Subjugation Angst:
Memory and Europeanisation of
Foreign Policymaking in Slovenia and Croatia



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ABSTRACT

The past and its remembrance possess an incredible power to influence the present. The field of foreign policy is not immune to the forces of history and a vast body of literature invokes collective memory—an intersubjectively shared narrative construction of the past—to explain states' international and foreign policy behaviour. The European Union is often called a community of memory, yet EU Members' national collective memories differ substantially and persistently. Similarly, although the EU strives for unity in foreign policymaking, a truly Europeanised foreign policy has not yet emerged. To determine whether the parallel fractures in the EU's respective memory and foreign policy communities are interrelated, this dissertation investigates the question: *How does national collective memory influence EU Members' Europeanisation of foreign policymaking?* Whilst conventional scholarship emphasizes the influence of collective memory on foreign policy outcomes, the *remembrance approach* advanced in this dissertation reveals its influence on the foreign policymaking process. More specifically, I argue that national collective memory shapes national role conception which influences the extent of EU Member's Europeanisation of foreign policymaking, as well as its crystallisation through uploading or downloading. The research design features an asymmetric comparative case study of the principal case of Slovenia and supplementary case of Croatia. It utilises a plethora of documentary primary sources, as well as conducts original empirical research in the form of elite interviews and questionnaire responses. Empirical findings support the theorised influence of collective memory on the Europeanisation of foreign policymaking and unveil that it is particularly remembrance of *co-opted subjugation* in Slovenia and Croatia that is informative for state practice.

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I

INTRODUCTION

The struggle of man against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting.
—Milan Kundera[1]

Escaping the grip of the past is an impossible task. The past and its remembrance possess an incredible power to influence the present, and the political world is no exception. Peculiar patterns of states' international behaviour and interactions cannot be simply explained away with Realpolitik; instead, considering the past and its remembrance as a catalyst for foreign policy(making) behaviour is crucial. The European Union (EU) is often described as a "community of memory"[2] of the 20th century which prompted the project of European integration.[3] Since its very conception, the abstruse interplay of remembering and forgetting Europe's past guided the EU's evolution. A myth arose of the EU's 'virgin birth' from the post-World War II ashes, whereby Europe's *other* past of political domination and imperialism was largely forgotten.[4] And yet, "this past has also never been far from the surface, acting as the backdrop for Europe's cautious self-reassertion on the global stage."[5] Legacies of political subjugation continue to influence not only EU Members' interactions with the world, but also their behaviour and foreign policymaking within the EU. Slovenian Member of the European Parliament (MEP) Franc Bogovič identified precisely this, describing how EU Members'

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[1] Milan Kundera, *The Book of Laughter and Forgetting*, trans. Aaron Asher, Main (1996; repr., London: Faber & Faber, 2020), 2–3.

[2] Gabrielle Maas, Berny Sebe, and Kalypso Nicolaïdis, eds., 'Echoes of Empire: The Present of the Past', in *Echoes of Empire: Memory, Identity and Colonial Legacies* (London, UNITED KINGDOM: I. B. Tauris & Company, Limited, 2014), 1, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oxford/detail.action?docID=1992209.

[3] Kalypso Nicolaïdis et al., *Echoes of Empire: Memory, Identity and Colonial Legacies* (London: I. B. Tauris & Company, 2014), http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oxford/detail.action?docID=1992209.

[4] Kalyspo Nicolaïdis, Berny Sèbe, and Gabrielle Maas, 'Southern Barbarians? A Post-Colonial Critique of EUniversalism', in *Echoes of Empire: Memory, Identity and Colonial Legacies* (London: I. B. Tauris & Company, 2014), 285, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oxford/detail.action?docID=1992209.

[5] Nicolaïdis, Sèbe, and Maas, 285.

behavioural patterns differ in accordance with the "historic difference"[6] between former imperial powers that for centuries cultivated global spheres of influence and largely new EU Members that only gained full political autonomy, even statehood, after the fall of the Berlin Wall. He explained that such a contrariety of "historical memory presents a collision within the EU"[7] that is strongly felt both internally *and* concerning foreign politics.

The EU's failure to live up to its memory community ideal does not stem only from its emphasis on World War II and amnesia of the more distant imperial past.[8] On the contrary, for many new EU Members, "the memory of imperial satellite status is barely more than two decades old,"[9] and traumatic memories of this recent past of subjugation lead to stark intra-EU differences in remembrance. Consequently, "today's EU can no longer take refuge as easily as it once could in romantic notions of a shared past,"[10] and EU Members' national collective memories "remain resolutely separate."[11] For the purpose of this dissertation, collective memory is understood as a narrative construction of the past,[12] "knowledge about that past that is shared, mutually acknowledged, and reinforced by collectivities,"[13] and functions as a framework through which collectivities organise their history.[14]

In exploring how remembrance influences patterns of foreign policy behaviour, this dissertation seeks to uncover how the *parallel fractures* of the EU's community of *memory* and *foreign policy* are interrelated. Although it has been expected that political, economic, and social integration will stimulate the development of a symbiotic European foreign policy (FP) perspective within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP),[15] EU Members have

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[6] Franc Bogovič, interview with author, 23 March 2021. Translation by author.

[7] Franc Bogovič, interview with author, 23 March 2021. Translation by author.

[8] Nicolaïdis, Sèbe, and Maas, 'Southern Barbarians? A Post-Colonial Critique of EUniversalism'; Aline Sierp, 'EU Memory Politics and Europe's Forgotten Colonial Past', *Interventions* 22, no. 6 (17 August 2020): 686–702, https://doi.org/10.1080/1369801X.2020.1749701.

[9] Maas, Sebe, and Nicolaïdis, 'Echoes of Empire: The Present of the Past', 7.

[10] Maas, Sebe, and Nicolaïdis, 7.

[11] Jan-Werner Müller, *Memory and Power in Post-War Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 16, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oxford/detail.action?docID=202156.

[12] Armen Hovhannisyan, 'Interaction between Collective Memory and Foreign Policy Making Process: A Social Constructivist Approach', *Strategic Monitor* 2014, no. 3–4 (2014): 36–46.

[13] Joachim J. Savelsberg and Ryan D. King, 'Law and Collective Memory', *Annual Review of Law and Social Science* 3 (12 January 2007): 190.

[14] Müller, *Memory and Power in Post-War Europe*, 3.

[15] Ian Manners and Richard G. Whitman, eds., 'Introduction', in *The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States*, by Ian Manners and Richard G. Whitman (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 7–8. in Baun and Marek 2013, 4.) Michael J. Baun and Dan Marek, 'The Foreign Policies of the New Member States: A Framework for Analysis', in *The New Member States and the European Union: Foreign Policy and Europeanization*, Routledge Advances in European Politics 91 (New York: Routledge, 2013), 4, https://ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/login?url=https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oxford/detail.action?docID=1143855.

retained national FPs which operate not only in parallel, but sometimes in conflict with CFSP.[16] This precludes the Europeanisation of foreign policymaking, broadly understood as convergence of national FPs,[17] but more specifically describing a transformation in the construction and pursuit of national FPs and the consequent internalisation of values and expectations, resulting from a complex system of intergovernmental policymaking at the EU level.[18] In fact, Europeanisation of foreign policymaking has failed to materialise beyond the threshold of accession Europeanisation.

As "few if any policy areas have been as permeated by concerns of memory as foreign policy,"[19] the parallel tensions in the EU's community of remembrance and foreign policymaking may be intertwined. Hence, this dissertation explores the following question: *How does national collective memory influence EU Members' Europeanisation of foreign policymaking?*

Numerous scholars have suggested that history is a constitutive element of FP traditions and narratives,[20] whereby some argue that the "predominant way in which history comes to life to affect the political culture of the present"[21] is through collective memory. Collective memory provides the collective with a sense of a shared identity, a common origin myth, and a general understanding of its past, thus endowing it with a moral and normative meaning, as well as facilitating collective action by providing shared communicative tools and understandings about appropriate behaviour.[22] National collective memory has been increasingly included in

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[16] Ben Tonra and Thomas Christiansen, eds., 'The Study of EU Foreign Policy: Between International Relations and European Studies', in *Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2004), 1–9, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oxford/detail.action?docID=589295; Reuben Wong and Christopher Hill, 'Introduction', in *National and European Foreign Policies: Towards Europeanization* (Florence, USA: Taylor & Francis Group, 2011), 1–18, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oxford/detail.action?docID=714013.

[17] Wong and Hill, 'Introduction', 1.

[18] Ben Tonra, 'Denmark and Ireland', in *The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States*, ed. Ian Manners, Richard G. Whitman, and David Allen (Manchester: University Press, 2000), 224–42; Ben Tonra, *The Europeanisation of National Foreign Policy: Dutch, Danish and Irish Foreign Policy in the European Union* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001); Reuben Wong and Christopher Hill, *National and European Foreign Policies: Towards Europeanization* (Florence, USA: Taylor & Francis Group, 2011), http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oxford/detail.action?docID=714013.

[19] Eric Langenbacher, 'Does Collective Memory Still Influence German Foreign Policy?', *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* 20, no. 2 (2014): 55.

[20] Faris Kočan, 'Collective Memory and an Interpretative Approach: The Struggle over Kosovo's Independence as an Ideational Background for Contemporary Serbia's Foreign Policy Choices', *Croatian Political Science Review* 56, no. 3–4 (2019): 200–217, https://doi.org/10.20901/pm.56.3-4.09; Mirawis Balkhi, 'The Determinants of Afghanistan's Foreign Policy', *Himalayan and Central Asian Studies* 21, no. 2/3 (2017): 26–IV.


[21] Eric Langenbacher, 'Collective Memory as a Factor in Political Culture and International Relations', in *Power and the Past: Collective Memory and International Relations*, ed. Eric Langenbacher and Yossi Shain (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2010), 26–27, https://ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/login?url=http://www.ciaonet.org/catalog/19705.

[22] Thomas Berger, 'The Power of Memory and Memories of Power: The Cultural Parameters of German Foreign Policy-Making since 1945', in *Memory and Power in Post-War Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past*, ed. Jan-Werner Müller (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 80, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oxford/detail.action?docID=202156.

the positivist research paradigm of international relations (IR) that aims to explain patterns of state behaviour in the international arena.[23] Whilst collective memory is certainly not the only determinant factor of FP, its power to shape national interests, legitimise policies, and serve a communicative role is broadly recognised.[24] Furthermore, the political influence of memory transcends national borders in the sense that the "cult of memory"[25] can be detected across states and FP areas.[26]

In this dissertation, I posit that national collective memory is an important internal factor which influences EU Members' Europeanisation of foreign policymaking by altering the foreign policymaking *process* (see Figure 1.1).[27]

Figure 1.1: Theoretical argument



More specifically, I theorise that *national collective memory* functions as a prism through which the nation-state as a collective conceives of the present. It manifests in EU Members' interactions and behavioural patterns in foreign policymaking by shaping *national role conception* (NRC), which refers to policymakers' internalised norms and expectations concerning FP decisions, commitments, and behaviours their state should perform in the international system.[28] It shapes both the master NRC, which denotes the overarching

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[23] Kočan, 'Collective Memory and an Interpretative Approach'.

[24] Müller, *Memory and Power in Post-War Europe*. Dimitar Bechev, 'From the Soviet Bloc to the New Middle Age: East-Central Europe's Three Imperial Moments', in *Echoes of Empire: Memory, Identity and Colonial Legacies*, ed. Gabrielle Maas, Berny Sebe, and Kalypso Nicolaïdis (London: I. B. Tauris & Company, Limited, 2014), http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oxford/detail.action?docID=1992209; Berger, 'The Power of Memory and Memories of Power: The Cultural Parameters of German Foreign Policy-Making since 1945'.

[25] Müller, *Memory and Power in Post-War Europe*, 16.

[26] Müller, *Memory and Power in Post-War Europe*; P. J. Verovšek, 'Collective Memory, Politics, and the Influence of the Past: The Politics of Memory as a Research Paradigm', *Politics Groups and Identities* 4, no. 3 (2016): 529-543. ISSN 2156-5503, https://doi.org/10.1080/21565503.2016.1167094.

[27] The theoretical argument is further elaborated in Chapter Two.

[28] Naomi Bailin Wish, 'Foreign Policy Makers and Their National Role Conceptions', *International Studies Quarterly* 24, no. 4 (December 1980): 533, https://doi.org/10.2307/2600291.

conceptualisation of the state's position in the global context, and the auxiliary NRC, which is a nuanced role conception of a more limited scope, embedded within a master NRC, and is for the purpose of this study imagined as EU-specific. This auxiliary, EU-specific NRC motivates the *extent* and *type* of *Europeanisation of foreign policymaking*, which broadly describes the process of convergence of national foreign policymaking. A truly "Europeanised foreign policy takes common EU positions as major referencing point; does not defect from common positions even when they cause difficulties; attempts to pursue national priorities principally through collective EU action;" [29] and "subscribes positively to values and principles expressed by the EU in its external activity."[30] The type of Europeanisation of foreign policymaking describes its directionality along the vertical dimension between the EU and national level: uploading (the projection of national ideas, interests, and preferences to the EU level) or downloading (national adaptation to and integration of EU-generated, majority consensus-based policies).

The EU's remembrance fractures are mainly situated atop diverging recollections of political subjugation and power asymmetries. Thus, the collective memory of *subjugation,* referring to a state of existence under the political control of another polity, is particularly pertinent for this exploration of the relationship between collective memory and Europeanisation of foreign policymaking. The very nature of EU membership demands the voluntary delegation of sovereignty to a supranational political sphere; hence, many imagine the EU as a modern, neo-imperialist project[31] and interpret its enlargement as "empire by invitation."[32] Slovenian MEP Bogovič, for instance, explained that legacies of political subjugation within the EU manifest in former imperial powers having developed "mechanisms of integration"[33] which other EU Members, such as Slovenia, lack. Thus, it is important to understand how EU Members with experience of being subjugated navigate the EU political arena. I explore the relationship between collective memory and the Europeanisation of foreign policymaking by focusing on two EU Members which have long historical experiences of political subjugation and have only

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[29] Wong and Hill, *National and European Foreign Policies*, 211.

[30] Wong and Hill, 211.

[31] Gary Marks, 'Europe and Its Empires: From Rome to the European Union*', *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 50, no. 1 (2012): 1–20, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2011.02218.x; Jan Zielonka, *Europe as Empire: The Nature of the Enlarged European Union* (Oxford: University Press, 2006); Jan Zielonka, 'Europe's New Civilizing Missions: The EU's Normative Power Discourse', *Journal of Political Ideologies* 18, no. 1 (2013): 35–55, https://doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2013.750172; Raffaella A. Del Sarto, 'Normative Empire Europe: The European Union, Its Borderlands, and the "Arab Spring"', *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 54, no. 2 (2016): 215–32, https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12282.

[32] Bechev, 'From the Soviet Bloc to the New Middle Age: East-Central Europe's Three Imperial Moments', 259.

[33] Franc Bogovič, interview with author, 23 March 2021. Translation by author.

gained independence recently: Slovenia and Croatia. I argue that it is precisely their collective memory of *co-opted subjugation* that shapes their respective NRCs and thus motivates the Europeanisation of foreign policymaking. The term 'co-opted subjugation' describes a particular, softer form of political subjugation by another polity, may it be an imperial, federal, or even supranational entity, whereby subjugation does not manifest as colonisation but is co-opted in the sense that it is to some extent willing and tolerated, and does not involve forceful oppression. Slovenia's and Croatia's remembrance of a past of *co-opted subjugation*, I argue, unveils important parallels with their present *voluntary* delegation of sovereignty to the EU and thus significantly influences their foreign policymaking behaviour within the EU sphere.

SIGNIFICANCE

The purpose of this dissertation is to advance a constructivist approach to Europeanisation of foreign policymaking which emphasises particularly the importance of the cultural framework in which policy is produced.[34] More specifically, I seek to expand the conventional link between collective memory and FP to include the *process* of foreign policymaking, not merely its outcomes. Additionally, I aim to reveal how specific frames of remembrance inform NRC and thus Europeanisation. The relationship between collective memory and foreign policymaking cannot be considered causal in the rationalist understanding,[35] as the very nature of such ideational phenomena prevents a conception of causality in "the sense that a bullet through the heart causes death."[36] My intention is indeed not to establish causality but rather to reveal channels of transmission through which collective memory impacts the present and show that foreign policymaking is imbued with remembrance.

This examination of the relationship between collective memory and the Europeanisation of foreign policymaking has both conceptual and practical implications. One of the foremost conceptual contributions is the focus on the foreign policymaking *process*. Unlike conventional

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[34] Ruth Wittlinger and Martin Larose, 'No Future for Germany's Past? Collective Memory and German Foreign Policy', *German Politics* 16, no. 4 (2007): 481–95, https://doi.org/10.1080/09644000701652490.

[35] Leonard August Schuette, 'Collective Memory in Germany and the Great Foreign Policy Debate: The Case of the European Refugee Crisis', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 31, no. 3–4 (4 July 2018): 272–90, https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2018.1519777.

[36] Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie, 'International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State', *International Organization* 40, no. 4 (1986): 768, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300027363. in Schuette, 'Collective Memory in Germany and the Great Foreign Policy Debate', 275.

outcome-oriented approaches, which overwhelmingly focus on the effects of remembrance on FP interests and specific policies, I investigate how collective memory shapes the ways in which foreign policymakers understand the world they operate in, the beliefs they have about their own and other countries' actions, and their international behaviour. In essence, this approach uncovers channels of transmission through which collective memory influences the Europeanisation of foreign policymaking. Moreover, focusing specifically on states' foreign policymaking within the EU context, I demonstrate how collective memory enters the process as an additional, state-specific element shaping national foreign policymakers' behaviour within the EU sphere.

This dissertation contributes to existing memory literature which often engages in narration of qualitative sources to analyse collective memory but does not compare it across cases. Similarly, implications of different memory frames and motifs of remembrance are only rarely systematically investigated for their explanatory power. In fact, "while few would doubt that memory mattered and exercised power … even fewer would be able to explain precisely how it mattered."[37] Moreover, in scholarship, the object of remembrance is largely limited to the recent 20th century past, particularly World War II and ideological extremism of totalitarian regimes. In contrast, this examination explores legacies of (co-opted) subjugation more broadly.

Yet another conceptual contribution is this dissertation's novel *remembrance approach* to the study of Europeanisation of foreign policymaking that theoretically links it with formerly unrelated conceptual frameworks. This approach syntheses two bodies of literature that theorise the relationship between remembrance and FP: collective memory and role theory. Both argue that the past and its remembrance can influence political behaviour, including FP behaviour, through ideational factors such as culture and identity. Until now, however, they have not yet been systematically integrated. Additionally, this dissertation incorporates and elaborates on the emerging field of Europeanisation of foreign policy(making). Such integration of distinct theoretical fields produces a theoretical approach adept at explaining the effects of national collective memory on foreign policymaking.

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[37] Müller, *Memory and Power in Post-War Europe*, 2.

This dissertation's empirical focus on small and new EU Members, namely Slovenia and Croatia, provides further insights, since European studies, as well as IR and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) literature more broadly, overwhelmingly direct analytical attention onto large states, particularly EU Members such as France and Germany. Small EU Members, however, undoubtedly conduct themselves in the international arena differently than their large(r) counterparts, as they often lack the material capacity, status, political influence, or even interest to devote substantial resources to global affairs. Understanding their foreign policymaking is not only crucial because it has so far been only poorly researched but also because assumptions that hold for larger states cannot simply be transposed onto small states.[38]

This dissertation also offers numerous practical contributions. Lessons learned from a better understanding of how EU Members engage in FP formulation within the EU allow policymakers to anticipate EU Members' commitment to national FPs, mitigate tensions and obstacles in negotiating CFSP, and develop expectations for FP behaviour of third countries, thus rendering resulting FP strategies more effective. Furthermore, understanding how remembrance stimulates specific foreign policymaking practices enables policymakers' informed harnessing of collective memory as a tool to increase the efficiency of foreign policymaking.

RESEARCH DESIGN

This section describes how this inquiry into the relationship between collective memory and Europeanisation of foreign policymaking is tailored to the complexity of investigated phenomena. I synthesise two theory-testing methods, which allows for the exploration of the theorised relationship by specifying it within each case, as well as comparing it across cases. First, process tracing—a systematic examination of cases—is used to unveil theorised channels of transmission.[39] It helps to uncover not only whether the explanatory phenomenon (collective memory) matters but also why and how it came to influence the outcome (Europeanisation of

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[38] 'Which Member States Have the Largest Share of EU's GDP?', Eurostat, 11 May 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/DDN-20180511-1; 'Living in the EU', European Union, 5 July 2016, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/figures/living_en.

[39] John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, 'Leaving Theory behind: Why Simplistic Hypothesis Testing Is Bad for International Relations', ed. Colin Wight, Lene Hansen, and Tim Dunne, *European Journal of International Relations* 19, no. 3 (2013): 427–57, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066113494320.

foreign policymaking).[40] Second, case comparison—a systematic examination of multiple cases through a comparison of paired observations—illuminates whether empirical observations are congruent or incongruent with theoretical predictions.[41]

Asymmetrical Comparative Case Study: Slovenia and Croatia

A comparative case study is an in-depth analysis of a single phenomenon with the aim of elucidating features of a larger class of similar phenomena.[42] Multiple reasons underwrite its utility for this dissertation. First, it is adept at comprehensively investigating interdisciplinary phenomena.[43] The study of both collective memory and role conceptions bridges disciplines of psychology, sociology, and political science.[44] The focus on Europeanisation and foreign policymaking similarly requires imports from the field of IR, FPA, and European studies.[45] Second, case study inquiry is well equipped to untangle complex social phenomena characterised by subtle and indirect interactions; it is best suited for exploring obscure mechanisms with a multivariate focus.[46] Therefore, it is an ideal explanatory method for the analysis of the intricate relationship between collective memory and Europeanisation of foreign policymaking that does not easily lend itself to the analysis of observable phenomena or unfold directly. Third, case studies are particularly useful for the analysis of contemporary events whereby boundaries between phenomena of interest and the context in which they unfold are not clearly evident.[47] The case study method allows for a contextual analysis of an

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[40] J. Blatter and M. Haverland, *Designing Case Studies: Explanatory Approaches in Small-N Research* (London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oxford/detail.action?docID=931717; Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).

[41] Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*.

[42] John Gerring, 'What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good For?', *American Political Science Review* 98, no. 2 (May 2004): 341–54, https://ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk:2095/10.1017/S0003055404001182.

[43] Bill Gillham, 'Case Study Research: The Qualitative Dimension', in *Case Study Research Methods* (London: Continuum, 2000), 9–14.

[44] Eric Langenbacher and Yossi Shain, *Power and the Past: Collective Memory and International Relations* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2010), https://ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/login?url=http://www.ciaonet.org/catalog/19705; Kočan, 'Collective Memory and an Interpretative Approach'; Verovšek, 'Collective Memory, Politics, and the Influence of the Past'.

[45] Baun and Marek, 'The Foreign Policies of the New Member States: A Framework for Analysis'.

[46] Robert K. Yin, 'Introduction', in *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, Third, vol. 5, Applied Social Research Methods Series (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2003), 1–17; Gary Goertz and James Mahoney, *A Tale of Two Cultures: Qualitative and Quantitative Research in the Social Sciences* (Princeton, USA: Princeton University Press, 2012), http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oxford/detail.action?docID=980043; James Mahoney and Gary Goertz, 'A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative and Qualitative Research', *Political Analysis* 14, no. 3 (2006): 227–49, https://doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpj017; Charles Lipson, 'Using Case Studies Effectively', in *How to Write a BA Thesis: A Practical Guide from Your First Ideas to Your Finished Paper* (Chicaga: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 99–109, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/brown/detail.action?docID=408315; Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman, 'Case Study Methods in the International Relations Subfield', *Comparative Political Studies* 40, no. 2 (February 2007): 170–75, https://doi.org/Comparative Political Studie.

[47] Yin, 'Introduction'.

'uncontrollable' phenomenon that is deeply intertwined with other contemporary phenomena and thus inseparable from its background conditions.[48] The study of collective memory is precisely that; it is deeply and firmly embedded in a network integrating the construct of national identity, political culture, and history and cannot ignore considerations of the broader identity-memory nexus. A holistic study of the influence of collective memory on foreign policymaking consequently can and must not extract phenomena of interest from the underlying context or consider them in isolation from the mosaic of intervening variables. Lastly, the case study method facilitates research bridging distinct levels of analysis.[49] This study primarily engages the subnational level of analysis to examine state-internal causes, yet it also assesses foreign policymaking at the EU level. Moreover, it bridges the distinction between behaviour of national policymakers and that of states as key actors.

In sum, this asymmetrical comparative case study encompasses an in-depth, systematic analysis of two cases—Slovenia and Croatia—for the purpose of theory elaboration and testing.[50] The following factors prompt the selection of Slovenia and Croatia for case study analysis. As the phenomenon of interest is the *Europeanisation* of foreign policymaking, the universe of cases is limited to EU Members; Slovenia joined the EU in 2004 and Croatia in 2013.[51] The cases were not selected as representative of all EU Members, or even small EU Members, but rather because of their intrinsic importance. First, my interest in the Balkans stems from the particular salience of history and memory in the region.[52] Moreover, the Balkans host overlapping influences from the EU, Russia, China, and Turkey, which renders the examination of Europeanisation of foreign policy(making) of Balkan countries (or at least countries with a 'Balkan experience') particularly interesting. Second, both Slovenia and Croatia are among the newer EU Members (with Croatia as the most recent) and have only recently become independent. In fact, both have a long history of non-independence and, in fact, co-opted subjugation. Both were part of the Habsburg empire and its descendants, as well

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[48] Lipson, 'Using Case Studies Effectively', 100; Yin, 'Introduction'; Gillham, 'Case Study Research: The Qualitative Dimension'.

[49] M. Coppedge, 'Thickening Thin Concepts and Theories: Combining Large N and Small in Comparative Politics', *Comparative Politics* 31, no. 4 (1999): 465–76, https://doi.org/10.2307/422240.

[50] David Collier, 'The Comparative Method: Two Decades of Change', in *Comparative Political Dynamics: Global Research Perspectives*, ed. Dankwart A. Rustow and Kenneth Paul Erickson (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), 7–31.

[51] 'Countries', European Union, 5 July 2016, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries_en.

[52] Maruša Pušnik, 'Media Memorial Discourses and Memory Struggles in Slovenia: Transforming Memories of the Second World War and Yugoslavia', *Memory Studies* 12, no. 4 (August 2019): 433–50, https://doi.org/10.1177/1750698017720254; Maria Nikolaeva Todorova, *Balkan Identities: Nation and Memory* (London: Hurst, 2004); Ana Milošević, 'Back to the Future, Forward to the Past: Croatian Politics of Memory in the European Parliament', *Nationalities Papers* 45, no. 5 (2017): 893–909, https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2017.1289368.

as Yugoslavia in its multiple forms: the State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (here jointly referred to as 'the first Yugoslavia'), and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY or 'the second Yugoslavia'). Unlike other Balkan EU Members such as Greece, Romania, or Bulgaria, Slovenia and Croatia did not become independent, sovereign states until 1991 and thus lack an essential tradition of statehood that would condition their international behaviour through path-dependence.

The asymmetric nature of the case study analysis serves a dual purpose. Slovenia is the principal case for which the theorised argument is elucidated in great detail. The focus on Slovenia is based on data richness and availability, specifically my capacity to execute multiple elite interviews in the Slovene language, which allows for a detailed within-case examination using a plurality of sources. A concise analysis of the supplementary case of Croatia, however, serves as a preliminary probe that broadly checks for the influence of remembrance on foreign policymaking. According to Mill's method of difference, cases with similar general characteristics prove most suitable for controlled comparison in qualitative studies.[53] Croatia and Slovenia are two such cases; they share a similar historical experience of non-independence and co-opted subjugation, they both became independent in the same time period, as well as resemble one another socio-politically and culturally.

Timeframe

Collective memory and NRC are constructs that develop across long timespans and never entirely consolidate. Similarly, the focus on the Europeanisation of foreign policymaking explores behavioural patterns and does not necessitate attention to specific FP issues. This dissertation's analytical timeframe is thus not strictly defined and is primarily concerned with the analysis of mature FP. Since 1991, Slovenia's and Croatia's FP evolved from infancy as both secured international recognition, established an independent FP machinery, and—in the case of Croatia—ended the Homeland War (1991-1995), to adolescence during the period of intensifying engagement with the EU and other international organisations. Finally, the period

[53] Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*.

of FP maturity dawned as both countries fulfilled their principal 'adolescent' FP goals of EU membership in 2004 and 2013, respectively, which required a 'Europeanising'[54] overhaul of the state. More specifically, in 2015, Slovenia for the first time since 1999 adopted a new 'Declaration on Foreign Policy of the Republic of Slovenia'[55] and accompanying strategy 'Slovenia: Safe, Successful, Globally Respected.'[56] The latter is replete with historical references and explicitly stresses the importance of historical experience as a framework upon which Slovenia's external relations are established. Hence, this dissertation analytically focuses principally on the *post-2015 period*.

Operationalisation of Variables

The empirical study of the influence of collective memory on national role conceptions and Europeanisation of foreign policymaking faces methodological challenges inherent to the study of any similar cultural constructs.[57] Collective memory as a social construct that is emotive, subjective, and deeply intertwined with (political) culture, as well as NRCs as internalised beliefs about the international sphere, are itself intangible and immaterial and can thus only be measured indirectly. Moreover, although the aim is not to establish causality, elucidating a clear and accurate account of the relationship between collective memory and actual behaviour is challenging. Just as much of the complex processes social science seeks to uncover, "collective remembering seldom lends itself to being studied with a methodology grounded in the control of variables."[58]

This methodological design (see Figure 1.2 for *Operationalisation of variables*) principally takes a qualitative approach. Nonetheless, it utilises the benefits of mixed methods research which integrates multiple data sources, data collection and analysis procedures, and research

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[54] It is important to distinguish accession Europeanisation which is conditional for full EU membership and during which EU legislation, for instance, is transposed into national legal systems, and post-accession Europeanisation which is the focus of this dissertation and refers to further Europeanisation.

[55] 'Declaration on Foreign Policy of the Republic of Slovenia (DeZPRS-1)', Pub. L. No. 007-01/15-16/12 (2015), https://www.gov.si/assets/ministrstva/MZZ/Dokumenti/strateski-in-programski-dokumenti/DECLARATION_ON_FOREIGN_POLICY_-_FINAL.pdf.

[56] 'Slovenia: Safe, Successful, Globally Respected' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia, 2015), https://www.gov.si/assets/ministrstva/MZZ/Dokumenti/strateski-in-programski-dokumenti/strategija_ZP_ang.pdf.

[57] Berger, 'The Power of Memory and Memories of Power: The Cultural Parameters of German Foreign Policy-Making since 1945', 81–82.

[58] James V. Wertsch, 'Collective Memory', in *Memory in Mind and Culture*, ed. Pascal Boyer and James V. Wertsch (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 122, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oxford/detail.action?docID=442858.

methods in a single study[59] "for the purposes of breadth and depth of understanding and corroboration."[60] I assess the variety of qualitative evidence specified below through textual analysis, synthesising both content analysis which examines texts systematically, objectively, and quantitatively, and discourse analysis which examines and interprets phenomena by exploring how socially constructed concepts and ideas are developed, and how social reality is produced.[61] It must be noted, however, that the asymmetric analysis of Croatia employs a different, more limited research methodology than the principal case of Slovenia.

To analyse national collective memory which is consolidated and deeply embedded in the national political and social system, this dissertation extracts collective memory's *master narrative*, defined as "the cultural script or a dominant discourse that proliferates in a society."[62] Because collective memory is primarily produced by national elites and consumed by the society at large,[63] ascertaining precisely what the master narrative is necessitates a primary focus on elites. I determine the master narrative by examining multiple sources of remembrance of the nation's past to anchor collective memory within the historical chronology and extract its central motifs. Historical anchors of collective memory are identified based on speeches given by high-level politicians (Presidents, Prime Ministers - PMs) on national holidays commemorating historic events, and expert interviews. To extract the motifs interwoven throughout the master narrative, the aforementioned sources are supplemented with analysis of official, state-produced documents chronicling national history.

To evaluate the relationship between NRC and the Europeanisation of foreign policymaking, it is crucial first to uncover the presence and characteristics of critical role conceptions in a

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[59] John W. Creswell, 'Controversies in Mixed Methods Research', in *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research*, ed. Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, 4th ed. (Thousand Oaks, Calif. ; London: Sage Publications, 2011), 271; Jason Seawright, *Multi-Method Social Science: Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Tools*, Strategies for Social Inquiry (Cambridge: University Press, 2016), 2; Abbas Tashakkori and Charles Teddlie, eds., 'The Past and Future of Mixed Methods Research: From Data Triangulation to Mixed Methods Design', in *SAGE Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social & Behavioral Research*, Second edition., SAGE Research Methods (Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE, 2003), 674; Abbas Tashakkori and Charles Teddlie, eds., 'Major Issues and Controversies in the Use of Mixed Methods in the Social and Behavioural Sciences', in *SAGE Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social & Behavioral Research*, Second edition., SAGE Research Methods (Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE, 2003), 8–10.

[60] Creswell, 'Controversies in Mixed Methods Research', 271.

[61] Cynthia Hardy, Nelson Phillips, and Bill Harley, 'Discourse Analysis and Content Analysis: Two Solitudes?', *Qualitative & Multi-Method Research* 2, no. 1 (31 March 2004): 19–22, https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.998649.

