A Descent into Hellshire: Safety, Security and the End of Slavery in Jamaica, 1819–20

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Abstract

Historians of slavery in the Americas have focussed on major revolts and rebellions such as Haiti in 1791 to help explain emancipation, and ignored the impact of smaller clashes. A close study of one such clash in Jamaica in 1819 between slave runaways in the Hellshire Hills and the colonial state offers a new perspective. Typical of other routine police actions carried out by other slave states, planters relied heavily on their own resources and the cooperation of free and enslaved people of colour, especially three parties of Maroons, to carry out a 'descent' into Hellshire that drove the runaways out of the region. Contrary to the prevailing opinion in the historiography, white societies such as Jamaica therefore possessed formidable military resources to defeat black resistance and break up black unity, even in the years immediately before Emancipation in 1834. Yet the descent itself was a product of the paranoid fears of local planters and cost over £3,000, adding substantial financial and social costs onto a slave society that was already overburdened with high rates of taxation and a declining economy. Close study therefore shows for the first time that even when open black resistance was unsuccessful it therefore helped to undermine slavery, by increasing the cost of security. The descent into Hellshire in 1819 is therefore an important example of the type of routine police operations that appeared to cement the authority of local planters but also gradually and cumulatively undermined white

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opposition to emancipation within the British West Indies, and thus also an instance of the important but indirect contribution of black resistance to the end of slavery in the region.

Keywords

Jamaica; Caribbean; Slavery; Security; Military; Emancipation

In August 1819 the custos or chief magistrate of the parish of St Catherine in Jamaica laid a request before the governor in Spanish Town. A number of groups of runaway slaves had taken up residence in the Hellshire (or Healthshire) Hills in the southern part of the parish, and were raiding and burning local plantations.[1] He asked the governor to call out the militia and a party of trustworthy slaves and Maroons to scour the region. Over the next six or seven months they carried out what they called an extended 'descent' or military raid into Hellshire that broke up these groups and brought many back to Spanish Town for punishment. These events therefore lacked the drama of the rebellions that convulsed Jamaica and other slave societies in the Americas during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, not least the Haitian Revolution between 1791 and 1804 which replaced the colonial society with an independent state of self-emancipated slaves, or the Baptist War of 1831 in Jamaica itself. The raid was typical though of the small-scale police actions routinely fought by slave societies to control runaways and maintain order, and a close study of this successful descent into Hellshire challenges the widespread impression that white planters were powerless against the rising tide of black resistance during this 'age of revolutions'.

In Jamaica however they retained the capacity to confront this challenge, due in a large part to the participation of free and enslaved people of colour, including the island's Maroons, who served as military auxiliaries and helped to prosecute the runaways caught

during the operation. A close study of the raid into Hellshire therefore provides a unique and important insight not only into the nature of runways and slave resistance in Jamaica on the eve of emancipation in 1834 but also the process of collaboration and cooperation which maintained the plantation system and slave society in the island even in its final years, and the interaction between white and black demands for safety, security and the end of slavery.

1. Background

The Hellshire (or Healthshire) Hills are a range of limestone or 'cockpit karst' hills of about 160 square kilometres or 62 square miles in the southernmost part of the parish of St Catherine in Jamaica (Figure 1).[2] Located only a few miles from the colonial capital of St Jago de la Vega or Spanish Town and the commercial city of Kingston, between the sea and the mountains, the region lay in the centre of the colonial state but was (and is), in the words of the Jamaican planter and historian Edward Long in 1774, 'so rocky and barren as not to be worth inhabiting … [and] the want of water-springs, there being only one … will probably be the means of its remaining for the most part in a state of nature'.[3] This made it an ideal refuge for runaway slaves in the early nineteenth century. 'Independent of the extensive and almost trackless woods to which they can always resort on the least approach of danger', a newspaper stated in 1846, 'there are also numerous caves leading in many instances from one to another, and where some of the entrances are so narrow that one man at a time can only creep into them'.[4] Parties were despatched there in 1774 and 1805 to 'scour' the hills of runaways, but it soon filled up again, and even in 1846 the newspaper urged that a party of constabulary should be dispatched to break up their settlements.[5]

[Insert Figure 1 here]

The Hellshire Hills therefore raised problems of security that were wholly typical of the issues faced by slave societies across the Americas. Groups of runaways, often called 'Maroons', existed outside the plantations, patrols and prisons that attempted to control the hostility and resistance endemic to slavery.[6] 'Marronage on a grand scale … struck directly at the foundations of the plantation system', notes Richard Price, both by raids on plantations and provision grounds and by the inspiration it offered to other slaves, 'presenting military and economic threats that often taxed the colonists to their very limits'.[7] Planters in Jamaica fought a series of damaging campaigns in the 1730s against the Maroons that laid waste to large parts of the interior, and again in 1795 and 1796 in a campaign that pitched some 5,000 troops against only 200 or 300 Maroons.[8] Other communities of Maroons existed across the British, French and Spanish West Indies and in North America, in places such as northern Florida or the Great Dismal Swamp in the Chesapeake, where they were likewise objects of fear to local planters.[9] Runaways were therefore one aspect of a much wider continuum of conspiracies, revolts and outright rebellions about which historians of slavery and abolition still know too little, but which menaced slave societies throughout the Americas and reached a fever pitch from the late eighteenth century during the 'age of revolutions'.

Building on the earlier work of C.L.R. James, it has been argued by Eugene Genovese, Michael Craton and others that this eventually made plantation slavery unsustainable in the Americas, particularly once the Haitian Revolution of 1791 had openly demonstrated how tenuously white planters clung to their hegemony in the face of hostility from both free and enslaved persons of colour.[10] Among several other factors, such as the rise of abolitionism in Britain and the declining economic importance of the West Indies, a series of revolts in Barbados in 1816, Demerara in 1823 and Jamaica in 1831 failed to

overthrow the white regime but managed to persuade British elites that slavery was unsustainable and emancipation unavoidable.

Examining the successful campaign against the runaways in Hellshire in 1819 offers an alternative perspective that highlights the relative stability of slave society in the island, thanks in no small part to a colonial state apparatus that proved effective at mobilising both white and black Jamaicans in defence of slavery. The tempo of black resistance may indeed have been rising, and Claudius Fergus and Gelien Matthews have shown how abolitionists in Britain were working to persuade metropolitan opinion that such revolts were an inevitable consequence of slavery, but planters also could – and did – argue that they clearly had the resources to contain such revolts.[11] As far back as the seventeenth century the safety and security of the British, French and Spanish Caribbean had been supported in part by the widespread use of people of colour as militiamen and soldiers, culminating in the purchase of 13,000 slaves by Britain between 1795 and 1807 for service in the European-style West India Regiments.[12] Planters in the Americas also fitted out parties of slaves and freedmen as rangers or light infantry for use against runaways in place of regular troops, and in Jamaica and elsewhere planters also made treaties with Maroons for service as military auxiliaries in wartime and patrolling parties and bounty hunters in peacetime, returning other runaways to their owners.[13] 'The evidence is overwhelming', notes Mavis Campbell of the Jamaican Maroons, 'that they … willingly and faithfully assisted the plantocracy in the control mechanism of the slave population', though without closer studies of their role in such expeditions it has been difficult to understand in a balanced way their contribution to Jamaican slave society.[14] However, it is clear that in combination with measures such as the system of rural patrols and urban police in the American South, studied recently by Sally Hadden, or the system of prisons in Jamaica after 1770 that Diana Paton has analysed, the

cooperation of free and enslaved persons of colour was an integral part of the structures of coercion and control which whites in the Americas could use to break up black resistance.[15]

