Oxford University
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THE GREAT DEBATE

Disruptions, identity politics and foreign policy in post-Cold War Greece

A thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

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in ever loving memory of my father

ABSTRACT

In this thesis, I explain the variance of Greek foreign policy outcomes by focusing on its most recent historical period. Since the end of the Cold War, Athens has displayed variance in its foreign policy behavior within and across issues, shifting from co-operation to defection from the international community or opting to stay inactive. I offer an analytical framework in order to understand the causal chain(s) leading to differing policy outcomes. I first discuss the dominant paradigms of IR theory, Liberalism and Realism. Arguably, both go a long way towards explaining the restraints and opportunities of states. However, since both hypotheses internalize states as unitary actors responding to external incentives, many questions are left unanswered. Hence, I also explore whether and to what extent decision-making and ultimately the policy outcome can be understood through the prism of national identity. I underline the continuity of Greek identity through Greece's modern history as an independent state but argue that the variance in Greek foreign policy is the product of an Identity characterized by a structural dichotomy as individuals or groups that attach different meanings to their common Identity can respond very differently to similar challenges. Thus, I examine whether 'soft' and 'hard liners' engaged in what I term a Great Debate on two levels: first, in the wider society amongst Identity Warriors, including the Church, the media and civil society; second, within the political elite, as a more instrumental analysis about end-means relationships in the context of political action must be considered. An enabling environment for the political process is thus created, with 'soft' and 'hard line' political agents struggling to gain the highest level of acceptance of their policies. Through the study of three particular moments in Greece's post-1989 foreign policy story, e.g. the 1999 Greco-Turkish rapprochement, the 2004

Cyprus Annan plan and the 1992 Macedonian name dispute, I examine how this great debate plays out, on both levels of analysis, amongst Identity Warriors and political agents, and under what conditions the policy outcome is determined.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT 3

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 6

1. INTRODUCTION 10

1.1 EMPIRICAL PUZZLE 12

1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 14

1.3 THEORETICAL GAP 18

1.4 CASE STUDY SELECTION 22

1.5 METHODS 24

1.6 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 27

2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 29

2.1 REALIST AND LIBERAL EXPLANATIONS 29

2.2 IDENTITY FRAMEWORK 34

2.2.1 DEFINING IDENTITY 34

2.2.2 CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITY 37

2.2.3 THE GREAT DEBATE: SOFT LINERS VS. HARD LINERS 39

2.2.4 WINNING THE GREAT DEBATE 45

2.3 CONCLUSION 54

3. SYNOPSES OF CASE STUDIES 55

3.1 MACEDONIAN ISSUE (1992) 55

3.2 GREEK – TURKISH RAPPROCHEMENT (1999) 60

3.3 THE ANNAN PLAN (2004) 66

3.4 CONCLUSION **75**

4. REALIST AND LIBERAL EXPLANATIONS **76**

4.1 MACEDONIAN ISSUE (1992) **76**

4.1.1 REALIST PERSPECTIVE 78

4.1.2 LIBERAL PERSPECTIVE 83

4.2 GREEK – TURKISH RAPPROCHEMENT (1999) **86**

4.2.1 REALIST PERSPECTIVE 87

4.2.2 LIBERAL PERSPECTIVE 93

4.3 ANNAN PLAN (2004) **102**

4.3.1 REALIST PERSPECTIVE 102

4.3.2 LIBERAL PERSPECTIVE 108

4.4 CONCLUSION **117**

5. CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY **121**

5.1 A NEW NATION - STATE IS BORN **123**

5.2 THE GREAT IDEA (1844 – 1922) **128**

5.3 HELLENISM (1922 -) **137**

5.4 EUROPEANIZATION (1974 –) **152**

5.5 CONCLUSION **169**

6. THE GREAT DEBATE AMONGST IDENTITY WARRIORS **172**

6.1 MACEDONIAN ISSUE **173**

6.1.1 ALLIANCES OF IDENTITY WARRIORS 177

6.2 GREEK – TURKISH RAPPROCHEMENT **189**

6.2.1 ALLIANCES OF IDENTITY WARRIORS 195

6.3 THE ANNAN PLAN **225**

6.3.1 ALLIANCES OF IDENTITY WARRIORS 235

6.4 CONCLUSION **247**

7. THE GREAT DEBATE WITHIN THE POLITICAL ELITE 252

7.1 MACEDONIAN ISSUE **252**

7.1.1 HARD LINE TERMS ARE SET: THE FIRST LEADERS' COUNCIL (FEBRUARY 18TH 1992) 255

7.1.2 A HARD LINE POLICY IS DECIDED: THE SECOND LEADERS' COUNCIL (APRIL 13TH 1992) 263

7.1.3 NO GOING BACK: THE THIRD LEADERS' COUNCIL (JUNE 14TH 1992) 277

7.1.4 A GOVERNMENT'S ATTEMPTS TO DISENTANGLE ITSELF: THE DAY AFTER THE COUNCILS 282

7.2 GREEK – TURKISH RAPPROCHEMENT **288**

7.2.1 MODERNIZERS AND PASOK SOLIDIFICATION 288

7.2.2 OPPOSITION 293

7.3 THE ANNAN PLAN **296**

7.3.1 THE KARAMANLIS HARD LINE GOVERNMENT 299

7.3.2 THE INFLUENCE OF THE HARD LINE CYPRIOT PRESIDENT 303

7.3.3 AFTER THE TALKS 309

7.3.4 POLITICAL COSTS AND BENEFITS 313

7.4 CONCLUSION **318**

8. CONCLUSION 323

9. BIBLIOGRAPHY 346

1. INTRODUCTION

This is the age of disruption. Disruption is used as a catchphrase or buzz word for the changes and transformations that grip the world. Globalization, technology, innovation, competition and their discontents, all decades in the making, drive communities and nations. Disruption extends across many industries and goes far beyond merely business or the economy. At the time of completing this thesis, the political order is no exception, with, most spectacularly, Brexit, the Trump election in the United States and Macron's victory in France. And foreign policy cannot be expected to remain outside this volatile mix. A nation's place in the world after all reflects, amongst others, its body politic's self-understanding.

As a growing sense of unease settles amongst traditional elites, it is becoming apparent that several political categories we have inherited have grown obsolete. Familiar political divisions between left and right, for instance, appear out of sync with the Identity politics that define an ever-shifting landscape. This new political reality demands new responses in terms of understanding and organizing political discussion or competition, raising more questions than answers about the future.

In this context, a case study on the impact of Identity politics upon a nation's foreign policy can be illuminating both in terms of reflecting on the field and in the search for new hypotheses in order to test and observe together with new analytical tools. For the purposes of this discussion, Greece is the canary in the coal mine. Imagine a country's foreign policy that in close to a decade and a half (1990 - 2004) championed the so-called world's most stupid issue, moved from what has been described as a policy of

sovereignty that makes one do strange things, to the greatest policy reversal of a decade, and, after working hard to achieve it, torpedoes the greatest opportunity in a generation to solve an international issue. Indeed, for a small sized, by global standards, country that is an established member of the world's most exclusive clubs, Greece's foreign policy choices have drawn the attention of frequently perplexed and, on occasion, flabbergasted allies, partners and friends. Unflattering comments and outright criticisms have been reserved for Athens, as practitioners and observers of international relations alike have tried to explain a foreign policy that can appear random, fitful, or capricious, causing dismay, apprehension and disbelief.

Identity politics in democracies is directly associated with debate regarding the sense of belonging, and often vigorous, robust, forceful and at times vitriolic engagement and push back. In this sense, this is a story of an ongoing contest between two fundamentally different outlooks. There is a long tradition of analogous 'Great Debates' in foreign policy, particularly within great powers such as the United States.[1] Countries with a lighter footprint in international relations, however, are not immune to such contestations. The case of Greece is characteristic. Since the end of the Cold War, where our story begins, Greece was confronted with strategic decisions on all its major foreign policy fronts.

This thesis is about a great debate that delineates Greek foreign policy. It is about national identity, those agents that filter public discourse and their influence on domestic politics, the political elites and ultimately policy outcomes. It is about the interaction between catalytic events in international affairs and domestic discourse.

[1] Morgenthau, H., (1952), *Another "Great Debate," the National Interests of the United States,* In *The American Political Science Review 46*, no. 4: 961-88.

Consequently, it is about a struggle, a great debate, between those I label as soft and hard liners, that defines Greece's place in the world.

1.1 Empirical puzzle

Since the end of the Cold War, Greek foreign policy has largely focused on three areas of ongoing disputes: The one between Athens and Skopje over the name Macedonia; Greece's charged bilateral relations with Turkey that even brought the two countries to the verge of war; and the Cyprus question, an issue of ethnic tensions, military invasion and division. Interestingly, Athens has displayed variance in its foreign policy behavior within and across issues, shifting from co-operation to defection from the international community or opting to stay inactive.

Macedonia: One of the most intriguing narratives of Greek defection from international co-operation is all about a name. The issue climaxed in 1992 when Athens decided not to recognize its northern neighbor with the name Macedonia or any of its derivatives. This constituted a significant deviation from decade-old practice. Until the end of the Cold War, Athens noted its denial of the existence of a so-called Macedonian nation but did not object outright to the use of the name. Since then, and for over two decades, Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) have quarreled over the name the latter chose when it declared independence from Yugoslavia, which Athens vehemently contests, citing cultural, historical, and national security reasons. The dispute escalated to the highest level of international mediation when the UN appointed a special envoy in 1993.

Turkey: Comparatively, in 1999, Greece approached its relationship with Turkey in the spirit of co-operation. Athens and Ankara have a long and complicated history, "*featuring a rich, diverse and explosive repertoire of crises*."[2] After lying largely dormant for a few decades, their differences resurfaced in the 1970s in the aftermath of Turkey's invasion and occupation of northern Cyprus. Ever since then, the two NATO allies have contested strategic and commercial questions such as the fate of minorities and sovereignty over the Aegean. Their arms race resulted in two of the highest percentages of military expenditures amongst NATO allies.[3] In 1999, however, Greek foreign policy changed course. After decades of vetoing Turkish accession to the European Union, Athens became one of its most committed champions.

Cyprus: In 2004, Greece, for all intents and purposes, de facto withdrew from the last phase of negotiations on the UN- sponsored Annan plan that was offered as a solution to the Cyprus problem. The Cyprus dispute had vexed Athens since the early 1950s. The 1960 Zurich and London agreements, which became the basis for the constitution of the newly independent Cyprus, were in large part the result of strong Greek pressure on their Greek – Cypriot brethren. Since the 1974 Turkish invasion, a response to the Greek Junta's coup d' état on the island, Athens actively participated in all reunification talks. Beginning in the 1990s, Greece waged a diplomatic battle on two fronts: working towards Cypriot accession to the European Union; and, at the same time, energetically pushing for what was described as a 'just and viable' settlement. In 2004, however, Greek foreign policy experienced a sea change, adopting an inactive or passive position.

[2] Loizides, N., (2012), *Securing Nations Manipulating Masses, the Greek-Turkish Neighborhood*, in *Conference on Advancing the Scientific Study of Conflict and Co-operation* , University of Essex.

[3] Zaras, F., (2012), *A Rational Choice Approach of Greek-Turkish Relations: The Greek Case*, Queen Mary University of London.

1.2 Research question and conceptual framework

How can we explain Greece's variance in foreign policy outcomes? Why was Greece intransigent in the Macedonian issue, co-operative in the Greek – Turkish relations and passive or inactive over the Cyprus problem? In providing an explanation, my goal will be to offer a conceptual framework that will shed light on the causal chain(s) leading to these differing policy outcomes.

I will first discuss the application of the dominant paradigms of International Relations (IR) theory, Liberalism and Realism, to Greek foreign policy choices. Both go a long way towards explaining the restraints and opportunities of states. These 'grand theories,' however, do not sufficiently explain the variation in Greek foreign policy. Realism, on the one hand, is helpful as the starting point of the causal pathway as it identifies the structural limitations of foreign policy actors. However, its overemphasis on material capacity fails to capture the complex, intricate and multidimensional contexts of decision making. Liberalism, on the other hand, with its emphasis on complex interdependence within the international community in general, and the impact of the European Union in particular, enables us to make considerable progress in the causal pathway, although its tendency to underestimate the political and social processes within states results in a blind spot.[4]

[4] Katzenstein, P., (1996), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New York; Chichester: Columbia University Press.

Indeed, both Realism and Liberalism mostly hypothesize states as unitary actors responding to external incentives and tend to exclude the 'home front' variable from the equation. In other words, "*the internal attributes of states, are given by assumption rather than treated as variables*."[5] Hence, it is assumed that states have stable preferences across outcomes and that they possess a fixed ability to mobilize domestic bargaining resources.[6] Nevertheless, empirical evidence suggests that even when faced with the same challenge, states can, and often do, react very differently. A relevant example is the relationship between Bulgaria and FYROM. Greece and Bulgaria are historically equally involved in the Macedonian question. From the late 19th Century, Greece and Bulgaria collided in an irredentist struggle to claim lands within the borders of present day FYROM. Interestingly, up to this day, Bulgaria officially does not recognize the existence of a Macedonian nation. Nevertheless, contrary to Athens, Sofia was one of the first capitals that recognized FYROM with its constitutional name and has not placed any obstacles in its international path.

I will introduce a third theoretical pillar that is based on constructivism and has Identity as a core component. Constructivism focuses on what Searle,[7] in line with Durkheim's[8] theory, called "*social facts*," things like money, sovereignty, and rights, which have no material reality but exist only because people collectively believe they exist and act accordingly. In the study of IR, "*constructivism is about human consciousness and its role in international life*."[9] It is about the role of ideas, beliefs, norms, knowledge,

[5] Keohane, R., (1986), *Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism. Realism and Beyond.* In ed. Keohane, R., *NeoRealism and Its Critics, the Political Economy of International Change*, New York: Columbia University Press, 165.

[6] Evans, P., Jacobson, H., and Putnam, R., (1993), *Double-Edged Diplomacy : International Bargaining and Domestic Politics*, Berkeley: London: University of California Press, 7.

[7] Searle, J., (1995), *The Construction of Social Reality*, New York: Free Press.

[8] Durkheim, E., (1982), *The Rules of the Sociological Method*, New York: Free Press, 50-59.

[9] Ruggie, J., (1998), *Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization*, London: Routledge, 866.

culture, and discourse in politics, emphasizing the role of collectively held or "*inter-subjective*" ideas and understandings in social life.[10]

In this sense, I argue that some more eclectic theorizing could add value with a two-fold purpose: First, accept the consensus amongst most scholars that there are strong links between the external and internal environments.[11] Putnam, for example, famously presented a metaphor of a "*two level game*:" statesmen are strategically positioned between two "*tables*," one representing domestic politics and the other international negotiation. To conclude a successful negotiation, the statesman must bargain on these two tables, both reaching an international agreement and also securing its domestic ratification.[12] Second, accommodate both ideational and material structures in an integrated model that influences decision-making wherein they are treated as complimentary rather than as mutually exclusive.[13] Indeed, as Weber noted, an "*elective affinity*" is at work between ideas and material circumstance,[14] and this view is mirrored in IR literature in a number of different ways.[15] Therefore, interests will not

[10] Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K., (2001), *Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics*, Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci., 4:391–416.

Adler, E., (1997), *Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics*. In European Journal of International Relations, vol.3 no. 3:319-363.

Wendt, A., (1999), *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[11] For an analysis of "national-international linkages" see Rosenau, J.,(ed.) (1969), *International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory*. New York: Free Press; London: Collier-Macmillan; Keohane, R., and Nye, J., (1977), *Power and Independence: World Politics in Transition*, Boston: Little Brown. For the international system and domestic politics explanations of state behavior: Waltz, K., (1979), *Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power*. In *Theory of International Relations*. New York: McGraw-Hill, (1979), 102-28.; George A., (1980), *Domestic Constraints on Regime Change in U. S. Foreign Policy*, In *Change in the International System*, ed. Holsti, R., Siverson, R., and George A.. Boulder, CO Westview Press.; Knecht, T., and Weatherford, S., (2006), *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: The Stages of Presidential Decision Making*. In International Studies Quarterly 50(2006): 705-27. ; Nye Jr, (2002), *The American National Interest and Global Public Goods*, International Affairs 78, no. 2. ;John, A., Sullivan, J., and Eugene, B., (1989), *Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting: Do Presidential Candidates "Waltz Before a Blind Audience?"*, The American Political Science Review 83, no. 1 (1989). For a US approach, Alastair, S.,(1998), *International Crises and Domestic Politics*, ibid.92, no. 3.; Schultz, K., *Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises*, ibid., no. 4.

[12] Putnam, R., (1988), *Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games*, International Organization. 42: 427–460. doi:10.1017/S0020818300027697.

[13] Pouloit, V., (2007), defines this as 'post-foundationalist constructivism' in his *"Subjectivism": Toward a Constructivist Methodology*, International Studies Quarterly 51, no. 2: 364. See also Fearon, J. and Wendt, A.,(2002), *Rationalism Vs. Constructivism, a Skeptical View*, in Handbook of International Relations, ed. Carlsnaes, Risse, and Simmons, p.52.

[14] Weber, M., (1958), *Social Psychology of the World Religions*, London: Oxford University Press.

[15] Goldstein J., and Keohane, R., (1993), *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*, Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press.

Katzenstein, P., (1996), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New York; Chichester: Columbia University Press.

Wendt, A., (1999), *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

be taken as given or fixed but as the product of social construction under internal and external influences.

My purpose is to develop a constructivist Identity framework that, in line with the existing literature, will both complement and challenge the worldviews of Realism and Liberalism. It should be underlined that this is not a hypothesis-testing endeavor and therefore I will not join the theoretical debate on the merits of each paradigm, the strengths and weaknesses of which have been extensively discussed for decades. For the purposes of this thesis I will not try to prove or disprove structural explanations but instead attempt to delineate what each approach offers towards explaining the puzzle of Greek foreign policy. Indeed, I do not want to offer a new theory, but inspired by Katzenstein to "*redress*" the imbalance between structural approaches and Identity-based frameworks in Greek foreign policy.[16]

To this end, I will try to understand whether, and to what extent, decision-making and ultimately the policy outcome can be understood through the prism of Identity. I argue that the variance in Greek foreign policy is the product of an Identity characterized by a structural dichotomy. Hence, I will test whether those I will define as soft and hard liners engage in a Great Debate on two levels: (a) amongst so-called Identity Warriors, including the Church, civil society or the media, and (b) within the political elite, including policy makers such as the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs or Members of Parliament. In other words, I will argue that Identity construction, both as a prior and as an evolving phenomenon, influences the enabling environment for decision making. The political context together with each policy proposition's level of

[16] Katzenstein, P., (1996), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New York; Chichester: Columbia University Press.

acceptance by public opinion must also be considered, as well as the notion of political cost for the government. I will argue that winning the Great Debate necessitates full engagement in the Identity war; and meeting at least three conditions: establishing a strong reference to the people, dividing the social and political plateau, and taking advantage of the diachronic institutionalization of cardinal themes of National Identity.

1.3 Theoretical gap

Several studies, particularly within the field of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), have discussed policy shifts and the impact of ideas in general and Identity in particular.[17] In this context, this research proceeds in dialogue with FPA literature. The purpose of FPA is to explain how foreign policy decision-making occurs within states, utilizing interdisciplinary insights to explain specific events and generate policy-relevant knowledge. The inherent difficulty with FPA, however, is that the discussion is dealing with abstractions or 'what is in people's heads.' This discussion is amongst others related to multiple and at times contradictory perceptions of national goals. Perceptions, however, can be shaped by Identity, which is infamously hard to pin down[18], generating a vicious circle.

A plethora of arguments offering theoretical frameworks on the impact of Identity upon foreign policy could be used in an attempt to solve the paradox of Greek foreign policy.[19] Indeed, various significant and noteworthy FPA theoretical frameworks have

[17] Beasley, R., (2013), *Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective: Domestic and International Influences on State Behavior*, London, Thousand Oaks, California: CQ Press.

[18] Hudson, V., (2007), *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classical and Contemporary Theory*, Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield, 105.

[19] Goldstein, J., and Keohane, R., (1993), *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*, Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press.

been constructed around single case studies: Significantly, Campbell discussed an Identity that dominates social discourse across time and all expressions of a state's foreign policy follow a clear pattern;[20] or Huntington reflected on a society that is consumed by a total event such as 9/11.[21] In the same vein, scholars have examined domestic politics and the utilization of Identity in the service of partisan political interest,[22] including in Greece;[23] or analyzed a single issue.[24]

In these contexts, Identity can be understood as "*penetrat(ing) every pore of the social body*,"[25] acquiring a *"life of their (its) own*."[26] In this sense, agents sleepwalk towards the predetermined policy outcome as, to quote Marx, "*Sie wissen das nicht, aber sie tun es*" ("they do not know it, but they are doing it").[27] In the words of Gellner: "*those … historic agents know not what they do.*"[28] In the case of Greece, a similar point is made by Stefanides on the Macedonian issue who concluded that responses "*may appear almost subconscious*."[29]

These frameworks offer important contributions to the debate. However, their weakness lies in their sweeping and all-embracing character, because, frequently, these

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George A., (1969), *A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making*, International Studies Quarterly. Vol. 13, No. 2: 190-222.
Hudson, V., (2007), *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classical and Contemporary Theory*, Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield.

[20] Campbell, D., (1988), *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.

[21] Huntington, S., (2004), *Who Are We: The Challenges to America's National Identity*, NY: Simon and Shuster, 20.

[22] De Mequita, B. (2002), *Domestic Politics and International Relations*, International Studies Quarterly, 46:1–9.

Fearon, J., (1994), *Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes*, American Political Science Review 88:577–592.

[23] Zahariades, N., (2005), *Essence of Political Manipulation: Emotion, Institutions, and Greek Foreign Policy*, New York: Peter Lang.

Constas, D., (1995), *Challenges to Greek Foreign Policy: Domestic and External Parameters.* In Constas, D. and Stavrou, T., (eds.), *Greece Prepares for the Twenty-first Century*, Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.

Ioakimidis, P., *The Model of Foreign Policy-Making in Greece: Personalities Versus Institutions.* In Stavridis, S., Couloumbis, T., Veremis, T., and Waites, N., (1999) (eds.) *The Foreign Policies of the European Union's Mediterranean States and Applicant Counries in the 1990s*, Basingstoke: MacMillan.

[24] Agnantopoulos, A., (2005), *The Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy: A Conceptual Framework and an Empirical Application in Greek-Turkish Relations.* Paper presented at the 2nd LSE Symposium on Modern Greece, London.

[25] Žižek, S., *The Spectre of Ideology.* The Žižek Reader. ed. Wright E. and Wright. E., Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1999: p.67.

[26] Hunt, M., (1987), *Ideology and U.S Foreign Policy*, New Haven: Yale University.

[27] Marx, K., Engels, F., - Werke, Band 23, *"Das Kapital"*, Bd. I, Erster Abschnitt, S.49 – 98. Dietz Verlag, Berlin/ DDR 1968.

[28] Hutchison, J., (1994), *Nationalism and High Cultures in Nationalism*, New York, p.65.

[29] Stefanides, I., (2007), *Stirring the Greek Nation. Political Culture, Irredentism and Anti-Americanism in Post-War Greece, 1945–1967*, VT: Ashgate.

analyses tend to be equally elusive and intuitive, acting as 'explanations of last resort.' Arguably, in line with Hudson's thought, they do not propose a "*crucial experiment*" that would falsify (or not) the hypothesis that Identity influences decision-making in foreign policy.[30] Indeed, pre-assuming a fixed Identity these frameworks fail to explain variance in foreign policy.

Nevertheless, contrary to expectations, the actual variance of Greek foreign policy presents a paradox. In two out of the three cases, the expectations based on a fixed Identity, addressed in such scholarly discussions, were not realized, as, in the case of Greek – Turkish relations, Athens chose co-operation with the international community, and in the case of Cyprus opted to stay inactive. Indeed, a static Identity that dominates social discourse would create the following expectations in the case of Greece. More analytically:

In the case of the Macedonian name issue, the impact of Identity, based on the Greekness of Macedonia, creates the expectation for defection from international co-operation. In a region gripped by uncertainty after the end of the Cold War, and as nationalisms awakened, Greece was worried that allowing Skopje to claim the name Macedonia would give the latter an advantage if and when they had future designs on territory in Northern Greece. This threat perception was grounded in a national sense of historical continuity and drew a connection between Alexander the Great and modern times; the significance of the Macedonian heartland as a battleground for competing Identity claims; the national self-perception that cultivated a missionary sense of European superiority vis-à-vis the Balkans; and a prevalent siege mentality. Thus, the

[30] Hudson, V., (2007), *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classical and Contemporary Theory*, Boulder, Colorado: Rowman and Littlefield, p.107.

name of Macedonia, as a signifier with great symbolic resonance, epitomized Greek National Identity.

In the case of Turkey, Greeks would be expected to remain hostage to long-standing narratives of animosity and competition and to choose defection. Historically, Greece and Turkey are strategic rivals, and Ankara is perceived in Greek National Identity as the perennial 'other.' Turkey is thus seen as an aggressive 'bully' that attempts to usurp the status quo by circumventing international law in the process. This siege mentality and sense of victimization, which goes way back to the Ottoman times and intensified with the Asia Minor catastrophe, together with deeply ingrained national prejudices, informed decision making. For decades, the Greek foreign policy dogma was based upon the premise that, contrary to Ankara, which engages in revisionist policies, Athens only wishes to safeguard the status quo as it is grounded in international law. Seen from this rather legalistic perspective, Greece did not demand anything from Turkey and therefore had no reason to engage in talks or negotiations that were "*ruled out as 'appeasement'…further fueling Turkey's expansionism*."[31]

In the case of the 2004 Cyprus reunification talks, the charged nature of the Cyprus question in Greek national discourse, defection would also be expected. Events in Cyprus, as a symbol of wider Hellenism that exceeds national borders, are vivid examples of Turkish 'otherness,' are internalized in Greek National Identity as Turkish expansionism and a constant reaffirmation of Turkey's 'violent' and 'barbaric' character. The very concept of a possible cohabitation of Greeks and Turks on the island challenges core Greek Identity claims. Moreover, the Annan plan could be perceived

[31] Ibid.di

as a minimalist compromise whose terms were synonymous with surrender to Turkish hostility and international pressure.

1.4 Case study selection

Interestingly, so far, the variance of Greek foreign policy has not been elaborated upon, and the aforementioned three specific instances of critical changes in the foreign policy behavior of Greek decision-makers have not been compared and contrasted within one single framework. On a stand-alone basis, however, each case has been the subject of considerable analysis. Thus, a structured and focused comparative cross–time study will be attempted here, and three case studies will be discussed with the purpose of presenting a balanced analysis of decision-making.

Arguably, the Macedonian issue in 1992, Greek-Turkish relations in 1999 and the Cyprus problem in 2004 are comparable in all respects except for the outcome. I examine the foreign policy of one country, which in three instances has three different reactions, thus maximizing variance on the outcome. At the same time, the phenomena being studied are analytically equivalent. A key factor is their paramount importance in Greek foreign policy, which is reflected in the statements of generations of policy makers. Not coincidently, all three have been labeled 'national issues' by the Greeks themselves. Indeed, no UN General Assembly speech by a Greek representative has failed to highlight all three and, on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, only these topics are discussed at length.[32]

[32] http://www.mfa.gr/en/

Moreover, whether from the perspective of Realism, Liberalism or Identity, all three cases have common denominators. In terms of Realism, each case relates to the state's security and sovereignty as it is associated with explicit or implicit territorial arrangements. It is not a coincidence that each issue has related to violent conflict during the 20th century. In terms of Liberalism, each foreign policy shift related to a catalytic event within the context of the end of the Cold War, the European Union and the European environment of enlargement, convergence and unification that prevailed in the post-1989 period. Within the context of Identity, all three cases have loaded and charged historical backgrounds that make them relevant to Identity politics: The Macedonian issue first caught the attention of Athens policy makers at the turn of the 20th century; the roots of Greek – Turkish problems can be traced to the Greek war of independence in 1821, the Cyprus problem has vexed Greek foreign policy since the early 1950s.

Case studies are usually criticized for selection bias. I would argue that the choice of topics excludes such a bias as no other Greek foreign policy issue's significance rivals these three. A question may arise regarding the chronological instances I have chosen to examine, as I have followed the advice of Bennet and George and have opted to focus on a "*well-defined aspect of a historical period*."[33] Indeed, although all three foreign policy questions can be understood as covering the entirety of the post-Cold War period to the present day, I have chosen to focus on a point in time when a critical policy decision was made. Each decision entailed a major foreign policy change, arguably representing the diplomatic climax of each issue since the end of the Cold War.

[33] George, A. and Bennett, A., (2005), *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, Cambridge: MIT Press, p.29.

Moreover, the decisions made at these critical junctures (1992, 1999, 2004) have clear legacy effects shaping foreign policy for more than a decade each.

1.5 Methods

Having generated a research framework, I attempt to develop case studies that are systematically structured, facilitating comparisons, detecting regularities between variables, delineating their limitations, and exploring the research's potential for replicability. Moreover, I can develop historical explanations, attain a satisfactory degree of construct validity and reach contingent generalizations that can apply to typologically parallel cases.

In the discussion of the case studies, I follow the example of historians such as Hunt, and theorists such as Huntington, and to a large extent assemble "*fragments of historical evidence and interpretation, some of it doubtless familiar to my readers, into a new pattern."*[34] This is an exercise, Hunt notes, that is "*intended to provide new insights into the past and provoke fresh thinking about the present*."[35] In this context, the greatest challenge in conducting analysis stems from the real need to retain metrological integrity and discipline, while dealing with such wide ranging primary and secondary material. At the same time, I follow the advice of George and Bennet and attempt to follow a chronological order within the discussion of the case studies to decipher the key causal moments.[36]

[34] Hunt, M., (2009), *Ideology and US Foreign Policy*, New Haven: Yale University Press, xi.
[35] Ibid.
[36] George, A. and Bennett, A., (2005), *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

I have therefore adopted an inductive approach, working from the bottom up, aiming at evidence-based explanations, even ad-hoc, on a case-to-case basis. Thus, I proceed first to delineate specific observations and second their relationship with generalizations. I identify the variables and search for the empirical manifestations of an underlying causal mechanism. In this context, my goal is not to offer a 'total history' but to decipher multiple interactions' effects and complex relationships. I struggle with the so-called degrees of freedom problem with too many variables and too few case studies. Therefore, in the conceptual framework, I propose a constant variable whose causal weight I will estimate. Moreover, competing explanations can be equally consistent, in others words all interpretations can be part of the explanation. In response, I follow George and Bennett and "*identify different turning points in the causal chain and sort out which independent variables explain each step in the causal chain*."[37]

For the purposes of this research, I have assembled a considerable body of primary evidence that will contribute towards producing original work. I have conducted extensive research in the archives, unearthing documents that will for the first time be publicly released, including for example the minutes of internal meetings of the Greek leadership in the case of Macedonia. These will be made public for the first time and offer significant new evidence of decision-making behind closed doors. Access to these documents was secured through the Foundation that keeps the records which has also provided the minutes to certain representatives of the media.

I have also conducted extensive interviews with four former Prime Ministers, three former Ministers of Foreign Affairs, deputy ministers, a considerable number of

[37] Ibid., 26.

diplomats and MFA experts, political appointees, political counselors, editors and journalists some on record amd some on background. I am extremely grateful for their time and especially for the new insights some have offered. Certain interviewees have asked that their anonymity be protected in order to speak candidly and freely. I have diversified my research considerably and follow a systematic approach in terms of sources, to ensure that I do not overplay one item, for example an interview or a document, however original. Moreover, during interviews, I have attempted to guard myself against the 'old men forget syndrome' or the tendency to re-write history self-servingly. In this context, I address each material as "*purposeful communication*."[38] Thus, I examine, "*who is speaking to whom, for what purpose and under what circumstances*."[39] On a personal note, and in the interest of full disclosure, I should point to the fact that Prime Minister Mitsotakis (1990-1993), one of the protagonists of the case study on Macedonia, was my grandfather. I have tried to the best of my ability to retain my academic integrity and objectivity in writing this thesis with the hope that I have not been too harsh in my criticisms.

Finally, Kaarbo correctly suggests that "*analysts typically retreat to the collective elite because they assess Identity through elite statements*."[40] Thus, this research looks beyond the political leadership and the foreign policy apparatus to those individuals or groups that in one way or the other may have an impact on public consciousness. After all, as Hudson notes: "*discourse and interaction within our society are the engines of National Identity. The jokes we tell ourselves on late-night television, the op-ed columns in our newspapers, the blogs, the radio talk shows, the books and movies, our dinner*

[38] George, A. and Bennett, A., (2005), *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, Cambridge: MIT Press, p.33.
[39] Ibid., 24.
[40] Garisson, J., (ed.), *Foreign Policy Analysis in 20/20: A Symposium*, International Studies Review 5, 155-202.

table conversations – all these inform and over time help change the answers"[41] to our questions. To this end, I have tapped into newspaper and journal archives and analyzed opinion poll data. I have also consulted a range of secondary sources from diverse fields including certain newspaper cartoons.

1.6 Structure of the thesis

The structure of the case studies that I will discuss will develop as follows: In the first chapter, I will discuss the conceptual framework developed for the purposes of this thesis which wishes to shed light on the riddle of variance in Greek foreign policy. In the second chapter, I will offer a short introductory narrative of events in each case study. In the third chapter, I will analyze the application of the dominant paradigms of IR, Realism and Liberalism, and to what extent they explain the restraints and opportunities of states, without however sufficiently deciphering changes in Greek foreign policy. Without attempting to engage in hypothesis testing, I will note the contributions of each paradigm in the understanding of each case study. In the fourth chapter, I will discuss the construction of National Identity, the links between domestic and foreign policy and the historical record of the Great Debate between soft liners and hard liners. To this end, this discussion will focus on the themes of Greek National Identity and its evolution of Greek from the birth of a new nation, to the 'Great Idea,' 'Hellenism' and Europeanization. My final two chapters will be dedicated to the unfolding of the Great Debate within the case studies: In the fifth chapter, I will discuss the Great Debate amongst alliances of Identity Warriors. In the sixth chapter, I will

[41] Hudson, V., (2007), *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classical and Contemporary Theory*, Boulder, Colorado: Rowman and Littlefield, p.106.

analyze the political process and the connection between domestic politics and the policy outcome. In the conclusion of the thesis, I will relate my discussion to the introduction and the conceptual framework, delineate any observable patterns that make us understand outcomes, and consider whether this discussion is generalizable. My research objective is to access causal effects; enable specific predictions for Greek foreign policy particularly since cases are ongoing.

2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The purpose of this chapter is to present a conceptual framework that explains the variance of Greek foreign policy. To this end, I will first explore the contributions applying the Realist and Liberal paradigms and then I turn my attention to Identity and its explanatory potential. In the introduction, I have highlighted a gap in the bibliographical debate, which tends to focus on Identity as a constant variable that does not adjust to changing times and circumstances. In response, I hypothesize that Identity, at least in the case of Greece, is not static but displays a form of cognitive dissonance. The bibliography of Greek Identity opens a causal pathway as it suggests that Identity is the outcome of the ongoing battle between two conflicting streams, soft vs. hard liners, relating Identity construction with the political process. I proceed to offer the proposal that if indeed this conflict can be observed in the realm of foreign policy making then it would explain the wide variety of foreign policy outcomes. Moreover, I attempt to provide a roadmap of alternative causal pathways that decodes decision making. To this end, I discuss the political process, the key conditions for winning the Great Debate and the historical advantage of hard liners.

2.1 Realist and Liberal explanations

Overall, a Realist reading of Greek foreign policy would focus on certain facts that influence the country's strategic strengths and weaknesses and help delineate its constraints and opportunities, including the geo-strategic position of Greece, a medium sized country with a long history of political turmoil and economic hardship, in an

unstable and hostile neighborhood. It would, particularly, emphasize the adverse balance of power with Turkey and the uneven distribution of resources. In this context, emblematically, the purges of Istanbul's Greek minority in the 1950s and 1960s, the Turkish invasion and occupation of Cyprus in 1974, and the perceived systematic threats posed to Greek sovereignty in the Aegean, along with the communist threat stemming from the north during the Cold War, can be categorized as further proof of the country's need to help itself in terms of guaranteeing and strengthening its security despite its membership in a variety of international organizations. Greece's exceptionally high defensive expenditures and its use of vetoes regarding the accession of its neighbors, Turkey or FYROM, to international organizations, can and have been understood as real politic par excellence.[42]

Indeed, few disagree that the material context influences foreign policy makers. Even for Wendt "*it is not ideas all the way down, for there is a material reality ruling out certain ideas somewhere: for example, landlocked Malawi is never going to be a naval power*"[43] or in the case of South Eastern Europe, at the very minimum, Greece is destined by geography to live next to Turkey. Nevertheless, it is not always possible to safely predict the response of states to changing material circumstances. In the case of Macedonia, for example, policy makers in Greece had more than one Realist option available. In other words, although it is tempting to conclude with hindsight that a certain policy decision was inevitable based on a reading of material circumstances, such an analysis would underestimate that Realism leaves open more than one alternative path. Moreover, these options can and have been contested by conflicting

[42] Hudson, V., (2007), *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classical and Contemporary Theory*, Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield, p. 11.
[43] Ibid.,10.

constituencies, all of which expressed a Realist worldview. The Realist drivers that pushed for the Greek Turkish rapprochement of 1999, for example, were visible for several years while Greece continued vetoing Turkish accession to Europe. Similarly, the Realist arguments that pushed one Greek government to openly support the Annan plan could have influenced its successor that chose instead to disengage from the issue. In other words, Realism alone makes predictions for the future strenuously since the same instance could lead to two often competing and contradictory conclusions.

From the perspective of Liberalism, overall, emphasis would lie on the drivers of co-operation, alliances and partnerships, which form international institutions. After all, Athens has been historically deeply embedded in multilateral frameworks demonstrating considerable agility. Greece was a founding member of the UN and one of the early Security Council non-permanent members in 1952-1953 and again in 2007-2008. Together with Turkey, it joined NATO in 1952, and a membership in the European Community in 1981 made Greece the first country in South-Eastern Europe to participate in both organizations. Greece's acceptance into the Euro zone in 2002 was seen within the country as the crowning achievement of 50 years' worth of foreign policy making.

Arguably, Liberalism travels a greater distance than Realism on the causal pathway particularly because of Greek membership in the EEC, the EC and later the EU. Europeanization has been widely discussed in literature. Radaelli defines Europeanization as: "*a process involving, a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things' and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and*

consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and sub national) discourse, political structures and public choices."[44] Thus, theoretically, its roots run far and deep, encapsulating political, social and economic dynamics. "*Europeanization, 'Southern style' has also been identified with a process of deep transformation and modernization of economies, polities, and societies.*"[45]

The theoretical exploration of the link between Liberalism and Europeanization, however, lies outside the scope of this thesis. For the purposes of the discussion of the Liberalism paradigm, the domestic consequences of Europeanization are secondary to the primary impact on foreign policy behavior of the participation in the European system. Therefore, from this perspective, 'Europe' was internalized in Athens primarily as a "*system of political solidarity*."[46] In his speech on the occasion of the signature of the ratification treaty in 1979, Prime Minister Karamanlis (1956-1965 and 1974-1980) stated: "*Our accession to a United Europe…(will)… above all strengthen the security of our country against external dangers*."[47] Indeed, Greek leadership at the time: "*firmly argued in favor of the need to deeply anchor Greece in western European integration and the transatlantic security community. These were clearly articulated foreign policy priorities considered by Karamanlis as strategic priorities for Greece's national security and even its political survival*."[48] This comprehension of Europe endured through time as the statement of Prime Minister Mitsotakis (1990-1993), more

[44] Cini, M., (2007), *European Union Politics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 407.

[45] Anastasakis, O., (2005), *The Europeanization of the Balkans*, Brown Journal of World Affairs, Volume XII, Issue 1: 79.

[46] Valinakis, Y., (1994): *Security Policy*. In Kazakos, K. and Ioakimidis, P., *Greece and EU Membership Evaluated*, London, Pinter, p.200.

[47] Speech by Karamanlis at the Zappeion 2013 (Accessed September 13, 2013), Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_QIfSAIRAdI (Should note that this is in Greek and the translation is the author's own.)

[48] Gropas, R., Kouki, H., and Triandafylidou, A., (2011), *Identity Construction Programs of the State and the EU.* IMEP Identities and Modernities in Europe. Work Package 5. ELIAMEP.

than a decade after Greek accession, underlined: "*Europe offers us security… (O)ur frontiers will henceforth be defended by a united Europe*."[49]

The influence of European membership on Greek foreign policy has been widely heralded in literature as "*one of the most remarkable developments over the past years has been the steady progress towards the Europeanization of Greece's foreign and security policy.*" [50] Alternatively, in other words: "*First, Europeanization is used to describe a process through which Greece has been transformed from an awkward partner that consistently deviated from EU consensus on foreign policy issues to an "orthodox" member-state and champion of European integration*."[51]

The Liberal paradigm, however, only goes so far in terms of explaining foreign policy behavior. Athens is not alone amongst member-states in using the diplomatic levers, the bargaining power and negotiating capacity gained as a European member, to further its own perceived national goals. Greece, however, on the one hand, consistently attempts to draw its EU partners into the disputes as support and, on the other hand, resists the European philosophy of mutually beneficial compromises, or 'win-wins,' going so far as to threaten the very bridges of co-operation it had been building when it comes to foreign policy issues that dominate its public discourse. This is the case, paradoxically, despite Greece's display of a strong and unyielding support for the project of European integration and, especially since the late 1980s, of any type of

[49] Valinakis, Y., (1994), *Security Policy*. In Kazakos, K. and Ioakimidis, P., *Greece and EU Membership Evaluated*, London, Pinter p.208.

[50] Ioakimidis, P., (2000), *The Europeanisation of Greece's Foreign Policy: Progress and Problems.* In *Contemporary Greece and Europe*, edited by Mitsos, A. and Mossialos, E., Surrey: Ashgate, p.359.

[51] Agnantopoulos, A., (2005), *The Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy: A Conceptual Framework and an Empirical Application in Greek-Turkish Relations.* Paper presented at the 2nd LSE Symposium on Modern Greece, London.

Heinz-Jurgen, A., (1997), *National Interests on Top of the Agenda: Greece's Role in Common Foreign and Security Policy*. In Axt Heinz-Jurgen (ed.), *Greece and the European Union: Stranger Among Patrners?*, Baden-Baden: Nomos.

Valinakis, Y., (1993), *Greece in European Political Co-operation: The First Ten Years.* In *Greece in the European Community: The Challenge of Adjustment*. Edited by Tsoukalis, L., Athens: EKEM.

federal unification. In this context, for example, Greece's position regarding Macedonia increased the country's isolation within European fora, while its European membership was already two decades old when Greece embarked on its rapprochement with Turkey.

2.2 Identity framework

For the purposes of this thesis, I strive to understand the role of Identity not only in theory but also in practice. The conceptual framework that I offer seeks to integrate Identity and domestic politics. I will systematically explore both the social construction of the Identity of the Greek nation and the political processes that resulted in each policy outcome. In this sense, this thesis is about how Identity construction, both as a prior and as an evolving phenomenon, not only determines but is also used by various agents who hold different views of Identity. This Great Debate, between competing factions, and the accompanying power struggle, define the policy outcome depending on each proposition's level of social acceptance.

2.2.1 Defining Identity

Within IR, Identity has attracted multiple definitions in bibliography. Amongst others, Campbell defined Identity, in relation to difference, as performatively constituted. He argued that the constitution of Identity is achieved through the inscription of boundaries that serve to demarcate an "*inside*" from an "*outside*," a "*self*" from an "*other*," a "*domestic*" from a "*foreign*."[52] Similarly, Huntington stressed the value of the "*significant other*" in terms of shaping or projecting Identity.[53] I base this framework

[52] Campbell, D., (1998), *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
[53] Huntington, S., (2004), *Who Are We: The Challenges to America's National Identity*, NY: Simon and Shuster.

on the definition of Identity provided by Katzestein who associated the concept with four characteristics: 1) the term is a "*label for construction of nation – and statehood*"; 2) this process is "*typically explicitly political and pits conflicting actors against each other*"; 3) Identity "*depicts varying national ideologies of collective distinctiveness and purpose*"; and 4) it is "*enacted domestically and projected internationally*."[54]

I suggest that such politics of Identity, inferred by this definition, can be understood within the context of the distribution of power. Identity plays a central role because without it the only way for societies to survive is, as Burke suggests, "*the fear of the gallows*."[55] This premise goes back to Plato and his Republic when, to promote unity in the state, Socrates proposed to the epoch's equivalent of an elite the myth of a 'noble lie.' Indeed, "*the state is not only an agent of violence but also an agent of visions that mobilize the greatest majority*."[56]

In this sense, to the performative dimensions of Identity, one should add its capacity for legitimizing a dominant political power.[57] As famously noted by Gallie, "*power is an essentially contested concept*."[58] Barnett and Duvall define power in general terms, as "*the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their circumstances and fate*."[59] Thus, the relationship between Identity and power must be delineated. Here, I turn to work of 'critical' constructivism that has intellectual roots in critical social theory and shares the core features of constructivism. Critical constructivism adds a belief that constructions of reality reflect,

[54] Katzestein, P., (1996), *The Culture of National Security, Norms and Identity in World Politics,* NYC: Columbia University Press, p.6.
[55] Kitromilides, P., (2005), *Thoughts on the Social Necessity of Myths, Myths and Ideologies in Modern Greece,* Athens.
[56] Pesmatzoglou, S., (2005), *The Mythical Establishment of the Greek State, Myths and Ideologies in Modern Greece,* Athens: Moraiti, p.29.
[57] Žižek, S., *The Spectre of Ideology.* The Žižek Reader. ed. Wright E. and Wright. E., Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1999: 67.
[58] Barnett, M. and Duvall, R., (2005), *Power in International Politics,* International Organization 59, 3, p. 9-75.
[59] Barnett, M. and Duvall, R., (2005), *Power in International Politics,* International Organization 59, 3, p. 9-75.

enact, and reify relations of power. The task of the critical scholar is both to unmask these ideational structures of domination and also to facilitate the imagining of alternative worlds.[60] Critical constructivists thus see a weaker autonomous role for Identity than other constructivists would do because it is viewed as more tightly linked to relations of material power.[61]

Moreover, Identity owes much of its staying power to its capacity to be the subject of a wide variety of readings and a multiplicity of interpretations. Therefore, within Identity, the nation has the capacity to be used as an epithet or qualifier for different and frequently contradictory political or ideological claims, none of which are in themselves objective or complete. For example, the nation can be conservative, advocating a return to the homeland, religion and family. It can be statist, tying the survival of the nation to the authority and power of the state. It can be socialist or more generally leftist, identifying the fight for national sovereignty and independence with class struggle. It can be Liberal and project a vision of a cosmopolitan nation in a globalized world. It can be feminist, identifying the nation with masculine emancipation and male domination. It can be anarchic communitarian, stressing the historic significance of communities and the value of self-organization.[62]

At the same time, Identity can be also understood in terms of "*floating signifiers*." The term originates back to Claude Levi-Strauss, who defined floating signifiers as a representation of "*an undetermined quantity of signification, in itself void of meaning*

[60] Barnett, M. and Duvall, R., (2005), *Power in International Politics*, International Organization 59, 3, p. 9-75.

[61] Weldes, J., et al., (1999), *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities,and the Production of Danger*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Price, R., and Reus-Smit, C., (1998), *Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Relations Theory and Constructivism*, Eur. J. Int. Relat. 4:259–94.

[62] Žižek, S., *The Spectre of Ideology.* The Žižek Reader. ed. Wright E. and Wright. E., Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1999.

and thus apt to receive any meaning"[63]. In other words, a "floating signifier" can mean different things to different people often simultaneously. To use a classic example, the Greek flag can be the signifier of a geographical area, a community of people, a nation, a state and its policies and/or freedom and independence. At the same time and within the domestic political discourse, the Greek flag can be used by the Greek Communist Party as a symbol of resistance against imperialism and capitalism, by the Greek socialists as symbol of progress, social justice and social solidarity and by the Greek conservatives as a symbol of national cohesion, religion and family values.

2.2.2 Construction of Identity

The construction of National Identity in Greece was an unqualified success that exhibited remarkable continuity for almost two centuries.[64] At the same time, however, the complex Greek Identity has exhibited significant volatility, displaying a form of "cognitive dissonance."[65] Greek Identity has been the subject of an increasing controversy, a Great Debate, its inherent contradictions parenting an intrinsic tension which could influence foreign policy as it produces constraints and opportunities for policy-makers. As Katzenstein concludes: "*For most of the major states, Identity has become a subject of considerable political controversy. How these controversies are resolved…will be of great consequence for international security in the years to come*."[66]

[63] Lévi-Strauss, C., (1987), *Paroles Donnés*, 63–65.
[64] Mylonas, H., (2013), *The Politics of Nation Building. Making Co-nationals, Refugees and Minorities*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Ch. 2.
[65] Huntington, S., (1983), *American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
[66] Katzestein, P., (1996), *The Culture of National Security, Norms and Identity in World Politics*, NYC: Columbia University Press,18-19.

Indeed, in the bibliography, Greek Identity has often been understood as being the product of a struggle between two opposing forces - an ongoing dualism. The bibliographical narratives of Greek National Identity have been informed by the works of Diamandouros,[67] and Mouzelis[68], who understood Greek Identity in terms of two competing and often conflicting trends that run horizontally across the political spectrum: The so-called underdog stream that "*is essentially pre-modern, pre-democratic, anti-Western, traditionalist, with a powerful statist orientation and a strong imprint of the Orthodox Church's influence*" and the so-called "*reformist*" which is "*essentially secular in its orientation, pro-capitalist, pro-Western*."[69] Ioakimides connected the tension between Greece's self-images as a 'Balkan state' in the EU and a 'EU state' in the Balkans to this conflict and its impact on National Identity.[70]A similar distinction, described as an "*ongoing dualism*," was later made by Kalpadakis and Sotiropoulos who delineated a cleavage between two discourses, namely "*Europeanism*" and "*national populism*."[71] Similarly, Agnantopoulos posed two historical alternatives, "*ethno-culturalism*" and "*Liberal-westernist discourse*."[72]

In this context, the hypothesis that I will seek to test in the discussion of the case studies, my 'crucial experiment' that would falsify (or not) the hypothesis, is whether such a dualism concept can be operationalized to explain foreign policy outcomes and whether it forms the missing causal link between Identity and policy outputs. In other words, I

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[67] Diamandouros, N., (1994), *Cultural Dualism and Political Change in Post-authoritarian Greece*, Madrid: Foundacion Juan.

[68] Mouzelis, N., (1995), *Greece in the Twenty-first Century: Institutions and Political Culture.* In *Greece Prepares for the Twenty-first Century*, Constas, D. and Stavrou, T., (eds.), Washington DC: The Woodrow Wilson Center P.: 17-34.

[69] Gropas, R., Kouki, H., and Triandafylidou, A., (2011), *Identity Construction Programs of the State and the EU*. IMEdentities and Modernities in Europe. Work Package 5. ELIAMEP.

[70] Ioakimides, P., (1999), *Greece, the European Union and Southeastern Europe: Past Failures and Future Prospects*. In Coufoudakis, V. and Psomiades, H., (eds.), *Greece and the New Balkans*, New York: Pella Publishers, 176-191.

[71] Kalpadakis, G. and Sotiropoulos, D., (2007), *Europeanism and Nationalist Populism: The Europeanization of Greek Civil Society and Foreign Policy*. Hellenic Studies, 154 (1): 43-66.

[72] Agnantopoulos, A., (2005), *The Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy: A Conceptual Framework and an Empirical Application in Greek-Turkish Relations.* Paper presented at the 2nd LSE Symposium on Modern Greece, London.

seek to understand whether this cleavage is observable in the sphere of foreign policy making and if it is a factor in decision-making. If this working assumption is demonstrated, then Greek foreign policy could be read as the story of a Great Debate, between two approaches that exhibit fundamental differences in their conceptions of national goals. Indeed, the policy that prevails would be a function of the power struggle between opposing factions.

2.2.3 The Great Debate: soft liners vs. hard liners

Foreign policy is often examined in the context of hard liners versus soft liners with moderate and flexible "*doves*" confronting more dogmatic and rigid "*hawks*."[73] In this spirit, drawing from the discussion of dualism in the bibliography and especially the classic work of Diamantouros, I distinguish between the representations of the so-called reformist and underdog streams in the realm of foreign policy. I relate directly or indirectly the former with so-called soft liners and the later with so-called hard liners. Arguably, this thesis focuses on very specific manifestations of the generalizable trends of Greek dualism that are manifested in terms of foreign policy. I am therefore examining their observable implications. In this context:

On the one hand are the soft liners. More sensitive to the country's relative political and economic strengths and weaknesses, they are conscious of the nation's international obligations, its place in global affairs, usually within multilateral partnerships (most

[73] Schultz, K., (2005), *The Politics of Risking Peace: Do Hawks or Doves Deliver the Olive Branch?* International Organization 59(1): 1-38.

prominently Europe) or alliances, and the nation's capacity and potential role. Driven by a 'reformist' worldview, perceiving threats and opportunities, soft liners react on a case-by-case basis. Soft liners are more likely to identify national goals with the subtleties of diplomacy, display co-operation, engage in constructive dialogue, seek common ground and contemplate compromises that take the form of win-win.

On the other hand, are the hard liners. Driven by transcendal 'underdog' understandings of the nation and its position in world affairs, they tend to be more rigid in their positions and are apt to bring their positive or negative predispositions and biases to the table, for example viewing foreign interlocutors as inherently hostile. Hard liners are particularly aware of the burden of history and their worldview is informed by preconceived and predetermined notions. In this context, hard liners tend to equate national goals, which they suggestively often describe as 'national rights,' with maximalist aspirations and ambitions, are more likely to favor defection from the international community, are reluctant to offer concessions and doubt the value of final settlements thinking more in zero sum terms with a 'winner and loser' mentality.

Following this hypothesis, I argue that different agents articulate demands and form alliances, thus creating broader opposing camps of hard liners or soft- liners in search of political or social support. In this regard, dualism in foreign policy presents a two-fold challenge: It is a challenge for those political elites, such as the members of a government, who focus on Identity's instrumental function to secure domestic acceptability and political legitimacy. It also is a challenge for those state and not-state actors, such as the Church or the media, who are - or assume the role of - guarding Identity: They must keep reinterpreting the national narrative, the fundamental and not-

so fundamental beliefs and meanings of symbols, including myths, with reference to the past, in conjunction with the present and the future but also to each other.

The afore-mentioned agents in this thesis are political elites who are defined as groups or individuals possessing national authority that seek some type of consensus, wanting to gain minimum acceptability in support of their foreign policy.[74] In the case of Greece, this process centers certain key political officers who are directly involved in taking such foreign policy decisions. I will focus primarily on Prime Ministers and Ministers of Foreign Affairs who carry the burden of decision-making in Greek foreign policy. At the same time, however, following Hunt, I will also focus on the attitudes and values of the groups that have supplied the foreign –policy elite. [75] Thus, in the political context, agents are not just prominent policy makers, but also other participants in major policy discussions and debates including the President of the Republic, and Ministers and Members of Parliament from all parties.

Moreover, arguably, the political elites do not function in a vacuum. The political context for decision making is informed by the social enabling environment. Therefore, one key innovation of this thesis is that I also discuss those groups or individuals I define as Identity Warriors, namely those formal and informal networks of influence who may have an effect, to a lesser or greater extent, on the political context. Those actors may include the Church, civil society, the media or those who partake in the education system. I call them Identity Warriors because they have a stake in the construction and evolution of National Identity. Their lack of institutional legitimacy,

[74] Nicolaides, K.. and Lacroix, J., (2010), (eds.), *European Stories: Intellectual Debates on Europe in National Contexts*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[75] Hunt, M., (1987), *Ideology and U.S Foreign Policy*, New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University.

when it comes to decision making in foreign policy, does not mean that they are not immediately and actively concerned with its course. It should be noted that, for the purposes of this thesis, Identity Warriors as a categorization is broader than civil society which represents part but not the whole of the networks of influence under study. Historically, civil society in Greece suffers from "atrophy" due to politicization and partnership while "social life is suffocated, it becomes and arena for party competition."[76] Indeed, there are varying definitions of civil society with most focusing on its non-governmental character. However, not surprisingly certain actors discussed in the case studies are either considered state institutions or are directly and indirectly dependent on the government. At the same time, my discussion does not include a normative concept of civic values, e.g. democratic values such as freedom of speech and an independent judiciary, but is focused on the performative dimension of these organizations and their contribution to national identity.

The alliances of soft liners or hard liners may crosscut established political, partisan and ideological lines of Greek politics. In the case studies I discuss, agents interact and contest foreign policy, reaffirming and/ or redefining the Identity of the Greek nation and swaying the pendulum of decision-making. For example, the hostility towards the Turkish 'other' is deeply ingrained in the Greek educational system, cultivating prejudices and biases, creating 'barriers to entry' in the public discourse and breeding maximalist aspirations. Similar arguments are rehearsed by several agents including political actors, the Church and certain NGOs. In the case of the 1999 Greek- Turkish rapprochement, however, a soft liners' alliance of, amongst others, politicians

[76] Papadopoulos, Y. (1989): *Parties, the state and society in Greece: Continuity within change*. West European Politics 12.2: 55-71.

articulating the vision of a ‘strong’ European Greece, media sensitized by the double earthquakes in both countries and civil society gained the higher ground in the public debate.

These alliances may expand and consolidate through their symbolic unification, becoming something, which is more than the simple summation of the chain’s links. Nevertheless, at times there is an inherent tension between the particularity of demands, for example party ambitions or institutional agendas, and the alliance’s ultimate expression. In the case of Macedonia, for example, a heterogeneous hard line alliance brought together agents from the governing party, including the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the opposition, the Church, local government, the media, and civil society which led the soft liners, including the Prime Minister and most of his Cabinet to adopt a maximalist policy that ran against their beliefs. In other words, the alliances in question are not the product of a ‘grand plan,’ a conscious design materialized based on a common strategy or agenda, but the aggregation of different and often contradicting forces grouped around a symbolic purpose.

As this discussion unfolds, it should be underlined that both soft liners and hard liners are ideal types and that reality is much more nuanced: Indeed, the analysis of such alliances is not always Manichean in character. Much like ‘pure’ soft liners or hard liners can openly antagonize each other, their views can co-exist within governments, political parties and even the political careers of single individuals. Neither the capacity for political opportunism should be overlooked, nor the ability of seasoned politicians to adapt to popular moods be underestimated. Moreover, in a case of “*second image reversed*:” “*instead of being the causes of international politics, domestic structures*

may be the consequences of it."[77] In other words, the Realist or Liberal paradigms, and, in particular, Greece's European membership, because of its profound impact upon the country's political, social and economic life, may well influence the contestations over Greek Identity. At the same time, value judgments aside, both soft liners and hard liners can be rational actors, whose core purpose is to strengthen Greece's security and maximize its international standing. Historically, for example, although it falls beyond the scope of this thesis, it can be argued that Greece almost doubled its size after the Balkan Wars while led by hard line policy makers. Similarly, Greece's decisions to resist the Axis and fight in the Second World War, and to not follow Turkey's example, can be attributed to the waning influence of soft liners. Also, the battle between hard liners and soft liners is ongoing; continuing during different stages of bilateral and multilateral issues. Thus, both attitudes are tested over time and therefore I have opted to discuss three case studies that span close to fifteen years. Finally, as, by definition, such categorization tends to be rather coarse it is important to consider within-group heterogeneity. Therefore, in delineating the two competing alliances it is sufficient to establish that they agree on what they do and not why they do it.[78] In this sense, the so-called 'logic of appropriateness,' when actors understand themselves as being role players as they are called upon to accomplish specific missions at specific moments in time, is as relevant as their actionable beliefs.

I wish to employ and test the concept of dualism and the Great Debate, since its confirmation would arguably enable this analysis to gain leverage and respond to certain criticisms of Identity frameworks. In this context: Identity has been described

[77] Gourevitch, P., (1978), *The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics.* International Organization. Vol. 32, No. 4.
[78] Alexander George and Bennett, A., (2005), *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences,* Cambridge: MIT Press, p.32.

as the "*crucial link between environmental structures and interests*."[79] Nevertheless, the concept itself, not unlike that of culture, could be "*as elusive as it is intuitive*"[80] and is categorized as an explanation of last resort. In response to Hudson[81], the falsification or not of the dualism hypothesis, the answer to the question on whether a Great Debate indeed occurred, can be considered as a 'crucial experiment' for the causal impact of Identity on foreign policy. Also, the dualism hypothesis fills the void of Identity theories, which often tend to underestimate, if not outwardly neglect, "*politics and questions of power*."[82] Hard line or soft line alliances form the conveyor belts that connect perceptions of Identity and policy decisions. Moreover, frequently, the study of Identity is deeply rooted in specific historical contexts. As such, it becomes a victim of functionalism and, not unlike nationalism, it "*is derived from an interpretation of its purported utility*."[83] The purpose of this thesis, however, beginning with an inductive approach, is to gradually build a generalizable explanatory model for Greek foreign policy with the objective of gaining predictive value and thus being able to propose a set of conditions for forecasting policy outcomes in particular instances. Furthermore, the study of Identity is usually associated with long time periods, particularly as it denotes long-standing features, which change gradually over time. In response, scholars have offered concepts such as "*principled beliefs*" to differentiate between regulatory and constitutive principles[84] or developed approaches to 'learning,' for example distinguishing between "*simple*" and "*complex*" learning.[85] The dualism hypothesis,

[79] Katzestein, P., (1996), *The Culture of National Security, Norms and Identity in World Politics*, NYC: Columbia University Press, p.59.
[80] Hudson, V., (2007), *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classical and Contemporary Theory*, Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield, p. 104.
[81] Hudson, V., (2007), *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classical and Contemporary Theory*, Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield, p. 107.
[82] Katzestein, P., (1996), *The Culture of National Security, Norms and Identity in World Politics*, NYC: Columbia University Press, p. 285.
[83] Kalyvas, S., (1997), *The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, p.7.
[84] Goldstein, J. and Keohane, R., (1993), *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
[85] Levy, J., (1994), *Learning and Foreign Policy Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield*. International Organization.Vol. 48. No.2, Spring.

highlighting the contradictions of Identity, can be understood as being a causal pathway that enables significant changes over shorter time periods.

2.2.4 Winning the Great Debate

I propose that to fully understand how the Great Debate plays out in each case and its impact on decision making, a more instrumental analysis about end-means relationships in the context of political action must also be considered. My argument is based on Hudson's conclusion in her discussion of the future of FPA: "*Rather than explain, say, the Chinese behavior in the Spratly Islands by recourse to the thought of Hsun Tzu, perhaps we ought to ask which faction in Chinese politics is picking which elements in Chinese culture to promote their policy agenda on the Spratlys? By tracking which cultural 'story' becomes ascendant through the rough-and-tumble of power politics and the persuasiveness of the story to broader elements of society, we can ask what obeisance must then be paid to the cultural elements that compose it – regardless of risk, rational choice, and power politics considerations*."[86]

This is in line with the generalized definition of Identity offered in this thesis and with the definition of power that focuses on the capacities of actors to manage their destinies. After all, a social order of any kind implies some sort of power arrangements however timid, implied or tentative. Moreover, domestic politics, in modern democracies, constitute sophisticated structures and processes that aggregate demands, organize patterns and integrate individuals. Indeed, in a political context, effective action with

[86] Hudson, V., (2007), *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classical and Contemporary Theory*, Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield, p.121.

respect to substantive goals normally requires a "*sufficient consensus*" in support of proposed policies,[87] which depends on acceptability. To be effective, internationally as well as domestically, a policy must be acceptable to some minimum number of relevant groups and individuals.[88]

I suggest that the politicization of foreign policy making is particularly true in the case of Greece, where historically executive privilege transcends institutional structures. Scholars have described the "*limited institutionalization and the personalized policy-making style and ethos*"[89] which constitutes foreign policy as an object of political contest: "*The absence of a functioning institutional framework led to the dominance of personalities in the policy-making process, which in turn is said to contribute to the adoption of minimalistic and irrational foreign policy goals, because the criterion is the maximization of the electoral appeal of the personality concerned*."[90] Agents historically tend "*to treat foreign policy as their personal domain*" while "*in matters with serious domestic repercussions…they preferred to rely on a small circle of aides rather than on the competent bureaucracy of the Foreign Office*."[91] Strong political leadership, on the one hand, and weak institutional structures, on the other, tend to result in a practice of foreign policy making that is vulnerable to the pressures of domestic political politics.[92] Therefore, the notion of political cost is critical. Thus, decision-making in foreign policy can be better understood when its context is considered. This

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[87] George, Alexander, (1980), *Presidential Decision Making in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice*, Boulder, CO: Westview.
Kissinger, H., (1964), *Reflections on Power and Diplomacy.* In Johnson, E., (ed.), *Dimensions of Power and Diplomacy*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press: 24.

[88] Diesing, P., (1962), *Reason in Society, Five Types of Decision and Their Social Conditions*, Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, p.214.
Hilsman, R., (1967), *To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy*, Garden City, NY: Doubleday, p. 547.

[89] Ioakimidis, P., (1999), *The Model of Foreign Policy-Making in Greece: Personalities Versus Institutions*. In Stavridis, S., Couloumbis, T., Veremis, T. and Waites, N., (eds.) *The Foreign Policies of the European Union's Mediterranean States and Applicant Countries in the 1990s*, Basingstoke: MacMillan, p.156.

[90] Ibid., 144-147.

91 Stefanidis, I., *Pressure Groups and Greek Foreign Policy, 1945-67*. Discussion Paper No. 6. The Hellenic Observatory. LSE.

[92] Featherstone, K., and Papadimitriou D. (2015) *Prime ministers in Greece: The paradox of power*. OUP Oxford.

includes not only the substantial policy problem with its international implications at hand, but also the political context within which it must be addressed. Indeed, as we will see in the case studies, a thin majority, a reactionary opposition or a disagreement within a government may tilt the Great Debate towards one or the other side, thus driving policy.

After all, the task of agents in general and the elites in particular is to secure multiple payoffs and "*to find an alternative around which a consensus can be built that also deals satisfactorily with the substantive issues at stake in the decision*."[93] In the high-stakes environment of foreign policy and in decision-making, which carries considerable domestic political implications, two concerns are fundamental: how to get effective action on the decision at hand; and how to preserve and foster a capacity for effective action in the political context as a whole, in the future as well as the present.[94] At times, leaders may assume that they face a rather narrow set of options. As Farham notes: "*a concern with domestic acceptability can lead decision-makers to slight effectiveness*."[95] In foreign policy, "*reconciling substance and support may be particularly difficult when a value enjoys a measure of support*."[96] In the case of Macedonia, for example, the Prime Minister considered his hands tied politically. In such circumstances, decision-makers may be tempted to jump at an opportunity as soon as they identify a policy with a fairly high degree of acceptability. Moreover, a preoccupation with acceptability can lead to a failure to offer required policy initiatives, or reluctance to alter currently acceptable policies despite a pressing need for change,

[93] Hilsman, R., (1993), *The Politics of Policy-making in Defense and Foreign Affairs*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. p.78. and Hilsman, R., (1987), *The Foreign Policy Consensus: An Interim Report*. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 3, p.372.

[94] Diesing, P., (1962), *Reason in Society, Five Types of Decicion and Their Social Conditions*, Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, p.171.
Alexander George, (1980), *Presidential Decision Making in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice*, Boulder, CO: Westview, p.42.

[95] Farham. B., (1997), *Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis: A Study in Political Decision-Making*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

[96] Ibid.

a tendency compounded by the difficulty of renegotiating a majority coalition.[97] The latter may explain the Greek government's decision in the case of the Annan Plan to follow a policy of staying inactive given the domestic political discourse and the expected outcome of the referendum in Cyprus.

To form the minimum political consensus, hard liners or soft liners must offer a credible policy solution for the problem at hand and reaffirm or reinterpret National Identity. Thus, they must engage in Identity politics directly, generate their own version of shared Identity and appropriate the Identity discourse. In other words, soft liners or hard liners are called upon to take advantage of the tension and the dualism that defines Greek National Identity making and make them amenable either to hard line reassertion or to soft line reinvention. In the case of Macedonia, for example, hard liners framed the issue in the language of Identity thus dominating public discourse. Soft liners failed to offer an alternative Identity- based narrative that would strengthen their position. As a result, although the soft liner Prime Minister won a few of the political battles, he lost the Identity war. Indeed, arguably, the one-sidedness of the Identity debate explains the ultimate policy outcome. In contrast, in the case of the Greek – Turkish rapprochement, hard liners framed the issue in the language of Identity but soon became victims of their own success and the crises in Greek – Turkish relations together with the earthquakes which strengthened the hand of the soft liners. Soft liners, led by the government, adopted an elaborate political strategy, with a clear modernizing orientation within Europe, employing all the available tools to implement their policy choice. As a result, although the hard liners won a few political battles, the soft liners won the Identity war.

[97] Snyder, G. and Diesing, P., (1977), *Conflict Among Nations*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p.351.
Alexander George, (1980), *Domestic Constraints on Regime Change in U. S. Foreign Policy*. In Holsti, O., Siverson, R. and George Alexander (eds.), *Change in the International System*, Boulder, CO: Westview, p.248.

