
Medici 'Cross Roads':
The Intersection of Warfare and Politics in the Tyrrhenian Sea and Duke Cosimo I's Path Towards the Order of Santo Stefano (1544-1563)



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Upon his landmark scientific discoveries, Isaac Newton employed a much older observation: “If I have seen further, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants.” By no means does this thesis contain as much ‘gravity’ as Newton’s work. Nevertheless, there have been many gentle giants that lifted this timid student from North Carolina high enough to see the distant horizons of scholarship, the European continent, and within my spirit. My personal and academic growth between 2016-2021 would never have happened without them. Amidst the intricate web of love, generosity, and expertise that led me to this moment, there are a few individuals that proved crucial to this thesis and my time at Oxford.

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Images on title page are based upon flags in ASF MP 2077 ins. 1 f. 98-99; galley drawing in Cesare Ciano. *Santo Stefano per Mare e per Terra* […]. (Pisa, 1985), 50; and Giovanni Battista Belluzzi's drawing of *Forte Falcone* (Elba) *c.* 1552 from BNCF, II.I.280, f. 22v printed in Amelio Fara. *Portoferraio* […]. (Turin, 1997), illustration 4.

Medici 'Cross Roads':
The Intersection of Warfare and Politics in the Tyrrhenian Sea and Duke Cosimo I's Path Towards the Order of Santo Stefano (1544-1563)

Recent scholarship has emphasized the socio-economic aspects of the Medici crusading Order of Santo Stefano – especially regarding its establishment and early history (*c.* 1562-1621). Additionally, focus is almost always drawn to Santo Stefano's famous corsair voyages in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries – or the artwork and other cultural aspects related thereto. Yet, Cosimo I de Medici's overwhelming and intricate experiences during the Habsburg-Valois Italian Wars (1494-1559) and the subsequent campaigns in North Africa also directly influenced his plans to establish a military religious order. On the rare occasions that they have been discussed by historians, the first two decades of the Medici galley squadron and coastal fortresses (*c.* 1544-1563) are examined in their own right and completely separated from Santo Stefano and vice versa. The political and military triangle of Cosimo, his Habsburg 'allies,' and threats by his enemies – the Valois, Ottomans, and Barbary corsairs – during the Italian Wars was not only the impetuous towards an expanded naval infrastructure but was important in shaping the emergence of the order. Moreover, Cosimo's Levantine 'crusades' pre-date the order by at least three years. These 'voyages against the infidel' undoubtedly impacted and further shaped Cosimo's strategies towards increasing his maritime presence and founding a military religious order. While connecting Santo Stefano to these rarely-mentioned and arguably neglected events, this thesis sheds light on the intricate tapestry of warfare, politics, and crusading in the early modern Mediterranean as it pertained Cosimo I, duke of Florence and eventually Siena. The Habsburg-Valois conflict's naval and amphibious aspects; the ambitious projects and struggles related to building a Tuscan naval infrastructure and Medici sovereignty; 'crusading' and religious warfare; and Cosimo's political interactions with the Habsburgs, the Valois, and other powers ultimately contributed towards his decision to found the Order of Santo Stefano in 1562.

Long Abstract

This thesis utilizes Duke Cosimo I de Medici's galley squadron, coastal fortresses, and the foundation of the Order of Santo Stefano as a lens to investigate three major topics between 1544-1563: Cosimo's involvement in the last two decades of the Habsburg-Valois Italian Wars (1494-1559) with a special focus on the conflict's naval/amphibious dimensions and political episodes; Mediterranean galley warfare – in terms of deployment, combat, and administration – including its accompanying entrepreneurial and knowledge-exchange networks; and finally Cosimo's experience with crusading and religious warfare in the early modern Mediterranean. Overall, this account of the later Italian Wars and their reverberations into the early 1560s outlines some military and political factors that eventually prompted and allowed Cosimo to found the Order of Santo Stefano in 1562.

Introduction:

This section elaborates upon the themes and framework outlined above. It also addresses the foundational historiography regarding not only Duke Cosimo I and the Order of Santo Stefano, but early modern warfare, 'crusading,' and their interaction with politics. Considering that Cosimo's predecessor (Alessandro de Medici) had been assassinated and that the outcome of the Italian Wars was far from self-evident, "unstable," "insecure," and "uncertain" are by no means exaggerated descriptions of Cosimo's reign. Moreover, the *Introduction* outlines the intricate, multilayered, and personal-driven aspects that characterized warfare and especially politics in sixteenth-century Italy. I propose that both Cosimo's navy and his military religious order were partially intended to strengthen his sovereignty and martial standing. In short, this thesis utilizes specific examples from Cosimo's military campaigns/contributions, diplomacy,

and ‘crusades’ between 1544-1563 to argue that these experiences motivated him to build a robust naval infrastructure – of which Santo Stefano was one aspect.

Chapter 1:

An interruption of the Italian Wars between 1544-1551 provided Cosimo time to begin a program of building new coastal fortresses and warships. On Elba, he constructed a port city, Portoferraio (Cosmopolis), and his engineers revitalized Pisa and Livorno. Additionally, the first Tuscan galley constructed in at least fifty years was launched from the Pisan arsenal in 1547. While discussing the process, logistics, and individuals involved in these projects, *Chapter 1* also introduces the complex geopolitics involving the Spanish-Imperial Habsburgs and the French Valois – and their Ottoman allies – in this period. Moreover, it also discusses the geostrategy that had emerged in the Tyrrhenian Sea. Cosimo’s naval bases in Livorno, Pisa, and Elba were intended to guarantee Medici control over the Piombino Channel – a key maritime route along Italy’s western coast. Yet during this time, Cosimo struggled to obtain the coastal territory of Piombino itself. This chapter reveals the foundational steps Cosimo took to make his vision of a Tuscan navy and Medici military power in the central Tyrrhenian a reality. Moreover, this chapter identifies Cosimo’s place as a tentative Habsburg ally in the larger conflict.

Chapter 2:

By 1551, however, territorial disputes in Parma and a massive ‘Turkish’ armada – with contemporaneous North African campaigns – set the stage for another phase of the Italian Wars. Cosimo’s holdings on Elba had already endured a corsair raid in 1549, and in 1550 his galleys and troops had aided in the Habsburg recapture of Monastir and Mahdia – elements of the Spanish North African *Presidios* (garrisons). In addition to expanding upon how these episodes in Piedmont and the Maghreb impacted Cosimo, *Chapter 2* also explains the intricate diplomatic and military threats surrounding the

Sienese revolt in 1552 and the eventual War of Siena that resulted by 1553. In addition to these multifaceted obstacles and considerations, Cosimo also continued his naval infrastructure projects – both in terms of physically building warships and fortresses and in cultivating business relationships and an expanded administration. He also continued his quest to control the Piombino Channel. By late 1553, the Valois invaded Corsica with aims of securing it as a logistical base closer to Italy. This opened yet another front which further confounded matters. This chapter demonstrates the intricate geopolitical and geostrategic situation involving Piedmont, North Africa, Siena, Piombino, and Corsica that emerged between 1551-1553 – and identifies Cosimo's place amidst this tempest.

Chapter 3:

The War of Siena (*c.* 1553-1555) tested the Medici military machine. Whereas *Chapter 2* reveals that Cosimo had been 'behind the scenes' between 1552-1553, *Chapter 3* emphasizes that his infantry, cavalry, and naval forces – and their underlying logistical infrastructure – proved crucial in securing this region in favor of the Habsburgs by the late 1550s. The core of *Chapter 3* is a political and military history of the War of Siena with special focus on the naval/amphibious fronts along the Tuscan and Sienese coasts and on Corsica between January 1554 and March 1556. Of course, this discussion emphasizes Cosimo's galleys and their administration – and the related political implications. Additionally, these events are contextualized alongside the Habsburg family's internal struggles – as Charles V's authority was passing to his brother Ferdinand and his son and future king of Spain, Philip II. Regarding these dynastic squabbles, Cosimo primarily focused on Siena's status within the intertwined Holy Roman Imperial and Spanish spheres – and how he could rule Siena as well as Piombino. These Habsburg discussions also introduce further considerations regarding North Africa (*c.* 1555) that led to subsequent campaigns in the Maghreb and involved Cosimo and the

Order of Santo Stefano. Even though the city of Siena capitulated in April 1555, combat and increasingly intricate diplomacy in this region endured until at least 1557.

Chapter 4:

This chapter elaborates upon Cosimo's concerns and struggles regarding Siena. Among the new issues that challenged Cosimo's position was the election of the new Pope Paul IV Carafa who was openly hostile to the Habsburgs and through association, Cosimo. Paul reignited the Italian Wars in 1556, shattering the short-lived Truce of Vaucelles that had been concluded earlier that year. This chapter delves deeper into the political-military relationship between Tuscany and the Spanish Habsburgs. By 1557, Cosimo also became the duke of Siena at the price of a military vassalage agreement with the newly-crowned king of Spain (Philip II) and by relinquishing any claims over most of the region's important ports: Piombino, Orbetello, Porto Ercole, Porto Santo Stefano, and most of Elba. These territories had weighed heavily in Spanish Habsburg geostrategic thinking for decades, and, much to his chagrin, Cosimo had to accept Spanish *Presidios* within 'his' territory along Siena's coast – while long-coveted Piombino eluded him yet again. His new responsibilities – and continued legal and military battles – over Siena obviously shaped his ambitions regarding the ducal navy. After consulting with some of his trusted advisors, Cosimo outlined his vision for a coastal defense system and his fleet in a *memoria* (memorandum) preserved in the Florentine archives. Even though the Italian Wars officially ended with the Peace of Cateau Cambrésis in 1559, there had already been several peace agreements in previous years. Thus, Cosimo justifiably expected that he would continue to be in the midst of the conflict between the Habsburgs, the French, the Ottomans, and the Barbary corsairs in the coming years. Moreover, he had to confront the new reality of a Spanish Habsburg military occupation of 'his' territory and the delicate diplomacy related thereto. As outlined in his *memoria* and by his

advisors, Cosimo's naval infrastructure was seen as a solution to both overcome these threats and raise his status amidst the 'great powers.' Throughout the chapter, the ducal galleys, logistics (i.e. coastal fortresses/bases), and 'fleet' administration are discussed and analyzed within the context of the contemporary Mediterranean system(s) of war.

Chapter 5:

After briefly unveiling Cosimo's continued affairs in Siena and Spain's new *Presidios* between 1559-1560, this chapter reprises the theme of Habsburg concerns and obligations in North Africa. Specifically, this discussion focuses on Cosimo's experience in the famously failed siege of Djerba (1560) and his other personal 'crusades' – which includes a detailed account and analysis of one such 'crusade' in the summer of 1559. This episode highlights the considerations and complexities of the balance of power in the eastern Mediterranean; late medieval and early modern crusading; and practical aspects of galley deployment and operation. Since this mission pre-dates any papal approval for Santo Stefano, this naturally raises the question whether 'crusading' was the real reason to establish a religious order or if Cosimo had more practical, *Realpolitik* matters in mind. With a primary focus on the duke's personal deliberations, this chapter emphasizes the role of 'crusading' in all levels of the Spanish Habsburg sphere and its impact on military and geopolitical matters circa 1560.

Chapter 6:

This chapter opens with a discussion of the new geostrategic reality of the 'post-Djerba' Mediterranean and especially delves deeper into the interaction between crusading and military-political matters. Moreover, it also echoes Cosimo's *memoria* mentioned in *Chapter 4* since these notes also included his vision for founding a military religious order. In his appeals to the newly-elected Pope Pius IV from January 1560, Cosimo framed this proposed order within crusading rhetoric. Indeed, threats from


‘Muslim’ corsairs and the Ottomans were a real concern during the Italian Wars and especially after Djerba; however, there were many other factors to consider. The discussion in the previous chapters is used in this chapter to outline the intricate web which linked threats from piracy and other would-be invaders; the Spanish Habsburg presence in the Italian Peninsula; the role of the papacy in the Italian Wars; domestic concerns within Tuscany and Siena; and other considerations revealed by Cosimo’s wartime and ‘crusading’ experiences that prompted – and allowed – Cosimo to found the Order of Santo Stefano in 1562. Furthermore, this chapter features a detailed episode which is quite famous in Santo Stefano’s historiography – the galley *Lupa*’s capture by North African corsairs off the Spanish coast in 1563. Part of a 4-galley squadron, Cosimo dispatched the *Lupa* to aid in Philip II’s efforts to relieve Oran which was besieged by Muslim forces in 1563. As one of the last remaining Spanish North African *Presidios*, Oran maintained both strategic potential and especially nostalgic and religious value as Philip formulated his Mediterranean grand strategy. Unlike Djerba, this Spanish Habsburg mission was a success. Even though Cosimo’s galleys did not participate in the combat around Oran, the order still lost one of its galleys. Yet, this single episode underscores the complexities and nuances of warfare, politics, and crusading in the sixteenth-century Mediterranean. Specifically, this chapter demonstrates the state of Cosimo’s general military preparedness, the readiness of his galleys, and his experiences within the Spanish naval infrastructure. Moreover, it explores how the duke utilized – or planned to utilize – the papally-backed Order of Santo Stefano to his own political and military advantage.

Conclusion:

This detailed, chronological narrative of Cosimo's reign between 1544-1563 contributes to historiographical discussions regarding the intertwined political and military role of smaller/middling powers in early modern Europe; the quest by smaller powers to assert their sovereignty; and the complexity of Mediterranean naval warfare from both an administrative and operational standpoint. After weighing the evidence regarding these issues, the *Conclusion* proceeds with a quick overview of the first 'post-Italian Wars' decade and emphasizes how landmark events such as the siege of Malta (1565) and the famous Battle of Lepanto (1571) seemingly reinforced Cosimo's geostrategic perspective. Yet, as the remainder of the sixteenth century continued, it became clear that dramatic changes to the balance of political and military power had altered the Mediterranean world. In striking contrast to the massive conglomerate fleets required during the Italian Wars and especially leading up to Lepanto, the major players had misunderstood the future of Mediterranean warfare. Over the last quarter of the sixteenth century, large-scale naval conflicts gave way to small-scale corsair raids – which gave an enduring role to the Order of Santo Stefano and its famous corsair missions. The *Conclusion* looks ahead to briefly address how Cosimo's successors – his sons Francesco I and Ferdinando I – used their father's galleys, fortresses, and especially the Order of Santo Stefano to adapt to this new reality both within Tuscany-Siena and across the Mediterranean.




Cosimo's Duchy of Florence & Other Holdings in the 1550s
Based on Carta 1 on p. xv in
Giorgio Spini. *Cosimo I e L'Indipendenza del Principato Mediceo.* (Florence, 1980)




The Sienese & Corsican Fronts
(*c.* 1552-1555)



COSIMO'S HOLDINGS AMIDST THE PRESIDIOS *C.* 1559
BASED UPON "IL GRANDUCATO AI TEMPI DI FERDINANDO II" ON P. 376 IN FURIO DIAZ. *IL GRANDUCATO DI TOSCANA—I MEDICI.* (TURIN , 1982)



The *Lupa*'s "Voyage Against the Infidel" July - August 1559
Based on ASF MP 2077 f. 161-163 and 205-211
Where possible, modern names and spellings have been used



SANTO STEFANO'S FIRST MISSION, JUNE-AUGUST 1563

Introduction

> …vessels flying the red eight-pointed cross of St Stephen became a common and feared sight in the Mediterranean. Even more important, the Medici became firmly associated with the order, a thing that would ultimately condition the Florentine dynasty's foreign policy.[1]

In October 2016, I started a doctoral project on the Medici grand dukes and the Tuscan crusading Order of Santo Stefano. I had envisioned a project that would begin with the first Medici duke of Florence, Alessandro de' Medici (r. 1531-1537), and his successor, distant cousin, and founder of Santo Stefano, Cosimo I de Medici, and carry forward until the death of Cosimo's grandson, Grand Duke Cosimo II (r. 1609-1621). An overly ambitious PhD candidate, I imagined that I would not only detail the military history of the Medici ducal galley fleet between 1531-1621, but also address how the Order of Santo Stefano originated and evolved; how the grand dukes used the order to shape their relations with other powers; and the actual military and strategic role of Santo Stefano in sixteenth and seventeenth-century conflicts. Overall, as Niccolò Capponi beckoned scholars on this subject to do, I had hoped to investigate "the operational side of the question, and how [Santo Stefano] affected the tactical employment of the Medici fleet."[2] Additionally, I wanted to relate all of this to the larger conflicts between the Spanish Habsburgs and the Ottomans and compare the administration of the Medici navy to other Italian states – especially Venice and Genoa.

With all of this in mind, it became clear that I would first have to identify how the 'pre-Santo Stefano' Medici fleet actually functioned. (i.e. its "tactical employment" and general administration) Moreover, such overarching questions required that I assess the 'pre-Santo Stefano' duchy of Florence in terms of its military and diplomatic standing with other powers and its actual military and strategic role – while also touching upon

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[1] Niccolò Capponi. *Victory of the West* […]. (Cambridge, MA, 2007), 86. In many ways, this passage was my 'jumping off point' for my research questions.
[2] Niccolò Capponi. "Guns and profit […]," in Carlo Beltrame and Renato Gianni Ridella, eds. *Ships & Guns* […]. (Oxford, 2011), 62.

Duke Cosimo I's dynastic and personal ambitions. After all, in order to assess how the order did or did not impact these areas, I needed to first understand what they looked like *before* Cosimo founded Santo Stefano and became its first grand master in 1562.

As I began researching the topic, however, I was surprised that there was little in the existing historiography on Cosimo's navy.[3] There was quite a bit on the cultural[4] and political aspects of his reign,[5] and of course, the Order of Santo Stefano.[6] Regarding the latter, Franco Angiolini emerged as one of the leading scholars. Angiolini has demonstrated how Santo Stefano proved valuable in establishing collaborative relationships with the great Tuscan aristocratic families and the Medici grand dukes' other Tuscan and Sienese 'subjects' – in other words, the order's domestic benefits for both the grand dukes and its members.[7] Yet, many questions remained regarding Santo Stefano's role – both envisioned and actual – within the larger balance of military and political power in the Mediterranean. Angiolini touched upon some general information regarding the relationship between the 'Medici navy' and the order through the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but did not engage specifically with this issue. Again, my goal was to not only elaborate upon this interaction, but to also examine the administration of

[3] With the notable exception of Camillo Manfroni. "La Marina Militare del Granducato Mediceo Parte I […]." in *Rivista Marittima* […]. (Rome, 1895). In English, see also Gregory Hanlon. *The Twilight of a Military Tradition* […]. (London, 1998), 37-41.
[4] Recently, see Alessio Assontis and Brian Sandberg, eds. *The Grand Ducal Medici and their Archive (1537-1743)*. (Turnhout, Belgium, 2016); and Maurizio Arafioli and Marta Caroscio, eds. *The Grand Ducal Medici and the Levant* […]. (Turnhout, Belgium, 2016).
[5] Especially Giorgio Spini. *Cosimo I e l'Indipendenza del Principato Mediceo*. (Florence, 1980); and "The Medici Principality […]," in *Journal of Italian History* Number 3. (Winter 1979). See also Roberto Cantagalli. *Cosimo I de' Medici, granduca di Toscana.* (Milan, 1985); and Alessandra Contini. "Aspects of Medicean diplomacy in the 16th century," in Daniela Frigo, ed. *Politics and Diplomacy in Early Modern Italy* […]. Translated by Adrian Belton. (Cambridge, 2000).
[6] Especially Gino Guarnieri. *I Cavaliere di Santo Stefano* […]. (Pisa, 1928); and *L'Ordine di Santo Stefano nei suoi aspetti organizzativi interni sotto il Gran Magistero Mediceo*. 4 Volumes. (Pisa, 1966). See also Rodolfo Bernardini, ed. *Le Imprese e i Simboli* […]. (Pisa, 1989); and *Atti del Convegno L'Ordine di Santo Stefano e il Mare* […]. (Pisa, 2001). Gerald Warner. *The Sacred Military Order of St. Stephen Pope and Martyr*. (Pisa, 2004) is largely an attempt to translate and update Guarnieri's work.
[7] Franco Angiolini. *I cavalieri e il principe* […] (Florence, 1996).

Santo Stefano's galleys – alongside the ducal galleys – and contextualize this process with other Italian navies.

I figured that at least some of the answers to my questions could be found in the *Archivio di Stato di Pisa*'s Santo Stefano collection.[8] My first research trip to Pisa in March 2017 endeavored to find documents on the order's galleys. Overall, this visit revealed how Angiolini had written the book that he did. Most of what was preserved in Santo Stefano's archives centered around *commende* agreements (i.e. the order's financial benefits for its members) and proofs of nobility used by individuals and families to join the order. I already knew about the arguments regarding these issues. Angiolini and others had already proven that Cosimo founded the order in pursuit of a stronger and mutually beneficial relationship with prominent members of Tuscan society – whilst using tools such as *commende* to balance the traditional rights of his aristocratic 'subjects' within the framework of his "patrimonial state."[9] What I sought was information on the galleys.

While in Pisa, I discovered that the Santo Stefano archivist Christine Pennison had diligently searched Pisa's archive for these sources.[10] Even though she had retired from the archives before my work started, Pennison's overview revealed that glimpses of the galleys were scattered throughout the Santo Stefano collection's *zibaldoni* (bundles of miscellaneous documents). I managed to find a few obscure references in these seemingly countless – and unindexed – pages, but aside from the order's first statutes and a few rosters of knights aboard the galleys, I never found anything substantial relating to the

[8] ASP Inventario 20 Ordine dei Cavalieri di S. Stefano – Repertori e Memorie 1563-XIXs.
[9] Angiolini. *I cavalieri e il principe*, 20-24; Angiolini. "Il Granducato di Toscana, l'Ordine di Santo Stefano e il Mediterraneo (Secc. XVI-XVIII)," in Isabel Cristina Ferreira Fernandes, ed. *Ordens Militares* […] Volume 1. (Lisbon, 1999), 45; Furio Diaz. *Il Granducato Di Toscana: I Medici*. (Turin, 1987), 192-193; and Hanlon. *The Twilight*, 268-270.
[10] Christine V. Pennison. "The Grand duchy of Tuscany's contribution to the battle of Lepanto […]," in Kostas G. Tsiknakis, ed. *Atti Dell'Incontro Scientifico L'Eco Della Battaglia di Lepanto nel Mondo Europeo* (Venice-Athens, 2012).

order's naval squadron.[11] Moreover, through Pennison's article, I learned that Santo Stefano's *Libro delle Prede* (Prizes) – a detailed account of the knights' missions – was destroyed while on loan in Naples during the Second World War.[12] Furthermore, both Angiolini – whom I had the pleasure of meeting during my time in Pisa – and Pennison revealed that any information on Tuscany's and Santo Stefano's galleys would be found in the *Archivio di Stato di Firenze*.

Over three separate research trips to Florence between 2017 and 2019, my thesis assumed its final form. Originally, I had imagined that a discussion regarding Cosimo's navy and his reasons for founding the Order of Santo Stefano would cover one or two chapters at the most. Yet, the rich information from this earlier period between 1536-1574 – largely contained in Florence's *Mediceo del Principato Carteggio Universale di Cosimo I* collection[13] alongside a few others[14] – pleasantly surprised both my supervisor and me. From the beginning of this research, I had always felt that Cosimo's motivations for founding the Order of Santo Stefano went far beyond its stated purpose of 'crusading' or the domestic, interpersonal reasons identified by Angiolini.[15] Yet, these were certainly factors.

Although the order is not explicitly discussed until my final chapter, my thesis outlines Cosimo's path towards Santo Stefano from a diplomatic and military angle. My research features a thematic examination of how the duke of Florence responded to seemingly constant political and military threats. The Order of Santo Stefano comprised just one of his responses. Throughout my thesis, I explicitly demonstrate that the kaleidoscopic military and political circumstances of Cosimo's reign (1537-1574) pushed

[11] More sources are likely buried somewhere amidst this extensive collection.
[12] She adds that most of these records had been transcribed in Guarnieri. *I Cavaliere di Santo Stefano*.
[13] ASF MP 329-659A.
[14] Especially ASF *Miscellanea Medicea*.
[15] This view was influenced by Capponi. *Victory of the West*, 109-110. For part of his discussion, Capponi cites Angiolini. "Il Granducato di Toscana."

him to make decisions – and constantly reassess and adjust those decisions – to construct a sophisticated system of coastal fortresses; deploy a squadron of war galleys; and found a military religious order seemingly *ex nihilo*. This more focused investigation illuminates and explains twenty years of Tuscan history (*c.* 1544-1563) that can contribute to several historiographical discussions concerning the early modern Mediterranean world and Europe as a whole: the interaction between war and politics; the Habsburg-Valois Italian Wars (1494-1559); religious conflict; and early modern militaries – both in terms of naval/amphibious warfare and their administrative requirements.

Aside from the fact that Cosimo's navy and the Order of Santo Stefano have not been properly contextualized, analyzed, or at least reassessed – especially in English – in decades,[16] my research also offers a new, 'Tuscan' angle to better understand extensively covered figures such as the Habsburg Emperor Charles V; his son King Philip II; their allies the Toledo clan of Naples; and especially the Genoese patricians.[17] My thesis also provides a glimpse into the motivations and actions of the French Valois kings François I and Henri II; the Ottomans under Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent; and the North African corsairs. Moreover, given my focus on naval matters, I am able to demonstrate the inner workings of galley fleets – in terms of their construction, administration, and deployment – as well as other military matters of this period from 'the ground up.' In other words, as opposed to assuming the overarching perspective of a 'great power' such as Spain, France, or the Ottomans, my thesis provides insight into early modern militaries by using the experiences of a second-rank power and ruler: Duke Cosimo I of Florence.

[16] If not centuries or even at all in some cases.
[17] Specifically the Doria and the Centurione. Concerning famous Duke of Alba of the Alvarez de Toledo family, see especially William Maltby. *Alba: A Biography of Fernando Alvarez de Toledo* […]. (Berkley, 1983).

Regarding early modern naval warfare, I largely investigate galley combat and administration from the 'squadron' as opposed to the 'fleet' level.

War and Politics

Why offer another study on early modern Mediterranean galley warfare when excellent works such as John F. Guilmartin's *Gunpowder & Galleys*[18] and Philip Williams's *Empire and Holy War in the Mediterranean*[19] already exist? Even though both admirably aspired to extend their overviews across the entire sixteenth-century Mediterranean, they ultimately focused on certain operational and administrative aspects of galley warfare and drew most heavily on those galleys that were directly managed by the Spanish state and its agents. Moreover, the Spanish Habsburg galley fleet is not clearly depicted as a conglomerate force of vessels from Spain, Genoa, Naples, and Sicily with support from the pope, Monaco, the Knights of Malta, and Tuscany. The idea of a composite 'Christian' fleet like the one at the Battle of Lepanto (1571) – presented in most works as a 'Spanish fleet' – was a relatively recent development that arose in response to Ottoman sea power over the early sixteenth century.

Fabrizio Filioli Uranio[20] places the contemporary papal fleet within an "international republic of galleys," and this concept easily applies to the Spanish Habsburgs – and arguably to the Ottomans and the Venetians as well. In short, the galley fleets of the Mediterranean 'great powers' comprised of smaller squadrons originating from various states, individuals, and organizations. Indeed, there are works on the Genoese fleet,[21] and Naples and Sicily have also been extensively researched in Italian.[22]

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[18] John F. Guilmartin Jr. *Gunpowder and Galleys* […]. (Second Edition) (Annapolis, 2003).
[19] Philip Williams. *Empire and Holy War* […]. (London, 2014).
[20] Fabrizio Filioli Uranio. *La squadra navale pontificia nella repubblica internazionale delle galere: secoli XVI-XVII*. (Ariccia, Italy, 2016).
[21] Especially: Thomas Allison Kirk. *Genoa and the Sea* […]. (Baltimore, 2005). See also Vilma Borghesi: *Vita del Principe Giovanni Andrea Doria* […]. (Genoa, 1997); Borghesi's contributions to the *Miscellanea*

Yet, very few works have investigated the nuances of Spanish Habsburg galley administration and warfare and how truly 'Italian' it actually was.[23] Concerning this theme in another article, Philip Williams observes:

> In assessing the naval history of the Mediterranean it is, perhaps, easy to overlook the independent princes of Italy, or rather to assume that they were either clients of Madrid or so politically and militarily insignificant that they deserve little or no consideration. Men of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries would have rejected this assumption on both military and political grounds.[24]

Williams's observation resonates to the larger theme of individual agency (i.e. princely agency) within a larger power (i.e. empire) in European political historiography – particularly in discussions related to the Holy Roman Empire.[25] Regarding the sixteenth-century Mediterranean, much attention has been paid to 'the center' (i.e. Spain, Venice, or the Ottoman Empire), but the role of 'the periphery' – especially Italian princes and North African agents – has been brushed aside. Considering the mosaic nature of the 'Spanish fleet,' however, it is important to remember that these 'peripheral' powers – such as Cosimo and the Genoese patricians – maintained their own reasons for contributing their galley squadrons and availing their ports to 'central' Habsburg power. Lacking an imperial constitution, however, this political-military alliance was maintained through a shared understanding of security in the Mediterranean against the Ottomans – and in Cosimo's time, the French as well.

Storica Ligure; the articles in Carlo Beltrame, ed. *Boats, Ships and Shipyards* […]. (Oxford, 2003); and Beltrame and Ridella, eds. *Ships & Guns*.

[22] Especially the entries in Rosella Cancila, ed. *Mediterraneo in armi (secc. XV-XVIII)*. 2 Volumes (*Quaderni – Mediterranea: richerche storiche; 4*) (Palermo, 2007); works by Valentina Favarò: *La modernizzazione militare nella Sicilia di Filippo II,* Volume 10 of *Quaderni Mediterranea* (Palermo, 2009); and "Monitioni, Vettovaglie et Dinari […]," in *Mediterranea Recerche storiche* Anno IV – December 2007; and especially the articles in Giuseppe Galasso and Aurelio Musi, eds. *Carlo V, Napoli e Il Mediterraneo* […]. (Naples, 2001).

[23] Exceptions include Danilo Marrara. *Toscana E Spagna nell'Età Moderna e Contemporanea* […]. (Pisa, 1998); and Arturo Pacini. *'Desde Rosas a Gaeta' La costruzione della rotta spagnola* […]. (Milan, 2013).

[24] Philip Williams. "Past and present: the forms and limits of Spanish naval power in the Mediterranean, (1590 – 1620)" in Mario Rizzo et al., eds. *Le Forze del Principe* […] Volume 1. (Murcia, 2004), 244.

[25] For example, see Peter H. Wilson. *War, state and society in Württemberg, 1677-1793*. (Cambridge, 1995). Regarding the Napoleonic Empire, see Frederick C. Schneid. "Kings, Clients and Satellites in the Napoleonic Imperium," in *Journal of Strategic Studies* Volume 31, Number 4. (August 2008).

As I discuss throughout the thesis, Duke Cosimo I's galleys and his naval infrastructure were definitely a part of Spain's 'Italian' assets but were by no means "clients of Madrid." Yet, aside from Camillo Manfroni's nineteenth-century book-length article on the subject,[26] no comprehensive study of the sixteenth-century Tuscan fleet exists. More recently, there are a few articles by Franco Angiolini[27] and Marco Gemignani[28] and books on the Medici ports at Livorno[29] and Portoferraio (Elba),[30] but overall, these tend to be wider overviews of the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries. Moreover, with the exception of articles by Angiolini[31] and another by Raymond Role,[32] Cosimo's coastal fortresses and galleys are rarely contextualized within Spanish Habsburg aims and ambitions in the mid-sixteenth century. Manfroni's detailed 'article' also strives to do this, but his intentional, exclusive focus on naval affairs comes at the expense of skipping over the larger military situation, politics, and other issues of this period. Philip Williams adds that "contemporaries clearly [had] a sense of the command of the seas, *el señorio de la mar*,"[33] and my thesis seeks to demonstrate how

[26] Manfroni. "La Marina Militare."
[27] Franco Angiolini. "Arsenali e Costruzioni Navali Nella Toscana dei Medici" in Lorenza de Maria and Rita Turchetti, eds. *Rotte e Porti del Mediterraneo Dopo la Caduta Dell'Impero Romano d'Occidente* […]. (Genoa, 2004); "L'Ordine di Santo Stefano, i Toscani e il Mare," in *Atti del Convegno L'Ordine Di Santo Stefano e il Mare* (Pisa, 2001); "L'arsenale di Pisa fra politica ed economia: continuità e mutamenti (secoli XV-XVI)" in Ennio Cocina, ed. *Arsenali e citta nell'Occidente Europeo*. (Florence, 1987); "L'Arsenale Mediceo: La Politica Marittima dei Medici e le Vicende dell'Arsenale a Pisa" in *Livorno e Pisa* […]. (Pisa, 1980).
[28] Marco Gemignani. "The Navies of the Medici […]," in John B. Hattendorf and Richard W. Unger, eds. *War at Sea in the Middle Ages and Renaissance*. (Woodbridge, England, 2002), pp. 169-185.
[29] Dario Matteoni. *Le città nella storia d'Italia: Livorno*. (Rome, 1988); Giacinto Nudi et al., eds. *Livorno e Pisa: due città e un territorio nella politica dei Medici* […]. (Pisa, 1980); and Carlo Tesi. *Livorno dalla sua origine sino ai nostri tempi. Opera storica popolare*. 3 Volumes. (Livorno 1865-1868); and Antonio Piccini. "Fondazione e sviluppo del porto di Livorno," in *Rivista Marittima*, anno CXLIV, n. 9, settembre 2011.
[30] Amelio Fara. *Portoferraio: Architettura e Urbanistica, 1548-1877*. (Turin, 1997).
[31] Franco Angiolini. "Spagna, Toscana e Politica Navale," in *Atti del Convegno Le Relazioni tra Spagna e Toscana* […] (Pisa, 2007); "Il Granducato di Toscana e il Mediterraneo dopo Lepanto" in *Sardegna, Spagna e Stati italiani nell'età di Filippo II* […]. (Cagliari, 1998).
[32] Raymond Role. "The Naval bases of Grand Duke Cosimo I de'Medici […]," in *Fort* Volume 36. (2008).
[33] Philip Williams. "The strategy of galley warfare in the Mediterranean (1560-1620)," in Enrique Garcia Hernan & Davide Maffi, eds. *Guerra y sociedad en la monarquia hispanica* […] Volume I. (Madrid, 2006), 903.

the duke of Florence fit into the Spanish Habsburgs' quest to maintain control of the western Mediterranean – while simultaneously pursuing his own ambitions.

In his collaborative work on European navies, Alan James emphasizes that the Reformation created "[political outsiders] to whom sea power offered […] an acceptable, alternative means of demonstrating the martial prowess needed to secure legitimacy, authority, or even survival in their struggle to ultimately join the inner circle of great powers."[34] This is what James has labelled the "outside-in" factor. He emphasizes that sixteenth-century political forces pushed various early modern states – both major and second-rank powers – towards "modernizing" and expanding their fleets. Echoing the argument advanced by Jeremy Black,[35] James emphasizes that these "outside-in" factors pushed states towards technological advances (i.e. a military revolution).[36] New weapons and techniques themselves did not single-handedly 'revolutionize' early modern navies. Instead, James observes that for sixteenth-century rulers, "the pursuit of stability, security, and status […] the matter of protecting personal authority, or sovereignty, [is what] mattered most."

As evidence of this challenge and how it interacted with naval affairs, James uses King Henry VIII to demonstrate that his "political survival, security, and success depended upon legitimacy […]" and that "his well-known dynastic insecurity subsequently nurtured considerable imperial ambitions, not in the sense of overseas expansion but in the definition of his personal authority." According to James, "a formidable navy not only had practical benefits to this end [… but] also provided another

[34] Alan James, Carlos Alfaro Zaforteza, and Malcolm Murfett. *European Navies and the Conduct of War*. (New York, 2019). Chapter 1: "European navies and princely power."
[35] Jeremy Black. *A Military Revolution?* […]. (Atlantic Highlands, NJ, 1991).
[36] Most famously expressed in Geoffrey Parker. *The Military Revolution* […]. (Second Edition) (Cambridge, 1996). Concerning Cosimo's era, see especially Simon Pepper. "The Siege of Siena in its International Context," in Mario Ascheri et al., eds. *L'ultimo Secolo Della Repubblica Di Siena* […]. (Siena, 2008).

powerful statement of his military stature." Combined with an earlier discussion on Emperor Charles V, James underscores that the Mediterranean's "traditional powers" (Spain, the pope, and the Ottoman Empire) did not rely upon naval power as a way to "define their status." However, "states and communities with confessional identities at odds with the traditional political structure of Europe" and other second-rank powers could use navies to build such status. According to him, over the sixteenth century, fleets became "something which could contribute to the consolidation of political standing and legitimacy."

Thus, Cosimo's maritime efforts are a perfect case study to demonstrate James's proposed "outside-in" factors as a driving force in sixteenth-century naval warfare and military infrastructures. After the Medici family was exiled from Florence in the late fifteenth century, the Florentine Republic experienced brief revivals between 1494-1512 and 1527-1530. As the Italian Wars continued into the 1530s, Charles V and Pope Clement VII strategically reinstated the Medici – first with Clement's nephew, Alessandro de' Medici – as the dukes of Florence to better secure Tuscany and central Italy in their favor. Cosimo only assumed this title after his distant cousin (Alessandro) was assassinated in an intricate plot which necessitated the emperor's intervention.[37] Considering such turbulent politics, alongside Henry VIII, Cosimo offers another example of an early modern ruler in pursuit of "stability, security, and status" in the face of the "traditional powers" and his own 'subjects.' As I demonstrate throughout my thesis, the duke's navy was at least partially created and employed with these intertwined military and political motivations in mind.

[37] Detailed in Stefano Dall'Aglio. *The Duke's Assassin: Exile and Death of Lorenzino de'Medici*. Translated by Donald Weinstein. (New Haven, CT, 2015). See especially R. Burr Litchfield, *Emergence of a Bureaucracy*: *The Florentine Patricians* (Princeton, 1986) for more information on this era.

Cosimo's fortified harbors at Pisa, Livorno, and on Elba; his galleys; and the Order of Santo Stefano are best understood within this context. Indeed, these were primarily built for practical security reasons to pursue a naval policy, but one should not neglect the duke's quest to prove his status among Tuscans – including rivals – and especially towards other Italian principalities; the Spanish and imperial Habsburgs; and the French Valois that fought for dominance over Italy. After all, Italian princes often built citadels and fortifications less for their "pure military utility [and] more with a concern for dynastic aggrandizement,"[38] and Cosimo was no exception.

In one of his many articles, Angiolini placed the Knights of Santo Stefano and the Medici galley squadron within different "phases" of Mediterranean warfare.[39] The initial phase spanned from 1547 – when the first Tuscan galley was launched from the reconstructed arsenal at Pisa – until the end of the War for Cyprus (1570-73). Angiolini argues that, as Ottoman (Muslim) sea power grew during this period, Cosimo sought to build up Tuscany as the Spanish Habsburgs' primary naval ally in their wars against the sultan. Undoubtedly, the Order of Santo Stefano emerged from an intricate web which linked the Spanish Habsburgs, the papacy, Tuscan society, and threats from the French Valois, Barbary piracy, and the Ottomans. My thesis seeks to reexamine Angiolini's assumptions that Cosimo's overall strategy was concerned with making himself an "indispensable ally" of the Habsburgs during this period while emphasizing the duke's own geo-political and military considerations. I demonstrate that Cosimo's naval infrastructure and galleys were one of the tools he used to pursue his – albeit fluid – vision for Medici Tuscany and its place in the Mediterranean.

[38] David Parrott. "The Utility of Fortifications in Early Modern Europe: Italian Princes and Their Citadels, 1540-1640" in *War in History* Volume 7, Number 2. (2000), 149.
[39] Angiolini. "*Il Granducato di Toscana*."

The Habsburg-Valois Italian Wars (1494-1559)

Much of the naval and military collaboration between the Medici and the Habsburgs that I discuss occurred during the Italian Wars. In general, historians deem this conflict as "an important case of military experimentation and innovation that reshaped the practices of war far beyond Italy."[40] Yet, scholars have generally neglected the last two decades of combat (*c*. 1540-1559) – the precise setting of my thesis. Within the past decade, there is the excellent overview by Michael Mallett and Christine Shaw which discusses all stages of the conflict in adequate detail.[41] Yet, this is literally the only Anglophone book on this war listed in Gregory Hanlon's extensive bibliography of Italian history.[42] Niccolò Capponi also provides a helpful overview of this long and complicated conflict,[43] but still, his bibliography – alongside Mallett's and Shaw's – demonstrates how episodic and sporadic the historiography of this conflict that "reshaped the practices of war" remains in any language.[44]

This is not to say that there are not studies on the war between 1540-1559. At the same time, however, those that do exist are patches in a historiographical quilt that has not yet been stitched together.[45] By no means does my thesis cover everything in the latter stages of the war. However, I do seek to bring together significant portions of the military – particularly naval – and political activity that shaped the last two decades of a 65-year-long ordeal. In many ways, my thesis can be described as a naval and political

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[40] Brian Sandberg. *War and Conflict in the Early Modern World, 1500-1700*. (Cambridge, 2016), 32.
[41] Michael Mallett and Christine Shaw. *The Italian Wars, 1494-1559* […]. (Harlow, England, 2012). In French, see also Jean-Claude Zancarini and Jean-Louis Fournel. *Les guerres d'Italie. Des batailles pour l'Europe (1494-1559)*. (Paris, 2003).
[42] Gregory Hanlon. *Early Modern Italy 1550-1800, A comprehensive Bibliography of titles in English and French*. 12th Edition, summer 2016. Listed under "Political and Administrative History" in the "Diplomatic and military" subheading, pp. 69-96. PDF available for free via his academia.edu page.
[43] Niccolò Capponi. *Guerre d'Italia*. (Milan, 2016).
[44] Most comprehensive studies have tended to focus on the conflict until Charles V captured Rome in 1527. Most famously, Judith Hook. *The Sack of Rome 1527*. (London, 1972). Marco Pellegrini. *Le guerre d'Italia 1494-1530*. (Bologna, 2009) is a recent Italian example of this trend.
[45] For example, see Michele M. Rabà. *Potere e poteri: "Stati", "Privati" e comunità per l'egemonia in Italia settentrionale (1536-1558)*. (Milan, 2016); and Idan Sherer. *Warriors for a Living: The Experience of the Spanish Infantry in the Italian Wars, 1494-1559* […]. (Leiden, 2017).

history of the later Habsburg-Valois Italian Wars from Duke Cosimo's perspective[46] – a major factor towards founding the Order of Santo Stefano and constructing the Medici naval infrastructure in the first place. Constant incursions by the French[47] and especially the Ottomans and Barbary corsairs[48] – not to mention the growing dominion of the Spanish Habsburgs on the Italian peninsula – both during the conflict and its 'armistices' created a climate of instability that the duke and his advisors logically assumed would continue after 1559. Cosimo's naval projects and the Order of Santo Stefano are easily identifiable as precautionary measures in the face of such threats and uncertainties. Again, I do not provide a complete 'naval' or 'amphibious' history of the Italian Wars; however, I do try to demonstrate the constant threat by sea during this conflict and how this significantly weighed in Cosimo's decision making process.

Religious Warfare

Both during the Habsburg-Valois Wars and immediately thereafter, the Spanish Habsburgs and the duke of Florence had to confront the Ottomans and their tentative allies along the Barbary coast.[49] One can even argue that North Africa posed as another

[46] Which has been partially covered in Roberto Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena, 1552-1559*. (Siena, 1962).
[47] Mallett and Shaw's book on the Italian Wars – or any other secondary work or primary source covering the military history of this period – will make reference to "French galleys" when moving troops, supplies, or even in actual naval engagements. Alan James's aforementioned book includes a few details on the development and administration of the medieval and early modern French navy, but for whatever reason, this remains a neglected topic. For my thesis, I have used the one work on the topic I could find: Charles de la Roncière. *Histoire de la marine française* Volume 3 […]. (Paris, 1906).
[48] Regarding Mediterranean corsairs, see especially: Salvatore Bono. *Corsari nel Mediterraneo* […]. (Milan, 1993). Jacques Heers. *The Barbary Corsairs* […]. (London, 2003) can be helpful as a general introduction to the topic, but Bono's is a far better book in terms of understanding the nuances of Mediterranean dynamics.
[49] The Ottoman fleet and the Barbary corsairs of this period have received adequate attention in Dejanirah Couto, Feza Gunergun, and Maria Pia Pedani Fabris, eds. *Seapower, Technology, and Trade: Studies in Turkish Maritime History*. (Istanbul, 2014); Colin Imber. "The Navy of Süleyman the Magnificent," in Colin Imber, ed. *Studies in Ottoman History and Law*. (Istanbul, 1996); Salvatore Bono. *Corsari nel Mediterraneo* […]. (Milan, 1993); Andrew C. Hess. "The Evolution of the Ottoman Seaborne Empire […]," in *The American Historical Review* Volume 75, Number 7. (Dec., 1970); Andrew C. Hess. "The Ottoman Conquest of Egypt (1517) and the Beginning of the Sixteenth-Century World War," in *International Journal of Middle East Studies* Volume 4, Number 1. (Jan., 1973); Peter Earle. *The corsairs of Malta and Barbary*. (London, 1970); and E. Hamilton Currey. *Sea-wolves of the Mediterranean* […].

front of the Italian Wars, and that campaigns against the Ottomans and the Barbary corsairs – such as Charles V's famous Tunis campaign (1535), Algiers debacle (1541), and Venice and Genoa's involvement in the ill-fated Battle of Preveza (1538) – were part of the larger war. With this in mind, I have integrated campaigns and considerations regarding both North Africa and the Levant as they fit into my chronological account of Cosimo's naval affairs between 1544 and 1563.

Especially considering that the Order of Santo Stefano was originally founded under the pretext of crusading, this discussion is relevant to my investigation. Although the Reformation did not directly come into play, Cosimo's reign coincided with a period when "justification for religious wars attained new and explosive power."[50] Moreover, it is widely agreed that crusades were not "a dead or even 'residual' expression of Catholic belief or behaviour in the sixteenth century" – especially if one does not limit the definition of crusades as campaigns to retake the Holy Land.[51] Regarding the Barbary coast, I especially discuss expeditions during the last decade of the Italian Wars (1549-1559), and I move on to one of the most famous fiascos of the sixteenth century, Spain's defeat at Djerba in 1560. Much has been written on these topics,[52] but I focus on – not only the naval and amphibious elements – but specifically how these events involved and affected Cosimo.

(London, 1910, reprint. 2004). See also Emra Safa Gürken. "The centre and the frontier: […]" in *Turkish Historical Review* Volume 1 (2010).

[50] Franz Brendle and Anton Schindling. "Religious War and Religious Peace in the Age of Reformation," in R.J.W. Evans, Michael Schaich, and Peter H. Wilson, eds. *The Holy Roman Empire, 1495-1806*. (Oxford, 2011), 166.

[51] Norman Housley. *The Later Crusades, 1274-1580* […]. (Oxford, 1992), 1-2. Regarding the topic of Early Modern military orders as a whole, see especially Ferreira Fernandes, ed. *Ordens Militares* Volume 1.

[52] See especially Andrew C. Hess. *The Forgotten Frontier* […]. (Chicago, 1978); Guilmartin's chapter on Djerba in *Gunpowder and Galleys*; the discussions on Spanish North Africa scattered in M.J. Rodriguez-Salgado. *The changing face of Empire* […]. (Cambridge, 1988), and especially Fernand Braudel. *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* Volume II. Translated by Siân Reynolds. (Berkley, 1995).

Primarily in the 'post-Italian Wars' period of my thesis (1559-1563), I also refer to the duke's galleys in the Levant.[53] One of these episodes in 1559 offers insight into the "complex partnership between the Ottoman Empire and the Venetian Republic […that they] had fashioned together." Specifically, Cosimo's galleys – like the famous Knights of Malta – engaged in the *corso* which has been defined as "more elevated than mere piracy precisely because there was a kind of permanent war in the Mediterranean between Christianity and Islam." This practice has been considered a motivating factor for Cosimo to establish the Order of Santo Stefano.[54] Yet, I demonstrate that the duke already pursued a 'crusading' agenda before he was grand master of the order – which again lends credit to the idea that he had other motivations aside from its stated purpose of 'fighting the infidel.'

In general, most works on corsairs (those that practice the *corso*) focus on the 'post-Lepanto' era which has been dubbed "the great age of [Mediterranean] piracy."[55] My thesis, on the other hand, recounts the events leading up to the founding of Cosimo's religious order and offers one perspective on what both 'Christian' and 'Muslim' piracy (i.e. the "permanent [religious] war") looked like before the Battle of Lepanto (1571). From an even larger standpoint, accounts of the Habsburgs tend to eclipse matters in the Mediterranean with their focus on the Netherlands, the Holy Roman Empire, and the New World.[56] Again, my thesis by no means offers a 'complete' picture of early modern Mediterranean crusading or the role of religious warfare in the Italian Wars and Medici-Habsburg policy. However, I would be remiss to overlook this important aspect of

[53] On the topic of Italians and other 'western Christians' in the Levant, see especially Molly Greene. *Catholic Pirates and Greek Merchants* […]. (Princeton, 2010).
[54] Greene. *Catholic Pirates*, 90.
[55] Regarding his "phases" of Mediterranean conflict, Angiolini references a similar 'post-Lepanto' shift as did Fernand Braudel. See also Greene. *Catholic Pirates*, 17, 52-53, 79-81.
[56] For example: Geoffrey Parker. *Emperor: A New Life of Charles V*. (New Haven, 2019); and *Imprudent King: A New Life of Philip II*. (New Haven, 2014).

conflict in this period and major contributing factor towards establishing the Order of Santo Stefano.

My final chapter details the order's first official mission in 1563 – which famously failed. The knights joined Cosimo's state galleys in answering Spain's call for aid in North Africa. Although they ended up not actively participating in this particular campaign, their time along the Spanish coast and the complications and threats that emerged lend tremendous insight into the interaction between crusading, politics, and naval administration in the mid-sixteenth century.

Naval and amphibious warfare and their administrative requirements

In order to build coastal fortifications; a squadron of warships; and their accompanying shipyards more or less from scratch beginning in the 1540s, the duke of Florence tapped into the supply and expertise networks of the day. From an overarching perspective, the importance of networks and entrepreneurship – the interaction of the private sector and the state – in early modern warfare remains at the forefront of historiography.[57] Building upon this idea, the University of Oxford's European Fiscal-Military Systems project – led by Professor Peter Wilson – seeks to "identify the variety of war-making resources and assess how far their availability was dependent on accessing external expertise and sources of supply."[58] Among other aspects, this research also seeks to understand "the relation between war and political development […]" In an earlier article, Wilson demonstrated that privatized sources of warfare provided opportunities for

[57] Janice E. Thompson. *Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns* […]. (Princeton, 1994) and Giorgio Chittolini. "The 'Private,' the 'Public,' the State" in *The Journal of Modern History* Volume 67 […]. (Dec., 1995), pp. S34-S61. are certainly landmarks in this field. Regarding the Mediterranean, this theme is also explored in Jeff Fynn-Paul, ed. *War, Entrepreneurs, and the State in Europe and the Mediterranean, 1300-1800* […]. (Leiden, 2014).

[58] Information about the project can be accessed online: https://fiscalmilitary.history.ox.ac.uk. See also Wilson's newest articles: Peter H. Wilson. "Foreign military labour in Europe's transition to modernity," in *European Review of History: Revue européenne d'histoire*, 27:1-2 (2020); and Peter H. Wilson and Marianne Klerk. "The business of war untangled: Cities as fiscal-military hubs in Europe (1530s-1860s)," in *War in History* (December 2020).

small states (or non-state actors) to maintain political and personal relationships with other – usually more prominent – powers.[59] In other words, military entrepreneurship and James's aforementioned "outside-in" forces go hand-in-hand.

This theme has largely been explored regarding armies and ocean-going navies but not regarding Mediterranean galley warfare.[60] Yet, David Parrott's *Business of War* correctly asserts that galley fleets provide one of the earliest examples of privatized military contracts.[61] When this topic has been discussed, however, the focus has primarily been on the late sixteenth century and especially the seventeenth or even the eighteenth centuries.[62] Concerning my period of investigation, I.A.A. Thompson[63] and especially Guilmartin[64] have touched upon this phenomenon from the Spanish perspective, but space only allowed them to hint at the nuances and specific individuals involved in supplementing Spanish Habsburg Mediterranean naval power. As indicated above, the duke of Florence often availed his galleys and ports to support Spain's naval forces. I demonstrate several instances where Cosimo provided Spain – and her allies and satellite states – with ships, port facilities, and other military assistance in various campaigns between the 1540s and early 1560s. In other words, Cosimo actively contributed to these networks.

Of course, he also utilized them. My thesis provides specific, supplementary insight into the sources and systems that Duke Cosimo – and by association Habsburg

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[59] Peter H. Wilson. "The German 'Soldier Trade' of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: A Reassessment," in *The International History Review* Volume 18, Number 4. (Nov., 1996).
[60] Sandberg. *War and Conflict*. does use Venice, Genoa, and the Ottoman Empire in part of his discussion, but the Mediterranean is not the primary focus in his 'global history.'
[61] David Parrott. *The Business of War* […]. (Cambridge, 2012), 35-40, 80-87.
[62] For example, see David Goodman. *Spanish Naval Power, 1589-1665: Reconstruction and Defeat*. (Cambridge, 1996); Rafael Torres Sánchez. *Military Entrepreneurs and the Spanish Contractor State in the Eighteenth Century*. (Oxford, 2016); and Philip Williams. "Mare Nostrum? […]," in *Storia Economica* Number 1. (2016).
[63] I.A.A. Thompson. *War and Government in Habsburg Spain, 1560-1620*. (London, 1976); *War and Society in Habsburg Spain, Selected Essays*. (Aldershot, 1992).
[64] John F Guilmartin, Jr. "The Logistics of Warfare at Sea in the Sixteenth Century: The Spanish Perspective" in John A. Lynn, ed. *Feeding Mars* […]. (Boulder, 1993).

Spain – used to obtain both supplies and expertise in the early modern Mediterranean. Moreover, considering the role of Genoa, Naples, Sicily, Venice, and other maritime traditions capitalized upon by Cosimo's navy, my work should at least lay the foundation for continued research on the duchy of Florence's role in the sixteenth-century 'fiscal-military system.'[65] Additionally, Spain's use of Tuscany's naval infrastructure – and Cosimo's experience in administrating and using some of Philip II's maritime centers – provides further insight into the complexities and challenges of this system in the Mediterranean.

Philip Williams has observed that "the level and sophistication of [early modern] Mediterranean warfare was far in advance of the situation in the Channel, Atlantic and North Sea."[66] Using Cosimo's experiences, my discussion on the later Italian Wars reveals that this was an amphibious war – like most Mediterranean conflicts.[67] Such combat between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries has been credited for playing "an important role in European developments that had global implications," yet, at the same time, the period between the classical world and AD 1700 has been deemed "a black hole for the historiography of amphibious warfare."[68] I not only contribute towards bridging this gap in our understanding of this period, but I also demonstrate that many actions taken by the Habsburg 'allies' – which included Cosimo – were often "combined" or "joint" operations – meaning both inter-service and inter-allied.[69] Moreover, considering the Order of Santo Stefano, I further exhibit how such an organization related to the

[65] Regarding Venice, see especially M. E. Mallett and J. R. Hale. *The Military Organization of a Renaissance State: Venice c. 1400 to 1617*. (Cambridge, 2006). For Genoa: Benoit Maréchaux. "Business organisation in the Mediterranean Sea: Genoese galley entrepreneurs in the service of the Spanish Empire (late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries)" in *Business History* Volume 10. (August 2020).
[66] Williams. "The strategy of galley warfare," 906-908.
[67] To achieve this, I weave together the accounts from Manfroni. "La Marina Militare;" Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena*; and Simon Pepper and Nicholas Adams. *Firearms & Fortifications* […]. (Chicago, 1986) – alongside my primary sources.
[68] D.J.B. Trim and Mark Charles Fissel, eds. *Amphibious Warfare, 1000-1700: Commerce, State Formation and European Expansion*. (Leiden, 2011), 6, 10.
[69] Ibid., 1.

'privatized' and 'sophisticated,' joint-operational warfare during its first year of existence.

Late medieval / early modern Italian states & the Florentine-Medici example

When discussing Italian political history, it almost seems essential to acknowledge Prince Clemens von Metternich's famous observation that "Italy is nothing but a geographic expression." Even though the Austrian chancellor and architect of the Congress of Vienna was referring to nineteenth-century Italy, his remark certainly applied to Duke Cosimo's world. Fifteenth and sixteenth-century Italian states encompassed a complicated mosaic of urban and rural institutions – both 'official' provincial, city, and town governments and 'unofficial' social dispensations, customs, and patronage networks. Specifically in Tuscany, the city of Florence was the only sphere where Cosimo exercised any semblance of direct governance. All other regions were "regulated by the terms agreed upon at the time of subjugation…[wherein] many fiscal and jurisdictional privileges […were] maintained tenaciously."[70] In short, there was never a 'federal Tuscan constitution,' but rather a series of pacts and annexations between the Medici-Florentine government and their neighboring communities.[71]

Nevertheless, the Medici grand dukes significantly facilitated the livelihoods of their 'subjects' and provided for their security – a significant centralization of authority when compared to a medieval monarch. This was largely possible due to the Medici's sheer force of personality – which could fill in "the enormous legislative 'gaps'" that

[70] Elena Fasano Guarini. "Center and Periphery" in Julius Kirshner, ed. *The Origins of the state in Italy* […]. (Chicago, 1996), 81-82, 77-78. Fasano Guarini cites Angelo Ventura. *Nobilità e popolo nella società veneta del '400 e '500*. (Bari, 1964) when discussing Italy as a whole; and Antonio Anzilotti. *La costituzione interna dello Stato fiorentino sotto Cosimo I*. (Florence, 1910) for Cosimo.

[71] Luca Mannori. *Il Sovrano Tutore* […]. (Milan, 1994), 1-13. To better understand the entirety of Mannori's monograph, see Jean-Frédéric Schaub. "Luca Mannori, *Il sovrano tutore* […]," in *Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales*. 52e année, Number 2 (1997). Concerning this concept across Europe, see especially J.H. Elliot. "A Europe of Composite Monarchies" in *Past & Present* Number 137. (November 1992).

tended to accompany *ancien régime* administrations. Thus, Cosimo and especially his successors governed their 'Tuscan state' through a "paternalistic ideology" which they prominently exercised through infrastructure and military projects. As demonstrated by my discussion of the ducal galleys; coastal fortifications; port facilities; and my occasional reference to 'land forces,' Cosimo managed to centralize defenses to some degree – but never taxation or 'law and order.'[72]

Resonating Metternich's comment, I refer to Cosimo's 'Tuscan state' as a "duchy [of Florence]"; "Tuscany"; or "Medici" for the sake of convenience. By no means does my thesis attempt to delve into the intricacies of Cosimo's administration and his individual relationships with the regions, cities, communes, towns, villages, prominent families, and patronage networks that comprised his jurisdiction as the duke of Florence – a realm created by at least three centuries of conquest and treaty. Yet, it is imperative to maintain an awareness of this political reality.

Aside from the limited rule of various offices and institutions, "Florence" and "Tuscany" are best understood as geographic terms. Furthermore, since Cosimo eventually acquired a ducal title over Siena after intense negotiations with the Spanish and imperial Habsburgs in 1557, it is best to identify "Siena" as the city itself or the geographic area that once comprised the Sienese republic. Especially considering that most of Cosimo's 'state power' manifested as military undertakings, "Tuscany" and "Siena" refer to the regions that Cosimo strived to defend – and arguably arenas to present his dynasty as uniquely capable of protecting them.

Instead of viewing Cosimo as an "absolute monarch" over a feudal demesne, 'Tuscany' was an instance of a "city-based regional state" centered around Florence.[73]

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[72] Mannori. *Il Sovrano Tutore*, 1-13. See also Fasano Guarini. "Center and Periphery", 82.
[73] Mannori. *Il Sovrano Tutore*, 4.

Essentially, this 'state' comprised of inherited and newly-found relationships between Tuscany's various urban centers, villages, and prominent families – among other societal bonds – that were connected by an idea: a 'mini-confederation' under Medici leadership.

This "series of pacts and annexations" at the local level echoes the abovementioned concept of Mediterranean security that interlocked Habsburg Spain, Naples, Sicily; Genoa, the pope, the Knights of Malta, Monaco, occasionally Venice, and the Medici-Florentine duchy. One should consider that Cosimo's Tuscany – alongside many other Italian cities and 'states' – fell under the intertwined jurisdiction of the Holy Roman Empire, the Spanish Habsburgs, and theoretically the pope. Moreover, the Habsburg-Valois Italian Wars introduced the king of France as another possible overlord. Clearly, the parameters of sixteenth-century military and political alliances were immensely complicated and constantly in a state of flux.

Through my examination of Cosimo's policymaking – specifically regarding his 'state' defenses and accompanying political stances – my thesis reinforces our need to reject anachronistic models of dichotomous 'public' and 'private' realms in the early modern era. During my period of investigation, politics were personal. Boundaries were not lines on a map but rather relationships between sovereigns and between those sovereigns and the various groups/personalities in their realm. Thus, Cosimo's efforts to defend and govern a 'Tuscan state' should not be viewed as 'state-building' but rather 'dynasty-proving' or 'sovereignty-proving.' Although this was not my intention when I began researching those years ago, I have stumbled into a vivid example that demonstrates the multi-layered nature of early modern militaries and politics – both 'foreign' and 'domestic'. In all instances, the individuals involved made all the difference in shaping the course of events.

Cosimo's personal standing with the Holy Roman Emperor, the king of Spain, the king of France, and the pope – in addition to fellow Italian principalities, his 'subjects', and exiles – continuously molded his decisions. Moreover, the agents that carried out his decisions proved crucial to their success or failure. This political reality provided both a framework and flexibility. Everyone from the Habsburgs to the Medici to the individuals who served in Cosimo's navy took advantage of this. Institutions and informalities were equally capitalized upon to best suit the given situation. As will be seen, the Order of Santo Stefano was very much a product of sixteenth-century Tuscany. Cosimo saw a religious military order (*religione*) as a sword to cut the Gordian knot that characterized the world around him. Among other potential benefits, Santo Stefano seemed to offer solutions to the political and military challenges that the duke faced throughout his reign.

Chapter 1: The Medici Navy Embarks (c. 1544 – 1551)

Italy & Europe according to Cosimo (c. 1544 – 1547)

1544 ended on a promising note for the Habsburg-Valois conflict. Over the past two years, Piedmont had formed the primary front, and in order to partially fund Milan's efforts against the French in the region, Holy Roman Emperor Charles V had restored the fortresses of Florence and Livorno to Duke Cosimo I de Medici in exchange for 100,000 *scudi* in July 1543. By that August, a combined French and Ottoman fleet – including the famous corsair captain Hayreddin Barbarossa – besieged Nice which fell by early September. That winter, King François I shockingly allowed elements of the combined Ottoman and Barbary fleet to winter in Toulon – where they stayed until they launched a raid on the Italian coastline in May 1544. As fighting in Piedmont resumed later that year, Cosimo contributed infantry and money to aid the Habsburg war effort. When combined with threats from imperial and English troops in France, however, François enthusiastically agreed to a truce on 8 August 1544. By 18 September, the Peace of Crépy – at least temporarily – ended what had already amounted to a 50-year-long conflict. Of course, neither the emperor nor king of France were satisfied with their terms. Nevertheless, both had multiple fronts to concern themselves with: Reformation-torn Germany and territorial competition with Henry VIII's England respectively. Moreover, neither monarch was in a financial position to continue fighting in Italy.[1]

These events also coincided with the intertwined religious and political faction struggles that had broken out across Europe. By the 1540s, the Catholic church had more or less declared war against organized heretics.[2] In addition to combatting the reformed Christians who had strayed from Rome, Pope Paul III gathered financial resources to defend Europe against Sultan Süleyman's infidel armies – both along the Habsburg

[1] Michael Mallett and Christine Shaw. *The Italian Wars, 1494-1559* […]. (Harlow, UK, 2012), 238-243.
[2] David Sanderson Chambers. *Popes, cardinals and war* […]. (London, 2006), 157.

frontier running across modern Hungary and in the Mediterranean. Between 1543 and 1544, the looming threat of the Ottoman fleet under Barbarossa – alongside the French navy –had prompted the Holy Father to temporarily move the papal court to Bologna. Additionally, he sought to double the papal squadron from 3 to 6 galleys.[3] To further confound matters, it was no secret that the Farnese pope and the emperor were not on good terms, and it was in Paul III's family's best interest to maintain the Valois counterbalance in the increasingly Habsburg-dominated Italian peninsula.[4]

In spite of the Peace of Crépy, the French continued to meddle in Italian affairs after 1544 – particularly against the Habsburg's invaluable Genoese ally, Andrea Doria, in 1547. Of course, this was part of a larger effort to topple Spanish Habsburg dominance over northern Italy from Milan to the Ligurian coast. Whether it involved the rivalries between local families (or even within families) or the larger political and dynastic issues between the Habsburgs, the Valois, and the papacy – not to mention the Ottoman threat – Italy was extremely fragmented and contested at all levels.[5] In short, Europe – specifically Italy – presented a mass of unresolved military, political, and religious problems in the late 1540s. No peace could contain these issues forever.

Duke Cosimo de Medici endeavored to weather this treacherous situation. Shortly after the Peace of Crépy in 1544, the duke appointed an ambassador to Paris – a hotbed of Florentine exiles opposed to Medici rule – in an effort to build a rapport with the Valois king. Cosimo had already established a diplomatic presence in the Habsburg imperial

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[3] Fabrizio Filioli Uranio. "The Funding of the Papal Fleet in the War Against the Turks […]," in *The Journal of European Economic History* 2 (2016), 132-134. For Paul's Ottoman policies during the 1530s, see especially Chapter 6 in Bryan Cussen. *Pope Paul III and the Cultural Politics of Reform: 1534-1549*. (Amsterdam, 2020).

[4] Gianvittorio Signorotto. "Note sulla Politica e la Diplomazia dei Pontefici […]" in Marcello Fantoni, ed. *Carlo V e l'Italia* […]. (Rome, 2000), 47-50.

[5] Angelantonio Spagnoletti. "Guerra, Stati e Signori in Italia nell'età di Carlo V" in Fantoni, ed. *Carlo V e l'Italia*, 88-89. See also Niccolò Capponi, ed. *Guerre D'Italia*. (Milan, 2016), 124-125; David Potter. *Renaissance France At War* […]. (Woodbridge, 2008), 39; and Geoffrey Parker. *Emperor: A New Life of Charles V*. (London, 2019), Chapter 12, especially his section on Italy, pp 337-341.

court around 1537 and the papal court in 1539. He had also sent agents to Venice in 1540, but this position did not become permanent until much later. Of course, he hoped these representatives would weave a web of intelligence. Perhaps more importantly, however, their presence – and recognition – in these respective courts entailed a sense of legitimacy and prestige for the small Medici state. At the very least, these diplomatic efforts demonstrated the duke's aspirations for his sovereignty and political weight to be recognized in "the ceremonial game of precedences."[6] This would remain an objective throughout Cosimo's entire reign.

Even though the duke's representative at the Valois court only lasted a few years,[7] his simultaneous efforts to cultivate a relationship with Charles V demanded much more. Over the years leading up to Crépy, Cosimo had already appeased the Habsburgs by keeping local Tuscan ruling families – such as the Appiani of Piombino and the Cybo of Massa – and the cities of Siena and Lucca loyal to them. Furthermore, the duke had convinced Siena to accept a Spanish garrison in 1541. All of these actions maintained a stable Tuscany and also defended the Tyrrhenian coast – at no cost to Habsburg coffers or manpower. Concerning Charles's military obligations elsewhere, Cardinal Juan de Toledo, uncle of Cosimo's wife Eleanor, persuaded the duke of Florence to permit the recruitment of imperial troops from Tuscany in 1544. Cosimo also loaned the emperor at least 200,000 *scudi* towards his counter-insurgent efforts against German Lutheran rebels (the Schmalkaldic League) in 1546. While Charles concerned himself with Germany, the duke essentially served as the imperial "watch dog" in Italy by dealing with the aforementioned French-backed plot against the Doria in Genoa, another plot in Lucca,

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[6] Alessandra Contini. "Aspects of Medicean diplomacy in the 16th century," in Daniela Frigo, ed. *Politics and Diplomacy in Early Modern Italy* […]. Translated by Adrian Belton. (Cambridge, 2000), 63-65, 72. Cosimo would also have a permanent ambassador in Milan by 1546 and in Ferrara by 1560.

[7] This was clearly related to the d'Este of Ferrara's ambassador who had gained precedence with François I by 1545. See Contini. "Aspects of Medicean diplomacy," 63.

and a revolt against his father-in-law, Pedro Álvarez de Toledo, the viceroy of Naples, following his attempts to introduce the Spanish Inquisition into southern Italy. Aside from these military provisos, Cosimo granted many other favors to the Toledo family and Charles V regarding appointments across Italy and more personal legal matters. In return, Cosimo depended on Cardinal Toledo's help in his strenuous relationship with Pope Paul III – especially after the Holy Father ordered the arrest of a Florentine representative in Rome in 1546.[8]

Indeed, Cosimo and Charles shared an antagonistic relationship with the Farnese – specifically Paul III – that derived from their family's quest for power. By 1547, Cosimo personally wrote to Charles's most trusted advisor and representative, Cardinal Antoine Perrenot de Granvelle, that: "you should take away the pope's prestige by means of a council… that they no longer be allowed to make purely tyrannical usurpations anymore." He added that Charles V should "give [the pope] a good thrashing […if he] show[ed] signs of taking desperate action."[9]

Piombino in Mediterranean and Cosimo's strategy (c. 1544 – 1547)

Yet, by no means should any of his financial, diplomatic, military, religious, or other support suggest that Cosimo served the Habsburgs out of selfless devotion or exclusively common causes. Especially after the Peace of Crépy, he sought more territory – specifically Piombino. For their part, his top representatives in the imperial court, Averado Serristori and his legation secretary Bartolomeo Concini, worked towards

[8] Giorgio Spini. "The Medici Principality […]," in *Journal of Italian History* Number 3. (winter 1979), 423-425. Concerning Cosimo's relationship with Cardinal Toledo, see Carlos José Hernando Sánchez. "Naples and Florence in Charles V's Italy […]," in Thomas Dandelet and John A. Marino, eds. *Spain in Italy* […], (Leiden, 2006), 165-168. Hernando Sánchez only refers to the arrested Medici official as "the duke's secretary, Cornasole."

[9] Spini. "The Medici Principality," 423-425. For this translated letter to Granvelle, Spini cites: Cosimo to M. de Granvelle, Florence, February 6, 1547: Archivio di Stato di Firenze (ASF) Mediceo del Principato (MP) 'Registri di minute' 1, n. 4, in Abel Desjardins and Giuseppe Canestrini, eds. *Negociations diplomatiques de la France avec la Toscane* Volume III. (Paris, 1859-1886), pp. 173-174. See also Contini. "Aspects of Medicean diplomacy," 73; and Parker. *Emperor*, 431-432 and notes which details the bribery between Cosimo and Granvelle.

acquiring Florentine control over this key coastal holding.[10] Historically speaking, Piombino and Florence had been allies. A treaty dating to 1403 between the Republic of Florence and the then Lord of Piombino, Gherardo Leonardi Appiani, had enabled them to cooperatively defend the area against Alfonso of Aragon in 1448. Yet, matters shifted over subsequent decades, and by 1504, King Ferdinand II of Aragon – Charles V's maternal grandfather – established a pact of mutual assistance with the Appiani of Piombino. This agreement secured the region within the Spanish sphere of military and political influence. Five years later, Jacopo IV Appiani obtained the title of Prince of Piombino from Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian I – Charles V's paternal grandfather – and the region thus became an imperial fief.[11] Politically speaking, Piombino was subject to overlapping sovereignty claims from the Appiani, the house of Aragon, the Habsburg imperial crown, and, especially under Duke Cosimo, Florence. The reasons for this were not obscure.

Piombino's geographic location on the Italian mainland – almost directly in line with Elba and Corsica – formed a crucial link in the maritime chain between Italy and Spain. Military and political control of this state went hand-in-hand with securing Elba and the Tuscan archipelago – the islets of Pianosa, Montecristo, and Giglio alongside others. The small channels between these Tyrrhenian islands provided the crucial gateway for any military endeavor in the western Mediterranean. Thus, Piombino had been one of Barbarossa's key targets in the late 1530s and early 1540s. Moreover, the Habsburgs were especially concerned with the region's potential for exercising control over Corsica – then ruled by their invaluable ally, Genoa. In the midst of the ongoing

[10] Contini. "Aspects of Medicean diplomacy," 67.
[11] Franco Angiolini. "Lo Stato di Piombino […]" in Giuseppe Di Stefano et al., eds., *Italia non spagnola e monarchia spagnola tra '500 e '600* […]. (Florence, 2009), 128, 141. Emperor Maximilian's involvement and the role of the Holy Roman Emperor over Piombino is discussed again in Chapter 4.

Italian Wars, the French also coveted this island, and the locals were open to overthrowing what they perceived as a Genoese occupation of their homeland. In short, Piombino formed a cornerstone to securing maritime routes in the Tyrrhenian alongside Elba, Corsica, and other smaller islands. In addition to its geostrategic value, a rich iron vein only made this smallholding more alluring. Whether a Habsburg emperor, Valois king, Ottoman sultan, or a Barbary corsair – not to mention a middling Italian prince such as Cosimo – Piombino posed a tantalizing prize. The duke of Florence's aforementioned loan to Charles in 1546 – which considering his other financial support may have amounted to 330,000 *scudi* – and a small band of 250 cavalry for the emperor's campaigns in Germany were provided on the understanding that Charles would support Cosimo as the new ruler of Piombino.[12]

The Medici duke had openly pursued control of this territory since at least the Peace of Crépy. He used the fifteenth-century alliance between Florence and Piombino as a precedent and wished to alter their historical relationship from a partnership to a Medici-controlled state. By 1544, and undoubtedly under the duke of Florence's influence, Don Giovanni della Luna, the commander of the Habsburg garrison at Siena, had convinced Charles that he should exert his imperial authority over Piombino – vis-à-vis his grandfather's vassalage agreement with Jacopo IV decades earlier. Of course, such actions entailed deposing the Appiani and installing a Habsburg retainer (i.e. Cosimo) in their stead. Yet at the same time, Luna emphasized that the Medici duke had exaggerated Piombino's vulnerabilities to favor his own claims. As these discussions were underway, however, the sudden death of Jacopo V Appiani in 1545 and a pre-existing Medici familial rivalry with Appiani's widow, Cosimo's maternal aunt Elena Salviati, essentially

[12] Angiolini. "Lo Stato di Piombino," 125-130. Concerning the region's iron, see Ivan Tognarini. "La Questione del Ferro nella Toscana del XVI Secolo" in Leonardo Rombai, ed. *I Medici e lo Stato Senese 1555-1609: Storia e Territorio*. (Rome, 1980), pp. 239-261.

ended the negotiations.[13] Furthermore, the duke's 13-year-old cousin, Jacopo VI, was set to inherit his father's domain. In an effort to break the diplomatic stalemate, Luna – likely aided by Cosimo – incited a revolt against the Appiani on 29 November 1545. Conveniently, Habsburg troops were readily available to suppress the uprising. Amidst the chaos, Elena Salviati was essentially forced to hand over Piombino's fortifications to the Habsburgs, and Cosimo eagerly offered to finance the garrison and other troops needed to restore and maintain order. These funds coincided with the duke's abovementioned troops and loans for the emperor's war against the Schmalkaldic League. Although the Lutherans in Germany were his primary concern, Charles also desired to quickly resolve the Piombino issue. With some irony, the emperor observed that the November 1545 rebellion demonstrated the Appiani's inability to rule.[14] Given the region's strategic importance, an unstable Piombino was something Charles could not afford.

Around this same time and with similar justifications, the emperor tightened his grip on Siena. As mentioned earlier, he had already established a Habsburg garrison there with Cosimo's help. Additionally, Charles circumvented the local government (*Balìa*); reformed the city's constitution; disarmed the populace; raised taxes; and forcibly procured loans – while increasing the garrison to at least 400 Spanish troops. By 1547, the emperor ensured law and order by quartering troops in private homes and in barracks scattered throughout the city. Between 1547 and 1549, various figures in the Spanish

[13] More focused research would be needed here, but it seems extremely likely that there was some sort of compensation agreement underway with Jacopo V in exchange for relinquishing Piombino. See Raymond E. Role "The Naval bases of Grand Duke Cosimo I de'Medici […]," in *Fort* Volume 36. (2008), note 7 on p. 128 regarding an earlier agreement in 1541. Role conveniently has this information available in English, but he cites Marcella Aglietti "La Chiave della Toscana: Lo Stato di Pombino nella politica asburga prima di Cateau Cambresis (1541-1559)" in Ivan Tognarini, ed. *Piombino e l'Ordine di Santo Stefano. Nel 600° Anniversario della nascita dello Stato di Piombino*. (Pisa, 2000), 9-79. for his account of the ongoing Piombino affair.

[14] Role "The Naval bases," 114-115. See also Camillo Manfroni. "La Marina Militare […]." in *Rivista Marittima* […]. (Rome, 1895), 18; and Angiolini. "Lo Stato di Piombino," 128-129.

Habsburg sphere already proposed constructing a fortress that could bolster their presence against future French incursions and the restless Sienese population.[15] Additionally, Charles had already invested his son Philip – the future King Philip II of Spain – with charge over the duchy of Milan in 1546. In young Philip's mind at least, this entailed jurisdiction over Siena as well. Yet, to avoid French retaliation and further disturbances from Italian states, this was kept secret until 1549. Habsburg control over Milan, Parma, Piacenza, and Duke Cosimo's loyal service – in addition to a firm hold on Siena – comprised Charles's plan for a secure northern Italy.[16] Considering that Piombino was yet another domino in the emperor's delicate Italian structure, it was no wonder that he attempted to place it in trustworthy hands.