Closer attention to the strength of the colonial state therefore complements a broader reassessment of the underlying cohesion and stability of society in Jamaica and other West Indian islands. Edward Brathwaite, Trevor Burnard, Christer Petley and Gad Heuman, among others, have shown how the 'creole society' of Jamaica synthesised European and African practices to offer even a few free and enslaved people of colour a stake in the survival of its racial, social and economic hierarchies.[16] Slaves and freedmen who had acquired a modicum of liberty and property could be more than willing to support the society that guaranteed these small gains, and so too did the Maroons, even if they also did not cease to lobby for a better place within that society itself and eventually for the outright abolition of slavery. 'Creole society was stable because the unprivileged and underprivileged within it conformed to the system, its divisions and its restrictions', Brathwaite concluded, while Burnard has likewise argued (albeit for an earlier period) that 'what preserved slavery in Jamaica was that slaves accepted, albeit reluctantly and conditionally, that they were slaves and that masters had the right, or at least the capacity, to force them to do what they wanted them to do'.[17] Combined with work by Seymour Drescher and others demonstrating that the economy of these islands continued to grow up to 1807, this has tended to suggest that neither the slave society nor the plantation economy of Jamaica and the other islands were in inevitable decline before emancipation in 1834, and to refocus attention on the metropolitan campaigns for abolition that gathered force from the 1780s onwards.[18] Yet it has also been argued in turn that this approach denies the importance of local events in this process, not least the immense traumas created by events such as the Haitian Revolution long after 1791 and the agency displayed by enslaved and free people of colour in effecting their own liberation.[19] A study of the descent into the Hellshire Hills in 1819 can bring clarity to this

question by examining the nature of the resistance the planters faced, the extent of the collaboration afforded to them by people of colour with their own stakes in the slave society and plantation economy, and the costs entailed by the white determination to maintain the safety and security of Jamaican society near the end of slavery.

Such episodes have rarely been studied, both because they lacked the drama of larger revolts such as the Haitian Revolution and because colonial officials rarely sent back detailed reports of successful small-scale actions. Indeed, the governor of Jamaica nearly made no mention at all of the Hellshire expedition to the Colonial Office, and so such evidence is often missing from the archive. 'I should perhaps not have troubled your lordship … were I not apprehensive that more importance might be attached in England to this matter than it deserves', he wrote, 'by reason of my having been obliged to notice it in my speech at the opening of the session on account of the expence which had been unavoidably incurred on the occasion'.[20] As James Robertson has noted in his examination of archival holdings in Jamaica, there are large gaps in the documentary record – as in other islands of the region more generally – that often make it difficult to make particular kinds of historical enquiry, particularly for groups such as runaways living outside the archival reach of the colonial state.[21] Efforts have been made recently to compensate for this by exploring how the imperial and colonial archive might be reconstructed, but gaps remain.[22] In this case though the assembly eventually carried out a detailed audit of the campaign in November 1820, which is recorded in their *Journals*, and the raid itself was reported in several of the island's newspapers. Using these often-overlooked sources, it is possible to reconstruct not only the expedition itself and how the colonial state worked but also some aspects of the runaways and their motivations.

A close study of the descent into Hellshire in 1819 and 1820 therefore also affords the opportunity to suggest how other aspects of the slave society in Jamaica and elsewhere in this

period might be recovered through the creative new use of surviving historical records. Though both financial sources and newspaper accounts may seem unpromising and even intimidatingly complex materials, they can be used to show that over one hundred free and enslaved people of colour, many of them Maroons, worked with the colonial state in Jamaica to root out and punish the runaways and preserve the order and stability of the slave society. In the first phase in September and October 1819 they drove out the runaways from the Hellshire Hills, and in the second phase up to February 1820 small parties of militia and guides used wider patrols to scour the region around Hellshire to catch other runaways. Driven by the paranoia of the planters, the campaign was ultimately successful in tactical terms, but also contributed to the growing financial costs of maintaining the slave society in the island. It therefore hints at a more complex relationship between safety, security and the end of slavery in Jamaica and the British West Indies than has been provided by earlier studies of this period, and it highlights important issues that would repay even closer examination in the future.

2. The Maroons and the Descent into Hellshire

The first phase of the descent into Hellshire began on 14 August when the vestry of the parish of St Catherine raised the issue of runaways with the governor, the duke of Manchester. The local newspaper, the *St Jago Gazette*, noted that several groups of runaways had established houses and provision grounds in the region and had 'become so daring as to burn down the buildings on Mrs Brown's pen about three miles from this town ... and at Berrydale Pen within a mile of town as well as other properties in the vicinity, [and] no stock could be kept safe from their depredations'.[23] Other witnesses later reported thefts of corn, cattle and spirits, and the shooting of a cow at Smallwood Pen, which was owned by a member of the

vestry named William McRobbie.[24] The planters of the parish argued that these were the harbingers of an uprising by runaways who were 'so daring as to commit felonious and rebellious acts almost in public view and evidence a spirit ripe for rebellion'.[25] Writing only a few years later, the Jamaican clergyman and pro-slavery historian George Wilson Bridges, whose parish in Manchester lay a few miles away from the runaways, drew a frightening picture of a far broader slave conspiracy that threatened the security of the island. 'A wide extent of coast lay open to them; the enemies of Jamaica were active and designing; and it was more than suspected that a channel of communication had been kept open with a neighbouring colony of black barbarians [in Haiti]', he said, '[and] their strength and the apparent security of a mountainous country of vast resources and considerable extent, inhabited by themselves alone, had encouraged this formidable band of robbers to issue from its haunts and commit outrages on the neighbouring properties'.[26] This paranoia was a long way from the reality of the situation but it was sufficiently powerful to force action.

