . that basic mood (Grundstimmung), which lets self-limiting self-assertion empower resolute self-examination to genuine auto-nomy."

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305 Ibid., 203.
306 Ibid., 193.
307 Ibid., 202.
308 Ibid., 201. Cf. Derrida, De l'esprit, 142-145.
309 Cf. Derrida, "Heidegger's Ear: Philopolemology (Geschlecht IV)," 203.
Heidegger's apparent Hegelian fixation on restoring simple unity to an essentially German "self" grown self-estranged; his insistence on voluntarist forms of self-affirmation, self-definition, and autonomy ultimately signifies that the self-rapport, the self-relation, the self-appropriation, the so-called authentic return to "self," passes through the opening of a struggle for what, in fact, indefinitely displaces itself from purview in the very self-reinforcing gesture of willing supposed by Heidegger to ensure its sense of identity--a sense of self that resists the oppositional logic of the will upon which the founding of its selfhood ostensibly turns. For there is, on Derrida's account, no arche-originary "self" to which one might return by virtue of one's will to correspondence; no pre-determinate path to its proper disclosure, whose discovery alone would permit, as it were, to see differently, at a given moment, its unique past which inscribes in it all the rest. There is, for Derrida, no tracing back the origin to its origin, whose unfolding he would sooner characterize in terms of the indeterminate undulating movement of a poetic discourse that "spaces itself across multiple undecidable differences," as David Farrell Krell has once described it.

It is the metaphysical presuppositions of all essentialist invocations of primal willing that Derrida endeavors to identify at various intervals in Heidegger's work, not least of all in the latter's final violent attempt at re-appropriating the vocabulary of Spirit in dialogue with the poetic work of Georg Trakl, presented in "Die Sprache im Gedicht" (1953)--the text

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312 Derrida, "Heidegger's Ear: Philopolemology (Geschlecht IV)," 203.
313 Derrida, De l'esprit, 150.
that first prompted Derrida's Geschlecht series,\(^\text{316}\) and that constitutes the primary axis on which his criticism turns. For indeed, the figure of correspondence that I have been tracing is perhaps nowhere so overdetermined by an existential imperative to betake oneself (se rendre à) to Spirit's address; to the arche-originary place of its gathering force,\(^\text{317}\) than it is in the context of Heidegger's inquiry into the proper place (Ort) of Trakl's poetry (UzS: 76)--a place whose emplacement (Erörterung) appears, to Derrida, pre-determined, prior to all of Heidegger's ensuing commentary (Erläuterung) (cf. UzS: 38).\(^\text{318}\) In this context, the thematic of call and response between the poetic personae of "stranger" and "friend" is invoked to engender a stark division between those who endeavor to hearken and follow the melodious sound of the stranger (UzS: 69), and those other decayed degenerates who do not (UzS: 49). Spiritual are the followers who hearken to the essence of Spirit (UzS: 58); these destined few,\(^\text{319}\) who are of its unborn lineage (UzS: 74), and who always take leave of the unspiritual (UzS: 72). Spiritual is what is of the mould of this Spirit (UzS: 66), and only those strange followers of the stranger have the right mould (UzS: 50). What is of the mould of this Spirit belongs to that which brings one upon the way back to the arche-originial (UzS: 66). Those who live otherwise--i.e., other than the stranger, whose otherness is of another kind (UzS: 50)--are not able to fulfill their essential determination (UzS: 62). They are, simply put, without way (UzS: 47)--divorced from the way of their essence (UzS: 50), upon which one first dwells in the express undertaking of originary correspondence to one's calling.\(^\text{320}\)


\(^{317}\) Cf. Derrida, De l'esprit, 175.


\(^{319}\) Cf. Derrida, "Heidegger's Ear: Philopolemology (Geschlecht IV)," 190.

\(^{320}\) Lingering evidence for this notion of correspondence is found in (GA 79: 71)--the proper context of an epigram that Derrida instead attributes to the essay on the question concerning technology, which first appears four years later. Cf. Derrida, "Heidegger's Hand (Geschlecht II)," 27.
And yet, there is clear evidence indicating that Heidegger has abandoned the position formulated in this text by the time that the presentations of the late 1950s are written, which take as their point of departure the notion that man dwells authentically in language (cf. UzS: 159), whether or not s/he betakes him/herself in thoughtful return to the place of his/her existential abode (cf. UzS: 190). These presentations suggest that none--not even those decayed and degenerate in Spirit--are without way; that "all is way" (UzS: 198); that every speaking of man, as the unfolding of a relation of correspondence, is authentic, insofar as it is appropriated in the saying of its inaugurating event, thus brought to expression (UzS: 264); that we indeed dwell in the discursive movement (Be-wëgung) of such appropriation for the length of our lives (zeitlebens) (UzS: 259, 261). Such claims may be read as following to its conclusion the deeper consideration of the essence of language that Heidegger announces at the end of Was heißt Denken? (cf. WhD: 148)--claims which are likewise anticipated by those which appear near the end of the opening essay of Unterwegs zur Sprache, "Die Sprache" (1950-51): that mortal speaking, as correspondence, must have heard its own calling (Geheiß) before all else (allem zuvor); that its every word speaks out of, and as such hearing; that mortals speak insofar as they hear, taking heed (achten auf) of what calls them to think with or without their knowing such, in this sense having followed the call already (UzS: 32), regardless of their own willingness to question what it invokes.

For the activity of questioning is always carried out in accordance with the needs peculiar to the discourse that calls it forth. This is to say that the domain and the aims of inquiry unfold as appropriate to the respective demands of discussion. According to this view, authenticity is rendered a structural feature of language--a concept invoked to characterize the hermeneutic transmission (Überlieferung, Tradierung) of the question-worthy. It organizes
the later Heidegger's argument to the extent that it allows him to problematize the world-historical determination of the matter-to-be-thought within those speaking traditions for which it remains in dispute (cf. *UzS*: 215-216)--a development of consequence for his thoughts on how the question of identity unfolds (cf. *UzS*: 213), and so for the issue of what "self" there is to be known.

Heidegger's volume *Unterwegs zur Sprache* thus presents its reader with the challenge of navigating between two conflicting accounts of what one's authentic relation to language consists in, which only arrive at a sense of resolution once it is made clear, in the course of his reading of Stefan George in "Das Wesen der Sprache" (1957-58) and "Das Wort" (1958), that the expressly undertaken return to the supposed origin of one's way of correspondence leaves empty-handed those who would seek there some final answer to the question of what addressing this issue calls for (cf. *UzS*: 225-227); that the origin to this origin, in fact, remains forever obscure, arising from nowhere in particular (*UzS*: 226), gathered and thereby singularly brought to its expression along the way (cf. *UzS*: 224). Indeed, these two presentations on George's poem "Das Wort"--which Derrida evades with belated footnotes, passing phrases, and dismissive gestures--serve to call into question the very forms of argument that Heidegger had himself employed during the early 1930s; forms which had periodically resurfaced in his reading of Georg Trakl. Their portrayal of the fateful encounter experienced by the poem's speaker--a poet whose unending tale involves his/her addressee in the naming of an originary relation to 'the Word' that s/he fails to define on his/her own--is hardly reconcilable with the poetic encounter portrayed in the 1933-34 seminar series on Hölderlin, which Derrida's explication of the figure of correspondence

refers to as evidence of Heidegger's tenacious fetish for the attainment of the arche-original (cf. *GA 39*: 194).\(^{322}\) In this context, the poetic speaker is distinguished by what is called his/her penetrating ear; by his/her manner of standing firmly by an origin whose authentic unfolding s/he alone hears in advance\(^ {323}\) -- an origin whose origin s/he thereby discovers, maintains, and so preserves. Although they fail to apply to Heidegger's reading of George, iterations of these forms of argument are, in fact, reprised in "Die Sprache im Gedicht," which speaks of correspondence to one's calling as arising from an authentic undergoing undertaken in poetic return to one's place of beginning (*UzS*: 79, 74). In the interest of reckoning with these disparities, and of charting the developmental trajectory of Heidegger's conception of authenticity, I engage, in what follows, in closer readings of the figure of correspondence as construed in his interpretations of Georg Trakl and Stefan George. Of particular importance will be the question concerning the "originary" character of the call to correspondence -- the question of whence, and in what way it issues, and so of one's way of belonging to the gathering movement of its address. This approach not only serves to acknowledge the strength of Derrida's criticism and the limits of Heidegger's often laborious and violent Trakl interpretation,\(^ {324}\) but also points toward how Heidegger might have taken this interpretation in a direction more consistent with the position that emerges from his reading of George, which Derrida must indeed downplay to reduce Heidegger's account of the dynamics of call and response in *Unterwegs zur Sprache* to an empty repetition of what he found unconvincing about the voluntarist rhetoric of *Sein und Zeit*\(^ {325}\) -- in particular, its appeal to a 'call-of-conscience' that one must *want* of one's own accord (whoever "one" is), if

\(^{322}\) Cf. Derrida, "Heidegger's Ear: Philopolemology (*Geschlecht* IV)," 185.

\(^{323}\) Ibid., 186.

\(^{324}\) Derrida, *De l'esprit*, 178.

one is to authentically engage oneself in correspondence.\footnote{Cf. Derrida, \textit{De l'esprit}, 151-154.} The chapter's closing speculations address what implications Heidegger's eventual position yields for the issue of the question of identity, i.e., for the way in which its questioning unfolds: in accordance with the demands of the discourse to which such questioning responds, bringing to its proper expression the matter in question in the course of conversation--a matter-to-be-thought whose identity is determined \textit{along the way}.

\textit{On the Strange Paths of Dark Decay: of the Wanderer's Proper Calling}

Insofar as it prepares the interpretation of Trakl that follows, the essay entitled "Die Sprache" (1950-51) presents an appropriate point of departure for addressing the developing tension in the conception of authenticity structuring Heidegger's account of the figure of correspondence in "Die Sprache im Gedicht" (1953). The essay is led by an investigation of the problem with which Heidegger's thoughts in \textit{Was heißt Denken?} are also ultimately confronted: the linguistic element of the historical unfolding of ontological difference (cf. \textit{WhD}: 126, 174-175; \textit{VuA}: 238-239)--a notion marked in this text by a term designed to reformulate the scope of what the transcendental analysis of \textit{Dasein} formally identified as its factical thrownness (\textit{Geworfenheit}). Signifying both the locus for, and the way of the disclosure of the domain of the intelligible (cf. \textit{UzS}: 25), this term, \textit{der Unter-Schied}, invokes what is called the self-appropriating movement of a relation of correspondence to a matter whose proper articulation no longer turns upon the will to recognize one's own involvement in its unfolding (cf. \textit{UzS}: 30, 32)--a matter brought to expression in the discursive determination of its coordinating world-thing relation (cf. \textit{UzS}: 22), whose respective instantiation the human subject called \textit{Dasein} was once said to assume.
responsibility for in and of itself, according to its capacity for primordial attunement to its ownmost way of Being-in-the-world. In contrast, Heidegger suggests in "Die Sprache" that mortal correspondence always remains attuned to theUnter-Schied, such that one essentially dwells in a gathering encounter with the speaking of language (UzS: 32), whose essence is said to consist in, and as the way in which this differential relation is carried out (cf. UzS: 28, 30, 25). The Unter-Schied is hereby identified as the dimension of all mortal dwelling (UzS: 25)—signifying the unique way that man singularly abides in language, in whose movement of "under-taking" s/he is brought to reside by way of its gathering call, toward which s/he always remains "under-way." And yet, Heidegger is at the same time, and from the outset of this essay, committed to the questionable premise that it is only in thoughtful pursuit (nachdenken der Sprache) of the speaking of language itself,\footnote{To invoke Heidegger's subsequent self-critical response to the confusions that this premise engenders: "... laufen wir nicht doch Gefahr, wenn wir ... [so] das Sprachwesen zu denken versuchen, daß wir die Sprache zu einem phantastischen, an sich bestehenden Wesen hinaufsteigern, das wir nirgendwo finden, solange wir nüchtern der Sprache nachsinnen?" (UzS: 255). Such worries have since entrenched themselves in the ever-growing canon of criticism on both Heidegger and Derrida alike. Cf. Richard Rorty, "Pragmatism and post-Nietzschean philosophy," in Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2: Essays on Heidegger and Others (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 3.} that we find our way into its essential domain—i.e., the region within, and out of which it may first speak its essence unto us (UzS: 12). His reading of Trakl's "Ein Winterabend" suggests, in a manner reminiscent of the Second Division of Sein und Zeit, that neither all, nor many, but rather only some—who silently endure the dark paths of their homeward passing, taking upon themselves a journey unto death—are summoned forth to, and so involved in preserving the place of its gathering call; indeed, that most are incapable of thus making their way toward the domain whence such calling resounds (UzS: 23). So it would seem, in contradiction to the position defended by Heidegger's subsequent presentations (cf. UzS: 215),\footnote{On such evidential basis, I concur with Hans-Georg Gadamer's assessment of the later Heidegger's rejection of his original theses on the ontological implications of authentic Dasein's resolute Being-towards-} that one
first belongs to the unfolding of the essence of language when one involves oneself in pursuit of the call to this nether-realm of its ultimate undertaking.\textsuperscript{329} And so this text--which in the end insists on the necessity of constantly examining one's own capacity for such authentic correspondence (UzS: 33)--leaves its reader with conflicting impressions as to the way of one's proper involvement in bringing to expression the call of language: to which one is said to belong, and which one cannot fail to hear insofar as one speaks (UzS: 33), but into appropriate relation with which one is nonetheless bidden to first bring oneself (UzS: 12). This ambiguity lays the grounds for Derrida's claim that, for Heidegger, the propriety of man does not arise except in such response\textsuperscript{330}--a response which, in the context of "Die Sprache im Gedicht," appears to consist in commending oneself to the Word of God (cf. UzS: 78-79), whose chosen spiritual representative we are thus called upon to follow (cf. UzS: 70-71). For here, it would seem that it is only in the expressly undertaken pursuit of this departed soul; only in wanting to hear, i.e., in hearkening to the sound of his solitary passing, that we become, and belong to the wandering few endowed with the essential (cf. UzS: 68, 46). Until then, we have not yet begun our journey (UzS: 52); one is not yet underway to oneself.

And so indeed, the distinction bestowed upon these wandering few orients the metonymic journey that is Heidegger's interpretation of Trakl in "Die Sprache im Gedicht."\textsuperscript{331} Such are the terms on which those suited for the so-called rounding unison of the self-sustaining--i.e., those soulful in Spirit who fulfill their essential determination (UzS: 62)--are singled out from those said to be in decay, who have fallen, and lose their essence...
These good servants of the flame of Spirit, who veritably suffer the agony of solitude (UzS: 65), are set off against the evil and hopelessly miserable, who merely bear the semblance of its all-enduring grace (UzS: 64). For the measure of the solitude distinguishing these wandering few is said to manifest in their departure from those who are without way (UzS: 67)–left to their own malice; those who stand not in the wind of the holy (UzS: 47). However, a closer reading of this text will find that the disharmony of this two-fold characterization (cf. UzS: 78), in fact, resonates in a way which Heidegger did not himself anticipate at the time, at a moment that resists the violence of his interpretive impositions, where he inadvertently undermines his own earlier claims--along with the premises on which his reading began--regarding the way of one's belonging to the wandering few (cf. UzS: 23, 46). It is a moment which proves to be of importance for Heidegger's eventual conception of the movement (Be-wêgung) proper to the dynamics of correspondence (cf. UzS: 260-266)--a moment whose consequence is drawn by his subsequent invocation of the Taoist mantra on the unity of good and evil: that all is way (UzS: 198).

The path of Heidegger's argument in this text develops in accordance with the oscillating undertones sustained in the rounding turns of call and response between stranger and friend (cf. UzS: 78). By assembling a few of the places where this correspondent calling reverberates--whether it resounds in the lunar voice of the sister (UzS: 49), in the ringing which those pursuing solitude encounter (UzS: 69), in the melodious sound of the stranger's haunting step (UzS: 69), or in the chill of spiritual night's holy azure (UzS: 70)--one can reconstruct the moment brought to expression in the hearing of this call (cf. UzS: 73), consider how it is heard, and identify who it is that thus follows, and dwells authentically in what Heidegger, invoking Trakl's color schematics, calls the ensouled crepuscular blueness
of spiritual night (UzS: 77). Insofar as these figures of correspondence register disparate intervals of the call's intonation, one can expect to perceive in them a measure of dissonance once read in concert. In keeping with the form maintained by Heidegger's own interpretive strategy, the passages to which they belong will be read in counterpoint with their related thematic variations. A principal leitmotif of this metonymic fugue on the dynamics of correspondence is accentuated by Heidegger's reading of the poem "Geistliche Dämmerung," which suggests that the ever-resounding intonation of the call is then heard when its addressee attempts to follow--an addressee who, in this case, assumes the brotherly form of the friend to the stranger, whose sister calls:

Die »mondene« Stimme der Schwester, die immer durch die geistliche Nacht tönt, hört der Bruder dann, wenn er in seinem Kahn, der noch ein »schwarzer« ist und kaum beglänzt vom Goldenen des Fremdlings, diesem auf nächtiger Weiherfahrt zu folgen versucht. Wenn Sterbliche dem in den Untergang gerufenen »Fremden«, d.h. jetzt dem Fremdling, nachwandern, gelangen sie selber ins Fremde, werden sie selbst Fremdlinge und Einsame. (UzS: 49)

Does the sound of such calling then go unheard before one follows? That the brother's nebulonous black vessel is hardly struck by the golden glistening of the stranger--i.e., before having traversed the starlit sky's nocturnal pond--gives one pause to wonder whether it remains nonetheless within earshot of the stranger's wake. But the remainder of the passage appears to reinforce the conditional sense of its first sentence, marked by the words "dann" and "wenn." Indeed, it is said that mortals themselves become, and so belong to the lonely few when they first wander after the stranger called. That is to say, one becomes lonely, if one wanders--for lonely is the way of the wandering. And yet, in another iteration of this thematic, it seems that it is rather such loneliness which first brings one upon the way of the wandering (UzS: 61); that the strange transposition befalling the lonely first gives way to the
place where their wandering comes to pass (UzS: 60). That is to say, one is brought to
wander, if one is lonely—for wandering is the way of the lonely. In such a roundabout way as
this, that from which the wandering of the lonely first follows remains itself obscure. Such
tension in phrasing is brought to a point when read in the context of further discussion on the
fraternity of the stranger's friend:

Dem heimsuchenden Wohllaut der Schritte des Fremdlings entspricht die
Einladung des Freundes zum Gespräch. Dessen Sagen ist das singende
Wandern den Fluß hinunter, das Folgen in den Untergang zur Bläue der
Nacht, die der Geist des Frühverstorbenen beseelt. In solchem Gespräch
schaut der singende Freund den Abgeschiedenen an. Durch sein Anschauen
wird er im Gegenblick dem Fremdling zum Bruder. Mit dem Fremdling
wandernd gelangt der Bruder zu dem stilleren Aufenthalt in der Frühe.
(UzS: 69)

Such is the fraternization of the lonely stranger's friend. This lonely one is beheld in
conversation, to which the friend invites the stranger, in correspondence to the melodious
sound that resounds in his haunting step. From this the reader gathers that it is in hearing
such melodious sound, that one corresponds; in correspondence, that one beholds; in
beholding, that one becomes the stranger's brethren. However, reading both of the above
passages in concert suggests what appears a most peculiar and disharmonious claim: that the
brother, i.e., the friend of the stranger, who, as his brethren, has heard the call (cf. UzS: 69),
has not, in fact, yet heard until he follows (cf. UzS: 49)—which he supposedly has, in his
belonging to such fraternity (cf. UzS: 69). For the brother is one who wanders with the
stranger (UzS: 69), and only those who follow become themselves strange wanderers (UzS:
68).

This polyphonic dissonance in the way that one is called into one's belonging to the
wandering reciprocates in formal imitation what is expressed in a passage which articulates
Heidegger's previous discourse on the stranger's brother. Here, his earlier claim—that one does not hear the call until one attempts to follow (UzS: 49)—assumes its complementary form:

Doch die Seele des Freundes, die »des weißen Magiers Märchen gerne lauscht«, kann nur dann dem Abgeschiedenen nachsingen, wenn dem Nachfolgenden die Abgeschiedenheit entgegenklingt, wenn der dort tönende Wohllaut läutet, »wenn«, wie es im »Abendlied« heißt, »dunkler Wohllaut die Seele heimsucht«. (UzS: 69)

In this case, the friend's prior readiness for pursuit; his endeavors to follow, i.e., to hearken after the stranger's departure (UzS: 68), appear to have little bearing on whether the latter's lonely call is heard. For here, it is said that the song of his pursuit in the rounds of the resounding ensues only when its ringing is encountered. Does one then not follow the sound of such calling before one hears? That the people who are called those who follow after (Nachfolgenden) are so named in advance of the ringing encountered which calls them forth, only sustains in internal variation the reciprocal movement of correspondence in which the resounding sound of such calling originates—movement that alone brings its characteristic dissonance to resolution. For if one grants that the following of a "hearkening after" hearkens to what has been heard, the above passages, when read in concert, give way to a claim whose structure reiterates in contraposition that which had at first appeared disharmonious, and without resolution: that those who follow after, i.e., those who first in following have heard the call (UzS: 49), have not, in fact, yet followed until they hear (UzS: 69)—which they supposedly have, in their belonging to the stranger's fraternity of followers (UzS: 68-69). This rounding movement of resolution transposes the conditional sense of what was initially heard in the word "wenn." When those pursuing solitude encounter the ringing of the call, is also the moment in the process when the intonation of its melodious
sound tolls. One hears the call \textit{when} the rounds of its melodious sound resound: and its intonation resonates forever throughout the spiritual night (UzS: 49).

