The Shape of Things to Come: Global Order and Democracy in 1940s International Thought

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Abstract: The Shape of Things to Come: Global Order and Democracy in 1940s International Thought.

This thesis examines the role of democracy in British, French and American visions of global order in the 1940s. It argues that 'democracy' in a global context did not reflect 'Wilsonian' or 'Cosmopolitan' dreams, nor did it refer to the questions of state representation and institutional accountability that dominate contemporary debates. Instead, it shows that building a 'democratic' global order in the 1940s meant, above all, an attempt to address the challenge of democratic modernity, summarised by Karl Polanyi in 1944 as the search for 'freedom in a complex society', in the new global environment of the mid-century. This challenge was composed of five core concerns, ranging from the protection of the individual from the modern state and the transformation of democratic participation, to the use of expert planning and modern technology to secure economic justice. Achieving a balance between these competing and at times contradictory imperatives was seen as the key to securing a new democratic order that could resist the temptations of nationalism and totalitarianism and secure peace. Crucially, it was only through the structures of a new global order that, internationalists argued, there could be any chance of success. The task was not an easy one, and the historical investigation shows how the choices and trade-offs internationalists made in relation to these imperatives entailed costs in terms of inclusivity, participation and even rights within visions of democratic global order.

The thesis has both historical and conceptual goals. First, it recovers important ideas about global order that have been largely written out of the history of this period by taking the language of democracy in world order debates seriously and understanding these visions in context. Conceptually, its aim is to contest and transform how we think about global order and democracy in the history of international thought and in the present day. Instead of Cosmopolitan, Wilsonian, liberal or other normative blueprints for a democratic world order, the conclusion argues that we should, following the example of the 1940s, reconceptualise the relationship between global order and democracy today in relation to the persistent dilemmas of democratic modernity. In a global context, these continue to have interlocking domestic and international dimensions and, more importantly, continue to require choices that entail normatively contestable costs in the construction of a democratic global order. Only then, it argues, will it be possible to think about how these shortcomings can be mitigated and whether and what kind of democratic order we want to pursue at all.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction
1.1. Introduction
1.2. Global Order and the Challenge of Democratic Modernity
1.3. Actors
1.4. Significance
1.5. Methodology
1.6. Global Order and Democracy in the History of International Thought

2. Order and the Challenge of Democratic Modernity
2.1. Introduction
2.2. Democratic Modernity and Political Order
2.3. Democratic Modernity and Global Order
2.3.1. Interdependence and International Organisation
2.3.2. Challenges to the Western-centred Order
2.3.3. Global Entities and the Transformation of Power.

3. Union Now! Democratic Order and Union
3.1. Introduction
3.2. Preservation: Saving Democracy from the State
3.3. Expansion: Union and Socialist Democracy
3.4. Expansion: Union and 'Authentic' Democracy
3.5. Extension: Union and Global Democracy
3.6. Conclusion

4. Democratic Order and Human Rights
4.1. Introduction
4.2. Global Order, Democracy and the Birth of Human Rights
4.3. Human Rights and Democratic Society
4.3.1. Preservation
4.3.2. Expansion
4.3.3. Extension
4.4. Conclusion

5. The Freedom from Want: Global Order and Economic Democracy
5.1. Introduction
5.2. Economic Democracy and Supranational Planning
5.3. Economic Democracy and International Development
5.3.1. A World of New Deals for a Democratic World
5.3.2. Empires of Liberty
5.4. Conclusion

6. The Revolt of the Competent: Elites, Expertise and Democracy
6.1. Introduction

6.2. Planning and Mass Democracy
6.3. Functionalism, Pluralism and Two-Tiered Democracy
6.4. Performance Legitimacy, Social Concertation and Constraint
6.5. Conclusion

7. Conclusion
7.1. Introduction
7.2. Global Order and Democracy in the 21st Century
7.3. Global Order and the Challenge of Democratic Modernity in the 21st Century: the View From the 1940s
7.4. The Enduring Dilemma of Democratic Global Order

Chapter 1

Introduction

'The real task still lies ahead, the task of defining the democratic concept of the postwar order in such a way as to convince people throughout the world that a victory of the Western Powers would be, not the closing act of the drama, but the curtain raiser for a period of expanded and reinvigorated democracy'

Vera Dean, *The Struggle for World Order* 1941

1.1 Introduction

In the decade spanning the outbreak of the Second World War and the Korean War, internationalists in the West urgently debated what kind of world order could prevent another catastrophe. In spite of deep differences, the visions they elaborated shared one important feature: democracy. Only a 'democratic' global order, they insisted, could secure a lasting peace.

This thesis tells the story of these ideas. The role of democracy has been almost entirely forgotten, if not deliberately purged from the history and collective memory of postwar planning. Restored to its rightful place at the heart of 1940s internationalist debates, this investigation shows that 'democracy' in a global context referred to the way in which a new global order would address the challenge of democratic modernity in the mid century, summarised by Karl Polanyi in 1944 as the search for 'freedom in a complex society'.[1]

[1]Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001; 1944).

Recovering alternative visions of democratic world order that, in different ways, claimed to resolve this challenge, the aim of this research is to contest and transform the way we think about global order and democracy in this period and in the history of international thought.[2] It shows that the conceptual languages that are most commonly used to think about and describe ideas about international order in relation to democracy in the past– Wilsonianism and Cosmopolitanism– do not help us to understand what democracy meant to internationalists in the 1940s in the context of their visions of global order. Nor can visions of democratic order in the 1940s be usefully assessed in light of contemporary debates about global order and democracy that focus on narrow questions of state representation and institutional accountability. While these concerns were not absent in 1940s, they were not the primary way in which internationalists understood and addressed the relationship between global order and democracy.

Instead of seeking to apply Cosmopolitan, Wilsonian, liberal or other normative blueprints for a democratic world order, this study underscores the need to develop new conceptual tools outside these paradigms and 'traditions' for the recovery and evaluation of ideas about global order and democracy in the past. It also encourages us to rethink the nature of this relationship in contemporary global politics. Instead of focusing on representation and accountability within international institutions or abstract models of democratic order rooted in debates about moral cosmopolitanism and legal constitutionalism, the conclusion argues that we should reconceptualise the relationship between global order and democracy today in relation to the persistent dilemmas of democratic modernity. As in the 1940s, these continue to have

[2] In light of the central claim made by this research that democracy is not an unproblematic term in either a domestic or an international context, henceforth the discussion will dispense with the use of quotation marks around the terms democracy and democratic global order. The aim of this research is not to define in the abstract what 'democracy' means in an international context but to recover what democracy meant to a group of internationalists who when they did not speak directly about building a 'democratic world order'– many did– routinely discussed the survival, transformation and promotion of democracy in relation to their visions of global order. The investigation will use quotation marks when discussing visions of 'democratic' global order in which the language of democracy was clearly being abused and to highlight particularly ambiguous cases in which the fusion of power political concerns with a particular vision of democratic modernity produced results that are normatively problematic to the point at which the use of the term democracy is questionable.

interlocking domestic and global dimensions and, more importantly, continue to require choices that entail costs in terms of inclusivity, participation and even rights in the construction of a democratic global order. Only then, it argues, will it be possible to think about how these shortcomings can be mitigated and whether and what kind of democratic order we want to pursue at all.

The first section of the introduction elaborates on the central argument that visions of democratic global order in the 1940s responded to the challenge of democratic modernity. It shows how this challenge was composed of five core concerns, in response to which internationalist thinkers constructed democratic visions of world order that sought to preserve, expand and extend liberty worldwide. The first section will also discuss the significance of these findings, the subset of internationalists that are protagonists of this study and the methodological and ontological foundations of this research. The second section considers the investigation in the context of existing scholarship, demonstrating the serious gaps it seeks to fill and the developments it seeks to build on in its approach to global order and democracy in the 1940s and in the history of international thought.

1.2 Global Order and the Challenge of Democratic Modernity

Rooted in the material and ideological transformations of the 19th century and the traumatic experiences of the 1930s, at the heart of what this thesis calls the 'challenge of democratic modernity' in the 1940s were five core concerns. First, the protection of the individual from the ever-growing power of the modern state. Second, the need to harness new scientific and technical expertise to meet the 'continual growth in the material and intellectual demands which men make of life' and secure higher living standards.[3] Third, the need to find more meaningful forms of group identity and political expression than those offered by the nation

[3] "The Development of International Co-Operation in Economic and Social Affairs. Report of the Special Committee" (Geneva: The League of Nations, 1939), 9.

state and traditional parliamentary system. Fourth, the need to ensure accountability and legitimacy in an age in which unelected experts were destined to hold increased power. Fifth, the need to ensure that the participation of the masses in political life did not unduly inhibit the ability of governments to deliver on the promise of greater welfare and security.

Achieving a balance between these competing and times contradictory imperatives was seen as the key to securing a new kind of democratic order that could resist the temptations of nationalism, communism and totalitarianism more generally. The task was not an easy one. Intellectuals across Europe and the Atlantic argued fiercely over the precise combination of policies that would secure 'freedom in a complex society' within their respective polities in the postwar era. In this context, the internationalist thinkers examined in this study took the debate a step further. They recognised that there could be no democratic riposte either to Fascist or Soviet modernity that stopped at the water's edge; modernity itself was global. As a result, it was necessary to consider how the creation of a new democratic society was not only connected to but also dependent on the structures of a new global order. Whereas domestic reformers largely failed to consider what role the new international order would play in the resolution of the challenge of democratic modernity beyond securing peace; for these internationalists, it was clear that a radically transformed structure of world order would be instrumental to democratic survival and renewal in the modern world.

There would also be no peace if, conversely, thinking about global order was limited to the relations between states. These internationalists were deeply convinced that the war had not broken out as a result of the failure collective security to curb power politics, or the insufficiently rigorous application of the principal of national self-determination. At a deeper level, it was the failed nostrums of 19th century liberalism– parliamentary democracy, laissez-faire capitalism and the ideal of the nation state– that had underwritten the old order, including the structures and goals of the interwar League system, that had in the context of the 'shrinking world' produced the nationalist and totalitarian pathologies that had led to disaster.

Building a lasting peace, therefore, required a system built on a more credible recipe for liberty in the 20th century. The creation of new devices and mechanisms to address the eternal 'problem of anarchy' or the 'conundrum of war' that had little or nothing to do with the reorganisation of democratic societies and the relations between them in an interdependent age would not be enough.[4]

For internationalists in the 1940s, the separation of the 'international' task of peace building and the 'domestic' task of building an 'expanded and reinvigorated' democracy at home was thus largely artificial. Under the conditions of global modernity, there was no alternative except to address the dilemmas facing democracy through the structures of a new world order. Increasingly, moreover, there was no alternative except to do so globally. Interdependence had not only exacerbated the crisis facing democratic societies, it had also globalised the demand for a new era of liberty and bound the fate of Western and non-Western worlds more closely than ever before. The same forces of liberal capitalist modernity that had impoverished and disenfranchised the masses of the non-Western world long before those of Europe now made their plight much harder to ignore.

This transformation of the scope and scale on which thinking about organisation and order had to be understood, as the following chapter explores, multiplied the difficulties internationalists faced in seeking to build a democratic global order. Fundamentally, however, it remained the way in which proposed global orders offered a solution, directly or indirectly, to any and all of the five core concerns facing democratic societies that was at the heart of how internationalists understood and imagined the creation of a democratic global order in the 1940s.

[4] Duncan Bell, "Before the Democratic Peace: Racial Utopianism, Empire, and the Abolition of War", *European Journal of International Relations* 20, no. 3 (2014), 6.

The historical investigation demonstrates this, exploring visions of world order in the 1940s through the themes of union, human rights, economic justice and technocracy. These were without doubt among the most prominent and novel features of proposed global orders in this period.[5] Within each chapter, how internationalists connected these themes to building a democratic world order is then set out. In each case, we will see that it was the way in which supranational union or technocratic governance addressed the core challenges of democratic modernity, be it through protecting the individual from the modern state, improving welfare or offering alternative models of democratic participation that were paramount.

As a heuristic device, these connections are described in terms of visions of democratic global order that sought to 'preserve', 'expand' or 'extend' liberty, either alone or in combination. Hence visions of order that sought to protect the negative liberty of the individual from the transgressions of central authorities– through the creation of a supranational union or a global human rights regime for example– were democratic in the eyes of their creators because they sought to 'preserve' liberty. Those that used global order to promote social and economic justice or new forms of group identity and participation were democratic because they 'expanded' liberty from the narrow confines of the liberal model that was deemed to have failed so miserably in the 1930s. Finally, orders that sought to spread a vision of democratic society to include new groups were democratic because they 'extended' liberty. Importantly, these labels are neither rigid organisational categories nor are they offered as an ahistorical taxonomy for the study of global order and democracy. They are simply a tool to describe and illustrate in broader and more abstract terms how internationalists in the 1940s understood their visions of global order as democratic in relation to the central challenge of democratic modernity. They also help to highlight the tensions that existed within visions of democratic

[5] These themes were by no means entirely new, having roots in the interwar period if not before. In the context of the challenge of democratic modernity, however, the way these ideas were developed and used by internationalists in the 1940s was distinct. On the earlier history of these themes see Lucian M. Ashworth, *A History of International Thought: From the Origins of the Modern State to Academic International Relations* (Oxford: Routledge, 2014). Glenda Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013).

global order between, for example, claims to 'expand' liberty through the promotion of pluralistic models of democratic governance that were combined with ambitions to 'extend' this model globally in the hope of creating a unified society of democratic states. These tensions are explored further below.

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The recovery of these ideas of democratic global order challenges existing interpretations of the relationship between global order and democracy. Rooted in state-centric, essentialist and often narrowly liberal conceptions of democracy, these have limited ideas of democracy in a global context to the application or extension of democratic forms, practices and norms to 'the international'. As a result, attempts to make regional or global order more democratic are generally associated with the 'cosmopolitan' goals of establishing direct forms of representation and accountability between citizens and the institutions of global governance, as well as the 'liberal' and/or 'Wilsonian' goals of self-determination, equal state representation and the promotion of a transparent and rules-based system corresponding to the pluralist, rule of law ethos of liberal democracy. The assumption that states also be or become (liberal) democracies is another common aspect of these conceptions of democratic global order, although one that varies in prominence.

In contrast, the ideas explored in this investigation did not focus exclusively on the representative structure of the international community, or the accountability of international organisations vis-à-vis the population. One example was visions of democratic global order that sought to advance a new model of pluralistic democratic governance in which representation and participation shifted from national party systems to new professional, confessional and other collectives existing at the local, national, regional and global level. Virtually absent from existing accounts of international thought in the period, the following shows how this ambition animated conceptions of democratic order as diverse as David

Mitrany's functionalism, David Lilienthal's model of global development and Alexandre Marc's vision of European Union. Other ideas may be more familiar to contemporary audiences but have been divorced from the language of democracy in which they were described in the 1940s. We have, for example, lost sight of the overwhelming focus on the protection of the individual from the state or the promotion of economic justice that animated so many visions of democratic global order in this period. Consequently, there is little sense today that a democratic global order might be conceptualised primarily in such terms.

More problematic for existing views of global order and democracy is that far from promoting direct participation, equal state representation, self-determination or liberal democracy, many visions of democratic order in the 1940s appeared to do the opposite. Instead of championing a 'Chamber of Nations' or the General Assembly, for example, many ideas were deeply technocratic. As we will see in chapter five, among the most prominent beliefs of the period was that some form of expert led global or regional economic planning was essential for the creation of a democratic global order. In chapter six, we will see how some internationalists pressed technocratic visions of global governance that deliberately sought to exclude the masses and their representatives from decision making processes. Many visions of democratic order were actively opposed to liberal parliamentary models of political participation, championing alternatives that by today's standards appear dangerously radical. Others downplayed the importance of political rights as a whole and even sought to deny political rights to particular groups, in the non-Western world above all. In stark contrast to the Wilsonian ideal that saw national self-determination as 'the counterpart of democracy in the international sphere', most internationalists in 1940s premised the construction of a new democratic order on its abandonment.[6]

These were not only ways in which ideas of order could appear not only illiberal but undemocratic. The historical investigation reveals that visions of democratic order in the

[6] Edward Hallett Carr, *Conditions of Peace* (London: Macmillan and Co Ltd, 1942), 38.

1940s suffered from contradictions and shortcomings in terms of accountability, participation, pluralism, equality and even rights almost without exception. While explicit attempts by British and French internationalists to reconcile their visions of democratic global order with the preservation of empire are particularly striking in this regard, an even larger number of internationalists were guilty of double standards in relation to the non-Western world. Whereas democratic order in the Western space implied enhanced political and economic liberties guaranteed through new forms of national and supranational participation and economic planning; in the non-Western space, it often meant equal access to raw materials, Western-led economic development and increased local participation without full political rights and national autonomy. Even visions of democratic order that actively sought decolonisation through development did little or nothing to address global racial divides. If Ralph Bunche and W.E.B Du Bois' calls for global racial equality fell on deaf ears in the West, Alva Myrdal's claim for gender equality as a key component of democratic order based on liberty was universally ignored.[7]

Even within the West, hierarchical visions of order persisted. Among visions of democratic order that hinged on the creation of regional unions, for example, were many that excluded certain Western as well as non-Western states. Even within unions, moreover, internationalists often articulated clear ideas of leadership. The same was true globally. Western internationalists routinely combined visions of democratic global order with implicit or overt claims for Western, or more narrowly American, British or French global leadership. Finally, while many visions stressed pluralism as the core characteristic of a democratic global order, in many cases, this was combined with an overt desire to democratise the earth.

[7] Glenda Sluga, "The Human Story of Development: Alva Myrdal at the UN 1949-1955", in *International Organizations and Development, 1945-1990* ed. Marc Frey, Sönke Kunkel, and Corinna R. Unger (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). On the difficulties confronting African-American internationalists attempting to have their voices heard in the construction of the postwar order see Robert Vitalis, *White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015).

These findings clearly jar with existing conceptions of what a democratic global order should look like seen through a Wilsonian, Cosmopolitan or any other contemporary normative lens. As we will see in part two, it is partly for this reason that the international thought of the 1940s has been divorced from any concept of or concern with democracy. Existing scholarship assumes that visions of democratic order that embraced power, hierarchy and national interests, or that were otherwise less than inclusive must therefore be dismissed as 'realist', 'imperialist', 'nationalist' or simply hypocritical.

In contrast, this research argues that the illiberal, exclusionary and contradictory features that are often taken as evidence of the absence, failure or betrayal of democratic thinking about global order in the 1940s were in fact no such thing. On the contrary, they were intrinsic to visions of democratic order being, to a great extent, the product of inherent tensions within the challenge of democratic modernity and the quest to build new democratic societies that balanced the need for welfare, expertise and community with individual liberty, participation, equality and pluralism. In a global age, moreover, as chapter two explores, the requirement to negotiate these tensions on a global as well as national scale magnified and multiplied these tensions. It forced internationalists to consider how the global orders that they imagined would nurture new democratic societies would themselves reconcile the need for leadership, technocratic authority and solidarism with global pluralism and diversity, political rights and equality. Internationalists had to address these dilemmas vertically, in terms of the relationship between the structures and organisations of a new global order and the individuals whose lives they affected; and horizontally, in terms of the relationship between states and the West and the non-Western world in particular.

Confronted with these competing imperatives, the construction of a democratic global order inevitably involved choices and trade-offs that were reflected in their less than participative and often less than liberal appearance. Internationalists for whom economic justice was the most critical aspect of building a democratic global order, for example, were often willing to

make sacrifices in terms of inter-state equality, popular participation and liberalism to achieve this goal. It was on these grounds that EH Carr, among others, argued that supranational economic planning was paramount, even at the cost of democratic accountability. Similarly, for internationalists such as David Lilienthal and Barbara Ward, the promotion of global economic justice through Western-led development justified the hierarchical model of global governance this created and perpetuated.

Other visions of order reflected different priorities. Among internationalists who prioritised the protection of the individual from the dangers of centralised power some, including Friedrich Hayek and Raymond Buell, argued that guaranteeing economic justice was ultimately a less important aspect of democratic order building, and certainly not one that was worth the risks involved in economic planning. For René Cassin, the goal of individual protection from tyranny was more important than any question of international representation and indeed, more important than the extension of national rights of independence to the colonies. For Catholic thinkers and 'functionalists' like David Mitrany who wanted to create a new kind of 'authentic' democracy through the empowerment of new interest and identity based constituencies at the sub-national and supranational levels, the risks of undermining existing national structures of individual political rights and accountability were worth taking.

Limitations in terms of accountability, participation and scope within visions of democratic global order in the 1940s thus reflected deliberate choices. Importantly, we will see that most internationalists were well aware of these problems and sought not only to defend their positions but to mitigate the contradictory, exclusionary or otherwise 'undemocratic' aspects of their ideas in order to appease their critics. In other words, while it was clear that internationalists prioritised different aspects of the challenge of democratic modernity, most attempted to achieve some sort of balance between its core imperatives both within the democratic societies they sought to create through a new global order and in the structure of that order itself.

As we will see in chapter six, for example, while many advocates of highly technocratic global orders saw these as a means to produce democratic societies characterised by higher levels of social justice, political autonomy and pluralism, they also recognised the need for some form of democratic oversight and participation within the structure of order itself. Even internationalists who were least inclined to promote accountability, such as Jean Monnet, endeavoured to offer some form of participation to legitimise what remains an elitist and even anti-political vision of democratic order. Similarly, we will see how visions of democratic order based on the 'extension' of liberty through global democratisation were married to conceptions of local ownership, cultural autonomy and pluralism intended to counter charges of imperialism and exclusion.

Bringing these shortcomings 'in' to the reconstruction and understanding of visions of democratic order in this period constitutes a clear challenge to existing interpretations of global order and democracy both in the past and the present day. We will return to this below. Importantly, however, recognising that these limitations were largely intrinsic to visions of democratic order in the 1940s is not meant to offer an historicist apologia for exclusionary and illiberal visions of democratic global order. Not all attempts to justify these constructions or to mitigate their negative effects were equally convincing, or indeed genuine. The following excludes claims for 'democratic' order that were indeed spurious covers for nationalist, imperialist, racist or authoritarian agendas.[8] Among visions whose limitations and

[8] Borderline cases are discussed throughout. Excluded from the discussion are the ideas of international thinkers like Lionel Curtis and Alfred Zimmern who in spite of their efforts to recast their ideas in the democratic language of the day, failed to uproot them from the older, imperial visions of order they had championed in the past. Among the new generation, it also excludes the ideas of French thinkers emerging from Vichy whose visions of technocracy masked a committed to authoritarianism, as well as the phenomenally popular works of figures such as Ely Culbertson whose opportunistic exploitation of the language of democratic modernity was nothing but a means to advance a new 'scientific' vision of Western domination. It also includes works in which global hierarchies and exclusions were transparently determined on the basis of race. Although many of the visions of order explored in this study were marred by racial prejudice, the investigation still makes a distinction between these ideas and those inspired by more overtly racist views. These visions of democratic order were contradicted and fatally undermined by their authors but they were still attempts to grapple with the challenge of democratic modernity– as opposed to merely entrench White dominance. They are, as a result, explored

contradictions were the product of a genuine engagement with the core challenges of democratic modernity, moreover, there is still room for critical assessment. The degree to which internationalists engaged with the tensions their ideas harboured varied greatly. Among proponents of technocratic forms of order, for example, there are clear differences between the inventive efforts of internationalists like Barbara Wootton to allay the risks of supranational planning versus Jean Monnet's weak notion of 'concertation' offered in lieu of more direct forms of popular participation. Similarly, whereas David Lilienthal's vision of global democratisation through Western-led development was premised on the inclusion of local populations and the creation of pluralistic, diverse democratic societies, other models of democratic development were much more limited and paternalistic in their conception of local participation and the generation of democracies that reflected local preferences. Finally, whereas internationalists like Mortimer Adler and Barbara Ward made a considerable effort to think about the gradual rectification of imbalances and injustices that would lead to the emergence of a more fully integrated and democratic world order; others were deliberately vague about the point in future when issues of popular participation and accountability would finally be resolved, or indeed when the non-Western world would become full members of the West's democratic order.

Recovering visions of democratic global order in the 1940s in context does not, therefore, mean that these ideas must be accepted at face value. The investigation will probe and compare the internal coherence and consistency of internationalist claims to build a democratic order. In so doing, it also offers a more overtly normative critique of these ideas. While acknowledging that deciding at what point monistic ambition, hierarchy, weak structures of participation or other shortcomings fatally undermined claims to build a democratic order is both difficult and subjective when contradiction and tensions were built in to the challenge of democratic modernity, scrutinising how internationalists tried and failed to

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in this investigation but are by no means exempt from criticism or accepted as normatively equivalent to ideas that did not display such prejudice.

cope with these tensions is important. We might be able to accept, for example, certain visions of democratic global order in which the 'larger freedom' of economic security provided by expert-led economic planning, or the protection from dangers of centralised authorities, was privileged over direct political participation in the structures of global governance. We may be less willing to do so, however, if these ideas of order were wholly non-participative and unaccountable, still less if they actively downplayed or denied political rights. To a contemporary audience, while René Cassin's vision of democratic global order based on human rights has much to commend it, for example, his claim that this could be a world in which empires continued to exist– and continued to deny fundamental political rights– is clearly unacceptable.

Comparing and critiquing these visions has important implications for the wider significance of this research. This thesis argues that there is no pre-defined Cosmopolitan or Wilsonian yardstick against which these ideas should be judged as democratic or not. The obvious need– or desire– to exclude some ideas from the category of democratic visions of world order, however, implies that there are certain core characteristics, or normative red lines, that broadly delimit the space in which democratic visions, however imperfect, exist. Arguably, like the 1940s, it is only those visions of order that succeed in achieving an acceptable balance between the competing imperatives of democratic modernity that can inhabit this space. The conclusion returns to this question. It argues that debating the normative limits of visions of democratic global order is a critical aspect not only of the recovery of democratic ideas of past but also the way in which we should reconsider the relationship between global order and democracy today.

1.3 Actors

Asserting the centrality of democracy to internationalist debates stands in stark contrast to the dominant image of the 1940s as the dawn of the golden age of classical realism and geopolitics. Although the following investigation will show that the visions of order of so-called realists like EH Carr were profoundly concerned with the challenge of democratic modernity, this was certainly not true in all cases. It does not, for example, suggest that the seminal works of Nicholas Spykman, Hans Morgenthau or FDR's 'Geographer' Isaiah Bowman should be reinterpreted in this way, or that their influence in postwar planning circles should be diminished. Similarly, 'realist'– or indeed imperialist– characterisations of the predominant concerns within foreign ministries, prominent think tanks and among key figures of Western administrations in this period are not in dispute. The records of the Council on Foreign Relations, Chatham House and Roosevelt's 'Brains Trust' confirm how much attention was indeed focused on 'hard' questions of bases, borders, armaments and the treatment of defeated powers that had little or nothing to do with questions relating to 'freedom in a complex society'. Similarly, for leaders like Churchill, it is clear that a democratic global order represented little more than the benevolent dominance of democratic nations– or empires– and, to some extent, the gradual spread of democratic government throughout the world. Although Roosevelt's 'freedom from want' launched a thousand visions of democratic order based on economic justice in the 1940s, his own interest in global order was not especially profound and was, by many accounts, entirely pragmatic.[9]

[9] Churchill's much vaunted 'Three legged stool'– a World Council resting on three regional councils including a European and Asian Council– was not a democratic vision of order concerned with the challenges facing democratic societies in the 20th century. It was about preserving British power and the leadership of the Great Powers. There were many others, including Sumner Welles, who advocated the regional organisation of the postwar world, seeing it as an appropriate adaptation to the realities of power in a global age and a means of securing a durable peace through regional and/or great power 'policing' but without relating it to the challenge of democratic modernity. Welles even added a Wilsonian note to his vision. *Time for Decision* (1944) combined a regional organisation through which all states could be 'made to feel themselves participants' of the new order with appeals to world public opinion and the newer notion of great power policing. While internationalists in this study were also, as we will see in chapter two, concerned to adapt to the scale of power in the postwar world– many advocating regional reorganisation of 'global entities' and great power leadership– crucially, unlike Churchill and Welles,

'Realists' and unreconstructed imperialists are not the protagonists of this study. These men have for too long dominated the history of postwar planning when they and their ideas were neither the only nor the dominant force in the galaxy of international thought in this decade. There were many others who thought differently. These were the men and women who, in contrast, understood the task of building a new global order before them in terms of the intersecting dilemmas of democratic modernity. Although mostly embedded in international movements and organisations, think tanks and universities, this group included many influential individuals, some of whom would be directly involved in the creation of the postwar order.

Turning to this group, this investigation underscores how limited the realist depiction of international thought in this period is, whether it is viewed through the prism of imperial decline or the international power politics of the emerging Cold War. Importantly, however, the group of thinkers examined below were also not 'idealists'. As we will see at greater length in chapter two, they did not reject concepts of power, national interest or hierarchy. It is partly for the same reason that they are not representative of 'internationalists' or 'internationalism' as a whole either.

The individuals examined in this study certainly fall into the broad category of 'internationalism' defined by Fred Halliday as the belief that international relations are not wholly about the relations between states but encompass the inner workings of states and are

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their conceptions of power and hierarchy in a new world order were profoundly connected to their pursuit of a new vision of democratic order. For more traditional accounts of postwar regionalism– and indeed postwar 'Wilsonianism'– including Welles' view, see Robert Alexander Divine, *Second Chance. The Triumph of Internationalism in America During World War II* (New York: Atheneum, 1967), 107-113. On Churchill and FDR Andrew J. Williams, *Failed Imagination?: New World Orders of the Twentieth Century* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998). Townsend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley, *FDR and the Creation of the U.N* (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 1997); David B. Woolner, Warren F. Kimball, and David Reynolds, *FDR's' World: War, Peace, and Legacies* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

as a result 'also about the way in which societies interact, in a context that encompasses states but is much broader than that'. Many also believed that 'we are or should be part of a broader community than that of the nation state'.[10] Similarly, using Carsten Holbraad's definition of internationalism(s) as 'ideologies of international bonding', many of the ideas below, including visions of human rights or economic justice, could be described as attempts to go beyond the modest hopes of diplomacy and 'transform international society in some way or other' through the creation of new kinds of linkages between groups and individuals that may include but are not limited to the governments of nation states.[11]

More specifically, however, this study focuses on the group of 'internationalist' thinkers for whom recent experiences had revolutionised their understanding of global order, such that it had become inextricably bound to the challenge of finding a non-totalitarian, democratic form of modernity in the mid-century.[12] For this group, building a peaceful world order was not

[10] Fred Halliday, "Three Concepts of Internationalism", *International Affairs* 64, no. 2 (1988), 187.
[11] Carsten Holbraad, *Internationalism and Nationalism in European Political Thought* (New York ; Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 1.
[12] In this sense the following adopts a less abstract and more historically rooted idea of 'internationalism' that is more in line with the work of historians such as Glenda Sluga who in her recent volume argued that 'throughout the twentieth century, the significance and meaning attributed to internationalism emerged out of the same questions of modernity and democracy and political idealism that shaped the twentieth century into a corresponding age of nationalism'; both had at their core the 'same unresolved questions about the nature of individuals and groups, and the extent to which human beings could fashion a destiny of their choice'; both were 'ways of thinking about modernity, progress and politics'; both were 'profoundly connected to the history of democracy'. These statements clearly resonate with the kind of internationalism that is presented and explored in this study: ideas that were first and foremost about the challenge of democratic modernity and the pursuit of progressive vision of democratic society that struggled to articulate a more meaningful vision of individuals and groups in relation to each other within domestic communities and globally. In this regard, however, this investigation does finally move away from Sluga's own history of internationalism in the twentieth century and the 1940s in particular. Rooted in the binary of internationalism and nationalism and retaining the liberal epithet, Sluga's history ultimately keeps our gaze and understanding of internationalism focused on the cooperative reorganization of international life in ways that contest the nationalist dangers of sovereign state system and discrete ideas about the activities of international life to promote peace and, later, human well-being in a larger sense. While there is nothing intrinsically wrong with this, this investigation looks at a group of thinkers for whom 'internationalism' and the construction of a new global order was explicitly about the nature and attainment of democracy in the wake of the crisis of liberal modernity and the emergence of the global. To be sure, they wanted to overcome extreme nationalism but as a consequence of having addressed more fundamental questions about democracy and creation of democratic societies in a global world– to which end they also saw power as essential. This 'internationalism' was neither about nationalism or 'the international' or indeed peace per se. Nor was it liberal. As discussed in part two, this is undoubtedly a period of great change in the history and wider conceptualization of internationalism, one where Sluga herself is spearheading efforts to explore 'illiberal' internationalist thinking. This research supports this effort at

simply about bonding societies through shared economic, class or humanitarian interests with the objective of policing, taming or overcoming power politics; it was about the transformation of societies themselves in pursuit of 'freedom in a complex society' using the structures and tools of a new global order. The democratic transformation of the 'inner workings of states' was, in turn, expected to secure the durability and success of this new order. Likewise, the way in which this group re-imagined the relationship between societies in a new global order turned on the imperatives and dilemmas of democratic modernity, not the reform or transcendence of the traditional norms of international society per se. As a result, 'internationalism' did not imply the rejection of nationalism, power or hierarchy in and of themselves. What was more important for this group was for these to be reconciled with the pursuit of a progressive democratic global order.[13]

This group of internationalists comprised individuals from across the political spectrum, including liberals, socialist and catholic thinkers. It excludes, however, the minority of liberal internationalists like Cordell Hull who maintained a simple faith in free trade as the guarantor of harmony among nations, as well as those like Anita Blaine who still identified human reason as the 'ideology of international bonding' that, through increased diplomatic transparency and the 'panopticon' of world public opinion, would secure a peaceful world order. It also excludes Marxists who remained committed to proletarian internationalism, global revolution and the effective abolition of international relations and, similarly, the few 'cosmopolitans' who envisaged the transcendence of international relations through the

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the same time as it suggests that we should spend more time breaking down rather than perpetuating liberal/illiberal, domestic/global, national/international boundaries in our approach to ideas about world order and see how, as in this case, ideas that were united by a specific set of questions about democracy/democratic modernity cut across these divides. Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism,* 2, 8.

[13] There is perhaps some similarity here between what Edward Keene and Karma Nabulsi have described as the 'Grotian' tradition of international thought that combined a strong belief in hierarchy and power with an attempt to make international life more progressive and cooperative. As these ideas focused much more exclusively on international relations, international law and peace, however, the use of the label 'Grotian' to describe the thinkers or ideas in this study is not appropriate. Karma Nabulsi, *Traditions of War: Occupation, Resistance, and the Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). Edward Keene, *Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

creation of a world government without, however, relating this to the contemporary challenge of democratic modernity. Rooted in the shibboleths of 19th century internationalism, these ideas did not engage with the challenge of democracy modernity and continued to focus instead on the disjuncture between a presumed or potential transnational societal unity and the fractured and conflictual practices of inter-state relations. The latter was certainly an aspect of the ideas explored below, many of which, moreover, still echoed Wilsonian, Cosmopolitan and Marxist tropes of the past. Crucially, however, we will see how in these cases older ideas were adapted to address the challenge of democratic modernity, the concern with which finally sets the thinkers explored in this study apart from internationalists in the past as well as many of their more 'traditional' contemporaries.[14]

The delimitation of the group of internationalist thinkers explored in this study is also geographical. The following does not explore 'Western' ideas as a whole, were this even possible. Instead, it focuses on the ideas of British, France and American internationalists– although this includes the voices of several notable émigrés and, in the French case, non-Western French colonial thinkers such as Léopold Senghor. The reasons for doing so are partly practical. Internationalists in these countries had plausible grounds for believing that they or their governments would shape or indeed lead the new world order, hence it is no surprise that it was here where the greatest number as well as the most comprehensive and influential visions of the new world order were produced and debated. With the exception of France, the fact that these territories remained unoccupied during the war is also significant in

[14] Anita Blaine offers a good illustration of this distinction, appearing to sit on the margins between traditional Wilsonianism and the kind of internationalism explored in this study. While she and her World Citizens Association acknowledged that the 'shrinking and interdependent world' had irrevocably transformed international relations and insisted that the critical task of the new order was to ensure that the 'fundamental process of democracy' would 'stand the test at this critical moment' and spread throughout the world, the reality of her vision was far closer to a Wilsonian conception of democratic order that focused on collective security, state representation in an international chamber, law and the growing strength of world public opinion. This view stands in stark contrast to other so called 'Wilsonians' like Clark Eichelberger and James Shotwell who, despite the Wilsonian trappings of their vision of order, were driven by their concern to tackle the challenges facing democratic societies and to spread a new model of democracy. As a result, we will see that, unlike Blaine and the WCA, they placed a far greater emphasis on new structures and activities that would promote social justice and human rights as the core feature of a democratic global order Anita Blaine, *The World at the Crossroads* (Chicago Illinois: World Citizens, 1946), 12-14, 33.

this regard. That said, although French internationalist voices before 1945 are largely to be found in Algeria, London and New York, the following also shows that thinking about the postwar order within France was less parochial than previously thought.[15] Secondly, examining the role of democracy in the construction of a new world order from the perspective of the most powerful states in system is particularly interesting because it underscores the extent to which the idea of democratic order was taken seriously at the time and should not be thought of as a concern only of small or middle powers, or as a weapon of the weak against the strong.

Looking at examples from these three countries, as opposed to only single case study, also offers a useful point of comparison between visions of democratic global order. As systemic leaders, allies and opponents of totalitarianism, internationalists in all three countries shared a broadly similar analysis of the outbreak of war and a corresponding belief that a democratic global order that addressed the core challenges of democratic modernity was imperative. While this reinforces the central argument concerning the role of democracy in 'Western' visions of global order in the 1940s, the historical investigation will also point to where differences in their respective experiences of the interwar period, the war and its aftermath also affected visions of democratic global order. The vastly different material and strategic situations of the Allies at the end of the war had an obvious effect as did, for example, the redemptive experience of the New Deal in the United States versus the total collapse of the French State and 'dark years' that followed.[16] Whereas the former bred alternative

[15] The tendency to assume that within occupied France– and indeed among French political figures more broadly– that thinking about the postwar order was limited to the restoration of France's position has been contested by Aglan. The more traditional view holds that having suffered under Hitler's 'New Order', thoughts of European integration or the wider postwar order were far from the minds of French thinkers and Resistance fighters alike, even if the evidence amassed by Walter Lipgens in his seminal anthology of European integration has always suggested otherwise. Alya Aglan, *Temps De La Résistance* (Paris: Actes Sud, 2008); Patrick Pasture, "European Integration, Christian Democracy and the Development of a Secular Society: Continuities Beyond the Appearances", in *Rethinking European Christian Democracy* (Florence, Italy 2014); Walter Lipgens, ed. *Documents on the History of European Integration. Volume 1: Continental Plas for European Union 1939-45* (Berlin De Gruyter, 1984).

[16] It would be impossible to explain Jean Monnet's vision of European unity, for example, without reference to his profound concern for the French economy, or the transition of many British internationalists from imperial and European to Atlantic conceptions of regional union without

conceptions of the architecture of global order that suited national interests, the latter arguably produced different conceptions of the challenge of democratic modernity and the central tasks of a democratic global order itself. American New Dealers focused on the replication of a successful model of participative, technologically-advanced mass modernity. French internationalists, on the other hand, were more concerned that a democratic order protect individuals from the dangers of the modern state or, paradoxically, empower a technocratic elite, the weakness of which many in the Third Republic blamed for the disaster.[17] The existence of 'national' readings of the challenge of democratic modernity and 'national' differences should not be overstated however. While there are instances when national context and particular subnational intellectual families, be it French non-conformism, English pluralism or the shared experience of the pioneers of the TVA, fashioned distinctive responses to the challenge of democratic modernity, the visions explored below transcended national, political, confessional and philosophical boundaries to a remarkable extent.[18] Finally, as a key part of this research is also to compare and assess multiple visions of democratic global order, connecting these to contemporary debates, the greater variety offered by a multinational study and the insight it offers into the root causes for these differences is important.

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reference to the changing geopolitical fortunes of Britain over the course of the decade. As we will see further in chapter two, internationalists were very much influenced by power political calculations as much as their concern to use and fuse power and hierarchy with the pursuit of a democratic order. This historical investigation will not provide a constant commentary on the strategic machinations that lay behind visions of global order or focus on the effects of particular events, however, be it the Sterling Crisis or the Berlin Airlift. It will instead focus on instances where power political considerations can be seen to more directly subvert or stretch claims to democratic order. Similarly, it will not provide a biography of each thinkers' intellectual influences and formative experiences but draw attention to instances when particular ideas had a especially notable impact, including those that skewed visions of democratic modernity and democratic order in ways that were normatively problematic, in particular imperialist, social Darwinist and authoritarian ideas.

[17] Julian Jackson, *France: The Dark Years, 1940-1944* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). On the widespread view in wartime and postwar France that it had been the failure of the French State to realise that 'the leader of tomorrow is the engineer' and embrace more technocratic models of governance, see Philip G. Nord, *France's New Deal: From the Thirties to the Postwar Era* (Princeton, N.J. ; Woodstock: Princeton University Press, 2010), 50-52.

[18] Which is not to say that members of these groups such as socialists and Catholics did not articulate similar views. Shared experiences also fostered similar outlooks. International alumni of joint Allied planning boards or universities like the LSE and Columbia in New York, for example, often shared priorities and methods in their approach to postwar order. None had a monopoly on a particular issue or interpretation of challenge of democratic modernity however concerning, for example, social justice and welfare.

1.4 Significance

Many if not most of the ideas explored in this study were never realised. There was no European Planning Authority, no Atlantic Planning Board, no Council of Sages, no federal world or European government, no supranational corporatism and no radical decentralisation or pluralisation of democratic societies that instead became more centralised in the postwar period.

Nevertheless, what follows is not a study of obscure 'paths not taken' put forward by a fringe movement of internationalists obsessed with 'democratic' global order. The group of internationalists for whom the core challenges of democratic modernity were at the heart of the search for a new world order was much larger and more influential than any study of international thought or postwar planning in this period has recognised. As a result, the visions of democratic global order explored below are a vital part of the history of international thought and the postwar order. Firstly, despite the fact that their own visions of democratic order were never fully realised, many of the internationalists encountered in this story including Clark Eichelberger, Jean Monnet, René Cassin, David Mitrany and David Lilienthal did influence, directly and indirectly, many of the structures and broader objectives of the postwar order including the early European institutions and the United Nations.

Secondly, it is only possible to understand what vision of order triumphed in reference to what did not. While the order that eventually emerged was not the same as the visions below, it was these often more radical– and often far from liberal– democratic alternatives that dominated Western internationalists debates and were, at the very least, a vivid part of the intellectual context in which the diplomats, politicians and economists who finally agreed the outlines of the new order operated. More often, they were the direct opponents against which the architects of the postwar order had to articulate and defend less ambitious proposals that shied away from the burning questions of democratic modernity altogether or that, in the eyes

of many internationalists, did not go far enough. As we will see in chapter five, for example, from the vantage point of most of the thinkers in this study, the Bretton Woods agreements were not the victory of a bold vision of regulated global capitalism over Soviet Communism. It was victory of a mealy-mouthed, statist view of a democratic global order based on economic justice over their own more radical visions of supranational planning and economic equality.

As section two underscores, shifting our conception of the internationalist debate in the West to include these ideas fundamentally alters the interpretation of mid-century Western international thought and the postwar order. The contrasting notion that the order that emerged, from Bretton Woods and the UN to the ECSC, was the product of an uncontested liberal-realist 'postwar consensus' among Western international thinkers and the architects of the postwar order that has dominated the intellectual history of this period is revealed to be fundamentally misguided. While this story recognises that underlying the construction of a new world order was a debate between totalitarian and non-totalitarian forms of modernity, reflected in both the 'realist' concern with the geopolitical position of the West and the 'liberal' promotion of an open rules based system, it fails to recognise the extent to which visions of Western order were shaped by a profound debate concerning the nature of democratic modernity in the 20th century and the means of achieving it. Challenging the liberal, statist, international order that emerged were many other Western visions of democratic global order that, in contrast, posited a far more direct engagement between structures of a new global order and the construction of a new kind of democratic modernity. Many of these orders were also less than liberal in their operation and objectives.

Finally, the significance of this research is not only how it transforms our understanding of international thought and the emergence of the postwar order in the 1940s, but also how it might change the way we think about the relationship between global order and democracy today. It does so by inviting us to rethink this relationship, understanding democracy as an

essentially contested concept defined by a set of recurring dilemmas, as opposed to a set of core characteristics. The key question is not what is 'democracy' in a global context, but how does global order interact with and address the concerns associated with these dilemmas as they manifest at different points in time.

As we have seen, the core argument of this thesis is that we should take the language of democracy much more seriously than in the past in order to understand the visions of global order that emerged in the 1940s. Doing so, however, it does not seek to impose or extract an analytical model of 'democracy' or 'democratic global order'. On the contrary, it explicitly tries to break away from approaches to global order and democracy based on inflexible, essentialist and narrowly liberal interpretations of 'democracy' that have tended to reduce the significance of democracy in a global context to questions of representation and accountability.

Instead, the analysis focuses on ideas of global order and how these interacted with democracy which, in the 1940s, was not a subject of consensus but a deeply contested ideology composed of competing imperatives relating to the search for freedom in a complex society. These imperatives were very much rooted in their time; the birth of technological modernity, the palpable threat of the totalitarian state and the collision of mass politics with the accumulated social and economic challenges of the 19th century were clearly responsible for the acute concerns with welfare, participation, control and the balance between collective rights and identities and the individual that animated the visions of democratic order explored below. In spite of this, the conclusion argues that the concerns that dominated debates in the 1940s also reflect enduring tensions within idea of democracy itself, between participation and good governance, individual and group rights, pluralism and solidarism, hierarchy and equality, positive and negative liberty and indeed order and liberty more broadly that have shaped the history of democracy since the fifth century.

This view abandons narrow liberal conceptions of democracy and the antiseptic telos of the histories invoked to support it. Instead, it echoes WB Gallie and Michael Freeden, and treats democracy as a protean, prototypically contested concept or ideology that has been problematized and redefined throughout its history by evolving debates over the nature of liberty and the meaning of government of, by and for the people. Over the course of this history, moreover, democracy and liberalism have frequently been opposed.[19] It is by making a virtue of this contestation and using it to understand the ideas of global order that emerged in the 1940s that we can also rethink the relationship between global order and democracy today.

This relationship, the conclusion argues, shares important similarities to the 1940s. Today, contestation surrounding the nature of democracy is growing. Not only are we re-engaging with the enduring dilemmas of democracy but, in some cases, returning to the specific problems and arguments of the 1940s concerning, for example, the importance of economic justice to the existence of an authentic or 'economic democracy'. Most importantly, like the 1940s, addressing the renewed tension between participation and good governance or pluralism and solidarism implies changes to the existing global order. Once again, there is no way in which a new kind of democratic modernity can be imagined, let alone brought into being, without considering the role global order would have to play.

Amidst growing calls for more democratic global order, therefore, the conclusion argues that we should move away from the preoccupation with the representation of rising powers and democratic deficits and focus instead on how the democratic reform of global order reflects renewed contestation concerning the nature of freedom in a complex society, as it did in the 1940s. In light of specific similarities with the debates of that decade, we may have something to learn from revisiting the visions of democratic global order that were articulated then. More

[19] W. B. Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 56 (1956). Michael Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996).

importantly, however, by understanding the relationship between global order and democracy in terms of how global orders purport to address the enduring dilemmas of democracy in the modern world, we can get a better sense of the choices and trade-offs the pursuit of a democratic global order inevitably entails. While we may reject the decisions taken by internationalists in the 1940s, similar choices still have to be made today when we are confronted with many of the same tensions and dilemmas, between technocracy and participation, equality and hierarchy, pluralism and solidarism, that plagued internationalists in their pursuit of a democratic global order in the 1940s.

These need to be honestly and openly debated. This is not possible when, in contrast, we cling to visions of democratic order based on static, state-centric and often liberal ideals of democracy applied to the international, whether these generate 'Cosmopolitan' or 'Wilsonian' visions of participation and representation or fuel atavistic attempts to protect democracy from global order through national retrenchment. These escapist fantasies perpetuate binaries that oppose the idea of a democratic global order with technocracy, inequality and nationalism, fusing it with a narrowly participative, statist ideal that continues to hamper debates. Instead, the conclusion argues that we must accept that democracy in a global context is not a template for reform towards a perfect ideal of democratic order but a series of beliefs and choices about the nature and production of liberty in the modern world, and the dynamic relationship between global and domestic order that are invariably imperfect and normatively subjective. It is only by debating these imperfections frankly that we can mitigate the shortcomings of competing visions of democratic world order and, more importantly, decide if and how we want to pursue such visions at all.

1.5 Methodology

This argument has clear implications for the methodological and ontological basis of this research. What follows is, fundamentally, a work of intellectual history within the field of IR. Although it does not pretend to employ the 'extraordinarily demanding' method of the Cambridge School, it does, nevertheless, seek to adopt a 'genuinely historical' approach to international ideas informed by the 'broad historicist sensibility' of contextualism.[20] On that basis, it argues that the meaning of the word 'democracy', so prevalent in discussions of global order in the 1940s, must be recovered in the linguistic-historical context of the time through the reconstruction and exploration of overlapping debates about world order among a wide array of individuals and groups. Simply referring to what we might construe as the 'canonical texts' of 1940s international thought, including the abstract formulations of the Atlantic Charter and the founding documents of the UN, is not enough, and is likely to encourage interpretations of the role of democracy in postwar planning that reflect existing assumptions about the period and contemporary conceptions of global order and democracy. Analysed in context, it quickly becomes clear that 'democracy' in world order debates was neither a rhetorical platitude nor did it relate exclusively to the democratic distribution of rights and responsibilities within the international community, or forms of representation and accountability between citizens and international institutions. Instead, it referred to the way in which the new world order addressed pressing questions concerning the creation and survival of postwar, post-fascist democratic societies in a world where the European empires were increasingly contested and the Soviet Union loomed.

While this approach implies a fundamentally historicist ontology, this conclusion must be qualified. Much as it does not conform to the strong methodological claims of early contextualism, this research also rejects the historicist approach to political philosophy it

[20] John Dunn, *The History of Political Theory and Other Essays* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 22; Mark Bevir, "The Contextual Approach", in *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Political Philosophy*, ed. George Klosko (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 5.

promoted that argued that it was difficult, if not impossible, to say anything about patterns or traditions of thought across time and space, or to engage in any normative assessment or critique of these ideas.[21] This does not deny that we can usefully learn from simply recovering and engaging with visions of democratic order 1940s in the absence of this connection, much as Quentin Skinner demonstrated in his work on republican liberty. Showing how visions of democratic global order in the 1940s related to the specific concerns of that decade fulfils a similar didactic purpose by breaking down the anachronistic grand narratives and conceptual certainties relating to the nature of democracy in a global context that continue to constrain political/international imaginations today.

In addition, however, this thesis argues that these ideas are especially interesting not simply because they are different but because they can be situated within larger patterns of contestation surrounding democracy and the nature of liberty in the modern world that allow us to ask meaningful questions about the way in which our own visions of global order reflect and address these same unresolved tensions. In other words, while retaining a broadly historicist ontology in its approach to the history of ideas, it maintains that we can nevertheless couch past ideas at a sufficient level of abstraction at which they can be connected if not to 'perennial problems', then to a specific set of problems that emerged at a particular historical conjunction– in this case the emergence of global modernity– that are still relevant today. As the conclusion argues, while the dilemmas internationalists grappled with are inherent to the idea of democracy itself and are, in a sense, thus related to the 'perennial problem' of liberty; the way in which they were understood by internationalists in 1940s and

[21] This hardly a novel position today and indeed contesting the classic Skinnerian position that opposes the construction of 'perennial problems' and the 'myth of coherence' has a rich history of its own. A notable recent challenger is Mark Bevir: "Are There Perennial Problems in Political Theory?", *Political Studies* 42(1994); *The Logic of the History of Ideas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); "The Role of Contexts in Understanding and Explanation", *Human Studies,* 23 (2000); Mark Bevir, "The Contextual Approach", in *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Political Philosophy*, ed. George Klosko (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 57-89; Annabel Brett, "What Is Intellectual History Now", in *What Is History Now?*, ed. David Cannadine (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); David Boucher, *Texts in Context: Revisionist Methods for Studying the History of Ideas* (Dordrecht; Lancaster: Nijhoff, 1985); Quentin Skinner, *Visions of Politics. Volume 1, Regarding Method* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

the way in which they are relevant to us today is also much more connected to larger trends of liberal capitalist modernity as a result of which the tensions between solidarism and pluralism, participation and good governance or hierarchy and equality now play out along intersecting domestic and global dimensions. The visions of democratic global order that were articulated in the 1940s, and in particular their animating tensions and concerns, resonate beyond that decade but are to some extent temporally bound by the advent of global modernity.

This approach also opens up a much clearer space for unapologetic normative discussion. As Mark Bevir argues, by adopting a 'broader historicism' that uses the insights of the Cambridge School as a 'useful heuristic', because we are no longer seeking a single correct interpretation of a text but ascribing beliefs to its author, not only is there nothing to suggest we must interpret these beliefs in a way that severs any connection to our own concerns, 'we will be far more interested in their coherence than we would if interpretation were about identifying the particular speech-act being made'. We can, in other words, not only address 'perennial problems' across time but ask questions relating to the coherence of past ideas in relation to those problems.[22]

As we have seen, evaluating the internal coherence, contradictions and inconsistencies of visions of democratic order 1940s is a vital aspect of this research and, finally, of the way it connects to the enduring dilemmas of democratic global order. In what is ultimately the clearest break with its contextualist roots, this thesis argues that moving away from pure historicism while still recognising the historical specificity of our own beliefs, we can restore a much stronger normative dimension to the evaluation of evolving patterns of beliefs concerning the enduring dilemmas of democratic modernity in relation to the construction of global order.

[22] Bevir, "The Contextual Approach", 21-22.

1. 6 Global Order and Democracy in the History of International Thought

In the following chapters, the extent to which the language of democracy pervaded debates about world order in the 1940s will become clear. In spite of this, the dominant view characterises the period as a retreat from any grandiose Wilsonian style claims about 'international democracy'. The order that emerged from San Francisco and Bretton Woods was much more pragmatic than its predecessor and more modest than the Atlantic Charter. The UN's open membership to all 'peace-loving' nations, combined with the actual power structure of that organisation, is on this account taken as clear evidence that 'democracy' had been expunged from both the lexicon and the imagination of world order in the 1940s, with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights offering little proof to the contrary.[23]

Its replacement, according to most recent scholarship, was not only undemocratic but even anti-democratic. At the very least, as Stephen Wertheim argues, American internationalism was transformed into a vehicle for American power projection.[24] Other accounts are even less flattering, arguing that the ideological animus of America's 'conversion' to internationalism– and the United Nations system more broadly– was fundamentally imperial. It was a continuation– or transferal– of the imperial worldview that had dominated the League of Nations and most Western ideas of internationalism behind the facade of Wilsonian idealism.[25] Deeply undemocratic stuff, in other words, which in Mark Mazower's view was complemented by a second move away from any notions of international democracy in the

[23] Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History* (Cambridge, Mass.; London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010).
[24] Mark Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations*, Lawrence Stone Lectures (Princeton, N.J.; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009); *Governing the World: The History of an Idea* (London: Allen Lane, 2012); Sandrine Kott and Joe lle Droux, *Globalizing Social Rights: The International Labour Organization and Beyond* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Stephen Wertheim, "Instrumental Internationalism: The United Nations as America's Will to Lead the World," in *The UN and the Post-War Global Order: Dumbarton Oaks in Perspective after 70 years* (Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy, SOAS, University of London May 17-18 2014); "From League to UN Via American Power: Reconceiving Internationalism for U.S. World Leadership, 1940-1942," in *From the League of Nations to the United Nations: New Approaches to International Institutions* (European University Institute, FlorenceMarch 21-23 2013).
[25] Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations*. "The Strange Triumph of Human Rights, 1933-1950", *The Historical Journal* 47, no. 2 (2004).

postwar period represented by the advent of global technocracy. In the 1940s, the new agencies of economic management and global development increased the power of unelected and unmonitored technocrats– Mazower's 'world making' social scientists and economists– to a hitherto unknown degree. The continued dominance of this elite in the structures of global governance is, on this account, arguably the most enduring intellectual and practical legacy of 1940s internationalism.[26] Not all interpretations of rise of 'technical internationalism' are quite so negative. Some recent interpretations have adopted a more neutral, even path dependent approach to the rise of experts within international organisations.[27] Nevertheless, as we will see later in the investigation, the association between the new postwar order and a more decisive shift towards technocratic global governance is often combined with an implicit acknowledgement that part of the motivation for expanding the 'technical' activities of international organisations was to keep politics and democracy out of the business of global governance and that, as a result, technocratic and democratic ideas of order are inherently opposed.

The general historiography and 'liberal' IR literature, although less damning, accepts that the cooperative ambitions of postwar order from the Security Council to Bretton Woods were not derived from or related to any specific conception of world order and democracy.[28] In the narrative of liberal world order championed by John Ikenberry and others, any explicit discussion of democracy is conspicuous by its absence. These interpretations nevertheless

[26] Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea*, 291. See also James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State : How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*, Yale Agrarian Studies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 89.
[27] See for example Marc Frey, Sönke Kunkel, and Corinna R. Unger, *International Organizations and Development, 1945-1990*, Palgrave Macmillan Transnational History Series (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). Johan Schot and Vincent Lagendijk, "Technocratic Internationalism in the Interwar Years: Building Europe on Motorways and Electricity Networks", *Journal of Modern European History* 6, no. 2 (2008); Akira Iriye, *Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). Ashworth, *A History of International Thought: From the Origins of the Modern State to Academic International Relations*.
[28] E.g. Hoopes and Brinkley, *FDR and the Creation of the U.N*; Divine, *Second Chance. The Triumph of Internationalism in America During World War II*; Woolner, Kimball, and Reynolds, *FDR's World: War, Peace, and Legacies*; Paul M. Kennedy, *The Parliament of Man: The United Nations and the Quest for World Government* (London: Penguin, 2007). G. John Ikenberry, *The Crisis of American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the Twenty-First Century* (Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009).

agree that the liberal ideal of an open, institutionalised, rules-based order rowed back from the attempt to mimic democracy in its operation, embracing American leadership instead. Nevertheless, the construction of the postwar liberal order was still linked with the ambition to 'make the world safe for democracy' as part of the United States struggle against the Soviet Union. While an idea of democratic order– the triumph and spread of democratic systems– is therefore implicit in this liberal view, there is no acknowledgement either of the crisis of liberal modernity within the West, or the way this generated multiple ideas of democratic order among Western thinkers and postwar planners.[29]

In this regard, the notion of 'embedded liberalism' associated with John Ruggie offers a slightly deeper account of the connection between the new liberal world order and democracy.[30] The Anglo-American architects of this order recognised the need for Western democracies to address growing popular demands for economic security and prosperity that would match the bountiful image of the Soviet Union. Their response was to devise a multilateral economic order that would guarantee stability within which Western states would pursue full employment and other policies to secure the welfare of their citizens and the stability of democratic rule.

In both cases, however, while these liberal stories acknowledge that confrontation between the rival 'democratic' concepts of East and West played into the construction of the new order, there is no sense of how the perceived crisis of liberal modernity within the West played into multiple and competing conceptions of democratic world order, many of which

[29] *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001); *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order*, (Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2011); Stewart Patrick, *Best Laid Plans: The Origins of American Multilateralism* (Lanham, Md. ; Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009).

[30] John Gerard Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order", *International Organization* 36, no. 2 (1982). Ikenberry's early articles on the postwar order pressed a similar view, only later shifting to focus more exclusively to the 'open' and 'rules-based' and more narrowly international qualities of the liberal world order: G. John Ikenberry, "Creating Yesterday's New World Order: Keynesian "New Thinking" and the Anglo-American Postwar Settlement" in *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change*, ed. Judith Goldstein and Robert O Keohane (New York: Cornell University Press, 1993).

less than liberal, and centrality of these debates in discussions of postwar order. Furthermore, beyond the thin notion of 'updated' or 'realistic' Wilsonianism, there is no sense of how ideas intersected with the longer history of thinking about global order and democracy. More fundamentally, these approaches suffer from a deeper failure to pluralise internationalism and accept the existence of multiple visions of global order at all.

Similarly, outside the confines of IR's liberal canon, 'democracy' commonly appears in historical discussions of postwar order only as a descriptive reference to the identity of the Western Alliance in the Cold War and, more vaguely still, to the kind of order it promised to people on the other side of the iron curtain and around the world. Perhaps the most enduring association of democracy with a specific claim for change in the international order in the postwar period is the struggle against empire and, not unrelated to this, the later struggle of 1970s General Assembly to bolster its authority. This connection between 'international democracy' and national self-determination– arguably the most enduring 'Wilsonian' legacy, albeit one based on a misinterpretation of Wilson's intentions– is, however, not one that was widely shared among internationalists in the West in this decade.[31]

Despite criticism from non-Western internationalists and Western internationalists like W.E.B Du Bois, this was not simply a product of hidden imperialism. There would be no 'democratic' world order, Du Bois argued, as long as the 'colour line' kept the colonised from becoming 'co-partners in that democracy which alone can ensure peace among men' as citizens of free nations.[32] Yet even Du Bois did not tie his vision of liberty and peaceful world order exclusively to national self-determination and sovereign equality.[33] Whereas Du Bois focused on African-Asian solidarism as the foundation of a democratic international system,

[31] See Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
[32] W. E. B. Du Bois, *Color and Democracy: Colonies and Peace* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1945), 85.
[33] W. E. B. Du Bois, Bill Mullen, and Cathryn Watson, *W.E.B. Du Bois on Asia: Crossing the World Color Line*, 1st ed. ed. (Jackson, Miss.: University Press of Mississippi, 2005), 35-7.

the views of another African-American internationalist, Ralph Bunche, were more typical of the new ambivalence towards self-determination as the basis of a democratic world order in the West, even among anti-imperial internationalists in the 1940s. Bunche embraced the right to self-determination in the Atlantic Charter, but he had no specific attachment to the nation state as its requisite form, emphasising the political, social and economic elements of active citizenship instead. Senegalese thinker Léopold Sénghor advocated a system of transnational citizenship, local autonomy and regional solidarity, not nationhood, as the basis for a 'democratic' international order founded on 'true self-determination'.[34]

Most colonial thinkers, from Gandhi to Césaire, did associate the idea of a democratic global order with national independence. The key point, however, is that despite appearances, the suggestion that national self-determination was the key intellectual battleground in visions of democratic world order in the 1940s is not altogether accurate. On the contrary, the decade was characterised by a different kind of consensus that, as EH Carr put it, 'the crisis of national self-determination, which is in some sense the counterpart of democracy in the international sphere' meant that a foundations of a democratic global order had to be sought elsewhere.[35]

Among new works which have to some extent attempted to restore the link between domestic political and intellectual debates and international order a few have, albeit obliquely, explored the role of democracy in postwar international order. These are historians that have recently begun to connect the postwar 'reinvention' of democracy in Europe via the emergence of two powerful new hybrids– Christian Democracy and Social Democracy– to the emergence of particular ideas and organisations of international order, namely human rights, the European

[34] Frederick Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 1945-1960* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2014), 11.
[35] Carr, *Conditions of Peace,* 38; Walter Lippmann, *U.S. War Aims* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1944), 107.

