Cognitive Linguistics and the Demonology of Luke's Gospel



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Short Abstract

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This thesis is the first work to apply conceptual metaphor theory (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 1980) and conceptual blending theory (e.g. Fauconnier and Turner 2002) to Luke's conception and portrayal of demons, exorcisms, and Satan, with particular attention paid to Luke's use of the Septuagint. By applying cognitive linguistics to biblical texts, I have been able to illuminate difficult passages and to develop new insights into the text, thus demonstrating the usefulness of cognitive linguistics as a methodology for examining biblical narrative as well as epistolary or discursive texts.

Chapters 1 and 2 respectively outline past scholarship on NT demonology (especially Lukan demonology) and the cognitive linguistic fields of conceptual metaphor theory and conceptual blending theory (particularly their increasing use in biblical studies). Chapter 3 contains a brief contextual overview of demons and Satan in the Greco-Roman world and in the Jewish scriptures, in preparation to discuss conceptual blending in Chapter 4, which focuses on Luke 4:1-13 and 4:33-37. Chapters 5 and 6 explore specific conceptual metaphors in the rest of the gospel (particularly the WARFARE metaphor), and their application to specific questions in Luke's work, while Chapter 7 suggests future possible research.

Luke presents Satan as the leader of an enemy nation, and as such possession, exorcism, demons, evangelism, and other elements can all be conceptually mapped according to the WARFARE metaphor. Thus, applied to the particular fields of demonology and Satanology,

conceptual metaphor theory can also help to deepen our understanding of Luke's Christology, his presentation of the Gentile mission, and his understanding of the Septuagint and of Hellenistic culture. The topic of demonology cannot be ignored, and the field of cognitive linguistics provides a new, exciting lens through which to view it.

Long Abstract

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This thesis is the first work to apply conceptual metaphor theory (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 1980) and conceptual blending theory (e.g. Fauconnier and Turner 2002) to Luke's conception and portrayal of demons, exorcisms, and Satan, with particular attention paid to Luke's use of the Septuagint.

Conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) states that people conceive of the world in terms of metaphor; metaphor is not an instrument limited to literature or oratory, but the fundamental system that underlies our understanding of the world. Human conceptualisation of abstract domains is metaphorical, influenced by our bodily experience, and this conceptualisation is reflected by our everyday literal language, or even in our architecture, material culture, and infrastructure. Lakoff and Johnson argue that this is ubiquitous, and to be found in every natural language system. The second major area of cognitive linguistics which I use in this thesis, conceptual blending theory (CBT), uses the language of "input spaces" – distinct mental "pockets" – which are blended to create a new mental space, the "blend". In particular, the double-scope network of CBT allows for an articulation of blends within input spaces themselves and creates an emergent structure of its own, selecting certain entailments without necessarily carrying over all of a given input space's entailments into the new blended space. *Metaphors We Live By* may have been published in 1980, but it was some years before it was applied to biblical studies; publications on the use of metaphor theory in the New Testament began to appear recently (e.g. Nielsen 2006; Stovell 2012; Wassell and

Llewelyn 2014), and publications on the use of metaphor theory as a sustained methodology in the gospel of Luke only very recently (e.g. Green 2015; Somov 2017; Lanier 2018). In this thesis, I argue that Luke uses conceptual blends and metaphors to characterise demons, impure spirits, and Satan, and that by using cognitive linguistic methodologies we can make new steps in understanding his conception of the world and his theology.

This project is among the first to apply conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) to Luke's gospel, and is the first to use conceptual metaphor theory to specifically examine demonology in it – the conceptual metaphor and blending theories offer both fresh new insights, and add strength or nuance to the ideas already held about the Lukan works. CMT highlights both what we in the 21st century have in common with Luke's conception of the world, and what is unfamiliar to us about the context in which his texts were written. It is an ideal methodology to explore Luke's understanding of demonology: CMT is regularly used to engage with abstract concepts; it encourages a more holistic approach to exegesis, in which lexical elements support theories rather than limit them; and with its focus on every-day, 'literal' language, it is also well-suited to the discussion of cultural elements which were deemed so common there was little need to explain them.

In Chapter 1, I set out where within the scholarship I would situate this thesis, with a summary of the lately realised but slowly increasing use of cognitive linguistics in biblical studies. The majority of cognitive linguistic approaches to the New Testament in particular have been focused on the epistles or on discourse, rather than narrative passages; this tendency means that the potential for cognitive linguistics to illuminate so-called 'literal' speech has been largely unexplored. I then show the progression over the last few decades on the subject of Lukan demonology, from Walter Kirchschläger's use of redaction criticism, to

Susan Garrett's method combining narrative theory and ethnography, to Todd Klutz's use of sociostylistics. Whilst my thesis follows their literary approach in focusing on Luke as author, the cognitive linguistic methods I utilise allow for a more precise articulation of the influences upon Luke, and has the potential to bring out new understandings of his writing.

Given the primary aim of the thesis, to highlight how Luke's demonology can be better understood using cognitive linguistics, I sought to address various questions. What does Luke think a demon to be, in light of the different cultural influences of his milieu? How did he conceptualise possession and exorcism, and what role does he imagine the latter to play in the ministry of Jesus? What does Luke understand the relationship between Jesus and Satan to be? By what conceptual metaphors does Luke structure his cosmological worldview?

My methodology chapter (Chapter 2) contains an overview of conceptual metaphor theory (CMT), and explains some features of the theory identifying specific conceptual metaphors which prove to be particularly illuminating/relevant when applied to Luke's demonology. I then outline some of the criticisms and counter-criticisms of CMT. Next, I introduce conceptual blending theory (CBT), a related branch of cognitive linguistics which can often be applied in conjunction with CMT; this is followed by a brief discussion of the use of CMT and CBT in biblical studies. Finally, I discuss why CMT has been chosen as a suitable methodology for examining Luke's demonology.

Chapter 3 provides an overview of the cultural milieu in which Luke was writing, focusing on the resources he would have used to develop his understanding of demonology, and thus concentrating on the Septuagint given its important place in his work. I pay special attention to certain semantic entailments attached to the concepts of an "unclean spirit" and a

δαιμόνιον, and then detail how the translation of various Hebrew terms using the Greek δαιμόνιον results in a conceptual blend which is in common use by the time of the writing of the New Testament.

In Chapter 4 I focus on two particular passages: the Temptation of Jesus (Luke 4:1-13), in which the devil is introduced, and the Healing in the Capernaum Synagogue (Luke 4:33-37), in which a demon appears for the first time. While examining the Temptation narrative, I introduce two major conceptual metaphors: UP IS GOOD and ARGUMENT IS WARFARE. The first of these is part of the VERTICALITY schema; humans tend to associate the conceptual domain of UP with good things and DOWN with bad: virtue and vice, life and death, status and humiliation. I demonstrate how this is evident in the Temptation narrative. Each temptation involves an invitation to Jesus to go from UP to DOWN: to bend to pick up a stone from the ground, to bow to the devil, or to throw himself from the pinnacle of the Temple. Later in his gospel, only Luke will include the vision of Jesus relayed in 10:18, that Satan falls from Heaven, and only Luke will include the story of Jesus's ascension. The Temptation narrative also introduces the devil in the context of an argument. The famous conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR primes us to understand that the devil is an opponent to Jesus, and that the relationship between the two can be understood in terms of warfare.

In the second half of Chapter 4, I detail how Luke created a conceptual blend in 4:33, blending the term δαιμόνιον with the blended phrase πνεῦμα ἀκάθαρτον which he inherited from Mark 1:23. The various entailments of the latter phrase (and conceptual blend in itself) include immorality, ritual impurity, harm, incorporeality, some form of life, some form of intellect and will, invisibility, the power to affect humans, possession of the capability to exist separate to a body but within a body. I argue that another entailment – vulnerability to

the power of God – is evident when one is familiar with the Greek or Hebrew text of Zechariah 13:2. I also introduce the CONTAINER schema, in which the body is conceived of as a container, which becomes a crucial point regarding possession and exorcism in Chapter 5.

In Chapter 5, I follow the narrative from Luke 4 to Luke 9. Working from the assumption of a 2D origin of Luke's gospel with Markan priority, I examine several exorcisms and summary passages in the light of the 4:33 blend, the CONTAINER metaphor, and the WARFARE metaphor. The conjunction of these conceptual metaphors provides original observations, for example accounting for Luke's removal of self-harm as a symptom of possession. Luke understood possession in terms of the conceptual metaphor THE BODY IS A CONTAINER. A demon *entered* the body of its chosen victim, and exorcism was therefore the expulsion of the demon from this container. In this, Luke was following the model of possession which he received from Mark, and which had spread throughout the Mediterranean, probably as a result of the mind-body dualism which underwrote much of Hellenistic philosophy. This was in contrast to the earlier Ancient Near Eastern model, which conceptualised demonic attack in the form of something wrapping around the victim like clothing, or covering them. Luke's conceptualisation of the body according to the CONTAINER schema means that he is able to use a variety of different metaphors to illustrate the concepts of possession and exorcism, depending on which entailment he wishes to foreground. For example, in the story of the Gerasene Demoniac (Luke 8:26-39), there is an obvious military entailment in the self-identification of the Legion, and so the specific container by which the possessed body is conceptualised is that of a fortress or walled city. It makes little sense for an army to destroy its own defences, and so Luke removes the symptom of self-harm in his redaction.

After analysing the terminology and activity associated with demons, in Chapter 6 of the thesis I look at their place within Luke's broader narrative framework – namely, as an element within a large metaphorical schema. From Luke 10 to the end of the gospel, exorcisms become fewer, and mentions of Satan more frequent. The place of Satan in Luke's gospel has been the topic of much academic discussion, particularly in light of Conzelmann's famous argument that between Satan's temptation of Jesus in the wilderness and his entrance into the heart of Judas is the Period of Jesus, noted for being "free from Satan" (Conzelmann 1960: 28).

I do not agree with this analysis, as most of Jesus's exorcistic activity takes place within this period (the majority of the exorcisms are covered in Chapter 5, with two important exceptions: the old woman crippled by a spirit, and the Beelzebul Controversy; in both of these, Satan plays an important role), and the question of how Luke conceptualises Satan, his role, and his activities remains.

I argue that the primary conceptual metaphor by which Luke understands the relationship between Jesus and Satan is in terms of WARFARE. The link between demons and Satan is described using the conceptual metaphor SATAN IS THE LEADER OF AN ENEMY NATION. In the parable of the strong man (11:21-23) Luke clearly shifts the focus of his metaphors from the domestic to the political. In the ancient world the political and the military were inextricably linked. I have also argued throughout this project that Luke understands Satan as an ENEMY COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, combining the offices of king and general, the political and the military.

This metaphor is pervasive throughout the gospel, and CMT allows an articulation of its importance to the rest of Luke's gospel in a way which has not been possible before; it can be used to illuminate apparently unconnected passages like that of Luke 19:21 or 22:36, which commentators have long found problematic. Yamazaki-Ransom 2010 persuasively argued that Luke associates the Roman Empire with the kingdom of Satan. My thesis, however, has not focused on Luke's conscious political opinions. Rather, the Roman Empire provides the blueprint for understanding Luke's cosmological conceptualisation. Whether consciously or unconsciously, the framework of the Empire provided Luke with the metaphorical framework by which to understand the celestial power struggles of which he wrote; it provided him with a rational, concrete example by which to cognitively organise a wealth of entailments from his many different sources.

Within this metaphorical framework, God takes the role of Emperor; Satan is a vassal king, to whom rule of the οἰκουμένη has been given (Luke 4:6). Herod the Great had been a vassal king in this manner. This would explain his continued role in Heaven as a prosecutor, carried over from the Book of Job, as shown by his activity in the Temptation, and in his demand to sift the disciples like wheat in 22:31. It also explains why Satan is in Heaven for Jesus to see him fall from it (10:18) in an eschatological vision. In general, this more sophisticated model of power demonstrates how Luke was able to hold two apparently conflicting models simultaneously. Satan having the power and will to act against God suggests at least some degree of dualism, but Satan can be a king even in a monotheistic understanding, because in a metaphorical framework which mirrors Luke's lived socio-political experience, God is the Emperor.

The model also offers more specific insights. In Luke 10:17-20, Jesus tells the disciples that they should rejoice not in their power over demons, but because their names are written in Heaven. Commentators have generally linked this statement to the trope of the Book of Life, itself the abstract tied to Ancient Near Eastern censuses. Using the metaphorical framework of the Roman Empire, I instead suggest in Chapter 6 that Luke might also have been thinking of the right to Roman citizenship which was afforded to military veterans. The soldier's name was written on bronze tablets kept at the statue of Minerva behind the Temple of Augustus in Rome; we know that soldiers from Palestine were among those who received this military diploma and consequent citizenship. This is one way in which the application of CMT to the text produces an original contribution to scholarship.

I summarise these findings in Chapter 7, and consider the implications of my research for the wider field of NT studies. Cognitive linguistics opens up areas for discovery which traditional philology has kept hidden, especially when it comes to complicated and unfamiliar abstract concepts like demonology. Metaphor studies have in the past largely been applied to epistolary or discursive passages, and never applied to Luke's demonology. I hope to have shown the fruitfulness of CMT and CBT when analysing narrative, 'literal' language as well.

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CHAPTER 1: Introduction

With a handful of exceptions, the use of cognitive linguistics to analyse New Testament texts has focused overwhelmingly on the Letters, particularly on the Pauline Corpus. These rare examples include Baxter 2012 on Matthew's use of the shepherd motif, Nielsen 2006 on the conceptual blending theory and the metaphor 'The Lamb of God', and Stovell 2012 on kingship in the fourth gospel. Roth and Labahn 2014 contains several essays discussing particular metaphors in the parables of Q (e.g. Tuckett on familial metaphors, Smith on domestic space, Park on children and slaves), and an article by Wassell and Llewelyn focuses on the metaphor "Fishers of Humans" in Mark 1:16-20 and Matthew 4:18-22.

When it comes to the gospel of Luke, the use of cognitive linguistics is even more rare. The first I have been able to discover is Kos-Shaap's 1989 article "'Metaphors We Live By' im Lukasevangelium 10-20"; as its title suggests, this chapter consists mostly of an explanation of the basics of CMT and a list of some conceptual metaphors which the author identifies in Chapters 10 through 20 of Luke's gospel, with little discussion.

More recently, Somov 2017 includes a chapter using CMT in his study of Luke's representation of the afterlife (though does not use CMT throughout), and Lanier 2018 uses CMT to discuss specific Christological metaphors in the gospel of Luke. While Lanier's work is erudite and rigorous, his decision to focus on four specific metaphors (i.e., Luke 1:68-69; 1:78-79; 13:34; 20:17-18) does not do justice to the potential of CMT when applied to the New Testament.

In light of the overwhelming emphasis on applying CMT to epistolary literature or discourse, or solely to parables or epithets, an important element of CMT has been entirely neglected. A fundamental element of CMT is that what we think of as *literal* language is just as metaphorical as literary language. It is just as possible to apply CMT to the narrative parts of the NT, but this possibility has gone largely unexplored. In this thesis, I have therefore shown how cognitive linguistics can illuminate the text of a gospel, *even* when used to analyse a narrative as a whole as opposed to individual phrases.

In order to fulfil the primary aim of this thesis – to demonstrate further possibilities for how CMT can be used in the field of NT studies – I have selected the area of demonology in the gospel of Luke on which to focus. Demonology is an important element of Luke's cosmology, and thus has an enormous impact on his Christology and eschatology.

Thus, I will first give a brief overview of the topic of demonology in the study of the gospel of Luke. I pay particular attention to three scholars who influenced the development of this study: Walter Kirchschläger, who used redaction criticism to illuminate the area;[1] Susan Garrett, who used an interpretative method derived from narrative theory and ethnography;[2] and Todd Klutz, who used sociostylistics.[3] The influence of these three authors allows a clear progression to the cognitive linguistic method which this project utilises.

[1] Kirchschläger 1981.
[2] Garrett 1989; she explains her methodology on pages 4-10.
[3] Klutz 2004.

1.1 – Demonology and the New Testament

In Luke 13:32, Jesus bids some Pharisees, who have come to warn him that Herod wants to kill him, to "tell that fox, 'Behold, I cast out demons and I effect cures today and tomorrow, and on the third day I will be finished.'" That the evangelist portrays Jesus as summarising his work in such a way, with the exorcism of demons coming before the healing of the sick and in stark contrast with the absence of any mention of preaching, can be surprising and even embarrassing to modern audiences. Modern sensibilities mean that engagement with the topic is relatively rare, despite its obvious links with other theological areas like eschatology and Christology. Commentators have pointed out the difficulties in the case of the latter in the face of modern biases: Kallas wrote that if Jesus believed exorcisms were a primary part of his mission, and if we deny the existence or power of demons today, theologians are forced to reduce Jesus to "a rather befuddled do-gooder who spent all his time chasing harmless spectres who existed only in the imagination of the self-styled afflicted."[4] Sabourin brings up another possibility:

> Yet it seems easier to accept the existence of demons, as independent entities, than to explain, if this is denied, that Jesus is represented as having expelled them from the possessed. It is hardly possible, both to safeguard his honesty and to say that he simulated to act according to the common belief, or else to propose that he was invincibly immersed as man in the mistaken persuasions of his age and country.[5]

The ontological approach to NT demonology is largely concerned with the question of whether demons or Satan exist, and the theological consequences of that existence or non-existence. An element of this is what Fitzmyer terms "protological thinking" – that is, the "form of thinking which cannot ascribe physical or psychic disorders to proper secondary

[4] Kallas 1961: 87.
[5] Sabourin 1974: 175.

causes that makes ancient writers attribute them to beings of an intermediate spirit-world."[6] This attitude leads commentators to discuss what "real" illness is being discussed in the NT texts; for example, Fitzmyer himself says regarding Luke 9:39 that "to any modern reader who scrutinizes the details of the Marcan description of the boy's condition, it is clear that he is epileptic … Lacking the ability to diagnose the 'seizure,' the cause was attributed to the moon or a demon/spirit…"[7] I will discuss this approach in more detail in §5.10.2.

That is not to say that all scholars who discuss this approach use it to dismiss the importance of demons or exorcism; indeed, for some, demonology influences all other areas of biblical studies. The primary proponent of this "pan-demonological" interpretation is Böcher,[8] for whom demonic aetiology was a defining worldview in the ancient world, including of course for the biblical authors.

Yamauchi acknowledges the erudition of Böcher's work, but criticizes the extent to which he takes the theory: "Böcher goes to extreme lengths to interpret everything in the Bible as either an instance of demonic influence or conversely as a prophylactic against demons … Böcher's assertion is too broad a generalization, based on a very limited and one-sided reading of the evidence."[9] He later concludes that the pan-demonological interpretation is "patently false."[10] Yamauchi's article is persuasive in its analysis, and it is perhaps the case that its influence has led to Böcher's works being cited only rarely in modern demonological works, sometimes with caveats and citations of Yamauchi alongside them.[11]

[6] Fitzmyer 1981: 545.
[7] Fitzmyer 1981: 808.
[8] Böcher 1970; 1972a; 1972b.
[9] Yamauchi 1986: 93, 99.
[10] Yamauchi 1986: 142.
[11] E.g. Boyd 1997: 314 n. 1-2.

The second major approach to the study of demonology is the historical: specifically, the exorcistic activity of the historical Jesus. This approach has been dominated by the work of Graham Twelftree. Contra Grayston (1975: 90-94) and Best (1977: 1-9), Twelftree has shown, several times, and each time with persuasive rigour, that not only was exorcism an important element in the ministry of the historical Jesus, but that Jesus himself probably ascribed eschatological importance to his exorcistic activity.[12] In a later work (2007) Twelftree widens his examination to consider the place of exorcism in the early Church. As Klutz observes, "By improving our understanding of this facet of Jesus' activities, Twelftree has increased our chances of making meaningful observations about the continuities and discontinuities between exorcism in the historical Jesus' context and the narrative representation of exorcism in the NT gospels and Acts."[13] Twelftree's discussion of the historical Jesus as an exorcist was later joined by a 2010 dissertation and 2012 monograph by Amanda Witmer, who focused on social, political and anthropological interpretation where Twelftree had used canonical and extra-canonical Jewish sources. Related to the historical approach is a focus on the Jewish context of Jesus' exorcisms and other miracles, as in the work of Eric Eve, who examines the miracles in the gospels in a framework of second-Temple Jewish literature.[14] This is also the case in Sorensen 2002, though he includes more detail on the broader ancient Near Eastern context.

It is a common characteristic of the historical approach to demonology that more emphasis is placed on the mechanics and comparative analysis of exorcism in the time of Jesus than on demonological belief; many works purporting to be analyses of "demonology" are more commonly primarily or entirely concerned with exorcism[15] or Satanology. These topics are

[12] Twelftree 1985; 1986; 1993; 1999.
[13] Klutz 2004: 11.
[14] Eve 2002, esp. Ch. 13.
[15] Eitrem 1950.

obviously related to demonology – the former for obvious reasons, and the latter grows in importance *particularly* in the New Testament, and so eclipses the stricter understanding of demonology in Christianity. "In place of a world of demons competing with each other, Jesus regarded all demons as belonging to the kingdom of Satan – a radically new conception."[16]

The demons are not the primary enemy of the exorcist (in comparison with the presentations of Eleazar by Josephus (*Antiquities* 8.42) and of Apollonius of Tyanna by Philostratus (*Vita Apollonii* 3.38; 4.10, 20, 25; 6.27, 43), but minions of a greater threat. Instead of the demoniac taxonomies and bestiaries of the Ancient Near East, the names, appearances, and habits of particular demons are considered unimportant. Any interest in the activities of demons for its own sake is downplayed; demonic activity is only important in what it says about Jesus and his mission.[17] "The exorcisms are no longer to be seen as isolated victories over a series of autonomous demons, but part of Jesus's Messianic assault on the powers of evil."[18]

The third major approach focuses not on the practices of the historical Jesus, but on the presentation of Jesus, Satan, and demons by the New Testament writers. This literary approach is less concerned with the question of whether demons exist and the theological issues which arise from their existence or non-existence (the ontological approach) or the thoughts and practices of the historical Jesus (the historical approach). Instead, it is concerned with the choices and theological priorities of New Testament authors as authors – in the case of this thesis, with Luke as author and on his presentation of demons in his gospel. Belonging within this approach are the works of Walter Kirchschläger, Susan Garrett, and Todd Klutz,

[16] Yamauchi 1986: 142; see also Kallas 1961: 67; Yates 1977: 52; Kee 1990: 127-30.
[17] Although occasional hints remain, such as Jesus' reference to "this kind" of demon in Mark 9:29.
[18] Yates 1977: 52.

all of whom have influenced the development of this study and the selection of its methodology.

1.1.1 – Walter Kirchschläger

In terms of this literary approach, the first major study of Luke's demonology was Walter Kirchschläger's 1981 work *Jesu Exorzistisches Wirken aus der Sicht des Lukas: ein Beitrag zur lukanischen Redaktion*; there have been works before and since which have touched upon the subject, but usually in a very cursory way. Kirchschläger's work, on the other hand, is a comprehensive redaction-critical examination of the exorcism passages in Luke-Acts. Klutz, whom I discuss below, went so far as to say that it "covers every unit that contributes to exorcism as a theme,"[19] but I would disagree; as I will discuss in detail in Chapter 5, the pericope of the centurion's servant in 7:1-10 can contribute to our understanding of ἐξουσία and hence the nature of the struggle between Jesus and Satan. After all, as Kirchschläger himself writes, "Ἐξουσία ist entscheidendes Charakteristikum des Tuns Jesu."[20]

While Kirchschläger's treatment is significant and early, in the years since the 1981 publication of Kirchschläger's analysis, general scholarly opinion on Luke's cultural context has changed dramatically. For Kirchschläger, as for many commentators and New Testament scholars at the time,[21] Luke was most likely an educated Gentile writing between 70 and 80 CE for an audience of Gentile Christians.[22] Over the 1980s and 90s, more and more publications put forward the view that Luke and his audience were more likely to have been

[19] Klutz 2004: 3.
[20] Kirchschläger 1981: 266.
[21] See e.g. Rengstorf 1962: 11; Kümmel 1975:149-150.
[22] Kirchschläger 1981: 9 fn. 4.

Jewish Christians, proselytes, or "God-fearing" Gentiles who learnt at Jewish synagogues before identifying themselves as Christians.[23]

Furthermore, I would disagree with Kirchschläger's conclusion – with some caveats – that while one cannot go so far as to state that there is a "grundsätzliche Ablehnung exorzistischen Handelns" in Luke's texts, his redactions of the Markan traditions "zeigt sich jedoch auch das Desinteresse der Verfassers an der Materie."[24] I would disagree insofar as that Luke perhaps does not see the exorcism stories as important or interesting *in and of themselves,* but as I will argue in this thesis Luke's presentation of them includes hints as to the shape of Luke's conceptual cosmology, which in turn illuminates what Kirchschläger admits is Luke's overwhelming priority: "Lukas konzentriert seine Darstellung auf die Person Jesu."[25]

1.1.2 – Susan Garrett

The next major work to cover demonology and Satanology in the gospel of Luke is Susan Garrett's 1989 *The Demise of the Devil*. While Kirchschläger's focus was on the redaction of the exorcism stories, Garrett's priority is a discussion of magic and magicians within Luke-Acts. As one reviewer points out, she "refuses to construct a universal definition of the magician by which Jesus can either be named a magician, as Morton Smith does, or cleared of such charges, as Howard Clark Kee does. Rather she insists that 'magic' is a culture-specific deviance label with very differing meanings in distinct periods and religious groups."[26]

[23] For a relatively recent overview of the debate, see Strelan 2013: 102-10.
[24] Kirchschläger 1981: 268.
[25] Kirchschläger 1981: 266.
[26] Wire 1990: 311; see Garrett 1989: 22-36 for a discussion of Smith, Kee, and Neyrey.

With this understanding in mind, Garrett adapts the methodology of ethnography for a narrative text in order to interpret Luke's double-volume work. She concludes, like the other commentators discussed above, that "the dark regions are the realm of Satan, the ruler of this world, who for eons has sat entrenched and well-guarded, his many possessions gathered like trophies around him. The sick and possessed are held captive by his demons; the Gentiles, too, are subject to his dominion, giving him honor and glory that ought to be offered to God."[27] The Jewish people are likewise in bondage, but the coming of Jesus will bring release.

This release is not without opposition; Satan is unlikely to give up without a fight. He attempts to dissuade Jesus from his course at the Temptation, and opposes him throughout the ministry, regaining some measure of authority at the passion. The balance of power appears to tip in Satan's favour at the crucifixion, but then Jesus is exalted, and Satan falls from heaven. "Henceforth (as during Jesus' ministry prior to the passion) all the faithful who call upon the name of the Lord will have authority over the Enemy's power."[28] Much of Garrett's monograph focuses on Acts, in which she posits that Satan's revenge is to tempt people to magic: "In acts of magic Satan and his demons perversely replicate the Word-confirming signs and wonders that Christian preachers (like the prophets of God before them) perform, thereby enabling Satan's false prophets to impersonate God's true ones."[29] In Acts, the exorcism of demons is replaced for the most part (with the exception of the prophetic slave-girl in 16:16-18) with defeats of magicians and the conversion of their adherents. The

[27] Garrett 1989: 101.
[28] Garrett 1989: 101.
[29] Garrett 1989: 102.

territory of Satan is even more explicitly sociological than spiritual. In defeating the devil, Jesus' followers have a share in his authority, as Luke shows throughout Acts.

> The message is interwoven with an overarching and surprisingly apocalyptic myth about Satan's struggle and fall. Luke may have assumed that his readers shared knowledge of the basic plot of this story. At the very least, conceptual parallels furnished by contemporaneous Jewish and Christian documents indicate that the elements of the myth were conventional in the era when Luke and Acts were composed.[30]

In addition to a far more modern and nuanced understanding of magic within its cultural context, Garrett's work includes some excellent Lukan exegesis. She focuses much of her attention on Luke 4:1-13; 11:14-23; 10:17-20; Acts 8:4-25; 13:4-12; and 19:8-20, but makes reference to other passages; for example, unlike Kirchschläger, she makes a note of Luke 7:1-10[31] and its implications in understanding more about Luke's demonology. However, her engagement with the cultural background to this demonology is far sparser. It is in this area that Todd Klutz's work fills in some of the negative space which Kirchschläger and Garrett between them have left in this field.

1.1.3 – Todd Klutz

At the beginning of his 2004 monograph, Klutz makes the important point that there has been a scholarly tendency to focus on the exorcism stories in Luke "chiefly as units of Synoptic tradition rather than as integral parts of the two volume narrative Luke-Acts."[32] To address this deficit, he focuses on asserted co-texts and intertextual references of his chosen passages, rather than their assumed sources. For example, in his discussion of Luke 4:33-37, he claims

[30] Garrett 1989: 102.
[31] Garrett 1989: 39.
[32] Klutz 2004: 3.

that the demon's question in 4:34 should be understood as a deliberate allusion to the question of the widow of Zarephath to Elijah.[33] This focus on co-text and context, in contrast with Kirchschläger's use of redaction criticism, is Klutz's most important contribution to the discussion around Luke's exorcism stories. He identifies other areas of study which can be used to shine a light on difficult elements in four specific passages (Luke 4:33-37; 8:26-39; 9:37-43a; Acts 16:16-18), and uses sociostylistic methodologies[34] to address each pericope's co-textual, intertextual, and contextual relationships.

These contextual relationships form the other significant contribution of Klutz's monograph. Both Garrett and Kirchschläger make reference to various Jewish texts which might have influenced Luke,[35] or at least contributed to his cultural milieu, but Klutz draws on a much wider range of fields in order to contextualise Luke's cultural background. Klutz explores the ancient comparative material one might expect in more detail than either Garrett or Kirchschläger, but he then goes further by bringing to light subjects like shamanism.[36]

One area in which Klutz also strongly disagrees with Kirschläger regards the question of why there is so little material on exorcism from the time period. Kirschläger writes:

> Es neben der 'offiziellen' religiösen Strömung auch eine breite Tradition des Volksglaubens gab, der bisweilen bis in das Grenzgebiet des Aberglaubens reichte. Freilich fehlen hier die Textbelege, weil diese Überlieferungen mündlich weitergegeben und nicht aufgezeichnet wurden.[37]

[33] Klutz 2004: 56.
[34] Analysing elements like cohesion, narrative structure, repetition, iconicity, thematic organisation, transitivity, presupposition, verbal aspect, implicature, and choice of vocabulary.
[35] Kirchschläger 1981: 45-54. Kirchschläger attempts to cover all of the topic's cultural context within one ten-page exegesis. Garrett makes references to other text as required, usually in her endnotes.
[36] See especially Klutz 2004: 194-199, also Craffert 2008.
[37] Kirschläger 1981: 53-4.

Klutz accepts the general premise of this statement, writing that "the paucity of literary evidence outside the New Testament regarding exorcism prior to the second century CE almost certainly says less about how familiar exorcistic practices were to the masses of the Mediterranean world in the immediately preceding centuries than about the elitism of the surviving literature from this period".[38] However, he also makes the valid criticism that Kirchschläger's use of Aberglaubens, *superstition*, exemplifies "a widespread and regrettable scholarly habit which, although it is now being increasingly undermined by new approaches to studying the religions of others, has proved its tenacity and persists to the present time."[39]

This habit is evident in the use of categories like *magic* or *superstition*, based on abstract classification and often failing to note the pejorative tone with which these classifications are used in ancient literature, and the "ideological baggage" they thus carry with them. [40] The use of "deviance-labelling rhetoric" (γόης, μάγος, δεισιδαιμονία, etc.) was a social weapon, not an anthropological denotation[41] – a point that Susan Garrett makes in her 1989 work. This criticism also corresponds with that of Pilch 2002, which warns the New Testament scholar of the dangers of "medicocentrism".

Within these three major works on demonology in the gospel of Luke, there has been a clear progression in methodology from a more traditional redaction-critical exegesis to more engagement with modern linguistic theory. As such, Luke's presentation of demons and Satan is an excellent subject by which to demonstrate what fruit further NT utilisation of cognitive linguistics might bear.

[38] Klutz 2004: 6.
[39] Klutz 2004: 6.
[40] Klutz 2004: 6, with reference to Poupon 1981; Segal 1981; Lyons and Reiner 1998: 16-32; Janowitz 2001: 1-8, 16-20.
[41] Klutz 2004: 7.

1.2 – Thesis Statement

This study aims, first and foremost, to demonstrate what an impact continued engagement with cognitive linguistics can have on New Testament studies. In-roads have been made, but they have been limited, especially with regards to the gospels. I will show how this methodology can illuminate Luke's demonology and provide original insights and its particular use in discussing abstract elements of an ancient writer's cultural milieu which are more likely to be obscure to modern scholars. What precisely did Luke imagine a demon to be? What did he understand to be the role of Satan? How did he understand Jesus's relationship with Satan? How did Luke conceptualise possession? Were possession and demonically induced illness the same thing? What was the role of exorcism in Jesus's ministry and the mission of his disciples?

Specifically, the thesis will first articulate, using a branch of cognitive linguistics generally known as conceptual blending theory (CBT), what Luke understood a demon to *be*, drawing particularly on the Septuagint as an influence. From that point, I will use another major cognitive linguistic branch, conceptual metaphor theory (CMT), to describe how three major conceptual metaphors underlie much of Luke's conceptualisation of possession and exorcism, and their place in Jesus' mission. These are the VERTICALITY schema (UP IS GOOD, DOWN IS BAD),[42] the CONTAINER schema (THE BODY IS A CONTAINER), and a complex military metaphor (THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JESUS AND SATAN IS WARFARE) with various entailments.

[42] This work, as in almost all works on metaphor theory, follows the convention set in Lakoff and Johnson 1980, by representing target and source domains in SMALL CAPS. Conceptual metaphors are indicated by the conventional formula TARGET IS SOURCE as far as possible.

1.3 – Thesis Overview

The methodology used in this thesis is described and discussed in Chapter 2, which contains overviews of conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) and conceptual blending theory (CBT). These two theoretical models form a large part of the interdisciplinary field known as cognitive linguistics, which is concerned primarily with the relationship between language and thought. CMT argues that metaphor is not an instrument limited to literature or oratory, but *the* fundamental system that underlies our understanding of the world,[43] while CBT is concerned with how different ideas can be combined into new understandings.

Human conceptualisation of abstract domains is metaphorical, influenced greatly by our bodily experience, and this conceptualisation is reflected in our everyday literal language, or even in our architecture, material culture, and infrastructure. Lakoff and Johnson argue that this is ubiquitous, and to be found in every natural language system; the theory has already been successfully applied to Classical Greek literature as well as English.[44] I will give a general outline of CMT and some of the criticisms levelled against it; I will then describe CBT and demonstrate how it can be used to delineate complex relationships between ideas. There follows a brief comparison of CMT and CBT, and finally a description of how cognitive linguistics can create new insights into the biblical texts, and why CMT and CBT have been chosen as a suitable methodology for examining Luke's demonology.

Chapter 3 provides an overview of the cultural milieu in which Luke was writing, focusing on the resources he would have used to develop his understanding of demonology, and thus

[43] Thus giving the seminal 1980 work by Lakoff and Johnson its title: *Metaphors We Live By.*
[44] E.g. Griffith 1995; Giannakis 1998-9.

concentrating on the Septuagint given its important place in his work. I pay special attention to certain semantic entailments attached to the concepts of an "unclean spirit" and a δαιμόνιον, and then detail how the translation of various Hebrew terms using the Greek δαιμόνιον results in a conceptual blend which is in common use by the time of the writing of the New Testament. Further, I briefly summarise what we might deduce about beliefs in unclean spirits, demons, and a figure of 'the devil' during the Second Temple period of Judaism.

In Chapter 4 I turn to a detailed study of demons in Luke, progressing through the gospel chronologically. I begin by focusing on two particular passages: the Temptation of Jesus (Luke 4:1-13), in which the devil is introduced, and the Healing in the Capernaum Synagogue (Luke 4:33-37), in which a demon appears for the first time. The first half of my chapter focuses on the development of the development of two key CMT categories, the WARFARE metaphor and the VERTICALITY schema. The second half introduces the CONTAINER schema; I also use conceptual blending theory to discuss the phrase "the spirit of an unclean demon" in 4:33. The observation that Luke uses several different terms by which to refer to the demonic is uncontroversial, as is the fact that we can see that this range of different terms in general relates to a kind of interrelated set of concepts pertaining to malevolent spirits. These terms may belong to the same semantic field, but have significant morphological differences. In Luke 4:33, the evangelist explicitly creates a conceptual blend, one which has connotative significance for the rest of the narrative, especially his treatment of pneumatology and demonological references. I examine this blend and analyse its use throughout the rest of the gospel.

In Chapter 5, I work from Chapter 4 of Luke's gospel to the end of Chapter 9, following the order in which Luke arranged his material. Working from the assumption of a 2D origin of Luke's gospel with Markan priority, I examine several exorcisms and summary passages in the light of the 4:33 blend, the CONTAINER metaphor, and the WARFARE metaphor. The conjunction of these conceptual metaphors provides original observations to explain features of the Lukan narrative: for example, Luke's removal of self-harm as a symptom of possession.[45]

In Chapter 6, after analysing the terminology and activities associated with demons in chapters 4 and 5, I look at their place within Luke's broader narrative framework – namely, as an element within a large metaphorical schema. An important element in both conceptual metaphor theory and thus in this project is the distinction between *consistency* of metaphor and *coherence* of metaphor. Lakoff and Johnson argue that many of the metaphors that we use every day are unconsciously generated according to an underlying conceptual structure, from which further metaphors then arise. When this concept is applied to exegesis, one can begin to offer observations on the degree to which lexical choices are conceptually metaphorically coherent.

From Luke 10 to the end of the gospel, exorcisms become fewer, and mentions of Satan more frequent. The place of Satan in Luke's gospel has been the topic of much academic discussion, particularly in light of Conzelmann's famous argument that between Satan's

[45] See §5.8.4. In Luke's treatment of the Gerasene Demoniac (Luke 8:26-39), he removes Mark's symptom that the possessed man cuts himself with stones (Mark 5:5). I argue that this is due to Luke's conceptualisation of the body as a building, specifically a fortress or a walled city, which a demon has taken over, and a cognitive dissonance is introduced by the symptom of self-harm – what army would harm its own defences?

Temptation of Jesus in the wilderness and his entrance into the heart of Judas is the Period of Jesus, noted for being "free from Satan".[46]

Contrary to Conzelmann, my analysis highlights that most of Jesus' exorcistic activity takes place within this period (the majority of the exorcisms are covered in Chapter 5 of my thesis, with two important exceptions: the old woman crippled by a spirit (Luke 13:10-16) and the Beelzebul Controversy (Luke 11:14-26); in both of these, Satan plays an important role), and the question of how Luke conceptualises Satan, his role, and his activities remains. Many scholars have given the same persuasive answer to this question, that Jesus's exorcisms and healings are portrayed as a release of captives from the grip of Satan.[47] In contrast, I argue that analysing this motif as a conceptual metaphor – called, for example, SATAN IS THE LEADER OF AN ENEMY NATION – allows us to see how cohesive and how pervasive this analogy is, to articulate its importance to the rest of Luke's gospel in a way which has not been evident before, and to use it to illuminate apparently unconnected passages like that of Luke 19:21 or 22:36, which commentators have long found problematic.

CMT is concerned with metaphorical frameworks as well as etymology. An important distinction in CMT, and thus in this project, is the distinction between consistency of metaphor and coherence of metaphor. Lakoff and Johnson argue that many of the metaphors that we use every day are unconsciously generated according to an underlying conceptual structure, from which further metaphors then arise. They give the example of LOVE IS A JOURNEY; a relationship may be "on the rocks" (sea voyage), "off the tracks" (train journey) or have been "a long, bumpy road" (car journey), but all these metaphors refer to journeys,

[46] Conzelmann 1969: 28.
[47] Dillersberger 1958: 190; Caird 1963: 88-9; Marshall 1970: 137; Danker 1972: 62-63; Yates 1977: 41, 52; Kenik 1980: 239; Rice, 1982: 24-28; Yamauchi 1986: 142; Boyd 1997; see further below.

and so the metaphor is coherent.[48] When this concept is applied to exegesis, one can begin to offer observations on the degree to which lexical choices are conceptually metaphorically coherent.

In the case of this particular project, I examine the extent to which Luke's use of the metaphors THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JESUS AND SATAN IS WARFARE and SATAN IS THE LEADER OF AN ENEMY NATION throughout his gospel is coherent, and the relationship between these warfare metaphors and metaphors used in understanding possession. For example, conceptualising victims of possession as captured *fortresses* rather than *captives* leads to the uncovering of relationship between Luke 7:1-10, the healing of the centurion's boy, and the Beelzebul controversy, and thus casts the latter in a fresh new light.

I will summarise these findings in Chapter 7, and briefly consider the implications of this research in the wider field of NT studies, and how CMT might be further used in biblical studies in the future. Expanding the research done in this thesis to analyse the Acts of the Apostles is the next obvious step; due to the constraints of the word limit, this thesis has focused only on the gospel.

Furthermore, for example, as embodiment is such an important element of CMT, feminist and queer theology have crucial perspectives to be considered. Such elements of study were unfortunately beyond the scope of this thesis, but in §5.7 I discuss the conceptualisation of Mary Magdalene's body as a fortress or a city – a conceptual metaphor found throughout Greek and biblical literature, and to which I was only able to give a small degree of attention. Cognitive linguistics opens up areas for discovery which traditional philology has kept

[48] Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 44-5.

hidden, especially when it comes to complicated and unfamiliar abstract concepts like demonology.

These are all avenues of research which are suggested by the conjunction of cognitive linguistics and Lukan demonology, but this is a methodology which can be applied to any area of biblical studies. Lanier 2018 and Somov 2017 addressed Christology and eschatology respectively, and I have focused on demonology, unsatisfied by the habits of some exegetes to dismiss the topic as irrational and unworthy of the effort of understanding. But with more and more biblical scholars becoming aware of cognitive linguistics, the number of possible combinations and possible new paths to explore is dazzling.

CHAPTER 2: Methodology

2.1 – Introduction

This project is among the first to apply conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) to Luke's gospel, and is the first to use conceptual metaphor theory to specifically examine its demonology. The conceptual metaphor and blending theories offer both new insights and add strength or nuance to the ideas already held about the Lukan works. CMT has the potential to highlight both those ways in which the thinking of contemporary readers mirrors the evangelist's, and also what is unfamiliar to us about the context in which his texts were written. It is an ideal methodology to explore Luke's understanding of demonology: CMT is regularly used to engage with abstract concepts; it encourages a more holistic approach to exegesis, in which lexical elements support theories rather than limit them; and with its focus on every-day, 'literal' language, it is also well-suited to the discussion of cultural elements which were deemed so common there was little need to explain them.

After a brief discussion of some of the fundamental elements of CMT, I will discuss the related branch of theory known as conceptual blending theory, with some attention to the criticisms and weaknesses of the systems, and how cognitive linguists have adapted them. I will briefly describe some of the ways in which CMT in particular has begun to be applied in biblical studies, particularly in OT work, though in the last decade NT scholars have also begun to publish works which use a cognitive linguistic methodology.[1] I use both CMT and CBT in this thesis and will describe how and why I have selected which elements of both

[1] E.g. Stovell 2012; Somov 2017; Lanier 2018.

systems to examine Luke's conceptualisation of demons; the chapter also includes the criteria for identifying conceptual metaphors, especially novel ones.

First, I will briefly discuss the two major approaches to metaphor theory in the 20th century, showing how interaction theory gave rise to conceptual metaphor theory. I follow Ricoeur in calling these two theories the "substitution theory" and the "interaction theory",[2] but other scholars use other terms; Soskice (1987: 31), for example, uses "substitution" and "incremental".[3]

From the 4th century BCE,[4] metaphor has been overwhelmingly understood as a rhetorical or poetic device; in order to add rhetorical weight to a phrase, one word in it is *substituted* by another. When the Psalmist says, "The Lord is my shepherd," he means "the Lord is my carer" or "the Lord is my protector." Either considered a subset of the *substitution theory* or a development of it is the *comparison theory*, which takes a given metaphor to be an implied analogy or comparison. In this, it is a condensed and more direct version of a simile, in which *as* or *like* is used: The Kingdom of Heaven is *like* a grain of mustard seed. When Romeo says "Juliet is the sun", Juliet is clearly *not* the sun, but the meaning that Juliet is *like* the sun is implicit. An example which more clearly shows the *substitution* of "substitution theory" is the sentence "our marriage hit a pothole"; instead of the word "difficulty" or "problem", "pothole" has been used to improve the style of the sentence. As Lanier points out, the interpretation of the metaphor is quite simply that of removing the metaphorical word, and

[2] See e.g. Ricoeur 1981: 100.
[3] Soskice 1987: 31.
[4] E.g. Plato (*Sym*. 2212-222a); Isocrates (*Evag*. IX.9); Aristotle (*Poet*. XXI.7, 15-17; XXII.1-4; *Rhet*. III.2.5, 8-9, 12-13; III.3.4; III.4.1-2); see also Cicero (*De Orat.* III.38.152-155; III.39.157; III.41.166-III.42.169); Quintilian (*Inst. Orat.* VIII.6.1-19), all cited in Lanier 2016: 18 n.81.

replacing it with the literal term,[5] or as Ricoeur puts it, "substitution plus restitution equals zero."[6]

In the 20th century, however, metaphor theory underwent a revival in the form of the *interaction theory,* which understands metaphor not as mere ornamentation, but a creator of new meaning via the interaction of two underlying ideas. Building on the work of I. A. Richards,[7] Max Black outlined the interaction theory of metaphor as follows:

> (1) A metaphorical statement has two distinct subjects, to be identified as the "primary" subject and the "secondary" one…
> (2) The secondary subject is to be regarded as a system rather than an individual thing…
> (3) The metaphorical utterance works by "projecting upon" the primary subject a set of "associated implications," comprised in the implicative complex, that are predicable of the secondary subject.
> (4) The maker of a metaphorical statement selects, emphasises, suppresses and organises features of the primary subject by applying to it statements isomorphic with the members of the secondary subject's implicative complex…
> (5) In the context of a particular metaphorical statement, the two subjects "interact" in the following ways: (i) the presence of the primary subject incites the hearer to select some of the secondary subject's properties; and (ii) invites him to construct a parallel "implicative complex" that can fit the primary subject; and (iii) reciprocally induces parallel changes in the secondary subject…[8]

Interaction theory does not conceptualise metaphor as a single word to be deployed in substitution or comparison, but as "any syntactically complete utterance, ranging from short phrases to entire paragraphs."[9] Furthermore, a metaphor is made up of two distinct parts: the

[5] Lanier 2016: 18.
[6] Ricoeur 1976: 49, cited in Lanier 2016: 18.
[7] Richards 1936.
[8] Black 1979: 441-2; an expansion and clarification of the theory he set out in Black 1962: 44-45.
[9] Lanier 2016: 19; n. 90 notes that "An 'utterance' is an internally coherent linguistic expression, written or spoken (Ziem 2008:143). There remains debate regarding the syntactical scope of a metaphorical utterance (see Kittay 1989: 155; Ricoeur 1981: 49; Soskice 1987: 21)."

tenor and the vehicle, the primary and secondary, the actual and hypothetical, the focus and frame. In this we can see the articulation of what in CMT are called the *Source* and *Target domains,* discussed below.

Lakoff and Johnson's 1980 work *Metaphors We Live By* is largely cited as the beginning of conceptual metaphor theory, but Lakoff instead cites Reddy's 1979 paper "*The Conduit Metaphor:* A Case of Frame Conflict in Our Language About Language."[10] In this paper, Lakoff writes, Reddy identifies thought as the locus of metaphor, rather than language, and by discussing just one metaphor, "gave us a tiny glimpse of an enormous system of conceptual metaphor."[11] It is to that system I now turn.

2.2 – Conceptual Metaphor Theory

The seminal work of conceptual or cognitive metaphor theory is *Metaphors We Live By,* published in 1980 by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson. In a persuasive *tour de force*, they articulated the foundations of what would become the field of cognitive linguistics; thus, I rely on their work extensively throughout this thesis to define and discuss CMT. In *Metaphors We Live By*, Lakoff and Johnson argue that metaphor is not merely "a device of the poetic imagination and the rhetorical flourish,"[12] but the system by which we understand our existence. "Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature."[13]

[10] Lakoff 1993: 203-4.
[11] Lakoff 1993: 204. The metaphor in question, known as the CONDUIT metaphor, discusses how humans conceptualise communication: IDEAS (OR MEANINGS) ARE OBJECTS; LINGUISTIC EXPRESSIONS ARE CONTAINERS; COMMUNICATION IS SENDING. (e.g., It's hard to get that idea *across* to him; I *gave* you that idea; It's difficult to *put* my thoughts *into* words; Try to *pack* more thought *into* fewer words; Your words seem *hollow*.) See Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 10-12.
[12] Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 3.
[13] Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 3.

The quintessential essence of metaphor is "understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another,"[14] and the use of the word 'metaphor' up to this point has been used to describe what is only the linguistic expression of this system. "Since communication is based on the same conceptual system that we use in thinking and acting, language is an important source of evidence for what that system is like."[15]

This distinction is noticeable in a conceptual metaphor like STATUS IS UP; LACK OF STATUS IS DOWN.[16] We can see this in our use of language (e.g., She'll *rise* to the *top;* he's *climbing* the ladder; he's at the *bottom* of the social hierarchy),[17] but we can also see evidence of the concept in the placing of thrones on a dais, or the *High* Table of an Oxbridge college. This is the fundamental difference between the interaction theory of metaphor described above and the cognitive theory of metaphor. Cognitive linguists like Lakoff, Johnson and Turner do not argue that most language is metaphorical, but that it is our underlying cognitive processes that are metaphorical. Interaction theory focused on syntactic utterances in and of themselves, while cognitive linguistics views these as the linguistic evidence of more fundamental metaphorical conceptualisations.

Kövecses describes 11 key components of the cognitive linguistic (as he calls it, or conceptual) model of metaphor:

1. Source domain;
2. Target domain;
3. Experiential basis;

[14] Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 5
[15] Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 3.
[16] Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 16. Lakoff and Johnson actually call this metaphor HIGH STATUS IS UP; LOW STATUS IS DOWN; the presumably unconscious use of the conceptual metaphor in question lends weight to their argument that many everyday phrases which we think of as literal are in fact metaphorical.
[17] Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 16.

4. Neural structures corresponding to (1) and (2) in the brain;
5. Relationships between the source and the target;
6. Metaphorical linguistic expressions;
7. Mappings;
8. Entailments;
9. Blends;
10. Non-linguistic realizations;
11. Cultural models.[18]

In CMT, a 'domain' is a word given to everything that makes up our conceptualisation of a given idea: physical feelings, past experiences, cultural conventions, assumptions, encounters, semantic knowledge – "a slice of human experience."[19]

The *target* domain (2) is whatever the speaker wishes to describe, and the *source* domain (1) the area from which they draw material to describe or understand it. In general, the target is more abstract, and the source more concrete. For example, if someone says that they have warm feelings for someone, they are indicating that they feel affection for that person. The conceptual metaphor is thus AFFECTION IS WARMTH;[20] AFFECTION is the *target domain*, and WARMTH the *source domain*.

Thus, metaphorical linguistic expressions (6), and metaphor in general, is "the way we conceptualise one mental domain in terms of another,"[21] or "cross-domain mapping."[22]

[18] Kövecses 2005: 5. As Stovell 2012: 41 notes, Kövecses' summary (2005: 5-8) is excellent and concise. For more detail on the twenty years of scholarship following the publication of Lakoff and Johnson 1980, see Kövecses 2002.
[19] Lanier 2016: 21.
[20] The scholarly convention for expressing conceptual metaphors is to combine SMALL CAPS with the formula "TARGET IS SOURCE".
[21] Lakoff 2006: 185.
[22] Lakoff 2006: 186.

This "mapping" (7) is one manifestation of the relationship between the source and the target (5). To illustrate this, I will use the metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR. It is often used as the metaphor by which CMT is first explained; it is the first metaphor discussed in the first chapter of *Metaphors We Live By.* It is also a metaphor which will be of great importance throughout this thesis.

Lakoff and Johnson write that sentences like "Your claims are *indefensible*" and "He *attacked every weak point* in my argument" reveal that we conceptualise an argument as being like a war. In the case of the conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR, "argument" is the *target domain*, and "war" is the *source domain*.

> It is important to see that we don't just talk about arguments in terms of war. We can actually win or lose arguments. We see the person we are arguing with as an opponent. We attack his positions and we defend our own. We gain and lose ground. We plan and use strategies. If we find a position indefensible, we can abandon it and take a new line of attack. Many of the things we do in arguing are partially structured by the concept of war. Though there is no physical battle, there is a verbal battle, and the structure of an argument—attack, defense, counterattack, etc.—reflects this. It is in this sense that the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor is one that we live by in this culture; it structures the actions we perform in arguing.[23]

Here, Lakoff and Johnson outline how the experience of an argument corresponds with the imagined or remembered experience of physical violence or warfare. "The sense of being embattled comes from experiencing yourself as being in a warlike situation even though it is not actual combat – since you are maintaining the amenities of conversation." [24]

[23] Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 4.
[24] Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 79.

> You have an opinion that matters to you. (*having a position*)
>
> The other participant does not agree with your opinion. (*has a different position*)
>
> It matters to one or both of you that the other give up his opinion (*surrender*) and accept yours (*victory*). (*he is your adversary*)
>
> The difference of opinion becomes a conflict of opinions. (*conflict*)
>
> You think of how you can best convince him of your view (*plan strategy*) and consider what evidence you can bring to bear on the issue (*marshal forces*).
>
> Considering what you perceive as the weaknesses of his position, you ask questions and raise objections designed to force him ultimately to give up his position and adopt yours. (*attack*)
>
> You try to change the premises of the conversation so that you will be in a stronger position. (*maneuvering*)
>
> In response to his questions and objections, you try to maintain your own position. (*defense*)
>
> As the argument progresses, maintaining your general view may require some revision. (*retreat*)
>
> You may raise new questions and objections. (*counterattack*)
>
> Either you get tired and decide to quit arguing (*truce*), or neither of you can convince the other (*stalemate*), or one of you gives in. (*surrender*)[25]

This conceptual metaphor is not only made manifest in linguistic expressions (6), but in non-linguistic realisations (10): for example, the British House of Commons is not only designed as two sides of benches for opposing parties, mimicking lines of infantry on a battlefield, but the distance between the government's benches and the opposition's benches is traditionally

[25] Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 79-80.

held to be that of two sword lengths.[26] The conceptual metaphor can be broken down into participants, parts, and stages in a process called 'mapping' (7).[27]

The elements which are mapped above are known in CMT as *entailments* (8).[28] An entailment is a characteristic or a necessary conclusion which can be drawn logically from the source domain. For example, if we take the metaphor TIME IS MONEY (we *save* time, *spend* time, *waste* time, *give* time, *take* time, *budget* time, *invest* time), one major entailment is that TIME IS A LIMITED RESOURCE – one which is foregrounded whenever someone laments that they *do not have enough time*. That this is always a *lament* is because TIME IS A LIMITED RESOURCE itself entails that TIME IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY.[29] Value is a fundamental entailment of limit. The rarer something is, the more precious it becomes. In the language of metaphor theory, "these subcategorization relationships characterize entailment relationships ... metaphorical entailments can characterize a coherent system of metaphorical concepts and a corresponding coherent system of metaphorical expressions for those concepts."[30]

The metaphor STATUS IS UP; LACK OF STATUS IS DOWN discussed above belongs to a class of metaphor which Lakoff and Johnson call *orientational* metaphors. This kind of metaphor does not "structure one concept in terms of another but instead organizes a whole system of concepts with respect to one another."[31] Lakoff and Johnson call them *orientational* "since most of them have to do with spatial orientation: up-down, in-out, front-back, on-off, deep-shallow, central-peripheral. These spatial orientations arise from the fact that we have bodies

[26] House of Commons Information Office, "Some Traditions and Customs of the House: House of Commons Information Office Factsheet G7", August 2010 FS No.G7 Ed 3.4, accessed at https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-information-office/g07.pdf.
[27] For example, see §4.2.2 for the mapping of the metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR.
[28] Itself a metaphor drawn from inheritance law.
[29] Lakoff- Johnson 1980: 9.
[30] Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 9.
[31] Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 14.

of the sort we have and that they function as they do in our physical environment."[32] The metaphor STATUS IS UP is one of many metaphors in which positive things are associated with an upward position, and negative things with a downward one. Lakoff and Johnson give several examples, with suggestions of how each concept might have arisen from our physical experience of the world:

> HAPPY IS UP; SAD IS DOWN
>
> My spirits *rose*. You're in *high* spirits. I'm feeling *down*. I'm *depressed*. He's *really low* these days. I *fell* into a *depression*.
>
> Physical basis: Drooping posture typically goes along with sadness and depression, erect posture with a positive emotional state.
>
> HEALTH AND LIFE ARE UP; SICKNESS AND DEATH ARE DOWN
>
> He's at the *peak* of health. Lazarus *rose* from the dead. He *fell* ill. He's *sinking* fast. He *dropped* dead.
>
> Physical basis: Serious illness forces us to lie down physically. When you're dead, you are physically down.
>
> HAVING CONTROL OR FORCE IS UP; BEING SUBJECT TO CONTROL OR FORCE IS DOWN
>
> I have control *over* her. I am *on top* of the situation. He's at the *height* of his power. He's in the *high* command. He's in the *upper* echelon. His power *rose*. He is *under* my control. He *fell* from power.
>
> Physical basis: Physical size typically correlates with physical strength, and the victor in a fight is typically on top. [33]

Kövecses uses the example AFFECTION IS WARMTH to illustrate this development of metaphor;[34] if we like someone, we say that we have *warm* feelings for them, while someone who is aloof and unfriendly might be described as *cold*. This is because our brains formed a correlation in childhood: the embrace of a parent, and the bodily warmth that accompanies it.

[32] Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 14.
[33] Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 15. In each example, some illustrative phrases have been excised for length.
[34] See also Kövecses 1986: 101.

"Thinking of affection in terms of warmth arise from our embodied experience." This example illustrates two of the fundamental principles of the 'standard' Lakoff-Johnson CMT: universality/ubiquity and embodiment (Kövecses refers to above as "(3) experiential basis").

> To learn such 'primary' metaphors is not a choice for us: It happens unconsciously and automatically. Because this is a universal bodily experience, the metaphor corresponding to it may as well be universal. In other words, universal primary experiences produce universal primary metaphors.[35]

This principle of ubiquity is important in CMT; Lakoff and Johnson argue that while the specific conceptual metaphors in use differ from culture to culture and language to language, the metaphorical system itself is to be found in every natural language system; for example, the theory has already been successfully applied to Classical Greek literature as well as English.[36]

However, the variations of conceptual metaphors from culture to culture (11) is an equally rich field of study. In his 2005 work, Kövecses seeks out an answer to the question "How can we construct a comprehensive theory that can account for both the universality and the variation in our use of metaphor?" He suggests that while *primary* metaphors are universal, different cultures assemble them in different ways to develop *complex* metaphors. "Cultures greatly influence what complex conceptual metaphors emerge from the primary metaphors."[37]

[35] Kövecses 2005: 3.
[36] e.g., Giannakis 1998-1999; Griffith, 1995: 1-5.
[37] Kövecses 2005: 4. This forms the primary foundation of Kövecses' account, but he also suggests a number of caveats and nuances: "Universal experiences do not necessarily lead to universal metaphors; bodily experience may be selectively used in the creation of metaphors; bodily experience may be overridden by both culture and cognitive processes; primary metaphors are not necessarily universal; complex metaphors may be potentially or partially universal; metaphors are not necessarily based on bodily experience – many are based on cultural considerations and cognitive processes of different kinds." On the role of contextual factors influencing

Having said this, the relationship between culture and metaphorical conceptualisation is a complex one, and the emphasis of the role of universal embodiment in CMT has led to precise cultural studies being relatively neglected. Kövecses addresses the question in his 2005 work, in which he argues that human beings unconsciously expend effort to ensure as far as possible that metaphorical contextualisations are coherent under the twin pressures of universal embodiment and cultural context. The balance between these two pressures is a delicate one, and inevitably either embodiment or cultural context will win out over the other.[38] Social context, geography, the intended purpose of the metaphor, personal history – the variety of factors is vast, and thus has fundamentally remained "outside the interest and, indeed, competence" of traditional CMT.[39]

However, this criticism is a reminder that CMT is a relatively young theory, and one which offers enormous scope for interdisciplinary work. My thesis takes a largely historical-critical understanding of the gospel of Luke, with all the focus on compositional and cultural context which historical-criticism entails, and marries it with CMT to create something new.

metaphorical conceptualisations, see Kövecses 2015, especially Chapters 4, 8, and 10. Research has in the past prioritised cultural history as a cognitive influence (e.g., Kövecses 2005; Schmidt, Goran & Mario Brdar 2012; Kuczok 2017), but a recent study has focused on social factors instead, and particularly highlights the influence of education and reading habits on metaphor selection (Benczes & Ságvári 2018). See also Deignan 2008.

[38] Kövecses 2008: 179.

[39] Kövecses 2008: 181. On the role of contextual factors influencing metaphorical conceptualisations, see Kövecses, 2015, especially Chapters 4, 8, and 10. Research has in the past prioritised cultural history as a cognitive influence (e.g., Kövecses 2005.; Schmidt and Brdar 2012; Kuczok 2017), but a recent study, Benczes and Ságvári 2018, has focused on social factors instead, and particularly highlights the influence of education and reading habits on metaphor selection. See also Deignan 2008, 289-92.

2.3 – Criticisms of Conceptual Metaphor Theory

Zoltán Kövecses has argued that Lakoff and Johnson 1980, *Metaphors We Live By*, is a victim of its own success; it is a work of such importance in cognitive linguistics that it is apparently conceived of as the end of CMT as well as its beginning.[40] Many criticisms of CMT are really criticisms of this first articulation of it, ignoring later developments and more nuanced manifestations. Nonetheless, there are a number of criticisms which continue to be relevant.

The first major criticisms of CMT are methodological. One of the reasons Lakoff and Johnson's *Metaphors We Live By* is so seminal is that the authors set out their theory in such a way as to "awaken readers intuitively to the pervasiveness of metaphor via a rich array of examples."[41] However, this reliance on intuitive understanding can also be a weakness. The Pragglejaz Group argued that the identification of metaphors on the basis of intuition was systematically unsound. "Variability in intuitions, and lack of precision about what counts as a metaphor, makes it quite difficult to compare different empirical analyses."[42] Furthermore, the intuitive analysis of any one scholar – or, indeed, various different scholars – might not accurately reflect the unconscious behaviour of ordinary speakers.[43]

Thus, the two main charges of the methodological criticism are that "CMT researchers take for granted which expressions are metaphorical" and that "the approach does not pay attention to which actual expressions are used for the target domain by real speakers in

[40] Kövecses 2008; see this and Gibbs 2009 for overviews of criticism and evaluations of their pertinence and plausibility. The works critical of some or many aspects of CMT most often cited by cognitive linguists are McGlone 1996, Murphy 1996, Rakova 2002, Haser 2005, McGlone 2007, and Pragglejaz Group 2007
[41] Lam 2016: 11.
[42] Pragglejaz 2007: 1-2. The Pragglejaz group henceforth created the MIP, the Metaphor Identification Procedure.
[43] Gibbs 2006.

natural discourse"[44] (that is, any given expression *can* be used as CMT researchers state, but it might be very uncommon in normal use), and as such, the Pragglejaz Group has argued for the use of real corpora to identify conceptual metaphors, and puts forward a suggested methodology to do this.

This criticism concerns the general validity of CMT, rather than its use in biblical studies; as this thesis will focus on the gospel of Luke, there is already a clearly delineated corpus at hand. Kövecses distinguishes three levels at which metaphor can be studied: the supraindividual, the individual, and the subindividual levels.[45]

The supraindividual level:	A level based on conventionalised metaphors in a given language. This is the level of most CMT linguistic analysis. Collections of conventionalised metaphorical expressions are grouped and categorised according to the ABSTRACT TARGET DOMAIN IS CONCRETE SOURCE DOMAIN formula.[46]
The individual level:	This level is concerned with the existence of conceptual metaphors in the heads of individual speakers; images created by subjects when requested to form mental images of phrases like "hit the ceiling" were highly uniform and consistent with the conceptual metaphor ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER. However, correlation between supraindividual and individual levels is not perfect or complete; not all metaphors available at the supraindividual level are used, and new metaphors are created on the individual level.[47]
The subindividual level:	The level "at which the conceptualization of a conceptual domain (the target) by means of another conceptual domain (the source) is made natural and motivated for speakers."[48] Comparison of the two domains is often motivated by sensorimotor experiences shared by all humans; this level "corresponds to the universal aspects of metaphor."[49]

[44] Kövecses 2010: 305 ff.
[45] Kövecses 2008: 169.
[46] Eg. ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER, from expressions like "make one's blood boil" and "seethe with anger" in Lakoff and Kövecses 1987.
[47] Kövecses 2010: 308; see also Gibbs 1990.
[48] Kövecses 2010: 300.
[49] Kövecses 2010: 300.

