

Armies, politics and revolution. Chile, 1780-1826

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*To Catalina*

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## ABBREVIATIONS

- ABO: Archivo de don Bernardo O'Higgins
- AGS: Archivo de Simancas
- AGI: Archivo General de Indias
- AGN: Archivo General de la Nación (Argentina)
- AGNP: Archivo General de la Nación (Perú)
- AHILA: Asociación de Historiadores Latinoamericanistas Europeos
- AHM: Archivo Histórico de la Provincia de Mendoza
- AHMIP: Archivo Histórico Militar (Perú)
- AHNM: Archivo Histórico Nacional de Madrid
- AHR: American Historical Review
- ALH: American Literary History
- ALHIM: Amérique Latine Histoire et Mémoire. Les Cahiers*
- BACHH: Boletín de la Academia Chilena de la Historia
- BLAR: Bulletin of Latin American Research
- BRPO: British Public Record Office
- CG: Capitanía General
- CDHICH: Colección de Historiadores y de documentos de la Independencia de Chile
- CM: Contaduría Mayor
- DIBAM: Dirección de Bibliotecas, Archivos y Museos
- FV: Fondo Varios
- HAHR: Hispanic American Historical Review
- HJ: The Historical Journal
- IC: Intendencia de Coquimbo
- JIVE: José Ignacio Víctor Eyzaguirre
- JLAS: *Journal of Latin American Studies*
- JSH: Journal of Social History
- MJTM: Manuscritos José Toribio Medina
- MG: Ministerio de Guerra
- MI: Ministerio del Interior
- MLS: Municipalidad de La Serena

MQ: Municipalidad de Quillota

MSF: Municipalidad de San Felipe

MV: Morla Vicuña

RA: Real Audiencia

RChHG: Revista Chilena de Historia y Geografía

REA: Revista de Historia de América

REHMLAC: Revista de Estudios Históricos de la Masonería Latinoamericana y Caribeña

SCL: Sesiones de los Cuerpos Legislativos

VM: Vicuña Mackenna

VVAA: Various authors

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*Chile, 1780-1826*



*South America, 1780-1826*

(Modified from John Lynch, *San Martín. Argentine soldier, American hero*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2009)

## INTRODUCTION

This thesis studies the political role of the Chilean military during the years 1780-1826.<sup>1</sup> Beginning with the last decades of the eighteenth century and ending immediately after the last royalist contingents were expelled from the island of Chiloé, this thesis does not seek to give a full picture of the participation of military men on the battlefield but rather to interpret their involvement in local politics.<sup>2</sup> The main categories deployed in this study are 1) armies, 2) politics and 3) revolution, and the three are presented with the purpose of demonstrating that, as Peggy K. Liss has claimed, after 1810 Spanish American public life ‘became militarized; and the military, privileged’.<sup>3</sup> I argue that, notwithstanding the sometimes tense relationship between civilians and the armed forces, the Chilean military became privileged because the demise of the Spanish monarchy in 1808 made them protagonists of the decision-making process. In so doing, this thesis aims to make a contribution to the understanding of Chile’s revolution of independence, as well as to discuss some recent historiographical contributions on the role of the military in the creation of the Chilean republican system. Although the focus has been placed on the career and participation of Chilean revolutionary officers, this thesis also seeks to provide an overview of both the role of royalist armies and the influence of international events in Chile.

## I. THEMES AND HYPOTHESES

### Armies

In his *Ensayo histórico sobre la noción de Estado en Chile*, Mario Góngora asserted in 1981 that the war of independence in Chile was one of a series of military conflicts that played an important

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<sup>1</sup> Three good and relatively new essays on the historiography of the Spanish American independence are John Lynch, ‘Spanish American Independence in recent historiography’, in Anthony McFarlane and Eduardo Posada-Carbó, *Independence and Revolution in Spanish America*, Institute of Latin American Studies, London, 1999; Alfredo Ávila, ‘Las revoluciones hispanoamericanas vistas desde el siglo XXI’, in *Revista de Historia Iberoamericana*, Online, number 1, 2008; and Gabriel Paquette, ‘The Dissolution of the Spanish Atlantic Monarchy’, in *The Historical Journal*, number 52, vol. 1, 2009.

<sup>2</sup> For ‘military’ studies published in Chile, see Centro de Estudios e Investigaciones Militares, *Primera Jornada de Historia Militar, siglos XVII-XIX*, Ejército de Chile, Santiago, 2004; and Centro de Estudios e Investigaciones Militares, *Segunda Jornada de Historia Militar, siglos XIX-XX*, Ejército de Chile, Santiago, 2005.

<sup>3</sup> Peggy K. Liss, *Atlantic empires: the network of trade and revolution, 1713-1826*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1983, p. 233.

role in the socio-political development of the Chilean state. In his view, the building of the Chilean state was strongly influenced by warfare, as throughout the nineteenth century at least three generations of Chileans, whether as soldiers or as civilians whose lives were affected by war, experienced some kind of military confrontation.<sup>4</sup> Góngora's hypothesis has been cited time and again by diverse historiographical schools. However, this has not led professional historians of the last four decades to systematically study the military of the period 1780-1826. There are, of course, some exceptions, like Frederick M. Nunn's study of the Chilean military from 1810 to 1973; the prosopographic analysis published by Sergio Vergara in 1993; Leonardo León's article on deserters which appeared in 2002; the last part of Gabriel Salazar's *Construcción de Estado en Chile* (2005); Patricia Arancibia's *El ejército de los chilenos* (2007); or several chapters of Julio Pinto's and Verónica Valdivia Ortíz de Zárate's *¿Chilenos todos?*<sup>5</sup> Nonetheless, with the exception of these last two books, these studies do not tackle Chile's revolution as a whole, but only specific problems related to it. Thus, Jaime Eyzaguirre's (1957), Sergio Villalobos's (1961), Simon Collier's (1967), Julio Heise's (1978) and more recently Alfredo Jocelyn-Holt's (1992) books, all of them samples of what can loosely be called politico-intellectual history, are still considered the most important works on the Chilean revolution published in the twentieth century.<sup>6</sup>

Without neglecting the contributions made by these authors, especially by Collier, Heise and Jocelyn-Holt, this thesis offers a new study of the Chilean revolution, focusing primarily, albeit not exclusively, on military men. My approach follows the Latin American historiographical line inaugurated by Lyle McAlister in the 1950s, which has been successfully

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<sup>4</sup> Mario Góngora, *Ensayo histórico sobre la noción de Estado en Chile en los siglos XIX y XX*, Editorial Universitaria, Santiago, 1986.

<sup>5</sup> Frederick M. Nunn, *The military in Chilean history. Essays on civil-military relations, 1810-1973*, University of New Mexico Press, Albuquerque, 1976; Sergio Vergara Quiroz, *Historia Social del Ejército de Chile*, Universidad de Chile, Vicerrectoría Académica y Estudiantil, Departamento Técnico de Investigación, Santiago, 1993, 2 vols.; Leonardo León, 'Reclutas forzados y desertores de la patria: el bajo pueblo chileno en la Guerra de la Independencia, 1810-1814', in *Historia*, number 35, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago, 2002; Gabriel Salazar, *Construcción de Estado en Chile (1800-1837). Democracia de los 'pueblos'. Militarismo ciudadano. Golpismo Oligárquico*, Editorial Sudamericana, Santiago, 2005; Patricia Arancibia (editor), *El Ejército de los chilenos*, Editorial Biblioteca Americana, Santiago, 2007; Julio Pinto and Verónica Valdivia Ortíz de Zárate, *¿Chilenos todos? La construcción de la nación (1810-1840)*, LOM Ediciones, Santiago, 2009.

<sup>6</sup> Jaime Eyzaguirre, *Ideario y ruta de la emancipación chilena*, Editorial Universitaria, Santiago, 1957; Sergio Villalobos, *Tradición y Reforma en 1810*, Ediciones Universidad de Chile, Santiago, 1961; Simon Collier, *Ideas and Politics of Chilean Independence, 1808-1833*, Cambridge University Press, London, 1967; Julio Heise, *Años de formación y aprendizaje político*, Editorial Universitaria, Santiago, 1978; and Alfredo Jocelyn-Holt, *La Independencia de Chile. Tradición, modernización y mito*, Editorial Mapfre, Madrid, 1992. It is worth stating, however, that Eyzaguirre's and Villalobos' books deal mainly with the prolegomena of the revolution.

continued by Allan Kuethe, Christon Archer, Leon Campbell and Juan Marchena.<sup>7</sup> In a nutshell, the originality of these authors lies in the fact that, far from considering the development of armies only in relation to war, they take into account the social, economic and political contexts of the Spanish American armies at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth century. None of these scholars has written monographs on Chile, nor have they specialized in the revolutionary years;<sup>8</sup> however, their works on Cuba, Mexico, Peru and New Granada suggest ways in which the relationship between politics and military factors in Chile could be studied. To these contributions we must add Clément Thibaud's *Repúblicas en Armas*, which, unlike the books mentioned above, concentrates on the revolutionary years.<sup>9</sup> Thibaud's blend of great political events with small episodes is an example that I have followed in this thesis, where events like the re-conquest of Chile conducted by the Army of the Andes in early 1817 run parallel with not so well-known episodes.<sup>10</sup>

Following these works, one of the main purposes of this thesis is to analyze how armies were organized in Chile in the period 1780-1826, as well as to comprehend why warfare became so central in Chilean life. The Araucanian region, with Concepción as its capital and military centre, was a hotbed of military leaders. Although the Bourbons were unable to fulfil their aim of establishing a militarized regime in Chile, from the 1770s onwards new militia and regular detachments were organized in the frontier to both fight the Indians and stop external threats. However, in the colonial period confrontations were sporadic, and in general governors like Ambrosio O'Higgins favoured persuasion over force when dealing with the Indians. Matters changed when news of the Napoleonic invasion in the Peninsula arrived in Chile, both because the government introduced a new set of military reforms in Concepción

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<sup>7</sup> A short list of works published by these authors includes Lyle McAlister, *The 'Fuero Militar' in New Spain, 1764-1800*, University of Florida Press, Gainesville, 1952; Allan Kuethe, *Military Reform and Society in New Granada, 1773-1808*, University Presses of Florida, Gainesville, 1978; Christon Archer, *El Ejército en el México borbónico*, Fondo de Cultura Económica, Ciudad de México, 1983; Leon Campbell, *The Military and Society in Colonial Peru, 1750-1810*, American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, 1978; and Juan Marchena, *Ejército y milicias en el mundo colonial americano*, Editorial Mapfre, Madrid, 1992. Three collaborative works on the role of the Spanish American military in the period 1750-1850 are: Allan Kuethe and Juan Marchena (editors), *Soldados del Rey. El Ejército Borbónico en América colonial en vísperas de la Independencia*, Universitat Jaume I, Castelló de la Plana, 2005; Manuel Chust and Juan Marchena (editors), *Las armas de la Nación: independencia y ciudadanía en Hispanoamérica (1750-1850)*, Editorial Iberoamericana, Madrid, 2007; and Juan Marchena and Manuel Chust (editors), *Por la fuerza de las armas. Ejército e independencias en Iberoamérica*, Publicaciones de la Universitat Jaume I, Castelló de la Plana, 2008.

<sup>8</sup> An exception is Christon Archer (editor), *The Wars of Independence in Spanish America*, Scholarly Resources Inc., Delaware, 2000.

<sup>9</sup> Clément Thibaud, *Repúblicas en Armas. Los ejércitos bolivarianos en la guerra de Independencia en Colombia y Venezuela*, Editorial Planeta, Bogotá, 2003.

<sup>10</sup> In Alan Knight's words: 'there can be no high politics without a good deal of low politics'. Alan Knight, *The Mexican Revolution. Porfirians, liberals and peasants*, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 1990, vol. I, pp. X-XI.

and Santiago, and because political differences within the elites became increasingly resolved (radically and violently) on the battlefield. Santiago went through a series of events that allowed new military men, led by José Miguel Carrera, to militarize the political sphere. Carrera (1785) belonged to the generation of military officers born around the 1780s who were in command of Chile's regular army when the war between revolutionaries and royalists broke out in 1813. We shall see that well-known officers (both revolutionaries and royalists), like Ramón Freire (1787), Juan Gregorio de las Heras (1780), Francisco Casimiro Marcó del Pont (1770), Bernardo O'Higgins (1778), Mariano Osorio (1777), Francisco Antonio Pinto (1785), Joaquín Prieto (1786), Manuel Rodríguez (1785) and José de San Martín (1778), but also a number of not so well-known soldiers, like Rudecindo Alvarado (1792), Rafael Maroto (1783), Hilarión de la Quintana (1774), and José Ignacio Zenteno (1786), became protagonists of the years 1813-1826. They became protagonists not only because they commanded armies, but also, and not less significantly, because socio-political issues were intimately connected to military affairs. This work, in other words, follows Góngora's argument that warfare played a leading role in the origins of both Chilean society and the Chilean state.

In their book *¿Chilenos todos?*, Julio Pinto and Verónica Valdivia have challenged Góngora's hypothesis, arguing that independence did not improve the material conditions of rank-and-file soldiers, nor did warfare encourage their adherence to the new state. In their opinion, the lower classes were either excluded from the process of state building or were never truly interested in it, and that this was due to the fact that the 'war of Independence was not a generalized and permanent experience'. Because the war did not change or improve the lives of the lower classes, these authors claim, Góngora's hypothesis is inconsistent.<sup>11</sup> This thesis challenges Pinto's and Valdivia's argument, as it is argued that the revolutionary war was a prolonged experience which –for good or bad- had permanent effect on Chilean society.<sup>12</sup> It is true that independence did not change the material and political condition of the lower classes. However, it *did* change their lives. In all of the seven chapters of this thesis I study phenomena related to the role played by armies and warfare in the making of Chilean society. The war begun in 1813 was a conflict which brought about military, economic, political and

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<sup>11</sup> The rhetorical title of their book *¿Chilenos todos?* speaks for itself. It is worth stating, however, that sometimes Pinto and Valdivia confused the concept of 'identity' with that of the 'state'. Perhaps warfare did not shape 'Chilean identity', as these authors argue. Yet Góngora does not use such a concept in his analysis, and only stresses the close relationship between warfare and the 'state'.

<sup>12</sup> Pinto and Valdivia, *¿Chilenos todos?*, p. 129.

social consequences and, therefore, a large number of Chileans became involved in the conflict. *Inquilinos* were forced to be part of the armies (either as militiamen, regular soldiers, night watchmen or rural guards); high-ranking officers usually had interests in both commerce and the *haciendas*; civilian elites were politically overshadowed by military officers; and some soldiers managed to rise socially. Hence, it is not surprising that, despite some opposition from civilian elites, the country was ruled by military men until the 1850s, nor that Góngora should have emphasized the military aspects of nineteenth-century Chilean politics.

## Politics

In his *Modernidad e Independencias*, François-Xavier Guerra studied those whom in his opinion led the consolidation of political ‘modernity’ in Spanish America, namely journalists, men of letters and civilian politicians.<sup>13</sup> By ‘modernity’ Guerra referred to the emergence of new ‘spaces of sociability’ (such as political clubs, coffee shops and *tertulias*) that went hand-in-hand with the fall of the old regime and the use of the press as an informative vehicle for the consolidation of political independence in Spanish America. Due to Guerra’s influence, in the 1990s and 2000s his students neglected other actors and aspects of the revolutionary process, such as military men and warfare (with the exception of Clément Thibaud). There was, however, another trend –headed, as I have said, by McAlister and his followers– that emphasized the importance of studying armies and warfare not just from a military but also political perspective. Along with this current, this thesis stresses five political points: 1) Chile’s revolution was influenced by international political events, both European and Spanish American; 2) from 1808 military affairs became extremely politicized; 3) the fall of the monarchy provoked a crisis of political legitimacy; 4) warfare changed the meaning and scope of sovereignty; and 5) the conflict in Chile had the characteristics of a civil war.

In tackling the first point, this thesis takes a broad view of the period 1780-1826, including evidence derived from the River Plate, New Granada, Peru and Mexico. The goal is to grasp the international scenario and thus be able to make comparisons where they seem pertinent and necessary. In this respect, this thesis relies on two kinds of studies: general histories of the Spanish American revolutions; and works that emphasize the importance of

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<sup>13</sup> François-Xavier Guerra, *Modernidad e Independencias. Ensayos sobre las Revoluciones hispánicas*, Editorial Mapfre, Fondo de Cultura Económica, México, 1993.

the so-called ‘Atlantic revolutions’. Regarding the first, John Lynch’s classic book on the Spanish American revolutions presents, despite its comparative flaws, a good overview of the revolution in Spanish America. Jaime Rodríguez’s *The independence of Spanish America* is one of the most cited books written in the last fifteen years by historians of this period. Throughout this thesis I will discuss Rodríguez’s argument that the fall of the monarchy did not lead to an anti-colonial movement but, rather, to a political process in which continuities between the old and new regime were greater than the efforts to break up the links with Spain.<sup>14</sup> Here, suffice it to say that the fact that Chileans did not seek to declare independence in the period 1808-1814 does not mean that their political position was not revolutionary (more of this in the next section). Meanwhile, the commemoration of the Bicentennial in 2010 resulted in various international publications that study the political events that took place in both Spain and Spanish America after the fall of the monarchy. Two aspects emphasized by these works are the role of elections in the *bienio* 1808-1810, and the often tense relationship between capital cities and small towns and villages.<sup>15</sup>

Regarding the Atlantic perspective, it is argued that, even though the outcome of the Spanish American revolution was moulded by neither the North American nor the French revolutions, their influence is not to be overlooked.<sup>16</sup> It is hard to find evidence that the Chilean revolution was part of a wider ‘revolutionary cycle’ which started during the American War of Independence, reinforced during the French Revolution and finished in the 1820s, when the Spanish American countries became independent.<sup>17</sup> However, the documentation

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<sup>14</sup> Jaime E. Rodríguez, *The independence of Spanish America*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1998 (the version cited in this thesis was published in 2008; p. 2).

<sup>15</sup> Alfredo Ávila and Pedro Pérez Herrero (compilers), *Las experiencias de 1808 en Iberoamérica*, GM Editores/Espejo de Obsidiana, México DF, 2008; Roberto Breña (editor), *En el umbral de las revoluciones hispánicas: el bienio 1808-1810*, El Colegio de México, México D.F., 2010; and Roberto Breña (coordinator), ‘Iberoamérica en 1810: emancipación, autonomía y lealtad’, dossier published in *Historia y Política*, number 24, Madrid, July-December, 2010.

<sup>16</sup> For the ‘Atlantic’ perspective, see Robert R. Palmer, *The age of Democratic Revolution*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1959; Peggy K. Liss, *Atlantic empires*; Anthony Pagden, *Lords of all the world. Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France, 1700-1800*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1995; Richard L. Kagan y Geoffrey Parker (editors), *Spain, Europe and the Atlantic World. Essays in honor of John H. Elliott*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002; David Armitage y Michael J. Braddick (editors), *The British Atlantic World*, Palgrave Macmillan, Hong Kong, 2002; John H. Elliott, *Empires of the Atlantic World*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2007; and Wim Klooster, *Revolutions in the Atlantic World: a comparative history*, New York University Press, New York and London, 2009. For a critical approach of the concept of ‘Atlantic history’, see Roberto Breña, ‘Relevancia y contexto del bienio 1808-1810. El ciclo revolucionario hispánico: puntos de referencia e historiografía contemporánea’, in Roberto Breña (editor), *En el umbral de las revoluciones hispánicas: el bienio 1808-1810*, El Colegio de México, México D.F., 2010.

<sup>17</sup> See David Bushnell, ‘Independence compared: the Americas north and south’, in Anthony McFarlane and Eduardo Posada-Carbó, *Independence and Revolution in Spanish America*, Institute of Latin American Studies, London,

shows that political and military affairs in Chile were influenced by North American and European events, as well as by the American but especially French way of waging war. Like Clément Thibaud, I believe that the ‘Atlantic’ historical view can be useful for understanding how armies were recruited and how they fought. During the eighteenth century, reverberations of the Atlantic ‘imperial rivalry’ were felt in Chile, especially in defensive and economic terms; in the early nineteenth, Chilean revolutionaries and royalists unwittingly emulated the way the French waged war in the 1790s. In Chile there was never a *Grande Armée* developed by a ‘nation in arms’. However, the objective to annihilate the enemy was shared by both the French and the revolutionary and royalist Chilean armies.<sup>18</sup>

The objective of annihilating the enemy proves how politicized was the war that broke out in Chile in 1813 between revolutionaries and royalists. The aim of the second political point addressed in this thesis is to show that the fall of the colonial governor in 1810 led the new authorities to give to the defence of the kingdom an original political importance. While in the first period of the autonomist government (September 1810-February 1811) the Junta’s principal military objective was to prepare the local army for a Napoleonic invasion of Chile, from March 1811 onwards Chileans debated the best strategy to face the new South American military scenario. That year, radical autonomists, moderates and outright royalists differed on a significant point: whether or not Chile should help the Buenos Aires revolutionaries with forces to stop Francisco Javier Elío’s counterrevolutionary offensive in the River Plate. Discussions over this and other matters divided the main provinces, Santiago and Concepción, but conflicts were not resolved on the battlefield during the period 1811-1812. The war in Chile began only in 1813, and not precisely between *santiaguino* and *penquista*<sup>19</sup> revolutionaries, but rather between revolutionaries and viceroy Abascal. A central hypothesis of this thesis is

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1999, pp. 69-83; and Anthony McFarlane, ‘Guerras e independencias en las Américas’, in María Teresa Calderón and Clément Thibaud (coordinators), *Las revoluciones en el mundo atlántico*, Editorial Taurus, Bogotá, 2006, pp. 171-188.

<sup>18</sup> A few examples of works on the functioning of European armies at the end of the eighteenth century are Alfred Vagts, *A History of Militarism*, Free Press Paperback, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1967; Samuel E. Finer, ‘State- and Nation-Building in Europe: the role of the Military’, in Charles Tilly (editor), *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, Studies in Political Development, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1975. Geoffrey Best, *War and Society in Revolutionary Europe, 1770-1870*, Leicester University Press in Association with Fontana Paperbacks, United States of America, 1982; Richard Cobb, *The People’s Armies*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1987; Christopher Duffy, *The Military Experience in the Age of Reason*, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., New York, 1987; Jean-Paul Bertaud, *The Army of the French Revolution. From citizen-soldiers to instrument of power*, Princeton University Press, 1988; John Lynn, ‘International rivalry and warfare’ in T.C.W. Blanning (editor), *Short Oxford History of Europe. The Eighteenth Century*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2000. See also John Keegan *Historia de la Guerra*, Editorial Planeta, Barcelona, 1995.

<sup>19</sup> *Penquista* was, and still is, the name by which the people from Concepción were known.

that, in the first two years of the Chilean revolution, the *limeño* viceroy reacted politically rather than militarily to the radicalism of Juan Martínez de Rozas and José Miguel Carrera. Yet in late 1812, when Carrera published a Constitutional Chart stating that Chile ought to obey no foreign authority other than the king himself, he provoked the military response of a resentful Peruvian viceroy, who sent the first of a series of military expeditions to fight the Chileans. Consequently, *santiaguino* and *penquista* revolutionaries left their differences aside to fight Abascal's armies.

The third political point seeks to prove that the power vacuum generated in Chile as a consequence of Napoleon's attack to the Peninsula caused a crisis of political legitimacy. First, it was governor Francisco Antonio García Carrasco who became an illegitimate authority. Then, the various Juntas and military leaders (both revolutionaries and royalists) struggled to establish political legitimacy. Yet no military/politician, not even Bernardo O'Higgins when he arrived in Chile in 1817 after two and half years of exile, became legitimate in the eyes of the ruling classes for a period longer than five years. And that was because, prior to the early 1820s, there was no consensus within the elites regarding by whom and how the country should be governed, nor how power should be generated. Independence was one political option, but not necessarily the most popular until well into the 1810s. To emphasize this argument is crucial, because it questions approaches that see independence from a teleological and inevitable perspective.<sup>20</sup> At the same time, it challenges the idea that the political factions that struggled for power followed clearly defined ideological programmes. We shall see that political goals could change dramatically in short periods of time, as the various meanings given by Chileans to the words 'patria' and 'patriotism' show. In the eighteenth century, Chileans developed a sense of patriotism that did not necessarily stand against Spain. Indeed, Napoleon's attack on the Peninsula resulted in 'patriotic' reactions in Chile against the 'French intruder' and on behalf of Ferdinand VII. The meaning of patriotism changed as a consequence of viceroy Abascal's invasion of 1813. From then on, and in order to make their recruitment drives legitimate, revolutionaries began to identify their cause with 'real' patriotism. José de San Martín's 'American project', for its part, added a significant element to revolutionary patriotism: a marked anti-Spanish sentiment.

Napoleon's invasion of the Peninsula not only provoked a power vacuum and a crisis

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<sup>20</sup> Jeremy Adelman, 'An Age of Imperial Revolutions', in AHR, number 113, vol. 2, April, 2008, p. 320. See also his *Sovereignty and Revolution in the Iberian Atlantic*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 2006, p. 2 and others. See also Paquette, 'The dissolution', pp. 181-182.

of legitimacy in Spanish America; it also changed the meaning of political sovereignty. The fourth point aims at answering an important question: who was to claim sovereignty in Chile? The king, one of the Spanish Juntas, the Santiago Junta, viceroy Abascal, the local army, the civilian elites? In 1810, the Santiago Junta became the only sovereign corporation of the kingdom. However, conflicts between the capital and Concepción soon arose, as a result of which the Santiago Junta could no longer claim to exercise sovereignty. Abascal's invasion in early 1813 created another focus within this conflict over sovereignty. On the one hand, royalists proclaimed themselves the sole representatives of imperial sovereignty; on the other, the revolutionaries defended their right to advocate a new model of sovereignty based on republican principles. When the war between Lima and the Chilean revolutionaries subsided in the early 1820s, a subterranean conflict between different emerging states that formed the *Ejército libertador del Perú* took place. Indeed, we will see that in the early 1820s the struggle over sovereignty ceased to be a conflict between royalists and revolutionaries, and became a conflict between revolutionary officers who belonged to the same army but had different interests and political aspirations.

The fifth political point argues that the conflict over legitimacy and sovereignty in Chile was also a civil war between two armies made up of men born in, or with a long experience of, Spanish America.<sup>21</sup> I therefore reject the argument that the war in Chile was carried out by two nations –‘Spain’ versus ‘Chile’-, stressing, on the contrary, that the Chilean nation was not born in 1810.<sup>22</sup> In spite of the fact that eighteenth-century Chileans developed a sense of belonging to what this thesis calls ‘small patria’, I shall argue that, as François-Xavier Guerra put it, independence was not the arrival but the departure point for the emergence of the Spanish American nations.<sup>23</sup> Also, the civil characteristics of the war in Chile challenge the Manichaean approach that, unlike the ‘American’ revolutionaries, ‘Spanish’ royalists were absolutist, authoritarian, and anti-patriotic. In fact, revolutionaries and monarchists tended to use the same strategies to pursue and punish their enemies. This means that the failure of the counterrevolution cannot be explained by a simple approach of the ‘good’ versus the ‘bad’. Rather, we need to find political and military reasons why and how the revolutionary project

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<sup>21</sup> This argument appears briefly in Eyzaguirre, *Ideario y ruta*, pp. 135-136, footnote 104.

<sup>22</sup> The idea that ‘Chile’ fought a national war against ‘Spain’ became ‘official’ in the nineteenth century thanks to the work of Chilean historians, like Diego Barros Arana and the Amunátegui brothers.

<sup>23</sup> François-Xavier Guerra, ‘La nation en Amérique espagnole: le problème des origines’, in Baechler Jean (et al), *La pensée politique. La Nation*, number 3, Hautes Etudes-Gallimard-Le Seuil, 1995, p. 87.

became the preferred option amongst Chileans. An analysis of the royalist governments in the period 1814-1817 is thus crucial to understand the effects of this civil war within Chilean society, as well as to grasp the importance of day-to-day politics in Chile's revolutionary and counterrevolutionary contexts.

## Revolution

The third and last main category worked in this thesis is 'revolution'. In his *Sovereignty and Revolution*, Jeremy Adelman argues that 'the Spanish Atlantic went through a counterrevolutionary process before there was a real revolution: reaction preceded, indeed spawned, the revolution'.<sup>24</sup> According to Adelman, prior to 1814, Spanish Americans sought to have 'voice' in imperial matters, rather than to 'exit' the empire. In his view, therefore, the counterrevolution started only when Ferdinand VII returned to the Spanish throne. Adelman's argument is in accordance with Jaime Rodríguez's view that the demise of the monarchy in 1808 did not produce a total break with the Peninsula, but rather the creation of different local Juntas whose aim was not to become independent but to govern their respective territories on behalf of the king and the Spanish empire.<sup>25</sup> This thesis agrees with Rodríguez's idea that, in the period 1810-1814, most Chileans did not seek to break their links with the metropolis. However, the fact that they had not sought to declare independence did not prevent them from putting forward a revolutionary programme.

Despite some continuities with the old regime and the conservative reaction of powerful elites, like the members of the Real Audiencia, the creation of the Santiago Junta brought about major political changes in the country. True, if we classify an event as revolutionary only by virtue of its radicalism, violence and/or popular characteristics, then we should conclude that neither the Junta nor future governments led by Chileans were revolutionary. However, the fact that the political movement that led to the installation of the Santiago Junta had not followed the popular and radical example of the French Revolution, which, in the words of Patricia Marks, 'historians have too often taken to be the only model for events defined as revolutionary', does not mean that it was less revolutionary.<sup>26</sup> The

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<sup>24</sup> Adelman, *Sovereignty and Revolution*, p. 259.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibidem*, chapter V.

<sup>26</sup> Patricia Marks, *Deconstructing legitimacy. Viceroy, merchants and the military in late colonial Peru*, Pennsylvania State University Press, Pennsylvania, 2007, p. 1. For a criticism to those historians who reject the revolutionary

expulsion of the governor caused a peaceful yet decisive break with the authorities that governed Spain after Napoleon's invasion. It was, in fact, an irreversible blow to the colonial regime, as Chile never returned to the *status quo ante* 1810, not even when Mariano Osorio led his military counterrevolution four years later. When Osorio disembarked in Chile in mid 1814 changes were too deep for the local inhabitants to accept going back to square one. Thus, at least in the Chilean case, the counterrevolution did not precede but followed the revolution.

According to Anthony McFarlane, 'while it has long been assumed that American movements for independence, particularly those in Latin America, were never truly "revolutionary" since they did not match the French Revolution or modern "social revolutions", historians are beginning to shift their views on this issue, as regards both British and Spanish America'. Now, McFarlane continues, there 'is a growing tendency to emphasise the very considerable changes which affected monarchical societies which, in the course of conflict with their parent power, adopted ideas and practices which attacked *ancien regime* social distinctions, exalted the individual, and promoted wider political participation'.<sup>27</sup> This thesis argues that these revolutionary ideas and practices were present in Chile before Chileans became *independentistas*. Among those considered revolutionary, the military played a leading role. Chilean historian Claudio Rolle has argued that the military were 'agents of the revolution'.<sup>28</sup> This thesis shows that the military were 'agents of the revolution' because they became protagonists of revolutionary events, like the movement that ousted governor García Carrasco from power, the installation of the Santiago Junta, the preparation of the constitutional Chart of 1812 and the foundation of Chile's republican system. But their revolutionary behaviour was also evident on the battlefield. Recruiting drives in the countryside, the way of waging war by both armies and the radical punishment declared against enemies were all political/military decisions that followed the example of other revolutions, the French included. Thus to emphasize the revolutionary characteristics of the repercussions of the fall of the Spanish monarchy in Chile is crucial for understanding why

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characteristics of the Spanish American revolution because it did not allegedly match the radicalism of European revolutions, like the French, see François-Xavier Guerra, 'De lo uno a lo múltiple: dimensiones y lógicas de la Independencia', in Anthony McFarlane and Eduardo Posada Carbó, *Independence and Revolution in Spanish America*, Institute of Latin American Studies, London, 1999, p. 48.

<sup>27</sup> Anthony McFarlane, 'Issues in the history of Spanish American Independence', in Anthony McFarlane and Eduardo Posada-Carbó, *Independence and Revolution in Spanish America*, Institute of Latin American Studies, London, 1999, pp. 6-7.

<sup>28</sup> Claudio Rolle, 'Los militares como agentes de la revolución', in Ricardo Krebs y Cristián Gazmuri (editors), *La Revolución Francesa y Chile*, Editorial Universitaria, Santiago, 1990.

and how armies fought; why and how the war became indeed a 'general and permanent experience'.

## II. THESIS STRUCTURE

This thesis is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter analyzes the military repercussions in Chile of the loss of Havana to the British in 1762. According to David Brading and John Lynch, the Bourbon reforms were set up after the Seven Years' War in order to retake control of the colonies after two centuries of Habsburgs increasingly lax rule. In their view, one of the principal characteristics of the Bourbons' 're-conquest' of Spanish America is that they sought to rely on Spanish-born bureaucrats for the administration of the colonies, thus creating resentment among the creole elites. In this thesis, on the contrary, it is argued that the defeat of the Spanish empire in the Caribbean in the 1760s brought about a redefinition in Chile of the so-called colonial pact, by which the colony received new political and economic benefits in exchange for its military service. This challenges the hypothesis that the Bourbons were able to 're-conquer' Chile, claiming, on the contrary, that the geographical distance prevented metropolitan ministers from having control of the colony. In fact, eighteenth-century Chile enjoyed high degrees of political, economic and military autonomy. The installation of Intendancies in Santiago and Concepción, the creation of a Consulado in the capital, and the acceptance that military ranks be filled by either Chilean creoles or Europeans with a long experience of the region, show that, instead of consummating the 're-conquest' of Chile, the Bourbons implicitly accepted that the most important administrative offices of the Chilean colony should be run by Chileans.

The second chapter aims to demonstrate that the crisis of the monarchy in 1808 shocked the Chilean creoles, but did not paralyze them. As in other Spanish American regions, Ferdinand VII's abdication caused a governmental vacuum that only the formation of an autonomous Junta was able to overcome. This Junta was installed not only to replace the Chilean governor Francisco Antonio García Carrasco, but also to introduce profound political and military reforms throughout Chile. New militia and regular bodies were organized under the supervision of Santiago's authorities, and eventually a group of young officers led by José Miguel Carrera took political control of the capital. The leaders of Concepción criticized Carrera's 'praetorianism', even though their differences never drove them to the battlefield.

Actual confrontation on the battlefield began as a consequence of Abascal's reaction to the publication of Carrera's *Reglamento Constitucional*. The invasion of the royalist Antonio Pareja in early 1813 changed the internal political scenario completely, as *santiaguinos* and *penquistas* put their differences aside to fight Abascal's emissary.

Although the principal aim of this thesis is to study political and military events from the revolutionary perspective, the third chapter studies the counterrevolutionary offensive led by Mariano Osorio and Francisco Marcó del Pont (1814-1817) and how their governments influenced the course of the revolution. The objective is to show that the royalist government established in Chile after the defeat of O'Higgins' army in the battle of Rancagua was initially supported by important members of the elites, but that Osorio's attempt to re-assert the authority of the royal regime ended up alienating the same elites that had backed his political and military programme. We shall see that even the most conservative elites reacted to Osorio's and Marcó's aim to go back to square one, and that this was due to the elites' wish of continue enjoying political autonomy.

Chapter IV discusses the organization of the Army of the Andes under the command of the province of Cuyo's governor, José de San Martín, studying 1) the participation of Chilean officers in the army; 2) the negotiations behind the decision to invade Chile in order to use Santiago as a springboard to both conquer Lima and consolidate San Martín's project of establishing an 'American project', different to that of 'Spain'; and 3) San Martín's strategies to weaken and defeat the Chilean royalists. The organization of the Army of the Andes impacted on all aspects of the province's life: almost 5,000 soldiers were recruited from the main cities, Mendoza, San Juan and San Luis; shopkeepers were obliged to feed the army with their supplies; civil crimes were regularly investigated and sentenced by military authorities; military training was constant. The strategy included the participation of spies and guerrillas who were dispatched by San Martín to Chile with the objective of collecting information and disturbing the apparent tranquillity of the Central Valley of the country (i.e. from Concepción in the south to Coquimbo in the north). For San Martín, irregular fighting was as important as regular warfare, a fact that accounts for the rapid defeat suffered by the royalists after the revolutionaries crossed the *Cordillera* in early 1817.

Once Chile was re-conquered, the construction of a political regime based on republican principles and the preparation of a military expedition to Lima, considered the bastion of counterrevolution, became O'Higgins' and San Martín's main targets. Chapter V

deals with the first of these targets. I argue that the revolutionary victories at the battles of Chacabuco and Maipú confirmed the supremacy of O'Higgins' military subordinates over both unruly insurgents and civilian elites. In his position as Supreme Director of the Chilean state, O'Higgins founded his administration on two principles: first, he tried to give the country a new constitutional order and thus prepare the ground for the launching of republicanism. Second, he strengthened the political power of the Executive. The Constitutions of 1818 and 1822 underpinned O'Higgins' power as Supreme Director. In emulation of the Roman Dictator, they gave O'Higgins almost full control of politics; they also gave him power to form new armed bodies, appoint military officers and require from citizens a full commitment to local defence.

Chapter VI analyzes the creation in Chile of the *Ejército Libertador del Perú* and the role played by Chilean officers in the fall of Lima to the revolutionaries. However, it also stresses that rivalries provoked by problems in the administration of the army provoked a conflict of sovereignty between the different revolutionary states. Problems faced by the revolutionaries in Peru were political, military and economic: there were political, because San Martín never made up his mind about whether he preferred a monarchical or a republican system for Peru. Also, if San Martín ever thought to put the South American states under the command of a centralized government (an option that, given San Martín's reluctance to put his political thoughts in paper, is not easy to prove empirically), the establishment of an independent and sovereign state in Peru ended all chances of creating an 'American nation'. There were military, because the revolutionaries never consolidated a strategy for disbanding the royalists after they controlled Lima. There were economic, because the decision by the administration of the *Ejército Libertador* to pay different wages depending on which detachment soldiers belonged to caused a bitter dispute among the chief officers of the army. Eventually, the Chilean section of the army, headed by Francisco Antonio Pinto, resolved to withdraw to the north of Chile until Santiago's authorities guaranteed better economic conditions for its soldiers.

When San Martín fell from power in September 1822, O'Higgins' political power was also on the verge of collapse. As the last chapter shows, Pinto withdrew to Chile when a group of officers opposed to O'Higgins' decision to spend the Chilean treasury in Peru instead of using that money to fight the royalist guerrillas in the south of the country. O'Higgins' abdication in January 1823 was hardly surprising, nor was that the southern leader Ramón Freire, a historical ally of O'Higgins who in 1822 turned into his most powerful enemy,

assumed office afterwards. Freire's rise to power inaugurated a new era in Chilean politics, as for the first time in almost six years politicians and military men focused exclusively on internal issues. In the period 1824-1826 (which are the last years covered by this thesis) military officers carried out political careers, the case of Francisco Antonio Pinto being noteworthy. Pinto became one of the most powerful figures of the mid 1820s, both thanks to his participation as minister in Freire's government and to his role as intendant of Coquimbo. This chapter argues that civilian elites accepted the intervention in politics of officers like Pinto because they feared that the country could fall once again into royalist hands. This is not to say that civilians approved without conditions the involvement of the military in political discussions. Men of letters like Juan Egaña and José Miguel Infante had, in general, a critical view of the political power of the military. In any case, until 1826 they were exceptions to the rule.

Things changed that year. This thesis concludes by arguing that the fall of Chiloé to the revolutionaries in January 1826 brought about two important consequences: first, it allowed Freire's government to expel the last royalist chief from Chile, thus putting an end to revolutionary warfare. Second, the fall of Chiloé provoked a realignment of the role of the military in the new republic: from then on, they had to learn to live in a political regime that they had helped to create during the war but which could only endure in times of peace. From the series of military uprisings led by the veterans of the revolutionary wars between 1826-1830 (the first of which happened precisely in Chiloé), it is safe to say that officers and rank-and-file soldiers of the Army of Chile did not willingly agree to return to the barracks when the war finished. These uprisings were sought not so much to destroy the republican consensus as to change the visible face of the Executive, as Vice-president Pinto suffered firsthand in 1827 and in 1829-1830.<sup>29</sup> The last of these uprisings, headed by Joaquín Prieto, ended with Pinto's reformist government and inaugurated a new era in the Army of Chile: for the first time, a considerable number of officers –liberals most of them- were dismissed from the army and replaced by a powerful group of conservative military who remained in power throughout the 1830s.

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<sup>29</sup> Pinto assumed the presidency of Chile in 1827, but he never adopted the title of president (he remained as Vice-president). See Ossa Santa Cruz, 'La actividad política de Francisco Antonio Pinto', pp. 114-115.

### III. A NOTE ON SOURCES AND TERMINOLOGY

This thesis is based on primary documents collected from Chilean, Argentinean, Peruvian, Spanish and British archives. They are mostly political, though many refer to social and economic aspects. The study of criminal cases followed against rank-and-file soldiers shows, for example, how the authorities reacted to specific problems related to the conduct of soldiers, and the extent to which the revolution affected the lives of the common people. However, for two reasons this thesis deals mainly with high-ranking officers, not rank-and-file soldiers: first, because officers were more active in politics than soldiers. Second, because it is difficult to find written sources in both Chilean and other archives regarding common soldiers; actually, when found they are generally coloured by the opinion of the small group of people who could read and write in a society of low literacy. Of course, this elite bias has not prevented Chilean historians or scholars interested in Chile from writing good studies of the lower classes. Yet it is important to state clearly that not even social historians like Julio Pinto and Gabriel Salazar have been able to break this documentary restriction. Indeed, their sources are generally the same as those used by political historians like Simon Collier.

Many primary sources used in this thesis come from the same archives in which Collier, Salazar and Pinto have worked. Still, there are documents, including private correspondence, official reports, periodicals, military Instructions, lists of resources used by the armies, *Bandos*, *Proclamas*, *Hojas de Servicio* and consular reports, that have not generally been worked by historians of this period. The sources I have collected in the *Archivo de Indias* in Seville, the *Archivo General de la Nación* in Buenos Aires, the *Archivo Provincial de Mendoza* and the National Archives in London (Kew Gardens) are especially relevant. Regarding the first, the personal papers of viceroy Abascal offer an overview of the military objectives and political decisions made by the royalist authorities between 1808 and 1817. Because Abascal's papers make reference to the Spanish American revolution in general (i.e. Chile, Peru, Upper Peru and the Río de la Plata), they provide an international perspective on the conflict that Chilean sources do not usually reveal. Something similar can be said of Argentine sources: the information provided by these archives allows the historian to set the social, political and economic scenario of the River Plate when the Chilean revolutionaries fled to the other side of the *Cordillera* and prepared a military offensive to fight Marcó del Pont's counterrevolutionary army. Regarding the documents of the Chilean revolution that are located in the British National Archive, the consular reports written between 1818 and 1826 are particularly

important because they usually present this process much ‘less distortedly’ than those located in the South American archives. As Alan Knight has suggested when describing the empirical background of his *The Mexican Revolution*, consular reports ‘can provide a stream of valuable historical information’. Obviously, he says, ‘this source, like all sources, involves bias and must be used judiciously. But in many respects the bias of foreign observers [...] is clearer, hence less distorting, than that of [national] observers’.<sup>30</sup>

Finally, a note on terminology. Apart from the three principal categories analyzed in this thesis –armies, politics and revolution- there is one other term recurrently used in this work: ‘elites’. My approach to this word is more political than social. To argue that Chile’s colonial ‘elites’ were ‘aristocratic’ or ‘noble’ is not, in Frank Safford’s words, ‘entirely appropriate’: ‘under the overwhelming influence of the European experience, both nineteenth-century Spanish Americans and twentieth-century historians have translated *criollo* hacendados and merchants into something like a Continental noblesse and bourgeoisie’. However, Safford explains, ‘Spanish America did not have an aristocracy in the European sense of a titled nobility’ [...] In New Granada, if not in Mexico or Peru, titled nobles were too few in number to play a role as a corporate body or class’.<sup>31</sup> Something similar happened in Chile. It is true that, as chapter I shows, the Chilean elites ‘regarded themselves (and were regarded) as nobles’.<sup>32</sup> But it is also true that their use of the word ‘noble’ was not necessarily empirical. For them, ‘nobility’ was a vehicle to exercise their political power, especially in the army, where cadets were bound to show a ‘noble’ background –whether *de facto*, that is, through the purchase of titles, or *de jure*- in order to be accepted as officers. In fact, given that in Chile there were not many *de jure* noble titles, their use of the word ‘nobility’ was essentially political.

An important factor that differentiated the colonial Chilean elites from the rest of society was that they felt and acted as ‘creoles’. In the view of Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, creoles were ‘local elites who presided over racially mixed colonial societies of Indians, blacks, Spaniards, and *castas* (mixed bloods). Creoles felt entitled to rule over these racially and culturally heterogeneous societies, as part of a loosely held Catholic composite monarchy whose center was back in Madrid’.<sup>33</sup> Were the creole groups represented only by Chilean-born,

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<sup>30</sup> Knight, *The Mexican Revolution*, vol. I, p. X.

<sup>31</sup> Frank Safford, ‘Social aspects of politics in nineteenth-century Spanish America: New Granada, 1825-1850’, in JSH, vol. 5, number 3, 1972, pp. 349-350.

<sup>32</sup> Collier, *Ideas and politics*, p. 5.

<sup>33</sup> Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, ‘Racial, religious and civic creole identity in colonial Spanish America’, in ALH, vol. 17, number 3, Fall, 2005, p. 42.

as it is frequently believed? This thesis argues that Europeans living in Spanish America could also be seen as ‘creoles’, as in the end of the century they tended to have local rather than imperial interests. Did eighteenth-century creole elites behave homogeneously? My use of the plural –i.e. elites– seeks to emphasize the impossibility of identifying one specific economic or political group with *criollismo*. Nor is it advisable to classify the creoles within a rigid professional setting. *Hacendados*, merchants, men of letters, urban bureaucrats, military officers, were all components of the creole elites, but many of them were not exclusively *hacendados*, merchants, men of letters, bureaucrats or military officers. Indeed, at the turn of the century we find *hacendados* and merchants occupying military ranks, as well as men of letters working as imperial officials.<sup>34</sup>

Did the revolution have an effect on the composition of the Chilean elites? Revolutionary warfare in Chile provoked an important change within the elites: it allowed military officers to become masters of their country and, consequently, to become more powerful than other elite members. This, for two reasons: first, because in the years 1813-1826 no serious political decision could be made without taking into account what occurred on the battlefield. Second, because civilians implicitly admitted and sometimes favoured the political supremacy of the military, especially when they believed that their interests were at stake. To make a strict differentiation between civilian and military elites is not advisable, not least because there were many civilians who became officers before or immediately after the outbreak of the war (Bernardo O’Higgins is perhaps the most famous). However, when this happened the new officers tended to leave their civil aspirations behind and to enter the political sphere as military men. This is hardly surprising considering that it was warfare that allowed them to rise politically.

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<sup>34</sup> Criticizing John J. Johnson, Safford concludes correctly that elites cannot be exclusively identified ‘with land ownership’. See Safford, ‘Social aspects’, p. 368.

## CHAPTER I

### THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE *EJÉRCITO DE AMÉRICA* AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF A CREOLE ARMY IN CHILE, 1762-1808

This introductory chapter gives an overview of Chile's colonial army and of Chilean politics through the second half of the eighteenth century. The first section shows that, despite the efforts of the Bourbons to establish a military regime in Spanish America after the Seven Years' War (1756-1763), in the second half of the century neither the regular forces nor the militias experienced in Chile a significant improvement. Governors Jáuregui, Benavides and O'Higgins encountered difficulties that prevented them from building a professional army in Chile. New regular and militia detachments were created, and throughout the last decades of the eighteenth century the authorities made serious attempts to train better soldiers and officers. Yet both the lack of expertise of soldiers and militiamen and the complicated defensive conditions faced in the Araucanian region made the Bourbon military programme of the 1760s very difficult to implement.

The next section addresses the repercussions of other Bourbon reforms in Chile. Even though the colony never achieved the militarization of colonies like Cuba, the Chilean elites took some advantage of other reforms introduced by the metropolis. It is often said that the Bourbon reforms were designed from Madrid to empower the metropolis at the expense of the colonies. This section will challenge this perspective, arguing that in practice the Bourbons did not diminish the status of the Chilean elites. On the contrary, many reforms, like the improvement of the working of the military *Situado* and the creation of institutions like the Intendancies and the Consulado, allowed Chileans to enjoy administrative autonomy and, therefore, to empower their political and economic position.

It is important to emphasize, however, that the autonomy enjoyed by Chileans did not prompt them to cut their links with the metropolis prior to the 1810s. The last section of this chapter elaborates this argument by noting that at this stage the Chileans did not develop a proto-national consciousness opposed to Spain. At the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth century 'patriotism' had a double meaning: the 'big patria' [*patria grande*] referred to the Spanish empire; the 'small patria' [*patria pequeña*] to Spanish America and sometimes even its smaller components, like the Chilean territory. However, they were not necessarily exclusive, as both

Spanish American-born people and Spaniards could identify themselves with both forms of patriotism. In this, the concept of ‘creole’ played an important role. In this section it will be contended that the Chilean regular army and the militias were almost completely officered by Chilean-born men. Yet it will also show that the Spanish officers who lived in Chile at the time of the demise of the monarchy in 1808 tended to have the same interests and aspirations as Chileans. Indeed, both the matrimonial alliances with Spanish American families and their close relationship with local institutions like the Cabildo made Spanish-born officers ‘creole’ themselves, a fact that accounts for the hypothesis put forward in chapter II that the revolutionary struggle of the 1810s cannot be seen as a clash between different nations – ‘Chile’ and ‘Spain’.

## I. THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE *EJÉRCITO DE AMÉRICA* IN CHILE

The change of dynasty in Spain at the beginning of the eighteenth century provoked a complete restructuring of Western Europe. In comparison to the late Habsburgs, the Bourbons showed an inclination for warfare from the beginning. This was so evident that David Brading has claimed that if the Habsburg ‘used priests’ to govern the Americas, the Bourbons ‘employed soldiers’.<sup>1</sup> Although, as we will see, the militarization of the Bourbon state in Spanish America never truly occurred, it is true that Charles III relied heavily on the military when governing the empire. As John Lynch explains, despite the fact that Charles III’s Spain ‘could hardly be described as a military state’, his propensity to appoint military men to the civil administration and to enhance the Spanish armed forces reflects the ‘strong military dimension’ of his administration.<sup>2</sup>

The Seven Years’ War (1756-1763) was a great opportunity for Charles III to demonstrate his military capabilities.<sup>3</sup> True, the loss of Havana in August 1762 was a severe shock for the Spaniards, especially for those who had not realized the immense maritime power built up by the British in recent decades. However, due to Spain’s defeat, the Spanish government could make a better assessment of the condition of its imperial army, and have a

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<sup>1</sup> David Brading, *Miners and merchants in Bourbon Mexico, 1763-1810*, Cambridge University Press, London, 1971, p. 27.

<sup>2</sup> John Lynch, *Bourbon Spain, 1700-1808*, Basil Blackwell Ltd., Southampton, 1989, pp. 306-307.

<sup>3</sup> Tom Pocock, *Battle for Empire. The Very First World War, 1756-63*, The Caxton Publishing Group, London, 1998, p. 152.

better idea of the reforms that were needed in Spanish America if Spain had to face future British incursions in the continent.<sup>4</sup>

“The demands of war encouraged policies of “defensive modernisation”, Anthony McFarlane writes.<sup>5</sup> After the Seven Years’ War, Charles III imported French and Prussian military innovations to Spain, applying ‘a modern organizational system with brigades, regiments, battalions, companies, and squads’.<sup>6</sup> The navy, meanwhile, was expanded under the control of François Gautier, a French naval constructor, who, from 1766, directed the construction of more than ten ships in Spanish shipyards.<sup>7</sup> These innovations were, nevertheless, minor compared to the complete renovation that the *Ejército de América* experienced after the loss of Havana.

The Cuban militias were the first to experience this process of reform.<sup>8</sup> The Cuban plan divided the militias into two types: ‘urban’ and ‘disciplined’. The first were ‘formed in the larger cities and in strategically located coastal and frontier towns’ with the aim of defending their ‘immediate locality’ and of guarding and policing ‘their respective cities in cases of emergency’, while the second, also known as ‘provincials’, ‘had standard organization, received systematic training, and were provided with a cadre of regular officers and enlisted men’.<sup>9</sup> Urban militias hardly participated in armed conflicts and, in general, were summoned only for public events, such as religious festivities and governmental activities. ‘Disciplined’ militias, on the other hand, were trained by regular veterans, and so their members more actively participated in the defence of colonial territory.<sup>10</sup> The former enjoyed the *fuero* only when they were in ‘actual service’, the latter ‘all the time’.<sup>11</sup>

The *Reglamento para las milicias de Infantería y Caballería en la isla de Cuba* was printed in 1769. Its clauses complemented the *Ordenanzas de Su Majestad para el regimen, disciplina y servicio de sus exércitos*, published in Madrid in 1768, which were thought to solve the problems of the regular army. Some of the articles of both regulations were implemented in the other colonies

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<sup>4</sup> For a summary of Charles III’s imperial and warfare aims, see Allan Kuethe, ‘The development of the Cuban military as a socio-political elite, 1763-1783’, in *HAHR*, vol. 61, number 4, 1981, pp. 697-698.

<sup>5</sup> McFarlane, ‘Issues in the history of Spanish American Independence’, p. 5.

<sup>6</sup> Thomas E. Chávez, *España y la Independencia de Estados Unidos*, Taurus Historia, Madrid, 2006, p. 28.

<sup>7</sup> See Lynch, *Bourbon Spain*, p. 312.

<sup>8</sup> See Allan Kuethe, ‘Las milicias disciplinadas en América’, in Allan Kuethe and Juan Marchena (editors), *Soldados del Rey. El Ejército Borbónico en América colonial en vísperas de la Independencia*, Universitat Jaume I, Castelló de la Plana, 2005b, p. 110.

<sup>9</sup> McAlister, ‘The Reorganization’, p. 2.

<sup>10</sup> Roberto Oñat and Carlos Roa, *Régimen legal del Ejército en el reino de Chile. Notas para su estudio*, Universidad Católica de Chile, Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas, Políticas y Sociales, Santiago, 1953, p. 168.

<sup>11</sup> AGS, 6885, 61, Conde del Campo de Alange to Ambrosio O’Higgins, 19 November 1792.

without major amendments. That was the case of the disposition that allowed regular soldiers to enjoy the criminal and civil military *fuero*, which, according to Lyle McAlister, entailed major consequences for the Spanish Americans.<sup>12</sup> On most occasions, however, the 1760s military dispositions (especially the Cuban plan) underwent important modifications when the Spanish American governors tried to put them into practice, not least because of the particular needs of each colony.

In Chile, the task of reforming the army was undertaken in 1777 by governor Agustín de Jáuregui, who used the 1760s military programmes as a starting point of his reform.<sup>13</sup> Jáuregui was aware that warfare in the southern part of the country had made Chile an island within the continent, rather like the *Provincias Internas* of New Spain, where the struggle against the Indians was as challenging as in the Araucanian territory.<sup>14</sup> Indeed, although some historians have called the war in Arauco a ‘phantom’ struggle (due to the importance of trade and personal contacts across the frontier throughout the years),<sup>15</sup> the latent menace of conflict with the Indians forced the Chilean governors to maintain a sort of ‘standing army’ in Arauco, more specifically in Concepción and Valdivia. In his *Empires of the Atlantic World*, John Elliott has argued that the Araucanian War in Valdivia and other territories of the south of Chile ‘was deemed to meet the criteria of a “just war”’<sup>16</sup>. It had been labelled a ‘just war’ in an attempt to legitimate the enslavement of the Indians, in which traffic Spain, and more than one Chilean

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<sup>12</sup> For the functioning of the military *fueros* in other colonies, see McAlister, ‘The Reorganization’; Christon Archer, ‘The role of the military in Colonial Latin America’, in *The History Teacher*, vol. 14, number 3, Special Issue on Teaching Latin American History, May 1981, Published by Society for the History of Education Stable, in <http://www.jstor.org/>; Archer, *El ejército en el México Borbónico*; and Kuethe, *Military reform and society*. A few examples of Chilean and Spanish sources that refer to the use of this privilege in Chile are: AHNM, Consejos, 20.431; CG, vol. 185; CG, vol. 314; CG, vol. 319; CG, vol. 729; JIVE, vol. 2; MLS, vol. 34.

<sup>13</sup> See Arancibia, *El Ejército de los chilenos*, p. 41.

<sup>14</sup> On the *Provincias Internas* of New Spain, see Luis Navarro García, *José de Gálvez y la comandancia general de las Provincias Internas*, CSIC, Sevilla, 1964. Of course, Jáuregui and the other Chilean governors introduced their reforms to stop not only internal but also external threats, especially the British. Examples of copies of Declaration of Wars against foreign powers and which arrived in Chile can be found in: CG, vol. 730, pp. 59-59v, 18 May 1779 (against Great Britain); MQ, vol. 1, pp. 148-148v, 6 October 1779 (against Great Britain); MQ, vol. 1, pp. 149-150, 18 October 1779 (against Great Britain); MSF, vol. 4, pp. 109-110, 30 March 1793 (against revolutionary France); MLS, vol. 34, 23 March 1797 (against Great Britain); and CG vol. 748, pp. 129-131v, 17 September 1799 (against Russia). See also Ossa Santa Cruz Juan Luis, ‘La criollización de un ejército periférico. Chile, 1768-1810’, in *Historia*, number 43, vol. II, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago, July-December, 2010, pp. 418-430.

<sup>15</sup> See, for example, Sergio Villalobos, *La vida fronteriza en Chile. El mito de la guerra de Arauco*. Editorial Andrés Bello, Santiago, 1995. For a criticism of this interpretation, see Guillaume Boccara, ‘El poder creador: tipos de poder y estrategias de sujeción en la frontera sur de Chile en la época colonial. (De la guerra a la pacificación de la Araucanía)’, in <http://nuevomundo.revues.org>.

<sup>16</sup> Elliott, *Empires of the Atlantic World*, p. 270. See also Pagden, *Lords of all the world*, p. 38, 94-101.

merchant, had made profits.<sup>17</sup> Yet, at the same time, this 'lucrative traffic provided every inducement to perpetuate the conflict',<sup>18</sup> thereby compelling authorities like Jáuregui to introduce major reforms in both the regular army and the militias.

Jáuregui's reform of the regular army established 1,150 military posts, divided 'in 23 companies with 50 men'. Of these positions, '14 were of dragoons, 7 of infantry and 2 of artillery. The Frontier Army was composed of 6 infantry companies and 12 of dragoons. [...] The remaining 5 were distributed in the strongholds and fortresses of the kingdom',<sup>19</sup> (i.e. chiefly Santiago, Valparaíso and Juan Fernández). Jáuregui was especially keen on strengthening the defence of Concepción. Thus, for instance, the *Maestre de Campo* (a position most of the time held by Ambrosio O'Higgins, at least until the late 1780s), had to reside in Concepción, where 'two dragoon companies, three of infantry and one of artillery' completed the military personnel.<sup>20</sup> Regarding the militias, Jáuregui created two cavalry bodies, denominated *del Príncipe* and *de la Princesa*; each of them had 600 men, divided in 12 companies which, in turn, were distributed in four squadrons.<sup>21</sup> To these, were added the *Batallón del Comercio* and the *Regimiento de Infantería de Milicias del Rey*,<sup>22</sup> as well as more than thirty militia regiments scattered throughout the territory, from Copiapó and Coquimbo to Rere and Chiloé.<sup>23</sup> Compared to the regular forces, which had to confront special conditions in the frontier and, therefore, to devise a system that only loosely resembled the basic elements of the 1768 *Ordenanzas*, the militias implemented, at least in theory, most of the dispositions of the Cuban plan. In any case, the Chilean militias did not copy the pre-existent model, but rather adapted it. This is all the more true if we take into account that Jáuregui's plan was not at all easy to execute. True, his principal reforms lasted, more or less intact, until 1810. However, the fact that Jáuregui's successors, Ambrosio Benavides (1780-1787) and Ambrosio O'Higgins (1788-1796), continued introducing changes in all branches of the army reflects the difficulties experienced by the authorities when seeking to professionalize the armed forces.

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<sup>17</sup> For the origins of the enslavement of the Araucanians, see the pioneering work of Álvaro Jara, *Guerra y Sociedad en Chile*, Editorial Universitaria, Santiago, 1971, chapters VIII-X.

<sup>18</sup> Elliott, *Empires of the Atlantic World*, p. 270.

<sup>19</sup> Oñat and Roa, *Régimen legal*, pp. 116-117. The detail of Jáuregui's military reforms can be followed in AGI, Chile 435.

<sup>20</sup> Oñat and Roa, *Régimen legal*, p. 121.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibidem*, p.166.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>23</sup> See *Ibidem*, pp. 174-182. The exact number given by Jorge Allendesalazar, 'Ejército y Milicias del reino de Chile (1735-1815)', in BACHH, vols. 66, 67 and 68, Santiago, 1963, p. 262, for the entire army is 27,832 individuals in 1792, of whom 25,000 were militiamen. Vergara Quiroz, *Historia Social*, p. 54, gives 15,856 militiamen for the period 1790-1792.

In 1780, Jáuregui was made viceroy of Peru. Three years later, the king asked Benavides to carry out an inspection of the army to find out exactly the kind and number of troops that it was possible to count on to defend this part of the empire. Signed by José de Gálvez, this *Real Orden* had an impolite and even rude tone: the king, said Gálvez, not only needed an exact account of his military subjects, but he also needed it quickly. Benavides' mission was to fulfil the king's will without delay; apparently, Charles III could not keep waiting for the result of an inspection that should have been conducted years ago.<sup>24</sup> In his answer, Benavides stated that Chileans were not prepared to defend the colony from internal and external threats. According to his analysis, the veteran forces distributed across the territory were insufficient to deal with the Indians. The peculiarities of the terrain made the small number of veterans almost impotent to 'prevent the insults of those Barbarians'. In Valdivia, for example, 350 regular soldiers had to defend five 'forts' [*castillos*], which were separated by rivers and more than 'three leagues' distant from each other.<sup>25</sup> If geographical and weather conditions allowed, the commander of the frontier could accomplish a once-a-year inspection.<sup>26</sup> As a result, continued Benavides, the king had to recognize that the only one capable of controlling the regional detachments was the local commander, and that the *Ordenanzas* had been very difficult to introduce in Chile.<sup>27</sup>

But if problems were serious among the regular troops, those of the militiamen were even worse. Indirectly criticizing Jáuregui's work, Benavides concluded that the militias were practically nonexistent: 'in this territory, many of the detachments created by my predecessor, lieutenant Agustín de Jáuregui, are known as militias. [...] However, in my opinion, none of them ought to be considered as if they were *reglados* [disciplined], since their conformation and condition do not respond to *Ordenanzas*'.<sup>28</sup> For Benavides, the reform of the militias was a chimera. Not surprisingly, eleven days after Benavides wrote to Gálvez, the Spanish ministers ordered the Chilean governor to 'fix [*arreglar*] the militias of his district'<sup>29</sup>. Sadly for Benavides, the introduction in Chile of the Intendancies (a subject to be analyzed in the next section) led the governor to concentrate his efforts in other areas of the administration and therefore to

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<sup>24</sup> CG, vol. 732, pp. 28-29, Gálvez to Benavides, 12 March 1783.

<sup>25</sup> AGI, Chile 437, Benavides to Gálvez, 7 October 1784.

<sup>26</sup> Two years later, Benavides insisted on the difficulties that a precise inspection of the army entailed. See MV, vol. 7, pp. 123-124, Benavides to Gálvez, 7 November 1786.

<sup>27</sup> AGI, Chile 437, Benavides to Gálvez, 7 October 1784.

<sup>28</sup> AGI, Chile 437, Benavides to Gálvez, 7 October 1784.

<sup>29</sup> CG, vol. 733, p. 179, Gálvez to Benavides, 18 October 1784.

cease the process of reform of the militias, a decision acknowledged by Gálvez in August 1785.<sup>30</sup>

In September 1787, after Benavides had died, the inspection of the militias of Santiago was once again postponed. This time, the commandants of the *Regimiento de Caballería del Príncipe*, *Regimiento de Caballería de la Princesa*, *Infantería del Rey* and the *Batallón de Comercio* told the interim governor, Tomás Álvarez de Acevedo, that, due to a smallpox epidemic, the lack of arms and the controversies that the creation of the *fueros* had originated between military and civil tribunals, the inspection of their bodies had to be suspended. The chiefs of the militias – Ignacio de la Carrera, Mateo de Toro y Zambrano, Joaquín de la Plaza and Domingo Díaz de Salcedo y Muñoz- declared that their militia units urgently needed a new *Reglamento*, but that, until Spain had approved it, the governor should be in charge of the ‘direction of these detachments’.<sup>31</sup> Three days later, Álvarez agreed to postpone the *Revisa* of the militias; however, he remained silent about the possibility of writing a militia *Reglamento*.<sup>32</sup>

It was not until Ambrosio O’Higgins assumed power in 1788 that the authorities seriously attempted to reform the Chilean militias.<sup>33</sup> O’Higgins’ primary aim was to reform the regional militias, his plan touching upon three themes. His first preoccupation was to define the kind of people the militias ought to have in order to make them a reliable institution. In his opinion, militiamen should live relatively close to where their respective companies were stationed. Also, their officers and chiefs must be socially ‘well born’ [*apreciable nacimiento*], and to have enough ‘possessions as to live decently’ [*traherse con desencia*]. Second, he emphasized that militiamen must carry out the orders of their immediate captains and chiefs at all times. Only understanding the importance of this *conditio sine qua non*, could the authorities stop desertions, and train well-prepared militiamen (through the *ejercicios doctrinales*). Finally, O’Higgins claimed that every landowner had the responsibility to support the militias with food and other basic goods. In a word, they were compelled to ‘accomplish with love the obligation’ of serving the king and their ‘*patria*’.<sup>34</sup>

O’Higgins’ interest in reforming the militias lasted throughout his time in office. Perhaps the most important of his contributions from 1791 onwards was his insistence on

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<sup>30</sup> CG, vol. 734, p. 211, Gálvez to Benavides, 6 August 1785.

<sup>31</sup> AGI, Chile 437, Ignacio de la Carrera (et. al) to Álvarez de Acevedo, 4 September 1787.

<sup>32</sup> AGI, Chile 437, Álvarez de Acevedo, 7 September 1787.

<sup>33</sup> O’Higgins also made efforts to amend some aspects of the regular army. See, for instance, CG, vol. 738, pp. 131-132, Valdés to O’Higgins, 30 June 1789.

<sup>34</sup> MLS, vol. 34, O’Higgins to Shee, 10 February 1789.

properly classifying the militia detachments according to their origins and status. We saw that the Cuban plan had divided the militias into two types: ‘urban’ and ‘disciplined’, the latter also known as ‘provincial’. The ambiguity of the terms, as well as the misuse of the word ‘provincial’, had created confusion in Chile. An ineffective attempt to solve this confusion came with a *Real Orden* of 22 August 1791, by which Conde Campo de Alange tried to ‘remove doubts originating from the different denominations of the militias in Indias’, establishing that only two classes of militias in Spanish America should exist: ‘disciplined and urban’. If some units were denominated ‘provincial’, they could preserve that name but only after explaining whether they were disciplined or urban.<sup>35</sup> Thus, the confusion remained more or less the same.

Yet, as a token of his loyalty, in February 1792 O’Higgins ordered the *Subdelegados* to follow the crown’s desire and divide the militias as the *Real Orden* of August 1791 had instituted.<sup>36</sup> However, he also informed the peninsular authorities that the only militias that had veterans on their staff, which was a prerequisite to be called ‘disciplined’, were Santiago’s *Regimiento del Príncipe y de la Princesa*, the militias of La Serena and a few companies stationed on the frontier.<sup>37</sup> Consequently, O’Higgins claimed, the crown should confirm these militias’ right to the military *fuero*, and declare the others simply as ‘urban’. The king agreed with O’Higgins’ report, and, on 1 December 1792, stated that ‘the *Regimiento de Infantería del Rey* and the *Caballería de Príncipe y Princesa*, all three Militias from Santiago de Chile, must be considered disciplined; as well as the *Cuerpos de Infantería y Caballería de Milicias* of Coquimbo and Valparaiso. The rest of the militia detachments are to be regarded urban’. Surprisingly, the militias of the frontier who, according to O’Higgins, were trained by veterans, had to maintain their status and continue as ‘urban’.<sup>38</sup>

Decisions like these speak clearly of how difficult it was for colonies like Chile to implement a reformist military project that was designed by a faraway Madrid, and which did not always take into consideration local needs. It was one thing to aspire to build a military system in the colonies, but quite another to put that aspiration into practice. Neither Jáuregui nor Benavides nor O’Higgins were able to professionalize the regular army and the militias, a fact that accounts for O’Higgins’ decision in the early 1790s to try to pacify the Araucanian zone through political negotiation rather than military action. ‘Parliaments’ like that held

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<sup>35</sup> CG, vol. 740, p. 182, Conde Campo de Alange to O’Higgins, 22 August 1791.