Union and failed attempts at revitalised empire.[36] On the US side, a crop of new works has focused on the New Deal and the extent to which it inspired the creation of a new world order based on human rights, social and economic justice, or international development (although there is little agreement between these interpretations).[37]

It remains, however, that the importance and role of democracy in relation to global order has not been part of any systematic analysis of postwar visions of world order in either an explicit or comparative sense. More surprisingly still, it has not been studied as a distinct evolving feature of international thought in any period.[38] Even among new works that examine the transmission and evolution of international ideas, no attempt has been made to separate and track meanings of democracy in relation to global order throughout history, including the 1940s.[39] Meanwhile, new arguments about the 'New Deal for the World', the reactionary

[36] On Christian Democracy and Human Rights see Jan-Werner Müller, *Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in Twentieth-Century Europe* (New Haven, CT ; London: Yale University Press, 2011); *Christian Democracy: A New Intellectual History* (Harvard University Press, Forthcoming). Marco Duranti, "Conservatives and the European Convention on Human Rights", in *Toward a New Moral World Order Menschenrechtspolitik Und Volkerrecht Seit 1945*, ed. Norbert Frei and Annette Weinke (Weimar: Wallstein Verlag, 2013); "'A Blessed Act of Oblivion': Human Rights, European Unity and Postwar Reconciliation," in *Reconciliation, Civil Society, and the Politics of Memory: Transnational Initiatives in the 20th and 21st Century*, ed. B. Schwelling (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2012). On Social Democracy see Dan Stone, *The Oxford Handbook of Postwar European History*, First edition. ed. (2012). Especially the chapter by Geoff Eley: "Corporatism and the Social Democratic Moment: The Postwar Settlement, 1945–1973"; On Empire see Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation : Remaking France and French Africa, 1945-1960*. John Darwin, *The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830-1970* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Anne Deighton, "Entente Neo-Coloniale?: Ernest Bevin and the Proposals for an Anglo–French Third World Power, 1945–1949", *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 17, no. 4 (2006).

[37] See Elizabeth Borgwardt, *A New Deal for the World: America's Vision for Human Rights* (Cambridge, Mass.; London: Belknap, 2005); David Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010); David Ellwood, *The Shock of America: Europe and the Challenge of the Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). Kiran Klaus Patel, *The New Deal: A Global History* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016).Connecting the New Deal to thinking about world order is not entirely new: Anne Marie Slaughter, "Regulating the World: Multilateralism, International Law, and the Projection of the New Deal Regulatory State" in *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form*, ed. John Ruggie (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992); Ikenberry, "Creating Yesterday's New World Order: Keynesian "New Thinking" and the Anglo-American Postwar Settlement".

[38] With some partial exceptions. e.g. Bell, "Before the Democratic Peace: Racial Utopianism, Empire, and the Abolition of War", *European Journal of International Relations* 20, no. 3 (2014). Bell's exploration of 19th century articulations of 'democratic peace theory' in Britain highlights the exclusionary, racist and power political practices and ambitions that often accompanied them.

[39] See Samuel Moyn and Andrew Sartori, eds., *Global Intellectual History*, Columbia Studies in International and Global History (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013); S. L Lewis and S Ganger, "Forum: A World of Ideas: New Pathways in Global Intellectual History, c.1880–1930",

roots of the European Union or Human rights remain at best partial and at worst parochial. In some cases, we will see that they are simply unconvincing.[40]

Part of the problem is thus that there has been no attempt to conceptualise what we mean and what we have meant historically when we talk about world order and democracy or a democratic global order. References range from Kant, Cosmopolitanism and Democratic Peace Theory to Woodrow Wilson, whose own phrase to 'make the world safe for democracy' remains one of the most misunderstood sentences uttered in the history of international thought in the twentieth century. Did it simply mean that democracy would flourish in a peaceful world guaranteed by collective security, or was Wilson referring to a vision of international democracy rooted in the sovereignty of global public opinion; the sovereign equality of small and large states enshrined in an egalitarian, state-based, international organisation; the right to national self-determination; the 'democratisation' of foreign policy making or even, as Walter Lippmann insisted in 1944 (as an excuse for rejecting the idea of 'international democracy') the 'sovereignty of mankind' in a global super-state.[41] There is still no consensus on this important issue.[42]

Similarly, while cosmopolitanism remains associated with the goal of building a 'democratic' global order, the defining characteristics of this order remain open to debate. Contemporary ideas of 'Cosmopolitan democracy' emphasise 'transposition': the reproduction of representative democracy at a regional or even global level.[43] In the past, however, many

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Modern Intellectual History 10, no. 2 (2013). Some work is moving in this direction: Bell, "Before the Democratic Peace: Racial Utopianism, Empire, and the Abolition of War"; "Making and Taking Worlds" in *Global Intellectual History*, ed. Samuel Moyn and Andrew Sartori (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013).

[40]In particular the idea that the technocratic structure of the European Union reflected a Christian Democratic effort to 'constrain' democracy as argued by Müller, *Christian Democracy: A New Intellectual History*; Borgwardt, *A New Deal for the World: America's Vision for Human Rights*.

[41]Lippmann, *U.S. War Aims,* 111.

[42]For a range of views, see Stephen Wertheim, "The Wilsonian Chimera: Why Debating Wilson's Vision Hasn't Saved American Foreign Relations", *White House Studies* 10, no. 4 (2011); Ikenberry, *The Crisis of American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the Twenty-First Century*.

[43] 'Transposition' is a phrase associated with Pierre Rosanvallon who, building on work of Jürgen Habermas and David Held among others, has argued for the extension of representative democracy to

'cosmopolitan' visions of order were decidedly less concerned with questions of supranational representation and the creation of a democratic world government. Instead, they focused on promoting the unity of mankind through various means, including education, culture, language and science.[44] In the 19th century variant championed by Giuseppe Mazzini, a democratic order was one that conjoined world citizenship and republicanism with nationalism. Mazzini envisioned a world of republican nation states imbued with a cooperative 'cosmopolitan' ethos that was finally not dissimilar to some accounts of Wilsonianism and contemporary democratic peace theory.[45]

In the absence of consensus surrounding the existing labels used to describe thinking about global order and democracy, arguments that democracy 'dropped out' of thinking about global order in the 1940s because it was not 'Wilsonian' or 'Cosmopolitan' are even less convincing. Problematically, Stephen Wertheim's own analysis rests on the equation of the idea of a democratic world order with the Wilsonian ambition to render global public opinion a credible force in world politics.[46] Because this argument was abandoned in the 1940s, he suggests, it is safe to say that the quest for a democratic world order as a whole was also abandoned.

By the same token, the scholarship that refers not to the absence but the disappointment of dreams for a more 'democratic' world order tend to point to a multitude of 'Wilsonian' and 'Cosmopolitan' ambitions relating to voting structures, state representation, the right to individual petition and international law that are very much open to debate and that, at a

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a supranational level on the grounds that the '''dysfunction'' of the contemporary representative democracy is the fault simply of the framework of its exercise, and not of its very forms'. Pierre Rosanvallon and Samuel Moyn, *Democracy Past and Future* (New York; Chichester: Columbia University Press, 2006), 228. Daniele Archibugi and David Held, *Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order* (Cambridge: Polity, 1995).

[44] Derek Benjamin Heater, *World Citizenship and Government: Cosmopolitan Ideas in the History of Western Political Thought* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996).

[45] Giuseppe Mazzini, *Cosmopolitanismo E Nazione: Scritti Sulla Democrazia, L'autodeterminazione Dei Popoli E Le Relazioni Internazionali* (Rome: Elliot Edizioni s.r.l., 2011).

[46] Wertheim, "Instrumental Internationalism: The United Nations as America's Will to Lead the World."

deeper level, reinforce the idea that the relationship between global order and democracy was and should be conceived primarily in terms of the relationship between individuals and international institutions, state representation and the like. In most cases, moreover, it is worth adding that it simply remains unclear whether we should conclude that those pressing for a more 'democratic' postwar order felt most betrayed by the absence of a directly elected world government or, more prosaically, the weakness of the General Assembly or the ICJ.[47]

Most seriously, regardless of how we pin down Wilsonianism or Cosmopolitanism among existing interpretations, using these labels to describe democratic ambitions in the 1940s finds little support in the evidence. The historical investigation clearly shows how arguments for and against different kinds of order, from regional unions to the United Nations, did not stem from obviously 'Wilsonian' or 'Cosmopolitan' conceptions of global order and democracy. Crucially, this was true even when visions of democratic global order seemed to display 'Wilsonian' or 'Cosmopolitan' preoccupations with national representation, institutional accountability, world government even the importance of world public opinion. In these cases, we will see how the ideas of supposed 'Wilsonians' like Clark Eichelberger and James

[47] Divine, for example, talks about 'disappointment' from a largely 'Wilsonian' vantage point, that the weakness of the General Assembly blighted hopes for 'a truly democratic world body in which all nations, large and small, would join together in the quest for enduring peace'. Sluga– albeit indirectly– suggests something similar, saying that the UN Charter exposed awkward gaps 'between the versions of democratic international government circulating around San Francisco and the institution that was created…the biggest loser was the individual. The biggest winner in the new structure was the sovereign state, or more specifically those states with a place on the Security Council'. Mazower describes the disappointment of 'Dumbarton Hoax' that again focused on the betrayal of the 'Wilsonian dream' represented by the power structure of the new organization, and its additional failure to promote national self-determination, international law and the more 'cosmopolitan' ambition of human rights. Kennedy discusses an array of 'Wilsonian' and 'Cosmopolitan' disappointments focusing on the fate of small states and the weakness of the General Assembly vis-à-vis the Security Council, the weakness of the ICJ as well as dashed hopes for a more overtly 'cosmopolitan' dream of elected global parliament whose role went beyond the Wilsonian vision of a chamber as a 'global barometer' of world opinion. Robert Alexander Divine, *Second Chance. The Triumph of Internationalism in America During World War II* (New York: Atheneum, 1967), 276; Glenda Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 94; Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea* (London: Allen Lane, 2012), 209-212; Paul M. Kennedy, *The Parliament of Man: The United Nations and the Quest for World Government* (London: Penguin, 2007), 211 and chapter seven.

Shotwell and 'Cosmopolitans' like HG Wells were, in fact, adapted to address the challenges of democratic modernity in the mid-century.[48]

The existing lexicon of international thought provides us with no language to describe such visions. Finally, this shortcoming is also because of the shared tendency towards idealism in the existing ways we have tried to conceptualise thinking about global order and democracy. As a result, while there is no consensus on what a democratic global order is or has been in the past, there is some shared notion of what it is not. What unites advocates of a more democratic global order past and present is, supposedly, the desire to transcend or otherwise transform the existing institutions of international society including hierarchy, power politics and even the dominance of state actors. There is no sense in existing conceptions of global order and democracy that, in contrast, democratic visions of order could be technocratic, unequal and even exclusive by design. A core feature of visions of democratic global order in the 1940s, it is clear that we need an alternative conceptualisation of global order and democracy that is capable of bringing these seemingly undemocratic features 'in' to our understanding of these ideas themselves.

This investigation thus fills a very real gap in our understanding and approach to ideas about global order and democracy in this period and in the wider historical and international relations scholarship. In so doing, it problematizes many of these 'postwar' stories of that have been built out of an around the 1930s and 1940s in both disciplines. It also, however, seeks to contribute to new research agendas in history and international relations and builds on much new work on the history of international thought in the 20th century.

[48] Robert Divine, for example, portrays Shotwell and Eichelberger– who ran the League of Nations Association in the United States in the mid-1930s, as keeping the 'Wilsonian Spirit' alive through the aims and activities their new organization, the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace (CSOP) established in 1939. Divine, *Second Chance. The Triumph of Internationalism in America During World War II,* 26.

In recent years, the history of international institutions, internationalism, international theory and 'global intellectual history' has flourished. Pioneering work has problematized and pluralised internationalism and, most recently, historical conceptions of the global.[49] Substantively, this new work has uncovered a rich variety of internationalist ideas that galvanised politicians, intellectuals and activists around the world in the 19th and 20th centuries, and yielded an increasingly sophisticated map of the evolution of key themes in global order in the history of international thought: cosmopolitanism, federation, empire and the global itself. Among these, the focus on the dynamic interaction between imperialism and internationalism has been particularly notable.[50] Historians have also revisited and revised the history of international institutions, particularly the League of Nations, through fine-grained studies of the ideas and actions of the groups of intellectuals and practitioners that built them.[51] Others have focused on the movement and transformation of ideas of global order across time and space, highlighting the often unpredictable and unusual patterns of reception and re-articulation of international ideas.[52] While methods are diverse, the result has been to fundamentally challenge standard accounts of international institutions, the ideas behind them and their operation through an emphasis on historical context, complexity and contestation.

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[49] Bell, "Making and Taking Worlds", 257; Patricia Clavin and Glenda Sluga, eds., *Twentieth Century Internationalisms: A History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism*.

[50] Duncan Bell, *The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future of World Order, 1860-1900* (Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007); Jeanne Morefield, *Covenants without Swords: Idealist Liberalism and the Spirit of Empire* (Princeton, N.J.; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005); David Long and Brian C. Schmidt, *Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of International Relations* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 2005); Casper Sylvest, *British Liberal Internationalism, 1880-1930: Making Progress?* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009); Ashworth, *A History of International Thought: From the Origins of the Modern State to Academic International Relations*; Heater, *World Citizenship and Government: Cosmopolitan Ideas in the History of Western Political Thought*; Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea*; Patricia Clavin, "Interwar Internationalism: Conceptualising Transnational Thought and Action, 1919-1939", in *Iternationalism Reconfigured: Transnational Ideas and Movements between the World Wars*, ed. Daniel Laqua (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2011); David Long and Peter Wilson, *Thinkers of the Twenty Year' Crisis: Inter-War Idealism Reassessed* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). Cemil Aydin, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought* (New York; Chichester: Columbia University Press, 2007).

[51] Patricia Clavin, *Securing the World Economy: The Reinvention of the League of Nations, 1920-1946* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). Susan Pedersen, "Back to the League of Nations", *American Historical Review* 112, no. 4 (2007); *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

[52] Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism*. Rana Mitter, "Imperialism, Transnationalism, and the Reconstruction of Post-War China: UNRRA in China,1944–7", *Past and Present* Supplement 8 (2013).

This thesis contributes to the growing body of work that emphasises plurality and contestation in the history of thinking about the international. It also extends the analysis beyond the interwar years and the League of Nations where much new work is focused and reintroduces a greater emphasis on discontinuity.[53] This has been considered somewhat unfashionable in the rush to uncover 'hidden continuities' and, above all, demonstrate the enduring influence of imperial practices and mentalities and older 'traditions' of international thought. That said, the alternative offered in this study is not a reversion to the 'stunde null' interpretation of postwar history, nor does it claim that the 1940s marked an intellectual caesura in the history of international thought. There is no doubt that the intellectual inheritance of imperialism and pre-war internationalism shaped visions of global order in the 1940s. Equally, the central themes of supranational union, human rights, economic justice and technocracy were certainly not entirely new to internationalist thought and debate.[54] What this research will show, however, is how– like considerations of power and national interest– older ideas collided and combined with the quest to build a democratic world order in the 1940s that was more strongly focused on the crisis of democratic modernity– or the crisis of man– in the 20th century and the way in which this intersected with the advent of the global than has hitherto been acknowledged.

Substantively, despite the preoccupation with the interwar period, the historical investigation will also build on new work that has begun to uncover important themes of internationalist discussion in the 1940s, connecting it to the ways in which internationalists used ideas of global order to address the challenge of democratic modernity. These include recent work on internationalism, internationalist movements, institutions and rights but also work not

[53] Although there has also been a lot of interest in revisiting the ideas, individuals and early institutionalisation of the United Nations and, more recently, of looking at the connections between the League and the United Nations. Sunil Amrith and Glenda Sluga, "New Histories of the United Nations," *Journal of World History* 19, no. 3 (2008). And forthcoming edited by Simon Jackson and Alanna O'Malley: *From the League of Nations to the United Nations: New Approaches to International Institutions* (2016)

[54] See note 5 above.

specifically concerned with internationalism or global order, including new scholarship on the French Union, interwar and postwar France, the New Deal, and Christian Democracy in Europe.

International Relations scholarship has also witnessed a new emphasis on plurality and the global in recent years. Supporters of the idea of the Western led 'liberal world order' as an historical narrative and extant reality are increasingly beleaguered as discourses on global order become increasingly fractured. Growing claims for the recognition of non-Western ideas and experiences of order, captured in Amitav Acharya's metaphor of a 'multiplex world', have underscored the necessity for non-Western perspectives on order and international relations to be written back into the past as well as shaping the future.[55] New work on non-Western approaches to IR and non-Western contributions to the construction of international institutions and norms has begun to do this alongside analyses of how Western conceptions of order and the global itself have displaced alternatives and dominated understandings of global politics.[56] While this research focuses on Western ideas of democratic global order and not ideas of the global per se, it is part of this wider effort to restore contestation and plurality to understandings of global order and problematize the simplistic and often ahistorical narratives of the 'Western' and 'liberal' postwar order.

Finally, this research also contributes to new work in the subfield of 'historical international relations' that has questioned the projection of IR's paradigmatic debates onto the history of the discipline and begun to rethink the content and categorisation of international theory in

[55] Amitav Acharya, *The End of American World Order* (Cambridge: Polity, 2014). The International Studies Association Convention in 2015 on 'Global IR and Regional Worlds: A New Agenda for International Studies' underscores the new preoccupation with developing both more diverse and inclusive approaches to the study and conceptualisation of IR and global politics.

[56] Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and Beyond Asia* (London; New York: Routledge, 2010). Karoline Postel-Vinay, "European Power and the Mapping of Global Order", in *Echoes of Empire: Memory, Identity and Colonial Legacies*, ed. Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Berny Sèbe, and Gabrielle Maas (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015); "The Historicity of the International Region: Revisiting the "Europe and the Rest" Divide", *Geopolitics* 12(2007). John M. Hobson, *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western International Theory, 1760-2010* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

the past in new and interesting ways.[57] In so doing, this work has also begun to undermine old binaries between realism/idealism, nationalism/internationalism, domestic/global politics that have contributed to the misinterpretation of ideas of global order in the 1940s, although these scholars have not, as yet, extended their analysis to this period. As a result, the following clearly builds on and contributes to this research agenda. In the first instance, it contests the dominant image of 1940s as the dawn of the golden age of classical realism, demonstrating how much 'realist' thought in this period was in fact deeply concerned with key issues of democratic modernity, as well as illustrating the many different kinds of ideas that were in circulation outside the small circle of 'realist' thinkers and future Cold Warriors that have preoccupied international relations scholars. Secondly, it demonstrates how visions of democratic global order in the 1940s were not confined to the separate realm of 'the international' defined by the 'problem of anarchy' but emerged from domestic debates surrounding the nature of liberty in a complex society, underscoring the false separation of 'domestic' and 'international' political thought. Thirdly, it clearly shows how internationalists in this period were not only moved by nationalist considerations but believed in the use of power and hierarchy for the achievement of progressive ends.

These arguments are expanded and reinforced throughout the historical investigation, as are the larger critiques of the one-dimensional liberal narrative of postwar order and the inadequacy of Wilsonian and Cosmopolitan approaches to democratic ideas in this period. Different chapters will also engage with specific debates and bodies of scholarship and build

[57] Brian Schmidt's The Political Discourse of Anarchy, for example, emphasises the much greater continuity between pre and post WWII conceptualisations of international relations and the problem of world order Brian C. Schmidt, *The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International Relations* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998). Similarly see Lucian M. Ashworth, "Did the Realist-Idealist Great Debate Really Happen? A Revisionist History of International Relations", *International Relations* 16, no. 1 (2002); *Where Are the Idealists in Inter-War International Relations?* (Limerick: University of Limerick, Department of Politics and Public Administration, 2005); David Long and Peter Wilson, *Thinkers of the Twenty Year' Crisis: Inter-War Idealism Reassessed*. Moving away from 'great debates' to novel and interesting approaches to thinking about world order and international relations in history, notable and diverse examples include: Edward Keene, *Beyond the Anarchical Society : Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics*. Karma Nabulsi, *Traditions of War: Occupation, Resistance, and the Law*. Hidemi Suganami, *The Domestic Analogy and World Order Proposals* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

on and contribute to these literatures. Hence chapter three on unionist ideas engages with the substantial historiography of European integration, questioning how traditional distinctions between supranationalism, intergovernmentalism, functionalism and federalism have contributed to understandings and misunderstandings of democracy in visions of regional and indeed global union. It also considers the implications of historical work on European socialism and Christian Democracy in relation to ideas of global order. Chapter four shows how competing positions on the origins and significance of human rights in the 1940s have helped and hindered our understanding of the ways in which human rights underwrote visions of democratic world order. Connecting human rights to arguments designed to preserve, transform and extend liberty, the chapter also draws on new historical scholarship that has focused on individual thinkers and social rights in the 1940s.

The examination of the prominent theme of 'economic democracy' in chapter five challenges the established narrative of 'embedded liberalism' and the excessive focus on competing Anglo-American visions of economic order supposedly embodied by Harry White and Keynes at Bretton Woods. Together, these stories have pushed out many alternative ideas of economic order from the intellectual history of this period that were, crucially, connected to the widely discussed notion of 'economic democracy'. Exploring these alternatives, the chapter once again builds on new work that has to some extent recognised the new prominence of questions of economic justice and welfare in world order debates in this period. What this work has failed to do, however, is to recognise and address the fact that economic justice meant different things to different internationalists and, in many cases, to spell out what its advocates actually sought. Instead, many of these works have tended to tie the 'freedom from want' proclaimed in the Atlantic Charter to a singular vision of

economic order defined either by international development and modernisation, or the ideal of national welfare policy in the context of global growth and stability that defines the idea of 'embedded liberalism'. While some have implied that the unprecedented focus on social and economic justice in debates on world order in the 1940s amounted to a missed opportunity to elaborate a fairer economic order, the details of the paths not taken have remained extremely vague. Instead, the chapter tries to show how specific visions of regional economic planning and international development emerged that were tied to visions of democratic global order that to preserve, transform and extend liberty worldwide.

The final chapter engages the varied literature surrounding the rise of overtly technocratic ideas of world order in this period. Overall, it shows that while these ideas are often read as evidence of the non and even anti-democratic character of thinking about global order in the 1940s, technocratic visions order not only sought to address the challenges facing democratic societies, their sponsors were acutely aware of the contradictory nature of this effort and tried hard to justify and mitigate this tension through systems of accountability and participation. In so doing, this chapter also draws on new work exploring the ideas of individual technocrats like Jean Monnet and the rise of technocratic ideas in the interwar period within states and international institutions.

The conclusion returns to the broader significance of this research for contemporary debates about global order and democracy. Here too, new work focussing on the emergence of alternative models of democracy and challenges to the liberal world order points us towards rethinking the relationship between global order and democracy in light of the enduring challenge of democratic modernity in the 21st century and its interlocking global and domestic dimensions. It is a direction we have not yet taken however. The following makes the case for why we should.

Chapter 2

Order and the Challenge of Democratic Modernity

2.1 Introduction

In November 1941, two months after Roosevelt and Churchill promised a 'world free of want and fear' in the Atlantic Charter and one month before Pearl Harbor, the head of the Foreign Policy Association in New York, Vera Dean, published *The Struggle for World Order*. In it she wrote that the President's Four Freedoms speech– the inspiration for the Charter– had illuminated the 'real task' facing the West in its confrontation with totalitarianism: 'the task of defining the democratic concept of the postwar order in such a way as to convince people throughout the world that a victory of the Western powers would be, not the closing act of the drama, but the curtain raiser for a period of expanded and reinvigorated democracy'.[58]

This task, Dean explained, was to resolve the challenge that faced all remaining democratic systems in the 1940s. In order to survive and flourish, democracies had to establish a 'new social order' that could guarantee the basic welfare of all people, in which individuals would be neither isolated non-social atoms nor crushed under the weight of nationalist or communist collectivism. In contrast to the liberal democracies of the 19th century and totalitarianisms of the 20th century, this new order would succeed in reconciling both the positive and negative aspects of liberty in its provision of higher living standards. It would also reconcile the individual and communal aspects of liberty. Individuals would be 'integrated in communal life' while remaining free. They would, in so doing, inhabit a new democratic space: 'a vast

[58] Vera Micheles Dean, *The Struggle for World Order* (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1941), 22.

middle ground for fruitful cooperative living…both on the national and international plane' that lay between the extremes of individualism and statism.[59]

The pursuit of this new ideal of liberty, or 'philosophy of life' as Dean described it, contained inherent dangers.[60] Securing greater welfare would involve abandoning the laissez-faire system of global capitalism in favour of some form of 'planned national and international order' that would inevitably involve giving 'much greater authority to governments' and expert bodies. Globally, unequal 'imperialistic' relationships between advanced and developing countries would continue to exist, albeit in the pursuit of this democratic ideal. Steering a course between statism and individualism, hierarchy and equality would be perilous. How the balance would be struck would be the subject of debate in the critical years to come. Yet there was no alternative but to grapple with the problem: 'This conflict between the desire for order and the desire for freedom creates the real dilemma of democracy, which must be solved before we can develop a new democratic order in international affairs.' Only a democratic order, Dean insisted, would secure peace.[61]

Dean's views were not unique. Across the literature on global order in this period, calls to build a 'democratic' postwar order 'based on liberty' were tied to the emergence of a 'redefined', 'new', 'authentic' 'true', 'integral' or 'economic' democracy that, much like Dean's 'new horizon of democracy' fused welfare with more meaningful forms of communal and political life.[62]

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[59] Ibid, 24-5.
[60] Ibid, 25.
[61] Ibid, 50, 55.
[62] Ibid, 94. Examples of the use of these terms recur throughout the following. Catholic thinkers like Alexandre Marc and Jacques Maritain are particularly notable for their focus on 'authentic' and 'integral' democracy; 'Economic democracy', as we will see in chapter five, was a fairly ubiquitous expression. Others like EH Carr talked more straightforwardly about the redefinition of democracy (see note 67 below).

To begin the investigation into these visions of order, however, Dean's view remains particularly useful. It highlights not only the centrality but the core dimensions of and tensions within what this thesis calls the challenge of democratic modernity that lay at the heart of thinking about order in mid 20th century.

First, it underscores the central fact that visions of world order in the 1940s emerged from a deep sense of crisis surrounding liberal capitalist modernity. Virtually ignored in the existing scholarship, internationalists in the 1940s were motivated by a profound belief that the tragedy of the first half of the 20th century had resulted from the failure of the Western ideals of liberty that had underwritten the pre-war order, not anarchy, fascism or power politics per se. 'The spirit of liberty', wrote economist and noted author on international affairs Barbara Ward, had produced its own rejection. The West's failure to control the liberating forces of industrialism, science, technology and nationalism had, paradoxically, produced 'the mystery of iniquity which has existed in our midst' which in turn led to the destruction of democracy, the rise of the total state and the 'abyss'.[63] Dean called this 'the Western betrayal of democracy' which had left the masses impoverished and disenfranchised. As a result, Europeans had used their collective political power to destroy liberal democracies in search of the justice, belonging, and control or 'self-determination' these systems could not provide in the modern world.[64] EH Carr's *Conditions of Peace* was particularly frank. The interrelated crisis of the three central tenets of 19th century liberalism: laissez-faire capitalism, parliamentary democracy and national self-determination had led the world to the brink of annihilation.[65]

Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia and even growing unrest in Asia, were evidence that the West as a whole had reached its ideological nadir. Confronting these foes, it was incumbent on the

[63] Barbara Ward, *Policy for the West* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1951), 46-7.
[64] Dean, *The Struggle for World Order,* 20-21.
[65] Carr, *Conditions of Peace*. For a good illustration of how widespread such views were, and indeed all of the themes discussed in this chapter see Fawn. M. Brodie, *Peace Aims and Post-War Planning: A Bibliography Selected and Annotated by Fawn M. Brodie* (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1942).

West to elaborate a new vision of democracy that would ensure the war was also won on the battlefield of ideas.[66] The opponents of Nazism, Dean stressed, were not fighting for a return to 19th century Parliamentarism and laissez-faire capitalism. If there was to be any kind of restoration at all it would be of the 'original concepts of democracy' that privileged human welfare and the cultivation of meaningful self-government by the community.[67]

This new vision had not yet emerged in any detail. In 1942, Carr wrote that the West was still only in the process of its revolution 'against the belief that salvation can be achieved by representative government and one man one vote', liberal capitalism and the nation state. The final victory of an agreed alternative was by no means certain.[68] Uncertainty was fuelled and dampened by the progress of the war. Crucially, however, it was also a product of the tensions that can be clearly seen at the heart of Dean's vision of a new democracy that depended on finding a balance between collective and individual liberty, freedom and planning, hierarchy and equality, solidarism and pluralism. When all around was evidence of how such attempts could lead to overt and bloody trade-offs, doubt and contestation was the inevitable companion of determination to continue the 'struggle'.

Second, Dean's view illustrates how the forces of liberal capitalist modernity had not only transformed the challenges facing all political, social and economic organisations but also enlarged the scope and scale on which thinking about organisation and order had to be understood. Modernity was global; the same cocktail of material and ideological forces that had produced the crisis of democratic societies had created 'one world'. The interdependence of this world had exacerbated the crisis of democratic societies that had led to war, not least

[66] 'The war is not wholly national but in a sense social…both sides are talking of the necessary emergence at the end of war of a new order, although there are different conceptions of what that order should be'. Edward Hallett Carr and Salvador de Madariaga, *The Future of International Government* (London: National Peace Council, 1941), 2.
[67] Dean, *The Struggle for World Order*.20 Similarly Carr: 'The defence of democracy, like other negative aims, is dead and barren. The challenge of revolution can only be met by redefining and reinterpreting democracy in a new and revolutionary sense. The present crisis of democracy is the need for this redefinition'. *Conditions of Peace*, 12.
[68] Carr and Madariaga, *The Future of International Government*, 3.

as a result of the nationalist reaction to the collapse of the world economy. It had also, as Ward argued, globalised the 'contradictions', 'weaknesses and inconsistencies' Western democratic societies faced.[69] The untamed forces of industrialism, technology, science, rationalism and the entire edifice of 'Western habits and ideas' had 'overwhelmed' the non-Western world, producing results that were 'incompatible with the Western promise of freedom, personality, justice and equality'.[70] Globally, the twin birth of modern communications and mass politics had also fostered a growing awareness of this injustice. 'When I say that in order to have peace this world must be free' wrote Republican Presidential Candidate turned internationalist Wendell Willkie, 'I am only reporting that a great process has started which no man – certainly not Hitler – can stop. Men and women all over the world are on the march, physically, intellectually and spiritually. After centuries of ignorant and dull compliance, hundreds of millions of people in Eastern Europe and Asia have opened the books. Old fears no longer frighten them. They are no longer willing to be Eastern slaves for Western profits. They are beginning to know that men's welfare throughout the world is interdependent.'[71] In a postwar world, they too would demand an order that provided not just national and political rights but economic justice. The challenge of democratic modernity and the response to it was therefore global. It was for this reason that, as Dean acknowledged, the first task was to 'convince people throughout the world' that the Atlantic Charter was not another Fourteen Points: the non-Western world would be included in a new democratic order.[72] 'La paix qui vient sera à l'échelle de la guerre qui s'achève', wrote Raymond Aron.[73]

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[69] Ward, *Policy for the West,* 32-35.
[70] Ibid, 33.
[71] Wendell L. Willkie, *One World* (London: Cassell, 1943), 167.
[72] While there has been no work as yet that has focused on reactions and responses to the Atlantic Charter around the world on a par with Manela's 'Wilsonian moment', the enthusiasm– and scepticism–with which the Charter was received worldwide has been widely noted, most recently by Kiran Patel. Patel also notes that what was 'remarkable' about the Atlantic Charter was its inclusion of economic rights. As we will see throughout this investigation, it probably would have been more remarkable if the 'freedom from want' had not been included. Patel, *The New Deal: A Global History,* 275; Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism*.
[73] Raymond Aron, *L'âge Des Empires Et L'avenir De La France* (Paris: Défense de la France, 1945), 355.

The global had thus changed the scope of thinking about a new democratic order; it had also, more importantly, transformed the scale of political, economic and social organisation that would be able to provide it. In a global and interdependent world, it would be impossible for states to build a new kind of democracy either alone or in isolation. At the very least, democratic modernity required the international management of global interdependence. There could be no hope of securing new levels of liberty and justice in a world where 'a bank in New York can unwittingly precipitate a rebellion in Burma'.[74] In a stronger sense, it meant the creation of new regional or global entities would be more directly involved in meeting the challenges that states could not by, for example, securing social welfare. Political, economic and social organisation at a national and sub-national level as a result would not become obsolete. Instead, the hope was that they would be reconfigured and reinvigorated in relation to new supranational bodies and activities such that, collectively, a new order that met the core challenges of democratic modernity would emerge.

Most importantly of all, Dean's view illustrates how the global nature of the challenge of democratic modernity also magnified its central tensions and made them more intractable. Internationalists envisaged global orders that would nurture new democratic societies that balanced the need for welfare, expertise and community with individual liberty, participation, equality and pluralism. Yet they also had also to consider how these orders would themselves reconcile the need for leadership, solidarism and technocratic authority, with global pluralism and diversity, political rights and equality. Internationalists had to think about these dilemmas vertically, in terms of the relationship between the structures and organisations of a new global order and the individuals whose lives they affected; and horizontally, in terms of the relationship between states and the West and the non-Western world. This was all the more important when the tolerance of Western double standards among non-Western masses and elites was waning while, at the same time, the power of those elites was growing.

[74] Harold Laski, *Nationalism and the Future of Civilization* (London: Watts & Co., 1932), 42.

There was, finally, a geopolitical dimension to the challenge of democratic modernity. The global had transformed the scale of power. In a world where only larger units seemed destined to hold power, Western internationalists had to consider how this might lead to a world in which there would be many centres of power, in which there might also be a more direct challenge to the western-centred order if the West failed to share the benefits of a new democratic postwar order. The changing nature of power was part of the reason why it was necessary to think more directly about the inclusion and role of the non-Western world in a new world order. It also influenced the way in which internationalists thought about the new order in relation to their own countries: the United States, Britain and France. Internationalists sought to preserve national power through their leadership of the larger units they imagined would emerge in the postwar world, both to survive in a world of giants that might not be united but also, as we will see, in order to meet the challenge of democratic modernity necessary to survive. This highlights a final contradiction at the heart of the challenge of democratic modernity. Securing liberty in the modern world at once seemed to require dominance on a larger scale than ever before and the freedom of all people throughout the world in an era when liberty itself had become interdependent. Dean's uneasy solution was the 'democratic imperialism' of the United States; first among equals, America would justify its power by improving the lives of all. French and British internationalists offered similar constructs, some more successful than others.

There was no alternative. The new order had to grapple with the tensions and contradictions 'at the very core' of democratic modernity as they played out along the dimensions of political order and global order.[75] The way in which internationalists tried and failed to manage these tensions runs through the subsequent investigation. Reactions ranged from hard-headed engagement, evasions and wishful thinking and sometimes – often – trade-offs, some of which ultimately betrayed other sets of prejudices, inherited values and interests. It is

[75] Ward, *Policy for the West,* 35.

these choices – and the visions of democratic modernity to which they were tied – that are at the heart of how the following argues we should evaluate visions of democratic global order in the 1940s, not their conformity to an abstract Wilsonian, Cosmopolitan or other ideal.

The challenge of democratic modernity was the reason why, as Lionel Curtis observed in 1943, 'World Order' had become as popular a subject as 'self-determination' or 'collective security' had been a generation before.[76] These Wilsonian instruments alone would not begin to meet the task ahead. It was the reason why working for a new domestic order and new global order were, for prominent internationalists, 'aspects of the same vision'.[77] The following unpacks the core concerns that Western internationalists sought to address in a new democratic political order. Part two explores what the challenge of democratic modernity meant for international and global order in a global age and the way in which this amplified and multiplied the dilemmas internationalists faced in their pursuit of a democratic global order.

2.2. Democratic Modernity and Political Order

Internationalists in the 1940s shared a basic view that the collapse of democracy, the emergence of totalitarianism and the war itself were pathologies of the laissez-faire capitalist system, the distortions and weaknesses of liberal democracy in conjunction with industrial capitalism, mass modernity, modern technology and the nation state system and, in some cases, the weakness of man himself. It was an analysis articulated by many eminent political theorists of the time.[78] Their view of a new political system that would address the mistakes

[76] Gerald Studdert-Kennedya, "Christianity, Statecraft and Chatham House: Lionel Curtis and World Order," *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 6, no. 2 (1995).
[77] Ann Oakley, *A Critical Woman: Barbara Wootton, Social Science and Public Policy in the Twentieth Century* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2011), 157.
[78] Many of the internationalists explored in this study were deeply if not personally influenced by the most notable analysts of the West's predicament, including Laski, Polanyi, Mannheim, Freud, Niebuhr, Dewey, Tawney and others – whose own visions of international order remained comparatively undeveloped. On the influence of Mannheim on Carr see Charles A. Jones, *E.H. Carr and*

of the past likewise shared common themes, both with each other and in the context of wider political debates concerning the postwar political order. Now that 'the liberal hour had passed' the new democratic order that would lead the West and the world from the 'abyss' would address five core concerns.[79]

The first and most important of these was social and economic welfare. As Wendell Willkie put it, no one can any longer deny that 'economic freedom is as important as political freedom'.[80] 'To be effective in the modern world', wrote Carr, '"liberty" must be defined as something like "maximum social and economic opportunity"'.[81] The absence of guaranteed levels of basic welfare was not only profoundly destabilising for democracy, it was a negation of liberty and hence a negation of democracy itself. Political freedoms were not obsolete, but they were meaningless without economic rights that ensured that the basic needs of all were met. Crucially, it was economic justice in the form of guaranteed higher living standards, not merely economic stability or growth per se, that was the precondition, the foundation, and for many the essence of any democratic system. For the vast majority of international thinkers, this precluded the return to laissez-faire capitalism. Only 'some kind of planned' order guided by a new elite of 'men of great executive or technical ability' not dissimilar to the protagonists of Wells' *Open Conspiracy* (1928) could secure economic democracy.[82]

International Relations: A Duty to Lie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 136. On the influence of Laski, Mannheim and Polanyi on Wootton see Mary Jo Nye, *Michael Polanyi and His Generation : Origins of the Social Construction of Science* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 2011) 169; Or Rosenboim, "Barbara Wootton, Friedrich Hayek and the Debate on Democratic Federalism in the 1940s", *International History Review* Special issue on British Traditions of international thought, edited by Mark Bevir and Ian Hall, published online February 2014 (2014). On David Mitrany and the English Pluralists Cornelia Navari, *Public Intellectuals and International Affairs: Essays on Public Thinkers and Political Projects* (Dodrecht: Republic of Letters Publishing, 2013). Molly Cochran, *The Cambridge Companion to Dewey* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 290; Daniel F. Rice, *Reinhold Niebuhr and His Circle of Influence* (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013). Both Lilienthal and Carr, for example, made direct references to Dewey's *Freedom and Culture* (1939) in their discussions of global order and democracy. Carr, *Conditions of Peace*, 79; David E. Lilienthal, *TVA: Democracy on the March* (Harmondsworth, Middx.: Penguin Books, 1944), 193.

[79] Tony Judt, *Past Imperfect: French Intellectuals, 1944-1956* (Berkeley and Oxford: University of California Press, 1992), 230.

[80] Willkie, *One World,* 167.

[81] Carr and Madariaga, *The Future of International Government,* 3.

[82] Lilienthal, *TVA: Democracy on the March,* 185.

The second concern was to ensure that these same men at the helm of state planning agencies did not threaten liberty. The rise of totalitarian regimes had powerfully demonstrated the need to protect individuals from the ever-growing power of the bureaucratic, 'scientific' state. Importantly, this was not limited to protection from the racist fantasies of unusually murderous regimes. For internationalists such as Alva Myrdal, the 'nightmare of press-button perfection' inhered in technological modernity itself, not in specific nations or cultures.[83] As Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno's *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1944) underscored, totalitarianism was not just a reaction to the failures of liberal democracy and laissez-faire capitalism, it was the product of an elite attempt to use the tools of scientific modernity to correct the contradictions within capitalism and the political system. There was simply no guarantee, therefore, that the British, French or American experts who would be called on to build a democratic postwar order might not also threaten liberty through interventions in its name. For some internationalists, including Barbara Ward and Clarence Streit, the deep-rooted democratic culture of the 'Atlantic' offered some comfort. For the majority, however, additional measures to protect individual rights and to ensure strict vigilance were essential.

The third concern was to find new ways to connect individuals to the increasingly complex and technical processes of societal development and government in the 20th century – or to free them from the 'new bondage' Weber had described. Simply safeguarding basic rights was not enough to guarantee meaningful self-government in a technological and bureaucratic age when, as Carr said 'the bureaucrat and the specialist have largely supplanted' elected politicians as 'the managers of public affairs'.[84] 'More hazardous to democracy than such a dream of a ruling elite of managers and technicians' wrote New Dealer and internationalist David Lilienthal in 1944, was the assumption that this elite could achieve its 'democratic' ends without popular participation: 'a task cannot be done democratically if the method

[83] Cited in Sluga, "The Human Story of Development: Alva Myrdal at the UN 1949-1955", 53.
[84] Carr, *Conditions of Peace,* 29.

chosen for doing it is bureaucratic' and it is, as a result, done '"to" people not with them'.[85] 'Effective planners', Lilienthal explained 'understand and believe in people'. Without some form of direct contact between experts and citizens beyond the oversight of inexpert elected representatives, the cultivation of this understanding would be impossible. Only new forms of participative planning and corporatist consultation that succeeded in 'bringing the citizen into the process of government on his own specialist level, as well as in his capacity as an elector', argued leading international 'functionalist' David Mitrany, would ensure that expert government for the people was also, in so far as possible, by the people and, at a minimum, accountable to them.[86]

Separate but not unrelated to this, the fourth concern was to offer more meaningful forms of group identity and political expression – or 'self determination' – than liberal parliamentary democracy and the nation state. Contrary to expectation, the extension of the franchise had not granted freedom to the masses in the modern world. Instead, the atomised, 'non-social' conception of individual liberty that undergirded 19th century liberal democracy had palpably failed to compensate for the loss of traditional communities and identities as a result of industrialisation and the sense of belonging and autonomy they had provided.[87] Venal and distant national political parties were a poor substitute. Compounded by the crisis of capitalism, the resulting sense of powerlessness and alienation had encouraged the masses to lurch towards the collectivist extremes of the only remaining forms of communal identity on offer in the 20th century: class and nation. These mass movements – fused with the apparatus of the modern state – had, in turn, denied individual liberty, destroying democratic political rights and, at the extreme, life itself.

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[85] Lilienthal, *TVA: Democracy on the March,* 185, 190.
[86] David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organization*, Post-War Problems (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs; Oxford University Press, 1943). Echoing Weber's nation of masters argument. See also Long and Wilson, *Thinkers of the Twenty Year' Crisis: Inter-War Idealism Reassessed,* 225 and fn. 47.
[87] As argued by Cochran, *The Cambridge Companion to Dewey,* 290-91.

Confronted with collectivist totalitarianism, it was thus clear to internationalists in the remaining democracies that a new democratic order that failed to recognise the fundamentally social character of the individual would not survive. There could be no return to the 'false morality' of liberal individualism.[88] In Dean's words, liberty in a new and stable democratic system required that the individual be fully 'integrated into communal life'. A healthy communal life, Carr added, implied a community possessed of substantive social and ethical ends or a 'common purpose'[89]. Crucially, however, these needed to be forms of communal life that, unlike the proletariat or the *Volk*, would not pose a threat to individual liberty. The challenge of 'authentic democracy' wrote global federalist and Catholic internationalist Alexandre Marc, was to achieve a 'synthesis' not only between the political and economic but also the individual and communal aspects of liberty. A new system of democratic representation was needed that would be based on meaningful collectives but that in so doing preserved the integrity and enhanced the liberty of the individual 'human person'.[90]

For internationalists such as Marc and Mitrany, these were professional, confessional and other 'collectives closest to the individual'.[91] Not only were these more meaningful than the artificial constructs of class, party or nation, the boundaries of these collectives were not national but sub-national and even transnational. Pluralising communal life – without necessarily denying national cultures or class identities – would guard against the appropriation of state power by any single collective identity that might endanger individual liberties. Regardless of how communal life was reorganised and empowered, however, a central challenge of democratic modernity was finding a new form of representative system

[88] The 'obsession with "unmasking" the "false morality" of liberalism runs like a thread through the writings of the postwar years'. Tony Judt, *Past Imperfect : French Intellectuals, 1944-1956* (New York ; London: New York University Press, 2011), 242.
[89] Carr, *Conditions of Peace,* 291.
[90] Alexandre Marc, Extract "Du Communalisme au Fédéralisme Intégrale" (Paris 1948). Walter Lipgens Collection. Folder WL-69. HAEU 10.
[91] Gilda Manganaro Favaretto, *Il Federalismo Personalista Di Alexandre Marc* (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 2006), 111.

that recognised, as Jaques Martitain argued, that 'l'Idée du système représentatif en général est beaucoup plus large que l'idée de la représentation de type parlementaire'.[92]

The fifth and final concern was to ensure that forms of mass participation old and new did not prevent expert authorities from taking 'concerted action' in the face of complex challenges, above all those relating to the physical and economic security of individuals in the new democratic order.[93] The rise of totalitarianism had underscored the need for improved methods of participation, representation, oversight and accountability to ensure that the use of modern science and technology, both social and material, served democratic ends. Yet the experience of the 1930s had also starkly underlined the vulnerability of democratic systems to paralysis, populism and finally self-destruction in the face of crisis, complexity and growing demands for economic security. To preserve democracy from such threats it was essential, therefore, that new forms of participation were not unduly restrictive. Experts needed sufficient autonomy and authority to pursue the actions necessary to protect and expand liberty in a complex society that was essential to the very existence of democracy in the future.

Like David Lilienthal, the majority of internationalists turned their attention to the reconciliation of participation and expert governance. For others, such as Jean Monnet, the only solution to this problem was to minimise or contain the former. Only complete and uninhibited authority, Monnet argued, would yield the 'vue d'ensemble' among the expert elite that would produce beneficial 'common action'.[94] To some extent, this view was connected to an alternative analysis of the crisis of civilisation that questioned the nature of man himself. While the abuse of power and scientific knowledge by pioneering elites haunted

[92] "L'Europe et l'idée federale" 1940 in Jacques Maritain, *L'europe Et L'idée Fédérale: Textes Publiés Par Le Cercle D'études Jacques Et Raïssa Maritain* (Paris: Mame, 1993), 29-30.
[93] 'The displacement of cults of simple obedience by democratic assertiveness...complicated the problem of eliciting concerted action' Harold D. Lasswell, "Propaganda", *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 12 (New York: Macmillan, 1933).
[94] Michel Adam, *Jean Monnet Citoyen Du Monde: La Pensée D'un Précurseur* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2011), 44, 28.

Western dreams of a 'planned' democratic future, many intellectuals were no less concerned by the alacrity with which the masses had destroyed not only democracy but also their fellow citizens. Freud was not alone in concluding that it was the ease with which the darker, irrational impulses of human beings could be tempted to burst through the thin crust of civilisation – not the failure of laissez-faire capitalism, the tyranny of experts or the hubris of science – that had led to the destruction of democracy and peace in the interwar period.[95]

If human beings were not, finally, defined by their capacity for reason, then the possibility that truly participative and stable mass democracies could be brought into existence through the improvement of living standards, education and new forms of participation was open to doubt. 'Demagogy is not merely democracy gone astray' argued Salvador de Madariaga in Oxford in 1941 'it is the faithful and constant companion of democracy'.[96] This was inescapably true in the mass age. What many saw as the root cause of totalitarianism, the 'pathological characteristics of unorganised, amorphous masses and their susceptibility to the extremist and emotive rhetoric of charismatic leaders', could not be eradicated.[97] Paradoxically, therefore, building a new democratic order for a mass age would depend on the minimisation, manipulation and restraint of mass politics, permitting a select minority to pursue the concerted action that would grant the 'ever growing' needs and wants of individuals in the modern world. As Edward Thorndike, one of the founders of experimental psychology stated in 1939: 'the argument for democracy is not that it gives power to men

[95] Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents (London: Penguin, 2004), 53; Karl Mannheim, *Diagnosis of Our Time: Wartime Essays of a Sociologist* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd. , 1943), 1; Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 1st ed. (New York: Schocken Books, 2004), 310-11.
[96] Carr and Madariaga, *The Future of International Government,* 11.
[97] Richard Bellamy, "The Advent of the Masses and the Making of the Modern Theory of Democracy", in *The Cambridge History of Twentieth Century Political Thought*, ed. Terence Ball and Richard Bellamy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 101. Ian Hall notes that this was already a prominent theme in interwar internationalist writing that he argues resurfaced in the 1950s Ian Hall, *Dilemmas of Decline: British Intellectuals and World Politics, 1945-1975* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), 71.

without distinction, but that it gives greater freedom for ability and character to attain power'. The challenge of the future was to make sure that this happened.[98]

Combined with the protection of basic political rights, the 'larger freedom' bestowed by the provision of common goods 'for' the people, not participation, would be the essence of democracy. Importantly, such views were not confined to the crypto-fascist right or the interwar period. Surviving into the 1940s and beyond, doubts concerning mass democracy itself, not only mass democracy in conjunction with an unstable economic system, continued to shape visions of the future of democracy.[99] As Richard Bellamy has argued, Western political thought in the mid-twentieth century was not characterised by a rejection of democracy but an elitist shift *within* conceptions of democracy in response to the mass character of modern society and its perceived dangers.[100] While the influence of these ideas on democratic international thought was by no means straightforward, the restraining aspect of the challenge of democratic modernity remained vitally important.

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It is immediately apparent that while some of these concerns were complementary, others were contradictory. The need for new forms of political participation and enhanced individual protection from the destructive power of technology and the threat of the modern state contended with the need for expert elites, planning and the use of science to secure welfare and security. It is, finally, the obvious tensions between these imperatives that defined the challenge of democratic modernity in the 20th century and internationalist writing on global

[98] Cited in Noam Chomsky, "Intellectuals and the State (1977)", in *Towards a New Cold War: Essays on the Current Crisis and How We Got There* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982).
[99] See ibid. Robert McNamara argued in 1968 that 'the real threat to comes not from over management, but from under management. To under manage reality is not to keep it free. It is simply to let some force other than reason shape reality . . . if it is not reason that rules man, then man falls short of his potential.' In short, reason demands submission to centralized management: This is true freedom, the realization of democracy Robert S. McNamara, *The Essence of Security* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968).
[100] Bellamy, "The Advent of the Masses and the Making of the Modern Theory of Democracy", 101.

order in this period. As we will see, at the heart of competing visions of democratic order in the 1940s were disagreements about whether and how it was possible to balance these imperatives and, more broadly, different prioritisations between these core concerns. Whereas some visions of democratic order prioritised the reinvigoration of political and communal life, for example, others suggested that freedom in a complex society was much more dependent on higher standards of living and the empowerment of elites, even if this meant confining political life within much more conventional parameters and reducing the influence of ordinary citizens on the business of government in that context.

These reflected nuances in internationalists' readings of the crisis of liberal modernity that were to some extent shaped by different national experiences. Ultimately, however, these also reflected choices and trade-offs that are inherent to the idea of democracy itself regarding the relationship between participation and good governance, individual and collective rights, positive and negative liberty, pluralism and solidarism, hierarchy and equality, that the crisis of the twentieth century brought forth with renewed intensity.

Importantly, however, the limitations and contradictions within visions of democratic order were not all the product of deliberate choices when confronted with these dilemmas, nor were these choices always countered by genuine attempts to justify and mitigate their negative effects. Shortcomings in relation to political participation, pluralism, social justice and oversight betrayed other sets of prejudices, inherited values or vested interests. Perhaps the least egregious of these was complacency. As we will see, Clarence Streit's lack of concern with social justice or establishing new forms of political participation, for example, reflected his belief that solving one problem – the dangers of state centralisation – through the establishment of a federal union of democratic states, would solve all. The most offensive source of exclusion was racism. In a non-Western context, the political, communal and economic rights of new democratic political orders were often – and sometimes drastically – watered down compared to the new democratic order in the West. While lower living

standards were to some degree inevitable in the short term, claims that the traditional political and national rights that were still included in some basic form in the new democratic systems envisaged for the West were somehow irrelevant to the creation of democratic societies in a non-Western context were clearly motivated by imperial notions of hierarchy and power politics, if not racism. These double standards had little or nothing to do with the inherent dilemmas of democratic political order.

We will return to this issue below. Crucially, however, while most internationalists tried to find some sort of balance, or some semblance of balance, between these concerns in the new democratic political orders they sought, these tensions did not only exist in this context. Unlike domestic political thinkers, internationalists were profoundly aware that the challenge of democratic modernity was global in scope and scale, hence it would not be possible to produce a new democracy – or peace – without thinking about the structure and role of global order in the creation of new democratic societies domestically. While global order was thus part and parcel of the effort to address the tensions within democratic societies, it also meant that the central tensions of democratic modernity were reproduced and multiplied within this order itself, at once complicating and crystallising the choices and trade-offs internationalists faced in their pursuit of a democratic order that would preserve, expand and extend liberty in the modern world.

2.3 Democratic Modernity and Global Order

Modernity was now irremediably global and internationalists in the 1940s – perhaps for the first time – knew it.[101] The quintessential expression of this new view was *One World* (1943), Wendell Willkie's bestselling account of his aerial circumnavigation of the globe in only 160 hours. *One World* offered a striking vision of unity in the midst of world war. In spite of deep differences, Willkie argued that the technological developments that permitted mass production, rapid transportation and the global transmission of news and ideas had united the planet and its inhabitants as never before. In stark contrast to the world of 1919 when 'not a single plane had flown across the Atlantic... today that ocean is a mere ribbon...continents and oceans are plainly only parts of a whole, seen, as I have seen them, from the air'.[102] Whether readers agreed with Willkie's particular prescriptions for postwar order or not, there were few who denied the central argument of *One World*, that constructing a new order for this new global reality would be a challenge unlike any that had confronted peacemakers in the past.

Although partly responsible for the subsequent popularity of the phrase 'one world', Willkie was by no means the first to suggest that the future world order needed to respond to increasing global unity driven by technological advance.[103] HG Wells' 'history of the future' *The Shape of Things to Come*, published in 1933, had already claimed that science and technology pointed the way to a global polity emerging from 'the single world community in

[101] Even though the 1940s were clearly a key moment for the growing awareness and theorisation of the global among international thinkers most new scholarship on the global remains preoccupied by the 'first' era of globalisation between 1860 and 1914, Suzanne Berger, *Notre Première Mondialisation : Leçons D'un Échec Oublié* (Paris: Seuil, 2003); Bell, "Making and Taking Worlds." Postel-Vinay, "European Power and the Mapping of Global Order." A notable exception is Jo-Anne Pemberton, *Global Metaphors : Modernity and the Quest for One World* (London: Pluto Press, 2001). Other histories of international thought and internationalism in this period Ashworth (2014), Hall (2012), Mazower (2012), Sluga (2013) do not directly discuss the emergence and significance of the global at all.

[102] Willkie, *One World,* 165-6. The book sold over 3m copies.

[103] For a detailed account of the rise of 'One Worldism' See Joseph Preston Baratta, The Politics of World Federation (Westport, Conn.; London: Praeger, 2003).

which we live today'.[104] By the late 1930s, the 'shrinking' world was a well-established theme in writing about international relations. By the 1940s, almost any and every text on postwar order in Britain, France, the United States – and indeed further afield – began by describing the game changing effects on the prospects for future peace resulting from the transformation of space and time in the age of airpower, radio and other modern technologies. Another American bestseller, *Union Now* (1938), by prominent journalist and Atlanticist Clarence Streit, described the gradual unification of the globe through the rise of 'world machines', from the aeroplane to the modern tractor. 'We all live in the same world now, but the more civilised we are and the more we live together in it, the more we depend on each other, the more the world is one'. The implications for international relations, he argued, were inescapable: 'these world machines, these world made, world-needing and world-making machines, inevitably bring our nations many problems in living together'.[105] In Britain, popular philosopher CEM Joad premised his discussion of the postwar order in 1941 on the 'commonplace' that the 'changes in the range and scale and pace of living resulting from the abolition of distance' had united the world to an unprecedented degree: 'Nor is this increase in the speed and range of the facilities for human intercourse likely to stop. We can today talk with one another from the ends of the earth; in a dozen years we shall see one another face to face'.[106] The single most important fact that a new order had to address, Joad concluded, was that the world was now 'a vast echoing chamber in which what happens anywhere produces reverberations everywhere'. These 'reverberations', he stressed, were not only economic; they included the movement of people, the spread of ideas and the emergence of new political movements.

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[104] H. G. Wells, *The Shape of Things to Come: The Ultimate Revolution* (London: Penguin, 2005), 25.
[105] Clarence Streit was a journalist for the New York Times assigned to cover the League of Nations in Geneva in 1929 from where he wrote *Union Now*. Streit later founded Federal Union, Inc., (later the Association to Unite the Democracies) to promote his vision. In 1949 he founded the Atlantic Union Committee advocating the transformation of NATO into a political entity. Streit was very famous both in US and abroad. *Union Now* was referred to in internationalist writings throughout the decade. Clarence Streit, Union Now: A Proposal for a Federal Union of the Democracies of the North Atlantic (London: The Right Book Club, 1939), 64.
[106] C. E. M. Joad, "The Philosophy of Federal Union," in *Studies in Federal Planning* (London: Macmillan & Co., 1943). Originally published in 1941, 51.

In France, and more often in Algiers or New York until 1945 – a fact that surely contributed to perceptions of the 'shrinking' world – the views of French intellectuals and politicians were much the same. Christian philosopher Jacques Maritain spoke of the new world order needing to be based on the 'terribly new' fact that the 'community is on a global dimension' as a result of modern technology and industry'.[107] The articles of Pierre Bourdan in *Revue du Monde Libre* that were air dropped over France in September 1943 spoke of 'global interdependence' and the future of a united Europe connected to other 'global entities' like the USA and China.[108] Addressing the Consultative Assembly in Algiers, French socialists Pierre-Olivier Lapie, Vincent Auriol and Pierre Cot debated the how the 'forces of technology' were changing the scale of the international political economy, its implications for France and 'the new global order'.[109] Such views were not the preserve of the left, or indeed internationalists. Even de Gaulle conceded that 'in today's world everything forms a single whole. We cannot imagine our own affairs being considered and handled in the abstract, without regard to the world as it really is. In fact there are no economic, social, financial or imperial questions, there are not even, I assure you, any problems of production, prices, taxes, loans, strikes in our homeland or unrest overseas, which do not to a large extent have their causes and repercussions beyond our frontiers'.[110]

The growing prominence of the word 'global' was itself significant. In his work, *One World in the Making* (1945), American philosopher Ralph Barton Perry linked the growing unity of the planet driven by advances in production, transport, communication and weaponry to the

[107] Maritain, *L'europe Et L'idée Fédérale: Textes Publiés Par Le Cercle D'études Jacques Et Raïssa Maritain,* 141.
[108] Walter Lipgens, ed. *Documents on the History of European Integration. Volume 2: Plans for European Union in Great Britain and in Exile 1939-1945* (Berlin De Gruyter, 1985), 298.
[109] Ibid, 329-330.
[110] Walter Lipgens, ed. *Documents on the History of European Integration. Volume 3: The Struggle for European Union by Political Parties and Pressure Groups in Western European Countries 1945-50*, vol. 3 (Berlin De Gruyter, 1988), 49.

'coming age of the "global approach" in international relations'.[111] Conceding that the globe 'along with its derivative global is [still] seen by many today as journalistic jargon', another popular philosopher and leading member of the Chicago Committee to Frame a Constitution for the World, Mortimer Adler, remained confident that the popularity of Willkie's 'vision of oneness' heralded a paradigm shift in elite and popular perceptions towards an increasingly 'global' view of the world and its problems. The global idea, Adler stressed, was not itself new. The first glimmerings of a global approach were articulated in the international visions of Bentham and Kant. Crucially, however, the idea of 'the globe' held 'no political significance for Bentham's contemporaries or predecessors' and Kant's 'cosmopolitical right' had had 'insecure foundations on the back of a camel or ship'. In the modern era, however, technological advances have given it 'wings to soar on and an indivisible air ocean through which to encompass the globe'.[112]

Although 'world' remained the more popular word, it increasingly represented the more global view that the expression 'one world' deliberately underscored. As Karoline Postel-Vinay observes, the 'World' in World War II 'became a global narrative that described a condition of global disorder, which in turn complemented the idea of global order'.[113] Fundamentally, this global view – or 'narrative' – agreed that modern technology, having transformed the nature of conflict and 'contracted and transformed the social spaces of the world' both in terms of 'geographical time' and the mode of production and distribution, had profound implications for international relations and the postwar reordering of the world. The first of these, as Perry insisted, was to make the idea of the 'international' itself anachronistic; a global approach was now needed that recognised were that in a global world, the lines

[111] Pemberton, *Global Metaphors: Modernity and the Quest for One World*, 125.
[112] Mortimer Jerome Adler, *How to Think About War and Peace* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1995). Originally published in 1944, 216.
[113] Postel-Vinay, "European Power and the Mapping of Global Order", 332.

between local and global events, separate national communities and domestic and international affairs were increasingly blurred.[114]

2.3.1 Interdependence and International Organisation

What did this mean in relation to the challenge of democratic modernity and the architecture of international organisation and global order? Most importantly, it meant that there was no way that nation states could hope to nurture democratic political orders alone or in isolation. As public intellectual and noted internationalist Raymond Buell put it bluntly 'there is no such thing as isolation in the modern world', even for the United States.[115] More importantly, the war had conclusively shown that era of autarchy – the dream that became the nightmare of interwar international relations – was over. In the global world, it was simply impossible, even for large states, to guarantee security and prosperity for their citizens alone. Any attempt to do so was inherently vulnerable to external shocks if not bound to lead to the gradual erosion of liberty within states, increased international tension and finally war. For medium sized and small states, the latter was virtually guaranteed. In a typical statement, the Commission to Study Organisation of Peace (CSOP) argued that 'the plight of the individual must be recognised; only an international solution can relieve him of the economic insecurity arising from international interdependence and of physical insecurity arising from war which has become global and all pervading. The State is no longer capable, alone, of assuring the

[114] Pemberton, *Global Metaphors: Modernity and the Quest for One World,*125.
[115] Buell Papers, Box 34 Folder 4: America 1940-45. Buell made the same argument in Raymond Leslie Buell, *Isolated America* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1940). In this period the prolific Buell, whose career was to take him form Harvard to the presidency of the Foreign Policy Association to Wendell Willkie's presidential campaign in 1940, was foreign affairs advisor to the editors of *Life, Fortune* and *Time* (Henry Luce) where he was chair of the 'Q' Committee on postwar planning. Similar expressions appear across internationalist writings in this period. 'Isolationism is dead' H. B. Butler, *The Lost Peace. A Personal Impression* (London: Faber & Faber, 1941), 207; Léon Blum, *For All Mankind (a L'echelle Humaine)*, trans. W. Pickles (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1946), 125. All commented on how hard it would be to accept. The 'conversion' of American policy makers to interdependence and global engagement is at the heart of Stephen Wertheim's work on American visions of postwar order. Wertheim argues that the critical moment for most American internationalists came in 1942 Wertheim, "From League to UN Via American Power: Reconceiving Internationalism for U.S. World Leadership, 1940-1942."

welfare of its citizens'.[116] In the global age, most commentators agreed, the era of absolute national sovereignty was therefore definitively at an end. The only way to reconcile 'independence and interdependence' was to abandon the idea of 'watertight compartments' and accept, as Pierre Bourdan argued, that 'sovereignty is henceforth relative'.[117] Even Attlee conceded to the House of Commons that a 'new concept of sovereignty' was needed in the modern world if democratic societies and postwar peace were to have any chance of survival.[118]

Correspondingly, any new order that denied this reality was doomed to fail. A 'Wilsonian' order focused on 'collective security' and national self-determination would have no chance of creating the conditions in which democracies – let alone 'reinvigorated' democracies based on social justice and new forms of communal identity beyond the nation state – could take root. Elements of more traditional ideas of international order would continue to exist in the shape of intergovernmental international organisations and international law – but they would do so in the context of fundamentally transformed structures, activities and understandings of global order that recognised the de facto limitations of states in relation to the challenge of democratic modernity.[119]

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[116] "The United Nations and the Organization of Peace: Third Report and Papers Presented to the Commission," Commission to Study the Organization of Peace. (New York: Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, 1943), 266.

[117] Robert Aron *Why War?* (1944) and Bourdan *Revue du Monde Libre* (1943) in Lipgens, *Documents on the History of European Integration. Volume 2: Plans for European Union in Great Britain and in Exile 1939-1945*. 313; 299.