According to this reading of the polyphonic dynamics sustaining the argument of "Die Sprache im Gedicht," the authenticity of the correspondent calling between stranger and friend consists in nothing other than the self-appropriating movement of its reciprocal structure, by way of which its interlocutors are first brought to their proper place in relation to the matter in question (cf. WhD: 110)--in this case, their relation to the divine (cf. UzS: 75). This is to say that the "originary" character of such correspondence is solely brought to its expression \textit{along the way}--i.e., by way of the ongoing hermeneutic exchange between stranger and friend, and between the texts in which they feature and each iteration of their readership. One can reconcile, from this perspective, what might otherwise be called the fatal equivocation on which Heidegger's interpretation in "Die Sprache im Gedicht" essentially turns: the question of whether one hears the call "because" one follows (cf. UzS: 49), or whether one follows the call "because" one hears (cf. UzS: 69). On such a reading, one hears the call in following it. One follows the call in hearing it. The call calls \textit{when} heard. It \textit{is} followed, with or without one's recognition (cf. UzS: 32), to a place which first unfolds in such correspondence to the resounding sound of its rounding turns, by way of

\footnote{A glimpse of Heidegger's preliminary efforts to articulate what he calls the "appropriative" character of this kind of co-determinant relation is found in his unpublished work on language from the 1940s, where he revokes the premises on which he once posited the fundamentality of Dasein's grounding mood: "Das Sein be-stimmt als Stimmung . . . . Das Be-stimmen der Stimmung ist kein Be-wirken und gar kein Ver-ursachen. Das Be-stimmen ist wirkungslos, weil wirkungsunbedürftig. Die Stimmung hat das Wesen der Er- eignung ins Eigene," (GA 74: 21).

Gadamer conceives this process in terms of the reciprocal movement characteristic of the phenomenon of play, which structures his account of the linguistic determination of the hermeneutic object and its performative element: "Der Spielraum, in dem das Spiel sich abspielt, wird gleichsam durch das Spiel selbst von innen her ausgemessen und begrenzt sich weit mehr durch die Ordnung, die die Spielbewegung bestimmt, als durch das, woran sie stößt, d.h. die Grenzen des freien Raumes, die die Bewegung von außen beschränken." Cf. Hans-Georg Gadamer, \textit{Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik} (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 112. See also: 387-409.}
which its calling forever reverberates, throughout the ensouled crepuscular blueness of spiritual night.

This is not, however, the path that Heidegger's argument eventually follows, nor the way in which such correspondence is invoked to bring the interpretation full circle. For indeed, Heidegger's essay on Trakl's verse had been from the outset an express undertaking in properly placing (Erörterung) its poetry (UzS: 37-38)--a process which Derrida is right to suspect of having taken place in advance, once and for all, for better and for worse, for the best and the worst. The essay consists in the emplacement of a place which has already been decided in its opening pages; a place whose locus the thinker has endeavored to determine for him/herself. In the process of this endeavor, Heidegger impresses upon Trakl a generic mark for what was, in fact, left unsaid in the unending metaphoric of call and response between stranger and friend (cf. UzS: 75), seeking once and for all to establish the domain, i.e., the range and metric of the annular movement to which their correspondence gives way. The dynamic potential developed in the course of the essay's first two parts is thus suppressed by the interpretive impositions of the so-called daring inquiry that initiates its conclusion (UzS: 76); an inquiry by way of which all is brought to the decisive end that its beginning had first promised (UzS: 39), and which, in this way, maintains what Derrida views as Heidegger's insistent privileging of the question--sustained by this other kind, this other genus and species of piety, whose questioning of the proper remains faithful to an originary promise. In this respect, it is fitting that the notion of piety is invoked to stabilize

335 Derrida, De l'esprit, 162.
336 Derrida, "Heidegger's Ear: Philopolemology (Geschlecht IV)," 216.
338 Ibid., 178.
339 Derrida, De l'esprit, 152.
the very precarious moment in the text where Heidegger undermines his own earlier claims regarding one's way of belonging to those who wander. The subsequent passage attests to his equivocations on an argument that he will not see through to the end until his reading of Stefan George. This passage, which prepares Heidegger's concluding line of inquiry, and which follows an account of solitude's essence, concerns the way that the ringing stillness of solitude resounds. It speaks of those who belong to the departed in bringing the melodious sound of the stranger's path to its spoken intonation; of the conditions of one's proper involvement in the invocation of its call; of those whose speaking, in belonging to this convocation, is said to sing. For their language is song--and such singing is called poetry:


Frömmer kennst du den Sinn der dunklen Jahre. . . . (UzS: 70-71)

In the poetic intonation of the lunar chill of spiritual night's holy azure resounds its melodious sound, whose ringing stillness emanates throughout everything one says, in silence and aloud. Such speech brings forth and so preserves what is essentially unspoken in its ways of being said, insofar as such speech, like all speaking which thinks the unsaid, consists before all else in the hearing of what first calls for this articulation. That is to say, this hearing precedes the endeavor to articulate what is solely brought to its proper
expression in such correspondent movement. It is a hearing which is called, in this way, into conveying what still remains to be said--into a saying which follows upon what has thus far been told, and so also withheld in its transmission; a hearing (Hören) thus drawn into and ultimately overtaken by (holt . . . ein) that which is said after (Nachsagen). However, this relation of correspondence, which presages the form that it assumes in Heidegger's subsequent presentations (cf. UzS: 215, 265), undergoes an unexplained inversion by the end of the passage, which reverts to invoking the piety of a poet whose more primordial way of conveying the unsaid (Nachsagen) is called into the hearing hitherto said to precede it (ins Hören gerufen)--a poet whose pious hearkening is thus endowed with the capacity to say unto him/herself the sense of what s/he alone knows in advance.340

The significance of this curious equivocation lies in the implications of the contradiction that it is meant to resolve, and that resides at the center of this passage, in the phrase: "Die mondene Kühle der heiligen Bläue der geistlichen Nacht durchtönt und durchscheint alles Schauen und Sagen." For this statement contradicts what was said in earlier discussion on the form of man against which the wandering have been continuously singled out--that so-called mould of man which stands not in the wind of the holy, and is therefore without way: "Die verweste Gestalt des Menschen ist der Marter des Sengenden und dem Stechenden des Dorns ausgeliefert. Ihre Wildheit ist nicht durchschienen von der Bläue," (UzS: 47). This discrepancy can only be reconciled if one grants that the decayed form of man, as the embodiment of evil and untruth, is without "say" in the way that the lunar chill of spiritual night's holy azure resounds--a claim which hardly withstands a closer

reading of the internal thematic of any one of the poems that Heidegger instead passes over
metonymically to confine the movement of their shifting signatures and polyphonic textures
to the progression prescribed by a singular, all-harmonizing tonic (cf. UzS: 78). For even a
cursory reading of Trakl's "Siebengesang des Todes"--the poem to which this contradiction
refers (cf. UzS: 46)--lends credence to Derrida's (and Krell's) reservations on the role that
Heidegger attributes to the embodiment of decay. To reiterate a question raised by Krell in
his notes to Derrida, and included in his marginalia to the latter's unpublished Geschlecht III:
"... may one ask whether the future essence of humanity implies an abandonment of the
corpse, the end of corruption? ... Why this displacement of corruption or dis-essencing
[Ver-wesung] in the Heideggerian text?"341 Why dispropriate the corpse of its way of
involvement? Indeed, at various intervals in "Siebengesang,"342 this corpse both embodies,
and is embodied by the figure of innocence and purity which it follows, and by whose
somnambulistic step it is pursued into moonlit descent--a reciprocal relation expressed in the
pan-chromatically mediated phrasing of their song of death. For it is a poem whose very
coherence turns upon its additive and complementary color schemes: its imagery of blue
subterranean streams, red wounded animals, and purple stars--the nocturnal eyes of a
wanderer borne by black vessel, whose silver tears weave what blankets the lush verdure of
the final resting place s/he shares with his/her slumbering fellow passenger of snow-white
lunar pallor. With reference to what external authority is this decayed form of man then so
decidedly "without way"? If, as Heidegger himself says, what is underway (unterwegs), i.e.,
amongst and in between ways, speaks always and at the same moment out of that from
which it takes leave (UzS: 74), then the decaying lonely and forsaken left are what a person

341 Krell, "Marginalia to Geschlecht III: Derrida on Heidegger on Trakl," 188.
"underway" could in no way be without: *a way*, neither nearer to, nor further away from the true path of its wandering than the early departed (cf. *UzS*: 70; *GA* 74: 46). As Heidegger retrospectively concedes: *all is way*, and in this way, belongs to what gives way to the wayfaring (*UzS*: 198).\(^\text{343}\)

But this is not what is inferred in "Die Sprache im Gedicht." Here, the one way that one is "underway" has already been determined, once and for all, before the journey retold in the correspondence between stranger and friend begins--a path that all must follow if they are to find their way whatsoever. Such is the way in which Heidegger retreats, in the passage above, from drawing the consequences of his own argument,\(^\text{344}\) at a most ambivalent moment which suggests that those other than the stranger are perhaps not quite so estranged from his otherness as they had first appeared. And so, the so-called wildness of the decayed mould of man holds only derivative meaning in the form of a negative definition (*UzS*: 47), in reference to that in whose way it has no proper say (cf. *UzS*: 70). For indeed, its evil Spirit is marked by a horrible stigma that forever displaces not only those whom it designates, but also their immediate progeny (*UzS*: 65), from their essential way (*UzS*: 50). These are, on Heidegger's reading, the ill-fated souls of damnation (*UzS*: 60-61), uninitiated to the path of the pious that finds redemption in the consoling promise of resurrection (*UzS*: 70-71, 79), subject to the martyrdom of a searing, but truthless pain that blinds them to their own malevolence (*UzS*: 47, 62, 60). They bear the destiny of those who have lost their way (*UzS*: 46), and belong not to the wayfaring, until their distant descendants yield in obedient

\(^{343}\) "Indes könnte der Tao der alles be-wëgende Weg sein, dasjenige woraus wir erst zu denken vermögen, was... Geist... eigentlich, d.h. aus ihrem eigenen Wesen her sagen möchten," (*UzS*: 198). It is worth reiterating here that Yin-Yang is indivisible in Taoist thought.

\(^{344}\) Thus holds for this juncture of "Die Sprache im Gedicht" what Heidegger later says when qualifying his theses on the piety of thought: "Es gehört zu den erregenden Erfahrungen des Denkens, daß es bisweilen die gerade erreichten Einblicke nicht zureichend überblickt und ihnen nicht auf die gemäße Weise nachkommt," (*UzS*: 175).
acquiescence to the one true path that leads to man's more matutinal rebirth (*UzS*: 66, 62, 57). In such a way, the seat of evil in man's decayed form is rent from the event of Spirit's unconcealment in the shining of its luminescence beheld (*UzS*: 62). For such pure and true beholding of Spirit's flame--by those who seek the stillness of the silent sound of its inspiring aspiration--is the manner of correspondence to which the speaking of God Himself calls man (*UzS*: 64-65, 79). Thus, is man most at one with the heart of the flame that God's Word spoke unto his/her innermost (*UzS*: 79); thus, is s/he brought nearest to the call's supposed origin in the sonorous radiance of His holy mandate, and so first properly involved in the way that Spirit's flame is brought to light (*sich Lichten*) (*UzS*: 44). On such terms, the mere degenerate excess of evil does not truly belong to the clearing's (*Lichtung*) way, i.e., to the flame's revelation--the unenlightening flicker of a flame whose golden light of truth does not shine upon man's decayed form (cf. *UzS*: 46, 57).

Such are Heidegger's ultimately unconvincing efforts to read Trakl in a way that wrests him from a traditional Christian thinking of Spirit (cf. *UzS*: 75-76)--a reading of questionable philological basis that falls apart once rent from its carefully constructed metonymic latticework; a reading that proposes what amounts to an absolute conception of the "origin" of good and evil. For it is, indeed, the "originary" character of the relation of correspondence between stranger and friend that remains at stake in this essay's equivocations--a relation whose "origins" appear, upon closer inspection, as obscure in the

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345 This exclusion of the condemned from the clearing is poorly reconciled with the sense of singularity peculiar to Heidegger's concept of appropriation: "Das Eine der Alles Eigene einenden und Nichts ausschließenden Einheit, das Ereignis, ist als das nicht abgesonderte, sondern vereignende Eine der Huld das alles wahrhende Einzige. Das Ereignis ist das all-ein Einzige; das einzig, das Wesen des ursprünglichen Einens bergende, Einzige. Das allein Einzige ist nie das Ausschließende und also Ausschließliche. Es ist das Einschließende . . . ist aber zugleich doch in einem wesenhaften Sinne ausschließlich; nämlich so, daß es in seiner weitenden Weile überhaupt nichts wesen lassen kann, wogegen es sich abzusetzen vermöchte," (*GA* 74: 54-55).

346 Cf. Derrida, *De l'esprit*, 178.
work of Georg Trakl as they are later said to be in the work of Stefan George (cf. *UzS*: 226); origins spaced across a chromatic continuum whose index of refraction is variously modulated at frequencies of disparate intervals to hold in flux the way in which darkness and light, good and evil, the mortal and the divine, the spiritual and the corporeal, perennially belong together.\textsuperscript{347} Such fluctuations synaesthetically complement what resonates throughout the diverse sonic registers of their polyphonic interplay,\textsuperscript{348} whose non-fundamental harmonics are muted and flattened out when Heidegger attempts to resolve the dissonance entailed in the correspondence between stranger and friend with reference to a simple fundamental frequency (cf. *UzS*: 78)—an all-grounding tonic, evoked in the name of "God" (*UzS*: 79). For Heidegger, in so many words, calls "God" something which, for Trakl, remains instead an ineffable, indefinite happening—a luminescent sheen of overtones reverberating between the verses of the stranger's and friend's rounding turns. Heidegger names "God" the absolute origin of their correspondent calling; "God," whose promise of rebirth calls them into such correspondence (*UzS*: 79), giving way to its reciprocal movement, "before and after all."\textsuperscript{349} It is those who piously betake themselves to "God"—in daring inquiry into the domain of the divine (*UzS*: 76); in the knowing struggle to hearken to His behest, which enflames the Spirit of both thinker and poet alike (*UzS*: 71)—that first engage themselves in authentic correspondence. It is those who willingly suffer the solitude of the lunar paths upon which those destined to serve as the vessel for His consoling "Word" set out (*UzS*: 78). Thus, one first belongs to the way in which the call to correspondence

\textsuperscript{347} To this extent, evil is, for Trakl, no more or less "true" than good. A thinking which convinces itself otherwise runs the risk of explaining away matters not properly discussed—a bad habit to which Heidegger notoriously succumbed more than once: (*GA* 79: 27). In this respect, his subsequent dialogue with Paul Celan appears significant.

\textsuperscript{348} Thus, different narrative perspectives are invoked to color the respective relation between stranger and friend. Cf. the kaleidoscopic presentation of the murder story retold by their rounds of song in the "Kaspar Hauser Lied": Trakl, *Das dichterische Werk*, 55-56.

\textsuperscript{349} Cf. Derrida, "Heidegger's Hand (*Geschlecht* II)," 52.
resounds; to the wandering endowed with their essential way, who strive in poetic return to
the horizon of life and death, searching for the origin of their address in the name of "God."
The proper of man, it would seem, does not arise except in such response\(^{350}\)--i.e., until s/he
undertakes to stand firmly by the place whence his/her originary calling is assigned,\(^{351}\)
attuned in his/her hearkening to the sound of its command. And yet, it is precisely this figure
of correspondence; this conception of the transformational moment of insight which marks
evil's return to stillness in Heidegger's reading of Trakl (cf. \textit{UzS}: 67), that his reading of
Stefan George's poem "Das Wort" will find insufficient. This poem's song is sung to retell
the story of one's wandering; of a journey to distant horizons--in this case, a voyage to the
well-spring of the currents that carry a seaborne wayfarer, underway in poetic return to an
origin \textit{without} determinate origin, or proper name. It is a story whose \textit{passing on} addresses
an originary relation which slips from the speaker's grasp in his/her endeavor to behold it for
him/herself-- \textit{withheld} in the very telling of the tale unto those who thereby share in his/her
experience.

\textit{Echoes of an Unspeakable Silence: Addressing What Remains Unsaid}

The developments in the conception of authenticity that I have been tracing are
inscribed into the ambiguous title of the text which follows upon, and draws conclusions
from Heidegger's interpretation of Stefan George: "Der Weg zur Sprache" (1959). For this
title appears, at first glance, to promise its reader a formula for arriving at one's proper
relation to language (\textit{UzS}: 243)--a relation whose authentic transformation had indeed once
turned upon one's willingness to betake oneself in thoughtful pursuit to the place whence its

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\(^{350}\) Derrida, \textit{De l'esprit}, 154.
calling resounds (cf. *UzS*: 12, 14), in fulfillment of the condition from which one’s true belonging to its essence supposedly followed. However, in the course of Heidegger's reading of Stefan George, this *condition for*, is instead understood as an *expression of* one’s authentic belonging (cf. *UzS*: 190-191); as an indication of the communicative structures which first render possible such an undertaking—a shift which is made explicit in 1959, when Heidegger speaks of how this conception of the 'way to language' has been transformed *along the way*. Henceforth, this 'way to language' no longer invokes the prescription of an existential imperative—nor does it merely, let alone foremost, designate rites of passage undergone by a thinking that strives to undertake its contemplation (*UzS*: 261). For the transformation (*Wandlung*) that such an undertaking, in fact, already entails no longer signifies an event first brought about of one’s own accord, by one’s own decision—founded upon the achievement of metontologically sanctioned modes of self-comportment (cf. *UzS*: 267). Nor does it consist in an isolated incident that one might inscribe upon the datelines of historical representation—an effect or consequence that one might trace back to a grounding cause, or circumscribe as coming to pass under certain conditions, accomplished at some particular time (*UzS*: 258; cf. *GA 74*: 5). Its way of happening has been long since *underway*; it always belongs, so to speak, to the very way in which the 'way to language' is walked (*gewandelt*): "Der Weg zur Sprache hat sich unterwegs gewandelt. Er hat sich aus unserem Tun in das ereignete Sprachwesen verlagert. Allein die Wandlung des Weges zur Sprache sieht nur für uns in der Rücksicht auf uns wie eine jetzt erst erfolgte Verlagerung aus. In Wahrheit hat der Weg zur Sprache schon immer seine einzige Ortschaft im Sprachwesen selbst," (*UzS*: 261). On such terms, the concept of authenticity is now invoked only to characterize the reciprocal relation of need that structures the discursive movement
(Be-wëgung) belonging to the speaking of language, by way of which a thinking taken to pondering its paths in pursuit becomes possible and necessary (UzS: 261, 264).

Heidegger's interpretation of Stefan George's work in "Das Wesen der Sprache" (1957-58) and "Das Wort" (1958) is thus dedicated to an account of the way that man's authentic belonging to the speaking of language holds him/her open to the possibility of a transformative experience of his/her relation to its unfolding--at a moment whose meaning, in this way, precedes and exceeds that which follows from his/her own involvement in its articulation, becoming only all the more momentous underway (UzS: 243). The momentum carrying this transformative moment thus consists in the very way in which the experience with language that it entails is brought to expression in correspondence between those with whom this happening is shared.352 Such is the argument emerging from Heidegger's reading of George's "Das Wort," which inscribes the very hermeneutic structure of the story retold by its speaker into the way that the transformative moment at issue is endowed with its proper significance. On such a reading, the transformation, carried out in the discursive movement of the story's ongoing transmission, is not, as Derrida suggests, something that first occurs very late on, at some pre-given moment of its narration.353 Indeed, insofar as the motif of the jewel that structures the poem's unfolding is read as George's unspoken word for 'the Word' (UzS: 192, 237), each word of the journey retold relates to the moment of its eventual withdrawal, invoking the transformation to which it thus gives way. In such a way, the poem's entirety--even where the jewel is still as yet unseen by the one by whom it is invoked--gives expression to what Heidegger calls the self-concealing essence of 'the Word'

352 An issue addressed in Heidegger's unpublished work on the conversational articulation of the moment: "Wie kommt der Augenblick zu momentum -- der Rück, der Stoß -- wessen?" (GA 74: 114; cf. 163).
353 Cf. Derrida, De l'esprit, 150.
(UzS: 236). That is to say, the moment's coherence is held together by the way in which the speaker's learning experience is brought to pass as the jewel is withheld, and so passed on; what happens before the jewel's abrupt disappearance belongs nonetheless to the way that such experience takes place (UzS: 170)--an experience which, so it is said, speaks throughout the poem's six preceding couplets (UzS: 170). For though the speaker's travels previous to the jewel's disappearance were in some way of another kind, the singular journey that lets him/her experience release in the face of the withdrawn remains, on Heidegger's account, the one and only journey (UzS: 224).