<sup>36</sup> See, for example, MLS, vol. 34, O’Higgins to *Subdelegado del Partido de Coquimbo*, 15 February 1792.

<sup>37</sup> AGS, 6885, 61, Conde del Campo de Alange to Ambrosio O’Higgins, 19 November 1792.

<sup>38</sup> AGS, 6885, 61, Conde del Campo de Alange to Ambrosio O’Higgins, 19 November 1792.

between O'Higgins and the Indians at Negrete in March 1793 responded to a desperate strategy undertaken by the authorities to consolidate their position in the frontier, thus accepting that the pledge to establish a military force in Chile to confront the Indians had never materialized.<sup>39</sup> Indeed, it could be argued that the Chilean army never reached a satisfactory degree of military preparation to confront the internal threat, at least not in the fashion that other colonies, such as Cuba, did.<sup>40</sup> The next section will discuss the repercussions of other Bourbon reforms in Chile.

## II. IN SEARCH OF POLITICAL AUTONOMY

Even though the military capacity of the Chileans did not improve substantially during the second half of the eighteenth century, there were other reforms introduced by the Bourbons from which the Chilean elites took advantage. It is commonly said that Charles III's ascent to the throne of Spain allowed the metropolis to launch a 're-conquest' of its colonial possessions. Furthermore, it is often said that Spanish-born bureaucrats controlled the administration of the colonies in the second half of the eighteenth century, and that this affected the political position of the colonial people.<sup>41</sup> This section will argue, however, that in practice the Bourbons were unable to achieve their allegedly absolutist objectives in colonies like Chile and that, on the contrary, the Chilean elites administered their territory more or less autonomously.

Broadly, there are two factors that explain why in Chile the project of the Bourbons was more feeble than in other colonies: first, geographical distance from Spain prevented the Bourbons from dispatching Spanish-born bureaucrats to peripheral colonies such as Chile. Second, Spain's involvement in international conflicts (i.e. the Seven Years' War and the War of Independence in North America), led the Spanish ministers to concentrate their military efforts in Spain's most profitable regions, like Cuba. Consequently, the authorities in other

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<sup>39</sup> Donoso, *El Marqués de Osorno. Don Ambrosio Higgins*, Publicaciones de la Universidad de Chile, Santiago, 1941, chapters XVI and XVII. For an example of other defensive matters tackled by O'Higgins in the 1790s, see RA, vol. 3206, p. 261v-262, 3 November 1793. See also John Thomas, 'Los proyectos del Virrey O'Higgins', in RChHG, volume XI, number 15, Santiago, 1914.

<sup>40</sup> Kuethe, 'The development', p. 695.

<sup>41</sup> The word 're-conquest' was first used by Brading, *Miners and merchants*. A few years later, John Lynch, *Las Revoluciones Hispanoamericanas. 1808-1826*, Editorial Ariel, Barcelona, 1976, extended the term to the entire Spanish American continent. The last section of this chapter will analyze Lynch's hypotheses and whether they are fit for the Chilean case.

colonies, like Chile, were compelled to constantly request the defensive and economic support of the Spanish American elites, thus fostering their participation in important areas of the administration of the empire and unwittingly empowering their status.<sup>42</sup>

The Bourbons sought, both in Chile and in the rest of the colonies, to reinforce three aspects of the functioning of the Spanish empire in the New World: to make the internal administration of the Viceroyalties and their dependencies more dynamic; to enrich the royal treasury through the implementation of centralized policies; and to reform the army (as we have already seen). This is why, at the moment of demanding their support, the authorities increased the power of the colonial elites in political, economic and defensive terms. In the last section of this chapter I shall demonstrate that the failure of the crown to send contingents to Chile allowed the creoles to be in command of the army. Here, it will be shown that the economic and political status of the Chilean elites was reinforced thanks to the working of the military *Situado*, the establishment of the Chilean Intendancies, the creation of a Consulado in Santiago and the recognition of Chile as Captaincy-general.

From the early seventeenth century, the *Situados* had acted as ‘intra-imperial’<sup>43</sup> annual subsidies transferred by Lima to the Chilean frontier in order to finance its forts and military personnel.<sup>44</sup> In the early decades of the eighteenth century the system had not changed much, though from 1750 the Bourbons introduced innovations to make the *Situados* work more efficiently. In 1753, only a few years before Charles III became king, the Peruvian viceroy, José Manso de Velasco, reformed the financing of the Chilean army. In his *Reglamento para la guarnición de las Plazas de la Frontera de la Concepción, Valparaíso y Chiloé*, Manso ordered the officers of the Chilean garrisons to carry out a quantitative survey of their forces. This measure would enable the authorities to know, on one hand, the number of deaths and desertions within the army and, on the other, the exact amount of money required to pay for the living expenses of the soldiers.<sup>45</sup>

That same year, Manso instructed the Chilean exchequer to ‘provide the 90,764 pesos needed yearly to pay the field forces on the Bío Bío [Concepción], and to supply additionally a

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<sup>42</sup> This is not to say that the defence of Cuba was run by Spanish contingents only, as Kuethe, ‘The development’, pp. 695-704 has shown.

<sup>43</sup> Carlos Marichal and Matilde Suoto Mantecón, ‘Silver and Situados: New Spain and the Financing of the Spanish empire in the Caribbean in the Eighteenth Century’, in HAH, vol. 74, number 4, 1994, pp. 587-588.

<sup>44</sup> For the origins of the working of the military *Situados* in Chile, see Oñat and Roa, *Régimen legal*, pp. 73-77 and 82-86.

<sup>45</sup> See *Ibidem*, p. 110.

subsidy of 15,000 pesos a year to the garrison at Valdivia'.<sup>46</sup> Manso's intention was to make 'a financial order that could permit [the] control and verification [of the *Situado*] by the immediate authorities'.<sup>47</sup> To meet 'these new obligations', Chile would have to generate 'about 100,000 pesos of new income'.<sup>48</sup> However, according to Jacques Barbier, Manso arranged to obtain the money needed to pay for the Chilean army from the newly created *limeño* estanco rather than by levying new taxes in Chile. 'The administration of the [Lima] estanco', Barbier says, 'shipped tobacco to Chile and allowed the Chilean treasury to take the proceeds of local sales for its own use up to 100,000 pesos'.<sup>49</sup>

In the 1780s the Spanish *visitador* of the Peruvian Viceroyalty, Jorge Escobedo, tried to modify Manso's plan in order to reduce the expenditures of Lima's treasury in Chile. Escobedo's ideas appear in the documentation of the first Provincial Intendancies in Chile. There, the Spanish visitor stated that, if Lima really wanted to be more productive and solvent, Peru should share the expenditures of the Chilean army with Buenos Aires, an objective that, as we will see, never went into effect. Escobedo was a fervent supporter of the Intendancies, which had been born in seventeenth-century France with the aim of 'supervising tax collection, public works, measures of public health, and in general all governmental activity'.<sup>50</sup> Philippe V, Louis XIV's grandson, introduced them in Spain once he became king, but it was only after Charles III assumed power that the system was established in Spanish America. In Charles III's view, the Intendancies in Spain had improved both the administration of the public treasury and the provision of the army, and so between 1764 and 1782 he decided to create Intendancies in Cuba, New Spain, Venezuela and the River Plate.<sup>51</sup>

In 1784, Escobedo was charged with the mission of accomplishing in the Peruvian Viceroyalty 'the pious intentions of the king of standardizing the governments of those kingdoms through the Intendancies'.<sup>52</sup> With that aim, Escobedo ordered Ambrosio Benavides to inform him 'about the number of Intendancies' that were needed in Chile, and to 'indicate

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<sup>46</sup> Jaques Barbier, *Reform and Politics in Bourbon Chile, 1755-1796*, University of Ottawa Press, Ottawa, 1980, p. 26.

<sup>47</sup> Vergara Quiroz, *Historia Social*, p. 45.

<sup>48</sup> Barbier, *Reform and Politics*, p. 26.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.* For the history of the tobacco *estanco* in the Peruvian Viceroyalty, see Catalina Vizcarra, 'Bourbon intervention in the Peruvian Tobacco Industry, 1752-1813' in *JLAS*, vol. 39, 2007. See also Jacques Barbier, 'The Culmination of the Bourbon Reforms, 1787-1792', in *HAHR*, vol. 57, number 1, 1977.

<sup>50</sup> William Doyle, *Origins of the French Revolution*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, p. 60.

<sup>51</sup> See John Lynch, *Administración colonial española, 1782-1810. El sistema de intendencias en el Virreinato del Río de la Plata*, Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, 1962, pp. 54-60.

<sup>52</sup> AGI, Chile 315, Escobedo to Benavides, 6 September 1784.

their Capitals, and districts'.<sup>53</sup> Benavides answered Escobedo's letter in January 1785. He explained why he believed the creation of Provincial Intendancies in Chile was not really necessary. Benavides agreed that the Bourbon reforms had tried to 'vary the present system of the kingdom in the four branches of Justice, Police, Royal Estate, and War Economy [*Economía de Guerra*], thus promoting the agriculture and commerce, improving the Industry, favouring mining activities and procuring the happiness [*felicidad*] of the vassals'.<sup>54</sup> But he immediately added that, given the distance between Santiago and the rest of the colony and also the poverty of the country, the Provincial Intendancies in Chile would be extremely difficult and onerous to implement.

Benavides believed that the governors of Valparaíso, Concepción and Valdivia, who were considered Military Intendants, could easily undertake the work of the Provincial Intendants. In Concepción, for instance, the political government was linked to the military, as the Indian frontier was 'inseparably connected to the military command'.<sup>55</sup> Escobedo made reference to Benavides' letter in December 1785. This time, however, he addressed his ideas to the Peruvian viceroy, Teodoro de Croix. In this long document we see the real reason for the creation of Intendancies in Chile: following José Ábalos, the first Venezuelan intendant, who believed that the Spanish administrators could not know for certain what each of the colonies needed, Escobedo's purpose was to make Chile politically, economically and militarily autonomous of Peru. In so doing, Escobedo argued, Lima would free itself from a burden that was both troublesome and not very productive for the Peruvians.<sup>56</sup> This was a bold decision, but one that, according to the visitor, was worth taking if Spain wanted Lima to recover its privileged position, lost to Buenos Aires as a consequence of the latter's promotion to Viceroyalty capital in 1776. In his view, the Chilean provinces had to be divided into two major groups -one in the north, the other in the south-, and had to be governed by two Intendancies located in Santiago and Concepción (in the hands of Benavides and Ambrosio

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<sup>53</sup> AGI, Chile 315, Escobedo to Benavides, 6 September 1784.

<sup>54</sup> AGI, Chile 315, Benavides to Escobedo, 3 January 1785. About the importance given by eighteenth-century Chileans to the concept of happiness, see Lucía Santa Cruz, 'The influence of the political ideas of the Enlightenment on Spanish colonial policy, with reference to don Manuel de Salas in Chile', St Antony's College, University of Oxford, 1966; and Alfredo Jocelyn-Holt, *Historia general de Chile. Amos, señores y patricios*, Editorial Sudamericana, Santiago, 2008, chapter VI.

<sup>55</sup> AGI, Chile 315, Benavides to Escobedo, 3 January 1785.

<sup>56</sup> José Ábalos, 'Representación del intendente de Venezuela, José Ábalos, dirigida a Carlos III, en la que pronostica la independencia de América y sugiere la creación de varias monarquías en América y Filipinas (1781)', in *Premoniciones de la Independencia de Iberoamérica. Las reflexiones de José Ábalos y el Conde de Aranda sobre la situación de la América española a finales del siglo XVIII*, Ediciones Doce Calles, Fundación Mapfre, Madrid, 2003, p. 61.

O'Higgins, respectively).<sup>57</sup>

When making reference to the economic aspects of the creation of Intendancies in Chile, Escobedo indirectly criticized Manso's 1753 decision of subsidizing the Chilean army through the *limeño* tobacco *estanco*. He believed that Peru should keep supporting the Chilean army, especially when emergencies arose, but this could not be solely at the expense of Lima's treasury. That is why, he suggested, a new *Situado* had to be established, and its payment should be shared by Peru and the newly created Viceroyalty of the River Plate. However, this order was not implemented, and Lima continued remitting the total of the *Situado* until 1806, when the subsidy was finally ended.<sup>58</sup> In consequence, the Chilean creoles enjoyed the privilege of holding the highest ranks of the army (the subject of the last section of this chapter) without paying for the wages of the soldiers of the south.

Something similar occurred with the Intendancies. Despite the fact that Escobedo's main objective was to strengthen the power of Lima, in the end it was the Chilean elites who benefited most from the creation of these institutions (set up at the end of 1785, in spite of Benavides' opposition).<sup>59</sup> By insisting that the best way to safeguard Peruvian interests was to make Chileans responsible for the administration of their country, the Intendancies brought a fresh dynamism to a political system –the Chilean– that usually preferred to consult [*consultar*] Lima before deciding any important matter. The outcome of this policy was that it created a more balanced relationship between Lima and Santiago. Escobedo even claimed that Chile should 'be independent' of Peru, though it is likely that he understood the concept of 'independence' as synonymous with 'autonomy'.<sup>60</sup> In any case, considering that the person who expressed this argument was the crown's closest agent in South America, it could be said that the idea, formulated by some peninsular ministers throughout the second half of the eighteenth century, of liberalizing imperial structures was beginning to materialize.<sup>61</sup>

The decision to involve the Chileans in administrative decisions that previously could only be resolved from Lima was a reward for the Chilean elites, comparable only to the establishment of the Tribunal del Consulado in Santiago in 1795 and the confirmation of

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<sup>57</sup> AGI, Chile 315, Benavides to Croix, 13 December 1785.

<sup>58</sup> Vergara Quiroz, *Historia Social*, p. 45.

<sup>59</sup> On 24 December 1785, the interim Peruvian Viceroy, Juan Gómez Henríquez, appointed Ambrosio Benavides and Ambrosio O'Higgins as intendants of Santiago and Concepción, respectively. See AGI, Chile 315.

<sup>60</sup> AGI, Chile 315, Escobedo to de la Croix, 13 December 1785. As Jaime Rodríguez, *The Independence of Spanish America*, p. 2 has said, when the 'documents of the epoch use the word *independence*, they generally mean *autonomy*', that is, 'home rule' instead of a total break with the metropolis.

<sup>61</sup> See Ábalos, 'Representación', and Pagden, *Lords of all the world*, p. 194.

Chile as Captaincy-general three years later. Regarding the creation of the Consulado, the acceptance of the crown to grant the Chilean merchants the privilege of having their own tribunal was an important step towards the commercial autonomy of the kingdom. It is true that, as some historians have sustained, during the eighteenth century the colony depended neither on Madrid's nor on Peru's commerce and that, on the contrary, some merchants were able to amass large fortunes through their participation in the international economy.<sup>62</sup> Nonetheless, the fact that for the first time Madrid had recognized the right of Chileans to decide unilaterally in regards to their commercial activity, was a triumph that not even the most optimistic merchants would have dreamed of a few decades before. This is not to say that the Chilean economy reached a superlative production in the last decades of the eighteenth century. Rather, it means that the Bourbons accepted implicitly that in order to rationalize the imperial administration it was necessary to rely strongly upon the colonials, and that this process would inevitably promote their autonomy. When in 1798 Madrid gave Chile the status of Captaincy-general, the Bourbons ended up boosting the few political rights that Chileans did not yet enjoy.<sup>63</sup>

In a sense, John Lynch's thesis about the differences between the Habsburgs and the Bourbons, the former being supposedly more willing to allow the subjects to participate in the imperial system than the latter, provides useful points, although, due to its comparative and transcontinental approach, it makes generalizations that, instead of clarifying, confuse the reader. It is one thing to claim, as Lynch does, that the Bourbon's 'second conquest of America' occurred in richer and more important regions for the metropolis like New Spain and Peru, but quite another to extend this to colonies like Chile, where Spain could only have a loose control of the administration.<sup>64</sup> The incongruence between aims and empirical outcome

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<sup>62</sup> Sergio Villalobos, *El comercio y la crisis colonial: un mito de la independencia*, Ediciones de la Universidad de Chile, Santiago, 1968, p. 157, chapter VII and 'Conclusion'; Eduardo Cavieres, *El comercio chileno en la economía mundo colonial*, Ediciones Universitarias de Valparaíso, Valparaíso, 1996, p. 155 and followings; Eduardo Cavieres, *Servir al soberano sino detrimento del vasallo*, Ediciones Universitarias de Valparaíso de la Universidad Católica de Valparaíso, Valparaíso, 2003, chapter V. For a vision of the 'dependency theory' in the Chilean case, see Hernán Ramírez Necochea, *Antecedentes económicos de la Independencia de Chile*, Editorial Universitaria, Santiago, 1959, chapter IV.

<sup>63</sup> Although not as explicitly as in here, this argument appears also in Patricia H. Marks, *Deconstructing legitimacy*, pp. 67-68.

<sup>64</sup> See Lynch, *Las Revoluciones*; John Lynch, *América Latina, entre colonia y nación*, Editorial Crítica, Barcelona 2001; and John Lynch, *San Martín. Argentine soldier, American hero*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2009. Barbier, *Reform and Politics*, and Jocelyn-Holt, *La Independencia*, share the idea that the policies of the Bourbons could not 're-conquer' Chile. See also Serrano and Ossa Santa Cruz, '1810 en Chile: autonomía, soberanía popular y territorio', in Roberto Breña (coordinator), 'Iberoamérica en 1810: emancipación, autonomía y lealtad', dossier published in *Historia y Política*, number 24, Madrid, July-December, 2010, pp. 97-102.

is, in this case, symptomatic of the inherent weakness of an empire that could only rule from a distant Madrid. If the seventeenth-century's formula 'I obey but I don't comply' described the relationship between the metropolis and the Spanish Americans, in the eighteenth century that axiom had not significantly changed, though it had added an important element: thanks to their capacity to adapt the reforms introduced by the Bourbons,<sup>65</sup> the economic and political situation of the local elites was much stronger than a century ago.<sup>66</sup>

In the next section we will see that, in the second half of the century, the Chilean elites not only controlled the political and economic administration of the colony, but also the regular army and the militias.

### III. CONSOLIDATION OF A CREOLE ARMY IN CHILE

In Chile, in the last decades of the Ancien Régime, members of the militias and of the regular army experienced important changes in their social and political identities, which shaped a collective sense –historiographically known as ‘creole patriotism’- different from that of Spaniards. In general, ‘creole patriotism’ is understood as the phenomenon by which the Spanish Americans opposed to Spain and the rest of Europe by identifying themselves with their land of birth, with its cultural and intellectual roots and even with its flora and fauna. According to John Lynch, Simon Collier and David Brading, ‘creole patriotism’ developed into what the latter coined ‘proto-nationalism’. ‘Proto-nationalism’, in the view of these historians, explains a big deal of the reaction of Spanish Americans to the Napoleonic crisis. Indeed, for them the option for independence should be seen as a ‘proto-national’ reaction led by prominent Spanish Americans against the ‘absolutist’ reforms of the Bourbons, such as the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1767, the exclusion of creoles from important political positions, and the refusal of the Spanish corporations to give equal representations to Spanish Americans in the period 1808-1810.<sup>67</sup>

However, from the documentation available, it is not clear that Chileans understood ‘patriotism’ in opposition to Spain. At the turn of the century the word *patria* had a double

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<sup>65</sup> See Jocelyn-Holt, *La Independencia*, chapters II and III.

<sup>66</sup> See Paquette, ‘The dissolution’, p. 191.

<sup>67</sup> Collier, *Ideas and Politics*, chapter 1; David Brading, *Orbe indiano. De la monarquía católica a la república criolla, 1492-1867*, Fondo de Cultura Económica, México, D.F., 1991; Lynch, *América Latina*. A good analysis of the attacks of the *philosophes* in Antonello Gerbi, *La disputa del Nuevo Mundo. Historia de una polémica, 1750-1900*, Fondo de Cultura Económica, México, D.F., 1993.

implicit meaning: the ‘big *patria*’ [*patria grande*] referred to the Spanish empire. When Chileans reacted against Spain’s enemies they did so on behalf of the ‘big *patria*’ and with the clear purpose of reassuring that no foreign intruder would destroy the pillars on which the Spanish empire (of which they felt part) had been built. But ‘patriotism’ was also sometimes invoked by Chileans to defend the political rights of their ‘small *patria*’ [*patria pequeña*], that is, Spanish America and sometimes even its smaller components, like the Chilean territory. Both ways of calling the *patria* were not, however, mutually exclusive, since generally advocates of the ‘small *patria*’ were, at the same time, defenders of the empire.<sup>68</sup> Eighteenth-century advocates of the ‘small *patria*’ did not react against Spain because they did not need to. As it was argued in section II, Chilean bureaucrats were not excluded from high positions as often as creoles from other Spanish American regions, like Peru.<sup>69</sup> In Chile, important institutions like the army were officered almost exclusively by people who were either born in Spanish America or acted and behaved as ‘creoles’. Thus, the assertion that throughout the eighteenth century Chileans developed a ‘proto-national’ consciousness in opposition to Spanish-born people tends to exaggerate the existence of conflicts between ‘creoles’ and ‘non-creoles’. As we shall see in later chapters, the revolution that broke out in 1810 was not a conflict led by a ‘proto-nation’ – Chile- against the ‘absolutism’ of an established ‘nation’ –Spain-, but rather a civil conflict in which Spanish Americans and Europeans fought indistinctly on both sides.<sup>70</sup>

If differences between Chilean-born and Spaniards were not as much due to ‘national’ matters, how then is the concept of ‘creole’ to be understood? Who were and who were not ‘creoles’? My first approach to the concept analyzes the differences between ‘creoles’ and ‘non-creoles’ according to their geographical origins. My second approach discusses this subject in economic, social and political terms, stressing that, no matter what the place of birth of colonial individuals, both Spanish Americans and Spanish living in Chile could be seen as ‘creoles’. The reason for this apparent paradox is that Spaniards with profound connections in

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<sup>68</sup> See Serrano and Ossa, ‘1810 en Chile’, p. 110.

<sup>69</sup> It is no coincidence that Brading’s book is devoted mainly to studying the development of the ‘*patriotismo criollo*’ in New Spain and Peru, which were the regions where the administrative centralism of the Bourbons was most greatly felt. For Bourbon Peru, see John R. Fisher, ‘Redes de poder en el virreinato del Perú, 1776-1824: Los burócratas’, in *Revista de Indias*, vol. LXVI, number 236, 2006, pp. 149-164. For the Chilean case, see Jaques Barbier, ‘Elite and cadres in Bourbon Chile’, in *HAHR*, vol. 52, number 3, August 1972, pp. 416-435; and Jocelyn-Holt, *La Independencia*, p. 76.

<sup>70</sup> As Anthony McFarlane, *Colombia before independence. Economy, society, and politics under Bourbon rule*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1993, p. 4 put it for the Colombian case: ‘in the end, it was imperial crisis, rather than reactions against Bourbon absolutism or the foresight of enlightened “precursors”, that created the conditions for political emancipation in Colombia’.

the continent and Spanish American-born ‘creoles’ shared a similar way of seeing the world in which they lived: socially they were linked by marriage; politically, they had interests in local institutions, such as the Cabildos; and economically, they had mutual interests in mining and other activities regulated by the Consulado.<sup>71</sup> Because this second approach to the concept is especially related to the exercise of power by the local elites, only officers, not rank-and-file soldiers, are considered ‘creoles’. Although not all ‘creoles’ belonged to the elites, the elites were preferentially formed by ‘creoles’.<sup>72</sup>

In military terms, the principal sources to study the concept of ‘creole’ (the *Hojas de Servicios*) provide information that combines geographic with socio-political factors. Indeed, once a year the colonial authorities were compelled to send to Spain the *Hojas de Servicios* of the officers of the colonial army, which reported, among other things, the number of officers the army had, as well as their place of birth, age, rank, year of entrance in the army, behaviour, and number of participations in the battlefield.<sup>73</sup> For the purposes of this chapter, I have considered only a small number of the many elements given by the *Hojas de Servicios* of the period 1778-1810; they are, nevertheless, sufficient to demonstrate that in the last decades of the century both the Chilean regular army and the militias were almost completely officered by ‘creoles’.

Jorge Allendesalazar was the first historian to research the *Hojas de Servicios* of officers in Chilean archives.<sup>74</sup> Although, as the author himself recognized, his work is far from being a complete sample,<sup>75</sup> it represents a serious attempt to study the origins of the officers, as well as their ranks and date of admission in the army. Allendesalazar analysed 2,090 *Hojas de Servicios*, most of which refer to the different militia bodies allocated in the territory. For the purpose of this thesis, I have worked 769 of these *Hojas* (576 of militia officers and 193 of regular officers), to which I have added 212 *Hojas* located in the *Archivo de Simancas* (59 militia officers and 153 regular officers). Chronologically, these 981 *Hojas* give information of the period 1778-1810.

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<sup>71</sup> For a similar argument for the Mexican case, see Timothy Anna, *The fall of the royal government in Mexico City*, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 1978, p. 16.

<sup>72</sup> Cañizares-Esguerra, ‘Racial, religious and civic creole identity’, p. 423.

<sup>73</sup> The *Hoja de Servicio* is a much richer source than the ‘*Revistas Militares*’, which only give the name of soldiers, the unit in which they served, and their place of birth. For an example of these lists (i.e. *Batallón de Infantería de Valdivia*), see CM, vol. 110, pp. 71-76v.


<sup>74</sup> Allendesalazar, *Ejército y Milicias*.

<sup>75</sup> He said that the *Hojas de Servicios* located in Chilean archives should be complemented with those available in the Archivo de Simancas, a work that I have conducted online in the Spanish Archives’ official website: <http://www.pares.mcu.es>.


Graphs 1 and 2 show the geographical origin of Chile's colonial regular and militia officers, respectively. According to Graph 1, 67% of officers of the regular army were 'Chileans', that is to say, people born in the colony and considered 'creoles' because they were Spanish Americans.<sup>76</sup> Meanwhile, 26% of this group of officers were 'Spaniards'. In many occasions, the latter were seen by Chilean society as '*peninsulares*', though they were rarely deemed foreigners, as following graphs will confirm. The rest (7%) refers to other geographic places of birth, of whom 'Irish', 'French' and '*rioplatenses*' were the most common. The second graph, on the other hand, analyses the place of birth of militiamen. In this case, the result shows an even more explicit presence of 'geographical creoles' (77%) and, consequently, a rather small number of 'Spaniards' performing in both 'disciplined' and 'urban' militias (14%). Only 2% of militiamen appear to have been from other places, 'Peruvians' being the biggest group (0,06%).

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<sup>76</sup> A 1796 Census concluded that the total of inhabitants of the colony was 404,350, a number shared by Manuel de Salas who that same year spoke of a population of 400,000. Sadly, it is difficult to know how this figure was divided between the different colonial *castas*, and therefore the historian can only guess that around 20% of the population was white and that of this percentage the majority was creole (with both parents of Spanish origin, yet not necessarily born in Spain). *Mestizos*, according to Simon Collier formed 'well over half the total population of Chile in 1800'. In 1812, the national government conducted a demographic survey in Concepción, where apparently more than 300,000 inhabitants lived. A year later, Juan Egaña, commissioned by the the *Junta Gubernativa del Reino*, carried out another Census, though leaving aside both Santiago and Concepción. Despite this obvious gap, from the detail of the 1813 Census it is possible to conclude that 213,336 Spanish Americans [*Europeos Americanos*] lived in the province and 4,185 Spaniards, of a total of 900,000 given by Simon Collier (thus, the white population would had been 24%). Finally, according to a 1835 Census, 1.010.332 inhabitants resided in Chile. See Raúl Silva Castro, 'Introducción' in *Censo de 1813 levantado por don Juan Egaña por orden de la Junta de Gobierno formada por los Señores Pérez, Infante e Eyzaguirre*, Archivo Nacional de Chile, Imprenta Chile, Santiago, 1953. <http://www.memoriachilena.cl>; and Collier, *Ideas and Politics*, p. 4.



Total: 345 regular officers



Total: 636 militiamen

The 'geographical *criollización*' of the Chilean officers mirrored other parts of the continent. According to Juan Marchena, in 1800 60% of officers in the *Ejército de Dotación*

*Americano* (regular army) were Spanish Americans, while only 36,4% were '*peninsulares*'.<sup>77</sup> Regarding the Spanish American militias (e.g. Peru and New Granada), Marchena reaches a similar conclusion: in both rural and urban regions, Spanish American militia officers are much more represented than 'Spaniards'. Even in Lima, the capital city of the Viceroyalty, the percentage of '*limeños*' (48%) was higher than that of '*peninsulares*' (32%).<sup>78</sup>

But, as previously stated, the geographical aspects of the concept of *criollización* also reflect political and social factors. Most authors agree that the *Ejército de América* was a catalyst for the forging of the power of the creoles, and that the metropolis was unwittingly one of its principal instigators. Indeed, when the crown stopped sending contingents of the *Ejército de Refuerzo* to Chile, the authorities accepted that people from the colony, or at least from the Peninsula but with a long experience of Spanish America, would command the army. The 1768 *Ordenanzas*, through which Charles III tried to 'consolidate and extend the good origin'<sup>79</sup> of officers confirmed that an explicit tendency towards the complete *criollización* of the *Ejército de América* (not only of low and middle ranks, but also high) was rapidly gaining ground, since the only men who could meet this demand in Spanish America were either the small group of 'blood noblemen (*peninsulares*)' living in the continent or the increasingly powerful 'life nobles (Spanish Americans)'.<sup>80</sup>

Graphs 3 and 4 show the social background of regular officers and militiamen, respectively (graphs 5 and 6 study the social background by 'places of birth': 'Chileans' and 'Spaniards'). Whereas 61% of officers of the regular army were 'nobles', 80% of militia officers fell within that category. It is true that it is difficult to define the meaning of 'nobility' in eighteenth-century Chile and that, as Juan Marchena has said, in comparison to the 'authentic Spanish nobles' (blood nobles or *de jure*), the nobility titles of the military born in Spanish America (life nobles or *de facto*) were bought instead of inherited.<sup>81</sup> Yet Marchena seems to agree that more important than this is the fact that the creole officers had used the word 'noble' when making reference to their social origins, as this shows their interest in differentiating themselves from the rest of society. They, in other words, were aware that they belonged to a powerful corporate military elite.

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<sup>77</sup> Marchena, *Oficiales y soldados en el Ejército de América*, Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, Sevilla, 1983.p. 112.


<sup>78</sup> Marchena, *Ejército y milicias*, pp. 197-208.

<sup>79</sup> Vergara Quiroz, *Historia Social*, p. 63.

<sup>80</sup> Marchena, *Ejército y milicias*, p. 168.


<sup>81</sup> Marchena, *Oficiales y soldados*, p. 136.

**Graph 3: Social Background, 1778-1810 (Regular Army)**




Total: 345 officers<sup>82</sup>

**Graph 4: Social Background, 1778-1810 (Militias)**




Total: 636 militiamen

<sup>82</sup> INA: 'Infanzón de Naturaleza de Aragón'. Others: 'calidad buena', 'calidad regular', 'calidad bonrada', 'calidad dudosa', 'se ignora', etcetera.



Total: 318 officers (230 'Chileans', 88 'Spanish')




Total: 580 militiamen (490 'Chileans', 90 'Spanish')


As graphs 7, 8, 9 and 10 show, from the 1770s the majority of middle ranks (lieutenants, second lieutenants, cadets and sergeants, in the case of the regular army; captains, lieutenants, second lieutenants, and cadets in the militias) were made up of officers born in Chile; higher ranks of the regular army (colonels and lieutenant colonels), meanwhile, were in control of 'Spaniards', even though the difference with 'Chileans' in both groups is not truly significant (captains were represented equally by 'Spaniards' and 'Chileans': 17 each). The relationship high ranks='Chileans' is more evident in the militias than in the regular army.

Even so, considering that in the 1800s most of the middle ranks of the regular army were represented by Spanish Americans, and that they had a more direct contact with the common soldiers than the higher ranks, it could be argued that, by the end of the eighteenth century, the army was almost completely Americanized and that the Chilean elites used the army to protect and secure their social, political, and corporative interests.


**Graph 7: Military Ranks, 1778-1810  
(Regular Army)**



**Graph 8: Military Ranks, 1778-1810  
(Militias)**




**Graph 9: Military Ranks by Nationalities, 1778-1810  
(Regular Army)**



Total: 318 officers (230 'Chileans', 88 'Spanish')

**Graph 10: Military Ranks by Nationalities, 1778-1810  
(Militias)**



Total: 580 militiamen (490 'Chileans', 90 'Spanish')

Furthermore, and this refers to the second way of analyzing the word 'creole', even the Spanish officers living in the colonies backed the *criollización* of the army, as in the last decades of the century their political and social ambitions went hand-in-hand with those of the Spanish Americans. Matrimonial unions between Spanish nobles and wealthy creole women manifest this alliance. Considering that only noble cadets were allowed to enter the army, that around 90% of them were Spanish Americans and that of these many were sons of 'peninsulares' (the so-called '*hijos de militares*'), we can conclude that standing Spanish officers

experienced an evident *criollización* in their customs. In Marchena's words:

From the study of matrimonial documents it is possible to confirm that [Spanish officers of the *Ejército de Refuerzo*] always married wealthy creole women. Before the wedding the chosen bride had to demonstrate that she was of good family [*buena familia*] and that her family could contribute with an important dowry, which in some occasions could be higher than fifty thousand pesos. Through these alliances, the peninsular military obtained access to the Spanish American economic power, since landowners and creole merchants' daughters used to marry with officers of scarce fortune but with abundant nobility titles and Castilian Coats of Arms (*blasones castellanos*). Hence, their heirs were creoles, *hijos de militares*, young officers, nobles, and with strong links with the Spanish American economic power. In short, they were members of the creole oligarchy [*oligarquía criolla*].<sup>83</sup>

The *criollización* of the army made the Chilean officers powerful in socio-political rather than in military terms; indeed, as we have seen, to be in charge of the army was a road to influence in administrative decisions, not an opportunity to improve their technical skills. But, in an age when political negotiations between the metropolis and the Chilean colony were still more important than military solutions, to implicitly promote –as the crown did throughout the century- any sort of empowerment of the colonial people inevitably brought positive results for Spanish Americans. As it was discussed in section II, the metropolitan crisis of the last decades of the eighteenth century caused Chileans to adopt a relatively autonomist path, not at this stage with the desire of cutting their links with the Peninsula but rather with the aim of strengthening their already solid political and social position within the empire. The high participation of creoles in the army proves that they willingly agreed to lead the defence of the kingdom in exchange for military ranks and privileges, and that, as a consequence of the economic crisis of the 1780s-1790s, the crown was forced to accept this tacit clause of the colonial pact almost as a *conditio sine qua non*.

The power of the creole officers and the weakness of the metropolis became even more patent during the 1800s, as can be seen, for example, when studying the repercussions in Chile of the British invasions of the River Plate in 1806-1807. On that occasion, and following a Royal Order of 22 November 1804 that instructed the Chilean governor to attend the defence of the kingdom with local resources, the Santiago Cabildo –that is, the most important corporation in which the privileges of the creoles were defended- organized the defence of the territory without expecting the help of either the crown or the Peruvian viceroy.<sup>84</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> Marchena, *Oficiales y soldados*, p. 157.

<sup>84</sup> Néstor Meza Villalobos, *La actividad política del Reino de Chile entre 1806 y 1810*, Editorial Universitaria, Santiago, 1956, pp. 13-17. For the history of the Cabildo in colonial Chile, see Isaac Cox and Julio Alemparte, *El Cabildo en*

News of the invasion crossed the cordillera relatively fast.<sup>85</sup> Upon learning of it, the Chilean governor, Luis Muñoz de Guzmán, informed the Cabildo of events in Buenos Aires and prepared an action plan. This was a strong indication that the governor would have to rely on the Cabildo if the British decided to invade Chilean territory, a possibility that seemed real. Indeed, on 30 October 1806, William Windham had ordered an expeditionary force to occupy the principal ports of the colony to create a commercial axis between the River Plate and Chile.<sup>86</sup> Although the British attack never occurred, the Chilean creoles' reaction did not take long. Sceptical of the advantages of changing one monarchy for another, the governor, together with the Cabildo, asked Santiago's most prominent inhabitants to prepare a defensive plan. The responsibility was given to the militia colonel Judas Tadeo Reyes, who wrote a detailed report on the kingdom's military situation and the reforms that, in his view, should be applied. Broadly, the plan can be divided into three categories: the reasons and strategies behind a possible British invasion; the problems that a foreign attack could entail inside Chilean territory; and the practical military movements that were necessary to confront the British.

According to Reyes, the British would concentrate their attacks on the Chilean coast. The island of Chiloé would probably be their entry to the country, since it was the only place where British sailors could 'subsist from its natural productions without fear of being disturbed except by a strong expedition from Spain, and meanwhile fortifying and extending themselves throughout that under populated continent'.<sup>87</sup> The second point was much more complicated, because both the military preparation of Chilean inhabitants and their technical provisions were insignificant compared to those of the British. Santiago, the kingdom's capital, possessed only 5 cannon, 2,500 muskets, and the same number of lances, all of which led Reyes to infer that 'making the last effort, at the most we could put together less than two

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*Chile colonial. Orígenes municipales de las repúblicas hispanoamericanas*, Ediciones de la Universidad de Chile, Santiago, 1940, Review appeared in HAHHR, vol. 23, number 1, 1943.

<sup>85</sup> A short bibliographical list of the causes and consequences of these invasions includes: Klaus Gallo, *Las Invasiones inglesas*, Editorial Universitaria, Buenos Aires, 2004; Tulio Halperín Donghi, *Revolución y Guerra. Formación de una élite dirigente en la Argentina criolla*, Siglo Veintiuno Argentina Editores, Buenos Aires, 1972; Arturo Capdevila, *Las Invasiones Inglesas. Crónica y evocación*, Espasa-Calpe Argentina, Buenos Aires, 1938; Martín Rodríguez, 'Memorias del Brigadier General D. Martín Rodríguez', in *Los Sucesos de Mayo contados por sus actores*, W.M. Jackson Inc. Editores, Buenos Aires, 1928; and Cornelio Saavedra, 'Memoria autógrafa de Cornelio Saavedra', in *Los Sucesos de Mayo contados por sus actores*, W.M. Jackson Inc. Editores, Buenos Aires, 1928.

<sup>86</sup> See Diego Barros Arana, *Historia Jeneral de la Independencia de Chile*, vol. I, Librería de Pedro Yuste, Santiago, 1863 pp. 411-413, in section "Documentos justificativos".

<sup>87</sup> CDHICH, vol. 25, p. 22.

thousand men with muskets, [...] and a few others with cavalry lances.<sup>88</sup> The military condition of the other major areas was as precarious as that of the capital: ‘of our seaports only Valdivia is enabled by its fortification and circumstances to resist a formal blockade. [...] The important city of Concepcion runs extremely risk and deserves the greatest attention for being the capital of a very dangerous frontier country and for its closeness to the seaport of Talcahuano. [...] [Due to its proximity to] the sea, La Serena, a principal city, is in imminent danger’.<sup>89</sup>

The best way of making a good defensive plan, claimed Reyes, was to provide the regions with military supplies. Only after achieving this, would the Chilean army be ready to mount a robust defence of the territory. For Reyes, the Chileans must take advantage of their knowledge of the terrain, conducting attacks by surprise, and using the so-called *bnasos* as a cavalry force.<sup>90</sup> These horsemen should be accompanied by a group of *cuchilleros*,<sup>91</sup> collected among the ‘numerous labourers of this capital and its mines, small farms and estates of the circuit’,<sup>92</sup> and commanded by ‘landowners of great distinction’.<sup>93</sup>

Finally, Reyes recommended the creation of militias to defend the capital city. The governor and the Cabildo shared his opinion. On 14 March 1807, the Cabildo sent a note to the governor, presenting ‘some ideas for the benefit and safety of this country’,<sup>94</sup> like the organization in Santiago of a military detachment that was to be paid with the costs of the penitentiary.<sup>95</sup> Unfortunately, the documents do not tell us whether this militia was created or not. What is clear, however, is that, in September 1806, the capital’s inhabitants organized training sessions for militiamen in a camp called Las Lomas, located ‘no more than a league from Santiago’<sup>96</sup>. Tomás O’Higgins, an Irish ‘officer who had served in the regiment of Usbonia, and fought the Pyrenees campaign against the army of the French republic’, commanded the military exercises.<sup>97</sup> The participation (encouraged by the Cabildo) in these militias of young creoles like Francisco Antonio Pinto and Juan de Dios Vial proves that the military preparation in Las Lomas awoke a ‘sense of patriotism’<sup>98</sup> among the elites. Such as

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<sup>88</sup> Ibidem, p. 26.

<sup>89</sup> Ibidem, pp. 22-23.

<sup>90</sup> People who worked in the countryside.

<sup>91</sup> People armed with knives.

<sup>92</sup> CHDICH, vol. 25, p. 40.

<sup>93</sup> Ibidem, p. 42.

<sup>94</sup> Ibidem, pp. 8-7.

<sup>95</sup> Meza Villalobos, *La actividad política*, p. 19.

<sup>96</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia Jeneral de la Independencia*, p. 416.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid.

<sup>98</sup> Vergara Quiroz, *Historia Social*, p. 59.

‘sense of patriotism’ should not, however, be confused with alleged revolutionary aspirations to cut the links with the metropolis. In fact, ‘patriotism’, as conceived by Pinto, was in 1807 still built upon a strong loyalty towards Spain and the king.

...

In this introductory chapter I discussed three topics: first, I challenged the view that the Bourbons were able to establish a militarized regime in Chile after the negative outcome of the Seven Years’ War prompted the Spanish ministers to introduce a whole new scheme of political, military and economic reforms. Although David Brading’s belief that the Bourbons ‘employed soldiers’ to govern the empire is theoretically correct, in practice Chile’s colonial army did not experience a significant improvement in either tactical or organizational terms.

The second point underlined in this chapter is that in the second half of the eighteenth century Chilean creoles enjoyed increasing political and economic autonomy. Contrary to the argument that the Bourbons effected a ‘second conquest’ of Spanish America through their reformist programme, I have emphasized that the introduction of the Intendancies in 1785, the creation of a Tribunal del Consulado in 1795 and the confirmation of Chile as General Captaincy -all of them institutional reforms that aimed to strengthen the power of the metropolis in the colony-, were reforms that, to use Jocelyn-Holt’s word, were ‘co-opted’ by the Chilean elites to enhance their own position within the empire.<sup>99</sup> Hence the Chilean colonial people were not alienated by the policies introduced by the monarchy.

The last section argued that the local elites were represented by ‘creoles’, and that, in the Chilean military context, ‘creoles’ were officers either born in Chile or with a long experience of Spanish America. They did not rest their power on a proto-national consciousness aiming to bring about the collapse of the metropolis. In fact, many creoles were ‘patriot’ reformists, but when Napoleon invaded the Peninsula they did not seek to subvert the alleged absolutism of the Bourbons by means of a ‘proto-national’ discourse. Works that exaggerate the role played by ‘proto-nationalism’ in the construction of the revolutionary programme forget that, as we will see in the next chapter, the first years of the war in Chile (1813-1817) armies did not represent two defined nations, but rather two different political options that were defended mainly by people born in Spanish America.

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<sup>99</sup> Jocelyn-Holt, *La Independencia*, chapters II and III.

**CHAPTER II**

**BUILDING UP A REVOLUTIONARY ARMY  
IN CHILE 1808-1814**

This chapter studies the political and military consequences of the demise of the Spanish monarchy in Chile in 1808. The first section contends that after the British invasion of Buenos Aires both governor Francisco García Carrasco and the Santiago Cabildo continued organizing new military detachments and preparing the colony in case of a European invasion of Chile. News of Napoleon's attack on the Peninsula provoked a series of political and military changes that led to the replacement of the Chilean governor, Francisco Antonio García Carrasco. I shall argue that García Carrasco's failure to control Santiago's political agenda prompted a group of the capital's politicians, *hacendados* and military officers to oust him from power and establish a government more sympathetic to their interests. Such a government was embodied by a political Junta based in Santiago, whose objective was to govern the territory on behalf of the imprisoned king. The fact that the Junta had been created to 'preserve' the monarchical rights of Ferdinand VII shows that, although its establishment marked a revolutionary turning point with the administrative system that had historically ruled the colony, the *santiaguinos* did not aim to cut the links with the metropolis.

The next section discusses the response of the second biggest city of the kingdom, Concepción, to Santiago's unilateral decision to govern the Chilean territory on behalf of the entire kingdom. The relationship between these two political centres was relatively fluid until the military officer José Miguel Carrera, who arrived from Spain in mid 1811, became supreme master of the capital. Differences between Carrera and the leader of Concepción, Juan Martínez de Rozas, intensified in December 1811, and for the first time Chileans had grounds to fear that conflict might give way to a war involving Concepción and Santiago. Nevertheless, Santiago and Concepción did not resolve their problems on the battlefield, for in the end political solutions prevailed.

The following two sections analyze the same period (1810-1814), but from two distinct angles. Section III examines the military reforms enacted in Chile by both the Santiago Junta (1810-1811) and Carrera's successive governments (1811-1814). The creation of regular and militia detachments, as well as the measures to improve the education of military officers, were some of the most important reforms introduced by the *juntistas* during their time in office.

When internal conflicts with Rozas ended and Carrera's new enemy, the Peruvian viceroy José Fernando de Abascal, declared war on the Chilean insurgents, the process of militarization experienced by Chilean society finally became tested on the battlefield. The war against Abascal was cruel, violent, bloody and had the characters of a civil war. Indeed, as a consequence of Spain's inability to send troops to Chile from the 1780s, both armies were largely composed of men born in Spanish America in general and Chile in particular.

The last section also studies the years 1810-1814, though from a political perspective. In spite of their revolutionary characteristics, neither the creation of the Junta in 1810 nor the installation of Congress a year later weakened the loyalty of Chileans. It was only after José Miguel Carrera enacted a relatively radical *Reglamento Constitucional* in October 1812 that Lima decided to intervene in Chile militarily. After the outbreak of the war royalists and revolutionaries introduced a sophisticated system to punish deserters and traitors. In the case of the revolutionaries, the concept of 'loyalty' began to be used to differentiate 'patriots' and 'anti-patriots'. Even two revolutionaries officers as respected as Bernardo O'Higgins (son of Ambrosio) and Juan Mackenna were accused of treason and anti-patriotism when they signed a peace agreement with the royalist Gabino Gaínza near the river Lircay in May 1814. However, the alleged treason of O'Higgins and Mackenna is less important than the consequences of the Treaty of Lircay: after four years of revolution, the highest royalist officer in Chile –Gaínza- treated the rebels as members of a political state with which it was not only advisable but indispensable to negotiate. This meant, both in theory and practice, a remarkable diplomatic triumph for the insurgency.

## I. 1808-1810: INTERNAL RESPONSES TO IMPERIAL CRISIS

Although the British did not invade Chilean territory in 1807, the fear of being attacked by a European power led the Santiago Cabildo to keep professionalizing the troops. When the Buenos Aires mail informed that Napoleon had invaded Spain,<sup>1</sup> the creoles swore loyalty to the crown and prepared against a possible French incursion in Spanish America. Occupied as he was with the problems of the monarchical succession after the Bayonne abdications, Napoleon probably never thought of crossing the Atlantic Ocean and beginning a military incursion in

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<sup>1</sup> News arrived in Chile in September 1808. See Meza Villalobos, *La actividad política*, p. 40. For the Napoleonic invasion of the Iberian Peninsula, see Raymond Carr, *Spain 1808-1939*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1966, pp. 81-92.

the Spanish American colonies. In any case, geographical distance and lack of information prevented the creoles from knowing for certain the real significance of European events, and so they needed to be ready to confront any eventuality.

Throughout 1808-1809, people from Europe and the Americas participated in the constitutional debate triggered by the abdication of Ferdinand VII.<sup>2</sup> From the very beginning, Chileans resented Napoleon's presence in the Peninsula, and expressed a revival of the political and military 'patriotism' of 1806 and 1807. Thus, for example, in the session of 19 September 1808, the Santiago Cabildo declared that the best way of helping the metropolis was to arm the Chilean people, prepare the kingdom in case of a foreign invasion, and collect money to 'assist its sisters the European Spanish Provinces that are overthrowing the French yoke and defending the glorious cause of Ferdinand VII's rights'.<sup>3</sup>

The *cabildantes* were 'persuaded that the defence of these countries is a cooperation for the wellbeing of the state in general, and of the mother country',<sup>4</sup> which was the same as claiming that the peninsular crisis was their own.<sup>5</sup> But they also knew that, despite Judas Tadeo Reyes' defensive plan of 1806 and the latest efforts to professionalize the militias, the country was far from having a solid military system. To remedy this, on 19 September 1808 the Cabildo proposed seventeen solutions to Luis Muñoz de Guzmán's successor, governor Francisco Antonio García Carrasco, to improve the defensive capacity of the kingdom. Mixing military solutions with economic and political recommendations, the Santiago *cabildantes* believed that the governor should mobilize ten thousand infantry militiamen in the capital, and another six thousand in Concepción. Urban inhabitants were preferable to rural. Nevertheless, given the fact that the people working in the countryside would have to abandon their agricultural tasks only on training days, it was thought they should also be employed in the event of an emergency.

But the people of Santiago lacked the principal means to defend themselves: weapons. According to the Cabildo, it was necessary to buy ten thousand muskets and three thousand 'pairs of pistols', besides ordering the manufacture of 'fifty cannons in Lima'. To pay for weapons the government had to collect funds from the Chilean Royal Treasury, whose administrator had to stop financing public works that bore no relation to the 'defence of the

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<sup>2</sup> François-Xavier Guerra, *Modernidad e Independencias*, chapter IV.

<sup>3</sup> 'Acta del Cabildo de Santiago, 19 de Septiembre de 1808', in <http://www.historia.uchile.cl>.

<sup>4</sup> 'Acta del Cabildo de Santiago, 19 de Septiembre de 1808', in <http://www.historia.uchile.cl>.

<sup>5</sup> Guerra, *Modernidad e Independencias*, p. 126.

kingdom against foreign enemies'.<sup>6</sup> On 22 September, the Cabildo decided to buy weapons through economic contributions to be collected in Santiago and Concepción, and which were to be kept 'with the name of *Fondo Patriótico* in an chest of three keys of the General Treasury, one of which will be in charge of a person elected by the Cabildo'.<sup>7</sup>

This short account seeks to demonstrate that military affairs were the chief and almost sole preoccupation of the creoles during 1808. At the same time, it aims to show that the Santiago *cabildantes* were acting in the belief that Ferdinand VII was still their monarch, and that the Junta Suprema de Sevilla, established in Seville in May 1808, was his exclusive representative.<sup>8</sup> From the perspective of the Santiago Cabildo, this loyalty to Spain should be rewarded by giving the Spanish Americans the possibility of participating in the political debate in the metropolis. In January 1809, the Junta Central (which was the corporation that, in September 1808, centralized the decisions adopted in the Peninsula)<sup>9</sup> made a concession to the colonies and permitted them to send delegates to Spain to participate in the political negotiations, which proved that peninsular politicians had taken the expectations of the creoles seriously.

However, this decision was, to say the least, ambivalent. If in one of its documents the Junta Central had declared their intention of tightening the links with the colonies by means of a policy of equality, the use of the word 'concession' was quite offensive to the Spanish Americans, since the 'participation in the national representation appears not as a right, but as [...] a recompense'.<sup>10</sup> This inequality also appeared 'in the number of delegates: 9 for Spanish America and the Philippines against 36 for the Peninsula, when both more or less had the same number of inhabitants'.<sup>11</sup> As a consequence of these ambiguities and disparities, the distinction between loyal and disloyal subjects proved difficult to define. Some saw the election of delegates as an unprecedented opportunity to participate in metropolitan affairs, while others believed that it was unacceptable to be treated as inferiors.<sup>12</sup>

The lack of reliable news coming from Spain confused the Chilean political scenario

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<sup>6</sup> The seventeen solutions proposed by the Cabildo appear in 'Acta del Cabildo de Santiago, 19 de Septiembre de 1808', in <http://www.historia.uchile.cl>.

<sup>7</sup> 'Acta del Cabildo de Santiago, 22 de Septiembre de 1808', in <http://www.historia.uchile.cl>.

<sup>8</sup> 'Acta del Cabildo de Santiago, 26 de Octubre de 1808', in <http://www.historia.uchile.cl>.

<sup>9</sup> Víctor Peralta Ruiz, *La independencia y la cultura política peruana (1808-1821)*, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, Lima, 2010, chapter I.

<sup>10</sup> Guerra, *Modernidad e Independencias*, p. 135.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid. For the Chilean elections, see Miguel Luis Amunátegui, *La Crónica de 1810*, Imprenta de la República de Jacinto Nuñez, Santiago, 1876, vol. 1, pp. 325-356.

<sup>12</sup> Guerra, *Modernidad e Independencias*, pp. 133-138.

even more. The correspondence between the colonel of militias Juan Martínez de Rozas, inhabitant of Concepción, and the *santiaguino* José Antonio de Rojas gives an idea of this discontent. In a letter of 24 July 1809, Rozas told Rojas that reports from Europe were unclear and confused, and most confusing of all was the new role of Britain as an ally of Spain. Nobody could know for certain whether the Spanish forces were gaining or losing ground in the Peninsula.<sup>13</sup> Rojas shared the same scepticism regarding foreign reports, though he seemed to be more informed than his friend from Concepción. On 10 August, Rojas summarized for Rozas the principal military and political events in the Peninsula. In his opinion, despite Napoleon's problems in Europe, in particular after Prussia renewed hostilities against France, the Spanish military situation was extremely weak.<sup>14</sup>

This news made Rozas even more pessimistic about the situation in the Peninsula and its possible repercussions in Spanish America. In September 1809 Rozas expressed his latest thoughts. Painfully but pragmatically, he declared to Rojas that:

Since I saw in the gazettes and public papers that Zaragoza and Aragón were lost; that the French occupied Galicia after beating the English; that Cuesta was defeated in Medellín and the enemy occupied Extremadura; and, in short, that the Duque del Infantado was also defeated in la Mancha, losing all his artillery; since I saw all this, I say, I did not doubt, and I do not doubt for a moment, that everything is lost, and that the sickness does not have a cure. [...] Here, there is nothing we could do to help our mother country, unless sending money as we have done; but we can do plenty of things to save ourselves from all the foreigners who want to attack and conquer us; and nothing, we do nothing, because we reserve the remedies for the last minute.<sup>15</sup>

It is not clear how governor García Carrasco reacted to these criticisms, not least because Rozas, without doubt the most radical of these reformers, was at that time García Carrasco's most trusted supporter.<sup>16</sup> It is pretty clear, nevertheless, that some of the questionings analyzed above were seen by García Carrasco as a serious threat not only to Ferdinand VII but also, and more important, to his own political position.

Here, it might be useful to recall the mechanism that led García Carrasco to be appointed governor of Chile, and what the consequences of his election were. In 1806, a *Real Cédula* ordered that, due to defensive matters, the substitution of dead governors ought to fall upon the highest military officer of the kingdom. After Luis Muñoz de Guzmán's death in

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<sup>13</sup> CDHICH, vol. 30, pp. 25-27.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 30-36.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 28-29.

<sup>16</sup> In 1810, García Carrasco broke his alliance with Rozas, declaring that the appointment of Rozas as his 'private advisor' had been a 'disgrace'. AGI, Chile 206, García Carrasco to the King, 24 November 1810.

early 1808, the Real Audiencia argued that the vacancy should be occupied by one of the *regentes*, which explicitly contravened the Spanish disposition. Military officers from Concepción responded by stressing that García Carrasco was the highest officer in Chile, and that, consequently, the post of governor should be filled by him. Although García Carrasco was a relatively unknown military officer and a complete stranger among the ruling classes of Santiago, in the end the Real Audiencia accepted the appointment of García Carrasco as governor of Chile. However, his reception in the capital was cold, and in every official ceremony the elites criticized his outsider character. This was not a tension between Spaniards and Spanish Americans (García Carrasco was a Spanish-born officer, but by 1808 he had lived in the New World for more than two decades), but between rival institutions and provinces.<sup>17</sup>

The Santiago elites not only resented García Carrasco's outsider character, but also a series of political decisions made by him. Among the many aspects of García Carrasco's administration that worried the elites was his ambiguity regarding the kind of participation the colony should have in imperial affairs. Nothing shows García Carrasco's erratic behaviour better than his confrontation with José Santiago Luco, the Junta Suprema de Sevilla's envoy, who arrived in Chile in October 1808.<sup>18</sup>

Luco was a Chilean military officer who had lived the last few years in Spain. On 17 June 1808, the Junta Suprema de Sevilla, on behalf of Ferdinand VII, appointed him its delegate to Chile, his official objective being to convince the colonial authorities to remain loyal to Spain. With this brief, Luco was requested to arouse 'the patriotic fervour' of ecclesiastic and political authorities in the colony.<sup>19</sup> Luco accomplished relatively quickly his two most important tasks in Chile: to be recognized as the Junta's envoy by all the corporations of the colony; and to explain why Spain had declared war on France and signed an armistice with England, considered now an ally of the Spanish monarchy. His third aim, that is, to collect money among the kingdom's wealthiest inhabitants to pay for Spain's defensive campaigns in the Peninsula, was much more difficult to achieve, since García Carrasco was opposed to handing him the money.<sup>20</sup> García Carrasco was not convinced about the Junta Suprema's role and doubted whether he should accept Luco's economic demands,

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<sup>17</sup> This paragraph is based on Serrano and Ossa, '1810 en Chile', p. 103.

<sup>18</sup> AGI, Chile 206, 17 June 1808.

<sup>19</sup> AGI, Chile 206, 17 June 1808.

<sup>20</sup> MJTM, Document 5640, Microfilm MsM46, Luco to Señor Presidente y demás vocales de la Suprema Junta de Gobierno de España y de Indias, 9 December 1808, p. 245-251.

who, in his view, had made friends with ‘dangerous people’ [*sugetos cabilosos y mal contentos*].<sup>21</sup>

For the Santiago elites, the dispute with García Carrasco became a struggle of prerogatives. Should a governor who had refused to grant the envoy of the Junta Suprema de Sevilla the money he had requested to support Spain in its war against Napoleonic France continue to be seen as a legitimate agent of Spain?<sup>22</sup> There were a few *santiaguinos* who came to doubt García Carrasco’s loyalty towards Ferdinand VII. García Carrasco, for his part, believed that the creoles had local rather than imperial interests, an accusation which, although partly true, did not consider that having local and imperial interests was not necessarily incompatible. In other words, what García Carrasco failed to understand was that not even the most radical politicians in 1810 aimed to overthrow the monarchy; they, at most, tried to reform it from within.

Even an institution as conservative and attached to Spain as the Real Audiencia was criticized by García Carrasco. In the governor’s opinion, family connections mattered more than any other factor in the Real Audiencia: *oidores* Concha and Aldunate were born in Santiago, and married to families with strong connections to the country. For his part, Manuel Irigoyen, although a *patricio* from Buenos Aires, ‘has been for more than five years now engaged [*liado*] and attached [*apasionado*] to the House of Asesor Valdes. This is common knowledge; so evident, that is the gossip around Town. He is given to all sorts of Women, who make him despicable, and foreign [*extraño*] to the politic stance and seriousness that his employment demands’. This is why, the governor claimed, ‘it is impossible for these ministers to act with impartiality’.<sup>23</sup> García Carrasco not only demanded that those *regentes* be expelled from the colony, but also that higher authorities should stop the Real Audiencia from appointing ‘people born in the country or married to [Chilean] families [with] real estates [*fincas*]’, a statement that shows that even the Real Audiencia was formed at least partially by creoles.<sup>24</sup> It seems likely that García Carrasco’s attitude had also been influenced by the letter he received in April 1810 from the new River Plate viceroy, Baltasar Hidalgo de Cisneros, telling him that rumours of seditious movements organized in Chile by important *santiaguinos*

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<sup>21</sup> MJTM, Document 5673, Microfilm MsM46, García Carrasco to the King, 23 June 1809, p. 231.

<sup>22</sup> García Carrasco’s finally accepted Luco’s economic request; but he did it only six months after Luco’s first demand. In MJTM, Document 5692, Microfilm MsM46, pp. 235, Luco to Señor Presidente y demás vocales de la Suprema Junta de Gobierno de España y de Indias [?], 25 April 1809.

<sup>23</sup> AGI, Estado 85, N. 60, García Carrasco to Francisco Saavedra, 23 April 1810.

<sup>24</sup> AGI, Estado 85, N. 60, García Carrasco to Francisco Saavedra, 23 April 1810.

had reached Buenos Aires.<sup>25</sup> This gave a perfect opportunity for the Chilean governor to formally accuse those who had questioned his loyalty, and to demonstrate to the authorities in Buenos Aires and Spain that his power in the colony was supreme.

In order to prevent the military challenge of the creoles, the governor stopped militia training, and sent most cavalry lances in the capital to Spain, thus depriving the *santiaguinos* of arms in case of a revolt.<sup>26</sup> Astonished by the governor's measures, the Santiago Cabildo sent him a letter on 4 May 1810 reproaching him that it was indispensable for the inhabitants of the capital to retain 'the only arms that its cavalry has'.<sup>27</sup> Sadly for the *cabildantes*, García Carrasco was the highest-ranking military officers in the kingdom and, as such, he could make any military decision without even discussing it with the Real Audiencia. And, of course, that was exactly what he argued at the Santiago Cabildo on 22 May 1810, when he declared that it was beneath his dignity for him to keep 'engaging [with the *cabildantes*] in more discussions about his faculties'.<sup>28</sup>

García Carrasco's letter was a blow for the *cabildantes*, though it would not be the last or the heaviest. On 25 May, the same day that the first Junta of Buenos Aires was held, García Carrasco imprisoned the creoles Bernardo de Vera y Pintado, José Antonio de Ovalle and José Antonio de Rojas for spreading seditious ideas within Chilean territory.<sup>29</sup> Apparently, Ovalle, who was the Santiago Cabildo's attorney, used military arguments to explain what would happen in Chile if France definitively defeated Spain. According to a Spanish witness interrogated by the governor, Ovalle had told him that 'the people of the kingdom had the military capacity' to defend the 'independence' of Chile.<sup>30</sup> Even though it seems that Ovalle referred to independence only in relation to Napoleonic France, for the governor the use of military arguments was a proof of Ovalle's revolutionary goals, and thus he and his creole fellows had to be deported to Lima to be sentenced by the viceroy.

The obstinacy of the governor led Santiago's elites to prepare a political-military movement to oust him. On the night of 14 July 1810, the *cabildantes* agreed to 'repel force by force and constitute a provisional government'. To realize their project, the *cabildantes*

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<sup>25</sup> Collier, *Ideas and Politics*, p. 79.

<sup>26</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. VIII, p. 88.

<sup>27</sup> 'Acta del Cabildo de Santiago, 4 de Mayo de 1810', in <http://www.historia.uchile.cl>.

<sup>28</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, Editorial Universitaria and DIBAM, Santiago, 2002, vol. VIII, p. 89.

<sup>29</sup> See, for instance, Meza Villalobos, *La actividad política*, pp. 104-116; Villalobos, *Tradicón y Reforma*, pp. 194-204; and Collier, *Ideas and Politics*, pp. 46-47.

<sup>30</sup> Meza Villalobos, *La actividad política*, p. 105.

‘considered the forces that the governor counted on, which reached two hundred infantry soldiers from Concepción, fifty *Dragones de la Reina* and 60 artilleries’. According to Néstor Meza Villalobos, ‘to defeat these forces and secure the success of the project, they decided to bring together on the morning of Tuesday 17 [July] the greatest number of peasants from the outskirts of the capital. With this aim every *cabildante* would inform the landlords about the plan, bringing all the people they could from their estates’.<sup>31</sup> The position of the capital’s elites shows that, at least in terms of political practices, ideological shifts were undermining the legitimacy of Spain’s most important official in Chile. For the first time in Chile, the *santiaguinos* had gained sufficient power to depose the governor from office, an objective that on 16 July 1810 the Real Audiencia put into effect, naming the old *hacendado* and creole merchant Mateo de Toro y Zambrano as his successor. The fall of García Carrasco provoked a change in the way power had been constituted. Neither the metropolis nor the Peruvian viceroy had any influence on García Carrasco’s dismissal, which means that political power rested, from that moment and until a Junta was established a couple of months later, on the Cabildo.

In his various written defences García Carrasco claimed that these events had been accompanied by a fair amount of violence. In a letter to the king of 27 August 1810, he declared that even those who ‘in good faith’ had protested against the imprisonment of Ovalle, Rojas and Vera had threatened him with knives. Furthermore, after drinking alcohol in Santiago’s coffee houses [*Cafees*], young creoles had, ‘on behalf of what they called the *patria*,<sup>32</sup> intimidated the good people [*pueblo honrrado*]’, a report that also included an allusion to the reduced number of persons who, in García Carrasco’s opinion, had really been involved in his removal. According to the governor, the July revolt was led only by 52 people, among whom there were regular military like Manuel Olaguer Feliú, Francisco Javier Reina, Juan de Dios Vial and Juan Mackenna; and militia officers like Ignacio de la Carrera, Juan José Carrera, Luis Carrera, Martín Larraín, José Antonio Villota, Santos Izquierdo, and García Carrasco’s old enemy, José Santiago Luco.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Ibidem, p. 121.

<sup>32</sup> It is likely that for *patria* these young creoles referred to the ‘small *patria*’, and that enemies of the Chilean governor used this word to defend the kingdom from *malos gobiernos* like García Carrasco’s, and not as a means to question the relationship between Chile and Spain.

<sup>33</sup> AGI, Chile 206, García Carrasco to the King, 27 August 1810. Examples of García Carrasco’s worries about the intervention of military men in politics can easily be found in the documentation held in the *Archivo de Indias*. On 6 November 1810, for example, the former governor told the king that the Santiago Junta was levying taxes with the aim of ‘creating new troops to resist not the common enemy [Napoleon] [...], but to repel the authorities who were appointed by You [king] in order to remedy [*remediar*] these scandalous disorders’. In AGI,

The involvement of the military in politics grew with time. On 8 September, García Carrasco reported that Reina, who was Colonel of the *Real Cuerpo de Artillería*, was, at the moment that the former governor was writing his letter, receiving in his house ‘other fanatics to the system of independence [sic]’, such as sergeant major Juan de Dios Vial, lieutenant Pedro José Romero and militia colonel Ignacio de la Carrera.<sup>34</sup> The political activity of the military became so evident that on 17 September the Real Audiencia reported to the new governor, Mateo de Toro y Zambrano, that its members were surprised that Santiago’s troops had been assembled in circumstances that there were no serious reasons to fear a foreign attack. Besides, the Real Audiencia continued, the kingdom’s principal authorities were Chilean-born, a condition that ought to prevent the military chiefs from using their men against them. To be born in Chile was, in the Real Audiencia’s view, a sign of patriotism, and so Toro y Zambrano should encourage the rest of the *santiaguinos* to regard Napoleon as the sole enemy of the kingdom. Unless the French emperor prepared an invasion of Spanish America, the military must be kept out of politics.<sup>35</sup>

Toro y Zambrano answered the Real Audiencia’s letter that same day, arguing that there were no good reasons to fear the military, as many of them ‘lacked the necessary training’ to subvert the *status quo*. Therefore, he urged the Real Audiencia to stay calm. However, he also told the *regentes* to bear in mind that official news from Spain allowed ‘these Americas to form a Congress’, a solution that, ‘considering the present circumstances’, appeared to be of ‘great necessity’.<sup>36</sup> Hence, Toro y Zambrano played a double game: on one hand, his main intention was to avoid unnecessary friction with the Real Audiencia, as its members could form an alliance with him should the radicals gain excessive influence. On the other, he had to convince the Real Audiencia to accept some of the aspirations of the group that had not only backed the dismissal of García Carrasco, but that now was in favour of creating an autonomous government to rule the country until the return of Ferdinand VII.

The *Cabildo Abierto* –‘an open meeting of the chief notables of the city’ of Santiago<sup>37</sup>– of 18 September reflected Toro y Zambrano’s dilemma. This event was attended by nearly 350 people,<sup>38</sup> and its *Acta* made two major claims: first, that ‘Chile is to be preserved for King

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Chile 315, García Carrasco to the King, 6 November 1810.

<sup>34</sup> AGI, Chile 206, García Carrasco to the King, 8 September 1810.

<sup>35</sup> AGI, Chile 315, the *Real Audiencia* to Toro y Zambrano, 17 September 1810.

<sup>36</sup> AGI, Chile 315, Toro y Zambrano to the *Real Audiencia*, 17 September 1810.

<sup>37</sup> Collier, *Ideas and Politics*, p. 48.

<sup>38</sup> Pinto and Valdivia Ortiz de Zárate, *¿Chilenos todos?*, p. 21.

Ferdinand VII and defended against his enemies’;<sup>39</sup> second, that a Junta, presided by Mateo de Toro y Zambrano, should govern the country. The creation of this Junta was a bold step taken by the *santiaguinos*; bold, because it reinforced the idea that the corporations in the Peninsula – the Junta Suprema de Sevilla, the Junta Central and, after the latter was dissolved, the Consejo de Regencia- no longer represented the interest of the Chileans. In a sense, despite the fact that the establishment of the Junta was a transactional, corporate action, ‘the blow received by Chile’s colonial organization was irreparable’.<sup>40</sup> This became clearer when the newly created Junta of Santiago promised, also on 18 September, to summon a congress.<sup>41</sup>

Any attempt to return to the old days was now impossible. Independence was hardly sought by the people who backed the installation of the Junta, as shown both by the recognition made by the *juntistas* of Ferdinand VII as their king,<sup>42</sup> and by the promise that Chile would remain a part of the Spanish empire.<sup>43</sup> However, in political terms, major changes were sealed that day, in the sense that the *santiaguinos* were able not only to oust García Carrasco but also to form their own government. The next objective was to convince the rest of the colony that September’s decisions had been taken to favour not just the capital but all the regions of the kingdom.