The planters focussed in particular on the activities of two small bands of runaways; the 'Wall Pond party' in north-east Hellshire under a runaway named Yaw or Walker, and the 'Amity Hall party' in north-west Hellshire under another runaway called Quashie or Scipio.[27] It later emerged from the testimony submitted to the slave courts and reproduced in various newspapers that Walker was a skilled cooper who had escaped from a plantation in St Thomas in the Vale some twenty years before, and had a reputation for violence. It was his lieutenants Aberdeen, Tooka Tooka Jack and Toney who had burnt Brown's pen, and they had built several further settlements inside Hellshire around Salt Island Pond in the north-east and a lookout post on the surrounding hillside. Scipio was a creole slave born in Jamaica who had run away from a nearby plantation in St Catherine only five years before, and his gang retained strong links with settled society. Their settlement lay between Salt Island Pond and the plantation of Amity Hall in St Dorothy, only half a mile from its provision grounds

and near relatives such as his uncle Cudjoe and his mother, who was 'kept' by a watchman at Amity Hall named Quamin Fuller. His party included his wife Bessy and his sister Peggy Fuller, his lieutenants Leicester, Old Anthony and Cudjoe, and a wider group of slaves from Amity Hall and other estates who joined and left the party as they saw fit. Yet these gangs did not number more than about thirty people and lived next to larger numbers of runaways who had formed their own settlements in Hellshire itself or on its edges. Two hundred or so were captured in the raid and held in the workhouse at Spanish Town, and also had their descriptions published for the benefit of their owners.[28] Around one third were female. One third were locally-born, despite 'creoles' making up sixty percent of the population.[29] Over eighty percent had fled to Hellshire from nearby parishes or the towns of Kingston and St Jago de la Vega. In this respect they resembled runaway communities elsewhere, which were generally composed of young men, often African by birth, who tended to remain close to the plantations from which they had escaped.[30]

Like many other runaways, the groups in Hellshire also remained in relatively close contact with the settled regions surrounding the Hills. The *St Jago Gazette* reported with alarm in mid-September 1819 that two black soldiers of the West India Regiment at Apostle's Battery, on the eastern side of the Hellshire Hills, had been arrested for concealing runaways in the settlement established there by retired soldiers, and demanded that the government remove this 'perfect nuisance to the country'.[31] Witnesses later stated that neither the Wall Pond nor the Amity Hall parties had retreated into self-sufficiency but wove baskets and grew potatoes, cassava, pumpkins, pease and corn at their provision grounds, which they then sold with fresh meat from their raids to nearby plantations such as Cherry Garden and Amity Hall as part of the informal economy.[32] Perhaps most worryingly for planters, they had been able to exchange these goods not only for rum and other luxuries but also for arms, powder and shot. Slaves also moved to and from the Hills relatively freely and a runaway named Richard

later testified that he and several others had been invited by both Scipio and Walker to join their gangs, 'which they declined, as that party wished to steal too much, and the living would be hard, and they thought they would be safer where they were'. He had seen them both frequently at Amity Hall, and a nearby pen owned by John Vaughn, a free person of colour. There were also divisions and contests between the gangs and the plantation slaves. After the Amity Hall party killed McRobbie's cow in August their settlement was attacked and their huts burnt in revenge by a party of slaves from McRobbie's pen.[33]

The runaways were therefore in many respects typical of other runaway or Maroon communities in the Americas in this period and very far indeed from the rebellious hordes pictured by Bridges and other planters, who were still scarred in 1819 not only by the Haitian Revolution of 1791 but also by the revolt in Barbados only three years before.[34] 'The most reasonable apprehensions were entertained [in Jamaica in 1816] that the combustible materials of which Jamaica was composed would catch the spreading flame', Bridges later wrote, '[and] a spark would at such a moment have caused a general conflagration … follow[ing] the example of Haiti and Barbados'.[35] The killing of McRobbie's cow may have been a negligible *causus belli*, but both the letter of the parish to the governor and the reports in the local newspapers suggest that it reinforced fears among planters in Jamaica and led them to interpret minor raids by the runaways in Hellshire in 1819 as the stirrings of a general revolt with aid from revolutionary elements in Haiti, even though that island was in the throes of its own extended civil war and in no condition to incite revolution abroad.[36] The planters therefore demanded an immediate military response when a more sober assessment would probably have encouraged a more measured and less expensive reaction. Manchester later privately confided to the Colonial Office, for example, that 'one plantation had been burned … [but] it does not appear that these people entertained any hostile designs against the peace of the country but merely intended to guard themselves against attack or molestation, and …

contemplated an establishment similar to the Maroons'.[37] Left to himself it seems that he would have taken no action against Walker, Scipio or the other runaways, but the priority of the planters was clearly to assure their security by firm and decisive action in order to prevent a repetition of events in Barbados in 1816, let alone the revolution of St Domingue in 1791.

Despite his private doubts Manchester therefore quickly set the wheels of the colonial state in motion. Orders were sent on 14 August to the white superintendents at Moore Town, Charles Town and Accompong Town to muster parties of Maroons, and a further letter was sent to George Marshall of Meweton Pen near Spanish Town asking him to lead them on an expedition against the runaways.[38] Marshall was a major planter and vestryman who had served in the militia of St Catherine for over two decades, rising to the rank of major-general only a few years before.[39] He lived at Meweton with his black housekeeper Olive Pennington and her children George and Charlotte Marshall, who would all take key roles in the campaign.[40] The runaways would therefore be driven from the Hellshire Hills not by the imperial state and its garrison of regular troops but by the planters and their colonial state, which faced three main challenges.

The first was tactical. Marshall had overall responsibility not only for the Hellshire Hills but also the entire precinct of St Catherine, an area of some 1,200 square kilometres or 460 square miles which included the coastal parish of St Dorothy and the mountainous lands of St John and St Thomas in the Vale. The terrain in the Hellshire Hills was ideal for small-scale guerrilla warfare of ambush and favoured defenders with an intimate knowledge of the local hills and caves, as in the Cockpit Country used by the Trelawny Maroons in 1795 and 1796.[41] The second challenge was logistical. Food, water, ammunition and other essentials for maintaining the force in Hellshire could not be found locally, and a long logistics train would be needed to keep the Maroons in the field. Finally, Marshall lacked the element of surprise. After killing McRobbie's cow the two parties had immediately retreated into the

Hills 'lest a party should be sent after them', and soon after Marshall was appointed they met again. 'Walker said they must join, as a party was to be out; that they would dig pits, and put glass bottles, pegs etc. there', one witness recalled, '[and] that when the party came they would fall into the pit; when they would fall upon them and destroy them'.[42] Testimony at the slave court later reported that Scipio had refused because their settlements lacked a water supply and Walker's gang 'carried on [with] too much hardness', and proposed instead to recruit more runaways, but that the parties made oaths to each other with a mixture of honey, ashes and red dirt in the same way as many other slave rebellions in order to bolster their alliance with spiritual sanctions.[43] Marshall therefore faced a determined force with detailed knowledge of the difficult local terrain, and very few local supplies of his own.