[62] Phillip L. Hammack and Erin E. Toolis, 'Putting the Social into Personal Identity: The Master Narrative as Root Metaphor for Psychological and Developmental Science: Commentary on McLean and Syed', *Human Development* 58, no. 6 (2015): 350–64, https://doi.org/10.1159/000446054; Phillip L. Hammack, 'Narrative and the Cultural Psychology of Identity', *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 12, no. 3 (2008): 222–47, https://doi.org/10.1177/1088868308316892.

[63] Müller, *Memory and Power in Post-War Europe*; Langenbacher and Shain, *Power and the Past*; Richard Ned Lebow, 'The Future of Memory', *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 617, no. 1 (May 2008): 25–41, https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716207310817; Verovšek, 'Collective Memory, Politics, and the Influence of the Past'.

particular political system. I identify a master NRC and an auxiliary NRC and analyse them according to characteristics extrapolated from scholarship on the relationship between role conception and FP.[64] This dissertation exclusively refers to elite discourse to identify and examine relevant NRCs, since NRCs are developed, internalised, and enacted by the elites, especially policymakers.[65] While these processes are socially embedded, practical constraints of this dissertation preclude an extensive investigation of societal forces involved in the construction of NRCs. Primary sources include official FP documents by Slovenia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Parliament, Croatia's Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs (MFEA) and the parliament 'Sabor,' and general FP statements by highest-level politicians (Presidents, PMs, foreign ministers – FMs) that do not pertain to specific events or issues so as to reflect the state's comprehensive NRC. Furthermore, original empirical data is collected through elite interviews with practitioners and experts and a written questionnaire.

As aforementioned, the Europeanisation of foreign policymaking refers to the process of convergence of FP formulation. First, I explore the *extent* of Europeanisation of foreign policymaking qualitatively; directly through elite interviews and questionnaire responses, and indirectly by assessing CFSP's importance for national foreign policy(making) through FP documents, political speeches, elite interviews, and questionnaire responses. I further quantify it by determining EU Members' voting cohesion with the EU in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Because the EU strives to 'speak with a single voice,' particularly in international institutions where it benefits from pooling votes, higher voting cohesion indicates a higher level of Europeanisation of foreign policymaking (and vice versa).[66] While voting cohesion is a commonly used proxy for the degree of Europeanisation, it is imperfect and simplistic and can consequently only reflect the extent of Europeanisation in unison with other qualitative indicators. Second, I qualitatively assess the *type* (uploading or downloading) of Europeanisation of foreign policymaking by reviewing elite interviews and questionnaire

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[64] Refer to Table 1.1 for operationalisation of NRC and Chapter Two for a detailed explanation of the theoretical argument, including the essential characteristics of NRC.

[65] K. J. Holsti, 'National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy', *International Studies Quarterly* 14, no. 3 (September 1970): 233, https://doi.org/10.2307/3013584; Wish, 'Foreign Policy Makers and Their National Role Conceptions'; Stephen G. Walker, 'Role Theory and the Origins of Foreign Policy', in *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy*, ed. Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley, and James N. Rosenau (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987), 269–84; Naomi Bailin Wish, 'National Attributes as Sources of National Role Conceptions: A Capability-Motivation Model', in *Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis*, ed. Stephen G. Walker, Duke Press Policy Studies (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1987), 94–103.

[66] For further information on the quantitative measure of voting cohesion, refer to Annex II.

responses to determine EU Members' behaviour during foreign policymaking at the EU level, specifically when formulating CFSP and participating in the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC).

Figure 1.2: Operationalisation of variables

	Collective Memory (IV)	**National Role Conception** (IntV)	**Europeanisation of Foreign Policymaking** (DV)	
Variable	***Master narrative*** *(anchors and motifs)*	***Master NRC*** ***Auxiliary NRC***	***Extent***	***Type*** *(uploading or downloading)*
Operationalisation	• number of political speeches on national holidays • description and frequency of references to historic events	• labels and purposive statements for state's role in the global and EU context	• voting cohesion • importance of CFSP	• dimensions of CFSP formulation • behaviour within FAC
Analysis	Discourse and content analysis	Discourse and content analysis	Quantitative analysis, discourse analysis	Quantitative analysis, discourse analysis
Sources	• political speeches • official documents • elite interviews • public opinion polls	• political speeches • MFA/MFEA, Parliamentary documents • elite interviews • questionnaires	• UN voting records[67] • elite interviews • questionnaires • political speeches • MFA/MFEA documents	• elite interviews • questionnaires • MFA/MFEA documents

Original Empirical Research: Interviews and Questionnaires

For both Slovenia and Croatia, original empirical research involves semi-structured interviews and questionnaire responses.[68] In accordance with the asymmetric nature of the comparative case study, original research was conducted primarily for the principal case of Slovenia and was much more limited for the case of Croatia, which serves as a preliminary probe.

[67] Erik Voeten, Anton Strezhnev, and Michael Bailey, 'United Nations General Assembly Voting Data' (Harvard Dataverse, 6 May 2021), https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/LEJUQZ.

[68] Prior to conducting the interviews and questionnaires, this research was subject to appropriate ethical review by the Central University Research Ethics Committee (CUREC) of the University of Oxford.

This study's extensive reliance on elite interviews and questionnaires is based on their high utility in elucidating relationships that other methods simply cannot.[69] The intricacy of the proposed theoretical argument, which synthesises a complex social construct of collective memory with NRCs and Europeanisation of foreign policymaking, necessitates rich, complex data that can only be obtained through interviews. Moreover, investigation of NRCs hinges upon policymakers' first-hand explanation of their own views. Whereas NRCs can, to some extent, be deduced from FP documents, such data is insufficient, as official documents are produced for public consumption and may as such portray an ideal, exaggerated or confident role which may be performative and not reflective of policymakers' actual internalised beliefs. Similarly, whereas the extent and type of Europeanisation of foreign policymaking can somewhat be inferred from FP documents or political speeches, gaining sufficient insight into these complex and obscure processes crucially depends on interview data.

Interviewees were selected in accordance with this study's focus on national elites, which function as the primary producers of collective memory and NRC, as well as participate in foreign policymaking and facilitate its Europeanisation. To reiterate, whereas collective memory can with greater ease be deduced from other primary sources such as political speeches, official documents, as well as public opinion polls, the same does not hold for NRCs and the Europeanisation of foreign policymaking. To ensure maximum exposure to a multiplicity of perspectives on NRCs and foreign policymaking behaviour, interviewees include national elites with different institutional affiliations, areas of FP expertise, and political ideology. Moreover, interviews with both practitioners (individuals currently or formerly directly involved in politics and FP) and experts (academics in the field of history, politics, or IR) equalised practitioners' bias in assessing their own field and experts' criticism or isolationism from practice.

For the principal case of Slovenia, I conducted 15 interviews with historians, FP experts, foreign policymakers, as well as national and EU-level politicians (for a full list of interviewees and their affiliation, see Annex I). Interviews were conducted online between March and May 2021 in the Slovene language and were semi-structured. In two cases, interviews could not be

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[69] Claire Greenstein and Layna Mosley, 'When Talk Isn't Cheap: Opportunities and Challenges in Interview Research', in *The SAGE Handbook of Research Methods in Political Science and International Relations*, ed. Luigi Curini and Robert J. Franzese, SAGE Knowledge (London ; Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE, 2020), 1167–89, https://ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/login?url=http://sk.sagepub.com/reference/the-sage-handbook-of-research-methods-in-political-science-and-ir.

arranged due to temporal constraints and were substituted with open-ended written questions. Interviewees included ten practitioners: three Slovenian Members of the European Parliament (MEPs); two current employees of Slovenian MFA (a department head and a representative at the Slovenian Permanent Representation to the EU); two former diplomats; a National Councillor; a former President of the National Council; and a former PM. Additionally, I interviewed five experts at the University of Ljubljana and Slovenian research institutes. For the supplementary case of Croatia, which relies on different methodology and limited original empirical research, I conducted one online interview with an academic/politician who was able to provide information on all three concepts explored in this study. I also conducted four informal, anonymous interviews in the Croatian language with members of the civil society.

Questionnaires supplement interview data and facilitate standardisation and comparison of responses, which is more difficult to achieve in semi-structured interviews.[70] Moreover, both Slovenia's MFA and Croatia's MFEA discouraged employees from participating in interviews; instead, they pre-approved the questionnaire in the Slovene and Croatian language and circulated it on internal platforms for employees to voluntarily fill out. All questionnaire responses have been anonymised. For the case of Slovenia, twelve questionnaire respondents included eight MFA employees, specifically a head of Slovenia's representation office, deputy head of mission, deputy permanent representative to an international organisation, a senior official and two additional officials at Slovenia's Permanent Representation to the EU, and two department heads. Responses by foreign policymakers were supplemented with two senior foreign policy officials from the Slovenian National Council and National Assembly. Additionally, two interviewees (both practitioners) opted to respond in written form to open- and close-ended questions. One response was obtained from a senior official at Croatia's MFEA.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

Chapter II provides further discussion and critique of existing theoretical approaches to the study of collective memory and Europeanisation of foreign policy, as well as role theory. Moreover, it outlines the theoretical argument and presents a novel *remembrance approach* to

[70] See Annex III for the questionnaire's English translation.

the study of foreign policymaking. Chapter III elucidates Slovenia's master narrative of remembrance, specifying anchors and motifs structuring collective memory, and Chapter IV unveils the relationship between Slovenia's collective memory, role conception, and Europeanisation of foreign policymaking. Chapter V concisely examines the supporting case of Croatia and juxtaposes it with the case of Slovenia. Lastly, Chapter VI concludes by summarising empirical results and drawing implications of findings for theory and practice.

II

POLITICS OF MEMORY: CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES

> The past does not matter just by itself. Only by relating the past to oneself, i.e., only by placing oneself somewhere in this past, does it start to matter because it becomes one's *own* past, which makes one's *own* present and one's *own* future possible.[1]

The complex relationship between remembrance and FP is well established. And yet, while much of the scholarly focus has been on FP outcomes, the influence of remembrance on foreign policy*making* has largely been overlooked. To bridge this conceptual gap, I set forth a *remembrance approach* to foreign policymaking which synthesises three formerly isolated strands of literature: collective memory scholarship, role theory, and Europeanisation literature. This chapter discusses these central concepts and specifies their utility in deciphering the relationship between collective memory and foreign policymaking. The last section interweaves conceptual insights and specifies the remembrance approach to the Europeanisation of foreign policymaking.

COLLECTIVE MEMORY

The concept 'collective memory' resists a singular definition; it "is one of those elusive topics we all think we have a handle on. But as soon as we try to define it, it starts slipping and sliding, eluding attempts to grasp it either culturally, sociologically, or scientifically."[2] All too often, it

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[1] Michel-André Horelt and Judith Renner, 'Denting a Heroic Picture: A Narrative Analysis of Collective Memory in Post-War Croatia', *Perspectives* 16, no. 2 (2008): 10. Emphasis in original.23/05/2021 17:13:00

[2] Andreas Huyssen, *Present Pasts: Urban Palimpsests and the Politics of Memory*, Cultural Memory in the Present (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003), 3.

is conflated with concepts such as myth, historical consciousness, or cultural memo, and such terminological indeterminacy confuses our understanding of its importance. Although it is impossible to reconcile all of the competing definitions and synthesise them into a compact paradigm,[3] some commonalities nonetheless emerge.

Firstly, collective memory is inherently *social*; it is intersubjectively shared and (re)constructed through complex social processes.[4] It is shared by a social group—the collective—which need not be an objective reality but may be based upon a sense of its existence.[5] Sharing a common past is a crucial element of belonging to a collective, as any 'real' collective is a community of memory, meaning that it is based on a common remembrance of the past.[6]

Secondly, collective memory is *dynamic*, a product of complex social processes that is constantly (re)negotiated in ongoing intellectual and political negotiations within the collective.[7] Memories shared by some collectives are contested by others and are thus made and remade in hierarchical social structures,[8] as well as fall victim to intentional or organic forgetting.[9] In fact, "memorisation is not linear or uniform in progression. It is dynamic and can be imagined as a succession of waves and cycles, whereby events can fade into 'distant memory' or be awakened by younger generations who wish to remember what their parents wanted to forget."[10]

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[3] Wertsch, 'Collective Memory', 118.

[4] Langenbacher and Shain, *Power and the Past*; Hovhannisyan, 'Interaction between Collective Memory and Foreign Policy Making Process: A Social Constructivist Approach'; Brigittine M. French, 'The Semiotics of Collective Memories', *Annual Review of Anthropology* 41, no. 41 (2012): 337–53, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-anthro-081309-145936; Savelsberg and King, 'Law and Collective Memory'; Müller, *Memory and Power in Post-War Europe*; Wertsch, 'Collective Memory'; Verovšek, 'Collective Memory, Politics, and the Influence of the Past'.

[5] Henry L. Roediger III, Franklin M. Zaromb, and Andrew C. Butler, 'The Role of Repeated Retrieval in Shaping Collective Memory', in *Memory in Mind and Culture*, ed. Pascal Boyer and James V. Wertsch (New York, UNITED STATES: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 138–70, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oxford/detail.action?docID=442858.

[6] Hovhannisyan, 'Interaction between Collective Memory and Foreign Policy Making Process: A Social Constructivist Approach'. Alan J. Lambert et al., 'How Does Collective Memory Create the Sense of a Collective?', in *Memory in Mind and Culture*, ed. Pascal Boyer and James V. Wertsch (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 194–222, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oxford/detail.action?docID=442858.

[7] Kate Kenski and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, eds., 'The Politics of Memory', in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Communication* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019); Hovhannisyan, 'Interaction between Collective Memory and Foreign Policy Making Process: A Social Constructivist Approach'; Roediger III, Zaromb, and Butler, 'The Role of Repeated Retrieval in Shaping Collective Memory'; Langenbacher, 'Collective Memory as a Factor in Political Culture and International Relations', 223; Savelsberg and King, 'Law and Collective Memory'; Verovšek, 'Collective Memory, Politics, and the Influence of the Past'; Müller, *Memory and Power in Post-War Europe*, 21.

[8] French, 'The Semiotics of Collective Memories'.

[9] Nicole Maurantonio, 'The Politics of Memory', in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Communication*, ed. Kate Kenski and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, 1st ed. (Oxford University Press, 2017), https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199793471.013.026.

[10] Yossi Shain, 'Conclusion: Collective Memory and the Logic of Appropriate Behaviour', in *Power and the Past: Collective Memory and International Relations*, ed. Eric Langenbacher and Yossi Shain (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2010), 223, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oxford/detail.action?docID=547777.

Thirdly, collective memory is *emotive*; it interprets a common past, endowing it with an emotional and normative underpinning.[11] The emotional resonance of collective memory stems from its function as a source of a shared sense of origin and purpose. Consequently, "memory has turned into a new secular religion or at least an 'ersatz metaphysics', which feeds on a new emotionalism, and gives rise to endless grievance claims couched in the language of personal memories."[12]

Lastly, collective memory is *ahistorical*; it does not concern itself with accurately reporting objective, 'raw' history, but rather synthesises the past and extracts from it a moral, normative message.[13] Some claim that history and memory stand in opposition to one another.[14] Others, however, maintain that collective memory is closely intertwined with history, which provides a 'thin' and collective memory a 'thick' interpretation of the past.[15] Nonetheless, any precise distinction between them is highly contested, partly because both are woven from the same fabric – the past.[16] Regardless, collective memory is ahistorical because it is precisely what history is *not*; it is subjective, conveys a single perspective, seeks to eliminate ambiguities, and links the past with the present.[17] It "has no sense of the passage of time; it denies the 'pastness' of its objects and insists on their continuing presence."[18]

The Politics of Memory

Collective memory acts as the "guardian of difference."[19] It functions as an organising principle that is socially (re)constructed through complex mechanisms of conscious manipulation by

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[11] Berger, 'The Power of Memory and Memories of Power: The Cultural Parameters of German Foreign Policy-Making since 1945', 21; Langenbacher and Shain, *Power and the Past*, 26; Langenbacher, 'Does Collective Memory Still Influence German Foreign Policy?'

[12] Müller, *Memory and Power in Post-War Europe*, 19.

[13] Müller, 23; Langenbacher, 'Collective Memory as a Factor in Political Culture and International Relations'; Peter Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1999).

[14] Wertsch, 'Collective Memory'.

[15] Langenbacher, 'Collective Memory as a Factor in Political Culture and International Relations'.

[16] Verovšek, 'Collective Memory, Politics, and the Influence of the Past'.

[17] Wertsch, 'Collective Memory'; Hovhannisyan, 'Interaction between Collective Memory and Foreign Policy Making Process: A Social Constructivist Approach'.

[18] Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life*, 4.

[19] Philip J. Brendese, *The Power of Memory in Democratic Politics* (Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester Press, 2014), 2.

elites and unconscious absorption by members of the society at large.[20] While such asymmetric production of collective memory may simplify it to a 'collectivist general will' manufactured by the elites,[21] the implication is that it is an inherently political phenomenon that holds immense political power, particularly since it often consists of definitive 'truths' about the past.[22] Remembrance indeed serves a function beyond inspiring collective consciousness based on the recollection of a shared past; understanding the past matters normatively, strategically, and politically, and "contests over the meaning of the past are also contests over the meaning of the present and over ways of taking the past forward."[23]

'Politics of memory' describes both the production of collective memory by political actors and the influence remembrance discourse wields over the political arena.[24] Specifically, collective memory exerts *upward* political influence by conditioning interpretations of the past and thus affecting identities and elites' perceptions, and exerts *downward* political influence as a constitutive element of political statements that place specific events into national consciousness whilst discarding others.[25] Memory politics further describe "power relations that shape what is available to be remembered, who is permitted to remember, and the practices, occasions, and timing of remembering and forgetting."[26] Collective memory matters politically[27] because it "shapes power constellations,"[28] frames political content, serves as a societal resource and legitimisation tool for political actors,[29] and because its construction is in itself political. Power over memory is a form of power itself,[30] yet, "while present politicians have power over memory, memory also has power over them."[31]

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[20] Maurice Halbwachs, *Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire*, *Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire* (De Gruyter Mouton, 2010), https://ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk:2200/document/doi/10.1515/9783110869439/html; Verovšek, 'Collective Memory, Politics, and the Influence of the Past'; Shain, 'Conclusion: Collective Memory and the Logic of Appropriate Behaviour'.

[21] Jeffrey K. Olick, Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi, and Daniel Levy, *The Collective Memory Reader* (New York ; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

[22] French, 'The Semiotics of Collective Memories'.

[23] Katharine Hodgkin and Susannah Radstone, *Contested Pasts: The Politics of Memory* (London: Taylor & Francis Group, 2003), http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oxford/detail.action?docID=171352; Verovšek, 'Collective Memory, Politics, and the Influence of the Past', 530.

[24] Geneviève Zubrzycki and Anna Woźny, 'The Comparative Politics of Collective Memory', *Annual Review of Sociology* 46 (2020): 176, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-soc-121919-054808.

[25] Verovšek, 'Collective Memory, Politics, and the Influence of the Past', 529.

[26] Brendese, *The Power of Memory in Democratic Politics*, 2.

[27] Müller, *Memory and Power in Post-War Europe*.

[28] Müller, 2.

[29] Berger, 'The Power of Memory and Memories of Power: The Cultural Parameters of German Foreign Policy-Making since 1945', 80; Bechev, 'From the Soviet Bloc to the New Middle Age: East-Central Europe's Three Imperial Moments', 256; Yuen Foong Khong, *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965* (Princeton: University Press, 1992). in Verovšek, 'Collective Memory, Politics, and the Influence of the Past'.

[30] Verovšek, 'Collective Memory, Politics, and the Influence of the Past', 533.

[31] Müller, *Memory and Power in Post-War Europe*, 30.

Collective memory's political potency in international affairs is widely recognised; yet, scholarship overwhelmingly conceptualises its influence in terms of FP outcomes,[32] describing, for instance, how Germany's collective memory of World War II explains its FP during the European refugee crisis.[33] Some scholars expand this relationship to describe collective memory's discursive and legitimating role,[34] and others point out that it—as part of the memory-identity nexus—constitutes collective identity and political culture.[35] A still smaller body of scholarship admits that collective memory influences policymaking processes,[36] explaining, for example, that it conditions norms which structure diplomatic and FP behaviour and that "rationality of a political actor in policymaking is 'bounded' by collective memory as a sort of historical institution."[37] Studies that focus principally on the influence of remembrance on foreign policymaking are few but commonly describe its effect through shaping expectations for states' appropriate behaviour, function, and role in the international sphere.[38] Yet, even scholarship acknowledging this relationship between collective memory and foreign policy*making* fails to theorise this further and instead analytically focuses on FP outcomes.[39]

In conclusion, collective memory's crucial influence on foreign policy*making* is chronically underestimated. Related IR inquiry mainly takes two forms:[40] a normative approach[41] (in

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[32] For instance: Langenbacher and Shain, *Power and the Past*; Gavan McCormack, 'Japan's "Positive Pacifism": Issues of Historical Memory in Contemporary Foreign Policy', *Brown Journal of World Affairs* 20, no. 2 (Spring/Summer 2014): 73–91; Berger, 'The Power of Memory and Memories of Power: The Cultural Parameters of German Foreign Policy-Making since 1945'; Sam Sokol, 'The Tension between Historical Memory and Realpolitik in Israel's Foreign Policy', *Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs* 12, no. 3 (2018): 311–24, https://doi.org/10.1080/23739770.2018.1560563; Horelt and Renner, 'Denting a Heroic Picture: A Narrative Analysis of Collective Memory in Post-War Croatia'; Balkhi, 'The Determinants of Afghanistan's Foreign Policy'.

[33] Schuette, 'Collective Memory in Germany and the Great Foreign Policy Debate'.

[34] Ning Liao, 'Presentist or Cultural Memory: Chinese Nationalism as Constraint on Beijing's Foreign Policy Making: Presentist or Cultural Memory', *Asian Politics & Policy* 5, no. 4 (October 2013): 543–65, https://doi.org/10.1111/aspp.12066; Wittlinger and Larose, 'No Future for Germany's Past?'; Müller, *Memory and Power in Post-War Europe*.

[35] Langenbacher and Shain, *Power and the Past*; Müller, *Memory and Power in Post-War Europe*; Berger, 'The Power of Memory and Memories of Power: The Cultural Parameters of German Foreign Policy-Making since 1945'; Langenbacher, 'Does Collective Memory Still Influence German Foreign Policy?'; Horelt and Renner, 'Denting a Heroic Picture: A Narrative Analysis of Collective Memory in Post-War Croatia'; James V. Wertsch, 'Blank Spots in Collective Memory: A Case Study of Russia', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 617, no. 1 (May 2008): 58–71, https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716207312870; Kočan, 'Collective Memory and an Interpretative Approach'; Liao, 'Presentist or Cultural Memory'; Schuette, 'Collective Memory in Germany and the Great Foreign Policy Debate'.

[36] Kočan, 'Collective Memory and an Interpretative Approach'; Thomas U. Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan* (Baltimore, Md. ; London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); Andrei S. Markovits and Simon Reich, 'The Contemporary Power of Memory: The Dilemmas for German Foreign Policy', *The Communication Review (Yverdon, Switzerland)* 2, no. 1 (1997): 89–119, https://doi.org/10.1080/10714429709368551.

[37] Liao, 'Presentist or Cultural Memory', 557.

[38] Schuette, 'Collective Memory in Germany and the Great Foreign Policy Debate'.

[39] For instance Liao, 'Presentist or Cultural Memory'; Wittlinger and Larose, 'No Future for Germany's Past?'

[40] Kočan, 'Collective Memory and an Interpretative Approach'.

[41] Jeffrey K. Olick, 'The Guilt of Nations?', *Ethics & International Affairs* 17, no. 2 (2003): 109–17, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7093.2003.tb00443.x.

discussion of reconciliation issues et cetera) and a positivist approach[42] (in explaining international behaviour through analysis of FP outcomes). The alternative, rarely pursued interpretive approach, however, considers collective memory as constitutive of ideational factors that make up foreign policymaking, and "rests on the assumption that explanations for political action follow from an empathetic understanding of the social meaning that underpins political activity, especially how the processes of social representations are formed and internalised in the realm of the international."[43] Such interpretivist analyses track the effects of collective memory on foreign policymaking through collective identity or general beliefs about a state's "purposive action on the international stage."[44] Whilst such conceptualisations are indeed informative, they are theoretically underdeveloped and only hint at collective memory's influence on policymakers' beliefs about states' international positions.[45] More importantly, they remain detached from the import of role theory into IR and FPA disciplines.

ROLE THEORY

Role theory provides a theoretical foundation for individual-level analysis of social behaviour[46] and seeks to understand decision-making from the perspective of agents who are embedded in social structures and inherently exhibit biases and heuristics that shape their information processing, perception, and reasoning.[47] Fundamentally, role theory seeks to understand the interplay between social identity and group behaviour, as well as the mutual construction of the 'self' and the social structure through social interaction.[48] It imagines the social reality as a differentiated social sphere constituted of defined role positions (or simply roles) which determine the behaviour of agents within it.[49]

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[42] Berger, 'The Power of Memory and Memories of Power: The Cultural Parameters of German Foreign Policy-Making since 1945'; Peter J. Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New Directions in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Kočan, 'Collective Memory and an Interpretative Approach'.

[43] Mark Bevir and Oliver Daddow, 'Interpreting Foreign Policy: National, Comparative and Regional Studies', *International Relations (London)* 29, no. 3 (2015): 4, https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117815600930. in Kočan, 'Collective Memory and an Interpretative Approach', 205.

[44] Liao, 'Presentist or Cultural Memory', 551.

[45] For instance: Michael Grossman, 'Role Theory and Foreign Policy Change: The Transformation of Russian Foreign Policy in the 1990s', *International Politics* 42, no. 3 (2005): 334–51, https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800115.

[46] Kristen Renwick Monroe and Renée Bukovchik Van Vechten, 'The Psychological Foundations of Identity Politics', *Annual Review of Political Science* 3, no. 1 (1 June 2000): 419–47, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.3.1.419.

[47] Marijke Breuning, 'Role Theory in Politics and International Relations', in *The Oxford Handbook of Behavioral Political Science*, ed. Alex Mintz and Lesley Terris, 1st ed. (Oxford University Press, 2018).

[48] Monroe and Vechten, 'The Psychological Foundations of Identity Politics'.

[49] Holsti, 'National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy', September 1970.

A *role* (or *role position*) is a durable social construct and analytical tool for understanding social interactions,[50] defined as a symbol that determines a particular, stable position in the social structure and prescribes normative and behavioural expectations guiding patterns of social interactions.[51] It hinges on the assumption that as agents self-categorises into a role—in other words define the 'self' in terms of group norms and expectations for particular social categories—they are aware of expectations associated with a particular role and consciously adapt their behaviour accordingly.[52] Roles are inherently relational; they reflect how agents relate to one another and the social system as a whole.[53] One particular understanding of roles, for instance, defines them as notions of social agents about who they are, what they ought to be in relation to others, and how they should behave in the social sphere.[54]

As social positions, roles are constituted by the ego's and alter's expectations regarding the agent's purpose in the social sphere.[55] The agent's role is thus co-constituted by the ego (via role conception) and the alter (via role prescription). *Role conception* describes the ego's own consideration of the role it occupies vis-à-vis other agents in the social sphere, as well as the behaviour appropriate for this particular role.[56] *Role prescription*, on the other hand, emanates from the broader external environment and specifically from the alter, and constitute the norms and expectations the alter attaches to a particular role.[57] Once an agent inhabits a certain role, *role performance* encompasses the actual behaviour, attitudes, and decisions of the actor in a social sphere.[58]

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[50] Monroe and Vechten, 'The Psychological Foundations of Identity Politics'; Sebastian Harnisch, Cornelia Frank, and Hanns W. Maull, *Role Theory in International Relations* (Florence, USA: Taylor & Francis Group, 2011), http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oxford/detail.action?docID=684029.

[51] Monroe and Vechten, 'The Psychological Foundations of Identity Politics'; Holsti, 'National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy', September 1970; Harnisch, Frank, and Maull, *Role Theory in International Relations*; Sheldon Stryker, 'Identity Theory: Developments and Extensions', in *Self and Identity: Psychosocial Perspectives*, ed. Terry Honess and Krysia M. Yardley-Matwiejczuk (Chichester: Wiley, 1987), 89–103; Ralph H. Turner, 'Role-Taking, Role Standpoint, and Reference-Group Behavior', *American Journal of Sociology* 61, no. 4 (1956): 316–28, https://doi.org/10.1086/221763.

[52] John C. Wahlke, *The Legislative System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior* (New York ; London: Wiley, 1962). in Holsti, 'National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy', September 1970; Monroe and Vechten, 'The Psychological Foundations of Identity Politics'.

[53] Holsti, 'National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy', September 1970. Vít Beneš and Sebastian Harnisch, 'Role Theory in Symbolic Interactionism: Czech Republic, Germany and the EU', *Cooperation and Conflict* 50, no. 1 (2015): 146–65, https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836714525768.

[54] Harnisch, Frank, and Maull, *Role Theory in International Relations*.

[55] Harnisch, Frank, and Maull; Cameron G Thies, 'Role Theory and Foreign Policy', in *The International Studies Encyclopedia*, ed. Robert A. Denemark and Renée Marlin-Bennett, 1st ed. (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 6335–56, https://doi.org/10.1093/acref/9780191842665.001.0001.


[56] Monroe and Vechten, 'The Psychological Foundations of Identity Politics'; Holsti, 'National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy', September 1970; Harnisch, Frank, and Maull, *Role Theory in International Relations*.

[57] Monroe and Vechten, 'The Psychological Foundations of Identity Politics'; Holsti, 'National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy', September 1970; Harnisch, Frank, and Maull, *Role Theory in International Relations*.

[58] Monroe and Vechten, 'The Psychological Foundations of Identity Politics'; Holsti, 'National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy', September 1970; Harnisch, Frank, and Maull, *Role Theory in International Relations*.

In nesting role theory within IR and FPA,[59] a role describes a state's typical behavioural or decision-making pattern,[60] and is mutually constituted by the ego (the state) and the alter (the international social sphere). *National role conception* (NRC) is the core of a grand lens through which policymakers understand the international sphere and their state's existence therein.[61] It describes an internalised set of norms and expectations concerning FP behaviour;[62] thus NRC denotes "policymakers' own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system."[63] Conversely, *role prescription* describes the external environment's expectations for the state's international and FP behaviour, and *role enactment* or *performance* refers to the state's actual FP behaviour and includes patterns of attitudes, decisions, activities, and commitments governments make to implement the state's role (see Figure 2.1).[64]

Figure 2.1: Role theory in IR and FPA



[59] Cameron G. Thies and Marijke Breuning, 'Integrating Foreign Policy Analysis and International Relations through Role Theory: Integrating FPA and IR', *Foreign Policy Analysis* 8, no. 1 (January 2012): 1–4, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1743-8594.2011.00169.x; Thies, 'Role Theory and Foreign Policy'.

[60] Holsti, 'National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy', September 1970.

[61] Chih-Yu Shih, 'National Role Conception as Foreign Policy Motivation: The Psychocultural Bases of Chinese Diplomacy', *Political Psychology* 9, no. 4 (1988): 599–631, https://doi.org/10.2307/3791530.

[62] Lisbeth Aggestam, 'Role Identity and the Europeanization of Foreign Policy: A Political-Cultural Approach', in *Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy*, ed. Ben Tonra and Thomas Christiansen (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2004), 81–98, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oxford/detail.action?docID=589295; Lisbeth Aggestam, 'Role Theory and European Foreign Policy: A Framework of Analysis', in *The European Union's Roles in International Politics : Concepts and Analysis*, ed. Ole Elgström, Michael Smith, and Michael Smith (Routledge, 2006), 1–20, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203086414; Shih, 'National Role Conception as Foreign Policy Motivation'; Wish, 'Foreign Policy Makers and Their National Role Conceptions'; Lisbeth Aggestam and Markus Johansson, 'The Leadership Paradox in EU Foreign Policy', *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 55, no. 6 (2017): 1203–20, https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12558; Walker, 'Role Theory and the Origins of Foreign Policy'.

[63] Wish, 'Foreign Policy Makers and Their National Role Conceptions', 533.

[64] Holsti, 'National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy', September 1970; Harnisch, Frank, and Maull, *Role Theory in International Relations*; Eva Mareike Schmitt, 'Between European and National Role Conceptions – the EU3 Initiative Regarding the Iranian Nuclear Programme', *European Security* 26, no. 2 (3 April 2017): 253–72, https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2017.1286644; Wish, 'Foreign Policy Makers and Their National Role Conceptions'.

NRCs are influenced by both material factors such as state's economic resources, size, location, and material needs, as well as ideational factors such as collective identity, historical experiences, norms, ideology, and political culture, to name a few.[65] They are developed not by policymakers alone, but through a complex web of social interactions and experiences both within the domestic society and internationally. The multiplicity of social actors with varying degrees of involvement in NRCs' production may lead to the development of miscellaneous NRCs; in fact, frequently no consensus arises on the precise role a state should enact internationally.[66] Constructed NRCs are thus dissimilar; they may vary according to their importance, scope vis-à-vis specific international contexts (e.g., the global versus sub-regional international social arena), as well as significance in various policy fields.[67] Additionally, NRCs are not immune to change. While they are durable social constructs and display a high degree of path dependence, some roles are consistently reconstructed through processes of (social) learning and socialization.[68] Some NRCs become more embedded in national political structures, more broadly accepted by the society at large, and internalised by policymakers, and consequently become more influential for policymaking.[69] As NRCs "become a more pervasive part of the political culture of a nation, they are more likely to set limits on perceived or politically feasible policy alternatives, and less likely to allow idiosyncratic variables to play a crucial part in decision-making."[70]

Notably, within IR and FPA role theory literature, a consensus has not yet emerged on the balance between role conception and role prescription.[71] Some scholars, particularly those more strongly anchored in social role theory, perceive role conception as less significant than role prescription and argue that agents consider alter's role prescriptions as signalled through language and behaviour.[72] Hence, alter's role prescriptions may reshape actor's own role conceptions. Contrarily, a number of IR and FPA scholars argue that a state's FP is largely motivated by actor's internal ideas—role conception, whereas the influence of the external

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[65] Breuning, 'Role Theory in Politics and International Relations'; Michael Grossman, 'Role Theory and Foreign Policy Change'.