So it is that the course of the voyage affording the speaker his/her experience with the jewel, rich and subtle (UzS: 236), remains, in a way, the same throughout. Wherever his/her previous port of call, the speaker's calling brings him/her always and again to the edge of what s/he knows--before the so-called Norn, i.e., the old goddess of destiny (UzS: 225), who tends a wellspring of the great concealed stream whence and whither the waters that carry his/her craft of passage flow (UzS: 198). But the jewel's richness is not, in the end, something discovered by virtue of his/her endeavors to seek out the far away wonders of gods and dreams (UzS: 225). It said to be, in some mysterious way (UzS: 236), familiar to the speaker by the time that s/he betakes him/herself to the Norn's divine counsel--i.e., by the time that one engages oneself in addressing the manner of one's proper involvement with the jewel.\footnote{Contra: ibid., 154.} For it is, on Heidegger's account, proper to the way in which the speaker confronts this question that the jewel's richness has already reached him/her when s/he arrives at the issue of how it is called (UzS: 236). Secretly near, the jewel, rich and subtle, is always already in reach as the speaker's vessel makes its way to and fro, from swerve of
shore, to the furthest reaches of the familiar (UzS: 236). The unspoken origins of the jewel, gathered somewhere along the way, remain as obscure as its destiny, once it slips through the speaker's fingers (cf. UzS: 226, 236)—a destiny of which even the Norn knows not, nor what to say (cf. UzS: 219). But though it escapes the speaker's grasp when held by its edges, beheld at the edge of the world (UzS: 220, 227), the jewel remains at hand in being passed on to those to whom its unending story is told—still at hand when withheld in the naming of its many shining wonders (UzS: 220). For it is said that one would have no handle on even speaking of such matters (UzS: 161), had the jewel not, in its own, most peculiar way (UzS: 186), still brought itself to expression where left unsaid and kept unseen, in the first and last lines of the speaker's song (cf. UzS: 236). Such is its way of lying still in the palm of his/her hand on the brink of the unknown (UzS: 236); such is the manner in which this so-called jewel is always near, though its way of showing subtle, reaching far and wide (UzS: 236).356

This reading of the jewel's propinquity bears on one's understanding of the dimensions of the experience that it entails. For the moment of insight expressed in the tale of the speaker's experience of its self-concealment is not, on Heidegger's account, a revelation first brought underway once what refused to show itself again withdraws from view at the poem's end. Insofar as this word for 'the Word' is itself tacitly invoked in the expression of its eventual withdrawal, the moment of insight to which it thus gives way is underway throughout, and from the poem's beginning—entailed in the very telling of this tale, each utterance withholding a glimpse of the unfolding of what Gadamer, in related

356 For what Heidegger says elsewhere also holds here, in a manner of speaking: "Der Weg zum Nahen ist der weiteste," (GA 74: 180).
discussion on the essence of the word, calls its indeterminate openness,\textsuperscript{357} in which those to whom the tale is told partake. This is to say—in borrowing a turn of phrase withheld in Heidegger's earlier unpublished notes on 'the Word'—that we are always in, and speak out of this moment in which the conversation holds us (\textit{GA 74}: 114). Indeed, his interpretation of "Das Wort" makes manifestly clear that one's grasp on what remains withheld is not the condition for one's belonging to its way of being brought to light. Hence, the significance of his words regarding the "clearing of the withheld" in an unpublished chapter, entitled \textit{Die Wesung des Wortes}: "Die[se] Lichtung . . . west nicht als Eröffnung, in der und für die alsdann erst die Verweigerung das Eröffnete und gegenständlich Faßbare wäre . . . , sondern das Ganze dieser Nennung »Lichtung der Verweigerung« ist die Er-eignung des Er-eignisses (Die Verwindung in den Abschied.)," (\textit{GA 74}: 149). For this so-called 'clearing of the withheld' does not, as Derrida suggests, denote the point at which it is perceived "as such."\textsuperscript{358} In the context of Heidegger's reading of George, it is, rather, expressed in all that belongs to the way in which those who partake in its tale are brought before its site of eventual withdrawal; in all that points toward the place where such leave-taking takes place. To this extent, all that still remains unsaid between the lines, and between each iteration of the poem's story retold, gives expression to the way in which the word for 'the Word' withdraws (cf. \textit{UzS}: 253). The jewel's disappearance does not therefore designate the onset of the speaker's song—for this poem is said to be song, through and through (\textit{UzS}: 228). This word for 'the Word' invokes no more nor less, in such silent withdrawal, than a transposition of the song's arrangement that resonates with its each and every verse (cf. \textit{UzS}: 228). Its tale

\textsuperscript{357} Cf. his discussion of the essence of the word in its relation to the temporal problematic: Gadamer, "Über leere und erfüllte Zeit," 236.
\textsuperscript{358} An 'as such' (comme tel) whose fundamental significance in Heidegger's work from the late 1920s and early '30s Derrida is right to criticize. Cf. Derrida, \textit{De l'esprit}, 88-90, 108.
brings harmony to an unending melody \((melos)\) (cf. \textit{UzS}: 266)\textemdash--to a song thus transformed that, in its way, remains the same. Indeed, the poem's final line is the echo of a refrain in which its every word reverberates. "Die Schlußstrophe gibt die Weisung. So lernt ich traurig den verzicht: Wie denn? So, wie es die voraufgehenden sechs Strophen sagen," (\textit{UzS}: 224).

This understanding of the dimensions of the experience at issue transforms one's conception of what the 'way to language' signifies (\textit{UzS}: 261). No determinate beginning nor end to one's belonging to the unfolding of this event is here displayed, remaining unspoken in the stillness to which each telling of its tale, in turn, gives way. One might indeed say, that its way of being expressed \textit{already begins} in, and as its eventuation;\textsuperscript{359} that it is, in such a way, that the appropriative movement of this indeterminate inaugurating event unfolds in its perennial withdrawal (cf. \textit{UzS}: 262-263, 266-267; \textit{ZSdD}: 23)--which is to say, that \textit{it is}, in this way, as Heidegger suggests: "Der Weg ist ereignend," (\textit{UzS}: 261).\textsuperscript{360} To this extent, one always abides (\textit{wohnen}) in, and so belongs to the event's essential unfolding (\textit{UzS}: 264-266),\textsuperscript{361} in a way which one does not determine of one's own accord, as Heidegger once supposed. For one's involvement in the way that it is brought to its expression does not follow at one's discretion, but reponds to those who share in one's concerns. For these reasons, the figure of correspondence\textemdash--once represented in "Die Sprache im Gedicht" as an intradiegetic process--is inscribed into the very diegetic structure of the tale retold by the speaker of "Das Wort"; a tale whose telling holds interpretations of the jewel open to

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item\textsuperscript{359} Cf. (\textit{GA 74}: 54): "Das Ereignis beginnt ereignend und \textit{ist} der Beginn."
\item\textsuperscript{361} And so it is, "\ldots\ [dass] das Sich-heimisch-Machen in der Welt nie aufgehört hat, sich zu vollziehen \ldots. Ist nicht Sprache immer \ldots der Vollzug des Heimisch-Werdens in der Welt?" Cf. Gadamer, "Heidegger und die Sprache der Metaphysik," 219.
\end{enumerate}
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unending discussion. On Heidegger’s reading of George's poem, the unspoken word for 'the Word' holds no meaning other than that which is endowed in the retelling of the story that the speaker shares, by way of which its call to correspondence is addressed. The figure of correspondence therefore invokes not a means for first attaining, but rather the carrying out (Austrag) of one's authentic relation to a matter whose identity remains, in this way, at issue. Indeed, as Heidegger says in contemporaneous presentations on the essence of identity, "Der Mensch ist eigentlich dieser Bezug der Entsprechung, und er ist nur dies," (IuD: 18, cf. 8).

This is to say that the identity of the matter in question unfolds along the way, in the course of its interpretive transmission, brought to its proper expression in keeping with what still requires articulation, according to the correspondent parties that it implicates. Indeed, relations of identity of any kind are continuously shaped by those who are involved in their interpretation--no less when they are held at a distance in the interest of determining for oneself the significance of the issue at stake. Even one's own identity is, in the end, relinquished to those who participate in the preservation of one's memory. In these respects, there is no getting the last word on the word that designates one's "self": no willing its determination, nor knowing in advance what needs be asked or said to clarify its meaning (UzS: 265-266). For the 'self' is itself a problem that forever precedes and exceeds us—a question which, as it were, first overcomes one from behind. So it often seems the case: "Es stellt die Begrifflichkeit, aus der [man] fragt, selber in Frage. Man kann geradezu sagen: das philosophische Problem ist eine Frage, die man nicht zu 'stellen' weiß."362 Such an account of the reciprocal unfolding of this question leaves no room for unilateral impositions of the will which cut short the conversation that one always already is (cf. UzS: 266)363—an account

363 Cf. (GA 74: 135): "Das Gespräch ist Da-sein."
that Derrida himself truncates to assert Heidegger's insistence on a questioning of the proper for which one is supposed to assume sole responsibility. On Heidegger's eventual assessment of the authentic gesture of thought (cf. *UzS*: 176), one is called by those with whom one corresponds into one's questioning of the question-worthy matter that one remains--a question with which one is, oneself, endowed, and into relation to which one is first brought.

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Such were the ways in which Heidegger's discourses on the essence of language called into question his earlier appeals to voluntarist self-examination and assertion in characterizing *Dasein's* authentic relation to itself; discourses that conceptualize the linguistic determination of the propriety of the proper. It is, in this sense, appropriate that one address Heidegger's relation to the thinker with whom he remained in continuous discussion while coming to terms with his own position on these issues--a thinker whose apparent endorsement of voluntarism had motivated his endeavors to distance himself from a notion of authenticity construed in terms of the questioning undertaken in the interest of one's essential will to knowledge (cf. *GA 40*: 24). For it was, indeed, his dialogue with Nietzsche that led Heidegger to reconsider this understanding of one's self-critical relation--dialogue which gave way to a discursive conception of critique (cf. *WhD*: 121-122), exemplified in the many seminars and colloquia to which Heidegger would dedicate much of the remainder of his philosophical career (cf. *Z*: 100). At the same time, the exposition of

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365 This progression is unmistakably inscribed into Heidegger's notes on language and the essence of the word: "Nietzsche! → George," (*GA 74*: 129).

366 Cf. Derrida, *De l'esprit*, 71.
Nietzsche's problematization of the phenomena of willing in Chapters 1 and 2 has put us in the position to re-evaluate the criticisms that Heidegger presents, and to anticipate where the channels of conversation break down over the course of their decade-long confrontation, whose progression the following chapter will discuss.
Chapter 5: Authenticity Underway: Questioning Critique in Heidegger's Nietzsche

This chapter traces Nietzsche's role in the development of Heidegger's notion of authenticity, from its conception as the function of one's willed attunement to the practice of privileged modes of critical questioning (cf. GA 46: 179; GA 66: 47-48, 56, 63, 99), to its conception as a structural feature of thought's linguistic determination (cf. UzS: 190-191, 215, 254-255), in accordance with which the matter-to-be-thought is first brought to its expression (cf. UzS: 179-180), and by way of which one's involvement in its questioning is made possible and necessary (cf. UzS: 261). This development reflects Heidegger's reconsideration of the authentic gesture of thought in its relation to the historical unfolding of ontological difference (cf. UzS: 175-176; WhD: 126, 174-175). It bears on his understanding of the way in which the activity of criticism (krinein) maintaining such unfolding is manifest (cf. WhD: 121-122, 118); his understanding of the discursive determination of the need (chri) whose identity such critique articulates (cf. WhD: 110), in correspondence to its behest, thus carried out (cf. WhD: 126). These revisions to Heidegger's conception of the historicity of critical thought he carries out with Nietzsche's help, in the process of rethinking the scope of the temporal problematic--an issue which had from early on led the course of their confrontation (cf. GA 65: 85), and whose discussion gives way to the view of language that emerges for Heidegger (cf. UzS: 213-216; ZSdD: 16-17), but which features in the initial Nietzsche lectures (1936-40) only insofar as it allows Heidegger to inscribe his interlocutor into an extended narrative on the history of metaphysics from which he thereby prepares to take leave (cf. NI: 393-423; NII: 168-180). After identifying the stakes of their encounter and providing an overall sketch of its trajectory, the following account therefore takes as its point of departure the one lecture series that Heidegger left out
from his now canonical two-volume set on Nietzsche's work, on the peculiar grounds that "... it did not belong to his Aus-einander-setzung with Nietzsche 'the metaphysician',"367 as the others had: his lectures interpreting Nietzsche's second Unzeitgemässe Betrachtung: Vom Nutzen und Nachtheil der Historie für das Leben, presented in the winter of 1938-39. Opting for this approach not only allows one to prioritize attention on the specific problems Heidegger first sought to address by engaging with Nietzsche, and to not mire oneself too deeply in the often dubious philological strategies employed to ensure his philosophical failures.368 It also serves to respond to those who would refer to the Neske volumes as representative of the later Heidegger's argument in general,369 those who rely on them as principally defining for his interpretation of Nietzsche,370 along with those who accept and reassert what they criticize in the interest of radicalizing their intent371 --all of whom are forced into the precarious position of having to defend or rebuke this or the other philosophical position on what remain, in the end, Heidegger's terms alone, many of which he abandons in the succeeding years.372 This excluded lecture series provides a unique perspective on the monographs that Heidegger was concurrently drafting, and on what distinguishes their formulations regarding the notion of authenticity from those which emerge from his careful equivocations on the issue in Was heißt Denken? (Chapter 3, pp. 367 A response relayed to Wolfgang Müller-Lauter by Otto Pöggeler, who helped Heidegger publish the lectures from the late 1930s in 1961. Cf. Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, "Über die Stationen von Heideggers Weg mit Nietzsche," in Nietzsche-Interpretationen, Vol. 3: Heidegger und Nietzsche (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2000), 22.

368 With respect to the 1961 Neske volumes, one does well to bear in mind Müller-Lauter's words of warning: "Heideggers Auseinandersetzung mit Nietzsche bleibt auf Aspekte beschränkt, die für seine Konstruktion von Metaphysikgeschichte ergiebig sind," ibid., 32.

369 Cf. Paul Catanu, Heidegger's Nietzsche: Being and Becoming (Montreal: 8th House, 2010), 75.


118-127). In particular, the argument presented in the work directly prepared by these lectures, entitled *Besinnung* (1939)--which condemns Nietzsche's failure to fulfill an eschatological need for a form of high-philosophical critical questioning that wills its essential relation to the history of metaphysics thereby overcome (cf. *GA* 66: 53, 63-64)--will be juxtaposed to that which follows from Nietzsche's qualified re-vindication in *Was heißt Denken?* (cf. *WhD*: 23), where Heidegger proposes a discursive conception of critique that unfolds in correspondence to a relation of need whose determination resists the unilateral impositions characteristic of authoritarian decisionism (*WhD*: 108-110, 114-115, 121-122; cf. *W*: ix; *UzS*: 226-228). This account of Heidegger's confrontation with Nietzsche reconciles the conclusions that it eventually draws with certain crucial concerns which had first motivated their encounter, and which the former's monographs from the late 1930s and early '40s ultimately fail to address--concerns to which the revised form of the contemporaneous essay on "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes" (1936) testifies: regarding the displacement of control over the site of Being's poietic event from what had been the hegemonic grasp of the world-historical hero (cf. *UzS*: 236-238), whose authentic relation to its clearing had supposedly consisted in his/her unique capacity to attune him/herself (*sich bestimmen*) to destiny, in an act of *will* that *knows* in advance what is called for when responding to its demands. On the account that this chapter yields, the two thinkers' encounter gives way to a notion of authenticity whose linguistic determination (*Bestimmung*) transforms one's conception of the way in which such attunement (*Stimmung*)

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373 For commentary on what is identified as the beginnings of a new and more positive view of Nietzsche developed by Heidegger from 1951 on, cf. Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, "Das Willenwesen und der Übermensch," in *Nietzsche-Interpretationen, Vol. 3: Heidegger und Nietzsche* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2000), 117.

is brought to its expression (cf. *UzS*: 189, 202, 208), and the respective matter in question brought to pass (cf. *UzS*: 260, 265-266). According to this notion, critique is manifest in, and unfolds by way of correspondence--to a relation of need over which no single interlocutor holds sway.

*In Search of New Beginnings: Authentic Temporality and World-Historical Heroism*

Heidegger's appraisal of the thinker often called his true predecessor undergoes revision in the course of their confrontation.\(^{375}\) Indeed, Nietzsche goes from being the exemplar and willing harbinger of the onset of technological rationality in the lectures of the late 1930s, to the prophet of the dangerous devastation it threatened to bring about in the work of the early 1950s. But whether or not Nietzsche represented the consummation of metaphysical thought in Heidegger's world-historical account of the tradition, or above and beyond that, the so-called Übergänger who had pointed, if only vaguely, toward the inauguration of its new beginning,\(^{376}\) he had failed, in Heidegger's view, to grasp the dimensions of an issue whose proper exposition had likewise frustrated the completion of his own work on *Sein und Zeit* (cf. *ZSD*: 24, 58). It was an issue that Heidegger had sought to reformulate in several different vocabularies: as a question of Dasein's historicity in its relation to the sense of Being; or as a question of the epochal manifestation of thought's relation to Being as manifest in the history of metaphysics--i.e., a matter of conceiving the destinal unfolding of Being's ontological difference. All of these formulations led back to the problem of how man and Being belong together (cf. *IuD*: 28); of where man stood in

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relation to the clearing of Being (cf. W: 350, 354, 363); of his/her place in the appropriative event of meaning--his/her involvement in its way of determining the interplay between time and space themselves (cf. UzS: 214). At issue in such belonging together was the manner of time's "timing" (Zeitigung), i.e., the way in which its sense of temporality is manifest (cf. UzS: 213)--a question which Heidegger had from the beginning approached from the direction of a discussion of authenticity (cf. W: 332-333), but whose sufficient articulation had resisted the language of fundamental ontology (cf. W: 327-328).377

What these reservations entail--what more there is to time's temporality than is gleaned from an analysis of the activity of the human subject called Dasein,378 develops in the course of Heidegger's encounter with Nietzsche, along with what the notion of authenticity signifies. During the first years of Heidegger's explicit dialogue with Nietzsche in the late 1930s, the task of assuming an authentic relation to the sense of Being takes on world-historical proportions.379 According to the argument that Heidegger constructs at this precarious juncture of his oeuvre, it is no longer Dasein's fate, but rather that of the Occident itself which turns on a proper thinking of Being--a thinking which Nietzsche had sensed the need for, but was unable to bring to fruition. The inaugural moment of history that such thinking prepares is made the responsibility of the so-called few and seldom (cf. GA 65: 11-

20), on whom destiny called to usher in the next phase of Being's epochal sending\textsuperscript{380}--an historical mission reserved to figures of greatness (cf. \textit{GA 66}: 48), like Heidegger himself. Its accomplishment was the doing of high-cultural poets and thinkers--the leading representatives of Germany's spiritual prowess,\textsuperscript{381} capable of guiding the course of its fateful ascent to global hegemony. It was not until history itself had closed the book on this dark chapter of Heidegger's career that such visions of grandeur finally evaporated. As the prospects of his personally assuming the role of world-historical hero phased out of existence, so too were the arguments employed to validate the authenticity of the philosophical projects undertaken toward this end. Only in hindsight did it become clear to him what Gadamer endorses in the reading of Hölderlin that he presents during the early 1950s:

\begin{quote}
 Đà́ß der Mensch in sein wahres Wesen gelangt, kann nicht von einzelnen, weder von vorausdenkenden Denkern noch von vorausdichten Denkern, geleistet werden. . . . Đà́ß die Dichter mit den Denkern als Vorbereiter eines möglinden anderen Wohnens bezeichnet sind, meint nicht ihr Monopol. Entscheidend ist doch, daß die eigenste Möglichkeit des Menschen darin markiert wird, daß er »dichterisch wohnt« -- gerade auch, wenn er kein Dichter ist. Jeder Mensch wohnt dichterisch. (cf. \textit{VnA}: 189, 192)\textsuperscript{382}
\end{quote}

However, Nietzsche served not only as the springboard for the grandiose form that Heidegger's projects assumed during the course of the War. In the ensuing years, he remained Heidegger's guide along a path of thought that led from his high-philosophical account of the Occidental tradition to the line of argument emerging from his considerations


\textsuperscript{382} Cf. Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Gibt es auf Erden ein Maß?," in \textit{Gesammelte Werke, Vol. 3: Neuere Philosophie} (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1987), 344, 348. I sympathize with Gadamer's reading of the later Heidegger when he makes these claims in 1984, insofar as they hold for the form that Heidegger's project on language ultimately assumes. But a closer look at some of the more recently released works of the 1930s and early '40s renders this position untenable for much of what stems from the period. Cf. (\textit{GA 39}: 51-52) for a glimpse of the very different reading of Hölderlin that preceded Heidegger's explicit confrontation with Nietzsche.
on the essence of language, which ultimately call into question the figures of voluntarism and prescriptivism that had characterized his valorization of the conduct proper to the world-historical hero. In the course of his Auseinandersetzung with "Nietzsche's" metaphysics of the 'will to power', Heidegger distanced himself from a notion of authenticity that turned upon man's will to attune him/herself in self-critical questioning to the limits of his/her ownmost possibility (as in Angst, per Sein und Zeit)--or to the lingering absence manifest in Being's progressive epochal withdrawal (as in Verhaltenheit, per Beiträge zur Philosophie). The appeal to one's personal willingness to critically question one's appropriate belonging to Being, construed as the grounds of one's essential self-relation--whether the task was thought ontologically, in terms of one's 'wanting-to-have-a-conscience' (Gewissenhabenwollen, cf. SuZ: 288), or world-historically, in terms of one's 'will to mindful reflection' (Wille zur Besinnung, cf. GA 66: 153)--seemed, in the end, to distort the dimensions of the interpretive forces entailed in determining the propriety of the question posed. Endeavoring to substantiate one's authentic relation to Being with reference to grounding moods (Grundstimmungen) derived from hypotheses about the internal coherence of history made little sense to Heidegger in the context of his thoughts on language--identified as the groundless phenomenon that brings to expression the sense of movement proper to the interplay of time and space themselves (cf. UzS: 256, 213-214; WhD: 169). According to Heidegger's eventual assessment, the linguistic determination (Bestimmung) of the appropriate question does not, in any case, unfold at one's personal discretion, no more than does the respective matter-to-be-thought--which, for Heidegger, had changed along with the historical context, and his own view of his philosophical projects, as evinced by the following methodological claim: "... selbst das Begründen fällt ins Leere, wenn die Sache
Heidegger's later interpretation of Nietzsche launches his investigation of the essence of language in the early 1950s, at the same time that it marks the fragile beginnings of his problematization of the ontological privilege that he had long bestowed upon one's willingness to pose for oneself the grounding question (Grundfrage) of Being--a privilege maintained by the high-philosophical conception of critique that he proposes early on in the Auseinandersetzung--in response to a rather different version of "Nietzsche," as we shall see. Tracing the motivations for this problematization requires an orienting overview of the trajectory of their encounter. At stake throughout the discussion that follows this overview is the issue of how the need to which one's critical questioning responds is first determined--an issue whose reconsideration transforms Heidegger's conception of what the notion of authenticity entails.