[118] Debate on Motion 18 March 1948. *Documents on the History of European Integration. Volume 3: The Struggle for European Union by Political Parties and Pressure Groups in Western European Countries 1945-50,* 703.

[119] Although this period is widely associated with death of 'formalist' internationalism that stressed international law, whilst eschewing the naive faith in international law that culminated in the Kellog-Briand Pact (1928), for most internationalists law would still play an important role in supporting and delivering a new global order. Indeed, it is hard to find a text on world order that did not in some way suggest that new norms, practices and institutions needed to be embedded in a revived, revised and reinforced legal framework. Most works, for example, referred to the establishment of new international courts. Some were updated versions of the old court of arbitration, illustrating that for some internationalists at least, international law of a fairly traditional kind still had a part to play in managing the new global world. Many others, however, imagined entirely new jurisdictions, including of courts human rights, international criminal courts and other courts that would be the guardians and arbiters of new kinds of supranational entity. In these cases, international law clearly served entirely new visions of global order. Although the understanding and application of international law undoubtedly changed– it was certainly not the defining feature of internationalism in the 1940s– it is

At a minimum, this meant that a new order had to manage economic interdependence. Without a system that reduced the vulnerability of all states to economic shocks, the pursuit of new era of democracy would be forever on a knife-edge.[120] Alongside the stabilisation, regulation and opening of the world economy, managing global insecurity in the age of airpower and atomic energy was seen as an equally important precondition for the emergence of new democratic societies. Without it states would continue to divert vital resources and undermine the liberty of their citizens in a quixotic attempt to guarantee their physical security.[121]

For most internationalists, however, the limitations of nation states meant that a new global order would be more directly instrumental to the emergence of a new democratic political order. Powerful global agencies or regional entities that operated 'on a scale commensurate with the technical and economic realities in which we live' unencumbered by the politics of traditional intergovernmentalism would guarantee the conditions for 'expanded and reinvigorated' democratic life.[122] For Clark Eichelberger and the CSOP, the appropriate scale was the global itself. 'The time has come to organise and plan international life' on a world scale and above all 'the internationalisation of economic life that will be necessary to provide

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nevertheless clear from most works that most internationalists believed that a new global order would entail a new legal order as well. Cf. Wertheim, "Instrumental Internationalism: The United Nations as America's Will to Lead the World; "The League of Nations: A Retreat from International Law?," *Journal of Global History* 7, no. 02 (2012). Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea,* 187, 212.

[120] In addition to the enforced opening and regulation of trade and monetary flows, most internationalist works supported measures to secure equal access to raw materials and to stabilise the production and prices of basic commodities.

[121] In particular, internationalists dwelt on the need to address the power imbalances and dangers resulting from airpower through, for example, the creation of an international air force with guaranteed superiority. Later in the decade, the focus on arms control was exacerbated and to some extent supplanted by the concern to control and regulate atomic energy. Not only was a collective response to the global threat of atomic weaponry seen as imperative, it was equally critical to prevent the formation of new monopolies over what many were sure would become a vital new energy source in the future, see for example Aldous Huxley, *Science, Liberty and Peace* (New York: Harper, 1946). The control of Atomic energy was a major theme of federalist movements in the second half of the decade Baratta, *The Politics of World Federation*. Chapter 7 on the Atomic Scientists Movement.

[122] Barbara Wootton, "Socialism and Federation", in *Studies in Federal Planning* (London: Macmillan & Co., 1943), 296.

social justice'.[123] Chief among the task of new supranational agencies that would exist alongside and independently of more traditional intergovernmental fora would be ensuring higher living standards through economic development, the enforcement of social rights and other measures to promote social justice and democratic political systems. In addition, global agencies in the fields of health and agriculture, for example, would ensure the worldwide provision of basic goods necessary for any kind of liberty to exist. Crucially, it was these activities and the way they would facilitate the emergence of new democratic societies possessed of a 'larger freedom' than their 19th century forbears, not collective security, disarmament or the creation of the General Assembly. It was these activities that would ensure that the UN – the body championed by the CSOP – was both 'the crowning moment of a new age' and embodiment of a 'democratic world order'.[124]

Many others, including Robert Schuman, applied the same principle on a regional scale. Federal and even imperial regional units with authority to plan and make policy over larger areas than nation states would be able to 'guarantee their peoples the necessary prosperity and social development' for democracy and peace to emerge.[125] Importantly, new global and regional authorities would not assume responsibility for all aspects of modern life. The popular new notion of functionalism, for example, was premised on the notion that in a new order, the authority to decide should reside at the level at which a problem occurs – be it local, national, regional or global. Many internationalists, including Wendell Willkie, imagined the supranational organisation of economic life and security within which nation states would retain political control.[126] Most advocates of World Government imagined the

[123] Eichelberger was the director and co-founder of the CSOP in 1939 with James Shotwell who was the President. Clark Mell Eichelberger, *Organizing for Peace: A Personal History of the Founding of the United Nations* (New York ; London: Harper and Row, 1977), 231.
[124] Eichelberger Papers, Box 155 "Comparison of CSOP Framework and the UN Charter"; "Meeting of the Committee on Human Rights of the CSOP" March 4 1945; Box 151, Folders "CSOP Early Plans 1938/9" and "CSOP 1940".
[125] Robert Schuman and Henri Rieben, *La Naissance D'un Continent Nouveau* (Lausanne: Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe, Centre de Recherches Européennes, 1990), 121.
[126] Wendell Willkie accepted that while nation states might retain control of their domestic political affairs there could be no thought of returning to a system of small, independent economic and military units. Relics of the 'common fallacy' of national self-determination, this 'outmoded system' was no

existence of regional authorities and even national authorities that would continue to play a significant role.

The common view, however, was that the scale of the modern world required the partial or complete disaggregation and reassignment of political, economic and social authority to global, regional, national and subnational levels. Only in this way could new democratic orders emerge that were characterised by individual liberty, social justice and enhanced political and communal rights, both within existing states and worldwide. The ways in which internationalists made these arguments and even used the new scale of organisation to balance the tensions within the ideal of democratic modernity they sought – using supranational authority to permit the radical decentralisation and re-imagination of domestic political life for example – is the focus of the historical investigation. Fundamentally, however, these visions hinged on the shared belief that global modernity meant that modern, meaningful and resilient democratic societies could only emerge through combined forms of organisation and empowerment on and across different levels that included a much stronger role for regional and global authorities.

2.3.2. Challenges to the Western-centred Order

As we saw in the introduction, because the challenge of democratic modernity was itself global, this meant that the response to it could not focus exclusively on Europe and the West. For the first time, not only the rights of non-Western states and colonial territories but, more importantly, the lives of citizens within them were, theoretically at least, as important as those in the West. 'When I say that peace must be planned on a world basis', Willkie stressed, 'I mean quite literally that it must embrace the earth...it is inescapable that there can be no peace

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longer viable, and would destroy any chance of a peaceful world order in a global age *Willkie, One World,* 142-3.

for any part of the world unless the foundations of peace are made secure throughout all parts of the world'.[127]

For internationalists in the 1940s, the foundations of peace were one and the same as the foundations of democracy. It was essential, therefore, that a democratic global order – whether through global or regional organisations – encourage the creation of democratic societies worldwide and not just in Europe. In light of the belief that democracy in the modern world depended on economic justice, this gave birth to the notion that, globally, among the most important tasks and defining characteristics of a democratic order was the promotion of higher global living standards through economic development. In spite of uncomfortable echoes and continuities with the imperial past and the interwar mandate system, conceptions of development were, as a result, increasingly premised on the indivisibility of human welfare and liberty in an interdependent age, not a civilising mission that implied normative and often perpetual binaries between civilised and uncivilised that had little or nothing to do with the connection between liberty, democracy and peace. In a revealing rebuke, British attempts to revive the language of the League at San Francisco and define development in terms of the 'sacred trust' to help states that could not 'stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world' were dismissed as outmoded because very few countries, including Great Britain, could claim to 'stand by themselves' in the global era.[128]

The foundations of democracy were not only economic. Internationalists in the 1940s sought to create a new democratic orders built on the basis of individual rights and more meaningful forms of political and communal participation and autonomy as well as social justice. Here too, although it was much more contested and ambiguous – above all, unsurprisingly, among European internationalists – there was a much stronger sense that the non-Western world should also see these fully democratic societies emerge in the context of their own nation

[127] Ibid,166.
[128] Keene, *Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics,*138-9.

states within the new global order. This was Clark Eichelberger's objective through the establishment of a global human rights regime. David Lilienthal's vision of development was premised on the transmission of a full panoply of political and communal rights in the context of decentralised, egalitarian, independent democratic states. To him, there was simply no other way to create a truly democratic and peaceful global order unless the full model of democratic liberty to which Western people now aspired was extended worldwide.

There was a strongly normative component to this increasingly prominent belief. It was not only self-interest in an interdependent age and growing anti-Western sentiment that prompted greater consideration of the inclusion of the non-European world. There were simply no moral grounds on which a repetition of 'Western betrayal of democracy in international affairs' that excluded the non-Western world from a new order of liberty could be justified, not least when 'our Western world and our presumed supremacy are now on trial'.[129] In a broader sense, internationalists also recognised how difficult it would be to claim they were creating a democratic global order unless it itself reflected the same values of pluralism, diversity, egalitarianism and inclusion that they claimed to promote within domestic societies through its operation.

Insofar as this realisation implied that the non-Western world should share in the benefits and even participate in the design and management of a new democratic global order, however, most internationalists remained somewhat, if not completely, tone deaf. Colliding with enduring prejudice and the belief that the creation of a democratic order required hierarchy in the form of global Western leadership– an idea that was itself indebted to imperial conceptions of ordering – there were still very serious limits to the extent to which the new order would itself be democratic both horizontally and vertically in relation to the citizens of non-Western states. As Carr noted 'there has probably never been a time when so many people in so many parts of the world are not only looking for guidance, but are themselves so

[129] Dean, *The Struggle for World Order,* 21; Willkie, *One World,* 167.

eager to make their own contribution to the building of a new world order'.[130] Yet even in a democratic global order that included the non-European world, that contribution would be limited. While seeking to extend democratic liberties and respect diverse national cultures, there remained no real sense in which non-Western states would contribute to the leadership and technocratic management of the new order, let alone question its goal of promoting a particular idea of democratic modernity. Overall, although the extent to which internationalists struggled with this dilemma was greater than ever, there remains much to support the view that internationalists, like western governmental elites, continued to construct a 'global stage' where the 'stories played out relegated non-Western states to absent or semi-invisible actors'.[131]

2.3.4. Global Entities and the Transformation of Power

There was, finally, also a geopolitical aspect to Western internationalists' newfound concern with the inclusion of the non-European world. The global, interdependent world was not one where power would cease to matter. The consequences of anarchy were not the focus of internationalists' attention in the 1940s, but they remained an important dimension of order that had to be considered; internationalists were not idealists. 'Because we have recognised both the fact and the necessity of increasing interdependence among nations' wrote EH Carr, 'we should not therefore consider ourselves entitled to envisage a utopia where the lion – or even the eagle – will lie down on equal terms with the lamb. Foreign policy will not cease to exist for those who possess power...and it will be as necessary to take account of the realities of power in the new world as it was in the old'.[132] Barbara Ward was equally clear that the single greatest continuity between the pre-global age and the present was that 'the political

[130] Edward Hallett Carr, *The Conditions of Peace* (London: Macmillan & Co Ltd. 1942), 112.
[131] Postel-Vinay, "European Power and the Mapping of Global Order".
[132] Carr, *Conditions of Peace*,169.

problem in crudest terms [remains] a problem of power'.[133] The failure to recognise this fact in the structure of a new world order would be utopian and dangerous.

The global had, however, transformed the scale of power and it was partly for this reason too that, as Ward argued, 'this is the first time in the history of man that the working out of a relationship between the great civilisations of the Orient and ourselves is a matter of urgency'.[134] In a world where larger units were destined to hold the most power, the 'awakening' of the 'sleeping giants' in the East was only a matter of time.[135] In a future when it seemed as likely to internationalists like Carr that there would be 'many centres' of power, including China and India, as a single hegemon or indeed bipolarity, managing the relationship between these centres would be a critical aspect of any new world order.[136] This was what Raymond Aron had in mind in 1945 when he suggested that 'L'équilibre nouveau qui se dégage peu à peu aura pour cadre non un continent, mais la planète entière'.[137] As bipolarity began to emerge towards the end of the decade it was even more important, Ward argued, for the West to establish strong cooperative relations with China and India in anticipation of their future power.

It was equally important that at the same time the West itself adapt to the new scale of power and work to re-establish global hierarchies in which it would maintain its dominant position. For Britain and France, this meant working to establish their own leadership of new 'global entities', be they revamped empires or a European union that would ensure that notwithstanding their 'changed status' at the end of the war this would not spell the end of either country's power and role in the world.[138] It also meant ensuring that whatever global structures were put in place, both countries retained a seat at the top table. For the US, the

[133] Barbara Ward, "Prolegomena to Peace Aims", *The Political Quarterly* 12, no. 3 (1941), 240.
[134] Jean Gartlan, *Barbara Ward : Her Life and Letters* (London: Continuum, 2010), *vii.*
[135] Willkie, *One World,* 167.
[136] Carr, *Conditions of Peace,* 11, 176.
[137] Aron, *L'âge Des Empires Et L'avenir De La France,* 355.
[138] Carr, *Conditions of Peace,* 175. On the permanent weakening of UK and Western Europe vis-à-vis the US see 181.

task was somewhat different. It meant entrenching nascent dominance in the structure of new global institutions and preventing the unnecessary emergence of global entities, in addition to the Soviet Union, that might threaten it, including the British Empire, China and, initially, a European union, although American attitudes towards regional unions fluctuated dramatically as the decade progressed.[139]

The strategic dimension of these efforts in relation to the Soviet Union and, for Britain and France, the United States and the spectre of own their own decline, are obvious: concerns for national interests under changing geopolitical conditions shaped internationalist visions of order throughout the decade. Vainglorious obsessions with national prestige, particularly in France, were equally abundant.[140] Beyond national interests of survival in a global age, however, the insistence on the retention and recognition of power in the hierarchical ordering of the postwar world had another purpose.[141] It reflected what most Western internationalists believed was an unavoidable geopolitical dimension to the challenge of democratic modernity itself. In a global age, there was no other way to construct an order that would enhance the liberty of all, or the majority of the world's population, without the leadership of the West – and Britain, France and the United States in particular.

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[139] While it was of a concern for the American protagonists of this investigation, the question of regional powers and the maintenance of America's global position dominated discussions within institutions such as the Council on Foreign Relations. The best account of American attitudes among policy makers and internationalists on the power politics of the postwar order remains Divine, *Second Chance. The Triumph of Internationalism in America During World War II*. See also Woolner, Kimball, and Reynolds, *FDR's World: War, Peace, and Legacies*. Wertheim, "From League to UN Via American Power: Reconceiving Internationalism for U.S. World Leadership, 1940-1942".

[140] Aron was perfectly clear that his analysis of the global age should act as a guide for France in the bid to restore her former status or 'redevenir une grande puissance'. *Aron, L'âge Des Empires Et L'avenir De La France,* 360. French desperation to cling on to Great Power status in the postwar world is well documented. See Jacques Dalloz, *La France Et Le Monde Depuis 1945* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1993); Andrew Williams, "France and the New World Order, 1940-47", *Modern & Contemporary France* 8, no. 2 (2000); Andrew Williams, "'Si La France Ne Compte Plus, Qu'on Nous Le Dise': France and Dumbarton Oaks, 1944", in *The UN and the Post-War Global Order: Dumbarton Oaks in Perspective after 70 years* (London: SOAS, 2014). Frédéric Bozo, *La Politique Étrangère De La France Depuis 1945* (Paris: Flammarion, 2012).

[141] There were of course 'realist' visions of world order that were exclusively concerned with the geopolitics of new global world in this period, many of which advocated the leadership of the United States in particular. As noted in the introduction these works, including those by Bowman, Mackinder, Spykman and Whittlesey, Culbertson and Bullitt are not the focus of this investigation. Not only have the most famous of these received ample attention (E.g. Ashworth 2014), visions of this kind were in fact less numerous than might be supposed. More often, the advocacy of leadership by internationalists in this period was tied to the ambition of building a democratic global order.

In the first instance this was because only those with power could endow the postwar order with any capacity for meaningful action through their resources and willingness to act. Carr insisted that only the postwar powers 'will induce individuals and nations to combine spontaneously together for the common good. No durable peace can be made unless those who have the power have also the will [and the ability] in the last resort...take and enforce with vigour and impartiality the decisions which they think right'.[142] In the wake of the disaster of the League, this was a common position. Second and more important, however, was the belief that only the Western powers would make decisions that were 'right', leading to the emergence of a democratic global order that fostered new democratic societies that succeeded in overcoming the shortcomings of the past. Raymond Buell's view encapsulates both sides of this argument.

Criticising Niebuhr's view that the 'hegemony of the stronger powers' necessary for any kind of world order contained an 'inherent peril of imperialism', Raymond Buell argued that:

> 'this fear of leadership can be as destructive as outright imperialism. No system of organisation can possibly succeed if the US, with its 130m people and vast resources, expects to play no greater role than tiny Liberia or Guatemala. We must retain the belief in the equality of nations as much as the equality of individuals. But we must interpret this doctrine as meaning equality before the law, and equality in the right to be heard, while recognising that democracy cannot succeed without leadership of a gifted minority, based on reason and responsibility to the majority. It is only this doctrine, which we have accepted at home, applied abroad that can hope to build a new world order'.[143]

[142] Carr, *Conditions of Peace,* 280.
[143] Buell Papers, Box 34 Folder 4: America 1940-45. "American Leadership or Disaster" (1943), 9.

Crucially, although Buell argued that America's size and strength equipped it for leadership in a global era, it was ultimately America's ability to build a world order based on liberty that was more important. Just as democracy required leadership of a gifted minority, Buell argued, so 'international democracy' – defined as a system that would expand global welfare whilst preserving liberty – required the leadership of a gifted state: America. The special virtue of the US, Buell argued, was its unique ability to overcome the paradox of modern liberty, spearheading a new global ideology that would marry the market, welfare, democratic political rights and pluralism in support of lasting peace. This point is central. As the title of Buell's essay *American Leadership or Disaster* (1943) made clear, a leaderless global order, or one that was led by another power – and even the United States were it to remain in the grip of New Deal 'fanatics' – would result not only in the gradual erosion of liberty (as international authorities accumulated power in pursuit of greater prosperity), but also in war.[144]

Across the literature, variations of this argument supported British, French, American or Anglo-American leadership of a new democratic global order; more egalitarian visions of order were the exception, not the rule. For Vera Dean, only the 'democratic imperialism' of the United States would ultimately ensure the emergence of 'expanded and reinvigorated' democracies worldwide, not because it eschewed planning but because it alone could find a system that combined the international planning necessary for a prosperous global order without crushing the rights either of individuals or small states or the individuals within them.[145] Many non-Americans were equally enthused by this prospect. Thomas Mann argued that the leadership of the United States would be 'a piece of good fortune for mankind' not because of its great strength, but because by investing a new order with its democratic principles and encouraging their dissemination, the world could find a way to prosper in

[144] Ibid, 9-12.
[145] Dean, *The Struggle for World Order,* 50. Although Buell was opposed to the 'internationalization of the New Deal' as we will see in chapter five he articulated his own free market model of 'planning'.

liberty and peace.[146] Author and commentator Odette Keun suggested that only the US could assume 'world authority' in a new order because as the New Deal had shown only it knew 'how modernity could be achieved by liberal means on a global scale'.[147] Notably, while American internationalists showed some concern throughout the decade that the centralising effects of war might disqualify it from leadership on the basis of its special virtues, for the vast majority of white internationalists the status of African Americans posed no such threat.[148]

It was for similar reasons that Barbara Ward, despite her commitment to global pluralism, advocated joint Anglo-American leadership. Not only would Britain and the United States replace the Nazi 'will to power' with a 'will to order', their leadership would lead to a 'new birth of freedom' worldwide through their resolution of the fundamental problem of modern industrial society in a global world: the combination of large-scale national and international planning and expert authority with the preservation of liberty. In the West, a new Atlantic Union whose planning 'boards' would be dominated by British and American experts would implement this system directly, fostering Western unity 'without tyranny'.[149] In the East, developing countries like China and India would be encouraged to follow the Anglo-American example over the Soviet one.

Carr's vision of a world order composed of multiple global powers likewise hoped that a 'strong British lead' would emerge on the basis of its unique ability to contribute to the 'orderly and progressive development of human society' towards a democratic order

[146] Cited by Buell "Draftsmen of the New World: A Report on the Principle Plans for Postwar Political Reconstruction". Buell Papers, Box 34, Folder 4: America 1940-45.
[147] *A Foreigner Looks at the TVA* (1937) cited in Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order,* 71.
[148] Willkie, Buell and others alluded to this problem, or what Willkie called 'the mocking paradoxes in our own society' but did not take it seriously in their visions of global of order and American leadership– unlike Du Bois. One exception we will return to was Mortimer Adler whose views highlight the extent to which the absence of any explicit consideration of racial and gender equality was a major failing of most visions of democratic global order in the 1940s. Willkie, *One World*, 156.
[149] Ward, "Prolegomena to Peace Aims", 250.

characterised by a combination of individual liberty, 'common purpose' and social justice.[150] French internationalists were no less convinced in their country's unique ability to combine both greater prosperity and liberty and leadership and pluralism in a peaceful global order. In light of its relative power position, however, few suggested that France could deliver systemic leadership. Instead, French leadership was imagined in a European or imperial context, nested within a larger order of 'global entities' directed by the US, a Western triumvirate including France, or a number of great powers. Only French leadership of a united Europe, Michel Collinet argued, would ensure that it was a 'democratic' space combining political freedoms with new levels of social justice and not the 'senseless idea of a closed self sufficient Europe, a kind of beleaguered fortress à la Goebbels' that would neither safeguard liberty nor promote peace in a wider global context in which cooperation between global entities would be vital.[151] In some cases, French internationalists hoped that its leadership of Europe or a renewed French Empire would lead to the emergence of a 'Third Force' which, having struck a unique balance between the callous individualism of the United States and the crushing collectivism of the Soviet Union, would not only hold the balance of power but gradually dissolve the division between east and west and foster a truly 'global' order through the force of its example. Dreams of a British led 'Third Force' told a similar story. Additionally in the French case, the country's palpable loss of power translated into a greater number of arguments that claimed that France's normative leadership was the key to a lasting peace – as well helping France to punch above its weight in a global world. Thus René Cassin saw the

[150] Carr, *Conditions of Peace,*190. Carr shared the hope that although Britain would not be the leading power it would still count among a number of leading powers and, in particular, exert a form of 'revolutionary' 'moral leadership' based on its achievement of what Carr thought was the primary objective of any postwar democratic system: economic justice. *Conditions* is not unduly specific about how exactly Britain might lead. One option was through its role in the creation of a European Planning Authority (see chapter five)– the centrepiece of Carr's vision for a democratic postwar Europe. Carr was obviously concerned to maintain British status as a Great Power as Jones and others have stressed; but the important ideological–or what Carr might have called 'moral'– dimension of this ambition, connected to the challenge of democratic modernity, which runs through this work has not been discussed. Jones, *E.H. Carr and International Relations: A Duty to Lie*, 164-5; Jonathan Haslam, *The Vices of Integrity: E.H. Carr, 1892-1982* (London: Verso, 1999).

[151] Michel Collinet "L'Europe et son avenir" vol. 13 No.110 may 1945 and GDH Cole "Europe as a Third Force" May 1947 in Lipgens, *Documents on the History of European Integration. Volume 3: The Struggle for European Union by Political Parties and Pressure Groups in Western European Countries 1945-50,* 773-88, 670. Blum, *For All Mankind (a L'echelle Humaine),* 92.

promotion of international human rights both as a particularly French solution to global order that would secure peace through the protection of individuals against the power of modern states, as well as one that would help to preserve French power though the renewed legitimisation of the French empire.

2.4 Conclusion

The global nature of the challenge of democratic modernity magnified and multiplied the tensions and contradictions at its heart between solidarism and pluralism, technocracy and participation, equality and hierarchy, individual and collective, and negative and positive liberty. Fostering the emergence of new democratic political orders demanded the creation of supranational technocratic elites at a regional or global level that would – through economic planning, development or the promotion of human rights – create the conditions in which new and improved democracies could emerge. Underlining the problem of political participation in a complex age, these remote authorities were themselves embedded within hierarchical conceptions of order in which the United States, Britain, France and the West more broadly would take the lead. They would take the lead, finally, in spreading a model of democratic modernity across the world with the objective of fostering a global democratic solidarism that would undergird peace. Although theoretically global in scope, the geopolitical dimension of global modernity and the logic of large units also raised the possibility that the global order might be divided into units or spaces, some of which were more democratic than others. While this might offer a solution to the problem of global (if not regional) pluralism, it was also problematic in light of global interdependence and the pursuit of a democratic global order premised on the indivisibility of human liberty and the need for greater global equality.

The following explores how internationalists managed the tensions within their visions of a new democratic political order in the 1940s alongside, and in relation to, how they managed

the same set of tensions both vertically and horizontally in the visions of democratic global order they imagined would secure its emergence. The picture that emerges is a complicated mixture of balances and trade-offs, many of which resulted in limitations in terms of scope, participation, pluralism and even rights, particularly in relation to global order, but also within the democratic orders internationalists sought to promote domestically.

We will see many instances when internationalists made a genuine attempt to address and balance the inherent tensions of democratic modernity across the global, international and domestic dimensions of order, as well as grappling with the difficulties of applying a vision of democratic modernity in an uneven and divided world. Other ideas reveal more overt trade-offs and inconsistencies between, for example, democratic global order and democratic political order and the treatment of the Western and non-Western worlds. These could be the result of deliberate choices justified in relations to the practical dilemmas of action in a complex age or the propagation a unified democratic system in an unevenly developed world. They could also be the product of failure to tackle issues and, at times, other sets of prejudices, inherited values or vested interests, especially in relation to the non-Western world.

No vision of a democratic global order was perfect. Each entailed contradictions and limitations as internationalists tried and failed to grapple with the challenge of democratic modernity in a global age. It is, finally, the awkwardness and inconsistencies of the ways in which internationalists like Barbara Ward, for example, attempted to reconcile her belief in global pluralism and equality with a solidaristic, technocratic vision of democratic order led by the United States and Britain that defined visions of democratic global order in the 1940s and that are most important for the evaluation of these ideas. This should be based on the substantive visions of democratic modernity that internationalists championed, the ways in which they did or did not achieve some degree of compatibility between the models of democratic society they promoted, and the overall structure and means of the global order that

would provide it, and the costs and limitations their visions of order entailed. Of particular importance is distinguishing between those limitations, exclusions and contradictions that were the product of deliberate choices and trade-offs as a result of the dilemmas of democratic modernity in a global world, and those that were not (and that might subsequently lead us to question the degree to which these visions were 'democratic' at all). A pattern of problems will emerge – particularly concerning the non-Western world and political rights in relation to the new global order – neither of which, however, can or should be described and evaluated using the existing conceptual models of global order and democracy, be they Wilsonian, Cosmopolitan or otherwise 'liberal'. The narrow focus of these ideas on structures of accountability and representation at the international level completely fail to capture not only the centrality but the core dimensions and tensions of the challenge of democratic modernity that lay at the heart of thinking about order in mid 20th century and the subsequent investigation.

Chapter 3

'Union Now!' Democratic Order and Union

'A union must be democratic because it is not just about overturning war but preserving liberty'

C.E.M. Joad, *The Philosophy of Federal Union* 1941

3.1 Introduction

In the 1940s, visions of regional and global union flourished. In the United States, the publication of Clarence Streit's bestseller *Union Now* was soon followed by popular movements and academic enterprises like the *Chicago Committee to Frame a Constitution for the World*, dedicated to the pursuit of global or regional union.[152] By June 1940, the British movement *Federal Union* had swelled to 12,000 members, among who were many of the leading political and intellectual lights of the day.[153] In occupied Europe, the visions of unity that would drive the postwar European Movement had begun to emerge, even among

[152] Among many others, see Joseph Preston Baratta, *The Politics of World Federation*. On the European side, Walter Lipgens' seminal anthology of sources relating to European integration remains the best guide to the multitude of organisations, groups and individuals involved in the European Movement in the 1940s. Lipgens, *Documents on the History of European Integration. Volume 1: Continental Plas for European Union 1939-45*. (four volumes); Andrea Bosco, ed. *The Federal Idea* (London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1991).

[153] Founded in late 1938 by Derek Rawnsley, Charles Kimber and Patrick Ransome. By June 1940, *Federal Union* had 250 branches and 12, 00 members. The *Federal Union Research Institute* (FURI) met in Oxford from late 1939 to study the constitutional, economic and colonial aspects of federation produced works by Ivor Jennings, Lionel Robbins, Barbara Wootton and Friedrich Hayek among others. Other leading members of Federal Union included William Beveridge (Chairman of FURI and author of *Peace by Federation* 1940), Lionel Curtis, Lord Lothian, Ivor Jennings, C.E.M Joad, W.B. Curry (Curry's Penguin Special, *The Case for Federal Union* published in 1939 sold over 100,000 copies), Frances Josephy, Kim Mackay, Henry Usborne (Labour MP and founder of the Parliamentary Group for World Government), Konni Zilliacus, George Keeton, Henry Brailsford, Victor Gollancz, Harold Wilson and Kenneth Wheare. Many other prominent figures contributed to the discussion from Julian Huxley, J.B Priestly and Arnold Toynbee to the soon to be archbishop of Canterbury William Temple. See "Lothian, Curtis, Kimber and the Federal Union Movement (1938-1940)," *Journal of Contemporary History* 23, no. 3 (1988); "Federal Union, Chatham House, the Foreign Office and Anglo-French Union in Spring 1940," in *The Federal Idea* (London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1991); Richard Mayne, John Pinder, and John C. de V. Roberts, *Federal Union: The Pioneers , a History of Federal Union* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990).

Resistance fighters.[154] As the decade progressed, so too did the shape and ambition of unionist ideas. Splits and divisions between supporters of global, European, Atlantic, Federal, functional, 'minimalist' and 'maximalist' visions of union multiplied.[155] There can be no doubt, however, that although many movements had dwindled or expired by the end of the decade, that union remained one of the dominant themes, if not the passionate focus, of the international thought of this decade. As Ann Oakley writes 'the language was visionary and emotional but the notion of a Federal Union, however constituted, attracted the serious attention of many in this period'.[156]

Existing historiography portrays visions of union as a response to the problem of anarchy and peace. Their aim was to overcome nationalism and the sovereign state system and, at a European level, to pin down Germany.[157] It assumes in other words that the prevailing idea,

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[154] See Aglan, *Temps De La Résistance*. This view is contested by other historians who point to the widespread rejection of unionist ideals by the Resistance for whom the resonance with Hitler's 'New Order' was too pronounced e.g. Pasture, "European Integraion, Christian Democracy and the Development of a Secular Society: Continuities Beyond the Appearances".

[155] Many of which came to a head at the Montreaux Congress in 1947 when over 300 delegates from 51 federal organisations- including Federal Union and the Union of European Federalists- in 14 countries came together to discuss the future of the federal movement. Baratta, *The Politics of World Federation*, 336. On the demise of Federal Union see Philip. M. H Bell, "Discussion of European Integration in Britain 1942-45: Introduction", in *Documents on the History of European Integration: Plans for European Union in Great Britain and in Exile 1939-1945*, ed. Walter Lipgens (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1986); Philip. M. H Bell and John Pinder, "British Plans for European Union 1939-45: Introduction," in *Documents on the History of European Integration: Plans for European Union in Great Britain and in Exile, 1939-1945*, ed. Walter Lipgens (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1986).

[156] Oakley, *A Critical Woman: Barbara Wootton, Social Science and Public Policy in the Twentieth Century,* 145.

[157] Martin Ceadel for example, discusses the federal ideas that flourished in the 1940s as a 'the most drastic version of liberal pacifism' that saw 'the only way to control the irrational forces of nationalism is wholly to remove from each state the control of its foreign– though not its domestic– policy'. Martin Ceadel, *Thinking About Peace and War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 112. Regardless of whether moves towards European integration or unionism more broadly are viewed through a more idealist (Lipgens; Bosco; Unwin; Baratta) or realist (Calleo; Briggs and Clavin; Deighton et al.) lens, the impression remains that overcoming nationalism and securing peace in the aftermath of the war was the first motive. There is, of course, much in the literature that discusses the wider goals of economic reconstruction and prosperity in relation to this goal but it is only obliquely connected to any discussion of democracy and not at all to any discussion of democratic global order (Milward; Ellwood). The intention here is not to dispute these accounts per se but to pull out and focus on the way in which some of the most prominent intellectual and political supporters of union saw the structures of European and indeed global union as instrumental to the delivery and spread of a new kind of democracy, thus also taking the discussion about democracy in relation to union away from the debates about varieties of intergovernmentalism, functionalism and federalism. Anne Deighton, ed. *Building Postwar Europe: National Decision-Makers and European Institutions, 1948-63* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002). Asa Briggs and Patricia Clavin, *Modern Europe, 1789-Present*, 2nd ed. (London: Pearson Longman, 2003); David Calleo, *Rethinking Europe's Future* (Princeton, N.J.; Oxford:

and sentiment, was captured in the terms made famous by Clement Attlee in 1938, that Europe– or indeed the world– must 'federate or perish' as a result of nationalism, power politics and the destructive power of modern technology.

In contrast, this chapter demonstrates that visions of union in the 1940s were also, as Joad's view underscores, fundamentally concerned with the problem of liberty. Internationalists' support for different kinds of union hinged on the way in which it would address the core concerns of democratic modernity, whether by preventing the abuse of power by modern states or otherwise improving the lives of its citizens through higher living standards and new opportunities for meaningful self-government. Alone or in combination, we will see that internationalists connected democracy to the way in which their vision of union would preserve, expand and extend liberty in a world where so many believed that only large units would constitute meaningful 'global entities'. Importantly, we will see that it was for this reason and not simply the possession of a common foreign policy that internationalists believed that a union would succeed in 'overturning war'.

To this end, establishing forms of democratic participation within a regional or global union was important above all in relation to these deeper goals. For many unionists, a democratic federal government was the only way to ensure the emergence of a new kind of democratic society. Conformity to a prescribed constitutional or cosmopolitan ideal was largely irrelevant. In the lyrical terms of the dedicated federalist and Labour MP Kim Mackay, only a socialist majority in a European parliament would secure social justice and succeed in creating a truly democratic Europe 'with the people at its heart'.[158] In the more prosaic

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Princeton University Press, 2001). Derek W. Unwin, *The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration* (London & New York: Longman, 1995). David W. Ellwood, *Rebuilding Europe : Western Europe, America and Postwar Reconstruction* (London: Longman, 1992); Alan Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State* (London: Routledge, 1992).

[158] Mackay "Memorandum on United Europe" Walter Lipgens Collection, Folder WL-16 HAEU. Mackay was chair of Labour's parliamentary Europe Group, founder of the European Union of Federalists in 1946, chair of the European Parliamentary Union and author of many works on European union including Ronald William Gordon MacKay, *Peace Aims and the New Order: Outlining the Case*

language of social scientist and socialist Barbara Wootton, insisting on federal union would ensure that 'like a bus', union could be driven towards socialism, the key to true democracy in the 20th century.[159]

For other unionists, however, representation was less important; it would still be possible to create a democratic order that would preserve, expand and extend liberty through union but without the need for direct or indirect elections, or with electoral systems that were less than perfect. The following begins to illustrates this important distinction, although it is not until chapter six that visions of union that actively sought to limit popular participation are explored.

The central point is that attitudes towards representation reflected the deeper connection between union and liberty that internationalists posited. The same is true of the limitations and shortcomings of these ideas. Visions of union were not perfect. On the contrary, they were often exclusive and contradictory. Unions were confined to geographical areas or groups of existing democracies. They could also be 'imperialistic', aiming for the gradual democratisation of the earth. Others applied double standards to states remaining outside the union. Whereas democratic order within a European union, for example, depended on social justice and self-government, in a colonial or non-Western context it meant 'equal access' to raw materials, economic development and, in some cases, only limited political rights. More generally, unions were embedded in wider visions of global order dominated by seemingly more traditional intergovernmental organisations such as the UN.

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for European Federation Together with a Draft Constitution of a United States of Europe with a Foreword by Norman Angell (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1941); *Britain in Wonderland* (London: Gollancz, 1948); *Western Union in Crisis: Economic Anarchy or Political Union. Five Papers, Etc* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1949).

[159]Wootton, "Socialism and Federation", 295. A common objection to unionist projects by socialists was that it would be dominated by 'reactionary forces' and jeopardise attempts to build socialism at home. Wootton insisted that this was akin to rejecting the use of buses 'because buses can be used to carry people to anti-socialist meetings'; federation, like planning, was 'a neutral instrument'. Similarly, *Federal Union* maintained its support for a federal as opposed to functional union in order to ensure that union would be '*based on economic security and civil rights for all'* Baratta*, The Politics of World Federation,* 81.

Others imagined a world of unions in which only some unions were required to be democratic. Finally, global unions advocated less than fully operative and even discriminatory representative systems. Noted world federalist Grenville Clark, among others, openly supported a weighted system to secure additional votes for less populous but more powerful, industrialised states.[160] President of the Chicago Committee's Commission to prepare a Draft Constitution for the World, Robert Hutchins, admitted that the nine region electoral college system the Committee had devised was still 'discriminatory' but had the great advantage of not *appearing* undemocratic. An Indonesian from the Australasian region would not *feel* like their vote counted for less than the US or the Chinese less than the Russian.[161]

Instead of automatically taking these inconsistencies as evidence of failure, hypocrisy or disingenuity, part of their explanation lies in the way in which internationalists used the idea of union to meet the core imperatives of democratic modernity. Doing so produced inevitable tensions between technocracy and participation, solidarism and pluralism, hierarchy and equality. These exclusions and limitations are a reflection of these tensions and the choices and trade-offs internationalists were willing to make in pursuit of a democratic order in an unevenly developed, culturally diverse and ideologically-divided global context.

Limiting union to a 'nucleus' of existing democracies or culturally proximate European states, for example, was for unionists, including Jacques Martain, Alexandre Marc, Clarence Streit and WB Curry, the only viable means to begin the construction of a democratic global order.[162] Similarly, the need for other states to develop, both politically and economically, was used to justify their exclusion and the often hierarchical relations of cooperation and development that were imagined between the union and the non-Western world. The same

[160]Grenville Clark "A New World Order" 1944. See Baratta, *The Politics of World Federation,* 112.
[161] Ibid, 322.
[162] Curry, for example, argued the 'proximate' aim was European union as the only basis on which a democratic world order -'democratic in the sense described in this essay' that is one that included both political and social and economic rights, could develop. It would take time for common purposes and ideas to spread. W. B. Curry, "Federalism and Democracy" in *Federal Union: A Symposium*, ed. Melville Channing-Pearce (London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1940, 1991), 137-138.

arguments were used to justify weighted voting within a world union.[163] In both cases, such measures were theoretically temporary. Another reason why some unionists opted to exclude non-democratic and non-Western states was to preserve pluralism. Conversely, the pluralist nature of the democratic societies union would propagate was, in other cases, used to justify the gradual extension of union worldwide.

In every case, simply because unions were not fully participative, egalitarian, global or pluralistic did not mean that as visions of order they were undemocratic from the vantage point of their supporters, or that they should be seen as undemocratic by contemporary observers by default. The evaluation of these ideas is a question of normative judgment– not measurement according to a predefined standard of democratic international order– that reflects our own view of how the enduring tensions within the idea of democracy should be balanced and, in practice, translated into the construction of a democratic global order.

Undoubtedly, however, many of these contradictions and shortcomings were also the reflection of geopolitical considerations and, in some case, enduring Eurocentrism, imperialism and racism. The following will draw attention to instances when the limitations and exclusions within unionist conceptions of order were clearly shaped by these ideas as opposed to the inherent dilemmas of democratic modernity. Evidence of geopolitical calculation alone might not lead us to dismiss a particular vision of union. When exclusions were clearly based on pure power politics and racism, however, how 'democratic' visions of union should be judged is obvious. This includes the French Union where we will see that claims to democracy based on expansion of liberty through local autonomy and social justice were undermined by the absence of basic political rights. In cases where visions of union

[163] "Committee Documents" 1945-8, Committee to Frame a World Constitution, Microfilm Reel 309, University of Chicago Library. Esp. n. 16 Guérard "Commentaries on Contribution... with Special Reference to: a Senate on a territorial (regional) basis and an Assembly elected on a "Weighted?) popular basis", February 1946; n.83 Dieter Dux "Ratio of Population to One Representative in the Different Regions According to Draft Two"; n.87 McKeon "Federalism and World Democracy" August 13 1946. See also Baratta, *The Politics of World Federation,* 320-322.

made no attempt to address the problem of liberty at all and were transparently motivated by racism, cultural chauvinism, imperialism and geopolitical calculation, including the ideas of union championed by Ely Culbertson, Count Coundenhove-Kalergi and even Lionel Curtis– the following will dispense with the discussion of these ideas altogether.[164]

The argument offered below differs substantially from how we might otherwise imagine relationship between unionist visions of world order and democracy in the 1940s. A more intuitive approach would be to focus on the apparent confrontation between 'democratic' federalism that sought the 'transposition' of liberal democratic forms to the supranational level in a manner not dissimilar to contemporary advocates of cosmopolitan democracy, versus 'undemocratic' or even anti-democratic functionalism.[165] Alternatively, we might focus on the way in which intergovernmental visions of union, reflecting a weaker 'Wilsonian' conception of international democracy, competed with more democratic, federal and less democratic functional forms of supranationalism. In the European context, standard historical narratives point towards the view that these more democratic visions of European union were pushed out in favour of less or even anti-democratic formulations represented by functionalism. Overall, however, it remains the case that relatively little attention is paid to

[164] Although Culbertson's books were extremely popular he was also criticised as the 'Hitler of the peace movement' by Rosika Schwimmer and others (Baratta, *World Federation*, 67). His idea of world government was entirely motivated by a geopolitical vision of future power distribution where weighted voting structures reflected racist and geopolitical calculation. The indefatigable Coundenhove-Kalergi– treated as the romantic ideologue of the European movement– who through incessant letter writing to his friends in high places more than anything else contributed to cause of European unity, was motivated by a civilisational ideal of Christian Europe that had little or nothing to do with the challenges of democratic modernity. On the contrary, the aristocrat remained unsurprisingly elitist, if not reactionary in his vision of domestic society. Internationally, he was most preoccupied with the preserving the spiritual purity of Europe against external threats. Curtis repackaged his ideas of Christian Commonwealth in terms of democracy and liberty but there was nothing new in his civilisational/spiritual conception of British quasi-imperial leadership, as the lukewarm response to Civitas Dei (1938), harking back to the ideals of Milner's Kindergarten, demonstrates. Civilizational tropes were not banished from internationalist projects of empire, Atlantic Union, American leadership or Europe. But civilizational views were not the talismanic utopias, least of all those with an explicitly racial underpinning, which Duncan Bell argues dominated the internationalist imagination and indeed the organisational forms of federalism and imperialism as a whole in the late 19th century and lingered into the 20th. Bell, "Before the Democratic Peace: Racial Utopianism, Empire, and the Abolition of War".

[165] An opposition Ashworth has applied to debates about the nature of the postwar international order more broadly. Ashworth, *A History of International Thought: From the Origins of the Modern State to Academic International Relations,*183.

the idea of democracy at all in traditional accounts of European integration that focus on the split between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism.[166]

If we were to focus on the question of political representation the evidence suggests a rather different view. Political representation was not only a live issue in unionist debates, there seems to have been a marked shift from 'Wilsonian' to more 'Cosmopolitan' conceptions of transposition. In a European context, for example, it was not only committed federalists who supported some form directly or indirectly representative assembly. In light of the weakness of what subsequently emerged– namely the impotent Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe – it is tempting to treat Churchill's call for 'a European Assembly where the live forces for all our nations shall be represented' as reheated Wilsonianism at best.[167] Ernest Bevin, representing the British government at the founding negotiations of the Council, certainly had little intention of ceding real power. Yet although France did not seek direct elections either, its representative Robert Schuman moved towards a more radical position centred on the creation of transnational political formations and indirect political representation, arguing that delegations to the new assembly should reflect national parliaments and vote on an individual basis.[168] The vast majority of unionists wanted much more than this, as demonstrated by the bitter disappointment that met failure of the Consultative Assembly and persistent attempts to press for more participative order. In Mackay, Marc and Alterio Spinelli's case, this led to a more radical attempt to build a popular movement that would circumvent national parliaments and create a European federation.[169]

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[166] Somewhat differently, recent scholarship has suggested that the Catholic architects of a new European order were less concerned with the extension of representative democracy to the international level than its domestic restraint– this view is contested below. Müller, *Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in Twentieth-Century Europe*; Jan Werner Muller, "Christian Democracy: Towards a New Intellectual History," in *Rethinking European Christian Democracy* (Florence, Italy 2014).

[167] Winston Churchill "Opening Address to the Congress at the Hague", 7 May 1948. Fonds Mouvement Européen, Folder ME-421, HAEU.

[168] See Raphaële Ulrich-Pier, *René Massigli (1888-1988): Une Vie De Diplomate* (Bruxelles ; Oxford: P.I.E.-Peter Lang, 2006), 1072.

[169] Fonds Mouvement Européen, Folder-M255; Mackay Papers, Walter Lipgens Collection, Folder WL-16, HAEU. On the continued efforts of the All Party Group of the House of Commons led by Mackay, see Lipgens, *Documents on the History of European Integration. Volume 2: Plans for European Union in Great Britain and in Exile 1939-1945*, 699-711. Alterio Spinelli "Lo Stato

Similar demands emerged at global level in the face of entrenched national opposition towards even a gradualist approach to elected world government.[170]

Yet in spite of the widespread desire to extend and deepen representative ideas at the international level, we should still be wary of embracing this revisionist reading of union and democracy, focusing as it does on the narrow question of political representation. Such a view would assume that those who set little store by popular representation in supranational chambers were not concerned with the creation of a democratic order, in spite of their claims to the contrary. By same token, it suggests that the shortcomings and contradictions that still plagued visions of federal union, such as weighted voting structures, were evidence of hypocrisy, disingenuity and failure. Neither assumption is necessarily accurate or helpful. More worryingly, it overlooks the extent to which attitudes towards representation were bound to deeper arguments about union and the challenge of democratic modernity.

3.2 Preservation: Saving Democracy from the State

It is a puzzle that is not adequately explained by politics or opportunism that Robert Schuman was so willing to lend his name to a technocratic vision of European unity that, as we will see in chapter six, initially envisaged no kind of assembly at all. Schuman had argued against Bevin for a more robust Consultative Assembly and he would continue to support parliamentary oversight of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community and the eventual creation of a European Parliament as integration progressed. His ambivalence in the short term, however, is revealing. It captures the essential underlying

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Nazionale Contro La Democrazia", Fonds Mouvement Européen, Folder ME-1254; "Alexandre Marc: Soixante-quinze ans de combat fédéraliste", 13. *L'Europe en formation*, n.291, Hiver 1993 in Fonds Alexandre Marc, Folder AM-439, HAEU. Spinelli and Marc would go on to found the journal *Le Combat Fédéraliste* and the Congress of European Peoples in and the Congress of European Peoples in 1955, a popular campaign calling for a European constituent assembly to be directly elected by the citizens and mandated to draw up a draft federal constitution which would then be submitted for ratification by means of a European-wide referendum.

[170] Baratta, *The Politics of World Federation,* 324-5, 332, 337-8.

argument of so many internationalists who supported the creation of a union who believed that under the conditions of global modernity, union per se was a democratic form of international order.

'Whatever the external label, we must regard as essentially undemocratic all groups which see it as their main task to re-establish and conserve the national sovereign state. Even if they do not realise it, they are the grave diggers of civil liberty and well being, servants of the modern Leviathan, the all powerful total sovereign state'.[171]

In a world where the majority of internationalists believed that only large units would be capable of providing security and prosperity, the stubborn refusal of governments and people, 'indoctrinated with the principles of self determination', to recognise the need for integration would cost them their liberty and, ultimately, peace.[172] This happened in two ways. Firstly, by making liars out of democratic leaders who continued to promise greater security and prosperity to citizens when they could guarantee neither. Not only was the liberty of citizens diminished by worsening economic conditions, the legitimacy of the political system that failed to improve them was undermined, increasing the appeal of anti-democratic groups that claimed mastery of the modern environment.

Secondly, clinging to national sovereignty threated liberty by encouraging even democratic states to accumulate more power, both domestically and in relation to other states, in a bid to provide the economic and physical security demanded by their citizens. This attempt to control their destiny embodied what Clarence Streit described as the 'fallacy of self-sufficiency' in a global world, the results of which were disastrous. The more democracies– especially small and medium sized democracies– reacted to the bruising realities of interdependence by insisting on national boundaries, 'the greater the threat to liberty through

[171] Collection Robert Schuman by Hans August Lücker, Folder Halk-20, HAEU.
[172] Boothby and Mackay "Memorandum on a United Europe"1948. Walter Lipgens Collection, Folder WL-16, HAEU.

home grown despotism of a government desperately centralising trying to defend itself and navigate a complicated world'.[173] The shape of the economic system was immaterial. Emery Reves, the author of another bestseller *The Anatomy of Peace* (1945) argued that neither a socialist nor capitalist system could function in closed state system, each tending to develop into 'centralised bureaucratic and totalitarian regimes' at the expense of liberty and democracy. It was the same process that would threaten the citizens of other nations and lead to international conflict. As states became increasingly insecure, and increasingly undemocratic, the aggressive pursuit of resources abroad would follow.[174]

It was axiomatic, therefore, if 'in our modern industrial world, nation states are not only the greatest obstacle to world peace….they are the destroyers of the most cherished individual liberties in a democracy' that the creation of a regional or global union that prevented nation states from behaving in this way was democratic. Whatever form it took, union would protect individuals from the threat posed by increasingly centralised and undemocratic states.[175]

3.3. Expansion: Union and Socialist Democracy

Embedded in this notion of preservation was an idea of expansion: union would not only save basic rights, it would do so by enhancing the liberty of its citizens through 'effective common government' in the areas small sovereign states could no longer hope to manage alone.[176] At the very least, in addition to foreign policy, by delegating matters of economic coordination 'up' to a supranational authority operating on a viable scale, citizens of within a union would enjoy higher living standards. Even Streit emphasised the boon to economic well being that

[173] Clarence Streit Papers, Box 123, "Speeches and Statements" (1941), Folder 2, "*United Democracies*" (undated).
[174] Emery Reves, *The Anatomy of Peace* (New York: Penguin Books, 1947), 96.
[175] Ibid,164.
[176] Such as management of defence, the economy, communications, customs and citizenship- everything else could be left to the national level. Streit, *Union Now: A Proposal for a Federal Union of the Democracies of the North Atlantic,* 23-4.

would occur within Union, free from the burden of constant war preparation and the futile quest for self-sufficiency.[177]

Relieving democratic governments from the pressure of state centralisation was still the heart of Streit's conception of union as a democratic form of order; the expansion of liberty was secondary and automatic. While he obliquely acknowledged the challenge facing democracies in the modern world– including the need to secure higher levels of welfare– these problems would, he believed, be almost instantly resolved through the creation of union that left what remained essentially liberal democracies free to flourish.[178]

Even in the US, such sanguine views were comparatively rare. Most supporters of union had a more transformative agenda and saw unions as a vehicle– even the only vehicle– to deliver a radically new vision of democratic society based on an expanded ideal of liberty. In this view, it was not just the sovereign state system but liberal democracy itself that had become an anachronism in the modern world. The problems of the latter would not be erased by the elimination of the former. Liberal democracy was incapable of providing meaningful liberty, regardless of the scale at which it operated, as a result of its perpetuation of social injustice, the defects of the party system, or both. Union would not be democratic because it would preserve basic rights from the state or because it would allow liberal democracies to flourish, therefore, it would be democratic because through union it would be possible to create a new kind of democracy.

This outcome was not guaranteed. While clinging to the sovereign state system clearly threatened democracy for the reasons Streit and Schuman emphasised, for many

[177] "A New World Order"; "Union Now: A Westerner's Idea"; "United Democracies", Clarence Streit Papers, Box 123: Speeches & Statements, 1941 Folder 1 and Folder 2.
[178] At most Streit suggested that the particularly pluralist nature of Federal Union might lead to even greater expansion of liberty in the future: 'The existence of so many national autonomies in the Union would guarantee each of them freedom to experiment politically, economically, socially and would save this Union from the danger of hysteria and stampede to which more homogenous unions are exposed'. *Union Now*, 32.

internationalists– particularly in occupied Europe– the creation of union was not intrinsically democratic either. As Raymond Rifflet argued, while the sovereign state system was clearly doomed, 'Le tout est de savoir dans quel sens'. Larger units were bound to emerge, particularly in Europe, but a Soviet communist union, a fascist 'espace vitale' de type hitlérien' and even a liberal federal union as imagined by Streit would not be democratic.[179] Rifflet, too, insisted that only alternative was 'une Fédération démocratique liberment consentie' that would defend basic political and civil rights. He was equally clear, however, that a democratic union was not one that would save liberal democracy but one that would transform it, in Rifflet's case, through socialism.

It was for the same reason that Barbara Wootton supported the creation of a federal union. It alone represented a democratic form of international order, not because it would preserve individual liberty from the threat of the state or because it extended democratic participation to the supranational level – although these were both critical aspects of Wootton's support for federalism– but because it was 'like the engine on a train: a device for getting somewhere– to a socialist society'.[180] Like many others of her generation, Wootton believed that only a socialist economic system could guarantee the levels of welfare that would allow a genuine democracy to emerge. Only then would it be possible for the masses to truly engage in the democratic process and effectively practice self-government. Political rights were vital but they were not liberty in and of themselves. By failing to provide social justice, liberal democracy remained fundamentally undemocratic.[181]

[179] R. Rifflet "Du fédéralisme utopique au fédéralisme scientifique" 1945. Fonds Mouvement Européen, Folder ME-369, *French Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe,* HAEU.
[180] Oakley, *A Critical Woman: Barbara Wootton, Social Science and Public Policy in the Twentieth Century,*146.
[181] WB Curry and Olaf Stapeldon articulated a similar views of economic rights constituting the 'critical transformation of democratic principle' in the 20th century that must be guaranteed through Union. Melville Channing-Pearce, ed. *Federal Union: A Symposium* (London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1940), 125, 137.

Federal union would lead to socialism, Wootton argued, because it would permit supranational planning 'up to the Russian level'. This was a reference to scale, not means; unlike the Soviet Union, planning itself– as we will see further in chapter six– would be democratic. It was essential, however, that it took place on a 'larger canvas' than the nation state in order to have the greatest chance of success in ensuring the basic needs of all citizens were met.[182] Federalism, or 'the creation of a supranational entity' was thus the indispensable instrument of 'socialist planning of a scale commensurate with the technical and economic realities of the age in which we live'.[183]

Within socialist groupings in the European Movement, such views were widespread.[184] Yet supranational planning was not the only way in which union was connected to the emergence of new socialist democracies. More ambivalent concerning the role of supranational planning– often for political reasons– socialists such as Kim Mackay and André Philip stressed the establishment of minimum standards of welfare provision within a new union, among a host of other labour and education policies, that they argued would lead to a more equitable and participative democratic society[185]. More broadly, while they did not advocate the creation of an independent, expert planning authority, both Mackay and Philip imagined some form of federal economic management that was strongly dirigiste and directed towards the fulfilment of the basic needs or 'common good' of all.

Despite appearances, these views were just as radical as Wootton's. The hope that union would enforce welfare standards was not confined to socialists; it was a possibility that many

[182] Wootton, "Socialism and Federation", 288.
[183] Ibid, 297.
[184] Much of the discussion was subsequently devoted to how the union would ensure that planning was indeed 'democratic' and posed no threat to individual liberty. Alberto Castelli, *Una Pace Da Costruire : I Socialisti Britannici E Il Federalismo* (Milano: FrancoAngeli, 2002). 95 Wootton's views on democratic planning are discussed in chapter six. For others like Olaf Stapeldon the best hope remained to somehow try to 'revivify' traditional forms of democratic participation at both the national and federal level "Federalism and Socialism" in Channing-Pearce, *Federal Union: A Symposium,* 118; Lipgens, *Documents on the History of European Integration. Volume 3: The Struggle for European Union by Political Parties and Pressure Groups in Western European Countries 1945-50.*
[185] Wootton also talked about 'federal minima' "Socialism and Federation", 289.

non-socialists including William Beveridge– an active member of *Federal Union* in its early days– had considered. Compared to the majority of their peers, however, including socialists, these ideas had gone beyond narrowly statist conceptions of democratic reform. Even if Mackay and Philip spoke of advancing socialism within member states, they saw the creation of a supranational union as not only instrumental but essential to this end. What is equally clear is that, for these socialist internationalists, union would secure a lasting peace because it would lead to the emergence of socialist democracies and not simply, as Alberto Castelli has argued, because it would overcome anarchy.[186]

At the other end of the spectrum were those for whom achieving socialism in a national context without a union remained entirely possible. This included many socialists who supported the creation of some form of intergovernmental union on the grounds that it would foster transnational solidarity, facilitate the coordination and leadership of national labour movements and bolster the geopolitical position of socialism in the world.[187] Rooted in more traditional conceptions of socialist internationalism, these views have dominated the interpretation of socialist attitudes to European Union, particularly in Britain, from Labour's early support for an intergovernmental union to its rejection– Britain didn't need a European Union to achieve socialism after all. Similarly, Bevin's flirtation with the idea of a social democratic 'third space' or 'force' fashioned from the Empire-Commonwealth was not, finally, moved by a view that such a union was essential to the achievement of socialism in Britain and beyond in any directly instrumental way.[188] As the leader of such and entity, Bevin's priority was to protect and nourish nascent socialism in Britain from the threat of bi-polar geopolitics and provide resources– not to plan on a regional scale. As we will see in

[186] Castelli argues that above all else, socialist support for union marked the transition from the Leninist thesis of war as a product of capitalism to war as the product of anarchy Castelli, *Una Pace Da Costruire: I Socialisti Britannici E Il Federalismo*, 61, 67.
[187] Mark Minion, "The Fabian Society and Europe During the 1940s: The Search for a 'Socialist Foreign Policy'", *European History Quarterly* 30, no. 2 (2000).
[188] GDH Cole, "Europe as a Third Force", May 1947 and "Keep Left", May 1947. Lipgens, *Documents on the History of European Integration. Volume 3: The Struggle for European Union by Political Parties and Pressure Groups in Western European Countries 1945-50,* 670, 673.

chapter five, insofar as it was a vision of democratic order that served citizens beyond the borders of the United Kingdom through the promotion of socialism with the empire, moreover, Bevin's views were profoundly limited.[189] In France, while these more traditional conceptions of socialist internationalism were arguably less widespread, Guy Mollet's opposition to André Philip's case for federalism on the grounds that it would push away the British, for example, was rooted in a similar kind of internationalism that prioritised solidarity and geopolitics.[190]

Examining these arguments, it is unsurprising that socialists are often accused of lacking any kind of creative internationalism in this period.[191] At best, socialists have been accused of propagating out-dated solidarism that concealed a jealously national mind set focused on 'building Jerusalem' at home. By focusing on a narrow clique of national politicians and thinkers, however, this interpretation is a something of a self-fulfilling prophecy. It misses the fact that for socialists such as Wootton, who were more involved in *Federal Union* than the Fabian Society– as were many French and British socialists in the European movement more generally– union was not a pragmatic solution to the problem of power politics and the postwar international order or an opportunity for international cooperation that might be

[189] Darwin, *The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830-1970*, 546; Anne Deighton, "War, Law, Politics, and the Early Cold War: Making the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)", in *International Relations Research Colloquium* (Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, 2012). "Entente Neo-Coloniale?: Ernest Bevin and the Proposals for an Anglo–French Third World Power, 1945–1949".

[190] Lipgens, *Documents on the History of European Integration. Volume 3: The Struggle for European Union by Political Parties and Pressure Groups in Western European Countries 1945-50*, 12-13. The September 1949 meeting of the executive committee of the Socialist movement for the United States of Europe offers a good illustration of competing French views of socialist Europe. André Philip pressed for a socialist majority in a strengthened European Consultative Assembly/Parliament as the key to ensuring that European unity would lead to socialism while Marceau Pivert stressed 'democratic Europe' in terms of coordinating transnational Labour movements. Guy Mollet, supported by Bob Edwards and Fenner Brockway, emphasised the importance of Labour's leadership whilst others stressed the unification followed by the 'socialisation' of Europe through new welfare policies as the heart of a democratic future. A final group equated 'democracy' in a new European order with ensuring strategic and economic independence from the United States and the USSR. "French Socialist Movement for a United States of Europe", Fonds Mouvement Européen, Folder ME-369, HAEU.

[191] A critique, noted by Wootton, most famously levelled at the postwar European socialist movement by Geoff Eley, although recent scholarship has suggested a richer history of socialist visions of postwar Europe ,particularly in the Britain. Geoff Eley, *Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe, 1850-2000* (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Minion, "The Fabian Society and Europe During the 1940s: The Search for a 'Socialist Foreign Policy'"; R M Douglas, *The Labour Party, Nationalism and Internationalism, 1939-1951* (London: Routledge, 2004).

broadly beneficial for the socialist movement, it was essential to the emergence of socialist democracies and peace.

Although many socialist visions of global order were thus more radical than they seemed, there was one sense in which they were not. Union would be confined to Europe. Although Wootton herself argued that socialism and internationalism were indivisible and socialists must always consider the world as a whole, and while her vision of supranational planning had the potential for global application, it is not clear that the greater level of abstraction in her work compared to other European socialists should be read as universalism.[192] Overall, although socialism remained an intrinsically global project, its spread through a new global order remained sadly parochial. In most cases, the 'global' in socialist visions of democratic union referred to the geopolitical positioning of the socialist world that would emerge in the context of a new European union, not the extension of its model through expansion or replication. The protection of the embryonic democratic order in Europe from the USSR and USA was certainly construed as a vital part of the quest to spread socialism worldwide. Protecting the new model in its infancy, the implication was that as it grew in strength other states would gravitate towards it from both the capitalist and communist orbits. Within socialist discussions of union, however, this remained something of an afterthought.

Some, like Konni Zilliacus, did try to take a more global view, arguing that it was inconsistent to focus solely on the European space.[193] It was essential, he argued, to stay focused on the ultimate goal of democratic world federal government rooted in global socialism and the spread of democracy at the sub-federal level. In the interim, however,

[192] cf. Rosenboim, "Barbara Wootton, Friedrich Hayek and the Debate on Democratic Federalism in the 1940s." Rosenboim's assertion that Barbara Wootton imagined the extension of her vision of democratic federalism on a 'global scale' is not supported by any overt statement in her work. Wootton believed that internationalism was synonymous with socialism, but her global view focused on decolonisation, development and the potentially positive role of Europe in balancing relations between East and West, not global federation and economic planning. Wootton, in fact, resigned from Federal Union in 1944 when it voted in support of world federation as its aim.
[193] Konni Zilliacus "World Government and World Peace" 1943 in Patrick Ransome, *Studies in Federal Planning.* (London: Macmillan & Co., 1943), 337.

Zilliacus' views struggled to move away from mainstream conceptions of the broader postwar order that many socialist unionists, and indeed European unionists as a whole, imagined for the world outside the union. Here they reverted to anti-imperialism– although socialists too preferred development, trusteeship and 'association' to immediate independence for colonial territories– and the advocacy of a state or perhaps regionally based world organisation that would work to preserve peace and promote prosperity in a world increasingly divided into large blocs.[194] Hence, although socialist unionists reasoned that peace and liberty *depended* on the swift transition to socialism in the context of union, they were also guilty of a degree of intellectual inconsistency that betrayed a deeper Eurocentrism. In one sense, their ideas suggested that if the problem of liberty, democracy and peace could be solved in Europe, it would be solved for the world. Not all socialists thought in this way. Political constraints also played their part. It is easy to see that socialists like Wootton and Philip hoped for a more integrated global system that would work towards the same or broadly similar goals as a federal Europe. In the absence of sustained and explicit discussion of this system, however, socialist visions of democratic global order remained somewhat limited.