The criticisms of the Pragglejaz Group concern the individual level (wherein "specific speakers use specific metaphorical linguistic expressions in specific communicative situations in relation to particular target concepts"), and thus do not invalidate the supraindividual level (the goal of which is to "propose conceptual metaphors on the basis of linguistic expressions that researchers intuitively take to be metaphorical") at which theorists like Kövecses work. He ends by saying that the goals of the individual and supraindividual levels are complementary,

> in that the metaphors suggested on an intuitive basis may prove to be useful in organizing the systematically identified linguistic metaphors into "larger" conceptual metaphors used at the individual level and, also, because the systematically identified linguistic metaphors in real discourse may lead to the discovery of so far unidentified conceptual metaphors.[50]

There are other methodological criticisms. Some scholars suggest that these methodological ambiguities make it difficult or impossible to falsify CMT, which would render the theory unscientific according to the epistemology of Karl Popper.[51] Haser 2005 criticises CMT on the grounds of circularity, saying that "the conclusion of this argument[52] is launched by an observation which merely repeats the premise. Lakoff/Johnson presuppose what they should be arguing for."[53]Another major criticism is directed at the linguistic evidence used in CMT, which is, according to critics,[54] undermined by the inclusion of 'dead metaphors'; that is, metaphors that "originally had a tensive quality and surplus of meaning, but [lost] both by becoming part of common vernacular."[55]Gibbs responds with the argument that labelling

[50] Kövecses 2008: 169-170.
[51] Murphy 1996; Vervaeke and Kennedy 1996; cited in Gibbs 2009: 534.
[52] Referring to Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 5.
[53] Haser 2005: 146; see Kertesz and Rakosi 2009 for analysis of this claim, cited in Gibbs 2009: 534.
[54] Glucksberg, 2001; Jackendoff, 1983; Keysar, Shen, Glucksberg, & Horton, 2000; McGlone, 2007; Pinker, 2007; all cited Gibbs 2009: 534.
[55] Lanier 2016: 25.

something as being literal or polysemic does not explain the systematicity in conventional expressions, or "why individual linguistic expressions appear to reflect the detailed correspondences that arise from the metaphorical mapping of source onto target domains in talking about abstract concepts." There may be other reasons for this apparent systematicity. But CMT offers a reasonable explanation for it, and subsequent linguistic analyses offer detailed explanations with regard to certain words and expressions. The onus is on critics of CMT to "provide alternative hypotheses that explain the cognitive linguistic data, and not simply dismiss this evidence by simply labeling conventional expressions as 'dead' metaphors."[56] In fact, some major proponents of CMT argue that these 'dead metaphors' provide some of the *best* evidence in support of CMT.

> Expressions like *wasting time, attacking positions, going our separate ways*, etc., are reflections of systematic concepts that structure our actions and thoughts. They are 'alive' in the most fundamental sense: they are metaphors we live by. The fact that they are conventionally fixed within the lexicon of English makes them no less alive.[57]

The next principle to be criticised is traditional CMT's 'top-down' analysis; that is, the practice of postulating conceptual metaphors based on a small number of decontextualized examples, and then examining the entailments and mappings of these metaphors. However, in a 'bottom-up' analysis, the number of expressions studied is much higher, and based on a systematic protocol of identification, such as that formulated by the Pragglejaz Group (see above). While the 'top-down' approach focuses more on the conceptual metaphors themselves, the 'bottom-up' approach pays more attention to linguistic expression and contextual issues.[58]

[56] Gibbs 2007: 534. For more on 'dead' metaphors in the realm of NT demonology, see brief discussion of Revelation in Chapter 4.
[57] Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 55.
[58] Kövecses 2008: 170.

The two major objections raised against the 'top-down' approach are the assumed goal to identify every metaphor relating to any given target domain,[59] and the principle of 'the dominance of irregularity'. In any given corpus, we are more likely to find that an individual metaphor, while arising as the result of a regular cognitive process (i.e. conceptual metaphors), will be predominantly irregular. "That is to say, the main objection is that the top-down approach that emphasizes regularities (like conceptual metaphors) cannot account for the unique and irregular semantic behavior of many metaphorical expressions."[60] Critics of CMT thus write that the focus on universal cognitive structures like conceptual metaphors overshadows or neglects the irregularity of many metaphors.

Kövecses bows to the criticism with the admission that realistically, linguists are unlikely to be able to uncover a global conceptual metaphor behind every single metaphor and idiom in every language, and thus the criticism is valid.[61] On the other hand, many of the examples used by critics (e.g., ARGUMENT IS FIRE and ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER in Dobrovolskij and Piirainen 2005) are only discussed in terms of the first step of analysis, without due consideration of underlying frameworks and mappings which constitute the next stages of CMT analysis (e.g., both conceptual metaphors just mentioned are mappings of the metaphor INTENSITY IS HEAT).[62]

Going in the opposite direction are critics who discuss the *schematicity* of conceptual metaphors; that is, the level of their formulation. Taking the famous example

[59] The identification of conceptual metaphors is certainly welcome, but the goal of cognitive linguistics is understanding rather than cataloguing; "quantitative metaphor analysis must be supplemented by intuitive qualitative analysis." Kövecses 2008: 174.
[60] Kövecses 2008: 170. See also Dobrovolskij and Piirainen 2005: 355-6.
[61] Kövecses 2008: 171.
[62] Kövecses 2008: 172.

THEORIES/ARGUMENTS ARE BUILDINGS,[63] Lakoff and Johnson address the "unused" elements of a metaphor. One can say "The theory has a solid foundation," but the sentence "His theory had thousands of little rooms and long, winding corridors" falls outside normal, 'literal' use and is instead an example of imaginative or figurative use.[64] However, this prompts Clausner and Croft, for example, to argue that the conceptual metaphor should be articulated in a less schematic manner, as THE CONVINCINGNESS OF THEORIES/ARGUMENTS IS THE PHYSICAL INTEGRITY OF THE BUILDING.[65]

> In other words, without establishing the appropriate level of schematicity, it is not possible to answer the question of which elements of the source domain are mapped onto the target, and which ones are not. If the source and target domains are too schematic, then elements of the source *could* be mapped that are not mapped in reality, and if conceptual metaphors are not sufficiently schematic, then elements that are mapped in reality *could* not be mapped onto the target.[66]

Kövecses answers the criticism by adding two additional conceptual tools to the traditional Lakoff-Johnson discussion of CMT. The first is 'the scope of the source', which "means that each metaphorical source domain applies to a certain group, or set, of target domains."[67] The second is the 'main meaning of focus', in which "each source domain is used to conceptualize one or a small number of aspects of the target domain".[68] In the case of the metaphor THEORIES/ARGUMENTS ARE BUILDINGS, the meaning focus[69] of *structure* allows Kövecses to formulate a submetaphor, A COMPLEX ABSTRACT SYSTEM IS A COMPLEX PHYSICAL OBJECT, to illustrate metaphorical mappings at a subordinate level.[70] For a more

[63] Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 46.
[64] Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 53.
[65] Clausner and Croft 1997: 260.
[66] Kövecses 2008: 175.
[67] Kövecses 2008: 175.
[68] Kövecses 2008: 175.
[69] Or entailment, as I call it throughout this thesis, in keeping with Lakoff and Johnson's original terminology.
[70] Kövecses 2008: 176.

detailed discussion of the issue of schematicity and a proposed supplement to CMT, see Kövecses 2017.

One of the primary elements of CMT is the idea of *embodiment*, the understanding that "human concepts are not just reflections of an external reality, but that they are shaped by our bodies and brains, especially by our sensorimotor system."[71] However, the theory of embodiment simultaneously attempts to explain both universal conceptual metaphors and specific cultural metaphors. "Rakova emphasizes that a theory that builds on image schemas and, in general, on the universality of essential physical experiences cannot in the same breath be a theory of cultural variation — especially not if embodiment is conceived naturalistically."[72] That is, the claim that there are significant differences in conceptual metaphors of different cultures (see e.g., Núñez and Sweetser 2006 on spatial relations in Aymara) is incompatible with the theory of image schemas as set out by Lakoff and Johnson.

However, as Kövecses points out, to argue for the universality of embodiment does not automatically predicate an argument for universal metaphors arising from embodiment. Embodiment is not a "homogeneous, monolithic factor," but a collection of many components which can be singled out and emphasised by various different cultural milieus; an idea which Kövecses terms "differential experiential focus."[73]

Another focus of criticism is the principle of unidirectionality, which is a major distinction between the interaction theory of metaphor[74] and the conceptual theory of metaphor. The principle of unidirectionality states that conceptual metaphors map structure from the source

[71] Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 22.
[72] Kövecses 2008: 177, referring to Rakova 2002.
[73] Kövecses 2008: 177-8.
[74] See Black 1979.

domain to the target domain, but not vice versa. "For example, while we conceptualise LOVE in terms of JOURNEYS, we cannot conventionally structure JOURNEYS in terms of LOVE: travellers are not conventionally described as 'lovers', or car crashes in terms of 'heartbreak', and so on."[75] Typically, a more abstract target domain is mapped onto a more concrete source domain (e.g., ARGUMENT IS WAR, LOVE IS A JOURNEY, AFFECTION IS WARMTH; STATUS IS UP). For example, in a recent example of this theory as applied to the study of the Synoptic gospels, Wassell and Llewelyn explain the terminology of Contemporary Theory of Metaphor (CTM)[76] with this example: we, and the biblical authors, can talk about sin – an abstract concept – in various terms, including those of dirt, a dangerous animal, or a weight:

> In the jargon, SIN is the target domain and DIRT, DANGEROUS ANIMAL, or WEIGHT are the source domains.[77] Invariably the lesser known (more abstract) is explained in terms of the better known (more tangible). We structure SIN in terms of dirt when we wish to speak of its removal, in terms of a DANGEROUS ANIMAL or even SNARE when we seek to understand human vulnerability, or a WEIGHT when we seek to understand the consequences of sin for the sinner. In other words, different source domains are used to structure the target domain depending on what aspect of the target domain is being considered.[78]

The source domain of WEIGHT is a particularly rich one, in terms of the constituent elements of the domain, and the degree to which they can be mapped onto the target domain, a process known as "structuring". If one speaks about the weight of sin, the sinner corresponds to the person bearing a load, and the sin to the object that they carry. The degree of weight of the object upon the person corresponds to the weight of sin upon the sinner. SIN IS A WEIGHT, an

[75] Evans and Green 2007: 296-7.
[76] Wasell and Llewelyn follow Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez and Pérez Hernández 2011 in preferring to use the name "Contemporary Theory of Metaphor" as opposed to "Conceptual Metaphor Theory".
[77] Wassell and Llewelyn 2014: 629.
[78] Wassell and Llewelyn 2014: 629

excellent example of an embodiment metaphor,[79] relies on our visceral understanding of what weight is and feels like, and thus "can lead to metaphorical entailments, that is, the mapping of nonconstituent elements of the source domain onto the target domain."[80] 1 Peter 2:24 demonstrates this conceptual metaphor, just as Genesis 4:7 demonstrates the metaphor SIN IS A DANGEROUS ANIMAL and, as will become very important below in the discussion of impurity in Chapter 4, in Psalm 51:2, SIN IS DIRT.

Lakoff and Turner argued that even apparent exceptions to this rule still demonstrate unidirectionality.[81] For example, the conceptual metaphors PEOPLE ARE MACHINES (*He's had a nervous breakdown*; *He's so efficient, he's just a machine!*) and MACHINES ARE PEOPLE (*I think my computer hates me, it keeps deleting my data*; *I don't think my car wants to start this morning*; *The phone is dead*)[82] are two different conceptual metaphors which share domains, but disagree as to which is the source and which is the target.

> But these are two different metaphors, because the mappings go in opposite directions, and *different things get mapped*. In MACHINES ARE PEOPLE, the will and desire of a person are attributed to machines, but in the PEOPLE ARE MACHINES metaphor, there is no mention of will and desire. What is mapped instead is the fact that machines have parts that function in certain ways…[83]

The principle of unidirectionality has recently begun to be questioned by scholars.[84] In the integrative model proposed by Zhang and Li (2012) the target domain can influence directionality: the more abstract the target domain, the more *likely* the metaphor is

[79] See Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 14-32; Lakoff and Johnson 1999.
[80] Wassell and Llewelyn 2014: 629.
[81] Lakoff and Turner 1989: 5.
[82] Lakoff and Turner 1989: 58; Evans and Green 2007: 297.
[83] Lakoff and Turner 1989: 132; authors' original emphasis.
[84] Zhong and Leonardelli 2008; Zhang and Wang 2008; Landau, Meier, and Keefer 2010; Lee and Schwarz 2012; Zhang and Li 2012; Danesi 2017; Cian 2017; Porat and Shen 2017; Shen and Porat 2017.

unidirectional. As Cian writes, this interpretation is debatable.[85] The question of directionality is likely to go on for some time. For the purposes of this thesis, it is enough to say that *in general*, conceptual metaphors are used to describe a more abstract target domain in terms of a more concrete source domain.

The third school of thought on the subject of directionality is that arguing that the target domain maps onto the source domain, or that the source domain maps onto the target domain, is the wrong approach to take entirely. Instead, it speaks of the target domain and the source domain *blending together*.[86] I will discuss this in the section below, which gives a brief overview of conceptual blending theory (CBT).


The criticisms of CMT have been numerous. Some, such as criticisms of a methodological nature, have allowed more precise scientific methods of identification and analysis to be developed. Some have been levelled against the philosophical underpinnings of the theory. As Kövecses said in his 2008 article, many criticisms have arisen from the assumption that Lakoff and Johnson's *Metaphors We Live By* is the great CMT canon, rather than a seminal book which introduced the theory in its current form. Notwithstanding the above criticisms, CMT remains a valid methodology to use in this thesis. My aim is to apply CMT to Luke's gospel with the hope of discovering some new, interesting questions or answers, and in this regard CMT has worked extremely well, enabling a number of original observations. None of the criticisms levelled at CMT have been enough to fundamentally undermine it, and as a field cognitive linguistics continues to flourish.

[85] Cian 2017: 451.
[86] Croft and Cruse 2004.

2.4 – Conceptual Blending Theory

Conceptual blending theory (CBT) is often conceptualised as a part of metaphor theory; its developers, Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner, would instead argue that metaphor theory is a particular case of their blending theory. While 'traditional' CMT speaks in terms of source and target domains (see Figure 1), CBT speaks of "input spaces" – distinct mental "pockets" – which are blended to create a new mental space, the "blend".

Figure 1: The Basic Diagram – Conceptual Metaphor Theory



The most basic of these blend networks is the *simplex* network. Turner defines this as "a conceptual integration network in which one input space has a familiar abstract frame … that is designed to embrace certain kinds of values, and the other input space is a relatively specific situation presenting just such values."[87] For example, the simple statement "John is the father of James" is actually a blend of two different input spaces. One is the general idea

[87] Turner 2007: 2.

of a parental relationship – what Turner calls "the parent-ego frame of kin relation" – and the other input space contains the conception of two people, James and John. The connection between the two input spaces creates a new blended space: the understanding that John is a father, and that he is the father of James.[88]

The next blend network is known as the *mirror* network. In this network, "two input spaces share topology given by an organizing frame, and the blend inherits that organizing frame."[89] Fauconnier gives the example of a boat race to demonstrate this process. A catamaran sails from San Francisco to Boston in 1993, attempting to beat the time set by a clipper on the same route in 1853, a voyage which is reported in a sailing magazine:

> As we went to press, Rich Wilson and Bill Biewenga were barely maintaining a 4.5 day lead over the ghost of the clipper Northern Light, whose record run from San Francisco to Boston they're trying to beat. In 1853, the clipper made the passage in 76 days, 8 hours.[90]

Two separate voyages, nearly 150 years apart, are two input spaces: "1853" and "1993". The two are understood in terms of a single organising frame (a boat making a voyage), and thus a new blend is created: a race. The blended space is an extension of the initial organising frame; both input spaces and the blended space all share the same organising frame. This is what distinguishes the *mirror* network from the *double-scope* network, explained below.

[88] Turner 2007: 2-3; see also Fauconnier and Turner 1998: 148.
[89] Turner 2007: 3.
[90] "Great America II", *Latitude 38*, vol. 190, April 1993, 100.


2.4.1 – The Single-Scope Network

The next major classification is the *single-scope* network, which has "two input spaces with different organizing frames, one of which is projected to organize the blend. Its defining property is that the organizing frame of the blend is an extension of the organizing frame of one of the inputs but not the other."[91] Fauconnier and Turner give the example of imagining two CEOs as two boxers: "one CEO landed a blow but the other one recovered … one of them knocked the other out cold." There is cross-space mapping, for example, between each boxer and each CEO, and from a punch to a business venture. The projection is highly asymmetric: the idea of *boxing* supplies the organising frame, and therefore governs the rest of the discussion, the "frame-topology."[92]

This kind of single-scope network is equivalent to a conventional source-target metaphor. To use the example of the conceptual metaphor discussed in 2.2 above – ARGUMENT IS WAR – *war* is the organising frame, and *argument* the input space onto which it is projected. "The input that provides the organizing frame to the blend, the framing input, is often called the 'source.' The input that is the focus of understanding, the focus input, is often called the 'target.'"[93]

[91] Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 126.
[92] Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 127.
[93] Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 127.

Figure 2: A single-scope network: corporate competition is pictured as a boxing match with Murdoch knocking out Iacocca.[94]



From Figure 2, it can be seen how the use of a single-scope network and its diagram corresponds to the articulation of a conceptual metaphor (in this case, BUSINESS IS BOXING). An advantage of using the single-scope network as opposed to the conceptual mapping demonstrated above in Figure 2 is the clear delineation of how each element corresponds to

[94] Figure as given in Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 128.

its counterpart in the organising frame, and the result in the real-world application of the blended space. However, the mapping of CMT also demonstrates this, in my opinion, in an equally intuitive and comprehensible manner. The major disadvantage of the blended diagram over the metaphorical mapping is that when there are more than a handful of correspondences, the network swiftly becomes unwieldy. Designating the two primary input spaces as the "organizing frame" and "the framing input", as Fauconnier and Turner do, provides more opportunity for confusion, particularly in interdisciplinary works in which the labels 'source' and 'target' have already been in use for many years.

2.4.2 – The Double-Scope Network

The primary area in which CBT offers something which CMT does not is in the *double-scope* network. This is a network in which the input spaces have "different (and often clashing) organizing frames as well as an organizing frame for the blend that includes parts of each of those frames and has emergent structure all its own."[95]

A physical example of this is a computer desktop interface. In this we have two different input frames: one frame of traditional computer commands, and another frame of the office and its accoutrements (folders, files, and trashcans). The blend frame of the desktop interface draws from both input spaces. A user can open files or folders, or put work into the trashcan, but they can also use general programming commands like "find", "save", or "print". Like in the single-scope network, some of the elements from each frame correspond with each other (e.g., placing a file in the trashcan, or typing the "delete" command). But other elements are drawn from their respective input fields into the blended space without necessarily needing a

[95] Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 131.

correspondence in the other input space. Fauconnier and Turner give the example that throwing a file into the trashcan and the command to "print" do not clash, but neither do they belong to the same frame.[96]


Turner gives another example of a double-scope network with the sentence "Vanity is the quicksand of reason."[97] The organising frame is the input space of 'quicksand', entailing a traveller, a path, a potential danger. But as Turner points out, the blended space also takes elements from the input space of 'reason'. For example, a reasoner can be unaware of their own failure in reasoning, on account of their vanity; if the blend was a single-scope, rather than a double-scope network, this would imply that the traveller is unaware that they are up to their waist in quicksand. There is also a causal structure in the reason input space, with the implication that vanity can make one oblivious to one's own failures of reason. However, the existence of quicksand is not caused by the phenomenon of travelling along a path.

> Additionally, in the reason input, the more you have achieved through reason, the more justification you have for being vain; in the blend, the more you have achieved through reason, the more vulnerable you are to being caught in quicksand. But this structure conflicts with the quicksand input, where it is novice travelers who should be most vulnerable to quicksand.[98]

The double-scope network is one where a diagram is particularly helpful. In comparing Figure 2 with Figure 3, one can see the major distinction between the single-scope and double-scope networks: entailments from either input space which end up in the blended space without necessarily having a corresponding entailment in the other input space.

[96] Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 131.
[97] Turner 2007: 6.
[98] Turner 2007: 7. For simplicity's sake I refrain from discussing the Dunning-Kruger cognitive bias and its possible effect on the blend.

Figure 3: Double-scope network[99]



The double-scope network is thus hugely useful for discussing and examining phenomena like religious texts and practices. If, for example, one wished to examine the blend of Hellenistic Judaism (with all due respect for the fact that the term 'Hellenistic Judaism' itself refers to a collection of various different stances and practices), any scholar knows that Hellenistic Judaism is not *all* elements of Hellenism and *all* elements of Judaism. They would recognise that certain philosophical theories or political realities align, and emerge in the Hellenistic Judaism blend, but that it would also include elements of Judaism which have no counterpart in Hellenistic culture, and vice versa.

[99] Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 46.

So too the example of the Septuagint, or, one might argue, in any given translation from one language to another. It is rare that the act of translation results in a single-scope network, with precise and exact counterparts for any given lexeme; words in every language have their own nuanced cultural entailments that translators just grapple with.

This makes the double-scope network of CBT particularly useful for the study of the New Testament. Any given book of the New Testament is the result of at least two major input spaces, Second Temple Judaism and the Graeco-Roman world, and in reality many more. CBT gives scholars a vocabulary and organisational system by which to better understand the role of cultural influences on abstract metaphorical ideas. Evans and Green set out a table of the principles governing the use of CBT:[100]

Governing Principle	**Definition**
The topology principle	"Other things being equal, set up the blend and the inputs so that useful topology in the inputs and their outer-space relations is reflected by inner-space relations in the blend."[101]
The pattern completion principle	"Other things being equal, complete elements in the blend by using existing integrated patterns as additional inputs. Other things being equal, use a completing frame that has relations that can be compressed versions of the important outer-space vital relations between the inputs."[102]
The integration principle	"Achieve an integrated blend."[103]

[100] Evans and Green 2007: 433.
[101] Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 327.
[102] Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 328.
[103] Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 328.

The maximisation of vital relations principle	"Other things being equal, maximize vital relations in the network. In particular, maximize the vital relations in the blended space and reflect them in outer-space vital relations." [104]
The web principle	"Other things being equal, manipulating the blend as a unit must maintain the web of appropriate connections to the input space easily and without additional surveillance of composition." [105]
The unpacking principle	"Other things being equal, the blend all by itself should prompt for the reconstruction of the entire network." [106]
The relevance principle	"Other things being equal, an element in the blend should have relevance, including relevance for establishing links to other spaces and for running the blend. Conversely, an outer-space relation between the inputs that is important for the purposes of the network should have a corresponding compression in the blend."[107]

The relationship between CBT and CMT is such that both can be used under the umbrella term of 'cognitive linguistics', with each theory being used in accordance with its strengths. Both are based on the understanding of the depth of the connection between thought and language, and the different systems of description of this connection mean that, rather than researchers needing to strictly decide between the two, both theories can be used together in a thoughtful and complementary way.

[104] Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 330.
[105] Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 331.
[106] Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 332.
[107] Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 333.

2.5 – The Use of CMT and CBT in this Study

Having laid out some of the fundamental elements of both CMT and CBT, I will now discuss the differences between them, and how both are used in this thesis.

First, not all blends are metaphors. The prototypical conceptual metaphor aligns with a single-scope blend; the hallmark of both is "frame-projection asymmetry: while both inputs contain distinct frames, it is only the frame from one of these inputs (the 'source' in conceptual metaphor terms, the 'frame input' in blending terms) that is projected to the blend."[108] The double-scope blend, which will be used in this thesis, is not asymmetrical.

One of the main differences between CMT and CBT arises from the issue of unidirectionality. While unidirectionality in CMT has begun to be questioned,[109] it remains an important principle of 'traditional' CMT, as mentioned at the end of §2.2 above. CBT, on the other hand, deals in selective projections from input spaces to the blended space; furthermore, the blend can project structure back into the input spaces. "The two theories employ different architecture in order to model similar phenomena."[110]

Conversely, not all metaphors are blends. Primary metaphors (the universal metaphors based on embodied experience, like AFFECTION IS WARMTH)[111] are based on correspondence between entire concepts[112] (as opposed to, in CBT, individual elements which find a counterpart in a different input space due to presence of a generic space linking the two input

[108] Evans and Green 2007: 435.
[109] Zhong and Leonardelli 2008; Zhang and Wang 2008; Landau, Meier, and Keefer 2010; Lee and Schwarz 2012; Zhang and Li 2012; Danesi 2017; Cian 2017; Porat and Shen 2017; Shen and Porat 2017.
[110] Evans and Green 2007: 435.
[111] Kövecses 2005: 3.
[112] "… rather than entire domains (although the primary source and primary target concepts are in different domains)" - Evans and Green 2007: 437.

spaces). A large number of conceptual metaphors *are* blends,[113] but "there is a small but important subset of highly conventionalised conceptual metaphors that are not blends."[114] These non-blend conceptual metaphors can, however, be inputs for new blended spaces.

Before settling on conceptual integration or blending, Fauconnier and Turner first called their theory the 'many-space model'.[115] This highlights the most obvious distinction between CMT and CBT: conceptual metaphors are an articulation of the link between two domains, while every description of a conceptual blend involves at least four spaces, and contains the potential for more.

This leads to another major difference: the use of spaces versus the use of domains. A domain is a "highly stable knowledge structure", while "mental spaces are dynamic and temporary conceptual 'packets' constructed 'on-line'[116] during discourse."[117] Blends can become conventionalised over time.

> One consequence of the foregoing comparisons is that while Blending Theory emphasises the dynamic and mutable aspects of blending and its role in meaning construction, Conceptual Metaphor Theory emphasises the idea that there is a 'metaphor system' in which conceptual metaphors interact in order to provide relatively stable structure and organisation to the human conceptual system. This reflects the different emphases of the two traditions: metaphor theorists have been concerned with mapping the conventional patterns entrenched in conceptual structure, while blending theorists have been more concerned with investigating the contribution of conceptual integration to ongoing meaning construction.[118]

[113] Grady, Oakley, and Coulson 1999.
[114] Evans and Green 2007: 437.
[115] Fauconnier and Turner 1994, cited in Evans and Green 2007: 436.
[116] "On-line" refers to cognitive processing in real time, rather than anything to do with the Internet.
[117] Evans and Green 2007: 435-6.
[118] Evans and Green 2007: 436.

Evans and Green summarise that "Blending Theory places emphasis upon a process of meaning construction rather than a system of knowledge,"[119] and that "while Blending Theory provides an account of emergent structure, Conceptual Metaphor Theory does not."[120]

With the basic differences between the two fields laid out, the question of which is more suitable for biblical studies emerges. There are two major schools of thought: the first is that CBT represents a competing model, developed to account for elements of cognition which CMT has neglected. "In particular, CBT is seen to be better suited when input spaces are not conventionalized within a linguistic community's 'encyclopedia' (as with CMT's domains) but rather are dynamic; when input spaces involve other metaphors (leading to complex metaphors in the blend); and when new/emergent information structure arises from the blend that is not necessarily accounted for by the initial input spaces and one-directional mappings alone."[121]

As I said above, the double-scope network is very suitable for discussing and examining phenomena like religious beliefs, or the translation of abstract concepts from one language to another. CBT can allow for greater nuance in some particular cases. In Chapter 3, I will therefore show how the double-scope network explains the use of δαιμόνιον to translate various Hebrew terms in the Septuagint and a large part of the understanding of the resulting lexeme in Second Temple Jewish demonology, and in Chapter 4, I will show how Luke inherits this blend and uses it in his own work.

[119] Evans and Green 2007: 436.
[120] Evans and Green 2007: 436-7.
[121] Lanier 2017: 27, particularly referring to Fauconnier and Turner 2008.

However, I will also use CMT throughout this thesis. I follow the conclusion of Grady, Oakley, and Coulson, that "the two approaches are complementary … the cross-domain relationships which have been identified by CMT researchers shape and constrain the more complex process of conceptual blending."[122] CMT works better for long-term and stable knowledge structures, while CBT is better suited to dynamic or unconventional uses of metaphor.[123]

Metaphors We Live By may have been published in 1980, but it was some years before it was applied to biblical studies. CMT has been used far more in OT than in NT studies; recent OT monographs (which also contain excellent overviews of CMT) include Aaron 2001, Brown 2002, Weiss 2006, Moore 2009, Jindo 2010, and Gray 2014. Recent publications on the use of metaphor theory in the New Testament include Stovell 2012 and Wassell-Llewelyn 2014, and in the last few years there have been a handful of works on the use of metaphor theory as a sustained methodology to examine Luke's gospel.[124]

Gregory Lanier has recently[125] written an investigation of the use of OT metaphors in the development of the gospel of Luke's Christology; specifically, he applies CMT to four particular metaphors (HORN (Κέρας, 1:68-69); DAWN/LIGHT (Ἀνατολή, 1:178-79); MOTHER BIRD (Ὄρνις, 13:34); STONE (Λίθος, 20:17-18), and argues that Luke uses these to portray Jesus as an agent of Salvation, and even as the God of Israel. A few years previously, Beth Stovell also used CMT and CBT to examine Christological metaphors in the Fourth gospel. Both Lanier and Stovell's work show the contribution of CMT to Christology. They identify

[122] Grady, Oakley, and Coulson 1999: 101.
[123] Grady, Oakley, and Coulson 1999; Lanier 2017: 27.
[124] Green, 2015, esp. 87-122; Somov, 2017; Lanier, 2018.
[125] PhD Thesis (University of Cambridge), 2016; published as a monograph in 2018.

the person of Jesus as a target domain, and then examine which source domains are used to describe elements of his character and role.

CMT has also been recently used by Alexey Somov in an examination of the conceptualisation of the afterlife in Luke-Acts. He cites van Heerden 2009 as a methodological inspiration, and makes the important point that "CMT is a very productive tool for analyzing religious conceptual systems, which are for the most part structured metaphorically. It makes it possible to provide more profound results of the study of Luke's afterlife language and conceptual system than the traditional critical methods can achieve."[126]

For both Lanier and Somov, the use of CBT as a methodology means that scholars can move past an insistence on direct textual citation as evidence of OT influence, and instead can study ancient texts with intellectual rigour, but also an understanding of the nuanced and subtle ways in which the human mind creates meaning, and of the work as a holistic whole within a cultural context. Luke was a product of a several cultural spaces: the Judaism of the Septuagint and the Second Temple period, the Hellenism of literature and history, the diversity of the Roman Empire, and scattered early Christian sources. The blends which result from the interaction of these different spaces are best served by the use of CBT, while more fundamental, primary conceptual metaphors like UP IS GOOD, seen throughout Luke's double-work, is better understood in terms of CMT.

CMT highlights both what is familiar and what is unfamiliar in Luke's conception of the world and the context in which his texts were written. It is an ideal methodology to explore Luke's understanding of demonology: CMT is regularly used to engage with abstract

[126] Somov 2017: 47.

concepts; it encourages a more holistic approach to exegesis, in which lexical elements support theories rather than limit them; and with its focus on every-day, 'literal' language, it is also well-suited to the discussion of cultural elements which were deemed so common there was little need to explain them. The existentialist view that CMT entails[127] makes metaphor theory an ideal methodology for studying demonology in general. A demon is not a separate, definitive (objectivist) object, but analysing Luke through the subjectivist lens means we are making assumptions about him, his beliefs, and his motives. The subjectivist view stops the conversation; the objectivist barely allows it to begin. Instead, if we use metaphor as the lens of "imaginative rationality," as Lakoff and Johnson suggest,[128] we can glean a little more of Luke's own context and conceptualisations. The complex webs of generic spaces, blends, input sources, entailments – what Fauconnier and Turner call "integration networks" –

> are never built entirely on the fly nor are they pre-existing conventional structures. Integration networks underlying thought and action are always a mix. On the one hand, cultures build networks over long periods of time that get transmitted over generations. Techniques for building particular networks are also transmitted. People are capable of innovating in any particular context. The result is integration networks consisting of conventional parts, conventionally-structured parts, and novel mappings and compressions.[129]

The selection of Luke's gospel as a corpus allows me to follow what Jindo termed the *text-orientated pattern* of metaphorical methodology, in which a variety of metaphors (though often linked by a particular theme) are examined within the context of a specific biblical text – in this case, the gospel of Luke. In light of his criticism that such text-orientated works "generally present an insightful analysis of metaphors as they appear in their immediate

[127] Lakoff and Johnson 1980: Ch. 25.
[128] Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 193.
[129] Fauconnier & Turner 2008: 53-4.

context, but … do not always succeed in integrating those insights into a broader framework,"[130] I will begin with Chapter 3, which briefly summarises the cultural contexts in which the gospel was written, and show how the application of CBT to the translation of demonological terms from Hebrew into Greek created a blend which I call throughout this work 'the δαιμόνιον-blend'.

Rather than examining a handful of explicit metaphors like Lanier, instead I aim in this thesis to illuminate and contextualise Luke's cosmology in the light of specific conceptual metaphors and blends. With an understanding of the complicated and long-standing discussions regarding the authorship of the gospels, I use the traditional names of the evangelists for the sake of simplicity, and so "Luke" denotes the author of the gospel being primarily discussed. "Septuagint"/"LXX" will designate the collective Greek traditions of the OT; I will refer to Tobit or the Greek version of Daniel specifically when the text requires. In terms of editions of primary sources, I use the 28th edition of Nestle-Aland for the New Testament, and for the Septuagint I use the Göttingen critical edition whenever possible.

This thesis is not a redaction-critical study of the exorcism stories in Luke,[131] but in those places where Luke's presentation differs from that of the other Synoptic gospels, and where that difference engenders the opportunity for CMT to provide illumination, I work from the assumptions of a. Markan priority and b. Luke's use of the gospel of Mark, Q, and unique materials in the composition of his gospel. I have attempted throughout to follow a consistent pattern for each passage: first, I address any pertinent textual, interpretative or synoptic

[130] Jindo 2010: 4.
[131] For such a work, see Kirchschläger 1981.

issues; second, I review the chapter in its literary context, paying particular attention to any Septuagintal allusions or citations; third, I make an analysis of any use of the δαιμόνιον-blend or of any of the specific conceptual metaphors outlined in Chapter 4. Finally, I summarise the results of the examination, with particular attention to any new questions which emerge or any original interpretations that illuminate the passage.

Finally, I will often refer to metaphors in the gospel by using the primary word of the metaphor's source domain as shorthand ("WARFARE metaphor"); this is done for brevity and does not indicate a substitution view of metaphor.[132]

[132] Following Lanier 2017: 36.

CHAPTER 3: Luke's Cultural Context

3.1 – Introduction

In Chapter 2, I discussed the usefulness of CBT in examining religious worldviews, in which "input spaces" – distinct mental 'pockets' – are blended to create a new "blended space". I used the example of religious texts and practices: the input spaces of Hellenism and Judaism creating the blended space of 'Hellenistic Judaism', for example. In Chapter 4, I will argue that in Luke 4:33 the evangelist creates a blended space (πνεῦμα δαιμονίου ἀκαθάρτου) from the relationship between two input spaces ('unclean spirit' and 'δαιμόνιον'). He considers the two input spaces to be connected, and having created an explicit blend, is able to refer to these spiritual antagonists throughout his gospel using either πνεῦμα-language or δαιμόνιον-language (though with a preference for the latter).[1]

However, to understand the use of this new "πνεῦμα δαιμονίου ἀκαθάρτου" blend, we must first have some notion of what is meant by the two input spaces from which it arises. Further complexity emerges when we understand that each of these terms is a result of its own input spaces; for example, for Luke, the lexeme δαιμόνιον is engendered by the blending of the input space of Greek language with the input space of Septuagintal context. In Chapter 6 I will argue that Luke conceptualises Satan as, among other things, a king: one input space

[1] Luke did not invent this blend (δαιμόνιον is used synonymously with πνεῦμα ἀκάθαρτον in Mark 7:25-30), but he made it explicit in 4:33-41, his redaction of Mark 1:21-28 (who uses the phrase ἐν πνεύματι ἀκαθάρτῳ), and uses the two terms synonymously in Luke 8:27-38; 9:39-42; 11:14-26. Luke also uses δαιμόνιον synonymously with πνεῦμα in 9:39-42 and with πνεῦμα πονηρόν in 8:2 and possibly in 11:14-26.

contains Luke's understanding of what a king is, and another his understanding of who or what Satan is.

The aim of this chapter is to provide a brief overview of what we can reasonably expect of Luke's demonological and Satanological worldview. Scholars cannot take for granted that the two are inextricably linked. By 'demonological', I refer to malevolent, preternatural entities, and by Satanological, I refer to the developing idea of a leader of demons or of a personification of evil. Thus, at the time of Jesus and of the writing of the gospels, what was generally understood by the concepts of an evil spirit, of a demon, and of Satan?

Given Luke's major cultural input spaces of the Graeco-Roman world and of Judaism, many elements of his worldview would have been a blend of the two. The Septuagint is a perfect example: the Hebrew scriptures being translated into Greek would have brought semantic entailments from both the source input space and the target input space for every word translated. Furthermore, the Septuagint is not a homogenous translation, but rather a collection of works from different translators in different cultural contexts, with different attitudes towards translation and different religious and political priorities. The early Christians "wrestled with this multifaceted heritage …Mixed and contrasted with Greco-Roman concepts, every Father developed – knowingly or unknowingly – his own Satanology, based on the rich Jewish tradition."[2]

However, to structure this chapter in terms of these two input spaces would be to do the complexity and nuance of Luke's cultural environment a disservice; for example, in which 'input space' would the Septuagint be placed, being born of both the Jewish and the

[2] Fröhlich and Koskenniemi 2013: ix.

Hellenistic world? Instead, I have chosen to structure this chapter in terms of topic, and to address the three major topics which will be important in the rest of this thesis, particularly in Chapter 4.

Due to Luke's extensive use of the Septuagint,[3] the Hebrew Bible and subsequent Greek translation are the most sensible place with which to begin (§3.2).[4] I argue that in addition to the inherent cognitive complexities of understanding the activity of malevolent spirits in conjunction with monotheism (§3.2.1), the use of the Greek term δαιμόνιον to translate several Hebrew words in the course of the translation of the Septuagint contributed to the development of an understanding of what a δαιμόνιον was (§3.2.2). I also follow the general scholarly consensus that the concept of a leader of evil forces developed in the light of various passages in the Hebrew Bible (§3.2.3) but only really emerged in the Second Temple period. In the apocryphal books and other Second Temple Jewish literature there seems to be a general push towards an association between spirits, demons, and Satan, and so in §3.3 I will provide a brief summary of the scholarship on some important extra-biblical texts.

3.1.1 – The Definition of a Demon

It is a difficult task to talk about the demonology of the Hebrew Bible, and this for several reasons. The first is that the Hebrew Bible does not *have* a demonology – a demonology being a reasonably coherent system of thought concerning what a demon is and does. To ask

[3] For an excellent overview see Fitzmyer 1983: 114-127, particular pp. 114-116 on the specific subject of Lukan 'Septuagintalisms'; see also Muraoka 2012.
[4] Hellenism and Judaism are not the *only* input spaces which have influenced Luke; in several places in this thesis, I will argue that certain Mesopotamian tropes which predate the Hebrew Bible and Septuagint have influenced Luke's worldview, but this influence was probably at a remove, and not consciously engaged in. See e.g. Geller 1995.

for a "reasonably coherent system of thought" from what is, after all, not a book but a library, written by an unknown number of authors spanning centuries, is to ask for a great deal. In addition, when searching for demons in the Hebrew Bible, we must always do so conscious of the fact that our conception of what a demon is comes partly from the Hebrew Bible itself.

With this thought in mind, various writers on the subject of demonology in the Hebrew Bible have had to start from the question of what a demon is.[5] Stokes and van der Toorn both go to the OED for guidance and define a demon as a "malignant supernatural being." The first element of this definition, malignancy, is a difficult one, because in the Greek world a δαίμων could be ambivalent or good – I will examine this below. Second, the definition of a demon as "supernatural" is one which ignores a long-standing discussion in later demonology as to whether demons are *supernatural* or *praeternatural.*

Even to classify demons as *supernatural* is evidence of our post-Enlightenment bias. In the Renaissance, demonologists were far more likely to use the word "praeternatural".[6] Only to God could the truly supernatural be attributed; Satan and his demons, confined by the creation of which they were a part, could perform *mirabiles,* wonders, rather than true *miracles*. For if a demon is truly supernatural, truly capable of acts outside of natural law, that is a threat to monotheistic belief. But if a demon is praeternatural, it begs the question of why does God allow them to work their evil – in fact, why is God portrayed in the Bible as being in control of demons? The shift from monolatry, even from intolerant monolatry, to strict monotheism, requires some very sophisticated re-ordering of one's cultural perceptions as well as one's theology.

[5] e.g. Van der Toorn 2003; Martin 2010; Stokes 2016: 259.
[6] See Pumfrey 1998: 45-6; *Clark 1999:* 222-248.

However, while Van der Toorn uses 'demon' as something of a catch-all, Martin 2010 and Stokes 2016 are careful to differentiate between a demon and an evil spirit. The semantic overlap between the two in the New Testament should not be retrospectively read into the Hebrew Bible. As Stokes points out, "different authors conceived of the superhuman realm in different ways and employed terminology variously to describe it."[7] I entirely agree with their distinctions, and so I will first briefly discuss spirits, particularly 'evil spirits', in the Jewish Scriptures.

3.2 – The Hebrew Bible and Septuagint

3.2.1 – Spirits

The question of what a spirit *is* is often discussed in terms of what a spirit *does*. G. J. Riley makes the point that many of the 'demonic' occurrences in the Hebrew Bible are similar to the Greek conception of the εὐδαιμονία and κακοδαιμονία (Hesiod, *Erga* 252-255): "to enforce divine Law, to regulate the balance of blessing and curse in the human realm, and to ensure mortality, the gods employed, among other means, the *daimones*."[8] Just as the εὐδαιμονία brought blessings, the κακοδαιμονία "was caused by some dark but legitimate power."[9] The final one of these, the enforcement of mortality, does not appear as a function of any non-divine spiritual figures, but in the Hebrew Bible there are indeed spiritual creatures employed by God to enforce his Law, and to act as a vessel of punishment or strife.

[7] Stokes 2016: 261.
[8] Riley 1999a: 236.
[9] Riley 1999a: 236.

Several of the malevolent spirits that appear in the Hebrew Bible can be classified thus, as spirits performing the bidding of God. Possibly the most famous example of this is 1 Samuel 16:14, in which an "evil spirit (*rûaḥ rāʿâ*) from the Lord" torments Saul when the Spirit of God abandons him in favour of David; it is this spirit which appears in 18:10 and in 19:9,[10] where "the evil spirit of God" comes upon Saul while David is playing music, and Saul tries to pin David to the wall with a spear.

The Spirt of God has various functions in the Hebrew Bible: it can inspire leadership (Num 11:17-24; Judg 3:10), prophecy (Num 24:2) or the violence and strength of a berserker (Judges 14:19; 15:14-15). The same holds true for Saul: in 1 Sam 11:6, the Spirit of the Lord makes him burn with anger, and in 1 Samuel 10:6 and 10:10 it causes him to prophesy. This is the spirit that departs from him when God's favour turns to David, to be replaced by the *rûaḥ rāʿâ.*

For P. K. McCarter, this concept of *replacement* is a crucial one; once touched by any kind of spirit, whether evil or divine, the person can no longer be without one. He uses the metaphor of a vacuum, famously abhorred by nature, and in the Ancient Near Eastern tradition once one has received the attention of such a being, one can never again be free of it.[11] It is a tradition which echoes heavily in Luke 11:26, and thus will be returned to in Chapter 6. The ambiguity of both *rûaḥ* and πνεῦμα provide interpreters with a choice of three major translations: 'wind', 'breath', and 'spirit'. McCarter explores the first, making a link between the "Evil Spirit of God" and the Mesopotamian preoccupation with the effect of the winds on

[10] Erroneously noted as 19:1 in Stokes 2016: 261.
[11] McCarter 1980: 280.

human beings (a very pressing concern given its geography), particularly given the contrast between the 'good wind' (*šâru ṭābu*) and the 'evil wind' (*šâru lemnu or šâru lā ṭābu*), "the latter being exemplified especially by a group of seven evil spirits deemed responsible for a variety of human afflictions and miseries."[12] Again, the appearance of the seven demons in Luke 11:26 will receive attention below in Chapter 6.

Indeed, many commentators seem to feel that for the original writers, the concept of an 'evil spirit from God' might not have been so difficult to imagine. Sassoon writes that 1 Sam 16:15-16 gives the impression that the origin of such moods could be God himself was, for the writer and his original readers, taken for granted, and that it was even possible that "they were associated with the demonic world;"[13] Firth persuasively argues that *rā'â* does not necessarily have a moral force so much as a descriptive one (cf. Amos 3:6), and in general that "it should be borne in mind that the OT is seldom concerned with secondary causation, and since Yahweh is Lord of all, the spirit is seen as coming from him."[14]

This same phrase, *rûaḥ rā'â,* also appears in Judges 9:23, where God sends the 'evil spirit' to break down the pact between the men of Shechem and Abimelech which pits them against each other, as punishment for their pact which resulted in the deaths of the sons of Gideon. Lindström argues that *rûaḥ* here indicates a particular mood, in support of his argument against any monism in the Hebrew Bible;[15] Stokes supports this possible translation by citing Tengström's TDOT work on *rûaḥ* in the construct as indicating mood, disposition, or emotions in Job 7:11, Ps 51:12[10], Proverbs 14:29 and Isaiah 65:14,[16] though in none of

[12] McCarter 1999: 319.
[13] Sassoon 2014: 391.
[14] Firth 2009: 187.
[15] Lindström 1983: 77-78.
[16] S. Tengstrom (with H.-J. Fabry), '*Rûaḥ,*'TDOT 13: 365-402 cited in Stokes 2016: 261-262 n. 10.

these constructs is *rûaḥ* paired with *rāʿâ.* As stated above, in 1 Samuel, *rûaḥ rāʿâ* indicates an active spiritual being. In the Greek texts (Judges A (Codex Alexandrinus) and Judges B (Codex Vaticanus)), the phrase is translated into the Greek πνεῦμα πονηρόν, just as in 1 Samuel 16:14-16. It is a concept which commentators must in some way explain: for Webb, God's sending of an evil spirit does not indicate any stain on God, or evil behaviour – "rather, it shows his complete sovereignty over it; even an evil spirit is made to serve his purpose of punishing wrongdoers."[17] One could make the same argument for the gospels, that by being seen to be exorcised by Jesus, demons are unwittingly serving the purpose of the God who has control over them, just as in John 11:14 Jesus says that the death of Lazarus is for the glory of God, so that his son may be glorified through it.

In Hosea 4:12 and 5:4,[18] we find a different spirit which has negative effects on the humans affected by it, though its origin is not said to be from God. *Rûaḥ zĕnûnîm*, 'spirit of whoredom', is rendered by πνεῦμα πορνείας; thus, in both languages sexual immorality – particularly associated with prostitution[19] – is denoted. In both MT and LXX Hosea 5:4, the spirit is said to be *inside* the people, preventing them from repenting. A. A. Macintosh chooses to translate *rûaḥ zĕnûnîm* as a "promiscuous impulse", as Lindström translates *rûaḥ* above, a *Zeitgeist* rather than a *böser Geist*, which leads the people away from God.[20] This is a valid, but very abstract interpretation, and again highlights the difficulty for the Septuagintal translator, who has in this case chosen to retain the ambiguity of the Hebrew.

This is in contrast to the perception of the *rûaḥ rāʿâ* as a spirit that terrifies Saul (בעת). The conception in the Hebrew is that the *rûaḥ rāʿâ* is an external agent, and not the internal one

[17] Webb 2012: 281.
[18] Of particular interest in this project, because Luke quotes Hosea 10:8 in 23:30.
[19] As opposed to marital adultery, for which the word μοιχεία was used.
[20] Macintosh 1997: 152.

which the gospel writers conceive of: in the MT, the spirit "torments" Saul, but in the Septuagint it specifically chokes or strangles him (καὶ ἔπνιγεν αὐτὸν πνεῦμα πονηρὸν παρὰ κυρίου), which could suggest an external force. The Greek translation of 1 Sam 16:14-15 is the only place in the Septuagint where the verb πνίγω is found. In the NT it is rare (Matt 13:7; 18:28; Mark 5:13), but notable in its use describing the fate of the demons which Jesus exorcised into the herd of pigs in Gerasa. That the spirit behaves externally rather than internally is supported by the statement in 1 Sam 16:23 that the evil spirit "turned away from upon [Saul]". In the Septuagint's version of the verse, David plays the harp while πνεῦμα πονηρὸν ἐπὶ Σαοὺλ "the evil spirit was upon Saul", with the result that the spirit ἀφίστατο ἀπ᾽αὐτοῦ. The same combination of verb and preposition will be used of the devil departing from Jesus until the right time in 4:13.

Thus far, most of the spirits discussed have been 'bad' in the sense of being *harmful* (to the individual afflicted and perhaps, possible as a result of this, to the community in general), rather than personally morally evil. Another important distinction that survives in the New Testament is the 'unclean spirit' mentioned in Zechariah 13:2. In the second half of his book of prophecy, Zechariah delivers two oracles; the first (Chapters 9-11) is one of judgement against the land of Israel, in a series of images of battle, salvation, and restoration. "The continued presence in Israel of various obstacles to her restoration is a central concern of Zech. 9-14. The impure spirit of 13.2 is one of these obstacles."[21] As Wahlen points out, the impure spirit is both associated with idols and false prophets, and also distinct from them. What, precisely, the phrase רוח הטמאה means is more difficult to discern. Various options

[21] Wahlen 2004: 27.

have been suggested: a 'spirit of false prophecy',[22] for example, or demonic force.[23] In support of the latter, Wahlen points out that it is clear that the spirit of impurity is linked with idolatry, as is the case in Psalm 106; I discuss this passage in more detail below. Furthermore, the idols are said to have personal names, which makes it likely that they are conceived to be foreign gods. Wahlen's statement, that as the idols "are personal beings rather than abstract ideas"[24] it is reasonable to assume that the spirit of impurity is also a personal being, is something of a leap. However, what is more credible is his explanation that by the time of the translation of Zechariah into Greek, the spirit of impurity was assumed to be a personal being, given that a noun governed by a preceding noun in the construct case (הטמאה) was translated into Greek using an adjective (τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἀκαθαρτον). This is supported by the presupposition in *Num. Rab.* 19.8; *Pesiq. Rab.* 14.12; *Pesiq. Rab. Kah.* 4.7; *Tanh. 26;* and Revelation 16:13.[25] Ultimately, what the Hebrew-speaking writer of the Book of Zechariah intended to refer to is of less importance for this project than the Greek of the Septuagint which Luke received; in this case, the correspondence of the Greek phrase of Zechariah 13:2 with the material Luke inherited from Mark 1:21-28 is of greater significance. The association of τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἀκαθαρτον with idols – and, specifically, idols with names, connoting pagan gods – is one present throughout the use of δαιμόνιον in the Septuagint.


[22] Lys 1962: 239; Otzen 1964: 198; Sæbø 1969: 274; Baldwin 1972: 196; Larkin 1994: 171; Redditt 1995: 135; Sweeney 2000: 692-3. As Wahlen 2004: 28 n. 22 notes, "generally, its perceived effect is said to be the encouragement of ritually impure and/or morally impure tendencies or actions."
[23] Unger 1963: 225; Merrill 1994: 329-30; Lange 2002: 305.
[24] Wahlen 2004: 29.
[25] Wahlen 2004: 29 n. 29.

3.2.1 – The δαιμόνιον-blend in the Septuagint

Conceptualising what Luke might have understood by the lexeme δαιμόνιον is a complex task, but it is also the kind of task for which CBT is particularly suited. I will therefore show how the double-scope network explains the use of δαιμόνιον to translate various Hebrew terms in the Septuagint and a large part of the understanding of the resulting lexeme in Second Temple Jewish demonology.

We know two major facts about Luke's spheres of inspiration: 1. That he spoke Greek, and composed literature in it, and 2. that the Septuagint was a major influence on his work (see Figure 6). In the case of the latter, the lexeme δαιμόνιον appears in three books in the Septuagint proper (the Book of Tobit is a special case which will be examined separately below). These books – Deuteronomy, Psalms, and Isaiah – are all books which Luke quotes in his gospel.[26]

Figure 4: (arrows showing directions of influence):



[26] Even excluding quotations which have parallels in Matthew or Mark, Luke quotes Isaiah 61:1-2 in Luke 4:18-19 and Psalms 30:5 in 23:46; both are unique L material.

Of course, the reality was not so simple. Hellenistic language, literature and culture had an enormous impact on the Septuagint itself. In addition, the Septuagint was not translated as a whole, by a single author, within an instant. There are directions of influence within the Septuagint itself. Namely, the theory of lexical equivalence (or stereotyping) takes the fact that the Pentateuch was the first collection of biblical material to be translated into Greek, and from this, four main arguments are made:


> 1. The vocabulary of the Greek Torah was continued in the translation of the later books.
> 2. The Greek Torah served as a lexicon for the later translators who often turned to that translation when encountering difficult Hebrew words.
> 3. Quotations from and allusions to passages in the Torah in the later books were often phrased in Greek in a manner identical with the translation of the Torah.
> 4. The contents of the Greek Torah often influenced the wording of later translations on an exegetical level.[27]

I will argue below that the use of δαιμόνιον as a translation of the Hebrew *šēdîm* in Psalm 106:37 is a result of the translator seeing that δαιμόνιον translates *šēdîm* in Deuteronomy 32:17. This is not enough evidence in and of itself to prove the reliance of the Psalmic translator on the Greek text of Deuteronomy,[28] but even critics like Barr concede that had the theory been applied to the translation of rare and difficult words, "it might have deserved

[27] Tov 1999: 183.
[28] For a full discussion see Tov 1999: 183-194. For an earlier iteration of the theory, see Tov 1981. For arguments against the full extent of Tov's theory, see Bar 2003: 524 ff.

complete acceptance."[29] Barr distinguishes between the statement that the Pentateuch was used as a lexicon in the case of difficult words and the Pentateuch governing all later Septuagintal vocabulary – "on the contrary, it operated in this way only at quite limited points, at which the translator felt himself at a loss."[30] The Hebrew *šēdîm* being a dis legomena, the use of δαιμόνιον in Deuteronomy 32:17 and Psalm 106:37 is surely one of those limited points. With this in mind, a more accurate diagram of Luke's influences might be Figure 7.

Figure 5: (arrows showing directions of influence):



As, in the language of CBT, 'Hellenism' is an independent input space, it makes sense to begin this exploration here. In the following summary I seek to give a general overview of

[29] Barr 2003: 531.
[30] Barr 2003: 530.

what this input space might include. I have deliberately focused on those authors writing before the year 250 BCE; any general discussion of daimonology without recourse to Plutarch is highly unusual, but Plutarch wrote centuries after the translation of the Septuagint, and so I have discounted most writings which cannot have influenced the translation process. The work of Plutarch might give clues as to the worldview of the later New Testament writers, but given Luke's reliance on the Septuagint anything involving Plutarch would be much more speculative in comparison. Similarly, the Dead Sea Scrolls give us a great deal of information about the worldview of a particularly group of Jews in Palestine, but the literature in Hebrew and Aramaic does not necessarily reflect Luke's more Greek-influenced conceptualisation of the spiritual world. Given the limited space for exploration in this study, I have chosen to focus in this chapter on the specific areas which provide the most illumination of Luke's own cultural milieu, rather than seeking to present an overview of demonology at the time of the writing of the gospel. For example, we can be relatively sure that Luke had a decent knowledge of Homer, as this formed the basis of all literary education in the Greek-speaking world, and that he had some degree of knowledge of the Septuagint. The Dead Sea Scrolls, Philo, and Josephus include elements of Greek and Jewish cultures, and were written prior to or contemporary with the composition of Luke's gospel. On the other hand, despite the wealth of demonological information he includes, I have not engaged with Plutarch's oeuvre on the subject in any great detail, as his writing is generally by scholars to be later than the composition of the gospel.

The Classical World

From its first appearance in Greek literature, the δαίμων is difficult to pin down; one reason why is that the attributes which we *have* been able to deduce are namelessness,

unpredictability, and sinister, invisible hands dealing destiny or disease or death. It is generally thought that in its earliest appearances, δαίμων is a synonym for θεός.[31] Burkert calls the δαίμων "the veiled countenance of divine activity," the manifestation of divine activity "which eludes characterization and naming."[32] The theory appears as far back as in the works of Plutarch, who stated that Hesiod was the first to separate δαίμονες and gods, and that the two are synonymous in Homer.[33]

The use of δαίμων in Homer is important because his are the works we can be most certain were used in Hellenistic education, for both the Septuagint translators in Alexandria and for Luke himself. This is due to both a general understanding of Homer's prominence in the ancient world,[34] and a specialized understanding of the use of Homer in the Musaeum in Alexandria.[35]

In support of the Plutarchian idea that δαίμων is a synonym for θεός is the description of Aphrodite in *Iliad* 3:420, and the apparent use of the plural to refer to all divine beings (Iliad 1.222; 6.115; 23.595).[36] However, Homer's uses of δαίμων and θεός are not interchangeable, nor explained only by metre.[37] De Jong discusses the assertion that δαίμων is "used by characters whenever they do not know or do not wish to say whoever of the individual gods is responsible",[38] and differentiates between there being an ontological difference between

[31] E.g. G. J. Riley 1999, 'Demon': 235; Janowitz 2001: 33.
[32] Burkert 1985: 180; see also Waser 1901: 2010-2012; Andres 1914: 101-58; Farnell 1921: 76; Foerster 1964: 2.
[33] Plutarch, *De Defectu Oraculorum* 415b.
[34] Sandnes 2009; Finkelberg 2003; Stanley 1990; Procopé 2008: 462; Buffiere 1956: 10-12; Cribiore 2001: 178-80.
[35] Niehoff 2011; see also Rajak 2009: 86.
[36] Brenk 1986: 2075.
[37] Albinus 2003: 425–446.
[38] De Jong 1987: 158.

θεός and δαίμων and a difference of function, arguing for the latter.[39] In this, she agrees with the conclusions of Walter Burkert, that "*daimon* does not designate a specific class of divine beings, but a peculiar mode of activity," [40] and her summary is taken up in turn by Jan Bremmer, who summarises Greek thought on the daimonic as "whenever [the Greeks] felt that a god intervened for a short time, directly and concretely in their life, they spoke of *daimon*..."[41] In the Odyssey, the δαίμων is overwhelmingly portrayed as the bearer of evil or misfortune, disease and punishment, or of thoughts, dreams, and beguilement. As Brenk points out, with twenty-four cases to six, the δαίμων is overwhelmingly responsible for some evil as opposed to something neutral or good.[42]

At the end of an extremely detailed analysis, Brenk summarises his findings thus: the δαίμων has no visible form, no personal mythology, no anthropomorphic tendencies, no orders and no higher purpose. "The daimon to the end of its existence will tend to operate in an unpredictable and often, or mostly, damaging way."[43] Its realm is that of the mind: thoughts and dreams and feelings, and it has more than a hint of malevolence about it. There are faint links with wind and with disease, but no indication of possession, and little of physical power, though it is able to lead one through difficult places. "Yet within this Homeric nucleus one can see the capability for evolution into the more distinct usages of later periods: fate, chance, fortune, character, thoughts, good or evil spirits, the divinity."[44]

Hesiod's conception of the daimonic almost certainly does not have the same importance or influence that Homer's did – see above – but his works were nevertheless read widely. They

[39] De Jong 1984: 301-316.
[40] Burkert 1985: 180.
[41] Bremmer 1994: 11.
[42] Brenk 1986: 2079.
[43] Brenk 1986: 2081.
[44] Brenk 1986: 2081.

are also early (pre-700 BCE), and so are a further opportunity to attempt to perceive an early state of Greek daimonology. In his *Works and Days* 121ff., Hesiod states that when the men of the golden age died they were transformed into "pure daimons dwelling upon the earth" (τοὶ μὲν δαίμονες ἁγνοὶ ἐπιχθόνιοι) to watch over humanity. They "roam everywhere over the earth, clothed in mist and keep watch on judgements and cruel deeds, givers of wealth".[45] Presumably based on Hesiod's popularity throughout the Classical world, Farnell writes that this resulted in a particular meaning of a personal spirit who accompanied one through life, a conception which would prove popular in later understanding. "A lucky, fortunate person was *eudaimon* ('with a good *daimōn*': already in Hesiod), an unlucky one was *kakadaimōn* ('with a bad *daimōn*': from the 5th cent. BC)."[46] In discussion of Plutarch's later treatment of Hesiod's demonology, Brenk points out this is the moment at which "two strands then clearly emerge, daimones as independent spirits, and as the souls of the departed, and it is fair to say that that the strands could never be unravelled once they had become tangled."[47]

In the period of Greek Tragedy, several traits associated with δαίμονες began to emerge. At this point, the synonym hypothesis gains more traction: for example, as is understandable given his focus on singular nouns, Gilbert François dismisses all appearances of "δαίμονες" in the plural (*Agamemnon* 182, 635; *The Libation-bearers* 214, 436; *The Eumenides* 948; *The Persians* 1004; *The Suppliant Women* 692) with "dans chacun de ces passages, δαίμονες semble n'être qu'un synonyme de θεοί."[48] Some gods (such as Artemis, Apollo, Leto, Dionysus, Hermes and Poseidon) were referred to by the term δαίμων more often.[49] They are connected with vengeance, specifically with an 'ἀλάστωρ', an avenging spirit; for example,

[45] Bolt 1996: 78.
[46] Price and Kearns 2003: 144.
[47] Brenk 1986: 2082.
[48] François 1957: 103.
[49] Brenk 1986: 2082.

in Sophocles' *Women of Trachis* 1235 and in Hippocrates' *On the Sacred Disease* 1:40.[50] In Aeschylus' *The Persians* 354, a 'κακὸς δαίμων' is equated with an ἀλάστωρ, and in *Agamemnon* too, a δαίμων is addressed in lines 1468, 1477, and 1482, but is also called an 'ἀλάστωρ' in lines 1501 and 1508 – the representation of this δαίμων is entirely negative, entirely sinister:

> ἦ μέγαν οἰκονόμον
> δαίμονα καὶ βαρύμηνιν αἰνεῖς,
> φεῦ φεῦ, κακὸν αἶνον ἀτηρᾶς
> τύχας ἀκορέστου…[51]

In Euripides' *The Bacchae*, first performed in the Theatre of Dionysus in 405 BCE, it is possible to see the tradition that δαίμονες and θεοί are synonyms emerging. Brenk discusses the pertinent passages and some secondary literature in depth, and he particularly focuses on the connection between the daimonic and Dionysus.[52] There is one exception to this general trend of the sinister and unknowable δαίμων: The cult of the *Agathos Daimon*, often represented in the form of a snake, and to whom libations of unmixed wine were poured out at the end of a meal (i.e. Aristophanes, *Knights* 85, 106 (Ogden 2013: 298, fn. 141) / 107 (Sorensen 2002: 82, fn. 32); *Peace* 300; *Wasps* 525).[53]

This having been said, it is not δαίμων that is used in the Septuagint (with a possible exception in Isaiah 65:11), but δαιμόνιον. Usage of this derivative is relatively rare before the Septuagint and the New Testament, but does appear in a handful of passages. An early example is in Herodotus 5.87. Plato uses the lexeme in Apol. 24b-c, wherein an accusation levelled against Socrates is that he worships δαιμόνια καινά, rather than θεοὺς … ἡ πόλις.

[50] Brenk 1986: 2082.
[51] *Agamemnon*, 1481-1484: "Truly you speak of a mighty Fiend, haunting the house, and heavy in his wrath alas, alas!) – an evil tale of catastrophic fate insatiate…" – translation by Smyth 1926.
[52] Brenk 1986: 2083.
[53] Ogden 2013: 297-305.

The more famous account of the δαιμόνιον of Socrates appears in Apol. 40a. In Isocrates' *To Demonicus* 1.13 the reader is exhorted to do honour to τὸ δαιμόνιον. A later use by the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus (*Stoic*.2.338) applies the adjective φαῦλα to the δαιμόνιον, which suggests it was not an entirely pejorative noun even in the 3rd century BCE, when the Septuagint was being translated.