To set against these challenges though, Marshall and the colonial fiscal-military state also had formidable resources at their disposal. By far the most important were the Maroons. The treaties of 1739 between the Crown and the leeward and windward communities were regulated by further legislation, passed most recently in 1791, which allowed the governor to call out parties of Maroons 'to scour the woods and take up runaway slaves … [it being] of great ease and advantage to the planters and white inhabitants of the island'.[44] The legislation gave the white superintendents the power to control Maroons, but 'as an encouragement to the said parties to be diligent in the said service' it also allowed Maroons to receive pay and provisions while on duty and a 40s reward for each slave captured. Expeditions such as this therefore offered these Maroon communities both the prospect of gain and the further opportunity to enact a 'performance of freedom', to use a phrase first suggested by Kathleen Wilson, that served to remind white planters of their reliance on the Maroons and thus their obligations under the treaties.[45] With extensive experience in the light, mobile warfare that could be expected in the Hellshire Hills, the Maroons served as the backbone of Marshall's force. The most recent 'party' law passed in 1807 also offered an

operational framework that put Marshall and his adjutant or major of brigade at the head of a clear chain of command, which could direct parties of Maroons, militia and volunteers and place them under martial law to maintain discipline.[46] Marshall also cultivated his own key sources of information. Richard, the slave noted earlier, was violently expelled by the runaways when he refused to join Scipio and Walker and swear loyalty to them, a humiliation that would have serious repercussions since he offered the colonial state his services as a guide.[47] Scipio's sister Peggy Fuller fled with Richard, who noted that they had 'quarrelled … in consequence of her taking the part of [the] witness [i.e. Richard] when he refused to take the oath', and she was kept at Meweton by Marshall 'for the purpose of confronting witnesses'.[48] The colonial state was therefore able to exploit a complex and tangled set of emotional affinities and resentments between Richard, Scipio and his sister to obtain accurate and reliable information about the conditions of the runaways, offering in return to Richard and Peggy not only a degree of freedom but also the emotional satisfaction of revenge against Scipio and even the chance to develop their own relationship with each other.

The party law also provided him with the crucial logistical resources. Marshall and commissioners in each parish had the power to contract with local merchants for provisions and other supplies, issuing IOUs or certificates payable by the assembly in due course, and to conscript cattle, carts, boats and slaves as necessary on the same terms.[49] He could also to tap into the commercial networks around Kingston and Spanish Town, two important hubs for the importing of flour and salt provisions from overseas and the retailing of fresh provisions such as meat, vegetables and other supplies from the local pens and provision grounds that both planters and slaves maintained.[50] These were all deposited at Marshall's head-quarters at Meweton Pen, which gradually became 'a general depot for provisions, stores and baggage belonging to the party, and also … a hospital for sick and wounded and people with sore feet'.[51] He converted a new brick mill-house into a barracks, gaol and

hospital under the supervision of Olive Pennington, who was also charged with nursing the sick and supplying wine, candles, firewood and various other necessaries.[52] Making Meweton his headquarters also allowed Marshall to control the flow of information, and he later noted he had chosen it 'partly because I could get no other place for such purpose but chiefly for the purpose of keeping everything connected with the operations in as great a state of secrecy as possible'.[53]

These advantages in tactics and logistics allowed Marshall to develop his campaign methodically and to build up an overwhelming strategic advantage. One hundred Maroons from Charles Town, Moore Town and Accompong Town arrived at Spanish Town two weeks after receiving the letter from the governor and were garrisoned at Meweton.[54] Twelve or so volunteers were recruited by Marshall to help the parties, including Samuel Silverwood, John Mattee and Marshall's own son George, a free person of colour, who were each appointed quartermaster-sergeants and put in charge of the three Maroon parties.[55] Marshall also hired about thirty baggage slaves from nearby plantations, including six from his personal estates at Meweton and Golden Grove.[56] Around ten barrels of beef, 450 lb of biscuit and 300 loaves of bread were delivered by local merchants and retailers Asher Levy, Jean Baptiste Garel and Mary Redwar, with numerous casks of wine, rum, sugar, nutmeg, butter, cheese and medical supplies from local merchants.[57] Thirty drays, mules and drivers were hired from two local contractors near the end of August to transport these provisions to three main depots at Salt Pond Island, Wall's Pond and in Hellshire itself, which would serve as the main jumping-off points for Maroon expeditions into the interior. Minor depots were set up at strategic positions such as Bog Walk, Lloyd's Retreat, Brereton's Pen and Passage Fort to encircle Hellshire and control the movement of people through the precinct.[58] The accounts later presented to the assembly therefore show that the colonial state displayed an impressive

capacity to assemble military and logistical resources for a sustained policing action against the runaways, drawing in part on the assistance of free and enslaved persons of colour.

When Marshall began the expedition in early September it consequently broke upon the runaways in the Hellshire Hills with devastating force. Each day the Maroons sent large parties into the interior under the guidance of the local volunteers and armed guides, with the assistance of three sketches or maps supplied by an engineer in the imperial garrison 'for use of persons superintending the Maroons'.[59] Reconstructing the plan of campaign from the receipts for the journeys made by Marshall's three quartermaster-sergeants and a detailed contemporary map of Jamaica (Figure 1) shows that the Charles Town Maroons under John Matthee ranged northward and eastward from their depot at Wall's Pond, patrolling the lowlands around Spanish Town and Kingston and the marshes in between.[60] The Moore Town Maroons under Samuel Silverwood struck southward and westward into the Hellshire Hills from their depot on its edge, setting up a smaller depot at Wreck Bay on the southern coast to prevent the runaways escaping by sea.[61] Meanwhile the Accompong Town Maroons under George Marshall swept southward and eastward from the depot at Salt Island Point into the Hills, driving Scipio's party and the other runaways away from Amity Hall and into the marshes on the south-eastern edge of Hellshire or its barren interior. Once the Charles Town Maroons had finished their search on 17 September they crossed over to Old Harbour on the western side of the Hellshire Hills, and the accounts show that Marshall fitted out boats for three parties to search the maze of islands and keys to the south-west of the Hills for other runaways.[62] The regular trips by the three quartermaster-sergeants helped to coordinate this campaign, which first established a cordon around the Hills and then sought to drive the runaways into this net by expeditions into the interior.

Some sense of these descents into Hellshire is provided by the accounts of the capture of Walker and several other members of his gang in late September, drawn from the evidence

offered in the slave courts and published in the *St Jago Gazette*. They were taken at their settlement above Wall's Pond by a party of Charles Town Maroons under a white sergeant named John Brammer, who had all left the depot at daybreak with Richard as their guide.[63] Climbing the hill with only a few pauses for refreshment, the Maroons were 'obliged to cut thatch and put [it] under their feet for protection from the rocks', but around midday they made it to a small hut or house which they surrounded and attacked. Walker and his two wives were captured by a Maroon named John McInnes 'who overtook and seized Walker … and thereby stopped him until the rest of the party came up and secured him' and received a wound in his thigh as a result.[64] Walker was armed with a gun – a vital point, since it meant that by law he could now be deemed to have been in rebellion against the state and receive a harsher penalty – and Brammer reported that Walker struggled before finally conceding that '"my time is come, it is your time now; had I not been sick you would not have caught me"'. Leaving Walker under guard, the Maroons were then led by Richard to another group of huts, where they captured Tooka Tooka Jack, Aberdeen and several others. Rather than returning eastwards with their prisoners they then headed west instead to Salt Island Pond and met a party of Accompong Town Maroons, who helped them carry the prisoners back to Meweton Pen. The day-to-day business of hunting down the runaways was thus left almost entirely in the hands of the Maroons and local people of colour, and relied on their willing cooperation with only minimal intervention and direction, let alone coercion, from white officers.