[66] Shih, 'National Role Conception as Foreign Policy Motivation'.

[67] Aggestam, 'Role Identity and the Europeanization of Foreign Policy: A Political-Cultural Approach'.

[68] Harnisch, Frank, and Maull, *Role Theory in International Relations*.

[69] Aggestam, 'Role Identity and the Europeanization of Foreign Policy: A Political-Cultural Approach'.

[70] K. J. Holsti, 'National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy', in *Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis*, ed. Stephen G. Walker, Duke Press Policy Studies (1970; repr., Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1987), 38–39.in Aggestam, 'Role Identity and the Europeanization of Foreign Policy: A Political-Cultural Approach', 89.

[71] Leslie E. Wehner, 'Role Expectations As Foreign Policy: South American Secondary Powers' Expectations of Brazil As A Regional Power', *Foreign Policy Analysis* 11, no. 4 (2015): 435–55, https://doi.org/10.1111/fpa.12048.

[72] Harnisch, Frank, and Maull, *Role Theory in International Relations*.

environment is much weaker than in social role theory.[73] Hence, the assumption is that national role performance is primarily explained by policymakers' own NRC,[74] and the alter's role prescription is consequently largely ignored in examining roles and their performance. This stems from the principle of state sovereignty which implies that internal ideas take precedence over externally produced role prescriptions. Whereas external actors are certainly relevant in foreign policymaking, they are in IR and FPA nonetheless pushed aside from in-depth inquiry. Instead, role performance is considered a direct and consistent manifestation of policymakers' own NRC of their state's function in the international system.

Studies on NRCs and their influence on FP are numerous and set forth a number of distinct roles, such as an active independent, liberator, protectee, belligerent, or balancer, to name a few.[75] An urgent deficiency of such literature, however, is the absence of a systematic analysis of NRCs. Individual studies overwhelmingly produce NRCs that are case-specific and based on contextual evidence. Consequently, NRCs that are similar in some important respects often receive different labels and are not compared outside of case-specific contexts. A number of different labels for NRCs saturate existing literature, whereby a plethora of different labels describes the same behaviour, and specific NRC labels only emphasise a particular aspect of a single role. Moreover, the context in which many NRC categories were produced was the Cold War, which is less then appropriate for the current multipolar world.[76] This makes it incredibly difficult to systematically examine NRCs and, consequently, their analytically valuable characteristics escape detection.

FOREIGN POLICYMAKING

As one of the fundamental strands of state action, FP is located in the realm of high politics. Numerous definitions of FP saturate scholarly literature, differing according to the actors enacting FP, motivations propelling their behaviour, or categories of aims they seek to realise,

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[73] Harnisch, Frank, and Maull.

[74] Holsti, 'National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy', September 1970.

[75] For instance: Holsti; Wish, 'Foreign Policy Makers and Their National Role Conceptions'; Glenn Chafetz, 'Role Theory and Foreign Policy: Belarussian and Ukrainian Compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime', 2020, 32; Anna Caffarena and Giuseppe Gabusi, 'Making Sense of a Changing World: Foreign Policy Ideas and Italy's National Role Conceptions after 9/11', *Italian Political Science Review / Rivista Italiana Di Scienza Politica* 47, no. 2 (July 2017): 125–47, https://doi.org/10.1017/ipo.2017.5; Michael Grossman, 'Role Theory and Foreign Policy Change'; Richard Adigbuo, 'Beyond IR Theories: The Case for National Role Conceptions', n.d., 16; Wehner, 'Role Expectations As Foreign Policy'; Walker, 'Role Theory and the Origins of Foreign Policy'.

[76] For instance: Holsti, 'National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy', September 1970.

to name a few. Some scholars, for instance, contend that FP is enacted by state or nonstate actors such as nongovernmental organizations, whereas others emphasise the primacy of the state.[77] Similarly, FP can be conceived of as actual behaviour in the international sphere,[78] as well as underlying ideas and ideals that condition actors' objectives.[79] Still another distinction considers the extent of behaviour considered FP; some conceptualisations include any official external relations,[80] whereas this is not the case in others.

Challenges inherent in defining FP are further complicated when considering the EU, which is a *sui generis* actor, particularly considering its international behaviour. Not only can the EU enact its own FP, for instance through CFSP and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), but its Members, too, retain some autonomy in FP and nurture independent external relations. Moreover, a plethora of actors at the EU level such as the Commission, European Parliament (EP), or European External Action Service (EEAS), the national level (e.g., MFAs), as well as the supranational level, for example nongovernmental organizations and activist groups, all interact in the formulation and implementation of FP of the EU and its Members. EU's foreign policy is typically understood as the sum of the interaction of EU's external relations system which consists of national FPs of EU Members, EU's external trade relations and development policy, and CFSP/CSDP.[81] In fact, the EU's foreign policy is structurally fragmented along multiple dimensions: the vertical (between EU institutions and EU Members), horizontal (among various EU institutions), and the internal (among various strands of EU's external policy).[82] One of the most contentious challenges in defining EU's foreign policy has been whether it includes only those activities carried out by EU institutions and actors, or it also encompasses EU Members' actions. Similarly, the question of whether EU's foreign policy consists of CFSP/CSDP only or of the entirety of its external action is essential.

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[77] Balkhi, 'The Determinants of Afghanistan's Foreign Policy'; David Allen, 'Conclusions: The European Rescue of National Foreign Policy?', in *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy*, ed. Christopher Hill, Ebook Central (London ; New York: Routledge, 1996), 288–304, https://ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/login?url=http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oxford/detail.action?docID=168594.

[78] Christopher Hill, *The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

[79] Balkhi, 'The Determinants of Afghanistan's Foreign Policy'.


[80] Hill, *The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy*.

[81] Wong and Hill, *National and European Foreign Policies*; Tom Delreux and Stephan Keukeleire, 'Informal Division of Labour in EU Foreign Policy-Making', *Journal of European Public Policy* 24, no. 10 (27 October 2017): 1471–90, https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2016.1216151.

[82] Carmen Gebhard, 'The Problem of Coherence in the European Union's International Relations', in *International Relations and the European Union*, ed. Sophie Vanhoonacker, Christopher Hill, and Michael Smith, 3rd ed. (Oxford University Press, 2017), https://ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk:4099/view/10.1093/hepl/9780198737322.001.0001/hepl-9780198737322-chapter-6.

Likewise, conceptualising national FP is complicated by the fact that EU Members are bound by CFSP/CSDP, as well as the very nature of EU membership as it itself influences relationships among Members. Whilst EU membership blurs the lines between domestic, European, and foreign policies by substantially managing intra-EU relations, EU Members continue to "conduct residual foreign relations among themselves."[83] As a result, some scholars conceptualise national FPs of EU Members as consisting of both policies toward the EU and its Members, regardless of EU membership. For the purposes of this dissertation, national FP of EU Members is such that it exclusively involves their external actions targeting extra-EU political actors, but may be devised independently, through EU coordination, or through intergovernmental, EU-level policymaking (CFSP/CSDP). The EU's foreign policy, on the other hand, refers to external activities developed and enacted by EU-level institutions, including for instance environmental policy, trade relations, and developmental policy, as well as CFSP/CSDP. Hence, overlap between EU and national FP is centred in CFSP/CSDP (see Figure 2.2)

Figure 2.2: National and EU foreign policy



Europeanisation of Foreign Policy(making)

Europeanisation broadly refers to the process of identity and interest convergence among EU Members.[84] Importantly, all EU Members are Europeanised to *some* degree. Yet, this dissertation is not concerned with *pre-accession* Europeanisation which describes candidate

[83] Christopher Hill and Michael Smith, 'International Relations and the European Union: Themes and Issues', in *International Relations and the European Union*, ed. Christopher Hill and Michael Smith, 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press, 2011), 3–20, https://ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk:4099/view/10.1093/hepl/9780198737322.001.0001/hepl-9780198737322-chapter-6.in Baun and Marek, 'The Foreign Policies of the New Member States: A Framework for Analysis', 3.

[84] Wong and Hill, 'Introduction', 2.

countries' transformation to fulfil accession conditions and participate in EU-wide decision-making processes, but instead focuses on *post-accession* Europeanisation of EU Members who continue to Europeanise beyond the minimum threshold of conditionality as part of socialisation into the EU international social system. In this sense, Europeanisation describes a complex, ongoing process of change which renders national and European levels increasingly interdependent[85] and results from the redirecting and reshaping of national politics and policymaking to the degree that EU-level political dynamics become part of the national organisational logic.[86]

Europeanisation of FP is a relatively new strand of Europeanisation studies;[87] it is scarcely researched and much of the literature focuses on EU Members' institutional-structural adaptation in response to EU pressures—particularly by CFSP/CSDP.[88] Persistent conceptual disagreements primarily focus on whether FP is immune to Europeanising pressures, what aspect of FP is changing, what mechanisms propel Europeanisation, and whether Europeanisation can lead to a real convergence of FP trajectories and the emergence of truly common values and strategic interests in the field of FP.[89] Many scholars agree that FP "is not a special case immune to the pressures of Europeanisation which states face by virtue of EU membership."[90] In fact, some claim that as a conceptual framework, Europeanisation addresses weaknesses of IR approaches to European FP as it enables a better understanding of the complex, distinctly European nature of foreign policymaking.[91] Undeniably, however, "Europeanisation follows no single 'logic' across the various EU policy areas."[92] As FP belongs in the realm of high politics and crucially revolves around the notion of state sovereignty, FP Europeanisation occurs on a more voluntary and non-hierarchical basis which

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[85] Karolina Pomorska, 'The Impact of Enlargement: Europeanization of Polish Foreign Policy? Tracking Adaptation and Change in the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs', *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 2, no. 1 (1 January 2007): 25–51, https://doi.org/10.1163/187119007X180467; Baun and Marek, 'The Foreign Policies of the New Member States: A Framework for Analysis', 5.

[86] Robert Ladrech, 'Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France', *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 32, no. 1 (1994): 69, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.1994.tb00485.x.

[87] Wong and Hill, *National and European Foreign Policies*; Patrick Müller and Nicole Alecu de Flers, 'Applying the Concept of Europeanization to the Study of Foreign Policy: Dimensions and Mechanisms', *IDEAS Working Paper Series from RePEc*, 2009, http://search.proquest.com/docview/1698348948/?pq-origsite=primo.

[88] Wong and Hill, *National and European Foreign Policies*.

[89] Wong and Hill.

[90] Wong and Hill, 9.


[91] Patrick Müller and Nicole Alecu de Flers, 'Applying the Concept of Europeanization to the Study of Foreign Policy'.

[92] Patrick Müller and Nicole Alecu de Flers, 7.

features social processes such as learning and socialisation[93] and is not as susceptible to adaptational pressures.[94]

Europeanisation of FP is broadly defined as convergence of national FPs[95] or the development of a common European perspective in the FP field.[96] Notably, Europeanisation of FP involves changes in FP outcomes, interests, objectives, as well as institutional adaptation and changes of policymaking processes.[97] A sharp distinction between these described changes, however, is not always attainable or even practical.[98] However, as this dissertation focuses on Europeanisation of foreign policy*making*, it sets off from a more precise conceptualisation of Europeanisation of FP which emphasises the process. Here, foreign *policy* describes an outcome, a decision, a policy that may be long- or short-term in scope; it is a stock. Foreign policy*making*, however, describes a process of constructing policy and negotiating decisions; it is a flow. Hence, Europeanisation of foreign policy(making) is here understood as "a transformation in the way in which national foreign policies are *constructed*, in the ways in which professional roles are defined and pursued and in the consequent internalisation of norms and expectations arising from a *complex system of collective and European policy making*."[99] Europeanisation unfolds through three distinct mechanisms occurring along the vertical and horizontal dimensions: uploading, downloading, and crossloading (see Figure 2.3).[100]

Figure 2.3: Europeanisation of foreign policymaking



[93] Baun and Marek, 'The Foreign Policies of the New Member States: A Framework for Analysis', 7; Patrick Müller and Nicole Alecu de Flers, 'Applying the Concept of Europeanization to the Study of Foreign Policy', 5–6.

[94] Patrick Müller and Nicole Alecu de Flers, 'Applying the Concept of Europeanization to the Study of Foreign Policy'.

[95] Wong and Hill, *National and European Foreign Policies*, 1.

[96] Baun and Marek, 'The Foreign Policies of the New Member States: A Framework for Analysis', 4; Manners and Whitman, 'Introduction'.

[97] Patrick Müller and Nicole Alecu de Flers, 'Applying the Concept of Europeanization to the Study of Foreign Policy'.

[98] Patrick Müller and Nicole Alecu de Flers.

[99] Tonra, 'Denmark and Ireland'; Tonra, *The Europeanisation of National Foreign Policy*; Wong and Hill, 'Introduction', 3–4. Emphasis added.

[100] Wong and Hill, *National and European Foreign Policies*; Pomorska, 'The Impact of Enlargement'.

Crossloading occurs along the horizontal dimension on the EU level and refers to the interplay among EU institutions and the related exchange of ideas and norms which leads to the emergence of a sense of collective purpose. It does not bridge or reflect the dynamics between the EU and the national levels; it is thus excluded from this analysis. Because Europeanisation of foreign policy(making) is understood as an interactive process of change linking national and EU levels,[101] this dissertation focuses on Europeanisation unfolding along the vertical dimension which connects the EU and national levels. *Uploading* refers to the projection of national ideas, interests, and preferences to the EU level (bottom-up). *Downloading* encompasses the downward effect of EU membership on national FP and refers to national adaptation to and integration of EU-generated policies and ideas from the EU level (top-down).

The main drivers of foreign policy(making) Europeanisation are institutions and treaties, socialisation of policymakers (particularly as the intergovernmental nature of foreign policymaking on the EU level places a premium on personal relationships), leadership, external pressures on the EU to speak with one voice, politics of scale, legitimisation of a global role, and geo-cultural identity.[102] As aforementioned, FPs of all EU Members are by virtue of accession requirements Europeanised to a certain degree; yet EU Members can develop more or less Europeanised FPs beyond this threshold. The extent of Europeanisation of foreign policy(making) is determined by two factors: EU-level adaptational pressures on national institutions which present a positive force toward Europeanisation, and domestic intervening factors such as national political culture, which interfere with adaptational pressures and may deter or amplify the process of Europeanisation.[103] Precisely the latter is at the centre of this inquiry which explores the influence of collective memory on NRC and by extension Europeanisation of foreign policymaking.

Examining EU Members' foreign policymaking through the lens of Europeanisation is particularly advantageous, as it recentres attention to interactions between the national and the EU level, and facilitates inquiry into the precise course of EU Members' FP adaptation which differs depending on state-internal factors.[104] Moreover, such inquiry avoids the reductionist

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[101] Patrick Müller and Nicole Alecu de Flers, 'Applying the Concept of Europeanization to the Study of Foreign Policy'.

[102] Wong and Hill, *National and European Foreign Policies*.

[103] Mark A. Pollack, 'Theorizing the European Union: International Organization, Domestic Polity, or Experiment in New Governance?', *Annual Review of Political Science* 8, no. 1 (2005): 384, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.8.082103.104858.

[104] Patrick Müller and Nicole Alecu de Flers, 'Applying the Concept of Europeanization to the Study of Foreign Policy'.

understanding of Europeanisation of foreign policymaking as a rational or institutional choice, taking instead a constructivist approach to foreign policymaking whereby ideational assumptions condition state behaviour and as such influence the Europeanisation process.[105] The following section describes in detail this constructivist-interpretivist approach to the influence of collective memory on foreign policymaking, synthesising theoretical concepts of collective memory, role theory, and Europeanisation of foreign policymaking.


THE REMEMBRANCE APPROACH

The remembrance approach presented in this dissertation posits that examining national collective memory advances our understanding of foreign policymaking and its Europeanisation (see Figure 2.4). More specifically, I argue that collective memory influences EU Members' Europeanisation of foreign policymaking by shaping their national role conception (NRC). The claim is not that collective memory is the single or even the single most important factor determining NRC and Europeanisation of foreign policymaking, as both are conditioned by a plethora of determinants such as identity, political culture, material national attributes, or the international environment. Similarly, I do not argue that NRC is the principal determinant of Europeanisation of foreign policymaking, but rather that its specific characteristics inspire the extent and type of Europeanisation that unfolds. This dissertation seeks to show that collective memory does, in fact, influence NRC and foreign policymaking behaviour, and to unveil the channels of transmission through which this influence unfolds. Utilising a constructivist-interpretivist approach to the analysis of foreign policymaking, this argument synthesises aforementioned conceptual frameworks of how identity, history, and actors' self-image influence state international behaviour, integrates them with role theory, and applies them to a formerly detached field of Europeanisation. This section elaborates the theoretical argument in detail, demonstrating its utility for understanding foreign policymaking, tracing the sources of differences in state practice, and understanding processes of European integration from the national perspective.

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[105] Ana Bojinović Fenko and Marko Lovec, 'From a Good to a Poor Student: The De-Europeanisation of Slovenian Foreign Policy in the Light of (European) Economic and Financial Crisis', *Hellenic Studies* 23, no. 1 (2015): 11–140.

Figure 2.4: Remembrance approach to Europeanisation of foreign policymaking



Collective memory is defined as a narrative construction of the past that is socially (re)produced, dynamic, ahistorical, and emotive, and functions as a prism through which the collective perceives the present. Given its complexity, its scope must be carefully demarcated. Firstly, the sources of collective memory, processes which condition its evolution, (re)negotiation, and institutionalisation, as well as actors involved in its construction, fall outside of the scope of this study. Despite its inherently dynamic character, changes in collective memory result from complicated social interactions unfolding over long time periods. Therefore, this present conceptualisation of collective memory which examines it as a cause, not an effect, is a simplification of its perpetual evolution through social (re)production. Secondly, most existing literature considers collective memory to be principally produced by national elites and consumed by the society at large,[106] hence, this approach simplifies its diffuse production and consumption networks and instead considers the elites as the principal makers of collective memory and the collective *en masse* its consumer. Since policymaking elites decisively shape not only collective memory, but also national political culture, their experiences, discursive tools, and ideas are the most salient.[107] Lastly, it is necessary to determine collective memory's practical bounds and specify *who* is remembering. Collective memory examined here is specified as *national* collective memory, whereby the nation is considered a social group with statehood, a named community of history and culture,

[106] Müller, *Memory and Power in Post-War Europe*; Langenbacher and Shain, *Power and the Past*; Lebow, 'The Future of Memory'; Verovšek, 'Collective Memory, Politics, and the Influence of the Past'.

[107] Schuette, 'Collective Memory in Germany and the Great Foreign Policy Debate'; Langenbacher and Shain, *Power and the Past*; Gunther Hellmann, *Deutsche Außenpolitik: Eine Einführung*, 2., überarb. Aufl. 2014 edition (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2014), 198–199 in Schuette, 'Collective Memory in Germany and the Great Foreign Policy Debate'.

possessing a unified territory, economy, mass education system, and common legal status.[108] Although it is not a monolith and certainly exhibits a great deal of variation, the assumption is that the nation is the overarching social group within a state as a political entity. Consequently, nationally held collective memory is considered to be the most widely shared memory with a state.

I argue that as a crucial ideational factor, collective memory of the nation's past critically influences political elites' self-understanding of their state's function and position in the international arena – NRC. Notably, collective memory and NRC are co-constitutive; whereas collective memory provides a fundamental framework upon which a functional NRC is constructed, so does the NRC reinforce or adjust remembrance. Both collective memory and NRC are socially held and dynamic, subject to reimagination, renegotiation, and political manipulation. Just as collective memory, NRC is for the purposes of this study considered to be static in the short term.

The logic of this first part of the conceptual argument is based on the fundamentally self-determining and inward-oriented nature of collective memory, contrasted by the inherently relational character of NRC. By framing a state's function and position in the past and prescribing it for the future, collective memory primes NRC which has the capacity to enact a relational, systemic function of situating a state within the international social system. In other words, collective memory shapes NRC through the reproduction of its *relational motifs*. Additionally, as aforementioned, a number of NRCs of a different scope may develop for a specific subset of the international social system. For the purpose of this dissertation, such differentiation of NRCs according to their scope is most important. I identify a *master* NRC, which denotes the overarching role conception defining the state's position in the global context, and an *auxiliary* NRC, which is a nuanced role conception embedded within the master NRC that is for the purpose of this study imagined as an EU-specific NRC.[109]

Furthermore, the field of IR role theory suffers from the described over-saturation of NRC labels with poor generalisability and limited analytical value. To correct for this deficiency,


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[108] Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History*, Key Concepts (Polity Press) (Cambridge : Malden, MA: Polity Press ; Blackwell, 2001).

[109] Inspired by Wehner, 'Role Expectations As Foreign Policy'.

this thesis seeks not to propose a set of NRCs that could be applicable across different regions, contexts, and time periods; it is debatable whether this is even possible. Instead, it extrapolates from existing literature the essential characteristics that different conceptualisations of NRCs use to distinguish them.[110] Using these characteristics, nominal categorisation of NRCs which offers more confusion than analytical clarity is avoided and substituted with an anatomical differentiation of NRCs based on three essential characteristics: *mode of association*, *mode of action*, and *status perception*. Mode of association describes a spectrum between cooperative and competitive association in the international arena, mode of action differentiates proactive and reactive FP behaviour, and status perception denotes states' self-assessment as a high or low status state (see Figure 2.5). An important caveat is that this categorisation is of ideal types; certainly, practice does not always reflect either end of the spectrum for each of the three essential characteristics. Nonetheless, the analytical utility of such an approach is that generally, NRCs found in existing literature can be positioned anywhere in this categorisation which provides a much-needed layer of theoretical clarity and outweighs the dangers of oversimplification.

Figure 2.5: Influence of collective memory on NRC and its essential characteristics




As the second part of the conceptual argument, I argue that NRC (particularly auxiliary, EU-specific NRC) influences the type and extent of Europeanisation of foreign policymaking. To reiterate, Europeanisation of foreign policymaking refers to the process of convergence of national foreign policy and unfolds through two types of interactions between the national and the EU level: uploading (projection of national interests onto the EU level) and downloading (transposition of EU interests onto the national level). The horizontal dimension—

[110] Michael Grossman, 'Role Theory and Foreign Policy Change'; Adigbuo, 'Beyond IR Theories: The Case for National Role Conceptions'; Wish, 'Foreign Policy Makers and Their National Role Conceptions'; Holsti, 'National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy', September 1970; Wish, 'National Attributes as Sources of National Role Conceptions: A Capability-Motivation Model'.

crossloading—is excluded from this analysis because it does not bridge the EU level. Importantly, NRC and Europeanisation or foreign policymaking, too, may impact one another in a circular manner. Moreover, they are both determined by (material) national attributes, such as size, material capabilities, population size et cetera. In this study, however, the focus is on constructivist phenomena and not material features as guides of state behaviour. This is possible not only because of the empirical assessment of states with similar material capabilities, but also because the nature of EU-level decision-making concerning in FP is intergovernmental and consensual, thus (at least nominally) eliminating material asymmetries as an intervening factor in policymaking. To specify this theoretical argument further, I posit that the three essential characteristics of NRC influence the type of the Europeanisation of foreign policymaking a state typically employs (see Figure 2.6). NRC that is characterised with a competitive mode of association, proactive mode of action, and a perception of high status is conducive to uploading, whereas NRC that is cooperative in its mode of association, reactive in its mode of action, and of a low status perception is conducive to downloading.

Figure 2.6: Influence of NRC and its essential characteristics on the type of Europeanisation of foreign policymaking



This depicts ideal type characteristics of NRC, as well as ideal types of the Europeanisation of foreign policymaking, whereas in practice state NRC most often crystalises along a spectrum of three essential characteristics. A state may be competitive and proactive but conceives of itself as of low status in the international system. Moreover, state behaviour in practice rarely only exhibits one type of Europeanisation but may instead rely on a primary type which it supplements with another type of Europeanisation, depending on the policy area, issue salience, et cetera. For example, a state with a cooperative, proactive, and high-status NRC is more likely to principally upload in its Europeanisation but may nonetheless download in some policy areas.


This remembrance approach crystalises in five conceptual hypotheses (see Figure 2.7) which will be tested in the following empirical chapters for the cases of Slovenia and Croatia.

Figure 2.7: Theoretical hypotheses

Number	*Hypothesis*
1	National collective memory is an important factor in the construction of NRC.
2	National collective memory shapes NRC through the reproduction of relational motifs.
3	Auxiliary NRC that is competitive, proactive, and high status (type I auxiliary NRC) will propel state reliance on uploading as a vehicle of Europeanisation. Contrarily, auxiliary NRC conception that is cooperative, reactive, and low status (type II auxiliary NRC) will propel state reliance on downloading as a vehicle of Europeanisation.
4	Auxiliary NRC with a mix of characteristics of type I and type II auxiliary NRC will propel both types of Europeanisation, whereby one type will dominate depending on the assortment of characteristics.
5	National collective memory influences the extent and type of foreign policymaking Europeanisation.

In sum, the presented remembrance approach posits that national collective memory critically informs the construction and perpetuation of a state's master and auxiliary NRC. The essential characteristics of NRC, namely mode of association, mode of action, and status perception, in turn condition the extent and type of Europeanisation of foreign policymaking (see Figure 2.8).

Figure 2.8: Remembrance approach to foreign policymaking



CONCLUSION

As this chapter has shown, existing conceptual approaches to the study of the influence of collective memory on foreign policy(making) fall short of comprehensively theorising this relationship. Whilst frequently hinting at concepts such as state's 'role' or 'position' when describing how collective memory significantly influences foreign policymaking, they do not academically develop such vague references. The presented remembrance approach to foreign policymaking fills this scholarly gap and in so doing connects three, formerly isolated bodies

of literature. It understands that foreign policy "is not the representation of the nation to others as a pre-given object, but a construction of the nation in the very moment of representation,"[111] and consequently provides a new avenue for conceptualising how the nation's past presents a crucial input into the construction of the nation and contemporary political behaviour.

[111] Thomas Diez, 'Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering `Normative Power Europe'', *Millennium* 33, no. 3 (2005): 626–27, https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298050330031701.

III

SLOVENIA'S REMEMBRANCE: ANCIENTNESS, SERVILITY, MATURITY

> … independence is the pinnacle of Slovenian history. It is what our ancestors have dreamt about since Carantania. They were always enslaved, always suffered, were always prosecuted, most recently by Yugoslav Communists. And then, a generation came that established an independent Slovenia. This is the highest achievement of the Slovene nation…
>
> —Dr Božo Repe[1]

Remembrance of the past rarely, if ever, conforms to the fabric of history. Narratives of national histories exaggerate some events whilst negating others and reframe discordant developments. Collective memory of Slovenia's historical experience, too, presents a departure from objective history. Slovenia's remembrance as it is constructed today is a product of historical revisionism of 1990-2013,[2] as it needed to be renegotiated and synchronised with the socio-political reality of independence and de-legitimation of social institutions that framed the past, as well as reframed to differentiate Slovenia's past from that of Yugoslavia.[3] Because Slovenia's independence provided a tangible anchor for collective memory, such reframing did not require a dramatic reinvention of remembrance. What was problematic, however, was the absence of a golden age or historic statehood within which Slovenia's collective memory could be nested.[4] This chapter explores Slovenia's collective memory of co-opted subjugation in both the Austro-Hungarian empire and the federal Yugoslavia. I first chronologically anchor

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[1] Dr Božo Repe, interview with the author, 19 March 2021. Translation by author.

[2] Maca Jogan and Živa Broder, 'Samostojna Slovenija in kolektivni zgodovinski spomin', *Teorija in praksa* 53, no. Special Issue (2016): 22; Veronika Bajt, 'The Post-Communist Renegotiation of Slovenian National Symbols', *Družboslovne Razprave* 33, no. 85 (2017): 15–33.

[3] Bajt, 'The Post-Communist Renegotiation of Slovenian National Symbols'. Pušnik, 'Media Memorial Discourses and Memory Struggles in Slovenia'. Marja Kuzmanić, 'Collective Memory and Social Identity: A Social Psychological Exploration of the Memories of the Disintegration of Former Yugoslavia', *Horizons of Psychology* 17, no. 2 (2008): 22; Marja Kuzmanić, 'Collective Memory of Changing Identities: An Exploration of Memories and Identities Related to the Disintegration of Yugoslavia', *Two Homelands* 27 (2008): 18.

[4] Bajt, 'The Post-Communist Renegotiation of Slovenian National Symbols'.

national collective memory, proceed by identifying the prevalent motifs that frame remembrance, and lastly synthesise them to set forth a master narrative of Slovenia's collective memory.

ANCHORS OF REMEMBRANCE

Nesting Slovenia's remembrance in historical chronology is crucial for determining the anchors of national collective memory. First, analysis of the number of speeches given by Slovenia's Presidents and PMs on seven national holidays commemorating historic events[5] between 2016 and 2020 (see Figure 3.1) reveals that the greatest number of addresses took place on holidays commemorating Slovenia's 1991 independence from Yugoslavia, territorial integrity, and World War II.[6]

Figure 3.1: Anchoring remembrance based on the frequency of political speeches

Holiday:	*Event:*	*Speeches:*
Independence		
Statehood Day	declaration of independence (25 June 1991)	**8**
Independence and Unity Day	independence plebiscite (23 December 1990)	**4**
Sovereignty Day	Yugoslav National Army's departure from Slovenia (25 October 1991)	**4**
Territorial unifications		
Day of Unification of Prekmurje Slovenes with the Mother Nation	incorporation of Prekmurje (17 August 1919)	**5**
Return of Primorska to the Motherland	incorporation of Primorska with the Treaty of Peace with Italy (15 September 1947)	**4**
Rudolf Maister Day	seizure and incorporation of Styria and Carinthia into Slovenia by General Rudolf Maister (1919 - 1921)	**1**
World War II		
Day of Uprising Against the Occupation	establishment of the Anti-Imperialist Front (27 April 1941)	**4**

Second, a series of public opinion polls 'Slovene pulse: Slovene identity' 2010-2012[7] reveals Slovenians' assessment of the importance of specific events. Three-year averages reveal that

[5] 'National Holidays and Other Work-Free Days', Government of the Republic of Slovenia, accessed 12 March 2021, https://www.gov.si/en/topics/national-holidays/.

[6] For the exhaustive list of analysed speeches, refer to Annex IV.

[7] Matej Makarovič, 'Slovenski Utrip 2/2010: Slovenska Identiteta [Data File]' (Ljubljana: University of Ljubljana, Slovenian Social Science Data Archives, 2010), https://doi.org/10.17898/ADP_SUTR1002_V1; Matej Makarovič et al., 'Slovenski Utrip 2/2011: Slovenska Identiteta [Data File]' (Ljubljana: University of Ljubljana, Slovenian Social Science Data Archives, 2013), https://doi.org/10.17898/ADP_SUTR1102_V1; Matej Makarovič et al., 'Slovenski Utrip 2/2012: Slovenska Identiteta [Data File]' (Ljubljana: University of Ljubljana, Slovenian Social Science Data Archives, 2014), https://doi.org/10.17898/ADP_SUTR1202_V1.

Slovenia's independence in 1991 (79.8% of respondents), the printing of the first Slovene-language books in the 16th century (70.9%), resistance against the occupation during World War II (67.9%), the first democratic election in 1990 (66.7%), general Maister's fight for north Slovenian territories in 1918 (65.5%), and the 1848 national political programme United Slovenia' (43.5%) were all perceived as 'very important.' Slovenia's 2004 entry into the EU, by contrast, was perceived as 'important' by 31.5% of respondents. Evidently, respondents perceived events related to independence, nationhood (specifically language), World War II, and territorial integrity as crucial in Slovenia's history.

The anchors of Slovenia's collective memory were further identified during interviews with experts on Slovenian history: Dr Božo Repe, historian and head of research project History of Slovenia at the University of Ljubljana; Dr Jure Gašparič, current researcher and former director of the Institute of Contemporary History, as well as former state secretary at the Ministry of Education, Science and Sport; and Dr Oto Luthar, researcher at the Institute of Culture and Memory Studies and Director of Scientific Research Centre of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts. Interviewees confirmed the foremost position of Slovenia's 1991 independence and World War II in national collective memory, as well as described remembrance of SFRY and significance of the (mythicised) medieval state of Carantania. Importantly, they emphasised how Slovenia's collective memory of today resulted from historical revisionism of the 1980s, as nation-building and independence efforts necessitated national differentiation from Yugoslavia and instead reaffirming affinity with Central and Western Europe. Such differentiation was achieved by reinterpreting Slovenia's national origin and experience during World War II, and even after independence, revisionism continued in reinterpreting Yugoslavia.


REMEMBRANCE MOTIFS

In addition to chronologically anchoring Slovenia's collective memory, understanding thematic threads that run throughout is crucial. Analysis of 17 select speeches given by Slovenia's Presidents and PMs on national holidays commemorating historical events unveils precisely the motifs that structure Slovenia's collective remembrance.[8] Eight concepts (long

[8] For the exhaustive list of analysed speeches, refer to Annex IV.

and difficult history, many generations of Slovenians, Slovenian exceptionalism, maturity, noble values, foreign dominance, resistance or defence, and existential threats or survival) recurring throughout Slovenia's master narrative synthesise different, yet interrelated overarching motifs: *ancientness, servility,* and *maturity* (see Figure 3.2).

