

Rulers in Greek Tragedy

Thesis submitted for the DPhil in Classical
Languages and Literature

99,859 words

Theodore Hill
University College, Oxford

Hilary Term, 2020

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am above all grateful to Dr Scott Scullion, who has been a marvellous supervisor in every way, providing the most suitable and helpful feedback that I could have desired throughout the MSt and DPhil.

I am also grateful to my assessors for Transfer of Status, Prof. William Allan and Prof. Richard Rutherford, and to my assessors for Confirmation of Status, Prof. Constanze G  thenke and Dr Evert van Emde Boas, with whom I had a particularly useful discussion regarding the structure and method of the thesis. Prof. Andreas Schwab, to whom I am also grateful, provided a detailed response to an earlier version of Chapter 2 when I presented it at the joint Oxford-OIKOS-Munich colloquium in Munich in September 2018.

After hearing early oral versions of Chapters 1 and 2 respectively, Prof. Rosalind Thomas and Prof. Nicholas Purcell made helpful comments that caused me to revise my argument. Dr Alexandre Johnston, Dr Leah Lazar, Davide Morassi, Sarah Norvell, Prof. Robert Parker, and Jason Webber all drew my attention to references which I might otherwise have neglected. Katie Dennis and Sarah Norvell sent me, from Princeton, copies of some items which were not accessible in the Bodleian, and Dr Federico Favi sent me a copy of an article from Rome. Dr Christopher de Lisle, Prof. Melissa Lane, Il-Kweon Sir, and Dr Lucy van Essen-Fishman very kindly sent me unpublished work. My friends Dr Tom McConnell and Il-Kweon Sir helpfully and spontaneously volunteered to read the thesis, and pointed out various lapses in style, clarity and expression. At the kind suggestion of my mother, Cally Trench, I read the whole thesis aloud to her over Christmas, and she provided many helpful comments of the same nature. More broadly, I have had many valuable discussions of Greek literature and history with the people just mentioned, as well as in the context of the Tragedy Discussion Group and in both Work in Progress seminars (Ancient History, and Languages and Literature).

Special gratitude is also due to Christine Eckhard-Black, Simone Irmscher and Tania Batelli-Kneale, for teaching the ‘German for Classicists’ and ‘Italian for Classicists’ classes at the Language Centre, and to the Classics Faculty for requiring doctoral students to learn these languages. I knew no German or Italian before beginning my doctorate, and knowledge of them has been indispensable in writing this thesis.

My studies were funded jointly by the Stonehouse Foundation and through an Oxford-Cawkwell graduate studentship provided jointly by University College and the Faculty of Classics. Without this funding, I would not have been able to undertake the DPhil, and I am therefore very grateful to these bodies.

I would also like to express my gratitude to my Greek teachers at school, Jacky Evans, Ian Wilson, and especially the late John Edwards, as well as to Dr Renaud Gagn  , who taught me for most Greek literature papers at Cambridge.

Lastly, I am grateful to my mother, father and sister, who have been everything one could desire of a family throughout my university years.

While I was at a late stage of editing this thesis, the coronavirus outbreak forced the closure of the Oxford libraries. This did not affect the substance of the thesis, and I had looked up almost all references. However, it did make it impossible to consult for a second time some works of scholarship which I would have liked to have taken more account of, and prevented me from double-checking a few references and other matters.

Theodore Hill
April 2020

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	1
GENERAL INTRODUCTION	2
I. Purpose and aims	3
II. Overview of ideas associated with rulers	7
III. Terminology	13
IV. Overview of rulers in tragedy	29
V. Aeschylus and Euripides in the service of contemporary rulers	42
VI. The scope and purpose of Chapters 5-7	44
VII. Questions of authenticity	44
VIII. Summary	45
PART ONE: IDEAS	47
Chapter 1. Rulers in Stories in Herodotus and in Tragedy	48
I. Introduction	48
II. Moral elements	50
III. Characteristics and behaviours	56
IV. Conclusion	73
Chapter 2. <i>Tyrannis</i> , the Killing of <i>Tyrannoi</i> , and <i>Stasis</i> in Athenian Politics and Tragedy	75
I. Introduction	75
II. The role of <i>tyrannis</i> in Athenian politics	75
III. <i>Tyrannis</i> , <i>stasis</i> , and tragedy	85
IV. Conclusion	93
Chapter 3. Contemporary, Anachronistic, and Democratic Elements in the Depiction of Rulers in Tragedy	97
I. Introduction	97
II. Anachronism and democratic elements in the suppliant plays	98
III. Ideas about democratic leadership in Euripides' <i>Suppliants</i>	105
IV. Contemporary elements in the presentation of rulers in Sophocles	111
V. Conclusion	124
Chapter 4. Supplication, Punishment, and Rulers' Decisions and Actions in Tragedy	126
I. Introduction	126
II. Helping strangers	127
III. Harming subjects	129
IV. Conclusion	138

PART TWO: CHARACTERS	140
Introduction to Part Two	141
I. Introduction	141
II. General considerations regarding characters in tragedy	141
III. Ways of studying characters in tragedy	147
IV. The approach of the present investigation	152
Chapter 5. Two Rulers in Aeschylus	155
I. Introduction	155
II. The conceptions underlying the presentation of Eteocles and Agamemnon	155
III. The moral presentation of Eteocles and Agamemnon	187
IV. Conclusion	196
Chapter 6. Creon and Oedipus: A Comparison of Two Rulers in Sophocles	199
I. Introduction	199
II. The initial presentation of Creon and Oedipus	205
III. The presentation of Creon and Oedipus in the rest of each play	211
IV. Conclusion	236
Chapter 7. Pentheus in Euripides' <i>Bacchae</i>	238
I. Introduction	238
II. Presupposed ideas: Pentheus as ruler	240
III. Presupposed ideas: contemporary religious issues	245
IV. The moral presentation of Pentheus in the first part of the play	251
V. The <i>post mortem</i> characterisation of Pentheus	258
VI. Conclusion	264
GENERAL CONCLUSION	267
General Conclusion	268
APPENDICES	271
Appendix 1. Sophocles, <i>Oedipus Tyrannus</i> 873-882	272
Appendix 2. The Greed and Rapacity of Rulers	276
BIBLIOGRAPHY	280
I. Abbreviations	281
II. Editions used for quoted Greek	281
III. Editions used for references to fragments, etc.	284
IV. Other editions and translations mentioned by the editor's name alone	287
V. Works of scholarship cited by lemma	287
VI. Works of scholarship cited by page number	290

ABSTRACT

This thesis discusses the depiction of rulers in Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides. It aims to demonstrate the complexity and variety both of the ideas underlying the presentation of these rulers (**Part One**) and of how the playwrights use these ideas to depict these rulers (**Part Two**).

Chapter 1 presents the first detailed study of the features shared between rulers in Herodotus and tragedy. **Chapter 2** provides a fresh analysis of how the idea of *tyrannis* was used in Athenian political and intellectual life, before examining how tragedy fits into this context. **Chapter 3** examines how the depiction of tragic rulers draws on ideas current in the Athenian democracy, especially concerning leadership and obedience. **Chapter 4** argues that, since many tragic plots revolve around supplication and punishment, the depiction of tragic rulers is greatly affected both by the plays' plots and by contemporary conceptions of supplication and punishment.

After setting out a framework for discussing characters in tragedy (**Introduction to Part Two**), there follow case studies on five rulers. **Chapter 5**, on Aeschylus, argues that Eteocles (*Seven Against Thebes*) can best be understood in light of certain conceptions concerning the behaviour of warriors in epic, and that the presentation of Agamemnon (*Agamemnon*) draws on ideas about *basileia* current in the early fifth century. **Chapter 6** presents a comparison of Sophocles' Creon (*Antigone*) and Oedipus (*Oedipus Tyrannus*), exploring how Sophocles uses similar underlying ideas to depict them, while nevertheless presenting them differently in moral terms. **Chapter 7**, on Pentheus in Euripides' *Bacchae*, considers how Euripides' technique in presenting him resembles Sophocles'.

The thesis provides many novel observations about fifth-century political thought, about the relationship of tragedy to its political and intellectual context and to other genres (epic, lyric, historiography), and about the tragic playwrights' technique in presenting characters.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

I. Purpose and aims

This thesis investigates the depiction of rulers in the plays of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides. Rulers are one of the most prominent groups of characters in tragedy, occurring in the majority of extant plays. The plays are often deeply concerned with the decisions that they make, which can be of great moral importance given the power which the rulers often possess over other characters. In several plays where the ruler is a main character, the moral interest of the play is so strongly focused on this ruler that any interpretation of the play must necessarily depend to a considerable degree on the depiction of this ruler. This is especially true of the five plays considered in detail in the second half of this thesis: scholars' views of each have in equal measure depended on and determined their views of the rulers in them (Eteocles in Aeschylus' *Seven Against Thebes*, Agamemnon in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*, Creon in Sophocles' *Antigone*, Oedipus in Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus*, and Pentheus in Euripides' *Bacchae*). Understanding the depiction of rulers in tragedy is, then, essential for understanding these plays.

The depiction of tragic rulers is also, however, an interesting intellectual and literary phenomenon in its own right. In fifth-century Athens, there were no sole rulers, since Athens was governed democratically.¹ The Athenians did have officials (ἄρχοντες) and generals (στρατηγοί), but these held office temporarily and accountably, and never held full power over Athens on their own. Yet the traditional legends, which the Athenians knew through epic and lyric poetry and other oral storytelling, were full of sole rulers, and the tragedians based their plots on these legends. Consequently, in depicting these legendary rulers in their plays, the tragic playwrights did not have one single dominant model: they drew eclectically on a wide variety of ideas which were available to them, and which they could expect their audiences to understand.

¹ So e.g. Easterling 1984:33.

This is enough to make tragic rulers an unusual and fascinating *literary* phenomenon. However, precisely because the playwrights depicted rulers by drawing eclectically on different sources, the depiction of rulers is also a remarkable phenomenon in *intellectual-historical* terms. That is to say, much of these plays' engagement with contemporary thought, especially political thought, takes place in relation to the depiction of rulers. Studying the depiction of rulers consequently teaches us much about how fifth-century tragedy fitted into its political and intellectual context. Indeed, the plays occasionally draw our attention to aspects of fifth-century thought that might otherwise elude us.

Until now, however, investigation of tragic rulers has been disparate and unsystematic. Much important work can be found in articles or books concerning individual plays or playwrights. Such discussions, acutely aware of these works' literary complexity, often do justice to the moral issues surrounding individual rulers; however, being focused on individual plays, they generally cannot place these rulers within the phenomenon of tragic rulers as a whole. Most scholars who have taken a broader view have studied not *rulers* in tragedy, but *tyrants* in tragedy.² These scholars have maintained that certain tragic rulers (such as Sophocles' Creon and Euripides' Pentheus) are 'tragic tyrants', instantiating a prototypical 'figure of the tyrant', who displays certain conventional negative features. Within the Athenian democracy, it is suggested, the presentation of such characters had a particular ideological function: by representing democracy's ideological opposite, tyranny, on stage, tragedy played a role in democratic Athens' self-definition. Such studies have

² Berve 1967:I.192-202; Lanza 1977; Giorgini 1993:149-168, 193-211, 245-262; Edmunds 2002; Seaford 2003; T. Graham 2017 (doctoral supervisor: P. Burian); Ugolini 2017, especially 457-458. Lanza 1977, which I have built on especially in Chapter 1, has perhaps been most influential, and also covers many topics not discussed here (e.g. the relationship between 'tyrant' figures in tragedy and Plato; the reception of the 'tyrant' in later literature). Limitations of space prevent me from discussing Polyphemus in Euripides' *Cyclops*, whom O'Sullivan 2005 regards as displaying 'tyrannical' aspects.

Earlier analyses of particular tragic rulers as 'tyrants' include Sheppard 1916:75, 1922:xli-lviii; Thomson 1929; Bowra 1944:72-78; Podlecki 1966.

Zeitlin 1986, who, discussing the presentation of Thebes in tragedy, sees Thebes as 'the paradigmatic home of tyrants' (122), has also had widespread influence.

revealed many conventional features shared between different tragic rulers, often also shared with rulers in Herodotus. However, since such studies designedly focus on these recurrent negative features, it is not their concern to account for the full complexity of the depiction of tragic rulers. Consequently, they take little account either of other strands in contemporary thought that the playwrights drew upon in depicting these same rulers, or of the moral and characterisational complexity with which the playwrights have presented them. No substantial recent study has taken *rulers in general* in tragedy (as opposed to *tyrants*) as its subject, although some dissertations did so in the early twentieth century.³

The present thesis examines rulers in fifth-century tragedy as an intellectual-historical and literary phenomenon. Its aim is to present (in **Part One**) an account of the most important ideas that underlie the depiction of tragic rulers, and to explain in detail (in **Part Two**) how these ideas are used by Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides to depict five specific rulers, namely Eteocles in *Seven Against Thebes*, Agamemnon in *Agamemnon*, Creon in *Antigone*, Oedipus in *Oedipus Tyrannus*, and Pentheus in *Bacchae*. The **overall argument** of this thesis is that the variety and complexity both of the ideas underlying the depiction of rulers in tragedy and of the playwrights' actual depiction of these rulers is very great. By describing this variety and complexity, we

³ Heim 1904 (doctoral supervisor: A. Roemer); Blum 1940 (doctoral supervisor: J. Mewaldt); Nauhardt 1940:43-83 (a doctoral thesis; the preface thanks M. Pohlenz, K. Deichgräber, and U. Knoche); van Groningen 1941 (not a doctoral thesis); Callahan 1944 (doctoral supervisor: W. Jaeger); Meuli 1945 (doctoral supervisor: E. Howald). Heim 1904 is often helpful, the others occasionally.

These dissertations are also interesting from the perspective of the history of scholarship. Blum 1940, which interacts considerably with contemporary ideas about what a *Führer* should be, would reward attention from a scholar knowledgeable about Austria in the Nazi period. Blum, categorised as a *Mischling 1. Grades*, was prevented from receiving his doctorate until 1945 (Posch 2008). Nauhardt 1940, reviewed in glowing terms by Oldfather 1941, subscribes his preface 'Im Felde'; according to the website of the *Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge* (volksbund.de/graebersuche.html), he was reported missing in Poland at the start of 1945.

Easterling 1984 is a judicious but brief survey, which captures nicely the full range in the presentation of tragic rulers, rightly singling out Agamemnon in Aesch. *Ag.*, Creon in Soph. *Ant.* and Oedipus in Soph. *OT* as particularly complex figures (1984:42-44). Attack 2020 contains one chapter on drama (39-67), discussing Aeschylus' *Persians* and *Suppliants*, Euripides' *Suppliants* and *Erechtheus*, Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus*, and Aristophanes' *Wasps* and *Birds*.

can learn much both about the thought-world of fifth-century Greece and about the ways in which the tragic playwrights presented characters.

It should be noted that, although this thesis discusses in detail many political ideas present in tragedy, it does not rely on or aim to advance a specific view of the political or ideological function of tragedy in general within the Athenian *polis*. So much has been said about this topic by recent scholars that it would be difficult to add anything worthwhile. Also, since the validity of this thesis' arguments does not in fact depend on a specific view of this matter, setting out such a view might create the false impression that my conclusions are dependent on it, and might thereby undermine their credibility.⁴

In this Introduction, I provide an overview of what I consider the nature of the phenomenon under investigation to be. This is intended to indicate transparently and discuss briefly the many important issues that cannot be investigated in detail within a doctoral thesis of limited length, and to make it easier for the reader to fit the detailed arguments in the chapters that follow into the bigger picture.

This Introduction also aims to explain the terminology used by fifth-century Greeks to refer to rulers, especially since elsewhere I have preferred not to adopt a strongly lexical approach.

⁴ I am most in sympathy with Pelling 1997, 2000:164-188, Saïd 1998, and Allan and Kelly 2013:77-92, who all emphasise the *variety* of tragedy (and its original audience): the ways in which tragedy is political or ideological differ in different cases.

With Griffith's articles (1995, 1998, 2005, 2011), which emphasise the sympathy and admiration that Athenian audiences may have felt for tragedy's elite legendary figures, I am partially, but not entirely, in sympathy; cf. Carter 2007:44-49; Allan and Kelly 2013:95, 99. However, since this thesis does not seek to generalise regarding tragedy's ideology or social function, but focuses on detailed questions of intellectual history and characterisational technique, I have not presented any detailed response to this work (although I have occasionally cited it on individual points).

II. Overview of ideas associated with rulers

Tragic rulers are, inevitably, presented in terms of ideas about rulers available in fifth-century Athens. These are highly culturally specific, and are the direct product of the historical and political context. They may be divided into those deriving from the Greeks' legends, those deriving from oral traditions concerning the seventh and sixth centuries, and those deriving from the political environment of the fifth century.

1. We can assume that Greek **legend**, up to the fifth century, was recounted primarily in two forms—poetry and non-poetic oral storytelling.⁵ Our knowledge of the poetic tradition, consisting of the *Iliad*, *Odyssey*, and other surviving epic and lyric material, is substantial but partial. We know little about the non-poetic oral storytelling of legends. All extant tragedies except Aeschylus' *Persians* are set within the world of Greek legend (although specific plots are often invented by the playwright). Consequently, the vast majority of tragic rulers are pre-existing legendary figures. It is generally impossible to assess the extent to which the depiction of any given ruler in tragedy draws on or resembles earlier depictions of the same figure, because there is no extant tragedy (except the fourth-century *Rhesus*) for the plot of which we have a full narrative account of earlier date in which the protagonists are presented in a detailed fashion. Some characters depicted in the *Iliad* or *Odyssey* do appear in tragedy *in different contexts* (Agamemnon, Menelaus, Ajax, Odysseus, Achilles), and can fruitfully be compared with their epic antecedents. In particular, these characters are often placed in similar situations to those in which they are found in epic, and it has sometimes been argued that they are characterised similarly.⁶

⁵ In using the word 'legend', rather than 'myth', to refer to 'traditional stories about allegedly historical events of the human past' (W. Hansen 2002:25-26 n. 2), I follow the standard terminology of scholars of oral traditions (including e.g. Edmunds 1983, 1985; W. Hansen 2002). Since I discuss oral traditions in some detail in Chapter 1, it seems best to adopt this usage, even though it runs against that of most Anglophone scholarship on Greek literature.

⁶ The tragedians' adaptation of epic characters has been studied unsystematically, except by Aélion 1983:II.327-352. On Odysseus, however, see Stanford [1954] 1963:102-117; Worman 2002:115-122, 135-148; Schein 2013:20-23, and on Soph. *Phil.* 96-9; Jouanna [2007] 2018:331-333. On Ajax in Sophocles' *Ajax*, see e.g. Kirkwood 1965; Winnington-Ingram 1980:15-19; Jouanna [2007] 2018:320-328. Agamemnon is discussed usefully by van Erp Taalman Kip 1971, Griffin

However, tragedy is not period drama, or pastiche of epic.⁷ Although the poetic language of tragedy contains features which may recall epic and thereby give the world of tragedy a legendary colouring,⁸ the tragic playwrights do not reproduce the moral and political thought-world of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. In particular, in epic the role of the ruler is conceptualised in a highly distinctive way: he rules in consultation with the community;⁹ his role centres not only on military action, but also on conducting sacrifices and administering justice;¹⁰ rule is hereditary, but not firmly so;¹¹ the ruler, called *anax* and *basileus* in the singular, is surrounded by but distinct from the broader group of elite men, who are called *basilees* in the plural (sometimes γέροντες).¹² The ruler often has a staff or sceptre (σκῆπτρον),¹³ and, especially in the case of Agamemnon, his rule is seen as deriving from Zeus.¹⁴ The ruler is said to possess privileges (ἑρσας), and is regarded as the object of honour (τιμή) and respect (αἰδώς).¹⁵

These features are hardly ever replicated in tragedy. The political world of Sophocles' and Euripides' Trojan War plays (*Ajax*, *Philoctetes*; *Hecuba*, *Trojan Women*, *Iphigenia at Aulis*) is generally far removed from epic, and often recalls contemporary Athenian political and military life.¹⁶ However, the symbols of epic *basileia* are applied to Xerxes in a passage of Aeschylus' *Persians*;¹⁷ in *Agamemnon*, Agamemnon is described as possessing a *skeptron*, as having *time*, and as deriving his rule from Zeus;¹⁸ in Sophocles' *Electra*, Agamemnon's *skeptron* makes a vivid appearance in

1990, Fartzoff 1993; less interesting are Scholtze 1939:72-107, Blum 1940:72-113, H. F. Graham 1952:66-115.

⁷ See Easterling 1985.

⁸ Stanford 1942:17-27; Bergson 1956; Sideras 1971.

⁹ Ruzé 1989:221-223; van Wees 1992:31-36; Raaflaub 1997:8-20.

¹⁰ Carlier 1984:162-177.

¹¹ Van Wees 1992:281-294.

¹² Carlier 1984:145-150; van Wees 1992:31-32, 274-276; Raaflaub 1997:13-14; cf. Luraghi 2013a:14-15.

¹³ Easterling 1989; van Wees 1992:276-280; Unruh 2011.

¹⁴ Luraghi 2013c:133-134; Desmond 2018:42-52.

¹⁵ Carlier 1984:151-162; R. P. Martin 1984:41-43; Yamagata 1994:127-129; Cairns 2018.

¹⁶ Cf. pp. 10-11 below.

¹⁷ Aesch. *Pers.* 762-764, with Hall *ad loc.*.

¹⁸ Cf. pp. 171-172.

Clytaemestra's dream;¹⁹ and the Chorus of *Philoctetes* hails Neoptolemus with an elaborate evocation of epic *basileia*.²⁰

However, as only Heim seems to have observed, the depiction of tragic rulers, despite rarely drawing on epic conceptions of rulers in detail, has a fairly substantial legendary colouring.²¹ The *skeptron* and *thronos* are common as symbols of rule in all three playwrights, and, although in epic *skeptra* and *thronoi* are not exclusively associated with rulers,²² their association with rulers in tragedy probably does help to give these rulers legendary colouring.²³ The frequent use of the word *anax* and the occasional use of the word *koiranos*, both used in epic, probably also impart a legendary colour.²⁴ Indeed, even such commonplace features as the presence of retinues of slaves and attendants serving the ruler,²⁵ or Choruses of elders who

¹⁹ Soph. *El.* 417-423; cf. Easterling 1989:115-116.

²⁰ τέχνα γὰρ τέχνας ἐτέρας προύχει καὶ γνώμα παρ' ὅτῳ τὸ θεῖον Διὸς σκηπτρον ἀνάσσεται. σὲ δ', ὦ τέκνον, τόδ' ἐλήλυθεν πᾶν κράτος ὠγύγιον· τό μοι ἐννεπε τί σοι χρεὼν ὑπουργεῖν (Soph. *Phil.* 138-143). It is curious that Neoptolemus is the object of such an extensive evocation of epic *basileia*, especially since he is not otherwise conspicuously treated as a ruler. But the Chorus, composed of Neoptolemus' loyal sailors, does not know that he is acting on Odysseus' instructions rather than using his own τέχνα and γνώμα, or that he is taking orders (925-926, 1010, cf. 6) rather than exercising his own κράτος. So there is perhaps some irony here.

²¹ This paragraph summarises points made by Heim 1904:19-26, 92. Some of Heim's points, however, are based on unconvincing references (cf. Bengt 1929:23 n. 1); I have therefore been selective.

²² So Geddes 1984:35; Unruh 2011:279.

²³ The Atreids frequently have *skeptra* (Aesch. *Ag.* 43, 374; *Eum.* 626; Soph. *El.* 420, 651; Eur. *El.* 11, 321, *IT* 187, 235, *Or.* 237, 1058, *IA* 311, 412, 1194) and *thronoi* (Aesch. *Ag.* 43, 109, 260, and cf. 1054 with p. 184 n. 133 below; *Cho.* 572, 975; Soph. *El.* 267); much is made of Aegisthus' seizure of these symbols. Oedipus, Creon, and Oedipus' sons often have *skeptra* (Eur. *Phoen.* 52, 73, 80, 514, 591, 601, 1253; Soph. *OC* 425, 448-449, 1354) or *thronoi* (Soph. *Ant.* 166, 173, 533, *OT* 237, 399-400, *OC* 368, 375, 425, 448-449, 1293, 1354, 1380). Other cases: Aesch. *Pers.* 297, 762-764, 775, *Supp.* 374; Soph. *Phil.* 140; Eur. *Andr.* 23, 588, 1223, *HF* 167, 213, 1167, *Tro.* 150, *Ion* 578, 660, 1572, 1619, *Antiope* fr. 223.17-18, 109-110, *Melanippe Wise* fr. 481.5. Non-rulers with *skeptra* or *thronoi* are fewer, but do occur. Zeus (as ruler of the gods) frequently has a *skeptron* or *thronos*.

Normally *skeptra* and *thronoi* appear separately; they appear together only at Aesch. *Suppl.* 374, *Ag.* 43, and Soph. *OC* 425, 448-449, 1354, as well as Pind. *Pyth.* 4.152 (on which cf. p. 172 below), as M. L. West 1997:563 notes. (West suggests that their coupling at Aesch. *Supp.* 374 may be a Near Eastern element; cf. p. 99 n. 7 below.)

²⁴ M. Schmidt 2006:442-443 considers this already to be true of these words in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*.

²⁵ Heim 1904:20 rightly notes the archaising words δμῶες and ὀπάονες (along with ὀπαδοί); cf. Sideras 1971:68, 139. M. Schmidt 2006:441-442 considers δμῶες to be an archaism conveying a legendary colouring already in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*.

loyally advise the ruler,²⁶ probably help to make the rulers of tragedy seem more like those of epic. Passages where rulers are said to be the object of honour (τιμή) and reverence (σέβας),²⁷ or which emphasise their greatness by calling them blessed (μακάριοι), renowned (κλεινοί), or the like,²⁸ may perhaps evoke the traditional majesty of legendary rulers, even though these words are not in themselves epic vocabulary.²⁹ These elements do not closely correspond with epic, but nevertheless combine to bestow on these rulers a certain legendary and epicising grandeur.

Some Euripidean passages provide brief but explicit descriptions of the authority of Agamemnon or Menelaus over the Trojan expedition. In *Helen*, Menelaus says that he led the army against Troy ‘not as a *tyrannos* nor commanding by force, but leading the young men of Greece with their consent (έκοῦσι).’³⁰ Similarly, in *Orestes*, Orestes declares that he is the son of Agamemnon, ‘who ruled Greece not as a *tyrannos*, but because he was thought worthy, although he did acquire a certain divine strength.’³¹ *Electra* and *Iphigenia at Aulis* also contain passages describing Agamemnon being

²⁶ As Heim 1904:24 says, these elders’ position seems quite formalised when they are called πρέσβος Ἀργείων (Aesch. *Ag.* 855, 1393), σύγκλητον τήνδε γερόντων ... λέσχην (Soph. *Ant.* 159-160, although cf. T. Graham 2017:138-139), Θήβης ἄνακτες (*Ant.* 988), χώρας ἄνακτες (*OT* 911), τῆσδ’ ἔφοροι χώρας (*OC* 145), γῆς ἄνακτες (*OC* 831).

Sideras 1971:189 plausibly maintains that Aesch. *Supp.* 905, *Eum.* 399, and fr. 451q.9 are based on the epic formula Ἀργείων ἡγήτορες ἦδὲ μέδοντες (e.g. *Il.* II.79).

²⁷ On the difference between *time* and *sebas*, see Cairns 1993:206-214. Passages where a ruler is the object of *time* or *sebas* are concentrated in Aesch. *Ag.* (p. 171 n. 81 below), and are rarer elsewhere: Soph. *Aj.* 667, 670 (Atreids), *Ant.* 166 (house of Laius), 744-745 (Creon remarks that he has σέβας for his own ἀρχαί, setting up Haemon’s rejoinder that Creon’s σέβας is no true σέβας if it involves disrespecting the gods; cf. Dalfen 1977:16-17), *OT* 1203-1204 (Oedipus); Eur. *Dictys* fr. 337 (μὴ νεῖκος, ὦ γεραῖέ, κοιράνοις τίθου· σέβειν δὲ τοὺς κρατοῦντας ἀρχαῖος νόμος); *IA* 633 (Agamemnon, addressed by Clytaemestra, widely deleted partly on the grounds that the word σέβας is not so used in Eur.; cf. Collard and Morwood *ad loc.*); cf. *Bacch.* 319-321.

²⁸ Example of μακάριος: Eur. *El.* 709 (Atreus and Thyestes). Examples of κλεινός: Soph. *OT* 8, 1207 (Oedipus; cf. p. 206); Eur. *IT* 142, *Tro.* 358, *Or.* 17, *Hel.* 392 (Atreids), *Phoen.* 283 (Eteocles). These examples (with others, some less plausible): Heim 1904:21-23.

²⁹ On κλεινός, see Bergson 1956:194-196.

³⁰ τύραννος οὐδὲ πρὸς βίαν στρατηλατῶν, έκοῦσι δ’ ἄρξας Ἑλλάδος νεανίαις (Eur. *Hel.* 395-396). The manuscripts’ οὐδὲν yields ‘a *tyrannos* not in any respect commanding by force’, but Dobree’s οὐδὲ is universally accepted, because of the parallelism with Eur. *Or.* 1168 (Kannicht, Burian *ad loc.*).

³¹ ὃς Ἑλλάδος ἦρξ’ ἀξιοθείς, οὐ τύραννος, ἀλλ’ ὅμως ῥώμην θεοῦ τιν’ ἔσχ’ (Eur. *Or.* 1167-1169; cf. Kovacs’ translation). The latter phrase, reminiscent of epic (Biehl, Di Benedetto *ad loc.*), perhaps recalls the notion that Agamemnon’s power derived from Zeus.

chosen as general by the Greeks.³² We cannot be sure why, or on what authority, Euripides chose to present Agamemnon and Menelaus as elected generals commanding an army of free soldiers. He may have done so to assimilate them to contemporary Athenian generals;³³ he may also have been aware of the notion, later articulated in Aristotle, that the *basileiai* of the heroic period were over willing subjects (ἐκούσῑαι), unlike archaic and classical *tyrannides*.³⁴

Tragic rulers, then, are generally not depicted in terms of epic ideas concerning rulers. It will, however, be necessary to take epic fully into account when we consider Aeschylus' Eteocles and Agamemnon in Chapter 5.

2. In the fifth century, various oral **stories** circulated concerning the events that had taken place during the past two centuries. These often concern rulers of Greek *poleis* during the seventh and sixth centuries or Eastern rulers of the seventh, sixth and early fifth centuries; Herodotus recounts many such stories.³⁵ Since the recording of such stories in writing is not known before Herodotus, and since fifth-century Greece was an oral culture, such stories probably constituted most fifth-century Greeks' only source of knowledge about events before their own births. These stories, which may have arisen as hostile traditions following the fall of each ruler,³⁶ are generally unfavourable towards them.

Various elements which the stories in Herodotus recurrently associate with rulers are also found in fifth-century tragedy. These shared elements, which are explored in

³² Eur. *El.* 1082, *IA* 84-86.

³³ Similarly Roemer 1904:585; Heim 1904:30-31; Allan on Eur. *Hel.* 395-6. The sentiment behind ἐκούσι δ' ἄρξας Ἑλλάδος νεανίαις (Eur. *Hel.* 396) might perhaps be compared with the words with which, according to Plutarch, Pericles addressed himself whenever he assumed the generalship: πρόσεχε, Περικλείς· ἐλευθέρων ἄρχεις, Ἑλλήνων ἄρχεις, πολιτῶν Ἀθηναίων (Plut. *Mor.* 813d-814a).

Thucydides' account of Agamemnon's rule, though equally anachronistic, is different (Thuc. I.9; cf. Kannicht on Eur. *Hel.* 395-6).

³⁴ ἐκούσῑαι τε καὶ πάτριαι γιγνόμεναι κατὰ νόμον, Arist. *Pol.* III.1285b5; cf. also Thuc. I.13.1.

³⁵ General discussions of the oral nature of Herodotus' sources include Murray 1987; C. G. Thomas 1988; Gould 1989:19-41; Hornblower 2002; Luraghi [2005] 2013b.

³⁶ So (in different ways) Salmon 1984:186-187, 197-198; Lavelle 1993:22-26, 114-125; cf. Luraghi 2014:71-75, 2015:79-80.

Chapter 1, include moral patterns (especially the fall of the ruler from *olbos* to *ate*), and various recurrent behaviours and story patterns. In my view, the presence of these elements in both genres should probably be seen primarily as the result of the influence of the story tradition on the playwrights (especially Sophocles).

3. By the early fifth century, only a few sole rulers were in power in the Greek world, including in Sicily, Macedon and Cyrene. Thanks to surviving odes written by Pindar and Bacchylides in celebration of Hieron of Syracuse (who ruled from 478 to 467), we have a partial sense of the ideas and conceptions that could be employed in this period to portray sole rule in a positive light (something which we lack for earlier sole rulers). These ideas and conceptions are not generally reflected in Greek tragedy, but I will argue in Chapter 5 that they *are* reflected in the depiction of Agamemnon in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*.

The tragic playwrights also naturally had access to all the ideas current in the political life of the fifth-century Athenian democracy. These ideas are of many different kinds, and I devote Chapters 2-4 to these.

Firstly, the notion of *tyrannis* had considerable importance in fifth-century Athens. From the early fifth century, the Athenians kept alive a vivid memory of the fall of the Peisistratid rulers (in 510), especially by celebrating Harmodius and Aristogeiton, who had killed Hipparchus, the brother of the *tyrannos* Hippias, in 514. Furthermore, on some occasions in the late fifth century, there seems to have been widespread fear of *tyrannis* at Athens, and aspiring to become a *tyrannos* was employed as a political accusation. In addition, late in the fifth century we begin to see the notion of *tyrannis* being used, both in political and in intellectual contexts, as a metaphor for power in general. I discuss all these uses of *tyrannis* in **Chapter 2**. My conclusion (a surprising one, given a widespread tendency among scholars to suppose that the depiction of tragic rulers is closely connected to the Athenians' institutional antipathy to *tyrannis*) is that tragedy makes contact with these contemporary ideas about *tyrannis* only occasionally, and not systematically or continually.

Secondly, the Athenians had a variety of ideas concerning what constituted good and bad leadership, and also concerning the obedience owed to the holders of offices (*ἀρχαί*), especially in the military sphere. Such ideas are used liberally in fifth-century tragedy. In some cases, this produces problems of anachronism, of which (in my view) the tragic playwrights were aware, and to which they adopted various solutions, enabling them to preserve the legendary colour of the world of the play, but also to present the events of the play to their audience in contemporary political terms. I discuss how the playwrights do this in **Chapter 3**.

Furthermore, most tragic rulers appear in plots that involve the ruler either admitting suppliants into the *polis* or inflicting harm on his subjects. Consequently, the presentation of rulers is affected not only by the nature of the plots in which they appear, but also by the contemporary conceptions of supplication and punishment that underlie such plots. This is discussed in **Chapter 4**.

The complexity and variety of the conceptions underlying the portrayal of rulers in tragedy is, then, considerable. Indeed, besides the conceptions discussed in Chapters 1-4, which are recurrent in tragedy, there are many more which we will have to take into account in **Chapters 5-7**, especially those which have no inherent connection to rulers or rule, or which appear only in the presentation of one or two rulers. This thesis, without aspiring to absolute comprehensiveness, aims to present a reasonably detailed picture of the underlying ideas that bear most significantly on the depiction of rulers in fifth-century tragedy.

III. Terminology

III.i. The range of the words *anax*, *basileus*, and *tyrannos*

In fifth-century tragedy, the main words used to refer to sole rulers are *anax* (poetic only), *basileus*, and *tyrannos*. Fundamentally, all three designate a person ruling over

a group of people; each has a cognate verb (ἀνάσσω, βασιλεύω, τυραννέω) taking the genitive of the people or place ruled. The abstract noun *tyrannis* (never *basileia* in extant tragedy³⁷) refers to what a ruler possesses, i.e. ‘rule’. Cognate adjectives (βασιλῆϊος, βασιλικός, τυραννικός) are applied to what belongs to, or is proper to, a ruler. A woman belonging to a ruler’s family may be called *basileia* (sometimes *basilis*) or *tyrannos* (only in Euripides). Various other words for rulers are occasionally used, such as *koiranos* (verb κοιρανέω), *monarchos* and *tagos*. Other verbs are also used (including ἄρχω, κρατέω, ἡγοῦμαι), and we sometimes see the participle *archon*, which was habitually used substantively to refer to democratic officials at Athens.

The playwrights’ usage can only be understood in the context of that of earlier and contemporary writers. I focus on the most common words, *anax*, *basileus* and *tyrannos*: *tyrannos* poses most problems.

In epic, *anax* and *basileus* are both commonly used of legendary rulers,³⁸ as also in lyric.³⁹ By the seventh century, however, Greek *poleis* no longer had rulers called *basileis*, except for Cyrene, the Cyprian *poleis*, and Sparta (where there were two), although in other *poleis* (including Athens) the *basileus* or *basileis* were officials with limited powers.⁴⁰ In the seventh century, though, a new political phenomenon emerged of individuals taking power in Greek *poleis*, and a new word, *tyrannos*, became primarily applied to these Greek rulers (although the earliest attestation of *tyrannis*, in the seventh-century poet Archilochus, is usually understood to refer to the rule of the Lydian Gyges),⁴¹ and the archaic poets habitually use *tyrannos*, alongside

³⁷ Carlier 1984:236.

³⁸ On the distinctions between *anax* and *basileus* in epic, see Carlier 1984:142-150, 215-230 (a full list); Yamagata 1997; Carlier 2006; M. Schmidt 2006.

³⁹ For *basileus*, e.g. Alc. fr. 38a.5; Stesichorus fr. 180; Pind. *Ol.* 6.47. For *anax*, e.g. Stesichorus fr. 88.1; Pind. *Nem.* 3.33.

⁴⁰ See Drews 1983:116-128; Carlier 1984:325-484. Drews denies that the *basileis* of Cyrene and Sparta should be regarded as rulers, but see Carlier 1984:474-476, 503-505, Malkin 1994:113-114, Mitchell 2000 (on Cyrene); Cartledge 2001 (on Sparta). On the Cypriot *basileis*, see Iacovou 2006.

⁴¹ Archil. fr. 19, which the ancients themselves seem to have thought the earliest instance (V. Parker 1998:149-151, with references); cf. T. Graham 2017:21-34. (Sir 2020:148, however,

monarchos, to refer to sole rulers of *poleis* in their own day.⁴² No extant source prior to tragedy applies this word to legendary rulers. The word *tyrannos* is a designation and not a title; no known ruler used it as a title, and it is never used to address rulers in the vocative.⁴³ Indeed, such rulers may sometimes have been referred to as *basileis*,⁴⁴ and Pindar applies the title *basileus* to Hieron of Syracuse (as well as implicitly referring to him as a *tyrannos*).⁴⁵ A few cases also exist where a cognate of *anax* (ἀνάσσω) is seemingly applied to a ruler of this period.⁴⁶ For the most part, though, in early sources *tyrannos* refers to sole rulers of Greek *poleis* from the seventh century onwards, whereas *anax* and *basileus* refer to legendary rulers.

The historians Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophon are absolutely consistent in referring to legendary rulers as *basileus* (never *tyrannos*). When it comes to archaic and classical rulers, the word used depends on the locality ruled. Greek rulers (except in Macedon, Thessaly, Sparta, Cyrene, and Cyprus) are habitually called *tyrannos*, non-Greek rulers *basileus*. This usage Thucydides and Xenophon maintain

considers *tyrannis* not to refer to Gyges' rule here, arguing that τὰ Γύγεω and μεγάλης τυραννίδος are separate items renounced by the speaker.)

⁴² Archil. fr. 19 refers to Gyges of Lydia, and it is unclear whether Xenophanes fr. 3.2 refers to a Greek or a Lydian ruler; Archil. fr. 23.20 and Semon. fr. 7.69 are not specific. Alcaeus (fr. 348 and possibly 75) calls Pittacus of Mitylene *tyrannos*. The prospect of *tyrannis* is also used within the context of a Greek *polis* at Solon fr. 33.6; [Thgn.] 1181, 1204 (lines which may be inauthentic; cf. p. 45). (References from Kōiv 2016:18 nn. 74-75.)

⁴³ De Libero 1996:38.

⁴⁴ An oracle quoted in Herodotus, which may be old, calls Cypselus of Corinth *basileus* (Hdt. V.92ε.2, with Kōiv 2016:16-17 n. 66, who provides references). A popular song cited at Plut. *Mor.* 157d-e, of unknown date, calls Pittacus *basileus* (cf. V. Parker 1998:156-157, 170; T. Graham 2017:12), and a mutilated fragment of Alcaeus contains *basileus* (fr. 5.14); see Kōiv 2016:29-32.

⁴⁵ Cases of *basileus*: Pind. *Ol.* 1.23, 114; *Pyth.* 1.60, 68 (plural, referring also to Hieron's expected successors), 3.70. Cases of *tyrannos*: *Pyth.* 2.87, 3.85 (both generalisations; the latter implies more clearly that Hieron is a *tyrannos*). It is disputed what nouns were used to refer to Hieron in his day outside Pindar's poetry. Bacchylides applies neither word to Hieron; Herodotus, writing subsequently, uses both. See Oost 1976:224-232; Morgan 2015:14.

⁴⁶ The word *anax* is not used in lyric poetry to refer to any ruler of this period, but ἀνάσσω is reconstructed as applying to an uncertain Sicilian ruler (probably Gelon, Hieron or Polyzalus) on the erased earlier text of CEG 397 = FD III.4:452, the inscription that accompanied the famous charioteer at Delphi (Adornato 2008; Morgan 2015:75-80). Archil. fr. 23.20 says, of an unknown individual's capture of a city, κείνης ἀνάσσει καὶ τυραννίδην ἔχε (as Kōiv 2016:21 points out in this connection). One inscription applies the verb ἀνάσσω to the *damiourgoi* at Argos (SEG XI.336, quoted and discussed by Carlier 1984:394-395). Also, Aeschylus' *Persians* calls Darius and Xerxes *anax*.

consistently.⁴⁷ Herodotus generally maintains it, but occasionally diverges from it, particularly when it comes to Greek rulers in southern Italy, Sicily, Cyprus, and Macedon.

In maintaining that the distinction between *basileis* and *tyrannoi* is essentially geographical (*basileis* being legendary or non-Greek rulers, and *tyrannoi* Greek rulers of archaic or classical *poleis*), I disagree with scholars such as Ferrill, for whom Herodotus' distinction between *basileis* and *tyrannoi* is that *tyrannoi* are bad, usurping or illegitimate rulers, *basileis* legitimate ones.⁴⁸ It is true that Herodotus's work contains many negative statements about *tyrannoi*, and that most *tyrannoi* in Herodotus are illegitimate and most *basileis* legitimate—since, whereas Persia and other eastern lands had an institution of legitimate kingship, most Greek *poleis* did not. However, this does not entail that moral iniquity or illegitimacy is actually the principle governing Herodotus' usage. Herodotus refers to Greek rulers of *poleis* as *tyrannoi* irrespective of their ethical qualities, and to non-Greek rulers as *basileis* even if they are bad rulers or usurpers. On the small number of occasions where Herodotus *does* call non-Greeks *tyrannoi* (19 times, by my count) or refers to rulers of Greek *poleis* as *basileis* (11 times, excluding Sparta, etc.), it is not obvious that he does so in the direction of the distinction which Ferrill draws; for instance, he calls the good and legitimate ruler Croesus *tyrannos*. Most importantly, though, such cases are numerically dwarfed by cases where Herodotus adheres to the geographical distinction, calling non-Greek rulers *basileis* (699 times) and rulers of Greek *poleis* *tyrannoi* (92 times, excluding Sparta, etc.).⁴⁹ In maintaining that Herodotus draws this

⁴⁷ V. Parker 1998:164-165.

⁴⁸ Ferrill 1978, followed by Baragwanath 2008:191 n. 56, Attack 2020:16, but rightly rejected by V. Parker 1998:161-165; Kōiv 2016:21 n. 90. My views on Herodotus' usage largely coincide with Carlier 1984:236-238.

⁴⁹ 19 cases where non-Greek rulers are referred to using *tyrannos* or cognates: the Lydians Candaules (I.7.2; but his power is called βασιληϊή three times), Gyges (twice, at I.14.1; but eight times βασιλ-), Ardys (I.15; twice βασιλ-), and Croesus (I.6.1 and implicitly at I.86.4; seventeen times βασιλ-); the Medes Deioces (I.96.1, I.96.2, I.100.1; nine times βασιλ-), Cyaxares (I.73.3; twice βασιλ-), and Astyages (I.109.4; fourteen times βασιλ-); Xerxes (VII.52.2, VIII.142.5; 172 times βασιλ-); the Twelve Kings of Egypt (II.147.4; four times βασιλ-); Aridolis of Alabanda (VII.195; never βασιλ-); Pigres and Montanes, prospectively, over the Paeonians

geographical distinction, though, I also disagree with Parker, who, in rejecting the view that Herodotus maintains an ethical distinction, concludes that Herodotus drew no distinction at all;⁵⁰ the numbers show clearly that this is false.

Since archaic and fifth-century sources routinely call legendary rulers *anax* or *basileus*, it is unsurprising that tragedy does so too, presumably making use of these words' legendary connotations. In calling some legendary rulers *tyrannos*, however, tragedy is unusual.⁵¹

Regarding Aeschylus' usage, opinion has been divided (as with Herodotus) between Parker and others, who maintain that Aeschylus uses *basileus* and *tyrannos* interchangeably,⁵² and Bengt and Parara, who maintain that Aeschylus uses *basileus*

(V.12.1; never βασιλ-); Labynetos of Babylon (I.77.2; never βασιλ-); Artayctes (IX.119.1; never βασιλ-); Arganthonius of Tartessus (I.163.2; once βασιλ-).

11 cases where rulers of Greek *poleis* are referred to using *basileus* or cognates: Polycrates of Samos (III.42.2; but twice τυρανν-); Maeandrius of Samos (V.27.1; twice τυρανν-); Aristagoras of Miletus (V.35.1; three times τυρανν-); Telys of Sybaris (V.44.1; once τυρανν-); Cypselus of Corinth (V.92ε.2, within a quoted oracle; twice τυρανν-); Gelon of Syracuse (VII.161.1; twice τυρανν-); Lycophron of Corinth prospectively (III.52.4; never τυρανν-); Aristophilides of Taras (III.136.2; never τυρανν-); Scythes of Zancle (VI.23.1; never τυρανν-); Damasithymus of Calyndus (VIII.87.2; never τυρανν-); Amphicrates of Samos (III.59.4; never τυρανν-).

These numbers exclude legendary Greek rulers (always βασιλ-, 25 times), Spartan rulers (always βασιλ-, 78 times), Thessalian rulers (βασιλ- twice), rulers of Cyrene (βασιλ- 6 times), Grinnus of Thera (βασιλ- twice) and Etearchus of Oaxus (βασιλ- once). Cypriot rulers are called βασιλ- (8 times) and τυρανν- (3 times). Macedonian rulers are called βασιλ- (6 times) and τυρανν- (3 times).

Since I have reached these numbers by manually counting *TLG* searches, some room for human error must be allowed. Nonetheless, it seems manifest that cases where Herodotus diverges from the geographical distinction are few in proportion to cases where he adheres to it, and that no distinction between good and bad rulers, or legitimate rulers and usurpers, explains the divergences from this pattern, which are rather miscellaneous (cf. Càssola 1985:25-27).

⁵⁰ V. Parker 1998:161-165; similarly Waters 1971:6.

⁵¹ As Rood, Atack and Phillips 2020:66 note, the fact that this is 'peculiar' (ἴδιον) is noted in Hypothesis II to Soph. OT: ἴδιον δέ τι πεπόνθασιν οἱ μεθ' Ὅμηρον ποιηταὶ τοὺς πρὸ τῶν Τρωικῶν βασιλεῖς τυράννους προσαγορεύοντες, ὅψέ ποτε τοῦδε τοῦ ὀνόματος εἰς τοὺς Ἑλληνας διαδοθέντος, κατὰ τοὺς Ἀρχιλόχου χρόνους, καθάπερ Ἰππίας ὁ σοφιστὴς φησιν. It is not clear whether this observation goes back to Hippias of Elis, or just the second half of the sentence (Laks-Most 36 D26).

⁵² Andrewes 1956:22; V. Parker 1998:158 n. 52.

for legitimate rulers and *tyrannos* for illegitimate ones.⁵³ In my view, Aeschylus does distinguish quite strongly between *basileus* and *tyrannos*. He uses *basileus* for the legendary rulers Eteocles, Agamemnon and Menelaus, and for the Persian rulers in *Persians*, but *tyrannos* and its cognates for the rule of Aegisthus and Clytaemestra in the *Oresteia*.⁵⁴ This seems pointed, since the whole presentation of the rule of Aegisthus and Clytaemestra seems to evoke contemporary Athenian ideas about *tyrannis* and the killing of *tyrannoi*.⁵⁵ The fact that Aeschylus also applies the cognate adjective (τυραννικός) to Agamemnon and Priam (once each)—perhaps because he did not feel the adjective to be so strongly marked as the noun—hardly seems sufficient to justify Parker’s wholesale rejection of the distinction.⁵⁶

However, this does not necessarily mean that Aeschylus is distinguishing between *basileis* and *tyrannoi* strictly on the basis of legitimacy, as Bengl and Parara suppose. Such a view intrinsically loses plausibility if we accept (as I am inclined to) that no other archaic or fifth-century author maintains such a distinction strictly based on legitimacy. Moreover, if (as seems likely) Aeschylus has chosen the word *tyrannos* to evoke the full range of connotations which this word possessed in the Athenian context, the notion that Aeschylus is maintaining a distinction of legitimacy seems reductive; rather, he calls Aegisthus a *tyrannos* to make him seem analogous to the *tyrannoi* of archaic Greece, and to set him in contrast with Agamemnon, whose status as a *legendary* ruler Aeschylus stresses by frequently and emphatically calling him *basileus*.⁵⁷

Prometheus Bound consistently uses *tyrannos* to refer to Zeus (never *basileus*).⁵⁸ This diverges markedly from ordinary usage, since other sources commonly refer to Zeus

⁵³ Bengl 1929:59-60; Berve 1967:I.193-194, 202, cf. II.626; Parara 2010:78-83.

⁵⁴ Aesch. Ag. 1355, 1365, 1633; Cho. 972.

⁵⁵ See pp. 86-88.

⁵⁶ Aesch. Ag. 479, 828.

⁵⁷ Aesch. Ag. 113, 521, 783, 1346, 1489, 1513; Cho. 360, 724, 1070.

⁵⁸ So rightly Parara 2010:120. The playwright does, however, apply ἀνάσσω (*Prometheus Bound* 202) and ἄναξ (584) to Zeus.

as *anax* and *basileus*,⁵⁹ but not *tyrannos*.⁶⁰ This pointed use of *tyrannos* goes hand in hand with the playwright's application to Zeus of the traditional negative features associated with many rulers in the tradition of stories about archaic rulers which I discuss in Chapter 1.⁶¹ As in Aeschylus' *Oresteia*, it seems likely that the playwright chooses this word not just to indicate Zeus' illegitimate usurpation of power (although this is certainly *part* of the picture), but also to create a broader and more general analogy between Zeus and the rulers of archaic Greek *poleis* familiar from the story tradition.

Sophocles continues to distinguish, up to a point, between *basileis* and *tyrannoi*.⁶² In *Ajax*, he refers three times to Agamemnon and Menelaus as *basileis*, as in epic and Aeschylus,⁶³ although he refers to the circle of counsellors around Agamemnon using the cognate adjective of *tyrannos* (τυραννικός), and has Agamemnon state that it is not easy for a *tyrannos* to be pious.⁶⁴ So *basileus* perhaps predominates here. In *Antigone* and *Oedipus Tyrannus*, though, Creon and Oedipus (along with Laius) are referred to predominantly as *tyrannoi*, and only occasionally as *basileis*.⁶⁵ Since, as discussed in Chapter 1, Sophocles depicts Creon and Oedipus with many features shared with the story tradition about archaic rulers, his usage here may reflect this. It is perhaps also significant that Oedipus is not called *tyrannos* until around the point

⁵⁹ The *Iliad* and *Odyssey* do not call Zeus *basileus*, only *anax* (cf. Calhoun 1935; Yamagata 1997:1, 5), but *basileus* is common in other archaic and fifth-century poetry (references in Bruchmann 1893:126), and as a cult title (references in Jessen 1897).

⁶⁰ Cf. Parara 2010:46-47, 55. Zeus is, though, referred to using τυρανν- at Gorg. *Hel.* 3 (Laks-Most 32 D24; cited by Berve 1967:II.629); Soph. *Colchides* fr. 345, *Polyxena* fr. 524; Ar. *Nub.* 574, *Av.* 1605, 1643, *Plut.* 124 (of which *Birds* and *Wealth* are thought to parody *Prometheus Bound* or *Prometheus Unbound*; Herington 1963:239; T. Graham 2017:98-100). Cf. also Cratinus, *Wealth-Gods* fr. 171.22 (with Herington 1963:236-237); *Chirons* fr. 258 (lampooning Pericles; cf. pp. 77, 86, with quotation).

⁶¹ So already, in essence, Thomson 1929:3.

⁶² Here I agree broadly (although not in all details) with Giorgini 1993:209-210.

⁶³ Soph. *Aj.* 188, 390, 959.

⁶⁴ Soph. *Aj.* 749, 1350 (a generalisation; cf. pp. 21-22 below); cf. *Polyxena* fr. 524.3.

⁶⁵ Creon is *basileus* at Soph. *Ant.* 155, 382, but *tyrannos* at 60, 506, 1056, 1169. Oedipus is *basileus* only at OT 1202, but *tyrannos* at 380, 408, 513, 535, 541, 588, 592-593, 925, 939, 1094-1095. Laius is *basileus* at OT 257, but *tyrannos* at 128, 799, 1043.

in *Oedipus Tyrannus* at which he begins to display the anger and suspicion often associated with rulers in these stories.⁶⁶

In *Electra* and *Oedipus at Colonus*, Sophocles distinguishes between *basileis* and *tyrannoi*, never calling the same character by both titles. In *Electra*, Sophocles follows Aeschylus in referring to Aegisthus as *tyrannos*, and in comparing Clytaemestra to a *tyrannos* in a simile.⁶⁷ In *Oedipus at Colonus*, Sophocles calls the Theban rulers (Creon, Eteocles and Polynices) *tyrannoi*,⁶⁸ but calls Theseus *basileus*.⁶⁹ In this play, it is not obvious that any connection is drawn with the tradition of stories about rulers reflected in Herodotus, but Sophocles' use of the word *tyrannos* nevertheless seems unsurprising, given his previous application of this same word to the Theban rulers Creon and Oedipus in *Antigone* and *Oedipus Tyrannus*. It is also unsurprising that Sophocles chooses not to call Theseus *tyrannos*, given the associations of this word with the Peisistratids within the specific context of Athens, where this play is set.

In Aeschylus and Sophocles, then, the words *basileus* and *tyrannos* sometimes overlap, but are largely distinct, and it often seems possible to explain their usage. With Euripides, matters are more difficult.

Firstly, Euripides conspicuously applies *tyrannos* and its cognate adjective (τυραννικός) not just to rulers, but also collectively to their families, wives, daughters, palaces, and marriages (usages almost unknown in Aeschylus and Sophocles), while also using *basileus* and its cognates in similar situations.⁷⁰ Indeed, the only families *not* referred to using both words are families to whom Euripides

⁶⁶ Soph. *OT* 380; Budelmann 2000:219 notes this.

⁶⁷ Soph. *El.* 661, 664.

⁶⁸ Soph. *OC* 373, 448-449, 851, 1338.

⁶⁹ Soph. *OC* 67.

⁷⁰ In Aeschylus and Sophocles, such idioms using βασιλ- occur several times (Aesch. *Ag.* 96, 157, 518, *Cho.* 343, 1065, fr. 388; *PV* 869; Soph. *Ant.* 941, 1172), but only once using τυρανν- (Soph. *Trach.* 316).

applies this usage twice or less often: his habitual practice seems to be to mix the two.⁷¹

Furthermore, even discounting such collective usages, it is easy to see (from the list in section IV below) that Euripides *often* refers to the same ruler as both *basileus* and *tyrannos*. Unlike in Sophocles, it seems impossible to discern why any given ruler is called *basileus*, *tyrannos*, or both: the two words seem almost entirely interchangeable.

Indeed, these words can be used in close proximity, by the same speaker, with reference to the same ruler. The Chorus of Euripides' *Electra* sings, 'Now the old *basilees* whom we love will rule (τυραννεύσουσι) our land justly.'⁷² When Menelaus in *Helen* regrets that he, as a *basileus*, has to beg from other rulers (ἄλλους τυράννους), the word 'other' (ἄλλους) clearly implies that he includes himself among *tyrannoi*.⁷³ Theseus in *Suppliants*, arguing against sole rule, begins by saying, 'There is nothing worse for a *polis* than a *tyrannos*','⁷⁴ but then switches to *basileus*, before referring to this ruler's *tyrannis* again.⁷⁵

Nor does Euripides use *tyrannos* where traditional negative features are alluded to, and *basileus* where not; this is clear from Theseus' words. Similarly, although Creon in *Medea* calls the traditionally harsh temper of a ruler 'a *tyrannos*-like temper' (λῆμα τυραννικόν),⁷⁶ the First Messenger in *Bacchae* refers to Pentheus' temper as 'an excessively *basileus*-like manner' (τὸ βασιλικὸν λίκον), with similar force.⁷⁷

In some contexts, however, the two words are never interchangeable, even in Euripides. Above all, when a *generalisation* is made about rulers or rule in Euripides,

⁷¹ Euripides mixes βασιλ- and τυρανν- to refer to ruling families, palaces, etc., throughout *Med.*, *Andr.*, *Phoen.*, *Hel.*, *Or.*, with scattered cases elsewhere.

⁷² νῦν οἱ πάρος ἀμετέρας γαίας τυραννεύσουσι φίλοι βασιλῆς δικαίως (Eur. *El.* 876-878).

⁷³ Eur. *Hel.* 511-512.

⁷⁴ οὐδὲν τυράννου δυσμενέστερον πόλει (Eur. *Supp.* 429).

⁷⁵ Eur. *Supp.* 444, 446.

⁷⁶ Eur. *Med.* 348.

⁷⁷ Eur. *Bacch.* 671.

as also in Sophocles, *tyrannos* and *tyrannis* are consistently used.⁷⁸ One can only guess why; perhaps, since sole rulers in archaic and classical Greek *poleis* were habitually called *tyrannoi*, this was, for archaic and classical Greeks, the most obvious term to use when discussing sole rule in general. Furthermore, as elsewhere, no ruler is ever addressed as *tyrannos* in the vocative: normally *anax* is used.⁷⁹ Occasionally other factors arise. When, in *Phoenician Women*, Eteocles debates the merits of holding power in a fashion that draws on contemporary intellectual debates, his use of the word *tyrannis* reflects these debates, which always use this word in such contexts.⁸⁰ Also, when in *Helen* and *Orestes* it is denied that the Atreids ruled as *tyrannoi*, this perhaps reflects an awareness of the distinction later drawn by Aristotle between *tyrannis* and the *basileiai* of the heroic period.⁸¹

However, when Theseus in *Suppliants* declares that he is not a *tyrannos*, the point is not that he is a good ruler rather than a bad one,⁸² but rather—as he explicitly says—that Athens is a democracy and not governed by a sole ruler at all.⁸³ Euripides does not call Theseus *basileus* either; in this, Theseus resembles Pelasgus in Aeschylus' *Suppliants*.

⁷⁸ No generalisations about *tyrannoi* or *tyrannis* occur in Aeschylus.

In Sophocles: Aj. 1350, Ant. 506-507, 1056, OT 541-542 and 873, Ajax the Locrian fr. 14, Sons of Aleus fr. 88.1-3, fr. 873.

In Prometheus Bound: PV 224-225.

In Euripides: Med. 119-121, Hipp. 1012-1015, Supp. 429-455, Ion 621-625, Phoen. 549-551, Aegaeus fr. 8, Antigone fr. 171-172, Archelaus fr. 250, Auge fr. 275, Bellerophon fr. 286.5-9, Dictys fr. 335, Ino fr. 420, Ixion fr. 426, Oedipus fr. 543.1, Daughters of Pelias fr. 605, fr. 850, fr. 1050. Except Eur. Bellerophon fr. 286, we owe all fragments here to Stobaeus, whose interest means that a disproportionately large number of Euripidean generalisations regarding *tyrannis* have survived. Kovacs deletes several of these passages; cf. pp. 44-45.

Exceptions, using *basileus*: Eur. Supp. 444; Eur. IA 645.

Herodotus also tends to use *tyrannos* and *tyrannis* in generalisations, in Greek (e.g. V.92α), Persian (III.80.4, III.81.1), and mixed contexts (VIII.142.5).

⁷⁹ Cf. p. 15.

⁸⁰ Cf. pp. 90-92 below.

⁸¹ Cf. p. 11 above. Bengt 1929:61-62 (followed by Berve 1967:I.202) rightly notes that these passages draw such a distinction. Bengt compares Socrates' definition of *tyrannis* at Xen. Mem. IV.6.12, which however does not explain why Euripides has drawn this distinction only with reference to the Atreids; Aristotle's ideas about heroic *basileia* seem more relevant.

⁸² So seemingly Lanza 1977:100-101.

⁸³ Eur. Supp. 399, 403-406.

In short, then, Aeschylus sharply distinguishes between *basileis* (most legendary rulers) and *tyrannoi* (Aegisthus and Clytaemestra, whose rule evokes contemporary Athenian ideas about *tyrannis*). Sophocles draws a similar distinction, but with more fluidity. Euripides, however, habitually applies both words to the same rulers.

III.ii. Did the word *tyrannos* have negative connotations?

Archaic and classical texts often express antipathy towards *tyrannoi* and *tyrannis*. Solon says that it would be shameful for him to seize *tyrannis*.⁸⁴ A couplet attributed to Theognis contains an exhortation to lay low a ‘*demos*-eating *tyrannos*’ (δημοφάγον τύραννον) by any means, without resentment from the gods.⁸⁵ The Chorus of Aeschylus’ *Agamemnon* declares it better to die than to live under *tyrannis*.⁸⁶ Herodotus’ Socles tells the Spartans that there is nothing more unjust or bloody than *tyrannis*.⁸⁷ In Euripides’ *Suppliants*, Theseus declares that Athens has no *tyrannos* but is free. Here, the clear implication is that a *tyrannos* is a bad thing for a *polis*, as indeed he shortly explains explicitly.⁸⁸ It should, however, be emphasised that the word *tyrannos* does not actually have to carry the sense ‘bad and oppressive ruler’ in any of these passages, as the word ‘tyrant’ commonly does in English; indeed, it is doubtful whether any such passage exists in archaic or fifth-century Greek.⁸⁹

Furthermore, there are cases of *tyrannos* where the slightest negative connotation would be destructive. There are not only passages where *tyrannis* is considered to be positive and desirable *by its possessor*,⁹⁰ but also passages where *tyrannis* is regarded

⁸⁴ Solon fr. 32.1-4.

⁸⁵ [Thgn.] 1181-1182 (perhaps inauthentic; cf. p. 45).

⁸⁶ Aesch. Ag. 1364-1365.

⁸⁷ Hdt. V.92α.1.

⁸⁸ Eur. *Supp.* 403-405, 429-446. As we have just seen, though (p. 22), *tyrannos* cannot mean ‘bad ruler’ at 404, since Theseus is denying that Athens has *any* form of sole ruler.

⁸⁹ A possible exception is Soph. *OT* 873. Considering it undesirable to place too much weight on this controversial passage, I have set out my own view in Appendix 1 (pp. 272-275). For the distinction between *tyrannos* being used in antipathetic contexts and having intrinsic negative force, cf. p. 274 n. 4 there.

⁹⁰ Speakers in Archil. fr. 19, 23.17-21, Solon fr. 33.5-7, express this view, although Archilochus and Solon themselves reject it; cf. Connor 1977:98-104, Hoekstra 2016:29-30. In tragedy: Soph.

positively *by someone else*. When Pindar, praising Hieron, emphasises the prosperity of *tyrannoi*, not only Hieron but also poet and audience are presumably supposed to approve.⁹¹ When Herodotus declares that Polycrates' death was unworthy of him, and says that none of the Greek *tyrannoi*, not even the *tyrannoi* of Syracuse, could compete with him in magnificence (μεγαλοπρεπείη),⁹² any overtone of hostility towards Polycrates would run against the sentence's meaning. Herodotus surely writes *tyrannos* not to convey such an overtone, but because he habitually uses the word for rulers of Greek *poleis* regardless of whether he approves of them.⁹³

In tragedy, too, especially Euripides, *tyrannos* is found where negative connotations would be undesirable. Although Aeschylus primarily applies *tyrannos* and its cognates to Aegisthus and Clytaemestra, in *Libation-Bearers* Agamemnon is said to have died in a fashion unworthy of a *tyrannos* (τρόποισιν οὐ τυραννικοῖς θανών).⁹⁴ Although Aeschylus perhaps uses the cognate adjective (τυραννικός) more freely than the noun,⁹⁵ it remains difficult to believe that Aeschylus could have written a line where even this adjective is actually used in an approbatory fashion if he had regarded *tyrannos* as having strictly negative connotations. In Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus*, the Chorus, expressing goodwill towards Oedipus, apostrophises Mount Cithaeron, declaring that it 'will be celebrated by us in dances, for bringing good things to our *tyrannoi*.'⁹⁶ If *tyrannos* had intrinsic negative connotations, Sophocles would hardly have used it here. In Euripides' *Electra*, the Chorus recounts how a Herald summoned the populace for Atreus and Thyestes by proclaiming, 'Go to the

Sons of Aleus fr. 88.1-3; Eur. *Tro.* 1168-1170, *Phoen.* 503-508, *Archelaus* fr. 250, *Bellerophon* fr. 286.5-9, *Ixion* fr. 426. At Pl. *Resp.* VIII.568b (cited by Hoekstra), it is said that Euripides 'and the other poets' often praise *tyrannis*. Cf. p. 82 below.

⁹¹ Pind. *Pyth.* 3.84-86.

⁹² Hdt. III.125.2.

⁹³ Dewald 2003:40-41 gives more examples of τυρανν- in approbatory and neutral contexts. Ferrill's contention that no such cases exist (1978:396-397) seems incorrect.

⁹⁴ Aesch. *Ag.* 479.

⁹⁵ Cf. p. 19.

⁹⁶ καὶ χορεύεσθαι πρὸς ἡμῶν ὡς ἐπήρα φέροντα τοῖς ἑμοῖς τυράννοις (Soph. *OT* 1093-1095).

agora, to the *agora*, Mycenaeans, to see the portents of the blessed *tyrannoi*.⁹⁷ Here, any negative overtones would undermine the Herald's words, which praise the brothers, rousing the populace's loyalty towards them. In Euripides' *Heracles*, the Chorus, praising Heracles, declares, 'You are a better *tyrannos* in my eyes than the ignoble *anaktes* [i.e. Lycus]'; this is reduced to nonsense if *tyrannos* is taken in a negative sense.⁹⁸ Such cases show that *in itself* the word *tyrannos* need not imply disapprobation.

This does not, however, entail that *tyrannos* was a neutral or colourless word.⁹⁹ On the contrary, since the word refers to the whole phenomenon of sole rulers in archaic and classical Greek *poleis*, it will have been hugely meaningful to any classical Greek audience. Potentially, indeed, it could have reminded audience-members of any aspect of the phenomenon of *tyrannis* with which they happened to be familiar. Such aspects might include the wealth (*olbos*, *ploutos*) or injustice (*adikia*, *hybris*) often associated with *tyrannis* in archaic poetry and tragedy, for instance when Jocasta in Euripides' *Phoenician Women* calls *tyrannis* a 'prosperous injustice' (ἀδικίαν εὐδαίμονα).¹⁰⁰ Equally, though, for fifth-century Athenians the word may have been reminiscent of any of the *gnomai*, stories, and political ideas associated with *tyrannis* at the time—including, presumably, many of those outlined in Chapters 1-2, and others besides.

Many of these associations, clearly, will have been unfavourable, since most of these *gnomai*, stories and other ideas do reflect negatively on *tyrannis*—but it seems reductive to emphasise the negativity of these associations over their great variety. Rather, for fifth-century Greeks, *tyrannis* was a very real and multifaceted phenomenon. Only by detailed investigation of their stories about *tyrannoi* and their

⁹⁷ Ἄγορὰν ἀγορὰν, Μυκηναῖοι, στείχετε μακαρίων ὀψόμενοι τυράννων φάσματα (Eur. *El.* 708-711).

⁹⁸ κρείσσων μοι τύραννος ἔφες ἢ δυσγένει' ἀνάκτων (Eur. *HF* 809-810). Kovacs' translation, 'You are more kingly in my eyes than the ignoble tyrant', neatly illustrates the fact that *tyrannos* does not map onto English 'tyrant' here.

⁹⁹ Cf. Budelmann 2000:214-215.

¹⁰⁰ Eur. *Phoen.* 549; Connor 1977:98-104 (archaic poetry and tragedy); de Libero 1996:23-38 (archaic poetry); Budelmann 2000:214-219 (Sophocles).

generalisations about *tyrannis*, perhaps, might we approach a full understanding of the word's possible associations.

III.iii. Summary of the ancient terminology

In summary, then, my view of the terms *anax*, *basileus* and *tyrannos* is as follows.

Since archaic poets and fifth-century historians call legendary rulers *anax* and *basileus*, it is unsurprising that the tragic playwrights routinely use both words to refer to legendary rulers in their plays.

However, since these poets and historians only apply the word *tyrannos* to rulers of archaic and classical Greek *poleis*, it is more surprising that the playwrights call some tragic rulers *tyrannos*. When Aeschylus, the writer of the *Prometheus Bound*, and Sophocles do so, they often seem to be evoking the historical phenomenon of *tyrannis*. Euripides' usage is freer.

Archaic and classical authors distinguish between *tyrannoi* and *basileis* not primarily on the basis of morality or legitimacy, but rather on the basis that *tyrannoi* are rulers of Greek *poleis*, *basileis* legendary and non-Greek rulers.

In tragedy, the word *tyrannos* does not possess intrinsic negative connotations (since it is sometimes used in positive contexts where these would be destructive), but it is also misleading to call it a 'neutral' word. Rather, it is potentially evocative of *any* aspect of the phenomenon of sole rulers in Greek *poleis*, as understood in fifth-century Athens.

III.iv. The terminology used in this thesis

The complicated nature of the Greeks' own words for 'ruler' has some implications for how this thesis itself should talk about rulers.

Firstly, it can be seen that the mere fact that a tragic ruler is called *tyrannos* or *basileus* tells us nothing in itself about the way in which that ruler has been depicted. It may *sometimes* be possible to explain why a given playwright has used one term as opposed to the other, but we will only be able to give that kind of explanation if we already know the ideas in terms of which the ruler is depicted more broadly.

Secondly, it is clearly impossible to separate tragic rulers into two categories, one consisting of *basileis* and the other consisting of *tyrannoi*. The two words are, for the most part, not mutually exclusive in tragedy, and therefore do not constitute useful categories of analysis.

Similarly, it is not useful to use the words 'king' and 'tyrant' (which are conventionally used as equivalents for *basileus* and *tyrannos*). This is partly for the same reason: since there is no consistent division between *basileis* and *tyrannoi*, there can be no consistent division between 'kings' and 'tyrants', if these are understood as equivalents of the Greek words. More importantly, though, 'king' and 'tyrant' have unwanted associations in English that do not apply to Greek tragedy: 'king' has associations of majesty and feudalism, while 'tyrant' commonly signifies 'bad or oppressive ruler'.¹⁰¹ So it is impractical to divide rulers into *basileis* or 'kings' and *tyrannoi* or 'tyrants'.

The word 'tyrant' presents particular difficulties, since scholars have used it in multiple senses. There are at least five ways in which one *could* apply the word 'tyrant' to archaic and classical Greece:

- (a) as an equivalent for *tyrannos* as actually used in fifth-century literature (which is impractical, given the overlap with *basileus* and the variation between authors' usage),

¹⁰¹ Cf. Pope 1991:156.

- (b) to refer to those whom Thucydides would have called *tyrannoi*, i.e. sole rulers of Greek *poleis* (as is done by most modern historians),
- (c) to refer to usurpers or illegitimate rulers (who are not necessarily always the rulers whom Thucydides would have called *tyrannoi*),¹⁰²
- (d) to refer to those rulers who instantiate the conventional properties of the 'figure of the tyrant' (as is done by scholars who analyse tragic or Herodotean rulers in these terms, such as Lanza and Lateiner),¹⁰³
- (e) to refer to rulers who are, in the scholar's view, cruel and oppressive (as is done by some scholars of tragedy).¹⁰⁴

Clearly, there are some rulers that would fit into several of these categories, but there are also rulers who would fit only into one or two. For this reason, the word 'tyrant' is unsurpassed in its sheer potential for confusion as a term of analysis, and I have not used it.¹⁰⁵

Instead, in referring to any specific ruler or group of rulers in tragedy or elsewhere, I have called them **rulers**. This term possesses a convenient lack of positive or negative connotations in English, which makes it easy to refer to any given ruler without prejudging the way in which that ruler has been depicted. Where it is necessary to be more specific, it is easy to do so by qualifying the word 'ruler', for instance by saying 'rulers depicted as cruel and oppressive' or 'rulers depicted in terms of the conventionally negative ideas found in Herodotus'. (Of course, this involves additional verbosity—but that is a slight price to pay for avoiding ambiguity, especially where the presence of this particular source of ambiguity would be destructive to the clear exposition of the argument of the thesis.)

¹⁰² Cf. pp. 16-21 above.

¹⁰³ Lanza 1977; Lateiner 1989:170-186; cf. pp. 4-5 above.

¹⁰⁴ Jordan 1979:85-86 n. 133 is unusual in arguing explicitly for this usage; he also cites some earlier scholars who employ it.

¹⁰⁵ I say this only with respect to fifth-century tragedy. When applied to archaic history, the term 'tyrant' is not so confusing (although it is not without its problems), since historians of archaic Greece concur in using it in sense (b); cf. de Libero 1996:23, 37-38.

There is, however, one exception. In fifth-century sources (including Herodotus), the Peisistratids at Athens are always called *tyrannoi* and their rule a *tyrannis*, and the notion of *tyrannis* played an important role in fifth-century Athenian political and intellectual life, being widely used as a metaphor for absolute power. The words *basileus* and *basileia* are simply not used in our sources in this fashion. Therefore, I have used *tyrannoi* and *tyrannis* as interpretative categories specifically in the context of Athenian political and intellectual life, chiefly in Chapter 2. However, whenever it is necessary to discuss non-Athenian rulers or the rulers of fifth-century tragedy (who are, as we have seen, not consistently called *tyrannoi*), I have chosen to use the more neutral terms ‘rulers’ and ‘rule’.

Lastly, in common with most scholars, I have referred to the holders of *archai* within the Athenian democracy as ‘officials’. (Given the restricted powers of these officials except in military contexts, it seemed difficult to call them ‘rulers’ in English.) However, the Greek words commonly used to refer to them (ἄρχω, ἄρχοντες, ἀρχή) literally mean ‘rule’, and can equally be applied to sole rulers in tragedy. Therefore, when I say in Chapter 3 that Creon in *Antigone* is presented in a way that brings him close to the officials of the Athenian democracy, it should be borne in mind that this assimilation is perhaps facilitated by the fact that Greek has no categorical distinction between ‘rulers’ and ‘officials’ in the first place.

IV. Overview of rulers in tragedy

Most extant tragedies contain at least one ruler, and there are also many known rulers in fragmentary plays. It is not feasible to consider all of these in the thesis, and there is only room to enter into a fully detailed discussion of five (Chapters 5-7). Here, therefore, it seems important to discuss briefly the rulers whom I have *not* been able to discuss in detail in the thesis, and to clarify how the detailed chapters that follow fit into the full complexity and variety of the depiction of rulers in tragedy as a whole.

In order to facilitate this, but also in order to present visually the playwrights' use of terminology (as outlined above), I provide a list of all rulers in extant tragedy, categorised according to the play in which they appear, as well as a list of rulers from fragmentary plays. In each case, I have listed rulers who seem to me to be conceived of as exercising sole rule (or joint rule with one other person) within the play. Where a character who appears on stage is conceived of as exercising sole rule *in the past* or *in the future*, I have included this character in brackets. I have included rulers from fragmentary plays only where it seems clear that the character in question appeared on stage and was presented as ruling.

After each ruler's name, I have indicated, using the signs β , τ , and α , whether that ruler is referred to (in extant material) using the words *basileus*, *tyrannos*, and *anax* (or their cognates). Where the Greek letter is given in brackets, e.g. (β) , this denotes that *only* cognates occur, not the common noun.

I do not include gods, off-stage characters, family-members of rulers such as daughters and wives (unless they themselves exercise authority within the play), characters who are rulers in epic but exercise no authority within a given play (Ajax, Achilles, Philoctetes, Odysseus), generalisations, metaphors with no reference to a particular ruler, cases where the Chorus are called *anaktes*, or cases where these words are applied collectively to rulers' families, wives, daughters, palaces, and marriages. I also omit *Prometheus Bound* (where no ruler appears on stage anyway).

Space prohibits full references, which can easily be found using *TLG*.

Aeschylus

Persians: Xerxes $\beta\alpha$, (Darius $\beta\alpha$)

Suppliants: Pelasgus α

Seven Against Thebes: Eteocles $\beta\alpha$

The Oresteia: Agamemnon $\beta(\tau)\alpha$; Aegisthus and Clytaemestra τ

Also: Theseus and Adrastus (*Eleusinians*);¹⁰⁶ Lycurgus (*Edonians, Lycurgus*); Laius and Oedipus (*Laius, Oedipus*); Pentheus (*Wool-Carders* (?), *Pentheus*);¹⁰⁷ Menelaus and Proteus (*Proteus*); Telephus and Agamemnon (*Telephus*); Priam (*Phrygians*).

Sophocles

Ajax: Agamemnon^{βτ} and Menelaus^{β(α)}

Antigone: Creon^{βτα}

Oedipus Tyrannus: Oedipus^{βταα}, (Creon^α)

Women of Trachis: —

Electra: Aegisthus and Clytaemestra^{τ108}

Philoctetes: Neoptolemus^{α109}

Oedipus at Colonus: Theseus^{βα}, Creon^τ, (Oedipus)

Also: Aegeus (*Aegeus*); Athamas (*Athamas*); Acrisius (*Acrisius*); Priam (*Alexander*); Aeetes (*Women of Colchis*); Adrastus (*Eriphyle*); Atreus (and Thyestes) (*Thyestes*); Iobates (*Iobates*); Agamemnon (*Iphigenia*); Cocalus and Minos (*Men of Camicus*); Oenomaus (*Oenomaus*); Acastus^{β?} (*Peleus*); Agamemnon^(τ) (*Polyxena*); Agamemnon (*Those Who Dine Together [Syndeipnoi]*); Telephus (*Telephus*); Theseus (*Phaedra*).

Euripides

Cyclops: —

Alcestis: Admetus^{βα}, (Pheres^(τ))

Medea: Creon^{βτα}, Aegeus

¹⁰⁶ Plut. *Thes.* 29.4-5, Isoc. XII.168-171, with Sommerstein 2008:56-57.

¹⁰⁷ On *Wool-Carders*, see Jouan 1992:77-78; Sommerstein [1996] 2010a:35, 2008:170-173.

¹⁰⁸ Clytaemestra seems to be regarded as ruling at Soph. *El.* 522, 651; cf. 664. Aegisthus is, however, presented as the main ruler (267-268, 420-421, 661).

¹⁰⁹ Cf. p. 9 n. 20 above. Among off-stage characters, Agamemnon and Menelaus are mentioned as being in authority at 455-458, 793-795, 872-873, 1023-1024, 1294; cf. 6.

Children of Heracles: Demophon^{βτα},¹¹⁰ Eurystheus^{βτα}

Hippolytus: Theseus^{(τ)α}

Andromache: Peleus^α, Menelaus

Hecuba: Agamemnon^α, Polymestor^α

Suppliants: Theseus^α, Adrastus^{τα}

Electra: — ¹¹¹

Heracles: Lycus^{βτα}, Theseus^α

Trojan Women: — ¹¹²

Iphigenia among the Taurians: Thoas^{βτα}

Ion: Xuthus, (Ion^{(β)τ(α)})

Helen: Theoclymenus^{βτα}, Menelaus^{βτα}

Phoenician Women: Eteocles^{β(τ)α}, Creon

Orestes: Menelaus^{βα}, (Orestes^α)¹¹³

Bacchae: Pentheus^{(β)τα}, (Cadmus)

Iphigenia at Aulis: Agamemnon^{βα} and Menelaus^α

Also: Aegeus (with the young Theseus) (*Aegeus*); Aeolus^(τ) (*Aeolus*); Priam^{α?} (*Alexander*); Phegeus (*Alcmaeon in Psophis*); Creon^τ (*Alcmaeon in Corinth*); Creon (*Antigone*); Cisseus^β (*Archelaus*); Aleus (*Auge*); Busiris (*Busiris*); Acrisius (*Danae*); Polydectes^{τ?} (*Dictys*); Erechtheus and Eupolemus (*Erechtheus*); Eurystheus (*Eurystheus*); Minos (with the young Theseus) (*Theseus*); Atreus^τ (and Thyestes) (*Thyestes*); Athamas (*Ino*); Theseus (*Hippolytus Veiled*); Polyphontes^(τ)

¹¹⁰ Acamas is treated as co-ruler at 35, but not at 115-119, nor subsequently.

¹¹¹ Aegisthus, however, is a prominent offstage character. Clytaemestra does not seem to be treated as ruling.

¹¹² Menelaus appears, but does not seem to be in any particular position of authority.

¹¹³ This play has a unique quasi-democratic setting; no ruler is in power. Aegisthus and Diomedes are mentioned, but neither rules. At the end, though, Apollo declares that Menelaus will rule in Sparta, Orestes in Argos (Eur. *Or.* 1660-1661). Tyndareus is in a dominant position, but is not clearly presented as *ruling*, at Sparta (626; cf. Griffith 2011:203-204).

(*Cresphontes*); Catreus and Atreus (and possibly Thyestes) (*Cretan Women*); Minos^α (*Cretans*); Aeolus (*Melanippe Wise*); Metapontus (?) (*Melanippe Captive*);¹¹⁴ Oeneus^(α) (*Meleager*); Oedipus (*Oedipus*); Agrius and Oeneus (*Oeneus*); Oenomaus (*Oenomaus*); Agamemnon (*Palamedes*); Pelias (*Daughters of Pelias*); Minos (*Polyidus*); Proetus^α (*Sthenoboea*); Lycomedes (*Scyrians*); Agamemnon, Menelaus, and Telephus (*Telephus*); Tisamenus, Temenus, Cresphontes, the two sons of Aristodemus, and Archelaus (*Temenus, Sons of Temenus*); Merops^{βα} (*Phaethon*); Athamas (*Phrixus A and B*).

Aeschylus' rulers are hard to categorise. **Darius** and **Xerxes**, as the only two non-legendary rulers in tragedy, are unique; since the method pursued in this thesis could not be applied satisfactorily to them without detailed inquiry into Greek perceptions of Achaemenid kingship, I have generally left them aside.¹¹⁵ We will see in Chapter 5 that **Eteocles** and **Agamemnon** are presented in terms of ideas not found elsewhere in similar form. As discussed in Chapter 3, **Pelagus** resembles Demophon in Euripides' *Children of Heracles* and especially Theseus in Euripides' *Suppliants*. His role involves accepting suppliants into the *polis*, and he acts in a quasi-democratic way—although he differs from Demophon and Theseus in ruling Argos. **Aegisthus** and **Clytaemestra**, considered in Chapter 2, appear to recall contemporary Athenian ideas regarding *tyrannis* and the killing of *tyrannoi*.¹¹⁶ Clytaemestra is remarkable in holding a double *tyrannis* together with Aegisthus.¹¹⁷ Aegisthus and Clytaemestra can be compared with their equivalents in Sophocles' *Electra* and Euripides' *Electra*, who are not so clearly presented in these terms.

¹¹⁴ Cf. Collard, Cropp and Lee 1995:242-243.

¹¹⁵ I discuss aspects of *Persians* briefly at pp. 51, 65-67 below.

¹¹⁶ See pp. 86-88.

¹¹⁷ τὴν διπλὴν τυραννίδα (Aesch. *Cho.* 973). The plurals at Ag. 1354, 1362-1363, also seem to imply joint *tyrannis*, although at 1633 the Chorus objects specifically to Aegisthus becoming τύραννος Ἀργείων. Clytaemestra's possession of *tyrannis* picks up on her earlier exercise of rule in Agamemnon's absence (κράτος, 258) and her earlier tendency to assume a male role (11, 351): Winnington-Ingram [1948] 1983:101-106; Zeitlin 1978:153-154.

Aeschylean fragments offer few hints. His plays about **Oedipus** (*Oedipus*), about **Adrastus**' recovery of the corpses of the Seven through **Theseus**' help (*Eleusinians*), and about **Pentheus** (*Pentheus*, and perhaps *Wool-Carders*) depicted rulers who appear in extant plays by Sophocles (*Oedipus Tyrannus*) and Euripides (*Suppliants*, *Bacchae*). As discussed in Chapter 7, fragments of Aeschylus' *Edonians* suggest resemblances between **Lycurgus** in *Edonians* and Pentheus in Euripides' *Bacchae*.¹¹⁸

In Sophocles and Euripides, too, no two rulers are the same. Nevertheless, in order to present a clear overview, it is helpful to group them into a few loose categories. In doing so, I do not wish to suggest that these are the only possible categories, or to understate the variety within each group; rather, I wish to emphasise this variety, which is substantial.

1. A first convenient group consists of rulers depicted in terms of the conventionally negative features discussed in Chapter 1, many of which are shared with stories about rulers in Herodotus. There is much internal variety within this group, since these rulers often display other features that are not of this kind.

Firstly, we have Sophocles' **Creon** (*Antigone*) and **Oedipus** (*Oedipus Tyrannus*). These rulers, as is widely acknowledged, display considerable similarities, although they differ considerably in their *moral* presentation; a detailed comparison forms Chapter 6.

We do not know how Euripides presented Creon and Oedipus in his lost *Antigone* and *Oedipus*. The fragments are tantalising: we know that *Antigone* ended happily (perhaps suggesting a more positive portrayal of Creon), and extant fragments suggest that this *Antigone*, like Sophocles', may have reflected extensively on political issues and on Creon's role as ruler.¹¹⁹ In *Oedipus* a speaker, perhaps Jocasta, says that

¹¹⁸ See pp. 243-244.

¹¹⁹ Eur. *Antigone* fr. 171 articulates a principle, the need to please the many, which Creon emphatically denies at Soph. *Ant.* 734. Fr. 172 resembles Sophocles' play in exploring the relationship between a *tyrannos* and the *nomoi*.

phthonos was responsible for Oedipus' fall; if these lines accuse Creon of *phthonos* towards Oedipus, this may suggest tensions between Creon and Oedipus comparable to those in Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus*.¹²⁰

In extant Euripides, **Lycus** (*Heracles*) and **Pentheus** (*Bacchae*) display similar conventional features; Chapter 7 will discuss Pentheus in these and other respects. In *Medea*, Euripides seems to subvert conventional negative notions of how a ruler might behave, when **Creon** states that he does not have the temper of a *tyrannos* and has often been harmed by his *aidos*.¹²¹ Such a capacity to act harshly without displaying *aidos* is exhibited by Lycus in *Heracles*. So Euripides is cognisant of the association of rulers with harsh behaviour, but is not bound by it, even subverting it by presenting a ruler whose mildness causes his destruction.

Sophocles and Euripides may have presented other rulers similarly. We sometimes know enough about a fragmentary play's plot to see that a ruler *may* have been presented in such a light, as with **Cisseus** in *Archelaus*,¹²² **Polyphontes** in *Cresphontes*,¹²³ and **Lycus** in *Antiope*.¹²⁴ However, not all Euripidean rulers who play oppressive roles are presented in the conventional terms discussed in Chapter 1, and so we cannot be sure that such deductions are sound.

2. Theseus and other Athenian rulers. Sophocles' and Euripides' plays often feature Athenian rulers. **Demophon** in Euripides' *Children of Heracles* and **Theseus** in Euripides' *Suppliants* play especially similar roles, receiving suppliants into Athens, and going to war on their behalf. In this respect, these plays resemble Aeschylus' *Suppliants*, where Pelasgus receives suppliants into Argos and defends them against the Egyptians. Also comparable are **Theseus** in Euripides' *Heracles* and **Theseus** in Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus*, who receive a single hero into the Athenian *polis*. As Mills shows, these plays all have a close relationship with the Athenians' self-

¹²⁰ Eur. *Oedipus* fr. 551, with Collard and Cropp 2008b:6.

¹²¹ Eur. *Med.* 348-349.

¹²² Suggested by Schmid 1940:765.

¹²³ Hyg. *Fab.* 137 [= Eur. *Cresphontes* test. iia] gives the plot; cf. p. 89.

¹²⁴ So Collard, Cropp and Gibert 2004:266.

definition as a community, as also found in other sources (especially the formalised funeral orations delivered during wartime at Athens); this involved presenting Athens as a *polis* hospitable to suppliants, and presenting Theseus as a great man and as the founder of the Athenian democracy.¹²⁵

Nevertheless, these figures are not *merely* instantiations of Athens' self-image, but are also presented as people making genuinely difficult decisions. Demophon is confronted with an oracle that a young woman will have to be killed, which he cannot do without provoking popular unrest; Theseus initially refuses to help and is only convinced by his mother's intervention. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 3, these plays all present the ruler's political position differently. In Aeschylus' *Suppliants* Pelasgus acts as a democratic leader, and Euripides' *Suppliants* presents Theseus as the founder of the Athenian democracy, dwelling considerably on the nature of good and bad democratic leadership. In Euripides' *Children of Heracles* and Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus*, by contrast, the ruler is depicted more straightforwardly as a sole ruler. Both on the level of decision-making and in terms of the political ideas underlying their portrayal, therefore, the depiction of these characters displays considerable complexity.

Sophocles and Euripides present these characters in a largely positive fashion, which reflects and explores contemporary Athenian ideals about good leadership and Athens' role in the world. However, Euripides at least was by no means constrained to present Athenian rulers in such a way. In *Medea*, **Aegeus'** decision to offer sanctuary to Medea seems to subvert the conventional presentation of Athens as a place welcoming to strangers: whereas Heracles (*Heracles*) and Oedipus (*Oedipus at Colonus*) are heroes bringing great blessings, the Chorus of *Medea* expresses deep discomfort about Medea's admission to Athens, since she will shortly murder her children and (as the audience will probably have known) will subsequently attempt to poison Theseus.¹²⁶ In *Hippolytus*, Euripides' presentation of **Theseus**, who

¹²⁵ Mills 1997; similarly e.g. Atack 2020:47-52.

¹²⁶ B. Vickers 1973:476-478; Mossman on Eur. *Med.* 663-763; Swift 2017:88-89.

accidentally causes his son's death, is hardly flattering; as Mills suggests, Euripides has distanced this Theseus from Athens by setting the play in Troezen and not treating Theseus as Athens' representative.¹²⁷ In *Ion*, a play containing much reflection on Athenian identity, the depiction of **Xuthus**, **Creusa** and **Ion** does not seem idealised; indeed, Creusa's unwillingness to allow Ion to inherit power at Athens when (she thinks) he does not have autochthonous blood is partly what leads her to conspire against his life.¹²⁸ It is interesting that, whereas Euripides' *Suppliants* and Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus* avoid calling Theseus *tyrannos* (presumably because any Peisistratid connotations would be undesirable), in *Hippolytus* and *Ion* Theseus and Xuthus *do* possess *tyrannis*.¹²⁹ These plays, then, present Athenian rulers in a light which is not at all straightforward.

Several fragmentary plays featured Athenian rulers. Euripides' *Erechtheus*, like *Children of Heracles* and *Suppliants*, clearly placed **Erechtheus** in a difficult quandary: in one fragment, Erechtheus' wife Praxithea persuades him to allow his daughter to be sacrificed.¹³⁰ In another speech, Erechtheus gives advice to his son which shows that, like *Suppliants*, this play contained exploration not only of Athenian values, but also of politics and leadership.¹³¹ We know little about **Aegeus** or **Theseus** in other plays.¹³²

Athenian rulers, then, were presented in various ways; often, they were the focus for exploring ideas both about political leadership and about Athens' identity and values.

3. Non-Greek rulers. Aside from Aeschylus' *Persians*, Euripides' plays contain three non-Greek rulers: **Polymestor** in *Hecuba*, **Thoas** in *Iphigenia among the Taurians*, and

¹²⁷ Mills 1997:193-194.

¹²⁸ Cf. Loraux [1981] 1993:199-208, 220-224; Gibert 2019:40-43 (with further references).

¹²⁹ Eur. *Hipp.* 1013, 1020; *Ion* 621, 626, 829, 1464, 1572; also *Herac.* 111.

¹³⁰ Eur. *Erechtheus* fr. 360, used as an example of patriotism by Lycurg. *Leoc.* 99-101 [= Eur. *Erechtheus* test. ii]. Atack 2020:52-55 sees *Erechtheus* as anticipating theories of *basileia* later proposed by Xenophon and Isocrates.

¹³¹ Eur. *Erechtheus* fr. 362, especially lines 24-31.

¹³² Sophocles' *Phaedra* and Euripides' *Hippolytus Veiled* presumably featured Theseus in the same role as Euripides' *Hippolytus*. In Sophocles' *Aegeus*, Euripides' *Aegeus*, Euripides' *Theseus*, and perhaps Sophocles' *Theseus*, Theseus is still young.

Theoclymenus in *Helen*. Euripides may have invented all three.¹³³ *Iphigenia among the Taurians* and *Helen* have similar plot structures, in which the main characters escape from a foreign country, the ruler of which is determined to kill any visiting Greeks.¹³⁴ Some scholars regard not only Polymestor but also Thoas and Theoclymenus as stereotypical foreigners, brutal and stupid.¹³⁵ Others, however, have seen positive qualities in Thoas and Theoclymenus, noting that Thoas acts piously and is courteous to Iphigenia,¹³⁶ while Theoclymenus does not justify Helen's fear that he will rape her or disrespect her supplication of his father's tomb.¹³⁷ These considerations do not cancel out these rulers' willingness to murder visiting Greeks (or Theoclymenus' willingness to contemplate killing his sister), but perhaps Euripides has depicted these characters with a little more light and shade, morally speaking, than one might expect just from their plot roles.¹³⁸ Thoas and Theoclymenus are not assimilated in any significant way to real non-Greek rulers such as the Persian *basileis*, and these plays do not dwell on the political issues prominent in many plays discussed in this thesis.¹³⁹

Several fragmentary plays included non-Greek rulers. Like *Helen* and *Iphigenia among the Taurians*, *Andromeda*, produced together with *Helen*, depicted the escape of a male hero with a woman from a foreign country.¹⁴⁰ Therefore, **Cepheus** may possibly have been presented similarly to Thoas and Theoclymenus,¹⁴¹ but evidence is lacking. Since **Busiris** in the satyr-play *Busiris* rules Egypt (like Theoclymenus) and sacrifices foreign visitors (like Thoas), he should perhaps be connected with Thoas and Theoclymenus.¹⁴² Like Polymestor in *Hecuba*, **Eumolpus** in *Erechtheus* and **Tereus** in Sophocles' *Tereus* are portrayed as Thracians, and Hall suggests that the playwrights

¹³³ Mossman 1995:29-31, Battezzato 2018:8-9 (Polymestor); Dale on Eur. *Hel.* 9-10 (Theoclymenus); Cropp on Eur. *IT* 32-33 (Thoas); Hall 1989:107, 110, 112-113 (all three).

¹³⁴ Burian 2007a:40-41 summarises the similarities.

¹³⁵ Hall 1989:110-113; cf. Cropp 2000:48-50.

¹³⁶ Kyriakou 2006:34-36; L. P. E. Parker on Eur. *IT* 1153-1221.

¹³⁷ Wright 2005:194-199; Papadodima 2013:243.

¹³⁸ Cf. Wright 2005:194, 199.

¹³⁹ Despite Podlecki 1970:414-415; Allan 2008:58-59.

¹⁴⁰ Allan 2008:4; cf. Wright 2005:43-44.

¹⁴¹ Collard, Cropp and Gibert 2004:140.

¹⁴² Collard and Cropp 2008a:318; Marshall 2014:93 n. 117.

innovated in associating them with Thrace, perhaps to take advantage of the stereotype of Thracians as violent and deceitful.¹⁴³ However, we should be cautious about inferring these characters' presentation from their plot roles; the playwrights need not *necessarily* have presented them as negatively as their roles might suggest.

4. The Greek leaders at Troy. Agamemnon and Menelaus appear repeatedly in Greek tragedy. As mentioned above, their authority is not presented in a manner closely reflecting the *Iliad*;¹⁴⁴ rather, they are portrayed in more contemporary terms. In *Ajax*, Menelaus uses contemporary ideas about obedience to justify not burying Ajax.¹⁴⁵ Euripides, as with Athenian rulers, often places Agamemnon in difficult positions, especially ones where he is torn between obligations to the army and personal obligations. In *Hecuba* and *Iphigenia at Aulis*, Agamemnon complains about his position, declaring that the ruler of such an army is practically a slave to his own soldiers.¹⁴⁶ In *Hecuba*, the army's possible anger makes him reluctant to punish Polymestor.¹⁴⁷ In *Iphigenia at Aulis*, Agamemnon is incapable of preventing the sacrifice of Iphigenia because he believes that, if he tried, the army would mutiny.¹⁴⁸ In both plays, the army is depicted as an immensely powerful body, over which Agamemnon and Menelaus are far from having full control; perhaps this reflects how armies were seen as operating during the Peloponnesian War. In both plays the army is swayed by Odysseus' demagoguery;¹⁴⁹ in *Hecuba*, the army debates, like a

¹⁴³ Hall 1989:103-107; R. C. T. Parker 1987:203-204 disagrees regarding Eupolmus (cf. Collard, Cropp and Lee 1995:152-153). Tereus' savagery in Accius' *Tereus* may possibly go back to Sophocles (Degl'Innocenti Pierini 2002:127-128, 132; Sommerstein, Fitzpatrick and Talboy 2006:155-156).

¹⁴⁴ See pp. 7-11.

¹⁴⁵ See pp. 117-120.

¹⁴⁶ Eur. *Hec.* 850-867; *IA* 449-450, cf. 645; cf. Heim 1904:29-31, 48; T. Graham 2017:182-198. Almost no passage of *Iphigenia at Aulis* is free from textual doubt; Kovacs condemns some of the passages cited here, although Diggle thinks them probably authentic. Nevertheless, these parallels, being important if valid, cannot be neglected.

¹⁴⁷ Eur. *Hec.* 850-867.

¹⁴⁸ Eur. *IA* 531-535.