*Reconstructing the Encounter: the Enigma of Life and the Crisis of Historical Decision*

In sketching its trajectory, it helps to have some idea of where Heidegger's engagement with Nietzsche ends up, and of what issues remain key points of contention throughout. This can be gleaned from the principle charges leveled at Nietzsche during the last few lectures of the first half of *Was heißt Denken?* At the end of the Stundenübergang that prepares the final lecture on the connection between Nietzsche's concept of Being (construed as 'primal willing') and his concept of time (construed as 'eternal recurrence'), Heidegger endeavors to situate Nietzsche's understanding of the temporal problematic in relation to his critique of the metaphysical tradition (cf. *WhD*: 78). According to this version
of Heidegger's Nietzsche, an authentic belonging together of time and Being first follows when the will assumes a modality in which it, as will, eternally wills the eternity of its willing--i.e., a modality in which it wills the eternity already manifest in the circular movement of its own activity (cf. *WhD*: 77). The will's alignment with such movement is conceived as a matter of recovering one's primordial attunement to Being--a task whose fulfillment brings the will to the heights of its power in coordination with the axis of time's eternal return (cf. *WhD*: 77). This reading hangs together with Heidegger's interpretation of what Nietzsche calls the spirit of revenge (*Geist der Rache*), which is said to gnash its teeth at the thought of recurrence, and whose overcoming supposedly turns on a proper thinking of the will that frees it for the vitality of its highest possible expression. This will, conceived as 'will to power', is, to Heidegger, synonymous with Nietzsche's concept of 'life' (cf. *VuA*: 100). And it is always with respect to this notion of 'life'; with respect to the question of its domain, measure, and accomplishment (cf. *GA 46*: 212), that Heidegger sees Nietzsche ensnared in a number of traditional philosophical *aporiai*. For Heidegger, Nietzsche's appeal to 'life' is at fault, whether the concept is interpreted--at the beginning of their encounter--as providing the basis for a radical *affirmation* of the metaphysics of subjectivity (cf. *GA 46*: 214), or--at the encounter's end--as something to be preserved *against* the dangerous consequences to which such subjectivism leads (cf. *VuA*: 118).

Before further pursuing this vital clue to the development of Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche, it is worth tarrying a bit longer near the end of their confrontation, to mention a few philological discrepancies concerning the former's

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383 For a review of how crucial the concept of 'life' had been to the early Heidegger's own work, cf. Rita Casale, "Die hermeneutische Phänomenologie als »Fröhliche Wissenschaft«," in *Heideggers Nietzsche: Geschichte einer Obsession* (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2010), 127-155.
understanding of the 'spirit of revenge'. Doing so gives one a clearer sense for the problems that Heidegger, despite his concessions to Nietzsche over the years, attempts to hold him responsible for until the end. In the context of his ruminations on who Zarathustra is, Heidegger reads Nietzsche's 'free-spiritedness' (Freigeisterei)—the so-called grounding characteristic of his thought—as his primary means for overcoming the 'spirit of revenge' (cf. VuA: 107). In the process, he flattens out a concept that undergoes substantial revision over time (cf. KSA 2: 15-21). In particular, Heidegger's reading effaces the moment, in the winter of 1882-83, where Nietzsche rejects his initial conception of what such 'free-spiritedness' entails, calling it yet another ascetic attempt to finally free oneself from morality: "Aber jetzt erkennen wir die Freigeisterei selber als Moral," (KSA 10: 234). From Nietzsche's point of view, achieving freedom from the spirit of revenge is neither a matter of discerning and adequately conforming to an extra-moral measure for judgment, as Heidegger suggests in 1938 (cf. GA 46: 330), nor a matter of finally wresting oneself free from the influence of any such metaphysical projection in the interest of 'life', as Heidegger suggests in 1953 (cf. VuA: 113).\footnote{There is reason to doubt that Nietzsche's 'spirit of revenge' is something from which one might ultimately free oneself whatsoever; Zarathustra himself acknowledges his own lust for revenge, hallowed only by the perpetuation of his struggle. Cf. (KSA 10: 200). See also: Bret W. Davis, \textit{Heidegger and the Will: On the Way to Gelassenheit} (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2007), 154-157.} Nietzsche's self-criticism regarding this concept testifies to his growing awareness of there being no neutral standpoint from which to gauge Christianity's destructive tendency to elevate the supersensual at the expense of the corporeal; that his own previous efforts to account for the existential conditions of 'life' in a way which bracketed out morality in the interest of its exaltation (Erhöhung) had, in fact, given rise to yet another metaphysical projection. These conceptual revisions allow Nietzsche to qualify, and retrospectively affirm \textit{Die fröhliche Wissenschaft}'s project (cf. KSA 3: 346), along with a notion of 'free-
spiritedness' that knows itself inescapably affected by what the dispassionate impartiality of natural-scientific analysis presumes to have extricated itself from: "... die Freigeisterei unserer Herrn Naturforscher und Physiologen ist in meinen Augen ein Spaass, -- ihnen fehlt die Leidenschaft in diesen Dingen, das Leiden an ihnen," (KSA 6: 174).

These developments are obscured when Heidegger de-contextualizes Nietzsche's notes on the Foreword to the second edition of Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, turning his self-criticism into an endorsement of the notion of 'free-spiritedness' left behind in the intervening years (cf. VuA: 117-118). To Nietzsche, the problem with his attempt to protect 'life' against the impositions of Christian morality lie in the fact that he had invoked an understanding of this concept whose sense derived from a "slavish" reaction to what it was to be protected against. The endeavor to preserve an hypostasized conception of 'life' issuing from a mere Platonic inversion Nietzsche identifies in the early 1880s as symptomatic of a Christian pathology with which he himself had been afflicted, and which he was unable to simply extirpate--in the interest of 'life' (cf. KSA 3: 178; KSA 5: 270; KSA 12: 169). But to Heidegger, certain conceptual problems follow wherever Nietzsche appeals to the concept, regardless of his ongoing efforts during the 1880s to genealogically problematize its meaning. The former's reading of the essence of time as eternal recurrence turns upon just such an hypostasized notion of 'life', and of the 'will' which gives expression to its vital force.\footnote{On this matter, I concur with the following rebuttal to the unified conception of 'will' that Heidegger imposes upon Nietzsche in his famous reading of §617 of Der Wille zur Macht: "Rache am Leben kann solches Aufprägen schon deshalb nicht besagen, weil Leben (und damit Werden) sich nur als Aufprägen im Kampf gegen andere Aufprägungen vollzieht. Den Willen zur Macht gibt es nach Nietzsche ohnehin nicht, sondern allein das Gegen- und Miteinander einer auch 'zahlenmäßig' sich ändernden, ständig sich wandelnden Vielheit von Machtwillen, die sich zu Einheiten organisieren und um des Kampfes willen ihre Einfachheit vortäuschen." Cf. Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, "Heidegger über Zarathustras 'Geist der Rache'," in Nietzsche- Interpretationen, Vol. 3: Heidegger und Nietzsche (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2000), 155.} The remainder of Nietzsche's oeuvre, from Die fröhliche Wissenschaft onward,
Heidegger views from the perspective of an exercise in creatively characterizing the person capable of properly thinking this heaviest thought of recurrence (cf. WhD: 46). All of Nietzsche's subsequent efforts to problematize the moral-historically contingent significance of this placing-holding concept called 'life' are thus banished to the same desert of which he had once warned (cf. WhD: 26; KSA 2: 15-17). 386

Insofar as Heidegger's critique of Nietzsche's stance on man's authentic relation to time remains, until the end, rooted in the latter's ostensible hypostatization of the notion of life, an approach to the development of their confrontation should take as its point of departure a text that makes the connection between these concepts its express concern. Beginning with Heidegger's lecture series on Nietzsche's second Unzeitgemässe Betrachtung: Vom Nutzen und Nachtheil der Historie für das Leben (1938) also affords one the opportunity to debunk a tenacious interpretation of their encounter which supposes that Heidegger goes along with "Nietzsche's" philosophical position until the writing of Nietzsche II (ca. 1939). 387 For these lectures make unequivocally clear that Nietzsche had no longer served as a model for Heidegger's work in the late 1930s in the way that he had when the latter was still willing, in 1925, to identify phenomenology with la gaya scienza. 388 Indeed, prior to the first lectures held in 1936-37, Nietzsche had been the motivating force behind Heidegger's revisions to his essay on the "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes" (cf. H: 1-74), whose final form, presented in Frankfurt (1936), abandoned the position defended by the version presented in Freiburg (1935), displacing the locus of Being's poietic event from

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388 Cf. Casale, "Die hermeneutische Phänomenologie als »Fröhliche Wissenschaft«," 125.
the creator-artist to the created-work.\textsuperscript{389} In the context of the monographs that emerge during the War, this displacement corresponds to a notion of man's authentic relation to time that follows in accordance with his/her attunement to the culmination of the history of Occidental thought in nihilism. The moment (Augenblick) of historical decision, oncedesignating Dasein's respective existential situation, now signifies the unique constellation in which the destiny of Being's conception currently finds itself (cf. GA 66: 338). It is, to the Heidegger of the late 1930s, an era of dire world-historical need from which 'Being itself' has withdrawn--a need which only the few and seldom determined to question the abyssal void left in its wake are capable of properly articulating (cf. GA 65: 12-13).

This stage on the path of Heidegger's methodological turn (Kehre) has become the paradigm within which contemporary criticism of his later work consistently remains.\textsuperscript{390} According to those most eager to consign him to the ranks of philosophical idealism, the pendulum has simply swung from one absolute measure (Dasein) to another (Sein). All that follows upon this thematic reversal is to be shrugged off as a reactionary political exercise in myth-building,\textsuperscript{391} ultimately terminating in the reclusion of private meditation on the

\textsuperscript{389} Tracy Colony sums up this shift in the following way: "In the Freiburg versions, the meaning of creation is equated with the capacity of historical Dasein to stand within the openness of originary temporality and project new possibilities from out of an engagement with its cultural inheritance. These versions retain an essential continuity with the meaning of Dasein in Heidegger's earlier fundamental ontology in that the event of creation remains a hermeneutic engagement with the past which turns within the openness of Dasein's ownmost power of transcendence. In the final version of Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, the locus of unconcealment is shifted beyond Dasein into the more primordial revealing and concealing of being itself. . . . the meaning of creation is rethought in terms of the creator's deeper dependence on an event of unconcealment which Dasein is no longer the ground for." Cf. Tracy Colony, "Time and the Work of Art: Reconsidering Heidegger's Auseinandersetzung with Nietzsche," 93.

\textsuperscript{390} "Es ist leicht, über Ungewohntes oder Gewaltsames zu spotten. Es besser machen, ist schwer." Cf. Gadamer, "Martin Heidegger," 211.

bidding of the Gods.\textsuperscript{392} From this perspective, it is, indeed, hard to see what purpose the Auseinandersetzung with Nietzsche served that it had not already accomplished before it began in 1936-37. Their encounter appears to have been a dead end--a subject for the remorseful mutterings of a man on his deathbed as to how "Nietzsche had broken him."\textsuperscript{393} However, this first step in his broadened understanding of man's involvement in the unfolding of the site of Being's poietic event marks neither the culmination of his thought, nor his final position on Nietzsche. As his reading of Stefan George's poem has shown (Chapter 4, pp. 153-161), even the God of destiny has no answers for the questioning of the speaker, despite his/her heroic return to the supposed origin of his/her calling; responsibility for its invocation is not, on Heidegger’s account in the late 1950s, to be simply deferred to some other-worldly authority. Indeed, one is already involved in the correspondence that gives expression to the calling of this call by the time that one arrives at the question of what way to address its behest (cf. \textit{UzS}: 236). The divine encounter which it relates is brought to its proper significance in the hermeneutic transmission of the speaker's story.\textsuperscript{394} "I[n diesem] Sagen selbst begab sich das Nahen des Gottes,” (\textit{UzS}: 219).

To show how the Auseinandersetzung with Nietzsche paves the way for an account of language that allows man and Being what Gadamer, following the later Heidegger, calls their reciprocal provocation,\textsuperscript{395} the remaining sections of this chapter trace the latter's reading of Nietzsche's second \textit{Unzeitgemässe Betrachtung}, through the implications that it

\textsuperscript{393} Weighty words allegedly uttered by Heidegger to his family shortly before his death, according to: Dostal, \textit{ibid.}, 261.
\textsuperscript{394} Cf. (\textit{GA} 74: 143): "Das »Gespräch« -- nicht als Unterhaltung und Zwiesprache zwischen festgestelltem »Ich« und »Du«, und dieses gar noch christlich als Mensch und Gott! Sondern \textit{Gespräch} als Wortbehütung und Verschweigung, Ereignung des Da als Entscheidungsspielraum des Inzwischen."
has for his contemporary work on Besinnung, to the position at which he arrives in Was heißt Denken? This progression yields a revised conception of the way in which the 'critical moment' in the unfolding of man's relation to Being is manifest and maintained. Which is to say, that Heidegger's understanding of the dimensions of historical decision (krinein)--of what is involved in determining how the critique of such krinein is carried out--develops in the course of his dialogue with Nietzsche. What was once construed as the responsibility of great poets and thinkers destined to substantiate the abyss of Being's epochal sending in the age of the world-picture (cf. GA 66: 48; H: 96-97) is, in the end, conceived in terms of the collision of speaking communities in need of understanding on the terms of their discussion--a need in response to which one's critical thought first authentically unfolds (cf. WhD: 110, 121-122; UzS: 261). For the moment, however, we turn to Heidegger on Nietzsche in 1938.

Untimely Zeitkritik: from Reflection as Will to Power, to Reflection as World-Historical Philosophy

The volume on Nietzsche's second Unzeitgemässe Betrachtung was written between lectures held on "Die ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen" (1937) and on "Der Wille zur Macht als Erkenntnis" (1939), and makes explicit much of what is programmatically asserted in the latter lectures regarding the relation of these concepts in the form of what Heidegger calls justice (Gerechtigkeit)--conceived as the highest expression of life (GA 46: 335); as the mode of the 'will to power' in which knowledge and creation unfold in a single iterative gesture, representing most purely the poietic character proper to the way of beings (cf. GA 46: 279). The fact that Heidegger, to explain this relation, draws on a text written several years before the thought of eternal recurrence had occurred to Nietzsche during the summer of 1881 does not appear to trouble him (cf. KSA 9: 494); here he claims that Nietzsche's later
conception of truth and its grounding in a metaphysical understanding of life's proper connection to history is already prepared for in the time of the Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen (GA 46: 116). 'Life' is said to function as the leading word for Nietzsche's meditation; its title serves to show that in an account of life and history, life constitutes the primary criterion (Maßstab) of judgment (Richten)--a concept made synonymous with critique (Kritik): "Bei ihm [Nietzsche] ist »Kritik« . . . gleichbedeutend mit »Richten«; und »Richten« ist wiederum nicht im Sinne des Aburteilens, sondern analog der griechischen Bedeutung des Wortes »κρίνειν« als »Unterscheiden« gemeint." (GA 46: 296). Heidegger thus reads the work as a call to the practice of critical history, which is, for his own current consideration as well as for the entirety of Nietzsche's work, identified as the central issue (GA 46: 294). The practice of critical history--for Nietzsche, its most necessary form (GA 46: 289)--is said to belong to life itself (GA 46: 350), but is undermined when an excess in other forms of historical knowledge (i.e., 'monumental' and 'antiquarian') ossifies their dynamic living relation. Critical history is thereby understood as the principal way in which the criteria for life's relation to history are set (GA 46: 297). According to this conception of its practice, 'life' represents, both, the act of measuring and the measure itself; that is to say, life constitutes the criterion for its own critique. On Heidegger's current account, this self-justifying understanding of 'life' has its sole basis in Nietzsche's alleged claim to knowledge of the absolute character of beings (GA 46: 339); in a notion of vitality, whose underlying concept of 'life' Nietzsche not only presupposes in the early years of his work, but which also remains unsubstantiated later on (GA 46: 346)--indeed, becoming still less worthy of question in the course of his philosophical development (GA 46: 214).
To Heidegger, this notion of life's vitality amounts to a mere projection on an objective measure, derived from an unfounded metaphysical presupposition. Nietzsche is interpreted as laying claim to knowledge of the higher essence of truth (GA 46: 144)--and so the task emerges for Heidegger to reconstruct from Nietzsche's notes a notion of 'justice', and of the judgment exercised in the practice of critical history, that is adequate to this higher essence; to the objectivity of its object. Nietzsche's naive belief in truth as adaequatio (GA 46: 196) is supposedly made evident when the objectivity to which such critical judgment strives is, yet again, identified as 'justice' (GA 46: 332)--which renders it a characterization not just of human life, but of life conceived as the totality of all beings:

"... das Leben als Ganzes des Seienden überhaupt stellt sich dar in der Gerechtigkeit... das Leben ist seinem Wesen nach in der Gerechtigkeit, und auf die Gerechtigkeit bezogen, die Gerechtigkeit gehört zum Seienden überhaupt," (GA 46: 335). Such higher justice is called the root of truth and the rooting ground of life as such (GA 46: 170). It is said that the "and" in the relation between truth and life, between life and history, is determined by nothing other than such justice (GA 46: 138). Heidegger's account of this double-meaning peculiar to the concept of 'life' (GA 46: 232)396 yields a Nietzschean formula for the subject-object relation whose basis 'life', as the totality of all beings, provides, but whose accomplishment (Vollzug) remains a function of human representation (cf. GA 46: 323). This is what Heidegger means when he claims that the Unzeitgemässe Betrachtung on history moves within the domain of life, takes it as measure for the evaluation, and seeks to effect its accomplishment (GA 46: 212). Within this paradigm, man is placed over and against the world, whose respective historical formation revolves around his/her (in-)adequate representation of its inherent properties (cf. GA 46: 168). It is entirely unclear how

such a reading might be reconciled with passages from Nietzsche's work like the following, which reiterates a realization first made in the context of his middle period: "Die[se] ganze Attitüde 'Mensch gegen Welt' . . . der Mensch als Werthmaass der Dinge, als Welten-Richter, der zuletzt das Dasein selbst auf seine Wagschalen legt . . . die ungeheurliche Abgeschmacktheit dieser Attitüde ist uns als solche zum Bewusstsein gekommen und verleidet, -- wir lachen schon, wenn wir 'Mensch und Welt' nebeneinander gestellt finden, getrennt durch die sublime Anmaassung des Wörtchens 'und'!" (KSA 3: 580-581). Heidegger nonetheless insists that the subjectivist world-view's attending philosophical aporiai are of no consequence to Nietzsche. On the basis of unpublished notes from the early 1870s (cf. GA 46: 326), Heidegger argues that Nietzsche only antagonizes Descartes so strongly and frequently throughout his work because Descartes is still not Cartesian enough for Nietzsche (GA 46: 197).

According to this notion of life's true relation to history, the very horizon of time's eternal recurrence (what Heidegger had once conceived as the unified sense of its ecstatic unfolding) turns on man's adequate thinking of beings in their totality (cf. GA 46: 212). And that thinking in which life itself presents itself in its highest vitality; that thinking deemed most adequate to its matter, is that of justice--of judgment, as passed in the genuine exercise of critical history: "... hierin erscheint und ist das Leben selbst in seinem höchsten Wesen," (GA 46: 182). 'Thinking' is conceived as a function of life (GA 46: 234). But justice, as manifest in man's adequate representation of the way of beings, is set apart as that way of thinking which first truly involves itself in life's essential unfolding, insofar as it sets the very conditions for the achievement of its highest and fullest expression (cf. GA 46: 181). For it belongs, on Heidegger's reading, to the movement of life itself, that it exceeds itself in
determining the criteria for its own flourishing (cf. *GA 46*: 21, 182). However, as that mode in which life realizes its highest form, the just practice of critical thinking is not of the sort universally exercised by all. Indeed, the alleged premise for the necessity of the second *Unzeitgemässe Betrachtung* is that a rift (*Riss*) in German culture, brought on by a distortion in the vital element of all forms of knowledge, has resulted in a weakening of those personalities capable of standing fast before the greatness manifest in the movement of history--those with the potential to set that broadest horizon for a culture's heightened transfiguration within which all perspectives move (*GA 46*: 314, 336). Justice, as it unfolds in the genuine practice of critical history, is said to spring forth from an essential knowing, of which great individuals (or the highest exemplars, as Nietzsche also calls them; the pinnacle and the aim of an historical people) are alone capable (*GA 46*: 336, 281). For the greatness of a people's history can only be recognized by the great (*GA 46*: 333), who, from their great heights, are said to achieve comprehensive insight, and to fulfill the grounding condition of justice, by reflecting on the genuine needs of a culture in the interest of its 'survival' (*GA 46*: 336). Justice is thus characterized as a mode of decisive knowing and insight (*GA 46*: 183)--as a peculiar form of ingeniositas (*GA 46*: 337), embodied by 'Overmen' (*Übermenschen*), who realize in themselves the highest possibilities of human being (*GA 46*: 283); who assume the highest form of 'will to power' when meting out in critical reflection the measure for the higher ascension of a cultural life-world. The basis for this line of argument is, again, an unpublished note from 1872, where Nietzsche, still very much in the throes of his Wagnerian *Artistenmetaphysik*, claims that the real history of a people unfolds as an unseen bridge from genius to genius (*GA 46*: 316).
The ingenious form of practice which the 'will to power' as justice assumes in critical reflection is identified as conforming to the *leading demand* that emerges from the text's consideration (*GA 46*: 231). But because Heidegger has already done much to hollow out the supposed grounds on which this imperative issues, he struggles (or makes much of his struggle) to show how Nietzsche could have arrived at such a conception of it. This incoherence is taken as evidence for the frailty of Nietzsche's philosophical point of departure ('life'), and for the necessity of reformulating the work's central issue ('critical history'). It seems not to occur to Heidegger that his difficulty in making sense of the task to which the meditation appeals might be the function of his need to construct a unified account of Nietzsche on the basis of a single essay and a few unpublished notes. Meanwhile, a slew of questions prepares the task for Heidegger's own contemporaneous project (*Besinnung*) in identifying the need for a higher-order form of critical reflection—one capable of responding to the prevailing trend of world-view (*Weltanschauung*) historicism that Nietzsche's views allegedly presage (*GA 46*: 64-65). These questions revolve around the so-called genuine needs of life, as discerned by the essential self-knowing of the subject involved in critical reflection (*GA 46*: 231):

The figure of inauthentic *Dasein*'s flight from anxiety here takes on world-historical proportions. Flight in the face of a conception of the 'right' and 'just' that follows from an authentic reflection on Being's history is tantamount to flight before the project then at hand for Heidegger (*Besinnung*). Avoiding the fateful need for this project only ushers in the twin threat of absolute subjectivity (reading nur in final clause of the passage above as "only") and empty relativism (reading nur as "merely"). That there are greater and lesser ways of doing justice to the matter at issue in such reflection, and that some genius may be the one to set the criteria on which such judgment is carried out, remains, for the moment, unchallenged. Here, the dispute turns on the proper manner of posing the question that such judgment must address (*GA* 46: 179). Heidegger thus accuses Nietzsche of omitting a reflection on 'justice' from the point of view of the *question of Being* (*GA* 46: 179). But unlike the form that this question assumes in *Sein und Zeit*, such reflection (*Besinnung*) concerns itself with the culmination of Being's history in Occidental nihilism; with what is called Being's progressive oblivion (*Seinsvergessenheit*), i.e., its abandonment (*Seinsverlassenheit*) of beings, whose machination (*Machenschaft*) in the higher service of 'life' has done naught but serve to justify animal-man's raid on them as a closed totality of power—a process said to bring the *subjectivism* of the *ego vivo* to its most radical completion (*GA* 46: 218).