3.3. Expansion: Union and 'Authentic' Democracy

Among the most interesting groups to articulate a vision of union as a vehicle for the transformation of democracy was, in the broadest term, Christians. The mid-century revival of Christian and especially Catholic political thought had not only sought to reconcile but redefine democracy. This had a profound effect on the way in which Catholic thinkers, in particular, in France, Britain and the United States, imagined a new global order in the 1940s. The result was, as we will see, very different from Woodrow Wilson's Presbyterian worldview.

[194]Ibid.

The broad themes of the Catholic redefinition of democracy that had been gaining in strength during the 1930s were set out most famously in Jacques Maritain's *Christianity and Democracy* in 1944. These included economic justice, the importance of self-development in the context of autonomous communities and, more broadly, the rejection of all materialist ideologies– both individualist and collectivist– and their pursuit through the modern, centralised, all-powerful state. Derived from a Thomistic philosophy of the 'human person', it was not just Maritain and his fellow 'personalists', however, who argued that 'Christians democracy' or 'true democracy' was not individualist liberal Parliamentarism or Soviet collectivism but a 'third way' that focused on the flourishing of the 'human person' in the community.[195] As we will see, not only did the language of personalism infuse even non-Christian discussion of world order, particularly concerning human rights, the vision of a decentralised, pluralist and just democratic society pursued by Catholic internationalists through their visions of union was widely echoed throughout the decade in many different forms, by Catholics and non-Catholics alike.

Among the most important unionist thinkers inspired by a personalist philosophy was Alexandre Marc. An important figure of the European movement much neglected in Anglophone scholarship, Marc consistently advocated federal world order as the only way to achieve the political, economic and social revolution that would address the flaws of contemporary life and ensure liberty.[196] Marc, who arrived at federalism via the so-called

[195] Jacques Maritain and Doris C. Anson, *Christianity and Democracy. (Translated by Doris C. Anson.)* (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1945). esp. Part II "The Rights of Man and Natural Law", chapter I "A Society of Human Persons", 82-3, 90; Summary of the 'New Democracy' that the 'new men' must build up after the war in ch. II "The Rights of the Person" on the 'Personalist, communal and pluralist inspiration of the social organisation' and the 'common task inspired by the ideal of liberty and fraternity'. Characteristics of the 'sane political society' denied or disregarded 'both by the old bourgeois individualism and by the totalitarianisms of today', 99-100.

[196] Marc could become the first Secretary General of the prominent European Union of Federalists in 1946. Alongside him in charge of *La Fédération, Revue de l'Ordre Vivant* and the European Union of Federalists were many of his colleagues from *Ordre Nouveau*: Daniel Rops, Robert Aron, Arnaud Dandieu, Denis de Rougement, Jean Jardin, although Fédération had many other notable personalist contributors including Henri Brugmans and Jean Pierre Gouzy, as well as contributions from figures outside the personalist movement who nevertheless echoed many of these themes in different ways, including Maurice Allais, Andre Voisin and even Raoul Dautry. In general, the themes of Marc's

'non conformist' movement that thrived in interwar Paris around two journals– *Esprit*, founded by Emmanuel Mounier, and *Ordre Nouveau*, founded by Marc with Robert Aron– has often been accused of being 'anti-democratic'.[197] Whilst Marc shared the disgust with Third Republic that led some of his fellow non-conformists to support Vichy, he himself was part of a substantial group that rejected an authoritarian solution and turned instead towards federalism as a means to critique and transform the existing system.

Although Marc never embraced the 'equivocal' language of democracy, like Maritain in the early 1940s, he spoke of 'integral federalism' as a means to achieve 'authentic democracy' and peace in distinctly personalist tones.[198] Admittedly, he was more critical of traditional democratic structures than Maritain, but his view was still far from the authoritarian image of non-conformism.[199] Instead of controlling society, federalism was, above all, a means to liberate the individuals and communities that composed society from the control of the modern state through radical decentralisation. Federalism was, in this sense, the expression of a 'general philosophy, a conception of man and of the person' whose end point was the radical opposite of the Hegelian synthesis that others– like Alexandre Kojève– saw as the end point of modernity.[200] Instead of a closed, homogenous state, federalism would help to redirect modern life towards a state of maximum diversity produced by the maximum self-determination of the 'human person' freed from monolithic forms of identity and existence imposed by modern political, economic and social organisation.

Personalist 'integral federalism' can be seen throughout the pages of *Fédération* and the meetings of the UEF in the late 1940s. See note 202 below.

[197] John Hellman, *The Communitarian Third Way: Alexandre Marc's Ordre Nouveau, 1930-2000* (Montreal; London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002). Samuel Moyn, "Jacques Maritain, Christian New Order, and the Birth of Human Rights", in *Dialogo Interculturale E Diritti Umani: La Dichiarazione Universale Dei Diritti Umani. Genesi, Evoluzione E Problemi Odierni (1948-2008)*, ed. Luigi Bonante and Roberto Papini (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2011).

[198] Alexandre Marc, Extract from *Du Communalisme au Fédéralisme Intégrale*, (Paris 1948). Walter Lipgens Collection. Folder WL-69. HAEU "Democratie: un mot équivoque", 2.

[199] ibid. On closer inspection, Maritain's own view of democratic federalism was equally anti-parliamentary. Federal Europe, he argued, would permit nations to transition away from the false democracy of the liberal past characterised by Parliamentarism. "L'Europe et l'idée federale" 1940 in Maritain, *L'europe Et L'idée Fédérale: Textes Publiés Par Le Cercle D'études Jacques Et Raïssa Maritain,* 29-30.

[200] Dominique Auffret, *Alexandre Kojève: La Philosophie, L'etat, La Fin De L'histoire* (Paris: B. Grasset, 1990).

Echoing Bakhunin and Maritain, Marc wanted to rebuild society 'from the bottom up', reorganising it around 'collectives that are closest to the individual': the family, local community, or factory and at the same time rethinking every customary category of thought or activity from enterprise and academia to agriculture and ethnicity in light of the need to serve the human personality by maximising chances for its expression and engagement.[201] Fundamentally, Marc and his colleagues suggested that it was these smaller groups that were closer to the individual that could make democracy a reality in terms of the liberation and 'self-determination' of the human person in the modern world. Recognising that such sub-national groups are the true heart of an individual's meaningful existence, and encouraging their further development, they should also–Marc argued– be the core of a new political system built around the human person. A federal order that disempowered modern states and simultaneously decentralised authority to the subnational level as much as possible was the first step towards this goal.

Although comparatively extreme, rethinking democratic order in ways that privileged decentralisation and political pluralism was not just a major theme of personalist thought, characterising not only Marc's but Maritain's own federalist period; it was a major theme of both unionist and internationalist discourses on world order and democracy more broadly. As we will see in chapter six, Marc's federalist views were very similar to those of the most famous advocate of 'functional' world order, David Mitrany, whose vision reflected a belief that social groups such as trades unions and civic associations constituted the most meaningful collective units of modern life, not political parties. Marc and his colleagues also sought to base federal and sub-federal democratic representation in such alternative groupings, advocating a strongly corporatist structure of federal governance. In so doing, he hoped that democracy would overcome the most obvious defects of Parliamentarism based on

[201] Manganaro Favaretto, *Il Federalismo Personalista Di Alexandre Marc,* 111; Alexandre Marc Extract "Du Communalisme au Fédéralisme Intégrale" (Paris 1948), 10. Walter Lipgens Collection, Folder WL-69, HAEU.

universal suffrage, although this did not mean supplanting the latter altogether: 'we are democrats', he insisted.[202]

There were two other aspects of Marc's vision of federal union as a vehicle to a new democratic society, both of which we will return to in subsequent chapters. The first was economic justice that, like their socialist colleagues, integral federalists saw as a vital part of a new democratic order; there could be no real liberty of the human person under the conditions of economic insecurity and degradation that existed under liberal capitalism. Consequently, Marc's Union of European Federalists stressed that a new union would create a 'new commercial society' that would not only deliver the levels of economic wellbeing that were essential to human dignity, but do so in a way that fused supranational planning and the establishment of federal guarantees with the maximisation of local autonomy through the specialisation and localisation of enterprise and industry.[203] The second was the constitutional guarantee of human rights including social, economic and group rights at the federal level.[204] Once again, Marc's impetus was not just to protect the individual against the modern state but to foster the new kind of democratic society built around autonomous and overlapping identities and communities that was at the heart of his concept of democratic global order.

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[202] Interview with Alexandre Marc, 'L'indipendente', 10 May 1955, 14. Alexandre Marc Collection, Folder AM-439, HAEU. At the same time, Marc describes the flaws of parliamentary democracy and federalism as a means to its rectification through the recognition of the 'autonomy' of all 'collectives' and creation of new, non-centralised, structures of authority and decision making. On the 'equivocal' nature of democracy, the dangers of the party system and federalism as the midwife of 'Communalism and decentralisation' see Alexandre Marc Extract "Du Communalisme au Fédéralisme Intégrale" (Paris 1948), 6. Walter Lipgens Collection, Folder WL-69, HAEU. A typical editorial from *Fédération* No. 40 Main 1948 describing pluralism and functional representation via "structures transnationales plutôt que supranationalles" as the core of a new democratic order concluding. "Pense-t-on mettre de l'ordre dans le chaos contemporain grâce à quelque <<représentation proportionelle>> à l'échelle du continent? Si l'on veut une Europe où les Patries et les hommes s'épanouissent dans la liberté, on ne la construira qu'à partir de ses communautés vivantes'; Source: *Fédération, Revue de l'Ordre Vivant*, Documentation annexée au fonds Albert-Marie Giordani, Folders AMG/Doc-02 to 54.

[203] As can be clearly seen in the Charter adopted by the U.E.F. in Montreaux in 1947 which discusses not only federalism as a vehicle for 'authentic' democracy in a representative sense, but the accompanying reorganisation of industry, transnational planning, and the establishment of social minima. On the establishment of a new commercial society October 1949. Fonds Mouvement Européen, Folder ME-983, HAEU. On Marc's economic vision see Manganaro Favaretto, *Il Federalismo Personalista Di Alexandre Marc,* 113.

[204] Alexandre Marc, "Draft Charter of Human Rights prepared for the U.E.F Rome Conference", November 1948. Alexandre Marc Collection, Folder AM-374, HAEU.

Federalism was essential to this vision of 'authentic' democratic society. A functional or intergovernmental union that did not contain these constitutional guarantees would, Marc feared, result in a union of centralising states– an exercise that was both contradictory and futile. Even if nation states delegated sovereignty over foreign policy and nothing else, or a technocratic union managed to secure better standards of living without radial sub-federal decentralisation, real democracy and real peace would not exist.

Equally, because 'integral federalism' implied decentralisation within the state as well as federalism beyond the state, there was no reason why it should stop at the frontiers of Europe. Unity was not an end in itself, and Marc denounced the inconsistency of Europeanism for believing so. His view, echoed by many of his colleagues at Montreaux and beyond, was that notwithstanding temporary strategic priority of Europe, federalism was global by definition: 'le fédéralisme intégral affirme sa vocation englobante, contre l'idole stato-nationale'.[205]

It is for much the same reasons that we find that, in contrast to the unionism of their socialist colleagues, most Christians inspired by personalism adopted a truly global, yet always deeply pluralist, view. It is no coincidence that the Committee to Frame the Constitution of the World comprised several 'personalist' thinkers.[206] Its Chairman, President of Chicago University Robert M. Hutchins, in his own attempt to elaborate a Thomistic vision of world order in *St. Thomas and the World State* (1949) advocated a global pluralist political society

[205]The Campaign for Europe assumed a certain 'strategic priority' in postwar period but it was not in itself an end 'it always represented the ideal dimension for confronting specific social problems' Susanna Cobucci Intervista con il Fondatore di Ordre Nouveau, Wednesday 10 May 1955, 'L'independente' 14, Fonds Alexandre Marc, Folder AM-439, HAEU. As Marc reminded his readers in *Civilation en Sourcis* 1955, Europeanism was wholly inconsistent; 'unity at all costs' made no sense: the urgent task to create a federal Europe is 'inseparable from the revolution' in political, economic and social life that will enable it to respond to the 'defects of contemporary life'. Extract in Fonds Alexandre Marc, Folder AM-439, HAEU.

[206] Notably Mortimer Adler and Robert Hutchins. Several others, especially philosopher Richard McKeon and Albert Guerard, although not themselves 'personalists', articulated a similarly pluralist philosophy. Among this group, Antonio Borgese's views stand out for advancing a competing universalistic/moralistic constitution in place of the pluralistic design favoured by McKeon, Hutchins and Adler.

that would be composed of overlapping national and supranational institutions and multiple communities that would contribute to human flourishing- not a world state.[207]

Maritain himself was deeply impressed by the Chicago Committee, although at first sight his own federalism, appearing to stress the importance of Europe's shared values, suggests a more closed vision than Marc's. Yet their ideas were more similar than they appear. In his writings on federalism, Maritain too stressed European and indeed global federation as a means of attaining the 'true democracy' that would replace the individualist materialism of Parliamentarism and laissez-faire capitalism. The 'larger' idea of representation which federalism promised to encourage was the only foundation of a free and peaceful world order. These 'new forms' of representation would be diverse, both within and across nations, depending on their political and cultural traditions. But federalism alone, by freeing people from the grip of the total state, would let these forms flourish in all their diversity *and* in their essential similarities.[208]

Two elements were thus critical to Maritain's vision of true democracy and federal order: political pluralism and organic community or 'common purpose'. What Maritain described as the need for a shared 'oeuvre' was another common theme of personalism, and indeed thinking about world order in the 1940s more broadly.[209] Yet it should not be understood as a kind of cultural essentialism or political exceptionalism that confined his vision to Europe. Maritain feared 'the nightmare of the world state' if supranational institutions were created before the diverse and autonomous body politic, united in its common commitment to the flourishing of the human person, had emerged. He was more optimistic, at least initially, that a European federation could be truly 'united in diversity' in the personalist sense. Globally,

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[207] Robert Maynard Hutchins, *St. Thomas and the World State* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1949), 142-145.
[208] Maritain, *L'europe Et L'idée Fédérale: Textes Publiés Par Le Cercle D'études Jacques Et Raïssa Maritain,* 29-30.
[209] E.g. Carr, *Conditions of Peace,* 121. Ward, *Policy for the West*. See Part IV "Faith for Freedom", 243-253.

Maritain foresaw a longer process, guided by a supranational 'moral authority' or 'council of sages'. Combined with a global system of human rights, Maritain believed that this council could do more to foster the emergence of a global political community than the immediate federation of the world.[210]

Although this global vision ultimately supplanted even his support for a regional European federation, it remains clear that for Martian, as for the 'integral federalists' gathered around Marc, the journal *Fédération* and the pro-European institutions Marc subsequently founded, that personalist visions of union and a democratic world order– as a philosophy and an approach to meeting the challenge of liberty in the modern world– were not culturally or theologically bound to Europe but were both pluralist and intrinsically global. Although Christian in origin, Maritain and Marc argued that the values of 'true democracy' – diversity and respect for the human person– were not tied to being Catholic or European. Union should only be confined to Europe in the first instance because it was the only viable 'host' for a transnational democratic society that required the creation of a shared political community even as it sought to promote diversity. Shared European values seemed to offer the ideal terrain for this delicate balancing act. But the implication in Maritain and Marc's case was always that this community could grow as the 'democratic' values of diversity and respect for the human person spread. Globally, their universal application was intended to produce a plural and diverse democratic world order in which different regions and faiths could shape their own distinct social, political and economic realities. At the same time, participating in a larger, possibly federal global order, humanity would collectively counter the most dangerous forces of modernity that imperilled not only diversity and liberty but peace: materialist ideologies based on national or class collectivism or the atomised, self-seeking individual.

[210] Maritain, *L'europe Et L'idée Fédérale: Textes Publiés Par Le Cercle D'études Jacques Et Raïssa Maritain*, 146, 161-163.

These ideas are, finally, a good example of the way in which internationalists tried to articulate visions of democratic global order that addressed the inherent tension between solidarism and pluralism both domestically and globally. Instead of self-serving double standards or unimaginative Euro-centrism, these exclusive visions of European unity were clearly embedded in a much larger conceptions of democratic order characterised by new forms of individual and collective self-determination that, both Marc and Maritain hoped, would gradually spread worldwide through means that remained fundamentally consistent with these ends, be it the gradual extension of federalism or human rights.

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Like Wootton's vision of supranational planning, the radical ideas of the 'integral federalists' were much more widespread and influential within the European movement than most accounts suggest. Like their socialist colleagues, these visions competed with other 'Christian' visions of union that, while equally concerned to liberate the human person from the 'heresy' of excessive state power, were ultimately less transformative. The deeply religious future Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, for example, supported European union on predominantly pragmatic grounds.[211] Similarly, while leading pro-European Christian Democrats like Adenauer, de Gasperi and even Schuman were no lovers of centralising nation states and nationalist ideology, insofar as they were inspired by a 'Catholic' vision of union

[211] A devout Presbyterian Dulles' support for European union and the wider vision of order he articulated as chairman of *Federal Council of Churches Commission on Just and Durable Peace* in 1941 was arguably rooted in a much more traditional 'Protestant' interpretation of the gospel as a guide to world order: justice and brotherhood among Christian *nations* and by Christian nations vis-à-vis the rest of the world. See "The American People Need Now to be Imbued with a Righteous Faith: by John Foster Dulles in *A Righteous Faith for a Just and Durable Peace: USA Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America Commission to Study the Bases of a Just and Durable Peace*, (New York 1943), 10-12. On the explicit role of power political considerations, see also Martin Erdmann, *Building the Kingdom of God on Earth: The Churches' Contribution to Marshal Public Support for World Order and Peace, 1919-1945* (Oregon: Wipf & Stock Publishers, 2005); Richard H. Immerman, *John Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism, and Power in U.S. Foreign Policy* (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1999).

based on a radical vision of 'Christian Democracy' the evidence is scant.[212] One might argue that in its early days, Christian Democracy offered a self-conscious and even radical alternative to liberal individualism and communism that shared important similarities with personalism, albeit one that was fully reconciled to the party system. There is no evidence, however, to suggest that this animated a vision of global order that was in any way seen as instrumental to its delivery. At most, it could be said that Christian Democrats connected European unity to a domestic vision of democratic order in a permissive sense. In any case, Christian Democracy quickly became a conventionally conservative project. It remained rabidly opposed to Communism but lost the corporatist agenda inspired by Christian social doctrine that had initially pitted it against liberal capitalism. Unlike the integral federalists, moreover, rooted in an older notion of Catholic Europe tied to the Vatican itself, Christian democratic visions of Europe remained wholly confined to the faith and the territory of Europe.

Partly because it was not instrumental to any radical vision of democracy, Christian Democrats– with the partial exception of Schuman– were on the whole ambivalent about democratic representation at the European level. Yet there is no evidence at all to suggest that their support for a technocratic form of European union was therefore the counterpart of attempt to 'constrain' democracy domestically.[213] This view, paradoxically, is often derived from an authoritarian interpretation of interwar personalism that is expanded to describe Catholic political thought in the period as a whole and, by extension, Catholic international thought. A poor description of Christian Democratic attitudes towards international order, in

[212]See Pasture, "European Integraion, Christian Democracy and the Development of a Secular Society: Continuities Beyond the Appearances; Wolfram Kaiser, *Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Wolfram Kaiser and Helmut Wohnout, *Political Catholicism in Europe 1918-45* (London: Routledge, 2004); Michael Gehler and Wolfram Kaiser, "Transnationalism and Early European Integration: The Nouvelles Equipes Internationales and the Geneva Circle 1947–1957", *The Historical Journal* 44 (2001).

[213] As Muller and to some extent Marco Duranti have suggested. Muller, *Christian Democracy: Towards a New Intellectual History*; Duranti, "'A Blessed Act of Oblivion': Human Rights, European Unity and Postwar Reconciliation"; Müller, *Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in Twentieth-Century Europe*.

light of the preceding discussion, it is clear that even though there were indeed 'Catholic' visions of union based on a deep critique of liberal democracy, this is also a rather simplistic analysis of personalist or 'non-conformist' ideas.

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These transformative visions of Marc and Wootton did not triumph. Bevin, Adenauer and crucially Monnet– as we will see in chapter six– had other plans. Historically, however, it remains significant that these ideas were both more prominent and influential in debates about postwar order and European unity in particular, arguably even shaping important aspects of what emerged such as the so called principle of 'subsidiarity' that governs the European Union.[214] Conceptually, these ideas show us that internationalists in this period thought about the relationship between global order and democracy in terms of how it would assist in the preservation and expansion of liberty. Although federalism was vital to most of these internationalists, their visions of order were neither democratic nor undemocratic by virtue of their representative structure alone.

This does not mean that we must agree with or accept the visions of democracy that were put forward. If these ideas were not anti-democratic by virtue of the fact that they were opposed to liberal democracy, there is still much we might substantively critique. While socialists, for example, were careful to combine their vision of a socialist democracy defined by economic justice with the preservation of political rights, their ideas of democratic union arguably failed to give sufficient focus to pluralism and the dangers of centralisation and expert planning in pursuit of a socialist economy. Catholic thinkers, on the other hand, combined pluralism with the pursuit of economic justice. While the anti-parliamentary nature of these visions is

[214] Although the 'catholicity' of this notion has been much debated. Alan Paul Fimister, *Robert Schuman: Neo-Scholastic Humanism and the Reunification of Europe* (Brussels: Presses Interuniversitaires Europeennes, 2008). Fimister's argument has been deeply criticised: James Chappel, "Review: Robert Schuman: Neo-Scholastic Humanism and the Reunification of Europe by Alan Paul Fimister," *The Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 62, no. 1 (2011); Wolfram Kaiser, "Review: Robert Schuman: Neo-Scholastic Humanism and the Reunification of Europe", *The Catholic Historical Review* 96, no. 4 (2010).

alarming, it was balanced by a strong focus on human rights and local representation, not to mention federal guarantees of political rights. Equally, there is clearly much we might critique– particularly in the socialist case–in the way in which internationalists tried and failed to translate their visions globally.

These questions are a matter of historical investigation and judgement. In some cases, however, visions of democratic union based on transformative discourses of democracy are difficult to consider under the rubric of democracy at all. One example is the French Union: the vision of 'democratic' empire enshrined in the Constitution of the IV Republic. Although the French Union was clearly an expression of French ambition to retain its empire and status as a global power it was also, arguably, an attempt to address the challenge of democratic modernity through a new kind of regional order. As Fred Cooper has argued, the French Union was an organisation that sought to reconcile autonomy, liberty, and association as was deemed necessary for survival in the modern world.[215] In theory, the French Union attempted to articulate a 'republican' ideal of order based on a capacious conception of transnational citizenship that, extended to colonies, would permit a kind of 'true' self-determination based on social and economic rights, and political and cultural autonomy within a wider French community.[216] Belief in this model in French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa was initially widespread. Early supporters of the French Union included Léopold Sédar Senghor who put forward his own three level political structure of local autonomy, regional African federation and a French confederation of free and equal member states. This kind of French

[215] Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 1945-1960,* 10: 'the future of a complex and unequal polity depended on reconfiguring the relation of its components'.
[216] Stephen Tyer, "A Transnational End of Empire? The Case of the French Union in Sub-Saharan Africa", in *Interdisciplinary Approaches to Transnational History* (Balliol College, Oxford, 2013). Tyer emphasizes the extent to which these areas were themselves composites where experiments in international order were taking place. Paul Clay Sorum, *Intellectuals and Decolonization in France* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1977), 30.

Union, he argued, would be a vehicle for African autonomy– cultural, social, economic and political– and peace supported by 'horizontal' and 'vertical' solidarity.[217]

Senghor's vision was clearly based on the same transformative discourses of democracy that shaped other visions of order. Instead of defining self-determination in relation to the nation state, Senghor focused on economic justice, autonomy and the 'wider horizons of twentieth century citizenship'.[218] While French supporters of French Union spoke the same language, unlike Senghor and unlike transformative visions of European union, they left out the political. Whereas these visions of democratic order, like many others, postulated a move towards democracy based on economic justice and communal autonomy, they were always combined with some notion of democratic political rights and, at the very least, human rights. In the French Union this was not the case in practice and arguably even in theory, although we will return to this question in subsequent chapter. While the constitution imagined the creation of new assembly to assist and advise the new High Authority of the *Union Francaise*, it was not the assembly of Senghor's dreams but– as René Pleven made abundantly clear – a system that would maintain France's pre-eminence vis-à-vis fellow members of the French Union and the pre-eminence of white over black. Echoing Hutchins, Pleven confirmed to the imperial commission that the aim of the French Union was to try and make France 'appear inclusive', to have a republican international order without being 'egalitarian'; 'there are 60 million colonials for 40 million French people, a corresponding proportion of colonial representatives inside the metropolitan parliament would make the physiognomy of the French Parliament into a parody'. Unlike Hutchins, however, this was not intended as a temporary state of affairs but a permanent hierarchy. The extent to which, even from the vantage point of its French sponsors, the French Union was a serious attempt to trial a new conception of 'democratic' order that would secure liberty, prosperity and order is thus very much open to doubt. At the very least, it confirms that, from a contemporary

[217] Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation,* 188; 21.
[218] Wootton, "Socialism and Federation", 291.

vantage point, visions of democratic order that did not simply downplay political rights but denied political rights are clearly unacceptable.

3.5 Extension: Union and Global Democracy

It was not only Catholics who nurtured truly global visions of democratic union. While socialists were often mealy-mouthed about the relationship between their vision of democratic union and the global and others, including Beveridge, were overt in their assessment that federalism is 'not a healing lotion to be sprayed all over the world', the connection between union and democracy in many other visions depended explicitly on the global extension of liberty, as well as its preservation and expansion.[219] This raised obvious problems for visions of democratic order that claimed to be based on pluralism and the search for meaningful self-government. The Catholic solution was organic gradualism: a European federation would nurture 'authentic democracy' whose values would gradually spread, assisted by international institutions and a system of universal human rights. The resulting global system, while universal, would also be plural. Others proposed a different path, some that shared similarities with Maritain and Marc and others that were much more extreme. The extent to which these visions avoided charges of imperialist universalism is, as a result, more open to doubt.

For Clarence Streit, whose end goal was the democratic union of the entire world, the solution was nominally voluntarism and, to some extent, the pluralist nature of democratic federalism. Eschewing imperialism, the democratic 'nucleus' would expand only as non-democratic states, looking to the example of democratic union, would themselves throw off authoritarian rulers, democratise and petition to join the 'zone of peace'. Within the union, however, while the federal model would enhance the liberty of individuals and of sub-national communities through decentralisation, there is no sense in which, by 'uniting to decentralize', the ensuing

[219] Beverdige quoted by Partick Ransome in *Studies in Federal Planning* (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1943), ix.

pluralism would be reflected in the governance structure of either the member states or the federal union itself. Governance at both levels would remain modelled on liberal democracy, specifically a combined parliamentary and presidential system.[220]

While the union itself was thus less pluralist than it claimed, Streit's vision was also less open and more hierarchical in its vision of expansion. While Streit stressed global union as the final solution to liberty and world peace, it is equally apparent that he believed that the union of 'the fifteen' existing 'Western' democracies would all but solve the problem of peace by virtue of their immense power, begging the question about how much the extension of liberty worldwide really mattered. To join the union, moreover, states had not only to be democratic, they had to be economically developed, 'mature', 'strong', 'well trained' democracies. Thus excluding the 'politically inexperienced millions' of India, for example, not only does more than a hint of racism return to Streit's justifications for this supposedly temporary state of affairs, so too does a more imperialistic notion of how non-Western states would come to join the Union, under the auspices of the latter's policy 'to train them for admission to the union as fully self governing nations'.[221]

While Streit's vision of democratic global order was premised on the flourishing and spread of liberal democracy through federalism, other internationalists– echoing the Catholics– envisioned the global extension of union as a means of spreading a new kind of democracy that would also expand liberty. Among the most interesting was Mortimer Adler, public intellectual and prominent member of the Chicago Committee and author in 1944 of the hugely popular *How to Think About War and Peace*. Like other unionists, Adler argued that in a global context, the sovereign state system undermined constitutional governments and threatened liberty and peace as a result. It was therefore necessary to create a world

[220] Streit, *Union Now,* 243, 255.
[221] Streit even verged on the hysterical warning that the West would 'destroy democracy by seeking to spread it too quickly and by overloading the state with too many voters untrained for self government' *Union Now,* 249, 24-25, 27.

government or union in which constitutional governments could be preserved. Crucially, however, a 'World government must not only be constitutional, but it must also *become democratic*, with all the implications this has for the political status of men everywhere. It must not only become politically democratic, but it should also look to the realisation of economic democracy. It should not only be just politically and economically, but it must also safeguard whatever justice is attained by adequate sanctions. More than that, it should provide effective machinery for altering any compromise status quo, for improving justice continually by due process of law. No form of imperialism can be allowed to remain'.[222]

In addition to economic justice, Adler insisted that 'becoming democratic' also meant overcoming racial discrimination and other forms of cultural and class prejudice.[223] The great failure of existing democracies was their refusal to recognise that liberty and justice do not belong to a particular race or culture, a problem that Adler argued, played out internationally in the perpetuation of inequality between East and West. Overall, Adler's goal was a democratic global system in which autonomy and plurality was preserved but that recognised the universal right to liberty and justice of all human beings through shared basic rights and standards of living. Education and economic reform would be critical to this end, but Adler was clear that this kind of democracy would only develop at all in the context of constitutional government. Because the survival of constitutionalism depended on world union, therefore, so too did the emergence of true democracy.[224]

World government was not a practical possibility in 1944. It remained the case, however, that 'the spread of constitutional government and, more than that, the gradual democratisation of the world are phases in the progress toward lasting worldwide peace. These things are

[222] Adler, *How to Think About War and Peace,* 134. On Economic democracy see 128-129. My emphasis.
[223] Adler made no mention at all of discrimination against women.
[224] Ibid, 272.

inextricably connected'.[225] In the world as it was, therefore, while existing democracies might begin to form some kind of federal nucleus within which it would be possible to pursue true democracy, they might also do so through new international institutions. Through these institutions, it would also be possible to begin to ameliorate political and economic relations between different parts of the globe through education and development policies. In the rest of the world, however, prior to 'democratisation' the first step remained the extension of constitutional government. To which end, although Adler remained tantalisingly vague on its instigation, it would be necessary to 'spread [democracy] by revolution to those countries where despotism must first be downed by force'.[226]

Although it is a somewhat blunt conclusion to a sophisticated and layered work, to suggest that Adler's vision therefore concealed an imperialist agenda is clearly inadequate. This is particularly obvious in light of the fact that Adler's vision of world union as a vehicle of democratisation was almost unique in its focus on racial and cultural equality in addition to economic injustice and the dangers of centralisation. In theory, moreover, it is clear that Adler's vision of democratisation was not anti-pluralist. Pluralism was vital and Adler's vision of world government aimed to promote it as far as possible.[227] The idea was rather that it was in a sense anti-pluralist to deny the universal rights of constitutional government and economic justice to all within which different cultures would be able to flourish and co-exist: Pluralism depended on fundamental equality. In this sense, Adler's vision was not altogether dissimilar from Owen Lattimore's conception of a world order composed of democratic unions. Lattimore believed that spreading democracy was critical, but to be global in scope it

[225]Ibid, 187.
[226] Ibid, 283.
[227] Much like other ideas we have seen Adler insisted on matching centralisation with decentralisation and preserving autonomy as much as possible as the size of the political community expands. Over time, Adler imagined that a world federation in which nation states retained autonomy in internal affairs would be replaced as the growing equality and political unity of federal citizens loosened attachment to states and led to further diffusions of power and identity away from the nation state 'up' to the regional level- or what Adler imagined as 'chartered provinces', and 'down' to the local level. 'These provinces are likely to cover larger areas, regions having more economic and political significance, than the original states'. At the same time, sub-national local communities and identities could flourish, 161-3.

needed to make room for regional conceptions of democracy both for geopolitical reasons and in order to preserve pluralism.[228]

We may still have doubts about the means and ends of Adler's pluralist universalism. Nevertheless, it remains an example of a vision of democratic order that clearly tried to find a way to balance the competing claims of equality and hierarchy, and pluralism and solidarism both in its ultimate goals and its approach to building that order in an unevenly developed world, in Adler's case, through seemingly more traditional structures of international organisations and informal processes of global politics. This was not always the case, as can be seen in Streit's example and more clearly still in others. Emery Reves, for example, whose celebrity far outstripped Adler's, strained the paradox of pluralist universalism to the point where the outline of imperialism can clearly be seen underneath. The architects of Reves' 'rejuvenated democratic world' in which liberty would flourish in the context of multiple communities free from the tyranny of centralising power were an Anglo-American elite. This Wellsian caste would begin with the existing democracies, joining them in union to reverse the trend of centralisation. Confronted with rest of the world, however, there could be no thought of gradualism or voluntarism: Britain and America 'must have an iron will to spread their principles all over the world and to fight the enemies of their conceptions and ideals wherever they may be'.[229]

3.6 Conclusion

The examples above represent only a tiny fraction of the literature and debate on union that was produced in the 1940s. Nevertheless, while thinkers like Marc are certainly among the most interesting and inventive, the idea that union was not only a means of 'overturning war'

[228] See Or Rosenboim, "Geopolitics and Global Democracy in Owen Lattimore's Political Thought", *The International History Review* 36, no. 4 (2014).
[229] Emery Reves, *A Democratic Manifesto* (London: J. Cape, 1943), 104, 106. Written at the height of WWII, *Anatomy of Peace* struck a less messianic note.

but a means of preserving, expanding and extending liberty was ubiquitous. The connection between a union that was thus democratic and its ability to guarantee peace, moreover, was equally widespread. A great many other figures from the European movement or the Chicago Committee might therefore be discussed but the above is already sufficient to texture and transform existing narratives of union and democracy. In place of the one-dimensional focus on democratic federalism vs. intergovernmentalism and functionalism, these visions demonstrate the wider and deeper parameters of debates about union and democracy that focused on questions of economic justice, pluralism and participation, the role of the individual in the community and the relationship between the individual and the state, and not the narrower issue of supranational representation. The latter was not unimportant, but when it was not seen primarily as instrumental to the delivery of a democratic order, it was only one aspect of it.

Secondly, this foray into visions of union has illustrated many of the contradictions and limitations that this thesis argues plagued visions of democratic global order in the 1940s. We have seen how internationalists articulated visions of democratic union that were simultaneously global, pluralist, egalitarian and participative but also exclusive, solidarist, hierarchical and technocratic. In some cases, these contradictions have been stark.

To explain these limitations, we might easily invoke power. Arguably, power tells us a lot about why, for example, visions of world union premised on global decolonisation were more prominent in America than in Britain or France where a more limited European or imperial union was preferable. In many cases, we can also talk about Euro-centrism and the persistence of imperial and racist mentalities as the root cause of apparent double standards and exclusions. For unionists such as Mackay, it was simply more important to focus attention on the core states of the system: Europe. Although this chapter has excluded visions of 'democratic' union motivated by barely concealed power political and racist attitudes, undeniable traces of the latter can still be found in many of the ideas above, including those

that desired eventual equality within a truly global union. We should by no means exclude the possibility that in some cases this motivated, perhaps only subconsciously, some of the supposedly temporary exclusions and imbalances that were otherwise justified on pragmatic grounds.

Nevertheless, to explain these limitations and contradictions also requires that we consider the tensions and trade-offs inherent to the challenge of democratic modernity and the attempt to build an order that would deliver a new democratic order in an unequal and divided world. As a result, we have seen how visions of union reflected different views of political rights, economic justice or communal autonomy as the most important aspect of 'freedom in a complex society'. In most cases, however, we also saw some attempt to combine and balance these different aspects of liberty, however convincing or unconvincing. We also saw how internationalists struggled to apply their visions of democracy globally. While union was seen as vital to the delivery of democracy and peace, in world of many cultures, polities, economies and ideas– not to mention empires and geopolitical threats– whether and how such an order would be truly global was challenging. It might be most feasible to start regionally by dint of shared values, political culture and economic development– or through the establishment of more traditional global international institutions– or through imposed revolution.

Together, the inherent tensions within the idea of democracy and its global application explains much of what appears undemocratic about visions of union, from the quest to democratise the earth to the limitation of union of the West or the relative neglect of political rights. The central point, however, is that assessing these visions and their manifest shortcomings is not a matter of prejudgment according to a fixed idea of 'democratic' global order. We may, though historical investigation, identify and discard ideas in which the supposed nature and needs of democratic union used were ideological cover for naked imperialism, ethno-centric particularism or pure power politics. We may identify when

imperfect visions of democratic union strayed into incoherence and overt hypocrisy. In some cases, having wedded the notion of democratic order to a standard of economic justice or pluralism so convincingly, for example, justifications for its absence or weak and inconsistent application within or outside union finally betray a self-serving double standard. Finally, however, we are left with the ideas of democratic modernity that animated visions of union themselves. Here we may still be critical of the ideas that were put forward, the choices and trade-offs they represented and the accompanying attempts to mitigate the tensions between solidarism and pluralism, equality and hierarchy, participation and technocracy they implied. Whether we finally accept visions of democratic order that were universalistic or anti-parliamentary, such as the unions described above, however, remains a matter of judgement that beyond all but the most basic criteria– such as respect for fundamental human rights for example– reflects our own subjective visions of democracy.

For the internationalists in this chapter, union was the best if not the only form of international order capable of delivering freedom in a complex society. Others were less convinced. While he thought a world of unions or 'empires' was likely to emerge to meet the demands of scale in a global world, Aron predicted a much shallower peace than that which unionist thinkers hoped for– secured by virtue of the immense power of each 'imperial' agglomeration, not the flourishing of liberty.[230] For others, the creation of unions or a world government was neither feasible nor necessary for the creation of a new democratic order that would preserve, expand and extend liberty. Another prominent idea was one that existed in the context of unions as well but that many internationalists believed could also help to build a democratic world order without it: human rights.

[230] Aron, *L'âge Des Empires Et L'avenir De La France*. Aron's position, notably regarding European unity, would change over time. See Nicolas Bavarez, *Raymond Aron: Un Moraliste Au Temps Des Idéologies* (Paris: Perrin, 2006), 280.

Chapter 4

Democratic Order and Human Rights

4.1 Introduction

In January 1942, two months after the Atlantic Charter, the United Nations alliance promised for the first time that a future world order would 'preserve human rights and justice in their own lands as well as other lands'.[231] The story of human rights from that moment until the ratification of the UNDHR on December 10th 1948 is well known; the clash between Soviet and 'Western' interpretations of rights, the individualisation of the international rights regime and the finally weakened, non-binding, largely symbolic character of the Declaration that emerged.[232] In the history of international thought, the importance of human rights in visions of world order 1940s is increasingly acknowledged.[233] Where it is no longer dismissed as marginal moralism or crude realpolitik, however, it remains a peripheral concern compared to the rise and fall of other theoretical paradigms and themes in this period such as geopolitics

[231] Akira Iriye, Petra Goedde, and William I. Hitchcock, *The Human Rights Revolution: An International History* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 4.

[232] In spite of recent revisions (see below), the general hierarchy between different 'orders' of rights and the chronology of their appearance and importance internationally in successive 'generations' still holds sway. In the 1940s, 'first generation' 'first order' political and individual rights emerged as more important than second tier social and economic rights (that were supposedly championed in opposition to the West by the Soviet Union) and certainly over 'third' generation group rights- having replaced their precursor: the protection of minorities under the League system. Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann, *Human Rights in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Iriye, Goedde, and Hitchcock, *The Human Rights Revolution: An International History*.

[233] An effort that has been led by historians. Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism*; Glenda Sluga, "René Cassin: Les Droit De L'homme and the Universality of Human Rights, 1945–66 " in *Human Rights in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Samuel Moyn, "René Cassin, Human Rights, and Jewish Internationalism", in *Thinking Jewish Modernity*, ed. Jacques Picard, et al. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2015); Moyn, "Jacques Maritain, Christian New Order, and the Birth of Human Rights", in *Human Rights in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Moyn, "Personalism, Community and the Origins of Human Rights", in Luigi Bonante and Roberto Papini *Dialogo interculturale e diritti umani: La Dichiarazione Universale dei Diritti Umani. Genesi, evoluzione e problemi odierni, 1948-2008* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2011); Antoine Prost and Jay M. Winter, *René Cassin and Human Rights: From the Great War to the Universal Declaration* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

and classical realism, federalism, functionalism, the stability of global capitalism and the ignominious decline of international law.[234]

Regardless of how it is treated, one critical aspect of the existing stories about human rights is missing. That is how Western internationalists who supported human rights, including international lawyers, connected them to the search for a democratic global order in the 1940s that would meet the challenge of democratic modernity and secure a lasting peace. As a result, human rights were also a much more important part of visions of global order than many accounts of the international thought of this period continue to suggest.

Like ideas of union, the following will show that, first and foremost, internationalists proposed human rights as a route towards a democratic and peaceful world order because they would protect the individual from the growth of state power under conditions of global modernity. Human rights were also seen as critical part of the effort to expand liberty in the modern world. The international promotion of social and economic rights was seen as a vital weapon in the fight for the higher standards of guaranteed welfare that was necessary for the existence of democratic society and the 'free development' of the human 'personality' in the 1940s.[235] To this end, cultural rights and the right to self development in context of community were equally important.[236] They would lead to the reinvigoration of 'associative life' and the flourishing of diverse communities.[237] At a deeper level, therefore, human rights would address the root causes of collectivist totalitarianism that resulted from the excessive individualism of the liberal democratic model and its failure to address social injustice and the

[234] Particularly among IR scholars who focus on the history of international thought, human rights have not been treated as important aspect of thinking about world order in this period e.g. Ashworth, *A History of International Thought: From the Origins of the Modern State to Academic International Relations*, 183; Navari, *Public Intellectuals and International Affairs: Essays on Public Thinkers and Political Projects*; Williams, *Failed Imagination: New World Orders of the Twentieth Century*.
[235] Johannes Morsink, *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins and Intent* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 84. On the Third Session and the discussion of Article 22 of the UNDHR.
[236] Ibid, 210-211.
[237] Antoine Prost and Jay M. Winter, *René Cassin and Human Rights: From the Great War to the Universal Declaration* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 239.

need for individuals to feel part of a community. Older 'personal freedoms we associate with democracy', argued HG Wells, needed to be reasserted against fascist extremes and the tendency of all modern states to centralise in reaction to a global world; crucially, however, a global human rights regime would also represent 'consolidation, implementing and control of the revolutionary impulses that are astir all over the world'. It would instantiate and promote a new vision of democratic modernity.[238]

These pluralistic, communitarian and socially just visions of 'self determination' and 'democratic society' were not necessarily co-terminus with the nation state or a single model of political democracy. The international lawyers and internationalists discussed below were united by their desire to divorce the idea of democracy from the state as an abstract entity and to extend this idea of democracy globally through a new human rights regime. In the vast majority of cases, this included democratic political rights. Human rights would promote the spread of democratic political systems in addition to the spread of democratic societies defined by the protection of basic individual liberties and enhanced social, cultural, economic rights that guaranteed a full and free life in the modern world. Echoing Mortimer Adler, democratisation implied more than constitutional government but could not occur without it. Adler's own view of an international bill of rights certainly reflected his view that it would promote a democratic order characterised by democratic systems but also the deeper processes of democratisation that he identified with the emergence of economic justice or 'economic democracy' and cultural pluralism.[239]

Where it was not explicit it was certainly implied that this would take place in the context of independent nation states. This was partly a practical consideration. Like unionists, however, it was also a reflection of the underlying assumption of many supporters of human rights, including Clark Eichelberger and James Shotwell, that although it was necessary to divorce

[238] H. G. Wells, *The Rights of Man; or, What Are We Fighting For?* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1940), 22.
[239] Adler, *How to Think About War and Peace,*186.

nation and state and articulate richer ideas of democracy than the liberal model of the past; the nation remained a meaningful and valuable community that was not incompatible with this goal. There is a degree of tension surrounding this issue, however, concerning both the requirement and relative importance of national independence and the extent to which internationalists based their idea of democratisation on a unified or more diverse understanding of democratic political systems. This ambiguity reflects the fact that human rights were connected to visions of democratic order characterised by the spread of an idea of democracy that tried to balance pluralism and solidarism both internally and externally; how internationalists struck the balance between these competing requirements of democracy differed. Insofar as nation states were involved in this process, while it is clear that in most cases democratisation was associated with the extension of the nation state model, it is equally clear that, paradoxically, it was still not primarily through the right to national self-determination that internationalists connected human rights to democracy and the emergence of a democratic world order.

The core purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the ways in which human rights were thus connected to democratic visions that would preserve, expand and extend liberty, in particular by the few individuals, and primarily international lawyer René Cassin, for whom we can say that human rights was the central concept of his vision of world order.

Secondly, it highlights the different structures of world order in which ideas of human rights were embedded, confirming the predominantly permissive and instrumental approach to international organisation in relation to democracy that prevailed among internationalists in the 1940s. We already saw in the preceding chapter how human rights were allied to visions of democratic order achieved through union. Alexandre Marc was the author of his own declaration privileging the rights of the 'person' in the community, social justice and protection from the state in the belief that it would foster the expansion of his decentralised

ideal of democracy in the context of federal union and even globally.[240] The following considers other ideas of human rights that were wedded to visions of a state-based organisation, namely the United Nations.

The nature and justification of these different structures mattered to internationalists searching for a democratic world order, including the degree to which they were representative. Fundamentally, however, the following continues to demonstrate how concerns surrounding international organisation in relation to democracy did not refer to an abstract ideal of an egalitarian or representative democratic order that eschewed power or that sought to promote a new ideal of accountability between the international and the individual, as human rights in particular might be construed. What mattered to internationalists was how these structures would permit, if not facilitate, the emergence of a democratic order characterised by the preservation, expansion and extension of liberty and, to some degree, the extent to which these structures would themselves reflect the values they were trying to promote.

This is what finally convinced Jacques Maritain to turn away from the dream of European federation to a looser state based organisation that would focus on human rights. Maritain saw in the machinery of the United Nations means that were both superior and more consistent with his ideal of a democratic system characterised by the spread of 'authentic' democratic societies that put pluralism and flourishing of the human person at their heart. Avoiding the risks of centralisation and cultural homogenisation that a formal political union might pose, the organic expansion of Maritain's democratic norms through international organisations dedicated to the protection of human rights was itself more democratic. It was in a similar way that Clark Eichelberger, as we will see below, argued that pushing human rights through the machinery of the new United Nations would promote democratic convergence without imposing 'one pattern'.

[240] Alexandre Marc, "Draft Charter of Human Rights prepared for the U.E.F Rome Conference", November 1948. Alexandre Marc Collection, Folder AM-374, HAEU.

It was also practical. Eichelberger and the CSOP argued that championing human rights would foster the democratic system that would in the long term secure peace. In the short term, however, it was vital that the Great Powers be given explicit authority to manage emerging security issues in the new world order. In the short term, moreover, the General Assembly and Security Council would act as place holders for a more representative system of global governance that would eventually be required to reflect the unity among democratic societies that the activities of technical agencies promoting human rights– and social and economic development– would create. This is a good example of the way in which internationalists did not think the question of international representation was unimportant or irrelevant in relation to the pursuit of a democratic world order, but that it was also often a second order consideration that was contingent on the deeper realisation of their vision of democratic modernity through the best available means. In the CSOP's case, this was a combination of technocracy and American leadership in the context of a state-based international organisation.[241]

These justifications were not all so well intentioned. While decisions regarding the institutional machinery through which human rights would be advanced reflected the inherent tensions at the heart of the pursuit of a democratic order that would balance pluralism and solidarism, technocracy and participation and hierarchy and equality, prejudice and power political motives are equally in evidence. Cassin's claims that the French empire could both transmit and reflect the egalitarian, pluralistic vision of democratic society he sought to promote through human rights was partly informed by political calculation. More generally, the alleged pragmatism of a state-based model that preserved a special role for the Great Powers as a means to facilitate the emergence of a democratic order through the promotion of human rights was also clearly designed with the need to preserve national interests in mind. In

some cases, moreover, the suggestion that a more representative system was neither feasible nor desirable in the pursuit of a democratic order in the short term was also, as Walter Lippmann observed, a way of avoiding the morally indefensible position of having to advocate weighted voting on the grounds that European and American internationalists– as much as voters– would not tolerate being 'out voted ten to one' by the inhabitants of Asia.[242]

As Cassin's example makes plain, visions of democratic order that championed human rights were not normatively unproblematic either substantively– as visions of democratic modernity– or structurally, in terms of the coherence between the ideas of democratic order and the structures used to promote it. Despite Cassin's own anti-racism, his attitude towards empire not only pushed his own idea of democratic order through human rights to the brink of incoherence; his view highlights the extreme difficulty faced by any vision of democratic order that hinged on the promotion of an ideal of democratic society that did not include or at least underplayed political and indeed national rights. Among those thinkers who did see national and political rights as important, and who supported decolonisation, human rights were still tied to a vision of democratic world order premised on global democratisation that is itself contestable. The promise of pluralism within this ultimately solidaristic goal, moreover, was not, as we will see, always equally convincing. Nor was the suggestion that the means employed were consistent with the ends of a democratic order.

4.2 Global Order, Democracy and the Birth of Human Rights

As in other chapters, this argument has both historical and conceptual implications. Existing historical scholarship has paid almost no attention to the specific question of human rights in relation to democracy and the search for a democratic order.[243] This is somewhat surprising in

[242] Lippmann, *U.S. War Aims,*181.
[243] Although the connection with democracy and democratic order is implicit in much of the discussion, it has not been pulled out and examined in its own right. While Johannes Morsink, for

the midst of on-going history wars about the meaning and significance of human rights in recent years that have not only challenged the importance of human rights in the 1940s, but have even turned the rationale for their articulation on its head. Yet neither side of the 'Moralpolitik vs Realpolitik' divide offers much in relation to this question beyond what are often intuitive and suggestive arguments about whether and in what sense the role of human rights in the postwar order was or imagined to be democratic.[244]

Older accounts focused on the birth of human rights in response to the horrors of the Holocaust, the 'never again' commitment that prompted the internationalisation and culmination of the best traditions of Western democratic political thought.[245] This story is one of idealism and enlightenment, the triumph of civilisation over barbarism, democratic individualism over collectivist totalitarianism that, in its most hopeful version, ushered in a new era of supranational justice, unleashing a movement that would lead to the European Court of Human Rights, the birth of international criminal justice at Nuremberg and eventually to modern movements and humanitarian intervention.

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example, points to the centrality of debates over the nature of democratic societies during the drafting process does not comment on these differences or their wider significance in any way. Morsink, *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins and Intent,* 63, 248-9. Glenda Sluga does not directly connect her opening claim that in the 1940s internationalists desired a 'new geopolitical order grounded in the precepts of progress and democracy' with the subsequent discussion of human rights which does focus on the idea that international human rights aimed to put the individual 'above' nation states– an idea that this chapter tries to move away from insofar as it is portrayed as the central democratic claim of human rights. *Nationalism and Internationalism,* 79, 101. Similarly, Hoffmann's edited volume contains several contributions, notably those by Moyn, Sluga and Maul that touch on the issue of human rights as a vision of world order tied to thinking about democracy though again this is not the explicit focus of the analysis. See Hoffmann, *Human Rights in the Twentieth Century*.

[244] For a good overview of the state of the debate and the ways in which it is attempting to move beyond Moralpolitik vs. Realpolitik interpretations towards a more pluralistic understanding of human rights as an ideology that comprises many different interpretations and histories see Lasse Heerten and Natasha Wheatley, Report on the workshop "Human Rights in the Twentieth Century: Concepts and Conflicts," organized by Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann (Center for Contemporary History Potsdam) in conjunction with Dieter Gosewinkel (Social Science Research Center Berlin), co-sponsored by the Fritz-Thyssen-Foundation, Berlin, June 19-21, 2008: http://www.hsozkult.de/conferencereport/id/tagungsberichte-2208.

[245] E.g. Mary Ann Glendon, *A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, 1st ed. (New York: Random House, 2001); Lynn Hunt, *Inventing Human Rights : A History*, 1st ed. ed. (New York ; London: W. W. Norton, 2007). Paul Gordon Lauren, *The Evolution of International Human Rights : Visions Seen*, 3rd ed. ed. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011). Micheline Ishay, *The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalization Era* (Berkeley, Calif. ; London: University of California Press, 2008).

However hopeful, if and how human rights were connected to thinking about global order and democracy remains unexamined. These stories suggest little more than the fact that human rights symbolised a commitment to a democratic order defined in opposition to fascist dictatorships that had trampled individual rights. The new system would prize the dignity and equality of humans irrespective of culture, race within and between nations.[246] There is some suggestion too that this new order was democratic because it posited the sovereignty of the individual above the nation state and because it would support decolonisation. From a slightly different perspective, scholars such as Ian Clark have argued that the significance of human rights was intended to be primarily social. Folded into reciprocal standards of inter-state legitimacy, human rights were the expression of a democratic conception of world order insofar as they were now part of the terms of membership of the democratic society of nations.[247]

Challenging such views, Brian Simpson offered a more prosaic explanation of the unexpected approval of human rights commitments by hard-bitten bureaucrats and government officials with little evident desire to overcome realpolitik or, more importantly, empire. It was a result of 'conflicts, compromises and happenstances' which governments never dreamt would imply domestic intrusion in their internal affairs.[248] Other interpretations have been more critical, rewriting the history of postwar human rights as largely irrelevant rhetoric wholly unconnected with contemporary human rights and whatever 'democratic' significance it might have today. What Samuel Moyn dismisses as the anachronism of seeing human rights in the 1940s as an attack on empire or the birth of a new ideal of international democracy that placed the individual above the state, Mazower and others have described as a paradox: the intention was not to guarantee the liberty of the individual against states but to liberate states

[246] Antoine Fleury, "Droits De L'homme Et Enjeux Humanitaires", in *Pour L'histoire Des Relations Internationales*, ed. Robert Frank (Paris: Le Noeud Gordien, Presses Universitaires de France, 2012), 456.
[247] Ian Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 27, 137.
[248] A. W. B. Simpson, *Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the European Convention* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), vii.

from more onerous duties imposed on them by the hated old minorities system and its potential successors.[249] In a regional context, Marco Duranti has argued that human rights in Europe were used to underwrite a conservative political project, not an ideal of democratic world order.[250]

However the story of human rights in the immediate postwar period has been told, these accounts have lost sight of the way in which the promotion of human rights by Western internationalists was embedded in, and reflected, a very specific set of debates about the nature of freedom and democratic society in the 20th century and its relationship to global order. Consequently, for these thinkers, human rights were not just about reasserting liberal democratic rights versus statist collectivisms or east versus west, they were about rethinking democracy for the modern age way that went beyond political, individual and even national rights and, as we will see, spreading this model globally. As a result, human rights were also much more important and widespread among Western internationalists than many existing accounts of the international thought of this period continue to suggest.[251]

These ideas are not wholly absent from existing scholarship, in particular new work that has focused on conceptions of human rights advanced by individual thinkers and that has stressed

[249] Mazower, "The Strange Triumph of Human Rights, 1933-1950". Mazower concedes that although the 'Eleanor Roosevelt version' of history that emphasises the triumph of visionaries over selfish states is clearly incorrect, human rights also rose to prominence in the 1940s because democratic states sought to reaffirm values of liberal democracy against authoritarianism and, he adds, because the US want to carve out a universal mission for itself. Mazower's overall view remains overwhelmingly negative however. The 'wartime vogue for individualising rights' was carried through to the new system in the form of the UNDHR as a way to avoid potentially more demanding obligations, its 'ardent rhetoric of moral aspiration' acting as a 'substitute for the force of law' *No Enchanted Palace* 124, 130, 131; Moyn, *The Last Utopia : Human Rights in History*. Other critiques of the teleological narratives of Human Rights include Kenneth Cmiel, "The Recent History of Human Rights", *American Historical Review* 109, no. 1 (2004); Reza Afshari, "On Historiography of Human Rights Reflections on Paul Gordon Lauren's *The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen*", *Human Rights Quarterly* 29 (2009).

[250] Duranti, "Conservatives and the European Convention on Human Rights"; "'A Blessed Act of Oblivion': Human Rights, European Unity and Postwar Reconciliation".

[251] Equally, this is not to suggest that existing arguments about the self-serving, pedestrian or disingenuous character of 1940s 'rights talk' by governments is necessarily wrong or, conversely, that accounts of human rights internationalism and support in the postwar period are wrong, simply that an important dimension of this discussion has been obscured.

the importance of social rights in 1940s. These challenges to the liberal individualist understanding of early human rights have not, however, been connected to the central debates about democracy among Western internationalists or how human rights were as a result also connected to an idea of democratic global order.[252] In so doing, the following not only transforms how we think about why and how internationalists cared about human rights in the 1940s and what these rights were, it also problematizes all of the existing binaries that are usually deployed to discuss the emergence of human rights in the context of the postwar order including the opposition of idealism and realism, the sovereign state versus the individual, collectivism versus individualism and eastern versus western notions of human rights.

In a deeper sense, it also changes the way we think about human rights in connection to peace. Existing scholarship acknowledges and even stresses the novel connection made in the 1940s between the domestic protection of human rights and peace. The following shows that human rights were about peace in a much broader, deeper and as a result also more interesting and problematic way. The achievement of peace through human rights was not contingent merely on the prevention of abuses of individual rights by states in relation to an abstract notion of putting individuals 'above' states, but the articulation of a new positive ideal of democratic society and its global spread. This would produce a system that was democratic and peaceful not only because it was composed of democratic societies but because, reflecting these societies, it was itself both pluralist, egalitarian and unified and even promoted the emergence of new non-state actors internationally.

[252]Malgorzata Mazurek and Paul Betts, "Preface: When Rights Were Social", *Humanity* 3, no. Winter (2012). Moyn, "Jacques Maritain, Christian New Order, and the Birth of Human Rights"; "René Cassin, Human Rights, and Jewish Internationalism." Kott and Droux, *Globalizing Social Rights: The International Labour Organization and Beyond*. A lot of the focus on social rights has unsurprisingly focused on the ILO and what Mazurek and Betts call the 'Spirit of Philadelphia' in the wake of the Philadelphia Declaration in 1944 that looked forward to a new era of social rights protection spearheaded by the ILO. Despite widespread praise for the ILO– and its democratic governing structure–debate and concern surrounding social and economic rights and its role in the postwar period was also much wider than that institution, fusing with the broader discussion on economic justice in the context of debates about democracy and democratic order. In this chapter and in the following, the objective is to explore this the new concern with social rights, welfare and economic justice in connection to these larger arguments.

Conceptually, this reinterpretation of human rights within visions of democratic world order reaffirms the central argument that we should approach the question of global order and democracy in the 1940s in relation to the challenge of democratic modernity and not via Wilsonian, Cosmopolitan paradigms or any other that focuses narrowly on the structure of representation and accountability offered within any given vision of global order. Armed with these conceptual categories, the ideas discussed below could provide ample evidence that, outside the idealistic confines of federalist debates in Europe, ideas of international democracy were indeed in retreat. Judging by the institutional structures in which human rights were embedded, we might suggest that at best internationalists were clinging to Wilsonian and/or cosmopolitan formulas of democratic global order, if they were not also giving way to 'anti-democratic' visions of technocracy or indeed empire.

Judging by how they used language of democracy in relation to human rights and relation to global order, however, it is clear that this interpretation is inappropriate and that the arbitrary standards implied by these lenses are equally inappropriate for the evaluation of these ideas. These ideas about rights should, in contrast, be evaluated on the basis of their own coherence, substantively and structurally, as visions of democratic order that navigated inherent tensions of democratic modernity in a global context. They should also be evaluated on a more directly normative basis, in terms of the ideal of democratic modernity sought to produce and not an abstract ideal of representation, or indeed what a democratic order based on human rights might have looked like in 1940s when the absence of a stronger focus on national self-determination and decolonisation has often been criticised. From the vantage point of Western internationalists, we need also to recognise that this was, in part, not because they were 'anti-democratic' imperialists, but because the conception of democratic order they envisaged would emerge through the promotion of human rights was fundamentally focused on challenges of democratic modernity, not national self-determination or inter-state equality per se.

4.3 Human Rights and Democratic Society

'Totalitarianism…did not come about by accident, but from an internal shortcoming in democracy itself…It is a renewal of democracy that is needed if it is not to perish…the starting point for this transformation of democracy has to be the law. Human rights are the very crux of what we are doing. They are neither the dessert nor the starter but the basis, the foundation and keystone of everything that we want to do'. Address given by Alexandre Marc at the Congress of Europe, 8 May 1948.[253]

4.3.1 Preservation

It is ironic that by seeking to emphasise how different conceptions of human rights in the 1940s were from what we had previously imagined that their significance and purpose to many of the internationalists and international lawyers that championed them in the context of their visions of postwar order has to some degree been obscured. In plain sight across these internationalists texts is the fundamental idea, echoing the rationale underpinning many visions of union, that human rights would promote a democratic and peaceful global order because they would prevent states, under the conditions of global modernity, from threatening liberty.

This is to some extent implicit in the argument of Prost and Winter that the 'heart and soul of this earlier twentieth century history is the linkage between the defence of peace and the defence of human rights'.[254] What should be emphasised, however, was the explicit

[253] Archives du Mouvement européen international, Bruxelles. Congress of Europe (May 1948), Vol. IV. Cultural Committee, CVCE 3.
[254] Prost and Winter, *René Cassin and Human Rights: From the Great War to the Universal Declaration,* 348. The 'key point is that the very same generation that struggled for peace after 1918 fought for human rights after 1945' in the newfound belief that, having witnessed the self-destruction of democracy in the interwar period, safeguarding the liberty of individual, and thus democracy, in the modern world was the heart of preserving peace.

connection between the emergence of global, its impact on the state and the existence of democracy that lay behind it. Figures as diverse as John Foster Dulles and HG Wells made plain, it was the conditions of global modernity, under which all states were tempted to centralise in a bid to guarantee a level of welfare to their citizens that they could no longer provide, that it was necessary for rights to be reasserted on a 'world scale' if democracy in any form was to survive and with it the prospects of peace.[255]

At the helm of the CSOP, Clark Eichelberger and James Shotwell were not only instrumental in pressing the US delegation in San Francisco to propose the drafting of the Charter, they were equally clear that the core purpose of an international bill of rights was not equality per se but to place basic individual freedoms 'beyond the reach of government attack', thus ensuring survival of existing democracies and, world wide, ensuring that states would at least 'behave like democracies' vis-à-vis their populations in the expectation that they would, as a result, be peaceful Eichelberger in particular was especially clear that this was the first and most important condition of what could properly be called a democratic global order. [256]

Even Hersch Lauterpacht, otherwise accused of failing to critically engage with the collapse of the political order in the interwar period and clinging to the optimistic legalism that

[255]John Foster Dulles, *"A Just and Durable Peace". Discussion of Political Propositions (Six Pillars of Peace)* (New York: Commission to Study the Bases of a Just and Durable Peace, 1943), 83. Echoing unionists, Dulles argued that because 'state is no longer able alone to perform the function for which it was created- that of securing the safety and advancing the welfare of the individual within it' it posed a threat against which the international protection of rights had become a necessity; Wells, *The Rights of Man; or, What Are We Fighting For?*, 80. Wells was equally clear that it was the forces of modernity pushing states to threaten rights within states that need to reassert them on a 'world scale'.