In this context, within the Great Debate, three conditions must be met, at a minimum and on the level of strategy, if not tactics, for the translation of policy preferences into outputs:

First, the soft line or hard line narrative must relate to the 'people,' which can be paradoxically associated both with the community as a whole, and some smaller group within it. In each case, popular sovereignty is, as Canovan argues, the "*foundation myth*" of modern politics and an essential harmony of interests with normative and moral legitimacy is assumed that can be consolidated into a symbolic Identity.[98] This realization is critical in terms of the Identity framework as the Great Debate, whether amongst Identity Warriors or within the political elite, is influenced by its social reference. Therefore, in the case of Macedonia, for example, mass mobilization exemplified popular will demanding a hard line, while the government was left struggling behind closed doors. In the case of Greek Turkish relations, the soft liners articulated a vision of a strong and confident Greece within Europe while the hard liners were left to express rather parochial and anachronistic concerns. In the case of Cyprus, hard liners gave voice to a united people, including Greek Cypriots, while soft liners were left with mere cost benefit analyses of the Annan plan.

Second, the division of the political or social milieu into two opposing and antagonistic camps. Foreign policy adds another dimension, as an all-encompassing national message empowers political leaders thus helping them consolidate their power base: "*it moves political cleavages from the center to the periphery of the political community.*

[98] Canovan, M., (2004), *Populism for Political Theorists?* Journal of Political Ideologies, Volume 9, Issue 3, p. 241 – 252.

Thus, polarization is no longer between the rich and the poor, city and village, state and market, but between 'us' and 'them' -the external enemy."[99] Political strategy grows more complicated when leaders engage on both levels simultaneously with the same Identity foundation. The concepts of 'people's rule' and 'national independence', for example, can be the end goal of a two-level front strategy with 'us' against 'the establishment' domestically and 'us' against 'the great powers,' that tend to favor one's enemies. In this context, in the case of Macedonia, for example, hard liners were able offer a narrative that was defined by 'the other': 'Skopjans,' Turks or even the West. Soft liners, on the contrary, were left without a negative focal point upon which to concentrate their energies. In the case of Greek – Turkish relations, hard liners were discredited, as victims of their own success, while soft liners could paint a dark picture of Greece's 'Balkan' past in comparison to its 'European' future. In the case of Cyprus, the hard liners were able to build on the bias against the Turkish other and at the same time take advantage of deeply ingrained prejudices against the international community, Greece's sense of victimization and siege mentality. Soft liners, on the other hand, were trapped in their offering of an abstract positive future of cohabitation that did not alleviate social phobias.

Third, the institutionalization and thus the conscription of the full force of the state. The Great Debate does not take place in a historical vacuum and the chronological starting and ending points of the case studies under examination may well prove misleading. The state's role in the construction of National Identity will be discussed in this thesis as successive governments insisted on certain key themes of National Identity in the name of national cohesion. In this context, we must trace the "*externalization*" of ideas.

[99] Keridis, D., (1998), *The Foreign Policy of Nationalism: The Case of Serbia (1986-1995) and Greece (1991-1995).* Ph.D. dissertation, Tufts University.

In this analysis, Althusser's concept of "*Ideological State Apparatuses*" is very useful. The Church is a frequently used example: It is "*not merely, or even primarily, an inner conviction...the Church is an institution and its rituals (prayer, baptism, confirmation, confession etc.)...far from being a mere secondary externalization of the inner belief stand for the very mechanisms that generate it*."[100] Similarly, one can point to the impact of the education system, discussed in the case of Greek – Turkish relations, which presented significant barriers of entry in the Great Debate to soft liners. In this sense, Althusser quotes from Pascal who famously stated that "*Act as if you believe, pray, kneel down, and you shall believe, faith will arrive by itself*". Thus, in the words of Zizek "*the external ritual performativity generates its own ideological foundation*."[101]

Bibliography is rich on this point. Several scholars have also pointed out that the strength and continuity of new ideas often depends upon the degree to which they become embodied in institutions influencing their leadership. Indeed, an important part of the literature explores how ideas become institutionalized and what difference it makes. As Rousseau wrote "*it is the national institutions that form the genius, the character, the tastes and the mores of the people...which inspire in it this ardent love of the fatherland*."[102] The ideas that are successfully implemented and consolidated are those that have been instilled within an institutional home, where a team of like-minded people transform their individual ideas into institutional purpose.[103] Much depends on

[100] Žižek, S., *The Spectre of Ideology.* The Žižek Reader. ed. Wright E. and Wright. E., Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1999: 65-66.

[101] Ibid, 66.

[102] Rousseau, J., (1915), *The Political Writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau,* ed. from the original manuscripts and authentic editions, with introductions and notes by C. E. Vaughan. Cambridge University Press, In 2 vols. Vol. 2: 431.

[103] Adler, E., (1987), *The Power of Ideology: The Quest for Technological Autonomy in Argentina and Brazil*, Berkeley: University of California Press, Adler, E., (1992), *The Emergence of Co-operation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control*. Int. Org. 46.

growth of organizational infrastructures. Christianity was able to spread because literacy enabled the exchange of epistles. In the same way Benedict Anderson points to the organized press as the means that enabled the rise of nationalism. Moreover, several studies have investigated the interplay of culture and bureaucracies. Zurovchak, for example, investigated in 1997 the issue of culture organizing the structure of bureaucracies. As Hudson notes, "*a natural experiment was afforded him*" as he studied the architecture of the foreign ministries of the Czech Republic and Slovakia after Czechoslovakia's velvet divorce.[104]

Indeed, the case studies suggest that in response soft liners were able to implement their policy only when they employed the full state arsenal. In the case of Greek- Turkish relations, the Simitis government did not hesitate, amongst others, to go as far as to create a new bureaucracy that would provide economic incentives to those within civil society that supported a soft line. In the case of Macedonia, on the contrary, soft liners appear to have lost control of the state apparatus since the government itself would engage in propaganda, through textbooks and pamphlets, on the Greekness of Macedonia, that weakened its own position.

In discussing this third condition, it should be underlined that the Great Debate is not a fair game. It would not be possible, after all, because, as I have argued above, the battle between hard liners and soft liners is ongoing, spanning many decades as its origins can be traced to the early days of the modern Greek state. If the analogy is made between the Great Debate and a race, then it appears that soft and hard liners do not share the same starting point. Hard liners, as the term's definition suggests, are in a better position

[104] Hudson, V., (2007), *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classical and Contemporary Theory*, Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield, p.117.

to take advantage of the cardinal themes of a more rigidly, black and white, defined National Identity. Their transcendal 'underdog' understandings of the nation, positive or negative biases, preconceived and predetermined notions, and heightened sense of historical burden, are consensus driven and have thus been shaped over generations in the furnace of nation-building. Indeed, as we will see the historical record of the Great Debate suggests that ever since the inception of the Greek modern state, hard liners have established an advantage, with only periodic exceptions of the soft liners being able to translate their preference into actual policy. Soft liners, on the other hand, have a structural handicap and face a greater challenge. Soft liners tend to address challenges in foreign affairs within their policy and political contexts alone, largely underestimating the significance of Identity. This to a great extent is a product of the nature of the alliance because as an ideological, political and intellectual stream, soft liners tend to respond on an ad hoc basis and rarely develop the coherence of a single uniform worldview.

2.3 Conclusion

In defining Identity, I have argued that it is important not only how it is maintained but also what types of revisions take place. Thus, I have suggested that the tension inherent in Greek Identity and the dualism that has been analyzed in the relevant bibliography can be used as the crucial test for policy making. In this sense, a Great Debate unfolds, as conflicting alliances of hard liners and soft liners compete to determine the policy outcome. Political context, together with the notion of political cost for the government, is pivotal because at the level of acceptance it depends on public opinion constraints and opportunities. Therefore, I offer the suggestion that in the discussion of the case

studies I will explore (a) whether a conflict between hard liners and soft liners does exist and (b) under what conditions each alliance of Identity Warriors wins the policy argument.

3. SYNOPSES OF CASE STUDIES

A discussion of the case studies opens a window onto the study of modern Greek history at the turn of the century. In this chapter, I will provide important background information as a short narrative of each case study will be outlined and the policy outcome delineated. It should be noted that in terms of the third case study, the Annan Plan, the discussion will be more extensive and interpretative as this thesis unveils new empirical evidence that allows scholars to revisit the purpose of policy makers.

3.1 Macedonian issue (1992)

"*What's in a name? That which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet*"[105] Juliet famously asked in Shakespeare's masterpiece. Not unlike the lovers' family legacies that doom them from the start, a name defined the relationship between Athens and Skopje. The self- proclaimed Republic of Macedonia declared its independence in September 1991 and since that time Greece has defected from international co-operation, strongly objecting to the use of the term Macedonia by its northern neighbor. Holding the dubious distinction of "*the world's stupidest major issue*,"[106] the Macedonian issue, has preoccupied the international community for close to three decades.

[105] Shakespeare, W., (1597), *Romeo and Juliet*, II, ii, 1-2.

[106] NBC, "The world's stupidest major issue." 2008, (Accessed June 12 2012). Available at: http://worldblog.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2008/03/31/4376446-the-worlds-stupidest-major-in.

Interestingly, Greek foreign policy towards the Macedonian issue after 1990 entailed a significant revision. Greece found itself at the front line of the Cold War owing to its proximity to the communist bloc. A particular and acute sense of threat developed, stemming from the vulnerability of the northern Greek provinces, which were under siege as recently as the Civil War. In this context, successive Greek governments shared the view that Yugoslavia was a useful buffer state and the issue of the republic's name was treated by successive generations of Greek policy makers much like Pandora's box - better left unopened.

After the end of the Cold War, however, the relative ease, compared with the rest of Yugoslavia, with which Skopje achieved independence, can be contrasted with its almost unprecedented difficulties in achieving recognition. In the early 1990s, the Balkan crisis was seen as a European problem that demanded a European solution. The 'hour of Europe' came in December 1991 when the Council of the European Community, at a meeting of Foreign Ministers, declared its willingness to recognize the Republics of the former Yugoslavia on certain conditions. Europe's conditions included some general considerations in line with European norms and values relating to the peace process, human rights and non-proliferation. They also included one specific condition, on Greek insistence, which photographed Skopje. The EC demanded that the new Republic "*adopt constitutional and political guarantees ensuring that it has no territorial claims towards a neighboring Community State, including the use of a denomination which implies territorial claims*."[107]

[107] Council of EU, (1991), *Resolution of the EC Council of Foreign Ministers.*

Skopje responded by making several constitutional amendments to conform to European desiderata and requested official recognition. Despite the positive recommendation of the Badinter commission, which had been mandated with the task of evaluating on behalf of the EC the requests for recognition, the EC was not persuaded at the insistence of Greece. In its meeting at Guimarães in May of 1992, the Council of Ministers declared that it was "*willing to recognize… only under a name which can be accepted by all parties concerned*"[108] thus in effect granting Greece a veto on the decision. This position was more explicitly reaffirmed at the Lisbon summit in June 1992, which declared that it would only recognize the Republic "*under a name which did not include the term Macedonia*."[109]

Meanwhile, the first concrete attempt at international mediation occurred in the form of the Pinheiro Package, named after the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, who held the presidency of the EC. The European Foreign Ministers meeting at Lisbon in February of 1992 instructed the Portuguese to deliver a solution to the problem. After repeated consultations with both sides Pinheiro presented two texts but Athens rejected this proposal.[110]

By the end of 1992 it became apparent that there were signs of fatigue within the international community over the issue. Since the Europeans were restrained by their own decisions, the question moved to other multilateral fora. Skopje requested admittance to the United Nations, and, in February of 1993, Greece accepted international arbitration. In April, the Security Council adopted Resolution 817 (1993),

[108] Resolution of the EC Council of Foreign Ministers, May 1992.
[109] Resolution of the Lisbon European Summit, June 1992.
[110] Kofos, E., (2005), *The Unresolved 'Difference' Over the Name: A Greek Perspective.* In Kofos, E., and Vlasidis, V., (eds.), *Athens-Skopje: An Uneasy Symbiosis (1995-2002)*, Athens: ELIAMEP.

recommending the admittance of the Republic to the Organization but under the provisional name 'Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia', until some agreement was reached as to its final name. The Security Council justified its decision "*in the interest of maintaining peace and good neighborly relations in the region*" thus indirectly addressing Greek concerns.[111] The following day, Skopje was officially welcomed into the UN, but without a recognized flag. In the months that followed FYROM was recognized by all EC member states, except Greece, and several other states including all permanent members of the Security Council.

A second attempt at international mediation began, this time under the auspices of the UN rather than the Europeans. In May of 1993, in accordance with UN Security Council guidelines, UN appointed negotiators Vance and Owen produced a new draft treaty, which sought to regulate all aspects of the two countries' relations. Once again, Athens did not agree with the compromise proposal and a few months later, in October 1993, Greece withdrew from the UN-brokered negotiation.[112]

Extraordinarily, Greek policy on Macedonia was formulated in a bipartisan institutional forum. In February, April and June of 1992, three councils of all political leaders whose parties were represented in Parliament were convened by the President of the Republic Constantinos Karamanlis. Constantinos Mitsotakis participated as Prime Minister and President of center-right New Democracy (ND), former and future Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou as President of center-left PASOK, Maria Damanaki as President of the leftist Synaspismos (SYN) and Aleka Papariga as General Secretary of the

[111] UNSC Decision 817/7.4.1993.

[112] Kofos, E., (2005), *The Unresolved 'Difference' Over the Name: A Greek Perspective.* In Kofos, E., and Vlasidis, V., (eds.), *Athens-Skopje: An Uneasy Symbiosis (1995-2002)*, Athens: ELIAMEP.

Communist Party (KKE). The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Antonis Samaras, was also present.

The first Leaders' Council in February decided to push forward with negotiations over Macedonia. Publicly, the leadership confirmed its "*spirit of national responsibility*" and "*the willingness of the leaders…to have a common national strategy on national issues*." The second Leaders' Council in April was the most consequential of the three: The decision was made that Greece would not recognize Skopje under a name that included the term Macedonia. This was a policy that was not reversed in the third Leaders' council in June. Strikingly, this policy ran counter to the recommendation of the Prime Minister.

The second Council issued the following announcement: "*The Political leadership of the country, with the exception of the Communist Party, agreed that Greece will recognize Skopje only if the three conditions that the EEC set on December 16th 1991 are met, with the self-evident clarification that in the name of the state the word Macedonia will not exist. On this basis, the government will move forward to the completion of its effort, at the end of which a new meeting will be called to discuss the further course*."

The Greek hard line foreign policy of intransigence was sealed that day. The conclusions of the Council of Leaders became the policy of successive Greek governments. Only in 2007 did Athens decision makers revisit Greek foreign policy towards Macedonia without, however, avoiding accusations of having impeded Skopje in its path towards NATO membership.

3.2 Greek – Turkish rapprochement (1999)

Greece and Turkey gained independence fighting each other and have been at odds ever since. In the context of European accession, Greece and Turkey began their journeys to Europe at the same time. Athens, however, joined the European Community in 1980, thus gaining significant leverage and blocking Ankara's path for decades. In 1999, Greek foreign policy experienced a sea change, and Athens became one of Ankara's most important stalwarts and effective champions in Europe. This "*major paradigmatic shift*"[113] or "*momentous policy shift*"[114] is even more interesting given the long history of animosity between the two capitals and that various past rapprochement efforts (1931-1941, 1946-1953, 1988) proved to be simply "*lull(s) before the new storm.*"[115]

Indeed, Greek – Turkish animosity has long historical roots. Interestingly, however, most of the Cold War can be characterized as a period of relative calm in Greek – Turkish relations as both NATO members protected the alliance's south-eastern flank. Despite the escalation of ethnic conflict on Cyprus and the tensions that followed the forced deportations of Istanbul's Greek minority, a war between the two countries was considered "*inconceivable*."[116] The breaking point was reached in 1974 with the invasion and occupation of northern Cyprus by Turkish forces which "*had a negative impact on the bilateral relations of their respective homelands.*"[117] Indeed, "*in parallel*

[113] Öniş, Z., and Yilmaz, S., (2008), *Greek – Turkish Rapprochement, Rhetoric or Reality?* In *Political Science Quarterly*, The Academy of Political Science, Vol. 123, No. 1, pp. 123-149.

[114] Pagoulatos, G., (2002), *Greece, the European Union, and the 2003 Presidency, Research and European Issues.* Paper No. 21, Groupement d' Etudes et de Recherches "Notre Europe", Available at: www.notre-europe.asso.fr/Etud21-fr

[115] Koukoudakis, G., (2006), *The Role of Citizens in the Current Greek-Turkish Rapprochement*, Paper for the 56th Annual Conference of Political Studies Association. Available at: http://www.gpsg.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/2006-P3-Koukoudakis.pdf

[116] Botsiou, K., (2001), *Greek Turkish Relations: A Historical Overview (1974-2000).* In Kazakos, P. et al., *Greece and Turkey's European Future*, Sideris: Athens, p.141.

[117] Agnantopoulos, A., (2005), *The Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy: A Conceptual Framework and an Empirical Application in Greek-Turkish Relations.* Paper presented at the 2nd LSE Symposium on Modern Greece, London, p.13.

with the deterioration of the situation in Cyprus, Greek-Turkish relations since 1974 have been marked by the gradual emergence of bilateral differences"[118] including amongst others issues of sovereignty over the Aegean, territorial waters and airspace, the delimitation of the continental shelf and the treatment of minorities. In this context, a "*consensus was generated among Greek foreign policy-makers and public opinion that Turkey pursues a revisionist foreign policy which aims to alter the status quo*[119] *and therefore it represents a threat for Greece's national security*."[120]

Greece responded to the perceived Turkish threat with a threefold strategy that was initiated by the Karamanlis government in the 1970s and "*provided the general framework within which Greece's foreign policy towards Turkey has evolved*." [121] Firstly, Athens focused on the "*the maintenance of an adequate military balance with Turkey in order to dissuade it from attacking Greek territory*." Secondly, Greek policy makers consumed considerable energy towards "*the rallying of international support, on bilateral and multilateral levels, in order to enhance Greece's diplomatic leverage*."[122] Thus, Greek foreign policy invested time and effort in improving bilateral relations with other Balkan countries, cultivating great powers such as the US and Russia and increased Greece's presence in international organizations such as the EC and the UN. Third, successive governments insisted on "*the evocation of international law as the basis for a viable settlement of outstanding issues*."[123]

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[118] Ibid.

For a historical overview of the emergence of these bilateral differences, see Clogg, R., (1991), *Greek - Turkish Relations in the Post-1974 Period*. In Constas, D., *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s: Domestic and External Influences*, London, MacMillan.

[119] As set down by the Treaties of Lausanne (1923), Montreux (1936) and Paris (1947); see Coufoudakis, V., (1985), *Greek-Turkish Relations, 1973-1983: The View from Athens*. In Security Dialogue, pp. 201-204.

[120] Agnantopoulos, A., (2005), *The Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy: A Conceptual Framework and an Empirical Application in Greek-Turkish Relations.* Paper presented at the 2nd LSE Symposium on Modern Greece, London, p.14.

[121] Ibid.

[122] Ibid.

[123] Ibid.

Historically, Greece and Turkey shared the common goal of European integration. Athens submitted its application for accession to the newly established European Economic Community and Ankara applied for associate membership in 1959. Unlike their quest for NATO membership, however,[124] their paths diverged as time progressed. Greece signed its Association Agreement with the EEC in 1961, and almost twenty years later, having reactivated the process after the restoration of democracy in 1974, signed the Accession Deed in 1979. Turkey, on the other hand, signed its Association Agreement with the EEC in 1963, an additional protocol in 1970 and by the early 1980s had not even applied for full membership.

This time lag in the European course of the two strategic rivals allowed Greece to gain leverage over Turkey. Seeking diplomatic leverage internationally, Athens was disappointed by NATO's apparent unwillingness to intervene in Cyprus in 1974. The European project, although imperfect, contrary to NATO's military alliance was based on the rather loose and vague notion of political solidarity and appeared attractive because of its potential as an alternative "*security provider*" which would increase the stakes for Turkey's perceived aggression.[125]

Therefore, Athens imposed strict conditionality on Ankara, directly linking Turkey's consideration for accession to Europe with improvements in their bilateral relations.[126] Aiming to contain Turkey and increase the costs of its foreign policy, Greece took advantage of the European decision making structure that provides for unanimity and Turkey's desire to join Europe. Athens and Ankara, however, were unable to

[124] Both countries entered NATO in tandem in 1952.

[125] Valinakis, Y., (1994), *Security Policy*. In Kazakos, K. and Ioakimidis, P., *Greece and EU Membership Evaluated*, London, Pinter.

[126] Yannas, P., (1994), *The Greek Factor in EC-Turkey Relations*. In Kazakos, P. and Ioakimidis, P., *Greece and EU Membership Evaluated*, London, Pinter p.216.

compromise and, as a result, Turkey's path quickly reached an insurmountable roadblock. Thus, amongst others, the financial aid, provided in the "*Fourth Financial Protocol of 1981 between Turkey and the EEC, was effectively frozen; Turkish application for full membership of 1987 was denied in 1989 by the EEC citing amongst others Turkey's disputes with Greece, and the Cyprus issue*."[127]

In response, and in an effort to salvage what was left of the European – Turkish relationship, the European Commission redoubled its efforts to establish a Customs Union, with the subsequent release of the funds provided in the Fourth Financial Protocol, once again stumbling upon a Greek kneejerk reaction. The Conclusions of the Lisbon Summit of June 1992, the same Council in which, as the Case Study on Macedonia reveals, Greece had invested its diplomatic capital in the struggle over Skopje's name, included the reference to "*the Turkish role in the present European political situation*" as one "*of the greatest importance*" and resulted in the reopening of talks on the Customs Union. The next year, the European Community adopted the Copenhagen criteria, however, defining whether a country is eligible to join the European Union. With its emphasis on democratic governance and human rights, amongst others, this decision served to strengthen Greece's case against Turkey. During the 1997 Luxembourg summit, the debate on Turkish accession continued as Greece was joined by other member-states, such as Germany and Sweden which registered their reservations on Turkish accession.

In the late 1990s, the Greek government began a soft line process of rapprochement with Turkey that would culminate in the Helsinki Summit of European Heads of State

in December of 1999. The Greek Foreign Minister at the time, George Papandreou, publicly defined his nation's position: "*It is in Greece's interests --more than any other member of the EU-- that Turkey moves closer to Europe. Turkey's approach to Europe will be an important factor in the creation of a climate of co-operation, which is an essential pre-condition if we hope to solve the differences between us*."[128]

In early summer of 1999, the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, exchanged letters signaling their intention to normalize their bilateral relations, including proposals for confidence building measures in various fields, for instance, trade, tourism and the environment. Their efforts received a tragic and unexpected boost at the end of the summer with the double earthquakes that hit both Greece and Turkey. In the early stages of the process, the two countries adopted an incrementalistic approach, focusing on so-called "*soft issues*" or issues of "*low-politics*," that greatly facilitated their efforts[129], leaving the more complicated and difficult questions, such as those touching upon sovereignty, to the future.[130]

The new foreign policy dogma adopted by the Greek government was reflected in the public statements by the Greek leadership. Prime Minister Simitis stated: "*We did not want a virtual Turkish candidacy. We wanted a real and substantive candidacy. A candidacy which entails rights and duties emanating from the criteria that apply for any other country... The rules of the game are clear and identical for every country.*

[128] Gundogdu, A., (2001), *Identities in Question: Greek-Turkish Relations in a Period of Transformation*, Middle East Review of International Affairs, 5, 1 (2001).

[129] Couloumbis, T., (2000), *The Future of the Greek-Turkish Rapprochement,* (seminar in International Relations Department, Koç University, Istanbul; Veremis, T., (2005), *Greece, Turkey and the EU Triangle* (seminar jointly organized by Istanbul Bilgi University and the Greek Consulate, Istanbul).

[130] Öniş, Z., and Yilmaz, S., (2008), *Greek – Turkish Rapprochement, Rhetoric or Reality?* In *Political Science Quarterly,* The Academy of Political Science, Vol. 123, No. 1, pp. 123-149.

There is only one way for those who have differences: peaceful resolution and recourse to the International Court of Justice... The accession process will gradually construct links that transgress existing borders... it will lead to an extended relationship... it will consolidate peaceful co-existence and it will diminish or even abolish aggressive policies... references to co- operation and friendship are not merely wishful thinking, they have been made possible."[131] Foreign Minister Papandreou further added: "*From the moment that candidacy status is accorded there will be a framework for the monitoring of Turkey, just as for any other country... this is a European system... we do not refer to Greece, France, Germany and the special relationship that these might have with Turkey... It is a European system, committed to the decisions of the European Council... it will not be Greece that will ask for controls... our partners will be even more demanding that we are*."[132]

The Greek – Turkish rapprochement was quickly translated into concrete policy wins for the normalization of European – Turkish relations. Partly due to the change in Greek foreign policy, in December 1999, at the Helsinki Summit of the EU, Turkey was officially awarded the status of a candidate for accession to the EU. Greece, however, did not walk away empty-handed, having imposed conditionality on Turkey including that before the start of EU accession negotiations Turkey should settle its disputes with Greece or, alternatively, agree to bring the cases in front of the International Court of Justice. At the same time, substantial progress was the least to be expected for the Cyprus problem.[133] The Greek policy shift was sealed a few years later, during the EU

[131] Speech by Costas Simitis (Prime Minister – Leader of PASOK). In Journal of Parliamentary Debates, (15 December, 1999), pp. 2362-2364.

[132] Speech by George Papandreou (Minister of Foreign Affairs –PASOK). In Journal of Parliamentary Debates, (15 December, 1999), p. 2396.

[133] Grigoriadis, I., (2003), *The Changing Role of the EU Factor in Greek-Turkish Relations*, London School of Economics and Political Science, Hellenic Observatory with articles 4 and 9 emphasizing the fact that Turkey's eligibility for EU membership after Helsinki depended on resolving two issues: its border conflict with Greece, and the Cyprus dispute. Article 4 states that The European Council will review the situation relating to any outstanding disputes, in particular

Copenhagen Summit of December 2002, when Greece, from being Turkey's fiercest critic, became its staunchest ally, arguing a minority position, along with Spain and Italy, for an early date of Turkey's European bid.[134] Not coincidentally, at that very same summit, it was declared that Cyprus would become a full member by 2004, irrespective of the outcome of reunification talks.[135]

3.3 The Annan Plan (2004)

The Annan Plan, in A.J.P. Taylor's phrase, a "*turning point when history failed to turn*," was a once in a generation opportunity for the resolution of the decades-old Cyprus conflict. In 2004, the Greek government found itself at a crossroads. A solution of the Cyprus problem was an aspiration shared by generations of Greek policy makers. Developments in Cyprus had, after all, extracted a heavy toll from Athens, consuming for decades precious Greek diplomatic capital, derailing Greek – Turkish relations and risking regional stability and security. The Helsinki strategy had been partially successful as Cyprus was officially welcomed into the European family a year earlier. For the newly elected Karamanlis government, however, the resolution of the Cyprus problem was fraught with risks. Diplomatically, Athens attempted to balance, on the one side, the international, bilateral and multilateral, pressure, and the strategic priority of normalizing Greek – Turkish bilateral relations through Ankara's European accession, and, on the other, the apparent unwillingness of President Papadopoulos to wholeheartedly engage in talks together with the expected rejection of the plan by the

concerning the repercussions for the accession process and in order to promote their settlement through the International Court of Justice, at the latest by the end of 2004.

[134] Grigoriadis, I., (2003), *The Changing Role of the EU Factor in Greek-Turkish Relations*, London School of Economics and Political Science, Hellenic Observatory.

[135] Çakmak, G., *Greek -Turkish Relations in the Post Helsinki Period: Is Europe a Framework Providing Détente?*

Greek – Cypriots. As a result, in effect, Greek policy- makers apparently chose to effectively abstain from the critical last phase of the talks.

The Cyprus problem has captivated the interest of the international community for decades. From a wider international perspective, the "*Cyprus Gordian Knot*"[136] has in the words of one observer: "*Resisted with tenacity the efforts of nations great and small to bring about a solution. It frustrates diplomats, amazes outside observers, irritates those who believe we have made progress in studying the technique of negotiation ... [and] has been a sore point with Secretary-Generals of the United Nations*."[137]

From a narrower regional perspective, developments on Cyprus have set the Athens-Nicosia-Ankara triangle ablaze on several occasions since the beginning of the Cold War. In the words of former Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis: "*Cyprus has been at the heart of Greek-Turkish problems for decades*."[138] This was a sentiment shared by former Prime Ministers Simitis, Karamanlis, and Papandreou.[139] During the Cold War, ethnic strife on the island triggered the relapse of Greek – Turkish relations: "*The Cyprus question sounded the death knell of the cordial Greek–Turkish relations of the years 1930–1939 and 1945–1954 and continues to cast its ominous shadow upon attempts at a Greek–Turkish rapprochement*."[140]

In terms of foreign policy, Greece and Cyprus were joined in the national narrative since the Greek war of independence: "*The enosis phenomenon (unification of Cyprus*

[136] Heraclides, A., (2011), *The Cyprus Gordian Knot: An Intractable Ethnic Conflict, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, Volume 17, Issue 2.

[137] Epstein, M., (1986), *Efforts to Resolve the Cyprus Problem.* In Bendahmane, D. and McDonald, J., (eds.), *Perspectives on Negotiation*, Washington, DC: Foreign Service Institute, p.99.

[138] Interview with forrmer Prime Minister C. Mitsotakis, March 2013.

[139] Interviews with former Prime Ministers C. Simitis (June 2013), high official of the Karamanlis government (May 2013) , G. Papandreou (July 2013).

[140] Quoted in Heraclides, A., 'What will become of us without barbarians?' The enduring Greek–Turkish rivalry as an Identity-based conflict.

and Greece) had existed at least since 1821, but it did not manifest itself dramatically until the (Athens) riots of 1931."[141] In the inter-war period, Greece's Greek statesman Eleftherios Venizelos pursued a policy that "*pushed the idea of union with Greece back under the surface.*"[142] After the Second World War, however: "*The call for enosis triggered huge demonstrations in Greece*."[143] Indeed: "*The decolonization movement, US pressure, the Cypriot people – at least the Greek speaking majority – galvanized by the dynamism of (Archbishop and later President of Cyprus) Makarios, an efficient guerilla movement supported by both Greeks and Greek Cypriots, coupled with British rigidity, meant that no self-respecting Greek leader could 'do a Venizelos*.'"[144]

The London and Zurich agreements of 1959 and 1960 that parented the birth of the independent Republic of Cyprus, drafting the terms for the symbiosis of the island's Greek and Turkish communities after decades of British colonial rule, legalized the bonds that tied the parties as the attached Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee instituted the two motherlands as guarantor powers. Very quickly, however, the Zurich and London agreements collapsed under the weight of ethnic conflict, third-party interventions, discontent over the terms of the agreement on the part of hard-liners in Greece, and internal strife, culminating in a coup d'état engineered by the Greek junta against the island's Greek – Cypriot leadership and, in response, the 1974 invasion and occupation of one-third of the island by Turkish armed forces.

Since 1974, Greece and Cyprus agreed upon the pursuit of a common strategy aimed at internationalizing the Cyprus problem. The balance of power in the Eastern

[141] Malinson, W., (2008), *Cyprus: A Modern History*, I. B. Tauris, p. 90.
[142] Malinson, W., (2008), *Cyprus: A Modern History*, I. B. Tauris, p. 90.
[143] Heraclides, A., (2011), *The Cyprus Gordian Knot: An Intractable Ethnic Conflict, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, Volume 17, Issue 2.
[144] Malinson, W., (2008), *Cyprus: A Modern History*, I. B. Tauris, p. 91.

Mediterranean was seen as unfavorable due to Turkey's strategic gains on the island, its geographic proximity with Cyprus and its overall military advantage. In this context, Athens and Nicosia attempted to counterweight and counterbalance Turkey, seeking the engagement of the international community either on a multilateral or a bilateral level.

In the early 1990s, the governments of Athens and Nicosia began championing the European accession of Cyprus, while at the same time there was agreement, in the diplomatic language of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that: "*the generally acknowledged aim of resolving the Cyprus problem as set out in UN resolutions consists of the reunification of the island and the peaceful co-existence of the two communities within a federal state*."[145] Their systematic efforts bore fruit: The United Nations proposal to reach a settlement, the so-called Annan plan, named after the organization's General Secretary, was negotiated intermittently from 1999 to 2004 and went through a number of revisions before being put to twin referenda.

The final mile of the negotiations was run in Burgenstock, Switzerland. Days of dramatic consultations ensued, between Greeks and Turkish Cypriots with the Greeks rejecting the Turkish request for quadrilateral meetings, i.e. the two communities, plus Greece and Turkey. At the end, talks failed to bridge the gap and produce an agreed settlement. Despite the absence of a settlement, the UN Secretary General went ahead with the referenda, under the timetable agreed before the negotiations started. This decision was made although opinion poll data, provided by the Greek side to the UN,

[145] http://www.mfa.gr/en/the-cyprus-issue/

predicted the plan's rejection.[146] Both communities experienced energetic campaigns towards a 'Yes' or a 'No' at the referenda. Veteran Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash together with Cypriot President Papadopoulos both lobbied against the plan. Ankara and the Turkish Cypriot Prime Minister, Mehmet Ali Talat expressed their readiness to sign the blueprint for reunification. The international community mobilized in support of a solution. At the end, the plan was accepted by the Turkish – Cypriot community but was rejected by the Greek – Cypriots.

In this context, the stance of Athens presents great interest. Indeed, on Monday the 29th of March at Burgenstock, in a joint meeting with the Cypriot National Council, the Greek Prime Minister, described by a member of his own delegation at Burgenstock as "*overly cautious*"[147], articulated for the first time the new foreign policy dogma: "*Cyprus negotiates and Greece is actively present and supports its efforts, but the final solution belongs to the Cypriot people*."[148] In the end, Athens, as reported by Reuters, proclaimed that: "*the fate of Cyprus now rested squarely with the island's two ethnic communities, but suggested it saw little to commend a U.N.-backed reunification plan they will vote on this month*."[149] This change of Greek foreign policy resulted in Athens virtually abstaining from the last leg of the negotiations and --contrary to the governments of Cyprus and Turkey, Turkish-Cypriot leadership, the UN and the EU— refraining for all intents and purposes from offering a clear official position on the matter. In other words, the newly elected government of New Democracy chose to officially "*square the circle*", in the words of Foreign Minister Moliviatis[150], and

[146] Interview with high official of the Karamanlis government, May 2013.
[147] Interview with former Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Giorgos Koumoutsakos, April, 2013.
[148] Venizelos, K., Ignatiou, M. and Meletis, N., (2005), *The Annan Plan: The Secret Trade, the 129 Days That Shook Hellenism*, Athens: Livanis, p.387.
[149] Reuters, 2/04/2004.
[150] Kathimerini Newspaper, 18/04/04.

adopted the foreign policy dogma of 'Cyprus decides, Greece supports', thus shifting the burden of decision making onto the Cypriot government. At the same time, Athens attempted to disengage the Cyprus problem from Greek- Turkish relations, especially Turkey's accession to the EU, and mitigate as much as possible bilateral and multilateral pressures, managing the disappointment of the international community.

The Greek policy of non-intervention presents a riddle as to the government's true intentions. Indeed, it appears quite difficult to categorize the government's policy in terms of its soft line versus hard line character. In the words of a former high official referring to media coverage: "*We had confused them so much that whether they supported a 'yes' or a 'no' they thought they agreed with the government*."[151] In the past decade, the position of Athens has been understood in three ways:

According to the first interpretation, the government supported the plan, however timidly, giving support to the soft -line hypothesis. At the time, the international community understood Greek policy rather as such. In the words of the US State department, for example, according to WikiLeaks: "*Greece gave only tepid support to the Annan Plan in April 2004.*"[152]

According to the second -- and most widespread -- interpretation, the government was neutral, mixing the hard and soft line hypothesis. Within Greece, the Prime Minister's timid 'yes' was interpreted as an act of deliberate neutrality. In contrast with the clarity exhibited by most parties in opposition, the absence of a strong position on behalf of

[151] Interview with former Minister of State and Government Spokesman T. Rousopoulos, May 2013.
[152] http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ATHENS830.html

the government was reflected in the headlines and editorials. "*Karamanlis adopts a neutral stance despite the criticism of Mitsotakis,"*[153] stated the center left Eleftherotypia, attempting to highlight the difference between Karamanlis and his predecessor and former Prime Minister Mitsotakis, who openly supported the plan. The "*Government distances itself from a decision*" was the verdict of To Vima[154], while the most accurate and precise description can be found in a cartoon published in Kathimerini depicting President Papadopoulos and Premier Karamanlis in bed: "*President of Cyprus: Good morning, Prime-Minister of Greece: I will rise from the bed from whatever side you say*."[155]

According to the third interpretation, the government's policy aimed at the plan's rejection, in which case the hard line hypothesis would be confirmed. To Karamanlis loyalists and New Democracy supporters, the Prime Minister for all intents and purposes articulated his opposition to the plan. Indeed, in later years, the Prime Minister himself would strengthen this narrative in his public statements, especially during the two electoral campaigns that followed in 2007 and 2009. A few years later, in a book on his government written by a friendly journalist, the position of Karamanlis on the Annan Plan would be described as a cornerstone of his "*foreign policy of romantic nationalism*."[156]

What drove the Greek government's policy? Was it an outcome influenced by a hard line or a soft line position? I believe that paradoxically the government opted to mix hard line ends with soft line means in a variation of the hypotheses that I presented in

[153] Eleftherotypia Newspaper, 10/04/2004.
[154] To Vima Newspaper, 11/04/2004.
[155] Kathimerini Newspaper, 10/04/2004.
[156] Kottakis, M., (2011), *Caramanlis: Off the Record*, Athens: Livanis.

the conceptual framework. In private, the Greek high official, who influenced foreign policy at the time, choosing to retain his anonymity, was candid about the Greek government's strategy, going a step further than what public sources suggest: "*The whole world was for the plan…we could not ignore the fact. In the closest possible co-operation with the President of Cyprus we decided that he would voice his opposition and we would follow a strategy focusing on our friends, partners and allies in the international community, so that the plan's rejection wouldn't result in unpleasant consequences. We paid great attention to Turkey. In consultations with Ankara, always with the approval of Papadopoulos, we ensured that our bilateral relations would not be affected. In this context, we reached an understanding with the Turkish government and even before the referenda we planned to welcome Prime Minister Erdogan in Athens on the 10th of May. This prevented a deterioration of Greek - Turkish relations and facilitated us in 'shutting the mouths' of everyone internationally*."[157]

In other words, according to this interpretation of events, whose credibility is strengthened by the interviewee's direct involvement and first-hand information at the highest level, and other highly placed sources in the Greek delegation[158], the newly elected government of Karamanlis was from the very beginning against the plan and worked in tandem with President Papadopoulos. Greece and Cyprus thus adopted a 'bad cop, good cop' strategy, with Nicosia bearing the burden of the plan's rejection in the eyes of the international community, and Athens attempting to ameliorate any adverse consequences on the day after. Thus, in public, Athens paid lip service to the plan,

[157] Interview with former Minister of Foreign Affairs P. Moliviatis, May 2013.
[158] Interview with high official of the Karamanlis government, May 2013.

appearing to follow a soft line, however lukewarm, while in private the government was hard line enough to push, along with that of Cyprus, for its rejection.

It should be underlined that mixing soft and hard line means and ends was not outside the norm of Greek foreign policy making or domestic politics. Interestingly, the PASOK government during the Simitis years followed a similar approach, although it did exactly the opposite: soft-line ends with hard-line means. As Keridis wrote in 2003, post-'96 PASOK emerged as *"a 'champion' in the 'two-level games-approach'"* required for managing the discrepancy between its western-friendly orientation in foreign policy and the sensibilities of public opinion: "*PASOK is emerging as a reliable partner to its western allies as it is the only [party] that can manipulate unruly Greek public opinion and absorb its reactions*."[159] Indeed, during the NATO bombings of Serbia, for example, while the overwhelming majority of citizens were against them (PASOK ministers participating in anti-war rallies etc.), there was a tacit approval of the government's alignment with the rest of the NATO members in supporting military action. Perhaps not surprisingly the most successful and long-lived administrations in the last two decades (Simitis, Karamanlis) have been those which have managed to marshal all the disparate elements in the antinomic and contradictory Greek worldview so as to alleviate its cognitive dissonance.

[159] Keridis, D., (2003), *The Foreign Policy of Modernization: From Confrontation to Interdependence*. In Tsakonas, P., *Modern Greek-Foreign Policy. A Holistic Approach,* Athens: Sideris, p.323.

3.4 Conclusion

The three case studies under consideration represent perennial issues in Greece's foreign policy, focusing on critical historical moments when important decisions had to be made. Their significance, together with their common denominators in terms of Realism, Liberalism and Identity, arguably addresses selection bias. The brief discussion of the narrative of each case study underlines the twists and turns of Greek foreign policy and highlights its disruptive behavior and its variance that constitutes the empirical puzzle of this thesis. The new empirical insights unveiled in the case of the Annan Plan, as it appears that the government consciously opted to follow a veiled hard line, only make the variance of Greek foreign policy more explicit and intriguing.

4. REALIST AND LIBERAL EXPLANATIONS

The dominant paradigms of IR theory, Liberalism and Realism, shed light upon the restraints and opportunities of states. The case of Greece is not an exception. The purpose of this chapter is to outline what each approach offers towards explaining the puzzle of Greek foreign policy in each case study. I will explore to what extent the intentions of policy makers, their policy options and policy choices or decisions can be understood within the frameworks of Realism or Liberalism. As noted in the introduction, it should be underlined that this is not a hypothesis-testing endeavor and therefore I will not join the theoretical debate on the merits of each paradigm, the strengths and weaknesses of which have been extensively discussed for decades. For the purposes of this thesis, I will not try to 'prove' or 'disprove' structural explanations. Instead of offering a new theory, I aim to redress the imbalance between structural approaches and Identity-based frameworks in Greek foreign policy.

4.1 Macedonian issue (1992)

In the case of Macedonian issue, the restraints and opportunities of Athens can be explained more so from the perspective of Realism and less so from that of Liberalism. In terms of both dominant paradigms of IR, however, the catalytic event that influenced Greek foreign policy was the fall of the Berlin Wall. The Balkans were amongst the first victims of the bipolar system's sudden and abrupt demise. Regime changes, together with Greece's borders, from communist control to free-market and political pluralism, the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the resulting wars in the early 1990s

produced much instability and placed the region in flux. At the same time, the apparent incapability of the Europeans to enforce peace and stability and the reluctance of the United States to intervene bred yet more uncertainty, allowing, and at times encouraging, countries to fend for themselves.

Greece, at the time, was the most prosperous and nationally cohesive country in the region, a member of both the European Community and NATO. As such, Athens stood the most to lose and the less to gain by any changes to the status quo. Indeed, the international material context caused great concern to Greek policymakers. During a meeting of the country's leadership, President Constantine Karamanlis, repeatedly referred to "*dangers*", particularly for the "*security and honor of our country"* which required a *"common and unbroken national front*." Main opposition leader and former Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou agreed: "*personally in all the years that I have lived in this country I have never felt more insecure, not for myself, but for the country, than I feel now.*" The head of the leftist party Synaspismos Maria Damanaki noted: "*at this moment all the problems that Greek foreign policy has faced since the Second World War are in elation*."[160] In this context, Greece was called upon to redefine its Balkan policy with a three-fold purpose: first, to guarantee its territorial integrity and cohesion, second, to reinforce its position as a regional power and, third, to establish itself as the natural partner for the international community in the neighborhood.

[160] *Official Transcript of the Council of Leaders*, Constantine Mitsotakis Foundation.

4.1.1 Realist perspective

The Realist paradigm helps to explain the puzzle of Greek foreign policy. Arguably, the Realist drivers that influenced Greek foreign policies were informed by a threat perception that stemmed (a) from historical legacy effects and (b) Skopje's alleged bond with Ankara. Nevertheless, it should be noted that this framework does not provide a full answer. Largely this is because different constituencies, that can all be categorized as Realist, contested alternative policy options that were more contradictory than complimentary.

4.1.1.1 Legacy effects

The independence of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia raised historical fears about Greece's territorial integrity. Three times in half a century the Greeks fought over the geographical area of Macedonia, the first time during the so-called Macedonian struggle at the turn of the 20th century, the second during the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913, and the third during the 1940s when Bulgaria, an Axis ally, once again occupied Greek and Serb Macedonia and Tito's partisans pledged to create a united Macedonia as part of a future Communist Federation of Balkan People. Indeed, during the Greek Civil War that followed (1946-49), both Yugoslavs and Bulgarians actively supported Greek communists and their alliance was understood by their enemies as also aiming at the establishment of a united Communist Macedonia. In response, the victory of the Greek government army in the Civil War, amongst others, resulted in an exodus of Slav-speaking Macedonians who had sided with the Communists.

Half a century later, these legacy effects were internalized by policy makers as being a need for Greeks to be vigilant. Successive governments thus prepared the defense of Macedonia, not only Greece's second largest region but also home to its second biggest city and port and to a significant percentage of its heavy industry. With the end of the Cold War, Yugoslavia, Greece's well-known and relatively co-operative northern neighbor, Greece's "*Balkan strategic 'cushion*,'"[161] was replaced on its border with a new Republic. This fledgling state took its first steps by adopting several seemingly provocative practices including the use of an ancient symbol on its flag, the Star of Vergina, irredentist articles in its new Constitution, and anti-Greek rhetoric in the education system.[162] More worrying for Athens was the apparent willingness of Skopje and its supporters around the world to refer to the rights of a supposed Macedonian Slav-speaking minority within Greek borders. The name Macedonia came to symbolize these political choices, as it constituted in the minds of Greek officials the epitome of such policies.

4.1.1.2 The long hand of Ankara

The perceived bond of Skopje and Ankara further aggravated Greek fears, as many at the time saw FYROM as a client state of Turkey. Certain policy makers in Greece feared that Turkey, Greece perennial 'other,' engineered the country's encirclement. A perceived "*Muslim arc*"[163] which consisted of Turkey and its supposed client states

[161] Kechagiaras, Y., (2012), *Why Did Greece Block the Euro-Atlantic Integration of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia? An Analysis of Greek Foreign Policy Behaviour Shifts*, LSE Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe.GreeSE Paper, No.58.

[162] Axt, H., (1997), *National Interests on Top of the Agenda – Greece's Role in Common Foreign and Security Policy.* In Axt. H., *Greece and the EU – Stranger Among Partners?* Baden-Baden: Nomos.

[163] Kechagiaras, Y., (2012), *Why Did Greece Block the Euro-Atlantic Integration of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia? An Analysis of Greek Foreign Policy Behaviour Shifts*, LSE Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe.GreeSE Paper, No.58.

Constas, D., (1995), *Challenges to Greek Foreign Policy: Domestic and External Parameters*. In Constas, D. and Theofanis, S., (ed.), *Greece Prepares for the Twenty-first Century*, Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.

with Muslim populations, Albania, so-called Macedonia, Bulgaria and Bosnia, reinforced a Greek siege mentality. This view was shared by several opinion makers at the time.[164] Opposition leader Andreas Papandreou made the connection explicitly: "*The Turkish threat now comes from the north. The great trouble is that in past times we talked about danger from the north. A time came when we talked only about the danger from the east, Turkey. Now Turkey is in the Balkans… Skopje on its own has no significance but let us not forget that behind the developments in the Balkans … is also Turkey*." [165]

Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis was less forthcoming on the matter but unwilling to restrain his reservations when it came to Turkish interventions in the region. When discussing Greek bilateral relations with its Balkans neighbors, for example, the Prime Minister underlined the problems that arose in the traditionally "*strong and good*" relationship of Athens with Sofia because of the participation of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria's government, which is "*hence held captive by some Turkish opinions*." Indeed, he attributed Sofia's recognition of Skopje to this factor.[166]

This point is significant as it sheds light upon the mind set of Greek policy makers. Practitioners, scholars, observers and journalists alike often wonder why, given the Realist balance of power between Athens and Skopje, Greece paid so much attention to its northern neighbor. Papandreou's argument shows that many Greek policy makers,

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Wallden, S., (2003), *The Balkan Policy of Greece: Critical Review of the Post World-War Era and Perspectives*'. In Tsakonas, P., (ed.), *Modern Greek Foreign Policy,* Athens: I. Sideris, vol. 1.

[164] Karakasidou, A., (1993), *Politicizing Culture: Negating Ethnic Identity in Greek Macedonia*. Journal of Modern Greek Studies, Vol. 11, Number 1. Zahariadis, N., (1996), *Greek Policy Toward the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 1991-1995.* Journal of Modern Greek Studies.Volume 14, Number 2. Yallouridis, C., (1999), *The External Orientation and Political Culture of Turkey.* In Yallouridis, C. and Tsakonas, P., (eds.), *Greece and Turkey After the End of the Cold War.* Athens: Sideris.

[165] Official transcript of the Council of Leaders, Constantine Mitsotakis Foundation.

[166] Ibid.

perceived Skopje as being the long hand of Ankara. Therefore, during this period, "*less security for FYR Macedonia meant more security for Greece, which eventually resorted to the logic of a regional balance of power….*"[167]

4.1.1.3 Alternative Realist options

Greece, however, had more than one Realist option available. Alternatively, for example, Athens could have kept the course of the past fifty years. Indeed, Greek foreign policy on the Macedonian issue after 1990 entailed a significant revision. After the end of the Cold War, Athens prioritized its denial of the use of the name Macedonia over its opposition to the dissolution of Yugoslavia, while rejecting any compromise. Since the 1950s, successive Greek governments shared the view that Yugoslavia was a useful buffer state on the fringes of the Soviet- dominated communist world[168] and that its territorial integrity had to be sustained. Officially, Athens denied the existence of a distinct Macedonian nation but chose not to act on its position. Indeed, "*future historians with access to diplomatic archives of Greece's Balkan relations during the post-war decades might be intrigued at the extent of the impact of the 'Macedonian Question' on the formulation of Greece's policy options.*"[169] Thus, for decades, Athens neither challenged Yugoslavia's constitutional framework nor its federal administration. On the contrary, a Greek consulate was maintained in Skopje, as Athens

[167] Kechagiaras, Y., (2012), *Why Did Greece Block the Euro-Atlantic Integration of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia? An Analysis of Greek Foreign Policy Behaviour Shifts.* LSE Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe.GreeSE Paper, No.58.

[168] Kofos, E., (1999), *Greece's Macedonian Adventure: The Controversy Over FYROM's Independence and Recognition*. In Cofoudakis, V. et al., (eds.), *Greece and the New Balkans: Challenges and Opportunities*, New York: Pella Publishing Co.

[169] Ibid.

maintained de facto relations with the authorities of the Republic, although it was officially accredited with the federal authorities in Belgrade.[170]

Interestingly, at first, the Mitsotakis government appears to have followed a variation of traditional Greek policy, choosing to focus on the question of the minority. Early in its term, the government's rhetoric was restrained, carefully allowing itself breathing space for negotiation and possible compromise. Even before he was elected Prime Minister, Mitsotakis would prioritize the question of the existence (or not) of a Slav-speaking minority in Greece over that of the name. Indeed, the historical experience of the 20th century with the redrawing of borders in the name of minority rights appears to have weighed heavily. A few years later, Mitsotakis would reflect: "*I was preoccupied not with the name of this state, which is connected with the historical dimension of the problem and its value is mainly psychological and emotional. The problem for me was that a second minority problem in the area of Western Macedonia should not be created*."[171]

His early public statements highlight the alternative realist option available to Greece. In February 1990, as leader of the largest party in Parliament, Mitsotakis stated, visiting Belgrade: "*from Skopje, recently, the non-existent problem of a minority of Macedonia is projected and this is something that poisons the relationship between the two countries*." In September 1991, in response to a journalist's question on Macedonia, Mitsotakis would leave the question of the name open and deliberately vague, stating: "*the position of the Greek government regarding the name they use is given, self-*

[170] Ibid.

[171] Skylakakis, T.,(1995), *In the Name of Macedonia,* Athens: EuroEkdotiki, p.3.

evident, and is shared by all the Greek people." In contrast, during the same interview, the Prime Minister was much more straight-forward and explicit when it came to the so-called Macedonian minority which he described as a "*ghost minority*."[172] Significantly, a few days before the European council of the 16th of December 1991, the Greek Cabinet met to consider the issue and while stressing the significance of the minority question only decided vaguely on a "*change of name*" that would reflect the geographical, rather than the national, understanding of Macedonia, leaving a window open for compromise.[173] Developments in the next few months however would result in a shift in the Greek position.

4.1.2 Liberal perspective

The Liberalism paradigm fails to explain Greek policy on Macedonia. The main drivers of Liberalism, namely co-operation, alliances and partnerships, which form international institutions, were challenged at their very core, particularly Greece's position within the European Community. Athens, in effect, locked itself into a minority policy position, denying Skopje the use of the name Macedonia, refusing the recognition of the Republic bilaterally and undermining recognition as much as possible in multilateral fora. As a result, the Liberal paradigm weakens as an exploratory tool because Greece's partnerships and alliances were shaken resulting in (a) the country's isolation within multilateral fora and (b) negative spillover effects on other issues of Greek concern.

[172] Ibid., 46-48.
[173] Ibid.,48.

4.1.2.1 A country isolated

Greece found itself isolated from its allies, partners and friends at a critical time when its European orientation was rather uncertain, as Greece's place in a changing Europe was far from guaranteed. This was recognized by Foreign Minister Pangalos in 1994 when he stated: "*we must...maintain our position on the issue even if it harms relations with our allies*."[174] Indeed, Athens appeared to defect from international co-operation, systematically, despite intense pressures from its partners, allies and friends.

On the European front, in council after council of foreign ministers and summit after summit, Greek representatives refused to waver in their position. Taking advantage of the European decision-making process that required unanimity, Athens insisted on the conditions imposed on Skopje. The Greeks attempted to repeat their performance at the level of the United Nations but in the end they had no choice but to live with Skopje's acceptance into the UN. At the same time, Greece was equally uncooperative when it came to the offers of international mediation. The international community developed two elaborate proposals, the 'Pinheiro Package' and the 'Vance-Owen plan', which went a long way towards satisfying Greek security and even National Identity concerns. Nevertheless, both were found wanting from the Greek perspective.

At the same time, Athens lost the opportunity to appear as part of the solution in the Balkans and was perceived as actually contributing to instability in the region. The image of Greece in the international media was tarnished, reflecting the costs of defection across the board. The Economist, for example, would describe Greece as "*the*

[174] Zahariades, N., (2005), *Essence of Political Manipulation: Emotion, Institutions, and Greek Foreign Policy*, New York: Peter Lang.

sick man of Europe" writing: "*No article in the Treaty of Rome allows the European Community to expel a member. With Greece's relations with its partners at an all-time low, there are some who lament that absence*." A few days later, the International Herald Tribune would conclude: "*the EC has lost its patience with Greece*" and Le Monde, in an article headlined "*the Community facing Byzantine disputes*," concluded: "*enraged by the stance of Greece, mainly on the Macedonian issue, Brussels is searching for an improvement in its relations with Turkey*." The Financial Times, describing the failure of Common European Defense Policy and the weaknesses of the Portuguese Presidency, stated that "*under the present system, very little can be done to stop Greece from always being the Achilles heel*."[175]

4.1.2.2 Negative spillover effects

Moreover, Greek policy makers appeared to have been burning bridges in terms of the country's alliances and partnerships as the Macedonian issue had severe spillover effects on other policy areas. Greek diplomatic capital was diminished, and Athens found itself in a weak position in terms of marshaling its resources within international institutions. In the early 1990s, Greece was facing a number of geopolitical challenges. To the north, its immediate neighborhood was up in flames. To the east, the Greeks perceived its old adversary, Turkey, as threatening its territorial sovereignty and integrity, especially in the Aegean. The latest crisis that had brought the two countries to the verge of war was as recent as 1987. In the Mediterranean, the Cyprus wound

[175] Skylakakis, T.,(1995), *In the Name of Macedonia*, Athens: EuroEkdotiki, p.117. Direct quotes must be referred back to the original sources when easily available, as these would be. Author says that he has consulted newspaper sources.

remained open and an international mediation attempt, under the auspices of the UN Secretary General, was underway.

It is characteristic that in March of 1992 the President of Cyprus, Giorgos Vasiliou, made a rather unprecedented, public intervention in Greek foreign policy making: He expressed his dismay with Athens, criticizing Greek persistence on the issue of the name and did not hesitate to predict that it would have negative consequences for the Cyprus problem.[176] And yet Greece, for all intents and purposes, chose to monopolize its foreign policy, investing tremendous diplomatic capital into a single issue.

4.2 Greek – Turkish rapprochement (1999)

In the case study of Greek – Turkish relations, the restraints and opportunities of Athens can be explained both from the perspectives of Realism and Liberalism. In terms of both dominant paradigms of IR, the catalytic event that influenced Greek foreign policy was the paradigm shift initiated by the fall of the Berlin Wall and European enlargement. In a view supported by a number of scholars, the end of the Cold War,[177] and the sense of insecurity cultivated by developments in the Balkans[178], together with the project of an ever-larger Europe, informed Greek decision-making. As George Papandreou, Foreign Minister at the time, has stated: "*Three major elements can be*

[176] Ibid.

[177] Many foreign policy analysts have emphasized the difficulties of foreign policymaking in the post-Cold War era. As Van Coufadakis states, "During the Cold War, the Soviet threat provided a convenient heuristic device to explain events, to assess emerging threats, and to formulate foreign and defense policies, even though many times such simplistic explanations only distorted interpretation of events. The post-Cold War era created great uncertainty as to the role of states and their institutions." Coufadakis, V., (1996), *Greek Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: Issues and Challenges*. Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 3, p.41.

[178] Tsoukalis, L., (1996), *Is Greece an Awkward Partner?* In Featherstone, K. and Ifantis, K. (eds.), *Greece in a Changing Europe: Between European Integration and Balkan Disintegration*, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, p.28.

credited: political forces engulfing the region in the post-Cold War period, new realities of the 'globalized' world, and a re-evaluation of Greece's national interests."[179]

4.2.1 Realist perspective

The Realist paradigm goes a certain way towards explaining the puzzle of Greek foreign policy. The Realist drivers that influenced Greek foreign policies were informed by re-evaluation of Greek interests stemming from (a) near-death experiences, as the 1990s witnessed three crises in Greek – Turkish relations, one of which brought the two countries to the verge of conflict and (b) the arms race between Greece and Turkey which, from the Greek perspective, began to appear futile and costly, particularly within the context of EMU accession. Nevertheless, much like in the previous case study, this framework does not provide a comprehensive answer. Largely this is because different constituencies, that can all be categorized as Realist, contested alternative policy options that were contradictory.

4.2.1.1 Crises and near-war experiences

Three crisis in the late 1990s resulted in the deterioration of the relationship between Greece and Turkey bringing the two countries to the brink of war and prompting the U.S. National Security Council spokesman to conclude: "*Sovereignty prompts people to do strange things.*"[180] In 1996, the Imia crisis, with both sides claiming sovereignty

[179] Gundogdu, A., (2001), *Identities in Question: Greek-Turkish Relations in a Period of Transformation*, Middle East Review of International Affairs, 5, 1.

[180] Statement by Johnson, D., (1996), *Brinkmen on the Rocks: Greece and Turkey Stop Just Short of War Over a Pair of Stony Outcroppings in the Wine-Dark Sea*, Time International, Vol. 147, No. 7.

over an uninhabited islet in the Aegean; in 1998, the 'S-300 crisis' triggered by Greek deployment of a Russian-bought missile detachment in Cyprus; and the 1999 Ocalan crisis when Greece was implicated in the harboring of the Kurdish leader. Thus, in a short time span of just three years, Greek – Turkish relations reached their lowest point since 1974 and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus.

The consensus amongst Greek policy-makers and the general public was once again that Turkey's revisionist policy resulted in unwarranted hostility. After the Imia crisis in particular, Greece's "*firm, but flexible*"[181] position was interpreted as being a response to Turkish plans to drag Greece into an unnecessary conflict. In the words of Prime Minister Costas Simitis (1996-2004): "*Greece managed to deter the Turkish plans. The deterioration of the Imia incident into an all-out conflict, which was Turkey's intention, would have harmed Greek interests...Turkey's attempt to engage Greece in a widespread conflict and a general discussion failed. Turkey is now on the defensive*."[182]

The crisis repertoire of the late 1990s could have resulted in two different and at times contradictory Realist responses to Greece's security dilemma: (a) On the one hand, Greek policy-makers could pursue the Realist option of strengthening Greece's defense capacity and following a hard line policy. (b) On the other hand, the crises could result in an equally Realist option of re-evaluating Greece's capabilities and adopting a more conciliatory policy towards Turkey. In fact, for a time, it appeared that policy makers in Athens mixed both options until the later prevailed.

[181] Speech by Costas Simitis (Prime Minister – Leader of PASOK); in Journal of Parliamentary Debates, (6 May 1996), p. 6963.
[182] Speech by Costas Simitis (Prime Minister – Leader of PASOK); in Journal of Parliamentary Debates, (6 May 1996), p. 6963.

If the first option was pursued, Athens would be expected to allocate funds and resources, marshaling its diplomatic and military arsenal, in an effort to defend and protect itself from a position of further strength. Indeed, the crises contributed to strengthening Greece's negative perception of Turkey and fostering hostility.[183] As a result, at least for a short while, it appeared that the Greek government went down this road. Not coincidently, a few months after the Imia crisis, Greece embarked on an extensive re-armament program. Turkish- European relations reflect this dynamic. In the European Luxemburg Summit of 1997, partly due to Greek insistence, Turkey was omitted from the list of states awarded the status of EU candidate.

If the second option was pursued, Athens would be expected to revisit its strengths and weaknesses and pursue a soft line policy. Indeed, it has been suggested that the first seeds of the Greek foreign policy shift of 1999 were sown during these crises that may resemble 'blessings in disguise.' There is plenty of credible evidence to support the premise. In the face of intense pressure from Europe and the United States, the intensity of the crises and the concessions, imposed or otherwise, that Greece offered, Athens was compelled to re-evaluate its options vis-à-vis Ankara.[184] In this context, it was understood that the Imia crisis escaped escalation to conflict only after a last minute US intervention, thus revealing once more the inefficiency of European mechanisms when it came to crisis management.[185] In this context, in the words of George Papandreou:

[183] Gulden, A., (1998), *Kardak Krizinin Turk-Yunan Iliskilerine Etkisi*, Foreign Policy, Yaz, pp. 111-119.

[184] Athanassopoulou, E., (1997), *Blessing in Disguise? The Imia-Kardak Crisis and Greek-Turkish Relations*, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 2, No. 3, p. 97.

[185] Georgiades, H., (2000), *Greece and the EU-Turkish Relationship*. In Mitsos, A. and Mossialos, E., (eds.) *Contemporary Greece and Europe*, Ashgate, Aldershot.

"*From our perspective…the veto increased the bilateral tensions with Ankara as our partners constantly shifted the blame onto our shoulders*."[186]

As Prime Minister Costas Simitis argued with hindsight in his book, the incident illustrated the failure of earlier approaches towards Turkey's containment and endangered the Greek central policy aim of joining the EMU. In the Greek view, the incident manifested continuing Turkish aggression, which was seen as *"... a qualitative change in Turkey's revisionist behavior towards Greece*,"[187] and Greek vulnerability, urging for a new strategic approach to the bilateral relations. Thus, in the aftermath of the crisis, the need emerged for a new course in Greek foreign policy vis-à-vis Turkey.[188] During our interview, Christos Rozakis, an advisor and close confidant of Simitis who would later become Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, challenged that there is a direct link between the three crises and the Greek policy shift, noting that some time had passed between Imia and the decision to adopt the new policy and stating "*in practice neither Imia, nor Ocalan played a role*."[189] Costas Simitis, however, during our interview, reiterated his position, noting emphatically: "*I was driven by the fact that I did not want another Imia. Turkey now (after Helsinki) cannot challenge our sovereignty over Imia except in the international courts.*"[190] George Papandreou went further during his interview with the author: "*Our strategy was much more than simply a response to circumstance. Clearly, the challenges of Greek – Turkish relations produce events such as crises between our two countries, but the roots of the problems are deeper. There were fundamental questions that had to be considered including the*

[186] Interview with Former Prime Minister G. Papandreou, July 21 2013.

[187] Speech by Costas Simitis (Prime Minister – Leader of PASOK); in Journal of Parliamentary Debates, (6 May 1996), p. 6963.

[188] Simitis, C., (2005), *Politics for a Creative Greece, 1996-2004*, Athens: Polis, p.72-99.

Blavoukos, S., Bourantonis, D., (2010), *Accounting for Foreign Policy Change: The Role of Policy Entrepreneurs*; Paper prepared for the SGIR 7th Pan-European Conference on IR Stockholm.

[189] Interview with former Deputy Foreign Minister C. Rozakis, June 2013.

[190] Interview with former Prime Minsiter C. Simitis, June 2nd 2013.

path of Turkey towards Europe and the accession of Cyprus to the EU. We needed a long-term plan."[191]

Indeed, the Greek government took certain concrete steps in this direction starting in 1997 when it expressed for the first time its support for Turkey's European prospects under certain conditions and with the signing of the Madrid Declaration that established mutual respect for sovereignty rights. Moreover, Greece's participation together with Turkey in the Southeastern European Brigade for peacekeeping operations in the Balkans in 1998, and military co-operation with its eastern neighbor during NATO's Kosovo operation in 1999[192], constituted unprecedented moves.

4.2.1.2 Arms race

At the same time, Greek policymakers revisited their country's arms race with Turkey. Historically, Greek foreign policy was driven by the Realist undertraining that Greece had to fend for itself and therefore high defense expenditures were considered as a sine-qua-non. Since the 1970s, Athens had attempted to build up its defensive resources[193] with an annual expenditure that averaged at more than 6% of GDP until the end of the Cold War.[194] Greece faced each and every Turkish 'provocation' forcefully. This was the case whether at singular moments of crisis. In 1987 for example, Greece mobilized its armed forces in response to Turkish exploration in the Aegean, or in terms of day-

[191] Interview with Former Prime Minister G. Papandreou, July 21 2013.

[192] Gundogdu, A., (2001), *Identities in Question: Greek-Turkish Relations in a Period of Transformation*, Middle East Review of International Affairs, 5, 1.

[193] Platias, A., (1991), *Greece's Strategic Doctrine: In Search of Autonomy and Deterrence*. In Constas, D., *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s: Domestic and External Influences*, London: MacMillan, p. 99.

[194] Dokos, T., (2003), *Greek National Security Policy: The Link Between Defence Policy and Foreign Policy*. In Tsakonas, P., (2003), *Contemporary Greek Foreign Policy*, Athens, Papazisis.

to-day alleged violations of Greek airspace and the Athens FIR, which resulted in dogfights between the Greek and the Turkish air forces. Greek strategy reached a peak in 1993, when Athens adopted a so-called Common Defense Doctrine bringing Greece and Cyprus together under the same defense shield.

In the words of Costas Simitis, "*defense expenditures are yet another example of a subject everyone wants to do something about, but no one does*."[195] Once again, Greek policy-makers faced a dilemma. One the one hand, the high cost of defense was considered essential for national security. On the other hand, since the 1990s, "*we observe a growing concern over the deteriorating military balance between Greece and Turkey.*"[196] Indeed, the modernization of the Turkish armed forces was a source of concern for Athens.[197] At the same time, it was clear that any attempt to restore the balance would necessitate considerable public expenditure that would then derail the country's efforts at fiscal discipline in light of its ambition to join the EMU.[198] In the "*cannons versus butter*"[199] dilemma, popularized in certain sections of the Greek press at the time, the normalization of Greek-Turkish relations paid high dividends. The prospect of military de-escalation and the accompanying curtailment of military expenditures provided strong incentives. In this context, from a Realist perspective, certain analysts who saw a Greek – Turkish detente together with a de-escalation of tension as a reasonable foreign policy choice advanced a soft line agenda.[200]

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[195] Interview with former Prime Minsiter C. Simitis, June 2nd 2013.

[196] Agnantopoulos, A., (2005), *The Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy: A Conceptual Framework and an Empirical Application in Greek-Turkish Relations.* Paper presented at the 2nd LSE Symposium on Modern Greece, London.

[197] Dokos, T., (1999), *The Balancing of the Turkish Threat: The Military Dimension*. In Yallouridis, C. and Tsakonas, P., *Greece and Turkey After the End of the Cold War*, Athens: Sideris , p. 202.

[198] Dokos, T., (1999), *The Balancing of the Turkish Threat: The Military Dimension*. In Yallouridis, C. and Tsakonas, P., *Greece and Turkey After the End of the Cold War*, Athens: Sideris , p. 202.

[199] TA NEA Newspaper, 05/05/1998.

[200] Tsakonas, P., (1999), *Security Regimes and Regional Stability: The Case of the Greek-Turkish Arms Race*. In Yallouridis, C. and Tsakonas P., *Greece and Turkey After the End of the Cold War*, Athens: Sideris.