## II. A CONFLICT OF POLITICS, A CONFLICT BETWEEN PROVINCES

As Simon Collier has shown, when the Santiago *cabildantes* invited the representatives of Santiago’s inhabitants to participate in September’s open meeting, they did it on behalf of the entire kingdom: ‘the most significant aspect of [the creation of the Junta] is that the Santiago Cabildo was, in effect, playing an exaggerated and “national” role. It was attempting to run the affairs of the entire country’. But, Collier continues, the fact that Santiago had unilaterally arrogated the right to represent the ‘whole people of the Captaincy-General’ was not

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<sup>39</sup> Collier, *Ideas and Politics*, p. 49.

<sup>40</sup> Alfredo Jocelyn-Holt, ‘Chile, 1808-1809: la descomposición de la máquina institucional’, in Roberto Breña (editor), *En el umbral de las revoluciones hispánicas: el bienio 1808-1810*, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, México D.F., 2010, pp. 308-309. See also Tulio Halperín, *Historia contemporánea de América Latina*, Alianza Editorial, Buenos Aires, 1999, p. 91.

<sup>41</sup> Collier, *Ideas and Politics*, p. 49, and Jaime Eyzaguirre, *Ideario y ruta*, p. 123. The *Acta* of 18 September can be found in <http://www.historia.uchile.cl>.

<sup>42</sup> There were important military officers who swore loyalty to the Junta. These were: colonel Marqués de Montepío; militia colonel Manuel Fernández Valdivieso; sergeant major Juan de Dios Vial; commander Juan Miguel Benavente; and commander Juan Manuel de Ugarte. AGI, Chile 202, pp. 141v-142v.

<sup>43</sup> ‘Revolutions’, Adelman, ‘An age of Imperial Revolutions’, p. 320, says, ‘did not begin as secessionist episodes’. They began, in fact, as ‘revolutions within the empire’.

applauded by the rest of the provinces of the kingdom.<sup>44</sup> Historically, the relationship between the greatest provinces of the colony –above all Santiago and Concepción- had not been very controversial, with the regular military of the former respecting the political supremacy of the old *hacendados* of the latter.<sup>45</sup> Differences appeared in 1808 as a consequence of García Carrasco's election as governor of Chile, on which occasion some of the most important corporations of the capital objected that the highest-ranking military officer of the south should be chosen to lead the colony. From then on, difficulties would haunt the relationship between both provinces.

However, differences did not materialize immediately. Actually, at the beginning of the government of Santiago's Junta, 73 military men from Concepción, headed by Juan Martínez de Rozas, declared their loyalty to the capital's *juntistas*.<sup>46</sup> This was followed by the arrival of Rozas to the capital in November 1810 to assume as *vocal* of the Junta. Although Rozas was not an advocate of independence when he arrived in Santiago, the revolution was effectively propelled by his influence. Hence the accusation which he faced during the months following the fall of the governor that Rozas' goals were too close to those of Buenos Aires, considered by García Carrasco the most radical centre of the South American revolutionaries.<sup>47</sup> These accusations rested on solid ground: connections between both sides of the *Cordillera* became patent at the beginning of February 1811, when news from Mendoza reported that the Spanish general Francisco Javier Elío had disembarked in Montevideo with the aim of 'subjugating the Viceroyalty of the River Plate' and establishing a royalist government.<sup>48</sup> Santiago's Junta immediately wrote to Mendoza offering military help, specifically through the sending of troops from Concepción to Buenos Aires to support the cause of the *porteños*.

On 18 February 1811, Buenos Aires accepted Santiago's offer, requesting that 'without losing time the troop of armed veterans of the city depart to Mendoza'.<sup>49</sup> But this offer was not approved by the rest of the authorities of the kingdom. When the Santiago Junta asked the military chiefs whether it was reasonable to send men to Buenos Aires, not all gave their

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<sup>44</sup> Collier, *Ideas and Politics*, p. 58

<sup>45</sup> For demographic details of both Concepción and Santiago at the end of the old regime and beginning of the 1810's, cf. footnote 76 of the first chapter of this thesis.

<sup>46</sup> The names and military ranks of these officers appear in Allendesalazar, 'Ejército y Milicias', vol. 67, pp. 229-230. See also Armando Cartes Montory, *Concepción contra 'Chile'. Consensos y tensiones regionales en la Patria Vieja (1808-1811)*, Centro de Estudios Bicentenario, Santiago, 2010, p. 160.

<sup>47</sup> García Carrasco wrote, rather sarcastically, to Abascal that the members of Buenos Aires' Junta were 'disciples of Machiavelli'. AGI, Chile 206, García Carrasco to Abascal, 19 October 1810.

<sup>48</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. VIII, p. 214.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 215.

approval, and some even claimed that it was irresponsible.<sup>50</sup> The majority of those who voted against it did so because they believed that the troops must be kept in Chile in case of an emergency. The Cabildo backed this opinion, declaring that, before taking a final decision, it was advisable to discuss the topic more thoroughly, as Elío could decide to invade the kingdom of Chile instead of Buenos Aires.<sup>51</sup> Yet, in the same letter, the Cabildo argued that if Chilean needs had not been so pressing, its members would not have hesitated to send the requested men to Buenos Aires, which they considered ‘the first bastion of our security’.<sup>52</sup> This is why the Cabildo’s vote must be seen as a strategy to stop the Junta –and, within it, preferentially Rozas- from taking important decisions by itself. But in the end it was Rozas who made his point: on 7 March, the Junta decided to dispatch the troops from Concepción to Buenos Aires, thus giving radicals like Rozas the chance to create a direct relationship with the *porteño* revolutionaries.<sup>53</sup>

It is not clear whether the Concepción army approved Rozas’ decision; not at least if all of its officers did. This seems to have been the case of Tomás de Figueroa, who on 1 April 1811 led a revolt against the Junta. According to the classic interpretation, Figueroa wanted to ‘re-establish the old regime’, offended as he was by the radical stand of Rozas and his close supporters. However, Figueroa was not as royalist as historians like Barros Arana believed.<sup>54</sup> He had explicitly supported the Junta in September 1810,<sup>55</sup> arriving at Santiago from Concepción as one of Rozas’ most trusted advisers. True, the revolt happened on the day the delegates to the Congress were to be elected, so it could be argued that Figueroa reacted to the elections.<sup>56</sup> True, in political terms, Figueroa was much more moderate than Rozas, and therefore he probably thought the path recently taken by the *juntista* movement did not represent the original objectives of the September Junta. Still, it is scarcely credible that Figueroa aspired to dethrone the Junta because of the radicalism of its members, and it is much more likely that he rebelled in protest at the inadequacy of the military programme put together by Santiago’s authorities. Although he was born in Spain, his career was made in

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<sup>50</sup> The discussion can be followed in AGI, Buenos Aires 40, 3 March 1811.

<sup>51</sup> AGI, Buenos Aires 40, 6 March 1811.

<sup>52</sup> AGI, Buenos Aires 40, 6 March 1811.

<sup>53</sup> AGI, Buenos Aires 40, 7 March 1811.

<sup>54</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. VIII, p. 223.

<sup>55</sup> In a letter to Toro y Zambrano, Figueroa expressed his loyalty to the new government. This letter can be found in AGI, Chile 206.

<sup>56</sup> This, nevertheless, is much more unlikely, as the *Acta* of 18 September, which was signed by the military of Concepción (Rozas and Figueroa among them) implicitly promised to summon a Congress. Cf. footnote 46 of this chapter.

Concepción, that is, in the region where the bulk of veterans was concentrated. Thus, it is probable that the lack of reliable information about who was the real enemy –Napoleon, the politicians in the Peninsula, Elío, or one of the different internal factions- influenced his decision to rebel, especially considering that his brothers-in-arms of Concepción would be in the front line of defence.<sup>57</sup>

Nonetheless, if Figueroa did not rebel merely because of political differences with the radicals, the reaction of the authorities to Figueroa's revolt reflected how far the extremism of some of the *juntistas* –Rozas above all- had gone. Given that the soldiers who backed Figueroa gathered to the cry of 'Long live the King, die the Junta' [*Viva el Rey, Muera la Junta*], the immediate response of Rozas was not surprising. What was surprising in the Chilean context was that Rozas had convinced the Junta that arresting and prosecuting Figueroa after his men laid down their arms was the only possible way out of the conflict.

When Figueroa was finally captured the most complicated part of the process began. Rozas asserted that he should be condemned as a traitor to the *patria*, whose sovereignty, according to Rozas, rested exclusively in the Santiago Junta. Such a verdict meant that Figueroa must be executed, a punishment that could serve as a deterrent to future revolts against the Junta. This point of view was shared by the Junta's *vocal* Juan Enrique Rosales, but *vocales* Ignacio de la Carrera and Francisco Javier Reina voted for exile. The final decision was agreed when the president of the Junta, *vocal* Márquez de la Plata, supported those who favoured the death penalty.<sup>58</sup> With this sentence, Figueroa became the first casualty after the installation of the Junta in September 1810; this fact was later used by moderates and royalists to accuse Rozas of excessive violence.<sup>59</sup>

After Figueroa was executed, Rozas concentrated his efforts on winning as many seats as possible for him and his supporters in the elections to the first Congress. Rozas led a faction of deputies from the Concepción region, including the deputy from Los Ángeles Bernardo

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<sup>57</sup> In the opinion of Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna, *El coronel don Tomas de Figueroa*, Rafael Jove Editor, Santiago, 1884, pp. 30-37 the reason why Figueroa confronted the Junta was that he did not approve of Rozas' resolution of levying men in Concepción to send them to Buenos Aires, an opinion that is more or less in accordance with the impression given by Figueroa when asked about whether it was advisable to assemble that troop. See AGI, Buenos Aires 40, 3 March 1811.

<sup>58</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. VIII, p. 231.

<sup>59</sup> Rozas suspected that the magistrates of the *Real Audiencia* helped Figueroa in his attempt to overthrow the government, and so at the end of April 1811 the Junta decided to dissolve this traditional tribunal. As we will see in the next chapter, the *Audiencia* was re-established in March 1815, after a successful counterrevolutionary military campaign led by the Spanish general Mariano Osorio.

O'Higgins.<sup>60</sup> There were marked differences among those who represented the city of the south, as the examples of the former crown official, Manuel de Salas and that of the two most famous 'exaltados', Rozas and O'Higgins, demonstrate.<sup>61</sup> But sometimes their aims were similar, in particular when the well-being of Concepción was at issue. On 8 August, Salas claimed that since Concepción had enjoyed ample autonomy since the establishment of the Intendancies in 1785, the city should be 'conveniently represented in the Executive Power' (i.e. a new Junta). He was of the opinion that Santiago's thirty delegates should elect two representatives for the Junta, and that Concepción's twelve delegates should choose one.

His project was sponsored by Valparaíso's representative, Agustín Vial, who suggested the creation of a third province with 'the districts of the north and to be called Coquimbo'. The delegates of this province would also have the right to elect one of the Junta's *vocales*, and thus all the provinces of the kingdom would be proportionally represented. However, their plan was not accepted by the moderates who saw Rozas as Concepción's most appropriate candidate for the position of *vocal* of the Junta. In response, the radical deputies abandoned the room in which the Congress met and, on 13 August, Rozas and Rere's delegate, Luis de la Cruz, left for Concepción.<sup>62</sup> As Collier claimed, together with his 'radical phalanx' Rozas prepared the ground for setting up 'an independently minded Provincial Junta' in Concepción, an objective that he finally accomplished on 5 September 1811.<sup>63</sup>

The first declaration of the Junta of Concepción summarized the political position of the *exaltados* or radicals. On behalf of the *pueblo* of Concepción, 187 individuals elected Pedro José Benavente commander-in-chief of the Frontier and president of the provincial Junta. The other *vocales* were Rozas, Luis de la Cruz, Bernardo Vergara and Manuel Novoa. Article 7 of this declaration stated that the city should maintain a direct contact with Santiago's authorities, although only after securing the rights of representation of Concepción.<sup>64</sup>

In Santiago, meanwhile, one day before the creation of Concepción's Junta, a revolt commanded by José Miguel Carrera, 'who had just returned to Chile from gallant service in the Peninsular War',<sup>65</sup> purged important members of Congress and prepared to govern the kingdom. Carrera's case is one of the most interesting examples of the sort of military leaders

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<sup>60</sup> Alfredo Sepúlveda, *Bernardo. Una biografía de Bernardo O'Higgins*, Ediciones B, Santiago, 2007, pp. 126-127.

<sup>61</sup> Collier, *Ideas and Politics*, p. 94.

<sup>62</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. VIII, pp. 269-270.

<sup>63</sup> Collier, *Ideas and Politics*, p. 94. See also Cartes Montory, *Concepción contra 'Chile'*, chapter VI.

<sup>64</sup> AGI, Buenos Aires 40, September 5, 1811.

<sup>65</sup> Collier, *Ideas and Politics*, p. 94.

who, besides fighting on the battlefield, played an important political role during these years. Carrera ‘was not a replica of Bourbon general captains; he was a modern military’ leader, one whose actions reflected ‘the image of French young revolutionary officers who “domesticated” the Revolution or simply the image of the governor soldier, that is: Napoleon’.<sup>66</sup> Carrera was an officer who arrived in Chile in order to turn the military into ‘agents of the revolution’.<sup>67</sup> For better or worse, the political vacuum created by the fall of the monarchy in 1808 allowed regular military officers like Carrera to become as powerful politically as civilians like Manuel de Salas and militia chiefs like Rozas. The difference between them and Carrera was that, after September 1811, the latter would be in control not only of the political affairs of the capital but also, and more significantly, of its armed forces.

The military revolt of 4 September in Santiago led Carrera to promptly gain the confidence of other young officers, and that of the Larraín family, better known as the group of the *ochocientos*.<sup>68</sup> The revolt was planned by Luis and Juan José Carrera, brothers of José Miguel, and was supported by most officers of both the *Batallón de Granaderos* and the *Húsares*, besides some of the artillery.<sup>69</sup> José Miguel rapidly took charge of the revolt, and in a manifesto of 5 September he and his supporters claimed that one of the reasons they had to rise in arms against the Congress was the ‘infamous’ treatment the veteran [officers] had received from the authorities.<sup>70</sup> It is not clear to which specific ‘infamous’ event they referred to; yet, in view of events to come, it is quite remarkable that as early as September 1811 they had aimed to keep their programme as closely tied to the military as possible.<sup>71</sup>

Just as happened in Concepción, Santiago’s radicals established an executive Junta to act as a counterweight to the moderates. This Junta was composed of powerful figures who had become *exaltados*: Juan Enrique Rosales, Rozas, Martín Calvo Encalada, Juan Mackenna

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<sup>66</sup> Jocelyn-Holt, *La independencia*, pp. 158-159.

<sup>67</sup> Claudio Rolle, ‘Los militares como agentes de la revolución’, p. 294.

<sup>68</sup> For the group of the *ochocientos*, see Mary Lowenthal, ‘Kinship politics in the Chilean Independence Movement’, in *HAHR*, vol. 56, number 1, 1976, pp. 58-80. They were called *ochocientos* [eight hundred] because of the high number of persons who were connected to the Larraín family.

<sup>69</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. III, p. 283, footnote 5.

<sup>70</sup> AGI, Buenos Aires 40, 5 September 1811. See also Javiera Müller, ‘Adhesiones populares. El mito del apoyo popular a Carrera’, in *Seminario Simon Collier 2004*, Instituto de Historia de la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago, 2004; Mariana Labarca, ‘José Miguel Carrera y las clases populares, 1811-1813’, in *Seminario Simon Collier 2004*, Instituto de Historia de la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago, 2004.

<sup>71</sup> Of course, not all of Santiago’s inhabitants backed Carrera’s revolution. For a criticism to this revolt formulated by the *porteño* Isidro Castro, see AGN, room VII, Colección Carlos Casavalle, vol. 2307, Castro to Cornelio Saavedra, 10 September 1811.

and Gaspar Marín.<sup>72</sup> The fact that Rozas had been appointed a member of the Santiago Junta suggests that politicians in the capital were unaware of what had occurred in Concepción on 5 September. In any case, it is interesting that the new authorities in Santiago wanted to establish a direct relationship with the leader of the *penquistas*, as well as with the highest military engineer of the kingdom (who was, at the same time, married to a Larraín): Juan Mackenna.<sup>73</sup>

Relations between the Juntas of Santiago and Concepción went relatively well until 15 November 1811, when, in a strategy that recalls the Napoleonic *coup d'état* of 18 Brumaire (9 November 1799),<sup>74</sup> Carrera and his brothers dissolved the Santiago government that their own movement had created in September. At first, the moderates of the capital saw Carrera's action as an opportunity to recover their position and return to the *status quo ante* 1810.<sup>75</sup> This was reinforced by the first lines of a *Bando* published by Juan José Carrera in which he stated that 'every *vecino* without exception can come to the main square, and manifest [...] freely their sentiments'.<sup>76</sup> But Carrera's objective was not that of the royalists. José Miguel and his brothers were not looking to stop the radical course of the revolution. They were seeking to control the revolution, and for that they needed to control the army and transform their military colleagues into more active and powerful politicians. In this context, the second part of the *Bando* quoted above finished with an invitation to militarize political decisions: 'Inhabitants of Santiago, residents of the great Chilean capital, you will decide your fate. The choice is in your hand. [...] The bayonets [...] will lead the direction of your desires, and the sound of the cannon will be fatal only to those who oppose'.<sup>77</sup>

On 16 November, a new group was invited to assemble. However, on this occasion José Miguel Carrera allowed to gather only those who demonstrated a 'known patriotism', with which moderates were excluded.<sup>78</sup> Carrera's next step was to form a new Junta controlled by him and, on 2 December, to close the Congress, a decision that was 'viewed with distaste by Rozas and his followers in the South', who 'warned Carrera that praetorianism was no substitute for orderly civil government'.<sup>79</sup> For the first time Chileans feared that conflicts might

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<sup>72</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. VIII, p. 286.

<sup>73</sup> Mackenna was married to Josefa Vicuña Larraín. His marriage certificate [*licencia*] can be found in MG, vol. 1.

<sup>74</sup> See, among others, Felix Markham, *Napoleon and the Awakening of Europe*, English Universities Press, London, 1968, pp. 44-49, and François Furet, *Revolutionary France 1770-1880*, Blackwells, Oxford, 1992, pp. 206-210.

<sup>75</sup> Labarca, 'José Miguel Carrera y las clases populares', pp. 100-102.

<sup>76</sup> Quoted in Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. VIII, pp. 334-335, footnote 14.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>78</sup> Labarca, 'José Miguel Carrera y las clases populares', pp. 104.

<sup>79</sup> Collier, *Ideas and Politics*, p. 95.

give way to a war between Concepción and Santiago, similar to that which it would be waged by *centralistas* and *confederados* in New Granada in 1812-1814.<sup>80</sup>

Almost a fortnight after the closure of the Congress, Carrera sent Bernardo O'Higgins to Concepción to convince Rozas that the capital wanted to 'eliminate every disagreement between the two provinces'.<sup>81</sup> The same day, however, Carrera began gathering the militias of the Central Valley with the aim of cutting communications between the capital and Concepción. His intention was to organize an army on the northern bank of the River Maule, the boundary between the two provinces, and, with it, to stop any armed revolt by Rozas. In February and March of 1812 the dangers of an armed confrontation intensified. O'Higgins, who had changed sides, encouraged Rozas, who ordered him to go to Los Ángeles, to 'organize its regiment and take command of it'.<sup>82</sup> It is difficult to know exactly how O'Higgins brought together his army (around 1,000 soldiers), but it is likely that peasants from *Las Canteras*, his estate, helped to fill the ranks. In any case, there is no doubt that people from *Las Canteras* knew of his plans, since, on 17 March, O'Higgins asked his mother to tell the *inquilinos* to cut sticks of bamboo to use as lances.<sup>83</sup>

O'Higgins thought that the army of the South should attack Carrera's forces directly and without waiting for negotiations.<sup>84</sup> Rozas, on the other hand, decided to negotiate with Carrera and to withdraw his troops as long as the army of the north promised to do the same. Carrera accepted, knowing that Rozas had lost influence amongst his men and that his own position in the south had revived. On 8 July, Rozas' Junta in Concepción 'was deposed and replaced by a war Junta, which rapidly initiated communications with José Miguel Carrera'.<sup>85</sup> That was the end of Rozas, who, after he had spent a few months in the capital, was exiled by Carrera to Mendoza, where he died in May 1813.

In this way, Carrera became the undisputed master of most of the Central Valley. But not of all the regions of the country, because Valdivia refused to endorse his political project. At the end of 1811, the *valdivianos* backed Carrera's ideas of making Santiago the centre of

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<sup>80</sup> For the war between *centralistas* and *confederados* in New Granada, see Thibaud, *Repúblicas en Armas*, pp. 222-223 and 242.

<sup>81</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. VIII, p. 367, footnote 4.

<sup>82</sup> Eyzaguirre, *O'Higgins*, Editorial Zig-Zag, Santiago, 1946, p. 82.

<sup>83</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. VIII, p. 384, footnote 26, and Sepúlveda, *Bernardo*, p. 155.

<sup>84</sup> Eyzaguirre, *O'Higgins*, p. 82.

<sup>85</sup> Domingo Amunátegui Solar, *Nacimiento de la República de Chile (1808-1833)*, Establecimientos Gráficos Balcells & Co., Santiago, 1930, pp. 21-22.

Chile's political administration<sup>86</sup>; nevertheless, they eventually claimed that decisions made in the capital should lead neither to a radicalization of politics nor to a future break with the Peruvian viceroy. Valdivia's stand was not surprising, because throughout the colonial period the transfer of money –i.e. the *Situado*- from Lima, which paid the wages of Valdivia's military, had created a sort of dependency that most *valdivianos* were unwilling to relinquish. For them, Abascal was an ally and his authority must not be questioned. Carrera did not share their opinion; not yet because he saw in Abascal an enemy to be faced on the battlefield, but rather because he believed the viceroy should not intervene directly in Chilean affairs. When, in June 1812, the *valdivianos* broke their alliance with Carrera and put their city 'under the authority of the Peruvian viceroy',<sup>87</sup> the government of Santiago was forced to 'cut all communications with Valdivia'.<sup>88</sup>

However, as in the case of Concepción, during this period conflicts between Santiago and Valdivia were not conducted on the battlefield but in the political arena. Differences between these three provinces provoked potentially serious confrontations, but in the end no major violence broke out; that is why I have called this period a conflict of politics, a conflict of provinces. According to Clausewitz, 'the less involved the population and the less serious the strains within states [in this case, the Chilean provinces] and between them, the more political requirements in themselves will dominate and tend to be decisive. Situations can thus exist in which the political object will almost be the sole determinant'. The relationship between Santiago, Concepción and Valdivia in the years 1811-1812 resembled Clausewitz's argument, as political requirements and solutions dominated and tended to be decisive.<sup>89</sup> This is not to say, however, that military affairs did not matter. In fact, whoever was in power seemed well aware that the radicalization of politics was bound to force Chileans to take sides, and that the military would be asked to play an important role in the process.

### III. REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE IN CHILE

After establishing the Junta of September 1810, the Santiago authorities devoted themselves to

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<sup>86</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. VIII, pp. 326-328 and 391-397. See also AGI, Chile 207, pp. 249-276v.

<sup>87</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. VIII, p. 397.

<sup>88</sup> AGI, Chile 207, Pedro José Benavente to Valdivia's governor, 2 December 1812, p. 273v.

<sup>89</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, p. 21.

enhancing the military preparation of the kingdom.<sup>90</sup> The military programme of the authorities sought to accomplish two goals: first, to create new regular corps and militias, giving them proper training and weapons. Second, to organize an educational system to teach Chilean officers the general principles of the ‘art of war’. The recruitment drive of the Chilean government started in late 1811 went through two phases: 1) the period 1811-1812, when conflicts between Santiago and Concepción demanded the attention of the authorities; and 2) the years 1813-1814, when José Miguel Carrera and Bernardo O’Higgins left their differences aside in order to confront together a succession of forces dispatched by viceroy Abascal from Lima. The latter period embodies the beginning of what in this thesis it is called revolutionary warfare.

The number of detachments of Chile’s army had not significantly increased after governors Jáuregui, Benavides and O’Higgins introduced their reforms in the second half of the eighteenth century. To improve this situation, on 16 December 1810 the *juntistas* approved the formation of an artillery corp in Santiago to be headed by the veteran and Junta *vocal*, Colonel Francisco Javier Reina.<sup>91</sup> This decision was followed a few days later by the creation of an infantry battalion in the capital (known as the *Granaderos de Chile*), whose staff was headed by José Antonio Luco, García Carrasco’s old enemy. On Christmas day, a cavalry battalion was also organized in Santiago, and José Joaquín Toro was appointed its first commander.<sup>92</sup> The first of these detachments consisted of 280 men; the second of 699, and the third of 300. Together they formed a force of 1,279 men.<sup>93</sup>

The September Junta also attempted to buy new weapons. At the end of 1810, the *juntistas* signed a contract with an English merchant called Diego Whitaker by which he committed to bring from England 10,000 rifles, 10,000 pistols, 2,000 sabres and 2,000 military uniforms. Whitaker feared that England might deny him permission to export the cargo, and so he recommended that the Junta write to the British Foreign Secretary, Richard Wellesley, explaining that the requested weapons would be used to defend the interests of Ferdinand VII,

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<sup>90</sup> The reforms introduced in the army by the Chileans were based on eighteenth-century Spanish military regulation. See, for instance, *El Monitor Araucano*, vol. II, number 3, December 10, 1813, where the government quoted the *Ordenanzas* to stress that soldiers should not be employed as officers. In spite of the radicalism of the *porteño* officers, Buenos Aires’ authorities also applied the *Ordenanzas* as a model when reforming the *rioplatense* army. See Alejandro Rabinovich, ‘*Obedecer y comandar. La formación de un cuerpo de oficiales en los ejércitos revolucionarios del Río de la Plata, 1810-1820*’, 2010 (forthcoming).

<sup>91</sup> FV, vol. 238, 16 December 1810.

<sup>92</sup> FV, vol. 238, 24 December 1810.

<sup>93</sup> FV, vol. 238, 27 December 1810.

at that moment England's ally. But, according to Barros Arana, there was no full delivery of such weapons. The Junta's plan to entrust José Antonio Rojas with the building of a weapons factory was not successful either, since the costs of the plan considerably exceeded the economic capacity of Chile.<sup>94</sup> The poverty of the Chilean regular army was also evident in other areas. The uniforms of the common soldiers were completely aged, as a contemporary caricature of early 1811 featuring a group of well-dressed officers followed by a soldier in tatters illustrates.<sup>95</sup> In October 1811, the authorities attempted to regularize the uniforms of the recently created *Batallón de patriotas de Santiago*, ordering its officers wear a black jacket, boots, white trousers and ornamentations of gold.<sup>96</sup> But the majority of common soldiers rarely replaced their *inquilino* dress with military uniforms.

The organization of the militias was also a preoccupation of Santiago's authorities. José Miguel Carrera and his supporters were especially keen on improving the training of the militias. Thus, for instance, in the *Prospecto* of the first Chilean periodical, *La Aurora de Chile*, the author explicitly referred to the importance of having a respected mounted guard [*Gran Guardia Nacional de Caballería*] that could discipline the militias of the kingdom and train them to resemble those of Europe.<sup>97</sup> Two months later, when the conflict between Santiago and Concepción was at its peak, José Miguel Carrera complemented this periodical's proposal by appointing colonel Domingo Díaz de Salcedo 'General Inspector of militias' of the kingdom, a position that was supposedly to be recognized by all the 'officers and soldiers of the army'.<sup>98</sup> By the appointment of a militia inspector, the governor of the country emulated the Bourbons' practice of ordering trustworthy officers to travel the territory to study the principal characteristics of the militias to be reformed.

In November 1812, after Rozas had been defeated, the methods of the Bourbons were once again emulated by José Miguel Carrera, in regard to the exercises which the cavalry militias of Valparaíso and Quillota had to practise. He ordered to conduct drills on Sundays and other holidays, either by 'squadron or by two and two'. The officers in charge of the militias –veteran officers- also had to meet twice a week at the lieutenant colonel's house, who should 'teach them everything related to tactics'. Placing the responsibility of training the

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<sup>94</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. VIII, pp. 183-189.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 187.

<sup>96</sup> AGI, Buenos Aires 40, 17 October 1811.

<sup>97</sup> *La Aurora de Chile*, 'Prospecto', p. 2.

<sup>98</sup> AGI, Chile 207, p. 378, 6 April 1812.

troops on allegedly well-prepared officers, Carrera's government tried to win the approval of these officers, without doubt the only ones who, at that time, knew the basic principles of the art of war.<sup>99</sup> Two days later the government recommended that the militia officers were to be chosen from the same districts where companies were organized, emphasizing that they must be of 'noble birth' and have a 'suitable age and agility'.<sup>100</sup>

On the other hand, the Chilean authorities and men of letters attempted to improve the education of elite officers, Manuel de Salas' idea of establishing a military school in Santiago being the most important project of this time (October 1811). In Salas' view, education was the 'public basis of happiness' and it must be 'the first object of a good constitution'. Accordingly, Salas backed the idea of organizing a military school and recommended that it be put under the supervision of the *Director de la Academia de Matemáticas*. The main objective of this institution was to fulfil the requirements of the army cadets whose knowledge, especially mathematics, was not sufficient. As in France, where the military preparation of the officers included the study of mathematics and other practical matters,<sup>101</sup> Salas intended to make the officers 'useful' 'to their *patria*'. This was an aim that every talented person had to accomplish, and a functional educational system was the basic tool to achieve it.<sup>102</sup>

The education of military engineers was largely discussed a year later. In its 45<sup>th</sup> number, *La Aurora de Chile* published a letter sent by the Senate to the Santiago Junta in which Camilo Henríquez, Francisco Ruiz-Tagle and others discussed the role of engineers in an era when the 'whole universe is under arms, and every American region is successively transforming itself into a battlefield'. In such a scenario, it was necessary to educate officers in the 'science of fortifying, attacking and defending strategic points'. Although the National Institute had not yet opened its doors to the public, the senators expected that in its classrooms officers would learn mathematics, specifically geometry and trigonometry. It was recommended, nevertheless, that the training of military engineers remained separate from that of the artillery students, because both branches were 'too vast' to be studied at the same

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<sup>99</sup> JIVE, vol. 19, pp. 42-42v, Carrera to Valparaiso's governor, 4 November 1812.

<sup>100</sup> VM, vol. XXXIX, pp. 90v-91, November 6, 1812. This order was repeated on 15 January 1813. See MG, vol. 1.

<sup>101</sup> Langins, *Conserving the Enlightenment. French military engineering from Vauban to the revolution*, The MIT Press, Massachusetts, 2004. See also Alder Ken, *Engineering the Revolution. Arms and Enlightenment in France, 1763-1815*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1997.

<sup>102</sup> AGI, Chile 206, 21 October 1811.

time. Thus, Henríquez favoured specialization.<sup>103</sup>

However, although the Chilean Juntas –in both Concepción and Santiago- sought to give elite officers the responsibility for defending the territory, they had to accept that levying rank-and-file soldiers was as essential as having enlightened officers. A serious attempt to institutionalize recruitment began in 1811, more or less at the same time that conflicts between Santiago and Concepción were beginning to destabilize Chilean politics. In October 1811, Santiago’s government published a *Bando* ‘calling on all “free men” to present themselves in the new military bodies, threatening that those who did not obey this disposition would be “recognized as enemies”’.<sup>104</sup> The introduction of conscription mainly affected the lower classes, as in general common soldiers came from the bulk of *inquilinos*, miners, slaves and vagrants of the Central Valley. These groups were usually compelled to join the army. According to Leonardo León, the task of ‘enlarging the ranks of the regiments was for the *peonaje* no more than that: a task, never the defence of a principle nor a doctrinaire conception’.<sup>105</sup> The army, León continues, ‘reproduced the old relationship between bosses and dependants under a new nomenclature of officers and soldiers’, an argument that, although it exaggerates the alleged manipulation of the lower classes by the elites to join the army, is not entirely mistaken.<sup>106</sup> An example of this sort of relationship was given by Bernardo O’Higgins when, writing to Juan Mackenna in early 1811, he told the Irish engineer that ‘regiment number 2 of La Laja [...] was composed of his own *inquilinos*’.<sup>107</sup> In the following years, O’Higgins repeatedly relied on his *inquilinos* to enlarge his army.<sup>108</sup>

León’s approach helps us to understand the second phase of recruitment in Chile (i.e. in 1813-1814). Such a period covers more than twelve months of war between the Chilean insurgents and a royalist army organized in Chile but commanded by officers sent by viceroy Abascal from Peru. We will later see that what triggered the war was the printing in October 1812 of a relatively radical Chilean *Reglamento Constitucional*, which, among other things, stated that ‘any decree, provision or order emanated from any external authority or tribunal would

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<sup>103</sup> *La Aurora de Chile*, number 45, 17 December 1812, pp. 186-187.

<sup>104</sup> Quoted in León, ‘Reclutas forzados y desertores de la patria’, p. 260.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 259.

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>107</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 264.

<sup>108</sup> That most detachments of the army were formed by ‘*labradores*’ and ‘*inquilinos*’ is clear from the following document: ‘the troop of the [Maipo] Regiment is formed by *inquilinos* of the same *Hacienda[s]* of this district; some of them are *Labradores*, other *Arrieros*. [...] Generally, [they are] skilled riders, although most of them have just one mistreated [horse]’. In MG, vol. 1, without exact date (although it says 1813 in one of the margins of the document).

not have any effect in Chile',<sup>109</sup> which meant an open break with the Viceroyalty.

Abascal reacted to this *Reglamento* by sending brigadier Antonio Pareja from Peru to fight the Chilean revolutionaries. Pareja's attack prompted José Miguel Carrera and Rozas' lieutenant, Bernardo O'Higgins, to put their differences aside and confront Abascal's forces together. The transition from a political conflict between Carrera's and Rozas' factions to a bloody war confronting Pareja's 'royalist' forces and Carrera's and O'Higgins' 'revolutionary' army brought about a complete rearrangement of the role of armies. From 1813 the war in Chile involved explicit winners and losers, a typical characteristic of the revolutionary wars of the second half of the eighteenth century and the Napoleonic wars.<sup>110</sup> But the war in Chile was not only violent; it was also a civil war in which soldiers born mainly in Chile were for the first time dragged into the battlefield (whether to fight for the monarchist or the revolutionary army).

Pareja arrived in Chiloé on 18 January 1813 accompanied by a small detachment of no more than 100 men, a trend that other royalist officers sent by viceroy Abascal and viceroy Pezuela would repeat in future years.<sup>111</sup> Rapidly, he took command of the island, received the support of the authorities, mustered 1,370 soldiers, and embarked his army to Valdivia. There, he recruited another 700 men,<sup>112</sup> with whom he advanced to the north, seizing the port of Talcahuano, close to Concepción, on 26 March. Very soon, 4,110 royalist soldiers<sup>113</sup> controlled the entire province. The Junta Gubernativa del Reino, which at the time was presided by José Miguel Carrera, learnt of Pareja's invasion on 31 March 1813, and immediately reacted by appointing Carrera general-in-chief of the army. Informing the *pueblos* of this decision, Carrera

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<sup>109</sup> 'Reglamento constitucional provisorio del 27 de octubre de 1812'. In <http://www.historia.uchile.cl>.

<sup>110</sup> Lynn, 'International rivalry and warfare', p. 190, explains the main characteristics of revolutionary wars, among which Chile's wars during the revolution should be included. He claims that in the old regime wars were fought 'as processes', their principal characteristic being the 'indecisive character' of their performance, the 'slow tempo of [their] operations' and 'the considerable emphasis given [by the military] to ongoing diplomatic negotiations'. However, as a consequence of the French Revolution, wars started to be fought 'as events', which was a much more decisive form of warfare than the 'traditional' one (as were the cases of Austerlitz and Wagram, where Napoleon eliminated two of his greatest enemies). It is true that there were many bloody battles during the European old regime, as the battles of the War of Spanish Succession show. Yet from the 1790s the option to annihilate the enemy became not just accepted but advisable. In the case of Chile, where military confrontations did not occur very often during the colonial period, the war in Chile was to the death from the moment it started in 1813.

<sup>111</sup> The third royalist general sent by Abascal, Mariano Osorio, was the first to disembark in Chile accompanied by a Spanish-born contingent (500 men), the so-called *Talaveras de la Reina*. The *Talaveras*, in any case, were only 1/5 of Osorio's army in 1814. Four years later, Osorio travelled to Chile with 1,800 Spanish-born soldiers from the *Regimiento de Burgos*, but they did not remain long in Chile. Cf. section I of chapter III; and section II of chapter V of this thesis.

<sup>112</sup> I have collected these figures from Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. IX, p. 14, footnote 8, and p. 15.

<sup>113</sup> Arancibia, *El Ejército de los chilenos*, p. 72.

published a *Proclama* in which he called on Chileans to take sides: ‘the grievous voice of *moderantismo* has been erased from Chile’s political dictionary’.<sup>114</sup>

Only a couple of weeks after Antonio Pareja’s assault on the port of Talcahuano, *El Monitor Araucano* published a *Bando* ordering the *hacendados* to allow their *inquilinos* to join the army: ‘by this *bando* we order the landowners not to charge the *inquilinos* who have gone to war for the lease of this current year’.<sup>115</sup> A month later, a decree setting the rules for ‘the general recruitment of citizens’ was published. In three articles, the *vocales* of the Junta agreed that: 1) the authorities would distribute a document [*papeleta*] to the officers and soldiers of every military body, punishing those who did not have it with them when inspected; 2) commercial stores would be closed in the afternoons, when the military exercises had to be carried out; 3) every inhabitant –military or not- must ‘present’ [*presentar*] his arms to the commandants of the *Guardias Cívicas*.<sup>116</sup>

Thanks to these measures, in May 1813 the revolutionary army numbered around 8,000 men.<sup>117</sup> Although it exceeded Pareja’s army by almost 4,000 men, Carrera’s forces were unable to detain the royalists in the combat of Yervas Buenas, near the city of Linares. Disorder, fear and uncertainty among revolutionary troops helped the royalists obtain an easy victory. But when Pareja sought to cross the Maule river and pursue the enemy north, volunteers from Chiloé and Valdivia refused to follow him. With only 1,700 men, a dying Pareja had to withdraw his troops to Chillán and transfer his command to Juan Francisco Sánchez, who served as the senior royalist officer until Gabino Gáinza arrived from Lima in early 1814. In Chillán, Sánchez assembled his army, while the insurgents besieged the city for almost 45 days. For both Carrera and Sánchez it was clear that neither the revolutionaries nor the royalists had sufficient military training to perform well on the battlefield. However, whereas the latter found in Chillán a relatively safe place to rest and train, the former suffered multiple desertions and casualties.<sup>118</sup> As a contemporary author noted: ‘in this state, the daily rains and cold being

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<sup>114</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. IX, p. 35.

<sup>115</sup> *El Monitor Araucano*, vol. I, number 3, April 10, 1813.

<sup>116</sup> *El Monitor Araucano*, vol. 1, number 13, 6 May 1813. There were a few ‘professions’, however, that were excepted from serving in the army. That was the case, for example, of miners and the employees of the post office. See *El Monitor Araucano*, vol. 1, number 38, 3 July 1813; and *El Monitor Araucano*, vol. 1, number 54, 10 August 1813.

<sup>117</sup> Arancibia, *El Ejército de los chilenos*, p. 74.

<sup>118</sup> Fernando Campos Harriet, *Los defensores del Rey*, Editorial Andrés Bello, Santiago, 1958, p. 23, argued that in the *Sitio de Chillán* Juan Francisco Sánchez received the help of two ‘allies’: ‘the Franciscans of Chillán and the 1813 winter, the “General Winter of 1813”, one of the most decided defenders of the king’. For the support given by the Franciscans to the royalist army, see Jaime Valenzuela, ‘Los franciscanos de Chillán y la independencia:

so excessive that a sentinel could not remain five minutes in his post without dropping his weapon, the [revolutionary] army began to disappear. Soldiers deserted or died out of starvation; horses and cattle suffered the same fate'.<sup>119</sup>

A series of skirmishes between the revolutionary army and royalist guerrillas weakened the revolutionaries even more. Harder to combat and resist than regular troops, Sánchez's guerrillas surprised Carrera's forces in October 1813 in the combat of El Roble. Carrera's mistakes and misfortunes prompted the Junta to dismiss him from the post of general-in-chief, and replace him with Bernardo O'Higgins, 'who had built up a solid reputation for tactical skill and personal valour during the preceding campaigns'<sup>120</sup> and who, in the end, obtained a psychological victory in El Roble when he forced the royalists to 'cross the Itata river in the most evident disorder'.<sup>121</sup> At the same time, the Junta Gubernativa del Reino, which in the absence of Carrera was led by Francisco Antonio Pérez, José Miguel Infante and Agustín Eyzaguirre, moved south to Talca to take control of the 'military situation in general'.<sup>122</sup>

But despite O'Higgins' psychological victory in El Roble, the position of the royalists was much stronger than that of the revolutionaries. The royalist army became even more powerful when a new envoy of Abascal, Gabino Gaínza, arrived from Lima in early 1814 to take command. In his instructions to Gaínza, Abascal ordered that he consolidate the royalist soldiers into a single army. According to Abascal's plan, Gaínza should disembark in Arauco and then move north in order to re-conquer Concepción and the river *Maule*, thus forcing the revolutionaries to concentrate their troops in Santiago. Before entering Santiago, however, Gaínza should attempt peacefully to convince the insurgents to return to the fold of the monarchy. If the revolutionaries 'agree to lay down the weapons that without a serious cause they have taken against the king and the supreme national government', then they 'will be treated with courtesy and humanity. We should stop the hideous shedding of our precious blood and stop the calamities of a civil war'. Abascal finished his instructions by stressing that any attempt to sign a peace agreement with the insurgents in terms other than those stipulated by the viceroy should be approved by Abascal previously. We will see that Gaínza's failure to obey this clause prompted his dismissal from the position of general-in-chief of the royalist

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avatares de una comunidad monarquista', in *Historia*, number 38, vol. I, Santiago, June, 2005, pp. 113-158.

<sup>119</sup> CDHICH, vol. 8, p. 122.

<sup>120</sup> Collier, *Ideas and Politics*, p. 99.

<sup>121</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. IX, p. 142.

<sup>122</sup> Collier, *Ideas and Politics*, p. 99.

army.<sup>123</sup>

Gáinza disembarked in Arauco on 31 January 1814 with 200 men, and immediately departed for Chillán, where the bulk of the royalist army was stationed.<sup>124</sup> There, Gáinza met Juan Francisco Sánchez, who put his men at his disposal. Although Gáinza never got along very well with Sánchez and the rest of the royalist officers, in the first months of 1814 the Spanish general succeeded in cutting the communications between the two main divisions of the rebel army (the first led by Juan Mackenna in what is now the province of Ñuble, the other by O'Higgins in Concepción). The lack of communication between the insurgent divisions was as problematic as the lack of food and men. In October 1813, the revolutionary government issued a short *Reglamento provisional de aprovisionamiento*,<sup>125</sup> which was complemented a year later by another, much more comprehensive *Reglamento*.<sup>126</sup> Both of them vested responsibility for the supply of the army in a bureaucratic official called the *Proveedor General*, who had a fluid communication with the provinces (through the so-called provincial *Juntas de auxilios*). However, neither *Reglamento* was able to overcome the serious problem of lack of food.

Meanwhile, in order to enlarge the army the Santiago authorities introduced forced conscription on 14 January 1814. On that occasion, it was decided that ‘every Santiago inhabitant is a soldier. In each of its eight headquarters an infantry regiment or battalion will be formed, composed of the individuals who reside in them’.<sup>127</sup> The main ‘obligation of any inhabitant of the country was to improve his “knowledge and military instruction to defend the *patria*, especially when tyranny [Abascal] is making its utmost efforts to destroy it”’.<sup>128</sup> In March, a recruitment law ordered that ‘every citizen and every American individual, between the age of sixteen and fifty, who had not yet enrolled either in the regular bodies of the army or in the militias, should present himself in the square of the Tribunal de Justicia for the formation of the *Guardia Cívica*’.<sup>129</sup> Furthermore, in September 1814 José Miguel Carrera promised to free the slaves of Chile in exchange for their military service, which eventually caused a bitter debate between the government and many *hacendados* who still owned slaves.<sup>130</sup>

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<sup>123</sup> These instructions can be found in Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. IX, pp. 237-239.

<sup>124</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 237.

<sup>125</sup> FV, vol. 238, 1 October 1813, pp. 79-82.

<sup>126</sup> FV, vol. 238, 12 September 1814, pp. 83-88.

<sup>127</sup> Quoted in León, ‘Reclutas forzados y desertores de la patria’, p. 273. The decree is called: ‘Decreto [en que] se hace obligatorio el Servicio militar, Talca, 14 de enero de 1814’.

<sup>128</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>129</sup> *El Monitor Araucano*, vol. 2, Extraordinary, 12 March 1814.

<sup>130</sup> JIVE, vol. 19, August 29, 1814. I say ‘still’ because a law of 11 October 1811 had declared the freedom of the

The *hacendados* were apparently dissatisfied with the government's plan of paying the cost of the slaves 'progressively' instead of immediately, giving the *hacendados* half the soldiers' wage every month. The criticism of the *hacendados* became so evident that, on 4 September 1814, the authorities published a *Bando* ordering the '*amos*' to free their slaves under severe penalties.<sup>131</sup>

But these laws did little to improve the delicate situation of the revolutionaries. The Junta Gubernativa del Reino, which had remained in Talca for four months so that its members could be closer to the theatre of war, returned to Santiago on 1 March. This allowed the royalist Ildefonso Elorreaga to take Talca, and on 29 March a royalist contingent defeated a revolutionary division that had been recently sent from the capital. It was in this context that the *santiaguino* politicians decided to dismantle the Junta Gubernativa and gathered the executive power into one, powerful public office. Antonio José de Irisarri voted for the appointment of Valparaíso's military governor, Francisco de la Lastra, as Supreme Director of the country, a motion that was rapidly seconded by the capital's principal inhabitants.<sup>132</sup>

As Supreme Director, de la Lastra ordered O'Higgins and Mackenna to negotiate a peace treaty with Gáinza. The reason why Gáinza agreed to sign the Treaty of Lircay of 3 May 1814 was purely military, although, as we shall see in the next section, it brought about profound political repercussions. Despite the victories that his army had obtained in the period February-April 1814, in Gáinza's opinion the royalist army was in a state of complete disarray. While he referred to Sánchez as a 'despot', he criticized his soldiers for being poor fighters. He believed that '500 European soldiers are more valuable than 2,000 Chileans', a statement that shows how few European contingents the royalist army had.<sup>133</sup> Two months later, when Abascal had dismissed Gáinza's negotiation with the insurgents, Gáinza argued that he had signed the treaty because he was certain that if the war resumed its course the insurgents

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slaves. See Barros Arana, 2002, vol. VIII, pp. 311-313.

<sup>131</sup> Guillermo Feliú Cruz, *La abolición de la esclavitud en Chile*, Ediciones de la Universidad de Chile, Santiago, 1942, p. 77. For the history of the *Batallón de Infantes de la Patria*, a detachment composed of '*negros, morenos, mulatos, pardos and zambos*', see Hugo Contreras, 'Artisanos mulatos y soldados beneméritos. El Batallón de Infantes de la Patria en la Guerra de Independencia de Chile, 1795-1820', in *Historia*, vol. 44, number 1, Santiago, June, 2011. It is worth stating, however, that, in comparison to other American regions -such as Guadeloupe and New Granada, where the participation in the army of colour people was quite significant (especially on the royalist side, as Marcela Echeverri has recently argued for the case of Popayán)-, the participation of slaves in the Chilean revolution was much more limited. See Marcela Echeverri, 'Popular Royalists and Revolution in Colombia, 1809-1819', paper given in an Independence and Decolonization Conference held in the University of Texas at Austin (April 2010). For debates on citizenship and slavery at the end of the eighteenth century in Guadeloupe, see Laurent Dubois, *A Colony of Citizens: Revolution and Slave Emancipation in the French Caribbean, 1787-1804*, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2004.

<sup>132</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. IX, pp. 264-265.

<sup>133</sup> AGI, Diversos 3, Gáinza to Abascal, 26 April 1814.

would receive the support of Buenos Aires and organize an army that, in his view, would be 'stronger than ours'.<sup>134</sup> Judging by the origins of the military plan that two and half years later allowed José de San Martín to re-conquer Chile, Gáinza was not far wrong.

#### IV. THE POLITICAL LEGITIMIZATION OF A REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT

While the last section addressed the organization of the first Chilean revolutionary army and the participation of insurgents and royalists in the civil war that started in March 1813, this section discusses the military implications of the most important political projects of the period 1810-1814. The first of these political projects was the Santiago Junta's resolution of October 1810 to appoint a commission headed by the Irish officer Juan Mackenna and the man of letters Juan Egaña to prepare a new Defensive Plan to resist possible incursions from abroad. Their document combined political with military topics, as shown by their recommendation to integrate the island of Chiloé (which throughout the colonial period had depended on the Peruvian viceroy) into Chilean territory. They thought that the 'political relations with Peru' could change, and that the Junta should be ready to administer regions that, until then, had been Lima's responsibility.<sup>135</sup> In his view, such a significant military possession as Chiloé could not 'belong to a different kingdom [Lima]'.<sup>136</sup>

However, neither this statement nor future political decisions made by the *juntistas* weakened the relationship between the Chilean authorities and viceroy Abascal. In comparison with other South American regions, notably Buenos Aires, Chile was, in the opinion of the viceroy, 'much more moderate'.<sup>137</sup> The difference between the Chilean and the *porteño* Juntas was not that the behaviour of the former had been less revolutionary than the latter; actually, both Juntas responded to the principle that in the absence of the king the power had to return to the people. Rather, the difference was that 1810 in Chile was not a very violent year, as it was in Buenos Aires.<sup>138</sup>

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<sup>134</sup> AGI, Diversos 3, Gáinza to Abascal, 23 July 1814.

<sup>135</sup> Various Authors, *Plan de Defensa*, in Fray Melchor Martínez, *Memoria Histórica sobre la Revolución de Chile*, Editorial de la Biblioteca Nacional, Santiago, 1964, vol. I, p. 261. The Plan was presented to the authorities on 27 November 1810.

<sup>136</sup> Serrano and Ossa, '1810 en Chile', p. 111.

<sup>137</sup> AGI, Diversos 2. This opinion appears in a rough draft that was part of a letter to Evaristo Pérez de Castro.

<sup>138</sup> Vicente Rodríguez and José Antonio Calderón (editors), *Memoria de gobierno del Virrey Abascal*, CSIC, Escuela de Estudios Hispanoamericanos, Sevilla, 1944, vol. II, p. 163-164.

The historical economic links between Lima and Chile also played a part in Abascal's decision to postpone any action against the establishment of the September Junta. Taking into account the 'necessities that this kingdom [Peru] has of some of Chile's economic goods and also the profits that Peru obtains from their exchange', the viceroy stated, Lima 'persisted in its economic relations with Chile'.<sup>139</sup> In a sense, Cristián Guerrero's hypothesis that the active commercial exchange between both countries prevented the viceroy from sending an expeditionary force to attack the Chileans in the period 1810-1812 is perfectly plausible.<sup>140</sup> Not even the declaration of Free Trade made by the Santiago *juntistas* in February 1811, which theoretically affected the alleged monopoly rights of the *limeño* merchant guild, caused significant frictions between the viceroy and the Santiago *juntistas*.<sup>141</sup>

Conflicts between the Chilean authorities and Abascal began to be more explicit only in mid-1812, as a consequence of the rupture between José Miguel Carrera's government and the city of Valdivia. According to Abascal, the decision of the *valdivianos* to put their city 'under the dependency of the Peruvian viceroy'<sup>142</sup> prompted him to 'issue the appropriate orders to defend' the *valdivianos* 'from the attacks that the Santiago revolutionaries might carry out' against them.<sup>143</sup> Divergences deepened a couple of months later, when the Santiago authorities printed the *Reglamento Constitucional* of 27 October 1812. For the first time, *La Aurora de Chile* felt entitled to condemn the 'insults' and 'hostilities' of the viceroy:

Yesterday the *Junta de Corporaciones* and military chiefs read a letter sent by Lima's viceroy [Abascal] to the *vocales* of the administrative Junta. Everyone agreed that the insults of the viceroy demanded the immediate closing of the ports, a measure that in the end was not approved since the people of Lima, composed of our brothers, should not be harassed because of the viceroy's fault. However, we will make the viceroy understand that he is mistaken in his calculations, based on negligible reports, and so the inhabitants of this kingdom can be assured that the government's sole purpose is to encourage safety and general happiness.<sup>144</sup>

The Chilean *Reglamento* confirmed Ferdinand VII as king of Chile: '*su Rey es Fernando VII [...] A su nombre gobernará la Junta Superior Gubernativa establecida en la capital*'. Yet, as I have said, the fifth article stated that 'any decree, provision or order emanated from any external authority or tribunal would not have any effect in Chile, and those who try to enact them will

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<sup>139</sup> Ibidem, p. 165.

<sup>140</sup> Guerrero Lira, *La contrarrevolución de la Independencia en Chile*, DIBAM, Santiago, 2002, p. 16.

<sup>141</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. VIII, p. 198.

<sup>142</sup> Cf. footnote 87 of this chapter.

<sup>143</sup> Rodríguez and Calderón, *Memoria de gobierno del Virrey Abascal*, p. 166.

<sup>144</sup> *La Aurora de Chile*, number 41, 19 November 1812, p. 172.

be punished as outlaws by the state'.<sup>145</sup> From these articles it would be correct to conclude that José Miguel Carrera's purpose was to prepare the ground to establish a constitutional monarchy in Chile after Ferdinand VII's return to the throne. This was an objective similar to that sought by the delegates to the Spanish Cortes when they drew up their *Constitución de Cádiz* (which was finally promulgated on 19 March 1812). However, it is unlikely that the writers of the Chilean *Reglamento* used the Spanish Constitution as a model when they did their work. In fact, the article that announced that Ferdinand VII would act as king of Chile only under the condition that the king must give their constitution the same value as that 'of the Peninsula', suggests that the writers of the Chilean *Reglamento* knew of the Spanish constitution but did not think it should have validity in Chile.<sup>146</sup> A good example that shows the differences between the *Constitución de Cádiz* and the *Reglamento* is related to the role assigned by both charts to the post of viceroy: whereas the *Constitución de Cádiz* recognized some of the authority of the Spanish American viceroys,<sup>147</sup> the Chilean *Reglamento* cut all links with the Peruvian Viceroyalty.<sup>148</sup>

We have seen that the radical stand of the *Reglamento* prompted Abascal to dispatch Antonio Pareja to combat the Chilean revolutionaries in their own territory. This measure entailed both military and political consequences, as revolutionary warfare was fought not only in the battlefield but also in the political arena. The war in Chile forced the Chileans to take sides and, therefore, to accept that moderate positions could be easily confused with treason. Loyalty became, in this context, one of the most popular words to define an individual's political position, regardless of whether he was a monarchist or an insurgent. For the latter, there were two ways to show loyalty to the revolution: to be enrolled in the army, and to acknowledge the successive Juntas Gubernativas and afterwards the institution of the Supreme Director as the only, legitimate authority of the country. To be a good and faithful 'patriot' became, in fact, synonymous with being loyal to which ever revolutionary government that happened to be in power. Defenders of the 'big *patria*' began thus to be less and less seen as

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<sup>145</sup> 'Reglamento constitucional provisorio del 27 de octubre de 1812'. In <http://www.historia.uchile.cl>.

<sup>146</sup> A similar argument appears in Jocelyn-Holt, *La Independencia*, p. 188.

<sup>147</sup> As Peralta Ruiz, *En defensa de la autoridad*, p. 116, has said, in theory the *Constitución de Cádiz* reduced the political power of the Viceroys but maintained their military dominance over the rest of the Spanish American institutions. In any case, Abascal never truly subordinated himself to the Constitution.

<sup>148</sup> There were some Chilean officers who, at the same time, praised the *Constitución de Cádiz* but criticized the intervention of Viceroy Abascal in Chilean politics. That was the case of lieutenant-colonel Manuel Bulnes Quevedo. See Peter Heywood, *A memoir of the late Captain Peter Heywood, R.N. with extracts from his diaries and correspondence by Edward Tagart*, Published by Effingham Wilson, Royal Exchange, London, 1832, p. 253-258.

‘real patriots’.

The argument that every inhabitant should be a defender of his *patria* was a recurrent strategy used by the authorities to boost recruitment. This idea appears, for instance, in a *Catecismo Patriótico para instrucción de la juventud del Reyno de Chile*, which, although lacking an official date, it is likely that became popular in Chile around 1811.<sup>149</sup> Its author claimed that

The salaried [troops] that now exist in the different parts of the *Reyno* should be enough in time of peace. In times of War may the *Milicias* be disciplined, **and may all men be Soldiers**. [...] May one **hundred thousand citizens save the Patria in case of an external invasion**, so the enthusiasm that inspires self-preservation can circumvent the attempts of all European powers.<sup>150</sup>

A similar approach was advocated in March 1812 by José Miguel Carrera’s most trusted ally during these years, Camilo Henríquez. In *La Aurora de Chile*, Henríquez favoured the idea that the defence of the country must be conducted by ‘virtuous citizens’ turned into ‘soldiers’:

The country’s emblem must point out the virtuous citizen. [...] In a system of civic freedom each man is, with the force of expression, a soldier of his country. The odious differences of the state are finally over. Militiamen are armed citizens, and each citizen is a warrior who sustains the rights of society. May the humiliating idea of mercenaries, who have seen despotism as the satellites of tyranny, be completely vanished. May every single class of the secular state use the TRICOLOUR ROSETTE [*ESCARAPELA TRICOLOR*] that has been given to the Army.<sup>151</sup>

It seems that for ‘citizens’ Henríquez meant ‘inhabitants’, all of whom should receive ‘not only a civil but also a military education’.<sup>152</sup> Yet, at the same time, the editor of *La Aurora de Chile* was aware that the defence of the territory could not be exclusively undertaken by individuals gathered in the citizen body par excellence, i.e. the militia, but had also to involve the regular troops.<sup>153</sup> Thus, Henríquez stated that if in the past things ‘could have come to the point that every citizen could have been a soldier, and every soldier a hero; if the military education could have formed well-trained officers [...]; if continuous exercises [...] could have

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<sup>149</sup> This supposition arises from the fact that a copy of this *Catecismo* can be found together with other personal papers of Viceroy Abascal and which are dated to 1811. See AGI, Diversos 2. For the role of *Catecismos* during this period, see Rafael Sagredo, ‘Los actores políticos en los catecismos patriotas americanos. 1810-1821’, en *Historia*, number 28, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago, 1994; and Rafael Sagredo, *De la Colonia a la República. Los catecismos políticos americanos, 1811-1827*, Prisma Histórico, Madrid, 2009.

<sup>150</sup> AGI, Diversos 2. The emphasis is mine.

<sup>151</sup> *La Aurora de Chile*, number 24, 23 July 1812, p. 102. Capital letters in the original.

<sup>152</sup> *La Aurora de Chile*, number 5, 12 March 1812, pp. 23-24.

<sup>153</sup> In this, Henríquez opposed Juan Egaña’s argument that the defence of the territory should rest in the militia. See Vasco Castillo, *La creación de la República. La filosofía pública en Chile, 1810-1830*, LOM Ediciones, Santiago, 2009, pp. 49-51; and chapter VII of this thesis.

converted every citizen into a Lacedaemon', then the security of the state could have rested solely upon the militias.<sup>154</sup> But in the present circumstances, Henríquez concluded, only 'a regular and permanent army would bring us a solid and durable liberty'.<sup>155</sup> This point is crucial to understanding the process of militarization that Chileans experienced after the outbreak of war in 1813.

But Henríquez's approach did not produce an immediate practical response. Recruitment was hardly voluntary and, in fact, desertion and draconian recruitment laws were the main trends of the period 1813-1814. The reasons why soldiers deserted varied depending on where and when they deserted.<sup>156</sup> Thus, we find that in November 1813 the artilleryman Matías Larenas told his investigators that he had deserted during the battle of El Roble [17 October 1813] after hearing a Portuguese shopkeeper [*pulpero*] saying that the enemy's army was much stronger than the revolutionaries'. Larenas, in other words, fled the army because he was afraid that the royalists could arrest him and treat him badly, a statement that he probably used to justify his actions before his accusers.<sup>157</sup> In most cases, however, soldiers did not desert individually but en masse. In April 1814, for instance, the government ordered Rancagua's militia colonel, Juan Francisco Larraín, to pursue the deserters of the *División Maipú*, who, according to the authorities' estimation, were 65% of the total of the soldiers originally recruited (130 of 200).<sup>158</sup>

From the government's point of view, desertion was an act of treason that deserved exemplary punishment. It is little surprising, therefore, that punishments against deserters became more severe as warfare radicalized.<sup>159</sup> Only a few days after the royalist attacked the port of Talcahuano in March 1813, Carrera ordered the militia commander of Concepción,

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<sup>154</sup> *La Aurora de Chile*, number 5, 12 March 1812, pp. 23-24. Another reference to the Lacedaemonians can be found in JIVE, vol. 19, 3 May 1813, pp. 82-82v. A reference to the 'American Lacedaemonians' can be found in Clément Thibaud, 'La coyuntura de 1810 en Tierra Firme. Confederaciones, constituciones, repúblicas', in Roberto Breña (coordinator), 'Iberoamérica en 1810: emancipación, autonomía y lealtad', dossier published in *Historia y Política*, number 24, Madrid, July-December, 2010, p. 27. The use by turn-of-the-century Chilean men of letters of 'classic' republican arguments both to explain and legitimize their political positions is currently being studied by Susana Gazmuri, 'La función de la antigüedad greco-romana y el republicanismo clásico en Chile en el período de los ensayos constitucionales', PhD thesis, Universidad Católica de Chile (work in progress).

<sup>155</sup> *La Aurora de Chile*, number 6, 19 March 1812, p. 29.

<sup>156</sup> My analysis of desertions during this epoch is based on León, 'Reclutas forzados y desertores de la patria'.

<sup>157</sup> VM, vol. CXXII, ff. 150-155v. Given that Leonardo León's article on deserters has proved to be one of the best works on the subject, it is sufficient to present only a few examples of how the revolutionary government reacted to desertions.

<sup>158</sup> MG, vol. 1, 27 April 1814.

<sup>159</sup> The radicalization of the war can also be seen in the excesses committed by both armies in the *villas* and *pueblos* they seized. See, for instance, León, 'Reclutas forzados y desertores de la patria', p. 265; and CDHICH, vol. 8, p. 99.

Antonio Mendiburu, to remit to Curicó ‘escorted and imprisoned with a bar and shackles’ the militiamen who did not ‘blindly obey Mendiburu’s orders’.<sup>160</sup> Almost a year later, the revolutionary government claimed that anyone who ‘excuses himself’ from defending his country should be punished under the ‘declaration of being spurious [expurio, sic] to the *patria*’.<sup>161</sup> This *Oficio* was followed by another *Bando* at the end of March 1814. This time, however, the authorities went even further: ‘every individual who hides or flees from the army will be treated as a traitor; his possessions, meanwhile, will be confiscated, burned and destroyed’.<sup>162</sup>

But desertion was only one of the many types of treachery that an individual could commit during this time of political uncertainty. ‘Every good citizen who is aware of a secret conspiracy against the actual system’, claimed an 1811 Vigilance Junta Regulation, ‘must immediately inform one of the persons who compose the *Junta de Vigilancia*. If he does it, [...] he will be treated as a liberator of his *patria*; if he keeps silent [...] he will be rigorously punished according to law’.<sup>163</sup> This *Junta de Vigilancia* was composed of fifteen individuals from Santiago and Concepción, of whom at least three were militia officers.<sup>164</sup>

In September 1811, the new executive Junta (installed in Santiago after Carrera’s revolt of 4 September) published a *Bando* to reinforce the loyalty and patriotism of the Chileans. In the view of the *juntistas*, every person who had been employed by the state had to demonstrate his patriotism at all times and in any circumstance. ‘Indifference is the biggest crime that state employees can commit’, stated this *Bando*, adding that, in order to prevent apathy, the patriotism of the employees would be constantly evaluated. Hence the order that every *Hoja de Servicio* had to be filled with marks to measure the degree of loyalty of the people who had been ‘distinguished’ with the honour of working on behalf of the *patria*.<sup>165</sup> A year and a half later, the revolutionary authorities’ published a *Bando* explaining their position regarding this theme: ‘the government does not cease to promote and advance the common adherence to the sacred cause that the Chilean people have entrusted to its hands, both exciting the virtuous citizen and seriously admonishing the ungrateful, the indolent, and the disseminator of unrest and discord. Consequently, this junta has agreed not to recruit civilians and military who are

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<sup>160</sup> Quoted in León, ‘Reclutas forzados y desertores de la patria’, p. 263.

<sup>161</sup> MG, vol. 1, 19 March 1814.

<sup>162</sup> MG, vol. 1, 31 March 1814.

<sup>163</sup> AGI, Chile 207, 10 June 1811.

<sup>164</sup> They were: Ignacio Carrera, Domingo Díaz Salcedo and Manuel Pérez Cotapos.

<sup>165</sup> AGI, Buenos Aires 40, 16 September 1811.

not devoted to the *Patria*, stating, as well, that the anti-patriot or individual who has contrary views must be stripped off [*despojado*] of his current position'.<sup>166</sup>

We have seen that the radicalization of the political process and the outbreak of the war changed the meaning of 'patriotism': more and more defenders of the '*patria*' began to be identified with the revolutionary programme. The problem was that within the revolutionary group there were at least two different factions that struggled to achieve political supremacy and represent 'real' patriotism. The conflict between these factions became evident in May 1814, when revolutionaries and royalists signed a peace agreement near the river Lircay (the revolutionaries were represented by Bernardo O'Higgins and Juan Mackenna, the royalists by Gabino Gaínza). The main articles of the Treaty of Lircay asserted that the 'Chilean government' would administer the territory with some degree of autonomy but not independent of either the Peruvian viceroy or the metropolis. Article 1 stated that Chile was 'an integral part of the Spanish monarchy'. It also recognized Ferdinand VII as king of Chile, adding, however, that 'the internal [Chilean] government retains all its power and authority to trade with allied and neutral nations, especially with Great Britain, to which Spain owes its political existence'. Article 2 contended that hostilities between both armies were over. Furthermore, Gaínza agreed to withdraw his forces from Talca within thirty hours of having signed the agreement. Article 6 declared that the royalist officers 'who would like to continue their services in the country will enjoy the same ranks and salary they had before the outbreak of the war'.<sup>167</sup>

Of these articles, the one which stated that Chile 'was an integral part of the Spanish monarchy' was the most resented by the faction led by the Carrera brothers. People like Manuel José Gandarillas argued that 'America cannot and should not attain her prosperity in pious brotherhood with Spain'.<sup>168</sup> José Miguel Carrera went further, as he explicitly condemned the performance of O'Higgins and Mackenna in the negotiations and labelled them as traitors.<sup>169</sup> Even Francisco de la Lastra, the Supreme Director who ordered O'Higgins and

<sup>166</sup> JIVE, vol. 19, 2 February 1813, pp. 57-57v. Underlined in the original.

<sup>167</sup> A not very well preserved copy of the Treaty of Lircay can be found in F.V., vol. 812.

<sup>168</sup> As quoted by Collier, *Ideas and Politics*, p. 111. Julio Alemparte, *Carrera y Freire. Fundadores de la República*, Editorial Nascimento, Santiago, 1963, pp. 87-105 was perhaps the historian who most criticized the Treaty in the twentieth century.

<sup>169</sup> In his *Diary*, José Miguel Carrera suggests that O'Higgins and Mackenna signed the Treaty of Lircay to get rid of him and his brothers; apparently, one of the implicit decisions made during the negotiations was that the Carreras would be imprisoned in Chile and sent to Lima to be condemned by the viceroy. See his *Diario del Brigadier General D. José Miguel Carrera Verdugo*, Academia de Historia Militar, vol. III, Santiago, 1986, pp. 164-167.