¹⁴⁹ Eur. *Hec.* 130-140, 254-255; *IA* 525-533 (condemned by Kovacs). On Odysseus as demagogue, see Heim 1904:49-50, 96, 101 (citing the scholiast on Eur. *Hec.* 254 and Eustathius 201.24 on *Il.* II.200); Stanford [1954] 1963:111-116; Worman 2008:52-55; Schein on Soph. *Phil.* 96-9.

democratic assembly, the fate of Polyxena;¹⁵⁰ in *Iphigenia at Aulis*, Menelaus recounts how Agamemnon gained leadership over the army by humbly soliciting ordinary soldiers' favour.¹⁵¹

These plays may also be compared with Euripides' *Orestes*, where the populace of Argos is enormously powerful, and where neither Menelaus nor anyone else has the slightest power over them.¹⁵² Rather like Agamemnon in *Hecuba* or *Iphigenia at Aulis*, Menelaus explains that he cannot help Orestes because he does not have the military forces to defeat the Argives in a fight. All that can be done, he says, is to wait until the mob's rage abates and then try to persuade them.¹⁵³

We cannot know how Agamemnon and Menelaus were presented in Euripides' *Palamedes* and *Telephus*, or Sophocles' *Iphigenia*, *Syndeipnoi* and *Polyxena*. In one fragment of *Polyxena*, though, Agamemnon expresses the limitations of his power; so perhaps Agamemnon was presented as powerless before the army here, too.¹⁵⁴

Menelaus in Euripides' *Helen* falls within the Euripidean tendency, remarked upon by Aristophanes, of putting on stage traditionally high-status characters (not necessarily rulers) wearing ragged clothing.¹⁵⁵ Menelaus remarks upon his descent from prosperity, especially when he laments that, although a *basileus*, he must beg from other *tyrannoi*.¹⁵⁶ Indeed, Menelaus exemplifies two Euripidean tendencies—that of placing the Atreids in difficult and unglamorous positions, and that of reducing traditionally prosperous individuals to the status of beggars.

¹⁵⁰ Eur. *Hec.* 107-140; cf. Carter 2013:34-39, 48.

¹⁵¹ Eur. *IA* 337-345 (condemned by Kovacs).

¹⁵² De Romilly 1972:240 makes this comparison; cf. Carter 2010:81-82. On the *demos* in *Orestes*, cf. pp. 130-131 below, and de Romilly 1972; Easterling 1997:29-33; Carter 2013:39-46, 52-53.

¹⁵³ Eur. *Or.* 684-716.

¹⁵⁴ Soph. *Polyxena* fr. 524. Cf. also Aesch. *Myrmidons* fr. 132c.1 (discussed by Snell 1964:3-7; Michelakis 2002:24-26), where Achilles is concerned about being stoned by the Greek army.

¹⁵⁵ Ar. *Ach.* 412-434 (with examples), *Ran.* 1063-1064; cf. Eur. *Hel.* 420-424. The phenomenon (including Menelaus) is discussed by Aélion 1983:II.159-165; Allan 2008:34; Cecchet 2015:67-88.

¹⁵⁶ Eur. *Hel.* 510-512.

In *Andromache*, Menelaus takes up the same persecuting role as Theoclymenus in *Helen*. Much is made of Menelaus being a Spartan; his and his daughter Hermione's vicious conduct prompts numerous anti-Spartan reflections.¹⁵⁷

Euripides, then, often placed Agamemnon and Menelaus in difficult and demeaning positions, and assimilated them considerably to contemporary generals and political leaders. We cannot know how extensively Sophocles did the same, for instance in his *Polyxena*, but some contemporary elements are certainly present in the presentation of Menelaus in *Ajax*.

5. Various rulers in Euripides do not fall into any of these categories. Some, such as **Admetus** and **Pheres** in *Alcestitis* and **Peleus** in *Andromache*, are hardly depicted *as rulers* at all, acting largely as the heads of their households.

Eteocles in *Phoenician Women* is distinct from Euripides' Lycus and Pentheus in not displaying the traditional negative elements outlined in Chapter 1, and in drawing on contemporary intellectual debates concerning tyranny, power, and justice, which do not feature in the portrayal of Lycus and Pentheus.¹⁵⁸ The relationship between *Phoenician Women* and Aeschylus' *Seven Against Thebes* is also important.¹⁵⁹ In the *agon* of *Phoenician Women* Polynices' claim is made to seem credible, whereas Aeschylus' Eteocles dismisses it in a few lines;¹⁶⁰ Euripides' Eteocles engages in an extended and cautious strategic discussion with Creon, whereas Aeschylus' Eteocles acts decisively and on his own judgement.¹⁶¹ Euripides' Eteocles is, then, a complex special case, and, although presented less positively than in Aeschylus, is not really a typical 'tyrant'.

¹⁵⁷ Poole 1994:7, 9-11, 17 places Menelaus' portrayal within the wider context of anti-Spartan sentiment in Euripides. Some (e.g. Poole 1994:9) maintain that Eur. *Andr.* 471-474 criticises the Spartan double *basileia*, but Stevens *ad loc.* and Allan 2000:213-214 are cautious.

¹⁵⁸ So rightly Nauhardt 1940:72. Cf. pp. 90-92 below.

¹⁵⁹ Discussions of the relationship between *Phoenician Women* and *Seven Against Thebes* include Aélion 1983:I.197-228; Papadopoulou 2008:38-44; Hilton 2011:28-41. (Blum 1940:48-71 and Meuli 1945:79-84, comparing Euripides' Eteocles with Aeschylus', are not especially useful.)

¹⁶⁰ Aesch. *Sept.* 658-678; cf. Aélion 1983:I.211-213; Papadopoulou 2008:38.

¹⁶¹ Cf. Papadopoulou 2008:41. Hilton 2011:30 argues that Eur. *Phoen.* 751-752 points self-consciously to Aeschylus.

We have already considered several rulers who threaten suppliants at an altar; these tend to be presented negatively, although only Lycus in *Heracles* is presented using the conventionally negative features discussed in Chapter 1, while Theoclymenus in *Helen* is a remarkably pious non-Greek, and Menelaus in *Andromache* is a Spartan. To these we may add Creon in Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus* and Eurystheus in Euripides' *Children of Heracles*.¹⁶² **Creon's** position is curious: Eteocles and Polynices considered handing him the throne, but decided against it, and now he is acting under instructions from the Theban people 'even though a *tyrannos*'.¹⁶³ **Eurystheus** in *Children of Heracles* is also unusual, since, despite his role as persecutor, he apparently co-exists with an Argive democratic Assembly, which passes a legal verdict against the children of Heracles.¹⁶⁴ Also, although Eurystheus is deprecated by all other characters, he seems to be presented less darkly when he appears on stage; Euripides treats Alcmena's revenge, which might have been presented as a just act, as open to serious moral objections, making Eurystheus more sympathetic in the end than one might have expected.¹⁶⁵

V. Aeschylus and Euripides in the service of contemporary rulers

Aeschylus and Euripides primarily wrote plays for performance in democratic Athens. However, according to the biographical tradition, they visited the courts of sole rulers—in Aeschylus' case Hieron of Syracuse (ruled 478-467), and in Euripides' case Archelaus of Macedon (ruled 413-399).

Aeschylus wrote at least one play, *Aetnaean Women*, specifically for Sicilian performance, in celebration of Hieron's foundation of the *polis* of Aetna in the late

¹⁶² The similarity of these characters' roles is pointed out by Meuli 1945:76-77; Kopperschmidt 1971:339-343.

¹⁶³ Soph. OC 741-742, 837-838, 850-851 (καὶ τύραννος ὧν ὁμῶς), with Finglass 2011b:46 and 48 n. 17.

¹⁶⁴ Eur. *Heracl.* 141-142 and 186 (cf. 60) seem to imply that the Argives *voted* to kill or exile the children of Heracles, although Allan *ad locc.* interprets differently; cf. p. 166 n. 58 below. Also, in *Suppliants*, the decision to refuse Adrastus access to the bodies of the Seven is ascribed by the Herald to the whole Argive people, rather than Creon alone (*Supp.* 467-468, cited by Finglass 2011b:48-49).

¹⁶⁵ Allan on Eur. *Heracl.* 983-1017; cf. Burian 1977.

470s, and *Persians* was reperformed in Sicily around this time. Aeschylus' visit to Sicily will become relevant in Chapter 5.¹⁶⁶

In his last years, Euripides visited Archelaus of Macedon, for whom he wrote *Archelaus*.¹⁶⁷ This play depicted the rise of Archelaus' eponymous legendary ancestor to power in Macedon.¹⁶⁸ The performance context, plot, and prologue fragments (which trace the ancestry of the legendary Archelaus all the way back to Danaus) all suggest that this play will have served to legitimise the historical Archelaus' Greek heritage and rule over Macedon.¹⁶⁹ The legendary Archelaus is not a ruler within the play (since only at the end does he leave to found Aegae).¹⁷⁰ This legendary Archelaus was probably presented in a highly positive light, since several fragments praise a young man, probably Archelaus, for his noble ancestry, courage, and intelligence.¹⁷¹ Archelaus is probably contrasted with the injustice, foolishness, cowardice, violent savagery, and anger of a rich man described in another set of fragments; these may refer to Archelaus' enemy Cisseus, who rules during the play itself.¹⁷²

These visits do not bear greatly on Aeschylus' and Euripides' depiction of rulers in most of their other plays, which are written for Athenian audiences. The playwrights' willingness to work for sole rulers does, however, indicate that any view of their presentation of rulers that relies on a pervasive ideological antipathy to sole rulers is likely to be incorrect.¹⁷³ However, such a supposition is not borne out by the plays in

¹⁶⁶ See p. 180 n. 120.

¹⁶⁷ Eur. T 1.IA.6 = *Archelaus* test. iia¹. The biographical tradition also states that Euripides died in Macedon (T 1.IA.10, 1.IB.3, 1.II; Kannicht 2004:I.101, 104, 106 gives further sources), which Scullion 2002 doubts. However, it remains accepted that Euripides wrote the play for Archelaus (Scullion 2006:193-194; Moloney 2014:236).

¹⁶⁸ Hyg. *Fab.* 219 seems to recount the plot [= Eur. *Archelaus* test. iia]: Harder 1985:170; Collard, Cropp and Gibert 2004:331; Collard and Cropp 2008a:230.

¹⁶⁹ Moloney 2014:234-240; cf. Csapo 2010:172, Duncan 2011:78-80, Stewart 2019:6-9.

¹⁷⁰ Hyg. *Fab.* 219.5.

¹⁷¹ Eur. *Archelaus* frr. 231-233, 237, 240, 242, 246, with Collard and Cropp 2008a:231.

¹⁷² Eur. *Archelaus* frr. 235, 239, 255, 257-259, cf. 264. One wonders whether, in depicting Cisseus as laying a trap for Archelaus in which he intends Archelaus to be burnt alive (Hyg. *Fab.* 219.3), Euripides may have been reusing an element from *Heracles*, where Lycus intends to burn Heracles' family alive (Eur. *HF* 240-246).

¹⁷³ Cf. Duncan 2011.

any case, since—as we have seen—tragic rulers are presented in many different ways, some highly sympathetically, others very negatively.

VI. The scope and purpose of Chapters 5-7

Out of this great variety of rulers, I have only studied five in the fullest detail: Aeschylus' Eteocles and Agamemnon in **Chapter 5**, Sophocles' Creon and Oedipus in **Chapter 6**, and Euripides' Pentheus in **Chapter 7**. These chapters do not present comprehensive accounts of these characters, for instance by listing these rulers' character-traits, or by discussing their psychology and thoughts. Rather, these chapters aim to take the observations made in Chapters 1-4 further, by exploring how the playwrights use pre-existing ideas (including those considered in Part One) to present these five characters, especially in moral terms.

In contrast to the intellectual-historical approach of Chapters 1-4, Chapters 5-7 explore the playwrights' technique in presenting these characters. It is therefore necessary to set out certain points of principle regarding the study of characters. However, since these principles will not be relied on until Chapter 5, I have thought it best to leave these to the **Introduction to Part Two**, rather than discussing them here.

VII. Questions of authenticity

I have followed Griffith and others in maintaining that *Prometheus Bound* is probably not by Aeschylus, but by an unknown playwright writing before the 420s.¹⁷⁴ Since *Rhesus* is probably a fourth-century play, I have omitted it.¹⁷⁵

Kovacs systematically rejects several Euripidean passages discussing demagogues and *tyrannoi*,¹⁷⁶ namely *Hippolytus* 1012-1015; *Suppliants* 238-245, 414-416, 442-455; *Heracles* 588-592; *Ion* 595-606, 621-632; *Phoenician Women* 549-567; *Orestes* 907-913;

¹⁷⁴ Griffith 1977, especially 11-13 (date); M. L. West 1979, 1990:51-72.

¹⁷⁵ Liapis 2012:lxvii-lxxv; Fries 2014:22-42.

¹⁷⁶ Kovacs 1982.

Daughters of Pelias fr. 605; and tentatively *Ino* fr. 420. Except for *Orestes* 907-913, however, other recent editors retain these passages, and I consider them probably genuine, although my argument relies little on their authenticity.

I have cited poems attributed to Solon (fr. 4, 6, 9-11, 13, 30, 32-33, 36-37) as evidence for the circulation of given moral and political ideas by the tragic playwrights' day. I therefore do not rely on these poems' authenticity (which some doubt), but only on them predating the mid-fifth century (which seems secure).¹⁷⁷ I use Theognis 43-52, commonly considered authentic, in the same way.¹⁷⁸ Since Theognis 667-682 are probably by Euenus of Paros, I treat these lines as a fifth-century poem.¹⁷⁹ I have placed no great weight on Theognis 153-154, which are probably inauthentic,¹⁸⁰ or on 1181-1182, 1203-1206, which belong to a section of the corpus containing many inauthentic lines;¹⁸¹ where I adduce these lines as parallels, I do so only on the grounds that they *may* be archaic.

Here and there, these assumptions may be incorrect; if so, some observations made in the thesis might lose a little of their force, but the overall picture would be little affected.

VIII. Summary

All in all, then, the aim of this thesis is to explain the main conceptions that underlie the portrayal of rulers in the plays of Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides (primarily in **Chapters 1-4**), and then to explain in detail how these playwrights make use of these ideas to depict five specific rulers (discussed in **Chapters 5-7**). Detailed discussion of all points has not been possible, but the detailed discussions in the

¹⁷⁷ Lardinois 2006; Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010:45-65.

¹⁷⁸ It is a 'Cyrnus' poem within lines 19-254, which are widely considered authentic (M. L. West 1974:40-43, 55-56, followed by Bowie 1997:62, Lane Fox 2002:35-36; Selle 2008:185, 191 differs).

¹⁷⁹ See pp. 105-106.

¹⁸⁰ See p. 50 n. 10.

¹⁸¹ M. L. West 1974:43; Bowie 1997:62; Lane Fox 2002:36.

chapters that follow may be fitted into the broader overview that has been presented here.

PART ONE

IDEAS

CHAPTER 1. RULERS IN STORIES IN HERODOTUS AND IN TRAGEDY

I. Introduction

Many features are shared between rulers in Herodotus and in tragedy. Scholars have noted similarities between Herodotean and tragic rulers, but this chapter provides a detailed survey.

We are not here primarily concerned with the many recurring features characteristic of the Greek oral tradition of stories about rulers,¹ several of which appear also in the Oedipus legend, as employed in Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus*.² These include ominous prophecies heralding the ruler's birth, his exposure as a child, his rise to power through cunning, and abnormal sexual conduct (such as incest).³ Ogden also argues that the Oedipus story shares with numerous stories about rulers and colony-founders a 'loimos-schema', involving deformity or lameness, pestilence or sterility, exposure, scapegoating and expulsion.⁴ These features are of great importance for understanding the development of the story tradition, but were not introduced by

¹ Catenacci [1996] 2012; Luraghi 2013a:49-71; 2014; 2015.

² Such shared elements between the Oedipus legend and story tradition are discussed by Vernant [1981] 1988, Gentili 1986, and are taken into account by Catenacci [1996] 2012 *passim*.

³ Ominous prophecies: e.g. Hdt. I.59.1-3 (Peisistratus), V.92β.2-92γ.1 (Cypselus), Diod. Sic. VIII.24 (Orthagoras), Cic. *Div.* 1.23 (Phalaris); discussed by Catenacci [1996] 2012:38-53.

Cunning: e.g. Hdt. I.59.3-6, 60.3-5 (Peisistratus), Polyaeus, *Strat.* I.23.2 (Polycrates), Nicolaus of Damascus, *BNJ* 90 F 61 (Cleisthenes of Sicyon); discussed by Lavelle 1993:115; Catenacci [1996] 2012:160; Luraghi 2014:73 and *passim*.

Exposure: cf. Hdt. I.110-112 (Cyrus), with Catenacci [1996] 2012:59; Danze 2016:586-588.

Incest: Hdt. III.31-32 (Cambyses), VI.107 (Hippias, in a dream), Diog. Laert. I.96 and Parth. *Amat. narr.* 17 (Periander), with Catenacci [1996] 2012:124-125; Lightfoot 1999:485 and n. 254; cf. Finglass 2018b:60. Other abnormal sexual conduct: Hdt. I.61.1 (Peisistratus), V.92η.3 (Periander); cf. Catenacci [1996] 2012:121-141; Luraghi 2015:74-75.

Of course, Herodotus' stories about rulers also contain many characteristically oral features *not* shared with the Oedipus legend. See Hansen's folktale analyses of the stories of Darius and Intaphrenes' wife (Hdt. III.119 with W. Hansen 2002:62-66), Perdiccas of Macedon (VIII.137-139: 2002:424-426), Gyges and Croesus (I.6-13, 28-91: 2002:316-327), Cyrus' birth and early life (I.107-130: 2002:408-414), and Polycrates' ring (III.40-43: Aarne, Thompson, and Uther 736A; W. Hansen 2002:14, 29 n. 73). Scholars have also considered in some detail the oral elements of the stories about Cambyses (Aly 1921:86-88; Lang 1992, with Luraghi [2005] 2013b:100-101). Cf. pp. 72-73 n. 143 on Periander and Lycophron.

⁴ Ogden 1997:1-2, 29-30, *passim*.

Sophocles into the Oedipus legend, since *Oedipus Tyrannus* presupposes them. Rather, these elements are shared between the Oedipus legend and the story tradition *at the legendary level*; they may be among the oldest parts of the Oedipus legend, and may indeed predate the sixth century, and thus the entire tradition of stories about sixth-century rulers.⁵

Outside *Oedipus Tyrannus*, however, these elements scarcely appear: no other tragic ruler's birth is heralded by portents, none is exposed, none is lame or deformed, none rises to power by means of cunning or trickery,⁶ and none engages in markedly peculiar sexual behaviour. So, although these elements are of great importance for understanding the origins of Greek thought about rulers,⁷ they are generally not taken over into tragedy, and therefore need not concern us here.

This chapter surveys the **moral ideas (II)** and **characteristics and behaviours (III)** associated with rulers in Herodotus and tragedy.

I aim to complicate the view of Lanza and others, according to which the common behaviours attributed to rulers amount to a 'figure of the tyrant', by showing that the

⁵ Our evidence for the early Oedipus legend is shaky. The incest is attested at *Od.* XI.271-273. Late sixth-century and fifth-century pots depict Oedipus answering the Sphinx's riddle, i.e. rising to power by his intelligence (Moret 1984:I.49-50, 80, Edmunds 2006:18-19, Larson 2017:113-115, citing especially Rome, Vatican Museum 16.541, c. 470; Stuttgart, Landesmuseum Württemberg 65/15, c. 530; Basle, Cahn Collection 855; cf. also Edmunds 1985:12-13, 30-35).

The oracle addressed to Laius (first mentioned in Aesch. *Sept.* 742-749) and the story of Oedipus' birth and exposure (perhaps presupposed by Aesch. *Laius* fr. 122, but not properly recounted until Soph. *OT*) are not actually attested until the fifth century. However, these elements are widely analysed as basic to the legend (Edmunds [1981] 1983, 1985:6-10, 22-31; Gantz 1993:490, 492), especially given the Oedipus legend's connection with other Greek legends involving the hero's ascent to the throne (Luria 1927) and lameness and bastardy (Ogden 1997:31-32); cf. Bremmer 1987:43-53; Manuwald 1992:5. Edmunds 1979:8-10 and [1981] 1983:162-164, building on Luria, observes connections also with Near Eastern divine kingship myths. The *second* oracle, addressed to Oedipus, may however be a Sophoclean innovation (Manuwald 1992:9-10; Finglass 2018a:34). Cf. Catenacci's remarks on the relationship between heroic legend and the stories about rulers (Catenacci [1996] 2012:21-23).

⁶ Aeschylus' Aegisthus, indeed, excuses himself, saying that carrying out the deception was clearly a job for a woman (Aesch. *Ag.* 1636).

⁷ As Catenacci [1996] 2012:21 remarks, 'La complessa elaborazione [of ideas about tyranny] del V-IV secolo ... non nasce dal nulla.'

connections between different rulers in Herodotus and tragedy are often more extensive and complicated than has generally been realised. We are not dealing with the reproduction of a stock figure, but rather with a heterogeneous variety of recurrent moral ideas, story patterns, and other elements.

II. Moral elements

Perhaps the most prominent resemblance between rulers in Herodotus and in tragedy is the conventional idea according to which a person progresses from prosperity (*olbos* or *ploutos*) to ruin (*ate*). This progression often involves wrongdoing (*hybris*, *adikia*) followed by retribution or defeat, or the gods resent the person's prosperity (*phthonos*) and destroy it.⁸ Often, *ate* is preceded and precipitated by mental delusion (*anoia*, *apate*) or arrogance (*mega phronein*).⁹ This complex of ideas is, clearly, well-fitted to explain the fall of any ruler. It perhaps originated in the archaic period, first appearing in poetry attributed to Solon and Theognis, where these ideas are propounded in a general, moralising way, without apparent reference to rulers.¹⁰

⁸ Garvie 2009:xxiv-xxvi lays this out well; cf. R. C. T. Parker 1997:151-152. These two mechanisms are not necessarily mutually exclusive in any given case (Cairns 1996:17-22; cf. Lloyd-Jones 1971:55-70).

⁹ In tragedy, *ate* primarily refers to ruin or disaster, unlike in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* and occasionally Aeschylus (*Sept.* 312-316, 686-688, 1001, *Supp.* 104-111, *Ag.* 1192, according to Sommerstein 2013:6-7), where it refers to folly or delusion ($\approx$ *anoia*, *apate*). However, even where *ate* means ruin or disaster it is often *linked* with folly and delusion (e.g. Aesch. *Pers.* 93-100, 739-742, Soph. *Ant.* 594-603, with Cairns 2013:xii-xiv), and Aeschylus does not usually use *ate* to refer to ruin that is not somehow caused by the sufferer's own folly (only at *Supp.* 444, *Ag.* 643, 1124, according to Sommerstein 2013:10-11), although Sophocles and Euripides do (Sommerstein 2013:11-12).

The word 'hubris' has made its way into everyday English to refer to the pride that comes before a fall, but this is *mega phronein* in Greek. In Greek, *hybris* denotes outrageous, often violent and insulting, wrongdoing. However, there is a close association between *mega phronein* and *hybris*, and indeed the latter often implies the former (Cairns 1996:10-16, modifying Fisher 1992).

¹⁰ Solon fr. 6.3-4, 13.3-13, 13.71-76; [Thgn.] 153-154 (seemingly derivative of Solon fr. 6.3-4, and therefore perhaps inauthentic: Bowie 1997:62; *contra*, van Wees 2002:58 n. 21). Solon fr. 13.7-8 might, though, be connected to Solon's refusal of the wealth that comes with *tyrannis* elsewhere (fr. 33.5-6). There is also a different archaic idea according to which *hybris* produces *stasis*, leading to *tyrannis* (cf. p. 86 below).

Pindar uses the same ideas to interpret the downfalls of Tantalus and Ixion, in poems addressed to Hieron of Syracuse.¹¹

In tragedy, the fall from *olbos* to *ate* is described in choral odes of Aeschylus' *Persians* and *Agamemnon*, and Sophocles' *Antigone* and *Oedipus Tyrannus*, in generalising terms, which leave it to the audience to consider how this pattern might apply to the plays' characters.¹² However, Darius' Ghost explicitly invokes it to explain Xerxes' defeat,¹³ and Creon explains his own downfall in retrospect in similar terms.¹⁴ Also, it is surely no coincidence that the four plays in which the Chorus invokes the fall from *olbos* to *ate* all focus on a ruler meeting with disaster. It seems, then, that Aeschylus and Sophocles felt this pattern to be appropriate to stories involving the falls of rulers. So did Herodotus: Croesus' and Polycrates' falls are interpreted as happening on account of divine *nemesis* or *phthonos* at their *olbos*,¹⁵ while both divine *phthonos* and divine punishment are invoked in relation to Xerxes' defeat.¹⁶

Since there are multiple ways in which an individual can fall from *olbos* to *ate*, this moral pattern is very flexible. Herodotus mentions divine *phthonos* in relation to Croesus and Polycrates, but divine punishment *and* divine *phthonos* in relation to Xerxes. Solon's poetry strongly emphasises the moral aspect, strongly distinguishing between just prosperity, which is secure, and unjust prosperity, which brings destruction.¹⁷ Pindar also emphasises Tantalus' and Ixion's punishment for wrongdoing. In Aeschylus' *Persians*, Darius' Ghost explains Xerxes' defeat primarily as the result of *hybris*, which the gods resent.¹⁸ These passages do not exhibit any particular consciousness that divine *phthonos* and divine punishment are *alternatives*,

¹¹ Pind. *Ol.* 1.54-59, *Pyth.* 2.25-31. In urging Hieron not to act with *hybris*, these lines perhaps anticipate tragedy and Herodotus in applying the fall from *olbos* to *ate* to a ruler (although indirectly, and in a *contrario* fashion); cf. pp. 181-182.

¹² Aesch. *Pers.* 93-100; *Ag.* 381-388, 750-773; Soph. *Ant.* 611-625, *OT* 873-894 (references partly from Schmiel 1990:343-344).

¹³ Aesch. *Pers.* 807-828.

¹⁴ Soph. *Ant.* 1261-1276, cf. 1161-1171.

¹⁵ Hdt. I.34.1, III.40.2-3.

¹⁶ Hdt. VIII.77, 109.3, cited by Saïd 2002:137.

¹⁷ Solon fr. 13.7-13.

¹⁸ Aesch. *Pers.* 807-828.

but the second stasimon of *Agamemnon* seems to oppose the two, expressing the hope that the gods punish wrongdoers, rather than prosperity necessarily bringing destruction.¹⁹ Clearly, therefore, the fall from *olbos* to *ate* is a flexible motif: sometimes amoral divine *phthonos* is emphasised, sometimes *hybris* and punishment, and these explanations can be treated as complementary or set against each other. Herodotus' and the playwrights' choices in using these ideas can only be understood with reference to the situations, characters and ideas presented in each instance, as we will see in relation to *Agamemnon*, *Antigone* and *Oedipus Tyrannus* in Chapters 5-6.

Herodotus and tragedy associate other shared ideas with the falls of rulers, such as the notion of misfortunes running through a family. This sometimes takes the form of the idea that later generations are punished for the wrongdoings of earlier generations.²⁰ In Herodotus, the story of Croesus is framed by this notion,²¹ although elsewhere it is applied to non-rulers.²² In tragedy, the Chorus of *Seven Against Thebes* explains Eteocles' fall in terms of the wrongdoing of his grandfather Laius.²³ In *Agamemnon*, too, the killing of Agamemnon is placed in the context of the many misfortunes and crimes of earlier Atreids, especially those of Atreus and Thyestes (which Cassandra calls the '*ate* that began everything').²⁴ The notion of ancestral *kaka* is also employed prominently in relation to the Labdacids in Sophocles' *Antigone* and *Oedipus at Colonus* and Euripides' *Phoenician Women*, and in relation to the Atreids in Sophocles' *Electra* and Euripides' *Iphigenia among the Taurians* and *Orestes*.²⁵ In these plays, the specific notion of transgenerational *punishment* (articulated in Herodotus and in *Seven Against Thebes*) is present in the background if at all; the emphasis is rather on ancestral *misfortune*.

¹⁹ Aesch. *Ag.* 750-762, with Dodds 1951:30; Winnington-Ingram [1973] 1983:1, 8; Sommerstein on Aesch. *Ag.* 757-758; Garvie 2009:xxv; cf. Ellis 2017:52.

²⁰ This topic has been treated exhaustively by Gagné 2013:275-445.

²¹ Hdt. I.13.2, 91.1; see Gagné 2013:326-327.

²² See Gagné 2013:278-325.

²³ Aesch. *Sept.* 720-791, 800-802; see Gagné 2013:351-362.

²⁴ πρῶταρχον ἄτην (Aesch. *Ag.* 1192); cf. 1184-1197 *passim*, and Gagné 2013:394-416.

²⁵ Gagné 2013:362-393, 416-438.

Furthermore, rulers' falls are often foreshadowed by dreams, oracles or warnings. In Herodotus, the falls of Astyages and Polycrates and the defeat of Xerxes are all anticipated by dreams,²⁶ and scholars have compared these to ominous dreams in tragedy, such as Atossa's in *Persians* or Clytaemestra's in *Libation-Bearers*.²⁷ Oracles—or, rather, specifically the Delphic Oracle, accompanied by the 'constant presence of Delphic Apollo in the background'²⁸—play an important role in Herodotus, especially in the story of Croesus, where Apollo not only predicts Croesus' demise long in advance,²⁹ but issues a riddling oracle which actually prompts Croesus to the misjudgement that results in his destruction.³⁰ This resembles *Oedipus Tyrannus*, where Apollo similarly issues an oracle that results in Oedipus' destruction. Indeed, at the end of the Croesus story, Apollo is actually criticised by Croesus for his misleading oracle, in a way that somewhat resembles the criticism levelled at Apollo in Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus* or even Euripides' *Ion*.³¹ Saïd also maintains that there is a parallelism between the role of seers in tragedy (such as Teiresias in Sophocles' *Antigone* and *Oedipus Tyrannus*) and 'warner' characters in Herodotus (such as Solon, Croesus, and Artabanus). Although the 'warner' figures in Herodotus do not derive their authority from their religious position, both groups' warnings heighten the sense that the ruler's fall is inevitable, and, as Saïd says, 'foreshadow what is going to happen and help the reader notice the blindness of the rulers who did not pay attention to them'.³²

²⁶ Hdt. I.107-108 (Astyages; cf. Saïd 2002:128); III.124 (Polycrates; cf. Griffin 2006:53); VII.19 (Xerxes).

²⁷ Aesch. *Pers.* 176-199, *Cho.* 523-533, 928-929, with Griffin 2006:52-53 (also citing Eur. *Hecuba* 30-33, 69-78).

²⁸ Herington 1991:7.

²⁹ Hdt. I.13.2. Other oracles anticipating rulers' falls: II.139 (Sabacus of Ethiopia), 147, 151-152 (the Twelve Kings of Egypt), IV.163 (Arcesilaus of Cyrene), cited by Saïd 2002:122.

³⁰ Hdt. I.53.3.

³¹ E.g. Soph. *OT* 1329-1330; Eur. *Ion* 436-451. The criticism of Apollo in Herodotus' account (Hdt. I.90.2-3, cf. I.87, I.75.2) is discussed usefully by Flower 1991:71-73, Gagné 2013:327-329. Cf. also Fontenrose 1978:112.

³² Saïd 2002:122, drawing on Stahl 1975:6-7. Note also the parallelism between Hdt. IX.16.5 and Soph. *OT* 216-218, discussed by Edmunds 2000:37-40 (and cf. p. 216 n. 86 below).

Scholars of Herodotus have often suggested that these elements are shared between tragedy and Herodotus because of tragic influence on Herodotus.³³ Now, tragic influence on Herodotus is intrinsically plausible,³⁴ and such influence has been traced in verbal parallels between Herodotus and Sophocles,³⁵ and in the structure of some stories in Herodotus, especially that of Croesus and Atys.³⁶ However, when it comes specifically to these shared moral ideas, the notion that Herodotus' use of them was influenced by tragedy seems open to doubt, in view of the oral nature of Herodotus' work; his stories were his own versions of pre-existing stories.³⁷ We have no access to Herodotus' sources, but it must be regarded as at least possible that the oral versions of these stories that Herodotus relied upon already contained, in some cases, the moral elements in question. Moreover, it is inherently and necessarily the case that, if, in any given instance, Herodotus' oral source already mentioned any of these moral elements and then Herodotus used this element in his own version of the story, he *cannot possibly* have derived this element from tragedy: the two possibilities are mutually exclusive. (It is, though, logically possible that Herodotus' oral sources included such elements in their versions of *some* stories but that in *other* cases Herodotus was influenced by tragedy to include these elements.) Even considering the bare possibility that Herodotus' sources contained these moral elements should therefore make us pause before ascribing them to tragic influence.³⁸

³³ Saïd 2002, Griffin 2006. This notion, that the debt of Herodotus to tragedy can be seen in the shared moral ideas and worldview, is also advanced by Schmid 1934:570-572; Pohlenz 1937:116-118. I am not the first to doubt this view; Chiasson 1979:178-220 objects to it at length (although on different grounds from those presented here).

³⁴ Earlier scholars (notably Jacoby 1913 cols. 232-242; Schmid 1934:317-318, 569-570) maintain that Herodotus actually spent time in Athens and knew Sophocles personally. This is possible (and this view is adopted by Ostwald 1991:143-147), but see Podlecki 1977 for a sceptical discussion.

³⁵ Podlecki 1977:248-250 gives a list. (The best-known verbal parallel is between Hdt. III.119.6 and Soph. *Ant.* 909-912, but this is usually taken to reflect Herodotean influence on Sophocles rather than *vice versa*; see p. 72 n. 141.)

³⁶ Arguments for the story of Croesus and Atys (Hdt. I.34-45) displaying tragic form are presented by Rieks 1975:32-38, Fontenrose 1978:111-115, and Chiasson 2003:7-19; cf. the different approach of Manuwald 1992:5-7. More generally on tragic form in Herodotus, see Saïd 2002:118-119, 132 (with further references); Griffin 2006:54 (expressing some scepticism).

³⁷ Cf. the discussions cited at p. 11 n. 35.

³⁸ All this would hold true even if we *knew* that Herodotus was familiar with tragedies containing these same moral elements. So, for instance, even if we imagine Herodotus to have heard the Croesus story with a strong Apolline focus *and* to have watched a large number of

However, this is not just a bare possibility: it is entirely plausible and indeed positively likely that all the elements considered above were present in Herodotus' sources. We have already seen that the notion of a fall from *olbos* to *ate* is used in archaic poetry both in general terms and in specific cases (Tantalus and Ixion in Pindar). There is no reason at all to suppose that Athenian tragedy was the first genre to apply this motif to rulers, and the story tradition may well have been doing this long before. Equally, there is no particular reason to suppose that tragedy, as opposed to the broader legendary tradition, influenced Herodotus' depiction of the fall of Croesus in terms of trans-generational punishment. On the contrary, the way in which Herodotus frames the Croesus story—with brief but clear statements that Croesus' fall will represent a punishment for the wrongdoing of his ancestor—seems altogether different from tragedy, where the notion of trans-generational punishment is hinted at obscurely, creating an ominous atmosphere dominated by ancestral *kaka*. As for dreams, oracles and warnings, if Herodotus had drawn them from tragedy we would probably expect them to be more prominent in tragedy than in Herodotus, but the opposite is truer: most extant tragedies contain none of these elements, whereas they are frequent in Herodotus. Moreover, dreams, oracles and warnings are such common elements in archaic poetry, Greek legend, and throughout other folktale traditions that it would be surprising if they were not to some degree present in the fifth-century story tradition. Reinhardt, indeed, maintains that the Herodotean 'warner' figure is drawn from Near Eastern storytelling, and not from the Greek tradition at all; if there is any truth in this, it can hardly be maintained that Herodotean 'warner' figures have much to do with tragic seers.³⁹ Also, when it comes to Apollo and his oracles, the notion that their prominence in Herodotus is owed to tragedy conflicts with Jacoby's widely accepted hypothesis that they are owed to Herodotus drawing on Delphic sources, especially in the Lydian stories, and that any such Delphic sources are likely to have placed a strong emphasis on precisely these

tragedies with a similarly Apolline focus, it still makes no sense to attribute the Apolline elements in Herodotus' version of the Croesus story to tragedy.

³⁹ Reinhardt [1940] 1960:169-170.

elements, i.e. Apollo, his oracles, and human failure to comprehend them.⁴⁰ It also ignores the possibility that, as scholars have convincingly argued, the prominence of Apollo in both tragedy and Herodotus is owed in large part to the general cultural influence of Delphi on the whole legendary tradition underlying the *Oresteia*, the plays of Sophocles, and Herodotus' stories.⁴¹ In short, while tragedy sometimes *might* have influenced Herodotus' use of these moral ideas, it is certainly not safe to maintain this view in general terms; by and large, it seems rather improbable.

Therefore, all we can say with certainty is that fifth-century tragedy and storytelling had available similar moral ideas and ways of explaining things. Consequently, when Herodotus and the tragic playwrights depict the fall of rulers, many of the ways in which they do this are drawn from this shared pool.⁴² For precisely this reason, it is impossible to say whether, in any given instance, there is direct influence; there may have been a fair amount, in either direction. Reasonable caution dictates that we go little further than that. What seems beyond doubt, however, is that these writers' depiction of the fall of rulers shares many elements and is based on very closely related cultural preconceptions.

III. Characteristics and behaviours

III.i. Introduction

The moral ideas just discussed take the form of overarching patterns. However, rulers in Herodotus and tragedy also display various shared behaviours and other attributes. In tragedy, Lanza analyses these as a 'figure of the tyrant', and Lateiner has

⁴⁰ Jacoby 1913 cols. 421-422; Defradas 1954:211-215, 223-226; Rieks 1975:28-29; Fontenrose 1978:112-113, 115; Murray 1987:105-107; Flower 1991:61-63 and *passim*; Hornblower 2002:377-378.

⁴¹ Delphic influence on the Oedipus legend: Robert 1915:I.69-70 with Edmunds 1985:15; also Edmunds [1981] 1983:158; de Kock 1961:22-27; Fontenrose 1978:110. On the Orestes and other legends: Defradas 1954:136-146, 153-156, 164-165, 181-188, 200-201; Fontenrose 1978:108-110.

⁴² Similarly Chiasson 1979:237.

taken a similarly paradigmatic approach to Herodotus.⁴³ The similarity *between* Herodotean and tragic rulers is pointed out by Luraghi, who remarks that many passages in tragedy ‘contribute to depicting an image of the sole ruler that is broadly consistent with the historical narratives on archaic *tyrannoi*, which were being written down in the same years’.⁴⁴ However, since scholars have generally studied rulers in Herodotus and tragedy separately, the exact nature of this broad consistency has gone largely unspecified.

Lanza emphasises four main behaviours: impiety, greed, fear and suspicion, and anger; moreover, these rulers are often set in opposition to freedom (*eleutheria*), a central value of fifth-century Greek thought.⁴⁵ I have little to add regarding impiety; rulers in Herodotus and tragedy exhibit impiety in a heterogeneous variety of ways, which seem difficult to compare, except by acknowledging that impiety is found in both.⁴⁶ I will also not consider greed and rapacity here, for a different reason: although rulers in the story tradition exhibit these behaviours, I do not think that Lanza is actually correct to maintain that they are especially associated with rulers in tragedy.⁴⁷

I will consider four areas in which tragic and Herodotean rulers can be productively compared. Firstly, I will argue that rulers’ fear and suspicion is not so much an attribute of a prototypical ‘figure’ as a recurrent story pattern, in which a ruler suspects a plot and takes action to prevent it (ii). Secondly, the unwillingness of rulers to listen is also part of a recurrent story pattern (iii). Furthermore, anger (ὀργή),

⁴³ Lateiner 1989:170-186. Waters 1971, by contrast, rejects any kind of patterning in Herodotus’ presentation of rulers. Gammie 1986 and Dewald 2003 adopt a more moderate position, noting some shared features among rulers in Herodotus while also emphasising their variety.

⁴⁴ Luraghi 2013c:139.

⁴⁵ Lanza 1977:45-64.

⁴⁶ In Herodotus, note especially III.27-29, 37-38 (Cambyses in Egypt), VII.238.1-2, VIII.109.3 (Xerxes). Tragic rulers’ impiety is discussed by Lanza 1977:56-60; examples include Creon’s refusal of burial to Polynices (Soph. *Ant.*) and the Atreids’ refusal of burial to Ajax (and note especially Soph. *Aj.* 1350), Pentheus’ conflict with Dionysus (Eur. *Bacch.*), Lycus’ threats to burn Heracles’ family at the altar (Eur. *HF* 242-245), and Polymestor’s murder of his guest Polydorus (Eur. *Hec.* 21-27, 787-805, 852-853); cf. also Eur. *Phoen.* 492-493, 524-525.

⁴⁷ See Appendix 2 (pp. 276-279).

although it appears in many different contexts, is part of a wider constellation of shared motifs in one case, namely its use in the story of Periander and Lycophron and in Sophocles' *Antigone* and *Oedipus Tyrannus* (iv). Then, I will consider how Herodotus and tragedy apply the language of slavery and freedom firstly to Persia, and secondly to the legendary rulers of tragedy (v).

I will conclude by briefly arguing that, as with the moral ideas discussed above, these resemblances between Herodotus and tragedy probably do not indicate tragic influence on Herodotus; they may, however, indicate the influence of the story tradition on tragedy (vi).

III.ii. Fear and suspicion

Several Herodotean rulers, in a recurrent story pattern, act in order to prevent subjects from threatening their power.⁴⁸ Astyages orders the infant Cyrus exposed, because a dream informs him that Cyrus will overthrow him.⁴⁹ Cambyses orders Smerdis killed because he fears (ταῦτα δέισας) that he might kill him and take the throne.⁵⁰ Darius executes Intaphernes and his sons, suspecting them of plotting against him.⁵¹ Apries is falsely suspected of sending soldiers to military defeat in order to rule more securely (ἀσφαλέστερον ἄρχοι),⁵² and Polycrates does just this, sending men he suspects of planning to revolt (ὕπώπτευε μάλιστα ἐς ἐπανάστασιν) to serve under Cambyses.⁵³ Periander asks Thrasybulus how to govern Corinth most safely (ἀσφαλέστατον), and, on Thrasybulus' advice, kills Corinth's leading citizens.⁵⁴ In these passages, the most remarkable thing is perhaps *how little* the ruler's fear or suspicion is emphasised; only in Cambyses' case is fear briefly mentioned. Otanes, in his general discussion of the disadvantages of sole rule, does not mention

⁴⁸ These are selected from row A4 in Lateiner's table (Lateiner 1989:172, 176), which also contains passages less relevant here.

⁴⁹ Hdt. I.108.1-4.

⁵⁰ Hdt. III.30.3.

⁵¹ Hdt. III.119.

⁵² Hdt. II.161.4.

⁵³ Hdt. III.44.2.

⁵⁴ Hdt. V.92ζ.2-η.1. Also: I.64.1, I.99.2, I.134.2.

fear and suspicion, instead attributing rulers' tendency to mistreat their citizens to *phthonos*.⁵⁵ It seems clear that such stories about rulers were a recurring feature of the tradition, but also that Herodotus, in telling these stories, does not emphasise the fear and suspicion that might have been conjectured to lie behind the rulers' actions in each case.

In tragedy, fear and suspicion come into much sharper focus.⁵⁶ A fragment of Euripides' *Daughters of Pelias* (455) says, 'This highest state admired by mortals, *tyrannis*—you could not find one more wretched. He has to pillage and kill his friends, and is also subject to the greatest fear that they will do him some harm.'⁵⁷ Similar general statements are enunciated by characters justifying the renunciation of *tyrannis* in Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus*, and Euripides' *Hippolytus* and *Ion*.⁵⁸ In *Suppliants*, Theseus says that the ruler 'kills the best men and whoever he considers intelligent (or, 'proud'), fearing for his *tyrannis*.'⁵⁹ In *Prometheus Bound*, Prometheus remarks of Zeus, 'For this illness inheres in *tyrannis*: not trusting one's friends.'⁶⁰ Tragedy, then, places more emphasis than Herodotus on rulers' fear and suspicion.

As in Herodotus, several tragic rulers act to preempt threats to their power. Creon in *Antigone*, informed of Polynices' secret burial, wrongly suggests that it was done by paid agents of citizens desiring to overthrow him.⁶¹ In *Oedipus Tyrannus*, Oedipus

⁵⁵ Hdt. III.80.4-5; *phthonos*, which Herodotus specifically says is an inborn characteristic of humans in general (ἀρχῆθεν ἐμφύεται ἀνθρώπῳ, III.80.3), is clearly a different explanation from fear, which is produced by circumstances.

⁵⁶ The references given here, and in the next paragraph, are discussed by Lanza 1977:45-49; Ugolini 2017:462-463.

⁵⁷ τὸ δ' ἔσχατον δὴ τοῦτο θαυμαστὸν βροτοῖς, τυραννίς—οὐχ εὖροις ἂν ἀθλιώτερον· φίλους τε πορθεῖν καὶ κατακτανεῖν χρεών, πλεῖστος φόβος πρόσσεστι μὴ δρᾶσώσι τι (Eur. *Daughters of Pelias* fr. 605).

⁵⁸ Soph. *OT* 584-593; Eur. *Hipp.* 1013-1020, *Ion* 621-628.

⁵⁹ καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους οὓς <τ'> ἂν ἡγήται φρονεῖν κτείνει, δεδοικώς τῆς τυραννίδος πέρι (Eur. *Supp.* 445-446).

⁶⁰ ἔνεστι γὰρ πῶς τοῦτο τῇ τυραννίδι νόσημα, τοῖς φίλοισι μὴ πεποιθέναί (PV 224-225). Xenophon and Plato use the incapacity of the *tyrannos* to trust his friends as an argument against *tyrannis* (Xen. *Hier.* 4.2, Pl. *Resp.* VIII.567a-c, cited in relation to PV by Thomson 1929:4); see pp. 81-82 below.

⁶¹ Soph. *Ant.* 290-294; cf. 533.

suspects Teiresias and Creon of plotting against his rule and life,⁶² and threatens Creon with death.⁶³ In *Prometheus Bound*, Prometheus prophesies that his release will be owed to Zeus' desire to maintain his rule against a plot,⁶⁴ and Zeus submits Prometheus to further tortures to find out how to avoid this plot and preserve his rule.⁶⁵ In Euripides' *Heracles*, Lycus explains that he wishes to kill Heracles' family not out of shamelessness (ἀναίδεια) but out of caution (εὐλάβεια): having killed Heracles' father-in-law, he knows that Heracles' sons, when grown up, will threaten his life.⁶⁶ In Euripides' *Electra*, the Farmer describes the extensive precautions which Aegisthus has taken to secure his rule against overthrow by Orestes, and Aegisthus' fearfulness is emphasised throughout.⁶⁷

All this clarifies the exact resemblance between Herodotus and tragedy. What is shared is a recurrent story pattern in which rulers anticipate threats and take action to thwart them; what is not shared is an emphasis on rulers' fear and suspicion, which is scarcely mentioned in Herodotus, but which tragedy remarks on more explicitly.

III.iii. Unwillingness (or willingness) to listen to advice

A further pattern shared between Herodotus and tragedy involves subjects hesitating to address their ruler.

This is common in Herodotus' stories from the Persian court. Croesus asks Cyrus whether he should speak or be silent, Cambyses wishes to kill Croesus for speaking his mind, no-one except Artabanus is willing to advise Xerxes in opposition to Mardonius, and Demaratus hesitates to speak his mind to Xerxes. Artemisia says that

⁶² Soph. *OT* 380-389, 532-542, cf. 658-659.

⁶³ Soph. *OT* 623.

⁶⁴ *PV* 168-177, cf. 756, 761-762. At Hes. *Theog.* 526-534, by contrast, Zeus allows Heracles to release Prometheus in order to increase Heracles' fame.

⁶⁵ *PV* 947-950, 990-991, 1014-1035.

⁶⁶ Eur. *HF* 165-169; similarly 207-210, 213.

⁶⁷ Eur. *El.* 22-42, 617, 831-833, discussed by Durante 2017:566-571.

it is right for her to declare to Xerxes her real opinion.⁶⁸ These examples show that this motif of hesitation to speak is flexible, and is used in various permutations. Sometimes rulers react badly to advice, but sometimes are amenable to it; sometimes subjects hesitate to address rulers, but elsewhere disclaim hesitation, boldly speaking out.

Tragedy employs the same motif, with similar flexibility.⁶⁹ In Sophocles' *Antigone*, the Guard is afraid to announce Polynices' burial to Creon; here, this fear is justified by Creon's threats and fearsome conduct.⁷⁰ In *Oedipus Tyrannus*, however, Teiresias asserts his right to speak, saying that, even though Oedipus is ruler, he can be his equal in speaking back in turn. Later, Creon insists on Oedipus listening to him defend himself, which Oedipus does, although impatiently.⁷¹ In *Bacchae*, the Messenger is afraid to speak because he fears Pentheus' sharp temper and *to basilikon lian*. Pentheus, however, says he will not harm him.⁷² Later, too, the Chorus-leader hesitates to speak freely (λόγους ἐλευθέρους) before the *tyrannos*, but declares that she will speak nonetheless.⁷³

In Herodotus and tragedy, rulers do not, then, consistently behave in the same way; rather, the two genres share a story pattern. Its consequences for the presentation of rulers vary, since sometimes rulers willingly listen to advice, while elsewhere they react harshly and even violently.

III.iv. Anger

Another element displayed by rulers in Herodotus and tragedy is anger (ὀργή). Unlike the features just discussed, *orge* is not restricted to a single story pattern, but

⁶⁸ Hdt. I.88.2, III.36, VII.10.1, 101.3, 104.5, VIII.68α.1. I draw these from row C6 of Lateiner's table (Lateiner 1989:174, 178).

⁶⁹ On these passages, cf. Carter 2004:212-213; Finglass on Soph. *OT* 408-9.

⁷⁰ Soph. *Ant.* 223-236.

⁷¹ Soph. *OT* 408-410, 543-544.

⁷² Eur. *Bacch.* 670-672.

⁷³ Eur. *Bacch.* 775-777.

occurs in various situations. When Cyaxares mistreats certain Scythians, Herodotus remarks that he must have been prone to anger (ὀργὴν ἄκρος). Cyrus answers the Ionians with *orge* when refusing to receive their submission on the same terms as Croesus. Cambyses' *orge* prompts his disastrous invasion of Ethiopia; he also becomes angry when Prexaspes tells him that he is said to drink excessively, and, recollecting this anger later, kills Prexaspes' son with an arrow. Periander is angry with his son Lycophron, who is, however, even more persistent in his anger with Periander, who killed Lycophron's mother. Xerxes exhibits anger at Artabanus' advice not to invade Greece, and also when he orders that Pythias' son be cut in half.⁷⁴ So Herodotean rulers often display anger—and, whereas fear and suspicion only seem to occur in one particular story pattern, *orge* arises in many contexts.

For Euripides, there was clearly an association between rulers and a harsh or angry temper. This is clear from the Messenger's reference to Pentheus' 'excessively *basileus*-like manner' (τὸ βασιλικὸν λίαν), and from Creon's reference to the '*tyrannos*-like temper' (λήμα τυραννικόν) in *Medea*.⁷⁵

However, in two especially conspicuous cases of rulers displaying *orge*—Creon in Sophocles' *Antigone* and Oedipus in *Oedipus Tyrannus*⁷⁶—it seems that *orge* is part of a larger group of elements shared with the story tradition. This may be seen by comparing these two plays with the story of Periander and Lycophron in Herodotus.⁷⁷

⁷⁴ Hdt. I.73.4, I.141.1, III.25.1, 34.3, 35.1, 52.3-4, VII.11.1, 39.1. Other instances of rulers' anger: I.156.2; IV.128.1. Non-rulers also become enraged: I.61.2, I.114.5, II.121δ.3 (pretended anger), III.131.1, VI.85.2. I have compiled these parallels using a TLG search for οργ-.

⁷⁵ Eur. *Bacch.* 671; *Med.* 348-349, and cf. 455 (βασιλέων θυμουμένων). The Nurse's remark δεινὰ τυράννων λήματα καὶ πῶς ὀλίγ' ἀρχόμενοι, πολλὰ κρατοῦντες, χαλεπῶς ὀργὰς μεταβάλλουσιν (*Med.* 119-121) applies the same thought to Medea herself (cf. Mossman on Eur. *Med.* 115-30, 120-1); this exemplifies the breadth of Euripides' use of *tyrannos* (cf. pp. 20-21).

⁷⁶ Cf. Lanza 1977:49-50, whose account of rulers' anger focuses primarily on these two plays. Other angry rulers include Euripides' Eteocles (*Phoen.* 454, cited by Lanza).

⁷⁷ Shared elements between the story of Periander and Lycophron and *Oedipus Tyrannus*, including those mentioned here, are discussed by Catenacci 2000; Finglass 2018b. Catenacci [1996] 2012:148 briefly notes, without exploring, the fact that *Antigone* also exhibits some of these features.

In Herodotus, Lycophron returns to Corinth knowing that his father Periander killed his mother. On his arrival, Periander questions him (ἰστορέοντι), but Lycophron refuses to reply; Periander, enraged (περισσῶς θυμῷ ἐχόμενος), drives Lycophron out.⁷⁸ Periander has thus been displayed *questioning* and *enraged*. Then Periander questions Lycophron's brother (ἰστόρεε), and, getting no answer, continues to question him (ἐλπιάρεέ τε ἰστορέων).⁷⁹ When Periander finds out why Lycophron refuses to speak to him, he sends a herald to drive Lycophron from houses where he takes refuge,⁸⁰ and eventually makes a *proclamation* (κήρυγμα) that no-one should speak to Lycophron or receive him in their house.⁸¹ Later, Periander remonstrates with Lycophron, saying, 'My son, which of these things is preferable, your current state, or to take over, by being well-disposed towards your father, my *tyrannis* and the other good things which I now have? You are my son, and the *basileus* of wealthy Corinth, but have chosen the life of a beggar, opposing and being angry with the one with whom you least ought to.'⁸²

For our purposes, what is significant here is that Periander, rather than merely exhibiting *orge*, combines this with extensive questioning, and with making a proclamation. Furthermore, his *orge* is the result of provocation by his son, and it is particularly interesting that he uses the argument that it is unsuitable to maintain anger against one's own father.

Looking at Sophocles' *Antigone*, the portrayal of Creon contains similar elements. Rather as Periander made a *kerygma* forbidding anyone to receive Lycophron, Creon

⁷⁸ Hdt. III.50.3.

⁷⁹ Hdt. III.51.1.

⁸⁰ Euripides' *Children of Heracles* features a similar pattern (cf. Forsdyke 2009:256-259), since Eurystheus sends a herald from city to city to drive the Heraclids out. This may have been an established part of the legend (rather than indicating the story tradition's influence on Euripides), but we cannot tell. (It is not mentioned at Hdt. IX.27.2.)

⁸¹ Hdt. III.52.1.

⁸² ὦ παῖ, κότερα τούτων αἰρετώτερα ἐστί, ταῦτα τὰ νῦν ἔχων πρήσσεις, ἢ τὴν τυραννίδα καὶ <τὰ> ἀγαθὰ τὰ νῦν ἐγὼ ἔχω, ταῦτα ἐόντα τῷ πατρὶ ἐπιτήδεον παραλαμβάνειν; ὃς ἐὼν ἐμός τε παῖς καὶ Κορίνθου τῆς εὐδαίμονος βασιλεὺς ἀλήτην βίον εἴλεν, ἀντιστατέων τε καὶ ὀργῇ χρεώμενος ἐς τόν σε ἥκιστα ἐχρῆν (Hdt. III.52.3-4).

makes a *kerygma* forbidding Polynices' burial.⁸³ Creon interrogates the Guard and Antigone,⁸⁴ becomes enraged, threatening the Guard with his *orge*, and becomes similarly angry with Antigone.⁸⁵ Creon emphasises his son Haemon's duty not to argue with him,⁸⁶ but eventually provokes Haemon to *orge* against him.⁸⁷

Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus* exhibits some of these features again. Oedipus is provoked to anger against Teiresias and Creon,⁸⁸ and his questioning of Teiresias, Creon, the Messenger, and the Shepherd is even more prominent than in *Antigone*. Oedipus' *kerygma* is indeed closer to Periander's than Creon's is, since it concerns the exclusion of an individual from human contact.⁸⁹ Also, both rulers' *kerygmata* rebound upon themselves: Oedipus turns out to be the murderer cursed in his proclamation, whereas Periander breaks his proclamation by speaking to his son, thereby incurring the fine stipulated in it.⁹⁰ Indeed, as Catenacci points out, *Oedipus Tyrannus* resembles the story of Periander and Lycophron more broadly, since both depict the killing of a family member rebounding on the killer, and both also feature the killer's identity being revealed in a cryptic way (by Apollo's oracle in Sophocles, and by Procles' hint in Herodotus).⁹¹ Scholars have also postulated resemblances between the story of Periander and Lycophron and either Sophocles' *Electra* or Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus*.⁹²

Exactly how these resemblances should be explained is a difficult question, which I will consider further below. Here, my point is merely that these resemblances are

⁸³ Soph. *Ant.* 8.

⁸⁴ Soph. *Ant.* 237-248, 441-537.

⁸⁵ Soph. *Ant.* 280, 473-496.

⁸⁶ Soph. *Ant.* 639-647, 742.

⁸⁷ Soph. *Ant.* 766.

⁸⁸ See pp. 222-227. Oedipus' anger in *OT* cannot *in itself* be taken to derive from the story tradition, since Oedipus is already angry at *Thebaid* frs. 2, 3; Aesch. *Sept.* 724-725, 785-787 (Else 1976:83), but it is the broader constellation of motifs shared with Herodotus that is striking. Else's view that Creon's anger in *Antigone* also derives from the epic and Aeschylean Oedipus seems ill-founded to me (cf. p. 202 n. 13 below).

⁸⁹ This correspondence is discussed by Finglass 2018b:63, 67-73.

⁹⁰ Hdt. III.52.6, with Catenacci 2000:197-198.

⁹¹ Catenacci 2000:197.

⁹² *Electra*: Finglass 2018b:73. *Oedipus at Colonus*: Catenacci 2000:197-199.

clearly more complex than the mere sharing of a single behaviour, *orge*, between different rulers. The ‘figure of the tyrant’ model does not account for the depth and extent, or for the heterogeneity, of the shared features.

III.v. Rulers and the suppression of freedom

In fifth-century Greece, freedom (ἐλευθερία) and slavery (δουλεία) were important political concepts. Solon’s poems already raise the notion that subjection to a ruler constitutes slavery (δουλοσύνη).⁹³ Its opposite, *eleutheria*, probably gained particular importance as a political ideal due to the Persian Wars, when the Greeks faced the prospect of what they considered slavery to the Persian *basileus*.⁹⁴ This terminology appears in Herodotus, especially in relation to the Persian *basileus*: Cambyses considers the Ionians to be his inherited slaves, and elsewhere the Persians’ subjects are called slaves.⁹⁵ Greeks not subject to the Persian *basileus* are said to possess *eleutheria*, and the Spartans’ freedom is specifically contrasted with the subjection of those under his rule.⁹⁶ Greek rulers are presented in similar terms when the Athenians are said to have become more powerful on being freed (ἐλευθερωθέντων) from the Peisistratids.⁹⁷

In Aeschylus’ *Persians*, *douleia* and *eleutheria* are treated similarly.⁹⁸ The aim of Xerxes’ expedition is ‘to cast a yoke of slavery upon Greece’.⁹⁹ When Atossa asks who the Greeks’ master (δεσπότης) is, the Chorus-leader replies that the Greeks are not called

⁹³ Solon fr. 9.3-4; cf. fr. 4.17-18, 11.1-4, and Raaflaub [1985] 2004:27, 53-54.

⁹⁴ This is the view of Raaflaub [1985] 2004:58-89.

⁹⁵ Hdt. II.1.2; III.88.1. I draw these and the following parallels from row C8 of Lateiner’s table (Lateiner 1989:175, 179). The notion that all subjects of the Persian *basileus* are slaves is a Greek (mis)understanding of Persian culture, as discussed by Missiou 1993; T. Graham 2017:57-58.

⁹⁶ Hdt. VII.104.4, 135.3.

⁹⁷ Hdt. V.78; similarly, V.66.1, V.91.1; cf. VIII.143.1. Cf. also Thuc. I.17 (discussed by Forsdyke 2001:338).

⁹⁸ I here follow Raaflaub [1985] 2004:60-61. Xerxes in *Persians* is also usefully discussed by T. Graham 2017:62-70, who rightly says that Aeschylus portrays him in terms of ‘the political and ideological language of democracy, but does so in the negative’ (2017:62).

⁹⁹ ζυγὸν ἀμφιβαλεῖν δούλιον Ἑλλάδι (Aesch. *Pers.* 50). The yoke metaphor is important in *Persians* (cf. Garvie *ad loc.*, with further references); it is used of the Persian attempt to conquer the Greeks also in Atossa’s dream (Aesch. *Pers.* 191, 196, cf. 594).

slaves (δοῦλοι) or subjects (ὑπήκοοι) of any man.¹⁰⁰ Later, the Chorus anticipates that Persian defeat will entail freedom for their subjects: ‘No longer are men’s tongues guarded; for the people have been released to speak freely (ἐλεύθερα βάζειν), since the yoke (ζυγόν) of force has been released.’¹⁰¹ So Herodotus and Aeschylus’ *Persians* both use slavery and freedom to talk about Persian rule.

Furthermore, in Herodotus and in Euripides’ *Suppliants*, a character—Otanés in Herodotus, Theseus in Euripides—makes a speech in favour of democracy as opposed to sole rule, in a debate regarding which constitution is better. Theseus emphasises the *eleutheria* and equality of democracy, which are absent under a sole ruler, and the right to speak equally, *isegoria*, which was indeed a major feature of Athenian democracy.¹⁰² In Herodotus, Otanes says ‘How could *mounarchia*, in which the ruler can do what he likes without accountability (ἀνευθύνῳ ποιέειν τὰ βούλεται), be a well-adjusted thing?’¹⁰³ This thought finds a ready parallel in Aeschylus’ *Persians*, where Atossa says of Xerxes, ‘he is not accountable to the *polis* (οὐχ ὑπεύθυνος πόλει), and if he comes back safe he rules over this land.’¹⁰⁴ This

¹⁰⁰ Aesch. *Pers.* 242.

¹⁰¹ οὐδ’ ἔτι γλῶσσα βροτοῖσιν ἐν φυλακαῖς· λέλυται γὰρ λαὸς ἐλεύθερα βάζειν, ὡς ἐλύθη ζυγὸν ἀλκᾶς (Aesch. *Pers.* 591-594).

¹⁰² Eur. *Supp.* 438-441. *Isegoria* had probably been important as early as Cleisthenes’ reforms in 508/507 (J. D. Lewis 1971; Raaflaub [1985] 2004:96-97), although Ober 1989:78-79 maintains that it was pre-Cleisthenic, but only open to the elite until c. 462.

Tragedy often regards freedom of speech as an important part of freedom: Soph. *Aj.* 1257-1261, fr. 927a; Eur. *Phoen.* 391-395, fr. 216; Tragic Adespota fr. 304 (cited by Raaflaub 1981:360 n. 257 and [1985] 2004:348 n. 88). Euripides particularly emphasises the practice of being able to say anything and everything (*parrhesia*), which he associates with Athens (Eur. *Hipp.* 421-422; *Ion* 671-675). On *parrhesia* at Athens (as distinct from *isegoria* or *eleutherostomein*), see Raaflaub [1985] 2004:221-224; Carter 2004.

At Eur. *Phoen.* 393, τῶν κρατούντων presumably refers to the Argives in general, rather than specifically to their ruler Adrastus (who has not been mentioned since 160); if so, the thought is very similar to *Ion* 671-675.

¹⁰³ κῶς δ’ ἂν εἴη χρῆμα κατηρημένον μοναρχίῃ, τῇ ἔξεστι ἀνευθύνῳ ποιέειν τὰ βούλεται; (Hdt. III.80.3).

¹⁰⁴ οὐχ ὑπεύθυνος πόλει, σωθεὶς δ’ ὁμοίως τῇσδε κοιρανεῖ χθονός (Aesch. *Pers.* 213-214). In *Persians*, reference proper to a *polis* are several times used to talk about Persia (Tourraix 1993:108-109; Garvie *ad loc.*, citing 117, 219, 682, 715, 781, 946).

stands in contrast with the practice of the Athenian democracy, of which the accountability of officials was an important feature, and of other Greek *poleis*.¹⁰⁵

Herodotus and tragedy, then, use the language of slavery and freedom to talk about Persian rule, and about sole rule in general. However, what is more important for our purposes is how tragedy applies this language to *legendary* rulers. Since the tragic playwrights and their audiences were presumably used to thinking about Persian and sixth-century Greek rulers in terms of slavery and freedom, it is perhaps natural that the playwrights should also employ such ideas in depicting tragic rulers. Still, there is nothing inevitable about this development, and the playwrights certainly did not use such ideas indiscriminately; indeed, such ideas are only moderately common in tragedy, and are always used pointedly. Here, I provide a brief survey, summarising points often made before; several of these cases will be discussed further in later chapters.¹⁰⁶

The first tragic rulers to whom the language of slavery and freedom is applied are Aegisthus and Clytaemestra in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*.¹⁰⁷ As Agamemnon is being killed, the Chorus expresses extreme antipathy towards Aegisthus' and Clytaemestra's *tyrannis*, remarking that it would be better to die than live under it,¹⁰⁸ and threatening them with the Chorus' own opposition and with that of the populace, which they expect to stone Aegisthus and Clytaemestra.¹⁰⁹ Aegisthus threatens the Chorus using animal imagery, including the yoke and goad.¹¹⁰ In *Libation-Bearers*, the overthrow of Aegisthus and Clytaemestra is several times called *eleutheria*.¹¹¹ We will

¹⁰⁵ Accountability procedures were by no means a specifically Athenian or democratic feature, as Rhodes 2003:116 points out in the present context; for a useful overview and bibliography, see Fröhlich 2017. Accountability and *euthynai* at Athens are helpfully discussed by Sinclair 1988:77-83; Hamel 1998:126-130.

¹⁰⁶ In addition, note Soph. fr. 873 (ὅστις γὰρ ὡς τύραννον ἐμπορεύεται κείνου 'στι δοῦλος, καὶ ἐλεύθερος μόλη).

¹⁰⁷ This is discussed, using these references, by Podlecki 1986:94-95; Parara 2010:115-119.

¹⁰⁸ Aesch. Ag. 1364-1365; cf. 1354-1355.

¹⁰⁹ Aesch. Ag. 1409-1413, 1615-1616, 1633-1635.

¹¹⁰ Aesch. Ag. 1624, 1639-1640.

¹¹¹ Aesch. Cho. 807-811, 859-865, 1044-1047, cited by Raaflaub [1985] 2004:89 as 'the first unequivocal identification of the liberation of a city with the overthrow of tyranny'.

further discuss Aeschylus' presentation of their overthrow as the overthrow of an oppressive *tyrannis* in Chapter 2.

In Sophocles' *Ajax*, Agamemnon applies the language of slavery to Teucer, calling him a slave,¹¹² and objects to him speaking too freely.¹¹³ Agamemnon also uses animal imagery of the domination that should be exerted over men like Ajax.¹¹⁴ Agamemnon treats Teucer like this because Teucer's mother was a slave,¹¹⁵ and there is no suggestion that Agamemnon views his subjects in general as slaves; however, this language may still set Agamemnon in opposition to freedom.

In *Antigone*, Creon's rule is set in opposition to freedom rather more prominently.¹¹⁶ Creon uses the yoke metaphor of his own rule.¹¹⁷ He compares Antigone to an angry horse controlled by a bridle (another animal metaphor),¹¹⁸ before telling her that 'it is not possible for a person who is a slave of those close to them to think proudly.'¹¹⁹ When Antigone says of Creon that '*tyrannis* is fortunate in many ways, and especially in being able to do and say what it wishes,' this resembles statements about sole rulers' unaccountability in Aeschylus and Herodotus.¹²⁰ In regarding his own will as *nomos*, Creon perhaps bears out Theseus' observation in *Suppliants* that sole rulers keep the law in their own possession, whereas under democracy the laws are the

¹¹² Soph. *Aj.* 1235.

¹¹³ θαρσῶν ὑβρίζεις καὶ ξελευθεροστομεῖς (Soph. *Aj.* 1258).

¹¹⁴ Soph. *Aj.* 1253-1254. The point about animal metaphors is made by Finglass on Soph. *El.* 1462.

¹¹⁵ Soph. *Aj.* 1228.

¹¹⁶ These points about Creon are made e.g. by those cited at p. 199 n. 2. S. R. West 1999:124-129 compares Creon with Herodotus' Cambyses, suggesting that Creon would have been reminiscent of Persian monarchy, but the shared features which she mentions do not seem distinctively Persian in their connotations or distinctively Herodotean.

¹¹⁷ Soph. *Ant.* 291.

¹¹⁸ Soph. *Ant.* 477-478, again with Finglass on Soph. *El.* 1462.

¹¹⁹ οὐ γὰρ ἐκπέλει φρονεῖν μέγ' ὅστις δοῦλός ἐστι τῶν πέλας (Soph. *Ant.* 478-479). However, Creon is perhaps not calling Antigone a slave because she is subject to him politically; τῶν πέλας may imply that he is claiming obedience as her *kyrios*. Cf. also 517, 756.

¹²⁰ ἀλλ' ἢ τυραννὶς πολλὰ τ' ἄλλ' εὐδαιμονεῖ κάξεσθιν αὐτῇ δοῦν λέγειν θ' ἃ βούλεται (Soph. *Ant.* 506-507).

common property of all.¹²¹ I will place these aspects within the context of Creon's portrayal as a whole in Chapter 6.

In *Oedipus Tyrannus*, also discussed in Chapter 6, such features seem much less prominent. Edmunds emphasises the lines where Teiresias asserts his right to equal speech (i.e. *isegoria*) with Oedipus, declaring that he is not Oedipus' slave but Apollo's.¹²² This differs from *Antigone*, since Oedipus neither calls Teiresias a slave nor tries to prevent him speaking, but Teiresias' words perhaps imply that Oedipus' behaviour threatens his freedom. Creon also has to ask Oedipus to listen to him on an equal basis (ἴσ' ἀντάκουσον).¹²³

Sophocles' *Electra* seems, less strongly than Aeschylus' *Libation-Bearers*, to present Aegisthus' killing as that of a *tyrannos*, and at the end of the play Orestes is congratulated on securing *eleutheria*.¹²⁴ Aegisthus talks about the Argives' subjection using imagery that (as Finglass argues) probably echoes Aegisthus' words in *Agamemnon*.¹²⁵

In Euripides, notions of freedom and slavery appear prominently in the portrayal of two rulers.¹²⁶ In *Heracles*, Lycus tells the Chorus that they are slaves of his *tyrannis*;¹²⁷ the Chorus-leader is indignant at this,¹²⁸ and he and Megara speak bitterly of Lycus acting as their master (δεσπότης).¹²⁹ In *Bacchae*, Pentheus implies that the disguised

¹²¹ Eur. *Supp.* 429-432; so roughly B. Vickers 1973:529-530; Allen 2000:89-93.

¹²² Soph. *OT* 408-410, with Edmunds 2000:46-47 (following Raaflaub 1980:15 and 49 n. 43), 2002:75-76. For *isegoria*, cf. p. 66 above. Edmunds also suggests that these lines recall the word *isokratia*, a synonym for *isonomia* found at Hdt. V.92α.1. Cf. also Giorgini 1993:206-207; T. Graham 2017:114-115.

¹²³ Soph. *OT* 544, with Edmunds 2002:76. I here leave aside *Ant.* 736-739 and *OT* 629-630, discussed at pp. 121-123, 233-235 below. Although these passages are often considered 'tyrannical', and although the former presents Creon in an un-democratic light, they do not specifically relate to *freedom*, and therefore do not fall within the category discussed here.

¹²⁴ Soph. *El.* 1508-1510; cf. p. 89 below.

¹²⁵ Soph. *El.* 1458-1463, with Finglass 2005:204 and n. 19.

¹²⁶ These are pointed out e.g. by Finglass on Soph. *OT* 410-11. Note also *Hel.* 1428 (Theoclymenus); *Phoen.* 520, 628 (Eteocles; cited by Heim 1904:38).

¹²⁷ Eur. *HF* 250-251.

¹²⁸ Eur. *HF* 270-272.

¹²⁹ Eur. *HF* 258, 274, 277, as Sheppard 1916:75 points out.

Dionysus is his slave;¹³⁰ also, when the Chorus-leader says that she hesitates to speak ‘free words’ (λόγους ἐλευθέρους) before Pentheus, this implicitly creates an opposition between Pentheus and free speech.¹³¹

Prometheus Bound, where Zeus is pointedly called *tyrannos*, emphatically contrasts Zeus’ sole rule with freedom.¹³² Kratos tells Hephaestus that no-one is *eleutheros* except Zeus.¹³³ The Chorus warns Prometheus against speaking too freely (ἐλευθεροστομεῖν).¹³⁴ When Prometheus predicts Zeus’ fall, he contrasts Zeus’ rule with slavery, saying that Zeus will find out how different ruling (ἄρχειν) and slavery (δουλεύειν) are.¹³⁵ The yoke metaphor is used, when Hermes compares Prometheus to a ‘newly-yoked foal’ (νεοζυγῆς πῶλος) struggling against the bit.¹³⁶ Zeus is also said not to be accountable (ὑπεύθυνος),¹³⁷ and to keep the *nomoi* in his private possession,¹³⁸ ideas also applied to Creon in *Antigone*.

These elements clearly serve to place the strongest possible emphasis on the absolute nature of Zeus’ power. The significance which one attaches to this will depend on one’s overall view of the play, which cannot be explored in detail here. Certainly this emphasis makes Prometheus’ position seem bleaker, and increases the disjunction between his apparent hopelessness and the prospect which he raises of Zeus’ eventual fall. The emphasis on Zeus’ absolute power may also have a broader point regarding the nature of human existence, in demonstrating the helplessness of

¹³⁰ Eur. *Bacch.* 803.

¹³¹ Eur. *Bacch.* 775-776.

¹³² Cf. pp. 18-19 above. These key points are made by Thomson 1929. More detailed discussions include Saïd 1985:15-20, 312-314, 325; Giorgini 1993:163-168; Seaford 2003:99-100; Picariello and Saxonhouse 2015; T. Graham 2017:90-96.

¹³³ PV 50.

¹³⁴ PV 180.

¹³⁵ PV 927.

¹³⁶ PV 1009-1010; cf. 108, 579 (referring to Prometheus’ actual bondage).

¹³⁷ PV 324; cf. 150.

¹³⁸ PV 150, 403.

individuals before the gods' power, and perhaps a theological point, in posing the arbitrary omnipotence of Zeus as an intellectual problem.¹³⁹

III.vi. The relationship between rulers in Herodotus and in tragedy

Rulers in Herodotus and tragedy, then, exhibit certain shared features. However, taking a comparative approach has shown that matters are also more complex. Often, we are dealing not just with shared elements, but with broader story patterns or groups of elements. These are employed flexibly, and in ways that vary considerably not only between Herodotus and tragedy, but also within each. Lanza and others are right to highlight the shared elements, but we should also take full account of the flexibility and variety with which these are employed.

As with the moral ideas discussed above, we cannot be sure what actual relationship between Herodotus and tragedy these shared features suggest. Many of the considerations raised above, however, also apply to the shared story patterns, where rulers take action against plots, or where subjects hesitate to speak openly before rulers. That is to say, if these elements were already employed by Herodotus' source *for any individual story*, he cannot possibly have taken them over from tragedy *in that specific case*, and these patterns—which are often fundamental to the stories' structures, and which are generally more prominent in Herodotus than in tragedy—*may* have been used by Herodotus' sources in any number of cases. Consequently, we cannot confidently postulate any tragic influence at all here, although of course there is never any way of excluding it. By contrast, it seems entirely plausible that, in employing these patterns, tragedy was drawing on the story tradition (although not necessarily on the specific stories recorded in Herodotus). However, certainty is unattainable.

¹³⁹ It was argued by Schmid (especially 1940:306, regarding Zeus) that *PV* depends on various Sophistic ideas about the gods. Since scholarly opinion now tends to agree with Schmid that *PV* is not by Aeschylus (p. 44 above), the question of how *PV* fits into these intellectual currents would perhaps reward renewed scholarly attention.

The similarities between Sophocles' plays and the story of Periander and Lycophron present more difficulties, since they do not constitute a recurrent story pattern; indeed, questioning and proclamations are not especially common in Herodotus. Also, some of the resemblances seem rather close: Periander's argument with Lycophron and Creon's with Haemon both deal with the obedience owed by a son to a father, and Periander's and Oedipus' proclamations both exclude individuals from human contact. Some scholars have indeed regarded it as overwhelmingly likely that *Oedipus Tyrannus* is directly influenced by Herodotus' version of the Periander and Lycophron story,¹⁴⁰ which is rendered plausible if one accepts that Sophocles may have been familiar with Herodotus' work more broadly.¹⁴¹ Sophocles may, though, have heard the story independently in a similar form, given the intrinsic likelihood of a well-educated Athenian such as Sophocles having heard a story concerning such an important figure as Periander from a city as close as Corinth. The opposite hypothesis—tragic influence on the story of Periander and Lycophron sufficiently thoroughgoing to account for all these resemblances—seems rather unlikely, since the shared elements are fundamental to the story and spread throughout it. If they were all removed, it is difficult to see what form the story could have taken—whereas Sophocles had the fullest freedom to employ or not employ such elements in *Antigone* and *Oedipus Tyrannus*, given the largely invented nature of these plays' plots.¹⁴² Also, there are reasons internal to Herodotus' work to think that Herodotus recounted the story of Periander and Lycophron largely as he heard it.¹⁴³ It therefore seems more

¹⁴⁰ Aly 1921:95; Catenacci 2000:200-201. Finglass 2018b:73-75 is more cautious (as I am here).

¹⁴¹ The chief evidence is the verbal parallel between Hdt. III.119.6 (where Intaphrenes' wife explains her decision to save her brother on the grounds that she can find another husband and children) and Soph. *Ant.* 909-912 (where Antigone explains her burial of Polynices on the same grounds). The closeness of the wording and the greater suitability of the reasoning to the Herodotean context are widely taken to prove direct Herodotean influence on Sophocles. See Griffith on Soph. *Ant.* 904-15, 909-12, and Szlezák 1981:112-113, who lists some scholars who doubt this (to whom add W. Hansen 2002:64). Other possible close verbal parallels are listed by Podlecki 1977:248-249.

¹⁴² Catenacci 2000:201 seems right to remark that they 'sembrano caratterizzare proprio alcuni dei punti in cui più *personale* o addirittura *innovativa* appare la rielaborazione drammaturgica del mito di Edipo operata da Sofocle.' On Sophocles' invention in *Antigone*, cf. C. Zimmermann 1993:115-137; Griffith 1999:4-12. On *OT*, see Finglass 2018a:27-31.

¹⁴³ Indeed, Luraghi puts this forward as the clearest case of this in Herodotus' work, arguing that, since the connection between the story and its ostensible purpose (explaining why the Corinthians went to war against Polycrates of Samos) is very strained, 'the story has so little to

plausible that Sophocles' plays were influenced by the story than *vice versa*. But we cannot exclude other possibilities, such as that the elements in question also appeared in other stories—or earlier tragedies—unknown to us.

IV. Conclusion

In this chapter, it has been tentatively suggested that the shared elements considered are the result of shared cultural context, and are probably to be explained primarily on the basis that the tragic playwrights were cognisant of the tradition about stories current in their day about archaic rulers. Alternative hypotheses may, however, be tenable in some cases, and the partial nature of our evidence makes certainty on all such questions largely unattainable. By contrast, the features discussed do not seem to provide clear evidence for tragic influence on Herodotus or the story tradition, although such influence cannot be excluded.

However, the exact relationship between Herodotus and tragedy is not the main point of this chapter, which has aimed primarily to illustrate the *heterogeneity* of the elements shared between Herodotus and tragedy. Some are overarching moral ideas common within the culture of the time. Others are story patterns. The anger of rulers is different again, occurring in a wide variety of contexts. The opposition between sole rulers and freedom is a phenomenon of yet another kind, and stands apart from these other elements in being strongly politically charged and in being associated with Greek and Athenian self-definition in terms of freedom, especially from Persian domination. We should not forget, either, the oral elements considered at the start of the chapter, which do not regularly occur in tragedy, but are shared between the Oedipus legend and the stories about archaic rulers at the legendary level.

do with the context that the conclusion that Herodotus has collected it as a fully developed story seems inescapable' (Luraghi [2005] 2013b:106). Cf. Fränkel [1924] 1960:67-68 n. 3 (who thinks that Herodotus must have picked up the story in Corinth itself); Sourvinou-Inwood 1988:172 (arguing that this oral story shares a 'father-son hostility' schema with legends such as those of Theseus and Hippolytus, Phoenix, and Tenes).

Furthermore, these shared features differ not only in their natures, but in the rulers to whom they are applied. The rulers depicted in terms of the fall from *olbos* to *ate*, who include Herodotus' Croesus and Aeschylus' Agamemnon, are not always the same ones who are depicted as angry, suspicious or opposed to freedom. Anger, suspicion and the language of freedom and slavery are often, at least in tragedy, applied to the same characters at the same time—which, as Lanza saw, produces a highly effective dramatic figure—but these elements can occur separately, too. Overall, then, it was open to storytellers and playwrights alike to draw on this rich variety of traditional ideas, patterns and motifs in a flexible and varied manner, depending on whatever considerations seemed appropriate to depicting, or telling a story about, any particular ruler.

This chapter, presenting the first detailed comparison of the depiction of rulers in tragedy and in Herodotus, has demonstrated the considerable complexity of one important group of conceptions underlying the presentation of rulers in tragedy. In contrast with the approach of those scholars who seek to identify a 'figure of the tyrant' in Herodotus and tragedy, we have seen that the elements shared between rulers in tragedy and Herodotus are varied and flexible, and we have been able to identify the differing nature of these elements with more precision than is possible on the basis of that approach. In the next chapter, we will look at another group of ideas underlying the depiction of rulers, in order to continue to demonstrate the complexity and variety of the ideas underlying the presentation of rulers in tragedy.

CHAPTER 2. TYRANNIS, THE KILLING OF TYRANNOI, AND STASIS IN ATHENIAN POLITICS AND TRAGEDY

I. Introduction

This chapter investigates how the depiction of rulers in tragedy and the ideas enunciated about *tyrannis* in tragedy fit into the role of the idea of *tyrannis* in fifth-century Athenian politics. That the concept of *tyrannis* was important in how the Athenians thought about politics in this period is well-established, and it is nothing novel to suggest that tragedy's depiction of rulers may be related to this. However, scholars arguing this have generally focused on the notion that the role of *tyrannis* in Athenian politics was that of a foil against which the Athenian democracy could define itself, and that tragedy, in depicting rulers, took part in this process—i.e. that it portrayed on stage democracy's ideological opposite.¹ I wish to suggest that the reality is more complex than this, and that the relationship between tragedy and the role of *tyrannis* in Athenian politics is highly variable.

Firstly, I will lay out the role of the idea of *tyrannis* in Athenian politics, not exhaustively, but so as to show that the idea of *tyrannis* was used in Athenian political life in three readily distinguishable ways—which indicates that the role of *tyrannis* in Athenian political life is more multifaceted than is commonly acknowledged. Then, I will argue that tragedy fits into this complex picture in a more subtle and variable way than the common view allows for.

II. The role of *tyrannis* in Athenian politics

The three main roles that *tyrannis* played in Athenian political life were, I will argue, in the celebration of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, who killed Hipparchus, the brother of the *tyrannos* Hippias, in 514; as a perceived threat to democratic Athens, and

¹ E.g. Berve 1967:I.192-195; Lanza 1977:xii-xiv; Rosivach 1988:45-46; Edmunds 2002:67-70; Allan and Kelly 2013:92 and n. 60; Ugolini 2017:457-458. Also important is Cerri 1982:139-144.

therefore as a political accusation against opponents; and as a way of thinking about the use and nature of power, both in intellectual circles and in discussions of Athenian foreign policy.

The killing of Hipparchus by Harmodius and Aristogeiton at the Panathenaea of 514 BC was celebrated as a founding act of the Athenian democracy, in various official and unofficial contexts.² At an early date statues of the two men were set up in the *agora*.³ They were celebrated in cult.⁴ Songs were sung, declaring (misleadingly) that, by killing Hipparchus, Harmodius and Aristogeiton ended the *tyrannis*, making Athens *isonomos*.⁵ Privileges were accorded to descendants of the two men and long upheld,⁶ while the Peisistratids' descendants may have been outlawed.⁷ Official proclamations and oaths against *tyrannis* were sworn from an early date,⁸ and laws against *tyrannis* were passed.⁹ Harmodius and Aristogeiton appear on vase-

² For a fuller summary, see Raaflaub 2003.

³ On the statues, see Taylor [1981] 1991:13-21; Hölscher 1998:158-160; Azoulay [2015] 2017:23-45.

⁴ [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 58.1; Taylor [1981] 1991:5-7; R. C. T. Parker 1996:136 n. 55; Shear 2012.

⁵ *Carmina Popularia PMG* 893-896 [= *Ath.* XV.695a]; on these, cf. G. S. Jones 2014:232-233, 242-249; Budelmann 2018:266. Aristophanes mentions this song at *Ach.* 980, *Vesp.* 1222-1227, *Storks* fr. 444, and plays on it at *Ach.* 1093, *Lys.* 632 (Taylor [1981] 1991:23). The same view of the killing of Hipparchus is presupposed by Miltiades' remark at *Hdt.* VI.109.3 (cited by Taylor [1981] 1991:xviii).

⁶ *Isaeus* V.46-47, alongside other sources: see Taylor [1981] 1991:1-5.

⁷ This may have been the purpose of the 'stele about the wrongdoing of the *tyrannoi*' mentioned by Thucydides (VI.55.1-2, cf. *Ar. Av.* 1074-1075; *Andoc.* I.78, 106; Marcellinus, *Life of Thucydides* 32). This is accepted by Ostwald 1955:109 and Dover on *Thuc.* VI.54-59, but is only argued for fully (to my knowledge) by Stahl 1891:265 n. 1.

⁸ Proclamations against *tyrannis* before Assembly and Council meetings: *Ar. Thesm.* 338-339 with *Dem.* XIX.70; Rhodes 1972:36-37. The heliastic oath: *Dem.* XXIV.149. It has been suggested that the bouleutic oath contained a similar clause (U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1893:I.54 and n. 23, followed by Ostwald 1955:109, 112; against this, Highby 1936:29-30), but all we have solid evidence for is that it contained a clause against betrayal of the city and *katalysis tou demou* in general (*Dem.* XXIV.144; cf. Rhodes 1972:194).

⁹ Possible early laws against *tyrannis*: [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 8.4, 16.10; *Plut. Sol.* 19.3-4; Ostwald 1955:104-109; Gagarin 1981. The decree of Demophantus of 410 outlawed *tyrannoi* and required all citizens to swear to kill anyone who acted as *tyrannos* or helped establish one (*Andoc.* I.96-98); this oath was sworn at the Dionysia, perhaps in the *agora* (Shear 2007:157-8) or theatre (P. Wilson 2009:23-26). The decree was erected outside the *bouleuterion* to remind the *bouleutai* how they should treat those aspiring towards *tyrannis* (Lycurg. *Leoc.* 126; cf. Shear 2007:158-159). On the decree, see Teegarden 2013:30-53; Azoulay [2015] 2017:63-65. Later laws against *tyrannis* are discussed by Teegarden 2013:57-220.

paintings,¹⁰ and the readiness with which characters in Aristophanes quote the *skolia* songs or reminisce about the expulsion of the *tyrannoi* suggests that casual expression of patriotic sentiments about these events may have been commonplace.¹¹ These traditions were not uncritically accepted by everyone at Athens,¹² but the overall picture is very clear: an opposition to *tyrannis*, expressed through honouring and celebrating Harmodius and Aristogeiton and through practical and symbolic measures against *tyrannis*, was among the foundations of the Athenians' collective identity. This, then, is part of the picture.

The second role of *tyrannis* mentioned above is related, but different. This is that the Athenians sometimes used *tyrannis* to understand what they thought—or feared—was going on in contemporary Athenian politics.¹³ We see this firstly in political invective against Pericles in the 430s.¹⁴ However, in Aristophanes' *Wasps* (422) a character complains at the sudden commonness of accusations of *tyrannis*, a word which he says (presumably in exaggeration) that he had not heard being used for fifty years. This suggests that the commonness of accusations of tyranny varied; there was perhaps a boom in them in the late 420s.¹⁵ Such accusations appear several times in Aristophanes' *Wasps* and *Lysistrata*,¹⁶ although conspiracies of other sorts were also feared in this period: the accusations made in *Knights* (424) by the character

¹⁰ There are three early fifth-century instances (Würzburg, Martin von Wagner Museum L 515; Rome, Museo Nazionale Etrusco di Villa Giulia 50321; Vienna, Kunsthistorisches Museum inv. 5247), three late fifth- or early fourth-century Panathenaic vases (London, British Museum B 605; Hildesheim, Roemer und Pelizäus Museum inv. 1253 and 1254), and three late fifth- or early fourth-century *oinochoai* (Boston, Museum of Fine Arts 98.936; Rome, Museo Nazionale Etrusco di Villa Giulia 44255; Ferrara, Museo Nazionale di Spina 6406). All are discussed by S. Schmidt 2009; cf. Neer 2002:168-181, Azoulay [2015] 2017:77-83, 185-189.

¹¹ *Skolia* mentioned casually: Ar. *Ach.* 980, *Vesp.* 1222-1227. Reminiscences about military actions against the *tyrannoi* and Spartans: Ar. *Lys.* 273-285, 665, 1150-1156. Cf. Taylor [1981] 1991:31.

¹² Hdt. VI.123.2, Thuc. VI.54-59, and others question these traditions in various ways; cf. R. Thomas 1989:242-251; Lavelle 1993:63-79; Hornblower on Thuc. VI.54-59.

¹³ On all this, the summary of Cerri 1982:142-144 is useful.

¹⁴ Cratinus, *Chirons* fr. 258 [= Plut. *Per.* 3.4], quoted at p. 86 below; possibly Cratinus, *Wealth-Gods* fr. 171.22-23; Plut. *Per.* 4.2, 7.3, 11.1, 16.1, 39.5. Cf. Henderson 2003:162-163; Tracy 2009:96-108.

¹⁵ Ar. *Vesp.* 488-491. Cf. Taylor [1981] 1991:88-90; Henderson 2003:166-167 and n. 50.

¹⁶ Ar. *Vesp.* 417, 463-465, 486-487; *Lys.* 618-619, 630.

representing Cleon are mostly unspecific,¹⁷ while he mentions conspiracies aimed in one case at inducing allied revolt,¹⁸ and in another at conspiring with the enemy.¹⁹

It is the incidents of 415, though—the mutilation of the Herms and the profanation of the Mysteries—that demonstrate most vividly the Athenians’ fear of *tyrannis*. In 415, accusations of *tyrannis* gained particular potency from the suspicion that one specific person was aiming at *tyrannis*—namely, Alcibiades.²⁰ Thucydides explains the Athenians’ decision to recall Alcibiades from Sicily as follows: ‘the people of Athens ... were at that time ill-tempered and suspicious towards those charged concerning the Mysteries, and thought that everything had been done with a view to a conspiracy aimed at oligarchy or *tyrannis*’ (ἐπὶ συνωμοσίᾳ ὀλιγαρχικῇ καὶ τυραννικῇ).²¹

Thucydides’ account of the oligarchic revolution in 411, though, is conspicuously lacking in accusations of *tyrannis*. For instance, when Thucydides says that Phrynichus suspected Alcibiades’ motives, he says that Phrynichus rightly thought that Alcibiades did not care whether Athens was governed oligarchically or democratically, but merely wanted to be recalled as the result of a change in government.²² Here and elsewhere, *tyrannis* is not a relevant consideration—and, given the Athenians’ keenness to bring Alcibiades back at this point, it is difficult to see how it could have been.²³ After the revolution, however, *tyrannis* was certainly a

¹⁷ Ar. Eq. 257, 452, 628, 862.

¹⁸ Ar. Eq. 236.

¹⁹ Ar. Eq. 475.

²⁰ So explicitly Thuc. VI.15.4. That is to say, Alcibiades gave the Athenians’ latent fears of *tyrannis* an object, turning their general fear into a more specifically targeted and potent one (Woodhead 1970:79-80; de Romilly [1995] 2019:72-74).

²¹ Thuc. VI.60.1 (with Hornblower *ad loc.* for the translation ‘or’); cf. VI.28.2, VI.53.3, VI.61.1. These references are from Henderson 2003:169.

²² Thuc. VIII.48.4.

²³ Likewise, when members of the oligarchic party kill Androcles, Thucydides says that this is because he was a demagogue and enemy of Alcibiades (VIII.65.2), and, when mentioning the populace’s distrust of Antiphon, Thucydides merely says that they thought him too clever (ἀλλ’ ὑπόπτως τῷ πλήθει διὰ δόξαν δεινότητος διακείμενος, VIII.68.1). Osborne’s use of these passages to argue that ‘Continuing fear of tyranny certainly played some part in the events of 412/11’ (2003:258) seems doubtful; these passages suggest rather that other fears were prominent, whereas fear of *tyrannis* is conspicuously unmentioned.

factor. The decree of Demophantus (410) forbade both the holding of public offices after the *katalysis tou demou* (i.e. participation in an oligarchy) and aspiration towards or holding of *tyrannis*,²⁴ which implies that, as in 415, the Athenians feared conspiracies and revolutions of any sort, whether aimed at oligarchy or *tyrannis*. These two possible outcomes of a successful revolution were naturally closely associated, as their combination in the decree of Demophantus shows.²⁵

The Athenians' fear of *tyrannis*, then, clearly varied according to the circumstances; sometimes it was potent, sometimes less so. Furthermore, it co-existed with other fears, such as plots in favour of the enemy or revolting allies, and there is also abundant evidence that the Athenians were acutely aware of the threat posed by elite conspiracies that aimed at overthrowing the democracy (κατάλυσις τοῦ δήμου) and instituting an oligarchy.²⁶

²⁴ Shear 2007:150.

²⁵ Cf. Shear 2007:151-152.

²⁶ Thucydides tells us several times that the Athenians feared *katalysis tou demou*, firstly in 457 (I.107.4), and later in 415 (III.81.4)—at which point he also states that the Athenians were afraid of conspiracies aiming at both oligarchy and *tyrannis* (VI.60.1). In 411, Thucydides refers to the oligarchs' primary aim as *katalysis tou demou* (VIII.47.2, VIII.54.4, VIII.68.1), and tells us that the army at Samos and the crew of the *Paralus* blamed the oligarchs precisely for the *katalysis tou demou* (VIII.86.2, VIII.86.9; cf. also III.81.4). All this indicates that Athens was aware of the threat to democracies posed by oligarchic *katalyseis tou demou*. Nor is it surprising that this should be expressed as fear of *katalysis tou demou* rather than of *oligarchia*, since, in truth, the *katalysis* posed the immediate threat, not whatever precise constitution replaced the democratic one. None of this quite proves that in 457, or even 415, the words *katalysis tou demou* were used, but Thucydides does seem to have thought that Athenians and others were prepared to recognise the threat posed by conspirators of any sort, including the oligarchic ones who (unlike the ones supposedly aiming at *tyrannis*) were actually active throughout late fifth-century Greece.

I therefore see no warrant for saying that it 'is a tempting hypothesis that this binary view, of a choice between democracy and tyranny, laid the Athenians open to the oligarchic coup of 411, since many democrats had never seriously considered what real oligarchy and oligarchs might be like' (Brock 1989:161). The Athenians must have known that oligarchic conspiracies had been going on throughout fifth-century Greece (cf. Rhodes 2000:120-128; Simonton 2017:59-61), and Thucydides provides plenty of evidence that they were afraid of just this sort of conspiracy, whose aim was widely known to be that of *katalysis tou demou*.

The oligarchs themselves, as represented in our sources, talk about neither *oligarchia* nor *katalysis tou demou*, but rather 'changing the constitution' (Xen. *Hell.* II.3.24, 32, although *katalysis tou demou* at 28), 'rectifying the constitution' ([Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 35.2), 'doing politics more sensibly' (Thuc. VIII.53.3), or 'doing democracy but not in the same way' (VIII.53.1): Caire 2016:279. They also talked about reinstating the *patrios politeia* (e.g. [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 29.3): Shear 2011:49-53; Caire 2016:262-278.

The third main role of *tyrannis* in Athenian political discourse is its use as a tool of analysis. In the instances we have seen so far, *tyrannis* is understood as a political threat, something *somebody else* is aiming at. However, as has recently been discussed in an excellent article by Trampedach, *tyrannis* is also commonly used in meditating on the use of power by those who possess it, or who wish to acquire it, *by those people themselves*.²⁷

On the one hand, *tyrannis* is used to consider the use of power in the abstract, in the context of the intellectual debates of the late fifth and early fourth century, especially as represented in Plato.²⁸ In Plato's *Gorgias*, Polus, who wishes to demonstrate the great power of rhetoric and orators within *poleis*, emphasises that orators 'like *tyrannoi*, kill anyone they wish, and confiscate property and expel from their cities anyone they like.'²⁹ The point on which the orator is purportedly like the *tyrannos* is, then, his power to do injustice. Subsequently the debate turns to the question of whether the position of the *tyrannos*—'to be able to do whatever one likes in the *polis*, killing and expelling and doing everything according to one's own ideas'³⁰—is desirable. Polus raises Archelaus of Macedon as an example of such a man.³¹ Polus considers it obvious that Archelaus is fortunate (εὐδαίμων) and that any person in this position would be, and is confident that any Athenian would agree.³²

²⁷ Trampedach 2006. I have not, however, used Trampedach's article in detail; the questions asked are different from those considered here.

²⁸ I will not call these discussions 'Sophistic', because we cannot firmly attribute them to those to whom this adjective is uncontroversially attached (Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodicus, Hippias, Thrasymachus): the evidence is too thin. (For similar reasons, it is controversial to call immoralistic argumentation 'Sophistic': de Romilly [1988] 1992:111-161.)

²⁹ ὥσπερ οἱ τύραννοι, ἀποκτεινύασίν τε ὃν ἂν βούλωνται, καὶ ἀφαιροῦνται χρήματα καὶ ἐκβάλλουσιν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὃν ἂν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς (Pl. *Grg.* 466b-c).

³⁰ ἐξεῖναι ἐν τῇ πόλει, ὃ ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ποιεῖν τοῦτο, καὶ ἀποκτείνοντι καὶ ἐκβάλλοντι καὶ πάντα πράττοντι κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ δόξαν (Pl. *Grg.* 469c).

³¹ Pl. *Grg.* 470d-471d.

³² Pl. *Grg.* 468e, 471c-d. The desirability of *tyrannis* is likewise regarded as commonly accepted at *Resp.* I.344b-c (by Thrasymachus); *Leg.* II.661a-b; cf. Hoekstra 2016:29 (with further instances). For passages regarding *tyrannis* as desirable, cf. pp. 23-24 n. 90.