Backing up this impressive plan of campaign was an immense logistical effort which enabled the Maroon parties to maintain their cordon around the Hellshire Hills. The accounts presented to the assembly show that there were regular deliveries of biscuit, bread and beef to the three depots established on the outskirts of the Hills, and boxes of provisions containing wine, rum, porter, gin, sugar, butter, mustard, ham and cheese.[65] On 28 August thirty-five pairs of shoes were delivered to Meweton by Joseph Cohen Deleon for the superintendents,

volunteers, guides and baggage slaves, at a cost of £29.[66] Nearly £120 was spent in hiring some thirty slaves to transport the baggage of the Maroons and volunteers, usually from nearby plantations such as Meweton, Bodle's Pen and Bushy Park that were either hosting depots or were close to the scene.[67] At Meweton Pen itself there was a hospital which saw a regular stream of medical supplies. On 4 September two doctors arrived to attend to the sick and injured, including John McInnes, who received several further visits over the next few weeks while he recovered and additional medical help when his wound became infected on the journey back to Charles Town.[68] Combined with the mobility provided by the hire of boats and canoes for shifting supplies and transporting parties offshore, this logistical backing enabled Marshall to maintain large parties of Maroons in Hellshire for several weeks.

Once the runaways were captured they were brought back to Meweton and carefully interrogated, 'for the purpose of having them examined whether they were runaways or not … as well as for the purpose of obtaining from all such persons such information respecting rebels and their associates as might be necessary to forward to the several parties then at the outposts'.[69] Marshall or one of the other commissioners made a cursory initial examination to extract any information of immediate value, which would be sent forward to the Maroon parties through the regular trips made by the quartermaster-sergeants, and the commissioners then entered into a second and more detailed examination over the next few days. Marshall contended that keeping the prisoners confined there 'until such information was sent off … prevent[ed] any information being given or sent by the captured slaves to those remaining out', reflecting his justified concerns at the close links between these gangs and the surrounding slave plantations and the potential for leakage of information by sympathisers outside Hellshire.[70] When a Maroon party returned with further prisoners they escorted those already sifted to gaol at Spanish Town, apart from those 'whom it was deemed necessary to keep, for the purpose of confronting runaway slaves who had been captured and who were

expected to be brought in'.[71] As noted above, Scipio's sister Peggy was accommodated at Meweton for this purpose. A firm control over the circulation of information, which was then fed into the strategic direction of the campaign in real time, therefore helped Marshall to make the most of his resources. This phase of the campaign shows that the Jamaican state was an effective instrument of coercion, in part because it enjoyed the cooperation of many persons of colour, whose varied expertise and skills were invaluable in dislodging the runaways in Hellshire.

3. Punishment and Patrols

The newspapers were therefore able to report by 26 September 1819 that the main part of the campaign had been concluded. Nearly three hundred runaways had been sent to Meweton, including ten armed rebels 'and a great number of slaves who had formed themselves into gangs of a dangerous description'.[72] Large numbers of weapons had been confiscated and their huts and provision grounds in Hellshire and nearby destroyed. 'Complete success attended the measure', Marshall later argued, 'insofar as this, that of the runaways not one remained, nor was a house left upon the hills'.[73] The *St Jago Gazette* declared that 'a more useful service could scarcely have been performed to the public … which have not only secured so many dangerous runaways but has occasioned the return of many others to their owners through the fear of being taken up by the Maroons'.[74] Now it was necessary for planters to try, convict and punish the runaways through the slave courts, which Diana Paton has argued planters used to 'assert the legitimacy of their power … [and] transform … what was otherwise naked violence into legitimate punishment'.[75] The theatre and rhetoric of the slave courts were therefore a vital part of the general discourse of authority and law which maintained the wider legitimacy of the colonial state within Jamaican society, which is why

their proceedings were in this case reported at some length, enabling a closer study of both the runaways and the process of prosecution. Moreover, although Walker had been taken, Scipio and his gang remained at large. During the second phase of the raid, Marshall therefore dismissed his contingent of Maroons but kept under arms the white volunteers and several free and enslaved persons of colour until 22 February 1820, in order to consolidate the gains made during the first phase and further secure the stability of the slave society.

In order not to misuse the didactic possibilities of this moment, when the usual slave court was held at Spanish Town on 26 October it moved quickly to try members of Walker's gang such as Aberdeen, who were not only runaways but had also been found armed and in actual rebellion against the colonial state. A meeting of the vestry of St Catherine had been called on 18 September, where members had examined lists of runaways and 'pointed out' more than thirty slaves who should be tried for rebellion or other offences.[76] The slave court now heard firm testimony from Richard and from Scipio's wife Bessy that Aberdeen had been a member of Walker's gang, and from other slaves that he had burnt down Brown's pen earlier in August. He was found guilty and sentenced to be hanged. Walker was confronted with very similar evidence when he was put on trial three days later, as was Tooka Tooka Jack, and both were likewise hanged.[77] A slave named Fortune was captured in September with other runaways and 'was committed to the Spanish Town workhouse, being a principal evidence against him, and upon his testimony several of the ringleaders were tried, convicted and transported'.[78] More than forty other slaves were gaoled or exiled for carrying weapons and harbouring runaways, though the *St Jago Gazette* reported in early November that there were still at least eighty runaways awaiting trial. 'It is referred to the magistracy to decide whether ample example has not been made and public justice been satisfied', it recorded, demonstrating very clearly the exemplary and symbolic character of the trials, and eventually the remaining runaways were turned over to the workhouse or dismissed with a summary

punishment such as a whipping, 'after ascertaining and reserving the few cases connected with the armed *banditti* and such others as a committee may select.'[79] This episode serves to confirm not the symbolic as well as the practical importance of the slave courts as a theatre of legitimacy and exemplary punishment, but also the vital importance of collaboration by free and enslaved persons of colour in this process. By serving as witnesses they provided the testimony needed by the state to legitimise the harsher and more exemplary capital punishments, and thereby possibly secured for themselves better treatment and in the case of Richard or Bessy further emotional satisfaction and redress against other runways.

The fact that Scipio and his gang were still at large was a serious problem though, as it undermined the impact of the expedition as a deterrent. 'Let me ask whether the *banditti*, if left unpursued, would not have speedily reoccupied their former fastnesses or at no distant period formed themselves into gangs of the most desperate character', Marshall later asked, '[and] if yea, would it not be then too late to expostulate upon the useless expenditure of the Maroon expedition of 1819 or to censure the pusillanimous conduct of an officer who refused to follow the horses which he had put to the route'.[80] The paylists and muster rolls submitted to the assembly show that he formed his volunteers into smaller parties of four or five men under the same quartermaster-sergeants and sent them out on patrol throughout the precinct of St Catherine's. They were instructed to obey orders from the senior militia officers in their districts such as John Townshend and John Macfarlane, who had local knowledge and supplied their own 'confidential slaves' such as Cuffee Townshend and Wallace Macfarlane – possibly mixed-race relatives – as armed guides to help direct the parties.[81] The headquarters at Meweton Pen continued to receive a stream of beef, rum, bread and other supplies to subsist the parties out on patrol and the runaways they brought back.[82] Marshall's partner Olive Pennington continued to supply medicines, firewood and other necessaries, and horses for carrying provisions and despatches from Meweton to the smaller depots

throughout the precinct, while both Peggy and her mother's partner Quamin Fuller remained at Meweton to help Marshall examine the runaways they captured and to identify those belonging to Scipio's party.[83]