Mackenna to sign the Treaty on behalf of the 'Chilean government', declared a couple of weeks later that his administration had not sincerely sought to remain a part of the Spanish empire. On 27 May, twenty-four days after the Treaty of Lircay was concluded, de la Lastra wrote to the Chilean delegate to London, Francisco Antonio Pinto, that Chile 'is resolved to be free at any cost, that the more she knows her rights the more she hates slavery, that she has completely forgotten the old system, that she wants a liberal system which will provide this part of America –the most abandoned and downtrodden part- with those advantages which until now it has not experienced. These are the true and intimate sentiments of Chile'. In writing this, Collier says, de la Lastra accepted that he 'had agreed to the Treaty only as a means of buying time'.<sup>170</sup>

Viceroy Abascal, for his part, rejected the Treaty utterly, arguing that the terms under which the Treaty was signed contradicted Abascal's previous instruction that negotiations with the rebels ought to be approved by him first. 'It is evident that the [*limeño*] government approved the creation of the [Chilean] Junta and that of Quito', Abascal wrote in his *Memoria de Gobierno*, 'but it is clear also that the government wanted these bodies to be subject to the legitimate authorities'.<sup>171</sup> Abascal, it seems, was ready to accept that Chileans had some degree of political autonomy –quite a novel position considering his 'absolutist' credentials. However, neither Carrera's *Reglamento* of 1812 nor the Treaty of Lircay, whose second article stated that Gainza had to withdraw his forces from Chilean territory, could be tolerated by Lima. In his view, the Treaty of Lircay challenged his political position in South America, and for that it must be abolished completely.

Abascal's position regarding the Treaty shows that negotiations between revolutionaries and royalists had more profound effects than historians have usually believed.<sup>172</sup> True, sooner rather than later the insurgents reached a conclusion similar to that of Abascal: the Treaty could not satisfy either side. This explains why the struggle between revolutionaries and royalists continued throughout that year, ending in Rancagua, where the royalist troops of Mariano Osorio defeated the remains of the first Chilean revolutionary army and forced its

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<sup>170</sup> Mariano Osorio, *Conducta militar y política del General en Jefe del Ejército del Rey en oposición con las de los caudillos que tiranizaban el Reyno de Chile*, Imprenta del Gobierno, Santiago, 1814, p. 16. The English translation by Collier, *Ideas and Politics*, p. 118.

<sup>171</sup> Rodríguez and Calderón, *Memoria de Gobierno del Virrey Abascal*, pp. 176-178. See also AGI, Diversos 3.

<sup>172</sup> See Amunáteguis, *La Reconquista española*, Imprenta, Litografía y Encuadernación Barcelona, Santiago, 1912, chapter I; Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. IX, pp. 336-339; and Encina, *Historia de Chile desde la prehistoria hasta 1891*, Editorial Nascimento, Santiago, 1947-1954, volume VI, pp. 614-634.

leaders to cross the *Cordillera* and settle in Mendoza (this is the subject of the next chapter). However, more important than the motives behind the articles of this Treaty, and perhaps more significant than stressing its short duration, is to take into account the fact of its very existence. Thanks to the armistice both sides agreed –at least for a short period of time- that only the *derecho de gentes* could put an end to the conflict. This means that for the first time the most important royalist agent in Chile –Gáinza- admitted that the Chilean ‘rebels’ should be treated in accordance with international rather than penal law. Abascal himself was ready to accept this, although not before giving his approval to the terms of the negotiation.

Abascal rejected the detail of the Treaty not because he believed that rebels were unsuitable for negotiations, but rather because he concluded that the Treaty was too lenient with the revolutionaries. And he was right. Although Jaime Rodríguez is correct when he says that with the Treaty the revolutionaries sought not ‘independence but rather a form of government concordant with the principles of the Spanish Nation’,<sup>173</sup> Gabino Gáinza’s acknowledgment of the Chilean revolutionaries’ right to govern their territory was a triumph for the rebels. The articles of the Treaty, in fact, formalized some of the most profound political changes introduced in Chile since 1810. It did not institutionalize independence (not least because it is doubtful that O’Higgins, Mackenna and even Carrera had sought independence in 1814), but it institutionalized the idea that a revolution had indeed occurred in Chile. The armistice epitomized the views and goals of two communities that, at least in theory, were sovereign (otherwise no treaty between these two parties could have been signed). Furthermore, the signature of the Treaty by the representatives of two states, ‘Spain’ and ‘Chile’, proves that Gáinza saw in Chile a different counterpart with which it was acceptable and indispensable to negotiate.<sup>174</sup> Without a doubt this was a triumph more important for the revolutionaries than any military confrontation held until then.

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<sup>173</sup> Rodríguez, *The independence of Spanish America*, p. 143.

<sup>174</sup> This idea can be compared to that amply worked by Clément Thibaud, *Repúblicas en Armas*, pp. 475-490 when he analyzes the consequences of a peace Treaty signed by revolutionaries and royalists in the ex Viceroyalty of New Granada in 1821. A short version of his argument can be found in Thibaud, ‘Definiendo el sujeto de la soberanía: repúblicas y guerra en la Nueva Granada y Venezuela, 1808-1820’, in Manuel Chust y Juan Marchena (editors), *Las armas de la Nación: independencia y ciudadanía en Hispanoamérica (1750-1850)*, Editorial Iberoamericana, Madrid, 2007, pp. 217-218.

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In these pages I have discussed the repercussions in Chile of the Spanish imperial crisis of 1808. Immediately after learning about the abdications in Bayonne, the Chilean elites reaffirmed their loyalty to the imprisoned king and the successive corporations that governed the empire on behalf of the monarchy. The arrival in Chile of the envoy of the Junta Suprema de Sevilla, José Santiago de Luco, strengthened the loyalty of the *santiaguinos* towards Spain, though it created friction with the local governor, Francisco García Carrasco. Differences between García Carrasco and Luco affected the relationship between the governor and the local elites, as Luco managed to ally with important figures who were discontented with García Carrasco's '*mal gobierno*'. The dismissal of the governor in June 1810 opened the door to more, deeper administrative changes, even though none of them aimed to cut the links with the metropolis. The *juntistas*, in other words, led a political revolution to change the local government from within the empire.

By stressing in section II of this chapter that the creation of the Junta was a political move led mainly by the Santiago elites, I introduced an important yet often forgotten political aspect of this period: the fact that the Junta pressured to represent not only the capital but the entire kingdom. At first, Concepción, the second biggest city of the country, reacted positively to Santiago's preeminent position, and even one of its leading and most radical figures, Juan Martínez de Rozas, gladly accepted to be part of the Junta. The radical stand of Rozas was approved by some but resisted by others, which explains why in mid 1811 Rozas decided to go back to Concepción and form a government more in line with his political beliefs. His example was followed by a group of radicals from Santiago who, thanks to the support they received from the regular military officers headed by José Miguel Carrera and his brothers, established a new Junta and made contact with Rozas' followers in Concepción. The involvement of the military in politics was soon criticized by Rozas. But in the end differences between Concepción and Santiago did not reach the battlefield, and the search for political solutions became the approach employed by the leaders of both provinces.

Despite Rozas' critical view of Carrera's 'praetorianism', the September Junta unleashed a process of militarization in the entire kingdom. The uncertainty regarding Napoleon's plans for Spanish America, or how the rest of the Spanish American colonies would react to the newly created Junta, led the new authorities to strengthen the defence of the

country. They needed to be prepared to stop a foreign invasion, and so they did not delay in implementing a military reform project that included the professionalization of the officers and the systematic recruitment of new troops. The end of the conflict between Santiago and Concepción coincided more or less with the cutting of ties between the Carrera government and Abascal. The decision of the viceroy to send a series of expeditionary forces to combat the Chilean revolutionaries caused a civil war in Chile that, as we shall see in future chapters, lasted until 1826.

The last section addressed the political causes of the outbreak of the war, as well as the political repercussions of some of the most important military decisions made by the Chilean authorities in the years 1810-1814. It was argued that the publication in October 1812 of Carrera's *Reglamento Constitucional* prompted Abascal to send the first royalist force, stressing, nonetheless, that such a chart did not follow the model of the *Constitución de Cádiz*. This is an important point, because it shows that although Chileans were influenced by foreign affairs they did not react monolithically to them. At the same time, I rejected the traditional view that the so-called Treaty of Lircay did not have long-term consequences, underlining that its very existence allowed the Chilean revolutionaries to start being seen for the first time as members of a sovereign political community.

### CHAPTER III

#### POLITICAL AND MILITARY COUNTERREVOLUTION IN CHILE, 1814-1817

This chapter discusses the political and military characteristics of the counterrevolutionary government established in Chile in October 1814, which was successively led by Mariano Osorio (October 1814-December 1815) and Francisco Marcó del Pont (December 1815-February 1817). The first section argues, on the one hand, that at the beginning of his government Osorio enjoyed reasonable levels of support. But, on the other, it is claimed that the Spanish governor did not adopt a coherent course of action regarding how the insurgents should be judicially prosecuted both in Chile and outside the country. Osorio's erratic behaviour affected his image, and at the end of his administration the elites refused to grant him the economic resources that, according to him, were needed to defray the costs of the royalist army. However, even though Osorio's ambivalence destabilized his internal political position, it did not cause his fall. In fact, what triggered his fall was viceroy Abascal's decision to write to Spain asking for his removal, and Ferdinand VII's consequent appointment of Marcó del Pont in his place.

The next section examines Marcó del Pont's government, emphasizing that, equally to Osorio, he committed mistakes that disaffected the same elites that applauded his appointment. In less than a year, Marcó earned the enmity of most Chilean elites, the conservative members of the Real Audiencia included. His reluctance to implement a pardon negotiated by Osorio's emissaries to Spain, and which was extraordinarily granted by Ferdinand VII, alienated those who could have become his allies in a future government combining monarchical principles with some degrees of self-government. But he did not realize that such an option was still possible in 1816 (in the end, Ferdinand VII also failed to understand this). For Marcó there were no differences between the revolutionaries who emigrated to Mendoza and the moderate autonomists who remained in Chile, and so he confronted both groups with the same intensity and with similar tools. Sadly for him, while until late 1816 the Chilean elites were ready to accept Marcó's measures to stop the external threat coming from the other side of the *Cordillera*, they constantly rejected his policy of internal political persecution. By early 1817, when the revolutionaries defeated the royalists in Chacabuco, it was too late for Marcó to rely upon the local elites to stop the external threat.

In this line, the last section presents the hypothesis that the counterrevolutionary programme collapsed not only because the revolutionaries managed to carry out a successful military campaign, but also because, after eighteen months of royalist rule in Chile, important sectors of the elites detached from Spain's political project. The absolutist option represented by Ferdinand VII's return to power lost adherents as time went by, and at the end of Marcó's government Chileans were reluctant to relinquish the political rights they had achieved since 1810. The royalist regime in Chile failed because neither the governors of the period 1814-1817, nor the Spanish ministers, understood that in order to maintain the colony within the empire it was necessary to respect some of the privileges Chileans had won in the last couple of years.

### I. MARIANO OSORIO'S POLITICAL AND MILITARY BEHAVIOUR

Even though royalists and revolutionaries tried to honour the Treaty of Lircay, differences between the Spanish general, Gabino Gaínza, and the revolutionary leaders prevented the armistice from enduring. Stipulation 2 of the treaty was challenged by Gaínza, who understood that viceroy Abascal was hardly in a position to consent the withdrawal of the royalist army from Chilean territory, as this would have meant an explicit recognition that the war had ended. As a result, Gaínza delayed taking his forces out of Chile for as long as the revolutionary government accepted his arguments to keep his men in the country. However, this did not prevent viceroy Abascal from investigating his behaviour and replacing him with Mariano Osorio. Abascal wrote his instructions to Osorio in July 1814. As in the case of Gaínza, in these instructions Abascal promised to pardon the Chilean revolutionaries if they laid down their arms, an idea reinforced by Osorio on 20 August, when he had already arrived at the port of Talcahuano: 'Lima's viceroy has disapproved the agreement signed on 3 May last [1814]. He, therefore, has both entrusted me to command the [royalist] army [in Chile] and authorized me to propose peace, if indeed you lay down your weapons, renew the oath to Ferdinand VII, to the Constitution of the Spanish monarchy and to the government of its courts'.<sup>1</sup>

It is interesting to note Abascal's call for Chileans to 'renew' their loyalty oath not just to the king but also to the *Constitución de Cádiz* and the Spanish Cortes. Given that the

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<sup>1</sup> CDHICH, vol. 4, pp. 180.

*Constitución de Cádiz* never went into effect in Chile, it could be said that his words were aimed to persuade Spanish Americans in general that Lima would pardon them if they gave up the insurgency. Article 21 of Abascal's instructions informing Osorio that Chile ought to be used as a platform to re-conquer other regions –chiefly Buenos Aires and Upper Peru- reaffirms this hypothesis.<sup>2</sup> Thus, although the viceroy was an absolutist who disliked the *Constitución de Cádiz*, at that moment he had to obey Spain's order to enforce the Cadiz Chart.<sup>3</sup>

But the clauses where Abascal speaks of a future pardon are neither as significant nor as numerous as those that allude to the course of action that Osorio should take if the revolutionaries did not obey Abascal's instructions. The viceroy ordered Osorio to mobilize the royalist troops and find out 'the exact number of men that the cavalry, the infantry and the artillery possess'. Article 11 reported that the king's army was reinforced with the *Talavera* battalion, which, in Abascal's words, would prevent the 'enemies from beginning an incursion in the countryside'. If they decided to attack, Abascal continued, Osorio must wait until the end of the winter, when he would be able to 'confront the revolutionaries wherever they are found and without giving them the chance of recovering in case of being defeated'.

Once Santiago was seized, Osorio was expected to give the country a new administration. Article 12 instructed him to demand 'a moderate but general economic contribution from the inhabitants of the kingdom, with which the army will be paid and improved'. The next clause instructed him to imprison the 'leaders of the revolution and send them to Juan Fernández until they were judged according to the law'. Afterwards, Abascal ordered the creation of a military body to be called the '*Concordia Chilena*' to be composed of Americans and Europeans in equal numbers. Finally, clause 17 ordered to leave without effect the military promotions granted by the royalist generals without the viceroy's explicit approval. For Abascal it was vital to place the administration of the army in the hands of loyal officers, and so he insisted on being secretly informed about the loyalties of his men.<sup>4</sup> Therefore, Abascal wrote his Instructions with two different scenarios in mind: the first considered the possibility of convincing the insurgents to return to the monarchy. The second, considered the

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<sup>2</sup> In Guerrero Lira's, *La contrarrevolución*, p. 74, words: 'we can say that the final objective of this military campaign was not [to take control over the Chilean] territory but the *trasandino*'.

<sup>3</sup> In November 1814, Osorio asked Abascal to inform him whether he should or should not put the *Constitución de Cádiz* into practice, adding that news of its abolition had reached the Chilean coast and the inhabitants were beginning to doubt its validity. See AGI, Diversos 3, Osorio to Abascal (without exact date). The *Constitución* was finally derogated in Peru on 7 October 1814, a fact acknowledged by Osorio only on 6 December. See Peralta Ruiz, *En defensa de la autoridad*, p. 250; and AGI, Chile 206, respectively.

<sup>4</sup> Abascal's orders appear in CDHICH, vol. 4, pp. 148-160.

scenario that many rejected his call to disarm.

When Osorio's troops landed in Chile, differences between the revolutionary factions were increasing. At the end of July 1814 a political insurrection ousted Francisco de la Lastra from office, an event that empowered the critics of the Treaty of Lircay, especially José Miguel Carrera's supporters. Eventually, Carrera undertook his third personal *coup d'état* against the constituted authorities, forming a Junta composed of himself, Julián Uribe and Manuel Muñoz, whose first action was to expel one of the representatives of the government of 'Chile' during the negotiation of the treaty, Juan Mackenna, to Mendoza.<sup>5</sup> O'Higgins' troops, which were quartered in Talca, refused to recognize the new Junta. A small confrontation between the two revolutionary factions soon followed at a place called Tres Acequias.<sup>6</sup>

Before long, however, Carrera and O'Higgins put their differences aside and joined forces against Mariano Osorio's army. Carrera did not accept Osorio's invitations to return to the monarchy, and so by the end of September both armies knew that a new confrontation was inevitable. According to O'Higgins, the city of Rancagua, located 87 kilometres south of Santiago, was the best place to stop the royalists from advancing on the capital.<sup>7</sup> He believed that the revolutionary army (of around 3,900 men)<sup>8</sup> was sufficiently prepared to confront Osorio's troops (around 5,000 men),<sup>9</sup> and so he insisted on assembling in Rancagua. José Miguel Carrera, on the other hand, thought the revolutionaries should wait until the army was better organized. In his view, the city of Rancagua was not safe enough, and therefore he preferred to fight the royalists in Angostura de Paine, not far from Santiago. In the end, O'Higgins's argument prevailed: two of the three revolutionary divisions (one commanded by O'Higgins, the other by Juan José Carrera) occupied Rancagua's main square and remained there until the royalists decided to attack.<sup>10</sup> In the early morning of 1 October 1814, Osorio's forces advanced through the outskirts of Rancagua towards the square. The first royalist attack was headed by the *Talaveras*, a Spanish contingent of 550 veterans recently arrived from Lima

<sup>5</sup> Amunáteguis, *La Reconquista española*, pp. 154-155.

<sup>6</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. IX, pp. 376-379.

<sup>7</sup> For the battle of Rancagua, see Amunáteguis, *La Reconquista española*, pp. 158-176; Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. IX, pp. 413-428; Eyzaguirre, *O'Higgins*, pp. 135-142; Encina, *Historia de Chile*, vol. VI, pp. 701-715; and Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna, *Vida del capitán general don Bernardo O'Higgins*, Editorial del Pacífico, Santiago, 1976, pp. 200-212.

<sup>8</sup> Amunáteguis, *La Reconquista española*, p. 159.

<sup>9</sup> Encina, *Historia de Chile*, p. 680. The Amunáteguis, *La Reconquista española*, p. 164, also speaks of an army of around 5,000 men.

<sup>10</sup> According to the Amunáteguis, *La Reconquista española*, pp. 160-161 O'Higgins division had 1,155 men, whereas Juan José Carrera's 1,861 (in total they reached 3,016 men). In any case, Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. IX, p. 429, argues that the revolutionaries started the combat with less than 1,700 men.

(the first to arrive to Chile in decades, as we saw in chapter I).<sup>11</sup> Although the attack was initially stopped by O'Higgins' troops, the *Talaveras* kept advancing and engaged the revolutionaries in a fierce man-to-man combat. No battle of the Chilean revolution had started as violently as this.

Violence increased with the passage of the day. Making reference to the fact that this was a war to the death, the royalists led a second attack carrying black flags. According to Jaime Eyzaguirre, the *Talaveras* accompanied their attack crying 'traitors, surrender! Surrender, insurgents, or die!', while the revolutionaries responded shouting 'death to the *sarracenos*' (a word used by the Spanish Americans to insult the *peninsulares*).<sup>12</sup> The intensity of the conflict diminished in the evening; but, during the third royalist attack, Osorio's troops set to fire the city, which resulted in almost as many casualties as those of the morning.

Aware of the weakness of his forces, O'Higgins asked José Miguel Carrera to send his division to Rancagua to reinforce the revolutionaries. O'Higgins' emissary arrived back at the city with news that Carrera had agreed, and that they should expect him at dawn. Before Carrera's arrival, however, two new royalist attacks further weakened the insurgents. The revolutionaries lacked munitions, water and provisions. As the monarchists were launching their sixth and last assault, royalist guerrillas were dispatched from Rancagua to impede Carrera's division from crossing the river Cachapoal and joining O'Higgins' forces. Even though his division outnumbered the royalist guerrillas, Carrera withdrew his troops and left O'Higgins and his brother, Juan José, to face certain defeat. It is unclear whether Carrera did this because he wanted to blame O'Higgins for the defeat or, rather, because he thought it was better to save his troops in case they had to confront the royalists nearer to Santiago.<sup>13</sup> Whatever the reason, his decision forced O'Higgins to flee from Rancagua (he departed almost immediately for Mendoza, on the other side of the *Cordillera*) and to accept that the royalists had won their most important victory of the Chilean revolution.

Traditionally, Chilean scholars have considered the battle of Rancagua as one of the gloomiest episodes of the period 1810-1814. The idea that Rancagua was not simply a battle but a 'disaster' has solidified in Chile's national memory in ways that its main propagators, the

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<sup>11</sup> It might be useful to remember that the *Talaveras* were the only Spanish-born soldiers in Osorio's army. The rest of his troops were formed of Chilean soldiers recruited by Pareja and Gaínza.

<sup>12</sup> Eyzaguirre, *O'Higgins*, p. 138.

<sup>13</sup> The first point was defended by Vicuña Mackenna, *Vida del capitán*, p. 208, the second by the Amunáteguis, *La Reconquista española*, pp. 170-171.

nineteenth-century historians Miguel Luis and Gregorio Víctor Amunátegui, perhaps never expected. Undoubtedly, Rancagua was the cruellest and longest battle of these years. In two days there was a balance of nearly 900 deaths,<sup>14</sup> a significant number if we take into consideration that neither army numbered more than 5,000 men. In this sense, the Amunátegui brothers were right when they deemed this battle a ‘disaster’ for the revolutionaries. The problem with their approach is that they assumed that the ‘disastrous’ consequences of the battle were felt by the majority of the local inhabitants, when the truth is that there were many people who did not only applaud the result of the battle but also supported the counterrevolutionary government that was installed in Santiago in the wake of Rancagua.<sup>15</sup>

Indeed, as it happened with Pablo Morillo in Venezuela, the royalists’ arrival in Santiago in October 1814 was celebrated by the *santiaguinos*, who saw in Osorio the leader who would put an end to a fratricidal civil war. In this sense, Rebecca Earle’s argument that the ‘inhabitants of New Granada were deeply disillusioned with their new republican leaders’ could be applied to the case of Chile (in the case of Chile, it is more accurate to say ‘revolutionary’ rather than ‘republican leaders’).<sup>16</sup> The monarchist troops began their entry into Santiago at 8 am on 5 October. Both private and public buildings were adorned with royalist flags; the bells of the churches sounded, and even rockets [*cobetes*] were launched in signs of joyfulness. Barros Arana recounted that ‘the royalist troops occupied the headquarters that had been abandoned by the patriots, and officers were affectionately hosted’ by the *santiaguinos*. That same day, Osorio, who entered Santiago on 6 October, issued a *Proclama* calling on his soldiers to behave with decency and moderation, a call that was praised by those who did not think the royalists should act in a spirit of revenge. The *Proclama* said:

Soldiers! We are about to enter Santiago, capital of this unfortunate kingdom. It is important that you do not behave as harsh as you did in Rancagua. The *santiaguinos* are our brothers and not our enemies, who have already escaped [to Mendoza]. [...] Let us join together with them in a truly paternal friendship. [...] Let us make them see the great difference between the soldiers of the king and those of the so-called patria.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. IX, p. 429. According to Barros Arana, the revolutionaries lost 600 men, while the royalists 300.

<sup>15</sup> Considering that the Amunáteguis wrote their work at a time when history was beginning to be used as a vehicle to promote nationalism, it is hardly surprising that they have emphasized the ‘disastrous’ characteristics of the battle. For them, in Rancagua ‘Spain’ triumphed over ‘Chile’.

<sup>16</sup> Rebecca Earle, ‘Popular participation in the wars of independence in New Granada’, in Anthony McFarlane and Eduardo Posada Carbó (editors), *Independence and Revolution in Spanish America*, Institute of Latin American Studies, London, 1999, p. 88.

<sup>17</sup> Cited by Barros Arana, vol. IX, p. 444.

Celebrations to commemorate the royalist triumph continued throughout November 1814, and not only in Santiago. During that month the principal *villas* of the country swore loyalty to the king: in Linares, the oath was taken in presence of the ‘*vecindario de esta Villa y Milicias de todo el Partido*’; in Rancagua, ‘the Infantry detachment of this garrison formed in a V-shape in front of the stage; it was accompanied by two militia detachments that were distributed in both sides of the stage in identical formation’. In Santa Cruz, a stage was installed to celebrate the return of the royalists; in San Felipe, Petorca, Quillota and Santa Rosa de Los Andes, to name but a few, similar events happened throughout that month.<sup>18</sup> Loyalty was also inculcated through the exaltation of the royalist figures killed by the revolutionaries, the example of Tomás de Figueroa being the most evident. I have already questioned whether Figueroa was as much of a royalist as the traditional historiography has claimed.<sup>19</sup> However, more important is that Osorio had seen in him a martyr to be recognized and admired, and that, in a ceremony intended to give Figueroa a proper burial, his ashes had been relocated to Santiago’s Cathedral on 20 February 1815.<sup>20</sup> With these ceremonies Osorio sought to make a clear distinction between the radicalism of some insurgents (some of whom had voted for Figueroa’s execution) and the moderation of the royalists.

However, such actions were sometimes followed by other, less encouraging, decisions. For example, in December 1814 Osorio ordered the coining of silver medals to be given to ‘the heroes who re-conquered Chile’. On one side, the medals depicted the face of Ferdinand VII followed by the phrase ‘*Fernando VII, Rey de las Españas*’. On the other, the chosen phrase was: ‘Santiago re-conquered on 5 October 1814’.<sup>21</sup> According to Timothy Anna, the use of the word ‘re-conquered’ caused discontent among those who did not think that Chile had ever been ‘conquered’ in the first place. Consequently, a group of Chileans ‘requested that the medals distributed among loyalist forces in Chile with the words “Santiago reconquistada” engraved on them should be changed to “Santiago pacificada”, owing to the harmful public reaction to the word “reconquered”’. This claim was seconded by ‘the fiscal of the council of the Indies’, who pointed out ‘that one was not even supposed to use the word “conquered” for American territories restored to legitimate control. The council agreed. The king, however,

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<sup>18</sup> This information comes from AGI, Chile 206.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. the second section of Chapter II of this thesis.

<sup>20</sup> *Gaceta del Gobierno*, 23 February 1815, p. 106.

<sup>21</sup> *Gaceta del Gobierno*, 8 December 1814, p. 37. This information can also be found in AGI, Chile 315.

resolved to the contrary: “Continue with the line it has”, he ordered’.<sup>22</sup>

To commemorate the first anniversary of the battle of Rancagua was not a very clever political decision either, as there were many *santiaguinos* who were related to the émigrés who fled to the other side of the *Cordillera* after the battle. The report sent by Santiago’s post office director, Juan Bautista de Aeta, to his colleagues in the Peninsula gives an idea of this festivity.

On the day of Our Lady of Rosario, we commemorated the victory with which this *Reino* was re-conquered and which the King’s Arms secured in the Town of Rancagua. The function was the best this Capital has ever seen. [...] It has been said that the General Captain gave a feast to the Troop, choosing 6 individuals from the Soldiers’ class, drums and whistles of each detachment, and their respective Chiefs, with whom he had dinner. In the evening there was a magnificent procession whose route was followed by troops on both sides of the street. The *Plaza Mayor* was thoroughly cleaned and cleared, covering the four corners with artillery to make the Salute [*para hacer la Salva*]. The beautiful *Cuerpo del Regimiento de Talavera*, using its new military uniform for the first time, lined up by the side of the Cathedral that faces the east. The *Cuerpo de los Carabineros de Caballería de Abascal* formed in the side of the *Real Audiencia* that faces the south, with their Horses exquisitely dressed and saddled. The richly adorned *Cuerpo de la Concordia de Lima de Cavallería* was assembled near the *baratillos* that face the west.<sup>23</sup>

Osorio’s political mistakes did not end there. One of his first actions was to reward the *Talavera* officers with the same salary that they enjoyed in Lima. Because the salary of the royalist officers in Chile –the majority of whom were American born- was significantly lower than in Peru (i.e. a captain in Chile earned 50 pesos, whereas a *Talavera* captain received 250), Osorio’s measure provoked friction between the *Talaveras* and the Chilean officers of the royalist army. This difference led Barros Arana to interpret Osorio’s decision as a strategy to keep his compatriots content, and also as a way of making clear that he would favour Spanish-born officers whenever possible. Also, the Spanish officers who had traditionally belonged to the Chilean army but who did not form part of the *Talavera* regiment, like Ildefonso Elorreaga and Antonio Quintanilla, ‘were rewarded with other commissions [...] that allowed them to have a higher position than their comrades in arms’.<sup>24</sup>

Why did Osorio do this? Could he not have foreseen the political consequences of these measures? At the end of this chapter it will be argued that this decision confused and alienated especially those who, although not revolutionary, favoured the idea of enjoying partial autonomy. At this point, suffice it to say that his decision to favour the Spanish-born officers

<sup>22</sup> Anna, *Spain and the Loss of America*, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 1983, p. 155.

<sup>23</sup> AGI, Correos 87, Aeta to Señores Directores Generales de la Real Renta de Correos de España y las Indias, 3 October 1815.

<sup>24</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. X, p. 46 (footnote 2).

over the rest of the army was probably influenced by the organization of a revolutionary army on the other side of the *Cordillera* and whose objective was to carry out an attack on royalist Chile. In 1815 José de San Martín's army was not ready to undertake a serious military incursion into Chile; yet the royalists were aware that Mendoza's governor was training his forces to attempt an invasion. As early as November 1814, Osorio declared: 'Chile, or rather its usurper government, used to work in agreement with Buenos Aires. The insurgents trust that the United Provinces will assist them with forces'. According to Osorio, the Chilean émigrés in Mendoza (described by the royalist authorities as 'murderers, thieves, incendiaries, sacrilegious and pirates') were planning to 'increase their troops and military training' in order to invade Chilean territory.<sup>25</sup> So he ordered Chileans to treat the inhabitants of Buenos Aires as 'rebels and enemies of the state', while claiming, however, that this conflict was not 'a war between independent nations'. Giving an international connotation to the war 'was the same as accepting that the subjects achieved a status they did not deserve'.<sup>26</sup> He even claimed that this was a 'civil war' between 'nationals'. What he did not realize was that raising the salaries of the Spanish-born at the expense of the Spanish Americans contradicted Osorio's own aim of preventing the Chileans from seeing the revolution as a conflict between two 'nations'.

Measures like the ones analyzed above were accompanied by investigations of the political behaviour of revolutionaries and moderates who did not escape to Mendoza. Even though in March 1815 Osorio sent colonel Luis Urrejola and the attorney Juan Manuel de Elizalde to Madrid to obtain an acquittal from Ferdinand VII for the insurgents 'who did not act as promoters or leaders [*caudillos*] of the insurrection',<sup>27</sup> during Osorio's time in office the rebels and rebel sympathisers were constantly investigated and prosecuted. This was not new in the Chilean context, as the revolutionaries had followed similar methods prior to the battle of Rancagua (which, according to Guerrero Lira, shows that the royalists were not particularly impolitic or despotic; they were simply following a common practice).<sup>28</sup> Osorio's enemies faced two kinds of trials: the so-called *juicios de infidencia* and the *procesos de vindicación*, the latter being

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<sup>25</sup> AGI, Chile 315, 8 November 1814.

<sup>26</sup> AGI, Chile 315, 8 November 1814.

<sup>27</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. X, p. 151. Urrejola and Elizalde also sought to convince the metropolitan politicians that Osorio should be confirmed as Chile's governor, an aim that, as we will see, they did not achieve.

<sup>28</sup> This is an important clarification, because historians have traditionally assumed that the Chilean royalists were especially despotic, when the truth is that radical measures were common both in the period 1812-1814, and also in the period post 1817. The pursue of 'traitors' and 'anti-patriots' analyzed in chapter II reflects this point clearly. For the pursue of enemies after 1817, see chapter V of this thesis.

instituted to investigate the political conduct of government employees during the revolution. Punishments varied depending on whether the defendant was accused of ‘passive’ or ‘active’ loyalty to the insurgency.

According to Guerrero Lira, ‘it is possible to identify three [not mutually exclusive] levels of behaviour deemed criminal by the authorities. In the first group we find political crimes, which referred to: the obtaining and holding of political positions during the “usurper government” [...]; attempts to disrupt the administrative system; the changing of local authorities [...]; and the inadequate implementation of justice’. On a second level, there were the ‘accusations related to public opinion: to have expressed oneself in favour of the revolution or against the king and the monarchical system; to have prohibited the publication of ideas opposite to the revolution; to have celebrated the victories of the insurgency and, lastly, to have edited, copied, distributed and carried revolutionary papers and periodicals’. Finally, ‘in the third group we find military crimes: to have effectively served in the revolutionary army and contributed to both its provisioning and functioning’.<sup>29</sup>

The radical insurgents who in November 1814 were exiled to the island of Juan Fernández belonged to at least one of the three groups studied by Guerrero Lira.<sup>30</sup> Two of the most important men of letters of the period, Juan Egaña and Manuel de Salas, were amongst those exiled.<sup>31</sup> For the royalists, this group of exiles, together with the émigrés who escaped to Mendoza, were guilty of the negative consequences provoked by the previous administrations. In November 1814, for instance, Osorio told Abascal that he was trying to ‘give form to this amorphous machine’, thus pointing to the political chaos allegedly caused by the revolution.<sup>32</sup> This criticism was backed by many individuals who, like Pedro Díaz de Valdez, thought warfare prejudiced the economic system of the *haciendas* -not just because most *inquilinos* took up arms, but also because governments depended on the *haciendas*’ produce to feed the army. To preserve the belief that the revolution would inevitably make the lives of the Spanish Americans better, Díaz de Valdez argued, was a chimera.<sup>33</sup>

It is worth saying that the authorities based their sentences against the revolutionaries on the old regime’s legal codes (i.e. *Recopilación de Indias* and other *Reales Órdenes*). This decision

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<sup>29</sup> Guerrero Lira, *La contrarrevolución*, p. 158.

<sup>30</sup> Osorio informed Abascal about the expulsion on 14 November 1814. See CDHICH, vol. 35, p. 134.

<sup>31</sup> The complete list in Guerrero Lira, *La contrarrevolución*, pp. 304-308.

<sup>32</sup> AGI, Diversos 3, Osorio to Abascal, November 1814 (without exact date).

<sup>33</sup> AGI, Diversos 3, Díaz de Valdez to Abascal, 27 December 1814.

brought about two consequences: on one hand, it allowed the investigated to face a fair trial. Indeed, investigations were rarely put forward with a spirit of revenge.<sup>34</sup> However, on the other, the re-introduction of old regime's legal codes meant a low blow for those who had voted for the introduction of institutional and juridical changes in the last couple of years. This is an important point, since it shows that the royalists were not willing to accept that changes had been introduced precisely because in 1808 Spain was unable to continue ruling over the Spanish Americans. The authorities, in other words, omitted the fact that the Chilean Junta of 1810 (the installation of which, as we have seen, was not opposed by Abascal) was likely to promote the political and juridical autonomy of the Chileans, and that Ferdinand VII's and Abascal's aim of rolling back time, after five years of revolution, was illusory.

Something similar can be said of the repercussions caused by the introduction in July 1815 of a new taxation system to pay for the expenditures of the royalist army, which the Chileans rejected. Between July and October 1815 Osorio negotiated with the different corporations of the kingdom –Real Audiencia, Cabildo Eclesiástico, Cabildo Secular, Tribunales del Consulado y Minería, and Real Hacienda- the sum of money that the Chileans ought to provide to the state. At first, a *Junta* composed of these corporations decided to charge the inhabitants a monthly sum of 83,000 pesos for one year. In September, however, the *Junta* informed Osorio that, since the insurrection had almost destroyed the Chilean economy, of the 48,500 pesos that the corporations were bound to collect in the capital, only 22,100 had finally reached the royal treasury.<sup>35</sup> Negotiations continued the following weeks, and in the end it was agreed that the '*Pueblos del Reino*' would contribute a monthly sum of 43,174 pesos (i.e. a little more than half of the total originally envisioned).<sup>36</sup> Santiago was the city which benefited the most from this decision, as the authorities collected only 21,074 pesos from its inhabitants.

For the *santiaguinos* this was without doubt an important triumph; Osorio's political position, on the contrary, was certainly weakened by the negotiation. The attitude of the Santiago elites shows that powerful individuals conditioned their support to the tacit promise that their interests would not be harmed by the introduction of new policies and taxes.

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<sup>34</sup> See Guerrero Lira, *La contrarrevolución*, p. 173.

<sup>35</sup> AGI, Correos 87, 20 October 1815.

<sup>36</sup> AGI, Correos 87, Aeta to Señores Directores Generales de la Real Renta de Correos de España y las Indias, 31 October 1815.

Although some people voluntarily donated their money to the royal treasury,<sup>37</sup> the aim of the elites was to enjoy military and administrative stability (which is why they applauded Osorio's entrance to the capital in October 1814), but without spending much of their money in consolidating the new institutional order. Osorio's ambivalence was re-paid with indifference.

Sadly for Osorio, the Chilean's opposition to paying taxes was not the only one he faced at the end of 1815; in fact, viceroy Abascal soon declared him his personal enemy. According to Barros Arana, Abascal reacted against Osorio's plan of presenting himself in Madrid as the true strategist behind the royalist triumph in Rancagua. In his first report on Osorio's entry in Santiago, the viceroy praised the governor's military qualities.<sup>38</sup> Before long, however, Abascal realized that 'Osorio was exaggerating his participation in the triumphs' of the royalist army, and so he 'did not hesitate to present him to the king as a person who became a vain officer after the role he played' in Chile.<sup>39</sup> Bearing in mind that Osorio's agents in Spain (i.e. Urrejola and Elizalde) were unable to obtain his confirmation as Chile's governor from the metropolitan authorities, it seems it was Abascal's offensive against Osorio that decided the latter's immediate fate. Indeed, it appears that the decision to substitute the Spanish general with Francisco Marcó del Pont was based on Abascal's personal view about Osorio. This is even more probable considering that the decision to depose him was possibly taken in Madrid at a date as early as June 1815, that is, no more than twenty days after Abascal's last report arrived in the metropolis.<sup>40</sup> Osorio, in any case, learnt about his removal only on 25 November 1815; a month later, Marcó arrived in the capital, where he was received '*con muchas aclamaciones de viva el Rey*'.<sup>41</sup> It was the end of Osorio's government, although not the last opportunity he had to lead the royalist counterrevolution in Chile.

## II. FRANCISCO MARCÓ DEL PONT: ALIENATING INTERNAL INHABITANTS, FACING AN EXTERNAL THREAT

Historians have generally argued that Marcó del Pont's government was, in comparison to Osorio's, much more authoritarian, and that the main reason for this resides in Marcó's

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<sup>37</sup> For example, in August 1815 a group of Coquimbo's inhabitants gave the authorities 1,110 pesos. See *Gaceta del Gobierno*, 13 August 1815, p. 231.

<sup>38</sup> This report can be found in Rodríguez and Calderón, *Memoria de gobierno del Virrey Abascal*, pp. 187-188.

<sup>39</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. X, pp. 80-81.

<sup>40</sup> The report arrived in Madrid on 22 May 1815. *Ibidem*, p. 154, footnote 7.

<sup>41</sup> AGI, Diversos 4, Marcó to Abascal, 19 December 1815. Marcó assumed power on 26 December 1815.

‘arrogant’ personality.<sup>42</sup> From Marcó’s correspondence with both his subordinates in Chile and the ministers in the Peninsula, it can be inferred that the new governor had, in fact, a strong and authoritarian personality.<sup>43</sup> But it is also clear that the personal characters of both Spanish governors do not explain by themselves the complexity of their administrations. It is difficult to explain Osorio’s ambivalence *vis-à-vis* the Chileans on the grounds that he had an indecisive character. It is also risky to claim that Marcó’s alleged ‘despotism’ was based on his personality. Much safer than using psychological explanations is to study the political context faced by the two governors during their respective times in office. In the case of Marcó, his political performance is to be understood in the light of the complicated context of warfare he encountered in Chile. Indeed, he assumed office facing an increasingly dangerous external threat, which compelled him to organize an elaborate security system.<sup>44</sup> He, however, shared an important characteristic with Osorio: like his predecessor, he committed mistakes that alienated those who could have become his allies. We saw that Osorio’s method of investigation of the political conduct of the enemy was similar to that employed by the revolutionaries prior to 1814. Marcó’s, meanwhile, were equally extreme as those introduced by the revolutionaries. But, because Marcó knew that radical measures were unpopular among the elites (Osorio’s failure to charge the elites with new taxes had once again shown that the ruling classes were hardly willing to spend their economic capital to finance any of the two sides), eventually his relationship with the local inhabitants became even more tense than Carrera’s and Osorio’s.

In his third week in Chile, Marcó published a *Bando* (without asking the authorities of either the metropolis or Lima)<sup>45</sup> stating that any person caught attempting to recruit royalist soldiers to join the insurgency would be executed and his properties confiscated.<sup>46</sup> Five days

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<sup>42</sup> For the idea that the royalists, especially Marcó del Ponto, were vindictive, impolitic and despotic, see Amunáteguis, *La Reconquista española*, chapters II and III; Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. X, chapters I, V-VI; Encina, *Historia de Chile*, vol. VII, chapter XXIV; Collier, *Ideas and politics*, p. 120, 225; Jocelyn-Holt, *La independencia*, p. 164. Cf. Guerrero Lira, *La contrarrevolución*, pp. 187-212.

<sup>43</sup> A few clues about Marcó’s arrogant personality can be found in his correspondence with Abascal, in which he not only condemned his predecessor –Mariano Osorio– but also exaggerated his own political credentials. An example of his criticism towards Osorio is: ‘I have been reassured by very intelligent and sensible people, and it has been confirmed by experience, that if I had delayed my arrival here the *Reyno* would have been in imminent danger of being lost due to the indifference and apathy of my predecessor [Osorio], and the venality of his family and other confidants’, in AGI, Diversos 4, Marcó to Abascal, 20 January 1816.

<sup>44</sup> Guerrero Lira, *La contrarrevolución*, pp. 199-212.

<sup>45</sup> The metropolitan politicians criticized the governor’s for being an ‘illegal, impolitic and absurd’ document. See AGI, Estado 85, N. 64, 28 August 1816.

<sup>46</sup> AGI, Estado 85, N. 63, 12 January 1816.

later, Marcó ordered the organization of a Tribunal de Vigilancia y Seguridad Pública. The responsibilities of the Tribunal de Vigilancia were defined in 36 articles, all of which reaffirmed the important political role entrusted to military officers by the authorities. The Tribunal's president, for instance, had to be 'of military status' (on this occasion, the *Talavera* captain Vicente San Bruno was elected president). Another purpose of the Tribunal was to convince the Chileans who had abandoned the capital to return to the city. Marcó feared that they might give shelter to 'unknown people' on their *haciendas*. The remainder of the articles refer to the internal administration of the Tribunal, numbers 33 and 35 being worth mentioning: while the former ordered the creation of sub-committees throughout the kingdom to support the work of the central Tribunal, the latter stressed that 'every sensible man should know that the dispositions of this *Reglamento* are designed to safeguard the good people; the correction and punishment of the wicked is only its second objective'.<sup>47</sup> Further events would show that for 'wicked' Marcó meant not just revolutionaries but also moderate autonomists, that is, the same who had rejoiced when Osorio entered Santiago and applauded Marcó's appointment in December 1815.

The creation of the Tribunal de Vigilancia was followed in April 1816 by the publication of a *Reglamento de Policía*, in which the authorities assigned the *Alcaldes de Barrio* the responsibility of informing the state about the political and military behaviour of the inhabitants. The *Alcaldes* were asked to obtain reports from ordinary people (such as coffee house owners) that could be used later by the *Teniente de Policía* to denounce the government's enemies.<sup>48</sup> The royalist police was created to persecute the internal foes of the regime, many of whom, although moderates, had strong family connections with the revolutionaries who either escaped to Mendoza or were exiled to Juan Fernández. For a Spanish military officer like Marcó, whose links with Chile's prominent families were scant (not because Chileans in 1816 repudiated Spaniards, but because his short time in the country had prevented him from building a solid relationship with the local population), family connections were the most powerful weapon the revolutionaries had.

They were so powerful that even the conservative *oidores* of the Real Audiencia were, in the view of Marcó, putting aside their loyalty to the king to protect their revolutionary

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<sup>47</sup> AGI, Correos 87, 17 January 1816.

<sup>48</sup> The copy I have found of this *Reglamento* was sent by Marcó del Pont to Abascal and is located in AGI, Diversos 4. Although Abascal resigned his post of Viceroy in early 1816 and returned to Spain, Marcó kept writing to him throughout that year.

relatives. It is not clear whether Marcó's apprehensions were correct. What is clear is that, instead of reinforcing his government, his quarrels with the Real Audiencia affected both his popularity and the very basis of his administration. In a phrase that echoes the criticism directed by Francisco García Carrasco in 1810 against the members of the Real Audiencia,<sup>49</sup> Marcó claimed that at least four *oidores* were linked to the revolutionaries: *decano* Concha's daughter was married to an insurgent; *decano* Aldunate was considered a revolutionary; *decano* Bazo was 'married in the country'; and *decano* Caspe, 'who is the one who dominates them all, has a sordid and evil conduct'. In short, 'they are all related and colluded. I completely distrust them and, because of that, I have asked His Majesty to remove them to other *Audiencias* and provide this one with literate ministers of notorious probity'.<sup>50</sup>

Family connections between *decanos* from the Real Audiencia and the revolutionaries was one of the reasons why Marcó hesitated to implement the pardon in Chile that Osorio's emissaries requested from the monarchy and which included both the moderate insurgents who did not escape to Mendoza and the radicals who were exiled to Juan Fernández. In July 1816, the governor told Abascal that if the Juan Fernández 'villains' [*bribones*] were allowed to return to their homes they would 'never stop intriguing and plotting with their allies of Buenos Aires in order to re-introduce the civil war'.<sup>51</sup> Thus, when the *Real Cédula* announcing the pardon arrived in Chile in September 1816, Marcó refused to put it into effect, stressing that the 'fugitives' in Mendoza should not be included among the beneficiaries.<sup>52</sup> Five days later, the governor reported that he was ready to 'pursue the unruliest insurgents [who still lived in Chile], imposing such taxes on their properties that will be equal to a formal confiscation'.<sup>53</sup>

Marcó reasserted his position at the end of October, when he tried to convince politicians in Spain that the king's pardon would inevitably bring negative consequences to the country. Claiming that Osorio's agents in the Peninsula had deceived Ferdinand VII with arguments that underestimated the effects of the revolution, Marcó wrote a long report attacking the insurgents. First, he enumerated those events most incriminating to the revolutionaries: the publication of José Miguel Carrera's *Reglamento Constitucional* in 1812; the instructions given by the 1813 Junta to the Chilean delegate to London, Francisco Antonio

<sup>49</sup> Cf. footnote 23 of chapter II of this thesis.

<sup>50</sup> AGI, Diversos 4, Marcó to Abascal, 19 July 1816.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>52</sup> CDHCh, vol. 35, pp. 163-165.

<sup>53</sup> AGI, Diversos 4, Marcó to Abascal, 10 September 1816.

Pinto;<sup>54</sup> the acceptance of foreign consuls in the country; the recognition of the United States of 'Chile's independence';<sup>55</sup> and the 'embracing confederation with Buenos Aires and the so-called *Estados Soberanos del Río de la Plata*'. These events would not have been so reprehensible had they not been accompanied by three factors that, in Marcó's opinion, made the revolutionaries in Chile much more dangerous than the metropolitan ministers believed: their family ramifications, their wealth and their immense *haciendas*:

Their family ramifications, wealth, [...] and large *Haciendas de Campo*, in which they sometimes behave similarly to Lords [*Señores*] with servants [*Colonos*], make them powerful and fearsome. They have the power to use their peasants for any plot, as they did it against governor Francisco Antonio García Carrasco when, backed by the *Real Audiencia*, they threatened him with ten thousand men if he did not leave power. There are other *Letrados* who support the Popular and Republican system who have set up Plans and encouraged the revolution. Neither group escaped [to Mendoza] because they could not transport their *Haciendas* and families with them.

This was not all: according to Marcó, many revolutionaries who escaped to Mendoza after the battle of Rancagua were allowed to return to Chile by his predecessor and enjoy a peaceful life in the capital. Yet, 'abusing Osorio's trust', Marcó continued, the insurgents devoted themselves to gathering information about Chile's political, economic and military situation that San Martín could use when invading the kingdom. In other words, they worked as 'spies of the rebels of Buenos Aires', and behaved as 'leaders of independence' [*corifeos de independencia*]. In his view, the revolutionaries in Chile

Are few but unruly, smart, arrogant, rich and have connections in the whole *Reyno*. [...] This is why I think these subjects should be expelled from [South] America; it is more fair and reasonable that they feel the pressure to leave their Country, than a *Reino* as beautiful as Chile either falls back into anarchy or never frees itself from concerns and shocks [*sobresaltos*].<sup>56</sup>

From these types of documents, it is safe to argue that for Marcó there were only two political groups in Chile: recalcitrant royalists and outright revolutionaries. Yet people like the *oidores* fit in none of these poles; they, in fact, belonged to the increasingly numerous group of moderate autonomists who, although they criticized the revolution, were ready to accept the

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<sup>54</sup> I have analyzed Pinto's diplomatic mission in Juan Luis Ossa Santa Cruz, 'Francisco Antonio Pinto en los albores de la República, 1785-1828', Tesis para optar al grado de Licenciado en Historia, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago, 2006, chapter II.

<sup>55</sup> This was part of Marcó's imagination. Neither the Chilean revolutionaries had declared independence, nor had the US government made formal recognition of Chile's revolution. I shall return to this subject in chapter VII.

<sup>56</sup> AGI, Chile 208, Marcó del Pont to Secretario de Estado y del Despacho Universal de Gracia y Justicia, 30 October 1816.

pardon granted by the king to the exiles of Juan Fernández and the moderate insurgents who did not escape to Mendoza. Marcó accused some of the *letrados* of supporting the ‘Popular and Republican system’, but there is not proof that in 1816 the *oidores* had aimed to break all the links with the metropolis (it is likely that they had sought to enjoy some degree of self government within the empire). Marcó’s hesitation to implement such a pardon was, therefore, a mistake he could have easily avoided if he would have been less dogmatic and more pragmatic in the internal terrain.

The external terrain was a complete different matter. Marcó faced a much more complicated external scenario than Osorio; it was outside of Chile –in the River Plate, to be more precise- where the bulk of revolutionaries was settled, and so whatever decision to stop them from invading Chile seemed reasonable. On 19 January 1816, Marcó wrote to Spain that rumours had reached the capital of a powerful fleet, captained by American and French sailors, that was being prepared in the River Plate with the purpose of backing up San Martín’s army. If the authorities did not act promptly, Chile would be seized by a combination of foreign forces.<sup>57</sup> Such a combination of forces could only be stopped with the help of external troops. Chances of being aided by Spanish forces had vanished in early 1815 when the metropolis decided to send Pablo Morillo’s army not to its ‘original destination, the Río de la Plata’, but to Venezuela, considered ‘the focal point of revolution and counterrevolution’.<sup>58</sup> This is why, Marcó wrote Abascal that the new Peruvian viceroy, Joaquín de la Pezuela, had the moral obligation to help the Chilean royalists with arms and troops.<sup>59</sup>

But Marcó could not sit around waiting for that aid to arrive, and so he confronted San Martín’s threat with his own means, tackling three defensive issues: first, he improved and strengthened Chile’s royalist army, not just reforming the military but also collecting weapons throughout the kingdom. Second, he introduced a system to gauge how committed his officers and rank-and-file soldiers were to the royalist cause. Third, he negotiated with the indigenous communities of the south of the country to get their support should the insurgents invade Chile.

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<sup>57</sup> MI, vol. 26, pp. 63v-65, Marcó to Secretario de Estado y del Despacho Universal de Indias, 19 January 1816.

<sup>58</sup> John Lynch, *Simón Bolívar. A life*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2006, p. 91. See also Inés Quintero, *El sucesor de Bolívar. Biografía política de Antonio José de Sucre*, Bid & Co. Editor, Caracas, 2006, pp. 42-43. In December 1815 there were still Chilean royalists who believed that Morillo’s expedition would be sent not to Venezuela but to the River Plate. See AGI, Diversos 4, Diego Antonio Obispo de Concepción to Abascal, 20 December 1815.

<sup>59</sup> MI, vol. 26, pp. 62-62v, Marcó to Secretario de Estado y del Despacho Universal de Indias, 4 January 1816.

Marcó's first military objective was to give his army an administration as centralized as possible, for which reason he ordered his subordinates to carry out a thorough review of the royalist detachments, their weapons, clothing and equipment. Marcó based many of his decisions on the military regulations established in the *Ordenanzas* of 1768, stressing the importance of collecting the *Hojas de Servicios* of soldiers and officers in the manner ordered by title 8, treaty 3 of the *Ordenanzas*.<sup>60</sup> This was something that Osorio had also done.<sup>61</sup> There was, however, a marked difference between the two governors: whereas Osorio improved the discipline of the militias, Marcó preferred to reinforce the regular army. According to Marcó, excepting the *Talaveras*, the rest of the troops were 'abandoned', their officers being 'hated by their own troops'.<sup>62</sup> This was a criticism directed not only at the officers of the royalist army who had built a solid relationship with the Chileans (e.g. Rafael Maroto), but also at Osorio and his alleged incapacity to maintain discipline.<sup>63</sup>

Another difference between Osorio and Marcó was that the latter tended to concentrate his forces in Santiago at the expense of other provinces. At the beginning of his administration, it is true, Marcó gave the provincial troops some autonomy; thus, the troops quartered in Aconcagua and Los Andes were placed under the supervision of colonel Ildefonso Elorreaga.<sup>64</sup> However, a couple of weeks later the governor's plan of fortifying the principal *villas* of the Central Valley was scuttled in favour of concentrating the royalist forces in the capital. In letters of 16 and 18 July, Marcó ordered that the *Escuadrones de Dragones* of both Concepción and Coquimbo be 'brought in this capital to get disciplined and prepared for the next campaign'.<sup>65</sup> Similarly, in March of that year he ordered the building of a fortress in the *Cerro Santa Lucía*, whose strategic location in the heart of Santiago made it the royalist army's principal headquarters in the kingdom.<sup>66</sup>

But while the majority of the royalist forces assembled in Santiago, weapons to arm them had to be collected throughout the kingdom. Marcó knew that the defence of Santiago

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<sup>60</sup> MI, vol. 26, pp. 195-195v, Marcó to Commandants of the royalist army, 27 February 1816.

<sup>61</sup> For Osorio's use of the *Ordenanzas* and the *Reglamento de Cuba*, see MI, vol. 26, p. 115, Osorio to Quintanilla, 18 August 1815; and AGI, Chile 207, p. 373, Osorio to Secretario de Estado, 30 November 1815, respectively.

<sup>62</sup> AGI Diversos 4, Marcó to Abascal, 15 April 1816.

<sup>63</sup> See AGI, Diversos 4, Marcó to Abascal, 22 October 1816.

<sup>64</sup> MI, vol. 26, pp. 176-176v, Marcó to Elorreaga, 7 February 1816.

<sup>65</sup> MI, vol. 26, pp. 246-246v, Marcó to Concepción's intendant, 16 July 1816; MI, vol. 26, p. 247-247v, Marcó to commandant of Coquimbo, 18 July 1816.

<sup>66</sup> CG, vol. 1048, pp. 278-279v, Marcó to Ministros Generales de Estado y Real Hacienda, March 1, 1816. Lists with the names of the individuals who donated money to build this fortress appear in *Gaceta del Gobierno*, 23 February 1816, p. 79; *Gaceta del Gobierno*, 1 March 1816, p. 84; *Gaceta del Gobierno*, 5 March 1816, p. 86; *Gaceta del Gobierno*, 8 March 1816, pp. 88-89; *Gaceta del Gobierno*, 12 March 1816, p. 91.

was dependent on the support that the provinces could provide to the central government. This is made clear in the second part of the *Bando* of 12 January 1816, where the authorities demanded that all Chileans deliver their weapons to captain Vicente San Bruno and his officers. Punishments against those who did not obey this order were severe, the death penalty included.<sup>67</sup> In his *Historia General*, Barros Arana argued that Marcó's need of weapons was inspired by the 'arbitrariness' that Ferdinand VII's return to power inflicted on Spain and her colonies.<sup>68</sup> Barros Arana's impression is not incorrect, but it misses a relevant point: royalists and revolutionaries followed a similar strategy when collecting their weapons.

Indeed, Marcó's letter to Concepción's intendant in March 1816, instructing him to investigate why the troops of his city were so short of bayonets, could easily have been written by either José Miguel Carrera or one of his agents two years before.<sup>69</sup> And the truth is that other policies introduced by Marcó echoed those implemented before by the revolutionaries. Like their enemies, the royalists faced the important problem of convincing their men that their political project was viable and to be trusted. In so doing, they had to inculcate loyalty amongst their men, especially among the *hacendados* and officers who were in charge of training the *inquilinos* who formed the majority of the rank-and-file soldiers. Understanding the value of having the support of the *hacendados*, Marcó on 8 February 1816 entrusted the *inquilinos* of the *Marqués de Casa Larraín* with the mission of patrolling the river Cachapoal. The governor's aim was to persuade Larraín to 'assist with weapons when necessary', assuming that the men who would be in the first line of defence would be his workers.<sup>70</sup> Thus, like Carrera before him, Marcó gave some *hacendados* responsibility for building the army. This was a clever play to identify where the country's most powerful men stood in political terms.

From Marcó's official and private correspondence, it is clear that the governor believed that the loyalty of the soldiers and officers of the royalist army ought to be constantly tested. For example, one of the tasks of the captains of the body of Dragoons was to 'carefully examine the devotion of his men to the king', since the 'love of the royal service is to be considered the first element when approving their military posts'.<sup>71</sup> It appears that there were

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<sup>67</sup> AGI, Estado 85, N. 63, 12 January 1816.

<sup>68</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. X, p. 165.

<sup>69</sup> MI, vol. 26, pp. 207-207v, Marcó to Concepción's intendant, 19 March 1816. This letter can be confronted with the piece of news published in *El Monitor Araucano*, vol. II, number 64, 25 July 1814 (i.e. two days later Carrera's last *coup d'état*).

<sup>70</sup> MI, vol. 26, pp. 182-182v, Marcó to Juan Francisco Sánchez, 8 February 1816.

<sup>71</sup> MI, vol. 26, pp. 186v, Marcó to commander of the body of Dragoons, 8 February 1816.

officers who, in Marcó's view, did not meet the basic requirements of loyalty needed to be an essential part of the royalist army. On 19 July, Marcó told Abascal that 'he did not trust the local troops much', stressing that it was better for the defence of the kingdom to rely on Spanish rather than Spanish American soldiers.<sup>72</sup> Marcó, in other words, thought that the political behaviour of his men was influenced by their place of birth.

Marcó's division of Chilean society into Spanish and Spanish Americans was not, however, new in the context of the revolution. We will see that San Martín's 'American' strategy in the period 1815-1817 was accompanied by a marked anti-Spanish sentiment. Osorio used a similar argument, although from the opposite side: he favoured Spanish-born officers at the expense of Chileans, especially in economic terms.<sup>73</sup> The problem with this division is that it overlooked the fact that both armies were mainly formed by people whose connections with the country were profound (either through birth or tradition). There were, of course, Spanish-born leaders like Osorio, Marcó and the *Talavera* officers who were not strongly attached to Chile. Yet their cases were extraordinary, and so the *peninsulares* hardly represented the majority that Osorio and Marcó hoped for. Nor did Spanish-born people in Spanish America necessarily supported the royalists, as San Martín argued.

Moreover, the differentiation between 'Chileans' and 'Spanish' left out a large segment of the population: the Indian communities. Where did the indigenous people fit in this division? How relevant for both royalists and revolutionaries was their military help? In future chapters we will see that, in general, the Indians backed the royalist army in its struggle against the revolutionaries in the south of the country. They seemed to have been sceptical about changing an authority they knew and respected –the king- for another –the revolutionary- whose political project was still unclear to them. The royalists, in turn, were aware of the importance of this aid, even though they never explicitly recognized the Indians as equal subjects of the Spanish king. Marcó sought to use the military forces of the Indians but without stipulating the role they would play in the new political scenario opened by the dissolution of the monarchy in 1808. It is not surprising, therefore, that the royalists never clearly defined in which category the Indians should be placed: obviously, they were not Spanish-born, but neither were they regarded as creoles. This ambivalence would never be

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<sup>72</sup> AGI, Diversos 4, Marcó to Abascal, 19 July 1816.

<sup>73</sup> Cf. with footnote 24 of this chapter.

seriously addressed by either the royalists or the revolutionaries.<sup>74</sup>

Considering the resistance of the royalists to clarify the situation of the Indians, why did the latter support the king's army? A simplistic answer would be that the Indians were forced by the royalists to fight on behalf of the king. However, the decision to assist the royalist army was much more voluntary and considered than that. In fact, the Indians negotiated their alliance with the monarchists, especially in the months preceding San Martín's invasion, when Marcó understood that it was advisable to create an alliance against the revolutionaries rather than draft Indian troops against their will. Marcó's eagerness to secure the aid of the Indians became clear soon after he took office. At that time, the governor started planning a strategy to confront one of the few Indian communities that supported the insurgents and which was headed by an Indian called Venancio. Although Venancio was an exception among the Indians of the south of the country, it was too dangerous to allow him to spread his rebellious ideas to the rest of the communities.<sup>75</sup>

Along with Concepción's intendant, Marcó organized 'a defensive and offensive confederation with the *Junta de Caciques de los Llanos* to annihilate the rebel [Venancio]'. The purpose of the governor was not so much to force as to convince the Indians to assist him militarily. To this end, it was advisable to 'give the most powerful *caciques* special treatment and entertain them with gifts. Thus, we will ensure that they are the ones who hand Venancio's head over to us'. If the *caciques* wanted to parley with the authorities, then the intendant should 'provide them with passports and the accustomed aid' to travel towards the capital.<sup>76</sup> A couple of weeks later, Marcó ordered Curico's military commander to follow a similar method with the *Pebuenche*: any reliable information that these Indians could provide about San Martín and his army should be generously rewarded.<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>74</sup> In February 1819, the revolutionary government, at the time led by Bernardo O'Higgins, stated that from then on Indians should be called 'Chilean citizens and have equal voice and representation as any other inhabitant of the *Estado*, concurring by themselves to celebrate contracts, defend their cases, marry, trade, choose the arts to which they feel inclined, and exercise *las carreras de las letras y de las armas* in order to obtain the political and military position that correspond to their capacities'. However, this declaration of principles was rarely respected in practice (at least during the first half of the nineteenth century). In ABO, vol. 19, pp. 109-110, 13 February 1819.

<sup>75</sup> The Mapuche Indians were divided into four *Butalmapus* or confederations that covered the Araucanian region: those settled near the Pacific Ocean were known as *costinos*; those in the so-called *Depresión Intermedia* as *llanistas*; those in the foothills of The Andes as *builiches*; and those in the higher zones of the *Cordillera* as *pebuenches*. Chapter V will explain in more depth which Indian communities supported the revolutionaries and which the royalists in the period recognized as the *Guerra a Muerte* (1818-1822). Here, enough is to say that Venancio belonged to the *llanistas*. See Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna, *La Guerra a Muerte*, Editorial Francisco de Aguirre, Santiago, 1972, pp. 121-123.

<sup>76</sup> MI, vol. 26, pp. 158v-159, Marcó to Concepción's intendant, 4 January 1816.

<sup>77</sup> MI, vol. 26, p. 171v, Marcó to Curico's military commander, 23 January 1816.

The Franciscan priest and future chronicler of the revolution, Melchor Martínez, shared Marcó's approach to the Indian issue.<sup>78</sup> Martínez was one of the most active civil agents in Indian territory and, consequently, one of the people who best knew the behaviour of the Indians. The close relationship that Martínez built with the Indians prompted Marcó to appoint him his representative in the Araucanian region. Martínez's mission was to 'ensure the adherence of the Indians of our frontier and also to attract those of Mendoza', for which it was better to use persuasion rather than coercion. In a letter to both the military commanders and *subdelegados* of the Central Valley, Marcó explained his strategy:

The choice of good emissaries must be based on wisdom and personal knowledge. We need to pull the strings with secrecy and appropriate precautions, giving gifts to the most influential *Caciques* and Indians in their *Ayllereguas* [...]: Fr. Melchor Martinez, who is loved by the Indians, knows their territory well and is prudent, will from now on be in charge of this mission.<sup>79</sup>

Martínez's first report on the situation of the Indians was dated 19 November 1816, and was based on the declaration given to the Franciscan by an individual called Rudecindo González. González's aim was to collect firsthand information from the Indians and, thus, act as an intermediary between Martínez and the principal *caciques*. It was thanks to the research conducted by González near Talca that Martínez learned that a group of thirty people had recently crossed the *Cordillera* from Mendoza, their purpose being to 'assist the robber [*salteador*] Neira with four loads of rifles' (Neira's was a guerrilla officer who in recent years had grown close to Manuel Rodríguez, who was regarded by the royalist authorities as one of the most dangerous insurgents operating in Chile). According to González's informants, San Martín's army was consisted of 8,000 men, many of whom were blacks, and that its plan was to start crossing the Andes in late December 1816.<sup>80</sup> Of these pieces of information, only the first was exaggerated or inaccurate: when in January 1817 San Martín began to cross the

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<sup>78</sup> According to Valenzuela, 'Los franciscanos de Chillán y la independencia: avatares de una comunidad monarquista', in *Historia*, number 38, vol. I, Santiago, June, 2005, pp. 140-141, 'the Seraphic presence in the [Araucanian] zone was critical in maintaining loyalty amongst the *Mapuche* and the *Pebuenche* after the outbreak of the war in 1813'. To reaffirm this, Valenzuela quotes Melchor Martínez, *Memoria Histórica sobre la revolución de Chile desde el cautiverio de Fernando VII hasta 1814*, Ediciones de la Biblioteca Nacional, Santiago, 1964, II, pp. 112-113: '[we need] to preserve the natural adherence to the just cause of the king, and prevent them from supporting the revolutionary system [...]. If Indians take sides for the insurgent party, the total loss of Chile might be irremediable'.

<sup>79</sup> MI, vol. 26, pp. 269v-270, Marcó to military commanders of San Fernando, Curicó and Talca, 22 October 1816.

<sup>80</sup> Martínez's report can be found in MG, vol. 13, pp. 14-15.

*Cordillera*, the Army of the Andes mustered only 4,000 men, amongst whom slaves and other black people reached one third of the total (more of this in the next chapter).

In late 1816, therefore, Marcó's government was more or less aware of San Martín's plan. Gone were the days when the royalists thought it was possible to undertake an attack on the River Plate. In 1816, the enemies of the monarchists became more numerous and powerful; in the case of the Indians, the royalists were incapable of preventing Venancio from conducting new attacks.<sup>81</sup> Marcó's army was insufficient to tackle the defence of the territory properly, as a number of communications between Marcó and the military chiefs of the Central Valley show.<sup>82</sup> However, in spite of the weakness of his army, the governor refused to negotiate with the insurgents. In fact, Marcó destroyed all chances of coming to terms with the revolutionaries on 13 December, when he repudiated an envoy sent by San Martín. Claiming that it was unacceptable to negotiate with a delegate of a state that had recently declared itself independent from Spain (the independence of the United Provinces of the River Plate had been signed on 9 July 1816 in Tucumán), Marcó replied to San Martín that his men were ready to defend the king's rights on the battlefield.<sup>83</sup>

By sending a delegate to parley with Marcó, San Martín was not seeking to negotiate with the royalists but to acquire an accurate idea of the paths of the *Cordillera* that his army could use.<sup>84</sup> It is hard to know exactly the type of information San Martín's delegate gathered during his stay in Chile. What it is clear is that at the beginning of February 1817 (that is, a few days before the battle of Chacabuco) Marcó was still unable to set up a proper defensive plan, the capital being the only city relatively well garrisoned. As he himself told the Spanish government on 4 February, the vastness of the territory was his main enemy. He did not have enough men or resources to garrison all the *cordillerano* paths that ran from Copiapo to the Araucanian region. Thus, Marcó explained, the bulk of the army had been stationed between Maule and Aconcagua, and Concepción's and Coquimbo's inhabitants had to prepare the defence of their city with their own means.

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<sup>81</sup> On 26 December 1816, Marcó told Concepción's intendant that he had heard that a priest from Valdivia, Pedro José Eleizeguí [?], had joined Venancio's forces. See MI, vol. 26, p. 287. On 20 January, Marcó wrote to the same intendant that Venancio had surrendered his forces to the royalists, but only four days later he showed himself surprised that the Indian chief had, once again, risen up against his government. See MI, vol. 26, pp. 259v-260; and MI, vol. 26, pp. 294-294v.

<sup>82</sup> MI, vol. 26, p. 272v, Marcó to José Pérez, 1 November 1816; MI, vol. 26, pp. 273v-274, Marcó to Juan Francisco Sánchez, 13 November 1816; MI, vol. 26, p. 280, Marcó to Coquimbo's commander, 7 December 1816.

<sup>83</sup> MG, vol. 13, p. 24, Marcó to San Martín, 13 December 1816.

<sup>84</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. X, pp. 292-296. See also Lynch, *San Martín*, p. 90.

At the end of his letter, Marcó moderated his pessimism, reporting that a royalist expeditionary force had emerged victorious after a small engagement with the revolutionaries in Uspallata.<sup>85</sup> However, in comparison to San Martín's army, Marcó's troops were too untrained and too few to face the insurgents. Also, if Marcó had once believed that the local elites would support him in case of an invasion, such a possibility was now gone. He had done what he could to form a decent army to face San Martín, although he had erroneously estranged the Chileans from his political project. San Martín's easy triumph in Chacabuco (not far from Santiago) would show how little committed the Chileans really were to Marcó's strategy.