Yet into 1547, the acting regent of Piombino (Elena Salviati) still rejected any of the Habsburg-Medici suggestions for securing her realm. She insisted that it was Charles's responsibility to arrange a profitable marriage for her now 15-year-old son and heir so that she could repay Cosimo for the debt accrued by two years of military 'protection.' An equally stubborn Holy Roman Emperor refused to comply with her demands. Instead, he delivered an ultimatum: repay Cosimo by 4 June 1548 and retain the lordship or sell the state to the duke of Florence.[17] Although Piombino was now so close to Cosimo's grasp, the issue remained unresolved into 1548. This was partially due to changing international circumstances.

A new Valois king, Ottoman admiral, and pope (c. 1547 – 1550)

King François I had died on 31 March 1547, and his son, Henri II, succeeded him. Unlike his father, Henri focused more on his eastern frontier with the Habsburgs along

[15] Simon Pepper and Nicholas Adams. *Firearms & Fortifications* […]. (Chicago, 1986), 59. Concerning the numbers of Spanish Habsburg troops in 1547, see Mallett and Shaw. *The Italian Wars*, 244. Philip II's perspective on his role in Italy is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.
[16] Mallett and Shaw. *The Italian Wars*, 243-244.
[17] Role "The Naval bases," 115.

the Rhine rather than reclaiming Milan or Naples for France. Nevertheless, Henri regarded Savoy, Piedmont, and Saluzzo in northwest Italy as key holdings to further secure his kingdom against the Habsburgs. Additionally, Henri had married Cosimo's extremely distant cousin, Caterina de Medici. Unsurprisingly, the queen of France kept many Italians – specifically Florentine exiles – in her company. Most notably, this included her cousins, the staunch anti-Cosimo[18] Strozzi brothers. Also, the king's cousin, François de Lorraine, duc de Guise, had married Anna, the eldest daughter of Ercole II d'Este, the duke of Ferrara. The d'Este family's influence further manifested in the close relationship between Henri and Cardinal Ippolito d'Este, Duke Ercole II's brother. Together, the d'Este of Ferrara held a prominent place at the French court, and the queen surrounded herself with individuals – specifically the Strozzi – who bore a personal vendetta against Cosimo. Having spent part of his youth as a mistreated diplomatic hostage in Spanish captivity, King Henri II also had a personal axe to grind with Charles V.[19] It was no coincidence that Henri's ascension to the throne in 1547 occurred alongside Charles's difficulties regarding Parma and Piacenza and the aforesaid plot against the Doria in Genoa. Since Cosimo continued to work on the emperor's behalf and given the Florentine exiles in the Valois court, the duke of Florence posed another obvious target.

Two other shifts occurred around this same time. First, the great corsair and *kapudan-i derya* – commander of the Sultan's navy – Barbarossa had died of fever in the summer of 1546.[20] Leading up to Crépy in 1544, he had directly attacked the Sienese

[18] I am specifying "anti-Cosimo" (i.e. anti-duke of Florence) here as opposed to "anti-Medici" that one might see in other works. Especially since the queen of France was herself a Medici, and given the nuances of dynastic and familial dynamics, it seems oversimplistic to say "anti-Medici" in this context.
[19] Capponi, ed. *Guerre D'Italia*, 126 and Mallett and Shaw. *The Italian Wars*, 250-251.
[20] Haji Khalifeh. *The History of the Maritime Wars of the Turks Chapters I to V*. Translated by James Mitchell. (London, 1831), 68-69. Concerning Barbarossa's titles, see Idris Bostan. "The Establishment of

coastline at Porto Ercole and Orbetello and had also captured 700 inhabitants from the Tuscan island of Giglio alone.[21] His last campaign in 1545 targeted the Spanish near their base at Bône – about 180 miles west of Tunis[22] – and then the island of Minorca, where he took about 6,000 captives from the city of Mahon. Campaigns such as these had earned Barbarossa reverence, fear, and fame across the Mediterranean. Indeed, his passing left a void in the Ottoman navy's command-structure and opened the door for other great corsairs and captains such as Dragut Reis,[23] Salah Reis, and Sinan Pasha to take his place. Fortunately for the Spanish and Italians, however, the sultan's war with the Safavid Persians more or less kept the Ottomans out of the picture between 1547 and 1550. Moreover, Charles, his brother Ferdinand, and Sultan Süleyman established a five-year truce regarding Hungary in 1547.[24] Also, the emperor and the sultan forged an additional agreement to settle the Hafsid dynasty on the throne of Tunis and neutralize the Barbary corsairs between 1548 and 1553.[25] Nevertheless, this respite was short-lived, and by the early 1550s, there would be renewed trouble along Charles's southern front: the North African Spanish *Presidios* (garrisons) in the Maghreb.

The second shift centered upon Pope Paul III's death in late 1549. Together, Duke Cosimo and his cousin-in-law Pedro de Toledo attempted to prevent the anti-Medici

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the Province of Cezayir-i Bahr-i Sefid," in Elizabeth Zachariadou, ed., *The Kapudan Pasha* […]. (Rethymnon, Crete, 2002), 241.

[21] Some details about this raid are found in ASF MP 371 folio (f.) 170-171. This account makes note of the "*Priore di Capua*" (Leone Strozzi) – who features in Chapters 2 and 3 – operating out of Civitavecchia. See also Giuseppe Caciagli. *Stato dei Presidi*. (Pontedera, Italy, 1992), 34 and Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 18.

[22] Bône refers to modern Annaba, Algieria. The distance between Annaba and Tunis on land is about 290 km.

[23] In English historiography, Dragut is frequently referred to as Turgut, Thorgud, Dargouth, or other similar spellings. I have chosen to use "Dragut" because that is how he appears in primary and secondary Italian sources.

[24] For many details in this paragraph, see: Jacques Heers. *The Barbary Corsairs* […]. (London, 2003), 90. See also Colin Imber. *The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650: The Structure of Power* (second edition). (Houndmills, UK, 2009), 47; Anne Brogini and Maria Ghazali. "Un enjeu espagnol en Méditerranée […]," in *Cahiers de la Méditerranée* 70 […] (2005), 11; and Kenneth M. Setton *The Papacy and the Levant (1204-1571)* Volume III […]. (Philadelphia, 1984), 502.

[25] Angiolini. "Lo Stato di Piombino," 133.

Cardinal Giovanni Salviati – Elena Salviati's uncle – from winning the Papal miter. Considering the unresolved Piombino situation with Charles V in 1548, however, Cosimo had set aside his recent friction with the Farnese and asserted his independence by personally contacting Paul III to mend matters between them. At that moment, the Salviati and Habsburgs posed a greater hurdle than the Farnese, and Cosimo sought allies. Upon Paul's passing the next year, the duke used his newfound understanding with the Farnese – together with his connections in the Toledo family and his financial resources – to secure Giovanni Maria del Monte as Pope Julius III. The del Monte of Montepulciano were Tuscans and among the duke of Florence's strongest supporters. Although Cosimo had won many cardinals to his side, he had also made enemies – especially Spanish ambassador Don Diego Hurtado de Mendoza. The duke and Mendoza already had some disagreements regarding Siena, and the Medici victory at the 1550 papal conclave added fuel to the fire.[26] Although the rift with Mendoza would erupt a couple of years later, the situation in 1550 was generally favorable to Cosimo. Considering that Italy was a battleground for three different sovereigns – the Habsburgs, the Valois, and the pope – Julius III's elevation assured the duke of Florence that at least one of these leaders would work in his favor. Given the turn of events over the mid-late 1540s, this was Cosimo's desperately-needed break.

Although the Peace of Crépy had ended the physical combat between Habsburg and Valois armies in Italy in 1544, many complications remained and emerged in the years leading up to Julius III's election in 1550. Moreover, dissatisfaction with these terms ensured that the conflict would eventually reignite between the emperor and the king of France. In the meantime, a veritable Habsburg-Valois 'cold war' persisted. In this

[26] Hernando Sánchez. "Naples and Florence," 169-172. Spini. "The Medici Principality," 427. J.R. Hale. *Florence and the Medici* […]. (New York, 1978), 129.

stage of the struggle, Charles arguably asserted himself as the leading ruler of Italy – especially through his attempts to indirectly and directly manage places such as Parma, Piacenza, Siena, and Piombino. Yet, François I – and especially Henri II – used the peacetime to bolster their borders with the Habsburgs from Flanders to Italy and even backed the aforesaid anti-Spanish and anti-Doria plots. Moreover, the Florentine exiles and members of the d'Este family at the Valois court almost guaranteed eventual action in Italy, specifically against the duke of Florence. To further complicate matters, up until his death, the Farnese Pope Paul III had seemed more concerned with using his position to increase his family's wealth and influence as opposed to providing neutral spiritual leadership in the midst of European-wide conflict. Nevertheless, Cosimo's relationship with the Habsburgs, the Toledo clan, and eventually the Farnese – when coupled with his own ambition and resources – cleverly allowed him to navigate this military, political, religious, and interpersonal tempest. Indeed, his financial resources proved crucial in building a rapport with Charles V and with the church. Furthermore, his personal connections and military might aided both the emperor and himself. Yet during this same period, the duke of Florence sought to use another tool to defend and promote his sovereignty; further demonstrate his 'loyalty' to the Habsburgs; and showcase his strength to them, the Valois, the Ottomans, and even his 'Tuscan subjects.' Cosimo had decided to build a navy.

Cosimo's first naval endeavors in Tuscany: new holdings and coastal fortresses (c. 1541 – 1550)

In early January 1547, Ferrante Gonzaga, Charles's governor of Milan, cautioned the emperor that his relationship with Genoa – and especially its galleys – "[depended] on the life of a man (Andrea Doria) who is eighty years old, without any plan for what

should happen after his death – something that could occur any day."[27] Cosimo had certainly reached the same conclusion. Among his many motivations, he wanted to present the emperor with a 'plan' when Genoa inevitably lost its naval patriarch. Additionally, Charles told his son Philip in January 1548 that Cosimo "has a good brain and good judgement, and keeps his territories well-ordered."[28] Why would a Florentine navy prove otherwise? Cosimo sought to live up to his well-earned reputation.

Even though he had probably toyed with the idea earlier, by 17 May 1546, the duke wrote to his secretary, Piero Francesco del Riccio, that he wished to acquire models of nails used in galley construction.[29] Although no vessels were constructed until 1547, Cosimo had already considered and strengthened his coastal defenses. He built watchtowers at Castiglioncello – about 15 miles south of Livorno – and halfway between them at Calafuria among other places between 1541 and 1547.[30] Regarding other coastal fortifications, the duke dispatched his architect, Giovanni Camerini, to Piombino by the autumn of 1547. Camerini had already aided Cosimo – and by default the Habsburgs – in maintaining and improving Piombino's existing fortifications. Even though Piombino had not yet been formally handed over to Cosimo, Camerini began his work there, and ducal troops occupied the state. Charles V had already ousted Jacopo VI Appiani on 10 September 1547, and unless the Appiani managed to repay Cosimo for his expenses

[27] Translated in Parker. *Emperor*, 338. Parker cites: M.L.T. Belgrano Spinola and F. Podestà, "Documenti ispano-genovesi dell'archivio di Simancas,' *Atti della Società ligure di storia patria,* VIII (1868), 11-13, Gonzaga to Charles, 2 Jan. 1547.
[28] Translated in Parker. *Emperor*, 410. Cited as M. Fernández Álvarez, ed. *Corpus Documental de Carlos V* Volume II. (Salamanca, 1973-81), 569-592. See note 42 on pp. 657.
[29] Niccolò Capponi. "Guns and Profit […]," in Carlo Beltrame and Renato Gianni Ridella, eds. *Ships & Guns* […]. (Oxford, 2011), 61. Capponi cites: ASF MP 613 ins. 2 f. 83, Piero Francesco del Riccio to Cosimo I, 17 May 1546.
[30] Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 16-18. Manfroni debunks claims of Florentine galleys pre-dating 1547 made in Giovanni Battista Adriani's contemporary Tuscan history (Volume I, p. 92) and Giuseppe Vivoldi's nineteenth-century *Annali di Livorno*. The distance between Livorno and Castiglioncello is about 24.7 km.

related to the Habsburg 'protection' of their territory, the Medici duke was set to assume full possession of Piombino in June 1548.[31]

The decision to appoint Cosimo as the new lord entailed certain consequences. Charles could not ignore Elena Salviati's familial relationship with Queen Caterina de Medici – especially at a time when Henri II ascended the French throne. Obviously, the emperor wanted to avoid provoking the Valois too much. Additionally, the Habsburgs' own anti-Medici courtiers and officials advised Charles to substantially modify his agreement with Cosimo. Most notably, Genoa dispatched Adamo Centurione – a contractor for Elba's iron vein – to offer the emperor 300,000 *scudi* for the island of Elba – included in what was supposed to be Cosimo's newest addition. Genoa feared that the island would provide a stepping stone for a Medici-controlled Corsica.[32] Cosimo's challengers also included Elena Salviati's uncle, Cardinal Giovanni Salviati, who presented himself as a capable – and rightful – ruler. Additionally, Ferrante Gonzaga, and Cosimo's aforementioned foe, Mendoza, chimed in. Both advocated Habsburg control over Piombino, Siena, and Lucca. Yet Charles's trusted advisor Cardinal Granvelle and Cosimo's in-law, Fernando Álvarez de Toledo (the duke of Alba) argued in the duke of Florence's favor. After all, by 1548, Cosimo had already loaned the emperor 400,000 *ducats* for his campaign against the Schmalkaldic League; the garrison at Piombino; and other expenses. Moreover, over the past decade, Cosimo had proven himself loyal to the Habsburg cause. In addition to these opposing sides, Charles faced the practical concerns of defending this crucial territory against the Ottoman-Barbary fleet and the Valois – not to mention any mischievous popes. When this discussion was underway in 1548, an anti-

[31] Angiolini. "Lo Stato di Piombino," 143 and Role "The Naval bases," 115. See also Amelio Fara. *Portoferraio: Architettura e Urbanistica, 1548-1877*. (Turin, 1997), 9.
[32] Ivan Tognarini. "La 'guerra di Maremma'," in Rombai, ed. *I Medici e lo Stato Senese*, 26. As will be seen throughout this thesis, Adamo Centurione and especially his son Marco played a more crucial, amicable role in Tuscan naval matters. See also Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 23.

Habsburg league between Paul III and King Henri II had seemed a very real possibility. Playing upon these rumors, Cosimo rattled Charles V with hypothetical scenarios of Piombino becoming a French – and implicitly a 'Turkish' – naval base in the Tyrrhenian in hopes of having his way.[33]

Earlier in the spring of 1548, Cosimo had already begun accumulating the necessary resources – including 25 pieces of artillery with munitions – at his newly-acquired coastal holding, Livorno, with aims of building fortresses and other structures on Elba (which would belong to Cosimo upon assuming lordship over Piombino). He had also hired 400 workers, transport vessels, and 2 Genoese privateer galleys as security detail. Presumably guided by Giovanni Camerini's notes from the previous year, the duke also transported Giovanni Battista Belluzzi[34] – another key military engineer and architect – from Livorno to Elba on 2 April 1548 to lay the groundwork for Cosimo's namesake fortified port-city: Cosmopolis, also called Portoferraio. From these early stages, the duke of Florence already employed propaganda such as "*ILVA RENASCENS*" ("Elba reborn") and "*THUSCORUM ET LIBURUM SECURITATI*" (roughly: "Florence brings freedom and security") for his project on Elba. To live up to these expectations – and with legitimate concerns of French or even Genoese intervention – 1,000 Medici soldiers embarked for Elba from Livorno on 20 April. Almost a month later, Cosimo personally paid a visit to the island to oversee Belluzzi's progress and deliver more supplies from Livorno on 18 May. One week later, Cosimo noted that the earthworks

[33] For this paragraph as a whole, see Angiolini. "Lo Stato di Piombino," 143-144; Fara. *Portoferraio*, 3; and Giuseppe M. Battaglini. "Portoferraio," in Giacinto Nudi et al. *Livorno e Pisa* […]. (Pisa, 1980), 309. In "La Marina Militare" (pp.18-19) Manfroni also emphasizes a French-Farnese-Sienese intelligence network that sought to move the French into Siena and Piombino. See also Spini. "The Medici Principality," 423-427; and Spini. *Cosimo I*, 197-199, 214-217.

[34] Belluzzi is sometimes referred to as "San Marino" for his place of birth. He was accompanied by Otto da Montauto, Luca Antonio Cuppano, Bastiano Campana (Cosimo's *provveditore* of Piombino), and Pirro Colonna for the Portoferraio project. Luca Martini's (discussed below) frequent references to Bastiano Campana implies his important role in helping administrate Cosimo's vessels and coastal fortresses.

were well-underway but also believed that the project was behind schedule. As the duke had said himself in a letter to Don Francesco di Toledo: "delay multiplies spending" – something Cosimo hoped to avoid. The duke was especially concerned since he knew that both hills overlooking the harbor required fortifications – double the cost – and that the implied monthly salaries for a minimal garrison of 1,500 infantrymen would only add to this massive total. Nevertheless, Cosimo himself ambitiously envisioned a structure "as large as the fortress of Livorno [… complete with] 20 large and 10 small pieces of artillery, powder, and abundant supplies for several months." As a result of these personal disagreements, Cosimo replaced Belluzzi with Camerini by 9 June.[35]

A few weeks later, Charles V enfeoffed Piombino to Cosimo on 22 June 1548. Yet, as the abovementioned concerns raised by the Salviati and the Mendozas – and the hypothetical threat of a papal-Valois-Ottoman alliance – intensified over the summer of 1548, the emperor reneged on the original Piombino agreement on 24 July. Cosimo's actual authority over the region barely lasted a month! As this unexpected shift occurred, the garrison switched from Medici to Habsburg troops, and it seemed almost certain that Charles had no intention of repaying Cosimo the tremendous 200,000 ducat loan granted him in return for a Medici-ruled Piombino, let alone the other expenses he had supplemented over the years. Understandably irate, Cosimo vowed that if he was ever forced to surrender Cosmopolis too, he would raze it to the ground and fill the harbor with debris. The duke had every right to feel robbed and defensive. Aside from a broken agreement barely a month after assuming lordship over Piombino, it was Charles himself

[35] Regarding the 25 pieces of artillery, the potential French threat, and the 1,000 troops that embarked to Elba on 20 April 1548, see ASF MP 11 f. 5 "*Lettera del Duca Cosimo al Vescovo di Forli datata Livorno 20 April 1548*" transcribed as entry XVI.17 in Battaglini. "Portoferraio," 321. Regarding Cosimo's visit to Elba and his concerns about the slow progress and vision for the fortresses, see Battaglini's transcription of ASF MP 11 f. 195-199. "*Lettera del Duca Cosimo al Signor Don Francesco di Toledo datata 25 maggio 1548*," entry XVI.18 on pp. 321-322. For other general information in this paragraph, see: Role "The Naval bases," 116; Fara. *Portoferraio*, 6-8; and Battaglini. "Portoferraio," 310. Since Belluzzi kept making his plans increasingly elaborate, Cosimo accused him of purposefully delaying the works on 27 May.

– via Mendoza – who had authorized Cosimo's initial surveying and construction work on Elba in April 1548.[36] Certainly, these frustrations must have been amplified considering what the duke had already invested in hiring experts, ships, laborers, troops, and materials to make his vision of a Medici Elba a reality.

Charles placed Siena and Piombino under the authority of the duke of Florence's enemy, Mendoza.[37] Additionally, the emperor enfeoffed Cosimo with Elba. So, although Piombino was under more direct Habsburg rule, the duke was allowed to maintain control over the region's most strategic and valuable real estate: Elba. Charles's decision was simple: only his own financial backer (Cosimo) could afford to build and upkeep fortifications in this critical military and general maritime route. Moreover, Cosimo was the most likely candidate with the means to quickly dispatch troops and warships should the worst occur – an Ottoman or French landing on Elba.[38]

As works on Elba continued over the summer of 1548, Cosimo's other coastal holdings (Pisa and Livorno) also underwent reassessment. In addition to Cosimo's eventual plans to significantly improve Livorno's *Fortezza Vecchia*, he also wanted to incorporate a palace for him and his family to use.[39] Clearly, the duke had intentions of headquartering himself here from time to time. Alongside his work at Portoferraio,

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[36] Role "The Naval bases," 116-117. See also Fara. *Portoferraio*, 3 and Battaglini. "Portoferraio," 309. Unfortunately, Role does not cite Cosimo's vow to "fill the harbor with debris" aside from saying that he "publicly stated" such things. Based on Role's notes, this 'public statement' likely comes from Giuseppe Ninci. *Storia dell'Isola dell'Elba* (Elba, 1815).

[37] The exact hierarchy of authority over Piombino is a bit muddled, but all that needs to be noted here is that the Appiani were immediately subject to the authority of Mendoza, Charles V's ambassador in the region. Chapter 2 will expand on how this opaque situation resulted in Mendoza overstepping his bounds and more or less provoke the rebellion in Siena in 1552.

[38] Angiolini. "Lo Stato di Piombino," 145. See also Fara. *Portoferraio*, 6. In spite of these issues, Cosimo's choice for Piombino's *governatore generale*, Girolamo degli Albizi, retained his position as well as his *provveditore* Bastiano Campana. (Bastiano is most likely related to one of Cosimo's secretaries, Francesco Campana)

[39] Giacinto Nudi. "La Fortezza Vecchia" in Nudi et al. *Livorno e Pisa*, 54. Concerning the numbers of artillery in Livorno circa 1543, Nudi cites an inventory by Giovanni Orlandi da Pescia: ASF MP 625 f. 14-16. Even though the paleography is extremely challenging, there is also an account of the munitions in Livorno by Ferrante Gonzaga dating from 1 June 1546: ASF MP 377 f. 4-5.

between 1546 and 1547, Giovanni Battista Belluzzi also drew up plans for Livorno's fortifications. At some point in these early years between 1543 and 1547, Cosimo also built 12 commercial warehouses to facilitate trade and other maritime activity at Livorno.[40]

By 1544, erosion near Pisa's harbor had essentially made this once-great medieval port-city nearly irrelevant and unusable. Thus, Cosimo sought to create a new port at Livorno while maintaining Pisa as the primary commercial center – especially in transporting goods to and from Florence. Already by 1541, Cosimo had entertained the idea of linking Pisa and Livorno via a canal – the *Canale dei Navicelli*, a project that would not fully manifest itself until the 1570s. By 1546, he had built Livorno's customs house and was in the early planning stages for an arsenal and other naval facilities.[41] The next year in July 1547, Andrea Doria's cousin Antonio managed to harbor and revictual his galley squadron there.[42] Marco Centurione, another Doria associate and son of the abovementioned Adamo, also referenced infantry and other "*cose de Napoli*" that had embarked at the mouth of the Arno which – presumably aboard galleys – could "*pronar´ di condursi alla foce*" ("turn and head to 'the mouth'") or go to Livorno.[43] Clearly, the rapid progress on Livorno's naval infrastructure already favored the Habsburg-Genoese galleys.

[40] Giancarlo Severini. "Le fortificazioni" in Nudi et al. *Livorno e Pisa*, 85. See also Dario Matteoni. *Le città nella storia d'Italia: Livorno*. (Rome, 1988) 3, 11. Belluzzi's plans were likely based on designs drafted by Antonio da Sangallo il Vecchio and his brother Giuliano around 1506.
[41] Fernand Braudel and Ruggiero Romano. *Navires et Marchandises à l'entrée du Port de Livourne (1547-1611)*. (Paris, 1951), 16-18, 20.
[42] ASF MP 383 f. 114-115, 31 July 1547 Antonio Doria to Gerolamo Albizi, Iacopo de Medici, comm.i in Pisa, and Cosimo I from the galleys in Livorno. Doria mentions that he had taken 1,500 Spanish troops to Naples.
[43] ASF MP 383 f. 144-145, 14 August 1547 Marco Centurione to Cosimo I from La Spezia. In this same letter, Centurione also advises Cosimo about Dragut and at least 26 corsair vessels.

Yet, in spite of the duke's continual investments into building up Livorno as a major maritime center, by 1551, only 480 individuals lived there.[44] Demographic information is very scarce for this period, however, Portugal's intensified Inquisition in 1547 definitely prompted many Portuguese Jews – along with others from Venice, Ragusa, and Ancona – to establish themselves in Livorno around 1548. Similarly, only sporadic records of the city's commercial activity exist. An account from February 1545 details goods – such as tuna (*tonnine*) and hides (*quoia pilose*) – that were being sold by various merchants.[45] Additionally, there was clearly a link with Alexandria, Egypt by the late 1540s via Ragusan merchants. An account from November 1548 records an insurance policy issued to a small Ragusan vessel for her voyage from Alexandria to Livorno. Other documents from 1549 mention that an Alexandrian vessel delivered basic foodstuffs in addition to some linen goods and frankincense. Moreover, a few Tuscan merchants had established themselves in the Levant.[46] Indeed, the surviving records cannot entirely tell Livorno's story from these early years of Cosimo's revitalization projects. Nevertheless, it is clear that this was a crucial period for physically building Livorno and establishing the trade networks that would make her one of the Mediterranean's major commercial centers by the following century.

Florentine galleys and administration (*c.* 1547 – 1551)

The duke hoped that his *Livornina* law from March 1548 would attract naval experts to Livorno, but these individuals – most of whom were Genoese – had already established themselves in Pisa. In October 1547, around the same time that Cosimo had dispatched Giovanni Camerini to assess Piombino's fortifications and was working with

[44] Matteoni. *Le città nella storia d'Italia*, 12.
[45] ASF MP 375 f. 384, 15 February 1545 "Portata della nave Trinita (from Livorno)."
[46] Braudel and Romano. *Navires et Marchandises*, 27-28, 33, 37. Among their notes, Braudel and Romano cite Archives de Raguse *Diversa Notariae* 110 f 21; 5-6; 18-19; 14; ASF MP 2863 "Le Recteur de Raguse au Duc, Raguse, 5 mars 1550"; and ASF MP 1829 f 12.

Charles V to oust the Appiani, the very first Medici galley, the *Pisana*, launched from the recently renovated, medieval Pisan arsenal, *le Tersanaie di San Vito*. Construction of the *Arsenale Medicea* had just begun in 1546, however, and the duke of Florence wanted to quickly expand his fleet. He ordered 2 new galleys to be constructed in Pisa – the *San Giovanni* and the *Toscana* – but these were not completed until 1549 and 1550 respectively. In the meantime, he wanted to order at least one new galley from Genoa. However, given the republic's concerns over Cosimo's ambitions for Elba – and fears that he sought to move onto Corsica and Ligurian waters – this was not possible. Instead, he contacted his father-in-law (the viceroy of Naples) about acquiring a "light and swift" vessel. By late 1548, Cosimo added the Neapolitan galley *Saetta* (the Arrow) to his nascent fleet. In July that same year, he had purchased a plot of land from the nuns of San Vito to build a warehouse for servicing the galleys in Pisa. This was followed by a much larger purchase. In exchange for building a new church – *San Lorenzo alla Rivolta* and other buildings for the brothers of San Guglielmo – and a payment of 1,000 *scudi*, the duke of Florence acquired the original monastery of San Vito which included the adjacent land and four houses along the Arno. Although the groundwork for this deal was laid in 1548, it was not finalized until 1551. Still, by 1548, the Medici duke had attained over 8 acres (35,000 square meters) of land to build a new arsenal in Pisa. Yet, the city's silting problems remained. Even though Livorno lacked the appropriate facilities to build galleys, her shipyards could easily accommodate maintenance, restoration, or finishing work for galleys arriving from Pisa.[47] Slowly but surely, a Florentine naval infrastructure

[47] Capponi. "Guns and Profit," 61. Capponi cites ASF MP 383 f. 352r, Luca Martini to Cosimo I de'Medici, 13 October 1547 for the launching of the *Pisana*. Concerning the *Saetta*, he cites ASF MP 5 f. 674r, Cosimo I to Don Pedro de Toledo, 15 March 1547; and ASF MP 1174 ins. 3 f. 32v Cristiano Pagni to Piero Francesco del Riccio, 4 August 1548. Concerning the tension between Cosimo and Genoa, Capponi cites ASF MP 11 f. 71r, Cosmo I de' Medici to Girolamo degli Albizzi, 28 April 1548; ASF MP 11 f. 122r Cosimo I de'Medici to Bernardo de' Medici, 5 May 1548; and ASF MP 1169 ins 6 f. 207r Cristiano Pagni to Piero Francesco del Riccio, 27 February 1550. See also Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 21; Role "The

emerged. Mere months after acquiring Piombino in June and having it taken away in July 1548, Cosimo could still boast about the ongoing renovations and new construction in Pisa and Livorno – including new inhabitants in the latter; his strong foothold on Elba and Camerini's work on Cosmopolis (Portoferraio); and his budding maritime trading network and navy – which comprised of two galleys: the *Pisana* and the *Saetta*.

The *Pisana*, captained by Alessandro Corso, was a 24-bench galley with 180 *forzati* rowers – about 3 men per bench. Additionally, there were about 70 *marinai* including officers aboard: *il maestro bombardiere* and his aids, *il maestro calafato* (caulker), *l'aguzzino* (roughly a master-at-arms), *il maestro remolaro* (oar carpenter), and similar officers. All sailors – many from Naples, Sicily, or Venice – who served aboard were likely personally hired by Captain Corso. The other Tuscan galleys ready by 1549 and 1550 respectively - the *San Giovanni* and the *Toscana* – were equipped and manned in a similar fashion. Unfortunately, comparable records for the *Saetta*, captained by Simeone Rossermini of Pisa, have not surfaced.[48]

Arming the galleys was greatly aided by Cosimo's investment in the foundry at the fortress of San Giovanni in northern Florence. By 1549, a certain *Maestro* Janni Franzese was noted to have cast pieces "for the galleys" there. Two years later in 1551, *Maestro* Cremonese (Antonio da Cremona) – likely alongside his brother Bartolomeo – made another 5 guns.[49]

Naval bases," 115; Franco Angiolini. "Arsenali e Costruzioni Navali Nella Toscana dei Medici" in Lorenza de Maria and Rita Turchetti, eds. Proceedings from *Rotte e Porti del Mediterraneo* […]. (Genoa, 2004), 366, 369; and Franco Angiolini. "L'arsenale di Pisa fra politica ed economia: continuità e mutamenti (secoli XV-XVI)" in Ennio Cocina, ed. *Arsenali e citta nell'Occidente Europeo*. (Florence, 1987), 77, 79.

[48] Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 22, 25 and notes. According to www.treccani.it's "vocabolario on line," *l'aguzzino* refers to "an inferior officer who was in charge of supervising and directing the galley's maneuvers and inflicting punishment on the oarsmen." I have not found a similar definition for "remolaro," but presumably, this was someone who specialized in maintaining the oars (*remo*).

[49] Capponi. "Guns and Profit," 62. Capponi cites ASF MP 613 ins. 5 f. 17r Piero Francesco del Riccio to Cosimo I de' Medici, 20 May 1549; ASF MP 613 ins. 7 f. 46rv Piero Francesco del Riccio to Cosimo I de' Medici, 4 December 1551; and ASF MP 3101a f. 1179r Francesco Vinta to Cosimo I de' Medici, 12 August 1549. Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 21-22 discusses the armaments of these early galleys.

By 1551, Cosimo restored the naval government body, the *Consoli del Mare*, however, this office did not oversee the galleys. Those responsibilities were entrusted to Luca Martini, the first *Provveditore dell'Arsenale di Pisa*. Martini had been born into a wealthy, Florentine family, but his younger brother, Guglielmo, was exiled in 1541 for anti-Medici sentiments. Even young Luca himself befriended several of Cosimo's enemies – including the Varchi family – however, he was also acquainted with some of the duke's closest associates such as Cosimo's leading domestic policy advisor, Lelio Torelli. These connections eventually granted Luca Martini favor with the duke. He dedicated the early 1540s to several artistic and academic endeavors, and he was appointed *provveditore della muraglia* (of the wall) of Florence in 1546, where he oversaw the construction of the market: *Nuovo di Firenze*. By the next year, he was assigned to Pisa as *provveditore dei fossi* (ditches and canals), *delle galere*, and *delle fortezze*. Alongside constructing, provisioning, and equipping the galleys built in Pisa's *arsenale*, he also oversaw the city's ongoing works – in addition to those underway in Livorno and Portoferraio.[50]

Martini's frequent correspondence with Cosimo provides a detailed picture of his various responsibilities as *provveditore* and sheds light on the inner workings of the Medici military machine. Overall, he presents a fairly organized and extremely multifaceted naval infrastructure between 1548-1551. Considering the duke's ongoing projects on Elba, Martini's correspondence frequently referenced the works on this island such as: a *fregata* (frigate), *barche* (barge), and other vessels that delivered munitions and supplies;[51] specific amounts of grain and other victuals sent to Elba;[52] artillery and other

[50] Angiolini. "L'arsenale di Pisa," 79-80. On Luca Martini, see especially Angiolini's entry in the *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani (DBdI)*, Volume 71 (2008) accessible online: www.treccani.it.
[51] ASF MP 387 f. 577, 2 June 1548; f. 592, 4 June 1548; ASF MP 388 f. 277, 16 June 1548; ASF MP 388 f. 348, 15 June 1548; f. 446, 6 July 1548; f. 520, 28 June 1548; ASF MP 390 f. 87, 10 September 1548 – this document mentions the *Pisana*; f. 299, 25 September 1548; f. 365, 5 January 1548; ASF MP 393 f. 568, 13

weapons provided for the burgeoning fortresses,[53] the movement of specific individuals;[54] and building supplies.[55] On 29 August 1549, he observed that "we should have half of the island's (Elba's) ditch completed by mid-September."[56] Of course, with the ongoing works on Elba, Martini had consulted with Camerini on a few occasions.[57] Even at Pisa and Livorno, he kept Cosimo up-to-date on projects such as a wall along the Arno,[58] an assignment in the marshes ("*padule*") of Barbercina,[59] other works at Livorno's Tora River,[60] the Canal of Usciana ("*Gusciana*") between Pisa and Florence,[61] and the façade of the *nuovo palazzo di Pisa*.[62] Like Elba, he also ensured that these locations on the mainland maintained adequate food stores[63] and armaments.[64]

June 1549; f. 591, 15 June 1549; ASF MP 394 f. 9-10, 12 August 1549; f. 184, 16 August 1549; f. 199 29 August 1549; f. 219-220, 20 August 1549; ASF MP 402 f. 476, 25 April 1551; ASF 403A f. 726, 29 June 1551;

[52] ASF MP 388 f. 277, 16 June 1548; ASF MP 390 f. 40-41, 3 September 1548; ASF MP 403 f. 490, 19 June 1551 specifically details grain and saltpeter arriving to and from Elba. ASF MP 409 f. 159, 10 June 1552.

[53] ASF MP 388 f. 348, 15 June 1548; f. 349, 17 June 1548; f. 383, 23 June 1548; ASF MP 394 f. 635, 21 September 1549;

[54] ASF MP 389 f. 162, 22 July 1548 mentions Girolamo Zerbino; ASF MP 391 f. 360, 3 January 1549 (1548) mentions a certain S^{or} Otto. ASF MP 393 f. 592, 15 June 1549 mentions Ant^{o} del Mucione; ASF MP 394 f. 520, 12 September 1549 mentions a Knight of Malta, Cavaliero Joan de Vargas, captain of the *Pellegrina*. The arrival of "Gian de Vargas" is first mentioned in this same file on f. 220. ASF MP 403 f. 490 and 604, 19 June and 24 June 1551 respectively mention a certain "Giordano" who is mentioned again traveling around Elba on 7 July 1551 in ASF MP 403A f. 873.

[55] ASF MP 390 f. 422, 9 October 1548 – wood in this case. Affairs on Elba in 1549 are also referenced in ASF Filze e Registri Guidi (Guidi) 8 nn, 27 May and 21 August 1549. (about f. 58 and 62 if one counts the pages of the Luca Martini section)

[56] ASF MP 399 f. 199.

[57] ASF MP 396 f. 290, 18 March 1550 (1549). The index incorrectly notes this document as f. 291. See also ASF MP 403 f. 490, 19 June 1551.

[58] ASF MP 390 f. 40v, 3 September 1548;

[59] ASF MP 390 f. 146v, 13 September 1548. This also mentions the finances involved for this project and specifies that it was carried out by the *Cammarlingo* (camerléngo) *di Fossi*; f. 199, 20 September 1548; f. 389, 5 October 1548; ASF MP 394 f. 9-10, 12 August 1549; f. 413v, 5 September 1549; ASF MP 398 f. 410, 7 August 1550; f. 433, 10 August 1550. Barbercina is mentioned several times, but I am unsure of its location.

[60] ASF MP 394 f. 35, 4 August 1549; f. 413v, 5 September 1549.

[61] ASF MP 394 f. 137-138, 13 August 1549.

[62] ASF MP 401 f. 680, 17 March 1551 (1550).

[63] ASF MP 386 f. 178, 1548; f. 197v, 13 April 1548; ASF MP 388 f. 223, 7 June 1548; ASF MP 394A f. 667, 23 September 1549, seems to indicate a deficiency of grain. See also ASF MP 403 f. 437, 17 June 1551; ASF MP 406 f. 570, 15 December 1551; and ASF MP 409 f. 159, 10 June 1552 – which may refer to Elba at times. Another record of grain at Pisa is found in Martini's letter in ASF Guidi 8 nn, 1551. (about f. 54 if one counts the pages)

[64] A *colubrina* is mentioned in ASF MP 403 f. 604, 24 June 1551. Powder, shot, and a notable artillery delivery are discussed in ASF MP 403A f. 726, 29 June 1551 Gunpowder for the artillery and arquebuses is

As early as April 1548, Luca Martini also kept Cosimo updated on the slaves and especially the *forzati* (convicts) that had arrived from Florence and Palermo.[65] Most of these captives and convicts were destined for work on the galleys and other vessels[66] including the *Saetta*[67] and *Pisana*.[68] In 1549, Martini mentioned *forzati* from Pitigliano (in Siena's southern Grosseto region),[69] Barga (near Lucca), Volterra,[70] and Pistoia. However, this system was not without problems. An account from January 1549 related how a *forzato* escaped to Lucca,[71] and another letter in the summer of 1550 updated Cosimo on 2 *forzati* who had fled.[72] Martini specifically mentioned the names of a few of these convicts such as Antonio di Giovanni da Verona who had been sentenced to the galleys "*in perpetuo*" and was serving in Livorno aboard the *Toscana* in 1552.[73] In 1548 and 1551, however, some *forzati* were noted as working at Piombino[74] – presumably on the fortifications or other building projects. In addition to these men, Martini made note

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detailed in ASF MP 386 f. 225, 14 April 1548; f. 233, 16 April 1548; and ASF MP 398 f. 419-420, 9 August 1550. In ASF MP 348 f. 223, 7 June 1548, Martini observes that the one of the fortresses has "*poca artiglieria et massimamente moschetti et sagri*," and that they were months behind on making gunpowder for both artillery and arquebuses. On 7 August 1550, he notes that Bastiano Campana had helped inventory the fortress of Livorno in ASF MP 398 f. 410. Martini also recorded 48,531 lb. of saltpeter at Livorno on 22 June 1551 in ASF MP 403 f. 567. Regarding artillery, Martini references a certain Franc^{o} di S Iacopo who was operating from Florence. In addition to these letters in ASF MP, see Franc^{o} also referenced in ASF Guidi 8 nn, 24 August 1550. (about f. 27 if one counts the pages) Occasionally, Martini also references *Maestro Janni* [Franzese] as he does in ASF MP 398 419v, 9 August 1550.

[65] ASF MP 386 f. 178, 11 April 1548. Regarding slaves from Palermo, see also ASF MP 386 f. 179 "*Offerta di Benedetto Carretta di acquistare a Palermo schiavi per le galere*." A "Moorish" slave is referenced in ASF MP 388 f. 439r, 5 July 1548. There are also some arrangements between Cosimo and a certain Francesco Tappia regarding slaves in ASF MP 2077 ins. 1 f. 33-35, 1549.

[66] For an example, see ASF MP 388 f. 510-511, 26 July 1548; f. 679-680, 20 August 1548; ASF MP 394 f. 184, 16 August 1549; ASF MP 401 f. 680v; 17 March 1550.

[67] ASF MP 390 f. 87, 10 September 1548.

[68] Some of these individuals are detailed in a "*nota di component l'equipaggio delle galere*" from August or September 1549, ASF MP 394 f. 8. See also ASF MP 407 f. 379 and 382 "*lista di tre prigionieri condannati alle galere*" from early 1552.

[69] ASF MP 394 f. 37, 3 August 1549.

[70] ASF MP 394 f. 199, 29 August 1549.

[71] ASF MP 391 f. 378-379, 7 January 1549 (1548); and 439-440, 10 January 1549 (1548). The escaped *forzato* was Iacopo di Pauoloccio Paulocci Pistolese who was noted as escaping from the *Saetta* on 3 January 1549 (1548) in ASF MP 391 f. 366.

[72] ASF MP 398 f. 608-609. The end of this letter seems to have been misplaced – it could very well be buried in the same 398 file. Thus, the exact date is missing, but this collection is from July-August 1550.

[73] ASF MP 408A f. 571, 1 May 1552. Other individuals are specified in ASF MP 390 f. 141, 22 September 1548.

[74] ASF MP 390 f. 318, 27 September 1548; and ASF MP 404 f. 408, 26 August 1551. This 1551 letter is not from Luca Martini but instead "Bart^{o} Ghualtarattj" (Bartolomeo Gualterotti).

of several orphans ("*fanciulli delli innocenti*") that were divided between working on land and on the galleys.[75] The *Pisana* and the *Saetta* each had 3 or 4 "*innocenti picoli*" aboard in June 1549.[76] While there was a trickling stream of convicts and slaves, Cosimo was clearly training a new generation of 'home-grown' sailors and engineering professionals.

Among the other individuals that worked aboard the galleys and at Cosimo's bases, Martini also mentioned a few experts hired from outside of Tuscany and even Italy. In late January 1549, he noted the presence of some "*bonbardieri tedesci*" (German bombardiers) at Livorno.[77] That summer, another German in Naples made Cosimo some iron pulleys ("*tirare di ferro*").[78] Martini also received a letter from the viceroy of Sicily that recommended a certain Agostino and Gabriello – the former having served Charles V ("*sua M^{a} Ces*") 15 years on the Sicilian galleys.[79] Another recommendation surfaced for Federigo di Cardova (Córdoba) – a Spaniard.[80] Aboard the *Pisana*, Martini made note of *còmiti*[81] Luchino Corso and Gianni da Villafranca. Gianni had commanded the galleys of Monaco for Alessandro Corso – captain of the *Pisana* at the moment of Martini's letter. Both Luchino and Gianni had also served aboard the Genoese and papal galleys.[82] A letter from late August 1550 referenced payments made to several members of the Montauto ("*Montauuto*") clan of Palermo – particularly to Benedetto for his service on

[75] For example, see ASF MP 386 f. 197r, 13 April 1548; f. 226, 15 April 1548; and ASF MP 390 f. 146r, 13 September 1548.
[76] ASF MP 393 f. 701v, "*nota di compoenent l'equipaggio dell galere*" from 23 June 1549. In ASF MP 388 f. 491, the *còmito* of the *Pisana* noted that he had 4 "*raghassi*" from Ferrara aboard on 13 July 1548.
[77] ASF MP 391A f. 82 (noted as f. 590 in the index).
[78] ASF MP 393 f. 591, 15 June 1549.
[79] ASF MP 402A f. 1083, 29 May 1551. This letter also mentions their brother Iacopo and later Giovannettorio and Lorenzo who may also be from the same family.
[80] ASF MP 394 f. 137r, 13 August 1549. A recommendation for a Tuscan, Girolamo dell'Antella, is referenced in ASF Guidi 8 nn, 23 March 1549. (about f. 52 if one counts the pages)
[81] The "vocabolario online" of www.treccani.it defines a còmito as a "non-commissioned officer who, on the galleys, was in charge of maneuvering the sails and the seafaring services of the ship."
[82] ASF MP 390 f. 318, 27 September 1548. Martini references Captain Alessandro throughout this section of his correspondence. See especially ASF MP 390 f. 198-199; f. 331; ASF MP 391 f. 377; and ASF MP 393 f. 701-702.

the galleys.[83] Martini also noted a "*comito greco*" – who came from Naples aboard the *Saetta* –when he mentioned the delivery of two small explosive devices that could set fire to stone. ("*due scoppi piccolo che danno fuoco colla pietra*") This Greek *còmito* had apparently provided one of these.[84] The Neapolitan Captain Francesco Rustichi of the *nave* (ship) *San Giovanni Battista* – which was in Cosimo's service – had also built a model of a *galeone*.[85] Clearly, the Medici shipwrights were looking ahead towards building other sorts of vessels. Additionally, in December 1549, Martini revealed that the *maestro* who had built the *Pisana* would gladly keep building galleys for Cosimo.[86]

Even with all of these specialists, Cosimo's navy still struggled to maintain a decent pool of experts. Martini's correspondence on 6 September 1548 lamented that "on the galleys, we have no more than 4 *maestri* […], the others are sick, and two have died eight days ago." However, two of the older ("*maggiori*") *innocenti* had helped as best as they could.[87] Regarding a project related to the ditch outside of Livorno's fortress in 1551, Martini observed "there will be no one who knows how to do it here."[88] Another *còmito* expressed a clear need for placing aboard "men who are practiced at the galley."[89] Nevertheless, the nascent Medici shipyards provide yet another example of how proficiency, experience, and military technology transcended borders in the sixteenth century – presumably for the right price.

[83] ASF MP 398 f. 608r. This is part of a longer letter until f. 609, but as noted above, the ending for this letter has been misplaced and cannot be dated precisely.
[84] ASF MP 390 f. 448, 10 October 1548. He is mentioned earlier in f. 87, 10 September 1548.
[85] ASF MP 390 f. 41, 3 September 1548. See also ASF MP 2077 f. 11, which inventories this *nave* on 15 May 1548, and f. 19 which appears to be an agreement between Rustichi and Cosimo mediated by Leilo Torelli in 1547.
[86] ASF Guidi 8 nn, 5 December 1549. (about f. 35 if one counts the pages)
[87] ASF MP 390 f. 65r.
[88] ASF Guidi 8 nn, 21 September 1551. (about f. 53 if one counts the pages)
[89] ASF MP 388 f. 391, "*Grosso da Portovenere comito della galera Pisana*," to Cosimo I from Portoferraio, 13 July 1548.

The same applied to supplies and other equipment. Regarding a *bastarda*[90] and a galley, someone in Cosimo's service was clearly shopping around in Genoa for sails ("*vele*"), awnings ("*le sartie di tutte le sorte*"), and other parts for shipbuilding.[91] Luca Martini also obtained items made in Genoa[92] – including some armaments.[93]Additionally, he acquired wine from Corsica[94] and Sardinia,[95] as well as grain from Candia (Crete) and the Levant.[96] Interestingly, Martini also referred to an ongoing transaction with a "*mercati*" in "*Francia*,"[97] and on 20 August 1549, he mentioned business with some merchants at Lyons.[98] Recalling *Maestro* Janni Franzese who worked on artillery, it seems that even the enemy's homeland was not completely off limits for acquiring both goods and expertise. Especially considering the slaves, *forzati*, and experts mentioned above, when combined with the equipment and 'fuel' needed to keep it going, the early years of Cosimo's navy already had an 'international' flavor between 1548 and the early 1550s. Moreover, it is clear that Martini's jurisdiction as *provveditore* was seemingly boundless. He even corresponded with Cosimo regarding copper fittings for an iron portcullis on one of Elba's fortified holdings.[99] One could say that Martini literally handled the 'nuts and bolts' of the operation. If anything was going on in Pisa, Livorno, or on Elba – no matter how extraordinary or mundane – he was aware and, on most occasions, personally involved.

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[90] To borrow Niccolò Capponi's words, a *bastarda* was a 'love child' between a normal galley and a *galera grossa* (large/merchant galley). Capponi. *Victory of the West* […]. (Cambridge, MA, 2007), note on p. 180.
[91] ASF MP 394 f. 36, "*Bastarda, galera nota di generi di equipaggio*," 1549.
[92] ASF MP 394 f. 35, 4 August 1549. By December, Martini was requesting money related to a "*memoria per conto di Genova*." See ASF Guidi 8 nn, 5 December 1549. (about f. 35 if one counts the pages)
[93] ASF MP 394 f. 137r, 13 August 1549.
[94] ASF MP 390 f. 199r, 20 September 1548.
[95] ASF MP 394 f. 137r, 13 August 1549. The sources also mention wine from Elba.
[96] ASF MP 404 f. 132-133, 12 August 1551. This letter is from Captain Francesco Rustichi.
[97] ASF MP 397A f. 849. This undated document appears to be some sort of expense report. The collection is dated to 12 May - 30 June 1550.
[98] ASF MP 394 f. 219-220. For example: "*Non ostante queste cose havendo à mandare in Francia un pratico oltre che sarà buona sa egli arrivera in Lione in tempo che le compere di tali mercanzie sulle fiere saranno passate*" on f. 219r.
[99] ASF MP 396 f. 290, 18 March 1550 (1549). The index incorrectly notes this document as f. 291.

Most obviously, he oversaw the galleys and other vessels. On 16 April 1548, he assured Cosimo regarding the *Pisana*: "I will see to providing everything."[100] Regarding the galleys – and everything else for that matter – that is precisely what he did. In July that same year, he noted that he had enough grain to supply 4 galleys with *biscotti*.[101] By 6 September, he resupplied both the *Pisana* and the *Pellegrina* – a vessel belonging to the Knights of Malta – with *biscotti*.[102] Days later, Martini guaranteed that he would have another 2 months' supply of provisions for 2 galleys within the next 10 days.[103] He had even measured the Arno's water levels around Pisa and concluded that it was a sufficient depth for an armed galley and Cosimo's *galeotta*.[104] Concerning salaries, Martini or someone under him made notes about the monthly wages for the *Pisana*'s crew – which amounted to 81 ducats[105] – and aboard Rustichi's *nave San Giovanni Battista*[106] in 1548.

Amidst these administrative tasks, Martini also had to arm the galleys and Cosimo's other warships. Starting in April 1548, Martini began receiving various artillery pieces for the *Pisana* and other vessels.[107] By August, Martini proclaimed that he had finally gathered most of the arms and artillery for "the new galley" – presumably the

[100] ASF MP 386 f. 233, 16 April 1548.
[101] ASF MP 388 f. 435-436, 2 July 1548. Two months' of wine is mentioned in ASF MP 390 f. 198r, 20 September 1548.
[102] ASF MP 390 f. 64r. As noted above, the *Pellegrina* is specifically tied to Cavaliero Joan (Gian) de Vargas in ASF MP 394 f. 520, 12 September 1549.
[103] ASF MP 390 f. 87, 10 September 1548. He seemingly proved this when he revictualed Don Garcia's galley weeks later. (detailed below)
[104] ASF MP 403A, 29 June 1551.
[105] ASF MP 386 f. 234 "*Nota dell'equipaggio della galera Pisana e relative ingaggi*," 13 April 1548.
[106] ASF MP 386 f. 771 "*Modalita di navigazione e inventario della nave San Giovanni Battista*," April 1548. Payment for this *nave* or a different one is discussed another of Martini's letters: ASF Guidi 8 nn, 9 January 1551 (1550). (about f. 14 if one counts the pages)
[107] ASF MP 386 f. 197v, 13 April 1548; f. 233, 16 April 1548; and ASF MP 388 f. 220. The end of this letter seems to have been misplaced – it could very well be buried in the same 388 file. Thus, the exact date is missing, but this collection is from January 1548 - July 1549. See also ASF MP 389 f. 229, 30 July 1548.

Pisana or the *Saetta*.[108] As inventoried by Iacapo di Medici, the Neapolitan *Saetta* under Captain Simeone Rossermini had the artillery in "good order."[109]

Cosimo's *galeotta* was armed so that it could bring down a ship. ("*accio potesse accadendo fare ammainare una nave*") After disarming the duke's *fregata*,[110] she was given at least 4 *smerigli* and a *sagro* of 800-1,000 Florentine pounds.[111] Martini observed that this seemed appropriate since she was frequently crossing the channel to Elba. Moreover, he hoped that this armed vessel would further instill fear among the corsairs.[112] Considering that 5 corsair *galeotte* were spotted near Corsica in early October 1548, arming the *galeotta* seemed essential.[113] Bearing in mind the galleys – which by 1550 included the *Pisana*, *Saetta*, *San Giovanni*, and *Toscana* – and perhaps other hired vessels; at least one armed *galeotta* and *fregata*; the *nave San Giovanni Battista*; and the cargo ships used to ferry supplies between Cosimo's coastal holdings, the Medici squadron of warships and logistical support vessels was fairly considerable in this early period – especially for a small state that had only recently rejoined the ranks of the Italian maritime centers.

Livorno's harbor proved equally noteworthy. Martini referenced a copy of an account ("*una listra*") of the Marchese dell Vasto[114] who had passed through with 6

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[108] ASF MP 388 f. 616-617, 13 August 1548. In September, more *sagri* for the galleys arrived. See: ASF MP 390 f. 49, 16 September 1548. There were also *cannoni petrei* for the *Saetta*. See: ASF MP 390 f. 146, 13 September 1548.

[109] ASF MP 390 f. 40v, 3 September 1548. An obscure figure, the USA's National Gallery of Art has a bronze medallion by Piero Paolo Galeotti depicting Jacopo de Medici as the Marquess of Marignan and one of Charles V's generals around 1552. Accession number: 1957.14.948. Regarding galley artillery, Martini observed that he could always take pieces or other items from the fortresses as needed. See: ASF MP 386 f. 265, 17 April 1548. On 20 September, Martini took 2 *quarti cannoni* and a *smeriglio grosso* from the fortress at Livorno and placed them aboard the *Pisana*. See: ASF MP 390 f. 198r.

[110] ASF MP 388 f. 409, 26 June 1548 and f. 446, 6 July 1548.

[111] 1 Florentine pound = 339 grams (approximately ¾ lb.)

[112] ASF MP 388 f. 409, 26 June 1548. "*ch' oltre il giovare assai à quella impresa dice ch' passa in nome di galeotta fra li corsali come le loro fanno à noi et ch' darà loro piu timore*"

[113] ASF MP 390 f. 389, 5 October 1548.

[114] Alfonso d'Avalos, a condottiero in Charles V's service. See his entry in the *DBdI*, Volume 4 (1962) accessible online: www.treccani.it. I have not been able to find the "scrap" of paper Martini references, but there is a letter from Avalos to Cosimo from 10 May 1545: ASF MP 376 f. 185.

galleys in 1545.[115] On the night of 17-18 July 1548, 7 galleys under Cosimo's brother-in-law, Don Garcia de Toledo; 8 Sicilian galleys under a Don Berlinghieri; and 5 Genoese galleys under Antonio Doria – at least 20 vessels total – had rested at Livorno.[116] The next day, some were revictualed with *biscotti* and other supplies.[117] Later that year on 22 September 1548, Martini provided 100 *contara* of *biscotti* to Don Garcia's *captiana*.[118] Especially considering the abovementioned letters from Antonio Doria and Marco Centurione in 1547, Livorno was clearly playing a part in the Habsburg-allied navy even at this early stage of Cosimo's maritime endeavors. By the early 1550s, these vessels and infrastructure would prove invaluable as the Italian Wars resumed.

[115] ASF MP 387 f. 577, 2 June 1548. Martini references the "Marchese dl Vasto" and his 6 galleys again in ASF MP 387 f. 592v, 4 June 1548. ASF MP 1829 f. 3 appears to be a list of prices for ships using the port of Livorno in April 1545.
[116] ASF MP 389 f. 106. Berlinghieri is detailed in f. 110-111 cited below.
[117] ASF MP 389 f. 110-111, 19 July 1548. Although well supplied, a few other items had not yet come from Pisa.
[118] ASF MP 390 f. 141. 1 *contar* = 150 Florentine pounds. A *capitana* equivocates to a flagship.

Chapter 2: Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Cosimo's Dilemma Towards the War of Siena (c. May 1551 – December 1553)

The 'cold war' thaws: The War of Parma and Mirandola & the growing Ottoman threat (c. 1549 – August 1551)

As Cosimo's naval projects were underway between the late 1540s and early 1550s, the ominous threat of war emerged once again. Even though the 1549 negotiations between Charles V and Pope Paul III Farnese had made Parma a papal holding, the election of Pope Julius III in early 1550 prompted the emperor to propose reallocating Parma to the Farnese under his son-in-law, Ottavio (Ottaviano) Farnese. By May 1551, however, a treaty between Ottavio Farnese and King Henri II implied that the French crown had become the Farnese's new 'protector.' Now that they had revealed themselves to be Valois allies, Pope Julius immediately rescinded Parma from Farnese control. Shortly thereafter, Henri deployed cavalry and infantry to defend Parma as a Farnese holding. Immediately reacting to the French invasion, a Habsburg-Papal army emerged under Pope Julius's nephew, Giambattista del Monte, in June 1551. Instead of retaking Parma, however, del Monte's army strategically prioritized the French stronghold of Mirandola. Further conflict began in Piedmont from late August 1551 alongside other border skirmishes near Milan. As what became the War of Parma and Mirandola intensified, however, it was perceived more as a proxy war than a full-fledged renewal of the Habsburg-Valois conflict.[1]

Despite the 300,000 *scudi* that Julius III had already devoted towards the war in Piedmont, his efforts to uphold the church's title over Parma ultimately required the emperor's financial and military backing. Thus, Charles could easily claim that he was simply aiding the pope. Similarly, Henri justified French actions in Italy as mere support for the Farnese. Yet in this same moment, the Valois king also facilitated a reignited anti-

[1] Potter. *Renaissance France At War* […]. (Woodbridge, 2008), 39-41; and David Sanderson Chambers. *Popes, cardinals and war* […]. (London, 2006)162-163.

Habsburg rising in Germany.[2] With regard to Italy, Henri stated that he only wished to uphold his preexisting claims as part of his border with the Habsburgs. His true focus was along the Rhine – not new conquests in Italy. In spite of Charles's, Henri's, and Julius's intentions to avoid a general war in Italy, however, it seemed that the Peace of Crépy could only stall one for so much longer.[3]

Once again, Cosimo found himself in the thick of the action. Unlike the previous decade of his dukedom, by 1550, the pope was an ally not an antagonist. Moreover, Cosimo felt betrayed. He had not forgotten Charles V's abrogation of the Piombino agreement two years earlier. He could only contrast this duplicity with his years of loyal service to the Habsburgs. Thus, the duke of Florence pursued his best interests through the complex game of secret agreements, blackmail, and double dealing. For example, Cosimo was officially neutral during the War of Parma and Mirandola, however, he secretly worked towards securing Parma for Julius III not the Habsburgs or the Farnese-Valois camp. Moreover, unlike his previous 'donations' of troops and loans in the 1540s, Cosimo never offered Charles any help when German Protestant rebels attacked in the early 1550s. It was obvious to the emperor that Cosimo's absent aid was the price he had to pay for reneging on the deal over Piombino.[4] Additionally, Charles was now footing the bill for Piombino's garrison, and he unsuccessfully attempted to convince Jacopo VI Appiani to exchange Piombino for the duchy of Sessa, a trivial holding in Naples. The emperor hoped that he could convince Genoese bankers to loan him the tremendous sum that the Appiani and he personally owed Cosimo; get Jacopo to agree to Sessa; and then

[2] Vis-à-vis the Treaty of Chambord, 15 January 1552
[3] Michael Mallett and Christine Shaw. *The Italian Wars, 1494-1559* […]. (Harlow, UK, 2012), 251-256. See also Potter. *Renaissance France At War*, 39-41 and Sanderson Chambers. *Popes, cardinals and war*, 162-163.
[4] Giorgio Spini. "The Medici Principality […]," in *Journal of Italian History* Number 3. (winter 1979), 427.

place Piombino under the viceroy of Naples' jurisdiction.[5] Clearly, Charles wanted Habsburg *not* Medici control over this key territory. Yet, these personal differences and stalemated negotiations – on top of the constant expenses – did nothing to alleviate the urgent military situation in the Mediterranean.

Sultan Süleyman had been at war with the Safavid Empire until 1549; however, his tentative allies on the Barbary coast had been active. One of his newly appointed admirals, Dragut Reis, officially entered Ottoman service on 19 June 1550. Since at least the 1530s, Dragut had raided Venetian shipping lanes in the Aegean and commanded at the Battle of Preveza (1538) – a crushing Venetian-Genoese naval defeat. Even after he was captured by the Genoese and ransomed by Barbarossa during the 1540s, Dragut quickly resumed his status. By 1549, the corsair and his fleet of 5 galleys, 16 galliots, and some brigantines terrorized the western Mediterranean and raided Rapallo on the Ligurian coast.[6] That same year, he captured the Spanish holdings of Monastir and Mahdia (al-Mahdiyah or "Affrica") in Tunisia. By June 1550, Charles V launched an imperial fleet to reclaim Mahdia – a grueling siege that lasted until 20 September. In April 1551, Genoese naval legend Andrea Doria cornered Dragut behind the corsair's own earthworks in the Bocca de Cantara – a lagoon on the Tunisian island of Djerba. However, the wily corsair made a theatrical escape and, in the process, captured Sicily's *patrona*[7] galley which was en route to inform Doria of imminent reinforcements. Prince Abu Beker (Buguer), son of the king of Tunis – a known Spanish ally – was also aboard

[5] Raymond E. Role "The Naval bases of Grand Duke Cosimo I de'Medici […]," in *Fort* Volume 36. (2008), 117.
[6] Intelligence on this expedition can be found in Archivio di Stato di Firenze (ASF) Mediceo del Principato (MP) 1829 folio (f.) 9, 7 July 1549. See also ASF MP 393 f. 591, Luca Martini to Cosimo, 15 June 1549 and ASF MP 397A f. 1100.
[7] Deputy flagship

this vessel. The young prince served as enticing tribute to the sultan upon Dragut's arrival in Constantinople in May 1551.[8]

On 23 May 1551, around the same time as Dragut's triumphant arrival, a combined Ottoman-Barbary armada of 200 vessels under Sinan Pasha – which included Salah Reis and Dragut – headed towards the western Mediterranean to exact vengeance for the loss of Mahdia and to target the Knights of Saint John in Tripoli. As their Grand Master Juan de Homedès had written to Pope Paul III in 1547: "…if Tripoli falls into the hands of the Muslims, it would represent a considerable damage for the kingdom of Sicily, for Calabria, but also a loss for all of Christendom…" Strategically speaking, Tripoli formed a key holding to defend Italy and Spain – "all of [Catholic] Christendom" – against the Barbary corsairs and the Ottoman navy. Sinan Pasha knew this, and moreover, he saw Tripoli as an enticing hub for the region's gold and slave trade. There was a simultaneous assault on Augusta, Sicily that July, and Tripoli fell by 14 August 1551. In spite of a failed attempt to take Malta, the sultan's fleet also captured between 3,000-5,000 prisoners from the island by that September. Moreover, the presence of Henri II's ambassador (Gabriel de Luetz, baron d'Aramon) and 3 French vessels at the siege of Tripoli was enough to convince Pope Julius III and Charles V that the Valois had encouraged this invasion. Having moved the Knights of Saint John to Malta, even in losing Tripoli, Charles could present himself as a valiant defender of Christianity against the Ottomans – unlike Henri II who used them for his own ends.[9]

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[8] Currey, E. Hamilton. *Sea-wolves of the Mediterranean* […]. (London, 1910, reprint. 2004), Chapter XVII. See Kenneth M. Setton *The Papacy and the Levant (1204-1571)* Volume III […]. (Philadelphia, 1984), 532-535. Dragut's fleet in 1549 is detailed in Francisco López de Gómara. *Guerras de Mar del Emperador Carlos V*. Miguel Ángel de Bunes Ibarra and Nora Edith Jiménez, eds. (Madrid, 2000), 237. As indicated in de Bunes Ibarra's and Jiménez's introduction, Gómara's text dates from between 1560-1604. See also Haji Khalifeh. *The History of the Maritime Wars of the Turks Chapters I to V*. Translated by James Mitchell. (London, 1831), 78.

[9] Regarding Franco-Ottoman alliances, see Malcolm Noel. *Useful Enemies: Islam and the Ottoman Empire in Western Political Thought, 1450-1750*. (Oxford, 2019). On page 133, Noel notes that some French

With allegations of French collusion with the Ottomans in the Mediterranean and the erupting situation in Piedmont over 1551, it was only a matter of time before an official war between the Habsburgs and the Valois broke out. Furthermore, trouble with the Barbary corsairs and Süleyman's fleet in the vulnerable channel between Tunisia and Sicily – as well as the struggle with the sultan in Transylvania waged by Charles's brother Ferdinand, now king of Bohemia and Hungary – colored the geo-political situation. This forced Charles and Süleyman to frequently shift focus from central Europe to the Mediterranean. Moreover, there were other fronts with the Safavid Persians and King Henri's attempts to collaborate with the Protestant German princes – not to mention the conflict in northern Italy.[10] The Habsburg-Valois-Ottoman fronts truly stretched from Spain to Transylvania and Persia; from North Africa to the Netherlands – Christian against Muslim, Catholic against Protestant, Muslim against Muslim. Conflict in Italy was part of a larger picture, and instead of focusing on the local level, Charles V, Henri II, Süleyman, Pope Julius III, and all of their princely and military allies – including Cosimo – had to bear this larger picture in mind.

Cosimo's navy tests the waters, the 'baptism of fire' of Tuscan coastal defenses, and the continued quest for Piombino (c. July 1549 – July 1552)

Dragut's aforementioned raid on Rapallo in the summer of 1549 had first stopped at Elba in July. Yet, Cosimo's engineer, Giovanni Camerini, had made tremendous progress on the defenses at Cosmopolis/ Portoferraio by December 1548. So much so that

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writers of the period were critical of the Ottomans and presented the alliance as a demonstration of Valois benevolence towards Christians in the Levant. For many other examples of historical and theological defenses of this arrangement, see Noel's Chapter 5. For Grand Master Juan de Homedès's words to Paul III; see Archives of the Order of Malta 420 f. 217v, 8 January 1547 cited in Anne Brogini and Maria Ghazali. "Un enjeu espagnol en Méditerranée […]," in *Cahiers de la Méditerranée* 70:2005 […] (Tome 1), 10-11.

[10] Setton. *The Papacy and the Levant* Volume III, 539, 553-560. See also Colin Imber. *The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650: The Structure of Power* (second edition). (Houndmills, UK, 2009), 47-48; López de Gómara. *Guerras de Mar*, 252; Michel Fontenary. "Charles Quint, Malte et la Défense de la Méditerranée," in *Revue d'histoire modern & contemporaine* 2003/4 nº 50-4, 26.

even the corsair's force of 1,500 troops could not easily capture the city and abandoned the endeavor for easier prey. By 1550, work was underway for a massive chain to guard Cosmopolis's harbor, and between April and December 1551, Camerini devised a system of circuit walls, bulwarks, earthworks, and artillery stations. Even though plenty of work remained, his progress in 1551 significantly bolstered the port's defenses by that autumn and winter.[11] Cosimo's substantial investments and acquired expertise were clearly paying off.

Regarding his own navy, Cosimo contributed to Charles V's fleet sent against Dragut to recapture Monastir and Mahdia in 1550. The corsair captain had gathered 36 vessels – mostly *galeotte* and *fusti*[12] – and the emperor answered by once again calling upon Andrea Doria's warships. For his part, the duke of Florence dispatched 1,000 troops under Chiappino Vitelli and hired the Roman condottiero, Giordano Orsini, duke of Bracciano, as his admiral in command of the 3 Medici galleys: the *Pisana*, *Saetta*, and the *San Giovanni*. Cosimo's *patente di protezione* from Charles V echoed the crusading tone of Grand Master Homedès's abovementioned words when it observed that Cosimo's galleys worked on the behalf of the "*defension y beneficio dela Republica Christiana y a dan˙o de infieles y cossarios*" (*sic*).[13] The Habsburg-allied galley squadrons rendezvoused in the Gulf of Naples in early May 1550 where they joined another squadron under Don Garcia de Toledo, the appointed leader of this Habsburg military expedition. Given the tense relationship between Charles V and the duke of Florence, it seems likely that the family connections of Cosimo's wife Eleanor de Toledo were a key factor in ensuring his squadron's presence in this Christian fleet. Francesco Barbi, the Medici agent in Naples, made note that Cosimo's galleys were in good order and well equipped, but that "*la*

[11] Amelio Fara. *Portoferraio* […]. (Turin, 1997), 13-14. See also Role "The Naval bases," 117.
[12] Detailed by Sicilian intelligence via a Greek from Zanti in ASF MP 397 f. 443, 1550.
[13] ASF MP 329 f. 133v-134, 30 May 1550 "patente di protezione di Carlo V."

ciurma non asuefatta al travaglio del mare" ("the rowers/crew are not accustomed to work at sea.") Moreover, aside from their inexperience, the Medici galleys were short on rowers – possibly as many as 80. After reallocating appropriate manpower, Don Garcia departed from Naples towards Tunisia with his 20 galleys alongside Cosimo's 3 galleys; 3 from the pope under Carlo Sforza (prior of Lombardy for the Knights of Malta); 2 from Antonio Doria; and 2 more from the Knights of Malta. A second squadron of 16 galleys – presumably under Andrea Doria – moved towards the Balearics to rendezvous with the Spanish fleet under Don Bernardino di Mendoza, brother to Cosimo's nemesis at the conclave to elect Pope Julius III, Don Diego Hurtado de Mendoza.[14]

In spite of their inexperience, the Medici contingent shone during the campaign. Barbi's letters to the duke of Florence praise Giordano Orsini's actions at the capture of Monastir. After success here, Don Garcia's fleet of 24 galleys – including Cosimo's vessels – returned to Naples on 9 June in preparation to launch the other campaign at Mahdia. Yet, according to Barbi, Orsini concurred with Carlo Sforza that the "leadership [of this expedition] is in the hands of people without any experience." The fleet headed back towards Mahdia on 13 June, but this siege was much slower and dragged on for months. Orsini blamed this on the lack of order and discipline among the Spanish-Neapolitan forces. Moreover, tactical disagreements between Orsini and the Spanish led to unnecessary losses in manpower and obviously slowed the Habsburg 'crusading' forces. Additionally, the delays on land bought Dragut time to launch another assault on Rapallo and Liguria while his lieutenant, Uluç Ali, planned to attack Villafranca in

[14] Camillo Manfroni. "La Marina Militare […]." in *Rivista Marittima* […]. (Rome, 1895), 25-31 provides Barbi's letters from Archivio Storico Italiano, serie. I. vol. IX. See also Raymond E. Role. "Cosimo de'Medici's Holy Navy" in *MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History* Volume 15, Issue 1. (Autumn 2002), 76-86; and Role "The Naval bases," 117. Manfroni says "Camillo Sforza" was the Priore di Lombardia, however, the "enciclopedia on line" on www.treccani.it and other sources on the Knights of Malta clarify that Carlo Sforza held this title. I have not found a Camillo Sforza that fits this description outside of Manfroni's text.

Piedmont. The Spanish finally agreed to try Orsini's idea of a naval bombardment, but coastal shoals prevented the galleys from delivering this attack. A floating battery was constructed instead; however, munitions soon ran low. By early August, the Genoese captain Marco Centurione left with one of the Medici galleys in his ranks to gather more infantry from Genoa and cannonballs and powder from Cosimo and the imperial governor of Milan, Ferrante Gonzaga, in Livorno. For this expedition, Luca Martini had prepared 100,000 Florentine pounds of gunpowder and 2,000 50-55-pounder cannonballs. Upon their return to Mahdia, another two-day bombardment secured the city's surrender. In spite of interpersonal differences between the Habsburg-allied commanders and Orsini, the operation was still an overall success. This Christian force captured nearly the entire population of these settlements – 10,000 'Muslims' – and sold them into slavery. Cosimo's cut of the profits and booty acquired from this mission encouraged him to order the construction of two more galleys.[15]

The following year, Dragut's escape from Djerba; the fall of Tripoli; and a ransacked Malta made 1551 an eventful time for the western Mediterranean. However, there is no evidence that Cosimo contributed to any of these campaigns. Indeed, there was ongoing work on Elba and the galleys were used to transport materials from Livorno to Portoferraio. Yet, unlike the year before, the Medici squadron did not make any military contributions. For Cosimo, the biggest change was that Giordano Orsini – his brilliant hired commander in 1550 – had become an infantry captain for King Henri II. Also, when the massive Valois-Ottoman fleet under Sinan Pasha arrived in the Piombino Channel in June 1551, this obviously endangered the Tuscan coast. However, given his painful

[15] Centurione's receipt of the munitions from Livorno are in ASF MP 398 f. 413-414, 7 August 1550; and f. 563, 22 August 1550. See also a 1559 copy: ASF MP 2077 inserto (ins.) 1 f. 45-47. Martini's preparations are detailed in ASF MP 398 f. 410, 419-420, 433, 7-10 August 1550. ASF MP 398 f. 7, 4 July 1550 details some of the forces committed to the "Affrica" campaign. See also Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 25-31; and Role "The Naval bases," 117.

relationship with this coveted territory, Cosimo did not even send provisions for the Habsburg garrison to outlast an imminent attack – let alone troops, artillery, or naval support. The duke went so far as to suggest that Charles should abandon Piombino's capital and demolish the city's outdated fortifications instead of sacrificing more men and money for her defense. Fortunately, the emperor was not forced to make such a drastic move. Instead, Sinan Pasha, Dragut and the French targeted Portoferraio (Elba) again on 18 July. These hostile forces assessed Camerini's fortifications to be even stronger than in previous years, and they once again sought easier targets along the Ligurian and Catalan coasts and on Majorca. Work on Elba was clearly a worthwhile investment, and Cosimo continued to fund Camerini's work on circuit walls and even a replacement harbor chain into 1552.[16]

Even though Cosimo did not commit forces to any of the 1551 campaigns, this does not mean that he was not informed on these matters. In February 1551, a letter from Luigi Capponi, the Florentine ambassador to France, relayed a discussion he had with Captain Baccio Martelli, a Tuscan naval captain who had directly served Henri II at Marseilles and Toulon since at least 1548.[17] Although Capponi felt that no action from the French fleet was imminent in 1551, Martelli had informed him that Henri II sought to gather as many galleys as possible in Marseilles where they would be provided for until called into action at a moment's notice. Martelli had also expressed personal fantasies of

[16] For an account of the 'Turkish' armada in the summer of 1551, see ASF MP 402A f. 612 and 620. For the paragraph overall, see Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 32; Role "The Naval bases," 118; and Fara. *Portoferraio*, 15. Note that the original harbor chain from 1550 had already broken. Martini's preparations on Elba against Dragut are briefly addressed in ASF MP 402A f. 624, 8 May 1551.

[17] ASF Martelli 209 Ins. 10 f. 1-4. These are copies of Martelli's patent with Henri II from 1548, and notes in this collection indicate that the originals are with the Giordano Martelli collection. Folio 4 is by far the easiest to read. See also his entry by Marco Gemignani in the *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani* (*DBdI)*, Volume 71 (2008) accessible online: www.treccani.it

"coming to Florence when the king no longer wanted his service."[18] Apparently, in the ebb and flow of changing personnel – such as Giordano Orsini's newfound position under Henri II – Cosimo was keeping an open eye for potential expertise for hire. In June, Luca Martini learned that there were potentially as many as 28 armed galleys and 18 unarmed galleys at Marseilles,[19] and Bastiano Campana informed the duke of the sultan's galleys and especially that a French ambassador had arrived at Constantinople to arrange a "*nuova connessione*."[20] By August 1551, Luigi Capponi not only discussed specifics related to the sieges at Parma and Mirandola; the potential alliance between Venice and the Valois; and the strengthening alliance between Henri and the Farnese, but also a small squadron of French galleys that had nearly taken Barcelona by surprise.[21] Even without taking direct action, Cosimo and his agents stayed up-to-date on military and diplomatic developments.

By the summer of 1552, the ongoing War of Parma and Mirandola and the threat of another substantial Ottoman fleet pushed Charles V towards more decisive action regarding Piombino. Since Cosimo had already proven himself capable of defending its delicate but crucial channel – and could more importantly afford to do so – Charles had decided to reinstate the duke of Florence's full control over Piombino as a custodian of the Holy Roman Emperor. As he had done so before, Don Diego de Mendoza vehemently opposed Cosimo's reacquisition. He and the Genoese had been collaborating with the duke's aunt, Elena Salviati, to marry her son (Jacopo VI Appiani) to one of Mendoza's

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[18] Abel Desjardins and Giuseppe Canestrini, eds. *Negociations diplomatiques de la France avec la Toscane*, Volume III (Paris, 1859-1886), Luigi Capponi to Cosimo I from Blois, February 1551 on pp. 249-250. See also the entry "Luigi Capponi" by Franco Angiolini in the *DBdI*, Volume 19 (1976) accessible online: www.treccani.it

[19] ASF MP 403 f. 258, 11 June 1551. Martini provided another update on the French 19 September 1551, ASF MP 404A f. 641-642.

[20] ASF MP 403 f. 216, 11 June 1551. Captain Francesco Rustichi provided a report on the 'Turkish armada' in the Levant on 25 September 1551, ASF MP 405 f. 14.

[21] Desjardins and Canestrini, eds. *Negociations diplomatiques* Volume III, Luigi Capponi to Cristiano Pagni 31 August 1551 on pp. 287-290.

own daughters and convince Charles V that Cosimo actively worked against him. Quickly defending the duke of Florence, a meeting between the duke of Alba (Fernando Álvarez de Toledo) and Bernardo dei Medici (bishop of Cassano) proved Cosimo's innocence. Elena's death in 1552 further worked in the duke of Florence's favor. By July 1552, a Franco-Ottoman fleet off the Italian coast was the catalyst that prompted Charles V to swiftly act on the Piombino issue. A further agreement between Cosimo and Jacopo VI on 15 August clarified that this new arrangement would bar Portoferraio (Cosmopolis) from being considered part of Piombino for the time being.[22] Crises both within Italy and across Europe were adding up fast, and Charles's desperation was very much to Cosimo's advantage. Unfortunately, that same summer brought a new crisis in Siena.