Deuteronomy

With all this in mind, it is the *context* of the use of δαιμόνιον in the Septuagint which gives us the greatest clues as to how a reader of the Greek Old Testament would have understood the lexeme, and what entailments they would have consciously or unconsciously associated with it. The first use of δαιμόνιον, and the only use in the Pentateuch, occurs in Deuteronomy 32:17.

יזבחו לשדים לא אלה אלהים לא ידעום חדשים מקרב באו לא שערום אבתיכם

They are sacrificing to the šēdîm*, not God; gods, they did not know them – new ones came from near, your fathers were not horrified by them.*

ἔθυσαν δαιμονίοις καὶ οὐ Θεῷ, θεοῖς, οἷς οὐκ ᾔδεισαν· καινοὶ καὶ πρόσφατοι ἥκασιν, οὓς οὐκ ᾔδεισαν οἱ πατέρες αὐτῶν.

They sacrificed to demons and not to God, to gods, whom they had not known; new and recent they have come, whom their fathers had not known.

The task of discovering exactly what is meant by the word שדים, or *šēdîm*, is a difficult one, but one that can be approached from several angles. The first is philological: the Hebrew is apparently related to the *šēdu* of Babylonian and Assyrian mythology, also known as the

lamassu.[54] The *šēdu* were (usually) male counterparts of the (usually) female *lamassu*,[55] and the two were sometimes grouped in incantations.[56] They were seen as both malevolent[57] and "kindly" spirits ([še-e-du da]m-ḳu),[58] apotropaic deities as well as demons.[59] In their role as protective beings[60] they were well-represented in Babylonian bas-reliefs and statues, often in the form of bulls or bull-like creatures.[61]

There is discussion as to whether the *šēdu* were gods or demi-gods in their own right, or whether they worked under the auspices of another, more prominent god.[62] One suggestion is that of Nergal, mentioned in the Hebrew Bible as the deity of Cuth (2 Kings 17:30). In Mesopotamian mythology he was the son of Enlil and Ninlil, and the god of the destructive summer solstice, of war and pestilence, and who presided over the netherworld. According to S. Langdon, one Babylonian title for Nergal was that of Malku, 'king', and it was under this name that the god's cult spread through Canaan and Phoenicia, to become the Moloch of the Hebrew Bible (Leviticus 18:21, 20:2-5; 2 Kings 23:10; Jeremiah 32:35).[63] If this were the case, then the association of the *šēdîm* with Moloch – and thus the cult of human sacrifice as laid out in the Hebrew Bible – would have important connotations in Psalm 106:37, given below, in which sons and daughters are sacrificed "to the *šēdîm*".

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[54] Alexander 1999: 335.
[55] Beaulieu 2003: 136.
[56] Thompson 1903: 204.
[57] Thompson 1903: 68, 88, 105, 178; Thompson 1904: 12, 16.
[58] Thompson 1903: 204; Thompson prefers the translation of "spirits", but at Plate XLVII, Line 220 from Tablet K (found in Vol. I, at page 204) he uses the word "guardian" instead, presumably to draw attention to the contextual apotropaic role of the spirit.
[59] Black and Green 1992, Thompson 1903: 10, 28.
[60] "Prayer to the personal god who has abandoned the worshipper; IV R, 2nd ed., pl. 59, no. 2; obv. 19. dKALxBAD SIG5 dKAL SIG5 BE-*u* UGU-*ia*5 'the favourable *šēdu* spirit and the favourable *lamassu* spirit be attached to me'" – Seux 1976: 209.
[61] Toy 1890: 20. Toy also asserted that the *shîdu* should be considered as separate to both the chief deities on one hand, and to demons and spirits on the other.
[62] Langdon 1934: 52.
[63] Langdon 1934: 53.

While the etymology and Ancient Near Eastern context of the term is interesting, for the purposes of this project it is the context of the translation which gives more clues as to how Luke would have received it. The dual role of the *šēdîm*, being both gods and entities associated with gods, is brought to the fore by Deuteronomy 32:17. In one interpretation, the author goes to particular trouble to deny their divinity by classing them as "לא אלה"; according to S. R. Driver, this is a Hebrew idiom which is also used in Deuteronomy 32:21, in the phrase "בלא־אל".[64] Another possible interpretation is that of "they sacrificed to the *šēdîm* instead of to God," as opposed to "they sacrificed to the *šēdîm*, who are not God(s)" – the use of the plural "θεοῖς" in the Septuagint suggests that Driver's interpretation was the one favoured by the translator.

The denial of the *šēdîm*'s divinity is emphasised by the context of the verse; this is the second way in which it is possible to determine something of the meaning of the word. Deuteronomy 32:17 is a perfect example of synonymous parallelism, in which the theme of the first hemistich is iterated in a new but similar way in the second hemistich: "*They are sacrificing to the* šēdîm, *not God; gods, they did not know them / new ones came from near, your fathers were not horrified by them.*" The *šēdîm*, gods-who-are-not-gods, are equated with the new-ones-from-near. In Judges 5:8, the villagers of Israel chose חדשים, "new ones", and these are specifically identified as gods. This parallelism is emphasised by the repetition of the idea of the second half of each hemistich: "they did not know them" to "your fathers were not horrified by them". The latter phrase requires some more explanation: as Duane Christensen writes, the meaning of the verb שׂערום is uncertain, though he translates it as "they are not

[64] Driver 1902: 363.

cognizant". [65] This translation is supported by the Septuagint's "οὓς οὐκ ᾔδεισαν".[66] On the other hand, in Jeremiah 2:12, Ezekiel 27:35, and 32:10, the verb instead means "to bristle with horror";[67] the two meanings are not entirely at odds, as the natural reaction to knowledge of the supernatural or divine is fear, and fear is upheld in the Hebrew Bible as the suitable reaction to God (e.g. Proverbs 1:7, 9:10).

There is not only synonymous parallelism between the two hemistiches of verse 17; there is also parallelism between verse 17 and verse 16, which has its own synonymous parallelism. The word זרים, strange ones or foreigners, has negative and threatening connotations in the Hebrew Bible (e.g. Isaiah 1:7; Hosea 7:9; Jeremiah 5:19) and can also refer to foreign gods (e.g. Isaiah 43:12). It is paralleled by the word תועבת, abominations, which also has connotations in the Syriac version of other deities: 1 Kings 14:24 refers to תועבת הגוים, the "abominations of the nations", and in Deuteronomy 7:25 the silver and gold and graven images of "their gods" are תועבת יהוה, "abhorrences of Yahweh". This context of parallelism gives us valuable information about the *šēdîm*: they are foreign, abhorrent to Jewish sensibilities, new, and gods whose divinity is challenged – some elements of which are suggested by the only other time the word *šēdîm* appears in the Hebrew Bible.

Psalms

In the Psalms, δαιμόνιον is used to translate three different Hebrew words: *šēdîm, ʾelīlīm,* and *qeṭeb.* In addition to the major entailment that emerges from the Deuteronomic context – the

[65] Christensen 2002: 806.
[66] Tigay 1996: 306.
[67] Christensen 2002: 806.

evocation of pagan deities – the two major new entailments which the Psalmic context adds to the δαιμόνιον-blend emerging in the Septuagint are idolatry and harm.

Psalm 106 (LXX 105) begins with praise to God, despite the sins of the people of Israel described in the Pentateuch, and the later crimes of joining with the nations, worshipping idols, and finally, as described in this verse, engaging in human sacrifice.[68] That the only other use of *šēdîm* in the Hebrew Bible is also translated by the Greek δαιμόνιον can be explained by the theory of lexical equivalents discussed above. The rarity of the word *šēdîm* supports Barr's concession that Tov's lexicon theory is most reasonable in the instance of very uncommon words. Furthermore, the association of the *šēdîm* with demons continues long after the writing of the Septuagint: in Aramaic שׁידא is commonly used to denote a demon or an evil spirit, such as in Targum Leviticus 17:7, Isaiah 13:21, Psalm 91:6; and often in Syriac version of the New Testament.[69]

While the examination of why the Septuagintal translator used δαιμόνιον here is of interest, it is not crucial to the present study – after all, this project is more concerned with Luke's reception and subsequent use of conceptual blends than certainty of how those blends came to be attained – certainty which, in the case of the Septuagint in particular and the Bible in general, is rarely forthcoming. With this in mind, it is important that the link established in the translation of Deuteronomy 32:17 between δαιμονιά and foreign rites and foreign gods is reiterated, but also that a new semantic domain has been introduced. Not only are the people of God sacrificing to the other deities, but they are sacrificing their own children. Thus, the new entailment introduced into the developing δαιμόνιον-blend is that of immoral action by

[68] "Some scholars read the text here as referring to a cult of 'Shadday gods,' which included child sacrifice (see J. Hackett, 'Religious Traditions in Israelite Transjordan,' in *FS F. M. Cross* [1987], 133-34)." - Christensen 2002: 806.
[69] Driver 1902: 362.

those influenced by the δαιμονιά, immoral actions other than idolatry which do physical harm to members of the community, with death as their consequence.

In Psalm 96:5, δαιμονιά is used to translate the Hebrew word *ʾᵉlīlīm*, which is usually translated as "rags", "worthless things", or "idols". Of the twenty times the word *ʾᵉlīlīm* appears in the Hebrew Bible, in the vast majority of instances it has been taken to refer to idols (Leviticus 19:4, 26:1; 1 Chronicles 16:26 (a verse which shadows Psalm 96:5); Psalm 97:7; Isaiah 2:8, 18, 20 (twice), 10:10, 11, 19:1, 3, 31:7 (twice); Ezekiel 30:13; Habakkuk 2:18; the exceptions are Job 13:4 and Zechariah 11:17, and possibly Jeremiah 14:14 depending on how one translates it). These exceptions give us a clue as to its etymology: Job 13:4 refers to worthless physicians, Zechariah 11:17 to worthless shepherds, and Jeremiah 14:14 to idolatries or worthless, futile rituals or practices of divination.

Its etymology is difficult, but this meaning – from the sense of "rags" – is thought to come from the Ugaritic "*all*", which was apparently a type of garment, paired with another clothing-word, "*lbš*". This link between rags and idols corresponds with William F. Albright's possible explanation in *Archaeology and the Religion of Israel* of the biblical term *tᵉrāpīm*, which sought to explain the small household idols in the stories of Rachel and Michal, which were outlawed in Josiah's reform. Albright hypothesised that the word was related to the Canaanite *trp*, now known to have meant 'to wear out', and thus might also have had a ragged connotation.[70] A rag, something worn out, is deemed to be worthless – by using the word for 'rags' to refer to idols, especially when this is made clear in context, the similar entailment (worthlessness) is foregrounded. If this etymological link between 'rags'

[70] Albright 1968: 206 fn. 63; see Lewis, 'Teraphim' DDD: 844-845 for more detailed discussion.

and 'idols' is correct, this word itself is an example of metonymy, "[the use of] one entity to refer to another that is related to it."[71]

> The conceptual systems of cultures and religions are metaphorical in nature. Symbolic metonymies are critical links between everyday experience and the coherent metaphorical systems that characterize religions and cultures. *Symbolic metonymies that are grounded in our physical experience provide an essential means of comprehending religious and cultural concepts* [own emphasis].[72]

An alternative translation for *ʾᵉlīlīm* was offered by David Aaron. In his analysis of 1 Chronicles 16:25-26, a mirror of the earlier Psalm 96:5-6, he states that a translation of 'idols' actually makes very little sense. Why should Yahweh be feared above all gods, if the gods of the nations are idols? Is this a remnant of monolatry, or a statement of monotheism? To make sense of this, Aaron suggests an alternate translation of *ʾᵉlīlīm*: 'minor gods'. This would mean that the NRSV translation of 1 Chronicles 16:25-26 would read "For great is the Lord, and greatly to be praised; he is to be revered above all gods. For all the gods of the peoples are minor deities, but the Lord made the heavens." He also cites Isaiah 10:10-11 and Leviticus 26:1 as passages which would be elucidated by this alternative translation. Aaron makes the valid point that the theory of *ʾᵉlīl*'s etymology is only a theory, and suggests an alternative etymology: that the Hebrew *ʾᵉlīl* is not a parallel to the Ugaritc *all*, but to the Akkadian *ililu*, a term for the highest rank of gods, including Marduk, Nergal, and Aššur. It is itself a derivative of Ellil, the Akkadian form of the Sumerian Enlil – he is noteworthy as the god who bestows the divine authority to rule, the *ellilū'tu*, the 'Ellil-ship'. Aaron writes that "the term eventually became a generic reference for gods, not unlike the transformation

[71] Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 35.
[72] Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 40.

witnessed in the originally formal name Ishtar, which became *ishtaru* as a general term for female deities."[73]

However, he goes too far when he says that "the word אליל has no intrinsic relationship to iconolatry"[74] – the word has no intrinsic *etymological* relationship that we know of, but has clearly been taken to refer to idols in many contexts, suggesting a developed semantic relationship. His substitution in Isaiah 31:7 is far less persuasive than the new translations of 1 Chronicles 16:25, Isaiah 10:10-11, Leviticus 26:1, and of course, Psalm 96:5-6. That being said, his overall point is convincing: that *ʾᵉlīlīm* sometimes refers to idols, and sometimes to the gods that they represent. "By recognizing how integral the question of god-belief is to our understanding of idol imagery we are able to establish more sensible conditions of relevance when translation ... we should avoid forcing the vocabulary into certain stereotypical renderings. In the process, we also gain access to the function of idols as they were understood in biblical materials." [75]

In the language of metaphor, this identification of 'idols' as referring both to physical items and to the gods of which they were believed to be a dwelling-place is a *synecdoche* – the conceptual understanding that the part stands for the whole.[76] As Lakoff and Johnson write:

> When we think of *a Picasso*, we are not just thinking of a work of art alone, in and of itself. We think of it in terms of its relation to the artist, that is, his conception of his art, his technique, his role in art history, etc. We act with reverence towards *a Picasso*, even a sketch he made as a teen-ager, because of its relation to the artist.[77]

[73] Aaron 2001: 161 fn. 12.
[74] Aaron 2001: 161.
[75] Aaron 2001: 162.
[76] Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 36.
[77] Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 39.

However, the question of this chapter is not what the Hebrew composers understood *ʾelīlīm* to mean, save where that question can illuminate why the Psalmic translator translated it as he did. Instead, it asks what understanding might Luke have received from this passage? What is fascinating about this verse in particular is that, rare as it is, *ʾelīlīm* appears twice in Psalms: here, and in Psalm 97:7, where the translator[78] uses "τοῖς εἰδώλοις" as a translation. I would suggest that the translator is prioritising parallelism: just as the Lord is more terrifying than πάντας τοὺς θεούς, πάντες οἱ θεοὶ τῶν ἐθνῶν δαιμόνια, and just as πάντες οἱ προσκυνοῦντες τοῖς γλυπτοῖς will be shamed, so will anyone ἐγκαυχώμενοι ἐν τοῖς εἰδώλοις αὐτῶν. As for the message Luke receives, the verse is quite clear: the gods of the nations are demons. It is no great leap to the conclusion that at least some demons are therefore the gods of the nations.

The final use of δαιμόνιον in the Psalms comes in LXX 90:6, in which δαιμόνιον is used to translate the Hebrew *qeṭeb*. "The destruction that wastes at midday" has become a demon. It is quite possible that this personification was already present in the Hebrew text, as argued by Wyatt.[79] He argues that pestilence in Deuteronomy 32:24 is personified as Resheph, the Ugaritic god of plague, and that the Hebrew terms in Psalm 91:5-6 are likewise disease-gods. In the Ancient Near Eastern tradition, noon and pestilence were associated, and were both under the auspices of the god Nergal, who also controlled a number of demons and evil forces, like the *ilū sebettu*, the "Seven Gods", the agents of death. The association of demons with the number seven survives to appear in the gospel of Luke, in 8:2 and 11:26. Again, the major entailments carried forward are those relating to pagan deities and to harm.

[78] In the case of the Psalms, it is uncontroversial to assume a single translator.
[79] Wyatt, 'Qeteb' DDD: 673.

Isaiah

Isaiah 13:21 and 34:14 contain another example of one rare Hebrew word being translated with δαιμόνιον; the difference is that, unlike *šēdîm*, it is not always translated so. The word *śĕʻîrîm* is the plural of *śāʻîr*, a word meaning 'hairy', and used, for example, in Genesis 27:11. It thus appears over fifty times with the meaning of a male goat, in addition to its synonyms *ṣāpîr*, *tayiš*, and *ʻattûd*. However, in several instances it instead describes a kind of hairy demon. In Leviticus 17:17, the verse is rewritten so that instead of sacrifices no longer being offered to the *śĕʻîrîm*, they will no longer be offered to the ματαίοις, the ones who achieve nothing and are of no practical benefit. In 2 Chronicles 11:15, the Hebrew's "priests for the high places, and the *śĕʻîrîm*, and the calf-idols" become "priests for the high places, and for the idols and the vanities, and for the calves" in the Septuagint. For the first time there is a connection made with the animal world. The links between idolatry, foreign gods, and animals would have been particularly potent in the city of Alexandria, with so many representations of animal-headed Egyptian deities. From the context of the translations there is a further entailment of association with the wilderness – this entailment, perhaps most clearly included in the NT in Revelation 18:2, also survives in Luke 11:24 ff., in which an exorcised demon wanders in the waterless places.

Isaiah 65 forms a diatribe against an idolatrous people, a response to the piteous lament in Isaiah 64, in place of the usual response of divine assurance to such lamentation. Verse 3 in particular had a significant influence on New Testament demonology, especially on the story of the Gerasene demoniac, and in Paul's use of this verse in 1 Corinthians 10. It is a trying verse, with many difficulties for the exegete, and it is complicated further by the odd variant

in 1QIsa[a], which has "they suck hands on the stones" in place of "they burn incense". It is possible that the translator of Isaiah had just as much difficulty in trying to work out what is meant by this panoply of ritualistic actions, because δαιμόνιον here is used not as a translation of any given Hebrew word, but as a qualifier, an attempt to explain what in the actions of sacrificing in gardens and burning incense on bricks is so objectionable. Equally interesting is the addition of ἃ οὐκ ἔστιν. Instead of the monolatry suggested by the use of δαιμόνιον in Deuteronomy and Psalms, the translator of Isaiah is emphatic in his statement of monotheism. In the following verse, the worshippers are said to sit among the graves, eating pork and other unclean foods. The entailment of impurity is foregrounded, and the story of the Gerasene Demoniac in the Synoptic gospels has clear parallels with this text.

Later in the same chapter (65:11), the translator again uses δαιμόνιον, this time as the direct replacement for Gad, the name of a pagan deity of luck. The name is used only here, and in Genesis 30:11, in which Leah names Zilpah's son Gad. In the Hebrew Bible, his name survives in place-names like Baal-gad and Migdal-gad in the book of Joshua, and in personal names like Gadi, Gaddiel, and Azgad. Gad was worshipped in Phoenicia and in the Phoenician colonies around the Mediterranean, with epigraphic evidence in Punic inscriptions from Spain, Tunisia, and Sardinia as well as the Levant. In the same verse, the name Minni is translated using the name of the Greek goddess Tyche, a goddess of luck who was particularly invoked with regard to the prosperity of a city. Martin writes that the paring of the two terms in Aeschines, *Against Ctesiphon* 157 is "surely coincidental";[80] however, reliefs from the fourth century BCE suggest at the very least a traditional association between the Agathos Daimon and the Agathe Tyche, and that Agathe Tyche might have been

[80] Martin 2010: 659 n. 7.

conceptualised as the Agathodaimon's consort.[81] The Septuagint translation of Isaiah is particularly noted for the translator's reference to his Alexandrian context.[82]

Summary

In brief, the uses of δαιμόνιον taken together suggest several major entailments. The first and overwhelmingly the most important is the association of the δαιμόνιον with foreign gods – the use of the Hellenistic input space is particularly dominant in this blend, and is made very obvious by the contexts of Deuteronomy 32:17, Psalm 106:37 and Isaiah 65. A second entailment is that of idolatry, obviously linked to the association with foreign gods.
After this, there is an entailment of harm, particularly in the Psalms. Finally, particularly from the use of δαιμόνιον in Isaiah, are the entailments of association with animals, and association with wild places. These two are surprisingly relevant in the Synoptic gospels, with appearances in the stories of the Gerasene/Gadarene Demoniac and the Temptation respectively.

In support of my argument that together these uses can form a 'δαιμόνιον-blend' that survives to the time of the New Testament, each of these entailments appears in the Book of Revelation in association with the lexeme δαιμόνιον. The author of Revelation makes great use of the Septuagint, relying on allusions rather than marked citations.[83] In 9:20 a link is made between demons and idols, either one of association[84] or conflation due to an epexegetic interpretation of καί.[85]

[81] Gasparro 1997; Ogden 2014: 137.
[82] Seeligmann 1948; Schaper 2010; Greenbaum 2016.
[83] Law 2013: 114; see also Paulien 2001: 9 and Moyise 2004: 231.
[84] E.g. Charles 1920: 254.
[85] e.g. Smalley 2005: 242.

In Revelation 16:13-14, the author has a vision in which three "πνεύματα ... ἀκάθαρτα ὡς βάτραχοι", unclean spirits like frogs, emerge from the mouth of a dragon.[86] Frogs are considered unclean in Jewish Law (Lev. 11:20, 31-38, 42-43), evoking the entailments of association with animals and with impurity in Isaiah 65. G. K. Beale writes that "the frog plague was partly a polemic against Heqt, the goddess of resurrection, represented by a frog"[87] – if this is the case, then once again there is a link between the use of the word δαιμόνιον, and a reference to foreign gods. I will discuss the association with πνεύματα in §4.4.

Finally, in 18:2, the fall of Babylon is predicted: it will become "a dwelling-place of demons, a prison of every unclean spirit, a prison of every unclean bird, a prison of every unclean beast…." The beginning of 18:2b finds a close parallel in Isa. 34.13b.[88] "John's δαιμονίων almost certainly corresponds to שעירים (LXX δαιμόνια) in Isa. 13.21; 34.14a, and πνεύματος ἀκαθάρτου is probably a parallel expansion, though it may be inspired by the legendary לילית in Isa. 34.14."[89] The entailments discussed above are clearly in use: the association with animals, impurity, and the wilderness above all. The link to unclean spirits is equally clear.

The presence of these entailments supports the argument that the reading of the Septuagint created in the minds of its readers a δαιμόνιον-blend, a conceptualisation based on Greek literature and thought combined with the contexts in which the word appeared in the Septuagint. The same entailments engendered by these contexts are apparent in the Book of

[86] Such was the power of this image of demonic frogs that in the 13th century *Douce Apocalypse* and thereafter, Satan was imagined to bear a coat of arms of three green frogs on a shield of red – Rodney 1975: 112.
[87] Beale 1999: 832.
[88] Fekkes 1993: 215. Some criticisms of Fekkes' approach appear in Mathewson 2005: 189.
[89] Fekkes 1993: 215-216.

Revelation, another New Testament text written in the same period as Luke's gospel. It is therefore no great reach to suggest that Luke too had his own δαιμόνιον-blend, a conceptualisation of what a δαιμόνιον was, to which he then referred in his own works.

3.2.3 – Satan

In the early twentieth century, there were two major answers proposed to tackle the problem of Satan in the Old Testament. The first, exemplified by Volz 1924, was monism: that Yahweh is an ambivalent deity, containing both good and evil. This was explicitly challenged by Lindström 1983, though the neglect of 2 Samuel 24 (and its connection to 1 Chronicles 21) is a major flaw in his work, as Laato points out.[90] The second proposal could be termed the monolatry answer, exemplified by Kluger 1967. The Ugaritic finds of the 1930s brought the concept of a divine council to the attention of biblical scholars,[91] and Kluger hence argues that through the satanic references of the Hebrew Bible there is a progressive personification (and separation from the divine) of God's dark side, culminating in 1 Chronicles 21.[92]

The work of Day shifted the discussion onto the Hebrew word *śāṭān* itself.[93] She examines the use of *śāṭān* in Numbers 22:22 and 32, Job 1-2, Zechariah 3, and 1 Chronicles 21,[94] arguing that there is no coherent development in the Hebrew Bible. Instead, *śāṭān* is used at

[90] Laato 2013: 3 n. 6.
[91] e.g. Wheeler Robinson 1944; Wright 1950: 30-41; Moore Cross 1953: 274-277. On the development of the divine council in the light of increasing monotheism, see also Laato 2006: 5-17; Schreiber 2006: 438; Theobald 2015: 31.
[92] Kluger 1967: 79, 87, 159.
[93] The etymology of *śātān* has evoked a great deal of discussion with little agreement by scholars; several possible roots from Hebrew, Akkadian, or Egyptian have been at various points put forward or argued against. For more detail see Stokes 2014: 263 n. 34. Gershenson 2002 unpersuasively strikes out on his own to explore similarities with the Greek terms for 'satyr' and 'Titan' to argue that the name Satan is of Greek origin.
[94] This method is later followed by Tate 1992 and Laato 2006.

various points to refer to either angels, human opponents, or other obstacles rather than to a specific single figure, and each occurrence must be independently studied in its own context.

The noun *śāṭān* could mean both 'adversary' in general and 'legal accuser' in particular,[95] and it was used to refer to various beings both terrestrial and divine when they played either of these adversarial roles. Proceeding from this observation, it becomes clear that there is not one celestial *śāṭān* in the Hebrew Bible, but rather the potential for many. And if the *śāṭān* of, for instance, Zechariah 3 is not the same *śāṭān* as the one despatched to oppose Balaam nor the one who provoked David to number Israel, when we should certainly not speak of a single developing character or personality. To do so would be to speak from within the worldview of our pre-critical Jewish and Christian predecessors.[96]

In support of Day's argument, Kreutzer (2005) concludes that the use of *śāṭān* with the definite article in Zechariah and Job does not necessitate that we understand the title as a proper noun; instead, he equates it to the position of an antagonist in literature.[97] Laato (2006), however, argues that the use of the definite article could possibly refer to "a specific celestial individual," given that Adam is referred to with a definite article in Genesis 5:3. "The fact that the article does not occur in 1 Chronicles 21 lends credence to the interpretation."[98] He however goes on to admit that "Satan was not the self-evident name of the leader of demons in early Jewish writings,"[99] this being Shemihazah in 1 Enoch 6-7, for example, 'Asa'el in 1 Enoch 8, or Mastemah in Jubilees – though this is derived from *śātām*,

[95] Stokes 2014 argues that in a legal situation, "executioner" is a more appropriate translation, citing 2 Samuel 19:23. Stokes 2016: 268: "the word in fact refers to a person who attacks another person physically and, usually, lethally."
[96] Day 1988: 15; see also Tate 1992 and DDD 1999: 726–732 (n.b., of which Day was a co-author).
[97] On Zechariah, also see Rudman 2008.
[98] Laato 2006: 4.
[99] Laato 2006: 4.

a biform of *śāṭān.*[100] He concludes that *śāṭān* originally refers to a position on the divine council mentioned above, and that later it became "connected with the proper name of personal evil."[101]

In the Septuagint, *śāṭān* is usually translated as διάβολος, with the exception of 3 Kgdms 11:14, 23, where a human adversary is identified as a σατᾶν. The word διάβολος is also used in Esther 7:6 and 1 Maccabees 1:36 of a human figure (Haman and Antiochus IV respectively); the case of the latter is particularly interesting, given that the full phrase is διάβολον πονηρόν. "Thus the term διάβολος, as late as the translation of 1 Maccabees,[102] was not *ipso facto* taken to be a non-human figure nor sufficiently evil in connotation so that the adjective πονηρός, 'evil, wicked,' was no longer needed to modify it."[103]

3.3 – Hellenistic Jewish Sources

3.3.1 – Qumran Texts and Other Second Temple Jewish Sources

The impact of the discovery of the Dead Sea Scrolls on our understanding of Jewish and Christian demonology cannot be overestimated, and impossible within the small space this thesis allows.[104] In this section I focus on two specific themes: the connection between spirits

[100] Laato 2006: 4.
[101] Laato 2006: 4.
[102] "Klaus-Dietrich Schunck, 1 *Makkabäerbuch* (Jüdische Schriften aus hellenistischrömischer Zeit 1/4; Gütersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1980) 292, puts the composition of the original at 120 B.C.E. A date shortly thereafter for the translation into Greek seems appropriate, i.e., ca. 100—50 B.C.E." – Gammie 1985: 13 fn. 33.
[103] Gammie 1985: 12-13.
[104] More thorough overviews of the wealth of material can be found in Alexander 1999; Bohak 2008: 105-12, 298-305; Lichtenberger 2009; Fröhlich 2013; Stuckenbruck 2013; Reynolds 2013; Reynolds 2018; and Tigechelaar 2019.

and demons in Second Temple Jewish literature, and the question of how widespread was the belief in a celestial personification of evil or ruler of demons.

For example, the Book of Tobit does not contain a celestial personification of evil or an explicit ruler of demons, but the inclusion of a *named* demonic antagonist in a Jewish work is an important step in the development of Second Temple Jewish demonology. Tobit's entertaining format almost certainly increased its exposure and popularity. Docherty (2013), while making no claim of direct influence, notes several points of contact between Tobit and Luke-Acts, particularly on the issues of angelology, prayer, almsgiving, and relationships with Gentiles.[105] With regards to demonology in particular, as Stuckenbruck points out, in Tobit we see one of the earliest examples of characterisation of a specific demon, "to be more fully developed at a later period, which itemized and classified malevolent powers and dealt with them in accordance with their particular functions and characteristics."[106] We can see evidence of the development of this tradition in the New Testament, in the statement that "this kind [of demon] cannot be cast out by anything except prayer" in Mark 9:29. In Luke's treatment of this pericope in Luke 9:37-43 (see §5.10), this statement is one of several redactions made by Luke; however, we need not assume that Luke has any issues with this tradition in particular, as Luke shortens Mark's account quite dramatically, and other explanations have been put forward for this particular excision (e.g., that Luke wanted to soften any criticism of the disciples by removing Jesus's rebuke regarding their ignorance).[107]

On the question of a distinction between demons and evil spirits, Tobit is ambiguous. In 4Q197 4 I 13 (Tobit 6:8), the heart of the fish which Tobias catches is said to be useful for

[105] Docherty 2013: 92.
[106] Stuckenbruck 2013: 69; cf. 1 Enoch 15:8-16:1; 4Q560; 11Q11 v, and the later examples in Test. Sol., Sefer ha-Razim, and incantation bowls (as mentioned in Chapter 7 of this thesis).
[107] Fitzmyer 1970: 810.

relieving a person afflicted by "a demon or an [evil] spirit (שד או רוה באיש)".[108] However, it is difficult to be certain of the meaning of the Hebrew או; it could be an exclusive "or", or it could signify that the writer thought 'demon' and 'evil spirit' were synonyms and the "or" functions as the introduction of an explanation or illustration.

Stokes (2016) traces the connection between 'demons' and 'spirits' to the Book of Watchers (1 Enoch 1-36), an expansion of Gen 6:1-4.[109] The author of 1 Enoch 15:7-10 traces the creation of evil spirits to the union of angels and humans: "although the gigantic, fleshly bodies of the Watchers' children perish, the spiritual halves of these hybrid beings survive as 'evil spirits' (πνεύματα πονηρά)."[110] However, while spirits and demons have been brought together, they are conceived as distinct, for in 19:1 Uriel explains that the πνεύματα induce human beings to "sacrifice to δαιμονιά as to gods" – a clear similarity to Deut 32:16-17 and LXX Ps 106:37 discussed above. If, as Stokes argues, the 'demons' are to be equated with the punished angels, this would be the earliest text to identify demons as fallen angels.[111] In Hebrew, the relationship between spirits and demons is briefly alluded to in the extremely fragmentary Songs of the Sage or Songs of the *Maskil* (4Q510–511), in which the instructor seeks to terrify "all the spirits of the angels of destruction and the spirits of the bastards, demons, hyenas, Lilith, howlers."[112]

Like the text of the Book of Watchers, we lack the original Hebrew text of *Jubilees.* The 2nd century BCE text is preserved only in Ethiopic translation.[113] In it, evil spirits are particularly

[108] Stoke 2016: 265; see also Stuckenbruck 2013:56-60.
[109] See Charlesworth 2002: 233-34 on the third-century BCE composition of 1 Enoch 1-36, aptly titled "A Rare Consensus among Enoch Specialists."
[110] Stokes 2016: 263. As Stokes also points out, while 1 Enoch was composed in Aramaic, it only comes to us through Greek and Ethiopic translations.
[111] Stokes 2016: 264.
[112] See Tigchelaar 2019: 4 n. 14 for a more detailed discussion of the translation of terms in this fragment.
[113] Stokes 2016: 265.

associated with the Gentiles, and lead them into idolatry (11:1-6; 12:20); just like in 1 Enoch, the objects of this idolatry are demons, not spirits (1:11; 22:17). However, Stokes argues that the distinction between demons and spirits is at least somewhat diminished, and possibly interchangeable, because Jubilees twice refers to those who harm and mislead humans as demons (7:27; 10:2-3). The objects of idolatrous worship, on the other hand, are only ever referred to as demons, and never spirits. Both spirits and demons are malevolent entities, but only demons are worshipped by the Gentiles.[114] He makes the further point that this "terminological distinction" is preserved in the New Testament, in 1 Corinthians 10:20-21 and Revelation 9:20. "While *Jubilees* and the New Testament attest to some semantic overlap in these terms, the overlap is not complete, since evil spirits are not said to be objects of worship."[115]

Fröhlich makes a connection between the role played by Asmodeus in Tobit and mention of a spirit (*rwḥ*) who causes impotence in Pharaoh's court in Genesis Apocryphon (cf. Gen. 12:10-20). Just as Asmodeus ensures that Sarah remains a virgin until she marries Tobias, "the addition in *Genesis Apocryphon* fills a gap in the narrative logic of Gen. 12, offering an undeniable proof that Sarai could not have been made impure either by Pharaoh or by any other Egyptian (1Q20 xix 10-20…)." This spirit is both *mktš* (pestilential) and *b'yš'* (evil), and afflicted Pharaoh and all the men of his court for two years. It is removed and "driven away" (1Q20 xx 28) by Abram praying over Pharaoh and laying his hands upon his head.[116]

As Fröhlich notes, there is no ancient Jewish parallel to impotence caused by demonic activity, but impotence – along with fever and other illnesses, famine, drought, infertility –

[114] Stokes 2016: 265.
[115] Stokes 2016: 266.
[116] Fröhlich 2013: 39.

was a weapon in the arsenal of the *utukku* (from the Sumerian UDUG.HUL).[117] "The cause of the illness was usually some past sin committed by the patient, an offense against a certain god, which calls forth the functioning of the 'hand of god'. The concept of a causal relationship between sin and illness was similar in Israel."[118]

She also makes the presupposition from the congruence of *Genesis Apocryphon* with 2 Kings 5:11 and Luke 4:40-41 that the general belief with regards to illness-causing spirits was that they dwelt within the body. I will discuss this in more detail in **§4.3**; she is right that by the first centuries BCE and CE the conceptualisation of demonic attention certainly involves the demon being within the victim's body, but her application of this to the much earlier 2 Kings 5:11 is more tenuous. Fröhlich cites Stol 1993: 52 in support of her general assertion,[119] but Waldman[120] and Wilson-Reynolds[121] show that the reality of understanding in the Ancient Near East was more nuanced.

While a demon is not explicitly mentioned in the Prayer of Nabonidus (4Q242), Fröhlich argues that the reader is meant to understand implicitly that the king's malady is the result of demonic activity due to two details: first, he is healed by an exiled Jewish exorcist (*gzr*) after a laying on of hands, and second, the exorcism involves the absolution of the king's sins. While a demon is not mentioned, the work includes a discussion that the king had been praying to idols of gold, silver, and other materials; as seen above in **§3.2.1**, by this time idolatry and demons were closely linked in Jewish thought.[122] Demons of fever are also

[117] Stol 1999: 57-68; see also Stol 1993 passim.
[118] Fröhlich 2013: 40, who notes Job 4:7-8; 5:6-7 as evidence of this. See also Van der Toorn 1985, Scurlock 2006, 73-4.
[119] Fröhlich 2013: 42-3, esp. fn. 92.
[120] Waldman 1989: 161.
[121] Wilson-Reynolds 1990: 189-193.
[122] Fröhlich 2013: 42-3.

mentioned in the Aramaic 4Q560[123] and are specifically mentioned as entering the flesh of their victim (4Q560 1 I 2-3). Fröhlich's analysis is particularly useful in its highlighting of the retention of Ancient Near Eastern demonological tropes in Second Temple Judaism.

The sheer breadth of material found in Qumran can symbolise the difficulty facing scholars in attempting to create a single, coherent "Second Temple Jewish demonology". Even articles which purport to summarise a "demonology of the Dead Sea Scrolls" are in truth an exploration of an incomplete library of texts in several different languages. If the Dead Sea Scrolls illustrate any one truth about belief in the demonic, it is of the diversity of ideas about sin, evil, and malevolent spiritual beings.

With this in mind, while the material at Qumran offers a glimpse into the variety of beliefs of a small group of believers in Palestine, it is known that Luke, at the very least, favoured the Septuagint and Greek scriptures over writings in Hebrew or Aramaic. The Dead Sea Scrolls are useful for understanding more about the general beliefs in demons at the time of Jesus in Palestine, but to sketch out a clearer image of the demonic worldview of the evangelist Luke, we must also consider the Greek writings of Jewish scholars like Philo and Josephus.

3.3.2 – Philo of Alexandria

The writings of Philo of Alexandria are particularly relevant because he, like Luke, was situated at the confluence of Jewish scripture and Hellenistic thought. Philo equated the δαίμονες he encountered in Hellenistic literature and philosophy with the angels of Judaism.

[123] Puech 2009: 291-302; for earlier editions, see Penney and Wise 1994: 627-50; Naveh 1998: 252-261; Garcia Martinez and Tigchelaar 1998: 2:1116-7.

They functioned as intermediaries between God and humans, and were situated in one of the heavens.

For Philo, δαίμονες, souls, and angels were names given to the same concept (Gig. 12-16; Somn. 1.138-141).[124] Philo took the stance that a demon was a malicious or malevolent δαίμων.[125] Any further division or classification was done according to their relationship with human bodies. Specifically, the major categories were: "immortal souls who have never descended into the body, souls who have descended and have been overwhelmed in the torrent of bodily passions, other incarnated souls who have devoted themselves to philosophy and have escaped the dungeon of the body (this demonology goes back to Plato and Xenocrates, and is essentially borrowed from Middle Platonism ....)."[126]

This final classification is of particular interest. The Orphic and Pythagorean conception of the body as a mausoleum in which the body was entombed was taken up by Plato (e.g. *Phd*. 82e and *passim*, *Phdr*. 250c; discussed with the famous sōma/sēma pun in *Gorg*. 493a and *Crat*. 400b-c), and thence by Philo (*Leg*. 1.108; *Somn*. 1.139; *QG* 2.69, 4.153).[127] Another articulation from the same or an extremely similar cultural point is found in Wisdom of Solomon 9:15,[128] which reads φθαρτὸν γὰρ σῶμα βαρύνει ψυχήν καὶ βρίθει τὸ γεῶδες σκῆνος νοῦν πολυφρόντιδα.

[124] See also *Decal* 54; *Virt* 172; *Prob*. 39, 112, 130; *Hypoth* 6.9; *De Mosis* 1.276.
[125] Nikiprowetzky 1980: 68.
[126] Runia 1986: 330.
[127] Runia 1986: 262.
[128] Probably written in the first century BCE, "though any time from the second century B.C.E. to the first century C.E. is possible" (Harrington 1999: 55). It is most likely to have been written in Alexandria (Harrington 1999: 55; see also Clifford 1998: 135-136.), and was composed in Greek (Harrington, 1999: 56).

In §4.3.2, I will discuss two distinct models of possession. The first, the COVERING model, was in use in the Ancient Near East and elements of it can be seen in the Hebrew Bible. The second, the CONTAINER model, conceptualises the body as a container in which the soul or mind resides – and in which an alien spirit may also reside, resulting in possession.

While I do not argue that Luke had read the Wisdom of Solomon or Philo, he was part of a Hellenistic Jewish milieu in which the body was conceptualised as a DWELLING or a CONTAINER. My conjecture is that this was a result of the general trend towards mind-body dualism in Greek thought. The CONTAINER model of possession evident in Luke's gospel and in the New Testament in general mirrors Philo's reception of Hellenistic philosophy, and his conscious synthesis of its ideas with Jewish literature and theology.[129]

3.3.3 – Josephus

A thorough overview of Josephus's understanding of the preternatural world is beyond the scope of this section; instead, I have chosen to highlight a handful of the most relevant passages to illustrate the cultural milieu in which *Luke* was writing. A recent and far more thorough overview can be found in Bay 2020.[130] In it, Bay argues that "Josephus' use of daemons helps us understand him as a concurrently Jewish and Hellenistic author, and illustrates how d(a)emons[131] could function within Hellenistic Judaism as markers of diverse cultural commitments."[132]

[129] For detailed discussion of Philo's demonology see Nikiprowetzky 1980 and Wright 2005.
[130] Kindly provided to me by the author ahead of its official publication.
[131] Bay 2020: 2 n. 5 explains the distinction; Bay uses the term "daemon(ic)" denote ancient Greek references to daemons and "demon" to translate Aramaic or Hebrew terms.
[132] Bay 2020: 2.

In *The Jewish War*, δαιμόνια are held responsible for a wide spectrum of events: prophecy (1.69; 6.300-309), signs (1.82; 1.331), deaths (1.84), earthquakes (1.370), and public frenzies (1.347). In 1.521, δαίμων is used to refer to the spirits of the dead; in 1.556, Herod blames the deaths of his sons on a δαίμων. In 1.599 and 1.607 the δαίμονες of Alexander and Aristobulus have a vengeful hand in human affairs (cf. *Antiquities* 17.1). Δαίμονες can seek destruction (1.628) and vengeance (2.455), or incite acts of madness (2.259; 3.485; 6.252).[133] However, as the spirits of the dead, they can work for justice (*The Jewish War* 1.82, 84; *Antiquities* 13.314, 317, 415-16, *etc.*).[134]

Two major indications of Josephus's thinking can be found in *The Jewish War*; in 6.47, he tells his audience:

> For what brave man knows not that souls released from the flesh by the sword on the battlefield are hospitably welcomed by that purest of elements, the ether, and placed among the stars, and that as good daemons (δαίμονες ἀγαθοὶ) and well-disposed heroes they manifest their presence to their posterity.

This degree of theoretical discussion is rare for Josephus; where Philo is more philosophical, Josephus' mentions of demons tend to be more practical, and usually grounded in narrative. With further regard to the spirits of the dead, in *The Jewish War* 7.185 he writes:

> The so-called daemons (καλούμενα δαιμόνια) – that is, the spirits of wicked men (ταῦτα δὲ πονηρῶν ἐστιν ἀνθρώπων πνεύματα) which enter the living and kill them unless aid is forthcoming – are promptly expelled by this root, if it is merely applied to patients.

[133] For further examples and discussion, see Bay 2020: 4-12.
[134] Bolt 1996: 95 n. 80.

This clause tells us several things. First, that there is a known connection between δαιμόνια and πνεύματα. Second, that they are able cause illness, to the point of death. Third, that they *enter* their victims (the verb εἰσδύνω has a relatively visceral or violent connotation). Fourth, just as they enter, so can they be expelled – in this case, by use of the Baaras plant.

However, it is the story of Eleazar from Josephus's *Jewish Antiquities* (8.45-49) which has tended to attract the most attention from scholars:[135]

> And God granted him (sc. Solomon) knowledge of the art used against demons for the benefit and healing of men. He also composed incantations by which illnesses are relieved, and left behind forms of exorcisms with which those possessed by demons drive them out, never to return. And this kind of cure is of a very great power among us to this day, for I have seen a certain Eleazar, a countryman of mine, in the presence of Vespasian, his sons, tribunes and a number of other soldiers, free men possessed by demons, and this was the manner of the cure: he put to the nose of the possessed man a ring which had under its seal one of the roots prescribed by Solomon, and then, as the man smelled it, drew out the demon (τὸ δαιμόνιον) through his nostrils, and, when the man at once fell down, adjured the demon never to come back into him, speaking Solomon's name and reciting the incantations which he had composed. Then, wishing to convince the bystanders and prove to them that he had this power, Eleazar placed a cup or foot-basin full of water a little way off and commanded the demon, as it went out of the man, to overturn it and make known to the spectators that he had left the man. And when this was done, the understanding and wisdom of Solomon were clearly revealed.

The δαιμόνιον is invisible, but clearly capable of moving physical objects. In §4.4.1 and §4.4.2 I will discuss the conceptualisations of πνεύματα and δαιμόνια: a demon, like a spirit, or wind, or breath, is invisible, but its effects can be felt, and sometimes seen. As was the

[135] For more analysis on the background and cultural context of this particular story, see Förster 2001: 205-221 and Torijano 2002: 93-105.

case with *The Jewish War* 7.185, the δαιμόνιον is capable of residing *within* the body of its victim, and can be exorcised by the use of esoteric knowledge and, again, a herbal remedy.

In Josephus's minor works, references to δαιμόνια follow standard Hellenistic understanding: in *Vita* 402, Josephus states that in his combat with Sulla, his military victory would have been complete "had I not been thwarted by δαίμονός τινος"; in *Contra Apion* 2.263, he makes reference to the δαιμόνιον of Socrates.

Deines (2003) focuses primarily on Josephus's treatment of the stories of Eleazar and Saul, and characterises Josephus's engagement as "zurückhaltende" (2003: 365), something expected by his readers, but sharply separated from all discussion of the divine: demons are not characterised as fallen angels or the sons of fallen angels, and the Devil is not mentioned.

Bay 2020 consciously attempts to fill the gaps left by Deines' treatment and aims to provide a more comprehensive review of Josephus's demonology. Bay concludes that Josephus's presentation of demons underscores the two worlds of his "hybrid identity". In agreement with Ferguson (1984: 85), Bay concludes that while Josephus does deliberately include some Jewish themes and narratives, his conceptualisation of daemons is overwhelmingly dependent on the Hellenistic elements of his background and education, and reflects widespread Greek ideas rather even when utilised in discussion of Jewish scripture.[136]

[136] Bay 2020: 32.

3.4 – Summary

In this chapter, I have shown how the confluence of Hellenistic and Jewish literature and belief – particularly in the Septuagint – resulted in a conceptualisation of the demonic which carried entailments from both spheres, in addition to remnants of influences from the Ancient Near East. This conceptual blend was used by Mark and thence Luke. I will demonstrate in the next chapter precisely how Luke creates his own conceptual blend of the spiritual and the demonic. Furthermore, the tentative dualism of Qumran and the invisible but physically powerful demonic possession of Josephus are both elements found within the gospels. Particularly in *Enoch* and *Jubilees*, we see evidence of demonic organisation, particularly under a specific named figure. The specific Septuagintal entailment which links δαιμόνια to specifically foreign gods impacts Luke's conceptualisation of the demonic world as an empire with a ruler, to whom authority over all the kingdoms of the world has been given, and into whose territory Jesus is encroaching with the aim of capturing territory for the kingdom of God.

CHAPTER 4: Return from the Jordan – The Devil and a Demon

4.1 – Introduction

Having given a brief overview of the various demonological influences on Luke before the composition of his gospel, in this chapter, I will introduce the three major elements of Luke's conception of demonology, and the questions which this thesis sets out to answer: What is Luke's understanding of Jesus's relationship with Satan? How does Luke conceptualise possession? And what does Luke think a demon *is*?

Luke's cosmological worldview is governed by three structures. The first is a conceptual metaphor: ARGUMENT IS WAR. Luke's presentation of the Temptation Narrative evokes this metaphor, and introduces us as readers to the metaphor which underlies his understanding of Satan's role in the story which he is telling.

The second structure is the UP-DOWN schema – this is a cognitive structure by which we organise many metaphors on a vertical axis. We will see that each of the three temptations involves a suggested move from a higher physical position to a lower one, which mirrors the evangelist's understanding of the moral and cosmological implications of such movement.

The UP-DOWN schema also characterises one of the major models of possession in the ancient world, which I called the COVERING Metaphor. According to this metaphor, a spirit remains outside the body of the person it seeks to influence. A second schema, the CONTAINER schema, characterises the second model of possession, in which the spirit *enters* the body of the person whom it influences. Luke uses both the COVERING and CONTAINER metaphors

when speaking about the Holy Spirit, but foregrounds the CONTAINER metaphor regarding demonic possession.

Finally, I will show how conceptual blending can be used to describe Luke's conceptualisation of a demon. This blend is largely reliant on the understanding of the various entailments of the lexeme πνεῦμα, and on the entailments which Luke has inherited from the Septuagint's uses of the lexeme δαιμόνιον. Luke articulates an explicit conceptual blend from his Markan source and his understanding of the Septuagint which he uses throughout the rest of his two-volume work.

4.2 – Luke 4:1-13 – The Temptation Narrative

Before I discuss the appearance of the devil and of the temptations themselves, it is first worth noting Luke's use of scripture in this passage. His Jesus introduces three quotations from Deuteronomy with the Greek Γέγραπται ("it has been written"), in Luke 4:4, 8, and 10. The inclusion here of Deuteronomy indicates some degree of influence on the evangelist.

4.2.1 – Use of the Old Testament

Lukan quotations of the Old Testament are taken from ten books: Genesis (20.28), Exodus (2.23; 18:20; 20:37), Leviticus (2.24; 10.27), Deuteronomy (4.4, 8, 12; 10.27; 18:20; 20:28), Psalms (4.10-11; 13.35; 19.38; 20.17; 20.42-43; 22.69; 23.46), Isaiah (3.4-6; 4:18-19; 8:10; 19.46; 22.37), Jeremiah 19.46), Daniel (21.27), Hosea (23.30), and Malachi (7.27).[1] In

[1] Kimball 1994: 48.

section 4.4, I will argue that what Luke conceives a δαιμόνιον to be is influenced by the uses of the lexeme in the Greek versions of Deuteronomy, Psalms, and Isaiah. That is not to say that Luke is *only* influenced by the LXX versions, or even *mostly*; given the assumption of Markan priority and engagement in some kind of Christian community, these will obviously have also influenced his conceptualisation. Furthermore, the citation of certain quotations from a particular scriptural book does not necessarily prove that the author had the scroll in front of him as he wrote, or even that he was familiar with the book in its entirety. However, the frequency of Luke's Septuagintalisms suggests a broader knowledge than *just* the quotations he cites, and as Muraoka (2012) argues, in certain cases thematic affinity as well as similar vocabulary suggests "that Luke was familiar with whole narratives and stories in their Greek, Septuagintal version, not just isolated words, turns of phrase, and the like."[2] With this in mind, I argue that the inclusion of quotations from Deuteronomy, Isaiah, and Psalms in Luke 4 at the very least allows for the possibility that knowledge of the LXX uses of δαιμόνιον influenced Luke's conceptualisation of a demon.

LXX	**Gospel of Luke**
Deuteronomy 8:3	4:4
Deuteronomy 6:13	4:8
Deuteronomy 6:16	4:12
Psalm 91:11-12	4:10-11
Isaiah 61:1-2	4:18-19

[2] Muraoka 2012: 13.

Allison concludes that while Mark's temptation account is meant to compare Jesus to Adam, who no longer lives in peace with the wild beasts or is ministered to by angels after failing his temptation, the Q account is more interested in linking Jesus to Israel, wandering in the desert, and falling to temptation again and again.[3] In addition to Luke's general interest in Deuteronomy,[4] this is why all three of the quotations which Jesus employs against the devil are from this book.

The devil's offer in 4:6-7 echoes that of God in Psalm 2:8; the allusion is probably intentional, given Luke's knowledge and use of the Psalms, and because the preceding verse of Psalm 2:7 is alluded to more explicitly in Luke 3:22 (cf. Matthew 3:17; Mark 1:11; Mark and Luke's use of the second person is a more faithful echo of the Psalm than Matthew's use of the third).[5]

As I have discussed recent scholarship on Satanology in Chapter 3 above, it is worth considering what conclusions a 'naïve' Gentile reader or hearer of Luke's gospel might have gleaned from his presentation of the scene.[6] Without any knowledge of Jewish angelology, a new Christian would swiftly know that 'the devil' is a malevolent character, and over the course of the passage would learn that he has great powers and is an antagonist to Jesus. For a Jewish reader, the impression might be a more complex one.

[3] Allison 1999: 195-199.
[4] Evans 1955: 37-53; Evans 1993: 121-39; Moessner 1998: 46, all cited in Yamazaki-Ransom 2010: 88 n. 124.
[5] Yamazaki-Ransom 2010: 89.
[6] See also Koskenniemi 2016.

4.2.2 – ARGUMENT IS WAR

The major way by which Luke swiftly indicates what kind of role the devil might play in his gospel is to introduce the character as an opponent in an argument. With a protagonist clear in an audience's mind, a character who argues with them is immediately categorised as an antagonist. This stereotyping arises from the conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR.

> In each of the scenes the devil is vanquished by Jesus, the Son of God, quoting scripture… He is thus portrayed as the conqueror because he is armed with 'the sword of the Spirit, the word of God,' to put it in non-Lucan, but nevertheless apt (Eph 6:7) terminology.[7]

This conclusion by Fitzmyer uses language popular with scholars about the Temptation narrative. Garrett says that "a human being has conquered Satan by withstanding his terrible tests."[8] Goulder states that "Matthew's τότε then becomes 'Having completed every temptation', which stresses the comprehensiveness of the devil's defeat…"[9] But why does an apparently civil conversation (Luke's Jesus says nothing other than quotations from Deuteronomy, unlike Matthew's (4:10)) between two characters evoke the idea of a conquering and defeat for commentators?

In this section, I will discuss a very famous conceptual metaphor: ARGUMENT IS WAR. It is often used as the metaphor by which CMT is first explained; it is the first metaphor discussed in the first chapter of *Metaphors We Live By.* Lakoff and Johnson write that sentences like "Your claims are *indefensible*" and "He *attacked every weak point* in my argument" reveal that we conceptualise an argument as being like a war.

[7] Fitzmyer 1970: 513.
[8] Garrett 1989: 42.
[9] Goulder 1994: 293.

> It is important to see that we don't just talk about arguments in terms of war. We can actually win or lose arguments. We see the person we are arguing with as an opponent. We attack his positions and we defend our own. We gain and lose ground. We plan and use strategies. If we find a position indefensible, we can abandon it and take a new line of attack. Many of the things we do in arguing are partially structured by the concept of war. Though there is no physical battle, there is a verbal battle, and the structure of an argument—attack, defense, counterattack, etc.—reflects this. It is in this sense that the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor is one that we live by in this culture; it structures the actions we perform in arguing.[10]

Jesus and Satan are arguing: the devil presses forwards and Jesus defends his own position, the devil finds new lines of attack, the devil finally makes a retreat. The Temptation narrative follows the mappings set out in CMT literature quite clearly, and the advantage of this being such a famous metaphor is that the developers of the theory have mapped it out themselves. Here, Lakoff and Johnson outline how the experience of an argument corresponds with the imagined or remembered experience of physical violence or warfare. "The sense of being embattled comes from experiencing yourself as being in a warlike situation even though it is not actual combat – since you are maintaining the amenities of conversation." [11]

> You have an opinion that matters to you. (*having a position*)
>
> The other participant does not agree with your opinion. (*has a different position*)
>
> It matters to one or both of you that the other give up his opinion (*surrender*) and accept yours (*victory*). (*he is your adversary*)
>
> The difference of opinion becomes a conflict of opinions. (*conflict*)

[10] Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 4.
[11] Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 79.

> You think of how you can best convince him of your view (*plan strategy*) and consider what evidence you can bring to bear on the issue (*marshal forces*).
>
> Considering what you perceive as the weaknesses of his position, you ask questions and raise objections designed to force him ultimately to give up his position and adopt yours. (*attack*)
>
> You try to change the premises of the conversation so that you will be in a stronger position. (*maneuvering*)
>
> In response to his questions and objections, you try to maintain your own position. (*defense*)
>
> As the argument progresses, maintaining your general view may require some revision. (*retreat*)
>
> You may raise new questions and objections. (*counterattack*)
>
> Either you get tired and decide to quit arguing (*truce*), or neither of you can convince the other (*stalemate*), or one of you gives in. (*surrender*)[12]

Lakoff and Johnson also provide a mapping of the conceptual metaphor (Figure 6);[13]

mapping will become increasingly important through the course of this thesis.

[12] Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 79-80.
[13] Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 80-81.

Figure 6: Mapping of the conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR

Participants:	The kind of participants are people or groups of people. They play the role of adversaries.	
Parts:	The two positions Planning strategy Attack Defense Retreat Maneuvering Counterattack Stalemate Truce Surrender/victory	
Stages:	Initial conditions:	Participants have different positions. One or both wants the other to surrender. Each participant assumes he can defend his position.
	Beginning:	One adversary attacks.
	Middle:	Combinations of defense maneuvering retreat counterattack
	End:	Either truce or stalemate or surrender/victory
	Final state:	Peace, victor has dominance over loser
Linear sequence:	Retreat after attack Defense after attack Counterattack after attack	
Causation:	Attack results in defense or counterattack or retreat or end.	
Purpose:	Victory	

The conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR exists in Greek from at least the time of the Iliad.[14] Discussing metaphors in Revelation, Hylen draws attention to the repeated description of the Christ-figure as conquering with a sword which comes from his mouth (Revelation

[14] Machiomai, Il. 1; ἐρίζω, meaning "I strive, wrangle, argue" is used to refer to argument (12.423: ἀλλ᾽ ὥς τ᾽ ἀμφ᾽ οὔροισι δύ᾽ ἀνέρε δηριάασθον μέτρ᾽ ἐν χερσὶν ἔχοντες ἐπιξύνῳ ἐν ἀρούρῃ, ὥ τ᾽ ὀλίγῳ ἐνὶ χώρῳ ἐρίζητον περὶ ἴσης, ὣς ἄρα τοὺς διέεργον ἐπάλξιες) and to battle (13.325).

1:16; 2:12, 16; 19:15, 21 cf. Isaiah 11:4-5; Wisdom 5:17-20; Ephesians 6:17).[15] The conceptual metaphor WORDS ARE WEAPONS is a sub-metaphor of ARGUMENT IS WAR, which exists in everyday English as phrases like "*sharp-tongued*" or "a *cutting* remark."[16]

Sweetser makes the excellent point that "the most basic instances of this metaphor appear to have as their source domain precisely the two-person physical fight, not the broader military kind of combat stipulated by the word 'war'"[17] and so prefers to refer to the conceptual metaphor as ARGUMENT IS COMBAT. In the case of the Temptation narrative on its own, ARGUMENT IS COMBAT seems to be a more immediately applicable metaphor, as Satan and Jesus are alone, and fundamentally, the difference between argument and conversation is, as Sweetser puts it, *domination*. "In combat, the goal is to physically restrain or dominate the opponent, rendering resistance impossible so that the victor can then do whatever the opponent was preventing or opposing. Or, potentially, the goal could be to compel the loser to do something, by physically overcoming his or her ability to resist."[18] Again, the Temptation narrative would fall into this category: the goal of the Devil is to compel Jesus to do as he suggests.

However, there are important entailments of ARGUMENT IS WAR that ARGUMENT IS COMBAT does not necessarily carry. Like ARGUMENT IS COMBAT, ARGUMENT IS WAR foregrounds the entailment of conflict. However, in a 2005 doctoral thesis, Nannette Brenner argued that:

> Because argument is a form of communication, however, the parties often have far more commonalities than not. First, they have obviously both agreed that the topic over which they are contending is important enough to risk conflict over. Secondly,

[15] Hylen 2011: 781-2.
[16] Sweetser 1992: 713.
[17] Sweetser 1992: 718 n. 11.
[18] Sweetser 1992: 718.

> they both agree to participate in the process. And thirdly, though they have differing viewpoints, they both believe that they share enough of a common understanding of their language that they can comprehend one another's meanings. These foundational commonalities are often overlooked because we focus on the differences that spark the argument rather than the commonalities that make it possible.[19]

The source domain of WAR carries far more entailments of communication than COMBAT; two people could fight without ever speaking the same language or agreeing to certain rules of engagement. In the Temptation Narrative, the two opponents quote from Scripture to support their positions; if ARGUMENT IS WAR and WORDS ARE WEAPONS, the devil and Jesus are picking their weapons from the same armoury.

Another foundational commonality is the devil's claim to have authority over all the kingdoms of the world, and the right to give it to whomever he wishes. Kelly discusses several options for where this idea came from; it is certainly not unique to Luke, because John refers to Satan as "the ruler of this world" (e.g. 12:31; 14:30; 16:11), and the concept can also be found in the letters of Paul (e.g. 2 Corinthians 4:4). One option is that it was inspired by the Septuagint translation of Job, wherein "the DEVIL tells the Lord that he has gone about the Earth, and walked about upon the Earth under Heaven? Or does it come from his position as Superintendent of Discipline in the *Book of Jubilees*, where God grants him a staff of malignant Spirits?"[20] He also suggests that the characterisation of Satan as ruler of the world is a result of his role as the Angel of Death: "after all, anyone in charge of death has universal sway. In the *Great Midrash* on Leviticus (18.118a), when the Israelites promise to obey Yahweh's commands, He tells the Angel of Death that, even though He has made him Ruler of the World (*Kosmokrator*) over Men, he must have nothing to do with this Nation, for

[19] Brenner 2005: 154.
[20] Kelly 2006: 95.

they are His children."[21] What makes this latter suggestion less persuasive is that in Luke's gospel, Satan is not associated with death in the same way that he is, for example, in John 8:44, where the devil is described as "a murderer from the beginning." In Luke, Satan's primary association is with temptation, and harm, but not death; in 13:10-16, he keeps a woman bound and crippled for eighteen years, but did not kill her.

More persuasive is the theory of Jack Miles,[22] who connects the appointment of Satan as Ruler of the World with the establishment of Nebuchadnezzar as the Ruler of the Nations in Jeremiah 27:5-8. Kelly makes two points: that Nebuchadnezzar is called God's servant, despite his character, and that his reign has a set time limit; however, these appear only in the Hebrew text, and not the shorter Greek text of LXX Jeremiah 34:5-8 that Luke would have been using.[23] Nonetheless, he argues that the similarity between the speech of God in LXX Jeremiah 27:5[24] (ὅτι ἐγὼ ἐποίησα τὴν γῆν ἐν τῇ ἰσχύι μου τῇ μεγάλῃ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐπιχείρῳ μου τῷ ὑψηλῷ καὶ **δώσω** αὐτὴν ᾧ ἐὰν δόξῃ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς μου) and the speech of the devil in Luke 4:6 (καὶ εἶπεν αὐτῷ ὁ διάβολος σοὶ **δώσω** τὴν ἐξουσίαν ταύτην ἅπασαν καὶ τὴν δόξαν αὐτῶν ὅτι ἐμοὶ παραδέδοται καὶ ᾧ ἐὰν θέλω δίδωμι αὐτήν) indicates the possibility of an echo.[25] The word δώσω is also used by Matthew in 4:9, and Kelly does not discuss whether any echo of Jeremiah is a deliberate intertextual addition on the part of Luke and Matthew's source for the Temptation scene.

[21] Kelly 2006: 95.
[22] Jack Miles, *Christ: A Crisis in the Life of God* [New York: Knopf, 2001], 29, cited in Kelly 2006: 96.
[23] Kelly 2006: 96.
[24] Cited as Jeremiah 34:5 by Kelly 2006: 96.
[25] Kelly 2006: 97.

On the other hand, Warren is too eager to undermine this foundational commonality:

> In the temptation narrative … Satan offers Jesus a kingdom, implying it is his to offer. Boyd notes that Jesus did not dispute Satan's claim.[26] However, neither did Jesus affirm it. It could be that such a claim was not worthy of an answer; plus, Satan is elsewhere described as a liar. Fitzmyer suggests that Satan merely poses as god of the world, claiming illegitimate authority.[27] Neither in this passage nor elsewhere does Jesus endorse the rule of Satan; neither does he describe himself as involved in a battle to win the world from Satan.[28]

This statement is emblematic of Warren's general dismissal of any evidence that does not fit her thesis. She conflates acknowledgement with endorsement, and treats the New Testament as one work, with little apparent consciousness that it is a library of works written by multiple authors with their own theological conceptions and agendas. Nowhere in her work on CMT and warfare language in the Bible does she mention the conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR; significantly, it is even missing from her methodology chapter. Elsewhere, she writes that "it is difficult to see warfare imagery in this story, which depicts Jesus as calmly and quietly quoting sacred texts."[29] Warren makes the mistake of associating enmity only with passion, but as Robert Frost wrote, for destruction ice is also great, and would suffice. One might as well say that one cannot see warfare imagery in the depiction of two players calmly and quietly moving small pieces on a board, or in lawyers calmly and quietly approaching the bench to discuss an objection with a judge.