### III. WAS IT POSSIBLE TO RE-CONQUER CHILE?

The next chapter will analyze the build up of the Army of the Andes in Mendoza, the battle of Chacabuco of 12 February 1817, and the tactical reasons behind the royalist defeat. Here, I would like to offer a few answers to a simple yet important question that refers not so much to military as to political factors: why did the royalists fail? One of the main hypothesis of this chapter is that the counterrevolutionary option (as it was designed in Madrid) failed because it did not acknowledge the political changes that, for good or ill, had been introduced in Chile since 1810. Also, it failed because both Osorio and Marcó did not consider the fact that royalists with a long experience of Chile shared with outright revolutionaries the impression that the Chilean elites should enjoy the same rights as the peninsular elites (both economically and politically). There were recalcitrant royalists, like archbishop José Santiago Rodríguez Zorrilla and Pedro Díaz de Valdez, whose loyalty to the king was unquestionable. Nonetheless, there were also royalists who did not look badly at the idea of strengthening some of the political privileges that Chileans had achieved since the breakdown of the monarchy in 1808, as the case of the *oidores* of the Real Audiencia proves. In other words, people like the *oidores* had, after six years of revolution, become moderate autonomists.<sup>86</sup>

Where on the political spectrum do these moderate autonomists fit? In his book on the fall of the royal government in Mexico City, Timothy Anna presents some ideas that might be

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<sup>85</sup> MI, vol. 26, pp. 27-28 Marcó to Secretario de Estado y del Despacho Universal de la Guerra, 4 February 1817.

<sup>86</sup> This shows a clear difference with García Carrasco's case, as in 1810 the *oidores* were still far from becoming autonomists. In 1810, they saw themselves as the best guarantors of imperial sovereignty.

helpful when studying why the counterrevolutionary project in Chile collapsed, and the role played by people who were moderates in its fall. According to Anna, the concepts ‘legitimacy’ and ‘authority’ explain the principal characteristics of the crisis faced by the Mexican royalists in the period 1816-1821, a crisis that led a royalist-turned-revolutionary –Agustín de Iturbide– to seize the Mexican government. Anna proposes that the ‘Spanish imperial government lost its authority in about 1816 –as result of events of the eight preceding years–. This fact did not become manifest until 1821 because, before the appearance of Iturbide on the scene, there was no one in whom, or no idea upon which, the nation could vest authority. *Authority*, as used in this study [Anna’s], is thus similar to the more widely recognized term *legitimacy* but is somewhat broader’. Quoting Carl J. Friedrich, Anna argues that ‘authority is not “legitimate power” as is often claimed, for legitimate power may be without authority, a situation which arises in the approach to a revolution’. ‘Authority’, continues Anna, is given by the community, ‘albeit unconsciously, to the state or the regime. It is the right to possess sovereignty, the right to govern. It is thus based upon the ability of the established authority to prove to the governed its right to continue governing them’. In this sense, ‘it is essential to distinguish between authority and legitimacy in the case of the Mexican example because the royal regime remained the only legitimate regime for some years after it ceased to possess authority’ [1816].<sup>87</sup>

It could be said that, in Chile, the metropolis lost its ‘authority’ in 1810, but that the ‘legitimacy’ of the captive king lasted for several more years. When Osorio tried to re-implement the ‘authority’ of the royal regime, he found that the Chilean elites were slowly abandoning the idea that the Spanish absolutism had the ‘legitimate’ right to represent their interests. The insistence of the *santiaguinos* on reducing the taxes extracted by Osorio from the corporations of the capital shows the tenuous yet effective detachment of the Chileans *vis-à-vis* the monarchist government. However, the same elites were aware that the revolutionary government prior to 1814 was not ‘legitimate’ either. This means that in addition to an armed conflict, Pareja’s invasion in 1813 provoked a vacuum of ‘legitimacy’ and political ‘authority’. It is argued, therefore, that it was only after the triumph of O’Higgins and San Martín in 1817 that both ‘authority’ and ‘legitimacy’ again worked in concert. The difference between the counterrevolutionary government and the O’Higgins administration was that, at least in theory, San Martín and O’Higgins’ political programme was, like Iturbide’s *Plan de Iguala* in Mexico, politically more acceptable to the elites than both the programme of the revolutionaries before

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<sup>87</sup> Anna, *The fall of the royal government in Mexico City*, p. XIV.

1814 and the programme of the counterrevolutionary administrations.<sup>88</sup> This is not to say that O'Higgins was immediately backed by the moderate royalists. In fact, as we will see in later chapters, more than once O'Higgins had to use force to repel his enemies in both Santiago and the south of the country. But, in comparison to Osorio and Marcó, O'Higgins managed to gain the confidence of the majority of the inhabitants of the Central Valley and create an effective political regime.

In short, Osorio and Marcó del Pont failed to maintain the support of the Chilean elites because the absolutist return of Ferdinand VII in 1814 clashed with the rights that the Spanish Americans had achieved in recent years. Even some of the most conservative allies of the king (e.g. the *oidores* of the Real Audiencia) criticized the idea of 'turning the clock back', that is, of removing once and for all the achievements of the creoles in matters of self-governance.<sup>89</sup> The establishment of a constitutional monarchy could have been supported by some men of letters and landowners, but to re-conquer Chile in order to return to the *status quo ante* 1810 was not a possibility. They applauded Ferdinand VII's willingness to grant a pardon to the exiles of Juan Fernández and the revolutionaries who remained in Chile. However, to grant a pardon was not the same to ask Spanish Americans to go back to the fold of the monarchy as if anything had occurred in the last eight years. It was there that Ferdinand VII failed; there where the intransigent position of officials like viceroy Abascal began to weaken in the uncertainty over how to confront the inescapable fact that the Spanish American elites celebrated and clung to their autonomist triumphs proudly. Not surprisingly, a total break with Spain slowly went from being a project championed by a group of exiled radicals to an increasingly widespread desire within the Chilean elites. The future revolutionary triumphs on the battlefield confirmed this trend.

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The outcome of the battle of Rancagua allowed the royalist Mariano Osorio to enter Santiago and establish a counterrevolutionary government. Rancagua was one of the cruellest and bloodiest battles of this period of the revolution. However, it was not a 'disaster' for all Chileans, and in fact after the battle Osorio enjoyed reasonable levels of support. The fact that

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<sup>88</sup> Ibidem, p. 187.

<sup>89</sup> The phrase 'turning the clock back' is used for the Venezuelan case by Adelman, 'An Age of Imperial Revolutions', p. 335.

the main cities and *villas* of the country had rapidly sworn loyalty to the king proves that in late 1814 there were many people who believed the radicalism of military officers like José Miguel Carrera or Bernardo O'Higgins affected the political stability of the country. For royalists and moderate autonomists, Osorio, and later on also Marcó, played a similar role to that of Pablo Morillo in Venezuela during his first months in the New World: both leaders were seen by the inhabitants as the only one who would put an end to a fratricidal civil war.

According to Rebecca Earle, Spain lost New Granada because Morillo and his men did not maintain a good and long-lasting relationship with the Neogranadans, a failure that Osorio and Marcó also experienced during his time in office in Chile. There was, however, a marked difference between Morillo's men and the royalists in Chile: while the former behaved despotically and even vulgarly in Spanish America, the latter were not particularly impolitic.<sup>90</sup> The accusation that Osorio's and Marcó's subordinates were despotic was put forward in the 1850s by the Amunáteguis, and since then it has been repeated by scholars interested in this period (with the exception of Cristián Guerrero Lira). Nonetheless, royalist policies were hardly more despotic than those the revolutionaries had introduced until 1814 and immediately after they re-conquered Chile in early 1817. Thus, the fall of the counterrevolutionary government is to be explained by highlighting the incapacity of both governors to gain the support of the local elites, rather than by assuming that Chileans reacted against the alleged despotism of the royalists.

In the case of Osorio, he never managed to balance his negotiating strategy with his policy of investigation and prosecution of the insurgents. Although it was Marcó who left the pardon granted by the king without effect, during his time in office Osorio did not stop investigating the rebels who were to be included in the pardon. In so doing, he adhered strictly to the legal codes of the monarchy, a decision that probably disaffected many moderates who believed that Chileans must be prosecuted according to local rather than imperial laws. Marcó del Pont, for his part, had an even more distant relationship with the Chilean elites. He broke with the *oidores* of the Real Audiencia; he criticized the Spanish officer Rafael Maroto because, in Marcó's opinion, Maroto had too close a relationship with the inhabitants of the country; in short, he, as well as Ferdinand VII and Abascal, tried to obliterate once and for all the political achievements attained by the Chileans since the beginning of the revolution. It is not

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<sup>90</sup> Earle, 'Popular participation', pp. 90-96. See also her *Spain and the Independence of Colombia, 1810-1825*, University of Exeter Press, Exeter, 2000.

surprising, therefore, that O'Higgins had been able to both count on the support of the elites and create a much more permanent political regime when he re-conquered Chile in early 1817.

## CHAPTER IV

### MENDOZA: THE PREPARATION OF A SOUTH AMERICAN ARMY, 1814-1817

Chapter III discussed how the defeat at the battle of Rancagua forced the Chilean revolutionaries to flee to Mendoza, on the eastern side of the *Cordillera*. The question that this current chapter would like to answer is why did the revolutionaries escape to the River Plate instead of, say, the northern regions of Chile, where they would have probably been able to reorganize their army and retake control of the Central Valley? The answer to this question is to be found in the close relationship built up in the previous four years between the revolutionaries of the River Plate and the Chilean insurgents. Indeed, this relationship prompted O'Higgins and his men to settle in Mendoza –a city that at the time was the capital of the province of Cuyo and which depended politically on Buenos Aires- and to make an alliance with the local governor, José de San Martín, to re-conquer Chile. From that moment, the Chilean revolutionaries acted in accordance with Buenos Aires' politicians and military officers.

The first section of this chapter analyzes both the role played by San Martín as an informal arbiter in O'Higgins' dispute with José Miguel Carrera, and also the difficult conditions in which the Chilean émigrés lived in Mendoza. The aim is to explain why the *rioplatense* general decided to support O'Higgins, and what were the immediate consequences of this alliance. The second section addresses the main characteristics of the Army of the Andes and the process of militarization experienced by the local inhabitants. Here, I stress that the day-to-day life of Mendoza became inseparable from the needs of the revolutionary army. The third aim is to provide an overview of the so-called '*guerra de zapa*' and the participation of irregular agents in it. We will see that the involvement of spies and guerrilla officers in the revolution increased as revolutionary warfare intensified. The final section studies the last days of the Army of the Andes in Mendoza, the crossing of the *Cordillera* by the insurgents and the revolutionary triumph of 12 February 1817 at Chacabuco. This chapter presents the hypothesis that San Martín's goal was to use the re-conquest of Chile as a springboard to attack strategically more important cities than Santiago, Lima being his principal target.

## I. CHILEAN ÉMIGRÉS IN A FOREIGN TERRITORY

The revolutionary flight to Mendoza began almost immediately after the battle of Rancagua, as did the recriminations between O'Higgins and José Miguel Carrera's men. Opinion among the Chilean émigrés polarized rapidly between those who resented Carrera's behaviour in Rancagua and those who believed that his decision to deny assistance to O'Higgins was sensible. The first group accused Carrera not only of treason and cowardice but also of taking the treasury of the revolutionary government from Santiago to use for his own benefit. Even San Martín became involved in this tricky dispute: on 15 October, the governor of Mendoza ordered his men to search Carrera's baggage, which the Chilean general flatly refused to allow. However, two days later, when Carrera was about to enter Mendoza, the local authorities were able to inspect his baggage and that of his brothers. Although no money was found, some argued that the treasury was indeed taken out of the capital after the battle of Rancagua but that it was seized by the royalists a couple of days later.<sup>1</sup>

From his involvement in the affair of the Chilean treasury one can conclude that San Martín chose to support O'Higgins' group at a date as early as the first days of October 1814.<sup>2</sup> There are two reasons that explain his choice: first, the expulsion by the government of José Miguel Carrera of Juan Mackenna and Antonio José de Irisarri to Mendoza in August of that year prompted these two refugees in Cuyo to criticize the arrogance of the Chilean general and his brothers, a criticism that sooner rather than later San Martín echoed. Thus, Mackenna and Irisarri became Carrera's most powerful enemies in Mendoza.<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, San Martín objected to Carrera's presentation of himself as 'governor of Chile' in Mendoza. In the opinion of San Martín, all inhabitants of the city –whether they were *rioplatenses* or Chileans– were under the authority of the governor of the province of Cuyo.

Other military officers and politicians in Mendoza shared San Martín's reaction, because they did not see José Miguel Carrera as the sole, legitimate authority of the 'Chilean state'.<sup>4</sup> O'Higgins and his followers tried to discredit Carrera as much as they could. They insisted that Carrera had stolen the Chilean treasury and that he was responsible for the defeat

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<sup>1</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. X, pp. 103, 109.

<sup>2</sup> On 12 October, San Martín travelled to Uspallata to receive the first groups of émigrés. There, he requested O'Higgins to forbid desertions among his soldiers, this being the first mission entrusted by Mendoza's governor to the Chilean general. See *Ibidem*, p. 102; and Eyzaguirre, *O'Higgins*, p. 152.

<sup>3</sup> Raúl Téletz, *El general Juan Mackenna*, Editorial Francisco de Aguirre, Santiago, 1976, pp. 126-129; Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. X, p. 98.

<sup>4</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. X, p. 104.

of the revolutionaries in Rancagua. This point of view was reinforced by the *rioplatense* delegate to Santiago, Juan José Paso, who referred to the Carrera brothers as ‘indecent’, ‘famous criminals’ and ‘inept’. In Paso’s opinion, José Miguel and his brothers should leave Mendoza. San Martín seconded this opinion on 19 October, when he asked the Carrera brothers to leave the city (‘asked’, because he was careful not to demand that they depart).<sup>5</sup>

That same day, however, a group of supporters of the Carreras claimed that they would never be politically subordinated to the ‘head of this small village [*pueblecito*], but only to the government of Buenos Aires’.<sup>6</sup> This was the first time that the unruly émigrés accepted the interference of Buenos Aires in Chilean politics, although on the condition that San Martín would not have command over them. On 30 October, San Martín responded by writing (now in peremptory terms) to Carrera saying that, since ‘all the Chilean émigrés are subject to the protection of the supreme government of the United Provinces’, he must immediately put his troops at the disposal of Marcos Balcarce. Realizing that San Martín’s forces were much stronger than his own (San Martín led around 1,000 men, compared to the 400 who remained loyal to Carrera), Carrera laid down his arms to the authorities. Carrera and his close relatives left Mendoza on 3 November, arriving in Buenos Aires at the end of that month.<sup>7</sup>

Once Carrera was expelled from Mendoza, the émigrés began to rebuild their lives in the River Plate. According to a document written by Carrera, 708 Chilean military crossed the *Cordillera* immediately after the defeat in Rancagua.<sup>8</sup> This is more or less in accordance with a list in Argentina’s National Archive which speaks of 162 officers and 595 ‘infantry troops’ (total: 757).<sup>9</sup> Cristián Guerrero Lira, moreover, transcribed the names of 391 émigrés, of whom 49 also appear in this list.<sup>10</sup> This means that the number of Chileans in Cuyo in late 1814 can be rounded up to about 1,000. If we subtract the 49 names of Guerrero’s lists from the total of 757, we have that, as Carrera said, at least 708 of those 1,000 were military men.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Ibidem, p. 106.

<sup>6</sup> AHM, box 235, doc. 38, Juan de la Cruz Vargas to San Martín, 19 October 1814.

<sup>7</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. X, pp. 113-117.

<sup>8</sup> Ibidem, p. 116, footnote 33. 708 is also the number given by an ‘*Estado de fuerza militar emigrada del Reino de Chile a las Provincias Unidas y existente en Mendoza*’. See VM, vol. CXXII, pp. 70-70v.

<sup>9</sup> This is an undated list (although is located together with documents dated around October 1814) and is located in AGN, room X, 4-2-5, pp. 2-4.

<sup>10</sup> Guerrero Lira, *La contrarrevolución*, pp. 297-299. There are five names in Guerrero Lira’s list that may be added to the list of 49, but I have decided not to because their names do not exactly match the names that appear in my list.

<sup>11</sup> I say ‘at least’, because in Guerrero Lira’s book there are military officers who do not appear in the list I have compiled. According to Guerrero Lira, *La contrarrevolución*, p. 99, only 16% of the names in his lists were military men.

However, only a few émigrés –mainly officers- were allowed to live in Mendoza, since San Martín decided to send most Chilean soldiers away from the province (either to Buenos Aires or to Upper Peru, where the army of Manuel Belgrano was fighting the royalists led by Joaquín Pezuela).<sup>12</sup> One of the reasons why San Martín dispatched the Chilean soldiers to other regions of the River Plate was that he and his subordinates did not see them as good, professional military men.<sup>13</sup> In January 1815, for example, Marcos Balcarce criticized that Chileans had only 63 rifles, some 30 machetes and ‘a few pistols’.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, according to the *rioplatense* Juan Gregorio de las Heras, his soldiers were obliged to gather the weapons (‘most of them useless’) that the émigrés abandoned in the *Cordillera*. This would have not been so reprehensible, Las Heras argued, if the Chileans had not intended to enter Mendoza carrying the weapons simply as a way to be admired by the local inhabitants.<sup>15</sup>

The émigrés who stayed in Mendoza were compelled to live in the city. Those who tried to escape from Mendoza to Chile were usually prosecuted as traitors. This was the case of Miguel Zañartu, who, after he tried to return to his country in January 1815, was accused by Buenos Aires’ politicians of ‘contributing actively to the division of the Chilean army’. In an unsigned and ‘reserved’ letter to San Martín, one closely related to the Supreme Director of the River Plate referred to Zañartu as ‘an undercover enemy of the American cause’, an accusation designed to prevent Mendoza’s governor from allowing Zañartu to return to Chile.<sup>16</sup> Bartola Morales Reyes experienced a similar situation. On 10 March, San Martín prevented her from returning to Chile, arguing that as the sister of Osorio’s secretary she would inevitably inform the royalists of the military preparations in the *Banda Oriental*.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> See AGN, *Paso de Los Andes y Campaña Libertadora de Chile*, tome 1149, vol. I, Buenos Aires, 1917, pp. 229-230, San Martín to Nicolás Herrera, 19 November 1814. In January 1815, San Martín published a *Bando* preventing the émigrés from travelling to Buenos Aires, which confirms that from that month onwards the main destination of Chileans was Upper Peru (to fight Pezuela’s army). See AGN, room X, 5-5-5, p. 202, San Martín to Nicolás Herrera, 1 March 1815. In 1826, O’Higgins told Bernardino Rivadavia that in 1815 there were 800 Chilean soldiers in Salta (i.e. one of the closest *rioplatense* cities to Upper Peru). In 1817, meanwhile, Francisco Antonio Pinto, who at that time was enrolled as an officer in Manuel Belgrano’s army in Tucumán, informed O’Higgins that ‘without exaggeration I can vouch that one fourth of this army is made up of Chileans’. See Vicuña Mackenna, *Vida del capitán*, p. 222, footnote 125. This explains why, as we will soon see, the Army of the Andes was mainly made up of *rioplatense* soldiers, as well as why Chileans recruited by San Martín were principally officers.

<sup>13</sup> In the third section of this chapter I shall discuss in more depth the military participation in Cuyo of the reduced number of Chilean officers who were allowed to stay in the province.

<sup>14</sup> AGN, room X, 4-2-5, p. 63, Balcarce to San Martín, 19 January 1815. In AGN, room X, 4-2-5, p. 212.

<sup>15</sup> AGN, room X, 4-2-5, p. 212, Las Heras to San Martín, 21 June 1815. The letter makes reference to an event which occurred on 8 November 1814.

<sup>16</sup> AGN, room X, 5-5-5, p. 99, Anonymous to San Martín, 27 January 1815.

<sup>17</sup> AGN, room X, 5-5-5, p. 240, San Martín to the Supreme Director of the United Provinces, 10 March 1815.

Twenty days later, the Supreme Director, who in January had given Morales a passport to travel to Chile, accepted San Martín's resolution.<sup>18</sup>

The émigré Pedro Aldunate, for his part, was imprisoned in San Luis –a city known for its brutal jail- after he attempted to escape to Chile, a crime that, according to San Martín, should be punished by confining the accused to a border post.<sup>19</sup> In his defence, Aldunate stressed his revolutionary credentials, as well as the injustices that he and his family –who belonged to Santiago's elites- had faced since the battle of Rancagua: 'there is no suffering I have not endured since I have been in San Luis', Aldunate wrote San Martín, '[...] my Grandfather, the last President of Chile [Mateo Toro y Zambrano], gave in the baton and abdicated it to the people: my immediate family relations have sacrificed their lives in war and I, together with others, have emigrated leaving behind our interests and our families and even bringing with us the arms that helped to defend us'. Recognizing that he did indeed seek to return to Chile but that he never intended to disobey San Martín, Aldunate argued that 'facts must be judged by their intentions; my return was not so criminal and my stay [in Chile] would have been hard for the tyrannical despot, [because] I was going to help the Patriots. The misery and abuse received in this city justify my clandestine departure'.<sup>20</sup> In the end, Aldunate was not confined to the frontier, even though it was only on 2 September that he left San Luis and settled in Mendoza.<sup>21</sup>

These desertions continued throughout 1815. San Martín's fears were mostly political. In his view, going back to Chile was an act of treason that only untrustworthy citizens who had forgotten what real patriotism was could commit; consequently, they were to be punished as selfish individuals unable to appreciate the 'generosity' of the *rioplatense* government. A *Bando* of 22 August stated:

The insolent impudence, and scandalous reiteration with which many inhabitants of these provinces and many Chilean émigrés –in an overt denial of their patriotism and jeopardizing the opinion of the truly honest and meritorious Chileans,- go over to the Enemy is already an insult to the generosity of the Government and it would have degenerated into criminal weakness if kept in disguise for much longer, affecting the honour of the Good Citizens, the trust of the people and the safety of the *Patria*. Therefore, after seeing so many prohibitions

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<sup>18</sup> AGN, room X, 5-5-5, p. 239, the Supreme Director of the United Provinces to San Martín, 31 March 1815. Although these letters do not give the name of the Supreme Director, it is likely that they referred to Carlos María de Alvear, who was Supreme Director of the United Provinces from January to April 1815.

<sup>19</sup> AHM, box 233, doc. 68, 7 May 1815.

<sup>20</sup> AHM, box 233, doc. 68, Aldunate to San Martín, without exact date.

<sup>21</sup> AHM, box 233, doc. 75, 2 September 1815. Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. X, p. 234 said that afterwards San Martín used Aldunate as one of his spies in Chile.

of this assiduous communication defrauded [the government] declares for the last time that whoever is apprehended in the direction of Chile [...] or whatever individual justifies this conduct or whoever keeps the slightest communication in words or writing with Chile, will irrevocably be executed 24 hours after the process has begun. The same penalty will be inflicted on whomever does not denounce these criminals.<sup>22</sup>

While San Martín thought that the émigrés wished to return to Chile because they had lost faith in the revolution, the émigrés had other, more pragmatic reasons to think that their life in Mendoza was intolerable. In fact, the archival records show that the deplorable conditions in which Chileans lived in Mendoza led them to conclude that confronting the royalists in their country was better than destitution in a foreign territory. Doubtless, the most complicated problem faced by the émigrés in Mendoza was to find suitable places to live. Guerrero Lira has studied a number of cases of Chileans who sought housing in the capital of Cuyo. This kind of source provided him ‘useful information to find out what caused the departure of the exiles from Chile and the situations that affected them in Mendoza’. Eighty-four of the 391 exiles identified by Guerrero Lira requested housing from the authorities, the majority of whom (69%) were military men. Indeed, although only 61 of his list of exiles (16%) ‘exercised in Chile military functions or were part of the militias’,<sup>23</sup> as many as 58 (95%) requested a house.<sup>24</sup> This was due to the lack of a system to pay the wages of the soldiers (especially during the first year of the exile, when San Martín had not yet organized the Army of the Andes). The large number of military men seeking housing is also obvious from documents that I have consulted. Out of a total of 15 people who sought housing, 10 were military officers (the rest of the applications were signed by three women, a barber and a court clerk).<sup>25</sup>

The arguments employed by the applicants to secure accommodation in Mendoza usually followed the same pattern: starting with a brief description of why they emigrated to the River Plate, they stressed the importance of being assisted by authorities. Most applications were short and straightforward. Diego Eduardo’s application, however, did not follow this trend and is, therefore, worth quoting. At the beginning of his application, Eduardo declared

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<sup>22</sup> AGN, room X, 5-5-6, p. 186, 22 August 1815.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. footnote 11 of this chapter.

<sup>24</sup> Guerrero Lira, *La contrarrevolución*, p. 99.

<sup>25</sup> AHM, box 497, doc. 9. The Chilean officers who requested a house were: Venancio Escanilla, lieutenant-colonel; Juan Esteban Fernández Manzanos, captain; Francisco Ezequiel de Noya, lieutenant; Calextro Enríquez, sergeant; Diego Eduardo, second lieutenant; Pascual José Tenorio, lieutenant; Ignacio Fernández, lieutenant; Juan José Fernández, second lieutenant; Juan de Dios Godoy, without a clear military rank; Pedro Arriagada, lieutenant-colonel.

that, although in 1797 he was enrolled in the king's army, he joined the revolutionary army immediately after Juan Martínez de Rozas organized a military company in Cauquenes. In 1813, 'we had the misfortune that the enemy invaded the City of Concepción and that all militia detachments of that province opted for the unjust cause of the King. [...] My own detachment and the infantry took flight in speed to Talca to join the Army of the *Patria*'. After losing his 'few possessions', Eduardo 'had no other reward than fulfilling his duties in the military service'. The outcome of the battle of Rancagua prompted Eduardo to emigrate to Mendoza: 'once that unfortunate kingdom [Chile] was lost, I saw myself obliged to seek refuge in this Province where, having remained for over a year, I have maintained myself by force of my industry [...]. Today, I find no means and, weighed down by the burden of keeping two other fellow countrymen who suffer worse fate than me, I find myself living in the street with them, not having the money to pay for the room where we live and which belongs to mayor Jose Clemente Venegas, to whom I owe nearly two months of rent'.<sup>26</sup> After analyzing his application, the authorities gave Eduardo accommodation at Estanislao Pelliza's house, a type of benefit that thirteen other applicants of my list also enjoyed.<sup>27</sup> In March 1816, meanwhile, Mendoza's Cabildo reported that 76 émigrés (of whom 47 were military men) were living at the houses of sixty *mendocinos*.<sup>28</sup>

But to obtain a house did not guarantee the émigrés livelihood. It was only after the Army of the Andes was properly organized that wages started to be systematically paid, which means that in 1815 the Chilean officers lived in an almost complete state of destitution. Even senior officers like lieutenant colonel Venancio Escanilla suffered the prevalent local poverty. In his application, Escanilla reported that immediately after emigrating he retired to the countryside to work as a farmer. After sixteen months, he and his family returned to the city and asked the assistance of the authorities.<sup>29</sup> In another case, we find lieutenant Ezequiel Noya

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<sup>26</sup>AHM, box 497, doc. 9, Eduardo to Mendoza's governor, without exact date. In his application Eduardo reported that Juan de Dios Vial had rewarded his services by appointing him second lieutenant of his company, which proves that sometimes merit could lead rank-and-file soldiers to occupy officers posts.

<sup>27</sup> The decisions of the authorities appear in the top left margin of every application. In the case of the barber Juan Briseño the solution was not immediately taken, although in the document it says that an answer to his demand will be 'opportunistically provided'.

<sup>28</sup> Camilo Alarcón, 'Soldados sin ejército: la vida de la emigración militar patriota en las Provincias Unidas del Río de la Plata (1814-1817)', in *Cuadernos de Historia Militar*, number 5, Departamento de Historia Militar, Santiago, December 2009, pp. 46-47. In the process of deciding whether the émigrés were eligible to receive the help of the authorities, we find the participation of 'informants' whose mission was to investigate the political loyalties of the applicants and then 'qualify their solicitudes'. See *Ibidem*, p. 47, and AHM, box 497, doc. 9, 30 January 1815.

<sup>29</sup> AHM, box 497, doc. 9, Escanilla to Mendoza's governor, without exact date. Escanilla was very close to O'Higgins, a fact that shows that not only Carrera's followers experienced the severity of the exile. For Escanilla's

reporting that for more than a year he and his father survived with a small remuneration of 10 pesos that the latter received from Mendoza's Cabildo for working as its secretary. That small amount, Noya explained, was insufficient to 'pay for food, room and the services of a washerwoman'.<sup>30</sup> In the end, the clerk José María González was so desperate that he promised to compensate the help that the state could give him by assuring that, when he had grown up, his fourteen month old son would become a soldier of the patria.<sup>31</sup>

It was in this context of economic distress that the first plans to confront the Chilean royalists were developed. O'Higgins, who spent 1815 in Buenos Aires defending the interests of his political cause, presented the Supreme Director, Ignacio Álvarez Thomas, with a detailed military programme to re-conquer Chile. His aim was to assemble 6,000 men and then divide them into four divisions, each with the mission to cross into Chile from a specific region (the first three would go via Antuco, Río Claro and Coquimbo, the last through the port of Arauco).<sup>32</sup> Carrera also devised a plan to 'restore the Chilean state' (Barros Arana's words). He believed that the revolutionaries should attack the royalists in the winter, regardless of the complications entailed by the closure of the *Cordillera*. In Carrera's words, 'this invasion can be made across Coquimbo [...] with only 500 Chilean soldiers and 1,000 rifles. It is known that Coquimbo's garrison is no more than 100 men and that they are willing to receive the assistance of the liberators'.<sup>33</sup> In practical terms, Carrera's plan was the more unrealistic of the two, and when the Supreme Director, Ignacio Álvarez Thomas, asked the opinion of San Martín, the governor answered that, in order to re-conquer Chile the army required '3,500 to 4,000 strong and disciplined men'.<sup>34</sup> However, at that stage O'Higgins' plan was not practicable either. Álvarez Thomas needed empirical proof that the efforts of Buenos Aires would not be in vain, and for that San Martín had to convince him that Chile was where the royalists should be attacked first.

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friendship with O'Higgins, see Vicuña Mackenna, *Vida del capitán*, p. 214.

<sup>30</sup> AHM, box 497, doc. 9, Noya to Mendoza's governor, 7 February 1816.

<sup>31</sup> AHM, box 497, doc. 9, González to Mendoza's governor, without exact date.

<sup>32</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. X, p. 144; Eyzaguirre, *O'Higgins*, pp. 160-161. A copy of O'Higgins' plan can be found in AGN, *Paso de Los Andes*, pp. 248-251.

<sup>33</sup> Quoted in Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. X, p. 143. A copy of Carrera's plan can be found in AGN, *Paso de Los Andes*, pp. 245-246.

<sup>34</sup> Quoted in *Ibidem*, p. 144. San Martín's answer can be found in AGN, *Paso de Los Andes*, pp. 246-247.

## II. THE ARMY OF THE ANDES AND THE MILITARIZATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Throughout his time as governor of Cuyo, San Martín's main task was to keep the province in a state of alert in case the royalists invaded the River Plate. There were three regions from which the enemy could enter into the former Viceroyalty: from one of the ports of the Atlantic, from Chile, or from Upper Peru. Of these, the first was without a doubt the most dangerous for the revolutionaries, as only an expedition as powerful as Morillo's could dare to disembark in one of the ports near Buenos Aires and take control of the capital. When the Buenos Aires authorities learnt that Morillo was finally sent to Venezuela, the idea of going on the offensive began to win supporters. San Martín favoured an attack on Chile, but the general opinion in 1815 voted for sending Manuel Belgrano to fight the enemy in Upper Peru. Despite this setback, San Martín never abandoned the idea of undertaking an invasion of Chile, and the plan to confront Marcó's army can be traced back at least to the second half of 1815. On 30 October of that year San Martín argued that the River Plate should aid the Chilean revolutionaries with weapons, money, recruits and provisions.<sup>35</sup>

Why did San Martín encourage the authorities to help Chileans to re-conquer their country? What was the best and most effective way of delivering this assistance? In San Martín's view, the security of the River Plate depended on freeing Chile. This is why he offered to organize a professional army in Cuyo, where new soldiers could be trained under his direct supervision and employed to liberate Chile. Buenos Aires' politicians accepted the governor's proposal of creating a local army in Cuyo, even though they did not immediately commit themselves to spending the capital's treasury to solve the financial problems faced by the army during its first year of life (i.e. from mid 1815 until mid 1816). The army lacked three important elements: regular men, resources and discipline. Mendoza's Cabildo addressed the first deficiency in April 1815. The *cabildantes* were opposed to sending a contingent to Buenos Aires, arguing that the winter closure of the *Cordillera* would not be an obstacle for the Chilean royalists if they attempted to attack Mendoza. Just as the 'destitute émigré populace' [*chusma desvalida de la emigración*] had done six months earlier, the 'enemy of the west' could cross the *Cordillera* with 2,000 *peones* and destroy the city's weak defence. Should this happen, the Cabildo claimed, the entire River Plate would be at the mercy of the royalists. Hence, the Cabildo recommended keeping Mendoza's contingents in Cuyo, in order not to give the enemy the

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<sup>35</sup> Vicuña Mackenna, *Vida del capitán*, p. 221, footnote 124.

opportunity to invade easily the province.<sup>36</sup>

In order to reinforce the troops of Cuyo (especially the infantry and the cavalry), in August 1815 San Martín published a new recruitment *Bando*. In its first article, the governor explained that enrolment should be voluntary, and that it would last as long as the enemy was ‘in possession of the kingdom of Chile’. Also, it stated that soldiers would be taken out of the province only if the re-conquest of Chile was finally agreed. Yet, due to the difficulty of filling the ranks with volunteers, in the second article San Martín ordered the recruitment of soldiers in Cuyo through a lottery in which every single man older than 16 and younger than 50 would be included; if these were not enough, then married individuals without children were to be included in the lottery. Article 3 stated the cases in which exceptions could be requested: if recruits were only children and their mothers were widows; if they had orphan sisters; if they had a disease; or if they had recently worked as ‘mayor, councillors or judges’ [*alcaldes, regidores o jueces de partido*]. Those who were deemed to have useful jobs (such as farmers and merchants) could be also excepted from military service, but they had to ensure that people with similar physical characteristics would replace them.<sup>37</sup>

The publication of this *Bando* was the starting point of a progressive militarization experienced by Cuyo’s society as a whole.<sup>38</sup> The establishment of a military camp in the northeast of Mendoza at El Plumerillo confirmed this. In September 1815, the first contingents arrived in the camp, where they went through strict professional military training.<sup>39</sup> The army was improved also in institutional terms: a gunpowder factory was built, an English physician, Diego [James] Paroissien, was appointed surgeon-major of the army,<sup>40</sup> and an engineer was hired to build an hydraulic machine [*batán*] to produce uniforms.<sup>41</sup> At the same time, Bernardo de Vera y Pintado was elected Auditor of War; his mission was to merge the

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<sup>36</sup> AGN, room X, 5-5-5, p. 282-283, Mendoza’s *cabildantes* to the Supreme Director of the United Provinces, 2 April 1815.

<sup>37</sup> AGN, room X, 5-5-6, pp. 115-116, 14 August 1815. In his crusade to recruit new contingents, San Martín was also assisted by ordinary civilians. Thus, for instance, a lady from Mendoza called Eulalia Calderón offered two of her peons to the army. See AHM, box 361, doc. 26, Calderón to Mendoza’s governor, 7 October 1815.

<sup>38</sup> John Lynch, *San Martín*, p. 73 argues that the process of militarization experienced by Mendoza can be traced back to the last months of 1814: ‘from late 1814 San Martín began to translate his vision into reality, converting Mendoza into a military as well as a civilian headquarters’.

<sup>39</sup> Gerónimo Espejo, *El Paso de Los Andes: crónica histórica de las operaciones del Ejército de Los Andes, para la Restauración de Chile en 1817*, Imprenta y Librería de Mayo, Buenos Aires, 1882, p. 365. For a summary of the training of the Army of the Andes, see Lynch, *San Martín*, pp. 74-75.

<sup>40</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. X, p. 242-243.

<sup>41</sup> AGN, room X, 5-5-6, pp. 370-371v, San Martín to Secretary of War, 29 December 1815.

*Ordenanzas* written by San Martín with those published in Spain during Charles III's reign.<sup>42</sup> On 20 November, Buenos Aires determined that 'every commander-in-chief [of the army of the United Provinces] who considers himself to be facing the enemy is authorized to execute his orders' without discussing them directly with the *porteños*, a decision that empowered military chiefs who, like San Martín, operated far from the capital.<sup>43</sup>

The reforms introduced by San Martín in Cuyo's army allowed him to mobilize 5,887 men by the end of December, of whom only 1,543 were regular soldiers (the rest being militiamen).<sup>44</sup> In April 1816, the infantry and the artillery numbered 1,300 soldiers, the cavalry 473 (the total of regular soldiers was, therefore, 1,773 men).<sup>45</sup> In the following two months, only 36 fresh recruits were enrolled,<sup>46</sup> but on 1 August the army reached a total of 2,166 men (182 artillerymen, 1,412 infantry and 569 cavalry).<sup>47</sup> The inclusion of slaves in the army explains in part the increase of Cuyo's troops. In January 1815, San Martín ordered the 'European Spaniards to hand over their slaves to the army or pay a fine of five hundred pesos per slave'.<sup>48</sup> The governor conducted a thorough investigation to establish who possessed slaves and how many they had. If the authorities suspected that Spaniards living in the province had not delivered their slaves to the government, they were obliged to display numbers, documents and witnesses to explain why they had kept them.<sup>49</sup> In any case, it seems that San Martín was able to accomplish his objective of depriving the enemy of a military force that could have been used against his army. Nine days after this *Bando* was published, the authorities collected 23 'useful' slaves (some were qualified as 'not useful' because they were either too old or too sick to be employed as soldiers) from 24 Europeans.<sup>50</sup> The value of these

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<sup>42</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. X, pp. 244.

<sup>43</sup> AGN, room X, 4-2-5, pp. 442-442v, the Supreme Director of the United Provinces to Mendoza's governor, 20 November 1815.

<sup>44</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. X, p. 240.

<sup>45</sup> AGN, room X, 4-2-6, p. 162, 2 April 1816.

<sup>46</sup> AGN, room X, 4-2-6, p. 283, 1 June 1816.

<sup>47</sup> AGN, room X, 4-2-6, p. 344, 1 August 1816. Detailed reports of the development of the army between December 1814 and February 1816 can be found in AHM, box 485.

<sup>48</sup> Lynch, *San Martín*, p. 76.

<sup>49</sup> An interesting example in AHM, box 368, doc. 5 (it is dated between late January and early February 1815). The name of the person investigated was Francisco Segura.

<sup>50</sup> AHM, box 368, doc. 7, 4 February 1815. According to Nuria Sales de Bohigas, 'Esclavos y Reclutas en Sudamerica, 1816-1826', in *Revista de Historia de América*, Instituto Panamericano de Geografía e Historia, number 70, July - December, 1970, pp. 289-293, the slaves who were recruited to serve in San Martín's army were not always emancipated (at most they were promised they would be emancipated). The fact that the slaves had been 'rated' shows that the authorities willingly bought them from their owners, which means that they did not lose their status as slaves once recruited for the army.

slaves was assessed at 4,432 pesos.<sup>51</sup>

But the inclusion of slaves in the army explains only in part why the military forces of the province grew at the rate they did in the second half of 1816. There were political factors which led San Martín to form a formidable army in Cuyo, and these factors had to do with Buenos Aires and Upper Peru. It was in the capital that San Martín found one of his most powerful and loyal allies: Tomás Guido. As minister of war, Guido stressed the importance of using the re-conquest of Chile as a springboard to other territorial conquests: 'the occupation of Chile should be the government's principal aim. First, because it is the flank in which the enemy is weaker; second, because it is the shortest, easiest and safest way to free Upper Peru; and third, because the restoration of freedom in that country can consolidate the emancipation of America'.<sup>52</sup> On the other hand, the situation in Upper Peru also played its part. Indeed, it was only after Belgrano's decision to undertake a defensive strategy in that region (May 1816) that San Martín was able to obtain the attention not only of Guido but also of other *rioplatense* politicians.<sup>53</sup>

The *rioplatenses* changed their view regarding an invasion of Chile when they were gathered in the Congreso de Tucumán, which was installed in March 1816 to bring the provinces together into one, united government. Two months later, Tucumán's congressmen appointed a widely respected military officer, Juan Martín de Pueyrredón, as Supreme Director of the River Plate.<sup>54</sup> Astutely, San Martín rapidly sent an emissary to convince the new chief executive of the importance of invading Chile, and a couple of weeks later the general personally discussed his plan with Pueyrredón. It is unclear exactly what the two leaders talked about during the two days that the so-called Conference of Córdoba lasted. What is known is that, more or less at the same time that the Congreso de Tucumán proclaimed the independence of the United Provinces (9 July 1816), San Martín persuaded the Supreme Director both to attack royalist Chile and to expand the contingents of the army that were

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<sup>51</sup> AHM, box 368, doc. 8, 4 February 1815. On 19 February 1816, San Martín ordered the émigrés who had worked as slaves in Chile to present themselves to Manuel Corvalán, who was the *Mayor de Órdenes* of Mendoza. In AHM, box 283, doc. 58.

<sup>52</sup> Quoted by Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. X, p. 263. A copy of Guido's report can be found in AGN, *Paso de Los Andes*, pp. 263-268.

<sup>53</sup> I have discussed Belgrano's defensive strategy in Ossa Santa Cruz, 'Francisco Antonio Pinto', pp. 73-77.

<sup>54</sup> An interesting account of political events in the River Plate in the period 1810-1827 is Klaus Gallo, 'Political instability in post-independence Argentina, 1810-1827', in Anthony McFarlane and Eduardo Posada Carbó, *Independence and Revolution in Spanish America*, Institute of Latin American Studies, London, 1999.

undergoing training in Cuyo.<sup>55</sup> As San Martín told his friend Tomás Godoy Cruz, ‘in two days with their respective nights, we reached an agreement. There is nothing else we can do but act’.<sup>56</sup>

Once back in Mendoza, San Martín resumed command of the organization of the Army of the Andes. Together with Bernardo O’Higgins, who arrived in Mendoza from Buenos Aires at the beginning of 1816, and other military officers, like Miguel Estanislao Soler and Juan Gregorio de las Heras, the governor put into practice a detailed military plan to reconquer Chile. Recruitment intensified in the second half of 1816. In the words of John Lynch, ‘recruitment for the Army of the Andes was now critical and urgent. San Martín needed reinforcements of veteran troops, for the rapid increase of the army had mainly been through younger recruits and volunteers’. Socially, the army ‘was recruited primarily from creoles and mestizos. The cavalry consisted of mestizos and poor creoles, and its officers were from the creole elite’. At the same time, new contingents of slaves were incorporated in the army, above all as infantrymen: ‘the best infantry soldiers we have’, claimed San Martín in May 1816, ‘are the Negroes and mulattos’.<sup>57</sup> According to O’Higgins, in September 1816 there were about 600 slaves enrolled in the army.<sup>58</sup>

Nonetheless, as Lynch himself argues, ‘San Martín led the way not only in the more obvious work of recruiting and training troops [...], but also in the unpopular tasks of raising money’.<sup>59</sup> His first task was to instruct his subordinates to give him a summary of the province’s economic and material needs. In a letter to Buenos Aires of 16 January 1815, San Martín calculated that Mendoza required over 14,000 pesos monthly to survive (i.e. to pay for military and civil wages; to finance the maintenance of the local hospitals; and to keep the nitre factory functioning), and that the city could manage to raise only half of that amount.<sup>60</sup> In his opinion, the capital should cover the other half, a request that, despite the governor’s insistence, Buenos Aires’ politicians refused to fulfil.<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> The Act of independence of the United Provinces was received by Mendoza’s authorities on 5 August 1816. See AGN, room X, 5-5-7, pp. 157-157v. San Martín was appointed general-in-chief of the Army of the Andes on 1 August 1816. See Lynch, *San Martín*, p. 86.

<sup>56</sup> Quoted in *Ibidem*, p. 267. See also Espejo, *El Paso de Los Andes*, pp. 411-412.

<sup>57</sup> Lynch, *San Martín*, pp. 86-87. There were 500 slaves who were brought from Buenos Aires to Mendoza by Soler. See Vicuña Mackenna, *Vida del capitán*, p. 227, footnote 131.

<sup>58</sup> AGN, room X, 4-2-7, p. 57, O’Higgins to Secretary of War, 14 September 1816.

<sup>59</sup> Lynch, *San Martín*, p. 75.

<sup>60</sup> AGN, room X, 5-5-5, pp. 72-72v, San Martín to the Supreme Director of the United Provinces, 16 January 1815.

<sup>61</sup> AGN, room X, 5-5-5, pp. 71-71v, Supreme Director of the United Provinces to San Martín, 9 February 1815.

It was due to this refusal that San Martín began to think about other ways of financing his army. Following the tendency of the *Bando* of 26 January, the governor ordered the European Spaniards, particularly those ‘who merit public outrage for being enemy of the sacred system of freedom’, to surrender their cash to the state. On 15 February, he received 6,800 pesos from 40 Spaniards, a significant amount considering that the city needed 14,000 pesos to pay for its services.<sup>62</sup> Soon after he collected this money, San Martín was aided by non-European *hacendados* who voluntarily donated money and goods to clothe and feed the army. In a document of 10 March we find a list of people giving money, shirts, vests, jackets, shoes, wheat, flour, barley, nuts, maize, potatoes, wine, horses, cattle, and so on.<sup>63</sup> In this sense, John Lynch was more or less right when he argued that ‘Cuyo in general and Mendoza in particular responded generously to their general’s demands. In Mendoza project and people met in perfect unity. Without the participation of the citizens of the province the whole plan would have failed. San Martín himself inspired the popular response. Patrician though he was, he had the common touch’.<sup>64</sup>

I say that Lynch was more or less right because the authorities took months to actually achieve adequate funding. The help they enjoyed from the local inhabitants was invaluable, but never enough. Reports written between September and October 1815 by the newly appointed *Comisario de Víveres* of the army, Domingo Pérez, give an idea of the many things the army still needed: cattle, salt, chilli pepper, biscuits, wine, garbanzos, alfalfa, brandy (*aguardiente*), candles, sugar, tobacco, paper, pots, funnels, balances, blankets, ponchos, reins, saddle girths, stirrups, spikes, axes, etc.<sup>65</sup> The lack of clothing in ‘the middle of the winter’, San Martín wrote on 2 May 1816, was especially worrisome, because ‘it exposes the soldier to sicknesses that are currently appearing, and incites him to desert from the army in order to find the shelter he does not find in military service’.<sup>66</sup>

On 23 August 1816 (i.e. when the decision to invade Chile had already been taken), the governor claimed that it would be impossible to ‘act on Chile’ if Buenos Aires did not remit to

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<sup>62</sup> AGN, room X, 5-5-5, pp. 155-156, San Martín to the Supreme Director of the United Provinces, 15 February 1815.

<sup>63</sup> AGN, room X, 5-5-5, P. 237, 10 March 1815. For a list of donations given by merchants, shoemakers and ‘*dueños de carretas*’, see AGN, room X, 5-5-5, without exact pages, March 10, 1815.

<sup>64</sup> Lynch, *San Martín*, p. 76.

<sup>65</sup> AHM, box 500, doc. 1, September-October 1815.

<sup>66</sup> AGN, room X, 4-2-6, San Martín to Secretary of War, 2 May 1816.

Cuyo the 'articles of war' that were needed.<sup>67</sup> On this occasion, the capital responded by adding three thousand pesos to the total of 5,000 that Buenos Aires regularly sent every month.<sup>68</sup> But that amount did not satisfy all the needs of the army. In October, for instance, the governor asked the secretary of war to dispatch as many mules as he could gather from Buenos Aires. Without those mules, San Martín argued, the army would not be able to cross the *Cordillera*: 'we shall have a ready and decided army but incapable to move, with which we shall unwillingly lose the most opportune season and maybe the best occasion to act'.<sup>69</sup> On 6 December, meanwhile, the general called for the same authority to deliver 3,000 bags for the infantry,<sup>70</sup> and on a date as close to the departure of the first contingents as 4 January 1817 San Martín reported that the cavalry was short of 400 sabres.<sup>71</sup> Mendoza, San Juan and San Luis were bankrupt and could not keep financing an army that, the *mendocinos* thought, was organized not only to free Chile but also to combat royalists in other regions of South America, like Upper Peru.<sup>72</sup>

One way or another, the economic and military demands that the creation of the army placed on Cuyo's society provoked the resistance of local inhabitants who believed some demands were exaggerated and unfair. An interesting criticism was advanced by three '*jefes cívicos de infantería*' who, in August 1816, were forced to close their shops and supply houses (*casas de abasto*) in order to attend military trainings. Their complaint was not directed so much against the idea of attending the military drills as against the fact that royalist shopkeepers were exempted from being enrolled in the army and so they were not compelled to close their shops. Therefore, the *jefes cívicos de infantería* asked the governor to shut all the shops of the city –included those of the royalists– during the afternoons that the army conducted its training:

The *cuerpos cívicos* of the infantry, created by their determined patriotism to dedicate Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays afternoon to military discipline, have expressed the damages which they suffer in their shops and supply houses for having to close them in order to attend these exercises, while others who live off the same trades, and who are exempted from this military obligation –either because they are Godos [a derogatory way of addressing the Spaniards] or suspects in relation to our system of freedom and independence– take advantage of sales that should have been theirs and which they cannot carry through because their shops are closed.

<sup>67</sup> AGN, room X, 4-2-6, p. 402, San Martín to the Supreme Director of the United Provinces, 23 August 1816.

<sup>68</sup> AGN, room X, 4-2-7, p. 26, Manuel Obligado to 'General ministers', 31 August 1816.

<sup>69</sup> AGN, room X, 4-2-7, pp. 199-199v, San Martín to Secretary of War, 21 October 1816.

<sup>70</sup> AGN, room X, 4-2-7, p. 263, San Martín to Secretary of War, 6 December 1816.

<sup>71</sup> AGN, room X, 4-2-8, p. 21, San Martín to Secretary of War, 4 January 1817.

<sup>72</sup> For summaries of the amount of money and resources spent by these three cities, see AHM, box 368, doc. 2, and AGN, room X, 5-5-7, pp. 200-205.

In representation of the detachments under us [...] we ask You to order that in the said days in the afternoons all shops and supply houses be closed during the time of compulsory exercises.<sup>73</sup>

Although I found no reply to this letter, its very existence shows elements that are worth highlighting. First, the use by the *jefes cívicos* of words like ‘*Godos*’, ‘*independencia*’ and ‘*libertad*’ reflects how the new political vocabulary brought about by the revolution could be employed in both public and private spheres. In fact, a public decision (i.e. to close the shops during the afternoons of military drills) caused the response of three individuals whose aim was to defend their private interests. Second, this document proves that the organization of the army was difficult not only politically and economically, but also in terms of discipline. It is unlikely that San Martín considered the *jefes cívicos*’ request a threat to his government, or to the administration of the Army of the Andes. However, it would be an error not to see these petitions in their entirety, that is, as manifestations of discontent that, in one way or another, affected military discipline in Cuyo.

Throughout his period as governor and later as general-in-chief of the Army of the Andes, San Martín faced frequent discontent, most of it manifested in the form of crime. We saw in the first section that the émigrés who tried to return to Chile were severely punished, as were deserters.<sup>74</sup> But there were other crimes just as damaging to the discipline of the army as desertion. Fights between soldiers were common in the province of Cuyo, and in general they occurred in public. This was the case of a street fight in May 1815 between a soldier of the second company of *pardos* and a lieutenant of Battalion 11. In his position as sentinel at the *Comedia* [theatre], Pedro López of Battalion 11 had the mission to prevent ‘people with ponchos’ from entering the theatre. Ignoring this elitist provision, the *pardo* Cristóbal Tobal tried to force the main entrance of the theatre, but he was seized and beaten by López and his men. In his defence, Tobal used his knife and threatened the lieutenant; Lopez, however, overwhelmed Tobal and took him to headquarters. When the authorities investigated Tobal’s cause, they ordered the accused to explain why he was carrying a knife when it was widely known that soldiers were not allowed to carry arms when off duty. His explanation that he spent the afternoon killing [*carneando*] an animal did not satisfy San Martín, who sentenced

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<sup>73</sup> AHM, box 489, doc. 50, Nicolás Aranda, Pedro Molina and Manuel Corvalán to Mendoza’s governor, 20 August 1816.

<sup>74</sup> A good example of a cause followed against two Chilean deserters can be found in: AHM, box 442, doc. 13, March-April 1815.

Tobal to be drafted into the army for another five years.<sup>75</sup>

Chileans living in Mendoza committed similar crimes; a short list of cases includes a Chilean officer who was imprisoned after he attacked a person in a coffee shop;<sup>76</sup> a Chilean soldier who was prosecuted for forcing the door of the women's jail;<sup>77</sup> an émigré who was incarcerated for living with a married lady;<sup>78</sup> and a Chilean soldier accused of being a thief.<sup>79</sup> Of these types of crimes, there was one that might be worthy of mention. In August 1815, Francisco Toledo, lieutenant of the body of Grenadiers of the Chilean army, was taken prisoner after a fight with Juan Antonio Rodríguez (a *rioplatense*) and Juan Sobée (a Frenchman). This case began with Toledo's complaining that he was unjustly imprisoned, and that the accusation that he intimidated Rodríguez and Sobée with a knife was false (in his written defence, Toledo argued that it was Rodríguez who hit him with a stick). He asked to be released, or at least that the other two protagonists be imprisoned as well. Once San Martín read Toledo's statement, the governor appointed a committee to find out the reason for Toledo's imprisonment. The committee began by hearing the declarations of Rodríguez and Sobée. Both agreed that Toledo attacked them because he was envious that Sobée had replaced him as the person in charge of Sra. Rodríguez's *pulpería*. According to Rodríguez and Sobée, the first indeed used a stick to stop Toledo, but only after noticing that his former employee was about to assault him with a knife. Given the discrepancies between Toledo's statement and those of his rivals, on 6 September the auditor of war, Bernardo Vera y Pintado, freed Toledo.<sup>80</sup>

These cases reflect San Martín's obsession with order and discipline, and how his obsession grew as the day of departure to Chile approached. San Martín 'never gave up on discipline', John Lynch says. 'He still had time, in September 1816, to issue a lengthy order on military crime and punishment listing forty-one offences including blasphemy, sedition, desertion, malingering, troublemaking, the rape and robbery of women, all with drastic punishments intended to keep order in the ranks and an example before the eyes of the people'. Through this *Bando* San Martín reacted to circumstances: blasphemy, sedition, desertion and the rest of offences listed in this *Bando* were, as we have seen, common amongst

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<sup>75</sup> AHM, box 442, doc. 42, 28 May 1815.

<sup>76</sup> AHM, box 442, doc. 36, September 1815.

<sup>77</sup> AHM, box 442, doc. 40, September 1815.

<sup>78</sup> AHM, box 233, doc. 87, October 1815.

<sup>79</sup> AHM, box 443, doc. 11, December 1815.

<sup>80</sup> AHM, box 442, doc. 32, August-September 1815.

soldiers and officers of this period. But the fact that he reacted to these crimes, instead of anticipating them, does not lessen his political and military credentials. On the contrary, to respond positively to specific problems is as relevant as to try to predict them. And the truth is that if San Martín had a special quality, it was his ability to react to difficult situations. His decision to weaken the royalists by employing irregular agents -the subject of the following pages- is further proof of his highly developed political and military skills.

### III. CHILEANS IN THE ARMY OF THE ANDES SPIES, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AND THE *GUERRA DE ZAPA*.

In the first section of this chapter I argued that the presence of Chileans in Cuyo decreased significantly in early 1815, because San Martín sent them away from the province. But there was a small number of émigrés who were allowed to reorganize their lives in Cuyo (with all the complications that this option entailed), some of whom were requested to be part of a commission in April 1816 to organize ‘the veteran forces of the Chilean army’. This commission was formed by officers José María Benavente, Venancio Escanilla, Antonio Hermida, Antonio Merino, Juan de Dios Vial and Pedro Antonio del Villar, and their mission was to elaborate a working programme to mobilize the émigrés in the three traditional detachments: infantry, cavalry and artillery, although their efforts were to be ‘adapted’ to a plan previously designed by San Martín.<sup>81</sup>

According to San Martín, the Chilean infantry should be organized in eight companies, each led by a captain, two lieutenants and one second lieutenant. The cavalry should consist of three squadrons, each of one composed of a captain, two lieutenants and one second lieutenant. The artillery battalion, meanwhile, ‘will consist of three companies, each one with a captain, two lieutenants and one second lieutenant’. The commission had the power to appoint the officers in charge of the detachments. It was vital that officers be chosen taking into consideration their ‘good knowledge, valour, patriotism and integrity’, as this was the only way that the army would ‘attract the approval of the people’ [*la opinión de los pueblos*]. With these characteristics in mind, the commission agreed to name Juan de Dios Vial commander of the infantry battalion of Chile. Antonio Merino was appointed inspector of the cavalry militias, Joaquín Prieto commander of the artillery. These corps began their military training in El

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<sup>81</sup> Alarcón, ‘Soldados sin ejército’, p. 50.

Plumerillo in July 1816. In October 1816, meanwhile, a *Legión Patriótica de Chile* was created to organize the émigrés who were not yet enrolled in the army. In a *Bando* of the 16<sup>th</sup> of that month, it was stated that the *Legión* would be formed in San Juan and that ‘the armament, munitions and whatever the *Legión* needs to fulfil its military venture will be paid by the state’.<sup>82</sup>

However, the efforts of San Martín and the commission to make Chileans participate in the re-conquest of their country did not succeed. As Gerónimo Espejo claimed, ‘no body was created under the flag of Chile. Chilean historians who argued that the Army of the Andes should be called United Army’ were completely wrong, since San Martín’s forces were ‘purely Argentine’.<sup>83</sup> Espejo’s view was somewhat exaggerated and clearly nationalistic. Yet the short time that the émigrés spent in Cuyo in 1816 was insufficient to create detachments formed only by Chileans, and so Espejo was correct in his judgement. But he did not consider that the Chilean officers who participated in the re-conquest of their country would later form the backbone of the Army of Chile. An army that, as we will see in future chapters, would fight the royalist guerrillas in the south of the territory, go to Peru with the *Ejército Libertador*, and back officers like Ramón Freire when they began their political careers in the mid 1820s. This is why to reduce the role of Chileans in the Army of the Andes to that of mere spectators is as mistaken as to assign them the responsibility for the revolutionary triumph in Chacabuco, like some Chilean historians have argued.<sup>84</sup>

There was one scenario, nevertheless, in which Chilean rebels living in Cuyo had an active participation during the years 1814-1817: the so-called *guerra de zapa*.<sup>85</sup> The *guerra de zapa*, or irregular warfare, ‘went through three defined stages. In the first, the rebels sent spies or emissaries to scrutinize the territory. The second aimed to spread revolutionary propaganda in Chile [...]. In the third, by far the most difficult and risky, the rebels sought to disperse [the royalist] forces employing small guerrillas’.<sup>86</sup> San Martín’s work as general-in-chief of the Army of the Andes was heavily dependent on spies and rural guerrillas. He used spies from the beginning of his government in Cuyo. Thus, on 24 February 1815 two spies notified him that

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<sup>82</sup> AGN, room X, 4-4-2. See also Alarcón, ‘Soldados sin ejército’, pp. 50-55.

<sup>83</sup> Espejo, *El Paso de Los Andes*, p. 420. See also pp. 477-478.

<sup>84</sup> For a criticism of the approach that exaggerates the role played by Chileans in the battle of Chacabuco, see Alemparte, *Carrera y Freire*, pp. 133-132, 141-144.

<sup>85</sup> John Lynch, *San Martín*, p. 79, defines *de guerra de zapa* as ‘an underground war of espionage and sabotage, with a network of spies in the mountain provinces reporting on the movements of the enemy, directing black propaganda across the Andes, keeping the cause alive and the resistance movement active in readiness for the invasion, while San Martín himself organized hit-an-run attacks on the enemy’.

<sup>86</sup> Leopoldo Castedo, *Resumen de la Historia de Chile de Francisco Antonio Encina*, Editorial Zig-Zag, Santiago, 1954, vol. I, pp. 609-610.

British ships were ‘blockading and harassing’ the Chilean ports. In the view of the anonymous author of this letter, the British attitude reflected opposition to Osorio, who had recently confiscated the cargo of three British ships. Even though Spain and Great Britain were not at war, it seems that the British ships had London’s implicit permission to blockade neutral ports if they felt they were in danger.<sup>87</sup>

In February 1815, too, San Martín received news ‘from the spies I have in Chile’ that Osorio was planning an invasion of the River Plate.<sup>88</sup> These sorts of reports were likely to be directed to Buenos Aires, especially when they carried news concerning not only the wellbeing of Cuyo but also that of the rest of the provinces. Considering that in early 1815 Buenos Aires’ politicians were mostly concentrating on facing the royalist threat in Upper Peru, it is not surprising that San Martín’s spies in Chile occasionally informed him of Osorio’s moves to help Pezuela’s army. On 3 May 1815, San Martín wrote to the Supreme Director that the report he had sent on 9 April should be discarded, for he had recently learned from his spies that Osorio had dispatched to Upper Peru not 300 men, as the previous report suggested, but 1,500 men.<sup>89</sup> The change of figures in this case exemplifies the many difficulties faced by irregular agents when conducting their missions. Dates, numbers, locations and topics could vary from one report to another, some times because the spies consciously lied so they were not caught, others because the enemy hid the real information concerning the royalist army.

The most complicated aspect of a spy’s work in Chile was to win the confidence of the royalist authorities, sceptical as they were of any émigrés who returned from Mendoza. Arriving in Mendoza from Chile in September 1815, Francisco Silva was interrogated by the Auditor of War, Bernardo Vera y Pintado, about his role as a spy in Chile, where he had been sent by San Martín in January. Along with details about the number of Osorio’s soldiers, Silva reported that the royalist governor treated him with respect because Silva managed to convince Osorio that he was an ‘enemy of the American cause’.<sup>90</sup> Other spies, however, did not have Silva’s luck. Two days after Vera y Pintado wrote his report, San Martín told the Supreme Director that two of Buenos Aires’ best spies,<sup>91</sup> Domingo Guzmán and Ramón Picarte, had

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<sup>87</sup> AGN, room X, 5-5-5, pp. 142-143v, 24 February 1815.

<sup>88</sup> AGN, room X, 5-5-5, pp. 159-160, San Martín to the Supreme Director of the United Provinces, 8 February 1815.

<sup>89</sup> AGN, room X, 5-5-5, p. 304, San Martín to the Supreme Director of the United Provinces, 3 May 1815.

<sup>90</sup> AGN, room X, 4-2-5, pp. 321-322v, 25 September 1815. According to Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. X, p. 236, footnote 33, Silva was a ‘double spy’.

<sup>91</sup> Buenos Aires appointment of Guzmán and Picarte as spies can be found in AGN, *Paso de Los Andes*, pp. 299-

been ‘imprisoned by the enemy while they were crossing the *Cordillera*’. Although it is probable that, as Barros Arana said, Guzmán and Picarte contrived their incarceration in Santiago in order to collect information,<sup>92</sup> this outcome obstructed their plans (indeed, in his letter to Buenos Aires San Martín stated that Guzmán’s and Picarte’s detention ‘deprives us of the best communication’).<sup>93</sup>

Despite these setbacks, at the end of 1815 San Martín’s spies were able to give Cuyo’s governor a detailed account of Osorio’s troops and their distribution throughout the Chilean territory. For San Martín, the news given by his ‘commissioners’ in Chile was invaluable. According to this report, Osorio had 3,506 men distributed as follows: 530 *Talaveras*; 766 men from Chillán; 350 from Chiloé; 500 infantry soldiers from Concepción; 400 from Valdivia; 160 *Húsares Colorados*; 250 *Carabineros de Abascal*; 250 dragoons from Concepción; and 300 artilleries.<sup>94</sup> The royalist army had, therefore, increased its personnel by more or less 500 men since July 1814 (which was when Abascal gave his orders to Osorio).

Thanks to his spies San Martín was also able to discover minor yet significant details of who his enemies were and how they performed. On 27 November José Zapiola remitted to Cuyo’s governor an intercepted letter in which an unknown correspondent referred to San Martín in harsh terms. Reminding his recipient (a certain ‘Matías’) not to forget that ‘he had been born a gentleman and had eaten the bread of the king’, the author of this letter advised his friend to ‘distrust that bloody San Martín, because he has a very dirty tail [*cola muy sucia*] and should never socialize with good men. The fear that this letter may be lost to the rebels prevents me from going deeper into this subject’.<sup>95</sup> We do not know whether Zapiola or San Martín ever found out who the writer of this letter was; however, it is more relevant to stress the number of people participating in this case (Zapiola, ‘Matías’, San Martín and, of course, a series of unknown intermediaries who helped Zapiola to obtain the letter), since this demonstrates the persuasive effect that the revolution had on Spanish Americans in general.

The sophistication of the reports written by San Martín’s spies grew as time went by, as

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<sup>92</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. X, p. 238.

<sup>93</sup> AGN, room X, 5-5-6, P. 201, San Martín to the Supreme Director of the United Provinces, 27 September 1815. As well as Osorio, San Martín did not hesitate to incarcerate anyone suspected of being a royalist spy. Two examples can be found in AGN, room X, 5-5-6, p. 265, San Martín to Marcos Balcarce, 2 November 1815; and AGN, room X, 5-5-7, p. 53, San Martín to the governor of the province of Buenos Aires, 16 February 1816.

<sup>94</sup> AGN, room X, 4-2-5, p. 461, November 1815.

<sup>95</sup> AGN, room X, 5-5-6, pp. 351-352, Zapiola to San Martín, 27 November 1815. For another of Zapiola’s report, now concerning events in the Banda Oriental, see AGN, room X, 4-2-7, pp. 320-320v, Zapiola to San Martín, 26 November 1816.

did the money spent on ‘espionage service’. Regarding the first point, in January 1816 San Martín received a document signed by a so-called ‘Español’.<sup>96</sup> In it, an unknown spy reported of a series of events in Chile, mixing them up without any apparent logic, but clear enough to be understood by well-informed readers like San Martín. Providing details of the construction of the Santa Lucía fortress, the recruitment drive of the royalists, the doubts that the revolutionary spies spread within Chilean society and the economic hardship suffered by San Martín’s emissaries, ‘Español’ contrived to provide Cuyo’s governor with useful data about Marcó del Pont’s administration in no more than six paragraphs. His report was accompanied with eight ounces of gold that the wife of Gaspar Marín (who emigrated to Mendoza after being involved in various revolutionary posts, including the secretariat of the first autonomous Junta established in Santiago in September 1810) had collected for him.<sup>97</sup> With regard to the second point, San Martín’s personal intervention before the Buenos Aires authorities in order to obtain higher wages for his spies elicited a significant increase in money used for ‘espionage service’ between February 1815 and February 1816.<sup>98</sup> The *Estado que manifiesta el dinero dado por esta Tesorería por Orden del Señor Gobernador Intendente para gastos secretos de Guerra en el año pasado y dos más de este* was summarized on 9 March 1816 as follows:

Year 1815: February.....	68 pesos
April.....	92 pesos
June.....	175 pesos
August.....	131 pesos
September.....	368 pesos
October.....	635 pesos
November.....	764 pesos
December.....	490 pesos
Year 1816: January.....	1,712 pesos
February.....	496 pesos
	TOTAL 4,931 pesos

<sup>96</sup> According to Ricardo Latcham, *Vida de Manuel Rodríguez*, p. 151, ‘Español’ was one of the pseudonyms used by the spy Manuel Rodríguez.

<sup>97</sup> AGN, *Paso de Los Andes*, pp. 298.

<sup>98</sup> As Lynch, *San Martín*, p. 81, argues, San Martín was ‘aware of the costs and the risks of espionage. Secret-service money was vital to keep on his payroll, otherwise they could be “turned” by the enemy’.

‘This night 800 pesos are to be sent to Chile’ to pay the spies, continued this document signed by San Martín.<sup>99</sup> Almost a month later, Buenos Aires’ Supreme Director ‘approved’ the expenditures made by Cuyo’s governor and even encouraged him to dispatch new ‘well-briefed emissaries, thus disheartening the [royalist] troops, introducing division amongst them and inspiring confidence in the patriot side’.<sup>100</sup> Doubtless, the support granted by Buenos Aires to San Martín’s plan had a profound impact on Chile, where the royalist authorities had neither men nor mechanisms to break down the military intelligence set up by the revolutionaries.<sup>101</sup> Marcó del Pont himself recognized his inability to deal with San Martín’s spies in his communications with his subordinates. In August 1816, Marcó ordered San Fernando’s military commander to conduct an investigation into why his men had not prevented San Martín’s spies from entering the Chilean territory. Marcó was particularly suspicious of the *cordillerano* guards and of the political and military chiefs stationed in Curicó, Maule and their surroundings:

It is certain that a scandalous communication is maintained between the *Partidos y Boquetes* in the Curicó and Maule mountain ranges with revolutionaries of Mendoza, without having spies or conductors being seized. This would have been easy to do if paths [*pasajes*] and entries were properly guarded and if there were fidelity amongst the guards and political and military chiefs. This makes me distrustful of the lack of zeal or lack of energy of the present commanders of those parties who do not take the necessary precautions and who insist nevertheless on keeping troops at their disposal. Please make a discreet verbal enquiry into their behaviour in this matter and let me know what you find for certain and whether their aptitudes correspond to the requirements of their offices.<sup>102</sup>

For the period in which this letter was written, San Martín’s emissaries had already been able both to spread revolutionary propaganda and to form guerrilla groups to fight Marcó’s regular soldiers. Since the mid nineteenth century historians have been interested in analyzing the role of irregular agents in subverting the royalist government, not only as spies but especially as guerrilla fighters [*guerrilleros*]. Rodríguez was a relatively respected lawyer who, despite his elevated social background (although his father was not rich, Rodríguez went to the same school as Carrera, Francisco Antonio Pinto and other powerful *santiaguinos*), from 1814 lived as an outlaw, made friends with low-class fugitives who eventually turned into *guerrilleros*,

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<sup>99</sup> AGN, *Paso de Los Andes*, p. 307.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 308.