The detailed pattern of patrols between October 1819 and February 1820 is hard to reconstruct from the records but seems to have been restricted to two broad areas. One set of patrols moved westwards from Meweton into St Dorothy and St John and used the depots at Amity Hall and Fuller's Rest to support a regular series of incursions into the hills around them as well as the swamps and lagoons along the coast.[84] Scipio and his gang had remained in relatively close proximity to Amity Hall and Salt Island Pond, and there was a bloody clash on 26 November between the gang and one of the militia parties which so much alarmed the assembly that they asked the governor to offer a bounty or reward of £100 for capturing them.[85] The gang headed further west across the broad coastal belt of sugar plantations and provision pens in the parish of St Dorothy to the foothills around Fuller's Rest and Bully Tree, and evaded the parties sent after them.[86] These operations continued until December 1819 and then gradually tapered away, though occasional sweeps continued, and George Marshall recalled for the assembly an extended patrol in February 1820 that moved east from Fuller's Pen towards Amity Hall, Salt Pond Island, Wall's Pond and then back to Spanish Town.[87] Other patrols headed north into the parish of St Thomas in the Vale to find runaways who had managed to evade the guard post at Bog Walk, a narrow gorge that controlled access to the parish.[88] Some patrols ranged even further afield; in February, Marshall received a complaint about runaways at River Road in the parish of St Mary on the northern coast, and despatched a small party to scour the region with help from a slave from the nearby River Road plantation.[89]

Though none these parties were able to catch Scipio, Marshall reported many other successes. They had brought in nearly two hundred more runaways and destroyed their huts

and provision grounds, 'thereby completing a service', Marshall argued, 'which was … equal at least in importance to any of a similar feature that can be found in the annals of Jamaica'.[90] After a brief detention at Meweton for examination these runaways were likewise committed to gaol in Spanish Town, though by March 1820 the backlog was again so high that the decision was taken once more to try only those slaves accused of serious offences and to turn over all the others to the workhouse.[91] At least ten slaves were tried as runaways, and many planters noted that their slaves had either been captured by the Maroons or had returned as a result of the parties.[92] 'Not a planter or an owner of slaves in any of the neighbouring parishes have I conversed with who has not readily expressed his firm belief that the unprecedented activity of the men on duty had so harassed the runaways that they could no longer remain out', Marshall later concluded, 'and that therefore a great number equal to those brought in by the party had returned to their owners without further loss of time or any personal expence whatever'.[93] He duly submitted his accounts to the assembly in November 1820, confidently expecting that the house would fully concur and reimburse him for the money he had laid out on the Maroons during the first phase and on the militia parties in the second phase.

However, when presented with a bill for £3,162 3s 4½d the members of the assembly balked, and they immediately referred the accounts to a committee for further examination and audit. Marshall and his officers faced a hostile interview and he was accused of keeping the militia on foot after the Maroons had been dismissed on 26 September for no reason beyond his own aggrandisement.[94] The fact that he and his own household had received such a large amount of public cash did not help his case, and he was accused of soliciting a misleading opinion from the attorney-general 'to induce the receiver-general to satisfy some of the demands made upon the public … and more especially the demand for pay to himself and his brigade-major'.[95] An even more hostile amendment to the report was proposed on 18

December 1820 which accused Marshall of incurring 'a great and unnecessary expense … without any legal warrant or authority and in a manner which your committee consider highly improper', and although it was defeated the house asked that the governor launch a suit at law against him for the recovery of the £1,422 15s 2¾d paid out after 26 September.[96] Marshall hit back that the parties had successfully accomplished their main aims and at a much lower cost than the island had any reason to expect. The bills for rations and other logistical costs were cheaper than any for the last twenty years, due to the bargains he had struck with local contractors; he had employed family and friends for convenience and secrecy; his pay as major-general was a fair recompense for the trouble and risk involved; and 'the business was satisfactorily accomplished without any loss to the public or any benefit, except a trifling remuneration, to the individuals employed'.[97]

4. Conclusion

Even a fairly routine descent into Hellshire between August 1819 and February 1820 thus relied heavily on Maroons and free and enslaved people of colour, to capture the runaways in the first place and to secure their conviction. In tandem with the logistical capacity afforded by established military structures this was sufficient to allow the Jamaican state to break up the threat that seemed to be posed to local planters by the runaways in the Hellshire Hills. The power of the Jamaican state therefore arose from the cooperation of multiple sectors of the slave society, in which groups such as the Maroons were afforded small but significant gains in return for their service against runaways. The effect of this was not only to support the economic and social *status quo*, by demonstrating that rebellions would be quickly and efficiently suppressed, but also to prevent resistance forming in the first place by disrupting black solidarity and entrenching divisions between different groups. For example, Marshall

dismissed the Accompong Town Maroons in late September 'in consequence of their bad conduct to the free and slave inhabitants of the neighbourhood, whose resentment they had raised to a most alarming degree', and when the Moore Town Maroons were returning home they were attacked in Kingston by a mob of slaves and free persons of colour 'in consequence of their late exertions in apprehending so many runaways'.[98] The *St Jago Gazette* reported several complaints from slaveowners that their loyal slaves had been hassled by the Maroons and other acts of violence committed, 'but we cannot for a moment doubt that the result will justify every proceeding and a little private evil be compensated by a great deal of public good'.[99] The military force displayed during the raid was therefore just a small part of the wider system that maintained the safety and security of slave society, which seems to have remained an effective deterrent even during the final years of Jamaican slavery.

Yet the expedition also demonstrates some of the growing weaknesses in the system of control that may have helped to undermine it. Careful economy by Marshall meant that it cost only about one percent of annual revenues, but it still met with hostile scrutiny from an assembly concerned with economy, which left its mark on Marshall. '[It is not] wise or consistent with the policy of our local situation, … to impugn the services and impute improper motives to the transactions of an officer engaged in such service', he wrote, adding that it was '[not] consistent with the interest of the great landholder; with the safety of the small settler; with the colonial policy of this island'.[100] Thinking perhaps of the low-level disturbances that roiled Jamaica in the 1820s, Bridges complained in 1827 that the house had 'instituted so rigorous an inquiry that the active vigilance of the country has ever since been paralysed. The attempt has not been repeated, the runaways have again increased to a most alarming extent, and, though an impartial yet tardy verdict fully exonerated the meritorious officer, it left no triumph but to the partisans of disorder and rebellion'.[101] When the governor's secretary wrote to Marshall in May 1830 that they had decided to send another

expedition into Hellshire, 'relative to the hordes of negroes which have again assembled … [in] the scene of your former services … [since] the evil has become of so great a magnitude that something must be done', he asked Marshall to lead it, but noted – apparently with reference to 1820 – that 'I am quite aware that there are many circumstances which may discourage you from so laborious an enterprise'.[102]