4.2.2 Liberal perspective

The Liberalism paradigm as an exploratory tool offers much in terms of explaining the policy shift of 1999. The main drivers of Liberalism, namely co-operation, alliances and partnerships, which form international institutions, played a catalytic role, particularly in Greece's position as an equal amongst equals in the European Community. Greece's insistence upon blocking Turkish accession resulted in the increasing isolation of Athens, while European member states showed an increased willingness to circumvent the process and move forward with Turkish accession, overruling Athens. At the same time, the prospect of Cypriot accession and the normalization of Greek – Turkish relations provided a strong incentive for Athens to revisit its position and resolve its security dilemma. In effect, Greek policy makers at the time opted for a paradigm shift that was to a great extent based on an appreciation of a Liberal outlook of international relations. Prime Minister Simitis emphatically defended his Liberal worldview during our interview: "*With globalization, international relations are different. Interconnections transcend old disputes and there are other ways to resolve differences. No state, any longer, is a nation-state that can impose its will with wars and exclusions. Even less so in Europe or those with whom Europe relates. Lonely roads are not possible any longer and lead nowhere*".[201]

[201] Interview with former Prime Minsiter C. Simitis, June 2nd 2013.

4.2.2.1 Intransigence and its cost

Since 1974, the policy of intransigence, as exemplified through a long series of repetitive vetoes, was a cornerstone of Greek foreign policy. At the turn of the 20th century, however, it became apparent that Greek intransigence towards Turkey was "*being achieved at increasing political cost*."[202] Arguably, Greece, which was portrayed for a long time as the sole culprit, effectively allowed several of its partners to hide their own concerns behind the cloak of Greek intransigence.[203] In the words of George Papandreou, "*the veto was convenient for many Europeans*."[204] In the words of Rozakis: "*Kranidiotis (senior adviser to the PMs Papandreou and Simitis and later Deputy Foreign Minister) believed that this absolute refusal took us nowhere. It has already been tried and has not borne fruit: Turkey's behavior towards Greece has not changed, while this policy has begun to alienate us a bit from Europe*."[205]

Indeed, from a Liberal perspective, the diplomatic losses were real. Athens was increasingly seen as Europe's black sheep, nationalizing European policy, placing its own interpretation of national goals ahead of the European project's progress. That was a considerable blow for the Greek policy - makers, particularly the Simitis government, which attached great strategic significance to Greece's participation in the strong nucleus of European integration. In the words of Rozakis: "*What did play a role was the sense that while we were advancing within the EU as equal partners, that was the*

[202] Grigoriadis, I., (2003), *The Changing Role of the EU Factor in Greek-Turkish Relations*, London School of Economics and Political Science, Hellenic Observatory.

[203] Blavoukos, S., Bourantonis, D., (2010), *Accounting for Foreign Policy Change: The Role of Policy Entrepreneurs*; Paper prepared for the SGIR 7th Pan-European Conference on IR Stockholm ; Georgiades, H., (2000), *Greece and the EU-Turkish Relationship*. In Mitsos, A. and Mossialos, E., (eds.), *Contemporary Greece and Europe*, Ashgate, Aldershot; Grigoriadis, I., (2003), *The Changing Role of the EU Factor in Greek-Turkish Relations*, London School of Economics and Political Science, Hellenic Observatory.

[204] Interview with Former Prime Minister G. Papandreou, July 21 2013.

[205] Interview with former Deputy Foreign Minister C. Rozakis, June 2013.

trend, we could not be a pariah. Given that it was made known to us that we were a pariah. Simitis felt that Greece's 'face' within the EU was at risk if we continued without change to our past policy."[206]

At the same time, the problem was further complicated by the limited options available to Greek decision-makers within the narrow confines of intransigence. Thus, Athens came face to face with issue linkages and negative spill-over effects. In this context, during the 1980s and 1990s, Greece's "*conditionality policy seems to have been restricted by its limited bargaining power inside the Community which necessitated the concentration of diplomatic efforts on one issue at a time*."[207] Athens, for example, was forced to exchange the release of the Fourth Financial Protocol with European support on Macedonia while later conditionality was gradually relaxed in exchange of a piecemeal progress in Cypriot accession.[208]

Furthermore, there appeared to be a consensus amongst Greek policymakers that the policy of intransigence had a deadline as several European partner states were seeking ways to circumvent the process and bypass Greek objections. Turkey, a country with undeniable geostrategic interest together with a significant domestic market, particularly in these first stages in Ankara's road to European accession, attracted the majority of European member states. Greek policy, therefore, backfired as its partners isolated Greece. Indeed, "*it soon became apparent that this (the Greek veto) policy had*

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[206] Ibid.

[207] Agnantopoulos, A., (2005), *The Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy: A Conceptual Framework and an Empirical Application in Greek-Turkish Relations.* Paper presented at the 2nd LSE Symposium on Modern Greece, London; Yannas, P., (1994), *The Greek Factor in EC-Turkey Relations*. In Kazakos, P. and Ioakimidis, P., (1994), *Greece and EU Mebership Evaluated*, London, Pinter, p. 220.

[208] Suvarierol, S., (2003), *The Cyprus Obstacle in Turkey's Road to the European Union*". In Carkoglu, A. and Rubin, B., (eds.), *Turkey and the European Union*, London: Frank Cass, pp. 62-66; quoted in Grigoriadis, I., (2003), *The Changing Role of the EU Factor in Greek-Turkish Relations*, London School of Economics and Political Science, Hellenic Observatory.

not prevented Turkey from establishing closer relations with the EU and that it had instead led to increased disaffection towards Greece."[209] For example, as early as 1994, after Greece's veto on the Customs Union between Brussels and Ankara, it became apparent that a group of member-states were organizing themselves in the direction of bypassing Greece. Indeed, representatives of the UK, France, Germany and Italy held a separate meeting with Turkish leaders on the subject of Turkish European accession.[210] In the words of Yannos Kranidiotis: "*The dogmatic and complete denial of Greece to accept the EU-Turkey Customs Union would not only breach Greece's contractual obligations but it could also lead our country to face a 'legal coup' from our partners and the approval of the Customs Union with a qualified majority from the Council despite Greece's objections*."[211]

Papandreou has a different recollection, noting Greece's capacity to sustain the veto: "*We had a strong basis for a veto and we could defend our position relatively easily. There were always pressures, but the veto was convenient for many Europeans*."[212] Rozakis, however, who praised Kranidiotis, crediting him with starting the Greek policy shift during our interview, would make a different argument: "*Europe wanted Turkey inside (Europe) very much, and it was understood that after a certain point in time the Europeans had decided that if we continued being negative they would find a way to circumvent our veto. If this happened, it would have meant that we would have accomplished nothing: We wouldn't have the possibility to play some role and we*

[209] Stephanou, C. and Tsardanides, C., (1991), *The EC Factor in the Greece-Turkey-Cyprus Triangle*. In Constas, D., *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s: Domestic and External Influences*, London: MacMillan, p. 213; Georgiades, H., (2000), *Greece and the EU-Turkish Relationship.* In Mitsos, A. and Mossialos, E., (eds.), *Contemporary Greece and Europe*, Ashgate, Aldershot, p.425.

[210] Athens News Agency Bulletin, 4/2/1995. Available at: http://www.hri.org/news/greek/ana/1995/95-02-04.ana.txt; Agnantopoulos, A., (2005), *The Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy: A Conceptual Framework and an Empirical Application in Greek-Turkish Relations.* Paper presented at the 2nd LSE Symposium on Modern Greece, London.

[211] Kranidiotis, Y., (2000), *Greek Foreign Policy: Reflections and Thoughts on the Eve of the Twenty-first Century*, Athens: Sideris.

[212] Interview with Former Prime Minister G. Papandreou, July 21 2013.

would have retained Turkey's hostility, while our veto would be circumvented. I don't know how they would have circumvented our veto – it is not simple, since it was not very simple, but it was made known to us."[213] Simitis, during our interview, would defend the position of Rozakis: "*I did not feel any pressure. Rozakis however is right that it is always the case that when a small country like Greece presents obstacles to the policy of the EU its position weakens considerably. You have to integrate your own pursuits within the wider pursuits*."[214]

4.2.2.2 Liberal security dilemma

The above reading of European reality and the diplomatic cost of Greek foreign policy appeared to set the terms for a dilemma that was felt acutely in Liberal terms. As Rozakis stated: "*There were two alternative propositions. The first was that we accept our destiny, our fate; that if Europe insisted so much, we should comply. The second was to comply, we could not do differently, otherwise we were in danger of being isolated without gaining any benefit but asking for certain things in return. And at this point the conversation began about what to do*."[215]

In this context, the re-orientation of Greek foreign policy has been presented to a great extent as being a Liberal response to a security dilemma. In other words, Greek foreign policy was defined by the multilateral environment. Papandreou described the decision-making process during our interview: "*Greek strategy was the outcome of long and thoughtful consideration. Early on, we commissioned a study that examined our options*

[213] Interview with former Deputy Foreign Minister C. Rozakis, June 2013.
[214] Interview with former Prime Minsiter C. Simitis, June 2nd 2013.
[215] Interview with former Deputy Foreign Minister C. Rozakis, June 2013.

regarding Turkey's relationship with Europe. There was much talk, at the time, about the so-called special relationship, which focused on common defense and economic co-operation, but we chose to adopt a comprehensive long-term strategy, based on conditionality, which would transcend our differences and at the same time secure Greek interests."[216]

The 1999 policy transformation entailed among others "*the full communitarization of the Greek-Turkish relationship, counting upon engagement and socialization effects to bring about the normalization of bilateral relations*".[217] This is the interpretation of events preferred by several scholars and most importantly by the protagonists themselves, namely Simitis and Papandreou. As Simitis characteristically stated: "*The deeper engagement of international institutions could support the normative system needed by Southeastern European states: the importance of democratic governance domestically, the rejection of war as a means for dispute resolution, the legitimacy of existing dispute/conflict resolution mechanisms, and the preference for multilateral solutions to common security challenges*."[218]

Thus, Greek policy makers counted upon the strategy's dynamic and potential as it was understood as having history on its side. By engaging Turkey within the European framework, Athens would reap the benefits of Turkey's modernization, its political and economic reforms, and Ankara's integration of European norms and values. In this line of thinking, it was more probable that a Europeanized Turkey would qualify its

[216] Interview with Former Prime Minister G. Papandreou, July 21 2013.

[217] Blavoukos, S., Bourantonis, D., (2010), *Accounting for Foreign Policy Change: The Role of Policy Entrepreneurs*; Paper prepared for the SGIR 7th Pan-European Conference on IR Stockholm.

[218] Quoted in Karatrantos, T.,Tsakonas, P., *The Europeanization of Greek Foreign Policy. From the Community Principle to the Crisis Uncertainty*. University of the Aegean.

revisionist aggressive policies. In this context, Athens embarked upon and was fully committed to its strategy. In the words of Papandreou: "*We supported a real Turkish candidacy for the EU and not a virtual one. We wanted our European partners to face the facts and rise to the occasion with sincere intentions - without double-talk or evasions. I should say that some countries were lukewarm regarding Turkish accession, while others were dead set against it. Significantly, both Germany and France supported Turkey's efforts, although later they changed their positions. Equally importantly, the United States was pushed to change its policy and shifted from an unconditional support of Turkey to a support for Turkey's European accession with all the strings attached. In other words, all powers aligned in support of this policy*."[219]

4.2.2.3 Conditionality and its benefits

For decades, the cornerstone of Greek foreign policy was the concept of conditionality which was fully articulated in the form of "*conditional sanctions and conditional rewards*" by Greek scholar Theodoros Couloumbis.[220] Previously, conditionality was associated with the power of the veto[221] and Greece's capacity to manage the distance between Turkey and Europe, thus cultivating its comparative advantage.[222] By the late 1990s, however, a new understanding prevailed amongst Greek policy makers: "*The potential losses in terms of diplomatic leverage entailed by the renunciation of the veto would be compensated by the fact that Turkey's conformity and co-operation would*

[219] Interview with Former Prime Minister G. Papandreou, July 21 2013.

[220] Couloumbis, T. and Ifandis, P., (2003), *Transforming the Security Dilemma in the Aegean: Greek Strategic Choices and Structural Constraints – A Realist Approach.* In Tsakonas, P., (ed.), *Contemporary Greek Foreign Policy*, Athens: Sideris, p.103.

[221] Yannas, P., (1994), *The Greek Factor in EC-Turkey Relations*. In Kazakos, P. and Ioakimidis, P., (1994), *Greece and EU Membership Evaluated*, London, Pinter, p. 216.

[222] Coufoudakis, V., (1991), *Greek Political Party Attitudes Towards Turkey: 1974-89*. In Constas, D., *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s: Domestic and External Influences*, London: MacMillan.

become subject not only to Greek supervision but to an institutionalized EU monitoring mechanism."[223] In the words of Papandreou: "*We wanted to turn this around and include issues that were important to us, such as the accession of Cyprus to the EU, good neighborly relations, and the Copenhagen criteria in the process. What did we achieve? Our national issues became European issues. Europe now defended our interests as long as they were grounded in international law, which they were, and designed a road map for Turkey*."[224]

The emergence of Cyprus as a candidate country for European membership played an important role in the change in Greek foreign policy. The very recognition amongst Greek policy makers of the need for Cyprus to join the EU is indicative of the pulling power of the main drivers of Liberalism, namely co-operation, alliances and partnerships, which form international institutions. In this context, Athens would "*agree on the piecemeal improvement of Turkey-EU relations and in exchange would secure the progress of Cyprus' EU membership application*."[225] Former Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos underlined this fact: "*The Helsinki success that lead us to withdraw from our veto right was the acceptance of Cyprus into the EU without the precondition of solution...So we achieved the entry of a state with some important particularities in the EU*."[226]

[223] Agnantopoulos, A., (2005), *The Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy: A Conceptual Framework and an Empirical Application in Greek-Turkish Relations.* Paper presented at the 2nd LSE Symposium on Modern Greece, London; Tsakonas, P., (2003), Communautarising the Enemy: Greek Balance Strategy and Greek Turkish Relations; in Tsakonas, P., Contemporary Greek Foreign Policy, Athens: Sideris.

[224] Interview with Former Prime Minister G. Papandreou, July 21 2013.

[225] Grigoriadis, I., (2003), *The Changing Role of the EU Factor in Greek-Turkish Relations*, London School of Economics and Political Science, Hellenic Observatory.

[226] Interview with Theodoros Pangalos, Athens, 9 December 2008. And Zaras, F., (2012), *A Rational Choice Approach of Greek-Turkish Relations: The Greek Case*, Queen Mary University of London.

In other words, Greece increased its bargaining power. In return for its support for the EU- Turkey Customs Union, Athens had demanded the beginning of accession negotiations for Cyprus. At Helsinki, Greece secured the disentanglement of a solution to the Cyprus problem from Nicosia's European accession. In the words of Rozakis: "*The Cyprus problem was the major issue at the time of our decision. Cyprus was a candidate for accession, but in the political circles in which it was discussed it was made clear to everyone that if the political problem was not solved there would be no accession. And that was unrelated to the compliance of Cyprus with the conditions for accession. There was a nominal candidacy, which undoubtedly, we all took seriously, but unfortunately it wasn't, and a serious reaction on behalf of Europe. We still haven't realized the degree of difficulty of Cyprus' accession. Probably, this is why we have understated Helsinki, those who have, but it is a critical subject. Therefore, we decided that we would agree to forget the veto, and they would forget the political solution to the problem*."[227]

At the same time, Athens managed to include in the wording of the summit's conclusions a reference to the necessity to solve territorial disputes either through dialogue or through the International Court of Justice, thus inscribing "*a long standing Greek demand as EU policy, without having to define what the existing differences with Turkey were … and without being accused of high-jacking the EU decision making process*."[228] Rozakis describes this development as follows: "*We took a major step in the sense that the EU was involved in the resolution of our differences. The condition that was agreed, namely that Turkey had to resolve its differences with its neighbors*

[227] Interview with former Deputy Foreign Minister C. Rozakis, June 2013.

[228] Agnantopoulos, A., (2005), *The Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy: A Conceptual Framework and an Empirical Application in Greek-Turkish Relations.* Paper presented at the 2nd LSE Symposium on Modern Greece, London.

with recourse to the International Court of Justice, had a twofold character. First, Europe's continuous monitoring of Turkey. Second, it was much more than simply notification and monitoring. The negotiations between Europe and Turkey depended on Greek Turkish relations…. Greece had to agree for the negotiations to continue."[229]

Thus, the foreign policy shift offered a concrete and tangible benefit vis-à-vis Cyprus and the normalization of Greek-Turkish relations. The Realist 'zero-sum' character of the bilateral relationship was transformed into a more Liberal one of 'mutual benefit' thus altering cost benefit estimates in both capitals.[230]

4.3 Annan Plan (2004)

The restraints and opportunities of Athens can be explained both from the perspectives of Realism and Liberalism. In terms of both dominant paradigms of IR, the catalytic event that influenced Greek foreign policy was the paradigm shift initiated by the process of European enlargement that gained traction and the dramatic engagement of the international community with the resolution of the Cyprus problem.

4.3.1 Realist perspective

The Realist paradigm helps explain the puzzle of Greek foreign policy. A complete answer to the question, however, is not provided as different Realist constituencies

[229] Interview with former Deputy Foreign Minister C. Rozakis, June 2013.
[230] Kranidiotis, Y., (2010), *The Greek Foreign Policy*, Athens: Sideris.

contested various policy options. The Realist drivers that influenced Greek foreign policies were to a great extent informed by different understandings of the role of the Cyprus problem within the framework of Greek – Turkish relations, contradictory evaluations of the Annan plan and its correspondence to the Greek policy aims and, finally, different views about the capacity of Greeks and Turks to co-exist.

4.3.1.1 The Cyprus problem and Greek - Turkish relations

For decades, Greek and Turkish troops continue facing off along the Cypriot Green Line. The interlock between Greek – Turkish bilateral relations and the Cyprus problem is as real as the potential spillover effects. This common understanding, however, tends to overshadow a subtler, but critical, divergence of views amongst Realist policy makers. According to one Realist understanding of Greek – Turkish relations, without resolution of the Cyprus problem there would always be tension between Athens and Ankara and their bilateral relations would never be fully normalized. Former Prime Minister Mitsotakis clearly articulated this position: "*The reality is that since the end of the Second World War the Cyprus problem is the crux of Greek – Turkish bilateral problems. It is a true barometer of the atmosphere between our two countries. There is no question in my mind that if the Cyprus problem is solved, our bilateral problems will be resolved quickly and easily*." [231]

Other Realist decision-makers, however, including the Greek high official who influenced foreign policy under Karamanlis, have challenged this understanding of Greek – Turkish relations. From this perspective, the Cyprus problem is seen as only

[231] Interview with Former Prime Minister C. Mitsotakis, August 2012.

one piece of the puzzle. "*Clearly, the Cyprus problem it at the heart of Greek - Turkish relations. We have said so publicly repeatedly. Our bilateral relations with Turkey will not be normalized without a resolution of the Cyprus problem. However, the great difficulty in Greek - Turkish relations lies in the fact that there are many big problems that cannot be solved easily. Therefore, Cyprus is not the only obstacle. Let me put it differently. If the Cyprus problem was solved, would Greek - Turkish relations be automatically normalized? The answer is no*."[232]

The later view prevailed at the time of the Annan Plan. The American co-ordinator Weston would describe the Greek position in the following way: "*Greece was very discreet on too many things. (Karamanlis)…gave more thought than anything else to the relations between Greece and Turkey*."[233] Indeed, it appeared that the strategic goal of Athens was the support of Turkish European accession and the attempt to normalize Greek- Turkish relations irrespective of the Annan plan's fate. In this respect, the Greek government attempted to insulate Greek- Turkish relations from the Cyprus problem.

4.3.1.2 Strengths and weaknesses of the Annan plan

The United Nations proposal was the subject of a fervent debate that falls beyond the scope of this thesis. From a Realist perspective, contradictory options could have been pursued. Indeed, there appeared to be no consensus amongst Greek policy makers as the viability of the plan was the subject of an intense debate.

[232] Interview with former Minister of Foreign Affairs P. Moliviatis, May 2013.

[233] Venizelos, K., Ignatiou, M. and Meletis, N., (2005), *The Annan Plan: The Secret Trade, the 129 Days That Shook Hellenism*, Athens: Livanis.

For some, the plan was ill conceived and non-viable: "*The terms of the Annan Plan would in fact have embedded instability into the heart of a Cyprus settlement and would inevitably have led to increasing friction and destabilization. This is underlined by the provisions concerning the position of foreign nationals with effective control over key areas of governmental activities in Cyprus. Examples where non-Cypriots would (in the event of disagreement between the equal numbers of Greek and Turkish Cypriots) have effective control appeared to include the Reconciliation Commission; the Supreme Court invested with legislative and executive powers; the Central Bank; the Relocation Board; the Property Court and the organs of the Property Board. Bearing in mind the experience of the period 1960–63, the need for stability in the ordering of governmental activities is critical. Furthermore, the foreign nationals concerned would not be democratically accountable to the people of Cyprus*."[234]

For other Realist policy makers, the plan was a necessary compromise: "*The plan's philosophy is in line with human rights conventions, UN resolutions, the EU Acquis and the High Level agreements of 1977 and 1979. It defines 'a bizonal bicommunal federation with a single sovereignty, international personality and citizenship'. The alternative – the indefinite continuation of de facto partition, or a de jure partition, or a 'return' to a majoritarian unitary non-geographical consociation – is unfeasible, dangerous, painful and costly for one side or the other*."[235]

At the end of the day, from the perspective of the Karamanlis government, the questionable viability of the plan raised a red flag. Reportedly, the Prime Minister

[234] International Group of Legal Experts, Agora Dialogue, 12 October 2005. Retrieved 16 September 2011.

[235] Trimikliniotis, N., (2009), *Pro Annan: Rethinking the Unviability of the Constitutional Arrangement*. In Varnava, A. and Faustmann, H., (eds.), *Reunifying Cyprus: The Annan Plan and Beyond*, Tauris, London, pp. 112-127.

expressed serious doubts about the plan's sustainability, suggesting that a possible settlement would not survive for more than six months.[236] In the words of one knowledgeable diplomat who joined the Greek delegation in Burgenstock and followed deliberations quite closely: "*Athens wanted a solution to the Cypriot problem. We could not however accept any plan, particularly as the proposals were the subject of extensive debate in terms of their sustainability. What if two or three years down the road the settlement unraveled? Who would be responsible? The situation was further complicated by the fact that the (new) government inherited the plan without having negotiated its provision. The risks were too great*."[237]

A Greek high official who influenced foreign policy later expressed his own reservations about the plan candidly: "*Today there exists the Republic of Cyprus, like it did in 2004. It is a sovereign and independent state that is afforded recognition by the entire international community and is a member of several international organizations. The Cypriots have achieved impressive economic growth, against the odds, and have managed to secure a high standard of living. On the other side are the Turkish-Cypriots, a construct, in essence a Turkish province, which is not recognized by anyone because it is the product of invasion and occupation. All this would be destroyed by the plan whose purpose was the foundation of a new construct, without precedent: two states, three governments, four Parliaments, with full equality and parity, and the right of veto accorded to each community. Most significantly, there was no provision for a mechanism that could resolve disagreements except a court, which would be staffed with three judges from each side plus three foreign members of*

[236] Interview with high official of the Karamanlis government, May 2013.

[237] Interview with former Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, G. Koumoutsakos, April, 2013.

the judiciary. In other words, the Annan Plan was a monstrosity, which was not in the interests of Greece or Cyprus. In essence, it would have resulted in a Turkish protectorate with British oversight. The change in Greek foreign policy that you describe is nothing more than recognition of reality. Cyprus is neither a province, nor a colony of the British Crown. Greece and Cyprus co-operate on an equal basis. This so-called dogma (Cyprus decides; Greece supports) is a misunderstanding. We cannot impose our will on Cyprus."[238]

4.3.1.3 Co-existence or partition

Arguably, at the very heart of the Realist debate amongst Realists was the question as to whether Greek- Cypriots and Turkish – Cypriots can co-exist. De jure Greek foreign policy is driven by the need for a settlement in Cyprus based on a Federation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. De facto, however, for several Realist policy makers, the decision-making pendulum has gravitated between two extremes: the re-establishment of the Republic of Cyprus as a state dominated by Greek –Cypriots; and partition, with two sovereigns sharing the island's territory. In this context, practically, some refuse to consider any settlement of the Cyprus problem if it involves parity between the two communities and tends to prefer partition.

This view appears to have prevailed within the Greek government in 2004. New evidence gathered for the purposes of this thesis suggests that, in the words of Minister Theodoros Rousopoulos, the spokesman of the Greek government in 2004 and a close advisor to the Prime Minister: "*The thought of partition was the elephant in the room.*

[238] Interview with former Minister of Foreign Affairs P. Moliviatis, May 2013.

We never spoke about it, but it was there."[239] Reportedly, the Prime Minister himself, in private conversations, openly considered the merits of partition.[240] The argument presented by a high official who influenced foreign policy under Karamanlis is quite illuminating of the decision-making mindset in Athens. "*I think that a partition of the island is the most feasible practical and Realistic solution. The facts on the ground were settled by war. Only war can change it again, which of course is not an acceptable option. The north is in any case a Turkish province. Any solution, however well worked out, would only worsen the position of the Greek - Cypriots*."[241] Another high official who played a catalytic role stated: "*I would never say so publicly of course, but I agree that partition is the best solution. They simply cannot live together*. "[242]

4.3.2 Liberal perspective

The Liberalism paradigm as an exploratory tool offers much in terms of explaining the outcome of the Annan plan. The main drivers of Liberalism, namely co-operation, alliances and partnerships, which form international institutions, played a catalytic role, particularly Cypriot and Turkish European accession, and the role of multilateral organizations and international pressures. At the same time, the process that was designed by Greece's partners, allies and friends around the world appeared to undermine the settlement of the issue.

[239] Interview with former Minister of State and Government Spokesman T. Rousopoulos, May 2013.
[240] Interview with high official of the Karamanlis government, May 2013.
[241] Interview with former Minister of Foreign Affairs P. Moliviatis, May 2013, Italics set by the author.
[242] Interview with high official of the Karamanlis government, May 2013. On this line of reasoning, see also Nicolaides, K., (1998), *Exploring Second-Best Solutions in Cyprus*, Survival, vol.40.

4.3.2.1 International engagement

From a Liberal perspective, a series of reasons made possible the opening of an unprecedented window of opportunity for resolution of the problem. This historic circumstance has been deemed "*exceptional*" because of seven factors: *"(1) The prospect of Cyprus's EU accession acting as "a catalyst" that ignited the new attempt at conflict settlement; (2) Turkey's strong advocacy for accession to the EU that meant that it had to abandon its unconditional support for (Turkish – Cypriot leader) Denktash; (3) an unprecedented support for reunion on the part of a large segment of the Cypriot population, especially on the Turkish-Cypriot side that eventually led to the erosion of Denktash's power; (4) the unexpected Greek-Turkish thaw of 1999 (the so-called "seismic rapprochement"); (5) strong encouragement for inter-ethnic reconciliation on the part of Greece; (6) by mid-2003 onwards a volte face on the part of Turkey under the Erdogan Government in support of Annan's efforts; and (7) renewed support for a settlement by the United States, Britain, and the EU (the first two assigning representatives to assist the UN).*"[243]

Indeed, the unfolding of events underlined the catalytic role of international institutions. The curtain of the latest act in the Cypriot drama was drawn on June 1999, when the UN Security Council, with Resolution 1250, requested that the Secretary General initiate the process of negotiations. So-called proximity talks began at the end of the year. At the December Helsinki European summit's conclusions, the launch of talks was welcomed, with European leadership noting: "*a political settlement will facilitate*

[243] Heraclides, A., (2011), *The Cyprus Gordian Knot: An Intractable Ethnic Conflict, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, Volume 17, Issue 2.

the accession of Cyprus to the European Union."[244] In line with Greek desiderata, the Council underlined: "*If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council's decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition*."[245] At the same time, however, the European Heads of State added a disclaimer: *"In this, the Council will take account of all relevant factors*."[246] In other words, the European Union set in place, very clearly, concrete incentives and counter-incentives that could foster a solution. From the Greek perspective, however: *"This last reference to undefined "relevant factors" created relative skepticism in Athens, as it was obvious that until the last moment various sides in the EU would retain the final accession of Cyprus to the EU as a weapon*."[247] In any case, Athens and Nicosia working in unison had achieved their ends: Cyprus was on track to join the European family and the pressure was now on Turkey to help resolve the Cyprus problem, having to match words with deeds at the negotiation table and to display willingness towards a compromise between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

Rounds of talks followed, which, despite having halted and resumed several times, resulted, under increased pressure from the UN Secretary General, members of the Security Council and European governments, in the presentation of the first drafts of a comprehensive plan for the resolution of the Cyprus problem known as Annan I in November 2002 and a revised version on December 10th, just a few days ahead of the deadline of the Copenhagen December European Council Summit. Nevertheless, despite the application of intense pressures to both sides, no breakthrough was achieved. Rewarding the apparent willingness of the Greeks to compromise, and in a

[244] "Helsinki European Council 10 and 11 December 1999 Presidency Conclusions". Retrieved 11 October 2011.
[245] "Helsinki European Council 10 and 11 December 1999 Presidency Conclusions". Retrieved 11 October 2011.
[246] "Helsinki European Council 10 and 11 December 1999 Presidency Conclusions". Retrieved 11 October 2011.
[247] Syrigos, A., (2005), *The Annan Plan, The Inheritance of the Past and Future Perspective,* Athens: Patakis, p. 121.

diplomatic victory for the Greek government, the Council, having confirmed "*its strong preference for accession to the European Union by a united Cyprus*"[248], concluded that Cyprus would be allowed to join the Union in May 2004 in any case and "*in the absence of a settlement, the application of the acquis to the northern part of the island shall be suspended*."[249] At the same time, with regard to Turkey, the Council declared its support for its accession but decided that its European perspective would be conditional on its fulfilment of the so-called Copenhagen criteria. In one bold stroke, Greece and Cyprus had secured the accession of Nicosia. The wording dreaded by the Greeks of "*relevant factors*" in the Helsinki conclusions was deleted, thus significantly weakening the pull of Europe as a catalyst towards a solution at least from the perspective of Nicosia. At the same time, Europe, despite intense lobbying by Athens, chose to retain a hard line towards Turkey as the reference to the open-ended Copenhagen criteria politicized a decision that until that moment remained largely streamlined and transparent. Ankara now had reason to complain that its European partners kept "*moving the goal posts*."[250]

Talks continued amongst parties, with the submission of Annan III, although once again a deadline of the 28th of February 2003, so that the process would be completed before Cyprus signed the EU accession treaty, was missed. The Turkish-Cypriot side shouldered the blame, with the BBC reporting that, "*ultimately it was the Turkish Cypriot side which refused to even talk further, and which was blamed for the failure of the peace process*."[251] Until that point in time Athens and Nicosia could convincingly claim readiness to accept a reasonable settlement, thus retaining the moral high ground in the eyes of their European partners. In April 2003, during the Greek presidency,

[248] The Copenhagen European Council the Leaders of the 15 EU Member States, December 2002.
[249] The Copenhagen European Council the Leaders of the 15 EU Member States, December 2002.
[250] http://www.euronews.com/tag/eu-enlargement/
[251] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2838535.stm

Cyprus was officially accepted into the EU. It was a rare victory for Greek foreign policy, a game-changer, after decades of stalemate.

Negotiations were revived at the beginning of 2004, with US diplomats pushing enthusiastically for a resolution and the European leadership publicly declaring its preference for a settlement in the Council held in Brussels on December 12th. In meetings in New York, it was decided that the talks would proceed but, if no agreement was reached, then the Secretary General was authorized to submit his proposals to the two communities in mutual referenda. Meanwhile, two important developments resulted in a spectacular policy shift on the Turkish side. On the island, elections in the Turkish Cypriot Community brought to power Mehmet Ali Talat, the leader of a coalition of pro-Annan plan parties, forcing the hard liner leader Denktash to share power for the first time in decades. In Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan became Prime Minister in March 2003 and very quickly declared his willingness to break decades-old Turkish foreign policy dogma, even going so far as to criticize Denktash in public.

Foreign pressure mounted. A Greek high official would confirm the intensity of international pressure: "*Everyone supported it: the UN, many of our European partners including the British and the Germans, many in Greece and many in Cyprus*."[252] "*There was …tremendous pressure from abroad*," stated former Minister Rousopoulos, in an interview. In an unprecedented move in Greek – US relations, for example, interventions reached the highest levels, as President Bush contacted Premier

[252] Interview with former Minister of Foreign Affairs P. Moliviatis, May 2013.

Karamanlis three times in a short period of time and addressed a number of letters arguing that the plan was "*fair and balanced*."[253]

In this context, and as the Plan stood on the verge of rebuff, reportedly the Greek Prime Minister had expressed his reservations to the President of Cyprus about the day-after and the consequences of the plan's rejection.[254] Indeed, Turkey appeared to be about to achieve the unthinkable: to survive an intense process that did not result in the problem's solution, having extended and enriched its diplomatic capital. For thirty years, Turkey's invasion and occupation of Cyprus gained Ankara the label of aggressor and the Greek- Cypriots the acknowledged portrayal as being victims. The Annan talks allowed Ankara to present herself as a constructive power that worked towards a peaceful solution, contrary to Nicosia which could not escape the accusations of intransigence. In other words, Turkey was about to manage to climb the moral high ground that the Greek - Cypriots willingly surrendered.

Retrospectively, the international response provided after the referendum ample evidence about the extent of the pressures. The UNSC, the US, the European Commission, the European Parliament and EU member countries immediately proceeded to respond to the vote, voicing their regret at the result and wishing to reward the Turkish Cypriots. Following the referendum, the Security Council expressed its "*disappointment*" noting that "*an extraordinary and historic opportunity to resolve the Cyprus problem has been missed*."[255] The European Commission along with its "*deep regret*," noted the loss of a "*unique opportunity*," "*warmly congratulated*" the Turkish

[253] www.in.gr, 1/04/04

[254] Interview with high official of the Karamanlis government, May 2013.

[255] http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8079.doc.htm

Cypriots and expressed its readiness to "*consider ways of further promoting economic development of the northern part of Cyprus*."[256] At the same time in Brussels: "*The most outspoken comment came from EU Enlargement Commissioner, Günter Verheugen who on 21 April declared that he felt "cheated" by the Greek Cypriot Government*"[257], a comment he apparently angrily repeated in talks with the Greek delegation.[258]Germany declared that it is "*unfortunate*" that "*a reunited Cyprus will not now be joining the European Union*"[259] while Sweden pointedly "*appreciated*" the initiatives of the Turks "*in order to re-unite Cyprus*."[260] The government of the United Kingdom proclaimed: "*We must now act to end the isolation of northern Cyprus*."[261] The US State Department Spokesman underlined that his government has "*nothing but praise for the courageous Turkish Cypriots*" noting the "*regrettable outcome*" of the referendum.[262]

4.3.2.2 The poison pill

From a Liberal perspective, the extent and intensity of international engagement also carried the seeds of the plan's destruction. In this context, this explanation stems from an understanding of the negotiations in game theoretic terms wherein the very structure of the game makes it impossible to co-operate. Thus, the talks have been understood as being a Prisoner's dilemma: "*The dilemma suggests that it is always advantageous for one side to defect regardless of how the other player acts. However, in relation to the*

[256] http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_3431_en.htm
[257] Asmussen, J., (2004), *Cyprus After the Failure of the Annan Plan*, European Centre for Minority Issues, Vol.11.
[258] Interview with high official of the Karamanlis government, May 2013.
[259] http://www.mfa.gov.tr/what-the-world-said-after-the-referanda.en.mfa
[260] http://www.mfa.gov.tr/what-the-world-said-after-the-referanda.en.mfa
[261] http://www.mfa.gov.tr/what-the-world-said-after-the-referanda.en.mfa
[262] http://www.mfa.gov.tr/what-the-world-said-after-the-referanda.en.mfa

Cyprus conflict, this basic principle was confirmed only for the Greek Cypriots. For the Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, it was always beneficial to co-operate."[263]

Paradoxically, the failure of the Annan plan can be viewed as a win-win for Greek – Cypriots and Turkey; an explanation apparently adopted by Prime Minister Karamanlis in hindsight.[264] In this context, the events can be read as a mutual bluff. On the one hand, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan understood that Cypriot President Papadopoulos would be intransigent and therefore pushed forward supporting a solution knowing that it would be rejected. Papadopoulos, on the other hand, assumed that Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash would continue opposing any type of settlement and proceeded down the road of talks, safe in the knowledge that there would not be an agreement.

Thus, Greek Cypriots, on the one hand, had secured their entrance into the European Union without having to make painful compromises from the perspective of hard liners: "*The EU factor, though clearly a catalyst, did not carry the day (note that its failure had been predicted by several analysts). Greece lifted its veto to Turkey's candidacy on the condition that Cyprus's accession would go through. The EU Helsinki Summit Decision (Dec. 1999) stated that the settlement of the Cyprus problem would facilitate Cyprus's accession but that it would accede anyway. For good measure, a proviso was added (known as the "Helsinki tail") that, if settlement was not forthcoming, the EU Council would take into consideration all the relevant circumstances. Unfortunately, this proviso was abandoned at the Copenhagen EU Summit (Dec. 2002). With entry in the bag, the Greek Cypriots had little incentive to find a solution. With hindsight, it was*

[263] Koca-Atabey, M., (2009), *The Annan Plan for Cyprus as a Prisoner's Dilemma Game*

[264] Interview with high official of the Karamanlis government, May 2013.

a grave mistake on the part of the EU and Greece for that matter to have accepted Cyprus without a prior resolution of the problem."[265] Turkey, on the other hand, came out of the negotiations having proved its good and sincere intentions. Thus, although Turkey retained its strategic position on the island, it would be difficult for the European Member States to use the Cyprus problem as an alibi to protract the Turkish pre-accession period.

In other words, all sides of the negotiations found themselves in a trap of their own making as events spiraled out of control. If this is the case, the UN Secretary General and his team underestimated the intentions of the negotiating parties pushing forward with a tight timetable that undermined the end result. This later criticism has been voiced by members of the Greek delegation including Giorgos Koumoutsakos, then spokesman of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "*I believe that the process that was followed was catalytic in the ultimate rejection of the plan. One should look back and research what happened in New York a few months earlier, why these tight timetables were adopted and how the UN Secretary General was given the right to move forward no matter what happened in the talks. That is why after Burgenstock we asked for the referenda to be postponed. Did the UN not read opinion polls (in Cyprus)?"*

[265] Heraclides, A., (2011), *The Cyprus Gordian Knot: An Intractable Ethnic Conflict, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, Volume 17, Issue 2.

4.4 Conclusion

I have argued that the dominant paradigms of IR, Realism and Liberalism, help explain the restraints and opportunities of states, but do not sufficiently explain changes in Greek foreign policy. Without attempting to engage in hypothesis testing, I have noted the contributions of each paradigm in the discussion of the case studies.

In the case of Macedonia, Realism offers significant insights into explaining the Greek hard line. Legacy effects and the perceived bond between Ankara and Skopje, informed the threat matrix that drove policy making. Nevertheless, there is no question that Athens had more than one Realist option available. A soft line proposition that would have resolved the minority question and settled on a geographical qualifier for the name is equally convincing from this point of view. Indeed, fifteen years later, Greek foreign policy would shift gears and adopt exactly such a position in the name of Realism. Liberalism offers less towards an explanation. Greece's alliances and partnerships suffered considerably because of the hard line policy adopted. Athens found itself isolated in international fora in response to its policy choices, and its international image was blemished, while the country's position on other significant issues, for example the Cyprus problem, was disadvantaged. Overall, the benefits from a Realist's perspective, the existence of an alternative Realist option and the high costs incurred from the perspective of Liberalism only complicate the puzzle of Greek foreign policy.

In the case of Greek – Turkish rapprochement, Realism also offers insights into explaining the radical change of Greek foreign policy in 1999. The three crises in Greek – Turkish relations stigmatized the Simitis government and together with the increasing

cost of the arms race drove a soft line policy. Nevertheless, arguably, the government had more than one Realist option available. A hard line proposition that would insist on the veto within the European institutions while strengthening the country's defense capacity was equally feasible. Liberalism offers more towards an explanation. Greece's alliances and partnerships contributed greatly towards the adoption of a soft line. The perception of Greece as a black sheep that nationalized the European project and the country's increasing isolation played a significant role together with issue linkages and negative spill-over effects experienced during the struggle of Greece over Macedonia. There was a sense amongst policy makers that the policy of vetoing Turkish accession had an expiration date. Therefore, Athens faced a dilemma that was the product of Greece's international engagements. Within the multilateral environment of the European Union, the Greek government devised a Liberal solution to a Liberal problem and opted to communitarize the Greek-Turkish relationship. Subsequently, Athens supported Turkey's candidacy for the European Union, securing in exchange concrete concessions in terms of the Cyprus problem and Greek – Turkish relations. Overall, an analysis from the Realist and the Liberal perspectives would appear to explain to an extent the policy choice of the Greek government. Nevertheless, key questions remain. The first relates to the existence of an alternative Realist option. The second pertains to the timing. In the past, similar Realist and Liberal arguments could have been made on a number of occasions in support of a normalization with Turkey. However, successive Greek governments opted to sustain their hard line policy. Thus, the puzzle of Greek foreign policy still stands.

In the case of the Annan Plan, Realism offers insights into explaining the position of the Greek government towards the Annan plan. However, various and often

contradictory Realist options were available to Greek policy makers. Different views were informed by different perceptions of Greek – Turkish relations and the role of Cyprus, contradictory understandings of the strengths and the weaknesses of the Annan plan and opposing evaluations about the structural capacity of Greeks and Turks on Cyprus to co-exist. In this context, different Realist analyses could result both in hard line and soft line policy outcomes. Liberalism offers more towards an explanation although the policy outcome itself appears to weaken the framework. Greece's alliances and partnerships played a major role due to the dramatic intensity, breadth and scope of international engagement. Within a period of a few years, the Cyprus problem became the focal point for the United Nations, the European Union and international players such as the United States, which applied considerable pressure to secure the solution to the problem. The Greek government was quite sensitive to the positions of international institutions, its partners, allies and friends around the world, and could be expected to adopt a soft line. At the same time, however, the process itself, as designed by its international architects, included a poison pill as the earlier acceptance of Cyprus into the EU essentially weakened the Liberal promise of Cypriot engagement for a solution, increasing the probability of a hard line.

In this context, an analysis from the Realist and the Liberal perspectives would appear to explain to an extent the policy choice of the Greek government. Nevertheless, it should be noted that both perspectives are far from offering a convincing explanation. From the perspective of Realism, multiple Realist options were available to policy makers stemming from markedly different readings of Greece's international environment, restraints and opportunities. From the perspective of Liberalism, the

Greek government's actual hard line appears to weaken the exploratory potential of the hypothesis, while the structural weaknesses of the process only provide an explanation.

Overall, in all three cases, I would argue that both Realism and Liberalism go a long way but do not sufficiently explain the changes in Greek foreign policy. These frameworks are clearly relevant but do not translate into specific policy options. Both explanations highlight the crossroads that Athens policy makers reached as there had been several alternative paths. Arguably, as noted in the introduction, both hypothesize states as unitary actors and tend to exclude the 'home front' variable from the equation, thus leaving questions unanswered about policy outputs. Subsequently, I will now turn to my alternative conceptual framework that is constructivist and focuses on the role of Identity.

5. THE CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY

Identity is a nation – state's anchor; a broader worldview, a salient orthodoxy, which is central to the evolution of the nation-state. As noted in the introduction, however, Greek National Identity could not maintain its dominant position without evolving and adapting to changing times and circumstances. In this context, historically, since the birth of the Greek nation-state in the first quarter of the 19th century, and all the way to its Europeanization in the last quarter of the 20th century, it is interesting to ask not only how Identity is constructed and maintained but also to discuss its ongoing transformations and revisions.

The purpose of this chapter is to trace the evolution and discuss the performative dimensions of National Identity. In light of this, I have divided this discussion into four parts concentrating on the four historical waves: first, the birth of the new nation state, focusing on the catalytic role of the state and its institutions in the construction of National Identity given the challenges on the ground; second, the birth and maturity of the so-called Great Idea, an irredentist project, that concentrated the energies of state and society, providing a tangible vehicle for National Identity; third, the introduction of the concept of Hellenism, and the regeneration of National Identity engineered by the 1930s generation; fourth, Europeanization and its debatable impact on reinterpreting National Identity.

In this discussion, I do not aim at providing a historical record of the Great Debate and the ensuing discontinuities in foreign policy making. Indeed, I am restraining myself to a few potent examples of foreign policy debates amongst soft and hard liners and

resulting policy changes focusing amongst others on the intellectuals and historians who shaped the enabling environment. Instead, my purpose is to operationalize the conceptual framework I have offered in the Introduction, beginning with Katzestein's definition of Identity as dynamic. Moreover, I wish to shed light on Identity's potential for legitimizing a dominant political power and that it owes much of its staying power to its capacity to represent simultaneously different, even contradictory, claims utilizing amongst others so-called floating signifiers. In this regard, my analysis focuses on the self-defined themes of Greek National Identity: the unbroken continuity of the Greek nation from ancient to modern times; Greece's rightful place in the European family and its sense of superiority towards its neighbors; and its antagonistic and hostile relationship primarily with the Turkish 'other' and secondarily during certain historical periods with the Slav and Communist 'others.' At the same time, I will concentrate on a narrative that is by no means unique to the Greeks but is a common feature with most other Balkan identities during times of disintegration of empires, including Yugoslavia more recently: the hegemonic position of Greek irredentist aspirations; and the inherited sense of loss which would result in the creation of a sentiment of historical injustice and victimization.

Interestingly, the main themes of National Identity survived the historical demise of the Great Idea in the early 20th century and even Europeanization in the late 20th century to a great extent due to continuous reformulations. In other words, National Identity was, more or less, depending on the historical moment, conserved as much as changed, constituting a process as much as an outcome, that included revisions and transformations. Therefore, windows of opportunity for reinterpretation were left open for the Great Debate between hard liners and soft liners, thus confirming my dualism

hypothesis. However, there is a note of caution, as the discussion on Europeanization shows these windows were never as big as it has been suggested. Furthermore, this chapter highlights the politicization of decision making together with the links between domestic and foreign policy and explains the historical advantage of hard liners within an ongoing Great Debate that spans across many decades as they are in a better position to draw from the cardinal themes of National Identity.

5.1 A nation - state is born

The epistemological historical narrative of Greek state and nation building is subject to multiple interpretations. The effective reversal of four hundred years of Ottoman history and the construction of a National Identity, appear in hindsight, by any account, a remarkable feat. Nevertheless, "*the seriousness that historiography ascribes to the birth of the Greek kingdom is not reflected in the study of the movement of ideas*."[266] In this sense, a misinterpretation of early 19th century reality in the lands that were to form the Greek kingdom has been informed by the so-called national awakening assumption and presupposes as a given fact the existence of a Greek nation before the Greek state was construed. This is in line with views expressed by theorists such as Gellner who analyzed the organic natural growth of nationalism[267], and prevalent national historiography, which was developed quite self-consciously and rather self-servingly by the creators of a "*suitably tailored discourse*."[268]

[266] Skopetea, E., (1988), *The "Model Kingdom" and the Grand Idea: Views of the National Problem in Greece (1830-1880),* Athens: Polytypo,1988, p.13.
[267] Kitromilides, P., (1989), *'Imagined Communities' and the Origins of the National Question in the Balkans*, European History Quarterly 19 (2): 160.
[268] Hobsbawm, E., and Ranger, T., (1983), *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge University Press, 1, 60.

The exploratory scheme, however, demands a return to the origins of the Greek nation. Philhellenes visiting Greece in the 1820s and 1830s could not fail to be disappointed with the divergence between their romanticized vision of Greece and the true Greeks. The vast majority of the people were illiterate and even amongst the lower clergy only one percent could spell their names.[269] The lands of ancient philosophers and artists were now overrun by a largely agrarian society of landless or small holding peasants.[270] Until the 1820s, in the lands that were to form the Greek kingdom, localism and communalism dominated social life. The robust ties of the inhabitants with their respective communities, usually villages or local areas, were reinforced, through decentralized networks of dependency and allegiance that were primarily based on particularistic attributes, such as common descent and blood relations together with social constructs such as mutual oaths. In this pre-modern society, language and religion were treated both as means and as ends, serving both as causes uniting individuals and as tools towards survival and prosperity.

As a result, in line with Katzenstein's first characteristic of National Identity, it is not possible to overstate the significance of the state in the construction of National Identity, which under successive governments and even under different regimes did not compromise on its overriding goal of establishing national cohesion and national union in an effort to legitimize their power. In other words, National Identity in Greece was institutionalized from the very beginning. For the purposes of this thesis, this is an important point because it reflects the special weight of entrenched expressions of National Identity in the Great Debate. The working assumption of this discussion is that

[269] Frazee, C., (1969), *The Orthodox Church and Independent Greece*, Cambridge University Press, London: England.
[270] Svoronos, N., (1975), *Review of Modern Greek History*, Athens: Themelio, p.992.

the emergence and consolidation of the Greek state was the decisive factor behind the socialization and politicization of the Identity of the Greek nation: Kitromilides suggests: "*actually what happened in the nineteenth century was the gradual constructions of the nation by states*." [271] Demertzis and Politis go a step further as their point of departure is the "*superimposition of modern political structures on traditional cultural patterns.*"[272] Herzfeld concludes: "*Before the establishment of the Greek nation-state, the existence of Greek nationhood was an intellectual and political article of faith; the process of ethnological justification, however, was really set in motion only after that event*."[273] Similarly for Veremis: "*National consciousness is consolidated gradually with mechanisms that are established by the agents of the Enlightenment and, after its creation, the Greek state…. (which) aimed at securing internal unity and the incorporation of the masses in the national body*."[274]

From its birth, and at least until 1974, Greece experienced "*conditional sovereignty*" with systematic foreign interference in Greek political life. [275] In this context, in its first steps, from 1830 to 1880, Greece changed governments, kings and constitutions, yet the state remained undeterred in its insistent and systematic cultivation of National Identity. For a few decades after independence, Greece was governed by a Bavarian regency that formed a highly centralized bureaucratic state, which is the case to this day, attempting to create in the words of the historian Elli Skopetea "*a model kingdom*."

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[271] Kitromilides, P., (1989), *'Imagined Communities' and the Origins of the National Question in the Balkans*, European History Quarterly 19 (2): 159.

[272] Quoted in Stefanides, I., (2007), *Stirring the Greek Nation Political Culture, Irredentism and Anti-Americanism in Post-War Greece, 1945–1967*, Ashgate, VT.

[273] Hertferzfeld, M. (1986) *Ours Once More: Folklore, Ideology and the Making of Modern Greece*. New York: Pella Publishing Co.

[274] Tsaousis, D., *(1988), Hellenism, Greek Ideological and Experiential Axes of Modern Greek Society*, Athens: Estia.

[275] Diamandouros, N., (1993), *Politics and Culture in Greece, 1974-1991: An Interpretation.* In Clogg, R., (ed), *Greece 1981-1989. The Populist Decade*, New York: St Martin's Press, pp. 1-25. And Triandafyllidou, A., (2002), *We Belong to the West? Representations of Eastern and Western Europe in the Greek Press and the Positioning of the "We"*, in Kourvetaris, G., Roudometof, V., Koutsoukis, K. and Kourvetaris, A., (eds.), *The New Balkans*, Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 293–316.

[276] The foreign administrators, however, failed to meet expectations, having little knowledge of reality on the ground.[277] Predictably, for the Bavarian regency, localism and communalism constituted enemies that ought to be defeated. Maurer, the first regent, saw the communities as being "*a result of the deficiencies of Ottoman rule*."[278] Indeed, the institution of communities was, in the words of Pantazopoulos, "*artfully strangled*" as it was alien to a state of the western type.[279] The concentrated state modeled on the west was the template for the new Greek nation – to the point where bits and pieces of the French constitutions of 1793 and especially 1795 and the American one of 1787 "*were transferred whole*" into the constitutions of the revolution, not always with the necessary adaptations to reality on the ground.[280] Maurer said it best himself: *"it's enough for the Greeks to mimic the Germans to regain what they once had"*.[281] As Edmont About would observe sarcastically: "*A Bavarian was appointed inspector of waters and forests in Syros which has neither waters nor forests*."[282] An acute Greek observer at the time wrote: "*In all its steps (the Bavarian viceroy) did not hesitate at all to treat Greece as a place without traditions, without beliefs, without its own tendencies, without having precedents and other memories…wanted to build everything from scratch, according to its own ideas and dependent on its power, as if Greece was a paper that was unwritten and any passerby could write, whatever strange and bizarre, freely*."[283]

[276] Legg, K. and Roberts, J., (1997), *Modern Greece: A Civilization in the Periphery*, Oxford: Westview Press.
[277] Legg, 1969:54; Legg and Roberts, 1997:29.
[278] Liata, E., (2004), *Historiography of Modern and Modern Greece 1933-2002*, National Institute of Research, vol. B', p.545.
[279] Ibid.
[280] Alivizatos, N., (2004), *Constitutions and Institutions, Historiography of Modern Greece*, Vol. II ,683, 61.
[281] Gourgouris S., *Dream Nation: Enlightenment, Colonization, and the Institution of Modern Greece*, Stanford University Press, 1996, p.255.
[282] Finlay, G., (1837), *The Hellenic Kingdom and the Greek Nation*, vol. 2, p. 120.
[283] Bastea, E., (2008), *Athens 1834-1896: Neoclassical Urban Planning and Greek National Consciousness*, Athens: Libro, p.48.

Modeled on conservative Bavaria, the new regime was a conservative monarchy of the old school, with little time for the lofty ideas of Liberalism and the spirit of the Enlightenment. As Eleftheriadis points out, "*the drift of Greek society from 1830 to 1880 was clearly towards anti-Enlightenment, pro-Church, conservative and nationalist positions*."[284] Diamantouros argues that the "*concept of the individual and the citizen is (was) substituted with the concept of the volk*."[285] In the name of the establishment of royal authority and the political organization of the people, the state invaded the Greek lands like a conqueror. Arguably, national cohesion was the explicit purpose of the state and in this sense the ideal of equality appeared to override that of freedom. Thus, Alivizatos notes that the notion of "*equality*" always had a privileged position amongst all constitutional rights and became a constant characteristic of Greek constitutions. "*This expressed the unquestionable supremacy of equality over freedom in the political preferences of a people, in which the equalitarian rhetoric of Rousseau has a much greater appeal then the Liberal rhetoric of Voltaire*."[286]

In this context, National Identity was a work in progress. The Greek state had just embarked upon its project of transforming a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, multi-lingual and sometimes multi-religious aggregation of Ottoman subjects into a centralized, uniform, and homogenized nation. This was acknowledged at the time: "*The present-day Greek*", wrote the editor of a newspaper in 1826, "*is not reborn, as is commonly believed; he is born. He is the child of a famous and proud father; possesses the same features and constitution, the same functions, almost the same intellectual powers; in short, he is the living image of his father, a lion's cub. To grow and become like his*

[283] Eleftheriadis, *Political Romanticism in Modern Greece*, in Journal of Modern Greek Studies, p. 47, Vol. 17, 1999.
[285] Tsaousis, D., (1988), *Hellenism, Greekity Ideological and Experiential Axes of Modern Greek Society*, Athens: Estia.
[286] Alivizatos, N., (2004), *Constitutions and Institutions, Historiography of Modern Greece*, Vol. II ,683, 43.

father, he must have the same upbringing, the same conditions, those at least which are in accord with the spirit of the present century."[287]

In the tradition of romanticism and thinkers such as Fichte and Herder, the Greek state began aggressively cultivating the Identity of the nation both within and beyond its borders. Neither was the excessive classicism of Bavarian rule, especially in matters of arts and education,[288] nor the personal choices of royalty, with the Queen rising "*to the vanguard of Greek fashion*", adopting public appearances on national holidays, sufficient. However, being dressed as 'Amalia' survives to this day and is popular with pre-school children and cultural associations.[289] The newly born Greek state was in need of a vehicle that would embody the aspirations, hopes and dreams of its people and at the same time secure social peace and national unity. The realm of foreign policy offered the opportunity.

5.2 The Great Idea (1844 – 1922)

The concept of the Great Idea was introduced in 1844, during a Parliamentary debate, not coincidently on the politically charged and highly-disputed subject of citizenship, to describe Greece's post-independence irredentist aspirations. As over three-quarters of Greeks, at the time, lived outside the borders of the kingdom,[290] mostly within the Ottoman Empire, it became the policy of successive governments to unite and

[287] Geniki Ephemeris tis Hellados, 20.2.1826 in *Greece, the Modern Sequel*, pp. 227.

[288] Gourgouris, S., (1996), *Dream Nation: Enlightenment, Colonization, and the Institution of Modern Greece*, Stanford University Press, p.153.

[289] Gourgouris, S., (1996), *Dream Nation: Enlightenment, Colonization, and the Institution of Modern Greece*. Stanford University Press, p.153.

[290] Statistical Yearbook of Greece 1970, p.18; Kokosalakis, N. and Psimmenos, I., (2002), *Modern Greece: A Profile of Identity and Nationalism*, Athens: Centre for Social Morphology and Social Policy (KEKMOKOP) - Panteion University; Florence: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies – European University Institute.

incorporate all territories, which were home to unredeemed Greeks. As the story unfolded, Greek foreign policy experienced several twists and turns as soft and hard liners collided within the arena of foreign policy.

In terms of policy outputs, when the young agrarian Kingdom took its early steps in the 1830s, soft line attempts to normalize diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Porte collapsed under hard line opposition, resulting in the failure of the Greek-Ottoman commercial agreement of 1840.[291] A few year later, the winds blew in the sails of Greece as the international community gradually helped turn the Great Idea into a reality. In 1864, the borders of Greece were extended for the first time, when the mainland was united with the Ionian Islands at the bequest of the Great Powers. The 1878 Treaty of Berlin resulted in a further enlargement, as the Ottoman Empire paid for its defeat by the Russians, amongst others, with the transfer of Thessaly and a section of Epirus to Greece. In the late 1870s, a hard line Greek government changed its foreign policy behavior when, under intense public pressure, it decided to take the matter into its own hands, to forsake multilateral diplomacy, and to move forward unilaterally, employing the threat of war. The ensuing isolation, the decision of the international community to place an embargo on Greek coasts and the downfall of the Deligiannis government, was not sufficient as a deterrent. Indeed, the aptly described "*noble blindness*" of hard line policy makers resulted in another war ten years later and ultimately Greek humiliation. During the Balkan Wars and World War I, Greece reached its current size, with the exception of the Dodecanese, ceded to it under the 1947 Paris treaty. As a result of the Balkan Wars, Greek lands increased by 70% and

[291] Laskaris, T., (1947), *Diplomatic History of Greece 1821-1914,* Athens; Vournas, T., (1997), *History of Modern Greece Vol A (From the 1821 Revolution to the Goudi Movement (1909),* Athens; Georgis. G., (1996), *At the Beginning of Greek Foreign Policy*. Athens.

its population almost doubled. [292] The Great Idea expired in 1922 after the catastrophic defeat in Asia Minor and the ensuing exodus of populations of Greek descent from the area.

The Great Idea developed the status of political orthodoxy, within Greek National Identity, "*the only ideology*" of the new state in the 19th century.[293] In other words, "*Greek national consciousness was 'constructed' throughout the nineteenth century with reference to the nation's irredenta*."[294] Irredentism was "*systematically cultivated as the principal factor of cohesion for a geographically, culturally and politically fragmented nation*."[295] The force of the inner logic of the conception of the Great Idea was such that all energies of modernization, whether understood in economic, social or administrative terms, were channeled towards realizing the great political goal epitomized by the conquest of the capital of the Ottoman Empire.[296] Indeed, very quickly, the Great Idea developed a life of its own, building social expectations of normality and shaping the Identity of the Greek state.

In many ways, this was a matter of domestic, as well as foreign, policy. As early as the 1840s, the weaknesses and deficits of Bavarian rule had become apparent and the country faced serious socio-economic difficulties. Greece seemed unable to follow the European path towards modernization, as its economy remained stubbornly pre-capitalist, lacking the capacity to enter the industrialist orbit. At the same time, the

[292] Kokosalakis, N. and Psimmenos, I., (2002), *Modern Greece: A Profile of Identity and Nationalism*. Athens: Centre for Social Morphology and Social Policy (KEKMOKOP) - Panteion University; Florence: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies – European University Institute.

[293] Clogg, R., (1987), *Parties and Elections in Greece. The Search for Legitimacy*, Durham: Duke University Press, p.254.

[294] Triandafyllidou, A., (2001), *Immigrants and National Identity in Europe*, London: Routledge.

[295] Stefanides, I., (2007), *Stirring the Greek Nation Political Culture, Irredentism and Anti-Americanism in Post-War Greece, 1945–1967*, Ashgate, VT, p.517.

[296] Dertilis, G., (1977), *Social Restructuring and Military Intervention: 1880-1909*, Athens, Exantas, pp.143-66.

political system gravitated between political parties that mirrored foreign antagonisms and networks of clientelism and corruption that evolved around strong personalities.[297]

Analyzed in this context, whatever its failings in the sphere of foreign policy, the Great Idea clearly served its purpose domestically. On the one hand, Greek irredentism provided the public with a distraction from the many significant social and economic problems. On the other hand, the Great Idea empowered and legitimized to a certain extent an even more heavy-handed intervention of the Great Powers in Greek decision making.[298] Not coincidently, the Great Idea, although it reached its height under the stewardship of Liberal politicians such as Venizelos, was associated with the institution of the monarchy. Historically, Greek monarchs, beginning with George I in 1864, had assumed the title of King of the Hellenes, rather than King of Hellas or Greece, thus signifying the unrealized dream of unifying Greeks living beyond Greece's borders with the motherland.[299] Thus, George's successor King Constantine was hailed at his coronation in 1913 as the direct descendant of the last emperor of Byzantium Constantine Palaiologos as it was prophesized that another Constantine would liberate Constantinople from the Turkish yoke.[300]

In this context, the Great Debate can be traced on two levels. On the first level, particularly in the late 19th century, an alternative was offered, as a number of groups and individuals articulated the vision of a 'small and honorable' Greece. Thus, voices were divided about what policy to pursue vis-a-vis the Ottoman Empire with soft liners

[297] Petropoulos, J., (1968), *Politics and Statescraft in the Kingdom of Greece 1833-1843*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

[298] Campbell, J. and Sherrard, P., (1968), *Modern Greece*, N.Y., Washington: Praeger; Clogg, R., (1979), *A Short History of Modern Greece*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.; Svoronos, N., (1975), *Review of Modern Greek History*, Athens; Themelio.

[299] Campbell, J. and Sherrard, P., (1968), *Modern Greece*, N.Y., Washington: Praeger; Clogg, R., (1979), *A Short History of Modern Greece*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Svoronos, N., (1975), *Review of Modern Greek History*, Athens; Themelio.

[300] Clogg, R., (1979), *A Short History of Modern Greece*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

favoring co-operation and hard liners confrontation. In this sense, the Great Idea's detractors criticized this grand project, focusing on its seemingly organic and natural attributes. In the late 19th century, for example, intellectuals such as Ion Dragoumis and Athanasios Souliotis criticized the failed policies of the Greek state that brought about the defeat of 1897 when the "*nation was about to believe that the only truth is the Greek reality*."[301] In the same spirit, the well-known socialist Giorgos Skliros condemned Greece's "*Asian and Byzantine instincts*" favoring instead western, (meaning Liberal), norms and values.[302] On another level, particularly in the early 20th century, during the Balkan Wars and up to 1922, a Great Debate occurred as to the question of means and not ends. In other words, the Great Idea was accepted as the unifying purpose of the state but there were disagreements about whether Greece should focus on its alliances, resembling soft line positions, or on its own strengths, mirroring more hard line viewpoints. This Great Debate assumed the proportions of a so-called national schism when King Constantine I disagreed repeatedly and dramatically with Prime Minister Venizelos.

A deconstruction of the Great Idea in terms of National Identity reveals its three fundamental tenants. First, it was defined vis-à-vis the 'other,' namely the Ottomans. Second, it was bestowed with the aura of European confidence as its mission was identified with the cause of European civilization. Third, it was founded on a particular nation-centric reading of Greek historical continuity throughout the ages. Together, these three themes, that were clearly interlinked and reinforced each other, formed the backbone of Greek irredentism and became the cornerstone of Greek National Identity.

[301] Tsaousis, D., (1988), *Hellenism, Greekness Ideological and Experiential Axes of Modern Greek Society*, Athens: Estia. p.65.
[302] Tsaousis, D., (1988), *Hellenism, Greekness Ideological and Experiential Axes of Modern Greek Society*, Athens: Estia. p.67.

In this context, the Great Idea was based on the demonization of the 'other,' as primarily represented first by the Ottoman Empire and later by its successor state of Turkey. The lands that formed the Greek kingdom were historically an integral part of the Ottoman Empire. As Bizantios Skarlatos, the historian and lexicographer, would conclude, "*after one thousand years of cohabitation, they became more Greek and we became more Turkish*."[303] Such a premise, however, was unacceptable for the Greek state as the liberation struggle was waged against the Porte and the rejection of its Ottoman past was seen as a sine qua non in its struggle to establish itself as a cohesive independent entity. After all, during the Greek war of independence that lasted for nine years and was interrupted by two civil wars, only the antithesis to Ottoman rule unified a wide and diverse aggregation of fighters from different geographical, linguistic, ethnic and even religious backgrounds. Moreover, the Greek state's aversion to any Ottoman memory can be explained by the perception of the so-called 'four hundred years of slavery' as an interruption in the continuity of the Greek nation from ancient to modern times. In this context, the oriental dimension of Greek Identity was directly at odds with Greek self-conception as European, as one of the main goals of the state was to move Greece from the East to the West.

At the same time, contrary to other Balkan irredentist projects, such as the Serb 'nacertanije', the Great Idea was explicitly understood by the Greeks, and by many Europeans, as a Western project, the importance of which politically and culturally was far greater than Greece itself. In 18th and 19th century romantic thought, ancient Greece

[303] Pesmazoglou, S., (2007), *The Mythological Foundation of the New-Greek State.* In Practices Scientific Symposium 2005, *Myths and Ideologies in Modern Greece,* Athens: Moraiti.

was identified with the cradle of European civilization, and the epitome of antithesis to barbarity.[304] Such 'Hellenolatry' resulted in a strong symbolism being assigned to Greek imperialism and, in a case of image reversed, the Greeks saw themselves as missionaries who carried the torch of Europe. Arnold Toynbee, writing under the impact of the traumatic experiences of the 1919- 1922 Greco-Turkish war, described the vision of a regenerated Hellas as "*one of the extravagances of Western philhellenism*."[305] He added that the attraction of the West to Greece at the time of the Greek revolution was "*a curse which the West has set upon Greece*" that led to Greece's "*spiritual pauperization*" and was responsible for "*what Greece has lost or failed to win*."[306] Indeed, in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, a romanticized image of Greece captured the imagination of many Europeans who saw Greece as a nation on a crusade from its birth. As the first Bavarian regent Maurer wrote: "*The purpose of Greece is one day to pass the torch with the light of European civilization to Asia and beyond. In this, it is helped by its privileged geographical position and the mental perspicacity of its inhabitants. As it was once the cradle of civilization for Europe, which Europe reciprocates now with education, it must, according to the eternal laws of exchange, return to Asia, Egypt and the other countries of the East that which she received from them thousands of years ago*." [307]

European wonder with Greece, however, did not always serve the cause of the Greek state. One of the most infamous names in Greek public discourse is that of the academic

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[304] Tsoukalas, C., (2002), *The Irony of Symbolic Reciprocities: The Greek Meaning of "Europe" as a Historical Inversion of the European Meaning of "Greece".* In Malmborg, M. and Strath, B., (eds.), *The Meaning of Europe*, Oxford: Berg, 27– 50./ and in Ioakimidis, P., (ed.), *Greece in the European Union: The New Role and the New Agenda*, Athens 2002 (75- 89).

[305] Koliopoulos, J., (2008), *Modern Greece: An Old Debate*. In Campbell, J. and Mazower, M., (eds.), *Networks of Power in Modern Greece: Essays in Honor of John Campbell / Mark Mazower*. New York: Columbia University Press, p.129.

[306] Koliopoulos, J., (2008), *Modern Greece: An Old Debate*. In Campbell, J. and Mazower, M., (eds.), *Networks of Power in Modern Greece: Essays in Honor of John Campbell / Mark Mazower*. New York: Columbia University Press, p.129.

[307] Kremidas, V., (2010), *The Great Idea: Transformations of a National Ideology*, Athens, p. 15-16.