<sup>101</sup> The royalists did also employ spies; however, they never developed an espionage service as sophisticated as the revolutionaries. For examples of the work of royalist spies, see AGN, room X, 5-5-6, 2 November 1815, p. 265; AGN, room X, 5-5-6, 12 November 1815, p. 277, 279; MI, vol. 26, pp. 161-161v, 5 January 1816; and AGN, room X, 5-5-7, p. 53, 19 February 1816.

<sup>102</sup> MI, vol. 26, pp. 251v-252, Marcó to Joaquín Magallar, 5 August 1816.

and became one of San Martín's closest allies in Chile without once having been captured by Marcó. However, most works on Rodríguez exaggerate his qualities, thereby creating a myth of his figure that, instead of shedding light on his role in the revolution, obscures his character. Any attempt to study his life as a *guerrillero* should be, therefore, based on primary sources rather than secondary.<sup>103</sup>

Rodríguez left Mendoza for Chile at the beginning of 1816. His mission was twofold: on one hand, to make contact with José Miguel Neira, a rural bandit whose action in the Central Valley intimidated the royalists as much as the prospect of facing San Martín's regular men. On the other, to find out details of Marcó del Pont's military dispositions. Behind San Martín's decision to dispatch Rodríguez to Chile was his plan to exhaust the royalists with rapid and effective attacks commanded by Rodríguez, Neira and other *guerrilleros* in the major towns south of Santiago. In so doing, San Martín believed, he would be able to understand the functioning of Marcó's defensive system, and thus prepare the ground for a future invasion by the Army of the Andes. How effective was this strategy? If Ricardo Latcham was correct and 'Español' was one of Rodríguez's undercover names,<sup>104</sup> it can be assured that Rodríguez had already made contact with San Martín in January 1816, and that, consequently, his idea of sending him to the other side of the *Cordillera* was indeed useful. Still, it is also likely that the royalist authorities did not know of Rodríguez's guerrillas until August or September of that

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<sup>103</sup> Diego Barros Arana and the Amunátegui brothers were the first to elevate Rodríguez to the sacred pantheon of heroes of the revolution. In the first half of the twentieth century, his figure was co-opted by a left-nationalistic trend. In a book of 1932, Ricardo Latcham published his *Vida de Manuel Rodríguez*, which emphasized Rodríguez's alleged differences with the local elites during his years as student and then as a lawyer, thus stressing his popular habits, like drinking wine in company of *huasos* and *inquilinos*. This tradition incubated in Chilean historiography, influencing the whole political spectrum. In the dictatorial years of Augusto Pinochet (1973-1989), the armed opposition was led by the so-called *Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodríguez*, a group that, as its name implies, combined Marxist ideas with 'patriotic' ends. More than a decade after Pinochet's fall, Gabriel Salazar, *Construcción de Estado en Chile*, pp. 466-467, once again rescued Rodríguez's role in the revolution from a left-wing perspective. In his view, 'Rodríguez's war of guerrillas configured a clear example of militia odyssey, but of a militia that was not loaded with patrician ornamentation [*oropeles patricios*] [...], because, in order to put their political and military objectives into practice, he employed rural instead of urban militias. Rural militias that did not operate with the logic of the *hacendados*, but with the marginal logic of the *montonera* and the *peonaje* bandits. It must be remembered that colonel Rodríguez did not come from a landowning family. In that sense –at least in regard to his guerrilla– his concept of citizenship was wider than that of other militiamen of his generation, as, in one way or another, it included the *campesinado* and the *peonaje*'. Salazar's thesis is interesting because it includes historical actors traditionally excluded by historiography. Yet his argument is more romantic and *voluntarista* than empirical, not least because he gives the word 'citizenship' a meaning that refers more to the late twentieth century than to the early nineteenth. Romantic approaches have even reached the television: in 2010, the year of Chile's Bicentennial, a local channel broadcasted a soap opera called *Manuel Rodríguez, el guerrillero del amor* (!), whose rating results were, in fact, much lower than expected. A good summary of how scholars have seen Rodríguez's figure throughout almost two centuries of history appears in Ernesto Guajardo, *Manuel Rodríguez. Historia y leyenda*, Ril Editores, Santiago, 2010.

<sup>104</sup> Cf. footnote 96 of this chapter.

year, which means that their assaults were circumscribed to a very restricted area.

The first document that I have found where Marcó del Pont made reference to Rodríguez is dated 12 September 1816. There, the royalist governor included the ‘son of Carlos Rodríguez’ among the ‘outlaws [*facinerosos*] sheltered in the *Cordilleras* of Colchagua and Maule, where they carry out their incursions and attack innocent travellers’. From this letter it is clear that Marcó was aware that Rodríguez was an emissary of San Martín, who, in words of the royalist governor, sent Rodríguez from Mendoza to ‘revolutionize’ the Chilean territory. Marcó feared that Rodríguez and his men could enter Concepción and, from there, make contact with the Indian Venancio and other ‘unruly of the *Butalmapu*’.<sup>105</sup> Two weeks later, the governor repeated this order to Antonio Quintanilla, emphasizing that, until Rodríguez’s ‘gang of *salteadores*’ was captured, Quintanilla’s troops must stay in the region. The decision to pursue the guerrillas and not use those troops to reinforce Rancagua and other places of the Central Valley –as Quintanilla proposed a few days before– is to be explained by Marcó’s decision of controlling specific threats instead of having a general military plan to face the insurgents.<sup>106</sup> In fact, the disorganization of the royalist army led Quintanilla’s men to spend their days as local policemen rather than as professional military. This obviously helped San Martín when he crossed the *Cordillera*.<sup>107</sup>

How did Rodríguez’s small guerrillas manage to attack towns like Melipilla and then disappear without trace? It was Marcó himself who answered this question in a letter to Abascal. For him, the insurgents had an advantage over the royalists, especially over the *Talaveras* and other Spanish-born officers: they knew the territory better. In this report, Marcó mentioned to Abascal that he imprisoned ‘three confidants of San Martín, all of them Chileans, who are in charge of fostering the revolution, and giving San Martín news about the state of discipline and weaponry of the [royalist] army. They have been also ordered to inform the regions effectively occupied by the army, so they can plan a victorious invasion of this kingdom’. On 4 January 1817, continued Marcó, ‘a band of armed insurgents, captained by the Chilean-born lawyer, Carrera’s secretary and San Martín’s principal agent, Manuel Rodríguez, invaded Melipilla’. They were aided by both ‘a famous bandit called José Miguel Neira and

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<sup>105</sup> MI, vol. 26, pp. 259v-260, Marcó to Concepción’s intendant, 12 September 1816. Marcó is obviously referring to the *Butalmapu* of the *Llanos*. Cf. footnote 75 of chapter III of this thesis.

<sup>106</sup> MI, vol. 26, p. 263v, Marcó to Quintanilla, 28 September 1816.

<sup>107</sup> Another example of Quintanilla’s role as ‘policeman’ in MI, vol. 26, p. 273, Marcó to Quintanilla, 6 November 1816.

other Chilean émigrés, who have committed many forms of harassment and violence in the *haciendas*, and also by the local people who ‘inform them about the impenetrable forest trails’ of the Central Valley. Moreover, the guerrillas ‘are protected by the *hacendados*, who give them horses, provisions and whatever they need, since all of them are their supporters’. And, in a phrase that summarizes Marcó’s desperation, the governor concluded that ‘this way of harassing us is in accordance with San Martín’s instructions. San Martín has ordered Rodríguez to get together as many horses as possible and distribute them in small groups near the *Cordillera* until he arrives’ in Chile.<sup>108</sup>

Marcó’s letter to Abascal (written only two weeks before the battle of Chacabuco) shows the political and military weakness of the royalist government to which I made reference in chapter III, proving also that San Martín’s system of military intelligence was indeed successful. Despite the economic and administrative problems of the Army of the Andes, in 1816 San Martín achieved a number of moral victories on the Chilean side of the *Cordillera*. The three stages of the *guerra de zapa* were tackled with intelligence and expertise by his emissaries. His spies not only gathered useful information about the royalist army, but they also spread revolutionary propaganda (usually orally). Guerrillas like Rodríguez’s, meanwhile, launched a type of war that until then had not been very common in Chile. Revolutionary warfare in the period 1813-1814 was radical, bloody and cruel. Nonetheless, during that time confrontations generally involved regular soldiers and officers, whose military training, although rudimentary, followed those of other regular armies of the region. Irregular warfare, on the other hand, introduced new elements to the fight, radicalizing further the conflict between royalists and insurgents.

At the end of January 1817, Marcó del Pont’s administration was almost completely powerless. The publication throughout that month of a series of *Bandos* announcing severe punishments for the rebel *montoneros* is another proof of his vulnerability.<sup>109</sup> None of these *Bandos* had, however, the expected result. San Martín’s men had already begun to cross the *Cordillera* and a new confrontation between both armies was inevitable.

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<sup>108</sup> AGI, Diversos 5, Marcó del Pont to Abascal, 28 January 1817. Women and priests were also sometimes employed as spies. See Hans Bertling, *Documentos históricos referentes al paso de Los Andes efectuado en 1817 por el General San Martín*, Litografía e Imprenta Concepción, Concepción, 1908, pp. 61-62 and 68 respectively.

<sup>109</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. X, pp. 349-350.

IV. CROSSING THE *CORDILLERA*

During its last months in Mendoza, the high command of the Army of the Andes continued conducting military drills in Mendoza and preparing the ground for an invasion of Chile. San Martín, for his part, spent this time in Cuyo dealing mainly with political matters. The decision made by the Supreme Director to send an expeditionary force not to Upper Peru but to Chile entailed important political consequences. From the beginning of the negotiations, San Martín favoured an attack on the other side of the *Cordillera*. However, he believed that Chile should not depend on the River Plate in matters of internal administration. In principle, the Supreme Directors of the period 1815-1816 were of the same idea, even though, as we will see, the *rioplatense* politicians ended up interfering in Chilean politics much more than anticipated.

In September 1815, San Martín asked the Supreme Director, Ignacio Álvarez Thomas, to advise him about the political conduct he should follow in Chile in case Buenos Aires seized Santiago: ‘what sort of governmental system must be established? If this is to be formed by locals, which party ought to dominate: the *Larraínes* or the Carrera brothers?’, San Martín asked.<sup>110</sup> In his answer, the Supreme Director stated that ‘given that one of the Chilean parties have to dominate, then I declare myself in favour of the *Larraínes*’. It is likely that, during his stay in Buenos Aires, O’Higgins made contact with important political figures in the *porteño* capital, and that this helped his faction achieve the approval of Álvarez Thomas.<sup>111</sup> But this approval was contingent upon political factors rather than on any personal support. In April 1815, Álvarez Thomas was amongst those who precipitated the fall of Carlos María de Alvear, who had recently become one of Carrera’s closest allies in the River Plate and, in turn, San Martín’s most dangerous internal enemy. Thus, Álvarez Thomas’ decision to back the *Larraínes* was clearly influenced by his political differences with Alvear and his allies.<sup>112</sup>

Nonetheless, during his time in office Álvarez Thomas did not have the opportunity to make his preference known. It could be argued that Juan Martín de Pueyrredón, who was the Supreme Director of the River Plate when the expedition to Chile was launched, was more impartial than Álvarez Thomas. In his Instructions to San Martín, Pueyrredón ordered the

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<sup>110</sup> AGN, room X, 5-5-6, pp. 197-197v, San Martín to the Supreme Director of the United Provinces, 26 September 1815.

<sup>111</sup> Sepúlveda, *Bernardo*, p. 301, says that during his time in Buenos Aires O’Higgins met Álvarez and was introduced to the *Logia Lautaro*, a secret Masonic lodge that advised O’Higgins during his administration. I shall discuss the role played in Chilean politics by the *Logia Lautaro* in the following chapter.

<sup>112</sup> AGN, room X, 5-5-6, pp. 199, the Supreme Director of the United Provinces to San Martín, 30 October 1815.

general-in chief to bear always in mind that the objective of the Army of the Andes was to assist the Chileans to re-conquer their territory, but that any attempt to ‘keep possession of the aided country’ must ruled out. In the second section of the Instructions [*Ramo político y gubernativo*], the neutrality of Buenos Aires in relation to Chilean politics was stated: ‘being notorious the division in two parties in which Chile found itself before the entrance of the King’s troops, one led by the Carrera family and the other by the house of Larraín, **we will procure to extinguish the seed of disorder with impartial proclamations**, without justifying either party and preventing the renewal of the causes of that fatal clash’.<sup>113</sup> But to show impartiality in internal politics should not preclude San Martín from convincing Chileans to be part of a general ‘American government’ and ‘constitute one single nation’:

Although the general has been warned that he should not interfere either by action or through fear in the establishment of the supreme government of the country, he should procure to use his influence and persuasion to make Chile send deputies to the general congress of the United Provinces so that a general form of government might be created in America, united in purpose and identity and whose cause, interests and objective might constitute one single nation. But, above all, he shall procure that a government be established in accordance with the one our congress will established, and that whatever form of government that country might adopt must include a constitutional alliance with our provinces.

Why was Buenos Aires insisting on the importance of constituting an ‘American nation’? There are both political and military answers that explain what the ‘American project’ was and which were its principal aims. In late 1816 ‘patriotism’ was exclusively invoked by the insurgents to refer to America, in spite of the fact that the royalist army was, like the revolutionary, composed above all of people born in the New World. In so doing, the South American revolutionaries followed Simón Bolívar when he tried to ‘found the identity of two belligerents, and establish them in different nations’. According to Clément Thibaud, in the declaration of the War to the Death Bolívar created ‘an ambiguous identity fiction, where the “Spanish” figure was the scapegoat of the war. Through this act of naming the “Spanish” enemy in the political sense of the term, the “American” party acquired sense and consistence in compensation. Bolívar’s objective was to create a division in the old nation, [...] with the purpose of forging a new political body’.<sup>114</sup> Although Pueyrredon’s and San Martín’s ‘American project’ changed significantly in the coming years (as later chapter will show), it

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<sup>113</sup> The Instructions, which are dated on 21 December 1816, are in AGN, *Paso de Los Andes*, pp. 284-287. The emphasize is mine.

<sup>114</sup> Thibaud, *Repúblicas en Armas*, p. 130.

maintained one, important characteristic: its anti-Spanish sentiment.<sup>115</sup> It is safe to argue, therefore, that Pueyrredón's and San Martín's anti-Spanish outcry introduced the same 'fictional' division between 'Spain' and 'America' as Bolívar's Manichean division.

But there are also military reasons that explain why Buenos Aires called upon Chileans to 'Americanize' the revolution. Like San Martín, Pueyrredón was convinced that, after taking control of Chile, an attack on Lima would annihilate the royalists in South America, and that to undertake such an attack it was essential to organize an army in Chile formed both of Chilean and *rioplatenses*. The Army of the Andes should be the basis of that force, though it was hoped that in the future Chileans would engage more actively in the defence of the revolutionary cause. In the view of the Supreme Director, the allegiance of Chileans to local defence was key to putting the military aspects of the American project into practice. However, he also believed that Chileans must understand that the struggle against the 'Spanish yoke' was extremely onerous, and that Buenos Aires would not always be willing to assist its fellow revolutionaries. So Pueyrredón decided that, after re-conquering Chile, the Chilean government was to 'repay the United Provinces with two million pesos to cover the enormous expenses of the campaign'.<sup>116</sup>

By the time these Instructions were written (21 December 1816), the training of the Army of the Andes was at its height. But contrary to what one might have thought, San Martín spent his last days in Mendoza busy with symbolic rather than military issues. He 'knew the importance of spectacle and liturgy',<sup>117</sup> a fact that accounts for the general's decision to encourage the loyalty of his men by religious means. San Martín and Cuyo's new governor, Toribio de Luzuriaga, were Catholic themselves, which is why in their attitudes towards religion one can hardly find traces of atheism or even signs of irreligion.<sup>118</sup> What one does find is a conscious effort to link their cause with the teachings of the Church. Phrases such as 'the churches of the capital had begun to implore the protection of the God of the Armies'; 'let us

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<sup>115</sup> Examples of San Martín's anti-Spanishness are: a proposal on 28 October 1815 to expel all Spaniards from Mendoza (see AGN, room X, 5-5-6, pp. 254-254v, San Martín to Secretary of Government); a request to the Supreme Director to replace the Spanish Sergeant-Major Bonifacio García with a non-European officer (see AGN, room X, 4-2-5, p. 374, San Martín to the Supreme Director of the United Provinces). Meanwhile, on 1 November Bernardo de Vera y Pintado advised San Martín to pardon a 'countryman' [*paisano*] who had deserted, but recommended the execution of a group of European deserters and traitors. San Martín approved at least the first recommendation. See AGN, room X, 4-2-5, p. 378.

<sup>116</sup> AGN, *Paso de Los Andes*, p. 287.

<sup>117</sup> Lynch, *San Martín*, p. 91.

<sup>118</sup> Luzuriaga was appointed governor of Cuyo in October 1816 so San Martín could devote himself exclusively preparing the invasion of Chile. See Enrique Díaz Araujo, 'Historia institucional de Mendoza. Notas para servir a su estudio', in *Revista de la Junta de Estudios Históricos de Mendoza*, segunda época, number 4, pp. 187-189.

unite our vows in the Sacred Altar, so God can bless our weapons and grant a double spirit to the brave Legions that are prepared for the fight'; 'it is a duty of every good patriot to participate in these acts of piety'; 'the cause of God and that of the *Patria* are indissolubly linked by the grace of the Supreme Maker'; '[let us hope] that the great God of Battles pours His blessing on our arms, crowning the justice of our cause', were repeatedly used by Luzuriaga in his *Bandos* between late December 1816 and early February 1817.<sup>119</sup> It was so important for both San Martín and Luzuriaga to ensure that Mendoza's inhabitants participate in these religious/political ceremonies, that they usually ordered the local merchants to close their stores so they could also be part of the celebrations.<sup>120</sup>

Without doubt the festivity of 5 January 1817, in which Our Lady of Carmen was designated Patroness of the army and the first *rioplatense* flag was blessed, was the most popular of all these ceremonies. According to Luzuriaga, 'the fifth [of January] is marked by the august and sacred ceremony of the oath to the Patroness of the army of Our Lady of Carmen and by the blessing of the flag under whose auspices the struggle against the victimizers of the Kingdom of Chile will be undertaken. Shall we mark with a mysterious Thau the place where the banner of our liberty will be hoisted'.<sup>121</sup> John Lynch gives a lively description of the festivity of 5 January:

In fine summer weather his troops [San Martín's] left their camp at El Plumerillo, their uniforms smart, buttons shining, weapons gleaming, and as they marched through the streets of Mendoza the drums sounded and the fifes played and the crowds shouted. The first stop was the monastery of San Francisco, where the statue of Our Lady of Carmen, the Virgin General, whom San Martín had designated Patron of the army, was carried out to head the column with San Martín at its head. From there it made its way to the church to collect the blue and white flag made by the women of Mendoza and lying at the foot of the altar. The army chaplain celebrated mass and blessed the flag, which was then taken by San Martín to the porch of the church and shown to the crowd in the square outside: 'Soldiers! This is the first flag to have been raised in America. Swear to uphold it and to die in its defence, as I swear'. 'We swear' came the reply.<sup>122</sup>

Drums, fifes and other musical instruments had a special place on that historic day. 'On 5 January', Carmen Gutiérrez argues, 'the bands of the infantry, cavalry and artillery played' military music, as also did when the Army of the Andes began to cross the *Cordillera*.<sup>123</sup> It is

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<sup>119</sup> AHM, box 4, doc. 50, 31 December 1816; AHM, box 4, doc. 55, 1 February 1817.

<sup>120</sup> This order appears in both *Bandos* quoted above.

<sup>121</sup> AHM, box 4, doc. 5, 3 January 1817. This document was published with an introductory analysis written by the author of this thesis in Joaquín Alliende, *Madre Alma, Carmen de Chile*, Ediciones UC, Santiago, 2010, pp. 327-329.

<sup>122</sup> Lynch, *San Martín*, p. 91.

<sup>123</sup> Carmen Gutiérrez, 'La música en el pensamiento estratégico del general San Martín', in *San Martín, gobernador y*

not surprising that, in a period marked by the influence of the *Marseillaise*, San Martín made his soldiers play and sing military music, nor that in 1818 Chileans sang their first anthem (which was written by the auditor of war of the Army of the Andes, Bernardo de Vera y Pintado) to the same rhythm and music as those of the anthem of the River Plate.<sup>124</sup> From the anecdote that in his odyssey across the *Cordillera* San Martín more than once ordered ‘the band to play the Argentine national anthem, the music echoing high through the mountains’, it can be said that the musicians of the Army of the Andes brought the *rioplatense* anthem into Chile and popularized it.<sup>125</sup> San Martín himself sang the anthem in a reception held in Santiago to celebrate the revolutionary triumph in Chacabuco.<sup>126</sup>

After designating Our Lady of Carmen Patroness of the army and blessing the flag, San Martín started to dispatch his forces. San Martín was well aware that to cross the *Cordillera* was a major task. As he told Tomás Guido in June 1816, his main preoccupation was not as much the ‘opposition that the enemy may present, but to cross those immense mountains’.<sup>127</sup> However, he overcame his fears and concluded that the bulk of his army should break into Chile from two central passes: Uspallata and Los Patos.

The Army of the Andes was, according to a *Estado general de su actual fuerza, armamento y municiones* dated 31 December 1816, formed by 195 officers, 14 commanders and 3,778 soldiers (total: 3,987 men). The artillery had 258 men, the infantry 2,928 and the cavalry 801.<sup>128</sup> This total diminished, however, in the first weeks of January, as is shown by a letter sent on 21 January by San Martín to Pueyrredón informing him of the loss of 400 men (because of desertions, disease or death).<sup>129</sup> Tactically, the army was organized in two major divisions. The first was under the command of Juan Gregorio de las Heras, its objective being to advance through Uspallata to Santa Rosa de Los Andes. The second was led ‘by another *porteño* soldier, Miguel Estanislao Soler’,<sup>130</sup> and its aim was to enter into Chile through Los Patos and ‘seize San Felipe de Aconcagua the same day that Las Heras took control of Santa Rosa de Los

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*Libertador de América*, Exhibition held in the Archivo General de la Provincia de Mendoza, August, 2006.

<sup>124</sup> The lyrics of this anthem can be found in AGN, *Paso de Los Andes*, p. 92.

<sup>125</sup> Lynch, *San Martín*, p. 93.

<sup>126</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 97.

<sup>127</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. X, p. 377. This is a quote from a letter sent by San Martín to Tomás Guido on 14 June 1816.

<sup>128</sup> Espejo, *El paso de Los Andes*, p. 525.

<sup>129</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. X, p. 372, footnote 5.

<sup>130</sup> Lynch, *San Martín*, p. 92.

Andes'.<sup>131</sup> Soler's division was, in turn, divided in three: Soler was in charge of the vanguard, Bernardo O'Higgins of the centre, and San Martín of the reserve. To them were added small columns, the first of which left Mendoza on 9 January. On that day, 'small, lighter detachments [began to be] sent in carefully timed departures to each flank over a front of 805 kilometres'.<sup>132</sup> This column was led by Juan Manuel Cabot and was sent to Coquimbo. Five days later, another small column headed by Ramón Freire was dispatched to the southern regions of the Central Valley so he could get into Chile from Curicó and Colchagua. Las Heras' division of 800 men started to cross the *Cordillera* on 18 January. He was followed by Soler's vanguard, which left Mendoza between 19 and 20 January. O'Higgins' centre left between 21 and 22 January, while San Martín and the Army Staff set off on 24 January.<sup>133</sup>

Giving O'Higgins the responsibility to command a quarter of the army, Pueyrredón and San Martín empowered the man they deemed their most strategic ally in Chile. And the truth is that this was not the only mission assigned to O'Higgins by the *rioplatenses*. Indeed, only a day before Las Heras' division began their advance towards Chile, Pueyrredón agreed with San Martín that, if the Army of the Andes succeeded, O'Higgins should be appointed 'president or Supreme Director of the Chilean state'.<sup>134</sup> O'Higgins' appointment, for them, ensured that Buenos Aires' continental strategy would be politically, militarily, and economically supported by the Chilean treasury. Thus, even though San Martín and Pueyrredón rejected the idea of naming one of the military chiefs of the River Plate governor of Chile, they actively participated in the decision that allowed O'Higgins to become Supreme Director of Chile in February 1817.

The divisions of the Army of the Andes took about twenty days to cross the *Cordillera*. The day-to-day life of the divisions during this period can be followed in a book published by H. Bertling in 1908, which shows that the crossing was exhausting, dangerous and unpredictable.<sup>135</sup> Most of the documents published by Bertling were remitted to San Martín and some of them were written by the general-in-chief himself. Thus, for instance, we find a letter of Las Heras of 25 January notifying San Martín that a minor confrontation had taken

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<sup>131</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. X, p. 382.

<sup>132</sup> Lynch, *San Martín*, p. 92.

<sup>133</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. X, p. 384 and footnote 14 of that page.

<sup>134</sup> AGN, *Paso de Los Andes*, p. 287, Pueyrredón to San Martín, 17 January 1817.

<sup>135</sup> Bertling, *Documentos históricos*. In annex 2 (p. 117) and 3 (p. 120) of this book there is a summary of the distance travelled by the army each day, and the amounts of water, alfalfa and firewood for fire that the insurgents needed during the crossing.

place between his men and 60 of the enemy.<sup>136</sup> Two days later, Las Heras asked San Martín to send the surgeon-major of the army with medicines to Uspallata, as he did not want to leave his sick soldiers (who numbered 16) behind.<sup>137</sup> These setbacks did not, however, stop Las Heras, and on 2 February he was already in Juncalillo (located in the Chilean side of the *Cordillera*). Las Heras wrote to San Martín from Juncalillo that he had ‘taken control of the heights of the *Cordillera*’, informing him also that in order to monitor the ‘movements of the enemy’ he had sent a spy accompanied by a guerrilla band of 30 men to a place called *La Guardia* (which was where the royalists were allegedly assembled).<sup>138</sup> That same day, Las Heras decided that his division’s watchword [*santo y seña*] would be: ‘our army has overcome the greatest obstacle’. On 4 February, this watchword was changed for ‘the brave Argentine has passed through the Andes’, and on 5 February for ‘the vanguard has entered into the Valley’.<sup>139</sup>

O’Higgins’ troops also experienced setbacks throughout the crossing of the *Cordillera*. On 1 February, the Chilean general told San Martín that the cold temperatures of the Andes were causing suffering amongst his men, and that ‘a black soldier’ [*un negrito*] had recently died due to the severity of the weather. O’Higgins was able to relieve the suffering of his men only by giving them wine.<sup>140</sup> But like Las Heras’ division, O’Higgins’ and Soler’s men kept marching. Once in Los Patos, the second division of the army was ordered to ‘open communications with Las Heras and then march directly to Chacabuco’. In Lynch’s words, the royalists ‘were alerted to the danger of a junction of the two divisions, which they could prevent by dominating one of the passes and so stop the Army of the Andes from occupying the plain’. San Martín, however, foresaw this threat and ‘sent in a unit of twenty-five mounted grenadiers,

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<sup>136</sup> Ibidem, p. 39. It is likely that this is the same confrontation to which the royalist Miguel Marqueli made reference in a letter to Marcó del Pont of 26 January. In what is without doubt the most interesting paragraph of this document, Marqueli reported that the revolutionaries attacked the royalist troops singing French marches (the *Marseillaise*?), but that in the end the courage of his men prevailed: ‘the enemy collected with incredible speed their wounded and dead and took them away. They came playing French marches and insulting us; in our side all that could be heard was “fire” and “long live the King”. Their losses must have been very great considering how well directed our firing was and that, although they collected their dead, they left behind 15 bodies. We lost four *talaveras*, and seven from Chiloé were wounded. I would be unjust if I were to recommend one particular person. All, all, officers, soldiers, *chilotes* and *talaveras* have surpassed the high opinion that they had so justly gained. Such bravery is not imaginable. Their honour, enthusiasm and constancy shone throughout, and it can be assured that with soldiers such as these we will always be victorious’. In Ibidem, p. 175.

<sup>137</sup> Ibidem, p. 48.

<sup>138</sup> Ibidem, pp. 58-59.

<sup>139</sup> Ibidem, pp. 105-106. It is interesting that Las Heras had used the word ‘Argentine’ in a date as early as 1817. We should remember that at this time the former Viceroyalty was known as Provincias Unidas del Río de la Plata and that it was only during Bernardino Rivadavia’s administration (1826) that Argentina became the country’s official name.

<sup>140</sup> Ibidem, p. 10.

whose epic charge on 4 February –the first of a series- put to flight the Spanish detachment, taking their stores and equipment’. On 10 February, Lynch continues, ‘San Martín’s men united on the Chilean side as planned, truly a miracle of timing. They took up position on the heights overlooking the hill of Chacabuco, which blocked the north end of the central valley of Chile and was the key to the advance on Santiago’.<sup>141</sup>

The battle of Chacabuco started early in the morning of 12 February 1817, and only O’Higgins’ and Soler’s divisions were active on the battlefield.<sup>142</sup> O’Higgins had orders not to engage in a direct attack until the forces of Soler, who had been sent to confront the enemy’s right, joined the rest of the army. San Martín had ‘always planned a single massive attack on the Spanish forces’, and so he could not afford to have his army destroyed because of a sally by a subordinate. However, impatient as he was, O’Higgins disobeyed and ‘threw his men in alone against the Spaniards’, who were led by Rafael Maroto.<sup>143</sup> O’Higgins’ aim was to attack the enemy’s left flank, to which end he led the infantry himself. But, as Barros Arana wrote, ‘such a charge did not produce the expected results’;<sup>144</sup> furthermore, ‘this one impulsive act threatened the whole strategy of San Martín’, who saw from the heights how his men had ‘to retreat in disorder, leaving on the field “a heap of poor negroes”’.<sup>145</sup> To remedy this risky situation, San Martín ordered Soler to ‘hasten the march of his division’ and help O’Higgins’ troops to destroy the forces of the enemy. With two squadrons of grenadiers, San Martín ‘charged the right of the enemy and routed them’,<sup>146</sup> thereby ‘encouraging O’Higgins infantry to renew their attack with a fierce bayonet charge’.<sup>147</sup>

Soler’s division arrived more or less at the same time that San Martín engaged personally in the combat. In a pincer strategy, the *rioplatense* general appeared from the right, though he finally attacked the left flank of the enemy. The royalists were ‘caught between O’Higgins’ infantry and the main body of Soler’s division, which cut off their retreat’.<sup>148</sup> As a result, the insurgents lost 150 men between dead and wounded, while almost 600 royalists died

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<sup>141</sup> Lynch, *San Martín*, pp. 93-94.

<sup>142</sup> Scholars have shown interest in the battle of Chacabuco since the 1840s, when the Amunáteguis, *La Reconquista*, pp. 449-456, published their work on the Chilean ‘*reconquista*’. See also Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. X, pp. 425-431; Eyzaguirre, *O’Higgins*, pp. 168-172. My analysis of the battle of Chacabuco is based mainly on Lynch, *San Martín*, pp. 94-95, as this is without doubt the best work published in recent years in English about San Martín and his time.

<sup>143</sup> Lynch, *San Martín*, p. 94.

<sup>144</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. X, p. 427.

<sup>145</sup> Lynch, *San Martín*, pp. 94-95.

<sup>146</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 95.

<sup>147</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid.*

and another 600 were captured (of these, 32 were officers, among them Vicente San Bruno). In addition, the insurgents captured the enemy's artillery and the flag of the *Regimiento de Chiloé*.<sup>149</sup>

The battle of Chacabuco put an end to a period known for the inability of both sides to build a sophisticated administrative project, even though it did not put an end to the military confrontations between royalists and insurgents in Chilean territory. This, because after the battle of Chacabuco of 12 February 1817 the insurgents re-conquered only Santiago and its surroundings, the royalists, now led by José Ordóñez, being able to reassemble their forces in Talca and Concepción and deploy them throughout the south of the country. San Martín's statement of 22 February that in twenty-four days the Army of the Andes 'defeated the tyrants and freed Chile' was, therefore, exaggerated. The 'echo of patriotism', as San Martín called it, resounded stronger than ever.<sup>150</sup> However, in the words of Lynch, Chacabuco was 'a victory squandered', not least because of the revolutionaries' decision not to chase the enemy.<sup>151</sup> The insurgents retook control of Santiago. They even imprisoned Marcó del Pont and his closest allies. But they did not consummate independence militarily. That remained far off.

The next chapter will discuss O'Higgins' attempts to secure both the political and military independence of the Chilean state.

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This chapter analyzed the process of militarization experienced by Cuyo's society as a consequence of the organization of the Army of the Andes. We have seen that San Martín engaged himself personally in the various stages of the creation of the army, especially from mid-1816, when the decision to assist the Chilean revolutionaries to re-conquer their country was finally made. The participation of Chilean officers in both the preparation of the army and the battle of Chacabuco was marginal, as most émigrés were sent out of the province to combat the royalists in other parts of the River Plate. However, there was a small group of Chileans, headed by O'Higgins and some of his closest allies, who crossed the *Cordillera* with the rest of the army to fight the royalists. They were backed by a number of Chilean spies who either remained in the country or were sent by San Martín to Chile in order to recollect

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<sup>149</sup> Bertling, *Documentos históricos*, p. 135.

<sup>150</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 137.

<sup>151</sup> Lynch, *San Martín*, p. 95.

information of Marcó del Pont's government and army. Manuel Rodríguez was without doubt the one who stood out most in this task, even though his role during this period of the revolution is not to be exaggerated, because it can easily be confused with mythology.

This chapter also highlighted the relationship between the Buenos Aires politicians and San Martín, as well as the important support given by Pueyrredón to the plan of invading Chile with a *rioplatense* force. Pueyrredón agreed to spend money, resources and men to reconquer Chile because he believed that this would allow Buenos Aires to attempt an attack on Lima, the centre of the counterrevolution. This explains why Pueyrredón and San Martín never aspired to establish a *rioplatense* government in Chile, but rather to secure O'Higgins' appointment as Supreme Director of the country. In their view, O'Higgins was the best ally they could have in Chile, and the only one who would convince his fellowmen of the importance of using Chile as a springboard to future military ventures. However, we shall see in the next chapter that with the passage of time the intervention in Chilean politics of the *Logia Lautaro* –formed of both *rioplatense* and Chilean officers, but commanded from Buenos Aires and Mendoza- would be criticized by those who resented its secrecy and radical measures.

## CHAPTER V

### THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MILITARY REGIME IN CHILE, 1817-1823

San Martín's arrival in Santiago after the battle of Chacabuco provoked a realignment of Chilean politics. For the first time in more than two years the insurgents took control of the administration of the capital. We will see that the *santiaguinos* became actively involved in politics, and that military affairs were at the centre of their political agenda. This was the case because decisions concerning the war were made in Santiago, and also because O'Higgins' political programme was designed and implemented by his military allies.

This chapter is divided into four sections. Section one addresses the establishment of a new revolutionary regime, as well as the political strategies employed by San Martín and O'Higgins to strengthen their power *vis-à-vis* 1) the royalists, and 2) their opponents within the insurgent faction. It will be argued that one of the main differences between the royalist governments of the years 1814-1817 and the O'Higgins administration is that the revolutionaries did not hesitate to prosecute and sentence those who, although insurgents, were at odds with the central government. An analysis of the functioning of the *Logia Lautaro* is, in this case, crucial to understanding the participation of Buenos Aires's politicians both in the organization of the O'Higgins government and the pursuit of unruly revolutionaries.

The second section concerns the battle of Maipú of 5 April 1818, and it emphasizes that in the aftermath of the battle the insurgents dominated the Central Valley but not the south of the country. Consequently, the third section offers an overview of the irregular warfare in the period 1818-1821 in the Concepción and the Araucanian regions. During that period, O'Higgins sent sporadic irregular forces from the Central Valley to fight the royalists led by Juan Francisco Sánchez and Vicente Benavides, but could not carry out a long-term military plan to expel the enemy from Chilean territory. Eventually, O'Higgins' indecision regarding how the royalist should be confronted created friction between the government's envoy in the Araucanian region, Joaquín Prieto, and colonel Ramón Freire, the chief of the Army of the South. This friction marked the start of a political conflict that, in early 1823, prompted the deposition of O'Higgins in favour of Freire.

The last section deals with the principal political characteristics of the O'Higgins government (1817-1823), which followed the model of the Roman republican dictator. It will

be contended that, through a series of measures, including the installation of the first military academy, the creation of a *Legión de Mérito* to award officers and soldiers, and the writing of two very personalistic constitutions, the O'Higgins government sought to secure both his political position and that of his military colleagues in the new Chilean republic. In general, the elites reacted positively to the intervention of military officers in politics, but criticized the excessive attributions assigned constitutionally to the Supreme Directorship. The Constitutions of 1818 and 1822 alienated provinces like Concepción, which, as chapter VII will show, in 1823 voted for the deposition not of O'Higgins the military officer but of O'Higgins the 'despotic' ruler.

### I. RULING OVER AN UNRULY POPULATION

San Martín arrived in Santiago two days after Chacabuco. The morning after the battle, Marcó del Pont escaped to Valparaíso, hoping to take the first ship to Lima. However, before Marcó reached the port, a squad of revolutionaries took him back to the capital, where he was imprisoned. After a private conversation with the Spanish general, San Martín sent Marcó to Mendoza to be sentenced by Cuyo's authorities. Toribio de Luzuriaga confined Marcó to San Luis, where he lived for two years. He eventually died in the *rioplatense* city of Luján, imprisoned and poor.

Other important royalist figures from Santiago also escaped from the capital. These included Santiago's *Administrador de Correos*, Juan Bautista Aeta, who experienced a real odyssey in finding a ship that could take him and his family to Lima.<sup>1</sup> Aeta's consternation at the defeat was total, as also was that of Juan Manuel Mendiburu, who, on 20 March 1817, wrote to Abascal from Guayaquil to report on events at Chacabuco. Mendiburu expressed his astonishment at the rapidity with which Marcó's army had been defeated, arguing that the Chilean royalists had chosen not to resist San Martín vigorously, but rather wait until they had learned more of Buenos Aires' political and military plans. What is more, Mendiburu implicitly said that the weak resistance of the *santiaguinos* was due to the latter's interest in signing a political alliance with Buenos Aires.<sup>2</sup> Bearing in mind the conflicts between Marcó and the Santiago elites, Mendiburu seemed to have been correct.

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<sup>1</sup> AGI, Correos 87, 26 March 1817.

<sup>2</sup> AGI, Diversos 5, Mendiburu to Abascal, 20 March 1817.

After entering the capital, San Martín sought to build bridges with the Santiago elites. The nomination, arranged in advance, of O'Higgins as Supreme Director of Chile on 16 February was the first step towards the consolidation of San Martín's plans in Chile.<sup>3</sup> Once in office, O'Higgins furthered this strategy, both in his communications with Pueyrredón and in his public acts in Santiago during the first months of 1817. While in his correspondence with Buenos Aires we perceive O'Higgins' gratitude towards San Martín for helping recover Chile, in his actions in Santiago we appreciate his efforts to make Chileans understand the important role played by Buenos Aires in the re-conquest of their country. A good example of the first case is a letter of 4 March to Pueyrredón in which O'Higgins told the Buenos Aires Supreme Director that 'we find ourselves in an Octavian tranquillity [...] Events in the south [of Chile] do not offer material worthy of the pen'.<sup>4</sup> Two examples of the second are the opinion of the *Gaceta del Supremo Gobierno* that 12 of February was a 'glorious day both for Chile and the Argentine Nation',<sup>5</sup> as well as O'Higgins' statement on 17 February thanking 'our friends, the sons of the River Plate', for helping the Chileans to regain their freedom.<sup>6</sup> At the same time, the creation of the Army of Chile (*Ejército de Chile*) and the establishment of a military academy in Santiago in March 1817 were designed to tighten the 'alliance with the government of Buenos Aires [...], whose aim was to take the war into Peru'.<sup>7</sup>

As it was argued in chapter IV, the alliance between the Chilean and the *rioplatense* revolutionaries was strengthened in the aftermath of the battle of Rancagua. This became clear already in 1815, while O'Higgins was living in Buenos Aires and became involved in the *Logia Lautaro*. The *Logia* can loosely be defined as a 'hybrid form of sociability, a combination of Masonic Lodge and patriot society'.<sup>8</sup> According to Felipe del Solar, it derived from a group called *Caballeros Racionales* that was created in Spain during the Napoleonic occupation of the

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<sup>3</sup> Julio Alemparte, *Carrera y Freire*, p. 151, claims that the election of O'Higgins was seconded by people like marqués de Larraín and conde de Quinta Alegre, which proves that at that time there were moderate royalists who were beginning to see the possibility that Chile enjoyed some degree of self-government. Cf. the last section of chapter III of this thesis.

<sup>4</sup> AGN, room X, 4-2-8, p. 218, O'Higgins to the Supreme Director of the United Provinces, 4 March 1817.

<sup>5</sup> *Gaceta del Supremo Gobierno de Chile*, vol. 1, number 1, 26 February 1817. A couple of months later, the Chilean government ordered the coining of medals to celebrate the triumph in Chacabuco and which should start circulating in the *porteño* capital on 25 May 1817, that is, the day of the commemoration of the installation of Buenos Aires' Junta. See AGN, room X, 4-2-8, p. 348, San Martín to the Supreme Director of the United Provinces, 3 June 1817.

<sup>6</sup> Espejo, *El Paso de Los Andes*, p. 622.

<sup>7</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. XI, p. 26. I will discuss in more depth the importance of this military academy in the fourth section of this chapter.

<sup>8</sup> Felipe Del Solar, 'Masones y Sociedades Secretas: redes militares durante las guerras de independencia en América del Sur', in *ALHIM*, Online, 2010 (b).

Peninsula. It is probable that San Martín's old enemy, Carlos Alvear, was a member of the *Caballeros Racionales* and that he launched a branch of the lodge in Buenos Aires once he returned to Spanish America. In any case, in 1816 the *Logia Lautaro*, as this branch was called, was led by Pueyrredón and San Martín, who set about 'creating an affiliate lodge in Mendoza and afterwards another one in Santiago'. In Del Solar's opinion, the *Logia Lautaro* responded 'to a process of regional military organization, whose ultimate objective was to overthrow the royalists from the Peruvian Viceroyalty'.<sup>9</sup>

Indeed, the *Logia* had political and military purposes, and both converged on the expulsion of the royalists from Spanish America. In Jaime Eyzaguirre's view, the aim of the *Logia* was to secure the independence of Spanish America.<sup>10</sup> The *Logia* did not act as a modern political party, but rather as a 'patriotic society' in which military activities went hand in hand with the introduction of a new political regime.<sup>11</sup> It is not surprising, therefore, that the principal members of the *Logia Lautaro* had been soldiers, nor that they had become key political figures in the 1820s.<sup>12</sup> Some of the better-known Chilean officers who participated in the *Logia Lautaro* of Santiago were O'Higgins, Ramón Freire, Luis de la Cruz and Manuel Borgoño, to whom we must add a group of *rioplatense* officers led by San Martín, Hilarión de la Quintana and Rudecindo Alvarado.<sup>13</sup> These military men were actively involved in the *Ejército Libertador* that was organized with the remains of the Army of the Andes and other troops recruited in Chile to liberate Peru.

Their involvement in the *Ejército Libertador del Perú* was one of the many elements shared by these officers. San Martín, O'Higgins and the other officers and civilians who participated in the re-conquest of Chile had the impression (or, at least, that was what they asserted in public) that Spanish Americans were not only different from, but also more virtuous than *peninsulares*. The first edition of the revolutionary periodical *Gaceta del Supremo Gobierno de Chile* pointed out the alleged differences between Europeans and Spanish Americans, as San Martín had done in Mendoza when he organized the Army of the Andes

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<sup>9</sup> Del Solar, 'La Francmasonería en Chile: de sus orígenes hasta su institucionalización', in REHMLAC, San José, 2010, pp. 6-7. Del Solar, 'Masones y Sociedades Secretas', has said that 'while Pueyrredón had the mission to administrate the *Logia* inside the United Provinces, San Martín was in charge of its expansive project'.

<sup>10</sup> Eyzaguirre, *La Logia Lautarina*, Editorial Francisco de Aguirre, Santiago, 1973, p. 13.

<sup>11</sup> Del Solar, 'Masones y Sociedades Secretas'.

<sup>12</sup> In the opinion of Klaus Gallo, 'Political instability in post-independence Argentina', p. 109, the participation of Alvear and San Martín in the *Logia Lautaro* 'illustrates a tendency among *rioplatenses* to value the presence of military men at the highest levels of politics'.

<sup>13</sup> Del Solar, 'La Francmasonería en Chile', p. 7, footnote 13.

and created a division between ‘Americans’ and ‘Spaniards’.<sup>14</sup> For San Martín and O’Higgins it was vital to convince the *Gaceta’s* readers that the royalists’ greatest crime was their foreign origin. The author of the article even brought up the coincidence that the battle of Chacabuco was fought on the same day that the first Spanish ‘usurper’, Pedro de Valdivia, founded Santiago in 1541: the grave of Valdivia ‘accompanies the shameful flight of the miserable remnant of the Spaniards who survived the triumph of Chacabuco’.<sup>15</sup>

Two weeks later, the *Gaceta* underscored this point once again, though this time its criticism focused on what the editors saw as the responsibility of the Spaniards in bringing violence to Chile. The so-called ‘*sistema de pura sangre*’ was in the heart of every ‘Spanish barbarian’. Nothing was more indicative of the Spanish ‘cruelty’ than the four gallows that the royalists set up during Marco’s government in the main square of Santiago and upon which the ‘*independientes*’ looked with horror when they arrived in the capital. In contrast to the ‘Spanish barbarians’, the revolutionaries had pardoned 23 royalist spies and treated Marcó’s emissaries with respect and even sympathy. Also, while the *Ejército Restaurador* led by San Martín was sober and loyal, the royalists had confiscated and spent the fortunes of hundreds of Chileans. ‘Nobles’ as well as the lower classes [*labradores*] faced the ‘brutality of the Spaniards’, not only in Chile but throughout Spanish America. An example of this last point was the one thousand ‘citizens’ killed in Chuquisaca following general La Serna’s orders.<sup>16</sup>

José Antonino Sapiain, a revolutionary regional leader from Huasco, was of the same opinion. In a long, well-articulated ‘*Proclama*’ Sapiain explained the invasion of Chile on the grounds that San Martín and his men had crossed the *Cordillera* to free their fellow revolutionaries from the Spanish yoke. ‘Every American carried a chain’ during the colonial period, said Sapiain, adding that the worst crime of the Spaniards was to deny that Americans ‘were a substantial part of the monarchy’. Things had changed in the last seven years (i.e. from 1810), and now the same Americans who once had struggled to be considered as a constitutive part of the empire had decided to cut their links to the metropolis. ‘The inequality of rights was scandalous’, as it opposed the ‘natural state of free men’. Sapiain’s reference to ‘nature’ was not new. According to Simon Collier, the Chilean men of letters of this period usually defined liberty in natural terms: ‘the law which created a suitable framework for the operation of liberty had to be as “natural” as possible. It had to be consonant with the eternal yardstick

<sup>14</sup> Cf. footnote 115 of chapter IV of this thesis.

<sup>15</sup> *Gaceta del Supremo Gobierno de Chile*, vol. 1, number 1, 26 February 1817.

<sup>16</sup> *Gaceta del Supremo Gobierno de Chile*, vol. 1, number 3, 12 March 1817.

of the Natural Law. Natural Law, to the Chileans, was fixed in a permanent and unshakable position in the universe'.<sup>17</sup> Thus, Sapiain's position was in conformity with Santiago's plan to reinforce the argument that the battle of Chacabuco allowed the Chileans to recover their 'natural freedom'.<sup>18</sup>

Because the Spanish regime was 'unnatural', its followers had to be punished. Notwithstanding the belief that the insurgents were lenient while the royalists were vindictive and despotic, O'Higgins' reprisals did not differ much from Mariano Osorio's and Francisco Marcó del Pont's. On 12 March 1817, for instance, the *Gaceta* stated that the 'patriots whose possessions [*bienes*] were seized by the tyrant deserve a reciprocal reward'. Accordingly, O'Higgins stated that 1) 'all properties belonging to residents of Spain and its domains, whether continental or ultramarine, be immediately confiscated, excepting those belonging to exiles or prisoners' of the previous regime; 2) that 'everyone who possesses such properties should hand them over within 48 hours from this publication'; 3) that 'those who do not declare them on time will suffer a total confiscation of their possessions'; 4) and that 'after this denunciation process [*delación*], the government will open a new book of *delaciones* in which accusations against those who had hidden their intentions will be recorded'.<sup>19</sup> These orders were followed a week later by the following admonition: 'whoever after two months has not qualified as a Patriot will lose his job and remain with no further option of employment'.<sup>20</sup>

Dismissals and detentions of royalist civil employees and military officers began almost immediately after the publication of the *Bando* of 12 March. The *rioplatense* officer Hilarión de la Quintana, who performed as interim Supreme Director while O'Higgins was in the south fighting the royalist guerrillas, took personal charge in executing this task.<sup>21</sup> On 24 April 1817, de la Quintana informed O'Higgins that he had instructed his subordinates to imprison 'all the officers who served in the enemy's army'.<sup>22</sup> Three days later, he informed O'Higgins that all suspected individuals, from *hacendados* to *inquilinos*, had been removed from the coast, and that

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<sup>17</sup> Collier, *Ideas and politics*, p. 134. Natural Law was deeply rooted in the Spanish intellectual tradition. See Jaime Rodríguez, 'Sobre la supuesta influencia de la independencia de los Estados Unidos en las independencias hispanoamericanas', in *Revista de Indias*, vol. LXX, number 250, 2010, p. 694.

<sup>18</sup> AHM, box 702, doc. 9, 23 February 1817.

<sup>19</sup> *Gaceta del Supremo Gobierno de Chile*, vol. 1, number 3, 12 March 1817.

<sup>20</sup> *Gaceta del Supremo Gobierno de Chile*, vol. 1, number 4, 19 March 1817.

<sup>21</sup> Quintana was Supreme Director of Chile (*Delegado*) from April to September 1817. He was replaced by a *Junta Gubernativa* formed by Luis de la Cruz, Francisco Antonio Pérez and José Manuel Astorga until O'Higgins retook office (24 March 1818). See Alemparte, *Carrera y Freire*, p. 158; and Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. XI, p. 173.

<sup>22</sup> MG, vol. 34, p. 16, de la Quintana to O'Higgins, 24 April 1817.

‘true patriots’ had been appointed as coast guards. He added proudly that ‘patriot priests’ were helping the authorities to ‘preach’ the new ‘system’.<sup>23</sup>

These general measures were accompanied by the systematic pursuit of specific individuals who had relations with the previous government.<sup>24</sup> Defendants were generally accused of ‘*realismo*’, although the word ‘*realismo*’ could mean very different things. Indeed, there were at least two levels of ‘*realismo*’: the first was related to what we might call ‘high politics’, the second to mundane issues. While in the former case the royalists were investigated because the authorities were suspicious of their ‘political conduct’, in the latter the defendants were prosecuted for minor ‘crimes’, such as giving the royalists shelter or aiding them with food and other goods during the war.

Like in the case of Mariano Osorio,<sup>25</sup> investigations could last months before a verdict was passed, and the defendants could be either common people or relatively powerful figures. Regarding common people, we find a ‘criminal case’ followed in San Felipe against the ‘*godo europeo*’ and second lieutenant of the royalist army, Esteban del Campo, between March and May 1817. Del Campo faced three charges: to have escaped with his family to ‘enemy territory’ [*campo enemigo*]; to have ‘denounced’ an individual called Juan Naranjo ‘for speaking in favour of the patriots’; and to have stolen gold from the ‘patriots who fled to Mendoza’ after the battle of Rancagua. However, after two months of investigations the authorities had not reached a final sentence. Consequently, del Campo asked to be released, admitting nevertheless that he had indeed stolen money from some of the soldiers who migrated to the other side of the *Cordillera*, but stressing that he was innocent of the other accusations. The authority in charge of his case agreed to release him after he paid a small fine.<sup>26</sup>

Other defendants were more powerful and important than del Campo, and therefore O’Higgins involved himself directly in the formulation of charges. Rafael Beltrán was a respected *vecino* of Santiago who, according to O’Higgins, ‘showed the most obstinate adherence to the right and the cause of the King’ during Osorio’s and Marcó’s governments. O’Higgins continued: ‘three days before action at Chacabuco he [Beltrán] protested in the Act of 9 February 1817 the most solemn hatred of the patriotic system, swearing to uphold the monarchy with his life, belongings and honour’. After the revolutionary triumph in Chacabuco,

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<sup>23</sup> MG, vol. 34, pp. 20-21, de la Quintana to O’Higgins, 27 April 1817.

<sup>24</sup> For lists of prisoners, see AHM, box 496, docs. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26; and AHM, box 497, docs. 33, 34, 38.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. section I of chapter III of this thesis.

<sup>26</sup> CG, vol. 336, pp. 284-297.

Beltrán ‘escaped to Lima’, where he offered ‘enormous amounts of money to assist the expedition’ that Joaquín Pezuela organized in 1818 in order to ‘subdue Chile’ (I shall return to this expedition later in this chapter). But on 1 June 1818 Beltrán was captured and ‘now it seems fair that due to the charges mentioned above, which can also be applied to other *vecinos* of this capital, the accused should be prosecuted’.<sup>27</sup> Though I was unable to find the verdict in this case, I have located a document in which Agustín Díaz confirmed O’Higgins’ accusations. In Díaz’s words: ‘I certify as true that, during the governments of Osorio and Marcó, Rafael Beltrán expressed the most determined commitment to the rights and cause of the king’.<sup>28</sup>

There were, as I said, other individuals who were prosecuted for minor ‘crimes’. Manuel Bello and José León were charged by the soldier Lorenzo Flores of providing ‘bread, chilli, wine and other goods’ to the enemy. It is not clear whether Bello and León helped the royalists for ideological reasons or, rather, because they had a commercial relation with them. Flores could not ascertain if Bello and León handed letters to the royalists when they delivered their provisions, nor if they were spies of Juan Francisco Sánchez. What he could say for certain was that other individuals, such as Benito Lazo, Juan Lazo, Josefa Bello, Isabel Bello, Martina Bello and Juana Bello, participated in this traffic. He also stated that Sánchez had given them ‘free passage for them to come and go, and they came and left this city with no obstacles’. The sentence in this case is unknown, but the entire Bello family declared that the accusation was false and that Manuel Bello and José León should be released.<sup>29</sup>

Cases such as these show that royalists and revolutionaries shared a common belief with regard to how their respective enemies should be investigated and punished. The division of society between those who ‘opposed’ and those who ‘supported’ the political regime that happened to be in power was an approach typically employed by both royalists and revolutionaries. When persuasion failed, both sides used coercion. There was, however, a marked difference between royalists and revolutionaries regarding this matter: the former rarely prosecuted their fellow royalists,<sup>30</sup> while O’Higgins and his closest allies did not hesitate in condemning those insurgents who opposed the intervention of the *Logia Lautaro* in Chilean

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<sup>27</sup> MG, vol. 78, 15 July 1818.

<sup>28</sup> MG, vol. 78, 29 July 1818. Other examples of ‘political cases’ in AGN, room X, 4-2-9, pp. 314-314v, 9 December 1817; and AHM, box 703, doc. 16, 17 January 1818.

<sup>29</sup> MG, vol. 6, 4 July 1817.

<sup>30</sup> Although Marcó del Pont had problems with the Real Audiencia, he never carried out a system of persecution of its members. Cf. sections II and III of chapter III of this thesis.

politics or the way that O'Higgins ran his government.<sup>31</sup> O'Higgins' enemies within the insurgent faction were both civilians and military men, but the government feared the latter more. This was because men like the spy Manuel Rodríguez, who a couple of months after the battle of Chacabuco became O'Higgins' enemy,<sup>32</sup> and the Carrera brothers, who were supposedly plotting in the River Plate against the Chilean government, still had some influence in the army.

The responsibility of O'Higgins for the pursuit and subsequent murder of Rodríguez in May 1818 has traditionally been a subject of controversy among Chilean historians, though, in general, it is accepted that O'Higgins ordered his assassination. O'Higgins' intention to appoint Rodríguez as the Chilean delegate to the United States (March 1817) and then to the River Plate (August 1817) shows that, in the first months of his government, he favoured persuasion over coercion when dealing with this 'disruptive' insurgent.<sup>33</sup> This changed a couple of weeks later when, as we will see, news about the imprisonment in Mendoza of Luis and Juan José Carrera reached Santiago,<sup>34</sup> and Hilarión de la Quintana ordered the imprisonment in Chile of Rodríguez and other figures linked to the Carrera brothers.<sup>35</sup> After that, Rodríguez was relentlessly pursued as one of the most dangerous enemies of the government, a charge Rodríguez faced with particular intensity after he managed to reach power on 22 March 1818 in the absence of O'Higgins. On that occasion, and after learning of the revolutionary defeat in the battle of Cancha Rayada, Rodríguez took control of the capital by spreading rumours that O'Higgins had died in the battle. He was then appointed head of a new government together with Luis de la Cruz, from which position he organized a cavalry body of 200 men called the *Húsares de la Muerte* and whose highest ranks were given to the partisans of Carrera.<sup>36</sup>

But O'Higgins did not die in Cancha Rayada (he was only wounded, as the next section will show), nor did his political power. In fact, only a day and half after Rodríguez was appointed head of the government, O'Higgins returned to the capital and retook command of the administration of the country. Rodríguez was eventually taken prisoner and shot. Ricardo

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<sup>31</sup> We must not confuse 'internal political' enemies with ordinary 'criminals'. For an interesting example of a legal action initiated against an ordinary 'criminal' during O'Higgins' government (in this case, a military man who raped a woman), see AGN, room X, 4-2-9, pp. 191-193, 2 October 1817. For how O'Higgins' government recruited vagrants and criminals for the army, see MG, vol. 34, 28 November 1817.

<sup>32</sup> In fact, despite Rodríguez and his *guerrilleros* supported San Martín's plans to invade Chile, all his biographers coincide that Rodríguez was a follower of José Miguel Carrera.

<sup>33</sup> Ricardo Latcham, *Vida de Manuel Rodríguez*, p. 221, 230.

<sup>34</sup> Fernando Campos Harriet, *José Miguel Carrera*, Editorial Orbe, Santiago, 1974, pp. 87-89.

<sup>35</sup> Latcham, *Vida de Manuel Rodríguez*, p. 232.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 242-245; Alemparte, *Carrera y Freire*, pp. 179-181.

Latcham, the biographer of Rodríguez, noted that the former spy was assassinated by a lieutenant named Navarro. It is probable, as I have said, that O'Higgins had ordered his death.<sup>37</sup> In any case, what is undeniable is that in 1818 O'Higgins believed that the political stability of his government depended on the ability of his subordinates to get rid of enemies like Rodríguez.

For O'Higgins and his allies, the political foes within the revolutionary faction were as dangerous as recalcitrant royalists, especially those who criticized the influence of the *Logia Lautaro* in Chilean politics. Juan José and Luis Carrera, who were imprisoned in August 1817 in Mendoza for 'conspiring against the state', were among those who most openly criticized the methods of the *Logia*, including its secrecy.<sup>38</sup> It is not clear what the authorities meant by 'conspiracy', nor whether Juan José and Luis planned an attack on Chile with José Miguel, who lived in Montevideo. The only clear fact is that Juan José and Luis tried to return to Chile, but that they were stopped in Mendoza.<sup>39</sup> The judicial process faced by the Carreras in Mendoza was led by Toribio de Luzuriaga, but the O'Higgins government, represented by commissioners José Ignacio Zenteno and José Silvestre, conducted its own investigation to track down Carrera's followers in Chile.<sup>40</sup> Some of the individuals who were asked to give evidence about the political behaviour of the Carreras were the man of letters, Juan Egaña, and one of the most influential civil insurgents, the *rioplatense* Hipólito Villegas. While Egaña stated that his knowledge of the defendants was superficial and that because of that and so he could not make 'more specific comments about their internal affairs',<sup>41</sup> Villegas gave a detailed account of why he believed the Carreras were as dangerous as the royalists.

Villegas, for his part, stated that the political conduct of the Carreras 'has been a web of all sorts of inequities, of crimes of high treason or *lesa patria*, of squandering the public treasury, of rapes, murders, lootings'. Villegas' accusation that José Miguel Carrera had committed the crime of rape [*estupro*] was the most serious, and in many ways the most original of all. Nobody until then had ever accused the Carreras of other 'crimes' that were not political. In Villegas' words:

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<sup>37</sup> Latcham, *Vida de Manuel Rodríguez*, pp. 263-269. See also Alemparte, *Carrera y Freire*, pp. 185-189; and Salazar, *Construcción de Estado*, p. 475.

<sup>38</sup> FV, vol. 817, 9 September 1817.

<sup>39</sup> Campos Harriet, *José Miguel Carrera*, p. 87.

<sup>40</sup> The details of the process can be found in FV, vol. 817. See also CDHICH, vol. 43.

<sup>41</sup> FV, vol. 817, pp. 10-10v, Egaña to Zenteno and Silvestre, 10 September 1817.

Ask Coronel Antonio Mendiburu whether is not true that Jose Miguel, President of the Junta and general in Concepción, committed several rapes and put in jail several honest fathers under the pretext of being *godos* [...] and with the purpose of summoning to his presence their daughters without their mothers being present, supposedly to give evidence of secret domestic events but in fact to force their virtue: these were painful scenes which had begun before in Talca, where I was stationed as *comisario del ejército* and had the opportunity to hear about them.

Villegas finished his statement making reference to the participation of the Carreras in '*logias*' created in San Juan and Buenos Aires. Villegas, in other words, implicitly answered the accusation that O'Higgins and his allies were members of a Lodge by claiming that their enemies were also involved in this sort of 'secret club'. Apparently the aim of those *logias* was 'to put an end to the existence of certain rivals and to get rid of the Argentine troops which, as experience has demonstrated, had begun to set in motion their plans'.<sup>42</sup> That is, like the *Logia Lautaro*, whose objective was to overthrow the 'Spanish yoke' as well as to get rid of as many internal enemies as possible, the aim of the *logias* in which the Carreras participated was to destroy the group headed by San Martín and O'Higgins.

The defence of Juan José and Luis in Mendoza was led by Manuel Araoz, whose promise that the prisoners would never again set foot in Chile if the authorities commuted the death penalty for permanent exile did not produce the expected results. On 8 April 1818, three days after the battle of Maipú, Juan José and Luis Carrera were shot in the main square of Mendoza.<sup>43</sup> It is common knowledge that after the battle O'Higgins asked San Martín to dismiss the judicial case against the Carreras, a request which, according to O'Higgins' supporters, proves that the Supreme Director was unaware that the defendants had already been shot. However, it is less well-known that O'Higgins callously 'sent the bill for the costs of the case against his sons to Ignacio de la Carrera'.<sup>44</sup> To this were added a series of requisitions faced by the Carrera family during the O'Higgins government, which illustrates that the Supreme Director employed the same radical measures as the Carreras when they were in power.<sup>45</sup>

But what about José Miguel, who was the most experienced and, therefore, allegedly the most dangerous of the three brothers? After he was expelled from Mendoza in November 1814, José Miguel devoted himself to preparing alternative plans to those of San Martín to re-

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<sup>42</sup> FV, vol. 817, pp. 6-8v, Villegas to Zenteno and Silvestre, September 1817 (without exact date).

<sup>43</sup> Campos Harriet, *José Miguel Carrera*, p. 92.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 93. See also Alemparte, *Carrera y Freire*, pp. 168-170.

<sup>45</sup> Some details of the requisitions can be found in FV, vol. 237.

conquer Chile. We saw that he presented a plan in early 1815, but was rejected by the Buenos Aires authorities.<sup>46</sup> He then travelled to the United States and requested the economic aid of the Americans to fight the royalists. After fourteen months in the US, Carrera was able to gather a small *cuadrilla* to fight the royalists.<sup>47</sup> Although in the end only a small number of ships arrived in Buenos Aires from the United States, a significant group of American and French officers joined Carrera in his expedition. In the case of the French officers, they were veterans of the Napoleonic wars willing to continue their military career in the New World.<sup>48</sup>

José Miguel arrived back in Buenos Aires while San Martín was crossing the *Cordillera*. Carrera reported his achievements in the United States to Pueyrredón, but his idea of using his *cuadrilla* to attack the royalists by sea was rejected by the *porteño* Supreme Director. At the end of March 1817, Carrera was imprisoned in Buenos Aires together with his brother Juan José, who had been charged with conspiracy.<sup>49</sup> However, they escaped from prison: while Juan José fled to Chile (not reaching his destination, as we have seen), José Miguel went to Montevideo. He lived there during 1817-1818, publishing articles criticizing the role in Chile of the *Logia Lautaro*.<sup>50</sup> After leaving Montevideo he helped the regional leader Francisco Ramírez to overthrow Pueyrredón. He was even able to besiege Buenos Aires for more than two weeks (July 1820), a military accomplishment which, however, was too ephemeral to achieve his goal of once again putting his good friend Carlos Alvear at the head of the *rioplatense* government.

When colonel Manuel Dorrego was appointed governor of the River Plate, Carrera was forced to leave Buenos Aires and reorganize his forces in the *Pampa* (November 1820),<sup>51</sup> where he experienced one of the darkest periods of his life. He led a guerrilla faction formed by Chilean and *rioplatense* regular and irregular soldiers (including many Indians). He then tried to get closer to the Andes, seizing San Luis and San Juan, but not for long. In late August 1821 he was finally stopped by the army of Mendoza, and on 4 September he, like his brothers three

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<sup>46</sup> Cf. footnote 33 of chapter IV of this thesis.

<sup>47</sup> Alemparte, *Carrera y Freire*, p. 154.

<sup>48</sup> A list of these officers appears in Campos Harriet, *José Miguel Carrera*, p. 79. See also Patrick Puigmal, 'Influencia militar francesa durante la independencia chilena', in Patrick Puigmal (editor), *Memorias de Jorge Beauchef*, DIBAM, Santiago, 2005, pp. 41.45.

<sup>49</sup> Alemparte, *Carrera y Freire*, p. 158.

<sup>50</sup> Ibidem, pp. 272-275. On 25 May 1819, a worried minister of state, Joaquín Echeverría, requested the Chilean delegate to the River Plate, Miguel Zañartu, to find out Carrera's exactly whereabouts. Echeverría knew that Carrera was in the River Plate, but could not say for certain exactly where. See ABO, vol. 6, pp. 81-82, Echeverría to Chilean delegate to the United Provinces.

<sup>51</sup> Campos Harriet, *José Miguel Carrera*, pp. 98-101.

years earlier, was shot by a *mendocino* firing squad.<sup>52</sup>

Was O'Higgins involved in José Miguel's death, as he supposedly was in the case of his brothers? Apart from the novelistic aspects of the last years of José Miguel in the River Plate, what are the political/military conclusions that one can reach from his death? Even though O'Higgins' responsibility in José Miguel's death is much less clear than in the case of Juan José and Luis, to argue that O'Higgins' regime did little if anything to stop it is almost tautological. Like Manuel Rodríguez, José Miguel Carrera was viewed as a serious threat to a political regime that was starting to be seen by the Chileans as the only, legitimate representative of a still weak government. For O'Higgins, San Martín and the other members of the *Logia Lautaro* the annihilation of José Miguel Carrera became a requisite to accomplishing stability. At some point, this impression became an overarching opinion among the ruling classes. In Jocelyn-Holt's words: 'the tolerance [of the elites] towards O'Higgins' dictatorial and personalistic characteristics was founded on the fear that other, more charismatic and less malleable figures might prevail. The internal and external threat of Carrera until 1821 explains the rigour that was used in the prosecution and punishment of the *carrerino* side. The ruling elites preferred the [alleged] docility and opacity of O'Higgins rather than the leadership of his romantic and aristocratic rival'.<sup>53</sup>

Indeed, although the support for the Carrera brothers did not die with them, it is undeniable that if the elites had not backed O'Higgins' project with the enthusiasm they did, the government's political achievements in the period 1818-1822 would have been much more difficult to attain. The appointment of O'Higgins as Supreme Director was applauded by the *santiaguinos*, especially by those who saw in O'Higgins the twin of San Martín (who was without doubt the most popular figure in Chile at that time). Even the installation of the *Logia Lautaro* did not create serious friction at the beginning of the O'Higgins government. These frictions began only in the second half of 1817, when the followers of the Carreras opposed the role played by the *Logia*. However, these criticisms did not prevent the *Logia* from putting its goals into practice, and that this was because in general the ruling classes accepted the *Logia's* role as a power in the shadows. This explains in part why the years 1818-1821 were, politically speaking, so successful for O'Higgins. The revolutionary triumph in Maipú –the subject of the next section- explains a good deal more of this success.