This suggests that even the successful defence of Jamaica against black resistance in this period, especially when that resistance might itself have been very largely a product of paranoia, could generate financial and social costs. I have recently shown that the costs of policing and defence took up an increasing proportion of the colony's income after 1768, rising from one percent to four or five percent by 1834 and reaching six or eight percent in the suppression of rebellions in 1795 and 1832, thereby placing an 'unprecedented burden' on the economy of the island as it tipped over into decline after 1815.[103] Episodes such as the descent into Hellshire might have supported the safety and security of the island against black resistance in the short term, but further research may demonstrate that over the long term it helped to undermine the capacity of planters to resist increasingly the insistent demands for amelioration and even outright emancipation coming from Britain and from within their own societies. It may even eventually became clear that black resistance was as destructive, indirectly, of slave societies in Jamaica and elsewhere as it was in St Domingue, as Williams and Genovese argued. Yet all this came too late for Scipio, who surrendered to the authorities in Spanish Town in November 1820. He was placed on trial three months later and faced damning testimony from his sister Peggy and from her companion Richard, who had been manumitted in April by the vestry of St Catherine for his services to the public of Jamaica and now perhaps obtained further satisfaction through his final revenge against Scipio.[104] Notwithstanding 'a very feeling and impressive' speech to the jury from the chief magistrate, '[who] drew their attention to the fact of the prisoner having, of his own accord,

delivered himself up to justice, a circumstance which might probably induce them to recommend him to mercy', the jury made no such recommendation, and Scipio was duly hanged at the race course outside Spanish Town five days later.

Notes

[1] *Royal Gazette*, 11 to 18 September 1819.

[2] Fleurant, Tucker and Viles, "Cockpit karst landscape".

[3] Long, *The History of Jamaica*, volume 2, 43–44.

[4] *Falmouth Post*, 14 July 1846, in an article entitled 'The Healthshire Banditti'.

[5] Simmonds, ""Little shadow"," 416; Jamaica Archives, Spanish Town, Jamaica [hereafter JA], 2/2/6 (St Catherine's Vestry Minute Book, 1799–1807) f. 146r; *Falmouth Post*, 14 July 1846.

[6] See Price, *Maroon Societies*, especially Price, "Introduction"; Genovese, *From Rebellion to Revolution*, 51–81. For Jamaica, see Craton, *Testing the Chains,* 61–65; Campbell, *Maroons of Jamaica*, 15–43.

[7] Price, "Introduction," 3

[8] Brathwaite, *Creole Society,* 200–211; Craton, *Testing the Chains*, 65–92, 125–138, 211–222; Campbell, *Maroons*, 44–134

[9] Price, "Introduction"; Gaspar, *Bondmen and Rebels*, 151–160; Brereton, "Resistance to Enslavement"; Craton, *Testing the Chains*, 140–158, 180–195; Fabel, *Colonial Challenges*, 162–179; Franklin and Schweninger, *Runaway Slaves*, 79–92; Higman, *British Caribbean*, 386–394.

[10] Genovese, *Rebellion and Revolution*, 82–125; Craton, *Testing the Chains*, 49–53; Gaspar, *Bondmen and Rebels*, especially 171–172, 224–238.

[11] See Drescher, *Econocide*; Matthews, *Caribbean Slave Revolts*, 58–179; Fergus, "'Dread of insurrection'". For pro-slavery arguments, see Matthew, *Caribbean Slave revolts*, 28–52 and, more broadly, Dumas, *Proslavery Britain*.

[12] Brathwaite, *Creole Society*, 26–31, 135–150; Craton, *Testing the Chains*, 167–171, 195–210, 224–229; Buckley, *British Army,* 3–16, 23–29, 91–124, 135–144; Morgan and O'Shaughnessy, "Arming slaves in the American Revolution"; Burnard, *Planters, Merchants, and Slaves*, 247–255.

[13] Geggus, "Arming of slaves in the Haitian Revolution". For the Maroons, see Goveia, *Slave Society,* 204–233; Burnard, *Mastery, Tyranny, and Desire,* 70–93; Marshall, *Slavery, Law and Society*, 149–168.

[14] Campbell, *Maroons*, 147–162; Craton, *Testing the Chains*, 130–138, 214–221.

[15] Hadden, *Slave Patrols*, especially 42–70, 103–136; Wade, *Slavery in the Cities,* 80–110; Gaspar, *Bondmen and Rebels*, 197–204; Franklin and Schweninger, *Runaway Slaves*, 150–181; Burnard, *Planters, Merchants and slaves*, 78–87; Paton, *No Bond but the Law*, 19–82.

[16] Brathwaite, *Creole Society*, especially 306–311; Goveia, *Slave Society*, 312–316; Burnard, *Mastery, Tyranny and Desire*, 139–174; Petley, *Slaveholders in Jamaica*, 103–111; Burnard, *Planters, Merchants and Slaves*, 262–271; Heuman, *Between Black and White*, 14–15, 83–113; Wilson, "Performance of Freedom". For an historiographical overview, see Petley, "New Perspectives".

[17] Brathwaite, *Creole Society*, 193 and, more broadly, 193–200; Burnard, *Mastery, Tyranny and Desire*, 154.

[18] For works in this tradition, see Ragatz, *Fall of the Planter Class,* 204–229, 286–311, 331–383, 429–443; Goveia, *Slave Society*, 152–202, 248–262, 311–341; Craton, *Testing the Chains*, especially 161–167, 241–252, 254–290; Gaspar, *Bondmen and Rebels*, 216–254; Heuman, "Riots and Resistance".

[19] Geggus, "British Opinion" and *idem*. "Haiti and the Abolitionists".

[20] Manchester to Bathurst, 8 November 1819, CO 137/148, National Archives of the United Kingdom, Kew, UK [hereafter TNA], f. 104r.

[21] Robertson, "Jamaican Archival Resources" and, on Caribbean archives more generally, Buisseret, "Documentary Evidence".

[22] See, for example, the website "Slave Revolt in Jamaica, 1760–1" and the commentaries in Zacek, "Reading the Rebels" and Brown, "Narrative Interface".

[23] This report from the *St Jago Gazette* was reproduced in the *Kingston Chronicle*, 20 September 1819, and *Royal Gazette*, 18 to 25 September 1819.

[24] *Royal Gazette*, 30 October to 6 November 1819.

[25] *Royal Gazette*, 6 to 13 November 1819.

[26] Bridges, *Annals of Jamaica*, volume 2, 348–9

[27] Based on testimonies given in the later slave courts and reprinted in *Royal Gazette*, 30 October to 6 November 1820, and 27 January to 3 February 1821.

[28] These figures are based on a survey of detainees who entered the St Catherine workhouse between 23 August and 26 October 1819, when the Maroon parties disbanded, from *Royal Gazette*, 4 September 1819 27 November 1819, and between 3 March and 17 March 1820, when the militia parties turned over the remaining slaves captured during recent expeditions, from the *St Jago de la Vega Gazette,* 11 March 1820 to 1 April 1820. These have been cross-referenced with the lists of runaways and detainees held in the Spanish Town gaol to identify those captured during the raids: *Votes of the House of Assembly* 1819, 238–9; *Votes of the House of Assembly* 1820, 257–9.

[29] Higman, *Jamaica*, 75–80.

[30] See note 6.