In other respects, however, Polus' view of the *tyrannos* is not merely traditional. Because it is being used as an example to prove that power to do injustice *in general* is a good thing (for instance in the case of orators), it is an argumentative, hypothetical and tendentious picture of the *tyrannos*. No mention is made of the disadvantages that might go along with the power of a real *tyrannos*, not necessarily because Polus is unaware that there might be disadvantages, but because Polus (or rather Plato through him) is setting up a thought experiment: would a person with supreme power to do injustice be fortunate *in principle*? This *tyrannos* is not a realistic portrait; his identity is restricted to such propositions as are relevant to the task of acting as a yardstick for the question of whether injustice is always bad or is sometimes beneficial to oneself.

Much the same thought experiment is posed when Glaucon, in Plato's *Republic*, puts forward Gyges (who was not only a *tyrannos*, but also possessed of a ring conferring invisibility and therefore undetectable in injustice) in the same way Polus put forward Archelaus.³³ Here again, the notion of *tyrannis* used is one advanced for the sake of the argument, and the way in which tyranny is conceived here is entirely determined by Glaucon's polemical purpose, namely that of giving a description of a person who is supremely powerful and supremely unjust, and about whom questions can be asked including, 'would such a man be *eudaimon*?', and 'should a man in such a position of power act immorally?'

This polemical description of the *tyrannos* as powerful, unjust and happy appears to have been well-known in this period, since several authors offer responses aimed at refuting this view. One such response is provided by the Anonymus Iamblichi, who argues that there is no such thing as a man who is supremely powerful, and that even if one existed he could not defeat the laws and his fellow citizens; *tyrannoi* only arise in *poleis* where respect for the laws is lacking.³⁴ Moreover, long before these thinkers,

³³ Pl. *Resp.* II.359b-361b.

³⁴ Anonymus Iamblichi 6.2-4, 7.12-16 (Laks-Most 40). Cf. de Romilly 1980:31-33, comparing this writer's criticism of *tyrannis* and *philotimia* to the treatment of these issues in Thucydides, Plato's *Gorgias*, and Euripides' *Phoenician Women*.

a strong strain of ideas existed emphasising the unhappiness and undesirability of *tyrannis*, and especially the lack of friends and fear of losing power which the *tyrannos* is said to experience. Such ideas, which occur in Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus* and Euripides' *Hippolytus*, *Suppliants* and *Ion*, already appear in a fragment of Euripides' *Daughters of Pelias* (455), and are somewhat anticipated in Pindar's *Pythian* 11 (466).³⁵ (As discussed in Chapter 1, such ideas may be connected with the story tradition reflected in Herodotus, where rulers often take action to thwart plots against them.³⁶) Intellectuals of the late fifth and early fourth centuries naturally found such ideas highly suitable for inclusion within their own arguments against the desirability of *tyrannis*.³⁷ In Xenophon's *Hiero*, Hiero argues that the *tyrannos* has a thoroughly unpleasant life, for just these reasons.³⁸ Building on Socrates' idea that injustice harms the doer's soul, Plato's *Republic* expands on this picture of the *tyrannos* as fearful and friendless by arguing that the *tyrannos* is not only supremely unhappy but is also powerless, since he is a slave of his own appetites.³⁹ In this intellectual debate, therefore—both sides of which are represented in tragedy⁴⁰—not only is the *tyrannos* described in a very particular way (as a successful practicer of great injustice), but there are also several creative responses to this picture of the *tyrannos*, which involve showing his weakness, unhappiness or vulnerability.

But the use of the idea of *tyrannis* to discuss the morality and attractiveness of supreme power was not limited to intellectual debates: it is also sometimes used to conceptualise the power of Athens as a *tyrannos polis* over its subject allies. This metaphor may possibly have emerged in the mid-fifth century when Athens' domination over its allies was criticised.⁴¹ If so, the Athenians had various possible

³⁵ Pind. *Pyth.* 11.53-54; Eur. *Daughters of Pelias* fr. 605, *Hipp.* 1013-1020, *Supp.* 446, *Ion* 621-628; Soph. *OT* 584-593. These examples are discussed by de Romilly 1970:181-183; Cuny 2004:72-76.

³⁶ See pp. 58-59.

³⁷ Cf. Ugolini 2017:463 and 472-473 n. 23.

³⁸ Xen. *Hier.* 3 (lack of friends), 4.1-2, 5.1-2 (fearfulness).

³⁹ Pl. *Resp.* VIII.567a-c, IX.573b-580a (especially 579c-580a).

⁴⁰ Cf. Kriegbaum 1913:27-28. The undesirability of *tyrannis* is emphasised in the cases mentioned just above; its desirability is argued for by Eteocles in Euripides' *Phoenician Women*, and in the passages cited in pp. 23-24 n. 90.

⁴¹ This is Raaflaub's theory, although conclusive evidence is lacking (Raaflaub 1979:243-252, [1985] 2004:133-134).

responses. They could have strenuously denied that they possessed a *tyrannis*,⁴² or they could have accepted that they possessed a *tyrannis* but urged that *tyrannis* was a desirable thing to possess (which would have been in line with arguments such as those attributed to the Athenians in Thucydides' Melian Dialogue).⁴³

The evidence for the Athenians' own use of the idea, though—a passage in Aristophanes' *Knights* and three speeches in Thucydides⁴⁴—shows the Athenians doing neither of these things. On the contrary, in each case the idea is accepted more or less dispassionately, as signifying the acknowledged fact that they exert absolute power over the allies and the allies hate them for it; this is then used as a basis for asking what action the Athenians should take as a result.⁴⁵ Thus, Pericles takes as his premise the allies' hatred of Athens on account of Athens' unjust rule, here called *tyrannis*, and argues that it would for this reason be dangerous to relinquish the empire.⁴⁶ Cleon likewise takes it as his premise that the allies hate Athens for its

⁴² This would have been in line with some of their other rhetorical strategies for defending their empire, such as their argument that they ruled in their subjects' interests (Raaflaub [1985] 2004:173-177).

⁴³ Thuc. V.89, 105. The Athenians perhaps did *not* habitually employ such argumentation (Strasburger [1958] 2009; Low 2005 and 2007, especially 227-228).

⁴⁴ Thuc. II.63.2, III.37.2, VI.85.1; Ar. *Eq.* 1111-1114. In Book I, the idea is used by the Corinthians as an accusation against the Athenians, rather than by the Athenians themselves (I.122.3, I.124.3). Tuplin 1985:348-358 shows that these passages are essentially the only relevant fifth-century ones.

⁴⁵ On the *tyrannis polis* metaphor I follow chiefly de Romilly [1947] 1963:124-128, 258-259; Tuplin 1985:352-358; Hoekstra 2016:26-28. Some scholars are unwilling to allow that the Athenians, owing to the vehement and institutional opposition to *tyrannis* associated with the celebration of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, can have been willing to look at *tyrannis* in the dispassionate way I describe (especially Raaflaub [1985] 2004:177, 2003:77-81). This, however, is precisely what the Athenians *did* do, and Pericles' speech at II.63.2, which is clearly predicated on the more dispassionate and analytical concept of *tyrannis* which I am elaborating in this section (as indeed de Romilly [1947] 1963:126-127 comments), cannot be explained on any other basis: Pericles' use of the metaphor *requires* it to be somewhat dispassionate.

I also disagree with Connor, who maintains that the metaphor of the *tyrannis polis* was appropriate in Athenian politics because, although it might have negative connotations, it was also highly appealing to the Athenians, in line with traditional ideas about the desirability of *tyrannis* to the possessor (Connor 1977, citing the passages given in pp. 23-24 n. 90). This is largely beside the point (cf. Tuplin 1985:361-362; Hoekstra 2016:27-28), because Thucydides' orators do not use the metaphor to evoke an emotional response, positive or negative, so much as an analytical one: they use it to help their audience deliberate on the issue at hand.

⁴⁶ Thuc. II.63.2; cf. Tuplin 1985:353-354.

unjust rule, again called *tyrannis*, and argues that for this reason Athens cannot afford to trust them and cannot hope to win their goodwill.⁴⁷ Euphemus uses the same metaphor, arguing that Athens' status as a *tyrannos* is a reason why it has to be particularly self-interested, choosing its friends and enemies cynically. As in Cleon's argument, Euphemus' premise is that, because everyone hates Athens' unjust rule (i.e., *tyrannis*), Athens cannot rely on goodwill or pre-existing ties, and therefore must be cynical and calculating.⁴⁸ In Aristophanes' *Knights*, the Chorus sings to the character Demos, 'Demos, your rule is excellent, since all people fear you like a *tyrannos*.'⁴⁹ Here, the dominance of the *demos* within the *polis* is referred to, rather than the *polis* within the *arche*. As in the Thucydidean cases, though, the metaphor is used as a means of discussing the nature and advantageousness of power: the Chorus argues that the power of the *demos* entails that it is duped by politicians, while Demos replies that this position is nonetheless highly satisfactory, since it can profit from these politicians and ruin them when it wishes.⁵⁰ The Thucydidean evidence, then, suggests that the Athenians responded to the accusation of *tyrannis* neither with vehement denial nor with greedy cupidity, but rather by pragmatically realising their allies' antipathy towards them on account of their unjust power over them, and by considering the consequences of this observation for the nature of their power and how to employ it most expediently. In Aristophanes, similarly, the metaphor is used to consider the advantageousness of the power of the *demos*.

In one case, *tyrannis* is used to think about an oligarchy's power, when Xenophon's Critias tells Theramenes that 'if, because we are thirty and not one, you think that it is any less necessary for us to take care over our rule as though it were a *tyrannis*, you

⁴⁷ Thuc. III.37.2.

⁴⁸ Thuc. VI.85.1.

⁴⁹ ὦ Δῆμμε, καλήν γ' ἔχεις ἀρχήν, ὅτε πάντες ἄνθρωποι δεδίασί σ' ὥσπερ ἄνδρα τύραννον (Ar. Eq. 1111-1114).

⁵⁰ Ar. Eq. 1121-1130.

are naive.’ Xenophon’s Critias here applies the same logic to the power of the Thirty within Athens that Thucydides’ Pericles applies to Athens’ power within its empire.⁵¹

The flexibility of *tyrannis* as a metaphor for power is further shown by its application to abstract things. Plato’s Hippias calls *nomos* a *tyrannos*.⁵² Sisyphus, in the fragment of the *Sisyphus* attributed to Critias, says that *nomoi* were invented so that *dike* might be a *tyrannos* over humans.⁵³ Gorgias, using a similar metaphor, argues that *logos*, i.e. persuasion, is a ‘great potentate’ (μέγας δυνάστης).⁵⁴ Love is called a *tyrannos* over gods and humans in both Euripides and Plato.⁵⁵ A Chorus in Sophocles even expresses the power of the *aulos* over them by calling it a *tyrannos* over their minds.⁵⁶ Tyranny could, then, be used as a metaphor for the power of all kinds of things.

So *tyrannis* was a flexible analytical tool, used for thinking about power both in theory and in practice. This use of *tyrannis* coexisted alongside the two phenomena discussed above—the celebration of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, and the perception of *tyrannis* as a practical threat in late fifth-century politics. This, then, is the complex role of *tyrannis* in Athenian political life, within which we must place tragedy.

III. *Tyrannis, stasis, and tragedy*

The role of the concept of *tyrannis* in Athenian politics is connected to that of the concept of *stasis*. The philosophical discussions of *tyrannis* discussed above are based on the notion that one might attain *tyrannis* by force and injustice, i.e. by some sort of *stasis*. Likewise, the use of *tyrannis* as a political accusation was founded on Athenian fears that *stasis* might occur and result in *tyrannis*. This fear was not precisely borne out by events, since *stasis* led rather to oligarchy in 411 and 404; however, the

⁵¹ εἰ δέ, ὅτι τριάκοντά ἐσμεν καὶ οὐχ εἷς, ἥττον τι οἶει ὥσπερ τυραννίδος ταύτης τῆς ἀρχῆς χρῆναι ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, εὐήθης εἶ (Xen. *Hell.* II.3.16); cf. Theramenes’ reply at III.3.48-49. This parallelism is observed by Caire 2016:50-51.

⁵² Pl. *Prt.* 337d.

⁵³ Critias, *Sisyphus* fr. 19.5-6.

⁵⁴ Gorg. *Hel.* 8 (Laks-Most 32 D24).

⁵⁵ Eur. *Andromeda* fr. 136.1; Pl. *Resp.* IX.573b.

⁵⁶ Soph. *Trach.* 217.

Athenians were not averse to conceiving of the end-point of *stasis* as *tyrannis* even where this was not representative of the situation in hand. This is shown by Cratinus' joking account of Pericles' divine parentage: '*Stasis* and *Chronos*, mingling together, brought forth the greatest *tyrannos*, whom the gods call the Head-Gatherer.'⁵⁷ Pericles neither attained power by *stasis* nor was a *tyrannos*—but, because the notion that *stasis* led to *tyrannis* was well-accepted, it is employed here polemically and comically despite not, strictly speaking, being accurate.

Indeed, the notion that *stasis* led to *tyrannis* (often as a result of *hybris*) seems to have been well-established. Theognis, warning against bad men (κακοί) acting with *hybris* for the sake of private gain, concludes, 'From this emerge *stasies*, the killing of men by their relatives, and *mounarchoi*; may this never please this city.'⁵⁸ Similar passages occur in Solon and Herodotus.⁵⁹

This brings us to Aeschylus' *Oresteia*. In an excellent article, Fisher has rightly said, 'The idea that serious *hybris*, especially as a result of an excess of power, prosperity or wealth, may produce *stasis* if unchecked through the laws remains a cliché in the dramatic poetry of fifth-century Athens.'⁶⁰ As he further observes, the *Oresteia* is marked by a series of murderous crimes—i.e. the *hybris* and *phonos* mentioned in the poetry ascribed to Theognis and Solon and in Herodotus. These lead to the *tyrannis* of Aegisthus and Clytaemestra, and further *stasis* in the form of Orestes' return and revenge. Aeschylus refers to the conspirators as a *stasis*, and in *Eumenides* the Chorus prays 'that *stasis*, insatiate of evil, may never rage in this *polis*; and may the dust not drink up the dark blood of the citizens and then, out of lust for revenge, eagerly welcome the city's ruin through retaliatory murder.'⁶¹ The trilogy, then, does not

⁵⁷ Στάσις δὲ καὶ πρεσβυγενὴς Χρόνος ἀλλήλοισι μιγέντε μέγιστον τίκτετον τύραννον, ὃν δὴ κεφαληγερέταν θεοὶ καλέουσιν (Cratinus, *Chirons* fr. 258 PCG [= Plut. *Per.* 3.4]).

⁵⁸ ἐκ τῶν γὰρ στάσιές τε καὶ ἔμφυλοι φόνοι ἀνδρῶν μούναρχοί τε· πόλει μήποτε τῇδε ἄδοι (Thgn. 51-52).

⁵⁹ Solon fr. 4.18-19, and cf. fr. 9.1-4, 11.3-4 (although it is not entirely clear whether *doulosyne* at fr. 4.18 refers to *tyrannis*: see Noussia-Fantuzzi *ad loc.*); Hdt. III.82.3; cf. Bengt 1929:84.

⁶⁰ Fisher 2000:101. I follow him closely in this paragraph.

⁶¹ Orestes and associates as a *stasis*: Aesch. *Cho.* 111, 458-460. The Chorus' prayer: τὰν δ' ἄπληστον κακῶν μήποτ' ἐν πόλει στάσιν τᾷδ' ἐπεύχομαι βρέμειν, μηδὲ πιούσα κόνις

examine *tyrannis* in isolation; like Solon and Theognis, it explores it as part of the wider phenomenon of political conflict within the *polis*.

Some scholars have linked the killing of Aegisthus in the *Oresteia* directly with the killing of Hipparchus,⁶² because, in *Libation-Bearers*, Orestes' killing of Aegisthus and Clytaemestra is seen as bringing *eleutheria* to the *polis*. When Orestes enters with Aegisthus' and Clytaemestra's dead bodies, he proclaims, 'Behold the double *tyrannis* of the land, which killed my father and pillaged my house!'⁶³—and later the Chorus-leader reassures Orestes with the words, 'You have done well! Do not yoke your mouth to painful speech or utter evil words: you have freed (ἡλευθέρωσας) the whole *polis* of Argos, handily cutting off the two serpents' heads.'⁶⁴ So *Libation-Bearers* sees Orestes' act not only as vengeance, but also as liberating the *polis* from *tyrannis*. Also, the Chorus twice uses the imagery of the 'light of freedom' for Orestes' act:⁶⁵ this imagery is shared with the epigram attributed to Simonides that may have been inscribed on the base of the statue of Harmodius and Aristogeiton in the Athenian *agora*.⁶⁶ However, although the killing of Aegisthus and Clytaemestra is described as the killing of two *tyrannoi*, the theme of vengeance is much more prominent, and the language of killing *tyrannoi* is adapted to a plot where the killing of Aegisthus and Clytaemestra will lead not to *isonomia* but to the restoration of a traditional regime of sole rule;⁶⁷ it is chiefly to the *domos*, not to the *polis*, that the 'light of freedom' is said to come.⁶⁸

μέλαν αἶμα πολιτᾶν δι' ὄργαν πονῆς ἀντιφόνους ἄτας ἀρπαλίσαι πόλεως (Aesch. *Eum.* 976-983, trans. Sommerstein).

⁶² Raaflaub [1985] 2004:89 and 309 n. 134; Griffith 1995:95 n. 112.

⁶³ ἴδεσθε χῶρας τὴν διπλὴν τυραννίδα πατροκτόνους τε δωμάτων πορθήτορας (Aesch. *Cho.* 973-974).

⁶⁴ ἀλλ' εὖ γ' ἔπραξας, μηδ' ἐπιζευχθῆς στόμα φήμη πονηρᾷ μηδ' ἐπιγλωσσῶ κακά· ἡλευθέρωσας πᾶσαν Ἀργείων πόλιν, δυοῖν δρακόντοιν εὐπετῶς τεμὼν κάρα (Aesch. *Cho.* 1044-1047). This last line perhaps recalls Orestes' phrase τὴν διπλὴν τυραννίδα (973).

⁶⁵ Aesch. *Cho.* 807-811, 859-865.

⁶⁶ The epigram runs, ἦ μέγ' Ἀθηναίοισι φῶως γένεθ', ἥνικ' Ἀριστογείτων Ἰππαρχον κτεῖνε καὶ Ἀρμόδιος (Simon. *FGE* I). On the epigram, see Taylor [1981] 1991:22-23; de Lisle 2018.

⁶⁷ Griffith 1995:95 notes this.

⁶⁸ The view that the killing of Aegisthus and Clytaemestra in *Libation-Bearers* reflects the killing of Hipparchus has a corollary in the possibility, explored by Prag 1985:103-105, that vase-paintings of Orestes and of Aegisthus' death recall the killing of Hipparchus. However, Prag rightly emphasises 'how tentative such suggestions must be' (Prag 1985:104).

It is difficult to know how much importance to assign to these turns of phrase. Dodds regarded them as ‘no more than straws in the wind’, and perhaps he is right⁶⁹—but it may be that, given the prominence of Harmodius and Aristogeiton in Athenian culture, only a few small hints would have been needed to remind Athenians of this particular point of reference. If one entertains the possibility that the killing of Aegisthus and Clytaemestra recalls the killing of Hipparchus (even if very loosely), one will wish to consider how this fits into the wider ways in which Aeschylus’ *Oresteia* is embedded in contemporary political life. The most conspicuous political elements in the trilogy, of course, are those in *Eumenides*, where the depiction of the legendary foundation of the Areopagus and the repeated mentions of an alliance with Argos are generally taken to refer with clarity to contemporary events.⁷⁰ The significance of Aeschylus’ presentation of the killing of Aegisthus and Clytaemestra, though, is probably to be found at a broader level. The *Oresteia*, as a whole, presents a number of political processes experienced by archaic and early classical Athens; among these processes, as we have seen, the progression from *stasis* to *tyrannis* has a role. The killing of a *tyrannos* and the resulting liberation—as Meier points out—also have a place among these political processes reflected in the trilogy.⁷¹ Indeed, the fact that the killing of the *tyrannoi* at Argos is followed by the establishment of democratic *eunomia* at Athens in *Eumenides* means that the *Oresteia* seems to echo quite closely the preceding century of Athenian history, as Aeschylus may have understood it: firstly *stasis*, then *tyrannis*, then the killing of the *tyrannoi* and liberation, and lastly reform and the rule of law. The killing of *tyrannoi*, then, plays its part in the wider texture of political issues and processes handled in the trilogy, which culminate in the founding of the Areopagus and the establishment of *eunomia* at Athens at the trilogy’s conclusion.

⁶⁹ Dodds 1960b:20.

⁷⁰ For the relationship between Aesch. *Eum.* (esp. 689-706) and Ephialtes’ reform of the Areopagus in 462 ([Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 25; Arist. *Pol.* II.1274a8-16), see Macleod 1982:127-129; Schaps 1993. Extreme scepticism is expressed by Harris 2019. The alliance with Argos: Aesch. *Eum.* 289-291, 669-673, 754-777, with Thuc. I.102.4 and e.g. Sommerstein [1989] 2010a:285-287, although cf. Harris 2019:392 n. 8.

⁷¹ Meier [1988] 1993:130, 134-135; cf. McGlew 1993:190-196 (more adventurous, and less fully convincing).

Aeschylus' emphasis on the killing of *tyrannoi* in *Libation-Bearers* is not matched elsewhere. Sophocles' *Electra* includes some such ideas. Juffras suggests that the picture which Electra paints of the honours she and Chrysothemis would receive for killing Aegisthus echoes the honours paid to Harmodius and Aristogeiton,⁷² and the play ends with the Chorus praising Orestes for obtaining *eleutheria*.⁷³ But scholars have rightly noted that political elements such as these are hardly prominent; relative to Aeschylus, Sophocles has clearly reduced the prominence of the theme.⁷⁴ In Euripides' *Electra*, although Electra expresses indignation at Aegisthus' carrying of Agamemnon's sceptre and riding his chariot,⁷⁵ Aegisthus' death does not seem to be presented in any significant respect as the killing of a *tyrannos*.⁷⁶

However, Euripides' plays do provide some of the clearest instances of the notion that *stasis* leads to *tyrannis*. In a fragment of *Cresphontes* (before 421), the Chorus prays to Peace to defend the house from *stasis*.⁷⁷ The relevant act of *stasis* was presumably Polyphontes' killing of the previous ruler Cresphontes (the father of the titular character) so that he, Polyphontes, might be *tyrannos*,⁷⁸ but we cannot know whether the play explored *stasis* in detail.⁷⁹

Similarly perhaps, Euripides' *Heracles* of 416, although without exploring *stasis* in depth, conceives of the *tyrannis* of Lycus as obtained through *stasis*.⁸⁰ The prologue tells us that Lycus 'killed Creon and having killed him rules the land, having fallen upon the *polis* when it was sick with *stasis*.'⁸¹ Likewise the Chorus-leader,

⁷² Soph. *El.* 973-985 with Juffras 1991; Finglass *ad loc.*.

⁷³ Soph. *El.* 1508-1510.

⁷⁴ Cf. Knox 1983:7-9; Finglass 2005, especially 201-202.

⁷⁵ Eur. *El.* 319-322, cited by Finglass 2005:201.

⁷⁶ Indeed, as Duranti 2017:571-572 notes, it is stated that Orestes can expect no assistance from within Argos (Eur. *El.* 605-611).

⁷⁷ Eur. *Cresphontes* fr. 453.15-26.

⁷⁸ ὡς τυραννεύει χθονός (Eur. *Cresphontes* fr. 448a.22).

⁷⁹ Cf. Harder 1985:103; Collard, Cropp and Lee 1995:125.

⁸⁰ These citations are from Harder 1985:109.

⁸¹ κτείνει Κρέοντα καὶ κτανὼν ἄρχει χθονός, στάσει νοσοῦσαν τήνδ' ἐπεσπεσὼν πόλιν (Eur. *HF* 33-34).

complaining about Lycus' rule, remarks, 'The *polis* is not thinking right, sick through *stasis* and bad counsel.'⁸² Later, Amphytrion states that Lycus' power base consists of 'many poor men, but outwardly appearing to be rich, who created *stasis* and destroyed the *polis* to plunder their neighbours' property'.⁸³ This notion of *stasis* being stirred up by impoverished nobles is also used by other writers to explain fifth- and fourth-century political discord⁸⁴—and so these lines show a clear connection to contemporary ideas about *stasis*.⁸⁵ In *Heracles*, then (and perhaps *Cresphontes*), despite these plays involving the killing of a *tyrannos*, Euripides does not choose to assimilate the plays to the Athenian conceptions concerning killing *tyrannoi* which we discussed in relation to Aeschylus: instead, to the extent that Euripides uses a contemporary frame of reference at all, it is that of *stasis*.

Euripides' *Phoenician Women*, produced within a few years of the oligarchic revolution of 411 and democratic counter-revolution of 410, explores issues of *stasis* in detail. As scholars have shown, the play contrasts devotion to one's *polis* with selfish individualism, and civic-minded *isotes* with *philotimia* and *pleonexia*—problems which Thucydides, too, saw in contemporary politics.⁸⁶ Within this context *tyrannis* plays an important role, especially in Eteocles' *agon* speech. Here Eteocles—uniquely in tragedy—employs the third use of *tyrannis* discussed above, whereby power is analysed from its holder's perspective. As has sometimes been pointed out, his speech uses 'immoralist' techniques of argument commonly employed in contemporary intellectual debates; in particular, in using *tyrannis* in this context, Eteocles resembles Polus, Callicles and Glaucon in Plato's *Gorgias* and *Republic*.⁸⁷

⁸² οὐ γὰρ εὖ φρονεῖ πόλις στάσει νοσοῦσα καὶ κακοῖς βουλευμασιν (Eur. HF 272-273).

⁸³ πολλοὺς πένητας, ὀλβίους δὲ τῶ λόγῳ δοκοῦντας εἶναι συμμάχους ἄναξ ἔχει, οἱ στάσιν ἔθηκαν καὶ διώλεσαν πόλιν ἐφ' ἀρπαγαῖσι τῶν πέλας (Eur. HF 588-591).

⁸⁴ Plut. *Arist.* 13.1; Lys. XXIV.19, XXV.11; Pl. *Resp.* VIII.555d; *Arist. Pol.* V.1305b39-40, V.1316b14-21 (parallels from Bond on Eur. HF 588-92).

⁸⁵ However, U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff on Eur. HF 588-92 (followed by Kovacs 1982:32-33) suggests deletion.

⁸⁶ Especially Thuc. II.65.8. *Phoenician Women* is discussed in this light, with further references, by de Romilly 1965:35-46; Neumann 1995:62-66; Hose 1995:118-126; Medda 2006:27-41.

⁸⁷ This broad point (in slightly different terms) is made by Kriegbaum 1913:27-28; Nauhardt 1940:72-73 (who says that Eteocles is 'ausgestattet mit den Zügen des sophistischen Übermenschen'); Medda 2006:38-40. For the term 'immoralist', see Barney 2004, n. 1.

Eteocles starts by casting doubt on the absolute nature of *to kalon* and *to sophon*, and employs the notion that to act justly would be cowardice.⁸⁸ This resembles Thucydides' statement, in his description of *stasis*, that 'They exchanged their usual verbal evaluations of actions for new ones, in the light of what they thought justified',⁸⁹ and in particular that 'Hesitation through forethought was considered specious cowardice.'⁹⁰ Eteocles' elaborate argumentation is anticipated by Polynices, who earlier says that the argument of truth (μῦθος τῆς ἀληθείας) is simple, whereas the unjust argument (ἄδικος λόγος) is sick, and requires 'clever medicines' (φαρμάκων ... σοφῶν).⁹¹ This contrast between these two arguments is the same one vividly depicted in Aristophanes' *Clouds*, and recalls the notion associated with Protagoras that a clever speaker can make two opposing arguments about anything.⁹² Eteocles begins his argument proper by—like Polus in the *Gorgias*—emphatically asserting the supreme desirability of *tyrannis*.⁹³ His treatment of *tyrannis* as a goddess is also typical of contemporary argumentation.⁹⁴ His conclusion makes it clear that he is, like Plato's immoralists, arguing in favour of a confessedly unjust course of action: 'For I shall never hand over my *tyrannis* to this man; for if one must act unjustly, it is finest to do injustice concerning *tyrannis*, but one should be pious in all other things.'⁹⁵

⁸⁸ Eur. *Phoen.* 499-502, 509-510.

⁸⁹ καὶ τὴν εἰωθυῖαν ἀξίωσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐς τὰ ἔργα ἀντήλλαξαν τῇ δικαίῳσει (Thuc. III.82.4); trans. Hornblower, as explained by Hornblower *ad loc.*.

⁹⁰ μέλλησις δὲ προμηθὴς δειλία εὐπρεπής (Thuc. III.82.4). Eteocles' argument shares with this passage the opposition of *andreia* to *dikaíosyne*, found also at Anonymus Iamblichi 6.1 (Laks-Most 40). (Parallels from Medda 2006:36-37.)

⁹¹ Eur. *Phoen.* 469-472.

⁹² Ar. *Nub.* 889-1112, cf. 116; Diog. Laert. IX.51 (= Laks-Most 31 D26); cf. Eur. *Antiope* fr. 189. The anonymous *Dissoi Logoi* are written on a similar principle (Laks-Most 41).

⁹³ Cf. Pl. *Grg.* 469c-470e. Incidentally, Bellerophon's description of *tyrannis* (Eur. *Bellerophon* fr. 286.5-8) is remarkably similar to Polus' (Kriegbaum 1913:27-28).

⁹⁴ Attribution of divinity to an untraditional object: cf. Eur. *Phoen.* 531-532, 782, *Cyc.* 316-317, 334-335, with Seaford on Eur. *Cyc.* 316. Aristophanes portrays Socrates (*Nub.* 364-365) and Euripides (*Ran.* 892-893) as doing much the same. Seaford connects this 'persuasive redefinition of divinity' with Prodicus (Laks-Most 34 D15, D16, D17; cf. also Egli 2003:136-156, especially 154-156).

⁹⁵ ὥς οὐ παρήσω τῷδ' ἐμὴν τυραννίδα. εἶπερ γὰρ ἀδικεῖν χρή, τυραννίδος πέρι κάλλιστον ἀδικεῖν, τᾶλλα δ' εὐσεβεῖν χρεών (Eur. *Phoen.* 523-525).

Here, then, as in Plato, the idea of *tyrannis* is used to debate the morality of power. When placed in the context of this play, though, these arguments are no longer abstract and hypothetical. Whereas in the cases discussed previously *tyrannis* was used as a means of thinking somewhat metaphorically about the power of someone other than a *tyrannos*, in Eteocles' case (and only here) Euripides imagines what a real *tyrannos* who acted according to the openly immoralist principles associated with *tyrannis* by fifth-century intellectuals would look like.⁹⁶ And it is a striking picture: unlike in the arguments of immoralist thinkers, we get a remarkable view of Eteocles' fallibility, as we know that these principles will lead to his downfall. By applying the analytical use of *tyrannis* to the presentation of Eteocles, Euripides explores contemporary issues of *stasis* in a fascinating and unique fashion.

Euripides' *Orestes* (produced in 408) explores further issues connected with the same political context. The play has often rightly been compared with Thucydides' description of *stasis*—and, although one might expect Thucydides' and Euripides' depictions of *stasis* to be highly personal,⁹⁷ they coincide on a remarkable number of points.⁹⁸ *Hetaireiai* are particularly prominent in both Thucydides and Euripides. Rather as Thucydides says that that ties of blood (τὸ ξυγγενές) became weaker than those of *hetairia*, Orestes, impressed by Pylades' loyalty, specifically exclaims that *hetairoi* are greatly to be preferred to blood-relations.⁹⁹ Pylades says he is bound to Orestes by the *pistis* of their complicity in Clytaemestra's murder; certain historical *hetaireiai* were bound together similarly, including the one that murdered Hyperbolus in 411 to create a *pistis* between the oligarchic conspirators.¹⁰⁰ There are numerous

⁹⁶ Nauhardt 1940:73 writes, 'Aus der sophistischen Lehre vom Naturrecht des Stärkeren, von der Physis im Gegensatz zum Nomos, werden hier die politischen Konsequenzen gezogen.'

⁹⁷ Porter 1994:330.

⁹⁸ Rawson 1972:161 says of the Thucydides passage, "Could not this almost have been written as a commentary on Orestes' way of speaking?" The link with Thuc. III.82 has often been discussed (Longo 1975; Porter 1994:327-332, with further bibliography in 325 n. 2; cf. also Neumann 1995:93-94).

⁹⁹ Thuc. III.82.6; Eur. *Or.* 804-806.

¹⁰⁰ Thuc. VIII.73.3; cf. Andoc. I.67, Polyaeus, *Strat.* I.40.1; Calhoun 1913:35; Burkert 1974:107; Longo 1975:273-274; Simonton 2017:260-263. On Athenian political *hetaireiai* in these years, see Calhoun 1913 *passim*; Andrewes, Hornblower on Thuc. VIII.54.4; Ostwald 1986:354-358. On

other points of analogy between the portrayal of *hetaireiai* and *stasis* in this play and in Thucydides.

It may seem that, in discussing *stasis* in Euripides, we have almost lost sight of *tyrannis*. This, though, is exactly the point: in his *Orestes*, one of Euripides' most striking innovations is that he has completely removed from the picture the notion that the killing of Aegisthus constitutes the killing of a *tyrannos*. The play never even attributes the possession of *tyrannis* to Aegisthus, although it twice mentions his *philo*i taking a role in the political conflict, i.e. as a *hetaireia*.¹⁰¹ Indeed, the play only mentions Aegisthus a few times,¹⁰² and all discussion of the morality of Orestes' act centres on his killing of Clytaemestra and on her adultery.¹⁰³ This clearly demonstrates the variety of ways which the tragic playwrights—like contemporary politicians and intellectuals—had of conceptualising political conflict. Whereas Aeschylus chose to depict the killing of Aegisthus as the killing of a *tyrannos*, Euripides appears to have preferred to reframe the situation to fit with the political climate and ideas of his own day.¹⁰⁴

IV. Conclusion

Above all, then, the relationship between tragedy and the politics of fifth-century Athens is highly varied: different ideas about *tyrannis* are employed in different ways in different plays. This variation is to be attributed to the different intentions of Aeschylus and Euripides, but also to the different times in which they lived. In Aeschylus' *Oresteia*, it is impossible—in the absence of detailed information about

philia and *hetaireia* in the play, see Greenberg 1962; Rawson 1972:158-160; Willink 1986:xliv; Hall 1993:269-271.

¹⁰¹ Eur. *Or.* 435, 894.

¹⁰² Eur. *Or.* 435, 561 (sometimes deleted), 619, 894, 1158.

¹⁰³ Eur. *Or.* 496-506, 539-541, 546-564, 923-929, 1131-1152 all focus entirely on adultery.

¹⁰⁴ Petre 1997:1218-1220—followed with only slightly more caution by Azoulay [2015] 2017:65-67—sees Euripides' *Orestes* as a comment on the killing of Hipparchus: 'Come anche Tucidide, Euripide drammatizza la natura paradossale del tirannicidio, cui anche il poeta contesta il carattere univoco che gli attribuiva la semplificazione popolare e commemorativa' (Petre 1997:1219). However, since Euripides plays down this element, the play provides little basis for this.

how exactly the political debates of the early 450s were framed—to be sure how audience-members would have related the presentation of Aegisthus' death as the killing of a *tyrannos* to the political debates of the day. Thanks to Thucydides, we are more minutely informed when it comes to the 410s, and can see that Euripides' *Phoenician Women* and *Orestes* treat their subject-matter in a thoroughly contemporary way, which maps strikingly onto the terms of contemporary political debate. We will, though, perhaps not go far wrong if we assume that a detailed knowledge of the political debates of the early 450s would be just as illuminating for our interpretation of Aeschylus' *Oresteia* as our knowledge of that of the 410s is for our understanding of Euripides' *Phoenician Women* and *Orestes*. Certainly, Aeschylus' *Oresteia* is very much a product of the 450s, just as Euripides' *Phoenician Women* and *Orestes* are very much products of the 410s; these plays' handling of political conflict and *tyrannis* are closely related to the political contexts in which they were written.

Apart from the great deal of variation, though, the most important point is the *relatively slight* degree of contact between these plays and the main political uses of *tyrannis* that can be observed in fifth-century Athens. Only Aeschylus' *Libation-Bearers* relates closely to Athenian ideas about the killing of *tyrannoi* (although some slight reminiscences are present in Sophocles' *Electra*), and only Euripides' *Phoenician Women* seems to draw on the analytical use of the idea of *tyrannis*. Extant tragedy does not draw on the use of the idea of *tyrannis* as political invective at all, as far as I am aware.¹⁰⁵ The playwrights could easily have included all of these ideas in the plays frequently, if they had wished their audiences to habitually associate the rulers on the stage with how the idea of *tyrannis* was used in Athenian politics. Yet they did so only occasionally and selectively.

This seems to undermine the notion that the depiction of rulers in tragedy has anything much to do with the way in which the idea of *tyrannis* was used in Athenian politics, except where it is demonstrably invoked. If the depiction of rulers in tragedy

¹⁰⁵ Of course, Oedipus accuses Creon of attempting to seize *tyrannis* at Soph. *OT* 532-542, but this cannot be taken to recall contemporary invective: Oedipus objects to this not because *tyrannis* is bad for the *polis*, but because he thinks that Creon wishes to usurp his power.

were significantly affected by the execration of *tyrannoi* by means of the veneration of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, or by the use of *tyrannis* as a term of political invective, we would expect tragedy to make frequent contact with these ideas. As it is, however, tragedy scarcely makes any—despite the fact that *in other ways* contemporary political ideas are continually employed in tragedy, both in the depiction of rulers and more broadly. The relationship between the ways in which the idea of *tyrannis* is used in tragedy and in Athenian political and intellectual life, then, is a complex and variable one: it is not reducible to, and often has little to do with, the portrayal of the *tyrannos* as a foil against which Athenian identity might define itself.¹⁰⁶

In this chapter, we have continued to demonstrate the complexity and variety of the ideas underlying the depiction of rulers in tragedy by looking at Athenian ideas concerning *tyrannis*. We have seen that the relationship between ideas about *tyrannis* in tragedy and in politics varies from case to case, and that tragedy makes contact with Athenian political ideas about *tyrannis* relatively infrequently. This casts doubt on the common view according to which the tragic playwrights' depiction of rulers and treatment of the issue of *tyrannis* are connected in a close and general fashion to contemporary Athenian political ideas about *tyrannis*. In the next chapter, we will further demonstrate the complexity and variety of the ideas underlying the depiction of tragic rulers by looking at a different strand of ideas from Athenian political life,

¹⁰⁶ I also doubt that *tyrannis* in tragedy should be closely connected with Athenian foreign policy, as suggested by Knox 1954:100 ≈ 1957:60-66 (Soph. OT); Raaflaub 1988:294-295 (PV); de Romilly 1970:180 and Hoekstra 2016:34-37 (more generally, tentatively).

These scholars suggest references to Athenian imperialism on the grounds that such a reference-point would in principle have been available to the audience. However, these interpretations are not based on *detailed correspondences* between the plays and contemporary political debates, and the detailed correspondences that *do* exist between tragedy and contemporary debates are not with those concerning Athenian imperialism (cf. Griffin 1998:50-51). In *Phoenician Women*, where the idea of *tyrannis* is used analytically, the correspondences are with philosophical texts, and links to contemporary politics are lacking.

Above all, such interpretations are excessively narrow. The use of the idea of *tyrannis* to think about the empire was just one component of a wider contemplation of the internal and external use of power at Athens (cf. de Romilly [1947] 1963:125-126; Raaflaub 1979:245-252, [1985] 2004:128-146; Kallet 2003:121-122); there is no special reason to suppose that tragedy would have prompted Athenian audience-members to think about the empire *in particular*, rather than about power more broadly or in other manifestations.

namely those which were actually used to think about the leadership of, and the obedience due to, the leaders and officials of the Athenian democracy.

CHAPTER 3. CONTEMPORARY, ANACHRONISTIC, AND DEMOCRATIC ELEMENTS IN THE DEPICTION OF RULERS IN TRAGEDY

I. Introduction

We have now seen that tragic rulers are depicted using ideas about *tyrannis* and sole rule, even though there were no sole rulers in democratic Athens. However, the depiction of rulers is also affected by political ideas applied in the fifth century to leaders and officials of the Athenian democracy.

When the playwrights apply contemporary ideas to plays set in the distant legendary past, one may be inclined to call such ideas ‘anachronisms’. However, this idea does not apply entirely satisfactorily to tragedy. Its legendary setting never existed, as such; although the Greeks’ epic poetry provides a view of this legendary past, tragedy does not imitate the world of epic in detail, and it makes a nonsense of tragedy to call everything that cannot be paralleled in extant epic ‘anachronism’.¹

However, this does not mean that the playwrights were utterly blasé about anachronism. Important here is ‘heroic vagueness’, the phenomenon, identified by Easterling, whereby strong (and uncontroversial) correspondences between the play and contemporary life are cloaked in terminology that lightly disguises their contemporary referentiality.² Here, I will argue that, in presenting rulers, the playwrights do not combine contemporary elements with the legendary past haphazardly, but rather blend them carefully. They do so in various ways, in each case striking a different balance between making the plays relevant in their own day and maintaining the illusion of a legendary setting.

Firstly, we will compare how the playwrights combine contemporary elements with the legendary past in four ‘suppliant plays’—Aeschylus’ *Suppliants*, Euripides’

¹ Cf. Easterling 1985:1; Rood, Atack and Phillips 2020:61-62.

² Easterling 1985, 1997; Pelling 2000:164-165.

Children of Heracles and *Suppliants*, and Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus* (II)—before looking closely at Euripides' *Suppliants*, where uniquely interesting ideas about leadership can be found, comparable to those used in both archaic poetry and Thucydides (III).

Finally, we will consider Sophocles' *Antigone*, where Creon is presented, to an extent, in terms analogous to contemporary *polis* officials (IV).

II. Anachronism and democratic elements in the suppliant plays

II.i. Democratic rulers in Aeschylus

The earliest extant play to depict a ruler in somewhat democratic terms is Aeschylus' *Suppliants*. Pelasgus, as has been noted, is unusual in being called neither *basileus* nor *tyrannos*.³ On entry, he explains that he is the *archegetes* of the land, the local people are called Pelasgians after him, and he rules (κρατῶ) a vast territory consisting of most of mainland Greece⁴—remarks which present him as extremely important and powerful. His role within the *polis*, though, only arises when the Danaids supplicate him. He replies that the Danaids are not his personal suppliants, but those of the *polis*, adding, 'I would not make (ἐγὼ δ' ἂν οὐ κραίνοιμ') a promise beforehand, but only after communicating (κοινώσας) with all the citizens concerning these things.'⁵ This remark is ambiguous, since the potential optative (κραίνοιμ') does not spell out whether he is *incapable* of making such a promise, or *unwilling*. Nor does 'communicating' (κοινώσας) specify whether he or the *demos* will make the final

³ Cf. pp. 22, 30 above.

⁴ Aesch. *Supp.* 251-259. The word ἀρχηγέτης (also 184) sometimes means 'founder' (e.g. ML 5.26). However, given its use in the Spartan Great Rhetra, its original sense was probably 'chief leader' (Plut. *Lyc.* 6, with Rhodes [1986] 2007:68), and it means 'ruler' at Bacchyl. 3.24, Soph. *OT* 751, and Eur. *Tro.* 447. Also, at Aesch. *Supp.* 184 the speaker (Danaus) does not yet know that Pelasgus is the Pelasgians' founder, as well as ruler. In Aeschylus, then, ἀρχηγέτης presumably means 'ruler' (Friis Johansen and Whittle on Aesch. *Supp.* 184-9; Sommertein on Aesch. *Supp.* 184), although Pelasgus' status as founder might possibly have influenced Aeschylus' choice of word (Parara 2010:48).

⁵ ἐγὼ δ' ἂν οὐ κραίνοιμ' ὑπόσχεσιν πάρος, ἀστοῖς δὲ πᾶσι τῶνδε κοινώσας πέρι (Aesch. *Supp.* 368-369).

decision. The Chorus, however, disagrees vehemently, saying, ‘But you are the *polis*, and you are the populace: as a *prytanis* not subject to judgement, you rule the altar, the hearth of this land, by your vote and nod alone; sitting on your throne, with your sceptre alone, you decide every matter.’⁶ What we are to make of this is disputed. One possibility is that the Chorus, as foreigners, are uncomprehending of Greek custom.⁷ In fact, however, the matter is not spelt out; by making the extent of Pelasgus’ power a matter of contestation, Aeschylus makes it ambiguous.

Shortly, Pelasgus reiterates his stance in different words, saying, ‘As I said before, I would not do this (οὐκ ... πράξαίμ’ ἄν) without the *demos*, even having the power (οὐδέ περ κρατῶν), in case, if something bad occurred, the people might say, “By honouring newcomers you destroyed the *polis*.”’⁸ Here, the participial phrase (οὐδέ περ κρατῶν) is often taken to imply ‘even though I do have the power’ (a concessive participle) rather than ‘even if I did have the power’ (a conditional participle),⁹ but the latter is not impossible.¹⁰ He adds here, though, an additional element, namely his reluctance to be criticised by the people, a Homeric feature.¹¹ These passages, then, do not make Pelasgus’ theoretical powers very clear. In any case, the question is subsequently put to the side, since—whether by choice, convention, or necessity—Pelasgus does not attempt to exercise them.

⁶ σύ τοι πόλις, σὺ δὲ τὸ δάμιον· πρύτανις ἄκριτος ὧν κρατύνεις βωμόν, ἐστίαν χθονός, μονοπήφοισι νεύμασιν σέθεν, μονοσκήπτροισι δ’ ἐν θρόνοις χρέος πᾶν ἐπικραίνεις (Aesch. *Supp.* 370-375).

The word *prytanis*, used of Zeus (Pind. *Pyth.* 6.24; PV 169; Eur. *Tro.* 1258), Apollo (*Hymn. Hom. Ap.* 68), and Hieron of Syracuse (Pind. *Pyth.* 2.58), was used in many *poleis* either for the principal civic official, or for a board of officials (Welwei 2006, with references), as at Athens, where the *prytaneis* were the presiding board of the *boule*. Here, the phrase *prytanis akritos* is probably a paradoxical turn of phrase, recalling the Athenians’ own *prytaneis*, who were accountable (Easterling 1985:2; Sommerstein on Aesch. *Supp.* 371; cf. p. 166 n. 58 below).

⁷ Most usefully, Sommerstein on Aesch. *Supp.* 370-5, 370 (paying attention to the τοι); similarly, Heim 1904:27-29, Easterling 1985:2, Herington 1986:110; cf. M. L. West 2006:35-37.

⁸ εἶπον δὲ καὶ πρῖν, οὐκ ἄνευ δήμου τάδε πράξαίμ’ ἄν, οὐδέ περ κρατῶν, μὴ καὶ ποτε εἴποι λεώς, εἴ ποῦ τι μὴ λῶον τύχοι, “ἐπὶ λυδᾶς τιμῶν ἀπώλεσας πόλιν” (Aesch. *Supp.* 398-401).

⁹ Friis Johansen and Whittle, Sommerstein *ad loc.*; cf. Denniston 1934:487.

¹⁰ So Garvie 2006:xvi; Bowen *ad loc.*. Allowing περ its usual concessive force (as in Denniston’s examples) does not necessarily prevent the participle being interpreted as conditional: in the statement, ‘even if I had the power, [nevertheless] I would not do it’, there is a concession involved alongside the conditional, and περ seems explicable on that basis.

¹¹ Aesch. *Supp.* 401, with Friis Johansen and Whittle *ad loc.*, comparing *Il.* XX.107; *Od.* XXIV.426-429; Eur. *Supp.* 229-231.

Instead, Pelasgus proceeds to act fully like a democratic leader. He calls the people together in terms that, with considerable ‘heroic vagueness’, recall a democratic Assembly without using the terminology.¹² The meeting itself is described in terms that clearly recall democratic procedure: there is a show of hands,¹³ resulting in a decree.¹⁴ Pelasgus acts as a democratic orator, persuading them to adopt his proposal.¹⁵ It is then the vote (ψηφος) of the *demos*, not his own decision, that Pelasgus cites against the Egyptian Herald, and to reassure the Danaids.¹⁶ Pelasgus’ behaviour, then, reflects democratic political life. Yet Aeschylus also seems to have carefully avoided pushing the democratic elements so far as to explicitly remove Pelasgus’ status as a sole ruler; since he persuades the *demos* and the *demos* obeys him, there is no clash of wills, and consequently no final and definite indication of who is really the party with *kratos* in this *polis*.¹⁷

In *Agamemnon*, Agamemnon also plans to consult the *polis*, by holding public (κοινούς) assemblies among the whole people (ἐν πανηγύρει).¹⁸ However, Agamemnon’s ‘constitutional’ position is, again, ‘heroically vague’. Since he *chooses* to

¹² Aesch. *Supp.* 517-518.

¹³ Aesch. *Supp.* 604, 607-608, 621. The phrase δήμου κρατοῦσα χεὶρ (604) is sometimes thought to veil the notion of *demokratia* (Ehrenberg 1950:522-524; Raaflaub [1985] 2004:206; Sommerstein *ad loc.*), but Vlastos 1953:338-339 and M. L. West 2006:36 are more cautious.

¹⁴ δήμου δέδοκται παντελῇ ψηφίσματα (Aesch. *Supp.* 601); ἔδοξεν Ἀργείοισιν, οὐ διχορρόπως (605).

¹⁵ ἔπειθε (Aesch. *Supp.* 615); cf. 623-624.

¹⁶ Aesch. *Supp.* 942-943, 963-965.

¹⁷ I thus disagree both with those who argue that Pelasgus is clearly an absolute monarch (Friis Johansen and Whittle 1980:I.28 and on Aesch. *Supp.* 365-9; Burian [1974] 2007b:202-205, but cf. 2006:200) and with those who argue that the Assembly is definitely sovereign (Herington 1986:110; Bakewell 1994:142-144, following U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1914:11 and Snell 1928:59). Such views involve constitutional hair-splitting, and do not do justice to Aeschylus’ presentation of a world that combines aspects of the present with the illusion of a legendary past. More helpful observations are made by Friis Johansen and Whittle 1980:I.29; Easterling 1985:2; Podlecki 1986:85-86; Sommerstein 2019:29-31. Others compare Pelasgus’ Argos to historical *poleis* (Grégoire 1923:90-91; M. L. West 2006:37).

¹⁸ Aesch. *Ag.* 844-847. Fraenkel on 845 compares Agamemnon’s use of κοινούς with Pelasgus’ κοινώσας (*Supp.* 369).

consult the populace, it is not apparent that he is obliged to do so, and Aeschylus does not undermine his position as a sole ruler.¹⁹

Aeschylus' *Suppliants* is the earliest of several 'suppliant plays' featuring a ruler who receives outsiders into the *polis*, acting in alignment with the *polis* and on its behalf:²⁰ Demophon in Euripides' *Children of Heracles*, Theseus in Euripides' *Suppliants*, and Theseus in Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus* are placed in roles comparable to Pelasgus'. Yet these rulers are not all presented in the same way, making it useful to set out the ways in which these rulers' positions are, or are not, 'democratic'.

II.ii. Euripides' *Children of Heracles* and Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus*

In *Children of Heracles*, Demophon is first mentioned when Iolaus says that Theseus' two sons obtained rule over Attica by lot from among the descendants of Pandion (κλήρω λαχόντας ἐκ γένους Πανδίονος).²¹ Some consider this to echo the Athenians' use of the *kleros* to select officials from a predetermined list, but drawing of lots is also found in the *Iliad*. Euripides has not chosen to mention anything explicitly or exclusively democratic, and audience-members are free to imagine a democratic procedure, the drawing of lots from a helmet, or anything in between.²²

After this, Demophon is treated altogether as a sole ruler.²³ The Chorus-leader reproaches the Herald for attempting to seize the children of Heracles by saying that he should have shown respect for a free land (γῆν σέβοντ' ἐλευθέραν) by speaking to its *tyrannos* first.²⁴ The Chorus-leader here asserts Demophon's authority as *tyrannos*—not that of the *demos*—and indeed makes it clear that this authority is to be understood to be compatible with Athens' status as a free land. The Herald replies by

¹⁹ Here I disagree with U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1910:55 and Fraenkel on Aesch. Ag. 845, who regard Agamemnon as a constitutional ruler.

²⁰ Cf. Burian 1971:1-33; Kopperschmidt 1971.

²¹ Eur. *Herac.* 34-36.

²² Pearson, Allan, Kovacs on Eur. *Herac.* 36 are all convinced that this is a democratic element; Wilkins on *Herac.* 34-7 is rightly cautious, pointing to e.g. *Il.* XXIV.400.

²³ Demophon's supposed co-ruler Acamas is effectively forgotten.

²⁴ Eur. *Herac.* 111-113.

asking who the *anax* of the *polis* is, and the Chorus-leader directly states that it is Demophon, upon which the Herald remarks that he must speak to Demophon, and that anything else he says is spoken in vain.²⁵

In all this there is no hint of democracy; Demophon is unambiguously a sole ruler, and he acts as the unquestioned representative of the *polis* throughout the scene, without any mention of a popular vote.²⁶ Later, however, matters change: oracles demand that a virgin be sacrificed, and Demophon is confronted with ‘dense crowds’ (πυκνὰς ... συστάσεις) of people, some approving of him and others accusing him of foolishness, so that if he does what the oracle says, civil war (οἰκεῖος ... πόλεμος) is on the point of breaking out.²⁷ Here, Demophon recognises the impossibility of acting at odds with the populace. However, there is no hint of a democratic constitution, as in Aeschylus’ *Suppliants* and Euripides’ *Suppliants*: rather, we have a picture of multiple irregular gatherings that are turning into *stasis*.²⁸ Such *stasis*, which Euripides also portrays in other plays, was a familiar feature of fifth-century politics;²⁹ however, Euripides has introduced this contemporary feature carefully, without making Demophon anything other than a sole ruler. Similarly, although Demophon’s remark that he does not have a *tyrannis* like that of foreigners (οὐ γὰρ τυραννίδ’ ὥστε βαρβάρων ἔχω) may possibly recall Athens’ hard-won freedom from Persian rule,³⁰ we have already been told that Demophon does hold a *tyrannis*—presumably of a different, heroic-age sort.³¹ This heroic-age *tyrannis* is not clearly defined, but, as in Aeschylus, this kind of vagueness is essential to how Euripides has dealt with the issue of anachronism. It enables Demophon’s Athens to have resemblances to

²⁵ Eur. *Herac.* 114-117.

²⁶ So Mills 1997:102-103, rightly contrasting Eur. *Herac.* with Aesch. *Supp.*, while pointing out the similarity with Soph. *OC* (as below).

²⁷ Eur. *Herac.* 415-419.

²⁸ When Kovacs on Eur. *Herac.* 36 states, ‘In this play Athens is governed, even in heroic times, on democratic lines: cf. 415-24’, this seems entirely misleading, since nothing in either passage shows that Athens is governed democratically.

²⁹ Allan on Eur. *Herac.* 418-19; on *stasis* in Euripides, cf. pp. 89-93 above.

³⁰ Eur. *Herac.* 423-424; cf. Hall 1989:193.

³¹ As Carter 2010:81, 85 says, it is not sole rule and democracy that are contrasted here, but non-Greek and Greek sole rule.

contemporary politics, while nevertheless remaining the domain of a sole ruler, as in the tradition.

In Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus*, there is similarly no doubt that Athens is governed by a sole ruler. Indeed, Oedipus asks whether Athens is governed by a single person or the *plethos* (i.e. democratically) and is explicitly told—as in the equivalent exchange in *Children of Heracles*—that it is ruled by one man, Theseus. However, it is only in the Sophoclean exchange that the possibility of rule by the *plethos* is explicitly mentioned and rejected.³² Theseus continues to act with unquestioned authority throughout *Oedipus at Colonus*.³³

II.iii. Euripides' *Suppliants*

In *Suppliants*, Euripides approaches matters differently. The Prologue does not mention that Theseus is a sole ruler: Aethra prays for good fortune for herself, Theseus, Athens and Troezen in one breath, and calls the recovery of the bodies of the Seven a joint task for Theseus and Athens.³⁴ Adrastus addresses him as *anax*—a vague term which tells us nothing about Theseus' specific position.³⁵ When Theseus rejects Adrastus' request, though, he mentions the people, saying that he could not justify helping Adrastus to them.³⁶ These scenes operate under the initial assumption that Theseus is the decision-maker, but Euripides leaves his position undefined.

However, when Theseus decides that he wishes to help, he says, remarkably, 'I want the whole *polis* to decree this too, and they will, since I wish it, but by giving them a share in the discussion I will have the *demos* more favourable. And indeed I established the *demos* in sole rule when I freed this *polis* on the basis of equal votes. Taking Adrastus as a demonstration of my words, I will go into the gathering of the

³² Soph. OC 66-69 (cf. Eur. *Heracl.* 114-115), with J. P. Wilson 1997:191-192 (also comparing Aesch. *Pers.* 241-242); Jouanna [2007] 2018:161. Cf. also Finglass 2011b:45-47.

³³ E.g. Soph. OC 294-308, 1518-1535; Kelly 2009:111.

³⁴ Eur. *Supp.* 3-4, 27-28.

³⁵ Eur. *Supp.* 113, 164; cf. 255.

³⁶ Eur. *Supp.* 247.

citizens. Once I have persuaded them of this, I will gather select young men and come back here.³⁷ Shortly afterwards, the Herald asks Theseus who the *tyrannos* of the land is, and Theseus explicitly denies that one exists, saying that the *polis* is not ruled by one man but is free and governed by annual officials.³⁸ This contrasts with *Children of Heracles*, where the land is said to be free *and* ruled by Demophon, and with Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus*.³⁹

In *Suppliants*, then, Euripides reconciles the play's contemporary political referentiality with the legendary past very differently. Whereas Pelasgus acts as a democratic leader while still maintaining his status as sole ruler (without any real explanation of how the two are compatible), and whereas Euripides maintains Demophon's status as sole ruler in *Children of Heracles* by not including democratic institutions, Euripides' Theseus' status as sole ruler is explicitly denied, and Athens has become a full democracy. Moreover, Theseus presents an explanation: *he himself* founded the democracy.⁴⁰ This idea, which may predate Euripides but certainly became widespread in the fourth century,⁴¹ enables Euripides to present a logically coherent situation: the play presents Athens' imagined constitution after Theseus' foundation of the democracy but before his exile and death. This solution to the issue of anachronism—a solution that would only work with Theseus—resembles Aeschylus' *Suppliants* in portraying a ruler acting within a democracy. However, Euripides' *Suppliants*, unlike Aeschylus' play, provides an explicit explanation as to

³⁷ δόξαι δὲ χρήζω καὶ πόλει πάσῃ τόδε, δόξει δ' ἐμοῦ θέλοντος· ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου προσδοῦς ἔχοιμ' ἂν δῆμον εὐμενέστερον. καὶ γὰρ κατέστησ' αὐτὸν ἐς μοναρχίαν ἐλευθερώσας τήνδ' ἰσόψηφον πόλιν. λαβὼν δ' Ἀδραστον δεῖγμα τῶν ἐμῶν λόγων ἐς πλῆθος ἀστῶν εἶμι· καὶ πείσας τάδε, λεκτοὺς ἀθροίσας δεῦρ' Ἀθηναίων κόρους ἤξω (Eur. *Supp.* 349-357).

³⁸ Eur. *Supp.* 403-408.

³⁹ Eur. *Heracl.* 114-115; Soph. *OC* 66-69; cf. pp. 101-103.

⁴⁰ Eur. *Supp.* 352-353.

⁴¹ Fourth-century sources: Isoc. X.36; Plut. *Thes.* 25.2, citing Aristotle; [Dem.] LIX.75.4; Dem. LX.28. It seems more likely that a well-established tradition should have become accepted by multiple fourth-century sources than one invented by Euripides only a few decades previously, and Eur. *Supp.* 352-353 would surely be presented more emphatically if innovative: Morwood 2007:8-11, with further arguments; similarly Pohlenz [1930] 1954:I.361; Herter 1939:307-313; Bain 1977:210; Easterling 1985:3. The opposite view is adopted, but without good grounds, by Jacoby on Philochorus, *FGrHist* 328 F 19; Walker 1995:144-145.

how Theseus can be the unquestioned leader of the *polis* (although not, in this play, its sole ruler) at the same time as the *polis* is a democracy.

III. Ideas about democratic leadership in Euripides' *Suppliants*

Euripides' *Suppliants* contains some discussion of good and bad political leadership, which can be closely compared with ideas about political leadership found in poetry ascribed to Solon and Theognis, and in Thucydides.

Some of the clearest evidence for archaic conceptions of leadership comes from Solon.⁴² One poem says, 'The *demos* would best follow its leaders if they are not excessively let loose (μήτε λίην ἀνεθείς) or constrained; for *koros* begets *hybris* whenever great *olbos* comes to people whose mind is not sound.'⁴³ These lines imply that the proper role of the *hegemon* of the *demos* is to restrain and prevent *hybris* or *koros*.⁴⁴ Elsewhere, the poet claims it as a merit of his own leadership that, if anyone else had been in his position of leadership, that person 'would not have restrained the *demos*.'⁴⁵ The bad leader is said to do what pleases one party or another,⁴⁶ and is also corrupt and greedy.⁴⁷ In these poems, then, good leadership lies in restraining the *demos*, whereas the bad leader is pleasing but rapacious.

Also interesting is a poem transmitted under the name of Theognis, but probably actually by the fifth-century intellectual Euenus of Paros.⁴⁸ The poet, complaining

⁴² On the question of authenticity, cf. p. 45 above.

⁴³ δῆμος δ' ὧδ' ἂν ἄριστα σὺν ἡγεμόνεσσιν ἔποιτο, μήτε λίην ἀνεθείς μήτε βιαζόμενος· τίκτει γὰρ κόρος ὕβριν, ὅταν πολὺς ὄλβος ἔπνηται ἀνθρώποις ὅποσιν μὴ νόος ἄρτιος ᾗ (Solon fr. 6).

⁴⁴ Cf. Solon fr. 4.7-10 (δήμου θ' ἡγεμόνων ἄδικος νόος, οἷσιν ἐτοῖμον ὕβριος ἐκ μεγάλης ἄλγεα πολλὰ παθεῖν· οὐ γὰρ ἐπίστανται κατέχειν κόρον οὐδὲ παρούσας εὐφροσύνας κοσμεῖν δαιτὸς ἐν ἡσυχίῃ). On the association between *hybris*, *koros* and *ate*, cf. pp. 50-51.

⁴⁵ οὐκ ἂν κατέσχε δῆμον (Solon fr. 36.22, fr. 37.7).

⁴⁶ εἰ γὰρ ἤθελον ἅ τοῖς ἐναντίοισιν ἥνδανεν τότε (Solon fr. 36.22-23).

⁴⁷ κακοφραδὴς τε καὶ φιλοκτῆμων ἀνὴρ (Solon fr. 36.21); cf. Solon fr. 4.11-13.

⁴⁸ [Thgn.] 667-682. So Hudson-Williams 1910:32-35, M. L. West [1972] 1992:66, and Selle 2008:225, although the poem's authorship is a complex and uncertain matter.

about the behaviour of his fellow-citizens,⁴⁹ says, ‘They have deposed the noble helmsman who skilfully kept watch, they seize possessions by force, and discipline is lost; no longer is there an equal distribution in the common interest; the porters rule, and the base are above the noble.’⁵⁰ The attitude here is more emphatically aristocratic than in Solon, but these poems share the notion that the role of a good leader is a matter of skill,⁵¹ and of directing the people rather than being directed by them.⁵² Again, this good leadership is contrasted with the bad leadership of corrupt and disorderly leaders, against whom the poet cites their low social class (φορτηγοί, κακοί).⁵³

These ideas about leadership resemble those which Thucydides employs in praising the leadership of Pericles.⁵⁴ Pericles governs the city moderately in peace, and guards it safely, as does Euenus’ helmsman.⁵⁵ Like the good leader in Solon, Pericles exhibits skill (which Thucydides calls *πρόνοια*, *γνώμη*).⁵⁶ Thucydides sums up Pericles’ excellence by saying, ‘He, being powerful through his high standing and good judgement, and being manifestly entirely incorruptible, restrained (*κατεῖχε*) the multitude while allowing them freedom, and was not led by them rather than leading them.’⁵⁷ Here, and also when he later says that in 411 no-one except Alcibiades was able to control the mob (*κατασχεῖν τὸν ὄχλον*),⁵⁸ Thucydides advances the same notion of restraining the populace as Solon.⁵⁹ Thucydides then proceeds to explain

⁴⁹ [Thgn.] 670.

⁵⁰ κυβερνήτην μὲν ἔπαυσαν ἐσθλόν, ὅτις φυλακὴν εἶχεν ἐπισταμένως· χρήματα δ’ ἀρπάζουσι βίη, κόσμος δ’ ἀπόλωλεν, δασμὸς δ’ οὐκέτ’ ἴσος γίνεται ἐς τὸ μέσον· φορτηγοὶ δ’ ἄρχουσι, κακοὶ δ’ ἀγαθῶν καθύπερθε (Thgn.] 675-679, trans. Gerber). This parallel from Bengt 1929:21.

⁵¹ ἐπισταμένως (Thgn.] 676); cf. ἐπίστανται (Solon fr. 4.9).

⁵² Cf. Solon fr. 6.2, fr. 36.22, fr. 37.7.

⁵³ For the metaphor of the helmsman, see also p. 115 below.

⁵⁴ Thuc. II.65. In general on Thucydides’ treatment of good leadership as exhibited by Pericles, cf. Yunis 1996:67-76; Leppin 1999:143-170.

⁵⁵ ἀσφαλῶς διεφύλαξεν αὐτήν (Thuc. II.65.5); cf. φυλακὴν εἶχεν ἐπισταμένως (Thgn.] 676).

⁵⁶ Thuc. II.65.6, 8; cf. ἐπίστανται (Solon fr. 4.9), and ἐπισταμένως (Thgn.] 676).

⁵⁷ ἐκεῖνος μὲν δυνατὸς ὦν τῷ τε ἀξιώματι καὶ τῇ γνώμῃ χρημάτων τε διαφανῶς ἀδωρότατος γενόμενος κατεῖχε τὸ πλῆθος ἐλευθέρως, καὶ οὐκ ἤγετο μᾶλλον ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ ἢ αὐτὸς ἤγε (Thuc. II.65.8).

⁵⁸ Thuc. VIII.86.5.

⁵⁹ Solon fr. 36.22, fr. 37.7; Hornblower on Thuc. II.65.9.

that, whenever Pericles saw the populace 'bold in *hybris*' (ὕβρει θαρσοῦντας), he would produce fear in them with his words.⁶⁰ This again resembles Solonic ideas—since Solon saw good leadership as a matter of restraining *koros* or *hybris*,⁶¹ and since elsewhere Solon prides himself on openly reproaching the *demos*,⁶² rather as Pericles is said to do here. Thucydides' rhetorical final remark, that Athens 'became in name a democracy, but in fact rule under the foremost man,' carries the Solonic ideal to a provocative extreme.⁶³ So Thucydides applies to Pericles ideals of leadership that largely go back to archaic times.

Thucydides contrasts Pericles' leadership with the Athenians' ignoring of Pericles' advice after his death, saying, 'But they (οἱ δέ), in all these matters, as well as others which seemed unrelated to the war, acted in the opposite way, according to their private ambitions and interests (κατὰ τὰς ιδίας φιλοτιμίας καὶ ἴδια κέρδη), and conducted affairs badly both for themselves and their allies; when matters went well, the honour and benefit was more for private citizens, but, when matters went badly, harm was done to the *polis* with regard to the war.'⁶⁴ When Thucydides mentions the populace's 'private ambitions and interests' here, it is primarily the ambitions and interests of their bad leaders, Pericles' successors, that are referred to.⁶⁵ Thucydides shortly turns directly to Pericles' successors, who, he says, 'were disposed to surrender all matters to the *demos* according to its pleasures.'⁶⁶ The bad leader's rapacity is already present in Solon and Theognis,⁶⁷ as is the bad leader's willingness

⁶⁰ Thuc. II.65.9.

⁶¹ Solon fr. 4.9, fr. 6.

⁶² δήμῳ μὲν εἰ χρη διαφάδην ὀνειδίσαι (Solon fr. 37.1).

⁶³ ἐγίγνετό τε λόγῳ μὲν δημοκρατία, ἔργῳ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀνδρὸς ἀρχή (Thuc. II.65.9). Thucydides cannot possibly have thought this remark strictly accurate, since he has just explained how the people ejected Pericles from office; rather, Thucydides is emphasising Pericles' long-term influence over the Assembly (Gomme on Thuc. III.82.4).

⁶⁴ οἱ δὲ ταῦτά τε πάντα ἐς τοῦναντίον ἔπραξαν καὶ ἄλλα ἔξω τοῦ πολέμου δοκοῦντα εἶναι κατὰ τὰς ιδίας φιλοτιμίας καὶ ἴδια κέρδη κακῶς ἔς τε σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς συμμαχοὺς ἐπολίτευσαν, ἃ κατορθούμενα μὲν τοῖς ιδιώταις τιμὴ καὶ ὠφελία μᾶλλον ἦν, σφαλέντα δὲ τῇ πόλει ἐς τὸν πόλεμον βλάβη καθίστατο (Thuc. II.65.7).

⁶⁵ Hornblower *ad loc.* remarks, 'here for once ... Th[ucydides] is not concerned to distinguish between the people and its leaders'.

⁶⁶ ἐτράποντο καθ' ἡδονὰς τῷ δήμῳ καὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐνδιδόναι (Thuc. II.65.10).

⁶⁷ Solon fr. 4.11-13, fr. 36.21, cf. fr. 4.5-6; Thgn. 45-46 and 49-50, using the word *kerdos* (this parallel from Bengt 1929:48).

to please the multitude.⁶⁸ Thucydides' contemporary Aristophanes also uses the same ideas: in *Frogs*, the Chorus envisages a bad leader who stirs up *stasis* because of eagerness for private gain (κερδῶν ἰδίῳν ἐπιθυμῶν) and takes bribes while steering the ship of state.⁶⁹ Thucydides' remarks about Pericles' successors, then, draw on much older ideas about leadership.

Although leadership in the fourth-century Athenian democracy differed in some ways from that of the fifth century—for instance with regard to the separation of the roles of general and orator⁷⁰—similar ideas about leadership continue to be applied. Rather as in the earlier authors the good leader is seen as defending the city and its populace, so in the fourth century the orator continued to be thought of as the defender of the populace.⁷¹ Likewise, rather as in Solon and Thucydides, fourth-century orators often present themselves as harsh critics of the *demos* while condemning other orators who speak for the sake of gaining *charis* with the *demos*.⁷²

In *Suppliants*, Euripides draws on similar ideas.⁷³ Adrastus explains to Theseus that he has turned to Athens for help because Athens 'has in you a good shepherd, for the lack of which many *poleis* have been destroyed, lacking a general.'⁷⁴ The notion that a lack of leadership results in disaster is common: Thucydides maintains that bad leadership after Pericles' death resulted in the Sicilian disaster,⁷⁵ and Solon and Euenus suggest that bad leadership would entail the *polis* being harmed or destroyed.⁷⁶ Similarly, the Messenger in *Suppliants* casts Theseus as an ideal general: 'This is the kind of general that one should choose, who is mighty amid perils, and

⁶⁸ Solon fr. 36.23.

⁶⁹ Ar. *Ran.* 359-361.

⁷⁰ M. H. Hansen 1983:49-51; Sinclair 1988:45-46.

⁷¹ [Thgn.] 676, Thuc. II.65.5; φύλακες τῆς δημοκρατίας (Aeschin. III.250); φύλακες ὑφ' ὑμῶν καταστάντες (Lys. XXVII.3); Ober 1989:316-317.

⁷² Isoc. VIII.3-6; Dem. III.21.22; Lycurg. fr. I.5; Ober 1989:318-324.

⁷³ My discussion here draws on Bengt 1929:20-29 in a general way and in the passages discussed, although my point is different.

⁷⁴ ἔχει σε ποιμέν' ἐσθλόν· οὗ χρεῖα πόλεις πολλαὶ διώλοντ', ἐνδεεῖς στρατηλάτου (Eur. *Supp.* 191-192).

⁷⁵ Thuc. II.65.10-11.

⁷⁶ Solon fr. 36.25; [Thgn.] 680.

hates the insolent multitude, which, when faring well, seeks to climb to the highest rungs of the ladder, and destroys the *olbos* which it could have enjoyed.⁷⁷ Like Pericles' leadership in Thucydides, then, Theseus' military leadership is described in terms recalling archaic poetry: it is contrasted to the *hybris* of the *demos*, which must be restrained, because it threatens to destroy its *olbos*, leading to ruin.⁷⁸

The excellence of Theseus' leadership is primarily demonstrated in the military sphere, but he also mirrors traditional practices of leadership in fifth-century Athens by combining military leadership with political.⁷⁹ In particular, Theseus' persuasion of the *demos* is directly followed by gathering the young men of Athens for war.⁸⁰ Although Theseus has no need to *restrain* the *demos*, his attitude towards it accords with Solon's and Thucydides' ideals, since he leads the *demos*, which follows his policy.⁸¹ His means of leadership is his persuasion⁸²—as the structure of the Athenian democracy entailed that it was for all Athens' leaders⁸³—and he is confident that his personal authority will bring the populace with him.⁸⁴

Euripides' *Suppliants* also contains ideas about bad leadership. Theseus claims that Adrastus went to war because he was 'led astray by the kind of young men who delight in being honoured and in creating wars without justice, destroying the citizens (φθείροντες ἀστούς), one in order to be general, another so that he can act outrageously once he has taken power into his hands, another for the sake of profit (κέρδους οὐνεκ'), not considering whether the populace is harmed in any respect (τὸ

⁷⁷ τοιόνδε τοι στρατηγὸν αἰρεῖσθαι χρεών, ὃς ἔν τε τοῖς δεινοῖσιν ἐστὶν ἄλκιμος μισεῖ θ' ὑβριστὴν λαόν, ὃς πράσσων καλῶς ἐς ἄκρα βῆναι κλιμάκων ἐνήλατα ζητῶν ἀπώλεσ' ὄλβον ᾧ χρῆσθαι παρῆν (Eur. *Supp.* 726-730).

⁷⁸ Thuc. II.65.9; cf. Solon fr. 6.

⁷⁹ Bengt 1929:28 remarks, 'Mit der Strategie ist in der Stellung der idealen Volksherrscher ... die *Prostasie* verbunden, auf die militärische baut sich die politische Führerschaft auf: sie [Pelasgus and Theseus] haben die Initiative, das Volk ist zwar beratendes und entscheidendes Organ, erteilt in Wirklichkeit aber nur die Zustimmung zu den Vorschlägen des προστάτης.' Cf. M. H. Hansen 1983:49-51 on the tendency in the fifth century to unite the roles of general and orator but to separate them in the fourth.

⁸⁰ Eur. *Supp.* 355-357.

⁸¹ Eur. *Supp.* 349-355.

⁸² καὶ πείσας τάδε (Eur. *Supp.* 355).

⁸³ Finley 1962; Rhodes 2000.

⁸⁴ δόξει δ' ἐμοῦ θέλοντος (Eur. *Supp.* 350).

πλήθος εἴ τι βλάπτεται) by enduring this.⁸⁵ The Argive Herald (a much less sympathetic character, of course) uses a similar picture of bad leadership to criticise democracy, claiming that, in Argos, ‘There is no-one who, flattering the *polis* with his words, turns it this way and that (ἄλλοτ’ ἄλλοσε στρέφει) for private profit (πρὸς κέρδος ἴδιον), and who, though for the moment congenial and giving much pleasure (ἡδὺς καὶ διδούς πολλὴν χάριν), subsequently does the *polis* harm (ἐσαυθὺς ἔβλαψ’), and then escapes justice by concealing his earlier mistakes behind new calumnies.’⁸⁶

Both Theseus and the Herald accuse the bad leader of aiming for private gain (κέρδος), an idea which we have seen in Solon and Theognis, as well as Thucydides and Aristophanes. The Herald mentions the bad leader’s changeability in order to win *charis* with the populace: likewise, Solon associates the bad leader’s changeability with his willingness to please.⁸⁷ Also, Theseus and the Herald consider this to lead to the *polis* being harmed—a thought which we have seen in Solon and Thucydides. Similar notions about bad leadership, including the bad leader’s willingness to please, are also found in Euripides’ *Hecuba* and *Orestes*.⁸⁸

In *Suppliants*, then, Euripides explores and contrasts ideas about good and bad leadership that go back to archaic poetry, and which were used in his own day to think about contemporary leaders such as Pericles. This play’s focus on leadership within the *polis* is made possible by the setting which Euripides adopts: whereas in the other ‘suppliant plays’ the playwright maintains the ruler’s legendary status as a sole ruler, here Euripides presents Theseus as having already made Athens a

⁸⁵ νέοις παραχθεις οἵτινες τιμώμενοι χαίρουσι πολέμους τ’ αὐξάνουσ’ ἄνευ δίκης, φθείροντες ἀστούς, ὁ μὲν ὅπως στρατηλατῇ, ὁ δ’ ὡς ὑβρίζῃ δύναμιν ἐς χειρας λαβών, ἄλλος δὲ κέρδους οὐνεκ’, οὐκ ἀποσκοπῶν τὸ πλήθος εἴ τι βλάπτεται πάσχον τάδε (Eur. *Supp.* 232-237). As de Romilly 1986:127-128 and Connor 1992:147-149 point out, this should be placed in the context of other complaints about the youth of Athens’ leaders in the 420s (Thuc. VI.12.2, VI.17.1, VI.18.6; Eup. *Demes* fr. 104, 133, *Cities* fr. 252, *Demes* (?) fr. 333; Cratinus, *Seasons* fr. 283): the youth of the men Theseus criticises is part of the picture of bad leadership current in Athens at the time.

⁸⁶ οὐδ’ ἔστιν αὐτὴν ὅστις ἐκχαυνῶν λόγοις πρὸς κέρδος ἴδιον ἄλλοτ’ ἄλλοσε στρέφει, τὸ δ’ αὐτίχ’ ἡδὺς καὶ διδούς πολλὴν χάριν ἐσαυθὺς ἔβλαψ’, εἶτα διαβολαῖς νέαις κλέψας τὰ πρόσθε σφάλματ’ ἐξέδν δίκης (Eur. *Supp.* 412-416).

⁸⁷ Solon fr. 36.22-25.

⁸⁸ Eur. *Hec.* 131-133, 254-257, *Or.* 772-773, 902-916, fr. 1029. Cf. p. 39 n. 149.

democracy. Here, then, Euripides applies to the legendary past ideas about leadership current in democratic Athens. Without compromising the internal coherence of the imagined legendary past of the world of the play, these ideas involve the audience-member in reflection on what good leadership and bad leadership are like within a democracy, and provide a prompt to think about issues of leadership in the audience's own day.⁸⁹

IV. Contemporary elements in the presentation of rulers in Sophocles

IV.i. Introduction

It would be wrong, however, to neglect Sophocles. In particular, Sophocles presents Creon in *Antigone* using substantial contemporary elements. These co-exist with Creon's legendary status as a sole ruler, which the play maintains, and also with the features discussed in Chapter 1 which are associated with sole rulers in the story tradition.

These contemporary elements are not continuous throughout the play; they are chiefly concentrated in Creon's opening speech (175-190) and his discussion of obedience (663-676). In this way, Sophocles brings Creon more into contact with the contemporary *polis* at some points, less at others. Nonetheless, these elements are

⁸⁹ Some scholars go further, arguing that *Suppliants* refers to *particular* contemporary politicians: Pericles (Goossens 1932, 1962:435-439, Morrison 1950:77, Podlecki 1976:22-27), Alcibiades (U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1907:13, Delebecque 1951:222, Di Benedetto 1971:182-184, Micheli 1997, M. Vickers 2015), or Nicias (Goossens 1932:35-37, 1962:445-446). However, since the ideas about leadership employed are commonplaces going back to archaic poetry, in themselves they can hardly hint at any single politician; rather, audience-members will have been able to judge any politician against these widely articulated notions, which are instantiated in idealised form in Theseus. It is not just that Theseus is assimilable to multiple contemporary politicians (as indeed is allowed by Grégoire 1923:90; M. Vickers 2008:11-12, 2015:339-340), but rather that his presentation encourages reflection on leadership on a more general level. Of course, such general reflections may have prompted Athenians to reflect on particular leaders, but such reflections take place in audience-members' own minds, and are not actually part of the play. Cf. Burian 1985:129 and 211-213 n. 1 ('The real problem is that all these scholars assume that Euripides must be writing not about his ostensible subject but about something else that can only be ferreted out by a kind of allegorical interpretation'); Morwood on Eur. *Supp.* 352-3.

prominent, and indeed seem sufficient to justify maintaining that Sophocles encourages his audience to judge Creon against contemporary standards, almost as though he were an official of the Athenian *polis*.

IV.ii. Creon as a *polis* official in Sophocles' *Antigone*

At the start of *Antigone*, Antigone informs Ismene that the *strategos* (Creon) has made a *kerygma* to the whole *demos* of the *polis* (πανδήμῳ πόλει). It would be mistaken to place too much weight on the single word *strategos*, which Sophocles might have applied to any military commander, irrespective of contemporary associations. However, various considerations (which scholars have pointed out disparately) validate the notion that Sophocles places Creon in a position analogous to a fifth-century *strategos*. Creon here makes a *kerygma* carrying the death penalty—a power which Athenian *strategoí* actually had, albeit only in the field.⁹⁰ More broadly, although we have no specifically analogous historical parallel, it seems to have been the duty of Greek military commanders to arrange the fate of the enemy after a battle,⁹¹ and—as the controversy after Arginusae indicates—to arrange for the burial of the dead.⁹² Creon's calling of a 'summoned meeting of elders' (σύγκλητον τήνδε γερόντων ... λέσχην) may possibly evoke the phrase σύγκλητος ἐκκλησία denoting a specially convened Assembly meeting,⁹³ or the power of Athenian στρατηγοί to call the Assembly.⁹⁴ Also, as discussed below, it seems likely that the contemporary ideas which Creon articulates later were primarily military in their associations.⁹⁵ Of course, none of this can have made audience-members think of Creon *exactly* as though he were a democratic official, but such features make it possible to think about him in analogous terms, to an extent. Ismene also talks about Creon as though he were a *polis*

⁹⁰ Griffith on Soph. *Ant.* 7-8, citing Xen. *Hell.* I.1.15 (where Alcibiades makes a *kerygma* carrying the death penalty); Calder 1968:393, citing Lys. XIII.65 and Frontin. *Str.* III.12.2. Cf. Hamel 1998:59-63.

⁹¹ Cf. Hamel 1998:40-44, 51-55.

⁹² Xen. *Hell.* I.7; the point is made by Schachermeyr 1966:54.

⁹³ Soph. *Ant.* 159-160 with Griffith *ad loc.*, citing M. H. Hansen 1991:134-135.

⁹⁴ T. Graham 2017:139, citing Sinclair 1988:81, and cf. Hamel 1998:6-12; our sources do not make the nature of this power very clear.

⁹⁵ See pp. 117-118.

official when she justifies following Creon's proclamation by talking of obeying 'those in power' (τοῖς ἐν τέλει) and not acting against the will of the citizens (βίᾳ πολιτῶν).⁹⁶

Furthermore, in his first speech, Creon enunciates a series of political principles, beginning with the words, 'It is impossible to find out the spirit, judgement and good sense of any man, before he is shown to be practiced in the *archai* and *nomoi*.'⁹⁷ This phrase, as scholars have observed, clearly invites the audience to judge Creon on the basis of his political conduct during the play.⁹⁸ Since *archai* and *nomoi* are often coupled as a set phrase in Athenian contexts, Creon's remark is one which could equally easily be applied to any Athenian democratic official. Indeed, Creon's remark is an expansion of a proverb which Aristotle attributes to Bias of Priene, 'Office will reveal the man' (ἀρχὴ ἄνδρα δείξει).⁹⁹ Again, Sophocles is not actually portraying Creon as a democratic official, but makes it easy for audience-members to think about him, to some extent, as though he *were* one, and to judge him by a contemporary and democratic standard.

Creon now expresses ideas about what it means to be a good leader and citizen,¹⁰⁰ which he puts forward as his own principles of conduct. These principles' broad acceptability in classical Athens is suggested not only by Demosthenes' quotation of them in *On the Embassy* (343) as expressing an ideal of statesmanship which Aeschines fails to live up to,¹⁰¹ but also and more importantly by parallels with

⁹⁶ *Ant.* 67, 79, cf. 907; Sourvinou-Inwood 1989:139.

⁹⁷ ἀμήχανον δὲ παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ἐκμαθεῖν ψυχὴν τε καὶ φρόνημα καὶ γνώμην, πρὶν ἂν ἀρχαῖς τε καὶ νόμοισιν ἐντριβῆς φανῇ (*Soph. Ant.* 175-177).

⁹⁸ Cf. Holt 1999:675-676, 680-681, Cairns 2016:54, and (from a different angle) Budelmann and Easterling 2010:299.

⁹⁹ *Arist. Eth. Nic.* V.1130a1-2, cited by Bowra 1944:69; Griffith on *Soph. Ant.* 175-7.

¹⁰⁰ As Cuny 2007:282-283 says, 'Créon commence par définir dans l'abstrait le bon dirigeant (v. 175-183).'

¹⁰¹ *Dem.* XIX.246-249, often taken to prove that Creon is presented positively here (Calder 1968:404-405; Sourvinou-Inwood 1989:139, 142; Liapis 2013:87-88), although Harris [2004] 2006:69-70 disagrees. Cf. also Kirkwood 1958:121-122; Budelmann 2000:76-77; Cuny 2007:284-287. In my view (similar to Cuny's), Creon's emphasis on his good judgement and sound democratic principles in this speech set up criteria against which he ultimately fails (as discussed further in Chapter 6).

similar sentiments expressed elsewhere. Creon's emphasis on taking hold of the best plans (ἄριστα βουλευματα) is an idea applicable to any form of government,¹⁰² but is comparable to the bouleutic oath at Athens, which contained the clause 'I will make the best plans for the city', and to proverbs attributed to Cleobulus and Solon.¹⁰³ Creon's notion that a citizen should not *keep quiet*, but should participate, also has relevance in a democratic context: it is rather close to the condemnation of political non-participation (ἀπραγμοσύνη) and laziness (ἀργία) articulated by Thucydides' Pericles and in Euripides.¹⁰⁴ Creon's specific argument that one should not put a private *philos* above the *polis* is perhaps only found here—but his justification for this, namely that private matters such as *philia* can only be sustained in a stable *polis*, is also found elsewhere.¹⁰⁵ These principles are not *distinctively* democratic—and do not stand in tension with Creon's status as sole ruler—but are nevertheless contemporary ideas which any Athenian might have professed and used to justify political actions.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰² Soph. *Ant.* 179; Hdt. III.81.3 (oligarchy), VII.10.δ1 (Xerxes); Thuc. I.43.4 (the Athenian Assembly).

¹⁰³ Bouleutic oath: τὰ βέλτιστα βουλεύσειν τῇ πόλει (Lys. XXXI.2); alternatively, τὰ βέλτιστα βουλεύσειν τῷ δήμῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων ([Dem.] LIX.4); cf. Lys. XXX.10, and Rhodes 1972:194-195 (maintaining, on good grounds, that this clause was probably part of the original Cleisthenic bouleutic oath). Proverbs: πολίταις τὰ βέλτιστα συμβουλεύειν (Cleobulus, Laks-Most 3 T35 1.10); συμβούλευε μὴ τὰ ἥδιστα, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἄριστα (Solon, quoted at Diog. Laert. I.60). These parallels are all from Blundell 1989:116 n. 43.

¹⁰⁴ Soph. *Ant.* 180; Thuc. II.40.2, cf. II.63.3 and II.64.4; Eur. *Antiope* frr. 183, 185, 187, 188; *Med.* 294-297. These criticisms are discussed by Ehrenberg 1947:47-48, 53-55; cf. the discussion of Euripides' *Antiope* at Pl. *Grg.* 484c-486d, with Dodds on Pl. *Grg.* 485e3-486d1.

¹⁰⁵ Democritus at Laks-Most 27 D356; Thuc. II.60.2-3. These parallels are from Blundell 1989:118 n. 46, who gives a few others less relevant here.

¹⁰⁶ Some scholars (Ehrenberg 1954:113-116, 141-149; C. G. Thomas 1975) draw a close connection between Creon and Pericles. It is true that Creon's 'assertions are reminiscent of Perikles' (Thuc. 2.38-46, 60)' (Griffith 1999:48 n. 142). But it is misleading to say that 'The political and cultural programme pronounced in the Funeral Speech contains most of the ideas which Creon declares to be his programme: aggrandisement of the State, eulogy of the present time, demand that equal order exist in house and State' (Ehrenberg 1954:95). There are certainly broad similarities, but none of Pericles' arguments is *closely* parallel to Creon's. Pericles does not mention the things Creon does (testing people through the exercise of *archai* and *nomoi*; *philia*; the ship of state), but merely *related* ideas, such as any two people living in democratic Athens might have enunciated (cf. Bowra 1944:68; Schachermeyr 1966:57). Cf. p. 111 n. 89 for similar problems regarding Theseus in Euripides' *Suppliants*.

Creon also uses the Ship of State metaphor here: his words imply that he is its captain, and Teiresias later says so explicitly.¹⁰⁷ The same metaphor is found in *Oedipus Tyrannus*, where the Priest talks about the *polis* as a storm-tossed ship, and Jocasta refers to Oedipus as the ship's captain.¹⁰⁸ The Ship of State, used previously in Aeschylus,¹⁰⁹ is used to refer to leadership by the fourth-century orators, but evidence for similar fifth-century uses is lacking.¹¹⁰ This may be because little fifth-century political oratory survives, although, even if this metaphor was not so used, it may have been used to *think* about leadership. Therefore, we cannot confidently call the Ship of State an element shared with contemporary ways of thinking about leadership, but it should still be considered a *possible* point of contact.

Ehrenberg notes that, in *Antigone* and *Oedipus Tyrannus*, Sophocles uses the verb 'to set straight' (ὀρθόω), to refer to the successful conduct of the affairs of the *polis*. Aeschylus and Euripides do not use the word in this sense.¹¹¹ However, one of the Attic *skolia* prays to Athena to set the *polis* straight,¹¹² and Thucydides puts it in the mouth not only of Pericles, but also Cleon, Diodotus, the Athenians at Melos, and Nicias.¹¹³ These politicians do not directly attribute the 'straightening' to themselves; rather, they use the verb in general terms to refer to the success of the *polis*, and obliquely present themselves as helping to bring that success about.¹¹⁴ Creon's use of

¹⁰⁷ Soph. *Ant.* 189-190, cf. also 162-163, 994. Nautical imagery in *Antigone* more broadly is discussed by Goheen 1951:44-50.

¹⁰⁸ Soph. *OT* 22-24, 922-923. Nautical imagery in the play more generally is discussed by Campbell 1986.

¹⁰⁹ Chiefly Aesch. *Sept.* 2-3, 62-64. Archaic cases are less clear-cut, but the metaphor seems to emerge gradually (Brock 2013:53-55, citing Alc. fr. 6, 208; Plut. *Sol.* 14.6; Aesch. *Pers.* 656; [Thgn.] 667-682).

¹¹⁰ Perhaps excepting only Ar. *Ran.* 361. Brock 2013:57 cites numerous fourth-century passages, e.g. Dem. IX.69, XIX.250; Aeschin. III.158.

¹¹¹ Aeschylus does not use the verb, while Euripides only uses it non-metaphorically.

¹¹² Carmina Popularia, 884 PMG [= Ath. XV.694c].

¹¹³ Thuc. I.140.1, II.42.4, II.60.2 (Pericles); III.37.5 (Cleon); III.42.4 (Diodotus); V.111.4 (Athenians at Melos); VI.9.2 (Nicias); cf. VIII.64.4. Ehrenberg 1954:146-148 cites the *skolion* and the uses by Pericles, but not the other politicians (although he notes the word's commonness), creating the impression that this verb is particularly Periclean—which seems implausible, given its use in these other Thucydidean passages.

¹¹⁴ Especially Thuc. III.37.5 (Cleon), VI.9.2 (Nicias).

the word, including twice near the start of his first speech,¹¹⁵ along with the Ship of State metaphor that follows,¹¹⁶ similarly helps to imply that he envisages himself as the one setting the *polis* on the right course, but again without explicitly applying the idea to himself. So, although Ehrenberg's own interpretation (that Creon is talking like Pericles) seems implausible, it may be that Creon is talking like a contemporary politician here.

The verb is also applied to Oedipus by the Priest in *Oedipus Tyrannus* and by Creon in *Antigone*. However, these characters *do* attribute the success of the *polis* directly to Oedipus, using the verb in the active.¹¹⁷ This usage reflects the unique circumstances of Oedipus' legendary career, in that Oedipus did save the *polis* all by himself when he overcame the Sphinx, an achievement strongly emphasised in *Oedipus Tyrannus*.¹¹⁸ Also, since other direct attributions of the success of the *polis* to particular agents attribute it to the gods,¹¹⁹ its direct attribution to Oedipus perhaps helps to present him as an almost divine figure in the first scene of *Oedipus Tyrannus*, where he is the target of the Priest's supplicatory address.¹²⁰

In the scenes of *Antigone* where Creon interacts with the Guard and Antigone, there are features that resemble the story tradition (discussed in Chapter 1),¹²¹ but relatively little evokes contemporary political life. However, Creon's continual accusations of bribery and conspiracies may have been reminiscent of those commonly made in fifth-century politics.¹²² Also, as Harris has argued, when Antigone argues that Creon's *kerygma* does not have sufficient force to override pre-existing *nomoi*, this perhaps reflects the principle established in contemporary Athens according to which illegal orders issued by *polis* officials should not be obeyed.¹²³

¹¹⁵ Soph. *Ant.* 163, 167, 675.

¹¹⁶ Soph. *Ant.* 184-190 and especially ὁρθῆς, 190.

¹¹⁷ Soph. *Ant.* 167; *OT* 39, 46, 51.

¹¹⁸ See pp. 206, 220.

¹¹⁹ *Carmina Popularia*, 884 *PMG*; Soph. *Ant.* 163.

¹²⁰ Cf. p. 210.

¹²¹ See pp. 63-64.

¹²² See p. 279.

¹²³ Soph. *Ant.* 453-455, with Harris [2004] 2006:59-61, 75-76.

In the following scene, however, where Creon argues with Haemon, there is another extended passage where Creon articulates ideas—concerning obedience—with contemporary currency. Since contemporary ideas about obedience are also invoked elsewhere (including in *Ajax*), we must place *Antigone* within this broader context.

IV.iii. Ideas about obedience

That obedience was owed to those holding power within the democracy, namely the holders of *archai*, was a well-established principle. It was part of the Ephebic Oath, which included the clause, ‘I shall obey those who exercise power reasonably at any given time and the established laws and whatever laws may be reasonably established in future.’¹²⁴ Thucydides’ Pericles articulates a similar principle: ‘in public affairs we do not contravene the laws, above all because of fear, through obedience to those in office at any given time and to the laws (τῶν τε αἰεὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ ὄντων ἀκροάσει καὶ τῶν νόμων), and especially to those laws which are established to help people who are being wronged, and the unwritten laws the violation of which brings well-recognised disgrace.’¹²⁵ Some sources apply the ideal of obedience to Sparta in particular, and suggest that Spartans especially excelled in their willingness to obey laws and officials.¹²⁶ However, the Ephebic Oath and Thucydides’ Pericles show that obedience was an ideal considered valid at Athens too.

The Ephebic Oath, Thucydides and Xenophon all emphasise the value of obedience *in general*. However, given the restricted powers of officials in Athenian public life, it seems likely that the main situations in which Athenians would have been called

¹²⁴ καὶ εὐηκοήσω τῶν ἀεὶ κραινόντων ἐμφρόνως καὶ τῶν θεσμῶν τῶν ἰδρυμένων καὶ οὓς ἂν τὸ λοιπὸν ἰδρύσωνται ἐμφρόνως (RO 88.11-14). The inscription recording the oath is fourth-century, but the oath’s text, couched in archaic language, is probably sixth-century (Rhodes and Osborne 2003:445-449).

¹²⁵ τὰ δημόσια διὰ δέος μάλιστα οὐ παρανομοῦμεν, τῶν τε αἰεὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ ὄντων ἀκροάσει καὶ τῶν νόμων, καὶ μάλιστα αὐτῶν ὅσοι τε ἐπ’ ὠφελίᾳ τῶν ἀδικουμένων κεῖνται καὶ ὅσοι ἄγραφοι ὄντες αἰσχύνην ὁμολογουμένην φέρουσιν (Thuc. II.37.3). Siewert 1977:104-105 thinks that this passage directly echoes the Ephebic Oath.

¹²⁶ Hdt. VII.104.4-5; Xen. *Lac.* 8.1-2, *Mem.* III.5.15-16; cf. also Thuc. I.84.3, and Plut. *Cleom.* 9.

upon to obey officials would have been military. It is surely no coincidence that the three tragic characters who emphasise the importance of obedience (Eteocles in *Seven Against Thebes*; Menelaus in *Ajax*; Creon in *Antigone*) are all military commanders.¹²⁷ Indeed, Creon in *Antigone* makes it clear that the advantages of obedience lie primarily in the military sphere, when he expresses confidence that only an obedient man would 'remain a good and noble comrade in the storm of battle.'¹²⁸ Still, though, neither in tragedy nor in other sources is obedience to *polis* officials said to be an *exclusively* military virtue; it is treated as a good quality for a citizen to possess in general.

Tragedy mentions obedience several times. Aeschylus provides the earliest attestation of the word *peitharchia* (obedience), the status of which as an ideal he confirms by having Eteocles refer to her as a goddess.¹²⁹ Aeschylus also mentions the notion that fear is important in a law-abiding society, which he applies to Athens in *Eumenides*.¹³⁰

Obedience owed to people is explored in Sophocles' *Ajax* and *Antigone*.¹³¹ In *Ajax*, Menelaus uses an argument based on obedience to justify not burying Ajax. He begins by stating that it is the behaviour of a bad man not to obey those in authority (τῶν ἐφεστώτων κλύειν). He then presents obedience as a civic *and* military virtue, saying that the *nomoi* will not function properly within a *polis* where fear (δέος) is not established, and that an army cannot be properly led without fear (φόβος) and respect (αἰδώς).¹³² So Menelaus brings the *archai* and *nomoi* into close relation, like the Ephebic Oath and Thucydides' Pericles, and Menelaus' notion that obedience should

¹²⁷ Ehrenberg 1954:105-112 denies that Creon should be seen as acting in a military capacity, but this seems implausible. Since *Antigone* takes place in the immediate aftermath of the campaign of the Seven, Sophocles must have expected his audience to be aware of the military context. At any rate, Sophocles has not written anything to *prevent* Creon's role from being seen in a military light. See further Funke 1966:39, and p. 112 above.