Fallmerayer, whose 1835 lecture on the origin of the modern Greeks had a visible impact on the Identity of the Greek nation, although it was not translated into Greek for one hundred and fifty years. Fallmerayer argued that all ancient Greek races, both racial and cultural, had become extinct during the Slavic invasions of mainland Greece. [308] In other words, the Bavarian directly challenged the historical and cultural inheritance of the Modern Greek state. Fallmerayer's challenge was met with the emergence of systematic national historiography. The 1850s were marked by the writings of three historians: Spyridon Zambelios in 1852, Spyridon Trikoupis and Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos in 1853. Koliopoulos and Veremis sum up the diachronic significance of this generation's work and its relevance to this day: "*This generation of Greeks gave the nation a truly modern theory of Greek history and nationality. Building on existing scholarship and working in the charged atmosphere of the 1850s and 1860s, …(they) were able to build a historical edifice that survived the onslaughts of many subsequent historiographers, and, when not distorted or misinterpreted, has served the rebuilding of the nation as no other theory has*." [309]

Paparrigopoulos has received the most recognition of the three, having also gained the title of "*national historian*."[310] His career began with a treatise directly addressing Fallmerayer's argument, and his later six-volume History of the Hellenic Nation, the first of its kind, is seminal in terms of the Identity of the Greek Nation. Paparrigopoulos organized his history around a main character, the Greek nation, and imposed a dominant use of "*we*" and "*us*" in describing the Greeks of the past, in this way identifying the reader with the national subject. Moreover, in his periodical study, he

[308] Gourgouris, S., (1996), *Dream Nation: Enlightenment, Colonization, and the Institution of Modern Greece*, Stanford University Press, p.141.
[309] Koliopoulos, J. and Veremis, T., (2002), *Greece: The Modern Sequel : From 1831 to the Present*, C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, p.233.
[310] Liakos, A., (2008), *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*. In Zacharia, K., (ed.), *Hellenisms. Culture, Identity and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, Aldershot, Ashgate, pp.201-236.

introduced the terms "*First Hellenism," "Macedonian Hellenism," "Christian Hellenism," "Medieval Hellenism," "Modern Hellenism." "These Hellenisms are connected by the following genealogy: Ancient Hellenism father great-great-grandfather, Macedonian Hellenism son great-grandfather, Christian Hellenism grandson grandfather, Medieval Hellenism great-grandson father, Modern Hellenism great-great-grandson son*."[311]

Thus, Paparrigopoulos legitimized the notion of the continuity of Greece throughout the millennia. As Gourgouris notes, the project of Paparrigopoulos resulted in the "*reinscription of Byzantine culture into the ancestral narrative of modern Greece*."[312] For Koliopoulos, "*the collective will of the Greek imagined community was expressed in a way that would satisfy the romantics in the notion of the continuity of the Greek nations.*"[313] Last but not least, Paparrigopoulos represents what Skopetea has defined as "*the elusion of the present*", meaning in the words of Gourgouris the "*constitution of Greece's modernity as a transitional phase*", resulting in a national history which takes on, "*in conjunction with a didactic character, an explicitly quietist one*."[314] At the same time and in a similar spirit, Zampelios introduced to the Greek public discourse the concept of 'Hellenochristianikos' (Helleno-Christian), to be included one hundred years later in the 1952 Constitution of Greece, in order to underline the unbroken continuity of the Greeks from ancient to modern times and to create a synthesis of

[311] Liakos, A., (2008), *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*. In Zacharia, K., (ed.), *Hellenisms. Culture, Identity and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, Aldershot, Ashgate, pp.201-236.

[312] Gourgouris, S., (1996), *Dream Nation: Enlightenment, Colonization, and the Institution of Modern Greece*, Stanford University Press, p.144.

[313] Koliopoulos, J., (2008), *Modern Greece': An Old Debate*. In Campbell, J. and Mazower, M., (eds.) *Networks of Power in Modern Greece: Essays in Honor of John Campbell / Mark Mazower*. New York: Columbia University Press.

[314] Skopetea, E., (1988), *The "Model Kingdom" and the Grand Idea: Views of the National Problem in Greece (1830-1880)*, Athens: Polytypo, 1988, p.190. Gourgouris, S., (1996), *Dream Nation: Enlightenment, Colonization, and the Institution of Modern Greece*, Stanford University Press, p.145.

ancient Greek thought, Byzantium's imperial theocracy and modernity integrating the all-important, in 19th century Greece, Church into the national narrative.[315]

5.3 Hellenism (1922 -)

Since the 1920s, Greece has upheld the new territorial status quo in the Balkans and the Aegean, "*turning*," in the words of a seasoned diplomat and key player in its European accession in 1980, "*from an irredentist foreign policy towards a policy of security, part of which eventually became, today, the accession to Europe*."[316] Nevertheless, once again, in the years that followed 1922, the Great Debate continued, leading to changes in foreign policy, two of which stand out.

On the one hand, in the 1920s, in the aftermath of the 1922 catastrophic defeat at the hands of the Turks, and as Greece lay in economic and social ruin while also attempting to integrate a million and a half of refugees, the triumph of soft liners led to one of the most spectacular changes in Greek foreign policy. At that time, Athens adopted a policy of rapprochement towards Ankara, thus reversing over a half a century of foreign policy making. The old foes, Venizelos and Ataturk, spearheaded a soft line policy of reconciliation that, despite vitriolic domestic opposition from hard liners, culminated in a historic visit by the Greek Prime Minister to Ankara in 1930 and the signing of a treaty of friendship. Venizelos even went as far as to nominate the Turkish leader for

[315] Kitromilides, P., (1990), *"Imagined Communities" and the Origins of the National Question in the Balkans.* In Blinkhorn, M. and Veremis, T., (eds.), *Modern Greece: Nationalism and Nationality*, Athens: ELIAMEP, pp. 25–33.

[316] Thodoropoulos, V., *Introduction, Modern Greek Foreign Policy*; Tsakonas, P., (2003), (ed.), *Modern Greek Foreign Policy: A Holistic Approach*, Athens: Sideris.

the Nobel Peace Prize in 1934.[317] On the other hand, thirty years later, in the aftermath of the Second World War and the Civil War that followed, anti-communist fixation, political exclusionism and industrial growth provided the backdrop for the Greek government's 1954 hard line decision to abandon a long held, soft line policy of Greece, to champion the cause of Greek -Cypriots and to support their struggle for independence.[318]

The struggle between hard liners and soft liners did not end in 1922 or 1930. The diplomatic resolution of the decade of warfare, the treaty of Lausanne, was perceived as a necessary evil. The high costs entailed, whether in terms of mass population exchanges and resettlement or the abandonment by Greece of any claims on property compensation, were viewed as "*acceptable and justifiable in return for stability in the region*"[319] but did not provide catharsis. Indeed, evidence suggests that the so-called (in public discourse) 'Asia Minor catastrophe' left a trauma in the national psyche. Today, a Google search of the 'Asia Minor catastrophe' in Greek returns 611,000 results. At the same time, the existence and symbolic content of annual days of remembrance, marking the moments millions were forced to flee from their ancestral homelands in Ionia, Pontus and Eastern Thrace, should be noted. Every year, print and electronic media commemorate the events, often offering extensive coverage. Events are held throughout Greece and church services are dedicated to the memory of the fallen. Not surprisingly, considering that according to certain estimates the ancestry of more than half of Greece's population originates from refugees, the prevalent historical

[317] Interestingly, the Realist par excellance policy of the detante was partially supported by idealist utopian visions for a Greek-Turkish federatio. See the leading recent advocate of this idea in Kitsikis, D., (1978), *Comparative History of Greece and Turkey in the 20th Century*, Athens: Estia-Kollaros, and Kitsikis, D., (1981), *History of the Greek-Turkish Region,1928-1973,* Athens: Estia-Kollaros.

[318] Papachelas, A., (1997), *The Rape of Greek Democracy Athens.* Athens; Terlexis, P., (1973), *Cyprus the Anatomy of an Error*, Athens.

[319] Coufoudakis, V., (1985), *Greek-Turkish Relations, 1973-1983: The View from Athens, International Security*. Vol.9, No.4.

interpretation is one that stresses the historical injustice and cultivates a 'siege mentality' that defined National Identity. Public discourse is shaped by readings of history that attribute the loss to the 'betrayal of the Great powers' and reinforce a sense of victimization and even martyrdom.

Indeed, despite the fundamental foreign policy change of the inter-war period and the temporary victory of soft liners, "*no radical reorientation took place*"[320] in the public discourse as, in many ways, the Great Idea survived in all but name as a building block of National Identity, and the Great Debate continued. In the post-war period, Identity was used by both soft liners and hard liners to confront the 'internationalist' communist threat from within and was influenced Greek foreign policy towards the so-called national issues: Cyprus, Greek-Turkish relations, and later, the Macedonian problem. As Stefanides suggests: "*Greek political culture remained imbued with the language of nineteenth- and early twentieth century irredentist nationalism. It prominently featured the mission of the nation, divinely preordained and manifested throughout three or four millennia of continuous historical presence; humanity's debt of gratitude to a nation that both fathered and defended Western civilization; the image of a martyr nation, victim of unjust treatment by the 'powerful of the Earth'; and the confluence between nation and Christian Orthodoxy*."[321]

The intellectual Panayiotis Kanellopoulos (1902–1986), wrote: "*despite the de facto abandonment and annulment of the Great Idea*" after 1922, there still existed "*an emotionalism ... regarding at least those parts of the globe where the Greek element*

[320] Stefanides, I., (2007), *Stirring the Greek Nation Political Culture, Irredentism and Anti-Americanism in Post-War Greece, 1945–1967*, Ashgate, VT.
[321] Stefanides, I., (2007), *Stirring the Greek Nation Political Culture, Irredentism and Anti-Americanism in Post-War Greece, 1945–1967*, Ashgate, VT.

was in the majority."[322] As late as 1964, more than forty years after the war, the succession of King Paul by King Constantine was mired in a dispute regarding the new King's name. For some, he should have been named after his grandfather and be known as "Constantine B," while for others he should have taken his name from the last emperor of Byzantium and be known as "*Constantine IB.*"[323] This is not surprising, given public sentiment. In the mid-1960s, Terlexis conducted a groundbreaking study surveying public opinion in Athens, mostly from university students, concluding that the vast majority still viewed the Great Idea as a "*desired task*" and a majority as a "*feasible task.*"[324] The educational system greatly contributed to the public mood, as a cursory look at Greek textbooks to the present day suggests: "*Children are taught a poem relating to the Fall of Constantinople… which ends 'Don't cry, Lady, a time will come when the city is ours again'. Then they read the legend of the Byzantine Emperor turned to stone by an angel on the day Constantinople fell, who is hidden in a cave, and will one day come back to life and "chase away the Turks ... and much killing will follow, so much killing that the calf will float in blood*."[325]

Indeed, the relevance of the Great Idea continued to be discussed, energizing hard liners. In the 1990s, the popular Archbishop of the Church of Greece Christodoulos, for example, mirrored 19th century romanticism, suggesting that "*the long-term historical choice cannot be peace*."[326] In a 1992 article published in the Sunday newspaper To Vima, and republished in a collection of articles in 1999, he discussed the need for an 'eschatological national vision – a 'Great Idea.'

[322] Stefanides, I., (2007), *Stirring the Greek Nation Political Culture, Irredentism and Anti-Americanism in Post-War Greece, 1945–1967*, Ashgate, VT.
[323] Koukouriotis, T., *Great Idea, Great Hypocricy, Great Disaster*, Eleftherotypia, 17/09/2009.
[324] Terlexis, P., (1973), *Cyprus the Anatomy of an Error*, Athens: Rappa, p. 38, 421ff.
[325] Millas, H., (1991), *History Textbooks in Greece and Turkey*. In *History Workshop Journal*, Volume 31, Issue 1.
[326] To Vima Newspaper, 25/02/1996.

The opinion piece deserves to be quoted at length: "*Even today, after five hundred and thirty-nine years, true Greeks continue to consider that Tuesday of May 1453, the day the City was taken, as a cursed day…Since then, Hellenism has known many adventures and trials, it was shrunk, humiliated and finally forced to be limited to its present borders … Nevertheless, many others shed tears for the drama of the race. Those who are nostalgic for the Great Idea never grow old; this Great Idea cannot be wrecked by cosmopolitan internationalism and the abuse of the motherland. This Great Idea fed generations with the mousse of the legend, and the nation continues, despite the diplomats, to whisper: Again with years, with times – again they will be ours*[327]*… Pan-Slavism from the North and pan-Turkism from the East rise…To the mad course of the mighty that are once again willing to humiliate Greece in order to serve their interests, the Greeks are obliged to retort with an aggressive vision that also engulfs, together with Hellenism, the willingness to free conquered land…Any sort of vassalage, compromises and 'peace-ology' does not correspond with national patriotism, nor with what is best for Hellenism….Near us, the sounds of weapons are heard. Our children must not fear them because they can deny them the 'sweet life…'"*[328]

How did the main themes of the Great Idea survive 1922 within Greek National Identity? After all, the Greeks paid dearly for their hard line policy. The catastrophic defeat of the Greek forces had enormous economic and social consequences. Culturally, the end of the Greco-Turkish war generated, in the words of the Greek Nobel laureate poet Seferis, "*the psychological syndromes of hungry castaways on a battered raft*."[329]

[327] Greek demotic song that refers to Constantinople and Byzantium in general.

[328] Archbishop of Athens and All Greece mr. Christodoulos (1998-2008), (1999), *From Earth to Sky,* Athens: Kastaniotis, p.50-54.

[329] Alivizatos, N., (2004), *Constitutions and Institutions, Historiography of Modern Greece,* Vol. II ,683.

Arguably the Great Idea in all but name owes its survival to the so-called Generation of the 1930s: A diverse and often contradictory literary and intellectual movement, consisting of poets, novelists, scholars and academics, modernists, realists, hyperrealists, believers and atheists, conservatives, radicals, and even communists, that had a profound impact on the Identity of the Greek nation. As the prominent scholar K. T. Dimaras suggests, the 1930s generation "*reframed the Greek problem, attempted to rebuild Greek values and displayed the maturity of Greek education*."[330] For Tziovas, the 1930s generation was first and foremost a myth. He suggests that it should be treated as a "*cultural pattern and ideology rather than a tool of historical and literary periodology*."[331] Indeed, this generation, although it lacked the coherence of a unifying political agenda, created a tidal wave that covered the Greek political and social landscape. Not coincidently, the 1930s generation knew apotheosis and vicious attacks like no other.[332]

The generation of the 1930s took it upon itself to fill the void left by the Great Idea in public discourse and National Identity. It was characterized by a deep need for faith cultivated against the psychological backdrop of disaster and loss. "*The existence of the 1930s generation is related to the ideological void, a psychological change and a historical circumstance*."[333] One of his prominent representatives, Theotokas, repeatedly referred to his contemporaries' "*interminable quest for the unique cultural mission of the nation, as they 'painfully yearned for something to replace the lost ideal.*'"[334] As Stefanides notes: "*In effect, Greeks raised and schooled after 1922*

[330] Tziovas, D., (2011), *The Myth of the 1930s Generation, Modernity, Hellenicity and Cultural Ideology*, Athens: Polis, p.27.
[331] Tziovas, D., (2011), *The Myth of the 1930s Generation, Modernity, Hellenicity and Cultural Ideology*, Athens: Polis, p.53.
[332] Tziovas, D., (2011), *The Myth of the 1930s Generation, Modernity, Hellenicity and Cultural Ideology*, Athens: Polis, p.17.
[333] Tziovas, D., (2011), *The Myth of the 1930s Generation, Modernity, Hellenicity and Cultural Ideology*, Athens: Polis, p.28.
[334] Tziovas, D., (2011), *The Myth of the 1930s Generation, Modernity, Hellenicity and Cultural Ideology*, Athens: Polis, p.147.

continued to imbibe the highly romantic, irredentist nationalism of their fathers. Perhaps, it might have been unrealistic to expect a different orientation, particularly during the nationalist revival of the 1930s…. thus, even if it lost its salience in political discourse, irredentism hibernated, only to be awakened by the sirens of the next international crisis."[335]

The 1930s generation introduced 'Hellenism' or 'Hellenicity', an equivalent of 'Hispanidad' or 'Italianità',[336] a concept with multiple meanings and definitions,[337] that resembles a 'floating signifier' to effectively substitute for the Great Idea within National Identity. A connection between history and aesthetics was established, as after the disaster in Greece there was "*a new relationship between space and time*."[338] For the 1930s generation, the nation was defined, in the words of Theotokas, as being "*primarily a spiritual reality, a common wealth of ideas, emotions, psychological conditions*."[339] As a result, "*with the generation of the 1930s, ethnos (nation) and laos (the people) become synonymous, simultaneously aesthetic abstractions and ideological weapons, reference points and means of self -confirmation*."[340] In this context: "*It was assumed that history was embodied in Hellenism as a Weltanschauung ('world view') immutable in time despite historical changes. Thus, Hellenism resulted in a search for authenticity in the cultural tradition, from archaic times to modern Greece. This tradition was considered continuous and living in the language, the popular artifacts, and the 'spirit' of the people, beyond Western influences. It*

[335] Stefanides, I., (2007), *Stirring the Greek Nation Political Culture, Irredentism and Anti-Americanism in Post-War Greece, 1945–1967*, Ashgate, VT.

[336] Liakos, A., (2008), *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*. In Zacharia, K., (ed.), *Hellenisms. Culture, Identity and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, Aldershot, Ashgate.

[337] Tziovas, D., (2011), *The Myth of the 1930s Generation, Modernity, Hellenicity and Cultural Ideology*, Athens: Polis, p.287.

[338] Tziovas, D., (2011), *The Myth of the 1930s Generation, Modernity, Hellenicity and Cultural Ideology*, Athens: Polis, p.36.

[339] Tziovas, D., (2011), *The Myth of the 1930s Generation, Modernity, Hellenicity and Cultural Ideology*, Athens: Polis, p.153.

[340] Gourgouris, S., (1996), *Dream Nation: Enlightenment, Colonization, and the Institution of Modern Greece*, Stanford University Press, p.210.

contributed to a consideration of history as part of the aesthetic canon, from high cultural activities to popular entertainment."[341]

The quest for Hellenicity was a three-front struggle, which reframed the pillars of the Great Idea within National Identity, as discussed above, namely Greece's relationship with Europe, its diachronic National Identity in an encompassing narrative for the nation and the demonization of 'others' influencing the Great Debate. With regard to the first, arguably, the search for Hellenicity represented a step towards emancipation from the straightjacket imposed by the European forces of philhellenism. The 1930s generation recognized their debt to Europe but tried to create an alternative European modernism with Greece at its center.[342] The poet Elitis, Greece's second Nobel Laureate, suggested in an interview that his generation struggled to discover "*the real face of Greece and it was necessary, because until that time the real face of Greece was what the Europeans wanted to show*."[343] Indeed, some members of the 1930s generation have tried to reassert national identity and contrast "*European Hellenicity*" with the new "*Hellenic Hellenicity*", to quote Seferis, or to project the impression of the "*Greek of Greece and not the Greek of the Renaissance*", according to Elitis.[344] In other words, Greece's position in Europe was seen as one amongst equals.

With regard to the second, the national historical discourse, the 1930s generation attempted to unite past, present and future and thus secure Greece's diachronic Identity and a new mission. This process had begun earlier. As stated above, Paparrigopoulos

[341] Liakos, A., (2008), *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*. In Zacharia, K., (ed.), *Hellenisms. Culture, Identity and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, Aldershot, Ashgate, pp.201-236.
[342] Tziovas, D., (2011), *The Myth of the 1930s Generation, Modernity, Hellenicity and Cultural Ideology*, Athens: Polis, p.313.
[343] Tziovas, D., (2011), *The Myth of the 1930s Generation, Modernity, Hellenicity and Cultural Ideology*, Athens: Polis, p.293.
[344] Tziovas, D., (2011), *The Myth of the 1930s Generation, Modernity, Hellenicity and Cultural Ideology*, Athens: Polis, p.294.

introduced the concept of a national continuity and it had become a standard reference. In literature, the Venizelist poet Palamas constructed the notion of the "*national soul*" that remains "*in essence unshakeable*."[345] In the 1930s, Seferis elaborated on the concept of the soul rather poetically: "*I have a very organic sentiment that identifies human nature with Hellenic nature…*"[346] In other words, what Paparrigopoulos did for identity though history, the 1930s generation attempted to do for Identity through aesthetic sentiment.[347] First, Palamas, during the reign of the Great Idea, tried to bring together as many elements as possible from ancient times, Byzantium, and modernity, championing the idea of a synthesis. The 1930s generation continued down that road in a rather eclectic fashion providing signs of a "*selective construction*"[348]. Theotokas for example used the mythological and ancient past with the metaphor of the Argonauts for the endless journey of the Greek nation. For Seferis, much like Eliot, "*history is not what has died, but what is still alive. Living, present, modern…Poets must provide and constantly develop the consciousness of the past and present*." [349]

Within this context, it is reasonable to expect that the impact of Paparrigopoulos and others on Greek public discourse is visible to this day and influences the Great Debate. Their history remains a point of reference in Greek public education, while his ideas continue to inspire the nation. Paying tribute to Greece's role in World War II, for example, Archbishop Makarios (1913–1977), future president of the Republic of Cyprus, recounted a glorious record stretching from the battle of Marathon to the present: "*The Greek spirit*," he wrote, "*had proved itself to be 'the hallmark of human*

[345] Scientific Symposium (1994), *Nation, State, Nationalism*, Society for Studies of Modern Greek Culture and General Education, p.24.
[346] Gourgouris, S., (1996), *Dream Nation: Enlightenment, Colonization, and the Institution of Modern Greece*, Stanford University Press, p.153.
[347] Tziovas, D., (2011), *The Myth of the 1930s Generation, Modernity, Hellenicity and Cultural Ideology*, Athens: Polis, p.150.
[348] Tziovas, D., (2011), *The Myth of the 1930s Generation, Modernity, Hellenicity and Cultural Ideology*, Athens: Polis, p.296.
[349] Tziovas, D., (2011), *The Myth of the 1930s Generation, Modernity, Hellenicity and Cultural Ideology*, Athens: Polis, p.296.

dignity, a defiant expression of freedom and virtue'. The ancient torch had been passed to Byzantium, the ark of civilization, and then to the 'small but proud' people, the modern Greeks. It was these people, he averred, who, armed only 'with courage and virtue', had recently defied two mighty empires."[350]

As Kitromilides notes, the regulatory schema of Paparrigopoulos was adopted by some conservative thinkers such as K. Tsatsos, or D. A. Zakinthinos, liberals who wanted alternative modes of expressions, such as G. Theotokas, G. Seferis and I. Th. Kakrides, and leftist intellectuals, for example Nikos Beis, Alexandros Svolos and Nikos Svoronos."[351] Interestingly, even Socialists and Marxists did not challenge this hegemonic version of history. The prominent Marxist historian of the second half of the twentieth century, Nikos Svoronos, for example, argued: "*Hellenism as a metaphysical entity, as a sui generis ('one of its kind') essence does not participate in the changes of the environment and, as a result, it remains continuous, coherent, and unchanging in its qualities*."[352] Apostolos Bakalopoulos, another significant leftist historian, chose not to challenge the working assumptions and hypotheses of Paparrigopoulos, focusing instead upon a redirection of historical research towards social reality.[353]

Third, the image of the 1930s generation as we know it to this day was shaped and established during the 1940s,[354] when it joined the fight against the communist 'other',

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[350] Stefanides, I., (2007), *Stirring the Greek Nation. Political Culture, Irredentism and Anti-Americanism in Post-War Greece, 1945–1967*, VT: Ashgate

[351] Kitromilides, P., *The Idea of the Nation and the Greek Community in Greek Historiography, Historiography of Modern and Contemprorry Greece, 1933-2002*, Vol. A, 44.

[352] Liakos, A., (2008), *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*. In Zacharia, K., (ed.) *Hellenisms. Culture, Identity and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, Aldershot, Ashgate, pp.201-236.

[353] Kitromilides, P., *The Idea of the Nation and the Greek Community in Greek Historiography, Historiography of Modern and Contemprorary Greece, 1933-2002*, Vol. A, 42.

[354] Tziovas, D., (2011), *The Myth of the 1930s Generation, Modernity, Hellenicity and Cultural Ideology*, Athens: Polis, p. 47.

with domestic and foreign policy concerns often overlapping. Communism was the common enemy and the bloody Civil War that was fought in Greece was perceived as an existential national struggle: more than just a power struggle, the Civil War was understood as a fight for the heart and soul of the nation. Communists, for example, would directly challenge the idea of national continuity, focusing on Byzantium and 'peoples' creation.' Thus, at the Communist Party conference, its leader, Nikos Zahariadis, intervened to disconnect the ancient times from peoples' civilization, assigning the birth of neo-Hellenic consciousness to the years of Ottoman rule.[355] In the struggle against communism, Greek National Identity and the Great Idea, as it was reframed by the 1930s generation, became a tool in the hands of the state. As Pesmatzoglou notes: "*In Greece and elsewhere, historically, national values were used to defeat social and class challenges through the vertical penetration of the ideas of nationalism in all social classes."*[356] Thus, for example, the terms 'Eamoslavoi' (from the name of the communist organization 'EAM' and the word 'Slavs') and 'Eamoboulgaroi' (from the name of the communist organization 'EAM' and the word 'Bulgarians'), connecting communists to national enemies, were used as derogatory terms in public discourse. [357]

In the inter-war period, the Greek state would adopt several policies to repel the communist danger, all in the name of the nation. Thus, Alivizatos underlined the willingness of the political leadership to "*transfer to the area of national problems and national sensitivity, the social problem of the country*."[358] It is characteristic that the so-

[355] Tziovas, D., (2011), *The Myth of the 1930s Generation, Modernity, Hellenicity and Cultural Ideology*, Athens: Polis, p.316.

[356] Pesmazoglou, S., (2007), *The Mythological Foundation of the New-Greek State.* In Practices Scientific Symposium 2005, *Myths and Ideologies in Modern Greece*, Athens: Moraiti, p.26.

[357] Pesmazoglou, S., (2007), *The Mythological Foundation of the New-Greek State.* In Practices Scientific Symposium 2005, *Myths and Ideologies in Modern Greece*, Athens: Moraiti, p. 26.

[358] Tsaousis, D., (1988), *Hellenism, Greekity Ideological and Experiential Axes of Modern Greek Society*, Athens: Estia, p.86.

called Venizelist 'idionimo', the anti-communist legislation, together with the ideas that attempted "*the overthrow of the established social system via violent means"* also punished equally forcefully the ideas that aimed at the *"detachment of part of the whole of the domain.*"[359] In other words, the social and the national were identified. The Metaxas dictatorship (1936 – 1940) would take National Identity to its fascist extremes, generating the concept of the "*homogeneous and compact*" nation described in the 1939 pamphlet of the country's youth. This "*compact*" nation kept together by "*physical, biological, psychological and historical bonds*", became the ideological caricature of Paparrigopoulo's ideas.[360]

The service of the 1930s generation to the state and its National Identity is exemplified by the discovery of Makriyiannis in the 1940s and his ascendance to the status of a national symbol. Today, the narrative of Yiannis Makriyiannis (1797-1864), a sprominent figure in the Greek revolution, is taught systematically in schools and his sayings are often repeated in public discourse and remain deeply ingrained in popular culture. His moment of "*literary canonization*"[361] was marked by a lecture delivered by a spokesman of the 1930s generation, Seferis, a Nobel laureate in poetry and a career diplomat. Seferis had made it quite clear that he saw it in these difficult historic times as a way "*to cultivate, to preserve, and to give new voice to the artifacts of the past*."[362] Seferis does so by introducing to the public debate a new object of Identity that best expresses the Greek soul, being authentic, pure and honest. Seferis treats Makriyianni's illiteracy, the fact that he learned to write late in life just to prepare his memoirs, as a device. Not coincidentally, Makriyiannis starts and ends his memoirs with recourse to

[359] Ibid.
[360] Koliopoulos, J. and Veremis, T., (2002), *Greece: The Modern Sequel: From 1831 to the Present*, C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, p.235.
[361] Gourgouris, S., (1996), *Dream Nation: Enlightenment, Colonization, and the Institution of Modern Greece*, Stanford University Press, p.179.
[362] Gourgouris, S., (1996), *Dream Nation: Enlightenment, Colonization, and the Institution of Modern Greece*, Stanford University Press, p.180.

"*the naked truth*."[363] For Seferis, Makriyiannis represented "*the most basically Hellenic idea…the sentiment kneaded into every Hellenic temperament since those very distant times when Oedipus abolished the Sphinx and her nightmarish world by uttering the single word: anthropos.*"[364] In this way, Seferis made a direct connection with the Identity project of the 1930s generation by identifying Makriyiannis as "*one of the most refined souls of Hellenism*."[365]

The Greek state emerged from the Nazi occupation and the Civil War victorious but deeply wounded. Aptly described as the "*Kingship of the Right*"[366], the post- war period heralded a new epoch of "*a new nationalism, fanatic and self-complacent, which resembled the previous one of the 19th century. In contrast to that, however, its National Identity was not embedded in a general, holistic, irredentist programme, but was defensive, reactionary and inward looking*."[367] Democratic participation was curtailed, as Greece's "*crippled democracy*" was based on anti-communist exclusionary practices. The regime of the ultra-conservative, anti-communist right reached its height during the period of the Greek junta between 1967-1974. In this context, the Greek social milieu was sharply divided, having gone through two national schisms in fifty years, the second climaxing into a full scale Civil War. Politically and socially, the Greeks were divided into opposing ideological camps, with vastly different understandings of the present and contrasting visions of the future.

[363] Gourgouris, S., (1996), *Dream Nation: Enlightenment, Colonization, and the Institution of Modern Greece*, Stanford University Press, p.183.
[364] Gourgouris, S., (1996), *Dream Nation: Enlightenment, Colonization, and the Institution of Modern Greece*, Stanford University Press, p.182.
[365] Gourgouris, S., (1996), *Dream Nation: Enlightenment, Colonization, and the Institution of Modern Greece*, Stanford University Press, p.180.
[366] Svoronos, N., (1975), *Review of Modern Greek History*, Athens: Themelio, p.144-148.
[367] Tsoukalas, K., (1986), *State, Society, Work in Post-war Greece*, Athens: Themelio.

The 1930s generation, however, having introduced the concept of Hellenism, had put in place safety valves that made possible multiple interpretations of Identity, without altering its fundamental precepts. In this context, the basic dichotomy was between the 'people' and the 'nation.' In this sense, even the left found room to stress the concept of the 'people' in order to define a broad social majority that was inherently opposed to the minority-ruling establishment. The right highlighted the 'nation' in an attempt to express an unfragmented and unified social collective. The great success of the understanding of National Identity as it was spearheaded by the 1930s generation was its capacity to capture, encapsulate and embody leftist ideals by identifying the 'people' with the 'nation.' The historical continuity of Greece, its position in the European family, and the eternal 'others' thus survived unchallenged. As Liakos observes, the 1930s generation "*was hegemonic (in the Gramscian sense) …because it absorbed the left perception of continuities*."[368] For Patrikiou, the conflict between the left and the right: "*Related to deep political expectations. The position of Marxists expressed the attempt at historic legalization of certain social forces and particularly the working class. Meanwhile, the position of the representatives of 'national' history can be included in the broader defense of bourgeois forces against the crisis that was created by the serious social problems of the time: The nation was a collectivity in which certain new social aggregations had to be included. These new aggregations were the product of either new geopolitical circumstances, such as the populations of the new countries and the refugees, or of new social conditions and were the rising labor movement*."[369]

[368] Liakos, A., (2004), *The Continuity of Modern Greek Historiography*. In *Historiography of Modern and Contemporary Greece 1833-2002*, Athens: Center for Modern Greek Studies, vol.A, p. 60.

[369] Stavridou-Patrikiou, R., *The Greek-Christian Idea*. In *Historiography of Modern and Contemporary Greece 1833-2002*, Athens: Center for Modern Greek Studies, vol.A, p. 69.

In other words, the Identity of the Greek nation was opened to multiple readings, including both by hard liners and soft liners, without however changing its inherent meanings. The left and the right may have been divided in terms of politics, society and economics but were united around the nation or the people, creating suitably tailored discourses around the fundamental premises regarding Greek National Identity. In this context, for example, together with establishment poets such as Seferis and Elytis, Yannis Ritsos, a well-known leftist poet, carried forward the sentimental and aesthetic contribution of the 1930s generation to the definition of National Identity. Similarly, in the area of music, Hellenism reaffirmed its hegemony through the popularizations of the bourgeois Manos Hadjidakis and the more radical- minded Mikis Theodorakis.

Within this hegemonic discourse, foreign policy presented an opportunity for both the right and the left, in the form of the Cyprus problem, to articulate interchangeably hard line and soft line foreign policy designs. After the Civil War, the state was once again in need of a vehicle that would embody National Identity, transcend political and social differences, and unify the nation. For decades, Greece followed a policy of non-involvement in Cyprus, despite the ethnically Greek majority on the island. In the early 1950s, however, the Plastiras government changed foreign policy behavior and adopted a hard line, supporting the independence of Greek Cypriots and the eventual unification of the island with the mainland, thus severely testing Greece's relations with Turkey and a number of its allies, most prominently the United Kingdom. The Cyprus problem would come to dominate public discourse in later decades as soft liners and hard liners clashed, resulting in changes to Greek foreign policy. The 1960 agreement that guaranteed the independence of the Republic of Cyprus and set the terms for the cohabitation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots was a victory for soft liners, which was

then soon undermined by hard liners both in Greece and in Cyprus. In the 1960s, the issue was highly politicized, with Enosis Centrou, the Union of the Center party, taking up the hard line cause regarding Cyprus and a number of leftist organizations which strongly opposed the 1960 Zurich agreements, searched for paths towards the unification of Greece and Cyprus and advocated a change in foreign policy.[370] The fatal blow was administered by the right in its most extreme manifestation, the Junta in 1974, which, in an attempt to materialize the hard line vision of unifying Cyprus with the mainland, engineered a coup d' etat against Cypriot President Makarios, thus creating the best possible pretext for a Turkish invasion.[371]

5.4 Europeanization (1974 –)

The year 1974 marked a watershed moment in Greek history. For the first time since independence, Greece began to be essentially governed as a full democracy while foreign interference in domestic affairs was dramatically curbed. [372] Nevertheless, Greece's well-managed transition to democracy, widely heralded retrospectively by scholars such as Huntington,[373] was far from assured. At the time, Greek society endured an existential crisis, in the words of Antonio Gramsci, an "*organic crisis*."[374] Three decades of division between the left and the right, dramatized in the authoritarian practices of the state that culminated in the Junta preceded the transformative

[370] Terlexis, P., (1973), *Cyprus the Anatomy of an Error*, Athens: Rappa.

[371] Crawshaw, N., (1978), *The Cyprus Revolt - An Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece*, Unwin Hyman.

Crouzet, F., (1973), *Le Conflit de Chypre 1946-1959*, Brussels: Etablissements Emile Bruyant; Xydis, St., (1967), *Cyprus: Conflict and Conciliation 1954-1958*. Columbia: Ohio State University Press.

[372] Diamandouros, N., (1993), *Politics and Culture in Greece, 1974-1991: An Interpretation.* In Clogg, R., (ed.), *Greece 1981-1989. The Populist Decade*, New York: St Martin's Press, pp. 1-25.

[373] Huntington, democracy.

[374] Gramsci, A., (1999), *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, ed. and trans. by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, International Publishers: New York.

experience that began with the return of Karamanlis in the summer of the same year and the restoration of democracy.

Greek society's condition of flux was reflected in the state's mercurial foreign policy choices. Greece withdrew from NATO's military wing in 1974, in a hard line protest at US support for the dictatorship, only to return in 1980 with a controversial decision made from a soft line perspective. In such an environment, the state was once again in need of an overriding goal, a grand vision, which would rise above political, social and economic differences, mobilize society around a single purpose and embody National Identity. In response, the Karamanlis government set in motion the process of European accession, reawakening the negotiations with the EC after a decade of hibernation. This decision had a profound influence upon Greece's political and socio-economic development.

Greece was far from ready to join the European family and its future partners' decision was ultimately political. In the 1970s, the European Commission had concluded: "*Greece was absolutely not prepared economically to enter the Community*."[375] The problem was not purely economic; the Greek political system was viewed as immature and "*accession occurred without a broad consensus within political parties and the population*."[376] The application for European accession, the satisfaction of the membership criteria and Greece's subsequent path within the European framework demanded a modernization program that was unprecedented in scope and breadth. Greek history has known a number of modernizing projects, mostly periods of

[375] Hibou, B., (2009), *Greece and Portugal: Convergent or Divergent Europeanization*. In Simon, B., and Lequesne, C., (eds.), *The Member States of the European Union*, Oxford University Press, pp. 229-253 (23).

[376] Hibou, B., (2009), *Greece and Portugal: Convergent or Divergent Europenanization*. In Simon, B., and Lequesne, C., (eds.), *The Member States of the European Union*, Oxford University Press, pp. 229-253 (23).

structural reform connected with the stewardship of certain extraordinary statesmen, Capodistrias in the 1830s, Trikoupis in the 1880s, Venizelos in the 1920s and Karamanlis in the 1950s, but none acquired the drive of Europeanization or challenged and attempted to reinterpret Greek National Identity to such a degree.

After all, in the case of Greece and other southern European countries, Europeanization was synonymous with modernization: "*Membership… has meant opening up to the rest of Europe and the world in more than an economic sense; in other words, greater exposure to modernity*."[377] Indeed, there are multiple interpretations of Europeanization, but most agree that it represented much more than a modernizing agenda or a type of political rhetoric. "*Europeanization*," wrote Anastasakis, "*is a means and an end; it is method as well as substance; it is a project and a vision. It signifies a certain political, socio-economic, and cultural reality, but it is also an ideology, a symbol, and a myth. It has universal value by virtue of its historical, holistic, and globalizing nature*."[378]

If Europeanization, however, was interpreted as a struggle for democracy and security then clearly it necessitated a reassessment and re-evaluation of the Greek National Identity that had taken Greece that far with disappointing results both internally in the sphere of democracy and human rights and externally in terms of protecting national territorial integrity.[379] As such, foreign policy proved a major test for Europeanization and it is widely considered the field in which its consequences are most evident. In the words of a widely respected academic: "*One of the most remarkable developments over*

[377] Tsoukalis, L., (2003), *What Kind of Europe?*, Oxford, p. 55.
[378] Anastasakis, O., (2005), *The Europeanization of the Balkans*, Brown Journal of World Affairs, Volume XII, Issue 1: 79.
[379] Tsoukalis, L., (1979), *Greece And The European Community*, Gower.

the past years has been the steady progress towards the Europeanization of Greece's foreign and security policy." [380] Indeed, many scholars have considered this transformation of Greek foreign policy as being the product of a shift in Identity's tectonic plates as a result of Greece's European membership that, if realized, would be expected to empower soft liners. It is associated with the "*ongoing replacement of the static and exclusionary idea of the Greek nation with the evolutionary and open Identity representations entailed in liberal-westernism that may have important foreign policy implications*."[381]

Arguably, however, the impact of Europeanization on Greek foreign policy since the late 1970s to the present day, and the subsequent strengthening of soft liners, remains subject to debate. Clearly, there is significant evidence to suggest Europeanization changed the style, tactics and even strategy of Greek foreign policy, although it is questionable whether it had a long-lasting impact in terms of substance. Indeed, although it is difficult not to consider the country pro-European or European-orientated, it remains a challenge to define its foreign policy as Europeanized, despite the adaptation and socialization that took place over the years. Paradoxically, Greece has displayed a strong and unyielding support for the project of European integration and, especially since the late 1980s, of any type of federal unification. Nevertheless, in terms of the foreign policy issues that dominate its public discourse, the transformative impact of Europeanization on Greek National Identity remains subject to question as the ongoing Great Debate shows.

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[380] Ioakimidis, P., (2000), *The Europeanisation of Greece's Foreign Policy: Progress and Problems*. In Mitsos, A. and Mossialos, E. (eds.), *Contemporary Greece and Europe*, Ashgate, Aldershot, pp 359-372.

[381] Agnantopoulos, A., (2005), *The Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy: A Conceptual Framework and an Empirical Application in Greek-Turkish Relations.* Paper presented at the 2nd LSE Symposium on Modern Greece, London.

The politics of Europeanization played an important role in the evolution of Greek National Identity and to an extent shaped the environment in which the hard line and soft line factions partook in the Great Debate. Historically, the center- right party of New Democracy was identified with the nation's European perspective. Its founder Karamanlis personally led the effort of pushing through Greece's application for membership. Karamanlis, as party leader, Prime Minister, and later President of the Republic: "*firmly argued in favor of the need to deeply anchor Greece in western European integration and the transatlantic security community. These were clearly articulated foreign policy priorities considered by Karamanlis as strategic priorities for Greece's national security and even its political survival. His conviction that Greece's EEC and NATO memberships would guarantee the country's territorial sovereignty and integrity (from the northern Communist threat during the Cold War period and from Turkey from the east), while also supporting the country's internal democratization and economic modernization, defined New Democracy's pro-European stance over the past three decades whether in government or in opposition*."[382]

Foreign policy debates peaked after the restorations of democracy in 1974 to a great extent as a response to the practices of the Junta and Turkey's invasion and occupation of Cyprus. Greek – Turkish relations were now at the forefront of Greek foreign policy decision making after the period of detente that followed the Second World War. Overall, the center – right New Democracy party saw foreign affairs through the prism

[382] Gropas, R., Kouki H., and Triandafylidou, A., (2011), *Identity Construction Programs of the State and the EU.* IMEPSEP Identities and Modernities in Europe. Work Package 5. ELIAMEP.

of the country's accession to the European Communities and its leadership showed willingness to normalize Greek – Turkish relations and set the stage for a solution to the Cyprus problem. In this regard, Karamanlis was prepared to gather all available resources to achieve his goal of European membership and this extended to the realm of foreign policy. It has thus been argued that Greek failure to retaliate to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus was also because of the fear that a Greek – Turkish conflict could undermine Greece's path towards Europe.[383] In the same spirit, it has been suggested that the decision made by the Karamanlis government to reframe the continental shelf dispute with Turkey on the basis of international law[384] and seek recourse to the International Court of Justice and the relative openness of Athens to bilateral dialogue with Turkey in the late 1970s[385] must be understood from a soft liner perspective in the context of European accession.

What appeared as a panacea to some, however, was anathematized by others, who saw in Europeanization yet another obstacle on the path towards national independence. Decades of conditional sovereignty and conditional democracy had left their mark and western support for the Junta together with the Turkish invasion of Cyprus had strengthened so-called anti-imperialist and anti-western popular sentiment. PASOK, led by the charismatic Andreas Papandreou, rode these social waves, taking advantage of the political momentum to the point that it was seen abroad as a thorn in the side of Greek accession.[386]

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[383] Couloumbis, T. and Yannas, P., (1994), *Greek Foreign Policy Priorities for the 1990s*. In Featherstone, K. and Ifandis, K., (eds.), *Greece in a Changing Europe: Between European Integration and Balkan Disitnegration?*, Manchester, Manchester University Press.

[384] Arvanitopoulos, C., (1994), *The Belief System of Constantine Caramanlis*. In *Mediterranean Quarterly*, pp. 61-86; See also Tsakaloyannis, P., (1980), *The European Community and the Greek- Turkish Dispute*. In *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol 29, No. , pp. 35-54.

[385] Pridham, G., (1991), *Linkage Politics Theory and the Greek-Turkish Rapprochement*. In Constas, D., (ed.), *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s: Domestic and External Influences*, London; MacMillan, p.79.

[386] Clogg, R., (1979), *A Short History of Modern Greece*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Thus, in the 1980s, Greece's "*populist decade*,"[387] there was a reaffirmation of Greek National Identity as the socialist PASOK, led by Andreas Papandreou with the slogan 'Greece belongs to the Greeks', politicized national historical continuity, stressed Turkish 'otherness' by adopting a hard line foreign policy and attempted to recalibrate Greece's relationship with its European Partners and NATO allies, advocating a "third way." In the 1981 electoral campaign, PASOK promised 'change', voicing strong anti-European and anti-NATO positions, calling for a withdrawal from both NATO and the EEC.[388]

For PASOK, Greece had to rebalance its relationships, which had tilted against Greek interests, with Europe, NATO and the West in general and also withstand American intervention. Papandreou adopted an alternative foreign policy, building bridges with Yasser Arafat and the PLO, Colonel Gadhafi and Libya, the Sandinistas and Nicaragua, joining Olaf Palme's 'Group of Six Peace Initiative' and investing considerable rhetoric in his effort to promote a nuclear–free area in the region. In the same spirit, the Greek government did not hesitate to deviate from the European consensus in such eye-opening occasions such as the condemnation of the imposition of martial law in Poland (January 1982), the downing of Korean Airlines Flight 007 (September 1983), and support for the UK in its war over the Falklands (April 1982). [389] This period of retrenchment did not last long, however, as in practice a gradual transformation began with PASOK accepting the EEC and particularly its tangible economic benefits including, for example, the 1985 Integrated Mediterranean Programs and the Delors I

[387] Clogg, R., (1993), *Greece, 1981-89: The Populist Decade*, New York: St. Martin's Press.

[388] Ioakimidis, P., (1996), *The New Enlargement of the European Union and Greece*, Athens: Sideris, p. 36-38.

[389] Economides, S., (2005), *The Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy*, Journal West European Politics Vol. 28, Issue 2; Christodoulides, T., (1988), *Greece and European Political Co-operation: The Intractable Partner*, in Stavrou, N., (ed.), *Greece Under Socialism: A NATO Ally Adrift*, New York: Orpheus Publishing.

and II packages of economic assistance. [390] The late 1980s saw a reversal of roles with PASOK adopting a more soft line policy of rapprochement, named after Davos where the Greek and Turkish leaderships met, and New Democracy challenging these choices on hard line grounds.

In this context, the most striking feature of Europeanization as it was reflected in the political system, given New Democracy's traditionally pro-European stance, was "*the metamorphosis of PASOK from a fiercely anti-European movement in the 1970s and early 1980s into a pro-federalist, integrationist force in the 1990s*".[391] In other words "*PASOK can probably be considered as being the Greek political party that experienced the deepest consequences of the Europeanization process*." [392] At least in the 1980s, PASOK's understanding of Europe was far from the European norm. At the time, the party exhibited "*an underlying juridico-legalistic interpretation of membership obligations, which deprived the acquis politique from any binding qualities*."[393] The pro-European outlook of PASOK, however, was solidified after 1996 when Papandreou's successor, Simitis, engineered the party's ideological shift accepting 'Europe' as the catalyst of Greek modernization. Under Prime Minister Simitis (1996-2004), PASOK moved onto the path of the so-called third-way, following its British and French socialist counterparts. [394] In Lyrintzis' words: "*The 'modernization' period (...) marked a shift from the socialist- populist period to one characterized by pragmatism, a managerial discourse and a technocratic approach all*

[390] Urwin, D., (1995), *The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration Since 1945*, London: Longman.

[391] Ioakimidis, P., (2001), *The Europeanization of Greece: An Overall Assessment*. In Featherstone, K., and Kazamias, G., (eds.), *Europeanization and the Southern Periphery*, London: Frank Cass; Pagoulatos, G., (2002), *Greece, the European Union, and the 2003 Presidency, Research and European Issues.* Paper No.21, Groupement d' Etudes et de Recherches "Notre Europe", p.3-10.

[392] Gropas, R., Kouki H., and Triandafylidou, A., (2011), *Identity Construction Programs of the State and the EU.* IMEmIdentities and Modernities in Europe. Work Package 5. ELIAMEP.

[393] Agnantopoulos, A., (2010), *The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy: The Case of Greece*, Available at: https://www.ies.be/files/Agnantopoulos%20Europeanisation.pdf

[394] Pagoulatos, G., (2005), *The Politics of Privatization: Redrawing the Public-Private Boundary*, West European Politics, vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 358-380.

packed into a project for the modernization, rationalization and Europeanization of Greek society and economy. The PASOK governments under Simitis accomplished the main task, which was the stabilization of the economy according to the Maastricht criteria and the subsequent entry of the country into the European Monetary Union."[395]

In terms of foreign policy, evidence is provided in the shift of Greek public discourse. In the 1990s, for example, the Balkans were depicted as a ticking time bomb that could explode at any moment, unleashing instability and threatening Greek territorial integrity and independence. Consequently, Greece's periphery could only be understood in the hard line language of Greece's relative strengths and weaknesses. Since the mid-1990s, the view of the Balkans and Greece's position vis-à-vis its hinterland changed, with a more positive soft line outlook gaining acceptance: Greece was seen as a positive example for other less-developed societies and economies that could play the role of a locomotive for the region's development, and act as a catalyst for the region's stability, facilitating its neighbors' European accession.

In terms of domestic politics, the convergence of left and right around the European flag with their unqualified support for European federalism was one of the most significant results of Europeanization. With the end of the Cold War shaping a new world order and the disillusionment with alternative paths towards development, all political parties, with the exception of the Communist party had emerged as ardent supporters of Greece's membership of the EU. In other words: "*Political discourse across the two mainstream parties (PASOK and New Democracy) has emphasized the advantages and strengths of the country's EU membership; the Europeanization*

[395] Lyrintzis, C., (2005), *The Changing Party System: Stable Democracy, Contested 'Modernisation'*, p. 250; In *West European Politics*, vol. 28.

process that has modernized and supported the country's necessary reforms; as well as the advantages of European Identity and citizenship. Both parties that have alternated in government have been overall undoubtedly pro-European during the period under study. [396] *The national consensus on Europe was further strengthened by two key developments at the turn of the century: Greece's adoption of the Euro in 2002 with its economic value and great symbolic connotations*[397] *and the 2004 enlargement of the EU which shifted Greece from the periphery to the core of the European project*."[398]

The convergence of the two main parties was associated with a decline of traditional ideological affiliations of the left and the right. PASOK moved towards the center- left and New Democracy to the center- right with the ultimate triumph of these mutual strategies coming to the fore in 2004 when New Democracy's strategy of a 'middle space', a politically neutral and ideologically void concept, resulted in its electoral triumph. [399] In this context, on the one hand, a reassertion, at least in the sphere of rhetoric, of the more social, pre-neoliberal, state- centered discourse of post- war conservatism triumphedtogether with, on the other hand, a policy of national reconciliation rather than an electoral investment in the right- left divide. Therefore, "*at the end of the 1990s, both major parties had developed a moderate, managerial and minimalist political discourse reflecting a clear convergence*."[400] In this context, both political parties effectively agreed upon the main tenets of a public policy that was

[396] Gropas, R., Kouki H., and Triandafylidou, A., (2011), *Identity Construction Programs of the State and the EU.* IMEPIDentities and Modernities in Europe. Work Package 5. ELIAMEP.

[397] Psimmenos, I., (2004), *Representations of the Nation, the EU and Europe by the Mass Media and Political Parties of Greece*. In Kassimati, K., (ed.), *National and European Identity: Convergence and Divergence*, Athens: Gutenberg, 127–58.

[398] Triandafyllidou, A. and Spohn, W., (2003), "Introduction" in W. Spohn and A. Triandafyllidou (eds.), *Europeanisation, National Identities and Migration*. London: Routledge.

[399] This strategy was the inspiration of a Greek media-expert named John Loulis. See Loulis, J., (2004), *The End of a Domination: How and Why PASOK Lost at the Elections*, Livanis: Athens.

[400] Lyrintzis, C., (2005), *The Changing Party System: Stable Democracy, Contested 'Modernisation'*, p. 254; In *West European Politics*, vol. 28.

based on the redistribution of debt, rather than wealth, which gradually and fatally exceeded the nation's capacity. Moreover, political acceptance, social cohesion and democratic peace were established at the cost of an expansionary fiscal policy. More so than in Europe, domestic agendas or policy issues, the two main parties converged in their choice of political methods, adopting populist schemas, creating networks of clientelism and corruption that encircled the political system and suffocated decision making.

The retreat of party politics, leading some to label the period as "*post-democratic*",[401] was also connected to the development of Greece's nascent civil society in the 1990s and to the steadily decreasing significance of the Parliament as party discipline and partisan differences eroded the expression of the people's sovereignty. At the same time, the focus of public discourse shifted from the Parliamentary chamber to television studios, as Greece witnessed the increasing and disproportionate role of the media, together with the growth in power of institutional agents such as for example trade unions, chambers of commerce and the Church and extra-institutional powers, such as vested corporate interests which operated outside the parameters of Parliamentary representation. In terms of public discourse, the convergence between left and right on Europe was achieved not because of political debate but despite its very absence. European questions did not figure prominently in the electoral campaign of the parties ahead of neither the national nor the European elections. Indeed, "*by the time of the 1993 and the 1996 elections, an overall consensus towards Europe was achieved among the largest parties, so any discussion of European matters at election time is*

[401] Katsambekis, G., (2011), *Populism in Post-democratic Times: Greek Politics and the Limits of Consensus*, Paper presented at the 61st Political Studies Association Annual Conference.

perfunctory."[402] Instead, "*the apolitical struggle between the two parties led eventually to a moralization of politics*."[403] Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the two parties mostly engaged in a moralizing practice, challenging each other's individual and collective ethics and attributing policy failures or successes to rather blurred notions of political will, strength of character or at best competence.

The cumulative effect of all of the above was the creation, in the words of Pantazopoulos, of a "*democracy of emotion*" as public discourse was dominated by an "*anti-political constellation of a Greek national-democratic soul*."[404] Indeed, "*during the 1990s, we witnessed an increased fetishization of Greekness and an increasing emphasis on ethnic and cultural features of National Identity''*.[405] The new consensus, rather than putting to rest the ghosts of the Great Idea and Hellenism, paradoxically strengthened the axioms of Greek National Identity: "*The individualized (post-) modern subject/citizen, being alienated from other collective forms of participation and expression, and, with a dislocated Identity, seems to desire what is lacking; a concrete Identity. And sure enough, the national or religious imaginary, offer in this case a well-tested and well-grounded easy way out; back to basics*."[406]

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[402] Frangakis, N. and Papayannides, A., (2003), *Greece: A Never-ending Story of Mutual Attraction and Estrangement.* In Wessels, W., Mauer, A. and Mittag, J., (eds.), *Fifteen in One? The EU and its Member States*, Manchester University Press.

[403] Katsambekis, G., (2011), *Populism in Post-democratic Times: Greek Politics and the Limits of Consensus*, Paper presented at the 61st Political Studies Association Annual Conference. For the moralization of politics as a symptom of post-politics and for its dangers for democracy, see Mouffe, C., (2005), *On the Political*, Psychology Press.

[404] Pantazopoulos, A., (2002), *Democracy of Emotion*, Athens: Polis, p. 149.

[405] Triandafyllidou, A., Gropas, R., (2007), *Cultural Diversity in Greek Public and Political Discourses.* Available at: https://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/en/2008/05/greece_report_multicultural_discourses_final.pdf, see also
Triandafyllidou, A., (2007), *Greek Nationalism in the New European Context*. In Karolewski, I. P. and Suszycki, A. M., (eds.), *Nationalism in Contemporary Europe*, London and New York: Continuum, in press.

[406] Katsambekis, G., (2011), *Populism in Post-democratic Times: Greek Politics and the Limits of Consensus*, Paper presented at the 61st Political Studies Association Annual Conference.

An analysis of public opinion surveys provides evidence to support this conclusion, revealing a shrinking case of cognitive dissonance. Greeks appear to be overall positive about their country's participation in the European project and support an ever-closer Union, whether on an economic or a political level.[407] Thus, for example, the Greek public welcomed the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the introduction of a common currency in the late 1990s, with wide margins exceeding levels of support in other European states. Greeks may be very proud of being European and find no conflict between their national and European identities, but at the same time seem to lack empathy towards other European people, perceiving them as 'others' and 'different.' [408] A qualitative survey of students, for example, suggests that "*the majority of Greek students identified themselves more readily as Greeks or as Greeks and Europeans (186 out of 225, 88,6%), rather than as Europeans only, or as more European than Greek, pointing to a strong ethno- centric comportment."* At the same time: *"to the question "To what degree do you like the following people?", Greek students ranked themselves (Greeks), highest in their preference, followed by Cypriots and Europeans, in general. The rest of the ethnicities are ranked at much lower levels of preference, with the Turks lowest in their ratings, implying a continuation of old, parochial allegiances or enmities and biased or xenophobic attitudes towards the 'others', those less familiar to them.*"[409]

Arguably, the course of Europeanization in terms of Identity cannot be disengaged from the main tenets of National Identity as defined in 19th century romanticism and

[407] Kokosalakis, N. and Psimmenos, I., (2002), *Modern Greece: A Profile of Identity and Nationalism*, Athens: Centre for Social Morphology and Social Policy (KEKMOKOP) - Panteion University; Florence: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies – European University Institute.

[408] Kokosalakis, N., (2004), *National Identity and Europe: Positions and Attitudes of Greek Citizens*. In Kassimati, K., (ed.), *National and European Identity: Convergence and Divergence*, Athens: Gutenberg, 57–100. And Anagnostou, D., (2005), *Deepening Democracy or Defending the Nation? The Europeanisation of Minority Rights and Greek Citizenship*, West European Politics, 28(2):336–58.

[409] Klonari, A. and Terkenli, T., (2013), *How European Do We Feel? Greek School-children's Perceptions of Identity*. In Klonari, A., and Planinc, T., (eds.), *European Identity at the Crossroads*, LIT Verlag.

reinterpreted after 1922 by the 1930s generation. Europeanization brought to light a duality within Greek public discourse as the sense of a natural predestined belonging to Europe collided with the political and socio-economic reality of Greece. On the one hand, clearly, Europe played a key role in the construction of the Greek Identity edifice since independence. A legacy of the Great Idea and Hellenism was a strong identification of the Greek nation with Europe. "*Greece is the member state which, by virtue of its classical cultural heritage, feels that it is entitled more than anyone else to the name 'European.*'" [410] As the popular dictum states, often heard in Greece, "*when we were building Parthenon, they were swinging from the trees."*[411] After all*, "the name Europe is a Greek one*." [412] As such, Greece is seen as historically, culturally and ethically deserving to belong to the strong nucleus of Europe. On the other hand, as recently as the Cold War, Greece belonged to the West, a key domestic mechanism of legitimization for the exclusionary state of the right, not because of strong democratic institutions or its economic development but because of its geostrategic significance, its opposition to the Communist Block and its participation in western security arrangements. The process of Europeanization thus inherently implied an effort to step up and catch up with the rest of Europe. In this context, Europeanization is sometimes taken to be synonymous with "*convergence*"[413] or "*support for further integration*." [414] In other words, Europeanization was equivocated with a deeply transformative experience, 'a need for adaption' with Western Europe and the emulation of specific European policies, norms and values.

[410] Kazakos, P. and Ioakimidis, P., (eds.), (1994), *Greece and EC Membership Evaluated*, Pinter, London.
[411] About 23,300 results in google on 19/1/2013.
[412] Kazakos, P. and Ioakimidis, P., (eds.), (1994), *Greece and EC Membership Evaluated*, Pinter, London.
[413] Tsardanidis, C. and Stavridis, S., (2005), *The Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy: A Critical Appraisal*, Journal of European Integration ,Vol. 27 – 2.
[414] Torreblanca, J., (2001), *Ideas, Preferences and Institutions: Explaining the Europeanisation of Spanish Foreign Policy*, Arena Working Papers 26/01, Available at: www.arena.uio.no/events/papers/torreblanca%20europeanization%20of%20spanish %20foreign%20policy.pdf

At the same time, however, paradoxically, Europeanization strengthened the sense of the 'other' that was articulated in Greek National Identity. Europeanization is usually associated with the normalization of bilateral and multilateral relations, stability and peace. In the case of Greece, however, while its relations with its European partners dramatically improved at least pro-forma, its relations with its neighbors, and especially its regional antagonist Turkey, suffered. In terms of the first tenet of Greek National Identity, hostility versus the other, particularly the sense of an eastern threat emanating from Turkey was actually further strengthened during the period of Europeanization. As we have seen, Turko-phobia was a key driving force of Europeanization, providing the project with a raison d'etre. The invasion of Cyprus contributed towards a reversal of Greek policy towards Turkey as the rapprochement efforts that characterized the period between 1922 and 1974 gave place to a new period of confrontation.

In this regard, Europeanization cultivated a sense of national superiority, which together with a sense of victimization because of perceived power politics was a key driving force. Greece may be smaller and weaker than Turkey, and had been recently defeated over Cyprus, but it retained its cultural superiority and thus its national honor. In other words: "*Europeanization as an Identity formation project can be defined by its relationship or juxtaposition with the civilizational 'other,' often assuming culturalist or essentialist and exclusionary conceptions of Europe. Turkey's accession to the European Union adds a culturalist angle to the debate. It forces the European Union to distinguish between a Christian, geographically narrow Europe and a broader, multicultural Europe of values. This debate on Europeanization is closely linked with the geographical and cultural boundaries of Europe*".[415]

[415] Anastasakis, O., (2005), *The Europeanization of the Balkans*, Brown Journal of World Affairs, Volume XII, Issue 1: 79.

Greek National Identity was inherently connected to the self-perception of Greece as being European. Arguably, the European narrative, rather than weakening, actually strengthened the demonization of the 'other.' Greece is seen as the mythical motherland of European civilization and as such the eastern, barbaric, other, represented by the Persians in ancient times, the Ottomans in the Middle Ages and the Turks in modernity, is perceived as the natural enemy.[416] As the scholar Frangoudaki suggests: "*the integration of Greece into the Union has had a powerful ideological effect upon the national self-image. [It reproduced and validated] the Eurocentric stereotype of the alleged superiority of the northern and western zone...* "[417]

Moreover, the events of the summer of 1974 in the eastern Mediterranean reawakened the ghosts of 1922, reinforcing a strong sense of victimization and a 'looser mentality.' Mixed with leftist, anti-western and anti-American syndromes, originating in the Civil War, and culminating in the period of the Junta, victimization dominated Greek public discourse, as the nation was perceived to be wronged not only by the Turks but also by its western allies and friends, particularly the United States. Anti-Americanism swept the country in waves as Greek public opinion, as a result, tended to identify with underdogs, such as the Serbs or the Arabs, and discourse gravitated towards extreme positions like understanding of the 9/11 terrorist attacks[418] and support for Saddam Hussein's Iraq in the 2003 war.

[416] Herzfeld, M., (1987), *Anthropology Through the Looking-Glass: Critical Ethnography in the Margins of Europe*, Cambridge University Press.

[417] Rumelili, B., (2005), *The European Union and Cultural Change in Greek-Turkish Relations*, Working Papers Series in EU Border Conflicts Studies, No. 17, The University of Birmingham.

[418] Vasilakis, M., (2002), *Good to Suffer*, Athens: Gnoseis.

Indeed, much has been made of Europeanization in terms of redefining National Identity. Today, one view of Greece's Europeanization focuses on an unsubtle dichotomy between Europeanization and National Identity. Thus, Greek National Identity is presented in opposition to a Liberal European discourse. In the words of Agnantopoulos: "*The historical alternative to ethno-culturalism is a Liberal-westernist discourse, which constructs the Greek nation as being a constellation of individuals united by common structures of citizenship and positions Greek history within an evolutionist narrative, whereby humanity progresses from tradition and parochialism to modernity. This construction of the Greek nation is inclusive and open to otherness. Crucially, it also establishes a more positive relationship with Europe, which is seen as a more advanced form of the self. As a result, it has been reinforced by EU membership and has started to challenge the dominance of ethno-culturalism*."[419]

Such readings, however, tend to reflect academic and intellectual circles more than social and political life. Europeanization, contrary to expectations, rather than effectively challenging Greek National Identity and reinterpreting its fundamental suppositions served instead to strengthen its pre-existing basic themes, thus further legitimizing its content. Indeed, the politics of Europeanization and the emergence of a so-called democracy of emotion with the convergence of left and right around the European flag reinforced the sense of the 'other' and of superiority that were pivotal in the construction of National Identity since the 1830s.

For all intents and purposes, supporters of Europeanization, however firm and committed, refrained – with a few notable exceptions – from engaging with Greek

[419] Agnantopoulos, A., (2010), *The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy: The Case of Greece.*

National Identity directly. Europeanization, to paraphrase Anastasakis, was internalized in Greece as a means rather than an end, a method and not a substance, a project but not a vision. It signified a certain political, socio- economic, and cultural reality, but also a National Identity, a cultural symbol, and a myth of Hellenism. For some, Europeanization was far from antithetical with National Identity. For Karamanlis, the accession of Greece to the EC was a "*historic challenge*" that ought to be met "*maintaining our National Identity*."[420] For others, such as Simitis, it was mostly a battle that could or should not be waged, relying on the technocratic managerial perspective to advance the project with a few exceptions, for example the public debate on the specification of religion on Greek identification papers. As a result, the forces of Europeanization, either reinvigorating the main tenants of Greek National Identity, or by refusing to critically engage its content, left a void, paradoxically further strengthening National Identity itself.

5.5 Conclusion

Greek National Identity, as it was shaped in the 19th century, was reaffirmed, reinterpreted and reformulated in the 20th century, and has dominated public discourse over generations. The purpose of this chapter was to explore the evolution of this Identity and its performative dimensions and thus I discussed its themes through the birth of a new nation, the Great Idea, Hellenism, and Europeanization.

[420] Speech by Karamanlis at the Zappeion in 2013 (Accessed September 13, 2013), Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_QIfSAIRAdI (Should note that this is in Greek and the translation is the author's own.)

This discussion is highly pertinent for the purposes of this thesis, as the critical foreign policy choices of Greek governments in the three case studies under consideration, can be better understood if the far-reaching implications of National Identity for the Great Debate and thus for foreign policy making are considered. Arguably, National Identity in the case of Greece has evolved over time and in response to changing circumstances. Interestingly, however, its main tenets would largely survive after the historical demise of the Great Idea in 1922 all the way through Greek membership of the European family. Therefore, Greek National Identity revolved around the following: the unbroken continuity of the Greek nation from ancient to modern times; Greece's rightful place in the European family and its sense of superiority towards its neighbors; its antagonistic and hostile relationship primarily with the Turkish 'other' and secondarily with the Slav and Communist 'others;' the hegemonic position of Greek irredentist aspirations; and the inherited sense of loss which would result in the creation of a sentiment of historical injustice and victimization. Europeanization's advent in the last quarter of the 20th century appears to have changed the terms of the debate without however effectively challenging the main axioms of National Identity.

In this sense, the empirical puzzle that drove this thesis acquires a new-found urgency. The variation of Greek foreign policy outcomes appears more paradoxical given the character of National Identity, however evolving, and the difficulty in terms of challenging its main axioms from a soft line perspective. National Identity, however, should not be understood neither as fixed nor as the subject of a linear evolution, at least in terms of its expression in foreign policy. Instead, National Identity's adaptability must be underlined. Indeed, Greece's turbulent history witnessed a number of foreign policy twists and turns from the 1830s up to 2004, suggesting that the

country's course in the international arena was far from predetermined. The historical record suggests, for example, that even while the Great Idea's hegemony was undisputed there was a debate between soft liners and hard liners about how to proceed during the late 19th century. Clearly, however, in terms of the Great Debate, the social internalization of Identity assumed a life of its own, creating expectations of normalcy and strengthening the hard line worldview. It is indicative that, as we have seen above, as late as the 1990s the Greek Church would openly refer to the unrealized dream of conquering Istanbul.

Arguably, history suggests that what stays constant is the hard line discourse, and what varies is the soft line discourse. The Great Debate is far from fair because hard liners are in a better position to take advantage of the cardinal themes of National Identity. In response, soft-liners must engage in Identity politics directly, generate their own version of shared Identity and appropriate the Identity discourse. Furthermore, the conscription of the full force of the state is essential. In other words, as noted in the conceptual framework, soft liners or hard liners are called upon to take advantage of the tension and the dualism that defines Greek National Identity, making it amenable either to hard line reassertion or to soft line reinvention.

6. THE GREAT DEBATE AMONGST IDENTITY WARRIORS

As discussed in the previous chapter, the debate about National Identity in Greece exhibited continuity for close to two centuries. At the same time, however, Greek Identity has been open to reinterpretations and reformulations. As such, it has often been understood by scholars as being the product of a struggle between two opposing forces - an ongoing dualism. In this context, the hypothesis that I will seek to test in this chapter, my 'crucial experiment', is whether such a dualism concept can be transferred to the area of Greek foreign policy.

Moving forward in the empirical discussion, for the purposes of this chapter, each case study will be discussed on two levels. First, I will shortly delineate the background of the Great Debate and analyze the position of each so-called national issue within the edifice of National Identity, together with the interplay between internal and external factors. Second, I will present the Great Debate itself, as it unfolded, in each case.

I seek to understand whether this cleavage is observable in the sphere of foreign policy making. To this end, I will discuss the role of Identity Warriors, including civil society, the Church, the media and others, in articulating demands, forming alliances and creating broader opposing camps of hard liners or soft- liners in search of political or social support. I will also explore if and how these competing alliances met the instrumental challenge of reaffirming, reinterpreting or reinventing Identity. In this regard, the capacity of such alliances to crosscut established political, partisan and ideological lines of Greek politics is catalytic, as much in their potential to expand and

consolidate through their symbolic unification, thus becoming something which is more than the simple summation of the chain's links.