[26] Boyd 1997: 181.
[27] Fitzmyer 1970: 516.
[28] Warren 2012: 172-173.
[29] Warren 2012: 196.

This is the other conceptualisation of the Temptation narrative that might make sense: a trial, with Jesus being examined by a prosecutor. It is an image which is suggested by the use of πειράζω, by the connotations attached to the epithet ὁ διάβολος, and by knowledge of the few Old Testament contexts in which it appears.[30] However, this interpretation aligns with Matthew's presentation more closely than with Luke's. In Matthew 4:1, Ἰησοῦς ἀνήχθη εἰς τὴν ἔρημον ὑπὸ τοῦ πνεύματος πειρασθῆναι ὑπὸ τοῦ διαβολου. The infinitive πειρασθῆναι makes it clear that the Holy Spirit was leading Jesus into the desert *in order to be* tested by the devil. Satan can still be conceived of as God's prosecutor. But in Luke 4:2, there is no such instrumental infinitive. The devil and Jesus are clearly adversarial.

In any case, fundamentally, if the Temptation narrative is thought of as a court drama, it is still coherent with the metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR. The metaphor A LEGAL TRIAL IS A WAR is used by Cicero (e.g. when Verres' former lieutenant Caecilius offers to prosecute Verres, Cicero says that by acting as an accuser to an erstwhile superior officer "you are endeavouring to wage an unjust and impious war against him" (*iniustum impiumque bellum, Divinatio in Caecilium* 62); in *In Verrem* 1.1.15, he describes Verres' bribery of the judges by saying that "that senseless and profligate man attempts to combat me in another manner," using the verb *pugnare*). The conflation of war and legal trial is all the more understandable with the consciousness that in the Roman empire, the same man often embodied both elements, especially any man with *imperium*.

To summarise, many commentators have instinctively understood the Temptation narrative by way of the conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR. Over the next three chapters, I will

[30] The Ugaritic finds of the 1930s brought the concept of a divine council to the attention of Biblical scholars, and the judicial role of such a council has become largely accepted among those working on the Hebrew Bible. e.g.Robinson 1944; Wright, 1950: 30-41; Cross 1953: 274-277, cited in Day 1988: 1.

show that Luke primarily conceptualises the relationship between Jesus and Satan using the WAR source domain, which I will refer to as the WARFARE metaphor. This metaphor works in conjunction with other conceptual structures which underly Luke's worldview to create new conceptual metaphors. One such structure is the UP-DOWN schema.

4.2.3 – The UP-DOWN Schema

Any domain is a "background knowledge structure,"[31] and it is only as a result of and in the context of these background structures that any semantic concept can be comprehended. Some domains can be associated with a visual image, such as a path or a container. Some cannot: Lakoff and Turner give the examples of thought,[32] time, [33] life[34] and death.[35] They call these domains "abstract"[36] (in their analysis, Clausner and Croft prefer "nonimagistic").[37] Some domains are "embodied", an important concept in conceptual metaphor theory: these domains are imagistic, and are particularly related to our physical experiences and interactions.[38] Many metaphors can be grouped together under a small number of – primarily orientational – umbrella domains. There are often somewhat skeletal in structure ("in the sense that these source domains do not map rich knowledge onto the target."[39]), with the commonalities of the grouped metaphors boiled down to their most basic constituents. Each of these groups is known as a schema.

[31] Clausner-Croft 1999: 2.
[32] Lakoff-Turner 1989: 94.
[33] Lakoff-Turner 1989: 95.
[34] Lakoff-Turner 1989: 97.
[35] Lakoff-Turner 1989 :95.
[36] Lakoff-Turner 1989: 94.
[37] Clausner-Croft 1999: 14.
[38] Lakoff 1987: 267; see in general Lakoff and Johnson 1999.
[39] Kövecses 2010: 326.

Image schemata draw from imagistic and physical domains: they are abstract schematic patterns arising from physical imagistic domains, which are so ubiquitous that they become "recurring basic conceptual structures."[40] The embodied nature of the abstract structure means that scholars "can map this image-schema onto abstract target domains that themselves do not inherently contain images, such as wakefulness, alertness, and living."[41]

In Section 4.3 I will discuss the CONTAINER schema, in which anything which has an exterior, an interior, and a boundary between the two is discussed as though it is a container. For example, the human heart is conceived of as a container which can then hold thoughts or emotions. But first we must examine the UP-DOWN schema. Many schemas are thought of in terms of a spectrum of orientational images based on our embodied experiences: FRONT-BACK, NEAR-FAR, PART-WHOLE, and UP-DOWN.

The UP-DOWN schema is a crucial one in Luke's worldview, which I will discuss again in my analysis of Luke 10:17-20, and one of the schemas which has received the most attention in cognitive linguistics.[42] The fall of Satan in Luke 10:18 has had so much influence on Western culture that it is often used as the primary illustration of the schema. For example, Lakoff and Johnson use it in their discussion of the conceptual metaphor GOOD IS UP in *Philosophy in the Flesh*:

> The metaphor of Moral Strength is complex. It consists of both the strength to maintain and upright and balanced moral posture and also the strength to overcome evil forces. The uprightness aspect of this metaphor is experientially grounded in the fact that, other things being equal, it is better to be upright and

[40] Clausner-Croft 1999: 1.
[41] Lakoff-Turner [1989: 97. For more detail on image schemata, see Clausner-Croft 1999: 13-20; for a further discussion of the issue of schemacity, and some of the criticisms that have been levied against it, see Kövecses 2006: 174-176. For an argument for further definition and categorisation of the term "image schemas," see Mandler-Cánovas 2014: 510-532.
[42] E.g. Boers 1996: 43-165.

> balanced. When one is healthy and in control of things, one is typically upright and balanced. Thus, *moral* uprightness is understood metaphorically in terms of physical uprightness: Being Moral Is Being Upright; Being Immoral Is Being Low. Examples include:
>
> He's an *upstanding* citizen. She's on the *up and up*. She's as *upright* as they come. That was a *low* thing to do. He's *under*handed. I would never *stoop* to such a thing.
>
> Doing evil is therefore moving from a position of morality (uprightness) to a position of immorality (being low). Hence, Doing Evil Is Falling. The most famous example, of course, is the Fall from grace.[43]

The metaphor VIRTUE IS UP is just one of the many metaphors mapped onto the UP-DOWN schema, being in keeping with the general human practice of ascribing positive abstract concepts with an upward spatial position and negative abstract concepts with a downward spatial position.[44] Examples of the *up-down* configuration, as well as other configurations such as *centre-periphery*, are known collectively as "orientational metaphors" (although Kövecses suggests that as "their cognitive job … is to make a set of target concepts coherent in our conceptual system," they should perhaps be referred to instead as "coherence metaphors").[45] For example, in addition to the aforementioned VIRTUE IS UP (She's an *upstanding* citizen.),[46] we have HAPPY IS UP (I'm feeling really *up* today); MORE IS UP, LESS IS DOWN (Speak *up*.);[47] HEALTHY IS UP (Lazarus *rose* from the dead.), RATIONAL IS UP (He couldn't *rise above* his emotion.); CONTROL IS UP (I'm *on top* of the situation).

This schema is particularly important to Luke, who is the only evangelist[48] to include reference to two crucial vertical movements: the fall of Satan, and the ascension of Jesus.

[43] Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 299.
[44] Gottwald-Elsner-Pollatos 2015: 1-10.
[45] Kövecses 2010: 40.
[46] An example also given in Kövecses 2010: 40; see also Ścigała-Indurkhya 2016: 205-212.
[47] Kövecses 2010: 40.
[48] Discounting Mark's long ending.

Somov, in his chapter analysing Luke's conception of the afterlife using CMT, also identifies the use of the UP-DOWN schema in the unique Lukan parable of Lazarus and the Rich Man; he focuses his attention on one of Luke's cosmographical understandings of heaven as the dwelling place for the virtuous dead. In 16:19-21, Lazarus lies (DOWN) at the rich man's gate while he feasts, and he longs to eat what falls (DOWN) from the rich man's table (UP). However, in 16:22-23, the angels carry Lazarus (UP) to Abraham's bosom, and the rich man is buried (DOWN).[49] In Hades (DOWN), he has to "raise his eyes" (ἐπάρας τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς αὐτοῦ) to see Lazarus.[50] The UP-DOWN schema is, of course, most obvious and important when discussing heaven and its many meanings in theological studies. For the purposes of this thesis, it is enough to note that the metaphor HEAVEN IS UP[51] is coherent whether it refers to the sky, a place of happiness for the righteous dead, as is the common usage today (HAPPY IS UP),[52] or the dwelling place of God, as was the common usage throughout the Hebrew Bible and into the New Testament (VIRTUE IS UP;[53] CONTROL (and thus POWER and IMPORTANCE) IS UP).[54]

There is an invocation of the UP-DOWN schema in each temptation. The devil seeks to bring Jesus from a physically 'high' position to a 'low' one, which would mirror the metaphors of VIRTUE IS UP and SIN IS DOWN. This is most obvious in the third temptation; the devil takes Jesus to the pinnacle[55] of the temple, and tells him to throw himself down. The correspondence with the fall that Luke describes in 10:18 is clear. This evocation of the UP-

[49] Somov 2017: 216.
[50] On whether the Septuagentalism ἐπάρας τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς αὐτοῦ should be taken as indicating "to look at" or "to look up at", see Somov 2014: 291-309 and Somov 2017: 215-16.
[51] Meier-Hauser- Robinson-Friesen-Schjeldahl 2007: 699–710.
[52] Safarnejad-Ho-Abdullah-Mat-Awal 2014: 112.
[53] Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 299.
[54] Schubert 2005: 1–21; Goatly 2007: Chapter 2.
[55] The English 'pinnacle' comes from the Latin translation of πτερύγιον, the diminutive of πτέρυξ "wing". The precise meaning of this term in terms of the architecture of the temple is disputed; see Wolter 2016: 191-192 for a summary of early Christian discussion. In any case, from the context of the narrative it is obvious that the πτερύγιον is dangerously high.

DOWN schema lead Milton to the conclusion that the fall described in 10:18 is that of Satan falling from the pinnacle of the temple; having failed to tempt Jesus to cast himself down from it, "smitten with amazement" he falls himself, as the Sphinx of Thebes "Cast herself headlong from th' Ismenian steep" when Oedipus solved her riddle. Milton even inserted a variant on the conceptual metaphor UP IS GOOD into the devil's mouth (*Paradise Regained*, Book IV, Line 553; small caps my own):

> There stand, if thou wilt stand; to stand upright
> Will ask thee skill. I to thy Father's house
> Have brought thee, and highest placed: HIGHEST IS BEST.
> Now shew thy progeny; if not to stand,
> Cast thyself down.

I will discuss the fall of Satan in Chapter 6; for now, it is enough to notice that Jesus's defeat would have entailed a fall from a height.

In the second temptation, the verticality schema is evoked, rather than invoked. The devil invites Jesus to worship him in exchange for all the authority of all the kingdoms of the world. This act of worship is προσκύνησις,[56] which involves bowing before the object of the gesture – that the gesture of προσκύνησις is required rather than any interior worshipful attitude is indicated by the Lukan use of ἐνώπιον, even if 4:7 lacks the πεσὼν of Matthew 4:9.[57]

[56] For a discussion on the act of προσκύνησις as portrayed in the New Testament, see Jack 2010: 84-97. Jack argues against the gesture involving a kiss, but notes that in Hellenistic sources, the LXX, and the NT, προσκύνησις does entail obeisance and the physical act of falling before the object of worship.
[57] Luke also lacks the specification in Matthew that the kingdoms of the world are shown from the top of a high mountain.

Finally, in the first temptation, the UP-DOWN schema is less immediately obvious, but becomes apparent when the passage is viewed in its intertextual context. "Luke has unmistakably designed the terminology of v. 2a as an allusion to the time of Israel's wilderness wandering."[58] Manna is not mentioned explicitly in the Lukan text, but he certainly invokes it. Jesus's first retort is an exact quotation from the Septuagint's Deuteronomy 8:3: οὐκ ἐπ᾽ ἄρτῳ μόνῳ ζήσεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος. Unlike Matthew (4:4), he does not include the final clause (ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ παντὶ ῥήματι τῷ ἐκπορευομένῳ διὰ στόματος Θεοῦ [ζήσεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος]). But neither evangelist includes what comes immediately before: καὶ ἐκάκωσέν σε καὶ ἐλιμαγχόνησέν σε καὶ ἐψώμισέν σε τὸ μαννα, ὃ οὐκ εἴδησαν οἱ πατέρες σου. By not including the explanation that humanity lives by the words of God, it allows for an even more stark contrast between the bread-from-stones which the devil offers, and manna.

In Exodus 16:1-36, the Israelites are given quail and manna to eat; the manna is found on the ground. However, in Numbers 11:9, it is said that the manna *falls*, like the dew, and the heavenly origin of manna is made even more explicit in the Psalms. In LXX Psalm 104:40 (ᾔτησαν καὶ ἦλθεν ὀρτυγομήτρα καὶ ἄρτον οὐρανοῦ ἐνέπλησεν αὐτούς) the food given to the Israelites in their wilderness wanderings are both from the sky: meat in the form of birds, and 'bread from heaven'. In LXX Psalm 77:24-25, the provenance is clearly described:

> καὶ ἔβρεξεν αὐτοῖς μαννα φαγεῖν καὶ ἄρτον οὐρανοῦ ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς
> ἄρτον ἀγγέλων ἔφαγεν ἄνθρωπος ἐπισιτισμὸν ἀπέστειλεν αὐτοῖς εἰς πλησμονήν

[58] Wolter 2016: 187; see also Witmer 2012: 105, Allison 1999: 199.

This connection between the value of food and the UP-DOWN schema is also evident in Acts 10:9-16. In a vision, Peter sees the heavens opened, and various kinds of unclean foods are lowered to him on a sheet. The heavenly origin of the unclean foods is accompanied by the command from God, "What God has made clean, you must not call profane." The provenance of the food on the UP-DOWN axis is more pertinent than substance of the food or its state according to Jewish law when deciding whether it is holy or profane: UP IS HOLY.

With this context in mind, the UP-DOWN contrast becomes obvious in the second and third temptation, and is certainly possible in the first, if not so clearly profiled as in the other two. The devil invites Jesus to fall, both physically and figuratively. Instead, Jesus tells his disciples in 10:18, it is Satan who falls. The clear connection between the UP-DOWN schema and the WARFARE metaphor in Luke's conceptions and his work barely seems worthy of comment, because A DEFEAT IS A FALL is a conceptual metaphor so deeply embedded in our cultural consciousness. I will discuss A DEFEAT IS A FALL in more detail in Chapter 6.2, in connection with Luke 10:18, but I have yet to see any scholar make the connection with the UP-DOWN schema in all three temptations, rather than just in that of the temple in Jerusalem. This is an example of how the application of CMT to a text can engender new insights.

4.3 – Luke's Conception of Possession

The question of the way Luke portrays the Holy Spirit, especially in comparison to Mark and Matthew, is part of a larger question about Luke's worldview.[59] Throughout the first four chapters of the gospel we read references to the Holy Spirit, leading characters or protecting

[59] For an overview of pneumatology in Luke-Acts, see Bock 2012: 211-226; for more in-depth discussion, see Menzies 1991; Turner 1996; Hur 2001; Woods 2001; Mittelstadt 2004; Wenk 2004; Cho 2005; Warrington 2009: 15-32; Kuecker 2011.

them, or giving them insight into the workings of God which they are witnessing. From 4:33 onwards, we will read accounts of the workings of malevolent spirits on unwilling victims, and much will be made of their residing inside their victim or being forcefully expelled by Jesus.

We take it for granted that this is what demonic possession *is*, and frequently commentators take it as read that if someone is possessed by a demon, the demon is located *inside their body*. In this section, I show that this conception of 'demonisation' was a relatively new development in demonological thought, and it created some difficulties for Luke when it came to his engagement with the Septuagint and his existing use of the UP-DOWN schema. First, I will discuss the two models of spiritual 'possession' or demonic influence – the CLOTHING or COVERING metaphor, where the demon is located *outside* their victim, and then the CONTAINER metaphor, where they are located *inside* the body of their victim. Then I will show how Luke has thus far used both models in his writing, especially on the Holy Spirit, and explain why going forward he will place more emphasis on the CONTAINER metaphor when discussing demonic possession.

4.3.1 – The COVERING Model

In the Ancient Near East, demonic victimisation was conceptualised primarily according to the UP-DOWN schema. A demon was in control of the symptoms afflicting their victim, and thus was conceptualised as being 'above' the victim in various ways. For example, in the *Sakikkū*, the Diagnostic Handbook, many of the symptoms of epilepsy begin with the phrases describing a demon 'falling' on the patient (e.g., "[If an epilepsy demon has fallen once(?)

upon him" or "[If an epilepsy demon falls many times upon him]")[60] or 'pouring out upon him' (e.g., "If at the end of his fit his limbs become paralysed, (the demon) 'pouring out' upon him so much that he loses control);[61] "If (the demon) possesses him during his sleep, and, while he is still conscious, continues to 'pour out' upon him until he loses consciousness…"[62]). The guilty demons are not conceived as being *inside* the patient, but in the room, and close at hand, and possibly looming over the patient ("If he has panic attacks (or, becomes more and more fearful) and (the demon) causes his eyeballs to protrude, a demon bent on killing him is standing at the head of his bed. He will die.").[63]

Another demon often associated with epilepsy is Lugal-urra, the 'Lord of the Roof'. He was thought to be a god who seizes a man, and who often caused abnormal symptoms of the eye.[64] Stol cites several examples where the reason for this particular entity's name is because he is likely to strike if a man goes onto the roof, particularly for sexual intercourse (the flat roof was a particularly dangerous place in Mesopotamian thought, especially due to the attention of the female demon, the *ardat lilî*.[65] The Lugal-urra is of particular interest to anyone studying the demonology of the Syriac versions of the New Testament; in Matthew 17:15, the 'epileptic boy' (see §**5.10** below) is said to be possessed by the *bar ʾeggārâ,* the 'Son of the Roof'.[66]

I mention the Lugal-urra because if the demon is associated with the roof, this also puts him *above* his victim. Perhaps there is also an element of embodiment (an important element of CMT) in this description of a malevolent figure who is associated with seizures and with the

[60] Wilson-Reynolds 1990: 189.
[61] Wilson-Reynolds 1990: 190.
[62] Wilson-Reynolds 1990: 192.
[63] Wilson-Reynolds 1990: 193.
[64] Stol 1993: 16.
[65] Stoll 1993: 17-18; see also Stol 1993: 166.
[66] Stol 1993: 18.

eyes moving in unexpected directions. Perhaps he is situated on the roof due to the eyes rolling backwards in the course of an epileptic seizure; an attendant physician or exorcist would be forgiven for thinking that the victim was looking towards the position of their assailant. This is however an extremely tentative theory, and would require much more research.

On this topic, the work of Nahum Waldman is extremely illuminating. In his 1989 article, he points out that in Sumerian and Akkadian literature, the imagery of clothing, covering, or enveloping is used with the sense of "overpower" or "overwhelm" – describing emotions, demons, storms, violence – and provides extensive examples (e.g., a.lá.ḫul.gal.e.túg.gin$_x$ mu.un.dul.la: *alû lemnu ša kīma ṣubāti ikattamu*, "the evil *alû*-ghost who envelops [his victim] like a garment.").[67] The COVERING schema, as it would be called in CMT, is used to conceptualise the activity of the alû-demon – which can then be used as the source domain to describe new target domains. "The images of being overwhelmed both by fear of battle and by the alu-demon are combined in a simile in the following passage: *ḫurbašu tāḫāzija kīma lê* (sandhi for *kīma alê*) *zumuršun isḫup*,' the fear of my battle overwhelmed their bodies like an [a]lû-demon.' [*sic*]"[68]

The Hebrew equivalent of the Akkadian verbs *katāmu* 'cover' and *saḫāpu* 'overwhelm, envelop' is *ksh* 'cover', as it is used in Habakkuk 3:3; it is used of shuddering in Ezekiel 7:18 and shame in Psalm 44:16; a parallel metaphor with the verb *lbš* appears in Ps. 35:26 and Job 8:22.[69] Judges 6:34 (*wĕrûaḥ YHWH lāḇĕšāh ʾeṯ Gidʿôn*) is a difficult verse to translate:

[67] *CT* 16, 1:30f.; *CAD* A/1, 376a, quoted in Waldman 1989: 161.
[68] *OIP* 2, 47, vi:26-27; *CAD* A/1, 376, 377, quoted in Waldman 1989: 162.
[69] Waldman 1989: 162.

> The various translations reflect the confusion surrounding the verse's proper syntactic analysis. Does the spirit of God clothe (cover) Gideon or does it wear him (Gideon being the covering of the spirit of God)? Normally, of course, *lbš* in the *Qal* has as its direct object the garment. The wearer of the garment is the subject of the sentence; see, e.g., Lev. 6:3, 16:4; Ps. 93:1. If the normal, expected syntax of *lbš* is being strictly followed in this verse, then the spirit of God, the subject of the sentence, is wearing Gideon. It is on the inside, and Gideon, the direct object, is the garment on the outside, clothing the spirit.[70]

The LXX followed this interpretation (Judges Codex A: καὶ πνεῦμα θεοῦ ἐνέδυσεν τὸν Γεδεων), but recent biblical translations tend to favour a more ambiguous one (e.g. NRSV: But the spirit of the Lord took possession of Gideon). However, Waldman notes, commentaries have begun to move away from a strict understanding of *lbš* to only mean "wear" or "put on" to "cover" and "envelop" in light of the conception of the spirit of God as an external force in verses like Isaiah 11:2 and 1 Samuel 19:20 and 23.[71]

Waldman draws a connection between Judges 6:34 and a quotation from the Akkadian poem *Ludlul bēl nēmeqi*, known in English as The Poem of the Righteous Sufferer. In it, the poet complains that *alû zumrī ītediq ṣubāti kīma šuškalli ukatimanni šittu*, "the alû-demon has clothed himself in my body as with a garment; sleep covers me like a net."[72] This interpretation is based on the verb *ītediq* being reflexive; however, due to a shift in the use of the perfect in Middle Babylonian, and the fact that edēqu, "to wrap", can actually take both body and clothing as a direct object, means that *alû zumrī ītediq ṣubāti* could also be translated as "the alu-demon has wrapped my body as with a garment."[73] A new translation of *Ludlul bēl nēmeqi* was published in 2010 by Annus and Lenzi; in it, the phrase is translated as

[70] Waldman 1989: 163-4.
[71] Waldman 1989: 164.
[72] Lambert 1960: 42-43, Lines 71 – 72; *CAD* A/1, 36a translation: "has put on my body as if it were a garment," quoted in Waldman 1989: 163.
[73] Waldman 1989: 164-5.

"A malevolent demon clothed my body *as* a garment,"[74] placing the demon on the outside of the victim, rather than the inside.

While there are instances in Mesopotamian texts of demonization which suggest the latter, "the prevailing Mesopotamian imagery has the action of the demon on the outside."[75] Waldman also notes that this is the case of the prophetic spirit in the Hebrew Bible, with some possible exceptions like 2 Sam 23:2, and makes the important point that "in all of the Sumerian and Akkadian material we have cited as evidence for the image of 'covering, overwhelming' we have demons, illness, fear, etc., as the subjects, but there is no mention of a god covering a person in a prophetic or ecstatic situation." In most cases in the historical books, the spirit of God "comes upon" a person (Judg. 3: 10; 11:29; 1 Sam. 10:6, 10; 11:6,13; 16:13), or "rests upon" them (2 Kgs. 2:15).[76]

In the Hebrew Bible, however, the influence of supernatural, invisible forces was often conceived of as the entity remaining outside of their victim, with the conceptual metaphors AN EVIL SPIRIT IS AN INVISIBLE ATTACKER or AN EVIL SPIRIT IS A COVERING being used. For example, as I detailed in Chapter 2, in 1 Samuel 16:14, 18:10 (absent in the LXX) and 19:9, a *rûaḥ rāʿâ* from God torments Saul. In LXX 1 Kings 16:14, this is rendered ἔπνιγεν αὐτὸν πνεῦμα πονηρὸν, a wicked spirit was *strangling* Saul. In 19:9, καὶ ἐγένετο πνεῦμα θεοῦ πονηρὸν ἐπὶ Σαουλ. In Judges 9:23, an evil spirit is sent by God *between* Abimelech and the people of Shechem.

[74] *Ludlul bēl nēmeqi* Tablet II Line 71, in Annus-Lenzi 2010: 36.
[75] Waldman 1989: 165.
[76] Waldman 1989: 166.

In the Book of Tobit, we receive little information of how Asmodeus' obsession with Sarah works, but a small clue is given to us in 3:8. In the Greek 1 version of Tobit, Sarah's servant-girl accuses her of strangling her husbands, rather than just killing them. The Greek verb ἀποπνίγω only appears twice in the LXX (here, and in Nahum 2:13), and thrice in the NT (Matthew 13:7, and Luke 8:7 and 8:33). Matthew 13:7 and Luke 8:7 both refer to the seeds which grow among thorns and are choked by them. Luke 8:33 refers to the drowning of the Gerasene swine. In some manuscripts, Matthew 13:7 uses the aorist form of the verb πνίγω, in addition to the imperfect of πνίγω in 18:28, which Mark uses in 5:13 to describe the death of the pigs in Gerasa. In the LXX, πνίγω only appears in 1 Kings 16:14-15: the oppression of Saul by an evil spirit from the Lord. It is quite possible that only Luke used the verb ἀποπνίγω.[77]

Despite all this, by the time of the NT – including in the writings of Josephus[78] – the CLOTHING metaphor, in which a demon remains outside of its victim, is barely to be seen. A different metaphor has become ubiquitous: the CONTAINER metaphor, discussed below.
Of the evangelists, Luke is the only one who retains strong elements of the COVERING metaphor, and there have been several instances of it in the first four chapters of his gospel. It is used of emotions (1:12 - καὶ φόβος ἐπέπεσεν ἐπ᾽ αὐτόν; 1:65 - καὶ ἐγένετο ἐπὶ πάντας φόβος τοὺς περιοικοῦντας αὐτούς), of the πνεύματι καὶ δυνάμει Ἠλιού in 1:17, and the χάρις Θεοῦ in 2:40. The most famous instance of these is probably Gabriel's statement to Mary at the Annunciation (1:35: Πνεῦμα Ἅγιον ἐπελεύσεται[79] ἐπὶ σὲ καὶ δύναμις ὑψίστου ἐπισκιάσει σοι). The Holy Spirit is described as being "on" Jesus in 2:25, and at 4:14 after the temptations he is described as being ἐν τῇ δυνάμει τοῦ Πνεύματος. The beginning of the

[77] For the question of whether Luke knew Tobit see Kurtz 1987:205 and Docherty 2013.
[78] Antiquities of the Jews — Book VIII, 5.
[79] The verb ἐπέρχομαι is overwhelmingly used by Luke (1:35; 11:22; 21:26, 35; Acts 1:8; 8:24; 13:40; 14:19), with the only non-Lukan NT uses being James 5:1 and, interestingly, Ephesians 2:7.

Isaianic passage that Jesus reads in 4:18 states that "Πνεῦμα Κυρίου ἐπ᾽ ἐμέ", and of course, at the baptism in 3:22, καταβῆναι τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ Ἅγιον σωματικῷ εἴδει ὡσεὶ περιστερὰν ἐπ᾽ αὐτόν.

However, he has also used the CONTAINER metaphor to describe spiritual activity, and going forwards, this will be the metaphor he favours for describing demonic possession.


4.3.2 – The CONTAINER Model

Throughout this thesis I will discuss the CONTAINER schema. The absolute fundamentals of this schema are an interior and an exterior, and a boundary between the two.[80] There are further logical conclusions included in this schema (i.e., if container A is in container B, and object X is in container A, then X is also in container B), and one result of the image-schema's "gestaltic" nature is that we perceive a container as embracing its contents. Thus, if we say that we lost our suitcase at the airport, unless otherwise stated, it can be assumed that we also lost all the belongings contained within the suitcase at the time.[81]

> A bounded space with an interior and an exterior is an image,
> but an extremely skeletal and schematic image.[82]

[80] George Lakoff, 'Some empirical results about the nature of concepts' in *Mind and Language* 4 (1-2) [1989], 116, quoted in Díez Velasco 2001-2002: 53.
[81] Díez Velasco 2001-2002: 53.
[82] Lakoff-Turner 1989: 97.

Figure 7: The essence of the CONTAINER schema at its most basic: a container will have an interior, an exterior, and a boundary between the two.



One famous example of the CONTAINER schema being applied to an abstract concept in the ancient world is that of the metaphor THE MIND IS A CONTAINER, which contains thoughts or memories or emotions. Thus Plato can conceive of the mind as an aviary, in which various birds representing various areas of knowledge can be placed (*Theaetetus* 197d-200d), and Virgil has Achates ask '*quae nunc animo sententia surgit?*' in *Aeniad* 1.582.[83] But even more fundamental than this is the conception that THE BODY IS A CONTAINER.

Up to this point in the gospel, there have been numerous instances of someone being *filled* with the Holy Spirit, as though they are a container for it: John is prophesied to be in 1:15,

[83] Domaradzki 2007: 47, n. 6, accessed on the 10th August 2017 at http://www.lingua.amu.edu.pl/Lingua_17/lin-4.pdf.

Elizabeth is in 1:41, and finally the family is completed by Zechariah in 1:67.[84] Finally, we are told that Jesus himself is πλήρης Πνεύματος Ἁγίου in 4:1.

I have discussed above the Ancient Near Eastern origins of the COVERING metaphor of demonic victimisation, but whence does the CONTAINER model come? In the 1951 seminal work *The Greeks and the Irrational,* Dodds cites the Phythia at Delphi as the example *par excellence* of possession in the Greek world:

> At Delphi, and apparently at most of his oracles, Apollo relied, not on visions like those of Theoclymenus, but on 'enthusiasm' in its original and literal sense. The Pythia became *entheos, plena deo*: the god entered into her and used her vocal organs as if they were his own, exactly as the so-called 'control' does in modern spirit-mediumship; that is why Apollo's Delphic utterances are always couched in the first person, never in the third.[85]

On the other hand, in another important article of 1965 ("So-called possession in pre-Christian Greece")[86] Wesley D. Smith, "argues that in the Classical and Hellenistic periods, possession as we understand it was quite unknown. The divine inspiration of the Pythia of Delphi was rejected by Plutarch as "unsound 'Oriental' imagination. Demons only 'attack' and affect human life 'from without' … there is no demonic entry or possession."[87]

Since then, authors have struggled between these two poles, grappling with the entailments of the word 'possession' from our own Christian culture as well as a dearth of Classical

[84] Other metaphors of the CONTAINER schema in these chapters include Jesus being filled with wisdom in 2:40, and Mary treasuring and contemplating her experiences "in her heart" in 2:19 and 2:51.
[85] Dodds 1984: 70-71.
[86] Smith 1965: 403-426.
[87] Stol 1993: 52.

sources.[88] The meaning of the term ἔνθεος is particularly difficult: does it mean 'full of the god', the god being *inside* the person possessed, as the LSJ says? Or does it mean that the person is *in* the god? Aune calls the etymological meaning of ἔνθεος "obvious" but nevertheless states that "the normal way in which … supernatural beings were thought to exercise influence on human beings was *from without*…." (author's own emphasis).[89] Taking Smith's article into account, one can go to Euripides' *Hippolytus* Line 141; in it, the Chorus asks Phaedra, σύ γὰρ ἔνθεος, ὦ κούρα, εἴτ᾽ ἐκ Πανὸς εἴθ᾽ Ἑκάτας…? We can see that a qualification or expansion of the term ἔνθεος is ἐκ Πανὸς, *out of* Pan, suggesting that Pan is the container of Phaedra, rather than Phaedra the container of Pan.

I would suggest that the CONTAINER model of possession does not, then, come from Classical Greek religious thought; rather, it is more likely to have emerged as a result of philosophical thought, and the development of mind-soul dualism. Once Plato, the Orphics, and the Pythagoreans could imagine the body as the tomb of the soul, it is no great cognitive leap to begin to understand the body as being able to contain foreign, invisible, entities as well as one's own.

4.3.3 – Luke's Model of Possession

Until the end of the Temptation narrative, Luke has used the COVERING (e.g., 1:35; 4:18) and the CONTAINER (e.g., 4:1) models for spiritual influence evenly. It is reasonable to assume that this is due to his conscious utilisation of the Septuagint, particularly in his early chapters. However, as I will detail below, once the trope of demonic possession is introduced into the

[88] E.g. Padel 2013: 12-14.
[89] Aune 1983: 33.

narrative Luke goes to great lengths to foreground the CONTAINER metaphor as a model of possession, most obviously in his inclusion of the Parable of the Demon's House in 11:24-26. On the other hand, especially in Acts, he tends to prefer the CLOTHING/COVERING metaphor for the gift of the Holy Spirit (e.g., Acts 1:5; 1:8; 2:17-18; 2:33; 8:14-20, esp. v. 16; 10:44-45; 11:15; 19:6). Some of these verses are references to the Septuagint – 2:17-18 being a quotation from Joel 2:28-32 – and exceptions include Acts 2:4, which uses "all were filled with the Holy Spirit" (even though in 2:3 the Spirit appears as tongues of fire sitting above each of the recipients), 9:17, 13:9, and the CONTAINER metaphor being used of Stephen in 6:8.

Luke overwhelmingly prefers the CONTAINER metaphor for demonic possession, as I will show throughout the next three chapters, but has a tendency to mix the CONTAINER and COVERING METAPHORS when it comes to talking about the Holy Spirit. Both metaphors come from different elements which influence Luke's worldview; the CONTAINER metaphor from his own cultural milieu and the NT accounts which he used for his works, and the COVERING metaphor from the much older understanding common in the Levant which was preserved in the Septuagint. As detailed below, a great deal of Luke's understanding of demonology comes from the Septuagint, where details of demons are rare and fleeting, and references to any form of 'demonisation' are even rarer. In those that do appear, in Tobit and 1 Samuel, the effects of demonisation are likened to strangling, an outward form of harm, rather than an inward one.

I argue that this is done for two reasons: first, the inclusion of the COVERING metaphor is primarily due to Luke's use of the Septuagint, in which the Spirit of God is often spoken of overshadowing, covering, or wrapping its recipient. Second, the action of covering,

wrapping, or clothing presents the spirit as being *above* the human, just as clothing rests on the skin, or a shade is positioned over the head. In line with the UP-DOWN schema discussed above, this upper position is one associated with control, but also with status and moral goodness. This position can thus be given to the Holy Spirit without any cognitive issues, but it becomes problematic to cede this position to a demon. It is the staple of CMT that if a schema is at play even entirely subconsciously, people will act in accordance to it.[90] Luke thus prefers to use the CONTAINER schema to describe demonic possession, as I will detail below.

With regard to the Holy Spirit, it could be said that Luke is mixing his metaphors – is the Holy Spirit located inside or outside the recipient? The fact that Luke uses two different metaphors does not in fact indicate *incoherence* in his worldview. The concept of coherency has an important role in CMT: "the most fundamental values in a culture will be coherent with the metaphorical structure of the most fundamental concepts in a structure."[91] Several different metaphors being used to describe the same phenomenon is natural and understandable. "There is a good reason why a single target concept is understood via several source concepts: one source just cannot do the job because our concepts have a number of distinct aspects to them and the metaphors address these different aspects."[92] However, in this case, both the COVERING metaphor and the CONTAINER metaphor describing the activities of spirits, whether Holy or profane, come from the same source domain: *rûaḥ*, or πνεῦμα.

[90] Ścigała-Indurkhya 2016: 205-212. In this paper, people asking for donations to charity are placed at the top and bottom of escalators in a busy shopping centre. Those placed at the top of escalators received significantly more donations than those placed at the bottom.
[91] Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 22.
[92] Kövecses 2010: 135.

By trying to work out whether these lexemes should be translated as ‘spirit’ or ‘breath’ or ‘wind’ in any given passages, we blind ourselves to the entailments which are consistent across these different translations. As breath, *rûaḥ* or πνεῦμα can be inside a body. As wind, *rûaḥ* or πνεῦμα can whirl and rush around a person. As a spirit, a *rûaḥ*, or a πνεῦμα can do both. The two metaphors, while at first glance appearing to be inconsistent, are in fact perfectly coherent with each other. I will discuss this further in the section below, with regard to the phrase τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἀκάθαρτον in Luke 4:33.

4.4 – Luke 4:31-37 – The Exorcism in Capernaum

In this section, I set out what Luke believes a demon to *be*. Like anyone reading this thesis, Luke lived in a society of multiple cultural and linguistic influences. We are largely ignorant of many of them. His understanding of any abstract concept would have been the result of the mingling of various ideas and images. Conceptual metaphor theory allows these ideas and images to be better detected and described, and conceptual blending theory allows for a far greater degree of accuracy when describing such mingled influences.

If one accepts the two-documentary hypothesis and assumes Markan priority, we know at least one of Luke’s sources, and can explore what he retained of this source, and what he changed. In his treatment of Mark 1:23-27, Luke writes in 4:33, καὶ ἐν τῇ συναγωγῇ ἦν ἄνθρωπος ἔχων πνεῦμα δαιμονίου ἀκαθάρτου... To understand how Luke conceptualises this antagonist, we must first break down this phrase, πνεῦμα δαιμονίου ἀκαθάρτου, by way of three questions:

1. What does Luke understand when he reads Mark’s phrase “unclean spirit”?

2. What does Luke understand by the lexeme δαιμόνιον?
3. Why does he add this to his redaction of Mark 1:23-27?

The first mention of demons in the gospel of Mark comes very early, in 1:23-27; this is the passage Luke has redacted in his own treatment of the episode. The man is specifically referred to as ἄνθρωπος ἐν πνεύματι ἀκαθάρτῳ,[93] a person with an unclean spirit, and the possessing agent is referred to as τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἀκάθαρτον in verse 26. In verse 27, the audience asks among itself, "he commands τοῖς πνεύμασιν τοῖς ἀκαθάρτοις, and they obey him."

Returning to Luke, Joseph Fitzmyer decides to translate ἔχων πνεῦμα δαιμονίου ἀκαθάρτου as "under the influence of an unclean spirit", despite the fact that he translates τὸ δαιμόνιον in verse 35 as "the demon."[94] It is unclear whether this is best understood as an internal or external metaphor; instead, it is an example of the conceptual metaphor HARM IS HAVING A HARMFUL POSSESSION, just as we might say *I have a headache* or *She has an injury.* Commentators can become oddly prescriptive when faced with the unexpected phrase, calling it "cumbersome" or declaring it to be "a contamination of *pneuma akatharton.*"[95] In the case of the latter, however, these are the same commentators who declare, inaccurately, that "*pneuma,* when not referring to the divine or the human spirit, is always combined with *akatharton.*"[96]

[93] Zerwick translates ἐν as 'with', "of concomitant circumstances (sociative ἐν)"; this is the meaning of the particle in Mark 5:25 also. (Zerwick-Grosvenor 1996: 115.) However, Joel Marcus (2000: 342) prefers a more literal interpretation: that the man has been swallowed up by the demons. He is almost flippant with his acknowledgement that, yes, the demons will flee from within the man in 5:13, but "we should not look for too much consistency when dealing with things as ambivalent and protean as demonic spirits." I think this is to do a disservice to the evangelist and to demonology in general; its rules and rituals have their own logic, as I will show with my discussion of metaphorical coherency, and Zerwick's translation is much more convincing.
[94] Fitzmyer 1970: 541.
[95] Fitzmyer 1983: 544.
[96] Reiling-Swellengrebel 1971: 214. Luke uses πνεῦμα without qualification to refer to a demon in 9:39, πνεῦμα πονηρὸν in Acts 19:12-17, and πνεῦμα πύθωνα in Acts 16:16.

What makes this short phrase of just four lexemes so exciting to anyone studying Lukan metaphors – and indeed any corpus or historical linguist – is that it demonstrates the evangelist's awareness of different semantic domains and their overlapping entailments. Furthermore, it provides explicit evidence of a conscious decision to conceptually blend those domains. It not only completely changes how one must approach the rest of Luke's demonology; it shows the extraordinary potential of Luke-Acts for linguistic analysis.

4.4.1 – τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἀκάθαρτον

The phrase πνεῦμα ἀκάθαρτον is an excellent vessel for the explanation of both conceptual metaphor theory and conceptual blending theory. First, to answer the question of how πνεῦμα ἀκάθαρτον can be used to explain conceptual metaphor theory, I set out two further questions:

1. What is meant by πνεῦμα?
2. What is meant by ἀκάθαρτον?

To begin: What is meant by πνεῦμα? As every first-year Greek student knows, this word can mean both "breath" and "spirit". Marie Isaacs' extremely thorough monograph accurately and succinctly explores a vast amount of Hellenistic Jewish material to trace the understanding of the lexeme πνεῦμα, and is well worth a full examination. She notes that 277 of the 378 occurrences of *rûaḥ* are translated in the Septuagint with πνεῦμα, including all the various entailments also found in the Hebrew: "breath, wind, life principle; human disposition, mood,

thought or determination; and the spirit of God."[97] Her concern is whether *rûaḥ* underwent semantic change as a result of the translation from Hebrew to Greek, and so she examines those passages where *rûaḥ* is not translated with πνεῦμα. For example, in the 117 instances where *rûaḥ* indicates wind, 65 instances of this are translated with πνεῦμα; in the other 52, ἄνεμος is used. "Thus the LXX reflects common Greek usage in regarding πνεῦμα as a synonymous term for ἄνεμος"[98] (cf. LXX Job 13:25). When *rûaḥ* indicates breath, πνεῦμα is usually used, with some exceptions (ἄνεμος – e.g. Jer 5:13; πνοή – Isa 38:16; Ezek 13:13; Prov 1:23). On the other hand, another Hebrew word for 'breath', *neshamah*, is also translated as πνεῦμα (3 Kgdms 17:17; Dan 5:23 (Theodotian πνοή)).[99]

The major divergence occurs when *rûaḥ* refers to human emotion or determination. In much of Greek literature,[100] a distinction is made between ψυχή, the intellect, and θυμός, the emotion.[101] Thus, both ψυχή and θυμός are also used to translate *rûaḥ* in the Septuagint, along with other words.[102] But at several points, including Judges 9:23,[103] Ecclesiastes 7:8, Numbers 5:14 and Deuteronomy 2:30, the translators "use πνεῦμα in this 'psychic' sense. In 3 Kgdms 20:4 (MT, 21:4) πνεῦμα has been introduced where there was no reference to *ruach* in the Hebrew text. (Fn 17: ... A similar introduction of πνεῦμα can be seen in 2 Kgdms 13:21, and in Job 7:15 where πνεῦμα is used to translate *nephesh*...)."[104]

[97] Isaacs 1976: 10. In footnote 2 on the same page she recommends C. A. Briggs, 'The Use of *Ruach* in the Old Testament', JBL 19 [1900], 132-145 and W. R. Shoemaker, 'The Use of *Ruach* in the O.T. and of Πνεῦμα in the N.T.', JBL 23 [1904], 13-67.
[98] Isaacs 1976: 10.
[99] Isaacs 1976: 11.
[100] Isaacs claims that the word ψυχή appears in the Iliad, 22.417, "speaking as a kind of breath, which resides in the body and is exhaled at death" (Isaacs 1976: 17 n. 7). I can find no such use of ψυχή in Il. 22.417.
[101] For a more up to date examination of ψυχή from Homer to Plato, and an examination of this lexeme and θυμός using Conceptual Metaphor Theory, see Cairns 2014.
[102] Isaacs 1976: 11.
[103] Discussed in more depth in Chapter 3.
[104] Isaacs 1976: 12.

Conceptually speaking, the distinction between πνεῦμα and ψυχή is even less marked. While Barr[105] and Silva[106] warn exegetes of the dangers of relying too heavily on etymology, it is useful here to note that both πνεῦμα and ψυχή are of Proto-Indo-European origin: πνεῦμα comes from the root *pneu-*, 'to breathe,'[107] and ψυχή from the root *bhes-*, meaning 'to blow,'[108] evidenced by the Greek verb ψύχω, 'I breathe'. Inspiration, expiration, aspiration – in English and in Latin as in Greek, the air, the wind, the breath are all at a most fundamental level, conceptual and linguistic, the metaphors by which we understand the abstract ideas of those invisible things whose effects we see and feel: intellect, determination, life. SPIRIT IS BREATH.

Just like SIN IS A WEIGHT, this is another example of an embodiment metaphor. This particular polysemy, labelled "probably the most significant" of all nouns associated with "breath" by linguist Alexandre François, is born of a metaphor that is universally obvious: "namely, *that the phenomenon of breathing is the most salient property that distinguishes a live creature from a dead body*."[109]

A general rule of metaphor theory is that a more abstract concept is described in terms of a more observable one, and this is the case with *pneuma* (and, indeed, with its Latin – French – English variation of 'spirit'). With a source domain of 'breath', the attribution of the noun to a target domain of incorporeal beings, life, or a soul is found in many languages (e.g. Ancient Greek, Hebrew, Latin, Classical Chinese, and Sanskrit). Just as breath or wind is invisible, their effects can be seen and felt; this entailment is extremely important when it comes to

[105] Barr 1961: 107-115.
[106] Silva 1983: 35-52.
[107] Pokorny 1959: 838-839.
[108] Pokorny 1959: 146.
[109] François 2008: 187.

understanding what a spirit is conceived to be. François writes briefly on the history of this phenomenon; in Greek, the association of *pneuma* with a spirit develops from the conception of certain types of inspiration (itself from the Latin *inspīro* 'blow into'), such as poetic or prophetic, as the breath of a god. "Finally, a process of metonymy triggers a shift from <divine breath> to <the divine entity *or* supernatural being from whom a divine breath emanates>..."[110]

With this metaphor come certain *entailments*.[111] An entailment is a characteristic or a necessary conclusion which can be drawn logically from the source domain. For example, if we take the metaphor TIME IS MONEY (we save time, spend time, waste time, give time, take time, budget time, invest time), one major entailment is that TIME IS A LIMITED RESOURCE, one which is foregrounded whenever someone laments that they *do not have enough time*. That this is always a *lament* is because TIME IS A LIMITED RESOURCE itself entails that TIME IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY.[112] Value is a fundamental entailment of limit. The rarer something is, the more precious it becomes. In the language of metaphor theory, "these subcategorization relationships characterize entailment relationships ... metaphorical entailments can characterize a coherent system of metaphorical concepts and a corresponding coherent system of metaphorical expressions for those concepts."[113]

What then are the entailments of SPIRIT IS BREATH? We can logically deduce that a spirit is invisible, but its effects might be visible. It is capable of causing physical effects on humans. It is *alive*, in a sense of the word that is separate from the understanding of a living body. It is incorporeal. It is separate to the body. But it can be contained *within* a body. An entailment of

[110] François 2008: 190-191.
[111] Itself a metaphor drawn from inheritance law.
[112] Lakoff- Johnson 1980: 9.
[113] Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 9.

being alive suggests a basic level of intelligence and will. This thesis was born from a very simple question, one which I never saw a commentator answer in a fundamental way: *what is a demon*? The answer to that question is still some way off, but here I think is the beginning of an answer to the question I asked above: What is meant by πνεῦμα? However abstract the idea of 'a spirit' is, the entailments of the metaphor SPIRIT IS BREATH begin to provide a working definition. Furthermore, it is a definition *Luke* would have understood when writing his works, and this statement will be supported by the evidence that follows in the rest of this chapter.

Next: What is meant by ἀκάθαρτον? The neuter adjectival form of ἀκάθαρτος, καθαρός with a privitive alpha, the LSJ gives the denotative meaning of *clean, pure, spotless, unsoiled.*[114] A problem arises because the concepts of purity and cleanness are not synonyms; in fact, there is a metaphorical relationship between the two.

> "A substance is pure when it has no admixture of any other substance within it. A common impurity is dirt. Thus, substances that are pure are typically clean, and substances that are dirty are usually considered impure. This correlation between purity and cleanliness gives rise to the metaphor Purity is Cleanliness.[115]"[116]

Etymology can only bring us so far in attempting to discern which concept καθαρός originally denoted, for its origins are notoriously obscure. In the very earliest Greek texts we find καθαίρω to refer to cleansing, either of the body or of clothes (Homer, Iliad 14.171; Odyssey 6.93). Walter Burkert writes that "... the root *kathar*, to clean/to purify, has no Indo-European etymology but ties in with a Semitic root in the sphere of purification: *qatar*, to

[114] LSJ: καθαρός §1.
[115] Lakoff and Johnson do not utilise small caps in their 1999 work.
[116] Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 307.

fumigate. One cleansing substance in this context is sulphur: Fumigation with sulphur is used in Homer for both practical and ritual means."[117] Examining the word synchronically, we can look to verses 18 and 21 of Revelation 21: καὶ ἡ πόλις χρυσίον καθαρὸν, ὅμοιον ὑάλῳ καθαρῷ - "and the city was pure gold, like pure glass"- and καὶ ἡ πλατεῖα τῆς πόλεως χρυσίον καθαρὸν ὡς ὕαλος διαυγής – "and the street of the city was pure gold, as transparent as glass." These verses *could* be referring to *clean* gold, but reference to *pure* gold makes far more sense. It matters little for this project. By the time of the writing of Luke's gospel, the concepts of purity and cleanliness have become so inextricably intertwined in the word καθαρός that attempting to untangle them is both futile and unnecessary.

Of more importance is the creation of a new derivative metaphor by associating purity/cleanliness with morality. "There is nothing inherent in the note of purity that aligns it with goodness. There can be *pure* evil just as well as *pure* goodness."[118] But purity is associated with cleanliness, and it is human nature to value the clean over the dirty. "Since morality is concerned with well-being, either our own or that of another, fundamental experiences concerning well-being give rise to conceptual metaphors of morality."[119] We know from both instinct and experience that we are healthier when we eat pure food and drink pure water; we know that we feel better, and are less likely to fall ill or encounter bad smells, when our bodies and clothes are clean. "Thus, when Morality is conceptualized as purity and purity as cleanliness, we get the derived metaphor Morality is Cleanliness."[120] This metaphor is alive and well all throughout Greek literature, and Luke plainly uses καθαρός in

[117] Burkert 1992: 64.
[118] Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 307.
[119] Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 250.
[120] Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 307.

its moral sense in Luke 11:41, Acts 18:6 and Acts 20:26, speaking of "an obligation fully met or a declaration of innocence in relation to a crime."[121]

The significance of the changing stance on ritual and moral purity of Jesus, the evangelists, and the early Christians cannot be underestimated, and will be explored further below.[122] For now, we must recognise the entailments that Mark and Luke's use of ἀκάθαρτον brings. The spirit is associated with ritual impurity. It is immoral. It is harmful.

Again, it is a crucial part of conceptual metaphor theory that we remember that these metaphors are *conceptual*, not merely rhetorical. In historical linguistics, of course, our main engagement with metaphors comes through texts, but, in the words of Samuel Johnson, "Language is the dress of thought", and thought influences our behaviour. A vineyard planted in accordance with Deuteronomy 22:9 or cloth woven in accordance with Leviticus 19:19, the use of the mikva'ot, Peter's concern and anxious refusal in Acts 10:14 ("I have never eaten anything common and unclean") are all evidence of these metaphors in play. CLEANLINESS IS NEXT TO GODLINESS. MORALITY IS PURITY. SIN IS DIRT.

Furthermore, neither Clinton Wahlen[123] nor Jonathan Klawans,[124] both of whom published erudite and detailed works on impurity in the Bible after 2000, mention Lakoff and Johnson at all, much less engage meaningfully with CMT, despite the wealth of material in cognitive and linguistic fields which explicitly explore the connections between physical impurity and immorality in human conceptualisation. This neglect demonstrates perfectly the importance


[121] Adewuya 2016: note 363.
[122] With particular reference to Ermakov 2014: 89-113 and Wahlen 2004.
[123] Wahlen 2004.
[124] Klawans 2000.

of interdisciplinary work in biblical studies, and how useful metaphor theory can be when applied to historical texts.

Conceptual metaphor theory has thus given us an understanding of the two lexemes πνεῦμα and ἀκάθαρτον, but bringing the two together is more complex. How can a spirit, something intangible and incorporeal, be dirty or impure? The entailments of ritual impurity, immorality and harm answer this question for us, instinctively, unconsciously – we understand what the evangelists mean. Some entailments are foregrounded, others are backgrounded. But the process by which we arrive at this understanding is another important area of cognitive linguistics.

Often conceptualised as a part of metaphor theory is conceptual blending theory (CBT); its developers, Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner, would instead argue that metaphor theory is a particular case of their blending theory. Instead of speaking about source and target domains, CBT speaks in the language of "input spaces", distinct mental 'pockets', which are blended to create a new mental space, the "blend".

Figure 8: The Basic Diagram – Conceptual Blending Theory[125]



Using this theory, Input I_1 is πνεῦμα and Input I_2 is ἀκάθαρτον; πνεῦμα ἀκάθαρτον is the Blend. Some entailments have been brought forward: immorality, ritual impurity, harm, incorporeality, some form of life, some form of intellect and will, invisibility, the power to affect humans, possession of the capability to exist separate to a body but within a body. Others have not: physical impurity or filth. Other entailments arrive in the blend from other sources, such as the use of 'unclean spirit' in the Hebrew and Greek versions of Zechariah 13:2, detailed in Chapter 2.2.2.a – an example entailment from this source might be the attribute of being vulnerable to the power of God. Commentators list plenty of other references which might have contributed entailments to the blend used by Luke and Mark.[126]

[125] Fauconnier-Turner, 2002: 46.
[126] e.g. Marcus 2000: 187: "This is Jewish terminology for a demon; see, for example, T. Benj. 5:2 and the rabbinic phrase 'spirit of uncleanness' (rûaḥ ṭûm'āh; see e.g. b. Ḥag 3b; b. Sota 3a); 1QM 13:5, similarly, speaks of the uncleanness of the spirits of Belial's lot."


This is the blend which Luke inherited from his redaction of Mark 1:23, and which he uses creatively in 4:33.

4.4.2 – δαιμόνιον

At the beginning of this section, the second question I asked was "What does Luke understand by the lexeme δαιμόνιον?" In Chapter 3 I examined the translation of various Hebrew terms using δαιμόνιον, which has the most basic denotative sense of 'something like a δαίμων'. I will briefly iterate those findings here, for they become extremely important when engaging with Luke's first use of the lexeme, which is a conceptual blend of several different Hebrew and Greek input spaces.

Figure 9 shows the process of conceptual blending were only one to read LXX Deuteronomy as a way by which to understand the meaning of δαιμόνιον; specifically, LXX Deuteronomy 32:17. As detailed in Chapter 2, the *šēdîm* were a. gods, b. specifically foreign gods, and c. probably related to the bull-like apotropaic *lamassu*. On the diagram these entailments are demonstrated as corresponding with these entailments of the δαίμονες: they, too, were a. associated with gods, b. foreign, and c. sometimes associated with animals (specifically, the Agathos Daimon worshipped in Alexandria in the form of a snake). The major entailments of the blend which the reader of LXX Deuteronomy therefore receives is that a δαιμόνιον is foreign, something like a divinity (depending on how monotheistic or monolatrous the reader was), and very much *not* YHWH. From LXX Deuteronomy's co-text they would perceive a pejorative tone, but there is nothing fundamentally negative about the lexeme itself.

Figure 9: Conceptual Blending in the LXX translation of Deuteronomy and Psalms



This is not the case for LXX Psalms. The use of δαιμόνια as a translation for *šēdîm* in Psalm 106(MT)/105(LXX):37 was, I have argued, quite probably influenced by the Greek translation of Deuteronomy. This translation also involves cross-space mapping between the elements of foreign rites and foreign gods, but a new semantic domain has been introduced: that of immoral action by those influenced by the δαιμόνια, immoral actions other than idolatry which do physical harm to members of the community, with death as their consequence.

However, two other Hebrew lexemes have been translated by δαιμόνια, each with their own set of entailments. As is the case in Figure 9, the entailments of not-YHWH and foreign divinity remain; added to this is the entailment of evil or harm, from the co-text of the lexemes in 105:37 and in 90:6. Despite the repeated claims of many scholars that δαίμων was entirely ambiguous before its use in the Jewish scriptures, Brenk has argued persuasively that in the Homeric works, and overwhelmingly so in the Odyssey, the portrayal of the δαίμων was as bringing harm, rather than good or neutral things[127] - overall "the daimon to the end of its existence will tend to operate in an unpredictable and often, or mostly, damaging way."[128]

The translation of *'ĕlîlîm* with δαιμόνια in Psalm 96(MT)/95(LXX):5 foregrounds again the element of foreign divinity, whether *'ĕlîlîm* has the commonly given meaning of "idols", or whether it means "minor gods" as Aaron argues.[129] The question here is not whether Luke had a detailed understanding of Hebrew or Ugaritic philology: it concerns the conceptual metaphors which he received from the Greek text of Psalms, and in this case we can know that the metaphor Luke received, from Psalm 95:5's co-text alone, is DAIMONIA ARE GENTILE

[127] Brenk 1986: 2079.
[128] Brenk 1986: 2081. See Chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion of the daimon in its Classical context.
[129] Aaron 2001: 160-161.

GODS. Furthermore, in Psalm 97:7, the translator[130] uses τοῖς εἰδώλοις as a translation of *ʾᵉlīlīm* - this source domain of GENTILE GODS is so closely connected with the domain of IDOLS that in practice, whatever the original meaning of Hebrew composer or Greek translator, we can be confident that Luke would have been aware of both entailments. GENTILE GODS and IDOLS are both source domains which end up in the conceptual blend of DAIMONIA.

We can be sure that Luke was familiar with Psalm 91(MT)/90(LXX):6 because Satan quotes verses 11 and 12 in Luke 4:10-11. I discussed the difficulty of *qeteb*'s denotation and connotations in Chapter 2.3.3.c, but purely using the Septuagintal co-text, we know that Luke would have inherited entailments of noon, of vulnerability to the power of God, and of harm, mostly likely physical. Completely contrary to Judit Blair's definition of what a demon is,[131] we can conclude that the translator of Psalms associated several entailments with δαιμόνια: they received sacrifice, even human sacrifice; they caused illness or distress; they were associated with foreign deities or idols, or both; and they could be subdued with the help of God.

In Isaiah 13:21 and 34:14, δαιμόνια is used to translate *śᵉʿîrîm.* The word *śĕʿîrîm* is the plural of *śāʿîr*, a word meaning 'hairy' and used, for example, in Genesis 27:11. It thus appears over fifty times meaning a male goat, in addition to its synonyms *ṣāpîr*, *tayiš*, and *ʿattûd*. In Leviticus 17:17, the verse is rewritten so that instead of sacrifices no longer being offered to the *śĕʿîrîm*, they will no longer be offered to the ματαίοις, the ones who achieve nothing and

[130] In the case of the Psalms, it is uncontroversial to assume a single translator.
[131] "For the purposes of the present study 'demon' can be defined as a supernatural evil being that exists or operates independent from Yahweh. Demons cause physical, mental and moral harm. They are not worshipped and do not receive sacrifice." Blair 2008: 11.

are of no practical benefit. In 2 Chronicles 11:15, the Hebrew's "priests for the high places, and the *śĕʿîrîm*, and the calf-idols" become "priests for the high places, and for the idols and the vanities (τοῖς εἰδώλοις καὶ τοῖς ματαίοις), and for the calves" in the Septuagint. There is no direct evidence that the use of δαιμόνια in Isaiah 13 and 34 carries the entailment of idolatry, but it must be considered. They appear in desolate places, the favoured haunts of demons in Ancient Near Eastern demonology, and in the company of dangerous and wild animals – including the *llîlît*, the Akkadian *lilītu,* a female demon, of the genus which also included the male *lilî* and the female *ardat-lilî*. The entailment of association with animals is shared with the input space of δαίμων, and even if δαίμων does not in and of itself carry the entailment of desolate spaces, it does not need to for it to be included in the blend as well.

Finally, in Isaiah 65:3 there is a Greek addition to the Hebrew text of τοῖς δαιμονίοις, ἃ οὐκ ἔστιν, making the connection between idolatry and the δαιμόνια completely explicit. In Isaiah 65:11, a table is prepared for Gad, possibly a god of luck, translated according to the manuscript with either τῷ δαιμονίῳ or, most interestingly, δαίμονι. "To Meni", apparently another god, is translated with τῇ τύχῃ. In Alcman's Fragment 69, δαίμων appears "in an impersonal sense, meaning apparently the distribution of human lots" [132] – it is possible that there is an entailment of luck attached to the δαιμόνιον. Even more interestingly, "Tyche we know at Lebadeia as the wife of the Agathos Daimon"[133] – the same Agathos Daimon that was worshipped in Alexandria, often in the form of a snake. From Isaiah 65, then, Luke received entailments of foreign gods and idol worship, as well as possible entailments of luck and animal association.

[132] Farnell 1921: 76.
[133] Harrison 1908: 355.

From the input spaces of LXX Deuteronomy, LXX Psalms, LXX Isaiah, and the Greek understanding of what was signified by the lexeme δαίμων, a blend was created. This is what Luke means by δαιμόνιον. Above are the blends of the translators – now I will explore the blend Luke received, taking the aforementioned blends as input spaces. We know that Luke was aware of the content of LXX Deuteronomy, Psalms and Isaiah, because even by this early point in his narrative he has quoted all three: Isaiah 40:3-5 in 3:4-6; Deuteronomy 8:3 in 4:4; Deuteronomy 6:13-14 in 4:8; Psalm 91:11-12 in 4:10-11; Deuteronomy 6:16 in 4:12; and of course, Isaiah 61:1-2 and 58:6 in 4:18-19.

I have not discussed here the possibility of Luke having knowledge of any of the Greek versions of Tobit[134] or other deutero-canonical or apocryphal sources, and I have relied on etymology as little as possible. Instead, I have shown just from the co-texts which we can be confident Luke knew that he inherited a significant number of entailments from the Septuagint associated with the word δαιμόνιον. Thus:

1. Luke knows some of the entailments of the phrase πνεῦμα ἀκάθαρτον, through Mark and his knowledge of Greek, if through nowhere else.
2. Luke knows some of the entailments of the lexeme δαιμόνιον through the LXX Deuteronomy, Psalms, Isaiah, and his knowledge of Greek.

With these two presuppositions in mind: In Luke 4:33, the evangelist creates a blend from two input spaces (Inputs I_1 = the blend labelled πνεῦμα ἀκάθαρτον and I_2 = the blend labelled δαιμόνιον), drawn from the generic space of the vast conception of the spiritual, preternatural

[134] Cf. Docherty 2013: 81-94.

and supernatural world in Luke's cultural milieu, resulting in a new conceptual blend, which he labelled πνεῦμα δαιμονίου ἀκαθάρτου.

Cross-mapping occurs between certain entailments – both δαιμόνια and unclean spirits are invisible and incorporeal, they can cause harm, they are associated with immorality in a monotheistic Jewish understanding of the universe, they are ritually impure, they are conceived to have life and sentience in some preternatural way, they are both inferior to the monotheistic God. Other entailments are foregrounded from either input space: the unclean spirit's ability to reside within a body while remaining apart from it, the δαιμόνιον's link to foreign deities. By the conscious syntactical blending of the "unclean spirit" and δαιμόνια in 4:33, Luke is deliberately creating a *conceptual* blend which henceforth is referred to by both terms. He can then refer to the same concept by either designation, based on the entailments he wishes to foreground. The later use of this blend was to have an important effect on the history of Christianity:

> Just on the field of 'spirits', demons and souls (ψυχαί), and in the domain of power and powers (δυνάμεις) Christians and heathens somehow understood each other. This fact immensely favoured Christian propaganda and the development of Christian cult and Christian sacraments. [135]

It is of great importance to understand that the creation of this blend did *not* originate with Luke – the use of both terms by Mark to refer to a single entity (Mark 7:24-30) shows that the conceptual blend was either one that was in common use, or that the entailments were so pervasively understood as to be created naturally and unconsciously. What *is* significant

[135] Eitrem 1950: 53.

about Luke's presentation of the blend is his explicit lexical statement of it. Conceptual metaphor theory and conceptual blending theory do not require that a writer be obviously aware of the cognitive functions behind the use of such language. After all, "we draw inferences, set goals, make commitments, and execute plans, all on the basis of how we in part structure our experience, consciously and unconsciously, by means of metaphor."[136] But evidence of the conscious and creative use of metaphor and blending by the evangelist are testament to the nuanced and sophisticated composition of Luke-Acts, and hint at the subtle and exciting concepts in the rest of his work.