¹²⁸ δορός τ' ἂν ἐν χειμῶνι προστεταγμένον μένειν δίκαιον καγαθὸν παραστάτην (Soph. *Ant.* 670-671).

¹²⁹ Aesch. *Sept.* 223-225; cf. 196.

¹³⁰ Aesch. *Eum.* 517-525, 697-699.

¹³¹ In the present discussion I focus fairly narrowly on obedience and on two particular passages. An excellent broader discussion of obedience and related ideas in these two plays, which complements the present one, is Cuny 2007:279-328.

¹³² *Aj.* 1071-1076; he emphasises δέος again at 1079, 1084.

be founded on fear is also mentioned elsewhere.¹³³ In associating respect (αἰδώς) and shame (αἰσχύνῃ) with obedience to the laws, Menelaus resembles Thucydides' Pericles.¹³⁴ Menelaus' speech also shares with Aeschylus' *Seven Against Thebes* and *Eumenides* and Sophocles' *Antigone* the notion that the safety of the *polis* depends on such obedience.¹³⁵

Menelaus' stance is, then, founded on commonly accepted premises. However, the way he puts it (especially his quadruple mention of fear) perhaps makes his stance seem rather excessive. Also, although Menelaus' principles may be acceptable, his use of them is problematic, since it is unclear that these premises justify the conclusion that Ajax should not be buried,¹³⁶ and other considerations strongly mandate Ajax's burial, namely Ajax's great virtues and the laws of the gods.¹³⁷ Also, Menelaus admits that his actions towards Ajax are motivated by his personal desire for revenge, and the Chorus-leader suggests that they would constitute *hybris*.¹³⁸

Furthermore, when Agamemnon arrives and castigates Teucer for his insubordination towards Menelaus, Agamemnon uses the language of slavery and animal control. Such language, as discussed in Chapter 1, presents Agamemnon as an oppressive and even anti-democratic figure; since Agamemnon's starting point is the same insistence on obedience which Menelaus had expressed less abhorrently,

¹³³ Aesch. *Eum.* 517-525, 697-699; Hdt. VII.104.4-5; Thuc. II.37.3; Xen. *Lac.* 8.2; Plut. *Cleom.* 9. Since Sophocles' Creon employs a similar argument, and since the sources also apply these ideas to Athens, Menelaus' argument is not *distinctively* Spartan, but of course Athenian audience-members may have found it so (cf. Stanford, Finglass on Soph. *Aj.* 1073-6).

¹³⁴ Soph. *Aj.* 1076, 1079; Thuc. II.37.3 (quoted above); cf. Archidamus at I.84.3; Mittelstadt 1977:45. This association of *aidos* with *deos* goes back to Homer and is also discussed by Plato (Stanford, Finglass on Soph. *Aj.* 1073-6).

¹³⁵ Soph. *Aj.* 1079-1083.

¹³⁶ The Chorus-leader approves of Menelaus' γνώμας ... σοφάς (Soph. *Aj.* 1091) immediately before telling him nevertheless not to become a ὑβριστής towards the dead (1092), which amounts to saying that Menelaus' proposed course of action is not satisfactorily justified by his *gnomai*.

¹³⁷ Soph. *Aj.* 1266-1289, 1355, 1357 (Ajax's virtues), 1129-1131, 1343-1344, 1349-1350 (laws of the gods).

¹³⁸ Soph. *Aj.* 1087-1092. Similar points are made by Cuny 2007:320-322; Carter 2007:94-97; Finglass 2017:310-312.

Agamemnon's language here surely undermines the credibility of Menelaus' argumentation, too, in retrospect.¹³⁹

In *Antigone*, Creon uses ideas about obedience in urging Haemon to relinquish Antigone. He begins by rejecting the man who transgresses the *nomoi* or tries to give instructions to those in command (τοῖς κρατύνουσιν), again closely linking obedience to *archai* and *nomoi*.¹⁴⁰ He then makes several remarks which are independently attested as proverbs. When he says that the man whom the *polis* sets in command (ὃν πόλις στήσειε) should be obeyed in justice and its opposite, this resembles a proverb attributed to Solon, 'Obey the *archai* whether justly or unjustly.'¹⁴¹ Moreover, when Creon mentions 'ruling well and being willing to be ruled well' (καλῶς μὲν ἄρχειν, εὖ δ' ἂν ἄρχεσθαι θέλειν), his suggestion that ruling and being ruled go hand in hand reflects a well-established principle: a proverb attributed to Solon runs, 'Rule only once you have learnt to be ruled.'¹⁴² Moreover, Aristotle twice notes the proverbial status of this line of thought,¹⁴³ and indeed considers it essential to the maintenance of political authority in a community of free and equal citizens.¹⁴⁴ Like Menelaus, Creon emphasises that obedience is essential to the security of *poleis*, which he says are often ruined by *anarchia*, and often saved by *peitharchia*.¹⁴⁵ Also, some aspects of Creon's wording may recall the Ephebic Oath.¹⁴⁶ It

¹³⁹ Soph. *Aj.* 1253-1254, 1260-1261; so roughly Fartzoff 1993:357-358, 361, and 2003:141.

¹⁴⁰ Soph. *Ant.* 663-665.

¹⁴¹ Soph. *Ant.* 666; ἀρχῶν ἄκουε καὶ δικαίως καὶ δίκως (Solon fr. 30). This proverb, though, clearly derives its force from its exhortation to do what is unjust under certain circumstances, which makes it intrinsically problematic (cf. Aesch. *Cho.* 78); cf. Siewert 1977:106, Griffith on Soph. *Ant.* 670-1 [666-7], Cuny 2007:295, with further late parallels.

¹⁴² ἄρχε πρῶτον μαθὼν ἄρχεσθαι (Diog. Laert. I.60); also ἄρχεσθαι μαθὼν, ἄρχειν ἐπιστήσῃ (Laks-Most 3 T35 2.10).

¹⁴³ Arist. *Pol.* III.1277b12-13, VII.1333a3-4.

¹⁴⁴ Arist. *Pol.* II.1261b1-5, III.1277b7-20; Ugolini 2000:125-126 and n. 48. I owe all these Aristotle references to Prof. Melissa Lane.

¹⁴⁵ Soph. *Ant.* 672-676.

¹⁴⁶ Siewert 1977:106 compares Soph. *Ant.* 670-671 (προσ τεταγμένον μένειν δίκαιον καὶ γαθὸν παραστάτην) with RO 88.7-8 (οὐδὲ λείψω τὸν παραστάτην ὅπου ἂν στειχήσω), and 666 (ὃν πόλις στήσειε, τοῦδε χρὴ κλύειν) with RO 88.11-12 (quoted on p. 117).

seems clear that Creon's ideas about obedience are ones whose currency and acceptability in fifth-century Greece there is no reason to doubt.¹⁴⁷

However, as in *Ajax*, Sophocles places these notions within a context where they become more problematic.¹⁴⁸ This is because—as indeed in his opening speech—Creon is using these intrinsically acceptable principles to justify a morally doubtful course of action, which, indeed, he himself will eventually recognise to have been wrong. Moreover, even more forcefully than in *Ajax*, the notion has already been expressed by Antigone, and will be reinforced by Haemon and Teiresias, that Creon's decision to leave Polynices unburied violates the laws of the gods.¹⁴⁹ By placing Creon's political principles on a collision course with the laws of the gods, Sophocles makes them much more problematic than if heard in isolation.

Furthermore, we have seen how, in *Ajax*, Menelaus' principles of obedience are made to turn gradually into the language of slavery and domination. In *Antigone*, the same effect is even more pronounced, since even *before* Creon enunciates his ideas about obedience we have heard him talk about his subjects in terms of slavery and domination.¹⁵⁰ In both plays, then, Sophocles presents excessive demands for obedience and an attitude based on the subjection of others as going hand in hand.

Sophocles does not, however, leave it to his audience to work out the problems with Creon's political conduct, since Haemon spells matters out very explicitly in the stichomythia which follows Creon's speech and Haemon's reply:¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁷ Griffith 1998:68-69 thinks that the problem with Creon's argument is that he attempts to apply principles of obedience suited to the *oikos* to the *polis* where they are inappropriate. However, abundant evidence shows that these principles *were* considered appropriate to the *polis*; they give rise to difficulties because they are brought into conflict with other *polis*-oriented principles (honouring the gods, free speech, etc.). So it is a clash between different political principles, not between domestic and political ones. Cuny 2007:289-293, 295, perhaps treats the relationship between family and *polis* ideals here more convincingly.

¹⁴⁸ So rightly Fartzoff 2003:140.

¹⁴⁹ Soph. *Ant.* 76-77, 278-279, 450-460, 519, 745, 749, 1015-1022, 1070-1076.

¹⁵⁰ See pp. 68-69; Creon is compared with Agamemnon in *Ajax* on this point e.g. by Funke 1966:41.

¹⁵¹ HAEMON: οὐ φησι Θήβης τῆσδ' ὁμόπολις λεώς.

HAEMON: The whole people of this *polis* (or, the people of this same *polis*), Thebes, says not.

CREON: And should our *polis* tell me what orders to give?

HAEMON: Do you see that the remark which you just made was beneath your age?

CREON: But must I rule this land for someone else, rather than for myself?

HAEMON: Yes, since there is no *polis* that belongs to one man.

CREON: Is not the *polis* said to belong to its ruler?

HAEMON: You would rule well alone over a deserted *polis*!

Here, the divergence between Creon's actions (and, by extension, the attitude and principles underlying them) and values considered important in democratic Athens comes to the fore. In Athens, when the populace of the *polis* thought a different thing from its leaders, the populace was supposed to prevail, but Creon—in line with his obedience-focused attitude—thinks it unreasonable that the *polis* should tell him what orders to give. So Creon's attitude is placed in tension with democratic principles, and indeed Haemon's last two responses here indicate that it is incompatible with the proper operation of a *polis* at all.¹⁵²

CREON: πόλις γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀμὲ χρὴ τάσσειν ἐρεῖ;

HAEMON: ὁρᾷς τόδ' ὥς εἰρηκας ὥς ἄγαν νέος;

CREON: ἄλλω γὰρ ἢ 'μοὶ χρὴ με τῇσδ' ἄρχειν χθονός;

HAEMON: πόλις γὰρ οὐκ ἔσθ' ἥτις ἀνδρός ἐσθ' ἑνός.

CREON: οὐ τοῦ κρατοῦντος ἡ πόλις νομίζεται;

HAEMON: καλῶς ἐρήμης γ' ἂν σὺ γῆς ἄρχοις μόνος (Soph. *Ant.* 733-739).

¹⁵² The point that these lines set up Creon's position as antithetical to democratic ideals has been made by several scholars: my own formulation owes most to Rösler 1980:15-16, 18; Fartzoff 2003:140; cf. also Funke 1966:43-45, Cuny 2007:308-310, Liapis 2013:97-102. Most scholars who make this observation (Pohlenz [1930] 1954:I.192; Bowra 1944:75-76; Knox 1964:108; Podlecki 1966:364; Blundell 1989:127) maintain that, at this point, Creon reveals himself to be 'tyrannical': 'Es bedarf geringer Phantasie, um sich den Widerhall vorzustellen, den dieses Gespräch im perikleischen Athen weckte. Der Tyrann wird hier gezeichnet, der sich ausschließlich von eigenen Interessen und Launen leiten läßt' (Pohlenz). However, I am not sure whether this emphasis on Creon's 'tyrannical' features is entirely to the point. As discussed in Chapter 1, Creon has been displaying such features for several scenes—not just recently. Moreover, this conversation is framed in altogether democratic terms, and it seems entirely possible that an Athenian audience would have understood these lines as depicting Creon primarily as an official acting undemocratically by greatly exceeding his authority,

Furthermore, when Haemon says that no *polis* belongs to a single man, Sophocles exploits the very paradox which he himself has created by having the legendary sole ruler Creon articulate contemporary and democratic principles. If Sophocles had not previously presented Creon as occupying a role analogous to that of a contemporary official, who is to be judged in terms of his exercise of *archai* and *nomoi*, Haemon's argument would have less point. But since Sophocles *has* presented Creon in such a way, priming his audience to judge Creon against contemporary criteria, Haemon's criticism of him becomes a damning indictment of his political conduct throughout the play. That is to say, for Haemon at least, it is Creon's excessive demands of obedience and disregard for popular dissent that show the final bankruptcy of his political attitude. Creon started by declaring that it is impossible to know a man's *gnome* until he is experienced in the *archai* and *nomoi*, which is the standard against which audience-members will have judged their own civic officials; now, it is by exactly this standard that he falls short, since he denies the validity of the people's will.

Here, then, I have tried to show that Sophocles presents Creon in a way that enables him to be thought of in contemporary terms, almost as though he were a democratic official. By applying democratic standards to this fundamentally non-democratic ruler, Sophocles is able to indicate forcefully the inadequacy of Creon's political conduct. Equally, this presentation of Creon enables Sophocles to explore the value of obedience, and its dangers and limitations. Like *Ajax*, *Antigone* shows the potential for arguments based on obedience to be used to justify morally doubtful courses of action, and even implies the potentially undemocratic nature of such arguments, at any rate if taken to extremes. No audience could be expected to watch these plays without being provoked to consider anew the value of obedience and its limits.

rather than as depicting him as any more of a 'tyrant' than previously. I therefore agree that Creon's remarks condemn him out of his own mouth by democratic standards, but doubt whether 'tyrannical' is the right way of describing this.

Indeed, two later plays of Sophocles also suggest the problems of obedience in passing: Odysseus in *Philoctetes* and Creon in *Oedipus at Colonus* both explain morally questionable actions on the basis that they are carrying out instructions.¹⁵³

V. Conclusion

In this chapter, we have seen that the depiction of rulers in fifth-century tragedy reflects various ideas current in the Athenian democracy, especially concerning leadership and obedience. The use of these ideas entails that rulers are sometimes presented in a manner analogous to fifth-century Athenian politicians, but this is done in many different ways. Aeschylus' *Suppliants* and Euripides' *Suppliants* present Pelasgus and Theseus co-existing with a democratic assembly, whereas Demophon in *Children of Heracles* and Theseus in Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus* govern alone. Contemporary elements are also important in *Antigone*, where Creon is at several points presented as a figure analogous to a contemporary official, and *Ajax*.

Can we generalise about the playwrights' use of contemporary elements? It has occasionally been suggested that Sophocles, compared to Aeschylus and Euripides, is the 'poète du passé', who eschews contemporary elements in favour of the colouring of heroic legend.¹⁵⁴ Perhaps it is true that Sophocles exhibits more sensitivity to *overt* anachronism; there are no democratic assemblies in extant Sophocles, and the contemporary features in *Ajax* and *Antigone* are certainly handled in a subtle and effective way, producing no apparent tension with the traditional status of the Atreids and Creon as sole rulers. But these contemporary elements are nevertheless very substantial, and it must be considered entirely possible that Sophocles' lost plays contained contemporary elements just as overt as those in Aeschylus' and Euripides' *Suppliants*. When we have lost so much, it seems unsafe to generalise about the playwrights' technique in this respect.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵³ Soph. *Phil.* 6, with Schein *ad loc.* (cf. 925-926, 1010); OC 850-851.

¹⁵⁴ Goossens 1962:434; cf. U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1910:55, Jouanna [2007] 2018:156, 161.

¹⁵⁵ Cf. Rood, Atack and Phillips 2020:83-84.

In combination, then, Chapters 1-3 have demonstrated the complexity and variety of the ideas underlying the depiction of rulers in tragedy—both those shared with the story tradition and those drawn from the world of contemporary Athenian politics. In the next chapter, we will turn away from ideas specifically associated with rulers, and will look at the ways in which the Athenians conceptualised punishment and supplication, which dominate the plots of many tragedies in which rulers play a key role.

CHAPTER 4. SUPPLICATION, PUNISHMENT, AND THE REPRESENTATION OF RULERS' DECISIONS AND ACTIONS IN TRAGEDY

I. Introduction

In Chapters 1-3, we considered how tragedy reflects specific ideas associated with rulers. Here, I wish to take a broader view, arguing—fairly briefly—a single important point about how the representation of tragic rulers is affected by the nature of fifth-century Athenian society.

Much of the moral interest in the depiction of tragic rulers lies in their decisions and actions, which are often of great consequence within the plot. Most decisions by rulers can be divided into two groups: giving assistance to suppliants or other outsiders who approach the *polis* (often Athens, but not in our earliest case, Aeschylus' *Suppliants*), and harming subjects (often with death or exile). Decisions of other kinds are made (to deny burial to the dead, to sacrifice maidens, and so forth), but these are not as common. As indeed Meuli points out in his 1945 dissertation, this division of rulers into rescuers and oppressors immediately produces a striking dichotomy between characters like Demophon in *Children of Heracles* (who benefit those under their power) and characters like Lycus in *Heracles* (who harm them).¹ Here, however, I will argue that the differences between the depiction of rulers who accept suppliants and rulers who do their subjects harm are the result not *solely* of differing plot structures, but also of the basic fact that, in Athens, which was a direct democracy without sole rulers acting as judges, justice was collective and adversarial, and the notion that an individual had the right to use his power to harm others (an accepted feature of many justice systems) was absent.

¹ Meuli 1945; however, I have not found his detailed analyses useful. Meuli unhelpfully makes a point of excluding all cases that do not fall neatly into 'rescuer' or 'oppressor' (Meuli 1945:13-15).

II. Helping strangers

Firstly, then, rulers who help outsiders are generally depicted as acting deliberately, in close alignment with the *polis*, and on the basis of moral and religious considerations.

This is readily evident, and can be shown briefly. In Aeschylus' *Suppliants*, the Danaids urge religious and moral arguments upon Pelasgus;² Pelasgus accepts these, but his primary stated concern is the interests of the *polis*,³ and he decides that Zeus' wrath is more fearful than the sons of Aegyptus.⁴ As discussed above, he consults the *demos*, and cites its vote in ejecting the Egyptian Herald.⁵ Pelasgus' own interests are only brought up where closely connected to those of the *polis*.⁶ Similarly, in Euripides' *Children of Heracles*, Demophon acts in the interests of the *polis* and on moral and religious grounds, explaining that he accepts the suppliants above all (τὸ μὲν μέγιστον) because of Zeus, secondly because of his family relationship with them, and thirdly and especially (οὐπερ δεῖ μάλιστα φροντίσαι) because he is concerned about Athens' reputation, that he might be thought not to rule a free country (οὐκ ἐλευθέραν οἰκεῖν δοκήσω γαῖαν).⁷ As discussed above, Demophon's capacity to act for the *polis* goes unquestioned, and the possibility of a popular vote is not mentioned.⁸ Even when the *demos* falls into dissension over sacrificing a virgin, there is no question of Demophon doing anything other than remaining aligned with the *demos*. So Demophon, like Pelasgus, acts in alignment with the *polis* and according to its interests.

Theseus, in Euripides' *Suppliants*, acts similarly. When he initially rejects Adrastus' supplication, the only criterion mentioned is *polis* interest: Theseus cannot see why

² Cf. B. Vickers 1973:454-455.

³ Aesch. *Supp.* 346-347, 357-358, 399-401.

⁴ Aesch. *Supp.* 439-440, 472-479, cf. 616-620.

⁵ See p. 100.

⁶ Aesch. *Supp.* 399-401, 410-411, 484-485.

⁷ Eur. *Heracl.* 238-245.

⁸ See pp. 101-103. On Demophon's decision and association with the *polis* here, see Zuntz 1955:39; Burian 1977:5-6; Mills 1997:102-103.

the *demos* would agree to help Adrastus, or why Adrastus' problems are any concern of the *polis* as a whole.⁹ When Theseus changes his mind, moral and religious arguments are prominent. Aethra urges on him, firstly, the will of the gods and the laws of all Greece; secondly, she puts forward arguments about reputation.¹⁰ Rather as Demophon explains his decision to defend Heracles' children in terms of Athens' reputation,¹¹ Aethra identifies Theseus' reputation with Athens', saying not only that Theseus would be acting in line with his heroic labours, but also that he would 'win a crown of glory for the *polis*' (πόλει ... στέφανον εὐκλείας λαβεῖν) by helping the suppliants.¹² Aethra also adds further arguments in terms of Athens' reputation.¹³ Speaking to the Herald, Theseus justifies his decision with arguments echoing Aethra's: the laws of Greece mandate burying the dead, and such an action would be pious and in line with Athens' status as a free *polis*.¹⁴ As with Pelasgus and Demophon, then, Theseus accepts the supplication on the basis of religion, morality, and *polis* interest. Also, like Pelasgus, Theseus consults the *demos*, which readily agrees to his proposal,¹⁵ so that Theseus and the *demos* are closely aligned throughout.

In Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus*, although Oedipus does not formally supplicate, Theseus again has to make a decision regarding an outsider's request. As in Euripides' *Children of Heracles*, no popular assembly is mentioned, and Theseus acts altogether on Athens' behalf. Theseus' reasons for accepting Oedipus into the city are that Oedipus is his friend (δορύξενος), that Oedipus is a suppliant of the gods, and that he has a benefit to give to Athens. Again, then, the will of the gods is prominent, and the decisive factor is the interests of the *polis*.¹⁶ Similarly, in Euripides' *Heracles*,

⁹ Eur. *Supp.* 247, 249 (obelised by Diggle, but probably with some sense similar to Hermann's conjecture, πιέζειν σὴν τύχην ἡμᾶς τί δεῖ;).

¹⁰ Eur. *Supp.* 301-325; cf. B. Vickers 1973:459.

¹¹ Eur. *Heracl.* 242-246.

¹² Eur. *Supp.* 314-319; cf. Brock 1998:234.

¹³ Eur. *Supp.* 321-325.

¹⁴ Eur. *Supp.* 518-521, 537-540, 558-563, 575-576. I disagree here with Fitton 1961:361-363; cf. Burian 1985:136-137.

¹⁵ Eur. *Supp.* 349-355, 393-394.

¹⁶ Soph. *OC* 632-635, cf. 576-582. For Oedipus' lack of formal supplication, and for the decisive importance of his promise of a benefit to Athens, see Kelly 2009:75-79 (with further references).

Theseus points out that it will be a glorious achievement for the Athenians to receive a great hero.¹⁷ In *Medea*, however, although Aegeus cites the gods as a reason for accepting Medea into Athens, he is secondly (and more importantly) motivated by Medea's promise that she will enable him to have children, and the situation presented in *Heracles* and *Oedipus at Colonus* where the incomer is beneficial to Athens is subverted.¹⁸

In all these cases, the ruler's decision is made on behalf of the *polis*, and in its interests—interests which may include its very safety (Aeschylus' *Suppliants* and Euripides' *Children of Heracles*), or its reputation (Euripides' *Children of Heracles* and *Suppliants*), or the presence of a hero (Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus* and Euripides' *Heracles*). This should be placed in the context of the fact that supplication to the *polis* was an established practice in classical Athens, deliberated upon by the *demos*. The process has been studied by Zelnick-Abramovitz, who argues persuasively that Aeschylus' *Suppliants* probably reflects Athenian procedure.¹⁹ Pelasgus' dilemma in Aeschylus' *Suppliants* may also be compared with the story of Pactyes in Herodotus, where the *polis* of Cyme has to decide whether it is better to incur the enmity of a foreign power or that of a god.²⁰ Strikingly, however, whereas in reality such cases were handled collectively by the *polis*, the playwrights are happy to present the ruler as taking on this deliberative role on behalf of the *polis*—sometimes in close association with a decision of the *demos* (as in Aeschylus' and Euripides' *Suppliants*), but sometimes where the *demos* plays no formal role (as in the other cases).

III. Harming subjects

By contrast, rulers who harm their subjects, for instance by killing or exiling them, generally do so not deliberatively and as representatives of the *polis*, but adversarially and on the basis of their own interests and views. They do not issue punishments for

¹⁷ Eur. *HF* 1334-1335, where Heracles is said to benefit Athens (as Oedipus is at Soph. *OC* 1508-1509, 1533-1535).

¹⁸ Eur. *Med.* 720-721, with pp. 36-37 above.

¹⁹ Zelnick-Abramovitz 1998:570-571; cf. also Naiden 2006:176-177.

²⁰ Hdt. I.157-159.

definite crimes committed, as the *demos* did, whether in full Assembly or in democratic courts. Rather, rulers are placed more in the role of the *prosecutor* in an Athenian legal case, who, adversarially and in openly partisan fashion, pursues a legal case against his opponent, often on the basis of an enmity, although sometimes on the basis of the interests of the *polis* as he perceives them.²¹

Collective *polis* punishment, where the *polis* deliberates regarding the punishment of a person for a definite crime, is certainly present in tragedy. However, where such deliberation occurs, it is carried out not by a ruler, but by a collective governing body or law-court of a *polis* that appears not to have a sole ruler. In Aeschylus' *Eumenides*, it is not a ruler but a real-life Athenian court—the Areopagus—that deliberates on Orestes' possible punishment for matricide. Euripides' *Ion* and *Orestes* feature punishment for crimes by a collective governing body. In *Orestes*, this body is the 'summoned crowd of the Argives' (ἐκκλητην Ἀργείων ὄχλον), a phrase evoking the Athenian *ekklesia*; in *Ion*, it is the *anaktes* of Delphi, whose verdict is carried out by the whole *polis*.²² In each case a prosecutor (Ion in *Ion*; several in *Orestes*) uses a procedure analogous to real Athenian ones (the *βοή* in *Ion*; Assembly speeches in *Orestes*) to prosecute a defendant (Creusa in *Ion*; Orestes in *Orestes*) before a *polis* body.²³ The chief argument for punishment is that a crime (poisoning in *Ion*; matricide in *Orestes*) has been committed, and in *Orestes* arguments are advanced concerning law, religion, and *polis* interests.²⁴ The *polis* body then reaches a decision by vote,²⁵ involving a

²¹ The relative importance of private enmity and the interests of the *polis* in Athenian legal arguments has been hotly debated; many argue that the former was positively valued, while others disagree (Cohen 1995:17, 70-86; Allen 2000:35, 151-160; Rubinstein 2004; Herman 2006:189-191, 199-201; Harris 2013:61-71; Alwine 2015:5-9). There is, however, no need to take a position on this issue here.

²² Eur. *Ion* 1222 (Δελφῶν ἀνακτες), 1225 (πᾶσα ... πόλις), Or. 612.

²³ Eur. *Ion* 1217-1220, Or. 884-930. On the extensive parallels between the Assembly scene of *Orestes* and the Athenian democracy (a good example of 'heroic vagueness'), see Pelling 2000:164-167, 184-188; Naiden 2010. On the *βοή* and its correspondences with Athenian procedure, see Fraenkel on Aesch. Ag. 1317.

²⁴ Law: Eur. Or. 892-893, cf. 494-503. Religion: 900, cf. 503. The interests of the *polis*: here chiefly on the defence's side (926-929), but cf. 507-511, 524-525, 907-911 if genuine.

²⁵ οὐ ψήφῳ μιᾷ (Eur. *Ion* 1223); ἐν πλήθει χειρῶν (Or. 944); cf. ψήφον (Or. 49).

specified punishment that it is prepared to carry out.²⁶ These cases, along with other passages mentioning democratic punishment,²⁷ show tragedy conceiving of punishment being considered deliberatively and carried out on the basis of *polis* interest, law, morality, and religion, and as a response to a defined crime. When it does so, however, tragedy places this decision in the hands of a collective body; it does not generally depict sole rulers punishing crimes deliberatively on behalf of the *polis*. This maps onto how the Athenians regarded legitimate, deliberative punishment as an essentially collective matter, not conceived of as being carried out by a single person.

Rather, when tragic rulers harm their subjects, they do so not deliberatively or to punish crimes, but adversarially and according to their own interests or views. Most strikingly, three rulers (Creon in *Medea*, Eurystheus in *Children of Heracles*, and Lycus in *Heracles*) use their power pre-emptively, to harm someone who has not yet even done them harm, but who they fear may harm them in the future. Here, self-interest is the sole motive. Creon flatly tells Medea that he is exiling her because he fears that she may harm his daughter, and that he is therefore starting an enmity with her pre-emptively.²⁸ Eurystheus similarly wishes to kill Heracles' children to pre-empt their inherited enmity (ἔχθραν πατρώϊαν) towards him.²⁹ Likewise, Lycus states that he means to kill Heracles' family out of caution (εὐλαβεία) so that they cannot avenge Creon.³⁰ These rulers are clearly not deliberating as an Athenian democratic body might; rather, they use their power for transparently self-interested purposes, and without any deliberation over moral or religious questions, their victims' deserts, or *polis* interests.

²⁶ πετρορριφή θανεῖν (Eur. *Ion* 1222-1223); πετρούμενος θανεῖν commuted to suicide (*Or.* 946-969). Stoning is frequently employed in tragedy and other genres to emphasise the collective nature of the response to an offence (Barkan 1936:49-50; Allen 2000:141-146, 205-206). Cf. p. 166 below.

²⁷ E.g. Aesch. *Ag.* 1410-1413, 1615-1616.

²⁸ Eur. *Med.* 282-283, 290.

²⁹ Eur. *Heracl.* 1002; also 468-470.

³⁰ Eur. *HF* 165-169.

Whereas these rulers' actions are pre-emptive, other rulers act responsively. Yet the ruler still does not act deliberatively and as the representative of the *polis*, but rather takes a partisan role somewhat resembling a prosecutor's at Athens. Thus, when Theseus in *Hippolytus* becomes convinced that Hippolytus has raped Phaedra, he raises the shout for help (βοή) and immediately curses Hippolytus (ensuring Hippolytus' death).³¹ When a crowd of citizens and Hippolytus arrive, Theseus makes a prosecution speech full of the *topoi* of the Athenian courts;³² Hippolytus replies with an equally legalistic defence speech, which includes, for example, the topos that he is not used to speaking before a crowd.³³ Theseus makes no argument based on moral standards or community interest, but emphasises his pursuit of an enmity against Hippolytus by comparing his conflict with Hippolytus to his conflicts with Sinis and Sciron.³⁴ Theseus, then, takes up a prosecutor's role—but with the difference that he possesses personal power going beyond any that any citizen in contemporary Athens had, and so, like Creon, Eurystheus and Lycus, he can pursue his personal will to do harm beyond what was, to Athenians, normal and legitimate.³⁵ No notion is expressed that Theseus, as ruler, might be expected to deliberate over justice, as the rulers in the 'suppliant plays' deliberate over supplication.

This scene is sometimes compared with the scene in Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus* where Oedipus threatens to kill or exile Creon for plotting against him, and where Creon makes a similarly lengthy defence speech reminiscent of the lawcourts, in which he disclaims any desire for *tyrannis* (as Hippolytus also does).³⁶ Here, similarly, Oedipus treats Creon as a personal enemy, acting like a prosecutor rather than an impartial judge;³⁷ indeed, Creon reproaches Oedipus for this quite directly, when he

³¹ Eur. *Hipp.* 884-890; cf. Barrett on Eur. *Hipp.* 884.

³² Eur. *Hipp.* 943-980.

³³ Eur. *Hipp.* 983-1035, especially 986. For the law-court features, see Solmsen 1967:88-89; Karsai 1982; Lloyd 1992:34, 45-51.

³⁴ Eur. *Hipp.* 976-980.

³⁵ As Karsai 1982:115 says, 'cela dépasse toutes les règles du jeu démocratique.'

³⁶ The similarities are discussed by Newton 1980 (who is convinced that Euripides' scene is based on Sophocles'); Karsai 1993; Cuny 2004:73-76. On disclaiming desire for *tyrannis*, cf. p. 59 above. Possible lawcourt *topoi* in Creon's speech are discussed by Knox 1957:87-89; Cuny 2004:76-79.

³⁷ Cf. Cuny 2004:65.

tells Oedipus to consult the Delphic oracle, 'and then, if you find that I have plotted together with the soothsayer, take me and kill me not by a single vote, but with two, mine and yours—but do not accuse me on the basis of unclear suspicion, on your own.'³⁸ There is no notion here that a ruler might be expected, as a ruler, to distribute justice impartially. Even to articulate this reproach, Creon has to draw on the notion of voting; he reproaches him not on the basis of any notion of how rulers should act, but in contemporary Athenian terms.

As well as pursuing their own interests, tragic rulers, like prosecutors at Athens, sometimes act on their own perception of *polis* interests. In *Bacchae*, Pentheus regards the new Dionysiac activity in the *polis* as 'new evils throughout the *polis*' and 'this criminal Bacchic activity.'³⁹ His primary objection to the rites is that they involve illicit sexual activity.⁴⁰ Pentheus' concern to protect and restrain Thebes' women is, although mistaken, based on his view of Thebes' interests.⁴¹ Pentheus is not, though, identified with the *polis*, as the rulers in the supplication plays are; indeed, the First Messenger, an ordinary citizen, advises Pentheus to accept Dionysus into the *polis*,⁴² and Cadmus tells Pentheus that he is acting outside the *nomoi*.⁴³ Nor does Pentheus deliberate like rulers in the 'suppliant plays'; instead, he acts like a partisan accusing another person of an action that he regards as criminal, namely 'introducing a new divinity' (δαίμον' ... ἐσφέρων νέον).⁴⁴ This phrase closely resembles a phrase employed in the charges against Socrates in 399, 'introducing other new divinities' (ἕτερα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρον), and the same charge was brought in the fourth-century trials of Phryne and Nino.⁴⁵ The first part of the charge against

³⁸ τοῦτ' ἄλλ', ἐάν με τῷ τερασκόπῳ λάβης κοινῇ τι βουλευσάντα, μή μ' ἀπλῇ κτάνης ψήφῳ, διπλῇ δέ, τῇ τ' ἐμῇ καὶ σῇ, λαβὼν, γνώμη δ' ἀδήλω μή με χωρὶς αἰτιῶ (Soph. *OT* 605-608). On ψήφος here, cf. p. 166 n. 58.

³⁹ νεοχμὰ τήνδ' ἀνὰ πτόλιν κακά (Eur. *Bacch.* 216); κακούργου τῆσδε βακχείας (232).

⁴⁰ Eur. *Bacch.* 217-225.

⁴¹ Eur. *Bacch.* 686-688, 1051-1062; cf. Oranje 1984:42, March 1989:45-50, Mills 2006:61.

⁴² Eur. *Bacch.* 769-772.

⁴³ Eur. *Bacch.* 331.

⁴⁴ Eur. *Bacch.* 256.

⁴⁵ Xen. *Mem.* I.1. Other versions of the charges: Diog. Laert. II.40; Pl. *Ap.* 24c; Serv. on Verg. *Aen.* VIII.187. Nino: Joseph. *Ap.* 2.37. Phryne: Anonymus Seguerianus 215. On both cases see Versnel 1990:114-119, R. C. T. Parker 1996:162-163.

Socrates (οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων), moreover, is connected by a discernible continuity of thought with the Decree of Diopeithes,⁴⁶ which Plutarch says allowed for the prosecution of ‘those who do not acknowledge the divinities’ (τοὺς τὰ θεῖα μὴ νομίζοντας) already in Pericles’ time.⁴⁷ Thus Pentheus accuses Teiresias of what was quite probably a crime in Athens, and which certainly was within a decade of the production of *Bacchae*.⁴⁸ More generally, controversy over the introduction of new and foreign cults, such as those of Cybele, Sabazius and Isodaïtes, was a recurrent issue throughout the fifth and fourth centuries, and one which *Bacchae* makes contact with in a number of ways.⁴⁹ Given this, it seems unlikely that a character with such a partisan view within a long-running contemporary debate could be seen as representing the whole *polis*; rather, he might more readily be seen as occupying a particular position within it, namely that of a vehement religious conservative—the sort that *might* mount religious prosecutions. Pentheus, then, is not portrayed as a *polis* representative as the rulers in the ‘suppliant plays’ are; his opposition to the Stranger, Chorus and Teiresias is a personal undertaking founded on his own views.

In Sophocles’ *Antigone*, Creon’s actions are motivated by a sort of self-interest which (as discussed in Chapter 1) he shares with various rulers in Herodotus and tragedy, namely concern to maintain his rule, which he sees as threatened by dissenters. He interprets the burial of Polynices in this light, initially and when he knows Antigone to be the culprit.⁵⁰ He does not stop to consider whether Antigone’s actual motivations fit his theory, but rather shoehorns her into the role which his explanation demands. He regards himself as engaged in a personal conflict with her.⁵¹ He takes this attitude, though, in line with his opening speech, where he said, ‘I

⁴⁶ Although Socrates probably cannot have been prosecuted under the Decree of Diopeithes itself, it seems likely that he was prosecuted under a related law (Versnel 1990:124-129, especially 128; cf. R. C. T. Parker 1996:207-210).

⁴⁷ Plut. *Per.* 32.

⁴⁸ Cf. Roux on Eur. *Bacch.* 256, Versnel 1990:158, 173-174.

⁴⁹ See pp. 245-248 below.

⁵⁰ Soph. *Ant.* 289-294 (initially), 478-494, 533, 663-680 (later).

⁵¹ Soph. *Ant.* 653, 677-680, cf. Theseus’ words at Eur. *Hipp.* 976-980.

would never make an enemy of this land my friend.’⁵² Like Pentheus, then, Creon *thinks* that he is acting in the *polis* interest. The problem with this, though, is that he identifies the interests of the *polis* with his own *nomoi*, among which he includes his proclamation prohibiting Polynices’ burial.⁵³ Moreover, it gradually becomes evident that Creon’s views and the interests of the *polis* do not actually correspond, especially when Haemon argues that the populace does not agree with Creon; Creon does not deny this, but instead is forced to confront the possibility that his own interests might not be those of the *polis*. This pushes him to admit that he places his own wishes above those of the *polis*, when he asks, ‘But must I rule this land for someone else, rather than for myself?’—a question which, for Haemon at least, shows the bankruptcy of his attitude.⁵⁴ So the play brings out the problems implicit in one man having power beyond any Athenian citizen’s, and directly articulates the difficulties that might be seen as inhering in one man having the *nomoi* and the whole process of punishment in his own hands.

Oedipus’ proclamation in *Oedipus Tyrannus*, where Oedipus uses his political authority to threaten that anyone who withholds information about the killer of Laius will be exiled,⁵⁵ is exceptional, in that the proclamation must seem legitimate, so that Oedipus can be revealed as the culprit whom he is rightly pursuing. However, Sophocles could not rely on any preconception on his audience’s part that such action came within a sole ruler’s natural role. Instead, the portrayal of Oedipus draws on other sources of authority recognised at Athens. One such model is fatherhood. With Oedipus’ very first words, Sophocles sets up Oedipus as a father towards the citizens.⁵⁶ This gives Oedipus an authority that he would not otherwise possess—as does the Priest’s presentation of Oedipus as the mightiest of men, with a unique

⁵² οὐτ’ ἂν φίλον ποτ’ ἄνδρα δυσμενῇ χθονὸς θείμην ἐμαντῶ (Soph. *Ant.* 187-188). On Creon’s sense of friendship and enmity, see Goldhill 1986:94-98; Griffith 1999:40-41; Cairns 2016:93-104.

⁵³ Soph. *Ant.* 191-193, with Segal 1981:169; Blundell 1989:127-128.

⁵⁴ Soph. *Ant.* 733-737, quoted at pp. 121-122 above. Else 1976:98-99 discusses Creon’s tendency to prioritise himself above the *polis* elsewhere too (especially 292, 640, 1078-1101).

⁵⁵ Soph. *OT* 237-243.

⁵⁶ Soph. *OT* 1, cf. 6, 58; cf. p. 209 and the scholars cited there.

capacity to resolve Thebes' problems.⁵⁷ Oedipus also draws on Apollo's prophetic authority, calling himself an ally to the dead man and the god.⁵⁸ The play also justifies Oedipus' action in democratic terms by having the populace ask Oedipus to deal with the problem.⁵⁹ Furthermore, proclamations of this sort, although found in the story of Periander and Lycophron in Herodotus, are not exclusively associated with sole rulers, since in classical Athens, too, proclamations were made excluding killers from human contact.⁶⁰ Indeed, Oedipus emphasises that he is acting as a citizen.⁶¹ It has also been argued that the speech echoes (although not *straightforwardly*) the legal procedures of *dike phonou* and *zetesis*,⁶² perhaps making Oedipus' action seem more legitimate and familiar. Thus, to justify Oedipus' proclamation in Athenian eyes, Sophocles draws on sources of authority with contemporary currency; Sophocles seemingly cannot simply rely on the audience assuming that a ruler's orders of punishment are legitimate.

One play, Euripides' *Hecuba*, does place a ruler in a judging role, analogous to an Athenian jury's, but, even here, the notion that rulers are responsible for judging cases and punishing wrongdoers is conspicuously absent. When Hecuba initially suggests that Agamemnon should punish Polymestor, she appeals partly to the law, saying, 'But the gods have strength, and so does the law, their ruler. For it is by law that we believe in the gods, and live with an established distinction between what is just and unjust. If this law is negated when it comes before you, and if people who kill guests and dare to plunder the temples of the gods are not punished, there is no fairness among humans.'⁶³ This argument, as Battezzato points out, is similar to one

⁵⁷ Soph. *OT* 31-40.

⁵⁸ Soph. *OT* 244-245.

⁵⁹ Soph. *OT* 40-57.

⁶⁰ Edmunds 2012:73-74; Finglass 2018b:64-66, citing Dem. XX.158, XXIII.37, Lys. VI.52, [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 57.2 (mentioning proclamation), Pl. *Leg.* IX.868e3-5.

⁶¹ Soph. *OT* 222; cf. Greiffenhagen 1966:152-153, Edmunds 2012:79-80.

⁶² Knox 1957:80-98; Greiffenhagen 1966; R. G. Lewis 1989:50-63; Edmunds 2012:81-82.

⁶³ ἀλλ' οἱ θεοὶ σθένουσι χῶ κείνων κρατῶν νόμος· νόμῳ γὰρ τοὺς θεοὺς ἡγούμεθα καὶ ζῶμεν ἄδικα καὶ δίκαι' ὠρισμένοι· ὃς ἐς σ' ἀνελθὼν εἰ διαφθαρήσεται καὶ μὴ δίκην δώσουσιν οἵτινες ξένους κτείνουσιν ἢ θεῶν ἱερὰ τολμῶσιν φέρειν, οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἴσον (Eur. *Hec.* 799-805); cf. Agamemnon's response (850-853) in terms of supplication, the gods, and τὸ δίκαιον.

applied to the burial of the dead by Theseus in *Suppliants*.⁶⁴ But Hecuba also appeals to Agamemnon to punish Polymestor as a partisan of herself,⁶⁵ appealing at length to Agamemnon's love for Cassandra.⁶⁶ If Agamemnon did what Hecuba requests here, he would be acting as her partisan, not as a disinterested representative of civic or military justice.⁶⁷

Similarly, when Agamemnon finally takes up the role of an *ad hoc* judge, although he opens the debate by telling Polymestor, 'Speak, so that, having heard you and her in turn, I can judge justly why you have suffered this',⁶⁸ when he concludes the debate he says, 'Though other people's troubles are burdensome for me to judge, it is nevertheless necessary, since indeed it would bring disgrace to take this matter into my hands and then turn my back on it.'⁶⁹ Here Agamemnon seems to consider himself obliged to decide the matter not because it is his responsibility as ruler, but because he has already undertaken to. He decides (ἐμοὶ ... δοκεῖς) that Polymestor is lying and killed Polydorus out of greed, and justifies this by asking how he could escape criticism (ψόγος) if he judged Polymestor not guilty (κρίνας μὴ ἀδικοῦν).⁷⁰

Here, then, Euripides creates a unique and effective situation, where Agamemnon is placed in a deliberative position, analogous to a jury's, where he has to reach a verdict on a crime. However, his role as judge is treated in an *ad hoc* fashion, and no

⁶⁴ Eur. *Supp.* 561-563, cited by Battezzato on Eur. *Hec.* 802.

⁶⁵ σύ μοι γενοῦ τιμωρὸς ἀνδρὸς ἀνοσιωτάτου ξένου (Eur. *Hec.* 789-790).

⁶⁶ Eur. *Hec.* 824-835.

⁶⁷ Cf. Meridor 1983:15-16: 'In terms of Athenian law, it would probably have been the duty of Agamemnon, had he been the master of Polydorus, to see to the punishment of the murderer. As the free son of his slave, the case may have been one to which the γραφή ὕβρεως could have been applied, and Hecuba's master is likely to have been considered morally bound to do for Hecuba what any βουλόμενος was entitled to do for whoever had suffered a serious wrong.' (Battezzato on Eur. *Hec.* 834, however, considers Hecuba's argument 'rhetorically skilful, but legally specious'.)

⁶⁸ λέγ', ὥς ἀκούσας σοῦ τε τῆσδ' ἐν μέρει κρίνω δικάϊως ἄνθ' ὅτου πάσχεις τάδε (Eur. *Hec.* 1130-1131).

⁶⁹ ἀχθεινὰ μὲν μοι τὰλλότριά κρινεῖν κακά, ὅμως δ' ἀνάγκη· καὶ γὰρ αἰσχύνην φέρει προῦ μ' ἐς χέρας λαβόντ' ἀπώσασθαι τόδε (Eur. *Hec.* 1240-1242).

⁷⁰ Eur. *Hec.* 1243, 1249.

notion is expressed that Agamemnon has a responsibility as a ruler to administer justice.⁷¹

Thus, where a ruler inflicts harm on his subjects in tragedy, he often acts out of self-interest; where community interest, morality or religion enters into his motivations, he generally takes a one-sided, partisan, and non-deliberative view of it. The ruler does not act as a *polis* representative in alignment with the *demos*, as in the supplication plays. Where the playwright does depict legitimate punishment by the *polis*, collective bodies issue the punishment (*Ion*, *Orestes*). Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus* and Euripides' *Hecuba* perhaps present partial exceptions, but even here there is no notion that it is the special role of a ruler to punish criminals.

IV. Conclusion

Essentially, then, whereas rulers helping strangers act deliberately on behalf of and in alignment with the *polis* and *demos*, rulers harming those within their power do not, instead acting adversarially.

This is not an intrinsically necessary result of the plays' plots. Rather, it reflects the fact that Athenian justice was run collectively and not by individual judges; thus in these plays there is no ready model of an individual sitting in judgement for the playwrights to draw upon. Furthermore, it reflects the adversarial nature of Athenian notions of justice and punishment, which have been rightly emphasised by recent scholars. In Athens, a society with little provision for the centralised apprehension and punishment of criminals, as Allen puts it, 'the ancient Athenian was obliged, for safety's sake, to understand punishment: what it was, how it worked, how one "did" it. ... They had to see an act of power through from initiation to conclusion and carry

⁷¹ It is also worth noting, as Lloyd 1992:96 does in a different connection, that 'Euripides avoids organizing the action in such a way that the punishment of Polymestor depended on the *agon*.'

out the process of punishing.⁷² This, I think, is reflected in plays like *Hippolytus*, with the difference that Theseus, as ruler, can (unlike an Athenian citizen prosecutor) bring his will to pass directly.

So tragic rulers are not only presented in terms of specific ideas available to fifth-century Athenians (Chapters 1-3), but are shaped more broadly, albeit indirectly, by basic features of democratic Athenian society, especially its conceptualisation of punishment as a matter in which the individual played an adversarial role, but the community the deliberative role (Chapter 4). These chapters, then, provide us with a rounded picture of the complex and varied ways in which the presentation of tragic rulers *in general* is affected by the conceptions of the time. We are therefore now in a good position to consider five tragic rulers in detail, in order to show that the ways in which the tragic playwrights put these ideas to use are similarly complex and varied.

⁷² Allen 2000:4. For the highly adversarial nature of Athenian legal process, see Todd 1993:67-68, 79, 144-145, 160-163. For further bibliography, see Allen 2000:20-21.

PART TWO

CHARACTERS

INTRODUCTION TO PART TWO

I. Introduction

In Part One, we considered the most important ideas underlying the depiction of tragic rulers. Part Two aims to explain in detail how the playwrights put these ideas to use in presenting five characters—Eteocles in Aeschylus’ *Seven Against Thebes*, Agamemnon in Aeschylus’ *Agamemnon*, Creon in Sophocles’ *Antigone*, Oedipus in Sophocles’ *Oedipus Tyrannus*, and Pentheus in Euripides’ *Bacchae*.

In the chapters that follow, I will discuss these characters primarily with respect to their *moral* presentation (rather than, for instance, individuality or psychology). Moreover, I will discuss them primarily with regard to *means*—i.e. the playwrights’ dramatic technique in presenting these characters—rather than *ends* (i.e. the effect which these characters are supposed to have on the audience). This Introduction aims to explain and justify these choices. I will begin by explaining what I consider the nature of dramatic characters to be in general (II), before setting out some possible questions one might ask concerning characters in tragedy (III), allowing me to explain clearly why this thesis focuses on certain questions about tragic characters rather than others (IV).

II. General considerations regarding characters in tragedy

There has been considerable controversy over how to study characters.¹ Within the investigation of Greek tragedy, various scholars since T. von Wilamowitz have questioned the usefulness of studying the presentation of characters,² while other

¹ I use the word **character** for persons in a play (‘a character’, ‘characters’), but *not* as an abstract noun referring to characters’ stable attributes (like Budelmann 2000:61-62; cf. G. Currie 2009:61-63, De Temmerman and van Emde Boas 2018:2). This is because, although I think tragic characters are generally stable (which has sometimes been doubted; cf. n. 2 just below), I do not wish to embed this assumption in my terminology.

² T. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1917; Howald 1930; Dawe 1963. Arist. *Poet.* VI.1449b36-1450b12 is invoked to restrict characterisation’s importance by J. Jones 1962:29-32; Dale

scholars have argued in favour of it.³ Literary theorists have also paid attention to the presentation of characters in general terms; recent work has aimed to illuminate the portrayal of characters by drawing on insights from cognitive science concerning how people react to both real people in everyday life and characters on stage (as well as in other literature).⁴

In line with these theorists (and indeed earlier theorists such as E. M. Forster), I take the depiction of a character to be essentially a process of communication from the playwright to the audience-member.⁵ That is to say, literary characters do not exist in the way real people do; rather, the playwright writes words in the play which state or imply something about a character. These ‘cues’ lead audience-members to react to the character. Such reactions may be of various kinds. An audience-member might feel emotions such as fear or hatred towards a character; they might feel sympathy with the character; they might identify with the character; they might approve or disapprove. At a more complex—but, I think, not necessarily more important—level, the audience-member may form a sense of the character’s individuality, which they

1954:xxvii, [1959] 1969:139-155. However, although Aristotle sees ἥθος as secondary to μῦθος, characters remain important in his account of tragedy (Schmitt 1988:1-4; Mossman 1995:138-139; Seidensticker 2008:333-338). Other scholars have argued that characters in tragedy are inconsistent (T. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1917, Howald 1930, and Dawe 1963), but see Gibert 1995:24-54. Some scholars have argued that characterisation is impeded by tragedy’s conventions of staging and dialogue: the arguments of J. Jones 1962:43-45 (on masks) and Dale 1954:xxiv-xxix (on *rhesis*, *stichomythia*, etc.) are combined by Gould 1978:48-51 to argue that tragic characters are ‘fragmented and discontinuous’ and do not invite ‘the exploration of inner complexity’. Against this view of the mask: B. Vickers 1973:54; Seidensticker 2008:340, 2009:209-211; Meineck 2011. Against this view of tragic speech: Conacher 1981; Mastronarde 2010:222-245. Aeschylus’ depiction of characters has been subject to particular scepticism; perhaps most extreme is Lloyd-Jones 1964:374, who claims that ‘in character for its own [sake] Aeschylus took no interest whatsoever’. Other particularly sceptical views of Aeschylean characterisation: Dawe 1963; Rosenmeyer 1982:211-255.

³ E.g. B. Vickers 1973:3-6; Seidensticker 2008.

⁴ Especially useful is Culpeper 2001, which explains how cognitive approaches can be applied to theatrical characterisation. The relevance of such approaches to Greek literature is surveyed by De Temmerman and van Emde Boas 2018:15-19 (with much bibliography). Cognitive insights are applied to Greek tragedy in the same volume (van Emde Boas 2018; Lloyd 2018), and previously by Easterling 2005, Budelmann 2010, Budelmann and Easterling 2010, Budelmann *et al.* 2013, Budelmann *et al.* 2017.

⁵ E.g. Forster 1927:119 (emphasising ‘the power of the writer to bounce the reader into accepting what he says’); Cixous 1974:385; Docherty 1983:xii-xiv; Bortolussi and Dixon 2003:137-141; van Essen-Fishman 2014:5-6.

might describe using trait adjectives (unkind, brave, jaded, cheerful, and so forth). Audience-members also attribute thoughts, emotions and motivations to characters.

As when people react to each other in everyday life, such reactions may be based on various kinds of evidence. An audience-member might form the opinion that a character is foolish because this has been stated (an **explicit cue**) by that character (*self-presentation*) or by another character (*presentation by other characters*), or because the character's manner of speaking, behaving or interacting with other characters suggests this (an **implicit cue**). (These explicit and implicit cues are 'figural' cues, presented through a character, as opposed to explicit or implicit 'authorial' cues, presented in the author's own voice. In fifth-century tragedy, we generally have no 'authorial' cues, such as stage directions or descriptions of characters in the author's voice.)

The terminology used here is that of Pfister and Culpeper,⁶ whose category of 'explicit cues' I take to include cases where one character verbally *implies* something about another.⁷ For instance, if one character says of another, 'Wise people do not do such things,' or 'if he were wise, he would not have done such a thing,' thereby implying that the second character is foolish, I consider this still to count as an 'explicit cue'. We will see, especially in Chapters 6-7, that such statements, often in the form of generalisations or conditionals, play an important role in the presentation of tragic characters. Such statements can possess differing degrees of obliquity; for instance, when Antigone says that Creon is foolish ($\mu\omega\rho\omicron\varsigma$) if he thinks that she is saying foolish things ($\mu\omega\rho\alpha$), this is only slightly oblique,⁸ whereas, when Dionysus

⁶ Pfister [1977] 1988:183-195; Culpeper 2001:163-233. Contrast the classifications suggested for narrative by Rimmon-Kenan [1983] 2002:59-71; Jannidis 2004:198-210.

⁷ Pfister's 'implicit cues' are not statements by characters at all, but rather are matters of speaking style, gesture, etc., as is clear from the table on Pfister [1977] 1988:185. Therefore, I think that Pfister should be understood to include cues of the sort I mention among the 'explicit cues'. But Pfister is unclear on this, since he does not mention any cues of this sort in his discussion; so he might possibly have intended the opposite (and Evert van Emde Boas tells me that this is how he understands Pfister). The fact that Pfister and Culpeper ignore such cases, which in Greek tragedy at least are of great importance, seems a weakness in their system.

⁸ Soph. *Ant.* 469-470.

remarks to Pentheus that a man who is unwise (ἀμαθής) will think you are wrong even if you speak wisely, this seems slightly more oblique.⁹ I will call such cases **oblique** (not *implicit*), in order to avoid confusion with the cues that Pfister and Culpeper call ‘implicit cues’, which are of an entirely different nature.

These **implicit** cues are of various kinds. Some are **non-textual** aspects of performance, about which we have little information. Fifth-century **tragic masks** displayed some individualised facial detail,¹⁰ and actors may have achieved expression by altering their posture and thereby moving the mask;¹¹ however, we cannot be certain how this affected specific characters. Similarly, we have no clear evidence for rulers’ **costume**,¹² except where the text mentions some aspect of it.¹³ Nor can we tell how the **actors’ movements, gestures, and tone of voice** might have affected the presentation of characters. We can talk in general terms about **setting**: Eteocles, Creon, Oedipus and Pentheus all dominate the stage, directing events (seemingly, at least), until their final exit dramatically expresses their fall from prosperity to destruction. Aeschylus’ Agamemnon is different, only appearing in one scene; Clytaemestra dominates the threshold, and their relative positions reflect her dominance over him.¹⁴ But we can never study these aspects of characterisation in individual cases or in detail.

Other implicit cues, however, are *textual*. The **characterisation by style** of Creon in *Antigone*, who tends to talk in *gnomai* and to use animal, monetary and military imagery, has been most extensively studied,¹⁵ but such characterisation seems to be

⁹ Eur. *Bacch.* 480.

¹⁰ Pickard-Cambridge [1953] 1968:191-192; cf. Halliwell 1993:202-206.

¹¹ Meineck 2011:144-145.

¹² Alföldi 1955:35-41 suggests that the *chiton* with long sleeves, worn by many tragic characters in the fourth century, was already in Aeschylus’ day adopted for tyrannical rulers. Against this, however, see Pickard-Cambridge [1953] 1968:201-202; Bacon 1961:29-30 n. 13; Hall 1989:210; Miller 1997:164.

¹³ E.g. Aesch. *Pers.* 832-836, *Supp.* 246-248 (with Sommerstein *ad loc.*); Eur. *Hel.* 420-424, *Antiope* fr. 223.17-18.

¹⁴ Van Emde Boas 2018:330.

¹⁵ Goheen 1951:9-35; Kirkwood 1958:5; Kitzinger 1976:140-172; Griffith 1999:20, 36.

present for all five rulers.¹⁶ Lloyd has shown that Oedipus in *Oedipus Tyrannus* is politer in conversation than Creon in *Antigone*.¹⁷ The traditional elements of **conversational structure** are used flexibly: long *rheseis* can be used for angry rants, such as Creon's,¹⁸ or carefully-judged orations, as in Eteocles' opening speech.¹⁹ Similarly, stichomythia is employed to display Creon's and Pentheus' aggressive questioning and angry indignation,²⁰ but also when Agamemnon is being deceived by Clytaemestra.²¹ **Contrast between characters** is also important: Eteocles is contrasted with the panicking Chorus, and Creon's attitudes towards *nomoi*, *philoï* and the gods are continually contrasted with Antigone's.²²

Since we have the texts of extant tragedies, we can study these implicit textual cues, and it is important to do so; an advantage of these cues is that they come relatively directly from the playwright, rather than being mediated through any given character's perspective, as explicit statements are.²³ However, a challenge presented by these cues is that, whereas explicit cues by their nature explicitly state the assessment which they are supposed to prompt audience-members to consider, implicit cues do not: the message which they convey has to be inferred by the scholar. This generally entails that, if we want to explain how implicit cues contribute to the presentation of a given character *within the terms put forward by the play itself*, we cannot do so without already having identified what these terms are, i.e. how the character is presented explicitly. Partly for this reason, but partly because it would be difficult to do justice to the complex issues surrounding implicit characterisation in a

¹⁶ Eteocles: Hutchinson 1985:xxxv. Agamemnon: Stanford 1942:115-116; Katsouris 1975:39. Oedipus: Knox 1957:14-18; Finglass 2018, index s.v. Oedipus, language. Pentheus: Barlow 1971:88-92, 111; Katsouris 1975:92-93. A considerable methodological advance in studying stylistic characterisation is made by van Emde Boas 2017a.

¹⁷ Lloyd 2006:239.

¹⁸ E.g. Soph. *Ant.* 280-314.

¹⁹ Aesch. *Sept.* 1-38.

²⁰ Soph. *Ant.* 726-763; Eur. *Bacch.* 460-518.

²¹ Aesch. *Ag.* 931-945.

²² Dalfen 1977. Such contrasts are a well-recognised technique of Sophocles (Webster 1936:85-90; Seidensticker 1994:283-284).

²³ Van Emde Boas 2018:323.

thesis with its primary focus elsewhere, I have concentrated primarily on *explicit* characterisation.²⁴

As theorists have argued on the basis of cognitive science, audience-members' reactions to any character also depend on these audience-members' mental **categories**, both those used in understanding people in general and those for understanding characters within a particular literary genre.²⁵ (The word 'category' is to be understood as encompassing any pre-existing way an audience-member has of understanding a character, including social roles and terms of moral evaluation.²⁶) Given that playwrights are unlikely to depict characters in terms which their audiences will not understand, it is likely (although not absolutely inevitable) that these categories will be essentially the same as the ideas in terms of which a given character is depicted. (At any rate, we have no *better* source for the categories which an ancient Athenian audience might have possessed for interpreting a character than those which the presentation of that character seems to presuppose.) Audience-members from the same society who share a familiarity with a given genre are likely to have similar categories for understanding characters within that genre. In order to understand characters in any ancient genre, therefore, it is desirable to reconstruct these categories as far as possible.²⁷ When it comes to the ideas connected with rulers that the tragic playwrights expected their audiences to understand, we have been doing essentially this in Part One.

The presentation of characters is connected with and cannot be properly understood without reference to other aspects of the play. We have seen in Chapter 4 that the depiction of tragic rulers is connected with the **plot** (although this does not entail that

²⁴ I have, however, discussed Pentheus' implicit characterisation at pp. 256-258.

²⁵ This distinction (discussed by De Temmerman and van Emde Boas 2018:17; Lloyd 2018:336-340) is important: people do not react to characters exactly as though they were real people, but rather with an awareness of the conventions and non-realistic aspects of the genre.

²⁶ Such categories, according to cognitive science, are associated in any person's mind with a whole network of related beliefs and attitudes (often called a **schema**). (For this usage of the words 'category' and 'schema', see Culpeper 2001:73-80.)

²⁷ Cf. De Temmerman and van Emde Boas 2018:19.

they are *subordinate* to the plot;²⁸ it might be that both character and plot have been worked out with due regard to one another). In addition, however, the depiction of any character will be closely connected to the political, intellectual or other **issues** raised in the play.²⁹ For instance, Euripides' *Bacchae* explores the nature of wisdom and piety throughout, and Pentheus is presented in terms of wisdom and piety: the other characters constantly regard him as unwise and impious. Consequently, whether or not audience-members accept this view entirely, their views of Pentheus are likely to be couched to a significant extent in terms of wisdom and piety. Also, if an audience-member considers Pentheus to be unwise and impious, this goes hand in hand with a thought about the issues of the play, namely that it is unwise and impious to offend the gods—and *vice versa*. Consequently, we cannot understand the depiction of characters without attention to the issues of the play, but equally cannot understand any play's treatment of such issues without reference to the characters with respect to whom these issues are discussed.

III. Ways of studying characters in tragedy

As mentioned above, there are many ways in which an audience-member might possibly react to a character in tragedy. Consequently, there are many possible questions which a scholar can ask about such a character. For instance, regarding Pentheus, a scholar could ask how the play might prompt audience-members to assess him morally, or to perceive his traits, or to sympathise (or not) with him, or to conjecture his thoughts and feelings. These questions are often interrelated, but remain basically separate; answering one will not reveal the answer to another. A scholar studying any of these questions can also choose whether to focus more on *means* or *ends*: a scholar may primarily aim at finding out *by what technique* the playwright depicts a character, or *with what effect*. Of course, a scholar ought to keep

²⁸ The view of Jones and Dale, based on Aristotle (as cited in p. 141-142 n. 2).

²⁹ Cf. Goldhill 1986:173-174 and 1990:111-114, who, drawing on the observation of Barthes [1970] 1974:178 that 'in good narrative writing ... the character and the discourse are each other's accomplices', argues that the depiction of characters is closely linked with many aspects of the play's discourse, including its plot, metaphors, language, and the issues handled. Here, I am drawing attention to one particular aspect of this.

all these considerations in mind, but it is sensible and inevitable to focus on some more than others.

Scholars studying characters often focus on their *individuality*. When it is said in English that a character possesses ‘individuality’, this generally means something more than merely that the character is distinct from other characters. Rather, what is generally meant is that the character is presented as possessing a variety of character traits; the more complex the variety of traits, the more individualised the character. Now, there is a basic practical difficulty with studying individuality of this particular sort in tragedy. This is that, in fifth-century tragedy, characters only occasionally make statements about one another, and, when they do, often do so with considerable obliquity. Extensive descriptions of the traits of characters are exceedingly rare:³⁰ most of the statements we do find are brief, and are couched in terms of a fairly small group of virtues and vices (such as *sophia*, *eugeneia*, *dikaiosyne*, and their opposites). This does not mean that characters in tragedy are not individualised, nor does it mean that the playwrights were uninterested in individualising them. It does, however, mean that, in order to detect individuality of *this particular sort*, scholars have to look not primarily at the statements which characters make about each other, but rather at the ways in which the characters speak, act and interact with the other characters—which is to say, the implicit cues.

Another main focus of scholarly attention on characters is their *psychology*—by which I mean their thoughts, feelings and motivations. Sometimes, the playwrights present characters’ thoughts, feelings and motivations in considerable detail. Aeschylus’ extant plays contain several cases where a character’s thoughts and motivations are explained clearly, and we see the same in Sophocles and Euripides.³¹ Yet there are

³⁰ Cf. van Emde Boas 2018:324 for the rarity of such trait descriptions. When Eteocles calls Amphiaraus σώφρων δίκαιος ἀγαθὸς εὐσεβὴς ἀνὴρ (Aesch. *Sept.* 610), this is unusual, and moreover only forms a small part of the presentation of Amphiaraus, whom the Scout and Eteocles also present through various oblique cues and implicit cues.

³¹ Scholars have seen this especially in Euripides (Zürcher 1947:69-72, 183-188; Lesky 1960; Garton 1972:401-409; Thumiger 2008:23, 59-86; van Emde Boas 2018:356-363, 373-374; cf. Papadopoulou 1997:643-644).

also cases where a character acts, but where their thoughts and motivations are conspicuously *not* explained. The best-known instance of this is perhaps the scene in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* where Agamemnon walks into his house over precious fabrics. It is clear that Agamemnon does so after having given in to his wife's request, but why he does so is not spelt out in detail: an audience-member might suppose that he is weak, that he does this as a favour to his wife, that he has been afflicted by *ate* from the gods, that he is a straightforward person confronted by a masterly manipulator, or some combination of these. Yet, as Easterling points out, the fact that characters such as Agamemnon are sometimes not given explicit motivations does not undermine the intelligibility of their actions in human terms.³² Regardless of which (if any) of these possibilities an audience-member entertains, the result is that Agamemnon's conduct seems explicable and therefore verisimilitudinous.³³ So the playwrights depict characters' thoughts and feelings with greatly varying degrees of explicitness; the varying ways in which the playwrights prompt their audiences to think about these things have rightly received much attention.

In this thesis, however, I will focus chiefly on the *moral* presentation of characters. The importance of the moral aspect of character presentation in Greek literature in general has recently been emphasised by scholars.³⁴ However, it should also be emphasised that moral evaluation is important not only in understanding characters in Greek literature, but also more generally. Psychologists have shown that, in modern English-language contexts too, moral assessment is one of the most important factors

³² Easterling 1973:9-15 (using this example); cf. Dover [1977] 1987:155-157, Buxton 1982:107-108, and Easterling 1977:125-127, 1990:94-96 (on Soph. *OT* 412-462, *Ant.* 526-562, and *OC* 1130).

³³ From a cognitive perspective, this is to say that audience-members can apply their Theory of Mind to Agamemnon (i.e. their capacity, developed in early childhood, to attribute mental states and motivations to other people; this is helpfully discussed, with further references, in van Essen-Fishman 2014:6-11; De Temmerman and van Emde Boas 2018:16). Zunshine 2006:73-75 similarly uses the concept of Theory of Mind to argue that, in *Beowulf*, Unferth's behaviour is open to multiple explanations. Indeed, scholars observe that having to make constructions about characters' motivations resembles real life more closely than being told explicitly (Hamburger [1957] 1973:201-202, 206; Pfister [1977] 1988:162; Budelmann 2000:62-63; De Temmerman and van Emde Boas 2018:18-19).

³⁴ Halliwell 1990:50 and *passim*; Gill 1996; De Temmerman and van Emde Boas 2018:7-8.

in responding both to real people and to characters;³⁵ indeed, since most trait adjectives have strong positive or negative connotations, it is difficult to describe the individuality of any person or literary character without also implying some kind of moral assessment.³⁶

Furthermore, tragedy itself focuses strongly on the moral presentation of characters. That is to say, in tragedy, most statements that characters make about each other (**explicit cues**) are strongly moral in nature, and are often framed in terms of fairly simple virtues, such as *sophia*, *eusebeia*, and so forth. Naturally, this cannot be proved in this Introduction, but it will be obvious throughout our discussion of Sophocles and Euripides, whose plays contain many such statements. The explicit way in which tragedy handles these aspects of character presentation makes it clear that they are important to the understanding of characters in tragedy.

In focusing on the moral presentation of characters, I do not wish to be understood to maintain that questions of individuality or psychology are unimportant. On the contrary, these are not competing considerations or alternatives; a character may be depicted in all these ways at once.

I should also point out that what I mean by ‘moral presentation’ here is not the same thing as Aristotle’s concept of *ethos* (sometimes translated ‘moral character’) which he applies to tragedy in his *Poetics*.³⁷ Aristotle’s categories for analysing tragedy are of great scholarly interest, and a thesis that attempted to explain in Aristotelian terms wherein different tragic characters’ *ethos* lies might be very useful. However, this is not what I have attempted to do here; my interpretative framework is modern rather than Aristotelian, and it is not relevant to cite Aristotle (or any other ancient critic) in support of it.

³⁵ On moral approval as a psychological process essential to how people understand theatre, see Zillmann 2000; Raney 2002:356-362; Krakowiak and Oliver 2012; Budelmann *et al.* 2013:2.

³⁶ On the importance of morality for assessing people in everyday life, and for the morally charged nature of many trait words, see Goodwin *et al.* 2014 (with further references).

³⁷ Arist. *Poet.* VI.1450b8-10. This concept, which does not map easily onto modern equivalents, is discussed by Halliwell 1986:150-156; Blundell 1992 (citing earlier bibliography).

As well as having a choice in terms of what *questions* to ask when studying characters in tragedy, scholars also have a choice as to whether to focus more on *means* or *ends*. Often, scholars focus on *ends*. That is to say, a scholar following a trait-based approach focused on individuality might aim to present an account of the traits that a character displays; a scholar following a psychological approach might aim to explain what the thoughts of the character are supposed to be (an approach seen, for instance, in much scholarly work on the scene where Agamemnon treads on the fabrics in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*).³⁸ Such approaches, by their nature, involve the scholar posing a question to the text, on the basis of the scholar's own notions about the ways in which a character should or might be presented. The difficulty with this, though, is that the texts of fifth-century tragedies do not always answer exactly such questions about individuality and psychology in the explicit way that modern scholars sometimes demand of them, which is what (I think) has often led scholars to minimise the playwrights' interest in presenting their characters. Moreover, since the plays are often *not* explicit on these points, and since (despite all attempts at reconstruction) we often cannot possibly know how an ancient audience would have filled in the gaps, there is often a substantial practical danger that scholars' views of characters' traits and thoughts will differ, and that there will be no certain way of discerning which scholar's account is correct.

Clearly, however, there is an alternative approach, which is to focus on *means*—that is to say, to ask about the techniques which the playwrights use in depicting characters, while keeping an open mind as to exactly what effect these techniques are supposed to have on the audience. The disadvantage of doing this, of course, is that there is no guarantee that it will provide an answer to a fixed set of questions regarding the depiction of a character. The advantages, though, are that it is likely to direct one's attention to the aspects of the character's presentation which the playwright thought important (rather than to the aspects which one might oneself think important), and that it is likely to provide a more well-rounded sense of the manner in which

³⁸ See the references at pp. 149 above and 185 below.

characters are depicted in the plays than one would get merely by posing arbitrary questions about the characters.

Also, it is only by careful study of the playwrights' dramatic technique in presenting characters that one could ever demonstrate clearly that the playwrights were actually interested in presenting characters. One might well feel that, when scholars seek to maintain that the tragic playwrights were not interested (or were only slightly interested) in the presentation of characters, this view is *implausible*,³⁹ but it is only by demonstrating that each playwright actually employs given techniques in depicting characters that one could ever possibly show that it is *false*.

IV. The approach of the present investigation

As we have seen, there are multiple possible approaches for studying characters in tragedy. The approach pursued in the present investigation must, however, be determined by its overall aims. Specifically, Part Two aims to explain how the tragic playwrights have used the ideas discussed in the first half, and combined them with others, in presenting five rulers. This clearly entails that we must focus on means, rather than on ends. That is to say, we are interested in finding out the exact ways in which the playwrights present these characters: to consider what responses these characters might prompt in audience-members is only a subsidiary aim. Furthermore, since we are interested in finding out the complexity and variety of the ways in which rulers in tragedy are depicted, our approach must to a significant extent be a comparative one, which seeks to identify how the depiction of one ruler is different from that of another. But, since it is in principle possible to provoke a given response (such as the feeling that a character is brave or foolish) in various ways, there is no point in comparing these responses. Rather, if we wish to establish, say, that Creon and Pentheus are similar, we have to ask whether the ways in which such an effect

³⁹ Cf. De Temmerman and van Emde Boas 2018:18-19: 'Overly rigid notions that character is subordinated to plot or rhetoric, in any author or genre, are likely to misrepresent the manner in which literary figures are interpreted at least by most readers.'

has been produced are similar: such similarities will be real and thoroughgoing, whereas mere similarities in the effect produced might be illusory.

Furthermore, as noted above, in discussing characters we can choose to focus on individuality, psychology, moral assessment, or other issues. All of these questions are, in themselves, important. However, it seems important to pay *particular* attention to the **moral presentation** of these rulers. For one thing, the moral presentation of characters in tragedy is often relatively explicit, and there is a large amount of relatively clear evidence which we can draw upon, without having to rely on evidence of a more implicit kind. Also, it seems doubtful whether there would be, for instance, any particular merit in studying the individuality or psychology of rulers in tragedy as a group.⁴⁰ Above all, though, tragic rulers commonly take important and morally weighty decisions: a lot of the interest focused on them in tragedy is moral in nature. Also, a lot of the scholarly controversy over the depiction of these rulers has, fundamentally, centred on scholars' differing moral reactions to these rulers: regarding each of the five rulers discussed here, some scholars have maintained that the ruler is depicted in an essentially positive fashion, others that he is depicted essentially negatively. Only by paying careful attention to the moral presentation of these characters, then, can we can hope to contribute to a better understanding of the problems concerning these characters that have particularly troubled scholars.

My aim in Chapters 5-7, then, will be to demonstrate the variety and complexity of the ways in which the playwrights depict the five rulers in question. When we say that we are studying the *ways* in which the playwrights do this, this is meant literally: we are concerned primarily with the means by which the playwrights present the characters, rather than with the effects thereby produced (although these certainly cannot be neglected entirely). Our task will be essentially a comparative one, and we will take a particular interest in cases where a playwright has put similar ideas to similar (or different) use in depicting two different rulers. (This will be particularly

⁴⁰ For instance, to understand Pentheus' psychology, we should presumably compare him with other mad characters, not other rulers.

relevant in Chapter 6, which compares Sophocles' Creon and Oedipus at length.) Our focus throughout will be primarily on the *moral* presentation of these characters, although we will not neglect other aspects where they seem relevant, or where they provide a useful basis for comparing one ruler with another.

CHAPTER 5. TWO RULERS IN AESCHYLUS

I. Introduction

This chapter will consider Eteocles in *Seven Against Thebes* and Agamemnon in *Agamemnon*, characters who have long had a central place in Aeschylean criticism. I will not attempt here to resolve all questions concerning these characters—some of which, especially the famous question of Agamemnon’s motivations in walking over the fabrics, seem insoluble. However, the study of both can be illuminated by the method pursued in this thesis.

Firstly, we will consider what underlying ideas Aeschylus has employed in presenting them (section II). I will argue that Eteocles is, in important ways, presented in a manner analogous to various warriors in the *Iliad*. I will then argue that Agamemnon is presented in terms of contemporary ideas concerning *basileia* which were current in the Greek world in Aeschylus’ own day. This resolves various scholarly difficulties with both characters.

Then we will explore how these ideas enable the playwright to present the characters in moral terms (section III). I will argue that Aeschylus presents both characters with considerable moral complexity, in ways which indicate common strands of moral interest shared between the two plays.

II. The conceptions underlying the presentation of Eteocles and Agamemnon

II.i. Eteocles as (in part) an epic warrior

Eteocles has evoked varied responses. Scholars have often felt that he possesses great individuality and inwardness.¹ Scholars have also, however, pointed to an apparent

¹ E.g. von Fritz [1962] 2007:141, cf. 166; Winnington-Ingram [1977] 1983:16; Seidensticker 2009:227.

lack of consistency: initially, he seems to be a conscientious general defending his *polis*, whereas, from line 653, he seems to be a madman set on killing his brother in accordance with the curse of his father Oedipus.² Attempts to resolve this difference have often involved projecting his conscientious generalship and defence of the *polis* beyond line 653,³ although he does not mention the *polis* after this point.⁴ Other scholars, however, have emphasised the curse and Eteocles' reaction even before 653, even though the curse is only mentioned once before line 653.⁵ Others again suppose either that both sides of Eteocles' portrayal run throughout the play (which combines the disadvantages of both of the aforementioned approaches),⁶ or that the play dramatises a change of mindset on Eteocles' part.⁷

Here, I wish to argue that Eteocles makes most sense if understood in the light of certain ideas which, I will argue, his portrayal presupposes. That is to say, Eteocles' attitude and conduct are much clarified if we see him acting on a similar basis to epic warriors such as those of the *Iliad*.⁸ His concern for the *polis* plays a role; more important, however, is his concern for his honour, which is prominent both before and after line 653.⁹

² Cf. Winnington-Ingram [1977] 1983:21-23 (with earlier bibliography).

³ Von Fritz [1962] 2007:159-160, Herrmann 2013:66, accepting in this regard, although not in others, the *Opfertod* view of e.g. Pohlenz [1930] 1954:I.93-97.

⁴ So rightly Winnington-Ingram [1977] 1983:50; Seidensticker 2009:223-224 n. 58.

⁵ Aesch. *Sept.* 70. This approach is taken by Patzer 1958, especially 99, 103-105; cf. von Fritz [1962] 2007:145-148.

⁶ In different ways, Regenbogen 1933:67-69; I. C. Torrance 2007:27-29, 31-33.

⁷ Seidensticker 2009:221.

⁸ In using the term 'epic warrior' (rather than, say, 'epic hero'), I follow Finglass 2011a:45 n. 125.

⁹ Previous scholars emphasising Eteocles' concern for his honour have often tended to imply that this *excludes* concern for the *polis* (Regenbogen 1933:69; Brown 1977:312; Föllinger 2009:37, 91-92). However, I consider Eteocles' sense of honour to *encompass* the *polis*. Greek concepts of honour certainly admit concern for the *polis* (as with Hector in the *Iliad*), and Eteocles clearly enunciates such concern (Aesch. *Sept.* 4-9, 71-72). Later, he certainly focuses on his feud with Polynices (674-675), but nothing in 653-719 actually *contradicts* the notion that he cares about the *polis*. It is entirely natural that one man's sense of honour should encompass both the defence of his *polis* and the maintenance of a feud, especially if Eteocles is acting broadly in the manner of an epic warrior, as I argue. U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1914:66 and Herrmann 2013:64-67 rightly emphasise the importance of honour without discounting the *polis*, but (as discussed below) their views regarding Eteocles' epic antecedents seem questionable.

The similarity between Eteocles and certain epic warriors is, I think, due to the fact that Aeschylus has presented Eteocles in a way that draws on the epic tradition. That this is so cannot, perhaps, be proved decisively. The parallels described below vary in force; also, some of the ideas in question had some currency in Aeschylus' own day, and need not be exclusively epic.¹⁰ Indeed, we can never exclude the possibility that any apparently epic element in this play had some wider or more recent relevance of which we are unaware. However, in *some* cases, epic influence seems fairly clear. Also, it is not in itself controversial that *Seven Against Thebes* draws on epic; scholars have argued for such influence on the basis of numerous parallelisms.¹¹ Indeed, some scholars have proposed that the depiction of Eteocles draws not just on epic in general (as I think), but actually on the portrayal of Hector in the *Iliad*.¹² However, in depicting Eteocles, Aeschylus *may* have drawn on any number of epic warriors, including the Eteocles of the *Thebaid* (whose portrayal one might indeed suppose to be a more natural and obvious model, since the *Thebaid* presented the same events).¹³ Indeed, various features discussed below are shared with epic warriors other than Hector, and even features shared only with Hector might very easily have appeared elsewhere in non-extant parts of the epic tradition. In general, moreover, it seems doubtful whether Aeschylus' Eteocles and the Iliadic Hector are really similar enough to allow us to suppose direct dependency; rather, they seem about as similar as one would expect two epic warriors to be who have similar roles, as defenders of cities.

Therefore, it seems best to say that Eteocles behaves in the manner of an epic warrior, without insisting on a specific model. However, I do not wish to *exclude* such a model

¹⁰ This applies primarily to the ideas of honour which Eteocles appears to draw on (cf. p. 159 n. 19 below).

¹¹ Ieranò 2002; B. Zimmermann 2004.

¹² Herrmann 2013; also Ieranò 2002, and B. Zimmermann 2004, especially 196-197. U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf 1914:66-67, by contrast, sees Aeschylus' Eteocles as an uncritically compiled combination of two earlier epic versions of Eteocles: this is, of course, also undemonstrable.

¹³ No excessive speculation is required to see that the Eteocles of the *Thebaid* could easily have been closer to Aeschylus' Eteocles than the Iliadic Hector is. Since, if so, the relevance of Hector to interpreting this play would be greatly reduced, this bare possibility ought to make us cautious about interpreting Eteocles specifically in relation to Hector.

(whether that be Hector in the *Iliad*, Eteocles in the *Thebaid*, or any other). Nor should the possibility be excluded that some of the ideas discussed here may still have been current in Aeschylus' own day, in which case the epic resonances of Eteocles' behaviour might be less apparent than I am inclined to think. (Still, though, the currency of an idea in Aeschylus' own day does not exclude an epic resonance—and, in some instances, the link with epic seems quite clear.)

Eteocles' opening words articulate an ideal of leadership, which Eteocles uses to refer to himself, providing the audience with a first impression and a standard against which to assess him:¹⁴

'Citizens of Cadmus' land, he who guards the affairs of the *polis*, directing its tiller at the stern without letting his eyelids slumber in sleep, has to say the right things. For if we fare well, the god would be responsible, but if disaster struck (and may that not happen) the name of Eteocles alone would be sung through the *polis* by the citizens in tumultuous strains of lamentation, from which may Zeus the Defender, true to his name, defend the *polis* of the Cadmeans.'¹⁵

Not all of this recalls epic: he uses the Ship of State, which does not occur in extant epic,¹⁶ and his notion that a leader should say the right things is, of course, commonplace.¹⁷ However, what Eteocles expresses next is a very distinctive attitude of military *aidos*: he is afraid that, if he fails to defend the *polis*, he will be blamed. A similar attitude is expressed by Pelasgus in *Suppliants*, who expresses fear that 'if something bad occurred, the people might say, "By honouring newcomers you

¹⁴ So observes Cuny 2007:283.

¹⁵ Κάδμου πολῖται, χρὴ λέγειν τὰ καίρια, ὅστις φυλάσσει πρᾶγος ἐν πρύμνῃ πόλεως οἶακα νωμῶν, βλέφαρα μὴ κοιμῶν ὕπνῳ. εἰ μὲν γὰρ εὖ πράξαιμεν, αἰτία θεοῦ· εἰ δ' αὖθ', ὃ μὴ γένοιτο, συμφορὰ τύχοι, Ἐτεοκλῆς ἂν εἰς πολὺς κατὰ πτόλιν ὕμνοϊθ' ὑπ' ἀστῶν φροϊμίῳ πολυρρόθοις οἰμώγμασιν θ', ὃν Ζεὺς ἀλεξητήριος ἐπώνυμος γένοιτο Καδμείων πόλει (Aesch. *Sept.* 1-9).

¹⁶ Brock 2013:53-57.

¹⁷ The phrase λέγειν τὰ καίρια is used at Aesch. *Cho.* 582 and *Prometheus the Fire-Bringer* fr. 208, but not with reference to a ruler.

destroyed the *polis*.”¹⁸ Military *aidos* is *in general* a strongly epic feature.¹⁹ There are also, however, more specific parallels, especially with the Iliadic Hector, when he says, ‘But now, since I have destroyed the people through my foolishness, I am ashamed before the Trojans and the Trojan women with their long robes, that some man worse than me might say, “Hector, trusting in his strength, destroyed the people.”’²⁰ Pelasgus’ remark seems so much like Hector’s that some postulate direct influence, although this way of expressing *aidos* may have occurred elsewhere in epic too.²¹ Eteocles’ fear also resembles Hector’s, in that both specifically fear being reproached *by name*.²²

As for Eteocles’ notion that the ruler gets the blame if unsuccessful but the god the credit if successful, I am not aware of any full parallel in epic or elsewhere.²³ However, the notion that the ruler gets the blame for failure does occur in epic; Agamemnon says that it would be dishonourable to return to Argos once he had destroyed his people.²⁴ Also, Eteocles’ meditation on his responsibility bears some resemblance to a remark which Diomedes makes about Agamemnon: ‘great glory will follow together with him if the Greeks slay the Trojans and capture holy Troy,

¹⁸ Aesch. *Supp.* 399-401, quoted at p. 99 above.

¹⁹ Military *aidos* in the *Iliad*: Cairns 1993:68-87. Military *aidos* is found elsewhere in tragedy (e.g. Eur. *Heracl.* 839-840, *Supp.* 529-530, *Phoen.* 510-512, with Cairns 1993:265-268), which could suggest that Eteocles’ attitude would not have been out of place even in Aeschylus’ day. But the prominence of military *aidos* in tragedy scarcely approaches what we see in the *Iliad*; the only plays where military *aidos* plays a *major* role are perhaps *Seven Against Thebes* and Sophocles’ *Ajax* (discussed by Cairns 1993:228-241), both plays with main characters and situations drawn from epic. Under such circumstances, it seems likely that Aeschylus and his audience would have seen Eteocles’ morality as that of an epic warrior more readily than as that of a participant in the Persian Wars (say): the use of epic morality in a story drawn from epic would have seemed primarily epic in nature. Still, it is only in combination with the other correspondences discussed below that the present point has force.

²⁰ νῦν δ’ ἐπεὶ ὤλεσα λαὸν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ἐμῇσιν, αἰδέομαι Τρῶας καὶ Τρωάδας ἔλκεσιπέπλους, μή ποτέ τις εἴπησι κακώτερος ἄλλος ἐμεῖο. “Ἐκτωρ ἦφι βίηφι πιθήσας ὤλεσε λαόν” (*Il.* XXII.104-107).

²¹ ‘An almost certain reminiscence’: Friis Johansen and Whittle *ad loc.*; cf. Cairns 1993:191 (perhaps a better formulation).

²² This is noted by Hutchinson on Aesch. *Sept.* 6f.; he further remarks, ‘The use of one’s own name is always significant in Greek poetry.’

²³ Some parallels cited by Fraenkel 1961:57 (and with reservations by Hutchinson on Aesch. *Sept.* 4-9) employ a similar train of thought; however, none mentions a god, and the earliest is Dem. XVIII.212.

²⁴ *Il.* II.114-115, with Haubold 2000:55-56, cf. 27.

but great lamentation will also follow him if the Greeks are slain.’²⁵ This remark, like Eteocles’, explores the different consequences of the leader’s responsibility in case of success and failure (with μέν ... δέ ... and a pair of conditional phrases); in both cases, failure would consist in the leader’s people being destroyed. Also, Eteocles’ fear for Thebes’ destruction resembles Hector’s for Troy, which he expresses to Andromache.²⁶ In praying to Zeus for success, Eteocles resembles many Iliadic warriors.²⁷ Indeed, even the notion that commanders should not sleep is perhaps most easily paralleled in epic.²⁸ So Eteocles’ model of leadership and attitude seem similar to an epic warrior’s.

Also, Eteocles’ anticipation of the wailing of women up and down the city resembles the Trojans’ reaction to Hector’s death, which foreshadows Troy’s future capture: ‘And [Hector’s] dear father howled pitiably, and around him the people were taken by wailing and lamenting throughout the city (κατὰ ἄστυ; cf. Eteocles’ κατὰ πόλιν). It was just as though towering Troy were smouldering with fire from top to bottom.’²⁹

After the Scout inform Eteocles of the impending attack, Eteocles prays,

‘Zeus and Earth and gods of the *polis*, and you Curse and powerful Fury of my father, may you not uproot my *polis*, at least (μή μοι πόλιν γε), captured and destroyed totally, from top to bottom, and never bind a free land and the *polis* of Cadmus with the yoke of slavery, but be its protection. And I hope that what I say is in our common interest, since only a *polis* that fares well honours the gods.’³⁰

²⁵ τούτῳ μὲν γὰρ κῦδος ἄμ’ ἔψεται, εἴ κεν Ἀχαιοὶ Τρῶας δηώσωσιν ἔλωσί τε Ἴλιον ἱρήν, τούτῳ δ’ αὖ μέγα πένθος Ἀχαιῶν δηωθέντων (Il. IV.415-417).

²⁶ Il. VI.447-465 (discussed further below).

²⁷ Herrmann 2013:43-44 compares Hector’s prayer at Il. VIII.526-528, but other warriors pray to Zeus too (e.g. Agamemnon at Il.412-418).

²⁸ Il. II.23-25, repeated at Il.60-62; cf. X.86-118, and (less relevantly) IV.223. However, not falling asleep is also a virtue of sailors (Od. V.270, cited by Tucker on Aesch. Sept. 3).

²⁹ ὦμωξεν δ’ ἔλεεινὰ πατήρ φίλος· ἀμφὶ δὲ λαοὶ κωκυτῷ τ’ εἶχοντο καὶ οἰμωγῇ κατὰ ἄστυ. τῷ δὲ μάλιστ’ ἄρ’ ἔην ἐναλίγκιον, ὥς εἰ ἅπαντα Ἴλιος ὀφρυόεσσα πυρὶ σμύχοιτο κατ’ ἄκρης (Il. XXII.408-411).

³⁰ ὦ Ζεῦ τε καὶ Γῇ καὶ πολιισσοῦχοι θεοὶ Ἀρά τ’ Ἐρινὺς πατρός ἢ μεγασθενῆς, μή μοι πόλιν γε προυμόθεν πανώλεθρον ἐκθαμνίσῃτε δηάλωτον Ἑλλάδος· ἐλευθέραν δὲ γῆν τε καὶ

Eteocles' attitude here has puzzled scholars, especially his use of 'at least' (γε), which seems to imply that he desiring that the *polis* should not be destroyed even if he (or his family) is.³¹ This is rather surprising: is Eteocles offering himself as some sort of sacrifice to save the city,³² or implying a dichotomy between his *genos* and the *polis*?³³ It is not necessary to suppose either, if his whole attitude here is taken to be in keeping with that of epic warriors such as we find in the *Iliad*.

Eteocles' concern for his *polis* is entirely Iliadic, since it resembles Hector's when he fears that he might be blamed for the destruction of his people, and when he describes his fears concerning Troy's destruction. Indeed, responding to Andromache's fears that he might die,³⁴ Hector ignores his own death entirely, dwelling exclusively on the misfortune of the *polis* and its people; even this, though, distresses him less than the prospect of Andromache herself being enslaved. When Hector does finally mention his own death, it is only to wish that he may be long dead before all this happens.³⁵ Eteocles' position is, of course, not identical, but the two men's attitudes seem markedly similar: both are above all concerned to defend their *polis* and people, and care about this even when they envisage a situation in which they themselves will be dead.

Eteocles' attitude towards his fate is also Iliadic. The deaths of important epic warriors often seem to have been fixed in the tradition, and the *Iliad* contains several passages where a warrior is told what this fate is.³⁶ (For that matter, since in the

Κάδμου πόλιν ζεύγλησι δουλίοισι μήποτε σχεθεῖν· γένεσθε δ' ἄλκη. ξυνὰ δ' ἐλπίζω λέγειν· πόλις γὰρ εὖ πράσσοιτα δαίμονας τίει (Aesch. *Sept.* 69-77).

³¹ So Hutchinson, Sommerstein *ad loc.*; Winnington-Ingram [1977] 1983:26. But some (e.g. Paley, Tucker *ad loc.*) think that γε applies to the whole phrase.

³² A view sensibly opposed by Hutchinson *ad loc.*; Winnington-Ingram [1977] 1983:27.

³³ Winnington-Ingram [1977] 1983:26.

³⁴ *Il.* VI.407-413.

³⁵ *Il.* VI.447-465.

³⁶ By various means: a warning from a god (*Il.* XVIII.95-96, cf. I.352, 417-418, IX.410-416, XXI.275-278, XXIV.131-132), talking horses (XIX.408-417), other warriors' dying words (XVI.851-854; XXII.356-360), a father who is a prophet (XIII.665-670); cf. Rutherford 2019:6-7. Note also Athena's and Hera's promises that Menelaus will come safely home (V.714-718),

Thebaid Oedipus cursed Eteocles and Polynices to kill each other, Eteocles himself will have presumably been in a similar position in the *Thebaid*.³⁷) If Aeschylus' Eteocles is understood as being in such a position of Iliadic foresight, it need not surprise us that he barely mentions the curse until he realises at 653 that its hour of fulfilment has come, nor if he talks as though he may in fact survive.³⁸ After all, Achilles and Hector, when told of their impending deaths, receive this information with a certain combination of scepticism and acceptance, and without flinching at the prospect. For instance, when Achilles' horse Xanthus reminds him of his impending death, Achilles replies precisely by saying that he must nevertheless continue acting as a warrior should, saying, 'Xanthus, why do you prophesy my death? There is no need. I already know very well that it is my fate to die here, far from my dear father and mother, but even so I will not stop before I have chased the Trojans until they have had enough of war.'³⁹ Achilles reacts somewhat similarly when Hector predicts his death, as does Hector when Patroclus predicts his.⁴⁰

and Thetis' ambiguous prophecy, which Achilles interprets as referring to Patroclus, that 'the best of the Myrmidons' would perish while Achilles himself still lived (XVIII.9-11 with Rutherford 2019:16-17 and *ad loc.*). The *Library* of Apollodorus, in places a source for the *Cypria* (M. L. West 2013:11-14, 52-53), mentions two occasions where Thetis warns Achilles against doing something that would result in his death (Apollodorus, *Library*, Epitome 26, 28, used by West to supplement *Cypria* arg. 9-10).

³⁷ *Thebaid*, fr. 2, 3; the fratricide is also prophesied, long beforehand, in Stesichorus fr. 97.209-212. Amphiaras, as a prophet (*Thebaid* fr. 6), will also have known about his own impending death (cf. Aesch. *Sept.* 587-589). There is also a theory that, in the *Thebaid*, Arion, Adrastus' horse, may have predicted the expedition's failure to Adrastus (Davies 2014:86-87, with further bibliography).

³⁸ Von Fritz [1962] 2007:142 thinks that this is the implication of 274-278, although this is weakened by 278a probably being spurious (Hutchinson *ad loc.*), since the passage is otherwise couched in the first person *plural* (Lloyd 2007:9).

³⁹ Ξάνθε, τί μοι θάνατον μαντεύεαι; οὐδέ τί σε χροί. εὖ νύ τοι οἶδα καὶ αὐτός, ὃ μοι μόρος ἐνθάδ' ὀλέσθαι, νόσφι φίλου πατρὸς καὶ μητέρος· ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔμπης οὐ λήξω, πρὶν Τρῶας ἄδην ἐλάσαι πολέμοιο (*Il.* XIX.420-423).

⁴⁰ *Il.* XXI.365-366 (Achilles to Hector); XVI.859-861 (Hector to Patroclus). Achilles' and Hector's positions differ, since Thetis has told Achilles that he will die (XVIII.95-96), whereas Hector does not know if Patroclus' prediction will come true. Nevertheless, the two warriors, in both accepting their deaths, show a considerable similarity of attitude. Cf. Schadewaldt [1944] 1997:141-142; Griffin 1980:94-95, 163. Stesichorus' Geryon, who does not know whether he is mortal or destined to be immortal, also accepts the possibility of a fated death—like Achilles, Hector, and Aeschylus' Eteocles—because he wishes to avoid obloquy (fr. 15.8-24 and especially 20-24, with Davies and Finglass *ad locc.*).

Eteocles' fatalism is not restricted to the opening scene: it is still present, and indeed more conspicuous and important, after 653.⁴¹ When Eteocles hears that Polynices is the seventh champion, he exclaims,

'O my family, driven mad and greatly hated by the gods, my family so full of tears, the house of Oedipus! Ah me, my father's curse is truly now fulfilled! But it is not proper to cry or lament, lest that give birth to grief even harder to bear.'⁴²

Then he immediately resolves to fight Polynices. Normally, this passage is taken to represent a sudden shift in his depiction: the curse has become prominent out of nowhere. But if we see Eteocles as an epic warrior, the difficulty vanishes, since Hector similarly realises that his hour has come and that the gods have long been planning his death:

'Ah, how truly the gods have called me to my death! I thought that the warrior Deiphobus was here, but he is within the walls, and Athena has deceived me. And now miserable death is right next to me, no longer far away, nor can I escape. This, I suppose, has long been the wish of Zeus and of Zeus' son, the Far-Shooter, who willingly defended me before, but now my fate has caught me. Now, then, let me not be killed without a struggle or glory, but having done some great deed for future generations to hear about.'⁴³

⁴¹ That Eteocles' fatalism crosses the divide is indeed noted by Pohlenz [1930] 1954:I.95, comparing Aesch. *Sept.* 281 with 719. However, since Eteocles is not talking about his own fate at 281, this is less relevant here.

⁴² ὦ θεομανές τε καὶ θεῶν μέγα στύγος, ὦ πανδάκρυτον ἄμὸν Οἰδίπου γένος· ὦ μοι, πατρὸς δὴ νῦν ἄρᾳ τελεσφόροι. ἀλλ' οὔτε κλαίειν οὔτ' ὀδύρεσθαι πρέπει, μὴ καὶ τεκνωθῇ δυσφορώτερος γόος (Aesch. *Sept.* 653-657, trans. Sommerstein).

⁴³ ὦ πόποι, ἦ μάλα δὴ με θεοὶ θάνατόνδε κάλεσαν. Δηϊφοβὸν γὰρ ἐγὼ γ' ἐφάμην ἥρωα παρῆναι· ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἐν τείχει, ἐμὲ δ' ἐξαπάτησεν Ἀθήνη. νῦν δὲ δὴ ἐγγύθι μοι θάνατος κακός, οὐδ' ἔτ' ἄνευθεν, οὐδ' ἄλῃ. ἦ γὰρ ῥα πάλαι τό γε φίλτερον ἦεν Ζηνὶ τε καὶ Διὸς υἱὶ Ἑκτοβόλῳ, οἱ με πάρος γε πρόφρονες εἰρύατο· νῦν αὐτὲ με μοῖρα κιχάνει. μὴ μὰν ἀσπυδεῖ γε καὶ ἀκλείως ἀπολοίμην, ἀλλὰ μέγα ῥέξας τι καὶ ἐσσομένοισι πυθέσθαι (Il. XXII.297-305).