[256] The CSOP argued in 1944 that the Declaration of International Rights by the Institut de Droit International (1929), which had focused almost entirely on the oppression of people by their own state and not equality per se, had demonstrated beyond all doubt 'the bearing of human rights on the prevention of war'. Cited in the "Preparatory meetings for the 4th report of the CSOP" by the Sub-Committee on Human Rights (and in the 4th report itself). Clark Eichelberger Papers, Box 154, Folder "Human Rights", 3-4; "Fundamentals of International Organization", 23. "The United Nations and the Organisation of Peace: Third Report and Papers Presented to the Commission", (New York: Commission to Study the Organisation of Peace, 1943), 210-211. On the role of the CSOP in pushing human rights at San Francisco see Divine, *Second Chance. The Triumph of Internationalism in America During World War II,* 250, 292.

otherwise perished with it, argued in favour of human rights on this basis.[257] Human rights were important not only because international law and institutions might be empowered to protect the individual directly, overcoming the fallacy of an orthodox positivist doctrine that was increasingly incapable of reflecting the 'facts of international life' by having states as its sole subject; but because of the ways it would transform domestic polities, strengthening and improving existing democratic states and, by implication, hastening the transformation of authoritarian states by providing a vision of an alternative reality to its citizens.[258]

Lauterpacht too, in other words, grounded his idea of international human rights in terms of the imperative to find a 'spiritual counterpart' to the power of the modern state that itself constitutes the greatest threat to the rights of man, democracy and peace.[259] As Philippe Sands suggests, what was crucial for Lauterpacht was that human rights were not an end in themselves. They were intended to provide the 'spiritual basis' and 'political inspiration' to elevate the rights of man to 'a legal plane superior to the will of States'. Yet it was not up to a supranational entity to turn human rights into a living, 'democratic' world order. Positive law was insufficient to 'supply the solution of the problem of the rights of man'. Human rights, rooted in natural law, were instead to offer an 'ever present impulse and a fertile source of vitality and improvement' allowing the innovation of an International Bill to be 'connected' to the permanent legal traditions of Western civilization' and, by implication, those of others.[260]

[257] Martti Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law, 1870-1960*, Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lectures (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 394.
[258] Patrick Capps, "Lauterpacht's Method", *British Yearbook of International Law* 82, no. 1 (2011), 249 (fn.5); Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law, 1870-1960,* 394.
[259] Hersch Lauterpacht and Philippe Sands, *An International Bill of the Rights of Man* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), xiv.
[260] Ibid, xv; 39-52.

4.3.2 Expansion

At first sight, Lauterpacht's conception of human rights seems to point to the argument that rights would not only be a vehicle for the preservation and global promotion of democracy, but also for the wider reinvigoration or redefinition of democracy. The extent to which his views can be read in this light is somewhat limited, however, all the more so when it is compared to conceptions of human rights which saw their potential not just to protect but to simultaneously transform democratic societies as essential, as Marc's view clearly illustrates.

Perhaps the most prominent idea in this regard was that human rights would spread a new ideal of democratic society in which basic needs were met and that thus guaranteed the liberty of its citizens in a larger sense than in the past. It is difficult to over-estimate the prevalence of the view regardless of political affiliation or nationality, as expressed by Barbara Ward in 1941, that a new system of international rights protection 'must offer not only the rights of man in the traditional sense but an extended version which covers at the very least the right to eat and the right to work'.[261] When HG Wells spoke of international human rights as a means of inaugurating a new model of democracy it was first and foremost a democracy that recognised and guaranteed social and economic welfare: 'this time we have to go far beyond that assertion of individual liberty that has hitherto satisfied our ancestors…The economic factor has to emerge now side by side and merging with the political' through the guarantee of social security and economic justice. Most importantly, it was doubtful that a system that failed to guarantee social rights would produce a democratic order capable of resisting the pull of nationalism and totalitarianism at all.[262] Vera Dean, echoing Wells' revolutionary language, argued that the only way to build democratic societies that would not give way to fascist and communist extremes in the modern age would be to secure a basic level of

[261] Ward, "Prolegomena to Peace Aims", 238.
[262] H. G. Wells, *The Rights of Man or What Are We Fighting For?* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1940), 61; 55.

welfare. To this end a new bill of 'rights and responsibilities' would reflect and reinforce the coming revolution in economic and social underpinnings of democracy that would put welfare at its heart; this was not 'communist' but a necessary aspect of modernity.[263]

In a European context, support for human rights machinery within a new European union was equally focused on their transformative potential in relation to the critical question of welfare. Supporters of union from WB Curry to André Philip argued that guaranteeing social and economic rights through new juridical structures– including a supranational court– was as important as political rights to the creation of a democratic and peaceful order in Europe. Praising French Sociologist and Jurist Georges Gurvitch's *La Déclaration des droits sociaux* (1944), Jacques Maritain argued that same idea of social rights should be put at the heart of new international system of rights in Europe (and later the world) because it both reflected and would encourage the emergence of an 'authentic' democracy characterised by pluralism and social justice and the liberty of the human person in the community.[264]

Similarly at The Hague, noting how 'impossible it was, in the discussions in San Francisco and even in Geneva, to separate human rights from the consideration of economic and social structures', Alexandre Marc argued that the European protection of social and economic rights by a supreme court would act as a stimulus, guarantee and reflection of the transformation of democracy that would guarantee its survival.[265]

There is a degree of ambiguity in these texts relating to social rights as cause and consequence of democracy's transformation. Like Marc, while Shotwell and Eichelberger saw the guarantee of 'welfare' and 'livelihood' as essential to democracy and the emergence

[263] Dean, *The Struggle for World Order,* 54, 84.
[264] Michel Fourcade, "Jacques Maritain Et L'europe En Exil (1940-45)", in *Jacques Maritain En Europe: La Réception De Sa Pensée* ed. Bernard Hubert (Paris: Beauchesne, 1993), 314.
[265] Address given by Alexandre Marc at the Congress of Europe (The Hague, 8 May 1948), Archives du Mouvement européen international, Bruxelles. Congress of Europe (May 1948), Vol. IV. Cultural Committee, CVCE 4.

of a democratic global order, overall their support for social rights suggests that they saw these rights primarily as a reflection and final guarantee of a transformation that would be undertaken by other means, namely through the social and economic agencies of new regional and global organisations or unions.[266] Nevertheless, it is clear that for many internationalists, including Wells, Philip, Ward and, as Johannes Morsink has argued, many of the drafters of the UNDHR themselves, the international protection and enforcement of social and economic rights through the machinery of the United Nations or a new Federal Union– and not simply the ILO– was key to their attainment; their promotion could not be left to separate countries.[267] For them, as Fred Cooper has observed, it was by no means self evident that, much like the ambition to cure capitalism, the idea of social rights would be 'pushed into national containers'.[268] On the contrary, the direct involvement of new regional or global international legal authorities– including but not limited to courts– was a critical aspect of the way in which these internationalists discussed and imagined a democratic global order that would bring into existence democracies in which the social and economic rights 'indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality' were guaranteed.[269]

It was not only through the promotion of social justice that human rights were seen as a vehicle for transformation of democratic society and the expansion of liberty. Marc argued that European proposals at The Hague had 'gone further than the UN' because of its introduction of 'community rights' and 'collective' rights that would ensure emergence of democratic systems built on a principle of true 'autonomy'. What Marc meant was that the

[266] Ibid. Marc goes from suggesting social rights are a catalyst for democracy to arguing that wider changes in social and economic structures would 'guarantee a minimal level of social and economic security that allows human rights to exist not just as a pious hope, but as a reality embedded in institutions'.
[267] Morsink, *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins and Intent,* 84.
[268] Frederick Cooper, "Afterword: Social Rights and Human Rights in the Time of Decolonization", *Humanity* 3, no. 3 (2012). Cooper argues that it was precisely in this mid-century moment, when states and nations seemed to hang in the balance that 'the question of sovereignty and the question of social justice', as with so much else, 'were debated in terms that transcended locality and specific political configurations'.
[269] UNDHR, Article 22 "Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realisation, through national effort and international cooperation and in accordance with the organisation and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality' Morsink, *The Universal Declaration,* 84.

European system of rights would not simply save democracy from totalitarianism, it would, as Martian also believed, actually encourage the flourishing of human person in context of the community which, as we saw in preceding chapter, defined Marc's and Maritain's ideal of a pluralist, decentralised as well as socially just democracy.[270]

At the UN, however, perhaps the most famous European exponent of human rights in the 1940s had articulated a very similar vision of human rights as a vehicle for a new model of democracy that avoided individualist mistakes of the past and produced a peaceful world. This was the French international lawyer René Cassin. Cassin was among the first to argue that human rights should be the foundation stone of the postwar order. It is in part because of this perhaps that his vision of human rights more than any other illustrates the way in which they were connected to an ideal of democratic order that succeeded in addressing the challenge of democratic modernity and preserving, expanding and extending liberty worldwide.[271]

In the first instance, Cassin was explicit in his connection between human rights and the existence of democratic societies, using human rights not only to obtain but to define the latter.[272] The first condition of a democratic society that an international charter of human rights would secure was the protection of the individual from the 'Leviathan State'.[273] Under

[270] Maritain's praise for Gurvitch's social rights was inextricably bound to what he saw was also a means of pluralisation and separating the community from the state. Fourcade, "Jacques Maritain Et L'europe En Exil (1940-45)", 314; Moyn also discusses this as a critical aspect of Maritain's vision Moyn, "Jacques Maritain, Christian New Order, and the Birth of Human Rights".
[271] Although Moyn suggests Cassin first articulated his ideas in a speech given at St. James' Palace in 1941, Cassin had already published "L'Etat Leviathan" (*La pensée et l'action*, 1940) in which his central arguments for a new world order based on the protection of human rights were already clear. See Prost and Winter, *René Cassin and Human Rights: From the Great War to the Universal Declaration*, 227. cf. Moyn, "René Cassin, Human Rights, and Jewish Internationalism", 12.
[272] Debating the use of the term democratic state in the language of the Charter, Cassin argued that the idea of the state 'was much less important than that of democracy itself. The State was, in fact, a perishable product of society…In this view the criterion of democracy in any nation was the extent to which human rights were really respected. A state which did not respect them was not democratic, even if it claimed to be so; hence the supreme importance of the word, which must be retained' Morsink, *The Universal Declaration*, 64.
[273] Prost and Winter, *René Cassin and Human Rights: From the Great War to the Universal Declaration,* 222-224.

global conditions, without a 'universal declaration of the rights of the human person, bolstered by specific guarantees' that protected basic rights from the state, the future would be dominated by a few all powerful states bent on expansion to ensure their own survival. Alone in the modern world, democracy would not survive and as a result nor would peace.[274]

A democratic order required more than the protection of individual rights from the threat of state tyranny however.[275] Echoing Maritain and Marc, Cassin argued that a democratic society could only exist if it permitted the full development of the 'human personality'– a key phrase in debates about democracy in this period that was by no means confined to Catholics. This required both a basic level of social and economic justice but also ensuring that individuals could be part of autonomous and overlapping groups and communities; democracy had to recognise and respect the fundamentally social character of the individual. As Prost and Winter argue, Cassin's vision of human rights was 'a statement not of unbridled individualism but of the moral force of associative life, without which human development is impossible'.[276] International human rights would encourage the emergence of such a society by guaranteeing the right of the individual to 'self development' which in Cassin's scheme meant putting social, economic and cultural rights on a par with political rights as well as recognising the communitarian basis of rights possession.[277]

As a vision of global order that aimed to secure peace, Samuel Moyn has made an exception for Cassin in his otherwise negative assessment of human rights in this period. Cassin, he argues, 'stands for the novel attempt to go beyond vertical alliance with nation states to what one might call "vertical construction" of new norms and institutions above'.[278] To this

[274] Ibid, 227. Based on another 1940 essay published in *Les Nouveaux Cahiers* entitled "La nouvelle conception".
[275] Ibid, 212.
[276] Ibid, 239.
[277] Morsink, *The Universal Declaration*, 211-212.
[278] Moyn, "René Cassin, Human Rights, and Jewish Internationalism". Although Moyn still tries to dismiss Cassin's views as something of an anomaly among other advocates of Human Rights in this period insisting this was an age of 'nationalist rather than internationalist victory', 18.

assessment we should add that for Cassin and other supporters of human rights including Eichelberger, Wells, and Ward, what was equally if not more important was the horizontal spread of democratic societies, as they defined them, through human rights. The abstract formulation of putting the individual 'above' the state remains, trading on cosmopolitan themes, perhaps the most intuitive way of thinking about human rights as a democratic idea of global order was not absent from discussions of human rights in the 1940s. First and foremost, however, the evidence suggests that the primary way in which internationalists thought about the creation and function of international 'bill of rights' in the context of the search for a democratic global order focused on their potential to preserve, transform and spread democratic societies. Paradoxically, this may be part of the reason why figures such as Cassin insisted that, even in the absence of an international court of human rights and despite the non-binding character of the charter, human rights would play an essential part in creating a democratic postwar order. The gradual diffusion of human rights norms would promote the creation of democratic societies from the grassroots, to some extent regardless of the formal 'vertical' relationship with a supranational body or the existence of a court, although Cassin– like Eichelberger and the CSOP– continued to push for stronger mechanisms of enforcement and individual rights to petition.[279]

Prost and Winter's claim that Cassin's understanding of the UNDHR as a means of securing peace was not simply through its prevention of tyrannical states also as a 'moral and educational manifesto', a 'foundational' document on which a new conception of global politics would be built should also be read in this light. They argue that because Cassin's

[279] Regarding institutional machinery and enforcement, Shotwell and Eichelberger imagined the diffusion of Human Rights in similarly national terms: each nation would be encouraged to update its constitution to include Human Rights. It was critical, however, to ensure that the UN and a permanent Human Rights Commission had appropriate powers of investigation to uncover and report on Human Rights abuses and shortcomings where they occurred. Individuals should also have the right to petition. Finally, if despite advice from the HRC violations became flagrant, the CSOP advised that the 'political council' (the Security Council) should be empowered to declare a 'trouble zone' and, with the approval of 'larger powers' establish branch offices to provide legal aid and/or carry an appeal to the political council or permanent court. Part III: "International Safeguard of Human Rights" in Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, *Fourth Report* (Commission to Study the Organization of Peace: New York, 1944).

conception of human rights was not narrowly concerned with the relations between states but 'defining the relationships of individuals to each other and to the groups they formed for their benefit and well being', the UNDHR had a dual purpose. Its goal was not only to place 'the dignity of the human person above the writ of any individual state, thereby truncating state sovereignty in important respects', it was also to 'give notice that the struggle for human rights entails vigilance by non-governmental organisations too. Being universal, human rights are everybody's business'.[280] This suggested a future when not just treatment of citizens but international affairs more broadly was no longer the exclusive preserve of states but where domestic organisations would be empowered to look inside other nations.

The extent to which Cassin really imagined human rights might contribute to peace through emergence of domestic and even transnational human rights groups that would challenge supremacy of states in international affairs is debatable. If his vision implied the diversification of international society, however, it should be read as a reflection and extension of the vision of democratic society that was at the heart of his conception of human rights, that is one in which not only individuals but 'associative life' thrived in the context of a society that also prized social justice and cultural pluralism. This supports a wider point, that internationalists in the 1940s were more inclined to imagine a democratic global system as one that reflected the kinds of democratic societies they sought, as opposed to whether it was more formally democratic in terms of the representative structures of its international institutions. In a deeper sense, this was also because they saw peace and the emergence of a democratic order as a function of the democratic societies they sought to preserve and create. This left more room for an instrumental and permissive attitude towards the structures of order itself, while still trying to avoid a direct contradiction between democratic ends and democratic means. Internationalists were by no means equally successful in this regard. This is considered further below and in chapter six.

[280] Prost and Winter, *René Cassin*, 250.

4.3.3. Extension

Protecting human rights would not simply preserve and strengthen democratic societies, it would encourage their global spread. From Wells to Ward, support for an international bill of rights was transparently connected to this objective, the achievement of which would, in turn, be the final realisation of a democratic order and global peace.

This investigation argues that this was not in and of itself taboo. As a prominent feature of thinking about global order and democracy in the 1940s, however, it was not entirely unproblematic either. Internationalists were aware, albeit to differing degrees, of the tension between universalism, pluralism and solidarism, both within the visions of democratic modernity they championed, and in relation to its global extension. By the same token, they were aware of the need to justify and to ensure that the structures they proposed were at least normatively in tune with the wider conception of democracy they sought to promote. Although to some extent legitimate and indeed even desirable from the vantage point of their sponsors, visions of democratic global order could not, in other words, be unduly solidaristic, hierarchical or technocratic. Confronted with these tensions, however, internationalists made different choices and offered different rationales and justifications for the trade-offs and shortcomings these implied- some of which were much more successful and persuasive than others.

Importantly, for thinkers like Eichelberger, Shotwell and other supporters of a global human rights regime, democratisation through human rights was itself an attempt to address the inherent tension of this aim and promote democracy in a way that was normatively acceptable and consistent with the overall goal of a pluralist, democratic world order.[281] The CSOP argued that 'no international bill of human rights could aim at a uniformity of national

[281] Wells too talked about human rights as a way developing 'a solidarity' among people around his 'revolutionary' idea of democracy without overthrowing governments.

systems. A world of nations made out entirely to one pattern is no more possible than desirable. We may, however, seek to bring about certain minimal standards as established in forward looking democratic countries'.[282]

Minimal standards, however, included political rights and– in the case of the CSOP– the right to national self-determination. The fundamental objective of the CSOP remained the spread of democratic political systems in the context of nation states. While Shotwell and Eichelberger modestly suggested that the West must keep and 'open mind' and had 'much to learn' about the values and operation of non Western systems, their own view remained that the international negotiation of a Bill of Rights, and indeed the postwar order more broadly, should be approached 'with a firm conviction that the elementary values of democratic civilization are to be consolidated'.[283]

On that basis, however, it would then be possible to deepen and diversify democracy producing a richer tapestry of democratic societies that was indeed not made out to 'one pattern'. In addition to a fundamental basis of constitutional government, however, this required another condition that the new global order would provide, both via the human rights regime in the shape of social and economic rights and through the social and economic work of other UN agencies: social justice. Incidentally, for Shotwell, the idea that democracy required a basis of social justice as much as shared political rights found its truest expression in the non-Western model of democracy championed by Sun-Yat Sen and his concept of 'livelihood', perhaps explaining the unusual– if ultimately hollow– genuflection to non-Western ideas.[284]

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[282] 'Just as through the ILO we have sought to heighten continuously the level of conditions surrounding the day's work". Press Release urging a UN conference on Human Rights as stated in 3rd and 4th report of CSOP, released by Shotwell on May 24th at HQ on 8 West 40th St (speech included). Headed "International Safeguard of Human Rights" May 25 1944. Clark Eichelberger Papers, Box 154, Folder "Human Rights", 2.

[283] Ibid.

[284] Shotwell talked about this constantly. In a speech in 1949, for example, he again emphasized the importance of 'welfare' or 'livelihood'- citing Sun Yat Sen's 'Three principles'- and human rights to

Echoing Adler, the overall objective remained a pluralistic world of diverse democratic societies based on an emergent global solidarism around core rights and basic levels of justice. To this end, Shotwell and Eichelberger clearly believed that human rights– including political, social, economic but also cultural rights– expressed and promoted both aims in a manner that was, moreover, gradual, voluntaristic and itself democratic.

At a deeper level, however, having in their minds addressed the tension between solidarism and pluralism, it remains clear that, as for other internationalists, there was nothing suspect in their view that the primary task of the postwar order was to provide those conditions in which democracy would take root. Or indeed to do so in a fashion that was rather technocratic and in a larger sense hierarchical; the CSOP set great store by the new agencies and councils that would work to promote human rights and social and economic development. In order to have the chance to work in peace, however, these bodies were embedded in a security organisation that prized great power leadership. As noted in the introduction, and as we will see further in chapter six, this did not mean that the CSOP and especially Eichelberger did not attempt to address questions of representation, participation and equality within this structure. These attempts being rather weak, however, tends to confirm that what was more important was how effective the new global organisation would be in promoting democracy at a deeper level. At the very least, the central role of human rights and economic development within the new organisation they sought confirms that the persistent characterisation of Shotwell, Eichelberger and the CSOP's approach to global order and democracy as 'Wilsonian' is seriously wide of the mark.

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his own and the CSOP's vision of world order. Its quest for a new Jus Gentium, he adds, was not a final goal but 'a basis for new and enlarged conceptions of economic and social justice throughout the world' James T. Shotwell "Address to the CSOP 10th Anniversary dinner", November 30, 1949. Shotwell Papers, Box 221, 20.

Eichelberger and Shotwell were not alone in thinking that pushing human rights and social justice through the UN could, as Anita Blaine put it, hasten the 'fundamental process of democracy' that they believed would ultimately triumph in the modern world if the new global order was correctly designed.[285] Others were less optimistic. Criticising Shotwell, Raymond Buell argued that if out of deference to pluralism or realism a new organisation was not willing to enforce human rights, the idea that it would inevitably result in the spread of constitutional government let alone produce an even more idealistic blossoming of democracy was a fantasy. The choice, bluntly, was between imperialism or ineffectiveness.[286]

Buell was not alone in thinking that pressing human rights without a shared foundation of constitutional government and indeed shared legal traditions put the cart before the horse; human rights would only work in preserving and deepening democracy where, in some form, it already existed. This argument was used both to confine the discussion of human rights to the context of a European or other democratic regional order or to suggest, like Alexandre Marc, that a stronger human rights regime in Europe could be nested in a weaker global system. Human rights, enforced by an active and powerful supranational legal system, would facilitate the deeper democratisation of Europe at a faster rate. Globally, while the system could not be as strong in the absence of a world government without being imperialistic, the basic principles and foundations of democracy: pluralism, justice, the dignity of the human person would nevertheless spread. To some degree, it was perhaps because Marc, like Maritain, was less wedded to an idea of democracy in the context of constitutional government (or indeed the nation state), this permitted a more optimistic, fluid notion of how

[285] Blaine, *The World at the Crossroads,* 13.
[286] This was the substance of Buell's review of Shotwell's *Great Decision*, New York Book Review July 2 1944. Buell pointed out that while Shotwell and the CSOP claimed to want strong enforcement mechanisms this was inconsistent with the national veto. In his review of Lauterpacht (undated) Buell reiterated the claim that a bill of rights would be essentially meaningless unless embedded in a democratic structure or otherwise adopted by a group of ideologically like minded states willing to enforce it such as in Europe or, perhaps, the Americas. A 'universal' approach to human rights was likely to do more harm than good 'so long as the world is moving in a totalitarian direction'; Human Rights could not be imposed from outside, they are the outgrowth of health internal conditions, perhaps assisted in some cases by international admonition. Buell Archive Box 27 Folder 13: Dumbarton Oaks Proposals 1944-45 & Undated.

human rights might work globally although, as we will see below this was also a double edged sword when it came to empire.

There is no space here to tease out the many different ways in which internationalists thought about human rights and their promotion through the structures of a new regional or global order. The central point is that the way internationalists thought about this question was in large part informed by the fact that they saw human rights as a path to democracy and a democratic order. This raised practical questions such as whether or not shared democratic and/or legal foundations were a precondition for their effectiveness, and normative questions relating to the acceptable balance between solidarism and pluralism in a world composed of democratic societies. Glenda Sluga's interpretation of human rights in the 1940s as expressions of the tension between universalism, liberal pluralism and particularism is accurate, more accurate if put it in context of contest over nature of democratic modernity and its translation globally in a democratic global order.[287]

These dilemmas, more than an abstract notion of democratic international organisation, informed the institutional choices of internationalists. Although this meant that institutions were connected to democracy in more instrumental and permissive terms, this did not mean the participative and representative structures of those institutions were wholly unimportant, just as they were not unimportant aspects of most visions of democratic modernity, even those that emphasised other aspects of liberty. It was no coincidence that the strongest visions of European human rights protection were usually imagined in the context of an elected federal government. Efforts to ensure that the machinery of world order was consistent with democratic objectives were not always especially convincing or successful. HG Wells, for example, failed to address the tension between his vision of a pluralist, democratic order based on universal human rights and the wholly exclusive leadership of a technocratic elite,

[287] Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism*.

even though he, too, suggested that human rights were themselves the best and least imperialistic way to 'develop a solidarity' around a 'revolutionary' concept of democracy.[288]

More troublingly, as we will see, were Wells' views on empire. The thinker who is most disappointing in this regard, however, is Cassin. While Cassin pressed for stronger mechanisms of oversight, a directly elected Human Rights Council and the right to individual petition, he nevertheless believed that the UN architecture had a good chance of success, all the more so if it did not challenge states too directly. A non-coercive, gradualist, technocratic approach was also more consistent with the pluralistic, egalitarian ideal of democratic society that human rights sought to promote.

These views were typical. Less typical for supporters of human rights– excluding Wells– however, was Cassin's continued support for the French Empire. Distinct from those who used human rights merely as a means to sanitise empire, Glenda Sluga has argued that Cassin belonged to a different tribe that genuinely believed that Empire was 'a valid cosmopolitan setting for these rights'.[289] The suggestion is that Cassin believed that democratic societies defined by social justice, local autonomy, pluralism and even political community could emerge in the context of the French Empire'.[290]

This tribe existed as we will see in relation to the French Union in chapter five. There is, moreover, a great deal in Cassin's thought, both in his definition of a democratic society and in relation to the importance of democratic society versus the 'perishable' form of the state that might explain why he thought empire and democracy were not necessarily at odds. Provided the overarching order performed its central function of securing an environment

[288] See chapter six.
[289] Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism,* 84. And unlike Smuts, Zimmern and the other protagonists of Mazower's *No Enchanted Palace*.
[290] Sluga's own evidence for such a deliberate rationalisation is somewhat scant: see Sluga, "René Cassin: Les Droit De L'homme and the Universality of Human Rights, 1945–66", 112 fn. 16. Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism,* 83 fn. 21.

conducive to the flourishing of the human personality, the possession of a nation state was irrelevant to the existence of democracy.

Be that as it may, Cassin's embrace of empire stretches the limits of this interpretation. While Cassin and other internationalist in 1940s articulated an ideal of democracy that did not privilege national self-determination as it sought to break free from the vice-like grip of the modern state and obsession with singular national community, they still recognised the importance of political rights that needed to be exercised in some meaningful framework be it local, national, regional, global or an innovative combination of these. Even though most visions of challenged the narrowly national, liberal parliamentary model of the past, offering not only more expansive notions of self-determination based on social justice even radical proposals for new forms of political participation and political community, the political dimension of democratic modernity was never irrelevant and often included a commitment to a traditional set of core political rights exercised in a fairly conventional fashion even when it added a stronger emphasis on, for example, functional or federal representation. In this context, the weak framework proffered by the French union, combining pseudo-federal representation and a limited local political rights, was clearly a poor imitation of some of these ideas that was never intended to provide real political self-determination.

In any event, if there was a group of internationalists that believed it was possible to exercise meaningful political rights without nation state altogether, it was comparatively small. Most internationalists, including most supporters of human rights, accepted that the nation state in some form was neither intrinsically dangerous provided rights could be protected nor normatively meaningless; it was at the very least useful. While national self-determination– like liberal democracy– was not at the heart of the visions of a democratic global order emerging from the global promotion of human rights explored above, the majority still imagined that the spread of new kinds of democratic societies would occur within and through the legal structures of nation states or federal systems composed of national units.

What this meant is that visions of democratic global order that championed human rights did see the democratisation of the world occurring through the spread of independent or federalised, participative, democratic states, including those who were most opposed to the state and the traditional forms of parliamentary democracy such as Marc and Maritain. They were no supporters of empire, and certainly not empires that denied not only political rights but human rights. This, finally, was the reality of Cassin's French empire. The French Union was no federation; nor was it a space in which even the most basic human rights that Cassin argued defined any democratic society exist.

Finally, it seems more likely that Cassin's attitude towards empire had less to do with a vision of democratic modernity that saw no place for traditional political rights or the nation state, or the dilemmas of its global application and much more to do with power politics and Cassin's own nationalism and career. How else to explain Cassin's own role in the legal justification of the war in Algeria? It was, in this sense, a straightforward contradiction of his own view of a democratic global order, not an expression of it.

If this hypocrisy means that Cassin's wider view can, to some extent, paradoxically be protected from the charge that it was ultimately incoherent, it is an important reminder of the double standards, contradictions and limitations that characterized all visions of democratic modernity, not all were the product of inherent dilemmas of democratic modernity and extension in a global world. Many were also the product of power politics and prejudice that could push visions of democratic order to incoherence and beyond the realm of what we might call democratic at all.[291]

[291] This is finally closer to Moyn's view that after the war Cassin did not allow his devotion to Human Rights to disturb his 'generally tolerant attitude towards the French empire, even as it moved to violent counterinsurgency during the Algerian war'. Moyn, "René Cassin, Human Rights, and Jewish Internationalism", 18.

4.4. Conclusion

It remained comparatively rare for the international protection and promotion of human rights, as for Cassin, to constitute the central focus of visions of democratic order in the 1940s. They were, however, seen by many internationalists as a potent weapon in the arsenal of new regional or global order for addressing challenge of democratic modernity. It was in this way, finally, that internationalists believed that human rights would help to secure peace and not in a more directly juridical sense of putting the individual 'above' the sovereign state or keeping sovereign states in check in a new legal framework. These remained legalistic visions of order, however, even when they were not particularly sophisticated, or advanced by international lawyers. Most imagined the international codification of human rights in some legally binding form and many the creation of an enforceable supranational legal structure. More generally, they imagined the diffusion of the democratic norms embodied in human rights through federal and national legal structures. Crucially, however, in light of the critical connection between human rights, global peace and the redefinition and promotion of democracy in these visions, they are not easily viewed through the lens of traditional international law focused on the relations between states, or indeed from the vantage point of later developments in international human rights law and its enforcement. Even in its most advanced incarnation in the European context, the international protection and promotion of human rights never focused on the social, cultural and communal rights that were so central to the visions of democracy that internationalists in the 1940s sought to promote through the creation of human rights regimes.[292] If human rights promote a vision of democracy today, it is one based on a much more negative, liberal ideal of liberty.

[292] On the brief flourishing and demise of social rights in the 1940s and why the early postwar welfarist consensus did not lead to any codification of social rights in Western Europe see *Humanity* 3:3 2012 on "Social Rights and Human Rights in the Twentieth Century" especially Marco Duranti, "Curbing Labour's Totalitarian Temptation: European Human Rights Law and British Postwar Politics", *Humanity* 3, no. Winter (2012). Malgorzata Mazurek and Paul Betts, "Preface: When Rights Were Social", ibid.

If the emphasis on social justice and pluralism implied a progressive 'revolutionary' vision of democratic modernity, as noted in the introduction, visions of democratic global order based on human rights were not normatively unproblematic either. Contemporaries criticized the relative lack of emphasis on racial and gender equality and the mealy-mouthed attitude to national self-determination that lurked within these ideals of a democratic world.[293] Regardless of claims to balance solidarism and pluralism, they remain ideologies of democratisation. Human rights were combined with, and used to justify, technocratic and hierarchical structures of order such as the United Nations that offered only weak forms of participation and representation. These choices were motivated by pragmatism in the pursuit of a democratic global order but also national interests. In a federal context, the promotion of human rights was arguably more egalitarian and less imperialistic; it was also a more exclusive vision of democratic order.

The ideas discussed in this chapter should not be shielded from such criticism. Reconceptualising how human rights were connected to visions of democratic world order by Western internationalists in the 1940s, however, we must also recognise that just as we cannot categorise the thinkers above as advocates of a 'Cosmopolitan' or 'Wilsonian' ideal of democratic global order, we also cannot dismiss these ideas as undemocratic or disingenuous because they fail to conform to a predefined ideal of democratic global order, democratic modernity or human rights.

[293] See section 'Human Rights and Les droits des femmes' in Sluga, "René Cassin: Les Droit De L'homme and the Universality of Human Rights", 1945–66, 115.

Chapter 5

The Freedom from Want: Global Order and Economic Democracy

5.1 Introduction

Among the most distinctive and pervasive phrases to emerge in world order debates in the 1940s was 'economic democracy'. Although it was often used in conjunction with other ideas that stand out for their novelty in this context, such as social and economic rights, 'welfare' and what French internationalists described as the search for 'une économie humaine'; more than any other, this term captures the critical connection between an idea of social justice, democracy and peace in the international thought of this period. For many, if not the majority, of internationalists in the 1940s, economic justice was central to the creation of a democratic and peaceful global order.[294]

What did this mean? At a basic level, it meant a global order that would secure a level of social welfare and economic opportunity that would expand and thereby preserve liberty by preventing a violent turn away from democratic political systems in the West or, in the developing world, the embrace of alternative visions of totalitarian modernity that promised prosperity at the expense of individual rights. A democratic global order would not only provide the level of welfare and equality that was essential to liberty 'to be effective in the modern world' or, as Ralph Bunche and others argued more directly, that was an essential element of active democratic citizenship, it would do so democratically. This meant securing welfare in a way that did not threaten individual liberty, and even enhanced it in other ways

[294] As Dean observed 'Concern for human welfare– until recently a forgotten element in the international equation' was now to be found across peace proposals. *The Struggle for World Order*, 5.

by, for example, multiplying and maximising opportunities for participation and local control.[295]

In most cases, therefore, economic democracy implied more than just greater prosperity and social equality by non-totalitarian means. It meant the pursuit of economic justice alongside if not in service of a wider vision of more meaningful democratic self government, or democratic society, in the 20th century. The search for economic justice through the structures of a new global order was, in other words, connected to the interrelated imperatives of the challenges of democratic modernity, not welfare in a narrow and isolated sense. It was for this reason that Mortimer Adler argued that 'Economic democracy [which] involves economic *justice* for all men, as well as economic *freedom* for all' had to be sought in the context of a global order that promoted political as well as economic 'democratisation': the two tasks were fundamentally intertwined.[296] It was the achievement of both that, Adler argued, would result in the emergence of a democratic world order. Adler's view also captures the central importance in many visions of order that promoted economic justice that, in addition to preserving and expanding liberty, sought to extend it globally, by exporting the model of democratic modernity in which economic justice was embedded worldwide. As we will see below, for many internationalists, social justice would be guaranteed through the spread of a participative, decentralised, and pluralistic form of technologically advanced democratic government. Welfare was central, but it was only part of the package.

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[295] Carr and Madariaga, *The Future of International Government*, 3. Similarly, In *Conditions of Peace*, Carr argued for the reinterpretation 'in predominantly economic terms the democratic ideals of liberty and equality'. This would be the foundation of the 'new democracy', 30; Bunche quoted in Sluga *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism*, 94. There were countless variations of the same basic idea whether it was discussed as an aspect of liberty, citizenship or a way to revive or reinvent democracy. Bunche focused on a combining what he saw as the elements of active citizenship: social and economic, political rights. This mattered more in creation of a democratic order than the nation state per se. The ways in which internationalists tried to ensure that technocratic forms of economic planning or development did not themselves threaten liberty are explored in the following chapter.

[296] Adler, *How to Think About War and Peace*, 128, 134.

This chapter focuses on how internationalists operationalised the search for economic justice in the context of their wider visions of democratic modernity through their ideas for the economic organisation of post-war world. Doing this, the chapter returns to many of the thinkers we have already encountered, zooming in on their ideas about economic order. It also excludes further discussion of ideas that, while underscoring the centrality of social justice to conceptions of democratic global order in the 1940s, focused on the promotion of social and economic rights through the ILO or a new global or regional human rights regime, as opposed to more a fundamental transformation of the structures and activities of international order in the economic field and the global economy more broadly. Similarly, it excludes many internationalists who supported the reorganisation of the global economy in the pursuit of economic justice, often echoing the calls for development and international planning that are examined below, but who did so in a comparatively passive fashion.[297] Instead, the chapter focuses on those thinkers for whom, for example, large scale development programmes were the critical feature of the new economic order and the emergence of a democratic global order. While these were among the most interesting, detailed and expansive examples of new thinking about economic justice, the global economy and democratic order, the chapter nevertheless suggests that they were representative of more widely held views.

[297] Including, for example, Eichelberger and Shotwell who, as we saw, were adamant that welfare and 'livelihood' were at the heart of building a democratic global order that secured the three critical foundations of democracy– security, justice and welfare– (Eichelberger Papers, Box 253 November 21 1943 "Fundamentals of International Organization", 2). While they were not exactly passive they did not offer any novel ideas of their own but rather confirm how the support for international development was connected to thinking about economic justice in relation to democracy and democratic order. Elizabeth Brogwardt comments on CSOP support for the FAO, UNRRA and the Bretton Woods Institutions to achieve the 'principle of livelihood' and realise a broader 'transformative agenda' to promote economic rights and "the development of the human personality" rooted in the New Deal. Eichleberger's own letter to FDR in 1937 already spoke of extending the logic of the New Deal, which recognised that the survival of democracy depended on securing social welfare and planning for the future– to the world. He urged FDR to 'demonstrate that the same problems exist for the world– that the time has come to organise and plan international life, particularly in economic field' to secure 'economic and social justice'. This 'collective ideal in the economic sense' would be the foundation for a renewed 'moral solidarity for the new world' and 'world democracy'. Note that at this stage Eichelberger imagined that the ILO might create global 'boards of planning and strategy'. Eichelberger, *Organizing for Peace: A Personal History of the Founding of the United Nations*, 231-3; Borgwardt, *A New Deal for the World: America's Vision for Human Rights,* 133.

Recovering these ideas below, the resulting picture of the international economic thought of this decade differs substantially from existing scholarship. The 1940s are widely associated with the realisation by the architects of the postwar order that peace depended on global economic management and, to some extent, on social welfare. The Bretton Woods agreements reflected a new commitment not to return to the economic chaos of the 1930s and the beggar-thy-neighbour policies that had done so much to increase tensions between states in the run up to war. Its parallel encouragement of full employment and social welfare policies at the national level is at least an oblique reference to the fact that postwar planners recognised that improved social welfare was vital to democratic stability.[298]

While the state-centric vision of Bretton Woods and 'embedded liberalism' ultimately triumphed, it remains of historical and conceptual significance that its victory was not, as traditional accounts suggest, against a global vision of Soviet planning, laissez-faire capitalism or even the embryonic neo-liberalism of the Mont Pèlerin Society founded in 1947.[299] Instead, the following shows that in the political and intellectual environment of the 1940s, it was equally, if not more, remarkable that Bretton Woods triumphed against visions of the postwar global economy that were more, not less radical than what emerged, and even more radical than Keynes' ill fated International Clearing Union or Bancor that still dominate discussions of 'what might have been'. They were more radical, firstly, in their explicit focus on economic justice and welfare in connection with the interrelated imperatives of the challenge of democratic modernity, as opposed to an anodyne notion of economic stability. Although Bretton Woods was also, to some extent, an answer to this question, there is no

[298] Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order"; Slaughter, "Regulating the World: Multilateralism, International Law, and the Projection of the New Deal Regulatory State"; Ikenberry, "Creating Yesterday's New World Order: Keynesian "New Thinking" and the Anglo-American Postwar Settlement"; Benn Steil, *The Battle of Bretton Woods John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2013); Williams, *Failed Imagination?: New World Orders of the Twentieth Century*; Clavin, *Securing the World Economy: The Reinvention of the League of Nations, 1920-1946*; Jamie Martin, "Were We Bullied?", *London Review of Books* 35, no. 22 (2013).
[299] Daniel Stedman Jones, *Masters of the Universe: Hayek, Friedman and the Birth of Neoliberal Politics* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2012).

doubt that other visions of the postwar economy reflected a deeper preoccupation with the idea that, as Vera Dean argued, 'politics plus economics may not equal peace unless future peacemakers pay the same attention to the problems created by the universal demand for improvements in social welfare.'[300]

Secondly, they were more radical in that the visions of economic order they subsequently proposed would provide social justice and a democratic global order. The 1940s were the heyday of planning. In the context of which, it is surprising that ideas of economic planning stopped at the water's edge as the existing story of 'embedded liberalism', achieved through the Bretton Woods system confirms: planning for full employment and welfare was a strictly national pursuit. It is surprising and also untrue. As we will see in part two, many internationalists had heeded Alfred Zimmern's call in 1931 that 'the devotees of 'planning' must learn to think internationally'.[301] Going beyond the permissive framework of monetary stability that emerged at Bretton Woods, these internationalists imagined the creation of supranational regional planning authorities that would be directly responsible for guaranteeing a basic level of social welfare and economic opportunity in a manner that was, moreover, explicitly aimed at transforming and preserving democracy from the threat of anti-democratic, war-mongering movements and the spread of totalitarianism. These visions confirm that, as British economist and Bretton Woods delegate Lionel Robbins argued, the choice confronting Western statesmen was not between planning and the free market, or 'order and chaos', but between rival plans, each offering their own vision of the global economy that would secure economic justice in a manner that would preserve if not promote a wider revitalisation of democracy.[302] Of these, the following clearly shows that the model of embedded liberalism that triumphed at Bretton woods was both the weakest in its focus on

[300] Dean, *The Struggle for World Order,* 52.
[301] Alfred Zimmern, "Reflections on the Crisis: Thoughts from Geneva", *Political Quarterly* 2 (1931), 474.
[302] Lionel Robbins, *Economic Planning and International Order* (London: Macmillan, 1937).

social justice and the most statist and least international in its approach to securing it in the new global order.

Another kind of international planning that proposed to create a democratic global order through the direct intervention of international authorities to promote social justice in the context of wider visions of democratic modernity was visions of global development. Although side-lined at Bretton Woods, existing scholarship acknowledges that development was a more prominent part of Western visions of postwar peace. In the context of the emerging Cold War, moreover, it suggests that development was viewed as a means to ensure the triumph of capitalist modernity against Soviet communism. It has not, however, understood the way in which ideas of economic development in the 1940s, in particular those advanced by American internationalists, reflected radical visions of democratic global order that not only connected social justice and democracy much more strongly, but did so in the context of a vision of democratic modernity that, in addition to social welfare, stressed the creation of highly decentralised and pluralistic democratic governments.

Instead, Western and particularly American ideas of development that emerged in this period have largely been portrayed as a form of updated imperialism that promoted a one size fits all vision of 'authoritarian modernity', or anti-political consumerist democracy, that would only be challenged much later. The visions explored below do not fully escape such charges. European models of development, moreover, were undoubtedly more straightforwardly imperialistic in the way they downplayed and even denied political rights, although we will see that these too, to some extent, were attempts to build a new democratic order on the basis of a new concept of self-determination that stressed social welfare and local autonomy.

Like visions of regional economic planning authorities, these ideas did not triumph; the New Dealers that tried to put this democratic vision into practice through the UN, the ILO or the United States' Technical Assistance programme were pushed out as the Cold War

progressed.[303] Historically, it is nevertheless important to stress that many of the ideas of pluralistic, culturally sensitive, 'human' development that focus on social justice and building capabilities– including political empowerment–- as opposed to liberalisation or modernisation that have subsequently become so popular had an earlier existence among the same individuals who supposedly pioneered its opposite.[304] Conceptually, it is significant that in the 1940s these ideas emerged in the context of debates about democratic global order that we will see once again had much less to do with the structures of international representation and participation–albeit arguably to their cost in many cases– and much more to do with the interrelated challenges of democratic modernity.

Existing narratives of the post war economic order, still dominated by the image of Bretton Woods, the pursuit of economic stability and the implicit opposition of embedded liberalism and laissez-faire capitalism, thus significantly underplay both the range of thinking and the expansiveness and ambition of so much economic thought among Western internationalists in the 1940s. Their objective was economic democracy, to which end the following shows that there was much more about the scale, substance and nature of what this meant in terms of international and global order than the narrowly statist and otherwise modest hopes of Bretton Woods. Although recent scholarship has noted 'the novel international political language dedicated to social reform and global justice' that flourished for a brief period in the 1940s,' it too has not looked at the way in which this was translated into actual plans concerning the architecture and activities of the postwar global economy that substantially diverged from

[303] To be replaced by the 'next generation of Cold War internationalists focused on economic growth as a main priority as opposed to social reform' Nils Gilman cited in Jill Jensen, "US New Deal Social Policy Experts and the ILO 1948-54", in *Globalising Social Rights: The ILO and Beyond*, ed. Sandrine Kott and Joelle Droux, *ILO Century Series* (Geneva; London: International Labour Organisation; Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 185. Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore; London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007). Patel also notes the early prominence of New Deal figures in within UNRRA, the FAO and especially the ILO. See Patel, *The New Deal: A Global History*, 286-7.

[304] Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, "The Human Development Paradigm: Operationalizing Sen's Ideas of Capabilities", *Feminist Economics* 9, no. 2-3 (2003). Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

what ultimately emerged, and secondly how these were connected to democracy and larger claims to build a democratic world order that would preserve, expand and extend liberty.[305]

Recovering these ideas, the following explores variations between them that were rooted in the wider visions of democratic modernity in which the search for social justice was only one, albeit vitally important element, and the different ways in which internationalists tried to translate their visions of economic democracy into an uneven and divided global context. As in preceding chapters, we will see how this produced contradictions and limitations, some of which were intrinsic to the attempt to create a democratic world order that balanced technocracy and participation, pluralism and solidarism, hierarchy and equality and positive and negative liberty more broadly, and others that reflected the enduring influence of power politics and prejudice.

[305] Mazurek and Betts, "Preface: When Rights Were Social". As noted in the preceding chapter, new work focused on social rights in the 1940s exists in the context of widespread acknowledgement that the language of welfare and economic justice, captured by Roosevelt's 'Freedom from want', was a novel and notable development in the international thought and wider approach to global order in this period. This literature stresses how this development was rooted in the interwar period in which the 1939 Bruce Report by the League of Nations– which called for the expansion of technical activities focused on improving human welfare– is often read as a marking a turning point in the growing prominence of welfare and social justice outside the confines of the ILO e.g. Sluga, *Internationalism in an Age of Nationalism*, 124; Frey et al., *International Organizations*, 6-7). Connected to the emergence of the paraphernalia of development and technical assistance in the postwar period, the relationship between development and the search for economic justice more broadly to thinking about democracy and democratic global order are not explicitly addressed. Meanwhile, other ideas about of international planning outside the UN and Bretton Woods institutions are mostly ignored, with the partial exception as of the larger hopes and plans for the ILO that failed to materialise. In this regard, as we will see below, David Ekbladh's work on the influence of the New Deal on American visions of global 'modernisation' stands out for its more detailed discussion of democracy in the context of many more negative– yet equally axiomatic– interpretations of American led development as a vehicle for global democratisation. In making this connection these works do not, however, consider the centrality of economic justice as opposed to prosperity, the kind of democracy that was promoted, or the wider debate about economic justice, democracy and global order in which it was embedded that extended. Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010).

5.2. Economic Democracy and Supranational Planning

Despite the horrors of totalitarianism, a majority of people within Western elites in the 1940s, particularly in Europe, had come to believe that state planning could be used as an instrument of social justice in a way that was compatible with liberty. Some argued that it could even promote diversity. As the influential non-socialist 'think tank' Political and Economic Planning (PEP) said in 1931, planning would result in greater comfort and more 'colour and variety'.[306] This new faith in reached across the political spectrum, generating many different conceptions of 'planning'.[307] The same was true of visions of international planning that flourished in Europe and, until now, have been largely ignored. The proponents of these visions were united in the belief that social welfare was a key aspect of liberty whose promotion was therefore critical to the creation of a democratic and peaceful world order. To this end, they were also united in the belief that some form of international planning would be necessary: neither laissez-faire nor national planning would be enough.

Conceptions of international planning varied, however, reflecting the different ways in which internationalists prioritised, balanced and otherwise connected the need to promote social welfare with the protection of individual rights and the promotion of pluralism, local autonomy and other forms of political participation. They also reflected differences in how they thought about welfare in a global context as well as power politics and Eurocentrism. As a result, we will see that most visions of international planning were limited to Europe or other groups of advanced economies, and articulated some notion of hierarchy or leadership within the planned space and in relation to the outside world. The following recovers a selection of these ideas and illustrates some of their main differences.

[306] Pemberton, *Global Metaphors: Modernity and the Quest for One World,* 106.
[307] Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945* (New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2005), 69.

Among socialists, as we saw in chapter three, ideas of supranational economic planning flourished in the context of debates surrounding the creation of a European Union. For Barbara Wootton, only a new authority that could plan on a 'larger canvas' than the nation state would be capable of securing the requisite levels of welfare that would stabilise and revive democratic governments across Europe, preventing popular disaffection and encouraging the democratic engagement of individuals liberated from poverty.[308] While this would empower a technocratic elite that Wootton trusted to assess the popular needs planning would meet, in the framework of a democratic federal government political rights and accountability would be ensured.[309] Crucially, Wootton argued that in addition planning itself would be inclusive and, to some degree, participative. As we will see in following chapter, not only did Wootton insist that her vision of planning posed no threat to private enterprise, she imagined a new form of bottom up participation that would connect the people of Europe to its expert planners.[310]

Outside the federalist movement, EH Carr's *Conditions of the Peace* offered similar vision of democratic order through supranational economic planning, albeit one that made more room for power and, arguably, gave less weight to the political aspects of democratic order. Like many other internationalists, Carr argued that the definition of democracy needed to shift away from the narrow liberal obsession with political rights and its international 'counterpart' national self determination, towards a definition grounded in economic rights and, internationally, transnational solidarity. Consequently, it was above all an economic as well as ideological revolution that, by replacing the 'quantitative' concept of 'wealth' for the 'qualitative' concept of 'welfare' which lay at the heart of building democratic states and a

[308] Wootton, "Socialism and Federation", 288.
[309] Disagreeing with Hayek, Wootton insisted that a technocratic elite of planners would not need to 'manufacture' agreement over the nature of the common good in order to act, they would be able to 'discover' agreement, adding 'this is the technique in which democracy is so little practiced'. *Freedom under Planning* (New York: University of North Carolina Press; Van Rees Press, 1945), 148.
[310] Ibid, 174.

'democratic world order' that would secure a lasting peace.[311] Not only would guaranteeing welfare across Europe prevent the emergence of totalitarianism, it would reduce the significance of national barriers and promote European solidarity, even in the absence of political union. Whereas the economic injustice produced by the laissez-faire system led to nationalism and war, economic justice produced by the planned system would promote internationalism and peace.[312]

To this end, Carr imagined the creation of a European Planning Authority to be matched, he hoped, by other regional planning authorities in the near future. Echoing Wootton, Carr's authority would be empowered to ensure that the peacetime needs of Europe's population were met. Importantly, equitable distribution and social justice, not the maximisation of production or prosperity per se, was to be the guiding aim of the new body. Carr was exceptionally clear that although supranational planning would boost economic efficiency, it remained a fundamentally moral endeavour in the service of the common good.[313]

Carr was equally clear that the creation of a democratic order characterised by social and economic equality would be hierarchical. Without the explicit support if not the leadership of the great powers, and Britain in particular in light of what Carr claimed was its unique ability to master democratic planning, the effort was doomed to fail.[314] Carr's relative lack of interest

[311] Carr, *Conditions of Peace,* 71. On the rise of 'welfare': 76.
[312] Carr, *Conditions of Peace*, 259.
[313] The European Planning Authority, 'the most ambitious body of all', the 'master-key to the problem of the postwar settlement' was not simply about economic reconstruction or economic efficiency in the longer term. Once it reached the point when it 'should be utilised to plan and organise the future expansion of consumption' it would also reach 'the crucial point where the ultimate possibility of creating some kind of international society will be tried and tested. The issue is neither constitutional, nor, strictly speaking, economic' but will turn on the 'imperative moral purpose, worthy of some necessary self sacrifice on our own part, to raise the standards of living of other human beings, not merely within the boundaries of our own national unit, but beyond them' *Conditions of Peace*, 259, 264.
[314] GDH Cole put forward a similar argument in favour of British led European planning, arguing that it would be much better for the future of European democracy if Britain were involved 'For it will be immensely harder for France alone...to give a constructive lead to Western Europe towards a Socialism imbued with the ideas of liberal democracy'. Cole 1941 *Europe, Russia and the Future;* Fabian Research Pamphlet No.71; Lipgens, *Documents on the History of European Integration. Volume 2: Plans for European Union in Great Britain and in Exile 1939-1945*.

in the political aspects of a democratic global order is arguably another cause of concern. Yet although, in the absence of economic justice, Carr argued that political rights were essentially meaningless, they were by no means unimportant.[315] Under a fairer economic system, basic political rights were still essential to a democratic order and to the prevention of tyranny and war. Similarly, despite appearances, Carr was clearly aware of the risks to individual liberty posed by centralised systems of regional and national planning. He, too, insisted that the rise in executive power in a new world order based on economic democracy had to be matched by greater devolution of political power where possible and, domestically at least, through the creation of new 'direct channels' of participation.[316] In relation to the new EPA, however, as we will return to in the following chapter, Carr was more ambiguous, suggesting that this and even global planning authorities might have democratic foundations through some direct appeal to the 'little man' and, eventually, through direct political representation within them.[317]

Undoubtedly, however, Socialists like Carr did not put pluralism and local control centre stage in their visions of economic democracy and supranational planning. Their ideas were thus profoundly different from those of their Catholic colleagues who, as we saw in chapter three, connected their vision of economic democracy to their broader democratic ideal that focused on the flourishing of the 'human person' rooted in diverse and autonomous communities and identities. Securing a basic level of social welfare was essential to this end, for which Marc and his colleagues believed supranational economic planning was a vital tool. Not only would federal planning authority itself be organised on corporatist lines, however, its primary role would be to ensure basic needs were guaranteed across the federation while at the same time wherever possible devolving economic planning to subnational and even local corporatist assemblies to meet these needs. In contrast to a national planning body, therefore, the federal planning body would prevent the accumulation of excessive power by nation

[315] Carr, *Conditions of Peace*, 62-3.
[316] Ibid, 164-5.
[317] Ibid, 276-7.

states. It would also expand liberty. Not only would the new system free people from the inhumane vagaries of free market capitalism by guaranteeing that basic needs were met, it would do so in such a way that also reinforced and reinvigorated the life of the individual in the community through its emphasis on local control and corporatism.[318]

No less concerned with pluralism and the protection of the individual, if not the emergence of an alternative to parliamentary democracy, were liberal advocates of international planning, including economist and Nobel laureate Maurice Allais. Allais was a prominent figure in the European Movement and éminence grise for Marc's *La Fédération*. Writing in that magazine, Allais confirmed that federalism would constitute a democratic form of order only insofar as it succeeded in promoting a 'démocratie économique' that would combine 'maximum prosperity' with 'maximum equality' alongside its defence of political rights.[319] To this end, although the free market remained the surest means of boosting production and prosperity, it was necessary to accept that maximum efficiency was not coterminous with meeting popular needs and that a degree of planning was therefore necessary.

Allais did not, however, support the more radical visions of federal economic planning put forward by socialists. The risk of inefficiency and dangers to personal liberty were too great. Instead, he proposed the supranational coordination and supervision of national plans, or what he called 'planisme concurrentiel'.[320] National authorities that were closer to the people, he argued, were best placed to assess the needs of the population and the wider economy. While the relationship between planning authorities and citizens remained rather opaque, it is clear that he also thought national plans would preserve a more tangible sense of accountability than a distant federal planning authority. This authority, however, would monitor and ensure

[318] Fonds Alexandre Marc, HAEU, AM-168 "Une économie au service de l'homme"; "Le fédéralisme fonctionnel"; "Le fédéralisme économique" (1947); AM-169 "Les trois dimensions de l'équilibre économique" (1947); AM-170 "Le fédéralisme postule-t'il une refonte de l'économie?" (1948); "Du communalisme au fédéralisme intégral" (1949).
[319] Maurice Allais, "Aspects Économiques Du Fédéralisme" (paper presented at the Rapport Du Première Congrès annuel de l'UEF, Genève 1947), 34, in Fonds Alexandre Marc, AM-585, HAEU.
[320] Contrasted with 'planisme autoritaire' and 'laissez-faire' ibid, 36.

the compatibility of the plans devised by national authorities with each other, and with overall economic goals, including minimum standards of welfare, set by the federal government.

A similar view was put forward by the British economist Lionel Robbins. As a member of the Economic Committee of the Federal Union Research Institute alongside Wootton and Hayek the group were charged with exploring the economic order of a democratic federal union and, in particular, debating how such an order would secure economic justice. In this context, Robbins adapted the central argument of *Economic Planning and International Order* (1937) in which he had criticised 'Independent National Planning', 'Partial International Planning' and 'Complete International Planning' in favour of 'International Liberalism'. This, importantly, was another kind of plan. While Robbins is often portrayed as a champion of the free market, having describing planning in 1937 as 'the grand panacea of our age', his objection to contemporary appeals to 'planning' was their imprecision. Planning itself, he argued, was intrinsic to the idea of economic order and therefore inevitable.[321]

It was also inevitable, he argued, that a democratic postwar plan had to meet the basic needs and wants of all people. The prevailing models for doing so, however, were inadequate. National plans would lead to over-bureaucratisation and inefficiency, and would ultimately diminish prosperity and liberty as governments tried and failed to meet inherently multifarious and distinct needs and wants. For the same reason, Robbins was equally sceptical of the idea of an international authority with control over natural resources and labour. If anything, the chances of success and the risk of tyranny would be even worse. 'Partial' International Planning in form of trade agreements and international labour standards on the other hand would simply be too weak to have any meaningful effect. The only 'plan' that could work was 'International liberalism'. As he wrote in 1937, in addition to promoting the

[321] Robbins, *Economic Planning and International Order*, 5, 188; A. Castelli, "I Socialisti Britannici E L'idea Di 'Popolo Europeo'" in *Un Popolo Per L'europa Unita. Fra Dibattito Storico E Nuove Prospettive Teoriche E Politiche* ed. C. Malandrino (Florence: Leo S. Okshcki, 2004), 95; Or Rosenboim, "Federalism and the Free Market: The International Economic Thought of Lionel Robbins", in *Interwar International Theory Workshop* (Queens' College Cambridge2014), 5.

comparatively unrestricted flow of goods, capital, and men 'the aim of the liberal plan [is] to create a framework in which private plans ... [can] be harmonized instead of superseding such plans by a public plan as the modern planner would do'.[322]

This argument reflected Robbins' belief that it was the duty of an international authority to harmonise the social and economic wants of individuals, communities and states. Four years later, in the context of debates within FURI, this was the putative federal government of Europe.[323] In addition, social and economic wants had to be reconciled in a democratic way. It was for this reason that, as Or Rosenboim has noted, 'this immense task was interpreted in terms of regulation, rule making and temporary intervention, rather than direct control or nationalisation'. Within this system, moreover, economic decision-making would be shared between local, national and federal authorities. This 'heterarchical' structure of economic planning was essential to preserve a structure of checks and balances within the world economy, to protect citizens in other member states from disruptive national policies and ultimately, to ensure that planning remained democratic.[324] In this regard, there is a clear similarity between Robbins and Allais' visions and the emphasis on monitored but decentralised supranational planning in the name of economic democracy preferred by Catholic thinkers like Marc.[325]

Finally, it is important to note that even opponents of this kind of supranational economic planning and indeed national planning– although a comparatively small group– articulated

[322] Robbins, *Economic Planning and International Order,* 7.
[323] Castelli, "I Socialisti Britannici E L'idea Di 'Popolo Europeo'",100-101 especially fn. 44; Rosenboim, "Federalism and the Free Market: The International Economic Thought of Lionel Robbins", 4-5; Lionel Robbins, "Economic Aspects of Federation", in *Federal Union: A Symposium*, ed. Melville Channing-Pearce (London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1940).
[324] Rosenboim, "Federalism and the Free Market: The International Economic Thought of Lionel Robbins", 8-9.
[325] Robbins was undoubtedly vague about the precise nature of the supranational 'framework' for 'international liberalism', as he also was in the *Economic Aspects of Federation* which was a rather less radical– and less interesting– proposal compared to his earlier work and his position in the FURI debates described by Castelli and Rosenboim. He was by no means alone among proponents of international planning to expound on general principles and outlines over nuts and bolts. Similarly, Robbins' contribution to the Bretton Woods negotiations bore little trace of these more radical ideas Diaries- LSE electronic holding: Archives Reference ROBBINS/6/1/2 1944.

visions of democratic order that were both deeply concerned with the promotion of welfare and advocated a more strongly international solution for doing so than Bretton Woods. The figure who most embodied this paradox was Friedrich Hayek. The odd man out among his colleagues at FURI, Hayek remained unpersuaded that planning by a supranational federal authority would neutralise the danger of totalitarianism inherent in the idea of national planning. Simply put, a consensual plan for global welfare was too complex to have any chance of success and would lead to infringements on liberty both within and between states.[326]

Hayek's own vision of a democratic international order, however, did not dispense with the concern for social welfare. On the contrary, while remaining somewhat vague in detail, Hayek insisted that his vision of federalism would also guarantee the levels of social welfare necessary for democratic stability.[327] The federal government would intercede against instances of national planning that might threaten the liberty within a given state or harm citizens of another state. It would also, Hayek claimed, provide an economic structure that would foster competition and common interests in equal measure, maximising individual initiative and making it work as beneficially as possible for the citizens of the federal union.[328] It was thus both because it would protect the individual from the state and in particular the welfare state but at the same time provide greater social welfare that Hayek too, albeit very differently, argued that some form of federal union would constitute 'the application to international affairs of democracy'.[329]

[326] As noted by Wootton in her rebuttal *Freedom Under Planning*, 140; On Hayek's objections to international planning on the model of the TVA as well as in the context of Federal Union see Hall, *Dilemmas of Decline: British Intellectuals and World Politics,1945-1975,* 80.
[327] Castelli, "I Socialisti Britannici E L'idea Di 'Popolo Europeo'", 97; Rosenboim, "Barbara Wootton, Friedrich Hayek and the Debate on Democratic Federalism in the 1940s",16.
[328] It might also allow for a degree of limited local planning where it would be most representative of desires of those it affected. "Barbara Wootton, Friedrich Hayek and the Debate on Democratic Federalism in the 1940", 18.
[329] Ibid, 19.

Other opponents of state planning including Raymond Buell in the US went further, suggesting what was essentially a free market model of international planning to promote welfare. Overlapping with Hayek as well as Wootton and Allais– all of whom insisted their ideas posed no threat to private enterprise but would steer them to the common good– the solution, Buell argued was that international organisations should 'plan' for private enterprise, encouraging innovation and investment where it would promote social welfare. The result would be a democratic order that guaranteed higher living standards for all, while posing no threat to individual innovation, pluralism and liberty.[330]

These examples clearly illustrate the striking degree to which the promotion of social welfare was seen as integral to democracy and the creation of a democratic and peaceful global order in the 1940s, and the extent to which, even among liberals, some form of international planning that went beyond the statist parameters of Bretton Woods was seen as essential to this end. In this context, what divided planners was the way in which they sought to reconcile the obvious and inherent tension between planning for the expansion and preservation of liberty and the threat of tyranny it might itself pose and, related to this, how they sought to press other aspects of a new democratic order in conjunction with social welfare, such as the reinvigoration of local communities or individual enterprise.

The extent to which planners succeeded in mitigating the technocratic implications of their visions is explored in the following chapter. Clearly, however, this dilemma was at the forefront of the minds of internationalists seeking a democratic order that secured economic justice through planning. More troubling from this perspective was the palpable and persistent Eurocentrism of visions of supranational planning. Wootton and Allais certainly did not deny that the extension of planning might follow the gradual expansion of the democratic political unions within which planning authorities were based. Carr referred to the establishment of

[330]Buell Papers, Box 26 Folder 3: Q Committee: World Economic Reconstruction 1945 "US policy on World Economic Reconstruction".

regional planning authorities in other parts of the world, implying that a patchwork of regional planning authorities might foster something approaching global solidarism.[331] Theoretically, the liberal models of Robbins and certainly Buell lent themselves more easily to global application; a higher degree of coordination need not wait for formal union.

Nevertheless, the extent to which these internationalists really thought about planning outside the European context or really considered *global* planning for social welfare as vital to the construction of a democratic global order can certainly be called into question. The clue lies in the ideas of international development which, pending the successful trial of a European planning mechanism, often accompanied visions of supranational planning. As we will see in part two, while these ideas suggested that visions of democratic order based on economic justice were premised on the elevation of global living standards, they often concealed a double standard that privileged the construction of economic democracy in the West or that otherwise restricted the form of liberty that was extended to the non-Western world through development.