4.5 – Summary

As Luke has introduced Satan and demons in Luke 4, the application of CMT to his writing has thrown light onto the structures beneath his words. Like a light shone through a paper lantern, where there is opacity, CMT allows colour to remain while also revealing the wires and joins which provide the lantern's shape. Without mentioning war, by the structure of an argument Luke has suggested that he perceives the relationship between Jesus and Satan to be one of animosity, strategy, and struggle – while also suggesting that there are foundational commonalities between them. We know of only some of them. Others will be hinted at, like when Satan demands to sift Peter like wheat in Luke 22:31. But by evoking warfare, his audience recognises that the pattern of exorcisms which we will examine in the next chapter have a role and a purpose. In Chapter 6, the pattern will be set out in the Beelzebul Controversy.

[136] Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 158.

Before we pay closer attention to those exorcisms, it is worth noting that we have paid attention to an area which has tended to be overlooked. Writers concerned with demonology in the NT have overwhelmingly tended to focus on the ritual and meaning of exorcism, with less emphasis on the understanding and significance of the possessions themselves. Before one begins to discuss the influences or origins of exorcism, we ought to be as clear as we can on what an exorcism is intended to cure. By CBT, we are able to see how Luke has mentally balanced and combined his various cultural influences in a deliberate conceptual blend. By CMT, we can more easily and precisely articulate the actions of that blend.

CHAPTER 5: Galilee – Possession and Exorcism

5.1 – Introduction

While the second half of Chapter 4 used conceptual metaphor theory and conceptual blending theory to discuss what Luke thought a demon *was*, this chapter will instead focus on the use of CMT to discuss what Luke thought a demon *did;* that is, the actions and behaviour of the demons which his characters encounter, and thus his presentation of possession and exorcism. CMT is concerned with systematic concepts, rather than rhetoric. Instead of discussing metaphor as a deliberate stylistic and ornamental choice, the evangelist's use of language is evidence of his worldview, particularly his conceptualisations of abstract matters.

I make a brief return to the story of the Capernaum Demoniac (Luke 4:31-37) to illustrate some of the major points of this chapter. First, Luke conceives of the human body as a container, and a possession occurs when a supernatural element inhabits or fills that container.

In the Hebrew Bible, the influence of supernatural, invisible forces was often conceived of as the entity remaining *outside* of their victim, with the conceptual metaphors AN EVIL SPIRIT IS AN INVISIBLE ATTACKER or AN EVIL SPIRIT IS A COVERING being used. For example, as I detailed in Chapter 4, in 1 Samuel 16:14, 18:10 (absent in the LXX) and 19:9, a *rûaḥ rāʿâ* from God torments Saul. In LXX 1 Kings 16:14, this is rendered ἔπνιγεν αὐτὸν πνεῦμα πονηρὸν, a wicked spirit was *strangling* Saul. In 19:9, καὶ ἐγένετο πνεῦμα θεοῦ πονηρὸν ἐπὶ Σαουλ. This second image, of the evil spirit *on* Saul *might* be coherent with Mark's

description of the Capernaum demoniac as ἄνθρωπος ἐν πνεύματι ἀκαθάρτῳ, but Luke is very clear in his 4:35 redaction: the demon is inside of the man, and exorcism involves it *coming out* of him. This metaphor, THE BODY IS A CONTAINER, has an example of a source domain so crucial in cognitive linguistics that it is known as a 'schema'. As I outlined in §4.2.3, some domains are concrete and imagistic (including 'embodied' domains, particularly related to our physical experiences and interactions),[1] and some are abstract[2] or nonimagistic.[3] Of these, some abstract patterns originally arising from physical domains become "recurring basic conceptual structures"[4] due to their ubiquity. These are schemas.

As I discussed in §4.3, Luke is comfortable using both the COVERING metaphor and the CONTAINER metaphor to illustrate the actions of the Holy Spirit; however, when it comes to demonic possession, he overwhelmingly favours the CONTAINER model. In this model, the body is a 'container' which 'holds' the demon. The source domain of the container is so commonly used that it is a schema, by which we understand multitudes of target domains: a country is a container, the human heart is a container, and we hold our country in our heart. Someone's affection is a container, a cohort is a container, a club is a container. "Are they in, or out?" The day is a container, and the night is a container (*in the middle of the night*); the future is a container, the past is a container (*in the past it was done like this).*

Particularly fundamental is the conception that THE BODY IS A CONTAINER. Interpretations of this conceptual metaphor can range from the physical (the body as a container of blood and bones, or as a container into which food disappears) to the abstract (the mind-body dualism on Greek philosophy).

[1] Lakoff 1987: 267; see in general Lakoff and Johnson 1999.
[2] Lakoff-Turner 1989: 94.
[3] Clausner-Croft 1999: 14.
[4] Clausner-Croft 1999: 1.

With this in mind, the major points of this chapter are:

1. Luke conceptualises disease and demonic possession as part of the same paradigm, and modern scholarly insistence on separating them into separate categories of miracle obscures the evangelist's presentation;
2. Luke conceptualises possession by the metaphor A BODY IS A CONTAINER, in which a demon resides;
3. that this CONTAINER is most clearly identified with a BUILDING (cf. 11:24-25);
4. that in conjunction with the WARFARE schema by which the larger roles of possession and exorcism are understood, that this BUILDING can be conceptualised as a FORTRESS or WALLED CITY;
5. that this conceptualisation (A POSSESSED BODY IS A CAPTURED FORTRESS) explains certain changes which Luke makes to his Markan source, e.g., the elimination of self-harm as a symptom of possession;
6. that this conceptualisation (A POSSESSED BODY IS A CAPTURED FORTRESS) explains why some healed victims offer logistical support (e.g. Mary Magdalene, 8:2-3) and why some offer propagandist support (e.g. the Gerasene Demoniac, 8:38-39);
7. that this conceptualisation (A POSSESSED BODY IS A CAPTURED FORTRESS) contributes to the characterisation of the disciples as COMMISSIONED OFFICERS, as a part of a greater mapping of the WARFARE schema explored below in Chapter 6;
8. finally, that this mapping of the WARFARE schema will address other elements, such as authority or the kingdom of God, which are often associated with exorcisms in Luke's narrative.

5.2 – Luke 4:38-41 – The Healing of Simon's Mother-in-Law

I will discuss below what *kind* of container Luke conceives the body to be. For the moment, it is enough to use the conceptual metaphor A BODY IS A CONTAINER. In 4:33-37, the Capernaum demoniac's body is the container for πνεῦμα δαιμονίου ἀκαθάρτου; at first, Luke just tells us that this man "has" it. It is only at the point of exorcism that we are made aware of *where* the man has the spirit: Jesus orders the spirit, ἔξελθε ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, "come out from him", and ἐξῆλθεν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, he came out from him.

We do not have this certainty in Luke 4:38-41. Simon's mother-in-law ἦν συνεχομένη πυρετῷ μεγάλῳ, was suffering from a great fever. There is no mention of a spirit or a demon, and no lexical indication that the fever is *inside* her. But many scholars have noted that Luke treats this healing as an exorcism, particularly in his choice of the word ἐπιτιμάω and the apparent personification of the fever.[5] As Kirchschläger writes:

> Lukas erfaßt die Charakterisierung der Krankheit nicht in einer attributivischen Beifügung, sondern schreibt das Substantiv, das er durch μεγάλῳ verstärkt. Hinter dieser Formulierung ist wohl die Vorstellung einer außermenschlichen Fiebermacht zu vermuten.[6]

For Kirchschläger, this portrayal of the fever as an extra-human force ("außermenschlichen Fiebermacht") is above all a stylistic choice, made by Luke to highlight the seriousness of the woman's condition "auf literarisch eindringliche Art."[7] Fitzmyer points out that Luke has redacted his Markan source to personalise the fever; Simon's mother-in-law was being

[5] See particularly Klutz 2004: 75-78. See also Theissen 1983: 86; Edwards 2015: 146; Hull 1974: 100; Garrett 1989: 129 n. 15; Twelftree 2007: 132.
[6] Kirchschläger 1981: 60.
[7] Kirchschläger 1981: 60.

"seized" or "tormented" (ἦν συνεχομένη) by the "great fever" (4:38),[8] as opposed to Mark's description of her κατέκειτο πυρέσσουσα (Mark 1:30), which Fitzmyer translates as "lying abed feverish."[9] But it is the verb Ἐπιτιμάω which excites the most comment with regards to the "demonization" of the fever by Luke. This verb, invariably translated as "to rebuke," is overwhelmingly treated as a technical exorcistic term:[10] "Επιτιμάω ist terminus technicus für das machtvolle Wort Jesu gegenüber Dämonen."[11] In the Septuagint, it is used to translate לעֵר, signifying "ein scheltendes, vernichtendes Sprechen,"[12] and Twelftree writes that it is a word specifically associated with God, calling down destruction in reproof.[13] Böcher points out the difference between Matthew and Luke's redaction of the story in Mark 1:31; while in Matthew Jesus heals by grasping her hand, in Luke, he threatens the fever. [14]

Bovon suggests that Luke specifically mentions Jesus leaning over Simon's mother-in-law as first of all demonstrating his power in the situation (cf. Elijah[15] in 1 Kgs [LXX Kdgms] 17:21), but also suggests that this gesture is meant to signify "his nearness, from which he can breathe into the woman his healing breath (The LXX understood Elijah's gesture in this way)." He also notes that the Septuagint has removed mention of Elijah's posture, and only of breathing on the patient.[16]

[8] For discussion of medical terminology see Fitzmyer 1983: 550; for a discussion as to whether the fever is a symptom of malaria, "a common ailment in low-lying, water-bound Capernaum", see Edwards 2015: 146, who cites J. Reed, 'Instability in Jesus' Galilee: A Demographic Perspective,' *JBL* 129/2 2010: 357 for further information. Contra this: "The analytic imperfect implies that the fever was chronic, and the verb that it was severe," F. W. Farrar, *The Gospel According to St. Luke* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1891: 157, quoted in Thomas 1998: 199, n.33.
[9] Fitzmyer 1983: 550.
[10] Edwards 2015: 146.
[11] Kirchschläger 1981: 61.
[12] Kirchschläger 1981: 61-62.
[13] Twelftree 2007: 135.
[14] Böcher 1972: 30.
[15] Bovon writes that 1 Kgs 17:21 is a story of *Elisha,* instead of Elijah; Elisha's very similar miracle occurs in 2 Kgs 4:34.
[16] Bovon 2002: 16.

If the fever is understood by Luke as a demon, and the healing as an exorcism, it is worth briefly examining their shared entailments. The fever is invisible. It causes the woman's skin to be hot to the touch, just as a fire contained within a brazier will cause the brazier to feel hot to the touch. It possibly causes the woman to sweat – something is passing through the boundary of the body, from the inside to the outside. With this understanding of what a fever does, it is logical that the CONTAINER schema could be applied to this case. It also shows why it is so easy to associate it with a spirit or a demon; see **§4.4.1** above for discussion of the entailments of "spirit."

It is true that the fever does not "go out of" Simon's mother-in-law as explicitly as the demons in 4:35 and 4:41 "come out" of their victims with ἐξ-prefixed lexemes, but the word ἀφίημι can also be used to mean "I leave (a CONTAINER)"[17] – just as in English we can *go out of* a room or we can *leave* it.

The phrase καὶ ἀθῆκεν αὐτὴν is taken directly from Mark 1:31, and it is more likely that both Mark and Luke used ἀφίημι in the sense of "to abandon" an object – like the nets in Mark 1:18, or Zebedee in 1:20. However, just as ἀφίημι is used to describe newly-called disciples leaving their boat in Matthew 4:22, this does not mean that Luke did not conceive of the healing of Simon's mother-in-law as the fever leaving a container. A boat, after all, is also a container. John uses ἀφίημι to indicate *leaving* a container in John 4:3 and 16:28; respectively, by virtue of having interiors, exteriors, and boundaries, A REGION IS A CONTAINER and THE COSMOS IS A CONTAINER. The vocabulary Luke has inherited from Mark

[17] Cf. John 4:3: "ἀφῆκεν τὴν Ἰουδαίαν, καὶ ἀπῆλθεν πάλιν εἰς τὴν Γαλιλαίαν"; John 16:28: "ἐλήλυθα εἰς τὸν κόσμον ... ἀφίημι τὸν κόσμον."

might be inconsistent with the language he uses in verses 35 and 41, but it is not necessarily *incoherent*.

I discussed the difference between metaphorical consistency and metaphorical coherence in Chapter 2; for now, a brief overview will suffice. Two metaphors might not be consistent, forming the same image, but they can be coherent "by virtue of being subcategories of a major category and therefore sharing a common entailment."[18] There is coherence between 4:31-37 and 4:38-39, a coherence which is highlighted and confirmed by 4:41, in which once again ἐξήρχετο ... δαιμόνια ἀπὸ πολλῶν. At the very least, Luke's understanding of exorcism and of healing are *coherent* because both a demon and a disease can be conceptualised as an object within the container of the body. I continue this discussion in the section below.

5.3 – Luke 6:18 – A Summary of Healings

In §5.2 I argued that Luke conceives of the fever of Simon's mother-in-law and her subsequent healing by Jesus according to the same CONTAINER schema by which he respectively understands a possessing demon and exorcism. In 6:18, one of Luke's famous 'summary passages', we read that a great crowd from Jerusalem, Judea, Tyre and Sidon came to Jesus, οἳ ἦλθον ... ἰαθῆναι ἀπὸ τῶν νόσων αὐτῶν· καὶ οἱ ἐνοχλούμενοι ἀπὸ πνευμάτων ἀκαθάρτων ἐθεραπεύοντο, "the ones coming … to be healed from their diseases; and the ones being troubled by unclean spirits were being healed." Is this to be interpreted as "they came to be healed of their diseases, and indeed the ones being troubled by [these] unclean spirits were being healed"? Or "they came to be healed of their diseases, just like the others who

[18] Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 44.

were troubled by unclean spirits were being healed"? How much overlap is there between exorcism and healing for Luke?

There is a question among commentators as to the degree to which Luke's conception is that disease and possession are one and the same. Bovon, for example, thinks that Luke differentiates healings from exorcisms, and only uses θεραπεύω because of the parallel in Mark 3:10,[19] but also acknowledges that ἐνοχλέω is also used of illness in the Flinders Petrie Papyri 2.25 A12.[20]

The lemma ἐνοχλέω appears in the NT only here and in Hebrews 12:15. Ὀχλέω, here with the intensifier ἐν, demonstrates a metaphor employed universally in Greek, from the time of Homer (Iliad 21.261): an ὄχλος is an annoyance. Luke uses ὀχλέω to refer to demonic possession in Acts 5:16, and it is the word that the angel Raphael uses twice in Tobit 6:8 to refer to the plight of those whom the fish's burning entrails would be able to help.[21]

However, in the Septuagint, ἐνοχλέω always refers to physical illness (with the exception of 1 Esdras, where it is used to denote rebellion against the king).[22] Several scholars have made the point that Luke's use of ἐθεραπεύοντο here draws a link between physical illness and demonic possession; however, they have failed to point out that Luke's use of ἐνοχλέω, with the connotation of physical sickness from the LXX, rather than ὀχλέω (which he uses elsewhere to refer to possession) confirms this conceptual association.

[19] Bovon 2002: 213, n.14.
[20] Bovon 2002: 213, n.15.
[21] I discuss the influence of Tobit in Chapter 3; for an exploration of whether Luke might have known Tobit, see Docherty 2013.
[22] LXX: Gen 48:1; 1 Kgs 19:14, 30:13; 1 Esd 2:17, 24; Mal 1:13; Dan (Theodotion) 6:3; cf. Luke's use of παρενοχλέω in Acts 15:19 to refer to the members of the council in Jerusalem deciding not to "trouble" Gentile converts regarding the issue of circumcision. See also BDAG: 267.

Green, on the other hand, writes that there is no need to decide between meaning of "sick" or "demon-troubled" because Luke considers the diseases mentioned as being the result of unclean spirits.[23] Twelftree compromises by stating that 6:18 is "another example of Luke's habit of blurring the distinction between healing and exorcism."[24] This is not incorrect, but dodges the issue somewhat.

Luke 6:18 encapsulates the question raised above in 4:38-39 and below in 7:1-10: how does Luke conceptualise the relationship between healing and exorcism? In terms of CMT, possession and illness are at the very least metaphorically coherent, if not metaphorically consistent. They are perceived by Luke as something harmful and unclean within the container of the body. As Lakoff and Johnson wrote, "A metaphor works when it satisfies a purpose, namely, understanding an aspect of that concept. When two metaphors successfully satisfy two purposes, then overlaps in the purpose will correspond to overlaps in the metaphors."[25] These overlaps are characterised by two things: shared entailments,[26] and resulting cross-metaphorical correspondences.

The insistence on a distinction between exorcism and healing by some commentators is a result of our own bio-medical paradigm. Conceptually, there is so much conceptual overlap between how Luke apparently understands illness and how he understands possession – an overlap exemplified in 13:1-10 – that at the very least we are dealing with two extremely coherent conceptualisations, if not two manifestations of the same image: a harmful object within a bodily container.

[23] Green 1997: 263.
[24] Twelftree 1999: 152
[25] Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 97.
[26] Discussed at length above in Chapter 4.

A result of this conclusion is that while the focus of this thesis is Luke's conceptualisation of Satan and of demons, we can find clues about Luke's worldview and theology in passages which do not mention either Satan or demons at all, with a framework provided by CMT to connect them. This is a great advantage of conceptual metaphor theory; it is a holistic method which is suited to a narrative created by a human being with his own irrational or contradictory or subconscious understanding of the cosmos. Were we limited to only examining the evangelist's vocabulary, the underlying metaphor would remain unidentified.

5.4 – Luke 7:1-10 – The Healing of the Centurion's Servant

As I have argued above that healings and exorcisms are part of the same paradigm for Luke, the healing of the Centurion's servant can provide important insights into that paradigm. In this passage, Jesus's power to heal is presented as authority, given within an established hierarchy, over personified malevolence (applied to illness, as here, or demons, as in 11:14-26) and is described using the WARFARE metaphor.

Demons are not mentioned in this pericope, nor is an exorcism shown. In fact, the healing is not shown at all. The entire story takes place as a conversation between two men who never meet – Jesus, and a centurion. Nevertheless,7:7-9 is a vital point in any discussion of demonology, and one which has not been examined by even the most thorough scholars of NT demonology (e.g. Walter Kirchschläger or Todd Klutz), or the most enthusiastic of pan-demonologists (e.g. Otto Böcher).

The centurion compares Jesus' ability to heal his servant to his own position within the Roman army. He is a man "under authority," probably the highest ranking soldier in the area who has been commissioned with keeping the peace,[27] and when he tells his soldiers to go, they go, or when he tells his slave to do something, he does it. He recognises that Jesus too is a man under authority, and one to whom the illness (see above for a discussion of Lukan personification of illness) must listen. Jesus is amazed by his faith, and the servant is healed.

Garret's only discussion of Luke 7:8 is, interestingly, in relation not to the authority of Jesus but the authority of Satan: specifically, that Satan is himself "under authority", in accordance with his appearances in Job 1:11-12, 2:5-6 (also Zech 3:1, possibly 1 Chron 21:1).[28] I have yet to read a scholar who follows this comparison to its logical conclusion. But some of Luke's characters do, and in 11:15 they accuse him of exactly what Jesus admits in 7:9. He is a man under authority, and so can cast out demons. But if illness or demons are equivalent to Roman soldiers, and the centurion recognises Jesus as someone in the same hierarchical position as himself, it is a perfectly reasonable and logical conclusion that it is by Beelzebul, the ruler of demons, that Jesus is able to cast out demons. How can this be explained?

The question that one must then ask is *how is Jesus able to have authority over evil spirits, if he is not part of that demonic hierarchy?* The answer is this: a soldier has authority over soldiers in another army when he has defeated them in battle. This introduces the WARFARE metaphor in a particularly explicit way, a metaphor which will gain more and more traction as Luke's narrative approaches the Passion. Demons are enemy soldiers who have suffered a defeat, and there are two major kinds of military defeat: on a battlefield, or in a siege.

[27] Haslam 1985: 109-110.
[28] Garrett 1989: 39; Luke 4:6 – "καὶ εἶπεν αὐτῷ ὁ διάβολος Σοὶ δώσω τὴν ἐξουσίαν ταύτην ἅπασαν καὶ τὴν δόξαν αὐτῶν, ὅτι ἐμοὶ παραδέδοται καὶ ᾧ ἐὰν θέλω δίδωμι αὐτήν" – is discussed above, in Chapter 4.

Siege warfare would have loomed large in Luke's mindscape, most obviously in the Siege of Jerusalem which he describes in 21:20-24. I argue that the siege of an occupied fortress is the metaphor by which Luke understands possession and exorcism. The foundational elements of this metaphor (A BODY IS A CONTAINER) have become visible in the narratives discussed above. Specifically, I argue below that the type of CONTAINER which best describes Luke's conception of the body is that of A BUILDING or, more specifically, A CASTLE or A FORTRESS. Thus, in combination with the WARFARE metaphor, EXORCISM IS A SIEGE .[29]

In 11:24, Luke portrays a demon, through a parable of Jesus, as calling a victim's body τὸν οἶκον μου ὅθεν ἐξῆλθον. As discussed above, the shared entailments between A CONTAINER, A BUILDING, and A BODY (viz. an interior, exterior, and boundary) mean that this conception is perfectly intratextually coherent. Furthermore, it is also a metaphor that is *inter*textually coherent; it was used for centuries before the writing of Luke's gospel and has been used for millennia afterwards, e.g. particularly in medical works in the Middle Ages: "Architectural metaphors were often used to describe the body: the body as house, as fortress, as edifice, cell, cage, box, coffer, with the womb as 'ultimate dwelling place, intended to shelter the foetus."[30]

The Orphic and Pythagorean conception of the body as a mausoleum in which the body was entombed was taken up by Plato (e.g. *Phd*. 82e and *passim*, *Phdr*. 250c; discussed with the

[29] The metaphor DISEASE IS AN INVASION, clearly connected to THE BODY IS A CASTLE, has been the subject of much discussion in the medical field. For general discussion on the military metaphor in medicine, both in terms of the body repelling or succumbing to an invasion by foreign germs or illness, and of society defending itself against or ridding itself of a particular plague or epidemic, see Sontag 1989: 5-12. "It was when the invader was seen not as the illness but as the microorganism that causes the illness that medicine really began to be effective, and the military metaphors took on new credibility and precision. Since then, military metaphors have more and more come to infuse all aspects of the description of the medical situation" (1989: 9).
[30] Pouchelle 1990: 134, in Lupton 2012: 57.

famous sōma/sēma pun in *Gorg*. 493a and *Crat*. 400b-c), and in turn by Philo (*Leg*. 1.108; *Somm*. 1.139; *QG* 2.69, 4.153).[31] Wisdom of Solomon 9:15 reads φθαρτὸν γὰρ σῶμα βαρύνει ψυχήν καὶ βρίθει τὸ γεῶδες σκῆνος νοῦν πολυφρόντιδα; it was probably written in the first century BCE, "though any time from the second century B.C.E. to the first century C.E. is possible."[32] It is most likely to have been written in Alexandria,[33] and was composed in Greek.[34] While I do not argue that Luke had certainly read the Wisdom of Solomon, and particularly not that he was an avid reader of Philo, these quotations show that the conceptualisation of the body as A DWELLING (and thus A CONTAINER) of the soul was becoming part of the Hellenistic Jewish milieu in which Luke was writing.

The body also began to be conceived as a city. Jeffery Zavadil states that "perhaps the earliest reference to the body politic" in Greek thought is Aesop's Fable of the Belly and the Members (Fable 66).[35] "A cosmological body metaphor also appears in Plato's *Timaeus,* where body, soul, city and universe all exhibit a similar hierarchic pattern (... 30c-34b, 44d-45b)."[36]

Some of the substance of this metaphor has been lost to us with time. The concept of a city is more abstract than it was in the past with the erosion of the physical boundary that marked city from non-city: the city walls. Overwhelmingly in the ancient world cities would have had have a clear boundary in the form of defences as fortified as its inhabitants could afford. Therefore in ancient and early modern metaphors, the walls function as an important part of

[31] Runia 1986: 262.
[32] Harrington 1999: 55.
[33] Harrington 1999: 55; see also Clifford 1998: 135-136.
[34] Harrington, 1999, p. 56.
[35] Zavadil 2009: 221; on the body as a city in Greek, see Secchi 2014: 125.
[36] Zavadil 2009: 222.

the conceptual metaphor. Possibly the very earliest time we see this so clearly in literature is in the Iliad, where Hektor's broken body is compared to his city (Iliad 22. 410-411):

> τῷ δὲ μάλιστ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἔην ἐναλίγκιον ὡς εἰ ἅπασα
> Ἴλιος ὀφρυόεσσα πυρὶ σμύχοιτο κατ᾽ ἄκρης.

As the source domain of CITY is equivalent to FORTIFIED OR WALLED CITY, we can see again the coherent progression of the metaphor into THE BODY IS A CASTLE or THE BODY IS A FORTRESS when the CONTAINER schema meets the WARFARE domain. Just as above, we see the use of the metaphor THE BODY IS A CASTLE passed from Classical Greek writing to Philo:[37]

> εἶτα ἔνειμαν τῷ μὲν λογιστικῷ τὸν περὶ κεφαλην χῶπον
> εἰπόντες, ὅπου ὁ βασιλεύς, ἐκεῖ καὶ οἱ δορυφόροι, δορυφόροι δὲ
> αἱ αἰσθήσεις τοῦ νοῦ περὶ κεφαλὴν οὖσαι, ὥστε καὶ ὁ βασιλεὺς
> εἴη ἂν ἐκεῖ, ὥσπερ ἄκραν ἐν πόλει λαχὼν οἰκεῖν...[38]

How can the FORTRESS metaphor be a coherent intratextual metaphor if Luke never explicitly uses it? This is the very crux of conceptual metaphor theory as opposed to traditional metaphor theories. The metaphor itself as it appears in writing or in speech is a window to the conceptual networks underlying it – like manholes leading down to a sewer system, to regretfully use an unpleasant metaphor. Oxford Circus and Brixton stations are separated by miles, with the wide river Thames between them, but underground, they are connected by a single Tube line. The FORTRESS metaphor is the Victoria line between the Oxford Circus of the CONTAINER schema and the Brixton of the WARFARE metaphor.

[37] Díaz Vera 2009: 80.
[38] Philo, Allegorical Interpretation III, 115, as found in *Philo* 1929: 378.

5.5 – Luke 7:20-21 – The Disciples of John the Baptist

The primary message of Luke 7:18-23 is that Jesus' miracles authenticate his message and his authority.[39] In this sense, the passage is a confirmation of Jesus' statement of his mission in 4:18-19, and a herald of the statement that he will make in 11:14-23, which places the ongoing conflict with Satan in the context of that mission. The latter will be discussed in more detail below in §6.4.

In 4:18-19, Luke portrays Jesus reading a mixed citation of LXX Isaiah 61:1-2 and 58:6 in the synagogue in Nazareth. In both 4:18-19 and in 7:21-22, Jesus' ministry is clearly cast in terms of the fulfilment of Isaianic prophecy. The messengers from John appear while Jesus is performing a slew of miracles which correspond to specific verses in Isaiah, and Jesus points to them as evidence that can be reported back to John: the healing of the deaf and the blind (Isaiah 35:5; 42:18); the healing of the lame and the mute (Isaiah 35:6), and the resurrection of the dead (Isaiah 26:19, presumably referring to the resurrection of the widow's son in Nain, Luke 7:11-17). That Luke clearly has these Isaianic entailments in mind and deliberately includes them here as an explicit invocation lends support to the argument I outlined in §4.5, that Luke's conception of what a *δαιμόνιον* is has been influenced (consciously or unconsciously) by his knowledge of the Septuagint. Sustained and intentional reference to Isaiah supports my assertion that entailments that arise from Isaianic uses of the lexeme δαιμόνιον survive in the New Testament in general, and that when Luke uses δαιμόνιον in his works, the lexeme indicates the δαιμόνιον-blend I outlined in §4.5, and not a dead metaphor.

[39] Bock 2012: 249.

This is further supported by a point that Klutz also makes, that the use of μάστιξ in conjunction with demonic affliction in verse 21 provides another clear link to the Septuagint. In the Septuagint, μάστιξ appears in Psalm 90(91):10, alongside the word δαιμόνιον in 91:6. Luke has already cited this psalm in connection with Satan in 4:10-11 (see §4.2.1 above), and Klutz sees a further use in Luke 10:17-20. [40]

However, there is still a clear distinction between John's expectations and Jesus's evidence, even though John's understanding of Jesus's person and work is also based on the writings of Isaiah. Luke's conscious use of Isaiah in this passage suggests an answer to the question of why doubts have apparently arisen in John the Baptist's mind concerning Jesus. In Jesus's description of his work,

> … there is no reference to cutting down evildoers (Isa 29:20) and punishing sinners (Isa 26:20). John's graphic wilderness warnings of divine reckoning – winnowing forks, clearing of threshing floors, burning of chaff with unquenchable fire (3:17) – attest that the judgment of evildoers was a constituent element of his messianic understanding. The silence of Jesus on the matter of judgment could account for the apparent reservations that John harbours about Jesus.[41]

In fact, Jesus's interpretation of his ministry is so different to John's – and so radical an interpretation of Isaiah – that the conceptual metaphor of JUDGEMENT IS SORTING WHEAT which John uses in 3:17 is later applied not *to* Jesus, but *by* him, in reference to Satan (22:31). On the contrary, Jesus is more concerned with the forgiveness of sin, as evidenced by his action after his speech concerning John the Baptist: he forgives the sinful woman in 7:36-50.[42] "The mixed citation of Isaiah 61.1-2/58.6 in Luke 4.18-19 may even have been adopted

[40] Klutz 2004: 118 n.101.
[41] Edwards 2015: 220.
[42] Bock 2012: 164.

by Luke in order to emphasize this aspect of release, an opportunity provided by the LXX text (note 62: The LXX uses the term ἄφεσις (release) in both Isa. 61.1 and 58.6, while the Hebrew uses different but conceptually similar words.)"[43]

The point that the conceptual metaphor JUDGEMENT IS SORTING WHEAT unites both John the Baptist and Satan shows just how radical Jesus' messianic interpretation is. Isaiah was a great prophet, as was John, and Satan has a heavenly origin (10:17). But none of them fully understands the kingdom of God; as Jesus says in 7:28, "among those born of women no one is greater than John; yet the least in the kingdom of God is greater than he." When confronted with Jesus' message about the kingdom of God and the release from sin which it entails, one can accept it (John's alignment with the Kingdom of God, though one which falls short, is implied by Acts 19:1-6, although Luke never tells us whether John's doubts were set to rest by his disciples' account, and unlike in the gospels of Matthew and Mark, Luke includes no detailed description of the death of John the Baptist), or one can resist it, as Satan does, in his continued use of the conceptual metaphor JUDGEMENT IS SORTING WHEAT which will be discussed below in §6.10.

Klutz interprets the inclusion of exorcism in the list of miracles in 7:21 as intended to "portray the healings as having been multifaceted and complete", with νόσος and πνεῦμα signifying "different aspects (e.g., the physical and the cosmological) of a single negative state of being."[44] This is perfectly persuasive, but he then claims that the association of exorcistic healing with Isaiah 61:1 has a further narrative consequence:

> … it entails that those who are harassed by evil spirits are understood by Jesus to overlap those who are designated as 'the poor' (πτωχοὶ); otherwise Jesus' use of this particular intertext

[43] Mallen 2008: 76.
[44] Klutz 2004: 118.

> loses all its relevance. But furthermore, this unit (i.e., 7.18-23) is not the first in Luke's Gospel to have these motifs interlaced. In Luke 6.20, for instance, immediately after Jesus heals many persons of demoniacal afflictions, his first of several macarisms is Μακάριοι οἱ πτωχοί, his audience clearly including those he has just delivered from diabolical oppression (cf. 7.1). Similarly, and as noted in my analysis of Luke 4.33-37, the citation of Isaiah 61.1 in Luke 4.18-19 (and in particular the words εὐαγγελίσασθαι πτωχοῖς) directly precedes and anticipates an account of Jesus' teaching and healing in which deliverance of the demonised is especially prominent (4.33-37, 38-39, 41). [45]

This consequently looks forward to the motifs of homelessness, nakedness, and bondage from which both the πτωχός and the possessed Gerasene demoniac (Luke 8.26-39, see §5.8) suffer.

However, to interpret Luke as deliberately meaning 'the demonised' when he uses the term πτωχός is something of a stretch. Exorcism is an important element of Jesus's ministry, as I argue throughout this thesis, and as Jesus himself states in 13:32 (see §6.6), but the plight of the poor is also an important topic for Luke. There is no need to go out of one's way to argue that πτωχός primarily applies to the demon-afflicted rather than the financially destitute when Luke's medical paradigm already makes a connection between the activity of demons and the other illnesses which Jesus cures in this passage.

One important element of this paradigm is the conceptual blend which I discussed in relation to Luke 4:33 (§4.4), by which the evangelist makes it clear that he is referring to the same kind of being whenever he refers to either a δαιμόνιον or to a πνεῦμα ἀκάθαρτον. In this passage, however, Luke refers instead to πνεύματα πονηρά. A connection between νόσος and a πνεῦμα ἀκάθαρτον would be expected, but Luke makes a clear connection between the impurity of disease and the malevolence and sinfulness of the spiritual beings which cause

[45] Klutz 2004: 118.

distress in the community. This reference to 'evil' spirits rather than the more usual 'unclean spirits' is "typically Lukan;"[46] as Wolter elaborates, "apart from the not entirely pertinent Q parallel Luke 11.26 par. Mathew 12.45 (comparative), this designation appears only in Luke in the New Testament" (Luke 8:2, Acts 19:12, 13, 15, 16).[47]

The introduction of the adjective πονηρός where ἀκάθαρτος might be expected introduces, in the terminology of conceptual blending theory, a further input space into what I termed the δαιμόνιον in §4.4. The major entailments that this new input source carries over into the blend are sinfulness and malevolence. This is important in the context of the greater place of the δαιμόνιον in Luke's cosmography; the demons in his work are not impersonally impure, like an animal or a skin disease, but impure due to conscious sinfulness. The introduction of the adjective πονηρός personalises the demons which appear in Luke's works by giving an indication of their character. "The ministry of Jesus is thus introduced in terms of one who brings release to Israel – from sickness, sin and Satan."[48]

5.6 – Luke 7:33 – "He has a demon"

The construction "he *has* a demon" is a conceptual metaphor, usually referred to in lists as HARM IS HAVING A HARMFUL POSSESSION.[49] In English, we say that we *have* a cold, *have* a fever, or *have* cancer, just as French allows one to possess unpleasant experiences **(**J'*ai* faim; j'*ai* froid; j'*ai* mal; j'*ai* peur), as does German (Ich *habe* Hunger; Ich *habe* Durst). Using the example of *j'ai peur*, "The combination with *avoir* can therefore be regarded as an attempt to

[46] Wolter 2016: 305.
[47] Wolter 2016: 330.
[48] Mallen 2008: 76.
[49] Lakoff-Espenson-Schwartz 1991.

render an 'entity of the invisible world' such as 'fear' less abstract by presenting it as an object in the possession of the speaker at the moment of speech."[50] This is another example of the general rule of CMT that the target domain, in this case FEAR, is described in terms of a more concrete source domain, as an OBJECT TO BE OWNED.[51]

The revelation that John's abstemiousness has led to accusations that "he has a demon" tell us less about either John or Luke's conception of demons. Rather, this verse highlights the social aspect of demonology which we ignore at our peril. As Klutz writes, "since someone in this milieu could therefore be labelled as a demoniac entirely on the basis of unconventional behaviour, many of the demoniacs encountered by Jesus were probably suffering chiefly from socioreligious degradation and marginalisation, and only secondarily from the psychological and physiological consequences of these processes."[52] This insight, unfortunately, is not limited in usefulness to scholars of the Bible or the ancient world. Accusations of demonic possession can have "less to do with individual psychopathology … than with challenges to local religious authority, rhetorical efforts to shame the challengers, and strategies of social control."[53]

[50] Ströbel 2015: 231.
[51] Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 10-13; Kövecses 2010: 84, 262. Describing the source domain as AN OBJECT TO BE POSSESSED might be more elegant English but could be confusing given the topic of this thesis.
[52] Klutz 2004: 119.
[53] Klutz 2004: 139; see also Green 1999: 303, n. 66. It is often the most vulnerable members of society who face stigmatisation due to religious belief, and the Victoria Climbié Foundation UK recently reported that child abuse cases linked to faith or belief (CALFB) appear to be on the rise, with an 11% increase between the 2016-17 reporting year (1,460 mentions in safeguarding assessments) and the 2017-18 reporting year (1,630 mentions in safeguarding assessments) (https://vcf-uk.org/census-suggests-11-increase-in-cases-of-child-abuse-linked-to-faith-or-belief/, accessed on 25th January 2019).

5.7 – Luke 8:2 – Mary, called Magdalene

In §5.6, I made note of two important conceptual metaphors by which Luke understands the role of exorcism in the ministry of Jesus. The first is that THE BODY IS A BUILDING, most explicitly referenced in 11:24-26.[54] The second is that Luke *primarily* understands the conflict between Satan and Jesus in terms of the source domain WARFARE (invoked in the use of the ARGUMENT IS WAR conceptual metaphor in the Temptation narrative;[55] see especially below on the word 'Legion' in the story of the Gerasene Demoniac (§5.8); on 10:17 (§6.2.1) and on the Beelzebul Controversy (§6.4)). Jesus has authority over demons (Luke 7:1-10) which would seem to indicate that he is on the same side as them; this is the charge levelled against him in the Beelzebul Controversy, but Jesus likens his authority to that over a defeated enemy.

The combination of these two basic metaphors (THE BODY IS A BUILDING and CONFLICT IS WARFARE) led me to suggest that Luke perceives people possessed by demons as fortresses held by an enemy army. Jesus lays siege to the occupying army, defeats them by his superior power, and then has the authority to order the defeated army to leave the fortress, thus liberating it (see § 6.5.2 on the metaphor EXORCISM IS RELEASE FROM CAPTIVITY in Luke 13:10-16). The recapture of the fortress has an immediate effect on the fortress itself, but also a strategic effect on the territories of Jesus and Satan (as will be outlined in **§ 6.4.5** on Luke 11:20-23).

[54] See §6.4.6.
[55] See §4.2.2.

The source domain of the FORTRESS can be replaced by the source domain of a WALLED CITY. Both are man-made structures with an interior and exterior, and a boundary between the two: the fundamentals of the CONTAINER schema. In our own cultural milieu, there is a vast difference between the source domain of a FORTRESS and the source domain of a WALLED CITY. However, in the evangelist's world, the vast majority of cities were encompassed by walls, and even those that had an element of urban sprawl had fortified citadels. Jerusalem had both walls and a citadel. There is little space in this thesis to enter into a detailed discussion of city-planning in the ancient Mediterranean, but the significant overlap in denotative and connotative meaning between a walled city and a fortress must be kept in mind. I have thus termed this conceptual metaphor A POSSESSED BODY IS A CAPTURED FORTRESS/CITY, though the source domain could also contain CASTLE, CITADEL, etc.

The comparison of a body to a castle or city has important connotations when the body in question is female.[56] There are two major variants of this comparison: the first is when a female body is described in terms of a city or a castle, and the second is when a city or a castle is described in terms of a female body. The former occurs in the thirteenth century work *Le Chasteau d'Amour*, for example, comparing the body of the Virgin Mary to a castle in an extended allegory.[57] However, in the ancient world, the latter case was far more common.

> The body is frequently used as a metaphor for bounded systems, such as castles, and Mary Douglas has observed that such imagery is pertinent particularly where the boundaries are threatened or precarious (Douglas 1966: 115). The metaphor of

[56] For a detailed exploration of the Mishnaic conception of the woman's body as a house, particularly with regards to *niddah*, marital relations, and ancient Palestinian architecture, see Baker 1998: 221-242; see also Lippis 2011: 129-139. There are interesting ramifications of CMT for gender studies, and of gender studies for CMT that are beyond the scope of this investigation, and feminist criticism that focuses on the topics of embodiment and experientialism in Lakoff and Johnson 1989.
[57] Powell 1919: 198-9.

> the female body, more specifically, provides the connotations of safe, contained spaces (Best 1995: 187; Irigaray 1985).[58]

This metaphor appears from the very earliest Greek literature. As Anne Carson notes, "the most common Greek word for female headgear is κρήδεμνον, whose symbolic force can be read from its three-fold usage. Properly signifying a woman's 'headbinder' (e.g., *Il.* 22.470), κρήδεμνον is also used to mean 'battlements of a city' (e.g., *Il.* 16.100) and 'stopper of a bottle' (e.g., *Od.* 3.392). It is plain what these three have in common. A corked bottle, a fortified city, a veiled woman, are vessels whose contents are sealed against dirt and loss. To put the lid on certifies purity."[59] In the terms of conceptual metaphor theory, the woman's headband is the source domain used to describe the target domain of the city's battlements. The battlements offer the city some measure of protection, just as a woman's head-covering brought some measure of societal honour, and thus protection from verbal or physical abuse. And yet this example goes against the general principle of CMT that a more concrete domain is used to describe a more abstract one. In the case of κρήδεμνον, societal modesty and honour is the source domain, and physical fortifications the target.

I will return to this topic. First, however, is the point that this description of a city or castle as a woman, rather than the description of a woman's body as a walled city or castle, has a great legacy in Hebrew literature as a description of Jerusalem (or of Judah or Israel; all still adhere to the CONTAINER schema, and sometimes Jerusalem is used as a metonymic signifier of the country rather than just the city).[60] Frymer-Kensky suggests that the major entailment that causes Israel to view itself as a woman is the entailment of vulnerability: "Israel was always

[58] Gilchrist 1999: 139.
[59] Carson 1999: 89. See also Pucci 1998: 17.
[60] E.g., Lamentations 1:1-7; Ezekiel 16; 23:1-4; Isaiah 1:8; 10:11; 37:22, 40:2; 51:18; 52:2; 66:7-12. See also 2 Samuel 20:19; Isaiah 21:9; 47:1; Zechariah 2:7 for other cities like Babylon being described in similar terms. It is possible that the metaphor was aided by the feminine gender of the noun עיר, as is the same for πόλις.

small and vulnerable in comparison to the empires surrounding it. As time went on, this vulnerability gave way to defeat, and Israel was conquered by more powerful nations. The Bible's view of women became central to Israel's thinking, for it provided a paradigm for understanding powerlessness and subordination without recourse to prejudicial ideas."[61] This interpretation would be in agreement with Douglas's claim that the use of the body as a metaphor for a bounded area particularly when that boundary is threatened.[62]

More importantly, Luke himself appears to be conscious of this particular metaphor. One example is in the use of feminine language in 21:20-21; however, while the Greek proper noun Ἰερουσαλὴμ is indeclinable, the word πόλις is feminine. Far more persuasive is 13:34: Ἰερουσαλὴμ Ἰερουσαλήμ, **ἡ ἀποκτείνουσα** τοὺς προφήτας καὶ **λιθοβολοῦσα** τοὺς ἀπεσταλμένους πρὸς **αὐτήν**— ποσάκις ἠθέλησα ἐπισυνάξαι τὰ τέκνα σου ὃν τρόπον ὄρνις τὴν ἑαυτῆς νοσσιὰν ὑπὸ τὰς πτέρυγας, καὶ οὐκ ἠθελήσατε [own emphasis]. The address of 23:28 to the 'daughters of Jerusalem' also invokes this biblical motif.[63]

In terms of CMT, this creates a problem. I have shown that Luke uses the conceptual metaphor A BODY IS A BUILDING (11:24-26). Combined with the metaphor CONFLICT IS WAR, I extrapolated a more complex metaphor, A BODY IS A CITY/FORTRESS, and have begun to argue that it is by this more complex metaphor that we can further our understanding of Luke's conceptualisation of possession and exorcism. In the case of Mary Magdalene, for example, this becomes the metaphor A WOMAN'S BODY IS A CITY/FORTRESS.

[61] Frymer-Kensky 2013: xvi-xvii.
[62] Douglas 1966: 115.
[63] Reeder 2018: 165; see 164 ff. for a detailed discussion of the feminised Jerusalem and warfare in Luke.

However, I have also shown that Luke uses the conceptual metaphor A CITY/FORTRESS IS A WOMAN'S BODY (13:34). A major principle of CMT is the *principle of unidirectionality*. That is, a conceptual metaphor only goes in one direction: from source domain, to target domain. We talk about love as a journey, but rarely about a journey in terms of a love affair. The more abstract concept is described in the terms of the more concrete source domain.[64] More recent works on conceptual metaphor theory argue for *bi-directionality* in some conceptual metaphors.[65]

If the conceptual metaphor A POSSESSED BODY IS A CAPTURED FORTRESS/CITY thus stands, then 8:2[66] introduces a new entailment: support.[67] Some fortresses in an occupied land, when retaken, are given back to the local populace, while some act as symbols of hope and the might of the conquering army. But some are strategic, and become important parts of an army's supply lines, and a base for further incursions and logistical planning. Mary Magdalene is one of these – she is rescued from the demons which occupy her, and becomes one of those fortresses of Jesus' mission, just as Simon's mother-in-law provides Jesus with logistical support after a hostile entity has been cast out.[68]

[64] Lakoff-Turner 1989: 38-39.
[65] Shen-Porat 2017; Porat-Shen 2017.
[66] On the grouping of the seven demons, Böcher writes that "wenn die Dämonen sich zu überschaubaren Gruppen zusammenschließen, wählen sie die – ambivalenten - »heiligen« Zahlen der Antike," with seven primary among them (also four and three) (Böcher 1972: 30). He suggests a link between these seven demons and the seven exorcists in Acts 19:13ff, but makes only glancing reference to the seven demons of Babylonian myth (Böcher 1972: 31). The pattern of seven demons is well-attested in Babylonian literature: "seven are they, seven are they, in the depth of the ocean seven are they" (Thompson 1904: 49), "those seven evil gods, death-dealing without fear, those seven evil gods, rushing on like a flood"(Thompson 1903: 99; xlii-xlv, li, 63-65, 69, 77-79, 89-95, 99, 135, 155, 191-199; Thompson 1904: 29, 49-51; Foster 2005: 963). There is a clear link to other elements of the Synoptic tradition, specifically to Luke 11:26 (/Matthew 12:45), an extremely important passage which shall be discussed in more depth below.
[67] See also Klutz 2004: 119-20 and Pilch 1991: 193-4.
[68] I challenge the traditional labelling of 4:38-41 as a healing with no exorcistic elements; see §5.2.

I *do not argue* that Luke was consciously characterising Mary Magdalene, or any other patient, as a fortress.[69] CMT is concerned with underlying conceptual frameworks, which can be accessed at a subconscious or unconscious level. This short passage of 8:2-3 is closely followed by the story of the Gerasene Demoniac, in which we find both the WARFARE metaphor and the CONTAINER schema: a demonic 'legion' inside the body of one man. The metaphor A POSSESSED BODY IS A CAPTURED FORTRESS/CITY runs as a single thread through the story of Jesus's ministry, and allows coherence between Jesus's lauding of the centurion's conception of Jesus as having power over spirits, as a centurion does over his soldiers with the Beelzebul controversy, in which Jesus is accused of this very thing and denies it. Furthermore, below I will show that the FORTRESS metaphor explains a significant Lukan change to the Markan source, just as it here illuminates the connection between the curing of Mary Magdalene and her subsequent financial support of Jesus.

[69] Having said this, if any one patient whom Jesus cures of demonic possession were to be associated with a fortress, I argue that it would be Mary Magdalene. Her epithet 'Magdalene' was almost certainly historical; even if not, it was used by Mark long before Luke wrote his Gospel. As Taylor writes, "Mary was not named in association with a man, and was therefore not married to anyone. People referred to her as Magde laitha: she was called this, as Simon was called Kepha (Petros in Greek). As such, beyond Galilee, Mary's distinctive name not only indicated her provenance but also her position as one of Jesus' closest disciples, and more. Perhaps, as Simon Peter was a Rock, she was in some way the woman of the 'Tower'" (Taylor 2014: 222).

5.8 – Luke 8:26-39 – The Gerasene Demoniac

5.8.1 – Introduction

An entire thesis could be written on the story of the Gerasene Demoniac alone; I will however limit myself to a few particular points where the application of CMT is most illuminating. I will begin with a general summary of some LXX entailments which can be found in this pericope, and show how the entailments of the word δαιμόνιον which Luke found in his source, Mark, match the entailments found in his resource, the Septuagint. Then, I will discuss the question of how far the name Λεγιὼν is to be interpreted as bringing a military overtone to the story; CMT clarifies the question raised by previous scholars, and confirms the coherency of a conceptual metaphor which I have argued that we can see emerging at this point in Luke's narrative: A POSSESSED BODY IS A CAPTURED FORTRESS/CITY. Finally, I will show how the application of this conceptual metaphor can be used to explain a text which I have yet to see any secondary literature comment upon: why Luke deliberately omits the detail of self-harm in Mark 5:5 as a symptom of possession?

5.8.2 – LXX Entailments

In 8:26-39, Luke shows clear preference for δαιμόνιον vocabulary. He twice replaces Mark's πνεῦμα ἀκάθαρτον with δαιμόνιον, but retains one instance of it in verse 29, perhaps to confirm the blending he produced in 4:33. As Wahlen points out, he also twice replaces δαιμονιζόμενος with rewordings including δαιμόνια (verses 35, 38), "in harmony with Lukan

avoidance of one-word labels for people."[70] However, his retention of both δαιμόνιον and πνεῦμα ἀκάθαρτον highlight the LXX entailments of both, despite his personal preference.

As discussed above in Chapter 4, entailments are "emotive, evaluative and associative overtones that often get added to a word or phrase by virtue of its context"[71] – a result of "the mapping of nonconstituent elements of the source domain onto the target domain."[72] I detailed how the use of δαιμόνιον by the Septuagint translators – particularly of Deuteronomy, Psalms, and Isaiah – resulted in the blending of various entailments from the use of δαίμων in Greek and from the LXX contexts in which δαιμόνιον appears. A series of conceptual blendings resulted in the understanding of δαιμόνιον which Luke displays in the rest of his works, and, subsequently, δαιμόνιον carries throughout Luke-Acts a number of Septuagintal entailments. Nowhere can these be seen more readily than in the pericope of the Gerasene demoniac.

The majority of these entailments are also present in Mark's original; if Luke was Jewish, or a God-fearer, and knew the Septuagint before coming to Christianity, this passage would have confirmed much of his understanding of what it signified to be possessed by a δαιμόνιον. If Luke came to the Septuagint already a Christian, already knowing this story, and possibly having heard Mark's own account of it, on a conscious or unconscious level he would have recognised the origins of many of the story's details, as subsequent scholars have done in their turn. In either case, he kept almost all of the Markan details, particularly of the

[70] Wahlen 2004: 153.
[71] Klutz 2004: 44-45, with reference to G. W. Turner, *Stylistics* Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973], 27-28.
[72] Wassell and Llewelyn 2014: 629. 'Mapping' is an important concept in CMT, borrowed from neuroscience, and is explored in more depth in Chapter 2, but in short: "A metaphoric mapping is multiple, that is, two or more elements are mapped to two or more other elements. Image-schema structure is preserved in the mapping—interiors of containers map to interiors, exteriors map to exteriors; sources of motion to sources, goals to goals, and so on," Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 265.

symptoms of the possession, with one important exception which will be explored below: the symptom of self-harm in Mark 5:5.

In the secondary literature discussing Luke 8 and Mark 5, one finds a great deal of discussion as to which passages inspired the original composer. Derrett suggests Zechariah 13:2, in which God promises to remove idols (with whom demons are often associated in Jewish thought) and the spirit of impurity "from the land" (cf. Mark 5:10). He also suggests Psalm 107:10-16 as a plausible parallel; indeed, the evocation of chains is relevant, but I think he does not go far enough. Psalm 107:4, which describes wandering in the desert, and v. 6, in which the subjects cry to God in distress for deliverance, could also be linked to Mark 5.[73] There is another Psalmic possibility: Nineham makes a connection to Psalm 68:6,[74] as does Harrington,[75] which can be translated as a promise that God will "bring out the ones who have been bound to prosperity, even the stubborn who have set their tents in a parched land." However, in the Septuagint (Psalm 67:7), the final clause is instead translated as "τοὺς κατοικοῦντας ἐν τάφοις" - "those who dwell in tombs" - which strengthens the parallel significantly.

However, the most common passage associated with Mark 5:1-20, and thus with Luke 8:26-39, is Isaiah 65;[76] Sahlin went so far as to suggest that the pericope began its existence as Christian midrash of Isaiah 65 (specifically of vv. 3-5).[77] Isaiah 65 is, as detailed in Chapter 4, one of only a handful of occurrences of δαιμόνιον in the Septuagint. The subjects of the

[73] Derrett 1979: 9.
[74] Nineham: 1963: 151.
[75] Harrington 2002: 164.
[76] E.g. Craghan 1968: 529-533; Pesch 1971: 361. Watts 1997 is a particular advocate of this interpretation; he asserts that Mark portrays Jesus as an "Isaianic Yahweh-Warrior", and that demonic-possession in the New Testament is the contemporary manifestation of Israel's oppression by the nations in (Deutero-) Isaiah. No little part of his own thesis is based on mappings between idols, demons, and foreign gods, though it is articulated in the language of inter-textual criticism, rather than CMT.
[77] Sahlin 1964: 159-72; cited in Derrett (Contribution) 1979: 9.

polemic "burn incense on the bricks τοῖς δαιμονίοις" and "prepare a table τῷ δαιμονίῳ". Craghan also sees a reference to Isaiah 65 in Mark's use of μνήμα for 'tomb' in 5:3 and 5:5; in the Septuagint, "μνήμα" is the typical word for 'tomb' (e.g., Ex 14:11; Num 11:34, 36: 19:16, 18; 33:16, 17; Deut 9:22; Josh 24:31: Ezek 32:22, 24; 26; 37:12), and Mark usually uses "μνημεῖον" in his gospel.[78]

In Chapter 4, I outlined a selection of entailments of δαιμόνιον emerging from the Septuagint (animals, foreign divinities, idolatry, moral harm, physical harm, death, the wilderness, vulnerability to the power of God, the receipt of sacrifice, graves, pigs, impure food, night (Isaiah 65)) and of πνεῦμα ἀκάθαρτον (immorality, ritual impurity, harm, incorporeality, some form of life, some form of intellect and will, invisibility, power to affect humans, possession of the capability to exist separate to a body but within a body).

The association of δαιμόνιον with pagan sacrifice and the worship of foreign gods is, as I have argued in Chapter 4, the most important entailment found in the Septuagint. The most dramatic element of the story, and one which has prompted a great deal of comment, is the inclusion of a herd of doomed pigs; as well as being a well-known symbol of impurity in Judaism, I agree that the presence of the pigs also entails the worship of pagan deities, and particularly an evocation of Isaiah 65.

It is possible that the use of pigs in Canaanite sacrifices could lie behind the prohibitions against keeping pigs in Judaism.[79] In the 10th century CE, Saadia ben Joseph of Faym explained that the pig, among other animals, was considered unclean because it was

[78] Craghan 1968: 530.
[79] R. de Vaux, 'Les sacrifices de porcs en Palestine et dans l'Ancien Orient", in *Bible et Orient* [Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 1967], 264, cited in Watts 1997: 158.

worshipped by other cultures (*The Book of Beliefs and Opinions* 117); while this is obviously far later than the NT period, it is not entirely unreasonable that this explanation should have carried a grain of truth. The theory has become more plausible with several discoveries in Palestine and Syria which emphasise the cultic importance of pigs, including "a votive statue of a pig in Jericho (4th Millennium), pig-bones under a stone slab in a sanctuary in Gezer (3-2nd Millennium), a libation container portraying a man carrying a pig (2nd Millennium), and a cultic pillar with pig bones in a temple at Beth-Shean (mid-2nd Millennium)."[80]

These instances are all much earlier than New Testament times, but evidence suggests that the association between pagan gods and pigs continued, particularly due to the influx of Greek and Roman beliefs. In "Heil für die Heiden: zur Bedeutung und Geschichte der Tradition vom besessenen Gerasener (Mk 5,1-20 parr.)",[81] Franz Annen has produced the best overview of the religious and cultic significance of pigs to date, examining Greek, Roman, Syrian and Palestinian conceptions, as well as those that appear in the Hebrew Bible, other Jewish writings, and the New Testament. He concludes that from a Jewish point of view, pigs were associated with polytheism and the worship of idols.[82] They were customarily offered to Athena, [83] Zeus, Dionysus, and Nemesis, all of whose cults were "very common" in Palestine in Hellenistic times, proven by discoveries in Jerusalem, Samaria, Caesarea Philippi, and most interestingly of all for the purposes of this chapter, in Gerasa.[84] Pigs were also associated with fertility rites and the chthonic deities,[85] and these came to be linked with the myth of Eubuleus, the swine-herd whose pigs were swallowed up by the

[80] De Vaux 1967: 254, cited in Watts 1997: 158.
[81] Annen 1976.
[82] Annen 1976: 133-181.
[83] P.R. Arbesmann, *Das Fasten Bei Den Griechen Und Romern* [Gießen: Verlag Von Alfred Topelmann, 1929], 43; Ludwig Deuber, *Attische Feste* [Berlin], 40-45, cited in Annen 1976: 163.
[84] 'H. Herter, Art. Nemesis, in: Pauly/Wissowa XVI, 2359', cited in Annen 1976: 163; cf. Langdon 1934: 49.
[85] Annen 1976: 163-164.

earth, and thence a ritual of the Thesmophoria festival of Demeter and Persephone – particularly in Eleusis – which involved placing the body of pigs in a trench or pit dedicated to Demeter, and bringing out the remains of the last year, which were then buried, mingled with seeds.[86]

The association of pigs with chthonic and fertility deities continued in the Roman empire, though pigs were also sacrificed to Mars.[87] Similarly, Watts states that in the Roman world, no Roman tomb was legally protected without a pig being sacrificed, and demons were understood to have "a particular liking for them."[88] This final point is one supported by Luke 8:32 (cf. Mark 5:12), for the demons themselves select the pigs as an appropriate substitute for the man they have possessed.

5.8.3 – Military language and the evocation of the WARFARE metaphor

One detail in particular has been important for scholars commenting on the characterisation of the struggle between Jesus and the demons as a military one: the name of 'Legion' that the demons give in 8:30. The degree to which exegetes can state that it is evidence of military overtones in the pericope has, however, recently come under discussion; it is an important question not only with regards to the representation of demons, but in any discussion of the socio-political setting of Luke's gospel.

[86] Paul Foucart, *Les mystères d'Éleusis* [Paris: Auguste Picard, 1914], 65, 104f., cited in Annen 1976: 164.
[87] Annen 1976: 165.
[88] Watts 1997: 158.

The majority view is that 'Legion' has a clear military overtone;[89] Ched Myers, for example, states that the Latin loan word "had only one meaning in Mark's world: a division of Roman soldiers."[90] Twelftree also quotes Klaus Wengst – wondering whether it is even possible to 'conceive of any ancient hearer or reader who would *not* think of Roman troops in connection with the name "Legion"[91] – but ultimately disagrees with both Myers and Wengst.

He quotes Pliny the Elder's writing of "a legion of crimes" (Nat. 33.26), as well as the use in Latin by Plautus (ca. 254-184 BCE) referring to "a legion of supporters" (*Cas.* 50), [92] which leads him to conclude that "Although the word may have had a military origin, it had lost its exclusively military ties to take on a metaphorical meaning that was no longer determined by its origin."[93]

In one sense, it is easy to agree with his assessment; it is natural to conclude that 'legion' had lost its exclusively military context. The crimes mentioned by Pliny are *not really soldiers*; the supporters mentioned by Plautus, might not have *really been soldiers.* Thus, a metaphorical meaning is obvious. One of the major and most fundamental entailments of the lexeme 'legion' is that it is a collective noun: a legion indicates *many* units belonging to a group, originally with a specific number, hierarchy, and origin. However, there is a difference between agreeing that 'legion' is a metaphor, and stating that it is a dead metaphor entirely divorced from its original meaning, and thus shorn of all military entailments.

[89] E.g. Annen 1991: 345-346; Edwards 2015: 250; Green 1997: 339, esp. fn. 76; Bovon 2002: 328; Boyd 1997: 194-195; Wahlen 2004: 96.
[90] Myers 1994: 191; cf. Derrett (Contributions):255-59; Wink 1986: 43-47; Dormandy 2000: 335-37; Twelftree 2007: 108 fn. 43.
[91] Wengst 1987: 66 [author's emphasis].
[92] Twelftree 2007: 109.
[93] Twelftree 2007: 108.

The original composer of this pericope, whether Mark or some other author, chose the word 'Legion' as the climactic demonic epithet. For the sake of ease, I will say that it was Mark. If the only entailment with which Mark was concerned was indicating a large number, why does he not put the name Πολλοί into the unfortunate demoniac's mouth, ὅτι πολλοί ἐσμεν (Mark 5:9)? Why not Ἀγέλη, to make even clearer the link to the herd of pigs (Mark 5:11, 13; Luke 8:32)? Mark does not use 'many' or 'herd', nor does he use 'crowd' or 'tribe' or 'swarm' or 'multitude'; he uses 'Legion', and Luke deems the epithet of enough importance to retain it. A Roman legion, with the literal meaning of a large group of soldiers within a military context, was still in use in Latin and in Greek at the time of the writing of the gospels. The use of Λεγιών here is not a dead metaphor, because its mappings would have been immediately obvious to any hearer or listener.

One of the fundamental elements of CMT is that metaphors are ubiquitous, even in "literal" speech. They are not merely rhetorical flourishes, but manifestations of the models by which we conceptualise the world. When different source domains can be accessed to describe the same target domain, we will choose the source domain – often instinctively, and unconsciously – with the entailments which we wish to foreground.

Janet Warren, writing on conceptual metaphor theory and demonology in 2012, says of Twelftree's interpretation that "he may be overstating his case; there is no certainty whether the term had military connotations or not. I would suggest at least that the metaphorical nature of the term be emphasized."[94] This is in support of her statement that apart from Satan, no demon is named; "on one occasion when a demon is perhaps named ("legion" in the

[94] Warren 2012: 169-170 fn. 24.

Gerasene demoniac), the term is metaphorical, meaning a large number."[95] The Lukan text itself in 8:30 states that the moniker is a metaphor: ὅτι εἰσῆλθεν δαιμόνια πολλὰ εἰς αὐτόν.

Any proponent of CMT would agree that the metaphorical nature of the epithet should be emphasised and analysed. However, Warren's attitude appears to be one of dismissal: the term is a metaphor, and thus little more need be said about it. It is understandable that Warren would seek to downplay the WARFARE model, and the military connotations of the word 'Legion' in 8:30, given that the underlying aim of her thesis is to develop new conceptual metaphors to describe evil. She has important theological and pastoral motives for doing so.

However, in the interest of accurate exegesis, a military entailment must surely be acknowledged in this case. Perhaps she is correct when she states that "it is a stretch to conclude from the 'legion' metaphor that demons exist in an organized, hierarchical army,"[96] and this might be the case were Luke 8:30 the only place where such a demonic hierarchy, and particularly a hierarchy alluded to in military language, was ever evoked. But it is not. As discussed above, in 7:1-10 Luke clearly discusses Jesus's authority in military terms, and structures his relationship to illness (and, thus, potentially, to demons, given Luke's relative conflation of the two) as that between an officer and a soldier. Below, in **Chapter 6**, I will discuss the Beelzebul controversy in detail, in which there is a clear and explicit reference to a "ruler" of demons in 11:15, and Satan is portrayed as having a "kingdom" in 11:18. It might not be a sophisticated hierarchy, and any attempts to delineate any kind of detailed organisation or structure must be treated with great scepticism,[97] but there is a demonic hierarchy all the same.

[95] Warren 2012: 169.
[96] Warren 2012: 169 fn. 22.
[97] As Warren states in her Introductory chapter.

5.8.4 – The Symptom of Self-Harm

Just as CMT can offer a different perspective on a question like that of *Legion*'s military connotations, the application of *specific* conceptual metaphors can offer new answers to certain questions. In this section, I will show how the newly articulated metaphor A POSSESSED BODY IS A CAPTURED FORTRESS/CITY can shed light on a detail of Luke's redaction of Mark's narrative.

After the Calming of the Storm at the end of Chapter 4 of Mark's gospel, Jesus comes to the land of the Gerasenes, on the eastern shore of the Sea of Galilee. As soon as he disembarks, a man "with an unclean spirit" comes out of the nearby tombs to meet him. We are told several things about this man: he dwelt in the tombs, he was able to tear apart any chains and break the shackles with which the local people try to restrain him, and no one is strong enough to subdue him. "And constantly, day and night, among the tombs and in the mountains, he was crying out," – "καὶ κατακόπτων ἑαυτὸν λίθοις." This phrase can be translated as "and he was beating himself with stones", but the verb κατακόπτω – a New Testament *hapax legomenon* – has various meanings, which thus account for differing translations. It can be mean "to slice up", "to cut", "to stamp" (i.e. an image onto a coin), or even "to kill". When applied to the actions and passions of a human being, extreme physical violence is obviously signified. This is its meaning throughout the Septuagint, but always denotes extreme physical violence aimed at others, not the self.