6.1 Macedonian issue

"*History and its interpretation lie at the heart of the Macedonian saga*."[421] Historical arguments from the Hellenistic period, Ottoman and Byzantine times frame the construction of Identity in terms of this case study. The name Macedonia is used to connote a broad geographical area of 25.000 square kilometers located at the heart of the Balkan Peninsula which, over centuries and since the time of Alexander the Great, changed hands a number of times. Part of the region of Macedonia was incorporated into Greece in 1912, although Greek-speakers were historically a minority. In the 1920s, Macedonia became the new home for nearly half a million refugees from Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace after Greece's defeat in its war with Turkey.[422] The Greek state, in response, driven by internal political considerations and a strong sense of external threat, proceeded with the construction of Greek National Identity, embedding Macedonia. Thus, the history of Macedonia was very quickly considered an integral part of the history of Hellenism over millennia. Alexander the Great personified this historical legacy of the nation much as his Hellenistic Empire symbolized the glory of Greek civilization.

[421] Roudometof, V., (2002), *Collective Memory, National Identity, and Ethnic Conflict: Greece, Bulgaria and the Macedonian Question*, Westpost, Conn Praeger, 3.

[422] Mavrogordatos, G., (1983), *Stillborn Republic: Social Conditions and Party Strategies in Greece, 1922-1936*, Berkeley: University of California Press, p.185-186.

The state's efforts were historically internalized as a response to foreign threats, cultivating a siege mentality that defined the construction of National Identity. Roudometof notes the importance of regionalism in Greek Macedonia and the traumatizing experiences of war, expulsion and occupation in shaping the local inhabitants' perception of the Macedonian controversy. The recurrent Bulgarian occupations of eastern Greek Macedonia and Thrace during the first part of the 20th century, and moreover the Asia Minor refugee population's experience of forceful expatriation and resettlement, as large numbers of refugees settled in Macedonia after 1922, produced traumatic memories and above all new Identity claims. These play a pivotal role in making Greek Macedonians particularly sensitive to perceived national threats and reaffirming the main tenants of National Identity.[423] As the President of the Republic Karamanlis, himself from the Macedonian town of Serres, would note during the discussion of the Macedonian issue in the Council of Leaders: "*We must not forget the past… As long as the state of balance between the coalitions existed, all the countries in the West and the East were under control…. We must not forget that Bulgaria invaded Macedonia three times and almost reached Strimona. We must also not forget that Serbia …sided with the Axis…with Thessaloniki as an exchange. I say this to understand the sensitivity of the people of that area. There is a history that has left bitter memories that justify reasonable apprehension about the future*."[424]

With the end of the Cold War, the establishment of Macedonia's position within the edifice of Greek National Identity was strengthened in response to domestic needs and developments in Greece's neighborhood. The state, for instance, weaponized

[423] Roudometof, V., (2002), *Collective Memory, National Identity, and Ethnic Conflict: Greece, Bulgaria and the Macedonian Question*, Westpost, Conn Praeger, 3.
[424] *Official Transcript of the Council of Leaders*, Constantine Mitsotakis Foundation.

Macedonian identity, one-sidedly stressing amongst others foreign atrocities through the collection of detailed but selective information on the Macedonian struggle at local level.[425] Internationally, in the early 1990s, Greek society appeared to be facing a crisis that reached existential dimensions and which added to the perennial Greek "*insecurity syndrome*"[426], epitomized best in what former President of the Republic Christos Sartzetakis called the "*brother-less, friend-less Greek nation*."[427] In this sense, the image of a victimized nation that was targeted by the international powers was cultivated. This siege mentality depicted a 'fortress nation' whose very existence was at stake and must be prepared to face danger. Former Prime Minister and leader of PASOK Papandreou, for example, argued that only fellow Orthodox Greece and Serbia in the Balkans are: "*Countries with dynamism, with history, with tradition, countries that can say no to some things, countries that have their own civilization. And there is also Orthodoxy, which we must not forget, because the Pope plays an energetic role in all developments and in the Eastern bloc…. Greece in any case is the target, as is Serbia.*"[428] This last point was also politically expedient for Papandreou because it suggests that he was in agreement with the Orthodox Church's anti- Catholic geopolitics. This is a crucial piece of evidence that solidifies Papandreou's turn towards the Church in his final administration.

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425 Mazower, M. (1995) *The cold war and the appropriation of memory: Greece after liberation. Resistance and Collaboration in Europe, 1939-1945: Experience, Memory, Myth, and Appropriation*. East European Politics and Societies.

426 Prodromou, E., (1997), *The Perception Paradox of Post- Cold War Security in Greece*. In Alisson, G. and Nicolaidis, K., (eds.), *The Greek Paradox, Promise vs. Performance*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.129.

427 Koutsovilis, S., (2005), *Exploring the Sources of Greek Foreign Policy Towards the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*. Paper presented at the 2nd PHD Symposium on Modern Greece London, June 2005.

Available at: http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/pdf/2nd_Symposium/Spyridon_Kotsovilis_paper.pdf

428 *Official Transcript of the Council of Leaders*, Constantine Mitsotakis Foundation.

The notion of threats dominated public discourse. In a joint communiqué on behalf of the country's leadership what is interesting about the statement is the systematic reference to threats: "*It was concluded that the situation in which our national issues find themselves today creates certain threats that make constant vigilance and national cohesion necessary. The threats, however, do not put the security and territorial integrity of the country in direct danger. And this is because Greece is in a position to face them effectively, thanks to its domestic power and its international support*."[429]

Not surprisingly, in 1992, foreign policy shot up to second place, after the economy, as being the most important problem, compared to ninth place in 1991.[430] At the same time, a qualitative survey based on focus groups sheds light into the mind-set of the Greeks, at the time, showing that the perceived national threat was also a proxy for a sense of general disenchantment: "*In all groups, throughout Greece, individuals spoke as if Greece was facing a national crisis. They treated Greece like Hiroshima after the bomb had fallen. There is no agreement on the content of the crisis; individuals talk about it in four different ways: Shame…Threat…Ethics…National*."[431]

Indeed, a sense of crisis permeated public discourse and appeared to have engulfed society. This crisis precipitated a tendency towards back-to–the-basics as the main themes of Greek Identity were reinforced. The world appeared less black and white to the Greeks and, as beliefs and ideals crumbled together with the collapse of the Berlin Wall, individuals and groups expressed a longing for Identity claims that could fill the ideological void after the end of the Cold War.[432]

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[429] *Official Transcript of the Council of Leaders,* Constantine Mitsotakis Foundation.

[430] Quotations are taken from Loulis, Y., (1995), *The Greek Political Crisis: 1980-1995,* Athens: Sideris, p.122- 123.

[431] Skylakakis, T., (1995), *In the Name of Macedonia,* Athens: EuroEkdotiki, p.252.

[432] Liakos, A., (1993), *Balkan Crisis and Nationalism.* In Elefantis, A. et al., (eds.), *The Janus of Nationalism and the Greek Balkan Policy,* Athens: Politis.

6.1.1 Alliances of Identity Warriors

Since the 1920s, the production of a "*nationally tailored discourse*" regarding the Greekness of Macedonia's past, present and future was of paramount importance. Therefore, any challenge to the Greekness of Macedonia was much more than merely a foreign policy problem. It was a challenge to the axiom of historical continuity that defined Greek National Identity and as such empowered aspirations whose "*ideological core degenerated into an ethnocentric discourse similar to the age-long, traditional nationalist discourse of the Greek state*."[433] At the same time, Macedonia was instrumentalized especially after the Cold War by successive governments.[434] In this context, an alliance of Identity Warriors joined the public debate, advocating a hard line regarding the Macedonian issue. Contrary to the other two case studies, in terms of the construction of National Identity, this alliance was largely unopposed because no other alliance competed for the attention of policy makers or the public.

6.1.1.1 Civil Society

[433] Kalpadakis, G. and Sotiropoulos, D., (2007), *Europeanism and Nationalist Populism: The Europanization of Greek Civil Society and Foreign Policy*, Hellenic Studies, 154 (1): 43244.

[434] Mazower, M. (1995.) *The cold war and the appropriation of memory: Greece after liberation. Resistance and Collaboration in Europe, 1939-1945: Experience, Memory, Myth, and Appropriation.* East European Politics and Societies.

The umbrella organization that spearheaded the hard line alliance was the so-called Macedonian Committee. Founded in January 1992, by a collection of individuals from the political, academic and industrial worlds of Northern Greece, the Macedonia Committee was justified in proclaiming that it "*represents all the intellectual, productive and social forces of Northern Greece*." An impressive number of institutions were represented in that first meeting, illustrating the breadth and scope of participation.[435] Interestingly, the Macedonian Committee systematically asserted its independence and autonomy from the state as it did not receive financial assistance from any government. On the contrary, its private fundraising efforts bore fruit: reportedly, in just a few months, in early 1992, the Committee had collected an impressive seventy million five hundred thousand drachmas from 49 companies.[436] This enabled the Macedonian Committee to go so far as to substitute the state, financing key public projects that served its goals. For example, in June 1992, at the behest of the Airport Manager, the Committee paid for a new sign at Thessaloniki's Airport after its renaming as 'Macedonia.'[437]

In the words of Kalpadakis, this organization: "*Constituted the genuine expression of the wider people's current on the name, operating as a conveyor belt for the general dissatisfaction and as a breakwater for the sentiments of fear that dominated society*."[438] Within the framework of National Identity, the public message articulated by the Macedonia Committee had three building blocks: first, the 'Greekness' of Macedonia, on the premise of the uninterrupted continuity of the Greek nation. The region's central role in the development of Greek Identity was contrasted with

[435] Research team, "Survey on the Rally for Macedonia." Macedonia.(February 11, 2006).
[436] Ibid.,262.
[437] Ibid.,66.
[438] Kalpadakis, G., (2012), *The Macedonian Issue, From Silence to People's Diplomacy 1962-1995*, Athens: Kastaniotis, p.261.

'Skopjan' falsification of history and irredentism. In this context, the eschatological dimension of the nation was for the Committee's purposes often identified with that of Orthodox religion. Second, 'national unity' was demanded as the only means to effectively defend the nation from any usurpers whether from the 'north' or the 'east.' A sense of crisis was thus reinforced and the need to transcend partisan political and social differences was underlined as being a key to national survival. Third, the European nature of Greek Identity was highlighted with an interpretative and instrumental function: on the interpretative level, it provided an explanation for Greek cultural and moral superiority over its neighbors and on an instrumental level, it made the calls for 'European Solidarity' meaningful and justified.

The Macedonian Committee's work represented only the tip of the iceberg. In many ways, the ground had been prepared for decades. The nationalization of Macedonia in the 20th century was led by the Society for Macedonian Studies (EMS), which was founded at the end of the 1930s, during the Metaxas dictatorship, in Thessaloniki and was actively supported by local businessmen, politicians and academics. The aim of the Society was to research "*everything concerning the Macedonian people and the Macedonian land",* to preserve, study and publish "*every linguistic, archaeological, historical and ethnographical material ... proving the indisputable and incontestable incorporation of Macedonia within the entire national framework",* thus contributing to raising the *"educational, spiritual and civilisatory level of the Macedonian people*". "*In plain language, the goal of EMS was to assert the past and present Greekness of Macedonia*"[439] and to solidify National Identity. Interestingly, the Society, although independent, received steady financial assistance from the Greek state ever since, which

[439] Vavouskos, K., *The Society for Macedonian Studies (1939-1980)*, Thessaloniki Analles.

is a truly impressive feat of bi-partisanship, thus enabling the society to grow and diversify its activities. In 1953, the Institute of Balkan Studies (IMXA) was formed as a separate branch of the Society, followed by the inauguration of the Historical Archive of Macedonia; all the while, a steady flow of publications emanated from its research centers.[440]

It is worth stressing that both institutions had three defining characteristics: first, although clearly benefiting from the tangible support of the state they remained bottom-up, local, initiatives which bridged the divide between the center, Athens, and the periphery, Thessaloniki. Second, these institutions had only one goal that transcended party politics and ideological divisions: "*first and foremost the defense of the national [Greek] positions in Macedonia*."[441] Third, over the decades these Institutions had solidified their place in the national discourse "*claiming scientific and historical authority before and during the name crisis*."[442] The impact of the collective works of institutions such as the EMS and IMXA cannot be underestimated. Evangelos Kofos, one of the leading scholars on Macedonia and a Foreign Ministry expert, would later describe how such institutions, although not mentioned by name, shaped the debate on the Macedonian question with "*constant misinformation of the Greek public by official announcements and government-inspired publications*" resulting in *"spasmodic reactions"* and cries of panic about a "*Slav conspiracy against Macedonia*."[443]

[440] Sjöberg, E., (2011), *Battlefields of Memory, The Macedonian Conflict and Greek Historical Culture.* PhD. Dissertation, Umeå University.
[441] Ibid.
[442] Ibid.
[443] Kofos, E., (1992), *The Macedonian Issues From the Second World War to Our Time*. In Koliopoulos, J., (ed), *Modern Macedonia, History, Economy, Society, Civilization,* Athens: Papazisis.

6.1.1.2 Mass mobilization

Mass mobilization occurred throughout Greece at the time but the event that provided an example par excellence of the internalization of the Macedonian issue in National Identity and epitomized the hard line expression of Greek public sentiment on the issue was the Thessaloniki mass rally of February 1992. The rally was the brainchild of the Macedonian Committee and was the byproduct of an increasingly autonomous civil society reasserting itself in the foreign policy arena, through largely unmediated extra-institutional interventions. The organization of the affair was entrusted to municipal authorities and in newspaper advertisements, along with radio and television, the Mayor invited the people to join the cause. In the same spirit, businesses run advertisements, while local newspapers enthusiastically covered the preparations.[444]

The mass rally in Thessaloniki, "*as a public display of concern… was perhaps not so much caused by the Macedonian crisis, as much as it reflected concerns, views and ambitions which had been communicated for several years*."[445] The mass rally was a resounding success showcasing several symbols of National Identity. The Mayor of the City addressed the people flanked by men wearing the characteristic black uniforms of Macedonian fighters at the turn of the century, standing in front of a backdrop of three flags - one European and two Greek. Bands played to the tune of 'Famous Macedonia,' a military march that is associated with the Greek Macedonian Struggle, while the euphoric crowd waved banners, in Greek and English, with slogans such as: 'The Macedonians; We are here,' 'Skopje should forget the name Macedonia,' 'Europe, your roots are here,' 'Skopjans, Μολών Λαβέ (Come and take them),' and the slogan that

[444] Sjöberg, E., (2011), *Battlefields of Memory, The Macedonian Conflict and Greek Historical Culture*. PhD. Dissertation, Umeå University.
[445] Ibid.

was to become synonymous with Greek aspirations regarding the name: 'Macedonia is Greece.' Indeed, this slogan that was widely popularized in Greece at the time carried a deep symbolic resonance and was subject to multiple interpretations in terms of Identity. As Zahariadis notes: "*The term "Greece" was used rather than "Greek" to make the point that the term "Macedonia" is synonymous with Greece and not a "Greek" possession. Although the slogan made little sense to outsiders, who also found it difficult to understand, it made perfect sense to Greeks. It carried several benefits. First, it was the perfect way for Greek public opinion to capture the essence of the problem with Skopje. Second, it evoked a higher order symbol "Macedonia," one that spoke to the cultural heritage and Identity of the Greek people. Third, it had considerable carrying capacity in that it reached many people regardless of partisan affiliation or class. Fourth, it constrained Greek policy by precluding any compromise over the name as a viable Greek option. In other words, the symbol was used not only to guide Greek policy but most importantly to frame all other options as unacceptable losses*."[446]

Mayor Kosmopoulos of Thessaloniki, in his speech, in which he stressed the historical continuity of Macedonia, including references to the archeological sites of Pela, Vergina, the language of Aristotle and Apostle Paul and the Holy Mountain, with the television coverage focusing on monks carrying banners, stated that Skopje: "*Dares to challenge history, to steal the name, to deny us the base upon which we stand…our past is sacred, more sacred than our own land, our own life…. our history, our civilization, our traditions, remained untouched for centuries…people without history do not have and cannot have a future. Thus, we say loudly…we are the Macedonians…our*

[446] Zahariades, N., (2005), *Essence of Political Manipulation: Emotion, Institutions, and Greek Foreign Policy*, New York: Peter Lang.

Macedonia is not simply a geographical concept, it is Greece itself…. it is all of us…history is not an object of trade, National Identity is not an object of trade, cannot be given as a gift, nor used…the aggressiveness of Skopje, is deterred and can be deterred only by the power of Hellenism…"[447]

Organizers contended that around one million people took to the streets that day. School pupils, university staff, students, workers and municipal employees had been officially given the day off and encouraged to join the rally. The organizers had approached representatives of organizations from all walks of life, even football teams: "*I remember PAOK fans came down first*," reminisced one of the event's organizers referring to one of Thessaloniki's most beloved football clubs.[448] Representatives of all political parties were present with the notable exception of the Communist party.

The press celebrated the rally, which was a nationally televised event, gaining extensive coverage by the newly founded private TV channels, with glowing reports: "*A 3000 year old national memory came to life*" wrote the conservative Kathimerini; "*The rally of Thessaloniki was necessary and had to happen, [...] in order to bring about a solid mobilization and gain sensitivity for our national issues*", the editorial of center-left Eleftherotypia stated; "*Wonderful Macedonians, bravo*", wrote the regional newspaper Macedonia. The people were said to have done their patriotic duty. Now it was up to the political leadership to overcome ideological and partisan political differences and carry on the struggle to "*inform international opinion, to neutralize the anti-Greek propaganda, to restore truth and justice*".[449]

[447] Speech by Mayor Kosmopoulos at the Rally (1992). Available at: www.youtube.com/watch?v=dW62LuHOVUk

[448] Research team, "Survey on the Rally for Macedonia." Macedonia, February 11, 2006.

[449] Sjöberg, E., (2011), *Battlefields of Memory, The Macedonian Conflict and Greek Historical Culture*, PhD. Dissertation, Umeå University.

The catalytic significance of the rally cannot be underestimated as the hard line alliance of Identity Warriors managed to empower significant segments of society to express "*themselves without intermediaries …without…taking advantage of the structures of political participation*."[450] In a country where crowds were often used as a potent political weapon, the rally in Thessaloniki, was an impressive occurrence if only for its grass roots organization. Traditionally rallies were the purview of political parties, trade unions or other organized interests and pressure groups. This rally however was exceptional because it was organized bottom-up by independent groups of citizens, a wide selection of Greek society that cut across political, social or economic differences, in co-operation with local government and under the auspices of the Church of Greece. In other words, no political party could claim the crowd that gathered in Thessaloniki, although it was an expression of cross-party consensus as it was organized with the tacit consent of the large majority of the political world, even though the organizers claimed that they would have gone ahead either way as the government was more or less unable to stop it.

In this context, the resolution adopted by the rally did not hesitate to provide instructions to the political leadership demanding a hard line policy: "*the people of Macedonia and Thessaloniki ask the Foreign Minister to continue our fight and not accept the recognition of Skopje with a name or a designation that includes the name Macedonia*." Arguably, the rally was a moment of "*people's diplomacy*"[451] which had considerable influence on decision-makers.

[450] Kalpadakis, G., (2012), *The Macedonian Issue, From Silence to People's Diplomacy 1962-1995*, Athens: Kastaniotis, p.236.
[451] Kalpadakis, G., (2012), *The Macedonian Issue, From Silence to People's Diplomacy 1962-1995*, Athens: Kastaniotis.

6.1.1.3 The Church

The Greek Orthodox Church has been closely linked with Greek National Identity since its effective nationalization in the 19th century. The symbiotic relationship of the Church and the hard line alliance was exemplified by the calls of hard liners to the Church to join their struggle. Former Minister Nikos Martis, for example, when writing on Macedonia, as early as 1984, defined the mission of the Church as being a duty to protect the culture and religion of the Orthodox, attributing to the Church the role of preserving National Identity. In this context, on the day of the Thessaloniki rally for example, Church bells rang in celebration throughout Greece. In his congratulatory telegram, the Archbishop of Greece reminded the Mayor of Thessaloniki that the representatives of the Church were always prepared to wage struggle "*in defense of national rights*." A few months later, in response to the rally held in Athens, the Head of the Church of Greece proclaimed that "*the whole of the sacred clergy*" stands next to the "*motherland- loving people*" and concluded that "*we are ready for every sacrifice*."[452] Indeed, in his own words: "*The propagandists of Skopje should shut up and not provoke us*."[453]

The Church as an institution positioned itself upon three axes: First, expressing the sense of crisis and cultivating the siege mentality that is inherent in Greek National Identity. Second, portraying itself as the defender of Hellenism's continuity and paradoxically connecting itself with historical events that occurred before the coming

[452] Kalpadakis, G., (2012), *The Macedonian Issue, From Silence to People's Diplomacy 1962-1995*, Athens: Kastaniotis, p.304.
[453] Eleftherotypia Newspaper, "Interview with Archbishop Serafim." January 3, 1993.

of Christ. Third, nurturing the perennial phobias ever- present regarding Greek National Identity, and adopting a defensive stance towards enemies coming from the east and the west.

First, during the Macedonian controversy, the Church played a decisive role, expropriating in terms of Identity the continuity of Hellenism and directly associating it with itself. Thus, by portraying, for instance, Alexander the Great as a means of divine providence, the Church elevated the national issue to an existential question of survival for both the nation and itself. The second speaker at the rally, for example, was the Metropolitan Panteleimon II of Thessaloniki. He identified religion with the nation, noting how Alexander the Great, uniting and civilizing the peoples of the East, paved the way for the coming of Christ: "*This supreme national issue...there is no Macedonian issue; it exists only for the enemies of our homeland… The Greekness of Macedonia is testified by archeology, geography and history…Alexander the Great was an instrument of divine blessing…he prepared the peoples for the Messiah… All united, we must face the national dangers whether they come from the east or from the north…It is time that our new generation learns … Northern Epirus, Monastiri, Eastern Romalia, Constantinople and Asia Minor…original Macedonians, descendants of Alexander the Great, cannot be threatened from anywhere…each of us should assume his responsibilities…they will never take our land, the Greek land, the land of Macedonians, the miracle of the centuries."*[454]

Second, the sense of crisis is present in the Church's public discourse. In April 1990, the Bishop of Fokida, Athinagoras, called for "*vigilance*" because the Greek nation was

[454] YouTube. Speech by the Metropolitan at the Rally for Macedonia. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5PsXQ_FUF_8

undergoing "*a large economic, political, cultural and social crisis"* together with a *"deeply familial, spiritual and moral crisis*."[455] In June 1992, the Holy Synod met in an extraordinary summit because of the "*critical national circumstance, which our beloved homeland is going through*."[456] Referring to the Macedonia issue, it proclaimed that the Church could not "*for any reason stay indifferent when an imposition of the century- old ideals of our nation is concerned"* and called upon *"devout Orthodox Greek people*" to stand for "*national unity and resistance*."[457]

Third, the Church emphasized the threat of 'the religious other' whether in the West or the East. This position was further emboldened by the Church's public support of the Serbs during the Yugoslav conflict, in an attempt to construct an Orthodox Balkan alliance that would challenge the so-called Muslim arc and thus the Turkish threat. Moreover, for the Church, Skopje was the battering ram of 'Papism:' the belief that the Catholic Church used the Macedonian issue to approach the populations of former communist countries.[458] According to this scenario, the Vatican was even prepared to facilitate the Muslim arc in order to encircle Orthodoxy. [459] A few days before the rally of February 14th, the Archbishop, in an interview, voicing his displeasure with Catholic policy, stated: "*It is known that…Skopje has penetrated the Vatican and the rest of Italy.*"[460] The Bishop of Thira would write that there is a "*gigantic effort of Papism to subjugate the Liberal Greek Church to the despotic Church of Rome"*[461] and that *"the Skopjans created a bridgehead for Rome and the Vatican in Skopje*."[462]

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[455] Kalpadakis, G., (2012), *The Macedonian Issue, From Silence to People's Diplomacy 1962-1995*, Athens: Kastaniotis, p.300.
[456] Ibid.,303.
[457] Ibid., 304.
[458] Ibid., 299.
[459] Ibid., 301.
[460] Ibid., 301.
[461] Ibid., 302.
[462] Ibid., 302.

6.1.1.4 The Media

Hard line positions dominated headlines, and the role of the media has been identified in several studies as enabling hard liners to play the "*nationalist card*."[463] To a certain extent, hard liners benefited from a change in the public sphere as private broadcasting was first permitted in Greece in 1990, and the new TV stations competed mercilessly to establish themselves and especially to increase their revenues through the creation of a tabloid media culture. In this context, a media culture of sensationalism grew.[464] Newspapers, highly partisan in their outlook, joined the fray, offering representations that were very skim analytically and replete with over-simplifications of complex international issues.

Overall, the media appear to have experienced a 'rally behind the flag phenomenon,' presenting themselves as the country's quasi-diplomats. Newspapers dedicated considerable space to arguments celebrating the Greekness of Macedonia, throughout the ages. The press described FYROM as a "*formation*" and as a "*little state*," both derogatory expressions serving to belittle its status as a sovereign state. Moreover, in the Greek discourse, the new entity was always called "*the Republic of Skopje*" and never Macedonia (unless the word was placed between quotation marks). Macedonians were referred to as "*Skopjans*" (the equivalent of calling Greeks 'Athenians').[465] At the same time, the 'other' was always highlighted, be it Skopje, Ankara or generally the

[463] Ellinas, A., (2010), *The Media and the Far Right in Western Europe: Playing the Nationalist Card*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

[464] Mitropoulos, D., (2003), *Foreign Policy and the Greek Media: Subjugation, Emancipation, and Apathy*. In Tsakonas, P., (ed.), *Modern Greek Foreign Policy: A Holistic Approach,* Athens: Sideris.

[465] Roudemetof, V., (1996), *Nationalism and Identity Politics in the Balkans: Greece and the Macedonian Question*, Journal of Modern Greek Studies, Vol. 14, N. 2.

West. Headlines, such as, "*Turkey sends its army for intervention in the Balkans*,"[466] connecting the primordial Turkophobia with developments in the Balkans, or "*The ungrateful West strikes Greece*,"[467] both in highly prestigious publications, are indicative.

6.2 Greek – Turkish rapprochement

In the early 1990s, a Greek Foreign Minister had a problem. He wanted to invite his Turkish counterpart to Athens, but all the reception rooms in the Ministry were decorated with murals depicting bloody battles between Greeks and Turks.[468] Prime Minister Simitis in an interview noted that the Ministry of Defense suffers from similar décor.[469] These are only a few out of many visible and tangible reminders of the Turkish 'other' in public discourse because Ankara is perceived as the perennial enemy. Indeed, "*this threat perception has demonstrated a remarkable stability*."[470] In the words of former Foreign Minister George Papandreou: "*We have developed stereotypes about the Turks. Essentially, this is our problem. In my experience, Turks keep their word. Public perception, however, is quite different. I remember the results of a study commissioned a few years ago. The content of schoolbooks was compared across the Balkans. The conclusion was that all the books say the same thing: that it is the other's fault!*"[471]

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[466] To Vima Newspaper, 22/11/1992.

[467] Oikonomikos Taxydromos Newspaper, 22/11/1992.

[468] Greece's earthquake diplomacy, Le Monde Diplomatique.

[469] Interview with former Prime Minsiter C. Simitis, June 2nd 2013.

[470] Agnantopoulos, A., (2005), *The Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy: A Conceptual Framework and an Empirical Application in Greek-Turkish Relations.* Paper presented at the 2nd LSE Symposium on Modern Greece, London. For a critical presentation of this thought, see Heraclides, A., (2001), *Greece and the Threat from the East*, Athens, Polis.

[471] Interview with Former Prime Minister G. Papandreou, July 21 2013.

As seen in the previous chapter, historically the Greek – Turkish relationship can be characterized by mutual alienation: "*Populations seldom cross-visited and the lack of face-to-face interrelation, aggravated by media-fed myths, painting the other as the epitome of 'evil', escalated the perceptions of enmity to levels of absurdity*."[472] Indeed, one of the main obstacles that the proponents of revisionist soft line foreign policy had to overcome related to Turkey as 'the other' in Greek public opinion - commonly expressed in the popular Greek expression 'you have made me a Turk' used to connote frustration, anger and rage. National prejudices and stereotypes inform public debate as Turks are presented as*:"(a)barbarian (often referred to as Asian) and inferior in terms of civilization; (b) untrustworthy and not hesitating to go back on their word (c) fanatical, conservative, as well as fearful of progress and insecure against the West, and (d) anti-Christian and unholy tyrants*."[473] This fear grew after the end of the Cold War: "*After the end of the Cold War, this threat perception has been exacerbated by the belief that Turkey could profit from the collapse of the Soviet Union and become a regional hegemon through the creation of an Islamic Arc extending from Central Asia to the Balkans*."[474]

In this context, historically, the Greeks have seen Turkey as an aggressive 'bully' that attempts to usurp the status quo, circumventing international law in the process. This siege mentality and sense of victimization, along with deeply ingrained national prejudices, informed a hard line approach. For decades, Greek foreign policy dogma

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[472] Isen, G., *A Decade of Rapprochement in Greek - Turkish Relations: Benefiting From a State-free State?*, Faculty of Communication, İstanbul Bilgi University Istanbul, Turkey

[473] Millas, H., (2001), *Images of Greeks and Turks*, Athens: Aleksandreia.

[474] Yallouridis, C., (1999), *The External Orientation and Political Culture of Turkey.* In Yallouridis, C. and Tsakonas, P., (eds.), *Greece and Turkey After the End of the Cold War*, Athens: Sideris, p.106.

was based on the premise that contrary to Ankara, which engages in revisionist policies, Athens only wishes to safeguard the status quo as it is grounded in international law. Seen from this rather legalistic perspective, Greece did not demand anything from Turkey and therefore has no reason to engage in talks or negotiations that "*were ruled out as 'appeasement'... further fuelling Turkey's expansionism*."[475] Therefore, in effect, in diplomatic practice for more than thirty years, Greece has recognized only one difference between itself and Turkey, the delimitation of the continental shelf, and has pushed for its referral to the International Court of Justice.

Greek hard line intransigence over a number of decades can be attributed to the role of the Turkish 'other' in the construction of Greek National Identity as discussed earlier in the thesis. In the past, Greece faced a number of security dilemmas, but each time, hard line policy prevailed. In the late 1970s, Greece invested the whole of its national resources in order to accede to the European Union. Nevertheless, the government of Karamanlis the elder, did not take any steps in the direction of the normalization of Greek - Turkish relations; in the late 1980s, Andreas Papandreou initiated a rapprochement at Davos, but Greece remained intransigent towards Turkey in Europe; in the early 1990s, the Mitsotakis government, as the records of the Council of the Leaders of the Parties reveal, was planning a soft line revision of Greek foreign policy but did not proceed far enough in the stage of implementation. Although the question of Cypriot accession to Europe did not figure as prominently in the past, as will be discussed in the next section, the case for a costs-benefit analysis that tilts towards the support of Turkey's European orientation could be made in all three instances. Indeed,

[475] Agnantopoulos, A., (2010), *The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy: The Case of Greece*, Available at: https://www.ies.be/files/Agnantopoulos%20Europeanisation.pdf

Greece could have avoided a number of near- war experiences, for example in 1987 and 1996, and could have secured piecemeal returns from Turkey under a program based on strict conditionality in a bilateral or multilateral framework. Instead, Athens insisted upon a policy of hard line intransigence, effectively freezing bilateral relations, joining Ankara in an arms race, investing its diplomatic capital, treasure and at times blood, in a regional Cold War.

I argue that in 1999 Turkey's internalization in Greek National Identity was, at least temporarily, directly challenged on two fronts: endogenously, by the economic and social state of the nation and exogenously by the 1999 double earthquakes in Greece and Turkey which drove a more soft line agenda:

On the one hand, at the turn of the century, Greece experienced a period of economy growth and social mobility. For several years, Greek GDP increased steadily, and the Greek state was able to redistribute social benefits. Despite the prevalent sense of corruption, Greece's accession to the EMU, and the country's preparation for the 2004 Olympic Games provided tangible and visible assurances of progress to a public nurturing a newfound sense of self-confidence. In the words of Papandreou: "*Nationalism is tied to weakness, fear and insecurity. Personally, I do not view Turkey with fear or prejudice. We can deal with them. Don't forget that in 2004, Greece was self-confident. The Olympic games were about to take place. There was growth and prosperity. The EU offered an understandable framework and our young generation was open to new ideas*."[476]

[476] Interview with Former Prime Minister G. Papandreou, July 21 2013.

On the other hand, the double tragedy of the 1999 earthquakes has a significant impact. In the words of a scholar: "*The earthquakes exploded myths alleging eternal Greek – Turkish enmity and the burden of history*."[477] At the same time, they "*contributed to a dramatic reversal of hostile attitudes in public opinion and the press, thereby facilitating détente efforts*."[478] Indeed, the earthquakes[479] arguably created a "*positive entrapment*" for the peoples of Greece and Turkey.[480] In terms of public opinion, the earthquakes played a catalytic role as they "*created a wave of compassion and spontaneous assistance across the borders, and doubtlessly strengthened the spirit of neighborly good will in both countries*."[481] In the words of Simitis: "*The earthquakes did play a role. There was help from Greece to Turkey and this is a sample of friendly conduct; every sample plays a role.*"[482] As Papandreou noted: "*The rapprochement had begun before the earthquakes as we had already embarked on talks. When the earthquake took place in Turkey we immediately proclaimed our willingness to help. Our peoples had nothing to divide. The reaction was mostly positive. There was also a feeling of superiority in Greece as the Greeks sent help, first aid, and necessary goods, even blood. There were emotional moments, such as when, for example, Greek rescuers saved a little Turkish boy.*"[483]

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[477] Couloumbis, T. and Veremis, T., (1999), *Greece and the Balkans: A Critical Review*, Royal United Services Institute, London, p.152.

[478] Grigoriadis, I., (2003), *The Changing Role of the EU Factor in Greek-Turkish Relations*, London School of Economics and Political Science, Hellenic Observatory.

[479] On August 17th, 1999, the Marmara region of Turkey was hit by a devastating earthquake. Greece was one of the first countries to send rescue teams. Less than a month later, on September 7, 1999, an earthquake hit the capital of Greece, Athens. Correspondingly, Turkey was among the first to send its already experienced rescue teams. This humane approach consequently backed the political approach, incarnated by the Foreign Ministers of the two states, George Papandreou and the late Ismail Cem. Moreover, there was a reappearance of positive feelings for the neighbor in both countries.

[480] Pasamitros, N., (2010), *Stereotypical Images and Enemy Perceptions in the Greco-Turkish Conflict: Is it Possible to Change Stereotypes?*

[481] Reuter, J., (2000), *Reshaping Greek-Turkish Relations: Developments Before and After the EU-Summit in Helsinki*, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), Athens, Greece, ELIAMEP Occasional Papers, p. 2.

[482] Interview with former Prime Minsiter C. Simitis, June 2nd 2013.

[483] Interview with Former Prime Minister G. Papandreou, July 21 2013.

As a result, according to opinion polls, at the time, Greeks did view their neighbor in a more positive light, the most favorable rating thus far, and yet remained divided regarding the nation's strategy towards Turkey: In 1999, 46% of Greeks saw the integration of Turkey into the EU positively, 65% viewed Turkey's European accession as the road towards an amelioration of its relationship with Greece, 41% believed that Greek security would be enforced and 55% that Ankara would be less dangerous. Last but not least, 41% believed that new investment opportunities would arise.[484]In the words of a scholar: "*In one fell swoop the deep popular enmity that sustained the politico-military rivalry and antagonism between Ankara and Athens disappeared. It gave way to a kind of solidarity that belied all the nationalist exhortations that dominated political discourse, particularly in Greece*."[485]

The statements of the foreign ministers themselves reflect the arguments for "*people's diplomacy*"[486], however grassroots. Greek Foreign Minister Papandreou wrote: "*Through their moving expressions of solidarity, the citizens of Greece and Turkey effectively coined a new political term: 'seismic diplomacy'.... They taught us that mutual interests can and must outweigh tired animosities*."[487]In this context, and from the bottom-up perspective of local government, certain municipalities were involved in the implementation of the confidence measure agreed by Athens and Ankara in the sphere of 'low politics.' Thus, there was a wave of co-operation among local governments and municipalities.[488] Moreover, in a move that would have been

[484]Greeks Split over Turkey in EU, (Kathimerini Newspaper, English Edition, 22/10/2005).

[485]Gulden, A., (2000), *Springtime in the Aegean*, Privateview, p.57.

[486]Gundogdu, A., (2001), *Identities in Question: Greek-Turkish Relations in a Period of Transformation*, Middle East Review of International Affairs, 5, 1.

[487]Papandreou, G., "Working Together: Why Greece Supports Turkey's European Future."
"http://www.greece.org/POLITICS/EuropeanUnion/GapGreekTurkishOpEd.stm"

[488]Ahmet, E., (2005), *Changing Greek Perspectives on Turkey: An Assessment of the Post-Earthquake Rapprochement.* In Carkglou, A. and Rubin, B. (eds.), *Greek-Turkish Relations in an Era of détente*, London: Routledge, p.9.

unthinkable a few years beforehand, municipalities along the Greek – Turkish border, eastern and western Thrace, began establishing a 'Euro region' on both sides of the Evros river.[489] At the same time, a number of cultural exchanges produced a multiplier effect within Greek society, challenging the Greek public to reassess their relationship with Greek National Identity. In the arts, Zulfu Livaneli and Mikis Theodorakis co-operated in common concerts, turning music into a "*common good*."[490] There were films, such as the Greek movie Politiki Kouzina (Kitchen of Istanbul), which tells the story of how a Greek family that was deported from Istanbul in 1964 used food to stress their Istanbul dual Identity, the hardship of adapting to Greek society, and the negative impact of nationalist Identity.[491] In the fields of sports, athletes from both sides passed the borders officially: Turkish basketball player, Ibrahim Kutluay (played at AEK and at Panathinaikos in Greece); Greek basketball player, Efthimis Rentzias (played at Ulker in Turkey); Turkish football player, Erol Bulut (played at Panionios in Greece). Greek sports teams have strong fan bases. Thus, these transfers had a very significant impact upon the Greek public.[492]

6.2.1 Alliances of Identity Warriors

As I have discussed earlier, the Turkish 'other' has historically been a cornerstone of Greek National Identity. The double earthquakes tragically humanized the face of Greece's arch-enemy but were ultimately not enough. The Simitis government

[489] Le Monde diplomatique, Greece's earthquake diplomacy.

[490] Koukoudakis, G., (2006), *The Role of Citizens in the Current Greek-Turkish Rapprochement*, Paper for the 56th Annual Conference of Political Studies Association.

[491] Rumelili, B., (2005), *The European Union and Cultural Change in Greek-Turkish Relations*, Working Papers Series in EU Border Conflicts Studies, No. 17, The University of Birmingham.

[492] Bilgic, T. and Karatzas, P., (2004), *The Contraction in Greece-Turkey-EU triangle: Rapprochements at the Edges.*

managed to implement an unprecedented change in foreign policy behavior to a great extent, against the odds. This was the outcome of a Great Debate and the government's conscious political plan that targeted the hard liners. Simitis himself outlines the Great Debate during our interview: "*Clearly, there was a nationalist block… There were hard liners and soft liners. Generally, there is a nationalist attitude that suggests that there is a need for national contests, that these have not been overtaken by events, while another attitude insists that such contests do not have the same significance as in the past and can be overcome with other ways rather than with intense conflicts*."[493]

In this context, an alliance of soft liners was constructed which was able to overcome hurdles such as the education system and took advantage of the comparative passivity exhibited by the Church of Greece, the positive outlook of the media, influenced by both political affiliations and the earthquakes, the discrediting of hard liners within civil society, in the aftermath of the Ocalan crisis, together with the government's strategy of constructing soft line allies within the world of NGOs and strong economic interests.

6.2.1.1 Education

The Great Debate was influenced by a salient force. Historically, Greek National Identity is propagated through education, with the nation "*presented as being an almost natural entity*" that was characterized by "*uninterrupted continuity since antiquity, a great ability to conserve the main cultural characteristics, and a high cultural homogeneity.*"[494] The Greek nation's long history has been defined as a perpetual

[493] Interview with former Prime Minsiter C. Simitis, June 2nd 2013.

[494] Frangoudaki, 2003 ; Athanasiadis, C., (2015), *The Removed Books: Nation and School History in Greece, 1858-2008,* Athens: Aleksandria, p.211.

struggle against the barbarians. In modern Greek textbooks, for example, it is stated: "*After the wars against the Persians . . . a new Greek civilization was created which the whole world still admires…. This civilization was later conveyed and spread to deepest Asia by Alexander the Great. When the Greeks became Roman subjects, this civilization was carried to Europe and formed the basis of present-day civilization. [During the Byzantine era, the Greeks] fought against the barbarian nations to save civilization and Christianity. When Sultan Mehmet II brought this long and glorious historic period to a close, Greek intellectuals escaped to the West and took with them the torch of Greek civilization, helping to kindle the Renaissance in Europe ... The Greeks were enslaved by the Turks for almost 400 years ... With its trust in God and its patriotic devotion, the eternal Greek race was reborn.*"[495]

Primary and secondary education played an important role in the demonization of the Turkish other.[496] The 'other' is described as being barbaric, a rude warrior, uncivilized, invader, sneaky and dishonest.[497] In a text that was later revised, after being taught for many years, the siege of Constantinople is described as follows: "*Emperor Constantine . . . made preparations for the defense of Constantinople even though he knew, as once Leonidas in Thermopylae was also aware, that the barbarians would eventually win ... Sultan Mehmet II . . . aroused the fanaticism of the Turkish soldiers by promising wealth in this life and happiness in Heaven. Those who died in their efforts to take the city would meet the Prophet (Mohammed) and His rich offer of food in Heaven . . . Terror*

[495] Millas, H., (1991), *History Textbooks in Greece and Turkey*. In *History Workshop Journal*, Volume 31, Issue 1.

[496] "We understand that there are two ways to dominate a country: With the army and with schools. When the school does not support the army and when the military victory is not accompanied by a school conquest, then this victory is wasted" in Millas, H., (2004), *National Perceptions of the 'Other' and the Persistence of Some Images*. In Mustafa A., and Ifantis, K., (eds.), *Turkish-Greek Relations: The Security Dilemma in the Aegean*, London: Routledge.

[497] Paparrigopoulos is the creator of the barbaric Turkish Image. Turks are compared to the Ancient Persians producing the Image of the Asian native barbarians that threaten the honor of the Greeks. In Millas, Hercules, Images of Greeks and Turks – Textbooks, Historiography, Literature and National Stereotypes, op.cit, pp. 303.

and horror followed the capture of the city: massacre, plunder, enslavement, vandalism and other barbarisms. Those who sought sanctuary in the church of Saint Sophia fell victims to the fury of the janissaries."[498]

At the same time, students learn that the Turks are responsible for Greece's four centuries of slavery, the nation held captive during Ottoman rule, keeping the Greeks in the dark ages. [499] In a textbook that has not been revised as of today (2018), Ottoman rule is narrated in the following way: "*It is impossible to imagine a greater catastrophe for our nation than our enslavement by the Turks. The Turks, being savages and without civilization, were disastrous in their impact and did not grant a single right to the enslaved nation*."[500]

Thus, textbooks are narratives of traumatic experiences, rich with a number of Turkish atrocities, while the Greeks are presented as the perfect race.[501] Academic historical debate is often sacrificed at the altar of the construction of National Identity, while historical distortions and hyperbole dominate. [502] Therefore, "*the collective memory… is continuously nourished by reminders of past enmity in history textbooks..."*[503]

After the end of the Cold War, a systematic effort began across the region, often sponsored by international institutions in order to desensitize the content of

[498] Millas, H., (1991), *History Textbooks in Greece and Turkey*. In *History Workshop Journal*, Volume 31, Issue 1.

[499] In Greek historiography, the four hundred or so years of Ottoman rule are known as the turkokratia, a word whose simple meaning ('Turkish rule') has overtones of 'the dark years of bondage'. Millas, H., (1991), *History Textbooks in Greece and Turkey*. In *History Workshop Journal*, Volume 31, Issue 1.

[500] Millas, H., (1991), *History Textbooks in Greece and Turkey*. In *History Workshop Journal*, Volume 31, Issue 1.

[501] Millas, H., (2004), *National Perceptions of the 'Other' and the Persistence of Some Images*. In Mustafa A., and Ifantis, K., (eds.), *Turkish-Greek Relations: The Security Dilemma in the Aegean*, London: Routledge, pp. 54,55.

[502] Heraclides, A., *Beyond the Need for "Barbarian*, Ta Nea Newspaper, February 1, 2007.

[503] Gundogdu, A., (2001), *Identities in Question: Greek-Turkish Relations in a Period of Transformation*, Middle East Review of International Affairs, 5, 1.

textbooks.[504] This was to a great extent the response to the violent nationalisms that plagued the Balkans in the early 1990s. In Greece, during the 1980s and the 1990s, various PASOK governments undertook an effort to turn the study of history towards a more socio- economic orientation. Nevertheless, textbooks remained nation-centered.[505] Although reforms were successful in filtering negative references to the 'other,' textbooks remain silent on a number of historical events that may lead to self-reflection and self-criticism on a national scale. The Greek Asia Minor campaign, described as a War of Independence in Turkish textbooks, is portrayed as being a War of Liberation and, while Greek losses are underlined, for example "*hundreds of Greek civilians were massacred by the Turks in 1922, during the war*",[506] there are no references to the collateral damage inflicted upon Turkish civilians.[507] Thus, "*schoolchildren in each country almost never read or heard that their ancestors might have injured the other side"*.[508] Moreover, while the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic were no longer vilified, severe criticisms of their policies can be traced.[509] For Greek textbooks, for example, Turks have the advantage of being effective warriors while any cultural achievement is ignored.

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[504]Starting with the early 1990s, there have been collaborative efforts among historians in Greece and in Turkey to purge schoolbooks of chauvinistic content and demonising references. Critical Greek, Turkish, and other Southeast European historians have come together several times in symposia and workshops organised by Bogazici University, the Turkish History Foundation, and the Centre for Democracy and Reconciliation in South- eastern Europe. Historians from Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Romania, and Turkey also reviewed primary and secondary-level history books from their countries for the 'Improvement of the Balkan History Textbooks Project', which was initiated by the Turkish History Foundation and funded by UNESCO, the Heinrich Boll Foundation and the Consulate General of the Netherlands in Turkey.

[505]Koulouri, C. (2001) *The Tyranny of History*, in C. Koulouri (Ed.) Teaching the History of Southeastern Europe, pp. 14-25. Thessaloniki: Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe; Southeast European Joint History Project.

[506]Millas, H., (1991), *History Textbooks in Greece and Turkey*. In *History Workshop Journal*, Volume 31, Issue 1.

[507]Koulouri, C. (2001), *The Tyranny of History*, in C. Koulouri (Ed.) Teaching the History of Southeastern Europe, pp. 14-25. Thessaloniki: Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe; Southeast European Joint History Project.

[508]Millas, H., (1991), *History Textbooks in Greece and Turkey*. In *History Workshop Journal*, Volume 31, Issue 1.

[509]Koulouri, C. (2001), *The Tyranny of History*, in C. Koulouri (Ed.) Teaching the History of Southeastern Europe, pp. 14-25. Thessaloniki: Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe; Southeast European Joint History Project.

The importance of textbooks is reflected in the intense debate that accompanies any suggested changes. Primary and secondary education is understood by several Greek opinion-makers as being a tool of National Identity building and must therefore be defended at all costs. In a characteristic incident, just a couple of years before the Helsinki agreement, in October 1997, the academic Giannaras published an article entitled: "*Greek killing education*." He criticized the books used in Greek primary schools because "t*he establishment of the comforts of 'peace' are propagandized*." He concluded by asking: "*does not anyone revolt against the great crime that takes place in schools…is the Turkish threat a greater danger than the de-Hellenization of youth*?"[510] Giannaras was referring to the pacifist passage of the great Greek novelist I. Venezis, a man who fought in the war of Asia Minor and joined the resistance against the German occupation during the Second World War, entitled 'This is how the war is.' Others followed Giannaras' example. G. Marinos, a journalist and later member of the European Parliament, wrote of "*opinions that tame the patriotic belief and are taught in Greek schools*."[511] Meanwhile, another journalist went so far as to correct Venezis, pointing to his *"unfortunate expression which missed the spirit of defending your country*."[512]

In terms of Identity's impact upon foreign policy, the significance of education should not be understated. To this day, Greek school children are brought up with the implicit and explicit demonization of the 'other.' In effect, for decades, the Greek state trained its people, from an early age, to develop an antagonistic and confrontational attitude towards Turkey "*as if they were armies already marshaled, being exhorted before the*

[510] Kathimerini Newspaper, 19/10/1997.
[511] To Vima Newspaper, 19/10/1998.
[512] Eleftherotypia Newspaper, 17/01/1997.

last deadly charge." [513] Turkish foreign policy is interpreted through this prism and even Ankara's actions post-1974 are seen as being the product of an inherent aggression and hostility towards the Greeks.[514] In this context, any Turkish move or action justifies Greek defensiveness and reaffirms its siege mentality. Thus, any new ideas or proposals for the revision of foreign policy dogma in a soft line direction, put forward through the Great Debate, had to overcome significant barriers to entry in Greek public discourse.

6.2.1.2 Civil Society

At the turn of the century, in the Great Debate on Greek- Turkish relations, one of the most significant hard line forces of civil society was the so-called Network 21, founded on the day of the anniversary of Greece's 1897 defeat by the Turks. It was to be 'symbolically re-founded' on the 29th of May 1998, the anniversary of the fall of Constantinople. The choice of the number 21 had multiple meanings, as it represented the past, the Greek revolution of 1821, and the future, the 21st century. The hard line Network's membership included an eclectic collection of professors, intellectuals, journalists and politicians. Symbolically, membership demanded an oath on the Gospel, touching the tip of a sword's blade.[515] The cardinal theme of Network 21 was one of 'national awakening.' Its founding manifesto was characteristic: "*National awakening is not an old-fashioned manifesto. It is a modern demand for the self-preservation of Hellenism. It is the need for collective Identity of a people who live through difficult moments and expect even more difficult ones…National awakening is not a political*

[513] Millas, H., (1991), *History Textbooks in Greece and Turkey*. In *History Workshop Journal*, Volume 31, Issue 1.
[514] For a critical presentation of this thought, see Heraclides, A., (2001), *Greece and the Threat from the East*, Athens, Polis.
[515] Klik, May 1999.

demand – it is a need for survival. It does not create fanaticism, it creates self-knowledge. It does not originate in complexes of insecurity – on the contrary, it creates a popular feeling of confidence. It does not threaten the rights of our neighbors – it guards the Greek rights that are threatened from every direction. It is not a denial of European completion. And finally, it is not the substitute of a modern ideology of development – it is the prerequisite of development."[516]

One of the group's prominent members, Lazaridis, later a Member of Parliament and a close advisor of former Foreign Minister, and subsequently Prime Minister, Samaras, explained the purpose of the Network, which he described as a "*lobby…whose subject is the study, communication, and synchronized action and public dialogue of the national issues that involve modern Hellenism."*[517] Indeed, the creation of this lobby was justified in terms of democratic representation. Lazaridis presented Network 21 as representative of a large part of public opinion that is "*discarded*."[518] "*At the moment,*" stated the member of Network 21, "*opinion polls show that 40-70% of Greeks have patriotic sensitivities. The representation of these feelings in the media, however, is less than 5%. We think that this is a democratic deficit*."[519] Thus, the ambitious purpose of this organization was, according to its founders, to "*play a balancing role as a citizen lobby*" because in Greece "*there already exist lobbies of powerful interests*."[520]

Politicians were not officially included in the Network's membership, but a number of them gave its creation a warm welcome. P. Pavlopoulos, a Member of Parliament of

[516] Eleftheros Typos Newspaper, 05/12/1997.
[517] Eleftheros Typos Newspaper, 05/12/1997.
[518] Eleftheros Typos Newspaper, 05/12/1997.
[519] Eleftheros Typos Newspaper, 05/12/1997.
[520] Eleftheros Typos Newspaper, 05/12/1997– the term powerful interests is actually used in Greek political discourse to connote foreign interference or influential businessman.

ND, a former press secretary of the party, later a Minister under Karamanlis and now current President of the Republic, publicly expressed the hope that the Network will find "*many thinking and responsible imitators*."[521] Former Minister of PASOK and Member of Parliament, S. Papathemelis, proclaimed his "*strong support for the positions and ideas of the Network.*"[522] A. Samaras, the former Foreign Minister during the Macedonian crisis and later Prime Minister, described the Network's founding as "*a very positive effort*."[523] A number of Orthodox Bishops supported the Network as well. The Bishop of Piraeus Kalinikos co-sponsored the Network's first event, the Bishop of Thessaloniki Panteileimon, who spoke at the rally on Macedonia, and the Bishop of Komotini were all vocal in their support.[524]

In general, the secretive nature of the Network presents obstacles to research. Its founding convention was held behind closed doors and, much in the same way, the list of its membership was never made public. According to press reports, Network 21 was the product of four years of organized work. The first circle of contacts included one thousand five hundred people in Greece and beyond. A second circle of contacts included five thousand more individuals who "*have accepted the founding manifesto of the Network*."[525] Several opinion makers publicly denied their membership in the Network although they were obviously involved. For example, a former military officer, Naxakis, denied that he was a member of the Network, although he participated in all the public events of the organization since its founding.[526] Professors Sarris, Gialouridis and Zouraris, presented themselves in 1997 as simple 'friends' of the

[521] Eleftherotypia Newspaper, 09/12/1997.
[522] Eleftherotypia Newspaper, 09/12/1997.
[523] Eleftherotypia Newspaper, 09/12/1997.
[524] Klik, May 1999.
[525] Eleftheros Typos Newspaper, 05/12/1997.
[526] Klik, May 1999.

Network. They even responded to various journalists who revealed their attachment to the Network, calling them "*paid organs of (Turkish Intelligence Service) MIT*."[527] Later, however, they became members of the Network's executive board. Two other professors, Ifestos and Platias, publicly declared that they were not members of the Network,[528] although they were main speakers at all the Network's public functions.[529] On the 11th of May, the politician Haralambidis denied that he was a member of the Network[530], although the very next day he was a speaker at the organization's press conference.[531] The leftist thinker Karambelias wrote that he was not a member[532] although he was the first speaker when it was symbolically re-founded.[533]

In any case, the interest of the Network in the discussion of the Great Debate can be explained by that fact that rarely, if ever, has the creation of a 'citizen lobby' attracted such wide attention and initiated such passionate public debate. It is noteworthy that two leading dailies, on opposite sides of the ideo-political spectrum, published extensive articles heralding the Network's birth before its founding meeting even took place.[534] Nevertheless, there were notable exceptions to the warm welcome. Network 21 came under attack from various journalists who compared it to the 'national firm' that engineered Greece's disastrous course towards war in 1897. For example, M. Vasilakis, pointed to the "*dramatic similarities*" between the founding manifesto of the National Firm and its "*twenty-first century reincarnation*,"[535] while P. Boukalas underlined the dangers of what he defined as "*post-modern nationalism*."[536] D.

[527] Exousia Newspaper 13/12/1997 and Eleftherotypia Newspaper, 15/01/1997.
[528] Eleftherotypia Newspaper, 08/12/1997.
[529] Klik, May 1999.
[530] Eleftherotypia Newspaper, 11/03/1999.
[531] Eleftherotypia Newspaper, 13/03/1999.
[532] Epoxi Newspaper, 10/05/1998.
[533] Eleftherotypia Newspaper, 30/05/1998.
[534] Eleftheros typos Newspaper, 05/12/1997 and Eleftherotypia Newspaper, 09/12/1997.
[535] Exousia Newspaper, 01/12/1997.
[536] Kathimerini Newspaper, 23/12/1997.

Mavromatis condemned the Network, using a phrase by the ancient Greek philosopher Eschynous "*they are stealing names to move things*."[537]

The reaction of the Network to those articles was self-contradictory. In a letter that was written to the newspaper Exousia, the journalists were accused of 'McCarthyism.' The members of the network, Sarris, Lazaridis, Zouraris, Giallouridis, then proceeded to state that their organization "*has no relation with the National Firm*."[538] Nevertheless, the members of the Network went to great efforts to defend the historical memory of the National Firm, pointing to the historically unverified allegation that its membership included Eleftherios Venizelos.[539] Only a day later, another member of the Network, S. Kargakos, described the Network as a new "*national firm that inspires us*."[540]

Network 21 made its voice heard in the Greek public sphere. In a characteristic statement in January of 1999, a few weeks before the Ocalan crisis, the Network demanded "*resistance*:" "*Resistance everywhere: In the Aegean, in Cyprus, in Thrace…only three years after the crisis in Imia, rather than being intensely fortified against Turkey, instead we delay our defensive fortification and discourage the defenses of Cyprus*."[541]

A few politicians from across the parties rushed to undersign the above 'policy proposal.' These included over fifteen members of Parliament who made statements to this effect in the following days.[542] Moreover, there were times when the Network's

[537] Eleftheros Typos Newspaper, 04/01/1998.
[538] Exousia Newspaper, 13/12/1997.
[539] Exousia Newspaper, 13/12/1997.
[540] Apogevmatini Newspaper, 14/12/1997.
[541] Eleftheros Typos Newspaper, 01/03/1990.
[542] Klik, May 1999.

expression in political life created what has been described as a "*nationalists' pandemonium*."[543] Papathemelis called for the creation of an alliance of "*Greece-Syria – PPK – Armenia*" in order to oppose the block of "*Turkey – Israel – Big Brother*".[544] This was the same man who proposed the birth of two hundred thousand 'Greek souls' in order to fortify Thrace because it hosted Greece's Muslim minority.[545] On a similar note, P. Kammenos, a ND member of Parliament at the time, in response to the 1997 agreement signed by the Simitis government in Madrid, proclaimed that there exist everywhere "*patriotic forces which are not willing to play the games of Mr. Simitis' bosses*."[546]

Network 21 found strong support in academic circles. University Professor Tzannis, for instance, defended the methodology of "*anthropometry*" and wrote of the "*ideological syphilis*" that was represented by those who had not established their national credentials.[547] Another Professor, S. Kargakos, addressing the founding convention of Network 21 stated: "*We live in the simplification of the nation. Child molesters and speculators direct the country. Political Men do not exist. We have no plan to deal with Turkey and Albania; we are not ready to face the Skopjans and the Bulgarians. We are full of Satanists and drug users…the yielding and the degenerates must be wiped out,, the root of the evil must be attacked, the Jewish conspiracy,… the country must be re-Hellenized. Greece is under occupation, there is racism against the Greeks*."[548] Yet another Network 21 academic, N. Sarris, expressed the academic version of Hellenism and Humanitarianism at the extreme: "*The Turks are flesh- eating animals. And if they*

[543] Exousia Newspaper, 29/01/1999.
[544] To Vima Newspaper, 11/10/1998.
[545] To Vima Newspaper, 04/09/1998.
[546] Eleftherotypia Newspaper, 16/11/1997.
[547] Klik, May 1999.
[548] Klik, May 1999.

are not flesh- eating, they certainly are animals."[549] When the general convention of the department of political science denounced its member, Sarris responded insisting upon his rhetoric, calling his colleagues cannibals as well.[550]

It would be an error, however, to categorize the hard line rhetoric of Network 21 one-dimensionally taking its alienation of the 'other' as its sole defining characteristic. Supporters and adversaries, friends and foes alike, agree that the 'guru' of the Network was the academic theologian Giannaras.[551] Giannaras presents a consistent worldview turning against globalization and underlining the essential character of Greek National Identity. For Giannaras: "*Hellenism is an inheritance of life and stance of life in the world...This stance has its roots in Byzantium, in Orthodox ecclesiastical tradition. It is the 'other pole' of Western European Civilization, the civilization of consumer barbarism and moralist censure*."[552]

Arguably, the ideas expressed by Giannaras originate in a perception of a National Identity that is inherently hostile towards the west. Thus, the nation, Hellenism, is a homogeneous space that is distinguished by its absence of internal contradictions. A homogeneous "*us*," with historical roots, that with diachronic certainty focuses its hostility upon foreigners, those Westerners that "*flatten*" this "*us*." It follows that the Greeks, in order to discover their National Identity and national inheritance, are obliged to return to their roots in order to find this "*us*," before it was expropriated. The history of Hellenism was thus understood as being a struggle between "*us*" and "*them*", namely the "*foreigners*." In this sense, Giannaras proposes that the Greek state was actually the

[549] Eleftherotypia Newspaper, 04/03/1999.
[550] Klik May 1999.
[551] Klik, May 1999, Exousia Newspaper Newspaper, 05/01/98, Eleftherotypia Newspaper, 07/07/1998.
[552] Giannaras, C., *The Neo Hellenic Identity*, Athens: Gregory, p. 80.

antithesis of Greek National Identity: "*In the construction, however, of the Modern Greek state, and against popular conscience, the objective was to organize a state 'equal to the European' - a formal copy of the national 'bourgeois' state that was born in Europe…Greek intellectuals…as well as the Bavarian advisors…ignored totally and programmatically the cultural particularity of the Greeks, which was identical to the Orthodox Church tradition*."[553]

Giannaras' argument skillfully blends religious, national and cultural elements in his particular account of history. Moreover, it seems that for Giannaras the survival of Greek Identity and religion is not only a central matter, for the Greek nation, but also a matter of theological and one can say 'eternal' significance. In fighting its battle of survival, Greek Identity has come under siege, attacked by a West that is deliberately and fanatically anti-Greek: "*European civilization – the civilization of the 'Renaissance,' of the 'Enlightenment' and absolute rational utilitarianism that the intellectuals of the tiny Greek state ecstatically admired – embodied the reversal of the terms of Greek civilization. It was the fruit of the fanatical hatred for Greece of the barbarian tribes that swept Eastern Europe, after the fourth century, aspiring to set up a Roman Empire of their own and driving the united Church to the tragic schism of the eleventh century*."[554]

Network 21 found allies in the most unexpected places, namely the terrorist organization 'November 17th.' The once self-proclaimed Marxist –Leninist group accompanied its terrorist attack of 1998 with a manifesto on 'patriotism.' In the

[553] Kathimerini Newspaper, 30/03/1994.
[554] Kathimerini Newspaper, 30/03/1994.

manifesto, the organization directly threatened those "*few, low bidding, journalists"* who *"exercise sneering against patriotism that is presented as nationalism*."[555] On its own, this event would not draw significant attention. The terrorists were known for high jacking various ideological schemas in an attempt to attract the attention and even support of public opinion. What is interesting is the warm welcome members of the media and the political establishment extended to this particular terrorist manifesto. The fact that 'November 17th' had claimed responsibility for the murder of over twenty-five people since 1974 and that it had been labeled 'public enemy number one' by all governments since 1977, did not stop the center- right newspaper Eleutheros Typos from the following introduction: "The denunciation of the government's yielding starts from the far right and extends to the armed far left. We publish a characteristic passage of the manifesto of 17N."[556] At the same time, the Minister of Public Order, Papathemelis, the man whose responsibility was for over two years to co-ordinate efforts to capture the terrorists, stated that the terrorists "*agree with him on some points on patriotic issues and disagree with him on other point*s." The minister of PASOK also suggested that he agreed with the terrorists on "*at least two points: that the policy of appeasement is compromising and anti-patriotic*." He further complimented the manifesto by suggesting that it was "*the most scholarly and most Greek manifesto that they have ever given.*"[557]

Network 21 overreached with its involvement in the Ocalan crisis, resulting in it being discredited and paving the way for a political counter-attack by the government and its ideological and political allies. In March of 1999, the findings of the Parliamentary

[555] Eleftherotypia Newspaper, 08/04/1998.
[556] Eleftheros Typos Newspaper, 10/04/1998.
[557] Eleftherotypia Newspaper, 10/04/1998.

Committee that was formed to investigate the Ocalan Affair were made public. The case of Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, had shaken Greece only a month earlier. After passing through Greece, Ocalan had been hiding in Kenya with the help of the Greek government, until Turkish commandos captured him and brought him to Turkey to be tried. Three ministers were forced to resign at the time, in a crisis that almost brought about the downfall of the Simitis government. It was revealed that several private individuals were involved in bringing Ocalan to Greece in the first place, essentially forcing the hand of the Greek government to deal with what former Foreign Minister Papandreou would later describe as a "*hot potato*."[558] Not coincidently, most of the private individuals who intervened in the Ocalan case were members of Network 21.[559]

Prime Minister Simitis, commending on the finding of the Parliamentary committee, forcefully criticized those "*organizations and Networks that exercise foreign policy…they are para-state and they must be treated as para-state*."[560] The employment of the term "*para-state*" by the Prime Minister is extremely important and very much indicative of the government's attitude towards Network 21 – which for all intents and purposes he photographed in his statement. The term "*para-state*" is traditionally employed to connote those mechanisms of power that exist in parallel with the state and act outside the sphere of law. In Greece, the term "*para-state*" carries extremely negative connotations because after the Second World War the "*para-state*" was involved in the pursuit of leftists and in various violent acts that culminated in the murder of Lambrakis, a leftist member of Parliament, in 1964. The words of Simitis

[558] Speech at KSG, 20/10/1999.
[559] Klik, May 1999.
[560] Ta Nea Newspaper, 19/03/1999.

resembled those of another Greek Prime Minister, T. Deligiannis, one century earlier, who, referring to the role of the National Firm in engineering the war of 1897, cried out: "*foreign policy was stolen from our hands*!"[561]

The Ocalan case signified, at least for some time, the beginning of an emerging soft line bipartite (ND-PASOK) consensus.[562] The Ocalan events, an extreme example of the 'old-school,' zero-sum game approach, led to a serious crisis in Greek – Turkish bilateral relations, and went far and beyond any foreign policy designs or control of the Greek government. Moreover, as a result, Greece was isolated from its partners and allies around the world "*in a manner not dissimilar to the period preceding the Interim Accord with FYROM in 1995*."[563] The blame was placed upon the shoulders of an "*abscess of para-state nationalists, amateurish agents, responsibility- fearing members of the administration, and a political leadership that seemed to be in complete disarray*."[564] A backlash emerged against those hard line groups and individuals, whose view of Greece's foreign relations was shaped through a prism of National Identity. In an interview, Simitis spoke of "*people who have lived their lives with ideological and economic interests in the current situation, people who made a living out of excessive nationalism, propaganda and cultivating confrontation with Turkey*."[565] Former ND Minister and Member of Parliament Marietta Giannakou, made reference to "*professionals*" who present themselves as super-patriots and Kostas Tsitselikis, member of KEMO, a center for researching minorities, referred to reactions against

[561] Gianopoulos, (1999), *Our Noble Kindness, Foreign Policy and "National Issues", From the Defeat of 1897 to the Disaster in Asia Minor*, Athens, p.65.

[562] Kalpadakis, G. and Sotiropoulos, D., (2007), *Europeanism and Nationalist Populism: The Europeanization of Greek Civil Society and Foreign Policy.* Hellenic Studies, 154 (1).

[563] Kalpadakis, G. and Sotiropoulos, D., (2007), *Europeanism and Nationalist Populism: The Europeanization of Greek Civil Society and Foreign Policy.* Hellenic Studies, 154 (1).

[564] Keridis, D., (2003), *The Foreign Policy of Modernization: From Confrontation to Interdependence*. In Tsakonas, P., *Modern Greek-Foreign Policy. A Holistic Approach*, Athens: Sideris.

[565] Zaras, F., (2012), *A Rational Choice Approach of Greek-Turkish Relations: The Greek Case*, Queen Mary University of London.

KEMO's activities from "*local writers and local government people who practically make a living out of the 'We are the Pure Greeks' motto*".[566]

The government, supported by several opinion makers, was convinced that foreign policy must be safeguarded, not to be left in the hands of non-state actors again, and that any attempt to shift foreign policy dogmas would require strong allies in the public sphere. Moreover, the experience of the Macedonian case had left a bitter after-taste for several opinion-makers who saw Greek foreign policy as overly influenced by strong personalities and charismatic leadership, thus weakening its resistances to hard line nationalist populism.[567] Simitis, during our interview, began his explanation with the Imia crisis and made a direct connection to the Ocalan affair: "*It is my belief that around Imia an intense nationalism emerged from certain sides, including within the armed forces. There were some who wanted war with Turkey, who wanted to attack Turkey that same night, even though the minimum necessary conditions did not exist. The Imia crisis was seen by a certain part of public opinion as a defeat. Nevertheless, it was a victory because we kept the peace, we safeguarded our borders and embarked upon our Helsinki strategy. The Ocalan crisis was a move made by those same circles who consciously wanted to create friction with Turkey and strengthen the nationalist camp. The case of Ocalan created tension and showed that the nationalist trend is dangerous. Politics constitutes a means to significantly weaken their policy. We did it consciously. And that was the government's plan*."[568]

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[566] Zaras, F., (2012), *A Rational Choice Approach of Greek-Turkish Relations: The Greek Case*, Queen Mary University of London.

[567] Ioakimidis, P., (1999), *The Model of Foreign Policy-Making in Greece: Personalities Versus Institutions.* In Stavridis, S., Couloumbis, T., Veremis, T. & Waites, N., (eds.), *The Foreign Policies of the European Union's Mediterranean States and Applicant Counries in the 1990s*,. Basingstoke, MacMillan, pp. 108-115.

[568] Interview with former Prime Minsiter C. Simitis, June 2nd 2013.