Double trouble for a double agent: Cosimo & the Siena uprising (c. July - December 1552)

Once again, the trouble centered around Don Diego Hurtado de Mendoza. Thanks to Cosimo's intervention over the 1540s, Siena was undeniably a Habsburg holding by 1550. As Charles V had tightened his grip on the city around 1547, Mendoza, who acted as both the emperor's ambassador in Rome and agent over Siena and Piombino, had strongly advocated constructing a fortress overlooking the city of Siena – which was soon underway. Yet, even though the ambassador essentially viewed himself as a "quasi-viceroy" over this troublesome region, he had failed to maintain or bolster Piombino's fortifications. Hence, Piombino's shaky defenses had motivated Charles to reconsider and eventually reinstate Cosimo's leadership over this crucial territory in the summer of 1552. Moreover, in addition to Mendoza's tense relationship with the emperor and the duke of

[22] Charles V's rationale and the agreement between Charles, Cosimo, and Jacopo VI is discussed in Franco Angiolini. "Lo Stato di Piombino […]" in Giuseppe Di Stefano et al., eds. *Italia non spagnola e monarchia spagnola tra '500 e '600* […]. (Florence, 2009), 145-146. Concerning the capitulation between Cosimo and Jacopo, Angiolini cites L. Cappelletti. *Storia della città e stato di Piombino*, 194-195; 474-475. See also Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 32-33. For an example of Cosimo keeping up with these matters and others, see his letter to Pierfilippo Pandolfini from 15 July 1552 transcribed in Desjardins and Canestrini, eds. *Negociations diplomatiques* Volume III, 312-315.

Florence, his meddling in church affairs in Rome – and general abrasive personality – had also put him at odds with Pope Julius III. Of course, this brusqueness also had an impact on the citizens of Siena.[23]

In a direct reaction to Mendoza's heavy-handedness, the city revolted against the Spanish garrison on 27 July 1552. Since at least 1551, these Habsburg troops – paid for by the state of Siena – cost the hefty sum of nearly 327 gold ducats a month. Similarly, Charles had expected the Sienese to pay for the fortress as well. Mendoza had enforced the 'emperor's wishes' by using blank letters signed by Charles himself to demand loans and acquire building materials without payment.[24] Unsurprisingly, the Sienese were provoked by these forced contributions to meet the costs of a Habsburg military occupation of what was supposed to be a friendly, quasi-independent state. Even though this was far from the first indication of civil unrest, Siena's uprising in July 1552 was well timed. It almost exactly coincided with the arrival of a Franco-Ottoman-Barbary fleet that terrorized the western Mediterranean. By 23 July, Sinan Pasha's armada had reached the island of Procida – just off the isle of Ischia and dangerously close to Naples.[25]

Earlier in 1552, the baron d'Aramon had journeyed to Constantinople in hopes of convincing Süleyman to use his new position on Tripoli to attack Naples. Additionally, the Neapolitan prince of Salerno (Ferrante da Sanseverino) had defected to the Valois side after personal differences with the viceroy.[26] The Ottomans were assured that the

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[23] Mallett and Shaw. *The Italian Wars,* 245-246, 256. Roberto Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena, 1552-1559*. (Siena, 1962), 9 also emphasizes Mendoza's poor relationship with the Viceroy of Naples and a minor, but strategically important lord in the Maremma (Southern Siena) – Count Nicola Orsini di Pitigliano. Cantagalli also mentions the count of Pitigliano in his article "La Guerra di Siena" in Leonardo Rombai, ed. *I Medici e lo Stato Senese 1555-1609* […]. (Rome, 1980), 9-22. Furio Diaz. *Il Granducato Di Toscana—I Medici*. (Turin, 1982), 115 details that the count was also a financial backer for the rebellion.
[24] Judith Hook. "Fortifications and the end of the Sienese State," in *History* (1977), 375-376.
[25] Setton *The Papacy and the Levant* Volume IV. (Philadelphia, 1984), 595.
[26] Cosimo's father-in-law, Pedro Álvarez de Toledo.

prince of Salerno and 40 French galleys from Marseilles would rendezvous with the sultan's armada while an alleged 20,000 Valois troops would await them in Naples. Thus, Sinan Pasha had amassed a fleet of at least 103 galleys and 6 other vessels and moved on southern Italy in July 1552. A dozen galleys under Dragut launched a simultaneous assault on Messina, Sicily. At the point their forces gathered, Sinan Pasha's and Dragut's combined Ottoman-Barbary armada numbered up to 216 vessels. From the Habsburg perspective, the situation was precarious to say the least. Andrea Doria and a fleet of 40 galleys – which included his cousin Antonio and close associate Marco Centurione – sailed towards Naples with between 2,000-3,000 German troops that August. As Dragut's raids carried on into the Tyrrhenian, he captured 7 Genoese vessels – presumably part of this convoy – that were carrying German troops to Naples. Although Süleyman's fleet did not ultimately establish a Franco-Ottoman foothold on southern Italy, it still wreaked havoc on the western Mediterranean – especially since the 'Turkish' armada had dispersed into several dangerous squadrons. Among other places, they raided the Balearic Islands, Cartagena, Gibraltar, and Cadiz. The combined Ottoman-Barbary forces also struck Spain's Algerian coastal fortresses at Bougie and Oran from land. By the autumn of 1552, the French and Ottoman fleets wintered on Chios and along the Anatolian coast respectively.[27]

Both the mounting tension in Siena and the real danger to the Italian coastline motivated Julius III's desperate attempt to resolve the War of Parma and Mirandola before all-out warfare erupted. Moreover, Charles V was preoccupied with several issues throughout his vast empire. As Henri II assessed the situation, he surmised that the Sienese rebellion was his best chance to gain a foothold in Italy – an investment should

[27] López de Gómara. *Guerras de Mar*, 253-255. See also Brogini and Ghazali. "Un enjeu espagnol," 16; Setton. *The Papacy and the Levant* Volume IV, 582-583, 588; and Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 33.

more opportune moments present themselves in northern Italy or Naples. Additionally, the Florentine exiles in his court – especially the Strozzi and rival bankers stationed in Lyon – provided a chorus of self-interested encouragement to Henri in launching this endeavor. [28]

Two months before Siena's July 1552 uprising, Cardinal Francesco di Tournon had already dispatched an agent to assure Cosimo – on Henri's behalf – that no French action would be taken against the Medici duchy. As part of his diplomatic games, the duke had informally declared his neutrality should the Habsburg-Valois cold war heat back up in Siena – which at the time seemed unlikely to him. With a massive Ottoman fleet in the region, Cosimo was primarily focused on this immediate threat to the Tuscan-Sienese coastline. Yet, his intelligence network had failed to provide an adequate picture of the situation in Siena itself until nearly the last minute in July 1552. When Cosimo finally understood how realistic the threat of a Valois-controlled Siena had become, he insisted that Charles V should revisit the Piombino issue and immediately remove Mendoza from office. On 28 July, the day after the Sienese uprising began, French troops began to pour in from Ottavio Farnese's state of Castro to Siena's south – the primary French base of operations in central Italy. [29] It was now clear that the Ottomans and the French were an equal threat to the Tyrrhenian coast and inland on Tuscany's doorstep.[30] Cosimo could no longer remain 'neutral' or idle.

The duke of Florence reprised his role as Charles V's loyal vassal but conjured his best smoke and mirrors to assure the French that their arrangements with him had not changed. As the Sienese revolt erupted in late July, Cosimo sent Ippolito da Correggio

[28] For this paragraph overall, see Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena*, 8-9, 17-20.
[29] Simon Pepper and Nicholas Adams. *Firearms & Fortifications* […]. (Chicago, 1986), 62. Among his other failures, Mendoza's negligence had left the Piombino garrison's pay heavily in arrears. As a result, the troops had secretly sold the Sienese at least 1,500 of their arquebuses. Whether known among the discontented soldiers or not, these purchases were held in preparation for the city's anti-Spanish revolt.
[30] For this paragraph overall, again see Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena,* 8-9, 17-20.

and Leone Santi to the city to offer his intervention towards a diplomatic solution but also to assess the military situation. Additionally, he had already deployed 400 infantry under Otto de Montauto to reinforce the Spanish garrison, and as an intimidating measure, more of his troops occupied Montefollonico and Lucignano – southeast and northeast of Siena respectively. The Spanish demanded that he contribute more towards their defenses. Yet, Cosimo's agents reported that the Sienese garrison's food and gunpowder stores were already running short just days into the revolt.[31] Further Florentine commitment seemed irrational.

The duke wrote to Andrea Doria on 30 July to explain these details and provide his assessment of Siena. "…I had intended to help [the garrison] and recover the rest of the city which is now very difficult – indeed almost impossible – since the adversaries gather more people every day." Cosimo elaborated that he had assembled 4,000 infantry and 300 cavalry but that he had also opened his own negotiations with Siena. Knowing full well that everyone within the Habsburg circle would question his motives, the duke apologized that "the anguish of the moment did not allow [me] to be able to consult with his majesty […] with your excellence, and with his [majesty's] other ministers in Italy. But I hope that you approve of everything that I have done…"[32]

As Cosimo assured Doria and others that he worked on the emperor's behalf, a French agent soon confirmed that the Valois had encouraged and would support the uprising in Siena. Moreover, the duke of Florence was expected to uphold his understanding with the French from May and was again guaranteed that he would not be a target. On the one hand, Cosimo felt that, given Charles V's many obligations

[31] Diaz. *Il Granducato*, 115; and Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena,* 26-30.
[32] Archivo General de Simancas (AGS) Estado LEG 1383 f. 429, copy of Cosimo to Andrea Doria, 30 July 1552. Available online via Portal de Archivos Españoles (PARES). Reference code: ES.47161.AGS/EST,LEG,1383,429.

throughout his empire and Pope Julius III's fear of angering the Valois and the sultan's fleet, no one would question or stop his assertion of neutrality. Additionally, he wished to avoid provoking the French any further. Thus, he withdrew his troops.[33] At the same time, however, the threat of Valois occupation at Tuscany's threshold had suddenly become too real for Cosimo not to take some sort of action.

Probably motivated by the duke of Florence's assured blind eye towards the situation, *maréchal* Paul de Thermes, commander of the French forces, initially raised the French presence in Siena to around 3,000 men and sent about half of this force to besiege the coastal fortress at Orbetello – Spain's last foothold in the region. As troops continued to arrive, Thermes maintained a garrison in Siena itself but focused on taking Orbetello.[34] Seeking to end this conflict before both Valois and Habsburg troops poured into his neighboring state, Cosimo used his own diplomatic means – not based upon any sort of instructions from Charles V – to conclude terms between the Habsburgs and Siena on 3 August. The fortress was to be torn down, and all Spanish and foreign troops were to leave Siena. They could, however, temporarily remain on the Sienese coast at Orbetello. In return, Siena pledged loyalty to the empire but not to Charles V.[35] Almost immediately, Cosimo was subject to intense scrutiny from the Spanish about suspected collusion with the French and for dealing with the Sienese rebels as a legitimate, independent state.[36] Little did they know that Cosimo had also confirmed his agreement with the French on 4 August – after being pressured by Cardinal Tournon on 28 July.[37]

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[33] For this paragraph overall, see Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena,* 26-30.
[34] Giuseppe Caciagli. *Stato dei Presidi*. (Pontedera, Italy, 1992), 35.
[35] Mallett and Shaw. *The Italian Wars*, 258. Whereas Mallett and Shaw indicate that the Spanish troops could stay in Orbetello, Cantagalli's *La Guerra di Siena* emphasizes that this was a major point of difference between Cosimo and the city in their negotiations. For example, see p. 110.
[36] Cantagalli. "La Guerra di Siena" in Rombai, ed. *I Medici*, 12-13.
[37] Giorgio Spini. "The Medici Principality," 427-428. For other details from this paragraph overall, again see Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena,* 30-31, 37, 85-86.

As the Habsburgs began to react, the duke's situation became even more intricate and precarious.

While Cosimo settled matters diplomatically with the Sienese and the French in early August 1552, Sinan Pasha's fleet besieged Gaeta.[38] This 'Turkish' armada clearly represented an effort to pin down Habsburg troops in Naples and prevent a swift deployment to Siena. With Charles V's armies kept at bay, Thermes personally assessed defenses in the Maremma (southern Siena) between 21 September through 4 October and made suggestions for coastal fortifications at Grosseto and Porto Ercole. As military preparations were underway into October, the Sienese were already fearful of a rumored imminent Habsburg expedition under the viceroy of Naples to recapture their city. By November, Henri's newly appointed lieutenant-general – his close friend Cardinal Ippolito d'Este – increasingly displayed the same self-entitlement as Mendoza and presumed to be Siena's governor.[39] Before arriving in Siena, however, Cardinal d'Este had spent a jubilant four days in Florence which earned Cosimo further suspicion from his Habsburg allies.[40] Ever cautious, Thermes intensified the military build-up between November and December 1552 by distributing about 5,000 troops throughout the various Sienese garrisons and ordering a second inspection of Siena's key fortified holdings.[41]

Unable to deal personally with these matters, Charles V entrusted the viceroy of Naples – Cosimo's father-in-law Don Pedro de Toledo – with organizing and leading a campaign to oust the French from Siena. Aside from his advanced age and poor health, Toledo was short of finances, provisions, commanders, and artillery. Don Francesco de Toledo – the viceroy's brother – was sent to Florence to ensure that Cosimo would help

[38] Setton. *The Papacy and the Levant* Volume IV, 595.
[39] Mallett and Shaw. *The Italian Wars*, 258. Regarding d'Este's time as lieutenant-general over Siena, see Giulia Vidori. "Negotiating Power in Sixteenth-Century Italy […]" (PhD dissertation) Harris Manchester College, University of Oxford, 2018.
[40] Cantagalli. "La Guerra di Siena" in Rombai, ed. *I Medici*, 12-13.
[41] For this paragraph overall, see Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena,* 30-31, 37, 39-40, 45-48.

Don Pedro with this expedition. Even though he was obligated through familial – and arguably feudal or at least financial – ties to help the Habsburgs, the duke of Florence was still trying to maintain a guise of neutrality to the French, d'Este, and the Sienese. Nevertheless, pressure from the Habsburgs and his in-laws proved decisive. Cosimo boldly cancelled the French agreement on 4 November 1552 but also emphasized that he still wanted to be on good terms with Henri II. As the duke of Florence strove to maintain peace, however, he encountered increasing pressure from Charles, who hoped that opening a front in Siena would alleviate pressure on Piedmont and the Rhine. By late November – with Cosimo's help and loans from Genoa and Venice – the Habsburgs were better prepared for war in Siena. With around 6,000 infantry enlisted for the campaign, they issued a formal declaration of war on 8 December. By this time, the French had recruited 10,000 infantry and 500 cavalry – all mercenaries.[42] The Habsburg-Valois conflict had reignited.

Just as had been the case over the 1540s, it would be a mistake to assume that Cosimo's ultimate 'pro-Habsburg' actions were not self-motivated. Even though Piombino was his recent prize, Cosimo had also harbored a much more ambitious desire to seize Siena with its crucial geographical position and economic opportunities, while also eliminating the threat from Florence's traditional rival.[43] The imminent War of Siena seemed to present an opportunity for Cosimo to gain more territorial holdings and

[42] Cantagalli. "La Guerra di Siena" in Rombai, ed. *I Medici*, 12-13 and Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena,* 84-86. These French troop numbers from December 1552 are also mentioned in Lauro Martines. *Furies: War in Europe 1450-1700*. (New York, 2013), 104. The Franco-Sienese forces used the winter of 1552-1553 to assess their walls and fortifications for any weak points. One of Cosimo's own architects, Giovambattista Peloro, oversaw one of these forts at Cammollia. It remains unclear if Peloro acted with the duke's permission or of his own accord as an independent contractor. See: Pepper and Adams. *Firearms & Fortifications*, 79-81. See also Maria Paola Rossignoli. "Giorgio di Giovanni […]," in Rombai, ed. *I Medici*, 125.

[43] Diaz. *Il Granducato*, 117. See also Ivan Tognarini. "La 'guerra di Maremma'" in Rombai, ed. *I Medici*, 27.

influence. Aside from his armies, he planned to use his navy in the Habsburg war effort to achieve his own ambitions.

Cosimo's new galley commander & Luca Martini's administration amidst the buildup to war (c. January 1552 – December 1552)

Even though the stage was being set for the War of Siena, the records for Cosimo's navy in 1552 are essentially restricted to logistical duties and administrative concerns. Over the course of the year, Captain Simeone Rossermini moved the galleys between Livorno, Piombino, Portoferraio, Genoa, and Naples to carry artillery, workers, materials, and eventually troops for various projects and assignments. Before even reacquiring Piombino in August, on 16 January 1552, Cosimo had already made the interesting choice of appointing Jacopo VI Appiani as his *Generalato del Mare*, supreme commander over his galleys and warships. In this agreement, Cosimo agreed to pay his young cousin 6,000 *scudi* for each galley in two parts: one about two months before the campaign season in March; the other at the end in September. With this money, the *generalato* was to keep the galleys armed and ready for action with at least 60 *huomini di cavo* (a crew) consisting of *marinari* (sailors) and officers aboard each one. During the off season between October and February, there were to be at least 20 crewmen ready for each galley. Moreover, Appiani was responsible for paying and feeding each of these experts. Regarding the rowers, there were to be at least 156 men including *forzati* and *schiavi* (slaves) that would be provided for at the discretion of the "charity of said general" as was the case with all of the *ciurme* (rowers and crew).[44]

Regarding administrating the galleys, the *capitulatione* between Cosimo and Appiani emphasized that only the *generalato* (i.e. Appiani) could oversee the galleys. In other words, no outsourcing – presumably implying a private deal between Appiani and

[44] ASF MP 2077 ins. 1 f. 61-62. This document is also transcribed in Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 34-37.

another individual – was allowed. Nevertheless, he had full discretion to hire captains, and should Cosimo decide to raise the numbers of crew, artillery, or other equipment, it was up to him – not Appiani – to raise the funds to meet these new parameters. The duke was also obligated to provide *fregate* to escort the galleys while they were armed and deployed. Obviously, neither the *generalato* nor any other men aboard the galleys were allowed to rebel or collaborate with dissenters against the duke of Florence. Should anyone aboard become unruly, however, Appiani would have full jurisdiction to enforce appropriate punishment without any accountability to the *magistrato*. Unless given direct instructions from Cosimo, the *generalato* also had full discretion to deploy the galleys. Should Appiani not be aboard the galleys or otherwise unavailable, his duties would pass to his *locotenente* (lieutenant).[45]

Whether he was physically present or not, however, it was Appiani's responsibility to financially compensate Cosimo the entire value for all equipment, crewmembers, or even an entire galley lost from "*mala fortuna*." For example, although paying for dead rowers was not required under normal circumstances, in the event of bad weather or war, the *generalato* would owe 35 *scudi* for each *forzato* or slave. To maintain accuracy of lost or damaged goods or slain individuals, the *generalato* was to keep an updated inventory and roster. In spite of these strict financial constraints, however, Appiani earned a major profit from this responsibility. Notes from the contract's appendix indicate that Cosimo's young cousin still had a little under 7,000 *scudi* out of the original 24,000 allocated for the 4 Medici galleys. However, he probably made a little more since this figure did not account for some extra savings from food and wages.[46]

[45] ASF MP 2077 ins. 1 f. 61-62.
[46] ASF MP 2077 ins. 1 f. 61-62. See also Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 35-37.

This *capitulatione* provides a detailed account of the intricate balance of authorities, remunerations, and liabilities involved in operating a galley squadron. Moreover, it hints at the inextricable link between Cosimo's naval endeavors and his politics. It is not clear what the duke precisely had in mind when he appointed young Jacopo to this prestigious position – especially considering that up until this point, he had sought to deprive his cousin of his inheritance. Yet, an undated letter suggests that Jacopo's mother, Cosimo's aunt Elena Salviati, had recommended her son to the duke for an unspecified purpose.[47] Even without this tantalizing reference, it is reasonable to suspect that Appiani's position in Cosimo's navy was a political reward – both in terms of his status as a commander and significant financial return – to gain him as an ally regarding the duke's aims on Piombino. Especially considering that Elena had served as a tremendous obstacle to both Cosimo's and Charles's ambitions for Piombino, it is also likely that the duke's choice to assign the teenaged – and inexperienced – Jacopo to this position formed part of his strategy to win over his stubborn aunt. Simultaneously, by selecting such a novice commander, Cosimo's naval infrastructure was allowed to operate more or less as it normally would – which up until this point had proven successful – without having any real 'weight' to counterbalance Luca Martini's and other individuals' reliable guidance.

Shortly after the new *generalto*'s appointment early 1552, Florentine intelligence from Marseilles indicated that at least 11 French galleys and the "Turkish armada" had their sights set on Corsica.[48] Even though this attack did not manifest that year, in March, the Ottoman fleet was noted as potentially numbering 150 vessels.[49] On the side of

[47] ASF MP 20 f. 197 opens with "*La s^ra di Piombino raccoma'da le coso del s^ri figlio a v. ecc^za*..." The archivists have dated the contents of this collection to 25 March-31 August 1552.
[48] ASF MP 2077 ins. 1 f. 64r, 14 April 1552 – continues on 64v and 65.
[49] ASF MP 408 f. 271-272 fra. Arcangelo Francescano to Cosimo [?], 22 March 1552.

caution, Luca Martini inventoried the munitions at Livorno's fortress while Cosimo's 3 galleys patrolled the sea south of Elba between Giannutri and Montecristo.[50] As Sinan Pasha's and Dragut's vessels moved on Sicily and Naples that June, Martini noted that a *nave* at Livorno was set to transport troops to that front. Meanwhile, Martini also revictualed Cosimo's *galeotta* and *fregata* stationed at Elba.[51] By that August, the Genoese father and son naval contractors, Adamo and Marco Centurione, embarked on the galleys from Livorno and sailed to defend Naples.[52] Andrea Doria's galleys also stopped at Livorno – presumably to transport Habsburg infantry against the Ottoman-Barbary fleet that threatened southern Italy.[53] Again preparing for the worst, at Pisa, an engineer ("*ingegero*") placed markers for the defensive ditch.[54] Martini also supervised as both the mast (*albero*) and yardarm (*a'tenne*) for *Generalato* Appiani's *galeotta* were replaced at Livorno.[55]

Earlier that month, Cosimo had forewarned his young *generalto* to be on alert against the "Turkish armada" and potential coordination with the "*imperiali*" for this campaign should the need arise.[56] Fortunately it did not. By 5 September, Captain Francesco Rustichi wrote from his Neapolitan homeland that the "*armata turchesccha e franzese*" had retreated to waters near Preveza.[57] Even though no direct action from Cosimo's navy proved necessary in 1552, Habsburg-allied vessels under the Centurione and Doria – presumably transporting troops and supplies for the Neapolitan and Sicilian

[50] ASF MP 408A f. 979, 22 May 1552.
[51] ASF MP 409 f. 159, 10 June 1552.
[52] ASF MP 410 f. 110, 3 August 1552 and f. 278, 7 August 1552.
[53] ASF MP 410 f. 988-989, 30 August 1552. This letter is unfortunately damaged, but it specifically mentions Spanish infantry.
[54] ASF MP 410 f. 855, 25 August 1552.
[55] ASF MP 410 f. 869-870, 25 August 1552. Martini adds that Bastiana Campana. – mentioned in Chapter 1 – was the custodian of the *galeotta*. The inventory for a *galeotta* is in this same collection on f. 563.
[56] ASF MP 20 f. 602, 7 August 1552. A contemporary copy is found on f. 600r.
[57] ASF MP 411 f. 75. Rustichi is discussed in Chapter 1.

front – had used Livorno on multiple occasions. Simultaneously, Cosimo had ensured that Livorno's and Pisa's defenses were ready should the enemy approach his shores.

With the threat of a Franco-Ottoman invasion removed that autumn, Luca Martini journeyed to Genoa to address some business related to galley administration. On 11 November, he wrote that he had found – and presumably hired – some *calafati* (caulkers) and *maestri d'ascia* (roughly carpenters). He had also embarked wood needed for another project and had received quotes for grain prices.[58] While there, Martini also worked very closely with the Abate di Negro, the Centurione family's representative.[59] By 22 November, Cosimo's *provveditore* noted that he had ultimately acquired 18 *calafati* and 6 "*maestrj d'ascie*," but that he contended with stomach issues and a mild fever. That same day, he had also finished negotiations for grain and his unspecified dealings with Adamo Centurione vis-à-vis the Abate di Negro.[60] After recovering from his illness, on 11 December, Martini spoke optimistically about his dealings with Adamo Centurione ("*[…] al s^r^ Adam Centurioni di far cosa grata à v're ecc^za^ Ill^mi^*") and planned to return to Pisa soon.[61] Overall, 1552 proved to be a year of preparation and consolidation for Cosimo's navy. As 1553 approached, however, Cosimo and others in the Habsburg and 'neutral' sphere kept a watchful eye on the developing French and Ottoman fleets.

[58] ASF MP 412 f. 66, which covers the grain and f. 93 – both from 11 November 1552.
[59] Mentioned in both ASF MP 412 f. 66 and f. 93. Correspondence between Cosimo and Signor di Negro from this same period can be found in ASF MP 17, 18, and especially 20 which covers March-August 1552 and 23 which covers June 1552-March 1553. Martini had corresponded with "Signor di Negro" since at least June 1548: ASF MP 387 f. 592, 4 June 1548 and ASF MP 388 f. 678, 20 August 1548. For di Negro's role in the Centurione family, see Ildefonso Pulido Bueno, *El gran mercader y la corte real del Renacimiento* […]. (Huelva, Spain, 2004), 210. See also Simone di Negro Pasqua's entry *DBdI*, Volume 40 (1991) accessible online: www.treccani.it. It also seems that Duchess Eleanor played a role in Martini's dealings with the Centurione: ASF MP 412 f. 66 and 211; and ASF MP 23 f. 171-172, 27 October 1552. She specifically mentions "l'Abate di Negri" playing a role in her errands in Genoa before addressing the abbot personally in the subsequent letter. See also ASF MP 23 f. 235.
[60] ASF MP 412 f. 217, 22 November 1552. Some of Cosimo's correspondence with the Centurione is found in ASF MP 20 f. 156 and especially ASF MP 23. This relationship is further discussed in Chapter 3.
[61] ASF MP 412 f. 381.

The Valois and Ottoman navies and the renewed war with the Habsburgs (c. July 1552 – February 1553)

Since ascending the throne in 1547, Henri II had overseen a tremendous revitalization project for his own shipyards and coastal fortifications. His *Marine du Levant* (Mediterranean) budget alone amounted to nearly 169,000 *écus* between 1548-1550 with an extraordinary budget of nearly 304,000 between 1547-1549. Henri eventually wanted 50 or 60 galleys in the Mediterranean, and he looked to Florentine exile – and his queen's cousin – Leone Strozzi (prior of Capua for the Knights of Malta) to provide an additional 10 vessels. The king named Strozzi *capitaine générale* over all French galleys both in the Mediterranean and in the north. By the early 1550s, the aforementioned Tuscan sailor Baccio Martelli and the prior of Lombardy for the Knights of Malta (Carlo Sforza) proved to be among the *capitaine générale*'s most faithful lieutenants.[62]

Among his exploits in the Mediterranean, Strozzi had covertly sent a frigate with Knights of Malta – or at least individuals posing as knights – to Spain to discover more precise dates of departure and numbers for the Spanish forces allocated to one of the many North African campaigns in the late 1540s and early 1550s. Upon receiving this intelligence, he took 4 galleys from the Order of Malta and joined the French fleet of 29 galleys and 6 galliots and Dragut's corsair fleet to attack the Spanish-Habsburgs. On another expedition in August 1551, Strozzi left Marseilles with 12 well-armed galleys, apparently sailing the Levant. This same squadron had deceptively flown Spanish colors

[62] Charles de la Roncière. *Histoire de la marine française*. Volume 3 […]. (Paris, 1906), 455-461, 463, 472. As mentioned earlier, Sforza had served in North Africa on the Habsburg side in 1551. Both Sforza and Strozzi had been educated "at the harsh school of Andrea Doria." See p. 469. Also, in 1547, the Venetian ambassador Matteo Dandolo noted that Henri II was building an arsenal in Nantes with aims of building 50 galleys. See "*Relazione di Francia dell'Ambasciatore Matteo Dandolo*. Leita in Senato il di 17 Decembre 1547" in Eugenio Alberi. *Relazioni degli Ambasciatori Veneti al Senato Raccolte, Annotate ed Edite*, Serie I Volume II. (Florence, 1840), 177.

and launched the aforementioned surprise assault on Barcelona earlier that month. They nearly captured the city.[63]

Cosimo had personally written to the grand master of the Knights of Malta, Juan de Homedès, regarding Leone Strozzi. The duke received a response a few days after the Siena uprising on 30 July 1552. The grand master assured Cosimo that even though Strozzi had satisfied his requirements as a knight, he had been absent from their headquarters ("*conuento*") for many years "in another service." Moreover, because of his involvement in the wars between "the Christian princes," he had been denied entry into one of the order's *commenda*[64] (the source of financial benefit). In other words, Strozzi acted on his own accord under no direct guidance from the Knights of Malta. Obviously referring to the prior of Capua's frequent campaigns against the Spanish Habsburgs and his dubious standing with the order, the grand master expressed confidence that "your excellence (Cosimo) will do the right thing and worthy of his good name […] and especially our venerable Italian [heritage]" when dealing with Strozzi.[65] To say the least, a Florentine exile sworn against Cosimo who was a member of the Order of Malta and who was related to the queen of France and served Henri directly in his navy had created an intricate and delicate jurisdictional situation. As far as Cosimo was concerned, however, the grand master had given his approval for the duke of Florence to use his best judgement when dealing with Leone Strozzi in the upcoming conflict.

Concerning the Ottomans, by February 1553, the Venetian ambassador to Constantinople, Bernardo Navagero, observed that the sultan's galleys would pose an even greater threat than the Valois navy. At the arsenal at Gallipoli, he noted ready access to timber, iron, copper, and other resources should Süleyman wish to expand his

[63] Roncière. *Histoire* Volume 3, 465, 467, 474-479.
[64] This concept is explained a little further in the conclusion.
[65] ASF MP 4176 f. 7.

shipyards or fleet. The ambassador only identified a single *maestro*, a Greek from Rhodes named Michele Benetto, that oversaw the fleet. Nevertheless, Navagero estimated that there were about 300 workers – "all Greeks except for some slaves" – in the Ottoman arsenals from Gallipoli, Mytilene, Scio (Chios), Rhodes, and other places. Like Cosimo and other Mediterranean naval powers, the sultan had amassed his own network of resources and manpower. Concerning the fleet itself, the Venetian ambassador identified Dragut as the "*uomo di mare*" of the moment, but also mentioned that Piri Reis of the *guardia d'Alessandria* was "highly esteemed by them." Even though Navagero suggested that the sultan struggled to assemble even 100 vessels for his recent campaigns, he expressed great concern that someone as "badly disposed and offended as Dragut" was in charge.[66]

Indeed, the sultan's navy and Dragut presented the greatest danger to Cosimo and the Habsburgs in 1553. Rustam Pasha, Sinan Pasha's brother, supported another Ottoman-backed French campaign in Naples under the prince of Salerno – who had also prompted their joint attack in the summer of 1552. On 1 February 1553, Süleyman agreed to provide 60 galleys and 20 galliots for 4 months starting 1 May on the condition that Henri would pay 300,000 ducats for them. Moreover, all fortresses taken from Cotrón to the Tronto River would belong to the sultan. The French and the Ottomans had essentially agreed to split Italy from Rome southwards. Additionally, there were to be no limits on slaves or loot captured.[67] In January, Cosimo's ship captain Francesco Rustichi had estimated that the combined Franco-Ottoman fleet could number 120 galleys – including 20 Valois vessels.[68] Alongside the military storm brewing in the Mediterranean,

[66] "*Relazione dell'Impero Ottomano* del Clarrisimo, Bernardo Navagero Stato Bailo a Costantinopoli, Fatta in Pregadi, nel mese di Febbrajo del 1553" in Alberi. *Relazioni*, Serie III Volume I, 66-70.
[67] de Gómara. *Guerras de Mar*, 255.
[68] ASF MP 413 f. 95-96, 6 January 1553 (dated 1552) and f. 268-269, 15 January – this document (f. 268-269) is damaged, but given the other documents in this collection, it presumably dates from 1553.

Charles V and his brother Ferdinand contended with Süleyman along the Hungarian frontier.[69] However, Cosimo's father-in-law Viceroy Pedro de Toledo stepped in to cover the Mediterranean and Italian defense – especially the developing problems in Siena.

Florentine and Habsburg efforts near Siena & the ongoing Piombino issue (January – May 1553)

By late 1552 into 1553, Charles gladly accepted Don Pedro's offer to help with Siena, but he could not provide financial support. In spite of this, the viceroy managed to raise a force of infantry and cavalry numbering between 16,000 and 18,000. Yet, he was still short of weapons and commanders.[70] On 1 January 1553, 14,000 troops marched north from Naples towards Siena. By the end of the month, this Habsburg army joined 5,000 Italian troops and took delivery of some of Cosimo's heavy artillery between Lago Trasimeno and Cortona along the Tuscan-Umbrian border. Although in poor health, the viceroy embarked 2,500 Spanish troops aboard 30 galleys on 5 January and journeyed to Tuscany. After spending 3 days at Gaeta and another relatively extended stay at Civitavecchia during a storm, he disembarked his troops at Livorno sometime between 10-13 January and dispatched them towards Siena. Instead of joining them, however, the viceroy met with Cosimo to discuss the duke's potential role in the conflict.[71] With his health waning, Don Pedro passed away shortly after his arrival in Florence on 22 February. Even before the viceroy's death, Charles V had initially offered Cosimo permanent lordship of Piombino if he assumed the captain-generalship – and implicitly the cost – of the Siena campaign. Yet, the duke knew very well that this war would cost far more than Piombino would ever yield, so he had rejected Charles's proposal. Lacking

[69] On this matter, see the opening of Setton. *The Papacy and the Levant* Volume IV; and especially Fernand Braudel. *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* Volume II. Translated by Siân Reynolds. (Berkley, 1995), 923-924. Braudel emphasizes that the ongoing affairs in Germany and against the Ottomans were a much bigger struggle among Charles V's many obligations during this period.
[70] Mallett and Shaw. *The Italian Wars*, 258.
[71] Setton. *The Papacy and the Levant* Volume IV, 595.

a commander for what everyone expected would be a critically important campaign in late February 1553, and not able to rely on Cosimo, the emperor tasked the duke's brother-in-law, the viceroy's son Don Garcia de Toledo, with the command.[72]

Even though Cosimo was still technically neutral, he provided victuals, weapons, troops, and transportation for the imperial forces and simultaneously maintained a trade and diplomatic relationship with Siena. At this same moment, the duke also amassed intelligence on the 16 towns that the Sienese planned to use in their defense. Among these, by early 1553, the Sienese had nearly completed 6 new bastions and curtain walls at Grossetto – the primary coastal town that connected Siena to the sea. Given the strong imperial presence at Piombino and a Medici-controlled Elba, however, Grossetto was unable to provide the Sienese rebels and Valois forces with a wartime logistical hub. Moreover, in spite of Thermes's best efforts, the Spanish had managed to hold onto nearby Orbetello – which in addition to being well defended from a tower that guarded its harbor, leeched off locals by preying on their cattle and other goods. Unable to take Orbetello, the French and Sienese instead relied on Porto Ercole for their supplies. Franco-Sienese work on different forts at Porto Ercole had already begun in October 1552 and at least one of these was completed and garrisoned by May 1553. Montalcino – defended by mountains and capable of supporting the city of Siena and reaching the coast – proved their most vital fortification project inland.[73] Especially given its location on the

[72] Role "The Naval bases," 119. Cosimo's interest in Siena and especially the finances involved are discussed further in Chapter 3. His reasons for turning down this Piombino agreement were likely related to his previous 'deals' with Charles V, his stronger relationship with Jacopo VI, and perhaps an effort to claim neutrality. In short, Cosimo wanted to see how affairs in Siena developed before revisiting the troublesome Piombino issue.

[73] Pepper and Adams. *Firearms & Fortifications*, 83, 87-89, 145, 182. Some of the French – or at least French employed – engineers tasked with bolstering the defenses around the key Sienese holdings between 1552-1553 included a certain Malagrida and Maestro Guglielmo Francese. See p. 184. For an overview of how these fortification projects affected Sienese governmental bodies and inhabitants, see Hook. "Fortifications," 372-387. Concerning Orbetello, see also Giovanni Battista Cini. *Vita del Serenissimo Signor Cosimo de Medici, primo gran duca di Toscana*. (Florence, 1611), 182.

main road hubs to Rome and the Sienese coastline, this holding became Don Garcia's immediate target.

Although Cosimo might have nullified his agreement with the Valois in late 1552, he did not initially promise to send his brother-in-law any direct aid for the campaign. Instead, the duke directed his ambassadors to belittle Don Garcia's military reputation at the imperial court. This slander formed just a part of his attempt to balance his deals with the Habsburgs, the French, and the Sienese. Ultimately, Cosimo wanted to avoid war and sought a settlement that would leave Siena independent – which Henri II quickly rejected.[74] However, Charles was playing a similar double-game with the duke of Florence. As Habsburg troops marched into Sienese territory in late February 1553, Bernardo de Bolea assessed Piombino on the emperor's behalf with aims of convincing Jacopo VI to finally accept the duchy of Sessa in compensation and determine a price for Cosimo to purchase permanent lordship. Apparently, Charles remained dissatisfied with the current arrangement regarding Piombino.[75]

In the meantime, and likely the result of increased pressure from his wife and her family among other factors, Cosimo became more involved in supporting the Habsburgs in Siena. By March 1553, he had provided troops, gunners, and artillery for the sieges at Monticchiello and Montalcino. Early into the campaign, Siena's scorched-earth tactics had already forced the Habsburg forces to rely heavily on Medici logistical support – including Cosimo's new fortress at Valiano.[76] Don Garcia depended on at least 12 heavy artillery pieces loaned by Cosimo from his fortresses in Florence, Arezzo, and Montepulciano. He hoped that Cosimo would send 6 more guns and 1,200 cannonballs

[74] AGS Estada LEG 1383 f. 431 preserves an agreement between Cosimo and Siena dated to 1553. Available online via PARES reference code: ES.47161.AGS/EST,LEG,1383,431. See also Spini. "The Medici Principality," 428.
[75] Role "The Naval bases," 119.
[76] Valiano is located southeast of Siena between Montepulciano and Lago Trasimeno.

for the upcoming siege of Montalcino – which the duke eventually did. Ironically, Cosimo's former mercenary commander from the Mahdia campaign in 1550, Giordano Orsini, garrisoned Montalcino on behalf of the Franco-Sienese forces with 1,000 men. As the siege continued over the spring of 1553, the Habsburg army in Siena grew from 14,000 to 20,000 troops with an equal number of technicians, laborers, and camp followers – potentially as many as 40,000 individuals.[77] While the land campaign continued to grow exponentially between 27 March and 15 June 1553, the naval situation equally intensified.

Dragut's return: Cosimo's forces at sea and on the coast (February – July 1553)

On 7 February, Luca Martini noted that at least 1,000 Spanish infantry had left the Genoese port of La Spezia towards Sicily, but expected that they would approach – and likely stop at – Livorno, where 5 Neapolitan galleys had already arrived.[78] Later that same month, Martini had fallen ill again, but his brother Carlo wrote to Cosimo updating him that the newest galley, the *Fiorenza*, had been launched in Pisa.[79] A week later on 2 March 1553, Luca Martini indicated that he had provided at least 8,000 gold ducats to "*s^or Generale*" (Appiani) for the galleys.[80] Another document specified that this amount would finance 3 "ordinary galleys" to operate without soldiers' pay and perhaps a few other costs. Including these other expenses and those of the *capitana* (flagship),

[77] Pepper and Adams. *Firearms & Fortifications*, 93-94, 98, 100-104, 109. During the siege of Monticchiello on 16 March, however, a Florentine official felt the Spanish abused the 12 Florentine guns. That very day, one of Cosimo's gunners reported that 3 of his 18 artillery pieces were already unusable – allegedly from the Spaniards' rough handling. Regarding the guns deemed unfit for service, Pepper and Adams cite ASF MP 423 f. 481, 18 March 1553, Simone d'Arezzo to Cosimo. For the siege of Montalcino, see also Maria Paola Rossignoli. "Giorgio di Giovanni" in Rombai, ed. *I Medici*, 125-127. Cosimo's former military engineer Giovanni Battista Belluzzi traveled alongside Don Garcia's army to assess the defenses at Montalcino and the sapping techniques used by Don Garcia's army.

[78] ASF MP 413 f. 599.

[79] ASF Guidi, Filze e Registri (Guidi) 8 not numbered (nn), Carlo Martini to Cosimo's secretary Jacopo Guidi, 23 February 1553 (dated 1552). Even though the folios are not numbered, this letter is the sixth document in the Luca Martini sequence.

[80] ASF Guidi 8 nn, Luca Martini to Jacopo Guidi. Third document in the sequence. Dated 2 March 1552. Total amounts regarding payments for officials on the galleys (including "*bombardierj*," "*m^ro d'asce,"* and "*calafato*") along with grain are briefly discussed in ASF MP 411 f. 281-282, 19 September 1552.

Christiano Pagni – Jacopo Appiani's secretary – expected that operating Cosimo's squadron would cost nearly 17,000 ducats for 1553.[81]

Early that year, the duke of Florence used his 4 galleys to bolster Piombino's defenses; help Doria occupy the tower near Orbetello; and welcome Viceroy Don Pedro to Livorno. They had also cruised the Tuscan archipelago and captured some slaves – presumably from passing enemy vessels.[82] As Medici forces became more invested in the Sienese war by land that spring, however, the situation shifted towards an amphibious war. By March, the French and Sienese intercepted documents indicating that Don Garcia would abandon Siena to defend Naples should the Ottoman fleet be unleashed again.[83] This was exactly what they had in mind. On 8 March, the French finalized military plans for a multi-pronged invasion of the Tyrrhenian Sea from Naples and Sicily to Genoa. Henri's plan to split Italy with the sultan was underway.[84]

Captain Francesco Rustichi noted rumors of at least 70 galleys under "Capitano Dragute Rais" set to combine forces with the French.[85] By mid-May, the Genoese caught word of this same fleet under Dragut and expected that it would sail towards Italy in early June. Timed almost exactly to this intelligence, Sinan Pasha and Dragut led a fleet of 120-130 vessels from Gallipoli – which included 50 corsair ships – on 3 June. They rendezvoused with a French fleet of 20 galleys under the *générale des galères* Le Paulin[86] at Lepanto and moved on Italy. Crotone in eastern Calabria was the first of many places targeted. Lurking around Sicily, the Valois-Turkish fleet wreaked havoc with a few landings, skirmishes, and raids on Sicily at Catania, Caragoça (Ragusa), Modica, and Puzallo (Pozzallo). While on Sicily, Sinan Pasha seized the castle at Licato (Licata), and

[81] ASF MP 2077 ins. 1 f. 63, 12 January 1553 (noted as 1552).
[82] Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 39.
[83] Pepper and Adams. *Firearms & Fortifications*, 113.
[84] Role "The Naval bases," 119.
[85] ASF MP 414A f. 881-882, 13 May 1553 and f. 933, 16 May 1553.
[86] Antoine Escalin des Aimars, the Baron de La Garde

Dragut captured over 1,000 people from the island of Pantalanea (Pantelleria) – between Sicily and Tunis. After this already very successful raid, they replenished their stores at Tunis before moving north into the Tyrrhenian.[87]

On 7 June 1553, this massive 150-vessel Franco-Ottoman fleet was en route to Naples from Messina. At this moment, Cosimo ordered his officials in Don Garcia's army to carefully guard his artillery should a likely chaotic retreat to Naples ensue. Following the emperor's orders, Don Garcia de Toledo lifted the siege of Montalcino on 15 June and returned to defend Naples. Aside from the Spanish troops in Orbetello, Cosimo felt abandoned. He mustered 2,000 Italian troops and another 5,000 hired in Germany – along with 500 men-at-arms. Additionally, his commander, Giangiacomo de Medici, the marchese di Margignano, bolstered defenses along the Sienese border and on the coast. Cosimo had already provided so much for this conflict, and by June 1553, the Habsburg contingent had already spent 540,000 ducats on the Siena campaign – mostly derived from forced Neapolitan contributions.[88] The situation would demand much more as the conflict escalated from a rebellion in Siena and a few raids in the south towards a full-scale invasion of Italy. Whether the emperor had intended this or not, Don Garcia's withdrawal – combined with Cosimo's already substantial dedication of real as well as political capital – left the duke with little choice but to increase his own commitment to avoid losing what he had already invested in the campaign to safeguard Tuscany and Siena.

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[87] de Gómara. *Guerras de Mar*, 256. See also Pepper and Adams. *Firearms & Fortifications*, 113; and Role "The Naval bases," 119, 122; and Khalifeh. *The History of the Maritime Wars*, 80. At Pozzallo, Le Paulin's 1,500 troops – mostly French and Italian – were pushed back by the local militia of 2,000 troops and 200 cavalry under Don Guillén de Belvis.

[88] Mallett and Shaw. *The Italian Wars*, 259. See also Setton. *The Papacy and the Levant* Volume IV, 598; Pepper and Adams. *Firearms & Fortifications*, 113; and M.J. Rodriguez-Salgado. *The changing face of Empire* […]. (Cambridge, 1988), 113. Despite their shared surname, Giangiacomo de Medici was from a Milanese family with the same name and not Cosimo's relative. However, he had served the duke's father as a junior officer in his troop of condottiere. See Chapter 3 regarding Cosimo's finances and Siena.

Moreover, Cosimo had been directly threatened. In a letter from Henri II to Captain Le Paulin, the king specifically mentioned that he planned to move on "the duke of Florence who from day to day carries out harmful activities against me." Moreover, he had advised Dragut on "the great booty he could [take] without drawing too much resistance" as the corsair moved on Italy.[89] In preparation for the French and Ottoman offensive, Cosimo dispatched 1,200 troops under Chiappino Vitelli to Piombino's capital with horsemen to patrol the coast. Vitelli's soldiers were augmented by an additional 4,000 infantry stationed in nearby villages – Vada, Torre di San Vincente, Populónia, and Follónica. Cosimo also stationed 15,000 men along the Florentine-Sienese border should enemy reinforcements land. Cosimo's 4 galleys under Appiani – outfitted for a 2-month deployment – transported an additional 800-1,000 men and sufficient munitions and provisions for an 8-month siege from Livorno to Elba. Any inhabitants not participating in defending the island were evacuated to Tuscany. Once all preparations were made, Cosimo's galleys joined Andrea Doria's 30-galley fleet which had abandoned the ongoing Spanish-Habsburg defense at Orbetello and retreated to Genoa.[90]

Measures were also taken at Livorno and Piombino. In July 1553, Cosimo assigned his top engineers – Camerini and Belluzzi – to significantly bolster Livorno's fortifications with 3 earthwork bastions to defend it from a land assault and expand the moat around the city's walls. The port city's inhabitants and locals from the surrounding countryside chipped in to defend their homes. Camerini also assessed Piombino's defenses. He added two bastions to the city's existing medieval citadel; significantly reinforced its walls; and transformed the top of the tower into an artillery platform. Work

[89] ASF Miscellanea Medicea 669 f. 70-71 "Copia d'una lettera del Re di Francia [Enrico II di Valois] a Baron della Guardia [Antoine Escalin des Aimars, baron de La Garde], capitano generale delle sue galere, et a Mons. D'Aramon [Gabriele de Luetz] suo Ambasciatore in levanter," 11 June 1553.
[90] Role "The Naval bases," 122. See also Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 39; and Riguccio Galluzzi. *Istoria del Granducato di Toscana* Volume I. (Florence, 1781), 213. Based on Role's notes, his information here likely comes from Giuseppe Ninci. *Storia dell'Isola dell'Elba* (Elba, 1815).

had barely begun by August 1553, but fortunately, the Franco-Ottoman fleet did not target Piombino or Livorno.[91] Instead, they chose Elba.

Aside from the island's strategic location – and a fortification system that promised to become a major obstacle to Valois-Ottoman domination of the Tyrrhenian – Cosimo had also attempted to provoke the local Sienese population to rebel against their French garrison to generate a substantial distraction. Together, these factors arguably motivated Dragut and Le Paulin to target Elba as 'punishment' for the duke's meddling in their affairs.[92] While they moved towards Cosimo's jewel (Portoferraio) a 12-galley detachment under Karàt Mustafa attacked Pianosa – one of the duke's other holdings. The island tried to surrender to King Henri II, but Mustafa captured the island for himself. He destroyed the medieval tower defending the island, burned its small village, and captured around 200 inhabitants after killing the rest. Meanwhile, the Franco-Ottoman fleet blockaded Portoferraio from the Gulf of Lungone on 7 August.[93] By the next day, Siena received word that 130 "Turkish" vessels were off their shores – certainly a reassuring boost to morale. On 10 August, Thermes journeyed to meet the city's leadership at Porto Ercole to discuss their strategy.[94]

Meanwhile, the siege of Elba had begun. When the Valois and 'Muslim' forces landed, they captured Capoliveri, Marciano, and Rio Marina – where Dragut's beached galleys had launched an amphibious bombardment. Upon the garrison's surrender – to the French – they were taken aboard the corsair vessels as galley slaves. The stronghold at Rocco Giogo withstood their assault. The troops stationed in Portoferraio's *piazza* under

[91] Role "The Naval bases," 122. In addition to Ninci's work, Role also cites Licurgo Cappalletti. *Storia della Citta e Stato Piombinio dale Origine fino a 1814* (Livorno, 1837) and Marcella Aglietti "La Chiave della Toscana: Lo Stato di Pombino nella politica asburga prima di Cateau Cambresis (1541-1559)" in Ivan Tognarini, ed. *Piombino e l'Ordine di Santo Stefano* […]. (Pisa, 2000), 9-79.
[92] Roncière. *Histoire* Volume 3, 513.
[93] Role "The Naval bases," 122-123.
[94] Setton. *The Papacy and the Levant* Volume IV, 599.

Luc Antonio Cuppano also endured 3 separate sorties and eventually forced Dragut to withdraw from the city itself. Instead, Le Paulin and the corsair captain concentrated all of their might on Portoferraio's fortresses. Once again, Giordano Orsini – who had apparently joined them from Montalcino[95] – played a prominent role. His expertise in artillery and knowledge of Elba's fortifications proved a tremendous advantage to the invaders. Most of the fortresses still stood, but Porto Longone suffered significant damage from the constant barrages. Whereas Le Paulin trusted Orsini's hunch that one of the new bastions at Portoferraio had a structural fault, Dragut relied on his own experience. He knew very well that the artillery aboard their galleys were no match for Camerini's well-constructed walls.[96]

Dragut dispatched Le Paulin to Castiglione della Pescaia – a little over 30 miles away near Grosseto – to pick up munitions and 4,000 French troops that were no longer dealing with Don Garcia's army. Elba's defender, Luc Antoino Cuppano, quickly realized what Le Paulin's intent was, and he took advantage of this small reprieve. The former commander of Cosimo's *Saetta*, Captain Simeone Rossermini, initiated a daring mission. Rossermini rushed to the mainland; armed the new galley *Fiorenza*; and boarded 300 infantry and extra supplies. The captain then navigated through Dragut's blockade and executed a risky night-time landing. These reinforcements joined the other troops under Cuppano, and with help from Cosimo's galley artillery, they effectively forced Dragut to withdraw. By this point, however, the corsair had already decided that Elba was not worth such a high price. The Franco-Ottoman fleet left Elba on 21 August 1553.[97]

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[95] Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena,* 103 indicates that Orsini had been wounded by one of the many cannon shots on the city early in Don Garcia's campaign.
[96] Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 39-40 and Role "The Naval bases," 123. See also Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena,* 144. Cantagalli cites ASF [?] Balìa 755 f. 56. See note 39 on p. 168.
[97] Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 40; Role "The Naval bases," 123; and Roncière. *Histoire* Volume 3, 514. Manfroni also mentions another commander on Elba alongside Cuppano – a certain "Montauto," who

Le Paulin and Dragut bypassed their other original target – Piombino – since they were aware that Cosimo's militia under Chiappino Vitelli awaited them there. Also, another 3,500 infantry and 300 cavalry under the marchese di Marignano would soon join his defense. Instead, they targeted Corsica.[98] Under Genoese rule, the island was key to the trade routes between Spain, France, and Italy – not to mention providing a tantalizing western Mediterranean base for future military operations. Moreover, it was a rich prize for the corsairs. The French were not providing their Barbary allies with much financial support, and many argued that loot and slaves alone had convinced Sinan Pasha and Dragut to partake in the campaign in the first place. In order to entice the corsair captain to join in their endeavor that summer, the French had to further bribe him with 1,000 *écus*. As they had moved west, Dragut had initially desired to target the Spanish *Presidios* (garrisons) near Tunis, but in the event – most likely through these bribes – he decided to go along with the Corsica plan.[99]

Among the French forces, Cardinal du Bellay and Chevalier de Villegagnon knew Corsica's weak points and had outlined a plan to take the island for France. Also, the Maremma in Siena was inhabited by many Corsicans, so they were able to play upon this motivation to garner further support. On 22 August, Corsican exile and rebel Sampiero da Bastelica (Sampiero Corso) was detached with 12 galleys and managed to recruit the garrison of Bastia on Corsica's northern peninsula to help with their venture. Upon

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is probably either the aforementioned Otto or Federigo mentioned in a subsequent paragraph. The *Fiorenza* is not specifically mentioned, but instead referred to as the *Padrona* (vice-flagship).

[98] Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 41.

[99] Jacques Heers. *The Barbary Corsairs* […]. (London, 2003), 91-92. See also Rodriguez-Salgado. *The Changing Face of Empire*, 111, 262. Rodriguez-Salgado adds that Charles V had inherited Aragonese claims to Corsica, but he had set these aside to maintain an alliance with the Doria and Genoa.

launching their assault on the island, the Ottoman-Barbary contingent lost 1,500 men after 16 days of bombardment and 3 sorties. [100] The fighting was brutal.

Cosimo weighs his options regarding Siena (c. August – November 1553)

For Cosimo, the new Corsican front presented a major predicament. On the one hand, the 4,000 troops under Thermes that Le Paulin had picked up during the end of the siege of Elba had significantly reduced French numbers in central Italy. Only 2,000 Valois troops remained in all of Siena – including 700 within the city itself.[101] If the duke of Florence concentrated all of his forces on Siena – when most of the French troops had been reallocated to Corsica – the entire region could "have been swallowed in one bite." Aware of this, France's lieutenant general of Siena, Cardinal Ippolito d'Este, received instructions to maintain an agreement with Cosimo and a "climate of maximum relaxation." The cardinal had committed personal finances towards the Corsica expedition in hopes of keeping the war out of central Italy. Engaged in this discourse, he once again assured Cosimo that Henri wanted nothing but friendship with the duke – especially since they were family through the king's marriage to Caterina de Medici. Yet, Cosimo knew that the queen of France, his distant cousin, was "the star to whom all the Florentine exiles fixed their hopes." Still, the duke tried to leverage the situation to his best advantage. He indicated that he would agree to a non-aggression pact or even an alliance with Henri II if his son Francesco were betrothed to one of the king's legitimate daughters. Influenced by his brother, Duke Ercole II of Ferrara, the cardinal even suggested that if Henri would not agree to the royal wedding, Cosimo's daughter Lucrezia could marry Alfonso d'Este, the crown prince of Ferrara. Yet, whereas Cardinal d'Este played off the Corsican expedition as evidence of France's lack of interest in

[100] Roncière. *Histoire* Volume 3, 512, 514. Roncière and Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena,* 144 also mention that Gianbernardo da Sanseverino, the duke of Somma, worked alongside Sampiero.
[101] Mallett and Shaw. *The Italian Wars*, 259.

dominating the Italian peninsula, Cosimo was no fool. He saw Corsica as a clear indication of wider Valois ambitions. Especially considering Henri's occupation of Piedmont, once he held this island as well, it would only be a matter of time before France could take Genoa from both land and sea. The Medici duke played along, but saw that the French foothold in Siena – with a base on Corsica – meant that it would not be long before Valois armies marched upon Tuscany.[102]

Playing both sides as ever, Cosimo also opened negotiations with Charles V. However, in the midst of his other crises within the Holy Roman Empire, the emperor's waning health and depression did not help matters. The duke of Florence wrote to him several times between August and October without a response.[103] Concerning the Habsburg-Valois war in Italy, by August 1553, Ferrante Gonzaga, imperial governor of Milan, signed a truce with the French in Piedmont after not receiving any imperial funds. For Charles V, Italy, the Netherlands, and the Holy Roman Empire – both against France and the Ottomans in Hungary – were one giant front, and things were not going well. Considering the recent truce in French-occupied Piedmont; the insurrection and French occupation of Siena; the ransacking of Sicily; and a promising foothold on Corsica, Henri was encouraged by his successes in Italy – just as he had been in Germany after Charles abandoned the siege of Metz at the beginning of 1553. As a result, Henri felt he could leave these fronts alone for the time being and decided to concentrate on the Netherlands in 1553 into 1554. [104] Bearing all of this in mind, Cosimo had been looking towards the

[102] Roberto Cantagalli. *Cosimo I de' Medici, granduca di Toscana.* (Milan, 1985), 204-205. Regarding strategic marriages, Cosimo had married his second daughter, Isabella, to Paolo Giordano Orsini in 1553 to provide a family connection along the Tuscan border. He also suggested marrying another of his daughters to Pope Julius III's nephew Fabiano del Monte. See Cecily Booth. *Cosimo I, Duke of Florence*. (Cambridge, 1921), 139.
[103] Cantagalli. *Cosimo I de' Medici*, 206. At this moment, all that Don Francesco di Toledo, imperial ambassador to Florence, and Don Juan Maurique de Lara, the imperial ambassador to Rome, could say was that Charles would contribute 4,000 infantry and 300 cavalry towards the campaign in Siena.
[104] Rodriguez-Salgado. *The Changing Face of Empire*, 47, 92. To further add scale to the larger European

more immediate threat of a Valois Corsica. Just because Henri – *vis-à-vis* the Cardinal d'Este – had expressed continued friendship did not mean that his ambitions in Siena or Tuscany had suddenly vanished. The duke wanted to be at least one step ahead of him. Preparing for the next year, he engaged in diplomatic maneuvers to determine his inevitable role in the War of Siena.

Without any communication from Charles – and frustrated that the emperor had appointed Cardinal Pedro Pacheco de Villena, the Bishop of Jaén, as the interim viceroy of Naples in spite of the duke's opposition – Cosimo pursued both a Valois and Habsburg offer. He simultaneously dispatched a secretary (Bernardo Giusti da Colle) to Rome to negotiate a truce with the French over Siena and secretly asked Naples what forces they could realistically contribute towards the War of Siena. In spite of his careful planning and pursuit of options, his duplicity almost backfired. An angry letter from Cosimo to Don Francesco di Toledo (imperial ambassador to Florence) revealed that Viceroy Pacheco – "the devil who can neither conceive nor imagine [my plans]" – nearly unraveled the duke's entire web when he revealed to the pope details of the 'secret' inquiry regarding possible Neapolitan forces.[105] After all, it was in Rome that the duke of Florence was also negotiating with the Valois!

Again likely pressured by his wife and her family, Cosimo ended up pursuing the Habsburg option.[106] Unlike his 'secret' correspondence with Viceroy Pacheco, however, this time, he relied on someone he could trust. In October 1553, Cosimo sent his most faithful ambassador, Bartolomeo Concini, to Brussels to discretely negotiate Florence's role in the War of Siena. The duke emphasized that he would be waging the war on the

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conflict, Charles managed a consistent army of 60,000-80,000 men in the Holy Roman Empire alone. See note 16 on p. 47.

[105] Cantagalli. *Cosimo I de' Medici,* 207. Regarding Cosimo's angry letter, Cantagalli cites ASF MP 324 f. 32.

[106] Diaz. *Il Granducato*, 118.

emperor's behalf, but he did not ask for Siena to be granted to him – at least not yet. Instead, Cosimo requested 4,000 infantry and 300 cavalry – fully paid by the emperor – for at least 10 months. Should French numbers prove overwhelming, he expected more Habsburg military aid. The duke essentially used the recent Piombino debacle as blackmail to ensure that all costs for the war or territorial compensation would be granted without delays. Yet, Cosimo stated that his primary purpose was to remove the French threat from his threshold – not territorial expansion.[107] In spite of opposition to this arrangement from Charles V's trusted advisor Cardinal Granvelle, the emperor's representative Francesco di Toledo, Viceroy Pacheco of Naples, and the Spanish ambassador at Rome (Don Giovanni Manriquez) pressed forward with granting the duke of Florence this responsibility.[108] With the understanding that he was working on the emperor's behalf, Cosimo agreed to pay for all expenses – aside from an imperial subsidy – and accepted 2,000 German troops, 2,000 Spanish troops, and 300 cavalry – all financed by the Neapolitan treasury – by November.[109] Cosimo and Charles moved forward with the understanding that the entire Sienese Republic would belong to Cosimo until he was repaid in money or land for his efforts.[110]

Charles further notified Pacheco and Ferrante Gonzaga that they were to restore Cosimo on the ducal throne should Florence be lost.[111] Indeed, this was a tremendous

[107] Cantagalli. *Cosimo I de' Medici*, 208. See also Cantagalli. "La Guerra di Siena" in Rombai, ed. *I Medici*, 15.
[108] Diaz. *Il Granducato*, 118.
[109] Mallett and Shaw. *The Italian Wars*, 259. See also Diaz. *Il Granducato*, 118. Although Charles had already agreed to provide the requested infantry and cavalry, and 23,000 ducats per month for Cosimo's Siena venture, these parameters shifted. Shortly thereafter, Cosimo convinced him to contribute 6,000 men during peacetime and 16,000 for the campaign. Expenses quickly accelerated to 33,600 ducats per month in peacetime and 79,800 ducats per month for the campaign. The duke endured a lot of criticism for these numbers and was depicted as an incompetent commander. For example, Ferrante Gonzaga claimed he could take Siena for only 11,300 ducats per month. See: Rodriguez-Salgado. *The Changing Face of Empire*, 114. Rodriguez-Salgado cites AGS Estado 1045 f. 88, 57, 90; AGS Estado 1047 f. 219; AGS Estado 1202 f. 129; and Biblioteca del Palacio Real, Madrid 11-2286 f. 114.
[110] Caciagli. *Stato dei Presidi*, 37. See also Diaz. *Il Granducato*, 118.
[111] Cantagalli. *Cosimo I de' Medici*, 208.

undertaking for both the duke of Florence and the Habsburg emperor. Ultimately, Duke Cosimo I de Medici – not a Gonzaga, Toledo, or another Habsburg agent including the emperor himself – would bear this burden and provide leadership on this crucial front of a European-wide war.

Among many other factors, Dragut's assault on Elba and a massive Franco-Ottoman fleet in the Tyrrhenian had once again pushed Cosimo to lend his galleys and troops to the Habsburg cause – specifically in recovering Corsica. Charles V's agreement with the duke stated that Medici financial backing and military leadership for the War of Siena would be compensated with either land or a full reimbursement. Although risky, Cosimo felt confident that since he was fighting "on his own doorstep," he would eventually emerge victorious. After all, Henri II would be forced to maintain a long and vulnerable logistical train from France to Siena – much further than the distance between Florence to Siena.[112] The duke's fellow Italian princes and even Charles V were astounded by Cosimo's boldness. He had essentially single-handedly challenged Henri II and his vast armies on the field of battle.[113] Cosimo spent the autumn and winter planning for his massive military campaign the next year.[114]

The Brutal Corsican Front (August 1553 – January 1554)

The Valois's company of exiled Florentines and Genoese had significantly influenced the targets in 1553. As a combined Franco-Ottoman fleet launched its assault on Corsica, Cosimo immediately dispatched ambassadors to the Doria in Genoa. Both the Florentine Medici and the Doria were victims of their rivals sheltered by the French court, and this enabled them to set aside their differences. Neither Italian ruler would stand idly by as his respective realm was invaded by pirates, exiles, and an ambitious

[112] Spini. "The Medici Principality," 428-429.
[113] Diaz. *Il Granducato*, 118.
[114] Cantagalli. *Cosimo I de' Medici*, 208.

king. Considering Leone Strozzi's presence in the Piombino Channel and active campaigning on Corsica at that moment, enough was enough. By September 1553, Genoa collected 1 million ducats; an expeditionary force of 15,000 men; and the entire Doria fleet of 20 galleys. An additional 7 Neapolitan galleys and 12 ships joined the Dorias' Corsican task force. Cosimo himself contributed 2,400 infantry and 200 cavalry under Chiappino Vitelli. The duke also offered his 4 galleys – fully provisioned – for four months.[115] Again, Cosimo could have devoted these forces and others towards the relatively abandoned Siena front. Yet, he was fully aware of the larger picture. Gaining more territory to his south would quickly be negated should the Franco-Ottoman forces gain Corsica as a logistical base. Although the Genoese island became the primary focus for the time being, Siena never ceased to be part of Cosimo's plans. His secretary Bartolomeo Concini served on the Imperial Council of War and provided most of duke's intelligence for the Siena campaign – and the larger ongoing European war.[116]

By the early autumn 1553, affairs in the Mediterranean appeared in Henri's and Süleyman's favor, but as winter approached, the situation shifted. The corsairs and Valois forces – including Thermes's 4,000 troops from Siena – had more or less seized Corsica with help from Sampiero Corso.[117] Yet, dissension soon emerged between the French and the Barbary corsairs. When attacking Bonifacio, for example, Dragut threatened to burn the city and enslave its inhabitants if he was not given 30,000 *scudi*. Throughout the entire campaign thus far, Dragut's corsair fleet had behaved with such rapacious cruelty that the Prince of Salerno and Sampiero Corso openly demanded restrictions on Dragut's methods. Yet, the move to Corsica was arguably a way to further

[115] Ibid., 204. Regarding troop/vessel numbers and commanders, see also Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 41; and López de Gómara. *Guerras de Mar*, 256-257. At least 2,500 of the Spanish troops had arrived under Antonio Luis de Lugo from Tenerife. The Medici troops immediately served under *capitani venturieri* including Carlotto Orsino, Troilo dei Rossi, and Bartolomeo da Rodi among others.
[116] Pepper and Adams. *Firearms & Fortifications*, 117.
[117] Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 41.

entice the Barbary captain to carry on with an as-of-yet unfruitful campaign. Not wishing to put up with criticism or suffer restraints on his methods, Dragut took at least 4,000 Christian slaves and left Corsica before their work on the island was finished. The alliance was not completely broken, however, since the corsair's ambassador was taken to Marseilles. Nevertheless, even though this turn of events had significantly reduced the invading land and especially naval forces, some reinforcements under Scipione Fieschi aboard 5 galleys from Provence soon arrived. By late November into December, only the stronghold at Calvi (Saint-Florent) on the northern Corsican coast had escaped the Valois's clutches.[118]

Dragut's departure in the late autumn coincided with the Doria-Medici counterattack. Castilian official Juan Vazques de Molina's letter to Andrea Doria from 11 November 1553 detailed that German and Spanish-Neapolitan troops had arrived in Genoa on galleys between September and October. He expressed some relief that the "Turkish Armada" (i.e. Dragut's corsair fleet) was on its way to winter in the Levant; however, Molina feared what would happen if they decided to return. Already, he lamented what "the Turks have done on that island (Corsica), and in taking so many souls from it." At the time he wrote to Doria, Molina also indicated that Habsburg forces had gathered near Málaga to resupply and head towards Corsica. Emperor Charles V had dedicated another 3,000 Spanish infantry aboard 26 galleys – paid for 4 months – towards the campaign. In spite of this encouraging news, Molina expressed some concern that these 'Spanish' galleys were "already wintering and unarmed […] and in need of repairs [since they have] not rested for two winters."[119]

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[118] Roncière. *Histoire* Volume 3, 515; and Rodriguez-Salgado. *The Changing Face of Empire*, 111, 262.
[119] Archivo Doria Pamphilj, Roma (ADP) Bancone 65 No. 1 transcribed in Rafael Vargas-Hidalgo. *Guerra y Diplomacia en el Mediterráneo* […]. (Madrid, 2002), 6-7. Vargas-Hidalgo notes that the response to this letter is found on 11 February 1554. Molina wrote again on 15 November to clarify that three-months' pay for these 3,000 troops alone amounted to 50,000 *escudos*. He also added that the galleys had transported at

These worries aside, at least 32 galleys and up to 15 other vessels moved to rescue Corsica in November 1553. Among them, 4 Medici galleys under *Generalto* Jacopo Appiani departed from Livorno and joined the allied fleet – mostly Neapolitan – under Doria and his lieutenant Spinola.[120] Shortly thereafter, the Habsburg-allied galleys blockaded the Gulf of Calvi and bombarded the besiegers. Giordano Orsini – who reappeared in a starring role against the Habsburgs – and 1,500 men were trapped. With aims of disrupting Doria's blockade, France's *générale des galères* (Le Paulin) gathered at least 35 galleys and 6 other vessels. He divided these into smaller squadrons including 4 galleys under Baccio Martelli. On land, the Corsican rebels continued to receive support from Thermes and the Valois army. Meanwhile the men aboard the Habsburg galleys developed illnesses which they blamed on the nearby marshes. On top of these maladies, Doria expected to confront a massive French fleet of at least 30 galleys, and made the necessary preparations. With the situation once again appearing in the Valois's favor, Cosimo called his squadron back to Tuscany with aims of using them in Siena. He wished to cut off the French from the sea by taking Grosseto, Castiglione della Pescaia, and other important holdings along the Maremma coastline. Among their obstacles in the region, an Italian soldier in French service (Alessandro Ternni) held Grosetto with a small but significant garrison of 200 men. Following Cosimo's orders, the marchese di Marignano – the *generale supremo* of the war – instructed Federigo di Montauto to go from Pisa to Livorno and resupply the galleys that had recently arrived from Corsica. On Elba, they were to take artillery and other materiel and land near Grosseto. They were set

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least 700 infantry to Calvi. See: ADP Bancone 65 No. 1 transcribed in Vargas-Hidalgo. *Guerra y Diplomacia*, 7-8

[120] This may refer to Filippo Spinola, Marchese di Venafro e di Sesto Campano; but it may also refer to Agostino Spinola or Quilico Spinola referenced in Chapters 3 and 4 respectively.

to launch a coordinated attack alongside Rodrigo d'Avila, the commander of the Spanish garrison at Orbetello.[121]

Even though Doria had expected the worst in defending Corsica from the French relief fleet, disaster befell Le Paulin. A major storm claimed many of his vessels, and the precarious French and Nicoise coastline finished off many survivors. Even Baccio Martelli's galley ran aground on the rocks of Antibes – about 14 miles west of Nice. Le Paulin's expected 30-galley armada dwindled to a mere 10 galleys and a brigantine, and he quickly realized that it was only a matter of time before the French forces at Calvi would fall. The remnants of Henri II's galleys wintered in Porto Longone – literally south of Portoferraio on Elba.[122] Interestingly, neither the Medici nor other Habsburg-allied fleets managed to prevent this landing so close to Tuscany. Nevertheless, their positioning made their intentions very clear. Siena would be the objective for the 1554 campaign season.

What Siena meant for Cosimo, Italy, and Europe (November 1553 – January 1554)

By late November, Henri II considered naming – and by 1554 did name – a Florentine exile and one of Cosimo's bitterest enemies, Piero Strozzi, as his commander over Valois troops in Siena.[123] By this point, the duke could not deny that he was a personal target. However, his problems were not restricted to the French. Once again, Piombino formed a rift between Cosimo and the Habsburgs. By November 1553, Bernardo de Boleo finished his calculations for Piombino. On Charles V's behalf, he offered this strategic holding to Cosimo for 900,000 ducats – at least 180 times its annual income in 1547! Moreover, the agreement featured a clause that would allow Charles to reinstate imperial lordship at any time. Outraged over Piombino yet again, the duke did

[121] Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 41-42; and Roncière. *Histoire* Volume 3, 517-518.
[122] Roncière. *Histoire* Volume 3, 517-519.
[123] Cantagalli. *Cosimo I de' Medici*, 205. See also Pepper and Adams. *Firearms & Fortifications*, 117.

not even respond to this absurd offer. By late January 1554, imperial forces for Siena had not yet arrived, so Cosimo prepared his own army: 24,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry.[124] He seemingly had no choice but to commit forces. As the duke observed, with at least 9 French galleys at Marseilles, "it will be easy for the king [of France] to go to Siena."[125]

In spite of the personal problems between Charles V and Cosimo, however, the duke remained in the Habsburg camp. Moreover, whereas the French initially viewed their Corsican campaign as a victory, they were sorely mistaken. Aside from their crushing defeat, their movement here convinced all of Italy – including the pope – that the Valois and their Ottoman allies were a far greater threat than the Habsburgs. Their presence in Siena and Genoa alongside a 'Turkish' southern Italy would essentially make Henri II and Süleyman masters of the Mediterranean.[126] Anyone – including Cosimo – who had attempted to remain neutral or play both sides now realized that the Habsburgs were the lesser of two evils. Serving a Holy Roman Emperor or a king of Spain was one thing, but becoming the sultan's subject was quite another. Supporting the French not only meant accepting a king's lordship but Ottoman rule as well.

From a broader perspective, Cosimo and the Doria were fighting merely one front of a much larger conflict. Funding Habsburg efforts in the War of Siena alone would involve Belgian and German bankers in Antwerp and Augsburg, the Italian Republics of Genoa and Venice, and the Spanish viceroy of Naples. For the conflict as a whole, troops were recruited from across Italy, Spain, Germany, France, and of course the Ottoman Empire.[127] Regarding the seas, there was the Mediterranean conflict, but Henri II waged a simultaneous naval war against Charles V in the north near the Netherlands.[128] There was

[124] Role "The Naval bases," 123.
[125] ASF MP 26 f. 31, 12 December 1553, Cosimo to Fabritao [?] Ferrari.
[126] Cantagalli. "La Guerra di Siena," in Rombai, ed. *I Medici*, 14.
[127] Martines. *Furies*, 105.
[128] Roncière. *Histoire* Volume 3, 480-484.

also the constant tension – and sometimes the outbreak of war – along the Franco-German border and on the empire's Ottoman frontier. Especially if one also considers the sultan's ongoing struggles with Persia, this was literally a war spanning from Gibraltar to Mesopotamia. Of course, not all fronts were active at the same time and alliances were not always clear or coordinated. Nevertheless, leaders from the sultan, the king of France, and emperor all the way down to second-rank Italian princes – including Cosimo – needed to bear this in mind. As 1553 turned to 1554, Tuscany and Siena proved to be among the most active and crucial fronts of the fighting.

Chapter 3: Cosimo Fights the War of Siena (c. January 1554 – March 1556)

Family rivalries: Habsburg factions & Valois exploitation (c. December 1553 – January 1554)

Late 1553 into 1554 marked a turbulent period of transition from Charles V to his son, Philip – the future King Philip II of Spain. As the emperor's health worsened, Philip increasingly oversaw the Italian front as well as other Habsburg holdings. Henri II of France attempted to capitalize on this situation by targeting the Rhine borderlands and especially the Netherlands. In response, Charles had devoted immense financial resources and reallocated many of the troops who were attached to the Mediterranean fleet towards the Flanders campaign. As the Corsica invasion unfolded in late 1553, tension and squabbles between Charles and Philip regarding the latter's Italian role became more overt.[1] Habsburg familial interests were seemingly divided threefold: the French and Protestant threats against Charles V in Germany and the Low Countries; the struggles on the Hungarian and Transylvanian frontiers against the Ottomans; and Philip's increasing role in command of the Italian and Mediterranean front.

Many in Genoa interpreted Philip's concern over Corsica as a reflection of his personal ambitions. Yet, he justified his intervention in their affairs by emphasizing the island's strategic value and his father's overwhelming duties throughout his realm. Moreover, the future king of Spain hoped he could use Genoa as an example of Habsburg magnanimity – royal protection in exchange for loyalty. In 1553, Philip had overridden his father's authority and his top advisors by ordering the Spanish fleet and 3,000 troops to Corsica. He had also offered Spanish financial backing towards raising, transporting, and victualing the troops. Not only was this suggestion not authorized by his father, but Charles had originally planned to devote these forces to the war in Piedmont. Furthermore, this was the first time that the Spanish fleet had returned to Spain in three

[1] M.J. Rodriguez-Salgado. *The Changing Face of Empire* […]. (Cambridge, 1988), 73-77, 92-94, 110.

years. Spanish captains understood that their vessels desperately needed maintenance and repairs, and others throughout the Habsburg Empire felt that these resources could be better used elsewhere.[2] Moreover, Castile alone had already provided more than 4.5 million ducats to defend Spain, Italy, and the Mediterranean as well as to help Charles in Germany.[3] Indeed, Philip had significantly reallocated Spain's military forces – not to mention enormous financial contributions – towards the German and especially the Italian fronts.

When word of Philip's planned counterattack on Corsica reached Charles's court in Brussels, almost everyone assumed it was a ploy to cover up a campaign on Algiers. It seemed inconceivable that the young prince would make such a decision without consulting his father. Yet, on 30 December 1553, it became clear that this was no ruse when the emperor's orders finally arrived for the Spanish galleys to support Genoa in recovering Corsica. However, these instructions offered no specifics regarding troops or money.[4] Charles was at least trying to maintain the illusion that he was still in control. By this time, however, Tuscany was clearly the "flash point" of the conflict in Italy[5] – and arguably of the European-Mediterranean military situation as a whole. Philip and his father had no choice but to focus on this crucial front.

The Corsican campaign comprised just part of Valois efforts to gain a foothold in central Italy via Siena. By early January 1554, the arrival of one of Cosimo de Medici's arch-enemies in Siena – Piero Strozzi, Henri's *lieutenant-général* of Tuscany – motivated

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[2] Rodriguez-Salgado. *The Changing Face of Empire*, 111-112. In late May 1554, Prince Diego de Vargas reflected on intelligence regarding the Corsican campaign between October and December 1553. He noted the 4,000 infantry that Philip had contributed, but he lamented that Spain's galleys had been "so badly treated" throughout the campaign. See: Archivo Doria Pamphilj, Roma (ADP) Bancone 65 No. 1. Transcribed in Rafael Vargas-Hidalgo. *Guerra y Diplomacia en el Mediterráneo* […]. (Madrid, 2002), 9. Vargas-Hidalgo notes a similar copy in Archivo General de Simancas (AGS) Estado 1384 folio (f.) 112.
[3] Geoffrey Parker. *Imprudent King: A New Life of Philip II*. (New Haven, 2014), 43.
[4] Rodriguez-Salgado. *The Changing Face of Empire*, 112.
[5] Lauro Martines. *Furies: War in Europe 1450-1700*. (New York, 2013), 104.

the duke to launch a campaign to quickly crush him. Cosimo issued orders of "vicious cruelty," and Strozzi made it no secret that his true purpose was to target the duke of Florence – not defend Sienese independence.[6] The War of Siena was just as much a personal vendetta against Cosimo as it was a conflict between the Valois and the Habsburgs.