In the Markan pericope we can see that physical violence, particularly directed against oneself, is considered an obvious symptom of demonic possession. It is so obvious that commentators have little to say about it. Some suggest in a sentence that 5:5 could be a

reference to 1 Kings 18:28, in which we learn that this was the custom of the prophets of Baal, and so cutting oneself with stones might have been taken for a form of demon-worship in the time of Jesus. In his detailed commentary, Joel Marcus finds little to comment on except that "besides stressing the magnitude of the power that possesses the man, 5:3-5 also emphasizes its malevolent destructiveness."[98] Furthermore, the act of cutting oneself with stones breaks the law of Leviticus 19:28 which prohibits cutting oneself for the dead.

Derrett also notes that "It is also notorious how possessed persons will enter fire, drown themselves, rush into battle unharmed, or pierce their bodies, as a sign that they are insensible to pain, the deity inhabiting them being superior to natural reflexes."[99] One of the passages which has added to this notoriety is the so-called 'healing of the epileptic boy' in Mark 9:14-29. I say 'so-called' because the boy's affliction is never referred to in the text as being epilepsy, but the identification of the symptoms is taken as read by almost all commentators. After the disciples fail to exorcise a demon who causes muteness and convulsions, Jesus rebukes them and speaks to the child's father. As soon as the boy is brought to him, he falls to the ground in a seizure, and Jesus asks how long he has been so affected. The father replies that the boy has been possessed since childhood, and that it "often threw him into fire and into water, so that it might destroy him." Ἔβαλεν followed by ἵνα implies that the boy would not be collateral damage to a demon's mischievous impulses, but that his death is the desired outcome.

These two accounts treat self-harm, whether in the form of self-mutilation or self-endangerment, as a normal and expected symptom of possession. No extra attention or

[98] Marcus 2000: 350.
[99] Derrett (Spirit-Possession): 287.

explanation is given to them. In Matthew's redaction of Mark 5:1-20 in 8:28-34, the evangelist has split the single demoniac into two (possibly to explain Mark's inconsistent use of plural verbs), and all mention of their symptoms has been excised. In Matthew 17:14-20, the pericope has again been shortened significantly, but the detail of fire and water has been kept, though de-personalised: "for he is a lunatic (quite literally, moon-struck) he suffers terribly, for often he falls into the fire and often into the water."

However, Luke's redaction of Mark's writing is far more interesting, because his editorial choices are much more focused. He retains many more of the Markan elements than Matthew does, but in 8:27 and 8:29, he reports that the demoniac wears no clothes and lived in the tombs, that locals had attempted to bind him with chains and shackles but he had broken them, and that he wandered in the wild places. The single most important detail that Luke has left out is "κατακόπτων ἑαυτὸν λίθοις" from Mark 5:5, "he beat himself with stones." As will be explored below, a similar redaction appears in 9:38-43. Luke is not unusual in this regard: in contemporary accounts of exorcism, self-harm is never mentioned as a symptom of possession.[100] Perhaps Luke changed his account to make his narrative more palatable for Greek readers?

If this were the case, we then have the question of why, if Luke changed his source text out of concern for Hellenistic sensibilities, should he wish to make a text describing demonic possession *less* disturbing or unusual? Conceptual metaphor theory offers a more concrete explanation. Luke's sources – particularly 11:24, which will be discussed in more depth in the next chapter – give him an impression of a demon's motivations which are not limited to

[100] E.g. Philostratus, *Life of Apollonius of Tyana*, 3:38, 4:20; Plutarch, *Marcellus*, 20.5f.; Lucian, *Lover of Lies*, 16.

"do harm." If Luke's conception of a possession, whether conscious or unconscious, is that of an occupied fortress – if the underlying conceptual metaphor A POSSESSED BODY IS A CAPTURED FORTRESS/CITY is in play – it is *illogical* for self-harm to be a symptom of possession. Who would sabotage their own defences? Who would tear down their own walls? One might harm a captive, but a soldier is unlikely to vandalise or sabotage the fortress that is his protection, and thus a demon to vandalise its "house" (11:24).

The advantage of using CMT in New Testament studies is that the question of deliberate redaction and authorial intention can still be explored, but it is no longer the only factor by which redactions and compositions can be explored. The fact that so much of CMT relies on discussion of unconscious or subconscious linguistic decisions means that our approach must be that much more holistic. Despite the conclusions of some commentators that we cannot expect demonology to make any kind of rational sense,[101] Luke was an intelligent human being, and one who valued order and accuracy. The detail of self-harm as a symptom of possession was incoherent with his underlying conception that A POSSESSED BODY IS A CAPTURED FORTRESS/CITY, and so he removed it.

5.8.5 – Summary

Due to the length of §5.8, and the number of findings which is contains, I now briefly summarise the three specific ways in which CMT has illuminated our understanding of Luke's treatment of demonology, and thus more broadly how it can be a useful critical tool for engaging with other biblical works.

[101] E.g. Marcus 2000: 342: "we should not look for too much consistency when dealing with things as ambivalent and protean as demonic spirits."

The first is the highlighting of the fact that Luke's Markan source (Mark 5:1-20) contains many of the same entailments attached to δαιμόνιον and πνεῦμα ἀκάθαρτον which Luke found in his reading of LXX Deuteronomy, Psalms, and Isaiah (the latter of which is often particularly associated with this pericope by commentators), and confirmed the conceptual blend that he receives from the Septuagint.

I have also argued that the application of CMT provides an answer to the question of whether Mark's use and Luke's retention of the epithet 'Legion' was intended to deliberately evoke military connotations, and that the term clearly evokes the WARFARE metaphor. This supports the contention that one way by which Luke understands the role of possession and exorcism in the mission of Jesus is through the conceptual metaphor A POSSESSED BODY IS A CAPTURED FORTRESS/CITY.

In turn, the conceptual metaphor A POSSESSED BODY IS A CAPTURED FORTRESS/CITY provides a plausible reason for why Luke removes the Marcan detail of self-harm as a symptom of possession. It makes no sense for an occupying force to damage its own shelter and defences. In understanding the conceptual metaphors at work in a narrative, we are able to make sense of minor details as well as major tropes.

5.9 – Luke 9:1-6 – Power and Authority over all demons

In general, Luke 9[102] explores the relationship between Jesus and his disciples: how they are alike (v. 1-2) and how they differ (v. 37-42),[103] as well as the confession of Peter that Jesus is the messiah (v. 18-22), the statement that his followers must take up their own cross (v. 23-27), the Transfiguration (v. 28-36), the disagreement about which disciple is the greatest (v. 46-48), the distinction between those who follow Jesus and those who cast out demons in his name (v. 49-5),[104] Jesus' rebuke of James and John (v. 54-55), and the demands made of followers (v. 57-62).

5.9.1 – Power and Authority

Mark 6:7 states that Jesus gave to the Twelve ἐξουσίαν τῶν πνευμάτων, with the genitive of τῶν πνευμάτων implying that authority was given *over* the spirits (presumably because ἐπι with the genitive indicates location *on*);[105] Luke interprets and clarifies this by saying that Jesus gave the disciples ἐξουσίαν **ἐπὶ** πάντα τὰ δαιμόνια (added emphasis). This is in accordance with the conceptual metaphors CONTROL IS UP and LACK OF CONTROL IS DOWN, common manifestations of the UP-DOWN schema.[106]

One of the stated aims of this chapter is to demonstrate the CMT principle of ubiquity. Luke's use of CONTROL IS UP is not a deliberate rhetorical flourish, but an ordinary part of his

[102] With the understanding that our chapter divisions are a mediaeval interpretation.
[103] The failure of the disciples to heal a boy possessed by a seizure-causing spirit; see §5.10 below.
[104] See §5.11 below.
[105] Zerwick-Grosvenor 1996: 121.
[106] See §4.2.3 above.

general language. The same metaphor exists in English: I'm *on top* of the situation; he is *under* my control; he's at the *height* of his power.[107]

In Luke's own work, we have clearly seen these metaphors in the healing of the centurion's servant (7:1-10, §5.4); the centurion says that he is also a man ὑπὸ ἐξουσίαν πασσόμενος, being placed *under* authority, and ἔχων ὑπ' ἐμαυτὸν στρατιώτας, having *under* [himself] soldiers. The metaphor will be seen in 10:19 (§6.2), when Jesus gives the seventy "authority to *tread* on snakes and scorpions". It will also appear in 19:17 when the god slave will be ἐξουσίαν ἔχων ἐπάνω δέκα πόλεων, having authority *over* ten cities, on account of his shrewd investment, and the slave who made an extra five minas for his master is told in 19:19, Καὶ σὺ ἐπάνω γίνου πέντε πόλεων, "And you be over five cities." The conceptual metaphor pair CONTROL IS UP/LACK OF CONTROL IS DOWN is also often visible etymologically; in English, we see it in words like *submit* or *subject*, and in Luke's Greek we see it in the verb ὑποτάσσω, which is also used about the power of Jesus's followers over demons in 10:17 and 10:20.

5.9.2 – Conceptual Mapping

If Jesus is a general, laying siege to and liberating (EXORCISM IS RELEASE FROM CAPTIVITY) captured fortresses (A POSSESSED BODY IS A CAPTURED FORTRESS), what then are the disciples in this section? They are sent out to perform exorcisms of their own. In the WARFARE schema, they are junior officers sent out by their commanding officer. Just as the centurion says go and his soldiers go, so too does Jesus say "go", and his disciples "go". The parallel between the centurion and his soldiers and Jesus and his disciples is apparent. Both Jesus and the

[107] Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 15; Kövecses 2010: 40, 246.

centurion are also conduits of greater authority, which they have been given to exercise; the centurion of Rome, and Jesus of the Kingdom of God (see esp. 11:26; the entire question of the Beelzebul Controversy, discussed in §6.4, regards the authority by which Jesus performs his exorcisms).

If THE DISCIPLES ARE COMMISSIONED OFFICERS, then what are the metaphorical mappings of δύναμις and ἐξουσία? Power and authority would immediately suggest, in the case of the latter, the right to give orders (e.g., to vacate a human body which a demon is possessing), and in the former, the means to ensure that those orders are carried out. As Twelftree notes, Luke clearly attributes miracles to δύναμις on four occasions, three of them being redactional[108] (Luke 4:36 (Mark 1:26); Luke 5:17 (Mark 2:2); Luke 6:19 (Mark 3:10); cf. Luke 8:46 (Mark 5:30)).[109]

According to Hull, for Luke δύναμις is "a substance, a mana-like charge of divine potency, spiritual in so far as it emanates from the world of the spirits, but actual, as vital as the beings who possess it."[110] Hull does not use conceptual metaphor theory, of course, but his understanding of δύναμις based on 5:17 and 8:46 can be explained using it. As A BODY IS A CONTAINER, and we read in Luke 5:17 that "the power of the Lord was *in* him to cure (ἦν εἰς τὸ ἰᾶσθαι αὐτόν) and in 8:46 that Jesus feels δύναμις *go out of* him (ἐγὼ γὰρ ἔγνων δύναμιν ἐξεληλυθυῖαν ἀπ' ἐμοῦ, it makes sense to conceive of this δύναμις as being A SUBSTANCE WITHIN A CONTAINER. However, while Hull argues that this conception of δύναμις has no roots in the Old Testament,[111] Twelftree argues that the general mana-paradigm is correct, but that it comes from the Septuagint. Luke's understanding of δύναμις mirrors two major LXX

[108] Twelftree 1999: 170.
[109] Twelftree 1999: 392 n.35.
[110] Hull 1974: 105.
[111] Hull 1974: 108-9.

uses:[112] in the sense of a miracle (Luke 10:13; 19:37; Acts 2:22; 8:13; 19:11; cf. Ps 77:14; 145:4)[113] or to refer to 'the host of heaven' (Luke 21:26 (Mark 13:25); cf. Isaiah 34:4 (B)).[114] Furthermore, it lacks nuance; instead of being understood as general 'mana', Luke's understanding of δύναμις is instead "the powerful presence of God's Spirit received for healing *through faith*" (Twelftree's own emphasis).[115] In support of Twelftree's argument is the use of δύναμις in 2 Maccabees 3:38, which was composed in Greek, to refer to divine miraculous power (see also 2 Maccabees 3:24; 9:8; 3 Maccabees 2:6; 6:13). Twelftree briefly touches on the use of δύναμις in reference to the hosts of heaven, by implying that δύναμις appears thus in 34:4, the probable origin for Mark 13:25 and hence Luke 21:26. However, in LXX Isaiah 34:4, the word ἄστρα is used instead. The pairing of δύναμις and ἐξουσία immediately recalls 4:36, especially given the context of exorcising demons.

5.10 – Luke 9:37-43 – The Disciples' Failure to Exorcise a Demon

5.10.1 – Introduction

The primary goal of this chapter has been to demonstrate how conceptual metaphor theory can be used to explore both over-arching themes of Luke's work (e.g., Luke's use of LXX entailments and their relationship with his δαιμόνιον-blend; his conception of the relationship between Jesus and demons in the light of the WARFARE metaphor; the CONTAINER model of possession; the conceptual metaphor A POSSESSED BODY IS A CAPTURED FORTRESS/CITY), and how it can be applied to particular exegetical problems (e.g., Luke's removal of self-harm as

[112] Twelftree 1999: 172; see also Twelftree 1999: 392 n.54.
[113] Twelftree 1999: 392 n.49.
[114] Twelftree 1999: 392 n.50.
[115] Twelftree 1999: 172.

a symptom of possession in 8:26-39; the extent to which Λεγιὼν in Luke 8:30 has military overtones).

The secondary goal has been to draw attention to certain elements of the WARFARE metaphor which Luke uses in his work, and which was introduced in the Temptation narrative (4:1-13 – explored above in §4.2); these elements have slowly been introduced, and in Chapter 6 I will show how they are clustered and mapped by means of the parables of the Beelzebul Controversy (11:14-26). These elements are conceptual metaphors which are mapped according to the WARFARE model; for example, THE APOSTLES ARE COMMISSIONED OFFICERS in 9:1-2, or HEALED VICTIMS OF POSSESSION ARE RECAPTURED TERRITORY which can then provide logistical support (4:38-41; 8:2) or represent victories which can then serve as propaganda (8:39; 9:1-2).

Building on both of these goals, and the themes identified so far, in this section I first will briefly return to the question of the degree to which Luke conflates healings and exorcisms; I argue that this pericope *must* be treated first and foremost as an exorcism, contrary to the opinions of Weissenrieder and Wahlen, and that it furthermore demonstrates the Lukan δαιμόνιον-blend which I examined in depth in Chapter 4. On the subject of terminology, I then turn to Luke's inclusion of ἐκβάλλω – this verb evokes the expulsion of paganism from Israel in the LXX, and is thus connotatively linked to the LXX entailments (from Deuteronomy 32:17, Psalms 96:5 and 106:37, and Isaiah 65).

The use of ἐκβάλλω thus affirms the WARFARE model in two important ways: the first, by equating the body of the child with the land of the God of Israel, and turning the exorcism into an issue of territory, and the second, by emphasising again the CONTAINER model of

possession and thus the conceptual metaphor A POSSESSED BODY IS A CAPTURED FORTRESS/CITY. Here, I briefly discuss Luke's substitution of the Markan καταλαμβάνω with λαμβάνω. Luke also removes physical violence as a symptom of the exorcism itself, and I show how CMT can be used to explain this redaction. Finally, I discuss the failure of Jesus' disciples to exorcise the demon, and the role this failure plays in Luke's over-arching WARFARE metaphor.

5.10.2 – Healing or Exorcism?

I have explored the scholarly conversation regarding the extent to which Luke conflates exorcisms and healings above, particularly in §§ 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4. The topic is discussed again in commentaries on this section,[116] and examined in depth by Weissenrieder. She writes:

> … the demonic interpretation of the illness is founded less on a folk (mis)understanding in the sense of the illness, but rather on its opposition to the divine power of Jesus' actions. If we take the textual indicators of illness into account, the understanding in the sense of a folk interpretation is relativized therefore in favor of an explanation based on ancient medicine.[117]

In addition to her analysis of terms related to the Greek understanding of epilepsy, Weissenrieder's reasons for this conclusion are that Luke removes the father's aetiology in 9:17 and Jesus's address in 9:25. "This corresponds to the construction of the Marcan narrative as an exorcism: At the center of the story is the exorcism of a mute spirit. In contrast, [Luke] speaks decisively of a healing, ἰάσατο (9:42). He does not mention an exorcism of the demon causing the illness."[118] For Weissenrieder, Luke's redaction of the

[116] E.g., Parsons 2015: 159; van der Loos 1965: 401-5; Page 1995: 160-61; Bock 1994: 884.
[117] Weissenrieder 2003: 279.
[118] Weissenrieder 2003: 279.

Markan description of the boy's symptoms is an indication that Luke conceives of the boy's illness as a specific form of epilepsy brought on by a transudation of phlegm, and is attempting to remove any contradictory evidence from the longer description of symptoms.[119]

Weissenrieder's analysis is most erudite, and her examination of Classical sources is thorough and fascinating. However, her analysis of Luke's perception of the illness's aetiology is entirely unpersuasive. She argues for the "more medically influenced interpretation of the narrative,"[120] but the Hippocratic texts to which she refers (i.e. *De morbo sacro*, 7.1 and 1.37f.) themselves attribute symptoms to Ares and to Hecate.

I contend that, while this work of Jesus could be described as a healing *as well as* an exorcism (in light of the use of ἰάσατο in 9:42), the fact remains that in Luke's dramatic shortening of the pericope (sixteen Markan verses to seven and a half in Luke),[121] there are four explicit mentions of the possessing entity in Mark (9:17: πνεῦμα ἄλαλον; 9:20: τὸ πνεῦμα; 9:25: τῷ πνεύματι τῷ ἀκαθάρτῳ, Τὸ ἄλαλον καὶ κωφὸν πνεῦμα) and three in Luke (9:39: πνεῦμα; 9:42: τὸ δαιμονιον, τῷ πνεύματι τῷ ἀκαθάρτῳ),[122] while almost all detailed description of the boy's symptoms has been removed.

I will return the question of redacted symptoms below, but the issue of terminology is an important one. One of Wahlen's major original contentions in his chapter on impurity of spirits in Luke-Acts is the assertion that "those afflicted by impure spirits are *healed* (οἱ

[119] Weissenrieder 2003: 279-282.
[120] Weissenrieder 2003: 282.
[121] Fitzmyer 1983: 806.
[122] As discussed above in § 5.8.2, Luke once again inserts δαιμόνιον vocabulary where there is none in the Markan source. The use of three separate denominations reaffirm the conceptual blend which Luke articulated in 4:33, and examined above in §4.3.

ἐνοχλούμενοι ἀπὸ πνευμάτων ἀκαθάρτων ἐθεραπεύοντο)."[123] He states that whenever Luke speaks of someone being 'cured' or 'healed', the affliction is always the result of a spirit, not a demon. "Therefore, it is probably incorrect to equate demon possession with illness, even in Luke where the lines between them seem less clear than in the other gospels. Rather, the demons (through their hosts) *attack Jesus* while the 'spirits' seem satisfied to *afflict people*" (all italics Wahlen's own).[124] This pericope disproves this contention just as clearly as Luke's use of the phrase πνεῦμα δαιμονίου ἀκαθάρτου in 4:33 does. The same malevolent entity is called a πνεῦμα in 9:39, and then both τὸ δαιμόνιον and τῷ πνεύματι τῷ ἀκαθαρτῳ in 9:42. As I described above in §4.4**,** Luke uses both δαιμόνιον and πνεῦμα ἀκαθάρτου to refer to the same conceptual blend – just as I discussed in §5.8.2, Luke once again inserts δαιμόνιον vocabulary where there is none in the Markan source. The deliberate use of three separate denominations reaffirm the conceptual blend which Luke articulated in 4:33. That is not to say that Luke does not use one phrase or the other to foreground or background particular entailments, but he clearly uses both δαιμόνιον and πνεῦμα to refer to the same kind of being.

As it is, I follow the view of Joel Green that proclaiming a diagnosis of epilepsy "transforms this illness account into a report susceptible in an unmediated way to the categories of Western biomedicine."[125] As he states, the authors above do not sufficiently account for the report of the malady or the report of the resolution, both of which are explicitly stated to involve the supernatural, and his judgement is sound in labelling the "reductionistic use of the biomedical paradigm" as imperialistic.[126] It is for this reason that I refer to this pericope as

[123] Wahlen 2004: 161.
[124] Wahlen 2004: 162.
[125] Green 1997: 387-388, n.118.
[126] Green 1997: 387-388, n.118; he further recommends Robert A. Hahn, *Sickness and Healing: An Anthropological Perspective* [Yale: Yale University Press, 1996], and Byron J. Good, *Medicine, Rationality and Experience: An Anthropological Perspective* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994]. From 171 of the latter: "empiricist program of studying culturally relative beliefs about natural disease objects ... on two grounds – for its essentialist conception of disease and for a superficial analysis of how illness is cognized and comes to be known as a dimension of human experience and understanding." For more detail, see Pilch, 1991: 181-209.

"The Disciples' Failure to Exorcise a Demon," rather than with the reference to epilepsy favoured by commentators.

5.10.3 – Ἐκβάλλω and the CONTAINER Schema

That Luke conceives of this work of Jesus primarily as an exorcism is affirmed by his addition of the verb ἐκβάλλω in 9:40 (cf. Mark 9:24 [ἐγὼ ἐπιτάσσω σοι ἔξελθε ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ μηκέτι εἰσέλθῃς εἰς αὐτόν] and 9:25 [καὶ κράξας καὶ πολλὰ σπαράξας ἐξῆλθεν…]). It could be argued that as the verb is used not by the narrator or by Jesus, but by the boy's father, that Luke does not necessarily agree with the father's aetiology, but the use of demonic vocabulary detailed above renders this objection rather weak.

Once again, the application of *specific* conceptual metaphors can offer new perspectives and answers, and the inclusion of ἐκβάλλω has important consequences when seen in the light of conceptual metaphor theory.

The first is that while ἐκβάλλω is never used in the LXX to describe the expulsion of demons – indeed, this would be unlikely given how few demons or evil spirits are discussed in the LXX, and even fewer possible references to possession – it *is* used relatively often to refer to the expulsion of pagan peoples or gods, from Jewish territory:

> ἐκβάλλω serves to denote the Israelite deity's expulsion of pagan peoples, or their gods, or both, from the land promised to the children of Israel. (Fn. 50: See, e.g., LXX Exod. 23.18, 28, 29, 30, 31; 33.2; 34.11, 24; Num. 21:32; Deut. 11.23; 33.27; Josh. 24.12, 18; Judg. 6.9; 2 Sam. 7.23; 1 Chron. 17.21; Pss 77.55; 79.8; Judith 6.14, 16; 1 Macc. 11.66; 13.11.)[127]

[127] Klutz 2004: 167.

As I have shown in §3.2.1, by the time of the translation of the Septuagint, there was an increasing identification of δαιμόνια with pagan gods; in the terms of CMT, a new conceptual metaphor has been created: DAIMONIA ARE GENTILE GODS. In the terms of conceptual blending theory, shared entailments between Hebrew concepts like the *'ĕlîlîm* or the *šēdîm* and the Greek concept of the δαίμων created a new conceptual blend which is identified with the lexeme δαιμόνιον – in the LXX and, I argue, consequently in the NT.[128] The use of ἐκβάλλω thus subtly foregrounds the entailments of warfare and the reclaiming of territory for those in the audience who are familiar with the Septuagint. This conclusion can be reached by way of cognitive linguistics, as I have done, or by the sociolinguistic elements of sociostylistics, as demonstrated by Klutz; like any other rigorous methodology, CMT can not only bring original perspectives to exegetical questions, but can also be used to support or undermine the findings of other scholars.

Secondly, the inclusion of ἐκβάλλω, and particularly of a verb containing the ἐκ- prefix, reaffirms Luke's own adherence to the CONTAINER schema. Just as in the case of the Gerasene Demoniac, the conjunction of the WARFARE metaphor and the CONTAINER schema suggests the application of Luke's specific underlying conceptual metaphor, A POSSESSED BODY IS A CAPTURED FORTRESS/CITY. Furthermore, ἐκβάλλω is noted[129] specifically to refer to the casting out of a demon,[130] but also in Luke's double work itself it is used to refer to the casting out of a person from a city.[131] Consideration of this metaphor illuminates certain changes that Luke makes to his Markan source, particularly on the theme of violence.

[128] For more detail see §4.4.2.
[129] BDAG: 299, meaning 1.
[130] In addition to examples in the Gospels as noted throughout, see also Josephus *Ant.* 6, 211.
[131] Luke 4:29; 13:28; Acts 7:58, 9:40.

5.10.4 – Καταλαμβάνω vs. Λαμβάνω

The conceptual metaphor A POSSESSED BODY IS A CAPTURED FORTRESS/CITY is actually more readily apparent in the Markan narrative than in the Lukan thanks to the inclusion of the verb καταλαμβάνω. Luke replaces Mark's αὐτὸν καταλάβῃ (Mark 9:18) with λαμβάνει αὐτόν (Luke 9:39), a change which generates little discussion in commentaries.[132] Fitzmyer *does* note that our own term "epilepsy," which commentators are so keen to apply,[133] "is derived from Greek *epilēpsia,* 'attack, seizure' (<*epilambanein*, 'seize')."[134]

However, both καταλαμβάνω[135] and λαμβάνω[136] can refer to the capturing of a person, a city, or goods. The intensifier κατα adds an entailment of force which λαμβάνω does not *necessarily* have alone. Thus, in the Septuagint, it is καταλαμβάνω that is often used to describe the capture of a city (e.g., Joshua 8:19; 2 Kings LXX (2 Samuel) 12:26, 27, 29); if Luke is writing his exorcism stories according to the conceptual metaphor A POSSESSED BODY IS A CAPTURED FORTRESS/CITY, then why would he replace καταλαμβάνω with λαμβάνω, when the Septuagint is a favoured Lukan resource?

In this case, Luke's vocabulary is influenced by an even more fundamental conceptual metaphor: UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING.[137] Luke does not use καταλαμβάνω in his gospel,

[132] E.g., Fitzmyer 1983: 808; Bovon 2002: 386; Green 1997: 387-88; Wolter 2016: 399; Edwards 2015: 286-287.
[133] Edwards 2015: 286-287 goes so far as to write "Why Luke, ostensibly a physician, attributes the malady to a 'spirit' rather than to epilepsy, which was widely diagnosed in the ancient world, is difficult to say." The refusal to consider that the evangelist believed in demons and a demonic aetiology of illness displays a profound lack of cultural understanding and imagination.
[134] Fitzmyer 1983: 808.
[135] BDAG: 519-520, meanings 1 and 2; Muraoka 2009: 374, meaning 2 (citing Numbers 21:32, Judges 2:25, and Isaiah 10:14 with particular reference to military conquest).
[136] BDAG: 583, meanings 1, 2, and 3; Muraoka 2009: 423-424, meanings 1, 2, 4, 5, 11, and particularly 6 – see Isaiah 36:1.
[137] Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 20; Johnson 2007: 166.

but he uses it three times in Acts (4:1; 10:34; 25:25), each time with the meaning "to understand."[138] UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING is a conceptual metaphor which we use in English; we can *grasp* a concept, or we can *comprehend* a statement or situation; in Latin the word *comprehendere* meant to grasp or to seize (compare *prehensile*). We use the word 'comprehend' in English only in its metaphorical sense (though the police do still *apprehend* criminals); the original etymological sense is dead, but the underlying conceptual metaphor remains in use.[139] The metaphor is related to an important conceptual metaphor by which we understand our own thought: IDEAS ARE OBJECTS.[140]

For Luke, the major entailment of καταλαμβάνω is understanding, not force or capture, and so he replaces it in his redaction of Mark with λαμβάνω, which also has the entailments of capture and of taking spoils (see 11:22; cf. 1 Maccabees 5:3, 22, 28, 35, 51).

5.10.5 – Symptoms of Violence

A major result of Luke's underlying adherence to the conceptual metaphor A POSSESSED BODY IS A CAPTURED FORTRESS/CITY is that, as I discussed above in **5.8.4**, his redaction of self-harm as a symptom of possession can be explained in a new way. This is a case in which CMT clearly offers an original and logical solution to an exegetical question. For example, arguing from an anthropological perspective, Witmer suggests that the fact that Luke and Matthew both "downplayed the violence" in this pericope indicates that – with reference to the criterion of embarrassment – they were reluctant to entirely remove exorcisms from their

[138] For this use of καταλαμβάνω see BDAG: 520, meaning 4; Muraoka 2009: 375, meaning 8.
[139] Lakoff-Turner 1989: 129.
[140] Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 10-13; Kövecses 2010: 84, 262. It is held as a general rule in CMT that the more concrete source domain (OBJECT) is used to describe a more abstract target domain (IDEA). This conceptual metaphor is part of what is known as the "conduit" metaphor; see the seminal essay on the topic, Reddy 1979: 284-324.

gospels because of their place in earliest traditions of the ministry of Jesus, but that "they felt the need to weaken Mark's language in order to reduce the image of violence or vulgarity in the behaviour of the demoniacs, perhaps out of fear that it might lead to accusations that Jesus was operating as a magician."[141]

While he shortened the pericope significantly, Matthew retains the detail of the fire and the water from Mark 9:22 in Matthew 17:14-20; just as he removed the detail καὶ κατακόπτων ἑαυτὸν λίθοις from his redaction of Mark 5:5, Luke has utterly excised mention of self-harm as a symptom of possession. There are plenty of "vulgar" details which Luke retains from his Markan source, and even ones he makes more explicit (such as the Gerasene demoniac's nakedness in 8:27); in 9:39, the father's description of the boy's suffering is effusive and full of pathos. But the demons in 8:26-39 do not make their victim cut or beat himself, and the demon in 9:37-43 does not try to kill its victim; the worst level of violence is removed. There are already many differences between the presentation of Jesus in the gospels and contemporary accounts of exorcisms, and so Witmer's suggestion that a desire for Jesus not to be identified as a magician does not hold up. The detail of self-harm is a symptom of possession, not an element of exorcism. Possession and exorcism are obviously related and connected as concepts, but are different concepts all the same. The removal of self-harm is a question of how Luke views *possession*, and I contend that the articulation of the conceptual metaphor A POSSESSED BODY IS A CAPTURED FORTRESS/CITY provides a more persuasive answer: just as I discussed above in §5.8.4, Luke removes references to self-harm because it is illogical for a demon to vandalise its own house, or to sabotage its own fortress's defences.

[141] Witmer 2012: 1 89.

Luke has, however, not only removed violence (self-harm and self-endangerment) as a symptom of possession. He has also removed it as a symptom of the exorcism itself. This is not merely a result of his shortening of the pericope; in Mark 1:27 and 9:26 the unwilling departure of the evil spirit is marked by fierce convulsions, and Luke removes this element each time. Twelftree writes that "in [Mark] 1.27 the violence may have been a vehicle for dramatizing and heightening Jesus' authority,"[142] but "Luke's treatment is … telling of the early Church's embarrassment."[143]

CMT is able to suggest a reason less nebulous than that of 'embarrassment'. Self-harm as a symptom of possession is incoherent with the metaphor A POSSESSED BODY IS A CAPTURED FORTRESS/CITY - a demon would not destroy its own defences while still residing inside – but self-harm as a symptom of an *exorcism* is not. On the contrary, it makes perfect tactical sense. 'Scorched earth' policies of retreat were entirely logical, and well-known as a norm in the ancient world.[144] If the demons are acting as an enemy host, sabotage of the walls of the city or fort (mapped onto the physical body in this metaphor) in the hope of later recapture, or to provide the triumphant enemy with fewer resources, would be coherent.

As explored above in § 5.4, the metaphor of Jesus as a triumphant general explains why he is able to have authority over demons – as is implied by 7:9 – without being a part of their military hierarchy (the conceptual metaphor employed, understandably, by the centurion in his discussion of what ἐξουσία entails). It is by his ἐξουσία that Jesus heals or casts out demons (cf. 4:36), just as much as his δύναμις, and he gives both to his disciples in 9:1. It is

[142] Twelftree 1993: 71. As Klutz 2004: 74 n. 224 points out, Twelftree is unpersuasive in arguing on a single page that the violence in Mark 1.27 is likely "to have heightened Jesus's authority and simultaneously embarrassed the early church."
[143] Twelftree 1993: 71.
[144] E.g. Memnon; *Anabasis*; European Scythian campaign; *vastatio* in the Roman world; Celtic Helvetii; Vercingetorix.

the ἐξουσία which the centurion recognises, rather than Jesus' δύναμις, and a centurion would be well-acquainted with both.

In this case, CMT supports the conclusion of Klutz, arrived at by the application of sociostylistics, when he writes that the emphasis on the non-injurious nature of Jesus' intervention: "the Lucan … foregrounding of Jesus' authority … would be undermined by a denouement in which either the exorcist's own technique or the departing demon brought harm to the patient."[145] The authority and power of a triumphant general over a defeated enemy is complete, particularly in the ancient world; Jesus' power is so overwhelming, his authority so all-encompassing, that a 'scorched earth' retreat by the demons is impossible.

5.10.6 – The Failure of the Disciples and the WARFARE Metaphor

The overwhelming power of Jesus over the demons is contrasted by the most important point of this pericope: what makes this passage singular is not that Jesus is able to exorcise a demon, even a very violent and entrenched one, but that even after being given ἐξουσία and δύναμις in 9:1, his disciples cannot. If Jesus is the triumphant general, the disciples are his commissioned officers, and here, they fail to liberate the captured city. Its inclusion provides an important function with regards to the WARFARE metaphor. Luke removes the discussion about faith and prayer, and instead focuses on a simple point: defeat is imaginable. Defeat is a fundamental entailment of battle; it is an ever-present possibility.

[145] Klutz 2004: 74. In this quotation he is referring to the removal of injury in Luke 4:33-37, but repeats this sentiment on p. 165; Jesus's authority is highlighted in Chapter 9 by the use of ἐξουσία in v. 1 and the placement of the Transfiguration in 9:28-36.

The inclusion of a defeat does not only highlight Jesus's strength in comparison to that of his disciples. A primary objection to the WARFARE metaphor that is used by the majority of scholars to discuss the relationship between Jesus and Satan, and the role of exorcisms in Jesus's ministry, is that the exorcisms are too easy for Jesus. Something cannot be called a battle without an element of violence, or the prospect of defeat.

> We find no hint of a struggle in these encounters. Jesus does not have to subdue the demons. Their behavior from the outset shows them to recognize the hopelessness of their situation before him. They come as supplicants rather than negotiators. Instead of resorting to various devices or tricks for removing the demons, Jesus simply orders the demons to leave the victim.[146]

This pericope provides the evidence of that struggle. Guelich's statement that "the phrase 'spiritual warfare' finds no basis in the gospel's portrait of Jesus' ministry"[147] is erroneous. The WARFARE model is well-suited because the conflict between Jesus and Satan is not a duel; there are cities and territories to be captured, hostages to be taken or freed, legions, hierarchy, weapons, and commissioned officers who are fallible, and can be defeated in battles which their general can win. That Guelich sees no struggle in the encounters between Jesus and demons does not negate the WARFARE model, because we can recognise the concept of an unequal fight, or an unconditional surrender.[148]

A benefit of conceptual metaphor theory, especially when applied to ancient literature, is that it is holistic. It is not necessary that every single entailment be present in every single instance to recognise that a conceptual metaphor is in play. As Lakoff and Johnson themselves point out, "it is important to see that the metaphorical structuring involved here

[146] Guelich 1991: 41.
[147] Guelich 1991: 42.
[148] An example of a conflict with no human casualties is the Pig War of 1859 (cf. Luke 8:26-39).

is partial, not total. If it were total, one concept would actually *be* the other, not merely be understood in terms of it."[149] Regardless of this, Luke 9:37-43 contains those entailments – struggle, and the possibility of defeat – which Guelich argues are absent from the gospels. We can be entirely convinced by Guelich and Warren's concerns about the practical[150] and theological[151] dangers which an over-emphasis of the WARFARE model can bring without denying its existence in the gospels. As Warren herself says, "the issue here is exegetical."[152]

5.10.7 – Summary

As I did in §5.8.5, due to the length and depth of the preceding section, I provide a short summary. In this section, I have examined the changes which Luke made to the Markan narrative, and shown how CMT can explain them. I have also shown how this passage adds to the developing representation of demonology in the gospel; on a secondary level, I have addressed some broader issues within New Testament studies, particularly the interpretation of biblical texts in the light of modern medical paradigms.

For example, despite the use of ἰάσατο, this pericope should be considered primarily as an exorcism; focus on whether or not the boy suffered from epilepsy is anthropologically imperialistic. It prioritises the modern medical knowledge of the commentator over the likelihood that the author, his audience, and his subject, genuinely believed in the existence

[149] Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 13.
[150] Warren 2012: 17-28.
[151] E.g., "The accent on spiritual warfare as the fundamental description of the Christian life risks turning the 'Prince of peace' into the 'Commander-in-chief,' a role that fits the messianic expectation of Jewish apocalyptic eschatology more than the Christology of the Gospels and the Pauline corpus." – Guelich 1991: 63. On the other hand, 'Prince of Peace' is an appellation from Isaiah 9:6 that is retroactively applied to Jesus by Christians. In Luke 12:51, Jesus says "Do you think that I came to bring peace on earth? No, I tell you, but rather division."
[152] Warren 2012: 189.

of demons and their ability to possess victims. This is supported by Luke's use of demonological vocabulary, which furthermore recalls his invention of the δαιμόνιον-blend in Luke 4:33.

From an intertextual point of view, Luke's inclusion of ἐκβάλλω evokes the expulsion of paganism from Israel, and is thus linked to the LXX entailments of the δαιμόνιον-blend. Furthermore, by evoking these wars and battles of the Israelites, the use of ἐκβάλλω thus affirms the WARFARE model, and also emphasises the CONTAINER model of possession again in the light of Luke's shortening of the passage and redaction of Mark's ἐξέρχομαι in Mark 9:24-25.

The conjunction of the WARFARE metaphor and the CONTAINER schema once again suggests Luke's underlying conceptual metaphor, A POSSESSED BODY IS A CAPTURED FORTRESS/CITY. This metaphor is more readily visible in Mark's account, which uses καταλαμβάνω in Mark 9:18 – a lexeme used in the LXX to refer to the capture of a fortified city. However, Luke uses καταλαμβάνω in reference to another conceptual metaphor: UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING (Acts 4:1; 10:34; 25:25). He thus replaces καταλαμβάνω with λαμβάνω in 9:39.

As I detailed above in §**5.8.4**, this conceptual metaphor explains why Luke removes self-harm as a symptom of possession. The explanation which CMT provides is fundamentally understood in terms of military tactics rather than cultural embarrassment, the latter of which is more nebulous but nonetheless favoured by scholars. Luke also removes violence as a symptom of the exorcism itself. The removal of struggle from the encounter between Jesus and the demon does not negate the WARFARE metaphor, as Guelich and Warren state, because the *disciples* are unable to exorcise the demon. Having been commissioned (as OFFICERS, if mapped onto the WARFARE metaphor) and given power and authority in 9:1-2,

they are outmatched by some of their enemy counterparts. This failure is brought to the foreground of the pericope by the removal of the themes of faith and prayer.

5.11 – Luke 9:49-50 – Casting out demons in your name

The story of the unknown exorcist, who arouses John's ire when he apparently successfully performs exorcisms in the name of Jesus while acting independently of the twelve, is in Luke's gospel a much-shortened variation of Mark 9:38-40. As such, many of the words devoted to it focus on its historicity and its meaning to the Early Church. Twelftree, for example, takes the Markan context ("material on internal relationships in a Christian community", e.g. 9:33-37 and 9:42)[153] as indicating that the unknown exorcist represents some other follower of Christ, or someone who is on their way to becoming one.[154] Witmer is in agreement, and concludes that "if this tradition is early, it tells us that there were other exorcists who used Jesus' name, but were not connected with him or his disciples. If it is a creation of the early church, it may indicate that there were questions about the legitimacy of people outside the community appropriating the name of Jesus for use in exorcism. In either case, the connection of exorcism to early Jesus traditions is likely."[155]

More relevant to this thesis is how Luke has used and changed his Markan source. As both Twelftree[156] and Garrett[157] note, Luke makes a significant change to John's complaint. In Mark 9:38, John says that the unknown exorcist οὐκ ἠκολούθει ἡμῶν, "was not following

[153] Twelftree 2007: 125.
[154] Twelftree 2007: 126.
[155] Witmer 2012: 133.
[156] Twelftree 1986: 366-7.
[157] Garrrett 1989: 157 n. 35.

us"; in Luke 9:49, he οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ μεθ' ἡμῶν, "does not follow *with* us" (emphasis added). Even more importantly, Luke changes Jesus' reply from the first-person plural in Mark 9:40 ("For whoever is not against us is for us") to the second person plural in 9:50 ("For whoever is not against you is for you").

Witmer concludes from this that "Luke's changes of both tense and person could indicate that it is he who altered an earlier tradition to make it fit the context of the early church,"[158] in agreement with Twelftree's suggestion that the change to Jesus's response in particular is perhaps intended to make the statement more relevant to an early Christian audience.[159] Due to her focus on Lukan presentation, rather than attempting to reconstruct the historical setting of an original source, Garrett's interpretation is rather more persuasive:

> Together these alterations shift the focus of the interchange from the relationship between the one who does not follow *and Jesus* to the relationship between the former *and the apostles*. Luke's wording thus leaves open the possibility that he regarded the one casting out demons as himself a believer, not a part of the apostles' immediate group but not hostile to it either.[160]

Garrett then discusses a possible allusion to Eldad and Modad in Numbers 11:27-29, but returns to the Lukan context with the point that "the appointment of the seventy (-two) a few verses later and their remarkable success at casting out demons in Jesus's name then demonstrate the validity of the principle just established, since the seventy (-two) do not 'follow with' the apostles, either."[161]

[158] Witmer 2012: 133.
[159] Twelftree 1986: 366-7.
[160] Garrrett 1989: 157-8 n. 35.
[161] Garrrett 1989: 158 n. 35.

For Klutz, too, the focus of the pericope is on the disciples. Like Garrett, he does conclude that a major theme of the pericope is the relationship between the twelve and other followers of Jesus; however, unlike Garrett, he has a particular follower in mind. Klutz sees the conjunction of exorcism in the name of Jesus with a discussion of what constitutes legitimate discipleship as pointing beyond the gospel to Acts of the Apostles, particularly, to the person of Paul. In Acts 16:16-18, Paul irritably exorcises a πνεῦμα πύθων [162] from a slave-girl,[163] the masters of whom drag Paul and Silas before the local magistrates for damages. The word Πύθων is a NT hapax legomenon, referencing the Pythia, a priestess of Apollo who spoke for him as the oracle of Delphi. While a thorough examination of exorcisms in Acts is unfortunately beyond the scope of this thesis, it is worth noting here the link made by Luke between demonology and Hellenistic pagan religion.[164] This supports the argument I developed in §3.2.1 and stated in §4.4, that LXX entailments of δαιμόνιον survive in Luke's conceptual blend; in this case, the entailment of relation to foreign gods.

However, returning to 9:49-50, "the figure whom the apostles 'hinder' represents a socioreligious type to which the Lucan Paul corresponds in several notable ways."[165] The unknown exorcist in 9:49-50 and Paul in Acts 16:16-18 both exorcise demons in the name of Jesus, apparently successfully. Each figure "stands outside the circle of the twelve apostles, encounters opposition from the latter (Acts 9.26), and yet is embraced by Jesus as an ally; Paul, moreover, is the only figure in Luke-Acts who matches this category in all the

[162] For general discussion, see Maurizo 1995.
[163] i.e. παιδίσκη; Klutz 2004: 230 makes a connection between the use of παιδίσκη and the παῖς of Luke 9:42 and the παιδίον of 9:47.
[164] See Brenk 1987: 2115; Garrett 1989, esp. 61-97; Klutz 2004: 207-264. I was fortunate to hear Graham Twelftree read an essay on the topic entitled "Miracle and Magic: Border Clashes and Boundaries in the Acts of the Apostles" at the University of Oxford New Testament Senior Seminar in Keble College on the 9th March 2018. The article is being developed into a chapter of his forthcoming book *Magic and Miracle in Early Christianity: The First Two Centuries* [Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press]; this essay outlined and highlighted this relationship between demonology and pagan religion as understood by Luke, but primarily concentrated on the different cultural uses of the accusation of magic.
[165] Klutz 2004: 230.

particulars just mentioned."[166] This parallel has the effect of legitimising Paul's ministry in terms of both his exorcisms in the name of Jesus, but also in terms of his relationship with the apostles and his independent preaching.

Klutz's interpretation has the further advantage of explaining why Luke removed 9:39 ("But Jesus said, 'Do not prevent him. For there is no one who will do a mighty work in my name and will be able soon after to speak evil of me.'") and 9:41 ("For whoever gives a cup of water to you to drink in my name, because you are Christ's, truly I say to you, they will by no means lose his reward.") from Mark's account. In the case of the latter, the emphasis is placed on those who receive the disciples in their ministry, rather than the person who has their own ministry independent of the Twelve; the second of these is obviously closer to Paul's characterisation. Even more persuasively, in the case of the former, Jesus' allowance of the use of his name in Mark's account as a magical aid *before* the exorcist has any kind of faith in him, as well as the implication of this method's success, is completely contradicted by the attempt of the sons of Scaeva (and other itinerant Jewish exorcists) to use Jesus' name in such a manner (Acts 19:13-16).

In terms of the WARFARE metaphor, Jesus's statement makes perfect sense. This is not only a case of 'The enemy of my enemy is my friend';[167] the unknown exorcist is acting as a guerrilla ally. Whether this coheres with the characterisation of Paul in Acts is a discussion that cannot be included in this thesis.

[166] Klutz 2004: 230; n. 73 also clarifies: "The seventy-two (Luke 10.1, 17-20), e.g., are never described as encountering resistance from the twelve; and the seven sons of Scaeva fail to expel the demon (Acts 19.13-16)."
[167] First stated in Book 6 of Kautilya's *Arthashastra*, which in Rudrapatna Shamasastry's translation states that "The king who is situated anywhere immediately on the circumference of the conqueror's territory is termed the enemy. The king who is likewise situated close to the enemy, but separated from the conqueror only by the enemy, is termed the friend (of the conqueror)." Accessed at http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00litlinks/kautilya/book06.htm on 27th February, 2019.

The other element of the pericope is the relationship between the disciples and those who come to them for help. He links John's complaint with the disagreement about status which immediately precedes it (9:46-48), in which Jesus says that anyone who welcomes this child welcomes him, and thus welcomes the one who sent him.[168] Moreover, this link sheds light on the apparent tension between 9:1, in which Jesus gives the twelve power and authority over all demons (§5.9), and 9:40, in which it is reported that the disciples were unable to exorcise a spirit causing seizures in a young boy (§5.10). In all three passages, he writes, appear the themes of acting in Jesus' name and exorcism. If one takes 9:46-48 as being part of the same passage as 9:49-50, this pericope is further linked to the story of 9:37-43 ("Most notably the lexemes δαιμόνιον, ἐκβάλλω, and the παῖς/παιδίον group, all of which occur in 9.37-43a, are likewise found together in 9.46-50").[169] Klutz concludes that the fundamental flaw which the disciples exhibit in 9:46-50, the value which they place on their honour and status, in accordance with the paradigm of Graeco-Roman social standing as a limited good,[170] is the reason why they are unable to exorcise the demon in 9:37. Jesus' placing of the child at his side in 9:47 is interpreted by Klutz as a direct allusion to the child whom the disciples were unable to heal.[171] Healing the boy in 9:37-43 would have created a dyadic social bond between him (a figure of low status) and the healer, which could be a risk to the honour of the healer.

Consequently, the non-specific and very ambiguous characterisation of the disciples in 9.40 as having been 'unable' to cast out the boy's demon can (and probably should) be read in a manner which makes our narrator's unreliability, in the end, only apparent rather than real: to

[168] Klutz 2004: 182.
[169] Klutz 2004: 182 n. 88.
[170] Klutz 2004: 183.
[171] Klutz 2004: 182.

be precise, the disciples' inability in this instance did not consist of a failure either to expel a demon they had wholeheartedly tried to expel or to heal a boy they had genuinely tried to heal; rather, it consisted of an unwillingness to welcome the boy for healing in the first place.[172]

As interesting as this analysis is, it is not convincing. The verb ἠδυνήθησαν suggests inability rather than lack of willingness, and Jesus rebukes the disciples for their lack of belief, not their lack of compassion or rigid adherence to social mores. Klutz concludes that while exorcisms have an "explicit and prominent place" in the narrative as a whole, his discernment of a chiastic structure throughout Luke 9 and consequent sociostylistic analysis can highlight Luke's internal design on a micro- and, then, macro-level. "For if we can establish how exorcism and the demonic relate to other prominent interests in this part of the narrative, we might also be able to gauge what degree of prominence these themes have vis-à-vis other topics in Luke's larger narrative programme and thus to specify what kind of role they could have played in the whole composition's original situation." [173] This, too, is an advantage of conceptual metaphor theory as opposed to more traditional metaphor theory. The analysis of underlying themes and conceptual frameworks allows for a more intuitive and holistic approach to the study of an ancient narrative than the understanding of metaphor as a strict rhetorical ornamentation, without sacrificing scientific rigour.

Instead, I argue that linguistic examination (whether sociological or cognitive) can in general open up the text of Luke in new ways, and specifically that it brings the relationship between Satan and demons and exorcism back into the foreground of the gospel. It is a crucial theme

[172] Klutz 2004: 183.
[173] Klutz 2004: 183.

for Luke and an important element of his cosmological worldview. However, I would not go so far as to agree with what Yamauchi called Böcher's "pan-demonological" hermeneutic. Demonology is an important element of Luke's two-volume work, but certainly not the only one. Rather, I agree with Klutz when he makes the point that:

> the subordination of exorcism as a theme to Luke's interest in the death of Jesus and its implications for discipleship (Luke 9.18-27) creates an expectation that subsequent references to exorcism in Luke's volumes may likewise be part of some larger schematic structure whose primary emphasis falls on non-exorcistic elements.[174]

This larger schematic structure – the conceptual understanding which underlies Luke's story – includes Satanology and demonology, but also Luke's pneumatology, eschatology, cosmology, and Christology. The place of Satan and exorcism as a motif and an illustration of a larger picture will be explored in the next chapter.

5.12 – Summary

This chapter has shown how the conceptual metaphors underlying Luke's understanding of the demonic are revealed and developed throughout the narrative of the Galilean Ministry. Contra the claim that "we should not look for too much consistency when dealing with things as ambivalent and protean as demonic spirits,"[175] there is a coherence and a logical sophistication to Luke's conceptualisation of the relationship between Jesus, demons, and the Devil.

[174] Klutz 2004: 207.
[175] Marcus 2000: 342.

First, the CONTAINER metaphor explains his conceptualisation of possession. Second, the WARFARE metaphor explains his conceptualisation of exorcism. Third, the articulation of the conceptual metaphor A POSSESSED BODY IS A CAPTURED FORTRESS/CITY can (a) be used to answer several redactional problems and (b) contribute several elements to the extended mapping of the WARFARE metaphor. This extended mapping will grow in importance, and become a fundamental underlying system for the rest of the gospel, examined below in Chapter 6**.**

More generally, I have demonstrated in this chapter several ways in which CMT is particularly useful in biblical exegesis. Because CMT is concerned with underlying systems of thought rather than just syntax and vocabulary, I have been able to discuss passages like 7:1-10 in which demons are never mentioned. It is a methodology particularly suited to the exploration of abstract topics which we cannot experience in a culturally unbiased state, but that were deemed common enough not to require detailed description. Furthermore, CMT brings to the discussion of metaphor the articulation of entailment, foregrounding and backgrounding, which proved illuminating when applied to the particular question of 'Legion' in **5.8.3**. Finally, CMT proves itself to be a flexible methodology which is both rational and nuanced, and which encourages a more holistic approach to the study of the NT.

CHAPTER 6: Jerusalem – The Work of Satan

6.1 – Introduction

While Chapter 4 was concerned with the introduction of the devil and of demons – the *who* of the thesis, and Chapter 5 explored those exorcisms which concentrate most on the symptoms of possession and the nuances of exorcism – the question of *what* these demons did, and *what* Jesus did to counter them – this chapter explores reasons behind the possessions and exorcisms: the *why* of Luke's demonology. In the second half of Luke's gospel, there are far fewer exorcisms, and those that appear do so with few details. Instead, they prompt Jesus's teachings on Satan, and his own role against him. In this Chapter we see the culmination of Luke's WARFARE metaphor, which is given strength and confirmation by his use of the UP-DOWN schema, and nuance and detail by his use of the CONTAINER schema.

Two major arguments of this thesis are that conceptual metaphor theory illuminates our understanding of Luke's worldview, especially with regards to Satan, demons, and exorcism, and that this worldview is metaphorically coherent. In this chapter, I will once again use CMT to offer some original interpretations of Luke's composition, but more importantly, I will show how remarkably coherent Luke's demonological worldview is. This coherency is elucidated in several statements of metaphorical mapping which Luke gives in the context of the Beelzebul Controversy. In the first half of his gospel, Luke has provided several exorcism stories which evoke particular Septuagintal entailments and which provide clues as to the role of exorcism in Jesus' mission. But before we come to the explanatory mappings of the

Beelzebul Controversy, Luke includes a unique passage, the interpretation of which has been as difficult as its legacy has been rich.

6.2 – Luke 10:17-20 – Satan Falling from Heaven

6.2.1 – 10:17 – The demons are subject to us

In verse 17, Luke immediately evokes the WARFARE metaphor; the disciples whom he sent out at the beginning of Chapter 10 have not only been able to exorcise demons, but they say that 'the demons are subject [ὑποτάσσω; cf. Luke 2:51] to us in your name'. As Twelftree points out, "The verb ὑποτάσσω often had military associations (Fn. 72: See 1 Kings 10:15 || 2 Chron. 9:14 (LXX); Esther 3.13a (LXX); Josephus, C. *Ap.* 1.119; 2 Macc. 8:9, 22; 3 Macc. 1.7.] so that, in the context of the whole saying, the early Christian represented by Luke probably understood that they were confronting the demons with (the authority of) Jesus." [1] A clear mirror is made to 9:1-2; this is another successful commissioning of officers. The use of ἐν τῷ ὀνόματί σου also recalls 9:48-49.

6.2.2 – 10:18 – I saw Satan falling like lightning from heaven

The effects of this brief and powerful verse have rippled throughout the centuries of Christian thought and literature. Analysis of it could probably form the basis for an entire thesis in and of itself. I will therefore limit myself to particular points where CMT offers possible answers or new interpretations, and particularly the use of the UP-DOWN schema in Luke's gospel.

[1] Twelftree 2007: 140-141.

First, it ought to be noted that Luke only uses the word διάβολος in his Temptation narrative and in the Parable of the Sower, both of which have Matthean counterparts which use διάβολος as well. Whenever the figure appears in uniquely Lukan material in the gospel, he is Σατανᾶς. Twice in Acts he is referred to as διάβολος (Acts 10:38 and 13:10); both occurrences are in reported direct speech.

Graham Twelftree has done more than any other recent scholar to underscore the importance of exorcism to Jesus as he is presented by the early Christians, and this to the early Christians themselves. "Jesus was the first to make the connection between exorcism and eschatology. For him, his exorcisms were the first or preliminary binding of Satan who would finally be destroyed in the eschaton."[2] That statement is strong and persuasive, but Twelftree also claims that Luke 10:18 is proof of this gradual and on-going victory over Satan.[3]

Commentators are almost entirely united in their analysis that this verse is discussing a defeat of Satan but appear to disagree on almost every other aspect. For example, Müller makes a distinction between the tradition which Luke inherited, which is purely theological (i.e. the fall of Satan is a result of the actions of God alone) and the use to which Luke puts it, which gives the statement Christological and ecclesiological nuances by virtue of the context into which Luke places it.[4] This statement is against Garrett[5] and Crump, the latter of whom argues for an analogy with Testament of Solomon 20:12-17,[6] in which demons can fall but can also go back and forth between the earth and heaven. The most important source of disagreement is the debate as to when the fall in Jesus's vision is meant to have taken place.

[2] Twelftree 1993: 224.
[3] Twelftree 2007: 140.
[4] Müller 1977: 419.
[5] Garrett 1989: 51-53.
[6] Crump 1992: 54-55.

As Gathercole notes, there are three major ways by which this passage has been interpreted: "that which refers to a vision of Jesus of a *primeval past* event; that which refers to a vision of Jesus of an event in the *recent* past, prior to (or even simultaneous with) the vision; and finally, that which refers to a vision of a future event."[7] The first of these, a vision of the primeval past, has been interpreted in two ways: one, popular in the patristic period, is of the fall of Lucifer, and the second possibility is that of the descent of the Nephilim in Genesis 6:4. Gathercole moves through the arguments for the primeval interpretation through Origen[8] and Jerome[9] to Kittel (one of very few modern proponents) with a brief discussion of Leany's objections to the theory in light of The Life of Adam and Eve (15:2 – 16:2) and 2 Enoch (J, 29:3-6), but concludes that:

> The bigger problem here with both the primeval views is that while Lk 10,18 could in isolation refer to a primeval fall, it would in this case make very little sense in the context of Lk 10,17–20. … Why respond to the success of the disciples with reference to the primeval fall of Satan? The only reason could be that Jesus was simply claiming that he had seen something more impressive than that which they had witnessed, but which was otherwise largely unrelated. To reply simply by oneupmanship would seem to be a strange response on Jesus' part. Just as difficult is the question of why Jesus would follow a reference to such a fall with the reassurance of future immunity from evil powers in Luke 10,19.[10]

[7] Gathercole 2003: 144.
[8] Origen's De Principiis – I, 5, 4-5, H. De Lubac, *Origen on First Principles: With an Introduction and Notes by G. W. Butterworth*, New York 1966, cited in Gathercole 2003: 146.
[9] Jerome, *Commentarium in Esaiam* (CChr.SL 73), Turnhout [1960], 240, cited and translated in Gathercole 2003: 146.
[10] Gathercole 2003: 149.

If the primeval interpretation is unlikely, it is the understanding of the verse that Satan has fallen at some point in the ministry of Jesus that has garnered the most support in modern scholarship; Gathercole cites Vollenweider[11] and Evans[12] as examples. If this is accepted as the correct meaning, then "Interpretation of the event typically takes three forms, depending on whether the focus is on the action of God, of the disciples, or of Jesus himself."[13]

- God defeats Satan in heaven, as a pre-condition of the proclamation of the kingdom of God, but Satan continues his work on earth, particularly through the actions of demons: "Der Verkündigung der Gottesherrschaft als gegenwärtiger Macht wird dadurch möglich."[14] Müller, sees a distinction between the defeat of Satan in heaven and his activity, especially through demons, on earth, but the heavenly defeat has nothing to do with Jesus or his disciples.[15] This attribution of Satan's downfall to God without any reference to Jesus indicates, for Manson, that this belongs to the earliest stratum of tradition.[16]
- The fall of Satan is contemporary with and a result of the mission of the disciples.[17] Contra this, Gathercole writes, "Significant as the disciples' exorcistic activity is, it is very difficult to see how it could be invested with such powerful cosmic significance that it could be described as tantamount to the fall of Satan himself."[18]

[11] S. Vollenweider, "Ich sah den Satan wie einen Blitz vom Himmel fallen" (Lk 10,18), *ZNW* 79 [1988], 196: "Die *endzeitliche* Vernichtung des Teufels gehört zum Hoffnungsgut des Judentums. In der Vision Jesu handelt es sich gewiß auch um ein *eschatologisches, aber nun bereits geschehenes Ereignis,*" emphasis Vollenweider's, cited in Gathercole 2003: 149, fn. 24.
[12] Evans 1990: 445, "seeing a contrast with the expectation of 1Enoch 16; 54,4–5; 90,21ff; TLevi 18,12; TJud. 25,3; Revelation 12," cited in Gathercole 2003: 14 n. 25.
[13] Gathercole 2003: 150.
[14] Müller 1977: 422.
[15] Müller 1977: 418-421, cited in Gathercole 2003: 150. See also Garrett 1989: 52, for criticism of Müller's conclusions.
[16] Manson 1949: 258, cited in Gathercole 2003: 150.
[17] Manson 1949: 258; Bock 1996: 1007; Danker 1988: 217; Zerwick 1948: 114, cited in Gathercole 2003: 151 n. 36.
[18] Gathercole 2003: 151.

- An event in the life of Jesus caused the fall, such as the incarnation,[19] the Temptation,[20] or Jesus' prayer.[21] Against this, Gathercole cites a lack of evidence, but prefers the interpretation that the fall of Satan, as witnessed by Jesus, allows the disciples' exorcisms to be successful, which has a parallel in Testament of Levi 18:12.[22] The problem with this interpretation, as Gathercole notes, is that Satan is active and indeed appears successful later in the gospel and in Acts. Particularly, Gathercole interprets Luke 22:31 as portraying Satan in his role as accuser in the divine council.[23]

The difficulty with any of these interpretations is that Satan does reappear in the gospel; his role in bringing about the betrayal and death of Jesus (22:3) and his demand to sift Peter like wheat (22:31) make little sense if his ultimate defeat has occurred by 10:18[24] ("Scholars such as Limbeck and Merklein note that Satan's fall is his disempowering, such that he can no longer function as the adversary in the divine council such as he did in Job 1–2; yet in Lk 22,31, Satan is portrayed in exactly that role").[25]

Consequently, contra Müller,[26] both Gathercole and Garrett conclude that the passage makes most sense as a vision of a *future* fall of Satan – future from the point of 10:17. Both point

[19] Plummer 1896: 278, cited in Gathercole 2003: 151 n. 38.
[20] Geldenhuys 1961: 302; S.H.T. Page, *Powers of Evil: A Biblical Study of Satan and Demons* [Grand Rapids: Baker and Leicester: Apollos, 1995], 111, cited in Gathercole 2003: 151 fn. 39.
[21] Crump 1992: 51.
[22] S. Vollenweider, "Ich sah den Satan wie einen Blitz vom Himmel fallen" (Lk 10,18), *ZNW* 79 [1988], 196, cited in Gathercole 2003: 152 fn. 43.
[23] Gathercole 2003: 153.
[24] Gathercole 2003: 153.
[25] Meinrad Limbeck, "Satan und das Böse im NT," Herbert Haag ed., *Teufelsglaube* [Tübingen Katzmann, 1974], 286–87; Helmut Merklein, *Jesu Botschaft von der Gottesherrschaft: Eine Skizze* (SBS 111) [Stuttgart: Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1983], 60–61; Michi Miyoshi, *Der Anfang des Reiseberichts, Lk 9,51–10,24: Eine redaktionsgeschichtliche Untersuchung* (AnBib 60) [Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1974], 99 fn. 29, cited in Gathercole 2003: 153 fn. 49.
[26] Müller 1977: 417.

out that there is a biblical precedent for the use of ἑθεώρουν as a reference of visions of things to come, particular in LXX Daniel (4:13, the vision of Nebuchadnezzar; 7:2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 11, 13, 21; cf. 8,15).[27] To this, Garrett adds further instances of imperfect verbs being used to introduce visions in Acts 11:6 and Josephus' *Antiquities* 2.83,[28] while Gathercole offers another example of θεωρῶν, the present participle, being used in 1 Enoch 1:2 "in an explicitly futuristic context: 'not for the present generation, but for one that is far off'."[29]

Satan is still active at the end of Luke's gospel (22:3) and in Acts (e.g. 16:16-18), and so Jesus cannot have seen his final defeat unless it is a vision of the future.[30] Gathercole is one of those who interprets the passage as being indicative of an eschatological fall, but adds a caveat: "This fall of Satan is not only a positive message; Satan falling from heaven implies that he will, temporarily at least, wreak havoc on the earth before his final destruction."[31] Could the appearances of Satan in the rest of the double work be examples of this 'havoc'? As Wolter also notes, "But perhaps the assurance also reflects the notion that the fall of Satan from heaven brings salvation upon the earth (cf. Revelation 12.9-12; Testament of Job 16.3; Testament of Solomon 20.17; P. Busch 1996, 135)."[32] However, it is unlikely, given the fact that Satan sees himself in a position of some power at 22:31, as he has the confidence to demand that he be able to sift the disciples like wheat.