Hector's words seem remarkably similar to Eteocles'; although Eteocles' knowledge of divine purposes is more specific,⁴⁴ both men realise the situation and accept their impending death. Consequently, it is indeed easy to imagine that *any* epic warrior, placed in Eteocles' shoes, would adopt a similar attitude to Eteocles'. Even Eteocles' notion that there is no point lamenting mirrors Iliadic attitudes, especially when Achilles asks Lycaon why he laments his death, given the inevitability of death for all men, even Achilles.⁴⁵ By fifth-century standards, accepting one's fate in the way Eteocles does may seem odd, but if we see Aeschylus as portraying Eteocles as behaving according to epic principles of conduct rather than fifth-century ones, the oddity disappears: Eteocles' fatalism, while atypical of extant tragedy, is typical of epic.⁴⁶ In the dialogue that follows, too, Eteocles complains that the gods have abandoned him,⁴⁷ and states that the gods have brought evils upon him which he cannot escape:⁴⁸ these ideas are also found in epic, especially in the case of Hector, who, as just discussed, realises before his death that the gods have deceived and abandoned him.⁴⁹

As well as Eteocles' attitude towards his death, his sense of honour and *aidos* also crosses the supposed divide at 653. Firstly, he insists that he must fight Polynices because he would incur shame otherwise: 'If one has to endure evil, let it be without shame: that is the only gain (κέρδος) among the dead. You will not say that there is

⁴⁴ Hutchinson on Aesch. *Sept.* 702, citing this *Iliad* passage: 'the purposes of the gods are not inscrutable to Eteocles as they are to Hector'.

⁴⁵ *Il.* XXI.106-110, and cf. XXIV.549-551; van Wees 1998:13-14 gives further epic parallels for the uselessness of lamenting. (Different is the rejection of crying *tout court* as unmanly in Sophocles and Euripides, discussed by van Wees 1998:13-14; Allan on Eur. *Hel.* 950-3.)

⁴⁶ Moreover, if Eteocles' attitude towards his duty and impending death are those of an epic warrior, this may explain why Eteocles does not hesitate; in this, he differs markedly from Aeschylus' characters who enunciate a genuine dilemma, i.e. Pelasgus, Agamemnon, and to a lesser extent Orestes. (For this important distinction, cf. van Erp Taalman Kip 1971:136-138 ≈ 268-270; Hutchinson on Aesch. *Sept.* 653-719; Sewell-Rutter 2007:158-161.)

⁴⁷ Θεοῖς μὲν ἤδη πῶς παρημελήμεθα, χάρις δ' ἅφ' ἡμῶν ὀλομένων θαυμάζεται; (Aesch. *Sept.* 702-703).

⁴⁸ Θεῶν διδόντων οὐκ ἂν ἐκφύγοις κακά (Aesch. *Sept.* 719).

⁴⁹ Similarly, when Sarpedon is killed, Glaucus remarks that Zeus did not defend his son (*Il.* XVI.521-522). The notion that gods, especially Zeus, give evils to mortals is enunciated at *Il.* XXIV.428-433; *Od.* I.33, VI.188-190. The phrase θεῶν διδόντων is used in the same sense at Aesch. *Pers.* 293-294.

any glory in evils that are also shameful.⁵⁰ This remark indicates that, as in his opening lines, Eteocles is motivated by his reputation (εὐκλεία) and sense of shame (αἰσχύνη): he does not want to merit criticism. A few lines later, Eteocles says, rather opaquely, that his father's Curse is sitting beside him, 'saying that the gain is earlier than the later death.'⁵¹ If, as seems probable, the 'gain' (κέρδος) is a glorious rather than a shameful death,⁵² this remark which he attributes to the Curse is again fundamentally about honour and shame. Furthermore, the Chorus-leader suggests to him that 'the god respects even a base victory', and Eteocles remarks that 'No soldier ought to approve of that remark.'⁵³ Again, this displays the same attitude, which would not be out of place in the *Iliad*. Understanding Eteocles as an epic warrior, then, allows us to link and reconcile his conduct in the first scene with his conduct in 653-719, providing a coherent explanation that does not rely on a break in his depiction or a sudden onset of madness at 653.⁵⁴

Eteocles, then, both as man and as ruler, is portrayed in predominantly epic terms. This includes how he is initially portrayed and the principles on which he acts—as well as his fatalism and his lack of hesitation before facing death at his brother's hands.

However, *Seven Against Thebes* naturally contains many things absent from the *Iliad* which also bear on Eteocles. Most important is his argument with the women of the Chorus, whom he rebukes for engaging in excessive panic and prayer. Here, his

⁵⁰ εἴπερ κακὸν φέρει τις, αἰσχύνῃς ἄτερ ἔστω· μόνον γὰρ κέρδος ἐν τεθνηκόσιν. κακῶν δὲ κᾶσχρῶν οὐτὶν' εὐκλείαν ἐρεῖς (Aesch. *Sept.* 683-685).

⁵¹ λέγουσα κέρδος πρότερον ὑστέρου μόρου (Aesch. *Sept.* 697).

⁵² Hutchinson *ad loc.*. Hector's use of the notion of *kerdos* at *Il.* XXII.103, 108 is perhaps comparable. Others suggest that the *kerdos* is Polynices' death, or Eteocles' own (i.e. that an early death is better than a late one), but these views seem less plausible; cf. Winnington-Ingram [1977] 1983:37-38; Seidensticker 2009:223.

⁵³ CHORUS-LEADER: νίκην γε μέντοι καὶ κακὴν τιμᾶ θεός.

ETEOCLES: οὐκ ἄνδρ' ὀπλίτην τοῦτο χρὴ στέργειν ἔπος (Aesch. *Sept.* 716-717).

⁵⁴ The justification for seeing Eteocles as going mad lies in the Chorus' words, τί μέμονας, τέκνον; (Aesch. *Sept.* 686). But this assessment seems difficult to accept, since Eteocles gives perfectly lucid reasons for acting as he does (Kirkwood 1969:13-15; Jackson 1988:294-299), unlike, say, Heracles in Euripides' *Heracles*. Rather, the Chorus' question, I think, indicates their perplexity, rather as one might say 'Are you mad?' in English to someone proposing to do something foolish or wrong (Brown 1977:310-311).

depiction draws on the same pool of ideas about obedience discussed in Chapter 3. Although these ideas are in no way incompatible with the Iliadic picture of generalship outlined in Eteocles' opening lines, they are not themselves Iliadic, but rather are related to the world of the archaic and classical *polis*. This is true when Eteocles emphasises the importance of *peitharchia* (obedience) by calling her a goddess,⁵⁵ and also when Eteocles says that if anyone disobeys his *arche*, a vote (ψηφος) will be passed against them, and they will be stoned by the *demos* (λευστήρα δήμου ... μόρον).⁵⁶ Stoning is mentioned in epic,⁵⁷ but its presentation here as a somewhat formalised and even democratic communal punishment more resembles later tragedy.⁵⁸ Indeed, since *peitharchia* literally means 'obedience to *archai*', both of these passages presuppose the non-Iliadic notion of *archai*, i.e. the offices of a *polis*. Also, Eteocles' attitude towards the women is un-Iliadic; women routinely engage in extreme lamentation in the *Iliad* without any suggestion that this is demoralising or inappropriate.⁵⁹

⁵⁵ Aesch. *Sept.* 224-225, discussed at p. 118 above.

⁵⁶ Aesch. *Sept.* 196-199.

⁵⁷ *Il.* III.56-57; cf. *Od.* XVI.424-430 with Barkan 1936:41-42.

⁵⁸ Snell 1964:5-6 makes the point that Eteocles' approach to stoning is un-Homeric; for later tragedy, cf. p. 131 n. 26 above.

At Aesch. *Sept.* 198, it is disputed whether *psephos* indicates a popular decision. Hutchinson *ad loc.* and Carter 2013:56 n. 74 take the *psephos* to be Eteocles' own, but I think the view of Rosivach 1987:239 more natural: 'Eteocles proclaims a process of punishment that will involve a preliminary decree by the boule (cf. ψηφος ... βουλεύσεται, 198) and the execution of that decree by the demos (cf. λευστήρα δήμου ... μόρον, 199), a process which is totally unnecessary, since Eteocles is essentially an autocrat and can decree any punishment he chooses.' A similar issue arises at Eur. *Heracl.* 60, 139-143, 184-189. Allan on Eur. *Heracl.* 141-2 thinks that the Herald is lying in implying that the death sentence was issued democratically, and on 186 he thinks that Iolaus' mention of a *psephos* refers to Eurystheus' personal decision (citing Aesch. *Sept.* 198, with Hutchinson *ad loc.*). But I see no reason to exclude a popular vote (cf. p. 42).

All this, I think, holds true despite Soph. *Ant.* 60, where Antigone calls Creon's decision ψηφον τυράννων, and 632, where Creon calls it a τελείαν ψηφον. At 60, I take ψηφον to be in tension with τυράννων: Antigone's paradoxical phrase expresses her indignation at Creon's autocratic behaviour (cf. T. Graham 2017:132-133). At 632, similarly, Creon's words indicate his appropriation to himself of authority that would in democratic Athens be collective (cf. T. Graham 2017:144). Similarly, at Aesch. *Supp.* 373, the reference to Pelasgus' μονοψηφοισι νέύμασιν is paradoxical (Sommerstein *ad loc.*; cf. p. 99 n. 6 above). At Soph. *OT* 605-608, Creon seems to use *psephos* in a quasi-legal sense transferred from its Athenian context (cf. pp. 132-133 above, and Finglass *ad loc.*).

⁵⁹ Cf. Foley 2001:46-48.

A second largely non-epic feature is Eteocles' focus on *dike*: in his speech where he chooses to fight Polynices, he emphasises that Polynices is in the wrong, and claims emphatically that *dike* is on his side instead.⁶⁰ In the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, δίκη is not normally used as an abstract moral value as it is here, and disputing warriors do not level claims of *dike* against one another. Of course, they may possibly have done so in lost narrative epics, and in the *Works and Days*, as here, *dike* is treated as an abstract moral value and personified.⁶¹ Still, Eteocles' argument seems far removed from arguments made by warriors in extant narrative epic, and it therefore seems reasonable to consider it a non-epic feature, in the absence of evidence to the contrary.⁶² This does not detract from the epic elements of Eteocles' presentation, such as his focus on honour and attitude towards his fate; rather, his appeal to *dike* adds an extra element which supplements these.

The play also features non-Iliadic ideas about pollution and purification, especially in the dialogue before Eteocles confronts his brother, where the Chorus-leader argues that the pollution stemming from fratricide never grows old; the Chorus' horror at this pollution runs through the dialogue.⁶³ Indeed, Eteocles himself goes beyond mere acceptance of the curse; he now actually sees the curse as driving him to kill his brother, making his spirit boil to do so.⁶⁴ Yet Eteocles nevertheless refuses to acknowledge the force of the considerations which the Chorus puts forward; he ignores the issues of pollution and purification, exhibiting none of the Chorus' horror at the prospect of fratricide, and continues to insist on his Iliadic attitude, according to which he must fight the enemy and meet his fate regardless. Indeed, characters in

⁶⁰ Aesch. *Sept.* 658-673.

⁶¹ Hes. *Op.* 213-237, with Dickie 1978:98-99. On *dike* in epic, see Dickie 1978 *passim*; Yamagata 1994:61-92.

⁶² Snell 1928:83 points this out (contrasting Eteocles with Hector).

⁶³ Aesch. *Sept.* 679-682; cf. 693-694, 718, 738-739. On the absence of pollution in epic and its prominence in tragedy, see R. C. T. Parker 1983:13-16, 130-138. Parker emphasises that there is no strong basis for seeing a *historical* shift; the difference may be temporal, generic, or a bit of both.

⁶⁴ Aesch. *Sept.* 692-697, 706-711; note γάγ at 695, 709 (Regenbogen 1933:67; Hutchinson *ad locc.*). Snell 1928:82-83 sharply distinguishes between Hector's resignation and what he sees as Eteocles' positive enthusiasm ('amor fati'), but this seems a matter of degree; their attitudes remain remarkably similar. In any case, resignation, rather than enthusiasm, seems predominant e.g. at 719.

the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* rarely seem to feel any great horror about killing, even of family-members, and it is easy to imagine that epic might have dealt with such a fratricide as Eteocles' without any horror either.⁶⁵ One might perhaps suggest that, in having the Chorus confront Eteocles' attitude with sheer horror, the play contrasts two value systems, reflecting on the irreligious violence of the epic warrior, so incompatible at times with the moral norms of the world in which Aeschylus and his contemporaries lived.⁶⁶

Inherited evils and trans-generational punishment are not prominent in the *Iliad*;⁶⁷ we do not know whether they featured in the Theban epics.⁶⁸ In *Seven Against Thebes*, these ideas are absent during the portion of the play in which Eteocles is actually on stage. However, in the second stasimon, the Chorus sets the fratricide in the broader context of the house's sufferings, singing of Laius' transgression of Apollo's command not to have children, which is being punished to the third generation.⁶⁹ Then the Chorus sings of the fratricide as the third and most potent of the troubles to beset the house of Laius.⁷⁰ All this serves to heighten the effect of the fratricide as the climax both of the play and of the trilogy, providing the audience with an additional moral perspective on Eteocles' position. This additional perspective does not contradict or

⁶⁵ Agamemnon's account of his and Cassandra's deaths is indignant and condemnatory, but there is no horror or pollution (*Od.* XI.405-439). Phoenix's abortive parricide in the *Iliad* is particularly interesting. When Phoenix's father lays a curse of infertility on him, Phoenix reacts not with horror, but by plotting to kill his father (*Il.* IX.453-458). Then, however, he changes his mind: ἀλλὰ τις ἀθανάτων τρέψε φρένας, ὅς ῥ' ἐνὶ θυμῷ δήμου θῆκε φάτιν καὶ ὀνειδέα πόλλ' ἀνθρώπων, ὡς μὴ πατροφόνος μετ' Ἀχαιοῖσιν καλεοίμην (*Il.* IX.459-461). The whole situation is dealt with within the framework of *aidos*, and, among the considerations that cause him to change his mind, the horror attendant on parricide has no place.

⁶⁶ Such readings have often been applied to Sophocles' *Ajax* (especially Knox 1961), although there are several difficulties with interpreting *Ajax* in these terms (surveyed by Finglass 2011a:44-46). Perhaps, though, *Seven Against Thebes* would actually sustain such readings more easily.

⁶⁷ Gagné 2013:177-205 surveys the evidence.

⁶⁸ For the problem, see M. L. West 1999; Gagné 2013:346-350.

⁶⁹ Aesch. *Sept.* 739-745; cf. Gagné 2013:351-356.

⁷⁰ Aesch. *Sept.* 758-761.

supplant Eteocles' presentation as an epic-style warrior; rather, it supplements it, as a broader and longer-term perspective on the same events.⁷¹

Aeschylus has, then, included features atypical of extant epic, such as *dike*, *peitharchia* and ancestral evils. This does not conflict with the notion that Eteocles acts like an epic warrior; rather, it suggests that Aeschylus has used the behaviour of epic warriors as a basis for presenting Eteocles, but has also elaborated the presentation of Eteocles with other, more contemporary elements. This kind of creative mixing of elements is absolutely central to the way in which all three dramatists present rulers, and we will see it again throughout Chapters 6-7.

If it is accepted that Eteocles is depicted as behaving somewhat like an epic warrior, this vindicates the point that was made at the outset: understanding the conceptions presupposed by the depiction of a character provides us with an otherwise unattainable basis for understanding that character, and is therefore of the greatest utility.

II.ii. Agamemnon as (in part) a victorious *basileus*

Eteocles' behaviour, then, seems more intelligible and consistent if seen as based on attitudes and modes of conduct proper to epic warriors. Scholars studying *Agamemnon* have not generally considered Agamemnon's consistency to be such a problem. Rather, debates have focused on other difficulties, especially why (in terms of character traits and motivations) he agrees to Clytaemestra's request and walks into his palace over rich fabrics—a question which is perhaps insoluble, since the text provides no clear answer.⁷² This lack of explicit motivation has led some scholars to suggest that Agamemnon lacks characterisation, or that Aeschylus has taken little care to characterise him.⁷³ Yet, as we have said, many different questions may be asked concerning a character in tragedy; a lack of detailed motivation does not entail

⁷¹ Similarly Sewell-Rutter 2007:34: 'A theme is added to the mix as Eteocles goes to his death.'

⁷² Cf. p. 149 above.

⁷³ E.g. Rosenmeyer 1982:221-223.

that the presentation of the character is insignificant. If we are not to judge Aeschylus' work by an artificial modern standard of what constitutes 'characterisation', we should not try to find in Agamemnon motivations which Aeschylus has not cared to specify. Rather, we will discern the nature of Aeschylus' characterisation most readily if we take care to identify aspects that Aeschylus *has* made clear. Here, I want to draw attention to one aspect of Agamemnon which (partly, perhaps, because of scholars' focus on this one scene) has been little studied. This is Agamemnon's presentation throughout the play (not just, or even primarily, in this one scene) as a successful and honoured *basileus*.

Agamemnon is not depicted in the conventionally negative terms discussed in Chapter 1. Certainly, *Agamemnon* is one of four plays containing choral odes reflecting on the fall from *olbos* to *ate*, a motif which Aeschylus and Sophocles, like Herodotus, apply to the falls of rulers.⁷⁴ However, the presence of this moral pattern does not necessarily entail that a ruler is depicted in a conventionally negative fashion in *other* respects: Xerxes in *Persians*, Creon in *Antigone*, and Oedipus in *Oedipus Tyrannus* all exhibit conventionally negative behaviours and motifs that are *not* applied to Agamemnon. Although scholars have not spelt this out,⁷⁵ this presumably explains why they have generally correctly concurred in *not* regarding Agamemnon as a 'typical tyrant'. That Agamemnon is not presented in conventionally negative terms is particularly clear if we contrast him with Aegisthus in the same play, who *is* presented in such terms.⁷⁶

This is not to deny that some aspects of Agamemnon's portrayal present him negatively in moral terms, especially his killing of Iphigenia.⁷⁷ However, for a full understanding of the complexity of his presentation, this negative aspect should, I suggest, be contrasted with other broadly positive aspects of his presentation, which

⁷⁴ See pp. 50-51.

⁷⁵ A partial exception is Sheppard 1922:liii-lvii, who thinks that, although Agamemnon is 'no tyrant', the moral patterns in his portrayal anticipate the later 'tyrant type' used by Sophocles and Euripides.

⁷⁶ See pp. 67-68.

⁷⁷ I discuss this further at pp. 189-193.

give an impression of legitimacy and majesty. Indeed, scholars have sometimes briefly suggested that Agamemnon is presented as a ‘legitimate king’ in the *Oresteia*, but without spelling out *exactly what* about his portrayal gives this impression.⁷⁸

I argue here that this aspect of Agamemnon’s portrayal can be best understood in light of certain ideas concerning sole rule current in the early fifth century—chiefly those employed by the praise poets Pindar and Bacchylides to praise their dedicatees, especially Hieron of Syracuse. In indicating resemblances between Aeschylus’ presentation of Agamemnon and the poetry of Pindar and Bacchylides, I follow Steiner and others.⁷⁹ However, whereas these scholars emphasise generic links with epinician poetry, here I investigate what these similarities tell us about contemporary notions about sole rule. Indeed, the parallels mentioned here indicate that Aeschylus’ *Agamemnon* interacts not just with epinician poetry, but with a wider complex of early fifth-century ideas concerning *basileia*. Also, whereas these scholars focus exclusively on the scene where Agamemnon treads on the fabrics, I consider evidence beginning in the *parodos* and continuing into *Libation-Bearers* and *Eumenides*.

The *parodos* introduces Agamemnon in positive, even laudatory, terms:

‘This is the tenth year since the great prosecutor, Menelaus the *anax*, and Agamemnon, that yoke-pair of the Atreids holding the honour (τιμή) of two thrones and two sceptres from Zeus, raised from this land an expedition of a thousand ships against Priam, to support them militarily, shouting war loudly from their hearts.’⁸⁰

⁷⁸ E.g. Kitto [1939] 1961:78.

⁷⁹ Crane 1993:133-134; Steiner 2010; Carey 2012:18-22.

⁸⁰ δέκατον μὲν ἔτος τόδ’ ἐπεὶ Πριάμῳ μέγας ἀντίδικος Μενέλαος ἄναξ ἢδ’ Ἀγαμέμνων, διθρόνου Διόθεν καὶ δισκήπτρου τιμῆς ὄχυρόν ζευγος Ἀτρειδᾶν, στόλον Ἀργείων χιλιοναύτην τῆσδ’ ἀπὸ χώρας ἦραν, στρατιῶτιν ἀρωγὴν, μεγάλ’ ἐκ θυμοῦ κλάζοντες Ἄρη (Aesch. Ag. 40-48). Cf. the description of the Atreids as Ἀχαιῶν δίθρονον κράτος, Ἑλλάδος ἥβας ξύμφορνα ταγάν (108-110), and Agamemnon’s πεισίσβοτον τε βάκτρον (Cho. 362, with Garvie, Brown *ad loc.*).

These lines focus on Agamemnon's honour, symbols of authority (throne and sceptre), and power deriving from Zeus. Since honour (τιμή), the sceptre, and power conferred by Zeus are important attributes conferring legitimacy on rulers in epic,⁸¹ it seems likely that these lines draw attention to Agamemnon's status as a legendary and epic figure, emphasising the traditional and legitimate nature of his rule.⁸² In Aeschylus' day, however, such ideas were by no means defunct: Aeschylus' contemporaries Pindar and Bacchylides employ them. Pindar sometimes uses such ideas, as Aeschylus does here, to describe a *legendary* figure's rule: Jason refers to Aeson's rule, usurped by Pelias, as 'the sceptre of sole rule and the throne upon which the son of Cretheus used to sit as he judged suits for his horse-riding people.'⁸³ However, many of the odes of Pindar and Bacchylides (as well as Simonides) were dedicated to historical Greek rulers of the early fifth century. No ruler has so many odes dedicated to him as Hieron, who ruled Syracuse from 478 to 467, and whose court Aeschylus also visited between 472 and 468.⁸⁴ Pindar and Bacchylides accordingly use the same ideas to indicate the traditional and rightful nature of the

⁸¹ For rulers' *time* and *sebas* in epic and tragedy, see pp. 8-10. Agamemnon is also regarded as having *time* at Aesch. Ag. 531 (cf. pp. 174-175), 259 (implicitly), *Eum.* 626 (διοσδότοις σκήπτροισι τιμαλφούμενον, rightly regarded by Heim 1904:19 as an epic reminiscence). Agamemnon is considered the object of *sebas* at Ag. 258 (implicitly), 785, 833, 925, *Cho.* 55, 157.

⁸² So rightly Heim 1904:19.

⁸³ καὶ σκᾶπτρον μόναρχον καὶ θρόνος, ᾧ ποτε Κρηθεΐδας ἐγκαθίζων ἰππόταις εὐθύνε λαοῖς δίκας (Pind. *Pyth.* 4.152). This vision of Aeson's rule resembles epic in emphasising the administration of justice (cf. p. 8). On the coupling of *skeptron* and *thronos*, see p. 9 n. 23.

⁸⁴ On Aeschylus' visits to Sicily, see p. 180 n. 120.

The following are dedicated to **Hieron of Syracuse**: Pind. *Ol.* 1, *Pyth.* 1, 2, 3, fr. 105ab, 106, 124d, 125, 126; Bacchyl. 3, 4, 5, fr. 20C; Simon. fr. 580, possibly fr. 552 (Molyneux 1992:224-233; Morgan 2015:93-96). Hieron is also praised in epinicians dedicated to his subordinates Hegesias (Pind. *Ol.* 6) and Chromius (Pind. *Nem.* 1, 9). Other rulers to whom odes are dedicated include **Theron of Acragas** (Pind. *Ol.* 2, 3, fr. 118, 119), along with his brother Xenocrates (Pind. *Pyth.* 6, *Isthm.* 2; Simon. fr. 513, cf. Molyneux 1992:233-235, Morgan 2015:94-95); **Arcesilas IV of Cyrene** (Pind. *Pyth.* 4, 5); **Alexander I of Macedon** (Pind. fr. 120, 121; Bacchyl. fr. 20B), **Anaxilas of Rhegium** (Simon. fr. 515, cf. Molyneux 1992:212), and the Aleuad **Thorax of Pelinna** (Pind. *Pyth.* 10; cf. Westlake 1936:12, Hornblower 2006:151).

Pindar does not praise all these rulers in the same terms; in particular, he praises Hieron in more elevated terms than Theron (who is treated more like an ordinary elite dedicatee) or even Arcesilas (Luraghi 2011:30-36; cf. Mann 2013:40-42, 45, Morgan 2015:414-418). Consequently, it is not by chance that most comparisons which I draw here involve odes dedicated to Hieron, since these odes are most emphatic in glorifying their dedicatee as a *basileus*.

rule of Hieron.⁸⁵ They draw attention to Hieron's sceptre, in a way that in one case appears to evoke epic,⁸⁶ and Bacchylides talks of Hieron as 'having got from Zeus (παρὰ Ζηνός) the privilege (γέρας) of ruling the greatest number of Greeks', which similarly presents Hieron's power in a traditional and epicising light.⁸⁷ These poets' use of these symbols of traditional power shows that Aeschylus is not just presenting Agamemnon as an epic figure, but is doing so in terms similar to those which his contemporaries used with reference both to the legendary past and to the present.

So the resemblances between Aeschylus' imagery concerning rulers and that of Pindar and Bacchylides are partly a matter of using symbols drawn from epic similarly. A similar point can be made concerning Aeschylus' use of eagle imagery. In the *parodos* of *Agamemnon*, two eagles (presumably sent by Zeus, given the ubiquitous connection of eagles with Zeus throughout Greek thought) appear as an omen to Agamemnon, 'the *basileus* of birds to the *basileis* of ships' (οἰωνῶν βασιλεὺς βασιλεῦσι νεῶν).⁸⁸ Within the omen, as Calchas interprets it, the eagles represent the two Atreids.⁸⁹ Eagles are sometimes sent by Zeus as omens in the *Iliad*, including to Agamemnon and Priam.⁹⁰ It is in Bacchylides and Pindar, though, that a particularly strong association between rulers and the eagle of Zeus emerges (although the eagle is also prominent more generally, as an image for both dedicatee and poet); the eagle of Zeus is particularly conspicuous in two odes praising Hieron, namely *Pythian* 1 and Bacchylides 5.⁹¹ So the *parodos* of *Agamemnon* presents Agamemnon in terms of

⁸⁵ The presentation of Hieron in Pindar and Bacchylides has rightly attracted much recent interest: Cairns 2010:19-23; Luraghi 2011; Mann 2013; Morgan 2015.

⁸⁶ Pind. *Ol.* 1.12 refers to Hieron as θεμιστεῖον ὃς ἀμφέπει σκᾶπτρον ἐν πολυμήλῳ Σικελίᾳ, which resembles the epic phrase σκῆπτρόν τ' ἠδὲ θέμιστας (*Il.* II.206, IX.99, referring to the rule of Agamemnon): Harrell 2002:441-448; Morgan 2015:225-228. Hieron's sceptre is also mentioned at Pind. *Ol.* 6.93, Bacchyl. 3.70 (called the σκᾶπτρον Διός); the sceptre of Zeus is also prominent (although in Zeus' own hands) at Pind. *Pyth.* 1.6.

⁸⁷ ὃς παρὰ Ζηνός λαχὼν πλείσταρχον Ἑλλάνων γέρας (Bacchyl. 3.11-12).

⁸⁸ Aesch. *Ag.* 114-115.

⁸⁹ Aesch. *Ag.* 123-125.

⁹⁰ *Il.* VIII.245-255, XXIV.314-321; cf. Anhalt 1995.

⁹¹ At Pind. *Pyth.* 1.6-10, the eagle is described as sitting on Zeus' sceptre, and as being charmed by Apollo's lyre. Since Pindar presents himself as praising Hieron with music, this presumably produces an association between Hieron (the recipient of the ode) and Zeus (the recipient of song within the ode). At Bacchyl. 5.16-30, although the simile turns out in retrospect to concern the poet, 'the eagle appears because of its similarity to Hieron,

symbols similar to those used by Pindar and Bacchylides to indicate the traditional and rightful nature of the power not only of legendary figures but also of Hieron of Syracuse, the most powerful Greek ruler of their own day.⁹²

Furthermore, Aeschylus' emphasis on Agamemnon's *olbos* tends to magnify him, making him seem impressive and majestic. Of course, rulers in Herodotus and tragedy are often *olbios*. Frequently, though, this is simply taken for granted; in *Antigone* we hear of Creon's *olbos* only when invoked to emphasise Creon's traditional fall from *olbos* to *ate*.⁹³ Here, by contrast, Aeschylus brings out Agamemnon's *olbos* very vividly: tragedy provides no clearer visual illustration of *olbos* than Agamemnon's entry into his palace over rich fabrics, and no speech evokes *olbos* more vividly than Clytaemestra's as he begins his walk.⁹⁴

Moreover, Agamemnon's *olbos*, already before this, is made the object of celebration and praise.⁹⁵ When the Herald announces Agamemnon's return, he emphasises the splendour of his achievement, concluding, 'The *anax*, the elder son of Atreus, has come, a fortunate man (εὐδαίμων): he is the worthiest of mortals now alive (τῶν νῦν) to be honoured.'⁹⁶ This attitude is common in Pindar, where dedicatees are often praised for their *olbos* or *eudaimonia*, which is (as here) seen as the result of the dedicatee's personal achievements and toils.⁹⁷ Moreover, the Herald's specific remark resembles one addressed to Hieron in Pindar's *First Olympian*: 'For I am confident that there is no guest-friend either more expert in good things or more authoritative

illustrating the qualities of the man the poet wishes to praise' (Pfeijffer 1994:316). The only *direct* comparison of a victor with an eagle (Arcesilas at Pind. *Pyth.* 5.111-115) is brief, not mentioning Zeus, but *implicit* comparison of victors with eagles occurs throughout Pindar and Bacchylides (Pfeijffer 1994). Cf. Cairns on Bacchyl. 5.16-30, 19-20; Morgan 2015:123-131.

⁹² Cf. Bacchylides' comment that Hieron holds the πλείσταρχον Ἑλλάνων γέρας (Bacchyl. 3.12).

⁹³ Soph. *Ant.* 1161-1171; also 1026, 1265.

⁹⁴ ἔστιν θάλασσα—τίς δέ νιν κατασβέσει;—τρέφουσα πολλῆς πορφύρας ἰσάργυρον κηκίδα παγκαίνιστον, εἰμάτων βαφάς· ἄκος δ' ὑπάρχει τῶνδε σὺν θεοῖς, ἄναξ, ἔχειν· πένεσθαι δ' οὐκ ἐπίσταται δόμος (Aesch. *Ag.* 958-962).

⁹⁵ On the characters' loyalty towards Agamemnon in general, cf. Griffith 1995:76-81, 121.

⁹⁶ ἄναξ Ἀτρείδης πρέσβυς εὐδαίμων ἀνὴρ ἦκει. τίεσθαι δ' ἀξιώτατος βροτῶν τῶν νῦν (Aesch. *Ag.* 530-532).

⁹⁷ Pindar often sees success (ὄλβος, νίκη) as the result of toil (πόνος, κάματος), e.g. Pind. *Ol.* 5.15-16, 11.4-6; *Pyth.* 8.73, 12.28-29; *Nem.* 6.23-24.

in his power among those now alive (τῶν νῦν) to adorn in the folds of songs.⁹⁸ The significance of this similarity lies not so much in the similar wording as in the similar sentiment: the speaker justifies his praise by asserting that the ruler is uniquely worthy of it, thereby emphasising the ruler's excellence and greatness.

The Chorus adopts a similar attitude of celebration and praise towards Agamemnon's *olbos* in the anapaests before his entry: 'Come now, *basileus*, sacker of Troy, offspring of Atreus, how shall I address you, how shall I do you reverence (πῶς σε σεβίξω), neither overshooting nor falling short of the target of pleasure?'⁹⁹ Here, like the Herald, the Chorus implies that their admiring attitude towards Agamemnon derives from his great achievement, the capture of Troy (Τροίας πτολίπορθ'). As Steiner points out, the Chorus' metaphor of the bowman or javelin-thrower is one employed by Pindar to express high praise,¹⁰⁰ and the Chorus articulates the Pindaric notion that praise should be neither excessive nor insufficient, but should hit the mark (καιρός).¹⁰¹ The importance of this, again, lies not in verbal closeness, but in the similar sentiment: Aeschylus has the Chorus express much the same view of Agamemnon that Pindar's odes express of their dedicatees. The Chorus also expresses their positive attitude towards Agamemnon's success and consequent *olbos* by contrasting themselves with those who merely pretend to feel goodwill towards the successful man,¹⁰² and when they declare that they have goodwill towards 'those who have accomplished their toil (πόνον) well'.¹⁰³

⁹⁸ πέποιθα δὲ ξένον μή τιν' ἀμφοτέρω καλῶν τε ἴδριν ἄμα καὶ δύναμιν κυριώτερον τῶν γε νῦν κλυταῖσι δαιδαλωσέμεν ὕμνων πτυχαῖς (Pind. *Ol.* 1.103-105, cited by Fraenkel on Aesch. *Ag.* 532 to elucidate Aeschylus' τῶν νῦν).

⁹⁹ ἄγε δῆ, βασιλεῦ, Τροίας πτολίπορθ', Ἀτρέως γένεθλον, πῶς σε προσείπω, πῶς σε σεβίξω, μήθ' ὑπεράρας μήθ' ὑποκάμψας καιρὸν χάριτος; (Aesch. *Ag.* 783-787, trans. Sommerstein).

¹⁰⁰ Steiner 2010:25-26. Cf. Pind. *Ol.* 2.89-90; *Pyth.* 1.42-45 (perhaps closest); *Nem.* 6.26-28, 7.64-79, 9.53-55; *Isthm.* 5.46-48.

¹⁰¹ Pindar uses καιρός to refer to well-judged praise e.g. at *Pyth.* 1.81; cf. J. R. Wilson 1980:181-183.

¹⁰² Aesch. *Ag.* 788-794.

¹⁰³ νῦν δ' οὐκ ἀπ' ἄκρας φρενὸς οὐδ' ἀφίλως εὐφρων πόνον εὖ τελέσασιν <ἐγώ> (Aesch. *Ag.* 805-806). Steiner 2010:29-30 considers the use of litotes and alpha-privatives here particularly reminiscent of praise poetry.

Perhaps an even more striking similarity with praise poetry is the prominence of the notion of human *phthonos*. Divine *phthonos*, of course, is fairly common throughout Herodotus and tragedy, especially as an explanation for the falls of great men. The ideas of human *phthonos*, however, serves a different function, being generally used to deprecate negative feelings towards prosperous people, presenting these feelings as illegitimate: *phthonos* designates a negative emotion which the speaker considers *unjustified*.¹⁰⁴ Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* several times draws attention to people who feel negatively towards Agamemnon's prosperity, most extensively in the anapaests before Agamemnon's entry, where the Chorus warns Agamemnon about disloyal citizens who pretend to be loyal, but may actually harbour negative feelings in their hearts.¹⁰⁵ This image of popular resentment, including the notion that people keep their negative feelings secret in their hearts, is also found in praise poetry; in praising Hieron, Pindar says, 'And rumour weighs down the secret hearts of the citizens (ἄστοί) most of all when it concerns other people's good fortune.'¹⁰⁶ Agamemnon, agreeing with the Chorus, says, 'Few men have it in their nature to honour without *phthonos* a friend who is enjoying good fortune. When a man has an affliction, the poison of ill-will sits close to his heart and doubles his burden: he is weighed down by his own sufferings, and he also grieves to see the success of another.'¹⁰⁷ As Steiner points out, this remark, in indicating the unpleasantness of *phthonos* for whoever *feels* it, resembles Pindar's remark addressed to Hieron that 'But not even that soothes the mind of envious men; by pulling, as it were, a measuring line too far, they fix a painful wound in their own hearts, before they gain all that they contrive in their

¹⁰⁴ Cairns 2003 makes this point excellently, comparing English 'envy'. In general on the prominence of *phthonos* in praise poetry, see Most 2003.

¹⁰⁵ Aesch. Ag. 788-794. *Phthonos* towards Agamemnon is already dwelt on at 450-474 (especially 450, 471), where it is suggested that Agamemnon is the object of human *and* divine *phthonos*.

¹⁰⁶ ἄστων δ' ἀκοὰ κρύφιον θυμὸν βαρύνει μάλιστ' ἐσλοῖσιν ἐπ' ἄλλοτρίοις (Pind. *Pyth.* 1.83-84); cf. *Pyth.* 2.73-88, 11.25-28; *Nem.* 8.32-34. Bacchylides does not dwell on this, but *mentions* it, e.g. Bacchyl. 3.67-68, 13.199-209.

¹⁰⁷ παύροις γὰρ ἀνδρῶν ἐστὶ συγγενὲς τόδε, φίλον τὸν εὐτυχοῦντ' ἄνευ φθόνων σέβειν. δύσφρων γὰρ ἰὸς καρδίαν προσήμενος ἄχθος διπλοῖζει τῷ πεπαμένῳ νόσον· τοῖς τ' αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ πῆμασιν βαρύνεται καὶ τὸν θυραῖον ὄλβον εἰσορῶν στένει (Aesch. Ag. 832-837, trans. Sommerstein).

thoughts.’¹⁰⁸ So the Chorus and Agamemnon, in terms similar to praise poetry, imply that admiration is the proper attitude to Agamemnon’s *olbos* and *nike*, while rejecting as *phthonos* the attitude of those who do *not* admire him.

Phthonos is again important in Agamemnon’s final stichomythic exchange with Clytaemestra, when Clytaemestra argues that the man who is unenvied (ἀφθόνητος) is unenviable (οὐκ ἐπίζηλος).¹⁰⁹ Here, of course, Clytaemestra uses this language tendentiously, and she is only pretending to admire Agamemnon’s *olbos*. However, the sentiment expressed that *phthonos* is not the least desirable of things has been interestingly compared with the proverb that it is better to be envied than to be pitied, which is associated with rulers not only in an ode addressed to Hieron, but also in the story of Periander and Lycophron in Herodotus.¹¹⁰

There is, then, a real sense in which the other characters present Agamemnon, especially before his entry, in terms that magnify him and make him impressive. This is achieved by the use of symbols of *basileia*, by a strong emphasis on his *olbos*, by the fact that the Herald and Chorus praise him strongly for his achievement using phrases common in epinician poetry, and by the presence of *phthonos* towards him. In all these regards, similarities exist with how rulers (especially Hieron) are praised in Pindar and Bacchylides. These parallels are not close verbal ones (and, where

¹⁰⁸ ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ταῦτα νόον λαίνει φθονερῶν· στάθμας δέ τινος ἐλκόμενοι περισσᾶς ἐνέπαξαν ἔλκος ὀδυναρὸν ἔᾱ πρόσθε καρδίᾳ, πρὶν ὅσα φροντίδι μητίονται τυχεῖν (Pind. *Pyth.* 2.89-92, trans. Race); Steiner 2010:31-32. Steiner 2010:27-28 also notes that the Chorus’ description of the citizen whose eyes ‘are fawning with watery affection’ (ὕδαρ εἰ σαίνειν φιλότῃτι, Aesch. *Ag.* 798, trans. Sommerstein) resembles Pindar’s description of the citizen who ‘fawns on all and weaves his utter ruin’ (ὅμως μὲν σαίνων ποτὶ πάντα ἄταν πάγχυ διαπλέκει, Pind. *Pyth.* 2.81-82, trans. Race).

¹⁰⁹ Aesch. *Ag.* 939.

¹¹⁰ ἀλλ’ ὅμως, κρέσσον γὰρ οἰκτιρμοῦ φθόνος, μὴ παρίει καλά (Pind. *Pyth.* 1.85-86, cited by Raeburn and Thomas on Aesch. *Ag.* 937-9). Fränkel [1924] 1960:67-68 n. 3 argues that *two* pieces of advice given here by Pindar appear in the story of Periander and Lycophron: Periander tells Lycophron that *phthonos* is better than pity (Hdt. III.52.5), and Lycophron’s sister tells Lycophron not to relinquish good things (III.53.4). Fränkel suggests that these ideas may have been more widely associated with rulers in the late sixth and early fifth centuries (cf. also Fränkel [1951] 1975:460 n. 38; Kurke 1991:221-222 n. 47). Cf. Thgn. 797-798; Pind. fr. 94a.8-10 (both cited by Fränkel); Pind. *Pyth.* 11.29-30 (cited by Donlan 1980:96-97); Bacchyl. 10.47-48.

relatively close, are fairly commonplace); rather, the similarity lies in the ideas about *basileia* and *olbos* which are presupposed. In part at least, then, Aeschylus presents Agamemnon in accordance with an established body of ideas concerning *basileia* and *olbos*, which had currency at the time.

It is, however, after Agamemnon leaves the stage that he is perhaps made to seem most majestic and impressive. Cassandra presents him in a positive light, expressing indignation at his death in view of his position as ‘the commander of the ships and destroyer of Troy’ (νεῶν δ’ ἄπαρχος Ἰλίου τ’ ἀναστάτης),¹¹¹ and calling him the ‘noble lion’ whose ‘two-footed lioness’ slept with a wolf in his absence.¹¹² The Chorus laments his death in a manner that mirrors how they hailed his return: before they said, ‘How shall I revere you?’ (πῶς σε σεβίξω), and now they sing, ‘How shall I lament you?’ (πῶς σε δακρύσω). Similarly, before they said that they were ‘well-disposed, deep in their hearts and with devotion’ (οὐκ ἀπ’ ἄκρας φρενὸς οὐδ’ ἀφίλως εὐφρων), and now they ask what they should say ‘from their devoted hearts’ (φρενὸς ἐκ φιλίας).¹¹³ In *Libation-Bearers* and *Eumenides*, Agamemnon is highly regarded and repeatedly praised as the glorious sacker of Troy.¹¹⁴

More remarkably, though, Agamemnon becomes the recipient of worship in *Libation-Bearers*, which is dominated by a rite performed by Orestes, Electra, and the Chorus, who seek Agamemnon’s help in killing Aegisthus and Clytaemestra. Rites in honour of particular dead individuals, which modern scholars discuss under the umbrella term ‘hero cult’, were common throughout this period, and were accorded to a wide range of prestigious individuals. The rite performed in *Libation-Bearers* may be considered to constitute hero cult of just this sort, or at least to be somewhat

¹¹¹ Aesch. Ag. 1226, trans. Sommerstein, modified.

¹¹² αὕτη δίπους λέαινα, συγκοιμωμένη λύκῳ λέοντος εὐγενοῦς ἀπουσία (Aesch. Ag. 1258-1259).

¹¹³ Aesch. Ag. 1489-1491, compared with 785, 805-806, quoted at p. 175.

¹¹⁴ Especially Aesch. Cho. 345-362 (with Brown 2018:30), Eum. 625-639 (with Macleod 1982:143); cf. Cho. 247, 255, 1070-1072, Eum. 455-458. Agamemnon’s killing of Iphigenia is largely forgotten, except briefly at Cho. 242: cf. van Erp Taalman Kip 1996, and Brown *ad loc.*

analogous to it.¹¹⁵ Recipients of hero cult included famous legendary heroes, including Agamemnon, who was worshipped at Mycenae and also at Amyclae near Sparta (where a separate tradition claimed that his death took place), although the archaeological evidence for the dates at which these cults were established is difficult.¹¹⁶ Recipients of hero cult also included *basileis* such as Hieron of Syracuse, who received cult at Aetna (which he founded),¹¹⁷ as well as various other people.¹¹⁸ Therefore, from one point of view that may have been available to Aeschylus and his audience, Agamemnon's receipt of cult represents the last stage of his career as a legendary hero: Agamemnon had fought the Trojan War, had been murdered, and was now worshipped as a hero. From another point of view, though, Agamemnon's receipt of cult represents the culmination of his career as a glorious and successful

¹¹⁵ Mikalson 1991:36 (cf. 118-119) argues that the altar at the tomb and animal sacrifices conducted for Agamemnon were not ordinary features of worship of one's own ancestors in the classical period: 'These are features of hero cult, and it is only as a hero that Agamemnon can be prayed to, conjured up, and expected to provide tangible assistance to the living.' Nagy 2013:486-490 sees this fictional rite as both ancestor worship and hero cult, since it has the character of hero cult but constitutes ancestor worship from Electra's point of view.

¹¹⁶ On the cults of Agamemnon, see Antonaccio 1995:147-152; Salapata 2011. The dates at which Agamemnon began to receive cult at Mycenae and Amyclae (where he was honoured alongside Cassandra, known as Alexandra) are uncertain. At Mycenae, there is no firm evidence that the site was associated with Agamemnon until the late fourth century (Morgan and Whitelaw 1991:88-90), although Salapata thinks that the cult may nevertheless have been archaic, and Antonaccio suggests that it might have been established following the Argive capture of Mycenae in 468. (This would be interesting in the present connection, since it is commonly maintained that the setting of the *Oresteia* at Argos rather than Mycenae reflects this same situation, as suggested by Müller [1833] 1835:117-119 and accepted e.g. by Dover 1957:236; Sommerstein [1996] 2010a:285.) At Amyclae, the earliest dedications to Agamemnon apparently date to c. 525 (Salapata 2014:18-19 n. 36, with further references). When Pindar places Agamemnon's death at Amyclae (Pind. *Pyth.* 11.31-37), this may reflect the existence of the cult at Amyclae (Finglass on Pind. *Pyth.* 11.32, following U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1896:250-251). Stesichorus and Simonides both already placed Agamemnon's death in Laconia (Stesichorus fr. 177 = Simon. fr. 549), and such a tradition may underlie *Il.* IX.514-518, *Od.* IV.514-518 (Davies and Finglass on Stesichorus fr. 177; Salapata 2014:28-34). Given these broad connections, it seems reasonably plausible that Aeschylus and his audience could have been aware of Agamemnon's status as a cult hero in the Peloponnese, and that *Libation-Bearers* reflects this. In the present context, though, I have not wished to place weight on this supposition.

¹¹⁷ Diod. Sic. XI.49.2, 66.4. Gelon of Syracuse and Theron of Acragas also gained hero cult according to Diod. Sic. XI.38.5, 53.2 (cf. Malkin 1987:237-239; Harrell 2002:441; B. Currie 2005:3, 171). Pind. *Pyth.* 5.96-97 implies that the Battiad rulers of Cyrene were so honoured (B. Currie 2005:3).

¹¹⁸ These include war dead, athletes, founders of *poleis*, and others (Farnell 1921:361-372; B. Currie 2005:87-172).

basileus, as it was conceived of in Aeschylus' day, as we can see most clearly in Hieron's case: a *basileus* might gain success through military or athletic victory,¹¹⁹ would be *olbios*, would meet with praise and *phthonos* alike, and after his death might be the object of cult. From either of these points of view, the cult in *Libation-Bearers* completes the presentation of Agamemnon as a great and impressive ruler, of a kind which has far more in common with the representation of rulers in Pindar and Bacchylides than it does with the conventionally negative ideas about rulers discussed in Chapter 1.

Such similarities between Aeschylus' presentation of Agamemnon and the praise of Hieron by Pindar and Bacchylides make one wonder what significance we should ascribe to the resemblances. We should bear in mind that Aeschylus visited Hieron's court between 472 and 468, when *Persians* was reperformed, and wrote his *Aetnaean Women* in celebration of the foundation of Aetna, an act for which Pindar praises Hieron in his *First Pythian* (470) and for which Hieron was subsequently honoured with hero cult. By 458, when the *Oresteia* was performed, Hieron had been dead since 467, and Syracuse had been a democracy since c. 465, as indeed it was when Aeschylus revisited Sicily, dying there in 456/5.¹²⁰ If Aeschylus visited Hieron's court and wrote a play celebrating his foundation of Aetna, it necessarily follows that Aeschylus will have been familiar with Hieron's rule—not just in the form of the rose-tinted image of Hieron's rule which Pindar and Bacchylides provide *us* with access to,

¹¹⁹ In Hieron's case, both: note the celebration of military success e.g. at Pind. *Pyth.* 1.67-80 (Harrell 2002:446; Mann 2013:29-31).

¹²⁰ These details are recorded in the *Aischylou Bios* (Aesch. T 1.9.33-34; 1.10.35-11.47; 1.18.68-69); the reperformance of *Persians* is corroborated by Eratosthenes, according to an Aristophanic scholion (Aesch. T 56a; cf. Herington 1967:75), and Aeschylus' date of death by the *Marmor Parium* (FGrHist 239 A 59) and a scholion on Ar. *Ach.* 10. Although the biographical tradition is unreliable (Lefkowitz 1981:71-73 ≈ 2012:73-76), it is generally accepted (including explicitly by Lefkowitz 2012:75) that Aeschylus visited Hieron's court in Sicily. (This fits well with Hieron's patronage of other poets, including Epicharmus and Xenophanes as well as Simonides, Pindar and Bacchylides: Morgan 2015:87-119.) Scholars have recently devoted considerable attention to the possible political or ideological function of the performance of *Aetnaean Women* and reperformance of *Persians* within Hieron's Sicily: Poli-Palladini 2001; Duncan 2011:71-76; Boshier 2012; Morgan 2015:96-105; Lamari 2017:23-35. It is not certain whether *Aetnaean Women* was performed on the same visit as *Persians* (i.e. between 472 and 468) or whether we should postulate an earlier visit in 476/5: Herington 1967:75-76.

but in terms of its actual everyday reality.¹²¹ So, it is hardly surprising if, when Aeschylus has his characters celebrate Agamemnon's splendour and *olbos*, he did so using language resembling that used by Pindar and Bacchylides; Aeschylus knew the *milieu* in which this language was used, and was presumably thoroughly familiar with it. (He may also, of course, have been familiar with it from other contexts unknown to us; for instance, earlier poets might already have applied such language to legendary rulers.) This does not, however, necessarily entail that Aeschylus wanted or expected Athenian audience-members—most of whom presumably had far less experience of sole rulers than him—to associate Agamemnon with contemporary sole rulers, or even to perceive the similarity at all (although some may have done).

However, this is no obstacle to the essential point here. In the early fifth century, there was a well-established body of ideas which might be used to present a ruler as glorious, traditional, legitimate, and of legendary stature. Pindar and Bacchylides drew on this body of ideas to praise Hieron (and, to a lesser extent, other rulers); Aeschylus presents his characters as glorifying Agamemnon in the same terms. We see this nowhere else in extant tragedy.

So far, we have focused on how these contemporary ideas are used by characters to present Agamemnon in a *positive* light. However, they also help us understand less positive aspects of his presentation, including Aeschylus' use of the conventional moral patterns of *olbos*, *hybris* and *ate*—since Pindar also uses these in odes dedicated to Hieron. In *Pythian* 2, Pindar describes Ixion's attempted rape of Hera and murder of his father-in-law in terms of *hybris*, *auate*, and punishment,¹²² and thereby presents a negative example, implicitly urging Hieron to enjoy and display his prosperity more wisely.¹²³ Similarly, in *Olympian* 1, Pindar describes Tantalus' theft of nectar and

¹²¹ In other words, the parallels are not *just* a matter of tragedy coming under epinician influence (as cogently argued by Steiner, etc.), but are *also* due to shared context: Aeschylus, like Pindar, was familiar with contemporary sole rule even independently of epinician poetry. The notion that the playwrights could have been influenced by familiarity with Sicilian rulers is suggested, but not elaborated, by Heim 1904:14.

¹²² Pind. *Pyth.* 2.25-31.

¹²³ Pind. *Pyth.* 2.49-61 explicitly gives this advice.

ambrosia from the gods as resulting from Tantalus' inability to digest his *megas olbos*, and says that on account of this *koros* he met with *ate* in the form of punishment from Zeus.¹²⁴ By using these legendary figures as negative examples in odes dedicated to Hieron, Pindar shows his awareness of the moral dangers which rulers like Hieron, too, were thought to face. This enables Pindar to draw an implicit contrast between Hieron and these conventional evildoers, indicating that Hieron (unlike other rulers of whom Pindar's audiences may have known) is *not* an evildoer of this sort.¹²⁵ So the fall from *olbos* to *ate* was part of the complex of ideas associated with rulers in Aeschylus' own day. The difference, though, is that Pindar presents the fall from *olbos* to *ate* as something which he hopes Hieron will avoid; Aeschylus, by contrast, shows it actually taking place. However, the poets' analyses of the dangers which a prosperous and successful *basileus* might face seem similar.

The scene where Agamemnon treads on the fabrics may also reflect contemporary concerns about rulers in how it deals with the East. We have no contemporary evidence for how the Persian invasion of 480 affected the Greeks' perception of Greek sole rulers such as those whom Pindar praised. However, Morgan conjectures that, in the 470s, positive ideas such as Pindar's concerning *basileia* may have been under some pressure, because of Greek hostility towards the most powerful *basileus* of all, Xerxes, and given the alignment of various Greek rulers and former rulers (especially the Athenian Peisistratids) with the Persians.¹²⁶ Furthermore, sources starting with Thucydides record traditions about Pausanias, who ruled in Sparta in the 470s in place of the underage *basileus* Pleistarchus;¹²⁷ the relevance of these traditions to this

¹²⁴ Pind. *Ol.* 1.54-59. Ixion and Tantalus as negative examples: Morgan 2015:170-171, 184-185, 205, 240-245, 259. Other passages where Pindar advises or praises avoidance of *koros* or *hybris*: *Ol.* 4.16, 7.90; *Pyth.* 11.55; *Isthm.* 3.2, 4.8-9. Kurke 1991:209-218 considers all these passages to be coloured by the rejection of *tyrannis*. However, since such a rejection is only explicit at *Pyth.* 11.55 (on which see Young 1968:6-19; Finglass *ad loc.*), this seems doubtful to me.

¹²⁵ The notorious Phalaris of Acragas is explicitly used as a negative example at Pind. *Pyth.* 1.94-98 (cf. Morgan 2015:119-120), and is contrasted with Croesus, whom Bacchylides also uses as a positive example in Bacchyl. 3 (cf. Mann 2013:32-35).

¹²⁶ Morgan 2015:4-5, 119, 132, 133-134, 155-157, 160-162; on these friendships, cf. Austin 1990:291, 295-306.

¹²⁷ Morgan 2015:142-150, 160-161.

scene in *Agamemnon* is suggested by Dover.¹²⁸ According to Thucydides, the Spartans removed Pausanias from supreme command over the Greek forces on account of his violence (βίαια) and injustice (ἀδικία), because he behaved like he was holding a *tyrannis* rather than a *strategia*, and especially because he was charged with *medismos*.¹²⁹ Then, Thucydides records that Pausanias, no longer in command, defected to the Persians, promising to subject Greece to Xerxes, and began to live in the Persian fashion, dressing and eating like a Persian, and making himself difficult to access.¹³⁰ We do not know whether such traditions were current in the 450s, when Aeschylus wrote, although Morgan argues that they probably were.¹³¹ Such traditions seem to hint at the possibility that the Greeks—at least in this specific case—may have been worried about the danger that might be posed by a Greek ruler adopting Eastern behaviours.

Agamemnon does not present himself in an Eastern fashion (as Pausanias is described as doing), and indeed (as we will see) repeatedly expresses unwillingness to be treated like an Eastern ruler. Clytaemestra, however, treats him in such a way; the reasons for thinking that her attitude has Eastern resonances are fairly convincing, despite resting on a rather small number of verbal indications. Firstly, various scholars have argued that Clytaemestra's speech welcoming Agamemnon, in which she first suggests laying out fabrics for Agamemnon to walk on, has an Eastern colour, since it contains features that appear to resemble certain passages in Mesopotamian and Egyptian literature.¹³² This connection could reasonably be doubted, since such features might be commonplaces explicable without such influence, but the resemblance may suggest that Aeschylus wrote the speech to

¹²⁸ Dover [1977] 1987:156-159. Like Dover, I do not suppose that Aeschylus had Pausanias in mind; the resemblance lies on a more general level.

¹²⁹ Thuc. I.95.3-4. On the idea of *medismos* here, see Graf 1984:15 and n. 3; Tuplin 1997:156-161.

¹³⁰ Thuc. I.130.1-2.

¹³¹ Morgan 2015:144-145 argues that, since Pausanias died in the late 470s or early 460s, such stories might easily have developed shortly afterwards. She also suggests that, if Pausanias was stripped of his command primarily because of accusations of *medismos*, stories with a similar tone might have circulated already in 477/6.

¹³² M. L. West 1997:570-572 (expanding on U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1927:287-288); similarly, Hall 1989:206. Without doubting this, Steiner 2010:33-34 also sees epinician parallels for Clytaemestra's praise, especially Pind. *Ol.* 10.86-93.

possess a somewhat Eastern ambience. Moreover, although the evidence is not plentiful, various passages seem to suggest that the treading of fabrics by rulers was an Eastern custom. If so, Aeschylus and his audience might possibly have seen it as such, in which case Clytaemestra's suggestion might in itself amount to treating Agamemnon like an Eastern ruler.¹³³ In any case, Agamemnon responds, 'For the rest, do not pamper me as if I were a woman; do not fall to the ground before me and utter open-mouthed cries in the manner of a barbarian (*or*, 'as though I were a barbarian'); and do not strew my path with clothing and thereby make it invidious.'¹³⁴ This remark can convincingly be understood to refer to the manner in which Clytaemestra addressed him, and as prompting the audience to see her manner of welcoming him in an Eastern light. Probably, then, Clytaemestra should be understood as treating

¹³³ This is argued by Hall 1989:207 (on the basis of Xen. *Cyr.* VIII.8.16); S. R. West 1992 (on the basis of Heraclides of Cyme, *BNJ* 689 F 1 [= Ath. XII.514c], with 2 *Kings* 9.13 and other Biblical passages); Crane 1993:122-123 (also noting Deinon, *BNJ* 690 F 26 [= Ath. XII.514a-b]).

Alföldi at Thompson 1956:287 and Francis 1992:355, perceiving a similarity between Agamemnon's ἀμαξήρης θρόνος (Aesch. *Ag.* 1054) and Xerxes' ἀρμάμαξα (Hdt. VII.41.1), suggest that, already on his entry, Agamemnon's chariot or carriage would have connoted the East. But the connotations of such an entry might equally be epinician (Steiner 2010:23, comparing Psaumis' ὄχεα at Pind. *Ol.* 4.10-12). Indeed, although Agamemnon's vehicle (ἀπήνη, 906 and 1039; ἀμαξήρης θρόνος, 1054; ὄχος, 1070) is presumably not an Iliadic battle chariot, Nausicaa has an elaborate ἀπήνη at *Od.* VI.58-78; so Agamemnon's entrance could be epic in its connotations.

There is no reason to suppose that Agamemnon's wealth would in itself have had Eastern connotations for an Athenian audience, given the vast wealth of Agamemnon's brother Menelaus at *Od.* IV.43-81, and given that much evidence shows that it was possible to be hugely wealthy in classical Athens without any particular Eastern connotations arising (Tuplin 1997:174-185, with detailed references).

¹³⁴ καὶ τᾶλλα μὴ γυναικὸς ἐν τρόποις ἐμὲ ἄβρυνε, μηδὲ βαρβάρου φωτὸς δίκην χαμαιπετέες βόαμα προσχάνης ἐμοί, μηδ' εἵμασι στρώσας ἐπίφθονον πόρον τίθει (Aesch. *Ag.* 918-922, trans. Sommerstein). The words βαρβάρου φωτὸς δίκην are understood to mean 'in the manner of a barbarian' by Sommerstein, and by Raeburn and Thomas *ad loc.*, but to mean 'as though I [Agamemnon] were a barbarian' by Fraenkel, Denniston and Page *ad loc.*.

When Agamemnon tells Clytaemestra not to greet him with a χαμαιπετέες βόαμα (Aesch. *Ag.* 920), this is probably a reference to the Persian custom of *proskynesis* (Fraenkel *ad loc.*, comparing Aesch. *Pers.* 588). Scholars differ regarding whether Clytaemestra actually performs *proskynesis* during her speech, which would connote the East markedly (Hall 1989:206-207), or whether Agamemnon is merely telling her not to in future (Fraenkel).

Papadodima 2013:148-149 is wholly sceptical, considering that only the χαμαιπετέες βόαμα is explicitly called foreign, and that Priam could be mentioned at 935 not as an Eastern ruler, but 'simply as "some other great king"'. But these features, together with the possibly Eastern style of Clytaemestra's speech, seem to have more cumulative force than when considered individually.

Agamemnon like an Eastern ruler, and Agamemnon should be understood as rejecting this as inappropriate to a Greek ruler such as himself.

Furthermore, in the stichomythia which follows, Clytaemestra tries to persuade Agamemnon by asking him what Priam would have done, if he had been similarly successful—to which Agamemnon replies that Priam would have walked on rich fabrics.¹³⁵ Here, it is commonly thought that Clytaemestra is drawing on the association of Troy and its rulers with the East,¹³⁶ an association common in fifth-century thought,¹³⁷ and their expectations about what Priam would have done reflect fifth-century notions about conduct typical of an Eastern *basileus*. If so, Clytaemestra is again treating Agamemnon as though he were an Eastern ruler.

Aeschylus' text does not really make it clear—although it may have been clearer in performance—whether Clytaemestra's arguments (including this one) convince Agamemnon to tread on the fabrics,¹³⁸ or whether he effectively rejects these arguments and gives in merely as a personal favour to her.¹³⁹ In either case, though, he continues to express his hesitation about acting as Clytaemestra suggests by taking off his shoes before doing so.¹⁴⁰ Clearly, on either interpretation of these lines, we are not dealing with a Pausanias-like figure who readily and eagerly sets about adopting Eastern practices; rather, Agamemnon is induced to carry out a single Eastern act which he knows to be inappropriate to a Greek *basileus*.¹⁴¹

If all this is accepted (and it does fall short of certainty), the scene addresses a similar set of problems to those touched on in the stories about Pausanias of Sparta: what are the limits of what a great, victorious and prosperous ruler may do? What kind of display and magnificence is proper to a Greek ruler, and what sort is only proper to

¹³⁵ Aesch. Ag. 935-937.

¹³⁶ So Hall 1989:209 (and already, indeed, Heim 1904:92).

¹³⁷ See Erskine 2001:61-92.

¹³⁸ E.g. Winnington-Ingram 1983:91-93; Konishi 1989; Cairns 1993:196-197.

¹³⁹ E.g. Scullion 2016:11-12 (comparing Soph. Aj. 1353, 1370-1373); cf. van Emde Boas 2017b:422-424.

¹⁴⁰ Aesch. Ag. 944-949; cf. Easterling 1973:14-15.

¹⁴¹ Cf. Fraenkel on Aesch. Ag. 936.

an Eastern ruler? However, Aeschylus deals with these issues in a way different from and subtler than the Pausanias anecdote. Whereas Pausanias' transgression of the norms is manifest, Agamemnon's is hesitant and fraught; Agamemnon's exact motivations may be unclear, but his discomfort and the tension between his decision and his own inclinations are apparent.

All in all, Aeschylus depicts Agamemnon in terms used to talk about rulers in Aeschylus' own day. If Pindar and Bacchylides were not our only contemporary sources for early fifth-century Greek rulers, we would presumably gain a much better picture of how Aeschylus' play fits into such thought. Yet the resemblances are clear despite the partial evidence, and exist on various levels. We have seen similarities of imagery and phraseology, similar attitudes towards *olbos* and human *phthonos*, a similar role for hero cult, and similar moral patterns concerning the falls of rulers. It is also possible (although not certain) that the play interacts with contemporary concerns about defining the boundary between the conduct proper to Greek rulers and those of the East.

II.iv. Conclusion to the section

We have now seen how firmly embedded these two characters are in the literary, cultural and political thought-world with which Aeschylus and his audience were familiar. In each case, understanding this connection helps us to understand each ruler, above all in two ways.

Firstly, if we understand the ideas underlying the depiction of a character, we thereby share some of the ideas which Aeschylus and his audience had available to them in interpreting the same character. Of course, our understanding of these will always be imperfect, but a partial understanding is highly desirable. If Aeschylus and his audience *did* understand Eteocles in a manner analogous to how they understood epic warriors, or if they *did* think about Agamemnon on the basis of ideas about *basileia*

that had contemporary currency, we would be missing something important if we failed to take account of these same ideas in understanding these characters.

Secondly, at least sometimes, if we do *not* understand the ideas underlying a character, that character's behaviours can be puzzling. Eteocles' decision to kill his brother *does* seem inconsistent and ill-motivated, until one takes the ideas that underlie his portrayal into account. As for Agamemnon, looking at the ideas underlying his portrayal does not help us specify his exact motivations in the scene with the fabrics. However, we have seen how emphatically he is presented, throughout the play, as a prosperous *basileus* in his moment of glory. This may perhaps help to vindicate one scholarly view of the scene, namely that of Easterling, who indeed says—even without explicitly considering the features mentioned above—that Agamemnon's behaviour in the scene with the fabrics makes sense partly because he is 'a highly successful person in his moment of triumph'.¹⁴² Easterling says that Agamemnon's behaviour is intelligible partly because we can imagine that *any* person in such a moment of triumph might act similarly; now, perhaps, we can also say that his behaviour is intelligible because he is carefully presented according to a pre-existing set of Greek conceptions about what a highly successful *basileus* looks like, how such a *basileus* might possibly behave, and what kinds of moral dangers he might encounter.

We can see, then, that understanding the ideas underlying these characters helps us to understand them. It is also, as we will now see, a vital basis for analysing their moral presentation.

III. The moral presentation of Eteocles and Agamemnon

In focusing on the ideas in light of which Eteocles and Agamemnon may be understood, we have gone some way towards explaining Aeschylus' depiction of

¹⁴² Easterling 1973:10 (and similar points are made elsewhere in the article); cf. also Heath 1987:120.

them. However, it is also important to consider how Aeschylus has presented these characters in moral terms, through their own words (*self-presentation*) and those of other characters (*presentation by other characters*). Has Aeschylus so arranged matters that the various characters all express essentially the same moral view of Eteocles in *Seven Against Thebes*, and of Agamemnon in *Agamemnon*, thereby presenting to the audience essentially a single moral assessment of each character? Or has Aeschylus presented conflicting views of each character within each play, creating an impression of moral complexity? Or has Aeschylus used these characterisation techniques in a haphazard or chaotic way, as we might expect if he was indifferent to the presentation of his characters in moral terms?

In Chapters 6 and 7, it will be argued that, in the plays discussed, the viewpoints which different characters express regarding each ruler largely cohere. In *Antigone*, various characters make it clear that Creon is in the wrong: Creon holds the opposite view, but ultimately accepts this too. In *Oedipus Tyrannus*, the characters essentially admire Oedipus, and pity him after his fall. In *Bacchae*, all the other characters present Pentheus as foolish and impious—although, at the end, there is a division of views, since the Chorus exults over his grisly demise, whereas Pentheus' family laments him and sees him more positively (although they still consider him to have been in the wrong). In none of these cases is there *complete* agreement in the characters' moral assessments, but a single moral judgement preponderates. The situation in these plays, then, is close to the first possibility mentioned above, namely that the playwrights have carefully presented a single moral assessment of the characters. This does not necessarily entail that audience-members would simply have adopted whatever moral assessment preponderates; however, even if audience-members doubt it or diverge from it, this moral assessment is firmly embedded in the play and constitutes the essential starting-point for any such meditations.

In *Seven Against Thebes*, however, it is very difficult to see Aeschylus as doing anything of this sort. This is simply because there are only three characters (Eteocles, the Messenger and the Chorus), a situation which is partly a result (although not a

necessary consequence) of early fifth-century tragedies using only two actors.¹⁴³ Therefore, the only two moral perspectives on Eteocles' most morally consequential action, confronting his brother, are those of Eteocles himself (who thinks that he is right) and the Chorus (which is horrified). Since no third character expresses a view, there is nothing *within the text itself* to arbitrate between these perspectives or to guide audience-members towards accepting one over the other. Rather, the audience will simply have had to assess Eteocles on the basis of their own pre-existing moral views, which may have included holding his actions as a general and defender of his *polis* in high regard, but which will surely also have included a strong current of horror at the prospect of fratricide. We have no external evidence on how Athenians in the 470s will have rated each of these considerations; we can guess, but there is no obvious way of being confident that such guesses are correct.¹⁴⁴

By contrast, in *Agamemnon*, there is clearly no shortage of characters who express an opinion—and these views show a considerable degree of coherence. The Herald, the Chorus, Clytaemestra (while dissembling), and Agamemnon himself, as well as Cassandra, all consistently say positive and admiring things about Agamemnon, and the praise of Agamemnon by Orestes and the Chorus in *Libation-Bearers* and Apollo in *Eumenides* represents a clear continuation of this praise in *Agamemnon*.¹⁴⁵ On the face of it, the characters' explicit attitudes present a fairly unified and consistent moral picture of Agamemnon as glorious and praiseworthy.

Yet this picture is greatly complicated by important factors that push in the opposite direction. Above all, Agamemnon's sacrifice of Iphigenia is described in decidedly unpleasant and morally troubling terms. Although the Chorus' account presents

¹⁴³ On this convention, see Starkey 2018:269-281.

¹⁴⁴ The same problem applies to any attempt to judge Eteocles' argument with the women at Aesch. *Sept.* 182-263. Is his misogyny of a piece with contemporary norms (cf. Hutchinson on Aesch. *Sept.* 187-195), or would it have seemed excessive (e.g. I. C. Torrance 2007:96-99)? Strong views have been expressed, but, since we simply do not know what degree of misogyny was considered appropriate at Athens in the 470s, we cannot confidently resolve the problem.

¹⁴⁵ See p. 178.

Agamemnon's dilemma as extremely difficult,¹⁴⁶ the Chorus reacts to Agamemnon's decision with abhorrence, telling us that 'his mental wind veered in a direction that was impious, impure, unholy, and from that point he turned to a mindset that would stop at nothing.'¹⁴⁷ Here, the Chorus expresses considerable discomfort and horror at his action, and they proceed to describe the sacrifice with considerable pathos. Furthermore, just before Agamemnon's entry, although their attitude is essentially one of high praise and loyalty, the Chorus also reproaches Agamemnon rather strongly, saying, 'To me, at that time, when you were leading forth an expedition on account of Helen—I will not conceal this from you—you seemed painted in very ugly colours and like one whose mind was steering a bad course, trying to win back a willingly wanton <woman> by taking men to their deaths'.¹⁴⁸ So the Chorus, even as they express their own positive view of Agamemnon, draws attention to the terrible and horrific nature of his actions; it can hardly be said that, by including these lines, Aeschylus has presented Agamemnon in a resoundingly positive moral light.¹⁴⁹

Moreover, throughout the play the Chorus, interpreting events through a strongly gnomic perspective and in terms of traditional moral patterns, repeatedly implies that Agamemnon is an evildoer. The first and second stasima both express the view, strongly and in a generalising fashion, that the gods punish wrongdoers who offend against *dike*. In the second stasimon the Chorus is primarily talking about Paris and Troy,¹⁵⁰ but in the first stasimon they clearly imply that Agamemnon may likewise suffer punishment at the gods' hands when they say,

'I have an anxiety that waits to hear of something happening under cover of night.
For the gods do not fail to take aim against those who have killed many, and in

¹⁴⁶ Aesch. Ag. 205-213.

¹⁴⁷ φρενὸς πνέων δυσσεβῆ τροπαίαν ἀναγνον, ἀνίερρον, τόθεν τὸ παντότολμον φρονεῖν μετέγνω (Aesch. Ag. 219-221, trans. Sommerstein, modified).

¹⁴⁸ σὺ δ' ἐμοὶ τότε μὲν στέλλων στρατιὰν Ἑλένης ἔνεκ', οὐ γὰρ σ' ἐπικεύσω, κάρτ' ἀπομούσως ἦσθα γεγραμμένος οὐδ' εὖ πραπίδων οἶακα νέμων, < γυναικὸς > θάρσος ἐκούσιον ἀνδράσι θνήσκουσι κομίζων (Aesch. Ag. 799-802, trans. Sommerstein).

¹⁴⁹ Cf. Podlecki 1986:91-92.

¹⁵⁰ Aesch. Ag. 750-782. This passage is also, however, capable of application to Agamemnon, and such application seems to be encouraged by its placement immediately before the anapaests with which the Chorus greets Agamemnon (as e.g. Podlecki 1986:91 notes).

time the black Furies enfeeble him who has been fortunate against justice (τυχηρὸν ὄντ' ἄνευ δίκας), reversing his fortune and corroding his life, and when he comes to the land of the unseen, he has no protection. And to be excessively praised is dangerous: a thunderbolt is launched from the eyes of Zeus. I prefer a prosperity that attracts no envy: may I neither be a sacker of cities, nor myself be captured and see my life subjected to another.¹⁵¹

In expressing their fear that Agamemnon may be punished by the gods, the Chorus only obliquely reflects upon Agamemnon. Nevertheless, these lines point to the bloodiness of Agamemnon's conquest of Troy and imply that he may be one of those who have gained success without *dike*. Similarly, the third stasimon seems to hint darkly and unpleasantly at Agamemnon's guilt in spilling his daughter's blood, and to imply the likelihood of it bringing bad consequences upon him.¹⁵² Thus, the first three stasima all build on the *parodos* in recalling Agamemnon's bloody deeds. This implicit darkening of his presentation coexists and contrasts with the Chorus' own attitude, which remains essentially laudatory, despite their stated misgivings.

Furthermore, the Chorus, in articulating their own positive view, repeatedly complicates the picture by mentioning that others hold the contrary view. As we have seen, even Pindar mentions malcontents to *deprecate their viewpoint*, but the Chorus goes further, dwelling considerably on the existence of antipathy towards Agamemnon,¹⁵³ and stating that it is a serious matter.¹⁵⁴ The Chorus does not treat this contrary perspective as worthless or insubstantial, as Pindar does; they give it

¹⁵¹ μένει δ' ἀκοῦσαί τί μοι μέριμνα νυκτηρεφές. τῶν πολυκτόνων γὰρ οὐκ ἄσκοποι θεοί, κελαιναὶ δ' Ἑρινύες χρόνῳ τυχηρὸν ὄντ' ἄνευ δίκας παλιντυχεῖ τριβᾶ βίου τιθεῖσ' ἀμαυρόν, ἐν δ' αἴστοις τελέθοντος οὐτις ἀλκά. τὸ δ' ὑπερκόπως κλύειν εὖ βαρὺ· βάλλεται γὰρ ὅσοις Διόθεν κεραυνός. κρίνω δ' ἄφθονον ὄλβον· μήτ' εἶην πτολιπόρθης, μήτ' οὖν αὐτὸς ἀλόνθ' ὑπ' ἄλλῳ βίον κατίδοιμι (Aesch. Ag. 459-474, trans. Sommerstein).

¹⁵² τὸ δ' ἐπὶ γὰν πεσὸν ἅπαξ θανάσιμον πρόπαρ ἀνδρὸς μέλαν αἷμα τίς ἂν πάλιν ἀγκαλέσαιτ' ἐπαείδων; (Aesch. Ag. 1018-1021); so e.g. Raeburn and Thomas *ad loc.*.

¹⁵³ Aesch. Ag. 445-451; with regard to the language and imagery here, cf. Sailor and Stroup 1999:159-160.

¹⁵⁴ βαρεῖα δ' ἀστῶν φάτις σὺν κότῳ, δημοκράντου δ' ἀρᾶς τίνει χρέος (Aesch. Ag. 456-457).

considerable weight, and offer their support to Agamemnon despite expressing severe discomfort at his actions.¹⁵⁵

Also, we must take into account Clytaemestra's perspective. She, like the Chorus and the Herald, praises Agamemnon in the highest terms. Yet we know that she is speaking deceptively: her real opinion of Agamemnon is exactly the opposite. Consequently, whenever she praises Agamemnon, audience-members must necessarily be conscious that all her praise is shot through with undertones of hostility. Attention is repeatedly drawn to this by double meanings. So, in calling Agamemnon her 'revered husband' (αἰδοῖον πόσιν), she indicates for the audience her actual lack of *aidos* towards him; in saying that no day could be sweeter than his day of return, she indicates that her actual pleasure derives from the prospect of killing him.¹⁵⁶ When she says that she is loyal to Agamemnon and hostile to his enemies, and knows no more of the pleasure of another man than of the tempering of iron, this points to her murderous hostility towards Agamemnon, motivated by an affair with his enemy.¹⁵⁷ Whereas the Chorus *fears* that Agamemnon may meet with divine punishment, the audience will realise, when Clytaemestra prays to Zeus, that she is calling for assistance in accomplishing Agamemnon's death.¹⁵⁸ All these double meanings hint at Clytaemestra's actual, bitterly hostile, view of Agamemnon.¹⁵⁹ All in all, Clytaemestra's extravagant but insincere praise, like the Chorus' hesitant and tortured praise, draws attention to the moral ambiguity of Agamemnon's past conduct, the bloodiness of which has (for different reasons) earned him the hostility both of Clytaemestra and of the discontented citizens mentioned by the Chorus.

¹⁵⁵ Carey 2012:20 makes this point well (although regarding Aesch. Ag. 783-787, discussed at p. 175 above): 'What in Pindar is (for all its seriousness) in part a rhetorical "conceit" becomes here a genuinely hesitant response complicated by an awareness of the moral ambiguity of [Agamemnon's] conduct, the enormous cost of his success in human lives, the dangers for him which the chorus perceive, and their own ambiguous combination of loyalty and disapproval.' On the Chorus' troubled attitude, cf. also Dover 1973:58, 66-67.

¹⁵⁶ Aesch. Ag. 600-604; cf. B. Vickers 1973:361.

¹⁵⁷ Aesch. Ag. 611-612, with Raeburn and Thomas *ad loc.*.

¹⁵⁸ Aesch. Ag. 973-974, with Fraenkel *ad loc.*.

¹⁵⁹ Further examples: Stanford 1942:119-120.

The views of Agamemnon expressed, then, diverge considerably. We have various strongly positive views, which predominate in what the characters say explicitly. On the other hand, there is the strongly negative view which the Chorus attributes to other citizens, and which the Chorus takes seriously; they themselves are troubled for the same reasons. Then there is Clytaemestra: explicitly she praises Agamemnon more extravagantly than any other character, but we know that her actual view is utterly hostile. Therefore, since Aeschylus has arranged for multiple perspectives on Agamemnon to be presented, some positive and some negative, making both apparent throughout the play, he has clearly presented Agamemnon with profound moral complexity—the second of the possibilities mentioned at the start of this section. This is not fortuitous, but is part of the play's whole design. All the morally weighty issues raised in *Agamemnon*—the sacrifice of Iphigenia, the Trojan War, the scene with the fabrics, and the murder of Agamemnon—are closely linked with the moral presentation of Agamemnon, who is consequently the focus of much of the play's moral interest.

So far, though, we have been talking in rather abstract terms, as though in depicting Eteocles and Agamemnon what Aeschylus was doing was simply juxtaposing positive and negative aspects. We can, however, go a bit further, if we are willing to grant that we can discern the intentions of a playwright from the playwright's apparent choices in developing pre-existing legendary material. This can be dangerous, since it is only ever partly possible to reconstruct the traditions on which the playwrights relied. However, we do know that Eteocles' mutual fratricide with his brother Polynices and Agamemnon's sacrifice of his daughter Iphigenia were well-established.¹⁶⁰ We do not know how Aeschylus' predecessors, such as the *Thebaid* and *Nostoi* (or less textually fixed epic poems treating similar subject-matter), represented these deeds—nor do we know how authors contemporary with Aeschylus presented these acts.

¹⁶⁰ The fratricide: *Thebaid* fr. 3; Stesichorus fr. 97.211-212 (cf. Gantz 1993:502-503). Iphigenia: [Hes.] *Cat.* fr. 19.13-26 (followed here by Stesichorus fr. 178); *Cypria* arg. 8; cf. Gantz 1993:582-583. Some think that the sacrifice is alluded to at *Il.* I.70-72, 106-108 (e.g. Kullmann 1960:198, 1965:201; M. L. West 2013:110), but others doubt this (cf. Gantz 1993:582; Hainsworth on *Il.* IX.145).

Nevertheless, even if we cannot know where Aeschylus has innovated in presenting these acts, we can say that Aeschylus has *emphasised* certain aspects. Moreover, the aspects emphasised in each case are comparable: they are not identical (and the representation of the two rulers' decisions differs considerably), but there is a kinship between them. In *Seven Against Thebes*, the deed is presented as being motivated primarily by Eteocles' sense of honour and shame, although this is not sharply distinguished from his motivation of defending the *polis* (which is more strongly emphasised earlier in the play);¹⁶¹ in *Agamemnon*, the motivation for the deed is presented as being Agamemnon's reluctance, faced with Calchas' instruction that a sacrifice must be performed, to desert his fleet and lose his allies by refusing to perform it.¹⁶² In both cases, though, the dreadfulness of the act stands in tension with its status as something that the ruler feels that, as a ruler, he has to do, whether for the sake of honour or for the sake of his people. In both cases, the Chorus is horrified, draws attention to the bloodiness of the deed, and expresses the thought that the ruler's mind has been driven astray by some kind of derangement. Also, in both cases Aeschylus surrounds the act with dense clouds of gnomic moralising: the Chorus of *Seven Against Thebes* fits Eteocles' act into the bloody ancestral troubles of his progenitors, while the Chorus of *Agamemnon* hints throughout the first three stasima at the prospect of Agamemnon meeting with punishment in turn. Therefore, although we cannot know where Aeschylus is innovating, we can be sure that in both cases he emphasised the same broad aspects—above all, the sheer horror of these legendary figures' deeds, the place of these acts within larger patterns of divine activity and family disaster, and the tension between these acts and conventional moral ideas of the sort expressed by the Chorus.

Yet in both cases—as we have seen—Aeschylus places these characters' dreadful deeds in tension with contrasting and positive aspects, namely Eteocles' exemplary conduct as a general and as an honourable epic warrior and Agamemnon's glory and

¹⁶¹ See pp. 155-161, 164-165.

¹⁶² Aesch. *Ag.* 212-213.

magnificence as a victorious *olbios*. This tension between the positive aspects of their presentation and their status as horrific wrongdoers has puzzled scholars, who have often emphasised one side at the expense of the other. Yet, if—as I am suggesting—Aeschylus’ interest in depicting these acts lay in bringing out the dreadfulness and horror of these deeds which these legendary figures traditionally performed, it follows that the moral interest of these characters lies precisely in the fact that they are at the same time magnificent and dreadful. Furthermore, it follows that the moral complexity with which they are presented is intentionally sought, and integral to the plays’ design.

How might Aeschylus’ Athenian audience have reacted to these characters? As always, the question is insoluble. Since these characters’ deeds put them beyond the pale of what was acceptable in the fifth-century *polis*, Athenians may very probably have reacted to these actions, like the Chorus, with a good deal of horror and aversion. Yet we should not discount other more positive aspects or regard them as mere foils for the negative. There is no particular reason to doubt that Athenians might have admired Eteocles’ epic-style martial valour and defence of his *polis*, and Eteocles’ appeals to *dike* and *peitharchia* would also presumably have presented him positively. It is difficult to know how Athenians would have reacted to the elaborate praise of Agamemnon. One might be tempted to suggest that Athenians would have been instinctively hostile to such extravagance, but it seems doubtful whether we can really attribute such systematically anti-elitist sentiments to fifth-century Athenians; Athenian politicians not infrequently flaunted their wealth and athletic and military victories, displaying them prominently in the public sphere.¹⁶³ Moreover, Aeschylus makes the praise of Agamemnon frequent throughout the *Oresteia*, putting it into the

¹⁶³ See especially Hornblower 2004:254-261. Alcibiades’ wealth-flaunting behaviour at Thuc. VI.16.1-3 is important evidence, indicating that similar display might still be politically viable even late in the fifth century. Certainly, Thucydides says that Alcibiades’ behaviour led to accusations of *tyrannis* against him (VI.15.4; cf. Kurke 1991:175-176), and Pindar’s focus on *phthonos* indicates that even in his day some felt hostile towards the display of wealth. But lavish display remained part of fifth-century Athenian life, and audience-members may have had various attitudes towards it, some more admiring, some more begrudging. Griffith 1995:84 thinks that Agamemnon ‘represents in many respects the embodiment of the democratically-perceived upper-class wastrel’, but I am not sure that any such notion is suggested by the play; rather, the characters admire him.

mouths of sympathetic characters such as the Herald and the Chorus, for whom Agamemnon is their legitimate and honoured *basileus*. No doubt it would be difficult for Athenians to judge a fratricidal Eteocles and a filicidal Agamemnon favourably by their own contemporary standards; yet, by presenting Eteocles as an epic warrior and Agamemnon as a glorious *basileus*, Aeschylus has also provided other standards, largely external to the Athenian democratic *polis*, against which to judge them. It is in this very clash that the characters' moral complexity lies.

As always, however, we altogether lack hard evidence for audience reactions to fifth-century tragedy. We can only be sure of what Aeschylus has written: in each play, Aeschylus has presented a character who acts and is assessed positively and negatively. Aeschylus leaves his audience to tease out the moral problem. With exactly how much difficulty, or with what unanimity, audience-members resolved the issues and reached a decisive judgement on the characters, we will never know.

IV. Conclusion

In Chapters 1-4 we attempted to explain the ideas underlying the depiction of various rulers, but without considering how, in each case, the use of these ideas allowed the playwright to depict the character in a particular way. In this chapter, by contrast, focusing on two specific characters has enabled us to look much more closely not just at the ideas underlying their portrayal, but also at *how* Aeschylus has used these ideas to depict these characters.

Investigating these rulers in this fashion has yielded important results. As we saw in section II, when we consider the ideas in terms of which Eteocles and Agamemnon are depicted, it becomes clear that Eteocles behaves in a fashion analogous to certain epic warriors. Agamemnon, meanwhile, is depicted in similar terms, and as encountering similar moral dangers, to those which were seen as applicable to *basileis* in Aeschylus' own day. This is important for two reasons—firstly because it renders their actions, which in Eteocles' case at least might otherwise seem puzzling, more

readily intelligible, and secondly because it provides us with categories for interpreting these characters which may be expected to approximate to those used by Aeschylus and his audience in interpreting them.

Moreover, studying Aeschylus' use of these same underlying ideas greatly helps us to understand how he has depicted these characters in moral terms. It is, of course, possible to inquire into the moral depiction of characters even without laying out the ideas which these characters presuppose. However, doing so makes our understanding of their presentation in moral terms much clearer, because it enables us to see how this moral presentation fits into the thought of Aeschylus' own day. Moreover, it enables us to see much more clearly the intimate relationship that exists between, on the one hand, the moral and intellectual issues raised in each play and, on the other hand, the presentation of the characters.¹⁶⁴ In particular, although the moral complexity of Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* as a play has been widely recognised, it has been less readily noted that this moral complexity inheres not only in the play as a whole, but actually in the presentation of its titular character. When we focus closely on the tensions in the presentation of this character—between his splendour and his blood-guilt—we find ourselves confronted with a moral problem that is central to the play, but which is less apparent otherwise. Similarly, considering the presentation of Agamemnon as a *basileus* enables us to see very readily that the play engages in an extended meditation on the nature of *basileia*, with all its glories and dangers. Practically speaking, therefore, it is clear that a careful focus on the moral presentation of *characters* in a play by Aeschylus leads directly to a better understanding of the *issues* of that play.

In the Introduction to Part Two, I mentioned that this thesis would not focus greatly on the question of *individuality*, but rather would focus specifically on the *moral* presentation of characters. Nevertheless, our discussion does give us a better sense of what the individuality of a character in tragedy consists in. As I said before, the

¹⁶⁴ In the Introduction to Part Two, I suggested that such a relationship generally exists (pp. 146-147).

individuality of a tragic character *partly* consists in their implicit characterisation—the style of their speech, and so forth. But it also surely *partly* (or even primarily) consists precisely in the ideas that underlie their portrayal, and in the fact that these ideas are altogether different in different cases. That is to say, if we ask what about Eteocles and Agamemnon makes them distinctive from one another, we will surely have to say that they are different *because the ideas upon which they are founded are different*. At this, the most basic and fundamental level of their construction, they really have almost nothing in common with each other or with any other character in extant tragedy—even if, at the level of moral presentation, Aeschylus’ treatment of each displays certain common threads (horror at their crimes, ancestral *kaka*, and so forth). For us today, this surely plays a vital role in creating a vivid sense of each of these characters’ individuality—and it will, we may presume, have done the same for Aeschylus’ audience, helping to maintain their interest in each character and involving them in the different moral issues presented in each case.

CHAPTER 6. CREON AND OEDIPUS: A COMPARISON OF TWO RULERS IN SOPHOCLES

I. Introduction

We have already said much about the ideas underlying the presentation of Creon in *Antigone* and Oedipus in *Oedipus Tyrannus*. This chapter will focus on how Sophocles, using these ideas, presents these characters in moral terms.

Interpretation of *Antigone* has long revolved to a considerable extent around Creon.¹ Most scholars have considered the play to present him in a negative light, as acting wrongly; these scholars have generally also regarded Creon as a 'tyrant', emphasising the traditional negative features discussed in Chapter 1.² Some, however, have seen him more positively, as a man who acts on behalf of the *polis* and with whom the audience would have sympathised. Such scholars have often *denied* that Creon should be considered a 'tyrant', emphasising the contemporary aspects of his portrayal,³ although some have rightly noted that the contemporary aspects of Creon's portrayal do not necessarily make it positive.⁴ The problem with this debate, however, is that Sophocles has clearly presented Creon *both* using conventionally negative features shared with the story tradition *and* in contemporary terms; it is misleading to set these against each other. Rather, to understand Creon, we should consider how Sophocles has *blended* these elements.⁵ But few have even acknowledged both simultaneously. We should also not forget Creon's status as a legendary *basileus*, which is emphasised briefly when he first enters.

¹ Funke's summary of earlier scholarship shows this particularly clearly (1966:29-33).

² Analyses of Creon as a 'tyrant' are numerous, and include Bowra 1944:72-78; Funke 1966; Podlecki 1966; Lanza 1977:149-159; Winnington-Ingram 1980:125-127; Cerri 1982:147-149; Griffith 1999:33; Seaford 2003:104-106; Ugolini 2017:465-466.

³ E.g. MacKay 1962:169; Sourvinou-Inwood 1989:142.

⁴ Holt 1999; cf. Liapis 2013.

⁵ That Creon should be seen as combining a *mixture* of elements is correctly maintained by Heim 1904:10.

Such questions have been less central to discussion of Oedipus, which has often focused on how his moral responsibility is presented. However, like Creon, Oedipus is presented using three groups of underlying ideas—those evoking his status as a legendary figure, those reminiscent of the story tradition, and those shared with contemporary life. Scholars have generally regarded Oedipus as a ‘good king’, but several have argued that ‘tyrannical’ elements come to the fore during the middle part of the play.⁶ This is, to an extent, well justified; as discussed in Chapter 1, Oedipus exhibits the anger and suspicion associated with rulers in the story tradition primarily in his disputes with Teiresias and Creon. However, beyond seeing Oedipus as behaving in a more ‘tyrannical’ way in the middle of the play, Sophocles’ blending of these different elements has been little scrutinised.

Some scholars have argued that Creon and Oedipus are *transformed* into ‘tyrants’ over the course of each play.⁷ However, although it is true that these rulers’ fear, anger and suspicion emerge only some way into each play’s action, it seems doubtful whether this kind of developmental view—appealing though it may be—is really justified. Creon articulates principles with contemporary currency in democratic Athens as late as his discussion with Haemon, and the Chorus of *Oedipus Tyrannus* recalls Oedipus’ goodness towards the *polis* even late in the play.⁸ Sophocles’ blending of these different elements does not, then, take the form of a straightforward linear

⁶ So Bowra 1944:188-189; Lanza 1977:141-148; Edmunds 2012:65-67, 82-83. Edmunds 2002 provides a detailed study of Oedipus as ‘tyrant’.

⁷ Creon: Bowra 1944:77, Podlecki 1966:365-366, Jouanna [2007] 2018:334. Oedipus: Lanza 1977:141-148. Both: Ugolini 2017:463-467. Bowra, Podlecki and Jouanna compare Otanes’ remark that even a good man placed in the position of a sole ruler would “stand outside his usual ways of thinking” (ἐκτὸς τῶν ἐωθότων νοημάτων στήσειε, Hdt. III.80.3). But the specific notion that Creon (or Oedipus) is corrupted by power is not mentioned in the plays themselves, and the analogy therefore seems superficial. Besides, both rulers’ conduct throughout the play is based precisely on rigid adherence to their emphatically stated initial principles, namely Creon’s determination that an enemy of the *polis* should not be buried (Soph. *Ant.* 187-210) and Oedipus’ determination to obey the god’s instructions and rescue the *polis* (e.g. *OT* 68-77).

⁸ Especially Soph. *Ant.* 663-678 (with pp. 120-121 above); *OT* 1196-1222 (with p. 220 below). These problems are indeed noted by Ugolini 2017:466 (Creon); Edmunds 2012:64 (Oedipus).

progression. Besides, both plays clearly indicate that these rulers' angry conduct is a permanent feature of their disposition, extending into the past.⁹

Existing accounts also exhibit a further shortcoming. Scholars have often noted substantial resemblances between Creon and Oedipus. Some of these features are also shared with the story tradition, as discussed in Chapter 1, such as anger and suspicion, detection and prevention of threats to rule, subjects who hesitate to address rulers, and also the fall from *olbos* to *ate*, invoked in the second stasimon of each play.

Other shared features, however, are not shared with the story tradition, and result from Sophocles' similar technique in composing the plays. Both depict a ruler who is in a sense deluded—Creon morally, Oedipus factually—coming to understand the real situation. The plays' first scenes differ; Creon is initially absent, whereas Oedipus appears at the start. However, after the *parodos*, each ruler makes a proclamation. The middle of each play consists of scenes in which each ruler interacts with, and questions, various interlocutors—including Teiresias (last in *Antigone*, first in *Oedipus Tyrannus*),¹⁰ a servant (the Guard in *Antigone*, the Shepherd in *Oedipus Tyrannus*), a female family member (Antigone in *Antigone*, Jocasta in *Oedipus Tyrannus*), and a male family member (Haemon in *Antigone*, Creon in *Oedipus Tyrannus*). By the end of these scenes, each ruler realises his mistake. A messenger announces the destruction of the ruler's family; the ruler emerges, laments his ruin, and returns into the house, a broken man.¹¹ Furthermore, each ruler is said not to 'think right' (φρονεῖν), is urged to lay aside his obstinacy (ἀνθαδία), yield (εἵκεν) and learn (μανθάνειν), and is

⁹ See pp. 223-225.

¹⁰ Teiresias scenes also appear at Eur. *Bacch.* 170-369 (discussed throughout Chapter 7) and *Phoen.* 834-1018, and should therefore be considered a tragic *topos*, although a flexible one (Ugolini 1995:186-191). Cf. also Lanza 1977:252-254.

¹¹ The final scenes are formally similar, containing partially lyrical dialogues with the Chorus in strophic pairs, followed by further dialogue, and ending with the ruler being led back into the palace (Jouanna [2007] 2018:440-441).

unwilling to listen to persuasion; these features, as Knox argues, are common to various Sophoclean characters.¹²

Scholars have noted these resemblances briefly and disparately,¹³ but, in studying the plays for the most part separately, have paid little systematic attention to them. Yet these similarities pose a problem for the common view that Creon is basically presented negatively, Oedipus positively; indeed, in arguing for a culpable Oedipus, Lefèvre appeals precisely to the similarities between Oedipus and Creon.¹⁴ So they need proper consideration. Furthermore, as studies such as Kirkwood's have shown regarding other plays, there is no better way of understanding Sophocles' dramatic technique than comparing different plays composed in comparable ways.¹⁵ Comparing Creon and Oedipus, therefore, promises to be useful.

This chapter, taking these similarities for granted, aims to explain how Sophocles has presented Creon and Oedipus *differently*. There are, I think, two main overarching differences. Firstly, the two plays start entirely differently; Oedipus is presented much more positively than Creon (II). Secondly, although Creon and Oedipus behave somewhat similarly in the scenes that follow, and are presented morally in some of the same ways, their situations are very different; Creon makes a moral misjudgement, for which the characters blame him, whereas Oedipus is under a factual misconception, for which he is pitied (III). In short, Sophocles has used similar

¹² Knox 1964:10-27 (in general), 67-75 (Creon); cf. Diller 1956. I cite Knox several times, without fully subscribing to his interpretation of *Oedipus Tyrannus* (Knox 1957) or Sophocles in general (Knox 1964); cf. e.g. Finglass 2011a:42-44, and p. 95 n. 106 above.

¹³ Brief discussions, noting these similarities and others, include: T. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1917:69-70 n. 1; Reinhardt [1933] 1979:99-101, 104-113; Kitto [1939] 1961:143; Nauhardt 1940:62-63; R. M. Torrance 1965:305; Ehrenberg 1954:66-69, 73-74; Else 1976:80-96; Hester 1977:39; Patzer 1978:86-87; Lefèvre 1987:55-56; Segal [1993] 2001:132-133; Gould 2001:263-268; Cuny 2004:67-69, 2007:181-186, 286; Jouanna [2007] 2018:316-317, 333-340, 440-442; Cairns 2013:xxxvii-xxxviii; T. Graham 2017:144-146; Ugolini 2017:463-469. Else 1976:80-96 is perhaps most detailed, noting various close verbal parallels. He sees these as more apt to Oedipus than Creon, despite *Oedipus Tyrannus* probably being later, and therefore suggests that the shared features go back to Aeschylus' Oedipus, and perhaps also to epic. However, the evidence seems inadequate, and Else ignores Herodotus, where many of the shared elements also occur (cf. Chapter 1).

¹⁴ Lefèvre 1987:55-56.

¹⁵ Kirkwood 1958.

means to present Creon and Oedipus, but has presented them to different effect in important ways. Furthermore, although Sophocles has used conventional elements shared with the story tradition ('tyrannical' elements) in presenting both, he has used them to different effect in each case, in line with his different moral presentation of the two rulers (IV).

The differences between Creon and Oedipus are closely connected to each play's *situation*. Both rulers are subject to a delusion, but the substance of this delusion differs greatly. In *Antigone*, the key issues are whether Creon is justified in denying burial to Polynices, insisting on obedience to his proclamation, and having Antigone executed for flouting it. Creon and Antigone justify their positions using contemporary principles, Creon arguing that traitors should not be buried on native soil,¹⁶ and that *polis* officials should be obeyed,¹⁷ while Antigone appeals to the Panhellenic and divine principle that the dead should always be buried,¹⁸ and argues that officials' orders should not be obeyed if contrary to established laws.¹⁹ Since, then, Sophocles has made the play revolve to a significant extent around whether

¹⁶ Xen. *Hell.* I.7.22; cf. Rosivach 1983:193-194 (with other passages). At Soph. *Aj.* 1055, Menelaus appeals to the same principle in refusing to bury Ajax; cf. Rosivach 1983:204. Since Athenian practice allowed traitors to be buried beyond the borders, some maintain that Creon's proclamation cannot be justified using Athenian legal principles, as it involves leaving Polynices unburied altogether (e.g. Harris [2004] 2006:67-68). However, even if Creon's proclamation does not correspond absolutely with Athenian law, an Athenian might still have felt that the principle of not burying traitors is sound, and, besides, Antigone *does* break Athenian law, since she *does* bury Polynices on his native soil. Furthermore, since the play does not raise the possibility of burying Polynices beyond the borders, making it doubtful whether the play prompts interpretation in such a light. Therefore, Creon's appeal to this principle probably has some force. Cf. Rosivach 1983:193-194 and 208 n. 49; Schmitt 1988:7-8; Griffith 1999:29; Holt 1999:663-668; Liapis 2013:89-90; Cairns 2016:39.