Among Piero's services provided for François I and Henri II through the 1540s and early 1550s, he supported Protestant rebels in Germany; fought in Lombardy; and most recently had served in the War of Parma and Mirandola. As this Italian campaign continued, however, Henri had also used Strozzi's expertise in further securing and supplying the fortress at Metz against Charles V in Germany. After his work there, the Valois king sent Piero to the Venetians and the duke of Ferrara in hopes of currying their support in the war effort. By 1553, Strozzi briefly served in Corsica, and upon his departure, took some French galleys to Rome to recruit more Florentine exiles for Siena. By January 1554, he went to Siena to serve Cardinal Ippolito d'Este.[7] Indeed, *Lieutenant-Général* Strozzi had been a key player in the Italian Wars for over a decade by the time he was assigned to Siena.

Given his years of loyal service to the French crown, Strozzi seemed to be the right man for this crucial front of the Habsburg-Valois conflict. Especially considering Cosimo's high taxes and intrusive policing – and the imbalanced anti-Cosimo view at the Valois court – Henri II assumed that Strozzi could easily incite a rebellion to overthrow the duke of Florence and gain control of the region.[8] Piero himself confidently stated that

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[6] Michael Mallett and Christine Shaw. *The Italian Wars, 1494-1559* […]. (Harlow, UK, 2012), 259-261. For background on Strozzi's experience with Cosimo and the immediate aftermath, see G. Barbera, ed. *Vite di Uomini d'Arme e d'Affari del secolo XVI* […]. (Florence, 1866), 511-530; Giuseppe Caciagli. *Stato dei Presidi*. (Pontedera, Italy, 1992), footnote on p. 37; and Michael Jacob Levin. *A Spanish eye on Italy* […]. (PhD dissertation) Yale University, 1997, 38-40, 75.

[7] Barbera, ed. *Vite di Uomini d'Arme*, 532-539, 542-548, 557-558, 563-564.

[8] Roberto Cantagalli. *Cosimo I de' Medici, granduca di Toscana.* (Milan, 1985), 210-211.

he could recruit help from Ferrara, Parma, and Lucca for this endeavor.[9] Again, Strozzi's aims in Siena and Tuscany had nothing to do with 'liberating' the locals from the Habsburgs or the Medici. This was all about revenge and personal ambition. Moreover, he wanted to restore the power and privileges of the old Florentine oligarchy, but this time "in the shadow of the lilies of France."[10] Geo-strategically and personally, Cosimo could not allow this to happen. He began 1554 with immediate actions against Strozzi and the Valois foothold in Siena.

Naval dimensions of Cosimo's first campaign in Siena (c. January – March 1554)

On the stormy night of 26 January 1554, the duke of Florence launched a three-pronged attack on Siena: one force against the city itself; another on Valdichiana – between Arezzo and Siena; and a third on Grosseto and the coast.[11] By early January, Cosimo's commander, Giangiacomo de Medici, the marchese di Marignano, had ordered Federigo di Montauto – the commander for the Grosseto operation – to depart Pisa towards Livorno. From there, he was to rendezvous with the galleys that had left Corsica and load artillery, explosives,[12] and ladders for a surprise attack on Grosseto. According to their military plans, this expedition would be executed in collaboration with Rodrigo d'Avila and the Spanish garrison at Orbetello.[13] On 26 January 1554, at least 600 Italian troops under Montauto embarked from Pisa to Grosseto while Cosimo's other forces – 4,000 infantry, 400 cavalry, 600 pioneers, and light artillery – marched overland towards

[9] Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale di Firenze magliabechiano cod. 336, 17 March 1554. Transcribed in Francesco Trucchi. *Vita e Gesta di Piero Strozzi Fiorentino Marrsciallo di Francia*. (Florence: 1847), Document VII on p. 156-158.
[10] Roberto Cantagalli. "La Guerra di Siena" in Leonardo Rombai, ed. *I Medici e lo Stato Senese 1555-1609* […]. (Rome, 1980), 16.
[11] Cantagalli. "La Guerra di Siena" in Rombai, ed. *I Medici e lo Stato Senese*, 16.
[12] "Pertardi" can translate to "firecrackers" or even "crackers" (i.e. biscuit) in modern Italian. Since Manfroni uses "*biscotti*" elsewhere, I'm assuming that some sort of explosive is a more accurate translation here.
[13] Camillo Manfroni. "La Marina Militare […]." in *Rivista Marittima* […]. (Rome, 1895), 42.

Siena and Valdichiana.[14] By early February, the Tuscan galleys – which had recently returned from *Generalato* Iacopo VI Appiani's assignment in Genoa[15] – successfully reached Grosseto and delivered supplies for the attack. However, storms and the crews' inexperience in these adverse conditions presented unforeseen delays. Even though Orbetello's Spanish troops brought Montauto's force to 1,500 infantry,[16] the operation was a failure. After two futile landing attempts near Castiglione della Pescaia and Massa di Maremma,[17] Montauto finally disembarked for the campaign only to discover that the weather had bought Piero Strozzi time to deploy more reinforcements in the region.[18] Ultimately, they had not managed to cut the French maritime logistical train.

On their enemy's side, the Valois Mediterranean squadron proved very active between January and February 1554. From their winter base at Porto Longone on Elba, Le Paulin's[19] 10 galleys and a brigantine preyed upon 4 – presumably Tuscan – galleys en route to Piombino. They captured one of these vessels, while the other 3 fled to Livorno. However, a storm – probably the same storm that delayed Montauto's operation in Grosseto – wrecked half of the French galleys near the island of Pianosa. With help from the shipwrecked Spanish and Italian convict rowers, the local farmers captured or killed the 400 French sailors and troops that made it ashore at various points on the island. This incident also allowed Cosimo's forces to salvage 40 bronze artillery pieces from the wreckage.[20]

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[14] Simon Pepper and Nicholas Adams. *Firearms & Fortifications* […]. (Chicago, 1986), 118.
[15] Archivio di Stato di Firenze (ASF) Miscellanea Medicea (MM) 538 f. 1, January 1554. Appiani's other business regarding Cosimo's galleys – written from Genoa in January – is alluded to in f. 2-6.
[16] Roberto Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena, 1552-1559*. (Siena, 1962), 189.
[17] I have not identified this specific location on any maps.
[18] Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 42.
[19] Antoine Escalin des Aimars, the Baron de La Garde. Frequently referred to as "La Garde."
[20] Le Paulin's squadron also seized a *nave* from Ragusa – likely en route to Livorno – laden with wheat and sugar. Charles de la Roncière. *Histoire de la marine française*. Volume 3 […]. (Paris, 1906), 519. See also Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena*, 200; and Niccolò Capponi. "Guns and Profit […]," in Carlo Beltrame and Renato Gianni Ridella, eds. *Ships & Guns* […]. (Oxford, 2011), 62. Capponi cites ASF Mediceo del

Contemplating his wrecked fleet near Corsica in late 1553 and these losses near Pianosa, Le Paulin realized that he could no longer control the Piombinio channel with only 5 Valois vessels. Moreover, France's Corsican front was collapsing. After Doria had sacrificed nearly two-thirds of his forces in this campaign, Henri's hired captain, Giordano Orsini, capitulated on 27 February 1554. Cosimo had already recalled his troops to Siena on 16 February, and it was clear that the French also needed to regroup their forces. After most of Doria's soldiers and galleys followed suit, his close associate Adamo Centurione oversaw the recapture of Calvi. With Habsburg-allied forces gathering near Siena and the Piombino Channel, Le Paulin desperately headed towards Marseilles – which he reached in late February 1554. Nevertheless, he still hoped that a combined Ottoman-Algerian fleet would provide much-needed support against Sicily and Naples later that year.[21]

Even though the winter storm had decimated the French squadron, it had also enabled Strozzi to prevent Cosimo's troops under Montauto from achieving their goal in Grosseto. Yet, the *lieutenant-général* still feared that the Spanish at Orbetello might incite anti-Valois rebellions in the Maremma (southern Siena). Since he could not feasibly hold the entire region, Strozzi ordered his forces to concentrate on defending the coast at Porto Ercole, Capalbio, and Grosseto.[22] Ultimately, however, any successes of the Medici army at Siena in January and February 1554 were short-lived. Despite being unprepared, the city successfully drove the Florentines away and forced them to conduct a traditional siege.[23] Siena was technically blockaded, but it was no problem for

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Principato (MP) 627. Specifically, their haul included: 4 large reinforced cannons, 8 *sagri*, and 28 smaller pieces – as well as 300 prisoners who could fill in the rowing benches.

[21] Roncière. *Histoire* Volume 3, 519-520. See also Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena*, 200.

[22] Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena*. 192, 202. At the time, Grosseto was under the Duke of Somma, see p. 202. As a further move against Cosimo, Strozzi commandeered the massive herds of Florentine cattle – numbering as many as 150,000 head – that roamed Grosseto.

[23] Caciagli. *Stato dei Presidi,* 37.

individuals to gather wood, food, wine, and occasional livestock in these early months.[24] Save for capturing the fort near Porta Camollia – on the city's northern fringes – and a few others, Cosimo's entire operation in Siena proved a failure. Over the upcoming months, Strozzi would control the war's momentum.[25]

Cosimo's administration: logistics and finances (c. March – December 1554)

Even with a brief respite in the early spring of 1554, Cosimo was hard at work. Anticipating future fighting, in February 1554, Cosimo wrote to Bartolomeo Concini – presumably still at the emperor's court in Brussels – regarding the forces and supplies available in Siena itself. The duke also mentioned that 16 French galleys had arrived at Porto Ercole. Clearly, his enemies had quickly reestablished a formidable logistical link to Siena. Despite this, Cosimo confidently proclaimed that the soldiers at Orbetello "who have suffered so much" as well as his forces besieging Siena itself could rely on him to maintain a reliable supply chain.[26]

Responsible for the duke's ongoing naval infrastructure projects, Luca Martini continued to oversee three bulwarks on Pisa's outer works from 1553 into 1554.[27] On Elba, Bernardo Buontalenti took over the projects at Portoferraio from Giovanni Battista Belluzzi and Giovanni Camerini.[28] After their abovementioned misadventure near Grosseto, the Medici galleys provided security detail for Spanish troop transports from Orbetello to Livorno. Additionally, since Genoese finances had already been exhausted by the Corsican campaign, Cosimo's squadron also provided logistical support for the

[24] Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena*, 223.
[25] Niccolò Capponi, ed. *Guerre d'Italia*. (Milan, 2016), 129. See also Cantagalli. "La Guerra di Siena" in Rombai, ed. *I Medici e lo Stato Senese*, 16.
[26] "Codice di Lettere Originali del Duca Cosimo." Transcribed in Lorenzo Cantini. *Vita di Cosimo de' Medici primo gran-duca di Toscana*. (Florence, 1805), 610-612. The duke of Florence also brought small fiefs such as Caprigliola and Corlago (inland from La Spezia) into the Tuscan fold. See: J.R. Hale. *Florence and the Medici* […]. (New York, 1978), 131.
[27] Dario Matteoni. *Le città nella storia d'Italia: Livorno*. (Rome, 1988), 7.
[28] Giuseppe M. Battaglini. "Portoferraio," in Nudi, Giacinto et al. *Livorno e Pisa* […]. (Pisa, 1980), 312.

Florentine Chiappino Vitelli and the other infantry captains who were still on the island.[29] Between February and May 1554, all of *Generalato* Jacopo Appiani's correspondence was addressed from Genoa.[30] Since the ducal galleys were working on Genoa's behalf on Corsica, it seems plausible that Cosimo's vessels conducted their convoys from the republic's ports. Moreover, on 23 May, Appiani observed that "I sail without the burden of providing anything for the galleys"[31] which strongly implies that Genoa also victualed Cosimo's galleys for these relief missions. Regardless of their base of operations, this collaboration demonstrated that even a well-established maritime state like Genoa could benefit from Cosimo's small but clearly useful squadron in physically moving men and materiel to and from the front lines.

Simultaneous to these war efforts, by March 1554, Cosimo reformed the *Deposito Generale* and sought to centralize Tuscan finances more effectively. Between 1546 and 1550, loans granted to the duchy of Florence had amounted to between 75,000 and 170,000 *scudi* per year, and this was the trend leading up to the War of Siena.[32] As he became more personally involved in the unfolding events of 1554, however, Cosimo borrowed 240,000 *scudi* from foreign and Italian bankers – mostly the Genoese and the German Fugger family. Cosimo's wife Eleanor de Toledo also used her connections to secure more funds.[33] In total, Florentine revenues from March through December 1554

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[29] Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 42. Some of Jacopo Appiani's financial records for the galleys are alluded to in ASF MM 538 f. 5-6, 30 January 1554; f. 8-9, 15 February 1554. See also the entry "Iacopo Appiani" by Luisa Bertoni Argentini in the *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani (DBdI)*, Volume 3 (1961) accessible online: www.treccani.it.

[30] ASF MM 538 f. 8-34.

[31] ASF MM 538 f. 26v. The entire letter is f. 26-28. "*me vela p[er]sona propria senza io havessi carico provedere le galere di cosa alcuna* […]"

[32] Other sources estimate smaller totals: 1546: 74,750 *scudi*; 1547: 161,000 *scudi*; 1548: 14,933 *scudi*, 1549: 103,880 *scudi*; 1550: 50,000 *scudi*; 1551: 3,640 *scudi*; 1552: no records; 1553: 168,500 *scudi*; 1554: 169,377.15.7 *scudi*. See Anna Teicher. "Politics and Finance in the Age of Cosimo I […]," in Furio Diaz et al., eds. *Firenze e la Toscana dei Medici nell'Europa del '500* Volume I […]. (Florence, 1983), 347. Cosimo only borrowed 13,000 *scudi* for 1551.

[33] Teicher. "Politics and Finance," 345-355. See also note 31 on p. 352. Already between 1547 and 1554, the Fugger – based in Venice and Antwerp – lent 260,000 *scudi* to Florence. Cosimo also purchased copper

amounted 774,666 *scudi*. Despite these loans from the Fugger, the Doria, and others – not to mention significant tax hikes and Spanish aid – Cosimo's financial resources still fell short of the costs of the War of Siena.[34] This burden would only grow heavier over the late spring and early summer of 1554.

Cosimo's enemies on the move (c. April – June 1554)

So far as a threat from the Ottomans was concerned, the situation looked fairly stable at first. In the wake of the first failed Corsican campaign between late 1553 and early 1554, it seemed that the sultan – and more specifically his tentative ally Dragut – had no aims beyond the Adriatic. The French were outraged and accused them of only wanting plunder.[35] But this was music to Spain's ears. In a letter from May 1554, Prince Diego de Vargas observed that the Valois holding at Bastia on Corsica had capitulated. He added that, even though the "Turkish armada" could easily threaten Naples, Sicily, or Venice, the sultan was distracted by affairs in Persia.[36] Venetian intelligence, however, painted a different story. On 3 April 1554, the *bailio* on the Bosporus, Domenico Trevisan, wrote to the republic that Dragut was preparing 55 galleys to sail into the Adriatic on 15 May.[37] Regarding the western Mediterranean, things seemed especially precarious since the Knights of Malta refused to assume any responsibility over Mahdia in 1554.[38] North Africa increasingly seemed abandoned by Christian powers, and this delicate front would only present more difficulties over the subsequent years.

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on extended credit from Antwerp – presumably for arms manufacture. In total, domestic sources such as taxes and local loans amounted to 401,333 *scudi* between March 1554 and the end of 1555.

[34] Furio Diaz. *Il Granducato Di Toscana—I Medici*. (Turin, 1982), 119.

[35] Jacques Heers. *The Barbary Corsairs* […]. (London, 2003), 92.

[36] ADP Bancone 65 No. 1. Transcribed in Vargas-Hidalgo. *Guerra y Diplomacia*, 9-12.

[37] Kenneth M. Setton *The Papacy and the Levant (1204-1571)* Volume IV […]. (Philadelphia, 1984), 606. Setton cites Archivio di Stato di Venezia (ASV) Senato Secreta Reg. 69 f. 26r.

[38] Anne Brogini and Maria Ghazali. "Un enjeu espagnol en Méditerranée […]," in *Cahiers de la Méditerranée* 70: 2005 […] (Tome 1), 15.

After a personal leave of absence related to his duties as a Knight of Malta, Leone Strozzi – Piero's brother – was reappointed an admiral in the French Mediterranean fleet.[39] Specifically, Leone served as lieutenant-general of the galleys under Flaminio Orsini dell Anguillara, Henri II's governor of Porto Ercole. On 16 April 1554, Strozzi led his personal squadron of 3 galleys: the *Leona*, the *Santa Barbara*, and the *Porfiada* – manned by many Tuscan knights of Malta including members of the Soderini, Rucellai, del Bene, Guicciardini, and Ridolfi families and Asdrubale de Medici – towards the Sienese coast. Alongside his brother Roberto and a Neapolitan exile (Gianbernardo da Sanseverino, the duke of Somma) Leone Strozzi journeyed to Grosseto and then to Siena to assess the military situation.[40] By May 1554, Cosimo's intelligence confirmed that French troops were marching south from Lombardy and landing at Porto Ercole.[41] As Cosimo's aforementioned February correspondence indicated, however, Valois forces had already been trickling into Siena for months.

After Leone Strozzi and the duke of Somma visited Siena in May, Piero Strozzi planned a joint operation wherein they – alongside Lucca and the duke of Ferrara (Ercole II d'Este) – would capture Orbetello and Piombino as well as raid their wheat stores for Siena. On the night of 11 June, Strozzi left Siena with 8,000 infantry and 1,000 horses. To support this ambitious campaign, Piero had also entrusted Leone with instructing admiral Le Paulin to land at Porto Ercole where he was expected as early as 10 June.[42]

Instead of arriving between 10 and 15 June, however, Le Paulin and his 50 ships did not appear in Porto Ercole until 8 July. The delay was largely caused by Dragut's absence. The French fleet had been relying on the sultan and Dragut, but, as Habsburg

[39] Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena*, 202.
[40] Roncière. *Histoire* Volume 3, 522-523.
[41] Pepper and Adams. *Firearms & Fortifications*, 126. Pepper and Adams do not cite this specific intelligence.
[42] Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena* 242-245.

intelligence had indicated, Süleyman was once again distracted by his Persian front. Moreover, the Venetians had convinced the sultan that continued involvement in the French Mediterranean campaign was against his best interests, and Dragut was still fuming over the criticism he had endured regarding Bonifacio on Corsica the previous year.[43] Instead of following the French, the corsair engaged in affairs much closer to Constantinople. In June 1554, Dragut[44] led the Sultan's armada through the Strait of Otranto where he laid siege to Vieste on the Gargano Promontory near Italy's 'ankle' in the Adriatic. He then moved to Avlona (Vlorë) in Albania where he put down a rebellion led by Ahmed Beg. In recognition of these successes, Süleyman all but officially granted Barbarossa's former title (*Kapudan Pasha*) to Dragut.[45] With Dragut – and the sultan's fleet under his command – preoccupied and uninterested in the campaign off the Sienese coast, the Strozzi and Le Paulin were on their own.

Having left Siena with a good portion of his troops on 11 June, Piero Strozzi's army assembled with forces from Lombardy and moved to Viareggio where they awaited the French-'Turkish' fleet until 15 June.[46] Piero still knew nothing of Dragut's diversion to the Adriatic and Le Paulin's scramble to gather a fleet. In the meantime, Leone Strozzi refortified Porto Ercole by building Fort Sant'Elmo. Unfortunately for Leone, however, his spy for Livorno, Pisa, and Piombino relayed information about the French in Siena to Jacopo Appiani who in turn told Cosimo. Not aware of his double agent, Leone then moved on to Orbetello. Whereas he had merely 3 galleys with some troops, Andrea Doria

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[43] Roncière. *Histoire* Volume 3, 525. See also Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena*, 252.
[44] Named "Torghudjeh" in Khalifeh's account.
[45] Haji Khalifeh. *The History of the Maritime Wars of the Turks Chapters I to V*. Translated by James Mitchell. (London, 1831), 80. See also Özlem Kumrular. "Turgut Reis (1485-1565): The uncrowned King of the Mediterranean," in Dejanirah Couto, Feza Gunergun, and Maria Pia Pedani Fabris, eds. *Seapower, Technology, and Trade* […]. (Istanbul, 2014), 51; and Setton *The Papacy and the Levant* Volume IV, 607. Setton refers to Avalona as simply "Valona." Setton says "Vieste" whereas Khalifeh's account says "Bastia." Khalifeh only specifies that these events occurred in Rajab 961.
[46] Pepper and Adams. *Firearms & Fortifications*, 127.

was en route with a fleet of galleys complete with munitions and troops to relieve Orbetello.[47]

Piero Strozzi's strategy for the summer of 1554 had hinged upon the French fleet reallocating German and Gascon troops from Piedmont to Porto Ercole. When it was clear they would not arrive in time, however, he attempted to keep the momentum as much in his favor as possible. On 17 June, he launched an arduous land campaign into Florentine territory with around 13,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry – which involved crossing a flooded Arno River. In striking contrast to the delayed French fleet, Cosimo received reinforcements from Lombardy and Corsica. Faced with stronger Medici forces than expected, Piero Strozzi marched back across the Arno on 24 June as Cosimo's army pursued him. By 27 June, Strozzi had retreated back into Sienese territory. Instead of weakening the duke of Florence, this fruitless military maneuver had only strengthened the Medici military presence in the region. Objectively speaking, this intended raid had also increased the numbers of Valois troops in Siena. Nevertheless, a fairer fight was not the situation Strozzi had planned for. After briefly stopping in Siena itself, Piero joined most of his army in the Maremma. When he arrived, he discovered that his brother Leone had been killed in action during a hasty amphibious attack near the castle of Scarlino – between Grosseto and Piombino. Despite the blow of losing his brother, Piero remained certain that he would be perceived as a 'liberator' among the Tuscans, and he hoped to stir up anti-Medici rebellions in Pisa, Pistoia, Arezzo, Cortona, and other regions. He also attempted to capitalize on his connections in Lucca for passage and supplies. Neither

[47] Roncière. *Histoire* Volume 3, 523-524.

endeavor proved successful.[48] His outlook – and in consequence Henri II's – veered dangerously far from reality.

Moreover, Cosimo's forces had been almost certain that Strozzi would move upon some of Tuscany's more vulnerable holdings. Chiappino Vitelli had scouted Strozzi's army, and since Pisa had only 200 troops in the garrison, the duke's advisors agreed this was a likely target. To prepare for what seemed like an imminent assault, the city even resorted to distributing weapons among the students of the *Collegio Ducale*.[49] However, instead of moving on this crucial center, and before his strategic retreat back into Sienese territory, Piero Strozzi had targeted Calcinaia – roughly 14 miles up the Arno from Pisa.[50] He garrisoned some of his troops at Porto Ercole but moved most of them to Montalcino. Additionally, even though Leone Strozzi had been killed, the duke of Somma had captured Scarlino and Suvereto – about 23 miles east and 15 miles northeast of Piombino respectively.[51] In spite of these small successes and more or less maintaining Henri's Sienese army, this leg of the Valois campaign was marked by some grave setbacks: French reinforcements remained stranded aboard Le Paulin's galleys; Leone Strozzi had fallen; Cosimo received reinforcements; Piero Strozzi's impatience and warped perception of the real situation in Tuscany intensified; and Piero missed an opportunity at Pisa. Over the course of July 1554, Strozzi hoped to salvage this situation.

Cosimo's and Doria's galleys confront Le Paulin's fleet (c. June – July 1554)

Le Paulin's delayed French fleet had vanquished Strozzi's hopes of a surprise attack in June. When neither the sultan nor Dragut offered the Ottoman armada for the

[48] Mallett and Shaw. *The Italian Wars*, 261. See also Pepper and Adams. *Firearms & Fortifications*, 127; Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena*, 247, 255; Roncière. *Histoire* Volume 3, 524; and Diaz. *Il Granducato*, 120.
[49] Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena*, 246.
[50] Cantagalli. "La Guerra di Siena" in Rombai, ed. *I Medici e lo Stato Senese*, 16. Using modern roads, the distance between Pisa and Calcinaia is roughly 21-25 km.
[51] Mallett and Shaw. *The Italian Wars*, 261. On modern roads, the distance between Piombino and Suvereto is about 24 km; and about 37 km to Scarlino.

1554 campaign, Le Paulin had few options. By May, he had asked *beylerbey* Salah Reis of Algeria for reinforcements as a personal favor – not on Henri's formal request. On the condition of reciprocity, the *beylerbey* offered 20 vessels for later that month and 40 in total by mid-June. Le Paulin planned to use this force to raid the Spanish coast and confront Doria's fleet. In the meantime, however, a frigate dispatched from Marseilles had finally tracked the Valois naval commander down with an urgent order to pick up 10 companies of troops under Blaise de Monluc and another German regiment under Georg Reckenrot to help Piero Strozzi in his Tuscan campaign. Le Paulin immediately headed to Toulon; embarked the troops; and alongside 14 galleys and 16 galliots provided by Salah Reis, the 26 French galleys departed on 1 July – up to 56 vessels total. On their way to deliver these desperately-needed reinforcements, Le Paulin captured 8 or 9 transport ships bearing Sicilian wheat. By 6 July, Porto Ercole was in their sights, and they arrived on 8 July.[52]

Along the way, Le Paulin and Salah Reis were also nearly intercepted by Doria's galleys. Cosimo had warned Ferrante Gonzaga, the governor of Milan, of the danger that Le Paulin's Franco-Algerian fleet posed. In turn, the governor had ordered Doria to secure the area near Piombino. By the summer of 1554, Andrea Doria was well over 80 years old, so he had sent his nephew, Gian Andrea Doria, with 15 galleys in his stead. This Genoese squadron had assembled with Cosimo's galleys and a few others to form a Habsburg fleet of at least 27 galleys. Later, a good portion of the Habsburg forces from the Corsican campaign also joined them at their new headquarters on the islet of Troia[53] –

[52] Roncière. *Histoire* Volume 3, 525-526. See also Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena*, 284-285. On page 252, Cantagalli says that Salah Reis's fleet only numbered 25 vessels, but this is still a considerable number. Also on 8 July, Siena received news from their ambassador, Enea Piccolomini, that Le Paulin had returned from the Valois court, and was now aboard a massive French-Barbary fleet. See: Setton. *The Papacy and the Levant* Volume IV, 602.

[53] According to Castiglione della Pescaia's tourism website (castiglionedellapescaia.com), the Islet of Troia (Isolotto dello Sparviero) is a very small island just across from the Punta Ala.

just south of Piombino. When the time came to confront Le Paulin's fleet, however, the young Doria retreated and targeted Civitavecchia. Instead of blockading the French landing near Porto Ercole, the Genoese fleet – which included the Medici galleys – had opened the door for more French troops and supplies to reach Siena. Especially considering the infantry and cavalry support that Gian Andrea Doria would have received from the beaches – and that several of the Valois galleys were the ragged remnants of the Corsican campaign – this generated accusations of cowardice and treachery.[54]

From an entrepreneurial perspective, however, Andrea Doria – who had most certainly instructed his nephew – could not risk his galleys being captured or destroyed in battle. Moreover, he was facing an enemy fleet that was at least double his own. Since Appiani's agreement with Cosimo from 1552 had made him responsible for any losses, it can be argued that he was complicit in Doria's decision – if not a proponent of a similar philosophy. Whether the decision to target Civitavecchia was based on military or entrepreneurial prudence – or a combination of both – the Valois forces had reached Porto Ercole without any real fight.

Concerning Cosimo's squadron in June and early July, neither the notes from Jacopo Appiani, Luca Martini, nor the latter's newly appointed assistant, Lorenzo Scala (the *commissario delle galere*) offer any real specifics. As rumors circulated about yet another potential Franco-Ottoman fleet, Martini had sent grain to Elba –in preparation for a likely siege.[55] Regarding affairs on the island, he made reference to a Spanish official, Gianvasques, who was overseeing matters.[56] Yet, it is unclear if Gianvasques was an

[54] Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 43-44. As typical in his own time and even among Doria's contemporaries, Manfroni paints the Genoese in a negative light and all but calls them greedy 'cowards' or 'traitors' – only concerned with their profits. With that in mind, Manfroni numbered the enemy fleet at 30 vessels maximum – not nearly twice that number as was actually the case.
[55] ASF MP 431 f. 129, 4 July 1554.
[56] ASF MP 431 f. 172, 14 July 1554. Possibly Juan Vázquez del Molina, Spain's Secretary of the Council of State and a chief advisor. See his entry in the glossary of Vargas-Hidalgo. *Guerra y Diplomacia*,

expert hired by Cosimo or if he was working on behalf of the Spanish Habsburgs. Regardless of the arrangement, his position further demonstrated the path of cooperation Cosimo had chosen for the time being. Martini also referenced a Doria *fregata* that had journeyed to Elba with some documents for Cosimo on 4 July, and a little over a week later, he gathered more "*cariche di grane destinate per Genova*."[57] Meanwhile, the Genoese naval contractor Adamo Centurione – Cosimo's former opponent on the Piombino issue and Martini's recent business partner – offered intelligence that could contribute towards the duke's military efforts.[58]

Martini's aforementioned dealings with the Centurione over the previous years; the abovementioned Doria vessels – probably bearing Centurione's correspondence; the Medici grain that was being provided to Genoa; and that Jacopo Appiani was still based in Genoa in June and July 1554[59] all strongly suggests that the duke of Florence and the Genoese naval patricians (i.e. the Doria and Centurione) had reached some sort of official or unofficial agreement. Moreover, in the midst of the struggles for Piombino, Jacopo Appiani and his mother Elena Salviati had self-exiled themselves in Genoa between 1548 and at least 1552. Thus, it seems extremely likely that Cosimo's decision to appoint his young cousin as *generalato* over his galleys in 1552 had been linked to Appiani's connections in Genoa.[60] Since the duke's galleys actively operated alongside the Genoese both on Corsica and in the Piombino Channel while *Generalato* Appiani acted as a supervisor and Florentine intermediary in Genoa itself, this implies that Cosimo's galleys were already 'shadowing' – if not actually administrated by – the experienced Doria and Centurione families during this crucial moment of the war. Moreover, considering the

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CCCXI. Lorenzo Scala, who was based in Portoferraio at the time, also mentioned Gianvasques: ASF MP 433 f. 69, 16 July 1554; f. 103, 20 July 1554

[57] ASF MP 431 f. 173, 14 July 1554. See also f. 129.

[58] ASF MP 431 f. 68, 2 July 1554.

[59] ASF MM 538 f. 35, 17 June 1554; f. 36, 25 July 1554.

[60] Regarding Appiani's time in Genoa, see "Iacopo Appiani" in the DBdI.

abovementioned Genoese reservations about the emperor's son Philip's involvement on Corsica, a 'business' partnership between Duke Cosimo and the Genoese patriciate could prove mutually beneficial over the subsequent years – especially if their relationship with the Spanish Habsburgs soured or if the Valois proved victorious.

Meanwhile, with Le Paulin's galleys arriving at Porto Ercole on 8 July, Roberto Strozzi assumed command of Monluc's and Reckenrot's 4,000 troops, and they joined his brother Piero's forces at Buonconvento on 14 July. Further reinforcements arrived from Naples shortly thereafter. While this army prepared to march, the French ambassador in Rome (Louis de Lanssac) ordered his agent to secretly travel to Ancona; board a galley to Albania; find Dragut; and convince him to support the French fleet along the Tuscan coast. En route in the Adriatic, however, Neapolitan vessels intercepted Lanssac's agent near Ortona, and his papers – including a letter from the sultan – fell into imperial hands. Any hope of receiving aid from Dragut vanished. Nevertheless, with all of his reinforcements and consolidated forces, Piero Strozzi still had a formidable 16,000 infantry, 1,000 light cavalry, and 350 men-at-arms. Having left behind only 1,200 infantry and 200 cavalry in Siena, he marched on 17 July in pursuit of an encounter against Cosimo's army. This culminated in the battle of Marciano on 2 August.[61]

Cosimo's attempts to capitalize on the battle of Marciano: Siena inland and on the coast (August – November 1554)

Strozzi attributed this catastrophic defeat to the missing reinforcements at Porto Ercole in June.[62] Whatever or whomever was to blame, he was wounded; 4,000 of his troops killed; and another 4,000 wounded or taken prisoner. Many captains were

[61] Mallett and Shaw. *The Italian Wars,* 261-262, 285. See also Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena*, 285, 327-328. Martines. *Furies* emphasizes that Blaise de Monluc was supposed to be commander of the troops in Siena itself but severe illness kept him away until mid-July. See p. 105.
[62] Francesco Trucchi. *Vita e Gesta di Piero Strozzi* […]. (Florence, 1847), Document 13 p. 170-177, which seems to date from August 1554. The battle itself is thoroughly covered in Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena*, 281-307. See also Pepper and Adams. *Firearms & Fortifications*, 129-130.

captured, and 400 of the German troops were integrated into the imperial army. Over the course of August, numerous Valois soldiers deserted to the Habsburg camp with hopes of acquiring desperately-needed food and payment. In striking contrast, imperial-Medici losses numbered a mere 200. Yet, Cosimo was displeased by reports of how his army treated the "useless mouths" driven out of blockaded Siena – the situation in the city itself worsened by the day. Ever keeping his goals in mind, Cosimo sought to present himself as a paternal 'protector' over – what he hoped would be – his future subjects. Among his strategically benevolent acts, captured Sienese peasants fleeing the besieged city were granted mercy if they swore loyalty to the duke of Florence. In addition to winning over some of Siena's 'hearts and minds,' the great victory at Marciano had finally given Cosimo the upper hand. With Strozzi's army significantly dwindling, the duke focused on taking Siena's neighbors Monterrigioni and Casole by late August.[63] Strozzi had wrongly believed that he had enough troops to execute his plans, but Cosimo proved otherwise.[64] In efforts to reconsolidate his forces, Piero Strozzi welcomed 6,000 additional troops from Corsica at Talamone that August[65] – a significant detraction from Henri II's larger strategic goal.

Regarding Valois naval affairs, the French king wished to place the blame on someone for what was amounting to a disastrous campaign year and for alienating Dragut. Certainly, the corsair's forces could have made all the difference to Strozzi's plan. Frustrated, Henri denounced Le Paulin and refused to have an audience with him.[66]

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[63] Mallett and Shaw. *The Italian Wars,* 262. Concerning the treatment of prisoners of war and Florentine exiles, see Cecily Booth. *Cosimo I, Duke of Florence*. (Cambridge, 1921), 153; and Capponi, ed. *Guerre D'Italia*, 131. See also Martines. *Furies*, 109. Regarding the treatment of innocent civilians, Florentine exiles, and Sienese peasants, see Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena*, 227, 341. The artist Giorgio Vasari depicted Cosimo as a 'protector of the people.' For an example of Cosimo's use of paternalistic charity, see: Diana Bullen Presciutti. "Carità e potere […]" in *Renaissance Studies* Volume 24 No. 2 (2010).
[64] Roncière. *Histoire* Volume 3, 527.
[65] Enrico Coppi, ed. *Cronaca Fiorentina* […]. (Florence, 2000), 170.
[66] Roncière. *Histoire* Volume 3, 527-528.

Even before the defeat at Marciano, the Valois king had already prepared another naval force. On 2 August, Adamo Centurione warned Cosimo that at least 17 Algerian corsair vessels and 18 French ones had departed for the "*marine di Senesi*."[67] Luca Martini also caught word that the incoming French force could number as many as 22 galleys, 3 *galeotte*, and at least 1 *fregata*,[68] and weeks earlier, he had already noted that there were at least 11 corsair vessels around northern Corsica – dangerously close to Elba.[69] Agosto Spinola underscored that the French had established themselves at a fortress on Montecristo – an island in the Tuscan archipelago – and that at least 30 galleys with 1,600 infantry under Marshal Paul de Thermes neared Porto Ercole.[70] By 18 August, Henri issued further orders for Baccio Martelli, the Tuscan galley captain in his service, to move against "our enemies: the emperor, the duke of Florence, and the Genoese,"[71] but Martelli did not move on Porto Ercole until early October.[72]

In spite of the mounting French-Barbary threat from August into the autumn, Tuscany's and Siena's shores were relatively unprotected by Medici-Habsburg vessels. Cosimo's galleys had already returned to Livorno by 18 July,[73] but later that month, Luca Martini noted that they were unavailable to further supply Elba with flour and other foodstuffs.[74] This was likely related to the Genoese-led Spanish-Habsburg military buildup in Naples he alluded to on 1 August.[75] After readying the ducal galleys under Don Garcia de Toledo's direction, Lorenzo Scala's correspondence from 31 July confirmed that, indeed, Cosimo's vessels had joined this convoy – which by that day had

[67] ASF MP 432 f. 500-501.
[68] ASF MP 432 f. 447, 9 August 1554.
[69] ASF MP 431 f. 822-823, 29 July 1554; f. 856, 30 July 1554. At least 7 of these corsair vessels patrolled near La Spezia, the Genoese-Florentine borderlands.
[70] ASF MM 538 f. 45, 5 August 1554.
[71] ASF Filze Martelli 209 ins. 10 f. 197 and ins. 12 f. 194-195, 18 August 1554.
[72] ASF MP 434 f. 593, 4 October 1554, Adamo Centurione to Cosimo.
[73] ASF MP 431 f. 368.
[74] ASF MP 431 f. 540, 21 July 1554; f. 785, 28 July 1554.
[75] ASF MP 432 f. 2-3.

reached Messina.[76] While the ducal galleys transported troops and other war materiel on Spain's behalf in Naples and Sicily,[77] Scala also conducted business matters to acquire victuals and provisions for the galleys and perhaps also for the stores at Cosimo's coastal fortresses. These transactions involved agents from the Capponi and Biffoli families as well as Giovanni Corsi – Florentines who had established themselves in Naples.[78] Even though the French military presence near Porto Ercole continued to grow over the course of August into September, Cosimo's galleys still worked alongside the Genoese in southern Italy until at least late September.[79] This speaks to the perceived importance of the Neapolitan front in the Habsburg-Genoese-Medici war effort at that moment and to the limited offensive capabilities of the enemy fleet in the Tyrrhenian. Moreover, Cosimo's commitments to this endeavor further demonstrated his loyalty to the Habsburgs and sustained collaboration with the Genoese.

For both the combatants and the non-combatants, 1554 had already proven itself a challenging and trying year. That autumn marked the start of the darkest hours for Siena's population. The city had been unable – or unwisely missed the opportunity – to replenish its stores while the imperial and Valois forces were preoccupied with the Tuscan campaign. Strozzi's last significant restocking occurred on 18 September, and supplies quickly began to dwindle.[80] This was a trying time, but there was still more fighting and work to do. By 11 October, Doria led the galleys – carrying German and Spanish troops – towards the Siena front where they would "vigorously increase" Cosimo's available

[76] ASF MP 433 f. 103, 20 July 1554; f. 335, 31 July 1554.
[77] For example, see ASF MP 2077 f. 10, 3 August 1554; f. 12, 14 August 1554.
[78] ASF MP 433 f. 381-382, 392-393, 8-10 August 1554. See also ASF MP 2078 f. 6 and 8, 1 August 1554; f. 10.
[79] ASF MP 433 f. 660, 23 September 1554, Lorenzo Scala from Naples.
[80] Pepper and Adams. *Firearms & Fortifications*, 130. By 21 September 1554, there was also a bread shortage in Florence. See: Coppi, ed. *Cronaca Fiorentina*, 166.

forces.[81] Around this same moment, Luca Martini assessed some of the available artillery, munitions, and victuals for the upcoming campaign in the Maremma.[82] Again speaking to the amphibious nature of this operation, Martini was tasked with overseeing the galleys as well as providing adequate logistics for the land campaign.

As the duke of Florence's scouts assessed the military situation and fortifications – especially at Porto Ercole – Piero Strozzi took all available cavalry in Montalcino and Valdichiana and traveled overland to the Maremma on 16 October. Two days later, he arrived at Grosseto where he remained through November while his troops manned Porto Ercole. That same month, Habsburg-aligned Carlo Gonzaga ordered his Maremma forces to move against Porto Ercole and Talamone. Cosimo had explicitly commanded that Talamone be destroyed, but these troops merely took the tower and halted operations. Such negligence meant that this coastal holding could easily be retaken and used again by the Valois forces – which did happen shortly thereafter.[83]

Likely alluding to the aforementioned deal between Cosimo and the Genoese, Adamo Centurione wrote the duke on 31 October that he "want[ed] to continue everything that [could] bring [Cosimo] such service and satisfaction" regarding the galleys.[84] Living up to this claim, he confirmed that 12 Doria galleys were en route to Livorno.[85] Yet, Gian Andrea Doria's frustrating performance was strikingly juxtaposed against Centurione's aspirations. The young Genoese commander and Bernardino di Mendoza did not blockade Porto Ercole as Cosimo had hoped. So, just like at Talamone,

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[81] ASF MP 434 f. 681, Adamo Centurione to Cosimo. Lorenzo Scala notes that Cosimo's galleys were near Rome by 1 October, ASF MP 434 f. 564-565.
[82] ASF MP 435 f. 138-139, 15 October 1554.
[83] Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena,* 342-343. See also Pepper and Adams. *Firearms & Fortifications*, 145-146.
[84] ASF MP 435 f. 380. "*Quanto spetta al particular di douer solicitor col s^r^ Princ^e^ l'andata delle galee gia sa v.ecc^za^ eßendole io tanto ser^ze^ desidero di continouo ogni cosa c[he] poßa apportarle servigio et satisfattione* […]"
[85] ASF MP 436 f. 120, 8 November 1554.

nothing could be achieved there either.[86] Furthermore, the duke of Florence had made every effort to provide adequate artillery and munitions to drive the French from Porto Ercole; gathered these armaments at Portoferraio; and loaded them on his galleys. When Cosimo requested that Doria send galleys to escort this force, however, the Genoese commander refused, citing the fatigue of his rowers.[87] By the end of the month, Luca Martini noted that another 25 Genoese galleys were headed towards southern Italy ("*mezzo giorno*") but would be stopping in Livorno. According to him, such services had been included in the negotiations with the Genoese.[88] Indeed, by the end of the year, Adamo Centurione and Luca Martini all but explicitly stated that there had been some sort of agreement (i.e. a contract) made between the duke of Florence and the Genoese naval patriciate. Nevertheless, based on the tension between Cosimo and Gian Andrea Doria, many details regarding the duties and obligations related thereto needed to be clarified.

To further add to Cosimo's concerns, the French had not only reclaimed Talamone but had also undertaken more fortification projects at Porto Ercole. Additionally, on 12 November 1554, Jacopo de Medici wrote from Campriano that "our galleys have fought with those of the French,"[89] and it must have seemed that opportunities to gain 'ground' in the Sienese waters had vanished. Yet, the duke's Genoese partners assured him that he did not need to worry. On 23 November, Adamo Centurione indicated that Strozzi had dispatched a *fregata* from Porto Ercole that had summoned 16 French galleys to the region,[90] but the vessels under "*il Paulino*" – who had finally returned to action – were only slowly preparing for their mission to Porto

[86] Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena,* 342-343.
[87] Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 45.
[88] ASF MP 436 f. 365, 23 November 1554. "*le incluse douerranno eser' per tal negozio*"
[89] "Codice di Lettere Originali del Duca Cosimo." Transcribed in Cantini. *Vita di Cosimo*, 588, document N LVI.
[90] ASF MP 436 f. 368.

Ercole.[91] Moreover, he added that the Genoese force of 37 galleys – including Cosimo's warships – would make Henri think twice about deploying this squadron.[92] Even by 27 December, Centurione confidently stated that the French "did not have people […] nor provisions [for their 30 galleys] to be able to go out."[93]

Moreover, Medici forces continued to advance on land. Crevole, the last French holding between Siena and Montalcino, had fallen. 30,000 troops now encircled Siena's walls, and the remnants of Piero Strozzi's cavalry had established a last-ditch defense at Grosseto and Porto Ercole. The Valois *lieutenant-général* planned on taking these as his personal conquests, and this move seemingly abandoned Siena to her fate.[94] As winter approached, Monluc's forces in Siena numbered 2,800 infantry and 300 cavalry.[95] The siege and the war continued – even if they had undergone a brief respite into late 1554.

Towards another year of war: potential problems (c. December 1554 – March 1555)

Near the end of 1554, the acting regent of Spain, the emperor's daughter Juana de Austria, expressed fears that the "armada of the Turk that Dragut is in charge of has already been [spotted] in Preveza [and] that it is a sign of planning to winter there [so that he can] do damage to the coasts of his majesty."[96] Even though the Habsburg allies had avoided the sultan's fleet in 1554, the Ottomans were a constant concern. The Venetian *bail* (Domenico Trevisano) noted that Süleyman could easily arm up to 130 galleys and adequately provide for his arsenals. Additionally, as Juana mentioned, Trevisano confirmed that the sultan had moved his forward base of operations from Negroponte to

[91] ASF MP 436 f. 466, 24 (29?) November 1554. "*che quelle galee si andauano_ acconciando però lentamente*"
[92] ASF MP 436 f. 484, 30 November 1554.
[93] ASF MP 436 f. 984-985.
[94] Mallett and Shaw. *The Italian Wars,* 263.
[95] Martines. *Furies*, 108-109. Duke Ercole II d'Este had offered to mediate between the French and the Medici at Pope Julius's request. See Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena,* 348.
[96] ADP Bancone 65 No. 1, Letter from to Juan Vazques de Molina 22 November 1554. Transcribed in Vargas-Hidalgo. *Guerra y Diplomacia*, 12-13.

Preveza – from the Aegean to the Ionian Sea. Yet, much like Centurione's intelligence on the French, the *bailo* observed several administrative and logistical issues. In spite of all of these complications, however, he still feared that the sultan had the resources and manpower to assemble an armada the like of which "has never been seen to have come out of Constantinople before… which one could reasonably fear, containing a great abundance of practical (skilled) people of the sea."[97]

Trevisano concluded that since the sultan had already provided his services to the king of France, he expected that Henri would request the Ottoman fleet again for the upcoming 1555 campaign season. The *bailo* feared that a massive Franco-'Turkish' armada would terrorize Italy and carry off "prey of possessions and souls, which they easily do in many places…" Concerning the sultan's existing fleet, he counted 30 older galleys that needed serious refitting, 16 new galleys, and around 114 nearing completion. He also caught word of several others in Algiers.[98] As made evident by the cooperation with Salah Reis in 1554, the French had also discovered that the corsairs alone could counterbalance the Habsburg-allied forces. The Genoese expressed their concern to Charles V that Franco-Algerian fleets would certainly overwhelm them.[99] Cosimo, Genoa, and the Habsburgs had greatly benefitted from the Ottoman absence in 1554. They could only pray they would be lucky again in 1555.

Not wanting to leave everything to fate, preparations for the next year were underway. Both the Valois and Habsburg allies spent the winter anticipating another

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[97] "Relazione dell'Impero Ottoman del Clarissimo, Domenico Trevisano […]," in Eugenio Alberi. *Relazioni degli Ambasciatori Veneti al Senato Raccolte, Annotate ed Edite*. Serie III Volume I. (Florence, 1840), 135-149.
[98] Ibid., 143. Trevisano hoped that the rivalry between Rustan and Sinan Pasha against Dragut would prevent the corsair from inflicting any serious damage. See p. 142.
[99] Rodriguez-Salgado. *The Changing Face of Empire*, 262. See also the citation in note 23: R. Ciasca, ed. *Istruzione e relazioni degli ambasciatori genovesi*. Volume 1, Spagna, 1494-1617. (Rome, 1951), 145.

campaign in Tuscany and Corsica.[100] In hopes of maintaining some sort of sustenance, on 20 December 1554, Piero Strozzi confirmed an exclusive contract that all of Siena – including the city itself and especially the Maremma – would purchase wine from Corsica. Moreover, nothing was to be sold to anyone affiliated with the emperor.[101] However, relying on Corsica provided yet another example of Strozzi's ill-placed hopes. Even though ousting the French was a years-long process, Genoa had recaptured most of the island by late 1554.[102] With Corsica more or less in Genoese hands, there were theoretically more troops and specialists available for the campaign on the Italian mainland. For example, when numbers of Medici gunners ran short during the late fall and winter of 1554, Cosimo was advised to 'recruit' all available experts from the papal fortresses, Ancona, and Doria's galleys.[103] This created disagreements related to jurisdiction and rank among other issues – a mirror-image of the situation among the Habsburgs themselves over 1554.

Taking into account the issues between himself and his brother Ferdinand, Charles V had determined that a marriage between his son Philip and Mary Tudor of England would place Philip in a prime geographic position to oversee both Spain and the Netherlands – regardless of his status in the Holy Roman Empire.[104] To commemorate Philip's marriage to Mary on 24 July, Charles had publicly transferred both Milan and Naples to him. The emperor had also already moved towards appointing Philip to an imperial vicariate over Siena in May 1554. The Habsburg prince considered the region as

[100] Roncière. *Histoire* Volume 3, 528.
[101] Transcribed in Trucchi. *Vita e Gesta di Piero Strozzi*, 220.
[102] Mallett and Shaw. *The Italian Wars,* 268.
[103] Pepper and Adams. *Firearms & Fortifications*, 132.
[104] Parker. *Imprudent King*, 43. Considering his son's authority over Italy and the Netherlands, Charles had entered into tense debates with his brother Ferdinand over Philip's status. Charles insisted that Philip – not Ferdinand's son Maximilian - should be the successor to the imperial throne. As this squabbling carried on, their sister Mary of Hungary interceded. Although the two branches of the family would eventually work out an arrangement, the Habsburgs were clearly not a monolithic unit. See p. 39.

his domain – not imperial and certainly not Medici.[105] Yet, under a constant ebb and flow of orders regarding the Netherlands, Philip was still concerned that his father was not focusing enough on the Mediterranean. He feared that Genoa and others in Italy could become more inclined to shelter under the Valois mantle. Philip told his father in November 1554 that Siena was "the most important and most direct route leading the French king to the kingdom of Naples, and therefore [seen] as the bulwark for its defense."[106]

Unlike his son, however, Charles held no delusions about dynastic claims over Siena. This was only 'his' possession by imperial precedent and military force. Essentially, their argument regarding Siena boiled down to Charles's willingness to sacrifice this holding in central Italy in order to defend the wider empire versus Philip's insistence that Corsica and especially Siena would only open the door to further losses and eventually a fragmentation of the Habsburg empire. As the new king of Naples, Philip ended up arguing with his father about who had primacy to order troops and money towards the Siena campaign – much like the previous year. Charles also insisted that Siena should remain an imperial holding whereas his son envisioned an independent republic. By December 1554, Charles yielded to his son on both issues.[107] Titles had been granted, but the sovereignty issue over Siena – not to mention the war – was far from over.

By the new year, it was also clear that Pope Julius III's health was failing. Still, he strove to pave the path to peace in Siena by writing to Cosimo and other leaders in January 1555. He urged the duke to sway Charles V's representatives (Don Juan

[105] Mallett and Shaw. *The Italian Wars,* 264-266.
[106] Rodriguez-Salgado. *The Changing Face of Empire*, 94, 112-113. Philip's view on Siena is cited in note 36 on p. 113: AGS EST LEG 808 f. 54, to Charles, 16 November 1554.
[107] Rodriguez-Salgado. *The Changing Face of Empire*, 115.

Manrique and Don Francesco de Toledo) to abide by his solution. The Holy Father suggested that he would offer 10,000 troops and that the duke of Urbino would recruit another 10,000 from his state and the Romagna to occupy Siena. In return, both Charles and Henri would immediately remove their forces. Obviously, considering his aims in acquiring the region – and especially given all of the manpower and resources he had already committed towards this endeavor – Cosimo was not keen on this idea. Maintaining his course to bring peace and stability, Julius also beckoned Queen Mary of England and the Reichstag at Augsburg to return their realms to the 'true faith.' He hoped to consolidate all of Europe under Rome's leadership and bolster her against Süleyman's armada and armies. Julius's health worsened, and he passed away on 23 March. The pope left behind many unresolved matters: a significantly diminished papal treasury; loss in the War of Parma; failure to solve the Siena crisis; frequent Ottoman and Barbary incursions into Italy; and Habsburg-Valois factions that segmented Europe and the church's own college of cardinals – not to mention the ongoing religious divisions.[108]

Among these problems, the War of Siena raged on. With his eyes on Grosseto and Porto Ercole, Piero Strozzi had moved most of his forces to Montalcino. Even though Henri II's war effort was increasingly focused on Piedmont, he was still maintaining 5,000 infantry and a few hundred cavalry in the city of Siena and the surrounding area. Seeking to free up these troops for other campaigns, the French ambassadors in Rome urged the Sienese to work with Charles V's agents. In hopes of opening negotiations with the city leadership, Cosimo also personally wrote expressing his interest in reaching a settlement – which manifested in secret parleys by 10 March.[109] In addition to his own ambitions over the region, the duke was motivated to end the conflict due to the

[108] Setton *The Papacy and the Levant* Volume IV, 602-605.
[109] Mallett and Shaw. *The Italian Wars,* 263. See also Martines. *Furies*, 109.

challenges he encountered in sustaining the war. Chief among them, the supply lines from Florence to Siena already took 5 or 6 days to traverse without accounting for weather or other mishaps.[110]

With the aim of hindering Valois logistics, 28 galleys under Gian Andrea Doria and 14 Neapolitan galleys with 2,000 Spanish troops sailed to Elba to blockade the Piombino channel and break the French supply train.[111] Feeling the pressure of the young Doria's blockade, Piero Strozzi ordered his 3 galleys that guarded Porto Ercole to stop all commercial vessels and buy their food. A small victory for Cosimo, one Florentine grain ship managed to slip by Strozzi's 'blockade' by flying the colors of Baccio Martelli. On the Corsican front, Andrea Doria's galleys reinforced Agostino Spinola's forces at Calvi and other places on the island. Meanwhile, Marshal Thermes also received logistical support from Le Paulin's 28 galleys which left Toulon in early March and disembarked 7 of Giordano Orsini's companies at Ajaccio – the French base of operations on Corsica. After convoying these reinforcements, Le Paulin had planned to move onto the Maremma. Yet instead of facing Gian Andrea's fleet as anticipated, he ultimately decided to focus on the campaign over Calvi.[112] Meanwhile in Siena, the grip of the blockade tightened on the besieged city.

Siena surrenders: the end of the beginning (April – June 1555)

By cutting off the troops, the Medici-Habsburg forces had also cut off the civilians. Between escape attempts, disease, and starvation, Siena's 40,000 inhabitants had dwindled down to 6,000.[113] Moreover, the 20 or so miles surrounding the city were

[110] Martines. *Furies,* 111.
[111] Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena,*384-385.
[112] Roncière. *Histoire* Volume 3, 528-529.
[113] Caciagli. *Stato dei Presidi*, 39.

completely ravaged.[114] Outside of Siena, Strozzi counted 4,620 troops that he needed to feed.[115] His reckoning did not account for the exponentially larger number of inhabitants that had endured constant marauding at the hands of Medici, Habsburg, Valois, and Ottoman troops and Barbary corsairs for at least two years. Affairs in the city grew worse by the day, and by early April, Cosimo's commander (Marignano) secretly allowed imperial and Florentine rebels to escape from Siena with an escort of French troops.[116] Over the next few weeks, Cosimo concluded his terms with Siena under the guise that he had imperial authority to do so – which of course he did not. In short, they agreed that everyone except blatant rebels against the Habsburgs or Medici would be pardoned. The republic would fall under Charles V's protection, and even though it would be free, the emperor could reform the government. The city itself would have to accept a garrison of whatever the emperor saw fit, but he – not their taxes – would pay for it. Furthermore, a fortress would not be built without the citizens' consent. The French were to leave no later than 22 April, and Cosimo's troops would occupy the city until Charles could assess the situation.[117] After nearly 8 months of agonizing siege, Siena capitulated on 21 April 1555, and on that day, 242 noblemen and their families along with 435 armed citizens, their families, and servants left for Montalcino. During this interim period, Cosimo set a garrison of Spanish and German troops under Conte Sforza di Santa Fiora.[118] The duke had – in many respects single-handedly – negotiated a truce 'on the emperor's behalf.'

Even with the city now in Medici and imperial hands, the War of Siena was far from over. Military endeavors in Val d'Orcia – just outside Montalcino – and the

[114] Martines. *Furies,* 111-112. Cosimo observed that starvation and the war had killed at least 10,000 people.
[115] Roncière. *Histoire* Volume 3, 528.
[116] Martines. *Furies,* 109. The Sienese exiles that went with the French to Montalcino were mostly from the Monte del Popolo. See Cantagalli. "La Guerra di Siena" in Rombai, ed. *I Medici e lo Stato Senese*, 17.
[117] Mallett and Shaw. *The Italian Wars,* 263.
[118] Cantagalli. "La Guerra di Siena" in Rombai, ed. *I Medici e lo Stato Senese,* 17. See also Martines. *Furies,* 109; and Mallett and Shaw. *The Italian Wars,* 263-264.

Maremma continued to be waged by Valois and Sienese guerrilla forces instead of formal armies.[119] Moreover, there were other concerns on the horizon. On 23 March 1555 – the day of Julius III's death – the Venetian *bailio* in Constantinople had warned that 60 or 70 galleys were being armed under Dragut or another Ottoman admiral. They merely awaited oarsmen from across Anatolia before embarking on what was sure to be a massive campaign. Another *avvisi* from 8 April warned the same but also mentioned that the sultan was distracted by affairs in Persia among other issues.[120] Even though Cosimo had quelled the city of Siena itself, an Ottoman armada and continued warfare in southern Siena and along the coast consumed the rest of 1555.

Additionally, there still remained the issue of ruling Siena. Given all of the money and manpower devoted to this conflict, the duke of Florence expected that he would receive the entire territory as compensation. With hopes of leveraging the situation in his favor, Cosimo had also withheld his logistical support from the Habsburg forces in Siena and demanded to be promptly reimbursed for two years of intense warfare – which amounted to something around 1,200,000 *scudi*. Philip, on the other hand, wished to leave the sovereignty issue open and requested that his father finalize his proposed investiture as an imperial vicar of Siena in May 1555. Moreover, this was the first year that Philip could act as king of Naples and duke of Milan, and he now considered these Italian matters under his jurisdiction – not his father's. Philip initially chose Fernando de Toledo (the duke of Alba) to oversee the Siena negotiations. Given his years of loyal Habsburg service and familial ties to Cosimo's wife Eleanor, all parties could agree that Alba was an acceptable intermediary on this issue. For their part, the dukes of Florence and Alba worked very hard to relieve Charles's concerns regarding the capitulation

[119] Cantagalli. "La Guerra di Siena" in Rombai, ed. *I Medici e lo Stato Senese,* 17.
[120] Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Lettere di principi vol. XV, f. 162 and 224 transcribed and translated in Setton *The Papacy and the Levant* Volume IV, 622-623 and notes.

agreement over the course of May 1555. As these discussions continued, Cosimo also sent Angelo (Agnolo) Niccolini on 23 May to influence things in Siena as he wished. When presented with Cosimo's original terms, Alba was given two royal letters – one accepting and one renouncing them. It was his responsibility to choose a course and to eventually settle the matter between the duke of Florence and the Habsburgs regarding Siena. Even though his final decision already emerged by June 1555, it was only after personally discussing the matter with Cosimo in July that Alba accepted the terms. According to his finalized negotiations, he would offer the duke's original terms, but the Sienese would request Charles to annul them and appoint an imperial vicariate over Siena (i.e. Philip) who could grant it in fief to an appropriate vassal (i.e. Cosimo). After hearing this arrangement, the emperor and his advisors in Brussels figured it was best to cede Siena to Cosimo to place the expenses and "headaches" on him. Charles V agreed to this settlement, but after consulting his sister Mary of Hungary, he appointed Francesco de Toledo as a temporary governor of Siena – without discussing the matter with Philip or Cosimo.[121] Similar debates and overlapping jurisdictions would continue over the next few years.

Another major ongoing discussion around this same time involved the election of Pope Julius III's successor. After the immediate succession of the short-lived Pope Marcellus II, another conclave was summoned on 15 May 1555. Two factions quickly emerged: the imperialist-Spanish party under Guido Ascanio Sforza and Cristoforo Madruzzo and the French-Farnese party under Alessandro Farnese. After much Habsburg opposition, Cardinal Giovanni Pietro Carafa – Pope Paul III Farnese's protégé and hostile

[121] Mallett and Shaw. *The Italian Wars,* 264-265. See also: Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena,* 409, 429, 441; Rodriguez-Salgado. *The Changing Face of Empire*, 116-117; and Caciagli. *Stato dei Presidi*, 41. Regarding the complexities of the negotiations between Cosimo, Siena, and their reception by Charles V, see Elena Fasano Guarini. "Le istituzioni di Siena e del suo Stato nel Ducato Mediceo" in Rombai, ed. *I Medici e lo Stato Senese*, 49-62. These issues are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.

opponent to Habsburg-Toledo Naples since at least 1549 – was elected as the new pope. He assumed the name Paul IV in Paul III's honor and was crowned on 26 May.[122] Like his namesake, Paul IV would prove a major obstacle to both the Habsburgs and to Cosimo. Weeks after his election, Paul's nephew, the 36-year-old Don Carlo Carafa – who had been a soldier under Strozzi both in Parma and Siena – was named a cardinal with charge over Bologna. Cardinal Carlo Carafa would play a key role in instigating hostilities between the Habsburgs and the Valois the following year. Paul IV also secured the release of another nephew, Giovanni Carafa, the count of Montorio, from Duke Cosimo after he was captured at Porto Ercole in the battle that had ensued there.[123] Aside from the Siena investiture issue and this new pope – who sent a shockwave through Cosimo's and the Habsburg's plans[124] – the developing military situation both in southern Siena and across the Mediterranean demanded immediate attention.

Cosimo's galleys in the amphibious & naval war for Siena's coast (May – June 1555)

With Siena's official surrender only weeks earlier, the Maremma campaign began on 11 May when Habsburg and Medici forces occupied many locations.[125] As this land operation ensued, there were simultaneous amphibious missions brewing both along the Maremma coast – namely at Porto Ercole – and on Corsica. Around this same time, Blaise de Monluc – who had embarked from Siena to Civitavecchia – learned that 52 imperial galleys and 4,000 infantry had just left Piombino to recapture Calvi which had fallen once again to the French. Not wanting to risk their fleet in the face of this massive

[122] Setton *The Papacy and the Levant* Volume IV, 617, 620-621, 625 and notes.
[123] Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena*, 444- 445. Regarding the Carafa-Toledo rivalry, see also C.J. Hernando Sanchez. "Naples and Florence in Charles V's Italy […]," in Thomas Dandelet and John A. Marino, eds. *Spain in Italy* […]. (Leiden, 2006), 179.
[124] Capponi, ed. *Guerre D'Italia*, 131.
[125] Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena,* 433.

incoming armada, however, Marshal Thermes, Le Paulin, and 15 French galleys only escaped by throwing some of their artillery overboard.[126]

Weeks earlier – on Siena's official capitulation date, 22 April 1555 – and for reasons that remain unclear, Cosimo transferred command of his squadron of 5 galleys from Jacopo Appiani to Marco Centurione – son of the aforementioned Adamo. Part of Cosimo's reasoning might have included the fact that the Centurione had contributed significant sums of money towards the War of Siena – not to mention the Corsican campaign[127] – and that the Piombino issue kept rearing its ugly head. Thus, future tension between the young Appiani and the duke of Florence was almost guaranteed.[128] Marco Centurione had already personally written to Charles V regarding his new position on 28 March 1555 – which had clearly been in development for quite a while. Given the emperor's "*molto occupationi*" (*sic*) at the moment, Marco did not go into detail. Instead, he simply observed that "I am all the more willingly accommodated in [the duke of Florence's] service as I command the same fortune with your majesty."[129] In other words, the young man had found a new – presumably lucrative – opportunity, but considering Cosimo's alignment with the Habsburgs, Centurione ultimately remained a servant of the emperor. By announcing this appointment to Charles V and making it 'official' a month later, Marco and Cosimo had quelled any suspicions of a 'secret alliance' between Genoa and Florence. Moreover, as discussed above, the duke and the Genoese – specifically the Centurione – had clearly made some sort of arrangement involving the Medici galleys

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[126] Roncière. *Histoire* Volume 3, 529-530. After gathering this intelligence, Monluc embarked for Marseille on 6 May, and 14 of Doria's galleys pursued him. They closed in within arquebus-firing range; however, the French galley managed to gain some speed. The Genoese abandoned the chase.
[127] Ildefonso Pulido Bueno, *El gran mercader y la corte real del Renacimiento* […]. (Huelva, Spain, 2004), 210.
[128] Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 45-46.
[129] AGS EST LEG 1384 f. 181 accessible online via PARES portal de archivos Españoles, reference code: ES.47161.AGS//EST,LEG,1384,181. "*io mi sono accomodato tanto piu volentieri al suo seruigio quanto comendo egli uno medesima fortuna con la M^ta V*"

and ports dating back to at least 1554. In many respects, Marco Centurione's new position merely recognized what was already the case in practice.

As the ducal galleys were presented to Marco Centurione, Giovanni Conti dal Bucine inventoried each one – including their convict and slave rowers. The record's concluding remarks specified that Centurione was given "*instrumento attualmente consegnato il possesso*" (consigned ownership) over these warships. Luca Martini maintained his position as *general provveditore d'esse galere* and Lorenzo Scala was designated *general scriviano* (i.e. Martini's administrative assistant). These notes also named the aforementioned Gianvasques "*nobile Spagnuolo*" as commander over Cosimo's 5 galleys –the *San Giovanni Battista* (the *capitana*), *Fiorenza*, *Toscana*, *Pisana* (the *padrona*), and the *San Giovanni*.[130] Considering what Cosimo had already achieved over the past decade or so, some individuals in Venice and Genoa were both impressed and concerned by the Medici navy and its potential to "threaten their positions in the hierarchy of Christian fleets in the Mediterranean."[131] Indeed, although a small squadron, Cosimo's warships were well-armed and in expert hands – especially Luca Martini's and Marco Centurione's.

Centurione was a graduate of the "*scuola del Doria*" and understood well that each galley represented a significant investment of both raw and military resources as well as manpower. Unsurprisingly, his supervision – and eventually Gian Andrea Doria's too – meant that Cosimo's galleys emulated Genoese practices. In recognition of his appointment, Centurione reserved the right to change sailors and captains as well as

[130] ASF MP 627 f. 61. This entire 627 volume is dedicated to the 1555 galley inventory. See also commentary in Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 45-46. Among the armaments noted in Bucine's account, the *San Giovanni*'s three main pieces were French guns from the aforementioned wreck near the island of Pianosa in early 1554. See: Capponi. "Guns and Profit," 62. Capponi cites: ASF MP 29 f. 357r, Cosimo to Averardo Serristori, 12 March 1553 (1554).

[131] Marco Gemignani. "The Navies of the Medici […]," in John B. Hattendorf and Richard W. Unger, eds. *War at Sea in the Middle Ages and Renaissance*. (Woodbridge, England, 2002), 172.

adjust the numbers of crewmen. Many of these sailors were Genoese, Sicilians, Venetians, Corsicans, Greeks, and other renegades – including some Marseillais. Records of men serving aboard one of Cosimo's *galleota* include Filippo da Messina, Chostantino Grecho, Masino da Monte Carlo, Fran[cesco] di Levantto; Batista Genovesse, Giovanni di Milio Grecho, Batista di Guifreda da Napoli, Andrea di Bernardino da Ghaetta, Giovanni da Mesina, Antonio del Moro, and Batista Turcho just to name a few.[132] Yet, acquiring such diversified talent – Genoese, Neapolitans, Sicilians, Monacans, 'Moors', 'Turks', Greeks, and other Levantines – remained a challenge. For example, in order to gain employment with a potential enemy of their state, Venetians used the excuse of "a pilgrimage to Loreto" to reach Livorno and become gunners and captains. Insofar as Cosimo wished to cast his own artillery, there remained stiff competition to recruit the best gun-casters – especially Venetians – from among the Italian states. To acquire supplemental rowers, the duke relied on a monk with connections on Chios, Cyprus, and other places in the Levant to provide many Greek oarsmen on the condition that they could practice their Greek Orthodox faith. Regardless of their origin, most of these men were experts in the truest sense.[133]

Almost immediately after assuming office, Marco Centurione and at least 4 of the Medici galleys joined the Spanish vessels under Don Bernardino di Mendoza for the abovementioned campaign off of Siena's coast.[134] Luca Martini had prepared Centurione for this mission,[135] and he had also provided at least 6 *cannoni* with ammunition to Gian

[132] ASF MP 2077 ins. 1 f. 70-73, 26 October 1553 – 26 October 1555.
[133] Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 48-49. See also Capponi. "Guns and Profit," 61-62; and Cecily Booth. *Cosimo I, Duke of Florence*. (Cambridge, 1921), 248. Booth does not specify the name of the monk who provided Cosimo's leads for acquiring Greek rowers. According to Manfroni, some of these hired men – at all levels – were petty criminals who were keen on looting and lining their pockets. Although there were exceptions, even some captains schemed ways to keep their position by reducing rations and using other 'shortcuts' to save money.
[134] Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena,* 385.
[135] ASF MP 446 f. 318, 14 May 1555.

Andrea Doria's galleys. Foreseeing a likely attack on the Tuscan-Sienese coast that summer, he had also sent some artillery pieces from Livorno to Piombino and assessed the defenses and stores available at Pisa.[136] He later noted that some of the grain had arrived from the Levant vis-à-vis the Capponi[137] – presumably the same Capponi that Lorenzo Scala had negotiated with in 1554.

In addition to readying the galleys and Cosimo's fortresses, Martini was also responsible for supplying the Spanish holding at Orbetello with victuals and munitions.[138] The continued fighting in Siena was truly an amphibious campaign. Even though Martini's official title gave him authority over the galleys, these operations alone demonstrate that his responsibilities extended far beyond readying Cosimo's 5 warships – or even exclusively the duke's own fortresses. Especially considering his contributions towards arming Doria's galleys and supplying the Spanish at Orbetello, Martini was clearly acting on behalf of the larger Habsburg war effort. Although Cosimo's ambitions often deviated from the Habsburgs' wishes, at this moment, they shared the same concerns.

As had been the case in Dragut's campaign in 1553, the duke and the Habsburg allies still feared the possibility of continued raids conducted by massive corsair fleets along their coastlines. Holdings like Porto Ercole provided the French – and their Ottoman and Barbary allies – with a potential base to launch more frequent attacks. In coordination with Doria's fleet, Cosimo's army under the marchese di Marignano besieged Porto Ercole to deprive their enemy from using this harbor to supply their remaining troops in the region and maintaining a foothold for future campaigns.[139]

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[136] ASF MP 446 f. 218, 10 May 1555.
[137] ASF MP 446 f. 277-278, 13 May 1555.
[138] ASF MP 446 f. 277-278. Orbetello had been placed under an Alessandro de Medici. See: f. 228; 229-231; 307-308; and ASF MP 447 f. 164-165; 169.
[139] Mallett and Shaw. *The Italian Wars,* 266.

Having taken several places in the Maremma during mid-May, the Medici-Habsburg forces in Siena moved towards the coast. In addition to targeting Talamone, Castiglione della Pescaia, Scarlino, and Gavorrano,[140] they moved on Porto Ercole by 25 May. Along the treacherous march across this rugged landscape, the ducal galleys provided the troops with logistical support near Orbetello. Additionally, a further 38 Doria galleys had returned from Corsica and were anchored in nearby Porto Santo Stefano. As this operation was underway, all feared the rumors of a large, incoming 'Turkish' fleet – "*settanta* (70) *galere per uscire in fauor' deli francesi*"[141] – which would spell certain doom for their operation.[142]

On the ground, Cosimo's scouts determined that Porto Ercole's small hillside fort of Sant Ippolito was so well-defended that it could not be taken even after 20 days. With this intelligence, on 26 May, Chiappino Vitelli took 1,500 German and Spanish infantry over the forested, rocky landscape at the foot of Monte Argentario in a daring attempt to take this holding by storm. With ladders – and simultaneous assaults on the neighboring forts – the 150 garrisoned troops surrendered to Vitelli's troops. The Medici-Habsburg army camped behind Sant Ippolito, but given the rugged terrain and surrounding hostile fortifications, they completely relied on the galley fleet to deliver supplies. Additionally, they were vulnerable to enemy guns at Erculetto – a small island across the harbor. They also ran the risk of enduring naval bombardments from the French galleys – which were consistently resupplied at the papal port of Civitavecchia. Even though this garnered Pope Paul IV much criticism as a supposedly 'neutral' power, the fact that Gian Andrea Doria with up to 64 Genoese, 'Spanish,' and Medici galleys could not maintain adequate logistical support, protection, or an effective blockade earned the Genoese even more

[140] Caciagli. *Stato dei Presidi*, 53.
[141] ASF MP 447 f. 51, 10 April 1555. See also f. 52, 3 May 1555.
[142] Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena,* 433.

scornful criticism – especially from Marignano. Heavy rains only made matters worse. On the ground, it seemed that weather, fortresses, and galleys were working against the imperial forces.[143] As the Medici-Habsburg allies pressed on, however, Piero Strozzi arrived on 27 May to salvage a successful defense of Henri's last coastal position in Siena.[144]

By 2 June, 4 Medici galleys, 2 Doria galleys, a few skiffs, and 300 troops under Chiappino Vitelli made an assault on Erculetto – which fell after an hour of combat. All 100 troops in the garrison were either killed or drowned. This mission not only alleviated some of the forces already at Porto Ercole but also opened up the landing beach for more imperial troops to arrive.[145] With matters looking bleak for his troops, Piero Strozzi fled to Civitavecchia on his last galley– where he wrote a desperate letter for reinforcements – and eventually left for France. Before receiving this correspondence, Marshal Thermes had already prepared Baccio Martelli and a few other captains to embark for the summer campaign. Shortly after his arrival at this front, Baccio Martelli's galley easily slipped through Doria's surveillance,[146] and it may have very well been his galley that took Piero Strozzi to Civitavecchia. If so, Doria had missed an opportunity to capture one of Henri's principal actors on the Siena front.

By the early morning of 3 June, the Habsburg-Medici armada brought some artillery ashore, but all 4 pieces were in terrible condition with broken carriages and other defects; many of the pioneers were in bad physical condition; and Marignano determined that he needed more tools and time. By 7 June, there were 6 pieces of artillery ashore, but

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[143] Pepper and Adams. *Firearms & Fortifications,* 147-148.
[144] Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena,* 433. From the French perspective, holding Porto Ercole proved especially crucial since they had already lost Talamone again to Doria's and Mendoza's fleet. See: Roncière. *Histoire* Volume 3, 531.
[145] Pepper and Adams. *Firearms & Fortifications,* 148. See also Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena,* 434.
[146] Roncière. *Histoire* Volume 3, 531. See also Diaz. *Il Granducato*, 121; and Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena,*435.

most still lacked adequate carriages. Additionally, the arquebusiers were short of powder, lead, and match. Coupled with these logistical issues, Marignano emphasized that disaster would ensue should the rumored Ottoman fleet arrive.[147]

In spite of these obstacles and threats, the Habsburg-Medici troops pressed on. With help from Lorenzo Scala and Luca Martini, the bombardment of Stronco (one of Porto Ercole's six fortresses) commenced. By 4 June, Scala had reached Piombino from the battlefield where he relayed a list of provisions requested by Marignano.[148] Martini's notes indicate that he fulfilled Marignano's request during this critical moment when weapons and supplies were running low. Among other items, Martini provided the Medici-Habsburg forces with 2 additional *cannoni*; powder and shot for artillery and small arms; 50 pickaxes; and flour and wine "*in quantita*."[149] Marco Centurione also used this time to return the galleys to Livorno (*Legorno*) and Portoferraio ("*ferraro*") for supplies – especially to reinforce Orbetello. Judging by the Valois performance at Porto Ercole thus far, Centurione also observed that Piero Strozzi "does not behave in the manner of a very strong enemy."[150] Nevertheless, this important location was not yet under Habsburg-allied control.

By 8 June, the attackers had already suffered 125 killed and 500 wounded, but a German deserter indicated that the Valois losses had been higher. He also added that Piero Strozzi had already fled from Porto Ercole. With Strozzi absent, the German "Captain Colone" – with 310 troops – made a bargain with Marignano[151] and only

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[147] Pepper and Adams. *Firearms & Fortifications,* 148. Before accounting for any additional logistical hindrances, Marignano observed that he would need 40 days to take Porto Ercole. His men attempted to bring a large piece from Erculetto, but the rough terrain and a shortage of pioneers prevented this endeavor from succeeding.
[148] ASF MP 2078 f. 102. Scala wrote from Monte Argentario (i.e. Porto Ercole) on 1 June. See f. 99.
[149] ASF MP 447 f. 166. The *Carteggio Universale di Cosimo I* index dates this document to June 1555.
[150] ASF MP 447 f. 149-150, 6 June 1555. Centurione only mentions that these supplies were sent to Alessandro de Medici – he does not specify Orbetello.
[151] Called "Medichino" in the *Cronaca Fiorentina*.

pretended to fight to save face. The shelling on Stronco continued over the subsequent days, and the fortress fell on 12 June – again without true resistance.[152] Five more strongholds remained.