According to the argument that Heidegger presents in 1938, the domain of historical decision brought to bear in world-historical reflection exceeds that which is revealed by an analysis of beings' respective relation to Being—whether the "true" nature of that relation is thought in terms of its adequate representation, or in terms of its authentic disclosure. There is, to this extent, more at stake in assuming one's proper involvement in the historical
unfolding of ontological difference than the potential for determining the structural totality of one's own Being-in-the-world (cf. *SuZ*: 326-327). Heidegger wants to widen the scope of the question concerning life's genuine relation to history--concerning man's authentic relation to time--beyond the realm of activity disclosed in one's personal confrontation with finitude, to include the broader happening of Being's epochal withdrawal in the history of Occidental thought, in the hopes that confronting the horror (*Erschrecken*) of Being's utter estrangement might (cf. *GA* 65: 14), as it were, tear man away from an animal understanding of his/her essence (*GA* 46: 218). 

"...[N]icht um ihn harmlos und bieder und befriedigt zu machen, aus dem Raubtier nur das Haustier . . . 


Such was Heidegger's position on what assuming the highest mode of historical existence demands. In reconsidering the measure for man's genius--for his/her authentic involvement in the world-historical decision on which the very fate of the Occident supposedly turned--he is brought before the fundamental task of conceptualizing a new understanding of philosophy. Like the practice of critical history described in Nietzsche's second *Unzeitgemässe Betrachtung*, the critical reflection carried out in the practice of world-historical philosophy is defined as a form of *Zeitkritik* (cf. *GA* 46: 295). But for Heidegger, this practice goes beyond the endeavor to think against one's own era (*GA* 46: 295). It is said to be a matter of the decision on metaphysics as such, to which a

consideration of what Nietzsche's hypotheses on 'life' had left unthought finds itself compelled (GA 46: 218). In considering critically the world-historical unfolding of the metaphysical tradition, it can be brought before an Auseinandersetzung with itself, and so be brought to knowledge of its own essence--indeed, such reflection is said to be in the position to think ahead and inaugurate the possibilities of its future (GA 46: 295). Here, the examination of Nietzsche's text reaches its limits: "Diese unsere Besinnung geht über den Rahmen der vorliegenden Schrift hinaus. Sie bestimmt die Art unserer Fragestellung ihr gegenüber und ist der Grund unserer kritischen Auseinandersetzung mit den Gedanken der Nietzsche'schen Philosophie überhaupt," (GA 46: 295-296). In turning to a notion of critique conceived in terms of Being's world-historical decision, Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche lays the ground for his own understanding of what the will to reflection (Wille zur Besinnung) entails (GA 66: 153).

Determining the Nature of Need: Besinnung on the Critique of Being's Conception

The first guide to reflection that Heidegger's lectures on the second Unzeitgemässe Betrachtung provide (GA 46: 7) prepares a conception of the onset (Anfang) of critical thinking--of the criteria for its authentic unfolding, and of the manifestation of the need to which its questioning responds (cf. GA 66: 53)--which conflicts with the form that it assumes in his work on language emerging at the end of his Auseinandersetzung with Nietzsche (cf. WhD: 121-122; UzS: 258-266). A closer reading of Heidegger's contemporaneous work on Besinnung (1939) demonstrates that the version of Nietzsche constructed in 1938-39 serves only to vindicate Heidegger's predilection for world-historical heroism by widening the scope, and raising the stakes of its undertaking--in the end, maintaining a notion of authenticity modeled on the critical insight of the high-cultural
genius, who presumes to take into his/her own hands responsibility for the determination of what counts as question-worthy.

The valorization of Heidegger's own project in this text knows only the bounds which it sets for itself. In keeping with his understanding of its authentic domain, measure, and accomplishment, world-historical reflection (seynsgeschichtliche Besinnung) grants unique privilege to a mode of philosophical questioning which, in the form of a now familiar 'will to essential knowing',\textsuperscript{398} lays the ground for a leap toward a new beginning for Occidental thought (GA 66: 63, 53). It is a privileging which follows from the notion of language developed in the monograph that preceded the drafting of Besinnung, where the essential unfolding of language is conceived in terms of the thinking of Being in which Heidegger was himself then engaged (cf. GA 65: 500-501). On such terms, the grounding critique carried out in the questioning of world-historical reflection paves the way for what Heidegger calls an essential 'saying of Being' (Sage des Seyns), which exposes man to the unspoken question-worthiness of his/her authentic relation to its epochal determination (GA 66: 48-49). Critique, so construed, is thus made the grounding condition for the proper saying of Being (cf. GA 66: 64); the essential reflection of great thinkers like Heidegger must, in this way, ground man's originary bondage (ursprüngliche Hörigkeit) to Being's word (GA 85: 5). These forms of argument amount to an appeal to the figures of high-culture to endow one's saying of the word of Being with its proper meaning, such that one's saying unfolds in accordance with their critique of its conception--an order of relations which Heidegger has inverted by 1952, when all 'critique' is said to first follow from a 'saying' of Being, in which one is involved by the speaking communities that one belongs to.

\textsuperscript{398} Derrida, De l'esprit, 71. Cf. (GA 40: 24).
(cf. *WhD*: 121-122). For the moment, however, Heidegger's conception of critique allows him retain principal authority over the proper determination of its criteria. His project is made to appear the manifest destiny of an eschatological myth of the fate of the Occident, which it alone substantiates (cf. *GA 66*: 50). For the course of Being's history is supposedly entrusted to the essential thinking practiced by the chosen functionaries of a transcendent authorial power whose call to action only they perceive (cf. *GA 66*: 46). It is these seldom few who truly measure up to the task of assuming an authentic relation to Being's destiny in the age of its utter abandonment (*Seinsverlassenheit*) of beings (*GA 66*: 59; cf. *GA 65*: 11-19); their involvement in the questioning of critical reflection functions as the pivot on which its epochal determination--and so the promise of a new era--fundamentally turns (cf. *GA 66*: 99, 60). Indeed, reflection itself, and so also philosophy, is said to belong always and only to these destined children of the future: "[den] Zukünftigen . . . [die] des harten Geschlechts [sind], das die Deutschen wieder in die Not ihres Wesens rettet," (*GA 66*: 61).

The following reading of Heidegger's project in *Besinnung* focuses on an early section of the work which encapsulates the line of argument followed by his world-historical critique of the metaphysical tradition. It bears the working title: "Die Philosophie (Selbstbesinnung: geschichtliche Auseinandersetzung; das seynsgeschichtliche Denken -- die Metaphysik)," (*GA 66*: 43). Nietzsche lurks throughout the section, wherever the notion of 'life' is invoked (cf. *GA 66*: 51-52), as the silent straw-man at which the examination repeatedly takes aim. His alleged failure to initiate a new beginning for philosophy with recourse to the concept of 'life' is used by Heidegger to designate the need to which his treatise responds (cf. *GA 66*: 67). According to Heidegger's current view, 'philosophy'--not

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yet abandoned to, and made synonymous with 'metaphysics' (cf. ZSdD: 61)--must think what it has thus far left unthought, and what it is said to be incapable of properly addressing when invoking the concept of 'life' to substantiate the Being of beings in their totality (GA 66: 67). Philosophy must think the epochal history of this ontological relation and its culmination in Occidental nihilism to inaugurate the future of Being's destiny. For the sort of 'thinking' that Heidegger--as opposed to "Nietzsche"--has in mind, it is not essential whether something of service to 'life' can be made out, or whether it is capable of establishing a system of guidelines for structuring and orienting the evaluative judgments on which 'life's' further enhancement depends (GA 66: 62-63): "... entscheidungsunwürdig ist, ob wir... im Besitz der Sicherung dieses »Lebens« [sind]," (GA 66: 45). It is, rather, only the highest measure--manifest in the deepest world-historical essence of philosophy itself, i.e., the epochal unfolding of Being's abyssal withdrawal--which provides an appropriate point of orientation for reflection amidst the spreading confusion characteristic of the era (GA 66: 65). All developments in philosophy thus far are gauged against the loftiness and inner necessity of Heidegger's current endeavor (cf. GA 66: 50). On such terms, he declares what is singularly de-cisive (ent-scheidend) for all attempts to do justice to this highest of measures; that which, indeed, first opens and initiates the singular decision on the future of Being's destiny: "... ob das Seyn selbst... zuvor in seine gegründete Wahrheit komme oder von der bloßen Wirklichkeit und Wirksamkeit des Seienden überschattet und übernachtet werde," (GA 66: 46).

However, the way in which such "de-cisive" grounding of Being's truth takes place remains itself decidedly ambiguous. On the one hand, Being, in whose historical unfolding man is always somehow implicated, supposedly decides for itself his/her involvement in the
grounding of its truth (GA 66: 46). On the other hand, Heidegger declares that Being demands of man a thinking which might serve as the onset (Anfang) for its historical renewal. The philosophical questioning practiced by this form of thinking is thus made requisite not only for the grounding of Being's truth, but for the possibility that it ever again finds presence in the open (GA 66: 47). In the reflection carried out by such questioning, man is said to venture out before him/herself, such that s/he comes into the truth of Being, taking him/herself into the essential transformation thus emerging from its historical renewal (GA 66: 48). This notion of reflection is identified as the very intonation (Anstimmung) of the grounding mood (Grundstimmung) of man that determines (bestimmt) his/her involvement in the grounding of Being's truth (GA 66: 49). To this extent, man him/herself shapes that which determines his/her own involvement. Indeed, his/her thinking of Being is what grounds the still undecided decision as to the grounding of its truth (GA 66: 56, 67). On such grounds, Heidegger insists, on the one hand, that 'philosophy', as carried out in reflection, is not to be construed as a merely human construct, but rather as a path of the history of the truth of Being, whose ground 'Being itself' first and authentically fathoms (GA 66: 64). On the other hand, because 'Being itself' is said to be philosophical in essence, Heidegger asserts that man must venture his/her thinking on 'philosophy', for in so doing s/he is entrusted to Being as the ground for his/her possible history (GA 66: 64). With respect to the issue of man's authentic involvement in Being's historical unfolding, the reader gleans from this argument that unique precedence is granted to his/her conformity to the demands of world-historical philosophy. The future history of man's belonging to Being turns on the accomplishment of their essential relation in a privileged mode of philosophical reflection that supposedly returns to Being its originary dignity (GA 66: 48), and to man the
mysterious question-worthiness of his/her humanity (GA 66: 55), which all (Nietzschean) reflection on the animal demands of 'life' fails to fathom (GA 66: 51). For 'philosophy' is 'grounding'--and the so-called "grounders" of this relation are supposedly those who, transforming the essence of Being, bring to the ground of truth's originary essence its way of essencing (GA 66: 60). Thus, the grounding critique of philosophical reflection is carried out on 'Being's' authority by a select few called upon to see though a decision of world-historical proportions on the appropriate measure for man's thought (GA 66: 64). This is to say that an authentic relation to Being's historical unfolding demands of man distinct modes of being of which most remain forever incapable.

Those named the seldom and lonely few capable of rising to such a challenge are not only privy to the conditions on which man is first opened to the domain of Being's world-historical decision (GA 66: 60-61): "Die[se] Gründer bestimmen die kaum faßbaren Anfangs- und Untergangszeiten wesentlicher Zeitalter," (GA 66: 60). Whereas the "Nietzschean" genius of the second Unzeitgemässe Betrachtung--the figure of justice damned to the peculiar fate of right judgment on the criteria of Germany's future greatness (GA 46: 337)--had sought only to recreate man's understanding of beings, these seldom lonely few ground the path toward a radically redefining new era for Occidental thought in re-conceptualizing the historical unfolding of the ontological relation that sustains them (GA 66: 67): "Schaffende . . . erneuern und vermehren je nur das Seiende. Jeder Gründer ist . . . auch ein Schaffender. Kein Schaffender ist schon ein Gründer," (GA 66: 60). Indeed, such grounding is identified as the highest honor paid to Being by those likened to its greatness when exposing themselves in question to the fundamental demand manifest in its progressive epochal withdrawal (GA 66: 48). Only the great, so Heidegger declares, possess
the power to carry out this grandiose mission (GA 66: 48): "Gleiches wird nur durch Gleiches in die Lichtung seines Wesens gehoben," (GA 66: 64). One's experience of the essential need (Wesensnot) to bring Being out of such concealment into the clearing of its essence therefore follows on the condition that one assume the exalted task of undertaking an authentic relation to its withdrawal in the critical questioning of world-historical reflection. One is thus first properly involved in what necessitates the necessity of Being's grounding: "... [seine] Verbergung [muß] nur erst zur Erfahrung und zum Eingeständnis gebracht werden ... durch das Loswerfen der Frage nach der Wahrheit des Seyns. ... Besinnung ist [so] die Nötigung in das Notwendige, das Seyn zu gründen," (GA 66: 59).

This is yet another order of relations to be inverted in the 1950s, when one's authentic involvement in Being's linguistic determination is identified as what first renders such an 'experience' of need, and the question concerning it, conceivable (cf. UzS: 159, 215). At this juncture, however, it is only for reflection, and for the will to its accomplishment (Wille zur Besinnung) that the transformation wrought by such experience may occur (cf. GA 66: 153).

Only in the questioning reflection ventured by the so-called 'thinkerly conception' (Erdenken) of its clearing is Being experienced in its decisive need (GA 66: 56). Only sometimes, Heidegger insists: only in the leap of essential questioning (in questioning after one's entrustment to Being, and after Being itself and its clearing) does man him/herself give rise to its abyss, and become, as Da-sein, the bridge for its passage into the open (GA 66: 99). Such is the singular task for thought assigned to 'Being's con-ception' (Er-denken des Seyns) as carried out in world-historical critique. Man must, in this way, let him/herself be brought to knowledge of Being (GA 66: 341), if s/he is to involve him/herself in the clearing of its future history. Hence, Heidegger's claim: "Dies Denken des Seyns ... stellt sich im

The fate of Occidental nihilism thus rides upon great individuals who willingly undertake the critical questioning of world-historical reflection to assimilate the chaos of Being's abyssal oblivation (Seinsvergessenheit) (GA 66: 102), in the fulfillment of a need for historical renewal of which only these seldom few know in advance. In light of these assertions, it is remarkable how much indeed Heidegger's project in Besinnung appears a higher-order iteration of the metaphysical Nietzschean foil devised early on in their encounter (cf. NI: 506-513, 573-575)—a strategy that lingers and resurfaces throughout his work in the 1940s, and that is explicitly rejected in his subsequent reconsiderations "Zur Frage nach der Bestimmung der Sache des Denkens," of which he says the following in 1965: "Es handelt sich weder um ein Überhöhen der Philosophie, gleichsam um eine transzendentale Fragestellung in der zweiten Potenz, noch handelt es sich um ein Tieferlegen der Fundamente der Philosophie im Sinne eines »Rückganges in den Grund der Metaphysik«," (GA 16: 632; cf. W: 365). For much had changed in Heidegger's understanding of the matter along the way—changes which led him to assert that the critical question concerning the matter for thought always and necessarily belongs to thinking (ZSdD: 61; UzS: 180). Indeed, the line of argument that Besinnung pursues regarding the issue of critique was withdrawn as Heidegger's dialogue with Nietzsche was brought to its conclusion. And it is in this respect that Was heißt Denken?, a work bridging Heidegger's express turn from Nietzsche to language, designates the onset of a critical transition in the former's oeuvre, where the question concerning the extent to which thought is, by necessity,
called into Being's historical decision (cf. WhD: 162) gives way to a discussion of its linguistic determination that transforms how one conceives of its authentic unfolding (cf. WhD: 108-110, 121-122; UzS: 261, 264)--developments to which the next section turns.

*One's Way of Saying the Same: the Discursive Singularity of Being's Event*

In an essay from 1986, Gadamer pauses in recollection of a personal encounter with Heidegger shortly before the presentations that he held in 1957 on identity and difference, which Gadamer reads as an essential landmark along Heidegger's path of thought. He recalls Heidegger's eager anticipation at the time: "Ich erinnere mich, wie er am Vorabend zu mir sagte, als wir uns verabschiedeten: »Ich bin gespannt, was morgen passiert.«“

Gadamer makes clear that it was not as though Heidegger assumed he would, by virtue of these presentations, effect a mass movement which would open the way for a transformed notion of thinking. According to his reading, what set this moment apart for Heidegger lay in his attempt to construe his own discussion of the essence of technology--an issue which his encounter with Nietzsche had brought to a point--not merely in terms of the culmination of Being's history, but in terms of his considerations on the linguistic determination of the essence of identity. The presentations served to forge a link between his critical account of the metaphysical tradition and his contemporaneous work on the so-called 'saying' (Sage) of identity (cf. UzS: 211-215), which had shed light upon the structures of interpretive transmission that had defined the questions addressed by his critical account. From the vantage point of this growing awareness of the peculiar hermeneutic conditions of his former philosophical project, the essence of technology no longer represented an issue whose critical examination world-historical reflection alone might properly carry out.

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400 Gadamer, "Der eine Weg Martin Heideggers," 428.
Though this means for checking its global repercussions had once been construed as the crux on which Being's manifest destiny turned, the technological era was now viewed as just one epoch amongst many in which the possible unfolding of new beginnings was, in fact, already underway. The essence of technology was, so Gadamer claims, to be thought merely as "the last presencing of Being" in a history without pre-determinate end. Responding to the demands that it entailed called not for some heroic act of abyssal thinking to provide the grounds on which Being's epochal obli viation might at last be reconciled, but for letting the matter lie where it did not serve to obstruct the free channels of discussion (cf. G: 22-23).

Heidegger himself registers the methodological significance of his presentations on identity and difference when remarking in retrospect: "Erst im Zurückdenken aus der vorliegenden Schrift und den hier angeführten Veröffentlichungen wird der Brief über den Humanismus (1947), der überall nur andeutend spricht, ein möglicher Anstoß zu einer Auseinandersetzung der Sache des Denkens," (IuD: 70). The Brief does, indeed, point toward these developments in argument when describing the historical structures that give shape to the endeavors of essential thinkers to bring to language Being's constant arrival in a perpetual saying of the same (W: 363). However, in this context, thought itself is still conceived as the grounding element of its linguistic relation to Being; it remains, so to speak, the ploughshare with which the saying of Being is brought to its proper fruition (W:

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401 For a closer look at the competing trends in the later Heidegger's argument that led to this position, cf. Ute Guzzoni, "Die unterschiedlichen Weisen der Besinnung," Der andere Heidegger: Überlegungen zu seinem späteren Denken (Freiburg: Karl Alber, 2009), 69-104.
403 Gadamer, "Der eine Weg Martin Heideggers," 428-429.
404 Contra: (WhD: 51): "Doch nur insofern der Mensch spricht, denkt er; nicht umgekehrt, wie die Metaphysik noch meint."
364). It is this notion of the *grounding* of thought's identical relation to Being that loses

ground in the course of Heidegger's presentations in the late 1950s. For it is said to adhere to

the conception of the essence of language which characterizes the tradition of metaphysics

that Heidegger now sees fit to leave to itself (cf. *IuD*: 61; *ZSdD*: 25).

By the time that he holds his presentations on the essence of language, there are, to

Heidegger, no 'deepest grounds' left for the essential thinker to seek in the interest of world-

historically substantiating its way of bringing to expression thought's authentic relation to

Being (cf. *GA 66*: 65). There is no 'highest measure' remaining in reference to which one

might lay to rest the conditions for their proper belonging together.405 No longer does one's

authentic belonging to the future of Being's history; to the so-called shepherds of its destiny

(*den Zukünftigen*) (*GA 66*: 61), turn upon one's willing leap of courage in measured restraint

(*Verhaltenheit*) before the dreadful abyss of Being's epochal withdrawal (*GA 65*: 395-396).