In this vein, while advocates of supranational planning authorities in Europe supported an increase in global living standards through non-exploitative forms of development, there is little in the work of Wootton, Robbins or Allais to suggest that the achievement of comparable welfare standards in developing countries or a more equitable distribution of global wealth was seen as an essential component of a democratic order based on economic justice and, by extension, essential to global peace.[332] Equally, whereas it was vital even for harsh critics of liberal democracy such as Marc and Carr that supranational planning take

[331] Carr, *Conditions of Peace*, 264.
[332] Carr is something of an exception in this regard, insisting that it was not the maximization of world production but the implementation of measures to ensure the 'increasing equalization of standards of living and a wider distribution of the processes of production, between the more privileged and less privileged countries' was essential to democratic and peaceful global order; Unfortunately, Carr did not elaborate, rendering his position rather less radical than it first appears. He clearly remained hopeful, however, that the time had come when the world would not tolerate the concentration of wealth and the elimination of 'the weak' that resulted from laissez-faire on a *global* scale. My emphasis. *Conditions of Peace*, 265-6.

place in the context of a system that protected individual rights, ensured accountability and offered form of representation within supranational planning bodies, this condition was largely absent from the idea of development suggested by the thinkers above. In other words, whereas the tension between technocracy and liberty was addressed head on in visions of supranational planning in Europe, in a global development context such questions were scarcely raised. More problematically, it remained entirely unclear whether economic justice through development implied the extension of national and political rights at all.[333]

The implicit suggestion that once developed, non-Western countries would somehow be incorporated into the democratic planned order is therefore highly dubious. On balance, it is clear that the top priority remained the preservation and expansion of liberty in the West. It was essential to 'make democrats' of the masses in what was still perceived to be the centre of the system and the cauldron of war: Europe. By and large, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that for advocates of supranational planning, achieving global economic justice through development was a separate, even secondary aspect of building a democratic global order. In this regard, while these critics of Bretton Woods went further in their imagination of a truly international model of economic justice, they remained equally Eurocentric in their focus on the welfare of labouring masses and the nature of democracy in the advanced industrial economies and their conflation of a democratic order in Europe with a peaceful world order. Finally, these were at best inconsistent and at worst parochial visions of a democratic 'global' order.

A notable exception, however, demonstrates that limited ideas of international planning were also to some extent motivated by the practical and intellectual difficulties of globalising an idea of democratic order based on a combination of social welfare and political rights, not least in light of changing geopolitical realities. In her *Prolegomena to Peace Aims* (1941),

[333] Carr talked about the dominions being brought into the scope of the planning authority as a means to internationalise their development and wider administration but status of political rights in this context is not discussed. Ibid, 265.

Barbara Ward had predicted that economic planning to secure both national social welfare and global economic justice would constitute the central task of a democratic postwar order.[334] Having initially imagined a European planning board, by the end of the decade Ward had adapted her vision in light of changing geopolitical realities and the structure of postwar order that had emerged. That order, she argued, had not gone far enough in the pursuit of economic justice. Hampered by a stubborn belief in automaticity and self-regulation and, to some extent, the reluctance of planners to focus on efficiency, the opportunity afforded to nation states to pursue economic expansion and justice under the Bretton Woods system had been squandered by 'planlessness and unpredictability'.[335] The Marshall plan was an encouraging sign of changing attitudes. Yet Ward believed that only a bolder move towards international planning that broke the spell of national authority once and for all would secure a democratic order on the basis of economic justice. To this end, she proposed the establishment of the World Production and World Resources Board and the Economic Development Board. As the 'Economic general staff of the free world', these Boards would have authority over nation states to mandate the pursuit of full employment policies alongside other measure that would promote economic expansion, development and justice.[336]

The Boards themselves would exist in the context of an Atlantic Union that Ward proposed could develop through an organic process of 'functional federalism' originating in the existing structures of NATO, the OEEC and the Economic Cooperation Administration.[337] While the Atlantic Union was limited to the free world, Ward's vision of planning was explicitly intended to have a global impact. For the time being, she argued, the Atlantic Union could use the Economic and Social Council and the Specialised Agencies of the UN, staffed

[334] Ward, "Prolegomena to Peace Aims", 237, 239, 248. Solving the problem of 'planning and freedom' was the essential task of the postwar order. The European Planning Board, based on the principle of 'production for use' would preserve 'the wartime principle of control' of key industries and ensure the basic needs of all were met while national parliaments guarded against the risks of over-centralisation and bureaucratisation.
[335] *Policy for the West,* 253.
[336] Ibid, 260.
[337] Ibid, 293.

by the right officials, as suitable mechanism for projection of Atlantic policy into Asia, promoting development and binding the rest of the world to the Western model.[338] At the same time, the UN would act as the platform through which the Atlantic Union would build cooperative relationships with rising Asian economies that would pave the way to a more equitable model of management of the global economy that would reflect the gradual rebalancing between the developed and developing world.

In this regard, Ward's vision was almost unique. Despite rhetorical suggestions to the contrary, very few Western internationalists saw equal management of the global economy as a critical aspect of global economic democracy. Compared to other advocates of international planning, moreover, Ward's limitation of planning to the Atlantic Union was more convincingly motivated by a concern with pluralism and equality as well as pragmatism. In the context of the emerging Cold War, Ward insisted that it was not only realistic but prudent to coax India and China towards the democratic order through the strength of its example rather than offering a more radical proposal that was doomed to fail or alternatively, doing nothing to alter the 'planless' state of the economic order at all. Crucially, it was also more democratic to permit the non-Western world to chart its own path albeit, Ward hoped, towards the West's model.[339]

Ward's example shows that exclusion was not always product of conscious or unconscious Eurocentrism, nor did the premium on development-as-planning in a non-Western context in lieu of membership of the advanced planning zone always reflect a clear double standard concerning the importance of social welfare or political rights in the non-Western world. Nevertheless, while Ward's vision of democratic order clearly put an idea of global economic

[338] Ibid, 288.
[339] Ibid, 285. Part of the reason for opting for a functional, economically focused Atlantic Union over a formal political union was also to make it easier to 'weave a living community' between East and West through existing organs of cooperation and partnership without risking a dangerous rift. Regional arrangements might be useful but they should not get in the way of the final objective which was a global order that promoted economic justice and the 'stability of human society' worldwide.

justice at its heart, it was by no means free of contradiction and limitation as a result. Ward's goal remained deeply solidaristic: unity around a Western model of economic democracy, that is to say social justice achieved in the context of constitutional government. It was also to some degree plainly hierarchical, supporting an idea of Anglo-American leadership that was justified on the grounds of an assumed probity. While Ward was more attuned to the importance and difficulties of thinking about welfare, economic justice and planning on a global scale, moreover, compared to other planners, she was relatively unconcerned with the tension between planning and participation within the Atlantic Union itself. Once again, Ward's assumption that the inherently well-intentioned Anglo-American experts who would dominate her planning boards would not jeopardise democratic freedoms remained entirely unscrutinised. What this perhaps shows is that, finally, Ward's idea was no different from any other vision of democratic order, whose contours were shaped by a combination of the choices internationalists made confronted with the dilemmas of democratic modernity but also power and prejudice. While the latter can be seen in Ward's failure to unpack her faith in Anglo-American leadership, the failure of other planners to interrogate the palpable difference between the visions of economic democracy in the Western and non-Western world points to a bias that was arguably even more troubling.

5.3 Economic Democracy and International Development

5.3.1 A World of New Deals for a Democratic World

'[The New Deal] is not alone a war against want and destitution and economic demoralization. It is more than that; it is a war for the survival of democracy. We are

> fighting to save a great and precious form of government for ourselves and for the world'.[340]

Western delegates at Bretton Woods would not commit to the large-scale development programme pressed by Indian, Chinese and Latin American delegates in New Hampshire. The IMF was designed with European and American interests in mind.[341] Yet the postwar period is still associated with a new commitment to global development embodied in the preamble of United Nations Charter's pledge to 'promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom'. In practice, this was translated into the work of the subsidiary agencies and commissions of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, the World Bank and national development programmes, in particular that of the United States in the wake of President Truman's Point Four Program (1949).

The new emphasis on development is in a sense the most obvious reflection that economic justice or welfare was seen as a central aspect of building a new world order. It is, moreover, the most obvious reflection of the centrality of economic justice to ideas of democratic world order. Not only were the calls for global development and higher global living standards that saturate the internationalist literature of this period articulated in language of liberty, they were often explicitly connected to democracy and the pursuit of a 'democratic concept' of postwar order which, as Vera Dean insisted, meant that the peace makers faced a 'double task' of reconstructing the relations within and between nations 'both in such a way as to improve the living conditions of all. The two tasks are closely interwoven. Neither can be undertaken or accomplished alone'.[342]

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[340] Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Acceptance Speech for the Re-nomination for the Presidency, Philadelphia, Pa.," June 27, 1936. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15314.
[341] Eric Helleiner, *Forgotten Foundations of Bretton Woods: International Development and the Making of the Postwar Order* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014).
[342] Dean, *The Struggle for World Order,* 53-4.

In spite of this, the connection between international development and visions of democratic global order has not been explored. Examining these ideas, we can see that, like planning, while visions of international development reflected a shared belief that higher standards of social welfare were a key aspect of modern liberty and thus any democratic national and international system, the way in which internationalists consequently claimed that development would produce a democratic global order varied. Once again, this variation turned on the way in which the promotion of social justice was embedded in larger visions of democratic modernity that sought to protect the individual but also promote pluralism, diversity, participation, local autonomy or otherwise alternative concepts of self-determination in the modern world. Seeking to extend these visions of liberty through international development, internationalists also differed in how they rationalised and mitigated the tensions and contradictions that were inherent to this kind of 'democratic imperialism' as a means to a democratic world order.[343]

By definition, results were not perfect. Both internally and externally, American visions of development as a path to democracy tried to combine social justice with pluralism, decentralisation and local autonomy. The degree to which they succeeded, however, remains open to doubt. The New Dealers wanted to produce a democratic order composed of vigorous democracies that would cooperate in diversity, yet it remained an end which, like its means, was to some extent inherently hierarchical, solidaristic and even imperialistic, as well as geopolitically self-interested. In the European case, however, not only were the visions of democratic modernity that advocates of development claimed to press largely unpersuasive, the extent to which these ideas were really part of an attempt to build a democratic global order with welfare at its heart, or indeed the liberty of non-Western populations in larger sense , can be questioned. The failures of these ideas to combine the promotion of welfare with credible political rights, forms of participation in development itself and sensitivity to local desires betrays a double standard motivated by prejudice and power, not the practical

[343] Ibid, 53.

and intellectual dilemmas of democratic modernity in an unevenly developed, politically divided world.

Existing scholarship suggests an equally negative– or unduly positive– interpretation of American ideas of development that emerged in the 1940s.[344] This literature stresses the connection between America's stated objective to guarantee the 'freedom from want' in the postwar world and democratic nation building. While this was true it does not, however, realise that for many American internationalists development would thus produce a democratic global order because of the *kind* of democratic state it would create, or the extent to which in this context internationalists wrestled with the contradiction inherent in their dream of a democratic order that was created and led by the United States and united around its values.[345] Instead, the dominant image of American-led development in the postwar period has continued to rely on the analytical prism of imperialism, in which goal of democratisation has been tied to distinctly undemocratic or even anti-democratic ambitions. Mark Mazower, for example, has argued that the new emphasis on development reflected an American desire to control the world by recreating it in its own liberal-capitalist image.[346] James Scott has credited the US with authorship of the ideology of 'high modernism' that supposedly characterised Western approaches to development in the postwar period. Imposed by Western experts acting on their own authority or that of international institutions they controlled, this

[344] Although Borgwardt's work nominally focuses on human rights rather than development, the latter is bundled in to her triumphalist interpretation of the 'American' postwar order emerging from the New Deal and the Atlantic Charter in which the global promotion of democracy is variously implicit and explicit but always an entirely unproblematic aim. Borgwardt, *A New Deal for the World: America's Vision for Human Rights*.

[345] In this regard David Ekbladh's work is much richer. Overall, however, the connection between American led development and democracy still tends to be cast in the larger strategic terms of the Cold War, the connection between democracy and 'prosperity' per se produced by 'modernisation' rather than economic justice and its relation to the existence and nature of democratic systems. So Ekbladh, like Ellwood, finally tells us that 'New Deal' inspired development was a way of spreading democracy or ensuring the victory of democracy but it remains rather axiomatic and under-explored. Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order*; Borgwardt, *A New Deal for the World: America's Vision for Human Rights*. Ellwood, *The Shock of America: Europe and the Challenge of the Century*, 272. Ellwood argues that the connection between 'democracy and prosperity and the propositions they derived from this belief' defined the New Dealers' and broader American attitudes towards development, democracy and the postwar order.

[346] Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea*. Esp. chapter 10; 266, 274, 290-291.

approach was wholly indifferent to the local context, values and desires of its subjects. Supposedly, it also imparted a profoundly statist model of democratic modernity that glorified and empowered highly centralised technocratic states.[347] For David Ellwood, development, or what he prefers to call 'modernisation' or 'Americanisation' was equally anti-political. It was the delivery mechanism for a model of mass democracy supported by Fordist consumer capitalism whose primary objective was to pacify the masses within constitutional democracies, thus permitting the leaders of tranquil democratic states to fashion a cooperative, open and peaceful international system.[348]

Turning to the American internationalists that championed international development, particularly the New Dealers that pioneered development thought in the United States, while their aim was indeed the creation of democratic nation states in the image of US, crucially, it was the image of a revived, rethought and reinvigorated American democracy that had imbibed the elixir of the New Deal that guided their vision. As a result, their end goal was not a democratic empire of identikit democracies but cooperation between diverse democracies on the egalitarian model of Western Hemisphere. Crucially, this outcome was contingent on the creation of decentralised, not centralised states and on the re-engagement, not the

[347] Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*, 89. 'It is best conceived as a strong, one might even say muscle-bound, version of the beliefs in scientific and technical progress that were associated with industrialization in Western Europe and in North America from roughly 1830 until World War I. At its core was a supreme self-confidence about continued linear progress, the development of scientific and technical knowledge, the expansion of production, the rational design of social order, the growing satisfaction of human needs, and, not least, an increasing control over nature'. In reaction, William Easterly has recently tried to promote a new model of development that, much as internationalists in the 1940s argued, understands that unchecked state power is the problem, not the solution. William Easterly, *The Tyranny of Experts: Economists, Dictators, and the Forgotten Rights of the Poor*.

[348] Ellwood's focus is the application of the New Deal model on Europe. His take on the New Dealers' global ambition and reach of the New Dealers' 'mechanistic idealism' (Dean Acheson's phrase), however, is abundantly clear. 'The birth of the United Nations represented the greatest triumph of the New Deal in its new globalist expression' promising an opportunity to spread development- its 'doctrine of liberation'- and democracy world wide with 'its strange mixture of utopianism and ruthlessness, of earnest concern for the future of 'the masses' and indifference to local conditions and context, the inclusiveness and at the same time the hubris of a winning, post-imperial power. Development was the mantra- development through trade, exchange, industrialisation, technology, scientific knowledge, planning- all premised on an end to empires; the rapid transformation, somehow, of the Atlantic Charter pledges of self-determination into reality, and an unquestioning faith that what had been best for America would be ideal for the rest'. Ellwood, *The Shock of America: Europe and the Challenge of the Century*, 233, 235.

mollification of the masses. These democracies would not be straightforwardly liberal or capitalist. They would, like the US after the New Deal, be more equitable societies in which which social security and full employment was guaranteed, free enterprise would work for common goals and the state, through decentralised authorities embedded in local communities, would 'plan' and partially finance projects of regional and local regeneration.

It was no coincidence that the strongest exponent of this vision was the former head of the TVA himself, David Lilienthal. In *Democracy on the March* (1944) Lilienthal translated the experience of the TVA as a world of new deals in which regionally rooted semi-autonomous agencies under the supervision of an overarching international organisation would direct large scale regional development projects focused above all on the of natural resources: 'the central fact in the immediate future of the world'.[349] The result, he argued would be a world of vigorous, cooperative democratic nation states.

Vital to this end was the peculiarly democratic method of the TVA and the kind of democracies TVA-inspired development would promote. The TVA represented, as Stuart Chase had argued a 'special kind of planning based on consent' and participation that Lilienthal connected to an idea of 'democracy at the grassroots'.[350] Eschewing centralised 'remote control' development from a distant HQ, the close cooperation between expert planners and local people inspired by the TVA model would forge strong local communities composed of enterprising, independent individuals. It was this legacy, not roads, dams and bridges or even higher living standards per se that would, more than anything else, ensure the superiority, survival and spread of democracy in the modern world. In US, the New Deal had saved American democracy; globally, it would create the foundations for equitable, decentralised, pluralistic and diverse democratic states that, like many other internationalists

[349] Lilienthal, *TVA: Democracy on the March,*78.
[350] Op cit. (1932) Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order*, 46. Lilienthal, *TVA: Democracy on the March,* 77.

in 1940s, Lilienthal believed were vital to the creation of a truly democratic global order in the 20th century.[351]

The alternative, development projects that were centrally directed, non-participative, or that used development to create a centralised democratic states were, echoing Marc, anathema to the objective of a democratic world order. Citing John Dewey, it would simply be impossible to 'nourish a democratic spirit in men' if they were not directly involved in the process of developing their own communities and nations.[352] Nor could the US, in spite of its expertise and experience, claim to lead global development if it reserved democratic means for its own self development and employed an autocratic and exclusive method abroad, or indeed if American democracy itself became excessively centralised.[353] The US could only assume leadership of the new world order if it did so on democratic foundations, that is, through the promotion of the unique combination of prosperity, social justice and democratic participation embodied in the TVA. Importantly, Lilienthal stressed, a top down, one size fits all approach that failed to foster 'democracy at the grassroots' would not only be imperialistic and unjust, it would be ineffective in the pursuit of peace through economic development.[354]

The extent to which Lilienthal thus succeeded in addressing the tension between technocratic planning and participation in his vision of economic justice is addressed in the following chapter. Importantly, however, *Democracy on the March* clearly demonstrates Lilienthal's awareness of this dilemma as well as the tension between hierarchy and equality and

[351] Ibid, 78, 199.
[352] Ibid, 193.
[353] Fears that the centralisation produced by war and the threat of the Soviet Union might lead to what Laswell called the 'garrison state', or that American democracy might otherwise be threatened by the growth of the state– as Buell believed would result from the New Deal– 'ran through national and internationalist debates in the US in this period. Ekbladh has gone so far as to describe Laswell's position– echoed by Staley– as the 'marrow' of US geopolitical thinking from the 1930s onwards and a major impetus for America's new 'globalism'. This 'argument is finally much like Stephen Wertheim's geopolitical view of American internationalism, although Wertheim makes no explicit mention of the preservation and extension democracy as the primary objective. Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order,* 64. Wertheim, "Instrumental Internationalism: The United Nations as America's Will to Lead the World."
[354] Lilienthal, *Democracy on the March,* 199.

solidarism and pluralism that was inherent in the idea of democratisation through development. It also demonstrates an attempt to address this problem both internally and externally. While it remained a vision of global democratisation, Lilienthal argued that the participative, pluralistic nature of development would be reflected outwardly in the emergence of democracies that reflected local preferences. Sharing core values and, in addition, a democratic system that guaranteed the social and economic as well as political rights of its citizens, while remaining autonomous and culturally diverse, these democracies would live in peace within a cooperative inter-state order organised along the lines of what became the Organisation of American States in 1948.

Lilienthal was not alone in searching for ways to reconcile diversity and democratisation as the end goal of economic development. Another figure who grappled with this problem was the leading academic advocate of New Deal inspired global development Eugene Staley. Staley argued that development would lead to the creation of a democratic global order through its promotion of cultural pluralism and, somewhat differently to Lilienthal, the more even distribution of world political power. A TVA-style international development authority working with national governments around the world would 'supersede the predominantly one way flow that was founded on the superiority of Western industrial techniques and the period of cultural "imperialism" of the West will recede into the past'. 'Development in Asia, Africa, South Easter Europe and Latin America will ultimately enhance the influence of the people in these areas' both in terms of culture, and 'in determining the political destinies of their own regions and of the world'.[355]

[355]Eugene Staley, *World Economic Development: Effects on Advanced Industrial Countries* (Montreal: International Labour Office, 1944), 216-7.

Like Lilienthal, however, it remained vital that economic development was tied to political democratisation. Economic betterment 'does not necessarily make nice people'.[356] Cooperation for mutual benefit required shared core values without which, Staley argued, not only could newly powerful states pose a threat to global security, their rise threatened to undermine existing democracies: welfare was a necessary but a not sufficient condition for democracy either at home or abroad. As a result, the US had little choice but to try and make its democratic partners itself, through a combination of democratic economic development on the model of the TVA and careful political cooperation with developing states to encourage and assist in the wider political and social changes necessary for 'successful' development towards democracy. The end result, Staley insisted, would not be devoid of pluralism. The order that would emerge would be a kind of global Western Hemisphere driven by 'mutual interchange between diverse cultures' which, on the basis of shared democratic principles, would succeed in fitting development and trade policies together in 'a pattern of mutual benefit'.[357]

Compared to Lilienthal, Staley's vision was arguably more ambiguous about the precise ways in which solidarism and pluralism, hierarchy and equality and, in particular, planning and participation would be combined.[358] Equally, however, it is possible that the relative ambiguity of Staley's work in the face of these contradictions also reflected a deeper acknowledgement that because there was no point at which these tensions could be perfectly resolved, a more tentative and pragmatic approach that acknowledged the intrinsic tension and mutability of the relationship between economic development and democratic global order was required. Instead of positing an inevitable process of pluralistic democratisation and/or reconciliation between international development, democracy and pluralism, as one

[356] Gardner Patterson, "Reviewed Work: The Future of Underdeveloped Countries by Eugene Staley", *The American Economic Review* 45, no. 1 (1955), 176; Staley, *World Economic Development: Effects on Advanced Industrial Countries*.
[357] *World Economic Development: Effects on Advanced Industrial Countries*, 22-23.
[358] Ekbladh suggests a more unambiguous interpretation of Staley as the champion of American leadership to ensure development led to the spread of 'liberal principles'. *The Great American Mission,* 67-8.

reviewer noted, Staley was at pains to stress that 'the conditions under which increased production will lead to the goals of internal democracy and attitudes that make for peace among nations are complex and delicate, change over time, differ between areas and can not be accurately forecast'.[359] Staley was equally convinced that measures to ensure the requisite changes in the political and social structures of developing countries that would tie economic development to democratisation would be neither uniform nor uniformly successful. While the help given by outsiders– be it the US or UN– 'may well be the difference between success and failure' Staley argued 'most of the burden must be borne by local people'. Echoing Lilienthal, try as it might to impose democracy, the final mechanism that would guard against imperialism was that it would ultimately be impossible to create a democratic order without the input of local populations.[360]

Where was economic justice? For all their emphasis on 'democracy at the grassroots' and economic betterment it might seem that American visions of development were not, as existing interpretations suggest, really concerned with social welfare and equality as much as the spread of a particular model of prosperous capitalist modernity per se. If this is to a limited extent true of Lilienthal and Staley– both of whom did still talk about the importance of improving welfare and wellbeing in unambiguous terms– then it was certainly not true in all cases. Vera Dean, for example, blended elements of a New Deal vision of American-led democratic nation building with a strong emphasis on social justice within both developing and advanced countries. Dean's vision of development 'broadly planned by central authorities, national and international, which would be responsible to the people, whose fulfilment could be left to local or regional authorities, with the cooperation of private

[359] op cit. Patterson, "Reviewed Work: The Future of Underdeveloped Countries by Eugene Staley", 176-7. The reviewer thought that a more appropriate title would have been the political implications of development 'for it accurately indicates the author's major interest'.
[360] Ibid.

enterprise' was very similar to those we have seen above.[361] The end result was the same: a cooperative world of decentralised, pluralistic, politically engaged mass democracies. Crucially, however, these democracies would be characterised by a high level of social welfare and equality which, for Dean, remained at the heart of the 'dilemma of democracy' in the 20th century and, consequently, 'building a new democratic order in international affairs'. This dilemma was the task of 'adapting the political institutions of democracy…to the economic and social needs of a mass production era all over the world'.[362] It was imperative, therefore, that the new international order should support moves towards greater welfare within advanced economies and that the development of 'backward' countries should be driven by 'the social objective' as much as the political.[363]

In every other respect, Dean struggled with same tensions that ran through other visions of a democratic order emerging from international efforts in global development, or what Dean was unafraid to call 'democratic imperialism'. Her solutions echoed those of her peers.[364] Globally, however, she proposed a modified, arguably more pluralistic idea of democratic solidarism. A democratic order, she suggested, might also be one of less than uniform and even less than perfect groups of democracies that cooperated together for mutual benefit. Globally, provision would be made for 'cultural autonomy of national groups, combined with their political integration into one or more regional systems in which they could be assured a minimum of security and economic stability'.[365] Thus avoiding the twin perils of direct control by the United States or isolation, these democratic or democratising blocs in Europe, Asia and Africa would work peacefully with US and Western Hemisphere in the pursuit of

[361] Dean, *The Struggle for World Order*, 55. A 'planned national and international order' for social welfare would also be a 'more flexible system which would leave scope for individual initiative and creative action'.
[362] Ibid.
[363] Ibid, 52, 83.
[364] Although Dean's conception of local participation remained decidedly understated in fact, her language veers much more towards development 'in the interests' of local populations that dominated European visions. Ibid, 90.
[365] Ibid, 90.

'cooperative measures to assure security, economic development and social wellbeing' that Dean described as the 'new horizon of democracy'.[366]

As in preceding chapters, the solutions that were offered to the obvious contradictions and limitations of these visions can and should be criticised. Collectively, however, it is nevertheless clear that these were not the anti-political, homogenising, centralising, straightforwardly liberal or imperial visions of American development that have dominated the scholarship. Crucially, what these accounts, whether positive or negative, have missed by overlooking the contradictory bundle of themes that characterised each articulation of a 'New Deal for the World'– leadership, technocracy, democratisation, pluralism, participation– is the self-consciousness with which internationalists sought to address the tensions between these themes in their vision of a democratic world order. It was not, as Glenda Sluga suggests, only occasional visionaries like Alva Myrdal as head of the Social Affairs division at the UN in 1949 who asked 'what constituted choice and freedom in a top down international view of rational social planning and modernisation' and argued in favour of maximum local involvement, pluralism and the primacy of the 'human factor' in global development. Myrdal might still be seen as a Cassandra for postwar development models in the 1950s when, as the influence of New Dealers waned in the US and international institutions, the ideology of 'high modernism' rose to prominence. In the 1940s, however, most American internationalists who imagined a democratic global order emerging through global development inspired by the New Deal shared Myrdal's concerns and worked to ensure that international development would not turn against the culture of local people in pursuit of the 'nightmarish dream of push button perfection'.[367]

[366] Ibid, 94.
[367] Sluga writes that, in addition, Myrdal championed 'balanced modernisation', 'adjusted to the particular culture of the region' that also maintained focus on social objective of living standards through 'agricultural improvement, basic health measures and education about life's fundamentals'– not unlike many of the ideas above. Sluga, "The Human Story of Development: Alva Myrdal at the UN, 1949-1955", 52.

5.3.2 Empires of Liberty

In Europe, with the exception of figures such as Myrdal and Julian Huxley, enthusiasm for the international export of the New Deal served a different ideal of democratic global order.[368] Generally confined to Europe, popular plans for regional development such as the 'Danube Valley Authority' were designed to preserve liberty by reducing the power of nation states and national animosities and expand the liberty of local populations through enhanced prosperity. They were, in other words, similar to if not incorporated into other European ideas of international planning like Carr's. Unsurprisingly, TVA-style regional planning projects were often discussed in the context of regional federal unions.[369]

Nation building, still less building democracies, was not a critical feature of views of global of development either. Despite certain rhetorical similarities, globally, British and French ideas of development as a path to a democratic global order did not imagine the end goal as peaceful cooperation among independent, democratic nation states. Even when economic development was cast as a path to national independence, this was often imagined in the context of a lasting 'special relationship' with Britain, France or Europe. Overall, compared with American internationalists, the extent to which European visions of development reflected visions of democratic order that put liberty of non-Western states on a par with Western is questionable to say the least. There is an argument to be made, however, that British and French visions of development, even in an imperial context, were connected to a vision of democratic modernity that privileged social justice, local autonomy and the 'wider

[368] Julian Huxley, *TVA: Adventure in Planning* (Cheam: Architectural Press, 1943). Lilienthal cited this publication as evidence of worldwide enthusiasm for international planning on the model of the TVA, *Democracy on the March,* 198. On his support Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order*, 84.

[369] Michel Collinet, for example, argued in *Esprit* that it was the duty of a renewed 'democratic France' to propose a 'European New Deal for the prevention of starvation and unemployment, the restoration of transport and the distribution of credit' and 'a democratic order from which famine and fascism are excluded once and or all'. "L'Europe et son avenir" vol. 13 No.110 May 1945, 773-88. Lipgens, *Documents on the History of European Integration. Volume 3: The Struggle for European Union by Political Parties and Pressure Groups in Western European Countries 1945-50,* 29.

horizons of twentieth century citizenship' over conventional political rights and the making of democracies in a narrowly national mould.[370] It is necessary, therefore, to briefly consider these ideas. The following will nevertheless confirm that the obvious shortcomings of these visions in terms of political rights, participation and equality meant that these did not, finally, reflect an alternative vision of democracy and the dilemmas of its global application but enduring Eurocentrism, power political concerns and imperialism. Perhaps the strongest evidence of this is, in stark contrast to the ideas explored above, the failure not only to fully address but even acknowledge the tensions and contradictions within European ideas of 'democratic' development in a federal and imperial context at all.

Within the European movement, for example, the economic development of 'backward' areas, particularly dependent territories in Africa, was presented as a key aspect of the new union's global role in promoting a democratic postwar order beyond its borders. The benefits of helping developing countries to 'stand by themselves in the strenuous conditions of the modern world' within the Union, however, were made abundantly clear. Through eventual membership or institutionalised association with the union, developing countries would guarantee both the supply of raw materials and the markets necessary to support the higher living standards at the heart of democratic renewal in in Europe and at the same ensure that Europe could be a viable 'global entity' on a par with the US and USSR. It would, in this sense, support the preservation and expansion of liberty in Europe.

Insofar as this order would be democratic from the vantage point of developing countries, however, the picture is far more ambiguous. There were certainly French and British federalists for whom the promotion of higher living standards and eventual independence was crucial to a vision of democratic order built on development. Norman Bentwich spoke for many federalists when he argued that British and French policy, in the context of Federal Union, must be driven by the twin aims to 'foster self government and to expand as rapidly as

[370] Wootton, "Socialism and Federation", 291.

possible the social services' in dependent territories. To this end, a newly created federal 'technical service' would assist in the ensuring the adoption of a 'common economic and common social policy'.[371] It was only through such means, Bentwich argued, that the threat the 'colonial problem' posed to global peace through the injustices visited on increasingly restive native populations *and* 'have not' powers could be assuaged.[372]

Frequently, however, having stressed the advantages of colonial development to Europeans, the objective of improving living standards in dependent territories appears both secondary, and second rate. The rhetorical emphasis on non-exploitation, 'equal access to raw materials' and other advantages to member states, as opposed to the living standards or economic autonomy of native populations, remains suggestive of an idea of economic justice that replaced wanton plunder with 'mutual benefit' in which the unequal size of benefits accrued by developed and developing states was normatively unproblematic.[373] The system would expand the liberty of all, but not by the same amount.

Similarly, concern with democratic participation in the process of development itself and the explicit means through which development would promote self-government was mixed. Several texts give little indication that native populations would be involved at all, merely asserting the 'paramountcy of local interest' and the 'democratic' principle that development

[371] Bentwich saw British and French colonial administrations beginning to do this and used it to argue in favour of a joint Anglo-French administration embedded in a new federal union that might draw on a new federal technical service Norman Bentwich, "The Colonial Problem and the Federal Solution," ibid. (Macmillan and co., Ltd.), 131-2. Similarly, although he did not advocate Federal control of colonial territories, even Lord Lugard was particularly opposed to any federal solutions that made no mention of the political rights within the dependencies or sought to diminish such rights in the context of eventual membership of federal union. He was highly critical of Ivor Jennings' initial plans to exclude voting rights on grounds that they would swamp electors. Frederick Lugard, "Federal Union and the Colonies", ibid. (Macmillan & Co.), 166.

[372] Ibid, 110-111.

[373] Ivor Jennings, *A Federation for Western Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940), 51. On sharing the 'advantages and responsibilities of colonial government'; The principal aims that should inspire federal government of dependencies as defined by William Beveridge were the 'paramountcy of native interests; equality among all citizens of member States for trading, access and settlement; fair consideration of the interests outside the federation'. The idea of giving excluded countries like Germany access to satisfy the old desire for a 'place in the sun' remained widespread. Ibid, 129.

would henceforth be undertaken 'in the interests of native peoples'.[374] At the stronger end, thinkers like Bentwich insisted on a triple mechanism to ensure that colonial development was not exploitative: the oversight of national parliaments, international authorities and 'the check of the people themselves'. This 'can only be exercised effectively if the native peoples are increasingly responsible for the legislative and executive organisation of government'.[375]

Crucially however, while Bentwich and others made frequent reference to increased oversight by native populations, there was little or no discussion of grass roots participation in development itself. Instead, terse references to increasing local 'responsibility' formed part of longer discussions that focused on the constitution of the central authority, be it British, French, Anglo-French or Federal that would design and administer development projects. Moreover, instead of focusing on the vexed relationship between technocrat and citizen/subject that dominated ideas of planning and economic justice in Europe or American visions of regional development, federal thinkers were more preoccupied with the harmonisation of policy preferences among technocrats drawn from all member states.[376] Overall, across federalist writings on colonial development as a whole, the objective of increasing local participation was still couched in the older language of Western tutelage in preparation for 'self government' in which the nature of the relationship between local populations and colonial administrators turned development experts working in their 'interests', or the kind of democratic state that might emerge, remained wholly unexamined.

[374] Georg Schwarzenberger, "Federation and the Colonial Problem", in *Federal Union. A Symposium*, ed. Melville Channing-Pearce (London: Lothian Foundation Press 1940, 1991), 205.
[375] 'The French have advanced more thoroughly in this resect. There colonies send elected representatives to the French Chamber and the Senate'. In the British Empire, conversely, 'it is still different for a member of the coloured peoples in Africa to attain any high place in the local administration'. This is all the attention Bentwich gives to the matter, however, turning to focus on how Western powers would arrange the administration among themselves. Note also that it is all oversight and not actually participation. Bentwich, "The Colonial Problem and the Federal Solution," 122.
[376] Ibid.145, 132.

Equally conspicuous by its absence was any concern that development would foster a democratic order characterised by pluralism. Like the New Dealers, federalists, particularly socialists, suggested that the development of dependent territories and their subsequent association, or inclusion, in the Federal Union would constitute a cooperative, mutually beneficial democratic order animated by shared values of the European 'third way': the alternative ideological model of democratic modernity that avoided the pitfalls of American capitalism and Soviet communism that, as we saw in chapter three, lay behind many visions of federal union. However, not only were the relationships within this enlarged Federal union or wider sphere of influence not always equal, varying, for example, in the treatment of Dominions versus former African colonies; how and to what extent variation between national systems could be preserved and even encouraged was not discussed.[377]

Outside the federal movement, development was a key aspect of the 'democratic' reinvention of empire in the form of the French Union. As we saw in chapter three, the French Union promised to expand the liberty of all of its citizens by offering a more meaningful and modern form of non-national self-determination that combined social justice, local autonomy and supranational citizenship. It was also, as we saw, fatally undermined by the limitations it imposed on the political and even human rights of its 'citizens' outside metropolitan France that were, finally, motivated by power political and racist calculations rather than a genuinely radical, post-political notion of democratic modernity. It remains important to stress, however, that among the few convinced ideologues of the French Union, their belief that it would constitute a genuinely democratic form of order was not entirely disingenuous. Robert Delavignette, for example, a leading colonial administrator and director of the École nationale de la France d'outre-mer, was fervently convinced that the social and economic rights promised by the French Union would usher in a new empire of liberty fit for the global 20th

[377] In practice moreover how the union between a European Federal Union and former African colonies– an idea that was particularly popular among French internationalists– would expand this vision of democratic modernity to these countries was little explored, leaving only a paternalistic notion that erstwhile colonisers would protect infant nations from the bad influences of America and the Soviet Union.

century.[378] Socialists like Pierre Cot were equally adamant that the 'larger freedom' granted to the colonial 'citizens' of the French Union through economic and social development constituted a true vision of democratic order.[379]

The participative nature of development and the wider local regeneration and local autonomy development projects would stimulate was also, crucially, presented as a key aspect of the new democratic 'socialist-humanist' ethos and ambition of the French Union. For these thinkers, however, it is clear that the vision of democratic modernity that they argued the French Union would provide really hinged on an idea of liberty rooted in social and economic welfare secured through regional development projects, rather than national and even local political rights. If it was more genuine, the denial of the latter still points to self-serving self-deception. Overall, to a contemporary audience, a notion of democratic modernity that not only underplayed but denied basic rights, even if it promoted social justice, is clearly untenable. In the event, even these modest hopes were quickly disappointed. These thinkers soon began to critique French Union not for absence of political rights but for its perpetuation of economic exploitation and the immiseration of colonial people– the opposite of what had been intended.[380]

In France, only a small clique of internationalist thinkers treated the French Union as a serious experiment in democratic international order. In Britain, genuine concern with the expansion of liberty in the colonies among internationalist defenders of Empire was even less pronounced. Visions of 'democratic' empire including Bevin's 'Third Force' never articulated a sophisticated notion of colonial citizenship based on expanded social and economic rights

[378] Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 1945-1960*, 24; Ariane Chebel d'Appollonia, *Histoire Politique Des Intellectuels En France (1944-1954) Tome II: Le Temps De L'engagement*, Questions Au Xxe Siècle (Brussels Editions Complexe, 1991), 217; Tyer, "A Transnational End of Empire? The Case of the French Union in Sub-Saharan Africa".
[379] Sorum, *Intellectuals and Decolonization in France,* 30-31.
[380] Ibid, 58.

and local autonomy on par with the French Union.[381] In general, 'democratic' visions of empire continued to view improvements in living standards and increases in local autonomy as a means to justify empire, reduce costs and continue to reap the benefits of advantageous economic relations with the colonies.[382] These ideas of empire on the cheap were 'democratic' only insofar as they claimed to be non-exploitative and to some extent improve the lives of colonial subjects.

In Bevin's case, moreover, a new form of empire would be democratic insofar as it would create a market that supported the construction of socialism and thus the preservation of democracy at home and offer geopolitical security to the social-democratic project writ large in the context of the emerging Cold War. Influenced by the ideas of 'Empire planning' popularised by Fabian Colonial Research Bureau in the 1930s, Bevin's imperial dream was in this sense, as John Darwin has argued, 'the counterpart of welfare state' at home, not the extension of it[383]. Although improving the welfare of colonial subjects was essential to its political success, it was neither the overriding objective nor an integral part of deeply held visions of democratic *global* order based on economic justice.

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[381] As Deighton observes in her account of Bevin's quest for an imperial grouping led by Britain and France united by shared economic and defence concerns as well as social-democratic values 'there remained substantial differences of opinion between the French and the British about the purpose of reform. Or, as one cynic reflected, "the established French policy of turning the African native into a good Frenchman . . . compared with the British policy of helping the native to become a good African"'. Bevin himself can hardly be credited with such concerns, however, his priorities being much more geostrategic and focused on social democracy in Europe and Britain. Deighton, "Entente Neo-Coloniale?: Ernest Bevin and the Proposals for an Anglo–French Third World Power, 1945–1949".

[382]These were the same ideas that had animated discussions of development within the Colonial Office in the years before the war that culminated in the Colonial Development and Welfare Act 1940. Development was intended to plug supply holes, support domestic policies and hold onto empires. It was also an idea of Empire on the cheap: the only way empires would pay for themselves was to develop them in non-exploitative way.

[383] The 'new social democratic ideology of empire' promoted an idea of 'partnership', in which empire was the instrument of social, economic and political uplift, the imperial counterpart to the welfare state at home' that could also be used to 'cover a multitude of colonial sins and offered firm reassurance' that what was good for Britain 'was also an act of imperial benevolence'. Nevertheless, while it was never an ideological endeavour on a par with the French Union, Darwin goes on to argue that the Labour government was genuinely committed to a new 'more *dirigiste,* more development minded and, up to a point, more democratic' empire. Darwin, *The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830-1970,* 546, 561. Approaches to empire still remained deeply contested within the society Minion, "The Fabian Society and Europe During the 1940s: The Search for a 'Socialist Foreign Policy'".

As has been widely noted elsewhere, European ideas of development emerged from the slow death of the *mission civilatrice* as much as a newfound enthusiasm for the economic potential of large scale planning and man's mastery over nature to meet the needs of humanity.[384] The undue focus among British and French internationalists on their own colonial territories underscores this fact. Within these ideas of development, however, there was clearly some attempt to articulate a vision of democratic order based on expansion and, to a far lesser extent the extension of liberty applied to undeveloped countries. At best, one could say that the imperial or quasi-imperial ideas above, unlike American visions of democratic world order composed of democratic nation states 'united in diversity', imagined a democratic regional order in which all citizens, albeit to a differing extent, would enjoy a combination of higher living standards and political rights that guaranteed a greater level of freedom than laissez-faire capitalism/liberalism or Soviet Communism. Yet these goals were not met in practice and it remains doubtful how much they were sincerely meant in theory. Even when, as we have seen, economic development was married to the goal of 'self government', these remained visions of democratic order preoccupied with the expansion and preservation of liberty in Europe that were, in addition, relatively unconcerned with the challenge of democratic modernity within developing countries. This included the relationship between technocracy and democratic participation, pluralism and solidarism and also, more significantly, the relationship between social justice and the creation of democracy.

5.4 Conclusion

At Bretton Woods, it was not only demands for a greater focus on international development that were resisted. Calls from China, India and Latin American countries to increase their voting share in the new institutions also went unheeded. These demands were not based on

[384] Martin Evans, "Colonial Fantasies Shattered: Developmental Colonialism and Imperial Citizens", in *The Oxford Handbook of Postwar European History*, ed. Dan Stone (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

population or the presumed economic might of these countries in the future alone. Non-Western delegates argued that it was only by securing an equal role for the Global South in the management of the global economy that the new system would, as US Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau Jnr. promised in his opening address at Bretton Woods, work to improve the lives of 'all the people of all the countries on this earth'.[385]

These views were echoed among many Western internationalists for whom, rhetorically at least, a democratic order required greater equality between states not only in terms of living standards but in the shared management of the global economy.[386] In this aspect, however, the orders that were proposed ultimately fell short, offering further evidence that when it came to the rights and experience of non-Western states and populations, visions of democratic order based on global justice were marred by double standards and limitations.

Many ideas of global economic justice contained no reference to joint management at all, confining themselves to the justification of renewed and indeed enhanced Western leadership of the global economy. Among the exceptions was Barbara Ward. Ward, too, was no advocate of immediate joint stewardship. In the medium term, Anglo-American leadership would be vital to the creation of a prosperous global economy that could promote growth and social justice. More than many of her peers, however, Ward's writing is marked by a conviction that preparing for the joint management of the global economy, preferably through the cooperative structures of the United Nations reformed for the purpose, was essential. Not only was the inclusion of major economies in Latin America and Asia pragmatic in light of future power shifts and the friction that exclusion might cause; it was, Ward insisted, critical

[385] "Prosperity, like peace, is indivisible. We cannot afford to have it scattered here or there among the fortunate or to enjoy it at the expense of others. Poverty, wherever it exists, is menacing to us all and undermines the well-being of each of us". In a high profile article in Foreign Affairs in early 1945, Morgenthau also went out of his way to stress how the Bretton Woods framework was designed not just to meet developed countries' goals but also to address less developed countries' Cited in Helleiner, *Forgotten Foundations of Bretton Woods: International Development and the Making of the Postwar Order,* 122, 5 fn. 12.
[386] As we saw in Carr's case for example fn. 331.

to the attainment of a democratic order that really served the goal of global economic justice to enhance the liberty of the world's population.

In the interim, Ward alluded to regional structures of economic management as a means of ensuring a democratic distribution of power and responsibility in the global economy, notwithstanding Anglo-American dominance. Similar views were voiced by Dean and Carr. In all cases, however, the underlying hope that these regional structures would emulate the model of democratic modernity championed by the West was explicit. This was, once again, an ideal of pluralism built on a foundation of solidarism.

Ultimately, even in these examples, the actual mechanisms of co-management or economic regionalisation received comparatively little attention in comparison to the leadership of the West. To some extent, confirming the central argument of this investigation, this was because the focus in visions of democratic order in this period was individual liberty in the modern world, as a result of which social welfare and participation in planning methods took precedence over questions of national representation and global economic management. As the powers with the intellectual and material ballast to boost global prosperity and at the same time promote global equality, Ward, Carr and Dean argued, the leadership of the West was a pragmatic necessity.

There is no doubt, however, that the exclusion, temporary or not, of developing countries from economic decision-making in visions of democratic world order was also informed by strategic considerations, the desire to ensure the spread of the West's own model of democratic modernity and, in some cases, simple prejudice. Finally, the often vague and evasive treatment of this issue confirms the existence of a contradiction within all internationalist visions of *global* economic justice that defined this democratic order as one that worked in the interests of the world as a whole, not one that was decided by the whole world. For all their focus on grass roots participation, the right to social justice was not a right

to determine, at a macro level, what economic justice meant. While internationalists made some effort to ensure this right existed in the context of European visions of international planning for social welfare to some extent, similar efforts outside the West are hard to find.

Throughout the rich literature of internationalist thought in the 1940s, it remains true that the ubiquitous references to economic justice were often ambiguous. In some cases, this was strategic, designed to cover the unpalatable contradictions that inhered in these brave new visions of a democratic world order that promised the 'freedom from want'. In the absence of such motives, however, enthusiasm for global economic justice was often unmatched by a concrete vision of the global economy or the wider order that would secure it. Perhaps the quintessential example of this was Vice President Henry Wallace's bombastic promise to secure a democratic 'people's peace' based on the globalisation of the New Deal which, as Sumner Welles grumbled, remained exceptionally vague, inspiring people worldwide with too great a hope and frightening others with a spectre of 'Stalinoid liberalism'[387].

As the introduction noted, this vagueness has to some extent been reflected in new scholarship that has sought to stress the importance of social justice in international debates in this period. In contrast, the preceding discussion has shown that a much greater degree of specificity is possible when we expand the history of international thought in this period to include this language. As we have seen, the goal of economic justice was connected to visions of international planning and development that were in turn the work horses of much larger visions of democratic order in which the promotion of welfare was as essential but not the only defining characteristic.

Collectively, the recovery of these ideas challenges existing interpretations that limit conceptions of economic justice in visions of world order in the 1940s to the state's provision

[387] Divine, *Second Chance. The Triumph of Internationalism in America During World War II,* 65. Extract from a 1942 speech 'The Price of a Free World Victory'.

of social security and the pursuit of full employment encouraged by the Bretton Woods system. It also contests the view that the new goal of international development was an imperialist exercise in global homogenisation on the American model or, in the European case, nothing more than a cynical ploy for to maintain empire. In spite of these revisions, the ambiguities, limitations and contradictions in visions of democratic order based on economic justice remain apparent. Some of these were products of power politics and prejudice. Others reflected internationalist attempts to navigate the tensions between pluralism and solidarism, equality and hierarchy that inhered in these visions of democratic global order. Among the most prominent was the tension between the need to empower experts in the pursuit of economic justice in a complex global economy and democratic participation. Underlying all of the visions of order that have been explored in this historical investigation, the final chapter considers in greater depth how internationalists addressed this critical challenge of democratic modernity in their visions of global order.

Chapter 6

The Revolt of the Competent: Elites, Expertise and Democracy

'There will be a new class, a new hierarchy of real and counterfeit scientists and scholars, and the world will be divided into a minority ruling in the name of knowledge, and an immense ignorant majority. And then, woe unto the mass of ignorant ones'.[388] Mikhail Bakhunin (1872)

'I pledge myself that I will use my knowledge for the good of humanity and against the destructive forces of the world and the ruthless intent of men; and I will work together with my fellow scientists of whatever nation, creed or colour for these our common ends'.[389] The Technicians and Scientists Oath, as imagined by Aldous Huxley in *Science, Liberty and Peace* (1947)

6.1 Introduction

Most visions of democratic global order in the 1940s faced an obvious problem: the servants of the new order were also its masters. Ward's Atlantic Planning Board, Carr's European Planning Authority, Huxley's UNESCO, Monnet's European Coal and Steel Community, Cassin's Human Rights Council would be staffed by unelected technocrats. In spite of Julian Huxley's awkward boast likening UNESCO to a 'zoo', the new technocratic elite was, in reality, heavily dominated by American and European experts, many of whom were themselves alumni of elite and, at times, explicitly elitist national bodies including the

[388] Cited in Chomsky, "Intellectuals and the State (1977)", 2.
[389] Huxley, *Science, Liberty and Peace,* 63.

Tennessee Valley Authority, the British Colonial Office, Monnet's Commissariat Général du Plan and even the École des cadres d'Uriage, the ideological finishing school of the Vichy regime.[390]

These individuals would play the leading role in economic planning, modernisation, large scale development projects, monitoring human rights and whatever else was deemed critical for the creation of a democratic global order that would preserve, expand or extend liberty. There was no alternative in an increasingly complex, technological age. There was also, clearly, a paradox, of which internationalists who believed in the empowerment and liberation of experts from political interference were well aware. Using science to enhance human liberty, a democratic global order would have to do so 'without jeopardising human liberties' and without undermining the political aspect of liberty in the shape of existing political rights if not the search for more meaningful forms of political expression and self-determination. These visions of democratic order were still, in other words, required to balance the competing imperatives of democratic modernity.

Across visions of democratic order in the 1940s, the vast majority of which envisaged the expansion of 'technical' work and empowerment of experts to some degree, the response to this dilemma appears at first sight to fall into two broad camps. The first comprised those who stressed the need for democratic oversight and accountability to a directly elected or otherwise representative body to protect individual rights and– foreshadowing contemporary debates– to prevent national democracies from being undermined. Thus André Philip argued in reference to the creation of European 'high authorities' that although they would provide outcomes that expanded human liberty 'these organisations must be responsible to a democratically elected body'. If not, while the resulting system would be democratic from the

[390] Other notable sources of expert personnel included veterans of the League of Nations 'technical' bodies such as the economists of the Economic and Financial Organisation, the hive of internationalist historians and international lawyers centred around Columbia University in New York and a new generation of social scientists and economists emerging from two universities that would remain at the forefront of training the new technocratic elite in the postwar period: the LSE and Sciences Po.

perspective of maximising human wellbeing, it would only be partially democratic in regards to self-government. In Philip's words, it would formalise 'the tragedy which is steadily developing in all our countries in different forms and to varying extents: everywhere, parliamentary control is gradually being deprived of its true role because the real decisions are being taken where the real problems are arising' that is, at the regional or global level.[391]

The second group saw no such threat. It would still be possible to preserve individual rights and meaningful self government without the direct control of technical agencies in a way that risked undermining their efforts. Whether bound by an 'oath' or not, apolitical experts committed to the improvement of human welfare would not threaten individuals. Importantly, national governments would still be required to approve the creation of technical bodies and the political structure of the new global order would retain the most vital powers for states. At same time, political rights exercised at a national level would continue to have meaning, bolstered by international efforts to remove the scourges of poverty and hunger that undermined and destabilised democracies, and in light of the fact that the effort to 'canalise the great forces' of scientific modernity 'for good' already had an implicit democratic mandate. 'If the peoples of the world can be given a voice', argued the first director of FAO Sir John Boyd Orr, 'they will certainly speak for world government; for peace and a

[391]Philip argued that 'democracy must be restored in the place where the problem arises' and proposed a form of 'parliamentary functionalism' that involved allowing the formation of supranational authorities empowered to take decisions in a wide variety of areas from agricultural production to exports. These authorities would not be bogged down by 'committees and sub committees', deputies and other organisations engaged in 'endless discussion' but would be responsible to a parliamentary assembly. Andre Philip ''For a Political Authority" 8 August 1950 Report of Second Session, Consultative Assembly, Council of Europe. Lipgens, *Documents on the History of European Integration. Volume 3: The Struggle for European Union by Political Parties and Pressure Groups in Western European Countries 1945-50,* 122-3. Note that in the context of federal movement there were many federalists such as Philip who were by no means opposed to 'functionalism' per se. These debates were echoed at a global level. John Russell Hancock– arguably among first thinkers to propose a series of international functional assemblies of expert delegates covering the full range of technical government administration– insisted on the vital importance of a parallel task: fostering a world citizenry that would elect the supervisory World Congress of Citizens that would in turn elect the coordinating 'Board' of these assemblies. Heater, *World Citizenship and Government: Cosmopolitan Ideas in the History of Western Political Thought*, 102. Hancock's theory was written in 1941 but only published in 1944.

constructive use of science for the benefit of all'.[392] World government was not possible or practical immediately. Both governments and the masses of people were not ready. In the long run, however, this dual structure of semi-independent technical agencies within a state dominated political organisation would give way to a more unified and more directly democratic system. Crucially, it was the common welfare and common understanding that technical agencies would foster free from the interference of national representatives that, paradoxically, would lead to this more fully democratic end.[393] In the short term, however, the participative aspect of a democratic world order at the global level, if not at the national level, would be delayed.

Arguments of this kind can be found throughout the literature. As representations of how internationalists addressed the paradox of a democratic order reliant on experts, however, they are somewhat limited, if not misleading. Insofar as these arguments point to a division between internationalists who believed some form of popular participation within a technocratic international order was necessary and those that argued that people could still be free, including in a political sense, without such participation, and that non-participative technocracy also means to 'mould society' of democratise minds of men, they are

[392] John Boyd Orr, "Food: The Foundation of World Unity", in *Towards World Government* (London: National Peace Council 1948), 14. Echoing Philip's position, members of *Federal Union* were unimpressed, responding to Boyd Orr's speech by insisting that 'it must be controlled by a properly elected political institution'; 'certain aspects of sovereignty must be surrendered to a world government in order to ensure a united policy and democratic methods'. Ibid. 14. See also Federal Union Sources "Brains Trust on United States of Europe 1945"; "Expansion of Policy", November 1947; "Aims in May", 1949: Lipgens, *Documents on the History of European Integration. Volume 2: Plans for European Union in Great Britain and in Exile 1939-1945*, 644, 681, 723.

[393] EH Carr put forward a similar argument suggesting that by serving the common welfare of the 'little man'– and perhaps by some form of 'direct appeal' to him– supranational planning authorities possessed greater democratic legitimacy than traditional institutions and might, in the long run lead to more formally participative structures. There are some interesting ambiguities that are considered in the conclusion of this chapter. *Conditions of Peace*, 276-7; Eichelberger too argued that the technical activities of the UN constituted the foundations of a democratic 'people's peace' (that would also bypass obstructionist politicians; as the third report of the CSOP made clear, it was vital that should be free of all political control 205); they were 'democratising' international order by benefitting the poor and those in small states and colonial territories in particular. Apparently unconcerned by any risk of undermining national democracies, in the long run he argued that the evidence of such good work might allow internationalists to persuade not just guardians of national sovereignty but people to support a more political organisation. Eichelberger Papers, Box 253 "Next Steps in the Organization of the UN" April 1943; "The United Nations and the Organization of Peace: Third Report and Papers Presented to the Commission.", 205.

important.[394] The tension between these views runs through the subsequent discussion. Insofar as they continue to suggest that we should think about the connection between technocracy and democracy in terms of the democratic control over technocracy through the immediate or eventual creation of a directly or indirectly representative supranational body or, at a minimum, control by state representatives, however, they are not.

Diving under the superficial question of supranational representation, this chapter explores the greater range and sophistication of ways in which internationalists claimed, in addition to enhancing welfare and security, that technocracy would not undermine existing individual and political rights or the search for more meaningful forms of political expression and would, as a result, be fully democratic visions of global order. The solution was not, in the majority cases, democratic 'control' in a traditional sense of a supranational chamber. Returning to the deeply technocratic notions of planning for social welfare or development that we encountered in the preceding chapter, for example, we will see how these ideas stressed direct forms of participation by ordinary citizens in technocratic planning itself, not as a matter of democratic right per se, but in connection to the achievement of a vision of democratic modernity characterised by greater social welfare, pluralism and local control in the context of mass party democracies. The 'father' of functionalism David Mitrany was more radical, using technocracy as the midwife of a new kind of democracy that eschewed mass politics in favour of representation rooted in specialised communities. Not surprisingly, therefore, his solution to the danger posed to democratic self-government by supranational functionalism was not the creation of a supranational parliament or the direct participation of all citizens in functional bodies, but an alternative form of popular participation rooted in these same communities.

At the other end of the spectrum, the second 'father' of functionalism Jean Monnet articulated a vision of technocratic order that reflected a much more elitist conception of democratic

[394] Boyd Orr, "Food: The Foundation of World Unity", 14.

modernity whose ambition was not to transform democracies by making them more participative and dynamic but to preserve them by making them more elitist. As result, the role of popular participation in a technocratic global order was also much more limited. Even here, however, it was not entirely absent. While Monnet privileged the involvement of an even narrower group of ordinary citizens than Mitrany– namely the 'great entrepreneurs' and businessmen of the age– limited and largely symbolic forms of popular participation were still important, even if supranational control of any kind remained anathema. At a deeper level, however, we will see how these visions hinged on an idea of democratic modernity that solved the problem of participation by suggesting that the daily political life of the masses would be largely undisturbed and even protected as governance at a national and international level became more technocratic. In addition, an enduring connection between the people and their new rulers would exist in the form of a kind of 'performance legitimacy'.[395] The technocratic order would be justified and democratic insofar and as long as it produced the concerted action and beneficial outcomes on which liberty of citizens and the survival of free governments in the 20th century depended, even at the cost of full political control of democratic citizens over all aspects of their lives.

Like their more participative counterparts, visions of technocratic order that limited popular participation were not uniform in the solutions they proposed to the problem of politics. Others reflected a different notion of democratic modernity that was elitist in the sense that it believed that a technocratic elite was required to forge a common democratic mind and purpose. This idea, which we can track across visions of technocratic order including those that were more participative, was both very particular to its time and was also one that clearly collided with imperial and older internationalist ideas.

[395] A term borrowed from more recent debates: Wei-Wei Zhang, *The China Wave: Rise of a Civilizational State* (Hackensack, N.J.: World Century, 2012), 133.

In both cases, however, the deliberate exclusion of the masses and their representatives from a technocratic global order was not justified by a straightforward appeal to ends justifying means that masked a hidden authoritarian or imperialist agenda. This rationale was undoubtedly more pronounced in these visions, yet they were still connected to ideas of democratic, not totalitarian modernity, and were as a result bound to address issues of participation, self-determination and politics. As such, they were also only to a limited extent motivated by the belief that the masses had to be actively restrained, as opposed to kept out of the complex business of government. This idea, popular in contemporary scholarship of early European integration, is present in some form but only in a minor key. These ideas served elitist visions of democratic modernity which did not prize participation and did not intend to undermine national democracies or the political rights of the masses within them.

In this sense these visions, like all of the ideas explored below, were very much a product of the contradictory and at times ambiguous intellectual environment of the 1940s, defined by the competing imperatives of challenge of democratic modernity. In this environment, as we saw in chapter two, the idea that in a complex, technological age it was necessary to limit mass participation in favour of a Weberian 'secular priesthood' of engineers, social scientists and economists contended with the belief that political rights needed to be protected, enhanced and adapted. The belief that 'knowledge and information' held the key to modern freedom contended with the view, dramatised by TS Eliot's *Choruses on the Rock*, that it would lead not to liberation but to ruin.

The visions explored below reflected different interpretation and different answer of these central problems of democratic modernity. While they were united in their faith in technocratic elites, the way in which they addressed the tension with political rights clearly reflected different levels of faith in the masses, or specialised groups of them, and different ideas about what constituted liberty, including meaningful political liberty, in the 20th century. Importantly, this was true across all three countries of this study. While distinct national

experiences of the crisis clearly shaped many of the visions explored below, including the extent to which they embraced or rejected participation, it remains impossible to generalise. In France, for example, having linked the nation's democratic suicide to its failure to bolster its parliamentary system with a more robust, modernising technocratic form of governance, it is unsurprising to find less participatory ideas of democratic modernity and technocratic internationalism.[396] Emerging from the shadow of Hitler's 'New Order', however, it is equally unsurprising to find views like Philip's and even Schuman's that insisted on direct participation. Similarly, while the survival of British and American democracy, the successes of the New Deal, and inter-Allied Wartime planning might explain the hopeful visions of participative mass democracy that were reflected in the technocratic visions of Lilienthal and Wootton, in Britain and the US too the proximate and palpable failure of liberal democracies inspired visions of technocratic order that aimed to replace, if not substantially alter, the ideal of mass democracy.[397] Thus while many of the ideas below bear the hallmarks of particular national experience of the interwar crisis, the war itself as well as other national intellectual traditions including English pluralism and indeed imperialism; the competing lessons of the crisis of liberal modernity are in evidence everywhere.

The central aim of this chapter, as in others, is to demonstrate that it is not enough to talk about technocratic visions of order being more or less democratic in terms of whether or not they were combined with some form of democratic control that was more or less Wilsonian or Cosmopolitan in nature. While we can still draw a distinction between technocratic visions that prized an idea of participation, the following shows how it was above all linked to how

[396] This was a widespread view according to Philip Nord, the 'technocratic turn' of Daladier's government in the late 1930s having come too late. Nord, *France's New Deal: From the Thirties to the Postwar Era,* 66-7.

[397] Although Monnet's formative experience of inter-Allied planning in both wars and his experience as *Commissaire à l'Armement* of the National Liberation Committee in Algiers should leave us wary of taking this idea too far, all of these impressing upon him the absolute necessity of decisive power at a technocratic level free of political interference. Jean Monnet, *Mémoires* (Paris: Fayard, 1976), 60-61, 106, 108, 110, 265.

internationalists thought about the shape and importance of participation within the idea of democratic modernity that their vision of technocracy claimed to produce.

This is important both historically and conceptually. In existing scholarship, the 1940s are associated with the dramatic expansion of 'technical internationalism'.[398] Insofar as it has been connected with democracy, while some scholars have suggested that the work of new technical bodies was guilelessly apolitical, others acknowledge that it was a conscious but not necessarily nefarious attempt to circumvent meddlesome or obstructionist national governments and get on with the work that, through UNRRA or ECOSOC, would assist in securing peace. Clavin and Woods, for example, argue that the reduced emphasis on balancing 'representative' and 'expert' advice in the postwar order in favour of expert advice alone reflected the growing view among internationalists that peace would be better served within the new institutions if their activities were conducted by experts in camera, away from the attention of the masses and their elected representatives.[399] In imperial and post-imperial context and in the regional context of the nascent European Union, the technocratic nature of development assistance and the ECSC has been read as deliberately anti-democratic. Whereas the former was a vehicle for American domination and the undemocratic imposition of a single model of capitalist modernity, the latter reflected a deliberate attempt to constrain and even destroy democracy.[400]

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[398] See fn 27. And with it the number of technical internationalists, this period witnessing 'the rise of the social scientist' in particular. Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism*, 107. As Clavin writes, 'the pre-eminent link between the worlds of international organizations before and after 1945 was the continued emphasis on the value of technocracy' Clavin, *Securing the World Economy: The Reinvention of the League of Nations, 1920-1946,* 347.

[399] Whereas the League had demonstrated to its supporters the value of bringing together 'expert' and 'representative' advice, after 1945 'the place of "representative advice"–was less clear. Many social scientists believed politics were best left out of the equation. Myrdal was not alone in arguing that technocratic cooperation needed to be conducted in camera'. Ibid, 347-8; Ngaire Woods, *The Globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank, and Their Borrowers*, Cornell Studies in Money (Ithaca, N.Y. ; London: Cornell University Press, 2006, 26-7.