The Medici-Habsburg forces then moved on to the fortress of Avoltoio on the night of 14-15 June, and it fell two days later. With the two main holdings captured, the garrisons at Galera, Sant'Elmo, and Guasparino quickly surrendered, and the French garrison of 400 men in the nearby castle followed suit the next day. By 20 June, Marignano's men were demolishing the forts except for the one above Porto Ercole (Sant Ippolito) and Galera. The primary Franco-Sienese port was now in imperial hands. The neighboring villages fell like dominos: Capalbio, Castiglione della Pescaia, Scarlino, and Gavoranno.[153]

The loss of Porto Ercole disgraced Piero Strozzi in the French court. When he finally arrived in France in late June, he tried to gain an audience with the king for months but was ignored. Yet on the war front, the arrival of the sultan's armada was fearfully anticipated, so Gian Andrea Doria and 16 galleys brought 2,000 Spanish troops to Genoa, and the remaining vessels took 2,000 Germans to Gaeta by 8 July. On the Sienese coast, Chiappino Vitelli had occupied Capalbio, and by 22 June, his troops had destroyed the tower of Talamone and occupied Castiglione della Pescaia, Scarlino, and Gargano. Cosimo hoped to use his forces in Porto Ercole to move on the rest of the Maremma, but limited money and time prevented this.[154]

Instead, the ducal galleys returned to Livorno with captured Florentine rebels including members of the Salviati, De Nobili, and other families. At this moment, rumors were already spreading that Piali Pasha – the newly appointed Ottoman naval commander

[152] Coppi, ed. *Cronaca Fiorentina*, 190. See also Pepper and Adams. *Firearms & Fortifications,* 149.
[153] Pepper and Adams. *Firearms & Fortifications,* 149-150, 157.
[154] Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena,*435-437. See also Caciagli. *Stato dei Presidi*, 53

– would target Piombino and Portoferraio. Cosimo immediately deployed his unarmed galleys with reinforcements and provisions to support these threatened holdings. Chiappino Vitelli and Simeone Rossermini personally oversaw the Piombino and Portoferraio operations, and Marco Centurione occupied the island of Giglio with some of Vitelli's troops.[155] Before taking this island, however, Centurione ensured that he also prepared the Maremma coast and especially Elba and Piombino for the imminent attack.[156] By late June, the Ottomans had already reached Brindisi and Otranto on Italy's 'heel.'[157]

The Ottomans descend on Cosimo's realm (July - August 1555)

From the strait of Messina, Süleyman's armada under Piali Pasha and Dragut passed the Punta del Faro on Sicily's northwestern coast and sailed to Civitavecchia. They then moved towards Porto Santo Stefano in the Maremma and then Piombino.[158] By 11 July, 90 Ottoman galleys and 20 smaller vessels approached Piombino. With Cosimo's troops distracted with coastal defense, the remaining French in Siena were able to raid from their new base at Montalcino and recapture several inland locations. As the Ottoman fleet anchored off of Piombino's shores on the night of 12 July, Dragut sent 13 smaller boats to Porto Baratto near Populónia – just 5 miles north of Piombino – as a diversion. Meanwhile, he prepared to devote most of his forces towards capturing the main city.[159]

As they readied to move on this key port, the Ottomans looted at least 12 locations; captured Campiglia – about 8 miles east of Piombino; and burned many homes

[155] Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 49. Captured rebels also mentioned by Luca Martini: ASF MP 447 f. 653.
[156] ASF MP 447 f. 547, 26 June 1555. The French navy was also attempting to bolster their forces. The Saint-Blancard division of 4 galleys and a brigantine had embarked from Preveza to bring more reinforcements to the Sienese front, but they were intercepted by some Habsburg or Genoese vessels. Bad weather ultimately diverted them to the Sicilian strait where they encountered Piali Pasha and his fleet. See: Roncière. *Histoire* Volume 3, 532.
[157] ASF MP 446 f. 573, 27 June 1555.
[158] Setton *The Papacy and the Levant* Volume IV, 623.
[159] Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena,* 437-439.

at Baratti – near Populónia. At this point, a good number of Marignano's forces were scattered across the Sienese coastline, but Cosimo's armies were well-prepared for this invasion.[160] Given the situation, Dragut was aware of Camerini's updated fortifications at Piombino. What he did not know, however, was that Chiappino Vitelli and a few thousand imperial troops – which had been rushed from their success at Castiglione della Pescaia – awaited him there. As Dragut's decoy force raided by night, the inhabitants near Populónia took cover in the nearby fortress as their homes burned. Meanwhile, about 3,000 Janissaries landed near Santa Anastasia[161] and moved on Piombino itself. This landing coincided with another 2,000 Ottoman troops that landed about 11 miles east at Follónica to cut the coastal road from the south. As the Populónians held off their attackers for a few hours, the Medici cavalry under Gian Giacomo de Medici repelled this diversion force. As he moved on the city of Piombino, Dragut mistakenly assumed that many of the troops his men had already encountered were the sallying Piombino garrison. Thus, he expected a skeleton crew within the capital city. Instead, the corsair and the Janissaries confronted Chiappino Vitelli's force of 6,000 Italian and Spanish troops and German Landsknechts alongside Leone da Carpi's cavalry. As they fled to their ships, 400 of the corsair's troops – including the Janissary captain and some elite soldiers – fell in the fray. Many stragglers were taken prisoner. Meanwhile, the 2,000 'Turkish' troops near Follónica feared that another relief column was en route and fled. Combat near Piombino had lasted about 2 hours, and by 10 am on 12 July, the Ottomans embarked for

[160] Pepper and Adams. *Firearms & Fortifications,* 157; and Caciagli. *Stato dei Presidi*, 52.
[161] I have not managed to identify this specific location.

Elba where they undertook another 12-day raid.[162] Days later, Luca Martini dispatched a *fregata* to deliver relief supplies to Piombino.[163]

On Elba, Dragut and Piali Pasha awaited the French fleet at Porto Longone (Porto Azzurro) and began assaulting various communities across the island. Similar incursions had become common enough that the locals knew how to respond. They took whatever household goods they could carry and sought refuge in Portoferraio – the Medici Cosmopolis. Considering his previous experiences with the city, Dragut felt that it was too well-defended to take the risk of an assault.[164] Indeed, it was better protected than usual. Since Siena had surrendered earlier in the year, 1,000 troops under Luca Antonio Cuppano had been reallocated to re-garrison Portoferraio before the arrival of the sultan's armada.[165]

Yet, the invaders also received substantial reinforcements. By 17 July, the French fleet was seen moving to rescue Porto Ercole and to join the Ottoman-Barbary galleys. Two days later, at least some of the French and Dragut's vessels were spotted off the beaches of Pisa.[166] By 25 July, Henri II's 23-28 galleys rendezvoused with Dragut and Piali Pasha. Together, they now had between 12,000-15,000 troops.[167] Considering that the Ottoman-Barbary fleet numbered up to 90 galleys and 20 smaller vessels,[168] and the

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[162] Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena,* 439. See also Role. "The Naval bases," 125; Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 49; and Caciagli. *Stato dei Presidi,* 53. Role uses kilometers for distance: Populónia is 8 km north of Piombino, Campiglia is 13 km east, and Follónica is 17 km east.
[163] ASF MP 447 f. 720, 14 July 1555. See also f. 716, 14 July 1555.
[164] Setton *The Papacy and the Levant* Volume IV, 623; Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena,* 440; and Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 49.
[165] Role. "The Naval bases," 125. Role mentions that Cuppano's troops were ordered to Elba by a certain Gian Carlo Medici.
[166] Coppi, ed. *Cronaca Fiorentina*, 194-195.
[167] Role. "The Naval bases," 125; Setton *The Papacy and the Levant* Volume IV, 623; and Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena,* 440. Given that Dragut still had at least 2,500 Janissaries alone after the Piombino debacle in addition to at least another 2,000 troops that fled from Follónica – not to mention a certain number or reserves – the Ottoman-Valois forces must have been considerable.
[168] It is important to remember that the Sultan's fleet may have been a few vessels short by this time since some were damaged in the retreat from Piombino.

Valois galleys numbered at least 25, they formed a true armada of 135 vessels – mostly warships – concentrated on Cosimo's shores.

Even before the French arrival, such overwhelming numbers had prompted the duke of Florence to keep his galleys in port. Instead of waging war at sea, his sailors filled in ranks to defend Portoferraio among other coastal holdings.[169] As the enemy fleet blockaded the Medici harbor on Elba, one of Cosimo's captains, Angiolo Guicciardini, miraculously managed a nighttime run to Piombino to pick up small arms, munitions, a few hundred reinforcements, and 8 master gunners.[170] While Ottomans and French gathered off Elba's coast, many Genoese vessels were already in southern Italy to deploy troops at Gaeta. There, 30 galleys under Gian Andrea Doria combined with another 33 at Naples.[171] As the Habsburg allies began to deploy their forces on the southern and northwest Italian coasts – and Portoferraio still stood exceptionally strong – Dragut, Piali Pasha, and Henri's fleet abandoned Elba and moved on Corsica by 28 July.[172] Even though Cosimo's forces had pushed Dragut back at Piombino and sustained the assault on Elba, the thought of a Valois-Ottoman base so close to Tuscany would continue to haunt him in the years to come.[173] Especially considering the astronomical numbers of galleys and troops that had just appeared off his shores, Cosimo had every reason to suspect that they could very well focus on Tuscany or Siena again in the near future.

Fortunately for him, they had targeted Genoa this time. On 29 July, Marco Centurione noted that "*l'armata Turchesca*" had been spotted from the island of Capraia

[169] Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 50.
[170] Role. "The Naval bases," 125.
[171] Setton *The Papacy and the Levant* Volume IV, 623. Regarding the preparations at Genoa, see note 22 on p. 623 where Setton cites *ASV* Senato Secreta Reg. 69 f. 136 and other notes. In Liguria, Genoa had also deployed infantry to defend the coast at Savona and Arbenga (Albenga) as a precaution.
[172] Role. "The Naval bases," 125.
[173] Capponi, ed. *Guerre D'Italia*, 131.

headed towards Corsica.[174] After arriving in Livorno on 30 July, the duke's galleys embarked for Genoa to help in their defense.[175] By 10 August, the combined Valois-Ottoman armada joined forces near Corsica's Gulf of Saint Florent and deployed 3,000 troops on the shore to support Valois defenses at Calvi. The French had 20 galleys and the Ottoman-Barbary fleet still numbered 70 galleys and 24 galliots. Despite the fleet's impressive size, it may have proved a paper tiger. For their part, the French galleys were poorly supplied and armed. Additionally, constant threats to the French base of operations at Ajaccio imposed further obligations upon their logistically-stretched army. On top of these challenges, they had lost at least 300 troops in this endeavor and Le Paulin was wounded. Valois commander Giordano Orsini decided on a strategic retreat from Calvi and even proposed moving into one of Genoa's neighboring rivers to prevent more enemy reinforcements from trickling in. Instead, Orsini switched his focus on Bastia in the northeast on 18 August. Given Bastia's precarious landing beach, however, Dragut and Piali Pasha insisted that they would only provide supporting fire from the sea until a better beachhead was established. As little progress was made – and food ran low – Orsini abandoned this attack as well. Still, aside from Corsica, Piombino, and Elba, the Franco-Ottoman fleet had also raided Calabria, Messina, Porto Santo Stefano, and the Stromboli islands. If nothing else, this campaign demonstrated the huge numbers of troops and ships that Henri and Süleyman could bring into the western Mediterranean and particularly to Italy. Pope Paul IV observed that the Ottomans "know our homelands and our shores better than we do." Nevertheless, they had been unsuccessful overall. They had not used their large numbers to focus on the Maremma, Piombinio, Elba, or Corsica but had instead divided them. By 23 August, the French on Corsica retreated to Ajaccio

[174] ASF MP 449A f. 1002.
[175] ASF MP 449 f. 379.

and eventually to Marseilles. On that day, Marco Centurione wrote from Genoa that the Ottoman fleet had also withdrawn.[176] After pillaging parts of Sardinia, Piali Pasha's galleys began the voyage back to Constantinople. On 1 October, the Venetian *provveditore* of the galleys observed that "*l'armata Turchesca*" was returning to the Levant. However, many *fuste* were targeting the waters near Corfu.[177]

Even with the Ottomans gone from Corsica, Centurione emphasized that enemies could easily "perch on that island." Moreover, he declared that the Genoese-Habsburg defensive plans unwisely relied on Spain's galleys and the "*principe vecchio*" (Andrea Doria) who was 87 years old. He vowed that "for my part, I will not fail to appeal to the souls of those gentlemen who are already willing [to develop a sound strategy]."[178] Indeed, the larger strategic situation needed to be reconsidered. Together, Cosimo and Centurione hoped they would form part of the solution. Among these matters for reassessment, the North African corsairs had acquired captives and loot from this summer campaign.

Habsburg deliberation concerning North Africa (c. January – November 1555)

The Italian coast and Corsica had been saved, but Spanish intelligence indicated that Süleyman had ambitions of moving onto the Iberian Peninsula from North Africa. Moreover, French pirates already made frequent incursions along the Castilian coast and Andalucía endured constant Muslim corsair raids. The acting regent of Spain, Charles V's daughter and Philip II's sister Juana, had repeatedly appealed to her father and brother for guidance and permission to launch a campaign into the Maghreb. Charles and Philip

[176] ASF MP 448 f. 106, 23 August 1555. "*l'armata Turchesca ritrattenersi molto piu in questi Mare come V.Ecc^za*"
[177] Roncière. *Histoire* Volume 3, 533-535. See also Setton *The Papacy and the Levant (1204-1571)* Volume IV, 623-624 and notes; Pepper and Adams. *Firearms & Fortifications*, 157; Mallett and Shaw. *The Italian Wars*, 266, 268; Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena*, 440; Giorgio Spini. "The Medici Principality […]," in *Journal of Italian History*, no. 3, winter 1979, 429; and especially Rodriguez-Salgado. *The Changing Face of Empire*, 263 and note 25.
[178] ASF MP 448 f. 204, 29 August 1555.

realized that this proposition made sense from a purely Spanish perspective; however, both believed that the threat to Spain was more hypothetical than real. Philip personally wrote his sister to reassure her that he and his father sympathized, but especially considering pressing matters in Italy, they could not afford the distraction of the Maghreb at that moment. Yet, Salah Reis had already captured the North African *Presidio* (garrison) of Peñon de Velez. As Le Paulin, Dragut, and Piali Pasha terrorized the Tyrrhenian in 1555, Salah also took Bougie – which the Spanish had held since 1510. These events alone seemingly justified her petitions. Additionally, upon capitulation, Bougie's garrison commander had been assured that the inhabitants would be spared and allowed to leave. In spite of these agreements, Salah still enslaved 400 men, 120 women, and 100 children.[179]

The fall of Bougie sparked an intense debate regarding the Spanish holdings in North Africa. Moreover, many in Spain questioned why the royal fleet rarely guarded Iberian shores. Already back in 1554, Charles's top advisors nearly unanimously agreed that Spain was wasting resources in North Africa. Yet, with Bougie now in corsair hands, the Valencian and Catalan coasts were in even more danger, and the local populations publicly recognized this. Juana pushed for not only the recovery of Bougie but a new campaign to conquer Algiers in November 1555 – which she hoped would happen in the spring of 1556.[180] Before embarking on such an ambitious expedition, however, Spain needed to consider her own defenses. On 18 September 1555, Juan Vazques de Molina wrote to Juana regarding the "Turkish armada […that had] entered so far into these seas" that summer. He added that "the galleys of your majesty are so divided and do not seem

[179] Rodriguez-Salgado. *The Changing Face of Empire,* 259-263, 266-268, note 29 and note 42, and p. 271. Rodriguez-Salgado provides detailed citations for the developing situation at Bougie in note 41. See also Heers. *The Barbary Corsairs*, 92, 95. Heers's chronology is a little confusing. He mentions that Leone Strozzi recruited Salah Reis – which obviously could not have happened after 1554 and adds that Peñon de Velez fell in 1555 and Bougie in 1556 – which is clearly an error.
[180] Rodriguez-Salgado. *The Changing Face of Empire,* 268-272.

able to respond so quickly… there [are] only a few people left to guard the coasts." Taking into account this continual danger, he implored her not to neglect paying the salaries and the overall maintenance of the galley fleet.[181] From this perspective, the Habsburg-Valois conflict in Italy had deprived Spain of her ability to defend herself against the corsairs, and Juana was advised to redirect the Spanish galleys back to her own shores. Even as affairs in Italy slowed down over the next few years, however, North Africa remained a constant threat and occupied Spanish and Italian geostrategy – including Cosimo's. As had already been the case at Mahadia a few years earlier, Medici forces would soon find themselves committed to future North African campaigns.

Cosimo in the shifting sands (c. August 1555 – January 1556)

With the fall of Bougie to Salah Reis; Dragut's and Piali Pasha's raids from Sicily to Elba; the Medici-Habsburg conquest of Porto Ercole; the ongoing struggle in the Maremma; and the war for Corsica, the summer of 1555 proved eventful for the western Mediterranean. While his fleet moved against Corsica on 1 August, Süleyman had returned to Constantinople after two years on campaign in Persia – signaling that he could finally focus his attention on the Mediterranean and central European fronts. On the Habsburg side, at least 12 galleys had been deployed from Naples – where the Genoese galleys had also harbored – to provide logistical and military support on the Sienese coast at Porto Ercole.[182] Even though Siena had fallen in the spring and much progress had been made that summer, the war was clearly set to continue. After consolidating his conquests on the Maremma coast, Cosimo's commander (Marignano) marched to retake Pienza[183] and Crevole from Valois forces.[184] In the city of Siena, Cosimo withdrew his

[181] ADP Bancone 65 No. 1. Transcribed in Rafael Vargas-Hidalgo. *Guerra y Diplomacia*, 14-15.
[182] Setton *The Papacy and the Levant* Volume IV, 624. See also Note 23.
[183] Immediately northwest of Monticchiello
[184] Pepper and Adams. *Firearms & Fortifications,* 157.

ambassador, Angelo Niccolini. He also explored the possibility of trading Siena with Ottavio Farnese for Piacenza. Meanwhile, he informed Charles that he was no longer interested in buying Piombino.[185] Considering his conquests in Siena and Portoferraio's excellent defense, it was fair to say that the duke of Florence's strategic outlook was shifting according to the developments of 1555. Among these had certainly been the election of Pope Paul IV and, later that year, the abdication of Charles V. As matters developed over the last few months of 1555, however, his perspective would slightly reshape itself once again.

By mid-August, the Carafa pope was blatantly acting against Charles V. From mid-August, Paul used 5,000-6,000 troops under the duke of Urbino to move against imperial allies in and around Rome.[186] Although conversations between the pope and King Henri II had begun almost as soon as his election in May, they did not move towards an official Papal-Valois league until 14 October 1555.[187] By then, Habsburg power in the Low Countries had been transferred to Philip's hands. Charles V subsequently transferred his Spanish kingdoms, the dependencies in the Americas, Sardinia, Sicily, and the title "Catholic King" to Philip on 17 January 1556. He also named Philip an imperial vicar in Italy.[188] Thus far, Cosimo had spent his reign primarily dealing with Charles. From 1556 onwards, he would have to build his rapport with Philip and trust the new king to oversee the ongoing Siena sovereignty issue.

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[185] Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena,* 440; and Role. "The Naval bases," 125. A Tuscan that had recently defected from Valois service, Captain Girolamo da Vecchiano di Pisa, now oversaw Siena's garrison.
[186] Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena,* 447.
[187] Mallett and Shaw. *The Italian Wars,* 271-272.
[188] Parker. *Imprudent King*, 49-50. Charles also secretly renounced his imperial title in favor of his brother Ferdinand and made a rush of appointments in the Netherlands – which soon frustrated his son. See p. 50. See also: Caciagli. *Stato dei Presidi*, 41; and Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena,* 454. A discussion regarding Charles's abdication from the imperial crown, and planned armistices with the Ottomans and the French are preserved in the Archivo Histórico Provincial de Álava GAM, 22113, Doc. 1, most likely from 15 May 1556. Available online via PARES Portal de Archivos Españoles, reference code: ES.01059.AHPA//GAM,22113,Doc.1.

The Medici duke also worked towards strengthening his bonds with his subjects. In political, military, economic, and other matters, "he was very much a prince of the sixteenth century, thinking in terms of a state [or more appropriately a dynasty] rather than a city, and thinking of that not only in strategic but in economic and administrative terms." He also initiated a "Tuscanization of the economy" and provided opportunities for non-Florentine families to break into industry and government. Of course, Cosimo used these endeavors to gain massive profits and create significant financial distance between himself and the Florentine patricians. This was also useful in "[diminishing] the administrative contrasts between one city and another…" in Tuscany and further withdrawing Florentine patrician dominance over the region. Among their earliest collaborative endeavors, Cosimo and Philip II pursued policies to import tax-free wool textiles within the Spanish ports – which undoubtedly helped some of Cosimo's more rural communities. Closer to home, the duke also used his projects in Pisa – the university, water system, and shipbuilding – to bolster his public image.[189] It is important to bear in mind that Cosimo's efforts to build ships, fortresses, and paint himself as a competent military leader coincided with attempts to 'fortify' the Tuscan economy and his relationship with his people of all stations. For all this, his role in the Habsburg-Valois wars was bound to continue – especially in southern Siena.

The brewing war: Papal-Valois ambitions and yet another peace (c. October 1555 – March 1556)

Between October and December, Duke Ottavio Farnese and Roberto Strozzi began to gather troops on the border between the Papal States and the Maremma. Considering that the Siena sovereignty issue was also still up for discussion, Philip tried to pacify Cosimo with 60,000 *scudi* – a fraction of what he truly owed him. He also

[189] Hale. *Florence and the Medici*, 133, 141. See also Spini. "The Medici Principality," 434. Regarding Pisa, Hale implies that Cosimo purposefully modelled himself after Lorenzo the Magnificent.

appointed a new imperial governor over Siena – the Cardinal of Burgos, Francesco di Mendoza – after Don Francesco di Toledo's sudden death on 30 November. Given that Cardinal Mendoza was a distant relative of Don Diego de Mendoza and had an abrasive discussion with Cosimo on his way to Siena, however, this appointment had a far from placating effect. Neither the Medici duke nor the Sienese maintained a good relationship with him. Even disregarding Mendoza's difficult personality, the city's government was a shadow administration. The real decisions were made by Spanish officials and a handful of military authorities – including Cosimo's commander Conte Sforza di Santa Fiora and the Tuscan captain Girolamo da Vecchiano di Pisa, a recent Valois defector.[190] Siena's administration was not remotely independent but neither was it overseen by Cosimo as originally agreed. Much remained unresolved into 1556 regarding Siena, both militarily and diplomatically.

Moreover, the Italian Wars looked certain to continue. Considering their common ambitions, Henri II and Pope Paul IV envisaged a renewed campaign to capture Milan, Naples, and Sicily which would then be divided between the papacy (i.e. the Carafa family) and the Valois. Of course, this received much support from Queen Caterina de Medici and the Italian exiles in Henri's court.[191] A French alliance with the duke of Ferrara was secured on 16 November, and Piero Strozzi was back in Italy by late December. The Papal-Valois agreement was confirmed by 27 January 1556 – an anti-Habsburg and anti-Medici alliance – and comprised of Henri II, Pope Paul IV, and the d'Este of Ferrara with some of the troops under Piero Strozzi. When word of the then 'secret' discussions surrounding this alliance reached Cosimo in December 1555, he immediately dispatched Alfonso Tornabuoni to request Piombino from Philip – after he

[190] Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena,* 449, 451.
[191] Mallett and Shaw. *The Italian Wars,* 272.

had declined it just months earlier – and also forcefully demanded the 1,200,000 *scudi* that the Habsburgs owed him for the war in Siena.[192]

While this papal-Valois plot to reinvigorate the war was afoot, however, talks were already underway in December 1555 to establish a five-year truce between Spain and France. By 5 February 1556, Charles and Philip signed this agreement – the Truce of Vaucelles[193] – with Henri II. Considering their own recently concluded arrangement, this immediately put Paul IV and Henri II at odds. The Holy Father called Henri "the traitor king."[194] Yet, Henri could justifiably defend himself by citing finances as his only motivating factor. The imperial ambassador at the Valois court described France at the time as a heavily taxed, impoverished, and bankrupt realm.[195] Between 1551-1555, Henri had spent nearly 8 million *livre tournois* on Italy alone.[196]

Moreover, he clearly wanted to use Vaucelles to consolidate his holdings. Before concluding the truce, Henri had ordered another campaign in early 1556 to capture as much territory as possible – since it was understood that each side would maintain what they currently held at the time of signing the armistice. By February 1556, this included a largely Valois Corsica.[197] During the winter of 1555-1556, Giordano Orsini, Le Paulin, and the Doria had looked to gain what they could on Corscia before any negotiations between their respective sovereigns were finalized. This front proved exceptionally active. For example, 12 galleys under Le Paulin intercepted 11 Spanish transport vessels convoying troops. The French broke one transport's rudder and ended up capturing 2

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[192] Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena,* 448, 450, 454. See also Caciagli. *Stato dei Presidi*, 41. Henri II also hoped to recruit Venice to their cause.
[193] AGS EST, LEG, 1385, f. 48 preserves a 1556 capitulation agreement composed by Gómez Suárez de Figueroa, the Spanish ambassador in Genoa, with the French. This document is accessible online via PARES portal de archivos Españoles, reference code: ES.47161.AGS/EST,LEG,1385,48.
[194] Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena,* 454-455. See also Pepper and Adams. *Firearms & Fortifications,* 157.
[195] Rodriguez-Salgado. *The changing face of Empire*, 149 and notes.
[196] David Potter. *Renaissance France At War* […]. (Woodbridge, UK, 2008), 219.
[197] Mallett and Shaw. *The Italian Wars,* 268.

vessels in the chaos. At least 3 companies of "the best" Spanish troops were lost, and another 100 washed ashore on Corisca. With this chance encounter, Le Paulin had easily killed or captured 1,000 Spaniards.[198]

Marco Centurione made reference to the danger of a French squadron of 12 galleys and 2 "*fragatte*" – probably Le Paulin's – as he relayed information about 3 ships around Livorno. One was from Ragusa ("*Ragugea*"), and another belonged to Cosimo's Neapolitan captain Francesco Rustichi ("*Rustici*"). The third came from Provence (*"Callasi*" – Callas) and had joined another group of French galleys between Giglio and Montecristo.[199] Centurione's note alone provides a glimpse into the naval activities that winter. The French continued to assemble in the Tyrrhenian; trade and information continued to pour into Livorno from Ragusa;[200] and Cosimo's own *nave* under Rustichi presumably delivered supplies and/or troops to the Medici Tuscan fortresses and probably to the Corsican front as well. That December, Rustichi journeyed to Corsica ("*San Firenzo*" – Saint Florent) where he had been chased by French galleys. Moreover, Centurione warned of more galleys being readied for Piero Strozzi who was still in Marseilles at that time.[201] In the midst of these events, he also referenced the construction of Cosimo's sixth galley and an apparent argument over where it should be built – Genoa or Pisa.[202] Regardless of the outcome, it is clear that military build-up increased – not decreased – during this temporary lull in the Habsburg-Valois conflict.

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[198] AGS Estado 1385 f. 68, Spanish ambassador to Genoa, Gómez Suárez de Figueroa, to Juana de Austria, 21 December 1555. Transcribed in Vargas-Hidalgo. *Guerra y Diplomacia*, 15-16. See also Roncière. *Histoire* Volume 3, 535-536.

[199] ASF MP 450A ins. 2 f. 1037-1038, 6 December 1555.

[200] ASF MP 447 f. 140 and 573 are *avviso*s from Ragusa where Cosimo clearly had contacts.

[201] ASF MP 450A ins. 1 f. 978, 20 December 1555. "*Dicano che si apprestauano alter galer' per porto il Strozzi ch' era a marsiglia*"

[202] ASF MP 450A ins. 1 f. 972-973, 15 November 1555. This document is damaged, but this is the closest transcription I can make: "*non si manchera di tutto lo non scrissi a v.ecc^{Za}Ill^{ma} della fabrica della sesta Galera perche mi persuadessi che la si douesse fabricar' qui ma si per saper' s'io hauetto a far uenir' il capo maestro che haueuo in Genoua doue ando ammalato perche gia sapeno io che v.ecc^{Za}Ill^{ma} haueua determinato di farla far a Pisa e pero la sara […] torno al Capom^{Ro} quello che piu le torna ser^{Zo}*"

On 6 February – literally the day after the Truce of Vaucelles was enacted – Gian Andrea Doria lost 9 of his 12 galleys on the reefs of Porto-Vecchio en route to Bonifacio on the southern tip of Corsica. With his enemy vulnerably run aground, Giordano Orsini captured many Spanish troops; freed 700 Christian slaves as well as 600 "Turks" and "Moors" – whom he planned to return to the sultan; and absconded with at least 70 pieces of artillery. Since this occurred on the day after the truce, Doria demanded that the men and loot be returned to him.[203] With his forces fully concentrated on Corsica, Henri had found gaining ground before finalizing Vaucelles relatively easy. Moreover, especially given the pope's hostile stance towards the Habsburgs, it was already becoming evident that the king of France had no intentions of upholding the truce.[204]

After this armistice in early 1556, Marco Centurione had also embarked on a mission to capture slaves in the Levant. 4 Medici galleys joined some other Habsburg galleys and captured up to 11 "Turkish" vessels near Calabria and Puglia.[205] Regarding the diplomatic developments, Cosimo was not notified about the details of the Vaucelles truce until 16 March, and these were not officially published in Tuscany until 28 March 1556. Only then did the conflict in Siena officially end[206] – at least on paper. In theory, the war with Siena had finished more than seven months earlier with the finalized negotiations between the city and the Habsburgs in July 1555. Yet, as the campaign in the Maremma continued – not to mention the assaults on Piombino, Elba, and Corsica over the previous half a year – it was clear that an end to the War of Siena and the larger

[203] Roncière. *Histoire* Volume 3, 536-537. Roncière adds that Doria's accident was either a product of a piloting error – wherein the crew had mistaken Porto-Vecchio for Bonifacio – or a storm.
[204] Mallett and Shaw. *The Italian Wars,* 272. In addition to an armistice, the truce also stipulated that neither side could construct new fortresses.
[205] Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 50. Since Gian Andrea Doria was moving Spanish infantry to Oran in North Africa and was on another mission for the duke of Alba at the time, it seems unlikely that he took part in this expedition. Aside from a note of "*schiavi catturati dal Centurione in Levante*" in ASF MP 2077 – which I have been unable to locate – Manfroni reveals that the only evidence of this Levantine adventure can be found in Marcello Adriani and Giovanni Battista Adriani. *Istoria de' suoi tempi* […]. Book 12 (dodicesimo) (Florence, 1587), 945.
[206] Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena,* 456.

Habsburg-Valois conflict remained a distant prospect for Cosimo and everyone else involved.

Chapter 4: Cosimo's Challenges and Proposed Solutions at the War's End (c. May 1556 – April 1559)

War in peace: Cosimo in the midst of the renewed Italian Wars (c. May 1556 – May 1557)

Henri II and Charles V – alongside his son Philip II – had established the five-year Truce of Vaucelles in February 1556. Yet Pope Paul IV wasted no time in reigniting the conflict. The fanatically anti-Spanish Holy Father targeted suspected Habsburg supporters in Rome including the Sforza di Santa Fiora and especially the Colonna. He wielded excommunication as a weapon; confiscated and dismantled fortresses and estates; and even had the audacity to arrest two Habsburg agents. Moreover, he requested that any French troops in Siena should regroup in Rome. In the Valois court, Paul's nephew Cardinal Carlo Carafa – alongside members of the Guise family and Florentine exiles – presented the ongoing conflict as Habsburg aggression against the pope.[1]

Henri deployed 30 galleys with an additional 3,000 infantry and requested that Ottavio Farnese, the duke of Parma, also lend military support to the 'threatened' Carafa pope. Yet, the French crown's most influential advisor, Anne de Montmorency, *connétable de France*, resisted any further commitments since the Valois could not rely on their Italian allies. The *connétable* sent explicit instructions to the French ambassador in Rome not to support any papal actions that might provoke the Habsburgs. When Duke Ottavio defected to the Habsburgs in an effort to maintain control of Parma and regain Piacenza for the Farnese, Montmorency's advice was validated.[2]

On the imperial side, Charles and Philip bestowed their blessing on Fernando de Toledo, the duke of Alba and the new interim viceroy of Naples, as he marched 10,000 troops with an additional 4,500 cavalry under Marcantonio Colonna from Naples into the

[1] Michael Mallett and Christine Shaw. *The Italian Wars, 1494-1559* […]. (Harlow, England, 2012), 271-273 and notes. On the specific Habsburg agents arrested and the voices in the Valois court, see Roberto Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena, 1552-1559*. (Siena, 1962), 483. By late summer 1556, 600 Gascon troops landed in Civitavecchia specifically to protect the pope.
[2] Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena*, 484.

Papal States in September 1556. Since the pope had not yet received additional reinforcements from Henri, the advantage lay with the Spanish Habsburg army. Marching on Rome, Alba's forces quickly captured several castles and holdings more or less without a fight. As long as Montmorency's influence prevailed at Henri's court, however, Paul IV could not rely upon further aid from the French crown. The Carafa forces were no match for Alba's troops, and the pope agreed to a forty-day truce with Spain in November. As negotiations continued, Cardinal Carafa – leader of the ragtag Roman army – offered to return Colonna estates including the key fortress Paliano if his family was gifted Siena. Although Philip II considered this proposal, he tactically delayed these discussions into January 1557 – long after the forty-day truce ended. By then, France had already reignited her campaign in Italy after the Guise family had finally overcome Montmorency at the French court. Having also gained support from Duke Ercole II d'Este of Ferrara, the Carafa papacy could once again benefit from Valois backing.[3]

Henri appointed his cousin François de Lorraine, the duc de Guise, as his *lieutenant général du royaume*, and entrusted him with 14,000 troops – almost equal parts French, Swiss, and Italian. By 9 January 1557, the duc rendezvoused with a French expeditionary force that had already gathered in Turin. As his campaign in Piedmont rolled on, Duke Ercole II – Guise's father-in-law – sent an additional 5,000 troops and 200 cavalry against the Farnese in Parma. By late January 1557, Guise's army had reached the duchy of Piacenza, and debated whether the immediate goal would be Naples, Lombardy, or Tuscany. Under the sway of the Florentine and Sienese exiles who had flocked to the French court, Guise wished to move against Cosimo. On the other hand, Cardinal Carafa believed that Naples housed enough Carafa supporters and anti-

[3] Mallett and Shaw. *The Italian Wars*, 272-275 and notes. See also Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena*, 485-488. Cardinal Carlo Carafa had even attempted to sway the Venetians to their side without avail.

Spanish sentiments to guarantee a French victory. After all, Cosimo had not denounced the truce with France. Especially considering the military strength he had demonstrated over the previous year, it seemed unwise to unnecessarily provoke the duke. Furthermore, the Carafa-Valois camp was seemingly unaware that Cosimo was well-informed on the alliance between the pope, France, and Ferrara – as well as the 'secret' negotiations between Philip II and Cardinal Carafa regarding Siena.[4] The Medici duke strategically played his hand.

On the Habsburg side, the duke of Alba urged Cosimo to contribute 3,000 troops to the Neapolitan campaign. At this same moment, however, the duke of Florence needed to secure his own borders. By February 1557, a French army was literally at his doorstep in the Papal States to the south and in Bologna and other places in the north. Understandably, he expected them to move into Siena or Tuscany. Moreover, Valois troops under Blaise de Monluc remained in the southern part of the Sienese province (the Maremma). Many locals still opposed Medici lordship over their homeland, and Sienese rebels had formed the Republic of Montalcino – just south of the city of Siena. Though conquered by Medici troops two years earlier in 1555, the city of Siena itself remained on edge regarding their political and economic autonomy within Cosimo's realm. Most importantly, the surrounding countryside had been devastated, and the people had endured battles, raiding, and military occupation by Valois, Habsburg, Ottoman, Barbary, and Medici forces. Considering the French troops in Siena and those approaching from the north and the south, Cosimo hired captains, 8,000 Florentine and other Italian troops, and 2,000 foreign mercenaries. Even though financing this sudden boost in military potential required new taxes upon his subjects, the duke did not feel confident that

[4] Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena*, 488-490. See also Mallett and Shaw. *The Italian Wars*, 273-275 and notes. Regarding the war in northern Italy, see especially Michele M. Rabà. *Potere e poteri* […]. (Milan, 2016).

Philip's financial or political resources would sufficiently offer the protection he and his people required at this critical moment.[5]

In addition to working with the Habsburgs and providing military aid, Cosimo maintained communications with Henri II and Pope Paul IV should the situation shift to their favor. The very fact that Siena was being discussed without him had prompted the duke to take matters into his own hands. One of his key agents in Rome, Bongianni Gianfigliazzi, quickly befriended Paul through flattery and diverted his interests away from Siena. To counteract the Florentine exiles in France, Cosimo covertly cooperated with Cardinal François de Tournon – a known ally of Montmorency – to support the arguments against Guise's campaign. Moreover, Cosimo correctly believed that France had logistically and strategically overextended herself in Italy. He used this perceived predicament to leverage a marriage alliance with the Valois. By 25 February, a papal messenger revealed that Henri was willing to offer one of his legitimate daughters as a bride to the duke's eldest son, Francesco. Even though these ambitious marriage plans did not manifest in reality, Henri and the duc de Guise interpreted Cosimo's enthusiastic diplomacy as an indication that he would not provide an obstacle to their aims in Italy. From his perspective, however, Cosimo had essentially secured neutrality – if not an alliance – with the papacy and the king of France…while Guise's army was literally on Tuscany's threshold![6]

Nevertheless, the impressive Medici diplomatic gymnastics were short-lived. In spite of Cosimo's personal ambitions, his wife Eleanor de Toledo very much held sway over his final decisions. While he tactically and tactfully maintained extended

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[5] Elena Fasano Guarini. "Le istituzioni di Siena […]" in Leonardo Rombai, ed. *I Medici e lo Stato Senese 1555-1609* […]. (Rome, 1980), 49-51 and notes. See also Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena*, 491-492.
[6] Mallett and Shaw. *The Italian Wars*, 275-276 and notes. See also Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena*, 492-495.

conversations regarding the Valois marriage alliance, Spanish and German troops continued to pour into Tuscany. It became increasingly clear to Paul IV that Cosimo and the Habsburgs were unwaveringly linked. In reality, the duke of Florence never intended to follow through with the abovementioned royal wedding plans. He sought to use Henri's daughter as a vivid demonstration of how much the Valois valued an alliance with him. Cosimo hoped that the Habsburgs would recognize his contributions commensurately. Philip II and Charles V knew his price – Siena and Piombino. By 18 February 1557, Cosimo had made one last request for these lands. The duke relied on his wife's youngest brother, Luis de Toledo, to push Philip into conceding with his wishes. In the meantime, Cosimo's bluff with the Carafa and the French literally ran aground. A vessel carrying his secretary Bartolomeo Concini to Gaeta was wrecked near the mouth of the Tiber on 28 February. In efforts to safely reach the shore, Concini threw his bag overboard – including documents reserved for the duke of Alba – which soon reached Pope Paul's hands. At that moment, the pope's suspicions were confirmed: Cosimo had not severed his ties with the Habsburgs and had been playing a double game.[7]

Moreover, Piero Strozzi had returned to action and had successes in Ostia while Marshal Carlo Cossé de Brissac attacked Milan. When combined with the duke of Ferrara's alliance with the Carafa-Valois camp, Philip seriously considered relinquishing Siena to his enemies – even if this meant ignoring two decades of Cosimo's support. In the spring of 1557, Guise's army maintained a central position in the Marche – unsure if their next campaign would be in the Abruzzo region of central Italy or Tuscany. By late April, there were an additional 3,000 Gascon troops and 400 horse in Bologna under

[7] Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena*, 496-498.

Strozzi. The more imminent threat to Tuscany arose from Blaise de Monluc who remained in Siena at Montalcino and Pienza.[8]

Based on intelligence from Rome on 1 April 1557, Philip learned that a French army had moved from Rimini to Cattolica – the Papal States' northern Adriatic coast – towards the Kingdom of Naples. Again, Cosimo suspected that they would move against Tuscany or Siena. Spanish reports indicated that there were 37 – albeit undermanned – French galleys ready for action in Marseilles. Meanwhile in Lombardy, there were 10,000 Habsburg German troops at the ready. Yet, since there were two French armies in Italy – and they were continually receiving support – Philip was advised to quickly dispatch the Spanish galleys to ensure that his troops would receive similar provisions and reinforcements. As the viceroy of Naples, Alba also embarked 3,700 German troops from Naples.[9] Philip's military overview from March had already instructed Cosimo to provide 2,000 quintals – roughly 200,000 pounds – of biscuit for the Spanish galleys under Don Juan de Mendoza ("*Mendoça*") at Pisa. Philip detailed that this massive order necessitated that the viceroy of Sicily, Juan de Vega, should promptly send 3,000 *salamas*[10] of wheat.[11] As the French military build-up in Italy continued in the spring of 1557, it seemed as if Cosimo was about reprise his role as a dutiful Habsburg ally – at least logistically speaking.

By May 1557, an informant (Pero Pelido) wrote to Cosimo from Venice. According to him, Henri had ordered the duc de Guise to campaign in the Abruzzo region – not Tuscany – and fortify at least one position. Additionally, the Valois king planned to send at least 5,000 Swiss troops to Piedmont and another 5,000 German and French

[8] Ibid., 498-501.
[9] Archivo Generale de Simancas (AGS) Estado 1386 folio (f.) 134. Transcribed in Rafael Vargas-Hidalgo. *Guerra y Diplomacia en el Mediterráneo* […]. (Madrid, 2002), 126 note 304.
[10] 1 *salama* = about 8-10 bushels, or approximately 64-80 gallons.
[11] Archivo Doria Pamphilj (ADP) Roma; Bancone 65 No. 1, dated 3 March 1557. Transcribed in Vargas-Hidalgo. *Guerra y Diplomacia*, 119-121.

troops to Naples. Even though the Ottoman fleet was not ready for a campaign, it was believed that the French would again receive support from Salah Reis, the *beylerbey* of Algiers. It may have seemed that lady luck accompanied France at the moment, but Pelido assured Cosimo that "in the end, the game is about to turn around."[12] Of course, this insight was an opinion – nothing had been decided. Many turns in the game had yet to be played.

Regarding the conflict with the Valois in the latter half of 1557, French logistical problems materialized alongside rumors of discord between Henri and Pope Paul. Moreover, the successes of Habsburg-allied forces in southern Italy under Marcantonio Colonna and in northern France at Picardy prompted Alba to march a good portion of his 18,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry on Rome by late August 1557. French galleys extracted Guise and part of the French army from the papal port of Civitavecchia and returned them to France. Henri's remaining forces in Rome either marched to Montalcino in Siena, to Ferrara, or they returned to France overland. Although defeated for the time being, the French maintained a significant military presence in Corsica, Piedmont, Ferrara, and Sienese territory.[13] On 12 September 1557, Cosimo played a prominent role in reconciling Pope Paul IV and Philip with the Treaty of Cavi and the final withdrawal of French troops from the Papal States.[14] Not only did the Spanish king depend on Medici ports to resupply his fleet, he also benefitted from the duke's skillful negotiations. Yet, over that same summer of 1557, Cosimo's and Philip's discussions regarding Siena's fate tested their relationship to its utmost limits.

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[12] Archivio di Stato di Firenze (ASF) Mediceo del Principato (MP) 131, Pero Pelido to Cosimo I from Venice 1-8 May 1557 transcribed in Abel Desjardins and Giuseppe Canestrini, eds. *Negociations diplomatiques de la France avec la Toscane* […] Volume 3 (Paris: 1859-1886), 369-370.
[13] Mallett and Shaw. *The Italian Wars*, 275-279 and notes.
[14] Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena*, 511-512, 516.

Cosimo and Philip's Siena agreement (c. May – October 1557)

The Spanish king had already reinstated Piombino to the Appiani on 29 May, and especially considering the duke of Florence's history with the region, this arguably set the tone for their parleys over Siena. Months earlier, Philip's original proposition had required Cosimo to relinquish any rights over the major Sienese ports and coastal fortresses – Talamone and those around Monte Argentario: Porto Ercole, Orbetello, and Porto Santo Stefano – in addition to Piombino and Elba. This first offer had also required Cosimo to grant an equivalent reward in the Sienese state to the Appiani. Most demeaning to the duke, Philip demanded that Cosimo not make marriage arrangements for his children without the king's consent. Understandably, after years of dedicated military and diplomatic service, these stipulations deeply offended Cosimo. He addressed each of these points and felt they demonstrated Philip's lack of trust. Among his caveats, the duke of Florence emphasized that he would rather remove himself from consideration as duke of Siena than relinquish Elba. Losing Portoferraio would have removed a key bastion from Cosimo's coastal defenses. Moreover, the duke had invested substantial capital in Portoferraio's military and naval infrastructure, not to mention his efforts in defending and refortifying Piombino. On 2 June, Philip approved some of Cosimo's counter-proposals, and the final terms were delivered one month later.[15]

Militarily speaking, the final agreement reserved Talamone and the abovementioned ports around Monte Argentario as the Spanish Tuscan *Presidios* (garrisons) under the viceroy of Naples. Although he had to return Piombino and Elba to

[15] Even after the finalized agreement appeared, Cosimo personally wrote a secret letter to Philip on 4 July 1557 indicating that he did not agree to the condition that his children could not marry without the king of Spain's approval. Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena*, 503-508. See also Giuseppe Caciagli. *Stato dei Presidi*. (Pontedera, Italy, 1992), 54-55; Camillo Manfroni. "La Marina Militare del Granducato Mediceo Parte I […]." in *Rivista Marittima* […]. (Rome, 1895), 51-52; and Marco Gemignani. "The Navies of the Medici […]," in John B. Hattendorf and Richard W. Unger, eds. *War at Sea in the Middle Ages and Renaissance*, (Woodbridge, Suffolk, UK, 2003), 173. On this issue, Gemignani cites Arnaldo d'Addario, *Il problema senese nella storia italiana della prima metà del Cinquecento*. (Florence, 1958), 399-424.

Jacopo VI Appiani, Cosimo was allowed to keep Portoferraio and two miles of its surrounding hinterlands in fief. Aside from the war expenses he had already devoted to Siena, Cosimo was now required to also contribute infantry, cavalry, artillery, ammunition, and his galleys towards the ongoing conflict in Naples. Moreover, in the event that Naples or Milan were attacked by Italian princes in the future, the king of Spain expected that the duke of Florence and Siena would provide similar military support – including his galley squadron.

Of course, this contained a set of mutual obligations. While entrusting Siena to Cosimo and his male descendants by order of primogeniture, Philip promised to devote 4,000 infantry and 400 horses within six months to chase the French out of the duke's realm. Regarding future threats to Florence or Siena, Cosimo and his successors could expect similar Spanish reinforcements, albeit at the duchy's expense. Both agreed not to enter any alliances that could contradict or otherwise impede the other.

Although the major ports belonged to Spain – under Neapolitan charge – Cosimo still had plenty of new coastline to defend and many new expenses and responsibilities to accompany it. Additionally, he had to formally renounce any claims to the territory that now belonged to the Spanish king and the Appiani. As one of the region's three sovereigns, however, Cosimo assumed responsibility for one third of expenses related to supplying and arming the ports.[16]

[16] Regarding the Siena agreement in the three paragraphs above see: Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena,* 503-505. See also Giorgio Spini. "The Medici Principality […]," in *Journal of Italian History*, no. 3, winter 1979, 429 and Niccolò Capponi. *Victory of the West* […]. (Cambridge, Mass., 2007), 83-86. Concerning the village of Marsiliana, it is approximately 14 km from the coast on modern roads. This coast includes a small island (Monte Argentario) where Porto Santo Stefano, Orbetello, and Porto Ercole are located. Talamone is not too far away. A copy of the agreement between Cosimo and Philip is preserved in the Florentine archives: ASF *Miscellanea Medicea* (MM) 594, ins. 21. (8 pages) Similarly, the agreement between Philip and the Appiani is preserved in Spain's *Archivo Histórico Nacional*, ESTADO, 2776, Exp. 3 accessible online via the Portal de Archivos Españoles (PARES).

The newly-established Spanish Tuscan *Presidios* only covered an area of 111 square miles. Yet, the region was riddled with vagaries and other disputes over borders and citizenship – some of which continued into the eighteenth century. Unlike the North African *Presidios*, those along the Sienese coastline were not surrounded by hostile forces. Additionally, their administrative dependence on Naples paled in comparison to the delicate lifeline between Spain and the Maghreb. As opposed to serving as garrisons on the African frontier, the Tuscan *Presidios* offered secure bases for the Spanish vessels that roamed between Naples and the Iberian Peninsula. They also provided a means to assert Spanish hegemony in central Italy. Over a decade earlier in 1545, the viceroy of Sicily (Juan de Vega) had expressed that Spain needed to control Piombino if she was to maintain voyages from Italy to Spain – independent of Genoa's policies. In 1551, Ferrante Gonzaga and the duke of Alba had supported Don Diego Hurtado de Mendoza's observation that Piombino, Monte Argentario, and Civitavecchia could form a "golden chain" between Spain and Naples. Gonzaga elaborated that in addition to Siena, Lucca, and Piombino, Spain should maintain a domain in northern Italy in Piedmont and Milan. Clearly, the benefits of a Spanish Habsburg position in central Italy had consumed Spanish geopolitics for over a decade. At the highest level, Charles V had aimed to establish a stronghold in the central Tyrrhenian as early as the 1540s. Of course, this impeded on Cosimo's sovereignty in the area, and Philip's intentions in this regard were thinly veiled at best. After all, in January 1557, Philip had nearly finalized an agreement to grant Siena to one of Pope Paul Carafa's grandchildren, nieces, or nephews. As Philip had stipulated with the Medici duke, in this proposition, the king of Spain reserved Talamone and Monte Argentario for himself. It would seem that Philip cared less about who Siena belonged to as long as Spain maintained control of these key ports. It was very

apparent that Philip sought to maintain a significant Spanish garrison in this strategically vital area regardless of who was the duke of Siena.[17]

In spite of Philip's obvious endeavor to eclipse Cosimo's authority, however, the Spanish commanders of Orbetello, Talamone, Porto Ercole, and Piombino received direct, royal orders to obey the duke of Florence and Siena. Philip's rationale was simple: Cosimo undoubtedly knew the region better than anyone else. Moreover, he had recruited the era's top military architects.[18] Starting in 1557, the engineers at Pisa, Livorno, and Portoferraio merely incorporated the Spanish *Presidios* into their work schedule. Nevertheless, authority in the region was far from a clear-cut affair.

Although Cosimo had sworn fealty to Philip II to assume the ducal title over Siena, many details regarding feudal law still required attention. The Medici duke recruited help from his close advisor Lelio Torelli and the Florentine jurist Angelo (Agnolo) Niccolini in navigating all of the clauses within these investiture negotiations. As Torelli and Niccolini read over drafts beginning in August 1557, Cosimo instructed his ambassador to Spain (Bernadetto Minerbetti, the bishop of Pistoia) to prioritize the Siena issue. Cosimo and Torelli had discussed their expectation that Philip should grant the Medici the same entitlements that Charles V had granted his son as an imperial vicar – most notably, the right to "*disporre et alienarlo*" (dispose and sell). Most importantly, Cosimo wanted to ensure that his descendants could easily disentangle themselves from any obligations to the Spanish or imperial Habsburgs. Discussions between the duke's

[17] Franco Angiolini. "Lo Stato di Piombino […]" in Giuseppe Di Stefano, Elana Fasano Guarini, and Alessandro Martinengo, eds. *Italia non spagnola e monarchia spagnola tra '500 e '600* […]. (Florence, 2009), 172-177. Angiolini specifies that the *Presidios* covered an area of 287 square kilometers. Juan de Vega's letter was addressed to Pedro de Marquina. Papal envoy Filip Fantuzzi helped draft the offer to the Carafas.
[18] Caciagli. *Stato dei Presidi*, 76.

and Philip's respective ministers regarding the investiture's specifics slowly proceeded over the next few years, and rumors surrounding the final terms continued to circulate.[19]

Most prominently, many doubted whether Philip truly possessed the rights to dispose of Siena and Piombino as a feudal state – this ability only belonged to the Holy Roman Emperor. After all, it had been Maximilian I who granted Piombino to the Appiani as an imperial fief in 1509. At least one letter arrived at Cosimo's court that insisted that the king of Spain did not have the right to concede Elba or even Portoferraio. Lorenzo de Medici, a knight of Malta, informed Cosimo of these same rumors, and Philip's cousin Maximilian – son of the newly crowned Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand I – vehemently opposed Spain's claimed ability to make the investiture of Siena.[20] Regardless of their debatable legitimacy, these relatively swift vassalage arrangements between the king of Spain and the duke of Florence were only possible because Charles V had named Philip a vicar of the Holy Roman Empire and had granted him Siena in subinfeudation in 1556. Technically speaking, these responsibilities passed to Cosimo on 3 July 1557.[21] Nevertheless, the fog of doubt surrounding Philip's rights over Siena remained and was merely one of the many complications throughout the negotiations and the process of Cosimo's assumption of the ducal title and responsibilities.

Contemporaries perceived that, with the addition of Siena, the duke's yearly income would increase by at least fifty percent – "one and a half million in gold." Yet, considering the ongoing conflict, it would take several years before the duke's new holding recovered from constant marauding – not to mention the ravaged 20 or so miles around Siena itself. Even into the early 1560s, Cosimo essentially had to deal with each

[19] Danilo Marrara and Cinzia Rossi. "Lo Stato di Siena tra Impero […]" in Danilo Marrara. *Toscana E Spagna nell'Età Moderna e Contemporanea* […]. (Pisa, 1998), 16-23.
[20] Marrara and Rossi. "Lo Stato di Siena tra Impero,", 29-30. See also 36-37 and Angelo Biondi. "Tentativi di Unire al Presidi Spagnoli la Contea di Pitgliano" in Anna Guarducci, ed. *Orbetello e i Presidios*. (Florence, 2000), 211.
[21] Guarini. "Le istituzioni di Siena […]," 49-50 and notes.

Sienese city one at a time by repairing buildings; constructing fortresses and mills; and managing the region's cattle, grain, and alum trade.[22] Any potential financial benefits that accompanied his new title remained in the distant future.

Aside from securing Portoferraio on Elba, however, Cosimo gained little more on the coast. Indeed, he had acquired Siena, but at the cost of granting Philip – more specifically the viceroy of Naples – the major Sienese ports and, of course, returning Piombino to the Appiani. Yet he was still a duke twice over – Florence and Siena. After swearing Philip an oath of allegiance, Cosimo notified Monluc and the Republic of Montalcino that Florence and Spain now ruled Siena. Similarly, the duke essentially told his military commander Chiappino Vitelli that the Medici forces were an extension of the Spanish sword. By 13 October, the newly appointed *luogotenente e governatore generale dela città e stato di Siena*, none other than Cosimo's jurist Angelo Niccolini, undertook similar oaths of loyalty. Unsurprisingly, Sienese citizens did not like the idea of Medici appointees administrating their city – especially Niccolini – since he had already served as Siena's governor for ten years.[23] In a letter to Niccolini on 30 August 1557, Cosimo wrote that he "understood the evil that afflicts these Sienese people in many ways, and we want to benefit them as much as we can, considering this is our obligation. […] you will let us know your thoughts to remedy the serious [complaints]."[24] Cosimo understood that he now had more duties and responsibilities. These included overseeing the defenses – particularly the coastal defenses – of both Tuscany and Siena.

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[22] Ibid., 50-51 and notes. Guarini cites "One and a half million in gold" quote from Eugenio Alberi. *Relazioni degli Ambasciatori veneti al Senato* […], (Florence, 1839) serie II, volume I, pp. 329, 334, 345.
[23] Marrara and Rossi. "Lo Stato di Siena," 14-16. See also Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena*, 507.
[24] Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena*, 507. Cantagalli attributes Cosimo's words to Lorenzo Cantini's appendix in *Vita di Cosimo I granduca*. (Florence, 1805), 620-621.

Cosimo's coastal administration (c. February 1557 – January 1558)

To aid in these efforts, Cosimo had named Piero Machiavelli – son of the famous Niccolò – as his *commissario generale* over the Florentine *armata marittima* in February 1557. At 43 years old, Machiavelli had spent over two decades traveling across Europe – reaching as far east as the Tanai (Don) River. This was part of a self-imposed exile after personal and legal troubles with Duke Alessandro de Medici. Through his many journeys, Piero became a skilled navigator and astronomer. He had also accompanied, observed, and fought alongside the Habsburg imperial army on the Austrian-Ottoman frontier. Moreover, he had endured three shipwrecks and three captures: two at the hands of Barbary corsairs and one by the Ottomans. Over a decade before his appointment as *commissario generale*, Piero had also served as one of Cosimo's informants on naval affairs. Given his many travels and experiences – especially at sea – Cosimo recruited Machiavelli's services for his native city.[25]

At this moment, the duke's biggest focus was Portoferraio. Just as he had done in Livorno, Cosimo also attempted to attract new inhabitants to Elba via enticing tax exemptions and other privileges. In 1556, the duke had already invited "any person [from] whatsoever state, grade, condition, or province" to settle in Cosmopolis/ Portoferraio. He issued a statement wherein he granted free movement "despite any [previous] debt and obligation" – except those offenses which entailed capital punishment or imprisonment. Cosimo also emphasized that the island would be safer from the "constant hazards of the corsairs" if more people settled there – an assertion which his fortresses had reinforced over the past decade. These privileges also exempted settlers from duties and the *gabelle* tax for ten years. Moreover, vessels built in Portoferraio

[25] Gaspar Amico. *La Vita di Niccolo Machiavelli* […]. (Florence, 1875), 662. See also the entry for Piero Machiavelli by Marco Gemignani in the *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani* (DBdI) vol. 67 (2006) available online: www.treccani.it Examples of his informant role are in ASF MP 364 f. 396-397, 4 January 1544 (1543). See also f. 398, and f. 422.

would receive a distinctive mark and would not pay duties in her ports. Yet, this did not absolve individuals from any contracts or other financial obligations involving Florentine citizens or any of the duke's other subjects. Regarding property law, as long as the house or other building remained in the builder's possession, land was considered a donation. With the Siena agreement in July 1557, however, all of the island except for Portoferraio fell under Piombino's jurisdiction. Unsurprisingly, many of the poor and destitute from Elba's non-Tuscan areas flocked to Portoferraio to take advantage of the Medici concessions. Additionally, settlers from outside of Elba slowly arrived.[26] The Spanish-Neapolitan galleys also benefitted from the duke's investments on the island. On 27 November, the duke of Alba took 28 galleys to Portoferraio.[27] Meanwhile at Livorno, Luca Martini repaired and reinforced the city's outer defensive structures after years of heavy rains and flooding.[28]

Regarding armament for his fortresses and galleys, Cosimo profited from Philip's exhausted finances immediately after the War of Siena – especially since the Italian Wars carried on. The king's Spanish and German troops and cavalry had endured many months without pay, and Philip pursued several avenues to offset these expenses. Among them, he sold Cosimo ammunition and provisions from the *castello di Siena* for 11,000 *scudi* as well as gunpowder and pikes for an additional 4,000. From Milan on 21 August 1557, the interim Sienese governor Juan de Figueroa expressed his feelings regarding the duke's recent purchase from the king. He found the entire transaction "inconvenient" because "so much of what [Philip] held in the *castello*" had been given to the duke that "there is

[26] Marisa Sardi. *Gli Statuti di Portoferraio (Sec. XVI)* […]. (Portoferraio, 2017), 26 and especially Sardi's transcription of Cosimo's 1556 Privileges on pp. 60-63, cited as: Privilegi ed esenzioni del 1556 (Archivio Storico del Comune di Portoferraio realizzato da Gloria Peria 1 (già E1) *Statuti*). See also Amelio Fara. *Portoferraio* […]. (Turin, 1997), 12-13. Concering Giglio, see Roberto Ferretti. "La pirateria barbaresca sulle coste della Maremma […]" in Rombai, ed. *I Medici e lo Stato Senese*, 39 and notes.
[27] AGS Estado 1387 f. 75 transcribed in Vargas-Hidalgo. *Guerra y Diplomacia*, 158.
[28] Dario Matteoni. *Le città nella storia d'Italia: Livorno*. (Roma-Bari, 1988), 7-9.

almost nothing left for Piombino and Porto Ercole." In other words, Figueroa perceived that, through his finances and control of material, Cosimo – not the Spanish or imperial Habsburgs – controlled the Sienese coastal garrisons.[29] Indeed, although the viceroy of Naples managed these new *Presidios* that belonged to Philip via the imperial fief from his father Charles and uncle Ferdinand, it was Cosimo – the Spanish king's vassal– who consistently proved himself the active military administrator and arguable lord of these lands.

Such authority was needed almost immediately upon assuming the Sienese ducal title. Already on 3 August 1557, Francesco Vinta (one Cosimo's agents) revealed an emerging dispute regarding Piombino. Specifically, the Appiani wished to clarify their territorial waters. With their compliance, Piero Machiavelli assisted with surveying the port and coastline to determine the precise boundaries. Moreover, Vinta referenced a group of 7 Spaniards under an official that had assumed administrative responsibility for Piombino's troops. Cosimo's agent also mentioned that "Signor Marcho" – presumably Marco Centurione – had "made a collection" at Piombino with all 6 galleys. Additionally, "Marcho" had sent Vinta a well-provisioned galley and *fregata* to use on his mission while Centurione took the other Medici galleys to Livorno to refill their food stores.[30] Regarding Cosimo's troops in and around the Appiani state, Jacopo's brother Alfonso relayed his concerns on 24 January 1558. Apparently, one of Chiappino Vitelli's men – Marco Corso – had stolen horses from the Lazio region and had passed through Piombino's forests before selling them in Tuscany. Alfonso wanted to ensure that Cosimo

[29] Simone Martinelli. "L'arsenale bellico dei presidi spagnoli di Toscana […]," in *Rivista di Storia Finanziaria*, 17 (2006), 94. Concerning Juan de Figueroa's quote, Martinelli cites: AGS Estado Pequeños 1446 f. 34. On Philip II's finances, see especially Mauricio Drelichman and Hans-Joachim Voth. *Lending to the Borrower from Hell* […]. (Princeton, 2014).
[30] ASF MM 541 f. 23-24.

punished this Marco Corso for such a crime.[31] Medici troops alongside Spanish officials and under the Appiani's watchful eye; Medici galleys and Cosimo's *commissario generale* operating in an Appiani port; and Spanish Habsburg galleys seemingly more dependent on Cosimo's ports… Clearly, this was a moment major of transition that featured shifting borders, chains of command, and jurisdiction. In the midst of all of these projects and discussions, however, the war continued.

Shifting diplomacy and the looming war at sea (c. December 1557 – June 1558)

By December 1557, Philip was advised to winter his galleys in Naples alongside the Neapolitan and Sicilian warships. Even though the region lacked victuals and other resources – and the Spanish galleys required repairs and maintenance – the city of Naples itself was well stocked and equipped to look after them. This same note observed that the French in Corsica lacked necessary provisions, but that vessels in Marseilles were preparing to restock the island.[32] Although the conflict had waned in Corsica and most of Piedmont into 1558, it very much continued in Casale Monferrato between Milan and Turin. Furthermore, the French still maintained or had regained control over key territories in southern Siena in the Maremma region – including Montalcino, Grosseto, and Talamone.[33] Combat in the province of Siena sought to determine not only if the French or the Spanish would command central Italy but also the balance between the victorious major power and the duke of Florence. The significant Habsburg and Valois presence in the region proved the greatest threat to Cosimo's hold on Tuscany and Siena – not to mention his dreams of a Medici dynasty and the status of Piombino.[34] In spite of

[31] ASF MM 538 f. 114. Alfonso does not specifically say "Lazo," but rather "Rome."
[32] ADP Bancone 65, no. 1 transcribed in Vargas-Hidalgo. *Guerra y Diplomacia*, 163-164.
[33] Mallett and Shaw. *The Italian Wars*, 279 and notes.
[34] Ivan Tognarini. "La 'guerra di Maremma'" in Rombai, ed. *I Medici e lo Stato Senese*, 23-25 and notes.

this precarious situation, Cosimo once again wasted no time in taking matters into his own hands.

In the midst of his own military and legal battles for Siena, Cosimo actively served as an intermediary for Philip II and the Valois allies in Ferrara and Rome. By May 1558, the remaining French troops left the duchy of Ferrara because Cosimo's daughter Lucrezia married Duke Ercole II's son Prince Alfonso d'Este. Although the Medici duke championed the Habsburg cause on the battlefield and at the negotiating table, his mediation may have masked his true aims – to form a strong counterbalance against them. Until Cosimo managed to quell Duke Ercole II's anti-Spanish aggression, Ferrara had been linked with Venice in hostility to Spain's activities on the peninsula. Moreover, although Pope Paul and the Spanish king had also reached terms through Cosimo's mediation, the duke of Florence could count on the Carafa to remain suspicious of Habsburg intentions. What Cosimo had essentially created in 1558 was an unofficial Italian coalition – Florence, Ferrara, Venice, and the Papacy – that could withstand Habsburg domination.[35] Six months earlier on 4 December 1557, Gómez Suárez de Figueroa, the Spanish ambassador to Genoa, expressed his ongoing suspicions of Cosimo's intentions. At that moment, the duke was in Livorno negotiating his eldest daughter's marriage to Alfonso d'Este. Moreover, Figueroa had heard rumors that Cosimo actively inquired of the French regarding prices for territory in Siena.[36] Clearly, by 1558, the duke of Florence had prepared for several diplomatic scenarios.

When word of a 'Turkish' armada's arrival in Calabria emerged in mid-June 1558, Andrea Doria assured the regent of Spain, Philip's sister Juana of Austria, that he had dispatched a squadron of galleys with 1,000 Italian infantry under *colonello* Quilico

[35] Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena*, 515-516. Also consider Cosimo's relationship with Genoa from Chapter 3.
[36] AGS Estado 1387 f. 75 transcribed in Vargas-Hidalgo. *Guerra y Diplomacia*, 158.

Spinola to Piombino in preparation for an imminent attack. Alongside the Neapolitans and Sicilians, he expressed confidence that they would withstand their oncoming foes.[37] A letter from Jacopo VI Appiani dated 25 June 1558 indicated that this Ottoman armada numbered 110 galleys "*del gran signore*" and 30 "*vasselli di corsali*."[38] Other correspondence to Cosimo dated 24 June 1558 counted as many as 145 enemy galleys.[39] Around this same time, however, Philip was advised that this "Turkish armada" could not "undertake anything of importance in the Kingdom of Naples..." despite its large numbers. Yet, considering this Ottoman presence in southern Italy, the Spanish galleys were recommended to harbor in Genoa.[40] Appiani added that a French *galeotta* laden with provisions made in Piedmont had been spotted in the area as well.[41] With rumors circulating and preparations being made, clearly, the amphibious war was not yet over.

Livorno, Pisa, Elba, and Cosimo's galley fleet (c. February – June 1558)

By 1558, Livorno had become a burgeoning center of commerce and among Cosimo's substantial military investments. Florentine merchants– such as the Capponi and Simon Corsi – alongside others from Genoa and Lucca had established themselves in Livorno. Sardinian vessels regularly delivered cheese imports while Sicilians brought in wheat, sugar, and silk. Ships from Ragusa maintained a widespread, exceptionally organized shipping network and provided a crucial commercial link between Livorno, Egypt, and Spain. In February 1558, a Ragusan ship – "*di mona carena*" – bearing goods from Naples sank in the port of Livorno.[42] It is reasonable to assume that this specific

[37] AGS Estado 1387 f. 44, 18 June 1558 transcribed in Vargas-Hidalgo. *Guerra y Diplomacia*, 192-194.
[38] ASF MM 538, f. 192. Appiani's earlier letter from 16 April detailed this corsair fleet as 25 or 30 vessels from Algeria. See: ASF MM 538 f. 141.
[39] ASF MP 471 f. 723. This letter also mentions that French forces in Thionville set to move against Philip and Queen Mary of England totaled 16,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry, and 60 cannon.
[40] ADP Bancone 65 No. 1, 21 June 1558 transcribed in Vargas-Hidalgo. *Guerra y Diplomacia*, 194-196.
[41] ASF MM 538 f. 193.
[42] Fernand Braudel and Ruggiero Romano. *Navires et Marchandises à l'entrée du Port de Livourne (1547-1611)*. (Paris, 1951), 32-38.

episode offers a glimpse into the wider maritime traffic coming to and from Livorno in this turbulent period.

The jewel of Cosimo's holdings, Portoferraio on Elba, also witnessed improvements during this time. In May 1558, Gabrio Serbelloni inspected and further reinforced the fortress on Falcone – one of the hills overlooking the harbor. Records from Cosimo's *Carteggio Universale* also preserve a sketch of fortification works by a certain Captain Lionardo Colucci which may have been tied to the works on Elba. Yet, by no means were these projects 'smooth sailing.' In October 1558, Giovanni Camerini reported that he lacked bricks to complete the rooms in the Stella fortifications – the other hill overlooking Portoferraio's harbor. Work had also begun on the *biscotteria* to supply rations for Cosimo's fleet. Its 8 ovens and grain warehouse were set to be completed the next year.[43]

Since Spain frequently requested aid from the Tuscan navy – and Cosimo perceived that this need would likely increase in subsequent years – the duke decided to focus on constructing and arming his own vessels instead of purchasing them. In 1558, Cosimo had 6 galleys: the *Pisana*, *Fiorenza*, *Toscana*, *Centuriona* (the renamed *San Giovanni*), and the recently constructed *Lupa* and *Elbigina*.[44] These were equally part of Cosimo's defense system as much as they were pieces in his diplomatic game with Philip.

By this point, Tuscany's naval – and overall military – expenses had gotten out of control. Thus, Cosimo had promoted Piero Machiavelli as his *commissario generale* in hopes of getting a better grip on his finances. Moreover, the duke's contract with the

[43] Fara. *Portoferraio*, 3-6, 12-13, 16-19, 23-24. Regarding the records in Cosimo's *Carteggio Universale*, see ASF MP 471 f. 444 and 884v. Lionardo's sketch is only dated 16 June, but the documents on either side of it are dated 1558. Folio 884v may be by Serbelloni's own hand. Based on the way that these documents are bound, it is clear that this Forte Falcone drawing is part of another document much earlier in the sequence – perhaps a letter explaining its context. However, determining this would require the archivists to unbind the entire collection. ASF MP 471's index notes include several entries by Serbelloni.
[44] Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 54-55.

Centurione expired in 1558. In negotiating a three-year renewal contract, Cosimo likely intentionally set high standards – knowing full well that the Centurione would never agree to them – so that he could completely control his galley administration. Even though Machiavelli assumed many of Marco Centurione's duties, the Genoese expert remained 'on board' as an advisor and commander. This transition was finalized by late 1558 when Piero Machiavelli was promoted to *provveditore*.[45]

As this shift was underway in late May 1558, Machiavelli detailed the contents aboard each of Cosimo's galleys. Some of these were missing key elements. For example, the 25-bench *Capitana*[46] had 150 oars and an additional 8 for the skiff, but the commissioner never mentioned a skiff – unlike his notes for the *Fiorenza*, *Toscana*, and *Pisana*. The *Toscana*'s report only mentioned 37 oars. Similarly, the *Elbigina* and the *Centuriona* lacked a skiff, and both also lacked their oars. Numbers of water barrels varied as well. The *Capitana* bore 160, the *Fiorenza* 97, the *Toscana* 110, the *Pisana* 107, the *Centuriona* 160, and the *Elbigina* 70. Perhaps some of these containers were different sizes, however, Piero's records for the *Capitana* and the *Toscana* specified their barrels to be "*di carat 12*." Considering that the *Capitana* had 25 benches per side and the *Toscana* had 24 – comparable sizes – their 50-barrel difference meant significantly less water available for each man aboard the *Toscana*. One could elaborate upon every single item aboard from masts and sails to cooking and medical equipment. Nevertheless, these three key items: oars, skiffs, and water barrels clearly varied from vessel to vessel.[47]

Of course, this same inventory also accounted for weapons and artillery. All had a centerline cannon accompanied by anywhere between 10 and 14 other pieces.

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[45] Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 53. See also Raymond E. Role. "Cosimo de'Medici's Holy Navy" in *MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History* Volume 15, Issue 1 (Autumn 2002), 76-86.
[46] This flagship was one of the other named vessels much as the *Pisana* was the *Padrona* or vice-flagship.
[47] ASF MP 2131 ins. 1. The pages in this collection are not numbered (nn), however, this inventory literally begins on the first page through page 19.

Additionally, 5 of them included between 14 and 17 "*mascholi*"[48] – which likely refer to swivel guns or other light firearms. By comparison, Genoese, Ottoman, and Barbary galleys were lightly armed. Although some Ottoman and Barbary vessels carried as many as 7 to 13 guns, many possessed 3, and in some cases, only one artillery piece.[49] In 1560, the Genoese flagship galley *Capitana* accompanied her heavy centerline gun with 6 artillery pieces.[50] The Medici *Capitana* from 1558, on the other hand, had a 13-gun accompaniment – literally double the firepower of a comparable Genoese vessel: 7 *smeriglio* of various calibers, 2 *canon petrero*, 2 *sagro*, and 2 *mortarietto* in addition to the *canone di corsia*. In fact, all Medici galleys had 12 or more accompanying guns except for the *Fiorenza* which had 10.[51] Clearly, Cosimo's vessels outgunned their opponents and their tentative Genoese allies.

By comparison, this level of ordnance was typical for Venetian galleys. Although each vessel's armament varied, the large centerline gun always went to battle with a vast accompaniment. Usually, this arrangement included 6 medium guns at the bow; 2 light guns at the aft; and sometimes several medium or light pieces along the sides. Additionally, between 6 and 36 mounted one-pounder swivel guns protected the galley's flanks.[52] Pantero Pantera's seventeenth-century treatise on naval warfare praised Venice's galley armament system and her effective way of circumventing boarding tactics:

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[48] ASF MP 2131 ins. 1, nn.
[49] Gábor Ágoston. *Guns for the Sultan* […]. (New York, 2009), 52-53 (table 2.3), 74-85. See also Capponi. *Victory of the West*, 188 and notes.
[50] Renato Gianni Ridella. "Genoese Ordnance Aboard Galleys and Merchantmen in the 16th Century," in Carlo Beltrame and Renato Gianni Ridella, eds. *Ships & Guns* […]. (Oxford, 2011), 50-52. Ridella cites Archivio di Stato di Genova *Magistrato delle Galee* f. 1, 18 July 1560 which records this *Capitana*'s sale to Cosimo. Although I have accounted for all of the artillery Ridella mentions, it is entirely reasonable to suspect that she had been armed with even more pieces before being sold. (i.e. these numbers reflect a 'stripped' Genoese galley)
[51] ASF MP 2131 ins. 1, nn.
[52] Marco Morin. "Artiglierie navali in ambito veneziano […]," in *Quaderni di Oplologia*, XXIII-2, (2006), 19-24. See also his chapter "Morphology and Constructive Techniques […]" in Beltrame and Ridella's *Ships & Guns*.

multiple small artillery pieces along the sides.[53] In addition to artillery, troops provided supplemental firepower. Venetian galleys uniquely built defensive structures along the sides where soldiers could rest and aim their firearms. The Spanish and Ottoman galleys only built such defenses fore and aft.[54] It is unclear which defensive structures the Medici vessels implemented. Yet, the 1558 records also list the small arms aboard. All of Cosimo's galleys carried at least 37 arquebuses. Two of them carried 61 and 84 – the *Capitana* and the *Centuriona* respectively. Additionally, 4 of them also armed between 7 and 10 muskets (*archibusi da posta*).[55]

In general, the numbers of artillery and firearms aboard distinguished Venetian galleys from their contemporaries. Based on the numbers of guns aboard Cosimo's galleys, however, it appears that they implemented similar tactical considerations and gun placement. Venetians typically accompanied their centerline cannons with at least 10 lighter pieces, and as already mentioned, the centerline guns on Cosimo's warships usually had at least 12 accompanying pieces. Additionally, 5 of his galleys matched the Venetians in terms of the number of swivel guns. The Republic's galleys were considered the most heavily armed in the Mediterranean. According to Piero Machiavelli's records, however, it appears that Florence also considered gunpowder technology as the answer to the sixteenth-century Mediterranean military situation. Although on opposite sides of the Italian peninsula, Cosimo and Venice faced similar circumstances. Both were small, wealthy, independent states that confronted the Habsburgs, the Ottomans, Barbary corsairs, and the French. Perhaps they could not match these kingdoms and empires in

[53] Pantero Pantera. *L'armata navale* […]. (Rome, 1614), 85-92. Special thanks to Niccolò Capponi for clarifying the meaning of Pantera's text.
[54] J. R. Hale. "Men and Weapons […]," in Brian Bond and Ian Roy, eds. *War and Society*. (London, 1975), 14.
[55] ASF MP 2131 ins. 1, nn.

manpower, but they could use military technology and expertise to weigh the balance a little further in their favor.[56]

Alongside these itemized lists, Piero Machiavelli's letter to Cosimo on 2 June 1558 detailed some of his other administrative duties during this same period. Before he and Marco Centurione had journeyed to Livorno to assess the defenses, Cosimo's *commissario generale* explained that 390 convicts ("*mariuoli*") manned 3 of his galleys. Moreover, he had delivered some funds and supplies to Porto Ercole – where there were apparently some disagreements among the officials. Interestingly, he had also patrolled the waters between Elba and Giglio – and escorted some ill-provisioned galleys – because of a mysterious vessel ("*navetto*") spotted in the area.[57] On another encounter with corsair vessels, the *commissario generale* requested and was granted 25 *soldati* from Porto Ercole to ensure adequate numbers of troops.[58]

Writing on 22 June 1558, Marco Centurione relayed the details of his own recent mission to the *Presidios*. From Livorno, he had stopped between the island of Giglio and the isle of Giannutri ("*Géa*") before reaching Porto Ercole. He embarked *soldati* to reinforce the 430 Spanish troops at Orbetello. Centurione added that, upon arriving there, the commander "remained very happy with the assistance that we brought him." He emphasized that "I provided for all of those places very well" and added that "in Orbetello…360 Spaniards [are ready] for combat and [I have] more than 120 [additional troops] for them…" He also discussed Camerini's work on the port's fortifications.

[56] I investigated the Venetian side of this perspective in my master's thesis: *Viva San Marco* […]. (High Point University, 2014).
[57] ASF MP 471 f. 310.
[58] ASF *Carte Strozzione* (CS) prima serie (I) 145 f. 5-6.