Heidegger recognizes in retrospect that all of these forms of argument had appealed to a 'will

to essential knowing' (cf. *GA 66*: 63-64) that presumed to establish for itself the matter-to-

be-thought in advance (cf. *UzS*: 100). They had all been unwitting demonstrations of his

inheritance of an insistent philosophical prejudice regarding the proper knowing of

knowledge. Indeed, when looking back upon the many dead ends to which his path of

thought was led astray, it appeared to Heidegger that even one who willingly betakes oneself

to the questioning of thought's relation to Being may, in fact, know least of all what it was

that moved him/her to concern him/herself with its proper determination (*W*: ix).406 Who

was he to say what the question's appropriate posing entailed (cf. *GA 46*: 213)? It seemed

\[405\] As Heidegger eventually admits, "... [so] fragen wir, nach Gründen suchend, am Sprachwesen

vorbei," (*UzS*: 256).

\[406\] These realizations are reminiscent of those yielded by Nietzsche's retrospective considerations in

the Foreword to *Zur Genealogie der Moral*. Cf. (*KSA 5*: 247-249).
more fitting to say that the appropriate questions had imposed themselves in accordance with the needs of the discussions in which he was already involved--many of which had pushed in conflicting directions, not all of them fruitful. In a way, one's questioning was itself, as Gadamer also suggests, more something suffered than done.\footnote{Gadamer, \emph{Wahrheit und Methode}, 372.} For the most part, one was, so to speak, swept up in the questioning of a matter which had overtaken one from behind by the time that one undertook to run forth (\emph{Vorlaufen}, per \emph{Sein und Zeit}), or leap out (\emph{Sprung}, per \emph{Beiträge zur Philosophie}) to meet it (\emph{W}: ix)--a matter for which one became responsible either way. To this extent, the question-worthiness of the identity of this matter remained the singular domain of all of one's express attempts to undertake its questioning (\emph{W}: ix; cf. \emph{WhD}: 113). Venturing out in question of the way that thought belongs to this abode merely aids in what Heidegger identifies in 1967 as thought's interminable efforts to situate one's proper relation to Being (\emph{W}: ix)--a relation to which one's questioning attests and which it articulates (cf. \emph{UzS}: 180), but whose \emph{grounding} it no longer effects (cf. \emph{SvG}: 86).

It is thought's grounding relation to Being that is called into question in the course of Heidegger's considerations on language, whose essence is likened to the ebbing, flooding tidal movement of the sea (cf. \emph{WhD}: 169); whose "grounds" shift and reconsolidate to meet the momentary needs of conversation, determined in accordance with the respective commitments of the parties they concern.\footnote{For an account of these developments in argument with respect to the implications that they hold for a theory of discourse, cf. Radomír Rozbroj, "Die 'Sprache des Wesens' als 'Ortschaft des Abschieds von Sein und Zeit'," in \emph{Gespräch: Die zwischenmenschliche Problematik im Spätwerk Heideggers} (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2008), 98-106.} This marks a significant departure from the early Heidegger's understanding of the essence of ground (cf. \emph{W}: 174), and its attending conception of \emph{Dasein}'s ownmost capacity to decide for itself the significance of its
commitments in the isolated reticence of its attunement to the grounding mood of Angst, which puts it into the position to carry out its Being in the manner that befits what most concerns it. It is clear just how far Heidegger is prepared to take the subjectivist prejudices of his fundamental ontology when—in the process of constructing his 'metaphysics of Dasein' in 1928 (cf. GA 26: 171, 175, 214, 239)—he asserts that existing Dasein gives Being to itself (GA 26: 195). If nothing else, such claims indicate a distinctly "Nietzschean" position underlying the sense of self-empowerment derived from authentic Dasein's anxious self-projection in the face of the overwhelming force (Übermacht) of destiny (cf. SuZ: 385). Properly addressing the issue of becoming the destiny that one was simply required a different order of questioning than Nietzsche had proposed (cf. SuZ: 145; KSA 6: 365-374)—a suggestion which had, in the end, only exacerbated the subjectivist "misinterpretations" of Sein und Zeit that Heidegger would later attribute to its fragmentary publication (cf. W: 327-328).

However, as he is presented in the first half of Was heißt Denken?, Nietzsche no longer merely serves in juxtaposition to what was retrospectively declared Sein und Zeit's genuine intentions, taken up by the series of monographs that Beiträge zur Philosophie and Besinnung introduce (cf. GA 65: 433-434; GA 66: 146). In this context, a more positive reception of Nietzsche prepares Heidegger's ultimate rejection of the conceptual premises on which Sein und Zeit's project had relied (cf. ZSdD: 24, 58), along with its understanding of authentic Dasein's grounding relation to Being. His reading paves the way for a notion of authenticity construed not in terms of a personally assumed existential modality or register

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of philosophy, especially attuned to the task of fathoming and heroically responding to the
needs of the world-historical moment--but in terms of a structural feature of language,
whose discursive movement unfolds in correspondence to the needs of the conversation at
hand. A review of the ways in which Heidegger here passes off onto Nietzsche what he finds
dissatisfying about Sein und Zeit's formulations will shed light on how the notion of
authenticity that emerges bears on his understanding of the dimensions of 'critique',
conceived as the unfolding of an ongoing linguistic happening, rather than something first
properly carried out in the voluntary undertaking of exceptional modes of Being. This
proves to be a crucial distinction for Heidegger's subsequent reading of Parmenides in the
latter half of Was heißt Denken?, which questions whether the 'needs' of such critique are
met by virtue of one's personal capacities for thought and speech, or whether it is more
fitting to think of thought's authentic relation to Being as being brought to language
according to the needs of discussion (cf. WhD: 106-110).

Discerning Nietzsche's contribution to these developments requires another look at
the interpretation that Heidegger presents in the opening half of Was heißt Denken? In this
case, the accomplishment of the will's most vital forms of expression no longer turns--as it
had in his reading of the second Unzeitgemässe Betrachtung--on its conformity to a
metaphysical measure derived from an hypothesis about the Being of beings, but rather,
from an hypothesis about the Being of its own being, i.e., following in accordance with its
conformity to the internal dynamics of willing that supposedly regulate the metabolism of its
essential life-force. My earlier discussion of this version of Heidegger's Nietzsche had
identified the terms on which an authentic belonging together of time and Being are first
established. It is made a matter of whether the will assumes a modality in which it, as will,
eternally wills the eternity of its willing--i.e., a mode in which it wills the eternity already manifest in the circular movement of its own activity (cf. WhD: 77). The will's alignment with such movement, and so also its 'freedom from revenge', turns upon its capacity to will what Nietzsche calls "it was--" (es war); its capacity to will "what was"--to will its repeated confrontation with what could not be otherwise, which here means not merely what lies behind it, as some discrete ontic occurrence, chronologically displaced by a number of days, hours, and minutes, but rather, what lies ontologically before it: the eternal recurrence of that very confrontation. Insofar as it wills the necessity of such repetition, the will is said to recover its primordial attunement to the 'way' of Being ('eternal recurrence') peculiar to 'what' it supposedly is ('will to power'). The will's will to itself is empowering to the extent that it appropriates precisely what exceeds its power for the purposes of its own actualization. Such is the way that the 'will to power' empowers its potential to determine for itself how "what was" will be. Within this paradigm, the krinein of critique is carried out according to the will's capacity to correspond to its intrinsic need to repeatedly transcend itself, and so, to retrieve what remains of itself in the course of its struggle with the eternal. This is to say that ontological difference unfolds in keeping with the will's voluntary attunement to what the internal dynamics of its relation to its own eternal return supposedly necessitate. In the spirit of freedom from revenge--which Heidegger calls the grounding characteristic of Nietzsche's thought (VuA: 107)--the will preserves its potential to assume the form most appropriate to the way of its own perpetual overcoming. This reflects the will's power to actualize its own deliverance from what might otherwise impede the transcendental movement peculiar to its primordial way of Being (cf. WhD: 43). In willing the necessity of such transcendence, the will is said to will itself as its own ground (WhD:
43)—as the grounds upon which the eternal task of its grounding is carried out. To this extent, the eternity manifest in its own transcendence can be made the very product of its willing (cf. WhD: 43).

This reading of Nietzsche—who was once the foil for Sein und Zeit's true, groundbreaking intent at the beginning of Heidegger's Auseinandersetzung with his nineteenth-century precursor—is employed to introduce an issue whose dimensions the transcendental analytic had failed to fathom: the historical unfolding of ontological difference (cf. WhD: 175, 135-136, 116; ZSdD: 25, 61). Heidegger addresses this issue in a discussion on the notion of 'need' that emerges from his interpretation of the Parmenides-Spruch relayed in the second half of Was heißt Denken?—a sense of 'need' whose identity is said to unfold in the linguistic determination of ontological difference (cf. WhD: 146, 148). In this context, need, as it pertains to the way of one's correspondence to the matter under discussion, no longer indicates the sort of relation in which the will need figure. This is a point made especially clear by Heidegger's emphasis on the paratactic character of the Spruch, reproduced as follows: χρὴ τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τ’ ἐδὼ ἔμεναι, (WhD: 111). On his account, when one reads the saying as it normally appears in translation in the form of a proposition--"Nötig ist zu sagen und zu denken, daß das Seiende ist«—it appears at most a statement on the fact that "beings are" (WhD: 105-106; cf. W: 122), and on how it behooves the subject to think about what that entails for him/her (cf. WhD: 132)—as though understanding it properly were a question of privately repeating this statement to oneself in

\footnote{As Gadamer likewise says of authentic conversation: "Je eigentlicher ein Gespräch ist, desto weniger liegt die Führung desselben in dem Willen des einen oder anderen Gesprächspartners. So ist das eigentliche Gespräch niemals das, was wir führen wollten. Vielmehr ist es im allgemeinen richtiger zu sagen, daß wir in ein Gespräch geraten, wenn nicht gar, daß wir uns in ein Gespräch verwickeln." Cf. Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, 387. See also: (WhD: 110).}
silent meditation on its significance.\(^{411}\) From this perspective, it would seem to follow that thought first enters its authentic relation to Being when the subject betakes him/herself to the task of questioning the sense in which his/her concerns bear upon him/her; when s/he wills the necessity of his/her encounter with the question of what this means; when s/he questions the significance of his/her own involvement in what demands his/her attention. 'Critique', so construed, appears to issue from the activity of the individual thinking subject (cf. \textit{WhD}: 114), in whose questioning the way of his/her relation to Being is brought to light.

However, for Heidegger's current consideration of 'need' (\textit{Gebrauch}), the perennial question-worthiness of how it is that this relation is brought to light is made the matter of inquiry itself (\textit{WhD}: 148). The issue of man's involvement in the question's posing is thereby called into question with respect to the saying of the matter with which such questioning is concerned. This bears on Heidegger's understanding of identity and difference as they appear in the saying of the \textit{Spruch}. Once rent from its grammatical latticing and read paratactically--"„Nötig: das Sagen so Denken auch: Seiendes: sein-„" (\textit{WhD}: 111)--all parts of the saying bear on one another mutually; each figures into the sense of its other as an iteration of its saying of the same. On this interpretation, 'critique' happens not according to the thinking subject's express attunement to its fundamental encounter with the demands of mortal existence, nor does it issue from Being's history itself, in the interest of world-historically substantiating its epochal withdrawal. For critique is not merely something which thinking "does" to align itself with Being, nor something which Being "does" to align thought with the course of its own destiny. Here, 'critique' is conceived as an ongoing linguistic process responsive to the demands of the respective event's discursive unfolding.

\(^{411}\) As suggested by the reading of the later Heidegger's conception of authentic thought defended by: Dostal, "Gadamer's relation to Heidegger and Phenomenology," 257.
Critique belongs to the determination of a relation of need singularly brought to its proper expression in the course of conversation. The entirety of the saying therefore speaks in the sense of such need (WhD: 116). This is to say that the χρη of "critique" is expressed in the saying's every word, with which it remains in an identical relation. This reading of the saying's structure is reiterated on the level of the argument that it prepares: clarity concerning the nature of such 'need' first follows with respect to all that its 'saying' includes (cf. WhD: 116).412 'Need' speaks throughout all that such 'saying' invokes (cf. WhD: 126) -- still, in that which speaks silently between the spoken words (WhD: 114). For the relation of need in which their "in-between" consists is essentially involved in the way that the respective manner of their grammatical belonging together is brought to bear. According to this line of argument, critique is thought neither in terms of the subject's decision (Entschlossenheit des Daseins) on the nature of the activity in which s/he is involved, nor in terms of Being's 'de-cision' (Ent-scheidung des Seyns) on the culmination of its history in Occidental nihilism. The authority on which the one's relation to its other issues does not originate in either (cf. WhD: 162), insofar as it is only in the discursive movement which gives way to the relation itself that some trace of an origin is left of which to speak. Thus, the question concerning the grounding characteristics of thought's authentic relation to Being becomes, instead, a linguistic consideration on how one already moves, as it were, in the midst of its shifting tidal swell (WhD: 169); on how one's involvement in the moment of its determination is already "at hand" by the time that one arrives at the question of what addressing the issue calls for (cf. WhD: 162; UzS: 226). It is for this reason that Heidegger is

412 Precursors to these claims are found in Heidegger's unpublished notes from the 1940s: "Das Ereignis ist . . . das wahrende Einen, worin die Eigentümlichkeit jedes Eigenen im Ereignis mit jedem Eigenen seine Einheit der Einigkeit hat. Das Eine der Alles Eigene einenden und Nichts ausschließenden Einheit, das Ereignis, ist . . . das alles wahrende Einzige . . . das all-ein Einzige," (GA 74: 54).
concerned to show, in the context of his interpretation of Stefan George's "Das Wort," how one's expressly undertaken return to the supposed origin of their originary relation--to the distant well-spring on the sea's horizon (UzS: 225)--will leave one "empty-handed" if one is looking for final answers (cf. UzS: 236; WhD: 136).

This reading of critique and its authority hangs together with Heidegger's emphasis on how Parmenides's Spruch on the essence of identity unfolds in discussion, as a saying handed down between interlocutors. This is evident from the way in which the fragmentary character of the saying is made to reflect its hermeneutic structure (cf. WhD: 105).

For its interpretation, it is crucial that the saying is passed on according to the respective needs of the speaking traditions for which its understanding remains an issue. The saying is "spoken unto" (zugespochen) Parmenides by one also once entrusted with its demands, and so on, indefinitely (WhD: 108). Particular stress is laid upon how the imperative entailed in the saying issues from neither speaker alone as the object of his/her imposition. And to suggest that this imperative somehow follows from the relation of ontological difference itself, as the deed of some historical meta-subject, Heidegger now finds equally crude (WhD: 132; cf. UzS: 255). For this reason, he takes care to leave the identity of the speaker of the saying undefined (cf. WhD: 108). In any case, it is made clear that the question concerning the identity of the one so involved in its transmission belongs together with the way in which thought is called into relation to its matter. To this extent, the question concerning one's proper involvement with respect to the issue of thought's behest presents not merely a task to be assumed by the individual inquirer. It remains, foremost, an expression of one's authentic

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414 "Wer ist dieses »Ich«? In jedem Fall ein heißendes Wesen, in jedem Fall ein Geheiß, das zum Denkenden spricht," (WhD: 108).
abode in language, belonging to the very way in which the matter in question is brought to bear (cf. UzS: 261-266); to the way it is endowed with the voice (Be-stimmung) of the peculiar speaking traditions for which it is at issue; to the singular way of its discursive determination. For it is due to one's authentic dwelling in language that an experience made with the issue may affect the way of one's own involvement in its questioning (cf. UzS: 159). This stance on the issue does nothing to undermine the need to question, but rather, points toward the manner of its discursive determination; it calls into question the notion that one is first authentically involved in the activity of questioning when it is made a matter of personal undertaking. So Gadamer, in keeping with the later Heidegger, also says of the question, ".... daß sie einem kommt, daß sie sich erhebt oder sich stellt -- viel eher als daß wir sie erheben oder stellen."\footnote{Gadamer, \textit{Wahrheit und Methode}, 372.} For this reading of Heidegger's later work, it makes the issue no less worthy of question that one's own involvement in the question's posing has always already begun. Nietzsche's way of saying the same is a question in its own right:

Hier sitzest du, unerbittlich wie meine Neubegier, die mich zu dir zwang: wohlan, Sphinx, ich bin ein Fragender, gleich dir: dieser Abgrund ist uns gemeinsam -- es wäre möglich, daß wir mit Einem Munde redeten?

\textit{Herbst 1881} (KSA 9: 622)
Chapter 6: Recapitulation

This concluding section recapitulates key developments in argument on the issue of the activity of self-knowing with reference to two later works that engage each thinker in a similar retrospective gesture: the second edition of Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (1887) and the Zollikoner Seminare (1959-72). These are moments where both Nietzsche and Heidegger revisit earlier texts with a clearer understanding of the motivating socio-historical forces entailed in being honest or authentic, and a critical perspective on what had been their respective endorsements of the 'will to truth' and the 'will-to-have-a-conscience' (cf. KSA 3: 352, 576-577; Z: 274) -- once conceived not as contingent expressions of, but as means for first effecting one's proper involvement in how such forces are brought to bear. For Nietzsche, this reassessment unfolds as a process of exposition: the addition of a fifth Book five years after the work's initial publication (1882), designed to explore the issues first addressed from the vantage point of the drive-psychological insights revealed over the intervening years (cf. KSA 3: 346-349, 578, 594-595). Heidegger's reassessment unfolds as a process of emendation: a re-appropriation of what, in Sein und Zeit, had withstood and remained amenable to his considerations on the essence of language (cf. Z: 171-172, 182-183); a tailoring of its project in the course of a series of seminars held in collaboration with Dr. Medard Boss and several other leading psychologists, psychiatrists, sociologists, and medics--seminars whose discussion of 'life's embodiment', in particular, sheds additional light on the often tenuous and equivocal progression of Heidegger's Nietzsche (cf. Z: 105, 292-294). This discussion serves as the segue to Nietzsche's exposition, which clarifies his own handling of the philosophical aporiai that Heidegger projects onto him to resolve for himself--a subject warranting additional space, to respond, if only indirectly, to a few of the
interpretive impositions registered by the preceding chapter. In the interest of demonstrating the interdisciplinary significance of the positions at which both thinkers arrive for current empirical research, and to acknowledge their respective decisions to engage the discourse of modern social science at the end of their careers, mutually illuminating parallels will be drawn in closing with recent work on the 'adaptive unconscious' by behavioral psychologist Timothy D. Wilson, and on cognitive- and neuro-scientific approaches to the 'biology of consciousness' by philosopher Alva Noë. These reciprocally reinforcing fields of inquiry attest to the need to leave the channels of conversation open on Nietzsche's and Heidegger's contribution to an understanding of the ways in which the activity of self-knowing remains always already more than a personal problem.

*Psychology in Zollikon and Ruta bei Genua*

In the process of sanitizing *Sein und Zeit's* project for the *Zollikoner Seminare*, much of what had led his contemporaries in the late 1920s and the '30s to interpret it as an exercise in existentialism, life-philosophy (cf. *GA 16*: 423), or indeed, as espousing a 'metaphysics of Dasein' (cf. *GA 26*: 171, 175, 214, 239), is forthrightly rejected, or excised from the itinerary altogether (cf. *Z*: 156). In this context, there is no talk of the authentic/inauthentic distinction and its corresponding fundamental modes of Being, whose determination had since proven otherwise than supposed (cf. *UzS*: 264, 266). The phenomenon of Angst now serves a merely heuristic purpose (cf. *Z*: 82), pointing toward the historical structures of situated understanding whose proper explication had demanded the deeper consideration of the essence of language eventually undertaken (cf. *Z*: 182-183). Heidegger's less than tacit deprecation of Gerede has been duly omitted. Accordingly, his former valorization of certain forms of behavior (of isolated, reticent reserve, e.g.) has been subdued and
moderated, divesting them of what had been their fundamental explanatory power (cf. Z: 126)--much as the phenomenon of resolute Being-toward-death had been in the interim (cf. UzS: 215). At this point, Heidegger does not claim to know, or to be able to formally indicate or analytically explain how space and time belong together in the clearing (Lichtung) of Being that the human subject called Dasein once supposedly was (cf. Z: 188; SuZ: 133)--to say nothing of the region to which this 'clearing' itself belongs (cf. GA 16: 631). An account of human subjectivity has also been excluded from the discussion (cf. Z: 151; SuZ: 24; W: 137-138)--along with the 'subject' of transcendence (cf. Z: 237), and the model of self-determination that this method yields when thought to its ultimate conclusion, from which Sein und Zeit, fragment of a book that it was, had shied away (cf. W: 327-328).

All is shunned that associates Heidegger's project with an endeavor to ground the unfolding of self-knowledge in a reflexive encounter with the ultimate conditions of one's ownmost possibility. A whole family of philosophemes and their attending hypotheses are now eschewed: an epistemological privileging of consummate self-presence, achieved by virtue of willing one's retrieval from the base sphere of public interpretedness--by turning "in" on oneself "toward" the horizons of what was thought to remain inalienably one's own, in the end. Likewise renounced is the notion of identity which follows from the suggestion that one could--if one only wanted to--hearken to the questions to which one's ownmost conscience called, and flee oneself no more--'running out', 'charging forth', 'setting out upon' oneself with relentless abandon (Z: 172), making oneself one's own in aligning oneself with what "one" supposedly was at the innermost. Such claims as these had given thinkers like Derrida reason to believe that behind Heidegger's critical stance on the axiomatics of the philosophy of consciousness there still lurked the "regulating norms of absolute intentional
meaning," whose metaphysical bulwarks were only revealed by another "protocol of reading" that took into account the "unconscious" presuppositions of the analytic.\textsuperscript{416} By 1965 Heidegger has, however, recognized that one cannot begin without history in the interest of consequently making sense of it (cf. \textit{Z}: 45); even the purely formal hypostatization of one's thrownness (\textit{Geworfenheit}) for the preliminary purposes of fundamental-analysis had made wide-ranging presumptions that one could only assume so long as one's sense of history was thought to be, first and foremost, a personal problem.\textsuperscript{417} It appears, for such reasons, more than a passing methodological musing of Heidegger's when he suggests that it is only in conversation with tradition that the appropriate questions clarify themselves: "Nur im Gespräch mit der Überlieferung klären sich die Fragen, wird der Willkür Einhalt geboten," (\textit{Z}: 45). His reconsideration of the grounding character of the self-conscious will to question had brought him to the realization that other forms and protocols of thinking were called for in addressing the motivating forces of inquiry (cf. \textit{SvG}: 7, 83-84; \textit{UzS}: 180, 256)--forms that allowed one to factor in from the start the hermeneutic structures entailed in self-criticism. 'Critique' is now conceived as something practiced conversationally and collectively (\textit{Z}: 100). Correspondingly, one is said to arrive at a sense of the self's sameness not by virtue of one's reflexive explication of the identical; in truth, an understanding of the identically same is learned through language (\textit{Z}: 171).