[400] As we saw in chapter five and as advanced in particular by Mark Mazower in *Governing the World*, esp. Chapter 10 'Development as World-Making' 1949-73. In a European context, the anti-democratic case for European integration has been made, in various guises by Antonin Cohen, *De Vichy À La Communauté Européenne* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2012). Marc Joly, *Le Mythe Jean Monnet : Contribution À Une Sociologie Historique De La Construction Européenne* (Paris: CNRS, 2007); Müller, *Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in Twentieth-Century Europe*; *Christian*

In their different ways, all of these histories invite us to imagine this period as the first to realise the contemporary truism that 'international governance tends to be effective only when it is anti-democratic', or if not anti-democratic, when elected representatives and people are kept out of complex business of governance at least to some degree.[401] Historically, the following does not deny that technocratic ideas were elitist and in this sense inherently undemocratic. To some degree they all believed that the 'leader of tomorrow is the engineer', or the political scientist or the economist and not the common or 'little man' whom he served.[402] They were, in this sense, the 'world makers' of Mazower's nightmares.[403] However, it also shows that this did not make them 'anti-democratic' by any standard except the most literal idea of what an opposing democratic vision of world order might be, that is one controlled by nation states, a supranational parliament or one that did not interfere in the domestic affairs of states at all. Instead, it shows that there was much more going on, even within the west, in the way internationalists in the 1940s thought about the leadership of technocrats in a new world order in relation to democracy than the binary debate about political versus technical internationalism or federalism versus functionalism on which existing histories rely, all of which in some sense pit technocracy against democracy, is able to capture.[404]

To see this alternative picture is contingent on situating technocratic visions of order in the more complex and contradictory intellectual context of debates about democratic modernity

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Democracy: A New Intellectual History; Muller, "Christian Democracy: Towards a New Intellectual History."

[401] Gideon Rachman, "And Now for a World Government", *The Financial Times*, 8 December 2008.

[402] Raoul Dautry's *Metier d'homme* (1937) cited in Nord, *France's New Deal*, 50-51. Carr was fond of discussing the 'little man' whom the modern bureaucratic political and economic machine was no longer serving, *Conditions of Peace*, 29-33. Despite his concern, the position of the 'little man' in relation to the technocratic structures of the new world order was as we will see rather ambiguous: 276-7 cf. 164-5.

[403] Mazower, *Governing the World*, 273.

[404] In a non-Western context, Rana Mitter has exposed the extent to which exported 'models' and 'knowledge transfers' were used and transformed by recipient populations and elites in pursuit of national political ends, suggesting that technical internationalism is invariably 'democratised' to some extent regardless of the intentions of the experts who champion it. E.g. Mitter, "Imperialism, Transnationalism, and the Reconstruction of Post-War China: UNRRA in China,1944–7".

in the mid-century. These have not, as yet, been incorporated into histories of technocratic internationalism and technocratic order and suggest that the historical interpretation of these ideas has, at least in part, been informed by the conceptual opposition of technocracy and democracy that exists today. Reflecting the ways in which ideas of democracy in international sphere have been narrowed to literal and liberal visions of democratic control by elected representatives, this opposition has been read back into the past.

Conceptually, therefore, collapsing the opposition between democracy and technocracy also reinforces the central argument of the thesis that we should in the present, much as the visions of democratic order in the 1940s show we should in the past, rethink the relationship between global order and democracy by focusing on the way in which visions of global order propose to address the competing imperatives of democratic modernity. Turning back to the 1940s we see that faced with these priorities, it is the choices, compromises and trade-offs internationalists made, most notably in regard to the balance between participation and good governance, hierarchy and equality, that are most important in identifying visions of democratic order and distinguishing them from one another, not the simple presence or absence of democratic checks and balances or participation or degree to which these are 'Wilsonian' or 'Cosmopolitan'.

As in preceding chapters, recovering ideas of technocratic, democratic global order reveals contradictions and other limitations, some of which resulted from the choices and difficulties internationalists faced when confronted with the challenge of democratic modernity and its problematic translation into the global, others that reflect enduring prejudice and power politics. Mindful of this distinction, the following will draw attention to points where ideas were least coherent and least normatively persuasive, noting that while the influence of the latter means that some of the visions below may not be considered 'democratic' at all; particularly in this chapter, we will also examine visions of order that were based on elitist

conceptions of democratic modernity that, while unpalatable, should not be dismissed as antidemocratic out of hand.

6.2 Planning and Mass Democracy

It was a worrying trend, Lilienthal observed, 'more hazardous to democracy than such a dream of a ruling elite of managers and technicians, but not unrelated to it', that the same 'men of great executive or technical ability' on whom peace depended displayed a ' growing contempt of "politics"'. They believed that only they, closeted in remote institutions free of popular interference could plan for prosperity and peace. The truth, Lilienthal insisted, was the opposite: 'effective planners understand and believe in people'; 'a task cannot be done democratically if the method chosen for doing it is bureaucratic' and it is, as a result, done '"to" people not with them'.[405]

For Lilienthal, undemocratic means were any that demonstrated no 'faith in the capacities of the people themselves'. To democratise international planning, however, did not imply the creation of a central system of oversight through which the people whom planning affected, directly or indirectly, would be given a say over the activities of the ruling technocratic elite. As we saw in the preceding chapter, Lilienthal's central idea was to establish direct cooperation between individuals and regionally embedded planning authorities living 'close to the people and close to their problems'.[406] Crucially, in so doing, Lilienthal's objective was not first and foremost to secure accountability and protect individual liberties from infringement; it was to produce vibrant, diverse and decentralised democratic societies. Echoing Thomas Mann, Lilienthal believed that it was only by putting democratic ideas into practice on a daily basis in the self-management and organisation of local communities, such

[405] Lilienthal, *TVA: Democracy on the March,* 185, 190.
[406] Ibid, 117.

as he believed his development projects would encourage, that democracy would emerge.[407] A centralised democracy was, as so many internationalists argued, a contradiction in terms.

By the same token, Lilienthal's greatest fear was that a technocratic global order would be designed in such a way that would prevent these kinds of democracies from emerging. If plans were designed and imposed by 'remote control' from afar or conducted by quarantined groups of international experts, even if it led to greater prosperity, democracy would remain a 'pure abstraction'.[408] Similarly, if technical authorities attempted to impose democracy top down the effort was doomed to fail.[409] As we saw in the preceding chapter, Lilienthal's 'democracy at the grassroots' was thus intended to kill two birds with one stone, dissolving the tension between technocracy and popular participation and, at a global level, solidarism and pluralism. Lilienthal's model would replace the 'paternalistic imperialism', of 'those who want to do the world over exactly on our own pattern'.[410] The goal remained democratisation through what John Dewey had described as the 'diffusion' of democratic ideas and practice through 'democratic methods of consultation, persuasion, negotiation, communication [and] cooperative intelligence'.[411] As a result, however, people would see democracy 'done in their own way'; this would not be the 'quixotic task' of building a democratic world order– a world literally composed of democratic states– on the 'undemocratic foundations' of a centrally designed, externally imposed one size fits all model of democracy.[412] The resulting garden of

[407] Ibid, 193. Echoing Thomas Mann's critique of the intellectualism in *The Coming Victory of Democracy* Lilienthal argued that 'democracy is thought; but it is thought related to life and action...It is characteristic of undemocratic or of democratically uneducated nations that their thinking goes on without reference to reality, in pure abstraction…without the slightest consideration for the realistic consequences of thought'.
[408] Ibid, 193.
[409] Ibid, 199.
[410] Ibid.
[411] Dewey's description of the only way democracy can be 'won' in *Freedom and Culture* (1939) quoted in Lilienthal, 193.
[412] Ibid, 199, 177. Just as local communities in the Tennessee Valley would have rejected an attempt to remake the valley 'according to a pattern of the TVA's own design', so people everywhere rightly want to see changes in their own country 'done in their own way'. Yet while Americans accept the former, Lilienthal noted, they seem quite eager to see the US attempt 'the even more quixotic task of building a world order on the same kind of undemocratic foundation' and impose its own model of on the rest of the world.

decentralised democratic states each nourished by subnational local roots, a dream we have come across many times in this investigation, would cooperate in peace.

Lilienthal's participative vision of technocracy thus had important implications for his overall idea of a democratic and peaceful global order composed of cooperative democratic states. Fundamentally, however, it demonstrates the extent to which the relationship between technocracy and democracy was seen, in this case almost entirely, through the prism of the challenge of the democratic modernity in the 1940s: the use of technical expertise in the search for greater welfare in combination with the protection of the individual from centralising states and the wider search for more meaningful forms of democratic self-government. In Lilienthal's case, his vision of technocracy and his attitude to the question of political rights and political liberty in relation to it, as well his conception of the overall order it would produce, reflected his modernised Tocquevillian ideal of a thriving mass democracy that combined localism and pluralism with greater social equality and advanced technology. It was in relation to the achievement of this vision of democratic modernity, not the way in which within in the structure of a new global order the authority of technical agencies would or should be controlled by political bodies or the establishment of some relationship of oversight and accountability between the people and the apparatus of international development, that Lilienthal thought about the relationship between technocracy and democracy. By the same token, regarding technocratic authorities, Lilienthal's greatest concern was whether their approach would foster the kind of democratic societies he sought, not the right of these agencies to operate or whether the composition of those agencies was itself democratic.

This is not unproblematic. Beyond participating in development projects administered by UNRRA or American technical assistance agencies, Lilienthal gives us little sense of how technocrats or individuals from recipient countries would be involved in designing plans, or in a larger sense how much developing states would be in charge of their own destinies.

Lilienthal does not discuss levels of overall control over development projects or whether, for example, developing countries would be at liberty to refuse technical assistance. A key difference between Lilienthal's vision of international development and the TVA model that inspired it was that the TVA was created and to some extent monitored by a democratically elected government. The critical failure of Lilienthal's analogy to hold in this regard in the global system he imagined, and his failure to acknowledge it is revealing. It shows that, despite his great sensitivity to the rights of people all over the world to determine the shape of their polities, assuming they fell within democratic parameters, Lilienthal was not above the double standards in regard to non-Western states that plagued other visions of democratic global order. Similarly, and more problematically, as we have seen throughout this investigation, Lilienthal's answer to the self-posed question 'what about politics'- his insistence on the connection between international experts and ordinary people in communities to ensure local ownership of democratisation – clearly shows that the question was not whether it was democratic to seek to spread democracy at all.

Finally, Lilienthal's view embodies a paradox, that is a conception of democratic technocracy that focused on political rights and participation both in relation to the activities of technocrats themselves and within the democracies it would create, that was nevertheless encased in a technocratic global order whose objectives and institutions at an international level remained exclusive, unmonitored, unaccountable and non-participative. Another paradox, notable for its prevalence among technocratic internationalists, is the underlying assumption that democratic societies could and would be created by technocratic means at all, that it was in a sense possible to socially engineer the right blend of individual initiative and community spirit or 'unity of purpose' that would, in Lilienthal's view, be democracy's answer both to our own home-grown would-be dictators and foreign anti-democracy alike'.[413]

[413] Ibid, 191. Lilienthal argued that 'the life principle of democratic planning- an awakening in the whole people of a sense of this common and moral purpose' would lead to what he called the 'great Plan'. The 'great Plan' would not be one goal or plan forever but 'the conscious selection by the people of successive plans' that cumulatively, however, would constitute 'a moral and indeed a religious

One thinker who did stress that the overall framework within which technocratic authorities operated internationally needed to be democratic, albeit only in a European context, was Barbara Wootton. The federal government would act as the ultimate guarantor of individual rights and political liberty within the new order. At the same time, the work of the independent planning authority within the union would ensure that democratic life at the member state level would be strengthened by the provision of greater social welfare.[414]

Despite appearances, however, and despite Wootton's faith in the abilities of her planners and her concerns regarding the abilities of non-specialists to adjudicate their work; unlike André Philip, federalism was not Wootton's real answer to the problem of technocracy, individual liberty and political participation. This system alone would not produce the vision of democratic modernity Wootton sought. That was one that protected individual liberty, provided social welfare and revived Parliamentarism but also involved the masses in politics through more than just the ballot box and was, as a result, more responsive to their needs. It was all the more important, Wootton argued, that as government became more 'scientific', direct channels of public expression and participation were not just open but widened and multiplied.[415]

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purpose, deep and fundamental, [that] is democracy's answer both to our own home-grown would-be dictators and foreign anti-democracy alike. In the unified development of resources there is such a Great Plan: the Unity of Nature and Mankind'.

[414] Wootton, "Socialism and Federation", 271-3.

[415] *Freedom under Planning,* 168, 171-2. At the same time as traditional party politics was simplified to present to the elector 'only those issues which are within his competence'. The technical nature of modern government, Wootton argued, meant that 'a new relationship between government and governed' that was 'in keeping with the contemporary ethos' would demand more attention to 'the quality of our governing personnel than to the actual details of what potential governments propose'. Political parties would have to present electors with 'definite concrete goals' not baggy promises of peace and prosperity and excluding all 'questions of technique and method'. While the 'wise selection of the men and women at the top' became more important in the age of planning, however, the parallel shift and strengthening of 'political activity' from 'centre to circumference' was vitally important as the 'ordinary person has most of real value to contribute' not least because of threat of 'day to day tyrannies' in execution of plans 'generously designed to promote accepted social objectives' was real.

To this end, centralised planning by independent authority in the context of a supranational federal government and national democracies was not enough. It was necessary to establish some form of direct popular participation– or what Wootton described as a new 'conception of useful civic activity in a modern democracy'– in relation to planning authorities which had also, to the extent that it was possible, to be decentralised to the local level.[416] Wootton's idea was the formation of democratic associations; groups of citizens working in a mostly advisory capacity in conjunction with local, national and– by implication– federal planning authorities.[417] These associations would act as an additional safeguard against abuses of power and, on a day to day basis, would ensure that planning was truly responsive to local needs, correcting the assessments of planners where they erred while at the same time avoiding the problem of judging complex schemes that scientific planners elaborated in their interests that a system of more direct parliamentary scrutiny would not.[418] An ideal of democracy rooted in social welfare needed the input of the people themselves to ensure that it was their notion of welfare– not an abstract ideal– that was finally being achieved. Crucially, Wootton's democratic associations would also 'reinforce popular participation in politics' and would themselves be a vital part of a more profoundly participative and 'self determining' mass democracy Wootton sought.[419]

Like Lilienthal, Wootton's version of social democracy at the grass roots was rather ambiguous when it came to how democratic associations would actually participate in national or federal decision-making.[420] Planning, moreover, clearly remains a largely central activity in Wootton's federal schema. Wootton talked about local councils, committees, trades

[416] Ibid, 173.
[417] Ibid, 175. A small number of local organs, such as Food Control Committees might have executive powers. Wootton also imagined the multiplication of local tribunals with judicial functions to protect individuals from the state's growing claims.
[418] Ibid, 173-4. 'Every extension of government activity, and particularly every excursion of government into economic planning, needs, in consequence, a corresponding growth of small local organs to control officials, to cooperate in the execution of centralised pans, to discover and adjust local and personal grievances, to report on results, and to offer suggestions for future improvement'
[419] Although Wootton's confidence in the ability of expert planners to 'discover' and respond to real needs in the elaboration of their plans is equally apparent; using the tools of social science, she believed, plans would never be made in the abstract. Ibid, 48.
[420] Carr's vision too, as we will see in the conclusion, arguably suffered from the same problem.

unions and political organisations as the foundation in 'bottom up' representation, but she did not fashion this insight into a formal system of participation or oversight connected to new planning activities at either the national or international level.[421] This is a shame, in particular because Wootton's democratic associations seem to imply a model that was quite different from the corporatist formulas that were popular on the continent. At the very least, however, it is reasonable to assume that Wootton intended that new democratic associations of some description would facilitate communication between local groupings and federal authorities in charge of planning, offering some opportunity for input and even control over the latter's decisions.

Wootton's vision is another example of how ideas about participation in relation to technocratic authorities in visions of postwar order were driven above all by particular conceptions of democratic modernity, not schematic ideas of democratic control. In Wootton's case, democratic associations were connected to the emergence of an ideal of democracy that was rooted in social welfare, that protected individual rights and that also made mass democracies more vigorous and participative. Despite the fact that, unlike Lilienthal, Wootton's technocrats were encased in a system of federal government, it remains clear from the weakness of the relationship between the federal government and the planning authority that remained virtually unaccountable to it, and indeed Wootton's comparative lack of interest in this relationship, that she, like Lilienthal, was much more interested in the relationship between technocracy, participation and political rights in relation to this deeper vision of democratic modernity, not the establishment of formal democratic control over technocratic bodies within the overarching structure of the international order itself.

[421] On the basis of Wootton's federalist writings, Rosenboim's suggestion to the contrary is a little overstated. Rosenboim, "Barbara Wootton, Friedrich Hayek and the Debate on Democratic Federalism in the 1940s", 9.

6.3 Functionalism, Pluralism and Two-tiered Democracy

Despite wanting to avoid the interference of unspecialised elected politicians in the work of experts, paradoxically, both Wootton and Lilienthal trusted in the rationality of the masses and their capacity for engagement in a complex world. This belief was reflected in the participative mass democratic societies they envisaged and in the way they imagined the relationship between technocrats and the people they served.

Other visions of technocratic order, and the forms of participation embedded in them, were designed to deliver a vision of democracy that eschewed mass politics in favour of representation rooted in specialised communities. The quintessential exponent of this view was the Romanian émigré turned British political theorist David Mitrany. Unsurprisingly, Mitrany did not see the creation of a supranational parliament or mass participation in technocratic bodies as the solution to problem of politics. Instead, he imagined an alternative form of participation in relation to 'functional' authorities rooted in the same communities of interest and expertise that took centre stage in his non-parliamentary conception of democratic modernity.

In terms of democratic control over technocratic activities, Mitrany's functionalism seems even more 'undemocratic' than Lilienthal or Wootton. Mitrany was not just ambivalent but actively opposed to the creation of a directly-elected supranational chamber that might unify and control the activities of functional bodies. The forms of participation he did imagine were, arguably, also weaker and more restrictive, leaving even greater autonomy for technical agencies. The central point, however, is that Mitrany too was deeply concerned with questions of participation and political liberty in relation to his functional vision of global order, albeit in the service of a vision of democratic modernity that sought to preserve, expand and indeed extend liberty in a way that might be less appealing by contemporary standards.

Mitrany's central argument in *A Working Peace System* (1943) drew on the proliferating range of 'services' that the citizens of modern states expected their respective governments to perform. In the context of the shrinking world, however, the demand for services led to excessive centralisation and the emergence of the 'comprehensive state' that instead of reflecting and meeting social needs subordinated them to political purposes.[422] Where states could not adequately fulfil these functions at a national level, Mitrany proposed the formation of international functional bodies with authority over a specific activity– thus breaking the link between authority and territory– and the power to act and react flexibly to issues as they arose. Within this system, moreover, Mitrany did not support the creation of a functional union or a supranational parliamentary chamber to oversee these functional bodies. This was partly a matter of pragmatism: the creation of a technical 'functional' order would not require sovereign nation states to formally cede sovereignty to a federal body. But it was also a matter of principle. Mitrany's system would avoid the constitutional headaches of federalism resulting from the centre having to impose its will on less enthusiastic states. Most importantly, as opposed to a federal or unitary functional system, Mitrany argued that a fragmented functional order would prevent the power to act from growing into a power to dominate.[423]

In many respects, while rejecting federal union, *AWPS* still mimicked the rationale of unionist arguments in general and functionalist unionism in particular with which Mitrany is so often (mistakenly) associated that suggested that, even without a federal political structure, union would be democratic. Mitrany's functional order would preserve liberty from centralising 'comprehensive' states and, in this case, a centralising federal government. It would also expand liberty by meeting the needs that states could no longer address alone. Politically, it

[422] Hereafter *AWPS*. Mitrany, *A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organization*. Navari, *Public Intellectuals and International Affairs: Essays on Public Thinkers and Political Projects*, 210.
[423] This was the greatest virtue of 'technical self-determination' whereby the scope and limits of power were determined by the nature of the task, 35.

might also seem that Mitrany's aim, like many unionists, was to save parliamentary democracies from the tyranny of the modern 'administrative' or bureaucratic state. Like many of his contemporaries– including Hayek– Mitrany argued that the growing power of experts in the modern states seeking to respond to 'ever widening popular claims' had produced a 'crisis of representation' that rendered structures of parliamentary democracy increasingly redundant.[424]

Mitrany's aim was not, however, the restoration of meaning to the parliamentary form through the functional expropriation of national state power. His was a more transformative agenda, inspired by theoretical traditions of English pluralism as much as the interwar crisis, that was not just critical of excessive, centralised state power but parliamentary democracy as well. In this view, neither state power nor electoral politics reflected the social reality of industrial modernity that a more authentic and modern form of democratic politics should aspire to represent. Modernity was characterised by a process of social diversification, giving birth to new communities of interest and identity. It was anachronistic, therefore, to base democratic representation and participation exclusively on the artificial community of the nation state and, within that, on the broad socio-economic divisions represented by political parties of left and right. A more authentic democratic system should instead root participation and representation in these more meaningful communities. The small self-governing associations that English pluralists saw as the basic elements of modern social life should be directly involved in political life through functional representation of churches, trade unions, voluntary organisations and other groups that ought to supplement of even replace centralised states with plenitude of sovereign powers.[425]

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[424] David Mitrany, "The Functional Approach in Historical Perspective", *International Affairs* 47, no. 3 (1971), 540. 'Whatever the form of the state, everywhere the executive is gaining in power and the representative element is falling away', 536.

[425] Navari, *Public Intellectuals and International Affairs: Essays on Public Thinkers and Political Projects*, 204-5. The English pluralist school was associated with figures including Maitland, Figgis, Cole, Laski, Hobhouse and Graham Wallas– Mitrany's tutor at the LSE. 'English pluralist doctrine', with its mixture of anti-statism, anti-Parliamentarism and belief in functional representation, Navari convincingly shows 'became Mitrany's theoretical lifeblood'.

Mitrany's vision of global order extended this vision of domestic politics to the international. In Mitrany's view, because social diversification was an integrative as much as a disingretative force, the broad evolutionary arc of modernity predicted the development of new transnational as well as sub-national communities of interest and expertise. Part and parcel of searching for a more authentic kind of democracy, therefore, was to give these groups their own functional authority and representation. At the heart of Mitrany's vision, Cornelia Navari writes, was 'the more diverse functional organisation of society itself and the breaking up of the unitary legal order of the state into a diversity of overlapping plural orders, operating locally, regionally, nationally and internationally'.[426]

Importantly, while Mitrany hinted that this plurality of political and legal orders responding to function and need might lead to the emergence of a 'comprehensive' global system, this would never be unitary. Functional organisation was intended to give expression to, and provide better representation and governance of, an already existent condition: diversity and specialisation, not organic unity and global community.[427] As a system of 'global governance' rather than government, whatever comprehensive system Mitrany imagined would emerge in the future would always be an untidy collection of overlapping systems of co-operation and welfare promotion, not a single homogenous world order. It was emphatically not the kind of 'federalism by instalments' associated with neo-functionalism that Mitrany, along with all forms of federalism, consistently rejected.[428] Federalist claims of 'subsidiarity' notwithstanding, Mitrany argued that federalism was still undergirded by an 'old liberal' belief in the neat separation of state and society that also ignored the role of technology. As a result, it could never yield an authentically democratic political system appropriate to modern conditions. In a more general sense, Mitrany argued that federalism continued to reflect the

[426] Ibid, 214-5.
[427] Ibid, 220.
[428] David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books in co-operation with the Society for a World Service Federation, 1966), 83.

misplaced, modern obsession with the nation state as the ideal form of political community. As a result, lurking behind the federalists' attempt to surpass the system of sovereign and increasingly centralised states, he argued, was an overt or subconscious desire to re-create the same kind of polity and power at a supranational level. Not only would democratic representation offered by a federal parliament in such a system be equally hollow, the creation of a regional federations would be as, if not more, dangerous to peace.[429]

Crucially, Mitrany's technocratic, functional vision of order was not democratic purely by virtue of its attempted re-organisation of international relations on more pluralist lines, it also based democratic representation in this new order in these more authentic, albeit technical, constituencies or communities of interest. As he wrote in *An Advance in Democratic Representation*, democracy would be enhanced by 'specialisation', through 'bringing the citizen into the process of government on his own specialist level, as well as in his capacity as an elector'. To do this, it would be necessary to form new assemblies attached to each new functional organisation created at the international level.[430]

In practice, this meant something akin to the representative structure of the European Coal and Steel Community.[431] Mitrany praised the mixture of technocratic leadership, parliamentary and above all sectoral representation of the ECSC and the requirement that the High Authority consult with producer and consumer associations in drafting policies. As a

[429] Navari, *Public Intellectuals and International Affairs: Essays on Public Thinkers and Political Projects*, 219-20, 222.
[430] David Mitrany, "An Advance in Democratic Representation", *International Associations* VI (1954). James Patrick Sewell, *Functionalism and World Politics: A Study Based on United Nations Programs Financing Economic Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 40; Navari, *Public Intellectuals and International Affairs: Essays on Public Thinkers and Political Projects*, 213. A more conventional view of Mitrany's 'pragmatic' form of 'planning' is that it was entirely apolitical, imagining a kind of bloodless technocratic nirvana at the point at which functional would 'acquire a purely technical form of management' (AWPS 1943:40) akin to the neo-functionalist ideal of Haas and others in the 1960s. Hall, *Dilemmas of Decline: British Intellectuals and World Politics, 1945-1975,* 78-9.
[431] Having challenged the 'habitual assumption' that 'international action must have some overall *political authority'* (37) and discussed national provisions for proportional shares of personnel within new international technical services (40) *AWPS* does not discuss representation in any detail. His attitude to the ECSC is much more revealing.

system that relied on 'the watchfulness of people who know the world as well as the "technocrats" themselves' and balanced greater freedom of action of the high authority vis-à-vis national governments with 'more points of cooperative contact', Mitrany judged that the ECSC would not only be successful, it was significantly more democratic than any federal parliament. In addition, the emergence of the ECSC itself was evidence of a move in a more democratic, pluralist direction where the growing need for planning or technical governance was not reflexively undertaken by the state and the state alone but by an appropriate body at an appropriate level with the 'right' people involved.[432]

This was a truer form of self-determination, Mitrany argued, than any attempt to create a more unitary political community. As long as the ECSC was a stand alone authority in a well defined area alongside other, similar entities in other areas possessed of their own representative/participative structures, then the cause of a more democratic, as well as peaceful, technocratic order would be furthered. If, on the other hand, functional agencies were gradually fused together in the service of a larger integration project that would eventually supersede their respective authorities and respective representative structures, as Mitrany detected in the EEC, it was not. Crucially, a move towards mass democratic participation would be less democratic in Mitrany's view than a system based on specialist, functional participation. Whereas in the domestic context, Mitrany stressed the double engagement of the individual as an 'elector' and as a 'specialist'– English pluralists sought the substantial reform but not necessarily the wholesale replacement of parliamentary democracy– at the international level, there is no evidence that Mitrany thought electoral engagement on a mass scale would be of any use at all. When Monnet's 'Action Group' belatedly began to press for direct elections to the European Parliament in 1955, Mitrany remained opposed. It was sentimental, he argued, to have mass constituencies vulnerable to populist manipulation making decisions on poorly understood issues. There was no reason to

[432] David Mitrany, "The Prospect of European Integration: Federal or Functional", *Journal of Common Market Studies* 4, no. 2 (1965), 141; Navari, *Public Intellectuals and International Affairs: Essays on Public Thinkers and Political Projects*, 214.

believe that the politics of mass democracy on an international scale would be more reasonable than it was nationally. It was necessary, therefore, to confine channels of representation and participation within the overlapping fora of functional governance to those individuals and groups who could meaningfully contribute.[433]

This important inconsistency is never fully explained in Mitrany's work which otherwise remains an extremely coherent vision of technocratic global order as both a vehicle and reflection of a particular conception of democratic modernity. This vision sought to use expertise to meet human needs, protect individuals from the state, but also expand the idea of democratic participation and political liberty in a way that recognised individuals beyond their existence as citizens of class or nation.

Mitrany's technocratic vision was not anti-democratic or unconcerned with the political because he rejected what he saw as the fetishization of supranational parliamentary assemblies. There is still much we might critique, however, both in the substantive ideal of democratic modernity Mitrany championed and in the way in which it was translated into an idea of participation within a functional world order. Mitrany's ideal of single-interest assemblies was clearly not intended to be deliberative in a traditionally democratic sense and how exactly sectoral or other specialist representatives would influence decisions within these authorities remained ambiguous. What is clear is that, overall, functional authorities and the technocratic leadership within them would retain a very high degree of autonomy. Moreover, insofar as Mitrany conceived of functional assemblies as a means to ensure accountability and prevent abuses of power, it is also clear that Mitrany set equal if not greater store by the self-determining quality of specialised technical authorities as a barrier to domination. It is this

[433] *Public Intellectuals and International Affairs: Essays on Public Thinkers and Political Projects*, 221-2. Mitrany repeated this critique, and the danger of mimicking the national form in the pursuit of a supranational parliament in Mitrany, "The Prospect of European Integration: Federal or Functional", 133-4.

limit, arguably, more than the internal balance between technocrats and specialist representatives that Mitrany saw as the most significant check on technocratic authority.

Substantively, Mitrany made no effort to address the potential exclusion of non-specialist citizens from his vision of democratic modernity at both an international and a domestic level. Globally, Mitrany's vision of functional order clearly restricted participation to specialists with the knowledge and expertise to engage with and police other specialists. Yet while at the domestic level citizens would participate as electors and specialists, assuming that not all electors are also specialists, what was crystallised at the international level was obvious here too: the enhanced political liberty on offer in Mitrany's system would be available only to a few. Mitrany's vision of order would thus reflect and reinforce a democratic society that contained essentially two tiers of political liberty. In terms of how that order would also support the liberty of democratic societies by meeting their needs, moreover, Cornelia Navari alerts us to the problematic assumption common to many enthusiasts of corporate representation that sectoral good and the good of the community were co-terminus.[434]

Compared to Wootton and Lilienthal, Mitrany's vision marks a critical shift towards a more elitist vision of democratic modernity and a democratic order that trusted less in the wisdom of the masses and more in specialised elites, both in terms of how it imagined the role of experts within a new global order and external participation within new technocratic bodies. It is nevertheless vital to stress that, although Mitrany was unconvinced by mass party politics, his articulation of an alternative emerged from his concern to fashion more meaningful form of political participation that is, in a sense, out of concern for the way in which the masses were disenfranchised by the national, party based political system under the conditions of global modernity.

[434] Navari, *Public Intellectuals and International Affairs: Essays on Public Thinkers and Political Projects*, 225.

Mitrany's vision was thus fundamentally different to those that are explored below. These ideas, captured in the vision of Jean Monnet, had no interest in expanding the political liberty of the masses or a significant sub-set of citizens through new forms of political participation. Reflecting a much more elitist conception of democratic modernity, technocrats like Monnet solved the problem of politics in three ways. First, through even more limited, largely symbolic forms of participation in technocratic governance that were designed above all as a vehicle for technocratic persuasion, not popular input. Second, through more direct ideas of performance legitimacy that would compensate the masses for their loss of political rights in relation to supranational technocratic authorities that were wholly free from political intrusion or control. Third, by insisting that domestic democratic politics would continue to have value and meaning for the people, enhanced by the security and prosperity that the new order would provide confronted with the Soviet Union, even if it was essentially a side show to the real business of governance.

Unsurprisingly for a vision of international order that focused exclusively on elites, posited no formal democratic control, and proposed only powerless forms of participation, these ideas have been labelled not merely as undemocratic but actively anti-democratic. The following rejects this charge, and proposes that while normatively problematic, these visions of technocratic order advanced an idea of democratic legitimacy that was rooted in a distinctly non-political conception of democratic modernity that did not suggest that political life was irrelevant but that it should occupy a fundamentally different place in understandings of liberty in 20th century.

6.4 Performance Legitimacy, Social Concertation and Constraint

The suggestion that Jean Monnet personified an elitist ideal of democratic order may seem ironic in light of Mitrany's praise for the participative structure of the ECSC, the eventual support of Monnet's 'Action Group' for direct elections to the European Parliament, and regular celebrations of the 'Father of Europe' by the European Parliament today. Nevertheless, Jean Monnet, although not anti-democratic, was no champion of democratic control and popular participation. The author of the phrase 'nous ne coalisons pas des états, nous unissons des hommes' had a very particular group of men in mind: the technical and political elite, not the masses of Europe or the World- the mission of another group of technocrats newly installed at UNESCO in 1945. Although the High Authority of the ECSC claimed inspiration from the TVA– notably in the use of the term 'Authority' itself– it shared none of the participative fervour of Lilienthal. The inspiration was rather, as a key member of Monnet's coterie responsible for the Schuman Plan and alumnus of Vichy's École des cadres d'Uriage Paul Reuter put it, of a system that entrusted 'independent men' with quasi-judicial power over an entire segment, in the American case geographical, of the economy and society in the pursuit of its visionary goals.[435]

Leaving well-documented strategic motivations aside,[436] the core purpose of Monnet's technocratic order– in which the ECSC would be the first step– was to empower experts,

[435] Quoted in Cohen, *De Vichy À La Communauté Européenne,* 59. The other two colleagues from the Commissariat Général du Plan (see next footnote) that were particularly involved in the drafting of the Schuman Plan with Monnet were Pierre Uri, an economist who spent the war working under François Perroux at the Institut de science économique appliquée; and Étienne Hirsch, a civil engineer and socialist whom Monnet first met and worked with in Algiers in 1943 coordinating the supply of armaments to the Free French forces.

[436] Ibid. 57. To bypass the British-American controlled International Authority of the Ruhr established in 1949 and to ensure German coal production was in line with the objectives of the Commissariat Général du Plan– the economic planning body established by de Gaulle in 1946 to rebuild and modernise the French economy of which Monnet was the first director until 1952. In a wider sense, the purpose of the ECSC was also to take the first step towards what Monnet and his allied called 'Lotharingia'- an imagined industrial area comprising the Rhineland, Alsace Lorraine, Belgium that would be the key to rebuilding Europe. Monnet had first had this idea in Algeria in 1943 when he imagined that postwar Germany would be dismantled.

specialists and those whom Monnet described as 'the great practitioners' who possessed 'wisdom' in their respective fields, to decide a collective course of action in the 'general interest' which would, of course, include peace.[437] Echoing countless of his internationalist peers, technocratic supranationalism was, first and foremost, presented as a matter of scale and problem solving: 'les nations souveraines du passé ne sont plus le cadre où peuvent se résoudre les problèmes du présent'.[438] Although Monnet focused on Europe as the 'right level' for problem solving, there was in fact no a priori limit to the forms of unity and action he thought Europe should take– the European Community could itself be a stage towards new forms of global organisation in the future.

Crucially, this elitist version of 'uniting men' for peace was at the heart of the so-called 'Monnet method': the means of fostering what Monnet described as the 'vue d'ensemble qui rassemble en énlargissant la vision, en surplombant, en dépassant'.[439] The 'vue d'ensemble' was a shared mentality, a common way of looking at problems that could be cultivated through information sharing and socialisation among the European (or global) knowledge elite. This, in turn, would allow the elite to find novel solutions in the service of a 'constantly refashioned' general good.[440] The key issue, in Monnet's view, was trust– 'confiance'– or the absence of it among an elite habituated to think along parochial national lines. To build it, Monnet's 'method' focused on the conditions for its growth, namely, replacing the traditional intergovernmental structure of international organisations in which a 'vue d'esemble' could not emerge by definition, with an entirely new kind of supranational 'space without name or master' free of the tug of national sentiment and political influence.[441] Within this space, relationships between groups of experts would be based on equality, configured in a collegial,

[437] Cited in Michel Adam's collection of key extracts from Monnet's memoires– his only substantial published work– that are most illustrative, in Adam's view, of his wider vision. Adam, *Jean Monnet Citoyen Du Monde: La Pensée D'un Précurseur,* 54-5. ***N.B***. unless otherwise stated all subsequent references from Adam are also direct quotations from Monnet's Memoires.
[438] Ibid, 93.
[439] Ibid, 49.
[440] Ibid, 44.
[441] Ibid, 28, 49.

non-hierarchical structure similar to what the then highly influential management theorist Mary Follet described in terms of 'integration'.[442] This was a non-coercive power sharing system based on a concept of 'power with' rather than 'power over' which, by embracing diversity and even conflict, developed integrated solutions that replaced sub-optimal compromises with 'win win' outcomes. It was in a very similar way that Monnet imagined that in the context of a kind of new supranational institution like the High Authority, the appropriate knowledge elite could build working relationships based on trust that would allow them to determine *what is good for the community* and then what is necessary for each to do without 'as in the past, searching in vain for precise equivalences'.[443]

There was a second trust building aspect to the 'Monnet method', however. Forging a 'common view' among, say, the coal and steel producers of Western Europe was vital, but it was also important to build trust between 'those who know and those who decide' at the national state level, that is to say political elites. Confronted with the complex realities of the modern, interdependent global political economy, in order to prevent political leaders from losing patience and making rash decisions, Monnet argued that it was necessary to build a 'common language' between political leaders and technical elites in the new authorities.[444] This was the rationale behind Monnet's acceptance of the re-insertion of national governments into his schema in the form of the Council of Ministers; as a point of contact where political elites could learn to understand the world of the experts, to appreciate the validity and above all the necessity of the course of action they determined for the 'general good' and to relay and facilitate the acceptance of this path in the wider political context of

[442] Ibid, 50, 65. Monnet insisted that his was not a bureaucratic approach because, at the elite level, it trampled on hierarchy. For a richer discussion of Follet, and the reprisal of her ideas about pluralism and the generation of a 'genuine common will' in the context of debates about the global in the 1940s in particular Ralph Perry's insistence that 'orderly freedom' obtained through international organisation see Pemberton, *Global Metaphors: Modernity and the Quest for One World,* 49-51, 125.
[443] Ibid, 50.
[444] Ibid, 56.

their respective nations. It was a means of building consensus without sharing power or, in other words, a way of bringing the political elite 'in' in order to keep them out.[445]

Was this the reflection of a deeper, more democratic principle of 'concertation'- an idea drawn from the mixture of socialist, non conformist and technocratic planning debates of the 1930s that was first deployed by Étienne Hirsch who persuaded Monnet to adopt the term in the context of the Commissariat Général du Plan?[446] It might at first seem so. Concertation was a means of ensuring that the plan for modernisation was the work of the 'living forces of the nation' not just the 'expert few'; 'the more interests brought on board, the greater the project's *legitimacy* and chances of success'.[447] The result was the overarching 'Conseil du Plan', a national advisory body composed of planners, experts and interest group officials alongside countrywide 'modernisation commissions' that included a similar mix of experts, civil servants, producers but also representatives of the workers.

For Monnet, however, whose vision of modernisation had a strong statist flavour, this was not, in fact, an attempt to introduce a corporatist decision making structure for the Plan itself and still less a Mitranian reconfiguration of democratic participation designed to enhance political liberty. Monnet did not want modernisation to proceed by simple directive and, as Philippe Nord has shown, the quasi-parliamentary character of the Conseil carried 'meaningful legitimating power'.[448] At the same time, it is equally clear that Monnet himself in no way saw this structure as a 'quasi-parliamentary' form of representation or power

[445] Ibid, 65. Joly, *Le Mythe Jean Monnet: Contribution À Une Sociologie Historique De La Construction Européenne,* 58-9. Joly's own argument goes further, describing Monnet's conception of his own role and that of the High Authority as 'civilising' political elites and, eventually, the wider population.
[446] Hisch later worked with Monnet on the Schuman Plan and the ECSC. Nord, *France's New Deal: From the Thirties to the Postwar Era,* 172-3. Nord argues that 'The idea of collective endeavor, of an economy run by concertation rather than a market based individualism, was indeed central to the Plan's conception of itself'.
[447] Ibid.
[448] Ibid, 173. 'The CdP's "representative" composition lent its deliberations a quasi-parliamentary character, and as such its imprimatur had meaningful legitimating power. But the conseil was not just a parliament of interests. It was also anchored in a 1930s past, a living connection to long standing currents of economic reform, whether of a socialist or more technocratic cast'.

sharing among different interest groups, and still less a vehicle for non-expert participation, political or popular, in the construction of the Plan itself.[449] 'Concertation' thus described a system that, in the first instance, brought together the most competent men in each sector, and secondly, found a way of bringing the rest on board with what had to be done, as determined by the 'competent'. Meanwhile, the actual structure of power reserved the decisive role to Monnet himself and his coterie of the 'best and brightest' attached to the Presidency of the Council in a manner that mimicked Monnet's own experience as director of the American War Production Board.[450]

When it came to Monnet's vision for Europe which, it is important to remember, was as much a vision of European modernisation as it was international order, Monnet's sporadic allusions to 'concertation' should be seen in a similarly instrumental light. The Council of Ministers and later the European Parliament were points of 'consultation' that were acceptable to Monnet for the purposes of persuasion and consensus building, generating the 'goodwill' around what the High Authority determined needed to be done that was essential to its success.[451] The more important task, however, remained 'concertation' among knowledge elite itself- bringing together planners, producers, the 'great practitioners' into a system in which, finally, it would be those who knew who decided. At the very top, the presidency of the ECSC would operate in in much the same way as the CGP and the War Production Board before it. If this represented a very different understanding of the problem of politics in relation to technocracy in which it was democratic politicians that needed to be persuaded to accept the de jure authority of the technocratic class, not the experts themselves that needed to

[449] As Nord reminds us 'The Monnet scheme was liberal and modernising in its willingness to open the French economy to international markets, and it was full of consultative promise, though just how consultation was to be organised remained unspecified. Yet Monnet's project also had a strong statist flavouring. It was after all a plan, concocted in the first instance by experts, economists, and statisticians, many of whom harboured second thoughts, if not more, about the effectiveness and viability of parliamentary institutions', 133.
[450] Joly, *Le Mythe Jean Monnet: Contribution À Une Sociologie Historique De La Construction Européenne,* 70-71.
[451] Adam, *Jean Monnet Citoyen Du Monde: La Pensée D'un Précurseur*, 65; Joly, *Le Mythe Jean Monnet: Contribution À Une Sociologie Historique De La Construction Européenne,* 77.

be checked or the people involved directly or indirectly; Monnet's original plan for a new international order arguably envisaged even less non-expert participation and 'oversight'. As Antonin Cohen has recently shown, early drafts of European Coal and Steel Community contain no reference to a chamber of any kind. Cohen finds no evidence in the words of Monnet and his coterie that any of them imagined a parliamentary assembly, a council of ministers or even a court of justice; the trappings of democratic control over the HA were only added later, as a result of complaints from national parliaments and Monnet's political allies. In midst of plans for 'interstate organs whose main institutional concern was parliamentary sovereignty' and the supranational reproduction of parliamentary forms of political power, he concludes, 'the High Authority wanted to reproduce and legitimise in the transnational space the type of institutional position that men of CGP held in the national space'.[452]

That position was one in which the right collection of 'independent people' made decisions that were binding on all and were subject to no other forms of external control. Marc Joly has argued that, in addition, Monnet saw the need to liaise with Council of Ministers as provisional, necessary only for as long as national governments retained control over other areas of the economy.[453] Whether or not this was the case, it is certainly true that Monnet did not see the addition of the Council and later the Parliament or the ECJ as compromises that risked jeopardising the core of his vision: the independence of the High Authority.[454] In his

[452] Cohen, *De Vichy À La Communauté Européenne,* 61.
[453] Joly, *Le Mythe Jean Monnet: Contribution À Une Sociologie Historique De La Construction Européenne,* 59-60.
[454] In his speech inaugurating the ECSC in 1952, Monnet expounded at length on its independent competence in its territory, its direct relationship with industries and companies, and its independent finance, beginning his oration with 'the solemn pledge of the members of the High Authority. We will perform our duties with complete independence in the general interest of the Community. In the performance of our duties, we will neither request nor accept instructions from any Government or organization and we will abstain from any action incompatible with the supranational character of our functions'. Speeches delivered by Monsieur Jean Monnet, President of the High Authority -at the inauguration of the High Authority on August 10th, 1952, in Luxembourg -at the opening session of the Assembly on September 11th, 1952, in Strasbourg. Strasbourg: European Coal and Steel Community, September 1952, 1-29. CVCE http://www.cvce.eu/obj/speech_by_jean_monnet_luxembourg_10_august_1952-en-cf6d3066-b75a-421c-b835- 80768add5a66.html.

mind at least, the Council of Ministers was simply not created to exercise control over the HA. It was, instead, a useful point of contact for persuasion, coordination and the transmission of the HA's vision that, if anything, would also serve to clarify the respective remits of national parliaments and the new authority.

Had the Council or the Parliament represented a form of genuine control, from Monnet's perspective, this would have compromised the entire project. It is difficult to overemphasise the extent to which it was absolutely essential to his vision that the decisions of the High Authority should be made apart from all political interference and should be binding on all member states. Firstly, this was because the ultimate goal of Monnet's plan was 'common action': at the heart of Monnet's vision of modern France and modern Europe was an idea of 'organised dynamism' to which end the creation of independent, powerful supranational institutions instead of an ineffective parliament was vital.[455] Secondly, Monnet insisted that the 'vue d'ensemble' on which 'common action' would be based would only be generated *if* the authority retained its autonomy of action and could rely on the binding force of its decisions on all members without exception. Thirdly, only a 'vue d'ensemble' generated in this apolitical, supranational context could have any claim to *legitimacy*. This claim was not simply the product of the authority of expertise but the result of the principle of 'partial' or plural legitimacy in light of which only by fusing and surpassing the particularistic claims of each in the egalitarian context of the new institution, could a truly legitimate position be obtained.[456] This what Monnet meant when he described a new approach that would 'make an authority' rather than 'being' an authority.[457]

The freedom from direct and indirect democratic interference was thus essential to Monnet's vision of order. Equally, it is abundantly clear that Monnet in no way believed that the

[455] Adam, *Jean Monnet Citoyen Du Monde: La Pensée D'un Précurseur,* 28, 70; Monnet, *Mémoires*, 57.
[456] Adam, *Jean Monnet Citoyen Du Monde: La Pensée D'un Précurseur*, 58-9.
[457] Ibid, 84.

legitimacy of his project was contingent on establishing any kind of democratic control or participation, elite or popular. Moreover, there is no hint of doubt as to the ability of the technical elite, composed of modern men like himself, to discern and act for the general good, nor any indication that these men posed any danger whatsoever to liberty and peace. It should come as no surprise, then, to find that hagiographic accounts of the 'father of Europe' have finally begun to give way to less than flattering portrayals. Even Monnet's defenders acknowledge that his views on democracy and legitimacy were not entirely conventional.[458]

Other scholars such as Marc Joly and Antonin Cohen have been far more critical. Joly has argued that Monnet's vision, 'délibérément étrangère á toute considération démocratique', imagined Europe as a vehicle for an elitist conception of public action.[459] Monnet himself, he argues, believed in and 'symbolised the dream of an elite sovereignty free from the powerlessness of parliamentary democracy and the deadly mythos of national politics; he personified the aspiration for a government of reality free of ideology and dogma'.[460] His method duly paved the way the emergence of the EU as a configuration of rival but interdependent elites united in a kind of de facto sovereignty and shared desire to legitimise their own power globally'.[461] That dream, Joly stresses, originated in the 'non-conformist' intellectual context of interwar and Vichy France, the subject of Antonin Cohen's recent study.[462] Focusing on Monnet's confidants and co-authors of the Schuman plan– Hirsch, Uri, Reuter– Cohen traces their ideological formation in predominantly technocratic, Catholic and above all authoritarian strands of interwar non-conformism and their subsequent involvement with the Vichy regime and the École des cadres d'Uriage. These individuals were not only

[458] Adam, *Jean Monnet Citoyen Du Monde: La Pensée D'un Précurseur,* 110. Praising Monnet's combination of 'L'ethique et la "techné: un mariage d'une fécondité exceptionelle', Adam acknowledges Monnet's deeply held belief that 'legitimacy surpassed legality and often preceded it'. Bizarrely, he goes on to suggest that Monnet's broader justification of his system on the grounds that people should not be tied to the mediocre abilities and dubious ambitions of elected politicians in democratic systems vulnerable to putschist threats is testament to Monnet's democratic credentials, 85.
[459] Joly, *Le Mythe Jean Monnet: Contribution À Une Sociologie Historique De La Construction Européenne,* 61.
[460] Ibid, 27.
[461] Ibid, 104, 172.
[462] Ibid, 61.

elitist in a technocratic sense, he argues, they were unequivocally anti-democratic, as demonstrated by their use of the term 'Community' itself which, Cohen shows, was redolent with past dreams of national rebirth under the charismatic leadership of an elite caste.[463]

To conclude that the technocratic vision of order embodied by the ECSC emerged from an intellectual milieu that rejected inefficient Parliamentarism and political legitimacy based on electoral politics in favour of a 'modern' notion of legitimacy based on technical expertise and performance is broadly accurate. At this end of the technocratic spectrum, the problem of politics focused on how to convince the demos to accept expert control, not the other way around. Three points, however, should nuance our reading of technocratic arguments that opposed democratic control at least in the European context. These suggest that they were not anti-democratic in the sense Cohen and Joly imply but that they were, however, elitist ideas of democratic modernity in which the status of politics is deeply problematic.

First, it is clear that although Monnet perceived nothing strange in doing precisely the opposite of what André Philip desired, that is elevating expert decision making to the European and even global level; there is nothing to suggest that he himself shared the more extreme views of his 'non-conformist' coterie. As the darling of the American political establishment and close friend of many European parliamentarians, Monnet accepted both the basic need for democratic systems and the need to rationalise, justify and reconcile his vision with the quest for a democratic and peaceful global order both to them and to himself. Although Monnet's memoirs offer some post hoc emphasis on the consultative paraphernalia of 'concertation' and even genuflect to the unionist idea that the system was designed to allow national democracies to flourish, neither of these, however, appear to be particularly convincing attempts to do this. Instead, it is clear that Monnet preferred to see and to justify the relationship between his technocratic order and democracy in broader geopolitical terms– as guaranteeing the survival of the 'free world' through French and European modernisation–

[463] Cohen, *De Vichy À La Communauté Européenne,* 62-64.

rather than in the structure of that order itself or its relationship to domestic democratic systems. Monnet was profoundly convinced that this process was inherently elitist, requiring the imposition of the solutions designed by a group of farsighted, technically skilled men on democratic states that consented to their supremacy, albeit in the hope that through processes of 'concertation' these states would also be willing recipients of these directives. As unsatisfactory as this may be to contemporary observers, not least for the almost total absence of controls on this group it contains no active desire to suppress and undermine national democracies as such, either out of fear of mass irrationality or a belief in the intrinsic worthlessness of liberal-democratic political systems, hence it was not 'anti-democratic' in this sense.

Second, although it is clear that such impulses were indeed more prevalent among the co-authors of the Schuman Plan, the rather old fashioned, monochrome interpretation of 'non-conformism' as an anti-democratic crypto-fascism offered by Joly and Cohen is unsatisfactory. As we saw in chapter 4, French 'non-conformism' was a broad church, united in its rejection of the 'decadence' of the Third Republic but divergent in the imagination of its reform, to the extent that it led some, including members of Monnet's group, to support Vichy and others, including Alexandre Marc to oppose it.[464] The intellectual themes of interwar France that we call 'non-conformism'– planning, expertise, leadership, the 'third way' between communism and capitalism, decentralisation, pluralism and the human person– could, in other words, be used in different combinations to support visions that were more and less 'anti-democratic'. Similarly, when it came to ideas of global order, not only did some members of this varied group, such as Alexandre Marc, actually oppose 'technocratic' forms of international governance absent a decentralising and participative political structure to accompany it; among the many who did favour a system that privileged the role of expert

[464] As Philippe Nord has recently shown, the technocrats, socialists, planners and personalists who opposed the third republic never constituted a united anti-liberal front and were propelled into divergent roles under Vichy and indeed in the postwar period when many of their ideas and protagonists would find their way into prominent positions. Nord, *France's New Deal: From the Thirties to the Postwar Era,* 51-2, 60, 66-7.

planners and specialist knowledge, excluding Monnet's immediate coterie, we should be very careful about what kind of 'anti-democratic' sentiments we read into it– many were not as extreme as Cohen and Joly suggest.

Third, while there is some evidence in the preceding discussion to support an interpretation of technocratic visions of Europe that rejected democratic control as a reflection and extension of Muller's 'constrained democracy' thesis, this needs to be tempered by the fact that the architects of this model domestically– Christian Democrats– were only its sponsors internationally.[465] It was not, in fact, Christian Democrat politicians like Schuman who spoke of the need to keep international government out of reach of the ignorant and irrational masses and their political playthings. As we saw in Chapter four, in contrast to the Christian personalists at *Fédération*, the ambitions embodied in Christian Democrat 'visions' of global and European order were at once more parochial and geostrategic. As Wolfram Kaiser suggests, most Christian Democrats were quite agnostic about the precise constitutional form of integration took, as long as it yielded electorally attractive results (and secured peace). While this suggests that the metric of 'performance legitimacy' implicit in Müller's 'constrained democracy' thesis was indeed applied to the international by Christian Democrat supporters of European integration, there is in fact little to suggest that this was combined with an active desire to restrict democratic participation in the new institutions of European unity.[466]

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[465] Müller, *Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in Twentieth-Century Europe*, 5.

[466] Kaiser, *Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union*, 175, 181, 185. While Kaiser notes the Christian Democratic preference for consociational decision making and electorally attractive 'output' over 'transparent antagonistic democratic competition within a more fully pluralistic society' meant that common welfare state policies were a key part of their approach to integration there was nothing anti-democratic about this (just as there was nothing overly democratic about it either- there were no dreams of American style federalism). The primary way in which Christian Democrats transposed domestic experiences and preference to the European level was their concern to ensure Europe's competitiveness, security and also a more independent role in the joint struggle against the Soviet Union. Martin Conway offers a similarly prosaic interpretation of Christian Democracy and Europe. A combination of deliberately dull but materially rewarding de-confessionalised democratic politics– the reconciliation was genuine, if unsentimental– combined with a realistic means of securing peace and prosperity, not executive or federal democracy. Martin Conway, *Catholic Politics in Europe, 1918-1945*, Historical Connections (London: Routledge, 1997); "The Rise and Fall of Western Europe's Democratic Age 1945-73", *Contemporary European History* XIII (2004); "Democracy in

Technocrats like Monnet were not moved by a reactionary hatred of Parliamentarism. They were moved by a belief that modernity itself was non-political. It was a realm that could only be navigated and ruled by experts. Confronted with this reality, the search for a democratic as opposed to totalitarian order required rethinking political rights and democratic legitimacy in a way that did not focus on popular participation and that would permit experts to carry out the 'common action' that democracies needed to survive at all. The opposing view, that democracy in a technological age required new and improved forms of popular participation represented a fundamentally anachronistic ideal of political liberty and its expansion in the 20th century.

Monnet's solution to the problem of politics was thus focused on performance legitimacy; popular 'consent' in the binding, contractual form of government agreements to transfer power to a High Authority in perpetuity; and loose, informal processes of consultation or 'concertation' between political and technocratic elites and authorities. In a deeper sense, it posited the bifurcation of domestic politics and international technocracy as the only viable solution to the challenge of democratic modernity. In the context of a modern global system managed by experts, despite the relative loss of real political control, the business of democratic politics would carry on much as usual. Clearly, this would not result in the expansion of liberty in political terms; there would be no 'flourishing' or 'épanouissement', in the language of Monnet's contemporaries.[467] There would, however, be greater prosperity and security that would more than justify the trade-off.

A notable result of this view is its unusually static nature. There is no sense in which this 'modern' arrangement implied any future transformation in the lives and minds of the masses.

Postwar Western Europe. The Triumph of a Political Model", *European History Quarterly* 32 (2002); Martin Conway and Kiran Klaus Patel, *Europeanization in the Twentieth Century: Historical Approaches*, Palgrave Macmillan Transnational History Series (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

[467] Or rather there would, but it would be confined to the blossoming of inter-elite relationships.

This idea, curiously, was part of both more and less participative visions of technocratic order. We saw how David Lilienthal suggested that international development could effectively change how people thought, turning them into democrats. Visions of technocratic order that were less participative also emphasised the way in experts would mould people's minds in a way that would lead to a new horizon of democracy. Some, including Boyd Orr, Eichelberger, and Schuman, imagined that the gradual formation of a European or global demos through such means would ultimately facilitate if not require a more participative supranational structure. Others, however, saw in the creation of a common democratic mentality the final democratisation of global order that would itself remain non-participative. In this sense, while focusing on the lives of the masses in a way that Monnet did not, such views still reflected a profoundly elitist and to some extent non-political conception of democratic modernity that did not deny but also did not privilege the exercise and extension of democratic political rights above all else.

This was the view of the prophesier of the 'revolt of the competent' himself. HG Wells' vision of democratic modernity was clearly one that prized diversity, individual liberty and social justice; it did not, however, prize democratic participation or even politics per se. At the very least, it is clear that Wells believed that confronted with the forces of scientific modernity, mass democracies were and would remain wholly inadequate models of governance both domestically and internationally. They represented the 'the rule of the planless man; the rule of the unkempt mind' that Wells had argued in the past was in fact more likely to *provoke* war.[468]

The new technocratic order, in contrast, represented a system of 'organised self control'.[469] The legitimacy of the 'technical elite' that would create and lead this order was not based on

[468] *Open Conspiracy* (1928) to *The Shape of Things to Come* (1933). Quoted in Heater, *World Citizenship and Government: Cosmopolitan Ideas in the History of Western Political Thought*, 134.
[469] ibid. On Wells' 1919 Argument that Democracies are more war prone see Bell, "Before the Democratic Peace: Racial Utopianism, Empire, and the Abolition of War", 7.

popular participation, representation or electoral approval. Unlike Monnet, however, what Wells did offer alongside performance legitimacy was a more inclusive eschatology. Cooperation among 'groups of the most interested, intelligent and devoted people' would not only foster the inter-elite confidence that would lead to the 'revolt'; technocratic rule would lead to an all encompassing shared mentality: the brotherhood of man. The end goal of Wells' vision was Cosmopolis, whereby through a process of psychological evolution 'the body of mankind becomes a single organism' living in the system of 'organised self control' guided by a 'common vision of existence' a 'comprehensive faith in the modernised World State, socialistic, cosmopolitan and creative'.[470]

Importantly, Wells' 'comprehensive faith' justified a technocratic order that would remain in the hands of the expert caste. Occasional allusions to a quasi-federal 'World State' notwithstanding, the emergence of a 'common vision of existence' worldwide did not contain a specific idea of participation, dialogue or engagement with a newly emerging demos. In the World State of the future, undergirded by the 'comprehensive faith', if and how 'the competent' would ever really share power with the masses or indeed their democratic representatives is never addressed. Ironically, it was groups claiming inspiration from Wells that much were more enthusiastic in their response to this question than Wells himself. The British Parliamentary Committee for the Crusade for World Government, for example, insisted that the 'first step towards what HG Wells wanted' was to move to elect a global parliament on the basis of a rigorous selection process that ensured that candidates would be 'men of vision'.[471]

Once again, the absence of participation, and even of politics as a whole does not mean that Wells' vision concealed darker, more overtly authoritarian ambitions. As Derek Heater points out, Wells' faith in the possibilities of human evolution manipulated by elite leadership was

[470] Heater, *World Citizenship and Government: Cosmopolitan Ideas in the History of Western Political Thought*; Wells, *The Shape of Things to Come: The Ultimate Revolution*, 366.
[471] Boyd Orr, "Food: The Foundation of World Unity", 16.

combined with a vision of the global brotherhood of mankind purified of race hatred, nationalism and class prejudice.[472] As the midwife of a vision of democratic modernity, moreover, Wells' vision clearly put a much greater emphasis on economic justice, pluralism and the thriving of communities and national cultures within it.[473] Whether these were or would be politically democratic– Wells, like Cassin, was more insistent on a universal respect for basic human rights as opposed to democratic or indeed national self government– it does not conjure the image of a technocratic bell jar within which monochrome mass democracies would grow more secure, prosperous and parochial. Wells' vision was in this sense a truer embodiment of Monnet's slogan 'united in diversity' than the latter's own vision whose interest in creative pluralism and dynamism was reserved to the elite itself.

Nevertheless, Wells' 'technocratic utopia', free of all restraint and oversight, participation reflected an idea of democratic modernity that, like Monnet, saw popular participation, representation and accountability as totems of a political philosophy and an ideal of political liberty that was no longer wholly appropriate to the modern era. Undeniably, Wells' belief in the power and authority of a visionary elite to remake man also bore traces of imperialism and the same social Darwinism that undergirded the totalitarian visions of modernity he sought to oppose. Like the shared intellectual roots of Vichy France and ECSC in interwar 'non-conformism', Wells' vision thus reminds us of the fine, at times blurred line between tendentious ideas of democratic modernity and those that cannot finally be considered 'democratic' at all. As in preceding chapters, there are clearly cases when both exclusive and participative technocratic visions order reflected imperialist, racist and authoritarian views as

[472] Heater, *World Citizenship and Government: Cosmopolitan Ideas in the History of Western Political Thought,* 135-137.

[473] Some claim has been made in recent years that Wells' 'technocratic utopia' was more democratic than it appears. John Partington has argued that Wells offered several models of cosmopolitan government, the final 'functional' version of which rested on a pluralistic concept of democratic order that sought to preserve national cultures and local autonomy while creating a system of global governance suitable for the modern, interdependent world John Partington, S. "H.G. Wells and the World State: A Liberal Cosmopolitan in a Totalitarian Age", *International Relations* 17, no. 2 (2003).

much, if not more, than a particular response/interpretation of the challenge of democratic modernity.

A good example of this is the vision of Wells' close friend and the first director of UNESCO Julian Huxley. Huxley's enthusiasm for the TVA model notwithstanding, his vision of world order was deeply elitist, offering a vision of a new expert class uniting humanity in diversity absent any idea of participation and accountability.[474] Like Wells, moreover, Huxley's vision of 'scientific progress' towards a united, post-racist, post-nationalist future based on the brotherhood of man was profoundly shaped by the intellectual inheritance of colonialism, not to mention undercurrent of Social Darwinism demonstrated in an active belief in eugenics.[475] Not only did Huxley's and to some extent Wells' visions contain racist views embedded in their notions of human progress, they continued to support the use of colonial structures of administration provided, as so many British internationalists argued, that these were used in pursuit of the new ends of social and economic development for the benefit of native populations. Folded into ideas of legitimacy based on output and the transformation of the popular mind, therefore, were older ideas of legitimacy based on the superiority of white, western and in particular Anglo-Saxon men– albeit technical experts and scientists, as opposed to the classicists and historians that dominated colonial administrations in the past. Even if the imagined technocracy was blind to colour and nationality, as Wells insisted, it is equally clear and at times even explicit that the international expert class itself was imagined as caste of 'global Englishmen' with the vision and skills to lead. In Wells' case and in others- particularly in Britain- it is undoubtedly true that the 'modern' idea of technocracy itself was, in some sense, a legacy of imperial patterns of thought and their recent evolution.

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[474] Julian Huxley, *UNESCO: Its Purpose and Its Philosophy* (London: Preparatory Commission of the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation, 1946).
[475] Much influenced by his father T.H Huxley aka 'Darwin's bulldog', it is no surprise to detect a similar undercurrent of Social Darwinism, in his case combined with an actual belief in eugenics, in the international thought of his son. Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism,* 105, 108.

Most visions of technocratic global order, including those that actively sought to minimise popular participation, were not rooted in authoritarian or imperialist ideals, at least not in any straightforward or unambiguous way. Similarly, the denial of 'democratic' control by a directly or indirectly representative supranational chamber did not mean that technocratic visions of order were anti-democratic or unconcerned with the way in which, while providing goods and services that were deemed essential ingredients of liberty in the 20th century, they might themselves threaten liberty, political rights and the search for more meaningful forms of self determination and political expression. This chapter has explored the wide variety of ways in which internationalists addressed this question that went well beyond the creation of a European or World parliament.

It has shown that, above all, attitudes towards political rights and participation in relation to technocratic orders were shaped by the visions of democratic modernity and the same ideal of politics they contained and sought to produce. In so doing, it has also shown that there was a divide between ideas that were more participative versus those that insisted that meaningful liberty could exist without any significant popular or political participation in the structures of the new global order itself. It is important, however, that we do not as a result substitute supranational control for direct participation as a metric of evaluation, or even categorisation. EH Carr, for example, whose vision of democratic modernity was always ambiguous concerning the importance of political rights and mass democracy, combined a Wellsian notion of 'moral purpose' that would make 'democracy work' and that downgraded the need for political rights in the context of a new international order with an oblique suggestion that the latter would be based on some form of direct appeal to the 'little man' leading, eventually, to a more representative system.[476]

[476] Although Carr, like Wootton, emphasised the importance of decentralisation and the empowerment of local democratic associations in an age of experts as a means of making modern democracy 'real and effective' by creating 'among the maximum number of people a lively sense that they, and people like them, are administrators as well as administered' but without 'the multiplication of elections or of elected officers' or other 'direct channels through which popular authority flows' (165); he, too, failed to connect this insight in any systematic fashion to his vision of supranational planning authorities.