Figure 3.2: Remembrance motifs



Slovenia's *ancientness* is echoed in most (65%) analysed speeches through references to Slovenian national persistence and 'miraculous survival,' as well as 'many generations' (59%) of nationally conscious Slovenians, which allowed for the survival of Slovenehood through the nation's long and difficult history (35% of speeches). Furthering the motif of arduous yet ancient national history is the motif of *servility*. Slovenian long endurance of servility is construed using reiterations of 'foreign domination' (47%), and resistance to subjugation is heralded as a core trait of Slovenehood (65% of speeches). Emphasis on existential threats to the nation (59% of speeches) further affirms the miraculous survival of Slovenians in the face of long suppression and domination. Lastly, Slovenian *maturity*, particularly in remembrance of newfound statehood, is in addition to references to resistance or defence of Slovenehood expressed with remarks about Slovenian exceptionalism (47%), noble values (35%), and national maturity (24% of speeches). The following sections synthesise described historical anchors and overarching remembrance motifs to crystalise the master narrative of Slovenia's collective memory.

ANCIENTNESS

Slovenia's collective remembrance cultivates and substantiates its *ancientness* by declaring the 9th-century proto-state Carantania the "cradle of Slovenehood."[9] The myth of Carantania is the most powerful nation-building myth about Slovenia's glorious and ancient history that endows Slovenians with an otherwise absent tradition of statehood. This "collective mirage"[10] came into existence only in the 1980s during Slovenian nation-building as part of its independence efforts.[11] This recent revival of public interest in the ancient Carantania sought to separate Slovenians from other (Yugo)Slavs, provide a credible ancient territorial homeland and kinship, justify Slovenia's independence efforts, and affirm Slovenian democracy. By establishing a historical link with the early Middle Ages, "the Slovenes indeed acquired one of their principal identity anchors, and at the same time one of the most important means for legitimising themselves as a nation, for their emancipation, integration and, last but not least, differentiation from other nations."[12]

Political speeches recurringly emphasise Slovenia's ancientness, which also permeates official remembrance as reflected in the government chronology of important dates[13] and the National Assembly's publication 'Slovenia in light of parliamentary tradition,'[14] which both display efforts to establish Slovenia's pre-historic origins even before the 6th-century settlement of Slavs.[15] Carantania is defined as the *first Slovenian state* and its incorporation into the Frankish empire is described as a loss of independence. Both official sources also describe continuity between proto-Slovenes and contemporary Slovenia.[16] Moreover, the description of Carantania in the publication 'Slovenia in light of parliamentary tradition' is longer than the subsequent

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[9] Dr Božo Repe, interview with author, 19 March 2021. Translation by author.

[10] Peter Štih, *The Middle Ages between the Eastern Alps and the Northern Adriatic : Select Papers on Slovene Historiography and Medieval History* (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 17. Emphasis in original.

[11] Bajt, 'The Post-Communist Renegotiation of Slovenian National Symbols'. Peter Štih, *The Middle Ages between the Eastern Alps and the Northern Adriatic : Select Papers on Slovene Historiography and Medieval History* (Leiden: Brill, 2010)

[12] Štih, *The Middle Ages between the Eastern Alps and the Northern Adriatic*, 13–14.

[13] Government Communication Office, 'Important Dates for Slovenia', Government of the Republic of Slovenia, 22 December 2020, https://www.gov.si/en/news/2020-12-22-important-dates-for-slovenia/.

[14] Janko Prunk and Jožko Šavli, *Slovenija v luči parlamentarnega izročila* (Ljubljana: Državni zbor Republike Slovenije, 2008), https://fotogalerija.dz-rs.si/datoteke/Publikacije/Monografija_Drzavnega_zbora/2008-01-1slo-2ang_Slovenija_v_luci__.pdf; Government Communication Office, 'Important Dates for Slovenia'.

[15] Government Communication Office, 'Important Dates for Slovenia'.

[16] Urad Vlade Republike Slovenije za komuniciranje, 'Pomembni datumi za Slovenijo', Republika Slovenija, 22 December 2020, https://www.gov.si/novice/2020-12-22-pomembni-datumi-za-slovenijo/; 'Zgodovina: pomembnejši mejniki', Vlada Republike Slovenije, accessed 27 February 2021, http://www.vlada.si/o_sloveniji/zgodovina/.

sections on Austria-Hungary and Yugoslavia, and is incredibly detailed, describing for instance enthronement procedures of Carantanian Dukes.[17]

The artificially constructed Slovenian ancientness was elaborated by interviewed experts on Slovenian history, who confirmed its origins in historical revisionism of the 1980s, stemming from the need to construct a glorious, ancient past to legitimise statehood and differentiate the Slovenian nation. Dr Gašparič and Dr Repe concretely described the myth of Carantania and the subsequent linear development of the Slovenian nation as an elaboration of the 'indigeneity thesis.' Dr Repe synthesised this "mythological story"[18] as follows: "first, we [Slovenians] had a medieval country that was taken from us, and second, we are not Slavs, let alone south Slavs, but have been here forever and are indigenous."[19] Dr Repe further described how the indigeneity thesis differentiates Slovenians from Yugoslavs by endowing them with a distinct, non-Slavic origin and critiqued the depiction of Carantania as the cradle of Slovenehood, constructed in romantic historiography of the 19th century. This distinct, non-Slavic origin contributed to the sense of Slovenian exceptionalism, even "chauvinism."[20] Moreover, Dr Gašparič indicated that this mythical representation of Slovenian ancientness has been socially internalised, whereby many today are convinced that Slovenians always populated the region. Dr Luthar similarly referenced the "millennium of Slovenehood"[21] as a symbolic instrument of "politics of the past"[22] which is constructed as a belief in centuries-long tradition and is an artificially produced consciousness of the community.

THE SERVILITY MYTH

After Carantania's 9th century incorporation into the Frankish empire, Slovenian-populated territories lacked political autonomy until statehood in 1991. This millennium was a period of external political control and limited autonomy, and unsurprisingly, the motif of Slovenian *servility* characterises its remembrance. Undeniably, the nature of political authority over Slovenian territories evolved over time, and Slovenia's experience in the Habsburg empire

[17] Prunk and Šavli, *Slovenija v luči parlamentarnega izročila*.
[18] Dr Božo Repe, interview with author, 19 March 2021. Translation by author.
[19] Dr Božo Repe, interview with author, 19 March 2021. Translation by author
[20] Dr Božo Repe, interview with author, 19 March 2021. Translation by author
[21] Dr Oto Luthar, interview with author, 27 March 2021. Translation by author.
[22] Dr Oto Luthar, interview with author, 27 March 2021. Translation by author.

(including its descendants) and the 20th century Yugoslav political formations differed dramatically. Nonetheless, before its 1991 independence, Slovenia existed as part of various power-sharing arrangements under which it enjoyed more (in Yugoslavia) or less (in the Habsburg empire) autonomy and self-rule. Consequently, in examining Slovenia's collective memory, this period is considered the millennium of Slovenia's co-opted subjugation. This historical experience of co-opted subjugation necessitated an explanation of the nation's history over a millennium:[23]

> The formula was found in martyrdom, in a thousand years of suffering of the Slovene people, in short in the *servility myth*. This myth perceives the history of the Slovenes as the history of a small and diligent nation, oppressed for centuries, suffering and toiling under the yoke of foreign masters, before they finally manage to free themselves of the millstone of misery, fulfil their dreams of a thousand years, and become a nation – a nation with its own state…

Dr Repe and Dr Gašparič confirmed precisely such remembrance of Slovenian history as a history of subjugation and servility. Dr Repe explained that the sentiment of servility is deeply ingrained, and Dr Gašparič clarified that the resulting notions of serfdom and exploitation are particularly characteristic for remembrance of Austria-Hungary and the first Yugoslavia, and to a lesser extent also of the second Yugoslavia.

The Habsburg Era

Because of both the longevity and nature of Habsburg and Austro-Hungarian rule, which starting in 1282 and ending only in 1918 clearly equates Slovenia's past of (co-opted) subjugation, the servility myth crucially determines Slovenian remembrance of this period.

Slovenia's collective remembrance of this period, as based on official discourse,[24] focuses on the negative aspects of Slovenian experience, particularly serfdom and peasant revolts, Germanisation, and Ottoman invasions. Slovenia's experience in the Habsburg monarchy, specifically the 11th century, is described as a period of intensive German colonisation, thus emphasising the colonial character of Habsburg rule, power asymmetries, and on the whole,

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[23] Štih, *The Middle Ages between the Eastern Alps and the Northern Adriatic*, 24–25. Emphasis added.

[24] Prunk and Šavli, *Slovenija v luči parlamentarnega izročila*; Government Communication Office, 'Important Dates for Slovenia'.

imbuing the period with a negative pejorative. The prevalent portrayal of this period as an era of victimisation of Slovenians by their (foreign) feudal lords, accompanied by a description of peasant revolts, further reinforces this imagery. Nonetheless, Slovenia's official remembrance discourse also emphasises certain positive events. First, while portraying the period as an era of Slovenian servitude to feudal landlords, the official narrative emphasises the Counts of Celje as the "last Slovene feudal dynasty"[25] and bearers of Slovenian political tradition to demonstrate Slovenia's experience and entitlement to self-rule, as well as portray Habsburg rule as wanton, unjustifiable, and exploitative. Similarly, the enthronement of Carantanian Dukes is described as a "democratic act without compare"[26] and credited as an inspiration for the American Declaration of Independence, hence implying Slovenian exceptionalism. Second, it describes the development of Slovenian national consciousness through language, which was long considered peasant language, particularly the printing of the first Slovene-language books. Third, official discourse considers 'United Slovenia,' the first Slovenian national programme which called for the unification of Slovenian-populated territories into a single, autonomous unit within the empire, "the basis of Slovene national policy"[27] and details opposition by Austrian imperial authorities and German minorities. Again, the aim is to showcase political and national continuity of the 'Slovenian' proto-state Carantania and discredit Habsburg political control as unnecessary and repressive in light of Slovenian (supposed) tradition and capacity for self-rule. Synthesising the official discourse, PM Cerar framed the Habsburg period of servility in more a positive light using references to "Slovenian insurgent thought"[28] as critically constitutive of Slovenian identity:[29]

> Our history is largely a history of *resistance*. The Slovenian nation has always consolidated and justified its identity and future with non-acceptance of foreign or alienated *domination*. It is therefore important to remember … that we are all Slovenia: Slovenian reformers and the enlightened, Matija Gubec [leader of a peasant revolt] and peasant insurgents, supporters of [United Slovenia] from the year 1848 …

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[25] Government Communication Office, 'Important Dates for Slovenia', Government of the Republic of Slovenia, 22 December 2020, https://www.gov.si/en/news/2020-12-22-important-dates-for-slovenia/.

[26] Prunk and Šavli, *Slovenija v luči parlamentarnega izročila*, 12.

[27] Prunk and Šavli, 13.

[28] Miro Cerar, 'Dan Upora Proti Okupatorju', http://vlada.arhiv-spletisc.gov.si/predsednik_vlade_2014_2018/sporocila_za_javnost/sporocilo_za_javnost/a/slavnostni_govor_predsednika_vlade_rs_dr_mira_cerarja_na_drzavni_proslavi_ob_dnevu_upora_proti_okupatorju_1329/index.html. Translation by author.

[29] Cerar. Translation by author, emphasis added.

Dr Repe and Dr Gašparič, too, echoed the pre-eminence of the servility myth in remembrance of the Habsburg era. Dr Gašparič referenced the frequent portrayal of the empire as the "prison of nations,"[30] yet recognised that detailed remembrance of the Austro-Hungarian empire is fading and its image being "rehabilitated."[31] He nonetheless indicated that Slovenia's self-conception as a nation of serfs, emerging from that era, remains prevalent. Dr Repe indicated that in addition to the myth of servility, Slovenia's re-identification efforts relied on Slovenian exceptionalism and differentiation according to the "Austro-Hungarian criterium,"[32] meaning affinity with Western Europe.

The First Yugoslav Era

After World War I, Slovenia joined a new political union of south Slavs. While the first Yugoslavia ended Slovenia's imperial existence, this new polity did not facilitate autonomy but instead an alternative form of co-opted subjugation. Imperial politics continued to affect Slovenia through subtle efforts of political control and power asymmetries within Yugoslavia, as well as the post-War redrawing of borders which was spearheaded by the great powers. Slovenia's remembrance of this period focuses precisely on territorial losses, which are framed as imperially imposed and tragic, thus representing an important anchor of Slovenian remembrance.

President Pahor's speech, for instance, describes how because of Slovenian experience with foreign "dominance,"[33] the creation of the first Yugoslavia provoked fear of Orthodox Serbs' religious hegemony and assimilatory pressures over Slovenians (and Croats) who were economically more developed and relegated to a minority status, but also emphasised that the fundamental goal at the time was the unification of all Slovenians within the same country, which the first Yugoslavia ultimately made possible. Official remembrance of the first Yugoslavia emphasises territorial losses and portrays them as a tragic partitioning of Slovenian 'ethnic' lands due to "imperialist policies of the major powers."[34] The loss of Carinthia, which

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[30] Dr Jure Gašparič, interview with author, 16 March 2021. Translation by author.

[31] Dr Jure Gašparič, interview with author, 16 March 2021. Translation by author.

[32] Dr Božo Repe, interview with author, 19 March 2021. Translation by author.

[33] Borut Pahor, '100. Obletnica Združitve Prekmurskih Slovencev z Matičnim Narodom', http://www.predsednik.si/up-rs/uprs.nsf/objave/61116EB7E80B4115C125845A00207DF4?OpenDocument. Translation by author.

[34] Prunk and Šavli, *Slovenija v luči parlamentarnega izročila*, 15.

is in Slovenia's collective memory equated with Carantania and thus highly symbolic, at the 1920 plebiscite is remembered with particular bitterness; in fact, the official narrative describes the loss as a result of German forces preventing Carinthian Slovenians from being incorporated into Slovenia.[35] Although the 1920 plebiscite is not commemorated as a national holiday, it is invoked in approximately a third of all analysed addresses. PM Šarec,[36] for instance, referenced it in connection to the 1990 independence plebiscite, and PM Janša assessed that "the wounds caused by the tragic 20th century in Europe are finally slowly healing."[37] The loss of Primorska is also portrayed as a tragic result of "the imperialist Treaty of London,"[38] whereby "historical destiny pushed Primorska Slovenes—against [their] will—outside of the frames of the mother nation"[39] and into a hostile environment in which Slovene language and culture were suppressed.[40] The unification of Prekmurje, too, was heralded as "an exceptional moment"[41] which allowed for the majority of Prekmurje Slovenians to be "after a thousand-year existence under the Hungarian crown politically, economically, and culturally reunited with the motherland."[42]

Dr Gašparič recognised the presence of a sentiment of loss and injustice yet was convinced that this is disappearing from collective remembrance and that Slovenians today accept modern borders. Dr Repe similarly described that the loss of Carinthia was mourned mainly in the inter-war period. Regarding the first Yugoslavia, Dr Gašparič described that it is remembered as an improvement from Austria-Hungary since Slovenians "at least were the one S in the Kingdom of SCS."[43]

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[35] Prunk and Šavli, 15.

[36] Marjan Šarec, 'Domoljubje Ne Pripada Samo Nekaterim, Temveč Je Pravica in Dolžnost Vsakega Izmed Nas', http://vlada.arhiv-spletisc.gov.si/predsednik_vlade/sporocila_za_javnost/sporocilo_za_javnost/a/predsednik_vlade_domoljubje_ne_pripada_samo_nekaterim_temvec_je_pravica_in_dolznost_vsakega_izmed_nas_1548/index.html.

[37] Janez Janša, 'Plebiscitno Izročilo Enotnega Naroda', https://www.gov.si/novice/2020-12-23-plebiscitno-izrocilo-enotnega-naroda/. Translation by author.

[38] Prunk and Šavli, *Slovenija v luči parlamentarnega izročila*, 15.

[39] Borut Pahor, '73. Obletnica Vrnitve Primorske k Matični Domovini', https://www.predsednik.si/up-rs/uprs.nsf/objave/95F430193A3820C4C12585E1003C6669?OpenDocument. Translation by author.

[40] Janez Janša, 'Poslanica Predsednika Vlade Janeza Janše Za Dan Vrnitve Primorske k Matični Domovini', https://www.gov.si/novice/2020-09-15-poslanica-predsednika-vlade-janeza-janse-za-dan-vrnitve-primorske-k-maticni-domovini/.

[41] Janez Janša, 'Poslanica Predsednika Vlade Janeza Janše Ob Dnevu Združitve Prekmurskih Slovencev z Matičnim Narodom', https://www.gov.si/novice/2020-08-17-poslanica-predsednika-vlade-janeza-janse-ob-dnevu-zdruzitve-prekmurskih-slovencev-z-maticnim-narodom/. Translation by author.

[42] Janša. Translation by author.

[43] Dr Jure Gašparič, interview with author, 16 March 2021. Translation by author.

World War II

World War II is an important anchor of Slovenia's collective memory, in which it represents a time of (imperial) occupation, national awakening, and resistance. Nevertheless, it is also the site of the most intense memorial struggle concerning the nature of national liberation efforts due to the polar opposite depictions of Communist Partisans and anti-Communist or collaborationist Home Guards.

A consequence of this ongoing remembrance struggle is a sanitised official narrative,[44] which is rather concise, condensed to the partitioning of Yugoslavia by the Axis and Slovenia's victimhood to Nazi aggression. The narrative includes reference to national resistance under the Communist leadership but does not mention Partisans, the Home Guard, nor Partisans' post-war mass execution of the Home Guard. President Pahor described the Day of the Uprising Against the Occupation as a "freedom holiday,"[45] acknowledged the enduring conflict in its remembrance, and called for reconciliation: "despite the differences among us, let us preserve in our historic memory the liberation fight as a glorious act of the Slovenian nation, of existential importance for our existence and development."[46] While his speech is bare of references to the nature of the national liberation fight, it is full of reminders of the event's significance for national consciousness. PM Cerar similarly credited the liberation effort as a pillar of the later independence struggle and emphasised its significance for national identity: "let us be decent heirs of all our rebels, small and large."[47]

Dr Gašparič determined World War II to be one of the main, as well as the most temporally distant remembrance anchor but insisted that emotive connections remain strong. He summarised that the majority of Slovenians still believe the Partisan fight to be justified and see the Home Guard in a negative light, and indicated that while people still nurture opposing views, tensions have weakened, as evident also in the overwhelming social condemnation of post-war mass murder. Dr Repe similarly described interpretations of World War II as polar opposite depictions of the national liberation effort and indicated that historical revisionism

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[44] Prunk and Šavli, *Slovenija v luči parlamentarnega izročila*; Government Communication Office, 'Important Dates for Slovenia'.

[45] Borut Pahor, 'Dan Upora Proti Okupatorju', http://www.predsednik.si/up-rs/uprs.nsf/objave/4B32B7447F2580DAC12585570037EC1B?OpenDocument. Translation by author.

[46] Pahor. Translation by author.

[47] Cerar, 'Dan Upora Proti Okupatorju'. Translation by author.

attempted to relativise collaboration by portraying both sides, despite participating in the 'great' national liberation fight, as equally 'bad.' He highlighted artificial attempts at reconciliation, illustrating them by referencing the Monument to the Victims of All Wars in Ljubljana: "it is essentially an empty wall to which [politicians] lead different delegations and which is very suitable for various graffiti which continue to appear."[48] Dr Luthar also confirmed that remembrance of World War II is politically instrumentalised for its salience and divisiveness in order to "lower fog on actual issues."[49] Importantly, the collective memory of World War II, too, is framed in terms of Slovenian victimhood and martyrdom, as well as resistance to imperialist aggression.

The Second Yugoslav Era

The second Yugoslavia cannot be characterised as Slovenia's experience with subjugation, *per se*. Yet, it was a time of non-sovereignty that can be—and in Slovenian remembrance *is*—seen as a period of soft, co-opted subjugation. As SFRY was established, Slovenia became a republic in a multi-ethnic federation based on the principle of national autonomy, self-rule, and self-determination, which drew support from national minorities, particularly Slovenians.[50] Despite social and economic development, urbanisation, and industrialisation, domestic development was unbalanced, and Slovenia became the most developed republic.[51] With Tito's death, the core of Yugoslav national identity that successfully unified multiple nationalities disappeared. Compounded with a worsening economic crisis, political challenges such as the rise of Serb nationalism led to growing calls for reform (and eventually secession).[52] In fact, Slovenia's collective memory of its existence in SFRY is not singular; the second Yugoslav era needs to be examined in two parts: the 'good' SFRY in Tito's years and the 'bad' SFRY, which resulted in Slovenia's secession.

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[48] Dr Božo Repe, interview with author, 19 March 2021. Translation by author.

[49] Dr Oto Luthar, interview with author, 27 March 2021. Translation by author.

[50] James Gow, *Slovenia and the Slovenes: A Small State and the New Europe* (London: Hurst & Company, 2010).

[51] John R. Lampe, *Balkans into Southeastern Europe : A Century of War and Transition* (Houndsmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire [England]: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Hilde Katrine Haug, *Creating a Socialist Yugoslavia : Tito, Communist Leadership and the National Question* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012).Lampe, Balkans into Southeastern Europe; Haug, Creating a Socialist Yugoslavia.

[52] Lampe, *Balkans into Southeastern Europe*; Miro Haček, *Slovenian Politics and the State*, 2017.

In official remembrance,[53] references to SFRY before intense independence efforts (post-1989) are minuscule, listing only the formation of SFRY, Slovenia's status as its federal republic, and the 1947 return of Primorska. Interviewees described that this era is remembered as a time of relative security; Dr Luthar and Dr Repe claimed that it is romanticised and idealised and consequently characterised as 'Yugonostalgia.' Dr Repe described how the period of 1950s-1970s was the greatest transformation in the lives of Slovenians as Slovenia industrialised and modernised, and Dr Luthar described Slovenia's development in SFRY as "the story of the advantage"[54] it enjoyed. Dr Gašparič elaborated that although criticisms of the period exist, for instance, of the communist dictatorship, it nonetheless facilitated some Slovenian national formation. He further described that this time is personified in Tito, who is still socially remembered as a great statesman who ensured stability and prosperity, but after whose death the "agony"[55] started.

The 'bad' SFRY after 1980s, on the other hand, is portrayed markedly differently. Dr Gašparič, for example, described how it is remembered as existence without a say or benefits in a political association, which fed into the fear of subjugation and exploitation. Moreover, he claimed that Slovenia's experience in Yugoslavia greatly shaped remembrance of its history as one of subjugation, and the consequent fear of exploitation and position in the broader political entity. This was reiterated by Dr Luthar, who described prevalent remembrance of Slovenia as a "victim to Belgrade's hegemonic politics."[56]

MATURITY

Slovenian politicians began experimenting with democratisation in the 1980s. In 1990, Slovenia held its first free democratic elections whereby the Communist Party suffered a resounding defeat,[57] as well as the independence plebiscite at which 88.5% of the eligible

[53] Prunk and Šavli, *Slovenija v luči parlamentarnega izročila*; Government Communication Office, 'Important Dates for Slovenia'.

[54] Dr Oto Luthar, interview with author, 27 March 2021. Translation by author.

[55] Dr Jure Gašparič, interview with author, 16 March 2021. Translation by author.

[56] Dr Oto Luthar, interview with author, 27 March 2021. Translation by author.

[57] Mojmir Mrak et al., eds., *Slovenia: From Yugoslavia to the European Union* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2004); Lampe, *Balkans into Southeastern Europe*.

population voted for independence.[58] Independence was proclaimed on 25 June 1991, and on the following day, the Ten-Day War started with Yugoslav National Army's (YNA) incursion. After the EU's mediation and signing of the Brioni Declaration, the war ended, and Slovenia's emancipatory processes froze until the complete withdrawal of YNA troops.[59]

Slovenia's collective memory is overwhelmingly centred on independence as the single most salient event, as reflected in official discourse,[60] which extensively details SFRY's breakdown and Slovenia's independence. Almost half (45%) of the National Assembly's publication details independence efforts starting in the late 1980s, as well as comprehensively elaborates the independence period.[61] The same is confirmed in political speeches: PM Janša stated that "in all of our long and turbulent history, no time is holier than the time of independence."[62] Similarly, President Pahor described how those were "the most historically dense and crucial years, as never before or after. … Everything was subordinate to independence and the creation of unity for this unique goal."[63] PM Cerar summarised the independence period as follows:[64]

> Today, we live a Slovenian state. However, our state did not arrive as a gift. It was conceived in the minds and hearts of numerous generations of conscious Slovenians who could 100 and more years ago only long for Slovenians to once live independently, without foreign masters, and freely and sovereignly associate with other nations. Slovenian state was then born with the plebiscite and came to life with independence. It was confirmed in resistance and became fully sovereign as the last soldier—then already of a foreign army—stepped onto the ship by the Koper pier.

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[58] Republic of Slovenia, Public Relations and Media Office, 'Od Plebiscita Do Samostojnosti', Deset let samostojnosti, May 2001, http://www.slovenija2001.gov.si/10let/pot/kronologija/.

[59] Republic of Slovenia, Public Relations and Media Office.

[60] Government Communication Office, 'Important Dates for Slovenia'; Prunk and Šavli, *Slovenija v luči parlamentarnega izročila*.

[61] Prunk and Šavli, *Slovenija v luči parlamentarnega izročila*.

[62] Janša, 'Plebiscitno Izročilo Enotnega Naroda'. Translation by author.

[63] Borut Pahor, 'Dan Samostojnosti in Enotnosti', http://www.predsednik.si/up-rs/uprs.nsf/objave/DA7D261044A579D8C12584D900528AA2?OpenDocument. Translation by author.

[64] Miro Cerar, 'Danes Živimo Slovensko Državo, Ki Ni Prišla Kot Darilo', http://vlada.arhiv-spletisc.gov.si/predsednik_vlade_2014_2018/sporocila_za_javnost/sporocilo_za_javnost/a/danes_zivimo_slovensko_drzavo_ki_ni_prisla_kot_darilo_560/index.html. Translation by author.

The independence plebiscite is commemorated with a holiday of "unity"[65] and "patriotism."[66] It is remembered as a moment which forever changed the course of Slovenian history as the ultimate expression of Slovenian will and desire for an independent country, "the only time when the nation truly, literally passed its own judgement,"[67] and which lives on as the "crown of Slovenian insurgent though and rejection of foreign domination."[68] Moreover, the proclamation of independence is described as a historical juncture, the most critical event in Slovenian history, which fulfilled centuries-old desires[69] despite foreign opposition[70] only due to Slovenian unity and bravery. PM Janša recollects it as "a victory, raised in its finality on the Slovene Olympus; a victory, more important than all battles fought by our ancestors, numerous times unfortunately also for someone else, through the spiral of ungrateful history of the past centuries."[71] Similarly, during the Ten-Day War, the defence of the state, in which the YNA is portrayed as an occupation force[72] and exponentially more powerful, is remembered as a struggle Slovenians fought alone, without any allies or assistance.

Interviewees, too, reiterated the importance of independence, and Dr Repe claimed that it is the most politicised event in Slovenia's history because it still carries political benefits; participation in the independence efforts continues to legitimise political authority and power. He further explained that it is interpreted as the "peak of Slovenian history"[73] and "the highest achievement of the Slovenian nation."[74] Dr Gašparič described Slovenian independence in 1991 as "annus mirabilis, the year zero when something was achieved which the Slovenian nation supposedly strove for since pre-historic times"[75] yet he recognised that the event was already mythicised in the remembrance narrative. Dr Repe elaborated by detailing the Ten-Day

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[65] Šarec, 'Domoljubje Ne Pripada Samo Nekaterim, Temveč Je Pravica in Dolžnost Vsakega Izmed Nas'; Miro Cerar, 'Dan Samostojnosti in Enotnosti', http://vlada.arhiv-spletisc.gov.si/predsednik_vlade_2014_2018/sporocila_za_javnost/sporocilo_za_javnost/a/govor_dr_cerarja_na_osrednji_drzavni_slovesnosti_ob_dnevu_samostojnosti_in_enotnosti_1208/index.html; Pahor, 'Dan Samostojnosti in Enotnosti'.Šarec 2018, Dan samostojnosti in enotnosti; Cerar 2017, Dan samostojnosti in enotnosti; Pahor 2019, Dan samostojnosti in enotnosti. Translations by author.

[66] Šarec, 'Domoljubje Ne Pripada Samo Nekaterim, Temveč Je Pravica in Dolžnost Vsakega Izmed Nas'.

[67] Janša, 'Plebiscitno Izročilo Enotnega Naroda'. Translation by author.

[68] Cerar, 'Dan Upora Proti Okupatorju'. Translation by author.

[69] Cerar.

[70] Janez Janša, 'Slovenija Je Domovina Moja', https://www.gov.si/novice/2020-06-24-slovenija-je-domovina-moja/.

[71] Janša. Translation by author.

[72] Janša.

[73] Dr Božo Repe, interview with author, 19 March 2021. Translation by author.

[74] Dr Božo Repe, interview with author, 19 March 2021. Translation by author.

[75] Dr Jure Gašparič, interview with author, 16 March 2021. Translation by author.

War, which is mythicised as an invasion by "aggressors,"[76] "traitors who opposed the independence and heroes who arrived on their white horses and emancipated Slovenia."[77]

CONCLUSION

Slovenia's collective memory of the national past is primarily a collective memory of co-opted subjugation by both the Austro-Hungarian empire and Yugoslavia. It is anchored principally in Slovenia's independence and World War II, as well as Carantania and territorial integrity. It synthesises three overarching threads of remembrance: ancientness, servility, and maturity. *Ancientness* is reflected in the myth of Carantania, which "to the Slovenes embodies ancient Slovene glory – a glory that never existed"[78] and "is the most powerful symbol of Slovene history."[79] The *servility* myth portrays perseverance despite foreigners' unjustifiable political domination over and suppression of Slovenians, as well as emphasises Slovenian emancipatory efforts from the imperial and federal centres. Hence, it synthesises Slovenian history as a history of the peasantry, national repression, and subjugation by foreign authorities. Finally, the grand narrative of Slovenia's independence as the attainment of a millennium-long desire emphasises its *maturity*. Significantly, as pointed out by Dr Gašparič, Slovenia's remembrance has been repeatedly reconstructed:[80]

> The successor state always defames its predecessor. The Kingdom of Yugoslavia called Austria-Hungary the prison of nations. Socialist Yugoslavia claimed the Kingdom was a monarchical, centralistic, Serbian hegemonic construction that exploited the working man. Slovenia now says that 'the second Yugoslavia was Tito's strange state, Tito was a dictator, Serbs exploited us, it was all for nothing and it had to fall apart.'

Dr Repe agreed, stating that "Slovenians actually only have little memory of past periods because every time a change occurred, monuments [were] torn down, streets renamed…"[81]

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[76] Dr Božo Repe, interview with author, 19 March 2021. Translation by author.
[77] Dr Božo Repe, interview with author, 19 March 2021. Translation by author.
[78] Štih, *The Middle Ages between the Eastern Alps and the Northern Adriatic*, 21–22.
[79] Štih, 21–22.
[80] Dr Jure Gašparič, interview with author, 16 March 2021. Translation by author.
[81] Dr Božo Repe, interview with author, 19 March 2021. Translation by author.

IV

REMEMBER TO FORGET THE EMPIRE:

THE CASE OF SLOVENIA

Slovenia's collective memory integrates three strands of remembrance—ancientness, servility, and maturity, which condition Slovenia's national role conception in both global and European contexts, as well as inform international behaviour and, by extension, Europeanisation of foreign policymaking. In 2015, Slovenia adopted a new foreign policy strategy, 'Slovenia: Safe, Successful, Globally Respected,' which unveils precisely how the past informs its foreign policymaking:[1]

> A quarter century of independence and parliamentary democracy, a decade of EU and NATO membership, a quarter century since the fall of the Berlin Wall, 40 years of the Helsinki Final Act, the 100th anniversary of the outbreak of the First World War, the 70th anniversary of the end of the Second World War, and the anniversaries of the Austrian State Treaty and the Treaties of Osimo – *these constituted the historical framework and the essence of how Slovenia established international relations*. These anniversaries also call for Slovenia to rethink its foreign policy, its foreign policy strategies, and its position in the international community…

To illuminate the channels of transmission through which the past comes to imbue foreign policymaking, this chapter first elucidates the relationship between Slovenia's collective memory of co-opted subjugation and its NRC, detailing how interpretations of Slovenia's past influence the conceptualisation of its role within the EU. The second part demonstrates how Slovenia's collective memory, through NRC, conditions Europeanisation of foreign policymaking. The conclusion synthesises empirical evidence and highlights the significance of collective memory of co-opted subjugation in foreign policymaking and Europeanisation.

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[1] 'Slovenia: Safe, Successful, Globally Respected', 6. Emphasis added.

NATIONAL ROLE CONCEPTION

Before 1991, Slovenian political elites had both few reasons and limited freedom to consider Slovenia's role in the international landscape. Although internal arrangements allowed for some political self-governance, particularly in Yugoslavia, Slovenian political elites had only little say in foreign affairs, as such decisions were determined in the imperial centre Vienna or at the federal level in Belgrade. It was only as independence efforts intensified in the late 1980s that the question of Slovenia's substantive role in the international landscape emerged. In lieu of a tradition of statehood and sovereign external relations upon which Slovenia's self-image would be based, NRC of the newly independent Slovenia not only had to be reimagined to reflect its sovereignty in the international landscape but had to be invented.