¹⁷ See pp. 117-124. Also important is Xen. *Mem.* I.2.42-46 (discussed by Harris [2004] 2006:48-49, cf. 70-71), where Pericles and Alcibiades discuss whether obedience to *nomoi* is obligatory if they are forcible impositions of a *tyrannos*—precisely the situation portrayed in *Antigone*. The fact that Xenophon's Pericles initially maintains that one should always obey the *nomoi* regardless may indicate that this was a question about which Athenians could (at least in Xenophon's view) hold opposed opinions.

¹⁸ Soph. *Ant.* 450-455, Eur. *Supp.* 311, 526-527, 671-672, Thuc. IV.97.2, and Lys. II.7-10, with Rosivach 1983:200-201; R. C. T. Parker 1983:44-45; Harris [2004] 2006:65-68.

¹⁹ This principle is implied by the Ephebic Oath (quoted at p. 117), and relied upon at Lys. XII.29-31, XV.11, XXII.10; [Dem.] L.46-51; Xen. *Mem.* IV.4.1-3. These passages are discussed by Harris [2004] 2006:59-60, 68-69, who shows excellently how controversies similar to that of *Antigone* were played out in Athenian court cases.

Creon has made the right decision, it is unsurprising that the play focuses considerably on Creon's judgement, or that Sophocles presents Creon in terms analogous to a contemporary official, enabling audience-members to judge him by democratic standards. By contrast, *Oedipus Tyrannus* concerns Oedipus' guilt for killing his father, in ignorance of his father's identity, long before the play. His position is therefore one of factual ignorance; it does not revolve around any decision taken by Oedipus as ruler, and has less to do with Oedipus' judgement or contemporary political ideas. It is therefore natural that Sophocles has not focused on these aspects, but rather has emphasised the horrific and pitiful state of Oedipus' situation, and the ignorance in which he killed his father.

By this, though, I do not mean that Sophocles' presentation of these characters is *subordinate* to the situation. Sophocles had great freedom to arrange each play's situation as he wished. Furthermore, even without changing the situation, Sophocles could easily have presented Creon's actions less unfavourably, or could have presented Oedipus as a morally guilty wrongdoer (as indeed some scholars maintain). We are not trying to discover how the situation of each play has dictated the presentation of the characters, but rather how Sophocles has composed the two to present a coherent whole, within which the presentation of each ruler plays an indissoluble part.

Scholars have reasonable grounds for thinking that *Antigone* is the earlier play (440s-450s), *Oedipus Tyrannus* the later (430s-420s).²⁰ My arguments here do not rely on this being true, since my aim is simply to identify how Sophocles has presented the two rulers differently. I have, however, used it as a working assumption, discussing Creon before Oedipus on each point.

²⁰ Scullion 2002:85-86; Finglass 2011a:1-11, 2018a:1-6.

II. The initial presentation of Creon and Oedipus (*Antigone* 1-222, *Oedipus Tyrannus* 1-299)

II.i. Introduction

We will begin by discussing the initial presentation of Creon and Oedipus. Both rulers present themselves positively, aligning themselves with the *polis* and gods. In most respects, however, they are presented dissimilarly, and Oedipus is presented much more positively.

II.ii. Legendary and contemporary elements in the initial presentation of Creon and Oedipus

Initially, neither ruler is presented in the conventionally negative terms discussed in Chapter 1; only after each ruler's proclamation do anger and suspicion, the language of slavery and freedom, and similar features appear. Rather, both are initially presented partly in terms evoking their status as legendary figures, and partly in contemporary terms.

Creon's status as a legendary *basileus* is briefly emphasised, when he first enters. The Chorus introduces him as the *basileus* of the land, and, in calling for their support, Creon appeals to their *sebas* for the *thronoi* of the house of Laius.²¹ He also mentions his inheritance of rule, a feature of legendary *basileia*.²² Sophocles does not, then, discount or ignore Creon's status as legendary *basileus*, and indeed states it conspicuously at the very moment of his entrance. Elsewhere, however, he places no weight on it: in the opening scene, Creon is presented almost as though he were a contemporary *polis* official, and his political principles, which follow, are contemporary.

²¹ Soph. *Ant.* 165-166.

²² Soph. *Ant.* 173-174.

By contrast, Oedipus is *primarily* depicted in terms recalling his status as a legendary figure. His introduction of himself as ‘I who am called famous Oedipus by all’ directly defines him in terms of his legendary reputation.²³ The Priest also presents Oedipus as a unique and superlative figure, addressing him grandiosely as ‘Oedipus, ruler of my land’ and ‘Mightiest man of all, Oedipus’,²⁴ and such phrases as ‘not equating you to the gods’ (θεοῖσι ... οὐκ ἰσούμενον), ‘the first of men’ (ἀνδρῶν ... πρῶτον), and ‘best of men’ (βροτῶν ἄριστ’) perhaps recall the superlative terms in which warriors are referred to in epic (ἰσόθεος φῶς, ἄριστος ἄνδρων, ἄριστος Ἀχαιῶν, βροτῶν ὅχ’ ἄριστος).²⁵ The correspondence with epic is not *detailed*, but the language seems archaising, and evocative of the world of legend. When Oedipus makes his proclamation, he emphasises his power in traditional terms, talking of ‘this land, over which I hold power and the throne’,²⁶ and emphasises the traditional excellence of Laius’ rule, calling him ‘a nobleman and *basileus*’.²⁷ The Chorus also recalls Oedipus’ legendary achievements and reputation in the second and fourth stasima.²⁸

There are also some contemporary elements. As mentioned in Chapter 4, Oedipus’ proclamation emphasises that he is acting as a citizen, and parallels exist with contemporary legal procedures. Furthermore, the play contains much contemporary political vocabulary; as Pope says of the debate with Teiresias, ‘the appeal throughout is to the ideals of a republic—citizenship, mutual trust, participation, and justice (“polis”, “politai”, “pistos”, “philos”, “meteinai”, “dikaios”).’²⁹ However, Oedipus, specifically, does not seem to be assimilated to contemporary officials, or judged

²³ Soph. *OT* 8.

²⁴ Soph. *OT* 14 (ὦ κρατύνων Οἰδίπους χώρας ἐμῆς); 40 (ὦ κράτιστον πᾶσιν Οἰδίπου κάρα).

²⁵ Soph. *OT* 31 (for which cf. also *Od.* XVI.187, cited by Finglass *ad loc.*), 33, 46. For these epic phrases, see e.g. *Il.* IX.211 (ἰσόθεος φῶς), II.768, V.839 (ἄριστος ἄνδρων), I.91 (ἄριστος Ἀχαιῶν); *Od.* XIII.297, XV.253 (βροτῶν ὅχ’ ἄριστος).

²⁶ γῆς τῆσδ’, ἧς ἐγὼ κράτη τε καὶ θρόνους νέμω (Soph. *OT* 236-237); similarly, Edmunds 2012:77.

²⁷ ἀνδρός γ’ ἀριστέως βασιλέως τ’ (Soph. *OT* 257). (Finglass *ad loc.* conjectures ἀριστέως for the manuscripts’ ἀρίστου: either suffices for the present argument.)

²⁸ See p. 220.

²⁹ Pope 1991:167.

against democratic standards, as Creon is in *Antigone*. Indeed, the strong emphasis on Oedipus' legendary status may even distance him from the contemporary *polis*.

Both rulers, then, are presented in legendary *and* contemporary terms, but in Oedipus' case the legendary elements are more strongly emphasised, whereas Creon is more conspicuously brought into contact with the contemporary *polis*.

II.iii. The initial presentation of Creon and Oedipus in moral terms

Perhaps the most obvious difference between the two characters' initial presentation is that, whereas Oedipus appears at the start of *Oedipus Tyrannus*, in *Antigone* we first hear about Creon from Antigone and Ismene, who are hostile. In the play's opening lines, Antigone declares Creon's proclamation to be the most recent of the dreadful family troubles (κακά, ἄτη) that have beset the house of Oedipus.³⁰ Despite discouraging Antigone, Ismene takes no more positive a view; she, too, vividly narrates the family's miseries, presenting Creon's edict (the ψῆφον τυράννων ἢ κῶλύπη) and its potential consequences as the culmination of these woes.³¹

Of course, audience-members need not adopt the sisters' negative view; perhaps, indeed, they might have seen Antigone and Ismene as rebellious women, plotting illegitimately against the *polis*.³² Nevertheless, seeing Creon firstly from the sisters' hostile perspective means that audience-members cannot immediately assess Creon in a *straightforwardly* positive light; as Pfister says, when characters are initially presented in their absence, audience-members are placed in a position of suspense, where they have to wait before they can evaluate the character properly.³³ Also, by linking Creon with *ate* and the family's *kaka*, ideas which become thematic, the sisters surround Creon with a general atmosphere of ominousness, the power of which does not really depend on their own authority.

³⁰ Soph. *Ant.* 1-10, especially 10 (τῶν ἐχθρῶν κακά). Unfortunately, line 4, which mentions *ate*, is corrupt.

³¹ Soph. *Ant.* 49-60; on this phrase, cf. p. 166 n. 58.

³² So Sourvinou-Inwood 1989:138-139.

³³ Pfister 1988:186; cf. Holt 1999:674, T. Graham 2017:130-131.

When Creon enters, as discussed in Chapter 3, he enunciates political principles with contemporary currency, professing his intention and desire to be a good leader and citizen. He also associates himself with the *polis* and gods, mentioning both at the start of his speech, and presents himself as a defender of the *polis*, swearing by Zeus, using a negative conditional phrase, that he would not keep silent if he saw *ate* coming upon the citizens.³⁴ However, although Creon certainly tries to present himself positively, this speech has further complexities. For one thing, when Creon says that one can only judge a man's mind through his conduct in office (ἀρχαῖς), this might well prompt audience-members not simply to approve, but to suspend judgement until they have seen how he acts. Indeed, in introducing him, the Chorus has already emphasised that he is a new (and therefore untested) ruler;³⁵ in this, Creon conspicuously differs from Oedipus.

Also, the speech contains ominous notes, which Creon cannot be taken to intend, and which reinforce the association between Creon, *ate* and the family's *kaka* introduced in the preceding scene. Antigone and Ismene emphasised that Creon's proclamation is the most recent of the family's miseries; Creon explains his own accession in similar terms, explaining how Oedipus was destroyed (διώλετ'), and how his sons killed each other on a single day, 'striking and being struck with murderous pollution' (παίσαντές τε καὶ πληγέντες αὐτόχειρι σὺν μιάσματι), and stating that he inherited the throne 'through closeness of family to the destroyed' (γένους κατ' ἀγχιστεῖα τῶν ὀλωλότων).³⁶ Creon entirely ignores the horrific implications of his language here. Furthermore, Creon swears by Zeus that he would not keep silent if he saw *ate* coming (στείχουσιν) upon the *polis*. Here, the return of the word *ate* is hardly reassuring: as Cairns observes, '*atē*, at least when it results from one's own error, is not something that one sees coming; Zeus sees everything (ὁ πάνθ' ὄρων αἰεὶ), and Zeus is the one who knows (ἴστω), but Creon does not.'³⁷ Moreover, Creon's use of

³⁴ Soph. *Ant.* 162, 184-186.

³⁵ Soph. *Ant.* 156-157.

³⁶ Soph. *Ant.* 169-174.

³⁷ Cairns 2013:xx.

this verb (στείχω) recalls Antigone's opening words, where she asks Ismene whether she has heard that the *kaka* of their enemies are coming upon their friends (πρὸς τοὺς φίλους στείχοντα τῶν ἐχθρῶν κακά).³⁸ Thus, Creon anticipates that he will see *ate* coming, but it has been hinted that *ate* has already started its onward march towards Creon and his family.

So, although Creon's self-presentation is positive in that he professes creditable principles, it is undercut by negative overtones, and conflicts with the sisters' strongly negative view of him. Even the Chorus seems to lack confidence in his decision; as commentators have noted, their immediate response seems unenthusiastic,³⁹ and later, too, they hint that he may be in the wrong.⁴⁰

By contrast, Oedipus' self-presentation is much more convincingly positive, and is reinforced by the other characters. Although Creon links himself with the *polis* and gods, Oedipus' association is deeper and more thoroughgoing: he links himself not just with the *polis*, but specifically with its people and their sufferings.⁴¹ By addressing the children of Thebes as 'children' (τέκνα), he sets himself up as a father figure to his people,⁴² and declares that he came in person, unwilling to hear their sufferings second-hand.⁴³ He defines himself as compassionate particularly clearly when, using a negative conditional phrase (a technique which we have just seen in *Antigone*), he says, 'I would be unfeeling if I did not pity such a supplication.'⁴⁴ This theme is reinforced by the Priest, who mentions how Oedipus previously saved the *polis*, and

³⁸ Soph. *Ant.* 10; *ate* is mentioned at 4 and 17.

³⁹ Soph. *Ant.* 211-214, with Campbell, Jebb, Brown, Kamerbeek, Griffith *ad loc.*; likewise Funke 1966:33-34; Winnington-Ingram 1980:137 n. 60, Blundell 1989:115 n. 36.

⁴⁰ See pp. 213-215.

⁴¹ As Lawrence 2013:139 notes, this focus on compassion is rare among Sophoclean main characters; on Oedipus' compassion more generally, see Danze 2016:569-577; Finglass 2018a:41-51.

⁴² Soph. *OT* 1, 6; cf. 58. So Sheppard, Dawe, Finglass on Soph. *OT* 1; Reinhardt [1933] 1979:95; Budelmann 2000:209; Danze 2016:572. Francis 1992:352 and Brock 2013:111-112 with 129 n. 34 point out that the practice of referring to rulers as 'father' has parallels only in Near Eastern contexts (Aesch. *Pers.* 215, 664 = 671; Hdt. I.155.1-2, III.89.3), but I doubt that they are right to find sinister connotations in this.

⁴³ Soph. *OT* 6-8.

⁴⁴ δυσάλγητος γὰρ ἂν εἶην τοιάνδε μὴ οὐ κατοικτίρων ἔδραν (Soph. *OT* 12-13).

begs him to do so again.⁴⁵ In his reply, Oedipus again emphasises his compassion for his people, saying that he suffers more than all of them, since he laments for the *polis* and its people as well as himself.⁴⁶ He then declares his intention, as the Priest requested, to rescue the *polis* (ἐρυσσάμην πόλιν) by seeking advice from Delphi.⁴⁷ So, although Creon also associated himself with the *polis*, Oedipus, who sympathises with his people's sufferings and is seen as a saviour figure, is aligned with the *polis* rather more closely.

Oedipus is also presented in terms of religion and the gods. In his opening speech, he indicates his respect for the suppliants' boughs, incense and paeans.⁴⁸ The Priest links him with the gods, saying that Oedipus is the best of men in dealing with the gods (δαιμόνων συναλλαγαῖς),⁴⁹ and suggesting that Oedipus saved the *polis* with a god's help before and may do the same now.⁵⁰ When the Priest declares that he is supplicating Oedipus not as the gods' equal but because he is first among men, this *almost* elevates Oedipus to the level of the gods themselves.⁵¹ In his reply, Oedipus defines himself in terms of his obedience to the god, using another negative conditional phrase: 'I would be bad if I did not do everything that the god should indicate.'⁵² When we combine this with the negative conditional in his previous speech, we can see that Oedipus defines himself in terms of both his compassion for his people and his obedience to the god.

These themes are further emphasised in Oedipus' proclamation. Framing it as a response to the Thebans' request, he indicates his compassionate attitude by hoping that he will provide them with 'protection and relief from evils',⁵³ and states that he

⁴⁵ Soph. OT 35-53.

⁴⁶ Soph. OT 58-64 (lines which, of course, foreshadow his own pitiable state later).

⁴⁷ Soph. OT 72.

⁴⁸ Soph. OT 3-5.

⁴⁹ Soph. OT 34.

⁵⁰ Soph. OT 38, 42-43.

⁵¹ Soph. OT 31; Knox 1957:159 perhaps presses the point too strongly.

⁵² ἐγὼ κακὸς μὴ δρῶν ἂν εἶην πάνθ' ὅσ' ἂν δηλοῖ θεός (Soph. OT 76-77).

⁵³ ἀλκὴν λάβοις ἂν κἀνακούφισιν κακῶν (Soph. OT 218).

has become their fellow-citizen.⁵⁴ He also emphasises his intention of acting in cooperation with the god.⁵⁵ He brings these thoughts together at the end of the speech, praying that the gods and justice may fight alongside the Thebans.⁵⁶

The initial presentation of Oedipus is, then, highly positive and laudatory. Oedipus links himself with the *polis* and gods more closely and strongly than Creon does, and the Priest praises him in terms which corroborate and exceed what Oedipus himself has said. By contrast, Creon's self-presentation is superficially creditable, but Antigone's and Ismene's hostility and the association drawn between him and the family's *kaka* and *ate* present him in a rather darker and more ominous light.

III. The presentation of Creon and Oedipus in the rest of each play (*Antigone* 223-1353, *Oedipus Tyrannus* 300-1530)

III.i. Introduction

In the scenes that follow, which exhibit formal similarities, Creon and Oedipus are, in many respects, presented similarly. In particular, their presentation exhibits features shared with the story tradition, especially anger and suspicion—although the depiction of Creon does contain further contemporary elements,⁵⁷ and the Chorus of *Oedipus Tyrannus* continues to recall Oedipus' legendary greatness.⁵⁸ There are also similarities between the moral presentation of Creon and Oedipus; in particular, each is accused of not 'thinking right' (εὔ φρονεῖν). My aim here is to argue that, despite and even by means of these shared features, Sophocles' presentation of the two rulers is substantially different. These differences go hand in hand with Sophocles' different presentation of these rulers' situations: Creon is presented as making a moral misjudgement, for which the characters blame him, whereas Oedipus is subject to a factual error, for which he is pitied.

⁵⁴ Soph. *OT* 222.

⁵⁵ Especially Soph. *OT* 244, 253.

⁵⁶ Soph. *OT* 273-275.

⁵⁷ See chiefly p. 120-121 above.

⁵⁸ See p. 220 below.

Firstly, I will survey the moral presentation of Creon and Oedipus (ii). Then I will argue that, although both rulers exhibit **anger and suspicion**, these are adapted to the plays' different situations, and indeed take such different forms in each case that it seems reasonable to say that the two rulers' tempers are genuinely different (iii). Also, whereas in the second stasimon of *Antigone* the theme of the **fall from *olbos* to *ate*** hints darkly at Creon's own fall through his own wrongdoing, in *Oedipus Tyrannus* the same theme seems to be used misguidedly by the Chorus, to highlight the difference between Oedipus and the conventional wrongdoer whom they imagine to be the killer of Laius (iv). Furthermore, whereas Creon's portrayal contains **anti-democratic elements** which place him in implicit opposition to the values of the Athenian democracy, Oedipus is not placed in such a position (v).

III.ii. The moral presentation of Creon and Oedipus

As mentioned above, the moral presentation of Creon centres on his decisions to deny Polynices burial and to punish Antigone when she disobeys. These decisions are assessed primarily against the criterion of good judgement.⁵⁹ The most common phrase used is (*eu*) *phronein*, i.e. 'thinking right', which has a wide range: as we will see in discussing *Oedipus Tyrannus*, *phronein* can refer to 'understanding', 'goodwill', 'loyalty' or 'sanity'.⁶⁰ However, in *Antigone*, *phronein* generally refers to judgement, occurring alongside words such as *euboulia* or *aboulia*, *hamartema*, and *ate*. Characters often accuse each other of bad judgement: Ismene sees Antigone, and Creon sees Antigone, Ismene and Haemon, as exercising bad judgement.⁶¹ Creon himself, however, is most consistently presented in these terms.

Creon mentions good judgement in his first speech, when he says that a man's *psyche*, *phronema* and *gnome* can be judged only on the basis of his conduct in office, and that

⁵⁹ Treatments of *phronein* in *Antigone* include Knapp 1916; Kirkwood 1958:233-236; Goldhill 1986:174-180; Cropp 1997:143-147; Griffith 1999:41-43; Lauriola 2007.

⁶⁰ These renderings are used variously by Lloyd-Jones and Finglass.

⁶¹ Soph. *Ant.* 68, 99, 561-562, 754.

a man governing the *polis* ought always to adopt the best *bouleumata*.⁶² This clearly invites the audience to assess him against these criteria.⁶³ Then, having forbidden Polynices' burial, he calls this decision his *phronema*.⁶⁴ So Creon expresses his intention to display good judgement, while prompting audience-members to consider whether he succeeds.

The other characters, however, emphasise Creon's bad judgement.⁶⁵ Although the Chorus' respect for Creon's authority is clear throughout, they are cool about his proclamation,⁶⁶ and, when the Guard reports the first burial, implicitly cast doubt on Creon's decision by suggesting that a god might be responsible.⁶⁷ When Creon accuses the Guard of taking bribes, the Guard implicitly criticises his judgement by saying, 'Ah! It is dreadful for one who thinks to think what is false.'⁶⁸ Antigone is more explicit: having explained that Creon's proclamation offends against the gods, she states that, if Creon thinks her words foolish (μῶρα), he is a fool (μῶρῳ).⁶⁹ Haemon, in his speech urging Creon to reconsider, starts by saying that *phrenes* are the greatest of all possessions, and thereby places a focus on Creon's; by saying that he could never say that his father was wrong, Haemon indicates that he thinks so.⁷⁰ Haemon urges Creon to yield (εἰκεῖν) and learn (μανθάνειν), and the Chorus-leader also suggests that he should learn (μαθεῖν) from Haemon.⁷¹ Haemon soon becomes more explicit, telling Creon that, if he were not his father, he would say that he was

⁶² Soph. *Ant.* 175-179.

⁶³ Cf. p. 113 n. 98, and the scholars cited there.

⁶⁴ Soph. *Ant.* 207.

⁶⁵ This (and everything in this paragraph) is discussed further by the scholars cited in p. 212 n. 59.

⁶⁶ Soph. *Ant.* 211-214, with the scholars cited at p. 209 n. 39.

⁶⁷ Soph. *Ant.* 278-279. On the Chorus' attitude throughout, see Kirkwood 1958:126-127; Burton 1980:85-90; Gardiner 1987:81-97; Eucken 1992:77-81.

⁶⁸ φεῦ· ἡ δεινόν, ᾧ δοκῇ γε, καὶ ψευδῇ δοκεῖν (Soph. *Ant.* 323); on this line, cf. Lauriola 2007:392. Funke 1966:35-38, noting that *doxa* and *tyrannis* are associated in Plato, suggests that 'das ψευδῇ δοκεῖν eine Weseneigenschaft des Tyrannen ist' (39), but Creon's conversation with the Guard seems insufficient to demonstrate that such an association already existed when *Antigone* was composed.

⁶⁹ Soph. *Ant.* 469-470.

⁷⁰ Soph. *Ant.* 683-686.

⁷¹ Soph. *Ant.* 705-725, especially 710, 718, 723, 725.

not thinking right (οὐκ εὖ φρονεῖν).⁷² Teiresias makes Creon's error even clearer: he tells Creon to think (φρόνει, φρόνησον), indicates that Creon is doing wrong (τοῦξαμαρτάνειν, ἀμάρτη), urges him to yield (εἶκε), learn (μανθάνειν) and desist from stubbornness (αὐθαδία), and tells him that he lacks good judgement (εὐβουλία), which Teiresias declares (like Haemon) to be the greatest of good things.⁷³ These characters' relationships with and attitudes towards Creon differ: Teiresias is severe, the Chorus cautious, Antigone hostile. Yet Sophocles has made all their views of Creon revolve around his judgement (the criterion against which he initially suggested that he should be assessed), so that these assessments produce a cohesive and cumulative effect. The characters' condemnations of Creon's misjudgement become severer and more explicit, making this misjudgement more and more apparent, as the play goes on.

After Teiresias' departure, Creon realises that he has made a mistake, and, on the Chorus-leader's advice, yields (παρεικαθεῖν),⁷⁴ and goes to release Antigone. When he returns, following the deaths of Haemon and Antigone, the Chorus declares that Creon's ruin (ἄτη) came from nobody else, but from his own error (αὐτὸς ἀμαρτών)—a remark with which Creon immediately agrees, lamenting his errors (φρενῶν δυσφρόνων ἀμαρτήματα) and bad judgement (δυσβουλία).⁷⁵ The Messenger reports that Eurydice, before dying, blamed Creon,⁷⁶ and Creon again explicitly declares that he himself was fully responsible.⁷⁷ The play ends with the Chorus declaring the importance of good judgement (τὸ φρονεῖν),⁷⁸ recalling similar remarks made to Creon by Haemon and Teiresias.⁷⁹ In the end, then, Creon's view of

⁷² Soph. *Ant.* 755.

⁷³ Soph. *Ant.* 996, 1023-1032, 1050, with Knox 1966:173-174. Both Teiresias and Haemon use the phrase ἀλλ' εἶκε (718, 1029, with Jens 1952:57).

⁷⁴ Soph. *Ant.* 1102.

⁷⁵ Soph. *Ant.* 1257-1269. Although *ate* generally means 'ruin' in tragedy rather than 'folly' (its main sense in epic), the link between *ate* and mental error is active throughout this play (Cairns 2013:xiii-xvi, xxii-xxiii, xxix-xxx).

⁷⁶ Soph. *Ant.* 1312-1313.

⁷⁷ Soph. *Ant.* 1317-1325.

⁷⁸ Soph. *Ant.* 1347-1353.

⁷⁹ Soph. *Ant.* 684 (regarding *phrenes*), 1050 (regarding *euboulia*); cf. Kirkwood 1959:235-236. The idea is a pre-existing *gnome* (cf. Aesch. *Ag.* 927-928).

himself comes into alignment with the other characters', as he realises that he was wrong.

In the earlier part of the play, audience-members will not necessarily have thought that Creon was making a misjudgement. Audience-members' reactions to him may have depended on their pre-existing views of the issues raised. Some, firmly feeling that the dead should always be buried, might already have seen Creon as misguided in attempting to use democratically acceptable political principles to justify leaving Polynices unburied. However, given the wide acceptability of these principles, and given that the notions that traitors should not be buried in their soil and that officials should be obeyed had currency in fifth-century Athens, many others may have found his argument persuasive.⁸⁰ The play, by making Creon's moral misjudgement explicit *gradually*, leaves it open to audience-members to realise Creon's error at any point up to when Creon himself does.⁸¹ In short, Creon's moral presentation is initially somewhat complex (his own view being at odds with the other characters'), but becomes fairly straightforwardly negative by the end.

The moral presentation of Oedipus has long been contested. Most scholars consider the emotional force of *Oedipus Tyrannus* to derive to a significant extent from the fact that, although Oedipus killed his father, he did so without knowing that the victim was his father: as Schadewaldt puts it, Oedipus is *unschuldig schuldig*, guilty in the sense of having done the deed, but not morally responsible.⁸² Some, however, have seen Oedipus as fully morally responsible.⁸³ Moreover, several recent scholars, without going so far, have argued that more emphasis is placed on Oedipus' guilt than some had thought: Kullmann argues that the other characters (except Jocasta) consistently regard Oedipus as *schuldig* and *verantwortlich* for his actions, Harris has

⁸⁰ Cf. p. 203 nn. 16-17.

⁸¹ Of course, audience-members *might* still maintain that he was right all along. But such audience-members would find themselves at odds with all characters, and might (I suppose) begin to feel that they were out of sympathy with the play itself.

⁸² Schadewaldt 1956:23; as Allan puts it, 'OT is so terrifying because we see someone being punished for acts he did not intend' (2013:174).

⁸³ Chiefly Lefèvre 1987 ≈ 2001:119-147, along with those cited by Lefèvre 2001:121 n. 14.

argued that an Athenian homicide court would have convicted Oedipus, and Allan has argued that Oedipus accepts responsibility for his actions, rather than rejecting it as in *Oedipus at Colonus*.⁸⁴ It seems clear that Oedipus is guilty to the extent of having done the deed, feeling horror at his guilt, being regarded as polluted, and perhaps being open to prosecution under Athenian law. These discussions, though, do not seem to me to have quantified quite satisfactorily how Oedipus is presented as *not* guilty. This, I think, can be demonstrated more precisely if we compare Oedipus with Creon, whose responsibility Sophocles strongly emphasises.

As discussed above, Oedipus and Creon are both subject to a delusion that is revealed explicitly during the play, although Oedipus' is factual, Creon's moral. Another difference is that, whereas in *Antigone* audience-members need not initially have thought that Creon was wrong, Oedipus' factual error would presumably have been apparent from the beginning, since Oedipus' killing of his father and marriage to his mother were basic premises of the legend, and since Sophocles has repeatedly put in Oedipus' mouth words hinting at his real situation, which can only be properly understood by an audience that knows the situation.⁸⁵

Like Creon, Oedipus is accused of not 'thinking right' (φρονεῖν). However, whereas in *Antigone* this almost invariably refers to *judgement*, in *Oedipus Tyrannus* the terminology scarcely ever refers to bad judgement; generally, it refers to *understanding*. Teiresias refers to his own accurate knowledge of the situation as *phronein*,⁸⁶ and Oedipus asks him not to turn away from them if he understands

⁸⁴ Kullmann 1994; Harris 2010 (but contrast Sommerstein 2011); Allan 2013. The relevant passage of *OC* is 266-274; as these scholars emphasise, *OC* cannot be taken as a basis for the interpretation of *OT*.

⁸⁵ Detailed lists e.g. in Stanford 1939:163-173; Markantonatos 2009:105-125. On dramatic irony in *OT* more generally (much of which is situational, rather than purely verbal), cf. Kirkwood 1958:248-255, Rutherford 2012:346-348, Lloyd 2012:568-571.

⁸⁶ φεῦ φεῦ, φρονεῖν ὡς δεινὸν ἔνθα μὴ τέλη λυή φρονοῦντι. ταῦτα γὰρ καλῶς ἐγὼ εἰδῶς διώλεσ'· οὐ γὰρ ἄν δευρ' ἰκόμην (Soph. *OT* 316-318). For the thought here, see Hdt. IX.16.5, cited by Edmunds 2000:37-40 and Finglass *ad loc.*; the lines also have a possible secondary reference to Oedipus' position (Lattimore 1975:106; Dawe, Finglass *ad loc.*). For the form of Teiresias' exclamation here, cf. *Ant.* 323, 1048 (Else 1976:87-89, although cf. p. 202 n. 13).

(φρονῶν).⁸⁷ Teiresias' reply, 'for you are all not thinking correctly' (πάντες γὰρ οὐ φρονεῖτ'), is taken differently by different scholars, but I take the point (in colloquial English) to be, 'But you don't understand what it is that you are asking for.'⁸⁸ Matters are slightly different in the scene with Creon, since Creon does not know the true situation—only that Oedipus is mistaken in accusing him of plotting against him. His initial reaction to the accusation is to ask whether Oedipus is talking 'from straight eyes and a straight mind': Oedipus' misconception seems so great that Creon wonders whether he is sane.⁸⁹ Creon also tells Oedipus that he is not thinking straight (οὐκ ὀρθῶς φρονεῖς) if he thinks it right to exhibit stubbornness (αὐθαδία) without good sense (τοῦ νοῦ χωρίς).⁹⁰ This remark resembles reproaches made against Creon in *Antigone*; nevertheless, the point is that Oedipus is misunderstanding the situation, not that his moral judgement is wrong. When the Chorus-leader tells Oedipus that 'in thinking (φρονεῖν), those who are quick are not safe', the point is that Oedipus' quick thinking is leading him to a false understanding of the situation.⁹¹ Creon certainly uses the word φρονεῖν to mean 'understand' earlier in the scene when he says, 'I like to keep silent on matters where I do not understand.'⁹²

Of course, in noting that *phronein* generally means 'understanding' rather than 'judgement' in *Oedipus Tyrannus*, I am drawing a distinction not present in the Greek. However, it is important to emphasise the flexibility of this language, which Sophocles could apply with equal validity to divergent situations. In other respects, as we will see, Sophocles *does* apply different language to Creon and Oedipus.

When the characters realise the real situation, they react with horror and pity towards Oedipus. The scene with Teiresias resembles that in *Antigone* in revealing the ruler's delusion, although the situation is significantly different, since Creon can still rectify

⁸⁷ Soph. OT 326.

⁸⁸ Soph. OT 328.

⁸⁹ Soph. OT 528 (ἐξ ὀμμάτων δ' ὀρθῶν τε καπ' ὀρθῆς φρενός), with Finglass *ad loc.*.

⁹⁰ Soph. OT 549-550; 'sanity' is probably also the point at 626 (Finglass *ad loc.*).

⁹¹ φρονεῖν γὰρ οἱ ταχεῖς οὐκ ἀσφαλεῖς (Soph. OT 617).

⁹² ἐφ' οἷς γὰρ μὴ φρονῶ σιγᾶν φιλῶ (Soph. OT 569).

his error, whereas Oedipus' situation is the inescapable result of a past action.⁹³ Although Teiresias' tone is severe and monitory in both plays, he expresses different moral views of the two rulers. He explains his reluctance to reveal the truth by hinting at Oedipus' miserable position.⁹⁴ When provoked to speak out, Teiresias expresses sharply the horror of Oedipus' position, calling him 'the unholy polluter of this land', and telling him, 'I say that, without your knowledge, you are living most shamefully with those dearest to you, and do not know in what a bad situation you are.'⁹⁵ His emphasis, then, is on the horror and misery of Oedipus' position. When Oedipus calls him blind, Teiresias replies by calling Oedipus pitiful (ἄθλιος) in his own blindness to his real situation.⁹⁶ When Teiresias, further provoked, explains the matter at greater length, he again emphasises the depth of Oedipus' real misery.⁹⁷ So Teiresias reacts with horror and pity, but at no point ascribes responsibility or blame to Oedipus.

Upon realising the true situation, each character reacts with pity. Jocasta's reaction is immediately one of pity.⁹⁸ The Shepherd pities Oedipus (δύστηνος) even as Oedipus is threatening to punish him,⁹⁹ and recalls his pity for Oedipus as an infant (κατοικτίρας), telling Oedipus that, if he was that infant, he is 'born miserable' (δύσποτμος γεγώς).¹⁰⁰ The Second Messenger, before narrating Jocasta's death, explains clearly the reaction that he expects from the Chorus, given their loyalty to

⁹³ Jouanna [2007] 2018:439; cf. Ugolini 1995:196.

⁹⁴ Soph. OT 321 (διοίσω), 329 (τὰ σ' ... κακά), 332 (ἐγὼ οὐτ' ἐμαυτὸν οὔτε σ' ἀλγυνῶ). The use of the word *kaka* here contrasts with the start of *Antigone*: whereas there Antigone presented Creon as the *cause* of the *kaka*, here Oedipus is presented as their *sufferer*.

⁹⁵ Soph. OT 353 (ὥς ὄντι γῆς τῆσδ' ἀνοσίῳ μιάστορι), 366-367 (λεληθέναι σέ φημι σὺν τοῖς φιλτάτοις αἰσχισθ' ὁμιλοῦντ', οὐδ' ὄρᾱν ἴν' εἰ κακοῦ). I cannot follow Kullmann 1994:109 in thinking that these words hold Oedipus morally responsible. Teiresias emphasises the sheer horror of Oedipus' polluting actions, and indeed emphasises Oedipus' ignorance above all (οὐδ' ὄρᾱν ἴν' εἰ κακοῦ, 367): he speaks as strongly as he possibly could *without* blaming Oedipus morally.

⁹⁶ Soph. OT 372-373.

⁹⁷ Soph. OT 413-428, especially 413 (σὺ καὶ δέδορκας κοῦ βλέπεις ἴν' εἰ κακοῦ), 424 (ἄλλων δὲ πλῆθος οὐκ ἐπαισθάνη κακῶν), 426-427 (σοῦ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν βροτῶν κάκιον ὅστις ἐκτριβήσεταιί ποτε).

⁹⁸ Soph. OT 1068 (ὦ δύσποτμ'), 1071 (ιοῦ ἰού, δύστηνε).

⁹⁹ Soph. OT 1155, taking the word to refer to Oedipus (Finglass *ad loc.*).

¹⁰⁰ Soph. OT 1178-1181.

the house of Labdacus: he says that they will feel sorrow (πένθος), and then he emphasises the number of the house's *kaka*, pollution which all the water of the Danube could not wash away.¹⁰¹ In the speech, he sympathises with Oedipus' misery when Oedipus discovers the dead Jocasta: 'the poor man bellowed dreadfully.'¹⁰² Right before Oedipus enters, the Messenger says that the sight is 'of the sort to make even one who hated him pity him.'¹⁰³ Upon his entry, the Chorus focuses on his dreadful suffering (δεινὸν ... πάθος), addresses him as 'wretched man' (ὦ τλῆμον), emphasises their pity for him, ascribes his misery to a god who leapt upon him, and declares that he inspires horror (φοβία) in them.¹⁰⁴ Oedipus himself agrees with them, calling himself wretched (δύστανος, τλάμων), and ascribing his misery to the god;¹⁰⁵ he continues to emphasise his misery continually throughout the rest of the play.¹⁰⁶ Oedipus interprets Creon's sending of his daughters to him as an act of pity (ἐποικτίρας), and Creon confirms that he did this out of a regard for Oedipus' feelings.¹⁰⁷ The general picture, then, is one of great consistency; all the characters are horrified by the pollution of the murder, but pity Oedipus, without blaming him or ascribing moral responsibility to him.

All this contrasts completely with *Antigone*, where the Chorus continually emphasises Creon's responsibility for his own misfortunes, without pitying him at all. The only pity Creon receives comes from himself, except, perhaps, when the Second Messenger calls Creon's speech upon reaching the tomb a 'wretched shout' (ἀθλίας ... βοῆς).¹⁰⁸

¹⁰¹ Soph. *OT* 1223-1230.

¹⁰² δεινὰ βρυχηθεὶς τάλας (Soph. *OT* 1265).

¹⁰³ Soph. *OT* 1295-1296; cf. Budelmann 2000:229-230.

¹⁰⁴ Soph. *OT* 1297-1306. Kullmann 1994:114 says that 'Der Chor empfindet nur Schauder, nicht Mitleid', but Oedipus even acknowledges their sympathy (Soph. *OT* 1321-1325 with Segal [1993] 2001:113; cf. Schmitt 1997:38).

¹⁰⁵ Soph. *OT* 1308-1311. He again ascribes some responsibility to Apollo at 1329-1336; it is disputed whether Oedipus means that he is responsible for the blinding, but Apollo for all the *kaka* that led him to blind himself (e.g. Segal [1993] 2001:111-112), or whether Apollo's agency and Oedipus' are seen as overlapping (Cairns 2013:135-136 and 165 n. 49).

¹⁰⁶ Soph. *OT* 1314-1415, 1444, 1455-1457, 1465-1466, 1478-1514 (lamenting his daughters' fate too).

¹⁰⁷ Soph. *OT* 1472-1477.

¹⁰⁸ Soph. *Ant.* 1209. The remarks of the Messenger and Chorus-leader at 1278-1280, 1337-1338, conspicuously fall short of sympathising with Creon. By contrast, sympathy is expressed for Eurydice (1283) and Haemon (1316).

Furthermore, we must emphasise the great loyalty and goodwill expressed towards Oedipus not only by the Priest, but also later by the Chorus and Jocasta. In the first stasimon, recalling his past success, the Chorus sings that he was seen to be wise (σοφός) and good for the *polis* (ἡδύπολις) and will never seem bad to their mind.¹⁰⁹ When Oedipus accuses them of giving him bad advice with regard to Creon, the Chorus exclaim that they would be mad to turn away from him.¹¹⁰ Jocasta's goodwill towards him is evident from her continual support of him and her desire to prevent him from learning the truth. Indeed, she purports to speak for everyone when she says that they are all at a loss when they see Oedipus frightened.¹¹¹ We have already seen how the Second Messenger appeals to the Chorus' regard for Oedipus and his family before narrating Jocasta's death.¹¹² In the fourth stasimon, directly after Oedipus realises the truth, the Chorus recalls Oedipus' past success and honoured position in order to set it in contrast with his current misery. Their reaction to this is, once again, horror and pity;¹¹³ their final remark, 'To speak straightforwardly, it was from you that I drew my breath and closed my eyes in sleep', indicates their affection and close connection with him.¹¹⁴ In short, characters articulate goodwill towards Oedipus throughout the play; this, in combination with the horror and pity which they all experience towards Oedipus, presents his fall in a sympathetic light.

In *Antigone*, by contrast, little goodwill is expressed towards Creon. Creon appeals to the Chorus' loyalty to the house of Oedipus,¹¹⁵ but they themselves do not articulate any particular loyalty towards Creon; they seem to have doubts regarding his conduct,¹¹⁶ and Antigone suggests that in reality they agree with her.¹¹⁷ At one point

¹⁰⁹ Soph. *OT* 504-511; in general on the Chorus' goodwill towards Oedipus, cf. Burton 1980:138-141 (contrasting *Antigone*), 174-175; Budelmann 2000:219-227.

¹¹⁰ Soph. *OT* 690-696.

¹¹¹ Soph. *OT* 922-923.

¹¹² Soph. *OT* 1223-1230, discussed at pp. 218-219.

¹¹³ Soph. *OT* 1186-1222.

¹¹⁴ τὸ δ' ὀρθὸν εἰπεῖν, ἀνέπνευσά τ' ἐκ σέθεν καὶ κατεκοίμασα τοῦμόν ὄμμα (Soph. *OT* 1220-1222).

¹¹⁵ Soph. *Ant.* 165-167.

¹¹⁶ Soph. *Ant.* 278-279 (with Sourvinou-Inwood 1989:148); cf. pp. 213-215 above.

Teiresias says that he is giving Creon advice out of goodwill towards him (εὖ σοὶ φρονήσας).¹¹⁸ But the characters express no extensive goodwill or admiration towards Creon.

Most importantly, perhaps, whereas Creon's bad judgement and culpability are indicated using words such as *aboulia*, *hamartia*, and *ate*, these words are almost entirely absent from *Oedipus Tyrannus*.¹¹⁹ The absence of *hamartia* and its cognates is particularly striking, since Oedipus *does* refer to his past acts as such (ἡμαρτημένα) in *Oedipus at Colonus*,¹²⁰ and since Aristotle famously said that Oedipus was one of those who fell through a *hamartia*—a remark which is sometimes taken to support the notion that Oedipus is presented as morally responsible in *Oedipus Tyrannus*.¹²¹ Yet Sophocles himself does *not* use this language to refer either to Oedipus' killing of Laius or to Oedipus' conduct during the play itself. This difference between *Antigone* and *Oedipus Tyrannus* seems important, since it is this language—especially as articulated by Creon himself at the end of the play—which indicates Creon's moral responsibility so strongly in *Antigone*. Sophocles' choice not to use this language in *Oedipus Tyrannus* may, therefore, reasonably be taken to indicate that his moral presentation of Oedipus is not supposed to have the same effect.

¹¹⁷ Soph. *Ant.* 509. Burton 1980:88 thinks that the Chorus' attitude in the *kommos* (806-943) shows that she is mistaken here. However, Antigone's statement that her burial of Polynices is glorious (502-504), which Antigone says the Chorus agrees with (509), is echoed by the Chorus' statement that her death is glorious (817-818), even though they also think that she has transgressed (853-856, 872-875).

¹¹⁸ Soph. *Ant.* 1031.

¹¹⁹ Except for Soph. *OT* 1284-1285, where *ate* seems not to connote bad judgement, but simply ruin.

¹²⁰ Soph. *OC* 439.

¹²¹ Arist. *Poet.* XIII.1453a7-12, with e.g. Lefèvre 2001:6-10, 133-134. The more common view is that, although in most classical authors *hamartia* denotes a moral error, Aristotle uses it more broadly (here and elsewhere) to mean any kind of mistake, moral or factual (Stinton 1975:221-228; Halliwell 1986:215-222; Lurje 2004:384-386, though, thinks it *cannot* be moral in *Poet.* XIII), and that when Aristotle calls Oedipus' act a *hamartia* he means Oedipus' *factual* error in killing his father and marrying his mother (Stinton 1975:238-239; Segal [1993] 2001:145; Lurje 2004:384-386). Whatever Oedipus' position is in Aristotelian terms, what seems more important is that Sophocles does *not* apply the word *hamartia* to Oedipus: in *Sophoclean* terms Oedipus, unlike Creon, has not been presented as committing a *hamartia* at all.

All in all, Sophocles' moral presentation of Creon and Oedipus is cohesive and concerted. Sophocles ensures that the other characters' views of these rulers are, essentially, in harmony with one another. In *Antigone*, they see Creon as a foolish man making a culpable mistake; the only conflicting view is that of Creon himself, who maintains that he is right for most of the play, against the judgements of the other characters—but who also realises his mistake in the end. In *Oedipus Tyrannus*, the other characters regard Oedipus with admiration, and react with horror and pity (but not blame) when the truth is discovered. The similarities between the characters—the delusion of each and the accusations of not 'thinking right' (φρονηεῖν)—are real, but these shared features are adapted to Sophocles' moral presentation of each character; most other aspects of the moral presentation of the two rulers differ, and many are diametrically opposed. These differences in many cases arise from the different situations which Sophocles has presented in the two plays, but it cannot be said that they are merely the product of these different situations. Rather, Sophocles has made full use of the possibilities provided by the situations that he had devised, but his consistent moral presentation of the two rulers, which is in harmony with but hardly dictated by the plot of each play, indicates that his presentation of each ruler is an essential part of each play's design in its own right.

III.iii. Anger and suspicion

Creon and Oedipus both display anger and suspicion. These function similarly within each play, motivating the rulers' conflicts with other characters, and accentuating the position of delusion in which each ruler stands.¹²² However, I will argue here that, since Creon's anger proceeds from moral error and Oedipus' from factual error, the importance of this anger for each character's presentation differs correspondingly. Moreover, although Sophocles has presented both rulers as displaying anger, this

¹²² In *Oedipus Tyrannus*, the Teiresias and Creon scenes play an important role not only in retarding the dramatic action and increasing suspense, but also in leading Oedipus further away from the truth (Kamerbeek 1967:17-18; Moreau 1993:230-231; Cuny 2004:66-67); cf. also Bain 1979:143-144.

does not mean that they display the same *kind* of anger; indeed, Sophocles has presented the two men as displaying tempers that differ discernibly.¹²³

In Creon's case, this anger takes the form of unbending stubbornness and unapproachability.¹²⁴ This is indicated by the Guard's statement that he hesitated to come before Creon, because he expects to be punished if he does;¹²⁵ since Creon then becomes angry and threatens the Guard with punishment, this produces the impression that Creon has a general tendency to behave in this fashion, extending into the past before the start of the play.¹²⁶ Creon's unapproachable disposition is remarked upon explicitly by Haemon, who says, 'Your countenance is terrifying (ὄμμα δεινὸν) for a man of the *demos* who has things to say of the sort which you do not like to hear.'¹²⁷ Similarly, Haemon remarks upon Creon's obstinate and unbending nature when he says, 'Do not wear only one *ethos* upon yourself, thinking that what you say and nothing else is right. Whoever thinks that he himself thinks right, or has a tongue or a spirit that no-one else has, these people when unfolded are seen to be empty.'¹²⁸ Creon's behaviour throughout the play, of course, corroborates Haemon on both points. So Sophocles clearly and explicitly indicates to the audience that Creon possesses this particular temper, within which anger is an important element, but not the whole.

¹²³ Sophocles' use of the words *physis* and *ethos* in his plays displays a clear perception of individuals' different natures and tempers, more explicitly than anything in Aeschylus (Diller 1956, especially 70-72). *Antigone* contains explicit statements about the *physis* and *ethos* not only of Creon, but also of Antigone (471-472, 523) and Haemon (746). In saying that the two rulers' tempers differ, I am reacting to Knox 1966, who sees various Sophoclean characters (including these) as sharing a single 'heroic temper'.

¹²⁴ Diller calls it 'starre Unnachgiebigkeit' (1956:82).

¹²⁵ Soph. *Ant.* 223-236; cf. ὀκνον πολύν (243); φόβῳ (270).

¹²⁶ As Holt 1999:676 remarks, 'It shows us what to watch for in Creon.'

¹²⁷ τὸ γὰρ σὸν ὄμμα δεινὸν ἀνδρὶ δημότῃ λόγοις τοιούτοις οἷς σὺ μὴ τέρῃ κλύων (Soph. *Ant.* 690-691). Knox 1966:70 rightly notes that Haemon here implies that he is speaking on behalf of the other citizens, who are too afraid to speak openly; Haemon then continues to appeal to popular opinion (692-700), suggesting, like the Guard (223-236), that Creon is widely perceived as intimidating and unapproachable.

¹²⁸ μή νυν ἐν ἥθους μῶνον ἐν σαυτῷ φέρει, ὡς φῆς σύ, κούδεν ἄλλο, τοῦτ' ὀρθῶς ἔχειν. ὅστις γὰρ αὐτὸς ἢ φρονεῖν μόνος δοκεῖ, ἢ γλῶσσαν, ἢν οὐκ ἄλλος, ἢ ψυχὴν ἔχειν, οὗτοι διαπτυχθέντες ὤφθησαν κενοί (Soph. *Ant.* 705-709). Knox 1966:70 and 178 n. 17 compares Ajax's refusal to modify his ἥθος at *Aj.* 594-595; cf. *Aj.* 481-484 and Finglass *ad locc.*

Oedipus, like Creon, displays anger, and this is part of his consistent temper, too.¹²⁹ Teiresias tells Oedipus, 'You reproach me for my anger, but you have not seen yours which lives with you, and blame me,'¹³⁰ and Creon tells Oedipus, 'You are clearly sullen when you yield (εἰκων), and severe when excessively angry. Such natures (φύσεις) are rightly most painful for themselves to bear.'¹³¹ Such statements might equally have been made to Creon in *Antigone*. However, Oedipus' temper does not seem identical to Creon's, since the strong elements of unapproachability and stubbornness are greatly softened: Oedipus yields relatively readily concerning the punishment of Creon,¹³² and is eminently approachable throughout.¹³³ What is instead emphasised is the quick and sharp nature of Oedipus' temper. We saw before that the Guard's first words in *Antigone* indicate that Creon's unapproachable disposition is habitual and extends into the past; similarly, Oedipus' account of his reactive and quick-tempered *orge* when he slew Laius gives us a sense that this disposition is permanent and consistent.¹³⁴ Oedipus displays this disposition in the play itself when he leaps into angry accusations against Creon, which the Chorus-leader suggests were 'perhaps forced out by anger rather than by the judgement of the mind.'¹³⁵ Moreover, the Chorus-leader warns Oedipus about his own quickness of mind, remarking that 'in thinking, those who are quick are not safe.'¹³⁶ Oedipus' quick temper contrasts with the caution exhibited in this play by Creon, who twice states

¹²⁹ Discussed e.g. by Bowra 1944:192-194.

¹³⁰ ὀργὴν ἐμέμψω τὴν ἐμήν, τὴν σὴν δ' ὁμοῦ ναίουσαν οὐ κατείδες, ἀλλ' ἐμὲ ψέγεις (Soph. OT 337-338).

¹³¹ στυνγνὸς μὲν εἰκὼν δῆλος εἶ, βαρὺς δ' ὅταν θυμοῦ περάσῃς. αἱ δὲ τοιαῦται φύσεις αὐταῖς δικαίως εἰσὶν ἄλγισται φέρειν (Soph. OT 673-675). Ryzman 1992:103 rightly remarks that here 'There is a direct connection between Oedipus' θυμός and his φύσις.'

¹³² OT 646-677.

¹³³ That Oedipus is not considered unapproachable is clear from the first scene, and especially from his reluctance to hear about his subjects' suffering second-hand (Soph. OT 6-7). Whereas the Guard is reluctant to approach Creon in *Antigone*, no character exhibits reluctance to interact with Oedipus.

¹³⁴ Soph. OT 807. This technique of giving characters a past is recognised by Webster 1936:93-94, Seidensticker 1994:285-288 (both giving this example). Note also Creon's remark to Oedipus at Soph. OC 855 (cited by Else 1976:83): ὀργῇ χάριν δούς, ἥ σ' αἰὲ λυμαίνεται.

¹³⁵ τάχ' ἂν δ' ὀργῇ βιασθὲν μᾶλλον ἢ γνώμη φρενῶν (Soph. OT 523-524); cf. Burton 1980:139-140.

¹³⁶ φρονεῖν γὰρ οἱ ταχεῖς οὐκ ἀσφαλεῖς (Soph. OT 617); cf. Knox 1957:16. Knox rightly notes that the word *tachys* is recurrently associated with Oedipus, including in the final scene (1957:15-17, 187-188); cf. Lesky [1972] 1983:155; Lefèvre 1987:44 ≈ 2001:130.

that, when he does not know, he prefers not to speak; by contrast, Oedipus' quick reasoning repeatedly leads him to mistaken conclusions.¹³⁷ The tempers of our two rulers do, then, overlap considerably, but the key-note of Creon's temper in *Antigone* is its stubborn obstinacy, whereas the central quality of Oedipus' temper is its reactive quickness.

Some scholars have maintained that Oedipus' anger in killing Laius makes him more morally responsible for Laius' death.¹³⁸ The chief objection to this view is that, although characters do (as we have seen) reprehend Oedipus' anger, no-one suggests that Oedipus' anger against Laius was culpable, or that, if he had had a different temper, he would have acted differently or avoided his misfortunes. Sophocles could easily have had his characters assess Oedipus' conduct in such terms, but has not done so. Since such an assessment—while intrinsically perfectly cogent—is not one which the play mentions, it cannot be said to be part of Sophocles' moral presentation of him.¹³⁹ In any case, it cannot be taken for granted that an Athenian audience would have regarded Oedipus' anger as reprehensible under the circumstances which he describes.¹⁴⁰

Moreover, the anger and suspicion which Creon and Oedipus show in their interactions with other people are motivated differently. Creon's first outburst of rage (παῦσαι, πρὶν ὀργῆς ...) comes in response to the Chorus' suggestion that the gods may have buried Polynices,¹⁴¹ and is thus a response to being challenged; during the same angry speech he expresses his view that the burial is a plot based on bribery by his political opponents.¹⁴² Creon engages in further outbursts of anger towards

¹³⁷ Soph. *OT* 569, 1520. Kitto 1966:219-222 makes this point well; cf. Kirkwood 1958:130-132.

¹³⁸ This is restated by Lefèvre 1987 ≈ 2001:119-147. Lefèvre derives support from the notion that, when Aristotle mentions Oedipus displaying a *hamartia* (*Poet.* XIII.1453a7-12), he means a moral error, but most scholars reject this (cf. p. 221 n. 121 above).

¹³⁹ In seeing Oedipus' anger as important to the play but not as increasing his moral responsibility, I agree with Scodel 1984:66-67; Allan 2013:178.

¹⁴⁰ As Altmeyer 2001:128-129 notes, ancient audience-members might have thought that Oedipus was morally entitled to defend his honour and *arete* by fighting Laius' attempt to push him off the road.

¹⁴¹ Soph. *Ant.* 280.

¹⁴² Soph. *Ant.* 289-303.

Antigone and Haemon.¹⁴³ In each case, Creon's anger is prompted by the suggestion that he is wrong, or by a perceived threat to his authority, especially by a woman.¹⁴⁴ Creon's anger thus stems from and emphasises his moral error.

Oedipus' anger, though, is prompted differently.¹⁴⁵ That is to say, Oedipus, in pursuit of the interests of the *polis*, asks Teiresias who the killer of Laius is, and Teiresias says that he knows but refuses to say. In this situation, it is natural that Oedipus should be enraged at Teiresias' silence. When Oedipus says that Teiresias would make even a stone angry and asks who would not be angry upon hearing Teiresias disrespect the *polis*, these remarks extenuate and justify Oedipus' anger.¹⁴⁶ In *Antigone*, no such justification is presented. Equally, it is natural, especially given the terms of Oedipus' proclamation earlier to the effect that no-one should shield the killer,¹⁴⁷ that Oedipus should draw the conclusion—from his perspective, indeed, almost unavoidable—that Teiresias must be complicit:¹⁴⁸ why else, from Oedipus' perspective, would Teiresias be silent? But it occurs to Oedipus that, being blind, Teiresias cannot have killed Laius,¹⁴⁹ which leads him to the thought that Creon and Teiresias must be plotting against him, and that Creon must have bribed Teiresias.¹⁵⁰ Then, he does not reproach Creon for flouting his authority, but rather reproaches Creon as a friend for betraying him and desiring to steal his rule.¹⁵¹ Oedipus' behaviour is, then, motivated by his misunderstanding of the true situation, which makes it seem far less culpable than

¹⁴³ Soph. *OT* 473-496, 740-761.

¹⁴⁴ Soph. *OT* 484-485, 677-680, 740.

¹⁴⁵ The careful verisimilitude with which Sophocles depicts Oedipus' train of thought in these two scenes has often been discussed: Kitto 1966:220-221; Kamerbeek 1967:15-16; Easterling 1977:125; Lesky [1972] 1983:154; Sicking 1998:33-37; Gould 1988:149-151; Lawrence 2013:143; Finglass on Soph. *OT* 297-462. Even T. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1917:77, who often denies such verisimilitude, recognises the plausibility with which Oedipus' anger and suspicion arise. (He does, however, think that Sophocles has violated plausibility by having Oedipus fail to listen to Teiresias' statements that he is the killer at 353, 362, 447-462; against this, see Easterling 1977:125.) The fact that the common element of suspicion is differently motivated in the two plays is noted by Reinhardt [1933] 1979:99-100.

¹⁴⁶ *OT* 334-335 and 339-340; cf. Knox 1957:26-27.

¹⁴⁷ Soph. *OT* 230-235.

¹⁴⁸ Soph. *OT* 345-349.

¹⁴⁹ Soph. *OT* 346-350.

¹⁵⁰ Soph. *OT* 385-389.

¹⁵¹ Soph. *OT* 386-388, 532-535.

Creon's, especially given that Oedipus' questioning of Teiresias and Creon is motivated in the first instance by Oedipus' wish to save his people and follow the god's instructions.¹⁵²

Furthermore, when Oedipus subsequently reproaches himself for his false accusations against Creon,¹⁵³ Creon specifically declares that he will not reproach Oedipus for any past wrong (τι τῶν πάρος κακῶν).¹⁵⁴ Creon thus indicates that the appropriate response to Oedipus' misfortune is to pity him, and not to hold his conduct against him. None of this entirely excuses Oedipus' anger; as we have just seen, Oedipus himself reprehends it. At the same time, though, Sophocles seems to have gone out of his way to make it understandable and even exculpable; it is not part of a cohesively negative view of Oedipus, as it is with Creon in *Antigone*.

Each ruler's anger, then, serves to motivate his behaviour and to emphasise his delusion. However, Creon's anger is a reaction to disagreement, emphasising his culpable moral error, whereas Oedipus' anger derives from his belief that he has been falsely accused and betrayed by his friends, emphasising his pitiable factual error. Furthermore, Creon's anger takes the form of a frightening unapproachability, whereas Oedipus' is quick-witted and reactive.

III.iv. The fall from *olbos* to *ate*

The second stasima of *Antigone* and *Oedipus Tyrannus* feature the moral pattern of the fall from *olbos* to *ate*, which (as discussed in Chapter 1) is often applied to rulers' falls in Herodotus, as well as Aeschylus. The question of whether and how these odes refer to Creon and Oedipus has often been discussed—and I have little to add, since I

¹⁵² For the point that Oedipus acts throughout on behalf of the *polis* (particularly clear at *OT* 340), cf. Segal [1993] 2001:77; Altmeyer 2001:129; Finglass 2018a:47. Resemblances between Oedipus' interrogations and Athenian legal procedures may also have made his aggressive questioning of Teiresias and Creon seem more creditable (Greiffenhagen 1966:159-163, followed by Kullmann 1994:107, Carawan 1999:215).

¹⁵³ Soph. *OT* 1419-1421; cf. 1433.

¹⁵⁴ Soph. *OT* 1423.

think that the view that currently prevails regarding each ode is probably correct. Yet scholars have generally considered these odes separately, whereas Sophocles' use of the pattern can perhaps be most effectively understood by placing Sophocles' two odes in relation to each other, and also in relation to Aeschylus' use of the same pattern.¹⁵⁵

In Herodotus, and also in Pindar and in Aeschylus' *Persians*, this moral pattern is applied to the fall of a ruler in retrospect, as an interpretation of past events.¹⁵⁶ In *Agamemnon*, though, as discussed in Chapter 5, Aeschylus uses the pattern with additional sophistication. When first articulated, it is applied to Paris and Troy, the prosperity of which has been reduced to ruin because of Paris' wrongdoing. However, the Chorus' generalisations about divine justice have a more uncomfortable side, since, as the Chorus realises, they do not bode well for Agamemnon, who has himself committed great injustice. Thus Aeschylus' use of the pattern is double-edged: what the Chorus initially applies to Paris *turns out* to apply to Agamemnon.¹⁵⁷

Sophocles' use of the pattern in the second stasimon of *Antigone*, as scholars generally understand it, has some similarities with this.¹⁵⁸ The Chorus begins by placing the fate of Antigone within the frame of the family's ancestral *kaka* and *ate*, describing her as the last root in the house of Oedipus. Therefore, when they declare that 'the bloody dust of the gods of the underworld is reaping it, mindlessness of speech and a Fury in the mind (φρενῶν)', the Chorus perhaps seems to attribute this destructive folly to Antigone herself.¹⁵⁹ Then, however, the Chorus begins to generalise. Turning to Zeus, they emphasise his infinite power, which no 'transgression of men' (ἀνδρῶν ὑπερβασία) could restrain,¹⁶⁰ and declare it as an eternal law that prosperity comes to

¹⁵⁵ A brief comparison: Funke 1966:50.

¹⁵⁶ See pp. 50-51.

¹⁵⁷ See pp. 190-191.

¹⁵⁸ On this stasimon, including the points made here, see Easterling 1978, especially 156-158; Cairns 2013:xiii-xiv, xviii-xix; Gagné 2013:362-376.

¹⁵⁹ κατ' αὖ νιν φοινία θεῶν τῶν νερτέρων ἀμᾶ κόνις, λόγου τ' ἄνοια καὶ φρενῶν Ἐρινύς (Soph. *Ant.* 601-603). Lloyd-Jones and Wilson print the conjecture κοπίς, 'chopper', but it is perhaps better to retain κόνις (Knapp 1916:306 n. 1; Easterling 1978:146-149; Griffith *ad loc.*).

¹⁶⁰ Soph. *Ant.* 604-605.

no mortal without ruin (ἄτας).¹⁶¹ Shortly afterwards, they add that ‘what is bad seems good to him whose mind (φρένας) the god is leading towards ruin (ἄταν).’¹⁶² The Chorus does not seem to be talking about any person in particular here. Unknown to them, however, these generalisations are highly applicable to Creon, given that the Chorus refers to the arrogance of *men*,¹⁶³ and since it is Creon, not Antigone, who, as a ruler, is in the especially prosperous state which the Chorus envisages. Moreover, as we have seen, when Creon eventually realises his error, the Messenger and Creon himself interpret his fall in very similar terms.¹⁶⁴ So Sophocles seems to have used this moral pattern in a sophisticated way, in which the Chorus’ generalisations are applicable to Creon in a way which the Chorus cannot itself yet understand.

This ode is dominated by the language of advancing *ate*: as Kitto puts it, the ode ‘re-echoes with two words: ἔρπει, “it comes”, and ἄτα, “disaster”.’¹⁶⁵ This application of human verbs of motion to *ate* is uncommon in archaic and classical Greek literature; as far as I am aware, it otherwise only occurs in the *Iliad*.¹⁶⁶ In *Antigone*, though, we have already seen it being used in this way, when Antigone describes Creon’s edict as evils advancing (στείχοντα) towards their friends,¹⁶⁷ and when Creon says that he would not keep silent if he saw *ate* advancing (στείχουσιν) upon the citizens.¹⁶⁸ Later, the word *ate* refers to the disastrous consequences of Creon’s misjudgement.¹⁶⁹ So the second stasimon is part of a broader set of images, which associate Creon with *kaka* and *ate* as early as the play’s opening lines, and which foreshadow Creon’s eventual ruin through his own error.

¹⁶¹ Soph. *Ant.* 611-614. The sense is not quite certain here (Griffith *ad loc.*).

¹⁶² τὸ κακὸν δοκεῖν ποτ’ ἐσθλὸν τῷδ’ ἔμμεν ὅτῳ φρένας θεὸς ἄγει πρὸς ἄταν (Soph. *Ant.* 622-624).

¹⁶³ Soph. *Ant.* 604-605; cf. ἀνδρῶν in 616.

¹⁶⁴ Soph. *Ant.* 1161-1171, 1261-1276.

¹⁶⁵ Kitto 1956:163.

¹⁶⁶ The key passage is *Il.* IX.502-512, where Phoenix personifies *ate* running out (ὑπεκπροθέει, 506) in front of the Lityae; this passage also seems to be evoked by Soph. *Ant.* 1074-1076, 1103-1104 (Cairns 2013:xxiii-xxv, 2016:76-78). Cf. also *Il.* XIX.92-94. The closest tragic parallels are perhaps Aesch. *Pers.* 97-100 (where *ate* leads men into her nets) and Ag. 735-749 (where Helen, approaching Troy, is envisaged as a manifestation of *ate*), but neither seems very similar.

¹⁶⁷ Soph. *Ant.* 10. Else 1976:28 rightly connects 1-10 and the second stasimon.

¹⁶⁸ Soph. *Ant.* 184-186; cf. pp. 208-209.

¹⁶⁹ Soph. *Ant.* 1259-1260.

The second stasimon of *Oedipus Tyrannus* has been more controversial. In this ode, the Chorus begins by declaring the greatness of the laws which come from the gods. They then declare, ‘*hybris* begets the *tyrannos*’.¹⁷⁰ The exact significance of both key words, *hybris* and *tyrannos*, is disputed, and so I am not inclined to place great weight on this line; I have, however, advanced a view in an Appendix.¹⁷¹

At any rate, the Chorus immediately evokes the traditional pattern, declaring that *hybris*, if overfilled with many things (i.e. *koros*), mounts to a high peak (i.e. *olbos*) where it cannot get a firm foothold.¹⁷² They then pray to Apollo ‘that he will never undo the wrestling beneficial to the *polis*’, a phrase perhaps referring to beneficial competition within the *polis*, in general terms.¹⁷³ Then, the Chorus, continuing to employ the traditional pattern, imagines a man who ‘proceeds in actions or words arrogantly (ὑπέροπτα, i.e. *mega phronein*), unafraid of justice and not revering the seats of the gods’, and who ‘will not win gain justly and keep himself from impiety, but wantonly lays hands on inviolable things’.¹⁷⁴ Such a man, they hope, will meet with an evil fate—and, moreover, if such a man does *not* meet with an evil fate, this, they declare at length, would cast doubt on the gods’ power and would undermine their willingness to honour them.¹⁷⁵

The Chorus’ image of the wrongdoer here is similar to what we see in other texts. In Aeschylus’ *Agamemnon*, the wrongdoer is similarly said to lay his hands on inviolable things,¹⁷⁶ and to be heedless of justice.¹⁷⁷ The notion that prosperity gained unjustly is

¹⁷⁰ ὕβρις φυτεύει τύραννον (Soph. OT 873).

¹⁷¹ See Appendix 1 (pp. 272-275).

¹⁷² Soph. OT 873-879.

¹⁷³ τὸ καλῶς δ’ ἔχον πόλη πάλαισμα μήποτε λῦσαι (Soph. OT 879-882); so interpret Carey 1986:177 and Finglass *ad loc.*. Others take the phrase to refer to Oedipus’ ascent to power (Ellendt, cf. Winnington-Ingram [1971] 1980:190-191), or to his attempts to discover the truth (Kamerbeek *ad loc.*). Cf. p. 274 below.

¹⁷⁴ εἰ δέ τις ὑπέροπτα χερσὶν ἢ λόγῳ πορεύεται, Δίκας ἀφόβητος, οὐδὲ δαιμόνων ἔδη σέβων, κακά νιν ἔλοιτο μοῖρα, δυσπότημον χάριν χλιδᾶς, εἰ μὴ τὸ κέρδος κερδανεῖ δικαίως καὶ τῶν ἀσέπτων ἔρξεται, ἢ τῶν ἀθίκτων θίξεται ματάζων (Soph. OT 883-891).

¹⁷⁵ Soph. OT 895-910.

¹⁷⁶ Aesch. Ag. 369-373 (cited by Finglass on Soph. OT 889-891).

what leads to disaster is found in Solon and in Aeschylus,¹⁷⁸ and the Chorus' fervent hope that the gods justly punish wrongdoers resembles the attitude of the Chorus in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*, where it is emphatically asserted that the gods punish unjust gainers of prosperity, not simply prosperous people in general.¹⁷⁹

In *Antigone*, as discussed above, Sophocles seems to use the moral pattern in such a way that its relevance for the play goes beyond what the Chorus can intend: from their perspective, they are uttering gnomic generalisations, but what they say turns out to apply to Creon. In *Oedipus Tyrannus*, therefore, there is no particular reason to suppose that the Chorus must necessarily have Oedipus in mind—and there are very good positive reasons to think that they do *not*. Within the play, the Chorus certainly does not think that Oedipus is an impious wrongdoer who has done anything worthy of divine punishment: they admire Oedipus, and say so repeatedly.¹⁸⁰ Some scholars suggest that the Chorus sees Oedipus' treatment of Teiresias and Creon as exhibiting impiety or *hybris*, but this is probably incorrect.¹⁸¹ No other passage suggests such an view of Oedipus' conduct, and it seems unlikely that Oedipus' behaviour towards Teiresias and Creon can be understood as impious *hybris* at all.¹⁸² We must therefore probably assume that, when the Chorus talks about *hybris* producing a *tyrannos* and imagines a wrongdoer, they are, from their own perspective, simply generalising without reference to anyone in particular.

Some scholars maintain that, rather as the second stasimon of *Antigone* foreshadows the fact that eventually Creon will turn out to have been a wrongdoer who committed a disastrous act through a moral error, the second stasimon of *Oedipus Tyrannus* foreshadows the fact that eventually Oedipus will turn out to have been an impious and arrogant perpetrator of *hybris*, who receives punishment from the gods.¹⁸³ This

¹⁷⁷ Aesch. *Ag.* 382-384 (ἀνδρὶ λακτίσαντι μέγαν Δίκας βωμὸν εἰς ἀφάνειαν).

¹⁷⁸ Solon fr. 13.7-13; Aesch. *Ag.* 464, 750-772.

¹⁷⁹ Aesch. *Ag.* 750-772; cf. pp. 51-52.

¹⁸⁰ So rightly Lesky [1972] 1983:160.

¹⁸¹ E.g. Sheppard 1922:xliv-xlvi; Bowra 1944:165.

¹⁸² Carey 1986:176; Fisher 1992:340-341.

¹⁸³ E.g. Gellie 1964:120-121; Kullmann 1994:111.

view has the attraction of being straightforward and analogous to *Antigone*, but is open to objections. No other passage refers to the killing of Laius as *hybris*, and it is doubtful whether this act constitutes *hybris* anyway.¹⁸⁴ Moreover, the Chorus envisages an impious and arrogant wrongdoer—but Oedipus is not regarded as impious or arrogant elsewhere, and the Chorus' picture of the wrongdoer does not seem to fit him.¹⁸⁵ Furthermore, no character attempts to interpret Oedipus in terms of this moral pattern, as Creon is interpreted in *Antigone*.¹⁸⁶

On the whole, therefore, it seems best to adopt the view of most recent scholars, which is that the Chorus' explanation does not fit Oedipus: the force of the ode lies precisely in the fact that, although the Chorus envisages a straightforward situation where a stereotypical wrongdoer comes to ruin through the agency of the gods, the play actually presents a situation where this happens to someone who is *not* a stereotypical wrongdoer.¹⁸⁷ If so, whereas in *Antigone* Sophocles uses this moral pattern to foreshadow the revelation of Creon's moral error, in *Oedipus Tyrannus* Sophocles uses the same pattern to increase the sense that, although Oedipus may have killed Laius, he does not fit into the paradigmatic frame of the traditional wrongdoer which the Chorus presents, since he acted unwittingly, rather than out of *hybris* or impiety.

If, then, these widely-held views of the second stasima of *Antigone* and *Oedipus Tyrannus* are indeed correct, Sophocles has used the motif of the fall from *olbos* to *ate* in a highly flexible way; indeed, his use of the pattern is diametrically opposed in each case. In *Antigone*, the pattern turns out to apply to Creon closely, fitting in with the characters' wider view that Creon is a morally responsible wrongdoer; in *Oedipus Tyrannus*, by contrast, the pattern turns out not to apply to Oedipus, but rather sets his actual piety in sharp relief, making his fall and the gods' part in it seem all the more troubling and piteous.

¹⁸⁴ Fisher 1992:339-340.

¹⁸⁵ Winnington-Ingram [1971] 1980:195-196, 202; similarly, Kitto [1939] 1961:167.

¹⁸⁶ *Soph. Ant.* 1161-1171, 1261-1276.

¹⁸⁷ Winnington-Ingram 1980:202-203; Fisher 1992:342; Finglass on *OT* 863-910; T. Graham 2017:121.

III.v. Are Creon and Oedipus anti-democratic figures?

Scholars who take the ‘figure of the tyrant’ view consider that the ‘tyrant’ is, *par excellence*, a figure opposed to democracy.¹⁸⁸ This view relies above all on the presence of one subset of the ideas discussed in Chapter 1—the association with rulers of the language of masters and slaves, and rulers’ suppression of freedoms treasured at Athens, especially the ability to speak freely.¹⁸⁹

In Chapter 3, I argued in favour of the view that Creon and his political principles (especially his strong emphasis on obedience) are brought into tension with democratic ideals. This view is supported partly by the fact that he talks about his subjects in terms of slavery and domination, but primarily by the exchange between Creon and Haemon, in which Creon denies the importance of the will of the people and treats the *polis* as belonging to him personally.¹⁹⁰

One passage in *Oedipus Tyrannus* has rightly been compared to this exchange. This comes during the dispute between Oedipus and Creon:¹⁹¹

CREON: For I see that you are not thinking right.

OEDIPUS: I am, when it comes to myself.

CREON: But you should when it comes to me, too.

OEDIPUS: But you are a traitor.

¹⁸⁸ E.g. Lanza 1977:xii-xiv.

¹⁸⁹ See pp. 65-71 above.

¹⁹⁰ Soph. *Ant.* 663-678, discussed at pp. 121-123 above.

¹⁹¹ CREON: οὐ γὰρ φρονοῦντά σ’ εὖ βλέπω.

OEDIPUS: τὸ γοῦν ἐμόν.

CREON: ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἴσου δεῖ καμόν.

OEDIPUS: ἀλλ’ ἔφυσ κακός.

CREON: εἰ δὲ ξυνίης μηδέν;

OEDIPUS: ἀρκτέον γ’ ὅμως.

CREON: οὐτοὶ κακῶς γ’ ἄρχοντος.

OEDIPUS: ὦ πόλις πόλις.

CREON: κάμοι πόλεως μέτεστιν, οὐχὶ σοὶ μόνῳ (Soph. *OT* 626-630).

CREON: But if you understand nothing?

OEDIPUS: Nevertheless, you must be ruled.

CREON: Not if you rule badly.

OEDIPUS: *Polis, polis!*

CREON: But I also have a share in the *polis*, not you alone.

Several scholars have compared this to the exchange between Creon and Haemon, arguing that here Oedipus 'veer[s] towards the imperiousness of the bad ruler, the tyrant, in the pejorative sense, like Creon in *Antigone*.'¹⁹² Indeed, there certainly are shared features. In particular, this passage briefly hints at the issue, dwelt upon in *Antigone*, of whether a ruler who gives bad instructions should be obeyed: Oedipus enunciates the view that Creon ought to 'be ruled', and Creon in reply enunciates the view that he should not have to be ruled when the ruler is ruling badly.¹⁹³ Furthermore, Creon's remark that the *polis* does not belong to Oedipus alone (μόνῳ) recalls Haemon's remarks that no *polis* belongs to its ruler and that Creon would rule well alone (μόνος) over a deserted land.¹⁹⁴ Sophocles has, then, used similar elements, even down to this verbal parallelism 'alone' (μόνος/μόνῳ).

Nevertheless, it seems wrong to interpret Oedipus as an anti-democratic figure in this passage, because the elements that make such an interpretation persuasive in Creon's case are absent.¹⁹⁵ In *Antigone*, Creon articulates principles which might be regarded as intrinsically objectionable by democratic standards: he casts doubt on the notion that a ruler should rule for the benefit of anyone other than himself, and suggests that a *polis* belongs to its ruler. By contrast, Oedipus merely asserts his own claims to be obeyed in the face of Creon telling him that he, Oedipus, does not understand the situation,¹⁹⁶ and appeals to the *polis*;¹⁹⁷ he says nothing pronouncedly undemocratic.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹² Segal [1993] 2001:85; similarly, Kitto [1939] 1961:178, Kamerbeek 1967:18, Zeitlin 1986:122 n. 20, Burian 2009:111.

¹⁹³ Soph. *OT* 628-629, taking ἀρκετέον to be passive (Finglass *ad loc.*); others (e.g. Lloyd-Jones) take it as active.

¹⁹⁴ Soph. *Ant.* 739, *OT* 630.

¹⁹⁵ I draw the essential point here from Rösler 1980:20.

¹⁹⁶ Cf. Finglass on Soph. *OT* 628.

Furthermore, in *Antigone*, it is Haemon's mention of the populace and its views that suggests that Creon is going against popular opinion, which on democratic principles would prevail over his personal will; in *Oedipus Tyrannus*, no-one mentions the populace. Unlike in *Antigone*, Sophocles does not turn this conversation into an extensive debate about obedience or political values, since Jocasta's entrance interrupts the discussion. Thus, whereas *Antigone* indicates that Creon is a bad leader, placing him in tension with the popular will, in *Oedipus Tyrannus* the notion that Oedipus might be a bad ruler becomes a one-off reproach addressed to Oedipus in anger,¹⁹⁹ and Sophocles has not chosen to draw the implications of this in democratic terms.

If we are to understand Sophocles' use of shared motifs in these two plays, it is exactly this kind of choice that we should give full weight to. In *Antigone*, Sophocles has presented Creon in a seemingly anti-democratic light; in *Oedipus Tyrannus*, he seems not to have done the same.

Furthermore, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 3, Creon uses the language of slavery and domination. If we look for similar features in Oedipus' case, however, we look in vain. There are two places where another character demands the right to speak on an equal footing with Oedipus (which Oedipus allows them to), and one place in which Teiresias says that he is Apollo's slave rather than Oedipus' (in order to avoid giving Oedipus information which he very reasonably desires). Edmunds places considerable weight on these passages in arguing that Oedipus is a 'tyrant', and this has a certain plausibility when one takes Oedipus in isolation.²⁰⁰ However, comparing these passages with those in *Antigone*, where Creon is set in opposition to freedom and democracy much more prominently, gives the impression not that Sophocles has chosen to present Oedipus as a similarly anti-democratic figure, but that he has stopped short of doing so.

¹⁹⁷ Soph. *OT* 629, discussed by Budelmann 2000:212, Finglass *ad loc.*.

¹⁹⁸ This is noted by Dawe, Finglass on Soph. *OT* 630.

¹⁹⁹ Soph. *OT* 629.

²⁰⁰ Soph. *OT* 408-410, 544, with Edmunds 2002:75-76.

IV. Conclusion

This chapter, by comparing Creon and Oedipus, has given full weight to the similarities between them. Sophocles has employed many of the same underlying ideas, and has structured the two plays similarly. Yet it would be wrong to suppose that Sophocles has portrayed them altogether similarly in moral or political terms. Rather, Sophocles has used the shared elements flexibly and economically to different effect in each case. Whereas the other characters view Creon negatively and as being greatly at fault, and whereas his conduct is contrasted with ideals of freedom and democracy prized at Athens, Oedipus is regarded with admiration and, later, pity, but not blame, and is not set in opposition to freedom or democracy, as Creon is.

Conventional features shared with the story tradition, as discussed in Chapter 1, play a role in the presentation of both rulers, but are blended with other features derived from democratic Athens or evocative of the world of legend. It is impossible to know what relative prominence these features would have seemed to have for Sophocles or his audience, and it is therefore at very least incautious to take these conventional features to be the defining aspect of these rulers, which labelling Creon and Oedipus as 'tyrants' seems to imply. Indeed, it seems rather likely that, since Sophocles presents Creon so insistently in terms of contemporary ideas, he may have expected his audience to interpret him primarily in contemporary terms, which indeed will surely have been more immediately accessible and obvious to them than any other terms of reference. As for Oedipus, it certainly seems plausible that Sophocles would have expected his audience to interpret him primarily as a glorious legendary figure, which is how he is presented at the start of the play. Sophocles may also have expected his audience to be reminded of the stories about archaic rulers; given the strong resemblances, it can hardly be doubted that such associations would have been readily conjured among audience-members familiar with the stories. But to regard these features as these rulers' defining quality seems unjustified.

All this shows the methodological importance of distinguishing carefully between the ideas that underlie a character's portrayal and the ways in which a playwright has actually used these to portray a character morally. If we try to judge a character solely on the basis that certain ideas are used in their portrayal, we are likely to err, but, if we take the playwright's technique in presenting the character into account as well, we can reach a more satisfactory account. Equally, it is important not to judge a character simply on the basis of the character's actions, but also to consider how these actions have actually been presented within the play. This is especially important in the case of Oedipus, whose killing of Laius and accusations against Creon could possibly be regarded as culpable on account of the negligence and fury with which they were committed; this, however, only makes it all the more striking that Sophocles does not have any character in the play suggest such an assessment.

Our comparison of Creon and Oedipus has shown us Sophocles' flexibility in employing the ideas discussed in Part One and in using them to present Creon and Oedipus differently. In the next chapter, we will discuss Pentheus in Euripides' *Bacchae*, who is also based on similar underlying ideas. In combination, therefore, these chapters examine three rulers conventionally regarded as 'tyrants' side by side, providing a detailed picture of how the playwrights use even very similar underlying ideas to present characters in varying and complex moral terms.

CHAPTER 7. PENTHEUS IN EURIPIDES' *BACCHAE*

I. Introduction

This chapter focuses on one ruler—Pentheus in Euripides' *Bacchae*. Pentheus has been studied extensively, but the previous chapter suggests two new lines of enquiry, which are made possible by the groundwork laid in this thesis.

Firstly, we have seen that Sophocles' Creon and Oedipus are depicted using a complex variety of ideas—some contemporary, some shared with the stories discussed in Chapter 1. Now, we can ask how similar Euripides' technique in employing traditional and contemporary ideas in the case of Pentheus is to Sophocles' in the case of Creon or Oedipus. Does Euripides blend these underlying ideas in a similarly complex way? Also, rather as similarities between Creon and Oedipus have often been noted, scholars have also compared Pentheus to Creon or Oedipus, but such similarities have, again, been studied unsystematically: this chapter provides an opportunity to look at this more closely.

Secondly, we have seen that Sophocles employs the techniques of self-presentation and presentation by other characters cohesively, so that the characters essentially present a unified and concerted moral assessment of Creon and Oedipus. Now, we can ask whether Euripides does the same in *Bacchae*. We will see that he does; in this respect, his technique shows significant continuity with Sophocles'.

Much discussion of Pentheus has focused on questions of psychology. Pentheus' aberrant behaviour has fascinated scholars researching Euripidean characterisation, of which one of the most striking aspects is Euripides' depiction of unusual mental states, and has also provided a starting-point for scholars to explain Pentheus' behaviour in modern psychological terms, as prurient, repressed, voyeuristic, or

mentally ill.¹ Firstly, Dionysus recounts how Pentheus experienced three false visions: he ties up a bull thinking that it is the Lydian stranger, mistakenly thinks his house is on fire, and chases an apparition seemingly sent by the god.² Secondly, in the following scene, Pentheus is initially aggressive and derisive towards the disguised Dionysus, as earlier. However, when Dionysus asks (intoning the syllable $\tilde{\alpha}$) whether Pentheus would like to see the Bacchants sitting on the mountains, Pentheus' aggression and derision suddenly dissipate, and he becomes compliant, even praising Dionysus for his *sophia* (although he still expresses some inhibitions and doubts).³ Scholars differ regarding the interpretation of this scene: some consider Dionysus' interjection to mark the moment when Dionysus drives Pentheus' wits awry and begins to influence him, while others consider Pentheus' reaction to Dionysus' suggestion to be in keeping with a 'prurient' attitude which Pentheus may be thought to exhibit already before this.⁴ At any rate, at the end of the scene Dionysus clearly declares that he will drive Pentheus mad.⁵ Upon re-entering, Pentheus experiences further hallucinations,⁶ and then acts with complete compliance beyond what he exhibited in the preceding scene.⁷

¹ Such approaches are suggested by Winnington-Ingram 1948:102-105 and 159-161, Dodds [1944] 1960a:xlili, 172-174, and on Eur. *Bacch.* 222-3, 810-12, and Seidensticker 1972:42-45, and developed elaborately by LaRue 1968, Sale 1972, Glenn 1979, and Parsons 1988, and in a different direction by Seaford 1996:33-35; useful recent discussions include Scullion 2004, Mills 2006:60-61, 97-100, and Lawrence 2013:287-297. Diller 1955:459-460, 466-467 perhaps presents the most cogent sceptical viewpoint. Studies of Pentheus' psychology from the perspective of Euripides' *technique* have been oddly few: Aélion 1983:II.255-258; Thumiger 2008. (The other discussions of Euripidean psychology listed at p. 148 n. 31 omit Pentheus, often focusing instead e.g. on Medea.)

² Eur. *Bacch.* 616-631. Pentheus' mental state here is usefully discussed by Aélion 1983:II.255-256 (arguing that Pentheus is not yet mad); Thumiger 2008:62.

³ Eur. *Bacch.* 810-846; Pentheus praises Dionysus as σοφός at 824.

⁴ Many accept both views, seeing Dionysus as embodying Pentheus' prurient desires (Winnington-Ingram 1948:102-105; Dodds on Eur. *Bacch.* 810; Conacher 1967:67-68; Sale 1972:70-71; Simon 1978:116; Glenn 1979:8; Thumiger 2008:63), while others consider Pentheus simply to be driven mad by Dionysus here (Oranje 1984:80-88; March 1989:38, 41-42, 46; Lawrence 2013:294-297). Scullion 2004:12 (differing from Winnington-Ingram 1948:105) argues that Pentheus is not yet under Dionysus' control, since Dionysus only indicates his intention to drive Pentheus mad at 849-861.

⁵ Eur. *Bacch.* 849-861.

⁶ Eur. *Bacch.* 918-922.

⁷ Note especially Eur. *Bacch.* 934.

These psychological phenomena undoubtedly constitute the most immediately striking aspect of Pentheus' portrayal, and, given Euripides' recurrent interest in unusual states of mind, one of the most characteristically Euripidean. Consequently, the questions that Pentheus' psychology gives rise to are of great importance. However, scholars' attention to this topic has perhaps distracted from the systematic study of less exciting but perhaps even more fundamental aspects of Euripides' technique, namely the techniques of self-presentation and presentation by other characters which are essential for the depiction of characters, especially in moral terms, in any drama.⁸ In any case, the present study is not the place for extended discussion of Euripidean psychology, given that it would be unwise to reach any definite conclusions on that topic without detailed study of other plays in which Euripides has depicted unusual mental states.⁹

In this chapter, we will firstly discuss the ideas underlying the depiction of Pentheus—firstly ideas about rulers, including similarities with Creon in *Antigone* and other tragic rulers (II), and secondly relevant contemporary ideas (III). Then we will consider his moral presentation, considering firstly his presentation in the earlier part of the play before his madness (IV), and secondly his presentation after his death (section V).

II. Presupposed ideas: Pentheus as ruler

Pentheus' depiction features similar negative ('tyrannical') features to those found in Sophocles and elsewhere in Euripides, which are (as discussed in Chapter 1) related to features associated with rulers in Herodotus. In particular, when the First Messenger hesitates to speak to Pentheus and Pentheus encourages him, this exemplifies the story-pattern found in Herodotus and in *Antigone*, where a subject hesitates to speak freely to the ruler, and either meets with the ruler's anger, or is listened to willingly. Moreover, when the First Messenger mentions Pentheus' 'sharp

⁸ Cf. pp. 143-146.

⁹ Cf. p. 153 n. 40.

temper and excessively *basileus*-like manner' (τοῦ ξύθυμον καὶ τὸ βασιλικὸν λίαν),¹⁰ this shows that Pentheus' tendency to display anger, which is so visible in Sophocles' Creon and Oedipus, is no coincidence, but is a product of Euripides' use of traditional ideas about rulers to depict Pentheus.¹¹ Also, when Pentheus suggests that Dionysus is his slave, this resembles the use of similar language by Creon in *Antigone* and Lycus in *Heracles*.¹²

However, there are resemblances between Pentheus and either Creon in *Antigone* or Lycus in *Heracles* which *cannot* be seen in the story tradition represented in Herodotus.

Parallels with Sophocles' *Antigone* are particularly abundant. Firstly, in a rather general sense, Creon and Pentheus exhibit similar attitudes. Both are alert to *kaka* that, in their view, threaten the *polis*,¹³ and both are suspicious concerning the hidden motives of the perpetrators.¹⁴ Both rulers exhibit outraged hostility towards the notion that the gods might be on their opponents' side: Creon considers it absurd that the gods might care about Polynices' corpse, while Pentheus considers it absurd that Dionysus could actually be a real god.¹⁵ Pentheus has an extended conflict with Teiresias, as do Sophocles' Creon and Oedipus;¹⁶ during this, Pentheus, like Creon and Oedipus, accuses Teiresias of being corrupt,¹⁷ and says that Teiresias would be punished were he not an old man (something which Oedipus also says).¹⁸ Pentheus

¹⁰ Eur. *Bacch.* 671.

¹¹ The First Messenger also mentions Pentheus' τάχος ... τῶν φρενῶν (Eur. *Bacch.* 670), which interestingly resembles the association of the word ταχύς with Oedipus in *Oedipus Tyrannus* (on which see p. 224 n. 136).

¹² Eur. *Bacch.* 803.

¹³ Eur. *Bacch.* 216; cf. e.g. Soph. *Ant.* 298-301, 313.

¹⁴ Pentheus suspects them of sexual motivations (Eur. *Bacch.* 222-225), while Creon suspects the buriers of Antigone of financial corruption (Soph. *Ant.* 293-303, 313-314).

¹⁵ Soph. *Ant.* 280-288; Eur. *Bacch.* 215-225.

¹⁶ Eur. *Bacch.* 215-369; cf. Soph. *Ant.* 988-1090, *OT* 300-462.

¹⁷ Eur. *Bacch.* 255-257; cf. Soph. *Ant.* 1033-1047, 1055-1063, *OT* 380-389. This parallelism is noted e.g. by Dodds *ad loc.*; cf. Sommerstein [2006] 2010b:278-279.

¹⁸ Eur. *Bacch.* 258-260; cf. Soph. *OT* 402-403. The parallelism is (again) noted by Dodds *ad loc.*.

then actually goes further than Creon or Oedipus by sending servants to wreck Teiresias' prophetic seat.¹⁹

Pentheus' relations with his servants and the Chorus also recall Creon's. We have already seen that the First Messenger, like the Guard in *Antigone*, hesitates to speak freely to Pentheus;²⁰ so does the Chorus-leader, in both plays.²¹ The Servant who arrests Dionysus recounts that he did so unwillingly; this attitude perhaps resembles the somewhat unwilling service of the Guard in *Antigone* in arresting Antigone.²² Also, Pentheus, like Creon, particularly resents the prospect of being defeated by women.²³ So several negative features shared between Pentheus and Creon are *not* found elsewhere. Some of these, indeed, are only apposite to both plays specifically because Pentheus and Creon both come into opposition with the divine.

Pentheus' resemblances with Lycus in *Heracles* also go beyond the traditional features discussed in Chapter 1. In particular, Pentheus' first scene has been written by Euripides in a similar way to Lycus' first scene. Both are, formally speaking, not true *agon* scenes with balanced speeches, but what Lloyd calls '*epideixis* scenes'.²⁴ Both rulers adopt a threatening tone in their entrance speeches—Lycus threatening to kill Heracles' family, with a repeated emphasis on the word 'die' (θανεῖν), and Pentheus threatening in brutal language to kill the disguised Dionysus and hunt the Bacchants from the mountain.²⁵ Both adopt a derisive tone; Pentheus ridicules Dionysus' feminine appearance, while Lycus ridicules Heracles' use of archery.²⁶ Rhetorical questions characterise Lycus' speech even more than Pentheus', but indicate both

¹⁹ Eur. *Bacch.* 345-351.

²⁰ Eur. *Bacch.* 668-671, with Soph. *Ant.* 223-245; cf. p. 61 above.

²¹ Eur. *Bacch.* 775-777; cf. the Chorus-leader's tentativeness at Soph. *Ant.* 211-220, 278-279, 1091-1101.

²² Eur. *Bacch.* 441-443; cf. Soph. *Ant.* 436-440 (and also 388-397).

²³ Eur. *Bacch.* 785-786; cf. Soph. *Ant.* 484-485, 678. This parallelism is noted by Dodds *ad loc.*; Mills 2006:59.

²⁴ Eur. *HF* 140-169, *Bacch.* 215-262, with Lloyd 1992:10-11.

²⁵ θανεῖν at Eur. *HF* 144, 147; θνήσκειν at 156. Pentheus mentions binding and imprisoning people (Eur. *Bacch.* 226-227), hunting and netting the Bacchants (228, 231), and cutting off the disguised Dionysus' head (241). Pentheus uses similarly violent language later, too: Leinieks 1996:210-216; cf. Segal 1982:56, 61, 88-93, 99-106.

²⁶ Eur. *HF* 148-166, *Bacch.* 233-247.

speakers' lack of patience with their interlocutors.²⁷ Each ruler's initial speech is followed by a long, intellectual *epideixis*-speech, in Teiresias' case defending Dionysus (with a supplementary speech from Cadmus), in Amphitryon's defending Heracles²⁸—to which each ruler reacts with violent dismissiveness. Pentheus, with revulsion, tells Cadmus to keep his hands off him; Lycus responds that, although Amphitryon may have a good argument, he will respond by harming him with deeds.²⁹ Then both rulers call their servants: Pentheus tells his to throw down Teiresias' prophetic seat, while Lycus instructs his to pile up logs to burn Heracles' family alive.³⁰ Both conclude with an emphatically brutal flourish: Lycus turns to the Chorus, reminding them that they are his slaves, whereas Pentheus says that the disguised Dionysus should be brought before him so that he can 'die, and find his Bacchic revel bitter.'³¹ These similarities are, essentially, similarities of form; the fact that Euripides has framed Lycus' and Pentheus' initial appearances using similarly constructed scenes should not surprise us any more than the formal similarities between Sophocles' *Antigone* and *Oedipus Tyrannus* should.

There are, then, numerous similarities between Pentheus and both Creon in *Antigone* and Lycus in *Heracles*. Although many of these may have appeared in the depiction of other rulers, to call them 'traditional' or 'typical' would go beyond our evidence; many of the resemblances between Pentheus and Creon are only possible because of the similar situation of the two plays, while many resemblances between Pentheus and Lycus seem to depend on specifically Euripidean aspects of formal composition. So there are strong resemblances between Pentheus and earlier negatively characterised tragic rulers, but these are of various different kinds, and are not merely a matter of reproducing a traditional stock figure.

Moreover, Euripides' *Bacchae* was only one of a number of fifth-century plays revolving around a ruler fighting Dionysus. Aeschylus wrote a *Pentheus*, but we

²⁷ Eur. HF 143-146, 151-156, *Bacch.* 246-248.

²⁸ Eur. HF 170-235, *Bacch.* 266-327.

²⁹ Eur. HF 238-239, *Bacch.* 343-344.

³⁰ Eur. HF 240-246, *Bacch.* 345-351.

³¹ Eur. HF 250-251, *Bacch.* 356-357.

know little about it.³² However, there is evidence of considerable similarities between *Bacchae* and Aeschylus' *Edonians*, where another ruler, Lycurgus, fought against Dionysus and was driven mad. In particular, a few fragments show that Dionysus was taken before Lycurgus as a prisoner, questioned about his place of birth, and mocked for his appearance. One runs, 'Whence comes this epicene? What is its country, what its garb?'³³—while another runs, 'He's certainly got long legs! He wasn't once a clothes-snatcher, was he?'³⁴ These snippets show that Pentheus' derisive attitude and manner of speaking towards Dionysus were anticipated in Aeschylus' *Edonians*.³⁵

In different ways, therefore, Pentheus resembles Creon in *Antigone*, Lycus in *Heracles*, and Lycurgus in *Edonians*. If more tragedies survived depicting similar rulers, perhaps we would see many resemblances with other rulers, too. Furthermore, the *variety* of elements shared between Pentheus and other rulers is striking. Only a few are shared with the story tradition; most are only shared with one other tragic ruler. As for Aeschylus' Lycurgus, the few elements known to be shared between him and Pentheus are shared neither with Creon, nor with Lycus, nor with the story tradition. Indeed, there is no evidence either way as to whether Aeschylus' depiction of Lycurgus (or of Pentheus) had any particular links to the tradition of negative depictions of rulers discussed in Chapter 1.

³² Cf. Dodds [1944] 1960a:xxxi. Aeschylus' *Wool-Carders* may also have involved Pentheus (cf. p. 31 n. 107).

³³ ποδαπὸς ὁ γύννις; τίς πάτρα; τίς ἢ στολή; (Aesch. *Edonians* fr. 61.1, trans. Sommerstein).

³⁴ μακροσκελὴς μὲν ἄρα μὴ χλούνης τις ἦν; (Aesch. *Edonians* fr. 62, trans. Sommerstein). On these two fragments, cf. M. L. West 1990:28-29.

³⁵ Dodds [1944] 1960a:xxxii-xxxiii, comparing Aesch. *Edonians* fr. 61 with Eur. *Ba.* 460-464, and frr. 59-62 with Eur. *Ba.* 453-458. More generally on the relationship between *Edonians* and *Bacchae*: Deichgräber 1939:306-309; Sutton 1971:402-407; Seaford 1996:26-27. The same impression of Lycurgus is given at Soph. *Ant.* 960-961 (cited in this connection by Kamerbeek 1948:282). Also, in Naevius' *Lycurgus*, probably based on Aeschylus' *Edonians* (Deichgräber 1939:260-265; Dodds [1944] 1960a:xxxii-xxxiii; Sutton 1971:387-389; Lattanzi 1994:193-198), Lycurgus remarks, *ne ille mei feri ingeni atque animi acrem acrimoniam* (fr. 21; cf. frr. 19-20).

Like Creon, Pentheus has commonly been regarded as a stock or typical 'tyrant'.³⁶ As with Creon, this makes sense up to a point: some aspects of his portrayal are shared with the story tradition, and Pentheus also resembles other tragic rulers in the ways just explained. However, we should not overemphasise the homogeneity of these different 'tyrants' to the exclusion of recognising the differences between them, which are considerable; many of the resemblances between Pentheus and another ruler are shared with only one other, and there is no firm reason to consider these features *traditional* in any strong sense. Rather than thinking of the 'tragic tyrant' as a 'type', it may be more helpful to think of these rulers as displaying family resemblances.³⁷ Moreover, in Pentheus' case, it will not do to suppose that Euripides has simply reproduced a traditional figure. Rather, Euripides had available to him a heterogeneous variety of ideas associated with rulers, which he has blended anew in presenting Pentheus; consequently, Pentheus resembles many other rulers in one way or another, but is yet unique, and differs markedly, at this most basic level of his construction, from each.