Centurione had apparently offered to bring some convicts ("*marriaolli*"), but Camerini did not feel that they were necessary to help with the construction.[59]

Indeed, the details in these accounts regarding Piero Machiavelli and Marco Centurione are seemingly routine. Yet, they hint to at least one insight regarding Medici geo-strategy. In both examples, the *Presidios* and Tuscan defenses are clearly depicted as part of one system. In other words, there is not a clear demarcation between a 'Medici' and 'Habsburg' sphere. The 25 Spanish troops lent by the *governatore* of Porto Ercole to Machiavelli and the 120 or more troops provided by Marco Centurione to Orbetello are an obvious piece of evidence to support this notion. Additionally, although the details lack context, Machiavelli's account of his visit to Porto Ercole in early June 1558 makes it very clear that money and supplies were exchanged between Habsburg and Medici officials. Moreover, Centurione had offered to provide Camerini – the Medici engineer – with supplemental labor for the ongoing defensive works at the Spanish *Presidios*. Porto Ercole and Orbetello did not belong to Cosimo, but his forces unmistakably formed a symbiotic bond with Philip's. At the very least, while a 'Turkish armada" posed an imminent threat along the coast in the summer of 1558, Spain and Tuscany cooperated to maintain security.

The 1558 galley inventory referenced Marco Centurione's aforementioned 'handing over the galleys' to Piero Machiavelli. As Centurione officially stepped down from his position, he corresponded with Cosimo regarding several issues. Organized with Roman numerals, this document is clearly a reply to an earlier letter or conversation with Cosimo which has not yet surfaced. Thus, most of Centurione's points lack proper

[59] ASF MP 471 f. 693. Centurione refers to Camerini as "Camerino." On the interaction of Medici and Spanish/Appiani forces, Andrea Doria expected the duke of Florence to outfit a Habsburg strike force when it arrived in Piombino in June 1558. See AGS Estado 1387 f. 44, 18 June 1558, Andrea Doria to Philip's sister and the regent of Spain, Juana of Austria, transcribed in Vargas-Hidalgo. *Guerra y Diplomacia*, 192-194.

context. Nevertheless, some provide exceptional insight. For example, his third and seventh points uncover difficulties regarding the numbers of oarsmen; their term of active service during the summer months; and their health. On a similar note, Marco's sixth point also regards *forzati*, and most notably, problems relating to managing the slaves and meeting payroll obligations for some of the workers in Cosimo's *arsenale*. Further regarding finances, Centurione's ninth point elaborates on the licenses required for purchasing wheat. Marco emphasized that "these things that I buy…are not for anything else but for the galleys." Again, significant context is missing from this account, but point three also makes references to licenses that may have been counterfeits which "bring harm and they do not serve [Cosimo]."[60] Even though many details are lacking, the overall tone of this letter indicates a functioning navy complete with administrative issues regarding manpower, finances, and potentially unauthorized licenses. Moreover, Centurione felt compelled to prove to Cosimo that he had not abused his position by spending Medici money on anything besides its intended purpose. Naval accounting records between 1556 and 1558 indicate that Marco Centurione had been paid 49,700 ducats – at least part of it in gold – to supplement the expenses he had accrued administrating Cosimo's galley squadron.[61]

Cosimo prepares for another onslaught and consolidates Siena (c. May – October 1558)

During that same summer of 1558, the Ottoman-Barbary fleet under Piali Pasha and Dragut moved on Tuscany after ransacking the Neapolitan coast. By June, they had captured 12,000 slaves along the Calabrian and Neapolitan shorelines. Correspondence to

[60] ASF MP 2077 ins. 1 f. 101-104. This document is not dated except as "1558." However, the sixth point concludes with: "…to the *forzati* I do not have to make another change [but] I can still [make them…] at the time of handing over [your] galleys if needed." Similarly, point eight mentions the *commissario* as another person. These statements imply that this document dates from around the time of Centurione's handover to Machiavelli.
[61] ASF MP 2077 ins. 1 f. 82.

Cosimo lamented that they had taken at least "4,000 souls or more without ransom."[62] This massive fleet of 140 vessels prompted all of Elba to retreat to the safety of Portoferraio's walls. Charles V urgently wrote to Don Juan de Molina to ensure that the utmost defensive measures were being taken. Considering the danger, Cosimo discussed the sad state of the Spanish *Presidios* along the Tuscan and Sienese coast – especially Porto Ercole – with the duke of Alba in Livorno. Together, they convinced Philip to allocate 10,000 ducats from Naples to refortify the Tuscan coast. Chiappino Vitelli led a team of engineers and other workers – at least 1,500 men – to reinforce Forte Filippo (at Porto Ercole), Orbetello, Piombino, and Portoferraio. In the meantime, Cosimo's galley captain, Simeone Rossermini, brought 500 troops to Campiglia but was explicitly ordered not to cross into the Appiani state unless Jacopo VI requested his help.[63]

As preparations for the incoming 'Turkish armada' had been underway in May 1558, Jacopo personally wrote to Cosimo to assure him "how much my belongings are protected…" Moreover, he emphasized that defensive works would be expedited as much as possible, and that construction on the *Forte de la Cittadella* was finished – at least for the time being. Yet, until the recent shipment of iron had arrived, he had been unable to dig a defensive ditch. Nevertheless, the young Signore Appiani promised Cosimo that "I do everything I can and I give [you] thanks for the offers [you] make me" – even if those offers amounted to "works for [your] own purposes."[64] By that June, Jacopo revealed that the 500 troops under "Captain Simeone" manned his fortress along with at least 2 *sagri* with 27 cannonballs and 4 *archibusi da posta* defending the walls. Although he had lead

[62] ASF MP 471 f. 723, 24 June 1558.
[63] Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena*, 516-517; and Angiolini. "Lo Stato di Piombino," 134. See also Tognarini. "La 'guerra di Maremma'," 23-25 and notes; and Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 52-53. The Neapolitan coast is also known as the Campania.
[64] ASF MM 538 f. 179, 28 May 1558.

for shot, he lacked pikes and gunpowder. Regarding the latter, he continued by emphasizing that "artillery is [of utmost] importance during war."[65]

Even though Siena had already built and modernized many coastal fortresses in the fifteenth century, these understandably required substantial updates and repairs by the mid-sixteenth century. Construction for Forte Filippo in Porto Ercole began in 1558 under the direction of Chiappino Vitelli and Giovanni Camerini. Part of the Siena agreement included Cosimo's obligations to provide men and materials for the king of Spain. This not only included troops but also specialists, workers, and money. By late August 1558, the work at Porto Ercole had already cost 5,593 *scudi*. This coincided with construction and restoration work on the lookout towers – which were part of the coastal defense system – along with refitting Piombino's fortifications.[66]

Expecting the incoming 'Turkish armada' in June 1558, Luca Martini noted the artillery in Livorno. Moreover, he emphasized that Piero Machiavelli desired to transfer a few pieces of artillery from Pisa to strengthen Livorno's defenses.[67] As 13 Neapolitan galleys arrived in Livorno – presumably a defensive move against the imminent threat – Martini expressed that he, Machiavelli, and Marco Centurione had discussed Livorno's defenses. In his letter to the duke, Martini underscored that he greatly desired Cosimo's perspective on the matter – whether or not he should proceed with further diminishing Pisa's defenses for Livorno's sake.[68] Cosimo ultimately ensured that all of his towers and fortresses were resupplied with artillery and ammunition. Additionally, Captain Domeninco Rinuccini garrisoned Livorno while a cavalry corps guarded the mouth of the Arno. During the summer of 1558, the galleys departed seven times from Livorno to

[65] ASF MM 538 f. 188, 20 and 22 June 1558.
[66] Franco Angiolini. "I Presidios di Toscana […]" in Enrique Garcia Hernan and Davide Maffi, eds. *Guerra y sociedad en la monarquia hispanica* Volume I […]. (Madrid, 2006), 180.
[67] ASF MP 471 f. 460, 14 June 1558. Specifically, Machiavelli wanted to move 2 *sagri* and 2 *moschetti grossi*.
[68] ASF MP 471 f. 459, 14 June 1558.

transport the troops, weapons, ammunition, and other provisions necessary for the *Presidios* to withstand the imminent attack. As a result, and especially without support from the French fleet, the Ottomans found these places extremely well-defended. After a few scouts aboard a *fregate* reported back regarding the state of Cosimo's defenses, Piali Pasha and Dragut stopped in Porto Longone on Elba for one night and immediately left for Corsica and the Balearic Islands. In the end, they only managed to launch minor assaults on Minorca and Nice. By 1 August, they were en-route to the Levant. Not only had the duke of Florence and Siena bolstered his holdings on the Tuscan and Sienese coast and Elba, but these efforts had also presented him as a strong, capable leader who needed to be taken seriously at the negotiating table.[69] Indeed, he was demonstrating himself as the key defender of the Tyrrhenian Sea.

Having protected Tuscany and Siena through careful planning, Cosimo sought to root out the last pockets of resistance in Siena: the Republic of Montalcino inland and Castiglione della Pescaia on the coast. Especially given the new alliance between the Medici and the d'Este family, the rebel leader Don Francesco d'Este tried to make it very clear that his war was against Spain *not* Cosimo. Nevertheless, Montalcino's resistance against Medici forces continued until late July 1558. By early August, the Republic of Montalcino surrendered and was transferred to Siena's governor Angelo Niccolini and another one of Cosimo's *procuratori* (jurists), Federigo di Montauto. In the midst of this, Jacopo Appiani was officially reinstated as Lord of Piombino on 1 August.[70]

Strategically speaking, the Medici duke understood that Talamone – to the south of Piombino – was the last available port for the remaining French under Francesco d'Este. Moreover, this holding was explicitly mentioned among Philip II's new Tuscan

[69] Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena*, 516-517. See also Tognarini. "La 'guerra di Maremma'," 23-25 and notes; and Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 52-53.
[70] Marrara and Rossi. "Lo Stato di Siena tra Impero," 34; and Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena*, 517-519.

and Sienese *Presidios*. Therefore, securing it remained Spain's responsibility. A Spanish expedition force under Don Sancio de Leyva embarked from Naples in September 1558; landed in Porto Ercole; and joined forces with the Medici contingent under Chiappino Vitelli and Simeone Rossermini. By 5 September, the 35-man French garrison of Talamone – weakened by malaria and demoralized by over a year's arrears in wages – surrendered. Castiglione della Pescaia capitulated the following day. Cosimo unsurprisingly took advantage of the situation. He managed to purchase Castiglione della Pescaia and the island of Giglio for 30,000 *scudi* in October. Through connections from his wife Eleanor de Toledo, the region's legitimate owner and traditional enemy of Spain and Florence – the marchese di Capestrano and duca d'Amalfi, Don Indico Piccolomini – granted Cosimo this favor. While dealing with this acquisition, Cosimo initiated the slow process of literally rebuilding the state of Siena.[71] The War of Siena was finally over, but ominous plots in Philip's court accompanied these military and personal successes.

The shifting sands of another peace agreement (c. November 1558 – April 1559)

By late 1558 into 1559, things on the international stage seemingly shifted against Cosimo yet again. Philip II's wife Queen Mary of England died and her half-sister Elizabeth ascended the throne. This not only deprived Spain of an important ally in northern Europe but also opened up discussions for the king of Spain to marry King Henri II's daughter Elisabeth. The titans that Cosimo had played against each other to benefit himself were set to become family. With the passing of Charles V in late 1558, Cosimo sent Chiappino Vitelli to offer his condolences but to also ensure that Philip would not renege on their agreement regarding Siena – which based on his previous

[71] Caciagli. *Stato dei Presidi*, 76; and Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena*, 517-519. Regarding the aforementioned actions of Piero Machiavelli and Marco Centurione during the summer of 1558, it was also already apparent that the isle of Giglio provided Cosimo with another strategic holding for coastal patrols. Both Machiavelli and Centurione mentioned it as a stepping stone during their respective missions.

experiences must have seemed a plausible scenario. Although Philip had already decided in Cosimo's favor by February 1559, it was not until the Habsburgs and Valois formally opened their peace agreement for Italy – Cateau Cambrésis[72] – in April that these confirmed details emerged. [73]

As Philip consolidated and reassessed his finances in the mid-late 1550s, negotiations regarding Spain's enormous debt also put the king's business with Genoese brokers – particularly the Centurione – in jeopardy. In the midst of these discussions, the Centurione felt that their years of loyal service – which amounted to at least a million ducats outstanding in 1557 – had been brushed aside.[74] Ultimately, however, Philip had previously been reminded to "measure the services [Adamo Centurione] has done."[75] Moreover, this advice emphasized the "[great] credit [Adamo Centurione] has in this land which your majesty must continuously use" and added that Signore Adamo "[had] always served in a manner [that was conducive for] your majesty for much money."[76] These statements echoed into 1560: "Mr. Adam Centurione has always served his crown and how faithfully Marco his son has provided […] the same service."[77] Moreover, Adamo Centurione had significantly contributed to the Corsican front of the Italian Wars, and as he transitioned out of Cosimo's service, Marco Centurione moved on to personally

[72] A final copy from 3 April 1559 can be found in Spain's Archivo Histórico Nacional ESTADO, 2776, Exp. 7 and can be viewed online via PARES, reference code: ES.28079.AHN//ESTADO,2776, Exp. 7. The metadata for another copy "Tratado de Cateau Cambresis firmado el 2 de abril de 1559 entre España, Francia e Inglaterra," composed between 7 March 1558 – 3 April 1559 can also be accessed via PARES.
[73] Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena*, 520-524. Regarding the lengthy Siena negotiations, see Marrara and Rossi. "Lo Stato di Siena tra Impero," 23, 30-34, 38-43.
[74] Ildefonso Pulido Bueno, *El gran mercader y la corte real del Renacimiento* […]. (Huelva, 2004), 149-156, 161-163, 210 and notes. For an example of these negotiations see also AGS Estado 1386 f. 78, Gómez Suárez de Figueroa, ambassador in Genoa, to Philip II, 18 July 1557 transcribed in Vargas-Hidalgo. *Guerra y Diplomacia*, 138-140.
[75] AGS Estado 1386 f. 71, Andrea Doria to Philip II, 13 November 1557 transcribed in Vargas-Hidalgo. *Guerra y Diplomacia*, 155-156.
[76] AGS Estado 1386 f. 10, Andrea Doria to Philip II, 18 November 1557 transcribed in Vargas-Hidalgo. *Guerra y Diplomacia*, 156-157.
[77] AGS Estado 1389 f. 60, Andrea Doria to Philip II, 26 April 1560 transcribed in Vargas-Hidalgo. *Guerra y Diplomacia*, 312.

command 4 galleys for Philip II.[78] Again, this period witnessed simultaneous changes and transfers of power wherein the respective sovereigns reassessed their accounts, military defenses, and their designated leadership. Many tried to persuade Philip to also reassess his relationship with the duke of Florence and Siena.

Among other plots against Cosimo, Masino del Bene, a representative of Florentine exiles in Lyon, presented evidence that the duke of Florence had concurrently worked with the Habsburgs and the French during the War of Siena – which of course was true. These exiles offered the Spanish king 2 million gold *scudi* to remove Cosimo as duke of Florence and instead make him the ruler of a domain within the kingdom of Naples with a 100,000 *scudi* annuity. Additionally, they suggested that Spain should consolidate control over Tuscany by taking Livorno and Pisa. Indeed, this offer tempted Philip; however, his proceedings with Cosimo were already too far along to consider this. In Siena, opponents of Medici rule continually turned to the d'Este of Ferrara, Pope Paul IV, and King Henri II to rule their state.[79] Nevertheless, Florentine and Habsburg representatives pressed on with finalizing the minute details regarding Cosimo's ducal title over Siena.

During these exchanges and schemes in 1558 and 1559, Cosimo's primary point of contention was ensuring that Tricosto (Capalbiaccio) – less than 18 miles inland from Porto Ercole – was included in his portion of Siena. Moreover, there remained many legal fees and other financial issues to discuss between the duke and his ministers – not to mention between Cosimo and Philip. Florentine representatives, ambassadors, and jurists found themselves corresponding and visiting the Spanish and imperial Habsburg courts,

[78] Pulido Bueno, *El gran mercader*, 210-212. See also ADP Bancone 65 No. 2 transcribed in Vargas-Hidalgo. *Guerra y Diplomacia*, 400-401. The Duke of Terranova and Viscount Cicala are discussed in Vargas-Hidalgo's glossary on pp. CIII-CIV and CXLIV-CXLVI respectively.
[79] Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena*, 520-524. Regarding the lengthy Siena negotiations, see Marrara and Rossi. "Lo Stato di Siena tra Impero," 23. See also pp. 30-34, 38-43.

the pope, and in some cases, the Valois. Even though the fighting had ended, officially conceding Siena to Cosimo required Emperor Ferdinand to renew his late brother Charles's original decree. Moreover, a great number of other nuanced negotiations still remained unresolved.[80] Needless to say, the Siena issue contained its fair share of intricacies over the following months and years.

As early as 1558, an observer in Naples also expressed concern over the duke of Florence's influence in Liguria. Apparently, Cosimo had constructed a castle along the Magra River at a point between Pontremoli and the coastal region of La Spezia to control movement from Lombardy to Naples. Considering Medici influence over the region, this observer underlined the importance of the *Presidios* at "Ponblín" (Piombino), Porto Ercole, and Orbetello as safe ports for Habsburg galleys traveling between Spain and Naples.[81] From this observer's perspective, Cosimo's presence in Liguria threated to impede the movement of Spanish-Habsburg forces. Fortified holdings such as the one Cosimo had built ensured economic and military influence over their surroundings. As the observer had made clear in his letter, however, the *Presidios* around Monte Argentario and Talamone were parts of a military system to control the Tyrrhenian and, arguably, the Mediterranean. Moreover, severing these coastal holdings and Piombino from Cosimo's control demonstrated their perceived strategic importance.[82] They represented – and effectively guaranteed – Spanish dominance over the movement of money and might in the region.

[80] Marrara and Rossi. "Lo Stato di Siena tra Impero," 30-32, 38-43.
[81] Giuseppe Coniglio. *Il viceregno di Napoli* […] Volume 1. (Naples, 1987), 93. Coniglio cites this document as *Consigli per il Governo di Napoli*, AGS Estado *Nápoles* 1049 f. 145. This section mentioning the duke of Florence is an excerpt of a larger document from pp. 87-100. It is undated, but Coniglio places it between 1558-1571.
[82] Ivano Tognarini. "Orbatello, I Presidios di Toscana e il Mediterraneo […]" in Guarducci, ed. *Orbetello e i Presidios*, 105-107.

In some respects, the duke of Florence had been left with the scraps. It was acceptable for Spain to control the maritime routes such as the Piombino channel and those ports along the Siense coastline. Yet, as the Neapolitan observer indicated, similar moves on Cosimo's behalf were viewed with the utmost suspicion. Moreover, Cosimo had gotten his military forces – including his galleys – entangled in an alarmingly 'feudal' arrangement with Philip regarding Siena. Under the shrewd guidance of Piero Machiavelli, the duke worked towards offsetting at least some of these constraints.

Piero Machiavelli and Cosimo discuss a solution (c. 1557-1558)

In 1560 – and perhaps as early as 1557[83] – the *provveditore* outlined his vision for Cosimo's role in the Mediterranean. Overall, he observed that if the duke could add more vessels to his fleet, he could become "the needle in the balance" in future conflicts between the Habsburgs and the Valois – which considering how all of the other peace agreements had gone must have seemed imminent. From Piero Machiavelli's view, Cateau Cambrésis would be short-lived. Machiavelli also encouraged Cosimo to cultivate an alliance with the papacy.[84]

Piero began his recommendations by discussing Tuscany's powerful neighbors on land. Even though Genoa and Lucca harbored many of Cosimo's enemies, they could not completely deprive him of the three essentials for war: provisions, money, and soldiers. Moreover, he emphasized that all efforts should be made to maintain good relations with their neighbors to the south – the duke of Ferrara and especially the church. Regarding the latter, Piero commented that "she needs the arms of a friend who can help her [… Every pope] will love the friendship of your excellency." Here and later on, he revealed

[83] Amico. *La Vita di Niccolo Machiavelli* indicates 1560 whereas Marco Gemignani in the DBdI suggests the earlier date. Both in conversation and in his article "Guns and Profit" in Beltrame and Ridella, eds. *Ships & Guns*, Niccolò Capponi entertains the idea that Machiavelli's letter to Cosimo could have been composed as early as 1556 or 1557.
[84] Gemignani. "The Navies of the Medici," 173 and notes.

that these alliances and friendships would rest upon the reputation of Medici arms and government. Thus, good relationships with one's neighbors was the fourth essential ingredient for victory in war. Machiavelli advised that Cosimo provide the pope with 6 armed galleys along with enough *forzati* for all of them. He proclaimed that providing these warships would be "a Christian thing […] the assumption of [the Holy Father's] defense by land and sea." Furthermore, in expectation of continued conflict in Italy, such strength could keep the French and Spanish – "who fight together for a perpetual enmity [… that] will last as long as the world lasts" – out of Tuscany. Additionally, the duke needed to consider the possibility of "the Turk, who occupies the Barbary area, […drawing] over the kingdoms of Valencia and of Granada." In both cases, Machiavelli observed "we therefore have to believe that their affairs [which have endured] for a few centuries, must remain in being for the present." Whenever a "respite for four or six years […arose]," Cosimo was advised to "regain [his] strength; [because inevitably] this truce or peace will break." Machiavelli pointed to the recent conflict involving the Carafa as but one example.[85]

Before continuing to a discussion of naval affairs, Piero summarized his observations thus far. He stated that maintaining friendship with one's neighbors from a position of military strength essentially killed three birds with one stone. A strong army facilitated alliances; enabled a leader to use his might as a marketable commodity; and obviously, encouraged one to build up his forces and troops.[86] There remained one more topic of discussion – one that occupied at least half of Piero Machiavelli's letter.

[85] Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale di Firenze (BNCF) *Magliabechi* E. B. 15.10, f. 176r-179v, *Codice di Giuliano De Ricci,* transcribed in Amico. *La Vita di Niccolo Machiavelli*, 667-671.
[86] BNCF *Magliabechi* E. B. 15.10, f. 176r-179v transcribed in Amico. *La Vita di Niccolo Machiavelli*, 670-671. As far as provisions were concerned, Machiavelli emphasized the combined roles of agriculture and a "lucky star."

"Affairs of the sea, that is two-thirds of the game" he quipped. According to Piero, a navy not only served its owner as a useful weapon and tool, but also offered "benefit and convenience for the imperials" – unlike Gian Andrea Doria who "obeys [money] more than any other man."[87] Indeed, contemporaries and subsequent historians regarded the Genoese as mere sell-swords – or more fittingly 'sell-ships' – concerned with little more than profit. The Doria were skilled sailors and politicians, and they were unquestionably motivated by their commercial interests and investments. After all, their galleys and crews were very expensive, and Genoese admirals' decisions were often completely tied to finances rather than political and religious loyalties.[88] Machiavelli implored Cosimo not to allow the Genoese galleys to outshine his own, and in that arena, the Medici duke should become the "*primi principij*." He emphasized that Cosimo should directly own and control the galleys, arms, and manpower. Once again, Piero mentioned the likelihood of France and Spain reigniting the conflict within five or six years, and that 10, 12, or even 20 galleys complete with adequate manpower would motivate the kings of France and Spain "to buy the friendship of your excellency." Especially with regard to the Habsburgs, Machiavelli viewed a substantial fleet as "the true way to cleanse Tuscany of all of their *Presidios*"[89] – an early statement of what became a policy for Cosimo and his successors.

With these lofty goals in mind, Piero then outlined how Cosimo could go about accomplishing them. He assured the duke of his ability to finance a reasonable level of galley construction – vessels that would last six or eight years – and hire the appropriate manpower. For 16 galleys, he advised Cosimo to acquire all of Elba from the Appiani and

[87] BNCF *Magliabechi* E. B. 15.10, f. 176r-179v transcribed in Amico. *La Vita di Niccolo Machiavelli*, 671 including note 1.
[88] See Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 71 for a historiographical example of this perspective.
[89] BNCF *Magliabechi* E. B. 15.10, f. 176r-179v transcribed in Amico. *La Vita di Niccolo Machiavelli*, 671-673.

arrange for them to cooperatively manage and finance 8 galleys – with the Medici directly paying for 2 of them. Similarly, he recommended that 6 galleys be jointly managed with the church, and again, Tuscany could pay for 2 of them. The remaining 2 galleys would form the basis for Cosimo's personal squadron to use as he saw fit in Livorno and Portoferraio. In other words, Machiavelli had determined a way for Cosimo to have a fleet of 16 warships but only pay for 6 of them.[90]

From a practical standpoint, he estimated that with 4,000 ducats every year, Cosimo could hire adequate *maestranza* (arms administrators) to build 3 galley hulls annually. Moreover, this would also pay for 50 *maestri d'ascia* (woodworkers) and *calefati* (caulkers). His further recommendations included reducing the Portoferrario garrison by 50 troops and permitting these soldiers to live there instead. Additionally, he suggested that 1,000 or even 1,500 Tuscan orphans could be apprenticed to the shipyards on Elba. Within six or eight years' time, Piero Machiavelli envisioned Cosimo possessing a fleet of 15 galleys with another 15 in the arsenals complete with a pool of competent mariners. His concluding tone presented this project in terms of defending Christendom against the Turks.[91] This was not seen as idle speculation by an armchair strategist with no experience of actual naval warfare. An account of his successes against two corsair *galeotte* emphasized that "Machiavelli is a great sailor."[92] Similarly, Cosimo's agent Francesco Vinta described him as "intelligent and practical…" when he witnessed Piero surveying the port in Piombino in August 1557.[93] His experience before overseeing the Medici navy – and the competence demonstrated once he assumed this position – only bolstered his advice to the Medici duke.

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[90] BNCF *Magliabechi* E. B. 15.10, f. 176r-179v transcribed in Amico. *La Vita di Niccolo Machiavelli*, 673.
[91] BNCF *Magliabechi* E. B. 15.10, f. 176r-179v transcribed in Amico. *La Vita di Niccolo Machiavelli*, 673-674.
[92] ASF CS I 145 f. 5-6.
[93] ASF MM 541 f. 23-24. Cited earlier, this document is dated 3 August 1557.

Around this same time, and likely after taking Piero Machiavelli's words to heart, Cosimo composed a *memoria* (memorandum) addressed to the future rulers of Tuscany. Although it is not dated, Cosimo certainly composed this note sometime between 1557 and early 1560, and the earlier dates are usually favored.[94] Although the duke's memorandum primarily focused on eventually establishing a Tuscan military religious order, he also identified two "*cose delle arme*" that could make the dukes of Florence "of honorable grade": a cavalry militia and a galley fleet.[95] In practical terms, both of these concerned his coastal defenses. A well-organized, professional cavalry force could swiftly respond to corsair incursions and bridge the gap between the galleys and watchtowers. Other Mediterranean powers had adopted this same defensive model, and years before writing this *memoria*, Cosimo had already established the "*lance*," a group of mounted knights headquartered in Pisa. Nevertheless, this unit proved inadequate to monitor the Tuscan coast, let alone the newly expanded Medici domains in Siena. Moreover, scouting and shoreline defenses comprised only part of their duties, and Cosimo wanted to ensure that he maintained a dependable cavalry to compliment his highly-regarded infantry militias[96] – especially considering the likelihood that the Habsburg-Valois conflict would reignite in the coming years.

The remainder of this note concerned "*delle cose del mare*" – his galley fleet. In addition to the 6 galleys which would eventually comprise the fleet of his *religione* (religious order), Cosimo emphatically stated that "the duke of Florence will keep better

[94] Franco Angiolini. *I cavalieri e il principe* […]. (Florence, 1996), 9-11, 16. See also Role. "Cosimo de Medici's Holy Navy." Angiolini justifies a 1557 or 1558 date because the *memoria* largely focuses on a religious order (i.e. the Order of Santo Stefano), and the order's future headquarters were already under construction in 1558.
[95] ASF MP 327 f. 7-8. Cosimo's motivations for founding a military religious order (Santo Stefano) is discussed in in Chapter 6.
[96] Angiolini. *I cavalieri e il principe*, 22-23. Regarding Cosimo's militia efforts thus far, see especially Jolanda Ferretti. "L'organizzazione militare in Toscana […]" in *Rivista Storica degli Archivi Toscani* (3 parts) […]. (Florence, 1929-1930). Calvary discussed on ASF MP 327 f. 7v-8r. In addition to numbers of troops and expenses related thereto, notes written in the margin of f. 7v appear to detail rations, but these are difficult to read due to the handwriting and shorthand used.

charge of these bodies of galleys… which [will] number 30" – the same number suggested by Piero Machiavelli. He continued by identifying artillery as the greatest expense for a fleet and the general logistical difficulties in managing forests; making the parts – including masts and sails; and organizing the necessary manpower. Of course, he only mentioned these in passing and did not discuss these processes in detail. Like the cavalry, however, he did provide the estimated costs. Expecting his religious order would eventually cover 6 of his galleys, Cosimo believed that the Medici state only needed to concern itself with 24 galleys for four months "*del anno armate*" – the summer campaign season. Additionally, he observed that each galley would cost at least 500 – and up to 1,000 – ducats per month. Cosimo's wording here is confusing, but he clearly stated that half of these costs would fall on "*li stati*" and that "*il principe*" would cover the other half. He continued by explicitly stating that there would be 12 "ordinary galleys of the prince" – exactly half of the 'state-navy' he envisioned. [97] Cosimo was likely expressing that he and his successors would personally supplement taxes (i.e. state funds) when it came to the galleys. After all, he made it no secret that this fleet was about his personal prestige as an Italian prince.

This theme is subtly echoed in the aforementioned records for the galleys in 1558. Piero Machiavelli's inventory also mentions each vessel's flags. The *Capitana*'s collection included at least 3 standards bearing the Medici arms, the cross, and the Virgin Mary respectively. Similarly, the *Fiorenza*, *Toscana*, and *Pisana* had at least one flag with the Medici arms.[98] Illustrations of these exact banners or similar ones can be found in another collection at the *Archivio di Stato di Firenze*. They clearly depict the Medici

[97] ASF MP 327 f. 8. Many of these financial matters regard his religious order which is discussed in Chapter 6.
[98] ASF MP 2131 ins. 1, nn. Lists for the *Centuriona* and *Elbigina* do not mention flags or standards.

coat of arms, John the Baptist, Christ's crucifixion, and the Madonna and child.[99] Additionally, the *Centuriona*'s inventory includes a painting of Mary in a gilded frame for the *camera di poppa*. The catalog itself states that the inventory process began "with the name of God to receive the galleys of your highness."[100] Of course, considering the era's religious and courtly milieu, it is nearly impossible to distinguish these items and phrases from any implications of crusading or any sense of proto-nationalism. Nevertheless, the fact that these galleys displayed their allegiance to God and Cosimo in such a prominent manner vividly conveyed a sense of professionalism and sincerity to their cause. The point was very clear – at least 4 out of the 6 vessels in 1558 could demonstrate that they represented Cosimo. Moreover, if the *Capitana*'s and *Centuriona*'s collections provided any indication, these vessels also fought in the name of Christianity. This combination fit nicely into his proposed idea of a religious order.

Contemporaries and subsequent commentaries on Cosimo's rule could easily accuse him of being violent, dishonest, and tyrannical. At the same time, however, he worked wonders. His impressive efforts regarding his navy are but one piece of evidence.[101] It is especially remarkable that this surge in maritime and coastal defense projects around 1557 – a growing fleet, infrastructure, and fortifications in Pisa, Livorno, Elba, and the significant contributions to the Tuscan *Presidios* – occurred within the context of the ongoing Italian Wars. Moreover, Cosimo undertook these endeavors while physically re-building and consolidating – militarily, politically, and diplomatically – the Sienese cities through his own means and extensive negotiations with Philip II among others. By 1560, Cosimo also continued his naval expansion and initiated works such as

[99] ASF MP 2077 ins. 1 f. 98-99.
[100] ASF MP 2131 ins. 1 nn. Even records for the galley *Pace* from 1561 make mention of flags bearing the Medici arms, the crucifixion, and the Madonna. ASF MP 2077 ins. 1 f. 225 (back).
[101] Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 56.

the *Canale dei Navicelli* to link Livorno and Pisa – alongside other ventures. However, these were not his only projects. During this same period, Cosimo initiated another plan to secure and promote his dynasty within Tuscany and beyond. As discussed in his *memoria*, another matter that greatly occupied his strategical approach to ruling was founding a religious order – a potential solution to the obstacles he faced. Before this could be tackled, however, all navies in the Habsburg sphere were about to face the ultimate test – a direct assault on the corsairs at Tripoli.

Chapter 5: Crusaders: Philip's Djerba Campaign and a Florentine 'Voyage against the infidel' (c. April 1559 – January 1561)

Aftermath: Cosimo's Italy and the Mediterranean immediately after the Peace of Cateau Cambrésis (c. April – August 1559)

Having settled another peace with Henri II, Philip II expressed his intentions regarding the Mediterranean in a letter to Cosimo dated 15 June 1559:

> Since it has pleased the Lord our God that peace should be signed with the most Christian king of France, it seemed to me that it would be to the greater glory of God and of service to all Christendom that the galleys for which I am paying in Italy should not lie idle for the rest of the summer, but be employed to destroy corsairs and to assure freedom of shipping… I have therefore authorized an expedition against Tripoli.[1]

Especially considering that the Spanish Habsburg fleet had been ordered to assemble in Messina on 8 May and that the logistical arrangements were well underway by early July, it seems that Philip had simultaneously signed the Peace of Cateau Cambrésis in April 1559 and decided on this North African campaign. In fact, he may have already been considering a 'crusade' in the Maghreb as early as January – even though the precise target had not yet been determined.[2] After establishing the treaty with France, Philip II refocused on Mediterranean affairs,[3] however, it was only one piece of the puzzle regarding his decision in doing so.

Contrary to his tone in the above letter to Cosimo, the king of Spain had actually hoped to achieve peace with both the French and the Ottomans in 1559. Unfortunately, a truce with the sultan was hampered by several factors – most prominently international relations. In February 1559, Philip's uncle (the Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand I) and Sultan Süleyman had tried to settle their own agreement along the Danubian frontier. Since the war with France was not officially over yet, Philip had drafted his terms and

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[1] Archivo Generale de Simancas (AGS) Estado 1124 folio (f.) 295, transcribed and translated in Fernand Braudel. *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World* […] Volume II. Translated by Siân Reynolds. (Berkley 1995), 970.
[2] John F. Guilmartin Jr. *Gunpowder and Galleys* […]. (Second Edition) (London, 2003), 140. See also M.J. Rodriguez-Salgado. *The Changing Face of Empire* […]. (Cambridge, 1988), 302 and notes.
[3] Anne Brogini and Maria Ghazali. "Un enjeu espagnol en Méditerranée […]," in *Cahiers de la Méditerranée* 70 (2005) […], 16.

hoped that these imperial talks with the sultan would provide the front he needed to subtly integrate his own Spanish peace with the Ottomans. After Cateau Cambrésis was finalized, however, the sultan's son Bayezid led a rebellion that sparked yet another war with the Safavid Persians. In the light of the accord with France and the sultan's preoccupations and advanced age, Philip abandoned his pursuit of – secret or public – peace with Süleyman.[4] Moreover, both rulers had status to uphold – especially considering that they were dealing with several matters across their vast empires. 'Weakness' on one front could not be carried to another. For his part, Philip had the safety of – and more importantly his reputation among – his Italian subjects and allies to consider. Nothing short of an all-out war would establish "mutually-acceptable spheres of influence" in the Mediterranean. Both Süleyman and Philip could be accused of overextending their military and geo-political influence. Nevertheless, if peace was ever to be achieved between them, the frontiers of North Africa and the western Mediterranean needed to clarified.[5] To preserve their dignity and pride – and to establish a better-defined boundary – war seemed the only course of action.

Henri II's unexpected death in July 1559 also jolted matters. With Cateau Cambrésis enacted for only about three months, the few remaining French troops in the Maremma (southern Siena) barricaded themselves in various Sienese forts and demanded their nearly two-year arrears in pay. Cosimo's commander Chiappino Vitelli with 2,000

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[4] Rodriguez-Salgado. *The Changing Face of Empire*, 297 - 301. See also: Colin Imber. *The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650* […] (second edition). (Houndmills, UK, 2009), 52; and Geoffrey Parker. *Imprudent King* […]. (New Haven, CT, 2014), 137 and notes. René Emmanuelli. *Gênes et l'Espagne dans la Guerre de Corse, 1559-1569*. (Paris, 1964), 118-119 details that Philip relied on Genoese intermediaries in Constantinople. Although they were allegedly helping the king of Spain, the Genoese were simultaneously negotiating a separate peace with the Ottomans. The sultan took these parleys seriously, but they ultimately amounted to nothing. This web of diplomacy and espionage undoubtedly complicated Philip's peace proposal and further supports the idea presented in previous chapters that Genoa was at least building a 'contingency plan' against Habsburg Spain in this period.

[5] Inspired by Jeremy Black. "Military Revolutions and Early Modern Europe: The Case of Spain" in Enrique Garcia Hernan and Davide Maffi, eds. *Guerra y sociedad en la monarquia hispanica* Volume I […] (Madrid, 2006), 19-20.

infantry and 150 horses supported Valois commander Cornelio Bentivoglio and his efforts to coax these mutinous troops out of Siena for good. These men returned to France aboard 13 Valois galleys on 2 August. Considering that he provided wagons, labor, and work animals to move the men and materials, this evacuation was largely at Cosimo's expense. Yet, this investment paid off. Without French recognition and military support, any remaining Sienese rebels from Montalcino and other places finalized their surrender to the Medici duke and swore allegiance to him.[6] From the lowest peasant and soldier to the sovereigns involved, everyone had made tremendous commitments and sacrifices during the Italian Wars. Even as 1560 approached, however, there was still much more to address.

Defending the spider's web: Medici and Spanish Habsburg Siena (c. August 1559 – October 1560)

Where did these military and diplomatic achievements leave Cosimo? With the War of Siena finally over, the conflict had cost him 2 million *scudi* – a tremendous expense he had assumed full responsibility over in exchange for becoming duke of Siena. Moreover, after years of devastating warfare, the land now part of the duchy of Siena was arguably worthless. Contemporaries assessed that it only maintained one-fifth of its 'pre-war' value. Indeed, this new title had cost Cosimo a great deal – financially and politically.[7] His legal team (his advisor Leilo Torelli and Angelo (Agnolo) Niccolini, the governor of Siena) finally obtained further privileges from Philip in August 1559, but

[6] AGS Estado 1388 f. 105 transcribed in Rafael Vargas-Hidalgo. *Guerra y Diplomacia en el Mediterráneo* […]. (Madrid, 2002), 270. See also Roberto Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena, 1552-1559*. (Siena, 1962), 525-528. Concerning Philip's own troops, the *factor mayor de Italia* (Silvestro Cattaneo) wrote to Philip from Genoa on 16 September 1559 regarding 650 or more Spanish soldiers imprisoned aboard the French galleys who had ransomed themselves by paying one *scudo* each. The king could rest assured that a few hired *barche* (small landing or lookout vessels) were taking his liberated troops to Lombardy.

[7] Cantagalli. *La Guerra di Siena*, 503-505, 508. See also Giuseppe Caciagli. *Stato dei Presidi*. (Pontedera, Italy, 1992), 54-55 and Marco Gemignani. "The Navies of the Medici […]," in John B. Hattendorf and Richard W. Unger, eds. *War at Sea in the Middle Ages and Renaissance*, (Woodbridge, Suffolk, UK, 2003), 173. On this issue, Gemignani cites Arnaldo d'Addario, *Il problema senese nella storia italiana della prima metà del Cinquecento*. (Florence, 1958), 399-424.

these were backdated to November 1558.[8] Of course, the Medici duke never obtained direct authority over Piombino or the major Sienese ports as he had originally hoped. By January 1560, Cosimo complained to his Spanish ambassador that the *Presidios* along the Sienese coast, particularly Orbetello and Porto Ercole, had created jurisdictional complications and a significant negative economic impact. For example, in October 1560, Niccolini entered into a confrontation with Tomas de Zuazola, commander of the Porto Ercole garrison, regarding Cosimo's jurisdiction of neighboring Marsiliana and Capalbio.[9] The Habsburg, Appiani, and Medici spheres of authority frequently tangled.

On paper, the viceroy of Naples oversaw these *Presidios* through an appointed *auditore* to administer civil and criminal justice; a *veditore* to manage the fortresses, troops, and artillery; and a *maestro portolano* to inspect and manage all goods entering and leaving the ports. Each official also had assistants to carry out these administrative duties. Similarly, each Spanish Habsburg garrison in Piombino, Porto Ercole, and Orbetello had its own administrators to supervise pay, procurement, storage, weapons, and provisions.[10] In addition to the works in the *Presidios*, the new viceroy of Naples, Don Pedro Afan (Perafán) de Ribera, also inherited the task of refitting the Neapolitan fortifications. By 1559, there were 339 towers in the Kingdom of Naples alone; however, at least 173 of these were declared "in ruins." In other words, since the Neapolitan and Sienese coastlines fell under the viceroy's jurisdiction, the works undertaken in Naples coincided with those in the newly-created *Presidios*.[11] Even though the viceroy was

[8] Arturo Pacini, "Tra terra e mare […]" in Elena Fasano Guarini and Paola Vopini, eds. *Frontiere di Terra Frontiere di Mare* […]. (Milan., 2008), 235-239.
[9] Pacini, "Tra terra e mare," 235 – 239.
[10] Simone Martinelli. "L'arsenale bellico dei presidi spagnoli […]," in *Rivista di Storia Finanziaria*, 17 (2006), 90.
[11] Caciagli. *Stato dei Presidi*, 77-88. Caciagli notes the scarcity of documentation on the Tuscan *Presidios* for this period. Numbers of garrisoned troops in the Neapolitan *Presidios* in February 1562 can be found in ASG Estado, *Nápoles*, 1052 f. 18 "*Presidio del Regno di Napoli*" transcribed in Giuseppe Coniglio. *Il viceregno di Napoli e la lotta tra spagnoli e turchi nel Mediterraneo*. Volume 1. (Naples, 1987), 232-234.

closely tied to the Spanish throne through the hereditary succession of Ferdinand II of Aragon, Charles V had repeatedly emphasized that, by law, Naples was imperial territory.[12] Thus, it is appropriate to consider the defenses of Naples and the *Presidios* in Siena as part of a larger Habsburg Italian defense system – and yet another example of the tricky administration and jurisdiction.

Some of the work in modernizing the fortresses on Monte Argentario (i.e. Porto Ercole and Porto Santo Stefano) had already begun in the midst of the conflict and definitely started as soon as the major part of the fighting in Siena had ended in 1557. When this territory officially became part of Medici-Habsburg Siena, Cosimo's engineers Giovanni Camerini and Baldassare Lanci took over.[13] Between 1559-1561, Lanci served on Cosimo's behalf in the Sienese *Presidios* while he simultaneously supervised works in Ancona – on Italy's Adriatic coast. As Tuscany (including Portoferraio on Elba), Siena, Piombino, and Naples overhauled their fortifications and military infrastructure in the late 1550s and early 1560s, the knights of Malta – with Lanci's help – followed suit.[14] It is important to note that the central Mediterranean powers: the Spanish Habsburgs – *vis-à-vis* the viceroy of Naples; the Knights of Malta; and Cosimo capitalized on the break in the Habsburg-Valois conflict to consolidate and strengthen their holdings – just as Piero

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Regarding specific "walk throughs" of some of the major fortresses, see Caciagli. *Stato dei Presidi*, 106, 118, 129; and for artillery see Martinelli. "L'arsenale bellico," 93, 95.

[12] Ivano Tognarini. "Orbatello, I Presidios di Toscana e il Mediterraneo […]" in Anna Guarducci, ed. *Orbetello e i Presidios*. (Florence, 2000), 108.

[13] Martinelli. "L'arsenale bellico," 91; and Caciagli. *Stato dei Presidi*, 116. Identifying the architects for the forts at Porto Ercole (*La Rocca* and Forte Filippo) remains troublesome to say the least. In all likelihood, Camerini designed both of these, see p. 118. Caciagli also mentions work by Leone Strozzi in the early 1550s.

[14] See especially Roger Vella Bonavita. "The Opinion of Gian Giacomo Leonardi […]," in *Fort*, Volume 34 (2006), 22, 26, 30-31; and Quentin Hughes. "Italian Engineers Working for the Knights of Malta," in *Fort*, Volume 31 (2003), 84-86. See also the entry "Baldassare Lanci" by Richard J. Goy in Grove Art Online (Oxford, 2003) and Lanci's entry in treccani.it's *"enciclopedia online*." Among other projects, Lanci also worked for Cosimo in Siena at Radicofani – inland from the *Presidios*. After the knights of Malta faced difficulties in hiring an architect, Cosimo reluctantly allowed Lanci to also commence work on what became Malta's capital (Valletta) in 1562.The Medici coat of arms conspicuously features on Valetta's bastions.

Machiavelli had advised in his aforementioned letter.[15] They certainly perceived 1557 into the early 1560s as a temporary reprieve in a war that had defined their world since the turn of the sixteenth century. Even after Cateau Cambrésis was finalized, they merely awaited and prepared for the inevitable spark that would reignite the pyres of war. Moreover, Cosimo's engineers prominently headlined three of these massive defense projects in Tuscany, Siena, and on Malta.

In 1560, while the duke of Florence and Siena continued to sponsor his projects in Livorno and Elba and collaborated with the Spanish Habsburgs in the Sienese *Presidios*, Philip was advised to establish a Spanish presence on Elba at Porto Longone – an idea he revisited throughout the late sixteenth century.[16] Indeed, this certainly tempted Philip, however, considering the ongoing works in Siena, Naples, and elsewhere – not to mention the enduring expenses of his and his father's decades-long war with the Valois – the project proved financially infeasible for the Spanish crown circa 1560. Moreover, Cosimo was clearly a crucial cog in Philip's military and diplomatic machinery, and the Spanish king did not wish to antagonize the duke too far. In many ways, the Siena agreement had already done enough damage.

Given the doubts surrounding Philip's authority to grant Siena in subinfeudation – and presumably to assume control over the entire coastline – Cosimo had appealed to Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand I. The finalized imperial diploma emerged on 9 September 1560 and confirmed that the *Presidios* belonged to the king of Spain as an imperial fief and that the city of Siena and its domain belonged to the duke of Florence as a hereditary vicarate of the Holy Roman Emperor. As rumors continued to circulate, the

[15] Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale di Firenze (BNCF) *Magliabechi* E. B. 15.10, f. 176r-179v, *Codice di Giuliano De Ricci,* transcribed in Amico. *La Vita di Niccolo Machiavelli*, 667-671.
[16] Franco Angiolini. "*I Presidios di Toscana* […]" in Garcia Hernan and Maffi, eds. *Guerra y sociedad*, Volume I, 179. See also Martinelli. "L'arsenale bellico," 92. Specifically, the *maestro di campo* Carlos de Eza made these suggestions in 1560. Porto Longone was finally incorporated into the *Presidios* in the early seventeenth century.

relationship between the duke of Florence – and his heirs – and Philip regarding Siena had to be clarified again on at least two occasions over the next fifteen years.[17] These nuanced negotiations were only one of Cosimo's many difficulties that emerged in the immediate post-Italian Wars period between 1559 and the early 1560s. Among his concerns, the duke of Florence and Siena continued to oversee the progress of his burgeoning naval infrastructure on Elba, Pisa, and especially Livorno.

Administrating Cosimo's galleys and fortresses (c. December 1558 – December 1560)

Alongside assessing Livorno's defenses,[18] Cosimo's engineers surveyed and constructed the city's streets and piazzas. Specifically, they addressed the precarious roads between Livorno and Pisa by commencing work on the *Canale dei Navicelli* in 1560. In addition to facilitating transportation between Livorno and Pisa, the canal also drained some of the neighboring marshes. Since this project minimized the mosquito-ridden fenland, Livorno became a much safer place to live.[19] Business was also relatively booming. As far as the city's trade networks were concerned, by the early 1560s, Venetian and Tuscan ships had established business relationships with the Low Countries and England. Similarly, Genoese merchants based in Livorno traded in Seville and Cadiz.[20] These advances aside, Livorno remained far from popular real estate circa 1560.

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[17] Danilo Marrara. "I Presidi Feudo Imperiale" in Guarducci, ed. *Orbetello e i Presidios*, 62. In the context of acquiring and clarifying these new holdings, Cosimo established the *Nove Conservatori della giurisdizione e del dominio*, a college of nine Florentine citizens to assist in managing state finances and administration in February 1560. Especially considering all of the different regions under Cosimo's authority, this office was crucial to maintaining justice and an orderly realm. See Antonio Stopani. *La Production des Frontières* […]. (Rome, 2008), 39-41.

[18] For a snapshot of Livorno's defenses circa 1560, see Giacinto Nudi. "La fortezza vecchia" (Chapter II) in Nudi et al. *Livorno e Pisa* […] (Pisa, 1980), 54. Regarding the artillery, Nudi cites Archivio di Stato di Firenze (ASF) Mediceo del Principato (MP) 2134 f. 231.

[19] Renzo Mazzanti, "Il territorio livornese" (Chapter III) in Nudi et al. *Livorno e Pisa*, 81. See also Raymond Role. "Cosimo de Medici's Holy Navy," *MHQ* […], 15 (2002), 76-86; and Dario Matteoni. *Le città nella storia d'Italia: Livorno*. (Roma-Bari, 1988), 11-12.

[20] Fernand Braudel and Ruggiero Romano. *Navires et Marchandises à l'entrée du Port de Livourne (1547-1611)*. (Paris, 1951), 32-38.

Despite Cosimo's best efforts, Livorno's population formed a motley crew: exiles, convicts, soldiers, peasants, and slaves. Even after a decade or more, his tax exemptions and other incentives had not attracted the investors and settlers he desired. By 1560, the population climbed slightly to 563, and there were about 111 residences – 30% of which belonged to Livorno's and Pisa's religious community and were rented. Nevertheless, these numbers consistently disappointed Cosimo. To alleviate this situation at first, he coupled his publicly announced enticements with secret correspondence to prominent Jewish and "new Christian" families – refugees and businessmen from Spain and Portugal. Since the early 1550s, he had also attempted to entice Muslims ('Turks,' 'Moors,' and Persians); non-Catholics (Greeks and Armenians); and other Jews to establish their livelihoods in Livorno. The duke assured them that they would not be subject to "inquisition, examination, denunciations for heresy, acts of blasphemy, apostasy, or for other crimes of faith." Yet, these seemingly benevolent accommodations were juxtaposed with his previous compliance to papal orders to destroy all copies of the Talmud in 1553 and a 1557 ordnance that compelled Tuscan Jews to wear an identifying insignia. Over the subsequent years, however, Cosimo grew so desperate to boost Livorno's population that he even allowed men condemned to the galleys to use payments towards portside property as a means to shorten or avoid their sentence. Overall, Cosimo and his immediate successors were elated by any individuals who expressed interest in living in Livorno. Virtually anyone was accepted regardless of their religious, political, or other – in some cases literal – convictions.[21]

[21] Stephanie Nadalo. "Populating a 'Nest of pirates, murtherers etc.' […]," in Timothy G. Fehler et al, eds. *Religious Diaspora in early modern Europe*. (London, 2014), 32, 36, 38, 44. Concerning Livorno's population numbers, see Braudel and Romano. *Navires et Marchandises*, 16. See also Matteoni. *Le città*, 11-12.

Additionally, work on Livorno's *arsenale* commenced in 1559. During these early years, Livorno's shipwrights had primarily focused on finishing vessels built in Pisa.[22] Among other projects, the *arsenale di Pisa* continued works on the galley *Grifona* in 1559. Records of this vessel's construction break down the monthly salaries for 23 individuals including: Filippo da Messina, Basilio da Messina, Giuseppo da Gaeta, Niccolaio da Napoli, Piero Venetiano, and Francesco da Genova. In short, Cosimo's pool of naval experts included Sicilians, Neapolitans, Venetians, and Genoese. Each individual listed received between 3 and 7 ducats per month. This amounted to a total payroll of 120.5 ducats per month for building this single galley – which did not include the at least 21 slaves listed in this same document. From Livorno on 9 December 1558, Piero Machiavelli totaled monthly expenses for 7 galleys. His estimates regarding biscuit and a few other costs – which clearly did not encompass all necessary funds to maintain an active galley fleet – totaled 4,160 ducats.[23] Another note from 15 September 1559 by the *camarlingo* (treasurer) *delle galere*, Filippo da Lutiano, detailed an annual galley squadron budget of around 32,696 ducats – of which around 31,605 had already been spent that year.[24] Especially considering what Cosimo continued to invest in Elba's, Pisa's, and Livorno's urban development and fortifications – and what he had already contributed over the past decade or so – Cosimo's commitment to his naval infrastructure project seemed relentless. Nevertheless, he hoped his galleys could yield financial and political dividends. Between 1559 and 1560, he dispatched his vessels on his personal assignments but also contributed them towards making Philip II's vision of the Mediterranean a reality.

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[22] Matteoni. *Le città*, 11-12. Regulations for the customs warehouses emerged in 1566.
[23] ASF MP 2077 inserto (ins.) 1 f. 106-107. See also f. 100 from January 1559 which indicates that similar payroll expenses totaled at least 2,000 ducats that month. Based on the language used "*questo mese*," "*ogni mese*," "*quello mese*," "*dalla meso d'Aprile*, "*alla messo di Luglio*," it is difficult to tell if this total is for the entire year or select months.
[24] ASF MP 2077 ins. 1 f. 149-153.

Philip's crusade on Djerba and Cosimo's contribution (c. October 1559 – October 1560)

By 1559, the king of Spain perceived that he had won the 65-year Habsburg-Valois Italian Wars. From the *longue durée* perspective, Spain had emerged victorious in the 300-year rivalry that began when Charles of Anjou conquered Naples in 1260. It is not difficult to imagine that destiny and "delusions of invincibility" against the French – when coupled with his own belief in his special divine purpose – convinced Philip II to pursue a religious war against the Muslims instead of peace.[25] Additionally, the Spanish king wanted to repair his relationship with the papacy. Cateau Cambrésis had ended the reinvigorated conflict heralded by Pope Paul IV Carafa, and Paul's death that same year granted Philip a chance to re-cultivate a rapport with Rome and the new pope, Pius IV. Considering this, the pope's position as lord over the Kingdom the Two Sicilies featured prominently in Philip's Mediterranean policies and his efforts to begin the ecclesiastical bond anew. As the pope's vassal in Sicily, Philip was obligated to maintain a fleet of "well-armed galleys" and to protect the Holy Father's realms "from the incursions of infidels and other invaders." Especially given precedents of papal threats to reclaim the region in the mid-fifteenth century, Philip took this responsibility very seriously. He felt duty-bound to defend Naples, Sicily, the Papal States, and Malta – essential logistical and strategic bases in Philip's rivalry with the sultan. When these commitments were coupled with the real dangers on the Italian and Spanish coastlines, "'abandonment of the Mediterranean' was not a policy that Philip II […] could have conceived of as a practical political and military strategy." He had to pull his weight in the overlapping authorities of the Holy See, the king of Sicily (i.e. Philip), and the grand master of the Knights of Malta that characterized the central Mediterranean.[26] Moreover, Philip felt compelled to

[25] Parker. *Imprudent King*, 137 and notes. For the *longue durée* view of the Italian Wars, see Jacques Heers. *The Barbary Corsairs* […]. (London, 2003), 95.
[26] Philip Williams. "The strategy of galley warfare in the Mediterranean (1560-1620)," in Garcia Hernan

preserve the legacy of previous Spanish kings – especially his father. Even though Spain retained only a handful of her former North African holdings by the 1550s, they remained Philip's responsibility.[27]

Charles V had observed that Spanish supremacy and success in the Mediterranean was intertwined with a safe and stable Italy.[28] As Juana de Austria, Philip, Charles, and other Habsburg officials and courtiers had already discussed over the previous decade, the seemingly incessant corsair raids on Spain, the Balearic Islands, Sicily, and Sardinia made Italy "the bastion of a maritime frontier" against Algiers.[29] With the war against France recently behind him, Philip II was only beginning to develop and practice his "theory of the empire" in Italy and his mutual obligations towards his subjects and of course the pope.[30] Yet, contemporary political writers – especially those in Florence – emphasized the dangers that the "barbarians" (i.e. the Habsburgs and Valois) posed to the Italian peninsula.[31] All the more reason Philip needed to present himself as a beneficent ruler and a protector. He had not only his own ambitions and obligations to consider, but also the safety – and loyalty – of his Italian and Spanish subjects. By 1559, Italy was in constant danger. As the Sardinian Archbishop Parragues de Castillejo wrote to the Spanish ambassador in Genoa, "*siempre estamos assediados de cossarios*" ("we are always besieged by corsairs"). Over the course of Philip's reign, Barbary pirate raids on

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and Maffi, eds. *Guerra y sociedad*, 893-896. See also Williams "War and Peace between the Catholic King and the Caliph […]" in Guido Candiani and Luca Lo Basso, eds. *Mutazioni e permanenze* […]. (Milan, 2010), 21-24. Milan was also a papal fief.

[27] Rodríguez-Salgado. *The Changing Face of Empire*, 253-255, 260-263, 266-278. See also Jean-Frederic Schaub. "Oran et les établissements chrétiens […]," in Giuseppe Galasso and Aurelio Musi, eds. *Carlo V, Napoli E Il Mediterraneo* […]. (Naples, 2001), 41-48; and Antonello Mattone. "Il Regno di Sardegna […]" in *Studi Storici*, Anno 42, No. 2 (April-June, 2001), 279.

[28] Williams. "The strategy of galley warfare," 897 and notes.

[29] Franco Angiolini. "Spagna, Toscana e Politica Navale," in *Atti del Convegno Le Relazioni tra Spagna e Toscana* […]. (Pisa, 2007), 46, 52-53. See also Gregory Hanlon. *Early Modern Italy 1550-1800* […]. (London, 2000), 183.

[30] Valentina Favarò. "Monitioni, Vettovaglie et Dinari […]," in *Mediterranea Recerche Storiche* Anno IV (December 2007), 438-440.

[31] Romain Descendre, Jean-Louis Fournel, and Jean-Claude Zancarini. "Apres les Guerres d'Italie: Florence, Venise, Rome (1530-1605)" in *Astérion,* 15 (2016), paragraph 8.

the coasts and open seas became one of the king's biggest concerns.[32] Confronting this threat required him to carefully allocate his forces and resources – not to mention devote immense finances – towards defending his Mediterranean holdings and obligations.

Moreover, this task did not rest solely upon Spain's shoulders. In 1511, King Ferdinand II of Aragon had made the viceroy of Sicily responsible for provisioning and managing Tripoli in North Africa – the crossroads of overland caravans and maritime shipping. Yet, this same geographic position was also its weakness. The region's Muslims were naturally suspicious of what they perceived as Christian occupiers and approached trading with caution. Moreover, Tripoli relied almost entirely on a naval logistical train to provide food and other supplies. To further complicate matters, by the 1530s – after the fall of Rhodes – Charles V had tasked the Knights of Malta with these same duties.[33] Again, this region was subject to several overlapping authorities – the pope, Spain, Sicily, and the Knights of Malta – not to mention the local leadership on both the Christian and Muslim[34] sides. From both the Spanish and Ottoman perspectives, exerting any control over North Africa required carefully navigating the lord-vassal relationship between themselves and the 'Moorish' and Arab princes and kings.[35]

Of course, the corsairs themselves also had their own agendas. 'Moors,' 'Turks,' and European renegades gathered from all corners of the Mediterranean to provide technical and tactical expertise, as well as the finances, for corsair activities – not to

[32] Antonello Mattone. "Il Regno di Sardegna," 277, 282. See also Gregory Hanlon. *The Twilight of a Military Tradition* […]. (London, 1998), 27 and notes.
[33] Brogini and Ghazali. "Un enjeu espagnol," 7-8.
[34] Süleyman's place in the Muslim world – parallel to Philip's place in the Catholic world – is discussed in Daniel Panzac. "La géostratégie navale de l'Empire ottoman […]" in Candiani and Lo Basso, eds. *Mutazioni e permanenze*, 100 and notes.
[35] Williams. "The strategy of galley warfare," 896-897.

mention to partaking in raids.[36] Indeed, regarding Philip II's Mediterranean aims, Dragut's firmly established presence in Tripoli and the surrounding area made a "Turkish-Barbary prevalence" in the central Mediterranean a political and military reality.[37] By the late 1550s, Dragut and Piali Pasha had unquestionably inherited Hayreddin Barbarossa's mantle. Dragut held Tripoli and Piali's efforts in the campaigns of the 1550s had prompted Süleyman to appoint him admiral and *sanjak* governor of Gallipoli. After Piali's commendable campaigns in North Africa against the Spanish, he was also promoted to governor-general of the archipelago by 1558.[38]

In June 1559, the viceroy of Sicily, Juan de la Cerda, the duke of Medinaceli, wrote to Philip II about Dragut. Medinaceli feared that the corsair's arm could reach not only Sicily but also the Catalan and Valencian coasts. Supported by the grand master of the Knights of Malta, Jean de la Valette – who wistfully recalled his time as governor of Tripoli and wished to benefit from the region's commercial opportunities – Medinaceli proposed re-taking Tripoli. At this same moment, Dragut found himself at war with local Muslim leaders, so it seemed the perfect time to wrest Tripoli from the corsair's clutches.[39]

Since this endeavor was the viceroy's idea and his responsibility, however, Sicily was expected to bear most of the costs – an estimated 293,455 *scudi*. Needless to say, amassing this substantial sum – and negotiating the loans – delayed the project. Yet, as far as Philip was concerned, Medinaceli's campaign could only work in his favor. Especially if the Spanish king managed to coax help from other Italian princes, this Tripoli venture could prove to be a relatively inexpensive campaign. In June, Philip's

[36] Heers. *The Barbary Corsairs*, 153-161. See also Peter Earle. *The corsairs of Malta and Barbary*. (London, 1970), 24-30. See also Gürken, Emra Safa. "The centre and the frontier […]," in *Turkish Historical Review* Volume 1 (2010).
[37] Salvatore Bono. *Corsari nel Mediterraneo* […]. (Milan, 1993), 19.
[38] Imber. *The Ottoman Empire*, 306; and Heers. *The Barbary Corsairs*, 92-96.
[39] Braudel. *The Mediterranean* Volume 2, 973-974.

envoys visited Milan, Genoa, Florence, the pope, Naples, and of course, the viceroy of Sicily and the grand master of the Knights of Malta to curry up material and financial support – not to mention to play up a few egos. Just as he had written to Cosimo in the abovementioned letter, this was presented as a carefully calculated expedition to Tripoli.[40] In reality, this mission snowballed from a quick raid into a full-fledged military crusade outside of the Spanish king's control.

Philip had envisioned a strategic strike into Dragut's nest of corsairs with around 8,000 troops. Medinaceli, however, hoped to recruit more than double that number – 20,000 men with 2 artillery batteries. The viceroy's ambitions were not quite met, but the force gathered was considerable – 10,000-14,000 men and a company of cavalry. According to Tuscan records, the fleet numbered 54 galleys, 30 *navi*, 12 *barche*, 7 *brigantini*, and 16 *fregate*. Considering that the pope provided 3, the Knights of Malta 6, Naples 7, Sicily 10, and Antonio Doria 5, Cosimo's quartet of galleys under the command of Niccolò Gentile was far from negligible.[41] Moreover, 16 vessels derived from individuals including Scipione Doria, Sancho de Leyva, and the duke of Monaco. Gian Andrea Doria also contributed 11 warships. In short, this was entirely – or nearly entirely – an Italian expedition backed by a few other small principalities such as Monaco and the Knights of Malta. This was a fleet built by squadrons of 3 to 10 galleys and proved much larger than the strike team that Philip originally had in mind. Nevertheless, this armada provided the king of Spain a glimpse of the sword he could wield in the Mediterranean.[42]

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[40] Favarò. "Monitioni, Vettovaglie et Dinari," 443-444 and Rodriguez-Salgado. *The Changing Face of Empire*, 303.
[41] ASF Carte Strozzione prima serie 145 f. 6v-7r. A few details for Niccolò Gentile are provided in the next subsection.
[42] For the paragraph as a whole, see: Braudel. *The Mediterranean* Volume 2, 975; Favarò. "Monitioni, Vettovaglie et Dinari," 444; and Kenneth M. Setton *The Papacy and the Levant (1204-1571)* Volume IV

At least one and possibly two of the Medici galleys were connected to Cardinal Vitellozzo Vitelli – Cosimo's military commander's (Chiappino Vitelli's) close relative. In January 1560, Piero Machiavelli calculated that equipping one of Vitelli's galleys cost a little over 3,000 *scudi*. On top of this, each vessel required 70 *schiavi* and *forzati* to man the oars – not to mention the other rowers and troops.[43] When multiplied by the 50 or so galleys involved in this expedition, it is easy to see how the viceroy of Sicily's calculations of nearly 300,000 *scudi* accurately reflected the forecast expenses. Moreover, the fleet was only one part of the equation. Capturing a position in North Africa required land forces as well. Between September and October 1559, Florence alone supplied at least 300 barrels of gunpowder and at least 1,000 iron cannonballs to one of Philip II's officials for the Tripoli enterprise.[44] Other notes by Francesco San Iacopo,[45] *provveditore generale* of the *Castello di Firenze,* from September 1559 further specify that at least some of the cannonballs were for 50-pounders and that the 147 barrels of gunpowder provided that month amounted to 20,473 *libras* – approximately 15,300 pounds.[46]

An armada of this size had not been marshalled since Charles V's expeditions to Tunis and Algiers nearly two decades earlier. Given this reality, Philip II admitted to Medinaceli on 8 October 1559 that he was "extremely anxious about the success of the expedition." Medinaceli's own galley commander also had his doubts. He explained to Philip that "the major chance of success of this expedition lay in speed and that delay was

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[…] (Philadelphia, 1984), 758. See also Fabrizio Filioli Uranio. *La squadra navale pontificia* […]. (Ariccia, Italy, 2016), 79; and Bono. *Corsari nel Mediterraneo*, 50.

[43] ASF MP 483 f. 98. The Vitèlli entry on treccani.it's "*enciclopedia online*" details that Chiappino Vitelli descended from the marchesi de Cetona e signori di Amatrice – who throughout the first half of the 16th century was the marquis and key military figure, Alessandro Vitèlli – who also has an entry. Cardinal Vitellozzo Vitelli (noted in the document as "Cardinal Vitello") was Alessandro's son. Therefore, one can assume that the cardinal and Chiappino Vitelli were closely related.

[44] ASF MP 2077 ins. 1 f. 46. As usual in archival sources from this period, the names are the trickiest to read. The Spanish official's name appears to be Francesco Monpean.

[45] This document only specifies "S Iacopo," but based on Luca Martini's correspondence discussed in Chapter 1, I am assuming this is the same individual he references: "Franco di S Iacopo."

[46] ASF MP 481 f. 295. One Florentine pound equals .339 kg, so the total amount of gunpowder amounted to 6,940.347 kg.

its worst enemy… and yet troops and supplies have been searched out from every part of Italy [to no avail]." This "not particularly large [Spanish expedition]" was apparently too large to be mustered and deployed efficiently.[47] Needless to say, the element of surprise was not to the Christians' advantage. Moreover, numerous storms, disease, and Medinaceli's – and the Spanish captain general of the sea, Gian Andrea Doria's – military inexperience accompanied the aforementioned financial and logistical difficulties. All of this worked in Dragut's and Süleyman's favor. Dragut used the extra time to muster up more reinforcements, and 86 of the sultan's galleys under Piali Pasha arrived in May – much earlier and much faster than the Habsburg forces had anticipated. Medinaceli left a small garrison to hold the fort at Djerba (an island that guarded Tripoli's harbor) and promised to send fresh troops and supplies from Sicily – a promise he was unable to keep. By late July 1560, Djerba fell to the Ottomans.[48]

A letter composed in June 1560 by Cosimo's galley commander Niccolò Gentile and his lieutenant, Piero Machiavelli, provided an overview of the military situation at that moment. The two explained that they had met with the viceroy of Sicily, Gian Andrea Doria, and the Knights of Malta on 24 May to discuss the nearly hopeless predicament at the "fortress of Gerbie." According to them, 18 galleys and 4 *galeotte* were trapped with "little hope of being saved." These included 3 of Doria's vessels, one from Sicily, one from Monaco, one from Terranova (Sardinia), and one belonging to

[47] Braudel. *The Mediterranean* Volume 2, 974-977. Braudel cites the original documents: AGS Estado 1124 f. 325-326 and f. 270 among others. The "not particularly large" quote is from Guilmartin. *Gunpowder and Galleys*, 140. On the number of Spanish galleys in Philip's fleet at the time, see Antonello Mattone. "L'amministrazione delle galere nella Sardegna spagnola" in *Societá e Storia* anno XIII, n. 49 (luglio – settembre 1990), 514. Perhaps realizing that this expedition was overly ambitious and certainly because of the real dangers to his realm, Philip had commanded his 17 royal galleys to patrol the Spanish coast against corsairs and other raiders instead of partaking in the campaign. Thus, none of the galleys lost at Djerba were Spanish ones.

[48] Favarò. "Monitioni, Vettovaglie et Dinari," 444-445. See also Guilmartin. *Gunpowder and Galleys*, 140 and Hanlon. *Early Modern Italy*, 183.

Genoese naval contractor and Doria associate Bendinello Sauli.[49] Two Medici galleys – the *Elbigina* and *Toscana* – had damaged yardarms and were noted for their bravery until capture. A few men had escaped the siege on small skiffs to Sicily, and 18 of the *navi* sought refuge in Oran – one of the last major Spanish outposts in the Maghreb. Amidst their desperate escape, they had been forced to leave the other supply ships behind. To make matters worse, Gentile and Machiavelli reported that at least 40 'Muslim' galleys were replenishing for another assault. According to the wearily resigned tone of the account: "things turn in favor for the Turks against the Christians, and they [have] cut many to pieces."[50] They had certainly cut the Christian armada to pieces. 28 galleys – over half of the entire force, 4 *galeotte*, and as many as 12 of the *navi* supply ships – sank, ran aground, or were captured.

The aforementioned delays caused by financial and logistical difficulties, weather, and disease – not to mention their reciprocal benefits on the Ottoman fleet – certainly played a key role in this crushing defeat. Spaniards – and presumably many of Philip's Italian subjects and allies – placed the blame on the Genoese and their alleged timid approach to warfare. These critics felt that the Genoese private contractors were more concerned with profits than protection.[51] More specifically, the inexperienced viceroy of Sicily and the equally green 20-year-old Gian Andrea Doria were held accountable. The young Doria had advised Medinaceli to bide his time throughout the campaign and had been key in the decision to pursue Djerba instead of directly attacking Tripoli. Medinaceli admitted that the latter had been a crucial blunder on his behalf – especially since Dragut had once again been allowed to escape Djerba. It was some compensation, however, that

[49] Information about Sauli can be found in Vargas-Hidalgo. *Guerra y Diplomacia*, CCLXXXI.
[50] ASF MP 2077 ins. 1 f. 191 and 192 (two copies). See also Filioli Uranio. *La squadra navale pontificia*, chart on p. 81 and notes. This chart details that 19 vessels were lost and 9 were stranded – including Cosimo's *Elbigina* and *Toscana*. It also includes *La Centuriona* which was either a Genoese or Tuscan vessel.
[51] I.A.A. Thompson. *War and Government in Habsburg Spain, 1560-1620*. (London, 1976), 175, 261.

Dragut was regarded as one of the best commanders in the Mediterranean.[52] Additionally, the naval and siege aspects of this campaign brought Uluç Ali – another great corsair – to the forefront. His actions earned him the title as governor of İzmir and set him up to eventually become the *beylerbey* of Algeria.[53] Like the Habsburg king, the sultan had called upon subjects from his wide-spanning empire. With promises of increasing their *timars* (land grants), those individuals administering Rumelia, Anatolia, and the surrounding islands supplied Süleyman's fleet with armed troops and provisions.[54] In terms of quality commanders, numbers of troops, and numbers of galleys, Philip had simply been outmatched.

Most significantly, this expedition cost Philip experienced Habsburg manpower. The battle and siege claimed at least 600 *oficiales* (experts and their trained assistants); at least an additional 600 sailors; and 2,000 naval arquebusiers and soldiers. Of course, captured and sunken vessels also meant captured or killed oarsmen – at least 6,400 of them.[55] These men possessed a lifetime of training and could not be easily replaced. Remembering that the Djerba campaign began with at least 50 galleys and about 12,000 men, the defeat alone cost Philip a little over half of 'his' warships and at least one third of 'his' sailors and soldiers – not to mention the oarsmen – dedicated to this venture.

As soon as Djerba fell in July 1560, Piali Pasha's fleet immediately departed on a triumphant 'pa-raid' across the central Mediterranean in August 1560. They began at Gozo on Malta on 13 August, then carried on to Sicily where they took Augusta on the

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[52] Regarding Gian Andrea Doria, see Guilmartin. *Gunpowder and Galleys*, 138-140. Medinaceli's 'confession' regarding Tripoli is cited in Braudel. *The Mediterranean* Volume 2, 978 and notes. On Dragut, see Currey, E. Hamilton. *Sea-wolves of the Mediterranean* […]. (London, 1910, reprint 2004); chapter XIX.

[53] Orhan Koloğlu "Renegades and the Case of Uluç/Kiliç Ali" in Rosella Cancila, ed. *Mediterraneo in armi (secc. XV-XVIII)* Volume 1 […]. (Palermo, 2007), 529. Koloğlu cites O.S. GIokyaya, ed. *Zekeriyyazad*e, *Ferrah Cerbe Savas,i*. (Istanbul, 1975).

[54] Imber. *The Ottoman Empire,* 315-316.

[55] Guilmartin. *Gunpowder and Galleys*, 144-145. See also notes 16 and 17 for those pages.

island's southeastern coast. The Ottomans continued along 'the sole' of Italy and possibly crossed into the Adriatic and raided the Abruzzo Coast. On 22 August, Florentine intelligence from Apulia reported that a "Turkish armada" of 20 vessels had been sighted near Santa Maura (Lefkada, Greece). By early September, the Ottoman galleys departed from Preveza towards Constantinople – where they arrived on 1 October.[56] In spite of this Ottoman victory, inflation, famine, disease, and revolts – most notably led by his own son Bayezid – prevented Süleyman from capitalizing on Philip's weakness.[57] Nevertheless, the specter of an Ottoman armada in the western Mediterranean haunted the minds of everyone in the Habsburg sphere.

From Naples in September 1560, Philip II received word that "Christianity [was] in manifest danger," and that the "Thurco" had aims to "take [Philip] out of the lordship of Africa [… and as] the lord of Italy because as [the Turk] sees us armed next to his house, he lives in perpetual suspicion." Moreover, the letter implored that there should be a fleet of 30 or more galleys in Brindes (Brindisi) or Manfredonia along the Apulian coast where "the Romans [had] ruled the Levant for five hundred years." It elaborated that these locations – especially if they were refortified – could easily supply a fleet of this size. Furthermore, they would take the pressure off Sicily as Philip's first line of defense because, "the great damages that the Turks and Moorish corsairs do to the Christians in the central Mediterranean will be remedied […] because it would be impossible to pass with twenty galleys." As a change of pace, "our armada could do great damage to their lands […] and we [could] stay in the field [after mid-September]." The letter added that "little by little [the Turk] is eating and diminishing Christianity and taking away our

[56] Braudel. *The Mediterranean* Volume 2, 984-985 and notes. The Florentine intelligence is recorded in a brief note: ASF MP 486 f. 440.
[57] Setton *The Papacy and the Levant* Volume IV, 767 – 770. See also Braudel. *The Mediterranean* Volume 2, 987-990. By February 1561, the Venetian *bailio* informed the *Serenissima* that Ottoman arsenals were preparing another 80 to 100 galleys.

strength" but concluded with hopes of a fleet of 100 galleys stationed on and around the Apulian coast. Overall, this letter proclaimed, "we have no need [except] to keep borders that confine the Turk."[58]

Indeed, the Muslim victory at Djerba only "increased the audacity and the initiative of the Barbary corsairs."[59] Sardinia, for example, was essentially in a state of emergency and was constantly on guard from corsairs for the next fifteen years.[60] While in the grips of famine, Sicily experienced corsair raids and feared that a larger Ottoman invasion was imminent. The Sicilian parliament raised the island's military budget to strengthen fortifications and to maintain at least 6 galleys. Before Djerba in 1559, these expenses had totaled around 193,000 *scudi*. By 1565, Sicily would spend over 375,000 *scudi* annually on defenses – just shy of double what they had been six years earlier.[61] In Djerba's wake, fear of 'the Turk' reigned.

Crusading's impact on Cosimo's navy (c. June 1559 – November 1560)

If anything, the duke's concerns regarding defenses; relationships with his 'subjects' and the papacy; and his place within the feudal order were mirrored by leaders of similar status – such as the viceroy of Sicily – and these concerns were exponentially greater for Philip II. Even though Cosimo's status and power (both political and martial) were eclipsed by the Spanish Habsburg king, an agreement between Philip II and Cosimo from 4 September 1560 emphasized Tuscany's vital service towards the Spanish crown. "*Las galeras del Illustrissimo Duque de' Florençia*" were depicted as part of the crucial defenses for all of the king's ports, beaches, and seas. Furthermore, the document contextualized Cosimo among "all of the viceroys, lieutenants, governors, *castellanos*,

[58] AGS Estado Nápoles 1050 f. 132, Alfonso Guerriero to Philip II transcribed in Coniglio. *Il viceregno di Napoli* Volume 1, 222 – 232.
[59] Bono. *Corsari nel Mediterraneo*, 20. See also Filioli Uranio. *La squadra navale pontificia*, 81.
[60] Mattone. "Il Regno di Sardegna," 283.
[61] Favarò. "Monitioni, Vettovaglie et Dinari," 445-446.

captains, soldiers, guards, and other officials and subjects [of our] king."[62] In short, the Florentine galleys were regarded and treated as Spanish galleys, and Cosimo was a critical cog in the Spanish military machinery. Unfortunately, the expedition to Tripoli and the resulting Djerba campaign between October 1559 and July 1560 had significantly damaged this machinery.