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<sup>52</sup> Ibidem, pp. 111-115.

<sup>53</sup> Jocelyn-Holt, *La Independencia*, p. 231.

## II. MAIPÚ: BATTLE FOR TERRITORIAL DOMINANCE

Throughout 1817 Bernardo O'Higgins spent much of his time in the south of the country pursuing the royalist forces that escaped from Chacabuco. In the first communications sent by O'Higgins' lieutenants to the royalist José Ordóñez,<sup>54</sup> they stressed that the revolutionaries were not willing to pursue the royalists. Thus, on 11 March 1817 Ramón Freire wrote to Ordóñez that his superiors were not aiming 'to tyrannize, nor to oppress, but to restore the rights that for so many years were neglected' by Spain.<sup>55</sup> A month later, Juan Gregorio de las Heras reinforced this idea by sending Ordóñez a letter signed by Marcó del Pont in which the former governor recommended that the new royalist chief lay down his arms and put an end to the conflict.<sup>56</sup>

However, it was one thing to state that the revolutionaries had peaceful intentions, but quite another to fulfil that statement.<sup>57</sup> Ordóñez was clearly aware of the policy of prosecution by the revolutionaries when he answered Las Heras. According to the royalist officer, Marcó del Pont's letter 'does not deserve a reply, both because his faculties as governor have ceased, and because he is an oppressed man whose signature was surely extracted by force'.<sup>58</sup> O'Higgins' resolution of April 1817 to delegate the responsibility of governing the country to Hilarión de la Quintana in order to personally lead the Army of the South, probably increased Ordóñez's fears.<sup>59</sup> Indeed, one could argue that the arrival of O'Higgins in the south coincided with the beginning of a merciless war in the south (the so-called *Guerra a Muerte*, whose main characteristics will be analyzed in the next section), in which hatred and extreme violence were the order of the day.

During this campaign in the south, O'Higgins tried to conduct an attack on Talcahuano, but was repulsed by Ordóñez.<sup>60</sup> A couple of weeks after this setback, O'Higgins learned that the *limeño* royalists were organizing a new expeditionary force to attack Chile. The

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<sup>54</sup> A report of 14 May 1817 says that the royalist army had 1,805 men, distributed as follows: 599 of the *Batallón de Infantería de Concepción*; 34 mariners; 21 *valdivianos*; 120 *Voluntarios de Infantería ligera de Talcahuano*; 182 of the *Infantería de la reunión de Chile*; 284 of the *Caballería de Dragones de Chile*; 75 *Lanceros de la Frontera*; 73 *Auxiliares voluntarios de la Frontera*; 162 *Dragones de Chillán*; 175 of the *Artillería de Concepción*; and 80 of the *Artillería venida de Lima*. 100 of these men 'at the hospital'. In AGI, Correos 87.

<sup>55</sup> AGI, Diversos 5, Freire to Ordóñez, 11 March 1817.

<sup>56</sup> AGI, Diversos 5, Las Heras to Ordóñez, 15 April 1817. Marcó's letter is dated 24 February 1817 and can be found in AGI, Diversos 5.

<sup>57</sup> Cf. footnote 19 of this chapter.

<sup>58</sup> AGI, Diversos 5, Ordóñez to las Heras, 16 April 1817.

<sup>59</sup> For O'Higgins' resolution, see MG, vol. 28, O'Higgins to San Martín, 9 April 1817. For O'Higgins' military performance in the south of the country throughout 1817, see ABO, vol. 21.

<sup>60</sup> For this attack, see Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. XI, pp. 202-212.

expedition was prepared by viceroy Pezuela, financed by a group of *limeño* merchants and conducted by an old acquaintance of Chile: Mariano Osorio. In his *Instrucciones* to Osorio, Pezuela (who had recently become Osorio's father-in-law) highlighted the two main reasons which led him to invade Chile; one was economic, the other military. In his view, the commercial relations between Peru and Chile were too close to let the rebels create an independent, free-trade state. Peruvians needed Chilean wheat as much as Chile needed Peru's sugar, and Peruvian merchants still believed that they could monopolize trade with Chile. At the same time, Pezuela believed that if Peru did not attack the insurgents in their own territory, it was likely that Chileans would organize an expeditionary force to invade Peru. Before this happened, it was advisable to take the offensive.<sup>61</sup>

Osorio departed from Lima in December 1817 with a contingent of 3,260 men,<sup>62</sup> but hoping to add some 1,300 additional troops from the army commanded by José Ordóñez in the Concepción region.<sup>63</sup> Osorio set out to accomplish three tasks in Chile: first, to seize Talcahuano and join forces with Ordóñez; second, to go northward in order to disembark his army in San Antonio, a small seaside town near Valparaíso; and finally, to attempt an attack on the capital. Pezuela hoped that Osorio would achieve these objectives in the shortest time possible, as this was the only way to prevent the insurgents from assembling the troops that were scattered throughout the Central Valley.<sup>64</sup> The royalist troops disembarked in Talcahuano between 5 and 10 January 1818. According to Barros Arana, they were mainly composed of veterans of the Napoleonic wars (i.e. the battalion of *Burgos*).<sup>65</sup>

When he ascertained that Pezuela was preparing a new invasion of Chile, O'Higgins left Concepción to reassemble his forces nearer Santiago.<sup>66</sup> This decision made clear that the revolutionary army was unable to have influence in regions far from the capital. In other words, O'Higgins' army was in the same position as immediately after the battle of Chacabuco: it controlled Santiago and its surroundings (besides northern regions, like Coquimbo), but the south of the country was controlled by the royalist regular army or by guerrilla fighters. Thus,

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<sup>61</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. XI, pp. 229-230.

<sup>62</sup> Osorio's *Estado de fuerza* can be found in AHM, box 702, doc. 64, 9 December 1817. Of these 3,260 men, around 1,800 were Spanish-born and belonged to the *Regimiento de Burgos* and the *Regimiento Infante don Carlos*. This was without doubt the larger Spanish-born contingent to arrive in Chile, although it did not remain long in the country. See Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. XI, p. 232, footnote 5.

<sup>63</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. XI, p. 244, footnote 18.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 231.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 241.

<sup>66</sup> An interesting account of O'Higgins withdrawal to the north appears in AHM, box 703, doc. 14, 22 January 1818.

his plan, which was prepared in concert with San Martín, was to withdraw his forces to Talca and join them with the other half of the revolutionary army at Chimbarongo. In doing so, they would hopefully prompt Osorio to leave Talcahuano and seek the final battle north of the river Maule, where the bulk of the insurgents was gathered.

Once O'Higgins reached Talca he signed the Proclamation of independence (12 February 1818, although the Act says 1 January 1818), by which the Chilean state followed the *rioplatense* example and broke all political links with the metropolis. The signature of the *Acta* of independence was an outstanding symbolic act, but it did not have much effect in practical terms; at least not in the months following the proclamation. In March the revolutionary army formed a respectable force of 6,600 soldiers,<sup>67</sup> thereby exceeding the royalists by more than two thousand men. Osorio, moreover, had fallen into San Martín's trap and led his army towards the river Maule. If all went as planned, the revolutionary army should have had no trouble in beating Osorio's army.<sup>68</sup> However, contrary to all logic, in the first major confrontation between both armies, Osorio surprised and inflicted a heavy defeat on the insurgents. Osorio's men wounded O'Higgins, killed 300 insurgent soldiers, took half of the revolutionary artillery and 'a considerable number of beasts of burden that were scattered on the battlefield'.<sup>69</sup> Osorio was so pleased with the victory that he wrote a sonnet to honour the winners of Cancha Rayada:

*Viva viva el Exército Valiente  
que en los campos de Talca perseguido  
con solo imaginarlo a destruido  
la banda feroz del Insurgente.  
La fama alorve[sic] vuestras glorias cuenta  
en tanto que mi pecho ágradecido  
riega el laurel con que le ha ceñido  
con lagrimas de goso tiernamente.  
Marchad, pues á Santiago en derechura  
Europa admirara vuestra victoria  
ya no resiste el enemigo vando  
Triunfad que mi palabra os ásegura  
precentad el laurel de vuestra gloria  
ante el agusto trono de Fernando.<sup>70</sup>*

News of the defeat in Cancha Rayada reached the capital a couple of days later, and,

<sup>67</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. XI, pp. 266-267.

<sup>68</sup> See AHM, box 703, doc. 21, Balcarce to the Supreme Director of the United Provinces, 6 March 1818.

<sup>69</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. XI, p. 282.

<sup>70</sup> AGI, Correos 87. This document is undated, but is located together with Juan Bautista Aeta's papers of March 1818.

among its immediate consequences, the accession of Manuel Rodríguez to power was without doubt the most important.<sup>71</sup> Santiago was in need of trained military men, and it was feared that, as Osorio's sonnet claimed, the enemy could be marching on the capital. Luis de la Cruz, who was Rodríguez's comrade in the new government formed in the wake of the defeat, but also one of O'Higgins' most loyal supporters, reported to Cuyo's intendant on 22 March that there was no serious reason to be worried, as the revolutionaries had 'a force which will be irresistible as soon as the help which is being collected in haste is gathered'.<sup>72</sup> Nonetheless, two days later, he complained to the same intendant that there were many *pusilánimes* who were 'infusing their bad spirit in the inhabitants of the capital'.<sup>73</sup> De la Cruz, in short, was confident that the army would recover from the defeat of Cancha Rayada, but could not hide the fact that there were people who still supported the royalists.

O'Higgins arrived in the capital on 24 March and rapidly managed to get rid of Rodríguez. He then assured his followers that the revolutionary army was not lost and that there were good reasons to believe that Cancha Rayada had been a serious but not definitive defeat. The arrival of San Martín in Santiago on 25 March helped to calm things further, and at the end of the month the revolutionary army was already reassembled in the Maipo Valley (to the south-west of Santiago) under the leadership of San Martín. The decision to gather the insurgent army in Maipo was made to prevent Osorio from advancing towards the capital. On 5 April 1818, the two armies fought a battle comparable in importance only with the battle of Rancagua, although the condition in which the battle of Maipú was fought was quite different. To begin with, around 9,000 men participated in this battle (4,500 men on each side) in comparison to the much lower number at Rancagua. In addition, the battle of Maipú was fought on an open plain, whereas Rancagua took place in the central square of the city. Finally, if the royalist forces in Rancagua were tactically superior to the revolutionaries, in Maipú both armies were equally prepared.

The revolutionary army that fought in Maipú was divided into three divisions, and was formed of a combination of soldiers from the Army of Chile and the Army of the Andes.<sup>74</sup> The division on the left was led by Rudecindo Alvarado (*cazadores*), that on the right by Juan

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<sup>71</sup> Cf. section I of this chapter.

<sup>72</sup> AHM, box 703, doc. 21, De la Cruz to Cuyo's intendant, 22 March 1818.

<sup>73</sup> AHM, box. 703, doc. 21, De la Cruz to Cuyo's intendant, 24 March 1818.

<sup>74</sup> According to an *Estado de fuerza* of 30 November 1817, the Army of the Andes had 4,449 men, and the *Ejército de Chile* 4,765. In total they reached the considerable amount of 9,214 men (between officers and soldiers). See Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. XI, pp.179-180, footnotes 54 and 55.

Gregorio de las Heras (grenadiers) and the reserve by Hilarión de la Quintana. The field artillery was placed in the centre, the *artillería volante* on the flanks. The revolutionary artillery, operated by Manuel Blanco Encalada, opened fire at the onset of the battle. San Martín opened fire at 11:30 on the morning of 5 April. Half an hour later, he ordered Alvarado's and Las Hera's divisions to charge the enemy. While Alvarado's men were defeated by the royalist right led by José Ordóñez, Las Heras managed to overcome the royalists' left led by Joaquín Primo de Rivera. San Martín then ordered de la Quintana's reserve to join battle, with which the revolutionaries were able to bring their forces together and inflict heavy casualties on the enemy. However, the royalist battalion *Burgos* was reluctant to surrender and continued fighting under the cry 'Here is the Burgos! Eighteen battles won! None lost!'. According to Francisco Antonio Encina, the remaining royalist forces followed the example of the *Burgos*, thus leading to a 'furious, almost point blank, combat'.<sup>75</sup> It was only through exhaustion that the royalists were finally defeated: the battalion *Burgos* repelled the attacks of the revolutionaries, but Primo de Rivera and Ordóñez could do little to stop the insurgent offensives. At 14:15 the 'battle was decided, and even though the royalists retired in fairly respectable number and order, everything seemed to indicate that their destruction would be complete and final before nightfall'.<sup>76</sup>

O'Higgins, who did not participate in the battle because he was still wounded, arrived at Maipo when the struggle was almost finished. Together with San Martín the Supreme Director witnessed how the enemies were chased down and captured. According to a letter written that afternoon by San Martín to the Supreme Director of the United Provinces, the revolutionaries took around 1,500 prisoners, among them Ordóñez, Primo de Rivera and more than 45 other officers.<sup>77</sup> Two days later, José Ignacio Zenteno reported that the number of prisoners had reached 2,000 (of whom 150 were officers), while the number of deaths in the enemy force amounted to 'more than 1,600'.<sup>78</sup> San Martín and O'Higgins returned to Santiago later in the evening of 5 April. One of their first acts was to reward the officers of both the

<sup>75</sup> Encina, *Historia de Chile*, vol. VII, pp. 521-522.

<sup>76</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. XI, p. 325. For the battle, see also Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna, *La batalla de Maipú*, Imprenta de Chile, Santiago, 1918. For San Martín's strategy, see Jorge Ariel Vigo, 'San Martín, Guibert y el orden oblicuo en la batalla de Maipú', in VVAA, *El lazo de Los Andes*, Editorial Universidad de Los Lagos, Osorno, 2007, pp. 65-88.

<sup>77</sup> AHM, box 498, doc. 11, San Martín to the Supreme Director of the United Provinces, 5 April 1818.

<sup>78</sup> AHM, box 703, doc. 29, Zenteno to Cuyo's intendant, 7 April 1818. A list of prisoners can be found in AHM, box 703, doc. 33, 28 April 1818. Barros Arana, *Historia general de Chile*, vol. XI, p. 331 says that the revolutionaries lost 800 men and 1,000 were wounded.

Army of the Andes and the Army of Chile by promoting them.<sup>79</sup> A couple of days later, San Martín resolved to leave Santiago for Buenos Aires ‘to raise support and resources for the next surge forward. He was away for six months’.<sup>80</sup> O’Higgins, for his part, stayed in the capital in order to accomplish the three main tasks of his government: to dispatch a military force to pursue the royalists who had not participated in the battle of Maipú and were stationed in the south of the country; to give his government a republican shape; and to prepare an expeditionary army to attack Peru. The first of these goals will be analyzed in the next section, the second in section IV, and the last in chapter VI.

But what about Osorio? The royalist general fled the same day of the battle, first in the direction of Valparaíso but finally towards Talcahuano. He abandoned the battlefield with 240 soldiers; however, upon arrival at the port on 12 April 1818 his followers numbered no more than twelve. In the words of the contemporary traveller Richard J. Cleveland, ‘a la Buonaparte’ Osorio ‘effected his escape, with ten or twelve followers; the only remains of the proud army, which left here [Talcahuano] a few weeks since’.<sup>81</sup> In Talcahuano, Osorio published a document calling on Chileans to join the king’s army; in his view, the royalists had not been completely defeated in Maipú, and so there was still time to launch a fresh campaign. Relying especially on the loyalty of the inhabitants of Concepción, Osorio promised that anyone who voluntarily enlisted in the army would be rewarded with land.<sup>82</sup> However, Osorio’s enterprise failed, because he was unable to persuade the Concepción inhabitants to carry out an immediate expedition to the northern regions of the Central Valley. In a letter to viceroy Pezuela seven days later, he reported that the gathering of the royalists forces could take two or three months, ‘in which time Talcahuano may be lost’.<sup>83</sup>

Osorio’s pessimism was shared by other royalists, and not just those from Chile. On 16 June 1818, Joseph Morales reported to Abascal, who was back in Spain, the anxiety in which the *limeños* lived as a consequence of the outcome of the battle of Maipú. In Morales’ opinion, ‘there is hardly a family in this city [Lima] which does not mourn the loss of a father, husband, brother or relative’, and the prospect of cutting commercial links with Chile ‘makes the cry resonate even more’. On the other hand, he believed that the royalist soldiers assembled in

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<sup>79</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. XI, p. 332.

<sup>80</sup> Lynch, *San Martín*, p. 104.

<sup>81</sup> Richard J. Cleveland, *Narrative of voyages and commercial enterprises*, Published by John Owen, Cambridge, 1842, vol. II, p. 179. See also Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. XI, p. 337.

<sup>82</sup> FV, vol. 964, pp. 200-200v, 28 April 1818.

<sup>83</sup> AGN, room VII, Colección Carlos Casavalle, box 2301, Osorio to Pezuela, 5 May 1818.

Concepción were too few to take the offensive. Only the sending of reinforcements from Lima, a rather unlikely possibility, could help the royalists 'recover Chile and retain Talcahuano'. And in a phrase that depicts how the *limeño* elites were beginning to detach themselves from viceroy Pezuela, Morales stated: 'meanwhile, nothing is done to provide for [*abastecer*] the people; prices increase, there are shortages in the market and the only thing that grows daily is discontent and desolation'.<sup>84</sup>

Morales' fears were further deepened a couple of months later, when Osorio returned to Lima. Osorio made this decision after realizing that Lima's own internal problems prevented the viceroy from assisting him with resources and men. Juan Francisco Sánchez assumed charge of the army. Before departing, Osorio wrote his Instructions to Sánchez, the most important of which stated that, if the revolutionaries organized a 'formal expedition against the forces stationed in Concepción', the new general-in-chief should retreat south 'and arm the Araucanian Indians to prolong the war as much as possible'. He also recommended reinforcing the royalist presence in Valdivia and Chiloé, as both could 'constitute vigorous centres of resistance'.<sup>85</sup> Osorio finally left on 8 September 1818, arriving a couple of weeks later in Lima, where he was welcomed by Pezuela.

It appears, however, that Pezuela was among the few who welcomed Osorio in Lima.<sup>86</sup> Indeed, the Spanish general met with a society that was perfectly aware that in the battle of Maipú the royalists had lost not only some 1,500 men but also what is one of the most important things in such a war: territorial dominance. The royalists were, in fact, forced to seek refuge in the south of the country, a position from which they could never recover. It is true that the war did not end with Maipú and that, on the contrary, irregular and sporadic confrontations continued until well into the 1820s. It is also true that in geographical terms the territory that runs from Concepción to Chiloé comprises more than 800 kilometres. Yet it was in Santiago that the most important political decisions were made. As Simon Collier writes, 'though the war in the South of Chile was to continue for several years, the heartland was never again threatened'.<sup>87</sup> In a sense, Maipú was undoubtedly a political triumph for O'Higgins: in the aftermath of the battle the revolutionaries took an irreversible step towards the political consolidation of Chilean independence. The question was whether O'Higgins'

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<sup>84</sup> AGI, Diversos 5, Morales to Abascal, 16 June 1818.

<sup>85</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. XI, p. 426.

<sup>86</sup> Anna, *The fall of royal government in Peru*, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln and London, 1979, p. 137.

<sup>87</sup> Collier, *Ideas and politics*, p. 231.

government would have the same strength to secure independence militarily.

### III. IRREGULAR WARFARE IN THE SOUTH OF CHILE

The irregular war that afflicted the south of Chile began immediately after the battle of Chacabuco on 12 February 1817. Indeed, contrary to Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna, who chose the battle of Maipú (April 1818) as the starting point of his *La Guerra a Muerte*, warfare in the south ran parallel to the government's policy of pursuit of royalists and unruly insurgents.<sup>88</sup> We saw that O'Higgins' major task throughout the second half of 1817 was to seize Talcahuano and force the enemy either to surrender or to seek refuge further south. The revolutionaries attempted to attack the port several times, but the royalists were able to stop them time and again. Aeta noted that the withdrawal of the revolutionaries from Talcahuano was followed by looting. He was a die-hard royalist, so his accounts must be taken with caution. Still, considering the conditions in which the war was fought, it seems conceivable that the revolutionaries 'looted the churches [...], convents and houses [of Concepción] [...]. They destroyed the furniture that they could not carry with them, setting fire both to the houses of the royalists and the palace of the *Ilustrísimo Señor Obispo*'.<sup>89</sup> A month later, Aeta reported that a group of insurgents had 'devastated the *villas* and *haciendas*' near Chillán. 'They set fire to the houses, ranches and crops [*sementeras*]', Aeta continued, 'so the royalist army could not find resources. They abandoned many families after stealing their jewels and clothes, leaving, according to his report, many women completely naked [*quedando muchas mujeres sin tener con que cubrirse las carnes*]'.<sup>90</sup> But the royalists were not strangers to these practices either. On 17 December 1817, Luis de la Cruz acknowledged O'Higgins' claim that the kind of war carried out by the enemy was 'characteristic of men who know their strength: otherwise, they would not keep their forces scattered, harassing helpless passengers as thieves seeking to plunder'.<sup>91</sup> In a later communication, De la Cruz referred to the groups of royalist guerrillas as *bandoleros*, hoping that a decisive action would eliminate them.<sup>92</sup> Sadly for De la Cruz and the other revolutionaries, such a decisive action did not take place in the next few years, as small but

<sup>88</sup> Vicuña Mackenna, *La Guerra a Muerte*.

<sup>89</sup> AGI, Correos 87, Aeta to Señores Directores Generales de la Real Renta de Correos de España y las Indias, 30 January 1818.

<sup>90</sup> AGI, Correos 87, Aeta to Señores Directores Generales de la Real Renta de Correos de España y las Indias, 26 February 1818.

<sup>91</sup> MG, vol. 34, p. 226, de la Cruz to O'Higgins, 16 December 1817.

<sup>92</sup> MG, vol. 34, p. 354, de la Cruz to O'Higgins, 24 January 1818.

bloody confrontations became the norm in the period 1818-1823.

In November 1818, San Martín tried to put an end to the war by means of negotiation. On that occasion, the revolutionary general sent a letter to Juan Francisco Sánchez, the general-in-chief of the royalist army after Osorio's departure, urging him to lay down his arms and sign a surrender. San Martín assured him that he would 'spare no means to avoid bloodshed and reach a rational agreement [*avenimiento*]. If you order your army to cease the hostilities after three days of receiving this letter and you want to withdraw to this capital [Santiago] or leave for Lima, I promise you that you and your properties will be respected. Otherwise, San Martín finished his letter, 'you will be responsible for the bloodshed and the evils caused by your futile resistance'.<sup>93</sup> In his answer of 3 December, Sánchez stated that he would not receive any delegate sent by San Martín, adding that any proposal for negotiations must be addressed to the *limeño* viceroy. In the meantime, and with 'the aim of avoiding bloodshed, I will willingly agree to sign an armistice if your troops withdraw to the other side of the [river] Maule [near Talca]'.<sup>94</sup>

However, in reality, neither San Martín nor Sánchez were genuinely looking to finish the fight. In the case of Sánchez, a couple of months before writing his response to San Martín, he published a *Bando* promising to pardon deserters who 'go back to their respective detachments within three days' and agree to 'hold the sacred rights of the throne'.<sup>95</sup> He also seemed aware that undertaking negotiations with the revolutionaries could cost him his post as general-in-chief. Moreover, in what kind of negotiations could Sánchez become involved if the insurgents had recently proclaimed Chilean independence? To accept San Martín's offer and leave the country was the same as accepting the independence of Chile. For San Martín, meanwhile, to withdraw his troops to Talca was tantamount to relinquishing the territorial dominance that the revolutionaries had gained after the battle of Maipú. The war, then, was more alive than ever, even though Sánchez would not participate in it much longer.

In April 1819, with the aim of reassembling his forces in what was one of the royalist regions par excellence, Sánchez sought refuge in Valdivia, leaving Vicente Benavides in charge of the Araucanian region. Compared to Sánchez, Benavides was much more prone to

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<sup>93</sup> VM, vol. XLII, pp. 44-47, San Martín to Sánchez, without exact date (although the source is dated in November 1818).

<sup>94</sup> VM, vol. XLII, pp. 69-71, Sánchez to San Martín, 3 December 1818.

<sup>95</sup> FV, vol. 815, pp. 27-27v, 9 September 1818.

launching irregular assaults.<sup>96</sup> Communications between Sánchez and Benavides were sporadic, and the assistance that the general-in-chief sent to his subordinate between April and June 1819 was ‘reduced to a few loads of articles of war’.<sup>97</sup> According to Vicuña Mackenna, that little help was interrupted by the viceroy’s decision to summon Sánchez to Lima to explain why he had withdrawn to Valdivia. Sánchez never returned to Chile (he died in Peru soon after his arrival), and so Benavides became the new general-in-chief of the royalist army.<sup>98</sup>

Benavides was a Chilean-born soldier, whose humble background prevented him from entering the army as an officer. At first, he joined the revolutionary army, and in 1813 he was sergeant of a cavalry force created in Concepción by José Miguel Carrera. But he deserted in February or March 1814 and joined the royalists. He fought in the battle of Rancagua and then worked as an instructor in Valparaíso, where he was promoted to lieutenant. During Osorio’s government he moved to Concepción; there, he married Teresa Ferrer, whose father was, according to Vicuña Mackenna, a supporter of the revolutionaries. According to Vicuña Mackenna’s account, this family alliance led Benavides to betray the royalists immediately after the battle of Chacabuco, a crime for which Ordóñez put him in jail. He was quickly forgiven, and in May 1817 was already back on the battlefield. Apparently he fought in the battle of Maipú, after which he was imprisoned by San Martín’s men and sentenced to be hanged for desertion. However, Benavides managed to escape death, and at some point he requested an appointment with San Martín to prepare a plan to deceive Sánchez and incite the Indians against the royalists. San Martín agreed to the plan, but once again Benavides betrayed the revolutionaries and enlisted on the monarchist side.<sup>99</sup> In mid 1819 he became the general-in-chief of the royalist army, a position he held until his death in February 1822.

Benavides’ biography is a good example of two important facts related to the revolutionary process: first, it shows that warfare allowed common soldiers like Benavides to become officers of either army. Soldiers were usually rewarded with promotion, which, in turn, enabled them to ascend socially. Yet Benavides’ biography shows also that such social mobility was not necessarily accompanied by a fervent political commitment. In fact, Benavides was one of the many who was not motivated by ideological grounds, but moved by their personal

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<sup>96</sup> Vicuña Mackenna, *La Guerra a Muerte*, p. 24 (the emphasis is of the original).

<sup>97</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 97.

<sup>98</sup> It appears that Benavides was never officially appointed general-in-chief of the royalist army. However, viceroy Pezuela referred to him as ‘*comandante don Vicente Benavides*’ and, in fact, after the departure of Sánchez and until Benavides’ death, there was no higher officer in Chile than Benavides. See *Ibidem*, p. 99.

<sup>99</sup> Benavides’ biographical information comes from *Ibidem*, pp. 230-234, footnote 1.

interests. At least until late 1818, Benavides did not behave as an outright revolutionary or as a convinced royalist; rather, his actions varied according to which side was likely to win on the battlefield.

But by mid 1819 his commitment to the royalist cause was stronger than his pragmatism, as his declaration of the War to the Death demonstrates. On 27 August, Benavides issued his 'Instructions to which the commanders and officers under my command must comply, who will undertake a march with their troops towards the other side of the Bío-Bío, and who must be obeyed at all times by everyone in compliance of his duties'. This Instruction defined the *modus operandi* that officers of the royalist army should follow when facing the revolutionaries. We have seen that battles like Rancagua and Maipú were to the death, with both armies aiming to annihilate the enemy with whatever strategy or weapons were available. In practical terms, therefore, Benavides' War to the Death was not new; what was new was his decision to describe its characteristics in writing and make explicit what until then was just implicit. Of the sixteen articles of Benavides' Instruction, numbers 5, 12 and 13 were especially important. While articles 5 and 13 show Benavides' radicalism (number 5 stated that the main objective was 'the destruction of the enemy according to his strength'; number 13 that 'the commander should execute prisoners [...] who cannot be led to a safe place'), number 12 defends the idea that attacks should be executed by flying squads, that is, groups of guerrillas. For the first time, the royalists recognized that the guerrillas were the best, and often the most reliable, military force for the kind of war carried out in the south of the country.<sup>100</sup> O'Higgins, too, convinced himself of the usefulness of the guerrillas, although it is probable that, as we will see, he favoured their use to counter criticism for not dispatching a proper regular force to the south to assist Ramón Freire (who at that time was intendant of Concepción and the general-in chief of the Army of the South). One of the first documents in which the Supreme Director advocated the use of guerrillas is an instruction sent by O'Higgins to José María Palacios in May 1819 explaining how the war in San Fernando had to be conducted: 'the war he will wage will not consist in fighting in line, but in attacking by surprise. Therefore he must not use his forces but split them in guerrillas, taking all possible advantages of the locality and the resources that practice might offer'.<sup>101</sup>

To this document we have to add a source called *Régimen que observarán los comandantes de*

<sup>100</sup> Benavides' Instruction can be found in *Ibidem*, pp. 797-801. The emphases are of the original.

<sup>101</sup> VM, vol. XXIV, p. 259, O'Higgins to Palacios, without exact date (although the source is dated in May 1819).

*guerrillas*, which, as Vicuña Mackenna said, does not have an official date but it was most likely issued between 1819 and 1821.<sup>102</sup> In this military regulation, O'Higgins once again praised the role of the guerrilla fighters: 'guerrilla soldiers will be flattered by the commander; he will assist them with horses, food and everything they need. [...] The government, for its part, offers them whatever is taken from the enemy: the land and the property of the *godos*, without distinction'. In tactical terms, the regulation asserted that 'the guerrillas will operate especially by the coast. [...] The guerrilla commandants can act together or separately, but they must always report to the government. They will never attack the enemy without having agreed to a meeting point should they be dispersed. These instructions will be destroyed immediately if [the guerrilla soldiers] found themselves in danger'.<sup>103</sup>

With such unrestricted support given to the guerrillas by royalists and revolutionaries alike it is not surprising that accounts of actions conducted by irregular troops proliferate in Chile's National Archive.<sup>104</sup> Indians were particularly good guerrilla fighters, as implied by the eagerness of both sides to have their military support. It is possible to argue that at this stage of the war the Indians of the *Llanos* were more prone to support the revolutionary cause; Venancio and Juan Colipí, two of the closest Indian *caciques* to the insurgents, were *llanistas*. The *costinos*, *builliches* and *pebuenches*, in turn, tended to back the royalists. However, it is important to clarify that within the *llanistas* there were also many royalists, and that not all the *costinos*, *builliches* or *pebuenches* were followers of Benavides<sup>105</sup>.

The Indian communities were powerful enough to negotiate when deciding to whom to give their support. O'Higgins' men, for their part, were aware that persuasion was a much more useful strategy than coercion when approaching the Indian communities. At the end of 1819, Pedro Andrés Alcázar, one of the revolutionaries who knew the Arucanian region well, explained to O'Higgins how, in his opinion, the Indian problem should be tackled. He recommended pacifying the Indians or, as Vicuña Mackenna said, 'at least inciting one against

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<sup>102</sup> Vicuña Mackenna, *La Guerra a Muerte*, p. 129, footnote 2.

<sup>103</sup> These Instructions appear in *Ibid.*

<sup>104</sup> For instance, we find that in November 1818 Manuel González reported to Ramón Freire that a group of royalist soldiers attacked an *hacienda* to steal alcohol. In revenge, González recommended undertaking a raid by the river Itata in order to terrorize the region. See VM, vol. XLII, pp. 57-58, González to Freire, without exact date (although the source is dated in November 1818). In December 1819, Andrés Alcázar wrote to Freire that a revolutionary guerrilla led by a so-called Molina had killed four royalists and stolen four loads of supplies. See VM, vol. XLII, p. 170, Alcázar to Freire, 10 December 1819.

<sup>105</sup> For a report describing the assistance given by the Indians to the royalists, see AHM, box 704, doc. 6, Antonio González Balcarce to San Martín, 31 January 1819; and MG, vol. 52, p. 133, Antonio de Quintanilla to Benavides, 25 July 1821.

the other' [*por lo menos ensañarlos los unos contra los otros*].<sup>106</sup> Venancio and Colipí were allies whom the O'Higgins administration could trust and depend on; however, having them as allies brought unavoidable costs, such as the refusal of Venancio's and Colipí's rivals to join the revolutionary side. How to get these rival communities to work in concert? For Alcázar the answer was simple: the revolutionaries should try to gain the confidence of the Indians by giving them gifts. This did not ensure their total commitment, but at least it guaranteed the support of the Indians in some cases. Thus, on 18 November 1819, Alcázar reported that the *caciques* of Angol (one of whom was Colipí) returned to their communities with two dozen handkerchiefs [*pañuelos*] and two boxes of indigo that Alcázar had given them.<sup>107</sup> The result was so satisfactory that a month later Alcázar requested Freire to send him another two dozen handkerchiefs, as well as knives, indigo, bridles, spurs and jackets for the *caciques* of Angol.<sup>108</sup>

But despite the use of guerrillas and the sporadic assistance of the Indians, in early 1820 the military situation of the revolutionaries was extremely precarious. Santiago never drew up a long-term policy to address the situation in the south. Thus, for example, O'Higgins' *Bando* of 3 December 1819, indicating that he had donated money from his family estate to pay the expenses of the army, speaks well of his personal attributes, but it did nothing to solve the much deeper problem that the lack of resources implied.<sup>109</sup> Furthermore, O'Higgins' decision to spend treasury money to prepare the *Expedición Libertadora del Perú* instead of sending reinforcements and economic resources to the south did little to overcome the problems of the revolutionaries, and in fact the whole idea of the *Expedición* alienated the military of the south and the elites who supported Freire. Given that the Chilean state was able to finance the organization of the expedition to Lima, it can hardly be said that the local treasury lacked the resources to pay for the war in the south when it first began in 1817. Rather, that war did not receive the attention it deserved because O'Higgins opted to use that money to assist San Martín's plans to attack Peru. It was, in other words, not as much an economic or military as a political decision which denied Freire and the rest of the officers of the Army of the South well-equipped troops: for O'Higgins, San Martín and the *Logia Lautaro*

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<sup>106</sup> Vicuña Mackenna, *La Guerra a Muerte*, p. 181.

<sup>107</sup> VM, vol. XLII, pp. 117-119, Alcázar to Freire, 18 November 1819.

<sup>108</sup> VM, vol. XLII, pp. 254-256, Alcázar to Freire, 31 December 1819. The loyalty of the *caciques* of Angol to the revolutionaries became patent on 22 December 1819, when they imprisoned a soldier called Eugenio Barrio for trying to convince them not to believe 'the promises of the *patria*'. Barrio was prosecuted by a military tribunal in Los Angeles and sentenced to death (he was shot). See VM, vol. XLII, pp. 224-225, 22 December 1819.

<sup>109</sup> FV, vol. 928a, 3 December 1819.

an attack on Peru was essential to consolidate the independence of the Southern Cone. Moreover, in their view, an assault on Lima would indirectly benefit the Army of the South, since the viceroy's energies would be concentrated on defending Peru rather than aiding Benavides.<sup>110</sup>

The lack of men and resources forced Freire to stay in Concepción, unable to take the offensive. Carlos María O'Carroll, an Irish officer who after the Napoleonic wars enrolled in Chile's revolutionary army, asserted in December 1819 that the squadron under his command had 200 ill-equipped men: only half of them had proper uniforms, and they lacked saddles, spurs and bridles.<sup>111</sup> In April 1820, O'Carroll told Freire that his men were literally dying of hunger. José Verdugo, a subordinate of O'Carroll, corroborated this in his *Memorias*: in Tucapel 'we lacked many necessities. We had to eat the meat of as many dogs as could catch. Later, we even ate mares and horses, always choosing the skinnier'.<sup>112</sup> With these reports in mind, Freire wrote to O'Higgins in January 1820 seeking the money that was required to pay the salaries of the military from the Supreme Director. Freire reminded O'Higgins that the situation was much worse than in 1817, when O'Higgins himself commanded the Army of the South:

You know very well that money is needed to pay the militias. You can imagine in what situation I find myself when I have received only 1000 pesos from the commissary to pay spies and everything else. Twice the army has had to sustain itself from a province which is exhausted: provisions and everything else have suffered; you cannot believe the effort displayed to obtain them to avoid the damages suffered by the troop [...]. You [...] can appreciate the effort involved if you remember what you had when this province had resources and was not in the state it now finds itself.<sup>113</sup>

In 1820, Freire was still a faithful subordinate, but he could not idly wait until the authorities decided to help him. Consequently, in March of that year, he travelled to the capital in order to obtain the assistance of the Supreme Director. He stayed in Santiago until late June, but could not accomplish much; in fact, O'Higgins and San Martín agreed to send just a small cavalry detachment to the south.<sup>114</sup> Afterward, it is true, the government appointed Joaquín

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<sup>110</sup> Of course, after years of war, the Chilean treasury was in a pretty bad state, as a report written in 1821 by the Chilean minister of finance, Agustín Vial, clearly shows. My argument, therefore, is not that the O'Higgins government was rich, but rather that the little money accumulated in the coffers was spent in organizing the expedition to Peru instead of the south of the country; this was a political, not economic, option. For Vial's report, see Vicuña Mackenna, *La Guerra a Muerte*, p. 528, footnote 1.

<sup>111</sup> VM, vol. XLII, pp. 229-230, O'Carroll to Freire, 24 December 1819

<sup>112</sup> Quoted by Vicuña Mackenna, *La Guerra a Muerte*, p. 243, footnote 1.

<sup>113</sup> VM, vol. XCIII, pp. 12-12v, Freire to O'Higgins, 11 January 1820.

<sup>114</sup> Vicuña Mackenna, *La Guerra a Muerte*, pp. 222, 268. See also CDIP, tome VI, vol. 2º, p. 70, San Martín to O'Higgins, 14 May 1820.

Prieto as commandant of Chile's second division of the Army of the South (the first was under the command of Freire) allegedly to assist Freire. However, paradoxically Prieto's appointment widened the gap between the central government and Concepción.

To begin with, Prieto had orders not to cross the river Maule. In addition, in his Instructions the minister of war, José Ignacio Zenteno, claimed once again that, if conditions allowed the revolutionaries to take the offensive, they should give the guerrillas –not the veterans who were under Prieto's command- the responsibility of attacking Benavides' men. For Zenteno, the best way to stop the royalist *montoneras* was utilizing their methods: **'against the war of disorder and of guerrillas which the enemy is pursuing you must try to oppose a similar one'**.<sup>115</sup> Pedro Arriagada, who on 4 November 1820 was designated *Jefe de bandas para hacer la guerra de vandalaje*, received similar instructions from Zenteno; nonetheless, in this document the minister of war went further, as he ordered Arriagada to encourage the participation of the guerrilla fighters by promising them that during their attacks they would be free to loot and steal at will: 'the attraction of theft will make our guerrillas reckless and many of them will gather when they hear of the means they will obtain to compensate for their weariness and losses. You must make this clear to your troops so that, inflamed by the desire for spoils, they might fight as successfully as is required'.<sup>116</sup>

With these orders, the O'Higgins government recognized two important facts: first, that Santiago did not have enough men to stop the royalists if Benavides continued moving north. That is why Zenteno vehemently urged Prieto not to cross the river Maule. Second, that in order to neutralize Freire's criticism it was better to send Arriagada's guerrillas than to wait for things to improve for the revolutionaries. But, again, this was not a long-term policy that could solve the problems of the Army of the South. Such a policy was never designed by the O'Higgins administration. If Freire and Prieto achieved some success in the last months of 1820 and the first of 1821 it was because they acted independently of the government: Freire in the military arena, Prieto in the political. Indeed, Prieto did not follow the instructions that ordered him to stay on the north side of the river Maule, because he opposed Zenteno's decision to give the guerrillas the responsibility of taking the offensive against the royalists. Prieto advanced south to the city of Chillán, where he carried out a persuasive –'political', as

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<sup>115</sup> Quoted by Vicuña Mackenna, *La Guerra a Muerte*, p. 810 (this document is dated 18 October 1820). The emphasis is in the original.

<sup>116</sup> Quoted by Ibidem, p. 815.

he called it- strategy to pacify the south.<sup>117</sup> The climax of this strategy was the publication of a *Bando* pardoning the royalists if they ‘abjured their cause in the following fifteen days’.<sup>118</sup> He did not ask the permission of the capital to publish this *Bando*, nor did he tell Freire about its content.

It appears that O’Higgins chose to turn a blind eye to Prieto’s autonomous actions, and that this was due to Prieto’s role as a secret informant of the government. In the most important of his reports to the capital, Prieto suggested that Freire was in conversations with the supporters of José Miguel Carrera to overthrow the Supreme Director. On 18 December 1820 he accused the Serrano family (relatives of Freire, whose second surname was Serrano) to ‘claim throughout this province that **marshal Freire will shortly be** [Supreme] **Director**’.<sup>119</sup> The truth of this rumour is very difficult to ascertain, and in fact it seems that what moved Prieto to disclose it was his animosity towards Freire. Still, it gives us an idea of the conflict between the officers who represented the interests of the capital and the allies of Freire. Chapter VII will study the last stage of the irregular war in the south of Chile, stressing that the tension between the central government and the general-in-chief of the Army of the South intensified in 1822, and that this explains why Freire joined the provincial movement that overthrew O’Higgins from power in January 1823. The aim of the next section is to address the militarization of politics in Chile in the period 1817-1822, as well as one of the main characteristics of the O’Higgins regime: the concentration of power in the Supreme Directorship.

#### IV. THE PERSONALIZATION OF POLITICS

At the same time that O’Higgins pursued the enemies –both internal and external- of the revolution, assembled an army to fight the royalists in the battle of Maipú, and monitored the war in the south of the country from a distant Santiago, he also developed a sophisticated political programme to achieve and legitimize the independence of Chile, as well as to justify the power of the Supreme Director. In both areas O’Higgins was supported by civilians and military men, though it was the latter who gave his regime its distinct personalistic and

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<sup>117</sup> Ibidem, p. 437, footnote 1.

<sup>118</sup> Ibidem, p. 430.

<sup>119</sup> Quoted in Ibidem, p. 446. The emphasis is of the original.

militarized character.<sup>120</sup> Among the many decisions made by O'Higgins in order, first, to reward the military for their participation on the battlefield and, second, to reinforce the power of the Supreme Directorship, the installation in Santiago of a military academy, the creation of the so-called *Legión de Mérito de Chile*, and the publication of the Constitutions of 1818 and 1822 are worthy of mention. In all these administrative decisions we see one of the most distinctive characteristics of the years 1817-1822: that with few exceptions, the ruling groups accepted the intervention of the military in politics, thus prefiguring a relationship between civilians and the military that, with ups and downs, lasted throughout the decade of the 1820s (and beyond). When in early 1823 the elites decided for O'Higgins' abdication, they did it using not anti-military arguments but rather criticizing the excessive power of the Supreme Director.

The idea behind the establishment of a military academy in Santiago can be dated back to 1811, when Manuel de Salas presented a plan to organize a military school to be supervised by the *Director de la Academia de Matemáticas*.<sup>121</sup> Such an idea was revived five weeks after the revolutionary triumph at Chacabuco. On 19 March 1817, the *Gaceta del Supremo Gobierno de Chile* issued an article reporting the government's decision to create an *Academia Militar de Matemáticas*, which, in the opinion of the editors, would ensure both the 'existence of the *Patria*' and 'national freedom' (the military engineer Antonio Arcos was appointed its Director).<sup>122</sup> The formation of the academy responded to immediate defensive needs, but also to longer-term goals.<sup>123</sup> The first of these goals can be seen in the government's desire to 'assemble a regular force educated in that sublime and fearsome doctrine of war', which, according to the *Gaceta*, would allow the revolutionaries to 'fight the barbarian endeavours of our invaders'. The second appears itemized in the *Reglamento* of the academy, and also in the three parts [*sesiones*] in which its *Organización* was divided. The main articles of the *Reglamento* stated that

[1º] Every officer [...] who is not currently enlisted cannot aspire to have an employment in the army if he is not first aggregated to the Military Academy. [2º] The class of cadets is completely abolished. Those who exist in the detachments of the army will pass into the Academy to be promoted; it must be understood that, from this moment, the only way to be

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<sup>120</sup> For O'Higgins' preference to give military men the responsibility for the administration of the provinces, see ABO, vol. 17, pp. 193-198 (March 1817).

<sup>121</sup> Cf. footnote 102 of chapter II of this thesis.

<sup>122</sup> This article appeared in *Gaceta del Supremo Gobierno de Chile*, vol. 1, number 4, 19 March 1817 (the decree that created the academy is dated 16 March 1817).

<sup>123</sup> The first building in which the academy functioned was the Convent of Saint Augustine of Santiago. See MG, vol. 62, p. 19, 5 April 1817.

an officer is by means of acquiring the knowledge that is indispensable to obtain and perform this distinguished position.

The fact that no future officer could be enrolled in the army without having studied at the academy shows the willingness of the government to professionalize the training of officers -of both the cavalry and the infantry- of the newly created Army of Chile. The academy was to give education to three kinds of officers: the first *sesión* gathered cadets; the second, sergeants and *cabos*; and the third, the *oficiales agregados*. The first *sesión* ‘will consist of all cadets who are currently serving in the army, as well as honest and well-behaved young people whom the Director considers worthy of admission. There are 100 places available to fill this *sesión*’.<sup>124</sup> The second ‘will consist of well-behaved individuals, who can read and write. [...] For the moment this *sesión* is going to be formed by two companies of sixty men’. The last *sesión* ‘will consist of all the officers who have served previously in the army of the *Patria* and wish to continue their service after acquiring the knowledge in the new tactics’. Socio-economically, the group of cadets belonged to the highest sectors of society, as shown by the fact that the applicants were bound to pay for their education. In any case, it was declared that no proof of nobility was required to be accepted in the academy as cadets, and that only ‘merit, virtue and patriotism’ were needed. The training of sergeants and *cabos*, meanwhile, was to ‘be paid by the army’.

What were the tactical principles on which the academy based its educational system? In the section called *Instrucción técnica y práctica de la Academia* we find a loose, though interesting, answer: the curriculum of the academy must ‘follow the infantry and cavalry tactics published in France in 1792, with all the amendments introduced until the last edition of 1815’.<sup>125</sup> The influence of imperial France in the Chilean military academy is important,<sup>126</sup> both because it gives an idea of the role played in Chile by a number of French officers who left their country

<sup>124</sup> On 28 March 1817, the Supreme Director reported that 12 of these 100 places would be occupied by young people from the province of Cuyo. See MG, vol. 62, p. 8.

<sup>125</sup> *Gaceta del Supremo Gobierno de Chile*, vol. 1, number 4, 19 March 1817. It is likely that O’Higgins made reference to the *Règlement concernant l’exercice et les manœuvres de l’infanterie du 1er août 1791*, De l’Imprimerie du Laillet, Paris, 1792 (and which can be read in <http://gallica.bnf.fr>). This supposition can be reaffirmed by the request made by O’Higgins to Hipólito Villegas in August 1816 regarding the purchase of a book of French tactics, ‘the more modern the better’. In a handwritten note made by Villegas in the back of this letter, we find the following: ‘I have bought the Instruction concerning the cavalry manoeuvres, in two volumes for 14 pesos. Item the *Reglamento concerniente al ejercicio y las maniobras de infantería*, for one peso, August 1791, printed in 1813’. It seems clear that O’Higgins read the latter book, which was, as can easily be deduced, a translation of the *Règlement*. In ABO, vol. 7, pp. 42-43. I thank Clément Thibaud for informing me of the existence of the *Règlement*.

<sup>126</sup> Of course, there were those who criticized the ‘ambition’ and ‘pride’ of the French officers. See, for instance, AGN, room X, 4-2-9, pp. 25-26v, 14 July 1817 (it is not clear who wrote this document, though it was sent to San Martín).

after Napoleon was finally defeated in 1815, and also because it shows that the Spanish American revolutionaries followed the tactical model developed in France since the Comte de Guibert published his *Essai général de tactique* in 1770.<sup>127</sup> Regarding the influence of French officers in the organization of the Chilean academy, it is interesting to note that its Director, Antonio Arcos, was a Spanish-born engineer who, notwithstanding his origin, fought as an officer in the French army after Napoleon invaded the Iberian Peninsula.<sup>128</sup> Arcos was aided by Jorge Beauchef, a French cavalry officer who arrived in Chile shortly after the battle of Chacabuco. On 23 October 1817, Beauchef was appointed commandant of the cavalry section of the military academy.<sup>129</sup> In his memoirs, Beauchef provides an overview of the type of exercise performed by his students, who, according to his account, after three months of training could be seen ‘carrying their rifles and backpacks with grace’.<sup>130</sup> Sadly for the French, San Martín appointed Mariano Pascual Necochea as Beauchef’s direct chief, a decision that, in his view, hastened the closing of the academy a couple of months later. Apparently, Necochea ‘knew nothing about administrating’ the academy.<sup>131</sup>

The military academy, despite its brief existence, was created to make Chileans better soldiers.<sup>132</sup> The *Legión de Mérito*, which was instituted by a *Bando* of 1 June 1817 as a means of rewarding the commitment and participation of the military throughout the revolution,<sup>133</sup> enabled O’Higgins to strengthen the close relationship that, according to him, should exist between politics and the armed forces.<sup>134</sup> Indeed, the *Legión* glorified ‘the memory of the year 8

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<sup>127</sup> See Thibaud’s, *Repúblicas en armas*, pp. 123-124; and Cf. my references to John Lynn’s ‘wars as processes’ and ‘wars as events’.

<sup>128</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. X, p. 243. See also Patrick Puigmal, ‘Los organismos de formación de los ejércitos de Argentina y Chile bajo la influencia militar napoleónica (1810-1830)’, VVAA, *El lazo de Los Andes*, Editorial Universidad de Los Lagos, Osorno, 2007, p. 122.

<sup>129</sup> MG, vol. 34, p. 175, Francisco Antonio Pérez, Luis de la Cruz and José Manuel Astorga to O’Higgins, 23 October 1817.

<sup>130</sup> Patrick Puigmal, (editor), *Memorias de Jorge Beauchef*, DIBAM, Santiago, 2005, p. 92.

<sup>131</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 93. For the internal functioning of the academy, see the documents published in ABO, vol. 25, pp. 119-156.

<sup>132</sup> The Constitutions of 1818 and 1822 included an article that stated that every Chilean should be ‘virtuous, honest, charitable, a good father, good son, good friend, **good soldier**, [and] obedient to the law’. The emphasis is mine. See also the *Reglamento del recluta* of 22 March 1822, a document that was issued in order to explain that the government’s aim was to enroll soldiers who did not think they were being forced into the ranks. In ABO, vol. 35, pp. 647-648.

<sup>133</sup> According to Puigmal, ‘Influencia militar francesa’, p. 40, the *Legión* was a ‘faithful copy of the *Legión de Honor* created by Napoleon in 1804’.

<sup>134</sup> It is not surprising that most civic celebrations had been connected to military triumphs. Thus, the 12<sup>th</sup> of February (the day of the battle of Chacabuco) and the 5<sup>th</sup> April (the day of the battle of Maipu) became ‘official days’ during O’Higgins’ government. These were accompanied by the 18<sup>th</sup> of September (the day of the opening of the first Chilean Junta, and today’s Chile’s ‘national day’). For this subject, see ABO, vol. 15, pp. 32-34, 17 February 1821 (when the ‘civic celebration’ of the 12<sup>th</sup> of February was institutionalized); and article 86 of the

of *la Libertad* (i.e. counted from 1810), and its ‘born leader’ [*jefe nato*] was the Supreme Director, that is, the Executive chief of the Chilean state.<sup>135</sup> The *Legión* was created to honour ‘the victors of Chacabuco’, but also those who, although they had not participated in the battle, deserved to wear the medal of the *Legión* due to their contributions to the achievement of freedom. Among those who were awarded the *Legión de Mérito* were the Supreme Director of the United Provinces, the generals who commanded the revolutionary army in Chacabuco, all the chief officers who were present at the battle, one captain of every body of the army, three captains and three junior officers of the regiment *Granaderos a Caballo*, two captains and two junior officers of the infantry battalion, and a junior officer of the artillery. Also, and this is one of the most important and original aspects of this *Bando*, the O’Higgins government stated that ‘twenty-five sergeants, *cabos* or soldiers chosen for their merit from the general mass of the army’ were also to enjoy the privilege of wearing the medal of the *Legión de Mérito*.

Institutions like the *Legión de Mérito* show the interest of the insurgent leaders in strengthening the ideological commitment of officers and rank-and-file soldiers. In their book *¿Chilenos todos?*, Julio Pinto and Verónica Valdivia have claimed that the civilian elites never approved the institution of the *Legión*, not least because they regarded it as an institution that reinforced the power of the military at the expense of their own power.<sup>136</sup> To prove this the authors cite the debates by which the Senate decided to cut the funding of the *Legión* and, eventually, abolish it in June 1823, when O’Higgins had already fallen from power.<sup>137</sup> Nonetheless, a detailed examination of these debates does not illustrate a tension between the civilian elites and the military as sharp as these authors believe. Rather, the abolition of the *Legión de Mérito* responded to the Senate’s desire to prevent the *Legión* from becoming an *o’bigginista* stronghold. In a phrase that summarizes the position of the Senate *vis-à-vis* O’Higgins very well, the senators referred to the *Legión* as an institution created by a ‘provisional authority’ (i.e. O’Higgins). Such an institution ‘should have disappeared after the establishment of the new legislative authority, which was set up in order to *llamar a juicio*

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Constitution of 1822 (where the authors speak of the 18<sup>th</sup> September, 12<sup>th</sup> February and 5<sup>th</sup> April as ‘civic anniversaries’). For a recent analysis of this topic, see Paulina Peralta, *¿Chile tiene fiesta! El origen del 18 de septiembre (1810-1837)*, LOM Ediciones, Santiago, 2007.

<sup>135</sup> The *Bando* that instituted the *Legión de Mérito* can be found in MG, vol. 62, pp. 26-29, 1 June 1817. At the end of this *Bando*, it is true, O’Higgins affirmed that in the future the *Legión* would be granted not only to military men but to every citizen who contributed to the country’s development, such as scholars and artists. However, he also stressed that these activities were less ‘heroic’ than the military.

<sup>136</sup> Pinto and Valdivia, *¿Chilenos todos?*, p. 149. On 10 March 1823, the periodical *Tizón Republicano*, number 3, criticized the *Legión de Mérito* for being ‘the work of tyranny’.

<sup>137</sup> Pinto and Valdivia, *¿Chilenos todos?*, p. 150.

everything that was done in earlier times'.<sup>138</sup>

To better understand the position of the Senate in 1823 we need to go back to 1818, that is, when the O'Higgins government issued the first of two extremely personalistic constitutions. Although constitutions do not necessarily reflect the aspirations of society as a whole, they give an idea of the ideological pillars upon which specific regimes built their political programmes. In the case of O'Higgins, the two constitutions that were issued during his time in office show clearly his tendency to concentrate decision-making in the Supreme Directorship, which explains also why his enemies, senators among them, tended increasingly to call him a dictator.

O'Higgins' favourite political model was, indeed, the Roman republican dictator. True, the Proclamation of independence of 12 February 1818 stands out for its lack of governmental definition: there is no mention of the type of administration that should govern Chile.<sup>139</sup> The Proclamation did not promise to create a republic, claiming only that Chile would, from then on, be independent of Spain.<sup>140</sup> However, at this stage of the revolution O'Higgins favoured republicanism over any other political system and, of the many variants of republicanism, he preferred a strong Executive.<sup>141</sup> According to Simon Collier, 'by the time he [O'Higgins] came to assume supreme power in 1817, he believed in the necessity for a strong, energetic government to carry the country through dangerous times and to implant a programme of radical reforms'. Furthermore, 'dangers at home and abroad [...] forced him to assume dictatorial privileges, in the manner of ancient Rome. "From the beginning I was

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<sup>138</sup> Valentín Letelier (editor), *Sesiones de los Cuerpos Legislativos de la República de Chile*, Imprenta Cervantes, Santiago, 1889, vol. VII, p. 198 (annex 319), 16 June 1823. A few officers who were awarded with the *Legión* include: Hilarión de la Quintana, Rudecindo Alvarado, José Ignacio Zenteno, Joaquín Prieto and Ramón Freire. See CG, vol. 1055, pp. 151-151v, 12 July 1822. The defence of the *Legión* in 1823 was personally led by Freire. This may lead some to think that the position of the Senate regarding the *Legión* was inspired by a supposed opposition of the civilian elites to the military, Freire's included. However, the main reason for the senators to abolishing the *Legión* was more economic and political than military. In their view, O'Higgins had abused his power when he ordered to fund the *Legión* with money coming from the property seized during his administration. Besides, in 1823 the *Legión* had not only been granted to military men, but also civilians. See, Letelier, SCL, vol. VII, May to June 1823, pp. 159-169, 181-182, 198 and 223-224 (annexes 256, 285, 319 and 355). For the funding of the *Legión*, see CG, vol. 3, pp. 535-535v, 30 July 1822.

<sup>139</sup> The Proclamation of independence was published in *Gaceta de Santiago de Chile*, 21 February 1818, pp. 3-4

<sup>140</sup> Collier, *Ideas and politics*, p. 251.

<sup>141</sup> In 1818 most revolutionary leaders preferred a republican system: 'a republic was the only form of government which allowed the sovereignty of the people a just and legitimate representation. [...] Republican government, in the Chilean concept, amounted to representative government. Representation was the logical solution to certain dilemmas implied by the first principles already described: the need to delegate sovereignty, and the equally pressing need to prevent the advance of despotism on the one hand and the inevitable chaos, on the other, which would be caused by direct democracy in the Aristotelian sense of the word'. In *Ibidem*, pp. 146-147. See also Jocelyn-Holt, *La Independencia*, chapter VII; and Castillo, *La creación de la República*.

charged with the Supreme Directorship, without limitation of powers. In the same way, the free state of Rome, in moments of greatest crisis, used to hide the tablets of the law beneath a veil and entrust absolute power to a Dictator”<sup>142</sup>.

In his analysis, Collier made clear that O’Higgins ‘never forgot the authoritarian government could easily degenerate into despotism’, and so he always tried to be ‘responsible to the people’.<sup>143</sup> He, in other words, ruled as a dictator, ‘but his democratic instincts were constantly hinting at the limits of authority’.<sup>144</sup> Collier’s statement is, in principle, correct; actually, to argue that he was an ‘anti-democratic’ governor is certainly an anachronism.<sup>145</sup> Yet we must not forget that, in comparison to other civil and military leaders (like Freire, as we shall see), O’Higgins concentrated the political power in the Executive, and that the Constitutions of 1818 and 1822 were designed to strengthen his political status.<sup>146</sup> The Constitution of 1818 contained, as Collier himself held, ‘no proposals for any popular elected assembly’, and the creation of an ‘advisory Senate to help the Supreme Director govern’ was its boldest, if bold it was, concession.<sup>147</sup> The fact that the Supreme Director had enjoyed the right to choose all members of the Senate –five- illustrates how little independence this advisory board really had (title I, chapter II, article 1). The Supreme Director even had the right to cast a decisive vote whenever the senators did not agree on a particular motion (title III, chapter III, article 12). Having this in mind, it is not surprising that in 1823 the Senate tried to eliminate O’Higgins’ influence from public life, seeking, among other things, to abolish the *Legión de Mérito*.<sup>148</sup>

The Constitution of 1818 assigned the Supreme Director other, important faculties.

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<sup>142</sup> Collier, *Ideas and politics*, pp. 240-241 (O’Higgins’ phrase is quoted by Collier). It could also be said that O’Higgins saw in Bolívar a good model to follow. For O’Higgins’ admiration for the *Libertador*, see In FV, 250, p. 16; and CG, 1055, p. 151v, 12 July 1821. For Bolívar’s authoritarian republicanism, see Lynch, *Simón Bolívar*, chapter VII.

<sup>143</sup> Collier, *Ideas and politics*, p. 242.

<sup>144</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 246.

<sup>145</sup> For a well articulated criticism of those who have seen O’Higgins as an ‘anti-democratic’ leader, see Julio Heise, *O’Higgins, forjador de una tradición democrática*, Talleres de Artesanía Gráfica R. Neupert, Santiago, 1975, pp. 75-93.

<sup>146</sup> In many ways, the Chilean Constitutions of 1818 and 1822 were similar to the Brazilian Constitution of 1824, which, in the view of Jeffrey D. Needell, ‘Variaciones para un tema: las vicisitudes del liberalismo durante la monarquía brasileña’, in Iván Jaksic and Eduardo Posada Carbó, *Liberalismo y poder. Latinoamérica en el siglo XIX*, Fondo de Cultura Económica, Santiago, 2011, p. 248, was based on the Constitution written by Benjamin Constant for Napoleon.

<sup>147</sup> Collier, *Ideas and politics*, p. 245. The Constitution of 1818 can be read in <http://www.leychile.cl>.

<sup>148</sup> The idea of having a Senate that could act as a supporter of the Executive power was also popular among the American federalists. For James Madison’s defence of the Senate, see *Federalist Papers*, number 63, in <http://www.conservativetruth.org>; Castillo, *La creación de la República*, pp. 85-86.

Title IV, chapter I, article 4 stated that the Supreme Director was not only the executive chief of the government, but also Captain General of the army. The next article declared that the ‘command and organization both of the armies and the armed militias’ were among his attributions, while article 10 of that same title and chapter asserted that the Executive power had the right to appoint all secretaries of the state (i.e. *Gobierno, Hacienda and Guerra*). Moreover, the Executive was entitled to nominate the military governments of Valparaíso, Talcahuano and Valdivia (title IV, chapter V, article 2), as well as the ministers who composed the Supreme Judiciary Tribunal (title V, chapter II, article 3). The Supreme Director also had the prerogative to ‘confirm or revoke criminal sentences against the military’ (title IV, chapter I, article 21), as well as ‘the faculty to suspend executions, grant pardons and commute sentences’ (title IV, chapter I, article 22). Among his obligations, perhaps the one calling upon him ‘to maintain the closest possible alliance with the supreme government of the United Provinces of the River Plate’ was the most significant (title IV, chapter I, article 8). By means of this provision O’Higgins gave a constitutional status to his relationship with the *rioplatense* military officers and politicians, thus assuring that the expedition to Lima could count on the support of Chilean citizens, whose foremost obligation was to show a ‘complete allegiance to the Constitution’ (title I, chapter II, article 1).<sup>149</sup>

The Constitution of 1818 prevailed until May 1822,<sup>150</sup> when a new Convention was elected. The Convention met between July and October 1822, and, as Simon Collier says, ‘produced a new Constitution which was in many ways moderate and wise’.<sup>151</sup> This Chart is considered to be the most serious constitutional work drafted in twelve years of revolution, though its main aim was similar to that of its predecessors: to consolidate the position of the Supreme Director over the other powers. In the Constitution of 1822 we find a much clearer separation of powers; the independence of the Legislative and Judicial powers are explicitly stated throughout the *carta*. The Legislature was formed by two chambers: the Senate (with more members than the Senate of the Constitution of 1818), and the *Cámara de Diputados*. The representatives in this latter chamber were to be chosen following a complicated system of indirect election, in which a number of *electores* had to form a *junta electoral*, which in turn had responsibility for electing the *diputados*. Military men who owned real estate and did not

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<sup>149</sup> For an interesting contemporary analysis of the 1818 Constitution, see *El Sol*, number 10, 11 September 1818, pp. 1-4.

<sup>150</sup> Heise, *O’Higgins, forjador*, p. 88.

<sup>151</sup> Collier, *Ideas and politics*, p. 234.

command regular troops were eligible as *electores* (article 37) and, from the article stating that the ‘members of the *Cámara de Diputados* should not be military who command regular troops’ (article 39, subsection 4), it can be inferred that the military who had been allowed to be *electores* could become *diputados*. Among the attributions of the Congress, there were six that referred to military matters (article 47, subsections 3, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12): Congress could declare war at the request of the Executive; establish the ‘force required by the nation on land and sea’; provide the *Ordenanzas* for the army, the militia and the navy; recruit new troops; command troops outside the state; and face foreign troops in Chilean territory.

Nonetheless, in a clever strategy to prevent the Legislature from exceeding the faculties of the Executive, a series of other articles of the Constitution of 1822 acknowledged both the political and military supremacy of the Supreme Director over the other powers. Regarding the military power of the Supreme Director, it is worth stating that, although the Legislature had the right to establish the ‘force required by the nation on land and sea’, the Executive had the prerogative to ‘organize and direct the army, navy and militias’ (article 90; but he could not, it is true, lead them personally without the approval of the Legislature). Besides, the Supreme Director was entitled to appoint the chief generals of the army (article 92) and, together with the Legislature, all military positions from brigadiers up (article 94). In short, he enjoyed more or less the same military privileges as those granted in the Constitution of 1818. Regarding the political attributions of the Supreme Director in the Constitution of 1822, suffice it to say that article 81 declared that the post of Supreme Director should always be elected, never inherited, and that each period of six years could be extended to ten. Article 84, for its part, stated that ‘the election of the Director (O’Higgins) by the present 1822 legislature shall be considered the first election’. This, of course, was not well received by O’Higgins’ enemies; indeed, in early 1823 Freire carried out his revolutionary movement against O’Higgins to stop the Supreme Director from transforming both the Executive power and the city of Santiago into his personal bastions.<sup>152</sup>

Freire’s movement was supported by civilians from Santiago, Concepción and Coquimbo. This proves that the aim of the civilian elites was to change not so much the militarized system established in Chile in 1817 as its visible face (otherwise, they would have not insisted on having Freire as the new head of the government).<sup>153</sup> Of course, there were

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<sup>152</sup> Ibidem, pp. 234-235.

<sup>153</sup> Jocelyn-Holt, *La Independencia*, pp. 231, correctly argues that the civilian elites ‘tolerated the personalistic and

some civilians who, like Juan Egaña, overtly opposed to the intervention of the military in politics. Yet they were an exception. In the case of the senators, they did not criticize the military in general, but only the ‘abuses’ committed by O’Higgins during his period in office (we shall see that even Egaña would change his impression and adopt a similar position to that of the senators who opposed to O’Higgins’ personalism). The very fact that in the early 1820s the regime had given the officers the responsibility for administering the country shows that the war acted as a political catalyst. As Véronique Hebrard has argued for Venezuela, ‘political and military actions were, of course, intertwined: the military defended the political and the political, in turn, rewarded those who enlisted in the army’, an hypothesis that, despite the obvious differences between these countries, can be extrapolated to the Chilean case.<sup>154</sup>

I shall return to this subject in the last part of this thesis, where it will be claimed that Freire’s government was much less personalistic than O’Higgins’ but just as dependent on the military as his. The two leaders were republicans; both believed –O’Higgins less fervently than Freire– in the separation of powers; and both thought that some degree of popular representation was needed. However, while O’Higgins’ model was closer to the ancient Roman authoritarian republicanism, we will see that Freire’s was somewhat closer to the European liberal model that promoted the limitation of power.

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Throughout the years 1817-1823 the revolutionary faction led by San Martín, O’Higgins and the *Logia Lautaro* consolidated a new political system that was different to both the insurgent governments who had ruled the country until the battle of Rancagua, and the royalist administrations of the period 1814-1817. In military terms, O’Higgins’ regime did not differ much from that of José Miguel Carrera, although in terms of policy-making O’Higgins’ was much more sophisticated and permanent. In the process of building his regime O’Higgins was helped by two important circumstances: first, by the acceptance of the *santiaguino* ruling groups to see him as the *alter ego* of San Martín, who enjoyed the wide respect and admiration of the people involved in politics. San Martín’s popularity was used by O’Higgins to justify the

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dictatorial’ characteristics of O’Higgins’ regime until 1822. However, the war in the south and the publication of the Constitution of 1822 in October alienated them from the Executive.

<sup>154</sup> Véronique Hebrard, ‘Ciudadanía y participación política en Venezuela, 1810-1830’, in Anthony McFarlane and Eduardo Posada Carbó, *Independence and Revolution in Spanish America*, Institute of Latin American Studies, London, 1999, p. 137.

prosecution and punishment of royalists and ‘unruly’ revolutionaries. O’Higgins and San Martín crossed the *Cordillera* knowing that the confrontation with the followers of the Carreras, Manuel Rodríguez among them, was inevitable, and that assassination was an extreme, though practical, solution to get rid of them. With the passage of time not only O’Higgins’ military subordinates but also civilians, like Hipólito Villegas, applauded the radical measures introduced by the government to fight the Carrera brothers and their allies in Chile.

Second, and related to this point, the O’Higgins administration was helped by the fact that, after the battles of Chacabuco and especially Maipú, the royalists were almost entirely ousted from the Central Valley: some of them escaped to Lima (e.g. Aeta and Osorio), others were imprisoned and exiled (e.g. Marcó del Pont and Ordóñez), and the rest sought refuge in the south of Chile (e.g. Sánchez and Benavides). This allowed the revolutionaries to achieve political control of the principal regions of the country, with the exception of Concepción and Valdivia, the first of which changed hands more than once. More than just military triumphs, these battles were, consequently, important political victories for O’Higgins. However, the irregular warfare in the Araucanian region that followed the battle of Chacabuco destabilized his government, creating serious frictions between Santiago and the officers of the Army of the South. The decision of the central government to devote Chilean resources to San Martín’s expedition to Lima instead of sending a regular force to deal with the royalists in the south provoked the reaction of Ramón Freire and the provincial elites who, in late 1822, demanded the deposition of O’Higgins. Although this is a key point of the last chapter of this thesis, it is worthy to make reference to it now in order to show that sending a division led by Joaquín Prieto and formed by regular soldiers to the south did nothing to appease the criticisms against O’Higgins’ political decision to finance the *Ejército Libertador del Perú*.