III. Presupposed ideas: contemporary religious issues

As we have seen, the depiction of Creon in *Antigone* is affected by contemporary political elements: he enunciates contemporary principles concerning leadership and obedience, and the situation is presented in terms of conflicts concerning *nomos*, the burial of the dead and the authority of officials which are conceived in contemporary terms.

The depiction of Pentheus is not affected by contemporary political elements of this sort. It is, however, affected by contemporary *religious* elements. Above all, as Dodds and Versnel argue, the play makes contact with Athenian concerns about the

³⁶ E.g. Dodds [1944] 1960a:xlili, Diller 1955:458, and Seaford 1996:47. Doubts are expressed by Oranje 1984:176; March 1989:44.

³⁷ The term popularised by Wittgenstein 1953, section 67.

introduction of new cults, especially ones with a ‘foreign’ flavour.³⁸ Euripides presents the cult of Dionysus in a distinctly ‘foreign’ light: the Chorus announces its arrival from Asia, and Dionysus, leading it, takes the guise of a Lydian stranger;³⁹ also, the cult is repeatedly associated with that of the ‘foreign’ goddess Cybele.⁴⁰ Also, many features of the cult emphasised in *Bacchae* are found in Demosthenes, who uses them in a lurid description of a cult that he accuses Aeschines of having taken part in in his youth. It is disputed whether Demosthenes is talking specifically about the ‘foreign’ god Sabazius here or is confecting a scandalous and satirical cult of his own;⁴¹ either way, though, Demosthenes’ comments indicate that the cult in *Bacchae* contains features that might be regarded as objectionable and disreputable at Athens a few decades later.⁴² The depiction of Pentheus is considerably affected by this whole issue, since some of the aspects of the cult of Dionysus to which Pentheus objects were seen as striking and problematic aspects of similar cults in the fifth and fourth centuries. In particular, his objections to the Bacchants’ ecstatic and nocturnal rites, as well as to the sexual promiscuity that he assumes goes with them, are in line with contemporary perceptions of the cults of Adonis and Sabazius.⁴³ Similarly, in calling the disguised Dionysus a ‘wizard and enchanter’ (γόης ἐπωδός),⁴⁴ he takes a line of attack used in the fourth century against Nino, a priestess of Sabazius, and also

³⁸ In calling these religious concerns *contemporary*, I do not mean to suggest that they were *new*. On the contrary, Versnel 1990:102-131 and R. C. T. Parker 1996:158-163, 188-198 clearly show that such cults were introduced long before the 400s; there was no ‘sudden outburst of interest in barbarian gods’ (1996:196-197). I also follow Parker in using scare quotes with reference to these ‘foreign’ cults, since their foreign origins are often questionable (1996:158-163). In general, cf. also Dodds 1940:171-175, 1960:xxiii-xxv; Allan 2004:138-147; Gehrke 2011; Reitzammer 2017.

³⁹ Especially Eur. *Bacch.* 13-22, 64-65, 135-166, 234, 460-484.

⁴⁰ Eur. *Bacch.* 59, 76-82, 128-134, with Versnel 1990:105-111, 173, 180; Allan 2004:141-146. Comparable is the association of Dionysus with the Thracian goddess Cotyto at Aesch. *Edonians* fr. 57 (a play with which *Bacchae* has a particular relationship; cf. p. 244 n. 35), as discussed by Allan 2004:138-140. For Cotyto, cf. p. 247 n. 46 below.

⁴¹ So R. C. T. Parker 1996:159; G. Martin 2009:104-115.

⁴² Dodds 1940:173-175, [1944] 1960a:xxiii, comparing Dem. XVIII.259-260, 284 with Eur. *Ba.* 72-166; cf. Versnel 1990:114-115. (The comparison retains its interest even if Demosthenes is not thinking specifically of Sabazius.)

⁴³ Eur. *Ba.* 215-225, 236-238, 260-262, 458-459, 485-487, with Cic. *Leg.* 2.37 (describing Aristophanes’ *Seasons*), Ar. *Lys.* 387-398, and Men. *Sam.* 43-49, discussed by Versnel 1990:104, 114; Reitzammer 2017:307-309.

⁴⁴ Eur. *Ba.* 234.

against other figures perceived as religious charlatans.⁴⁵ Also, in mocking the disguised Dionysus' exotic dress, Pentheus may be attacking an aspect of contemporary cults pilloried in Eupolis' *Dyers*, which depicted the Thracian goddess Cotyto being worshipped by effeminate men dressed as women.⁴⁶ Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 4, Pentheus' indictment of Dionysus as 'introducing a new divinity' (δαίμον' ... ἐσφέρον νέον) seems to evoke accusations that might be made formally in contemporary impiety trials, since a similar indictment was employed against Socrates.⁴⁷ So the contact which *Bacchae* makes with this contemporary issue bears significantly on Pentheus, since it places him in a position akin to that of an accuser in an impiety trial, or to that of a religious conservative vehemently opposed to new religious practices.

Like Creon in *Antigone*, then, Pentheus is portrayed as representing a point of view which existed in fifth-century Athens in relation to a contemporary issue. Indeed, like both Creon and Oedipus, Pentheus places a strong focus on the *polis* and its interests, aligning himself and his actions with it, although this is not emphasised quite as strongly as in Sophocles' two plays.⁴⁸

Now, there is plenty of evidence that many Athenians were opposed to religious innovation, and that they feared the sexual promiscuity with which 'foreign' and Bacchic cults were associated. As we have seen, 'foreign' cults were a target of late fifth-century comedy, and the Athenians tried several people on charges of religious innovation, resulting in the executions of Socrates and the priestess Nino. Orations

⁴⁵ Joseph. *Ap.* 2.37 (Nino); Philochorus, *BNJ* 328 F 60, with Plut. *Dem.* 14, and *Dem.* XXV.79 (Theoris), with Versnel 1990:115-118. As Versnel points out, though, antipathy to γόητες and ἐπωδοί is only sometimes connected with new or 'foreign' cults; cf. e.g. Eur. *Hipp.* 1038-1040 (Leinieks 1996:232-233), Soph. *OT* 387-388 (cited by Versnel).

⁴⁶ Versnel 1990:113, 159. For Eupolis' *Dyers* (and some useful discussion of the goddess Cotyto), see Storey 2003:94-111.

⁴⁷ See p. 133-134 above.

⁴⁸ Note especially his initial emphasis on νεοχμὰ τήνδ' ἀνὰ πτόλιν κακά (Eur. *Ba.* 216); cf. 352, 503, with Podlecki 1974:148-149, 151, Seidensticker 1972:46, Segal 1982:100. Pohlenz goes too far, however, in claiming that 'Pentheus ist jähzornig wie Oedipus, aber wie dieser nur auf das Wohl des Volkes bedacht' (1954:II.179); Oedipus' alignment with the *polis* and its people is of a special and particularly close kind, and even Creon appeals to the *polis* more prominently than Pentheus (cf. pp. 134-135, 207-208 above).

such as Lysias' *Against Nicomachus* suggest that, whether in prosecution or defence, religious arguments that were to stand up in court required the adoption of a conservative position.⁴⁹ Quite probably, therefore, if a new and disruptive god had been introduced in contemporary Athens, many audience-members might have adopted a position similar to Pentheus'—one of opposition to the new god.⁵⁰ Similarly, since cults of this sort were commonly associated with sexual promiscuity, it seems likely, based on what we know of Athenian attitudes towards women, that many Athenians, if confronted with their female relatives dancing off into the mountains unsupervised, might have reacted with just as much suspicion as Pentheus.⁵¹

Surviving evidence, then, gives the clear impression that suspicion of such cults and fear of the sexual promiscuity that accompanied them were widespread. Evidence for the opposite viewpoint does not seem to have survived, although this does not mean that none existed;⁵² after all, participants in such cults presumably had motivations, and could presumably expound these to other would-be participants. One might suppose, however, that these motivations may have been spiritual, convivial and hedonistic—and perhaps not formulated as rational arguments as such.

Scholars have sometimes used the likelihood that many Athenians were opposed to religious innovation and sexual promiscuity as a basis for a positive (or partly positive) overall view of Pentheus.⁵³ Sophocles' *Antigone*, however, should discourage

⁴⁹ Lys. XXX.18-19; cf. the passages cited at p. 255 n. 87, and Pl. *Euthyph.* 3b8-9 (with Rubel 2014:1). On Athenian religious conservatism in general, see Mikalson 1983:95-98; Price 1999:76-88.

⁵⁰ Cf. Gehrke 2011:357-359, 362, who lists most of the facets of the Dionysiac cult in *Bacchae* which an Athenian might have found objectionable.

⁵¹ So March 1989:45, partly followed by Mills 2006:61; similarly, Oranje 1984:42-43; Hose 2008:206-207.

⁵² '[I]t happens that all our witnesses are hostile to the new religious movement. ... Athenian public opinion is thus, so far as we happen to know it, on the side of law and order' (Dodds [1944] 1960a:xxiv). Gehrke 2011:363 suggests that *Bacchae* itself is a sort of *Gegenplädoyer* against this point of view.

⁵³ Of recent scholars, see March 1989:43-50. Mills 2006:61 also takes this to mitigate Pentheus' broadly negative characterisation. Straightforwardly positive views of Pentheus were

us from jumping to such a conclusion, since there, too, Sophocles gives Creon a position that is somewhat defensible (although, perhaps, not as defensible as Pentheus'), yet has the other characters present him unanimously as being in the wrong. It therefore does not follow from the fact that Euripides has given Pentheus a favourable starting position that Euripides has, overall, presented him favourably; we cannot reach a conclusion on that until we have actually examined Euripides' application of techniques of characterisation to Pentheus. Certainly, by giving Pentheus a favourable starting position, Euripides has ensured that his behaviour—like that of Sophocles' Creon or Oedipus—is understandable and verisimilitudinous. That is to say, all Athenians, regardless of whether they themselves opposed religious innovation and sexual promiscuity as vehemently as Pentheus, should have been able to recognise Pentheus' stance as being one which many Athenians might have adopted if placed in the same position.⁵⁴

Indeed, Euripides renders Pentheus' behaviour understandable throughout the play. We saw before how Creon's and Oedipus' reactions—especially anger—are motivated by their misconceptions and by their opponents' behaviour (such as Teiresias' in *Oedipus Tyrannus*) being carefully calibrated to bring out the worst in them. Euripides achieves a similar plausibility for Pentheus' reactions in *Bacchae*. For instance, Pentheus' derisive reaction to Cadmus' and Teiresias' costumes and arguments is well-motivated, since, although this reaction need not be shared by the audience, these clearly contain sufficient elements of potential absurdity to render

formerly common: Norwood 1908:58-67 (citing various earlier views); Pohlenz [1930] 1954:I.455; Deichgräber 1935:329-331, 348; Rivier [1944] 1975:81.

⁵⁴ The fact that Pentheus is placed in a position where his conduct is readily comprehensible, given his ignorance, is noted by Deichgräber 1935:330, Oranje 1984:41-42, March 1989:43-50, and Hose 2008:206-207, but is glossed over by most scholars adopting a negative view of Pentheus (as, on the whole, I do below).

Dodds on Eur. *Ba.* 973-6, March 1989:43-44 and Mills 2006:61 also consider Pentheus' youth (Eur. *Ba.* 274, 330, 974, 1226, 1308, 1317, 1319) to mitigate his behaviour, but this seems doubtful. Given e.g. Eur. *Supp.* 232-237, Pentheus' youth might have *aggravated* the negative impression produced by his bellicose behaviour and *hybris*; cf. Leinieks 1996:210. References to Pentheus' youth after his death surely do, however, contribute to making his fate seem piteous (Dodds on Eur. *Ba.* 973-6); cf. pp. 258-264 below.

this plausible.⁵⁵ Similarly, Pentheus' fury and contempt at the disguised Dionysus are rendered understandable by Dionysus' exotic clothing (which appeals to exactly the suspicions about cults which we have just discussed), and by the infuriatingly riddling mode of his answers, which has rightly been compared with Teiresias in *Oedipus Tyrannus*.⁵⁶ In one case, Pentheus spells out his motivations, when he says to the First Messenger, 'the more dreadful the things you report about the Bacchants, the more harshly I shall punish this man, who has suggested these crafty ways to them.'⁵⁷ Sure enough, the First Messenger reports some dreadful things that the Bacchants have done⁵⁸—and Pentheus, ignoring everything else the First Messenger has said, reacts furiously.⁵⁹ These techniques show considerable continuity with Sophocles: Euripides continually confronts Pentheus with situations and interactions which drag him further into moral and factual error.

All in all, the ideas underlying Pentheus, like those underlying Creon in *Antigone*, are much less straightforward than is often thought. Like Creon, Pentheus is depicted through a double lens—in terms of pre-existing ideas about rulers, and in terms of a contemporary issue. The pre-existing ideas about rulers ultimately draw, as with Creon, Oedipus and Lycus, on the tradition of stories about rulers; Pentheus is, then, a cousin (although a rather distant one) of Herodotean characters like Periander and

⁵⁵ Seidensticker 1978:310-316, 2016:277-278 emphasises the absurdity of Teiresias' and Cadmus' appearance; the best evidence is Eur. *Ba.* 248-251, where Pentheus calls their appearance *πολὺν γέλων* (250). Also, although Teiresias shares his Sophoclean predecessors' severe manner and dramatic function (cf. Ugolini 1995:202-204), his arguments possess a strongly contemporary character (Roth 1984; Egli 2003:138-146; Hose 2008:207; Seidensticker 2016:278-282), and some are difficult to take entirely seriously (especially Eur. *Ba.* 286-297, with Seidensticker 2016:281). However, I am inclined to doubt whether audience-members are supposed to *share* Pentheus' reaction (Deichgräber 1935:327-331; Seidensticker 1978:314-315); aspects of the scene might complicate any such response. Audience-members' understanding of Pentheus' laughter might be modified by their awareness that Pentheus is tragically mistaken (cf. Gregory 2000:66-67). Also, audience-members would have had to set Pentheus' scorn against Cadmus' and the Chorus-leader's view that Teiresias is wise and sensible (179, 328-329, 330), taking account of *both* perspectives in forming their own judgements. Cf. also Diller 1955:462-463; Morwood 2016.

⁵⁶ Diller 1955:465; Seidensticker 1971:218-219; Segal 1982:229; Gregory 2000:72; Papadopoulou 2001:29-30.

⁵⁷ Eur. *Bacch.* 674-676.

⁵⁸ Eur. *Bacch.* 748-768.

⁵⁹ Eur. *Bacch.* 778-786; cf. Oranje 1984:74. Pentheus ignores the Bacchants' chastity and initial peacefulness (685-688) and the Messenger's advice to honour the god (712-713, 769-774).

Cambyzes. However, this should not lead us to suppose that Pentheus is 'typical', or even very 'traditional'; each of these rulers is different, and the features which Pentheus shares with Creon, Lycus, and Lycurgus in Aeschylus' *Edonians* are diffuse and varied. When we consider not only that Pentheus' portrayal is based on a very particular set of pre-existing ideas about rulers, but also that this has been brought into contact with a contemporary issue in an effective and concerted way, we can only conclude that the blend of ideas which went into Pentheus' portrayal is highly distinctive. This distinctiveness will only become more apparent as we look at his moral presentation in the play.

IV. The moral presentation of Pentheus in the first part of the play

IV.i. The other characters' views of Pentheus

As discussed above, Creon and Oedipus are presented by the other characters in a broadly consistent way. With regard to Pentheus in *Bacchae*, this unanimity is even more pronounced: although the characters' personal relationships and attitudes towards Pentheus vary, their moral assessments are similar, since all regard him as impious and foolish.

After Pentheus' opening speech, the leader of the Chorus (the hostility of which to Pentheus is apparent throughout) briefly exclaims at his *duissebeia*.⁶⁰ Teiresias then condemns Pentheus at length; although his argumentation is contemporary,⁶¹ his severe and monitory attitude resembles that of his Sophoclean predecessors.⁶² Teiresias declares that, in contrast with the wise man (σοφός), Pentheus talks as though he were clever (ὡς φρονῶν), but there is no sense (φρόνεις) in what he says.⁶³ It is an indication of the characters' unanimity in assessing Pentheus that Teiresias' observation—that Pentheus does not possess true wisdom or good sense—is echoed

⁶⁰ Eur. *Bacch.* 263.

⁶¹ Cf. p. 250 n. 55.

⁶² Cf. pp. 217-218.

⁶³ Eur. *Bacch.* 266-269.

subsequently by Cadmus, the Chorus and Dionysus. Throughout his speech, Teiresias emphasises that Pentheus is reviling and fighting against a god, and even calls Pentheus mad.⁶⁴ At the end of the scene, he again says that Pentheus is mad, and calls him foolish (μῶρος).⁶⁵

Cadmus' attitude towards Pentheus is more benevolent. Addressing him in familiar terms (ὦ παῖ), he appeals to Pentheus' family feeling (οἶκει μεθ' ἡμῶν), and expresses concern and sympathy for the pitiful fate (ἄθλιον μόρον) that he rightly fears that Pentheus will suffer (ὁ μὴ πάθῃς σύ).⁶⁶ Cadmus also makes it clear, however, that Pentheus is acting outside the laws (θύραζε τῶν νόμων), and remarks, like Teiresias, that he lacks true good sense (φρονῶν οὐδὲν φρονεῖς).⁶⁷ Cadmus' moral assessment here is scarcely less condemnatory than the Chorus' or Teiresias'.

In the scenes that follow, the disguised Dionysus and the Chorus enunciate similar assessments. The Chorus, whose fear and enmity towards Pentheus are apparent throughout,⁶⁸ accuses him in the first stasimon of 'impious outrage towards Dionysus' (οὐχ ὁσίαν ὕβριν ἐς τὸν Βρόμιον).⁶⁹ They also remark, 'Cleverness is not wisdom, and thinking thoughts that are not mortal means a short life' (τὸ σοφὸν δ' οὐ σοφία, τό τε μὴ θνατὰ φρονεῖν βραχὺς αἰών).⁷⁰ Although these statements are generalisations, they seem to reflect on Pentheus: the distinction between true and superficial wisdom echoes Teiresias' and Cadmus' earlier statements that Pentheus

⁶⁴ Eur. *Bacch.* 272, 286, 325-326. Teiresias' words foreshadow Pentheus' later madness, but Teiresias should probably be understood as speaking hyperbolically here (Dodds on Eur. *Bacch.* 326-7; Aélion 1983:II.255). (Padel 1995:193 and Thumiger 2008:64-65, however, think that the boundary between genuine madness and figurative madness is more porous than this view allows.)

⁶⁵ Eur. *Bacch.* 359, 369.

⁶⁶ Eur. *Bacch.* 330-331, 337, 341. Cadmus' whole speech focuses on the family: see further Oranje 1984:44-45.

⁶⁷ Eur. *Bacch.* 331-332. I take Cadmus' remark to mean 'In thinking you do not think sensibly' (as, roughly, does Seaford). Kovacs' translation ('you are clever, but your cleverness amounts to nothing') suggests that Cadmus thinks that Pentheus is clever in some sense, but that surely goes beyond the Greek.

⁶⁸ Especially Eur. *Bacch.* 545-555, 608-613, 997-1023.

⁶⁹ Eur. *Bacch.* 374-375.

⁷⁰ Eur. *Bacch.* 395-397, trans. Seaford, modified. With Diggle (and Dodds *ad loc.*), I follow the Aldine edition's punctuation; others insert a stop after φρονεῖν.

lacks good sense despite his superficial ability to think, and the remark about thinking thoughts that are not mortal recalls Cadmus' and Teiresias' fears that Pentheus' foolishness and impiety will bring about his early death.⁷¹ In the second stasimon, when Pentheus has taken Dionysus away to imprison him, the Chorus enunciates an even more negative view, calling Pentheus a 'wild-looking beast, not a mortal man' (ἀγριωπὸν τέρας, οὐ φῶτα βρότειον), who shows bestial ferocity.⁷² Their view of him as violent and murderous is summed up in their prayer to Dionysus: 'Restrain the *hybris* of this murderous man'.⁷³

The disguised Dionysus' tone is more riddling and monitory than hostile: as mentioned above, scholars have rightly noted resemblances with Teiresias in *Oedipus Tyrannus*.⁷⁴ Indeed, Dionysus does not initially react negatively to Pentheus' disingenuous and sarcastic questions. However, when Pentheus accuses the disguised Dionysus of fraudulence, Dionysus expresses disapproval, although obliquely, remarking that the god's rites hate anyone who practises *asebeia*.⁷⁵ Shortly afterwards, Pentheus accuses Dionysus of 'saying nothing well' (εὖ γ' οὐδὲν λέγων), which prompts Dionysus to remark that 'even a person who says wise things will seem not to think right to a foolish person' (δόξει τις ἀμαθεῖ σοφὰ λέγων οὐκ εὖ φρονεῖν).⁷⁶ This contrast between the apparent nonsense of Dionysus' words to Pentheus (οὐκ εὖ φρονεῖν) and their actual wisdom (σοφὰ) recalls the contrast between true and false wisdom applied to Pentheus by Teiresias and Cadmus. When Pentheus threatens to punish Dionysus for his 'wicked inventions' (σοφισμάτων κακῶν),⁷⁷ Dionysus accuses him very directly of foolishness and impiety.⁷⁸ As he is led to prison, Dionysus strongly condemns Pentheus, as the Chorus did, by accusing

⁷¹ So Dodds on Eur. *Bacch.* 395, 397-9.

⁷² Eur. *Bacch.* 538-542. As Segal 1982:56 notes, the Chorus' words recall Teiresias' (καίπερ ὄντος ἀγρίου, 361).

⁷³ φονίου δ' ἀνδρὸς ὕβριν κατὰσχες (Eur. *Bacch.* 555).

⁷⁴ See p. 250 n. 56.

⁷⁵ Eur. *Bacch.* 476.

⁷⁶ Eur. *Bacch.* 479-480.

⁷⁷ Eur. *Bacch.* 489.

⁷⁸ σὲ δ' ἀμαθίας γε κἀσεβοῦντ' ἐς τὸν θεόν (Eur. *Bacch.* 490).

him of acts of *hybris* for which he shall be punished.⁷⁹ These words anticipate the realisation of Cadmus' and Teiresias' previous forebodings; Pentheus, in consigning the god to prison,⁸⁰ has taken a decisive step towards his own destruction.

Minor characters also seem to disapprove of Pentheus' conduct. The Servant who brings in the arrested Dionysus indicates this briefly, making it clear that he arrested Dionysus unwillingly.⁸¹ The First Messenger, though, tells Pentheus that, had Pentheus seen the Bacchants lying peacefully on the mountain, Pentheus would have worshipped Dionysus, and advises him to do so.⁸² These servants do not tell Pentheus to his face that he is impious: this is well-suited to their relationships towards him, especially since the First Messenger explicitly declares his nervousness of Pentheus' temper.⁸³ Nevertheless, these servants contribute to the characters' unanimity in seeing Pentheus as being in the wrong, and we should not underestimate the authority of serving characters' views—especially in *Bacchae*, where the Chorus is so partisan.⁸⁴

Like Sophocles' Creon and Oedipus, then, Pentheus is assessed morally with great unanimity, cutting across the characters' differences of perspective. Cadmus, Teiresias, Dionysus, the Chorus, and the servants all have different attitudes towards Pentheus, but their moral assessments coincide very substantially. The presentation of Pentheus is, however, perhaps more explicit than what we saw in Sophocles, where virtue terms like *sophos*, *moros* and *asebes* are used sparingly compared to oblique reflections using conditionals and generalisations; in *Bacchae*, the other characters call Pentheus foolish and impious not only obliquely, but also directly and explicitly.

⁷⁹ Eur. *Bacch.* 516-517; cf. ὁβρις at 375, 555.

⁸⁰ Cf. Eur. *Bacch.* 518.

⁸¹ Eur. *Bacch.* 441-442.

⁸² Eur. *Bacch.* 712-713, 769-774.

⁸³ Eur. *Bacch.* 670.

⁸⁴ So rightly Buxton 1989:229-230.

Another important consideration regarding Pentheus' characterisation is the lack of self-presentation. Sophocles' Creon and Oedipus both begin by explaining their principles and reflecting obliquely upon themselves. By contrast, Pentheus begins with an angry and emotional tirade against Dionysus' cult, without reflecting on what sort of person he is trying to be in taking this stance. Indeed, Pentheus scarcely makes any statements about himself at all in the whole play; nor does he refer obliquely to himself using generalisations or conditionals.⁸⁵ He does accuse Cadmus and Teiresias of *moria* and *anoia*,⁸⁶ presumably implying that he considers himself to have better sense. However, he does not intellectualise his position further, for instance by proposing an alternative conception of *eusebeia*, *nomos* or even *sophia* to oppose to theirs, although it would have been easy enough for Euripides to have put such arguments in his mouth. Pentheus could, for instance, have articulated an argument based on religious conservatism, arguing that true *eusebeia* consists not in innovating, but in preserving ancestral customs.⁸⁷ Although the situation is different, Creon in *Antigone*, unlike Pentheus, presents a coherent religious justification for his stance: Creon advances a different conception of *nomos* from Antigone, and emphasises his respect for Zeus, declaring his conviction that the gods would not favour a man like Polynices, who planned to sack their temples.⁸⁸ In *Bacchae*, however, Euripides has not chosen to provide Pentheus with any arguments with which to set forth his self-image and defend his position,⁸⁹ ensuring that only one moral assessment of Pentheus is framed clearly for the audience to hear—namely the negative assessment shared by the other characters.

⁸⁵ Similarly (although from a different angle), Lawrence 2013:298-299, 307.

⁸⁶ Eur. *Bacch.* 344, 345.

⁸⁷ Lys. XXX.18-19, Isocrates VII.30, [Dem.] LIX.77, and Lycurg. *Leoc.* 1-2, 97 (cited by R. C. T. Parker 1996:152; Volonaki on Lys. XXX.18-19) all present arguments which could fit Pentheus' position. Indeed, Gehrke 2011:362-363 writes out a speech for Pentheus along similar lines. My point is that Pentheus *could* have made some such argument—but Euripides has not chosen to allow him to.

⁸⁸ Soph. *Ant.* 282-289; Euripides puts similar ideas in Eteocles' mouth at *Phoen.* 604-609.

⁸⁹ Cf. Dodds [1944] 1960a:xlili, Diller 1955:458 (rightly contrasting Pentheus' opening speech with those of Eteocles in Aesch. *Sept.* and Oedipus in Soph. *OT*).

IV.ii. Implicit characterisation in Pentheus' first speech

Especially since we cannot discuss Pentheus in terms of explicit self-presentation, it seems important to discuss his *implicit* characterisation in the opening scene where he confronts Cadmus and Teiresias. As discussed in the Introduction to Part Two, one difficulty involved in studying implicit characterisation is that it does not verbally express the thought about the character which it is supposed to convey—whereas explicit characterisation (however oblique) does.⁹⁰ One guide that must always carry some weight, however, is other characters' reactions to this implicit characterisation. That is to say, if a speech's style and content are such as to provoke the reactions that it does in fact provoke, the characters' reactions will provide corroboration for our impression of the style and content of the speech, and *vice versa*.

Pentheus' speech, as we have seen, prompts the Chorus, Teiresias, and Cadmus to draw attention to his impiety and foolishness; Teiresias goes as far as to call him mad. Teiresias also emphasises the speech's derisive tone, saying that Pentheus *ridicules* (διαγελᾷς) the god and also Cadmus,⁹¹ and Teiresias and Cadmus indicate Pentheus' hasty and 'fluttered' state.⁹² The question, then, is whether Pentheus' speech is actually such as to *justify* these reactions.

It is easy to see why Pentheus' speech might seem unmeasured and anxious. Pentheus' initial failure to notice Teiresias and Cadmus indicates his distracted state; the thirty lines before he notices them are the longest speech spoken out of contact on entry in extant tragedy.⁹³ Pentheus' long and paratactic first sentence explaining what he has heard (which contains two instances of μέν and five of δέ) gives a clear impression of his anxiety at the numerous *kaka* throughout the *polis* with which he perceives that he is confronted.⁹⁴ Once he has declared in violent language that he will hunt and tie up the Bacchantes, he starts again, saying what he has been told

⁹⁰ See p. 145.

⁹¹ Eur. *Bacch.* 272, 286 (Dionysus), 322 (Cadmus).

⁹² διὰ σπουδῆς (Eur. *Bacch.* 212); ἐπτόηται (214); πέτη (332).

⁹³ So Mastronarde 1979:23.

⁹⁴ ἀνὰ πτόλιν κακά (Eur. *Bacch.* 216).

(λέγουσι) about the Lydian stranger, before again emphasising how violently he will kill him. As Seidensticker remarks, his development of thought is illogical, and he makes conflicting statements, as well as continually repeating words and thoughts.⁹⁵

Equally, Teiresias' statement that Pentheus' speech ridicules the god is well justified by Pentheus' derisive tone. Pentheus refers to Dionysus as 'that recent god Dionysus, whoever he is' (τὸν νεωστὶ δαίμονα Διόνυσον, ὅστις ἔστι); as commentators observe, 'recent' (νεωστὶ) and 'whoever he is' (ὅστις ἔστι) both convey contempt.⁹⁶ Pentheus' remark that the Bacchants really hold Aphrodite in higher regard than Dionysus is also rather derisive.⁹⁷ Above all, Pentheus treats the disguised Dionysus' claims about Dionysus' divinity with contempt, regarding him as a disreputable source of information, and concluding with an indignant and violently phrased rhetorical question: 'Are these things not terrible and deserving of strangling, performing these outrages, whoever the stranger is?'⁹⁸

Pentheus' speech also readily justifies the other characters' assessments of him as impious, foolish, and even mad. Pentheus' derisive tone towards Dionysus and lack of reasoned argument, which we have just discussed, convey his impiety and lack of *sophia*. Pentheus' foolishness is perhaps also suggested by his reliance on rumour (κλύω, λέγουσι):⁹⁹ as Dodds says, he exhibits a 'willingness to believe the worst on hearsay evidence (221ff.) or on none (255ff.) ... and a stupid reliance on physical force as a means of settling spiritual problems'.¹⁰⁰ Similarly, in his speech replying to Teiresias and Cadmus, Pentheus pays no attention to their remonstrances, and does not respond in a reasoned fashion, as even speakers advocating morally doubtful

⁹⁵ Seidensticker 2016:278 n. 22.

⁹⁶ Eur. *Bacch.* 219-220, with Dodds, Seaford *ad loc.*.

⁹⁷ Eur. *Bacch.* 225.

⁹⁸ ταῦτ' οὐχὶ δεινὰ καγχόνης ἔστ' ἄξια, ὕβρεις ὑβρίζειν, ὅστις ἔστιν ὁ ξένος; (Eur. *Bacch.* 246-247, trans. Seaford). The text is uncertain: if correct, καγχόνης ... ἄξια is probably a threat of punishment (Dodds, Seaford *ad loc.*), but Kovacs 1991:340 takes it to refer (hyperbolically) to suicide, positing a lacuna after 246.

⁹⁹ Cf. Leinieks 1996:217-218.

¹⁰⁰ Dodds [1944] 1960a:xlili; cf. Seidensticker 1972:46.

positions often do in Euripidean *agones*.¹⁰¹ Rather, Pentheus' reaction is violent and emotional: with rude and almost infantile repulsion, he tells his grandfather not to touch him in case his stupidity (μωρία) rubs off on him, and violently orders his men to upset Teiresias' oracular seat.¹⁰² Since in Sophocles, too, disrespectful behaviour towards Teiresias is shown to be misguided, and since Pentheus here goes even further than Creon and Oedipus, it seems likely that Pentheus' words are supposed to seem markedly foolish.

Pentheus, then, is characterised implicitly, as well as explicitly, as foolish and impious. Euripides has not only presented Pentheus as mistaken, but as failing to intellectualise his position or exhibit *sophia* in any noticeable way. Euripides could have portrayed Pentheus' ignorance of the real situation as that of an intelligent man, as Sophocles does in *Oedipus Tyrannus*. In fact, Pentheus' speech contains so much ridicule of Dionysus that it would be exceedingly difficult to regard it as pious, and is so unmeasured and badly framed that it would be similarly difficult to regard it as wise. Even an audience-member who would have been inclined in real life to oppose the introduction of a new god into Athens, and whose own notions of *sophia* and *eusebeia* would have run against such innovation, would have had great difficulty in maintaining that Pentheus' speech was in no respect foolish or impious. In short, Pentheus' implicit characterisation (the tone and content of his speech) coheres closely with his explicit characterisation (the other characters' remarks) to produce a strikingly unified moral picture of Pentheus.

V. The *post mortem* characterisation of Pentheus

We will now turn to Pentheus' presentation after his death. Scholars discussing Pentheus have naturally paid less attention to this than to Pentheus' initial presentation or to his madness (in the intervening scenes), but it nevertheless rewards careful attention. Broadly speaking, the characters continue, regardless of their

¹⁰¹ E.g. Jason (Eur. *Med.* 522-575); Helen (*Tro.* 914-965); Eteocles (*Phoen.* 499-525).

¹⁰² Eur. *Bacch.* 343-351.

relationships to Pentheus, to regard him as foolish and impious. However, after Pentheus' death, a new aspect is introduced—namely, a bifurcation in sympathy between characters who rejoice at his death (the Chorus, and initially Agave) and characters who lament it (the Second Messenger, Cadmus, and in the end Agave).

In the fourth stasimon, immediately before the news is brought, the Chorus reflects upon Pentheus in strongly negative terms, again recalling his anger, lawlessness, bad judgement, impiety and use of violence.¹⁰³ The Chorus also emphasises Pentheus' derangement of mind; although now literally true, this recalls Teiresias' earlier non-literal statement that Pentheus is mad.¹⁰⁴ So the Chorus' assessment of Pentheus coincides with those expressed previously.

Now the Second Messenger enters, bringing news of Pentheus' death, and introduces a new attitude which contrasts with the Chorus' hostility—namely, the sorrow, grief and pity which Pentheus' family and dependents feel for Pentheus' miserable fate.¹⁰⁵ This is not *entirely* new, since it displays continuity with, and realises, Cadmus' and Teiresias' earlier fear that Pentheus would meet with a dreadful fate and bring misery (πένθος) on the family.¹⁰⁶ However, the divergence between these views now become much more patent. They are immediately contrasted in the Messenger's initial exchange with the Chorus, which reacts with pleasure, praising Dionysus and delighting in the destruction of 'that wicked man, contriver of wickedness',¹⁰⁷ while the Messenger laments the family's misfortunes, indignantly reproaching the Chorus for taking pleasure in Pentheus' death. The Messenger also displays his loyal and sympathetic attitude in his speech, repeatedly expressing his pity for Pentheus (τλήμων, δύστηνος, δυσδαίμων, ἄθλιος), and closely associating himself with Pentheus throughout the speech.¹⁰⁸ However, none of this prevents the Messenger

¹⁰³ Eur. *Bacch.* 997-1001, 1008-1010 (criticising Pentheus implicitly; cf. 331).

¹⁰⁴ Eur. *Bacch.* 999-1000, cf. 326-327, 359.

¹⁰⁵ The contrast between the Messenger's and Chorus' attitudes is noted by de Jong 1992:575; Perris 2011:46-47.

¹⁰⁶ Eur. *Bacch.* 337-341, 367-368.

¹⁰⁷ ἄδικος ἄδικά τ' ἐκπορίζων ἀνήρ; (Eur. *Bacch.* 1042). Cf. 997, 1010.

¹⁰⁸ See Buxton 1991:44-45; de Jong 1992.

from regarding Pentheus as impious and foolish. He concludes his speech with the generalisation that being moderate (σωφρονεῖν) and honouring (σέβειν) the gods are the wisest (σοφώτατον) of possessions,¹⁰⁹ a remark which only has any point if one recalls that *sophrosyne*, *eusebeia* and *sophia* are precisely the qualities that Pentheus has repeatedly been said to lack.

After the fifth stasimon, again expressing the Chorus' joy,¹¹⁰ the bifurcation of sympathies is even more important, contributing greatly to the power of the dialogue between Agave and the Chorus. That is to say, the bifurcation is embodied in the attitude of a single person, Agave, who moves during the scene from exultation to grief. As long as Agave is ignorant and deranged, she is at one with the Chorus,¹¹¹ and they agree with her, praising her deed.¹¹² When Cadmus arrives, however, the contrast between his sorrow and her exultation is immediately apparent: she presents Cadmus with Pentheus' head, telling Cadmus that he is blessed (μακάριος) because of her accomplishment,¹¹³ whereas his reply emphasises his misfortune.¹¹⁴ The strongest effect produced by the contrast, though, comes when Cadmus has brought Agave round to sanity: Agave's grief brings her reactions into alignment with Cadmus', and she sees the magnitude of her own sorrow.¹¹⁵ Here, the great dramatic effectiveness of her realisation derives partly from the contrast between the two perspectives which Euripides has established throughout the scene.

As they talk, the moral assessments of Pentheus presented earlier continue to be stated: Cadmus repeats the Chorus' assessment that Dionysus punished Pentheus justly, while Agave herself draws attention to Pentheus' tendency to act as a *theomachos*. Yet these assessments, which were reproaches against Pentheus earlier, are recast so that they themselves are pathetic. Thus, even as Cadmus states that

¹⁰⁹ Eur. *Bacch.* 1150-1152.

¹¹⁰ Eur. *Bacch.* 1153-1164.

¹¹¹ This is emphasised at Eur. *Bacch.* 1167, 1172.

¹¹² Eur. *Bacch.* 1192.

¹¹³ Eur. *Bacch.* 1242-1243.

¹¹⁴ Eur. *Bacch.* 1244-1248. Lines 1244-1245 are textually problematic (Kovacs 1991:344-345), but 1248 suffices for the present argument.

¹¹⁵ Eur. *Bacch.* 1282-1284.

Pentheus' punishment was just, he also states—unlike the Chorus—that it was excessive (ἄγαν), and draws attention to the miserable fact that this punishment constitutes the destruction of Cadmus' family, a destruction which indeed he and Teiresias feared previously.¹¹⁶ Agave's remark that Pentheus is a *theomachos* is also made pathetic, since she imagines that Pentheus' punishment will be a telling-off (νουθετεῖν) from his grandfather, and, with more intense irony, she asks for Pentheus to be called to her, to congratulate her on her trophy.¹¹⁷ When Agave regains her sanity, the same moral attitudes are maintained: Cadmus states that Pentheus went to the mountain to insult the god (ἐκερτόμει, ὕβρις),¹¹⁸ and Cadmus and Agave recognise that Agave's and Pentheus' conduct constituted foolishness (ἄφροσύνης) and impiety (οὐ σέβων θεόν).¹¹⁹ Now, however, even Pentheus' foolishness and impiety are made to seem pathetic—because they are seen through the misery which Dionysus has consequently inflicted on the family. Cadmus' fate, indeed, is so miserable that even the Chorus-leader expresses a little sympathy for him, although none at all for Pentheus.¹²⁰

Euripides has, then, arranged the characters' statements to produce a radical shift after Pentheus' death. The moral assessments remain the same, but the characters' emotional reactions towards Pentheus, in terms of sympathy, emerge strongly for the first time, producing a new bifurcation between the Thebans' view and the Chorus'.

This, however, is not the only new feature in Euripides' presentation of Pentheus. Even more remarkable is Cadmus' speech lamenting Pentheus—an extensive piece of *post mortem* characterisation. After expressing sorrow again for his family's and Pentheus' destruction, Cadmus apostrophises Pentheus, describing what he was like in life. Firstly, he explains how Pentheus, by threatening to punish anyone who insulted Cadmus and creating fear, protected Cadmus from dishonour.¹²¹ This remark

¹¹⁶ Eur. *Bacch.* 1249-1250.

¹¹⁷ Eur. *Bacch.* 1255-1258.

¹¹⁸ Eur. *Bacch.* 1293, 1297; cf. 374-375, 516, 555.

¹¹⁹ Eur. *Bacch.* 1301-1302.

¹²⁰ Eur. *Bacch.* 1327-1328.

¹²¹ Eur. *Bacch.* 1308-1312.

is surprising, in evaluating Pentheus' behaviour in a positive and indeed loving light—something of which there was no hint earlier, and which Euripides appears to have kept back for this highly emotive moment.¹²² This remark does not, though, represent a change in Pentheus' depiction as such, since the tendencies that Cadmus praises here are the same ones remarked upon earlier, which contributed to characters' assessments of him as impious and foolish. Here, Pentheus is envisaged as exacting punishment from anyone who dared to insult Cadmus (δίκην γὰρ ἀξίαν ἐλάμβανες), but previously Pentheus repeatedly threatened that he would punish Dionysus and his followers—exactly the behaviour for which the other characters called him impious and foolish. Similarly, Cadmus mentions that Pentheus caused fear (τάρβος) in the *polis*, whereas previously the fear which Pentheus causes was treated much more negatively by the Chorus and the First Messenger.¹²³ Cadmus, then, places the same kind of behaviour exhibited by Pentheus earlier in a new and approbatory light.

Similarly, Cadmus emphasises something not seen before—the reciprocal love between grandfather and grandson. Cadmus calls him 'dearest of men' (ὦ φίλτατ' ἀνδρῶν), assuring him that even in death he will be considered one of the people whom Cadmus loves most.¹²⁴ Then Cadmus demonstrates Pentheus' love for him, too, by recalling how Pentheus had used to touch Cadmus' beard and embrace him.¹²⁵ The pathos of this attains its peak when Cadmus quotes Pentheus in direct speech, asking him who is mistreating or disrespecting him, and promising to punish them.¹²⁶ This direct speech allows Pentheus to speak to the audience from beyond the grave, as it were; these words, spoken by Pentheus before Dionysus ever came to Thebes, are pathetic because of the contrast between the domestic life envisaged here and the mad world into which Dionysus' arrival threw them all. As before, though, Pentheus'

¹²² As Garton 1957:252 remarks, 'When Euripides bespeaks sympathy for Pentheus at the end of *Bacchae*, he does so less by inventing, by calling up virtues hitherto undisclosed, than by presenting the old character from a different viewpoint. ... The effect is one of unexpected subtlety.' Similar brief remarks: Grube 1941:417-418; Whitehorne 1986:64-65.

¹²³ Chorus: Eur. *Bacch.* 545-555, 610-613, 775-777 (τάρβω), 1035. Messenger: 670-671.

¹²⁴ Eur. *Bacch.* 1316-1317.

¹²⁵ Eur. *Bacch.* 1318-1319.

¹²⁶ Eur. *Bacch.* 1320-1322.

emphasis on punishment (κολάζω τὸν ἀδικοῦντά) recalls his earlier threats to punish the disguised Dionysus and his Bacchants, as well as Teiresias.¹²⁷ However, Cadmus' moral assessment remains unchanged. He starts his speech by drawing attention to Pentheus' impiety, and ends it by drawing the moral that anyone who despises (ὑπερφρονεῖ) the gods should learn from Pentheus' death, a remark recalling Pentheus' earlier contempt for the gods.¹²⁸

What has changed, then, is not Pentheus' actual behaviour or Cadmus' moral assessment, but only the newly displayed sympathy and love which Cadmus describes. When the same aggressive behaviours on Pentheus' part are applied to a different context (defending his grandfather rather than defying a god), they suddenly seem natural and creditable, and can be regarded with a sympathy that they could not command earlier.

In order to show how remarkable Euripides' technique is here, it may be helpful to use Sophocles' Creon as a point of comparison. Creon is not actually dead by the end of *Antigone*, of course, but Sophocles brings out the misery of his suffering, by having him lament and blame himself. Yet there is little sympathy expressed for Creon: instead, the other characters' remarks largely emphasise Creon's responsibility. In *Oedipus Tyrannus*, as we saw, the situation is different: the characters' views of Oedipus are largely sympathetic, and therefore it is hardly surprising that the pathos at the end is great, since a character who was admired has met with great suffering.¹²⁹ In *Bacchae*, though, Euripides has contrived a much greater revolution in the portrayal of a character: firstly, he depicts him in the darkest moral terms, and only then, after his death, has characters express great pity and sympathy for him.¹³⁰ Moreover, unlike Sophocles, Euripides has written the play so that, at the end, the characters are *divided* regarding Pentheus, since the Chorus rejoices over his fate, whereas for

¹²⁷ Eur. *Bacch.* 226-231, 239-241, 246-247, 258-260, 345-351, 355-357, 489-493, 675-676, 793. The continuity here is rightly observed by Diller 1955:458-459.

¹²⁸ Eur. *Bacch.* 1302, 1325-1326; cf. especially 199 (οὐ καταφρονῶ).

¹²⁹ See pp. 217-220.

¹³⁰ The increased sympathy with which Hippolytus is presented at the end of *Hippolytus* is perhaps comparable.

Cadmus and Agave, despite Pentheus' impiety and foolishness, it will be a source of misery to them forever. Lastly, although it is a well-recognised technique of Sophoclean characterisation, which Sophocles applies to Creon and Oedipus, to give characters a past showing the continuity of their behaviour beyond the brief span of the play,¹³¹ it is surely Euripides who has employed it most powerfully here. By giving Pentheus a past right at the end of the play, Euripides achieves the culminating effect of making Pentheus, even though on stage he had hardly a redeeming feature, the focus of the greatest sympathy and pathos.

VI. Conclusion

Firstly, then, there is a methodological point to be made. It seems to me that much scholarly disagreement over characterisation in Sophocles and Euripides has lain not so much in the ambiguity of characters' depiction or in our doubts (however substantial) regarding the attitudes of Athenian audiences, as in a lack of scholarly determination to apply clear-cut terminology and methodical categorisation to the question. In discussing Pentheus or Sophocles' Creon, or indeed any other tragic character, we should not conflate the audience's agreement or disagreement with these characters' initial positions, the moral presentation of these characters, and the sympathy with which they are regarded. These are different questions. If we muddle them together, we run the risk of maintaining, for instance, that, because Pentheus' position may have been agreeable to the audience—or because much pity is excited for Pentheus late in the play—his characterisation must be morally positive. But in such arguments the conclusions do not follow from the premises. Such lines of thought are also destructive to a coherent understanding of tragic characterisation, because they misleadingly flatten out the most interesting complexities of any character's portrayal. The real interest of Pentheus' portrayal lies precisely in Euripides' negative presentation of a character who represents a position of which audience-members might have strongly approved, and also in the fact that Euripides excites great sympathy for a man who, morally speaking, has been presented with the

¹³¹ See p. 224 n. 134 for this Sophoclean technique.

greatest opprobrium. Recognising such effects and complexities is surely a prime aim of the study of tragic characterisation, and any approach that blurs these should be avoided.

When it comes to audience reactions to Pentheus, though, we cannot keep the different aspects of Pentheus' characterisation in such tidy boxes—even though these different aspects *can* be described in a clear-cut fashion with reference to the text of the play itself. In particular, partly because such clear-cut moral terms (especially *eusebeia* and *sophia*) are used, there is, compared to Sophocles, a quite substantial chance that audience-members might feel that, at any given point, the characters' judgements of Pentheus are more matters of opinion than of fact. The possibility of this sort of reflection in audience-members is surely made greater by the fact that Pentheus is engaged in conflict with an anthropomorphic divinity of a particularly Euripidean sort, whose behaviour is open to criticism, even within the play. Especially given Cadmus' criticism of Dionysus, there is a real possibility that an audience-member might feel that the very notions of *sophia* and *eusebeia* used by Teiresias and Cadmus have been destabilised, and might ask why we should be *eusebes* towards such a cruel god, and whether Pentheus ultimately even merits the moral opprobrium cast upon him throughout the play. Indeed, such relativising reactions might already be prompted by the different attitudes of Cadmus, Teiresias and the Chorus towards the god and the different conceptions of *sophia* which they seem to entertain,¹³² as well as potentially by the un-Sophoclean and perhaps un-authoritative way in which Euripides has presented Teiresias.¹³³ Indeed, already in the prologue, audience-members familiar with plays like *Hippolytus* may possibly have recognised the arbitrariness of the world, controlled by vengeful and cruel gods, in which Pentheus lives,¹³⁴ and may even have felt from the outset that moral

¹³² Cf. Segal 1982:295-296, 298-299; Mastronarde [1986] 2010:219-220; Schein 2016:272-273.

¹³³ Cf. p. 250 n. 55, although Seidensticker (cited there) does not think that the absurd elements of Teiresias' portrayal necessarily deprive him of authority (Seidensticker 2016:281-282).

¹³⁴ The general analogy between Dionysus and the Aphrodite of *Hippolytus* is pointed out by many scholars (e.g. Dodds [1944] 1960a:xlvi; Schein 2016:273). The resemblance seems pronounced already in the prologues of the two plays, where, rather as Dionysus declares his intention to secure his honour at Thebes, Aphrodite explains her intention to kill Hippolytus

condemnation of Pentheus, however clearly articulated, loses some absoluteness in such a changeable and varied dramatic world. Some relativism about values such as *eusebeia* and *sophia* might also be engendered simply by the fact that Euripides and his audience lived at a time when intellectuals (and we must count Euripides among them) were continually questioning and redefining moral values, including (prominently) these two. In the end, as discussed in the Introduction to Part Two, characterisation and the values treated in any play are necessarily deeply intertwined,¹³⁵ and Euripides' work regularly encourages speculations of this kind, from which Pentheus' portrayal cannot be isolated.

Yet this does not reduce the significance of Pentheus' moral characterisation; rather, it enhances its importance, and makes Pentheus the locus of the play's whole dramatic and intellectual effect. Nor, indeed, does all this undermine the *clarity* of Pentheus' moral characterisation. It remains the case that Euripides has depicted him in clear moral terms, both through the statements made by other characters and through his own implicit characterisation; it is just that the whole moral framework on which this depiction relies is, in a play written by Euripides at such a time as the late fifth century, built on shifting sands and continually open to questioning.

Looking back, it should be clear that the characterisation of Pentheus is unique in extant tragedy. As with Eteocles, Agamemnon, Creon, and Oedipus, this uniqueness runs throughout his characterisation, and applies not merely to the character as presented by the playwright, but also to the particular variety of pre-existing ideas used for the purpose. It is regrettable that space only allows for detailed discussion of one Euripidean ruler, since application of a similar method could be applied to show the complexity of many other characters. Even by studying one character, however, we have learnt much about Euripides' techniques of characterisation, especially in terms of continuity with those of Sophocles.

for not honouring her (Eur. *Hipp.* 1-57). Pohlenz [1930] 1954:I.455 is not wrong to remark, 'Dionysos ist schon im Prolog kaum besser als die Aphrodite des Hippolytos.' Dionysus' *deus ex machina*, as Hose 2008:217 points out, differs from others in not presenting the characters with any 'solution' that might free them from his misfortune. Cf. also Diller 1955:467-471.

¹³⁵ See pp. 146-147.

GENERAL CONCLUSION

GENERAL CONCLUSION

In this thesis, we have seen, not comprehensively but in detail, the complexity and variety of tragic rulers. In portraying these rulers, the tragic playwrights relied on underlying ideas of many different kinds. Some of these recall the world of legend, or of epic; others recall the story tradition, for which Herodotus is our main source; others are shared with life in contemporary Athens. Studying these ideas systematically has meant that, whereas earlier studies often focused on the 'tyrannical' aspects of rulers while neglecting others, this study has been able to put these ideas properly in relation with one another.

Furthermore, the playwrights' techniques in presenting these rulers are sophisticated and subtle. There are many shared features between rulers, some of which result from shared underlying ideas, but others of which can be traced to the playwrights' similar composition of different plays; throughout Part Two, we have seen each playwright's presentation of rulers reflecting particular techniques and thematic concerns specific to each playwright. However, each of these characters is highly distinct, both because each is based on a different set of underlying ideas and because, even where these underlying ideas are similar, the playwrights' presentation of these characters in moral terms is different in each case. By making use of the recent theoretical frameworks for discussing the presentation of characters, I have been able to talk more specifically than previous scholars about the playwrights' techniques in the presenting these rulers, and have been able to identify the definite and concerted way in which Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides arrange the characters' assessments of one another so as to present their rulers in particular moral terms.

This study, then, has displayed the complex variety of ideas in terms of which tragic rulers are portrayed, and has deepened our understanding of the playwrights' characterisation technique, and has aimed to make progress in both respects in innovative ways. However, perhaps the most important new observations are on matters of detail, and it seems appropriate to highlight some of the most significant.

This thesis has provided the first detailed comparison of rulers in Herodotus and tragedy, showing the heterogeneity of the shared moral ideas and story patterns, and the many differences between the two (**Chapter 1**), whereas previously only the broad similarity had been noted. Furthermore, although scholars have previously suggested that the use of the idea of *tyrannis* in fifth-century Athenian politics and society was significant for the interpretation of tragic rulers, this thesis has provided a more systematic account of how the idea of *tyrannis* was used in Athenian political and intellectual life, primarily in three ways, namely the celebration of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, as a political threat and accusation, and as a metaphor for power. Our discussion showed that these can be seen to be reflected in tragedy in a few cases, but are more often absent, showing the variable nature of the connection between tragic rulers and Athenian ideas about *tyrannis* (**Chapter 2**). My study of contemporary and democratic ideas in the presentation of tragic rulers has provided a detailed account of how the playwrights combine the present with the legendary past *differently* in different plays, and has shown that Euripides' *Suppliants* provides neglected evidence for fifth-century ideas about leadership, linking together those found in archaic poetry and in Thucydides (**Chapter 3**). Furthermore, although the fact that the plot and characters of any play are closely connected is a matter of course, this study has identified for the first time how the presentation of tragic rulers is systematically affected by Athenian ideas about punishment and supplication (**Chapter 4**).

Part Two has also made many new findings. Although scholars have noted that Aeschylus draws on epic in *Seven Against Thebes* and on praise poetry in *Agamemnon*, this study has been the first to draw the consequences of this fully for Eteocles and Agamemnon, showing that Eteocles is depicted in terms markedly similar to Iliadic warriors, and that Agamemnon is presented in terms of ideas about *basileia* with contemporary currency in the early fifth century (**Chapter 5**). Despite scholars often noting the resemblances between Sophocles' Creon and Oedipus, the study which I have provided represents the first detailed comparison, for the first time combining full recognition of the considerable similarities with a precise explanation of the

differences between Sophocles' moral presentation of each (**Chapter 6**). This focus on Sophocles' techniques of character presentation has enabled me to ask new questions about Euripides, in considering the extent to which Euripides' use of underlying ideas and moral presentation of Pentheus resembles Sophocles' use of similar techniques; I also provided a detailed account of the rather heterogeneous similarities between Pentheus and other rulers, including Euripides' Lycus as well as Sophocles' Creon (**Chapter 7**).

I hope, then, that this thesis has contributed to our understanding both of fifth-century tragedy and of the intellectual and literary context of which it formed a part.

APPENDICES

13.9-10; Hdt. VIII.77.1);¹ (b) the other concerning *hybris* resulting in *stasis*, which in turn results in *tyrannis* (Thgn. 39-52, Solon fr. 4.5-22, Hdt. III.82.3, Anonymus Iamblichi 7.12-14).²

I examined point 1 in Chapter 6, considering view (1c) to be most plausible. Regarding point 3, both sets of parallels are somewhat close, but neither is exact, since none of the parallels for (3a) actually speak of a *tyrannos* as the child of *hybris*, while (3b) is open to the objection that *stasis* has nothing to do with the situation of OT.³

On point 2, however, I wish to make a suggestion that may be novel. It seems to me that (2a) and (2b) are both contextually unlikely: why should the Chorus—especially if not referring to Oedipus—start talking about the means by which a *tyrannos* accedes to the throne, when the theme of the ode is divine law and the fall from prosperity to *ate*? The same problem, though, applies to (2c): why should the Chorus reflect at this point on the psychology of rulers?

A fresh solution, however, is ready at hand, if we suppose that the lapidary sentence ὕβρις φυτεύει τύραννον is explained by the sentence that follows. That is to say, it may be possible to understand the production of a *tyrannos* that is mentioned in 873 to be *the same thing* as the ascent to a prosperous but dangerous position that is mentioned in the following sentence. This notion seems to gain plausibility from the anadiplosis of the word *hybris* at the start of each sentence, which seems to especially invite the notion that the second sentence might be an expansion of the first. If so, we might paraphrase 873-879 as follows:

‘*Hybris* gives rise to a *tyrannos*, in the sense that *hybris* is what puts a man in a high and prosperous, but yet dangerous, position.’

¹ Finglass on Soph. OT 873/4-878/9 gives these parallels.

² Scodel 1982:216-218; Fisher 1992:333. I discussed the relevance of this train of thought to some tragedies at pp. 85-90 above.

³ So Carey 1986:176 n. 12.

This seems to yield good sense. If correct, it also has two advantages.

Firstly, it does not bring any irrelevant notions into the ode (as (2a), (2b) and (2c) do), but instead repeats the familiar idea that the position of a *tyrannos* who has come to power through *hybris* is a prosperous but yet dangerous one. This idea is entirely apposite to an ode which deals (as several odes in other plays also do) with the notion that a man who gains prosperity unjustly and violently will be brought to ruin.

Secondly, this interpretation does not require the word *tyrannos* to possess any negative force of its own (as (2b) and (2c) do). Since such an openly pejorative use of the word would be contrary to Sophocles' normal practice, this seems preferable.⁴ I do not, however, wish to attach decisive weight to this consideration.

This view is compatible with either (1c) or (1b). It is readily compatible with (1c), the view adopted in Chapter 6. If the ode lacks reference to Oedipus, and if 879-880 (τὸ καλῶς δ' ἔχον πόλη πάλαισμα) refers to beneficial emulation within a city's political life in general,⁵ the Chorus' point is roughly, 'When a *tyrannos* accedes to power through *hybris*, then his position is dangerous [and indeed may be subject to harm from the gods]; but ordinary emulation in a city is beneficial, and I pray that the god may allow it to continue.'⁶

⁴ In either case, of course, the *tyrannos* is seen negatively, because he is produced by *hybris*, which certainly *is* a pejorative word. However, Winnington-Ingram [1971] 1980:192 seems right to say that there is a significant difference between this negativity being created by the pejorative weight of the word *tyrannos* itself and being created by the context (although I do not adopt the rest of his argument).

Carey 1986:176 and Fisher 1992:332, in arguing that *tyrannos* sometimes carries pejorative force even in fifth-century Greek, do not, I think, pay sufficient attention to this distinction, and none of the passages which they cite seems to me to provide a genuine parallel for the word *tyrannos* straightforwardly meaning 'bad or oppressive ruler', as (2b) and (2c) would require. Cf. p. 23 above.

⁵ Finglass *ad loc.*.

⁶ This is not quite the same as Carey 1986:177, who thinks that this beneficial emulation is being contrasted with 'the self-will of the tyrant'. Whereas in his view the contrast is between *hybris* and *palaisma*, i.e. between the self-will of the *tyrannos* and emulation of the good citizen, I am suggesting that the contrast is between the *dangerousness* of the position of the *tyrannos* and the *security* which the Chorus desires for those engaging in emulation within the *polis*.

Although I am not inclined towards position (1b), my view of 873 is reconcilable with that too. That is to say, if Oedipus' killing of Laius is regarded as *hybris*, and if (again) 879-880 refers to beneficial emulation within a city's political life in general, the Chorus' words mean that Oedipus' position, attained through *hybris*, is insecure.

APPENDIX 2: THE GREED AND RAPACITY OF RULERS

According to Lanza and other scholars, rulers are strongly associated with rapacity and greed in tragedy.¹ In Chapter 1, I said that I consider this essentially incorrect.² This Appendix is intended to justify this view.

The association of rulers with wealth was, of course, long-standing (and indeed almost inevitable), and *is* common in tragedy. The specific feature of greed or rapacity for wealth, furthermore, occurs in Herodotus. Cypselus is said to have deprived many citizens of their wealth,³ and Periander strips the women of Corinth so that his wife will inform him of the location of some buried treasure.⁴ Moreover, Polycrates is lured to his death with promises of money.⁵ According to other traditions, Cylon robbed the temple of Athena, and Pythagoras of Ephesus had an 'unlimited desire for money'.⁶

In tragedy, rulers are connected with rapacity a few times. Euripides' Theseus mentions the tendency of rulers to snatch their subjects' wealth, while in *Heracles* the Chorus-leader declares that he will not let Lycus take his wealth.⁷ In *Hecuba*, as Seaford notes, the Thracian Polymestor, like Polycrates, kills Polydorus and is lured to his death through his desire for gold.⁸ Otherwise, the main possible evidence arises in *Antigone*, where, as also in *Oedipus Tyrannus*, the ruler makes accusations of bribery; these two plays dominate Lanza's discussion of this matter.⁹ However, the only explicit connection between rulers and greed occurs when Creon says to Teiresias that the whole race of seers is keen on money, and Teiresias replies, 'That

¹ Lanza 1977:53-56; Seaford 1998:131-137, 2003:96-99, 104-106.

² See p. 57.

³ Hdt. V.92γ.2.

⁴ Hdt. V.92η.2-4.

⁵ Hdt. III.122.3-123.2.

⁶ Scholion on Ar. *Eq.* 445, and Baton of Sinope, *BNJ* 268 F 3, both cited by Seaford 2003:96-98 (alongside Polycrates and Periander).

⁷ Eur. *Supp.* 450-451, *HF* 258-260 (cf. 590-592). I draw these references from Lanza 1977:53-56.

⁸ Eur. *Hec.* 775, 1002-1004, 1146-1148, 1206-1207, cited by Seaford 1998:121.

⁹ Lanza 1977:53-56.

which is born of rulers also loves shameful gain (αἰσχροκέρδειαν).¹⁰ Very possibly, Sophocles had stories like that of Polycrates in mind here, although even such a supposition is hardly necessary; Teiresias' remark is an apt rejoinder to Creon's accusation that seers are habitually corrupt,¹¹ and it would be wrong to suppose that such a *tu quoque* necessarily had much behind it.

Some scholars, however, take Teiresias' line in a psychological way, arguing that Creon's portrayal involves 'the projection by Creon of his own attitude to money onto others.'¹² This seems most unsatisfactory. On the one hand, Creon, like Oedipus, expresses the utmost disgust at people who do wrong because they are bribed; therefore, if we take their attitudes at face value, we can only conclude that Creon (along with Oedipus) is not at all characterised by rapacity, but rather by opposition to it. Also, the presence of *kerdos* and money in *Antigone* is sufficiently accounted for without any such explanation: it allows Antigone's motives to be contrasted to those which Creon suspects, heightening his error.¹³ Moreover, although tragedy can, and often does, capture complex behaviours that are capable of interpretation in modern psychological terms, it seems illegitimate to insist on an interpretation that can *only* work if the audience has a notion of psychological projection.¹⁴ If Creon's anti-bribery attitude has anything to do with pre-existing ideas about rulers, it is more natural to

¹⁰ CREON: τὸ μαντικὸν γὰρ πᾶν φιλάργυρον γένος.

TEIRESIAS: τὸ δ' ἐκ (or αὖ) τυράννων αἰσχροκέρδειαν φιλεῖ (Soph. *Ant.* 1055-1056).

¹¹ Griffith 2009 makes some interesting suggestions on the real-life background to Teiresias' portrayal.

¹² Seaford 2013:329, cf. 1998:133-134; more cautiously, Bowra 1944:73; Lanza 1977:54; Segal 2003:41; Rehm 2006:200-201. Seaford 1998:133-134 reinforces his view by maintaining that in Teiresias' line οὕτω γὰρ ἤδη καὶ δοκῶ τὸ σὸν μέρος (Soph. *Ant.* 1062, sometimes taken as a question and sometimes as a statement), τὸ σὸν μέρος refers to Creon's *role* as a typical tyrant. However, this fails to account for the fact that μέρος seems to be picked up by Creon's reply (ὥς μὴ ἔμπολίσων ἴσθι τὴν ἐμὴν φρένα, 1063). The parallelism of construction suggests that Creon understands τὸ σὸν μέρος as referring to his mind (τὴν ἐμὴν φρένα), which fits with how 1062 is conventionally understood ('that is what I already seem like *to you*', viz. to your way of thinking); additionally, one point of using μέρος is that, in the sense of 'portion', a μέρος can be bought and sold, which may be taken to prompt Creon's use of the word ἔμπολίσων. Since a tyrannical *role* cannot be bought and sold, and cannot readily be taken as parallel to τὴν ἐμὴν φρένα, it is difficult to see how μέρος can refer to Creon's role as tyrant, rather than to Creon's point of view.

¹³ Cf. Dalfen 1977:21-23.

¹⁴ Segal 2003:41 soundly remarks, 'the play is not psychological in this way.'

suppose that Sophocles has actually inverted the conventional idea by producing in Creon a ruler who, whatever his other defects, is *not* avaricious, than that any sort of psychological projection is involved here.

However, it seems quite likely that Creon's rejection of bribery has more to do with fifth-century Athenian politics than with ideas about archaic rulers. I argued in Chapter 3 that important elements of Creon's portrayal involve drawing on a civic rhetoric concerning obedience and loyalty to the *polis* that is, although authoritarian in tone, civic and democratic in its milieu.¹⁵ The same, however, is true of bribery, which was a standing problem throughout the history of the Athenian democracy; in many fifth-century and fourth-century sources political bribery is seen as an important issue. In particular, Cimon had been tried for accepting bribes in 463, as were several other politicians through the century,¹⁶ and Pericles is emphatically praised by Thucydides for being incorruptible.¹⁷ In *Antigone*, as Conover points out, the speech in which Creon first mentions bribery divides the *polis* into *philoï* and *kakoi*, and envisages the *kakoi* as those who deal in money and are therefore diverted from loyal service to the *polis*.¹⁸ In this respect, the suspicion of bribery is of a piece with the civic ideas about citizenship and obedience which Creon employs at a number of points in the play. It therefore seems doubtful whether Creon's attitude towards bribery and money has anything to do with the ideas about rulers possessed by Sophocles and his audience.

Therefore, we should probably reject the notion that Creon is supposed to be rapacious. The rapacity of rulers plays a significant role in Euripides' *Hecuba*, and is mentioned in passing in Sophocles' *Antigone* and Euripides' *Suppliants* and *Heracles*, but its presence does not extend much beyond that. To treat it as one of the central

¹⁵ See pp. 117-124.

¹⁶ Plut. *Cim.* 14.1-4, discussed by Conover 2010:81-86, 315-320, with further references. Other bribery trials included that of Laches, mocked by Aristophanes (*Vesp.* 240-242, 894-897); Conover 2010:83 n. 3 lists further examples.

¹⁷ χρημάτων κρείσσων, Thuc. II.60.5; χρημάτων τε διαφανῶς ἀδωρότατος, II.65.8; these are discussed by Conover 2010:99.

¹⁸ Soph. *Ant.* 288-303. I follow here Conover's useful discussion of the bribery issue in the play (Conover 2010:102-109); cf. also MacKay 1962:170-171; Holt 1999:678-679.

features of tragic 'tyranny', as Lanza and Seaford do, is to exaggerate its prominence considerably.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. Abbreviations

All abbreviated references to classical texts (including *CEG*, *FD*, *ML*, *RO*, and *SEG*, referring to corpora of inscriptions) follow the list of abbreviations in the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, except that I have taken the liberty of citing the *Iliad*, *Odyssey*, and *Prometheus Bound* as *Il.*, *Od.*, and *PV* without giving authors' names.

In naming Greek tragedies and comedies in full, I have used the English names given in the Loeb editions (including the Latin forms *Oedipus Tyrannus* and *Bacchae*), except that I have written *Suppliants* rather than *Suppliant Women*.

Note also the following:

Aarne, Thompson, and Uther:

H.-J. Uther. *The Types of International Folktales: A Classification and Bibliography, Based on the System of Antti Aarne and Stith Thompson*. Three volumes. Helsinki, 2004.

The abbreviations *BNJ*, *FGE*, *FGrHist*, *Laks-Most*, and *PMG* refer to editions listed under **III** below.

II. Editions used for quoted Greek

Where I have quoted Greek (in the footnotes, appendices, and in parentheses within the main text), I have done so according to the following editions, except that I have consistently printed iota subscripts (rather than adscripts) and regular sigmas (rather than lunate sigmas).

Where I have quoted the texts in English translations (in the main text), I have provided my own translations, except where explicitly noted. (I have used Sommerstein's translation of Aeschylus in this fashion fairly frequently.)

AESCHYLUS:

PERSIANS, SEVEN AGAINST THEBES, SUPPLIANTS, PROMETHEUS BOUND:

A. H. Sommerstein. *Aeschylus. I: Persians, Seven Against Thebes, Suppliants, Prometheus Bound* (Loeb Classical Library, 145). Cambridge, MA, 2008.

AGAMEMNON, LIBATION-BEARERS, EUMENIDES:

A. H. Sommerstein. *Aeschylus. II: Oresteia* (Loeb Classical Library, 146). Cambridge, MA, 2008.

EDONIANS (FRAGMENTS):

A. H. Sommerstein. *Aeschylus. III: Fragments* (Loeb Classical Library, 505). Cambridge, MA, 2008.

ARCHILOCHUS:

M. L. West. *Iambi et elegi Graeci ante Alexandrum cantati. Volumen I*. Second edition. Oxford, 1989.

ARISTOPHANES:

KNIGHTS:

N. G. Wilson. *Aristophanis fabulae. Tomus I: Acharnenses; Equites; Nubes; Vespae; Pax; Aves*. Oxford, 2007.

BACCHYLIDES:

H. Maehler. *Bacchylidis carmina cum fragmentis*. Tenth edition. Leipzig, 1970.

CRATINUS:

I. C. Storey. *Fragments of Old Comedy. Volume I: Alcaeus to Diocles*. Cambridge, MA, 2011.

CRITIAS:

C. Collard, and M. J. Cropp. *Euripides, Fragments: Oedipus—Chrysippus; Other Fragments* (Loeb Classical Library, 506). Cambridge, MA, 2008.

[DEMOSTHENES:]

W. Rennie. *Demosthenis orationes. Tomus III: Orationes XLI-LXI; Prooemia; Epistulae*. Tenth edition. Leipzig, 1970.

DIOGENES LAERTIUS:

H. S. Long. *Diogenes Laertii vitae philosophorum*. Two volumes. Oxford, 1964.

EURIPIDES:

MEDEA:

D. J. Mastronarde. *Euripides: Medea*. Cambridge, 2002.

CHILDREN OF HERACLES:

J. Diggle. *Euripidis fabulae. Tomus I: Cyclops, Alceste, Medea, Heraclidae, Hippolytus, Andromacha, Hecuba*. Oxford, 1984.

HECUBA:

L. Battezzato. *Euripides: Hecuba*. Cambridge, 2008.

SUPPLIANTS, ELECTRA, HERACLES:

J. Diggle. *Euripidis fabulae. Tomus II: Supplices, Electra, Hercules, Troades, Iphigenia in Tauris, Ion*. Oxford, 1981.

ION:

J. Gibert. *Euripides: Ion*. Cambridge, 2019.

HELEN:

W. Allan. *Euripides: Helen*. Cambridge, 2008.

PHOENICIAN WOMEN, ORESTES, BACCHAE:

J. Diggle. *Euripidis fabulae. Tomus III: Helena, Phoenissae, Orestes, Bacchae, Iphigenia Aulidensis, Rhesus*. Oxford, 1994.

DICTYS, CRESPHONTES (FRAGMENTS):

C. Collard, and M. J. Cropp. *Euripides, Fragments: Aegeus—Meleager* (Loeb Classical Library, 504). Cambridge, MA, 2008.

DAUGHTERS OF PELIAS (FRAGMENT):

as for CRITIAS above.

HERODOTUS:

N. G. Wilson. *Herodoti historiae*. Two volumes. Oxford, 2015.

HYPOTHESEIS TO SOPHOCLES, OEDIPUS TYRANNUS:

R. C. Jebb. *Sophocles: The Plays and Fragments. Part I: The Oedipus Tyrannus*, 3-6. Second edition. Cambridge, 1893.

ILIAD:

M. L. West. *Homeri Ilias*. Two volumes. Stuttgart, 1998, 2000.

LYSIAS:

C. Carey. *Lysiae orationes cum fragmentis*. Oxford, 2007.

ODYSSEY:

M. L. West. *Homerus: Odyssea*. Berlin, 2017.

PINDAR:

OLYMPIAN AND PYTHIAN ODES:

W. H. Race. *Pindar. Volume I: Olympian Odes; Pythian Odes* (Loeb Classical Library, 56). Cambridge, MA, 1997.

PLUTARCH:

MORALIA:

H. N. Fowler. *Plutarch: Moralia. Volume X* (Loeb Classical Library, 321). Cambridge, MA, 1936.

RO 88 (CONTAINING THE EPHEBIC OATH):

S. Lambert (after P. J. Rhodes and R. Osborne). 'Dedication from Acharnai with Military Oaths', on *Attic Inscriptions Online* (https://www.atticinscriptions.com/inscription/RO/88?text_type=greek). 2014.

SIMONIDES (EPIGRAMS):

D. L. Page. *Further Greek Epigrams: Epigrams before A.D. 50 from the Greek Anthology and Other Sources, Not Included in Hellenistic Epigrams or The Garland of Philip*. Cambridge, 1981.

SOLON (POEMS):

M. L. West. *Iambi et elegi Graeci ante Alexandrum cantati. Volumen II*. Second edition. Oxford, 1992.

SOPHOCLES:

AJAX:

P. J. Finglass. *Sophocles: Ajax* (Cambridge Classical Texts and Commentaries, 48). Cambridge, 2011.

ANTIGONE:

M. Griffith. *Sophocles: Antigone*. Cambridge, 1999.

OEDIPUS TYRANNUS:

P. J. Finglass. *Sophocles: Oedipus the King* (Cambridge Classical Texts and Commentaries, 57). Cambridge, 2018.

PHILOCTETES:

S. Schein. *Sophocles: Philoctetes*. Cambridge, 2016.

OEDIPUS AT COLONUS:

H. J. Lloyd-Jones and N. Wilson. *Sophoclis fabulae*. Oxford, 1990.

FRAGMENTS:

S. L. Radt. *Tragicorum Graecorum fragmenta. IV: Sophocles*. Göttingen, 1977.

THEOGNIS:

as for ARCHILOCHUS above.

THUCYDIDES:

I. B. Alberti. *Thucydidis historiae*. Three volumes. Rome, 1972, 1992, 2000.

XENOPHON:

HELLENICA:

E. C. Marchant. *Xenophontis omnia opera. Tomus I: Historia graeca*. Oxford, 1900.

MEMORABILIA:

E. C. Marchant. *Xenophontis omnia opera. Tomus II: Commentarii; Oeconomicus; Convivium; Apologia Socratis*. Oxford, 1921.

III. Editions used for references to fragments, etc.

Fragments, testimonia, epigrams, proverbs, and so forth are cited according to the numberings proposed in the following editions. (Except in the cases of Lysurgus, Naeuius and Stesichorus, these numberings are replicated in the latest Loeb editions, which I have more often consulted than the editions actually listed below.)

AESCHYLUS:

S. L. Radt. *Tragicorum Graecorum fragmenta. III: Aeschylus*. Göttingen, 1985.

ALCAEUS:

E.-M. Voigt. *Sappho et Alcaeus: Fragmenta*. Amsterdam, 1971.

ANONYMUS IAMBLICHI:

A. Laks, and G. Most. *Early Greek Philosophy. IX: The Sophists, Part 2* (Loeb Classical Library, 532). Cambridge, MA, 2016. [Abbreviation: Laks-Most.]

ARCHILOCHUS:

M. L. West. *Iambi et elegi Graeci ante Alexandrum cantati. Volumen I*. Second edition. Oxford, 1989.

ARISTOPHANES:

R. Kassel, and C. Austin. *Poetae comici Graeci. III.2: Aristophanes. Testimonia et fragmenta*. Berlin, 1984.

BACCHYLIDES:

H. Maehler. *Bacchylidis Carmina cum Fragmentis*. Tenth edition. Leipzig, 1970.

BATON OF SINOPE:

I. Worthington (ed.), *Brill's New Jacoby*
(<https://referenceworks.brillonline.com/browse/brill-s-new-jacoby>).
[Abbreviation: BNJ.]

CARMINA POPULARIA:

D. L. Page. *Poetae melici Graeci*. Oxford, 1962. [Abbreviation: PMG.]

CLEOBULUS (PROVERBS QUOTED BY DEMETRIUS OF PHALERUM):

A. Laks, and G. Most. *Early Greek Philosophy. II: Beginnings and Early Ionian Thinkers, Part 1* (Loeb Classical Library, 525). Cambridge, MA, 2016. [Abbreviation: Laks-Most.]

CRATINUS:

R. Kassel, and C. Austin. *Poetae comici Graeci. IV: Aristophan—Crobilus*. Berlin, 1983.

CRITIAS:

B. Snell. *Tragicorum Graecorum fragmenta. I: Didascaliae tragicarum; Catalogi tragicorum et tragoediarum; Testimonia et fragmenta tragicorum minorum*. Second edition. Göttingen, 1986.

CYPRIA:

M. L. West. *Greek Epic Fragments* (Loeb Classical Library, 497). Cambridge, MA, 2003.

DEINON:

as for BATON OF SINOPE above.

DEMOCRITUS:

A. Laks, and G. Most. *Early Greek Philosophy. VII: Later Ionian and Athenian Thinkers, Part 2* (Loeb Classical Library, 530). Cambridge, MA, 2016. [Abbreviation: Laks-Most.]

DISSOI LOGOI:

as for ANONYMUS IAMBlicHI above.

EUPOLIS:

R. Kassel, and C. Austin. *Poetae comici Graeci. V: Damoxenus—Mages*. Berlin, 1986.

EURIPIDES:

R. Kannicht. *Tragicorum Graecorum fragmenta. V: Euripides*. Two volumes. Göttingen, 2004.

GORGIAS:

A. Laks, and G. Most. *Early Greek Philosophy. VIII: The Sophists, Part 1* (Loeb Classical Library, 531). Cambridge, MA, 2016. [Abbreviation: Laks-Most.]

HERACLIDES OF CYME:

as for BATON OF SINOPE above.

HESIOD:

G. Most. *Hesiod. II: The Shield; Catalogue of Women; Fragments* (Loeb Classical Library, 503). Cambridge, MA, 2018.

HIPPIAS OF ELIS:

as for GORGIAS above.

LYCURGUS:

N. C. Conomis. *Lycurgi oratio in Leocratem cum ceterarum Lycurgi orationum fragmentis*. Leipzig, 1970.

MARMOR PARIUM:

F. Jacoby. *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker. Zweiter Teil: Zeitgeschichte. B. Spezialgeschichten, Autobiographien und Memoiren; Zeittafeln*. Berlin, 1929. [Abbreviation: FGrHist.]

NAEVIUS:

M. Schauer. *Tragicorum Romanorum fragmenta. I: Livius Andronicus; Naevius; Tragici minores; Fragmenta adespota*. Göttingen, 2012.

NICOLAUS OF DAMASCUS:

as for BATON OF SINOPE above.

PHILOCHORUS:

as for BATON OF SINOPE above.

PINDAR:

H. Maehler. *Pindari carmina cum fragmentis. Pars II: Fragmenta; Indices*. Leipzig, 1989.

PRODICUS:

as for GORGIAS above.

PROTAGORAS:

as for GORGIAS above.

SEMONIDES:

M. L. West. *Iambi et elegi Graeci ante Alexandrum cantati. Volumen II*. Second edition. Oxford, 1992.

SIMONIDES (EPIGRAMS):

D. L. Page. *Further Greek Epigrams: Epigrams before A.D. 50 from the Greek Anthology and Other Sources, Not Included in Hellenistic Epigrams or The Garland of Philip*. Cambridge, 1981. [Abbreviation: FGE.]

SIMONIDES (LYRIC POEMS):

as for CARMINA POPULARIA above.

SOLON (POEMS):

as for SEMONIDES above.

SOLON (PROVERBS QUOTED BY DEMETRIUS OF PHALERUM):

as for CLEOBULUS (PROVERBS QUOTED BY DEMETRIUS OF PHALERUM) above.

SOPHOCLES:

S. L. Radt. *Tragicorum Graecorum fragmenta. IV: Sophocles*. Göttingen, 1977.

STESICHORUS:

M. Davies, and P. J. Finglass. *Stesichorus: The Poems* (Cambridge Classical Texts and Commentaries, 54). Cambridge, 2014.

THEBAID:

as for CYPRIA above.

TRAGICA ADESPOTA:

R. Kannicht, and B. Snell. *Tragicorum Graecorum fragmenta. II: Fragmenta adespota; Testimonia volumini I addenda; Indices ad volumina I et II*. Göttingen, 1971.

XENOPHANES:

as for SEMONIDES above.

It seems useful to provide the following conversions:

ANONYMUS IAMBLICHI:

Laks-Most 40 = Diels-Kranz 89

CLEOBULUS (PROVERBS QUOTED BY DEMETRIUS OF PHALERUM):

Laks-Most 3 T35 1.10 = Diels-Kranz 10.3.α.9

DEMOCRITUS:

Laks-Most 27 D356 = Diels-Kranz 68 B 252

DISSOI LOGOI:

Laks-Most 41 = Diels-Kranz 90

GORGIAS:

Laks-Most 32 D24 = Diels-Kranz 82 B 11

HESIOD:

fr. 19.13-26 Most = 23a.13-26 Merkelbach-West

HIPPIAS OF ELIS:

Laks-Most 36 D26 = Diels-Kranz 86 B9 = *FGrHist* and *BNJ* 6 F 6

LYCURGUS:

fr. I.5 Conomis = fr. A.1 Burt

NAEVIUS:

fr. 19 Schauer = fr. 46-47 Warmington

fr. 20 Schauer = fr. 37-38 Warmington

fr. 21 Schauer = fr. 49 Warmington

PRODICUS:

Laks-Most 34 D15, D16, D17 = Diels-Kranz 84 B 5

PROTAGORAS:

Laks-Most 31 D26 = Diels-Kranz 80 B 6a

SOLON (PROVERBS QUOTED BY DEMETRIUS OF PHALERUM):

Laks-Most 3 T35 2.10 = Diels-Kranz 10.3.β.10

STESICHORUS:

fr. 15 Finglass = fr. S11 + S31 *PMGF*

fr. 88 Finglass = fr. 187 *PMGF*

fr. 97 Finglass = fr. 222(b) *PMGF*

fr. 177 Finglass = fr. 216 *PMGF*

fr. 178 Finglass = fr. 215 *PMGF*

fr. 180 Finglass = fr. 219 *PMGF*

IV. Other editions and translations mentioned by the editor's name alone

I have mentioned readings or translations adopted in the following editions, not listed under **II** or **III**.

EURIPIDES:

Kovacs, D. *Euripides. Volume II: Children of Heracles; Hippolytus; Andromache; Hecuba* (Loeb Classical Library, 484). Cambridge, MA, 1995.

Kovacs, D. *Euripides. Volume III: Suppliant Women; Electra; Heracles* (Loeb Classical Library, 9). Cambridge, MA, 1998.

Kovacs, D. *Euripides. Volume V: Helen; Phoenician Women; Orestes* (Loeb Classical Library, 11). Cambridge, MA, 2002.

Kovacs, D. *Euripides. Volume VI: Bacchae; Iphigenia at Aulis; Rhesus* (Loeb Classical Library, 495). Cambridge, MA, 2002.

Seaford, R. A. S. *Euripides: Bacchae*. Warminster, 1996.

SOPHOCLES:

Lloyd-Jones, H. J. *Sophocles. I: Ajax; Electra; Oedipus Tyrannus* (Loeb Classical Library, 20). Cambridge, MA, 1994.

Lloyd-Jones, H. J. *Sophocles. II: Antigone; Women of Trachis; Philoctetes; Oedipus at Colonus* (Loeb Classical Library, 21). Cambridge, MA, 1994.

THEOGNIS:

Gerber, D. E. *Greek Elegiac Poetry* (Loeb Classical Library, 258). Cambridge, MA, 2008.

V. Works of scholarship cited by lemma

I have cited these works of scholarship in the form 'Hutchinson on Aesch. *Sept.* 637', or 'Hutchinson *ad loc.*'. Where these works also contain material that I have cited by page numbers (primarily introductions and other unlemmatised sections), I have listed them again in the list of works referred to by page number (section **VI**).

Allan, W. *Euripides: The Children of Heracles*. Warminster, 2001.

Allan, W. *Euripides: Helen*. Cambridge, 2008.

Andrewes, A., in A. W. Gomme, A. Andrewes, and K. J. Dover. *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides. Volume V: Book VIII*. Oxford, 1981.

- Barrett, W. S. *Euripides: Hippolytos*. Oxford, 1964.
- Battezzato, L. *Euripides: Hecuba*. Cambridge, 2018.
- Biehl, W. *Euripides: Orestes*. Berlin, 1965.
- Bond, G. W. *Euripides: Heracles*. Oxford, 1981.
- Bowen, A. J. *Aeschylus: Suppliant Women*. Oxford, 2013.
- Brown, A. L. *Sophocles: Antigone*. Warminster, 1987.
- Brown, A. L. *Aeschylus: Libation Bearers*. Liverpool, 2018.
- Burian, P. *Euripides: Helen*. Oxford, 2007.
- Cairns, D. L. *Bacchylides: Five Epinician Odes (3, 5, 9, 11, 13) (ARCA, 49)*. Cambridge, 2010.
- Campbell, L. *Sophocles. Vol. I: Oedipus Tyrannus; Oedipus Coloneus; Antigone*. Oxford, 1889.
- Collard, C., and J. Morwood. *Euripides: Iphigenia at Aulis*. Two volumes. Liverpool, 2017.
- Cropp, M. J. *Euripides: Iphigenia in Tauris*. Warminster, 2000.
- Dale, A. M. *Euripides: Helen*. Oxford, 1967.
- Davies, M., and P. J. Finglass. *Stesichorus: The Poems (Cambridge Classical Texts and Commentaries, 54)*. Cambridge, 2014.
- Dawe, R. D. *Sophocles: Oedipus Rex*. Second edition. Cambridge, 2006.
- Denniston, J. D., and D. Page. *Aeschylus: Agamemnon*. Oxford, 1957.
- Di Benedetto, V. *Euripidis Orestes*. Florence, 1965.
- Dodds, E. R. *Plato: Gorgias*. Oxford, 1959.
- Dodds, E. R. *Euripides: Bacchae*. Second edition. Oxford, 1960.
- Dover, K. J., in A. W. Gomme, A. Andrewes, and K. J. Dover. *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides. Volume IV: Books V.25-VII*. Oxford, 1970.
- Finglass, P. J. *Sophocles: Electra (Cambridge Classical Texts and Commentaries, 44)*. Cambridge, 2007.
- Finglass, P. J. *Pindar: Pythian Eleven (Cambridge Classical Texts and Commentaries, 45)*. Cambridge, 2007.
- Finglass, P. J. *Sophocles: Ajax (Cambridge Classical Texts and Commentaries, 48)*. Cambridge, 2011.
- Finglass, P. J. *Sophocles: Oedipus the King (Cambridge Classical Texts and Commentaries, 57)*. Cambridge, 2018.
- Fraenkel, E. *Aeschylus: Agamemnon*. Three volumes. Oxford, 1950.
- Friis Johansen, H., and E. W. Whittle. *Aeschylus: The Suppliants*. Three volumes. Copenhagen, 1980.
- Garvie, A. F. *Aeschylus: Choephoroi*. Oxford, 1986.
- Garvie, A. F. *Aeschylus: Persae*. Oxford, 2009.
- Gomme, A. W. *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides. Volume II: Books II-III*. Oxford, 1956.
- Griffith, M. *Sophocles: Antigone*. Cambridge, 1999.
- Hainsworth, B. *The Iliad: A Commentary. Volume III: Books 9-12*. Cambridge, 1993.
- Hall, E. *Aeschylus: Persians*. Warminster, 1996.
- Hornblower, S. *A Commentary on Thucydides. Volume I: Books 1-3*. Oxford, 1991.
- Hornblower, S. *A Commentary on Thucydides. Volume III: Books 5.25-8.109*. Oxford, 2008.
- Hutchinson, G. O. *Aeschylus: Septem Contra Thebas*. Oxford, 1985.

- Jacoby, F. *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker. Dritter Teil: Geschichte von Staedten und Voelkern (Horographie und Ethnographie). B (Supplement): A Commentary on the Ancient Historians of Athens (Nos. 323a-334).* Leiden, 1954.
- Jebb, R. C. *Sophocles: The Plays and Fragments. Part III: The Antigone.* Second Edition. Cambridge, 1891.
- Kamerbeek, J. C. *The Plays of Sophocles. Commentaries. IV: The Oedipus Tyrannus.* Leiden, 1967.
- Kamerbeek, J. C. *The Plays of Sophocles. Commentaries. III: The Antigone.* Leiden, 1978.
- Kannicht, R. *Euripides: Helena.* Two volumes. Heidelberg, 1969.
- Kovacs, D. *Euripides. Volume II: Children of Heracles; Hippolytus; Andromache; Hecuba* (Loeb Classical Library, 484). Cambridge, MA, 1995.
- Mastronarde, D. J. *Euripides: Medea.* Cambridge, 2002.
- Morwood, J. H. W. *Euripides: Suppliant Women.* Oxford, 2007.
- Mossman, J. *Euripides: Medea.* Oxford, 2011.
- Noussia-Fantuzzi, M. *Solon the Athenian: The Poetic Fragments* (Mnemosyne Supplements, 326). Leiden, 2010.
- Paley, F. A. *The Tragedies of Aeschylus.* Fourth edition. London, 1879.
- Parker, L. P. E. *Euripides: Iphigenia in Tauris.* Oxford, 2016.
- Pearson, A. C. *Euripides: Heraclidae.* Cambridge, 1907.
- Raeburn, D., and O. Thomas. *Aeschylus: Agamemnon.* Oxford, 2011.
- Roux, J. *Euripide: Les Bacchantes.* Two volumes. Paris, 1970 and 1972.
- Rutherford, R. B. *Homer: Iliad, Book XVIII.* Cambridge, 2019.
- Schein, S. *Sophocles: Philoctetes.* Cambridge, 2013.
- Seaford, R. A. S. *Euripides: Cyclops.* Oxford, 1984.
- Seaford, R. A. S. *Euripides: Bacchae.* Warminster, 1996.
- Sheppard, J. T. *The Oedipus Tyrannus of Sophocles.* Cambridge, 1922.
- Sommerstein, A. H. *Aeschylus. I: Persians, Seven Against Thebes, Suppliants, Prometheus Bound* (Loeb Classical Library, 145). Cambridge, MA, 2008. [All references to Sommerstein on *Suppliants*, however, refer to the 2019 edition below.]
- Sommerstein, A. H. *Aeschylus. II: Oresteia* (Loeb Classical Library, 146). Cambridge, MA, 2008.
- Sommerstein, A. H. *Aeschylus: Suppliants.* Cambridge, 2019.
- Stanford, W. B. *Sophocles: Ajax.* London, 1963.
- Stevens, P. T. *Euripides: Andromache.* Oxford, 1971.
- Tucker, T. G. *The Seven Against Thebes of Aeschylus.* Cambridge, 1908.
- Volonaki, E. 'A Commentary on Lysias's Speeches 13 and 30' (Diss. Royal Holloway, 1998). Unpublished.
- Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, U. von. *Euripides: Herakles.* Second edition. Two volumes. Berlin, 1895.
- Wilkins, J. *Euripides: Heraclidae.* Oxford, 1993.

VI. Works of scholarship cited by page number

I have cited these works in the form 'Podlecki 1986:94-95'. Where the work exists in more than one pagination, I have cited the pagination which seems most helpful; generally, I have cited revised editions and English translations over first editions, but original articles over reprints in *Kleine Schriften* (which often give the original pagination anyway).

Where the pagination cited differs from the first edition, I have cited the work in the form 'Winnington-Ingram [1948] 1983:101-106'; this indicates that the pages in question were first published in 1948, but with a different pagination.

In this list, I have given names containing French *de* and German *von* under the letter that follows these particles (Romilly, J. de; Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, U. von), but have followed the opposite convention for English and Dutch names (de Lisle, C.; van Emde Boas, E).

- Adornato, G. 'Delphic Enigmas? The Γέλας ἀνάσσων, Polykalos, and the Charioteer Statue', *American Journal of Archaeology* 112 (2008) 29-55.
- Aélion, R. *Euripide, héretier d'Eschyle*. Two volumes. Paris, 1983.
- Alföldi, A. 'Gewaltherrscher und Theaterkönig', in K. Weitzmann (ed.), *Late Classical and Medieval Studies in Honor of Albert Mathias Friend, Jr.*, 15-55. Princeton, 1955.
- Allan, W. *The Andromache and Euripidean Tragedy*. Oxford, 2000.
- Allan, W. 'Religious Syncretism: The New Gods of Greek Tragedy', *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 102 (2004) 113-155.
- Allan, W. *Euripides: Helen*. Cambridge, 2008.
- Allan, W. "'Archaic" Guilt in Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus* and *Oedipus at Colonus*', in D. L. Cairns (ed.), *Tragedy and Archaic Greek Thought*, 173-191. Swansea, 2013.
- Allan, W., and A. Kelly. 'Listening to Many Voices: Athenian Tragedy as Popular Art', in A. Marmodoro and J. Hill (eds.), *The Author's Voice in Classical and Late Antiquity*, 77-116. Oxford, 2013.
- Allen, D. S. *The World of Prometheus: The Politics of Punishing in Democratic Athens*. Princeton, 2000.
- Altmeyer, M. *Unzeitgemäßes Denken bei Sophokles* (Hermes Einzelschriften, 85). Stuttgart, 2002.
- Alwine, A. T. *Enmity and Feuding in Classical Athens*. Austin, 2015.
- Aly, W. *Volksmärchen, Sage und Novelle bei Herodot und seinen Zeitgenossen. Eine Untersuchung über die volkstümlichen Elemente der altgriechischen Prosaerzählung*. Göttingen, 1921.
- Andrewes, A. *The Greek Tyrants*. London, 1956.
- Anhalt, E. K. 'Barrier and Transcendence: The Door and the Eagle in *Iliad* 24.314-21', *Classical Quarterly* 45 (1995) 280-295.
- Antonaccio, C. *An Archaeology of Ancestors: Tomb Cult and Hero Cult in Ancient Greece*. Lanham, 1995.
- Atack, C. *The Discourse of Kingship in Classical Greece*. Abingdon, 2020.
- Austin, M. M. 'Greek Tyrants and the Persians, 546-479 B.C.', *Classical Quarterly* 40 (1990) 289-306.

- Azoulay, V. *The Tyrant-Slayers of Ancient Athens: A Tale of Two Statues* (translated by J. Lloyd). Oxford, 2017. [Originally published in French in 2015.]
- Bacon, H. H. *Barbarians in Greek Tragedy*. New Haven, 1961.
- Bain, D. *Actors and Audiences: A Study of Asides and Related Conventions in Greek Drama*. Oxford, 1977.
- Bain, D. 'A Misunderstood Scene in Sophokles, *Oidipous* (O.T. 300-462)', *Greece and Rome* 26 (1979) 132-145.
- Bakewell, G. W. 'Producing the Polis: Political and Legal Terminology in Aeschylus' (Diss. Brown, 1994). Unpublished.
- Baragwanath, E. *Motivation and Narrative in Herodotus*. Oxford, 2008.
- Barkan, I. *Capital Punishment in Ancient Athens*. Chicago, 1936.
- Barlow, S. A. *The Imagery of Euripides: A Study in the Dramatic Use of Pictorial Language*. London, 1971.
- Barney, R. 'Callicles and Thrasymachus', in E. N. Zalta, ed., *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/callicles-thrasymachus/>). 2004.
- Barthes, R. *S/Z* (translated by R. Miller). Paris, 1974. [Originally published in French in 1970.]
- Battezzato, L. *Euripides: Hecuba*. Cambridge, 2018.
- Bengl, H. *Staatstheoretische Probleme im Rahmen der attischen, vornehmlich euripideischen Tragödie* (Diss. Munich). Coburg, 1929.
- Bergson, L. *L'épithète ornementale dans Eschyle, Sophocle et Euripide*. Uppsala, 1956.
- Berve, H. *Die Tyrannis bei den Griechen*. Two volumes. Munich, 1967.
- Blum, W. 'Die Gestalt des Königs in der attischen Tragödie' (Diss. Vienna, 1940). Unpublished. [Consulted via Inter-library Loan from Vienna to the Bodleian.]
- Blundell, M. W. *Helping Friends and Harming Enemies: A Study in Sophocles and Greek Ethics*. Cambridge, 1989.
- Blundell, M. W. 'Éthos and *Dianoia* Reconsidered', in A. O. Rorty (ed.), *Essays on Aristotle's Poetics*, 155-176. Princeton, 1992.
- Bortolussi, M., and P. Dixon. *Psychonarratology: Foundations for the Empirical Study of Literary Response*. Cambridge, 2003.
- Bosher, K. 'Hieron's Aeschylus', in K. Bosher (ed.), *Theater Outside Athens: Drama in Greek Sicily and South Italy*, 97-111. Cambridge, 2012.
- Bowie, E. L. 'The Theognidea: A Step Towards a Collection of Fragments?', in G. Most (ed.), *Collecting Fragments: Fragmente sammeln* (Aporemata, 1), 53-66. Göttingen, 1997.
- Bowra, C. M. *Sophoclean Tragedy*. Oxford, 1944.
- Bremmer, J. N. 'Oedipus and the Greek Oedipus Complex', in J. N. Bremmer (ed.), *Interpretations of Greek Mythology*, 41-59. London, 1987.
- Brock, R. 'Athenian Oligarchs: The Numbers Game', *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 109 (1989) 160-164.
- Brock, R. 'Mythical Polypragmosyne in Athenian Drama and Rhetoric', in M. Austin, J. Harries, and C. Smith (eds.), *Modus Operandi: Essays in Honour of Geoffrey Rickman* (BICS Supplements, 71), 227-238. London, 1998.
- Brock, R. *Greek Political Imagery: From Homer to Aristotle*. London, 2013.
- Brown, A. L. 'Eteocles and the Chorus in the *Seven Against Thebes*', *Phoenix* 31 (1977) 300-318.