It is equally clear that just because they stressed 'democracy at the grass roots' or democratic associations or functional assemblies, these visions of technocratic global order were not necessarily 'more' democratic. These more participative visions still championed the autonomy of technocrats, global democratisation and even the gradual replacement of mass democracies, all of which we might question. They still, in other words, reflected the tensions, choices and trade-offs between the competing imperatives of democratic modernity and their translation into ideas of global order, as result of which we have seen throughout this investigation how visions of democratic order that prized equality, pluralism and participation could also be exclusive, hierarchical, solidaristic and technocratic. Of the visions explored above, there are clearly some that are less acceptable, or less persuasive in the way in which they balanced these imperatives and negotiated these tensions, including, ironically, the vision which finally triumphed. The final point is not to suggest that all visions of democratic global order in the 1940s are normatively equivalent, only that their critique should be based on a deeper assessment of the vision of democratic modernity that they sought to promote, rather than the simple presence or absence of mechanisms of democratic oversight and participation at the international level.

Here Carr argued that that should begin by '*regarding* these various "European" authorities and institutions as representing...the people of "'Europe"' without, however, granting any direct, and presumably undesirable, political rights of representation. Echoing Boyd Orr, Carr seemed to suggest that this direct connection, built around the shared moral purpose of planners and people was in and of itself democratic but also that it might, in due course, lead to a more participative order. Carr hinted that having used power 'not for political ends…but to restore prosperity and to raise standards of living all over Europe' it might be possible to convince people 'that these organisations fulfil a vital need, and that they contain at any rate the seeds of a truly representative European or international order' *Conditions of Peace,* 276-7. My emphasis.

6.5 Conclusion

Western international thought in the 1940s reflected an era of paradox. 'Freedom under planning', 'democratic imperialism'– rhetorical absurdities that are usually associated with the Soviet Union– are its hallmarks. This investigation has shown how little about Western international thought was straightforwardly liberal or capitalist in this period. In this regard, technocratic visions of order capture what is perhaps the most fundamental and important paradox of all. That a moment of seemingly supreme self-confidence that is expressed so clearly in the 'scientific' visions of global order that blossomed in this period, was undergirded by a profound sense of crisis in the fundamental values of Western civilisation as they had existed before 1914, and in particular the ideal liberty that lived at the nexus of liberal capitalism, parliamentary democracy and nation state. As a result, we have seen how even these most confident visions of democratic order were tied to on-going debates about the nature and pursuit of freedom in complex society in the 20th century. These debates turned on competing and contradictory imperatives of the challenge of democratic modernity. While ideas of democratic planning may seem like dated and naïve attempts to balance these imperatives, as we will see in the conclusion, the underlying tensions they express are still very much present in on-going debates concerning the nature of democracy its relationship to global order today.

Tensions surrounding the meaning of democracy have been at the heart of the study of democratic visions of global order. Finally, we can also see how the debate surrounding the nature of liberty and the organisation of society in the modern world that fed into visions of world order in the 1940s was rooted in another more fundamental question. A decade made famous by the Declaration of Human Rights was also one when visions of global order reflected a deep disagreement over the nature of human beings themselves that echoes Hollis'

division between 'plastic' and 'autonomous' man.[477] As a result, internationalists were divided in their essential conception of global order and whether it would entail and emerge from a remodelled mentality– a remodelled human– forged by the tamed forces of scientific modernity; or an innovative reconciliation between a unified order and an 'autonomous' individuality described by Mitrany as the 'problem of the generation': 'how to weld together the common interests of all without interfering with the particular ways of each'.[478] Jo Ann Pemberton has observed that resolving the tension between pluralism and monism was characteristic of the search for global order in the 20th century.[479] As this investigation has shown, this included visions of democratic order in the 1940s that, like Huxley, Wells and Lilienthal, were moved by a more 'plastic' but also more deterministic view of human nature in which 'unity in diversity' and pluralism was built on the back of a scientifically generated solidarism. In also included the visions of Christian personalists and functionalists such as Mitrany that believed in the essentially social but unalterably autonomous nature of man, for whom it was not through the creation of shared mentalities but the creation of a decentralised and overlapping structures of autonomous activity and authority that a democratic world order that finally achieved a 'synthesis between liberty and unity' would emerge.[480]

Democracy in the 1940s described a system that at once represented order and disorder. It is because of this, in part, that it was used by internationalists in different ways to bridge gap between liberty and order and between order and power in the construction of visions of a new world in the 1940s. This investigation has demonstrated how the relationship between ideas of global order and democracy in the 1940s was profoundly different from how it has been seen in past. The conclusion turns to the need to rethink this relationship in the present day.

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[477] Martin Hollis, *Models of Man: Philosophical Thoughts on Social Action* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).
[478] Mitrany, *A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organization*, 31.
[479] Pemberton, *Global Metaphors: Modernity and the Quest for One World*, 112.
[480] Madariaga in Carr and Madariaga, *The Future of International Government*, 13.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

7.1 Introduction

In October 2015, a special edition of *International Affairs* marking the 70th anniversary of the establishment of the United Nations republished a selection of articles on global order from the 1930s and 1940s. Beyond the sense of occasion, the more pressing reason for this foray into the archives was the fact that the 'idea of world order is back in the public discourse'.[481] This is an increasingly popular view. A growing sense of disorder, compounded by the apparent inability of the postwar institutions to effectively manage global crises in the 21st century, has revived questions about how we can and should 'govern the world'.[482] Yet there is another reason why we should revisit the international thought of the 1940s. This is the return of another important idea to the public discourse and, in particular, debates about global order: democracy.

The need to situate contemporary debates in the longer history of thinking about global order and democracy may not seem like a particularly controversial proposition. The past is already very much present in proposals for a more democratic global order. Contemporary advocates of 'cosmopolitan democracy' see themselves as part of a long and rich tradition of

[481] Giovanni Farese, "The Rise of the Dual Culture of World Development and World Government in International Affairs, 1930–1950", *International Affairs*, no. Virtual Issue, October 2015 (2015). 1
[482] Tariq Ali, "The New World Disorder", *The London Review of Books* 37, no. 7 (2015). Tim Dunne and Trine Flockhart, eds., *Liberal World Orders* (Oxford Oxford University Press, 2013). Henry Kissinger, *World Order: Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of History* (London: Allen Lane, 2014); Joseph S. Nye, *Is the American Century Over?*, Global Futures Series; Acharya, *The End of American World Order*. G. John Ikenberry, "The Future of Liberal World Order", *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 16, no. 3 (2015). Charles Kupchan, A., *No One's World: The West, The Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). Anne-Marie Slaughter, *A New World Order* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004).

international thought. The ghost of Woodrow Wilson is readily invoked by champions of more transparent foreign policy making, greater equality between states within international organisations and national self-determination as the bedrock of democratic world order. In the United States, where Wilsonianism is itself embedded in a longer 'tradition' of American internationalism that hinges on making the world 'safe for democracy', scholars and practitioners continue to squabble over the core message of Wilson's vision and how best to 'update' Wilsonianism for the 21st century.[483]

This use of the past reinforces two dominant themes in contemporary debates surrounding world order and democracy: improving accountability, transparency and representation *versus* technocracy and/or power politics and, at the same time, establishing a more equitable, pluralistic model of global governance suitable for a multipolar world and the extent to which this requires a foundation of shared liberal values.[484] Notably, these ambitions co-exist with a realist critique that sees the return of the language of democracy to contemporary global politics as one and the same as the 'return' of geopolitics. In this view, appeals to democracy by China, Russia and even India are both a thinly veiled attack on the existing order and a cloak for regional and even global power ambitions. Like Roosevelt, many supporters of the

[483] Daniele Archibugi, Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, and Raffaele Marchetti, eds., *Global Democracy: Normative and Empirical Perspectives* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Archibugi and Held, *Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order*; David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995); Ikenberry, *The Crisis of American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the Twenty-First Century*; Francis Fukuyama, *After the Neocons: America at the Crossroads* (London: Profile, 2006).
[484] The former emphasised above all by cosmopolitans and in recent works such Anne-Marie Slaughter's idea of 'network governance' and, from a political theory perspective, Daniela Della Porta's recent analysis of the challenges facing democracy across many dimensions including global governance where her account of the problem and solutions echo the dominant themes of transparency, representation and accountability. Donatella Della Porta, *Can Democracy Be Saved?: Participation, Deliberation and Social Movements*, 112; Slaughter, *A New World Order*. Chapter six. Archibugi, Koenig-Archibugi, and Marchetti, *Global Democracy: Normative and Empirical Perspectives*. On the latter see especially Dunne and Flockhart, *Liberal World Orders*. Kissinger, *World Order: Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of History*, 363, 371; Acharya, *The End of American World Order*, 112-13.

American-led order believe that the push for the 'democratic' regionalisation or pluralisation of global order is little more than a euphemism for competition between geopolitical blocs.[485]

As we saw at start of this investigation, the role of democracy in 1940s world order debates can and has been viewed in much the same way. Traditional accounts tell us that in the 1940s 'realistic' Wilsonians sought to translate the democratic ideals of equality, representation and self-determination into the more robust structure of the UN. Disappointed 'Cosmopolitans' tried to introduce stronger forms of participation at the UN and at the regional level. Regionalism was widely touted as the most democratic form of global order. 'Democracy' in the global context was, as it remains, a battle of transparency, accountability, equality and representation against the un-democratic forces of technocracy and nationalism on the one hand, and a question of how to manage pluralism in a world of disunited values and different levels of power on the other. The 1940s were also a period when many historians have concluded that all talk of 'democracy' in the international arena can be reduced to geopolitical positioning in a post-imperial world of giants.

In contrast, this thesis has shown how much is missed and misunderstood about what democracy really meant to internationalists in the 1940s when it is viewed in such narrow terms. Casting technocrats as opponents of democracy, for example, we have missed the many ways in which technocrats, including those that were most tempted by authoritarianism, sought to legitimise their visions through alternative models of participation and deeper arguments about liberty and modernity in the mass age. We have missed the centrality of planning to discussions of postwar order based on 'economic democracy'. We have missed the overwhelming focus on the plight of the individual versus the modern state and the wider ways in which visions of global order related to a fundamental re-thinking of the relationship between citizens and government at a time when the nation state, party based parliamentary

[485] Robert Kagan, "Is Democracy in Decline? The Weight of Geopolitics", *Journal of Democracy* 26, no. 1 (2015). Walter Russell Mead, "The Return of Geopolitics: The Revenge of the Revisionist Powers,", *Foreign Affairs* May/June (2014).

model was widely seen to have failed. More broadly, we have missed how concerns with representation, accountability and pluralism within a new global order were balanced against and connected to a set of deeper objectives that for internationalists in the 1940s would truly define and instantiate a 'democratic' global order. Crucially, most of these related to the lives of individuals in domestic constituencies and the relationship between societies, not the relations between states. Finally, and most importantly, we have missed the ways in which the contradictions and limitations used as evidence of the betrayal, failure or absence of democratic ideals in the new world order, from the Security Council to Trusteeships, reflected deliberate choices and inevitable trade-offs inherent to the pursuit of a democratic order under modern global conditions and the fusion of nationalism and internationalism, not the triumph of one over another.

An obvious question follows: do we miss something when contemporary debates are characterised in terms of closing 'democratic deficits', governing emerging multipolarity, or indeed power politics? In other words, do we miss something when, like the 1940s, we fail to ask how ideas of democratic global order are or could be connected to the challenge of democratic modernity– the quest to secure freedom in a complex society in an age when, like the 1940s, the liberal formulas of the past appear increasingly inadequate.

The following suggests that we do. Like the 1940s, we risk underplaying the way in which visions of democratic order today may not be about accountability or pluralism per se but the pursuit of an alternative vision of liberty. More importantly, we miss a critical opportunity to put such questions at the heart of how we think and talk about the relationship between global order and democracy in the 21st century. The example of the 1940s suggests that we should spend more time asking what a democratic global order is for– what and whose idea of liberty it serves and how– rather than what it looks like in institutional terms. As we begin to ask such questions, we may also find that the way in which internationalists in the 1940s addressed the challenge of democratic modernity through their visions of order at a time when

we are confronted with many of the same imperatives– to secure economic justice, protect the individual from the growing power of the state and to find more meaningful forms of self government in the modern world– are of particular interest to us.

Most importantly, we miss the chance to openly and honestly debate the inevitable costs and trade-offs that the pursuit a new vision of liberty through global order entails. As this thesis has shown, although some of the apparent contradictions and shortcomings of visions of democratic order in the 1940s were a product of 'mentalities of the age' - including imperialism and Eurocentrism- they were also the product of the inherent tensions within the idea of democratic order under the conditions of global modernity.[486] The decision, for example, of internationalists like Monnet to embrace a technocratic order that empowered elites at the expense of the masses, or unionist thinkers like Adler to limit the creation of a more integrated, participative order to the developed Western democracies, were not simply a product of inherited concepts of hierarchy and authority specific to that historical context. They also represented a deliberate choice when confronted with the dilemmas, respectively, of how to create an efficient and effective order that would secure prosperity in the era of mass politics and how to establish an egalitarian system in absence of economic equality and cultural proximity that promoted democracy and economic justice globally while respecting diversity.

The crucial point is that these tensions– between technocracy and participation, solidarism and pluralism, hierarchy and equality– continue to exist. We may reject the decisions taken by internationalists in the 1940s, but similar choices still have to be made today as we attempt to balance the competing imperatives of democratic modernity in an uneven and divided global context. Revisiting the democratic debates of the 1940s presses us to consider what problems

[486] The argument is in this sense similar to Domenico Losurdo's recent polemic against the 'vulgar historicism' that explains the exclusionary and illiberal ideas and practices of the great liberal figures of the past as a product of unfortunate 'mentalities of the age' as opposed to the paradoxical nature of liberal ideology itself. Domenico Losurdo, *Liberalism: A Counter History* (London: Verso, 2014), 27.

and limitations in our own visions of global order reflect these enduring dilemmas and the choices we continue to make, often implicitly, about what the most important characteristics of liberty in the modern world are and, importantly, to whom it should be granted. Does the prioritisation of political liberty within visions of democratic global order, for example, entail costs in other areas, for particular groups, states or policy domains? To what extent are we prepared to prioritise political over economic rights, technocratic efficiency over participation, hierarchy over equality or solidarism over pluralism in the pursuit of a democratic order that preserves, expands and extends liberty worldwide? To what extent can the uneven and exclusionary effects of these choices be justified and mitigated? Should we, finally, try to use global orders to advance an idea of liberty and democracy at all?

The following explores the advantages of connecting contemporary debates about global order and democracy to those in the 1940s– and the costs of failing to do so– in greater depth. Beginning with how contemporary understandings of democracy in a global context have narrowed in spite of the re-emergence of the 'challenge of democratic modernity', part one argues for a 'return' to global order in our approach to this challenge and considers the ways in which the visions of order in 1940s might contain 'lessons' for us today. Part two turns to the inherent shortcomings and contradictions that plague visions of democratic global order. It argues that, having rejected both an historicist and idealist reading of 1940s internationalism, a more critical but more honest approach to these ideas in the present might help us to mitigate the double standards and exclusionary practices that efforts to build a democratic world order entail. It might also help us decide whether we want to persist in such efforts at all.

It is this issue more than any other that, finally, supports the key argument introduced in the introduction of this investigation, that although visions of democratic world order are not timeless abstractions that can be easily compared, or ideas whose development can be linearly traced from the past to the present; as reflections of on-going debates concerning the nature of

democratic modernity, they can be connected and to some extent compared across time. In part this is because, as Tony Judt argued, we are in the 21st century witnessing the 'return' of the central debate of the mid-century in the form of renewed contestation surrounding liberal democracy.[487] More accurately, we might say that the debate that emerged in the 1940s never really went away. The core concerns within the challenge of democratic modernity in the 1940s, from the controlled use of scientific expertise in search of improved living standards to the protection of the individual from the state, were fundamentally rooted in the era of total war, totalitarianism and the birth of global technological modernity in the early twentieth century. Much has changed, yet we are in many ways still living under the same, albeit amplified conditions of global modernity in which the same questions about liberty in a complex, interconnected world remain deeply relevant. All the more so when, increasingly, the liberal formulas that internationalists in the 1940s sought to relegate to the museum of ideological antiquities– liberal democracy, laissez-faire capitalism and even the nation state– appear not to have been successfully updated for the 21st century by their successors.

In one sense, therefore, the argument that we should approach visions of democratic global order as ideas about democratic modernity, or the pursuit of liberty in a complex society, is temporally bound by technological, mass modernity and the birth of the global. In another, both the ideas explored in this thesis and contemporary debates about democracy are connected a much larger patterns of contestation within the idea of democracy that predate the advent of global modernity. The tension between individual and community rights, popular participation and good governance, positive and negative liberty, equality and hierarchy that played out in visions of democratic modernity in the 1940s– and continue to do so today– are part of a much longer history of democracy as an essentially contested concept reaching back to the 18th century if not before. Since the 1940s, the scale and dimensions along which these tensions are navigated have been transformed by the global. For this reason, when we debate

[487] Tony Judt, *Reappraisals: Reflections on the Forgotten Twentieth Century* (New York: Penguin, 2008), 89.

democracy today it is imperative that we also debate global order and above all, realise that– like the 1940s– there is no way in which a new kind of democratic modernity can be imagined without considering what role global order would play in its delivery. As we will see below this is not, unfortunately, the prevailing view.

7.2 Global Order and Democracy in the 21st Century

Like the 1930s and 40s, the axioms of liberal modernity are once again being called into question, fuelling the emergence of alternative visions of freedom in a complex society– or democratic modernity– in the 21st century. Amidst growing disenchantment with liberal Parliamentarism, models of democracy claiming to offer a more meaningful sense of community and self-government in the modern world are flourishing both within and outside the West.[488] The negative effects of neo-liberal economics and the financial crisis have inspired visions of a new economic system that promotes greater security, equality, individual dignity and local autonomy– or 'economic democracy'.[489] Concerns about the liberty of the individual confronted with the overwhelming power of modern technology, be it in the hands of states, transnational corporations and international bodies, are re-emerging from their post-Cold War slumber, prompting demands for new systems of protection. At the same time, the palpable dysfunction of modern democratic politics has revived claims that only expert leadership can satisfy 'the ever growing demands which men make of life' and secure liberty in a complex, interdependent world.

Contestation between alternative visions of democratic modernity is also growing. This is itself an important sign of change as it includes many ideas that are not only not Western but

[488] Republican, deliberative, communitarian, associative, agonistic, feminist, green, social and religious models of democracy have all gained new life. Richard Youngs, *The Puzzle of Non-Western Democracy* (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2015), 85, 178 fn.7.
[489] Wolfgang Streeck and Armin Schafer, *Politics in the Age of Austerity* (Cambridge: Polity, 2013).

also far from liberal.[490] While overtly 'authoritarian' or 'illiberal' visions of democracy are still widely rejected, these too are treated with a new seriousness.[491] The situation is not unlike the 1940s, when Western intellectuals rejected totalitarian conceptions of modernity but still engaged with their claims to provide a truer form of 'democracy' based on economic justice and community and sought to address the shortcomings they highlighted in their own democratic ideals. Today, even non-secular, non-national, non-capitalist and even the non-participative ideas of democratic modernity are the legitimate subject of debate. Regardless of whether these iconoclastic conceptions of democracy are accepted or not, at the very least, a growing number of observers have recognised that, as John Keane has argued, the 21st century demands a 'more capacious, globally sensitive understanding of freedom, citizenship and democracy' that challenges the narrowly liberal- or neo-liberal-, national, secular and universalist model that triumphed in the immediate post Cold War period.[492]

It is a paradox, therefore, that as democracy seemingly reverts back to its existence as the paradigmatically 'open' and contested political concept that WB Gallie observed half a century ago, visions of democratic global order continue to reflect this much narrower model. Scholars and practitioners have continued to focus on questions of representation, accountability and civil society, translating these into visions of democratic order defined by the 'democratisation' of international organisations and the presence of internationally shared liberal norms that will preserve and propagate a liberal world economy, cooperative international relations and–implicitly–liberal democratic systems.

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[490] John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, *The Fourth Revolution: The Global Race to Reinvent the State* (London: Allen Lane, 2014); Youngs, *The Puzzle of Non-Western Democracy*. Fareed Zakaria, *The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad* (New York & London: W. W. Norton, 2007).

[491] Daniel Bell's recent defence of Chinese 'vertical democratic meritocracy', for example, has been met with interest and scepticism but very little scorn; Daniel A. Bell, *The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy.* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015). Daniel A. Bell et al., "Can the China Model Succeed?", in *Can the China Model Succeed* (New York: Asia Society, 2015).

[492] Cited in Youngs, *The Puzzle of Non-Western Democracy*, 85; John Keane, *The Life and Death of Democracy* (London: Simon & Schuster, 2009).

Among those who reject any possible alternative to liberal democracy, for whom democracy is consequently in 'retreat' worldwide, this is perhaps not surprising. Robert Kagan, for example, has on this basis argued that a democratic global order is simply one where liberal democracies remain on top and the rules of the existing liberal order are enforced, leading to the gradual spread of democracy world wide.[493] Unlike American internationalists who proposed the 'extension' of democracy under American leadership in 1940s, however, Kagan and many of his prominent contemporaries do not address the obvious dangers and contradictions of this position or engage with alternative conceptions of democratic modernity emerging within and outside the west. They are in this sense the intellectual inheritors of the 'bland fanatics of Western civilization' that Reinhold Niebuhr lamented had replaced the thoughtful voices of Buell and Lilienthal as the Cold War progressed, not the protagonists of this investigation themselves.[494]

Even scholars and practitioners who do recognise and nominally accept the emergence of alternative visions of democratic modernity reveal an enduring liberal bias in their conception of a more democratic global order for the 21st century. This order, they argue, should be characterised by greater pluralism, reflecting the new multipolarity of ideas as well as power. Translated into visions of balanced representation– or 'shared leadership'– within international institutions, this view clearly conforms to the literal, not to say liberal, understanding of democratic global order that focuses on equal state representation. In many cases, moreover, the stability of this new 'democratic' system is revealed to depend on convergence around set of core liberal-democratic norms and practices.[495] Tellingly, while

[493] Kagan, "Is Democracy in Decline? The Weight of Geopolitics".
[494] Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Structure of Nations and Empires: A Study of the Recurring Patterns and Problems of the Political Order in Relation to the Unique Problems of the Nuclear Age* (Scribner, 1959). Pankaj Mishra, "The Western Model Is Broken", *The Guardian*, 14.10. 2014. Michael Mandelbaum, *The Ideas That Conquered the World: Peace, Democracy, and Free Markets in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Public Affairs, 2002); *The Case for Goliath: How America Acts as the World's Government in the Twenty-First Century*, 1st ed. ed. (New York: PublicAffairs ; London: Perseus Running, 2005). Niall Ferguson, *Civilization: The Six Killer Apps of Western Power* (London: Penguin, 2012).
[495] Many of these scholars are essentially confident that the central ideas of the liberal order are resilient and that the crisis of the current order is primarily one of authority alone. Dunne and

scholars such as John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan suggest that 'alternatives to the Western way', 'multiple modernities' might be reflected in the development of new regional architecture, their focus remains on how 'Western' ideas might guide 'democratic' regionalisation and on the underlying solidarism around core values that will harmonise regional worlds.[496] The result, described by political philosophers as 'differentiated universalism' or 'thin' cosmopolitanism, is finally not unlike David Held's 'new medievalism' that based a pluralistic global democracy on conformity to basic democratic principles in 1995.[497]

The stubborn universalism within cosmopolitan dreams of 'transposition' and, more broadly, in the effort to improve the accountability of global governance is equally apparent. While the critique that these 'merely seek to scale up standard liberal democracy'[498] goes too far, even more sophisticated models of cosmopolitan democracy or 'networked' governance' that aim to close the 'accountability gap' or 'democratic deficit' between international institutions, nation states and their citizens are still rooted in an procedural conception of democracy and democratic legitimacy that conforms to a broadly liberal model. These ideas do not question the efficacy or sufficiency of these yardsticks of democracy. Although many of these scholars

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Flockhart, *Liberal World Orders*; Ikenberry, "The Future of Liberal World Order"; "The Future of Multilateralism: Governing the World in a Post-Hegemonic Era", *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 16, no. 3 (2015); *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order* (Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2011).

[496] Kupchan argues that the West should both lead in constructing a more pluralist approach to legitimacy and serve as a model for regional governance; the result will not be a 'homogenous brand of Western modernity' but will ensure that a world of multiple modernities will still converge around the Western values of 'political and ideological tolerance coupled with economic dynamism' Kupchan, *No One's World: The West, The Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn*, 193, 197, 205. Similarly, although John Ikenberry concedes that alternative values might be channelled into new regional architectures, he also insists that the there are 'possibilities for the old liberal international order to be updated and refurbished' on the grounds that rising powers 'are not putting forward ideas for international order that require a fundamental break with the existing system'; convergence around the guiding norms of the existing system remains the most likely scenario. Unlike Kupchan, Ikenberry is clearly sceptical that challengers to the liberal order possess what might properly be called alternative visions of 'modernity' at all; The problem is primarily one of authority, not fundamental principles. In both cases, however, the effect of regionalisation/pluralisation is essentially the same: to reinforce the fundamental principles of the existing liberal democratic model of order. Ikenberry, "The Future of Multilateralism: Governing the World in a Post-Hegemonic Era", 412.

[497] Held, *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance*. 140. Youngs, *The Puzzle of Non-Western Democracy,* 87-8.

[498] *The Puzzle of Non-Western Democracy,* 90.

acknowledge that liberal democracies are malfunctioning in a globalised world, they also believe that the literal democratisation of the structures of global order will restore national democracies at the same time rendering global order itself democratic to a large extent regardless of the existence and nature of the deeper normative aims of that order.[499] In so doing, they confirm that there is nothing essentially wrong or lacking in existing models of liberal democracy.

As the above demonstrates, at same time as conceptions of democratic order have narrowed, they have also become much shallower. Compared to the 1940s, visions of democratic global order today largely fail to consider what role the structures of regional or global order might play in the delivery of alternative visions of democratic modernity, to say nothing of the way in which they might address the contradictions and shortcomings such an effort would inevitably entail. Arguably, even the way in which global order does or should promote a liberal vision of democratic modernity and the costs and shortcomings associated with this objective is itself barely considered among those for whom it clearly remains the primary goal of a 'democratic' global order. Yet it remains more striking that even scholars like Amitav Acharya, whose 'multiplex' world embraces multiple visions of modernity– dispensing with the solidarist caveat– gives only limited consideration to the ideational 'plots' of these alternative visions in conjunction with new 'regional worlds'.[500] Similarly, advocates of 'agonistic' pluralism for whom the normative equality of competing democratic models, liberal or not, means that a more democratic, pluralist world order cannot by definition depend on or impose shared values, contain no notion of how global order and alternative

[499] Much as Rosanvallon argues (see footnote 43) Rosanvallon and Moyn, *Democracy Past and Future*, 228.
[500] Commenting, for example, that China's lack of an attractive ideology makes it unlikely to emerge as a regional hegemon in Asia. Critiquing 'hegemonic' models of regionalism that suggest a regional world will only be stable if it follows the European model, Acharya's vision of cooperation and 'collusion' in a pluralist global order, like his interpretation of regionalisation itself, is primarily interest driven. Acharya, *The End of American World Order*, 111, 94, 117.

visions of democracy interact or indeed depend on one another.[501] Among the few scholars who do talk about the expansion of liberty that will result from the deepening of non-Western forms of democracy worldwide, the role of global order in this transformation remains entirely permissive, if not absent. It is nation states that are finally, if not exclusively, responsible for the delivery of more 'authentic' forms of liberty to their citizens.[502]

Similarly, among those who argue that democracy in the West is in dire need of transformation, the retreat from global order in the way such a transformation is imagined is equally apparent. This is especially ironic in view of prominent position of globalisation and the existing structures of regional and global order occupy in these critiques. Yet while mass migration, neoliberal capitalism and transnational elites are blamed for the malfunctioning of national democracies in the 21st century, the relationship between democratic renewal and global order remains unexplored, to the extent that attitudes towards democratic reform at a global and domestic level can even be incoherent. Mark Mazower's critique of the 'undemocratic' power of global technocracy and American 'democratic imperialism' past and present, for example, remains strangely disjointed– if not at odds– from his view, so redolent of the 1940s, that the present crisis of democracy might necessitate a form of republican elitism to render decision making manageable in such a complex world and to arrive at some notion of the common good that he believes contemporary liberal democracies badly need.[503]

Most often, the global dimension of these critiques has been limited to the removal of perceived obstacles and threats that exist at the international level to the reform of democratic

[501] Chantal Mouffe, "Democracy in a Multipolar World", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 37, no. 3 (2009), 553. Mouffe argues that a degree of conflict, whether it takes place between states or regional blocs, is both inevitable and preferable to a system that seeks to impose a single model of liberal democratic modernity. Mouffe is similarly unconvinced by illusions of global ethics, global civil society and other cosmopolitan dreams.

[502] Richard Youngs hopes that a more pluralist order will not only be more 'democratic' in horizontal sense, it will also– provided it occurs within certain normative parameters defined as 'liberalism plus'– encourage the 'vertical' expansion of liberty within states resulting in a freer more progressive [democratic] world. Youngs, *The Puzzle of Non-Western Democracy,* 105.

[503] Mark Mazower, "Has Democracy Had Its Day?", *Prospect*, no. May (2013), 30.

systems, not how a reformed global order might itself be instrumental, even essential, to the delivery of a new kind of democracy for the 21st century. In a European context, for example, where critics have argued that the technocratic nature and neoliberal ideology of the EU has hollowed out democracy and even threatens it with extinction, for many the only to democratic redemption is through radical reforms to national political and economic structures freed from the intrusions of regional and global orders. Both the potentially positive role of global order and the negative effects of national retrenchment are not recognised. As we will see below, this is in large part because of narrow ways in which the relationship between global order and democracy is conceived. If a more 'democratic' Europe merely implies a strengthening of the European parliament or a democratic apotheosis of a Habermasian variety, it is unsurprising that those seeking more radical change in the nature of democratic societies domestically tend to dismiss the role of the EU as secondary at best and inherently obstructive at worst.[504]

7.3 Global Order and the Challenge of Democratic Modernity in the 21st Century: The View from the 1940s

Rhetorically at least, renewed contestation surrounding democracy in the 21st century is clearly 'back' in contemporary debates about world order.[505] Crucially, however while we are confronted with many of the same questions relating to freedom in a complex society and many of the same tensions and dilemmas raised by the competing imperatives of modern liberty as internationalists in 1940s faced-we have not, at a deeper level, connected the return

[504] Susan Watkins, "The Political State of the Union", *The New Left Review* 90 no. November-December 2014 (2014); "Vanity and Venality", *The London Review of Books* 35, no. 16 (2013). To restore a 'democracy capable of serving as a meaningful corrective of capitalism', argues Wolfgang Streeck, the only alternative to pessimism (or revolution) is to reassert democratic control over capitalism through nation states. Streeck's view is typical of a wider trend in contemporary critiques of liberal democracy which demonstrate little or no interest in how a new kind of democracy– whether social, economic, communitarian or otherwise– might be brought into being through the simultaneous re-imagination of regional or global orders and indeed only through such means. Wolfgang Streeck, "Comment on Wolfgang Merkel, 'Is Capitalism Compatible with Democracy?'", *Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft,* 9, no. 1-2 (2015), 59.
[505] Ali, "The New World Disorder."

of the 'challenge' of democratic modernity to the re-imagination of a democratic global order. Instead, in stark contrast to the ideas explored in this investigation, contemporary responses to crisis of liberal democracy appear parochial and, to some extent, naïve. Not only would internationalists in the 1940s have thought it was unrealistic to imagine that a new vision of democracy could emerge without the involvement if not the direct assistance of regional or global agencies and institutions, they would have been amazed by the extent to which the importance of this relationship for global peace has been forgotten. Internationalists in the 1940s were convinced that transcending the ideal of national liberal parliamentary democracies and the preservation of global peace were one and the same. In contrast today, evidence that the failure of this same model to deliver a meaningful sense of liberty to its citizens might be fostering conflict within and between societies in the 21st century is met with vigorous denial.[506]

The first 'lesson' of the 1940s is therefore obvious. Instead of focusing on representation and accountability or global pluralism per se, we should consider how the democratisation of global order in the 21st century might be defined and driven by particular objectives emerging from alternative– and not necessarily liberal– visions of modernity. In the language of this study, we should explore the ways in which a reformed global order might help us to preserve, expand and extend liberty in the modern globalised world and, related to this, how such efforts might simultaneously limit liberty in certain aspects and applications.

Recent years have seen some encouraging moves in this direction.[507] To support this research, more historical work exploring ideas of global order from the vantage point of contested

[506] Partly as a result perhaps of the way in which we have thought about the 'lessons' of the 20th century. Judt, *Reappraisals: Reflections on the Forgotten Twentieth Century*.

[507] Scholars working within the *Building Global Democracy Programme*, for example, are delving deeper into the ideal of global pluralism and exploring what competing models of democracy might actually mean in the context of new regional orders. Thinking globally, BS Chimni has challenged what he calls the liberal 'bourgeois' ideal of global democracy, arguing for a form of 'insurgent cosmopolitanism' that puts 'global social welfare', achieved through fundamental changes in the workings of global capitalism, at its heart. Echoing internationalists in the 1940s, in Chimni's vision of

conceptions of democratic modernity, perhaps especially in a non-Western context, is also needed. In light of the substantive similarities between the challenges facing liberal democracies today and the 1940s, however, the way in which internationalists addressed the core concerns of democratic modernity in their visions of global order in that period remains particularly relevant. In part, this is because of the way it suggests that the nascent solutions offered today, many of which echo the 1940s, could be furthered through reforms to the structures and activities of global order. Yet it is also because certain aspects of the challenge of modernity in 1940s that were central to visions of democratic global order are arguably underplayed in contemporary debates. Three areas of concern in the 1940s are particularly noteworthy and are briefly considered below: the search for economic justice, the transformation of democratic participation and protection from the state.

Returning to the ideas of democratic order in the 1940s based on notions of economic justice the most important 'lesson' we might learn can be summarised in one word: radicalism. Amidst the growing critique of the neo liberal economic order's effects on democracy, echoes of Polanyi can be heard in renewed calls to 're-embed' capitalism in the 21st century.[508] In part because of the way Polanyi himself has been hijacked by historians and supporters of 'embedded liberalism', however, framing the debate in this language has, as we have seen, re-nationalised the problem of 'economic democracy' in the 21st century. A new democratic order based on economic justice conjures an ideal of regulated capitalism in which nation states play the leading role, either by implementing internationally agreed standards or by

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democratic global order, the extension of participative structures to the international level itself is seen as important but not essential. Notably, the forms of participation Chimni proposes do not mimic liberal democracy. In another echo of the 1940s, he proposes an alternative form of decentralised, regional participation designed to empower marginalised groups including the labouring masses but also (unlike the 1940s) women. B. S. Chimni, "Global Capitalism and Global Democracy", in *Global Democracy: Normative and Empirical Perspectives*, ed. Daniele Archibugi, Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, and Raffaele Marchetti (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
The Building Global Democracy Programme is organized through Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at Warwick. All the papers on 'Conceptualising Global Democracy' are available online http://www.buildingglobaldemocracy.org/conceptualising-global-democracy-library

[508] Nancy Fraser, "A Triple Movement? Parsing the Politics of Crisis after Polanyi", *The New Left Review* 81, no. May/June (2013).

reasserting 'democratic control' over the economy, taking back power from the international to restore and enhance the full panoply of social protections offered by the welfare state.[509]

As we saw in chapter five, however, the state-centric story of 'embedded liberalism' was only one idea among many in the 1940s. Other visions of economic justice imagined a far greater role for international institutions than what emerged after Bretton Woods. Revisiting these ideas is important not because we should import the planned models that were advanced then. It does, however, suggest a space for more interventionist- or imaginative- forms of supranational economic governance as a path to economic justice than contemporary critics of the 'neo-liberal' global order are willing to imagine. It also suggests that without rethinking how global order needs to change to promote 'economic democracy' such hopes are not likely to be realised.

Ideas of this kind are emerging and even resemble those put forward in the 1940s.[510] Yet they remain on the fringes in a world where, in contrast to the 1940s, redistributive measures are spurned, labour rights are under attack and free trade, the market economy and limited financial regulation is still seen by many as the best and only means to secure 'freedom from want' measured in terms of global economic growth. Among those trying to counter this

[509] This is the image conjured by Tony Judt's appeal to the post-war order. Judt argued that we should try and restore the pro-state attitude of liberals and social democrats alike in the 1940s to the collective memory of the 20th century in order to understand that in the post-national anti-state environment of the 21st century fostered by the neo-liberal international system that it is possible to have 'too little' as well as too much state. Once again, global order is the opponent not the unavoidable ally of reform. Judt, *Reappraisals: Reflections on the Forgotten Twentieth Century*.

[510] In an echo of Barbara Ward's Planning 'Boards', for example, recent efforts to reform ECOSOC pushed for the creation of an Economic and Social Security Council with enhanced powers to manage the global economy in order to promote greater equality In 'larger freedom' paper https://www.globalpolicy.org/social-and-economic-policy/social-and-economic-policy-at-the-un/reform-of-ecosoc-and-the-social-and-economic-policy-process-at-the-un/47509.html// https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/225-general/52530-implementing-rio20-ecosocs-new-role-and-its-old-culture.html. Recent years have also seen efforts to revive the 1944 'Spirit of Philadelphia' and develop a stronger international architecture for the protection and promotion of social and economic rights. Arguably, we are even beginning to see a return to hybrid ideals of international planning that characterised many visions of economic democracy in the 1940s. China's 'One Belt One Road' Initiative hinges on a complex, centrally directed plan- itself based on needs of Chinese 'planned' economy- that aims to pull in private enterprises in the region and beyond promising to improve the living standards of all. Charles Parton, "China's Foreign Policy as Domestic Policy: The Case of 'One Belt, One Road'" (Chatham House, London, 29.09 2015).

view, as well as pushing them to think more about how global order could be allied to this task, returning to the 1940s also alerts us is to the trade-offs and limitations the pursuit of a democratic global order based on economic justice entails. As we saw in chapter six, visions of economic democracy were often Eurocentric, focusing on the needs of advanced industrial economies. As a whole, we saw how the ideas that were advanced, despite rhetorical commitments to the contrary, ultimately neglected the pursuit of equality in the management of the global economy and the real equalisation of global living standards. As we will see further in part two, this raises important– and in some cases identical–questions about the groups we may or may not privilege in our own visions of global justice which, particularly in the West, like the 1940s have grown in strength only as the global economic system has begun to hurt the advanced world. Moreover, like the 1940s, while greater equality in the management of the global economy has been touted as a key aspect of a more democratic world order, efforts to redress the balance within existing international institutions have stalled.[511] Similarly, commitments to economic equalisation between the global North and South– and indeed within the North– are comparatively muted themes of contemporary debates.[512] The West's idea of economic democracy, it seems, remains a system promotes the general prosperity of all and entrenches the dominance of the richest countries, rather than equality.

These questions and critiques are by no means absent from contemporary debates. Returning to their longer history in the 1940s, however, may still prove informative. Similarly, revisiting the way in which internationalists in the 1940s connected visions of global order to the re-imagination of participation and representation– one of the most neglected aspects of the international thought in this period– is equally important. At time when the liberal parliamentary ideal is once again under intense pressure, this critical question is all too often absent from debates about democratic world order. The need to restart this conversation could

[511] Leading to the creation of new and supposedly more 'democratic' entities such as the AIIB.
[512] As the opposition to a fiscal transfer mechanism within the European Union demonstrates.

not be more obvious. In the Middle East, for example, where the failure of liberal democratic systems to secure a sense of political belonging is bloodily playing out, the need for a new regional order that might devolve power to different groups, or permit some other form of participation beyond 'one man one vote' in the context of a secular, multi-party national democracies seems very important.

Again, this is not to say that we will embrace the visions of radical pluralism or corporatism advanced by the likes of Marc or Mitrany that flourished in the 1940s. It is interesting to note, however, that where there has been some renewed effort to think about how more meaningful forms of identity or interest based participation could be fostered by– and even in– changes to the architecture of global order, ideas have echoed those of the 1940s.[513] Finally, however, it is the more general way in which the example of the 1940s prompts us to think about how we might use regional and global orders to transform conceptions and structures of democratic participation– and to evaluate the normative validity of these attempts– that is most important. In the context of debates about global order and democracy, moreover, these ideas offer a valuable corrective to the still dominant view that fails to question whether the 'transposition' of liberal democratic practices to the global level or the restoration of 'democratic control' at a national level will succeed in reproducing an authentic sense of self-government to the disillusioned citizens of existing liberal democracies.

In light of the continent's history and ideas explored in this investigation, it is certainly a bitter irony that Europeans today should be clamouring for a return to the nation state as a

[513] In Europe, solutions to the crisis of liberal parliamentary democracy are once again being sought at a regional level through new ideas of decentralisation, even interest-identity based participation– in a some cases within a federal framework. A growing number of works in the field of 'cosmopolitan democracy' have suggested alternative structures of participation that would offer a more meaningful opportunity for individual and global 'self determination' than direct elections. Terry Macdonald, "Citizens or Stakeholders? Exclusion, Equality and Legitimacy in Global Stakeholder Democracy," in *Global Democracy: Normative and Empirical Perspectives*, ed. Daniele Archibugi, Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, and Raffaele Marchetti (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Kate Macdonald, "Global Democracy for a Partially Joined-up World: Towards a Multi-Level System of Public Power and Democratic Governance?", ibid; Della Porta, *Can Democracy Be Saved?: Participation, Deliberation and Social Movements*. Andreas Gross, "Towards a Better European Democracy: Facing the Challenges of a Federal Europe", (Strasbourg: The Council of Europe, 2014).

solution to their growing sense of disenfranchisement. In the 1940s, internationalists were united in the belief that boosting the power of modern states in an interdependent, global world would not rescue but risk undermining liberty, democracy and peace. Confronted with this reality, they tried to find ways to preserve and enhance meaningful self-government and– in most cases– retain the nation as a valuable community and source of identity that did not, however, result in the excessive empowerment of the state or the exclusive identification of democracy with the nation state.

Today, this elementary notion of free and progressive world order seems in danger of being lost. Instead of remembering why internationalists in the 1940s sought to moderate the power of nation states, the renewed and bloody failures of the Wilsonian ideal of national self-determination are construed as further reason to pursue a vision of a peaceful world order built on the basis of stable nation states.[514] In the West, the lack of focus on the dangers of the modern state in contemporary debates on global order and democracy is particularly striking. Amidst growing calls to 'return' power to national parliaments in the name of democracy there is very little talk about how the effect of this move will also be to empower states that are already infringing on the liberties and even the physical security of their own citizens– and indeed those of other states– through mass surveillance, new security laws and drone strikes. It is not at all clear why citizens of liberal democracies should believe that making the state stronger, as opposed to changing models of participation, will make them feel more in control of their own lives than they do at present. The experience of the 1930s points to a more worrying outcome. Finding themselves incapable of delivering the prosperity and security their citizens demand in an interdependent world, democracies, like any other regime, will begin to centralise and compete with other states in a bid to secure sufficient power and

[514] The popular analogy that compares the present situation in the Middle East to the Thirty Years' War, for example, is not used to suggest an alternative model of national/regional governance but to support a vision of Westphalian catharsis when religiously motivated conflict will finally be replaced by a stable, state based order. In addition, by focusing on failed states and non-state actors as the prime source of conflict in the globalised 21st century, we have arguably obscured extent to which states, democratic or not, are once again the instigators and protagonists of conflict.

resources to do so. It is a further irony that part of the reason why this danger is largely ignored in the West is the jackbooted image of state tyranny in the 1930s and 1940s that remains its most potent and prized legacy. Today, in the absence of overt repression, the West remains all too willing to believe that tyranny, like the past, is another country.

7.4 The Enduring Dilemma of Democratic Global Order

'Freedom is the purpose of order, and order the guarantee of freedom'[515]

Xi Jinping, 22 September 2015

The final and most important 'lesson' of this study for contemporary debates concerns the challenges and contradictions that accompany any attempt to build a democratic global order. In the 1940s, internationalists routinely undermined or otherwise limited the inclusivity, egalitarianism, pluralism and accountability of their visions of democratic order. Claims for greater equality were combined with Western leadership, weighted voting structures and other double standards. Very different notions of democratic order were applied within and outside the West, not least via intrinsically hierarchical ideas of development. Advocates of supranational union chose to limit the ideal of a fully integrated and participative order to the advanced Western democracies and even sub-groups among them. Claims for global pluralism were often married to an overt desire to spread a single model of democracy worldwide. Technocrats like Monnet and Boyd Orr sought to limit direct participation in the new architecture of global governance. Socialists like EH Carr arguably downgraded the importance of political rights as a whole in their imagination of a democratic global order. At the extreme, visions of order were even combined with empire. René Cassin argued that empires could be used as the vehicle to extend and expand global liberty without the extension of political rights and national independence to the colonial world.

[515] "Full Transcript: Interview with Chinese President Xi Jinping", *Wall Street Journal*, 22.09 2015.

To critics such as Mark Mazower and Duncan Bell, these exclusions and contradictions belie any claim that internationalists in the 1940s sought to build a democratic world order. Instead, they reveal the essential continuity between pre-war and postwar internationalism construed as an effort to sanitise and entrench Western dominance. There is no doubt that many of these exclusions and limitations were indeed the product of imperialism, Eurocentrism and racism, not to mention sexism and xenophobia. In some cases, for example, it was clear that weighted voting structures reflected little more than a desire to ensure that 'Asiatics' would never outvote whites. Similarly, the total absence of the global in some visions of European Union revealed a reflexive Eurocentrism in which the pursuit of liberty and prosperity within Europe was one and the same as building a democratic and peaceful 'world order'. Finally, among supporters of refurbished hierarchical arrangements between the Western and non-Western world, be it through 'democratic' imperial formations or Western led development more broadly, there were clearly those who continued to view these through the racial prism of the 'mission civilatrice' with little prospect, as a result, that these hierarchies would eventually give way to more egalitarian arrangements.

In spite of this, however, this investigation has demonstrated that a purely historicist or realist reading of these contradictions is insufficient and even inappropriate. Claims to leadership, the absence of participative structures and even the exclusions of particular groups were not simply the product of inherited ideas about race and civilisation or a reflection of pure power politics. They were also the product of inherent tensions within the idea of democracy that have been debated throughout its history as an 'essentially contested concept' of government by, for and of the people. The enduring tensions between solidarism and pluralism, hierarchy and equality, good governance and participation, collectivism and individualism and positive and negative liberty undoubtedly intensified with the advent of complex, technological modernity in the late 19th and early 20th century but they were by no means new. The greatest novelty of the 1940s was not the presence but the internationalisation or globalisation

of these dilemmas as a result of global interdependence and the war itself. As a result, addressing these tensions was no longer an exclusively national matter but extended to the architecture of global order. Moreover, in contrast to totalitarian visions of domestic and international order, a democratic global order would not only need to support democratic national systems as they struggled to redefine and reassert themselves in the modern world, it had itself to embody an acceptable balance between order and liberty. For example, while internationalists like Buell believed that a democratic global order, like national democracies, required the leadership of a 'gifted minority' and the propagation of core shared values, ensuring the preservation and equality of diverse national communities and cultures was equally important. The global scope and dimension of the dilemmas of democratic governance added one further complication. It also meant that the search for democratic order collided with the inescapable reality of global politics: power. The scale of power had been transformed but had not ceased to matter in the global world. As a result, internationalists' quest for a progressive world order that would support the flourishing of liberty was fused, reconciled and frequently disfigured by their concern to retain and use national power.

Confronted with these dilemmas internationalists, like other Western intellectuals rethinking liberal democracy for the postwar age, had to make choices. These choices entailed costs in terms of inclusivity, participation and even rights. Those who pressed for technocratic visions of national and international order, for example, did so in the belief that rule by experts, as opposed to a more participative model of democratic governance, was the best way create a democratic order that would expand and extend liberty in the era of mass politics, either because it would meet the needs that were seen as requirements of modern liberty and assist in the wider transformation of democratic societies, or because it would serve to limit the dangerous power of modern states under global conditions. Although this investigation has underscored the willingness of Western democrats to bolster the power of the experts in both the national and international context in the 1940s, only in a very few cases did we see that

advocates of technocracy were motivated by an overtly 'anti-democratic' desire to actively constrain the masses.

Hierarchical visions of global leadership and development, exclusive visions of union, ambitions to promote a single model of democracy worldwide and even the denial of national rights reflected similar decisions about best way to promote liberty, as well as serving national interests, in a diverse and challenging global context. In most cases, for example, weighted voting structures were justified on the grounds of relative political and economic development. They reflected the need, internationalists like Hutchins argued, to preserve Western leadership within the new global order pending the achievement of higher levels of global economic equality and political democratisation necessary for a more egalitarian system to function effectively. In the latter case, Cassin, Du Bois and Senghor argued that protecting basic human rights, enhancing local forms of autonomy and the promotion of socio-economic development constituted a more meaningful advancement of liberty than political rights or the possession of nation state- for the time being at least.

Importantly, internationalists in the 1940s were well aware of the trade-offs involved in their pursuit of a democratic system that would guarantee liberty in the modern world. Most tried hard to find a balance between efficiency and participation, solidarism and pluralism and equality and hierarchy in their visions of order and to otherwise justify or mitigate the negative effects of their choices. The exclusion of the non-Western World from Barbara Ward's Atlantic Union, for example, was an attempt to combine greater pluralism and equality with hierarchy– in the form of Anglo-American leadership– and the solidarist or universalist aim to spread a particular model of political democracy and regulated capitalism worldwide. Ward's Atlantic Union would not only safeguard and promote 'larger freedom' within the West; it would act as an example– and de facto global rule setter– for the rest of the 'free' world that would lead to the gradual convergence around shared democratic values. Among technocrats and planners, including those most convinced that particular outcomes

were important to the emergence of a new democratic order than participation, we saw many ways in which internationalists tried not only to mitigate the risks of centralised planning but to preserve and even enhance participation and pluralism. This was also true among the many internationalists, such as David Lilienthal, who connected development to global democratisation.

The success of such efforts remains open to doubt, as are the larger decisions to embrace technocracy, promote economic justice over political rights or exclude certain groups, nations or regions from visions of unions. Internationalists themselves were certainly not easily convinced by each other's claims to have fused order and liberty successfully. On the contrary, a Goldilocks debate raged throughout the decade between internationalists who claimed rival visions of democratic order were too exclusive, hierarchical, individualistic, collectivist, participative, technocratic, 'political', solidarist/universalising or even, as Eugene Staley feared, too pluralistic.

To contemporary observers, there is clearly much to dislike or reject about 1940s conceptions of democratic global order. Monnet's feeble attempt to offer some form of accountability through the weakly participative notion of social concertation, for example, is unlikely to convince many. More generally, visions of order that not only downplayed but even denied political and national rights are surely to be seen as entirely unacceptable. Crucially, however, this remains a question of normative judgment. Where a racist element clearly underpinned the denial of political rights in the context of the French Union or ideas about colonial development and trusteeship, this judgement is not only obvious but absolute: these were not legitimate or genuine visions of democratic order. In contrast, the idea that a global order that guaranteed basic human rights, local autonomy and greater social and economic justice without insisting on national self determination in the form of a nation state could be considered democratic, as Senghor, Bunche and Cassin– in theory– believed, cannot be

dismissed out of hand.[516] The idea that national independence, like representation within international organisations, is the be all and end all of democratic global order is finally a normative and contestable position.

Similarly, technocratic visions of order that actively sought to exclude the masses in the service of an explicitly authoritarian vision of society or claims to leadership based on race should clearly be rejected as fundamentally undemocratic. Claims to leadership or technocracy as whole, however, including those that explicitly sought to minimise opportunities for direct participation, cannot be so easily dismissed. As we saw, justifications for technocracy or American leadership in the 1940s emerged from genuine attempts to promote visions of democratic society that were in large part participative, pluralistic and egalitarian. Most were accompanied by some effort to reflect these goals even in the 'undemocratic' structures of order they proposed to achieve them. These may not be persuasive, either substantively– as visions of democratic society– or structurally, in the way that the imagined global orders mirrored and interacted with domestic orders. In some cases we also saw that internationalists proposed a more overt trade-off between a technocratic and hierarchical global order and a participative and egalitarian domestic order. How we should judge these ideas, however, still requires careful consideration.

The reason why this is so important is that while we may reject the choices and trade-offs internationalists in the 1940s were willing to make, the dilemmas of democratic modernity that prompted their decisions have not gone away. Under the global conditions of modernity it is in a sense our fate to negotiate the core dilemmas of democratic order in a manner that embraces the global, to secure not only our own liberty but also peace. It is for this reason

[516] Cassin sits awkwardly in this trio; the reality of the empire he actively supported was of course completely different and fatally undermined any claim that it could act as a vehicle and container for a new democracy for its citizens. It remains the case, however, that while Cassin was clearly hypocritical in his attitude to the French Empire, he still believed that democratic societies were not one and the same as nation states but depended on criteria that could be fulfilled by other means and in other contexts.

above all that our tendency to historicise the shortcomings or 'failures' of past visions of democratic global order, or otherwise to dismiss these as covers for racism and power politics needs to be contested. Doing so is not only inaccurate; it perpetuates an idealist conception of democratic global order that would be free of such contradictions that is entirely unobtainable. We imagine democratic global order as one that would be fully inclusive, participative and egalitarian. This misleading impression is compounded by the binaries that are still deployed to talk about global order and democracy and internationalism more broadly, including nationalism vs. internationalism, technocracy vs. democracy, hierarchy vs. egalitarianism and cosmopolitanism vs. power politics.

This idealism hinders our ability to promote a global order that will preserve, expand and extend liberty in the 21st century. Searching for a new vision of democratic modernity today will still involve a series of judgements, choices and trade-offs relating to participation, efficiency, equality, pluralism and, at a deeper level, human rationality and our capacity for self government, based on a subjective assessment of what is most likely and most important for the achievement of liberty in the modern world. The effects of these choices will invariably result in the exclusion or marginalisation of particular rights, claims, groups and goals. Revisiting visions of democratic order in the 1940s, therefore, presses us to consider these effects more closely. On that basis, we can more consciously select which visions of democratic order we wish to pursue, at what cost, and in addition take steps where possible to reduce those costs.

Once we abandon the false opposition between technocracy and democracy, for example, we can– as in chapter six– compare and evaluate contemporary visions of technocracy on the basis of the outcomes they purport to serve and the steps taken to mitigate the dangers and exclusions expert rule inevitably entails. It may, for example, finally matter more to our assessment of whether technocracy can be considered a 'democratic' form of order whether a technocratic elite is empowered to pursue a vision 'larger freedom' through policies that will

promote greater economic equality as opposed to economic liberalisation. Similarly, it may matter more if technocratic structures are designed to promote greater decentralisation and pluralism in global and national governance structures– as opposed to deliberately disempowering the masses and centralising authority– than whether or not power is 'returned' to national parliaments as populist critics demand, or indeed whether formal oversight mechanisms are established.

While these larger ambitions may prove decisive to the justification of technocracy in the name of democracy, the example of the 1940s certainly does not suggest that accompanying forms of participation or representation tied to technocratic authorities should be insignificant to our assessment either. The central point is rather that by abandoning an idealised notion of 'democratic' global order, such efforts should neither be rejected out of hand as irrelevant window dressing to what remains an inherently undemocratic form of order nor, for that matter, accepted as a panacea. Strengthening the European Parliament, for example, is both championed as the solution to the European 'democratic deficit' and rejected as a facile answer to the power of technocracy. In this regard, returning to the more nuanced debates of the 1940s suggests that we should, in conjunction with the closer scrutiny of the professed aims of international technocracies, spend more time exploring and debating the strengths and weaknesses of alternatives to simple re-nationalisation or 'Parliamentarisation' when it comes to the problem of politics in relation to technocratic structures of order themselves, including Habermasian solidarism, Macdonald's model of 'stakeholder democracy' or complex hybrids like Slaughter's 'network governance'.[517]

Similarly, free from both an idealist conception of a perfectly egalitarian democratic global order in which all forms of hierarchy cease to exist and a realist view that sees hierarchies as

[517] Jürgen Habermas, *The Lure of Technocracy* (Cambridge: Polity, 2015); Wolfgang Streeck, "What About Capitalism? Jürgen Habermas's Project of a European Democracy", *European Political Science* (2016). Slaughter, *A New World Order*; Macdonald, "Citizens or Stakeholders? Exclusion, Equality and Legitimacy in Global Stakeholder Democracy".

little more than the reflection of power politics, we might more usefully compare rival claims to leadership and enduring forms of global hierarchy more broadly on the basis of what vision of democratic order they claim to serve and at what cost. Justifications for American leadership and 'Western' models of development, for example, are arguably still based on a vision of global liberty focused on the extension of political rights in the context of nation building and economic liberalisation. The costs and contradictions of this model, however, are increasingly apparent. Demands are growing for higher levels of local participation and ownership, greater political pluralism and, perhaps above, all a greater focus on economic justice as key ingredients of a more democratic order.

Nevertheless, while political rights, nation building and free markets may not be sufficient justification for existing global hierarchies, alternatives that abandon the over arching aim of promoting democratic nation states will also entail costs and trade-offs that, by some accounts, might threaten rather than promote liberty. Visions of Chinese leadership or 'non-Western' development premised on the so-called 'China Model', for example, that some argue supports greater pluralism and a more equitable model of social and economic growth, clearly entail risks to human rights– and above all– political rights. Far from enhancing local control, moreover, this model has also been criticised– much as the Western model was in the past– for minimising local participation and reducing local autonomy vis-à-vis national elites in its approach to development.[518] In both cases, if we do not assume that all claims to being the 'indispensable nation' are inherently undemocratic or pretend that exclusions do not exist, we can pay more attention to how competing claims are not only justified but how the exclusions and shortcomings each entail are mitigated. More than the simple presence of hierarchy, these factors should be far more prominent in our assessment and imagination of democratic world order than they are at present.

[518] Shaun Breslin, "The 'China Model' and the Global Crisis: From Friedrich List to a Chinese Mode of Governance?", *International Affairs* 87, no. 6 (2011).

Revisiting the diverse and imperfect visions of order in the 1940s underscores the basic fact that the pursuit of a progressive, democratic global order that protects and promotes liberty is invariably contradictory and, in a certain sense, 'undemocratic'. The second 'lesson' is that for all the pious talk among statesmen, international organisations and academics of the 'minimal standards' and 'common features' that will unite the more pluralistic democratic world order we are not, in fact, agreed on what these are, or on what are or are not acceptable trade-offs and costs in the pursuit of a new vision of democratic modernity.[519]

Like the 1940s, when Western internationalists were united in their rejection of the Soviet model of 'democratic' modernity, overtly authoritarian or totalitarian models such as the so-called Caliphate of IS are unanimously rejected. Equally, where progressive agendas are clearly used as cover for geopolitical moves that will, at best, promote authoritarian models of government, as some critics of Russia's Eurasian Economic Union have suggested, their rejections as candidates for democratic order is relatively straightforward.[520] There are other red lines. Racism, where it continues to animate visions of global order should preclude the consideration of these ideas under the rubric of progressive or democratic internationalism. This is not an artefact of the imperial past; the racial undertones of some narratives of shared values used to support exclusions in structures of contemporary global order including, for example, Turkey's exclusion from the European Union, are undeniable.[521]

In spite of these areas of consensus, however, it is increasingly apparent that our conception of democratic modernity is more open to doubt now than at any other time since the 1940s. Embracing as opposed to denying this uncertainty is, finally, the greatest 'lesson' of the 1940s for contemporary debates about global order and democracy. What this thesis has

[519] Guidance Note of the Secretary-General on Democracy 2009. http://www.un.org/en/globalissues/democracy/pdfs/FINAL%20Guidance%20Note%20on%20Democracy.pdf
[520] Nicu Popescu, "Eurasian Union: The Real, the Imaginary and the Likely", in *Chaillot Paper* (Paris: EU Institute of Security Studies 2014), 14, 19.
[521] Senem Aydin-Düzgit and Nathalie Tocci, *Turkey and the European Union* (London: Palgrave macmillan, 2015), 192.

endeavoured to show above all is how the imagination of the postwar order was not only about addressing the problem of liberty in the modern world, but that the Western response to it was much more of a leap in the dark in a world where scientific and philosophical certainties had led from the Enlightenment to the gas chamber. The notable turn to religion in mid-century international thought, and indeed the wider turn to pluralism and mixed models of rights based communitarianism was not a coincidence; it reflected a deep unease towards man-made schemes of progress, embodied above all in the form of modern nation state.

Doubt was not translated into a rejection of scientific modernity tout court however. It simply meant that the vast majority of Western internationalists were open to rethinking democratic order in radical new ways. This was a decade when, as we have seen, despite their opposition to totalitarianism and their commitment to preserving national communities, very few intellectuals automatically rejected 'illiberal' and non-national notions of economic planning or technocratic governance in favour of a stripped down liberal ideal of national self-determination, parliamentary democracy and the free market. Confidence in this kind of model has been written back into the history of Allied victory and postwar planning where it did not exist. To be sure, this was not a moment free of contradiction either; among the victors, the United States emerged from the war presiding over the strongest economy and military on earth. Visions of a democratic world order were, as a result, also shaped by self-confidence, as well as doubt. This is still not the dominant image of postwar order captured in the aphoristic idea of 'never again' that supposedly drove the postwar planners. Whether this conjures an image of high idealism or grim realism in Western approaches to postwar order, it remains a travesty of the profound sense of doubt and fear that pervaded the intellectual world of the 'victors' for whom the 'abyss', as Ward put it, from which totalitarianism emerged, had resulted from the failure of west's own vision of democratic modernity– and democratic man– guided by the liberal principles of laissez-faire capitalism, parliamentary democracy and the nation state. Whether the West could construct a new model of democracy whose promise of

freedom was definitively superior to the rival claims of Soviet or 'People's' democracy was, as a result, by no means certain.

Thus it is no surprise that internationalists in the 1940s did not pursue an a priori ideal of democratic global order. Instead, while they rejected totalitarian claims to 'democracy', they debated a wide range of alternatives to the 19th century liberal democratic ideal. Translated into competing visions of global order, every alternative produced its own exclusions and contradictions that internationalists tried to mitigate and that most hoped, in time, would gradually recede.

Embracing doubt in the post-Cold War liberal democratic model and debating the merits and flaws of alternative ideas of democratic modernity today is increasingly necessary. It need not, however, entail pessimism or relativism. Like the 1940s, accepting contestation is not the same as accepting that visions of order that neglect political rights, for example, are normatively equal to those that do not. Abandoning an illusory ideal of democratic global order, however, allows us to be much clearer about which goals and ideals– which visions of democratic modernity– we want to pursue and which we do not and the inevitable costs of these choices. Only then will it be possible to address these shortcomings and, perhaps, explore if and how the combination of multiple ideas of democratic order could help to resolve their respective shortcomings.

Beate Jahn has recently argued that the exclusionary and otherwise unsavoury practices that have haunted liberalism throughout its history must be included in the definition of liberalism itself if the many pitfalls of liberal internationalism are to be addressed: 'the contradictions of the liberal world order are the contradictions of liberalism itself'.[522] Jahn never tells us why, however, if in practice liberalism is an inherently exclusive ideology, we should try to rescue

[522] Beate Jahn, *Liberal Internationalism: Theory, History, Practice*, Palgrave Studies in International Relations (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 186.

the liberal project by endeavouring to mitigate its negative effects at all. If, similarly, the pursuit of a democratic global order is to some extent inherently contradictory– plagued by flaws to some extent threaten or deny liberty– why should we attempt to pursue a more democratic global order in any sense that goes beyond a thin, normatively ambivalent notion of global pluralism? The best answer is perhaps an overly simple one. If we believe, as internationalists did in the 1940s, that it is only through a democratic global order that preserves, expands and extends liberty world wide that we can secure peace, we have little choice.

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