In the 30 years since independence, Slovenia's NRC evolved from a post-Communist success story to the EU's star pupil and continues to evolve today, yet its transformations fall outside of the scope of this study. What is of interest is Slovenia's NRC as detailed in the aforementioned FP strategy (henceforth the Strategy) and conceived by foreign policymakers *today*. What is Slovenia's self-conceptualised position and role in the global and EU context?

Global NRC: The Legacy of Servility


The cornerstones of Slovenia's FP (the Strategy and the Declaration on Foreign Policy of the Republic of Slovenia,[2] henceforth the Declaration)—provide an immediate glimpse into Slovenia's master NRC, which represents the broadest self-image of the state's international role. Notably, the Strategy reiterates the significance of Slovenia's historical experience for its international position and FP on multiple occasions. First, it describes that "Slovenia seized the comparative advantages [in international relations] deriving from its history,"[3] specifying that these "lie primarily in the country's geostrategic location and its particular historical and cultural aspects."[4] Second, the Strategy contextually underscores the significance of history in bilateral relations, defining, for instance, Slovenia's commitment to "a policy of overcoming

[2] Declaration on Foreign Policy of the Republic of Slovenia (DeZPRS-1).
[3] 'Slovenia: Safe, Successful, Globally Respected', 7.
[4] Declaration on Foreign Policy of the Republic of Slovenia (DeZPRS-1), 10.

historical conflicts"[5] as well as in foreign policymaking, explicitly referencing SFRY's balancing behaviour and multilateralism among the non-aligned.[6] In describing Slovenia's global role, the Declaration defines its objective of a "consolidated multilateral system."[7] The Strategy specifies this further, describing one of Slovenia's primary goals "to work toward a strong [EU] and a strong multilateral system, as well as to consolidate Slovenia's international standing."[8] Recognising the material limitations and corresponding international influence,[9] Slovenia's global NRC is overwhelmingly framed as "a promoter of effective multilateralism"[10] with an "ambition to establish itself as a regional multilateral centre."[11] Notably, the Strategy's title itself ('Slovenia: Safe, Successful, Globally Respected')[12] highlights achieving global respect as one of its central aims and thus hints at Slovenia's self-consciousness concerning its global role.

Interviews with Slovenian FP experts and practitioners provide further insights. As many as eleven expressed views of Slovenia's master NRC that can be summarised as *the subordinate*. More specifically, Slovenia's master NRC labels that reappeared continuously were *the subjugated*, *the serf*, *the victim*, and *the exploited* (see Figure 4.1).

Figure 4.1: Labels for Slovenia's master NRC



[5] 'Slovenia: Safe, Successful, Globally Respected', 21.
[6] 'Slovenia: Safe, Successful, Globally Respected', 26.
[7] Declaration on Foreign Policy of the Republic of Slovenia (DeZPRS-1).
[8] 'Slovenia: Safe, Successful, Globally Respected', 4.
[9] 'Slovenia: Safe, Successful, Globally Respected', 9–10.
[10] 'Slovenia: Safe, Successful, Globally Respected', 5.
[11] 'Slovenia: Safe, Successful, Globally Respected', 39.
[12] 'Slovenia: Safe, Successful, Globally Respected'.

Firstly, when asked about Slovenia's role in the international arena, as many as nine interviewees[13] described it as the role of *the subjugated*. Alojz Peterle (former PM, FM, and MEP) agreed that the question of the persistent, internalised sentiment of subjugation and nonindependence in Slovenian national consciousness is justified and Dr Gašparič expressed his view that the sentiment of subjugation and exploitation generally permeates the field of FP. Boštjan Jerman (representative to Relex, Permanent Representation to the EU), too, concurred that Slovenia's sentiment of subjugation is sometimes noticeable in how Slovenia navigates the international space and gave an example of Slovenian representatives only rarely speaking out in settings such as the UN. Moreover, Dr Repe explicitly referenced the sentiment of "servility"[14] that permeates Slovenian society and political culture.

Secondly, three interviewees explicitly referred to Slovenia's role as a *serf* and the state as a *nation of serfs*.[15] Dr Gašparič, for instance, pointed out that this idea remains common and that the Slovenian public is concerned with how "our political elite, if we truly are a nation of serfs, will actually be agile and active." Bojan Grobovšek (former Ambassador to Poland and Argentina) stated that "the village"[16] and "Martin Krpan"[17] (a folk character representing an imperial Habsburg subject who wins the emperor's favour and protects the court from invaders—a reference to Ottoman invasions) are the basis of Slovenehood. He further emphasised that such sentiments are deeply ingrained among Slovenians. Similarly, Dr Klemen Grošelj (MEP) referenced serf Jernej (a fictional character whose search for justice concerning his property takes him to the imperial capital of Vienna) to illustrate how contemporary Slovenian mentality stems from traditional exposure to social risk and poverty, which is now "written in our genes."[18]

Lastly, three interviewees both directly and indirectly characterised Slovenia's NRC as a *victim*.[19] Notably, Janez Sušnik (former President of the National Council) repeatedly asserted that Slovenia has always been unable to have its say in international decisions, referring explicitly to the Paris Peace Treaty in which great powers determined Slovenia's borders with

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[13] Bogovič, Dr Gašparič, Grobovšek, Jerman, Dr Luthar, Peterle, Dr Repe, Sušnik, Dr Toplak.
[14] Dr Božo Repe, interview with author, 19 March 2021. Translation by author.
[15] Dr Gašparič, Grobovšek, Dr Grošelj.
[16] Bojan Grobovšek, interview with author, 18 March 2021. Translation by author.
[17] Bojan Grobovšek, interview with author, 18 March 2021. Translation by author.
[18] Dr Klemen Grošelj, interview with author, 8 April 2021. Translation by author.
[19] Sušnik, Grobovšek, Dr Grošelj.

Italy. He further explained that Slovenia was always "cornered"[20] in international affairs and that "we lose, and lose, and lose."[21]

Two interviewees did not describe Slovenia's global NRC that would neatly fit the subordinate NRC. Nonetheless, their responses provide important insights. According to Dr Ana Bojinović Fenko (professor of IR, University of Ljubljana), there is too little public discussion of Slovenia's role in the international community, which leads to settling for others' perception of Slovenia's position and function. She claims that due to the lack of this debate and undetermined self-image, Slovenia remains unsure of the role it wishes to enact internationally, the contributions it wishes to make, and what it wishes to gain from the global community. Nevertheless, she described Slovenia's master NRC, specifically its mode of action, as reactive to changes in the international environment. Similarly, Peter Grk (Head of the Department for the Bled Strategic Forum, Directorate for CFSP at MFA) did not define an overarching, global NRC. Instead, he described that Slovenia is "trying to pursue ideas and suggestions through different organisations and mechanisms in the international multilateral space,"[22] therefore characterising it as inherently cooperative.

In sum, Slovenia's master NRC can broadly be labelled as the subordinate. More important, however, are the characteristics of this NRC. Based on the above empirical evidence, Slovenia's master NRC is cooperative in its mode of association, passive in its mode of action, and of low confidence. These characteristics bleed into Slovenia's auxiliary, EU-specific NRC and thus condition Slovenia's self-image and behaviour in the European social system.

EU-specific NRC: From a Serf to an Aide

Slovenia's auxiliary, EU-specific NRC is echoed in the Declaration and the Strategy and is historically justified. The Declaration underscores that Slovenia "enjoys historical, political and cultural ties woven through many centuries with the region's other countries. Central Europe is the cradle of our cultural heritage and collective memory."[23] The EU's centrality in

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[20] Janez Sušnik, interview with author, 31 March 2021. Translation by author.
[21] Janez Sušnik, interview with author, 31 March 2021. Translation by author.
[22] Peter Grk, interview with author, 8 April 2021. Translation by author.
[23] 'Slovenia: Safe, Successful, Globally Respected', 16.

Slovenia's self-image crystalises in its critical foreign policy objectives, namely "enhanced relations with partners"[24] in the EU, "a positive image and the visibility … as a successful member,"[25] positioning "at the centre of a deepened and widened EU, with a strong foreign and security policy,"[26] and promotion of the Slovenian language and culture within the EU. This not only underscores EU's significance but also reiterates Slovenia's NRC as "an active member at the heart"[27] of the EU which "must constantly prove itself, establish and strengthen its position, and, while promoting community interests, seek to pursue its own."[28] Another key signifiers of Slovenia's EU-specific NRC are the National Assembly's 'Declarations on Activities of the Republic of Slovenia in EU institutions' (henceforth Declarations on Activities) for the period 2015 – 2020,[29] which define Slovenia's strategy for engagement with the EU. First, Slovenia's self-image in the EU is of a "recognisable and established Member"[30] with the desire (and strategic interest[31]) to "remain in the core of European integration."[32] Second, Slovenia's EU-specific NRC is an advocate for EU's deepening,[33] closer and more effective cooperation of all EU Members in order to find common European solutions,[34] and European unity.[35] In addition to FP documents, the EU's s significance in Slovenia's understanding of its international role was conveyed by FM Cerar, who stated that the EU is

[24] Declaration on Foreign Policy of the Republic of Slovenia (DeZPRS-1).

[25] Declaration on Foreign Policy of the Republic of Slovenia (DeZPRS-1).

[26] Declaration on Foreign Policy of the Republic of Slovenia (DeZPRS-1).

[27] Declaration on Foreign Policy of the Republic of Slovenia (DeZPRS-1).

[28] 'Slovenia: Safe, Successful, Globally Respected'.

[29] 'Deklaracija o Usmeritvah Za Delovanje Republike Slovenije v Institucijah Evropske Unije v Letu 2015 (DeUDIEU15)', Pub. L. No. 008-05/14-115/44 (2015), http://www.pisrs.si/Pis.web/pregledPredpisa?id=DEKL39; 'Deklaracija o Usmeritvah Za Delovanje Republike Slovenije v Institucijah Evropske Unije v Obdobju Januar 2016–Junij 2017 (DeUDIEU1617)', Pub. L. No. 008-05/15-141/37 (2016), http://www.pisrs.si/Pis.web/pregledPredpisa?id=DEKL41&d-49681-o=1&d-49681-p=1&d-49681-s=3; 'Deklaracija o Usmeritvah Za Delovanje Republike Slovenije v Institucijah Evropske Unije v Obdobju Julij 2017–December 2018 (DeUDIEU1718)', Pub. L. No. 008-05/17-65/21 (2017), http://www.pisrs.si/Pis.web/pregledPredpisa?id=DEKL43; 'Deklaracija o Usmeritvah Za Delovanje Republike Slovenije v Institucijah Evropske Unije v Obdobju Januar 2019–Junij 2020 (DeUDIEU1920)', Pub. L. No. 008-05/18-131/36 (2019), http://www.pisrs.si/Pis.web/pregledPredpisa?id=DEKL45.

[30] Deklaracija o usmeritvah za delovanje Republike Slovenije v institucijah Evropske unije v letu 2015 (DeUDIEU15), 1.

[31] Deklaracija o usmeritvah za delovanje Republike Slovenije v institucijah Evropske unije v obdobju januar 2019–junij 2020 (DeUDIEU1920), 2.

[32] Deklaracija o usmeritvah za delovanje Republike Slovenije v institucijah Evropske unije v obdobju julij 2017–december 2018 (DeUDIEU1718), 2.

[33] Deklaracija o usmeritvah za delovanje Republike Slovenije v institucijah Evropske unije v letu 2015 (DeUDIEU15).

[34] Deklaracija o usmeritvah za delovanje Republike Slovenije v institucijah Evropske unije v obdobju januar 2016–junij 2017 (DeUDIEU1617).

[35] Deklaracija o usmeritvah za delovanje Republike Slovenije v institucijah Evropske unije v letu 2015 (DeUDIEU15); Deklaracija o usmeritvah za delovanje Republike Slovenije v institucijah Evropske unije v obdobju januar 2016–junij 2017 (DeUDIEU1617); Deklaracija o usmeritvah za delovanje Republike Slovenije v institucijah Evropske unije v obdobju julij 2017–december 2018 (DeUDIEU1718); Deklaracija o usmeritvah za delovanje Republike Slovenije v institucijah Evropske unije v obdobju januar 2019–junij 2020 (DeUDIEU1920).

Slovenia's "first, 'home' multilateral environment,"[36] and a "fundamental frame for the enforcement of our mutual values."[37]

Having ascertained the principal function of the EU for Slovenia's auxiliary NRC, the nature of this EU-specific NRC is determined using a mosaic of primary sources collected through interviews with policy experts and practitioners and questionnaire responses by foreign policymakers and Parliamentary FP experts, in addition to FP documents.

Questionnaire respondents,[38] illustrating Slovenia self-conceived role within the EU in their own words, described this EU-specific NRC as a determined supporter of an integrated and inclusive EU (two respondents), as an equal Member (two respondents), and a part of a whole (two respondents) that nonetheless cannot always influence final decisions (one respondent) and must fight for its position (one respondent). Notably, one (unprompted) respondent described that national mentality and consciousness are impacted by Slovenia's historical experience, particularly non-independence, indicating that Slovenia's self-image within the EU is indeed impacted by remembrance of the national past.


When describing Slovenia's EU-specific NRC, interviewees used numerous different labels (see Figure 4.2). The most frequently referenced were the bridge, co-operator, and subordinate (nine references each), followed by the inconsequential (eight references), the good worker (four references), the neutral, credible, good student, and implementor (three references each), balancer (two references), and lastly the mediator and reliable (one reference each).

[36] Miro Cerar, 'Uvodni Nagovor Ministra Za Zunanje Zadeve RS Dr. Mira Cerarja' (23. posvet slovenske diplomacije, Brdo pri Kranju, 23 April 2019), http://www.mzz.gov.si/fileadmin/pageuploads/foto/0114/Uvodni_nagovor_MZZ_dr._Cerar_posvet_VP.pdf.

[37] Cerar.

[38] Eight responses recorded.

Figure 4.2: Labels for Slovenia's auxiliary, EU-specific NRC



The Subordinate

While labels are indeed indicative of the general character of NRCs, they nonetheless overlap significantly. The first group of NRC labels—the inconsequential and subordinate—were jointly most frequently cited. Evidently, the concept of subjugation embedded not only in the master NRC but also in Slovenia's collective memory permeates descriptions of Slovenia's role within the EU, as evident in labels such as *the subordinate* or *the inconsequential*.

Implying Slovenia's subordinate role, Franc Bogovič (MEP, former delegate in the National Assembly) affirmed that historical experience of subjugation certainly influences ideas about Slovenia's engagement within the EU. Dr Repe explicitly characterised this influence, explaining that the EU accession process revealed Slovenia's marked "servility,"[39] which continues to characterise its role within the EU today. Grobovšek provided a different description of Slovenia's self-conceptualised role as "an orphan. Everyone is a member of some informal group that operates within the EU: the Balts, the Scandinavians, the Visegrads [*sic*] all have their own group, and so on. We, Slovenia, are the youngest, orphans who have no one."[40] He further credited Slovenia's self-conceptualised subordinate status within the EU

[39] Dr Božo Repe, interview with author, 19 March 2021. Translation by author.
[40] Bojan Grobovšek, interview with author, 18 March 2021. Translation by author.

to its historical experience in Communist Yugoslavia: "Culturally-civilisationally speaking [*sic*], the Berlin wall has not yet fallen. … People feel it. There is still the B Europe that was the B Europe even before the formation of the EU."[41] Dr Repe echoed this interpretation of the existence of a hierarchical status within the EU and explained that some Members remain highly pejorative vis-a-vis small and young states. He described that this attitude reinforces their existing anxieties and presented a caricatured illustration of interactions within the EU: "They [pejorative EU Members] say: 'Oh your English is so good, you are really wonderful,' but ignore whatever substantive you are saying. … This is a historically conditioned reflex of supremacy and arrogance. Unfortunately, a lot of it is preserved in politics."[42] Furthermore, Slovenia's subordinate NRC is softly echoed in the examined Declarations on Activities. The 2017-2018 Declaration on Activities, for example, states that Slovenia advocates for the EU's more consistent enforcement of the principle of equality of all Members and consequently supports further integration based on the community method,[43] thus implicitly conveying anxiety concerning biased or hierarchical intra-EU relations.

Some interviewees implied that Slovenia's EU-specific NRC is *the inconsequential*. Grobovšek, for instance, said that Brussels is "not particularly concerned with us."[44] Dr Jožef Kunič (former Ambassador to Iran and France) similarly described Slovenia as "*quantité négligeable*; thus, it is difficult to talk about any other, more serious role [in policymaking]."[45] Sušnik admitted that although Slovenia is a full and equal EU Member, "our positions are not taken into account."[46] Lastly, Dr Toplak argued that Slovenia is a "victim to its own self-conception of a powerless small nation."[47] The 2019-2020 Declaration on Activities reflects this point, stating: "we will continue to defend the respect for equality and solidarity of Member States as two key principles of the European integration process, and clear rules of the game which must hold for everyone equally."[48] Moreover, the same Declaration on Activities refers

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[41] Bojan Grobovšek, interview with author, 18 March 2021. Translation by author.

[42] Dr Božo Repe, interview with author, 19 March 2021. Translation by author.

[43] Deklaracija o usmeritvah za delovanje Republike Slovenije v institucijah Evropske unije v obdobju julij 2017–december 2018 (DeUDIEU1718), 2.

[44] Bojan Grobovšek, interview with author, 18 March 2021. Translation by author.

[45] Dr Jožef Kunič, interview with author, 15 March 2021. Translation by author.

[46] Janez Sušnik, interview with author, 31 March 2021. Translation by author.

[47] Dr Cirila Toplak, interview with author, 25 March 2021. Translation by author.

[48] Deklaracija o usmeritvah za delovanje Republike Slovenije v institucijah Evropske unije v obdobju januar 2019–junij 2020 (DeUDIEU1920), 1.

to findings of Slovenia's public consultations concerning the EU: that Slovenian citizens desire Slovenia's more significant influence within the EU.[49]

Some interviewees directly credited Slovenia's EU-specific subordinate NRC to its remembrance of the past of subjugation. Sušnik, for instance, described the perception that "since the Austro-Hungarian empire, Slovenians have always been in a subjugated position and are again … playing a subjugated role without any real influence and voice although EU Members all have a vote and, in some cases, decision-making needs to be 100% consensual."[50] Dr Cirila Toplak (professor of political theory – University of Ljubljana, former counsellor on European affairs to the President), too, revealed the importance of the remembrance of the past of subjugation for Slovenia's EU-specific NRC. She described that Slovenia's historically conditioned perception of the state as an alienated abstraction is projected onto Brussels, and illustrated how remembrance of the imperial past, specifically of distant authority, is invoked when national policymakers justify unpopular decisions. Moreover, Dr Toplak described Slovenia's NRC as a post-colony, explaining that inter-state relations within the EU are affected by remnants of colonial relations. Similarly, Peterle pointed out that particularly the left of the political spectrum frequently speaks of neo-colonialism. Dr Repe, too, described his opinion that remembrance of Slovenia's imperial existence whereby decision-making was delegated to the imperial centre propels the sentiment that Slovenia belongs in a larger political association where it would act as an executor of 'grand' policies decided by others and only act as a policymaker on "its own little field."[51] Dr Kunič similarly described that "many see the country's leadership as some sort of exploitative, not 'ours.' … The ruling have always been a sort of an opponent, may it be in Belgrade, Berlin, Rome, wherever. They were the ones that exploited us, that are against us. This element is still present, it has remained in Slovenian subconsciousness."[52]

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[49] Deklaracija o usmeritvah za delovanje Republike Slovenije v institucijah Evropske unije v obdobju januar 2019–junij 2020 (DeUDIEU1920), 3.

[50] Janez Sušnik, interview with author, 31 March 2021. Translation by author.

[51] Dr Božo Repe, interview with author, 19 March 2021. Translation by author.

[52] Dr Jožef Kunič, interview with author, 15 March 2021. Translation by author.

The Good Worker

The second group of NRC labels—the good student, good worker, and implementor—[53] resonates with Slovenia's self-conception as a 'successful Member,' as referenced in the Declaration, and denotes the idea that Slovenia's principal role is the accurate and speedy implementation of EU's policies. Bogovič, for instance, highlighted the presence of a cliché habit to "always listen to someone and act as a good executor of whatever someone tasked us with."[54] Dr Repe described how the sentiments of servility and mediocrity are in "Slovenian blood"[55] and described the tendency "to remain in the happy medium and be a good student."[56] Dr Toplak confirmed that diligence is strongly characteristic and indicated that Slovenia's 2021 Presidency of the Council of the EU will, just as in 2008, certainly be executed perfectly, as "the entire state administration will strive so that everything will be well-executed, and they will be praised for it."[57] Dr Bojinović Fenko, too, highlighted the notion of diligence and hard work as internalised in Slovenia's self-image, pointing out that it is "a historically determined role of the country. We used to be carpenters, horse keepers, or craftsmen within the Austro-Hungarian empire. We were very obedient, precise, …, but that is all. This is how the nation survived for centuries."[58]

The Credible Partner

Whereas interviewees generally recognised Slovenia's subordinate role, the third group of NRC labels—the co-operator, reliable, and the credible—reflects Slovenia's supportive role within the EU. Bogovič, for example, described how "in Brussels, our role is of a country with relatively moderate positions that is close to the core view on EU development."[59] When asked to define Slovenia's role in the EU, Grk described it as "responsible and trustworthy"[60] and explained that "we understand that we can only maximise our strengths by remaining responsible and trustworthy."[61] Similarly, Jerman emphasised that "for Slovenia, as for other

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[53] Bogovič, Dr Bojinović Fenko, Fajon, Dr Luthar, Dr Repe, Dr Toplak.
[54] Franc Bogovič, interview with author, 23 March 2021. Translation by author.
[55] Dr Božo Repe, interview with author, 19 March 2021. Translation by author.
[56] Dr Božo Repe, interview with author, 19 March 2021. Translation by author.
[57] Dr Cirila Toplak, interview with author, 25 March 2021. Translation by author.
[58] Dr Ana Bojinović Fenko, interview with author, 1 April 2021. Translation by author.
[59] Franc Bogovič, interview with author, 23 March 2021. Translation by author.
[60] Peter Grk, interview with author, 8 April 2021. Translation by author.
[61] Peter Grk, interview with author, 8 April 2021. Translation by author.

smaller countries, the absolute goal is to take joint steps, all together, not to take risks"[62] with independent actions. Dr Toplak, on the other hand, connected the reliable partner NRC with the implementor NRC, concurring that Slovenia's self-image is of a reliable partner on whom the EU can always count: "I am certain that until recently, Slovenia has been perceived by the EU ... as a reliable Member and partner that can be counted on to fulfil administrative assignments."[63] As Jerman, she emphasised that the EU's perception of Slovenia has mainly been the exact opposite of a rogue Member. Moreover, this NRC is also depicted in the Declaration, which characterises Slovenia's position within the EU "at the centre of a deepened and widened EU"[64] and emphasises the need for its "positive image."[65]

The Neutral

The last group of NRC labels—the bridge, mediator, neutral, and balancer—was frequently cited[66] in relation to both dynamics within the EU and between the EU and its neighbourhood. According to Grk, "maintaining a balance is something that Slovenia understands and strives to ensure within the EU by acting as a bridge among different interests."[67] Likewise, Peterle described the overall Slovenian NRC as a neutral Member: "Ljubljana is a wonderful destination for cooperation – it does not offer or impose an exclusionary model."[68] The 2019-2020 Declaration on Activities, too, reflects Slovenia's EU NRC of a balancer, stating that Slovenia will constructively contribute to preventing the deepening of differences and divisions within the EU.[69]

The external dimension of Slovenia's balancing NRC, especially relating to the Western Balkans, was reiterated by multiple interviewees. Peterle described Slovenia as a fundamentally neutral partner whose role is not to support either side. Bogovič stated that concerning the issue of the Western Balkans, Slovenia's role is one of balancing and

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[62] Boštjan Jerman, interview with author, 30 March 2021. Translation by author.

[63] Dr Cirila Toplak, interview with author, 25 March 2021. Translation by author.

[64] Declaration on Foreign Policy of the Republic of Slovenia (DeZPRS-1).

[65] Declaration on Foreign Policy of the Republic of Slovenia (DeZPRS-1).

[66] Bogovič, Dr Bojinović Fenko, Fajon, Grk, Grobovšek, Jerman, Dr Kunič, Peterle, Dr Toplak.

[67] Peter Grk, interview with author, 8 April 2021. Translation by author.

[68] Alojz Peterle, interview with author, 22 March 2021. Translation by author.

[69] Deklaracija o usmeritvah za delovanje Republike Slovenije v institucijah Evropske unije v obdobju januar 2019–junij 2020 (DeUDIEU1920), 2.

neutralising positions of certain other EU Members, namely Croatia. Dr Toplak, on the other hand, said that Slovenia perceived its role within the EU as a possible "mentor"[70] to the Western Balkan countries on their path towards the EU. Likewise, the Declaration (geopolitically) defines Slovenia as a "Central European and Mediterranean country, lying at the heart of the Alpine-Adriatic-Danube region and at the meeting point between the Western Europe and the Western Balkans,"[71] as well as defines one of Slovenia's FP objectives as "increasing Slovenia's presence in the Western Balkans"[72] and "actively supporting the enlargement of the European Union."[73] This reflects Slovenia's self-conceived function in the EU, particularly in relation to the Western Balkans, as a neutral party, balancer, or a bridge. The Strategy, too, details Slovenia's EU-specific NRC as promoting EU enlargement and enhanced cooperation with the Western Balkans,[74] which "offers an important platform for Slovenia to maintain its position as a political, economic and development *partner* and *adviser* to the region."[75] More explicitly, the Strategy defines Slovenia's "well-established"[76] role vis-à-vis the Western Balkans as its "true friend"[77] and "liaison"[78] with the EU. The examined Declarations on Activities also devote significant attention to the region, which affirms Slovenia's ambition to ensure sufficient EU's attention to the region,[79] and describe its role as a supporter in the region's progress toward the EU.[80]

Summarising the described multiplicity of EU-specific NRCs invoked by multiple sources is the following statement by FM Cerar:[81]

> … for fifteen years we have been full members, and for the large part of this time also a successful and responsible Member State. However, if we want to be among 'the best in the classroom,' we must realise that we are no longer in elementary

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[70] Dr Cirila Toplak, interview with author, 25 March 2021. Translation by author.

[71] Declaration on Foreign Policy of the Republic of Slovenia (DeZPRS-1).

[72] Declaration on Foreign Policy of the Republic of Slovenia (DeZPRS-1).

[73] Declaration on Foreign Policy of the Republic of Slovenia (DeZPRS-1).

[74] 'Slovenia: Safe, Successful, Globally Respected', 16, 22.

[75] 'Slovenia: Safe, Successful, Globally Respected', 22. Emphasis added.

[76] 'Slovenia: Safe, Successful, Globally Respected', 22.

[77] 'Slovenia: Safe, Successful, Globally Respected', 24.

[78] 'Slovenia: Safe, Successful, Globally Respected', 4.

[79] Deklaracija o usmeritvah za delovanje Republike Slovenije v institucijah Evropske unije v letu 2015 (DeUDIEU15); Deklaracija o usmeritvah za delovanje Republike Slovenije v institucijah Evropske unije v obdobju januar 2016–junij 2017 (DeUDIEU1617).

[80] Deklaracija o usmeritvah za delovanje Republike Slovenije v institucijah Evropske unije v obdobju julij 2017–december 2018 (DeUDIEU1718); Deklaracija o usmeritvah za delovanje Republike Slovenije v institucijah Evropske unije v obdobju januar 2019–junij 2020 (DeUDIEU1920).

[81] Cerar, 'Uvodni Nagovor Ministra Za Zunanje Zadeve RS Dr. Mira Cerarja'.

school but in university. If we want to remain in the core of the most interrelated countries [in the EU] … we must switch into a higher gear…

Assessing Slovenia's National Role Conception

As the above analysis of primary data has revealed, the relational motif of subjugation, deeply embedded in Slovenia's collective memory, permeates both its global and EU-specific NRC. The global NRC labelled the subjugated, serf, victim, and exploited, reflects this motif most evidently. In contrast, Slovenia's auxiliary, EU-specific NRC is supplemented by notions of responsibility and neutrality that alter Slovenia's self-conception within the EU from being purely subordinate, endowing it instead with some agency. However, more instructive than simply nominal labels for the described NRCs is their assessment according to the three essential characteristics set forth in the theoretical argument: mode of association, mode of action, and confidence (see Figure 4.3). Examination of the master NRC reveals that it is cooperative, passive, and of low confidence. Likewise, analysis of the auxiliary, EU-specific NRC reveals that it is principally cooperative, passive, and of low confidence. The exception is the *bridge, balancer, neutral, or mediator* auxiliary NRC, which pertains specifically to Slovenia's role of integrating the Western Balkans into the EU. This aspect of the auxiliary NRC is also cooperative but somewhat more proactive and of high confidence. It is also conditioned by collective memory; Slovenia's experience within Yugoslavia not only makes it uniquely competent to impact EU-Western Balkans relations, but its former position as the most successful republic of SFRY leads to its self-image of exceptionalism and therefore higher confidence vis-à-vis other former republics.

Figure 4.3: Characteristics of Slovenia's NRCs


<table>
<tr><th>NRC type:</th><th>Mode of association:</th><th>Mode of action:</th><th>Status perception:</th></tr>
<tr><td>Global NRC</td><td rowspan="3">Cooperative</td><td rowspan="2">Passive</td><td rowspan="2">Low</td></tr>
<tr><td>EU-specific NRC</td></tr>
<tr><td>EU-specific NRC
vis-à-vis the Western Balkans</td><td>Proactive</td><td>High</td></tr>
</table>

REMEMBRANCE OF SUBJUGATION AND FOREIGN POLICYMAKING

Remembrance of historical subjugation in various power-sharing systems undoubtedly shapes Slovenia's self-conceived position and role within the EU as a social sphere. How, then, do historically conditioned self-images of the subordinate, the good worker, the credible partner, or the neutral manifest in Slovenia's behavioural patterns in international contexts?

Questionnaire respondents mostly agreed with the claim that Slovenia's historical experiences influence its FP behaviour, whereby only one respondent disagreed (five were neutral) (see Figure 4.4). Of the main historical events or periods upon which Slovenia's collective remembrance is focused, both MFA and non-MFA respondents viewed Slovenia's experience in Yugoslavia and secession as most influential. Slovenia's experience during World War II and territorial conflicts were also deemed to have some influence on FP behaviour (in both cases, five respondents agreed, two were neutral, and five disagreed). Slovenia's experience in the Austro-Hungarian empire, however, was not deemed as significant (six respondents were neutral, whereas two agreed and four disagreed).

Figure 4.4: To what extent do you agree with the following statements?



When describing how Slovenia's historical experiences influence foreign policymaking behaviour, respondents reported the lack of a FP apparatus, which is still being developed, the fact that Slovenia's 'youth' conditions its desire to define a position on *all* international questions and the consequent dispersion of FP focus, the general (lack of) expertise and experience, as well as the absence of a long tradition of self-governance. One respondent described their view that the Yugoslav legacy continues to substantially and excessively characterise Slovenia, whereas its experience in Austro-Hungarian empire is not influential *enough*, even though it left a much more significant cultural mark. One respondent referred to an example of relations between Slovenia and Italy and the symbolic political gestures of reconciliation in recent years but said that history should be left to historians, remaining outside of the purview of politics. Two respondents emphasised the influence of history on foreign policymaking concerning specific issues, for instance, the right to self-determination, as well as concerning bilateral relations with former SFRY republics and parts of the Austro-Hungarian empire.

Explicitly considering the influence of Slovenia's historical subjugation, however, responses were less coherent; five respondents recognised its influence on FP behaviour, two were undecided, but five disagreed. Notably, responses diverged according to institutional affiliation: whereas MFA employees mostly disagreed, non-MFA respondents agreed with the statement that Slovenia's historical subjugation affects FP behaviour. Five respondents explained that it produces a hands-off approach and the expectation that someone else will get the job done, precludes an assertive stance because of the unwillingness to act independently even where interests demand it, and exaggerates the focus on alliances at the expense of expressing national positions. One respondent saw a connection through the burden of servility, which inhibits rational consideration and understanding of specific FP strategies, and yet another emphasised the creation of own national identity. Two respondents, however, claimed that this influence is not extensive and instead emphasised Slovenia's smallness and its objective, material capabilities as more critical.

It is undeniable that collective remembrance, particularly of the past of co-opted subjugation, influences national self-image and foreign policymaking behaviour and, by extension, Europeanisation of foreign policymaking of EU Members. The following section investigates how Slovenia's Europeanisation of foreign policymaking reflects this influence of


remembrance on state demeanour and engagement in policy formulation and decision-making regarding the EU's external affairs, examining both the extent and type of Europeanisation of foreign policymaking.

EUROPEANISATION OF FOREIGN POLICYMAKING

The Extent of the Europeanisation of Foreign Policymaking

Slovenia's EU-specific NRC dictates its behaviour in and engagement with EU institutions and EU Members throughout policymaking processes, thus affecting the extent to which Slovenia's foreign policymaking is Europeanised. The questionnaire asked participants to assess the extent of FP Europeanisation, and the results reveal respondents' belief that Slovenia's foreign policy(making) is fairly Europeanised,[82] but that it is not more Europeanised than that of other EU Members (see Figure 4.5).[83]

Figure 4.5: To what extent do you agree with the following statements?



Some interviewees directly assessed the extent of foreign policymaking Europeanisation; Grobovšek concluded that it is "fairly Europeanised"[84] and Grk that it "cannot be anything but

[82] Five of twelve respondents agreed, five were neutral, and two disagreed.
[83] Seven of twelve respondents were neutral and five disagreed.
[84] Bojan Grobovšek, interview with author, 18 March 2021. Translation by author.