In terms of their structural integrity and their crews' morale, the duke's 2 galleys that had survived this failed endeavor – the *Capitana* and *Fiorenza* – were in bad shape. A new galley, the *Livornina*, joined them under their new *ammiraglio*, Piero Machiavelli. Cosimo hoped this would breathe new life into his fledgling squadron. Unfortunately, things went from bad to worse that same year. In November 1560 near the isle of Giannutri (roughly 40 miles southeast of Elba) at least 13 Algerian *galeotte* under a Corsican renegade called Mehemet ambushed Machiavelli's squadron of 3 or 4 galleys. In the attack, the *Capitana* lost her rudder. Both she and the *Fiorenza* were left behind, and they became easy prey. Machiavelli and the *Livornina* made it safely to nearby Civitavecchia and eventually to Elba. Yet, Cosimo had still lost another 2 galleys – bringing his losses in 1560 to four. To help offset his dwindling squadron, Cosimo finally managed to enlist the help of Baccio Martelli – the aforementioned Tuscan formerly in the service of King Henri II[63] – and his 2 galleys: the *Margherita* and the *Pace*.[64]

Even before participating in the Djerba campaign, Cosimo had dispatched a galley under Otto da Montauto to purchase slaves from France, and another 4 were sent to the Levant under a Centurione *luogotenente* to capture 'Turkish' vessels and their slaves in 1559. After 3 of these galleys returned from the Aegean with 100 captured 'Turks,' the

[62] ASF Miscellanea Medicea *(*MM) 360 ins. 11 f. 1-4.
[63] See especially the Martelli discussion in Chapter 2.
[64] Camillo Manfroni "La Marina Militare […]," in *Rivista Marittima* [...]. (Rome, 1895), 77-79 and notes. See also: Caciagli. *Stato dei Presidi*, 80; and Role. "Cosimo de Medici's Holy Navy," 76-86.

duke had immediately dispatched them to Messina to join the Habsburg fleet for Medinaceli's expedition. When the other galley arrived from France, she was sent to rendezvous with the other 3, and Cosimo had placed Niccolò Gentile in command over his squadron. In spite of Gentile's rank as Marco Centurione's lieutenant, however, he was inexperienced in military matters. Moreover, although the veteran Piero Machiavelli served as his commissioner, Machiavelli was not granted any military authority on the Djerba venture. The defeat had also coincided with at least one of Cosimo's galleys shipwrecking near Corsica and the abovementioned 2 galleys that fell into the corsairs' clutches.[65] Thus, at least 5 Medici galleys were captured or wrecked in 1560.

Additionally, Cosimo had already lost another galley, the *Lupa*, off Cyprus in the summer of 1559. Two sets of documents provide a detailed account of this disastrous, though smaller expedition. One is a detailed report written by the *scrivano di razione* (scribe) aboard the *Lupa* in 1559: Gian Filippo Marucelli.[66] The other account is anonymous and far more succinct; however, it is not inconceivable – nor unlikely – that this is an earlier draft by Marucelli.[67] Although the word 'crusade' (*crociata* or *cruzada*) never appears in either report, the *Lupa*'s 1559 expedition illuminates the complexities of crusading and warfare in the late medieval and early modern Mediterranean. While specifically concerning Cosimo's fleet, it emphasizes the practical, logistical, and tactical concerns of commanders in conducting a galley campaign, in addition to geopolitics, and piracy.

[65] Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 55-58.
[66] ASF MP 2077 ins. 1 f. 205-211. The *scrivano* was often considered to be second-in command aboard the galley. See Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 100-101, especially note 4 on p. 101. There is also a brief note about Marucelli in ASF MP 471 f. 851, undated.
[67] ASF MP 2077 ins. 1 f. 161-163.

The Lupa's 'crusade' (c. June 1559 – January 1561)

The accounts begin by mentioning that, aside from a few payment issues among the troops and sailors, the *Lupa* remained "well-armed" for her "voyage against the infidels" on 20 June 1559. She had a few months' supply of victuals and supplies for the 339 fighting men (*scapoli* and soldiers), sailors (*marinara*), rowers, and officers aboard. This also included 25 sailors and troops to man the *fregata* lookout and boarding vessel. Concerning the galley's leadership, Captain Piero de Luxciano had handpicked his officers for the voyage. After making a quick journey around Sicily from Messina to Syracuse, the *Lupa* met up with a *galeotta* belonging to Marco Centurione. Each vessel's respective commanders struck an accord regarding the distribution of any booty acquired, and the 249 men aboard the Genoese vessel joined forces with the *Lupa* to undertake what was, if not in name, a crusade.[68]

Between 21 June and 4 July, the *Lupa* and the Centurione *galeotta* patrolled Sicilian waters with stops at Reggio, Catania, and Syracuse. Aside from acquiring water for the rowers and crew, neither account specified if these vessels were refitting, resupplying, or simply awaiting news and rumors of potential targets. By 4 July, however, they had their heading: the Morea (the Peloponnese). On 5 July, the *Lupa* and the *galeotta* departed from Syracuse and by 8 July, they had reached the Mani peninsula in southern Greece. At some point in their journey, a 'Christian' vessel informed them of a "Turkish armada" in Negroponte (Euobea or Evvia) on the eastern side of Greece. Moreover, the *Lupa*'s crew learned of a 'Moorish' ship from the "Barberia" near Isola Cerigo (Venetian Kythira) about 30 miles away.[69]

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[68] ASF MP 2077 ins. 1 f. 206r. The rowers are referred to as *forzati* (convict rowers). Since Marco Centurione is not mentioned in either account – except when referring to owning the *galeotta* – it is reasonable to assume that he was not present.

[69] ASF MP 2077 ins. 1 f. 161r and f. 206. The distance between the Mani Penisula and Kythira is about 47.6 Kilometers.

That night, the *Lupa* spotted a ship turning towards Porto Quaglio (Porto Kale) from their position on Cape Matapan (Cape Tainaron or Tenaro) on the Mani Peninsula – 6 miles away at the most. After confirming it was a 'Turkish' ship, the *Lupa* heavily bombarded the solitary vessel. The captain of Centurione's *galeotta*, however, hesitated to attack. He insisted that because of "all the scandals that may be born in assault," they should wait until daylight to continue. Heeding his request, the *Lupa* and the *galeotta* followed this 'Turkish' *barca* towards Kythira under favorable winds that night. After sunrise the following day, the crew prepared the artillery to "spice" ("*spugnarla*") the *barca* with ordnance. Additionally, the Medici *fregata* was readied to intercept the enemy vessel and aid in the assault and boarding process. That morning, a second bombardment and pressure from the swift Tuscan *fregata* prevented the 'Turkish' *barca* from escaping towards Anatolia.[70] This almost certainly resulted in the capture of many goods and slaves among the captured *barca*'s 'Turkish' crew.

Later that same day (11 July), the Medici and Genoese crews spotted another *nave* 25 miles away. They followed the vessel by circling back to their original location on the Mani Peninsula. Upon getting closer, however, they realized that this *nave* was a friendly Genoese merchant ship. This had been a false alarm. The *nave* they spotted later that evening, however, was anything but friendly. Having stopped again at Cape Matapan, the *Lupa* spied another 'Turkish' vessel and engaged in a firefight. At least 6 men aboard the Medici galley were injured in the fray, and changing winds allowed the hostile *nave* to escape towards land. During the pursuit, 4 galleys, presumably from the "Turkish armada" stationed at Negroponte, arrived to investigate the situation. Marucelli insisted that the *Lupa*'s and *galeotta*'s cannon fire during their capture of the *barca* the previous night and morning – not to mention the *nave* just moments earlier – had attracted their

[70] ASF MP 2077 ins. 1 f. 206v.

attention.[71] Regardless of how the enemy squadron ascertained their location, 4 galleys confronted the joint Tuscan and Genoese force.

The *Lupa* and Centurione's *galeotta* were outnumbered two to one. As the Ottoman warships closed in, the Medici crew made a bold move. They hoisted a banner bearing the insignia of the Knights of Malta on their stern. Marucelli's tone indicated that if the Ottomans had wanted to fight, his men would have used their own "damn hands" worthy of the Knights of Malta. He added that the 'Turks' feared that the *Lupa* was part of a 5-galley Maltese contingent rumored to be in the area.[72] The knights maintained a formidable reputation – which they had earned through decades of practicing the *corso* (piracy practiced under the pretext of the larger 'religious war' in the Mediterranean) near southern Greece.[73] Malta's reputation aside, this 'Turkish' squadron feared they had been caught in an ambush. When the *Lupa* unfurled Maltese colors, the 4 'Turkish' vessels expected they would soon be outnumbered by an additional 4 heavily armed Maltese galleys – not to mention Centurione's *galeotta* and the *fregata* that were already part of the Medici squadron. Wisely, the 'Turks' retreated.

As their adversaries withdrew, the *Lupa*, *galeotta*, and the *fregata* were near Kythira. However, Centurione's vessel broke away and headed towards Coron and Modon on the next Peloponnesian peninsula to the west. Upon seeing the *galeotta* detach from the 'Maltese' squadron, it did not take the Ottomans long to figure out that the banner had been a ruse. Once again, 4 enemy galleys closed in on the *Lupa*. Also remembering the Genoese captain's hesitation to engage the *barca* the previous night,

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[71] ASF MP 2077 ins. 1 f. 161 and f. 206v-207r. Manfroni. *La Marina Militare*, 73 specifies that these 4 galleys were Algerian.
[72] ASF MP 2077 ins. 1 f. 207r.
[73] Molly Greene. *Catholic Pirates and Greek Merchants* […]. (Princeton, 2010), 53, 56. Greene particularly cites Michel Fontenay and Alberto Tenenti. "Course et piraterie Mediterranee de la fin du moyen-âge au début du XIXè siècle," in Michel Mollat, ed. *Etudes présentées a la Commission international d'historie martitime à l'occasion de son XVe colloque international pendant le XIVe Congres international des sciences historiques.* (Paris), 78.

Marucelli emphasized that "it was always their habit of being timid."[74] He likely intended this as a slur against not only the *galeotta*'s crew but the Genoese in general. Throughout the sixteenth century, the Doria were affiliated with "treachery [but] not of the crudely obvious sort"[75] and accusations of "suspiciously excessive prudence."[76] The Genoese could be accused of duplicity just as easily they could claim – truthfully or otherwise – caution. Although they were acknowledged as experts in building and maintaining fleets, Marucelli's comments emphasize that the Genoese were perceived as "timid" to the point of mistrust. Yet, Centurione's *galeotta* captain understood that the vessel's owner had much invested in her – not to mention the skill and expertise of the 249 men aboard. Thus, the Centurione *galeotta* broke away because her captain realized that the odds of this 'crusading' mission going wrong seemed very high. Within about a week, the *Lupa* and her crew would experience the reality of this situation where the cards were stacked against them.

As the *galeotta* sailed away, the 4 'Turkish' galleys made their way towards the solitary *Lupa*. Captain Luxciano wisely decided to flee. Fortunately, the winds were in his favor, and by nightfall, the Medici vessel reached Selino, the southwest corner of Crete. The *fregata*'s fate is not as clear in these recollections of the events. Marucelli revealed that she had no choice but to seek refuge under the Venetian fortress of Kythira. However, neither account mentioned the *fregata* again after 11 July.[77] The *fregata*'s captain (Giovanni da Reggio di Calabria) described his vessel's experiences about a month later. After seeking refuge near Kythira, he had guided this small boat west until a *nave* travelling from Damietta ("Damiata") Egypt to Messina offered to tow them.

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[74] ASF MP 2077 ins. 1 f. 207r.
[75] Guilmartin. *Gunpowder and Galleys*, 57- 69. Quote from page 68.
[76] Braudel. *The Mediterranean* Volume 2., 1084, 1087; Guilmartin. *Gunpowder & Galleys*, 252, 255-256; and Niccolò Capponi. *Victory of the West* […]. (Cambridge, MA, 2007), 226-228, 238-239, 280.
[77] ASF MP 2077 ins. 1 f. 162r and f. 207r.

Somewhere between Zante (Zakynthos) and Kefalonia, Spanish agents granted Captain Giovanni "letters for the viceroy [of Sicily]," but he also became aware of a nearby enemy fleet that numbered at least 60 'Turkish' galleys.[78] Relatively speaking, the *fregata* was safe and sound and eventually made a return voyage to Sicily.

While hiding around Crete, however, the *Lupa*'s crew confronted an unsettling truth: they were not only outnumbered, but they had also lost their Genoese support vessel and their *fregata*. It seemed their only choice was to outwait the Ottoman galley squadron. The *Lupa* lingered at Selino (possibly for repairs), and after hearing word about ships departing towards Scarpanto – to the northeast between Crete and Rhodes – she eventually headed for "the turn of Barberia" and Alexandria.[79] By 19 July, Cosimo's galley reached this juncture after making stops for water on 12, 14, and 15 July. On her last stop, the local Greeks at Chavo di Cerapato (Scarpanto) doubted the *Lupa*'s intentions – and likely suspected that those aboard were pirates. Thus, they were forced "to take water with great haste."[80]

By 19 July, the *Lupa*'s crew spotted a coastal 'Arab' tower, and on 21 July, they approached Damietta, "land of the Moors," about 130 miles east of Alexandria. Over the next twenty-four hours, they encountered several vessels. Among them, a ship – specified later as a *germa* – tantalized Luxciano's men with its cargo of salt, rice, vegetables, silk, and other merchandise. In the meantime, they flagged down – or possibly captured – a Cypriot *padrone*. If the *Lupa* was initially hostile, perhaps the *padrone*'s crew consisting of 11 "Turks" and 20 "*negri*" or "Saracens" – specified in both accounts – had caused the confusion. Nevertheless, Captain Luxciano reached some sort of arrangement with the

[78] ASF MP 480 f. 206-207, "*relazione di Giovanni da Reggio di Calabria sulla galera Lupa*," 10 August 1559 from Messina. A very similar account – by Piero Machiavelli who may have been present aboard the *fregata* – can be found in this same collection on f. 165-166.
[79] ASF MP 2077 ins. 1 f. 207r. The necessity of repairs is indicated in Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 73.
[80] ASF MP 2077 ins. 1 f. 162r.

'Christians' and Greeks on board before their next raid began. Suddenly, a *barca* with 60 "Saracens" and "many Turks" arrived. Preparing for imminent battle, the captain placed 25 Medici troops aboard the Cypriot vessel. After a brief firefight, the 2 'Christian' vessels successfully chased away the 'Turkish' *barca*. Upon seeing this, the *germa*'s crew abandoned ship and her goods were for the taking. The *Lupa* and the Cypriot *padrone* towed their loot laden prize until they reached a port where they tried to negotiate – presumably an attempt to sell some, if not all, of their captured cargo – with two Greek bankers. By 23 July, however, it was clear that these negotiations were going nowhere.[81]

As the *scrivano di razione*, Marucelli certainly kept a detailed record of the *Lupa*'s haul from the enterprise thus far. Apparently, the captain and officers agreed to send part of their loot back to Cosimo aboard the Cypriot vessel. Accepting profits from some of the rice as their freight fee, the Cypriot *padrone* was loaded with 2 captured bronze artillery pieces, some firearms, other weapons, and 16 slaves comprising of Greeks and Venetians – who, although Christians, were regarded as Ottoman subjects and allies respectively[82] – all to be sold at an auction. Marucelli assured Cosimo that the value of their booty and slaves placed aboard the Cypriot galley would have reimbursed his investment. To ensure that the plunder's profits would reach Cosimo's coffers, however, a Florentine gentleman, Francesco della Pieve, and some other individuals from the *Lupa* accompanied the Cypriot *padrone* on her new mission. Much like Marco Centurione's *galeotta* and other Genoese vessels, Cosimo personally had much to gain or lose from this expedition. Writing these events one year later, Marucelli added that the Cypriot ship was later captured off the coast of Crete.[83] Of course, as far as the *Lupa*'s commanders

[81] ASF MP 2077 ins. 1 f. 162 and f. 207. Damietta is approximately 210 kilometers away from Alexandria.
[82] For example, see Greene. *Catholic Pirates*, 61-62; 115-116.
[83] ASF MP 2077 ins. 1 f. 207v and f. 208r. The 2 artillery pieces are specifically *smerigli*. The Florentine gentleman may be "Francesco della Pieue," but I have assumed his surname refers to his family's origins in Città della Pieve in Perugia (Umbria).

were concerned in July 1559, however, their operation, although challenging, had essentially paid for itself. Any future captures would only add to their – and Cosimo's – income. By late July, as the solitary Medici galley continued to patrol deep into Ottoman waters, Captain Luxciano knew nothing about his ill-fated comrades and the lost cargo aboard the Cypriot *padrone*. Nor did he realize the *Lupa*'s own forthcoming troubles were merely days away.

Although this was a self-proclaimed "voyage against the infidel," in reality, this was at best a *corso*. More accurately, Cosimo had sponsored privateers to raid 'Turkish' merchant ships in the Levant. Marucelli's shipmates had been tasked with augmenting the *Lupa*'s immense expenses and acquiring more slaves for profit and the oar. Indeed, labeling her 1559 operation as 'a crusade' veiled its true identity as a "piratic enterprise worthy of Dragut and the other most renowned corsairs."[84] After decades of enduring raids on his own coastline, Cosimo had brought the fight into the heartland of the Muslim Mediterranean. Moreover, the duke of Florence and Siena used the perceived "permanent state of war…between Christianity and Islam"[85] to further justify his 'crusading' actions. In the summer of 1559, the *Lupa* captured at least 3 vessels, and all seemed well. Perhaps what the Florentines had not anticipated, however, was the Muslims' Levantine ally: the Republic of Venice. To make matters worse, Cosimo's sailors' inexperience became ever-more apparent.

The Cypriot *padrone* and the *Lupa* parted ways on 23 July. The Medici galley's water stores were running low, but the captain disregarded advice to acquire it from nearby Castel Bero.[86] Instead, he wanted to wait to replenish their water by night at Zaffo

[84] Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 73.
[85] Greene. *Catholic Pirates*, 58.
[86] I have not specifically located Castel Bero, but clearly, it lies along the coast of modern Israel, Lebanon, or Syria.

(Jaffa) about a day's journey away. Unfortunately, the *Lupa*'s pilot was unfamiliar with the region, and their delays only alerted "the Barbary coast" all the more. Clearly, Zaffo was no longer an option. Following the coastline, the crew gladly spotted "Monte Carmello" on 26 July. The anonymous account emphasizes that this was "where Elijah…[had] called to our Lord." This most likely refers to Mount Carmel, where the prophet Elijah had challenged the prophets of Baal to prove their god's power – which they could not. The anonymous account indicates that, in spite of their water shortage, the crew acknowledged this holy site. After this brief, reverent moment, a proposition was made to acquire water from nearby Santo Giovanni de Acri (Acre). The captain approved this plan if it was conducted at night. Once again, however, the pilot became disoriented. Marucelli's account emphasizes that not only did they miss another opportunity to fill their barrels with water, but also, the pilot's incompetence had deprived them of acquiring more "prey" and slaves. In a small stroke of luck, however, a 'Christian' vessel found the *Lupa* and offered 8 barrels of water. This friendly captain also provided directions to a nearby water source but warned Captain Luxciano about a defensive tower overlooking it.[87]

The evening of 27 July started out promising. As the *Lupa* approached the rumored tower to replenish her desperately-needed water, the crew found and looted a vessel with "loads of cotton" that lay abandoned on the beach. In addition to keeping the 'Christian' vessel's warnings in mind, Captain Luxciano learned that 6 galleys of the *guardia d'Alexandria* were stationed at nearby Tripoli, Lebanon. Marucelli stressed that, in spite of the danger, "Captain Piero [tried] to make water anyway." The captain dispatched a landing party under the command of "a spirited person," Antonio del

[87] ASF MP 2077 ins. 1 f. 162v-163r and f. 208r. The writing on the anonymous account (f. 163r) appears to say "Monte Carmenio." The story of Elijah is in 1 Kings 18.

Berrettino of Venice to secure water. As the men collected the water, however, they were ambushed by at least 200 "Moors." The captain responded by sending 70 or so Medici troops with arquebuses and small artillery to create a defensive perimeter. The routine task of refilling the water barrels had erupted into a small amphibious battle.[88] The Medici troops who could escape were forced to leave most of the barrels behind, but many never had a chance to retreat to the *Lupa*. Despite his personal efforts from the marina, the captain eventually made the difficult decision to retreat without waiting for the rest of his men. Marucelli implied that this was reckless of Luxciano. Just as he suspected that the *Lupa*'s artillery fire had attracted 4 enemy galleys near Kythira about two weeks earlier, Marucelli believed that – not only had they abandoned many men but – Luxciano's supporting fire would attract the rumored nearby *guardia d'Alexandria* and other "Moorish vessels."[89]

After pushing back to sea, the remaining officers held a council. Essentially, they deliberated on nearby destinations where water could be acquired. Tripoli and Acre were both proposed, but because the captain suspected that "Turkish galleys" were nearby, he opted to head towards Cavo Santo Andrea (Cape Apostolos Andreas) on the northeastern tip of Cyprus. In spite of concerns regarding the *guardia di Cipro* and the general Venetian administration in Famagusta, the captain felt confident that their licenses (*patenti*) from Duke Cosimo would assure the authorities of their legitimacy. Before embarking towards Cyprus, however, the Captain made one more attempt to gather some water for their journey. The *Lupa* reached a small outpost where the crew could gather water from another famous biblical site, the Jordan River, but they had been followed.

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[88] An overlooked but crucial aspect of Mediterranean galley warfare. See: John F. Guilmartin, Jr. "The Logistics of Warfare at Sea in the Sixteenth Century: The Spanish Perspective" in John A. Lynn, ed. *Feeding Mars* […]. (Boulder, Co., 1993), 116, 120-126.
[89] ASF MP 2077 ins. 1 f. 163r; f. 208v-209r.

'Moorish' cavalry prevented yet another effort to refresh their water stores, and the *Lupa* headed for Cyprus. By this point, a "good number of the men" were already dehydrated and in bad health.[90] Considering that oared galleys were largely manpowered vessels, maintaining adequate water stores proved vital for Mediterranean fleets.

Warships and corsair vessels typically carried as much water as possible. Obviously, such missions greatly diminished opportunities to replenish this vital resource. Thus, Ottoman war galleys and galliots could carry up to 2,000 gallons, and this permitted them to operate for up to three weeks. Larger merchant galleys carried about 1,700 gallons (12 *botti*) of water which could last two weeks. However, the average galley carried between 800 to 1,500 gallons of water at a time.[91] Considering that the *Lupa*'s crew numbered 339 men when her voyage began, even these larger quantities amount to about 5 gallons per person. However, if she carried closer to 800 gallons, water rations for each sailor decreased by more than half. As they journeyed towards Cyprus, the *Lupa*'s crew had already made eight stops to replenish their water stores since leaving Sicily on 5 July. Clearly, they wanted to ensure that they did not run out. Yet, only half of these had succeeded. The last four attempts failed due to enemy interference and, as Marucelli explicitly stated, the pilot's incompetence and the captain's cautiousness. Regardless of the cause, aside from the friendly 'Christian' vessel's kind donation of 8 barrels of water – and whatever had made it aboard after the amphibious skirmish on 27 July – the *Lupa* had not made a successful stop for water since 15 July.

Moreover, the need for water made galley movement somewhat predictable. Especially for larger fleets, few regions could supply 50 galleys or more with their

[90] ASF MP 2077 ins. 1 f. 163 and f. 209r.
[91] John H. Pryor. *Geography, Technology, and War* […]. (New York, 1988), 54-55, 77-80, 85. Also consider the water barrel inconsistencies aboard Cosimo's galleys mentioned in Chapter 4.

watering needs. These locations were well-known to local seafarers.[92] Although Marucelli implied that the captain had ignorantly discounted motions to acquire water from Tripoli and Acre, the decision to sail for Cyprus and face the Venetians likely seemed the lesser of two evils to Luxciano. Especially considering that the *Lupa* was in 'Moorish' waters – that were unfamiliar to the pilot – it would have been exceptionally naïve to assume that the *guardia d'Alexandria* or other nearby enemy vessels were not aware of the *Lupa*'s position and her potential water sources along the Levantine coast. After all, they had already been followed on land to the Jordan River. By changing course for Cyprus, Captain Luxciano hoped to lose their pursuers. Unfortunately, this was a classic instance of "out of the frying pan and into the fire."

The crew had been two or three days without water when a terrible storm tossed the *Lupa* as she approached Cavo Santo Andrea. Marucelli's account remains vague about whether the storm had set the *Lupa* slightly off course, or if to avoid the worst of it, the captain had decided to head towards Cyprus' southeastern coast. Marucelli is very clear, however, that they were very close to Famagusta, and the captain was concerned that their current location was a "frequented place of the [Venetian] *guardia*." Considering this, Luxciano and the pilot agreed to keep going to Cavo Chitti.[93] They continued to follow the coast by night, and having had nothing to drink except wine and vinegar, the rowers were forced to compensate for the absence of wind. When they finally reached Cavo Chitti, however, the Venetian *grande guardia* awaited them. Ideally, the captain wanted to escape, but the oarsmen were "dead by thirst." Fleeing was not an option.[94]

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[92] Guilmartin. *Gunpowder and Galleys*, 112.
[93] "Cavo Chitti" refers to Citium, the Latin name for the ancient Greek settlement Kition – the ruins of which are located in modern Larnaca.
[94] ASF MP 2077 ins. 1 f. 163v and f. 209v-210r.

After the Venetians called upon them three times, Captain Luxciano and the other officers took a small boat to the meet with the captain of the Venetian *guardia*. While presenting the *patenti* from Duke Cosimo, Luxicano explained that they were simply acquiring desperately needed water before journeying to Caramania (Karaman) on the southern Anatolian coast. After inspecting the documents, the Venetian captain disregarded the Medici *patenti*. He ordered the *guardia* to board the *Lupa*. All of her troops (*scapoli*) and sailors (*marinara*) were robbed and taken aboard the Venetian galleys in irons. Every 'Turkish' and 'Moorish' galley slave and Venetian *forzato* was freed and given "good provisions" and lodging in Famagusta. The Venetians promised the other *forzati* freedom and similar treatment if they told 'the truth' about the nature of the *Lupa*'s voyage.[95] Exhausted and desperately thirsty, their motives for exaggerating, lying, and betraying their shipmates and superiors are not difficult to imagine.

The Venetian *guardia* paraded the captive *Lupa* at Famagusta on 1 August. "For [the *Lupa* crew's] contempt," the Venetian captain cut out a paper woman. In her hand, she held a tongue and a text that essentially read: "I made the mouths of these liars burn." Not only had these Venetian "scoundrels" put every man in chains and mocked them, they sold everything aboard the *Lupa* in the town square. Their suspected stolen goods and the galley's essential weapons, tools, and instruments were auctioned. Marucelli's account paints a picture reminiscent of Christ's trial and crucifixion as the Roman soldiers mocked Him and cast lots for His clothing. Most notably, all of the Medici shields were stripped and sold; while the Medici banners, standards, and flags were "shot down with great disdain." Marucelli added that he had "tried with [his] own life to oppose those wicked, foul executors…" During the next few days of imprisonment, Captain

[95] ASF MP 2077 ins. 1 f. 210.

Luxciano, Marucelli, and the other officers discussed their legal defense for the upcoming trial.[96]

Of course, this hearing was anything but fair towards Cosimo's crew. Based on testimonies from the *forzati* and other alleged evidence, the Venetian tribunal determined that the *Lupa* had raided a Cypriot vessel and enslaved Venetian subjects – clearly an exaggerated account of her deal with the aforementioned Cypriot *padrone*. Although he denied it, Captain Luxciano was condemned to life in prison – perhaps implying a life at the oar. Most of the other officers were given two-year sentences as *forzati*; while the pilot and others endured Famagusta's prison for months. The looted *scapoli* were hypothetically free to go – albeit empty handed. Additionally, aside from capturing the galley itself, the Venetians financially benefitted from the *Lupa*'s month-long voyage. Profits from silk, other tapestries and textiles, rice, and five "very beautiful and very valuable" women – among other slaves and goods – now belonged to the Venetians. In his account to Duke Cosimo, Marucelli stressed: "I believe that the captain of the *guardia* should be ashamed of his innate cruelty."[97] Luxciano had expected that Cosimo's *patenti* would quell any doubts about the *Lupa*'s legitimacy. Perhaps he and Cosimo had underestimated the *Serenissima*'s devotion to maintaining Levantine order.

Since at least the 1540s, Venice had pursued a policy of neutrality, spiced with dashes of bribes, in her relationship with the Ottomans. The republic had relinquished Peloponnesian fortresses, some Dalmatian ports, and many small possessions in the

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[96] ASF MP 2077 ins. 1 f. 210. The paper woman's text read: "*usq ad fauces mendax i con fuochi artifitati la fece ardere*." Christ's trial and crucifixion is recounted in all four Gospels: Matthew 26-27; Mark 14-15; Luke 22-23; and John 18-19.

[97] ASF MP 2077 ins. 1 f. 210v-211r. See also clarified commentary offered in Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 75-76. Marucelli elaborates that after their release from prison, the pilot's group ended up being captured and enslaved near Rhodes. Regarding Mediterranean slavery, see especially Daniel Hershenzon. "'[P]ara Que Me Saque Cabesea Por Cabesa…' […]" in *African Economic History* v. 42 (2014); and Hershenzon. "The Political Economy of Ransom in the Early Modern Mediterranean," in *Past and Present*, No. 231 (May 2016).

Aegean. Moreover, she literally had to pay for this peace with annual tribute and a massive financial restitution. However, this abject behavior also yielded thirty years of mutual benefits.[98] By 1554, Venetian merchants had obtained about half of the Alexandrian market's supply – approximately 600,000 pounds – of spices. Other luxuries followed these same routes and included medicine, silk, perfumes, and precious stones. This exchange amounted to "millions in gold." Nevertheless, this arrangement depended upon the *Serenissima*'s ability to keep her territorial waters free from pirates. This included denying them entry into ports, let alone access to food or water. Since 1555, the *guardia* of Cyprus had especially enforced these 'anti-piracy' policies against the Knights of Malta. Called to intercede, Pope Paul IV had even forbidden the knights from future access to Venetian waters.[99] Unfortunately, those aboard the *Lupa* experienced the severity of this Venetian policy first hand.

Venice clearly felt she could afford to provoke the duke of Florence and Siena – unlike Spain or perhaps even the Knights of Malta. From the republic's perspective, Cosimo's relatively insignificant fleet and lack of independent political standing must have seemed a 'low-risk' way of demonstrating the *Serenissima*'s devotion to protecting Ottoman shipping. Certainly, the *guardia* on Cyprus hoped that word of the *Lupa*'s capture and the public humiliation of her officers and crew would reach the sultan's ears. As news of this 'justice' spread, their commitment to the Ottoman treaty would be unquestioned.

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[98] Guilmartin. *Gunpowder and Galleys*, 68-69; Lester J. Libby, Jr. "Venetian Views of the Ottoman Empire […]," in *The Sixteenth Century Journal* Volume 9, No. 4, […] (Winter, 1978), 103; Capponi. *Victory of the West*, 39; and Braudel. *The Mediterranean* Volume 2, 845. See also: M.E. Mallett and J.R. Hale. *The Military Organization of a Renaissance State* […]. (Cambridge, 2006), 232.
[99] Braudel. *The Mediterranean* Volume I, 421-439, 543-549, 551, 555; and Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 73-74.

Cosimo reflects on the Lupa's fate (c. August 1559 – January 1561)

The Venetians' harshness – and the *Lupa*'s 1559 enterprise in general – revealed many things to Cosimo. Concerning practical matters, Marucelli's account all but explicitly called the pilot 'incompetent.' Especially when the *Lupa* reached the Levantine coast, opportunities to gather water and actively pursue their privateering venture were hampered by the pilot's unfamiliarity with the area. Likewise, Marucelli emphasized Captain Luxciano's cautiousness; similar inexperience in 'Turkish' waters; and his tendency to attract unwanted attention from nearby enemies. Although these are merely two individuals out of a 300-man crew, this demonstrated a lack of expertise aboard Cosimo's galleys. Their shortcomings highlighted the need to attract more professionals into the duke's navy – especially since they had lost so many in this 1559 debacle, not to mention what he would lose the next year at Djerba.

Marucelli also implied that the captain maintained a naïve overconfidence in Cosimo's *patenti* to justify himself and the crew before the Venetians. After inspecting their documents, the Greeks on Scarpanto had suspected that the *Lupa* was a pirate ship. Obviously, the Venetians on Cyprus assumed they were pirates. Outside of the Tyrrhenian, *patenti* bearing duke of Florence and Siena's signature were worthless. Moreover, the *guardia* that raided the *Lupa* disrespectfully stripped all Medici insignia from her. All Medici shields, banners, flags, and the like were either sold in Famagusta's square or used to mock Captain Luxciano and his men. Furthermore, this demonstrated Venetian views of Cosimo's sovereignty – at least in the Levant. Clearly, his authorization meant nothing. Writing in the nineteenth century, Camillo Manfroni best expresses the duke's reaction to this audacious insult:

> …the offense done to his flag [greatly aroused Cosimo] more than the loss of an excellent galley and good equipment, [the Venetians] greatly embittered him. He wrote in very resentful terms to the Venetian Senate demanding the return of the galley, the release of prisoners, compensation for the damages suffered and a thousand other things.[100]

The ordeal to reacquire the *Lupa*, the prisoners, and restitution from the *Serenissima* carried on into 1561.

Marucelli and a few others met with Venetian representatives on Corfu in December 1560 to discuss the return of the *Lupa*, her weapons, equipment, and any captive crew members to the "illustrious lord duke of Florence and Siena."[101] By January 1561, the *Lupa* was returned to Marucelli's care. Although some of her arms and other items aboard were to be delivered separately, her scribe diligently inventoried all of her masts, sails, rigging, and other hardware. Marucelli also counted her oars, benches, water barrels, and many artillery pieces: a 50-pounder cannon, 2 *aspidi*, 2 bronze *smerigli* and at least parts for a few others such as *falconeti*, *perier*, *mascoli*, and muskets.[102] Additionally, Antonio da Canal, the Venetian *governatore della galere*, personally oversaw the return of 57 *forzati*. Records from May 1558 indicate that – at best – this amounted to three quarters of the *forzati* typically aboard a Medici galley and was more likely about half of them. The released men were not named, but most were Tuscan or from nearby regions – Florence, Siena, Pistoia, Cortona, and Lucca – with a few other Italian outliers such as Rome, Piacenza, Modena, Genoa, and Naples.[103] Marucelli officially approved a receipt of the *Lupa* and her rowers on 13 January 1561 – over a year

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[100] Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 76. Manfroni arrived at this conclusion from the Diary of Settimanni "1560" – preserved in the Florentine Archives: ASF *Settimanni Fr.*

[101] ASF MP 2077 ins. 1 f. 185. It is difficult to read the folio number. Sequentially, it would also make sense to be f. 184. The Venetian public notary on Corfu was Zacaria Metaxa.

[102] ASF MP 2077 ins. 1 f. 186 -187.

[103] ASF MP 2077 ins. 1 f. 203. The number of rowers on a Medici galley in 1558 are noted in ASF MP 2131 ins. 1 f. not numbered – literally on the last page. In late April 1555, Marco Centurione made a list of all *forzati* and slaves (*schiavi* or *stiavi*) for 5 of Cosimo's war galleys. He included details such as the individual's name, their city of origin and/or ethnicity, a physical description, and either the details of their sentence (if a convict) or purchase and capture (if a slave). See also ASF MP 627 f. 25-60.

after her capture on Cyprus.[104] In another statement to Cosimo, Marucelli emphasized the men's "[many] months in prison" and relayed how one "found his dear father dead and therefore [had become] very poor and needy..." Furthermore, this freed prisoner "humbly begged" for someone to loan him the money he owed.[105] It is not difficult to imagine that, having missed over a year of their lives, many of the *Lupa*'s liberated crew confronted similar circumstances.

Although Marucelli eventually acquired restitution including the *Lupa* itself from the Venetians, the republic and even the Greeks on Scarpanto had openly marginalized Cosimo's sovereignty. As Marucelli's account indicates, the Levant was the intersection of the Christian and Muslim world. Seemingly under Cosimo's instructions, the *Lupa*'s crew had captured goods and slaves from Ottoman and other 'Muslim' vessels. When she exhausted her water stores, however, she found no mercy under the *Serenissima*'s jurisdiction. The *guardia* of Cyprus had based their policies on the increasing incursions from the Knights of Malta who posed a serious threat to the Muslim merchants and forces in the Levant. Even if piracy was relatively rarer in the first half of the sixteenth century,[106] the *Lupa*'s experience in 1559 clearly demonstrates that it was far from non-existent. Moreover, even though the Knights of Malta are much more famous for their naval exploits, the *Lupa* unmistakably partook in a 'pirate crusade' (i.e. a *corso*) in the Levant on Cosimo's behalf.

The Medici galley did not represent a religious order – nor officially participate in a crusade – yet, Cosimo's sailors engaged in a *corso* clearly modelled on the Knights of Malta. When the *Lupa* found herself outnumbered by 4 'Turkish' warships in 1559,

[104] ASF MP 2077 ins. 1 f. 188; and f. 204.
[105] ASF MP 2077 ins. 1 f. 215.
[106] Historians have characterized the 'post-Lepanto' period as "a maritime world that [had become] far more violent," marked by "the great age of [Mediterranean] piracy." Greene. *Catholic Pirates*, 4, 108-109, 79. See also Franco Angiolini. "*Il Granducato di Toscana,*" in Isabel Cristina Ferreira Fernandes. *Ordens Militares* […] Volume 1 (Lisbon, 1999), 39-56; and Braudel. *The Mediterranean* Volumes I / II.

hoisting the order's banner was enough to convince her enemies to turn away. Cosimo might have been looking for such 'brand recognition' for his own crusades. Especially considering the disrespect shown to the duke's own banners and the *Lupa*'s partnership with the 'cowardly' Genoese, Cosimo likely wished his galleys to fly colors that would instill the fear of a Maltese *corso* but promote his own dynastic prestige.

Marucelli's accounts reveal the perceived incapacity of the duke's navy; the revered status of the Knights of Malta across the Mediterranean; and most importantly, the blatant disregard for Cosimo's sovereignty outside of Tuscany. Arguably, the obstacles revealed by the *Lupa*'s 'crusade' almost certainly influenced Cosimo's desire and his ultimate decision found his own military religious order, the Order of Santo Stefano, over the next three years. Cosimo must have seen such an order as a solution to his navy's desperate need for expertise; a way of legitimizing his 'crusades' to acquire riches and slaves; and especially to instill respect for his sovereignty beyond Tuscany. Furthermore, this realization coincided with a "favorable opportunity" provided by the defeat at Djerba[107] – in addition to a new 'Medici' pope (Pius IV) and an advantageous Tuscan socio-economic situation. All worked in Cosimo's favor as he moved towards establishing the Order of Santo Stefano.

[107] Franco Angiolini. *I cavalieri e il principe* […]. (Florence, 1996), 19.

Chapter 6: Losses: Dwindling Navies and the Debut of the Order of Santo Stefano (c. July 1560 – November 1563)

The Western Mediterranean immediately after Djerba (c. July 1560 – July 1561)

The defeat at Djerba in 1560 had opened wide the door for Dragut to attempt to impose a tribute on Genoa and to pursue a virtual free rein in the western Mediterranean. Immediately after the battle, the sultan's forces – including the corsairs – sacked the Balearics and captured several ships.[1] The armada had scattered into raiding parties – just as Niccolò Gentile and Piero Machiavelli had told Cosimo in June 1560. By the following summer in July 1561, Dragut and at least 13 corsair galliots ambushed and took a Sicilian squadron of 7 galleys near the isle of Lipari.[2] Genoa and Savoy's Ligurian coast was unsafe, and corsairs also landed near the Piedmontese port of Villafranca.[3] That same year, a French bishop observed that Dragut "has held the kingdom of Naples in such a noose… [that the galleys] of Malta, of Sicily, and of other neighbouring ports are so harassed and confined by [Dragut] that not one of them can pass from one place to another."[4]

Yet, counterattacks against the corsairs or the Ottomans between 1560-1562 were small. Philip II continued to conduct minor strikes into North Africa, but in light of the Djerba debacle, he dared not provoke the Sultan's fleet again.[5] In the spring of 1561, the knights of Malta conducted their own raids in the Levant. In this expedition, they captured a *germe* carrying many slaves and goods. Among the captives were included Mehemet Bey of Cairo and an older woman who was a personal friend of Roxelana

[1] Camillo Manfroni. "La Marina Militare […]." (Rome, 1895), 55-58.
[2] Kenneth M. Setton *The Papacy and the Levant (1204-1571)* Volume IV […]. (Philadelphia, 1984), 831, 833. See also Fabrizio Filioli Uranio. *La squadra navale pontificia* […]. (Ariccia, Italy, 2016), 81.
[3] Salvatore Bono. *Corsari nel Mediterraneo* […]. (Milan, 1993), 143-144. This either occurred in 1561 or 1562.
[4] Roger Crowley. *Empires of the Sea* […]. (London, 2008), 79 and notes. This is Crowley's translation.
[5] M.J. Rodriguez-Salgado. *The changing face of Empire* […]. (Cambridge, 1988), 305.

(Hurrem Sultan) – Süleyman's wife and favorite consort.[6] Nevertheless, these offensive movements were not the norm. Most of the remaining Italo-Habsburg galleys had been forced to play a defensive role along their respective coastlines. The Habsburg-Valois War may have ended, but the conflict with the Barbary corsairs endured.

Additionally, there were other developments on the religious, economic, and political fronts. Pope Pius IV "had been caught for months between the Spanish Scylla and a Franco-German Charybdis" at the Council of Trent. Cosimo's friendship with Pius IV had arguably initiated a "Tuscan invasion of St. Peter's [that] resembled a colonial conquest." The duke instructed Tuscan bishops to support the papal curia in its rivalry against the bishops from France and the Holy Roman Empire – which in the context of the Protestant reformation implied a strong pro-papal stance. Additionally, in an economic move against Genoa, Cosimo sought to make Tuscany the exclusive manager of papal taxes alongside other business and financial matters. To support his cause, Cosimo planned to use significant monetary and military contributions towards combatting the Ottomans to bolster his image as a pious and passionate supporter of the counter reformation. However, not everyone was wooed by these perceptions. In 1561, the Venetian ambassador Vincenzo Fedeli alleged that Cosimo planned to use a Spanish war against the Ottomans to distract Philip from Siena and the disputed *Presidios*. Yet, regardless if these claims were true, this conflict against the sultan and the Barbary corsairs certainly justified Cosimo's efforts to maintain a formidable naval presence in the Tyrrhenian. Even though Philip II would unquestionably uphold and defend Catholicism and canon law, the Holy Father hoped Cosimo's military and economic presence could contribute towards a "counterbalance" against the Spanish dominion of

[6] Jurien de la Graviere, *Les Chevaliers de Malte et la marine de Philippe II* Volume 1, (Paris, 1887), 63-64.

Italy.[7] Although he was from a distant – and dubious – branch of the family, Pius[8] was still a Medici pope and had gained his position through Cosimo's financial backing. Each wanted to use the other to his own benefit.

The duke's dwindling galley squadron and works on Elba (c. January 1560 – June 1561)

As was the case throughout the Mediterranean, Cosimo's galley squadron was also far from ambitious between 1560-1561. Aboard the salvaged *Lupa* in late 1561 or early 1562, Piero Machiavelli had sailed to Civitavecchia to tow and escort a ship carrying gifts from Pope Pius IV to Cosimo – an ancient granite column and other artifacts. As had also happened in November 1560, Machiavelli was on the defensive against Algerian corsairs near the isle of Giannutri. This time, however, Machiavelli successfully captured one of the two enemy *galeotte*. His success forced the other pirate vessel to join him on shore to conduct negotiations.[9]

In addition to this small victory, Cosimo ambitiously gathered wood for 12 galleys. He gifted two of these to Pope Pius IV's nephew (Count Federigo Borromeo) who hoped to follow in the Doria's footsteps. Without a single vessel to his name, however, this young man had offered Philip 20 warships to augment the Spanish king's recent losses at Djerba. Cosimo's donation of 2 galleys – albeit unarmed and unequipped – formed part of his efforts to further cultivate his friendship with the Holy Father. To enhance this gift, Cosimo used Florentine 'state' funds to arm these vessels at Civitavecchia. Yet shortly thereafter, Count Borromeo died, and these galleys quickly

[7] Giorgio Spini. "The Medici Principality […]," in *Journal of Italian History*, no. 3, winter 1979, 431-433 and notes. For the Scylla and Charybdis quote and a few other details, see Setton. *The Papacy and the Levant* Volume IV, 769. Florentine and Pisan merchants and bankers (alongside Cosimo) engaged in an economic rivalry against Genoa.
[8] Giovanni Angelo Medici
[9] Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 96 and notes. Manfroni uses ASF MP 2077 to place this event in 1561-1562. *Archivio di Stato di Firenze* (ASF) Carte Strozzione (CS) prima serie (I) 145 folio (f.) 5-6 clearly refers to the same event – but has a different date. However, since the Carte Strozzione account appears to have been composed at a later date than the events described, I am proceeding with the assumption that Manfroni's assessment of the sources is more accurate.

passed from his brother (Cardinal Carlo) to Marcantonio Colonna and eventually back to Cosimo.[10] This episode revealed that the Medici galley squadron and naval infrastructure was as much a tool of diplomacy as it was a weapon for state defense.

Minor achievements aside, Cosimo's budding navy suffered a tremendous blow in early 1561. After contracting another illness, Luca Martini passed away on 9 January. Alongside the "one hundred sonnets on the death of Mr. Luca Martini," Cosimo's secretary Lorenzo Pagni observed: "it will be difficult to find another person who can perform all of these chores at Pisa." The saddened duke agreed. After Martini's death, the *provveditore delle galere* and *delle fossi* became two separate offices. According to everyone involved, no single person could achieve what Luca Martini had done.[11] Nevertheless, much work remained unfinished.

For example, Elba's *biscotteria* and administrative offices were still underway. As workers placed a roof over the ovens, however, other sections of the *biscotteria* ran into snags and complications. Frustrated by the delays, Piero Machiavelli insisted in April 1561 that building materials should be diverted away from a convent for the Franciscan friars that was also being built. The engineer Camerini consulted Cosimo on the matter, and the duke decided to carry on with the original plan – the friars' convent.[12] As peculiar as this decision seemed, collaboration with the church had allowed the duke to purchase desirable real estate for his arsenal and other naval administrative buildings in Pisa between 1548 and the early 1550s. Certainly, prioritizing the convent on Elba was related to a similar arrangement. Moreover, in the climate of counter reformation,

[10] Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 97 and notes.
[11] Franco Angiolini's entry for Luca Martini in the *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani* (DBdI) vol. 71 (2008) available online: www.treccani.it. Angiolini cites Pagni's comments: ASF MP 487 f. 626.
[12] Amelio Fara. *Portoferraio* […]. (Turin, 1997), 3-6, 12-13, 16-19, 23-24. The obstacles did not end with the *biscotteria*-convent debate. Even though Camerini had already begun laying the foundation for Portoferraio's *arsenale* between May and June 1561, by October, funds for the project suddenly ran dry. Yet, the church and cisterna were still under construction into the next year

physically building 'a fortress' for God's kingdom was on a similar footing to the duke's ongoing military works.

The enduring projects on Elba meant a great deal to Cosimo. Recalling a conversation between himself and the duke regarding Portoferraio (Cosmopolis) in 1560, the Venetian ambassador Vincenzo Fedeli had noted:

> But what is more important, and that is the aim of the duke's final intention, is that he [will make] an arsenal there with fifty places to keep the galleys and everything an armada needs: and he told me several times that a prince is not powerful, if he is not powerful from land and sea, and that he thought of nothing but wanting to make galleys, since you can see wood [that is readily available] the pines and oaks from the huge forests and infinite woodlands of the territory of Pisa, the site of that city [which] the Pisans knew was suitable and ready for maritime enterprises, and from this, his soul grows seeing himself as master not only of the state of Pisa, with which only the Pisans [endured] so many tests, but of a much greater dominion [that Florence and Siena comprise].[13]

In addition to building arsenals and other administrative buildings, Cosimo also sought visionary engineers with new ideas for shipbuilding and other naval matters. Many Greeks and Venetians responded to this latter calling – including one from Curzola that proposed a new system with 12 men per oar. He also received detailed instructions for certain steps in galley construction and operation – including how felled trees should be treated and stored and how the oarsmen should be trained.[14] Cosimo personally reviewed every idea; issued captain's licenses and orders; and oversaw his recovering navy. He promised impressive wages with hopes of recruiting other experts from abroad such as his 16 *maestri d'ascia* (axe masters) who were mostly from Messina and Venice. Cosimo's galley builders and administrators were rapidly absorbing – and more often transferring – lessons from shipyards elsewhere. Clearly, the duke of Florence and Siena wanted to surpass every other Italian prince's naval power.[15] He said as much to Fedeli in 1560:

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[13] *Relazione di Firenze di Messer Vincenzo Fedeli* […] in Eugenio Albèri, ed. *Relazioni degli Ambasciatori Veneti al Senato* Serie II[a] Volume I (Florence, 1839), 358. See also Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 56.
[14] ASF Mediceo del Principato (MP) 2077 ins. 1 f. 115-117.
[15] For the paragraph as a whole, see Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 55.

> I have placed myself [within the spirit of all] things of the sea and I [will have] galleys made and yet [I will] continue to make them and I will keep all of those things in order that [the galleys] need to be able to arm them; that I will not [neglect] *ciurme*, and to my advantage, if it is necessary to serve my friends: and in a short time, I want to have thirty in order. And to have all things in my state in order for the needs of the arsenal, this year (1560) I placed an order for the sails to be made, to make the rest of [these] all on my own in the same fashion and to serve whoever wanted them.[16]

Remembering that Cosimo had lost the *Lupa* to the Venetians during Marucelli's disastrous voyage, 2 galleys at Djerba, another 2 near Gianutri, and another off the coast of Corsica, the duke's squadron had waned between 1559-1560.[17] His goal of building a fleet of 30 galleys – let alone the 50 galleys he planned to accommodate at Portoferraio – seemed a distant dream. If he was to continue serving Philip II and fulfilling Tuscany's and Siena's defensive needs, he desperately needed all of the warships he could muster – and the money and expertise to construct them. Yet Cosimo never allowed these setbacks to hinder his ambition.

An opportune moment: Cosimo founds the Order of Santo Stefano (c. January 1560 – May 1562)

In addition to a fleet of 30 galleys and a cavalry unit for patrolling his coastline, Cosimo's *memoria* declared that he planned to establish "an order of knights which fight for the faith… [similar to] all the other orders already created." The duke foresaw a squadron of "two ordinary galleys" with headquarters in Pisa or Elba. He expected that this force would expand to 6 galleys – which would combine with 24 state-owned galleys. Thus, one fifth of his envisioned navy would consist of vessels from his proposed religious order. Moreover, "spoils from all the knights," in addition to monthly and annual fees, would pay for the organization's vessels and *palazzo*. Cosimo anticipated that its starting capital would total 5,000 ducats with subsequent contributing payments from its members in increments of 500 and 100 *scudi* – some of which would presumably

[16] *Relazione di Firenze di Messer Vincenzo Fedeli*, 394. See also Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 55-56.
[17] That Cosimo had lost at least 5 galleys at this point is emphasized in Marco Gemignani. "The Navies of the Medici […]," in John B. Hattendorf and Richard W. Unger, eds. *War at Sea in the Middle Ages and Renaissance*. (Woodbridge, England, 2002), 175 footnote 19.

derive from "*commende di grazia*" and other privileges established by Tuscan and Sienese nobles. Among other ideas to supplement the order's income, he hoped to receive papal subsidies from "the tenth" whenever they voyaged "among the infidels."[18]

Overall, Cosimo's *memoria* revealed that he would pursue founding a religious order because it would subsidize the costs related to building and maintaining his ambitious fleet of 30 galleys. On the one hand, the order would accrue its own funds through its members – nobles and non-nobles alike. Moreover, the galley squadron would – it was hoped – fund itself with loot acquired while "[crusading] among the infidels" – much like the *Lupa* had aimed to do in the summer of 1559. On the other hand, as a papal-approved, crusading religious order (*religione*), it would be eligible to receive funds directly from the pope's coffers. This would simultaneously strengthen the personal relationship between the Holy See and future Medici dukes.[19]

Philip II, already benefitted from a similar arrangement with the papacy. The king of Spain relied on the "three graces" for military and other expenses: the *subsidio* or "tenth" (explicitly mentioned by Cosimo in his *memoria*); the *cruzada* (crusading indulgences); and the *excusado* (a portion of the tithe paid by the laity). Ten years later, income from the "three graces" alone covered Philip's financial contribution towards the Lepanto campaign in 1571. In the early sixteenth century, the Spanish religious orders of Santiago, Calatrava, and Alcántara were assessed at a value of 111,000 ducats. It was no exaggeration to suppose that, for a leader of a sovereign 'state,' the primary benefits of a military religious order were financial.[20] Cosimo undoubtedly knew this. Given these

[18] ASF MP 327 f. 7-8. Clarification of the document's contents is offered in Franco Angiolini. *I cavalieri e il principe* […]. (Florence, 1996), 16-17, and the *commende di grazia* is discussed on p. 38.
[19] These reasons are also identified by Angiolini. *I cavalieri e il principe*, 17, 20 and Gemignani. "The Navies of the Medici," 173-174. See also Riguccio Galluzzi. *Istoria del Granducato di Toscana* Volume II. (Florence, 1781), 36.
[20] Norman Housley. *The Later Crusades, 1274-1580* […]. (Oxford, 1992), 147-148, 316-317. Housley specifies that the Venetian ambassador Vincent Quirini estimated the value of the Spanish Military Orders.

contemporary calculations, one third of this value – about 35,000 ducats – was indeed a considerable yet realistic sum for Cosimo to eventually expect from his own order.

Moreover, Machiavelli's aforementioned letter had emphasized this exact agreement with the pope. In addition to sharing expenses for 8 galleys with the Appiani, he had encouraged the duke to jointly manage 6 galleys with the church – and allow the pope to cover 4 of them.[21] It is no coincidence that Cosimo's *memoria* and his propositions for a religious order aimed for a squadron of 6 galleys. Again, subsidizing the costs for the duke's ambitious fleet was certainly the largest motivating factor towards founding a 'crusading' order. Nevertheless, this proposed organization's interpersonal incentives with the church and prominent individuals in Tuscany and Siena could not be ignored.

Having acquired Siena through an arduous process with Philip II and other Habsburg officials, Cosimo sought political support from the Roman Catholic Church. The duke of Florence and Siena recognized that sacred and secular leadership were intertwined. On one occasion, he told Fedeli that "religious changes and alterations are [obviously] accompanied by the danger of changes in states." Two papacies – Paul III Farnese's early in his reign and most recently Paul IV Carafa's – had revealed the risks of a tumultuous relationship with the Holy See. Both popes were counted among Cosimo's fiercest political opponents, and the duke had learned from his past. Instead of providing an obstacle, he recognized that the church could play a key role in strengthening the recently expanded 'Medici state.' Moreover, he could capitalize on the climate of counter-reformation sentiment and the real 'Muslim' threat to the Italian coast in the mid-

[21] Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale di Firenze (BNCF) *Magliabechi* E. B. 15.10, f. 176r-179v, *Codice di Giuliano D e Ricci,* transcribed Gaspar Amico. *La Vita di Niccolo Machiavelli*, 673.

sixteenth century. Both of these realities bolstered Cosimo's case for a crusading order.[22] Indeed, a papal-instituted military religious order could ensure a lasting bond between future Medici dukes and the pope. If nothing else, it provided an excuse for correspondence and other building blocks for a personal relationship. Especially considering that St. Peter's keys frequently changed hands, Cosimo's proposed crusading order could always be the 'icebreaker' between Florence and Rome.

In addition to the Holy See, the duke intended to create ties with the nobility and the "best minds of Tuscan and international society." Concerning the ambitious navy outlined in his *memoria* – and in light of the men he had lost aboard the *Lupa* and those at Djerba – Cosimo wanted to accumulate military and naval experts from abroad. Moreover, he sought a stronger and mutually beneficial relationship with prominent members of Tuscan society. Given the context of constant wars; shifting alliances and leadership; and countless other variables, the first half of the sixteenth century encompassed a period of tremendous change for those in Tuscany, Siena, and Italy as a whole. Among others, questions related to Cosimo's domestic sovereignty and legitimacy arguably resulted in a rather precarious understanding between the duke and many powerful Tuscan and Sienese families. Given such circumstances, contemporary socio-political writers counselled rulers to create a system of "*provigionati et exercitati*" (provision and experience) for their courtiers and noble subjects. In other words, if a renaissance prince wanted to maintain control over the nobility and wealthy elites, he needed to offer opportunities for advancement and for these potential rivals to practice their courtly skills. Thus, it was essential for Cosimo to balance the traditional rights of his aristocratic subjects within the framework of his "patrimonial state." A highly

[22] Angiolini. *I cavalieri e il principe*, 20-21. Angiolini cites Cosimo's statement to Fedeli: *Relazione di messer Vincenzo Fedeli segretatrio dell'illustrissima Signoria di Venezia tornado dal duca di Fiorenza nel 1561*, in *Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti*, Vol. III Part I, 127.

selective chivalric order was one avenue that could lead prominent Tuscans – in addition to the newly-integrated Sienese subjects – towards the top of the nascent duchies' hierarchy. In essence, such an organization could eventually create a relationship of "honorable dependence" between the grand master (i.e. Cosimo) and the order's knights – "a socio-political patronage system firmly in Medici hands." Whether Cosimo realized this at the time or not, this Medici-papal institution could transcend familial rivalries and make the duke of Florence and Siena the source of socio-political legitimacy. Likewise, the esteemed members of his proposed military order would positively reflect upon Cosimo. Simply becoming the hub of "a powerful network of ties, solidarity," and expertise could further legitimize and raise the Medici regime within Tuscany and Siena – and ideally Europe.[23] As prospective members of his order, Cosimo's subjects similarly aimed to elevate their own status.

Economically speaking, sixteenth-century Tuscany had undergone major and significant changes regarding textiles, land organization, sharecropping, and mixed cropping (polycropping). Florentine – and other Tuscan urbanite – investors had ventured into commercial agriculture, co-cultivation, and sericulture (silk production). This resulted in more consistent work opportunities and higher incomes for peasants. Together, these phenomena transformed the Tuscan countryside and the financial status of their city-dwelling investors. Moreover, between the late 1550s (the end of the Italian Wars) and the 1570s, Florentine wool production – and profits – reached unprecedented levels. These simultaneous developments significantly linked the urban and rural economies. The ease of movement between these regions resulted in competitive wages

[23] Angiolini. *I cavalieri e il principe*, 20 -24, 44-45, 134, 149. Angiolini refers to the writings of Lodovico Alamanni (*c.* 1516) as an example of "*provigionati et exercitati*." "Patrimonial State" is a translation of Furio Diaz's term "*Stato Patrimoniale.*" See Furio Diaz. *Il Granducato di Toscana* […] (Turin, 1987), 192-193. "A socio-political…" quote is taken from Niccolò Capponi. *Victory of the West* […]. (Cambridge, MA, 2007), 86. See also Franco Angiolini. "Il Granducato di Toscana," in Isabel Cristina Ferreira Fernandes, ed. *Ordens Militares* […] Volume 1. (Lisbon, 1999), 45.

for skilled labor from the cities and countryside, and overall, fostered a flourishing economic ecosystem of rural produce and urban industry.[24] Numerous families had recently benefitted from their entrepreneurial endeavors. Florence especially provided opportunities in business, politics, and at the Medici court, but others in the countryside had continued to raise their economic status too. As a result, many influential Tuscans had wealth and stations but not necessarily a noble pedigree. Cosimo's proposed religious order could be used to secure their position among the Tuscan elite and eventually became a crucial step in climbing the socio-economic ladder.[25]

Thus, Cosimo's proposal for a military religious order coincided with a period of economic prosperity and a growing number of individuals looking to elevate their social status. Moreover, Pius IV was an ally, and his papacy occurred at a moment when militant Christianity (i.e. crusading) was widely supported. It has also been argued that the defeat at Djerba inspired the Medici duke's idea of crusading knights and their galley squadron. However, considering that Cosimo had already expressed this idea in his *memoria* between 1557 and early 1560, this seems extremely unlikely. Nevertheless, Djerba did instill a "climate of fear which spread in the western Mediterranean countries," and this defeat intensified interest in defending the Christian coastlines against Barbary Muslims.[26] In short, economic circumstances, a cooperative pope, and renewed religiously-charged security concerns made the early 1560s the perfect time to propose and found a crusading religious order.

From January 1560, ducal secretary Bartolomeo Concini worked closely with Pope Pius IV on Cosimo's requests for assistance from the Holy See. Among the appeals

[24] Judith C. Brown. "The 'Economic Decline' of Tuscany […]," in Sergio Bertelli, Nicolai Rubinstein, and Craig Hugh Smyth, eds. *Florence and Milan* […] Volume II. (Florence, 1989), 101-115. See also Angiolini. *I cavalieri e il principe*, 72.
[25] Angiolini. *I cavalieri e il principe*, 74, 77-78, 82, 90-91, 99, 122-123, 129, 149, and notes.
[26] Most of this is based upon the discussion above, but the Djerba aspect is analyzed in Angiolini. *I cavalieri e il principe*, 17-19.

outlined by Concini, the creation of a military order quickly became the primary issue of discussion. The duke's proposal contained some small changes from his *memoria*, but he continued to stress his desire to defend Catholicism against Islam. Particularly in the context of reformation and counter-reformation Europe, "religious wars" against non-Christians – as opposed to "confessional wars" among Christians – had received reinvigorated approval.[27] Again, this favorably reinforced Cosimo's proposition. Having received papal approval in October 1561, the duke's legal team – his reliable advisor Lelio Torelli alongside Francesco Vinta and Benedict Varchi – began drawing up the statutes for the Medici military order. Pius's first papal bull on the matter emphasized that these knights would "defend the Catholic faith and the Mediterranean Sea from the infidels… [now and for] future generations… just like the other [orders] in Spain…" Furthermore, he granted Cosimo and his successors with the authority to "[establish] habits, chapters, agreements, conditions, and [other arrangements with the knights] … [as long as these] things are lawful and honest [within canon and other laws]."[28]

Pope Pius IV issued a more formal bull on 30 January 1562 which outlined certain annual incomes, inheritance rights, and other entitlements regarding "indulgences, privileges, [and] exemptions from statutes… [which the papacy also granted to the Hospitallers of Saint John of Jerusalem]." Moreover, this more detailed statement continued to emphasize that the order's knights would form part of the "might of the army of the Catholic Church … [by launching] expeditions by [sea and land] against the

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[27] Franz Brendle and Anton Schindling. "Religious War and Religious Peace in the Age of Reformation," in R.J.W. Evans, Michael Schaich, and Peter H. Wilson, eds. *The Holy Roman Empire, 1495-1806*. (Oxford, 2011), 165-166.

[28] Transcribed in Gino Guarnieri. *L'Ordine di S. Stefano* […] Volume I (Pisa, 1966), 28-30. This is also included in the preface of the Order of Santo Stefano's first statutes: Archivio di Stato di Pisa (ASP) Inventario (Inv.) *20 Ordine di Cavalieri di Santo Stefano* (Santo Stefano) Numero Nuovo (NN.) 1, "Statuti capitoli et constitutioni del Ordine de' Cavalieri di S. Stefano." For the paragraph as a whole, see also Angiolini. *I cavalieri e il principe*, 10; and Gemignani. "The Navies of the Medici," 173. Gemignani cites Josefs Gelmi, *I Papi,* translated into Italian by C. Milesi (Milan: Rizzoli, 1986), 167 and ASF MP 468 f. 48r.

infidels or heretics…"[29] Most importantly, Pius acknowledged Cosimo de Medici and his successors as grand masters of the order. The papal nuncio presented these statutes to Cosimo in a ceremony held at the cathedral of Pisa on 15 March 1562. Since the Medici victory over the forces of Piero Strozzi at the battle of Marciano and an earlier victory over his father Filippo at the battle of Montemurlo had both occurred on 2 August – the feast day of pope and martyr Stephen I – this religious order was named in his honor: *Ordine dei Cavalieri di Santo Stefano*. By canon law, the Medici dukes of Florence and Siena had also become grand masters of a crusading order, knights to defend Mediterranean Christendom against Islam. With Santo Stefano finally approved in 1562, Cosimo had seemingly achieved his goal of creating "a maritime militia… [that was] at the same time…based on a religious ruling, approved by the pope, and formally independent from the direct will of the duke."[30]

Yet, the *Lupa*'s 1559 voyage demonstrates that Cosimo's fleet arguably pursued 'crusades' at least three years before officially founding the Order of Santo Stefano. Even though this mission cannot be directly tied to the duke's motives for founding a religious order, its chronological proximity to his *memoria*, favorable socio-economic conditions, and a 'Medici friendly' papacy cannot be overlooked. Moreover, this mission enlightened other potential sources of inspiration for a Medici military order. Marucelli's account of the pilot's and captain's mishaps highlighted but one of the numerous complications related to Cosimo's developing navy and acquiring expertise. Perhaps most importantly, however, this 'voyage against the infidel' demonstrated the regard – or lack thereof – of Cosimo's sovereignty outside of Tuscany. The *Lupa*'s treatment at the hand of the

[29] Transcribed in Guarnieri. *L'Ordine di S. Stefano* […] Volume I (Pisa, 1966), 30-35.
[30] Angiolini. *I cavalieri e il principe*, 19. See also pp. 10, 20-25. The ceremony and the knights' mission is colorfully described (with some fascist undertones) in Gino Guarnieri. *Cavalieri di Santo Stefano* […]. (Pisa, 1928), 25-28, 32. Guarnieri mistakenly states that the Battle of Montemurlo occurred in 1557 instead of 1537.

Venetians on Cyprus had essentially been an afront to the duke's respect and authority. Even though this was a crusading order in name, Santo Stefano seemed to be less about conducting future 'voyages against the infidel,' but rather Cosimo's quest to be recognized as a sovereign ruler; incorporate naval professionals into his service; subsidize part of his ambitious navy; and build a rapport with the papacy and his Tuscan and Sienese 'subjects.'

Moreover, it is interesting to note that the motivations for Medinaceli's and Philip II's 'crusade' on Djerba were not that different than Cosimo's reasons for his own 'crusades' and founding the Order of Santo Stefano. Just like Cosimo, Medinaceli's Sicily had been constantly subject to corsair raids. Indeed, there were practical security concerns that prompted these leaders to fight 'the infidel' – and certainly found great satisfaction in bringing the fight into Ottoman waters. Additionally, both Philip II and Cosimo sought to rebuild their relationship with the papacy, and crusades were an easy way to demonstrate that they were doing 'God's work.' Especially in Philip and Medinaceli's case, the territories they defended fell under the pope's lordship in the feudal hierarchy. By campaigning against the North African corsairs, they were fulfilling their duties as the pope's vassals. In all cases, fiefs and obligations played a significant role. Cosimo's 'feudal' relationship with Philip II regarding Siena was definitely another variable taken into account when he founded Santo Stefano. Again, the order's actions – including those of its galleys – were separate from Cosimo's secular role as the duke of Florence and ruler of Siena as Philip's vassal.

Overall, the western Mediterranean was an intricate feudal and religious web that involved the pope, the king of Spain, the viceroys of Sicily and Naples, the Knights of Malta, and second-rank Italian princes such as Cosimo on the Christian side and the sultan, his pashas, and the corsair captains on the Muslim side. Moreover, all had to

contend with the local kings and lords among the 'Moors' and Arabs in North Africa. Indeed, religion, regency, and renegades contributed to this realm's political and military intricacies. In addition to all of the benefits discussed above, the Order of Santo Stefano granted Cosimo diplomatic and military flexibility in the allocation of his galleys and allowed him to better secure his status in this highly-contested region.

Cosimo's place at the Mediterranean negotiating table (c. January - November 1562)

Even though the Italian Wars had ended three years earlier, many subtle negotiations remained. Queen Caterina de Medici of France dispatched a diplomatic envoy with hopes of freeing some of the Valois's captured leaders in the first half of 1562, and it is not difficult to imagine that similar attempts were underway on the behalf of other sovereigns. The queen's efforts were unsuccessful,[31] and 1562 witnessed the first violent confrontations between Protestants, Catholics, and their noble supporters which were to become the French Wars of Religion. Caterina sent the Florentine Abbot Baccio del Bene to her distant cousin Cosimo and requested a loan to help wage the war against the Huguenots. The duke of Florence and Siena understood that, although he would never possess the vast military resources of the Spanish Habsburgs, he could serve as the "banker to the holy crusades." To this end, he quickly approved Caterina's request, and this loan was the first of many in the 1560s. For his own benefit, Cosimo had already dispatched an ambassador to France as soon as Cateau Cambrésis had been finalized, and he aspired to use France as a counterbalance to Spanish power. As he maneuvered between the Valois and the Spanish Habsburgs, he even began establishing an

[31] Setton. *The Papacy and the Levant* Volume IV, 831, 833.

independent espionage network in Ragusa and other places.[32] Wiley as ever, the duke of Florence and Siena used the developing circumstances to try to appease both sides.

On Philip's behalf in August 1562, Cosimo collaborated with Count Giovan Francesco Orsini to restore the Comune of Pitigliano to the Orsini and bring them into the Spanish Habsburg fold. In fact though, the duke had already initiated these same discussions on his own accord to foster a personal relationship with the Orsini and to help them curry favor with the Farnese who watched this neighboring region with interest.[33] Cosimo – like Philip II – always maintained his own interests in mind, but ensured that his actions at least possessed the guise of working for Spain's benefit. It is interesting to note that three members of the Orsini clan: Orso of Pitigliano and two from the Roman branch of the family (Orazio di Vicino and Mario Orsino) were initiated into Santo Stefano in 1562.[34] Considering this, it is extremely likely that Cosimo had worn his new hat as the grand master of the Order of Santo Stefano in reaching an understanding with this noble family – and implies the order's appeal at this early stage.

In the larger realm of diplomacy, Djerba's wake had left many matters to be attended to between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans. Philip's uncle Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand I and Süleyman concluded an eight-year peace on 27 November 1562.[35] Around this same time, Italian appointments to Spanish military orders multiplied. Philip hoped to utilize the orders' prestige as a way to gain "pro-Spanish and pro-Catholic" influence in their respective courts.[36] Again, Cosimo's and Philip's

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[32] Spini. "The Medici Principality," 435 and notes. On Cosimo's espionage network, see Gennaro Varriale. "Avvisi del Levante a Firenze […]" in Alessio Assontis and Brian Sandberg, eds. *The Grand Ducal Medici and their Archive (1537-1743)*. (Turnhout, Belgium, 2016), 39, 41.
[33] Angelo Biondi. "Tentativi di Unire al Presidi Spagnoli […]" in Anna Guarducci, ed. *Orbetello e i Presidios*. (Florence, 2000), 212.
[34] Guarnieri. *L'Ordine di Santo Stefano* Volume IV, 154.
[35] Setton *The Papacy and the Levant* Volume IV, 829.
[36] Gregory Hanlon. *The Twilight of a Military Tradition* […]. (London, 1998), 59 and notes. Hanlon especially cites Martine Lambert-Gorges, "Le roi, les ordres, et le peril barbaresque: un exemple

individual perceptions on the Mediterranean's intertwined political-religious-military affairs appeared almost identical. 'Crusading' orders seemed to provide some solutions to the complex problems at hand… and there were many. On the naval front in 1562, Spanish intelligence indicated that the sultan had amassed a large fleet of 150 vessels including galleys and *mahonas*. Moreover, Piali Pasha patrolled with at least 15 galleys, and Dragut threatened La Goleta.[37] That June, Otranto on Italy's heel faced an amphibious attack from around 23 "Turkish" vessels under Ali Portuç.[38]

Cosimo incorporates the Order of Santo Stefano into his navy (May 1562 – March 1563)

On 23 May 1562, a squadron of 4 galleys under Baccio Martelli took Cosimo's son and heir Francesco de Medici to Spain. This convoy possibly included 2 vessels belonging to Marco Centurione but certainly comprised Martelli's *Margherita* and *Pace* and Cosimo's *Regina* and *Lupa*. Even though Santo Stefano's galley squadron had not yet been officially established, this fairly routine voyage to and from Spain likely included many of the order's newly-initiated knights – or at least individuals who would soon be initiated. Such an escort was deemed necessary to guard the Medici prince against the pirates that plagued the French and Spanish coasts. Francesco arrived at Rosas on 4 June where he met with his uncle, Don Garcia de Toledo, and was welcomed by Philip II's court in Segovia that September. From a practical standpoint, this mission sought to convince the king of Spain to provide a subsidy for the galleys. For Francesco, however,

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d'utilisation des ordres militaires castillans par le pouvoir royal dans l'Espagne du XVIe siècle," forthcoming in *Potere e ordini militari – cavallereschi nell' Europa mediterranea dell' età moderna*, (Brussels-Rome: in press) – which I have been unable to track down.

[37] Archivo Generale de Simancas (AGS) Estado 1391 f. 64, Gian Andrea (Juan Andrea) Doria to Philip II from Genoa, 30 Janaury 1562 transcribed in Rafael Vargas-Hidalgo. *Guerra y Diplomacia en el Mediterráneo* […]. (Madrid, 2002), 392-393.

[38] AGS Estado 1392 f. 106, Ferdinando Loffredo, Conde de Potenza, to Philip II from Otranto, 28 June 1563 transcribed in Vargas-Hidalgo. *Guerra y Diplomacia*, 418-419. Ali Portuç was noted as the "*guarda de canal de Rodas*" in *Relacion de la Gverra de Cipre* […]. (Seville, 1572). He had also been active in North Africa in 1556, see Vargas-Hidalgo. *Guerra y Diplomacia*, 57 note 130.

this visit also included an education for himself and his retinue. Presumably, this also introduced Cosimo's son to the customs and workings of the Spanish court.[39]

Having safely escorted Francesco to Barcelona on 8 June, Martelli's squadron began their return journey to Livorno on 9 June. Along the way, they encountered a *fregata* under a certain *Patrone* Piero Rosso,[40] who had survived an attack by "Moors." *Generale* Martelli hired Rosso to join his squadron – which considering the implied corsair threat was obviously a mutually beneficial arrangement. After stopping in Genoa and a few other places, they arrived at Livorno on 29 June. By 10 or 12 July, Martelli's 2 galleys and possibly Cosimo's *Lupa* and *Regina* were headed for the "turn of the Levant" – presumably on a *corso* 'crusade.' Having stopped at Naples and a few other places, they reached Messina on 29 July. Shortly after embarking from Messina on 4 August, they encountered 5 galleys and, expecting the worst, prepared for combat. Fortunately, these vessels turned out to be the Knights of Malta who were also headed towards the "turn of the Levant" for a crusade. After parting ways, Martelli's galleys gave chase to 4 "Turkish" *galeotte* on 7 August, but the cover of night and "the great heat and [the *forzati* and *schiavi*] not having rested" forced Martelli to call off the hunt. The following weeks were seemingly uneventful until they encountered a "Turkish" *nave* in the Gulf of Caramania (Karaman) on the southern Anatolian coast on 27 August. They captured the vessel and took 191 slaves among the "Turks" and "Moors" in addition to sugar, yarn, and other riches – including Abyssinian flags and a large golden cross. Shortly after this success, Martelli's squadron wished to replenish their water supplies at "Porto Bertone" –

[39] Roberto Cantagalli. *Cosimo I de' Medici* […]. (Milan, 1985), 256. See also Lorenzo Cantini. *Vita di Cosimo de' Medici* […]. (Florence, 1805), 417 and Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 97 and notes. A few more details regarding Francesco's mission to Spain can be found in Galluzzi. *Istoria del Granducato di Toscana* Volume II, 33-34.

[40] The Róssi's family entry on treccani.it's "enciclopedia on line" indicates that this family was very influential in Parma, but had minor branches in Naples, Rome, Mantua, and Ravenna. There was also a Rósso family from Sicily. A Pedro Rosso is identified as a galley captain in the late 16th century in Vargas-Hidalgo. *Guerra y Diplomacia*, CCLXXI.

presumably somewhere along the coast of modern Syria or Israel. However, since this was "a flat coast without a sign, it was advised that [Martelli's galleys] turn back… ten miles." Apparently, the backtracking disoriented at least one of the pilots.[41] Just like Marucelli's voyage a few years ago, Cosimo still faced difficulties in finding and training good pilots – among other skilled mariners.

After regaining their bearings, they finally reached "Porto Soliman" where they gathered water on 9 September. While in the area, they spotted 7 vessels about 6 or 8 miles ahead, and under favorable winds, they managed to close in within 3 miles. This carried on for at least 30 miles until Martelli dispatched a *fregata* commanded by *Padrone* Raymoda Gaeta to investigate. He discovered that these were 6 galleys and a *galeotta* of Malta. After dealing with a little rough winds and waters, the two squadrons made a rendezvous at "Porto Soliman." They held a council and decided to "go search for the *guardia* of Alexandria and Rhodes." Near Rhodes, they resisted the temptation of capturing 2 linen-laden Greek *navette*. However, having spotted the *guardia* of Alexandria, they sprang into action. Gaeta's *fregata* captured a suspicious *fregata*, and the Greeks on board were "put to torture to be examined [if] they knew anything of the *guardia*." These captives proved themselves to be sponge fishermen and were set free. Martelli and company arrived near Candia (Crete) on 25 September and remained there until 28 September. To avoid any entanglements with the Venetians – certainly the *Lupa*'s 1559 misadventure had become infamous – they remained offshore. This late in the season, it became evident that pursuing the *guardia* of Alexandria was untenable. From 29 September, they slowly returned to Messina – where they arrived on 23 October after stopping at Kythira, Kefalonia, and other places. Martelli's squadron and the Knights of Malta parted ways near Corfu in mid-October. Although this was largely an

[41] ASF MP 2077 ins. 1 f. 259. See also Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 98 and notes.

uneventful voyage, there had been no losses or accidents either. Martelli's galleys safely returned to Tuscany by 13 December.[42]

Amidst these relative successes in the summer of 1562, however, several tragedies befell Cosimo. In early December 1562, his wife, Eleanor of Toledo passed away, and around this same time, two of his sons, Giovanni and Garzia, died from malaria. As negotiations for the Order of Santo Stefano's galley squadron were still underway, he had planned to name Garzia as the order's admiral. Moreover, he had hoped to offer Garzia's services to Philip II in the defense of Oran (Mers-el-Kebir) – one of the Spanish king's last remaining strongholds in the Maghreb – which had become increasingly threatened by Dragut.[43] In March 1563, one year after establishing Santo Stefano, Pius IV granted Cosimo complete "privileges and faculties" over the order.[44] At this same time, the knights' first general assembly convened under the leadership of the order's highest officials – including Cosimo's loyal military commander, Grand Constable Chiappino Vitelli.[45] Among the matters they discussed, they established Santo Stefano's galley squadron.