The medium of Heidegger's seminars and of his correspondences with Medard Boss plays well into his simultaneous efforts to avoid certain confusions that had followed from


Sein und Zeit's isolationist rhetoric, and from the forms of argument employed by his work on Unterwegs zur Sprache--which appeared, to some, to fantastically invoke an aggrandized and disembodied entity called "Language" whose understanding only the soothsaying of some hermetic "Wizard Merlin" might achieve (cf. UzS: 255-256). The Zollikoner Seminare, however, give special attention to the essentially world-involving embodiment of all linguistic practice; the embodied expression of language in lived experience is here identified as a constantly determining factor in the disclosure of one's world-relation. This is to say that if hearing, speaking, language in general is always also a bodily phenomenon (Z: 126), then it is not merely so in the passive, hypostasized sense of the 'body' as a sensory receptacle for external acoustic events. One is said to arrive at a sense of one's own body in response to the diverse forms of communicative practice that shape its involvement in determining the domain of its intelligible interpretation (cf. Z: 294). This problem of the 'body' (Leib), and its relation to the interpretive processes of life had, in fact, always been a pivotal thematic in Heidegger's work. It had served as a key point of contention in distinguishing his position from Nietzsche's during the early years of the Auseinandersetzung: the entire category of concepts to which it belonged (Leib, Leiben, Leben, Erlebnis) was, at the time, to be avoided altogether (cf. GA 85: 36, 75, 173; GA 66: 140)-- contaminated as it was by the Nietzschean metaphysics of 'life' that Heidegger had then constructed. The following years would bring an end to this moratorium on discussion of the 'body'. By the time of the Zollikoner Seminare, Heidegger no longer faults Nietzsche with having taken recourse to the concept--only with having gotten it wrong (Z: 105). He had, on Heidegger's account, posited 'life' as the subject of such embodiment in the interest

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of substantiating the self-reflexive movement of its will to transcend the respective domain of its finite potential. When further pressed on the issue raised by Jean-Paul Sartre as to why Heidegger had himself only dedicated six lines in *Sein und Zeit* to the question of life's embodiment, Heidegger apologetically admits that he had, at the time, not known what else to say (*Z*: 292).\(^1\) One thing, however, had since become clear: one could not simply posit, as he had done in 1921,\(^2\) the fundamental subject (*Dasein*) from which a regional ontology of the body first followed in the interest of substantiating its unique capacity to will its attunement to the necessity of its own transcendence. Attempting to account for the body's role in how the 'life' of the 'mind' unfolds by appealing to the ontological priority of either one of these concepts had consistently culminated in a methodological impasse. Arriving at an understanding of what these notions entailed was itself an embodied process.

In the context of the *Zollikoner Seminare*, the 'body' is associated with a list of other tropes (the 'subject', the 'person', the 'I') that resist determinate conceptualization. These are tropes, so Heidegger insists, which all psychology to date has hypostasized, and fixed within its conceptual apparatus (*Z*: 3). A closer look at Nietzsche's psychological investigations into the history behind such concepts has, however, proven otherwise (cf. *KSA* 12: 143). Nietzsche expressly forbids himself to confabulate hypotheses on the "person" (*KSA* 11: 577)--a concept which may greatly facilitate the natural-scientific explanations of selfhood that we have grown accustomed to (cf. *KSA* 3: 594), but which harbors unspoken metaphysical prejudices that obfuscate the complexity of the problem (cf. *KSA* 11: 631).

One usually understands the 'person' as a mind-body conglomerate. But the concept of the

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\(^2\) Cf. (*GA* 61: 85): "Leben = Dasein, in und durch Leben, 'Sein'."

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'body' is just Nietzsche's best simile for what is, on his account, anything but a self-contained unified substrate (cf. *KSA I*: 577). The conscious workings of the 'mind' are, on his account, no less amorphous and variegated, entailing a whole spectrum of environmentally-situated embodied practices with varying degrees of mutual unintelligibility--what Nietzsche calls losses or disparities in translation (cf. *KSA I*: 578; *KSA II*: 189; *KSA III*: 460). In his own words: "Es gibt . . . im Menschen so viele 'Bewußtseins' als es Wesen gibt, -- in jedem Augenblicke seines Daseins, -- die seinen Leib constituieren," (*KSA I*: 577-578).\(^{421}\) There seems to him no point in drawing the mind-body distinction to begin with, especially if it merely serves to reaffirm what one has, out of habit, decided upon in advance. For one clarifies nothing when one makes psychical and physical phenomena the two faces of one and the same substance--the concept of "substance" is itself completely unusable (*KSA III*: 329). And it is, for Nietzsche, in this sense precisely that the erroneous post-hoc construction of "self" called the belonging together of body-and-mind is a moral and not a mechanistic problem (*KSA I*: 577)!\(^{422}\) According to his view, the synthetic concept of the "I" is posited through the activity of thinking (*KSA I*: 597)--an activity exercised constantly, on all levels of experience and sensation, both actively and passively, in a way that calls into question the boundaries of the traditionally conceived 'mind' (cf. *KSA I*: 658), whose development is driven by a great historical host of intelligent embodied practices (*KSA I*: 655). Behind all thinking, feeling, and willing there are always in play certain environmental conditions of life (*KSA I*: 283)--a concept which holds no determinate meaning whatsoever when divorced from the contingent moral history of evaluation that shapes one's sense of 'self' (cf. *KSA V*: 33-34).

\(^{421}\) ". . . (richtiger: von deren Zusammenwirken das, was wir 'Leib' nennen, das beste Gleichniß ist--),"

\(^{422}\) For Heidegger's response to Freud on this matter, cf. (*Z*: 24).
This perspective on the dimensions of one's epistemological activity challenges the notion that knowing oneself follows by virtue of a private practice of reflective self-determination. By the end of the 1880s, nothing could be further from Nietzsche's "mind"; the will to 'become what one was' did not give one free reign to start reflectively crafting one's self from nowhere in particular (cf. KSA 6: 294). This version of individualist autonomy, which stakes out ostensibly neutral spaces to create one's "self-image" as one sees fit--this brand of 'private irony',\(^{423}\) which thinkers like Richard Rorty champion, and which has since become a prominent postmodern paradigm--Nietzsche would sooner associate with the self-deception of a mutton race of 'last men' who shortsightedly claim final answers to the great questions (what is freedom?) (KSA 13: 63; cf. WzM: §770). In his view, who one is fluctuates in tandem with the perspectival unfolding of one's drive-psychology. It is a question whose meaning is determined in accordance with the existential conditions for those drives, and with the history of moral evaluation that regulates their expression--a history on which the intellect's development depends (cf. KSA 5: 20; KSA 11: 661).

One need not scrounge around in the Nachlass to see through this line of thought. Nietzsche's psychological critique of models of self-knowing built upon the subject's will to conscious reflection has its roots in the early 1880s, when he began to distance himself from the Stoic models of autonomy which had fascinated him in the late 1870s, and which still speckle Morgenröthe (1881).\(^{424}\) The argument behind this critique is clearly gaining momentum near the end of the first edition of Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (1882)--a book of

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\(^{424}\) For a biographically informed account of Nietzsche's developing distaste for Stoicism, cf. Thomas H. Brobjer, Nietzsche's Philosophical Context (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2008), 75-76.
which one had understood nothing, so Nietzsche claims (KSA 12: 150), and which would bring one trembling to one's knees if one had (KSA 3: 573). In expanding this work with a fifth Book, he clarifies the implications of the problems presented in sections like §333, Was heisst erkennen, which concerns typical errors made by epistemologists when characterizing the mind's domain, and the reach of our conscious capacities. This section lays out many of the principal objections that Nietzsche will refine in the course of exposing the moral prejudices of the scientific worldview (cf. KSA 5: 38; KSA 12: 141-142, 256-257; KSA 3: 624-626). To this extent, his considerations on these matters prepare the account of the Judeo-Christian origins of the will to truth that appears in Zur Genealogie der Moral, and in his notes on the never-published Der Wille zur Macht (cf. KSA 5: 409). In §333, several traditional axioms are under fire. There is the unified instrumentalist conception of 'mind', which stands over and against the non-thinking 'body' (cf. KSA 10: 658), and whose primary function consists in subjugating the body's disharmonious, irrational drives into order. There is the attending supposition that there is sufficient "vertical" clarity to reflectively master the execution of this task (cf. KSA 12: 112); that an act of will can render the message intelligible down an unbroken chain of command (cf. KSA 12: 248). There is the related presumption that mental activity is generally accessible to sensory perception; that one is aware when one thinks--the vast majority of the time--that one is thinking, and that an increase in such awareness is always advantageous (cf. KSA 12: 210). There is the tacit reduction of all knowing to conscious thinking; the notion that, where there is knowledge whatsoever, it is won by virtue of our conscious capacities (cf. KSA 13: 330). And finally, there is the erroneous idea that elevated forms of conscious thought--like those of the
philosopher--are mild and serene, because s/he has risen above the base influence of bodily instinct (cf. KSA 5: 17; KSA 9: 210).

Drawing on the insights revealed in the interim, Nietzsche builds upon this critique of the traditional precepts of epistemology in §374, Unser neues "Unendliches". Here, he stresses that the instruments of conscientious self-examination reach only as far as the hand that employs them (cf. KSA 3: 626, 13)--a hand directed by one's drives and affects (cf. KSA 4: 40). They are not, in any case, wielded from an impartial distance--taken up and stowed away at one's own whim. In Nietzsche's view, it is already a contradiction to want to remain unaffected by what one wants to know--an insistent scientific prejudice (cf. KSA 12: 141-142; KSA 3: 624-626). When it comes to knowing oneself, the will to overcome one's affects is, in the end, just the will of another, or several other affects (KSA 5: 93). Indeed, one does not exercise autonomous control over the fact that one wants to overcome one's affects in the first place (KSA 3: 98). All of this to say that our conscious capacities of mind do not afford us a disembodied, all-seeing Archimedean point of view. There is, to Nietzsche, no seeing around the corner in which one always already stands. And how far the perspectival character of existence reaches is not something one determines by making it the object of one's aesthetic reflection (KSA 3: 626). To say that all knowledge is 'perspectival' and all existence 'interpretive' is not, of course, the same as positing an objective 'world-in-itself', which we perceive in merely subjective, relative fashion.

For this characterization of the "objective world" already entails an orienting interpretation on the "subject" (cf. KSA 12:

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As argued by: Claus Zittel, "Ästhetisch fundierte Ethiken und Nietzsches Philosophie," in Nietzsche-Studien, Vol. 32, eds. Günter Abel, Josef Simon, and Werner Stegmaier (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2003), 103-123.

315). For Nietzsche, as for Gadamer, use of the concept 'world-in-itself' denotes a
philosophical confusion. The claim that our experience of the world allows infinite
interpretations need not result in a deification of the unreachable unknown (cf. KSA 3: 627;
KSA 12: 254). It is to claim, rather:

\[\ldots \text{daß man, in welcher Sprache immer man sich bewegt, nie zu etwas}\]
\[\text{anderem gelangt als zu einem immer mehr erweiterten Aspekt, einer}\]
\[\text{›Ansicht‹ der Welt. Solche Weltansichten sind nicht in dem Sinne relativ, daß}\]
\[\text{man ihnen die ›Welt an sich‹ entgegenstellen könnte, als ob die richtige}\]
\[\text{Ansicht von einem möglichen Standorte außerhalb der menschlich-}\]
\[\text{sprachlichen Welt aus sie in ihrem Ansichsein anzutreffen vermöchte. Daß}\]
\[\text{die Welt auch ohne den Menschen sein kann und vielleicht sein wird, ist}\]
\[\text{dabei ganz unbestritten. \ldots Die Mannigfaltigkeit solcher Weltansichten}\]
\[\text{bedeutet keine Relativierung der ›Welt‹. Vielmehr ist, was die Welt selbst ist,}\]
\[\text{nichts von den Ansichten, in denen sie sich darbietet, Verschiedenes.} {^{427}}\]

To abandon the 'world-in-itself' in this way is also to relinquish claims to the secure ground
one once had in the "I think" of the rational subject,\(^{428}\) and in the notion of 'truth' conceived
as adaequatio intellectus et rei (cf. KSA 5: 29-30; KSA 9: 263; KSA 12: 385). The
hinterworldly justifications of knowledge constructed upon these "grounds" Nietzsche views
as decadence phenomena--testament to an evil fit of reason (KSA 3: 287), wrought by an
unwitting "self"-deception (cf. KSA 4: 36-40). Interpretations of his work that associate his
position on epistemological questions with transcendental argumentation should, for these
reasons, draw immediate suspicion.\(^{429}\)

One of Nietzsche's most emphatic arguments against instrumentalizing conscious
reflection in the interest of self-knowledge takes the form of a linguistic consideration.

\(^{428}\)Cf. (Z: 154) for Heidegger's concordant commentary on this issue.
\(^{429}\)For an interpretation that defines Nietzsche's psychology as a "fundamentally transcendental
Revisiting a theme addressed in §115 of *Morgenröthe, Das sogenannte "Ich"*, §354 of *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft* discusses the evolution of language in its relation to our conscious efforts to make sense of ourselves. In Nietzsche's view, consciousness, like language, is an inherently social phenomenon; both develop in response to the needs of communal forms of life. A problem seems to arise when one considers that the words at our immediate disposal often do not suffice to make ourselves understood. It has become a platitude of sorts to say that our moods can never be fully articulated— that words cannot express what we *really* feel; that our best efforts at self-description are coarse schematizations which always end in distortion. To this extent, one of the dangers of valorizing conscientious self-examination is the possibility that we never break out of the petrified meanings of the words we use to render ourselves intelligible— that we always understand ourselves on everyone else's terms, and stifle what we might instead become (cf. *KSA* 3: 592). One might see this as grounds for reading into Nietzsche's argument the imperative to retreat from these crude forms of public interpretedness— as though speaking were itself already something inherently debased, and worthy of disdain (cf. *KSA* 3: 260). Whatever new truth appears in the distance *cannot speak*, as it were; there are, in fact, no words for it— does one not hear the error, the delusion behind every single word (*KSA* 3: 260)? Indeed, Nietzsche would not be the last philosopher to muse on whether it were not perhaps best to isolate ourselves from those who would estrange us from genuine self-understanding with their vulgarity; to stand alone in great silent reserve before the horizons of our ownmost possibility.

However, this reveals itself to be a false problem. As §115 of *Morgenröthe* suggests, words might sometimes trip us up like rocks upon the footpath of our efforts to know ourselves, but they remain mobile, malleable landmarks; they are, in any event, not
unbreakable (KSA 3: 53). At play in the vast array of intelligent embodied practices peculiar to a speaking community, there are, in Nietzsche's view, many more languages than one thinks, awaiting the appropriate moment to rise to the surface of conscious expression: "was redet nicht!" (KSA 10: 262). Indeed, we have done nothing else but instill the postulates of logic into the world long before we became conscious of our having done so (cf. KSA 12: 418). There is, to this extent, no running from language; we are always already involved in articulating its forms of expression, as logical beings through and through, whether we are aware of it or not. From this perspective, the attempt to counteract its leveling effects by willing a return to one's instincts approaches the nonsensical—like trying to make water flow upstream. And indeed, there is no need to escape the current. In the end, it is not the inherent limits of linguistic expression that Nietzsche is concerned with when criticizing the forms of consciousness in Die fröhliche Wissenschaft's §354. It is not that words like subject and object, "thing-in-itself" and appearance, fail to express a reality to which only Nietzsche, genius philosopher, is privy (cf. KSA 3: 593).

It is, rather, an issue of our tendency to fix words (like the so-called "I") with ahistorical meanings; words that allow infinite interpretive possibilities. On this matter, it is worth quoting Gadamer at length:

Wesenszusammenhang selbst zu bestätigen. Denn jede solche Kritik, die sich, um zu verstehen, über den Schematismus unserer Aussagen erhebt, findet ihren Ausdruck abermals in sprachlicher Gestalt. Insofern überholt die Sprache alle Einreden gegen ihre Zuständigkeit. . . Wenn alles Verstehen in einem notwendigen Äquivalenzverhältnis zu seiner möglichen Auslegung steht, und wenn dem Verstehen grundsätzlich keine Grenze gesetzt ist, so muß auch die sprachliche Erfassung, die dies Verstehen in der Auslegung erfährt, eine alle Schranken überwindende Unendlichkeit in sich tragen.431

It is, indeed, nothing other than language that carries Nietzsche's criticism through. This is precisely the upshot of Morgenröthe's §115. What had first appeared a lamentation over the supposed insufficiencies of language reveals itself to be a demonstration of how flexible words like the so-called "I" can be.432 Whether or not one is getting oneself all wrong, the only "real me" there is for one to speak of is that which happens through language.

It would therefore be mistaken to read a reactionary glorification of primitivism into Nietzsche's psychological critique of the elements of consciousness (cf. KSA 3: 594). This approach is not a sacrifice of the intellect--on the contrary (KSA 5: 39)! We are not meant to turn back time and become the "blonde beast" characterized in Zur Genealogie der Moral (cf. KSA 5: 275). It is true that Nietzsche sides with the mechanists and determinists against Descartes with regard to the human/animal distinction (cf. KSA 6: 180). But this does not mean that he has decided on attributing purely epiphenomenal status to our conscious capacities. In one sense, these capacities are what make humanity the most interesting of animals! They are what leaves us forever incomplete--an indication that we are not yet set in our ways;433 that what it means to be human remains open to unending interpretation. In

431 Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, 405. In this respect, Gadamer and Nietzsche seem not to diverge so much over the 'universality' or 'linguisticality of reason', but over just what follows from reason's becoming conscious. Cf. (KSA 12: 193-194).
432 For the later Heidegger's rendition of this argument, cf. (UzS: 268).
433 This casts a rather different light on Nietzsche's portrayal of humanity as "das noch nicht festgestellte Tier." Contra: (WhD: 24-29).

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another sense, i.e., when the supposed "facts of consciousness" are asserted as fundamental truths (KSA 3: 594; cf. KSA 12: 162), they can become a sickness--a fatal stupidity that threatens to bring about our downfall (KSA 3: 593). What Nietzsche wants to deter us from is the notion that true self-understanding ultimately turns upon the conscious exercise of our best will to know who we are (KSA 3: 568). For oftentimes this amounts to nothing more than the tyrannical imposition of a single perspective on the future development of the whole. When a predominant drive-complex assumes consummate hegemony over the forms of knowledge, it can result in the kind of "life-negation" that Nietzsche identifies in extreme forms of the scientific will to truth (cf. KSA 12: 533-34, 189-90)--a pathological manifestation of the otherwise healthy competition of drives that he recognizes in the phenomenon of honesty (cf. KSA 4: 37-38; KSA 3: 470-71; KSA 9: 259). As it was with language in general, the activity of self-knowing emerges in response to a need to render intelligible the mutual concerns of the implicated parties (cf. KSA 3: 568)--in this case, the competing claims of one's drives. Preemptively forcing one's will on this interpretive process can delimit possibilities, and exclude interlocutors with valuable alternative perspectives who may have led us to a more genuine understanding of ourselves. From this point of view, arriving at the truth about oneself--about one's 'soul'--is less a matter of willfully stripping away the golden veil that shrouds the endless mysteries of _vita femina_, and more about letting the matter reveal itself (cf. KSA 3: 568-69).\footnote{Cf. Jacques Derrida, _Éperons: Les styles de Nietzsche_ (Paris: Éditions Flammarion, 1978), 37-42.} It is less a conscious exercise in manipulating one's drives, and more a game of _wait-and-see_ (cf. KSA 9: 495). Which drive-complex presents itself and orients the interpretive process depends on the environmental context and the conditions of our lives (KSA 11: 283). To this extent, knowing oneself is, indeed, always already more than a personal problem.
This overview of Nietzsche's and Heidegger's critical re-appropriations of their earlier work makes it hard to accept readings that present their respective positions on self-knowing as the endorsement of a personal undertaking in reflective self-mastery. To suggest that Nietzschean honesty amounts to an idealization of the conscientious will to truth;\(^{435}\) that it consists in "a continuous and consistent reflection and self-reflection,"\(^{436}\) entirely misses the significance of his decision to conceive of its manifestation in terms of one's agonal drive-life activity. For Nietzsche, honesty is not the sort of thing that we one day make up our own minds to do; it is not the product of a spontaneous act of willpower. It is an environmentally driven, socially adaptive process already underway by the time that it is made the aim of one's express attention. Indeed, honesty, as Nietzsche conceives it, is itself involved in structuring the phenomenality of the objects of intention (cf. KSA 10: 224). From Morgenröthe onward, it becomes increasingly clear that honesty is not to be construed as the function of a personal exercise of one's conscious capacities, but as a situated expression of incorporated evaluative orientations in interpretive contention. This is one of the reasons why the figure of dishonesty is portrayed as the embodiment of a degenerate, myopic moral worldview, rather than associated with an inability to reflect and reconsider (cf. KSA 3: 58). In the end, to speak of honesty in terms of one's self-conscious will to knowledge does nothing to address the moral history that lies behind our traditional conception of the 'will'--which has unity only in name, and whose unconscious workings remain, in Nietzsche's view, largely unknown to us (cf. KSA 5: 31-34). A psychological 

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account of the various complexes of drives involved in the will's expression must reckon with the social forces that animate their discharge.