Europeanised."[85] Furthermore, Jerman described both direct and indirect Europeanisation, specifying direct, procedural Europeanisation evident in Slovenia's unfaltering initial consideration of EU's existing positions on international matters and indirect Europeanisation of Slovenia's behaviour in its bilateral relations.

To indirectly evaluate the extent of the Europeanisation of foreign policymaking, I investigate the following characteristics of a truly Europeanised FP: it chiefly pursues national FP aims through collective EU action (namely CFSP), subscribes positively to the EU's FP values, takes EU positions as a significant referencing point, and does not defect from common positions even when expedient.[86]

Firstly, although Slovenia's national FP and CFSP are intimately related, just how important is CFSP? As institutional sources reveal, CFSP is the principal framework upon which Slovenia devises and through which it enacts its national FP. The Strategy establishes the importance of CFSP as follows: "drawing on *lessons learned in the past,* Slovenia is aware of the importance of establishing in the [EU] a strong [CFSP] and a strong [CSDP]. Slovenia's history and geopolitical situation contribute to the benefits that Slovenia can offer in this regard."[87] Furthermore, it affirms that the EU strengthens Slovenia's voice globally, that Slovenia co-constructs and pursues its FP interests through CFSP, as well as that CFSP and EEAS critically ensure "that Slovenia is well-informed of, keeps pace with, and participates in, current global developments."[88] Similarly, in his 2020 address to the Consultation of Slovenian Diplomacy, FM Dr Logar explicitly affirmed that the EU (and NATO) is the "key pillar of Slovenian foreign policy and diplomacy."[89]

Somewhat contrarily, questionnaire responses[90] showcase respondents' reluctance to emphasise CFSP's significance and divergent views according to their institutional affiliation. Whereas MFA respondents deemed interests most important, followed by norms, party political interests, CFSP, FP of specific EU Members, and lastly the civil society, non-MFA

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[85] Peter Grk, interview with author, 8 April 2021. Translation by author.

[86] Wong and Hill, *National and European Foreign Policies*, 211.

[87] 'Slovenia: Safe, Successful, Globally Respected', 15. Emphasis added.


[88] 'Slovenia: Safe, Successful, Globally Respected', 25.

[89] Anže Logar, 'Press Conference' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia, 9 September 2020), https://www.gov.si/en/news/2020-09-09-minister-dr-logar-we-will-implement-a-more-confident-agile-and-active-foreign-policy/.

[90] Total of nine valid responses: two by senior officials of Slovenia's Parliament, seven by MFA employees.

respondents ranked CFSP as most important. Synthesising such polar responses reveals only a small influence of specific EU Members' FP and civil society, whereas interests, party political interests, and CFSP are the crucial determining factors. Moreover, respondents most frequently disagreed with the statement that Slovenia mostly pursues its FP through CFSP (six of twelve) and that it relies on CFSP more than other EU Members (four of twelve) (see Figure 4.6).

Figure 4. 6: To what extent do you agree with the following statements?




Peculiarly, questionnaire results were contradicted in multiple interviews with FP experts and practitioners[91] who reaffirmed CFSP's significance for Slovenia's national FP, though some opinions diverged on the exact magnitude of its importance. Grk described CFSP as "key"[92] for Slovenia's FP, crediting it with maximising Slovenia's external interests and providing a frame through which Slovenia can most practically and efficiently express its ideas and interests to the international community. Simultaneously, however, he joked that a five second definition of CFSP is "no common, no security, no policy, everything foreign [*sic*],"[93] and explained that Slovenia still leads an independent FP with specific interests which coincide with EU's norms and interest, but which Slovenia pursues bilaterally. Likewise, Peterle highlighted that Slovenia's pursuit of FP interests through CFSP is not the only pathway and that Slovenia pursues a part of its interests through CFSP, to the extent the EU treaties and political allow. Nonetheless, interviewees reiterated CFSP' primacy in Slovenia's foreign

[91] Bogovič, Grk, Dr Grošelj, Jerman, Dr Kunič, Peterle, Dr Toplak.
[92] Peter Grk, interview with author, 8 April 2021. Translation by author.
[93] Peter Grk, interview with author, 8 April 2021. Translation by author.

policymaking.[94] Dr Kunič stressed that "for Slovenia's foreign policy, CFSP is absolutely and undoubtedly essential,"[95] and Dr Toplak reiterated the primacy of CFSP by asserting that since joining the EU, Slovenia does not actually *have* a national FP of its own.

Secondly, how closely does Slovenia's national foreign policy(making) subscribe to EU's FP values? Albeit reluctant to explicitly assess Slovenia's FP as Europeanised, questionnaire respondents overwhelmingly agreed with the claim that Slovenia's FP interests and values are aligned with those of the EU (see Figure 4.7).[96]

Figure 4.7: To what extent do you agree with the following statements?



Lastly, how coherent is Slovenia's FP vis-à-vis CFSP? Slovenia's index of voting cohesion with the EU majority at UNGA's 71st, 72nd, and 73rd sessions (2015-2018) is an imperfect measure of Slovenia's FP coherence and Europeanisation.[97] Of 416 resolutions adopted with a vote, Slovenia and the EU majority cast identical votes on 410 occasions, casting a solidarity vote in only six instances.[98] Slovenia's 2015-2018 IVC with the EU majority was 99.28, indicating near-perfect voting cohesion and highly Europeanised foreign policymaking.

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[94] Bogovič, Dr Grošelj, Jerman, Dr Kunič, Dr Toplak.

[95] Dr Jožef Kunič, interview with author, 15 March 2021. Translation by author.

[96] Eleven of twelve respondents agreed that Slovenia's foreign policy norms are aligned with the EU's foreign policy norms, and one was neutral. Eight of twelve respondents agreed that Slovenia's foreign policy interests are aligned with the EU's foreign policy interests, three were neutral, and one disagreed.

[97] Refer to Annex II for more information on IVC and its calculation.
Database for the voting records: Voeten, Erik; Strezhnev, Anton; Bailey, Michael, 2009, "United Nations General Assembly Voting Data", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/LEJUQZ, Harvard Dataverse, V27, UNF:6:d0mGNR+Qja/nNTgUCC5xAA== [fileUNF].


[98] These votes related to Palestine (R/69/320), nuclear disarmament (R/70/34), humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons (R/70/34 and R/71/46), and armament and ammunitions containing depleted uranium (R/71/70 and R/73/38).

Based on the key function of CFSP in Slovenia's external relations, the congruence of Slovenia's and EU's FP values and interests, and the high voting cohesion, it can be concluded that Slovenia's foreign policymaking is highly Europeanised.

Type of Europeanisation of Foreign Policymaking

To determine the type of Slovenia's Europeanisation of foreign policymaking, I examine the directionality of Europeanisation along the vertical dimension and Slovenia's policymaking behaviour specifically during CFSP formulation. The questionnaire asked respondents to define the process of CFSP formulation and the directionality of Europeanisation between the EU and national level (see Figure 4.8). Respondents described the process of CFSP formulation as a top-down (seven of twelve) or horizontal (five of twelve) process. In contrast, they described Slovenia's participation as horizontal (five of eleven), top-down (four of eleven), or bottom-up (two of eleven). Of those who described CFSP formulation as horizontal, four also described Slovenia's participation as horizontal, indicating that policymaking occurs exclusively on the EU level, among EU Members, and not interactively between the EU and national level. Of those describing CFSP formulation of vertical, however, all indicated it is a top-down, not bottom-up process. Furthermore, when clarifying Slovenia's engagement with this top-down process, one respondent described it as horizontal, two as bottom-up (uploading), and three as top-down (downloading).[99]


Figure 4.8: Choose an answer you agree with most.



[99] One respondent did not answer the question on Slovenia's participation in the formulation of CFSP.

Questionnaire respondents similarly provided insights into Slovenia's behaviour during decision-making in FAC (see Figure 4.9). As expected, results reveal that Slovenia almost always agrees with decisions adopted in FAC. Sometimes, Slovenian policymakers adopt their positions on issues to be decided only after consulting with other EU Members, but it is rarer that they change their position after said consultations. When asked about Slovenia's behaviour when faced with a FAC decision it disagrees with, respondents reported that it more frequently does *not* use the veto. In comparison with other EU Members with similar material capabilities, respondents reported that Slovenia is somewhat less active and uses its veto powers and right to initiative slightly less frequently.

Figure 4. 9: How often does the below scenario occur? (1 – never; 2 – rarely; 3 – sometimes, 4 – often; 5 – almost always; 6 – always)



When asked to name Slovenia's role during CFSP formulation, six (of twelve) questionnaire respondents labelled it as a co-operator, two as a follower, two as a supporter, one as an honest broker/mediator, one as an independent, and one as a bridge.[100] One respondent further clarified

[100] Of twelve respondents, one marked two answers (co-operator and bridge) which were both counted.

that in foreign affairs, Slovenia's behaviour is not so much characterised by ensuring its FP interests are adequately reflected but rather by following the adopted common strategies. Most interviewees'[101] depictions of Slovenia's participation in EU-level foreign policymaking, too, reflect a practice of observing the EU's and other Members' cues. Dr Bojinović Fenko affirmed Slovenia's reliance on downloading as "normal and clear top-down transfer, whereby Slovenia does not form a particular interest except for participating in the collective interest of the EU."[102] Even more so, she said Slovenia does not pursue other specific FP goals in a way that would enact change, but instead reacts to international developments. More specifically, she described "that Slovenia *follows, and follows, and follows,* and will continue to follow the EU's umbrella policy,"[103] and illustrated by describing MFA's reorganisation in accordance with the European Commission's structuring of directorates general and CFSP. Among others,[104] Dr Grošelj concurred that Slovenia "*follows* the mainstream of EU's foreign policy."[105] Dr Kunič similarly insisted that "CFSP is what Slovenia must *follow*, with which it should stick,"[106] described Slovenia's role is "of a follower"[107] of what is previously agreed upon in Brussels and explained his belief that Slovenia's FP positions are largely formed after decision-making at the EU level. Although CFSP sometimes offers a "sour apple"[108] which requires Slovenia to purchase certain weapons or engage with some "leftover"[109] missions without any direct benefit, he admitted, it nonetheless offers indirect benefits by allowing Slovenia to be interconnected within the international community.

When detailing the process of determining national positions on FP issues, Jerman explained: "when we consider certain broader international issues and the external community expects us to specify our position, we always first investigate what the EU has said so far, what its position was, and what substantive arguments it offered."[110] Bogovič similarly explained that Slovenia only rarely develops its own positions on global issues (concerning north Africa or the Middle

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[101] Bogovič, Dr Bojinović Fenko, Fajon, Grobovšek, Dr Grošelj, Jerman, Dr Kunič, Maučec, Sušnik, Dr Toplak.
[102] Dr Ana Bojinović Fenko, interview with author, 1 April 2021. Translation by author.
[103] Dr Ana Bojinović Fenko, interview with author, 1 April 2021. Translation by author. Emphasis added
[104] Dr Bojinović Fenko, Fajon, Jerman, Dr Kunič, Dr Luthar, Peterle, Sušnik, Dr Toplak.
[105] Dr Klemen Grošelj, interview with author, 8 April 2021. Translation by author. Emphasis added.
[106] Dr Jožef Kunič, interview with author, 15 March 2021. Translation by author. Emphasis added.
[107] Dr Jožef Kunič, interview with author, 15 March 2021. Translation by author.
[108] Dr Jožef Kunič, interview with author, 15 March 2021. Translation by author.
[109] Dr Jožef Kunič, interview with author, 15 March 2021. Translation by author.
[110] Boštjan Jerman, interview with author, 30 March 2021. Translation by author.

East, for example) and instead more or less "yields"[111] to the majority EU positions. A similar portrayal of Slovenia's engagement in foreign policymaking as 'yielding' was shared by two additional interviewees.[112] Following her assertion that since its accession Slovenia has lacked its own, national FP, Dr Toplak explained that Slovenia very rarely acts as a soloist in its foreign affairs and instead adopts general orientations particularly of the most influential EU Members. Additionally, Jerman described how Slovenia strives to "avoid unpredictable behaviour"[113] and (with the exception of a certain policy areas, namely the Western Balkans) mostly "monitors, comments."[114] Jerman's characterisation of Slovenia's foreign policymaking engagement as "benign, without reservations,"[115] was also shared by Dr Bojinović Fenko and Peterle. Despite general agreement that Slovenia principally downloads, however, Peterle was reluctant to characterise it exclusively as such and provided a more neutral view, stating that "we follow the European framework and simultaneously our interests, which the [EU treaties] allow. We try to co-formulate the main stream and do not take positions that do not lead to this."[116]

Sources of Downloading

The aforementioned evidence leads to the conclusion that Slovenia's participation in CFSP policymaking is primarily a top-down process whereby FP decisions are made on and transposed from the EU to the national level, and that Slovenia does not make use of the competencies that facilitate upward projection of its national interests. This crystalises as following the EU's (Members') lead, rather than substantively and proactively contributing to policy formulation. The Europeanisation of Slovenia's foreign policymaking hence clearly occurs through downloading. *Why* is this so?

Interviewees most frequently credited Slovenia's Europeanisation through downloading to the lack of influence in the EU,[117] describing specifically that Slovenia cannot substantively

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[111] Franc Bogovič, interview with author, 23 March 2021. Translation by author.
[112] Dr Bojinović Fenko, Sušnik.
[113] Boštjan Jerman, interview with author, 30 March 2021. Translation by author.
[114] Boštjan Jerman, interview with author, 30 March 2021. Translation by author.
[115] Boštjan Jerman, interview with author, 30 March 2021. Translation by author.
[116] Alojz Peterle, interview with author, 22 March 2021. Translation by author.
[117] Grobovšek, Dr Kunič, Maučec, Peterle, Sušnik, Dr Toplak.


influence EU-level decision-making in CFSP to the extent as other EU Members.[118] Grobovšek claimed that Slovenia can only have a minor say but does not even take this limited opportunity. While recognising Slovenia's potential to provide smart suggestions or name individuals to important positions, Dr Kunič nevertheless concluded that "the idea, that Slovenia could play any important role [in policymaking], is illusory."[119] Moreover, he explained that "Slovenia can only have an influence on its close neighbours, or only parts of its neighbours. Anything else would be very difficult."[120] Peterle, too, implied Slovenia's limited influence: "I think there is a sufficient basis for confident politics, but I would not over-assert [oneself], as it is good to know that other criteria, not only the quality of ideas and initiatives, are at play in this arena."[121] Based on his professional experience in Relex, Jerman described similar challenges in asserting Slovenia's influence: "how can I then put myself on the map when there are three caveats for every point?"[122] In his view, Slovenia is consequently "not effective enough and sometimes even acts as a bystander."[123] In his 2020 address to the Consultation of Slovenian Diplomats, FM Logar similarly regretted Slovenia's FP behaviour as a "passive bystander"[124] and expressed his wish for its return "onto the diplomatic map."[125]

Questionnaire respondents agreed that Slovenia's influence potential in CFSP formation is limited. Results indicate that respondents do not believe that CFSP reflects Slovenian policymakers' opinions, but somewhat agree with the statement that Slovenia can influence CFSP to the same extent as other EU Members. Interestingly, when asked about how Slovenian citizens perceive Slovenia's foreign policymaking, respondents conveyed a more negative picture, indicating that Slovenian citizens would not think Slovenia able to influence CFSP, nor would they perceive CFSP as adequately reflective of Slovenian interests (see Figure 4.10). Two respondents highlighted that one of Slovenia's main challenges is precisely the ineffective promotion of national interest, especially when discordant with other EU Members' positions.

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[118] Grobovšek, Dr Kunič, Maučec, Dr Toplak, Dr Bojinović Fenko.
[119] Dr Jožef Kunič, interview with author, 15 March 2021. Translation by author.
[120] Dr Jožef Kunič, interview with author, 15 March 2021. Translation by author.
[121] Alojz Peterle, interview with author, 22 March 2021. Translation by author.
[122] Boštjan Jerman, interview with author, 30 March 2021. Translation by author.
[123] Boštjan Jerman, interview with author, 30 March 2021. Translation by author.
[124] Logar, 'Press Conference'.
[125] Logar.

Figure 4.10: To what extent do you agree with the following statements? (1 - completely disagree; 5 - completely agree)



Several interviewees and questionnaire respondents cited size as the main cause of Slovenia's influence deficiency. Respondents most frequently agreed with the claim that Slovenia's smallness constraints the pursuit of its external goals,[126] though on average they tended to view smallness less as a constraint. Dr Toplak agreed that small EU Members with comparable resources tend to be passive in CFSP's formulation and Dr Bojinović Fenko admitted that it clearly not expected that Slovenia would participate as extensively as France or Germany. Yet, many interviewees[127] do not credit limited material resources as the single cause of Slovenia's downloading behaviour but more frequently assign the reasons elsewhere. When addressing the 2019 Consultation of Slovenian Diplomats, FM Cerar indicated precisely that, stating that Slovenia ought to compensate for its smallness through skilled, expert diplomacy.[128]

In comparison to uploading, Europeanisation through downloading is more passive, requires less exertion, strategizing, and confidence. Whilst reliance on downloading is partly preconditioned (e.g., by size), it also results from (sub)conscious beliefs about state behaviour in the international arena. Collective remembrance of the past of subjugation and the resulting self-image as crucial determinants of Slovenia's enactment of its self-conceptualised role in the EU hence critically inform foreign policymaking Europeanisation through downloading.

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[126] Five of twelve respondents agreed, three were neutral, and four disagreed.

[127] Fajon, Gašparič, Grk, Jerman, Maučec, Peterle, Sušnik.

[128] Cerar, 'Uvodni Nagovor Ministra Za Zunanje Zadeve RS Dr. Mira Cerarja'.

Both central causes of downloading—as expressed by questionnaire respondents and interviewees alike—are the *absence of diplomatic and foreign policymaking tradition* and the *lack of confidence*, which are both historically conditioned.

Absence of Diplomatic Tradition

The absence of a rich diplomatic and FP tradition that would facilitate more assertive foreign policymaking behaviour importantly affects not only Slovenia's tangible capacity but also belief in its ability to influence CFSP. Because of the recent independence and historically minuscule participation in foreign affairs, such foreign policy and diplomatic mechanisms have not developed until fairly recently, yet the legacy of their absence in policymakers' collective remembrance persists. The collective memory of co-opted subjugation, specifically themes of imposed imperial policies (e.g., territorial separations) and exclusion from international decision-making, in fact heightens the inexperience of a young FP apparatus. It imbues it with historical anxieties of foreign political disqualification, thus perpetuating the servile behaviour of the past.

The absence of a diplomatic and FP tradition was reported by questionnaire respondents and interviewees.[129] Both credited this deficiency to Slovenia's historical experience, particularly non-independence, and described its manifestations in the underdeveloped FP and diplomatic apparatus, loosely articulated national interests and FP strategy, and lack of professionalism. Dr Kunič ascribed Slovenia's downloading to the lack of diplomatic and FP tradition and pointed to the absence of a strong, professional FP apparatus and "finesse"[130] which would facilitate uploading behaviour. Also recognising Slovenia's lack of influence and consequent downloading behaviour, Sušnik warned: "if we do not know how to explain and justify our votes, then it is all for nothing. Having some general comments will take us nowhere. … Expert groups, experienced in all fields, must be formed at home. Only then can Slovenia, despite its smallness, be elevated to the level of those counterparts that matter in Europe."[131]

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[129] Bogovič, Dr Bojinović Fenko, Fajon, Dr Grošelj, Jerman, Dr Kunič, Maučec, Sušnik, Dr Toplak.
[130] Dr Jožef Kunič, interview with author, 15 March 2021. Translation by author.
[131] Janez Sušnik, interview with author, 31 March 2021. Translation by author.

Dr Toplak further elaborated this lack of a diplomatic tradition and reminded that substantive and assertive foreign policymaking requires much more independent deliberation because it is, after all, based on national interest. She identified that Slovenia's problem is the lack of defined national interests which would allow for the "construction of a lasting, credible, and realistic foreign policy strategy."[132] Moreover, Dr Toplak explained that "Slovenia certainly does not have the logistical and political power to influence key decisions,"[133] nor does it, for lack of social capital, engage with other informal settings in which the foundations for decision-making are often laid. Dr Grošelj, too, described how "Slovenia does not know how to operationalise"[134] FP constructs such as CFSP, nor does it have its own clear positions which results in confused and inconsistent FP. He critiqued the Strategy for being unfocused, serving no other purpose than simply having one. Bogovič similarly explained that Slovenia's engagement with the EU is not serious enough: "we do not realise that [the EU] is our community where we can pursue many interests. You have to be present and take a position of co-creating."[135] Tanja Fajon (MEP, party leader of Social Democrats) similarly referenced the lack of focus and (domestic) coordination concerning FP priorities that result from domestic, historically conditioned disagreements and, in consequence, precludes any foreign policymaking behaviour other than downloading. In Dr Bojinović Fenko's view, Slovenia's passivity during FP formation precludes substantive contributions to CFSP-formation, leading instead to acceptance and adaptation to reached decisions. Whilst FP specialisation for particular fields would allow for substantive contributions, such specialisation was not pursued. Even more importantly, "there was no consideration of what Slovenia's contribution of the CFSP *could* be."[136] Dr Bojinović Fenko concluded that specialisation is "the way in which we could contribute and is the way in which countries, which have in practice long led their foreign affairs and have centuries of experience of foreign policy management, do so. We are still learning."[137]

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
[132] Dr Toplak, interview with author, 25 March 2021. Translation by author.
[133] Dr Toplak, interview with author, 25 March 2021. Translation by author.
[134] Dr Klemen Grošelj, interview with author, 8 April 2021. Translation by author.
[135] Franc Bogovič, interview with author, 23 March 2021. Translation by author.
[136] Dr Ana Bojinović Fenko, interview with author, 1 April 2021. Translation by author. Emphasis added.
[137] Dr Ana Bojinović Fenko, interview with author, 1 April 2021. Translation by author.

Lack of Confidence

Slovenia's lack of confidence is an additional determinant of its influence deficiency and consequent downloading behaviour in the EU's foreign policymaking. The lack of confidence, too, is intimately related with collective remembrance of the past of co-opted subjugation, particularly its servility and subordination motifs manifest in Slovenia's self-image.

Questionnaire respondents (see Figure 4.11) indicate that Slovenia's FP behaviour is not particularly confident. Instead, respondents primarily perceive Slovenia to be unassertive in pursuit of its FP interests. Notably, non-MFA respondents reported Slovenia's FP behaviour as less confident and less assertive than MFA-affiliated respondents. In comparison with other EU Members with similar capabilities, respondents perceived Slovenia as similarly or somewhat less assertive.

Figure 4.11: To what extent do you agree with the following statements? (1 - completely disagree, 5 - completely agree)



Six of eight questionnaire respondents agreed that Slovenia's past of non-independence significantly affects its confidence, and one respondent specifically referenced the "burden of servility" in foreign policymaking. Another respondent described how history precluded the development of national confidence because long integration into political frameworks did not allow for the development and pursuit of own political goals. They emphasised that such uncertainty has persisted despite some progress. While not rejecting the influence of

remembrance of subjugation, however, two respondents argued that this influence is weaker in comparison with other factors.

This lack of confidence was (directly and indirectly) reaffirmed by as many as thirteen interviewees.[138] According to Dr Kunič, the lack of confidence characterises Slovenian politics at large and the confidence someone from Luxembourg may have—despite it being a small country—will not be developed instantaneously. He saw its cause in Slovenia's historical subjugation, lack of a tradition of statehood, as well as a deeply rooted perception of political leadership as the exploitative Other: "the rulers have always been opponents, may it be in Belgrade, Berlin, or Rome. … They exploited us, were against us. This element is still present, it is preserved in Slovenian subconsciousness."[139] Dr Gašparič, too, described how Slovenian society at large experiences "fear about [its] position and status in some broader grouping,"[140] concluding that "we are a nation of serfs because we do not know how to asserts ourselves in multinational formations."[141] Fajon similarly described that although membership in international organisations strengthened Slovenia's confidence, the experience of subjugation left deep marks in the political sphere and still manifests itself in Slovenia's lack of confidence and assertiveness.

Jerman also described Slovenia's behaviour in policymaking, namely lower confidence and assertiveness, as a legacy of SFRY's balancing as a non-aligned nation, which did not require "assertiveness or aggressive lobbying"[142] on the international stage but rather indicated a peripheral position. He situated Slovenia's lack of confidence within Slovenian 'national character,' which guides foreign policymakers' avoidance of anything that would cause someone to resent or disfavour Slovenia, thus unavoidably complicating policymaking within the EU. Grk agreed that low confidence and the worldview that "others are always better than us"[143] may be a Slovenian national characteristic in the sense that Slovenia does not assert itself as openly and confidently as it could, which decreases its opportunity to nurture necessary social capital to maximise national influence within the EU. When asked whether differences

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[138] Bogovič, Fajon, Dr Gašparič, Grk, Grobovšek, Dr Grošelj, Jerman, Dr Kunič, Maučec, Peterle, Dr Repe, Sušnik, Dr Toplak.
[139] Dr Jožef Kunič, interview with author, 15 March 2021. Translation by author.
[140] Dr Jure Gašparič, interview with author, 16 March 2021. Translation by author.
[141] Dr Jure Gašparič, interview with author, 16 March 2021. Translation by author.
[142] Boštjan Jerman, interview with author, 30 March 2021. Translation by author.
[143] Peter Grk, interview with author, 8 April 2021. Translation by author.

in behaviour of national representatives are noticeable in his work in Relex, Jerman illustrated:[144]

> During discussions, we sometimes ask for clarifications. However, unavoidably the respondent will not answer all questions. … He will always leave someone out and first respond to Germany or France, not small countries like Cyprus, Malta, and Slovenia. My point is that if they do that to Spain, the Spanish representative will raise his hand and ask for clarifications again. I rarely ask a second time. Never the third time.

Slovenia's remembrance of difficulties experienced in multinational polities, namely the exaggerated Germanisation pressures in Austro-Hungarian empire or Serb hegemony in SFRY, as well as overall collective memory of co-opted subjugation condition a persistent lack of confidence. This manifests itself in Slovenia's engagement in the EU more broadly and EU-level foreign policymaking more specifically. When describing Slovenia's confidence, Grk concluded by referencing FM Logar's declaration to implement "a more confident, agile, and active foreign policy,"[145] and "rejuvenate Slovenian diplomacy."[146] The recognition that Slovenia's FP is hesitant and ought to be more confident was shared with FM Logar's predecessor FM Cerar, who in 2019 described his view that, having fulfilled independence so long ago, "we must be confident, and our voice must be heard clearly. Our positions need to be expressed clearly and we must never be afraid, even when engaging with the largest countries."[147]

Uploading: the Western Balkans

In a 2019 interview, FM Cerar described Slovenia's "active"[148] engagement within the EU. He illustrated its "key"[149] role in the regulation of migrant routes and specifically its initiative to close the Balkan route for illegal migration, as well as Slovenia's role as a "protagonist"[150] in

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144 Boštjan Jerman, interview with author, 30 March 2021. Translation by author.

145 Logar, 'Press Conference'.

146 Logar.

147 Miro Cerar, Intervju ministra za zunanje zadeve dr. Mira Cerarja, interview by Jure Kosec, Sobotna priloga Dela, 2 February 2019, https://www.delo.si/sobotna-priloga/smo-v-usodnem-casu-ce-zdaj-naredimo-vecje-napake-bodo-te-nepopravljive/. Translation by author.

148 Cerar. Translation by author.

149 Cerar. Translation by author.

150 Cerar. Translation by author.

the EU's pursuit of a circular, sustainable economy. Empirical evidence, however, paints a different picture and instead suggests that Slovenia's projection of national FP interests onto CFSP is limited and chiefly occurs in the area of EU's relations with the Western Balkans.

Interviewees' assessments of Slovenia's contributions to CFSP and uploading behaviour in CFSP policymaking diverged. Only two interviewees[151] indicated that Slovenia has an equal say in CFSP formation. Others provided examples of Slovenia's uploading practices, although they acknowledged their limited extent. Dr Grošelj, for instance, confirmed that uploading is possible and indeed occurs, illustrating how "in COREPER, [initiatives] are often supported without knowing why. For instance, Slovenia is supported."[152] When asked specifically to what extent Slovenia uses veto to upload its preferences, Grk said that "wherever [our] interests are very strong, we do not use the veto because the veto in fact does not exist in the EU, but we are more rigorous in standing up for our interests and searching for the lowest common denominator in the EU to arrive at a compromise."[153]

Other interviewees provided two examples of Slovenia's use of veto during CFSP formulation as cases of Slovenia's uploading: veto of EU's arms exports to Egypt (2013) and veto of EU's sanctions against Belarus (2012). Firstly, Jerman described that uploading "specific interests is difficult,"[154] but went on to detail an example of MFA's "sharp veto"[155] of arms exports to Egypt: "we specifically pointed out that we will try to stop exports of weapons used against the civil society. At the same time, the largest [Member] exported ships which were allegedly not used in this context and it was thus allowed. It was difficult to explain [domestically] what actually is the common foreign policy and what our interest is in blocking [Slovenian] people in conducting some small business while the big [Members] conduct big business."[156] Secondly, two interviewees[157] referenced Slovenia's veto of 2012 sanctions against Belarusian individuals linked to the Lukashenko regime as an example of uploading. In this instance, Slovenian representatives agreed with the EU's list of targeted individuals during two meetings of the competent working group, until the company Riko which secured a 200 million euros

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[151] Fajon, Peterle.
[152] Dr Klemen Grošelj, interview with author, 8 April 2021. Translation by author.
[153] Peter Grk, interview with author, 8 April 2021. Translation by author.
[154] Boštjan Jerman, interview with author, 30 March 2021. Translation by author.
[155] Boštjan Jerman, interview with author, 30 March 2021. Translation by author.
[156] Boštjan Jerman, interview with author, 30 March 2021. Translation by author.
[157] Dr Bojinović Fenko, Peterle.

contract with a Belarussian businessman contacted Slovenia's MFA. Afterwards, MFA protested the list of sanctioned individuals, allegedly in order to ensure the contract could go ahead. Dr Bojinović Fenko detailed how clumsily Slovenia engaged in such uploading: "suddenly they [MFA] started to protest. Here they projected, but notice – when they were forced to ensure economic survival. ... Because we [MFA] have never done this in any other field, we do not know how to do it, there is no protocol. For two weeks, we raised our hand without knowing we are harming ourselves. This means that something is very wrong."[158]

In addition to these (sporadic) cases of Slovenia's uploading through veto, empirical evidence reveals that the Western Balkans is the foremost issue area in which Slovenia uploads and actively projects its preferences onto CFSP. Analysis of FMs' speeches at annual Consultations of Slovenian Diplomats (2015-2020) reveals that of six speeches, five FMs took the opportunity to emphasise Slovenia's activities in the Western Balkans. FM Erjavec defined Slovenia's "credible, active and visible"[159] FP towards the Western Balkans a fundamental goal, emphasised the initiative Brdo Brioni process as the very platform facilitating dialogue and close cooperation,[160] and asserted that such initiatives presuppose the EU's proactive approach to the region.[161] When describing concrete FP objectives, FMs repeatedly and almost exclusively referenced the region's strategic importance and gravity. FM Cerar, for instance, described Slovenia's "exceptional effort"[162] to emphasise the importance of the Western Balkans' EU integration at all meetings and forums and claimed that Slovenia is one of the most enthusiastic Members in doing so.

Multiple interviewees[163] corroborated Slovenia's uploading principally in relation to the Western Balkans. Peterle described the Western Balkans as "a terrain where we, with our experience, expertise and our interests, contribute a lot,"[164] specifying that "elsewhere, [Slovenia's] voice cannot be as important as it is in relation to Western Balkans."[165] Grobovšek

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158 Dr Ana Bojinović Fenko, interview with author, 1 April 2021. Translation by author.

159 Karl Erjavec, 'Uvodni Nagovor' (19. posvet slovenske diplomacije, Brdo pri Kranju, 5 January 2015), http://mzz.arhiv-spletisc.gov.si/si/medijsko_sredisce/novica/34538/index.html.

160 Karl Erjavec, 'Uvodni Nagovor' (21. posvet slovenske diplomacije, Brdo pri Kranju, 3 January 2017), http://mzz.arhiv-spletisc.gov.si/si/medijsko_sredisce/novica/37912/index.html.

161 Karl Erjavec, 'Uvodni Nagovor' (22. posvet slovenske diplomacije, Brdo pri Kranju, 4 January 2018), http://mzz.arhiv-spletisc.gov.si/si/medijsko_sredisce/novica/39359/index.html.

162 Cerar, Intervju ministra za zunanje zadeve dr. Mira Cerarja.

163 Bogovič, Grk, Jerman, Peterle, Dr Toplak.

164 Alojz Peterle, interview with author, 22 March 2021. Translation by author.

165 Alojz Peterle, interview with author, 22 March 2021. Translation by author.

similarly claimed that "this part of the world is *grosso modo* seen by others as a region where Slovenia has a certain expertise."[166] Grk explained the need for Slovenia's uploading concerning the Western Balkans by highlighting other EU Members' unwillingness to deal with the region, which is, by virtue of geography, not their priority. He thus maintained that Slovenians "must be the ones to encourage the political will of other EU Members."[167] In his view, the Western Balkans is the principal issue area in which Slovenia uploads, "because of the situation in which the region has found itself, but also because of the expertise that [Slovenia] has based on the historical experience."[168] Providing practical examples, Grk cited multiple letters that Slovenia (in collaboration with certain other EU Members) addressed to other EU members and HR/VP concerning the region. He revealed that some of the arguments were adopted and integrated into EU discourse in its relations with the region. In his view, "these ideas can now be found in all EU documents concerning the Western Balkans. I would not say it is as important how many times we say something as it is that whenever we do say something, we voice a suggestion that is relevant."[169] Jerman illustrated how Slovenian representatives "are more active in the working groups for enlargement and the Western Balkans,"[170] and how in those working groups "it is more difficult to be a Slovenian delegate because you always have to promote something, contribute something."[171] He stressed the case of Kosovo, whereby during his work at the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo he consistently had to oppose Spain's delegates' efforts to define Kosovo as 'a breakaway province' and insist on Slovenia's recognition of Kosovo's statehood. Bogovič, too, agreed that Slovenia certainly has a defined FP vis-à-vis the Western Balkans, that it "is a player in this region and that [its] foreign policy behaviour is much more sovereign and assertive."[172] Moreover, he described that there is an expectation within the EU for Slovenia's active policymaking in this area which also leads to greater acceptance and appreciation of Slovenia's contributions.