- Brown, A. L. *Aeschylus: Libation Bearers*. Liverpool, 2018.
- Bruchmann, C. F. H. *Epitheta deorum quae apud poetas Graecos leguntur*. Leipzig, 1893.
- Budelmann, F. *The Language of Sophocles: Communalism, Communication and Involvement*. Cambridge, 2000.
- Budelmann, F. 'Bringing Together Nature and Culture: On the Uses and Limits of Cognitive Science for the Study of Performance Reception', in E. Hall and S. Harrop (eds.), *Theorising Performance: Greek Drama, Cultural History and Critical Practice*, 108-122. London, 2010.
- Budelmann, F. *Greek Lyric: A Selection*. Cambridge, 2018.
- Budelmann, F., and P. E. Easterling. 'Reading Minds in Greek Tragedy', *Greece and Rome* 57 (2010) 289-303.
- Budelmann, F., L. Maguire, and B. Teasdale. 'Audience Reactions to Greek and Shakespearean Tragedy' (<https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/ora:7003>). 2013.
- Budelmann, F., R. Dunbar, S. Duncan, E. van Emde Boas, L. Maguire, B. Teasdale, and J. Thomson. 'Cognition, Endorphins, and the Literary Response to Tragedy', *Cambridge Quarterly* 46 (2017) 229-250.
- Burian, P. 'Suppliant Drama: Studies in the Form and Interpretation of Five Greek Tragedies' (Diss. Princeton, 1971). Unpublished.
- Burian, P. 'Euripides' *Heraclidae*: An Interpretation', *Classical Philology* 72 (1977) 1-21.
- Burian, P. 'Logos and Pathos: The Politics of the *Suppliant Women*', in P. Burian (ed.), *Directions in Euripidean Criticism*, 129-155. Durham, NC, 1985.
- Burian, P. *Euripides: Helen*. Oxford, 2007a.
- Burian, P. 'Pelagus and Politics in Aeschylus' *Danaid Trilogy*', in M. A. Lloyd (ed.), *Aeschylus*, 199-210. Oxford, 2007b. [Originally published in 1974.]
- Burian, P. 'Inconclusive Conclusion: The Ending(s) of *Oedipus Tyrannus*', in S. Goldhill and E. Hall (eds.), *Sophocles and the Greek Tragic Tradition*, 99-118. Cambridge, 2009.
- Burkert, W. 'Die Absurdität der Gewalt und das Ende der Tragödie. Euripides' *Orestes*', *Antike und Abendland* 20 (1974) 97-109.
- Burton, R. W. B. *The Chorus in Sophocles' Tragedies*. Oxford, 1980.
- Buxton, R. G. A. *Persuasion in Greek Tragedy: A Study of Peitho*. Cambridge, 1982.
- Buxton, R. G. A. 'The Messenger and the Maenads: A Speech from Euripides' *Bacchae* (1043-1152)', *Acta Antiqua Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 32 (1989) 225-234.
- Buxton, R. G. A. 'News from Cithaeron: Narrators and Narratives in the *Bacchae*', *Pallas* 37 (1991) 39-48.
- Caire, E. *Penser l'oligarchie à Athènes aux V^e et IV^e siècles. Aspects d'une idéologie* (Études Anciennes, série grecque, 151). Paris, 2016.
- Cairns, D. L. *Aidōs: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature*. Oxford, 1993.
- Cairns, D. L. 'Hybris, Dishonour, and Thinking Big', *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 116 (1996) 1-32.
- Cairns, D. L. 'The Politics of Envy: Envy and Equality in Ancient Greece', in D. Konstan and K. Rutter (eds.), *Envy, Spite, and Jealousy: The Rivalrous Emotions in Ancient Greece*, 235-252. Edinburgh, 2003.
- Cairns, D. L. *Bacchylides: Five Epinician Odes* (3, 5, 9, 11, 13) (ARCA, 49). Cambridge, 2010.

- Cairns, D. L. 'Introduction: Archaic Thought and Tragic Interpretation' and 'Divine and Human Action in the *Oedipus Tyrannus*', in D. L. Cairns (ed.), *Tragedy and Archaic Greek Thought*, ix-liv, 119-171. Swansea, 2013.
- Cairns, D. L. *Sophocles: Antigone*. London, 2016.
- Cairns, D. L. 'Homeric Values and the Virtues of Kingship', in F.-H. Mutscher (ed.), *The Homeric Epics and the Chinese Book of Songs: Foundational Texts Compared*, 381-409. Newcastle upon Tyne, 2018.
- Calder, W. M. 'Sophokles' Political Tragedy, *Antigone*', *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 9 (1968) 389-407.
- Calhoun, G. M. *Athenian Clubs in Politics and Litigation* (Diss. Chicago). Austin, 1913.
- Calhoun, G. M. 'Zeus the Father in Homer', *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 66 (1935) 1-17.
- Callahan, V. N. W. *Types of Rulers in the Plays of Aeschylus* (Diss. Chicago). Chicago, 1944.
- Campbell, D. A. 'Ship Imagery in the *Oedipus Tyrannus*', in M. J. Cropp, E. Fantham, and S. E. Scully (eds.), *Greek Tragedy and its Legacy: Essays Presented to D. J. Conacher*, 115-120. Calgary, 1986.
- Carawan, E. 'The Edict of Oedipus (*Oedipus Tyrannus* 223-51)', *American Journal of Philology* 120 (1999) 187-222.
- Carey, C. 'The Second Stasimon of Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus*', *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 106 (1986) 175-179.
- Carey, C. 'The Victory Ode in the Theatre', in P. Agócs, C. Carey, and R. Rawles (eds.), *Receiving the Komos: Ancient and Modern Receptions of the Victory Ode* (BICS Supplements, 112), 17-36. London, 2012.
- Carlier, P. *La royauté en Grèce avant Alexandre* (Études et travaux publiés par le groupe de recherche d'histoire romaine de l'université des sciences humaines de Strasbourg, 6). Strasbourg, 1984.
- Carlier, P. 'Ἀναξ and βασιλεύς in the Homeric Poems', in S. Deger-Jalkotzy and I. S. Lemos (eds.), *Ancient Greece: From the Mycenaean Palaces to the Age of Homer*, 101-109. Edinburgh, 2006.
- Carter, D. M. 'Citizen Attribute, Negative Right: A Conceptual Difference between Ancient and Modern Ideas of Freedom of Speech', in I. Sluiter and R. M. Rosen (eds.), *Free Speech in Classical Antiquity* (Mnemosyne Supplements, 254), 197-220. Leiden, 2004.
- Carter, D. M. *The Politics of Greek Tragedy*. Exeter, 2007.
- Carter, D. M. 'The Demos in Greek Tragedy', *Cambridge Classical Journal* 56 (2010) 47-94.
- Carter, D. M. 'Reported Assembly Scenes in Greek Tragedy', *Illinois Classical Studies* 38 (2013) 23-63.
- Cartledge, P. 'Spartan Kingship: Doubly Odd?', in *Spartan Reflections*, 55-67. London, 2001.
- Càssola, F. 'Erodoto e la tirannide', in F. Broilo (ed.), *Xenia. Scritti in onore di Piero Treves*, 25-35. Rome, 1985.
- Catenacci, C. 'Edipo in Sofocle e le storie di Erodoto', in P. Angeli Bernardini (ed.), *Presenza e funzione della città di Tebe nella cultura greca. Atti del convegno internazionale, Urbino, 7-9 luglio 1997* (Quaderni urbinati di cultura classica, Atti di convegni, 7), 195-202. Pisa, 2000.

- Catenacci, C. *Il tiranno e l'eroe. Storia e mito nella Grecia antica*. Rome, 2012. [Originally published in 1996.]
- Cecchet, L. *Poverty in Athenian Public Discourse: From the Eve of the Peloponnesian War to the Rise of Macedonia* (Historia Einzelschriften, 239). Stuttgart, 2015.
- Cerri, G. 'Antigone, Creonte e l'idea della tirannide nell'Atene del V secolo (Alcune tesi di V. Di Benedetto)', *Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica* 10 (1982) 137-155.
- Chiasson, C. C. 'The Question of Tragic Influence on Herodotus' (Diss. Yale, 1979). Unpublished.
- Chiasson, C. C. 'Herodotus' Use of Tragedy in the Lydian Logos', *Classical Antiquity* 22 (2003) 5-35.
- Cixous, H. 'The Character of "Character"', *New Literary History* 5 (1974) 383-402.
- Cohen, D. *Law, Violence and Community in Classical Athens*. Cambridge, 1995.
- Collard, C., M. J. Cropp, and K. H. Lee. *Euripides: Selected Fragmentary Plays: Volume I*. Warminster, 1995.
- Collard, C., M. J. Cropp, and J. Gibert. *Euripides: Selected Fragmentary Plays: Volume II*. Oxford, 2004.
- Collard, C., and M. J. Cropp. *Euripides, Fragments: Aegeus—Meleager* (Loeb Classical Library, 504). Cambridge, MA, 2008a.
- Collard, C., and M. J. Cropp. *Euripides, Fragments: Oedipus—Chrysippus; Other Fragments* (Loeb Classical Library, 506). Cambridge, MA, 2008b.
- Conacher, D. J. *Euripidean Drama: Myth, Theme and Structure*. Toronto, 1967.
- Conacher, D. J. 'Rhetoric and Relevance in Euripidean Drama', *American Journal of Philology* 102 (1981) 3-25.
- Connor, W. R. 'Tyrannis Polis', in J. H. D'Arms and J. Eadie (eds.), *Ancient and Modern: Essays in Honor of G. F. Else*, 95-109. Ann Arbor, 1977.
- Connor, W. R. *The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens*. Princeton, 1992.
- Conover, K. 'Bribery in Classical Athens' (Diss. Princeton, 2010). Unpublished.
- Crane, G. 'Politics of Consumption and Generosity in the Carpet Scene of the Agamemnon', *Classical Philology* 88 (1993) 117-136.
- Cropp, M. J. 'Antigone's Final Speech (Sophocles, *Antigone* 891-928)', *Greece and Rome* 44 (1997) 137-160.
- Csapo, E. *Actors and Icons of the Ancient Theatre*. Chichester, 2010.
- Culpeper, J. *Language and Characterisation: People in Plays and Other Texts*. Harlow, 2001.
- Cuny, D. 'Théorie du complot et déviance tyrannique. Étude de l'agôn entre Œdipe et Créon dans *Œdipe Roi*', *Bulletin de l'Association Guillaume Budé* (2004) 64-81.
- Cuny, D. *Une leçon de vie. Les réflexions générales dans le théâtre de Sophocle* (Études Anciennes, série grecque, 133). Paris, 2007.
- Currie, B. *Pindar and the Cult of Heroes*. Oxford, 2005.
- Currie, G. 'Narrative and the Psychology of Character', *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 67 (2009) 61-71.
- Dale, A. M. *Euripides: Alcestis*. Oxford, 1954.
- Dale, A. M. 'Ethos and Dianoia: "Character" and "Thought" in Aristotle's *Poetics*', in *Collected Papers*, 139-155. Cambridge, 1969. [Originally published in 1959.]
- Dalfen, J. 'Gesetz ist nicht Gesetz und fromm ist nicht fromm. Die Sprache der Personen in der sophokleischen Antigone', *Wiener Studien* 11 (1977) 5-26.

- Danze, T. M. 'The Tragedy of Pity in Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus*', *American Journal of Philology* 137 (2016) 565-599.
- Davies, M. *The Theban Epics* (Hellenic Studies, 69). Washington, D.C., 2014.
- Dawe, R. D. 'Inconsistency of Plot and Character in Aeschylus', *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* 9 (1963) 21-62.
- Defradas, J. *Les thèmes de la propagande delphique* (Études et Commentaires, 21). Paris, 1954.
- Degl'Innocenti Pierini, R. 'Il barbaro Tereo di Accio. Attualizzazione e funzionalità ideologica di un mito greco', in S. Faller and G. Manuwald (eds.), *Accius und seine Zeit* (Identitäten und Alteritäten, 13), 127-139. Würzburg, 2002.
- Deichgräber, K. 'Die Kadmos-Teiresiaszene in Euripides' *Bakchen*', *Hermes* 70 (1935) 322-349.
- Deichgräber, K. 'Die Lykurgie des Aischylos. Versuch einer Wiederherstellung der Dionysischen Tetralogie', *Nachrichten von der Königl. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, Philologisch-Historische Klasse. Fachgruppe I (Alturwissenschaft)* 3 (1939) 231-309.
- de Jong, I. J. F. 'Récit et drame. Le deuxième récit de messager dans *Les Bacchantes*', *Revue des Études Grecques* 105 (1992) 572-583.
- de Kock, E. L. 'The Sophoklean Oidipus and its Antecedents', *Acta Classica* 4 (1961) 7-28.
- Delebecque, E. *Euripide et la guerre du Péloponnèse* (Études et Commentaires, 10). Paris, 1951.
- de Lisle, C. 'Dedication of statue of the Tyrannicides (IG I³ 502)', on *Attic Inscriptions Online* (<https://www.atticinscriptions.com/inscription/IGI3/502>). 2018.
- Denniston, J. D. *The Greek Particles*. Oxford, 1934.
- Desmond, W. 'Between Gods and Mortals: The Piety of Homeric Kings', in J. Klooster and B. van der Berg (eds.), *Homer and the Good Ruler in Antiquity and Beyond* (Mnemosyne Supplements, 413), 38-64. Leiden, 2018.
- De Temmerman, K., and E. van Emde Boas. 'Character and Characterization in Ancient Greek Literature: An Introduction', in K. De Temmerman and E. van Emde Boas (eds.), *Characterization in Ancient Greek Literature: Studies in Ancient Greek Narrative, Volume Four* (Mnemosyne Supplements, 411), 1-23. Leiden, 2018.
- Dewald, C. 'Form and Content: The Question of Tyranny in Herodotus', in K. A. Morgan (ed.), *Popular Tyranny: Sovereignty and its Discontents in Ancient Greece*, 25-58. Austin, 2003.
- Di Benedetto, V. *Euripide. Teatro e società*. Turin, 1971.
- Dickie, M. W. 'Dike as a Moral Term in Homer and Hesiod', *Classical Philology* 73 (1978) 91-101.
- Diller, H. 'Die Bakchen und ihre Stellung im Spätwerk des Euripides', *Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur im Mainz. Abhandlungen der Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Klasse* 5 (1955) 453-471.
- Diller, H. 'Über das Selbstbewußtsein der sophokleischen Personen', *Wiener Studien* 69 (1956) 70-85.
- Docherty, T. *Reading (Absent) Character: Towards A Theory of Characterization in Fiction*. Oxford, 1983.
- Dodds, E. R. 'Euripides the Irrationalist', *Classical Review* 43 (1929) 97-104.

- Dodds, E. R. 'Maenadism in the Bacchae', *Harvard Theological Review* 33 (1940) 155-176.
- Dodds, E. R. *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Sather Classical Lectures, 25). Berkeley, 1951.
- Dodds, E. R. *Euripides: Bacchae*. Oxford, 1960a. [Originally published in 1944.]
- Dodds, E. R. 'Morals and Politics in the "Oresteia"', *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* 6 (1960b) 19-31.
- Donlan, W. *The Aristocratic Ideal in Ancient Greece: Attitudes of Superiority from Homer to the End of the Fifth Century B.C.* Lawrence, 1980.
- Dover, K. J. 'The Political Aspect of Aeschylus's *Eumenides*', *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 77 (1957) 230-237.
- Dover, K. J. 'Some Neglected Aspects of Agamemnon's Dilemma', *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 93 (1973) 58-79.
- Dover, K. J. 'The Red Fabric in the *Agamemnon*', in *Greek and the Greeks: Collected Papers. Volume I: Language, Poetry, Drama*, 151-160. Oxford, 1987. [Originally published in Italian in 1977.]
- Drews, R. *Basileus: The Evidence for Kingship in Geometric Greece* (Yale Classical Monographs, 4). New Haven, 1983.
- Duncan, A. 'Tragedians at the Courts of Tyrants', in D. M. Carter (ed.), *Why Athens? A Reappraisal of Tragic Politics*, 69-84. Oxford, 2011.
- Duranti, M. 'When the King Suffers What the Tyrant Fears: The Disruption of Political Order in Euripides' *Electra* and *Orestes*', *Comparative Drama* 51 (2017) 564-587.
- Easterling, P. E. 'Presentation of Character in Aeschylus', *Greece and Rome* 20 (1973) 3-19.
- Easterling, P. E. 'Character in Sophocles', *Greece and Rome* 24 (1977) 121-129.
- Easterling, P. E. 'The Second Stasimon of *Antigone*', in R. D. Dawe, J. Diggle, and P. E. Easterling (eds.), *Dioysiacs: Nine Studies in Greek Poetry by Former Pupils Presented to Denys Page on his Seventieth Birthday*, 141-158. Cambridge, 1978.
- Easterling, P. E. 'Kings in Greek tragedy', in J. Coy and J. de Hoz (eds.), *Estudios sobre los géneros literarios, II*, 33-45. Salamanca, 1984.
- Easterling, P. E. 'Anachronism in Greek Tragedy', *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 105 (1985) 1-10.
- Easterling, P. E. 'Agamemnon's *Skēptron* in the *Iliad*', in M. M. Mackenzie and C. Roueché (eds.), *Images of Authority: Papers Presented to Joyce Reynolds on the Occasion of her 70th Birthday* (Cambridge Philological Society Supplementary Volumes, 16), 104-121. Cambridge, 1989.
- Easterling, P. E. 'Constructing Character in Greek Tragedy', in C. B. R. Pelling (ed.), *Characterization and Individuality in Greek Literature*, 83-99. Oxford, 1990.
- Easterling, P. E. 'Constructing the Heroic', in C. B. R. Pelling (ed.), *Greek Tragedy and the Historian*, 21-37. Oxford, 1997.
- Easterling, P. E. 'Ancient Plays for Modern Minds' (Housman Lecture) (<https://www.ucl.ac.uk/classics/events/document/Housman-2005-Easterling>). 2005.
- Edmunds, L. 'The Oedipus Myth and African Sacred Kingship', *Comparative Civilizations Review* 3 (1979) 1-12.
- Edmunds, L. 'The Sphinx in the Oedipus Legend', in L. Edmunds and A. Dundes (eds.), *Oedipus: A Folklore Casebook*, 147-173. New York, 1983. [Originally published in 1981.]

- Edmunds, L. *Oedipus: The Ancient Legend and its Later Analogues*. Baltimore, 1985.
- Edmunds, L. 'The Teiresias Scene in Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus*', *Syllecta Classica* 11 (2000) 34-73.
- Edmunds, L. 'Oedipus as Tyrant in Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus*', *Syllecta Classica* 13 (2002) 63-103.
- Edmunds, L. *Oedipus*. London, 2006.
- Edmunds, L. 'The Edict of Oedipus (Soph. OT 216-275)', in F. Citti and A. Iannucci (eds.), *Edipo classico e contemporaneo* (Spudasmata, 149), 63-88. Hildesheim, 2012.
- Egli, F. *Euripides im Kontext zeitgenössischer intellektueller Strömungen. Analyse der Funktion philosophischer Themen in den Tragödien und Fragmenten* (Beiträge zur Altertumskunde, 189). Munich, 2003.
- Ehrenberg, V. 'Polypragmosyne: A Study in Athenian Politics', *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 67 (1947) 46-67.
- Ehrenberg, V. 'Origins of Democracy', *Historia* 1 (1950) 515-548.
- Ehrenberg, V. *Sophocles and Pericles*. Oxford, 1954.
- Ellis, B. A. 'The Jealous God of Ancient Greece: Interpreting the Classical Greek Notion of Φθόρος Θεῶν between Renaissance Humanism and Altertumswissenschaft', *Erudition and the Republic of Letters* 2 (2017) 1-55.
- Else, G. F. *The Madness of Antigone* (Abhandlungen der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-historische Klasse, 1976 no. 1). Heidelberg, 1976.
- Erskine, A. *Troy Between Greece and Rome: Local Tradition and Imperial Power*. Oxford, 2001.
- Eucken, C. 'Das Drama zwischen Kreon und dem Chor in der *Antigone*', *Würzburger Jahrbücher für die Altertumswissenschaft* 18 (1992) 77-87.
- Farnell, L. R. *Greek Hero Cults and Ideas of Immortality*. Oxford, 1921.
- Fartzoff, M. 'Les Agamemnons de Sophocle', in A. Machin and L. Pernée (eds.), *Sophocle: le texte, les personnages. Acts du colloque international d'Aix-en-Provence, 10, 11, et 12 janvier 1992*, 343-364. Aix-en-Provence, 1993.
- Fartzoff, M. 'Le roi et l'armée chez Sophocle', in S. Franchet d'Espèrey, V. Fromentin, S. Gotteland, and J.-M. Roddaz (eds.), *Fondements et crises du pouvoir*, 135-145. Bordeaux, 2003.
- Ferrill, A. 'Herodotus on Tyranny', *Historia* 27 (1978) 385-398.
- Finglass, P. J. 'Is There a *Polis* in Sophocles' *Electra*?', *Phoenix* 59 (2005) 199-209.
- Finglass, P. J. *Sophocles: Ajax*. Cambridge, 2011a.
- Finglass, P. J. 'Sophocles' Theseus', in A. Markantonatos and B. Zimmermann (eds.), *Crisis on Stage: Tragedy and Comedy in Late Fifth-Century Athens* (Trends in Classics, Supplementary Volumes, 13), 41-53. Berlin, 2011b.
- Finglass, P. J. 'Sophocles' *Ajax* and the *Polis*', *Polis* 34 (2017) 306-317.
- Finglass, P. J. *Sophocles: Oedipus the King*. Cambridge, 2018a.
- Finglass, P. J. 'Sophocles' Oedipus and Herodotus' Periander', in E. L. Bowie (ed.), *Herodotus: Narrator, Scientist, Historian* (Trends in Classics, Supplementary Volumes, 59), 59-75. Berlin, 2018b.
- Finley, M. I. 'Athenian Demagogues', *Past and Present* 21 (1962) 3-24.
- Fisher, N. R. E. *Hybris: A Study in the Values of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greece*. Warminster, 1992.
- Fisher, N. R. E. 'Hybris, Revenge and Stasis in the Greek City-States', in H. van Wees (ed.), *War and Violence in Ancient Greece*, 83-123. London, 2000.

- Fitton, J. W. 'The Suppliant Women and the Herakleidae of Euripides', *Hermes* 89 (1961) 430-461.
- Flower, H. I. 'Herodotus and Delphic Traditions about Croesus', in M. A. Flower and M. Toher (eds.), *Georgica: Greek Studies in Honour of George Cawkwell* (BICS Supplements, 58), 57-77. London, 1991.
- Föllinger, S. *Aischylos. Meister der griechischen Tragödie*. Munich, 2009.
- Fontenrose, J. *The Delphic Oracle: Its Responses and Operations, with a Catalogue of Responses*. Berkeley, 1978.
- Forsdyke, S. 'Athenian Democratic Ideology and Herodotus' Histories', *American Journal of Philology* 122 (2001) 329-358.
- Forsdyke, S. *Exile, Ostracism, and Democracy: The Politics of Expulsion in Ancient Greece*. Princeton, 2009.
- Forster, E. M. *Aspects of the Novel*. New York, 1927.
- Fraenkel, E. 'Aeschylea', *Museum Helveticum* 18 (1961) 131-135.
- Francis, E. D. 'Oedipus Achaemenides', *American Journal of Philology* 113 (1992) 333-357.
- Fränkel, H. 'Eine Stileigenheit der frühgriechischen Literatur', in *Wege und Formen frühgriechischen Denkens*, 40-96. Munich, 1960. [Originally published in 1924.]
- Fränkel, H. *Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy: A History of Greek Epic, Lyric, and Prose to the Middle of the Fifth Century* (translated by M. Hadas and J. Willis). Oxford, 1975. [Originally published in German in 1951.]
- Fries, A. *Pseudo-Euripides: Rhesus* (Untersuchungen zur antiken Literatur und Geschichte, 114). Berlin, 2014.
- Friis Johansen, H., and E. W. Whittle. *Aeschylus: The Suppliants*. Three volumes. Copenhagen, 1980.
- Fritz, K. von. 'The Character of Eteocles in Aeschylus' *Seven Against Thebes*' (translated by M. A. Lloyd), in M. A. Lloyd (ed.), *Aeschylus*, 141-173. Oxford, 2007. [Originally published in German in 1962.]
- Fröhlich, P. 'Officials, Greek, accountability of', in *The Oxford Classical Dictionary* (<https://oxfordre.com/classics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199381135.001.0001/acrefore-9780199381135-e-8021>). 2017.
- Funke, H. 'ΚΡΕΩΝ ΑΠΟΛΙΣ', *Antike und Abendland* 12 (1966) 29-50.
- Gagarin, M. 'The Thesmothetai and the Earliest Athenian Tyranny Law', *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 111 (1981) 71-77.
- Gagné, R. *Ancestral Fault in Ancient Greece*. Cambridge, 2013.
- Gammie, J. G. 'Herodotus on Kings and Tyrants: Objective Historiography or Conventional Portraiture?', *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 45 (1986) 171-195.
- Gantz, T. *Early Greek Myth: A Guide to the Literary and Artistic Sources*. Baltimore, 1993.
- Gardiner, C. P. *The Sophoclean Chorus: A Study of Character and Function*. Iowa City, 1987.
- Garton, C. 'Characterisation in Greek Tragedy', *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 77 (1957) 247-254.
- Garton, C. 'The "Chameleon Trail" in the Criticism of Greek Tragedy', *Studies in Philology* 69 (1972) 389-413.
- Garvie, A. F. *Aeschylus' Supplikes: Play and Trilogy*. Second edition. Exeter, 2006. [Originally published in 1969, but I have only cited the new 2006 preface.]
- Garvie, A. F. *Aeschylus: Persae*. Oxford, 2009.

- Geddes, A. G. 'Who's Who in "Homeric" Society?', *Classical Quarterly* 34 (1984) 17-36.
- Gehrke, H.-J. 'Plädoyer für Pentheus oder: Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Religion für die griechische Polis', in R. Schlesier (ed.), *A Different God? Dionysos and Ancient Polytheism*, 357-369. Berlin, 2011.
- Gellie, G. H. 'The Second Stasimon of the *Oedipus Tyrannus*', *American Journal of Philology* 85 (1964) 113-123.
- Gentili, B. 'Il tiranno, l'eroe e la dimensione tragica', in B. Gentili and R. Pretagostini (eds.), *Edipo. Il teatro greco e la cultura europea. Atti del convegno internazionale (Urbino, 15-19 novembre 1982)*, 117-123. Rome, 1986.
- Gibert, J. *Change of Mind in Greek Tragedy* (Hypomnemata, 108). Göttingen, 1995.
- Gibert, J. *Euripides: Ion*. Cambridge, 2019.
- Gill, C. 'Character', in S. Hornblower and A. Spawforth (eds.), *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*. Third edition. Oxford, 1996.
- Giorgini, G. *La città e il tiranno. Il concetto di tirannide nella Grecia del VII-IV secolo a.c.* Milan, 1993.
- Glenn, J. 'Pentheus and the Psychologists: Some Recent Views of the *Bacchae*', *Rivista di studi classici* 27 (1979) 5-10.
- Goheen, R. F. *The Imagery of Sophocles' Antigone: A Study of Poetic Language and Structure*. Princeton, 1951.
- Goldhill, S. *Reading Greek Tragedy*. Cambridge, 1986.
- Goldhill, S. 'Character and Action, Representation and Reading: Greek Tragedy and its Critics', in C. B. R. Pelling (ed.), *Characterization and Individuality in Greek Literature*, 100-127. Oxford, 1990.
- Goodwin, G. P., J. Piazza, and P. Rozin. 'Moral Character Predominates in Person Perception and Evaluation', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 106 (2014) 148-168.
- Goossens, R. 'Périclès et Thésée. À propos des *Suppliantes* d'Euripide', *Bulletin de l'Association Guillaume Budé* 35 (1932) 9-40.
- Goossens, R. *Euripide et Athènes*. Brussels, 1962.
- Gould, J. 'Dramatic Character and "Human Intelligibility" in Greek Tragedy', *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* 24 (1978) 43-67.
- Gould, J. 'The Language of Oedipus', in H. Bloom (ed.), *Sophocles: Oedipus Rex*, 143-160. New Haven, 1988.
- Gould, J. *Herodotus*. London, 1989.
- Gould, J. 'Oedipus and Antigone at Thebes', in *Myth, Ritual, Memory, and Exchange: Essays in Greek Literature and Culture*, 263-268. Oxford, 2001.
- Graf, D. F. 'Medism: The Origin and Significance of the Term', *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 104 (1984) 15-30.
- Graham, H. F. 'The Character of Agamemnon as Depicted in Greek and Latin Poetry from Homer to Quintus Smyrnaeus' (Diss. Southern California, 1952). Unpublished.
- Graham, T. 'Playing the Tyrant: The Representation of Tyranny in Fifth-Century Athenian Tragedy' (Diss. Duke, 2017). Unpublished.
- Greenberg, N. A. 'Euripides' *Orestes*: An Interpretation', *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 66 (1962) 157-192.
- Grégoire, H. Introduction to *Les Suppliantes*, in L. Parmentier and H. Grégoire, *Euripide. Tome III: Héraclès, Les Suppliantes, Ion*, 79-101. Paris, 1923.

- Gregory, J. W. 'Comic Elements in Euripides', *Illinois Classical Studies* 24-25 (2000) 50-74.
- Greiffenhagen, G. 'Der Prozess des Ödipus. Strafrechtliche und strafprozessuale Bemerkungen zur Interpretation des Ödipus Rex des Sophokles', *Hermes* 94 (1966) 147-176.
- Griffin, J. *Homer on Life and Death*. Oxford, 1980.
- Griffin, J. 'Characterization in Euripides: *Hippolytus* and *Iphigeneia in Aulis*', in C. B. R. Pelling (ed.), *Characterization and Individuality in Greek Literature*, 128-149. Oxford, 1990.
- Griffin, J. 'The Social Function of Attic Tragedy', *Classical Quarterly* 48 (1998) 39-61.
- Griffin, J. 'Herodotus and Tragedy', in C. Dewald and J. Marincola (eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to Herodotus*, 46-59. Cambridge, 2006.
- Griffith, M. *The Authenticity of Prometheus Bound*. Cambridge, 1977.
- Griffith, M. 'Brilliant Dynasts: Power and Politics in the *Oresteia*', *Classical Antiquity* 14 (1995) 62-129.
- Griffith, M. 'The King and Eye: the Rule of the Father in Greek Tragedy', *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* 44 (1998) 20-84.
- Griffith, M. *Sophocles: Antigone*. Cambridge, 1999.
- Griffith, M. 'Authority Figures', in J. W. Gregory (ed.), *A Companion to Greek Tragedy*, 333-351. Oxford, 2005.
- Griffith, M. 'Apollo, Teiresias, and the Politics of Tragic Prophecy', in L. Athanassaki, R. P. Martin, and J. F. Miller (eds.), *Apolline Politics and Poetics: International Symposium*, 473-500. Athens, 2009.
- Griffith, M. 'Extended families, marriage, and inter-city relations in (later) Athenian tragedy (Dynasts II)', in D. M. Carter (ed.), *Why Athens? A Reappraisal of Tragic Politics*, 175-208. Oxford, 2011.
- Grube, G. M. A. *The Drama of Euripides*. London, 1941.
- Hall, E. *Inventing the Barbarian: Greek Self-Definition through Tragedy*. Oxford, 1989.
- Hall, E. 'Political and Cosmic Turbulence in Euripides' *Orestes*', in A. H. Sommerstein, S. Halliwell, J. Henderson, and B. Zimmermann (eds.), *Tragedy, Comedy and the Polis*, 263-285. Bari, 1993.
- Halliwell, S. *Aristotle's Poetics*. London, 1986.
- Halliwell, S. 'Traditional Greek Conceptions of Character', in C. B. R. Pelling (ed.), *Characterization and Individuality in Greek Literature*, 32-59. Oxford, 1990.
- Halliwell, S. 'The Function and Aesthetics of the Greek Tragic Mask', in N. W. Slater and B. Zimmermann (eds.), *Intertextualität in der griechisch-römischen Komödie* (Beiträge zum antiken Drama und seiner Rezeption, 2), 195-211. Stuttgart, 1993.
- Hamburger, K. *The Logic of Literature* (translated by M. J. Rose). Bloomington, 1973. [Originally published in German in 1957.]
- Hamel, D. *Athenian Generals: Military Authority in the Classical Period* (Mnemosyne Supplements, 182). Leiden, 1998.
- Hansen, M. H. 'The Athenian Politicians, 403-322 B.C.', *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies* 24 (1983) 33-55.
- Hansen, M. H. *The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes: Structure, Principles, and Ideology*. Oxford, 1991.
- Hansen, W. *Ariadne's Thread: A Guide to International Tales Found in Classical Literature*. Ithaca, 2002.

- Harder, M. A. *Euripides' Kresphontes and Archelaos: Introduction, Text, and Commentary*. Leiden, 1985.
- Harrell, S. E. 'King or Private Citizen: Fifth-Century Sicilian Tyrants at Olympia and Delphi', *Mnemosyne* 55 (2002) 439-464.
- Harris, E. M. 'Antigone the Lawyer, or the Ambiguities of Nomos', in *Democracy and the Rule of Law in Classical Athens: Essays on Law, Society, and Politics*, 41-80. Cambridge, 2006. [Originally published in 2004.]
- Harris, E. M. 'Is Oedipus Guilty? Sophocles and Athenian Homicide Law', in E. M. Harris, D. F. Leão, and P. J. Rhodes (eds.), *Law and Drama in Ancient Greece*, 122-146. London, 2010.
- Harris, E. M. *The Rule of Law in Action in Democratic Athens*. Oxford, 2013.
- Harris, E. M. 'Aeschylus' *Eumenides*: The Role of the Areopagus, the Rule of Law and Political Discourse in Attic Tragedy', in A. Markantonatos and E. Volonaki (eds.), *Poet and Orator: A Symbiotic Relationship in Classical Athens* (Trends in Classics, Supplementary Volumes, 74), 389-419. Berlin, 2019.
- Haubold, J. *Homer's People: Epic Poetry and Social Formation*. Cambridge, 2000.
- Heath, M. *The Poetics of Greek Tragedy*. London, 1987.
- Heim, W. *Die Königsgestalten bei den griechischen Tragikern* (Diss. Erlangen). Erlangen, 1904.
- Henderson, J. 'Demos, Demagogue, Tyrant in Attic Old Comedy', in K. A. Morgan (ed.), *Popular Tyranny: Sovereignty and its Discontents in Ancient Greece*, 155-179. Austin, 2003.
- Herington, J. 'A Study in the *Prometheia*. Part II: *Birds* and *Prometheia*', *Phoenix* 17 (1963) 236-243.
- Herington, J. 'Aeschylus in Sicily', *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 87 (1967) 74-85.
- Herington, J. *Aeschylus*. New Haven, 1986.
- Herington, J. 'The Poem of Herodotus', *Arion* 1 (1991) 5-16.
- Herman, G. *Morality and Behaviour in Democratic Athens: A Social History*. Cambridge, 2006.
- Herrmann, F.-G. 'Eteocles' Decision in Aeschylus' *Seven Against Thebes*', in D. L. Cairns (ed.), *Tragedy and Archaic Greek Thought*, 39-80. Swansea, 2013.
- Herter, H. 'Theseus der Athener', *Rheinisches Museum* 88 (1939) 244-326.
- Hester, D. A. 'Oedipus and Jonah', *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* 23 (1977) 32-61.
- Highby, L. I. *The Erythrae Decree: Contributions to the Early History of the Delian League and the Peloponnesian Confederacy* (Klio Beihefte, 36). Leipzig, 1936.
- Hilton, I. 'A Literary Study of Euripides' *Phoinissai*' (Diss. University College, London, 2011). Unpublished.
- Hoekstra, K. 'Athenian Democracy and Popular Tyranny', in R. Bourke and Q. Skinner (eds.), *Popular Sovereignty in Historical Perspective*, 15-51. Cambridge, 2016.
- Hölscher, T. 'Image and Political Identity: The Case of Athens', in D. Boedeker and K. A. Raafaub (eds.), *Democracy, Empire, and the Arts in Fifth-Century Athens*, 153-183. Cambridge, MA, 1998.
- Holt, P. 'Polis and Tragedy in the *Antigone*', *Mnemosyne* 52 (1999) 658-690.
- Hornblower, S. 'Herodotus and his Sources of Information', in E. J. Bakker, I. J. F. de Jong, and H. van Wees (eds.), *Brill's Companion to Herodotus*, 373-386. Leiden, 2002.

- Hornblower, S. *Thucydides and Pindar: Historical Narrative and the World of Epinician Poetry*. Oxford, 2004.
- Hornblower, S. 'Pindar and Kingship Theory', in S. Lewis (ed.), *Ancient Tyranny*, 151-162. Edinburgh, 2006.
- Hose, M. *Drama und Gesellschaft. Studien zur dramatischen Produktion in Athen am Ende des 5. Jahrhunderts* (Beiträge zum antiken Drama und seiner Rezeption, 3). Stuttgart, 1995.
- Hose, M. *Euripides. Der Dichter der Leidenschaften*. Munich, 2008.
- Howald, E. *Die griechische Tragödie*. Munich, 1930.
- Hudson-Williams, T. *The Elegies of Theognis*. London, 1910.
- Hutchinson, G. O. *Aeschylus: Septem Contra Thebas*. Oxford, 1985.
- Iacovou, M. 'From the Mycenaean *qa-si-re-u* to the Cypriot *pa-si-le-wo-se*: The *Basileus* in the Kingdoms of Cyprus', in S. Deger-Jalkotzy and I. S. Lemos (eds.), *Ancient Greece: From the Mycenaean Palaces to the Age of Homer*, 315-335. Edinburgh, 2006.
- Ieranò, G. 'La città delle donne. Il sesto canto dell'*Iliade* e il *Sette contro Tebe* di Eschilo', in A. Aloni, E. Berardi, G. Besso, and S. Cecchin (eds.), *I Sette a Tebe. Dal mito alla letteratura. Atti del Seminario Internazionale, Torino 21-22 Febbraio 2001*, 323-353. Bologna, 2002.
- Jackson, E. 'The Argument of *Septem contra Thebas*', *Phoenix* 42 (1988) 287-303.
- Jacoby, F. 'Herodotos', in G. Wissowa (ed.), *Pauly's Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft. Neue Bearbeitung. Supplement Volume II*, cols. 205-520. Stuttgart, 1913.
- Jannidis, F. *Figur und Person. Beitrag zu einer historischen Narratologie* (Narratologia, 3). Berlin, 2004.
- Jens, W. 'Antigone-Interpretationen', in *Satura. Früchte aus der antiken Welt. Otto Weinreich zum 13. März 1951 dargebracht*, 43-58. Baden-Baden, 1952.
- Jessen, O. 'Basileus (2)', in G. Wissowa (ed.), *Pauly's Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft. Neue Bearbeitung. Volume III.1*, col. 82. Stuttgart, 1897.
- Jones, G. S. 'Voice of the People: Popular Symposia and the Non-Elite Origins of the Attic *Skolia*', *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 144 (2014) 229-262.
- Jones, J. *Aristotle and Greek Tragedy*. London, 1962.
- Jordan, B. *Servants of the Gods: A Study in the Religion, History and Literature of Fifth-Century Athens* (Hypomnemata, 55). Göttingen, 1979.
- Jouan, F. 'Dionysos chez Eschyle', *Kernos* 5 (1992) 71-86.
- Jouanna, J. *Sophocles: A Study of his Theater in its Political and Social Context* (translated by S. Rendall). Princeton, 2018. [Originally published in French in 2007.]
- Juffras, D. M. 'Sophocles' *Electra* 973-85 and *Tyrannicide*', *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 121 (1991) 99-108.
- Kallet, L. 'Dēmos Tyrannos: Wealth, Power, and Economic Patronage', in K. A. Morgan (ed.), *Popular Tyranny: Sovereignty and its Discontents in Ancient Greece*, 117-153. Austin, 2003.
- Kamerbeek, J. C. 'On the Conception of ΘΕΟΜΑΕΩΣ in Relation with Greek Tragedy', *Mnemosyne* 1 (1948) 271-283.
- Kamerbeek, J. C. *The Plays of Sophocles: Commentaries. IV: The Oedipus Tyrannus*. Leiden, 1967.
- Kannicht, R. *Tragicorum Graecorum fragmenta. V: Euripides*. Two volumes. Göttingen, 2004.

- Karsai, G. 'Le monologue de Thésée', *Acta Antiqua Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 30 (1982) 113-127.
- Karsai, G. 'Oedipe et Créon, Thésée et Hippolyte', in A. Machin and L. Pernée (eds.), *Sophocle. Le texte, les personnages. Acts du colloque international d'Aix-en-Provence*, 10, 11, et 12 janvier 1992, 329-342. Aix-en-Provence, 1993.
- Katsouris, A. G. *Linguistic and Stylistic Characterisation: Tragedy and Menander* (Dodone Supplements, 5). Ioannina, 1975.
- Kelly, A. *Sophocles: Oedipus at Colonus*. London, 2009.
- Kirkwood, G. M. *A Study of Sophoclean Drama*. Ithaca, 1958.
- Kirkwood, G. M. 'Homer and Sophocles' *Ajax*', in M. Anderson (ed.), *Classical Drama and its Influence: Essays presented to H. D. F. Kitto*, 53-70. London, 1965.
- Kirkwood, G. M. 'Eteocles Oiakostrophos', *Phoenix* 23 (1969) 9-25.
- Kitto, H. D. F. *Form and Meaning in Drama: A Study of Six Greek Plays and of Hamlet*. London, 1956.
- Kitto, H. D. F. *Greek Tragedy: A Literary Study*. Third edition. London, 1961. [Originally published in 1939.]
- Kitto, H. D. F. *Poiesis: Structure and Thought* (Sather Classical Lectures, 36). Berkeley, 1966.
- Kitzinger, M. R. 'Stylistic Methods of Characterization in Sophocles' *Antigone*' (Diss. Stanford, 1976). Unpublished.
- Knapp, C. 'A Point in the Interpretation of the *Antigone* of Sophocles', *American Journal of Philology* 37 (1916) 300-316.
- Knox, B. M. W. 'Why is Oedipus Called *Tyrannos*?', *Classical Journal* 50 (1954) 97-102.
- Knox, B. M. W. *Oedipus at Thebes: Sophocles' Tragic Hero and His Time*. New Haven, 1957.
- Knox, B. M. W. 'The *Ajax* of Sophocles', *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 65 (1961) 1-37.
- Knox, B. M. W. *The Heroic Temper: Studies in Sophoclean Tragedy*. Berkeley, 1964.
- Knox, B. M. W. 'Sophocles and the *Polis*', *Entretiens sur l'Antiquité classique* 29 (1983) 1-27.
- Kõiv, M. 'Basileus, Tyrannos and Polis: The Dynamics of Monarchy in Early Greece', *Klio* 98 (2016) 1-89.
- Konishi, H. 'Agamemnon's Reasons for Yielding', *American Journal of Philology* 110 (1989) 210-222.
- Kopperschmidt, J. 'Hikesie als dramatische Form', in W. Jens (ed.), *Die Bauformen der griechischen Tragödie*, 321-346. Munich, 1971.
- Kovacs, D. 'Tyrants and Demagogues in Tragic Interpolation', *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 23 (1982) 31-50.
- Kovacs, D. 'Notes on the *Bacchae*', *Classical Quarterly* 41 (1991) 340-345.
- Krakiwiak, K. M., and M. B. Oliver. 'When Good Characters Do Bad Things: Examining the Effect of Moral Ambiguity on Enjoyment', *Journal of Communication* 62 (2012) 117-135.
- Kriegbaum, S. *Der Ursprung der von Kallikles in Platons Gorgias vertretenen Anschauungen* (Diss. Würzburg). Paderborn, 1913.
- Kullmann, W. *Die Quellen der Ilias* (Hermes Einzelschriften, 14). Wiesbaden, 1960.
- Kullmann, W. 'Die Töchter Agamemnons in der Ilias', *Gymnasium* 72 (1965) 200-203.

- Kullmann, W. 'Die Reaktionen auf die Orakel und ihre Erfüllung im *König Ödipus* des Sophokles', in A. Bierl and P. von Möllendorff (eds.), *Orchestra. Drama, Mythos, Bühne*, 105-118. Stuttgart, 1994.
- Kurke, L. *The Traffic in Praise: Pindar and the Poetics of Social Economy*. Ithaca, 1991.
- Kyriakou, P. *A Commentary on Euripides' Iphigenia in Tauris* (Untersuchungen zur antiken Literatur und Geschichte, 80). Berlin, 2006.
- Lamari, A. A. *Reperforming Greek Tragedy: Theater, Politics, and Cultural Mobility in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries BC* (Trends in Classics, Supplementary Volumes, 52). Berlin, 2017.
- Lane Fox, R. 'Theognis: An Alternative to Democracy', in R. Brock and S. Hodkinson (eds.), *Alternatives to Athens: Varieties of Political Organization and Community in Ancient Greece*, 35-51. Oxford, 2002.
- Lang, M. L. 'Prexaspes and Usurper Smerdis', *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 51 (1992) 201-207.
- Lanza, D. *Il tiranno e il suo pubblico*. Turin, 1977. [I have also consulted the French translation: *Le tyran et son public* (translated by J. Routier-Pucci). Paris, 1997.]
- Lardinois, A. 'Have We Solon's Verses?', in J. Blok and A. Lardinois (eds.), *Solon of Athens: New Historical and Philological Approaches* (Mnemosyne Supplements, 272), 15-35. Leiden, 2006.
- Larson, S. 'Meddling with Myth in Thebes: A New Vase from the Ismenion Hill (Thebes Museum 49726)', in G. Hawes (ed.), *Myths on the Map: The Storied Landscapes of Ancient Greece*, 106-121. Oxford, 2017.
- LaRue, J. 'Prurience Uncovered: The Psychology of Euripides' Pentheus', *Classical Journal* 63 (1968) 209-214.
- Lateiner, D. *The Historical Method of Herodotus* (Phoenix Supplementary Volumes, 23). Toronto, 1989.
- Lattanzi, L. 'Il Lucurgus di Nevio', *Aevum Antiquum* 7 (1994) 191-265.
- Lattimore, S. 'Oedipus and Teiresias', *California Studies in Classical Antiquity* 8 (1975) 105-111.
- Lauriola, R. 'Wisdom and Foolishness: A Further Point in the Interpretation of Sophocles' *Antigone*', *Hermes* 135 (2007) 389-405.
- Lavelle, B. M. *The Sorrow and the Pity: A Prolegomenon to a History of Athens under the Peisistratids, c. 560-510 B.C.* (Historia Einzelschriften, 80). Stuttgart, 1993.
- Lawrence, S. E. *Moral Awareness in Greek Tragedy*. Oxford, 2013.
- Lefèvre, E. 'Die Unfähigkeit, sich zu erkennen. Unzeitgemäße Bemerkungen zu Sophokles' *Oidipus Tyrannos*', *Würzburger Jahrbücher für die Altertumswissenschaft* 13 (1987) 37-58.
- Lefèvre, E. *Die Unfähigkeit, sich zu erkennen. Sophokles' Tragödien* (Mnemosyne Supplements, 227). Leiden, 2001.
- Lefkowitz, M. R. *The Lives of the Greek Poets*. London, 1981.
- Lefkowitz, M. R. *The Lives of the Greek Poets*. Second edition. London, 2012.
- Leinieks, V. *The City of Dionysos: A Study of Euripides' Bakchai* (Beiträge zur Altertumskunde, 88). Stuttgart, 1996.
- Leppin, H. *Thukydides und die Verfassung der Polis. Ein Beitrag zur politischen Ideengeschichte des 5. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.* (Klio Beihefte, Neue Folge, 1). Berlin, 1999.
- Lesky, A. 'Psychologie bei Euripides', *Entretiens sur l'Antiquité classique* 6 (1960) 125-150.

- Lesky, A. *Greek Tragic Poetry* (translated by M. Dillon). New Haven, 1983. [Originally published in German in 1972.]
- Lewis, J. D. 'Isegoria at Athens: When Did It Begin?', *Historia* 20 (1971) 129-140.
- Lewis, R. G. 'The Procedural Basis of Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus*', *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 30 (1989) 41-66.
- Liapis, V. *A Commentary on the Rhesus Attributed to Euripides*. Oxford, 2012.
- Liapis, V. 'Creon the Labdacid: Political Confrontation and the Doomed *oikos* in Sophocles' *Antigone*', in D. L. Cairns (ed.), *Tragedy and Archaic Greek Thought*, 81-118. Swansea, 2013.
- Libero, L. de. *Die archaische Tyrannis*. Stuttgart, 1996.
- Lightfoot, J. L. *Parthenius of Nicaea: The Poetical Fragments and the Ἐρωτικὰ Παθήματα*. Oxford, 1999.
- Lloyd, M. A. *The Agon in Euripides*. Oxford, 1992.
- Lloyd, M. A. 'Sophocles in the Light of Face-Threat Politeness Theory', in I. de Jong and A. Rijksbaron (eds.), *Sophocles and the Greek Language: Aspects of Diction, Syntax and Pragmatics* (Mnemosyne Supplements, 269), 225-239. Leiden, 2006.
- Lloyd, M. A. 'Introduction', in M. A. Lloyd (ed.), *Aeschylus*, 1-39. Oxford, 2007.
- Lloyd, M. A. 'Sophocles the Ironist', in A. Markantonatos (ed.), *Brill's Companion to Sophocles*, 563-577. Leiden, 2012.
- Lloyd, M. A. 'Sophocles', in K. De Temmerman and E. van Emde Boas (eds.), *Characterization in Ancient Greek Literature: Studies in Ancient Greek Narrative, Volume Four* (Mnemosyne Supplements, 411), 337-354. Leiden, 2018.
- Lloyd-Jones, H. J. 'The Supplices of Aeschylus: The New Date and Old Problems', *L'antiquité classique* 33 (1964) 356-374.
- Lloyd-Jones, H. J. *The Justice of Zeus* (Sather Classical Lectures, 41). Berkeley, 1971.
- Longo, O. 'Proposte di lettura per l'Oreste di Euripide', *Maia* 27 (1975) 265-287.
- Loraux, N. 'Autochthonous Kreousa: Euripides, *Ion*' (translated by F. I. Zeitlin and C. Levine), in *The Children of Athena: Athenian Ideas about Citizenship and the Division Between the Sexes*, 184-236. Princeton, 1993. [Originally published in French in 1981.]
- Low, P. 'Looking for the Language of Athenian Imperialism', *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 125 (2005) 93-111.
- Low, P. *Interstate Relations in Classical Greece: Morality and Power*. Cambridge, 2007.
- Luraghi, N. 'Hieron Agonistes or the Masks of the Tyrant', in G. Urso (ed.), *Dicere laudes. Elogio, comunicazione, creazione del consenso. Atti del convegno internazionale, Cividale del Friuli, 23-25 settembre 2010* (I convegni della Fondazione Niccolò Canussio, 10), 27-47. Pisa, 2011.
- Luraghi, N. 'Ruling Alone: Monarchy in Greek Politics and Thought' and 'To Die like a Tyrant', in N. Luraghi (ed.), *The Splendors and Miseries of Ruling Alone: Encounters with Monarchy from Archaic Greece to the Hellenistic Mediterranean* (Studies in Ancient Monarchies, 1), 11-24, 49-71. Stuttgart, 2013a.
- Luraghi, N. 'The Stories Before the Histories: Folktale and Traditional Narrative in Herodotus', in R. V. Munson (ed.), *Herodotus*, I.87-112. Oxford, 2013b. [Originally published in Italian in 2005.]
- Luraghi, N. 'One-Man Government: The Greeks and Monarchy', in H. Beck (ed.), *A Companion to Ancient Greek Government*, 131-145. Chichester, 2013c.

- Luraghi, N. 'The Cunning Tyrant', in A. Moreno and R. Thomas (eds.), *Patterns of the Past: Epitēdeumata in the Greek Tradition*, 67-92. Oxford, 2014.
- Luraghi, N. 'Anatomy of the Monster: The Discourse of Tyranny in Ancient Greece', in H. Börm (ed.), *Antimonarchic Discourse in Antiquity* (Studies in Ancient Monarchies, 3), 67-84. Stuttgart, 2015.
- Luria, S. 'ΤΟΝ ΣΟΪ ΥΙΟΝ ΦΡΕΪΟΝ (Die Oidipus-sage und Verwandtes)', in G. Gemelli (ed.), *Raccolta di Scritti in Onore di Felice Ramorino* (Pubblicazioni della Università cattolica del Sacro Cuore. Ser. 4, Scienze filologiche, vol. 7), 289-314. Milan, 1927.
- Lurje, M. *Die Suche nach der Schuld. Sophokles' Oedipus Rex, Aristoteles' Poetik und das Tragödienverständnis der Zeit* (Beiträge zur Altertumskunde, 209). Munich, 2004.
- MacKay, L. A. 'Antigone, Coriolanus and Hegel', *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 93 (1962) 166-174.
- Macleod, C. W. 'Politics and the Oresteia', *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 102 (1982) 124-144.
- Malkin, I. *Religion and Colonization in Ancient Greece* (Studies in Greek and Roman Religion, 3). Leiden, 1987.
- Malkin, I. *Myth and Territory in the Spartan Mediterranean*. New York, 1994.
- Mann, C. 'The Victorious Tyrant: Hieron of Syracuse in the Epinicia of Pindar and Bacchylides', in N. Luraghi (ed.), *The Splendors and Miseries of Ruling Alone: Encounters with Monarchy from Archaic Greece to the Hellenistic Mediterranean* (Studies in Ancient Monarchies, 1), 25-48. Stuttgart, 2013.
- Manuwald, B. 'Oidipus und Adrastus. Bemerkungen zur neueren Diskussion um die Schuldfrage in Sophokles' König Oidipus', *Rheinisches Museum* 135 (1992) 1-43.
- March, J. R. 'Euripides' *Bakchai*: A Reconsideration in the Light of Vase-Paintings', *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 36 (1989) 33-65.
- Markantonatos, G. *Tragic Irony in Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides*. Athens, 2009.
- Marshall, C. W. *The Structure and Performance of Euripides' Helen*. Cambridge, 2014.
- Martin, G. *Divine Talk: Religious Argumentation in Demosthenes*. Oxford, 2009.
- Martin, R. P. 'Hesiod, Odysseus, and the Instruction of Princes', *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 114 (1984) 29-48.
- Mastrorade, D. J. *Contact and Discontinuity: Some Conventions of Speech and Action on the Greek Tragic Stage* (University of California Publications in Classical Studies, 21). Berkeley, 1979.
- Mastrorade, D. J. *The Art of Euripides: Dramatic Technique and Social Context*. Cambridge, 2010. [Some pages previously published in 1986.]
- McGlew, J. F. *Tyranny and Political Culture in Ancient Greece*. Ithaca, 1993.
- Medda, E. *Euripide. Le Fenicie*. Milan, 2006.
- Meier, C. *The Political Art of Greek Tragedy* (translated by A. Webber). Cambridge, 1993. [Originally published in German in 1988.]
- Meineck, P. 'The Neuroscience of the Tragic Mask', *Arion* 19 (2011) 113-158.
- Meridor, R. 'The Function of Polymestor's Crime in the *Hecuba* of Euripides', *Eranos* 81 (1983) 13-20.
- Meuli, H. *Der König in der griechischen Tragödie* (Diss. Zurich). Thal, 1945.
- Michelakis, P. *Achilles in Greek Tragedy*. Cambridge, 2002.
- Michellini, A. N. 'Alcibiades and Theseus in Euripides' *Suppliants*', *Colby Quarterly* 33 (1997) 177-184.
- Mikalson, J. D. *Athenian Popular Religion*. Chapel Hill, 1983.

- Mikalson, J. D. *Honor Thy Gods: Popular Religion in Greek Tragedy*. Chapel Hill, 1991.
- Miller, M. C. *Athens and Persia in the Fifth Century BC: A Study in Cultural Receptivity*. Cambridge, 1997.
- Mills, S. *Theseus, Tragedy, and the Athenian Empire*. Oxford, 1997.
- Mills, S. *Euripides: Bacchae*. London, 2006.
- Missiou, A. 'Δοῦλος τοῦ Βασιλέως: The Politics of Translation', *Classical Quarterly* 43 (1993) 377-391.
- Mitchell, B. 'Cyrene: Typical or Atypical?', in R. Brock and S. Hodkinson (eds.), *Alternatives to Athens: Varieties of Political Organization and Community in Ancient Greece*, 82-102. Oxford, 2000.
- Mittelstadt, M. C. 'Thucydidean Psychology and Moral Value Judgement in the History: Some Observations', *Rivisti di studi classici* 25 (1977) 30-55.
- Moloney, E. 'Philippus in acie tutior quam in theatro fuit ... (Curtius 9.6.25): The Macedonian Kings and Greek Theatre', in E. Csapo, H. R. Goette, J. R. Green, and P. Wilson (eds.), *Greek Theatre in the Fourth Century B.C.*, 231-248. Berlin, 2014.
- Molyneux, J. H. *Simonides: A Historical Study*. Wauconda, 1992.
- Moreau, A. 'Tirésias. Un devin trop humain (Oedipe-Roi, 300-462)', in A. Machin and L. Pernée (eds.), *Sophocle. Le texte, les personnages. Acts du colloque international d'Aix-en-Provence, 10, 11, et 12 janvier 1992*, 219-232. Aix-en-Provence, 1993.
- Moret, J.-M. *Œdipe, la Sphinx et les Thébains. Essai de mythologie iconographique* (Bibliotheca Helvetica Romana, 23). Two volumes. Geneva, 1984.
- Morgan, C., and T. Whitelaw. 'Pots and Politics: Ceramic Evidence for the Rise of the Argive State', *American Journal of Archaeology* 95 (1991) 79-108.
- Morgan, K. A. *Pindar and the Construction of Syracusan Monarchy in the Fifth Century B.C.*. Oxford, 2015.
- Morrison, J. S. 'Pericles Monarchos', *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 70 (1950) 76-77.
- Morwood, J. H. W. *Euripides: Suppliant Women*. Oxford, 2007.
- Morwood, J. H. W. '"A Big Laugh": Horrid Laughter in Euripides' *Bacchae*', in D. Stuttard (ed.), *Looking at Bacchae*, 91-96. London, 2016.
- Mossman, J. *Wild Justice: A Study of Euripides' Hecuba*. Oxford, 1995.
- Most, G. 'Epinician Envy', in D. Konstan and K. Rutter (eds.), *Envy, Spite, and Jealousy: The Rivalrous Emotions in Ancient Greece*, 123-142. Edinburgh, 2003.
- Müller, K. O. *Dissertations on the Eumenides of Aeschylus*. Cambridge, 1835. [Originally published in German in 1833.]
- Murray, O. 'Herodotus and Oral History', in H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg and A. Kuhrt (eds.), *The Greek Sources: Proceedings of the Groningen 1984 Achaemenid History Workshop* (Achaemenid History, 2), 93-115. Leiden, 1987.
- Nagy, G. *The Greek Hero in 24 Hours*. Cambridge, MA, 2013.
- Naiden, F. S. *Ancient Supplication*. Oxford, 2006.
- Naiden, F. S. 'The Legal (and Other) Trials of Orestes', in E. M. Harris, D. F. Leão, and P. J. Rhodes (eds.), *Law and Drama in Ancient Greece*, 61-76. London, 2010.
- Nauhardt, W. *Das Bild des Herrschers in der griechischen Dichtung* (Diss. Berlin). Berlin, 1940.
- Neer, R. T. *Style and Politics in Athenian Vase-Painting: The Craft of Democracy, ca. 530–460 B.C.E.* Cambridge, 2002.
- Neumann, U. *Gegenwart und mythische Vergangenheit bei Euripides* (Hermes Einzelschriften, 69). Stuttgart, 1995.

- Newton, R. M. 'Hippolytus and the Dating of Oedipus Tyrannus', *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 21 (1980) 5-22.
- Norwood, G. *The Riddle of the Bacchae: The Last Stage of Euripides' Religious Views*. Manchester, 1908.
- Noussia-Fantuzzi, M. *Solon the Athenian: The Poetic Fragments* (Mnemosyne Supplements, 326). Leiden, 2010.
- Ober, J. *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Power of the People*. Princeton, 1989.
- Ogden, D. *The Crooked Kings of Ancient Greece*. London, 1997.
- Oldfather, W. A. Review of Nauhardt 1940. *Classical Weekly* 35 (1941) 53-55.
- Oost, S. I. 'The Tyrant Kings of Syracuse', *Classical Philology* 71 (1976) 224-236.
- Oranje, H. *Euripides' Bacchae: The Play and its Audience* (Mnemosyne Supplements, 78). Leiden, 1984.
- Osborne, R. 'Changing the Discourse', in K. A. Morgan (ed.), *Popular Tyranny: Sovereignty and its Discontents in Ancient Greece*, 251-272. Austin, 2003.
- Ostwald, M. 'The Athenian Legislation against Tyranny and Subversion', *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 86 (1955) 103-128.
- Ostwald, M. *From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law: Law, Society, and Politics in Fifth-Century Athens*. Berkeley, 1986.
- Ostwald, M. 'Herodotus and Athens', *Illinois Classical Studies* 16 (1991) 137-148.
- O'Sullivan, P. 'Of Sophists, Tyrants and Polyphemos: The Nature of the Beast in Euripides' *Cyclops*', in G. W. M. Harrison (ed.), *Satyr Drama: Tragedy at Play*, 119-159. Swansea, 2005.
- Padel, R. *Whom Gods Destroy: Elements of Greek and Tragic Madness*. Princeton, 1995.
- Papadodima, E. *Foreignness Negotiated: Conceptual and Ethical Aspects of the Greek-Barbarian Distinction in Fifth-Century Literature* (Spudasmata, 153). Hildesheim, 2013.
- Papadopoulou, T. 'The Presentation of the Inner Self: Euripides' *Medea* 1021-55 and Apollonius Rhodius' *Argonautica* 3, 772-801', *Mnemosyne* 50 (1997) 641-664.
- Papadopoulou, T. 'The Prophetic Figure in Euripides' *Phoenissae* and *Bacchae*', *Hermes* 129 (2001) 21-31.
- Papadopoulou, T. *Euripides: Phoenician Women*. London, 2008.
- Parara, P. *La dimension politique des tragédies d'Eschyle* (Association pour la diffusion de la recherche sur l'antiquité, Études anciennes, 44). Nancy, 2010.
- Parker, R. C. T. *Miasma: Pollution and Purification in Early Greek Religion*. Oxford, 1983.
- Parker, R. C. T. 'Myths of Early Athens', in J. N. Bremmer (ed.), *Interpretations of Greek Mythology*, 187-214. London, 1987.
- Parker, R. C. T. *Athenian Religion: A History*. Oxford, 1996.
- Parker, R. C. T. 'Gods Cruel and Kind: Tragic and Civic Theology', in C. B. R. Pelling (ed.), *Greek Tragedy and the Historian*, 143-160. Oxford, 1997.
- Parker, V. 'Τύραννος: The Semantics of a Political Concept from Archilochus to Aristotle', *Hermes* 126 (1998) 145-172.
- Parsons, M. 'Self-Knowledge Refused and Accepted: A Psychoanalytic Perspective on the *Bacchae* and the *Oedipus at Colonus*', *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 35 (1988) 1-14.
- Patzer, H. 'Die dramatische Handlung der *Sieben gegen Theben*', *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 63 (1958) 97-119.

- Patzer, H. *Hauptperson und tragischer Held in Sophokles' 'Antigone'* (Sitzungsberichte der wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft an der Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, 15 no. 2). Wiesbaden, 1978.
- Pelling, C. B. R. 'Conclusion', in C. B. R. Pelling (ed.), *Greek Tragedy and the Historian*, 213-235. Oxford, 1997.
- Pelling, C. B. R. *Literary Texts and the Greek Historian*. London, 2000.
- Perris, S. 'Perspectives on Violence in Euripides' *Bacchae*', *Mnemosyne* 64 (2011) 37-57.
- Petre, Z. 'L'uso politico e retorico del tema del tirannicidio', in S. Settis (ed.), *I Greci. Storia, cultura, arte, società*, II.ii.1207-1226. Turin, 1997.
- Pfeijffer, I. L. 'The Image of the Eagle in Pindar and Bacchylides', *Classical Philology* 89 (1994) 305-317.
- Pfister, M. *The Theory and Analysis of Drama* (translated by J. Halliday). Cambridge, 1988. [Originally published in German in 1977.]
- Picariello, D. K., and A. W. Saxonhouse. 'Aeschylus and the Binding of the Tyrant', *Polis* 32 (2015) 271-296.
- Pickard-Cambridge, A. W. *The Dramatic Festivals of Athens* (revised by J. Gould and D. M. Lewis). Oxford, 1968. [Originally published in 1953.]
- Podlecki, A. J. 'Creon and Herodotus', *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 97 (1966) 359-371.
- Podlecki, A. J. 'The Basic Seriousness of Euripides' *Helen*', *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 101 (1970) 401-418.
- Podlecki, A. J. 'Individual and Group in Euripides' *Bacchae*', *L'antiquité classique* 43 (1974) 143-165.
- Podlecki, A. J. 'A Pericles *Prosôpon* in Attic Tragedy?', *Euphrosyne* 7 (1976) 7-27.
- Podlecki, A. J. 'Herodotus in Athens?', in K. H. Kinzl (ed.), *Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean in Ancient History and Prehistory: Studies Presented to Fritz Schachermeyr on the Occasion of his Eightieth Birthday*, 246-265. Berlin, 1977.
- Podlecki, A. J. 'Polis and Monarch in Early Attic Tragedy', in J. P. Euben (ed.), *Greek Tragedy and Political Theory*, 76-100. Berkeley, 1986.
- Pohlenz, M. *Herodot. Der erste Geschichtschreiber des Abendlandes*. Leipzig, 1937.
- Pohlenz, M. *Die griechische Tragödie*. Two volumes. Second edition. Göttingen, 1954. [Originally published in 1930.]
- Poli-Palladini, L. 'Some Reflections on Aeschylus' *Aetnae(ae)*', *Rheinisches Museum* 144 (2001) 287-325.
- Poole, W. 'Euripides and Sparta', in A. Powell and S. Hodkinson (eds.), *The Shadow of Sparta*, 1-33. London, 1994.
- Pope, M. 'Addressing Oedipus', *Greece and Rome* 38 (1991) 156-170.
- Porter, J. R. *Studies in Euripides' Orestes* (Mnemosyne Supplements, 128). Leiden, 1994.
- Posch, H. 'Walter Franz Josef Blum', in the *Gedenkbuch für das Opfer des Nationalsozialismus an der Universität Wien 1938* (https://gedenkbuch.univie.ac.at/?id=index.php?id=435&no_cache=1&person_single_id=195). 2008.
- Prag, A. J. N. W. *The Oresteia: Iconographic and Narrative Tradition*. Warminster, 1985.
- Price, S. *Religions of the Ancient Greeks*. Cambridge, 1999.
- Raaflaub, K. A. 'Polis Tyrannos. Zur Entstehung einer politischen Metapher', in G. W. Bowersock, W. Burkert, and C. J. Putnam (eds.), *Arktouros: Hellenic Studies*

- Presented to Bernard M. W. Knox on the Occasion of his 65th Birthday*, 237-252. Berlin, 1979.
- Raaflaub, K. A. 'Zum Freiheitsbegriff der Griechen. Materialien und Untersuchungen zur Bedeutungsentwicklung von *eleutheros/eleutheria* in der archaischen und klassischen Zeit', in E. C. Weslkopf (ed.), *Soziale Typenbegriffe im alten Griechenland und ihr Fortleben in den Sprachen der Welt*, IV.180-405. Berlin, 1981.
- Raaflaub, K. A. 'Politisches Denken im Zeitalter Athens', in I. Fetscher and H. Münkler (eds.), *Pipers Handbuch der politischen Ideen*, I.273-368. Munich, 1988.
- Raaflaub, K. A. 'Politics and Interstate Relations among Early Greek Poleis: Homer and Beyond', *Antichthon* 31 (1997) 1-27.
- Raaflaub, K. A. 'Stick and Glue: The Function of Tyranny in Fifth-Century Athenian Democracy', in K. A. Morgan (ed.), *Popular Tyranny: Sovereignty and its Discontents in Ancient Greece*, 59-94. Austin, 2003.
- Raaflaub, K. A. *The Discovery of Freedom in Ancient Greece* (translated by R. Franciscano). Chicago, 2004. [Originally published in German in 1985.]
- Raney, A. A. 'Expanding Disposition Theory: Reconsidering Character Liking, Moral Evaluations, and Enjoyment', *Communication Theory* 14 (2004) 348-369.
- Rawson, E. 'Aspects of Euripides' *Orestes*', *Arethusa* 5 (1972) 155-167.
- Regenbogen, O. 'Bemerkungen zu den Sieben des Aischylos', *Hermes* 68 (1933) 51-69.
- Rehm, R. 'Sophocles' *Antigone* and Family Values', in C. B. Patterson (ed.), *Antigone's Answer: Essays on Death and Burial, Family and State in Classical Athens* (Helios, Special Issue, 33), 187-218. Lubbock, 2006.
- Reinhardt, K. 'Herodots Persergeschichten', in *Vermächtnis der Antike. Gesammelte Essays zur Philosophie und Geschichtsschreibung*, 133-174. Göttingen, 1960. [Originally published in 1940.]
- Reinhardt, K. *Sophocles* (translated by H. Harvey and D. Harvey). Oxford, 1979. [Originally published in 1933.]
- Reitzammer, L. 'Bacchae', in L. K. McClure (ed.), *A Companion to Euripides*, 298-311. Chichester, 2017.
- Rhodes, P. J. *The Athenian Boule*. Oxford, 1972.
- Rhodes, P. J. 'Oligarchs in Athens', in R. Brock and S. Hodkinson (eds.), *Alternatives to Athens: Varieties of Political Organization and Community in Ancient Greece*, 119-136. Oxford, 2000.
- Rhodes, P. J. 'Nothing to Do with Democracy: Athenian Drama and the *Polis*', *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 123 (2003) 104-119.
- Rhodes, P. J. *The Greek City States: A Source Book*. Second edition. London, 2007. [Originally published in 1986.]
- Rhodes, P. J., and R. Osborne. *Greek Historical Inscriptions: 404-323 BC*. Oxford, 2003.
- Rieks, R. 'Eine tragische Erzählung bei Herodot (Historien 1,34-45)', *Poetica* 7 (1975) 23-44.
- Rimmon-Kenan, S. *Narrative Fiction: Contemporary Poetics*. Second edition. London, 2002. [Originally published in 1983.]
- Rivier, A. *Essai sur le tragique d'Euripide*. Revised edition. Paris, 1975. [Originally published in 1944.]
- Robert, C. *Oidipus. Geschichte eines poetischen Stoffs im griechischen Altertum*. Two volumes. Berlin, 1915.

- Roemer, A. 'Zur Kritik und Exegese von Homer, Euripides, Aristophanes und den alten Erklärern derselben', *Abhandlungen der philosophisch-philologischen Classe der Königlich Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* 22 (1904) 577-656.
- Romilly, J. de. *Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism* (translated by P. Thody). Oxford, 1963. [Originally published in French in 1947.]
- Romilly, J. de. 'Les Phéniciennes d'Euripide ou l'actualité dans la tragédie grecque', *Revue de philologie, de littérature et d'histoire anciennes* 39 (1965) 28-47. [I have also consulted the English translation, which is less readily accessible: 'Phoenician Women of Euripides: Topicality in Greek Tragedy' (translated by D. H. Orrok), *Bucknell Review* 15 (1967) 108-132.]
- Romilly, J. de. 'La pensiero di Euripide sulla tirannia', *Dioniso* 43 (1970) 175-187.
- Romilly, J. de. 'L'assemblée du peuple dans l'*Oreste* d'Euripide' in *Studi classici in onore di Quintino Cataudella*, I.237-251. Catania, 1972.
- Romilly, J. de. 'Sur un écrit anonyme ancien et ses rapports avec Thucydide', *Journal des Savants* (1980) 19-34.
- Romilly, J. de. *La modernité d'Euripide*. Paris, 1986.
- Romilly, J. de. *The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens* (translated by J. Lloyd). Oxford, 1992. [Originally published in French in 1988.]
- Romilly, J. de. *The Life of Alcibiades: Dangerous Ambition and the Betrayal of Athens* (translated by E. T. Rawlings). Ithaca, 2019. [Originally published in French in 1995.]
- Rood, T., C. Atack, and T. Phillips. *Anachronism and Antiquity*. London, 2020.
- Rosenmeyer, T. G. *The Art of Aeschylus*. Berkeley, 1982.
- Rosivach, V. J. 'On Creon, *Antigone* and Not Burying the Dead', *Rheinisches Museum* 126 (1983) 193-211.
- Rosivach, V. J. 'Execution by Stoning in Athens', *Classical Antiquity* 6 (1987) 232-248.
- Rosivach, V. J. 'The Tyrant in Athenian Democracy', *Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica* 30 (1988) 43-57.
- Rösler, W. *Polis und Tragödie. Funktionsgeschichtliche Betrachtungen zu einer antiken Literaturgattung* (Konstanzer Universitätsreden, 138). Constance, 1980.
- Roth, P. 'Teiresias as Mantis and Intellectual in Euripides' *Bacchae*', *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 114 (1984) 59-69.
- Rubel, A. *Fear and Loathing in Ancient Athens: Religion and Politics During the Peloponnesian War* (translated by M. Vickers and A. Piftor). Durham, 2014. [Originally published in German in 2000.]
- Rubinstein, L. 'Stirring up Dicastic Anger', in D. Cairns and R. A. Knox (eds.), *Law, Rhetoric, and Comedy in Classical Athens: Essays in Honour of Douglas M. MacDowell*, 187-203. Swansea, 2004.
- Rutherford, R. B. *Greek Tragic Style: Form, Language and Interpretation*. Cambridge, 2012.
- Rutherford, R. B. *Homer: Iliad, Book XVIII*. Cambridge, 2019.
- Ruzé, F. 'Basileis, tyrans et magistrats', *Mètis* 4 (1989) 211-231.
- Ryzman, M. 'Oedipus, Nosos and Physis in Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus*', *L'antiquité classique* 61 (1992) 98-110.
- Saïd, S. *Sophiste et tyran, ou le problème du Prométhée enchaîné* (Études et Commentaires, 95). Paris, 1985.

- Saïd, S. 'Tragedy and Politics', in D. Boedeker and K. A. Raaflaub (eds.), *Democracy and the Arts in Fifth-Century Athens*, 275-295. Cambridge, MA, 1998.
- Saïd, S. 'Herodotus and Tragedy', in E. J. Bakker, I. J. F. de Jong, and H. van Wees (eds.), *Brill's Companion to Herodotus*, 117-147. Leiden, 2002.
- Sailor, D., and S. C. Stroup. 'ΦΘΟΝΟΣ Δ' ΑΠΕΣΤΩ: The Translation of Transgression in Aiskhylos' *Agamemnon*', *Classical Antiquity* 18 (1999) 153-182.
- Salapata, G. 'The Heroic Cult of Agamemnon', *Electra* 1 (2011) 39-60.
- Salapata, G. *Heroic Offerings: The Terracotta Plaques from the Spartan Sanctuary of Agamemnon and Cassandra*. Ann Arbor, 2014.
- Sale, W. 'The Psychoanalysis of Pentheus in the *Bacchae* of Euripides', *Yale Classical Studies* 22 (1972) 63-82.
- Salmon, J. *Wealthy Corinth: A History of the City to 338 B.C.* Oxford, 1984.
- Schachermeyr, F. 'Sophokles und die perikleische Politik', *Wiener Studien* 79 (1966) 45-63.
- Schadewaldt, W. 'Der "König Ödipus" des Sophokles in neuer Deutung', *Schweizer Monatshefte* 36 (1956) 21-31.
- Schadewaldt, W. 'Hector and Andromache' (translated by G. M. Wright and P. V. Jones), in G. M. Wright and P. V. Jones (eds.), *Homer: German Scholarship in Translation*, 124-142. Oxford, 1997. [Originally published in German in 1944.]
- Schaps, D. 'Aeschylus' Politics and the Theme of the *Oresteia*', in R. M. Rosen and J. Farrell (eds.), *Nomodeiktēs: Greek Studies in Honor of Martin Ostwald*, 505-515. Ann Arbor, 1993.
- Schein, S. *Sophocles: Philoctetes*. Cambridge, 2013.
- Schein, S. 'The Language of Wisdom in Sophocles' *Philoctetes* and Euripides' *Bacchae*', in P. Kyriakou and A. Rengakos (eds.), *Wisdom and Folly in Euripides* (Trends in Classics, Supplementary Volumes, 31), 257-273. Berlin, 2016.
- Schmid, W. *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur. Erster Teil: Die klassische Periode der griechischen Literatur. Zweiter Band: Die Griechische Literatur in der Zeit der attischen Hegemonie vor dem Eingreifen der Sophistik* (Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft, 7, part 1). Munich, 1934.
- Schmid, W. *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur. Erster Teil: Die klassische Periode der griechischen Literatur. Dritter Band: Die Griechische Literatur zur Zeit der attischen Hegemonie nach dem Eingreifen der Sophistik. Erste Hälfte* (Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft, 7, part 1). Munich, 1940.
- Schmidt, M. 'Some Remarks on the Semantics of ἄναξ in Homer', in S. Deger-Jalkotzy and I. S. Lemos (eds.), *Ancient Greece: From the Mycenaean Palaces to the Age of Homer*, 439-447. Edinburgh, 2006.
- Schmidt, S. 'Images of Statues on Attic Vases: The Case of the Tyrannicides', in V. Nørskov, L. Hannestad, C. Isler-Kerényi, and S. Lewis (eds.), *The World of Greek Vases*, 219-237. Rome, 2009.
- Schmiel, R. 'The ΟΛΒΟΣ, ΚΟΠΟΣ, ΥΒΡΙΣ, ATH Sequence', *Traditio* 45 (1990) 343-346.
- Schmitt, A. 'Bemerkungen zu Charakter und Schicksal der tragischen Hauptpersonen in der *Antigone*', *Antike und Abendland* 34 (1988) 1-16.
- Schmitt, A. 'Wesenszüge der griechischen Tragödie. Schicksal, Schuld, Tragik', in H. Flashar (ed.), *Tragödie. Idee und Transformation* (Colloquium Rauricum, 5), 5-49. Stuttgart, 1997.

- Scholtze, J. 'Der Charakter des Agamemnon von Homer bis Euripides' (Diss. Vienna, 1939). Unpublished. [Consulted via Inter-library Loan from Vienna to the Bodleian.]
- Scodel, R. 'Hybris in the Second Stasimon of the *Oedipus Rex*', *Classical Philology* 77 (1982) 214-223.
- Scodel, R. *Sophocles*. Boston, 1984.
- Scullion, S. 'Tragic Dates', *Classical Quarterly* 52 (2002) 81-101.
- Scullion, S. 'Pentheus in *Bacchae*: Puritan or Prurient?', *Omnibus* 48 (2004) 12-13.
- Scullion, S. 'The Opening of Euripides' *Archelaus*', in D. L. Cairns and V. Liapis (eds.), *Dionysalexandros: Essays on Aeschylus and his fellow tragedians in honour of Alexander F. Garvie*, 185-200. Swansea, 2006.
- Scullion, S. 'The "Textile Scene" in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*', *Omnibus* 72 (2016) 10-12.
- Seaford, R. A. S. *Euripides: Bacchae*. Warminster, 1996.
- Seaford, R. A. S. 'Tragic Money', *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 118 (1998) 119-139.
- Seaford, R. A. S. 'Tragic Tyranny', in K. A. Morgan (ed.), *Popular Tyranny: Sovereignty and its Discontents in Ancient Greece*, 95-115. Austin, 2003.
- Seaford, R. A. S. *Cosmology and the Polis: The Social Construction of Space and Time in the Tragedies of Aeschylus*. Cambridge, 2013.
- Segal, C. P. *Tragedy and Civilization: An Interpretation of Sophocles*. Cambridge, MA, 1981.
- Segal, C. P. *Dionysiac Poetics and Euripides' Bacchae*. Princeton, 1982.
- Segal, C. P. *Oedipus Tyrannus: Tragic Heroism and the Limits of Knowledge*. Second edition. Oxford, 2001. [Originally published in 1993.]
- Segal, C. P. 'Introduction', in R. Gibbons and C. P. Segal, *Sophocles: Antigone*, 1-36. Oxford, 2003.
- Seidensticker, B. 'Die Stichomythie', in W. Jens (ed.), *Die Bauformen der griechischen Tragödie*, 183-220. Munich, 1971.
- Seidensticker, B. 'Pentheus', *Poetica* 5 (1972) 35-63.
- Seidensticker, B. 'Comic Elements in Euripides' *Bacchae*', *American Journal of Philology* 99 (1978) 303-320.
- Seidensticker, B. 'Beobachtungen zur sophokleischen Kunst der Charakterzeichnung', in A. Bierl and P. von Möllendorff (eds.), *Orchestra. Drama, Mythos, Bühne*, 276-288. Stuttgart, 1994.
- Seidensticker, B. 'Character and Characterization in Greek Tragedy', in M. Revermann and P. Wilson (eds.), *Performance, Iconography, Reception: Studies in Honour of Oliver Taplin*, 333-346. Oxford, 2008.
- Seidensticker, B. 'Charakter und Charakterisierung bei Aischylos', *Entretiens sur l'Antiquité classique* 55 (2009) 205-256.
- Seidensticker, B. 'The Figure of Teiresias in Euripides' *Bacchae*', in P. Kyriakou and A. Rengakos (eds.), *Wisdom and Folly in Euripides* (Trends in Classics, Supplementary Volumes, 31), 275-283. Berlin, 2016.
- Selle, H. *Theognis und die Theognidea* (Untersuchungen zur antiken Literatur und Geschichte, 95). Berlin, 2008.
- Sewall-Rutter, N. J. *Guilt by Descent: Moral Inheritance and Decision Making in Greek Tragedy*. Oxford, 2007.

- Shear, J. L. 'The Oath of Demophantos and the Politics of Athenian Identity', in A. H. Sommerstein and J. Fletcher (eds.), *Horkos: The Oath in Greek Society*, 148-160. Exeter, 2007.
- Shear, J. L. *Polis and Revolution: Responding to Oligarchy in Classical Athens*. Cambridge, 2011.
- Shear, J. L. 'The Tyrannicides, their Cult and the Panathenaia: A Note', *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 132 (2012) 107-119.
- Sheppard, J. T. 'The Formal Beauty of the *Hercules Furens*', *Classical Quarterly* 10 (1916) 72-79.
- Sheppard, J. T. *The Oedipus Tyrannus of Sophocles*. Cambridge, 1922.
- Sicking, C. M. J. 'Oedipus and Teiresias', in *Distant Companions: Selected Papers* (Mnemosyne Supplements, 185), 29-37. Leiden, 1998. [Originally published in Dutch in 1975.]
- Sideras, A. *Aeschylus Homericus. Untersuchungen zu den Homerismen der aischyleischen Sprache* (Hypomnemata, 31). Göttingen, 1971.
- Siewert, P. 'The Ephebic Oath in Fifth-Century Athens', *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 97 (1977) 102-111.
- Simon, B. *Mind and Madness in Ancient Greece: The Classical Roots of Modern Psychiatry*. Ithaca, 1978.
- Simonton, M. *Classical Greek Oligarchy: A Political History*. Princeton, 2017.
- Sinclair, R. K. *Democracy and Participation in Athens*. Cambridge, 1988.
- Sir, I.-K. 'Lesbos' Other Lyricist: Studies in Alcaeus' (Diss. Oxford, 2020). Unpublished. [This thesis has not been examined; the pagination given may therefore differ from the eventual deposit copy.]
- Snell, B. *Aischylos und das Handeln im Drama* (Philologus Supplementband 20, Heft 1). Leipzig, 1928.
- Snell, B. *Scenes from Greek Drama* (Sather Classical Lectures, 34). Berkeley, 1964.
- Solmsen, F. Review of W. S. Barrett, *Euripides: Hippolytus* (Oxford, 1964), *American Journal of Philology* 88 (1967) 86-93.
- Sommerstein, A. H. *Aeschylus. III: Fragments* (Loeb Classical Library, 505). Cambridge, MA, 2008.
- Sommerstein, A. H. *Aeschylean Tragedy*. Revised edition. London, 2010a. [Originally published in 1996, and some sections on *Eumenides* in 1989.]
- Sommerstein, A. H. 'What Ought the Thebans to Have Done?', in *The Tangled Ways of Zeus, and Other Studies in and around Greek Tragedy*, 277-287. Oxford, 2010b. [Originally published in 2006.]
- Sommerstein, A. H. 'Sophocles and the Guilt of Oedipus', *Cuadernos de Filología Clásica. Estudios griegos e indoeuropeos* 21 (2011) 103-117.
- Sommerstein, A. H. 'Atē in Aeschylus', in D. L. Cairns (ed.), *Tragedy and Archaic Greek Thought*, 1-15. Swansea, 2013.
- Sommerstein, A. H. *Aeschylus: Suppliants*. Cambridge, 2019.
- Sommerstein, A. H., D. G. Fitzpatrick, and T. H. Talboy. *Sophocles: Selected Fragmentary Plays, Volume I*. Oxford, 2006.
- Sourvinou-Inwood, C. '"Myth" and History: On Herodotos 3.48 and 3.50-53', *Opuscula Atheniensia* 17 (1988) 167-182.
- Sourvinou-Inwood, C. 'Assumptions and the Creation of Meaning: Reading Sophocles' *Antigone*', *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 109 (1989) 134-148.

- Stahl, H.-P. 'Learning Through Suffering? Croesus' Conversations in the History of Herodotus', *Yale Classical Studies* 24 (1975) 1-36.
- Stahl, J. M. 'Ueber athenische Amnestiebeschlüsse', *Rheinisches Museum* 46 (1891) 250-86.
- Stanford, W. B. *Ambiguity in Greek Literature*. Oxford, 1939.
- Stanford, W. B. *Aeschylus in his Style: A Study in Language and Personality*. Dublin, 1942.
- Stanford, W. B. *The Ulysses Theme: A Study in the Adaptability of a Traditional Hero*. Second edition. Oxford, 1963. [Originally published in 1954.]
- Starkey, J. 'The Origin and Purpose of the Three-Actor Rule', *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 148 (2018) 269-297.
- Steiner, D. 'The Immeasures of Praise: The Epinician Celebration of Agamemnon's Return', *Hermes* 138 (2010) 22-37.
- Stewart, E. 'Tragedy and Tyranny: Euripides, Archelaus of Macedon and Popular Patronage', in S. Lewis (ed.), *Tyranny: New Contexts*. Besançon. Pre-published online (https://www.academia.edu/25832262/Archelaus_of_Macedon_and_Euripides). 2019.
- Stinton, T. C. W. 'Hamartia in Aristotle and Greek Tragedy', *Classical Quarterly* 25 (1975) 221-254.
- Storey, I. C. *Eupolis: Poet of Attic Comedy*. Oxford, 2003.
- Strasburger, H. 'Thucydides and the Political Self-Portrait of the Athenians', in J. S. Rusten (ed.), *Thucydides*, 191-219. Oxford, 2009. [Originally published in German in 1958.]
- Sutton, D. F. 'Aeschylus' *Edonians*', in *Fons perennis. Saggi critici di filologia classica raccolti in onore del prof. Vittorio D'Agostino*, 387-411. Turin, 1971.
- Swift, L. 'Medea', in L. K. McClure (ed.), *A Companion to Euripides*, 80-91. Chichester, 2017.
- Szlezák, T. A. 'Bemerkungen zur Diskussion um Sophokles, *Antigone* 904-920', *Rheinisches Museum* 124 (1981) 108-142.
- Taylor, M. W. *The Tyrant Slayers: The Heroic Image in Fifth Century B.C. Athenian Art and Politics*. Second edition. Salem, 1991. [Originally published in 1981.]
- Teegarden, D. A. *Death to Tyrants! Ancient Greek Democracy and the Struggle against Tyranny*. Princeton, 2013.
- Thomas, C. G. 'Sophocles, Pericles and Creon', *Classical World* 69 (1975) 120-122.
- Thomas, C. G. 'Between Literacy and Orality: Herodotus' Historiography', *Mediterranean Historical Review* 3 (1988) 54-70.
- Thomas, R. *Oral Tradition and Written Record in Classical Athens*. Cambridge, 1989.
- Thomson, G. D. 'ΖΕΥΣ ΤΥΠΑΝΝΟΣ: A Note on the *Prometheus Vincitus*', *Classical Review* 43 (1929) 3-5.
- Thompson, D. B. 'The Persian Spoils in Athens', in S. S. Weinberg (ed.), *The Aegean and the Near East: Studies Presented to Hetty Goldman on the Occasion of her Seventy-fifth Birthday*, 281-291. Locust Valley, 1956.
- Thumiger, C. *Hidden Paths: Self and Characterization in Greek Tragedy. Euripides' Bacchae* (BICS Supplements, 99). London, 2008.
- Todd, S. C. *The Shape of Athenian Law*. Oxford, 1993.
- Torrance, I. C. *Aeschylus: Seven Against Thebes*. London, 2007.

- Torrance, R. M. 'Sophocles: Some Bearings', *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 69 (1965) 269-327.
- Tourraix, A. 'Les Perses, la géopolitique et l'histoire', *Cahiers du GITA* 7 (1993) 99-117.
- Tracy, S. *Pericles: A Sourcebook and Reader*. Berkeley, 2009.
- Trampedach, K. 'Die Tyrannis als Wunsch- und Schreckbild. Zur Grammatik der Rede über Gewaltherrschaft im Griechenland des 5. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.', in B. Seidensticker and M. Vöhler (eds.), *Gewalt und Ästhetik. Zur Gewalt und ihrer Darstellung in der griechischen Klassik*, 3-27. Berlin, 2006.
- Tuplin, C. J. 'Imperial Tyranny: Some Reflections on a Classical Greek Political Metaphor', in P. Cartledge and D. Harvey (eds.), *Crux: Essays in Greek History Presented to G. E. M. de Ste. Croix on his 75th Birthday*, 348-375. London, 1985.
- Tuplin, C. J. 'Medism and its Causes', *Transeuphratene* 13 (1997) 155-185.
- Ugolini, G. *Untersuchungen zur Figur des Sehers Teiresias* (Classica Monacensia, 12). Tübingen, 1995.
- Ugolini, G. *Sofocle e Atene. Vita politica e attività teatrale nella Grecia classica*. Rome, 2000.
- Ugolini, G. 'Φόβος φυτεύει τύραννον: The Tyrant's Fears on the Attic Tragic Stage', *Comparative Drama* 51 (2017) 456-474.
- Unruh, D. 'Skeptouchoi: A New Look at the Homeric Scepter', *Classical World* 104 (2011) 279-294.
- van Emde Boas, E. *Language and Character in Euripides' Electra*. Oxford, 2017a.
- van Emde Boas, E. 'Analyzing Agamemnon: Conversation Analysis and Particles in Greek Tragic Dialogue', *Classical Philology* 112 (2017b) 411-434.
- van Emde Boas, E. 'Aeschylus' and 'Euripides', in K. De Temmerman and E. van Emde Boas (eds.), *Characterization in Ancient Greek Literature: Studies in Ancient Greek Narrative, Volume Four* (Mnemosyne Supplements, 411), 317-336, 355-374. Leiden, 2018.
- van Erp Taalman Kip, A. M. *Agamemnon in epos en tragedie. De persoonsuitbeelding als component van het epische en dramatische werk* (with a summary in English translated by C. M. van Staalén, in which some text is translated in full, 251-290). Assen, 1971.
- van Erp Taalman Kip, A. M. 'The Unity of the Oresteia', in M. S. Silk (ed.), *Tragedy and the Tragic*, 119-138. Oxford, 1996.
- van Essen-Fishman, L. 'Character through Interaction: Sophocles and the Delineation of the Individual' (Diss. Oxford, 2014). Unpublished.
- van Groningen, B. A. *Basileus. De alleenheerscher op het tragische tooneel der Grieken* (Mededeelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandsche Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde, nieuwe reeks, 4, no. 12). Amsterdam, 1941.
- van Wees, H. *Status Warriors: War, Violence and Society in Homer and History* (Dutch Monographs on Ancient History and Archaeology, 9). Amsterdam, 1992.
- van Wees, H. 'A Brief History of Tears: Gender Differentiation in Archaic Greece', in L. Foxhall and J. Salmon (eds.), *When Men Were Men: Masculinity, Power and Identity in Classical Antiquity* (Leicester—Nottingham Studies in Ancient Society, 8), 10-53. London, 1998.
- van Wees, H. 'Megara's Mafiosi: Timocracy and Violence in Theognis', in R. Brock and S. Hodkinson (eds.), *Alternatives to Athens: Varieties of Political Organization and Community in Ancient Greece*, 52-67. Oxford, 2002.

- Vernant, J.-P. 'The Lame Tyrant: From Oedipus to Periander', in J.-P. Vernant and P. Vidal-Naquet, *Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece* (translated by J. Lloyd), 207-236. New York, 1988. [Originally published in French in 1981.]
- Versnel, H. S. *Inconsistencies in Greek and Roman Religion. I: Ter Unus. Isis, Dionysos and Hermes: Three Studies in Henotheism* (Studies in Greek and Roman Religion, 6). Leiden, 1990.
- Vickers, B. *Towards Greek Tragedy: Drama, Myth, Society*. London, 1973.
- Vickers, M. *Sophocles and Alcibiades*. Stocksfield, 2008.
- Vickers, M. 'A Portmanteau Theseus in Euripides' *Supplikes*', *Phasis* 18 (2015) 335-349.
- Vlastos, G. 'Isonomia', *American Journal of Philology* 74 (1953) 337-366.
- Walker, H. J. *Theseus and Athens*. Oxford, 1995.
- Waters, K. H. *Herodotus on Tyrants and Despots: A Study in Objectivity* (Historia Einzelschriften, 15). Wiesbaden, 1971.
- Webster, T. B. L. *An Introduction to Sophocles*. Oxford, 1936.
- Welwei, K.-W. 'Prytaneis', in *Brill's New Pauly* (http://ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk:2094/10.1163/1574-9347_bnp_e1011970). 2006.
- West, M. L. *Studies in Greek Elegy and Iambus* (Untersuchungen zur antiken Literatur und Geschichte, 14). Berlin, 1974.
- West, M. L. 'The Prometheus Trilogy', *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 99 (1979) 130-148.
- West, M. L. *Studies in Aeschylus* (Beiträge zur Altertumskunde, 1). Stuttgart, 1990.
- West, M. L. *Iambi et elegi graeci ante Alexandrum cantati. Volumen II*. Second edition, 1992. [Originally published in 1972.]
- West, M. L. *The East Face of Helicon: West Asiatic Elements in Greek Poetry*. Oxford, 1997.
- West, M. L. 'Ancestral Curses', in J. Griffin (ed.), *Sophocles Revisited: Essays Presented to Sir Hugh Lloyd-Jones*, 31-45. Oxford, 1999.
- West, M. L. 'King and Demos in Aeschylus', in D. L. Cairns and V. Liapis (eds.), *Dionysalexandros: Essays on Aeschylus and his Fellow Tragedians in Honour of Alexander F. Garvie*, 31-40. Swansea, 2006.
- West, M. L. *The Epic Cycle: A Commentary on the Lost Troy Epics*. Oxford, 2013.
- West, S. R. 'Textile Homage: A Note on Aeschylus, *Agamemnon* 895-974', in *Apodosis: Festschrift W. W. Cruickshank*, 111-118. London, 1992.
- West, S. R. 'Sophocles' *Antigone* and Herodotus Book Three', in J. Griffin (ed.), *Sophocles Revisited: Essays Presented to Sir Hugh Lloyd-Jones*, 109-136. Oxford, 1999.
- Westlake, H. D. 'The Medism of Thessaly', *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 56 (1936) 12-24.
- Whitehorne, J. E. G. 'The Dead as Spectacle in Euripides' *Bacchae* and *Suppliants*', *Hermes* 114 (1986) 59-72.
- Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, T. von. *Die dramatische Technik des Sophokles*. Berlin, 1917.
- Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, U. von. *Aristoteles und Athen*. Two volumes. Berlin, 1893.
- Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, U. von. *Aischylos: Orestie. Zweites Stück: Das Opfer am Grabe*. Berlin, 1896.
- Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, U. von. 'Staat und Gesellschaft der Griechen', in U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff and B. Neise, *Staat und Gesellschaft der Griechen und Römer* (Die Kultur der Gegenwart, Teil II, Abteilung IV.1), 1-207. Berlin, 1910.
- Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, U. von. *Aischylos. Interpretationen*. Berlin, 1914.
- Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, U. von. 'Lesefrüchte', *Hermes* 62 (1927) 276-298.
- Willink, C. W. *Euripides: Orestes*. Oxford, 1986.

- Wilson, J. P. *The Hero and the City: An Interpretation of Sophocles' Oedipus at Colonus*. Ann Arbor, 1997.
- Wilson, J. R. 'KAIROS as "Due Measure"', *Glotta* 58 (1980) 177-204.
- Wilson, P. 'Tragic Honours and Democracy: Neglected Evidence for the Politics of the Athenian Dionysia', *Classical Quarterly* 59 (2009) 8-29.
- Winnington-Ingram, R. P. *Euripides and Dionysus: An Interpretation of the Bacchae*. Cambridge, 1948.
- Winnington-Ingram, R. P. *Sophocles: An Interpretation*. Cambridge, 1980. [Partly originally published in 1971.]
- Winnington-Ingram, R. P. *Studies in Aeschylus*. Cambridge, 1983. [Parts originally published in 1948, 1973, and 1977.]
- Wittgenstein, L. *Philosophical Investigations* (translated by G. E. M. Anscombe). Oxford, 1953.
- Woodhead, A. G. *Thucydides on the Nature of Power* (Martin Classical Lectures, 24). Cambridge, MA, 1970.
- Worman, N. *The Cast of Character: Style in Greek Literature*. Austin, 2002.
- Worman, N. *Abusive Mouths in Classical Athens*. Cambridge, 2008.
- Wright, M. *Euripides' Escape-Tragedies: A Study of Helen, Andromeda, and Iphigenia among the Taurians*. Oxford, 2005.
- Yamagata, N. *Homeric Morality* (Mnemosyne Supplements, 131). Leiden, 1994.
- Yamagata, N. 'ἄναξ and βασιλεύς in Homer', *Classical Quarterly* 48 (1997) 1-14.
- Young, D. C. *Three Odes of Pindar: A Literary Study of Pythian 11, Pythian 3, and Olympian 7* (Mnemosyne Supplements, 9). Leiden, 1968.
- Yunis, H. *Taming Democracy: Models of Political Rhetoric in Classical Athens*. Ithaca, 1996.
- Zeitlin, F. I. 'The Dynamics of Misogyny: Myth and Mythmaking in the *Oresteia*', *Arethusa* 11 (1978) 149-184.
- Zeitlin, F. I. 'Thebes: Theater of Self and Society in Athenian Drama', in J. P. Euben (ed.), *Greek Tragedy and Political Theory*, 101-141. Berkeley, 1986.
- Zelnick-Abramovitz, R. 'Supplication and Request: Application by Foreigners to the Athenian Polis', *Mnemosyne* 51 (1998) 554-573.
- Zillmann, D. 'Basal Morality in Drama Appreciation', in I. Bondebjerg (ed.), *Moving Images, Culture, and the Mind*, 53-63. Luton, 2000.
- Zimmermann, B. 'Aischylos und Homer', *Lexis* 22 (2004) 191-199.
- Zimmermann, C. *Der Antigone-Mythos in der antiken Literatur und Kunst* (Classica Monacensia, 5). Tübingen, 1993.
- Zunshine, L. *Why We Read Fiction: Theory of Mind and the Novel*. Columbus, 2006.
- Zuntz, G. *The Political Plays of Euripides*. Manchester, 1955.
- Zürcher, W. *Die Darstellung des Menschen im Drama des Euripides* (Schweizerische Beiträge zur Altertumswissenschaft, 2). Basle, 1947.