In this context, the government followed a 'conscious plan' to construct a soft line alliance that would confront its adversaries. This policy directly reflected the foreign policy of low-level co-operation with Ankara that was pursued by the government. The Greek foreign minister, having introduced a number of low-level agreements between Greece and Turkey, would later elaborate upon his policy: "*The frequent contacts among common people, as well as between academics, businessmen and journalists, can contribute decisively to the reduction of mutual suspicion [...] It has been possible for implacable enemies to overcome their mutual hatred and co-operate harmoniously in the context of the European Union, and it is also possible for Greece and Turkey."*[569]In the same spirit, the Deputy Foreign Minister at the time, Yannos Kranidiotis, noted that the level on which Greek – Turkish dialogue was taking place was: *"part of a broader strategy exemplifying the neo- functionalist approach, which had been successfully employed by the EU since the 1950s*."[570]

Evidence suggests that NGOs with a specified soft line pro-friendship political agenda existed since the 1980s. For instance, the Greek-Turkish Friendship Association and the Ipekci Awards were set up in the late 1970s and 'Journalists for Peace in the Aegean and Thrace', 'Helsinki Citizens Assembly', 'WINPEACE' and the 'Greek Turkish Forum (GTF)' followed in the 1990s.[571] Nevertheless, their impact was minimal and their influence rather limited: "*As a general assessment, only a few of them are (were) influential and very few of them are able to attract members. Usually, they are (were) either forums of discussion among businessmen, academics and politicians that organize events and make recommendations aiming to be heard by political*

[569]Agnantopoulos, A., (2010), *The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy: The Case of Greece*, Available at: https://www.ies.be/files/Agnantopoulos%20Europeanisation.pdf

[570]Kranidiotis, Y., (2000), *Greek Foreign Policy: Reflections and Thoughts in the eve of the twenty first century*, Sideris. Athens.

[571]Zaras, F., (2012), *A Rational Choice Approach of Greek-Turkish Relations: The Greek Case*, Queen Mary University of London.

leadership."[572] The government, however, needed stronger and more effective support to push ahead with its soft line agenda. This presented a challenge because, as Kalpadakis and Sotiropoulos suggest, in 1999 such minded NGOs and citizen's groups*: "Were confronted with the paradoxical situation of having to articulate a rights-based discourse without the benefits of a more developed civil society, as all three composite characteristics of civil society (material base, organizational expression, ideology and values) were present in Greece, but were imbued with the element of state-centrism.*"[573]

The government of PASOK and the new Foreign Minister, George Papandreou, took over after the Ocalan affair, and dealt with this problem leveraging state resources. A policy was implemented offering direct and indirect state support to soft line NGOs and other groups that advocated a policy of rapprochement with Turkey. In the words of Papandreou: "*Citizen's diplomacy was a priority for us. A nationalist strategy had entrapped us in phobias. Some were justified, most however were not. We faced well - orchestrated opposition. In response, when it came to citizen's diplomacy, we followed a deliberate political strategy. In the past, any aid to civil society was given directly from the Minister's office. We founded a new department that was responsible for international development and co-operation. Its goal was to meet our multilateral obligations and strengthen our role in South East Europe and the Middle East. Someone in my office collected the statistical data and we noticed that very quickly non-governmental organizations grew exponentially. Greek – Turkish friendship spread on the levels of citizens, mayors, business people, sports, and even TV shows*

[572] Zaras, F., (2012), *A Rational Choice Approach of Greek-Turkish Relations: The Greek Case,* Queen Mary University of London.

[573] Kalpadakis, G. and Sotiropoulos, D., (2007), *Europeanism and Nationalist Populism: The Europeanization of Greek Civil Society and Foreign Policy.* Hellenic Studies, 154 (1).

and cooking recipes. Significantly, some of those who originate from Pontus, together with many Greeks who had lived in Istanbul, joined our efforts."[574]

This policy received the immaterial boost of the public sympathy generated from the earthquakes and the material aid of the European Union. In this context, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs took up the role of a main sponsor of such NGOs by founding a new sector, that of 'developmental diplomacy.' The Greek tendency to underestimate non-state actors in foreign policy making was seen as anachronistic; as the head of the MFA"s Committee on NGOs noted, "*while a few years ago about 90 percent of decisions on foreign affairs had to go through the MFA, today it is only about 50-60 percent*."[575] In 1999, the Ministry established the General Directorate for International Development and Co-operation (YDAS) under whose authority was the financing and monitoring development assistance, emergency- and post- humanitarian aid programs initiated by NGOs and directed towards developing countries. YDAS also aimed to encourage the development of Greek civil society. Such encouragement included sensitizing public opinion with regard to humanitarian issues, providing a framework for selecting the most reliable actors of civil society, and promoting the development of Greek civil society and its co-ordination with the Ministry through programs for the promotion of voluntarism and development education.[576] In just one year, from 1999 to 2000, development funding increased by 300 percent.[577] Overall, the number of active NGOs in the field boomed, as later Deputy Foreign Minister Dimitris Droutsas noted in an interview.[578] These organizations had a three-fold function. First, a strong

[574] Interview with Former Prime Minister G. Papandreou, July 21 2013.

[575] Quoted in Frangonicolopoulos, C., (2014), *Non-Governmental Organizations and Greek Foreign Policy*, op. cit., p. 458.

[576] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "General Secretariat for International Economic Relations and Development Cooperation," (Athens, 2003), pp. 29-51, [in Greek].

[577] Anonymous interview with an official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 2003.

[578] Zaras, F., (2012), *A Rational Choice Approach of Greek-Turkish Relations: The Greek Case*, Queen Mary University of London.

message of familiarization, co-operation and friendship was sent to Ankara on a social level. Second, "*such activities are promoting the constant contact and the familiarization with the 'other' and its society. A 'positive entrapment' is being created as a safety valve against retrogression*."[579] Third, such initiatives built a strong political base for soft line rapprochement domestically. The Ministry was for all intents and purposes creating and strengthening potential allies for its cause.

With its new policies, Greece rose to the challenge and met the expectations of an OECD donor-state and a European Union partner, however delayed. Development policy had been outlined at Maastricht as early as 1992 and the EU‟s Liaison Committee on NGOs.[580] At the same time, NGOs drew ideological legitimacy from the Stability Pact and the multilateral co-operative model it propagated.[581] This framework mirrored international practices and was also used as an effective domestic filter of dissent, as it "*also affected the character of civil society, whose nationalist elements seemed to be dissipating, while a new framework was being created for their incorporation into a coherent policy framework*."[582]

6.2.1.3 Church

[579] Ahmet, E., (2005), *Changing Greek Perspectives on Turkey: An Assessment of the Post-Earthquake Rapprochement*. In Carkglou, A. and Rubin, B., (eds.), *Greek-Turkish Relations in an Era of Detente*. London: Routledge, p.9.

[580] Kalpadakis, G. and Sotiropoulos, D., (2007), *Europeanism and Nationalist Populism: The Europeanization of Greek Civil Society and Foreign Policy.* Hellenic Studies, 154 (1).

[581] Kondonis, H., (2003), *Civil Society and Multilateral Co-operative Models: The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe*. In Sotiropoulos, D. and Veremis, T., (eds.), *Is Southeastern Europe Doomed to Instability? A Regional Perspective*, London, Frank Cass, p.60.

[582] Kalpadakis, G. and Sotiropoulos, D., (2007), *Europeanism and Nationalist Populism: The Europeanization of Greek Civil Society and Foreign Policy.* Hellenic Studies, 154 (1).

In the late 1990s, the Church was led by the charismatic and vocal Archbishop Christodoulos. The media savvy Archbishop[583], the most popular person in Greece according to opinion polls with a huge majority of 76.8%[584], left his stigma in public discourse. On two occasions, over the government's decision to delete references to religion from state- issued ID cards and over ND's nomination of a candidate for local government who was viewed as being Liberal or leftist, he managed to successfully mobilize public opinion during his term in an unprecedented manner, resulting in a heavy-handed intervention in the political process.

On foreign policy, he reaffirmed his readiness to voice his opinions and projected himself as a defender of the nation. "*I am interested in the national interest and I will defend it at all costs*,"[585] he proclaimed. At the same time, the Archbishop strengthened Greek siege-mentality and its anti-western tendency that are fundamental to National Identity: "*I am scared of the New World Order. And, in Hitler's Germany, people spoke of a "New World Order. Of course, circumstances are different. I fear, however, a new world order that comes from a superpower that is able to impose its viewpoint through the use of violence and to the periphery, or which biologically extinguishes those who are informed. The new world order threatens the independence of human thought*."[586]

The Archbishop's delineation of the great battle of Globalization stems from his religiously defined worldview of international relations: a dogmatic view that is based upon the significance of religion as the most appropriate tool for understanding world

[583] The archbishop has been described in the Greek press as media savvy (Eleutherotypia, 4/3/00) or even media obsessed (Anti, 23/1/99).

[584] Public opinions in Greece, research Opinion Polls, 1996-2000, VPRC (Athens 2000) 397. It must be noted that in the opinion polls the archibishop is compared to political figures. Compared with his predecessor who only had a 42.5% popularity (227).

[585] Ta Nea Newspaper, 05/05/1998.

[586] Ta Nea Newspaper, 04/01/2000.

affairs. According to him, modern Turkey, guided by an 'Ottoman vision,' aims at managing an Islamist takeover of the Balkans and Europe.[587] Thus, he proposed the creation of a so-called "*Orthodox arrow*" in the Balkans, an alliance that would form an "*Orthodox Commonwealth*."[588]

The Archbishop did not limit the expression of his hard line aggressive vision to his writings. In May 1997, Christodoulos spoke at an event organized by the extremist far-right nationalist newspaper Stoxos, commemorating the fall of Constantinople. Christodoulos first congratulated the newspaper's publisher, an ardent supporter of the dogma "*a good Turk is a dead Turk*,"[589] who, according to Christodoulos, "*is a well-known Greek-centric and Greek soul, and at the same time Christian –Centric and Orthodox*."[590] He then proceeded to condemn: "*this state, which for many years, has wanted to bury the Great Idea, this space that has ridiculed the sacredness and holiness of the nation*."[591]

Interestingly, I have not found any direct references by Christodoulos to the soft line revision of Greek foreign policy at Helsinki. Although he was extremely vocal on Greek – Turkish relations in general, the Archbishop's choice to remain silent and not criticize the 1999 shift in Greek foreign policy directly is intriguing. Even more so, as he did not hesitate just a few months earlier to outrightly intervene in foreign policy making. Greece was in turmoil during the NATO bombings of Yugoslavia, as the majority of the Greek public opposed the actions of their allies. Christodoulos rode the wave of public opinion by proclaiming that the ancient monasteries of Kosovo were bombed

[587] Archbishop of Athens and All Greece mr. Christodoulos (1998-2008), (1999), *From Earth to Sky*, Athens: Kastaniotis, p.31.
[588] Archbishop of Athens and All Greece mr. Christodoulos (1998-2008), (1999), *From Earth to Sky*, Athens: Kastaniotis.
[589] Stoxos, 15/03/1997, 30/08/1999.
[590] Stoxos, 30/5/1997.
[591] Stoxos, 30/05/1997.

"*because the West hates Orthodox people."*[592] Moreover, he demanded that the government should not permit the passage of NATO troops through its territory because Greece "*must not get involved in an unjust war*."[593] A few months later, in January of 2000, the statements of Christodoulos even caused a minor diplomatic incident between the United States and Greece. After accusing President Clinton of "*hypocrisy*," he proclaimed his "*disturbance*" when he saw Clinton praying because "*blood drips from his hands*."[594]As a result, the American Ambassador in Athens brought an official complaint to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Church influenced public opinion greatly. The Archbishop embodied Greek National Identity. In many ways, he was a walking and talking reminder of the National Identity that was historically propagated by the Greek state since its inception. His manipulation of the media gave his voice increased strength, empowering the Church to gain unprecedented attention during his tenure. Regarding Greek – Turkish relations, the Archbishop's historicism, his constant reminders of past traumatic events and his self-portrayal as the apostle of Greece's unfulfilled dreams, together with his apparent readiness to defend the motherland at all costs contributed towards a climate of hostility towards Turkey. Directly and indirectly, implicitly and explicitly, he reasserted and reinforced the biases, prejudices and stereotypes of the Turks. Moreover, his systematic efforts to transform the bilateral dynamic between Athens and Ankara into a clash of religions and civilizations raised the bar considerably for any Greek government that attempted a soft line policy towards Turkey. The Archbishop's decision, however, not to directly challenge the revision of Greek foreign policy certainly gave the Simitis

[592] Ta Nea Newspaper, 09/04/1999.
[593] Ta Nea Newspaper, 16/04/1999.
[594] Ta Nea Newspaper, 16/01/2000.

government some breathing space. Nevertheless, his persistent expressions of Greek National Identity, in more than one way, and his impact upon the domestic environment, cultivated a hard line.

6.2.1.4 Media

Historically, the Greek media have contributed to the perpetuation of a hard line worldview and the 'other's' demonization. The media tends to project a national consensus of the 'other.'[595] What maintains the stereotypes is that while the journalists are conscious that the Greek and the Turkish viewpoints are in direct opposition, they do not accept "*that their views are subjective and nationally biased*."[596] Another reason for the maintenance of the stereotypes is the urge of the media to attract consumers at any cost. In this effort, it has been argued, journalists use tactics such as prejudice, one-sidedness and provocation to excite the public.[597] After all, the deregulation of the media sector in 1989 was still relatively recent, conducing the media towards sensationalist coverage.

In this regard, the Turkish arch enemy presented an easy target: "*This coverage works towards the continuation of the dispute, as it constructs a negative image of the 'Other.* "[598] This view is reflected in scholarly consensus.[599] According to Ozgunes and Terzis, the projection of Greek National Identity by the media can be understood

[595] Millas, Hercules, (2006), *A Silenced Aspect of the 'Peace Journalist': His/Her National Identity*, GMJ: Mediterranean Edition 1(2), pp. 14, 15..

[596] Millas, H., (2006), *A Silenced Aspect of the 'Peace Journalist': His/Her National Identity*, GMJ: Mediterranean Edition 1(2), p.17.

[597] Millas, H., (2006), *A Silenced Aspect of the 'Peace Journalist': His/Her National Identity*, GMJ: Mediterranean Edition 1(2), p.14.

[598] Panagiotou, N., (2003), *The Role of the Press in a "Conflict": The Greek Press Coverage of the Greek–Turkish Dispute*. 1st LSE Symposium on Social Science Research on Greece.

[599] Lazarou, E., (2011), *Transforming Discourses of „Otherness": The Role of the Mass-Media in Greek-Turkish Relations.*

through what they labeled "*oppositional metaphors*:" " *(i) "Us" with the great civilization vs. "Them" with historical backwardness; (ii) "Our" tolerance vs. "Their" nationalistic exaltation (iii) "Us", the modern civilized society vs. "Them", the uncivilized (iv) "Us", the giving/accepting vs. "Them", the receiving/frightening."*[600] As a result, Greece and Turkey are *"engaged in parallel monologues in which each is seen as the "opposite to the survival of the other*."[601] Just three years before the Helsinki decision, the media had played a catalytic role in the escalation of the Imia crisis.

Since 1999, however, the earthquakes and Helsinki, several scholars have noticed a shift in the Greek media "*towards abating the negative references to the 'other*"[602]. Arguably, to a certain extent, and in a sign of the interplay between domestic politics and the media, "*the stance of the Greek newspapers, as in the previous incidents, was informed by their political preferences, although common elements between them could be found*."[603] In other words, the government did not hesitate to promote its soft line agenda in the media sphere. Thus, the PASOK- leaning Eleftherotypia, with headlines such as, "*A new era marked by hopes and bargain*"[604], and To Vima, tended to support the government, while the opposition- leaning Eleftheros Typos and the communist Rizospastis criticized the decision.

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600 Terzis, G.Ozgunes,N.(2000)*Constraints and remedies for journalists reporting national conflict:the case of Greece and Turkey,* Journalism Studies Vol.1 (3), August, pp.405-426,Routledge

601 Ozkirimli, U., Sofos, S., (2008) *Tormented by History: Nationalism in Greece and Turkey,* NewYork: Columbia University Press

602 Lazarou, E., (2011), *Transforming Discourses of "Otherness": The Role of the Mass-Media in Greek-Turkish Relations,* also see Ker-Lindsay, J., (2000), *Greek-Turkish Rapprochement: The Impact of 'Disaster Diplomacy'?* Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 14 (1). 215-232; Millas, H., (2001), *Images of Greeks and Turks*, Athens: Aleksandreia; Rumelili, B., (2005), *The European Union and Cultural Change in Greek-Turkish Relations*, Working Papers Series in EU Border Conflicts Studies, No. 17, The University of Birmingham.

603 Panagiotou, N., (2003), *The Role of the Press in a "Conflict": The Greek Press Coverage of the Greek–Turkish Dispute*. 1st LSE Symposium on Social Science Research on Greece.

604 Panagiotou, N., (2003), *The Role of the Press in a "Conflict": The Greek Press Coverage of the Greek–Turkish Dispute*. 1st LSE Symposium on Social Science Research on Greece.

Indeed, since the Imia crisis, there had been traces in Greek public discourse of a soft line effort being underway, neither deliberate nor systematic, to shed light upon Turkish decision-making. Thus, a less black and white, and more soft line, understanding of Turkish politics began emerging. To this end, newspapers began to emphasize the lore of certain Turkish politicians. Foreign Minister Cem, for example, was covered quite extensively, along with his role in the potential normalization of Greek- Turkish relations. Thus, the papers highlighted the positive efforts of certain Turkish government officials, and particularly of the Turkish Foreign Minister, as well as of some Turkish milieus, which Eleftherotypia described as "*the Europhile powers of the neighbor and all those who wish to escape the control of the armed forces and to build a democracy, as we know it in the West."*[605]

In this context, a significant segment of the press welcomed the change of Greek foreign policy. Eleftherotypia described Cem's upcoming visit to Athens as initiating a "*new era*"[606] and spoke of a "*historic turn*"[607] in the Turkish establishment, while To Vima welcomed Papandreou's statement that "*whatever the result of Helsinki, I hope that we will continue upon this new course, this new opportunity, the new climate that has evolved between the two countries*"[608] and Kathimerini made reference to "*new horizons*" opening up for the country after Helsinki[609] and that "*Greece says Yes, but.. Greece got what it wanted*"[610], in a perception of Greek-Turkish relations as a zero-sum game.

[605] Lazarou, E., (2011), *Transforming Discourses of "Otherness": The Role of the Mass-Media in Greek-Turkish Relations.*

[606] Eleftherotypia, 13/12/1999

[607] Eleftherotypia, 12/12/1999

[608] To Vima Newspaper 08/12/1999.

[609] Kathimerini Newspaper 12/12/1999 and Lazarou, E., (2011), *Transforming Discourses of "Otherness": The Role of the Mass-Media in Greek-Turkish Relations.*

[610] Kathimerini Newspaper 10/12/1990, Kathimerini Newspaper 14/12/1999 and Panagiotou, N., (2003), *The Role of the Press in a "Conflict": The Greek Press Coverage of the Greek–Turkish Dispute*. 1st LSE Symposium on Social Science Research on Greece.

It was clear, however, that conditionality remained at the heart of the matter for the Greek media. Kathimerini ran a headline: "*From now on, the pressure will come from Europe*."[611] Ta Nea, emphasized that "*the inflexible stance held by Turkey on the issue of bilateral relations with Greece [...would] be maintained with greater stubbornness in case the EU [recognized] Turkey as a candidate state for accession without first witnessing the realization of the conditions that have been set*."[612] These conditions referred to the criteria agreed upon by the European Council in Copenhagen and Luxembourg. Interestingly. The Copenhagen Criteria and excerpts from the Luxembourg Conclusions were repeatedly cited in the press, even without commentary, as a way of a reminder of what the collective EU stance was on the Turkish issue. All four major dailies published the criteria in one form or another on the weekend of the 11th and 12th December 1999 when the Helsinki summit took place.[613]

Opposition newspapers harshly criticized the government's strategy, adopting a hard line position. Right-wing Eleftheros Typos ran headlines such as "*Three gifts to Ankara by Simitis; They gave away everything without getting anything in return; 6 reasons against and 1 in favor of the Helsinki Accord; Negative future effects are behind the triumphal*."[614] The same newspaper would note that the Turkish threat was not ameliorated: "*Simitis confession: Turkey still poses a threat even after Helsinki accords*."[615] Communist- leaning Rizospatis would claim: "*People will 'pay' for the*

[611] Kathimerini Newspaper 14/12/1999 and Panagiotou, N., (2003), *The Role of the Press in a "Conflict": The Greek Press Coverage of the Greek–Turkish Dispute*. 1st LSE Symposium on Social Science Research on Greece.

[612] Ta Nea Newspaper, 04/12/1999.

[613] Lazarou, E., (2011), *Transforming Discourses of "Otherness": The Role of the Mass-Media in Greek-Turkish Relations.*

[614] Panagiotou, N., (2003), *The Role of the Press in a "Conflict": The Greek Press Coverage of the Greek–Turkish Dispute*. 1st LSE Symposium on Social Science Research on Greece.

[615] Panagiotou, N., (2003), *The Role of the Press in a "Conflict": The Greek Press Coverage of the Greek–Turkish Dispute*. 1st LSE Symposium on Social Science Research on Greece.

Helsinki Accords."[616] In this typical hard line argumentation, Greece was seen as giving away 'gifts' to Turkey with nothing in exchange. This was the result of Western, i.e. US, pressure with headlines such as the one published by Eleutheros Typos: "*Yes to everything, Simitis accepts everything on Clinton's order*"[617]; and Rizospastis: "*People are ready to act against the 'New Order*.'"[618]

At the same time, however, the media's coverage of the earthquakes greatly facilitated the government's soft line agenda. "*The media focused on the humanitarian crisis, ran headlines in each other's languages, and steered the popular feelings of empathy towards a criticism of past government policies towards the 'Other'*."[619] Greek newspapers joined their Turkish counterparts in conveying emotionally charged messages of friendship and solidarity. Moreover, journalists criticized their government, contrasting state negative policy with people's compassion.[620] Because of the earthquakes, as Milas concludes: "*for the first time, the television screens in every home in the two countries presented the 'other' as he/she is: real, concrete and alive (not historical). People appeared under the debris, in pain, crying, desperate, as family members, as children, as old people […]. They looked 'human' and not as a threat. The 'other' had never before appeared like that. Even the players of football, of basketball, etc. beforehand were, by definition, the rivals, the obstacle. The citizens of the two*

[616] Panagiotou, N., (2003), *The Role of the Press in a "Conflict": The Greek Press Coverage of the Greek–Turkish Dispute*. 1st LSE Symposium on Social Science Research on Greece.
[617] Panagiotou, N., (2003), *The Role of the Press in a "Conflict": The Greek Press Coverage of the Greek–Turkish Dispute*. 1st LSE Symposium on Social Science Research on Greece.
[618] Panagiotou, N., (2003), *The Role of the Press in a "Conflict": The Greek Press Coverage of the Greek–Turkish Dispute*. 1st LSE Symposium on Social Science Research on Greece.
[619] Rumelili, B., (2005), *The European Union and Cultural Change in Greek-Turkish Relations*, Working Papers Series in EU Border Conflicts Studies, No. 17, The University of Birmingham.
[620] Gundogdu, A., (2001), *Identities in Question: Greek-Turkish Relations in a Period of Transformation*, Middle East Review of International Affairs, 5, 1 ; "A Greek newspaper cried, "We are all Turks" in its issue, following the earthquake in Turkey, and a Turkish newspaper responded in Greek: "Efharisto Poli, File"/"Thank You, Neighbor".

countries, in each and every house, saw – surprised, I assume – the 'other' trying to save 'us' (not harm us), and to rejoice when successful, and in tears when failing."[621]

A series of gestures were indicative of the change in climate amongst certain individuals in the ranks of the media. Indeed, it appears that the osmosis of Greeks and Turks contributed to the weakening of hard line beliefs. As Rumelili notes, the first Greek-Turkish media conference convened in Athens in February 2000, just a few months after the Helsinki summit. The follow-up meeting in Istanbul took place in October 2000. It should be noted that the EU has played a supplemental role in fostering contacts between the journalists of the two countries. These meetings between Greek and Turkish journalists had been funded by the media organizations themselves, and others by UNESCO; meanwhile, the EU has funded a media co-operation project, organized by the European Centre for Common Ground (ECCG) from its Civil Society Development Program in Turkey.[622]

6.3 The Annan Plan

Standard Greek diplomatic language calls for a 'just and viable' solution. The choice of wording is highly suggestive as the insistence on the term 'just,' a highly subjective and nebulous concept, can be related to the hard liners' discursive hegemony of 'national rights' as opposed to the soft liners' understanding of national goals. Arguably, the demise of the 1950s discourse that focused on the union of Greece with

[621] Millas, H., (2004), *National Perceptions of the 'Other' and the Persistence of Some Images*. In Mustafa A., and Ifantis, K., (eds.), *Turkish-Greek Relations: The Security Dilemma in the Aegean*. London: Routledge, pp. 64.

[622] Rumelili, B., (2005), *The European Union and Cultural Change in Greek-Turkish Relations*, Working Papers Series in EU Border Conflicts Studies, No. 17, The University of Birmingham.

Cyprus was not replaced by a common recognition and acceptance of a need for compromise. Instead, Greek National Identity and Greek – Cypriot nationalism fed upon each other, as their aspiration "*is not union with Greece but the reaffirmation of Greek Identity in the context of an independent polity which is organically tied to Greek culture and is politically anchored to the Greek state*."[623]

In 1992, Boutros Ghali's 'set of ideas,' the last attempt by a UN Secretary General to engineer a settlement before the Annan Plan, was welcomed with skepticism amongst many Greeks despite the energetic efforts of Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis and Cypriot President Vasiliou. In the words of President Vasiliou, soft liners collided with hard liners: "*Every time that an idea or a plan was suggested by the UN, [my opponents] portrayed this as being a national disaster, even when, through the various studies that we submitted to the National Council, it was made clear that the UN plans did satisfy positions that we were promoting*."[624] In the words of Stefanos Manos, a former Greek minister in the Mitsotakis government: "*In the first years following the invasion, the policy pursued by Greece and Cyprus furthered, in some way, the return to the previous situation. We wanted a just solution to the Cyprus problem. This policy pursuit formed stereotypes of what is desirable and what is not. Any deviation from these stereotypes verged on betrayal of the national case*."[625]

Seen from this perspective, the Annan plan triggered a climax, revealing how Greek National Identity had internalized the Cyprus problem. This process took place in a number of different ways: First, national unity and a collective sense of belonging to

[623] Mavratsas, C., (1997), *Approaches to Nationalism: Basic Theoretical Considerations in the Study of the Greek-Cypriot Case and a Historical Overview*, Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora.
[624] Vasiliou, G., (2010), *From the President's Office. A Journey Towards Reconciliation in a Divided Cyprus*, I.B. Tauris, p. 259.
[625] Estia Newspaper, 04/04/2004.

Hellenism connecting Greeks and Greek Cypriots; second, the siege mentality and a strong sense of victimizing that permeates the Greek public sphere; third, the symbolic representation of Cyprus as the battle ground of Greece and Turkey; and fourth, the prevailing dichotomy presenting the Cypriot conflict as a moral struggle between justice and injustice together with the language that articulated Greek National Identity when it came to the Cyrus problem.

First, Greek-Cypriots are perceived in Greek public discourse as Greeks first, and citizens of the Republic of Cyprus second, and as such are shareholders in Greek National Identity. Much in the same way, Cyprus is considered as rightfully Greek, its independence from the motherland attributed to a historical accident. The national monopoly of Greekness over Cyprus provides fertile ground for hard liners as it raised barriers of entry in public discourse for soft line proposals that are based on the island's co-habitation and the necessary power- sharing between the two communities, such as the Annan plan. Indeed, despite official talk of 'one people and two communities' on Cyprus, in the spirit of the 1960 accords, Greek Cypriots considered themselves and were perceived by mainland Greeks first and foremost as Greeks and thus as an integral part of Hellenism: "*To the extent that Greek Cypriots regard themselves, in their great majority, as Hellenes of Cyprus… that is, as members of a wider nation (and in the Greek-Cypriot case, 'truest Greeks; than those of Greece), an all-embracing Cypriot or pan-Cypriot Identity can make little headway*."[626]

Successive Greek governments underline the strong national bonds that connect Greece and Cyprus within National Identity. Externally, the public statements of respective

[626] Heraclides, A., (2011), *The Cyprus Gordian Knot: An Intractable Ethnic Conflict, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, Volume 17, Issue 2.

heads of government and delegations during the exchanges of official visits provide ample evidence. Traditionally, the first visit abroad by a Greek Prime Minister or a Minister of Foreign Affairs is to Cyprus. Internally, a characteristic example can be found in education policy: official maps of Greece printed and circulated by the Ministry of Education include Cyprus in a box to this day. In other words, the island is presented neither as united with the mainland nor as a separate entity. The origins of this attitude can be traced back to the 1950s when the Greek government engineered the island's liberation movement (EOKA) against the British imperium: "*Greek nationalism in Cyprus drew its symbolism and inspiration from the mainland, and the symbols of the Greek Cypriot armed struggle (1955-1959) were carefully selected to correspond to the Greek ones. EOKA initially planned to initiate its actions on the anniversary of Greek revolution on March 25, 1955, also a major Greek Orthodox religious holiday*."[627]

Moreover, in the spirit of the Cold War and reflecting Greek National Identity, "*the leadership of EOKA not only excluded any references to Turkish Cypriots or Leftists but increasingly gave the impression that the organization was turning against them*."[628] For a number of reasons, the 1960 agreements failed to revert course and cultivate a Cypriot Identity. The understanding of its national symbols provides a vivid illustration. "*The [Cyprus] flag has its defenders. In the summer of 1990 . . . Glafkos Clerides, [former President of the Republic of Cyprus] told the author [Monteagle Stearns] that the flag of Cyprus is ''the best in the world''. When asked why, he replied, ''because no one would die for it.''*"[629] Indeed, to the joy and satisfaction of mainland

[627] Loizides, N., (2016), *Designing Peace Processes: Institutional Innovations in Cyprus and Divided Societies*, University of Pennsylvania Press.
[628] Loizides, N., (2007), *Ethnic Nationalism and Adaptation in Cyprus, International Studies Perspectives*, 172–189.
[629] Loizides, N., (2007), *Ethnic Nationalism and Adaptation in Cyprus, International Studies Perspectives*, 172–189.

Greeks, Greek Cypriots continue waving Greek flags, although officially their state flies the Cypriot Unity flag, celebrates Greek national holidays and teaches Greek history at schools. Thus, the Annan plan's proposition that Greek national symbols would be exchanged with yet another new federation flag and a new national anthem without lyrics was perceived as an affront to national consciousness in Greece and Cyprus.

Second, the trauma of the 1974 conflict or, in the case of Greece, the view of a war that never occurred. The 1974 Turkish invasion and occupation of Cyprus, and the Junta's botched mobilization of the Greek armed forces, was the straw that broke the camel's back, bringing about the regime's downfall. The failure of the dictators to live up to National Identity and their powerlessness to protect and defend the territorial integrity of the nation proved to be their undoing. Interestingly, however, the Turkish invasion and occupation of Cyprus was not internalized in Greece as a military defeat, but as a strategic loss and a betrayal. Contrary to 1922, the last loss of national space, albeit on a grander scale, in Greek public discourse, the 1974 events were not understood as being a war that was lost but as the outcome of a series of treacherous moves by enemies foreign and domestic. In 1974, military necessity made the defense of Cyprus possible only if Greece launched a war with Turkey. Despite its mobilization, however, Athens restrained itself to certain symbolic gestures of military aid, opting not to defend Cyprus. In this context, from the perspective of Athens an actual war never occurred as Greece avoided confrontation at all costs. Thus, for instance, Stelios Papathemelis, a prominent PASOK MP and former Minister, would claim in 2002 that the nation's problem is the "*questionable masculinity of our political leadership*." In 1974, Greece possessed a "*very able professional army*" but the political leadership "*did not order*

the army to occupy parts of Eastern Thrace, so that we can have soil to exchange with Cyprus."[630]

As no conflict occurred, the inherent sense of victimization in Greek National Identity together with the underlying siege mentality, were further strengthened as the invasion and occupation of Cyprus was attributed primarily to the actions of foreign powers and especially the United States. In the words of a high official who shaped Greek foreign policy under Karamanlis: "*Our public debate is poisonous. We completely ignore - most of us - reality. There is an inherent suspiciousness and conspiracy syndrome. And this is dangerous for our country. Therein lie the origins of our tragic mistakes. And then we say that it is the fault of the foreigners. But they are only looking after their own interests. As if the foreigners have nothing better to do than to consume themselves with harming Greece. We are the ones who 'take our own eyes out.*'"[631]

It is indicative that the former White House National Security Advisor and Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, faced the wrath of a number of Greek opinion makers. Interestingly, the activity of the great powers, and particularly the United States, was injected into the Greek public discourse in two ways. On the one hand, it was understood as a Realistic strategy to appease and accommodate Turkey as reflected by a number of books and articles such as 'The secret files of Kissinger'[632] as late as 2002, while the negotiations that resulted in the Annan plan had already begun, detailing the US plan to divide Cyprus. On the other hand, Greek National Identity was perceived as the target of an international conspiracy because of Hellenism's roots, tradition, religion, language and history. In other words, it was Greek exceptionalism, as affirmed

[630] Vasilakis, M., (2006), *The Scourge of God,* Athens, Gnoseis.
[631] Interview with former Minister of Foreign Affairs P. Moliviatis, May 2013.
[632] Ignatiou M., and Venizelos, K., (2002), *The Secret Archives of Kissinger*, Athens: Livanis.

and practiced within Greek National Identity, which constituted Greece as an object of constant attacks. In this context, even statements supposedly made by Kissinger were fabricated. It has been widely reported, for example, in the Greek press that Kissinger has stated: "*The Greek people are anarchic and difficult to tame. For this reason, we must strike deep into their cultural roots: Perhaps then we can force them to conform. I mean, of course, to strike at their language, their religion, their cultural and historical reserves, so that we can neutralize their ability to develop, to distinguish themselves, or to prevail; thereby removing them as an obstacle to our strategically vital plans in the Balkans, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East*."[633] Kissinger's 'statement' has been denied a number of times. Nevertheless, it persists in Greek public discourse, often repeated by a number of outlets. Arguably, its circulation provides ample evidence regarding the self-image cultivated through Greek National Identity. Indeed, Kissinger's repeated denials fell on deaf ears as hard liners extensively utilized the 'statement' within the Great Debate.

The sense of victimization and the underlying siege mentality shaped the debate on the Annan Plan, strengthening the hand of hard liners. From a certain perspective, resistance to the plan was viewed as an opportunity for the Greeks to stand up to foreign pressure. Thus, "*the initial UN announcement for the holding of the referenda on 21 April was reminiscent of the Greek colonels' dictatorship (the coup took place on 21 April 1967 and was widely blamed on the US)*."[634] In the same context: "*The opposition to the proposed plan, was played upon the historical significance of the very word "oxi", which in Greek does not only mean no, it means no to foreign interference*."[635]

[633] The statement was made public in Nemesis Magazine, 1997, and denied at Politika Themata Magazine (13/06/1997).

[634] Hatzivassilou, E., *The Red Line: Pressure and Persuasion in Greek Diplomatic Strategies on Cyprus, 1945 to 2004i.*

[635] Panagiotou, N., (2006), *The Role of the Greek Press in Greek-Turkish Rapprochement:The Coverage of the "Annan Plan" for the Settlement of the Cyprus Conflict*, RAMSES Working Paper, European Studies Centre, University of Oxford.

This reaction can be understood in terms of a hard line view of the world: "*Countries are categorized as friends or foes of Greece… This way of reporting transmits false impressions and enables the categorization of countries between philhellene and non-philhellene. It does not allow the critical evaluation of policies while it blanket undermines the image of organizations or countries in public opinion*."[636]

Popular culture contains a number of representations of such hard line tendencies. The popular song of a famous singer, Stelios Kazantzides, entitled 'Cyprus is Greek' contains the lyric: 'And those who were killed to save the allies, shout from the graves, give us Cyprus.' Similarly, another famous Greek singer, Giorgos Dalaras, whose two albums 'On sea's earth, Cyprus' and 'Of the immortals' have been sung in concerts around the globe by Greeks and Greek Cypriots alike, made popular the lyrics: 'No, this land, does not want you, this land does not know you…because you are foreigners, as many flowers as you hold, this land is not for sale…' Last but not least, Mikis Thodorakis, the renowned Greek composer, proclaimed, on the anniversary of the 1967 coup d état, his opposition to the Annan settlement after "*in depth study of the plan*" and because of the "*unprecedented and over pressures of American officials and others*." Adding that it is the "*beginning of resistance in the struggle for the defense of the honor and dignity of our homeland*."[637]

Third, significantly, within the small borders of Cyprus, the larger problem of Greek - Turkish relations is represented, because on the island tensions between the two nations have climaxed in the second part of the 20th century. In this context, the debate on the

[636] Panagiotou, N., (2006), *The Role of the Greek Press in Greek-Turkish Rapprochement: The Coverage of the "Annan Plan" for the Settlement of the Cyprus Conflict*, RAMSES Working Paper, European Studies Centre, University of Oxford.

[637] Venizelos, K., Ignatiou, M. and Meletis, N., (2005), *The Annan Plan: The Secret Trade, the 129 Days That Shook Hellenism*, Athens: Livanis, p.509-510.

Annan plan served as a proxy for a wider debate, between hard liners and soft liners, on Greek – Turkish relations and the possibility or not of reaching an accommodation with Greece's primordial enemy.

In the previous case study, the tense and difficult relations between Greeks and Turks and their different understandings within the soft liner and hard liner worldviews received extensive consideration. Indeed, the bilateral relations of Athens and Ankara and the options of Greek policy makers cannot be understood without a discussion on the Cyprus problem and vice versa. The perception of the 'other' permeated public discourse. In the words of a high official who dealt extensively with the Cyprus problem: "*Historically the two problems of Greece are the Turks and our bad self. Every time in the past we tried (to reach a settlement on Cyprus), we failed. I am not saying that we did not make mistakes as well, but this is the truth*."[638]

In this context, Cyprus symbolizes a double battleground. On one level, it is the battleground of Greeks and Turks around the world, the Green line separating the island symbolizing the differences that the two nations have been unable to overcome. On a second level, it is the battleground of hard liners and soft liners who fundamentally disagree on whether Greek-Turkish problems can reach closure. Thus, if the Cyprus Problem was resolved and Greek and Turkish Cypriots were able to peacefully co-exist then any animosity in the Greek – Turkish – Cypriot triangle would be delegitimized, as the 'other' in Greek National Identity would have to be redefined: "*In the last phase of the famous Eastern Question, Greeks and Turks parted tragically in the years 1919–24 (the Greek-Turkish War in Anatolia and the compulsory exchange of populations*

[638] Interview with high official of the Karamanlis government, May 2013.

that followed it). To the national mindset in both communities, how can it be possible for the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus to do otherwise, to be an exception to this rule and to somehow live together?"[639]

Fourth, the internalization of the Cyprus conflict in Greek public discourse severely prejudiced any soft line discussion on settlement, again strengthening hard line positions. For many Greeks, the Cypriot problem is understood in terms of Manichean simplicity as a one-dimensional conflict revolving around: *"...no less than a struggle between justice and injustice, good and evil, culture and barbarity…. For most Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriots are a remnant of the "Turkish yoke" and Turkey's instrument in its 'territorial ambitions' regarding Cyprus. Most Greek Cypriots claim that the Cyprus question is purely a case of invasion and occupation. Hence, they tend to regard the Cyprus problem as an inter-communal conflict that started in 1974…The ethnic clashes, especially those of 1963–67 and 1974, and the bitter memories that have been kept alive by every conceivable means (school textbooks, commemorations, obituaries, museums of national struggle in both communities, parades, erecting statues of so-called 'hero-martyrs' from the EOKA struggle or of Kemal Ataturk, respectively, and other rituals) have proved until today to be an insurmountable psychological barrier to reconciliation….Cyprus is Greek and has been Greek since time immemorial*."[640]

Thus, for example, in Greek and Greek Cypriot rhetoric, the Turkish Cypriot controlled territory is referred to as the 'occupied areas' and the Republic of Cyprus as a 'free

[639] Heraclides, A., (2011), *The Cyprus Gordian Knot: An Intractable Ethnic Conflict, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, Vol.17, Issue 2.
[640] Heraclides, A., (2011), *The Cyprus Gordian Knot: An Intractable Ethnic Conflict, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, Vol.17, Issue 2.

zone.' Compared to the legitimate and recognized government of Cyprus, the north is always described as a 'pseudo-state' with 'so-called' ministers and a 'so-called' president. In this context, the Annan plan, a pragmatic and gray diplomatic proposal, contrasted negatively with the hard line black and white perceptions of the conflict. The 9,000-page document that went before the Cypriot people on the referendum, was by definition at a disadvantage: "*The 'solution' to the Cyprus 'problem' is often seen in terms of a constitutional formula that would be 'just', 'functional' and 'lasting'. However, these formulaic approaches, which can be interpreted in different and often conflicting ways across the political-ideological spectrum and across the ethnic/communal divide, must be surpassed in order to avoid one-sided and 'ethnicised' approaches based on particular communal or national(istic) vantage points. Was the Annan Plan a 'just', 'functional', 'viable' and 'lasting' solution to reunifying the country and people? What criteria should be used to make such an evaluation? Was the constitutional 'balance', philosophy and rationale 'fair' and 'just' towards each community and what are the 'next best solutions"*?"[641]

6.3.1 Alliances of Identity Warriors

In this enabling environment, a Great Debate took place between the alliances of soft liners and hard liners on the Annan plan. Influential agents participated actively and purposively in the public discourse. The voices of hard liners outnumbered those of soft liners, further aggravating the impact of Identity as a wide alliance spearheaded by the

[641] Trimikliniotis, N., (2009), *Pro Annan V: Rethinking the Unviability of the Constitutional Arrangement.*

Church of Greece, large sections of the media, and a number of civil society representatives and academics energetically campaigned against the Annan plan in Greece. The language of this hard liner alliance was rooted in National Identity as they articulated an intransigent national vision that refused to contemplate compromises and offer concessions.

6.3.1.1 Church

The Church of Greece, under the leadership of the charismatic and popular Archbishop Christodoulos, energetically campaigned against the Annan plan, by joining forces with the Church of Cyprus. The outspoken Archbishop made his preferences clear early on during the talks when he proclaimed, "*Canons are what we need in the Cyprus problem*. "[642] A few years later, in an event dedicated to the survivors of 1940-41 (the invasion of Greece by Axis powers) he emphasized: "*History repeats itself and those who violate history in favor of lawless and unmentionable interests are the great gravediggers of Hellenism…In this period, a big game is played concerning national independence or the enslavement of Cyprus…We say no to the pseudo-dilemma of war or peace…the real dilemma is: Do you want peace with enslavement or war with independence? This is the dilemma. And to this dilemma the Greeks never hesitated to say: War*!"[643]

The Church of Greece rejected the Annan plan as early as November 2002. Christodoulos demanded to be briefed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At the same time, he called for a meeting of the 'Committee of National issues' that he had founded

[642] Vasilakis, M., (2006), *The Scourge of God,* Athens: Gnoseis.
[643] Vasilakis, M., (2006), *The Scourge of God,* Athens: Gnoseis.

and sent a delegation to Cyprus to co-ordinate his Church's actions with its Cypriot religious brethren. In response, Foreign Minister Papandreou visited Christodoulos to brief him on the Cyprus problem. Thus: "*In the most official way, the government legitimized Christodoulos' intervention in issues of foreign policy.* "[644] In response, the next day, the Holy Synod of the Church issued its official pronouncement on the plan. This statement probably represented the pinnacle of the struggle between hard liners and soft liners, which is vividly portrayed. "*It is true,*" the Church, proclaimed, "*that circumstances and pressures of Realism apply force. Logic, however, and consciousness resist.*" The Church, having rejected the plan, appealed to: "*the political leadership of Hellenism to remain steady and unwavering in the values and principles the "genos" of the Greeks for centuries saves; and through which it is saved. Proposals and plans are negotiable. Principles and values however are not*."[645]

In 2004, referring to the Annan plan directly, once again, the Archbishop did not mince his words. On the 22nd of February 2004, before the last leg of the talks was completed, and without having full knowledge of the plan's latest version, Christodoulos voiced his strong opposition to the resolution of the Cyprus problem: "*The proposed Annan plan for the resolution of the Cypriot problem is anti-national, because essentially it de-Hellenizes Cyprus…. The Cypriots are called upon to forget Greece, their language and their history, their flag, and to submit to the powerful of the earth. They are called upon to forget their struggles together with the rest of the Greeks for freedom…The Cypriots must forget Greece, and national holidays that they cannot celebrate. This*

[644] Vasilakis, M., (2006), *The Scourge of God,* Athens: Gnoseis.
[645] Vasilakis, M., (2006), *The Scourge of God,* Athens: Gnoseis.

solution that is furthered is not in the interest of Cypriots, who made a sacrifice in 1955-59, because their sacrifice will be in vain."[646]

Moreover, in a clear example of the spillover effects between the Cyprus problem and Greek-Turkish relations more generally, Christodoulos prophesized that "*this solution will set a bad precedent for Greek- Turkish relations and have a negative impact upon the future of Thrace and the Aegean*." Last but not least, the Archbishop presented the plan as a struggle between Greeks and foreigners: "*The Americans pressure us to accept it... "* politicians, *"are pressured to accept a solution that deep down they do not want*."[647]

Christodoulos was supported in his pronouncements by his spiritual brother and fellow hard liner Bishop of Kalavrita Ambrosios, who denounced the US for their support of the plan as "*the world's arch-terrorist*" who protects "*the eastern swarms of Turkey*." He also warned that a "*piece of Greece is in danger of being lost forever*..."Ambrosios went back into Greek history invoking the glory of Ancient Sparta: "*with their shield in hand or carried upon it*"; and the Thermopylae: "*come and take it*"; the response of Emperor Paleologos to the Ottomans in 1453: "*I do not have the right to surrender the City*"; and the refrain of the 1821 Greek revolution "*freedom or death*" as opposed to the "*eternally stigmatized Ephialtes*. " Addressing the Greek- Cypriots, he stated: "*Mr. Annan and the powerful of the earth want to subjugate you completely to your Turkish conqueror. Better a divided, separated and bloody Cyprus than an ostensibly united, which however does not have its own language and physiognomy! You have no right to*

[646] Vasilakis, M., (2006), *The Scourge of God,* Athens: Gnoseis.
[647] Vasilakis, M., (2006), *The Scourge of God,* Athens: Gnoseis.

betray the Struggles of Grivas Digenis and Makarios, nor the blood of Grigori Auxentiou…."[648].

6.3.1.2 Media

The specter of the Cyprus problem has haunted the Greek public sphere for decades. For several years, the Cyprus problem was in hibernation and other 'national issues,' such as the Macedonian question or bilateral Greek-Turkish relations, consumed the energy of media discourse. For a few years, a dictum was popularized amongst Greek editors and journalists which was: "*Place Cyprus on the front page and circulation falls*."[649] The Annan Plan, however, brought the Cyprus problem back into the headlines. In their coverage of the plan, the behavior of the Greek media mostly did not deviate from its traditional systematic pursuit of mirroring national consensus and projecting Greek National Identity, thus solidifying hard line perceptions.

For the hard liner majority of the Greek media, the Cyprus question was characterized as a 'national issue:' "*As a consequence, the relations between the two communities are reduced to an Identity narrative, to an issue that ties in with the `survival of the nation itself'*."[650] In this context, emotional headlines dominated the debate, such as: "*The holy cause of Cyprus*"[651] underlining the issue's paramount significance; "*Lucerne as... Zurich?*",[652] emphasizing the plan's significance and the lessons that ought to be learned from history; and "*A patriotic NO to the imperialist plans'*'[653] marking the role

[648] Vasilakis, M., (2006), *The Scourge of God,* Athens: Gnoseis.
[649] *Interview with A. Papachelas*, editor of Kathimerini Newspaper, March 2013.
[650] Panagiotou, N., (2006), *The Role of the Greek Press in Greek-Turkish Rapprochement: The Coverage of the "Annan Plan" for the Settlement of the Cyprus Conflict*, RAMSES Working Paper, European Studies Centre, University of Oxford.
[651] Eleftherotypia Press, 16/04/2004.
[652] Rizospastis, 27/03/2004.
[653] Rizospastis, 16/04/2004.

played by the country's partners, allies and friends. Moreover, most newspapers: "*assumed a role of quasi-diplomats. It is the 'rally behind the flag' phenomenon where the need for national unity… is projected by the majority of the newspapers.*"[654] In this context, hard liners often prevailed over soft liners with characteristic headlines such as "*No to the divisions*"[655] from a center- left daily; and, "*National Unity for Cyprus*"[656] from a center- right daily. National solidarity however came at a price as it could only be reached based on the lowest common denominator that is historically defined by the reflexes of Greek National Identity. Moreover, in the name of national unity divergence can be penalized as anti-national and debate tends to asphyxiate alternative soft line views.

It follows that the perception of the 'other' tends to seriously impact discourse. In this context, Greek – Turkish relations were understood by the media as a "*zero sum game.*"[657] Headlines such as: "*Turks and Turkish-Cypriots celebrate*;"[658] "*Erdogan has bragged*;"[659] "*Agony and disappointment in Cyprus*;"[660] "*The Greek Defeat on the Cyprus problem*;"[661] are suggestive of the connection effect between Greek- Turkish relations and the Cyprus problem. Moreover: "*In this period, the way that the 'Other' Turks and Turkish Cypriots are 'reported', is consistent with the way that is presented in Greek-Turkish relations. More specifically, there is a selective presentation and emphasis on 'irrational', 'offensive' and 'aggressive' aspects of the claims of the*

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654 Panagiotou, N., (2006), *The Role of the Greek Press in Greek-Turkish Rapprochement:The Coverage of the "Annan Plan" for the Settlement of the Cyprus Conflict*, RAMSES Working Paper, European Studies Centre, University of Oxford.

655 Eleftherotypia Newspaper, 16/04/2004.

656 Kathimerini Newspaper, 04/04/2004.

657 Panagiotou, N., (2006), *The Role of the Greek Press in Greek-Turkish Rapprochement: The Coverage of the "Annan Plan" for the Settlement of the Cyprus Conflict*, RAMSES Working Paper, European Studies Centre, University of Oxford.

658 Eleftherotypia Newspaper, 01/04/2004.

659 Kathimerini Newspaper, 01/04/2004.

660 Eleftherotypia Newspaper, 01/04/2004.

661 Eleftherotypia Newspaper, 03/04/2004.

'Other'. Its arguments either are not presented or characterized as residing outside of lawful solutions. In contrast, the Greek-Cypriots' arguments are praised as being in accordance with international law. The antithetical scheme, employed in this case, is Greece's rightful claims against claims that are based on threats sought to be justified through bargaining. This scheme is part of the wider conflict frame that characterizes newspapers' reports regarding the proposed plan."[662]

At the same time, not unlike in the case of Macedonia, the reflection of Greek National Identity took precedence over partisan preferences, political affiliations or party support, with the hard line transcending party lines. Historically center- left newspaper To Vima, for example, was the only medium that adopted "*positive neutrality*" discreetly expressing its support for the Plan with headlines such as: "*The road opens...*"[663] and "*A sovereign state in a sovereign island*."[664] Notably however, at the same time, there was a clear distance between the rhetoric employed by PASOK and its President and that of To Vima, which was much less enthusiastic in its support of the Plan. Another center-left flagship, Eleftherotypia, was much more vocal in its opposition to the plan, despite its historically close ties with PASOK: Regardless of its center-left conventional political views, its stance comes into contrast with that of the socialist party (PASOK) that favored the acceptance of the plan. This case underlines the evolution that took place in the 1990s and later, as the Greek media in general function more autonomously and with a media-centric logic.[665]

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[662] Panagiotou, N., (2006), *The Role of the Greek Press in Greek-Turkish Rapprochement:The Coverage of the "Annan Plan" for the Settlement of the Cyprus Conflict*, RAMSES Working Paper, European Studies Centre, University of Oxford.

[663] To Vima Newspaper, 28/03/2004.

[664] To Vima Newspaper, 04/04/2012.

[665] Panagiotou, N., (2006), *The Role of the Greek Press in Greek-Turkish Rapprochement: The Coverage of the "Annan Plan" for the Settlement of the Cyprus Conflict*, RAMSES Working Paper, European Studies Centre, University of Oxford.

The center- right flagship, Kathimerini, wavered, finally adopting a 'negative neutrality' towards the plan with headlines such as: "*Everything is difficult in the Cyprus Problem,*"[666] and "*A Greek No to the Annan Plan*."[667] The same newspaper would report "*A long time ago announced NO*"[668] having projected the outcome of the talks as a "*backhanded Turkish victory*"[669] resulting in the conclusion that "*The rejection is inevitable*."[670] Only the ever faithful communist party instrument Rizospastis continued to express the official party hard line with headlines such as: "*A provocative injustice against Cyprus*,"[671] "*A rope for Greek-Cypriots*",[672] "*A plan-trap for the people of Cyprus*"[673], or "*The Yes of partition*."[674]

The editorial pages of the Greek press hosted a lively debate between hard liners and soft liners. A leftist hard line proponent of the plan's rejection delineated the two opposing camps, relativizing the Great Debate and showing that there are hard vs soft liners on both sides: "*In hours historically crucial for the future of Cyprus, extremes on both sides show folly and irresponsibility. I refer to the provocative insolence of proponents of the easy 'yes', ultra-modernizers and ultra-Europeanists, who, with privileged access to the media engaged in a dirty terror against anyone diverging towards their own view, at times with a brashness that has no limits. Likewise, I refer to the fanatical blindness of the proponents of the easy 'no' professional 'defenders of the motherland' which, with morbid ethnocentrism and Greek centrism and also the*

[666] Kathimerini Newspaper, 27/03/2004.
[667] Kathimerini Newspaper, 01/04/2004.
[668] Kathimerini Newspaper, 18/04/2004.
[669] Panagiotou, N., (2006), *The Role of the Greek Press in Greek-Turkish Rapprochement: The Coverage of the "Annan Plan" for the Settlement of the Cyprus Conflict*, RAMSES Working Paper, European Studies Centre, University of Oxford.
[670] Kathimerini Newspaper, 02/04/2004.
[671] Rizospastis Newspaper, 01/04/2004.
[672] Rizospastis Newspaper, 30/03/2004.
[673] Rizospastis Newspaper, 11/04/2004.
[674] Rizospastis Newspaper, 17/04/2004.

pietistic versions of Orthodoxy, they see everywhere submissive, low bidders and enemy agents…. two sides of the same coin, a danger duality."[675]

Thus, on the one hand, the soft line defense of the Annan plan was relatively meek. Most of its proponents adopted defensive positions. Madravelis, for example, a Liberal opinion writer, described the Annan plan, having taken note of its inherent weaknesses, as: "*A bet with the future against the past*" comparing the process with the French-German Entente after 1945 or the Great Friday accord in Northern Ireland, recognizing however that the: "*Cypriots will have to live with it and the Cypriots must decide*."[676] Kathimerini would offer and an equally apologetic defense of the plan in its main article: "*In 1974, Greece and Cyprus suffered a military defeat and its consequences can be reversed only with war, a victorious war. And because war would be insanity, Cyprus again sought compromise with conditions that were even worse. A new compromise will necessarily incorporate part of the results of the defeat, otherwise it would be unattainable. We lost a war and we constantly apply to the UN and the international community, seeking through a compromise, partial removal of the consequences of defeat. Such compromise is the 'Annan Plan'. Not the best, but we must know that we cannot again seek arbitration and help. And yet it should be noted that such a compromise involves two essential differences which in combination give this plan unprecedented dynamism: First, the Greek Cypriots with their intelligence, hard work and fighting spirit conquered, after 1974, a strong position in their region. And secondly, integration into the European Union opens a completely new perspective of action in a peaceful environment*."[677]

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[675] Eleftherotypia Newspaper, 05/04/2004.
[676] Apogevmatini Newspaper, 19/12/2002.
[677] Kathimerini Newspaper, 4/4/2004.

On the other hand, the hard line plan's detractors articulated their arguments quite passionately. The opinion writer Giannaras, a member of Network 21 a few years earlier, defined the plan in no uncertain terms: "*...(this) bearing the name of the sad Kofi Annan, Anglo-American plot. No reference to a 'solution' (especially fair, functional, European) to the problem of the co-existence of Greek - Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots on the island. The objectives of the Plan were, uniquely and exclusively, to ensure in perpetuity the colonial status of the British bases on Cyprus. And for the USA to have, through this monstrous political construct, the capability of internal control or inhibitory interventions and undermining the functions of the EU*."[678] In another column, Giannaras argued in defense of Greek National Identity, that since the time of ancient authors like Homer, Cyprus has been presented as "*a country and a society that is Greek*." Referring to the Annan plan, he argued: "*We are talking about a blatant betrayal of the struggle of the Cypriot Hellenism ... Betrayal exactly proportionate to the coup of Ioannides, without the excuses of stupidity.*[679] Opinion writer Stavros Lygeros would also conclude: *"The Annan plan came to dispel illusions about the reunification of Cyprus on a federal basis. The Greek Cypriots should liberate themselves from the stereotypes of three decades and approach the issue from the outset upon the basis of their collective security and prosperity ... In fact, the Annan plan is an institutional monstrosity. This practically means that the Annan Plan represents many more risks than opportunities not only for Cypriot Hellenism, but also for peace itself in the Mediterranean*."[680]

[678] Kathimerini Newspaper, 9/5/2004.
[679] Kathimerini Newspaper, 1/12/2002.
[680] Kathimerini Newspaper, 14/3/2004.

A review of the debate results in two interesting conclusions: first, the alliances of hard liners and soft liners appear to have matured, compared to the previous case studies adopting a self-conscious perspective; second, editorials transcended partisan and ideological differences. In this context, the journalist and opinion writer Giannis Triantis argued: "*The problem is that even serious people support the acceptance of this abortive plan, accusing those who reject the raw blackmail for maximalism. This is the so-called school of Realism, which by definition trains the public mind in the Realism of subjugation*."[681] Stefanos Kasimatis, a columnist, would reply to Triantis: "*… while the serious individuals amongst our politicians understand that it is in our interest to accept the Annan Plan, they dare not articulate a word! Why? Because within three and a half weeks it is not possible to overthrow untruths, lies and idiotic stereotypes about Cyprus (e.g. that everything was honey-milk in Cyprus until the invasion took place...) when you yourself cultivate them for thirty years… As for Realistic policies, they need a public which knows history, rather than a national ideology*."[682]

6.3.1.3 Civil Society

Civil society joined in the debate with both soft and hard line organizations, movements and platforms founded for the purposes of supporting or opposing the Annan plan. These were mostly ad hoc initiatives, which were created with the explicit purpose of joining the 'Great Debate.' Interestingly, NGOs with a more consistent presence on issues of foreign policy, such as the ones whose activities have been discussed in the

[681] Eleftherotypia Newspaper, 01/04/2004.
[682] To Vima Newspaper, 2/4/2004.

case study on Greek – Turkish relations, chose not to get involved in the debate. The collection of signatures of prominent politicians, academics, intellectuals and professionals was a tool in the struggle between hard liners and soft liners. Interestingly, once again, these efforts included representatives from all walks of life that transcended partisan or ideological divides.

From a hard liner's perspective, for example, a petition was circulated that demanded the plan's rejection: "*In Cyprus*," it proclaimed, "*the strength of the whole of Hellenism is tested. A retreat of such dimensions in Cyprus would mean a retreat on all fronts. We are obliged today to act the in the way free Greeks always knew how to act, and say no*." [683] The statement was undersigned by ninety individuals including current or former members of Parliament of PASOK, ND, KKE, DIKI, the leadership of the Holy Mountain and three high Church officials, university professors from all fields, the head of the 'Link of imprisoned and exiled resistance members 1967 – 1974', retired officers, composers, musicians, judges, publishers and authors.[684]The day after President Papadopoulos addressed the Cypriot people and proclaimed his opposition to the plan, another resolution, undersigned this time by one hundred and twenty four citizens, including, amongst others, politicians, officers, academics, lawyers, film directors, was published.[685]

In response, from a soft line perspective, initiatives in support of the Annan Plan were made public. The '*Front of logic, against nationalism for a modern foreign policy*' published its own manifesto undersigned by prominent leftist politicians and

[683] Avgi Newspaper, 05/05/2004.
[684] Avgi Newspaper, 05/05/2004.
[685] Eleftherotypia Newspaper, 09/04/2004.

intellectuals, a former New Democracy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Michalis Papakonstantinou, who was not coincidentally the same politician who attempted to reach a compromise regarding the Macedonian problem in the early 1990s, and academics as well. The text was based on European commitments and underlined the significance of the European catalyst that would "*secure unique circumstances of security and prosperity for all its citizens*." The statement in support of the plan noted that "*political circumstances...were never too positive for the resolution of the Cyprus problem. It is the first time that the exploitation of the motherland does not dominate the public stage...*" Describing the solution, they also tried to pre-empt their hard liners, stating that "*moving away from the model of the single "nation-state" in no way means moving away from a fairer and more effective governance*."[686]

6.4 Conclusion

This empirical discussion on the Great Debate amongst Identity Warriors is highly revealing. It is clear that the Great Debates did not occur in a historical vacuum. Indeed, it appears that the background of each case and its ties with National Identity was quite significant as it defined the enabling environment for the Great Debate.

In the case of Macedonia, the region's role in the construction of National Identity was established over generations. From this perspective, Macedonia was much more than simply a geographical area. It symbolized the continuity of the Greek nation through the millennia with the historical person of Alexander the Great acquiring symbolic

[686] Eleftherotypia Newspaper, 09/04/2004.

value. This was a concentrated effort that was made in response to internal and external threats, realized during the 20th century through the bitter experiences of wars. During the Cold War, Yugoslavia's presence as Greece's strategic cushion regionally laid the issue to rest at least temporarily. The fall of the Berlin Wall, the demise of Yugoslavia and the ensuing instability in the Balkans, however, brought the Macedonian issue back to the forefront of internal public discourse.

In the case of Greek – Turkish relations, the state sought to legitimize its political power, over generations, by strengthening Turkey's role in the construction of National Identity as the perennial other. From this perspective, Turkey, Greece's eternal foe, was a catalyst in the connection between Greece's ancient and modern history because the very concept of the continuity of Hellenism necessitated the rejection of its so-called Ottoman parenthesis. At the same time, national mobilization against a common foe strengthened social cohesion while also permitting the state to target internal national enemies. After the Turkish invasion and occupation of Cyprus in 1974, the sense of a Turkish threat was rekindled together with the Greek siege-mentality. The end of the Cold War resulted in the prevalence of a sense of insecurity. The process of European integration and enlargement appeared as a safe haven in an otherwise international hostile regional environment strengthening the prospect of a Greek – Turkish détente. At the same time, the tragedy of the 1999 double earthquakes humanized the Turkish other and presented a window of opportunity for the challenge of National Identity.

The Annan plan triggered a climax revealing how Greek National Identity had internalized the Cyprus problem in a number of different ways: First, national unity and a collective sense of belonging to Hellenism connecting Greeks and Greek Cypriots;

second, the conspiracy syndrome and a strong sense of victimization that permeates the Greek public sphere; third, the symbolic representation of Cyprus as the battle ground of Greece and Turkey; and fourth, the prevailing dichotomy presenting the Cypriot conflict as a moral struggle between justice and injustice, together with the language that articulated Greek National Identity when it came to the Cyprus problem

In this context, on the one hand, interestingly, and in contrast to the other two case studies, the construction of Identity relating to the Macedonian issue was unopposed. Arguably, in response to catalytic events abroad, the process was energized and intensified, thus generating considerable noise and attracting significant public interest, but the alliance of Identity Warriors that led the charge was virtually unopposed. Neither the soft line Prime Minister nor his supporters engaged in Identity politics at any point. In other words, having tested the dualism hypothesis that I have presented in the analytical framework, an understanding of Greek Identity as being the product of a clash between two competing and often conflictual trends that can be transferred to the area of foreign policy, I have found it null. In this respect, it is important to note that the Identity Warriors who advocated a hard line on the issue, through mass mobilization, and with the support of civil society, the Church and the media, fit the definition of hard liners that I presented in the analytical framework. The symbolic and semiotic language of hard line Identity Warriors appears defined by transcendal 'underdog' understandings of the nation and its position in world affairs. In the case of Macedonia, negative biases resurfaced, as Skopje was viewed as inherently hostile, because of the burden of history, leading to maximalist aspirations and ambitions.

In contrast to the previous case discussed regarding Macedonia, National Identity relating to the Greek – Turkish relations was the subject of a Great Debate. Arguably, in response to catalytic events abroad, the process was energized and intensified, with the active participation of a series of cultural warriors in the debate with the educational system, the Church, civil society, the media, and businesses joining the fray. It should however be underlined that the whole debate did not take place at the same time. Indeed, it appears that the hard liners peaked early, but were soon discredited after the crises that, together with the earthquakes, strengthened the countercharge led by the government, which engaged in Identity politics with a clear modernizing agenda. In other words, having tested the dualism hypothesis that I have presented in the analytical framework, an understanding of Greek Identity as being the product of a clash between two competing and often conflictual trends that can be transferred to the area of foreign policy, I have found it to be true. In this respect, it is important to note that the Identity Warriors fit the definitions of soft liners and hard liners that I presented in the analytical framework. The symbolic and semiotic language of hard line Identity Warriors appears defined by transcendal 'underdog' understandings of the nation and its position in world affairs. In the case of Greek- Turkish relations, negative biases resurfaced as Ankara was viewed as inherently hostile, because of the burden of history, leading to maximalist aspirations and ambitions. At the same time, the soft liners appear more sensitive to the country's relative constraints and opportunities and attach high value to Greece's place within a multilateral framework, particularly the European Union. In the case of Greek – Turkish relations, they were prepared to display co-operation, engage in constructive dialogue, seek common ground and contemplate compromises.

Last but not least, unlike the case discussed regarding Macedonia but not unlike the case on Greek – Turkish relations, National Identity relating to Cyprus was the subject of a Great Debate. Arguably, in response to catalytic events abroad the process was energized and intensified, with the active participation of a series of cultural warriors in the debate, with the Church, civil society, and the media joining the fray. Contrary to the previous case on Greek Turkish relations, however, the Great Debate appears to reach existential proportions as the very settlement of the issue was in play. The role of the government internally, contrary to the case of PASOK in 1999, served to strengthen the hand of the hard liners. In other words, having tested the dualism hypothesis that I have presented in the analytical framework, an understanding of Greek Identity as the product of a clash between two competing and often conflictual trends that can be transferred to the area of foreign policy, I have found it to be true. In this respect, it is important to note that the Identity Warriors fit the definitions of soft liners and hard liners that I presented in the analytical framework. The symbolic and semiotic language of hard line Identity Warriors appears defined by transcendal 'underdog' understandings of the nation and its position in world affairs. In the case of Cyprus, negative biases resurfaced, as the Turks were viewed as inherently hostile, because of the burden of history, leading to maximalist aspirations and ambitions. At the same time, the soft liners appear more sensitive to the country's relative constraints and opportunities and attach high value to the place of Greece and Cyprus within a multilateral framework, particularly the European Union. In the case of the Annan plan, they were prepared to display co-operation, engage in constructive dialogue, seek common ground and contemplate compromises.

7. THE GREAT DEBATE WITHIN THE POLITICAL ELITE

As discussed in the previous chapter, the Great Debate played out amongst Identity Warriors wishing to influence public opinion and create constraints and opportunities for policy makers. At the same time, I have argued that the Great Debate unfolds within the political elite. In this context, I want to test whether the concept of the ongoing dualism that has been shaped in National Identity can be observed in the political process. In this sense, I will explore whether the broader opposing camps of hard liners or soft- liners engage in the Great Debate and how the winning faction was able to translate its preference into policy.

As a reminder, I have previously argued that to fully understand how the Great Debate plays out in each case, and its impact on decision making, a more instrumental analysis about end-means relationships in the context of political action must be considered. In a political context, effective action with respect to substantive goals normally requires a minimum acceptability and a necessary consensus. Thus, the political elite's task is to secure multiple payoffs and ensure effective action. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the political process that resulted in the policy outcome in each case.

7.1 Macedonian issue

In the case of Macedonia, the political context of decision-making is complex and intricate. Decision-makers, particularly the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister,

struggled to build a consensus and gain acceptance for their policy agenda. Their ultimate failure was fatal for the government's effort to reconcile substance with support. Interestingly, in the area of politics, hard liners were not unopposed, as a Great Debate played out at the highest level but mostly behind closed doors.

In the early 1990s, the Greek government operated under a sword of Damocles. Due to the electoral law, its popular majority of 47% translated into a razor thin majority and for the first time in Greek Parliamentary history a government had to survive its term with only 152 votes out of 300: "*This gave to virtually every Parliamentarian the possibility of vetoing the government's policy*."[687] Within the context of domestic politics, two struggles over the Macedonian issue, one external and one internal, would torment the New Democracy (ND), center- right, government and decisively impact Greek foreign policy. Externally, ND was faced with a strong and vocal opposition particularly from the center- left's PASOK, whose leader Papandreou harshly criticized its management of the issue. Internally, a rift appeared between Prime Minister Mitsotakis and his Foreign Minister Samaras, which went as far as the expulsion of the latter from the government and later his resignation from the party.