When asked to list instances of Slovenia's successful uploading, only two of ten questionnaire respondents provided examples.[173] One questionnaire respondent listed Slovenia's success in

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[166] Bojan Grobovšek, interview with author, 18 March 2021. Translation by author.
[167] Peter Grk, interview with author, 8 April 2021. Translation by author.
[168] Peter Grk, interview with author, 8 April 2021. Translation by author.
[169] Peter Grk, interview with author, 8 April 2021. Translation by author.
[170] Boštjan Jerman, interview with author, 30 March 2021. Translation by author.
[171] Boštjan Jerman, interview with author, 30 March 2021. Translation by author.
[172] Franc Bogovič, interview with author, 23 March 2021. Translation by author.
[173] Only ten questionnaire respondents were asked this question.

changing other EU Members' position concerning Hungary when adopting the EU budget, which is not a *foreign* policy issue as understood here, whereas another respondent referenced Kosovo.

On the other hand, some interviewees were reluctant to acknowledge any instances of Slovenia's uploading. Dr Kunič, for example, explained that despite some efforts to upload, Slovenia's ideas had no real impact, and expressed his views that Slovenia enacts an independent FP in relation to its neighbours and the Holy See, although these are not relevant for CFSP and not foreign policy issues as considered here. Pertaining to the Western Balkans, Dr Kunič acknowledged FP specificity "relating to former Yugoslav republics due to traditional links."[174] More critically and again referencing the lack of Slovenia's definition of its FP strategy, Dr Bojinović Fenko responded: "I can honestly tell you that I *do not know*, not from practice nor from conversation with people working in the EU, what is Slovenia's national interest that we would want to be heard in the EU."[175] Even whilst examining Slovenia's engagement in the Western Balkans, Dr Bojinović Fenko explained: "we have [Slovenian] EU mission heads in the Western Balkans. … But this is only the organisational aspect, there is no added value or substance. These individuals are *EU* representatives. Slovenian uploading must be something else."[176] Dr Toplak, while concurring that Slovenia's foreign policymaking concerning the Western Balkans is an example of its bottom-up political strategy, noted that Austria was also interested in spearheading EU's activities in the region and had an absolute advantage in doing so, which led to it taking over. In this sense, Austria's intense involvement in the Western Balkans, too, is a remnant of its imperial past, specifically as a historical legacy of the Balkan's significance for the stability of the empire during the Ottoman invasions.

Questionnaire respondents similarly did not provide substantial evidence for Slovenia's uploading. When asked to list cases when Slovenia tried to change FP positions of other EU Members, one respondent gave an example of Slovenia's effort to achieve Covid-19 vaccination re-distribution, albeit this is again not a FP issue as understood in this dissertation. Another respondent described a certain situation in which Slovenia disagreed with the wording of the Foreign Affairs Council conclusions and tried to convince other EU Members to change it accordingly. After much pressure, however, it finally backed down and the suggested

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[174] Dr Jožef Kunič, interview with author, 15 March 2021. Translation by author.

[175] Dr Ana Bojinović Fenko, interview with author, 1 April 2021. Translation by author. Emphasis added.

[176] Dr Ana Bojinović Fenko, interview with author, 1 April 2021. Translation by author. Emphasis added.

changes were not implemented. The same respondent also described that Slovenia tries to ensure its FP interests are reflected in CFSP using veto power when coordination still occurs on the working level, but that Slovenia is much less effective when decision-making reaches the highest level (FAC) and becomes subject to greater pressures by other EU Members.

CONCLUSION

The above empirical analysis of Slovenia's global and EU-specific NRC and its foreign policymaking behaviour within the EU reveals important insights. Firstly, Slovenia's collective memory of its past of co-opted subjugation critically influences the construction of its NRC. The remembrance of Slovenia's past of subjugation in terms of servility as the relational element of national collective memory is particularly significant for NRC. This is evident in the *subordinate* global NRC and the EU-specific NRC labelled, for instance, the *follower, implementor, good worker,* or *the inconsequential*. What is more, remembrance of Slovenia's position in Yugoslavia impacts its EU-specific NRC vis-à-vis the Western Balkans, whereby Slovenia perceives its role as a bridge. Secondly, Slovenia's foreign policymaking in the EU is substantially Europeanised, whereby Europeanisation chiefly unfolds through downloading of EU preferences onto the national level. The lack of influence that precludes uploading practices occurs due to the absence of a FP and diplomatic tradition as well as the lack of confidence, which are both historically conditioned. Slovenia only uploads in CFSP formulation regarding matters connected to the Western Balkans, which results from Slovenia's self-conceptualised NRC of a mediator or bridge based on its collective memory of exceptionalism within the former Yugoslavia.

V

REMEMBRANCE AND FOREIGN POLICYMAKING: THE CASE OF CROATIA

Croatia's collective memory is to a great extent bound within the same historical skeleton as Slovenia's remembrance, namely its incorporation within the Austro-Hungarian empire and Yugoslavia. Yet, Croatia's fight for independence in the 1991-1995 Homeland War was much longer and bloodier and consequently gravely moulded Croatian consciousness. As remembrance often rebels against history, the master narrative of Croatia's remembrance may synthesise disparate interpretations of similar historical trajectories and uniquely affect Croatia's foreign policymaking behaviour. This chapter succinctly probes the supplementary case of Croatia to assess the performance of the remembrance approach to foreign policymaking. The first part briefly outlines the anchors and motifs framing Croatia's collective memory of co-opted subjugation in the Austro-Hungarian empire and Yugoslavia. The second part probes the effects of remembrance motifs on Croatia's NRC and the Europeanisation of foreign policymaking. I conclude with a brief comparison of Slovenia and Croatia to tease out similarities and differences in the relationship between collective memory and foreign policymaking.

CROATIA'S REMEMBRANCE: ANCHORS AND MOTIFS

To establish the master narrative of Croatia's collective memory, it is necessary to determine historic events upon which it is anchored, as well as extract motifs that frame it. Chronological anchors of remembrance are extrapolated from speeches given by Croatia's President Milanović and PM Plenković on thirteen national holidays commemorating historic events.[1] In

[1] 'Zakon o Blagdanima, Spomendanima i Neradnim Danima u Republici Hrvatskoj', Pub. L. No. 022-03/19-01/219 (2019), https://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/2019_11_110_2212.html.

2020, President Milanović and PM Plenković gave speeches on four holidays (see Figure 5.1): both gave a speech on the Victory and Homeland Thanksgiving Day and the Day of Croatian defenders, whereas only PM Plenković spoke on three other holidays of which two commemorate independence and the Homeland War and one World War II.

Figure 5.1: Anchoring Croatia's remembrance based on the frequency of political speeches

Holiday:	*Speeches by:*
Independence	
Statehood Day	PM Plenković
Victory and Homeland Thanksgiving Day and Day of Croatian defenders	PM Plenković President Milanović
Day of Remembrance of the Victims of the Homeland War and Day of Remembrance of the suffering of Vukovar and Škabrnja	PM Plenković
World War II	
European Day of Remembrance for Victims of totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, Nazism, fascism and communism	PM Plenković

Unsurprisingly, the frequency of political speeches demonstrates the primacy of the independence and the Homeland War in Croatia's collective memory, followed by World War II. Secondary sources confirm the Homeland War's central position as an anchor of collective memory.[2] Moreover, in an interview, Dr Dejan Jović (professor of political science – University of Zagreb; former special advisor to MFEA; former political analyst for President Josipović) explained that "the War is omnipresent in public discourse"[3] and is constructed as the beginning, the founding place of the 'new' Croatia, the brightest point in its history.

Analysis of aforementioned political speeches, corroborated by existing scholarship,[4] unveils the motifs that structure Croatia's remembrance: *victimhood*, *heroism*, and (ancient) *statehood*. Dr Jović highlighted the uniqueness of the "narrative of being both a victim and a winner"[5]

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[2] Michel-André Horelt and Judith Renner, 'Denting a Heroic Picture: A Narrative Analysis of Collective Memory in Post-War Croatia', *Perspectives* 16, no. 2 (2008): 5–27; Milošević, 'Back to the Future, Forward to the Past'.

[3] Dr Dejan Jović, interview with author, 5 May 2021.

[4] Horelt and Renner, 'Denting a Heroic Picture: A Narrative Analysis of Collective Memory in Post-War Croatia'; Masumi Kameda, 'Collective Memory of Communism in Croatia since 1994: Comparative Analysis of Contemporary Arts and National Narratives', *History of Communism in Europe*, no. 1 (2010): 105–15; Mark Biondich, '"We Were Defending the State:" Nationalism, Myth, and Memory in Twentieth-Century Croatia', in *Ideologies and National Identities: The Case of Twentieth-Century Southeastern Europe*, ed. John Lampe and Mark Mazower (New York: Central European University Press, 2003), 54–81, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oxford/detail.action?docID=3137202; Milošević, 'Back to the Future, Forward to the Past'; Ljiljana Radonić, 'Transformation of Memory in Croatia', in *Dynamics of Memory and Identity in Contemporary Europe*, ed. Eric Langenbacher, Bill Niven, and Ruth Wittlinger (New York: Berghahn Books, Incorporated, 2013), 166–79, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oxford/detail.action?docID=1337703; Jeremy F. Walton, 'The Ban's Mana: Post-Imperial Affect and Public Memory in Zagreb', *Cultural Studies (London, England)* 34, no. 5 (2020): 688–706, https://doi.org/10.1080/09502386.2020.1780285.

[5] Dr Dejan Jović, interview with author, 5 May 2021.

that "is based on the celebration *and* commemoration of the War."[6] Similarly, the overarching motifs of victimhood and heroism are synthesised also in 'The Declaration on the Homeland War' adopted by the Croatian Sabor in 2000: "The Republic of Croatia led a just and legitimate, defensive and liberating war, but not an aggressive and occupational war against anyone, in which she defended her territory from the great Serb aggression within internationally recognised borders."[7]

Croatia's national *victimhood* was, particularly in relation to the Homeland War, invoked in all analysed speeches. PM Plenković indicated that "it is necessary to nurture a culture of remembrance"[8] of victims of all crimes, particularly those who died in the Homeland War and "gave the most for Croatian freedom."[9] Similarly narrating the 1991 independence and the resulting Homeland War through the prism of victimhood, President Milanović said: "in a war that was imposed on us, a war in which we were attacked with weapons that we and the Slovenes were paying for, in a war we didn't want because no normal person wants war, we were startled from the very start and faced with a situation for which no one was prepared."[10] Such descriptions of Croatia's victimhood clearly assign guilt for national suffering. PM Plenković, for example, referred to "Great Serb aggression,"[11] as well as described Croatian victimhood relating to the totalitarian SFRY regime, focusing specifically on Croatian political prisoners.[12]

The motif of victimhood is closely related to Croatian *heroism*, which too, focuses principally on the Homeland War. The War is portrayed as an act of defence and liberation. President Milanović described: "victory came, but not on its own. Victory was achieved; it was captured

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[6] Dr Dejan Jović, interview with author, 5 May 2021. Emphasis added.

[7] 'Deklaracija o Domovinskom Ratu', Pub. L. No. 021-16/00-04/06 (2000), https://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/2000_10_102_1987.html.

[8] 'Premijer Na Golom Otoku: Važno Je Njegovati Kulturu Sjećanja. Bez Istine Nema Pomirbe Niti Poštovanja Prema Žrtvama', Vlada Republike Hrvatske, 23 August 2020, https://vlada.gov.hr/vijesti/premijer-na-golom-otoku-vazno-je-njegovati-kulturu-sjecanja-bez-istine-nema-pomirbe-niti-postovanja-prema-zrtvama/30191. Translation by author.

[9] 'Vlada Će Nastaviti Doprinositi Razvoju Vukovara, on Zaslužuje Posebnu Pozornost i Brigu Državnih Institucija', Vlada Republike Hrvatske, 18 November 2020, https://vlada.gov.hr/vijesti/vlada-ce-nastaviti-doprinositi-razvoju-vukovara-on-zasluzuje-posebnu-pozornost-i-brigu-drzavnih-institucija/30851. Translation by author.

[10] 'President Milanović's Speech on the Occasion of Victory and Homeland Thanksgiving Day, Day of Croatian Defenders and the 25th Anniversary of the Military-Police Operation Storm', President of the Republic of Croatia - Zoran Milanović, 5 August 2020, https://www.predsjednik.hr/en/press-en/.

[11] 'Čestitka Predsjednika Vlade u Povodu Dana Državnosti', Vlada Republike Hrvatske, 30 May 2020, https://vlada.gov.hr/vijesti/cestitka-predsjednika-vlade-u-povodu-dana-drzavnosti-29626/29626. Translation by author.

[12] 'Premijer Na Golom Otoku: Važno Je Njegovati Kulturu Sjećanja. Bez Istine Nema Pomirbe Niti Poštovanja Prema Žrtvama'. Translation by author.

by our brave soldiers and their commanders throughout Croatia."[13] In his description of the Homeland War, PM Plenković synthesised both motifs of victimhood and heroism: "Croatia was attacked, it defended itself and fought for its freedom. As a victor, Croatia has extended a hand of reconciliation and is now building its future."[14] Here, reconciliation refers to the war crimes Croats committed against Serbs during the Homeland War (and vice versa). Whilst both PM Plenković and President Milanović acknowledged these crimes, some reluctance to take responsibility remains. In fact, crimes are described as separate from the state and individualised. 'The Declaration on the Homeland War' clearly stipulates that Croatia will pursue war crimes, however, "strictly applying the principles of individual responsibility and guilt."[15] President Milanović similarly described how "fortunately, we never sank into an abyss of moral catastrophe, … There were mistakes and there were also crimes—unfortunate from a human and Christian standpoint—and they cost us later."[16] He concluded that "Croatia later rectified that mistake, but unfortunately a burden remains."[17]

In addition to the victimhood and heroism through which Croatia achieved independence, the motif of *ancientness* is prevalent in Croatia's collective memory. PM Plenković emphasised Croatia's historic statehood, describing how a "free Croatia"[18] was a dream of multiple generations of Croats. He referred to city of Knin as "the cradle of Croatian statehood"[19] and described its historic function as the capital of the 9th-11th century Croatian Kingdom, a city in which Dalmatian-Croatian parliaments ('Sabori') were held, and a town ruled by noble Croat families. He described that it is "today the city of symbols of Croatian freedom, Croatian victory in the Homeland War."[20] Nostalgic stories about the ancient Croatian Kingdom are used to establish national longevity beyond Communism and re-establish Croatia's position as

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[13] 'President Milanović's Speech on the Occasion of Victory and Homeland Thanksgiving Day, Day of Croatian Defenders and the 25th Anniversary of the Military-Police Operation Storm'.

[14] 'Oluju Obilježavamo u Znaku Pobjede, Zahvalnosti i Ponosa, Uz Osjećaj Pomirbe i Pijeteta', Vlada Republike Hrvatske, 5 August 2020, https://vlada.gov.hr/vijesti/oluju-obiljezavamo-u-znaku-pobjede-zahvalnosti-i-ponosa-uz-osjecaj-pomirbe-i-pijeteta/30080. Translation by author.

[15] Deklaracija o domovinskom ratu.

[16] 'President Milanović's Speech on the Occasion of Victory and Homeland Thanksgiving Day, Day of Croatian Defenders and the 25th Anniversary of the Military-Police Operation Storm'.

[17] 'President Milanović's Speech on the Occasion of Victory and Homeland Thanksgiving Day, Day of Croatian Defenders and the 25th Anniversary of the Military-Police Operation Storm'.

[18] 'Oluju Obilježavamo u Znaku Pobjede, Zahvalnosti i Ponosa, Uz Osjećaj Pomirbe i Pijeteta'. Translation by author.

[19] 'Oluju Obilježavamo u Znaku Pobjede, Zahvalnosti i Ponosa, Uz Osjećaj Pomirbe i Pijeteta'. Translation by author.

[20] 'Oluju Obilježavamo u Znaku Pobjede, Zahvalnosti i Ponosa, Uz Osjećaj Pomirbe i Pijeteta'. Translation by author.

part of Europe.[21] Moreover, Croatian national programme since 1848 instrumentalised the medieval Croatian Kingdom to reclaim statehood, asserting that it "had throughout its long existence been *de jure* an independent entity,"[22] whose sovereignty and independence were violated by the Austro-Hungarian empire. As Dr Jović explained, Croatia's remembrance is situated "in the construction of images of a thousand-year continuity of the Croatian nation."[23] He specified the common narrative that "for a thousand years, [Croats] were part of the empire and Yugoslavia, lost [their] Kingdom in 1102 and now resurrected it in 1991…"[24]

REMEMBRANCE AND FOREIGN POLICYMAKING

Croatia's National Role Conception

As in the case of Slovenia, Croatia, prior to its 1991 independence, had little reason to conceptualise its role in the international sphere and only had to do so after it entered the global stage as a sovereign state. Croatia's master NRC is of a country providing global and regional stability and security, thus upholding the international order. In his inaugural speech, President Milanović described Croatia as a wealthy, mature, and experienced state.[25] Additionally, at the 2020 Diplomatic Corps Reception he explained that small countries must be "open, ready to interact with the world."[26] Nevertheless, Croatia's historical experience of co-opted subjugation and non-independence is also reflected in its master NRC. Dr Jović, for instance, described that the self-image of being a subject, an object of others' actions and FP objectives, remains present in Croatia's self-consciousness.

Croatia's auxiliary, EU-specific NRC is of great importance. PM Plenković reiterated just that in his declaration that Croatia's independence "started the return … of the Croatian nation and state to the European civilisational, political, cultural and economic tradition."[27] Similarly,

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[21] Kameda, 'Collective Memory of Communism in Croatia since 1994'; Tamara Pavasović Trošt, 'Ruptures and Continuities in Nationhood Narratives: Reconstructing the Nation through History Textbooks in Serbia and Croatia', *Nations and Nationalism* 24, no. 3 (2018): 716–40, https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12433.

[22] Biondich, '"We Were Defending the State:" Nationalism, Myth, and Memory in Twentieth-Century Croatia', 56.

[23] Dr Dejan Jović, interview with author, 5 May 2021.

[24] Dr Dejan Jović, interview with author, 5 May 2021.

[25] 'President Milanović's Inaugural Speech', President of the Republic of Croatia - Zoran Milanović, 18 February 2020, https://www.predsjednik.hr/en/press-en/.

[26] 'President Milanović's Speech at Diplomatic Corps Reception', President of the Republic of Croatia - Zoran Milanović, 17 June 2020, https://www.predsjednik.hr/en/press-en/.

[27] 'Čestitka Predsjednika Vlade u Povodu Dana Državnosti'. Translation by author.

President Milanović at the 2020 Diplomatic Corps Reception asserted that the EU "is Croatia's destiny and the only smart path,"[28] as well as claimed that Croatia's place in the EU should not be questioned, "as there is no alternative to EU membership. There really is no alternative."[29] Croatia's FP documents, too, confirm the EU's centrality for Croatia's NRC. This is evident in the MFEA's 'Strategic plan for the period 2018-2020' (henceforth the Strategic plan), which, for instance, describes how the new structure of MFEA is based on new FP priorities, whereby a special emphasis is placed on its functioning within the EU, among other things.[30]

Specifying Croatia's EU-specific NRC in the questionnaire, a senior MFEA official described it as an *honest broker*, detailing that it perceives itself as an equal Member, a part of the team. They indicated that the main aim of Croatia's FP is to present itself as oriented toward democratic values and engaging in *constructive* and *law-based* international behaviour. In the context of historical legacies, this can be understood as FP behaviour that is influenced by Croatia's Homeland War, especially the war crimes and related proceedings by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.

Moreover, Croatia's global NRC also bleeds into its EU-specific NRC as an upholder of the regional order and stability, provider of security, and a bridge between the EU and the Balkans. PM Plenković described precisely this, stating that "as a member of the EU and the western European civilisational circle, we contribute to global security and stability."[31] According to this narrative, Croatia's independence war allowed for the liberation of parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina; it was therefore crucial for the signing of the Dayton Agreement, which ended the Bosnian War.[32] By fighting to liberate Croatia from Great Serbian expansionist politics, then, Croats 'saved' the region and facilitated peace and stability, which they continue to do today. Similarly, in the MFEA's Strategic plan, the first listed mission is to "promote stability in the immediate environment."[33] Dr Jović agreed with such a characterisation of Croatia's EU-specific NRC but did not think it unique, stating that all EU Members neighbouring non-

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[28] 'President Milanović's Speech at Diplomatic Corps Reception'.

[29] 'President Milanović's Speech at Diplomatic Corps Reception'.

[30] 'Strateški Plan Za Razdoblje 2018.-2020.' (Ministarstvo vanjskih i evropskih poslova, 2018), 3, http://www.mvep.hr/files/file/2018/1807061628-strateski-plan-ministarstva-vanjskih-i-europskih-poslova-za-razdoblje-2018-2020.pdf. Translation by author.

[31] 'Čestitka Predsjednika Vlade u Povodu Dana Državnosti'. Translation by author.

[32] Horelt and Renner, 'Denting a Heroic Picture: A Narrative Analysis of Collective Memory in Post-War Croatia'.

[33] 'Strateški Plan Za Razdoblje 2018.-2020.', 1. Translation by author.

EU states, namely Austria, Greece, and Slovenia, have similar ambitions. Notably, he pointed out that "Croatia is the keeper of the border with the EU"[34] and explained its enlargement ambitions as follows: "no one really wants to be the *Military Frontier of the EU*."[35] This language is essential, as it invokes Croatia's historical function as the *Military Frontier* of the Austro-Hungarian empire that protected the imperial centre against Ottoman invasions. Hence, Croatia's historical imperial 'external' function is reproduced in its contemporary, EU-specific NRC.

Nonetheless, the Strategic plan conveys some degree of self-consciousness about Croatia's role in the EU. It determines that as the EU's newest member, Croatia needs to "present itself as a mature, modern and effective member attached to the European project."[36] Dr Jović similarly pointed out that the general public recognises Croatia's *peripheral* position in the EU, as well as that the reality of being the newest EU Member contributes to the self-image of an "insignificant"[37] EU Member.

As the above empirical evidence demonstrates, Croatia's master and EU-specific NRC are greatly influenced by its historical experience of subjugation in both the Austro-Hungarian empire and Yugoslavia, as well as the Homeland War. Both its global and EU-specific NRC are cooperative, passive, and of low confidence (see Figure 5.2). Notably, the EU-specific NRC concerning Croatia's functioning in the Balkans is cooperative, proactive, and of high-status perception.

Figure 5.2: Characteristics of Croatia's NRC

<table>
<tr><th>NRC type:</th><th>Mode of association:</th><th>Mode of action:</th><th>Status perception:</th></tr>
<tr><td>Global NRC</td><td rowspan="3">Cooperative</td><td rowspan="2">Passive</td><td rowspan="2">Low</td></tr>
<tr><td>EU-specific NRC</td></tr>
<tr><td>EU-specific NRC
vis-à-vis the Western Balkans</td><td>Proactive</td><td>High</td></tr>
</table>

[34] Dr Dejan Jović, interview with author, 5 May 2021.
[35] Dr Dejan Jović, interview with author, 5 May 2021. Emphasis added.
[36] 'Strateški Plan Za Razdoblje 2018.-2020.', 1. Translation by author.
[37] Dr Dejan Jović, interview with author, 5 May 2021.

Legacies of Subjugation

Remembrance of historical non-independence and co-opted subjugation in various power-sharing systems and its breakaway to independence undoubtedly shapes Croatia's self-conceptualised role within the EU. How does this historically conditioned self-image manifest in Croatia's behaviour during foreign policymaking at the EU level?

In a questionnaire response, the senior MFEA official provided insights into the influence of historical legacies on Croatia's foreign policymaking behaviour. In their opinion, historical legacy *of any kind* impacts present-day FP and, what is more, they wholly agree with the statement that Croatia's historical experiences influence its FP behaviour. When specifying precisely how this relationship unfolds, however, the MFEA official did not believe that is it precisely Croatia's historical subjugation that is influential and specified that they would not describe Croatia's political history as a history of political subjugation. They recognised some influence of Croatia's experience in Yugoslavia, as well as its secession from Yugoslavia and the resulting Homeland War on Croatia's FP. Interestingly, they rejected the influence of Yugoslav foreign policymaking legacies, World War II, or Croatia's experience in the Austro-Hungarian empire. Asked to assess how strongly Croatia's historical legacies impact particular aspects of national FP, the senior MFEA official reported a strong impact concerning the region and issue field.

Europeanisation of Foreign Policymaking

To assess the influence of collective memory on the Europeanisation of foreign policymaking, I first turn to the extent of Europeanisation. Croatia's foreign policymaking is closely related to CFSP. The Strategic plan, for instance, states MFEA's vision of "creating and implementing self-conscious foreign policies aimed at developing alliances, partnerships and cooperation, *primarily within the European Union* and NATO, but also outside them…"[38] In addition to so explicitly defining the EU as a principal framework for Croatia's FP implementation, two of four FP goals specified in the Strategic plan are related to the EU: the implementation and coordination of European affairs, and Presidency to the Council of the EU in 2020. The senior

[38] 'Strateški Plan Za Razdoblje 2018.-2020.', 1. Translation by author. Emphasis added.

MFEA official, however, viewed CFSP's influence on Croatia's FP as only minor and disagreed with the statement that Croatia primarily fulfils its FP goals through CFSP. They nonetheless expressed their view that Croatia's FP is Europeanised, further confirming this by expressing their belief that Croatia's FP norms and interests are aligned with those of the EU. Croatia's voting cohesion with the EU in UNGA is further indicative of the Europeanisation of its foreign policymaking. Of 415 resolutions adopted with a vote, Croatia always cast identical votes with the EU-majority. When there was no EU-majority, Croatia consistently voted with the larger group. Croatia's IVC is 99.28, indicating near-perfect voting cohesion and consequently highly Europeanised foreign policymaking.[39] In sum, empirical evidence reveals that Croatia's foreign policymaking is highly Europeanised.

What type of Europeanisation has propelled such a high level of Croatia's foreign policymaking Europeanisation? When asked about the process of policymaking concerning the EU's foreign affairs, the senior MFEA official described it as a vertical, top-down process, but characterised Croatia's participation in the process as bottom-up. They explained that Croatia's FP positions concerning CFSP issues are broadly defined before both COREPER II and FAC meetings, and claimed that it only rarely occurs that Croatia does not have a specifically defined position concerning a FP issue discussed in FAC. Despite such an indication that Croatia engages in uploading of national FP preferences onto the EU level, their further description of Croatia's behaviour during CFSP-formation indicates the opposite. They reported, for instance, that Croatia often adopts and sometimes changes its position concerning a policy issue considered by FAC *after* consulting with other EU Members. In comparison with other EU Members with similar material capabilities, the MFEA official deemed Croatia as equally active in FAC and reported that it uses the power of veto and the right to policy initiative in CFSP formulation just as frequently. Dr Jović, however, disagreed and claimed that Croatia is less active in CFSP formulation than other EU Members. Furthermore, he warned that Croatia has not yet "instrumentalised"[40] its EU Membership, describing that whilst Croatia "takes part"[41] in CFSP, no major contribution in the field of FP can be detected. In his view, Croatia's

[39] For further details on IVC and its calculation for the case of Croatia, see Annex II.
[40] Dr Dejan Jović, interview with author, 5 May 2021.
[41] Dr Dejan Jović, interview with author, 5 May 2021.

participation in CFSP-formulation is "mainly following the mainstream position of others"[42] and cooperating with the main trends within the EU, particularly Germany and France.

Based on the above descriptions of Croatia's foreign policymaking within the EU, it can be concluded that it primarily engages in downloading practices. Notably, in his address at the 2020 Diplomatic Corps Reception, President Milanović expressed scepticism about substantive FP contributions, warning that "when small nations start daydreaming about great ideas, they very quickly become even smaller nations because they get into conflict with other, greater ideas."[43]

In exploring the reasons for Croatia's downloading, the senior MFEA official indicated that Croatian citizens do not think CFSP appropriately reflects Croatia's FP interests, nor do they think that Croatia is able to influence its content. The respondent was neutral regarding the suggestion that Croatia can influence CFSP formulation to the same extent as other EU Members but agreed that opinions of Croatian foreign policymaking actors are reflected in CFSP. Dr Jović agreed with the perceived lack of influence within the EU, stating that "no one in the broader public *or in politics* thinks that Croatia is an important factor in the EU."[44] Furthermore, he emphasised that Croats detect inequalities among EU Members, from which Croatia does not benefit.

As in the case of Slovenia, Croatia's downloading behaviour was connected to the lack of confidence and assertiveness. The senior MFEA official disagreed with the statement that Croatia is assertive when fulfilling its FP interests. Likewise, Dr Jović explained that policymakers lack confidence and consequently do not initiate FP or any other efforts within the EU. Moreover, Dr Jović agreed with the assessment that Croatia's historical subjugation influences this lack of confidence.

To obtain insights into potential Croatian uploading, the MFEA official was asked to list an instance when Croatia was able to successfully change the minds of other EU Members concerning a FP issue. They stated that Croatia is very proud that Albania and North Macedonia

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[42] Dr Dejan Jović, interview with author, 5 May 2021.
[43] 'President Milanović's Speech at Diplomatic Corps Reception'.
[44] Dr Dejan Jović, interview with author, 5 May 2021. Emphasis added.

opened accession negotiations with the EU during Croatia's 2020 Presidency of the Council of the EU. According to Dr Jović, Croatia's policymaking contribution in CFSP-formulation can be seen in its efforts to incorporate its own FP positions, especially regarding enlargement and in relation to Bosnia and Herzegovina. In his view, this is the only occasion when Croatia "wants to use the EU to achieve something that is [its] own national objective."[45] Dr Jović further explained Croatia's more active foreign policymaking concerning the Balkans as "compensation for subjugation. Now that [Croatia is] in the EU, [it] can place some additional conditions on others and … exercise power as an EU Members."[46]

CONCLUSION

Slovenia's and Croatia's national collective memories share numerous similarities. Most notably, both master narratives are anchored principally in the countries' 1991 independence, interpreted as the peak of national history and realisation of both nations' thousand-year dream. Additionally, remembrance of Slovenia's and Croatia's past is constructed upon the motif of ancientness, based on Slovenia's medieval state of Carantania and the Kingdom of Croatia. Moreover, the motifs of servility (Slovenia) and victimhood (Croatia) stem from the national experience of subjugation in the Austro-Hungarian empire (particularly for Slovenia) and Yugoslavia, as well as independence (particularly for Croatia). An important difference, however, are the motifs of maturity and heroism, permeating Slovenia's and Croatia's remembrance, respectively. Both are based mainly on national experiences of the independence struggle; whereas Slovenia's comparatively smooth independence facilitated a narrative of maturity, Croatia's Homeland War produced a much more glorious memory emphasising Croatian heroism in the War.

A comparison of Slovenia's and Croatia's NRCs reveals significant similarities. While labels used to describe their global and EU-specific NRCs are different, they share the same characteristics; they are cooperative, passive, and have low status perception. Moreover, both Slovenia's and Croatia's EU-specific NRCs vis-à-vis the Western Balkans are cooperative, proactive, and of high-status perception. Both cases reflect similarities also concerning the

[45] Dr Dejan Jović, interview with author, 5 May 2021.
[46] Dr Dejan Jović, interview with author, 5 May 2021.

Europeanisation of foreign policymaking. Whereas Croatia's voting cohesion (99.28) with the EU is somewhat higher than Slovenia's (99.04), it is evident that both are highly Europeanised. Both principally download when participating in foreign policymaking at the EU-level and, as in the case of Slovenia, Croatia's downloading behaviour is connected to the historically conditioned lack of confidence and assertiveness, though not on the absence of a diplomatic apparatus. The influence of historical legacies also conditions Slovenia's and Croatia's respective uploading attempts relating to the Western Balkans. In conclusion, remembrance of co-opted subjugation remains politically salient in both examined cases.

VI

SUBJUGATION ANGST:

REIMAGINING THE FOREIGN POLITICS OF MEMORY

The past is never dead. It's not even past.
—William Faulkner[1]

In the context of continued, even increasing salience of collective memory, this dissertation unveils the obscure relationship between remembrance and foreign policymaking. Prevailing constructivist IR and FPA arguments stress the importance of collective memory as a vehicle of FP outcomes, yet fail to transcend this reductionist understanding of its significance as merely shaping FP interests. To amend such deficiencies, I set forth a remembrance approach to foreign policy*making* that explains how national collective memory shapes global and EU-specific NRCs and thus influences foreign policymaking behaviour that crystalises in the extent and type of the Europeanisation of foreign policymaking. This concluding chapter presents empirical findings from the investigation of the principal case of Slovenia and supplementary case of Croatia, discusses theoretical implications, and concludes with recommendations for future research with the hope of inspiring a reassessment of the utility of traditional modes of thinking about the foreign politics of memory.