However, they differ on *when* this future fall takes place. While Gathercole sees an eschatological defeat, Garrett interprets the fall as taking place as a result of Jesus's death and

[27] Garrett 1989: 49; Gathercole 2003: 153-154.
[28] Garrett 1989: 135, n. 51.
[29] Gathercole 2003: 153.
[30] Twelftree 1993: 221.
[31] Gathercole 2003: 144-45.
[32] Wolter 2017: 67.

resurrection.[33] This would explain why Satan feels so confident at 22:31, but Gathercole's havoc-caveat also explains why Satan can be seen as active in Acts even after the resurrection and ascension. I find myself more convinced by Garrett's argument, particularly as it is supported by Luke's use of the UP-DOWN schema, as I will explain below.

Commentators are divided as to whether Jesus had a literal vision,[34] or was speaking metaphorically.[35] I disagree that there is sufficient evidence to dismiss the verse as "symbolic" or "poetic imagination"; however, one of the great advantages of CMT is that it matters little whether a statement is decided to be "literally true" or "just metaphorical", because of the fundamental tenet of CMT that speech can be *both* literal *and* metaphorical. The language of the verse contains meaning in and of itself, regardless of whether we believe that Luke thought Jesus had a physical vision or was speaking in metaphors. An interesting question that has not been asked is why all commentators interpret the fall – whether a literal vision or a metaphorical statement – to signify *defeat*. The question is asked whether Jesus's vision is a metaphor or not, or whether the disciples interpreted the statement as a vision or a metaphor, but it is never asked whether *the fall itself* is a metaphor.

After all, no commentator has ever suggested that Satan's fall is an accident. As Wolter puts it, "In the literature the fall of Satan is uniformly interpreted as part of an eschatic disempowering of the devil."[36] Implicitly, and particularly in the context in which Luke has placed it, every exegete understands that the fall is more than a mere uncontrolled descent: it

[33] Garrett 1989: 51-53.
[34] Müller 1977: 417; Aune 1983: 163; Garrett 1989: 49; Gathercole 2003: 154; Humphrey 2007: 109; Löfstedt 2011: 97.
[35] Leivestad 1954: 49; Marshall 1978: 428; Fitzmyer 1985: 860; Ladd 1993: 6; Page 1995: 110.
[36] Wolter 2017: 65.

is a descent uncontrolled by Satan, but perhaps controlled by God, from status and power to a lack of status or power.

This metaphor, DEFEAT IS A FALL, is an example of the UP-DOWN schema discussed in Chapter 4 (see **4.2.3**). There is a general human practice of ascribing positive abstract concepts with an upward spatial position and negative abstract concepts with a downward spatial position;[37] for example, VIRTUE IS UP (She's an *upstanding* citizen.),[38] HAPPY IS UP (I'm feeling really *up* today); MORE IS UP, LESS IS DOWN (Speak *up*.);[39] HEALTHY IS UP (Lazarus *rose* from the dead.), RATIONAL IS UP (He couldn't *rise above* his emotion.); CONTROL IS UP (I'm *on top* of the situation). The Fall of Satan and the Fall of Adam and Eve are used by Lakoff and Johnson as "the most famous example" of the conceptual metaphor GOOD IS UP: "Doing evil is therefore moving from a position of morality (uprightness) to a position of immorality (being low). Hence, Doing Evil Is Falling."[40]

DEFEAT IS A FALL is a particularly vivid metaphor, easily recognised as embodied; it is something which a human being experiences as soon as it learns to walk, or before, and feels the associated pain and failure of a fall before their first birthday. It is thus understandably extremely common.

> As a cultural metaphor, falling carries a pretty heavy symbolism in the West. Whether we are talking about the hubris of Icarus or the evil of Satan, the collapse of stock markets or the public stumbling of the latest politician to have lost his integrity on the Internet, falling is generally seen as a failure, a defeat, a loss or a decline.[41]

[37] Gottwald-Elsner-Pollatos 2015: 1-10.
[38] An example also given in Kövecses 2010: 40; see also Ścigała-Indurkhya 2016: 205-212.
[39] Kövecses 2010: 40.
[40] Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 299.
[41] Cooper Albright 2003: 36.

Throughout the Septuagint, the verb πίπτω is primarily used to indicate death, usually either in battle or as a result of violence (e.g., Ex. 32:28; Lev. 26:7-8; Num. 14:42-43; Deut 21:1; Tobit 14:10; Ps 9:31; 19:9; 35:13; Isaiah 8:15; 13:15; 21:9;)[42] or the falling on one's face, in fear, worship, or submission (e.g., Gen. 44:14; Lev. 9:24; Num. 16:22; Joshua B: 5:14; Ruth 2:10; Tobit 12:16). Even when the verb is used in a literal sense, for a falling object, it is often associated with death (e.g., Samson causing the stones of the building to fall on the heads of the Philistines: Judges A/B: 16:30) or defeat (e.g. Gideon's dream of the barley loaf falling and bringing down a tent, as a prophecy of his victory: Judges A/B 7:13), or humiliation and submission (The statue of Dagon falling and smashing before the Ark of the Covenant: 1 Kings 5:3-4; "Bel fell and Dagon was crushed": Isaiah 46:1). "That this downfall of Satan is described 'as lightning' (10:28) does not … necessarily mean that it was 'speedy,' (fn. 67.: Contra Werner Foerster, "ἀστραπή," *TDNT* 1:505; BDAG, "ἀστραπή.") as it might to the modern reader. Rather, it probably means bright, spectacular, and obvious. (fn. 68.: Cf. e.g. Dan. 10:6; Matt. 24:27; 28:3; Luke 11:36; 17:24; Rev. 4.5; 8.5; 11:19; 16:18.)"[43] Twelftree is correct that entailments can differ depending on cultural milieu, but is not entirely convincing here. Speed is one of the most obvious entailments of lightning, but contradicts Twelftree's interpretation that Satan's downfall is conceived as *ongoing*, concurrent with Jesus's exorcistic mission.

The only other time someone is described as 'like lightning' in Luke's gospel is the Son of Man, in Luke 17:74. As I have and will argue elsewhere in this thesis, Luke deliberately juxtaposes Jesus and Satan, and brings a question into starker focus: is Satan 'like lightning',

[42] There are hundreds of instances scattered throughout the whole of the Greek Bible; I have selected a few examples hoping to show the breadth of use, but also focusing on those books of which I have argued throughout that Luke had a particular knowledge, and that are pertinent to the on-going exploration in this thesis.
[43] Twelftree 2007: 140.

or is his *fall* 'like lightning'?[44] Fitzmyer explains that the best Greek word order is Ἐθεώρουν τὸν Σατανᾶν ὡς ἀστραπὴν ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ πεσόντα, but ms. B and Origen read Ἐθεώρουν τὸν Σατανᾶν ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ὡς ἀστραπὴν πεσόντα, while P^{75} and Epiphanius read Ἐθεώρουν τὸν Σατανᾶν ὡς ἀστραπὴν πεσόντα ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ. "Since in early mss. there was no punctuation, the best reading above (the first) could be understood in two ways and consequently gave rise to the variants."[45] The first variant is that Jesus saw Satan fall "like lightning from heaven"; "the latter translation understands the prepositional *ek tou ouranou* as a descriptive modifier of lightning and takes *ouranos* … as the place from which swift-flashing lightning seems to descend to earth in popular descriptions."[46]

However, in this case, CMT offers a more plausible explanation than syntax does.[47] In the Hebrew Bible (and Septuagint), lightning is always associated with God, often as part of a theophany or as a simile for God's sudden, violent or glorious action, never with any evil figure. The same is true for the NT occurrences listed above. I would thus argue that the major entailment associated with lightning is that it indicates an action of God, as all the other appearances in the New Testament appear to support. Thus, when Gathercole writes that "It is unclear why Fitzmyer associates the grammatical connection of "from heaven" to the lightning with Satan's deposition from the heavenly court,"[48] Fitzmyer is quite correct to do so, and is further supported by Carman's interpretation of the participle πεσόντα (i.e.,

[44] Admittedly, this is a question that Müller 1977: 418 n. 8 asks and then dismisses: "Auch wenn ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ Teil des Vergleichs mit einem Blitz wäre, so würde doch dieser Vergleich nur dann sinnvoll sein, wenn auch vom Satan selbst der Fall vom Himmel gemeint ist."
[45] Fitzmyer 1985: 861.
[46] Fitzmyer 1985: 861. Fitzmyer notes that this interpretation is preferred by P. Joüon ("Notes philologiques sur les évangiles," *RSR* 18 [1928], 353) and F. W. Lewis ("'I Beheld Satan Fall as Lightning from Heaven' (Luke x. 18)," *ExpTim 25* [1913-1914], 233).
[47] One of the major difficulties of syntactical analysis is the fact that in this verse, syntax varies from manuscript to manuscript.
[48] Gathercole 2003: 144, referring to Fitzmyer 1985: 165–166.

"Likely, πεσόντα is being used as a past form of βάλλω, conveying the notion not of falling but of being 'thrown down.'").[49]

There is surprisingly little said about the specific conceptual metaphor DEFEAT IS A FALL;[50] however, this is because it is a facet of the far more fundamental UP-DOWN schema. In Chapter 4, I discussed how each of the temptations entails Jesus bending, bowing, or falling. Throughout the whole of the gospel, Luke creates juxtapositions between Satan and Jesus; Satan tries to tempt Jesus to fall, and Jesus sees Satan fall instead. Even at the moment of Jesus's apparent defeat, he is lifted up on the cross; the three falls are added to the account of the Passion only many centuries later, in Catholic mysticism. Luke does not draw attention to this, unlike the author of the Fourth gospel, because Luke includes an ascent far more obvious and immediately glorious in the Ascension.

Once one analyses the gospel with the UP-DOWN schema in mind, other examples become apparent. In 1:52, as part of the Magnificat, Mary says of God: καθεῖλεν δυνάστας ἀπὸ θρόνων καὶ ὕψωσεν ταπεινούς "he has deposed the mighty from their thrones and he has exalted the humble." The κατά of καθαιρέω indicates that the motion of the mighty from their thrones is *downwards*, in correspondence with the conceptual metaphor POWERFUL IS UP.[51]

[49] Carman 2014: 223. Πεσόντα is the aorist participle of πίπτω, a pure constative aorist with a temporal connotation (Zerwick 1996: 219, in agreement with Fitzmyer 1985: 862; Crump 1992: 53; Edwards 2015: 312, and Carman 2014: 223). Zerwick prefers the translation "I saw Satan fall," as opposed to "I saw Satan falling"; "Note that although the fall of Satan was repeatedly seen, the participle need not necessarily for that reason be a present one; the repetition is already expressed by the main verb, and the subordinate one may thus distinguish by the use of present or aorist the aspect proper to the event regarded apart from its repetition (the same applies also to subordinate clauses of time for example). It is thus not necessary to understand this aorist as connoting the prehistorical, definitive fall of Lucifer; but the aorist may be regarded as a « global » one embracing the whole process of the defeat of Satan from the fall of Lucifer throughout the whole history of salvation to the full and final victory in the Last Judgement." - Zerwick 2011: 90, §269. Twelftree 2007: 140, on the other hand, argues that "the understanding of the duration or time of the 'falling' (πεσόντα, aorist participle, denoting a point of action) of Satan is governed by the earlier main verb 'I saw' (ἐθεώρουν, imperfect tense), which denotes a continuous, protracted action. Thus, we may translate Luke's intention here as 'I have been seeing Satan falling like lightning from heaven.'"

[50] Called A FAILURE IS A FALL or FAILING IS FALLING by Lakoff 2014: 9, 11.

[51] Also written as CONTROL IS UP, IMPORTANT IS UP, HIGH STATUS IS UP, etc.

Instead, in 1:52, the humble are exalted. The verb ὑψόω, related to the noun ὕψος "height, summit," is used 6 times in Luke, always in a comparison of exaltation and humiliation, on a vertical axis (1:52; 10:15; 14:11; 18:14).[52] Luke's is the only gospel to include the Ascension,[53] and ὑψόω is used three times in Acts, twice about Jesus (2:33; 5:31) and once about the people of Israel (13:17). I argue that the mighty ones of 1:52 could plausibly include the strong man of 11:21; the throne of 1:52 is comparable with heaven, as a place of high status (as Luke notes when he quotes Isaiah 66:1-2 in Acts 7:49, "Heaven is my throne…"). In Luke 14:11 and 18:14, the verb ταπεινόω is used in a participial form, as it is in Acts 8:33, when the Ethiopian eunuch discusses Isaiah 53:7-8 with Philip, and Luke has Philip say that the one who is referred to as being humiliated is Jesus.[54] Jesus goes from being the humble son of a humble handmaid (as Mary describes herself with another participle of ταπεινόω in 1:48) to being exalted, while Satan begins the gospel with all the authority and glory of all the kingdoms of the world, but at some point falls from heaven – an uncontrolled descent, understood implicitly by all commentators as a defeat, a movement from control and status to lack of control and lack of status.

Remarkably, many important scholars and contributions on the topic of Satan's fall appear to make no connection between 1:52 and 10:18.[55] This is the great advantage of CMT. It allows for the examination of patterns with regards to *concepts*, rather than in the strict use of

[52] He also uses it three times in Acts, twice with regard to Jesus and once with regard to the people of Israel, in 2:33, 5:31, and 13:17 respectively.
[53] If one does not count the longer Markan ending.
[54] One might also consider the correspondence between a heavenly throne and voluntary humbling in LXX Psalm 112:4-5.
[55] E.g., Müller 1974; Fitzmyer 1985; Garrett 1989; Crump 1992; Gathercole 2003; Wahlen 2004; Twelftree 2007; Bovon 2013; Edwards 2015; Wolter 2017. One exception is a brief mention in Simons 2009: 42. Green 1997: 419 makes a connection between 10:17-20 and Zechariah in 1:68-79 (esp. 1:71, 74), but not to Mary and the Magnificat. I must of course provide the caveat that it is eminently possible that a Lukan commentator has made the link before me, and I have yet to discover it.

vocabulary. It is a holistic approach which is more cognizant of how human beings conceive their world, CMT enables the exegete to find new comparisons and conclusions.

6.2.3 – 10:19 – The Enemy, the snakes, and the scorpions

There are three important points to be made about this verse. The first is the use again of ἐξουσία, authority, that has been brought up again and again in reference to exorcisms. Satan offers Jesus authority over all the kingdoms of the earth (4:6); the crowd is amazed that Jesus has authority over the unclean spirit in Capernaum (4:36); Jesus praises the insight of the centurion concerning his authority over malevolent forces like illness (7:8-9); and Jesus grants authority when he commissions the disciples (9:1). Now, he gives authority to the seventy-two "to tread on snakes and scorpions."[56]

The snakes and scorpions are generally accepted by scholars to be associated with demons,[57] or to be metaphors for them,[58] though Fitzmyer is a notable exception.[59] "V. 19 should not be understood to promise immunity from bodily injury. Rather, like the same metaphors of the psalmist, it refers to the spiritual protection God provides … (Ps 91:7-16)."[60] Psalm 91 is a common point of comparison, and persuasive given its use in the Temptation narrative. When trying to persuade Jesus to throw himself down from the Temple, he quotes Psalm 91:11-12,[61] and assures Jesus that the angels will subsequently "lift him up." Psalm 91 is one of the Septuagintal origins of the δαιμόνιον-blend (v. 6), and Satan's quotation in 4:11 cuts off

[56] Klutz 2004: 60.
[57] Twelftree 2007: 140; Warren 2012: 167 n. 14.
[58] Dochhorn 2013: 104; Carman 2014: 224.
[59] Fitzmyer 1985: 863
[60] Edwards 2015: 313.
[61] For more on Psalm 91, see sections 3.3.3.c and 4.2.

before 91:13: "You will tread on the lion and the adder, the young lion and the serpent you will trample under foot." Comparisons to Isaiah 14:13 are also popular, and Green makes a good point when he highlights the context of the passage: "Jesus had just used Isaianic imagery to describe the descent of Capernaum (v 15; Isa 14:1-27); the same is now used with reference to Satan, whose claim to glory and allegiance (cf. 4:5-7; cf. Isa 14:13) is antecedent to, even mandates, his fall."[62] The other major advantage to the Isaiah parallel is the motif of light; however, lightning and the morning star (Isaiah 14:12) are not the same, and Jesus is the figure compared to the morning star in Luke's gospel (by Zechariah, 1:78-79).[63]

Edwards also writes that the statement is "superficially" related to Genesis 3:15 but is "more properly illuminated by *T. Levi* 18:22, 'And Beliar (= Satan) shall be bound by him [the messianic Son of God]. And he shall grant to his children the authority to trample on wicked spirits.'"[64] For Twelftree there is a more clear link to *Testament of Zebulon* 9.8: "And thereafter the Lord himself will arise upon you, the light of righteousness with healing and compassion in his wings. He will liberate every captive of the sons of men from Beliar, and every spirit of error will be trampled down. He will turn all nations to being zealous for him. And you shall see <God in human form>…"[65] Garrett also quotes *T. Levi* and *T. Zebulon,* alongside a host of others, as evidence that:

> serpents and scorpions were interpreted as Satanic or demonic already in contemporaneous writings (Rev. 9:3, 10; 12:7-9 and 20:2; in the *Testaments if the Twelve Patriarchs,* see *Testament of Simon* 6:6; *Testament of Levi* 18:12; *Testament of Zebulon* 9:8; cf. also *Testament of Job* 43:8) Further, the literary context of Luke 10:19 suggests that the 'serpents and scorpions' here ought to be interpreted as demonic… Luke's inexact citation can be explained variously: he may have been quoting from memory, using a

[62] Green 1997: 418; see also Garrett 1989: 50.
[63] See also Kelly 2006: 93-94.
[64] Edwards 2015: 312-313.
[65] Twelftree 1993: 186.

> traditional form of Jesus' saying, or deliberately substituting the names of creatures that he supposed his readers would acknowledge as demonic (cf. Luke 11:11-13; contrast Matt. 7:9-11).[66]

While Psalm 91 and *T. Levi* are mentioned the most often as probable origins for the phrase,[67] Grulot instead sees a reference to Deuteronomy 8:15. This reference is the most convincing, particularly given Luke's own use of it in the Temptation narrative:

> Est-il utile de remarquer des maintenant que les deux autres dangers, occasions d'épreuves décisives, font l'objet d'allusions claires dans le récit de la tentation de Jésus selon Luc et Matthieu? Deux des réponses de Jésus au Tentateur sont empruntées à des passages du Deutéronome qui en traitent explicitement. C'est à propos de la manne qu'on trouve la parole : « Ce n'est pas seulement de pain que vivra l'homme » (Dt 8,3, cité dans Luc 4,4; cf. la reprise du thème dans Dt 8,16). C'est à propos des eaux de Massa qu'on trouve l'autre parole : « Tu ne mettras pas ton Dieu à l'épreuve » (Dt 6,16, cité dans Luc 4,12; cf. la reprise du thème dans Dt 8,15b).[68]

If one agrees with Garrett and Grulot that the snakes and scorpions are metaphors for demons – DEMONS ARE SNAKES/SCORPIONS – there remains a question of why these animals are so often associated with evil. The most obviously entailment of both animals is that they are venomous, causing pain and death. More subtle entailments can be made sense of by the use of CMT. Snakes and scorpions, like many reptiles, arachnids, and insects, are often grouped together in the Hebrew Bible as 'crawling things'; in keeping with the UP-DOWN schema,

[66] Garrett 1989: 138-9 n. 70.
[67] Wolter notably argues otherwise (2017: 66-7): "The lexical pair 'snakes and scorpions' (ὄφεις καὶ σκορπίοι) comes from the Hellenistic environment of early Christianity (cf. Theophrastus, De pietate, Fragment 12.68; Plutarch, Moralia 87a; Antoninus Liberalis 41.4; Aelian, De natura animalium 10.14, 29; Herodianus Grammaticus, De prosidea catholica, ed. Lentz/Ludwich 1965, III/I, 28.15-16; Orphica. Ed/ Halleux/Schamp 1985, 16.1; Ps.-Hippocrates, Ἑρμηνεία περὶ ἐνεργῶν λίθων 38 (Ruelle 1898, 189.20]; see also the reception of Deuteronomy 8.15 in Philo, De vita Mosis 1.192 and Luke 11:11-12; rabbinic parallels in Miyoshi 1974, 103ff.)."
[68] Grulot 1981: 94.

these animals which are the closest to the earth are considered more reprehensible, and morally corrupt (as well as impure with regards the kashrut laws). If the snakes and scorpions represent demons, and the work of Satan and demons are intertwined (or the same), then in terms of the UP-DOWN schema his humiliation[69] is complete; not only has Satan fallen from heaven, but he is grouped with the crawling animals.[70]

Snakes and scorpions are *sheqets*, abominations (Lev 11:42), and to eat or touch them makes one ritually unclean (Lev 22.5).[71] Furthermore, as crawling things, they are associated with idolatry (Ezek 8:10). Snakes particularly were associated with foreign gods, and, as I argued in Chapters 3 and 4, with *daimones*; the Agathodaimōn in particular had a strong cult in Alexandria. He was portrayed either as a youth with a cornucopia or as a serpent.[72] He was often paired with Tyche as his consort, and libations of unmixed wine were poured out at the end of a meal to him.[73]

I argued in Chapter **4.4.2** that Luke inherited a conceptual blend from his knowledge of the Septuagint, which I have called the δαιμόνιον-blend. The association of snakes with this blend in 10:17 lends credence to my supposition that this blend contains certain LXX entailments which can then be found in Luke's gospel. I predicted that the various LXX uses of the word δαιμόνιον would lead to an entailment of association of demons with animals;

[69] The etymology of the word 'humiliation' itself is an example of the UP-DOWN schema in action; the Latin *humus* is a word for 'earth', from the PIE root *ǵhðem-*, *ǵhðom-*, meaning "earth". This root also gives us the Greek χθών (Pokorny 1959).
[70] The association of the serpent of Eden with Satan is a later development; it can be considered, but too much weight cannot be confidently placed on it with regards to Luke's particular milieu. Nonetheless, Genesis 3 provides us with another example of the UP-DOWN schema; God punishes the serpent but cursing it to crawl on its belly.
[71] Wahlen notes that Jesus' promise in 10:19 is "closely related" to Luke's various designations for Satan (2004: 151) but does not discuss snakes and serpents as being ritually unclean despite his interest in the connection between demons and impurity.
[72] Ogden 2013: 297-305,
[73] e.g. Aristophanes, *Knights* 85, 106 (Ogden 2013: 298 n. 141; line 107 according to Sorensen 2002: 82 n. 32); *Peace* 300; *Wasps* 525 cf. Greek Isaiah 65:11.

this entailment derives from its use in the Septuagint, and before that, from the input space of Greek culture. The appearance of this entailment in Luke 10:19 (and in Revelation) demonstrate that the lexeme δαιμόνιον is not a dead metaphor, which must be studied solely at a denotative level, but an active conceptual blend, that must therefore also be considered connotatively.

With the conceptual metaphor DEMONS ARE SNAKES/SCORPIONS in mind, the connection between the animals and "all the power of the enemy" falls into place. As Wolter writes, "the prepositional phrase ἐπὶ πᾶσαν τὴν δύναμιν κτλ. is also dependent on ἐξουσία (cf. Tobit 1.21א; Sirach 33.20; Testament of Reuben 5.1; Luke 9.1; Revelation 6.8; 13.7; 16.9). As a metonymic designation for the devil, 'the enemy' is common also elsewhere (cf. Testament of Dan 6.2—4; Apocalypse of Moses 2.4; 7.2; 15.1; 25.4; 28.4; 29.13; Life of Adam and Eve 17.1; Testament of Job 47.10; Joseph and Asenath 12.8; 3 Baruch 13.2). In this respect, the phrasing δύναμις τοῦ ἐχθροῦ corresponds to Testament of Job 3.3 (an 'idol image' as δύναμις τοῦ διαβόλου; see also—with reversed orientation—Acts 8.10; 1 Corinthians 15.6). What is meant is that the ἐξουσία bestowed by Jesus is superior to everything through which the devil exercises his power."[74] This superiority is underlined by the verb πατεῖν; in addition to evoking other uses in Testament of Zebulun 9:8, Revelation 11:2, and most particularly Luke 21.24,[75] 'treading' is an element understood in terms of the UP-DOWN schema, discussed in detail above. Normally, the example of snakes and scorpions would be a rare and disturbing exception to the rule that the person who has the upper position is the one in control of an encounter (i.e., *the upper hand*), because when stepped on, a snake will react with a

[74] Wolter 2017: 67.
[75] Wolter 2017: 66.

venomous bite, and the scorpion with a sting. Jesus promises in 10:19 that the disciples will not be harmed, and thus will retain the position of control.

The UP-DOWN schema is finally used with regard to Satan himself. He is referred to explicitly as ὁ ἐχθρος, the enemy, and is acknowledged to have great power. In being able to tread on snakes and scorpions without harm, Jesus is able to promise that the disciples will have authority to tread ἐπὶ, *upon*, the powers of Satan. As Forsyth writes,

> …the passage clearly connects the power over demons with the combat tradition … Each little exorcism or act of healing is linked to the 'fall' of the enemy, who is envisaged here as a heavenly body (as in the rebel tradition), and the image of treading on the defeated foe, here represented by serpents and scorpions, is already a familiar one in the iconography of the victory scene.[76]

6.2.4 – 10:20 – Names Written in Heaven

Verse 20 marks the end of a chiastic structure in the passage, "through the semantic isotopy of the terms 'demons' (v. 17) and 'Satan' (v. 18), or 'the enemy' (v. 19) and 'spirits' (v. 20) … Furthermore, ἐξουσία (v. 19) belongs to the semantic field of ὑποτάσσεσθαι (v.17/v. 20), and ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ (concerning Satan; v. 18) and ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς (concerning the seventy-two; v. 20) stands over against each other antithetically,"[77] and well as echoing the phrase of ἐν τῷ ὀνόματί σου in 9:48-49 (explored above in **5.11**) and 10:17. It gives the final hints of an underlying WARFARE metaphor which Luke will illuminate during the Beelzebul controversy.

[76] Forsyth 1989: 294-5.
[77] Wolter 2017: 65.

The reference to the disciples' names being written in heaven is a well-attested metaphor in Hebrew literature. [78] The concept of the 'book of life' stretches back to Akkadian and Sumerian religious literature; Shalom Paul takes the sole use of the "book of life" or "book of the living" in the Hebrew Bible (Psalm 69:29, *yimmāḥû missēpęr ḥayyîm w^{e}'im ṣaddîqîm 'al yikkātēbû* "Let them be blotted out of the book of the living; let them not be enrolled among the righteous")[79] and by use of interdialectal semantic equivalents identifies its use in Akkadian (From a Neo-Assyrian tablet addressed to Esarhaddon (ABL 545): *lē'û ša balāṭi* "tablet of life/living") [80] and Sumerian ("The goddess Nungal is also known to possess such an i n – n a m – t i – l a 'tablet of life' - Nungal hymn, line 74 = PBS 112 104 Rs. 10 = Ni 42,13,17.").[81]

Wolter identifies the metaphor underlying this motif: "the names of the elect are fixed as in the register of the citizens of a town."[82] Bock too notes that "In everyday Greek, ἐγγράφω … refers to making a list in a public register or census."[83] In terms of CMT, this is an example of metonymy, in which the part stands for the whole[84] – their names are written in heaven, and thus they will be accepted there also.

[78] In the Hebrew Bible, it appears in Exodus 32:32-33; Psalm 40:8 56:7; 69:29; 87:6; 139:16; Isaiah 4:3; 34:16; 65:6; Jeremiah 17:13; 22:30; Daniel 7:10; 10:21; 12:1; Malachi 3:16-17; in inter-testamental literature: Jubilees 30:19-23; 1 Enoch 47:3; 104:1; 108:3, 7; 1QM 12:2, 1-2; 4Q180 1:3; 4QDibHam 6:14; CD 20:19-20; in the New Testament: Philippians 4:3; Hebrews 12:23; Revelation 3:5; 13:8; 17:8; 20:12, 15; 21:27. See Crump 1992: 54-55; Wolter 2017: 67; and Fitzmyer 1985: 863-864.
[79] Paul 1973: 351.
[80] English translation in L. Waterman, *Royal Correspondence of the Assyrian Empire*, Volume 1 [Ann Arbour, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1930], 386-87, cited in Paul 1973: 351, fn. 42.
[81] Paul 1973: 345.
[82] Wolter 2017: 67.
[83] Bock 2012: 252.
[84] E.g. "He likes to read the *Marquis de Sade*. (= the writings of the marquis); He's in *dance*. (= the dancing profession); *Acrylic* has taken over the art world (= the use of acrylic paint); The *Times* hasn't arrived at the press conference yet. (= the reporter from the *Times*)" – Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 35. For further discussion on the use of the NAME = PERSON metonymy in exorcism, see sections 5.8.3 and 5.11 above.

When and how they will be accepted into heaven is another question, and one outside the scope of this thesis. In a recent PhD thesis and subsequent monograph, Alexy Somov has explored Lukan conceptions of the afterlife (collective eschatology (a Day of Judgement) vs. individual eschatology (post-mortem judgement); the underworld vs. an abode for the righteous), and in Chapter 5 also engages with conceptual metaphor theory:

> Luke uses various sources and oral traditions that reflect the diverse and incoherent views on the afterlife which coexisted in his cultural-religious milieu with its predominantly metaphorical religious conceptual system. Using CMT to analyze the variety of ideas dealing with the afterlife in Luke-Acts demonstrates that Luke shares this conceptual system and does not consider this variety (or even discrepancy) to be a contradiction. Moreover, the application of CMT indicates that in his presentation of the afterlife Luke regards these ideas as consistent; they are apparently coherent in the conceptual system he shares.[85]

At its most fundamental, the idea of a place of the dead is an example of the conceptual metaphor STATES ARE LOCATIONS, a variation on the metaphor STATES ARE CONTAINERS (e.g. They are *in* love).[86] The state of being dead is conceived of as a place. In some cultures, like the Sumerian and Akkadian, there is a single netherworld for all the dead (Kur/Irkalla/Ersetu), with no distinct locations for the righteous or the unrighteous dead. In the Hebrew Bible, Sheol was also considered the place of the dead regardless of their actions in life. In accordance with the conceptual metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY, DEATH IS THE END OF THE JOURNEY.[87] Life ends in death, and a journey ends in a particular location; consequently, DEATH IS A LOCATION. As Shalom Paul points out, citizenship in the netherworld is also indicated by the presence of one's name in an inscription: Jeremiah 17:13, "O Lord, the hope

[85] Alexey Somov 2017: 247.
[86] Kövecses 2010: 39, 163, 207.
[87] Kövecses 2010: 51.

of Israel, all who reject You shall be put to shame, and those who turn from You, shall be inscribed in the netherworld."[88]

As Somov explores in more detail,[89] the post-mortem reward for righteousness is clearly located in 'heaven' (Luke 6:23; 12:33; 16:9; 18:22; Acts 7:56). The abode of the righteous after the collective judgement is also referred to as the Kingdom of God (Luke 13:29-30) or as Paradise after an individual eschatology (Luke 23:43). Finally, in Luke 16:23, the bosom of Abraham, the location of Lazarus after his death, is situated high above Hades, wherein the rich man is being tormented.[90]

This distinction is clearly connected to the mission of the disciples; in sending them out, Jesus predicts disaster for Capernaum in 10:15: "Surely you will not be exulted up to heaven? You will come down to Hades." Whether Hades indicates a neutral location of the dead or one specifically for the wicked in Luke 10:15 is discussed by Lehtipuu and Somov in turn,[91] but its clear use to refer to a place of punishment in 16:23 suggests that Luke conceives of Hades as a specifically negative place.

This distinction adds greater emphasis to two major statements in this passage: Satan is falling, from above to below, while the disciples are given an indication of their ascent. They will be heavenly inhabitants, and this should be the cause of their joy, not their success against the demons. As Wolter writes, it is:

[88] "For *'ęręṣ* as 'netherworld,' see W. Baumgartner, *Die Klagegedichte des Jeremias, BZATW* 32 (Giessen, 1917), 40. H. Gunkel, *Schöpfung und Chaos in Urzeit und Endzeit* (Göttingen, 1895), 18, n. 1., already amassed evidence for this meaning in Hebrew, Akkadian, and Aramaic. For this verse, cf., too, M. Dahood, *Biblica* 40 (1959), 164-66. The same meaning is now also well attested in Ugaritic, *'rṣ*. Cf., too, W. Baumgartner, B. Hartmann, E. Y. Kutscher, *Hebräisches und Aramäisches Lexikon zum Alten Testament* (Leiden, 1967), 88." – Paul 1973: 347, fn. 21.
[89] Somov 2014: 232.
[90] See Section 6.2. above for further discussion on the conceptual metaphor HEAVEN IS UP.
[91] Lehtipuu 2007: 270-271, cited in Somov 2014: 95, fn. 349.

> … only as representatives of the heavenly world [that the disciples] were able to subject the demons, and accordingly, they can recognize precisely in this that they belong to God. ἐγγέγραπται is *passive divinum* and perfect. Thus, the verb refers to a condition brought about by God that was already in effect at the subjection of the demons. Thus, the two are related to each other as epistemic basis (the subjection of the demons is the epistemic cause for the fact of being registered in heaven) and objective cause (the fact of being registered in heaven is the objective basis for the subjection of the demons).[92]

The major metaphor indicated by the ancient Near Eastern motif of the heavenly books is that THE DISCIPLES ARE SUBJECTS IN THE KINGDOM OF GOD. However, this has two consequences in the light of the WARFARE schema. First, it characterises the on-going hostility between Jesus and Satan as a war between nations, not as a personal duel. Secondly, the disciples are not only subjects in the Kingdom of God – they are its soldiers, whom Jesus the general sends out against demons.

As I discussed above in §5.9, the conceptual metaphor COMMISSIONED DISCIPLES ARE COMMISSIONED OFFICERS emerges as a result of the mapping of the WARFARE metaphor, and is a mapping which was supported by the role of the disciples in Luke 9:37-43, explored in **§5.10.6**. While commentators have remarked on the Ancient Near Eastern context of the writing of names in heaven, the lack of connection to the underlying WARFARE metaphor has resulted in a lack of engagement with another important context for Luke: that of the Roman Empire. The blending of these two important metaphors – THE DISCIPLES ARE SUBJECTS IN THE KINGDOM OF GOD and COMMISSIONED DISCIPLES ARE COMMISSIONED OFFICERS – has a

[92] Wolter 2017: 68.

clear, pertinent cultural parallel: the issuing of Roman military diplomas. The reward for military service is citizenship.

Whether or not Luke associates the Roman Empire with the kingdom of Satan, as argued by Kazuhiko Yamazaki-Ransom,[93] he was born, lived, and died under it, and clearly had a detailed knowledge of how its governments operated. For good or ill, its effect on Luke's worldview cannot be denied. From his reading of Jewish scripture, he would have been well aware of the metonymy of names being written in heaven as a reference to having the right to live in heaven; his Roman context, however, would have given him the additional understanding that one way to win citizenship and its associated rights was as service as a soldier.

It is known that the earliest military diplomas were awarded under Claudius in the 50s CE,[94] and that diplomas for soldiers in Judea were awarded from at least the late 80s CE.[95] The veteran could purchase his own copy of the bronze diploma, but the original was placed in the Temple of the Deified Augustus and Minerva in Rome.[96] These facts were set out in Brink's monograph on Luke's presentation of soldiers, but no link is made to Luke 10:20.

[93] Yamazaki-Ransom 2010: 173.
[94] Brink 2014: 95-96.
[95] M. H. Gracey, "The Roman Army in Syria, Judaea and Arabia" [D.Phil. thesis, Oxford University, 1981], 247; Edward Dąbrowa, *Legio X Fretensis: A Prosopographical Study of Its Officers (I – III c. A.D.)*, Historia Einzelschriften 66 [Stuttgart: Steiner, 1993], 32-33; Werner Eck and Andreas Pangerl, "Ein Diplom für die Truppen Judäas aus dem jahr 87 und die Frage nach der Gleichförmigkeit römischer Militäradministration," SCI 31 [2012]: 53-64; Hannah Cotton, Werner Eck and Benjamin Isaac, "Titus Pomponius Bassus, Governor of Judaea and a New Military Diploma from 89/90 CE," *Israel Museum Studies in Archaeology* 2 [2003], 17-31.
[96] Graham Webster, *The Roman Imperial Army of the First and Second Centuries A.D.* [3rd ed., Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma, 1998], 143, cited in Brink 2014: 96 fn. 15.

6.3 – Luke 11:11-14 – If your child asks for a fish…

In Luke 11:11-14, after the giving of the Lord's Prayer and immediately before the Beelzebul Controversy, Jesus says on the subject of prayer:

> Is there anyone among you who, if your child asks for a fish, will give a snake instead of a fish? Or if the child asks for an egg, will give a scorpion? If you then, who are evil, know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more will the heavenly Father give the Holy Spirit to those who ask him!

Commentators are quick (and correct) to draw conclusions about Luke's theology and pneumatology from this passage, but nothing about his demonology, despite its textual position immediately before the Beelzebul Controversy. The passage is barely mentioned by Garrett,[97] Wahlen,[98] or Twelftree[99] and not at all by Klutz,[100] Witmer, or Warren,[101] despite the latter's focus on conceptual metaphors and demonology.

Wolter admits that, "of course", the pairing of the snake and the scorpion calls 10:19 to mind, but takes from the evocation only that "the Lukan version evidently wants to speak very consciously of entities that harm the child in order to increase rhetorically the persuasiveness of the example with the help of the absurdity of the rejected action."[102] In Matthew 7:9-10, the second pair is bread and a stone, rather than an egg and a scorpion.

[97] Garrett 1989: 139 n. 70.
[98] Wahlen 2004: 156 n. 70.
[99] Twelftree 2007: 140 n. 70.
[100] Klutz 2004.
[101] Warren 2012.
[102] Wolter 2017: 100.

However, as Carman has also concluded, Luke deliberately creates a juxtaposition between Jesus and Satan. He writes that when information is given about Satan, we learn more about Jesus's mission.[103] What Carman does not say is that this necessarily works in both directions; if there really is a juxtaposition, there are places when, by learning about Jesus or God, we learn something about the character or work of Satan as well.

The equivalent gift from God to the fish or the egg is the Holy Spirit – another difference to the Matthean version, which instead has ἀγαθά in 7:11.[104] The changes and placing of this passage are deliberate on Luke's part, and mirror what will be played out more explicitly in the Beelzebul controversy. Jesus states that the human father, even being evil, does not give snakes or scorpions to his children to eat. But if we take the conceptual metaphor DEMONS ARE SNAKES/SCORPIONS into account, we *have* seen throughout the gospel victims with 'snakes' and 'scorpions' inside them. Lurking in the unmapped spaces of this rhetoric is another father figure, more evil than a human one, who causes snakes and scorpions to enter human beings, and do them harm. The heavenly father gives the Holy Spirit, but this other, malevolent father gives unclean and wicked spirits.

<table>
<tr><td>Human Father</td><td>God</td><td>?</td></tr>
<tr><td>Fish</td><td rowspan="2">Holy Spirit</td><td>Snake</td></tr>
<tr><td>Egg</td><td>Scorpion</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">Children</td></tr>
</table>

The juxtaposition between God and Satan is subtly made, in preparation for the discussion that is to follow. With this comparison in mind, the accusation that Jesus is in the camp of snakes and scorpions will be even more ludicrous.

[103] Carman 2014: 221-222.
[104] See Wolter 2017: 101 on the variant πνεῦμα ἀγαθόν in some manuscripts.

6.4 – Luke 11:14-26 – The Beelzebul Controversy

6.4.1 – Introduction

The Beelzebul Controversy is crucial for any work on demonology in Luke because it provides the most detailed and explicit statements regarding the role of Satan in the Synoptic gospels, and because the primary theme of Jesus being accused of working miracles by magic or demonic help[105] is thought to date to the Early Christian knowledge of the historical Jesus – the accusation being so scandalous that the criterion of embarrassment lends it weight. For this thesis, it is important because it provides two important metaphorical mappings, illuminating how Luke understands exorcisms and their role in Jesus's mission.

First, the question of who Beelzebul is must be briefly addressed.[106] In Luke 11:15, Luke redacts the Markan Βεελζεβοὺλ ἔχει, as does Matthew (Mark 3:22; cf. Matthew 12:24). While Garrett does acknowledge that the Johannine occurrences of the phrase (John 7:20; 8:48, 49, 52; and 10:20) "indicate that Jesus is thought to be possessed,"[107] she does not include the use of ἄνθρωπος ἔχων πνεῦμα δαιμονίου ἀκαθάρτου in Luke 4:33 (and, indeed, has nothing to say on the phrase at all). The 'having' construction also appears in Acts 8:7, 16:16, and 19:13, clearly referring to possession, and its use in reference to John the Baptist in 7:33 is also far more likely to be used to indicate possession rather than magical power. There is nothing to suggest in Mark 3:22 and 3:30 that "being possessed by a demon" and "working miracles through the help of a demon" are mutually exclusive (and indeed, the uses of the construction in Mark 5:15, 7:25 and 9:17 clearly refer to possession). Kraeling's

[105] For more details on this topic, see Garrett 1989 and Twelftree: 2017.
[106] For good overviews, see DDD: Baal-ze-Bul and Humphries 1999: 13-22.
[107] Garrett 1989: 132, n.33.

statement that "In the relations of men and demons there are two basic possibilities, either a demon has a man in his possession, or a man has a demon under his control. In the first instance the demon is the master and the man his unfortunate play-thing; in the second the demon is the servant and the man a magician"[108] demonstrates an unfortunately binary conception of power, with no room for the many nuances of influence and control.

While the name Beelzebul appears in all three Synoptic gospels, it appears that Luke regards it as necessary to include it for the sake of accurate reporting, but moves on as swiftly as possible, equating Beelzebul with Satan in 11:18 – a name he is far more comfortable with. Cheyne asserted that the name Baal-zebub most likely was "... a contemptuous uneuphonic Jewish modification of the true name, which was probably Baal-zebul, 'lord of the high house' [cf. I Kgs 8:13]",[109] just as Gaston translated the name as "Lord of the Dwelling".[110] Twelftree follows this interpretation.[111]An alternative, detailed in the DDD[112] and supported by Klutz,[113] is that Baal Zebul is an Ugaritic name for the god 'Baal the Prince'.

As intolerant monolatry turned to monotheism, this foreign god was turned into a demon – the same process which explains the use of δαιμόνιον in the Septuagint, as detailed above in Chapter 3. It is probably unlikely that Luke would have been aware of this etymology, and as he clearly inherited the name from his Markan source I am reluctant to place too much analytical weight on the metaphorical meanings of the name Beelzebul. What is important is that, as well as demonstrating the continued use of LXX entailments in the demonology of

[108] Kraeling 1940: 153. "He has a demon" is an example of the conceptual metaphor HARM IS HAVING A HARMFUL POSSESSION, discussed in more depth in Chapter 5.
[109] T. K. Cheyne, "Baalzebub", *Enc Bibl* 1 (1899), 407-8, cited in W. Hermann, DDD, 155.
[110] Gaston 1962.
[111] Twelftree 1993: 106.
[112] DDD: 155.
[113] Klutz 2004: 246, n.119.

the gospels, we see that Luke considers Beelzebul to be another name for Satan, and thus explicitly names Satan as "the ruler of demons" (11:15).

It has been noted[114] that the verb πειράζω appears only twice in Luke's gospel; here, in 11:16, and in 4:2. As Fitzmyer notes, this is an editorial insertion on Luke's part, "manifest here in his use of a favourite word, *heteroi*."[115] Fitzmyer also notes that the identification of Beelzebul with Satan might have been common at the time, as occurred with the names Belial, Mastemah and Asmodeus.[116] It is quite possible, given Luke's careful use of vocabulary and rare use of πειράζω, that the conceptual blend of Satan-Beelzebul is also meant to evoke memories of the Temptation narrative. Having spent a large part of the gospel thus far detailing Jesus's demonic opponents, all easily bested, in the second half of the narrative Satan looms much larger, especially given his confidence in 22:31-33 and his apparent triumph at the crucifixion.

6.4.2 - The Ruler of Demons

In the context of the WARFARE metaphor, 11:15 is an important quotation, which explicitly names Beelzebul (and thus, Satan) as "the ruler of demons." We have now been given enough information to begin to create metaphorical mappings for Luke's conception of Satan. Given that 11:11-14 juxtaposes Satan and God via the comparison of snakes and scorpions (i.e., demons) to the Holy Spirit, a first chart would look like this:

[114] E.g. Green 1997: 453, n.9.
[115] Fitzmyer 1985: 921.
[116] Fitzmyer 1985: 921.

God	Satan
Jesus	?
Holy Spirit	Demons

However, from the Temptation narrative forwards, it has been clear that both Satan and Jesus defer in some degree to God (i.e. when Satan acknowledges that his authority over all the kingdoms of the world has been given to him), and so the true juxtaposition is between Jesus and Satan. The fact that the Temptation narrative juxtaposes Satan and Jesus while 11:11-14 juxtaposes Satan and God the Heavenly Father serves to underline the Christological point of Jesus's closeness of identity and purpose with God.[117]

God/Jesus	Satan
Holy Spirit	Demons

Now that Beelzebul/Satan is described as the ruler of demons in 11:15, we can begin to map the relationships at play by way of a KINGSHIP metaphor:

God/Jesus	**King**	Satan
Kingdom of God	**Kingdom**	?
Holy Spirit	**Servants**	Demons

In the space marked by a question mark, one would infer there to be an equivalent 'kingdom of Satan', a hypothetical confirmed by Jesus in 11:18:

God/Jesus	**King**	Satan
Kingdom of God	**Kingdom**	Kingdom of Satan
Holy Spirit	**Servants**	Demons

[117] See discussion of Isaiah 49 below.

On the question of the connection between Satan's kingdom (βασιλεία, 11:17-18) and the kingdoms of the earth which have been given to him (βασιλεῖαι, 4:6), Horsley interprets Luke's conception as a direct equation between the kingdom of Satan and the empire of Rome (understandably given that in Acts 26:18 the Gentiles are portrayed as being under τῆς ἐξουσίας τοῦ Σατανᾶ,);[118] Wright, on the other hand, "argues that Jesus was criticizing the militant nationalism of Israel by the redefining of its enemy: the real enemy is not Rome but Satan."[119] Contra Wright, Yamazaki-Ransom argues persuasively that "Wright's thesis is based on a problematic distinction between the Jewish and the Roman authorities,"[120] and deems Wright's argument that Luke 12:4-7 recommends that Satan be the object of the verb φοβέω as "unacceptable", with the very reasonable argument that nowhere else in the Bible would fear of Satan be commended as opposed to fear of God.[121] I would also add that, while not explicitly being sent to hell, Luke has already shown Satan being cast out of heaven in 10:18, and I have argued above for a primarily theological interpretation of the cause of this fall (**6.2**).

So, this particular placement lacks nuance. After his resurrection, Jesus will be able to "send" the Holy Spirit, but at this point in the gospel they both work as servants of God, and the Holy Spirit leads Jesus into the desert to be tempted. Also, the juxtaposition of God and Satan implies a dualism which would be difficult for Luke to justify. However, the political system at the time of Jesus was far more complicated than this model of kingship would allow, and offers a model which I argue would fit the relationships at play in this discussion more accurately:

[118] Horsley 1993: 160.
[119] Yamazaki-Ransom 2010: 100, referring to Wright 1996: 451-59.
[120] Yamazaki-Ransom 2010: 101.
[121] Yamazaki-Ransom 2010: 101. Wright is against the majority of commentators here, who conclude that it is only God who has the authority to cast someone into hell (e.g., Bovon 2013: 253-255; Fitzmyer 1985: 959; Green 1997: 482).

God	**Emperor**	God
Jesus[122]	**Vassal King**	Satan
Kingdom of God	**Kingdom**	Kingdom of Satan
Holy Spirit	**Servants**	Demons

There is no reason to believe that Satan is lying when he claims to have been given authority over all the kingdoms of the world, as Fitzmyer[123] and Warren[124] have suggested. After all, the text implicitly supports the claim, or it would not have been an appropriate temptation for Jesus. The general model, that the kingdom of God opposes the kingdom of Satan, and furthermore, that this opposition can be conceived of and described in terms of warfare, is accepted by the majority of scholars.[125] For example, Green writes that Jesus' reply to the accusation in 11:15 is based on a series of assumptions: " (1) that the names Beelzebul and Satan refer to the same entity, (2) the propriety of referring to Satan as the head of a kingdom, (3) the marshalling of demons under the command of Satan and in the service of his aim, and, thus (4) the unity of Satan's dominion."[126]

In general, Warren tries to undermine this model as much as possible. She writes that "although there seems to be an implication that Satan has some power, I am not convinced broad conclusions can be made. As mentioned above, there are no passages where demons clearly take orders from Satan."[127] Once again, it is worth stating that from a pastoral and theological standpoint, there are notable and noble reasons for engaging with the gospels with the goal of seeking a conceptual metaphor other than the WARFARE schema to discuss the

[122] As indicated, for example, by the penitent thief's words on the cross in 23:42 ("Jesus, remember me, when you come into your kingdom") and the words of Gabriel in 1:32-33 ("… and the Lord God will give to him the throne of his ancestor David. He will reign over the house of Jacob forever, and of his kingdom there will be no end").
[123] Fitzmyer 1985: 512.
[124] Warren 2012: 172.
[125] E.g. Boyd 1997: 181, 185, 196.
[126] Green 1997: 455.
[127] Warren 2012: 173.

Christian's relationship with evil. Nevertheless, these reasons render Warren's use of CMT piecemeal at best.

For example, she states that between Satan and demons "there is clearly some sort of a distinction made, but it is unclear; perhaps through the use of chaos-complexity theory, Satan could be likened to the 'queen bee' in the demonic 'insect colony' (as opposed to a commander-in-chief of an army)."[128] But, as I discussed above in Chapter 5, neither Luke, nor any of the other evangelists, likens Satan to a queen bee;[129] Satan is referred to here as the archon of a basilea. Furthermore, given that we discuss bees in terms of monarchy to this day, the distinction is far less conclusive than Warren appears to think. Even when consciously trying to disengage with a military or monarchic conceptual metaphor, she engages with it. If nothing else, it is a powerful confirmation of that primary tenet of CMT: ubiquity. Without using the language of CMT, Green writes, with my added emphasis:

> Incidental to the charge against Jesus but significant within the worldview assumed by the Lukan narrative is the recognition of Satan as the 'ruler of demons.' *This image presupposes that demons serve an aim other than their own, that they are deployed by their lord in the service of his purpose and as instruments of his dominion (cf. 4:5-6).* This portrait has immediate relevance for the unfolding discourse, since it implies that an offensive against demonic activity is also an offensive against Satan.[130]

[128] Warren 2012: 170-171.
[129] Or, given the time of composition, the king bee: for a history of apian terminology, see Carlson 2015, esp. Ch. 2.
[130] Green 1997: 454.

6.4.3 – The Kingdom of Satan

For Luke the kingdom of God does not come into a neutral place. It invades the kingdom of his opponent: Satan.[131]

In Chapter 4, I outlined the argument that Luke conceives of the relationship between Satan and Jesus as a conflict – however, rather than portraying this conflict as a duel between individuals, Luke portrays the relationship as a war between nations – as indeed do Matthew and Mark, but Luke adds a number of particularly martial details. The metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR is one of the most famous of CMT, and is often used in introductions to the topic.[132]

This makes Warren's task of disengaging with WARFARE language even more difficult. She argues that there is no hierarchy between Satan and demons, no kind of organisation. She writes that "Biblical scholars … often assume that Satan is a ruler with his own kingdom";[133] they make this assumption because it is clearly stated as an assumption by Jesus in three of the gospels. She says that scholarly literature "tends to overrate and overstate the power of

[131] Yamazaki-Ransom 2010: 99.
[132] The earliest application of CMT to Luke's Gospel is Kos-Schaap's "'Metaphors We Live By' im Lukasevangelium 10-20", in which Kos-Schaap briefly draws attention to a few of the major conceptual metaphors which she identifies in Chapters 10 to 20 of the Gospel. She does not mention Satan or demons, and the only metaphor which would hint at them is her categorisation of 11:34-36 and 16:8 as demonstrating *Das Gute ist Licht; das Böse ist Finsternis (*Kos-Schaap 1989: 267; Kos-Schaap demarcates conceptual metaphors using italics rather than small caps). She classes this as a 'non-religious' metaphor, a categorisation which also includes *Entzweiung ist Krieg*; or, as it has been called throughout this thesis, ARGUMENT IS WAR. Kos-Schaap identifies the use of this conceptual metaphor only four times in the ten chapters of Luke's Gospel: 11:17; 11:18; 12:51; and 12:52 (Kos-Schaap 1989: 268.). Kos-Schaap was writing before the first German translation of *Metaphors We Live By* (Lakoff and Johnson 1980), in which the translation for ARGUMENT IS WAR is ARGUMENTIEREN IST KRIEG, but the metaphor *Entzweiung ist Krieg* covers the division of families in Chapter 12, and the hypothetical division of Satan's kingdom against itself in 11:17-18. The major failing of Kos-Schaap's work is its briefness and its focus on linguistic manifestations of conceptual metaphors, without taking narrative elements into consideration. In this pericope, she also notes the appearances of the relevant conceptual metaphors: *Das Gerichtewerden der Menschen durch Gott ist das Reich Gottes*; *Das Reich Gottes ist einde Stadt/ein Land*; *Sündenlosigkeit ist Reinheit* (11:24); *Glauben ist Sehen* (11:16), and *Gott ist Herr (der Schöpfung); Menschen sind Knechte*.
[133] Warren 2012: 169.

Satan";[134] if it does so, it is only because it was so rated and stated by the writers of the New Testament. [135] "The pervasiveness of the term 'kingdom of Satan' in secondary literature is quite surprising given its few biblical references; it appears in many biblical dictionaries and commentaries".[136] The same, however, could be said of the visit of the Magi, for example, or the Magnificat; any biblical dictionary would be incomplete without at least a short discussion of each of these, and yet each only appears in one book of the New Testament.

The fact of the matter is that all three of the Synoptic gospels clearly describe Satan and demons as a kingdom, and the pervasiveness of political and military[137] language in secondary literature is 1. a reflection of the political and military language in the gospels themselves, and 2. a reflection of the strength of WARFARE as a source domain, thousands of years later. We are able, unconsciously, to categorise experiences in terms of conflict, hierarchy, and strategy, whether the target domain is an argument, politics, a court case, or personal relationships.

Adding elements from sections above, a mapping of the WARFARE metaphor now looks like this:[138]

[134] Warren 2012: 169.
[135] Warren makes no distinctions between the demonologies of different evangelists; she takes examples from across the New Testament, and then states that "the Gospels do not present a cohesive demonology" (Warren 2012: 168).
[136] Warren 2012: 171.
[137] I would argue that in the time Luke was writing, the distinction was minimal.
[138] "In giving the correspondences, or mappings, we reverse the target-source order of the conceptual metaphors to yield source-target. We adopt this convention to emphasize the point that understanding typically goes from the more concrete to the more abstract concept." – Kövecses 2010: 8-9.

Source Domain **The WARFARE Schema**	**Target Domain**
The Enemy Ruler	Satan
	Jesus
Kingdom of Satan	Kingdom of Satan
Kingdom of God	Kingdom of God
Enemy soldiers (Legion)	Demons
	Exorcism
	Possessed people
Commissioned Officers[139]	Disciples
Attack	Temptation

Now that the question of who Satan is has been resolved (the ruler of demons), and Jesus' opposition to him has been openly and publicly stated, the nature of that opposition is explored. All Synoptic accounts agree that this is done by the Parable of the Strong Man's House, but Luke's version of this parable is quite different to Matthew and Mark's. Wahlen states that "Matthew's version of the Beelzebul controversy is the clearest of the three in depicting a 'kingdom' of demons headed by Satan,"[140] and cites Matthew 12:26 and 28 in support of this. However, Matthew 12:26 and Luke 11:18 are largely in agreement,[141] and the major disagreement between Matthew 12:28 and Luke 11:20 does not regard the kingdom of God (a rare Matthean appearance, instead of the respectful replacement of 'God' with 'heaven'), but whether Jesus casts out demons by the Spirit of God (Matthew) or the Finger of God (Luke). Scholars are divided as to whether Luke preserved the original Q reading – the majority view in the past[142] – or whether he changed 'Spirit' to 'Finger', an interpretation which has since grown in popularity.[143]

[139] Based on the commissioning and return of the 72 in Chapter 10.
[140] Wahlen 2004: 126.
[141] For a source analysis of the Beelzebul Pericope, see Wahlen 2004: 179-185.
[142] E.g., E. Schweizer, et al., *Spirit of God* [London: A&C Black, 1960], 26; Norman Perrin, *Rediscovering the Teaching of Jesus* [San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1967], 63; L. Morris, *The Gospel according to St. Luke: An Introduction and Commentary* [London: InterVarsity, 1974], 198; Robert W. Wall, "The Finger of God, Deuteronomy 9:10 and Luke 11:20," *NTS* 33 [1978] 144; I. H. Marshall, *The Gospel of Luke: A Commentary on the Greek Text* [Exeter: Paternoster Press, 1978], 475; Joachim Jeremias, *Die Sprache des Lukasevangeliums* [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980], 199–202.
[143] C. S. Rodd, 'Spirit or Finger', *Expository Times* 72(5) [1961], 158; J. H. E. Hull, *The Holy Spirit in the Acts of the Apostles* [London: Lutterworth, 1967], 19; Dunn, J. D. G. (1997). *Jesus and the Spirit: a study of the religious and charismatic experience of Jesus and the first Christians as reflected in the New Testament.* Grand

6.4.5 – The Strong Man's Castle

I discussed the difference between metaphorical consistency and metaphorical coherence in Chapter 2; for now, a brief overview will suffice. Two metaphors might not be consistent, forming the same image, but they can be coherent "by virtue of being subcategories of a major category and therefore sharing a common entailment."[144] It is by virtue of being subcategories of the CONTAINER schema that the metaphors THE BODY IS A CONTAINER, THE BODY IS A HOUSE, THE BODY IS A CASTLE and THE BODY IS A CITY cohere, and share a common logical structure.

Generally, commentators agree that the parable of the strong man's castle is a description of Jesus' invasion of the kingdom of Satan, in order to rescue captives bound by disease or possession. Green is an exception to this rule; guided by the parable co-texts, he concludes that the parable is not describing the defeat of Satan, but a single exorcism. "The strong man – that is, Satan, represented by one of his demonic agents – guards his mansion and property – that is, the person demonized."[145] His reason for choosing this mapping is the metaphor of A HUMAN BODY IS A HOUSE used in verse 24. It is a very reasonable interpretation, and has the advantage of being conceptually consistent: A HUMAN BODY IS AN AULE in v. 21, and A HUMAN BODY IS AN OIKOS, the metaphor that Luke makes explicit below in 11:24-26. Denotatively, an αὐλή and an οἶκος might be considered synonyms. However, a courtyard, a cloister, and a quadrangle might be architecturally consistent, but the words have significantly different cultural connotations. The cultural connotation of αὐλή is distinctly

Rapids, Mich: W.B. Eerdmans, 46; Twelftree [1986], 389; Robert P. Menzies, The Development of Early Christian Pneumatology [Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1991], 186; Emmrich 2000: 271; Williams, D. T. (2003). 'Why the Finger?', *The Expository Times*, 115/2, 46; Wahlen 2004: 157, n.76.

[144] Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 44.

[145] Green 1997: 458.

political.[146] "While the Markan and Matthean parallels have domestic household imagery, Luke's version of the story has a strong political, militaristic imagery."[147]

The perfect passive participle καθωπλισμένος (lemma: καθοπλίζω) is a New Testament hapax legomenon, meaning "to be fully armed".[148] Its appearances in the Septuagint, save one use in Jeremiah 26:9, are restricted to the books of the Maccabees.[149] The strong man is clad in a πανοπλία, the full suit of a ὁπλίτης, i.e. shield, helmet, breast plate, greaves, sword, and lance.[150]

In Luke's reworking, has the general plot of the parable been retained? Is the story still that of a theft, albeit with a more elevated target and the additional detail of distribution to others, an Ur-Robin Hood? Or do Luke's changes instead render the parable the story of a coup, rather than a robbery?

The answer to these questions depends on details that we are not given. If the original strong man remains in his house, albeit bruised and poorer, it is a theft. If he is removed from the house, someone else must be ensconced in his place. This would be the suggestion put forward by the following parable: the demon, thrown out of its 'house', comes back with an even more wicked crew and retakes the building.

[146] On political interpretations of Jesus's exorcisms, see Theissen 2002; Hollenbach 1981; Guijarro 1997; Oakman 1988 (re-published in expanded and updated form in Chapter 10 of *Jesus and the Peasants*). Crossan (1991: 313-20) also briefly addresses this connection between oppressive political context and spirit possession and exorcism in his discussion of the Gerasene Demoniac and the Beelzebul controversy.
[147] Yamazaki-Ransom 2010: 100.
[148] Zerwick-Grosvenor 1996: 224.
[149] 2 Macc. 4:40; 15:11; 3 Macc. 5:38; 4 Macc. 3:12; 4:10; 7:11; 11:22; 13:16.
[150] BDAG, 754; LSJ:πανοπλία; cf. Herodotus 4.180; Thucydides 3.114.1; Plato, *Leges*. 7 section 796c. Appears 11 times in the LXX (2 Kings 2:21; Job 39:20; Judith 14:3; 1 Macc. 13:29 (x2); 2 Macc. 3:25; 10:30; 11:8; 15:28; Wisdom 5:17; Sirach 46:6).

If Luke's change of the οἶκος to an αὐλή in 11:21 is meant to invoke an official political or religious position,[151] rather than simply wealth, this would be the inevitable conclusion. Following this chain of logic, the strong man, ousted from his seat of power, would come back with political or military allies. He would then either retake the αὐλή from the stronger man or be defeated again. If the strong man is no longer in the house, the retaking is that much simpler, and the parable in 11:24-26 becomes an illustrative sequel. It is usually interpreted as indicating that an exorcised person needs the presence of the Holy Spirit after their successful exorcism, as the empty house – the body in which no spirit dwells – is vulnerable to future possession.

The major advantage of this COUP interpretation is its consistency. The αὐλή in 11:21, originally an οἶκος, represents the human body, as does the οἶκος in 11:24. The change is explained by Luke's preoccupation with wealth and social justice, a preoccupation which also explains the detail of distribution of the spoils (see Luke 18:22 and Acts 4:35 for the evangelist's other uses of διαδίδωμι).

However, in mapping the COUP interpretation it becomes apparent that the interpretation is lacking.

Source Domain	**Target Domain**
Strong man	Demon
Stronger man	Jesus
αὐλή	Possessed human's body
Panoply of armour	?

[151] Very common in the LXX, αὐλή is used almost exclusively of the courts of the tabernacle or the temple. In NT it primarily appears in the gospels, often referring to the high priest's court.

Green lumps the αὐλή and the strong man's belongings as the source describing the target of the victim of possession. But what happens after an exorcism? Is the demon left in its victim's body, even if it has been rendered immobile and helpless? Surely not – in every exorcism explored thus far, Luke has been careful to indicate that the demon is expelled from the container of the body, and this paradigm is supported by 11:24-26. But there is no mention at all of the stronger man being thrown out of 'the house', and the Markan and Matthean parallels indicate that this does not happen. The thief enters, wins, and escapes with the loot; he doesn't throw out the previous inhabitant or settle down himself, and he doesn't throw the strong man out and then leave the house empty.

Furthermore, in Green's interpretation, what is Jesus taking out of the victim's body, and then distributing? After all, Luke makes no mention that the strong man gives the αὐλή to a previous inhabitant, held captive in his own house, or to one of his own followers. What is the armour which Luke is so careful to mention twice, and which is indicated by his own vocabulary to make up the spoils which the stronger man distributes?

Despite being dismissed by Legasse as "difficile de souscire,"[152] I am in agreement with Grundmann's interpretation, that "die Gefässe sind die Besessenen, die durch Jesus befreit warden."[153] Specifically, the possessed person's body is the πανοπλία, not the αὐλή. It is the πανοπλία that becomes the σκῦλα; σκῦλα (plural; sing. σκῦλον) is a general word for the spoils of a victory, but specifically refers to the armour stripped off a defeated corpse. The demon believes that while he is contained within this armour, he is safe from attack. The

[152] Legasse 1962: 7, n.6.
[153] Grundmann 1959: 84.

stronger man disabuses him of this notion. The demon is expelled from the body just as the stronger man is removed by force from his armour.