The Macedonian question had sharply divided the Left and the Right during the 1940s, but, by the 1970s, there was bipartisan agreement and even consensus on the subject. During the early 1990s, however, the consensus collapsed as PASOK adopted an opposition hard line towards ND and waged battle on all fronts with powerful polemics. Andreas Papandreou himself declared that his movement would follow what he

[687] Agnantopoulos, A., (2005), *The Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy: A Conceptual Framework and an Empirical Application in Greek-Turkish Relations.* Paper presented at the 2nd LSE Symposium on Modern Greece, London.

described as 'structural opposition', meaning that PASOK would not give its consent to the government on any issue whatsoever. Indeed, the period during which ND governed was marked by intense partisanship as the opposition, lead by PASOK, amongst others, encouraged strikes, supported demonstrations that sometimes turned violent, university and school closures. In this context, Papandreou was unyielding in his negative stance towards any ND policy, choice or action on Macedonia and particularly any idea of compromise. After all, according to the polls, in 1992, 60.2 % of the Greeks thought the Macedonian issue the most important foreign policy concern, thus sharing a hard line position.[688]

If PASOK's attitude was to be expected, given Greek partisan history, the internal conflict within ND came as a surprise to many. Greek political parties tend to be more or less leader-centric and hierarchical with very few mechanisms of internal democracy and collective decision-making. During his leadership, Mitsotakis managed to re-engineer his party, giving it a clear Liberal tilt, distancing it from its more traditional right wing roots and adopting a 'big tent' policy. This was not without costs, however, as a segment of his party resented this political shift. Samaras, a political and ideological prodigy of the more right-wing former leader Evangelos Averof, challenged Mitsotakis on his foreign policy having "*devised a path to (party) leadership by promoting nationalistic positions."*[689] At the beginning, the relationship between Mitsotakis and Samaras was very close and Mitsotakis entrusted Samaras with the prestigious Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Soon, however, Mitsotakis and Samaras

[688] Loulis, Y., (1995), *The Greek Political Crisis: 1980-1995*, Athens: Sideris, p.122- 123.

[689] Zahariades, N., (2005), *Essence of Political Manipulation: Emotion, Institutions, and Greek Foreign Policy*, New York: Peter Lang, p.106.

disagreed on the Macedonian issue with Samaras adopting a maximalist hard line position and Mitsotakis looking for a more soft line compromise.

7.1.1 Hard line terms are set: The first Party Leaders' Council (February 18th, 1992)

The 1992 December European Council's declaration, discussed previously in the synopses of the Case Studies, spelled out three conditions on recognition of Skopje that invited multiple interpretations. The nuances of diplomatic wording, however, were secondary for Greek politicians and the media. The results of the summit were publicly welcomed within Greece, particularly by the government and heralded as a diplomatic success. For Foreign Minister Samaras: "*the decision vindicates our struggle against those who wanted to un-historically falsify Greek inheritance and the rich in meanings historical meaning of the word Macedonia*."[690] For the Prime Minister: "*a great success was recorded because we clarified the issue of the Macedonia of Skopje…Samaras handled it exceptionally well…we obtained 100% of our positions regarding the Republic of Skopje*."[691]

PASOK went a step further in its interpretation. Raising the bar, it demanded that all of 'Macedonia's' derivatives should also be excluded from the denomination of the new state. In effect, such a position made any negotiation on a composite name such as 'New' or "Northern Macedonia" impossible. The government, not to be

[690] Skylakakis, T., (1995), *In the Name of Macedonia*, Athens: EuroEkdotiki, p. 64.
[691] Ibid.,65.

outmaneuvered, responded, with Samaras confirming the maximalist interpretation in several public statements. The Greek political system thus failed to align the international, in this case European, reality with the domestic understanding of current events. For the Greek public, Europe had made its position clear, denying Skopje the use of the term Macedonia: "*The public rejoiced. But in the councils of the EU, the chancelleries of Europe's capitals and the international press, the mood in no way corresponded to the prevailing atmosphere in Greece. Indeed, it was evident, particularly to seasoned Greek diplomats, that although the 'maximalist' thesis could be a useful bargaining point, it could only provide the stepping-stone for a fair compromise solution*."[692]

The divergence in the views of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister had already begun to appear in the press. The Prime Minister had already hinted publicly that it was not the name that was of crucial importance, as "*it would be difficult for Athens to succeed 100%, but the public recognition on behalf of Skopje that no Slav-Macedonian minority exists in Greece, which would once and for all halt Skopjan irredentism*."[693] Meanwhile, in the days leading up to the Thessaloniki rally, a plethora of reports appeared in the media suggesting that the Foreign Minister took a different view to the Prime Minister, both regarding the significance of the rallies and generally regarding policy on the issue.[694]

The first Leaders' Council took place just four days after the first mass rally for Macedonia in Thessaloniki. In the Council, the Prime Minister underlined that it was

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[692] Kofos, E., (1999), *Greece's Macedonian Adventure: The Controversy Over FYROM's Independence and Recognition."* In Van Cofoudakis et al., (ed.), *Greece and the New Balkans: Challenges and Opportunities*, New York: Pella Publishing Co.

[693] Skylakakis, T., (1995), *In the Name of Macedonia*, Athens: EuroEkdotiki, p.85-86.

[694] Ibid.,97.

in Greece's interest that this Republic retained its territorial integrity. "*It is better that this state exists*" Mitsotakis stated "*than that it does not exist*." He then went on to present the three conditions that were included in the European Council's December decision which were placed "*successfully by Mr. Samaras*." President Karamanlis observed that the third condition was "*formulated in an unclear way. Therefore, there is a problem*" and Mitsotakis agreed. [695] This was a significant concession on the part of the Prime Minister given the government's maximalist interpretation. In other words, this is a clear case of double language, with a wedge between the government's public position, and the private views expressed by the Prime Minister in the meeting. Mitsotakis himself would politically pay dearly for his stance in these first few months when public opinion was shaped on the issue. The seeds of discord between Mitsotakis and Samaras were sown during this period, when Samaras publicly locked himself into a hard line position, which Mitsotakis defended, although – as he later made clear – he did not believe.

In the Council's minutes, the Prime Minister's soft line position on the Macedonian problem was made clear: "*It is in the interest of Greece to reach some kind of an agreement with Skopje…Because, if we do not, it is clear that Skopje will be recognized…. and when Skopje is recognized we will have a national and internal problem, with our people, who will feel defeated, although (the people) will not be defeated because Skopje neither threatens us nor are we afraid of them. Thus, a psychology is created that could lead to unpleasant internal developments. Therefore, we must apply pressure uncompromisingly where we are right and to force them, and convince, Skopje. In my opinion, this is possible. If again, during this course, we*

[695] *Official Transcript of the Council of Leaders*, Constantine Mitsotakis Foundation, Athens.

conclude that from the three conditions we place on Skopje, they accept the two or two and a half, we should again discuss what we should do in such a case, because…Non-recognition is an open wound that is too much at this time when we have so much and- if we could- we should avoid it." [696]

The Prime Minister's statement merits further analysis. First, interestingly, Mitsotakis drew a line between "*national*" and "*internal*" questions. By "*national*" he meant Greek interests and, by internal, the people's "*psychology*." The Prime Minister went a long way towards describing a sense of defeat that would prevail, which he himself considered unjustified. Second, Mitsotakis clearly stated that, in his view, Skopje was not a danger to Greece. There was a sharp contrast between his reading of the problem and that of Samaras, Papandreou and indeed the general consensus. Third, the country's diplomatic struggle should focus on "*where we are right*." This was Mitsotakis the lawyer speaking, who evaluated his case objectively, analyzing its strengths and weaknesses. Fourth, he assessed his odds and concluded that Greece could not block recognition. Fifth, preparing for a plan B, he asked the council to reconsider its positions and be prepared to accept less than their hard line maximalist demands.

The government's position was clearly informed by the European context. Earlier in the meeting, Mitsotakis had stated that 'national rights' should be seen from the perspective of the country's "*position within the general effort that we undertake today to catch up with the train of a United Europe on a political, economic and monetary level*." [697] The statement of Mitsotakis that appeared to have been made in passing was

[696] Ibid.
[697] Ibid.

suggestive of a wider effort to Europeanize Greek foreign policy and thus enable the country's foreign policy to evolve from a nation with a regional and somewhat parochial worldview to a credible European partner and constructive ally. In any case, diachronically, Greece's diplomatic capital depends on the understanding and support of its partners and allies. On this front, the Prime Minister painted quite a bleak picture. It is clear the Prime Minister had a good sense of European reality, which makes the developments that would follow, his political and policy choices, even more surprising. Issue-linkage is dominant in this regard: "*Unfortunately*", Mitsotakis stated, and the council appeared to agree: "*Our country is weighed down with many problems. …Turkey… Cyprus… This is an added problem that weighes upon the atmosphere of the Community and talk begins along the lines of: At last! You are a small country; you have economic problems…do not over-strain us or harass us…. Our best friends in the US and Europe tell us: where are you going with this, you cannot be constantly hecklers*." [698]

The leader of the opposition, Papandreou, appeared to be looking more towards Athens and the Greek public than the European capitals and Greece's European partners, responding to Mitsotakis with a hard line: "*I am one of those who believe that the name Macedonia in any way should not be found in the characterization of the country. And this is not for emotional reasons, that our cultural heritage is Macedonia, Philip, Alexander the Great, Vergina, language, but for another…. their vision is of a Macedonian nation, with Macedonia of Pyrin, of Bulgaria, Macedonia of Skopje, and Macedonia of the Aegean, meaning us*." [699]

[698] Ibid.
[699] Ibid.

Papandreou thus referred to the perceived irredentist aspirations of Skopje and made a direct association with organizations abroad, powerful and well-financed lobbies, which supported this project: "*This needs an anchor, a base, to tie the notion of a Macedonian nation. And this base, this anchor, is Skopje*." Papandreou, a cosmopolitan, who had lived abroad for many years and has taught at California's Berkley, felt the need to clarify: "*I am not a chauvinist, neither nationally aggressive, but I believe in the nation and in the need to secure our integrity and independence with all means*." [700] He added: "*In my opinion, both in Skopje and in Ankara, there will be a provocation…. I cannot exclude that this will happen from third parties … …and I very much fear border episodes…say our position is an error…. If we retreat now from the position we have taken, our prestige in the Balkans will be lost.*" [701]

Papandreou's position is interesting on several levels in terms of National Identity. First, he connected the issue with the very survival of Greece, its territorial integrity and national independence. On this level, there could not be any discussion as he drew parallels between the Macedonian issue, Greek - Turkish relations and the Cyprus problem. He thus locked himself into a position allowing no room for compromise. Moreover, he clearly drew a dividing line between those who supported the policy of Skopje appeasement and those who advocated an aggressive policy. In other words, no two good Greeks could disagree on the matter, according to Papandreou; by definition he separated patriots and traitors.

[700] Ibid.
[701] Ibid.

Second, he played on the historical fears of Greeks, from the Macedonian struggle at the turn of the century, the Civil War, and the Cold War onwards. His rhetoric resembled that of the post-war Greek leadership that sought to galvanize the Greek nation against the communist enemy. Third, his reference to "*foreign centers*" strengthened the sense of isolation, implying the presence of an international conspiracy against the nation and cultivating a siege mentality. Papandreou referred to the Slav-Macedonian lobby but the language he used, and the structure of the argument was reminiscent of anti-foreign and anti-western rhetoric that has played a central role in Greek political discourse since the 1830s and the birth of the Greek state. Greek history is fraught with foreign interventions in Greece's internal affairs.[702] The often unsubtle, heavy-handed and crude involvement of Embassies and foreign governments had stirred strong reactionary sentiments that Papandreou exploited to establish his political supremacy in the late 1970s and 1980s in the "*constellation of populism*."[703]

Third, Papandreou built on the self-image of Greece as a protagonist in the region. From the years of the War of Independence, a sense of Greek superiority influenced Greek political discourse. The rare, if not unique, amalgam of ancient history and religion, that constituted the Identity of the Greek nation and the perceived obligation assumed by the Greeks to spread the light of civilization in their neighborhood and beyond was the bedrock of the national narrative in the 19th century. The Cold War contributed to this idea, as frequent political rhetoric compared and contrasted Greek Western progress with Eastern Communist backwardness. In other words, the mirror image of Greece was not just a reflection of power politics but also of deeply ingrained national

[702] Papachelas, A., (1997), *The Rape of Greek Democracy, The American Factor,* Athens: Estia.

[703] Cofoudakis, V., (1983), *Greco-Turkish Relations and the Greek Socialists: Ideology, Nationalism and Pragmatism.* Journal of Modern Greek Studies.Vol.1, n.2 and Elefantis, A., (2015), *In the Constellation of Populism,* Athens: Gkonis.

prejudices. Fifth, it is striking that there was no reference to the international environment or the European state of mind in the analysis of Papandreou. Although, he was very careful not to refer to Greek public opinion, unlike Mitsotakis, the very absence of a discussion of shifting dynamics abroad is characteristic.

The council of the political leaders appeared extremely conscious of the political and social environment in which they operated. The leader of the pro-European left wing party SYN, Damanaki, addressed the issue head on: Historically, the Greek left has had a bitter experience of Greek National Identity being used as a tool for domestic purposes. Therefore, Damanaki referred to the need for the government to "*base itself upon the element of people's enlightenment and awakening around the national issues*." [704] She continued by referring explicitly to Greek national identity: "*We have to underline and we all have to be very careful …not to give rise to a sterile nationalism that can lead to bigotry, that can lead to phenomena, if you like, that create dangers for the future…We are obliged not to cultivate aggressiveness towards other countries, particularly when they do not exist*." [705]

The Communist leader Papariga argued along the same lines, leading to a telling exchange with Papandreou and Karamanlis: "*After the Thessaloniki rally…things are more difficult, because for the people the number one issue is Skopje, in other words the name Macedonia. And that is not right…."* The Communist leader continued: "*In Greece, in our opinion, there is a nationalistic and chauvist stream… I hope, it will not become a river*." Papandreou disagreed, calling it a "*national awakening*." Papariga

[704] *Official Transcript of the Council of Leaders*, Constantine Mitsotakis Foundation, Athens.
[705] Ibid.

remained unfazed, however: "*You understand that when I mean nationalism I mean from irredentist opinions to the logic of military pressure, even this spirit of national egoism, that the Greeks are the chosen people, the smartest*." Karamanlis laconically interjected: "*This is our curse*", but continued, explaining the "*sensitivity*" of the people regarding the issue. [706]

Regarding Skopje, the Council reached an agreement to push the three conditions and reconvene. The statement that was issued was very broad and did not mention Skopje or any issue for that matter by name. Three points were made: first, the usefulness of the meeting was underlined, as it was described "*as an opportunity for a mutual briefing in depth on all aspects of our national issues and because it confirmed the spirit of national responsibility with which the political leadership of the country faces them*." Second, what is interesting about the statement is the reference to threats, as described earlier. Third, the general agreement on national issues was underlined together with the differences between parties. The willingness of the leaders was reaffirmed to have "*a common national strategy on national issues.*"

7.1.2 A hard line policy is decided: The second Leaders' Council (April 13th, 1992)

Since the previous Council, in February, a number of political developments had taken place overshadowing the April meeting. It is indicatory of the political climate that on the 18th of March, twelve Greek Macedonian Members of Parliament belonging to ND

[706] *Official Transcript of the Council of Leaders*, Constantine Mitsotakis Foundation, Athens.

submitted a Parliamentary question regarding the transfer of the Capital to Thessaloniki, which they were obliged to withdraw after the Prime Minister's angry reaction.[707] Meanwhile, the relationship between the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs was becoming sour, with Samaras taking advantage of headwinds. In a sign of his ascension in domestic politics, 50 to 70 ND Members of Parliament attended an event in his honor at a central Athens hotel. On the 23rd of March 1992, in a television interview, Samaras publicly challenged Mitsotakis, turning against those: "*who translate the uncompromising Greek position… into isolation*."[708]

The public position of the country's chief diplomat reflected the tension between the two men. The Prime Minister and Foreign Minister exchanged six letters in a very short time period as behind the scenes the debate climaxed. The very choice of written communication, initiated by Samaras, suggests that the discussion was geared towards a domestic audience. The letters could be used later in time by both sides to justify themselves politically. Indeed, the existence of the letters was leaked to the press at the time.[709] From the letters, it is clear that Samaras, using strong language, was pushing his maximalist argument and asking for a meeting of the Council of leaders. Mitsotakis, on the other hand, appeared more flexible and was asserting the government's right to make the final decision. From the exchange, the tone and content of the letters, it is clear that the relationship between the two men had reached a breaking point.

The April Council was the most significant of the three. The meeting presented an opportunity for high drama and was marked by two catalytic events, one on the

[707] Skylakakis, T., (1995), *In the Name of Macedonia,* Athens: EuroEkdotiki, p.117.
[708] Ibid.,117-118.
[709] Ibid., 133

domestic and one on the international front. Domestically, the tension between the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs reached a breaking point as the Prime Minister fired his Minister immediately after the meeting. On the international front, the Council reached the conclusion that Greece should not recognize Skopje if the name Macedonia was included in its denomination.

President Karamanlis opened the meeting, outlining the agenda that, unlike the previous meeting, included only one item, namely the Macedonian problem. It is noteworthy that in presenting the problem the President described the problem as being part domestic, "*divides our people*," and part international, "*…problems in our international relations*." [710] In other words, it is clear from the very beginning that the council was faced with a foreign policy challenge that had considerable domestic spillover effects.

The 'Pinheiro Package', a compromise proposed in the European Council, was the focus of the discussion. The Minister of Foreign Affairs related to the Council the details noting that two out of three conditions of December's summit conclusions were fully covered, and the sticking point was the name. Samaras confirmed that he accepted the package "*in principle*" but "*the final answer can be given after overall discussions with the political leadership of the land*." [711] This answer by Samaras was interesting as it indirectly circumvented the constitutional process. It appears that after the previous Council, ND had trapped itself in an unfortunate position because in the name of national unity it had conceded authority to the Council dramatically curtailing its freedom of movement. The meeting's terms of reference were clarified during the

[710] *Official Transcript of the Council of Leaders*, Constantine Mitsotakis Foundation, Athens.
[711] Ibid.

Second Council: after inquiries by Papariga and Papandreou, Karamanlis insisted upon a "*we must decide*" and Mitsotakis suggested: "*If we agree, we will make a decision. If we don't agree, of course the opinion will be advisory, which we will listen to. …We have met to reach a decision.*" [712]

The fact that the Greek government spoke with different voices, however, was also noted abroad. Samaras conveyed to the Council the reaction of the Portuguese Ambassador who upon hearing his response to the Package expressed in a joking manner his wish "*that the final decision by the Greek political leadership will be different from your Mr. Samaras*" [713], thus hinting at the mixed signals that the European capitals had been receiving. Indeed, in some ways, the mixed signals themselves may explain why the council met to consider the matter in the first place. Mitsotakis, on the one hand, was clearly in a difficult position trying to reign in the more hard line views of his popular minister. Samaras, on the other hand, was also reaching the point of no return because as Minister and Chief Diplomat, if he could not represent his government in good conscience he would be forced to resign. Both were unwilling to assume the political cost, in the case of Samaras, and the national cost, in the case of Mitsotakis, of a diplomatic defeat. The two politicians, once so close, had reached a dead end in their relationship.

According to the minutes, the Minister of Foreign Affairs asked the council for a clear declaration that Greece would not accept the word Macedonia: "*We need dynamic and clear accompanying measures that will show our determination and that Greece*

[712] Ibid.
[713] Ibid.

actionably supports its decision…and that with this we don't mess around." [714] His argument was based on the Greek interpretation of the third condition. The Minister's willingness to insist on such a narrow interpretation of December's conclusions, notwithstanding the European reality and prevailing wisdom in foreign capitals, can be explained by domestic political, rather than foreign policy, considerations. Presumably, Samaras was aware of their doubts and objections by his European colleagues, but nevertheless, a recognition of the weaknesses inherent in the wording of the Council's declaration and the ensuing obstacles Greece faced would amount to personal political suicide as Samaras would admit that he under-delivered diplomatically. Indeed, Samaras was unwilling to admit to the problematic character of the wording even in private and for the purposes of analysis. Karamanlis interrupted Samaras mid-sentence, demanding that he did not dictate policy to the Council, thus prompting him to leave the room.

The Prime Minister began his presentation with the infamous third condition of the December Declaration, noting the different interpretation given by the European Community. Mitsotakis shifted the blame to Samaras: "*I asked Mr. Samaras, if you give this interpretation, why weren't you able to impose it and he replied that he could not*." The Prime Minister continued his argument by posing a rhetorical question: *"If at the best time of Greek diplomacy, when the Germans needed us in order to recognize Croatia and dissolve Yugoslavia, we couldn't, what chances do we have today of succeeding?"* [715] Interestingly, Mitsotakis very early on in the discussion referred to public opinion and appeared self- critical about the way the December European

[714] Ibid.
[715] Ibid.

Council's conclusions were presented: "…*in any case, it is certain that there was a lack of clarity and a domestic interpretation, which we gave, which resulted in the creation of an undoubted public opinion. A public opinion, which consistently and vigorously supports this demand for emotional reasons without going into further analysis.*" [716]

Reference is also made to the international environment and intense pressures, with Mitsotakis noting that the climate abroad was hostile for Greek interests. The Prime Minister turned to the consequences of this issue: "*If we put up this fight and lose it, the consequences can be very serious. Because from that point onwards, Community countries can move ahead…to individual recognitions without conditions…. And Greece remains in the corner with its problem*." [717] Mitsotakis made an interesting argument, using the position of the Ministry's expert and academic Kofos: "*Even if we succeed in omitting the name Macedonia, we still don't solve our problem. Because, in any case, it does not stop this republic from returning to the issue in any way she wants and to permanently create problems for us…. I want to say that if one looks at it soberly, coolly, without considering the emotional reaction of the Greek people, most arguments weigh towards a policy that could lead to a solution on which we would agree*." [718] Mitsotakis further discussed the general challenges of Greek foreign policy "*Greece doesn't only have Skopje. At this time, all our national issues are on the edge.*" [719] The Prime Minister concluded by including the variable of public opinion into the equation: "*Of course, on the other side, I cannot overlook the people's demand and it is certain that the people's sentiment demands that we remain immovable on the issue of the name of Macedonia. My recommendation concludes that we should evaluate... the pros and*

[716] Ibid.
[717] Ibid.
[718] Ibid.
[719] Ibid.

the cons. I am not willing to recommend a policy, which is against a part of the Greek nation." [720]

This last disclaimer is extremely interesting. Mitsotakis more or less said that he believed in one policy, but he would not follow it unless the nation agrees. Therefore, he asked for the Council's "*unanimous position*." "*The government*" he said, "*is not willing in any case to divide the Greek people on this issue.*" [721] As time progressed, Mitsotakis clarified his recommendation: "I *put national unity over everything else …I do not want the government alone to bear the responsibility…. We negotiate until the end toughly in order to achieve the result, and if we don't achieve the result let us be prepared for possibly an alternative name, for example North Macedonia, which will close the issue. From then on, let's make a friendship offence on Skopje on which we all agree."* [722]

The position of Mitsotakis within the Great Debate is striking for a number of reasons. The Prime Minister showed a firm grasp of the weaknesses of the third condition and the reactions of European capitals; he weighted Greece's chances of success deliberately and found them to be lacking; last but not least, he engaged in a cost-benefit analysis examining the costs of failure, individual recognitions and negative spill-over effects on other significant issues, and the relative benefits of success, omission of the word Macedonia which did not guarantee that there would not be territorial aspirations in the future. It is clear from his discussion that Mitsotakis supported a more nuanced and flexible policy with which Greece would negotiate as strongly as possible but

[720] Ibid.
[721] Ibid.
[722] Ibid.

would not go as far as to adopt a hard line position. Interestingly, Mitsotakis, although he had a strong position on the matter, appeared to be prepared to submit to the will of the people. He thus attributed greater importance to national unity, valuing a common front more than a soft line policy choice.

A reading of the council's minutes leaves the impression that Mitsotakis is quite passionate about the issue. His case is extensive and well argued. With the benefit of hindsight, one may wonder why Mitsotakis, as Prime Minister, elected with 47% of the popular vote, despite his marginal Parliamentary majority of 152 votes in Parliament, did not assume the authority invested in him by the constitution to follow through with his foreign policy. After all, generally, the government of Mitsotakis did not avoid confrontation; on the contrary, it can be argued that its policies caused political conflict. In the economic sphere, for example, ND adopted an ambitious plan of Liberalization and privatizations that offended vested interests and created an uproar in Greece. Frequently, Mitsotakis had to push forward, despite intense opposition both outside and inside his party.

Indeed, his decision not to do so and his attempt to persuade the Council instead in the name of national unity seems out of character for a battle- hardened politician who throughout his career proclaimed that he valued 'truth' and 'courage' over all leadership traits. Mitsotakis came close to presenting an explanation for his political choice: The division within his own party, "*tomorrow morning Greece will be a laughing stock, because the Minister of Foreign Affairs will agree with the opposition*," he said, together with a determined public opinion, made a leaders' common front necessary. The Prime Minister argued: "*I believe that the political leadership must have the*

courage to go and say what indeed is happening, in reality. We will convince the Greek people. If all five of us go outside and tell the truth."

Thus, the position of Mitsotakis can be explained in two ways, which are not necessarily contradictory but can overlap: First, Mitsotakis had based his political ascendancy to the position of Prime Minister on two pillars: on the one hand, strong condemnation of failed PASOK policies and, on the other, a rhetoric of national unity. His policy of national reconciliation had reached its climax in 1989 with the national unity government that was formed through a coalition of the Left and the Right. In the months and years that followed, national unity and the need to transcend divisions and heal past wounds was a favorite rhetorical device of Mitsotakis. As the political climate in Greece grew more and more polarized, Mitsotakis was not prepared to throw oil onto the fire of civil strife, particularly on an issue with deep national resonance such as the Macedonia problem.

Second, the position of Mitsotakis was the product of domestic political calculations. Mitsotakis found himself in a weak position politically regarding the Macedonian problem. He was fighting a two- front battle, externally versus a strong and organized opposition that was spearheaded by PASOK and Papandreou and, internally, by Samaras who, having taken a hard line national line, could even go as far as to challenge him for the leadership of the party. As the Prime Minister would say later in the meeting: "*If the Majority Opposition allies itself with Samaras then there is a national crisis."* In other words, Mitsotakis, having performed a domestic political cost-benefit analysis, had concluded that he politically stood more to lose than gain by advocating his policy openly and publicly if he did not have the bipartisan support.

Papandreou took the opposite position to Mitsotakis. He began by describing the "*dead-end*" Greek foreign policy had reached on the matter: "*A dead end means that any decision you make has a cost"* he said, reminding the council of his disagreements with Greek support of the dissolution of Yugoslavia and suggested that even Greece's recognition of Bosnia was a mistake *"because it was a weapon we had*." He continued by agreeing that the "t*hird condition was clear only to us; it was not clear for our partners."* [723] In other words, he realized that there was a wedge driven between Greece and the International community: "*As we did Germany the favor and said yes to Slovenia, and yes to Croatia, it was the right moment to say: we will do so but under one condition…clearly, that the name Macedonia will not exist in the name of Skopje. Mr. Samaras…, who is ready to propose tough solutions, has made significant mistakes in this story*." [724] Papandreou went on to challenge Mitsotakis directly: "*The Prime Minister has never defined his position upon the issue of whether he accepts a name including the term Macedonia.*" Mitsotakis responded, defending his policy of leaving Greek options open. Papandreou however insisted, charging Mitsotakis with doublespeak, which "*undermined the capacity to win this battle that we want to win*." [725] Papandreou agreed with Mitsotakis on the nature of the challenge for the Greek people: "*What Mr. Mitsotakis said, that there is a powerful emotional factor, is exactly so*." The leader of PASOK took a radically different view on the foreign policy suggested, however, insisting upon the significance of the name: "*Regarding the other two terms, I will not speak about them*," he stated, "*because with the alterations that were asked for by Mr. Samaras, they are satisfactory*." [726] Papandreou repeated what

[723] Ibid.
[724] Ibid.
[725] Ibid.
[726] Ibid.

he said in the previous meeting. Referring to the Slav-Macedonians of Canada, the US and Australia who he knew "*personally*:" "*I know that the clearest possible long term plan is the creation of a state that will include the geographical area, which is geographically Macedonia, Macedonia of Pyrin, Bulgarian Macedonia, Macedonia of Skopje, and the Macedonia, as they say, of the Aegean. This plan is energetically promoted in all the countries, where they have very powerful lobbies.*" [727] He even set a time frame: "*The time limits which we can speak about are time limits of a few years not decades, meaning that we will face the problem within the 1990s. This plan means a shrinking of our borders, because with Bulgaria it is impossible.*" [728] Papandreou went further, putting the problem into the context of Greece's relations with its allies and partners: "*I have seen a strange attitude towards Greece, both by the US and the Partners. I have made the observation that the only one of the western countries that suffered a loss from the end of the Cold War was Greece. And the process continues. This hardness from the American side I would expect if the government in our country was a government that constantly created problems with America. But the government of Mr. Mitsotakis co-operates excellently with America. I don't understand why...we must always loose points. Constantly, we have been slapped, if you like."* [729] The opposition leader concluded with a power analysis of international relations: "*We have already presented the image of a weak, indecisive country. They know what they want; they know what they push for… our status in the Balkans and the Community will have suffered a major blow. …They may want us to have positions that were satisfactory for them, but what is appreciated in international relations, above all, is the display of force and determination*." [730] Papandreou ended by recognizing that "*there is little*

[727] Ibid.
[728] Ibid.
[729] Ibid.
[730] Ibid.

hope" to achieve the result that Greece wanted and proposed that Greece should close its borders with Skopje. At this point, Karamanlis intervened, asking: "*the consequence of a or b solution should be considered…. our position in the community is degraded and we don't need to saddle ourselves with unfortunate handling and decisions*." To this indirect challenge, Papandreou replied: "*The point, Mr. President, is how you degrade it. My impression is that a strong position on the issue can help. I am not saying 100%, I say 20% but it is worth it.*" [731]

Papandreou's statement was characteristic. In the substance of his position, his reference to foreign lobbies and territorial dangers for Greece, Papandreou articulated a similar argument in both Councils. In this Council, Papandreou appeared to be more critical of the government and ready to challenge Mitsotakis on his foreign policy choices on the dissolution of Yugoslavia in general and the Macedonian problem in particular. Indeed, he went a step further by implicating the bilateral relationship between Athens and Washington on the issue. Indirectly, he accused the government of being over- eager to co-operate with the United States, an accusation that as we have seen, always gained traction politically, with little or nothing in return. Papandreou thus presented the dilemma in black and white terms as being a choice between being "*soft*" and "*strong*." He made the implicit deduction that at the core of the problem was, quite simply, Greek willingness. If Greece appeared strong then it had chances to succeed. If Greece appeared soft then it was bound to be defeated. The leader of PASOK thus fleshed out the argument for a hard line position to the point where he proposed an embargo on Skopje. Interestingly, Papandreou proposed this policy having recognized that the third condition was relatively weak and that the name problem was

[731] Ibid.

"*emotional*." Moreover, he stated that the chances of success did not exceed "*20%*" and did not make any reference in his analysis to direct or indirect costs, choosing to ignore the international environment completely.

The Communist leader Papariga appeared more sensitive towards the impact of Identity construction in Greek politics. In terms of the process, Papariga was the only leader who clearly stated that the Greek government must "*own*" the issue and that the meeting should only have the character of "*registering opinions*", leaving space for partisan politics and opposition. In terms of substance, Papariga was critical of the government's policy and turned the discussion onto the role of public opinion: "*The people's sentiment, the public opinion, we had predicted that in this nationalist climate which developed the government would trap itself and maybe also other parties*." Papariga directly challenged the government specifically and the political system generally: "*we have a distortion of genuine patriotic feelings…. very many things were cultivated systematically by members of the government and other actors*", mentioning, as examples, the rallies and pamphlets that circulated in schools: "*There was directed nationalism more than we would normally understand might exist in such cases*." She went on emphasizing the responsibility of the municipalities in orchestrating this climate and stating that her party would continue to warn: "*disregarding the political cost*." On the policy of the matter, she proclaimed: "*the security of Greece cannot be identified with the issue of the name.*" [732]

Papandreou responded to Papariga, making his first comment regarding domestic politics: "*If the democratic world does not respond to popular sentiment we will create*

[732] Ibid.

for the first time in Greece a far – right." [733] In other words, the leader of PASOK appeared to suggest that if the nationalist wave was not surfed by the parties represented in the room there was a real and present danger that a far- right party would gain electoral influence. Historically, the Greek Junta was identified with a far-right ideology whose ghost had haunted Greek politics ever since. Fears of a coup engineered by the far- right would for example persist to as late as the 1980s.Nevertheless, one of the main achievements of Greece's transition to democracy was the sterilization of the far- right. This was achieved to a great extent in two ways: first, it was politically discredited because of the failure of the Junta and its involvement in the events that brought about the invasion and occupation of Cyprus; second, President Karamanlis embedded the far- right within ND, a policy that was followed by his all his successors, including Mitsotakis despite his Liberal background. The leader of PASOK appeared to be suggesting that the nationalist fever that had gripped the country could be exploited by elements of the far- right and allow them to gain electoral sway. Thus, his strategy consisted of the appropriation of the issue by the mainstream parties in order to keep the far- right in check.

In the last part of the Council, the discussion shifted to a negotiation mainly between Mitsotakis and Papandreou. The Prime Minister clarified his position: "*I am willing to accept the opinion of Andreas (Papandreou) and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, under the condition that we will not burn all bridges with finality …. The danger is not just from the (European) community. The danger is from the international community; it is a total isolation of Greece in the international community....*" [734] Papandreou replied:

[733] Ibid.
[734] Ibid.

"*At last! A country has the right I believe within International Law not to recognize another. I don't think that this in itself degrades us*." The Prime Minister turned to Karamanlis and asked that Papandreou should not publicly commit that he would close the borders "*because if it (PASOK) commits from now to the closure of the borders there is no chance of agreement."* [735] An agreement was reached, and Greek hard line foreign policy was sealed.

7.1.3 No going back: The third Leaders' Council (June 14th, 1992)

After the previous Council, Mitsotakis had regained the political advantage versus Samaras. Having won the battle, however, he appeared to be losing the war for the hearts and minds of the Greeks. The statement of President Karamanlis, with tears in his eyes: "*only one Macedonia exists and this Macedonia is Greek*" on his arrival at Macedonia Airport in Thessaloniki summarized public sentiment. As Kofos suggests: "*When Mitsotakis dismissed Samaras and also reserved the post of Foreign Minister for himself, instead of promoting his own conciliatory views, he proceeded publicly to pursue not his own views for a compromise solution, but the maximalist line of his dismissed minister. By that time, however, this line had been endorsed by three of the four party leaders represented in Parliament and apparently by President Karamanlis. Mitsotakis' move might be seen as a masterstroke in petty internal politics. It allowed him to outmaneouver the internal opposition of the "maximalists" in his own party and to checkmate the eroding tactics of his arch-opponent Andreas Papandreou. As it*

[735] Minutes of leadership council-118.

turned out, however, the real loser of all these confusing developments, as most Greek analysts came to assess it years later, was the 'national issue'."[736]

Once again, the meeting was monopolized by the Macedonian problem, which as President Karamanlis observed was "*serious and timely…and dominates within Greek and international public opinion."* [737] Mitsotakis began with a long discussion of the latest developments in former Yugoslavia and the misperception of Greece's positions internationally: "*Despite the fact that the position of Greece is clear and so right, our position internationally is very bad. We are under attack; we are misunderstood in everything.*" Karamanlis noted that the "*impression has been created that there is a solidarity*" with Milosevic in the international community and Mitsotakis adds "*solidarity and hidden aims*." [738] In other words, there was a recognition that the image of Greece in the international community was tarnished.

Against this backdrop, the Macedonian problem grew more complicated. Turning to the specifics of the issue, the discussion, as in previous meetings, began with a reference to the December 16th conclusions. The Prime Minister turned to the past and appeared critical of the way Samaras had led the negotiations upon the issue. The former Foreign Minister, Mitsotakis seemed to suggest, did not take such a hard line abroad as his domestic public statements would suggest. Samaras, "*had used the term that there should be no monopoly (over the name) and did not say anywhere what I went and told them …they heard this for the first time*." [739] Mitsotakis then briefed the Council

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[736] Kofos, E., (1999), *Greece's Macedonian Adventure: The Controversy Over FYROM's Independence and Recognition."* In Van Cofoudakis et al., (ed.), *Greece and the New Balkans: Challenges and Opportunities*. New York: Pella Publishing Co.

[737] *Official Transcript of the Council of Leaders*, Constantine Mitsotakis Foundation, Athens.

[738] Ibid.

[739] Ibid.

regarding the meeting at Guimarães concluding: "*our chances of winning the issue of the name are equal approximately to zero."* The Prime Minister offered an alternative course: "*my sense is that we can achieve whatever attributive adjective we want*." [740] It is indicative of the mind-set of the Prime Minister that he was not prepared to accept the Pinheiro Package as it stood, as it did not satisfy Greece on the minority issue. Referring to the course of the talks, he suggested that if Greece had insisted upon the minority question rather than the name it could have achieved its goals. In other words, the costs of the hard line already began to appear, as Greece was failing to secure the much needed guarantee on the so-called Greek Slav-minority, due to its insistence on the name.

Papandreou began by responding to the question raised by Papariga on why there was such a*"fury against Greece mainly on the subject of Skopje and why there is such a hurry to recognize (Skopje)*." Once again, the leader of PASOK and former Prime Minister, referred to the "*power of the Macedonian lobby*" in America, Australia and Canada. Papandreou continued, offering his geo-strategic analysis and describing a contest between Germany and the US in the European space for "*spheres of influence*" and also argued that only Greece and Serbia in the Balkans are: "*Countries with dynamism, with history, with tradition, countries that can say no to some things, countries that have their own civilization. And there is also Orthodoxy, which we must not forget, because the pope plays an energetic role in all developments and in the Eastern bloc…. Greece in any case is the target, as is Serbia.*" [741]

[740] Ibid.
[741] Ibid.

When asked by Karamanlis "*why do you suppose that it is the target*?" Papandreou insisted "*because these are the only countries that can hold up. Through the swamp, two countries protrude in the Balkans: Greece and Serbia. Serbia has a very long history and so does Greece*." President Karamanlis interjected "*Serbia was dissolved*." [742] Thus, Papandreou at the time expressed a popular worldview in Greek society. The Orthodox- axis was seen as a response to the Muslim- arc that was engineered by Turkey and could potentially encircle Greece. Arguments about the historical, religious and cultural bonds between Serbia and Greece persisted throughout the 1990s. Athens and Belgrade thus shared a common sense of victimization by the international community and the "new world order."

Papandreou recommended that Greece retain its "non-use of the term Macedonia." He argued: "*all that is happening consists of pressures upon Greece, let's not have any illusions. Instead of pressuring Gligorov, Greece is pressured by the whole of the international community*." Responding to the Prime Minister, the leader of the Opposition called the 16th of December a "*disastrous day*." [743] On the name itself, he was unwilling to change his hard line policy and recycles arguments that he had used in previous meetings: "*From the moment the name Macedonia is inside…the problem we face will persist. Yes, we will overcome the crisis now…to finally accept, under pressure, this compromise, I think that it degrades the status of the country in the Balkans and I will add that it does not solve the long term problem of the efforts to create a Macedonian state. And this is something that I fear in the coming decades*."[744]

[742] Ibid.
[743] Ibid.
[744] Ibid.

At this point in the discussion, the President of the Republic intervened in the discussion and made one of his few comments regarding the substance of the problem and the policy that could or should be adopted: "*This is an issue upon which all Greeks are sensitive. It is natural that personally I have an increased sensitivity…. But feelings like party considerations must be subordinate to national considerations. We must be careful what the consequences in our region and in our international relations will be with a' or b' solutions. And even our own, of absolute denial, may be dignified and proud but have serious disadvantages as well*." [745]

Papandreou replied that he did not disagree, "*but I see the image of Greece, which has fought and afterwards, at the last moment, retreats. We will not play a role in the Balkans from then on, at all, I think. We will be taken as granted*." Regarding the costs of this decision, the leader of the opposition was clear that "*There are negative consequences"* he admitted. Papandreou continued presenting himself as the ambassador of the people transcending party lines as the issue *"does not tolerate party criteria*." [746] He stated: "*I convey the climate amongst the peoples, …(they do) not do the distinction that we draw here, whether it will be Macedonian or Macedonia. This does not exist for the simple Greek citizen. And there will really be, regardless of party exhortations or moves, a serious reaction*." [747]

The Council concluded that the government should follow a hard line and that it would revisit the issue if a deadlock was reached. The announcement that followed did not refer to the name directly, or the Macedonia problem. Generally, the announcement

[745] Ibid.
[746] Ibid.
[747] Ibid.

included references to the "*usefulness*" of the meeting, the "*wish of the party leaders to attain the greatest possible degree of agreement of opinions on our national issues, within the frameworks of the known positions of the parties*" and concluded by underlining: "*the stable decision of the political leadership that Greece abstains from military involvement in the Balkans.*" [748]

7.1.4 A government's attempts to disentangle itself: The day after the councils

The three leaders' councils sealed the fate of the Macedonian issue: As the Prime Minister dramatically stated: "*I became a slave to a decision, which despite my efforts, I could not change*."[749] The next few months saw two positive decisions for Greek interests at Guimarães and Lisbon, which according to Kofos "*bear the personal mark of Mitsotakis.*"[750] Domestically, by that time, the levels of partisanship reached new heights. A few days before the Lisbon European Council, Papandreou traveled to Thessaloniki, the capital of Macedonia, and leveled harsh criticisms against "*the government of Athens,*" as he called it, which followed an "*under-bidding and submissive policy*" and "*sells out day by day a piece of our fatherland*."[751] At the same time, during the weekend the Lisbon council took place, certain that the government would fail, PASOK ran a paid TV advertisement, which showed the lowering of the Greek flag.[752] In response, Mitsotakis was much more careful, concluding his public

[748] Ibid.
[749] Skylakakis, T., (1995), *In the Name of Macedonia*, Athens: EuroEkdotiki.
[750] Kofos, E., (1999), *Greece's Macedonian Adventure: The Controversy Over FYROM's Independence and Recognition."* In Van Cofoudakis et al., (ed.), *Greece and the New Balkans: Challenges and Opportunities*. New York: Pella Publishing Co.
[751] Skylakakis, T., (1995), *In the Name of Macedonia*, Athens: EuroEkdotiki.
[752] Ibid.,172.

statements in Lisbon by addressing an international, rather than a domestic, audience: "*I do not present myself as a winner. I did not rout any opponent. I never saw them as opponents. We followed a policy that secures the normality and the peace…*"[753]

In 1993, the Greek government faced a new challenge, this time in the form of the Vance-Owen draft treaty, "*a masterpiece of diplomatic dexterity"* that *"fell victim of internal politics back in the two capitals*."[754] Indeed, it was clear by that point that the issue was primarily one of domestic, particularly intra-party, politics. As Mitsotakis stated later: "*Given the existence and various dependencies of this faction (Evert and others), without the help of the President of the Republic, which I asked for but was not given, I had neither the Parliamentary nor the internal partisan power to finish an effort such as this.*"[755] In the same spirit, the man who became Foreign Minister at the time, Michalis Papakonstantinou, noted, explaining his choice for the position: "*No one wanted the job…. No one could accuse me of being a traitor. I am from Macedonia, I studied the problem long before people discovered it, and I have impeccable nationalist credentials. I was the only one who could solve the problem and not be accused of selling out…"*.[756] He would go on to further state: "*all our efforts aimed at our domestic audience, as if we were trying to convince the Greeks of our position (on a compromise) and not the foreigners*."[757]

Indeed, the government's efforts to disentangle itself from a hard line position and the political developments in the months that preceded the 'Vance-Owen' proposal are of

[753] Ibid.,174.

[754] Kofos, E., (1999), *Greece's Macedonian Adventure: The Controversy Over FYROM's Independence and Recognition."* In Van Cofoudakis et al., (ed.), *Greece and the New Balkans: Challenges and Opportunities*, New York: Pella Publishing Co.

[755] Skylakakis, T., *In the Name of Macedonia* (Athens: EuroEkdotiki 1995).

[756] Zahariades, N., (2005), *Essence of Political Manipulation: Emotion, Institutions, and Greek Foreign Policy*, New York: Peter Lang.

[757] Papakonstantinou, M.,(1994), *The Diary of a Politician*, Athens: Estia, p.65.

great interest. The Prime Minister and the government made a systematic effort to regain the political advantage, both within ND and beyond, which would have empowered it to revise Greek hard line policy. Towards the end of 1992, the Prime Minister re-established his supremacy within his party. In October, Mitsotakis called a meeting of the ND Parliamentary caucus, challenging anyone who doubted his authority over foreign affairs with elections.

The caucus had a two-fold result: in terms of foreign policy, it followed the recommendation of Mitsotakis and agreed that the recognition of Skopje would not be accepted under a name that included the name Macedonia with a significant amendment: "*for its outside relations*." This was in line with the Prime Minister's recommendation who, at the time, was hoping to achieve a compromise based on a double formula with a different name for domestic and international use. In terms of domestic politics, Samaras was pushed to resignation after the caucus as a result of intra-party maneuvering. [758]

Moreover, in the last months of 1992, the government asked for the Council of Political Leaders to reconvene in an effort to revise its hard line position. This was in line with the agreement reached at the latest Council. In November 1992, during the Prime Minister's trip to the United States, Papandreou, who wished to torpedo a possible council at all costs, issued five terms for his participation in a new council. The first of these terms, which obviously could not be accepted by the government, was "*that the government recognizes the huge mistakes in its policy and management."*[759]

[758] Skylakakis, T., (1995), *In the Name of Macedonia,* Athens: EuroEkdotiki, p.191-196.
[759] Ibid., 203.

Karamanlis met with Papandreou a few days later, on the 27th of November 1992, and Papandreou reiterated his opposition to the meeting. Mitsotakis did not give up. He publicly turned up the pressure on Papandreou for his refusal and in early 1993 sent a letter to President Karamanlis formally requesting the Council of Leaders. The President of the Republic requested that the Prime Minister withdraw the letter, claiming that it would actually make a meeting of the leaders even more difficult. By that time, clouds had gathered over the relationship between Mitsotakis and Karamanlis. The Prime Minister increasingly believed that if he had the public, vocal, support of the President he would be able to discipline his party. Karamanlis, however, sensing the public mood, wished to keep himself above the fray.

Diplomatically, the discussion had moved from being a search for a formula of a double name to a proposed arbitration, the acceptance of which could even be obligatory for both sides. The government attempted to prepare the ground for a compromise with the Prime Minister stating that he would be prepared to accept a solution along the lines of "*Northern Macedonia*" and later arguing: "*In a few years, the name will be forgotten*." The opposition and the press harshly criticized both statements. [760] On the 27th of March 1993, the Prime Minister made a last effort to solidify his party base and to convince them to accept a compromise. The Parliamentary caucus of ND met once again to discuss the issue. Mitsotakis argued his case fully: First, he noted that for over forty five years the foreign policy of Greece was not that "*the Slavs of Skopje should not use the term Macedonia at all*", underlining that the problem of Greece was always the "*non-existent minority*." Second, he noted the difficulties Greece faced with Skopje's request to join the UN. "*When America was fighting with Korea*," he reminded

[760] Ibid., 211.

his audience, "*Korea entered the UN and America did not veto in order to stop her*." Third, he clarified that "*from the time we accept arbitration on the name, it is certain that we are abandoning the position that the name Macedonia is excluded in every case*." Fourth, the Prime Minister emphasized, "*Greece cannot have two open fronts, one with Turkey and one towards the North*."[761]

The standard- bearer of internal party opposition, Evert, took the floor: "*With hyper-enthusiasms and exaggerations regarding so-called diplomatic triumphs, we created a psychological climate, which our country will pay for dearly, the prestige of the people and our party*." And he continued: "*What we said today here, Mr. President, and what you will say tonight, will not be understood by the people, and I fear will not forget neither in one, nor in ten, not even in twenty years time. And the question that I asked, Mr. President, is why did we drag two million people in Thessaloniki and Athens to rallies?*" He continued, with his eye clearly on domestic politics: "*We cannot in the name of worse development accept compromises…. We are called upon to commit suicide. We prefer to be murdered."* Evert concluded by asking for a vote to reaffirm the decision of the previous party caucus. Mitsotakis responded forcefully, saying that the road the government took was *"demanded by the Greek people.*" He continued by stating that if the caucus reconfirmed its previous decision, this would be "*totally unacceptable*" as it would mean the rejection of the proposals by the United Nations. He concluded by challenging his MPs: "*if you have no faith in your government, you vote against it and you overthrow it. I am not disposed, as a castrated Prime Minister, to go and carry out foreign policy.*" The caucus agreed not to take a vote and accepted the recommendation of the Prime Minister that: "*Greece goes and battles in the field of*

[761] Skylakakis, T., (1995), *In the Name of Macedonia,* Athens: EuroEkdotiki.

the UN, seeking the desiderata of the Greek people. Not any more as an unyielding demand, however, which if it is not accepted, brings down all."[762]

Thus, Mitsotakis left for the UN having attained a weak modus vivendi. Nevertheless, it proved not to be enough. The acceptance of Skopje into the UN was harshly criticized by the opposition, with Papathemelis, the PASOK Member of Parliament and its resident Macedonian expert, stating: "*the government chose the road of defeat which is a euphemism it calls compromise*."[763] When the 'Vance-Owen' solution was tabled, the opposition was vitriolic in its attacks: Papandreou called the plan *"treasonous*" and urged the government to reject it, while Samaras accused the government of deviating from established policy and regarded the plan a "*national tragedy*." The government was forced to retreat because of the reactions within ND. A possible successor to Mitsotakis, Evert, together with a group of influential MPs, presented the Prime Minister with an ultimatum, stating that if he signed the document the government would lose its Parliamentary majority. Indeed, four months later, two MPs withdrew their confidence on an unrelated issue and joined the party formed by Samaras, thus bringing down the government and forcing an election in October. PASOK, which campaigned with foreign policy slogans such as 'the name is our life' was returned to power with a comfortable majority of twenty votes in Parliament, while Papandreou's election night statement began with a promise of 'national independence.'

[762] Ibid., 212-218.

[763] Zahariades, N., (2005), *Essence of Political Manipulation: Emotion, Institutions, and Greek Foreign Policy*, New York: Peter Lang, p.106.

7.2 Greek – Turkish rapprochement

The 1993 election saw the triumphant return of PASOK and its ailing leader Andreas Papandreou to power. It would be the beginning of the longest party hold on power in Greek twentieth century history, with the socialists governing the country for eleven years having won three consecutive elections. PASOK achieved this feat to a great extent by successfully managing its own internal democratic transition after the resignation and ultimate death of its founder in the mid-1990s.

7.2.1 Modernizers and PASOK solidification

The post-Papandreou era was marked by the self-described 'modernizers'; a fraction of PASOK lead by Costas Simitis, who succeeded Papandreou as leader of the party, developed a policy agenda of top-down rationalization and Europeanization of Greek politics, economy and society, placing above all else the convergence with Europe and membership in the EMU with its multiple economic and political meanings. The 'modernizers' and their ideological prodigy, 'modernization,' received praise from a number of scholars to the point where it has been described as an expression of an alternative political culture. In any case, it is clear that Simitis actively contrasted his political and policy choices with those of his predecessor, inviting comparisons with the socialist populist past, and with the pragmatic, managerial and technocratic present.[764]

[764] Blavoukos, S., Bourantonis, D., (2010), *Accounting for Foreign Policy Change: The Role of Policy Entrepreneurs*, Paper prepared for the SGIR 7th Pan-European Conference on IR Stockholm.

The re-prioritization of national policy objectives engineered by the 'modernizers' necessitated the minimization of foreign policy risks, such as the ones that could arise from a confrontational and adversarial relationship with Turkey. The modernizing agenda placed Greece's European path at its epicenter. In this context, the economic destabilizing effects of a probable crisis on the course to EMU accession, and the political and symbolic connotation of a 'normal' and 'European' foreign policy that was no longer monopolized by national interests and parochial concerns but was shaped by European strategies were equally important.[765] Rozakis drew a direct connection with the government's modernizing agenda: "*Modernization is the absolute denial of the past and goes further than foreign policy. Modernization views things as they should be, as Greece should be. Only the European aspect is fixed and invariable with Simitis*."[766] Simitis would underline this argument stating, during our interview, that Greek foreign policy is connected to modernization: "*friendly relations with all our neighbors provided us with a greater potential for growth, exports, imports and investments. Furthermore, European co-operation was advanced with European rules for all*."[767]

Interestingly, however, a time lag can be observed between PASOK's change of guard, in 1996, and the revision of Greek foreign policy dogma, in 1999. On the contrary, the three years that ensued were riddled by smaller and bigger crises between Ankara and Athens. Historically, foreign policy decision-making has not been without its own share of intra-party discord.[768]Nevertheless, the authoritarian structure of Greek parties and

[765]Blavoukos, S., Bourantonis, D., (2010), *Accounting for Foreign Policy Change: The Role of Policy Entrepreneurs*, Paper prepared for the SGIR 7th Pan-European Conference on IR Stockholm.

[766]Interview with former Deputy Foreign Minister C. Rozakis, June 2013.

[767]Interview with former Prime Minsiter C. Simitis, June 2nd 2013.

[768]Ioakimidis, P., (1999), *The Model of Foreign Policy-Making in Greece: Personalities Versus Institutions*. In Stavridis, S., Couloumbis, T., Veremis, T. and Waites, N., (eds.), *The Foreign Policies of the European Union's Mediterranean States and Applicant Counries in the 1990s*, Basingstoke, MacMillan, p.157.

their leadership- heavy processes have enabled Prime Ministers, in most cases, to impose their policy choices upon their governments and their parties. Simitis seems to be an exception to the rule, at first choosing not even to try, despite his large Parliamentary majority. Some scholars have attributed this lag to the need for "*intra-partisan solidification that over time sidelined political concerns and opposition*."[769] Arguably, the siege mentality that dominated Greek political discourse remained strong, informing risk and security perceptions both within and beyond PASOK.[770] Consequently, the space available to Simitis, whose political career was to a certain extent stigmatized by his disagreements with the more charismatic Papandreou, was controlled by the more traditionalist faction of PASOK which opposed his policy agenda: "*This induced him into some tactical compromises, especially during the early years of his government*."[771]

Interestingly it appears that the party itself, PASOK, presented the greatest political difficulties to the government's policy. In the words of Rozakis: "*The greatest obstacle was PASOK. Essentially, the main negative factor in the time delay, that manipulated developments was first and foremost the party itself that was nurtured with certain beliefs. Beliefs that unfortunately, after a certain point in time, became national beliefs…the Andreas (Papandreou) space was larger than Andreas himself. I am sure that you understand that a party that changes leadership in 1996 and that was nurtured in a certain attitude regarding Turkish – Greek relations, based on the premise that the*

[769] Blavoukos, S., Bourantonis, D., (2010), *Accounting for Foreign Policy Change: The Role of Policy Entrepreneurs*; Paper prepared for the SGIR 7th Pan-European Conference on IR Stockholm.
[770] Ibid.
[771] Kazamias, A., (1997), *The Quest for Modernisation in Greek Foreign Policy and its Limitations*. In *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 2, 71-94.

only problem is the continental shelf…such a petrification cannot be changed…there were exceptionally negative reactions."[772]

Simitis, talking with hindsight during our interview, appears much more self-assured: "*I did pay attention to the reactions. I thought that they were unreasonable and had no electoral influence upon the party. Our narrative was quite different than that of Papandreou and there was no connection with the defense of nationalist positions. Furthermore, our society had matured after Imia and we had made it clear that we wanted co-operation with Turkey and to overcome past rivalries*."[773]

It is equally apparent, however, that personalities also played a role. It appears that Simitis himself was not an early advocate of the normalization of Greek –Turkish relations. As Rozakis notes: "*Simitis was clearly a PASOK personality and for a long period of time almost identified with the positions of PASOK. And here you see an evolution this is due to his intelligence which essentially mutated him from being a strong opponent of the Greek- Turkish normalization to a more moderate position…. certainly, he became more conciliatory to reach the point he did…he perceives foreign reality very well...he saw our constraints…he lived through the Imia tragedy in all its scope*."[774]

At the same time, the 1999 assumption of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by George Papandreou, the son of former Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou and PASOK's most popular politician at the time, was critical. Paradoxically, the Ocalan crisis "*gave a*

[772] Interview with former Deputy Foreign Minister C. Rozakis, June 2013.
[773] Interview with former Prime Minsiter C. Simitis, June 2nd 2013.
[774] Interview with former Deputy Foreign Minister C. Rozakis, June 2013.

strong hand to the moderates within the PASOK party."[775] The crisis led to the dismissal of three Greek cabinet members, most significantly that of Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos, who appeared torn between adopting a Europeanized foreign policy and flamboyant rhetoric that far from contributed to the normalization of Greek foreign relations. Comparing and contrasting the statements by Pangalos and Papandreou is sufficiently revealing. On the one hand, for Pangalos, Greek – Turkish relations remained a hostage to history. "*We have nothing to do with Turkey*" he stated in 1997, "*a man can't discuss things with murderers, rapists and thieves*."[776] For Papandreou, on the other hand, Greece and Turkey had much more in common than not. In 1999, he wrote to his Turkish colleague: "*Both Greece and Turkey have rich cultural traditions. Building a multicultural Europe means that we need to enhance our cultural identities and understand each other's specificity*."[777] Rozakis confirms the significance of personal beliefs. "*I have to underline*," he noted during our interview "*that Pangalos was hesitant and up to a certain point Simitis was hesitant as well.*"[778] He attributes the three year time lag to political leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "*That infamous term 'vital interest' (in the 1997 Madrid declaration) played an important role in the reawakening of fears. We are in the post-Andreas period, without having overcome Andreas, and this step we took disturbed many individuals…. a full retreat followed. Without the Ocalan crisis, not in itself as event but as a cause to change the leadership of the ministry, we would never have reached Helsinki.*"[779] The recollection of Simitis is complementary to that of Rozakis. He notes that the "*succession of Pangalos contributed significantly*" and adds: "*Pangalos supported an*

[775] Gundogdu, A., (2001), *Identities in Question: Greek-Turkish Relations in a Period of Transformation*, Middle East Review of International Affairs, 5, 1.
[776] Athens News Agency, Daily News Bulletin, September 27, 1997.
[777] "Letter from Mr. George Papandreou, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Greece, to Mr. Ismail Cem, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Turkey," June 25, 1999.<http://www.greekturkishforum.org/docu_c2.htm>.
[778] Interview with former Deputy Foreign Minister C. Rozakis, June 2013.
[779] Ibid.

entente but only within a traditional framework. That is why Madrid happened with the United States. I believed that the United States were not necessary and that we should engage directly in dialogue in tandem with EU accession."[780]

Moreover, the 'modernizing' foreign policy agenda was opposed, according to opinion polls, by significant segments of the Greek public. Between 1996 and 1999, PASOK walked a tight- rope of balancing domestic politics and Greece's international obligations. In a typical case of Putnam's approach, the government emerged as "*a reliable partner for its Western allies*" as it was the only party that "*can manipulate unruly Greek public opinion and absorb its reactions.*"[781] The NATO campaign in Kosovo provided a case in point whereby PASOK expressed its tacit support of NATO action, even materially facilitating the allies, while publicly voicing reservations about the bombings.[782]

7.2.2 Opposition

The role of the opposition was critical. Compared to the early 1990s, partisanship had evolved, taking a different form. The two leaders who left their mark on Greek politics during the 1980s, Papandreou and Mitsotakis, had by now left the stage. A new generation of political leadership had taken charge, with Simitis leading PASOK and the youthful Karamanlis leading ND. The two 'elephants' of the Greek political system,

[780] Interview with former Prime Minsiter C. Simitis, June 2nd 2013.

[781] Keridis, D., (2003), *The Foreign Policy of Modernization: From Confrontation to Interdependence*. In Tsakonas, P., *Modern Greek-Foreign Policy. A Holistic Approach,* Athens: Sideris, pp. 323.

[782] Keridis, D., (2003), *The Foreign Policy of Modernization: From Confrontation to Interdependence*. In Tsakonas, P., *Modern Greek-Foreign Policy. A Holistic Approach,* Athens: Sideris, pp. 32.

PASOK and ND, still engaged in partisan contest, without however leading society to the levels of intense polarization known in the past. At the same time, a new political space developed in Greece. Not unlike in the rest of Europe, a convergence could be observed amongst the two main political parties as a consensus developed on Europeanization and key policy choices - primarily EMU accession. Politically, one of the most intriguing aspects of the 1999 policy revision is that it took place a few months before the 2000 national election. In other words, the government broke the political rule that makes incumbents more conservative in their policy choices, and assumed a considerable political risk. The government took advantage of the fact that the opposition ND did not present a common front, with leading MPs offering contradictory public statements.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Papandreou remembers opposition: "*I don't remember opposition being very intense. Of course, there were always cries calling me a traitor. But, overall, when in Parliament I presented our goals, including in the process, for instance, the Cyprus problem, the continental shelf and religious liberties, Mr. Moliviatis (the opposition spokesman on foreign affairs) challenged us, saying that we wouldn't attain our goals. Well, we did."* In the words of Rozakis*: "An opposition is always an opposition. They could not do differently. And Karamanlis led an opposition on all subjects but then later continued with our policy*."[783]

During the Parliamentary debate, Karamanlis criticized the government without however using the harsh tones of the past. Unlike Papandreou in the early 1990s, there was no talk of 'traitors' and 'patriots,' 'over-bidders' and 'under-bidders.' In other

[783] Interview with former Deputy Foreign Minister C. Rozakis, June 2013.

words, the leader of the opposition opted not to employ the rhetoric of Greek National Identity. Instead, Karamanlis chose to articulate more generic political language, opting for a lowest common denominator approach, and remaining short of specifics: "*It is a myth that we have to choose between retreat and conflict... it is a myth that accommodation generates international support... it is a myth that Greece is not powerful enough... the policy we advocate does not necessarily entail the use of military means... however it is important that the right messages are sent... whenever we are provoked, our reaction must be quick, integral and comprehensive*."[784]

Significantly, Karamanlis spoke in a language of moderation, emphasizing the utility of means at Greece's disposal and the effectiveness of the country's strategy. Karamanlis for instance stated: "*Accession to the EC has been the greatest achievement of our country after WWII... the capabilities which have been offered to us must be protected...the relinquishment of the veto considerably diminishes the capacity of Greece to use EU membership in order to exercise pressure on Turkey to follow the principles of peaceful co-existence*."[785] In the ensuing election, foreign policy was not at the epicenter of political debate. Again, compared to 1993 and the Macedonian case, the opposition chose to not place emphasis upon foreign policy and instead adopted a line of constructive criticism supporting good neighborly relations with Turkey and its European orientation but also criticizing governmental tactical choices. [786]PASOK won the ensuing 2000 election with a slight margin, gaining another term for Simitis as Prime Minister.

[784] Speech of Costas Caramanlis (Leader of New Democracy); in Journal of Parliamentary Debates, (6 November 1997), p. 1250.
[785] Speech of Costas Caramanlis (Leader of New Democracy); in Journal of Parliamentary Debates, (15 December, 1999), p. 2379.
[786] Le Monde Diplomatique, Greece's earthquake diplomacy.

7.3 The Annan Plan

In 2004, Greek political elites stood at the crossroads of hard liners and soft liners. The position of the PASOK government on the proposed Annan plan was first made public, two years earlier, on November 15th, 2002 and the Great Debate began. Visiting Warsaw, the Prime Minister stated that the plan "*constitutes a basis for negotiations*." Openly addressing his domestic audience, Simitis, counseled for "*soberness, seriousness and responsibility, not to damage the cause*."[787] Foreign Minister Papandreou briefed the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense that same day on the progress of the talks facing opposition from heavyweights within his party, including his predecessor at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a former Minister of Defense and a former Deputy Minister.[788] Former Minister of Defense and contender for PASOK's leadership in 1996, Arsenis characteristically proclaimed: "*The plan of Kofi Annan leads to the destruction of the Republic of Cyprus and now the international uproar against the General Secretary begins*."[789] The discussion extended to a joint meeting of the party's central committee and its Parliamentary caucus, fifteen days later, when only after extensive consultations a common statement was approved via acclamation and not via vote, proving that the plan was a hard-sell within PASOK itself.[790]

Developments on the benches of the opposition were less dramatic. New Democracy at first openly accepted the Annan plan as a basis for talks; the Communist Party voiced

[787] Venizelos, K., Ignatiou, M. and Meletis, N., (2005), *The Annan Plan: The Secret Trade, the 129 Days That Shook Hellenism.* Athens: Livanis, p 56.
[788] Ibid, p.56-7.
[789] Athens News Agency Bulletin, 24/11/2002.
[790] Venizelos, K., Ignatiou, M. and Meletis, N., (2005), *The Annan Plan: The Secret Trade, the 129 Days That Shook Hellenism.* Athens: Livanis, p 56-57.

its opposition and the leftist Synaspismos was divided. Politically, however, the first seeds of the hard liner cross-ideological boundaries and cross-party appeal of the campaign against the acceptance of the plan were sewn critically within the area of the governing center- left. In November 2002, party cadres of PASOK, including MPs and former Ministers, joined forces with the leadership and members of DIKI, a small splinter party, to form a movement against the Annan plan together with personalities from Greece and Cyprus. This 'Patriotic movement of citizens against the Annan Plan' was founded against the "*unacceptable Annan plan that legitimizes the dichotomy of Cyprus and extends the control of the Turkish Cypriot side to the whole of the island*" while its aim was the "*information*" of the Greek people and its "*activation*" for peace and justice in the region and the world in general. DIKI leader and former PASOK Minister Tsovolas, Former Minister Arsenis and others, in their meeting which took place in the presence of representatives from all parties, highlighted their concern that the Annan plan would be the "model" that would be implemented in the future in the Aegean and Thrace.[791] At the same time, former PASOK minister and protagonist of the campaign against a settlement to the Macedonian question, Papathemelis, denounced the "*monstrosity of the imaginary guarantor of international legitimacy, Mr. Annan*", condemning the plan because "*it imposes the violent geopolitical ostracization of Hellenism from Cyprus*."[792]

In 2004, the negotiations on the Annan Plan were approaching their end and a seminal historical decision lay ahead. Until March of that year, Athens, under a soft line PASOK government, actively pursued a solution and even applied relentless pressure on the

[791] Eleftherotypia Newspaper, 18/11/2002.
[792] Ta Nea Newspaper, 12/12/2002.

Cypriot government: "*It was clear from the deposition of the first Annan plan that the target of the government at the time was for the Greek Cypriots to accept the proposal by the UN's General Secretary*."[793] As Christos Rozakis, a trusted advisor and close confidant of the Prime Minister, confirmed: "*Premier Simitis was clearly in support of the plan although he had expressed his reservations on certain points*."[794] In the words of the Greek high official who influenced foreign policy under the Karamanlis government: "*The Simitis government had agreed on the plan. …We were kept informed from the beginning while we were in the opposition*."[795]

The Great Debate was complicated by the fact that in 2004 Greece was once again in transition and a change of government took place, with the soft line PASOK handing over to the hard line ND. Cyprus loomed large over the Greek political system. Prime Minister Simitis based his petition to the President of the Republic to dissolve the Parliament a few weeks before the end of its term with the May 1st deadline set by the UN Secretary General for the reunification talks "*so that the new government, with a fresh popular mandate, will face developments successfully*."[796] In other words, although successive PASOK governments had invested a considerable political capital in the talks since their inception six years earlier the Prime Minister appears to have recognized the historic significance of the decision and acknowledged the intensity of the ' Great Debate' as he sought the renewal of the public mandate. "*Any other option*," Prime Minister Simitis would add, in an interview with the author,

[793] Syrigos, A., (2005), *The Annan Plan, The Inheritance of the Past and Future Perspective*, Athens: Patakis, p.483.
[794] Interview with former Deputy Foreign Minister C. Rozakis, June 2013.
[795] Interview with former Minister of Foreign Affairs P. Moliviatis, May 2013.
[796] Letter by Simitis to Stephanopoulos http://news.pathfinder.gr/politics/23571.html

"*would transform the Cyprus problem into an object of domestic party competition*."[797]

7.3.1 The Karamanlis hard line government

Two years later, New Democracy won the March 2004 elections with 45,37%, gaining a comfortable majority in Parliament of 165 seats. The newly elected Karamanlis government had to use its ample political capital to face two significant challenges: The Cyprus talks and the organization of the upcoming Olympic games. For a government that was only a few weeks old, with minimal governing experience, last time New Democracy was in power was in 1993 and Karamanlis had never served in a Ministry, the Cyprus problem must have appeared daunting – a fact confirmed during interviews.[798] Indeed, the Annan Plan was unprecedented historically in its ambition for a final and lasting solution and the engagement of the international community.