Meanwhile, we are presented with similar problems by interpretations of Heidegger that read *authenticity* as a matter of "owning up to one's judgment through constant attention to one's life." The notion of "owning up" to something takes for granted that one *knows*; that one is aware of what one is, should, or would rather be doing (if not also that one can, because one should). Indeed, it suggests that one might, "at a given moment," *will* oneself back into alignment with what one at least presciently holds true--that one could be true to one's self in this way, if one just "betook oneself" to the task; if one were only prepared to carry out what one's conscience compels one to do; to question for oneself, in the practice of thought's *pietas*, the fundamental sense of its command. It is just a matter of acknowledging it, admitting to it; of assuming personal responsibility for what one has *oneself* become. It is clear why the unconscious presuppositions of this line of argument make thinkers like Derrida balk, and opt for a more Nietzschean position. But it is precisely this sort of knowledge to which the later Heidegger's work on language relinquishes claim. For there is no foretelling where the discussion might lead us--and who is to say where it should? In this context, the determining factors (*Bestimmungsgründe*) of one's world-historical relation fluctuate in accordance with the demands of one's linguistic situation; they do not follow according to the individual's willed attunement to any singular, metontologically-founded grounding mood (*Grundstimmung*). It was his dialogue with

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438 Derrida, *De l'esprit*, 150, 154.
440 Cf. Derrida, *Éperons*, 103-123.
Nietzsche that motivated Heidegger to reassess his emphatic appeals to the will to knowledge (cf. *GA 40*: 42; *UzS*: 100), which one finds reiterated in his texts from the 1930s and '40s in various forms. In the 'fourfold' conception of 'world' that emerges from their confrontation, man is made the interlocutor for an event (*Ereignis*) of understanding (*Da-sein*) that the force of its own will cannot compel. When it comes to understanding of ourselves, willing what one knows in a private exchange with the soul is poor substitute for authentic conversation, which resists the impositions of unilateral decision.

*Figures of the Adaptive Mind*

It turns out that many of the more theoretically driven conclusions that Nietzsche and Heidegger draw regarding the constraints on epistemological ventures in conscientious self-mastery are being confirmed from a more empirical direction by recent research in the fields of biology, and cognitive and behavioral psychology. To cast a different light on what may appear the rather abstract and esoteric issues addressed by this dissertation, in a way that demonstrates their significance for, and contributions to, these currently thriving disciplines, I would like, in closing, to draw a few parallels with Timothy D. Wilson's work on the 'adaptive unconscious', and with Alva Noë's work on the 'biology of consciousness'.

One of the main objectives of Wilson's *Strangers to Ourselves* is to deconstruct the established view of our conscious capacities as our primary means for interpreting the world

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442 It is worth noting how Heidegger's overlooks the significance of Zarathustra's failure to will himself to knowledge of his "most abysmal thought" in the absence of his fellow higher men. Cf. (KSA 4: 295; Vua: 104-105).  
and making sense of our place within it. It calls into question the notion of consciousness conceived as the organizing principle of understanding--selecting and ordering relevant environmental stimuli and commanding appropriate action; a view of consciousness construed as "Chief Executive Officer"--what Noë, in a similar vein, calls "Mission Control." Nietzsche prefigures their critique when he asserts that, for the most part, the interpreting intellect works unconsciously (KSA 3: 483). Indeed, with regard to the tremendous and manifold co- and counter-operative work displayed by the life of every organism in its entirety, its conscious world of feelings, intentions, and evaluations is but a small excerpt (KSA 12: 533)--a mere corner of the multitude of happenings that constitute its mental life (KSA 13: 39). Wilson points out that, according to current clinical estimates, ". . . we take in 11,000,000 pieces of information a second, but can process only 40 of them consciously. . . . Fortunately, we do make use of a great deal of this information outside of conscious awareness"--and this is a central task for what he refers to as the 'adaptive unconscious'. So too is the process through which certain aspects or bits of information reach the narrow corner of consciousness--what Wilson calls the operation of the 'nonconscious filter', and what Nietzsche calls the operation of geistige Einmagazinirung (KSA 13: 67-68), i.e., in Wilson's words, ". . . the way in which information is classified, sorted, and selected for further processing." Nietzsche considers it a distinguishing feature of consciousness that we remain, in this way, shielded and secluded from the countless procedures involved in such selection. "Das . . . was unserem Intellecte diese Auswahl

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445 Wilson, 66.
446 Noë, 92.
448 Wilson, 24.
449 Ibid., 28.
vorlegt . . . ist jedenfalls nicht eben dieser Intellett," (KSA 11: 578); it is attributed to the intelligent interpretive functioning of our socio-environmentally conditioned drive-life activity.

This conception of the adaptive processes involved in the exercise of conscious intention yields clear consequences for our understanding of goal-setting activities, and for the theories of self-determination that identify them with the practice of sovereign power. Wilson considers these matters by drawing on the experimental studies of John Bargh and Peter Gollwitzer,\textsuperscript{450} in a discussion of the ways in which the ". . . environment can trigger goals and direct our behavior completely outside of conscious awareness."\textsuperscript{451} This is what Nietzsche also has in mind when he declares it profoundly wrong to attribute primary responsibility to our conscious intellect for the arrangement of goal-oriented action. Insofar as it is removed in theoretical abstraction from its motivational context, nothing could be more superficial than the conscious setting of "ends" and "means" (KSA 11: 161). Goals are more often thrown into consciousness from "below," than they are imposed from "above" (cf. KSA 12: 248). This view of the unconscious structuring of our intellectual situation begs the question of whether all of our conscious willing, all conscious goals, are perhaps only means, with which something essentially different should be reached than appears within consciousness (KSA 10: 654). But supposing there were, indeed, some truth to this--what then are we to make of ourselves? What does knowing oneself involve, if one's best knowing fails to measure up to the task of rendering intelligible the sense of purpose prevailing on the minute scale of the unconscious workings of one's drives (KSA 10: 654)?


\textsuperscript{451} Wilson, 33.
Would this model of the intellect commit one to a form of epiphenomenal automatism? Or is consciousness instead, as Nietzsche claims, something essentially-other than, but nothing separate from the unconscious (KSA 10: 655)? To what extent are we estranged from ourselves, if we, as conscious goal-setting beings, constitute only the smallest part of the happenings which such unconscious workings involve (KSA 10: 654)?

A guiding thread in both Wilson's and Noë's work is the notion that one makes sense of oneself "out" in the world that continuously gives one's 'self' shape--not by turning one's attention "inward" toward the deepest recesses of one's private mental life. It is tempting to suppose that one already has in one's 'self'--however one conceives of it--all that one needs to understand the way that one thinks and behaves. After all, if there were anyone who knows our genuine interests and motivations when we act; anyone in the position to determine what influences us in the moment of decision, it surely must be us. A more skeptical Nietzsche would sooner associate this supposition with a post-Kantian iteration of an ancient madness that lays personal claim to clarity on the unknown world of the "subject" (KSA 3: 108). Wilson, for his part, makes a point of dismantling what he calls the "illusion of authenticity" brought about when we rely on private knowledge to explain our actions. It so happens that, "[a]veraging across several studies, there seems to be no net advantage to having privileged information about ourselves" when generating reasons for our behavior. Indeed, as some evidence suggests, "... the vast amount of privileged information people have might make it harder to recognize causes of their behavior that a

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453 Wilson, 112.
stranger, relying on cultural theories, would see\(^455\)--a hard thing to swallow for anyone particularly wary of vulgarizing their self-understanding with common concerns.

In Nietzsche's view, nothing is so very much a *deception* as this inner world that we observe with the renowned "inner sense" (KSA 13: 334-335). Our most earnest avowals often consist in pure confabulation, prattled into empty space (cf. KSA 10: 262). Our represented thoughts, wills, and feelings frequently prove to be entirely superficial (KSA 11: 161)! One obvious reason this exercise is so easily misguided lies in the fact that there is no singular driving force to which one might trace back one's conscious states and patterns of behavior. Indeed, to Nietzsche, *every thought*, *every feeling*, *every will* is *not* born of one particular drive, but is rather a *condition of the totality*, resulting from the momentary establishment of power of *all constitutive drives*--those ruling, as well as those obeying and resisting. The next thought is a sign of how the conditions of power in their entirety have been since displaced (KSA 12: 26). To this extent, our attempts to attribute the content of conscious experience to the effects of particular motivational factors can result in a form self-fabrication that obscures more than it explains.\(^456\) In Nietzsche's view, what we perceive as the *selfsame* feeling, affect, or "passion" is often better described as a synthetic *fictive unity*, with a multitude of perspectival aspects that only reveal themselves in the appropriate environmental setting (KSA 12: 25). Such considerations bear on the sense of causality that we attempt to identify in a sequence of thoughts and feelings (cf. KSA 10: 264), and to observe in the experience of conscious will and subsequent action (cf. KSA 5: 33). Wilson addresses these issues in his discussion of the results of Daniel Wegner's and Thalia Wheatley's experiments on the effects of 'nonconscious intention' on the way that we give

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\(^455\) Wilson, 109-110.
\(^456\) As similarly argued by: Wilson, 208.
account for our behavior," arguing that "[t]he causal role of conscious thought has been vastly overrated; instead, it is often a post-hoc explanation of responses that emanated from the adaptive unconscious." Nietzsche's position on this matter is unequivocal: in sum, that which becomes conscious does so under causal relations that are altogether withheld from us, -- the succession of thoughts, feelings, and ideas in consciousness expresses nothing about this sequence being a causal one (KSA 13: 68). But not only is the causal connection between thoughts, feelings, and desires concealed to us--so too is the actual process involved in the practice of "inner perception" that endeavors to explain it (KSA 13: 53). Our efforts to resolve one mystery introduce yet another.

It seems that there is no fully getting behind the way we think and feel (KSA 10: 343). Indeed, one might say that this blind spot of ours belongs to the very opening of a conscious perspective (cf. KSA 12: 205); to the conditions under which consciousness assumes its regent position in the performance of its own specific tasks (KSA 11: 638). One of Nietzsche's recurrent criticisms of contemporary philosophy is its claim to certain "facts of consciousness" that afford one an impartial position from which to appraise the whole (KSA 12: 167); on his account, observing ourselves in the interest of self-knowledge is a thousand-fold more difficult than that (KSA 12: 249). This is not to suggest that one should give up on the notion of knowing oneself altogether--only that one must keep in mind how the phenomenon one is attempting to understand is shaped no less by its immediate socio-environmental context than it is by the attempt itself (cf. KSA 3: 232). It is for such reasons that Nietzsche warns against the dangers and distortions involved in the private, reflective

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458 Wilson, 107.
practice of directly questioning oneself (KSA 11: 639), opting instead for a version of self-knowing that allows the situation to reveal aspects to ourselves that a headstrong will to truth might easily cover over (cf. KSA 3: 347-352; KSA 9: 494-495). This is one advantage to discussing honesty in terms of one's situated drive-life activity. And it is precisely this game of wait-and-see that Wilson, from the direction of behavioral psychology, endorses in Strangers to Ourselves. As he says, knowing oneself "... is an exercise best avoided--at least in the way we have studied it, whereby people sit down by themselves and think about why they feel the way they do. ... The trick is to allow the feelings to surface and to see them through the haze of one's theories and expectations." In his more recent work, however, Wilson appears to leave behind the guiding thread for his own insights--promoting his techniques on "narrative intervention" designed to "redirect" our own behavior into alignment with our desired self-image, instead of further exploring the workings of the motivational factors involved in our becoming aware of this need for change. As Nietzsche's work is apt to remind us, the moral-historical determination of what drives the will to redirect one's thoughts, feelings, and behavior poses a problem of much broader implications (cf. KSA 3: 98; KSA 5: 33-34)--albeit one less amenable to the project of formulating strategies on personal self-help.

Alva Noë, for his part, approaches the problem from the angle of biological science. He argues for a notion of consciousness that expands its locus of activity beyond that eked out by one's personal sense of "reigning deliberative awareness." On his account, the exercise of one's conscious capacities is anything but a private matter--for consciousness is

459 Ibid., 173.
461 Noë, 94.
not something that happens inside us, so much as it is something that happens to and through us. It is, in a word, something we do together. Its manifestation is shaped by one's history, and depends upon one's "... current position in and interaction with the wider world." Its place of happening is situated in "... the dynamic life of the whole, environmentally plugged-in person or animal." This view of consciousness affects our understanding of the practices of self-knowing, insofar as it presents an adaptive and essentially "... body- and world-involving conception of ourselves," and of our 'minds'--which, for Noë, is not synonymous with the organ called the 'brain', but with all that the 'life' of an organism entails. At any given time, our biological context bears on what there is to know of ourselves--which must therefore remain as wide open a question as the significance of the momentary conditions of life that demand one's appropriate response. In his view, "we ourselves are ... dynamically distributed, boundary crossing, offloaded, and environmentally situated, by our very nature," such that "... what we bearers of consciousness are ... depends on where we are and what we can do" under the circumstances. According to the species under consideration, these biological factors include the organism's socio-cultural habitat. As social animals, it is in relation to the community of others and the larger environmental structures and situations which determine our communal forms of life that we first become ourselves, and acquire a sense of

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462 Ibid., xii.
463 Ibid., 4.
464 Ibid., 4.
465 Ibid., xiii.
466 Ibid., 24.
467 Ibid., 87.
468 Ibid., 42.
469 Ibid., 68.
470 Ibid., 70.
471 Ibid., 185.
conscious, sovereign identity.\textsuperscript{471} The later Heidegger makes a similar point when criticizing Freud's understanding of consciousness in its relation to early childhood development (cf. Z: 228-229)--a subject largely precluded by Sein und Zeit's formal suppositions, now invoked to demonstrate one's perennial engagement in the shared forms of communication that first clear the paths (\textit{Lichtung}) for the unfolding of one's self-conscious reflective activity.\textsuperscript{472}

As a reader of Heidegger himself, Noë's conception of the seat of consciousness ultimately takes issue with the same Cartesian presuppositions that had been the target of the former's critical re-appropriation of Kant in Sein und Zeit--criticism compromised by an unexplained aversion to discussion of the body (\textit{corpus}), and equivocal appeals to Dasein's "spiritual" capacities.\textsuperscript{473} Heidegger restates his concerns with greater confidence in the \textit{Zollikoner Seminare} when he insists that one not divide the human being into one region belonging to nature, and another, more central region that attests to his/her god-like ability to subjugate it to his/her will: "Wie sollte man zwei so heterogene Dinge je zusammenbringen können und aufeinander wirken lassen können? Vielmehr muß das sogenannte zentralere . . . auch das Wesen des sogenannten periphereren Bereichs, etwa das Soma des Menschen, ausmachen," (Z: 34). In this sense, we wear our minds on our sleeves--but not in the sense of forgetting the question of the body as extraneous. The life of the 'mind' is \textit{out of our heads}, but still within reach--an intelligent embodied process of adaptation, manifest according to the need to render features of one's biological habitat

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\textsuperscript{471} Ibid., 51.

\textsuperscript{472} Nietzsche likewise points to our relation with the "outer world" when accounting for the development of the roles we attribute to "consciousness" (cf. \textit{KSA 13}: 67)--a process said to begin entirely external to the organism, initially furthest away from the supposed biological center of the individual, and thence perpetually deepened, internalized, converging upon that center (\textit{KSA 12}: 295). For such reasons, he calls the collective-sense-of-self that one develops in response to the demands of one's social environment the great preschool of personal-sovereignty (\textit{KSA 13}: 112).

\textsuperscript{473} Cf. Derrida, \textit{De l'esprit}, 43-52.
intelligible. For Heidegger as well as Noë, the boundaries of our embodiment are not to be
defined by the outer surface of our skin, or by the inner wall of our skulls. And there is no
ultimately defining where--along the neural pathways of such embodiment--the intelligent
processes of the 'mind' end and mere mechanics begin (cf. Z: 245-246). For the body is just
as much the 'mind' as the grey matter in our brains; it is itself involved in determining the
horizons of intelligibility that we inhabit, including our own sense of corporeality. In
Heidegger's words: "Grenze des Leibens (der Leib ist nur insofern er leibt: Leib) ist der
Seinshorizont, in dem ich mich aufhalte. Deshalb wandelt sich die Grenze des Leibens
ständig durch die Wandlung der Reichweite meines Aufenthaltes," (Z: 113). This essentially
distributed notion of the embodied processes of the 'mind' need not be confounded with the
specter of 'Spirit' haunting the conceptual world of German idealism. One can sensibly argue
for a mobile and dispersed conception of the intelligent, situated 'self' without having to
endow the material of terrestrial existence with the life-breath of another world. Noë pursues
this line of argument when enlisting the help of Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of
Perception to present recent neuroscientific research on how alterations to one's 'mind'-'schema--e.g., the displacement of environmental features, or the disruption of world-
mediating forms of embodied practice--can shape the activity of perception and one's
habitual ways of self-understanding.474 To this extent, "... what we are and what we can
accomplish depend on what is done to us as much as on what we do."475

Noë's conception of where 'consciousness' happens and what it involves corresponds
to the later Heidegger's broadened understanding of what the virtuous practice of self-

474 Cf. Marcel Kinsbourne, "Awareness of one's own body: an attention theory of its nature,
475 Noë, 94.
knowing entails. Virtue necessitates a process of habituation, and "[a] habit is not merely a disposition to act,"\textsuperscript{476} but a responsiveness to the situation in which we find ourselves, "\ldots dependent for its actualization and its sustenance on the availability of the right kind of environment."\textsuperscript{477} Linguistic habits, which Noë, following the lead of Wittgenstein and Putnam, includes in his conception of the 'mind', are no different. They are "\ldots buoyed by the availability of other people,"\textsuperscript{478} in ways that the later Heidegger's considerations on the structures of authentic correspondence sought to articulate; in the absence of others there is, in any event, little to maintain them. Genuine conversation is not, after all, the sort of thing that people learn alone. The \textit{Zollikoner Seminare} show, however, that Heidegger was more careful the second time around. The 'self' is a subtle word, and a delicate matter for thought--it slips through one's grasp whenever one wants to determine its true meaning (cf. \textit{UzS}: 236). Indeed, such matters were not to be reached by grasping after them and running them down: "Es gibt so merkwürdige Sachen, die man nur erfaßt, wenn man sie sich selbst als solche geben läßt. \ldots Wir können \textit{nur} auf sie hinweisen, hindeuten," (Z: 172). And what have we to show for ourselves on our own? "Wir sind wir, indem wir dahin weisen," (\textit{WhD}: 6).

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\textit{Coda}

Remaining in dialogue with Nietzsche and Heidegger over the course of their philosophical development has proven essential for making sense of the strategies that each thinker employs in reassessing their respective positions on the issue of \textit{self-knowing}. Several established preconceptions regarding the proper unfolding of its activity are shaken

\textsuperscript{476} Ibid., 125.  
\textsuperscript{477} Ibid., 127.  
\textsuperscript{478} Ibid., 126.
up along the way—preconceptions to which both thinkers had themselves long subscribed. In light of the many equivocations entailed by this process of revision—especially in transitional works like *Morgenröthe* and *Was heißt Denken?*, where they are presented in close proximity—one cannot fault modern commentators for having interpreted contextually specific claims in ways that only subsequent texts would call into question, and in varying degrees of consistency, at that. Indeed, the constantly reworked premises for Heidegger's engagement with Nietzsche had themselves attested to the peculiar fact that steps backward were often required before a way forward came into the clearing. In any event, the will to truth, and to self-overcoming; the will to own up to one's own judgment, and to carry out the grounding question of Being for oneself—all of these formulations were built upon an epistemological privileging of the "self"-conscious will to knowledge. But this will turned out to be a mere first indication and expression of the problem it was once thought to resolve, harboring a host of underlying constitutive phenomena that pointed toward the question of what made one want to know oneself. A broadened understanding of the socio-historical structures involved in shaping one's interpretation of these motivating forces would change the way each thinker conceived of what being honest or authentic entailed. According to the perspective that both eventually assume, the overbearing impositions of one's will to knowledge threaten violence upon what only unveils the depths of its question-worthiness to those open to a more reciprocal form of exchange (cf. *KSA 3*: 352; *UzS*: 100). Correspondence with others can expose aspects to the matter in question that otherwise withdraw from view when placed before the mirror. Much of what one knows of oneself to begin with one learns in being called by those involved in a shared situation into relation to an issue of mutual interest. More often than not, we are brought to an understanding of
ourselves by those close to us--driven by the need for a sense of clarity with respect to the case at hand. One could--to invoke the words of Virginia Woolf--perhaps, construct heaps of theories to finally explain this need for knowledge; grand transcendental theories designed to demonstrate the ultimate possibility of recovering all the unseen parts of oneself. But life was, for all of that, much too full of turns and corners, breath-taking surprises, mysteries unfolding before one that all the wishing in the world could not compel to speak.479 With regard to the truth about one's soul, one's self, who fish-like inhabits deep seas and plies among obscurities threading her way between the boles of giant weeds, over sun-flickered spaces and on and on into gloom, cold, deep, inscrutable, suddenly shooting to the surface to sport on wind-wrinkled waves, with a positive need to brush, scrape, kindle herself, gossiping;480 with regard to the truth about this thing called life481--did one not appear in retrospect to have barely scratched the surface in presuming to divine for oneself the meaning of a question into relation to which one had been brought?482--a question that echoes emptily in the absence of those who had called it to one's attention?483 Who was one to decide for oneself what this question had invoked? After all, how much of life lived together had not been self-conscious,484 spent with only the faintest notion of what significance the experiences in which one had yet to partake would proffer;485 spent losing one's self in the process of living, to find it, with a shock of delight, as the sun rose, as the day sank!486 For these horizons moved with one in all directions, bearing tidings from fellow wanderers--some long lost, some remaining nameless, and others nearest beside; from

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480 Ibid., 161.
481 Ibid., 122.
482 Ibid., 120-122, 142-143.
483 Ibid., 171.
484 Ibid., 138.
485 Ibid., 163.
486 Ibid., 185.
messengers shouldering the burdens of shared fate and fortunes unseen, imparting a legacy of unknown origins to those who would carry on in this adventurous, long, long voyage--this interminable life.\textsuperscript{487}

\textsuperscript{487} Ibid., 162.
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