While superficially *inconsistent*, the interpretation of the story as a ROBBERY is far more *coherent*. The use of the verb αἴρω suggests that the πανοπλία is removed from the house, to then be distributed as σκῦλα; Luke overwhelmingly uses the verb αἴρω to indicate something being taken away from someone (e.g. 6:29-30; 8:12, 18; 11:52; 19:24, 26; 23:18; Acts 8:33; 21:11, 36; 22:22) or taken with someone as they leave (e.g. 5:25-26; 9:3, 23; 17:31; 19:21-22; 22:36) rather than just borne or lifted (e.g. 9:18).[154]

In every healing and exorcism that he describes (excluding the summary passages), Luke is careful to note the success and the effect the miracle has on the recipient. If Green's interpretation is correct, what becomes of the αὐλή? We are not told, but we *are* told what happens to the πανοπλία and the σκῦλα; they are liberated from the strong man by the stronger man, and distributed in verse 22.

This distribution is another suggestion that the possessed person is represented by the πανοπλία and the σκῦλα, rather than the αὐλή. The belongings are distributed. The person who had been possessed is returned to their family and community, rather than being made to serve the agenda of Satan. This restorative element is important to Luke, and Green makes the important point that "interpreters of Luke must step outside the biomedical paradigm for understanding such illness episodes as the one summarized here (cf. e.g., Hahn, *Sickness and Healing*); otherwise, the intertwining of social, cosmic/spiritual, and physiological realities

[154] Possible exceptions are Luke 4:11; 9:17; 17:13; Acts 4:24; 20:9; 27:13, 17.

will be missed."[155] The spoil is distributed, to be of use – Mary Magdalene and Simon's mother-in-law are able to help the strong man's chosen recipients and followers (see §§ **5.2** and **5.7**).

Source Domain	**Target Domain**
Strong man	Demon
Stronger man	Jesus
αὐλή	Territory of the kingdom of Satan
πανοπλία / σκῦλα	Possessed human's body

The interpretation that the σκῦλα represent 'captives' of Satan is supported by the link between this passage and Isaiah 49:24-25; the allusion is most evident in the LXX version, which Luke tends to favour (emphasis added):

> μὴ λήμψεταί τις παρὰ γίγαντος σκῦλα; καὶ ἐὰν αἰχμαλωτεύσῃ τις ἀδίκως, σωθήσεται; οὕτως λέγει κύριος Ἐ**άν τις αἰχμαλωτεύσῃ γίγαντα, λήμψεται σκῦλα**· λαμβάνων δὲ παρὰ **ἰσχύοντος σωθήσεται**· ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν κρίσιν σου κρινῶ, καὶ ἐγὼ τοὺς υἱούς σου ῥύσομαι·

In the Septuagint, the word σκῦλα appears in both verse 24 and verse 25. It is crucial to remember that for most of human history, human beings were an important part of the plunder from successful warfare, and slaves a normal element of a rich person's wealth. Thus, "theft of objects" is not, from a biblical point of view, a metaphor for "liberating someone's captives". A metaphor describes one thing in terms of another, but the source domain cannot be the same thing as the target domain. "Life is a journey" is a metaphor, "a car-ride is a journey" is not.

[155] Green 1997: 452-3, n.5.

Instead, the metaphor of the parable comes by describing the sick or possessed or afflicted (relatively abstract concepts) as captives or slaves of Satan (at the time of the writing of the gospels, an everyday economic reality). They are *not* the physical captives of Satan, but their lives are trammelled as though they were. Their suffering indicates an increase in Satan's power and influence. Thus, the application of Isaiah 49:24-25 in a discussion of exorcism is a result of the metaphor POSSESSED PERSONS ARE CAPTIVES and thence EXORCISM IS RELEASE FROM CAPTIVITY.

The metaphor EXORCISM IS RELEASE FROM CAPTIVITY will be made explicit below, in 13:10-16. Furthermore, the conceptual metaphor is apparent in the fact that in Luke's gospel, Jesus states the release of captives (4:18) and exorcism (13:32) to be among the primary goals of his mission. As Edwards notes, the mission of the Servant of the Lord is to redeem Israel and to be a light to the Gentiles (Isaiah 49:6),[156] but he fails to note the further connection to Simeon's prophecy in 2:32.

The conceptual metaphor A HUMAN BODY IS A PANOPLIA is one that exists in English, in the phrase "human shield".[157] Just as the defence of a spatial territory is a fortress, defence of a body is armour. The stronger man is not only carrying away belongings, but the strong man's defences. It must be remembered that the 'spoils' which the thief carries off *include the armour which originally protected the strong man*. If the spoils are the victims of possession whom Jesus rescues, then the victims of possession *are also* the armour which protected Satan from attack.

[156] Edwards 2015: 345.
[157] See also Ross-Rivers 2018: 1-22.

When Jesus's enemy is conceived of as a single person, and his territory conceived as a single building, the enemy's captives are his armour. I argue that when Jesus's enemy is conceived of as a king, and his territory conceived of as a kingdom, it makes sense that the conceptual metaphor which enters into play is POSSESSED PERSONS ARE CAPTURED FORTRESSES. A fortress is an important line of defence for a realm, but it can be captured by the foe. That fortress can then become a symbolic victory, expanding the victor's territory (which I argued was the case for the Gerasene Demoniac), or it can become an important base for logistical support (which I argued was the case for Mary Magdalene).

Target Domain	**Source Domain 1** **The Warfare Schema**	**Source Domain 2** **The Robbery Metaphor**
Satan	The Enemy Ruler (10:19; 11:15)	The Strong Man
Jesus		A Stronger Man
	Kingdom of Satan	The palace
	Kingdom of God	
Demons	Enemy soldiers (Legion)	
Exorcism	Attack / Rescue	Theft
Possessed people	Fortresses under Satan's control	A panoply of armour
Exorcised people	Fortresses under Jesus' control	Spoils
Disciples	Commissioned Officers	
Temptation	Attack by Satan	

While Warren attempts to deny that the metaphor of kingdoms-at-war is used more often than her own cultic paradigm, she is forced to admit that this metaphor is used in this pericope, for Satan's kingdom is clearly referred to in 11:18. However, being unable to deny its existence, she attempts to dismiss its importance instead: "The two-kingdom concept is only implied in one passage, the Beelzebul controversy, and the point of this passage is that Jesus operates

with the power of the Holy Spirit, not the power of Satan."[158] In support of this statement, she writes that "Humphries notes that the emphasis is on the character of Jesus not Beelzebul; the image is not of two warring kingdoms but of a robber who has invaded the house of a strong man".[159]

Unfortunately, Warren's indiscriminate use of New Testament sources means that this quotation entirely distorts Humphries' conclusions. Humphries indeed writes that "the image presented is not of two warring kingdoms, but of a robber who invades the house of a strong man, binds him then plunders his goods," but only in reference to the Markan account (3:27). He writes also that this presentation is "in keeping with Mark's objective to identify Jesus specifically as the one possessed by the greater power of the Holy Spirit. [160]

This is almost certainly an error due to incomplete reading rather than deliberate misrepresentation of Humphries' work. Of *Luke's* account, Humphries writes that:

> The current analogy is taken from the world of social experience: The image is that of siege and conflict, warrior against warrior, kingdom against kingdom; it is an image appropriate to the context. The analogy also affirms a universal principle: The stronger man will prevail…. So if an exorcism has in fact occurred, and it is agreed that Satan cannot rise up against Satan, then the exorcism itself demonstrates that one stronger than Satan has acted … and that Satan's kingdom has been assailed by another and more powerful kingdom ("…then upon you has come the kingdom of God").[161] The analogy of the strong man confirms the truth of the proposition that Jesus (also the Q community) does not belong to Beelzebul (that is, Satan) but to the kingdom of Yahweh.[162]

[158] Warren 2012: 173.
[159] Warren 2012: 173, n.37, citing Humphries 1999: 53-54.
[160] Humphries 1999: 53.
[161] See also the Ugaritic prayer which makes a link between Baal and a strong enemy attacking, Humphries 199: 75, n.21.
[162] Humphries 1999: 35.

The point of the parable is not about whether or not Jesus can defeat demons; that has already been established. The point is the *reason behind* the exorcisms. The point of the parable is not that Jesus and a demon wrestle within a person's body – it is that the striving between them is taking place within the territory of Satan, from which Jesus is able to steal something of value – armour which formerly added to the power of Satan's kingdom, but has now been restored to help Jesus's followers. As Yamazaki-Ransom write, the words πανοπλία and σκῦλα occur "only in Luke's version of the parable. Although the main focus of the parable is Jesus' exorcism, the strong militaristic imagery suggests that Luke is consciously associating the conflict between God/Jesus and Satan with the military and political context of his narrative."[163] Commentators have been too eager to make sure that 11:21-23 is *consistent* with 11:24-26, when our focus should be on whether the mapping is *coherent*, and what that can tell us about Jesus' purpose and mission.

In support of this interpretation, Ephesians 6:10-17 contains an extended metaphor of armour and spiritual warfare which demonstrates that the WARFARE conceptual metaphor was very much alive at the time of the writing of the New Testament. The "numerous and striking" connections between Luke-Acts and Ephesians have been discussed by C. L. Mitton, who assumed a Lukan priority over a Pseudo-Pauline author of Ephesians, such as the reference to being "filled with the Holy Spirit" in Eph. 5:18 being reminiscent of references in Acts 2:4, 15.[164] Shellard, on the other hand, argues for an Ephesian priority, making the point that much of Mitton's evidence is reversible.[165] Ralph P. Martin even went so far as to argue that Luke *was* the author of Ephesians. [166] Whether there is a connection between Luke-Acts and Ephesians or not, at the very least, the appearance of the extended conceptual metaphor (with

[163] Yamazaki-Ransom 2010: 100.
[164] Mitton 1951: 198-220.
[165] Shellard 2002: 56.
[166] Martin 1968: 296-302..

an excitingly explicit example of mapping) shows that the conceptual metaphor was at work within the cultural milieu in which Luke wrote.

6.4.6 – "I will return to my house."

11:24-26 confirms the use of the conceptual metaphor THE BODY IS A HOUSE, a subset of the more general metaphor THE BODY IS A BUILDING, a subset of the more general metaphor THE BODY IS A CONTAINER. At the level of the most general metaphor, THE BODY IS A HOUSE is metaphorically coherent with the conceptual metaphor in 11:21-23.


Target Domain	**Source Domain 1 The Warfare Schema**	**Source Domain 2 The Robbery Metaphor**	**Source Domain 3 The Demon's House**
Satan	The Enemy Ruler (10:19; 11:15)	The Strong Man	
Jesus		A Stronger Man	
	Kingdom of Satan	The palace	
	Kingdom of God		
		A panoply of armour	
Demons	Enemy soldiers (Legion)		Inhabitant
Exorcism		Theft	Eviction
Possessed people		Spoils	House
Disciples			
Temptation	Attack		

6.4.7 – Summary

The conceptualisation of the body as a HOUSE does not negate the conceptual metaphor THE POSSESSED BODY IS A CAPTURED FORTRESS. The two conceptual metaphors are not *consistent*,

but they are *coherent.* Anything with the three fundamental characteristics of an interior, exterior, and a boundary between them, can be understood in terms of many different source domains, depending on the features of the target domain which the speaker or writers wishes to foreground.

Figure 10: The CONTAINER Schema



For this reason, Warren is right to discuss spatial metaphors to understand 'the Kingdom of Satan',[167] but mistakenly conceives them to be *separate* to WARFARE metaphors. The kingdom of God growing and the kingdom of Satan diminishing is both spatial *and* military;

[167] Warren 2012: 194-5.

the taking of territory is an act of aggression. In a military campaign, territory is won, lost, defended. Once again, Warren's aim might be noble, but the WARFARE metaphor is clearly at work in this passage – Jesus speaks of his exorcism in terms of violence and theft, not in terms of ritual cleansing. Furthermore, in his treatment of The Strong Man's Castle, Luke has deliberately added political and martial vocabulary to his source to foreground the WARFARE metaphor.

6.5 – Luke 13:10-16 – Woman crippled for 18 years

In this passage, unique to Luke (but bearing several similarities to Mark 3:1-6), Jesus heals a woman on the sabbath, prompting objections from the leader of the synagogue in which the miracle is set. As well as including the on-going conflict between Jesus and established religious leaders that will come to a climax in Jerusalem, and showcasing Luke's particular concern for women, this passage also makes the role of Satan explicit in the woman's illness. In doing so, Luke explicitly equates demonic oppression with captivity, and thus exorcism with rescue.

6.5.1 – Metonymy and Satan's Responsibility

The healing is performed by the laying on of hands in verse 13. As the CMT tenet of embodiment would suggest, the source domain of the human hand is a particularly rich one; Kövecses and Szabcón list several metonymies (THE HAND STANDS FOR THE ACTIVITY; THE HAND STANDS FOR THE PERSON; THE HAND STANDS FOR THE SKILL; THE HAND STANDS FOR CONTROL) and metaphors (FREEDOM TO ACT IS HAVING THE HANDS FREE; CONTROL IS

HOLDING SOMETHING IN THE HAND; POSSESSING SOMETHING IS HOLDING SOMETHING IN THE HAND; ATTENTION IS HOLDING SOMETHING IN THE HAND).[168]

In the case of 13:13, the most likely conceptual metonymy (that is, "[the use of] one entity to refer to another that is related to it")[169] in play is THE HAND STANDS FOR CONTROL. The moment of Jesus's laying on of hands is the moment of the woman's healing: καὶ παραχρῆμα ἀνωρθώθη, "and immediately she was restored". We have seen this metonymy in play in Luke 4:40 and above in §6.4.4 on Luke 11:20. A metonymy is the use of one entity to refer to another that is related to it – for example, in the sentence "The *ham sandwich* is waiting for his check," the phrase 'ham sandwich' is being used to refer to a person who ordered a ham sandwich.[170]

> Metonymy is distinguished from metaphor in such a way that metonymy is characterized as typically involving one conceptual domain, rather than two distinct ones (as is the case for metaphor). Furthermore, metonymy involves a 'stand for' conceptual relationship between two entities (within a single domain), while metaphor involves an 'is or 'is understood as' relationship between two conceptual domains, such as anger and fire.[171]

Different metonymies have different entailments. The metonymies THE PART STANDS FOR THE WHOLE and THE HAND STANDS FOR THE ACTIVITY strengthen the mental connection between Jesus and God in 11:20, for example. In this passage, however, there is another metonymy, with a very different entailment.

[168] Kövecses-Szabcó 1996: 337.
[169] Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 35.
[170] Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 35.
[171] Kövecses-Szabcó 1996: 338.

Warren writes that "the Gospels do not present a cohesive demonology";[172] quite apart from the methodological question of expecting cohesion between different works written by different authors with different theological priorities, when it comes to Luke-Acts, her example of a lack of cohesion in demonology comes in what she terms the "overlap" between Satan and demons:

> … in Acts 10:38, Jesus is described as healing those afflicted by the devil, whereas the Gospel accounts describe people as afflicted by demons, implying overlap between the devil and demons; and the woman healed on the Sabbath is crippled by a 'spirit' and bound by 'Satan' (Luke 13:11,16).[173]

Rather than being an "inconsistency", this is another example of metonymy: CONTROLLER FOR CONTROLLED. As Lakoff and Johnson write:

Nixon himself may not have dropped the bombs on Hanoi, but via the CONTROLLER FOR CONTROLLED metonymy we not only say 'Nixon bombed Hanoi' but also think of him as doing the bombing and hold him responsible for it. Again this is possible because of the nature of the metonymic relationship in the CONTROLLER FOR CONTROLLED metonymy, where responsibility is what is focused upon.[174]

The result is that the significance of an exorcism has shifted in the second half of the gospel. In the exorcisms discussed in Chapter 5, the element which every exorcism narrative highlighted was the power and authority of Jesus. However, as the setting of the gospel shifts from Galilee to Jerusalem, every exorcism is inextricably linked with Satan. In 10:17-20

[172] Warren 2012: 168.
[173] Warren 2012: 168.
[174] Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 39.

Jesus responds to the disciples' excited accounts of successful exorcisms with a pointed reference to Satan; in 11:14-26, the casting out of a mute demon leads to a discussion of the kingdom of Satan and a parable which shows Jesus's exorcisms in the context of a political, military struggle.

The same holds true for this pericope. A crippling spirit[175] had caused the woman's pain, but Jesus is able to say "whom Satan bound" because her victimisation was on Satan's orders and part of his overall strategy.

6.5.2 – EXORCISM IS RELEASE FROM CAPTIVITY

Upright posture was one of the defining features of humanity in Jewish thought,[176] and the ability to look up intrinsically connected with prayer (see Luke 9:16). "The woman was thus deprived of a part of her humanity and the possibility of contact with the divine."[177] It also recalls the UP-DOWN schema, discussed above in Section 4.2.3; once again, the downwards direction is associated with Satan, and the healing given by Jesus allows the woman to face upwards again. However, while this indicates coherence with the UP-DOWN schema in play throughout Luke's gospel, the primary conceptual metaphor at work is EXORCISM IS RELEASE FROM CAPTIVITY. Until now, this particular metaphor for exorcism has only been hinted at, most obviously by Jesus's statement in 4:18. The story takes place in a synagogue, just as Jesus was when he proclaimed his mission "to set captives free" in 4:18. This is the last time Jesus appears in a synagogue in the narrative (though they will be mentioned in 20:46 and

[175] A spirit that had crippled her: physical symptom of spiritual affliction; cf. illness discussion in §5.10.1 and Klutz 2010: 126.
[176] See *Gen. Rab*. 8.11 on Genesis 1:27, further supported by Symmachus's rendering of the verse.
[177] Bovon 2013: 285.

21:12). The metaphor was further evoked by the similarity of 11:21-23 to Isaiah 49:24-25 (see §6.4.5).

A notable feature of this pericope is not that the illness is conceived of as the work of a demon – as I have stated above, especially in Chapter 5, the strict separation of 'healing' and 'exorcism' as concepts is reductionistic[178] – but that Luke 13:10-16 represents a very rare use of the external model of possession, as opposed to the more usual CONTAINER model. There is no mention of the demon or the illness leaving the woman, or being cast out. Instead, the description of Satan's influence being a δεσμός, the parallel between the woman and the ox or donkey tied to the manger, and the vocabulary of tying and untying, all point to the external conception of possession which I discussed in §4.3.1. The external model of possession, in which a spirit is said to loom over a human being, to wrap around them, to strangle them, or to bind or clothe them, is more common in Akkadian and Hebrew sources (see e.g. 1 Samuel 16:14, 18:10; 19:9), and Luke uses the COVERING paradigm of spiritual influence more often in passages with clear Septuagintal inspiration. The use of the COVERING metaphor of possession in this pericope is explained by its origin in L-source material; cf. Luke's description of the Holy Spirit 'overshadowing' Mary in Luke 1:35.

The verb ἀπολύω appears 68 times in the New Testament, usually with one of four meanings: (1) to send away, (2) to divorce, (3) to forgive or (4) to release. The statement that Satan ἔδησεν ("bound") the woman, and that she has been λυθῆναι ἀπὸ τοῦ δεσμοῦ τούτου "released from this bond/chain" indicates that we must read the instance of ἀπολύω with the fourth interpretation, but it is worth noting that the conceptual metaphor EXORCISM IS DIVORCE existed in the surrounding Semitic milieu. For example, the adjurations in some

[178] See especially Section 5.10 above.

Aramaic incantation bowls take the form of a *gēt*, a legal divorce writ, against the demons (usually Lilith). The bowls include the normal Jewish opening for such a document, with reference to a rabbi to oversee the procedure, and the "adulterous wife" Lilith is forbidden to re-enter the marital home, as with a human divorce.[179] Furthermore, Stol discusses a Babylonian cure for epilepsy in which the disease was represented by a clay puppet, anointed in oil and dressed in wedding clothes. A piglet was then selected as a replacement wife, and offerings made to Šamaš, the sun-god who also oversaw oaths. The patient was instructed to "sever his (garment's) hem (by cutting it) from the puppet of the disease(s), three times." Finally the sick person says the prayer, including the phrase, "Any Evil to which I have been married in your presence: investigate my case and his case and [remove it] from my body. O Šamaš, in your presence I made him take in marriage (*aḫāzu*) a piglet…"[180] The ambiguous instruction to sever a tie between the patient and the puppet is likely to represent divorce.

Having said this, it is clear that the source domain in question is that of captivity, rather than marriage and divorce. Due to the juxtaposition of Satan and Jesus which this chapter has argued for, this source domain results in foregrounding the salvific nature of Jesus' mission. "The passive voice of [the word ἀπολέλυσαι] attributes the action to God. This pronouncement is therefore christologically significant, for in making it, Jesus presumes to stand in the place of God."[181]

Another major argument of this thesis is that Luke has a metaphorically coherent conception of demonology. As I outlined in §**6.3.6** above, consistency across metaphors is rare, while coherency is not. Human beings use different metaphors to foreground particular entailments,

[179] Geller 1995: 49. See also Shaked 1999: 175-195.
[180] Stol 1993: 99.
[181] Edwards 2015: 395.

depending on the context. In 11:21-23, exorcism was metaphorically conceived of as theft from a strong man's house. I argued that the possessed people were represented in the allegory by the strong man's armour. In this pericope, however, exorcism is metaphorically conceived of as the rescue of a captive.

This conception of exorcism is coherent with that detailed in 11:21-23. The source domains of the conceptual metaphors A POSSESSED PERSON IS A CAPTIVE and A POSSESSED PERSON IS A SUIT OF ARMOUR share two major entailments: both source domains reference a CONTAINER (with the understanding that we conceptualise the human body as a container for food, thoughts, the soul, feelings, etc.), and both source domains offer a tactical advantage to their possessor. The reason that different metaphors are used is to foreground different entailments. In this passage, the entailment which Luke seeks to highlight is not the tactical advantage that exorcism gives to the kingdom of God, but the salvation which the kingdom offers to those who have been under Satan's power.

6.6 – Luke 13:32 – Behold, I cast out demons

Upon being told by some Pharisees that Herod wants him dead, in Luke 13:32 Jesus says "Go and tell that fox, Behold, I cast out demons and I perform healings today, and tomorrow, and on the third day I will finish." Examined through the lens of this thesis, this verse has three major themes which are noteworthy.

The first point of this statement is the centrality of exorcisms to Jesus' missions. The connection between exorcisms, opposition to Satan, and the Kingdom of God has recently been made explicit in the Beelzebul Controversy, and now Jesus places exorcism at the

forefront of his mission. Second, Garrett states that "… a connection between Jesus' death and his earthly power to heal and exorcise seems to be implied by Jesus' enigmatic response to Herod in 13:32, where Jesus' acts of healing and exorcism and his 'perfection' or 'completion' on the third day are somehow linked."[182] Third, there is a link between exorcisms and earthly political conflict, as well as between exorcism and the spiritual conflict discussed above. Just as "Jesus argues that the good order as perceived by the authorities actually oppresses people who suffer and thereby support the domination of Satan (13:10-17) … Jesus's power to heal and to exorcise is put in direct confrontation with Herod the political ruler of Galilee (13:32);"[183] this point supports that of Yamazaki-Ransom, that "the cosmic conflict is closely tied to the social, political, and economic realities of the world."[184]

The word ἀλώπηξ appears only two other times in the New Testament, in the statement that "Foxes have holes, and swallows have nests" in Matthew 8:20 and Luke 9:58. In the Septuagint, apart from the story in Judges 15:4 where Samson ties burning torches to the tails of three hundred foxes, and their panicked flight destroys the food supplies of the Philistines, three major entailments arise: 1. foxes are scavengers (Song of Songs 2:15; LXX Psalm 62:11); 2. they signify what is small or insignificant (2 Esdr 13:35/Neh 3:35); and 3. They live in desolate or ruined places (Judges 1:35;[185] 3 Kings 21:10;[186] Lamentations 5:18; Ezekiel 13:4). Various meanings of the fox metaphor are used by commentators: Herod is a fox because he is crafty, in accordance with general Hellenistic thinking; [187] Herod is a fox because he is malicious;[188] Herod is a fox because he is weak or insignificant.[189]

[182] Garrett 1989: 46.
[183] Moxnes 2001: 205.
[184] Yamazaki-Ransom 2010: 102.
[185] Only in the LXX, arising from a misinterpretation of the place name Shaalbim.
[186] Another mistranslation, this time of the Hebrew שְׁעָל 'handful' in MT 1 Kings 20:10.
[187] Fitzmyer 1985: 1030; Wolter 2017: 201-2, with the qualification that the characterization is intended to be ironic, because of his lack of insight into God's plan.
[188] Darr1992: 144; Green 1997: 536.
[189] Bluth 1993; Green 1997: 536.

However, the third entailment (Foxes live in desolate, uninhabited places) receives minimal attention by scholars; because of course, Herod is in Jerusalem, and Jerusalem is certainly not a wild, uninhabited place. However, Jesus (or Luke's source) selected the fox as a source domain to describe Herod immediately before making a proclamation about Jerusalem. Furthermore, as I will discuss below, in 19:41f, Jesus weeps over Jerusalem, saying, "they will not leave one stone upon another within you, because you did not know the time of your visitation."[190] If HEROD IS A FOX, and a major Septuagintal entailment of foxes is that they are denizens of desolate places, it is possible that there is an implicit metaphor here that JERUSALEM IS A DESOLATE PLACE. By calling Herod a fox, could it be possible that this too hints at a prophecy of Jerusalem's coming destruction?

There is another possibility. As I discussed in Chapter 3, another entailment of δαιμόνιον in the Septuagint is that they inhabit desolate, wild places (i.e. Isaiah 13:21; 34:14); this is an entailment which I have argued survives to New Testament times (see Revelation 18:2). If the metaphor JERUSALEM IS A DESOLATE PLACE is being intentionally evoked in the same verse that Jesus states that his mission is to cast demons, Luke could be implying that Jerusalem is demonic territory, just as the wild places are in the Septuagint. After all, in Luke's gospel, Satan only directly acts in two places: in the desert, and in Jerusalem.

[190] See also 23:28-31.

6.7 – Luke 14:31-33 – The Cost of Discipleship

Throughout this thesis, I have argued that Luke makes extensive use of the WARFARE metaphor for describing the relationship between Satan and Jesus; essentially, that he conceptualises Satan and Jesus as two kings at war, with Jesus invading the territory of Satan. This model was exemplified in the Parable of the Strong Man, in 11:21-22, where Luke takes a story of a man being robbed and adds certain political and military elements to reconceptualise Jesus's exorcisms as the taking of defences, rather than the theft of valuables.

If the arguments put forward in this thesis are correct, it would be likely that other elements of Luke's worldview would also be conceptualised in accordance with the WARFARE source domain. In modern Western culture, love, sports, politics and the law can all be conceptualised using the WARFARE source domain,[191] just as both the target domains of life and love can be described in terms of a journey. We are more likely to use metaphors from certain source domains which are deeply encoded in our cultural awareness (possibly why Luke so often uses dinner parties as the settings for his parables).[192]

In 14:31-33, Luke writes of Jesus as describing the preparations one must make before becoming one of his disciples, particularly the emotional preparations of putting that discipleship before their families and their lives, in terms of a king preparing for a battle. He sits down and counts the numbers of his own soldiers and the reports of his enemy's before making a move, either to attack or negotiate. Luke is clearly comfortable with using this

[191] Aikin 2011; Ross-Rivers 2018.

[192] On the role of contextual factors influencing metaphorical conceptualisations, see Kövecses 2015, especially Chapters 4, 8, and 10. Research has in the past prioritised cultural history as a cognitive influence (e.g., Kövecses 2005; Schmidt, Goran & Brdar: 2012: 271–292; Marcin 2017), but a recent study has focused on social factors instead, and particularly highlights the influence of education and reading habits on metaphor selection: Benczes-Ságvári 2018. See also Deignan, 2008: 289-92.

political and military source domain to describe the costs of discipleship, which makes it all the more likely that WARFARE is a source domain by which he would understand the conflict between Jesus and Satan.

6.8 – Luke 19:43 – Siege Warfare

As a corollary to the use of the WARFARE source domain in 14:31-33, Luke's vocabulary in 19:43 indicates a familiarity with not only the WARFARE source domain, but also with the specific sub-domain of SIEGE WARFARE.

Throughout Chapter 5, I discussed the intersection of the WARFARE metaphor of demonic activity and the CONTAINER model of possession. As further discussed above in §6.4, Jesus makes it clear that his exorcisms constitute first an invasion of the territory of Satan, and second, a theft of his defences. In 11:21-22, these defences were a panoply of armour, but throughout the exorcisms in Chapter 5, I argued that the conceptual metaphor POSSESSED BODIES ARE CAPTURED FORTRESSES was more applicable. In this metaphor, human bodies are at the most fundamental level CONTAINERS, and at a more specific level, BUILDINGS. They are buildings which have been captured and occupied by hostile soldiers – indicated by the name of Legion given in Luke 8:30 – and mark the expansive territory of Satan, to whom these demons answer (11:15-18). The conceptual metaphor POSSESSED BODIES ARE CAPTURED FORTRESSES is coherent with the conceptual metaphor for which I argued in §6.4, POSSESSED BODIES ARE ARMOUR. The major entailment is that of *defence*, which is why it is the panoply of armour and not the palace which correspond to the victims of possession in 11:21-22. It is this entailment which prompts Luke to remove enforced self-harm as a symptom of possession, for what soldier would sabotage their own walls or weaken their own armour?

In support for the presence of the conceptual metaphor POSSESSED BODIES ARE CAPTURED FORTRESSES in Luke's gospel, I cite his familiarity with the source domain of siege warfare. In 19:43, Luke includes three NT hapax legomena: παρεμβαλοῦσιν ("they will construct"); χάρακά "a fence"; and περικυκλώσουσίν ("they will surround"). The lemma παρεμβάλλω is used some two hundred times in the LXX; χάραξ sixteen times; and περικυκλόω sixteen times.

The fact that this L material is unique, and speaks about sieges in such technical vocabulary, lends support to the conceptual metaphors previously discussed that POSSESSED BODIES ARE CAPTURED FORTRESSES and AN EXORCISM IS A SIEGE. Even though the target domains that are the focus of this thesis – Satan, demons, possession, exorcism – are not discussed in this verse, the fact that the source domain of siege warfare is one which Luke pays particular attention to supports the arguments detailed above. We can be confident of that fact that Luke's literary education would have focused on the most famous siege story in Western history in the form of Homer's *Iliad*, and the siege fall of Jerusalem is evidently a topic that looms large in his mind. These cultural contexts would form part of the worldview which provided Luke with the source domains from which to draw conceptual metaphors.

6.9 – Judas Iscariot

6.9.1 – Luke 22:3 – Satan entered the heart of Judas

There are no more exorcisms in the gospel of Luke. Instead, the beginning of the Passion Narrative is marked by the approach of Passover, and the entry of Satan into Judas in 22:3.

This, according to Conzelmann, is the return of Satan at "the appropriate time" which was alluded to in 4:3.[193] The verse also prompts discussions of free will: to what extent is Judas responsible for the betrayal? Brown is an example of a scholar who argues that the treachery is a result of Judas's free-will,[194] though I would argue that his point that Satan is the "heavenly counterpart" of the "earthly reality" of money which enticed Judas could benefit from more neutral language.[195] On the other hand are scholars like Crump[196] and Hull, the latter of whom argues that the realist stance towards magic and demonology in Luke-Acts means that we must take 22:3 as it reads: that Satan possessed Judas, who consequently betrayed Jesus.[197]

Without diving too deeply into philosophical discussions outside the scope of this thesis, the question as to Judas' responsibility is too often conflated with a distinct issue: whether *Luke considered* Judas to be responsible for the betrayal. The answer to this question is far more apparent: as I mention below in §6.8.2, unlike in Matthew, Luke does not portray Judas as repenting, and I will also discuss below the import of the manner of Judas's death, reported in Acts 1:18. Apart from this, Brown cites Judas's bargaining in verse 4, and his explicit consent in verse 6 (ἐξωμολόγησεν).[198]

As I wrote in §5.9 and §6.2, the major mapping of the WARFARE metaphor when it comes to the disciples is that of COMMISSIONED OFFICERS. This foregrounds the disciples' authority, power, and allegiance. However, here the important element which Luke seeks to foreground is not the establishment of the church, but of the approaching confrontation between Jesus

[193] Conzelmann 1969: 80.
[194] Brown 1969: 82-97.
[195] Brown 1969: 82.
[196] Crump 1992: 162-5.
[197] Hull 1974: 96.
[198] Brown 1969: 92.

and Satan. Thus, it is not the metaphor DISCIPLES ARE COMMISSIONED OFFICERS by which one best understands this verse, but the metaphor A POSSESSED BODY IS A CAPTURED FORTRESS, which I discussed at length in §5.7, §5.8, and §5.10, regarding Mary Magdalene, the Gerasene Demoniac, and the So-called Epileptic Boy.

This conceptual metaphor does not foreground the motives and interiority of Judas, but rather the strategy of Satan. By 'capturing a fortress with Jesus' territory', i.e., from among his own disciples, Satan thinks that he has created a fatal weakness.[199] This interpretation is supported by the fact that Satan apparently has the confidence in his own position that he demands to sift the disciples like wheat in 22:31, as I will discuss below in **§6.10.** Jesus himself seems to confirm that their position has been weakened in 22:35-38. Having sent out his disciples without purse or bag or sandals, they lacked nothing, but now they must take up these belongings, and sell their cloaks in order to buy swords.

6.9.2 – Acts 1:18 – The Death of Judas

Unlike in the gospel of Matthew (27:3-5), Judas shows no remorse. Instead, in Acts 1:18 Luke tells the reader that Judas used the proceeds of the betrayal to buy a field, where πρηνὴς γενόμενος ἐλάκησεν μέσος καὶ ἐξεχύθη πάντα τὰ σπλάγχνα αὐτοῦ ("he became prone and he burst open in the middle, and all his bowels were poured out").

There are two elements of this demise. The first is the fall from high to low, in line with the VERTICALITY schema. The second is the reversal of the CONTAINER schema; what is inward

[199] See also Green 1995: 66.

passes through its containing boundary and becomes outward. One conceptual metaphor is strictly adhered to: UP-DOWN as corresponding to both ALIVE-DEAD, and from the narrative context, MORALLY GOOD-MORALLY BAD. In the Temptation narrative, Jesus was invited to gather food from the ground, to fall to his knees, and to fall from the Temple; instead, Jesus saw Satan fall from Heaven in Luke 10:18. The other is gruesomely contrary to the conceptual expectation; the image of one's middle bursting, and guts pouring out onto the ground is a visceral inversion of what should be.

A less graphic but equally pointed echo of this death appears twice, in Acts 5. Ananias and Sapphira hold on to some of their money rather than donating it all to the church, and in verse 3, Peter asks, "Why has Satan filled your heart, that you lied to the Holy Spirit, and kept some back from the value of the land?" In verse 5, Ananias falls down (πεσὼν) and dies (ἐξέψυξεν). In verse 9, Peter asks Ananias' wife Sapphira, "Why did you agree to test (πειράσαι) the Spirit of the Lord?" and in response, in verse 10, she immediately fell down (ἔπεσεν) at Peter's feet and died (ἐξέψυξεν). The verb ἐκψύχω, rare in the LXX but more common in Classical Greek, is used in the New Testament only here and in Acts 12:28, describing the death of Herod. It characterises death as the ψυχή leaving the body – less messy than having one's σπλάγχνα exit the body, but just as fatal.[200]

[200] As I wrote above in Section 4.4.1, much of the conceptual metaphorical analysis which I have applied to πνεῦμα can also be applied to ψυχή; both are used to translate both *ruah* and *nefesh* in the Septuagint. Both πνεῦμα and ψυχή are of PIE origin: πνεῦμα comes from the root pneu-, 'to breathe,' (Pokorny 1959: 838-839) and ψυχή from the root bhes-, meaning 'to blow,' (Pokorny 1959: 146) evidenced by the Greek verb ψύχω, 'I breathe'. Inspiration, expiration, aspiration – in English and in Latin as in Greek, the air, the wind, the breath are all at a most fundamental level, conceptual and linguistic, the metaphors by which we understand the abstract ideas of those invisible things whose effects we see and feel: intellect, determination, life. SPIRIT IS BREATH. Just like SIN IS A WEIGHT,this is another example of an embodiment metaphor. This particular polysemy, labelled "probably the most significant" of all nouns associated with 'breath' by linguist Alexandre François, is born of a metaphor that is universally obvious: 'namely, that the phenomenon of breathing is the most salient property that distinguishes a live creature from a dead body.'" (François 2008: 187).

The contrast cannot be overstated. The results of 'being filled with the Holy Spirit' are myriad: courage, prophecy, eloquence, xenoglossia, protection. The result of allowing Satan to fill one's body instead is utter ruination: ruination that is just, as indicated by the application of the VERTICALITY schema, and complete, as indicated by the CONTAINER schema. Satan lacks the will or power to save those who he uses for his machinations.

Garrett refers to the authority and protection offered by Jesus in 10:19 are "to be used during an onslaught of 'the Enemy' that is yet to come." Paul's defeat of Bar Jesus in Acts 13 and "the exposure and punishment of Ananias and Sapphira, who were similarly agents of Satan" are cited as examples of this 'onslaught', but she makes no connection between the deaths of Ananias and Sapphira and the death of Judas.[201]

This underlines one of the major arguments of this thesis: that engaging with the text conceptually, as well as linguistically, creates new connections and interpretations. As Klutz has written regarding the application of sociostylistics to the exorcism stories in Luke:

> In addition … to foregrounding the authority of Jesus over the demonic realm, the Lucan stories of exorcism participate in macrostructural schemes that cut across the two volumes of Luke-Acts and help to tie the whole complex narrative together … By also forming a layer of discursive structure on top of that found in any one of the stories on its own, these correspondences foreground the extra meanings they create, which in turn shed light on the situation in which they were first produced.[202]

[201] Garrett 1989: 50.
[202] Klutz 2004: 230. He also cites Halliday 1978: 150 in Klutz 2004: 231 n.75: "We shall not find the entire context of situation in a text neatly laid out before us by a single sentence. It is only by considering the text as a whole that we can see how it springs from its environment and is determined by the specific features of that environment."

6.10 – Luke 22:31-33 – Satan has demanded to sift you like wheat

After his successful breach of Jesus's 'camp' in 22:3, Satan apparently grows in confidence; by 22:31, he makes a demand (ἐξῃτήσατο, from ἐξαιτέω). This NT hapax legomenon was interpreted by Stählin to mean 'to demand the surrender of' the disciples (cf. Josephus, *Antiquities* 5.2, 9.152).[203] Is this the demand of a military enemy who perceives he is in a strong position from which to negotiate? It is possible that Luke is still operating within the WARFARE metaphor. After all, in Book 5 of *Jewish War*, Josephus describes his own attempts to negotiate with the rebels in the Siege of Jerusalem.

It is a possibility, but it seems more likely that "a heavenly scene is … presupposed",[204] that Satan is acting as a prosecutor or courtier, "a heavenly official".[205] That Satan (or a differently named figure with a similar function) was exercising a divinely appointed authority appears most famously in Job 1:6-12 and 2:1-6,[206] but also in *Apocalypse of Abraham* 13:9-13, 23:11-13 (on Azazel); *Testament of Job* 8:1-3; 16:2, 4; 20:1; *Jubilees* 10:7-9 (Mastema).[207]

The 'sieving' that Satan has in mind for the disciples is one of two things. The most obvious meaning is that Satan wishes to test the disciples, in a πειρασμός similar to the one which Jesus was made to undertake.[208] Green specifies that "Satan is not only the accuser, as though his only aim were to detect faithlessness; rather, he inspires faithlessness. He is the

[203] H. Stählin *TDNT* 1.194, cited in Fitzmyer 1985: 1424.
[204] Wolter 2017: 474.
[205] Green 1997: 772.
[206] Wolter 2017: 474; Fitzmyer 1985: 1424; Green 1997: 772; Edwards 2015: 637.
[207] Garrett 1989: 129 n.13.
[208] Wolter 2017: 474; Crump 1992: 154-55.

one who supplies occasions for failure, who is active in resisting God's plan and God's people."[209] Edwards suggests that the image of sifting is less a reference to John the Baptist in 3:17 as it is to Amos 9:9: "'I will shake the house of Israel among all the nations as grain is shaken in a sieve, and not a pebble will reach the ground.' As this verse states, and as v. 31 implies, the purpose of 'sifting' is not refinement but of 'utterly destroying the faith of the apostles.'"[210]

If this is the case, that a royal court in which Satan acts as prosecutor and God as Judge is being referred to, then this conceptualisation is not consistent with the WARFARE metaphor by which Luke generally describes Satan. However, while not consistent, it is not *incoherent.* As I discussed in **§**4.2.2, the conceptual metaphor A LEGAL TRIAL IS A BATTLE can be found in literature pre-dating the gospels, such as in Cicero's *Divinatio in Caecilium* 62 and *In Verrem* 1.1.15.[211] It is a variation on the famous conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR, in which intellectual, spiritual, or ideological conflicts are characterised in terms of physical violence. The two metaphors are coherent, as both contain the entailment of conflict. The difference lies in the entailment of *authority*; in a courtroom, Satan is presumably making his demand of a higher authority (GOD IS A JUDGE), while if on a battlefield, Satan is making a demand from a position of assumed advantage, which confers authority.

If the former is correct, and the reader is meant to understand the context of Satan's demand as being in the context of a heavenly court, the questioning of Job's integrity by Satan is not the only scene which this passage calls to mind. In LXX Esther 3:2, Haman makes Mordecai his enemy when Mordecai οὐ προσεκύνει αὐτῷ, did not make *proskynesis* to him (cf. Luke

[209] Green 1997: 772.
[210] Edwards 2015: 637, quoting Bengel's *Gnomon* 2:199.
[211] For discussion of military metaphors in modern legal practice, see Watson 1995 and Thornburg 1995.

4:6). This takes place ἐν τῇ αὐλῇ (cf. Luke 11:21). However, Mordecai's cousin Esther has recently replaced Vashti as queen, and pleads before her husband the king to put a stop to Haman's genocidal plans. In 7:4 she calls Haman ὁ διάβολος (cf. e.g. Luke 4:2-13), and in 7:6 he is ἄνθρωπος ἐχθρὸς (cf. Luke 10:19). The king is convinced, and Haman is hanged. Unable to contravene a royal decree, Esther and Mordecai are granted the king's authority to issue another command, in which the Jews are given permission to defend themselves, and to act as they wished against their enemies (cf. Jesus' command to his disciples to take up swords in 22:36).

Despite Balch's attempts to make a connection between the xenoglossia of the apostles at Pentecost and the multiple languages into which King Ahasuerus' decrees are translated,[212] there is no overt link between Luke-Acts and the Book of Esther. But there does not need to be. The Book of Esther confirms the existence of a narrative trope, of the hostile and untrustworthy servant of a king, and the celebration of Purim would guarantee that it was a trope well-known in Jewish culture. As Josephus writes in *Antiquities of the Jews* Book 11 Chapter 6 Section 13, using the Greek text with its additions, Purim was celebrated was Palestine at the time of Jesus and the evangelists; a child in Britain does not need to have read the gospel of Luke to know the basics of the nativity story. The concept of a disloyal courtier is present both in Jewish literature and in history – Caligula was assassinated by his own guards and courtiers in 41 CE, and after the death of Claudius in 54 CE Josephus reports rumours that he was poisoned (*Antiquities of the Jews* 19:67; 20:148).

The additional Greek sections of the text not found in the Hebrew version provide even richer soil for any comparison between Satan and Haman. Mordecai dreams of he and Haman

[212] Balch 1998: 46; Balch 2015: 155.

fighting as two dragons. Throughout the text Mordecai is 'the Jew', and in Hebrew, Haman is a descendant of Agag, king of the Amalekites, the descendants of Esau and enemies of the Israelites in the battles for Canaan (although in Addition E, of the Greek Text, Haman is instead a Macedonian). They are representatives of two people, two kingdoms, who come into conflict in the court of a great king, in whose empire their respective ancestral homes lie. When Haman is disgraced, he is dismissed as "a Macedonian who was in truth a foreigner to the blood of the Persians and quite devoid of our kindness."[213]

Using the Book of Esther, a paradigm emerges in which Satan does have authority over all the kingdoms of the earth, gifted to him by God; in which he has the confidence to demand that he be allowed to 'sift' the disciples; in which he has a 'kingdom', a realm of authority, and people who are loyal to him and to his cause. The image of Satan as a servant in the heavenly court allows all these things without stepping into dualism, and without impugning the monotheism of Judaism or early Christianity.

Artaxerxes (in the Greek text, rather than Ahasuerus) sends out a letter to his entire empire (Addition E), verses 2 to 6 of which read:

> Many people, who are frequently honored with the greatest kindness of their benefactors, become the more ambitious and not only seek to harm those subject to us, but not being able to deal with prosperity, they even undertake to scheme against their own benefactors. They do not only abolish gratitude from among people, but also, carried away by the boasts of those who are inexperienced in goodness, they even presume to escape the evil-hating divine justice, who always observes everything. Furthermore, many times encouragement has implicated many of those appointed to places of authority, those entrusted to administer the affairs of friends, making them partly responsible for the shedding of innocent blood, and has brought about

[213] Addition E of the Old Greek, as translated by Karen Jobes.

> irremediable calamities by the malicious lie of an evil disposition of people who misconstrue the sincere goodwill of their sovereigns.

Conceptual metaphor theory operates under the rule that the concrete is used to explain the more abstract. It is completely understandable that Luke would favour the WARFARE metaphor over discussions about the machinations between Satan and Jesus in a heavenly court, because in many cases those machinations *would themselves* be spoken of using WARFARE metaphors. Two dragons added to Greek text as metaphor for the conflict between Haman and Mordechai – even though it was Esther who, at the risk to her own life, saved the Jewish people. But the metaphor of the two dragons would not work in the gospel of Luke, because it would obscure the roles of demons and disciples as the respective officers or soldiers of Satan and Jesus.

I have not stated in this thesis that the WARRING NATIONS metaphor is the only metaphor which Luke employs to discuss Satan and demons, or that every entailment of the metaphor corresponds perfectly to an element of Luke's worldview, only that it is the primary one. As Kövecses writes:

> It was claimed that conceptual metaphors can be characterized by the formula A is B. This would assume that an entire target domain would be understood in terms of an entire source domain. This obviously cannot be the case because it would mean that one conceptual domain would be exactly the same as another … mappings can be, and are, only partial. Only a part of B is mapped onto a part of A. We need to ask which parts of the source are mapped onto which parts of the target.[214]

[214] Kövecses 2010: 12.

The story of Esther and Haman is a reminder that human beings are capable of complex conceptualisations. Haman is a valued servant of the king, but also a murderous manipulator. He is an antagonist with legitimate authority, who uses that authority to do evil. Furthermore, Artaxerxes might be, in the context of the story, essentially omnipotent, but even he cannot undo his past edicts; instead, he is reliant on his more trustworthy servants to draft a new law which allows for the salvation of the Jewish people.

Luke does not need to know the Book of Esther to be capable of similarly complex conceptualisations. Satan can be the bearer of legitimately given authority; there is no need to say that he is a liar in 4:6, or to disbelieve Jesus's cautionary words in 22:31. Satan can be a courtier in heaven as well as a rebel with his own followers. But because the focus of Luke's gospel is *Jesus*, not Satan, it is completely understandable why the second characterisation would receive more attention than the first.

The focus of the evangelist is on the *conflict* between Jesus and Satan, and the CMT tenent that humans will generally characterise more abstract domains by more concrete ones,[215] the discussion of authority and spiritual affiliation is described by Luke *primarily* in terms of the WARFARE domain. The question of morality, of whom it is *right* to spiritually align oneself with, is discussed using the VERTICALITY schema. And the question of *how* one side or another prospers is answered primarily using the CONTAINER schema, discussing territory or possession.

[215] A pertinent example: in LXX Job 2:7, when Satan afflicts Job with sores, he is said to have 'struck' him, using the verb παίω.

6.11 – Summary

In this chapter, I have demonstrated how CMT can be used to understand more complex cosmological conceptualisations. In Chapter 5, I demonstrated how the conceptual metaphor A POSSESSED BODY IS A CAPTURED FORTRESS/CITY illuminated several questions which arise in the first half of the gospel. In the second, Luke provides a key to interpreting his understanding of the relationship between Jesus and Satan in the form of the Beelzebub Controversy.

It is overly simplistic to say that for Luke, the Roman Empire *is* the Kingdom of Satan (*pace* Yamazaki-Ransom 2010); instead, the Roman Empire provides the contextual framework by which Luke understands the cosmological context of his gospel. God is the Emperor who has given to Satan the authority of a vassal king; Satan has, however, used his power to oppress and incite God's subjects to evil. Possessed persons are the visible manifestations of Satan's oppression, and act as symbols of his territory. They are held by demons as a captured fortress is held by a military force.

In his ministry, Jesus has entered Satan's territory. He has been sent by God, and when he overthrows the rebellious vassal king, the Kingdom of God will be fully realised. A major element of his incursion into Satan's kingdom is the recapturing of certain fortresses i.e., possessed or ill persons. This is exemplified by the expulsion of a legion from the Gerasene demoniac. Each of these rescues indicates the recapture of territory from the rebellion vassal king, and every individual victory results in either a piece of propaganda, or, in the case of certain tactically important fortresses, logistical support (i.e. Mary Magdalene). Furthermore,

as a king/general, Jesus commissions officers of his own (the disciples), and sends them out of their own missions.

It is important to note that the gospel is not an allegory. It is almost impossible to say how conscious or subconscious Luke's conceptualisation of this underlying context was. Again, this demonstrates one of the great advantages of CMT: the focus on underlying systems of thought, rather than on individual redactions or additions.

CHAPTER 7: Conclusion

Demonology was central to Luke's understanding of the world, and thus to his gospel: without a sincere appreciation that, for Luke, demons and Satan were genuine enemies of Jesus and of the early Church, we can never hope to fully understand his Christology, his eschatology, or his ecclesiology. I have argued in this thesis that by using cognitive linguistics – specifically conceptual metaphor theory and conceptual blending theory – we are able to gain a deeper and more accurate understanding of this area of Luke's worldview.

When scholars do address demonology in the gospels, there can be a tendency to dismiss any discussion of demons as irrational. Thus Nigel Wright states that "it is surely mistaken to conceive of the demonic realm as well organized and highly structured. Its essence is not reason but unreason, not organization but chaos."[1] Warren, using CMT to discuss demonology in the gospels, makes much of this chaos, devoting an entire chapter to it,[2] and writes that "The gospels do not present a cohesive demonology; there is overlap of terms and ambiguity."[3] Joel Marcus concluded that "we should not look for too much consistency when dealing with things as ambivalent and protean as demonic spirits."[4]

On the contrary, Luke was an educated, rational man, who specifically set out to write his account 'in an orderly fashion' (Luke 1:3, καθεξῆς). As I have argued throughout this thesis, his conceptualisations of Satan and demons were rational and coherent; he may have

[1] Wright 2003: 116.
[2] Warren 2012: 55-79.
[3] Warren 2012: 168.
[4] Marcus 2000: 342.

inconsistent *vocabulary* (e.g. πνεῦμα ἀκάθαρτον v. δαιμόνιον), but the underlying understanding of what these lexemes indicate is, I have argued, coherent.

The first major aim of this study was to demonstrate how CMT and CBT can be used to illuminate the gospels, particularly in narratives as well as discourse. Other studies that have used CMT to examine the work of a particular evangelist (e.g. Nielsen, Stovell, Somov, Lanier) have concentrated on the use of metaphors in speech. This approach, however, does not illustrate how exciting and important CMT can be as a methodology for biblical Studies. A major difference between CMT and other metaphor theories is that it can be applied to 'literal' speech, tropes, etc. In Luke's gospel, descriptions such as that of the possessed man in 4:33 are just as informative as direct speech from the characters. One of the great advantages of CMT and CBT is that, unlike other theories of metaphor, we are not bound to only examining the rhetorical use of metaphors. Using CMT as a methodology and then only focusing on rhetoric, as Stovell and Lanier do, does not do justice to the possible breadth of analysis which CMT allows.

The second major aim of this project was to provide a framework of the metaphors used by Luke in his gospel to discuss demons and Satan. Over the course of this thesis I have identified two major schemas – the VERTICALITY schema and the CONTAINER schema – and one major framework of connected metaphors – which I have discussed under the umbrella term of the WARFARE metaphor. In doing so, I have shown that military characterisation and conceptualisation are more important for Luke than previously acknowledged by biblical scholars.

Finally, I aimed in this thesis to provide a summary of Luke's conceptualisation of what a demon *was*, particularly in the light of the Septuagint. The series of conceptual blends outlined in Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrate some of the stages of development from which Jewish and Christian demonology emerged. In doing so, I hope that I have also demonstrated the fact that CBT can also prove a useful methodology for examinations of translation in the Septuagint, particularly with regards to which entailments are then foregrounded in New Testament or Hellenistic Jewish writings.

Because CMT is concerned with underlying systems of thought rather than just syntax and vocabulary, I have been able to discuss passages like 7:1-10 in which demons are never mentioned. It is a methodology particularly suited to the exploration of abstract topics which we cannot experience in a culturally unbiased state, but that were deemed common enough not to require detailed description. CMT has proved to be a flexible methodology which is both rational and nuanced, which can do much to recontextualise exegesis, and which encourages a more holistic approach to the study of the NT.

In Chapter 1, I set out where within the scholarship I would situate this thesis. The majority of cognitive linguistic approaches to the New Testament in particular have been focused on the epistles or on discourse, rather than narrative passages; this tendency means that the potential for cognitive linguistics to illuminate so-called 'literal' speech has been largely unexplored. I then showed the progression over the last few decades on the subject of Lukan demonology, from Walter Kirchschläger's use of redaction criticism,[5] to Susan Garrett's

[5] Kirchschläger 1981.

method combining narrative theory and ethnography,[6] to Todd Klutz's use of sociostylistics,[7] and finally to this thesis, which has used cognitive linguistics. I demonstrated that despite the emergence of CMT in NT studies, Luke's demonology has not been adequately considered in light of the range of methodologies offered by the current fields of linguistics.

Given the primary aim of the thesis, to demonstrate the benefits of using cognitive linguistics in the study of the gospels, I sought to address various questions. What does Luke think a demon to be, in light of the different cultural influences of his milieu? How did he conceptualise possession and exorcism, and what role does he imagine the latter to play in the ministry of Jesus? What does Luke understand the relationship between Jesus and Satan to be? By what conceptual metaphors does Luke structure his cosmological worldview?

The two major cognitive linguistic elements which I have used have been conceptual metaphor theory and conceptual blending theory. In Chapter 2, I gave a brief outline of the development of CMT from the interaction theory of metaphor, which understood metaphor as a creator of new meaning via the interaction of underlying ideas, as opposed to the traditional substitution theory, which understood metaphor as rhetorical ornamentation. I set out some of the fundamental elements of CMT[8] (§2.2) and then the most pertinent of the major criticisms of CMT (§2.3), none of which were fatal to the study I wished to make. I then summarised CBT as I would use it (§2.4), particularly the double-scope network, and then delineated how I would use CMT and CBT in the course of this thesis (§2.5); namely, in a text-orientated

[6] Garrett 1989; she explains her methodology in pages 4-10.
[7] Klutz 2004.
[8] Kövecses 2005: 5: 1. Source domain; 2. Target domain; 3. Experiential basis; 4. Neural structures corresponding to (1) and (2) in the brain; 5. Relationships between the source and the target; 6. Metaphorical linguistic expressions; 7. Mappings; 8. Entailments; 9. Blends; 10. Non-linguistic realisations; 11. Cultural models.

pattern examining both specific metaphors *and* the general metaphorical framework which underlies them.

In Chapter 3 I detailed the conceptual blend created by the use of δαιμόνιον in the Septuagint to translate several Hebrew terms. In the LXX, the major meaning of δαιμόνιον was that of a foreign god, as opposed to the God of Israel; to this were added the entailments of harm, idolatry, and immorality. I have used CBT to demonstrate how Luke mentally balanced and combined his various cultural influences in a deliberate conceptual blend which more clearly articulates what he assumed a demon to *be*.

In relation to the story of Jesus's Temptation in Luke 4:1-13 I introduced two major conceptual metaphors: UP IS GOOD and ARGUMENT IS WARFARE. The first of these is part of the VERTICALITY schema; humans tend to associate the conceptual domain of UP with good things and DOWN with bad: virtue and vice, life and death, status and humiliation. Somov (2017: 205-240) demonstrates Luke's reliance on this schema with regard to Luke's conceptualisation of the afterlife – in Luke 16:23, the rich man looks *up* from Hades to see Lazarus in the bosom of Abraham – but I demonstrated how this is in effect in the Temptation narrative as well. Each temptation involves an invitation to Jesus to go from UP to DOWN: to bend to pick up a stone from the ground, to bow to the devil, or to throw himself from the pinnacle of the Temple. Later in his gospel, only Luke will include the vision of Jesus relayed in 10:18, that Satan falls from Heaven, and only Luke will include the story of Jesus's ascension. The Temptation narrative also introduces the devil in the context of an argument. The famous conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR primes us to understand that the devil is an opponent to Jesus, and that the relationship between the two can be understood in terms of warfare.

In the second half of Chapter 4 of this thesis, I detailed how Luke creates a conceptual blend in 4:33, blending the term δαιμόνιον with the blended phrase πνεῦμα ἀκάθαρτον which he inherited from Mark 1:23. The various entailments of the latter phrase (and conceptual blend in itself) include immorality, ritual impurity, harm, incorporeality, some form of life, some form of intellect and will, invisibility, the power to affect humans, possession of the capability to exist separate to a body but within a body. I have argued that another entailment – vulnerability to the power of God – is added when one is familiar with the Greek or Hebrew text of Zechariah 13:2.

As I then discussed in Chapter 5, Luke understood possession in terms of the conceptual metaphor THE BODY IS A CONTAINER. A demon *entered* the body of its chosen victim, and exorcism was therefore the expulsion of the demon from this container. In this, Luke was following the model of possession which he received from Mark, and which had spread throughout the Mediterranean, probably as a result of the mind-body dualism which underwrote much of Hellenistic philosophy. This was in contrast to the earlier Ancient Near Eastern model, which conceptualised demonic attack in the form of something wrapping around the victim like clothing, or covering them. Luke's conceptualisation of the body according to the CONTAINER schema means that he is able to use a variety of different metaphors to illustrate the concepts of possession and exorcism, depending on which entailment he wishes to foreground.

Whether an empire, a city, a house, or a box, a container has an interior, exterior, and a boundary between them. Luke is therefore able to use several different conceptual metaphors, which are nonetheless coherent. For example, THE BODY IS A HOUSE appears in 11:24.

However, I argued in Chapter 6 that in the story of the rich man in his palace, overpowered and robbed by a stronger man, the human bodies possessed by demons are the panoply of armour that are plundered then distributed.

In addition to his understanding that THE BODY IS A CONTAINER, Luke understands the relationship between Satan and Jesus to be one of WARFARE. From our modern language to our political systems, we think that ARGUMENT IS WAR. The principle of CMT that the abstract is described in terms of the concrete is at work here. Satan is a preternatural force, and the struggle for power between him and Jesus is invisible. In the parable of the strong man (11:21-23) Luke clearly shifts the focus of his metaphors from the domestic to the political. In the ancient world the political and the military were inextricably linked. I have also argued throughout this project that Luke understands Satan as an ENEMY COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, combining the offices of king and general, the political and the military. This is first invoked by the extended Temptation sequence, which Luke is likely to have altered from the original. The conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR is so ubiquitous that it is often used as an example to those new to CMT, and has been in use in literature since at least the composition of the Iliad. The first appearance of the devil as Jesus's opponent evokes a WARFARE framework in which their relationship is understood.

In the language of this metaphor, demons work for Satan by capturing territory for him, in the form of victims of possession. The combination of Luke's preferred conceptual metaphor THE BODY IS A BUILDING with the WARFARE framework results in a metaphorical conceptualisation of possessed bodies as fortresses captured and held by invading forces (including, in the case of the Gerasene Demoniac, an entire legion of demons). These invading forces bow either to the authority or power of Jesus, and are expelled from the

captured fortress; in the rescued person territory is recaptured for the kingdom of God, and the liberated fortress either stands in testament to the might of the victorious army (i.e. the Gerasene Demoniac) or offers logistical support henceforth (i.e. Mary Magdalene).

This metaphor explains why Luke is able to write in 7:1-10 that Jesus has authority over demonic soldiers. Jesus' opponents assume that his authority comes from being an officer in the demonic army – and thus casts out demons by Beelzebul, the ruler of demons – but instead demons obey his commands because he has power over them as a conquering enemy general.

He also casts out demons by his *authority*. This authority is given to him by God, but in Luke 4:6 the devil tells us that he has been given authority too, over all the kingdoms of the world. In 2010, Yamazaki-Ransom persuasively argued that Luke associates the Roman Empire with the kingdom of Satan.[9] My thesis, however, has not focused on Luke's conscious political opinions. Rather, the Roman Empire provides the blueprint for understanding Luke's cosmological conceptualisation. Whether consciously or unconsciously, the framework of the Empire provided Luke with the metaphorical framework by which to understand the celestial power struggles of which he wrote; it provided him with a rational, concrete example by which to cognitively organise a wealth of entailments from his many different sources.

Within this metaphorical framework, God takes the role of Emperor; Satan is a vassal king, to whom rule of the οἰκουμένη has been given (Luke 4:6). Herod the Great had been a vassal king in this manner. This would explain his continued role in Heaven as a prosecutor, carried over from the Book of Job, as shown by his activity in the Temptation, and in his demand to

[9] Yamazaki-Ransom 2010, esp. Ch. 3.

sift the disciples like wheat in 22:31. It also explains why Satan is in Heaven for Jesus to see him fall from it (10:18) in an eschatological vision.

In general, this more sophisticated model of power demonstrates how Luke was able to hold two apparently conflicting models simultaneously. Satan having the power and will to act against God suggests at least some degree of dualism, but Satan can be a king even in a monotheistic understanding, because in the metaphorical framework which mirrors Luke's lived socio-political experience, God is the Emperor.

The model also offers more specific insights. In Luke 10:17-20, Jesus tells the disciples that they should rejoice not in their power over demons, but because their names are written in Heaven. Commentators have generally linked this statement to the trope of the Book of Life, itself the abstract tied to Ancient Near Eastern censuses. Using the metaphorical framework of the Roman Empire, I instead suggested in Chapter 6 that Luke might also have been thinking of the right to Roman citizenship which was afforded to military veterans. The soldier's name was written on bronze tablets kept at the statue of Minerva behind the Temple of Augustus in Rome; we know that soldiers from Palestine were among those who received this military diploma and consequent citizenship. This is one way in which the application of CMT to the Lukan text has led to an original contribution to scholarship.

Another such original contribution is an answer to the question of why Luke removed mention of self-harm as a symptom of possession from his redactions of the Markan stories of the Gerasene Demoniac and the boy who suffered from seizures. This has generally been explained by vague suggestions that Luke did not wish to offend delicate Hellenistic sensibilities. However, with the conceptual metaphor A POSSESSED BODY IS A CAPTURED

FORTRESS, it makes perfect sense that Luke would remove any mention of self-harm, as it would be incoherent with his metaphorical framework. No army holding a fortress would destroy their own defences, or tear down their own walls.

With the help of CMT, this thesis has demonstrated that Luke's demonology is coherent, and has provided a model by which to understand it. As for the future, the obvious development of this research is to apply the same cognitive linguistic methodology to Acts, and determine whether Luke's demonology is coherent across both volumes as well as within his gospel. In the light of the WARFARE framework in which Jesus's disciples are his officers, in the same way the demons form Satan's army, what does this suggest about Luke's conception of the early Church?

Furthermore, while Somov has applied CMT to Luke's understanding of the afterlife, and Lanier to Luke's Christology, there are many other abstract areas which cognitive linguistics could illuminate, such as sin or salvation. Scholars can also delve more deeply into the topic of CMT itself. With embodiment being such a fundamental element of the methodology, there is a great deal of scope for further interpretation in the light of feminist or queer theology. In §5.7 I discuss the conceptualisation of Mary Magdalene's body as a fortress or a city – a conceptual metaphor found throughout Greek and biblical literature, and to which I was only able to give a small degree of attention in this project – but one might discuss Luke's use of the COVERING metaphor of divine influence in Luke 1:35, or the interiority of Mary in the Infancy narrative: the physical containment of Jesus in the womb, and the mental containment of 2:19, in which Mary "was keeping all these things, pondering them in her heart."

In this thesis I set out to highlight the importance of the uncomfortable role that topics like possession, demons, and militarism play in the New Testament. These elements are part of our scriptural inheritance, and we must thus take them seriously, and critically evaluate them with the same consideration that we apply to Christology or eschatology. The use of cognitive linguistics allows for a deeper understanding of Luke's cosmology, demonstrates that his demonology was coherent, and provides a vocabulary which allows scholars to articulate difficult and abstract concepts in a more accurate and precise way.

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