Cosimo's distant relative, Giulio de Medici, emerged as the first *ammiraglio* (admiral) of the order's fleet. Although relatively inexperienced in naval affairs, Giulio

[42] ASF MP 2077 ins. 1, f. 259v-260. See also Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 98-99 and notes. The account continues by describing Piero Machiavelli's success over 2 "Turkish" *galeotte* near Talamone on the Sienese coast in February 1563 – which under the Julian calendar in use at the time would've been February 1562. (see f. 260v-261). ASF CS I 145 f. 8v appears to detail that Machiavelli liberated 140 Christians in this encounter.
[43] J.R. Hale. *Florence and the Medici* […]. (New York, 1978), 139 and Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 99 and notes.
[44] For an overview of the various papal bulls and briefs issued in this period, see Silvano Burgalassi. "La 'Religione' di Santo Stefano P. e M. […]" in *Le Imprese e i Simboli* […]. (Pisa, 1989), 151.
[45] ASP Inv. 20 Santo Stefano NN. 835 f. 174-176. Given the paleography, other officials include Grand Prior Count Clemente Pieba, Grand Chancellor Lionardo Marinozzi, Treasurer-General Captain Leone Santi, and *Consigliere*-General Romensare Cavamiglia.

was Alessandro de Medici's illegitimate son.[46] Luca Martini had already written to the duke about the then 16-year-old[47] Giulio in June 1551. Martini observed that the young man awaited to begin his continuation studies, but that he was already an accomplished musician, athlete, and an avid horseman.[48] This short letter is seemingly trivial, however, given that Luca Martini had obviously been charged with assessing Giulio's activities while in Pisa, it seems extremely likely that Cosimo had already 'apprenticed' him to the *provveditore* at some level. At the very least, the duke wished for his young, distant cousin to observe the inner workings of a naval arsenal for a short period of time – and possibly much longer. Placing him under Martini's care, the duke had arguably considered using Giulio in a naval capacity for at least ten years before naming him *ammiraglio* of Santo Stefano.

The new admiral received the order's first 2 galleys on May 30, 1563 in Livorno. Perhaps making a statement regarding her treatment in 1559, the *Lupa* became Santo Stefano's flagship (*capitana*), and the *Fiorenza* became the vice-flagship (*padrona*). The order's statutes were very strict regarding the maintenance of each vessel and the regulation of the armament, spare parts, medicine, provisions, and other equipment on board. Moreover, they demanded that each galley have a crew of 50 men including officers and 25 knights in addition to any other troops.[49] Regarding armaments, the centerline cannon on a Santo Stefano galley was to be complimented by at least 2

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[46] Cesare Ciano. *Santo Stefano per Mare e per Terra* […]. (Pisa, 1985), 13. See also Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 100; Giovanni Battista Cini. *Vita del Serenissimo Signor Cosimo de Medici* […]. (Florence, 1611), Book 7, 462.

[47] As Alessandro's 'natural son,' his precise date of birth is unknown, but it has been placed between 1533-1537. The estimate of 16 years old is based on a 1535 birthday.

[48] ASF MP 403 f. 82, 4 June 1551. This solitary letter lacks context, but makes mention of Battista Rustichi and Andrea da Camerino who appear to have been in the company of young Giulio. It's tempting to suspect that these individuals were related to Captain Francesco Rustichi of the *nave San Giovanni Battista* and the engineer Giovanni Camerini – who were both in Cosimo's service at the time. Franco Angiolini identifies this same document in his entry for Luca Martini in the DBdI vol. 71 (2008) available online: www.treccani.it

[49] Guarnieri. *L'Ordine di Santo Stefano*, Volume 2, 15-16, 19. See also Gemignani. "The Navies of the Medici," 175.

cannonetti and one *falcone* – among other pieces. These guidelines even detailed the armor and small arms aboard – enough for at least 75 troops armed with cold steel – in addition to 100 arquebuses.[50] Additionally, each knight would undergo a rigorous physical, academic, religious, and maritime training regimen.[51] Again, Piero Machiavelli's letter from a few years earlier had advised Cosimo to build up a body of individuals skilled in naval affairs. Not only could the order's education system cultivate such expertise, but the new grand master used this organization to incorporate other professionals into his developing navy.

Inducted into the order in May 1562, Francesco Rustichi – the Neapolitan captain who had served Cosimo since at least 1548 – was named captain of the *Lupa*, and Gianfilippo Marucelli – the scribe aboard the *Lupa*'s infamous voyage in 1559 – was named captain of the *Fiorenza*.[52] Piero Machiavelli also joined the order's ranks that May. Other initiates included 6 Sienese citizens, 1 other Neapolitan, 1 Sicilian from Palermo, and two captains from the Levant: Leone de Santi of Corfu, and Giovanni Volterra from the Greek island of Zante (Zakynthos). Over the course of 1562, Cosimo inducted at least 60 knights into the order.[53] Considering that he brought in 2 captains from the Levant, a Sicilian, and his loyal, hired Neapolitan captain Francesco Rustichi, it is quite clear that Cosimo used the order as a way to secure external naval expertise from the very beginning. As mentioned earlier, he was undoubtedly conducting some familial networking with the Orsini, and he also used the order to appease some of his recently-

[50] ASP Inv. 20 Santo Stefano NN. 1 f. 44v-45r.
[51] Guarnieri. *Cavalieri di Santo Stefano*, 50-51 and Gino Zoli. "Navigazione, carte e strumenti […]" in *Le Imprese e i Simboli*, 123. See also Capponi. *Victory of the West*, 209, 213 and notes. Specifically, members of the order engaged in courses related to: religious studies, history, astronomy, navigation, geometry, arithmetic, drawing, war studies, wrestling, fencing with a variety of weapons, and shooting with the arquebus, crossbow, and 'Turkish' bow.
[52] Every knight inducted into the order is listed alphabetically in Guarnieri. *L'Ordine di Santo Stefano* Volume IV, 135. See also Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 100-101. See especially note 4 on p. 101. Rustichi's role as captain of the *Lupa* is noted in ASP Inv. 20 Santo Stefano NN. 1407 f. 77 (also noted as nº 46 on the top left corner).
[53] Guarnieri. *L'Ordine di Santo Stefano* Volume IV.

incorporated Siense subjects. With this crusading military order established for barely a year – including a recently-organized galley squadron – Cosimo put them to the test in the summer of 1563.

Navigating the treacherous Mediterranean (January – July 1563)

By January 1563, it was rumored that Dragut and the Ottomans not only threatened North Africa but also planned to invade Sardinia or Corsica. To further complicate matters, Corsican exile and rebel leader Sampiero Orano – once an emissary for Caterina de Medici[54] – had allegedly offered Cosimo the crown of Corsica if the duke would cooperate with the Ottomans in asserting the island's independence. At the sultan's court, another Corsican exile, Colonel Jean-Augustin Gigli, believed that the Corsicans would gladly welcome an Ottoman fleet if it could 'liberate' the island from Spanish-Genoese influence. Gigli even promised annual tribute to the sultan in return. Simultaneous to these ambitions, however, Dragut requested Süleyman's galleys to attack La Goleta in Tunis and Oran in Algiers. Of course, Philip II never planned to idly stand by as the Ottomans attacked Corsica, but he suspected that the danger was nothing more than Orano's and Gigli's fantastic notions and hearsay. As the Ottoman threat mounted into April 1563, however, rumors still circulated that there was some sort of agreement between Sampiero, the Ottomans, and Cosimo – even though most discounted these.[55] True or not, Cosimo was implicated in a plot very much against Philip II's best interests. 1563 was one of the most critical moments for Cosimo to demonstrate his loyalty. Once again, his military support – this time including the Order of Santo Stefano – would serve as a diplomatic tool to quell the situation.

[54] René Emmanuelli. *Gênes et l'Espagne dans la Guerre de Corse, 1559-1569*. (Paris, 1964), 101.
[55] Emmanuelli. *Gênes et l'Espagne*, 103, 118-119, 126-127, 130. See also Spini. "The Medici Principality," 433. Hypothetically, the rebel Orano could have accompanied the sultan's fleet to Corsica, put his hopes of an anti-Spanish uprising to the test, and then moved on to North Africa – or something to this effect. Keen to intelligence and speculation, Genoa took this threat seriously and assembled at least 500 German mercenaries to counteract an Ottoman invasion of the northern Tyrrhenian.

Gian Andrea Doria candidly told Philip II in February 1563 that the "Turkish armada" would only have two choices: Corsica or La Goleta. He added that La Goleta was the more plausible theater of war because the king of Tunis would cooperate with the sultan. Doria hoped that Sicily, Naples, and the "*confederati*" would join him in Messina to make a force of 56 galleys. He further specified that the viceroy of Sicily would need to "make a good supply of biscuits" and provide Italian infantry.[56] On 8 March 1563, Doria again implored that Sicily's galleys, the Order of Malta, and the Spaniards should gather – presumably at Messina – "as quickly as possible" in order to launch a preemptive strike near La Goleta. He added that given his correspondence with Naples, Savoy, Florence, Genoa, and Malta, he anticipated a fleet of at least 35 galleys. He further requested that Naples and Sicily provide biscuit and other supplies. Moreover, he hoped not only to strike North Africa, but to move into the Levant "to clean [the coasts and seas] of the corsairs."[57] By that April, a Neapolitan military official emphasized that the "Thurco [… usually raided] every year to damn the king's subjects and vassals." Bearing this in mind, however, he also observed that "the number of Spanish infantry […] here is not enough to guard these lands." Additionally, this responsibility lay "in the hands of unknowable or untrusted people [… and] it would be good to enlist a number of Italian infantry from the natives of this region."[58] This Genoese and Neapolitan correspondence demonstrated the delicate balance of defending the Italian coast while making preemptive strikes into North Africa and the Levant.

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[56] AGS Estado 1392 f. 69, Gian Andrea (Juan Andrea) Doria to Philip II; 6 February 1563 transcribed in Vargas-Hidalgo. *Guerra y Diplomacia*, 405-406.
[57] Archivo Doria Pamphilj (ADP) Roma Bancone 65 No. 2 transcribed in Vargas-Hidalgo. *Guerra y Diplomacia*, 408-409. Doria specifically calculated that there were 70 galleys available, but that half should be used at Philip's discretion. An official in Genoa, *Protonotario* Marc'Antonio Sauli, among others appears to have been key in coordinating these efforts. Doria also indicated that some 100,000 ducats – presumably expenses related to amassing this fleet – would be fulfilled by October that year. Vargas-Hidalgo notes another copy: AGS Estado 1392 f. 142.
[58] AGS Estado, Nápoles, 1052 f. 154 transcribed in Giuseppe Coniglio. *Il viceregno di Napoli* Volume 1, 252.

Concerning the galleys available in 1563, Piero Machiavelli or a similar official in Cosimo's *arsenale* corroborated Gian Andrea Doria's estimate that 36 were ready for action: 18 from Spain, 6 from Gian Andrea Doria, 2 from Sicily, 4 from Antonio Doria, and an additional 6 from Naples and other places. With 4 of Cosimo's galleys, the total would reach 40. Additionally, this official longed for a future when the Holy See, the duke of Savoy, the duke of Florence, and the *signoria* of Genoa could contribute 10 galleys each – which could bring the total western Mediterranean defense fleet to 80 galleys.[59] Alongside the losses at Djerba; however, a storm near Herradura off the Màlaga coast in November 1562 had destroyed 25 galleys and significantly diminished what Spanish Habsburg vessels remained.[60] The crushing defeat at Djerba and this tempest had dramatically reduced the numbers of available warships and had influenced the general geo-strategic outlook of the western Mediterranean.

Outside of any dubious help from the Venetians, the Christian Mediterranean fleet had essentially been cut in half – not to mention the tremendous loss of experienced manpower. As indicated in the aforementioned letters from Gian Andrea Doria and Naples, Italian princes like Cosimo understood that their 'subjects' were in constant danger of corsair raids. Moreover, the duke of Florence and Siena's few remaining warships were in poor condition and lacked competent and trustworthy leadership and crews. The other Habsburg-allied fleets – such as those from Sicily, Naples, Genoa, and the Knights of Malta – had also lost vessels and men. Moreover, as the defeat at Djerba had demonstrated, leadership – such as the viceroy of Sicily and Gian Andrea Doria – was inexperienced at best. It is safe to say that 1560-1563 was a period of regrouping and reassessment for all of the western Mediterranean's navies and squadrons. Again, this had

[59] ASF MP 327 f. 183r. The discussion continues on f. 183v and f. 184r.
[60] Hanlon. *The Twilight of a Military Tradition*, 17 and notes. See also Arturo Pacini. *'Desde Rosas a Gaeta'* […]. (Milan, 2013), 170.

served as the perfect context for Cosimo to campaign to Pope Pius IV for the creation of the Knights of Santo Stefano.

With Mediterranean Habsburg forces significantly diminished, Doria's and Naples' aforementioned letters had also advised Philip to divide his attention between North Africa and the Levant. In fact, Philip's attention was already torn between the threats of Protestants in the Netherlands and France and the Muslims in the Mediterranean. After Djerba, Philip had reluctantly pulled 3,000 veteran troops from the Netherlands to make good his losses. Since the Mediterranean had been relatively quiet in 1562, however, he had contributed some of these forces towards the religious war in France on behalf of his wife Elisabeth de France. After Oran was besieged in April 1563, however, Philip observed: "[Oran's] outcome depends on other things – including whether we stay here or return there [to the Netherlands]."[61] Especially considering how much he and his father had already devoted to Spain's North African *Presidios*, Philip ultimately decided to stay in Spain and defend Oran.

Alongside other parts of the Maghreb, Oran had been under Spanish control since the turn of the sixteenth century. Originally, it was hoped that the Spanish military orders would settle and rule the region, but this 'crusader-state' dream never manifested.[62] In spite of its relatively humble defenses, however, Oran's requirements were still substantial. Philip used the Spanish crown's budget – and his royal galleys – to supply and maintain the fortresses with troops, munitions, victuals, and other supplies.[63] Between shipping war materiel to North Africa; paying troops and other officials; and maintaining the various fortifications, these *Presidios* cost Philip and his troops over

[61] Geoffrey Parker. *Imprudent King* […]. (New Haven, CT, 2014), 138-139; 143.
[62] Jacques Heers. *The Barbary Corsairs* […]. (London, 2003), 167-172.
[63] I.A.A. Thompson. *War and Government in Habsburg Spain, 1560-1620*. (London, 1976), 206-207.

400,000 *scudi* per year.[64] Moreover, the 1563 expedition to rescue Oran ended up costing Philip an additional 600,000 *scudi*.[65] Unlike the newly-established *Presidios* along the Sienese coast, these positions were essentially surrounded by hostile forces and were on the frontier of Spanish military ambitions. As a result, they almost exclusively depended on supplies from Spain and Sicily.[66] Obviously, this was a delicate front that maintained – if not real strategic value – historical and religious significance to the Catholic rulers of Spain. Philip would not see Oran fall.

Even though the Oran garrison had already been on alert since late March 1563, by 3 April, it was confirmed that the young king of Algiers, Hassan Pasha, intended to strike Oran with a "great army by land." Son of Hayreddin Barbarossa, Hassan had already proven himself a worthy successor to his father and looked towards achieving even more. He moved on Oran with 4 galleys loaded with artillery and an additional 10 supporting galleys – many of which were likely 'Christian' galleys captured at Djerba just three years earlier. While Hassan began his siege works, he divided his naval support into two squadrons to keep an eye on Spanish deployments. Especially considering the threat of a massive Ottoman armada that same year, the situation necessitated that Philip call upon the naval forces of his subjects and allies. The fleet intended to rescue Oran comprised of those belonging to Cardinal Carlo Borromeo, Marco Centurione, the duke of Savoy, the duke of Florence, Genoa, Sicily, Naples, and the Knights of Malta– up to

[64] Valentina Favarò. "Monitioni, Vettovaglie et Dinari […]," in *Mediterranea Recerche storiche* Anno IV (December 2007), 441-442. See especially note 16. Munitions and salary alone accounted for a little less than one-third of these expenses.
[65] I.A.A. Thompson. *War and Society in Habsburg Spain*. (Hampshire, 1992), Chapter 1, 19. See also Parker. *Imprudent King*, 138-139. Thompson measures this amount in *escudos* and Parker – who co-authored Thompson's chapter – uses "ducats" in his 2014 translation. For the sake of consistency to other financial amounts provided in this chapter, I have gone with *scudi*.
[66] Franco Angiolini. "I Presidios di Toscana […]" in Enrique Garcia Hernan and Davide Maffi, eds. *Guerra y sociedad en la monarquia hispanica* Volume I […]. (Madrid, 2006), 173-174.

42 galleys total by the beginning of June.[67] Given that Cosimo had originally gifted 2 galleys to Borromeo's brother, it is entirely reasonable to suspect that the Cardinal's contributions were technically Cosimo's as well – at least in part.

In spite of these gathering forces, time was running out. In April, Philip had revealed that the Algerian army was within two leagues of Oran and Hassan Pasha himself was a mere six leagues away with the rest of his forces. This *Presidio*'s captain general (the Count of Alcaudete) had desperately requested that the galleys arrive soon,[68] and by 8 May, Oran's newly constructed Fort San Salvador fell to Hassan's forces. A relentless bombardment of Oran itself commenced over the following two weeks.[69] In the meantime, Philip learned that Hassan Pasha had requested that Süleyman dispatch 40 galleys to besiege Oran. Moreover, rumors also indicated that Piali Pasha and other Ottoman captains had been recruiting more forces. In the late spring of 1563, there were a feared 70 "Turkish" vessels in the Levant[70] that could appear at any time. Although the sultan did not officially provide naval support, the bey of Tripoli (Dragut) worked with the young king of Algiers in a collaborative effort to obliterate the Spanish from their domain once and for all.[71] Together, their fleet easily numbered between 50 and 60 oared vessels.[72]

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[67] ADP Bancone 65 No. 2 transcribed in Vargas-Hidalgo. *Guerra y Diplomacia*, 412-413. See also note 810 on p. 413. Regarding Hassan Pasha, his forces, and the Habsburg fleet numbers, see Braudel. *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World* […] Volume II. Translated by Siân Reynolds. (Berkley, 1995), 995-998 and notes; and Godfrey Fisher. *Barbary Legend* […]. (Westport, UK, 1974), 82.
[68] AGS Estado 1392 f. 148, Philip II to Gómez Suárez de Figueroa, ambassador to Genoa; 18 April 1563 transcribed in Vargas-Hidalgo. *Guerra y Diplomacia*, 414-415. See also reply from 23 April on p 415. In general, a league is 3 miles, so these measurements are 6 miles and 18 miles respectively.
[69] Braudel. *The Mediterranean* Volume II, 996 and notes.
[70] AGS Estado 1392 f. 99, Giovanni Agostino Gillia to Philip II from Constantinople 15 May 1563 transcribed in Vargas-Hidalgo. *Guerra y Diplomacia*, 416.
[71] Andrew C. Hess. *The Forgotten Frontier* […]. (Chicago, 1978), 82. Dragut's role is referenced in Guarnieri. *Cavalieri di Santo Stefano*, 90-91.
[72] Philip Williams. *Empire and Holy War* […]. (London, 2014), 143-144 and notes. For possible French involvement, see: Rinaldo Panetta. *Pirati e corsair turchi barbareschi nel Mare Nostrum: XVI secolo*. (Milan: Mursia, 1981), 186 cited in Emra Safa Gürkan. "The centre and the frontier […]," in *Turkish Historical Review* Volume 1 (2010), 137.

After enduring at least two-weeks of bombardment, Spanish forces at Oran made an offensive sortie on 22 May 1563. This counterstrike alone claimed 8 "galliot loads" of men. Nevertheless, Hassan's and Dragut's forces pressed on. They attacked the fortress from two sides and coordinated this with an amphibious 'artillery strike' from the galleys and other warships. Although the defenders had regularly received small, clandestine shipments of rations, munitions, and reinforcements from Spain between May and June, their meat supply seemed especially precarious. They were rescued on 8 June when a fleet of 34 Christian galleys – under the leadership of Francisco de Mendoza, captain general of the Spanish galleys – compelled the Barbary squadrons to retreat. Although Dragut's and Hassan's warships escaped, the Spanish galleys captured 16 supply ships including: 3 roundships, 12 *barques*, and a French *saëte* bearing munitions, lead, and coats of mail.[73] Among the captured vessels, however, Genoese ships were found alongside the Barbary ones. Philip's chief advisor on Mediterranean affairs, Cardinal Granvelle, wrote to Philip's secretary of state, Gonzalo Perez, that "I do not believe that [the Genoese] have a soul […] only profit and gain are in their head." He advised Philip to capture Genoa since, at that moment, they were diplomatically isolated.[74] This was certainly not the first time – and it definitely was not the last time – that the Genoese were regarded as cowardly and treacherous profiteers. Of course, Philip did not take such drastic action – Oran had been saved.

Unlike the Djerba campaign a few years earlier, everything had seemingly gone right. The 1563 Oran expedition was noted as "one of the very few good examples of Spanish dispatch."[75] By July 1563, Medinaceli believed that Philip's success at Oran

[73] Braudel. *The Mediterranean* Volume II, 996-997 and notes. See also AGS Estado 1392 f. 153, Philip II to Gómez Suárez de Figueroa, ambassador to Genoa; 15 June 1563 transcribed in Vargas-Hidalgo. *Guerra y Diplomacia*, 417-418.
[74] Emmanuelli. *Gênes et l'Espagne*, 120.
[75] Braudel. *The Mediterranean* Volume II, 997.

would significantly bolster Spanish objectives at the ongoing religious Council of Trent. According to the viceroy, King Philip II was Christendom's "one true defender 'on this planet.'"[76] Although Philip certainly deserved some credit, he believed that the viceroy of Naples was the true "architect of the victory."[77] In this auspicious moment, the Spanish king did not plan to rest on his laurels.

Philip had again been advised in May that two fleets should be established: the Spanish galleys under Francisco de Mendoza to defend the Spanish coasts, and "one from Italy" would move against the corsairs in their neighboring waters, in North Africa, and the Levant.[78] The king of Spain's decision to make Mendoza the commander had been based on these plans to divide the fleet between him and Gian Andrea Doria after Oran was rescued.[79] It was apparently clear to everyone at the time that, once the siege ended, the 'corsair season' would resume. Although they arrived after Mendoza had left for Oran, Cosimo's galleys – including the two from the Order of Santo Stefano – had formed part of this fleet. They had looked towards aiding Philip capitalize on the victory at Oran, but unfortunately, the seemingly unlucky *Lupa* became yet another victim in the "*guerre de course*" that characterized the Mediterranean.

Santo Stefano's disastrous debut (c. May – November 1563)

On 30 May 1563, Cosimo issued Giulio de Medici's instructions for the 1563 expedition. The admiral was ordered to guide Cosimo's galleys to Rosas, about halfway between Marseilles and Barcelona. There, he was to rendezvous with Don Garcia de Toledo or "whoever is the leader of this merged fleet" to help "the galleys of his Catholic majesty (Philip)" to secure Oran. Additionally, they were to serve as security detail for

[76] Williams. *Empire and Holy War*, 49. Note 17 cites the original document, AGS Estado 1127 f. 173.
[77] Braudel. *The Mediterranean* Volume II, 998.
[78] AGS Estado 1392 f. 99, Giovanni Agostino Gilli to Philip II; advisory from Constantinople; 15 May 1563 transcribed in Vargas-Hidalgo. *Guerra y Diplomacia*, 416.
[79] Braudel. *The Mediterranean* Volume II, 998.

Prince Francesco de Medici's voyage to Spain. Francesco's agenda is not clear in these instructions, but it is reasonable to assume that his purposes in 1563 were very similar to 1562 – negotiating on his father's behalf and/or getting acquainted with the workings of the Spanish court. Admiral Giulio de Medici was clearly commanded that: "if the galleys of his majesty do not go for the enterprise [to Oran]" and if this Spanish fleet journeyed "for the islands in Sicily as usual," Giulio was to prioritize Francesco's mission and then "return to Livorno […where] you will find an order of what you must do."[80]

The charted path for this voyage was intuitive – Giulio was to follow the modern Italian, French, and Spanish coastlines: "You will voyage for Spain stepping from Genoa to Nice […] up to Barcelona." For security purposes, however, he was given further instructions that "if the galleys of the duke of Savoy [deploy], you (your galleys) will make them keep sea up to Barcelona." Furthermore, Cosimo implored Giulio to follow "the good advice of the lieutenant (Piero Machiavelli)," and warned him of "the superior strength of the corsairs." As a matter of prominence, Cosimo emphasized that "if the papal banner [of Santo Stefano] leads it (the Medici squadron), you should not yield to the Genoese." Yet at the same time, he was ordered to demonstrate deference for the "*galer d rodi*" – the Knights of Malta.[81]

Their brevity aside, these instructions present several issues. First of all, the joint Florentine-Santo Stefano squadron is an intriguing arrangement to say the least. Cosimo's 4 galleys – specified in these instructions as "our *galere capitana* and the *Regina*" along

[80] ASF MP 327 f. 171r. Francesco's exact 'mission' is obscure, however, AGS Estados 1392 f. 120 is a letter to Francesco from the Spanish ambassador at Genoa, Gómez Suárez de Figueroa, dated 29 October 1563. This brief document hints at a long series of [largely un-answered] correspondence between "his Catholic majesty" and the duke of Florence and Siena. Presumably, this was either a continuation of Francesco's mission or had developed upon his return to Florence. Available online via PARES Portal de Archivos Españoles, Reference code: ES.47161.AGS/EST, LEG, 1392, 120. A little elaboration on Francesco's 1563 mission to Spain can be found in: Galluzzi. *Istoria del Granducato di Toscana* Volume II, 52.
[81] ASF MP 327 f. 171.

with "the *capitana della Religion* (the *Lupa*) and the *Fiorenza*" – were dispatched to aid Philip II in "securing Oran." Unlike the duke's earlier contributions to Spanish North Africa – especially in the capture of Monastir and Mahadia in 1550 – this Florentine galley squadron comprised of 2 'state' galleys and 2 from the newly-founded Order of Santo Stefano. Remembering the *Lupa*'s disastrous mission at least four years earlier and even Baccio Martelli's voyage that previous summer, it is clear that Cosimo's galleys already conducted 'crusades' by participating in the *corso* against Muslim shipping in the Levant. These allegedly religiously-motivated acts of piracy essentially imitated the Knights of Malta with the aim of directly benefitting the duke of Florence and Siena. However, this 1563 rescue mission for Oran was to aid the Spanish Habsburgs in their own 'holy war' in North Africa. It is safe to say that any apparent military or 'crusading' intentions for this 1563 expedition derived from Philip II not Cosimo.

Moreover, this arguable 'crusading' mission to Oran was intertwined with another – presumably diplomatic – objective: securing Prince Francesco de Medici's arrival in Spain. Giulio de Medici's instructions to prioritize Francesco's business in Philip's court imply that this Medici detachment of galleys was not merely a pawn in the Spanish king's North African campaign. Although Philip II could argue otherwise for himself, Cosimo's personal interests in deploying his galleys that summer were clearly not in 'crusading' or even in a direct assault on the North African corsairs. In short, this expedition was not necessarily aligned with Cosimo's state defense policies or even in the Order of Santo Stefano's official purpose of 'fighting the infidel.' Cosimo's contribution appears to have been politically-motivated. This was probably related to the aforementioned rumors surrounding the duke's plot on Corsica; his obligations as Philip's vassal in Siena; his aspirations at the papal court; and most certainly, as the instructions explicitly state, in Francesco's presumably diplomatic mission. Thus, Giulio's 'temporal-focused' directions

raise questions as to why the religious, crusading Order of Santo Stefano's presence was even necessary for this operation.

The seemingly trivial clarifications regarding the banners provides the most plausible explanation. As revealed in Marucelli's account of the *Lupa*'s fate in 1559, the Venetians and presumably others questioned the legitimacy of Cosimo's galleys – even when they bore his letters of marque and flew his colors. Additionally, when confronted by the Ottomans in the Aegean, the *Lupa* had hoisted the banner of the knights of Malta as an intimidating ruse. Nevertheless, pretending to be fierce corsairs from a well-respected crusading order and actually being from that order were two different things. As Giulio's instructions in 1563 demonstrate, however, the Maltese standard commanded respect among all vessels in the private squadrons and state navies assembled for this expedition. As a papal-backed military order, however, the duke and grand master clearly expected similar respect for Santo Stefano's galleys. Although the Genoese Centurione family, Neapolitans, Sicilians, and others arguably built the duke's naval infrastructure, the papal banner issued to the Order of Santo Stefano would hopefully provide precedence and significantly distinguish the *Lupa* and the *Fiorenza* from any other private or 'state-owned' galleys. Overall, these instructions illuminate several overlapping issues regarding Cosimo's sovereignty and status.

In addition to the Florentine-Santo Stefano squadron's stated purpose of aiding Philip in his geo-strategic issues in North Africa, Giulio de Medici's instructions also provide insight into security concerns at the tactical level. As explicitly stated, whether or not the expedition to Oran would proceed as planned, Cosimo anticipated corsair incursions. He forewarned Giulio of the "superior forces" or "superior strength" of the corsairs. Moreover, orders to rendezvous with the duke of Savoy's galleys and to arrange for their escort to Barcelona – if possible – implied 'safety in numbers.' Clearly, the

French and Spanish coastlines were not considered safe from pirates – not even for a squadron of 4 warships.

However, perhaps the corsairs were not the only concern. Rather, such incursions merely placed a magnifying glass upon the problems already present in the nascent Medici navy – especially the newly-founded Order of Santo Stefano. Giulio de Medici was the admiral in name, yet, as indicated in the instructions, Cosimo clearly respected and deferred to Piero Machiavelli's expertise and advised Giulio to do the same. As revealed by the disastrous 1559 *Lupa* voyage and even in Baccio Martelli's recent 'crusading' venture in 1562, not every sailor could be trusted to exhibit similar levels of competence. If nothing else, a corsair raid would reveal any weaknesses or shortcomings within Cosimo's squadron – from the oarsmen to the commanders. Again, this is not explicitly stated, but considering that Giulio's instructions clearly warned him of corsairs; advised him to arrange a security convoy; and to heed Piero Machiavelli's advice, Cosimo must have lacked a degree of confidence in his squadron's capabilities.

Still, by June 1563, the Order of Santo Stefano had inducted around 30 additional knights – bringing order's total to around 90 members. Many of these were Tuscan, but others originated from across Italy: Siena, Lombardy, the Emilia-Romagna region, Umbria, Rome, the Adriatic Marche region, Naples, Calabria, and Sicily. Aside from the aforementioned captains from Corfu and Zakynthos, there was also a knight from Avignon: Bartolommeo Navarrini.[82] 38 of these knights served aboard the *Lupa* during her maiden voyage with the order. Most – if not all of them – were from Tuscany. However, the *Lupa*'s crew in 1563 included individuals from across the Mediterranean: Genoa, Istria, Palermo, Naples, Nice, Venice, Cyprus, Corfu, Kefalonia, Chios, Candia,

[82] Guarnieri. *L'Ordine di Santo Stefano* Volume 4.

Heraklion, and Zakynthos.[83] If nothing else, Cosimo had successfully recruited potential talent from Italy and the wider Mediterranean world – particularly the Venetian-Greek region. The duke and grand master continued to be apprehensive, but at the same time, he had made every reasonable effort to recruit expertise aboard his galleys. As his instructions to Giulio imply, however, he maintained some anxieties when it came to his pool of naval experts.

Aside from these concerns and his reasons for participating in this campaign, Cosimo – like the other Italian princes in the Habsburg sphere – had answered Philip's and Oran's call for aid. Although most of the galleys assembled for this campaign partook in the relief of Oran under Francisco de Mendoza, at least 8 were left behind. These included Cosimo's vessels which had only departed from Livorno on 1 June 1563 – one week before Mendoza arrived at North Africa to relieve the garrison at Oran. While Santo Stefano managed the *Lupa* and *Fiorenza*, the duke's other 2 vessels (the *Capitana* and *Regina*) were captained by a Greek from Chios (Costantino Abiorso) and by Francesco Rucellai, a knight of Malta – yet another 'papal banner' that could prove useful to Cosimo's squadron. As instructed, Giulio de Medici's squadron followed the coastline and arrived at Barcelona by 26 June[84] – about two weeks after the Habsburg fleet had successfully chased away the besiegers from Oran. Upon arriving in Barcelona, Giulio received word that "Oran had been rescued and that the armada of infidels had departed […] for the various seas." With their primary mission no longer applicable, Cosimo's galleys awaited their new orders – "having gone to Spain for that reason and hearing that

[83] ASP Inv. 20 Santo Stefano NN. 1407 f. 76-77. See also Christine V. Pennison. "The Grand duchy of Tuscany's contribution to the battle of Lepanto […]," in Kostas G. Tsiknakis, ed. *Atti Dell'Incontro Scientifico* […]. (Athens-Venice, 2012), 127. Among the Tuscans, 24 Florentines had been inducted into the order, and only 10 of those were patricians. See Samuel Joseph Berner, "The Florentine Patriciate […]." PhD dissertation (University of California, Berkeley, 1969), table K on p. 237.
[84] ASF MP 500 f. 522. Giulio wrote from Nice on 7 June on f. 116 and from Marseilles on 11 June on f. 163-164.

[news…] it seemed impertinent to advance forward without new orders from Giulio de Medici."[85] In short, the duke of Florence and Siena's squadron had dutifully responded to Philip's call but ended up waiting around for new orders. Moreover, they were on the lookout for potential corsair raiders, and the *Lupa* had suffered some damage.

With Barcelona merely days away, Giulio de Medici had already written to Cosimo on 23 June regarding the *Lupa*'s mast. The young admiral emphasized that "yesterday the mast was bent by fate […] as was the yardarm."[86] By 4 July, Giulio wrote that in spite of the flagship's 'injuries,' the squadron had made good time. In addition to meeting with the viceroy of Sicily and safely transporting Francesco, he assured the duke and grand master that he had already made arrangements for the mast and yardarm to be repaired – even though he "[didn't] know the [kind of] wood for making the mast strong."[87] A few days later, he attempted to further quell Cosimo's concerns by mentioning that Don Garcia de Toledo had also advised him on the matter.[88] Captain Bendinello Sauli was personally dispatched from Philip II's court to safely escort the *Lupa* to Salò.[89] By 24 July, Giulio relayed a message to Francesco de Medici that he had delivered the *Lupa* near Salò for repairs.[90] In spite of assistance from Don Garcia, Bendinello Sauli, and Piero Machiavelli, this simple repair turned into a disaster. The *Lupa* was captured by two "Turkish *galeotte*" on 29 July.[91] According to another contemporary account, the *Lupa*'s crew abandoned ship and managed to save themselves

[85] ASF MP 2077 ins. 1 f. 261v-262r. See also Manfroni. "La Marina Militare," 101-103 and Gemignani. "The Navies of the Medici," 175-176.
[86] ASF MP 500 f. 343.
[87] ASF MP 500 f. 522. Giulio also mentioned that Doria served aboard the papal *capitana* "as a private soldier" and may also reveal that the lieutenant (Piero Machiavelli) had some sort of eye infection.
[88] ASF MP 500 f. 632-633.
[89] ASF MP 2077 ins. 1 f. 262v-263r.
[90] ASF MP 500 f. 847.
[91] ASF MP 2077 ins. 1 f. 263r.

by swimming to the mainland. The knights of Santo Stefano aboard, however, "fought valiantly" until they were captured or killed.[92]

While accompanied by a galley owned by Sauli, admiral Giulio de Medici composed another letter to Cosimo on 17 August 1563 to explain the loss of the *Lupa*. He clearly understood that the blame was easily placed upon his shoulders, so "by [his] mouth" he delivered his testimony so that King Philip II, the viceroy of Sicily, and especially Duke Cosimo could judge the matter "as he wished." Starting his account about a month earlier – on 18 July[93] – Giulio began by emphasizing that Philip had ordered the viceroy to return to Palamosa (Palamós). Presumably, this involved an order to rendezvous with other squadrons of the armada. Giulio stressed that the *Lupa*'s yardarm (*la'tene*) was patched as best as possible, but that both it and the mast (*l'arboro*) had rendered the order's *capitana* "*rotto*" (broken). In addition to replenishing stores, Giulio mentioned that he loaded other items (*robbe*) aboard to be delivered to the king of Spain. These exact instructions are a bit obscure, but they clearly involved a certain *signore* Cesio[94] and were obviously related to Prince Francesco's visit. After resupplying, the journey to Palamosa continued.[95]

Under the moonlight, very early on a Sunday morning, Giulio de Medici turned around near Palamosa towards Barcelona – under the orders of this *signore* Cesio. In his account, the order's admiral indicated that, at this moment, he "wanted to leave," and he painted this section of his statement with dashes of anxiety and fear – especially when everyone screamed. Giulio revealed that he immediately suspected that "Moors" were

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[92] ASF *Settimanni Fr.* Vol. III f. 272 "*Memoria della Perdita della galera 'Lupa'* […]" transcribed in Guarnieri, *Cavalieri di Santo Stefano* (1928); 271.See also pp. 90-91 and Gemignani, "The Navies of the Medici," 175-176 and notes.
[93] ASF MP 2077 ins. 1 f. 262v places the Medici squadron in Palamosa on 18 July.
[94] Based on the document, *signore* Cesio may have been the viceroy's personal secretary. Cesio is a commune in the province of Imperia in Liguria – approximately 56 miles southwest of Genoa. Thus, this individual was almost certainly from the Genoese-Doria circle.
[95] ASF MP 500 f. 284.

afoot. Darkness had obscured the location of friend and foe, but fortunately for this Medici squadron, the 'Moors' did not attack. A certain Neri il Gal[…][96] advised Giulio to return to Italy, and although the account becomes obscure, it appears that this discussion erupted into an argument. Giulio underscored that he was advised by a certain *signore* Pandolfo to include his sentiments in this testimony.[97] Again, the details are a bit muddled, but especially considering that the *Lupa* was straggling along, it seems that Neri's advice to return to Italy implied breaking up an already vulnerable squadron of 4 galleys – "put[ting] forward all dangers […] of the *corsali*."[98] Although Giulio never explicitly states this, he did not want to create a situation wherein the vulnerable *Lupa*, and perhaps other vessels, could become easy prey for 'Moorish' corsairs. In his words to Cosimo, Giulio insisted that *signore* Pandolfo and his *camerieri* (chamberlain) would testify in favor of his account.

After this altercation with Neri, the squadron reached the "turn of Salò" near the River di Tortosa (Rio Ebro). Aside from these heated arguments, more internal troubles arose. Admiral Giulio revealed that his *còmito*, *sotto còmito*, and other officers – including Niccolò da Dortouenede – would testify that, when they reached "the region of Messarla a Tortosa," the mast (or at least the sails and rigging) was not ready.[99] The concerns voiced throughout the 1550s regarding the Spanish galleys being neglected still resonated into the early 1560s. At some level, the Spanish naval infrastructure had failed the *Lupa*.

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[96] Unfortunately, the document is bound at this point, and one cannot read his full name.
[97] ASF MP 500 f. 284v-285r. Possibly Cosimo's secretary Pierfilippo Pandolfini.
[98] ASF MP 500 f. 285r.
[99] ASF MP 500 f. 285r and ASF MP 2077 ins. 1 f. 262v. As usual with paleography, names provide the most trouble. Dortouende's first name may also read "Nicola." ASP Inv. 20 Santo Stefano NN. 1407 f. 76-77 records the "master list" of all men aboard the *Lupa* in 1563; however, I have not been able to locate this specific "Nicola" on the list.

To reach the shipyard for these repairs, Giulio de Medici's galley and the *Lupa* seem to have detached from the squadron and journeyed over 40 miles up the river – presumably the Tortosa – during the night. Once again, Giulio's account paints a similar picture of danger lurking around the corner. The events are a bit confusing, however, it appears that, by this point in the voyage, the order's galleys had journeyed upriver and just discovered that the mast was not ready. In the meantime, the *Lupa*'s crew consulted with their admiral regarding the latest instructions from Cosimo. Since he was writing a defense of his actions, Giulio affirmed that Cosimo would remember these instructions and elaborated that the *Lupa* could not have been expected to sail to "Marsilia" (Marseilles) with her broken mast and yard arm.[100] Again, Giulio never explicitly stated this, but he implied that, since the *Lupa* could not sail, she would have to rely solely on her oarsmen to make the 300-mile journey from Barcelona to Marseilles – which would have been wholly impractical.

Admiral Giulio – either under orders or under his best judgement – returned to Palamosa to inquire about the delayed repairs and presumably to also determine the next course of action. Although deciding to separate the Tuscan squadron was a far-from an ideal option– particularly leaving the crippled *Lupa* behind – Giulio de Medici must have felt somewhat assured that he had safely left her tens of miles upriver in Spanish territory. Nevertheless, he expressed that, no matter what precautions one took, all vessels were vulnerable to the "omens and soothsayers… of seafaring." In such instances, he added: "let such evil be with us without our fault."[101] Bad luck *NOT* a bad admiral was to blame.

By the time he discussed the role of fate, Giulio expressed hopes that Cosimo would discuss this matter with the viceroy of Sicily. The admiral humbly elaborated that

[100] ASF MP 500 f. 285v. The actual distance from Tortosa to the coast is 29.8 km (18.5 miles) overland.
[101] ASF MP 500 f. 285v-286r.

it was the grand master's right to know the truth and that he would submit to his patron's judgement for being a "disobedient, negligent… sailor." However, Giulio pleaded that, before doing so, Cosimo should take note of his reasons and also consider the testimonies of others – especially from Bendinello Sauli. Continuing in this apologetic yet confident tone, Giulio de Medici closed by noting Scipione Malaspina among the knights killed in action.[102] Throughout this letter, Giulio's testimony identified troublesome officials; ill-coordinated repairs; the corsair threat along the Spanish coast; and simple bad luck as contributing factors towards this debacle. Moreover, he had listed several individuals that would corroborate his account.

The diary of Settimanni relates a few details absent from – or at least obscured in – the admiral's report. First of all, Settimanni's entry on 29 July confirmed that while the *Lupa* was taken for repairs, Francesco de'Medici was sitting in Philip II's court in Cartagena. Additionally, the Tuscan squadron had been charged with bringing 24 men from Salò to the Spanish Court.[103] This explains why Giulio de Medici and his lieutenant (Piero Machiavelli) had no choice but to leave the *Lupa* behind. As Giulio's original instructions stated, Francesco's business with Philip was second only to the siege of Oran.

Settimanni also specified that the *Lupa* was taken at the point of Alfach[104] (Peñón d'Ifac) – at least 200 miles along the coastline from Tortosa, where she had been left for repairs. The total journey from Tortosa to Cartagena measures approximately 296 miles (476 km). Assuming that the *Lupa* intended to rendezvous with the rest of the Florentine squadron in Cartagena, she was taken a little over two-thirds into her journey. Moreover, the distance from Oran to Cartagena measures approximately 134 miles. Algiers is also

[102] ASF MP 500 f. 286-287r.
[103] ASF *Settimanni Fr.* Vol. III f. 272 transcribed in Guarnieri. *Cavalieri di Santo Stefano* (1928); 271.
[104] ASF *Settimanni Fr.* Vol. III f. 272 transcribed in Guarnieri. *Cavalieri di Santo Stefano* (1928); 271.

229 miles away. In other words, this region was well within the reach of the North African corsairs. The fact that the *Lupa* was taken this far away from Tortosa leaves room to assume that her mast and yardarm had been repaired, and either on her crew's intuition or through orders, she attempted to rejoin the ranks of her companions.

Although it would seem obvious to cite poor leadership aboard Cosimo's ducal and 'crusading' galleys as a contributing factor in this embarrassing debut mission, in all cases except the *Lupa*'s return journey from Tortosa to Cartagena, Cosimo's squadron found itself under the careful guidance of the viceroy of Sicily, Don Garcia de Toledo, Bendinello Sauli, and their own Piero Machiavelli. Moreover, the troublesome individuals who emerged in Giulio's account were *signori* Cesio and Neri – both of whom were probably not affiliated with Cosimo's navy. The larger culprit for the *Lupa*'s capture seems to derive from the obvious – her broken mast and yardarm. Of course, this complicated the Medici squadron's ability to patrol the Spanish coastline and the logistics related to Francesco's mission. Nonetheless, this same damage had occurred to the *Toscana* and *Elbigina* during the Djerba campaign. Especially since Giulio de Medici's letter accounted the damage to nothing more than bad luck, this appears to have been a fairly common problem with galleys.[105] Yet, the true difficulties derived not from the *Lupa*'s 'injury,' but from her repair. At the very least, there was clearly a miscommunication regarding the timing of the work, or at the worst, this confusion demonstrated that Philip II's arsenals were not 'well-oiled machines.' Regardless of the cause, the Spanish shipyard at Tortosa – or at least a naval contractor employed there – was clearly not prepared to rapidly refit the *Lupa*. Additionally, it seems that, when

[105] ASF MP 404 f. 408, addressed to Cosimo from Elba on 26 August 1551 also mentions a broken "*albero*" and "*antenne*."

coupled with the delay at Tortosa, Francesco's mission to Cartagena – and his retinue of 24 men – forced Cosimo's squadron to split up.

The *Lupa* had actually kept up with the squadron for about a month. She did not lag behind and get swooped upon by predatory corsairs. Either by Philip II's orders, Cosimo's orders, or both, the remaining Florentine galleys were forced to leave the order's flagship behind while they transported *robbe* and Francesco's retinue to Philip II's court at Cartagena – a mission that apparently could not wait. Additionally, Spain's coastline was clearly unsafe. Once Hassan Pasha's and Dragut's fleet scattered, it was well-known that corsairs could strike anywhere at any time. Giulio de Medici's account makes it very clear that he did not feel safe on at least two occasions. It is incorrect to place all of the blame on Cosimo for his order's maiden voyage. If anything, as was the case regarding 'crusades' and fighting corsairs, Cosimo's motivations, concerns, and problems were simply a microcosm of Philip II's empire in the Mediterranean.

This episode is a famous yet unexamined chapter in Santo Stefano's history. The story typically told is that the *Lupa* lagged behind until she was ambushed by two corsair vessels that had stealthily followed the Medici squadron.[106] Many reasons for the order's unfortunate debut have been presented. Even before a mysterious accident damaged the *Lupa*'s mast, Marucelli had attested that the vessel was in poor condition and "could barely keep the sea"[107] – which was unsurprising considering her 'Venetian captivity' between 1559-1561 and immediate redeployment. Others placed further blame on the various individuals involved and the general "inexperience and […] carelessness of the naval command." Specifically, Marchese Scipione Malaspina (a knight of Santo Stefano)

[106] For example, see: Raymond E. Role. "Cosimo de'Medici's Holy Navy" in *MHQ* […] Volume 15, Issue 1 (Autumn 2002), pp. 76-86. See also Guarnieri. *Cavalieri di Santo Stefano* (1928), 89-96.
[107] Ciano. *Santo Stefano per Mare e per Terra*, 13-14. Like Spain's galleys, Cosimo's had been constantly deployed for well-over a decade. Scheduling routine maintenance must have proved challenging.

had allegedly ignored his duties after the *Lupa*'s mast broke. Instead of dealing with the matter, he had boarded the *Fiorenza* and left the aging knight and Neapolitan captain Francesco Rustichi to command the wounded galley single-handedly.[108] More specifically, when he re-embarked on the *Lupa*, Malaspina had requested that they land in Cartagena because he had never been there before. It is rumored that he blamed his "tourist ambitions" on his misfortune as he fell during the *Lupa*'s capture. Perhaps he was the reason why this vulnerable galley traveled unaccompanied in that direction after her repairs and ultimately fell into the corsairs' clutches. Both then and now, others also blamed Piero Machiavelli and Giulio de Medici for this loss. Some went as far as to argue that decades of Tuscan negligence towards naval affairs had produced poor quality sailors and troops.[109]

Although easily brushed over as another naval mishap that resulted in Cosimo losing a single galley, the *Lupa*'s capture in 1563 provides tremendous insight into the duke's experience in Spanish service. Both Cosimo's instructions to Giulio and Giulio's personal correspondence highlight the intricacies and interaction of politics, military geo-strategy, tactical operations, insurgents, 'crusading' ideology, military infrastructure, and court culture in the mid-sixteenth-century Mediterranean world.

Mediterranean geo-politics in late 1563 (c. August - November 1563)

Shortly after returning to Cartagena that summer, Philip ordered Mendoza's fleet take Peñon de Velez. Unfortunately, the Spanish captain general was ill. Even though this mission carried on without him, the Barbary garrison caught wind of the incoming 'surprise attack.' Ultimately, Spanish Habsburg commanders decided that the small island was not worth the risk and returned to Màlaga by the first week of August. Nevertheless,

[108] Guarnieri. *L'Ordine di Santo Stefano* Volume 2, 184-185.
[109] Ciano. *Santo Stefano per Mare e per Terra*, 13-14.

the Spanish had stirred up the hornet's nest. The corsairs increased their raids along the Spanish coast and even ventured as far as the Canary Islands.[110] Reports from late September 1563 indicated that Dragut raided the Calabrian coast and had returned to Tripoli.[111] By October, these accounts revealed that Dragut's squadron – perhaps as many as 32 galleys – had brought 2,000 men to raid and burn several coastal locations in Calabria, and the corsair had moved to Naples near the islands of Lipari and Filicudi.[112]

Perhaps large-scale conflict had been averted in 1563, but small-scale 'Muslim' raids along the Spanish and Italian coasts – as had happened to the *Lupa* – and 'Christian' raids in the Levant never stopped. Overall, 1563 is noted as the beginning of a period of recovery in Spanish finances and naval power.[113] Moreover, this same year arguably marks Philip II's Spanish Empire as "veritably globe spanning."[114] Clearly, this was a moment of significant transition for Spain and the Mediterranean world.

By November 1563, reports indicated that "the Turk (Süleyman) is in a great fury for the damages that the galleys of the religion (the Knights of Malta) and of the duke of Florence have done in the Levant and the fleet will come upon Malta and then Apulia." Of course, the sultan had every reason to target the Knights of Malta. Simultaneous to sending 4 galleys to help Spain at Oran, Grand Master la Valette had launched 2 private vessels into the Levant on a *corso* – which successfully captured 400 slaves.[115] That Süleyman also mentioned Cosimo's forces in 1563 – the very year that Santo Stefano

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[110] Fernand Braudel. *The Mediterranean* Volume II, 998.
[111] AGS Estado 1392 f. 113, Governor of Calabria to the Royal Secretary, 27 September 1563 transcribed in Vargas-Hidalgo. *Guerra y Diplomacia*, 426.
[112] ADP Bancone 65 No. 2, G[onzal]º Perez to Philip II, 16 October 1563; AGS Estado 1392 f. 117, Juan de la Cerda and Silva, Viceroy of Sicily to Gomez Suárer de Figueroa, ambassador to Genoa, 18 October 1563; and AGS Estado 1392 f. 161, Philip II to Gómez Suárez de Figueroa, ambassador to Genoa, 26 October 1563 transcribed in Vargas-Hidalgo. *Guerra y Diplomacia*, 428-429. See also Williams. *Empire and Holy War*, 143-144.
[113] Alvaro Pintado Castillo. "Dette flottante […]." *Annales* E.S.C. 4 (1963), 754 – 755.
[114] Faruk Tabak. *The Waning of the Mediterranean, 1550-1870* […]. (Baltimore, 2008), 2.
[115] Williams. *Empire and Holy War*, 252, 255. See notes 15 and 16 on p. 331: AGS Estado 1127 f. 37 "Avisos de Tripoli" April 1562 and AGS Estados 1324 f. 186, Secretary García Hernández to Philip II from Venice 13 November 1563.

finally gained a galley squadron – emphasizes that Medici vessels had already conducted their own *corso* in the Levant for years. Indeed, Cosimo's path towards founding the order had little to do with 'fighting the infidel,' but rather helping the duke navigate and participate in the military and political 'battles' between the Mediterranean powers: the Spanish Habsburgs, the Valois, the Ottomans, the Barbary corsairs, Venice, and the other Italian princes.

Conclusion

During the final, extended spasm of the Habsburg-Valois wars – the phase lasting from the end of the War of Siena to the finalization of the Peace of Cateau Cambrésis (*c.* 1556-1559) – Piero Machiavelli had observed that the conflict between the Habsburgs and the French "will last as long as the world lasts," and also emphasized the enduring Ottoman threat from the North African coast.[1] With this same perspective – and based on his personal experience during the Italian Wars – Cosimo had already developed his naval infrastructure and moved towards creating the Order of Santo Stefano under the reasonable assumption that massive galley fleets and armies representing the 'great powers' would always define Mediterranean warfare. After all, the sixteenth century had always featured the "'big war' of major battles and campaigns" within the ongoing "'little war' of economic attrition" (i.e. pirates and corsairs).[2] Cosimo logically believed that Tuscany could play a role in the "big wars" whenever they inevitably re-appeared. His galleys, fortified ports, and new military order were intended to confront his intertwined domestic and 'foreign policy' issues. Furthermore, his path towards Santo Stefano illuminates our understanding of middling/smaller powers; sovereignty; and naval warfare in the early modern Mediterranean.

What the path towards Santo Stefano reveals about early modern middling/smaller powers

Cosimo's experience between 1544-1563 emphasizes that this was a period of contingency and uncertainty. Especially as the Habsburg-Valois conflict endured, it became increasingly impossible for the respective Italian principalities to remain neutral. Moreover, when the duke of Florence had claimed 'neutrality' on several occasions, he

[1] Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale di Firenze *Magliabechi* E. B. 15.10, folio (f.) 176r-179v […], transcribed in Amico. *La Vita di Niccolo Machiavelli*, 667-671.
[2] John F. Guilmartin, Jr. *Gunpowder and Galleys* […]. (Annapolis, 2003), 269.

actively pursued options from both sides – perhaps most vividly demonstrated when the possibility of his son's betrothal to Henri II's daughter was used as 'blackmail' to obtain Habsburg-supported lordship over Piombino and/or Siena in 1553. Even though Cosimo ultimately sided with the Habsburgs, this 'alliance' was accompanied by its share of caveats (e.g. the Siena 'vassalage' agreement in 1557). Furthermore, Habsburg cooperation was largely secured through the duke's personal relationship with Charles V, Philip II, and especially his wife's relatives in the Toledo clan. In other words, these agreements were not systemic but rather at the mercies of family – and arguably business – dynamics.

The same 'personal touch' applied in the duke's 'anti-Habsburg' contingency plans – specifically his pact with the Genoese obtained via the Centurione and his young cousin, Jacopo VI Appiani circa 1554-1555. Additionally, the Habsburgs often benefitted from Cosimo's rapport with various Italian families – which of course, the duke earned and maintained with his own welfare in mind. After all, Cosimo often claimed to represent the Habsburgs – such as his early negotiations with Siena in 1552 – or used his 'official' diplomatic missions as a cover for his own networking – including his dealings with the d'Este of Ferrara, the Orsini, and even the troublesome Pope Paul IV in the late 1550s and early 1560s.

Although middling powers may appear to have been perfect pawns for early modern 'great powers,' Cosimo usually acted independently and on his own initiative. Many in the Habsburg sphere viewed the duke's hold on the Piombino Channel (i.e. his galley squadron and fortresses) with utmost suspicion, and Cosimo clearly employed his political and military means to secure this region for himself – or as close as possible. Yet, smaller and larger powers alike had every reason to respect Cosimo's infantry, cavalry, and naval forces after his success in Siena and against several assaults on Elba –

not to mention his contributions towards Spanish North Africa – between the late 1540s and early 1560s. Far from a pawn, Cosimo's experience between 1544-1563 suggests that middling powers were the squares on the chessboard. Without them, the 'game' of kings, sultans, and emperors could not be played at all. A second-rank power's decisions to maintain an 'alliance' with a larger power – and/or by joining forces with their fellow smaller powers and even local influential families – could determine a larger power's victory or defeat. Thus, middling powers controlled both the board and some of the game pieces – troops, weapons, supplies, and especially in Cosimo's case, fortresses and navies. Cosimo's military agreements with the Spanish Habsburgs referenced throughout my thesis are a testament to this phenomenon. From a martial and especially political perspective, the Order of Santo Stefano was a perfect tool to leverage future situations in the duke of Florence's favor. This religious order offered Cosimo political flexibility and theoretically fostered both military and diplomatic networking through its members.

What the path towards Santo Stefano suggests about early modern sovereignty

Under the joint authority of the Habsburg Holy Roman Emperor Charles V and the papacy – which also claimed overlordship of Tuscany – the duke of Florence title was created in the 1530s. Especially when coupled with Cosimo's duke of Siena title in 1557, these designations redefined the Medici's standing among Tuscan and Sienese noble families. Moreover, these new titles required a clear definition of Medici-Florentine agency and sovereignty on the international stage. Since the very beginning of his reign, Cosimo had placed ambassadors in various courts – both within Italy and abroad – and had used financial, political, military, and other favors as a way to build a rapport with the popes; fellow Italian principalities; the Habsburg circle; and even the Valois. Especially by 'single-handedly' challenging Henri II for Siena, Cosimo had deployed his defenses – including his galleys and coastal fortresses – to assert and prove his

sovereignty to his 'peers' (smaller powers), the 'great powers' (Spain, France; etc.), and arguably towards his 'Tuscan subjects.' In this respect, my thesis has opened the door for a scholarly discussion on how the Order of Santo Stefano could reinforce the sovereignty of Cosimo's middle-rank 'Tuscan' state.

Most of my investigation has focused on Cosimo's foreign policy. Especially considering that the duke's *patenti* and banners aboard the *Lupa* were disregarded by the Venetian officials on Cyprus in 1559, it is essential to recall that Santo Stefano was established by and ultimately answerable to the pope. If Medici sovereignty might not be acknowledged beyond the Tuscan coast, the duke's contemporaries in the Mediterranean would certainly be expected to recognize and respect papal agency. Additionally, as grand master of the order, Cosimo and his successors could allocate galleys between their 'state' and religious squadrons – which fell under completely different 'feudal' jurisdictions and obligations.[3] Recalling the Medici's political and military obligations to the Spanish crown vis-à-vis the 1557 Siena agreement, this flexibility could prove extremely valuable and allow Cosimo and his successors to continue playing "the double game" that had defined his reign.[4]

Regarding Cosimo's domestic sovereignty, Franco Angiolini has expertly revealed how the Order of Santo Stefano proved helpful in reintegrating disgraced noble families into the Florentine and Tuscan aristocracy – as well as among the newly-incorporated Sienese. Through the order's *commende*, knights gained control over wealth management, dowries, inheritance, and other financial transfers between family members – and could protect these funds from debt collectors. In addition to their status within the

[3] This last point is emphasized in Niccolò Capponi. "Guns and profit […]," in Carlo Beltrame and Renato Gianni Ridella, eds. *Ships & Guns* […]. (Oxford, 2011), 62.
[4] "The double game" is especially depicted in Giorgio Spini. "The Medici Principality […]," in *Journal of Italian History*, no. 3, (winter 1979). This flexibility is strongly implied by the papal banners – both Santo Stefano and from Malta – that were present in Cosimo's galley squadron deployed to rescue Oran in 1563.

Medici Grand Duchy, membership in the order was eventually accompanied by privileges such as the right to bear arms; exemption or at least partial exemption from certain taxes; primacy during public ceremonies; the right to refrain from certain communal duties; and exemption from certain local statutes – especially those that contradicted their rights as knights of the order. Moreover, members could only be taken to court with consent from the order's council; they could marry; and the knightly habit could be inherited. These benefits for both the knights and their grand master followed the models of similar orders across Europe. In the Medici's case, however, the [grand] dukes used their religious order "to reward deserving subjects, and to extend or strengthen their clientele and aristocratic networks." Unlike other military orders – particularly those in Spain and Savoy – the Order of Santo Stefano became more flexible and far more concerned with a family's "social survival strategy" as opposed to that of the order. This was only possible, however, because the sovereign of the 'Tuscan state' and the grand master of this Tuscan order were the same individual.[5]

Considering the novelty of the Medici [grand] ducal title, a military religious order provided a channel for the landed nobility to actively partake in 'defending the Tuscan state' and acquire the military prestige – among many other rights – related thereto. This potentially redirected the energies of rival aristocratic families, and also offered another avenue for 'common' Medici subjects to achieve a similar social status. For both the [grand] duke and the knights of the order, the institution's meetings and activities proved vital in establishing and fostering connections – both within Tuscany and beyond.[6]

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[5] Franco Angiolini. *I cavalieri e il principe* […]. (Florence, 1996), 71-74, 90-91, 99-101, 108, 119, 131, 152, 155-160, chart on p. 90, and notes. See also Gregory Hanlon. *The Twilight of a Military Tradition* […]. (London, 1998), 37, 269, and notes.
[6] Angiolini. *I cavalieri e il principe*, 34-39. See also Gemignani. "The Navies of the Medici," 174.

Santo Stefano and Cosimo's navy

Whereas a growing navy formed part of Cosimo's strategy to address these abovementioned sovereignty and status and concerns, he simultaneously sought to use Santo Stefano to supplement the costs, manpower, and other resources necessary to build and deploy a fleet of 30 galleys that he envisioned in his *memoria*.[7] From the very beginning of Cosimo's naval endeavors in the 1540s, he had strived to accumulate experts to make his vision of a 'Medici navy' possible. Among these individuals, Luca Martini and Piero Machiavelli had proven themselves true 'renaissance men' in overseeing nearly every aspect of this unique project: building galleys, a naval infrastructure, and coastal fortifications from scratch. Nevertheless, some of these appointments suggest more political motivations – particularly when the inexperienced Jacopo Appiani was named *generalto* in 1552 and arguably when Giulio de Medici was named admiral over Santo Stefano's galley squadron in 1563. Cosimo also fortuitously secured a balance of expertise and political connections when he befriended and hired the Genoese Centurione clan to manage his galleys in the 1550s. Moreover, as the rosters of men employed aboard his vessels and in his arsenals indicate, the duke of Florence and Siena also accumulated craftsmen and specialists from across the Mediterranean.

Yet, the duke's abovementioned aspirations that Santo Stefano could attract a more extensive and reliable pool of manpower seemingly came to naught. By February 1569, the duke offered two *scudi* per month for able-bodied men to serve aboard his galleys in the *milizia marittima*. Subsequent legal commentary suggested that Cosimo issued this 'call to arms' to both defend the Tyrrhenian against the Barbary corsairs and to possibly recover the Holy Sepulcher from Jerusalem for Florence's own Basilica of

[7] Archivio di Stato Firenze (ASF) Mediceo del Principato (MP) 327 folio (f.) 7-8.

San Lorenzo – and thus secure an alliance with Pope Pius V.[8] Clearly, such projects were tailor-made for the knights of Santo Stefano, but for whatever reason, their grand master did not feel that they were capable of the task alone. Moreover, as several detailed episodes that pre-dated the order revealed, Cosimo's maritime manpower varied in terms of availability and proficiency. Especially considering the 'crusades' that the duke's galleys had already pursued in the 1550s and early 1560s, founding the Order of Santo Stefano in 1562 seemed to neither encourage more 'crusades' nor provide more warriors or naval experts towards 'fighting the infidel' in the Tyrrhenian for at least its first seven years.

All of this speaks to the complexity of warfare in this period. Just as the duke of Florence found himself caught between the 'great powers' and his 'subjects' at all levels regarding his sovereignty, Cosimo's navy was likewise torn in many directions. On the one hand, throughout his reign, the duke had contributed men, materiel, port facilities, and vessels towards the massive composite galley fleets that ultimately secured Habsburg-allied hegemony in the western Mediterranean. Additionally, Cosimo's coastal fortifications – especially their administrators – and his armed forces had participated in intricate amphibious campaigns as both attackers and defenders. On the other hand, Spanish Habsburg ambitions for North Africa (which the duke of Florence had supported on several occasions); defending the Tuscan and Sienese coast against Ottomans and corsairs; and even Medici-backed *corso* raids into the Levant offer insight into the true dichotomy of Mediterranean warfare: geo-strategic matters versus dedication to

[8] Lorenzo Cantini. *Legislazione Toscana Raccolta* […] Volume 7. (Florence, 1803), 72-73.

protecting and promoting one's faith – the "ideal of secular [i.e. classical] prudence" while simultaneously subjecting non-Christians to "messianic imperialism."[9]

Every sailor, soldier, specialist, and sovereign maintained their own motivations for contributing to these conflicts and military projects. Moreover, just like the political realm, individuals made all the difference between victory and defeat. Throughout the Habsburg-Valois wars, decisive victory proved impossible simply because – to paraphrase the nineteenth-century Prussian general and military theorist Carl von Clausewitz – neither Habsburg, Valois, Ottoman, corsair, papal, 'Italian', nor Medici wills were easily broken or compelled (especially at concurrent moments). Furthermore, after the Italian Wars ended in 1559, the "big war" continued for at least another decade. The Order of Santo Stefano seemingly possessed the potential to aid on several levels of this military, political, and religious spectrum; however, Mediterranean naval warfare quickly transformed within a decade of founding Santo Stefano.

Looking ahead: Santo Stefano & early modern naval warfare and politics (c. 1563 – 1609)

Massive galley fleets and the Mediterranean 'clash of empires' peaked in the immediate decade or so after the Italian Wars. By the early 1570s, Philip II could count on at least 140 or 150 galleys to defend the western Mediterranean[10] – about double the hypothetical allied contingent from the 1563 Oran campaign. Among these, Cosimo leased 10 galleys – including Santo Stefano's *Fiorenza* – to Philip II under Don Garcia de Toledo between May 1564 and 1569. In this period, Cosimo contributed 2 ducal galleys and 2 from the Order of Santo Stefano towards the successful relief of Malta in 1565. Just

[9] Philip Williams. *Empire and Holy War* […]. (London, 2014), 247-263 – quotations from p. 249. See also Molly Greene. *Catholic Pirates and Greek Merchants* […] (Princeton, 2010), 17.
[10] M.J. Rodríguez-Salgado. *The Changing Face of Empire* […]. (Cambridge, 1988), 305. See also I.A.A. Thompson. *War and Society in Habsburg Spain* […]. (Hampshire, UK, 1992), chapter IX p. 70; Arturo Pacini. '*Desde Rosas a Gaeta*' […]. (Milan, 2013), 170 – 171; and Alvaro Pintado Castillo. "Dette flottante […]," *Annales* E.S.C. 4 (1963), 755.

after renewing this Spanish agreement in 1569; however, Spain lost at least 5 of the duke's galleys in a storm that Philip's commanders recklessly sailed through. To further alienate Cosimo from the king, the duke was not financially compensated for these losses. That same year, Pope Pius V also provocatively named Cosimo as the first grand duke of Tuscany.[11] The relationship between Spain and Florence was significantly shifting, and the grand ducal title opened further questions related to Medici status among European 'states.' Cosimo's strained standing with Philip II and other sovereigns coincided with noticeable changes in Mediterranean warfare between the grand duke's latter years and the reigns of his immediate successors: his sons Francesco I and Ferdinando I (*c.* 1574–1609).

The Battle of Lepanto (1571) marked the climax of the naval "big war" Cosimo had prepared for since the 1540s. The Christian Holy League of Spain, her Italian allies, Venice, the Knights of Malta, and Pope Pius V – in collaboration with the grand duke of Tuscany and the Order of Santo Stefano – captured or destroyed most of the Ottoman fleet. Any 'Muslim' survivors were primarily corsair vessels under Dragut's successor Uluç Ali.[12] Even though this encounter could justifiably be regarded as a "battle of annihilation,"[13] later evaluations deemed the battle more or less a fluke with few military

[11] ASF *Miscellanea Medicea* I 23 inserto (ins.) 29 preserves the agreement between Cosimo and Philip. See also Marco Gemignani. "The Navies of the Medici […]," in John B. Hattendorf and Richard W. Unger, eds. *War at Sea in the Middle Ages and Renaissance*. (Woodbridge, England, 2002), 176-177. On Malta, see Camillo Manfroni. "La Marina Militare […]." in *Rivista Marittima* […]. (Rome, 1895), 113; and ASF MP 2077 ins. 1 f. 266.

[12] For an account of the battle and the context leading up to it, see especially Niccolò Capponi. *Victory of the West* […]. (Cambridge, MA, 2007). Dragut fell at the siege of Malta (1565). For a specific Tuscan account of Lepanto, see Gino Guarnieri. *I Cavalieri di Santo Stefano* […]. (Pisa, 1960), chapter 8 and documents 3-6. See also Marcella Aglietti. "La Partecipazione delle Galere Toscane […]," in Danilo Marrara, ed. *Toscana E Spagna nell'Età Moderna e Contemporanea* […] (Pisa, 1998), pp. 55-146. For an archival glimpse of Santo Stefano's experience, see Archivio di Stato di Pisa (ASP) Inventario 20 Ordine dei Cavalieri di S. Stefano (Inv. 20) Numero Nuovo (NN) 905 f. 216-217; and especially NN 1087; the first part of NN 1088 and 1409 for 1570-1571.

[13] Jan Glete. *Warfare at Sea, 1500-1650* […]. (New York, 2000), 105.

or diplomatic consequences aside from dispelling the illusion of Ottoman invincibility.[14] Yet, even though a replacement Ottoman fleet of around 200 galleys was immediately placed under construction, the loss in manpower – among Lepanto's other effects– significantly dulled Ottoman offensive capability in the Mediterranean for nearly a century until the War of Candia (1645-1669).[15]

By 1573, some in Florence believed that epic clashes between galley fleets would continue to define the future of Mediterranean conflict.[16] However, Don Garcia de Toledo predicted that the Barbary corsairs – not the Ottomans – would pose the biggest threat to Spanish Habsburg security in the future. According to him, at least 5 galleys from the "*duque de Florencia*" could contribute to securing the western Mediterranean.[17] In other words, there was contemporary debate on whether another "big war" or the constant "little war" of the *corso* and pirating would dominate western geostrategic conflict. To further confound matters, the French Wars of Religion (1562-1598) had already lasted a decade and would define the rest of the sixteenth century. In short, from Lepanto onwards, Cosimo's old foes from the Italian Wars – France and the Ottomans – were essentially neutralized in the western Mediterranean. To echo Piero Machiavelli's observation, the war that Cosimo and the Habsburgs had expected to "last as long as the world lasts" had clearly ended. Whether they realized it or not, the world of the Mediterranean "big war" was over.

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[14] Andrew C. Hess. "The Battle of Lepanto […]," in *Past & Present*, No. 57 (November, 1972), pp. 53-73.
[15] Colin Imber. "The Reconstruction of the Ottoman Fleet after the Battle of Lepanto, 1571-1572," in Colin Imber, ed. *Studies in Ottoman History and Law*. (Istanbul, 1996). See also Fernand Braudel. *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World* Volume II. Translated by Siân Reynolds. (Berkley, 1995), 1103-1104; Onur Yildirim "The Battle of Lepanto […]," *Mediterraneo in armi (secc. XV-XVIII)*, 2, (2007), 543, 556; and Gábor Ágoston. *Guns for the Sultan* […]. (New York, 2009), 53-54.
[16] ASF MP 4274 f. 455-457, dated 1573.
[17] CODOIN Volume 102 document 18 on pp. 245-254, "Piccola flotta/grande flotta García de Toledo a Filippo II, Napoli, 10 settembre 1573." Special thanks to Arturo Pacini for directing me to this document. Emphasis has been drawn on Toledo's use of "duke" NOT "grand duke" of Florence because Cosimo's new title had become a major point of contention across Mediterranean politics.

Although Francesco had essentially co-ruled with his father since the 1560s, Cosimo's passing in 1574 marked his son's ascension to grand duke of Tuscany. Among countless other responsibilities, Francesco inherited 12 galleys and a few other larger and smaller warships – a significant investment during the last decade of Cosimo's reign. In order to cut costs and adapt to the post-Lepanto geostrategic reality across the Mediterranean (i.e. the "little war"), the new grand duke reduced the number of active galleys and largely organized his remaining squadron under Santo Stefano's banner.[18] Of course, this freed the Medici galleys from any Spanish Habsburg obligations.[19] In their expeditions, Santo Stefano not only targeted nearby North Africa but also the Aegean and even southern Anatolia. Already by 1575, the Ottoman military administration ordered that the order's 4 galleys be captured. A few years later, Santo Stefano joined forces with the Knights of Malta and raided the waters near Turkey. As peace and commercial discussions were underway between Francesco and the sultan in 1578, however, there was a temporary lull in the number of Tuscan *corsos* between 1578-1580.[20]

Yet, these famously failed negotiations were rooted more in politics than in Santo Stefano's incursions in the Levant. Among other factors, the Barbary states' sway in the Ottoman court strongly mitigated against the success of any resulting settlement, since this would be an agreement between Grand Duke Francesco and the Ottomans – not including North Africa. Moreover, since Spain was no longer as focused on Mediterranean affairs – and Venice had reached another peace agreement with the sultan – the threat of a "Holy League" simply did not carry the same weight as it had in previous decades. Finally, the pope's authority over Santo Stefano hindered Francesco's ability to

[18] Franco Angiolini. "Il Granducato di Toscana e il Mediterraneo dopo Lepanto," in *Sardegna, Spagna e Stati italiani nell'età di Filippo II* […]. (Cagliari, 1998), 199-202.
[19] Neri Capponi. "The Order of St. Stephen Pope and Martyr and the 1578 Tuscan-Ottoman Peace Talks," in *Settentrione: rivista di studi italo-finlandesi*, n. 18 (University of Turku, Finland, 2006).
[20] Mikail Acıpınar. "Anti-Ottoman activities of the Order of the Knights of St. Stephen […]," in Dejanirah Couto, et al., eds. *Seapower, Technology, and Trade* […]. (Istanbul, 2014), 167-170.

guarantee restrictions on their actions.[21] Again, the world in which Cosimo had prepared his naval infrastructure – including the Order of Santo Stefano – had dramatically changed. Francesco and later his brother Ferdinando sought to find their footing while building upon their father's legacy.

Aside from propaganda[22] and building a rapport with different levels of Florentine, Tuscan, Sienese, and general European society, however, the order ultimately fulfilled its mission of 'fighting the infidel.' Between the 1580s and the turn of the seventeenth century, Santo Stefano often joined forces with Genoa and the Knights of Malta in capturing corsair vessels and slaves in North Africa, the Aegean, and around Cyprus. Moreover, the admirable performance of Francesco's and later Ferdinando's galleys – alongside Livorno's growing importance and success – stirred many in Genoa to propose reinvigorating the republic's fleet and commercial activities.[23] Under Francesco, the order captured 1,872 slaves and freed 625 'Christians;' while Ferdinando's reign witnessed the peak of this activity with 5,416 slaves captured and 1,490 'Christians' rescued.[24]

Whereas Cosimo's own *corsos* had yielded about 5 slaves per year on average, Francesco could boast 189 and Ferdinando 259. Although Mediterranean warfare had become solely focused on corsair and pirate raids at sea and along the coast, a few things remained the same. The Spanish *Presidios* along the Sienese coast continued to cause administrative complications between the Habsburgs and the grand dukes. Moreover,

[21] Neri Capponi. "The Order of St. Stephen." Concerning Tuscan-Ottoman relations in this period, see also Alessandro Olsaretti. *Trade, Diplomacy and State formation in the early modern Mediterranean* […]. Unpublished Masters Thesis, McGill University, (October 2005).
[22] Grand Dukes and Grand Masters Francesco and Ferdinando never shied away from depicting themselves as valiant crusaders of Santo Stefano in many commissioned pieces. See: Katherine Poole-Jones. "The Medici, Maritime Empire, […]," in Nicholas Scott Baker and Brian Jeffrey Maxson, eds. *Florence in the Early Modern World* […]. (New York, 2020), pp. 156-186.
[23] Acıpınar. "Anti-Ottoman activities," 170-171; and Thomas Kirk. "Genoa and Livorno […]," in *History*, 86, (2001), pp. 3-17. See especially p. 5. An example of one of these expeditions in 1583 can be found in ASF MP 2077 ins. 3 f. 608-611, 13 October 1583.
[24] ASP Inv. 20 NN 2939 f. 352, *c.* 1644.

Spanish military presence intensified and the *Presidios* became more entrenched in the Neapolitan-Habsburg defense system. Like his father, Francesco also attempted to bring Piombino – still ruled by the Appiani – under his authority. Perhaps most importantly, Francesco and his brother transformed Livorno into one of the Mediterranean's most prominent port cities.[25] In many respects, commerce and corsairs superseded fortresses and fleets after Lepanto.[26] Cosimo's passing in 1574 coincided with a new world, and his sons used the tools their father had forged – galleys, coastal fortifications, and the Order of Santo Stefano – to confront and adapt to these challenges.

[25] Angiolini. "Il Granducato […] dopo Lepanto," 203, 207. Regarding the *Presidios* after Cosimo's time see especially Angiolini. "I Presidios di Toscana […]" in Enrique Garcia Hernan and Davide Maffi, eds. *Guerra y Sociedad* […] Volume 1 (Madrid, 2006); Giuseppe Caciagli. *Stato dei Presidi*. (Pontedera, Italy, 1992); Simone Martinelli. "L'arsenale bellico dei presidi spagnoli […]," in *Rivista di Storia Finanziaria,* 17 (2006); Arturo Pacini, "Tra terra e mare […]" in Elena Fasano Guarini and Paola Vopini, eds. *Frontiere di Terra Frontiere di Mare* […] (Milan., 2008). For the 'bigger picture' of Francesco's and Ferdinando's reign, see Brian Anthony Brege. *The Empire That Wasn't* […]. Unpublished PhD dissertation, Stanford University, (June 2014).

[26] This shift was identified in Fernand Braudel. *The Mediterranean*; Angiolini. "Il Granducato di Toscana […]," in Isabel Cristina Ferreira Fernandes, ed. *Ordens Militares* […], Volume 1. (Lisbon, 1999), 45; and Greene. *Catholic Pirates and Greek Merchants*, 17, 52-53, 79-81.

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