[1] William Faulkner, *Requiem for a Nun*, Faulkner, William, 1897-1962. Works. 1986 19 (New York: Garland Pub, 1987), 73.

EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

In approaching the relationship between remembrance and foreign policymaking, this dissertation inquires: *How does national collective memory influence EU Members' Europeanisation of foreign policymaking?* A detailed empirical analysis of Slovenia, as well as Croatia, reveals six principal findings:

I. The collective memory of co-opted subjugation is highly salient and pervasive; in cases of states such as Slovenia and Croatia with a long history of non-independence, remembrance of the national past is, to a great extent, remembrance of political subjugation.

II. Sharing similar historical experience of co-opted subjugation and otherwise, Slovenia and Croatia anchor their respective collective memories in *the same events* and interpret their national past of co-opted subjugation through *similar motifs*.

III. The collective memory of Slovenia's and Croatia's past as a whole, including specifically of co-opted subjugation, shapes their global and EU-specific NRCs through the reproduction of relational motifs of remembrance, namely servility in the case of Slovenia and victimhood/heroism in the case of Croatia.

IV. Slovenia's and Croatia's auxiliary NRCs are nuanced versions of their master NRCs. Although labels for a specific NRC may be different, three essential characteristics allow for the assessment of their EU-specific NRCs as *cooperative* in mode of association, *passive* in mode of action, and of *low-status* perception (see Figure 6.1). A more nuanced, historically conditioned EU-specific NRC vis-à-vis the Western Balkans, however, is *cooperative* in mode of association, but *proactive* in mode of action and of *high-status* perception.

Figure 6. 1: Summary of Slovenia's and Croatia's NRCs

<table>
<tr><th>NRC type:</th><th>Mode of association:</th><th>Mode of action:</th><th>Status perception:</th></tr>
<tr><td>Master NRC</td><td rowspan="3">Cooperative</td><td rowspan="2">Passive</td><td rowspan="2">Low</td></tr>
<tr><td>Auxiliary NRC</td></tr>
<tr><td>Auxiliary NRC
vis-à-vis the Western Balkans</td><td>Proactive</td><td>High</td></tr>
</table>

V. Slovenia's and Croatia's foreign policymaking is highly Europeanised. Their auxiliary, EU-specific (ideal type II) NRC motivates EU Members' *downloading* when engaging in EU-level foreign policymaking. The auxiliary, EU-specific NRC vis-à-vis the Western Balkans, however, was cooperative but proactive and of high-status importance. It thus does not match either ideal type and motivates their limited attempts at *uploading* behaviour.

VI. Slovenia's and Croatia's collective memory of co-opted subjugation influences the Europeanisation of foreign policymaking. Remembrance of subjugation and salient motifs of servility or victimhood/heroism motivate downloading behaviour due to the lack of confidence and lack of a diplomatic and FP tradition, which are both conditioned by historical experience of co-opted subjugation.

CONCEPTUAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

Outlined empirical findings provide strong support for hypotheses derived from this dissertation's theoretical argument about the influence of collective memory on EU Members' Europeanisation of foreign policymaking. This study reimagines the relationship between foreign policy(making) and the past, and offers conceptual contributions for the study of collective memory and more.

This dissertation contributes to existing memory literature by engaging in a systematic analysis of collective memory, as well as exploring the impact of remembrance of subjugation, which transcends the overwhelming focus of the field on remembrance of World War II, the Holocaust, and the Cold War. Furthermore, the presented remembrance approach to Europeanisation of foreign policymaking facilitates a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between the past and international behaviour by reimagining collective memory not as conditioning foreign policy *outcomes* but as shaping foreign policy *behaviour*. It thus contributes both to the literature on collective memory and constructivist-interpretivist frameworks of foreign policymaking. This synthesis of previously detached bodies of literature explaining collective memory's influence on (foreign) politics further unveils their value when operating in unison, as opposed to in isolation from one another. The integration of role theory with existing conceptualisations, particularly, crystalises whispers of collective memory's

purposive and prescriptive function by detailing its influence on NRC. Additionally, by examining the relationship between collective memory and EU Members' foreign policymaking through the lens of Europeanisation, this approach takes into account interactions between the EU and national levels and probes the effect of domestic intervening variables on these vertical interactions. Instead of conceptualising Europeanisation as an adaptational transformation due to EU Membership, this approach reimagines Europeanisation itself as resulting from EU Members' behavioural patterns and the EU as a social sphere, wherein EU Members interact as social agents.

This empirical study also produced unforeseen insights into the relationship between the past and foreign policymaking, which offers opportunities for future research. First, collective memory influences not only NRCs' essential characteristics, but also their scope. Whereas collective memory of co-opted subjugation, specifically, impacts overall NRCs (regardless of scope), the collective memory of the national past *as a whole* influences the narrower, more specific NRC the most. Second, depending on historic events' temporal distance from the present, collective memory influences NRC and foreign policymaking in different ways. Whereas remembrance of a more distant past influences NRC to a greater extent in the form of internalised beliefs about the state and its international position, remembrance of the more recent past takes the shape of 'lessons learned' and is more instructive for specific FP issues. Thus, further work is required to explore the effects of the collective memory of other important aspects of national histories. Third, NRCs of a different scope (i.e., master and auxiliary NRC) may differ in their mode of association, mode of action, or status perception, and thus motivate different foreign policymaking behaviours and Europeanisation types. Empirical evidence suggests that as NRC's scope is more limited, NRC characteristics encourage uploading behaviour; this is because the NRC is more proactive and of a higher status, whereas mode of association appears to be the most static. Future research should explore these dynamics further and tackle the question of whether collective memory or the scope itself is the source of such difference. Lastly, in contrast with vast scholarship on role theory in IR and FPA, foreign policymaking behaviour appears not to depend merely on role *conception,* but also on role *prescription* by other EU Members. Future research should explore the contexts in which role prescription is more influential and precisely *how* it matters, particularly pertaining to small(er) EU Members.

In addition to these empirical puzzles, future research should explore the influence of collective memory on foreign policymaking beyond the cases of Slovenia and Croatia as small, subjugated EU Members, and examine large(r) states with experience of co-opted subjugation, such as Poland. It should further expand this question to include former subjugat*ors*, both large (e.g., Spain) and small (e.g., Belgium), to understand *whether* and *how* remembrance of subjugation that (they enacted upon others) influences their foreign policymaking behaviour. More specifically, future studies should explore whether it is remembrance motifs or anchors that matter more in the construction of NRC.

SUBJUGATION ANGST: EUROPEANISATION AS AN IMPERIALIST NARRATIVE

Europe's 'virgin birth' has evidently failed to facilitate the amnesia of its legacies of political subjugation and the empire that underwrote the European project and re-centred it in remembrance of World War II and the Holocaust. Instead, memories of imperialism and various forms of political subjugation, more generally, remain deeply intertwined with policymakers' beliefs about the international spaces they operate within, as well as their state's position and purpose. As such, legacies of subjugation continue to affect EU Members' interactions, weigh on (or prop up) their self-image, and condition their international behaviour. Croatia's and Slovenia's self-identification *with* and emphasis *on* 'Central Europe,' for example, is a consequence not of their geographical position but of legacies of their co-opted subjugation. In fact, the term 'Central Europe' is little more than a "politically correct synonym for Austria-Hungary."[2] Moreover, remembrance of national experience in regimes of co-opted subjugation does not only influence state's self-conceptualisation in the international sphere. Legacies of subjugation actually burden inter-state interactions *within* the EU. EU Members' anxieties that permeate intra-EU interactions are reflected in Slovenian PM Janša's response to criticism by Belgian MEP and former PM Verhofstadt (see Figure 6.2): "Calm down, … You are not the head of a colonial power any more. And Slovenia's isn't Congo, either."[3]

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[2] Dr Dejan Jović, interview with author, 5 May 2021.

[3] Janez Janša, Twitter post, 2 March 2021, 21:08, https://twitter.com/jjansasds/status/1366857654098927624?lang=en.

Figure 6.2: PM Janša's tweet



Why does remembrance of co-opted subjugation matter? Remembrance of historical subjugation unveils parallels with contemporary power asymmetries and (neo)imperial dynamics within the EU. Memories of subjugation are *inherently* memories of power that have not simply evaporated, but instead continue to inform how states and policymakers understand the present political and social sphere.[4] At their core, memories of the imperial experience are memories of international relations, of political entities' positioning in the international landscape and hierarchies, as well as of their prescribed and enacted function within a certain political system. As I showed in this dissertation, relational motifs that frame remembrance of co-opted subjugation are reproduced in states' self-image. This reproduction, however, also involves the *reproduction of anxiety* and *insecurity* that are legacies of subjugation and are continuously renewed as EU Members with experience of non-independence voluntarily integrate into a new supranational entity and delegate newly found sovereignty to the EU. Just as many former imperialist states "still cling to their remnants of empire"[5] and are empowered by imperialist legacies,[6] the formerly subjugated states, too, continue to cultivate traumatic memories of the imperial past. Fundamentally, then, "talk of Europeanisation is a reproduction of imperialist narratives,"[7] and as such triggers subjugation angst. If the intentional forgetting of the European past of imperial subjugation failed to provide relief from such anxieties, perhaps it is precisely the purposive and open remembrance that can provide an escape.

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[4] Anne Deighton, 'The Past and the Present: British Imperial Memories and the European Question', in *Memory and Power in Post-War Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past*, ed. Jan-Werner Müller (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 100, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oxford/detail.action?docID=202156.

[5] Maas, Sebe, and Nicolaïdis, 'Echoes of Empire: The Present of the Past', 136.

[6] Liao, 'Presentist or Cultural Memory'.

[7] Dr Dejan Jović, interview with author, 5 May 2021.

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ANNEX I: INTERVIEWEES

The Case of Slovenia

Interviewee:	*Current Affiliation:*	*Relevance:*
Franc Bogovič	MEP	former Mayor, deputy in the National Assembly, Minister for Agriculture and the Environment; vice-chair of Delegation to the EU-Serbia Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee; substitute in Delegation for relations with the PRC
Tanja Fajon	MEP	former journalist; president of Social Democrats; chair of Delegation to the EU-Serbia Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee; member of Committee on Foreign Affairs
Dr Ana Bojinović Fenko	Professor of international relations, University of Ljubljana	expert in European studies, foreign policy, EU's external action, Slovenia's foreign policy, Europeanisation
Dr Jure Gašparič	Senior research fellow, Institute of Contemporary History	former director of the Institute; expert for Slovenia's political history; former state secretary at the Ministry of Education, Science and Sport
Peter Grk	Head of the Department for the Bled Strategic Forum, Directorate for CFSP at MFA	
Bojan Grobovšek	president emeritus of the Slovenian Association for International Relations	former chargés d'affaires in Vienna (immediately after independence); former Ambassador to Poland and Argentina; former journalist
Dr Klemen Grošelj	Member of European Parliament	member of Delegation to the EU-Serbia Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee; Committee on Foreign Affairs; substitute to the EU-Montenegro Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee; Delegation for relations with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly; Subcommittee on Security and Defence
Boštjan Jerman	Representative to Relex (Working Party of Foreign Relations Counsellors), Permanent Representation to the EU	employee of MFA since 1995; expert for multilateralism, non-proliferation, disarmament; member of Slovenia's former Mission to the EU, Mission to the UN
Dr Jožef Kunič	honorary president of the Slovenian Association for International Relations	former Ambassador to Iran and France; former employee of MFA
Dr Oto Luthar	Professor of History, Director of Scientific Research Centre of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts	Institute of Culture and Memory Studies; expert in (Slovenian) memory studies, historic revisionism, Slovenia's history
Marjan Maučec	National Councillor	former secretary of the National Council
Lojze Peterle	Former PM	first Slovenian Prime Minister; former Minister of Foreign Affairs, deputy in the National Assembly, MEP (Committee on Foreign Affairs; Subcommittee on Human Rights; delegations for relations with countries of Southeast Asia; EU-Russia Parliamentary Committee)
Dr Božo Repe	Professor of History, University of Ljubljana	head of research project History of Slovenia (University of Ljubljana)

Janez Sušnik	Former President of the National Council	
Dr Cirila Toplak	Professor of Political Theory, University of Ljubljana	expert in Europeanisation, participatory and decision-making processes, Slovenian political thought; former Director of the Institute of Ethnic Studies; Counsellor on European Affairs to the President of the Republic of Slovenia

The Case of Croatia

Participant:	*Current Affiliation:*	*Relevance:*
Dr Dejan Jović	professor of political science – University of Zagreb	former special advisor to MFEA; former political analyst for President Josipović
Anonymous informal interviewee 1	Member of civil society	
Anonymous informal interviewee 2	Member of civil society	
Anonymous informal interviewee 3	Member of civil society	
Anonymous informal interviewee 4	Member of civil society	

ANNEX II: INDEX OF VOTING COHESION

This analytical tool is further appropriate because Europeanisation of foreign policymaking is often described as 'goodness of fit.'[1] The index of voting cohesion (IVC) is calculated on the scale 1-100 (whereby 100 denotes perfect voting cohesion) and takes into account total agreement (identical votes), partial agreement (solidarity votes), and complete disagreement (divided votes).[2] By identical vote, I mean a case when both parties vote yes, both vote no, or both abstain from voting. By solidarity vote, I mean a case when one party votes either yes or no, and the other party abstains. By divided vote, I mean a case when one party votes yes and the other votes no, or vice versa.

As the EU consists of multiple Members that typically vote as a bloc, I compare Slovenia's and Croatia's votes with the EU majority (meaning that 14 or more Members cast identical votes). Quantitative analysis uses a pre-existing dataset of UNGA voting records,[3] specifically its most recent data within this study's timeframe that includes 416 resolutions adopted with a vote at UNGA'S 71st, 72nd, and 73rd (2015-2018) sessions. Of 416 resolutions, Slovenia and Croatia were absent once (on the same occasion), therefore this vote is excluded from analysis. Slovenia' and Croatia's votes are compared with the majority EU vote, except for six occasions where there was no majority (RCID 5417, 5511, 5526, 5619, 6071, 6081) and which are automatically considered solidarity votes.

Of 415 resolutions, Slovenia cast two solidarity votes (RCID 5392, 5409) to the EU-majority vote. When there was no EU-majority (RCID 5417, 5511, 5526, 5619, 6071, 6081), Slovenia voted with the smaller group once (RCID 5417), with the larger group three times (RCID 5511, 5619, 6081), and twice in a tie. When there is an EU majority, Slovenia's IVC is 99.76, and when there is not majority, its IVC (assuming all the votes without a clear majority are

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[1] Anna Michalski, 'Europeanization of National Foreign Policy: The Case of Denmark's and Sweden's Relations with China: Europeanization of National Foreign Policy', *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 51, no. 5 (September 2013): 884–900, https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12034.

[2] Methodology for IVC is based on: Arend Lijphart, 'The Analysis of Bloc Voting in the General Assembly: A Critique and a Proposal', *The American Political Science Review* 57, no. 4 (1963): 902–17, https://doi.org/10.2307/1952608; Paul Luif, 'EU Cohesion in the UN General Assembly', *The European Union Institute for Security Studies*, no. 49 (December 2003), https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/occ49.pdf.

[3] Erik Voeten, Anton Strezhnev, and Michael Bailey, 'United Nations General Assembly Voting Data', ed. Erik Voeten (Harvard Dataverse, 2009), https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/LEJUQZ.

solidarity votes) is 99.04, indicating near perfect voting cohesion and consequently highly Europeanised foreign policymaking.

Of 415, Croatia cast identical votes with all EU-majority vote. When there was no EU-majority (RCID 5417, 5511, 5526, 5619, 6071, 6081), Croatia voted always voted with the larger group. When there is no EU-majority, its IVC (assuming all the votes without a clear majority are solidarity votes) is 99.28, indicating near perfect voting cohesion and consequently highly Europeanised foreign policymaking.

ANNEX III: QUESTIONNAIRE

SLOVENIA'S FOREIGN POLICY AND EUROPEANISATION

1. Rank the influence of below concepts on Slovenia's foreign policy from most to least important (1-6):

Norms	
Interests	
CFSP	
National foreign policies of individual EU Members	
Slovenia's civil society	
Party political interests	

2. Rank the following documents based on their influence on Slovenia's foreign policy from most to least important (1-3):

Declaration on the functioning of Slovenia in EU institutions	
A Global Strategy for EU's Foreign and Security Policy	
Slovenia's foreign policy strategy	

The influence of historic legacy on Slovenia's foreign policy and foreign policymaking

3. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? *(1 – completely disagree; 2 – somewhat disagree, 3 – neutral, 4 – somewhat agree; 5 – completely agree)*

Slovenia has a rich foreign policy and diplomatic tradition.	
Slovenia's diplomatic and foreign policy mechanisms are less developed because of Slovenia's recent independence.	
Slovenia's historic experiences influence its foreign policy behaviour.	
Slovenia's historic subjugation influences its foreign policy behaviour.	
Slovenia's experience in Yugoslavia and its secession influences its foreign policy.	
Slovenia's diplomats and foreign policymakers are influenced by the legacies of Yugoslav foreign policymaking.	
Slovenia's experience during World War II influences its foreign policy.	
Slovenia's territorial conflicts (Prekmurje, Primorska, Koroška) influence its foreign policy.	
Slovenia's experience in the Austro-Hungarian empire influences its foreign policy.	

4. Assess how strongly Slovenia's historic legacies impact the following aspects of national foreign policy *(1 – no impact; 2 – minor impact, 3 – moderate impact; 4 – strong impact):*

Region	
Issue field	
Instruments and strategies used	
Assertiveness	

5. In your opinion, how does Slovenia's historic legacy of political subjugation manifest in present-day foreign policy behaviour?

Slovenia's foreign policy behaviour

6. To what extent do you agree with the following statements?
(1 – completely disagree; 5 – completely agree)

Slovenia is assertive when fulfilling its foreign policy interests.	
Slovenia is more assertive than other EU Members with similar (material and other) capabilities when fulfilling its foreign policy interests.	
Slovenia's foreign policy behaviour is confident.	
Slovenia's small size is an obstacle to the implementation of Slovenia's foreign policy goals.	
Slovenia primarily fulfils its foreign policy goals through CFSP.	
Slovenia relies on CFSP when fulfilling its foreign policy interests to a greater extent that other EU Members.	
Slovenia's foreign policy is Europeanised.*	
Slovenia's foreign policy is more Europeanised than foreign policy of other EU Members.	
Slovenia's foreign policy norms are aligned with EU's foreign policy norms.	
Slovenia's foreign policy interests and aligned with EU's foreign policy interests.	
Slovenian citizens would assess that CFSP appropriately reflects Slovene foreign policy interests.	
Slovenian citizens would assess that Slovenia is capable of influencing the content of CFSP.	
Slovenia's diplomatic and foreign policy mechanisms are less developed because of Slovenia's recent EU membership.	
The EU's diplomatic and foreign policy mechanisms (such as the European External Action Service) decrease the necessity for Slovenia to expand its national diplomatic and foreign policy mechanisms.	
Slovenia can influence CFSP policymaking to the same extent as other EU Members.	
Opinions of Slovenian foreign policymaking actors (the National Council, the National Assembly, MFA) are reflected in CFSP.	
Slovenia's representatives are always present at meetings of preparatory bodies and the FAC.	

** Europeanised foreign policy is such that foreign policy norms and interests are converged and there is little tension between national foreign policy and EU-level foreign policy.*

Chose an answer you agree with most.

7. In comparison with other smaller EU Members with similar material capabilities (for instance Croatia, Ireland, Baltic states) ...

... Slovenia is in the Foreign Affairs Council **more / equally / less** active.
... Slovenia uses the power of veto **more / equally / less** frequently.
... Slovenia uses the right to policy initiative in CFSP **more / equally / less** often.

8. Slovenia's foreign policy positions regarding discussed CFSP issues are mainly broadly defined...
   - ☐ before Coreper II and FAC meetings.
   - ☐ after Coreper II meetings, but before FAC meetings.
   - ☐ after Coreper II and FAC meetings.

9. In your opinion, what word best describes Slovenia's role during CFSP policymaking?
   - ☐ vodja ('*leader*')
   - ☐ sodelujoča država ('*co-operator*')
   - ☐ poštena posrednica ('*honest broker*')
   - ☐ most ('*bridge*')
   - ☐ nevtralna država ('*neutral country*')
   - ☐ sledilka ('*follower*')
   - ☐ podpornica ('*supporter'*)
   - ☐ other

10. In your opinion, what best describes policy formation of CFSP?
    - ☐ bottom-up
    - ☐ top-down
    - ☐ horizontal

11. In your opinion, what best describes Slovenia's participation in policy formation of CFSP?
    - ☐ bottom-up
    - ☐ top-down
    - ☐ horizontal

12. How often does the below scenario occur?
(1 – never; 2 – rarely; 3 – sometimes, 4 – often; 5 – almost always; 6 – always)

Slovenia agrees with the decisions adopted by FAC.	
Slovenia does not have specifically defined position (is neutral/undecided) concerning the decision adopted by FAC.	
Slovenia *defines* its position concerning the policy issue to be decided by FAC after consulting other EU Member States.	
Slovenia *changes* its position concerning the policy issue to be decided by FAC after consulting other EU Member States.	
Slovenia does not agree with the decision adopted by FAC but does not use veto.	
Slovenia does not agree with the decision adopted by FAC and uses the veto.	
Slovenia abstains from voting in FAC.	

List an instance when the following occurred:

13. Slovenia disagreed with a EU's foreign policy decision:

_____

14. Slovenia completely agreed with a EU's foreign policy decision:

_____

15. Slovenia tried to change foreign policy positions of other EU Members, but was not successful:

_____

16. Other EU Members tried to change Slovenia's foreign policy positions, but were unsuccessful:

_____

17. Slovenia tried to change foreign policy positions of other EU Members, and did so successfully:

_____

18. List an EU Member state to which Slovenia's foreign policymaking is most similar:

_____

OPTIONAL PART

Briefly respond to the following questions.

1. Does Slovenia's past of non-independence influence its confidence?

2. How does Slovenia see itself in the EU?

3. How does Slovenia's history influence its foreign policy?

4. How does Slovenia's history influence its behaviour in foreign policymaking?

5. What are some of the challenges Slovenia is facing during the coordination and formation of CFSP, which takes place inter-governmentally?

6. In what ways (with what strategies/instruments) does Slovenia try to ensure its foreign policy interests are adequately reflected in CFSP?

7. In what ways does Slovenia's history of subjugation influence its perceptions of and behaviour in the EU?

ANNEX IV: SLOVENIA'S REMEMBRANCE

POLITICAL SPEECHES ON NATIONAL HOLIDAYS

Analysed speeches are derived from the official website of the President of the Republic of Slovenia,[4] the official website of the current PM,[5] archival websites of the former PMs.[6] The occasions on which the President and the PM gave a speech on a national holiday were counted for all four years. The national holiday on which the greatest number of speeches was made in the four-year period between 2016 and 2020 (with the maximum number of speeches is 8 – once speech annually by the President and one by the Prime Minister), is considered the most 'important'.

Holiday:	*Event:*	*Speeches:*
Independence		
Statehood Day	declaration of independence (25 June 1991)	**8** (4 - President Pahor; 1 - PM Janša; 3 - PM Cerar)
Independence and Unity Day	independence plebiscite (23 December 1990)	**4** (1 - President Pahor; 1 - PM Janša, PM Cerar, PM Šarec)
Sovereignty Day	Yugoslav National Army's departure from Slovenia (25 October 1991)	**2** (1 - PM Janša, PM Cerar)
Territorial unifications		
Day of Unification of Prekmurje Slovenes with the Mother Nation	incorporation of Prekmurje (17 August 1919)	**5** (4 - President Pahor; 1 - PM Janša)
Return of Primorska to the Motherland	incorporation of Primorska with the Treaty of Peace with Italy (15 September 1947)	**4** (1 - President Pahor; 1 - PM Janša, PM Cerar)
Rudolf Maister Day	seizure and incorporation of Styria and Carinthia into Slovenia by General Rudolf Maister (1919 - 1921)	**1** (1 - President Pahor)
World War II		
Day of Uprising Against the Occupation	establishment of the Anti-Imperialist Front (27 April 1941)	**4** (2 - President Pahor; 2 - PM Cerar)

17 speeches[7] which were thoroughly analysed were selected from the total 28 speeches listed above, such that one speech by the President and/or the PM was examined for each national

[4] 'Medijsko središče: Govori', Predsednik Republike Slovenije, accessed 12 May 2021, https://www.up-rs.si/up-rs/uprs.nsf/medijsko-sredisce?OpenView&RestrictToCategory=govori.

[5] 'Predsednik vlade', Vlada Republike Slovenije, accessed 21 May 2021, https://www.gov.si/drzavni-organi/predsednik-vlade/.

[6] 'Sporočila Za Javnost', Government of the Republic of Slovenia, accessed 12 May 2021, http://www.vlada.si/predsednik_vlade/sporocila_za_javnost/.

[7] Pahor, '73. Obletnica Vrnitve Primorske k Matični Domovini'; Borut Pahor, 'Dan Državnosti', http://www.predsednik.si/up-rs/uprs.nsf/objave/E57A97407EF77B67C1258591002F4855?OpenDocument; Pahor, 'Dan Upora Proti Okupatorju'; Pahor, '100. Obletnica Združitve Prekmurskih Slovencev z Matičnim Narodom'; Borut Pahor, 'Dan Rudolfa Maistra', http://www.predsednik.si/up-rs/uprs.nsf/objave/78355159E2610532C125834E0040E96F?OpenDocument; Pahor, 'Dan Samostojnosti in Enotnosti'; Janša, 'Slovenija Je Domovina Moja'; Janša, 'Poslanica Predsednika Vlade Janeza Janše Za Dan Vrnitve Primorske k Matični Domovini'; Janša, 'Plebiscitno Izročilo Enotnega Naroda'; Janša, 'Poslanica Predsednika Vlade Janeza Janše Ob Dnevu Združitve Prekmurskih Slovencev z Matičnim Narodom'; Janez Janša, 'Dan Suverenosti', https://www.gov.si/novice/2020-10-25-predsednik-vlade-janez-jansa-ob-dnevu-suverenosti-oktobra-1991-se-je-zgodilo-nekaj-kar-je-bilo-se-leto-prej-za-vecino-nepredstavljivo/; Miro Cerar, 'Poslanica Predsednika Vlade Republike Slovenije Dr. Mira Cerarja Ob Dnevu Državnosti', http://vlada.arhiv-spletisc.gov.si/predsednik_vlade_2014_2018/sporocila_za_javnost/sporocilo_za_javnost/a/poslanica_predsednika_vlade_republike_slovenije_dr_mira_cerarja_ob_dnevu_drzavnosti_1385/index.html; Cerar, 'Dan Samostojnosti in Enotnosti'; Cerar, 'Dan Upora Proti Okupatorju';

holiday. When the same President or the same PM gave multiple speeches for the same holiday during the duration of their mandate (for instance in consecutive years), only the most recent speech was selected for analysis. This selection is based on the assumption that within the (relatively) short period of the President's or PM's mandate, their conception of the past has not changed dramatically.

CORROBATORY EVIDENCE: PUBLIC OPINION

The 2003 survey 'the Influence of History Lessons on the Shaping of Slovenian National Identity'[8] is significant for corroborating the presented anchors of Slovenia's remembrance, because it portrays the younger generations' understanding of Slovenia's history (55.2% said they learn most about Slovenian history in school) and because it exhibits state-sanctioned remembrance of Slovenia's history as embedded in history curricula and textbooks. The survey asked high school students to list three most important events for the faith of 'Slovenehood.' Independence (16.2%), Carantania (14.2%), and the beginnings of Slovenian literacy (10.4%) were the most frequently cited 'most important' events, whereas the creation of the first Yugoslavia (27.9%), modernisation in Austria-Hungary (14.0%) and the national liberation fight during World War II (13.6%) were most frequently cited 'second most important' events.

World War II

The great and ongoing remembrance struggle is reflected in the Slovene Public Opinion Survey 1998/2,[9] which was conducted in October and November 1998 and included 1018 adults. The prevailing narrative frames Slovenia's experience primarily in terms of an existential danger (11.7% of respondents agree and further 65.4% strongly agree), whereby Slovenia would disappear altogether had Slovenians not resisted the occupation under the leadership of the Liberation Front (LF) and the Communist Party (CP) (40.0% of respondents strongly agree,

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Miro Cerar, '70. Obletnica Vrnitve Primorske k Matični Domovini', http://vlada.arhiv-spletisc.gov.si/predsednik_vlade_2014_2018/sporocila_za_javnost/sporocilo_za_javnost/a/poslanica_predsednika_vlade_dr_mira_cerarja_ob_70_obletnici_vrnitve_primorske_k_maticni_domovini_1059/index.html; Cerar, 'Danes Živimo Slovensko Državo, Ki Ni Prišla Kot Darilo'; Šarec, 'Domoljubje Ne Pripada Samo Nekaterim, Temveč Je Pravica in Dolžnost Vsakega Izmed Nas'.

[8] Vlado Miheljak, 'Učinki Pouka Zgodovinskih Tem Na Oblikovanje Slovenske Identitete [Data File]' (University of Ljubljana, Slovenian Social Science Data Archives, 2005), https://doi.org/10.17898/ADP_MLAPRE03_V1.

[9] Niko Toš, 'Raziskava Slovensko Javno Mnenje 1998/2 in Razumevanje Preteklosti II [Data File]' (University of Ljubljana, Slovenian Social Science Data Archives, 2000), https://doi.org/10.17898/ADP_SJM982_V1.

14.9% agree, 10.8% are neutral, 7.8% disagree, 13.7% strongly disagree, and 12.8% do not know). Respondents' prevailing assessment of the (Communist) Partisans, operating under the broader aegis of the LF, and the (anti-Communist) Home Guard reveals that Partisans, LF, and CP in Slovenia are mainly remembered in a positive light, whereas the opposite is true for Home Guard. The prevalent narrative (as held by approximately two thirds of respondents of the 1998 survey) thus portrays the Partisans as the only real Slovenian army during World War II (65.2% agree) that fought for Slovene national interests (75.7%) and not the formation of a Communist state, and Partisans as having enjoyed the support of the majority of Slovene population (62.0%). Contrarily, the Home Guard is largely remembered negatively (42.6% report negative and only 13.0% positive association), and approximately half of respondents (48.1%) assessed its efforts as unjustified and undeserving of recognition. In fact, the prevalent remembrance (as held by approximately two thirds of respondents of the 1998 survey) of the Home Guard paints its collaboration with the occupation forces as a betrayal of own nation (57.5%, where only 10.7% disagree), that chiefly benefitted the occupation forces (60.2%) and was supported only by a small or insignificant portion of Slovene population (64.4%). Nonetheless, the mass execution of the Home Guard by the Partisans in May and June 1945 was overwhelmingly seen as a horrific war crime (43.1% agree; 21.0% see it as a great political mistake, 10.6% of respondents see it as a tragic, but unavoidable consequence of a civil war, 7.9% see it as a punishment for the betrayal of own nation, and 6.1% as an understandable act of revenge).

Yugoslavia

Socially held remembrance of SFRY as extracted from the 1998[10] and 2003[11] public opinion polls paints it through the lens of improving living standards and development, as a time of many good, as well as many bad things (1998 poll: 66.9% of responses; whereas 22.9% described it as a time of development and a good life; 2003 poll: 66.1%), yet a time during which the life of Slovenians was good (88.2%) and the position of the Slovenian nation improved (1998 poll: 55.0%; 15.5% say it remained the same and 8.9% that it worsened; 2003

[10] Toš.

[11] Niko Toš, 'Slovensko Javno Mnenje 2003/2: Mednarodna Raziskava o Družini in Narodni Identiteti in Stališča o Lokalni Demokraciji [Data File]' (University of Ljubljana, Slovenian Social Science Data Archives, 2003), https://doi.org/10.17898/ADP_SJM032_V1.

high school survey: 49.3% of respondents believed the position of Slovene nation improved after World War II and the formation of Yugoslavia; 13.6% say it remained the same and only 11.4% that it worsened). Even when considering political rights, remembrance remains mainly positive, and the era is portrayed as a time of gradual improvement. Not only is Tito overwhelmingly perceived positively (84.3%) and the Communist era as a time of relative freedom (71.0%; whereas only 25.9% describe the regime as dictatorial), 46.6% of respondents have personally not felt constrained concerning their human and political rights (31.5% report feeling partially constrained, and only 3.9% describe the time as a period of fear and repression) and approximately half believe the regime in Slovenia was more democratic than elsewhere in SFRY (17.3% disagree), again pointing to a sentiment of Slovenian exceptionalism within SFRY.

Independence

Collective memory of Slovenia's independence as further based on the 1998 public opinion poll which asked respondents to list factors that contributed most to the dissolution of Yugoslavia reveals that the most important reasons listed were Serbian nationalism and politics (37.4% listed it as the most important), economic issues (15.2% cited is as the most important, and 16.6% as the second most important reason), the fact that Yugoslav nations just are not compatible (15.1% listed it as the most important, and 18.2% as the second most important reason), and Slovenia's secession (11.6% cited it as the most important and 13.7% as the second most important reason), which was most frequently credited to Slovenian authorities in the former regime that took a stance against it (34.2%), as well as to the Slovenian nation as a whole (30.1%). Unsurprisingly, the position of Slovenian nation in the independent state is perceived as better than in SFRY (1998 poll: 58.1%, whilst 18.0% claimed it worsened; 2003 survey of high school students reveals similar views; 61.2% said that the position of Slovene nation improved with Slovenia's independence).