My interviews suggest that decision-makers, and particularly Premier Karamanlis, perceived themselves as firmly anchored in the hard line camp and their thinking was informed by the construction of National Identity. Indeed, the Cyprus problem is historically entangled and ideologically charged, creating complex legacy issues. Generations of Greek policy-makers struggled with the problem, which has confounded political elites for decades. In the words of Theodoros Rousopoulos, Minister of State and Government Spokesman in the Karamanlis government and who was a close

[797] Interview with former Prime Minsiter C. Simitis, June 2nd 2013.
[798] Interview with former Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, G. Koumoutsakos, April, 2013.

confidant of the Prime Minister: "*Growing older, without certainties, our only stable point of reference is the nation, our National Identity, an element of our existence and our self-determination. This certainty is number one in the mind of a Prime Minister. Whether one wants it or not the historical context within which a decision is made defines you. If you do 'a' you choose safety and security. If you do 'b' you become Ephialtes, Alcibiades or Pausanias (so-called traitors). There exists no nation, without national myths and one cannot fight against thousands of years of DNA*."[799]

Prime Minister Karamanlis, with a PhD in International Relations and an avid reader of history, having edited and prefaced a number of historical publications, writhed under the weight of history. In private conversations, Karamanlis, often presented himself as being a "*humble servant of a glorious past*."[800] Reportedly, he would self-consciously refer to the need for a leader to provide answers to "primordial questions" arguing that the Greeks are "*bearers of an illustrious inheritance, an ancient glory, the empire of Hellenism…we may be weak now, but we don't know where we will be in the future.*"[801]Interestingly, he appeared willing to draw a contrast between the soft line of leaders such as former Prime Minister Mitsotakis, which he "*respects*," and his personal beliefs that are associated with the "*purpose of the nation*."[802]As Rousopoulos confirmed: "*At the beginning, in opposition, regarding the Cyprus problem, Karamanlis wanted a solution, logically and dispassionately, but later he started talking about the ghosts of our ancestors*."[803] Moreover, policy-makers in the government felt the weight of history. As Rousopoulos stated, referring to the historical

[799] Interview with former Minister of State and Government Spokesman T. Rousopoulos, May 2013.
[800] Interview with high official of the Karamanlis government, May 2013.
[801] Ibid.
[802] Ibid.
[803] Interview with former Minister of State and Government Spokesman T. Rousopoulos, May 2013.

trajectory of Hellenism over millennia: "*When a leader goes against the historical current it is very difficult. It is the safest historical route to walk down the paths others before you have taken. In terms of the Cyprus problem, that was obvious. The historical weight of the decision was great*."[804]

Prime Minister Karamanlis, personally, was in many ways a hostage of his own family's legacy. After all, it was his uncle, namesake and political role model, Constantine Karamanlis, who followed a soft line and negotiated the Zurich - London Agreements that founded the Republic of Cyprus, offering significant concessions and reaching a compromise thus creating a significant 'lesson-learned'. Over the decades, hard liners tended to demonize the 1960 agreements, which were held responsible for the Cypriot troubles. Archbishop Makarios, President of Cyprus and co-signatory of the accords, would lead the opposition to the 1960 agreements claiming that he was forced to bow to international and Greek pressures. In private conversations, Prime Minister Karamanlis reportedly spoke of: "*My uncle's greatest error*."[805]

Historical analogies and their impact upon decision-making have been addressed in bibliographical debate.[806] In this context, the Great Debate was further driven by the legacy effect of the 1960 agreements, which cannot be underestimated despite the passage of time. In the words of one scholar: "*More importantly, critics have drawn parallels between proposals for the reunification of Cyprus and the 2002-2004 Annan Plan, as well as the 1959 Zürich-London Agreements which led to the establishment and subsequent collapse of the Republic of Cyprus. For instance, in an influential*

[804] Interview with former Minister of State and Government Spokesman T. Rousopoulos, May 2013.
[805] Interview with high official of the Karamanlis government, May 2013.
[806] Khong, Y., (1992), *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965*, Princeton University Press.

London Review of Books essay criticizing the Annan Plan, the renowned historian, Perry Anderson, mentions the 1959-1960 agreements: 'The constitution of Zurich had proved unworkable enough, leading only to communal strife and breakdown. The constitution of Birkenstock [the Annan Plan], far more complicated and still more inequitable, was a recipe for yet greater rancor and paralysis' (2008). Even when such parallels are not explicitly made, it is inevitable that past memories and legacies directly and indirectly influence decisions for the future".[807]

A diplomatic member of the delegation at Birkenstock, with intimate knowledge of the deliberations, noted in an interview: "*The cloud of Zurich clearly hung over us.*"[808]Reportedly, in an off- the- record exchange with journalists, the Greek Foreign Minister recalled the 1960 agreements of Zurich and his role as a young diplomatic messenger between Makarios and Karamanlis, stating that "*mishaps became lessons*." [809]A high official, who shaped foreign policy under Karamanlis, when asked about the historical legacy of Zurich, stated: "*I cannot personally deny that… there was a psychological residue. But it did not influence our decisions. It certainly did not bare an impact of the Prime Minister's thinking. There was a big difference between the Annan Plan and Zurich: Back in 1960, Cyprus was a colony and with the approval of the Cypriots, we negotiated on their behalf. Now Cyprus is independent. This is a big difference*."[810] Rousopoulos remembered during his interview: "*Personally, I believe that Zurich was number one for Karamanlis. Historically, if the elder Karamanlis had to worry about one thing in terms of his legacy it was Zurich. Karamanlis was labeled a traitor and Makarios a hero. You now had Costas*

[807]Loizides, N., (2016), *Designing Peace Processes: Institutional Innovations in Cyprus and Divided Societies*, University of Pennsylvania Press.
[808]Interview with former Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, G. Koumoutsakos, April, 2013.
[809]Venizelos, K., Ignatiou, M. and Meletis, N., (2005), *The Annan Plan: The Secret Trade, the 129 Days That Shook Hellenism*, Athens: Livanis, p.340.
[810]Interview with former Minister of Foreign Affairs P. Moliviatis, May 2013.

Karamanlis, a new Prime Minister, and Zurich loomed large over both the name Karamanlis and Greece."[811]

It should be noted that during the interviews for this thesis two members of the Greek delegation, separately, shared a historical anecdote that is highly suggestive of the delegation's mindset. After Zurich, the elder Karamanlis allegedly asked Makarios: "*You signed, and I signed. Why are you a hero and I am a traitor then*?"[812] The survival of this piece of historical evidence across generations as a warning and a lesson learned summarizes the dynamic interplay between the forces of foreign policy Identity and domestic politics together with their impact on decision making. As Rousopoulos suggested: "*Karamanlis –as I believe any Prime Minister would have done- was primarily interested in not making a major mistake and thus being labeled as a national traitor*."[813] As a high official stated at the time: "*I will not sacrifice Karamanlis*!"[814]

7.3.2 The influence of the hard line Cypriot President

Last but not least, the Karamanlis government was influenced by its Cypriot government which addressed the same political audience. The relationship between Cyprus and Greece has evolved over time into one of equals. Historically, the bilateral dynamic between Athens and Nicosia was shaped by the desire of Athens to be the center of Hellenism. The establishment of Athens as the 'national center' was a legacy

[811] Interview with former Minister of State and Government Spokesman T. Rousopoulos, May 2013.
[812] Interview with former spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Giorgos Koumoutsakos, April 2013; Interview with former Minister of Foreign Affairs P. Moliviatis, May 2013.
[813] Interview with former Minister of State and Government Spokesman T. Rousopoulos, May 2013.
[814] Interview with Former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs C. Rozakis, June 2013.

of 19th century romanticism with its eschatological perceptions of common origins, common history, common religion, and common destiny. After 1974, however, "*ideological dependency on the national centers declined in the Greek Cypriot community*."[815] The sense of betrayal in Cyprus, the frustration and anguish that followed the Greek Junta's coup d' état and the Turkish invasion resulted in "*a general decline in the use of Greek national symbols and a stronger emphasis on the need to protect the integrity and the status of the Republic*."[816] Arguably, 1974 was a watershed in Greek – Cypriot relations because it legitimized the autonomy of the island's foreign policy. Cyprus was recognized by Athens as being an equal partner in international affairs. Close collaboration and systematic consultation defined the relationship without however one state imposing its policy preferences upon the other.

In this context, Cypriot hard line President Papadopoulos considerably influenced the Great Debate. Indeed, his catalytic role was recognized by US diplomats. This conclusion is reportedly supported by Foreign Minister Moliviatis: "*FM Moliviatis has told us repeatedly that Papadopoulos, who is not personally popular with Greek Government officials, has more leverage on Greece than the other way around, since he can play the Pan-Hellenic card whenever GoG actions are not to his liking*."[817] Describing the March 2004 visit by Papadopoulos to Athens, the first visit Karamanlis received by a foreign delegation as Prime Minister, US diplomats note: "*During Cypriot President Papadopoulos' March 7-9 visit, we were dismayed by Papadopoulos' slick handling of the Greeks, leveraging enthusiastic support from his fellow Hellenes… For reasons of domestic political expediency, successive Greek governments have*

[815] Loizides, N., (2007), *Ethnic Nationalism and Adaptation in Cyprus, International Studies Perspectives*, 172–189.
[816] Ibid.
[817] http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/10/05ATHENS2647.html

tended not to be willing to weigh in effectively with Nicosia, even when Nicosia hardball tactics affect Greece's broader security interests with Turkey. The Karamanlis government is no exception."[818]

President Papadopoulos was a staunch opponent of the Annan Plan. Two weeks before the referendum he called on the people of Cyprus to say a "*loud no*." Addressing the nation, in a statement rich in National Identity, that was transmitted live on Greek TV, Papadopoulos emphasized that *"the people of Cyprus are called upon, each one of us separately and collectively, to write the history of the future of Cyprus*." At the same time, he demanded – drawing a contrast -- that *"our foreign friends will respect the people and the Republic of Cyprus and understand that interventions and pressure insult the dignity of the people of Cyprus, are against the provisions of the UN Charter and in the end are unproductive.*" He added that "*even with the most flexible judgment*," the final Annan plan *"does not meet the minimum aims we set*". He passionately detailed his objection, including that: "*the 1974 Turkish invasion and occupation of the island's northern third are erased*;" "*the Turkish Cypriots obtain equal participation in the new federal state*;" "*while the Greek Cypriot expectations from a painful compromise are left hovering without guarantees and are projected into the future, depending solely on the goodwill of Turkey to meet its obligations*;" *"The final Annan plan does not satisfy the Cypriots but fully satisfies Turkey's aim to control Cyprus*." Noting that he "*received an internationally recognized state and could not deliver a community*," Papadopoulos concluded passionately: "*They are asking us to accept these adverse adjustments in a spirit of compromise. They are telling us that a solution could not emerge if there were no such painful compromises and that a solution must be found. However, there are*

[818] http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/03/06ATHENS767.html

matters of principle and human rights where the 'middle solution' is not the right answer…. I am sure that for you the moral principles and values of our people, their civilization and national historic life still mean a lot to you and you want to continue with security, justice, freedom and peace."[819]

The profile and choices of President Papadopoulos fall outside the scope of this thesis. Interviews with members of the Greek delegation suggest that the President of Cyprus was identified with bitter opposition to the plan. Sources within the Greek delegation suggest that President Papadopoulos made it clear early on to Premier Karamanlis that his government would not accept the plan under any circumstances and the Greek Prime Minister agreed.[820] In the words of Former Minister Rousopoulos: "*There was a lot of pressure. The President of Cyprus, Papadopoulos, was more cool and self-collected and he didn't like the plan. He was clear on this and did not want to leave any doubt to anyone*."[821] *"For Papadopoulos,"* as another high official characteristically stated, "*the ultimate compromise was the 1960s agreement*."[822]. A year and a half after the referenda, Foreign Minister Moliviatis, known for his diplomatic language, reportedly replied to the US Ambassador, when questioned whether the Cypriot President wanted a deal, that: "*President Papadopoulos is not sure that he does not want a deal*."[823]

In this context, the extent to which the President of Cyprus engaged constructively and sincerely in negotiations has been challenged by a wide variety of public sources.

[819] http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/cna/2004/04-04-08.cna.html
[820] Interview with high official of the Karamanlis government, May 2013.
[821] Interview with former Minister of State and Government Spokesman T. Rousopoulos, May 2013.
[822] Interview with high official of the Karamanlis government, May 2013.
[823] Kathimerini Newspaper, 20/3/2011.

Former Cypriot President Clerides, who negotiated on behalf of Cyprus until a few months earlier, publicly criticized the President stating in an interview: "*At Birkenstock, Tasos Papadopoulos avoided negotiations*."[824] The leader of the opposition, at the time, and current President of Cyprus, Anastasiades, joined the critics arguing that Papadopoulos had come to Switzerland: "*Having made the decision some time ago that there will be no agreement.*"[825] Even Papadopoulos' ally, Communist Leader and later President, Christofias, noted that at Birkenstock: "*The President rejected entering a process of give and take.*"[826]

A Greek high official, who influenced Greek foreign policy under the Karamanlis government and who co-operated with Papadopoulos closely on a daily basis, indirectly confirmed that the President of Cyprus did not negotiate, attributing his behavior to the process of the negotiations: "*I will answer, describing the negotiations in Switzerland, a parody of negotiations occurred. Earlier in the year, in New York, it was concluded that the UN General Secretary would make the final decision, irrespective of the outcome of the talks. Thus, in Switzerland, negotiations were meaningless, it was a theater. Greece participated in the talks, on the level of security, which the Turks flatly rejected, proclaiming their unwillingness to negotiate. On some of the issues, the UN General Secretary presented proposals, which we knew were drafted earlier by the Turkish delegation. In other words, there was no room for negotiations*."[827] Another high official would be more forthcoming: "*There was no space for negotiations. Others made the decisions. Tasos (Papadopoulos) did not want to negotiate*."[828] In this context,

[824] http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_politics_2_23/05/2010_402103
[825] Politis, 20/01/2008.
[826] Ibid.
[827] Interview with former Minister of Foreign Affairs P. Moliviatis, May 2013.
[828] Interview with high official of the Karamanlis government, May 2013.

the Greek government opted to support President Papadopoulos on every level. Various sources suggest that the Cypriot government lead the negotiations and the Greek government followed. In the words of Rousopoulos: "*Papadopoulos did not trust anyone. He handled the issue and it was very difficult to impose anything upon him. Karamanlis and Papadopoulos talked very openly and candidly, but Papadopoulos as the chief negotiator had the primary role…"*[829]

The government's identification with Papadopoulos was made clear early on. Prime Minister Karamanlis and the Greek delegation buttressed Papadopoulos by refusing to deviate from their agreed line. When the question of a possible land exchange was raised during the talks, according to former Cypriot President Vasiliou, the leader of DISI Anastasiades, ND's sister party in Cyprus, asked Karamanlis to intervene. The Greek Prime Minister replied: "*I don't do anything if I don't have instructions from Tasos (Papadopoulos). And Tasos did not give me instructions. And he will not give me instructions*."[830]In this context, at Birkenstock, the Greek government avoided at all costs four-party talks, with Foreign Minister Moliviatis stating to his interlocutors again and again that he did not come as a negotiator but instead in a supporting role, despite Turkish willingness to participate in such talks.[831] In a meeting with his Turkish counterpart, and in response to Gul's statements that: "*There are two ways to help. Either consult or pressure. I believe that if necessary we should be prepared to persuade*," Minister Moliviatis made the Greek position clear: "*We can contribute, we can encourage, we can facilitate. But we must not pressure, because let's not forget*

[829] Interview with former Minister of State and Government Spokesman T. Rousopoulos, May 2013.
[830] Venizelos, K., Ignatiou, M. and Meletis, N., (2005), *The Annan Plan: The Secret Trade, the 129 Days That Shook Hellenism*, Athens: Livanis, p.387.
[830] Venizelos, K., Ignatiou, M. and Meletis, N., (2005), *The Annan Plan: The Secret Trade, the 129 Days That Shook Hellenism*, Athens: Livanis, p.407.
[831] Venizelos, K., Ignatiou, M. and Meletis, N., (2005), *The Annan Plan: The Secret Trade, the 129 Days That Shook Hellenism*, Athens: Livanis, p.334.

that at the end of the process there are the referendums and there will be a strong reaction from public opinion if it feels pressured."[832]

Indeed, there is little doubt that the relationship between the Greek and Cypriot governments influenced the outcome. Relevant evidence points to the hard line hypothesis. It appears that Greeks and Greek – Cypriots shared their animosity for the plan. According to interviews with Greek delegation members, in a meeting between Karamanlis and Papadopoulos in Switzerland, the Greek Prime Minister openly asked his Cypriot counterpart to delineate their strategy, beginning with the plan's acceptance or rejection. The President of Cyprus was very clear in his refusal to accept the plan and the Greek Prime Minister readily agreed. [833] At the same time, the Greek government was able to present a soft line stance abroad, claiming internationally that they made the best out of a bad situation, arguing that they had, in the words of the reported Prime Minister, "*zero influence over Papadopoulos*"[834] and that opinion polls commissioned by the government itself in Cyprus suggested that the plan would falter.[835]

7.3.3 After the talks

Upon his return from Birkenstock, the Greek Prime Minister went to Parliament where he refrained from expressing his final view, describing the Annan plan as "*the product*

[832] Venizelos, K., Ignatiou, M. and Meletis, N., (2005), *The Annan Plan: The Secret Trade, the 129 Days That Shook Hellenism*, Athens: Livanis, p.337.
[833] Interview with high official of the Karamanlis government, May 2013.
[834] http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ATHENS830.html
[835] Interview with high official of the Karamanlis government, May 2013.

of compromise" and adding that "*the final solution is in the judgment of the Cypriot people. I believe that it will be reached after mature thought*"[836] thus confirming his foreign policy dogma of "Cyprus decides, and Greece supports."

PASOK was in disarray after its humbling defeat. George Papandreou, the newly elected leader of the opposition, and former Foreign Minister, did not hesitate to make his position on the referendum known as soon as possible. After holding a meeting with the party's leadership, including former Prime Minister Simitis, Papandreou addressed the public critically two hours before the statement of the Cypriot President on April 7th in a move whose timing was criticized by hard liners in the media.[837] PASOK's leader was unequivocal in his statement and offered a number of soft line arguments. Interestingly, although Papandreou proclaimed his party's "*solidarity*" with the Greek – Cypriot people in his statement, there was no reference whatsoever to National Identity. Having noted that any decision of the Cypriot people would be respected, he explained PASOK's policy, arguing that his party "*says yes to co-operation and no to division, yes to prospects and no to stasis."* PASOK's President recognized that the Annan plan contained "*difficult settings*" but underlined that it could not be evaluated out of context given the status quo on the island or the dynamic that would be created by its participation in the European Union. Papandreou also criticized the government stating that "*no responsible leadership is entitled to expect the help offered by others in making decisions*" adding that the government "*broadcasts defeatism*." Last but not least, the leader of PASOK demanded that Washington and the European Union should not exercise pressures, and asked Athens and Ankara to agree that the resolution of the

[836] Venizelos, K., Ignatiou, M. and Meletis, N., (2005), *The Annan Plan: The Secret Trade, the 129 Days That Shook Hellenism*, Athens: Livanis, p.435.
[837] Kathimerini Newspaper, 8/4/2004.

Cyprus problem would contribute to the furthering of the normalization of bilateral relations. [838] Papandreou's statement may have been supported by a broad range of high-ranking PASOK cadres, including most members of the former Cabinet, but was received with dismay by the hard line Cypriot government, which immediately made its dissatisfaction known off the record to the Greek press, while 200 individuals made their support for the Cypriot President public including 14 PASOK MPs.[839]

On the 15th of April, the Council of Political leaders met under President Stephanopoulos for the first time since 1992. This time, however, the council did not make any decisions but instead each leader presented his or her party's views separately. Interestingly, the largely ceremonial President, who earlier in the talks had expressed his support for the plan, saying that it was a "*prospect that allows optimism*",[840] joined the Great Debate once again a few days before the referenda calling on the Greeks to "*consider the Annan Plan without emotionalism*"[841], indirectly referring to the need to desensitize from hard line leanings.

After the Council, the Prime Minister made his final view known in a statement influenced by National Identity. Proclaiming his "*respect for the settled principle of national policy on the Cyprus problem, that Cyprus decides, and Greece supports*," he highlighted the need to ensure above all: "*national harmony and unity, irrespective of the referendum's results. It would neither be realistic, nor tolerable, for a position that would draw wedges between Greek and Cypriot Hellenism…and (allow) conflicts in our domestic political system on a national issue."* Drawing the context of the European

[838] Ibid.
[839] Ibid.
[840] Rizospastis, 3/12/2002.
[841] Kathimerini Newspaper, 4/5/2004.

perspective and *"the pull of European reality. Its power to blunt difficulties.*" Karamanlis offered a very weak defense of the Annan plan, stating that "*its positive elements may be proved to be more than its negatives.*" He went on to argue extensively that the "*final responsibility for the future of their motherland lies with the Cypriot citizens*." He added that the "*exercise of pressures*" would "*not serve the free will of the Greek people and national unity*." Last but not least, the Prime Minister noted that whatever the outcome, normalization of Greek – Turkish relations would precede, and that Greece would support Turkey's European perspective.[842]

In response, PASOK's Papandreou repeated his position as expressed a week earlier. After the Council of leaders, Papandreou was restrained but critical of Karamanlis. He stated that he had criticized New Democracy, amongst others: "*On the dogma 'Cyprus decides, Greece Supports', no one disagrees on principle. It doesn't mean however that we sit passively and support Cyprus. We take initiatives and take advantage of all of our resources, something that I think the Greek government did not do*."[843]

The Communist Party was strongly against the plan, stating that the proposal would result in "*an international protectorate, worse than Kosovo*."[844] The leader of Synaspismos, Konstantopoulos, did not take a clear position, asking for a postponement of the referendum having however made public his view that the last Annan plan was the worst of all drafts.[845]

[842] Venizelos, K., Ignatiou, M. and Meletis, N., (2005), *The Annan Plan: The Secret Trade, the 129 Days That Shook Hellenism*, Athens: Livanis, p.478 – 480.
[843] Kathimerini Newspaper, 16/04/2004.
[844] Venizelos, K., Ignatiou, M. and Meletis, N., (2005), *The Annan Plan: The Secret Trade, the 129 Days That Shook Hellenism*, Athens: Livanis, p.483.
[845] Ibid.

7.3.4 Political costs and benefits

The position of the Greek government has been widely attributed to the domestic political implications of the 'Great Debate.'. In private conversations, Prime Minister Karamanlis reportedly strongly rejected the assumption that domestic politics influenced his government's decision, noting that as a newly elected government with a strong public mandate they possessed ample political capital and that his decision was informed only by a consideration of the plan.[846] The Greek high official who influenced foreign policy under Karamanlis emphatically stressed the point regarding domestic political considerations: "*Politics did not influence us at all. I am absolutely clear about that. Our criterion was the value of the plan, which was disastrous for Hellenism, as a Greek state would become a Turkish protectorate. To the extent that domestic political considerations converged with our views, our work was made easier. Nothing more*."[847]

Greek public consensus tended to be largely informed by hard line axioms pointing to the influence of Greek National Identity. This was clear to foreign observers. According to US State telegrams published through WikiLeaks, domestic politics was clearly a major concern for the Karamanlis government. US diplomats suggest: "*While we believe Athens can play a constructive role, simply asking Greece to put pressure on Papadopoulos is not likely to take us very far. We would expect a repetition of the stock answer of how difficult politically it is to intervene…*"[848] Interestingly, US diplomats

[846] Interview with high official of the Karamanlis government, May 2013.
[847] Interview with former Minister of Foreign Affairs P. Moliviatis, May 2013.
[848] http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/10/05ATHENS2647.html

relate political expediency with Greek National Identity in contrast to a soft line understanding of Greece's interests: "*Any Greek government -- especially the current one headed by ultra-cautious PM Karamanlis -- fears creating the impression with its voters that it does not support its Hellenic "little brother" far more than it fears Turkish troops on northern Cyprus…*[849] In other words, the strategy of the Greek government was delineated, according the US interpretation, by domestic political factors and Papadopoulos's sway over the Greek national psyche with the reference to 'fellow Hellenes' being highly suggestive of the forces of National Identity in play.

The political position of the Greek government was made more difficult by two exogenous factors, which stemmed from the perception of the 'other' in National Identity. On the one hand, in Turkey, in the aftermath of Birkenstock, Prime Minister Erdogan had expressed his support for the plan on a number of occasions. His government even went as far as to campaign for a 'yes' amongst Turkish Cypriots. ""*We started upon this path with good will and of course we would like to achieve a result,*" stated Erdogan.[850] Within Greece, the 'other's' support for the plan awakened hard line reflexes. In other words, "*once Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan appeared in front of the media, celebrating the agreement, Greeks and Greek Cypriots immediately shifted their attention to the negatives of the Annan Plan*."[851] On the other hand, in Cyprus, President Papadopoulos made his position known in a heartfelt and emotional plea against the plan, using highly explicit national language. The stakes were thus raised in Greek party political calculations. In the competitive world of domestic politics, support for the plan would be interpreted as support for Erdogan and

[849] http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/10/05ATHENS2647.html

[850] Cowell, A., *After Negotiations on Unity Fail, Cypriots to Decide on Plan* (NYT, 1/4/2004).

[851] Loizides, N., (2016), *Designing Peace Processes: Institutional Innovations in Cyprus and Divided Societies*, University of Pennsylvania Press.

the Turkish government and opposition to Papadopoulos and the government of Cyprus.

The influence of the hard line at the time was for all intents and purposes tested in opinion polls. At the time, according to an opinion poll that was made available to the government, the Greek public rejected the Annan plan by a margin of 44 against 40 percent. The difference grew considerably if party affiliations were considered. In terms of political audiences, 52% of New Democracy voters were against the plan, contrasted with 28% of PASOK voters, 78% of KKE voters and 54% of Synaspismos voters. In this context, the policy followed by Karamanlis appeared to be rewarded by the general public, as 60% of responders had a positive view of his position compared with 45% of Papandreou and 54% of Papadopoulos. Moreover, in terms of the government's key hypothesis, 49% agreed that the Cyprus problem and Greek - Turkish relations could be treated as separate issues, while 41% believed that Greek- Turkish relations were fully dependant on the Cyrus problem. Interestingly, 50% believed that the Cyprus problem should continue to be the first national priority for Greece while 43% suggested that the Cyprus problem did not need to determine Greece's national priorities.[852]

The Karamanlis government positioned itself strategically in order to gain politically. The government's understanding of the challenge that the Annan Plan posed is expounded upon and illuminated in a book published by one of the key strategists in the Prime Minister's staff, who at the time also advised President Papadopoulos. The key variable in the equation, according to Giannis Loulis, was the trend in Cyprus

[852] Opinion Poll conducted on the Annan Plan by "Opinion" (April 19th 2004).

towards a 'no' which the government had predicted. According to this reading of events, the Greek government found itself between the "*asphyxiating pressure*" of the international community and the "*unrestrained*" trend towards the rejection of the plan on Cyprus.[853]

In this exceptionally complex environment, the Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis, and the leader of the opposition, Papandreou, had to move with the utmost care and flexibility. On the one side, the challenge was the protection of the country's international footholds. On the other, a frontal collision of Greece with Cypriot Hellenism, whose great majority was orientating itself from the first moments for the 'no,' had to be avoided.[854]

For Loulis, Karamanlis "*moved carefully, with a plan and the necessary flexibility…he moved strategically, taking into account the day after of the referenda and the relationship between Athens and Nicosia*."[855] He compared and contrasted the position of the government with that of the opposition. Papandreou "*reacted in a hurry without a sense of the complexity of the environment…he moved with a short term view and hastily giving the impression that he could influence the climate in Cyprus. A belief that, if it existed, was outside reality*."[856] The strategist attributes the difference in policy to the leaders' understanding of Cypriot political reality. On the one hand, Karamanlis "*knew from the first instance that the trend for a "no" was overwhelming.*"[857] On the

[853] Loulis, Y., (2007), *The Battle of 2007*, Athens: Livanis, p.58.
[854] Ibid, p.59.
[855] Ibid, p.59.
[856] Ibid, p.59.
[857] Ibid, p.59.

other hand, Papandreou was "*fully detached from the obvious trends of public opinion in Cyprus*"[858] which resulted in his "*detachment from Greek public opinion.*"[859]

According to this analysis, the Annan plan was a "crash test" for the new government, considering that the leader of the opposition Papandreou was viewed as being stronger on foreign policy issues due to his experience as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Focus groups in Greece rewarded the government's position: In the mind of responders Karamanlis showed "*prudence*" and "*determination*." His whole attitude was internalized by Greek public opinion as being "*diplomatic*" and "*flexible*" while a considerable number of New Democracy and middle ground voters underlined that he "*stood up*" to pressures. Papandreou's policy in contrast was considered "*hasty*" and not the product of mature thought.[860] A survey held at the end of April, after the referenda, concluded that 53,3% of Greeks positively viewed "*the policy of and the handling by Karamanlis*," with 22,3% negative and 21,8% neutral. In the case of Papandreou, 37,3% were negative and 35,8% positive.[861]

The political dimension of the Annan plan was further clarified in retrospect a few years later. Against the backdrop of the Annan plan's demonization in the Greek political sphere, at their TV debate before the October 2009 election, Karamanlis, in an effort to score political points, described his government's position "*to secure the right of our Cypriot brothers to vote any way they liked, essentially to vote against the plan*." He continued attacking Papandreou: "*And I contrast this with your position at the time when you publicly insisted and pressured the Cypriots to vote for (the plan).*"

[858] Ibid, p.60.
[859] Ibid, p.60.
[860] Ibid, p.62.
[861] Ibid, p.62.

Papandreou responded: "*I took a position, a difficult position…. while you Mr. Karamanlis said yes in the Council of Leaders, but ever since minced your words and your (party) officials said no…. I assumed the political cost*."[862]

7.4 Conclusion

The discussion of political cost, in terms of a thin majority, reactionary opposition or disagreement within government is highly suggestive. In the case of Macedonia, the volatile political process, at least in private, during the lively debates that took place behind closed doors, revealed a schism between two very different conceptions of the Greek national goals. Thus, a real clash appeared between soft liners and hard liners over Greek foreign policy. The perspective of the soft liner Prime Minister appeared to be particularly informed by the significance of Greece's position in Europe. This was a point he made quite strongly in the Council of Leaders. In this respect, the position of Mitsotakis fitted the profile of soft liners that I have outlined in the analytical framework: He appeared sensitive to the country's relative political and economic strengths and weaknesses, was conscious of the nation's international obligations, its place in global affairs usually within multilateral partnerships (most prominently Europe) or alliances and the nation's capacity and potential role. On the other end of the spectrum, the leader of the opposition Papandreou assumed the characteristics of a typical hard liner, choosing to identify himself with the Identity Warriors who shared his worldview.

[862] The Greek election debate 2009, Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eCpnxJaVsAk

In this context, in terms of the political process, a dualism can be observed at the highest possible level and the minutes of the councils of leaders suggest that a power struggle took place between two opposing camps. Interestingly, however, this Great Debate can only be observed in private. In public, the Prime Minister made no systematic attempt to fight the battle on the level of Identity politics leaving the field wide open to his opponents. Thus, the government would repeatedly refer to the strengths and weaknesses of the Greek position diplomatically and the country's curtailed capacity for effective action on the issue but would not stress the performative dimensions of Greece's European Identity.

Mitsotakis, leading a two-front battle both against a strong and determined opposition and against dynamic internal party dissent, approached the issue purely politically not unlike any other policy problem, whether economic or social, that he faced during his tenure in government and refused to contest Greek Identity. Thus, Mitsotakis, surviving on a razor thin majority in Parliament, employed a number of different political tools to gain minimum acceptability in support of his foreign policy. The very convention of the Councils of Leaders, for example, was an attempt to build sufficient consensus that backfired dramatically as the government found itself trapped in a policy decision. Similarly, the government attempted on a number of occasions to find an alternative around which a consensus could be built. Towards this end, the Prime Minister attempted to secure the support of the President of the Republic or impose discipline within his Parliamentary caucus. Arguably, however, after a certain point in time, the soft liners found themselves struggling with a snowball effect as forces beyond their control were unleashed.

Therefore, I argue that the Great Debate that can indeed be observed between soft liners and hard liners, in private, was never expressed in the public sphere but it was inconsequential in terms of public opinion. On the one hand, the hard liners framed the issue in the language of Identity, thus dominating public discourse. On the other hand, the soft liners failed to offer an alternative Identity- based narrative that would strengthen their position. As a result, although the soft liner Prime Minister won a few of the political battles, he lost the Identity war. Indeed, arguably, the very absence of an Identity debate, explains the ultimate policy outcome.

In the case of Greek- Turkish relations, the political process, on the other hand, appeared in public much less subdued than would be expected, although the Great Debate did occur. Indeed, although the opposition, led by Karamanlis, reserved certain criticisms for the government it seems that some type of bipartisan consensus, at least when it came to foreign policy, had begun to emerge. Interestingly, sources suggest that the greatest domestic political obstacle for the government came from the ruling party itself given its political history. The challenge for the modernizing soft line Prime Minister Simitis was the party's mobilization and the government's unity.

Thus, I argue that the Great Debate can indeed be observed between soft liners and hard liners. On the one hand, the hard liners framed the issue in the language of Identity but soon became victims of their own success and the crises, together with the earthquakes, strengthened the hand of the soft liners. On the other hand, the soft liners adopted an elaborate political strategy, employing all the available tools in order to implement their policy choice. As a result, although the hard liners won a few political battles, the soft liners won the Identity war. Arguably, however, the 1999 reversal "*falls short of*

challenging the basic understandings upon which it has been built."[863] The case study on the Annan Plan shows that another Great Debate amongst Identity Warriors managed to dramatically influence the country's foreign policy only five years later. The fundamental tenets of Greek National Identity were not challenged during the paradigm shift of 1999. In effect, the alliance of soft liners only managed to temporarily circumvent the hard liners. It is not a coincidence that fourteen years after the Helsinki Summit, although crises have been avoided, Greek – Turkish bilateral relations remain a work in progress without any concrete and tangible policy gains.

In the case of Cyprus, the political process, on the other hand, appeared critically defined by the Great Debate. Indeed, it appears that the government itself was firmly anchored in the hard line camp as shaped by National Identity, was influenced by legacy issues and specifically the historical precedent of 1960, and driven by the position of the Cypriot government. At the same time, although the opposition was relatively weak, and the government continued to experience a honeymoon with the Greek public, Karamanlis took advantage of the opportunity to position the government strategically and secure political gains.

Thus, I argue that the Great Debate can indeed be observed between soft liners and hard liners. The government made a shrewd choice, adopting the dogma "Cyprus decides, Greece supports" which can be interpreted in two ways: First, it provided a diplomatic "way out" for soft liners. After all, the Prime Minister's neutrality was in many ways successful. Athens moderated international pressures; the government secured

[863] Agnantopoulos, A., (2005), *The Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy: A Conceptual Framework and an Empirical Application in Greek-Turkish Relations.*Paper presented at the 2nd LSE Symposium on Modern Greece, London.

domestic political gains and at the same time managed to evade the risks of decision that would undoubtedly define its legacy. Second, it was part of a hard line plan to actually torpedo the Annan Plan. Therefore, Athens and Nicosia working in unison managed to spectacularly undermine the UN effort. Indeed, in an interview with the daily Kathimerini, a week before the referendum, when the result was foreseen even in the journalist's introduction, Foreign Minister Moliviatis was careful not to comment upon the plan itself, expressing his satisfaction that the government walked a tight rope and detailing his government's soft line moves. Noting that he did not believe that there are "*last opportunities in life",* and although he predicted that there may be initiatives to support the Turkish Cypriots, Moliviatis argued that it was "*unlikely*" that the Turkish – Cypriot state would be recognized. This statement by the Greek Foreign Minister was a response to Secretary General Annan's statement: "*The choice is between this settlement or no settlement" and that "failure would be permanent*".[864] Moreover, Moliviatis was emphatic, underlining that bilateral Greek – Turkish relations would proceed on the road of normalization and improvement even going as far as to announce new rounds of talks. Last but not least, Moliviatis defended the government's policy, proclaiming that Greece managed to "*square the circle*" and stating that, "*all interested sides, expressed their satisfaction with the position of the Greek government*."[865] In this context, on the one hand, the hard liners framed the issue in the language of Identity securing a political comparative advantage. On the other hand, the soft liners appeared weak and fragmented, explaining the final policy outcome.

[864] Cowell, A., *After Negotiations on Unity Fail, Cypriots to Decide on Plan*, (NYT, 1/04/2004).
[865] Kathimerini Newspaper, 18/04/2004.

8. CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I have attempted to explain the variance of Greek foreign policy outcomes. Since the end of the Cold War, Athens has displayed variance in its foreign policy behavior within and across issues, shifting from co-operation to defection from the international community or opting to stay inactive. These changes in Greek foreign policy in the post-Cold War era constituted my empirical puzzle. In this concluding chapter, I summarize my argument and explore observable patterns. I also discuss the generalizability of this thesis and its predictive value.

8.1 Argument of the thesis

The conceptual framework attempts to shed light on foreign policy decision making in the case of Greece. I first analyzed the dominant paradigms of IR, Realism and Liberalism, and noted the contributions of each paradigm to the understanding of each case study. The record is mixed. I argued that both help towards mapping the restraints and opportunities of states, and indeed go a long way, without however fully explaining changes in Greek foreign policy because both exclude the domestic enabling environment for decision-making.

In the case of Macedonia, Realism, on the one hand, offers significant insights in explaining the Greek hard line. However, Athens had more than one Realist option available, for example implementing a soft line policy that would have resolved the minority question and settled on a geographical qualifier for the name. Indeed, in 2007, Greek foreign policy shifted gears and adopted such a position in the name of Realism.

Liberalism, on the other hand, offers less in terms of an explanation. Greece's alliances and partnerships suffered considerably because of the hard line policy adopted. In the case of Greek – Turkish relations, Realism also offers insights in explaining the change of Greek foreign policy in 1999. Nevertheless, arguably, once again, the government had more than one Realist option available, including for example a hard line position that would insist upon the veto within the European institutions while strengthening the country's defense. Liberalism, on the other hand, offers more towards an explanation as Greece's alliances and partnerships contributed greatly towards the adoption of a soft line. In the case of Cyprus, Realism, on the one hand, offers insights in explaining the position of the Greek government towards the Annan plan. However, not unlike the previous two case studies, various and often contradictory Realist options were available to Greek policy makers. Thus, different Realist analyses could result both in hard line and soft line policy outcomes. Liberalism, on the other hand, offers more towards an explanation, although the policy outcome itself appears to weaken the exploratory tool.

Having established the limits of IR's so-called grand theories, I turn to the Identity framework that I have proposed. Having defined Identity and noted its performative dimensions, including its capacity for legitimizing a dominant political power, I outlined its potential to be the subject of a wide variety of readings and a multiplicity of interpretations. In this context, I proposed that different agents articulate demands and form alliances, thus creating broader opposing camps of hard liners or soft- liners in search of political or social support. Moving forward, and having underlined the intense politicization of Greek foreign policy, I emphasized that decision-making in foreign policy can be better understood when its context is considered. This includes

not only the substantial policy problem with its international implications at hand, but also the political context within which it must be addressed. Under what conditions is the Great Debate won by which side? I assumed that to form the minimum political consensus, hard liners or soft liners must both offer a credible policy solution for the problem at hand and reaffirm or reinterpret national Identity. Thus, they must engage in Identity politics directly, generate their own version of shared Identity and appropriate the Identity discourse. In other words, soft liners or hard liners are called upon to take advantage of the tension and the dualism that defines Greek national Identity, making it amenable either to hard line reassertion or to soft line reinvention. Given, however, that the battle between hard liners and soft liners is ongoing, spanning across many decades, the former are in a better position to take advantage of the cardinal themes of National Identity almost to the point of expressing the default view. In this light, success in the Great Debate necessitates institutionalization and thus the conscription of the full force of the state.

In this context, I discussed the evolution of Greek National Identity. Arguably, Greek National Identity, as it was shaped in the 19th century, and was reaffirmed, reinterpreted and reinforced in the 20th century, has dominated public discourse over generations with far reaching implications for various policy spheres including foreign affairs. In this sense, I underlined that National Identity in the case of Greece has evolved over time and in response to changing circumstances. Interestingly, however, its main themes would survive after the historical demise of the Great Idea in 1922 and continued shaping National Identity throughout the 20th century and to this present day. Therefore, I tested the dualism hypothesis that I have presented in the analytical framework: an understanding of Greek Identity as being the product of a clash between

two competing and often conflictual trends that can be transferred to the area of foreign policy as a Great Debate between soft and hard liners on two levels of analysis, these being amongst Identity Warriors and within the political elite.

On the first level of analysis, a Great Debate amongst Identity Warriors did take place in two out of the three case studies. Beginning with the case of Macedonia, it is unique amongst the case studies because the hard line alliance of identity warriors that led the charge were virtually unopposed despite considerable public interest. In contrast to Macedonia, Greek – Turkish relations were the subject of a Great Debate with the active participation of a series of Identity Warriors in the debate and with the educational system, the Church, civil society, and the media joining the fray. However, the debate did not take place at the same time. Indeed, it appears that the hard liners scored some early wins but were soon discredited after the crises that, together with the earthquakes, strengthened the counter- charge led by the government which engaged in Identity politics with a clear modernizing agenda. Last but not least, the case of Cyprus experienced a Great Debate. Once again, a series of Identity Warriors, including the Church, civil society, and the media, participated actively in the Great Debate. Contrary to the previous case on Greek Turkish relations, however, the Great Debate appears to reach existential proportions as the very settlement of the issue was in play. The change in government and its position served to strengthen the hand of the hard liners.

On the second level of analysis, the Great Debate within the political elite, I found that it played out in all three case studies. Arguably, in the case of Macedonia, the volatile political process, at least in private, during the lively debates that took place behind closed doors, revealed a schism between two very different conceptions of Greek

national goals. Thus, a real clash appeared between soft liners and hard liners over Greek foreign policy. Interestingly, however, this Great Debate could only be observed in private. In public, the Prime Minister made no systematic attempt to fight the battle on the level of Identity politics, leaving the field wide open to his opponents. In the case of Greek- Turkish relations, the political process, on the other hand, appeared in public much less subdued than would be expected, although the Great Debate did occur. Indeed, although the opposition, led by Karamanlis, reserved certain criticisms for the government, it seems that a kind of bipartisan consensus, at least when it came to foreign policy, had begun to emerge. Interestingly, sources suggest that the greatest domestic political obstacle for the government came from the ruling party itself, given its political history. In the case of Cyprus, the political process, on the other hand, appeared critical in terms of the Great Debate. Indeed, it appeared that the government itself was firmly anchored in the hard line camp as shaped by National Identity. At the same time, although the opposition was relatively weak and the government continued to experience a honeymoon with the Greek public, Karamanlis took advantage of the opportunity to position the government strategically and secure political gains.

8.2 Observable patterns

Overall, I have established that hard liners carry a strong legacy and have a historical advantage over soft liners. In this sense, soft liners face an uphill struggle to turn their policy preference into outputs. Interestingly, the two levels were aligned in all three cases. As we have seen in two out of the three case studies, the Macedonian name and the Cyprus problem, the hard liners won the Great Debate on both levels. In the case of Greek – Turkish rapprochement, however, the soft liners had the upper hand. Arguably,

certain observable patterns can be delineated, stemming from the theoretical framework of this thesis.

To begin with, I would argue that domestic politics reigns unchallenged in decision making. The discussion of the case studies shows that soft liners owe their success in 1999 amongst others to their capacity to consider the political enabling environment. The Simitis government for all intents and purposes designed a strategy and materialized a political campaign with the explicit purpose of preserving and fostering political capital. For Foreign Minister and later Prime Minister Papandreou, policy and politics intersect: "*Greek-Turkish problems can and should be solved. It is a question of reaching a broader consensus domestically. It depends on circumstances, leadership and political will…. In this context, we had to have a serious conversation with Greek public opinion. What kind of Turkey do we want? Do we want a multicultural neighbor that respects religious diversity or a smaller fragmented state? Do we want a European Turkey, with clear incentives and counter- incentives, or a bilateral relationship without checks and balances*?" [866]

Going a step further, the discussion of the case studies affirms the significance of Identity politics. Ignoring or underestimating the forces of Identity is to the policy maker's peril. "*An uncontrollable dynamic was created in the people that showed great sensitivity to this issue. A tidal wave just swept us under*" said Prime Minister Mitsotakis looking back at the events of the Macedonia case study, which, to a great extent, contributed to his downfall.[867] Indeed, a key finding of this thesis has been that

[866] Interview with Former Prime Minister G. Papandreou, July 21 2013.
[867] Skylakakis, T.,(1995), *In the Name of Macedonia,* Athens: EuroEkdotiki.

foreign policy problems, particularly the so-called national issues under consideration in this thesis, constitute more than just policy problems or political challenges. The wide reaching and deep implications of National Identity must be considered. National Identity, in the case of Greece, is defined by an intrinsic tension, the product of an inherent dualism. As such, it is open to both reaffirmation and reformulation, presenting a challenge for those actors who seek to influence decision making. Nevertheless, the need for Identity reinterpretation often constitutes the missing link in the soft line narrative of political elites. For Mitsotakis, the problem in the case of Macedonia was primarily political: "*I would have solved the problem*," he says, "*if I had the full support of my party. Unfortunately, (President) Karamanlis did not help and we fell victims of his weakness to insist upon the right solution*." [868] Prime Minister Simitis, on the contrary, realizing the catalytic role of Identity, takes a long view, connecting Europeanization with his modernizing agenda and foreign policy: "*In parts, Europeanization was consolidated. Unfortunately, in political life there was no continuity. Four or eight years are not enough and sudden changes of policy or political disputes obstruct the creation of mainstream public opinion for the change of older convictions…. The promotion of a minority, quote unquote, views within a public opinion that has not evolved, would have been accepted if there were no turning backs. Our friendly relationship with Turkey was a minority opinion, but later became a majority view*." [869]

Indeed, I would suggest that the weakness of soft liners is structural. Soft liners, with a few exceptions such as Simitis, as the case study on Greek – Turkish rapprochement

[868] Interview with Former Prime Minister G. Mitsotakis, July 21 2013.
[869] Interview with former Prime Minsiter C. Simitis, June 2nd 2013.

suggests, fail to grasp the significance of National Identity. As such, they tend to address challenges in foreign affairs within their policy and political contexts alone. This, to a great extent, is a product of the nature of their alliance. Contrary to hard liners, soft liners create alliances on a case- by- case basis and are driven by specific domestic or international considerations. As such, they lack a coherent worldview that may strengthen them during the identity battles. Therefore, to the question under what conditions do hard liners or soft liners prevail in the Great Debate, the answer lies with the instrumental use of Identity. The ultimate policy outcome in each case can be connected to three factors:

First, the outcome of Great Debate depends on whether the soft line or hard line narratives are able to relate their messages to the 'people.' The impact of identity is such that even the state and its interests appear secondary to the notion of 'people' who are eschatologically identified with the nation, transcending boundaries of space and time in public consciousness. In the cases of Macedonia and the Annan plan, the people assumed ownership of the issues either through mass mobilization in the former or indirectly in the referendum in Cyprus, as a focal point. As such, the issues in question became national as much as personal, touching Identity's DNA. In this context, hard liners advocate the centrality of identity, as they see themselves as being core protagonists in a never-ending historical narrative: patriots always ready to provide their unmediated support for the 'national cause,' often over the 'less nation-minded,' 'incompetent' meddling of state officials. On the contrary soft liners are poorly equipped. If one connects the soft line to the modernization-Europeanization agenda, then Rozakis's definition of modernization as 'the absolute denial of the past', which 'views things as they should be, is quite indicative of the soft liners' self-perception.

According to this interpretation, the soft line narrative is inherently incapable of forging its own narrative of the past, which is a necessary prerequisite for Identity reinterpretation. Nevertheless, I do not agree that they have any less of a coherent worldview than hard-liners, but only that it is principled-normative rather than historical-descriptive. More generally, I do not think that there is such a thing as a soft line "narrative" – only prescriptions and axioms. This has proved to be their Achilles heel in the Great Debate. A solution to asserting the missing link of the soft liners would be to abandon Rozakis' ahistorical, (I would venture to say, metaphysical), self-definition and retrace the soft liners lineage in the past: their predecessors, their achievements and their failures, their belief in progress and its rivals.

Second, success in the Great Debate presupposes the division of the political or social milieu into two opposing and antagonistic camps. In other words, a successful strategy needs an 'us' as much as a 'them', whether from the point of view of soft or hard liners. The discussion of the case studies suggests that the 'them' could fall within or beyond the borders, or both. In all three cases, the hard liners targeted the soft liners, going as far as to question their patriotism, comparing their statements and actions with their interpretation of National Identity. In the cases of Macedonia and the Annan Plan, the 'them' was expanded and identified not only with the nation's direct partners, the 'other' being the 'Skopjans' or the Turks, but also foreign powers such as, for example, the Americans.

In the case of Macedonia, most characteristically, the 'them' focused on Greece's Western allies, especially the Europeans, who had still not managed to create a genuine European Community with solidarity between its members. For many Greeks,

especially right-wingers but also non-communist democrats, the indifferent/cold attitude of the US and the European partners towards Greece in the immediate post-Cold War era was a watershed moment for the rise of right- wing anti- Europeanism. After winning a hard-fought battle, the civil war in the 1940s, to remain in the Western camp, and after being surrounded for decades by hostile Communist neighbors, Greece's allies seemed to turn with much ease towards its newly democratized neighbors, embracing them and paying little heed to the sensitivities of Athens. For those on the Left, this turn of events was a validation of the longstanding, illusory sentimentality harbored by anti-communist powers regarding the ideological nature of Western democracies. *"The only one of the western countries that experienced a loss from the end of the Cold War is Greece",* Andreas Papandreou stated in the second Leaders' Council meeting, echoing a characteristic view voiced at the time. At the same time, this also reflected the absence of a solid Balkan strategy on the part of Greece, as well as its inability to grasp that, as Rozakis says, one's position is weakened by merely presenting obstacles to the EU policy and only enhanced by *"integrating one's own pursuits within the wider pursuits."* This point is important as a psychological factor which fed into the siege mentality and exacerbated public reactions to the Macedonian issue.

Moreover, the hardline discourse, which is rooted in the 'underdog' culture, not only connects more readily with the populace through identity issues, but takes full advantage of soft liners' inability to 'nationalize' EU institutional jargon, which is popularly seen as abstruse, elitist and inimical to the interests of European citizens. At the same time, hard liners tend to energize sectors of society which have been otherwise excluded, if not alienated, from foreign policy-making, especially in the devolved EU

context. Last but not least, while hard liners project the aura of mainstream institutional approaches, they thrive in micro-communities of retirees, small businessmen, mid-to-low-level functionaries, local politicians, as well as army officers, in which latent, if not conspiratorial and anti-statist, sentiments are cultivated. In the case studies, this has manifested itself through the creation of extra-institutional networks and secretive, if not secret, societies with a strong commitment to shaping public opinion, such as the Macedonian Committee and Network 21.

Only in the case of Greek –Turkish relations did the soft liners manage to assume the mantle of a broader 'us' that included both the nation's modernizers, within, and that of self-confident 'Europeans,' beyond the country's borders. Even at that point, however, it was a temporal and fragile moment. In order to effectively relate to the people, it is necessary for soft liners to abandon their self-perception as being almost above history, as suggested by Rozakis, and to augment their awareness of the historicity of their positions. Whether it is the Macedonian name issue, the Annan Plan or Greek-Turkish relations, a rich tapestry of realist positions taken by politicians and scholars can be recovered from the dustbin of history: soft liners should view this intellectual ancestry not as an anachronism which undermines their authority but as an enriching and ennobling feature that can help them both relate to the people and define what constitutes "otherness".

Third, for soft liners to win the Great Debate, they have needed to mobilize the force of the state. This happened in 1999 when the state consciously developed a plan employing its powers of patronage and even the public finances in order to build a friendly alliance of NGOs. In this context, the role played by the developing civil

society in Greece, the ‘earthquake diplomacy’ moment, confidence-building measures and low politics, and so forth, was a successful attempt by the soft liners to garner grassroots support from citizens for their low-level, institutionalist approach in what had traditionally been hard-liner, ‘national issues.’ This point is significant and should not be underestimated as soft liners are weak compared to hard liners, who enjoy the support of well-established state and non-state actors, such as the educational system and the Church that propagate a hard line agenda and set barriers of entry within public discourse. Nevertheless, this tactic only took the soft liner alliance so far because the support for the government’s policy became a flag of convenience, flown only for a short period of time. Many people set up NGOs and posed as soft liners in order to get on the public’s payroll, only to shift their positions or disappear from public view when the time of the Annan Plan arrived, and the government changed. This example strengthens the argument that a strong executive cannot make up for weak institutional structures, and it indicates the inefficacy of attempting to proliferate genuine soft-liners from above, merely through economic incentives and not through building or reinforcing Althusser’s “Ideological State Apparatuses.”

At the same time, in discussing the role of the state and its relationship with identity warriors, one should consider the evolution of institutions and their respective leaderships over time. It must be highlighted that Archbishop Christodoulos’ hard line worldview, most obvious in the Annan Plan case study, was not the mainstream Church’s as represented by both his predecessor and his successor. The official Church, for all the influence it wields and its latent criticism of state policies, has been, historically, largely controlled by the Greek state, especially in the post-Civil War era. Christodoulos’ rise to the seat of Archbishop was a rupture, a seminal moment as he

was a product of post- war right- wing para- and intra-ecclesiastical brotherhoods. He co- founded ‘Chrysopigi’ and was closely associated with ‘Zoi’ and Sotir’, which are steeped in xenophobia, radical irredentist rhetoric and a latent antagonism towards the official Westernized state. In this sense, his rise can be seen as part of the growing autonomy of the Church from state influence after the public clash with the state over the Church property issue in the late 1980s. Undoubtedly, his rise was reflective of the historical juncture and was fueled by the growing cross-party influence of identity warriors. By the same token, his death marked the retrenchment of para-ecclesiastical influence.

A similar argument can be made for the media. Although there is no concrete evidence, one can safely venture to guess that an additional factor for the Greco-Turkish detente and the weakening of the hard-liners could also be attributed to the more stable, easily controllable by the PASOK government, oligarchic media environment, in contrast to its earlier, sensationalist Eldoraro-like phase of the early 1990s, when the Macedonian issue hit the airwaves. In this sense, one could speculate that had the Karamanlis administration been genuinely in favor of the Annan Plan, the media would have been much more in line with the idea of reaching a mutually acceptable solution. This is further supported in the light of what happened in 2007-2008, when the Karamanlis government decided it would genuinely support the abandonment of the maximalist decision taken at the Council of Leaders in 1992, and thereby managed to ensure the acquiescence of the media to a considerable extent.

Overall, I argue that the key lesson of this thesis for practioners, scholars, observers and participants in the public sphere is the need to accept that there is a debate, and to

engage in its rough and tumble and put identity at the center. The historical background of the Macedonian experience in the early 1990s, and its subsequent negative spillover effects on the Great Debate, is highly suggestive. For three decades until 1991, Greek citizens, for various reasons, had been left more or less in the dark over the developing realities and mutations of the issue. This explains why the maximalist position embraced by the public, and ratified by the political leadership in April 1992, represented a radical revision of the pragmatic, moderate official line known only in elite policy circles, which virtually no one from the public was aware of due to the longstanding policy of silence over this taboo matter.

Identity warriors did indeed manage to energize the public in favor of the maximalist position by presenting it in terms of an existentalist threat, in contrast to my other two cases. In the Macedonian issue, the alliance of Identity Warriors who led the charge was virtually unopposed. However, the Identity Warriors were hardly to blame for the fact that the maximalist position had taken root so swiftly in public discourse: this was the fruit of a deep and longstanding failure of soft line policymakers and their secretive and heavily state-centered modus operandi in the preceding decades. They had abandoned Greek public opinion as hostages of the realities of the late 1950s, from which they emerged in 1991 intellectually disarmed, intransigent and unaware of the fact that they were radically revising decades of sober diplomatic pragmatism.

In my view, the Macedonian issue perfectly exemplifies how soft-liners should have overcome their moderate, introverted state-centrism and have attempted to engage with the public in a manner similar to that assumed by hard-liners, who are apt to go underground and actively campaign in order to attain consensus. Soft liners should have

assumed, long before 1991, the mantle of identity warriors both domestically, in enlightening public opinion, and in the international arena, in order to seek multilateral, mutually acceptable solutions to the Macedonian issue. By contrast, the mobilizations over the name issue in the early 1990s led to a watershed moment for the hard liners and their supporting identity warriors such as civil society, the media, or the Church, which emerged as legitimized influential players in the subsequent episodes of the Greek-Turkish detente and the Annan plan.

Indeed, what differentiates these later episodes from the Macedonian issue was that there was no moderate elite line that had been kept from the public. As Greek-Turkish relations and the Cyprus issue had been openly discussed for decades, soft-liners were much more alert and knowledgeable so as to be able to engage in the Great Debate, while in the Macedonian issue, apart from Mitsotakis himself, only a handful of brave souls went against the grain and tried to propagate consensual and pragmatic solutions. Such sparse voices to the maximalist 'monolith' could hardly mount an opposition and lead to a Great Debate similar to the ones that would ensue over Greek-Turkish relations and the Annan Plan. Unlike Simitis and Karamanlis, who had at their disposal realists both for and against Greek-Turkish collaboration and the Annan Plan respectively, Mitsotakis had virtually no soft-liner public spokesmen to be flanked by, as the Macedonian issue had ceased to be an object for public discussion since the early 1960s due to the policy of silence. The only public intellectuals 'in the know' who could shape Greek public opinion were hard-liners, if not zealots, who, unsurprisingly, supported the maximalist position vis-a-vis a public whose perceptions of the issue had remained unaltered since the post- war era.

8.3 Contribution of the thesis

This thesis has yielded a number of insights, which can be used by students of Greek foreign policy, Greek politics, Europeanization, nationalism and FPA. Regarding the study of Greek foreign policy, there are a number of excellent studies, whether from the historical or the diplomatic perspective, but only relatively recently has the focus shifted to the home front. This thesis goes further down this road and at the same time highlights the significance of identity, which could have attracted more attention so far in the bibliography of Greek foreign policy. In effect, and for the purposes of discussing decision making in foreign affairs, this thesis challenges a popular assumption in the study of Greek foreign policy: the tendency for the fundamental suppositions and assumptions that informed the Identity of the Greek nation to survive generations of scholarly debate as fixed, and relatively unscathed, enabling scholars together with decision makers to identify Greece's understanding of the world with the world's understanding of Greece. Indeed, this thesis provides a different optic of international relations because, not unlike earlier cartographers who tended to assign to their country of origin a central and/or disproportional position in their work, Greeks often succumbed to the temptation of identifying Greece's inalienable 'national rights' with its interests, notwithstanding any bilateral or multilateral accommodations, compromises, agreements or indeed the interests of Greece's neighbors, friends, allies and partners.

Another contribution of this thesis pertains to the clarification of the linkage between the domestic and foreign policy spheres. This is especially true in country cases such as Greece where the politicization of foreign policy making historically is explained

because executive privilege transcends institutional structures. Even in the case of Macedonia, for example, where the most institutional path was chosen with the government's choice to activate the Council of Political Leaders, decisions were taken on the basis of political cost- benefit calculations. Indeed, in line with FPA, I have argued that policy outcomes are a function of the power struggle between two opposing camps of soft and hard liners, because, as I have noted, individuals or groups that attach different meanings to their common Identity can respond very differently to similar challenges. I have argued that the Great Debate plays out on two levels: first, in wider society amongst Identity Warriors, including the Church, the media and civil society; second, within the political elite, as a more instrumental analysis about end-means relationships in the context of political action must be taken into account. Thus, the political elite's task is to secure multiple payoffs and build the needed consensus in support of its policy. If not, political agents fail to deliver on their optimal policy preferences. My empirical findings, analyzed through my conceptual framework, has allowed me to conclude that certain observable patterns influence the result, constituting nodes in the decision trees of policy makers.

A further contribution of this thesis is to put Europeanization into perspective. For a number of years the impact of Europeanization in Greek political and social life has been overstated in scholarly debate. In some ways, the recent financial crisis was a challenge to the reigning paradigm as the limits of Europeanization were exemplified. I suggest that this thesis sheds light upon the restraints of Europeanization within the Greek public sphere and its slow burn impact upon Identity. Indeed, I suggest that this is tied to the unwillingness or incapacity of Greek reformist politicians and policy

makers to effectively articulate a homogeneous agenda that could withstand the test of time.

In terms of FPA, the key theoretical value added of this thesis lies in the proposition that while National Identity does have continuity in time, it could not maintain its dominant position without adapting to changing times and circumstances. This is certainly not a new theory but there remains considerable space for its development within FPA regarding its connection with foreign policy. Indeed, in terms of foreign policy outcomes, I suggest that it is important not only how an Identity is maintained but also what kinds of revisions take place. Thus, I argue that the tension inherent in Greek Identity and the dualism that has been analyzed in the relevant bibliography can be used to explain foreign policy making.

To a great extent, this is the product of the challenge I set for myself. The purpose of this thesis is to explain discontinuities as much as continuities, as I have explored the variance of Greek foreign policy. In this sense, this framework differentiates itself from other noteworthy contributions that examine single themes. Therefore, I would suggest that the novelty of this thesis is the employment of the Great Debate as my crucial test. My effort, in other words, was to determine whether such a dualism concept can be transferred to the area of Greek foreign policy and whether it forms the missing causal link between Identity and policy outputs.

8.4 Generalizability and predictive value

The conceptual framework that I have developed can be used to discuss decision-making in other policy spheres and in other national contexts. This is the case for a number of reasons. These include, amongst others, the capacity of this approach to be agnostic as to the substantive content of Identity, political agendas or foreign policy options. At the same time, this framework can accommodate a wide variety of different actors from various walks of life.

Therefore, this conceptual framework can be applied to other national contexts, for example, Brexit or Israel's policy towards the peace process in general or settlements in particular. For quite a few years, London's partners, allies and friends have questioned British ambivalence towards Europe. The empirical puzzle focuses on variance as well, as a pattern of change can be observed: different British governments have adopted contradictory policy options, with Labour governments refusing to challenge Europe's ties with Britain, and with the current Conservative government being open to renegotiation and holding a referendum. Moreover, a Great Debate can be delineated between those who support and those who oppose British membership in the European institutions. Arguably, British Identity influences the debate with conflicting visions of the past and the future contesting the issue. In the same spirit, Israel's refusal to adopt the so-called two state solution, together with its insistence upon building settlements, has triggered reactions amongst the international community, including the United States. Once again, the empirical puzzle is familiar as a variance can be observed in terms of policy, from government to government, because different Israeli governments have followed contradictory policies. Furthermore, a

Great Debate can be traced between hawks and doves within Israeli society. In this sense, I would suggest, that Israeli Identity influences the debate with opposing factions contesting policy making.

This conceptual framework can also be applied in other policy spheres, within Greece, for example, the financial crisis. In the past few years, Greece's international lenders together with a number of observers, have often expressed their bewilderment or dismay regarding the perceived progress, or lack thereof, of successive governments in the implementation of the memoranda of financial assistance. Arguably, the empirical puzzle itself focuses on variance. Over the past few years, Athens has displayed variance in its implementation of the memorandum. The three bailouts, the infamous memoranda, were adopted by three different Greek Parliaments on three different occasions, under international pressure but with increasing Parliamentary majorities from one to the next. At the same time, however, the record of successive governments is mixed: On the one hand, Athens has delivered on austerity, with dramatic and unprecedented cuts in salaries and pensions, even exceeding the targets; on the other hand, Athens has performed poorly when it comes to public reforms, the opening up of markets and privatization. Moreover, at times, governments appeared to move more or less quickly, with the international lenders often protesting over foot-dragging. Interestingly, mixed results can be observed not only across but within governments.

The application of an Identity framework to a case that would appear at a first reading to be a question of political economy may appear strained. After all, the policy and political contexts should suffice to explain a puzzle that is at its heart related to increases in taxation or cuts in public spending. Arguably, however, the bailouts are much more

than simply agreements of economic assistance. For all intents and purposes, Greece surrendered parts of its sovereignty, having delegated important decisions regarding the country's future to its international lenders. As such, the memoranda can be tied to the cardinal themes of National Identity as discussed in this thesis. It is not a coincidence that the political narrative that developed against the memorandum included associations with 'Greekness,' raised questions of national autonomy, and fed on a sense of national injustice, victimization and a siege mentality, while emphasizing the European 'other.'

Moreover, a Great Debate can be delineated. For quite some time, the Greek social and political milieu was divided into the so-called 'pro-memorandum' and 'anti-memorandum' camps. Generally, the 'pro-memorandum' alliance took the dire fiscal circumstance as a given, recognized the need for reforms and supported the implementation of the agreement, however painful, in order to avoid bankruptcy and spur growth. The 'anti-memorandum' alliance also recognized the country's fiscal ruin but challenged Greece's international obligations directly and offered a relatively painless alternative that would be the outcome of renegotiation with the country's lenders.

Arguably, the division between 'pro-memorandum' and 'anti-memorandum' is seen as being a difference on economics. I would argue, however, that this struggle can be related to the ongoing dualism that defines National Identity. Drawing from the discussion of dualism in the bibliography, I suggest that one can distinguish between the representations of the so-called reformist and underdog streams in the realm of the memorandum's implementation. Thus, I relate directly (or indirectly) the former with

foreign policy soft liners and ‘pro-memorandum;’ and the latter with foreign policy hard liners and ‘anti-memorandum.’ Within this framework, I focus on very specific manifestations of the generalizable trends of Greek dualism that are manifested in terms of the implementation of the memorandum. I would therefore examine their observable implications. In this sense, the hypothesis that I would seek to test in the discussion of the Greek crisis, my ‘crucial experiment’ that would falsify (or not) the hypothesis, is whether such a dualism concept can be transferred to the area of Greek implementation of the memorandum.

Last but not least, I will focus on the predictive value of the conceptual framework I offered in order to understand the causal chain(s) leading to differing policy outcomes. Indeed, one of my research objectives is to enable specific predictions for Greek foreign policy, particularly as cases are ongoing. A few months before the submission of this thesis, Greek foreign policy experienced a momentous ocassion. In June 2018, Athens and Skopje ended their decade-old dispute reaching an agreement that entails the formal recognition of the Republic of North Macedonia, with the new name being used for all purposes (erga omnes). Controversially, from a Greek perspective, the agreement included recognition of the Macedonian language in the United Nations and that the citizenship of the country will be called Macedonian/citizen of the republic of North Macedonia. The international community greeted the news with enthusiasm. Within Greece however, as Prime Minister Tsipras would admit a few months later, the agreement “came at a price” with a large majority of the Greeks openly and strongly opposing the government’s foreign policy.

The Great Debate that revolved around Prespes falls outside the scope of this thesis, although arguably it would be very interesting to later add a separate case study dedicated to this historic development. As articulated in this discussion the conceptual framework necessitates a constellation of conditions for the soft liners winning the Great Debate that is difficult to achieve. The bar is high. Yet, in the present economic dire straits, a strongly willed and committed government emerged, which engaged in Identity politics, articulated a clear alternative vision of shared Greek Identity, mobilized Identity Warriors with a clear strategy with a strong social reference, created an 'us' vs 'them' and marshaled state resources. It is noteworthy, that a first reading of recent events suggests that the government of SYRIZA after a certain point in time consciously adopted a minority position. Prime Minister Tsipras, after failing in his partisan strategy of dividing the opposition, moved forward despite being unable to mobilize the necessary support within society. If this is empirically confirmed, one should reconsider the explanatory weight of certain variables including a leader's preoccupation with legacies and place in history. In this context a comparison of Tsipras with Karamanlis who spoke of "my Uncle's greatest error" when referencing the Cyprus problem and the Zurich agreements would be enlightening. At the same time, the deeply rooted personal, even ideological, beliefs of decision makers, should never be underestimated. One can contrast, for example, the personal outlook of Tsipras on the Macedonian issue with that of his predecessors, or that of Simitis and Papandreou with that of Karamanls and Moliviatis on the Cyprus problem and the Annan Plan.

Meanwhile, the Great Debate continues, in the remaining two cases that monopolize Greek foreign policy, namely the Cyprus problem and Greece's charged bilateral relations with Turkey, without however any momentous developments. One can expect,

in the foreseeable future, that the hard liners will retain the upper hand regarding the final policy outcomes especially when it comes to Greece's relations with Turkey. The Cyprus problem may hold surprises since if a Cypriot government, given the international and regional context, assumes the Identity burden of the Great Debate, it could for all intents and purposes substitute, even within the Greek public sphere, the Greek government. Thus, a solution- driven team of Cypriot policymakers could potentially meet the conditions described above and drive the agenda of the Greeks. In any case, bearing in mind Churchill's famous saying, Greece, much like the Balkans, will continue producing more history that it can consume.

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