[31] *Royal Gazette*, 18 to 25 September 1819.

[32] *Royal Gazette*, 30 October to 6 November 1820, and 27 January to 3 February 1821.

[33] *Royal Gazette*, 30 October to 6 November 1820.

[34] For black and white reactions to 1816, see Lambert, *White Creole Culture,* 122–127, 133–139.

[35] Bridges, *Annals of Jamaica*, volume 2, 325–326.

[36] Coupeau, *Haiti*, 37–61.

[37] Manchester to Bathurst, 8 November 1819, CO 137/148, TNA, ff 103r–104r.

[38] *Votes of the House of Assembly* 1820 157–8, 179–82

[39] His career has been reconstructed from the almanacs printed between 1801 and 1821, which have been transcribed and placed online at:
http://www.jamaicanfamilysearch.com/Samples/Almanacs.htm

[40] *Votes of the House of Assembly* 1820, 179–81, 339.

[41] Craton, *Testing the Chains*, 215–19.

[42] *Royal Gazette*, 30 October to 6 November 1820.

[43] *Royal Gazette*, 30 October to 6 November 1820, and 27 January to 3 February 1821. For the importance of oaths in slave conspiracies and revolts, see Gaspar, *Bondmen and Rebels*, especially 242–245; Bilby, "Swearing by the Past".

[44] Craton, *Testing the Chains*, 87–92, 224–227; Campbell, *Maroons*, 126–147. The acts were 32 Geo III c. 4 and 49 Geo III c. 22 (in *Laws of Jamaica*, volume 2, 473–83; volume 5, 130).

[45] Wilson, "Performance of Freedom".

[46] 48 Geo III c. 4 ss. 1–3, 21, 22 (in *Laws of Jamaica*, volume 5, 93–104).

[47] *Royal Gazette*, 30 October to 6 November 1820, and 27 January to 3 February 1821.

[48] *Royal Gazette* 27 January to 3 February 1821; *Votes of the House of Assembly* 1820, 377.

[49] 48 Geo III c. 4 ss. 6–9, 12–14

[50] Higman, "Patterns of Exchange"; Robertson, "Where the Country meets the Town", and, for the earlier period, Burnard, "'The Grand Mart of the Island'".

[51] *Votes of the House of Assembly* 1820, 336.

[52] *Votes of the House of Assembly* 1820, 370, 375, 377, 379, 380.

[53] *Votes of the House of Assembly* 1820, 336.

[54] Their pay-bills give their names, ranks and times of service: *Votes of the House of Assembly* 1820, 343, 344, 355–6, 377–8.

[55] *Votes of the House of Assembly* 1820, 342, 345–9.

[56] *Votes of the House of Assembly* 1820, 357–9.

[57] *Votes of the House of Assembly* 1820, 363–7, 371–4.

[58] This has been extrapolated from the receipts for deliveries: see ibid. and pp. 357-9.

[59] *Votes of the House of Assembly* 1820, 368. He received £18 for these maps.

[60] *Votes of the House of Assembly* 1820, 359–61.

[61] *Votes of the House of Assembly* 1820, 362.

[62] *Votes of the House of Assembly* 1820, 363, 365

[63] For Brammer, see *Votes of the House of Assembly* 1819, 239 and the pay-bills from the campaign.

[64] *Royal Gazette*, 30 October to 6 November 1820, and 27 January to 3 February 1821; *Votes of the House of Assembly* 1820, 383; Manchester to Bathurst, 8 November 1819, CO 137/148, TNA, f. 104v.

[65] *Votes of the House of Assembly* 1820, 363–7.

[66] *Votes of the House of Assembly* 1820, 368.

[67] *Votes of the House of Assembly* 1820, 357–9.

[68] *Votes of the House of Assembly* 1820, 368–9, 380–1.

[69] *Votes of the House of Assembly* 1820, 336.

[70] *Votes of the House of Assembly* 1820, 336.

[71] *Votes of the House of Assembly* 1820, 337

[72] *Royal Gazette*, 23 to 30 December 1820.

[73] *Royal Gazette*, 6 to 13 January 1821.

[74] *Royal Gazette*, 18 to 25 September 1819; Manchester to Bathurst, 8 November 1819, CO 137/148, TNA, f. 104r.

[75] Paton, 'Punishment," 944.

[76] *Royal Gazette*, 18 to 25 September 1819.

[77] *Royal Gazette*, 30 October to 6 November 1819; Manchester to Bathurst, 8 November 1819, CO137/148, TNA, ff 103r–v.

[78] *Votes of the House of Assembly* 1820, 92

[79] *Royal Gazette*, 6 to 13 November 1819.

[80] Ibid..

[81] This has been reconstructed from the pay-bills: see *Votes of the House of Assembly* 1820, 350–4. Their relationship probably resembled the relationship between Thomas Thistlewood in the mid-eighteenth century and his slave Lincoln, who was eventually trusted with weapons and a substantial degree of autonomy: see Burnard, *Mastery, tyranny and desire*, 194–209.

[82] *Votes of the House of Assembly* 1820, 371–7, 378–80.

[83] *Votes of the House of Assembly* 1820, 351, 370–7, 379–80.

[84] *Royal Gazette*, 23 to 30 December 1820.

[85] A copy of this proclamation was printed in *St Jago Gazette*, 15 to 22 January 1820.

[86] *Royal Gazette*, 6 to 13 January 1821.

[87] *Votes of the House of Assembly* 1820, 339

[88] Long, *Jamaica*, volume 2, 57–9.

[89] *Royal Gazette*, 6 to 13 January 1821.

[90] *Royal Gazette*, 23 to 30 December 1820; *Votes of the House of Assembly* 1820, 182

[91] *St Jago Gazette*, 4 to 11 March 1820.

[92] For example, Niall Harding testified that his slave Nero had returned home after being absent for ten years, '[and] he does not know where he was harboured but believes he might have been induced to return by the late rousting out of the runaways by the Maroons': see *St Jago Gazette*, 4 to 11 March 1820.

[93] *Royal Gazette*, 23 to 30 December 1820.

[94] *Votes of the House of Assembly* 1820, 102–3, 157–8, 179–81

[95] *Votes of the House of Assembly* 1820, 180

[96] *Votes of the House of Assembly* 1820, 180–3

[97] *Royal Gazette* 23 to 30 December 1820.

[98] *Royal Gazette*, 25 September to 2 October 1819; *Kingston Chronicle*, 25 September 1819, and 27 September 1819.

[99] See *Royal Gazette* 11 to 18 September 1819.

[100] *Royal Gazette*, 6 to 13 January 1821.

[101] Bridges, *Annals of Jamaica*, volume 2, 349–50

[102] Bullock to Marshall, 10 May 1830, 1B/5/81/2 (Governor's Letterbook, 1827-31), JA, f. 180r.

[103] Graham, "Colonial sinews".

[104] *Royal Gazette*, 11 to 18 November 1820, and 27 January to 3 February 1821; *Votes of the House of Assembly* 1820, 253. For the manumission of Richard, see JA, 2/2/7 (St Catherine's Vestry Minute Book, 1820–8) f. 6r.

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