The provincial movement that ousted O’Higgins from power also aimed to defy the personalistic characteristics of a government that, through the Constitutions of 1818 and 1822, strengthened the Executive at the expense of the other political powers. It is important, however, not to confuse ‘personalism’ with ‘militarism’. Indeed, in general civilians accepted and sometimes even encouraged the participation of the military in politics, which shows that the project of the elites who backed Freire was directed not against O’Higgins the military officer, but against O’Higgins the personalistic republican dictator. As we saw and we will again see, revolutionary warfare served as a political –and on rare occasions also social–springboard for many members of the military who, once the war entered its final stage,

became representatives of the various factions in which the political spectrum (and therefore also the army) was divided in the 1820s. In a sense, the actions of the provincial elites who voted for O'Higgins' removal suggest a different conception of republicanism, an important fact considering that debates over different republican models marked public discussion in Chile in the period 1823-1826.

## CHAPTER VI

**BECOMING A CHILEAN ARMY**  
**THE *EJÉRCITO LIBERTADOR DEL PERÚ*, 1818-1823**

Chapter V stated that one of the most salient characteristics of the militarized regime established in Chile in the wake of the battle of Chacabuco was its anti-Spanish sentiment. This chapter will show that the anti-Spanish reaction of the O'Higgins government was accompanied by the American military project developed by San Martín prior to the crossing of the *Cordillera*.<sup>1</sup> We saw in chapter IV that San Martín's Americanism had both political and military elements. Politically, he implicitly followed Bolívar's model of dividing society between those who favoured and those who opposed the 'American cause'. It is difficult to grasp what San Martín and his fellow revolutionaries, like Pueyrredón, meant by 'American cause', not least because within the 'American' faction there were those who favoured more radical changes and those who at most sought to enjoy autonomy within the empire. What it is clear, however, is that the creation of an American Congress was part of their programme. They also introduced the idea that Spanish-born people supported the metropolis and American-born people the revolution. Indeed, the American-born who fought on the royalist side were treated as traitors; the problem was that, as we have seen, the two armies were mainly formed by Spanish Americans. Militarily, San Martín's plan included the creation of the Army of the Andes, the re-conquest of Chile and the preparation of a new army, now formed by soldiers of the Army of the Andes and the Army of Chile, to invade Lima. This chapter discusses the organization of this army –known as the *Ejército Libertador del Perú*– and the political consequences brought about by its creation. It will be contended that the military aspects of San Martín's American plan succeeded, since he was able to enter Lima in 1821. However, it will also be argued that the idea of 'constituting one single' American nation failed, partly because San Martín decided to create a sovereign, independent state in Peru and partly because the Chilean officers in Peru became increasingly aloof from his Protectorate.

The first section presents an overview of the origins of the *Ejército Libertador del Perú*, studying three aspects: O'Higgins' whole hearted support of San Martín's American military programme; the reluctance of Buenos Aires to finance an expedition that was originally prepared in concert with the Chilean government; and the role played by Thomas Cochrane in

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. the fourth section of chapter IV of this thesis.

the creation of the first Chilean navy. The second section examines the political context in Peru before and immediately after the invasion carried out by San Martín. The aim here is to stress that, as Timothy Anna writes, the *limeño* elites gave only lukewarm support to San Martín. The third section addresses San Martín's failure to consolidate his *Protectorado* in Lima, and his subsequent political fall. The final section presents the idea that both the defeats of the revolutionaries in the combats of Moquegua and Torata and the lack of resources and men caused a sort of moral crisis in the high command of the *Ejército Libertador*. This crisis deepened, at least from the Chilean perspective, as a consequence of what the highest Chilean military officer in Peru, Francisco Antonio Pinto, saw as the 'arrogance' of the officers of the other South American armies *vis-à-vis* the Chileans. This 'arrogance' was connected to economic and military matters, though their consequences were related to three, much more subtle, issues: the emergence of divisions within the *Ejército Libertador del Perú*, the creation of a properly Chilean army and the consolidation of a Chilean sovereign state.

#### I. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE *EJÉRCITO LIBERTADOR DEL PERÚ* AND THE FIRST CHILEAN NAVY

The re-conquest of Chile was just the first stage towards a much bolder and more ambitious plan to expel the royalists from South America. San Martín always aimed to use the invasion of Chile as a springboard to attack Lima, an idea that was articulated in both political and military terms. According to Simon Collier, the officers and soldiers of the Army of the Andes and the Army of Chile were aware that 'their own cause was linked to a more general movement', politically known as Americanism. The press was one of the favoured vehicles to spread Americanism. In Collier's words: 'the progress of the patriot cause in northern South America was continually reported in the newspapers, while the ties between Chile and Argentina –and Chile and Peru- exercised a profound influence on the course of the revolution'.<sup>2</sup> But such a project needed a military dimension, and so San Martín and O'Higgins continuously stressed that, in order to reinforce the independence of both Chile and the United Provinces, it was imperative to undertake an offensive against Lima. 'The interest of America demands [an expedition to Peru]', said the *rioplatense* Bernardo José de Monteagudo in April 1820, 'the people of Peru want it, the existence of Chile depends on it, and peace in the provinces of the

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<sup>2</sup> Collier, *Ideas and politics*, p. 217.

River Plate may result from it'.<sup>3</sup>

The organization of the Peruvian expedition required 'great sacrifices, even beyond the effective forces'.<sup>4</sup> New recruitment laws issued in 1818 enabled the authorities to raise an army of more than 8,000 men, by far the largest figure of the revolutionary period in Chile.<sup>5</sup> According to an estimate made by San Martín at the end of 1818, the expeditionary army needed 6,100 men, divided into 5,400 infantrymen, 400 artillerymen, 200 cavalrymen and 100 sappers [*zapadores*]. An army this large was very expensive to mobilize and feed. In another calculation, San Martín informed the Chilean Senate that taking the war into Peru would cost nearly one million pesos, half of which should be paid by Buenos Aires, the other by Chile. On 25 November 1818, the senators promised to raise 200,000 pesos in cash and 300,000 in food and other goods. However, problems soon arose. In December 1818, O'Higgins asked the Chilean Senate to provide another 270,000 pesos, a request that was denied by the senators, who claimed that the government had assured them that the amount originally raised by them and Buenos Aires should be enough to cover the expenses of the expedition.<sup>6</sup> What the senators did not yet know was that politicians in Buenos Aires were beginning to conclude that the participation of the River Plate in the expedition was likely to bring more harm than good.

In February 1819 the Chilean government commissioned Antonio José de Irisarri to sign a treaty with the United Provinces in Buenos Aires in order to ensure that the 'costs of the expedition would be paid by both contracting parties'. Articles 5 and 6 of this treaty summarized the main points of an agreement that was designed not only to find the best way to finance the invasion, but also to plan how Peru should be governed after the expulsion of the royalists from Lima. On behalf of the Supreme Directors of Chile and the River Plate, Irisarri and Gregorio Tagle agreed that a combination of forces from both countries should expel the 'present rulers of Lima', and that the future government had to be elected 'freely by the inhabitants' of Peru. Yet that same article (number 6) also declared that if the 'states of Chile, the United Provinces and Lima concurred, the [liberating] army will be allowed to stay' in Peruvian territory. Thus, Chile and the River Plate made clear that they intended to mount a military expedition against Peru, but also to intervene in Peruvian political affairs.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>3</sup> *El Censor de la Revolución*, number 1, 20 April 1820.

<sup>4</sup> Pinto and Valdivia, *¿Chilenos todos?*, p. 122.

<sup>5</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. XII, p. 41, footnote 30.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 42-44.

<sup>7</sup> A copy of this treaty can be found in VM, vol. XCIV, pp. 22-24v.

In the end, this treaty did not have practical effects, since the Buenos Aires government never endorsed it. Both the threat of a royalist expedition of 10,000 men from Cadiz<sup>8</sup> and the threat posed by provinces that had broken away from Buenos Aires,<sup>9</sup> compelled the *porteño* authorities to focus on internal problems. In this context, in October 1819 the River Plate Supreme Director ordered San Martín, who was in Mendoza, to march with the Army of the Andes to Buenos Aires so that it could be used in case of a provincial uprising against Buenos Aires.<sup>10</sup> San Martín, nevertheless, opted to stay out of domestic *porteño* politics. In John Lynch's words: 'distancing himself from his colleagues' preoccupation with Spain, Uruguay and provincial *montoneros*, he set his sights on a different route, and he sacrificed his loyalty to Argentina in favour of his greater loyalty to America. In an act of "historic disobedience", as it has been called, he ignored orders to return with the Army of the Andes to Buenos Aires and committed himself completely to the liberation of America'.<sup>11</sup> An indirect consequence of San Martín 'historic disobedience' was that it obliged the Chilean state to bear the entire economic burden of the expedition. Militarily, however, the liberating army was, as we shall see, made up of both the Army of Chile and the Army of the Andes. Writing to O'Higgins from Mendoza on 9 November 1819, San Martín told his good friend: 'keep me informed of the results of Cochrane's movements so I can go with the entire division [of the Army of the Andes] to Santiago (except a grenadier detachment that I will leave in San Luis to safeguard the province). I am aware that this decision will bring upon me a terrible responsibility; but if we do not undertake the expedition to Peru, then everything will go to the devil [*todo se lo lleva el diablo*]. Inform me of the state of the artillery, because, if needed, we can take the artillery we have here'.<sup>12</sup>

To understand San Martín's reference to the English captain Thomas Cochrane we need to go back to early 1817, when O'Higgins, flushed with the triumph at Chacabuco but conscious that the war was not over, delivered his famous phrase that 'this victory [Chacabuco]

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<sup>8</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. XII, p. 61.

<sup>9</sup> For a summary of events about the tense relationship between Buenos Aires and the provinces, see Tulio Halperin Donghi, *Historia Argentina. De la revolución de independencia a la confederación rosista*, Editorial Paidós, Buenos Aires, 1972, pp. 105-140; for an analysis of the provinces as autonomous states, see José Carlos Chiaramonte, *Ciudades, provincias, Estados: orígenes de la Nación Argentina (1800-1846)*, Ariel Historia, Buenos Aires, 1997, especially pp. 159-165; for a relatively recent work on provincial *caudillismos*, see Noemí Goldman and Ricardo Salvatore, *Caudillismos rioplatenses. Nuevas miradas a un viejo problema*, Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, 1998.

<sup>10</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. XII, p. 401.

<sup>11</sup> Lynch, *San Martín*, p. 108.

<sup>12</sup> Quoted by Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. XII, p. 403.

and a hundred others, will be of no account unless we gain command of the sea'.<sup>13</sup> At that time, the revolutionaries had no fleet to face the royalist navy.<sup>14</sup> At most, they could give letters of marque to freelance vessels to act against the royalists on their behalf.<sup>15</sup> This changed in early 1818, when the government bought an 'East Indiaman of 800 tons and thirty-four guns called the *Windham*' in London, and rechristened it the *Lautaro*. The *Lautaro* was 'manned by a mixed crew of English, North Americans and Chileans, and placed under the command of Lieutenant William O'Brien, late of the Royal Navy'.<sup>16</sup> To the *Lautaro* were later added the *Chacabuco* (ex-*Coquimbo*), the *Araucano* (ex-*Columbus*), the *San Martín* (ex-*Cumberland*), a vessel sent by Pueyrredón called the *Intrépido*,<sup>17</sup> and the brigantines *Galvarino* and *Maipú*.<sup>18</sup> According to Stephen Clissold, 'the officers recruited for the new navy were mainly English volunteers, the ratings Chilean, English, American, and other nationalities', and its command 'was given to a twenty-eight year old Chilean [sic], Manuel Blanco Encalada, whose dash and enthusiasm were supported by an experience only of land operations'.<sup>19</sup> In September 1818 the Chilean navy was on its way to becoming one of the strongest navies in the Pacific, a fact acknowledged by *Hullet Hermanos y Compañía* in a letter to Bernardino Rivadavia, then based in London: 'others have received the news that the ship *Cumberland* had arrived in Valparaíso. Thus, the Chilean navy will have a marked superiority over the Spanish in the South Sea and, if it can on with good officers, it will come to Talcahuano as soon as possible and afterwards will deal with Callao'.<sup>20</sup>

These purchases were followed by the recruitment in London of Thomas Cochrane, a man who, in the opinion of Chile's envoy to London, Antonio Álvarez Condarco, 'will be the terror of Spain and a pillar of American liberty'.<sup>21</sup> It appears that O'Higgins at first doubted the advisability of endorsing the contract, worried as he was that the hiring of Cochrane, who

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<sup>13</sup> Quoted by Clissold, *Bernardo O'Higgins and the Independence of Chile*, Rupert Hart-Davis, London, 1968, p. 175.

<sup>14</sup> For an overview on how the Chilean navy was built and developed, see Donald E. Worcester, *El poder naval y la Independencia de Chile*, Editorial Francisco de Aguirre, Buenos Aires, 1971.

<sup>15</sup> Mario Cárdenas, 'Corso y guerra marítima en Chile', Universidad de Chile, Santiago, 1984.

<sup>16</sup> Clissold, *Bernardo O'Higgins*, p. 176.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>18</sup> The *Galvarino* and *Maipú* were sent from Buenos Aires and, according to Miguel Zañartu, they were manned by people 'from the countryside'. In ABO, vol. 5, Zañartu to O'Higgins, 15 September 1818.

<sup>19</sup> Clissold, *Bernardo O'Higgins*, p. 177. Blanco Encalada, who in fact was born not in Chile but in the River Plate, was the chief of the Chilean navy from February 1817 until December 1818, when Cochrane took charge. For Blanco's performance, see Worcester, *El poder naval*, pp. 54-58; and Cárdenas, 'Corso y guerra marítima en Chile', pp. 104-106.

<sup>20</sup> AGN, room VII, Documentos del Museo Histórico Nacional, doc. 914, 9 September 1818.

<sup>21</sup> Quoted by Clissold, *Bernardo O'Higgins*, p. 178.

had recently ‘fallen foul of the British government’, could delay the delivery of a million-pound English loan sought by the Chilean administration.<sup>22</sup> Yet the need to recruit Cochrane outweighed O’Higgins’ fears, and so the Supreme Director accepted Álvarez’s plan. Cochrane disembarked at Valparaíso on 28 November 1818, becoming a citizen of Chile a couple of weeks later. The Chilean government appointed him general-in-chief of the Chilean navy, while Blanco Encalada was appointed admiral and second-in-command.<sup>23</sup> On 9 January 1819, Cochrane received orders to ‘blockade the port of Callao, to cut off the maritime forces of the Viceroy of Lima [...] and by so-doing enable them to be defeated in detail’.<sup>24</sup> In the words of the editors of the *Gaceta Ministerial de Chile*: ‘the chiefs of Peru and their troops have repeatedly ravaged the territory of Chile, indiscriminately plundering the peaceful inhabitants of the *haciendas* and the coast; and now the formidable *rayo* of war has inevitably turned to those who have indulged themselves in slavery and the annihilation of your brothers’.<sup>25</sup>

The navy was divided into two flotillas. The first, composed of the four biggest ships, the *San Martín*, *O’Higgins*, *Lautaro* and *Chacabuco*, set sail for Peru between mid January and mid February 1819. It had a crew of 331 Chileans and 254 foreigners, besides 137 cadets, 128 artillerymen and 255 infantry soldiers.<sup>26</sup> All the captains were foreigners. The second flotilla was led by Blanco Encalada, and was composed of the *Galvarino*, *Araucano* and *Pueyrredón*.<sup>27</sup> Cochrane carried out his first attack on 28 February and the following day he declared a blockade of the port of Callao. In his correspondence with viceroy Pezuela reporting on these actions, Cochrane introduced himself as the representative of the ‘supreme government of Chile’. In doing so, he sought to put the Chilean state on the same level as the Peruvian, thereby using international law to legitimize this and future actions by the revolutionaries in Peruvian territory. Santiago applauded Cochrane’s move, and on 24 April 1819 the *Gaceta Ministerial* decreed that ‘vessels that present themselves in front of one of the blocked ports

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Worcester, *El poder naval*, p. 64.

<sup>24</sup> José Ignacio Zenteno to Cochrane, as cited by David Cordingly, *Cochrane, the Dauntless. The life and adventures of Thomas Cochrane*, Bloomsbury Publishing, London, 2007. p. 272.

<sup>25</sup> *Gaceta Ministerial de Chile*, number 5, 26 July 1819. Together with giving Cochrane orders to attack the Peruvian coasts, O’Higgins sent Rafael Garfías to Lima on a ‘secret mission’. Among the Instructions given to Garfías, the government asked him to ‘determine’ the amount of men that general La Serna counted on, as well as the number of royalist forces established in Lima. Besides, O’Higgins told Garfías to ‘circulate’ in Lima a series of *proclamas*, letters and public papers to encourage the ‘progress of our cause’. In FV, vol. 281, pp. 92-93v, 26 February 1819.

<sup>26</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General*, vol. XII, p. 142.

<sup>27</sup> Worcester, *El poder naval*, p. 79.

shall be sent to Valparaíso to be judged under the law of Nations'.<sup>28</sup> Pezuela, however, would not give Chile a status that, according to Spain, rebel governments did not deserve. The Chilean revolutionaries were still seen as insurgents, and so Cochrane's invocation of international law was not valid in the eyes of Pezuela. Not surprisingly, when Cochrane offered Pezuela an exchange of prisoners the viceroy agreed to free only a small number of them. In Pezuela's view, the prisoners of the brigantine *Maipo* could not be released, as they were 'pirates' who served under an 'unknown flag'. He, in other words, did not recognize 'the Chilean flag because he considered it illegitimate'.<sup>29</sup>

Along with seeing the revolutionaries as rebels, Pezuela ordered the royalist fleet to let time pass in order to exhaust both Cochrane's patience and the food supplies of the Chilean navy. In early April, Cochrane left Callao to find supplies in other ports on the Peruvian coast; Blanco Encalada, meanwhile, was instructed to maintain the blockade. Things went relatively well for the revolutionaries outside Callao, but in May 1819 Blanco Encalada was compelled to leave the blockade and return to Valparaíso to fetch supplies. Irritated with Blanco's decision, O'Higgins disapproved of his action and put him on trial for disobeying his superiors. The commander of the *Lautaro*, the English captain George Guise, was ordered to go back to Callao immediately to join forces with Cochrane. But in the end Guise did not sail for Callao, since, after searching in vain for the second flotilla, Cochrane and the rest of the navy returned to Valparaíso in mid-June.<sup>30</sup> Thus, the first blockade of Callao finished badly: after a couple of months of blockade, Pezuela's defensive strategy thwarted Cochrane's objective of inflicting a major attack on Lima.

During his months in Chile Cochrane devoted himself to preparing a new expedition to Callao. In July 1819 he voted for the pardon of Blanco Encalada, a motion seconded by the other members of the War Council and confirmed by O'Higgins.<sup>31</sup> Two months later, Cochrane received new instructions from the government. This time, O'Higgins stated that 'the sole purpose of this expedition is to strengthen in our hand the domain of the Pacific so that [...] the expeditionary army can set sail from our ports to liberate Peru and ensure the

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<sup>28</sup> Quoted in Barros Arana, *Historia General*, vol. XII, p. 165.

<sup>29</sup> Cárdenas, 'Corso y guerra marítima en Chile', p. 67. It is possible that Pezuela's refusal to treat the insurgents according to international rather than penal law had been influenced by the negative impression he had of foreigners, especially English, who 'protected and assisted' the insurgents. See AGI, Estado 85, N 66, Secretario del Despacho de Estado to minister of war, 19 June 1818.

<sup>30</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General*, vol. XII, pp. 175-193; and Worcester, *El poder naval*, p. 89-93.

<sup>31</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General*, vol. XII, p. 214.

independence of South America'.<sup>32</sup> The Chilean navy arrived at Callao on 27 September 1819 for the second time in nine months. Cochrane realized that the port had been reinforced with new defences, and that a contingent of about 3,000 men manned its forts. On 2 October, Cochrane ordered the use of Congreve rockets to respond to the sporadic attacks of the royalists,<sup>33</sup> who, encouraged by rumours that an expedition had finally departed from Cadiz to assist Pezuela, were much more willing than a couple of months before to confront the revolutionaries directly.<sup>34</sup> Cochrane's letter to Pezuela offering him an honourable fight between equal forces was answered with a definitive 'no more correspondence', which reinforced his previous decision that having conversations with the rebels was out of the question.<sup>35</sup> But, once again, Pezuela did not attack the Chilean navy. Impatient as he was, Cochrane then attempted an attack on Guayaquil, which was also under royalist control. Although Cochrane seized a few vessels in the river Guayaquil, he could not reach the city.<sup>36</sup> It was now December 1819, exactly a year after Cochrane's arrival in Chile. During this period, the vice-admiral had created an effective navy, but gained little in military terms. Cochrane's critics soon appeared. Among them was San Martín himself, who, after acknowledging that - following orders from Cochrane- Blanco Encalada had returned with the *Lautaro* to Valparaíso, demanded that the Chilean government dispatch a new naval force to blockade Callao.<sup>37</sup>

Donald Worcester argues that these criticisms played a part in Cochrane's decision in January 1820 to attempt an invasion of Valdivia, the Chilean royalist stronghold par excellence. To have control of Valdivia would prevent Vicente Benavides from using the city as a supply centre, as well as helping Cochrane to regain the approval of the authorities. Hence, instead of going back to Valparaíso with the rest of the Chilean navy, Cochrane travelled to the south of the country in complete secrecy; not even O'Higgins was informed of his plan. Cochrane reconnoitred Valdivia on 17 January 1820, finding out 'that the Spanish brig *Potrillo* was due shortly with money for the payment of the Valdivia garrison'.<sup>38</sup> He then headed north to Talcahuano, where he met Ramón Freire and learned about the irregular war in the south of

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<sup>32</sup> Quoted by Ibidem, p. 217.

<sup>33</sup> Worcester, *El poder naval*, p. 103.

<sup>34</sup> This expedition never set sail, as Rafael del Riego and other Spanish officers refused to leave for Spanish America, thus provoking a major political crisis and eventually a change of government. This revolt led to the *Trienio Liberal*. See Anna, *Spain and the loss of America*, chapter VI.

<sup>35</sup> Quoted by Barros Arana, *Historia General*, vol. XII, p. 325.

<sup>36</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General*, vol. XII, pp. 334-335; and Worcester, *El poder naval*, pp. 106-107.

<sup>37</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General*, vol. XII, p. 341.

<sup>38</sup> David Cordingly, *Cochrane*, p. 280.

Chile. Freire, Cochrane recalls, ‘gave him a hospitable welcome, “and after explanation of my plans, placed two hundred and fifty men at my disposal, under the command of a gallant Frenchman, Major Beauchef”. The *Moctezuma* and the *Intrépido*, two ships anchored at Talcahuano, ‘were persuaded to join the expedition’. The squadron departed for Valdivia on 25 January, its mission to seize a fort defended by nearly 2,000 men.<sup>39</sup>

The disadvantage posed by the huge difference in manpower was somewhat counterbalanced by Cochrane’s audacity. His men seized Valdivia between 2 and 4 February, after an admirable action by Beauchef and his men.<sup>40</sup> This was undoubtedly one of the greatest military triumphs of the revolutionaries, comparable to the battles of Chacabuco and Maipú. It allowed the O’Higgins government to gain 300 kilometres of coast, ‘10,000 cannon shot, 128 guns, 1,000 hundred-weight of gunpowder, 170,000 musket cartridges, a large quantity of small arms, and the ship *Dolores* which was later sold for \$20,000’.<sup>41</sup> The news of Cochrane’s ‘astounding victory came as a complete surprise’ to the authorities in Santiago,<sup>42</sup> who not only welcomed him as a hero when he returned to Valparaíso on 6 March, but also overlooked Cochrane’s failure to seize Chiloé a couple of weeks after he entered Valdivia.<sup>43</sup> It is likely that O’Higgins’ decision not to spend the state’s resources aiding Freire had been influenced by Cochrane’s achievement in Valdivia, especially considering that his victory led to the ‘destruction of Benavides’ operational base’ in the south of the country.<sup>44</sup>

It was in this context that San Martín requested that O’Higgins keep him informed of Cochrane’s campaign in the Pacific in November 1819, so he could return to Chile with the Army of the Andes and attempt the invasion of Peru. We saw that San Martín’s decision had important results. For one thing, it enabled San Martín to stay out of *rioplatense* politics and concentrate his energies on the military aspects of his American programme. But it also meant that Buenos Aires would have little to do with the preparation and consummation of the invasion, and that, at least until the Peruvians joined the revolution, the army of the ‘republic’ would have to bear the economic and human costs of the expedition. By the army of the ‘republic’ the authorities referred to both the Chilean contingents and those of the Army of

<sup>39</sup> Ibid. See also Clissold, *Bernardo O’Higgins*, p. 185.

<sup>40</sup> For the *Toma de Valdivia*, see Worcester, *El poder naval*, pp. 108-116; Barros Arana, *Historia General*, vol. XII, pp. 365-371; Puigmal (editor), *Memorias de Jorge Beauchef*, pp. 120-128; Cordingly, *Cochrane*, pp. 281-284.

<sup>41</sup> Cordingly, *Cochrane*, p. 284. Cochrane reported to Freire about the seizure of Valdivia on 11 February. See FV, vol. 808, pp. 85-85v.

<sup>42</sup> Cordingly, *Cochrane*, p. 284.

<sup>43</sup> Worcester, *El poder naval*, pp. 116-117.

<sup>44</sup> Cárdenas, ‘Curso y guerra marítima en Chile’, pp. 122, 124.

the Andes who travelled back to Chile with San Martín from Mendoza. As O'Higgins told the Senate in May 1820, it was inevitable that the 'liberating army of Peru be composed mainly of battalions from this republic. Politics, reason, decency and the reputation of the republic demand it; it is absolutely necessary, therefore, to reorganize and create new detachments to increase the army'.<sup>45</sup> According to new calculations by San Martín, the army required 4,000 men: 3,400 infantry soldiers, 300 cavalrymen and 100 sappers.<sup>46</sup> This was a much more modest army both to pay and organize than the army of 6,100 men envisioned by San Martín in late 1818.<sup>47</sup>

The O'Higgins government spent the first months of 1820 organizing the expedition to Peru.<sup>48</sup> In order to encourage recruitment, O'Higgins agreed with the Senate that soldiers, corporals and sergeants enrolled in the army would be compensated with an annuity that 'will consist of the fourth part of the wages earned by soldiers at the time of their retirement'.<sup>49</sup> However, from the numerous desertions in the period March-August 1820, it appears that such a measure did not have the expected effect; not at least among the rank-and-file soldiers who were forcefully recruited from the small towns north of Santiago, and who tended to desert en masse.<sup>50</sup> In early June 1820, the large number of desertions led San Martín to request that O'Higgins establish militia detachments throughout the country to prevent the escape of soldiers. The riskiest points were Limache, Ocoa, Puchuncaví, La Ligua and El Melón, all of them small *villas* near Quillota, where the army was quartered.<sup>51</sup> Desertions continued until the embarkation of the troops, as shown by a note sent by San Martín to O'Higgins on 8 August (only twelve days before the departure of the expedition), urging him to order his subordinates to take all arrested deserters to their respective detachments.<sup>52</sup>

Apart from desertions, other issues, related to the political consequences of the

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<sup>45</sup> Quoted by Pinto and Valdivia, *¿Chilenos todos?*, p. 122.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 123.

<sup>47</sup> San Martín believed that his army should be backed by Juan Bautista Bustos' army, stationed in Upper Peru. See AHM, box 286, doc. 119, San Martín to Bustos, 16 February 1820. This document can also be found in AGN, room X, 4-4-2. For Bustos' performance in early 1820, see Ovidio Giménez, *Vida, época y obra de Manuel Belgrano*, Ciudad Argentina Editorial de Ciencia y Cultura, Buenos Aires, 1999, p. 688.

<sup>48</sup> The organization of the expedition can be followed in the documents published by Félix Denegri Luna in CDIP, tome VI, vol. 2° pp. 3-142. There, we find all sorts of sources related to the economic, political and military aspects of the liberating army. Although most of them refer to bureaucratic questions, they give an interesting overview of how the army was built.

<sup>49</sup> CDIP, tome VI, vol. 2°, p. 8, 10 February 1820.

<sup>50</sup> Cases of desertions can be found in CDIP, tome VI, vol. 2°.

<sup>51</sup> CDIP, tome VI, vol. 2°, pp. 79-80, San Martín to O'Higgins, 4 June 1820.

<sup>52</sup> CDIP, tome VI, vol. 2°, p. 107, San Martín to O'Higgins, 8 August 1820.

expedition, are worthy of mention.<sup>53</sup> Consider, for instance, San Martín's letter to O'Higgins of 11 May 1820 acknowledging the Chilean government's decision to call the newly created army the *Ejército Libertador del Perú*.<sup>54</sup> Although today it may sound obvious (in general, historians speak of the army without giving much detail about the origin of its denomination), the decision to adopt that name involved a serious political issue. Following one of the points negotiated in February 1819 between the Chilean and *rioplatense* delegates, Antonio José de Irisarri and Gregorio Tagle,<sup>55</sup> the revolutionary authorities in Chile intelligently used the words *Libertador* and *Perú* to stress that San Martín's main objective was to free, not to conquer, Peru. From then on, soldiers recruited to the army would no longer represent the interests of either the Army of the Andes or the Army of Chile, and Peruvians would have the chance both to enrol in the army and to freely decide their political future.

But of these goals only recruiting troops in Peru was actually accomplished by San Martín. To begin with, the authorities tended to speak of the detachments of the *Ejército Libertador del Perú* according to whether they had historically belonged to the Army of the Andes or to the Army of Chile.<sup>56</sup> That is, although it received a new name, the *Ejército Libertador* never became a completely different integrated army, but a combination of forces taken from both the Army of the Andes and the Army of Chile. True, we will see that in 1822 the Army of Chile was formed by many Peruvian-born soldiers, while the *Ejército Libertador del Perú* had many Chileans in its ranks. However, the authorities used to give names to the armies on the basis of the state that had originally organized them, not on the basis of the place of birth of their soldiers. On the other hand, it is not entirely clear that San Martín sought to liberate Peru so that it could be governed by its own people. We saw that Irisarri and Tagle agreed that if the 'states of Chile, the United Provinces and Lima concurred' the *Ejército Libertador* would be allowed to 'stay' in Peruvian territory and, although it was not explicitly stated, proclaim independence in Lima and build a new government. San Martín was aware that his role in Peru should be not only military but political. Hence his confidential letter to O'Higgins of 12 June 1820, asking him for advice if the *limeño* viceroy 'wants to negotiate with

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<sup>53</sup> The army, of course, faced other types of complications apart from desertions. Perhaps the most damaging was the plague of smallpox which affected the soldiers who were stationed in Quillota in the days prior to the shipment of the troops. See CDIP, tome VI, vol. 2º, p. 112, San Martín to O'Higgins, 8 August 1820.

<sup>54</sup> CDIP, tome VI, vol. 2º, p. 69, San Martín to Secretary of War, 11 May 1820.

<sup>55</sup> Cf. footnote 7 of this chapter.

<sup>56</sup> See, for example, CDIP, tome VI, vol. 2º, p. 113, San Martín to Zenteno, 9 August 1820. In this source, San Martín speaks of the '*Ejército de Chile*' as formed by the 'sons of Chile'.

me', that is, as representative of the Chilean government.<sup>57</sup>

In August 1820, San Martín was appointed general-in-chief of the *Ejército Libertador*. In order to prevent misunderstandings, O'Higgins gave 'clear instructions to Cochrane that General San Martín had "exclusive control of the operations of this great enterprise, and you are to act strictly in accordance with the plan which he will provide".<sup>58</sup> The army was composed of 4,118 soldiers, 296 officers and the General Staff (a total of around 4,500 men, divided more or less equally into Chileans and *rioplatenses*).<sup>59</sup> In addition, small arms, 35 pieces of artillery, fifteen thousand muskets, and around two thousand sabres to arm 'the new corps to be formed in Peru' were shipped to the soldiers.<sup>60</sup> The General Staff carried a printing press to publish bulletins and proclamations, a 'weapon' that San Martín used in Peru as effectively as firearms.<sup>61</sup> The artillery, supplies, soldiers and horses were transported in seventeen cargo ships, which were 'escorted by eight [sic] warships under the command of Cochrane'.<sup>62</sup> They were: the *O'Higgins*, *San Martín*, *Lautaro*, *Independencia*, *Araucano*, *Galvarino* and *Moctezuma*. In total they had 231 cannon and 1,928 crew.<sup>63</sup>

The expedition departed on 20 August 1820 from Valparaíso, the 'key point of America',<sup>64</sup> for Peru. The British colonel William Miller, one of Cochrane's subordinates, recounted in his *Memoirs* that 'it was in truth an imposing and exciting spectacle to behold that bay crowded with shipping, under patriot banners, which formerly received only one merchant vessel annually. As the several corps, marching from cantonments, with music playing, through cheering multitudes, severally arrived upon the beach, they were taken off to their respective transports in the greatest order, and without the occurrence of a single accident'.<sup>65</sup> This celebratory atmosphere was crowned with a long poem called *Despedida de las chilenas al Ejército Libertador del Perú*, which was probably published in the days prior to the shipment of the troops. The main lines of the poem said:

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<sup>57</sup> CDIP, tome VI, vol. 2°, pp. 83-84, San Martín to O'Higgins, 12 June 1820.

<sup>58</sup> Lynch, *San Martín*, p. 121.

<sup>59</sup> According to an *Estado de fuerza* of 15 July 1820, there were 4,642 men enrolled in the *Ejército Libertador*. See CDIP, tome VI, vol. 2° (document inserted between pages 94 and 95).

<sup>60</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. XII, p. 454. See also Lynch, *San Martín*, p. 120.

<sup>61</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. XII, p. 455.

<sup>62</sup> Cordingley, *Cochrane*, p. 287.

<sup>63</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. XII, footnote 24, p. 456. See also AGI, Indiferente General 1569; and AHM, box 704, doc. 51, O'Higgins to Cuyo's intendant, 20 August 1820. In this last source, O'Higgins asserted that there were nine warships that accompanied the army.

<sup>64</sup> *El Censor de la Revolución*, number 7, 10 July 1820.

<sup>65</sup> John Miller, *Memoirs of General Miller in the service of the Republic of Peru*, Printed by Thomas Davison, London, 1828, p. 266.

*Qué terrible contraste,  
 O dulce Patria amada,  
 La expedición deseada  
 Causa en el corazón!  
 Ya es tiempo de cumplirse  
 Tu orden irrevocable:  
 La Libertad amable  
 Lidia con el amor.  
 [...]  
 Defensores de Chile  
 Corred a la victoria,  
 Y volved con la gloria  
 Que os adquiera el valor.  
 El cobarde que ceda  
 Al menos noble empeño  
 Vea siempre airado el ceño  
 [...]  
 Hermosuras de Lima  
 Nobles y generosas  
 Recibid obsequios  
 Los hijos del valor.  
 Otro mérito no hallen  
 Ante esos ojos bellos  
 Que el que se ganen ellos  
 Venciendo al opresor.<sup>66</sup>*

Appealing to the *limeño* women to welcome the soldiers of the *Ejército Libertador*, the last stanza of this poem anticipated one of the most difficult problems faced by San Martín and his men from the moment they set foot in Peru: the reluctance of the local elites to join the revolution. While the preparation, organization and financing of the expedition fell under the control of the O'Higgins government, the reaction of the Peruvians to San Martín's invasion was beyond its control.

## II. LIMA: ROYALIST STRONGHOLD

Lima was the most important counterrevolutionary centre in South America. In a stimulating recent publication, Víctor Peralta has tried to demonstrate that politics in Lima in the 1810s and early 1820s were much more dynamic and participative than previous scholars had believed. Such dynamism, Peralta has said, is shown by the participation of politicians and men of letters in public debates about the meaning and scope of revolution. Peralta tells us that opposition to Abascal and his successor, Joaquín Pezuela, was not confined to a small group

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<sup>66</sup> FV, vol. 972, pp. 65-68v.

of ‘radicals’, but spread throughout Lima (and beyond). In a sense, it would no longer be possible to assert that Lima was a land of recalcitrant royalists, whose attitude towards the revolution was merely defensive and reactive.<sup>67</sup>

Accepting that some of Peralta’s arguments are not only interesting but also convincing, especially when he stresses the role of the press in building an informative and politicized society, it appears that only small groups of the *limeño* elites backed the revolutionary project prior to the 1820s. The historian must not confuse opposition to Abascal and Pezuela with support for San Martín. When the revolutionary expedition set sail for Peru, O’Higgins, San Martín and the officers of the *Ejército Libertador* were explicit advocates of independence (though they differed on the type of government that should be implemented to replace the Spanish monarchy). However, promoters of independence in Lima were hardly a majority. There are various reasons why the independence programme did not prosper among the *limeño* elites prior to the early 1820s, though the fear that the insurgency might jeopardize their socio-economic status was the most evident. ‘The Peruvian aristocracy –an aristocracy of land, office and trade- clung fanatically to their power and privilege’, John Lynch has claimed. ‘The propertied classes of Lima were terrified by the “licentiousness of the populace and the coloured people of this city and its environs, who exceed the whites by a third or a fifth and who are arrogant, insubordinate and lawless”. The elite preferred security to change and were not prepared to risk their social predominance for the sake of independence’. This is why the ‘Peruvian liberals’, also members of the elites, ‘did not produce an independence movement. Prisoners of their society, they demanded no more than political reform and equality for creoles within the colonial framework’.<sup>68</sup> This fits Timothy Anna’s argument that it was one thing to be a defender of independence, but quite another to advocate ‘creole advancement’ in state employment. While the first option was cheered only by a few, the second was welcomed by most elite members.<sup>69</sup> Thus, San Martín’s belief that ‘time was on his side and that he had only to use the weapons of bluff and intrigue for the Viceroy’s army to melt away and allow

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<sup>67</sup> Peralta, *La independencia y la cultura política peruana*, especially parts 2, 3 and 4.

<sup>68</sup> Lynch, *San Martín*, pp. 116-117 (quoting Pablo Macera, *Tres etapas en el desarrollo de la conciencia nacional*, Lima, 1955, pp. 88-89).

<sup>69</sup> Anna, *The fall of the royal government in Peru*, p. 152. For a good example of why the elites felt threatened by the revolution, see the report sent by Lima’s Archbishop to Abascal in November 1819. There, we find an interesting account both of the ‘arrogant’ behaviour of the insurgents in the years 1818-1819, and the negative impression they caused among the *limeño* ruling classes. In AGI, Diversos 5, 27 November 1819.

him to enter Lima without bloodshed' did not quite correspond to reality.<sup>70</sup> We will see later that San Martín's failure to recognize that independence in Lima was not as popular as he thought when he first departed from Chile delayed not the proclamation of independence in Peru but its consolidation. Indeed, if San Martín was supported by some members of the elites, they were largely from the provinces, Lima being in essence the royalist stronghold of South America.<sup>71</sup>

After seizing the city of Pisco in September 1820, San Martín made use of one of his favourite strategies: the issue of *Proclamas* to explain to Peruvians the political goals of the liberating army. In one, San Martín assured Peruvians that the revolutionaries would respect the 'public morals and customs of the country', a strategy he used to persuade, rather than coerce, the provincial leaders to join the revolution.<sup>72</sup> On 20 September 1820, San Martín ordered the printing of a *Bando* to explain to the wealthiest inhabitants that his policy of recruiting of slaves would not harm their economic interests: 'every owner of slaves who had been enrolled to serve in the Liberating Army [...] is entitled to resort to the chief of the General Staff to ask restitution of the value of his slaves, which will be paid after the establishment of a National Government in Peru'.<sup>73</sup>

At the end of 1820, San Martín's strategy seemed to be paying off, both militarily and politically. On 5 November, Cochrane captured the Spanish frigate *Esmeralda*, 'the best royal warship on the Pacific',<sup>74</sup> while on 29 December the marquis of Torre Tagle, governor of Trujillo, proclaimed independence in the northern province and swore loyalty to San Martín's army:

The happy day has finally arrived in which the illustrious inhabitants of Trujillo have shaken the shameful yoke of the Spanish tyranny, and proclaimed the glorious Independence [...] They waited impatiently for the aid of a powerful arm; and behold it appears in Pisco at the head of the Army of Liberation, the guardian of genius, the Washington of South America, the undefeated General San Martín. [...] Break forth in imitation of your Governor and General, in tones of joy and enthusiasm the festive cheers of *Viva la Patria, Viva la*

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<sup>70</sup> Clissold, *Bernardo O'Higgins*, p. 189.

<sup>71</sup> And the truth is that the support of the provinces to San Martín's programme is not so clear either, as new investigations are beginning to show. See Elizabeth Hernández García, 'Crisis de autoridad en una región periférica: la veicidad peruana frente a la nueva Patria (Perú, 1821-1824)', paper given in the *XVI Congreso Internacional de AHILA. El nacimiento de la libertad en el Península Ibérica y Latinoamérica*, San Fernando, Spain, September 2011.

<sup>72</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. XIII, pp. 42-43.

<sup>73</sup> CDIP, tome VI, vol. 2º, p. 145, 20 September 1820. Three days later, San Martín reported to the Chilean minister of war that he had been able to recruit 650 slaves from the *haciendas* near Pisco. See *Ibidem*, pp. 144-145

<sup>74</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 164.

*Independencia, Viva la unión y la Libertad* = independent Trujillo.<sup>75</sup>

San Martín acknowledged Trujillo's move towards independence in a letter to Santiago on 2 January 1821. San Martín told José Ignacio Zenteno how pleased he was that 'the spirit of devotion to the Cause of Independence is becoming increasingly evident in the northern provinces'. In his view, events in Trujillo exemplified the usefulness of having conversations with the provincial elites.<sup>76</sup> It was in the provinces, in fact, that the revolutionary army recruited most of its Peruvian contingents. By mid February, the army had increased its contingents by more than two thousand men from the provinces, an impressive accomplishment considering the short period of time spent by the liberating army in Peruvian territory. The *Estado general* of the *Ejército Libertador* of 15 January 1821 amounted to 6,699 men.<sup>77</sup>

At the same time that San Martín negotiated with provincial leaders like Torre Tagle, he had conversations with the royalist authorities. The first contacts between the two sides were held during the last week of September 1820. According to Timothy Anna, 'Pezuela agreed to negotiations because he had been ordered to do so by the new government in Spain'. San Martín, for his part, 'agreed to talk because he had frequently claimed that his object was not to conquer Peru [...] but to provide an alternative to help Peruvians make up their own minds about their political future'.<sup>78</sup> The fact that Pezuela had received San Martín's envoys shows that Del Riego's revolt brought not only a shift of government in Spain, but also a change in the relationship between the Spanish American revolutionaries and Madrid. 'Rebels' were suddenly summoned to parley, and military officers like San Martín began to be seen by the viceroy as representatives of a sovereign state. In his communications with San Martín, Pezuela addressed the *rioplatense* officer as '*Excmo. señor general de las tropas de Chile don José de San Martín*', which, in comparison to the treatment given by Pezuela to Cochrane a year before, was quite novel.<sup>79</sup> For the first time in a decade, revolutionary delegates were officially received by a Peruvian viceroy, which was obviously the consequence of events in Spain.

However, the repercussions in Spanish America of the change of government in the metropolis should not be exaggerated. San Martín's envoys and Pezuela did not reach an agreement when they met at Miraflores, near Lima. Pezuela's mission was to get the

<sup>75</sup> CDIP, tome VI, vol. 2°, pp. 219-221, 29 December 1820.

<sup>76</sup> CDIP, tome VI, vol. 2°, p. 214, San Martín to Zenteno, 2 January 1821.

<sup>77</sup> CDIP, tome VI, vol. 2°, p. 243.

<sup>78</sup> Anna, *The fall of the royal government in Peru*, p. 161.

<sup>79</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. XIII, p. 55.

revolutionaries to send delegates to Spain to find a way out of the conflict, stressing, nevertheless, that he was not in a position to recognize the independence of Chile and the River Plate. San Martín's envoys, for their part, proposed to create a constitutional monarchy in Peru, but only after Spain agreed to recognize the independence of the country. Ferdinand VII could not, these delegates claimed, continue as king of Peru.<sup>80</sup> With objectives as different as these it is not surprising that negotiations ended completely on 1 October 1820. San Martín's delegates went back to Pisco, while Pezuela returned to Lima.

Back in the capital, Pezuela realized how much influence he had lost within the royalist army. The same day that the negotiations in Miraflores finished, José La Serna and other royalist generals presented Pezuela with a plan for the defence of the capital. Asserting that 'everything had already been arranged', Pezuela 'informed his Junta of War –the committee composed of the commanders of the various sections of the army- that the necessary orders had already been given and that he would not agree to the generals' suggestions'. Pezuela criticized not so much the detail of the plan as the fact that it was crafted without his consent. In any case, Pezuela and La Serna 'differed profoundly over the role Lima should play in the crisis now confronting them', especially in military terms. While La Serna, José Canterac and Jerónimo Valdés 'were convinced that it was impossible to defend Lima owing to the difficulties in supplying the city, its vulnerability to Chilean naval blockade, and the apparent increase of political dissidence among its civilians', Pezuela believed that under no circumstances should Lima be abandoned. La Serna wanted to re-concentrate forces in Upper Peru, while Pezuela asserted that Lima 'will be sustained as long as I exist'. The loss of Lima would, in Pezuela's opinion, precipitate the fall of Upper and Lower Peru.<sup>81</sup>

Pezuela fell from power in late January 1821, after nineteen military chiefs, supported by powerful *limeño* merchants, demanded that he resign in favour of La Serna.<sup>82</sup> This meant not only a political defeat for Pezuela, but also a political triumph for San Martín, who could show his critics in the *Ejército Libertador*, especially Cochrane, that his policy of intrigue was bearing fruit. The British admiral believed that time was *not* on San Martín's side and that, consequently, the safest way to defeat the royalist was by conducting a direct attack on the

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<sup>80</sup> Ibidem, pp. 58-59.

<sup>81</sup> Anna, *The fall of the royal government in Peru*, pp. 161-162.

<sup>82</sup> Ibidem, p. 170. That these military were backed by the *limeño* merchants is the main hypothesis of Marks, *Deconstructing legitimacy*.

city.<sup>83</sup> Rather reluctantly, in March 1821 San Martín authorized Cochrane to carry out an expedition to Intermedios, in the south of the country. Aided by William Miller, Cochrane gained important victories in the southern region, penetrating ‘successfully as far inland as Tacna and Moquegua’. Juan Antonio Álvarez de Arenales, for his part, ‘defeated a royalist detachment at Pasco, and in May advanced as far as Tarma’. Arenales then proposed that San Martín undertake an expedition to the sierra, ‘leaving Lima to the efforts of the navy and the guerrillas’. However, San Martín did not agree, and ‘when Arenales reached Jauja he received news that [a] ceasefire had been negotiated’.<sup>84</sup> The ceasefire was negotiated by La Serna and San Martín in April-May 1821, and the Spanish liberal delegate, Manuel Abreu, played an important role in it.<sup>85</sup>

The signing of the armistice was followed by an unexpected event: the abandonment of Lima by La Serna’s army. Just a few days after the armistice ended, La Serna’s second-in-command, general José Canterac, left Lima for the sierra with the royalist cavalry and infantry. According to Anna, the royalists left the Peruvian capital because ‘it did not provide a suitable military base from which to defend the rest of the country’.<sup>86</sup> Thus, it is possible to conclude that neither party had much confidence that the armistice would lead to a final settlement. The revolutionaries would not leave the country until they proclaimed the independence of Peru (what type of political regime should be implemented after independence was another matter). On the other hand, any decision made by the royalists regarding the future role of Spain in independent Peru needed to be approved by the metropolis, a process which could take months. La Serna, therefore, had no option but to abandon Lima: the city and the port of Callao were blockaded; the lack of supplies and illnesses were affecting the morale of the royalist army; and Spain was too wrapped up in its own problems to expect that metropolitan ministers would spend much time solving the *limeño* crisis.<sup>87</sup>

San Martín entered Lima on 12 July 1821.<sup>88</sup> Rumours announcing the almost certain fall of the royalist capital had reached Chile in April of that year. On 24 April, the British envoy to Valparaíso, H. Brown, summarized the latest news regarding the war in Peru to

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<sup>83</sup> Worcester, *El poder naval*, p. 126.

<sup>84</sup> Lynch, *San Martín*, pp. 127-128.

<sup>85</sup> For negotiations for the ceasefire, see *Spain and the loss of America*, p. 238; Anna, *The fall of the royal government in Peru*, p. 175; AGI, Indiferente General 1569, 18 March 1820; and AGI, Lima 800, San Martín to Abreu, 23 March 1821.

<sup>86</sup> Anna, *The fall of the royal government in Peru*, p. 176.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 177-178.

<sup>88</sup> Lynch, *San Martín*, p. 130. See also AGN, room X, 23-2-5, San Martín to O’Higgins, 19 July 1821.

Thomas Farrer: ‘we deferred writing to you after the arrival of our [ship?] from England, in the daily hopes of being able to announce to you the fall of Lima and consequent liberation of all Peru from the yoke of Spain, by which we should have been able in a short time after to give you a better idea of the probable consumpt[ion] for your articles generally on this side of the Continent of South America, but we are still unable to say such has been the case’. Brown believed that the fall of Lima ‘will give more life to the Trade of this side of the country [Valparaíso]’. Nevertheless, he warned Farrer against what he saw as the main problem in Chile: the lack of a ‘middle Class’ that could become Britain’s economic partner. In his view, British merchants should reduce their exports to Chile, as the ‘lower class of Inhabitants use very few European articles yet’.<sup>89</sup> But because the seizure of Lima by San Martín was likely to liberalize the whole South American economic system, it is safe to say that Brown and the British merchants in Chile rejoiced when news confirming the arrival of the revolutionaries in Lima reached Valparaíso.<sup>90</sup>

One of San Martín’s first actions in Lima was to recover the flags of ‘the Chilean state’ lost to the royalists in the battle of Rancagua in October 1814.<sup>91</sup> This was a symbolic triumph for the revolutionaries, as was the proclamation of the independence of Peru on 28 July 1821. Indeed, the declaration of independence was an important symbolic act, although it did not cause immediate major political changes within Peruvian society.<sup>92</sup> Most of the *limeño* elites who signed the declaration of independence did so simply because La Serna abandoned the city. In Anna’s words, Peruvian independence came ‘by default’:<sup>93</sup> ‘quite simply Lima had no choice but to declare independence’.<sup>94</sup> The war of opinion so vehemently defended by San Martín as the best strategy to face the opposition of the royalist elites was never as productive as the *rioplatense* general believed. The distribution of *proclamas* promising to respect and defend the privileged position of the ruling classes had little effect. So little, that in many cases the new authorities had to ‘pressure’ elite members to sign the *Acta* of independence. Hence, at least for Lima’s nobility, the ‘rebels’ claim that independence was the “general will” of Lima’

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<sup>89</sup> BPRO, E 140/26/1, pp. 16-16v, Brown to Farrer, 24 April 1821.

<sup>90</sup> ‘By October 1822’, says Anna, ‘at least fourteen British merchant houses were already established in Lima’. In Anna, *The fall of the royal government in Peru*, p. 199.

<sup>91</sup> AGN, room X, 23-2-5, San Martín to O’Higgins, 21 July 1821.

<sup>92</sup> For the ceremony of the proclamation of the independence of Peru, see Lynch, *San Martín*, pp. 131-132.

<sup>93</sup> Anna, *The fall of the royal government in Peru*, p. 163.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 179.

was not entirely true.<sup>95</sup> The indecision of the elites about the political regime to be established in Lima after the declaration of independence proves that those who backed San Martín did not aim to change colonialism into republicanism, as Chileans did –for good or ill- during the O’Higgins government. In fact, San Martín’s monarchical ideas prevent us from asserting that *his* Peru was ‘meant’ to be republican, or that those who signed the declaration of independence were explicit followers of republicanism.<sup>96</sup>

Of course, on 28 July 1821, the day when Peruvian independence was proclaimed by San Martín, nobody could have foreseen that San Martín would fail in shaping a solid political coalition to uphold his government. However, in mid 1821 San Martín was already in the position to realize that not only within the elites but also within the revolutionary ranks some officers were beginning to feel estranged from his government. San Martín’s appointment on 3 August as Protector of Peru was a political move by his allies to ensure that his power in Lima was supreme; not only *vis-à-vis* the royalists but also, and more important, *vis-à-vis* his revolutionary allies.<sup>97</sup> Yet the question remained whether such a move would silence both internal and external opposition. In the next section we will see that San Martín’s opponents increased significantly during the period August 1821-September 1822, and that his resignation from the Protectorate was largely due to his inability to cope with problems caused not so much by the royalists as by the revolutionaries.

### III. INTERNAL CONFLICTS, EXTERNAL CONSEQUENCES

San Martín usually favoured persuasion over coercion when facing the royalists. This was not, however, the kind of plan designed by Cochrane when he left Chile in August 1820. The British commander would have preferred not to disembark in Pisco but to ‘take immediate possession of the capital’.<sup>98</sup> Almost a year later, when the revolutionaries entered Lima, Cochrane voted for the immediate pursuit of the enemy: to allow Canterac’s and La Serna’s forces to freely withdraw to the sierra would allow the royalists to rearm and, eventually, launch the re-conquest of the capital. As Lynch put it, while ‘San Martín behaved as though the war

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<sup>95</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 181.

<sup>96</sup> I will refer to San Martín’s flirtations with monarchism later in this chapter.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 138.

<sup>98</sup> Quoted in Worcester, *El poder naval*, p. 126.

was over', Cochrane 'was convinced that it had still to be fought'.<sup>99</sup>

But Cochrane and San Martín differed not only on military but also on political and economic issues. Cochrane reproached the *rioplatense* general that his appointment as Protector of Peru had not been agreed with the navy, later adding that his decision to delay the offensive had caused problems in the payment of Chilean sailors.<sup>100</sup> The inactivity of the navy had prevented Cochrane from resorting to privateer to pay his crew, and now, Cochrane said, San Martín had to defray the wages of the navy. San Martín answered that 'I never promised to pay' the wages of the navy, since 'this debt belongs to Chile, whose government hired the sailors'.<sup>101</sup> San Martín's provocative response led Cochrane to seek resources in the port of Ancón, where he seized the local treasury to pay his men.<sup>102</sup> San Martín reacted indignantly. In a letter to O'Higgins, the Protector reported that 'the money which this villain [Cochrane] has stolen places us immediately in a critical situation, but this state [the Peruvian] is capable of making good the loss quickly. The trouble is that this devil is going to commit thousands of robberies which will severely compromise you and me'.<sup>103</sup>

Cochrane was a pragmatist, but so too was San Martín. San Martín's argument that it was Chile's responsibility, not Lima's, to pay the wages of the navy shows that, after a year of revolutionary action in Peru, the aim of the Protector was to set up a government in Peru independent not only of Spain, but also of Chile. Indeed, behind the conflict between San Martín and Cochrane, as well as in the differences between Chilean and *rioplatense* and Peruvian officers (this being the topic of the last section), lies a question of political sovereignty: should Lima be the focus of an American project or, rather, the capital of an independent state? We will see that San Martín ended up favouring the second option.<sup>104</sup>

San Martín's search for political sovereignty for Peru had consequences not only in Peru but also in Chile. One of the first acts of the Protectorate was to appoint a new general-in-chief of the *Ejército Libertador* to replace San Martín, busy as he was with his political

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<sup>99</sup> Lynch, *San Martín*, p. 135.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid. The state of destitution of the Chilean sailors was in part solved in August 1821, when the Chilean government sent salted meat and biscuits to feed the navy. See AGNP, box 3, O.L. 20-22, Jose Antonio Rodríguez Aldea to San Martín, 20 August 1821.

<sup>101</sup> Quoted in Worcester, *El poder naval*, p. 148.

<sup>102</sup> Ibidem, p. 155.

<sup>103</sup> Quoted in Lynch, *San Martín*, p. 135.

<sup>104</sup> This, in spite of the fact that, on 27 September 1821, San Martín declared: 'during my administration I will not omit any means to make the ties that bind our nations [Chile and Peru] indissoluble, and I shall always express to you the gratitude that I feel towards the great virtues and the eminent services Your Excellency [O'Higgins] has rendered to the general cause of the heroic Chilean nation'. In *Gaceta Ministerial de Chile*, number 18, p. 21.

responsibilities. On 17 August 1821, San Martín's secretary in Peru, the *rioplatense* Bernardo José de Monteagudo, reported to the Chilean government that the general command of the *Ejército Libertador del Perú* had been bestowed on the *porteño* Juan Gregorio de las Heras, while the former position of Las Heras (chief of the *Estado Mayor General* of the army) had been filled with another *rioplatense*, Rudecindo Alvarado. Monteagudo conceded that Chile was entitled to approve or disapprove of Las Heras and Alvarado as chiefs of the 'troops belonging to that state [Chile]', but he hoped that 'this measure will be accepted by the Chilean Supreme Director'. In other words, Monteagudo acknowledged that the O'Higgins government could appoint different officers to command the Chilean forces in Peru. But he insisted that the *Ejército Libertador* would be run by the 'designated officers'. In so doing, he implicitly referred to the liberating army as a exclusively 'Peruvian' force; the Army of Chile was, at best, its auxiliary.<sup>105</sup>

Citing health problems, Las Heras resigned his post as general-in-chief of the *Ejército Libertador* a month later.<sup>106</sup> Las Heras removed a burden from O'Higgins' shoulders, as the last thing he wanted was to engage in a conflict over prerogatives between Chile and Peru. Yet the Chilean Senate was about to intensify the differences between the two countries. Indirectly answering Monteagudo's note of August 1821, senators José María Rozas and José María Villarreal defended O'Higgins' right to decide whom to appoint as general-in-chief of the *Ejército Libertador*. Because the army was financed by Chile and San Martín received his Instructions from O'Higgins, the *Ejército Libertador* should remain 'dependent' on Chile:

The Army that left from Chile, commanded and financed by this State [Chile], even if it included a division from the [Army of] Andes, which is why it was called the united Army, can neither be deprived of its name nor of its dependence on this State [Chile] by him who was appointed as its general-in-chief [San Martín] nor by other subordinates.

If the Peruvian authorities did not accept the senators' view, O'Higgins was then entitled to appoint San Martín's successor, 'at least with regard to the detachments of Chile'. This last clarification resembled Monteagudo's argument that the *Ejército Libertador* was no longer a 'united' ['American'] force. The only difference was that the senators spoke from the Chilean perspective:

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<sup>105</sup> CDIP, tome VI, vol. 2°, p. 321, Monteagudo to Zenteno, 17 August 1821.

<sup>106</sup> CDIP, tome VI, vol. 2°, p. 305, Las Heras to O'Higgins, 23 September 1821.

The general-in-chief [San Martín], whom your excellency chose, ceased in that position owing to his ascent to the Protectorate of Peru. According to the Constitution [of 1818], it corresponds to you to appoint his successor, at least as far as the Chilean detachments are concerned, so that according to your instructions [the new general-in-chief] might in future provide his services with the honour, propriety, distinction and independence that Chile's flag deserves. The Senate must not doubt that the Supreme Government of Peru will grant him the distinction which he deserves in the same manner that this State [Chile] did with the Army of the Andes when it was our auxiliary.<sup>107</sup>

The tension between the Chilean state and the Protectorate increased during the following months. Shortly after the Senate expressed its opinion about the best method to choose San Martín's military successor, O'Higgins' sent senator Rozas to Peru to ensure that at least part of the expenses incurred by Chile in preparing the expedition would be paid by the Protectorate. In response, Monteagudo claimed: 'the Peruvian government will defray those expenditures when Chile pays Buenos Aires the money spent by that government to organize the 1817 expedition'.<sup>108</sup> Monteagudo's answer could be seen as rude and impolitic; however, one might also argue that Monteagudo reacted as any politician would in trying to obtain the greatest benefit for *his* state (Monteagudo was a *rioplatense* by birth, but he was now speaking on behalf of the Peruvian Protectorate). Monteagudo, in fact, acted as representative of both a sovereign and of a newly created state. Peru, San Martín's allies believed, was reborn in 1821 (an argument typically used by nineteenth-century historians to explain the alleged differences between the colonial government and the early republic), and therefore any commitment made before that date was nullified, economic debts included.<sup>109</sup>

Another event that illustrates the gap between Peru and Chile happened in January 1822, when the Spanish delegate, Manuel Abreu, travelled to Chile once his mission in Peru was finished. On 2 January, Abreu wrote to O'Higgins that, after realizing that the ship that was bound to take him back to Europe would stay in Valparaíso longer than expected, he had gone to Santiago to present himself in person before the Chilean authorities. Abreu did not find the Supreme Director in the capital, but hoped that, given the cordial relationship he had established with San Martín in Peru, O'Higgins would allow him to stay in Santiago for a couple of days.<sup>110</sup> Problems arose when the Chilean foreign minister, Joaquín Echeverría, told Abreu that he should not have travelled to the capital before receiving O'Higgins' permission.

<sup>107</sup> CDIP, tome VI, vol. 2º, p. 320, Rozas and Villarreal to José Antonio Rodríguez Aldea, 13 November 1821.

<sup>108</sup> Quoted in Barros Arana, *Historia general de Chile*, vol. XIII, p. 369.

<sup>109</sup> For an historiographical analysis of the idea that Spanish Americans were reborn after 1810, see Germán Colmenares, *Las convenciones contra la cultura*, Tercer Mundo Editores, Bogotá, 1989, chapters III y IV.

<sup>110</sup> AGI, Lima 800, Abreu to O'Higgins, 2 January 1822.

Also, Echeverría continued, when Abreu had been asked in Santiago to show both ‘the credentials of his legation and his licence to travel’, he had shown just a passport given by the ‘*Excelentísimo Señor Protector del Perú*’, thus forcing the Santiago intendant to ‘leave him in solitary confinement and with a guard of soldiers’ to guard him.<sup>111</sup>

Abreu defended himself by asserting that the passport he had obtained from the Protector was the best proof of his ‘good faith’. Furthermore, because Abreu was originally sent from Spain to negotiate a peace agreement with the Chilean government, O’Higgins should have treated him as a diplomat.<sup>112</sup> Echeverría responded two days later arguing that the Chilean government did not know that Abreu was meant to proceed to Chile instead of Peru, which explained why the authorities had reacted so drastically against the Spanish commissioner. However, more important than that, Echeverría reminded Abreu that ‘the Peruvian state is independent from the Chilean’ and, therefore, the negotiations held between Abreu and San Martín ‘had no significance in this republic’.<sup>113</sup> Hence, what on 2 January had started as a simple request by a diplomat to remain in Santiago, six days later became a major political statement: whatever agreement reached between San Martín and Abreu was not binding in Chile. If San Martín had negotiated with Abreu on behalf of Chile, that was clearly an abuse of power by the Protector. As Abreu told viceroy La Serna on 13 March 1822: ‘meanwhile I shall tell You that the Supreme Director of Chile has assured me that he not only ignored all that occurred between the gathered *Diputaciones*, You, the Junta and San Martín, but also that my commission had come to reach an agreement with his Government; **not even San Martín had the powers he claimed to have**’.<sup>114</sup>

The Abreu affair demonstrates that the O’Higgins government was as interested as San Martín’s in enforcing Chile’s sovereignty over the other South American states. The position of both the Chilean Senate and Echeverría was a reaction to Monteagudo’s argument that Peru was independent of all external powers. This shows that, at some point in late 1821, the two states understood that the rhetoric of the American project was no longer sufficient to sustain politically the revolution in either Chile, Peru, the River Plate or any other South American territory. The royalists were still strong in Peru, therefore the establishment of a combination

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<sup>111</sup> AGI, Lima 800, Echeverría to Abreu, 2 January 1822.

<sup>112</sup> AGI, Lima 800, Abreu to Echeverría, 4 January 1822, and AGI, Lima 800, Abreu to Echeverría, 6 January 1822.

<sup>113</sup> AGI, Lima 800, Echeverría to Abreu, 8 January 1822.

<sup>114</sup> AGI, Lima 800, Abreu La Serna, 13 March 1822. The emphasis is mine.

of forces between the *Ejército Libertador*, the Army of the Andes, the Army of Chile and Colombian detachments seemed the most reasonable choice to make. However, such a combination was the result of the merging of four independent armies representing four sovereign states –not just one. In the case of the Chilean army, the freedom of action of its officers in Peru grew as a consequence of Las Heras' resignation as general-in-chief of the 'united' army in September 1821. Indeed, on 12 February 1822 the Chilean Supreme Director appointed Luis de la Cruz as the first general-in-chief of the Army of Chile in Peru, with which the existing *de facto* separation between the Chilean and the rest of the revolutionary forces fighting the Peruvian viceroy finally became *de jure* (more of this in the last section).<sup>115</sup>

De la Cruz remained as general-in-chief of the Army of Chile until late 1822, when he 'delegated' his post to Francisco Antonio Pinto.<sup>116</sup> This transfer of power took place when Chilean politicians were beginning to lose faith in San Martín. John Lynch refers to the last months of the Protector in Lima as 'beleaguered' by difficult local circumstances and decreasing popularity among Chile's politicians. He argues that San Martín's decision to send Juan García del Río and James Paroissien to Europe 'not only to secure European recognition of Peruvian independence, but also to offer a crown to a European prince' was viewed with scepticism by Chilean republicans. Because García del Río and Paroissien 'were to proceed via Chile and the United Provinces', the envoys were able to grasp that the political climate in Santiago was becoming more and more hostile to San Martín's monarchical preferences.<sup>117</sup> In Lynch's words: 'public opinion was hostile to the idea of a monarchy, sympathetic to Cochrane and unimpressed by San Martín's conduct of the war'.<sup>118</sup> 'Feelings here are resentful towards you and your advisors', wrote García del Río to San Martín from Chile in March 1822, 'and people take delight in the news of what Cochrane accomplished in Ancón'.<sup>119</sup>

By mid 1822, the military and political situation in Peru was also unfavourable for San Martín. To the problem created by the Protector's successor as general-in-chief of the *Ejército Libertador* were added two important factors: 1) 1822 was the year when San Martín's defensive

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<sup>115</sup> CDIP, tome VI, vol. 2º, p. 306.

<sup>116</sup> CDIP, tome VI, vol. 2º, p. 332, De la Cruz to the Chilean minister of war, 3 May 1822. On 12 February 1822, Pinto had been appointed Chief of Staff of the Army of Chile. See MG, vol. 93, f. 67. Officially, De la Cruz continued as general-in-chief of the Army of Chile until 1823, when Pinto was appointed '*en propiedad*' in his place. This is why, when the expedition to Intermedios was organized in October 1822, De la Cruz occupied the post of general-in-chief of the Chilean division, while Pinto was in charge of the General Staff. See Gonzalo Bulnes, *Historia de la Expedición Libertadora del Perú*, Rafael Jover Editor, Santiago, 1887, vol. II, pp. 418-422.

<sup>117</sup> Lynch, *San Martín*, pp. 157-158.

<sup>118</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 158.

<sup>119</sup> Quoted by *Ibidem*, p. 159.

military strategy failed; 2) the repercussions of the so-called ‘Conference of Guayaquil’ held between San Martín and Simón Bolívar in July 1822 had the unexpected result of forcing the Protector to resign from office. This is not the place to discuss at length what happened at Guayaquil, although some comments may be useful to understand why San Martín transferred his power to Bolívar, and to know how their meeting was viewed by Pinto, one of the few Chilean officers who, years later, wrote about this event.

The first point to note is that it was San Martín, not Bolívar, who had to travel to Guayaquil to meet his counterpart. Bolívar had recently seized ‘the whole province of Quito, including Guayaquil, for Colombia’, a manoeuvre which allowed him to present himself before San Martín as the region’s hegemonic leader.<sup>120</sup> The Protector left Lima with three objectives in mind: to obtain the annexation of Guayaquil by Peru; to convince Bolívar to send Colombian troops to Peru to fight the royalists; and to get from the Venezuelan the acceptance to introduce a constitutional monarchy to rule the new states.<sup>121</sup> However, Bolívar acceded to none of San Martín’s requests; at least, not as they were originally devised by the Protector. Guayaquil remained for several years a part of Gran Colombia; Colombian troops entered Peru, though San Martín did not command them; and no constitutional monarchy was introduced in Spanish America. It is difficult to know for certain why Bolívar rejected San Martín’s ideas, but certainly part of the explanation is that over time both Liberators represented different interests. It is not that Bolívar was a republican, while San Martín was an outright monarchist. Indeed, Bolívar also flirted with monarchism. In a document written in 1853, Pinto advanced this argument:

Today it is not a secret. General San Martín would have preferred a constitutional monarchy for the political organization of Peru. With this object in mind, he sent a commission to Europe composed of *señores* García del Río and Paroissien, the former from New Granada, the latter English, to request that a prince from the House of Bourbons assume the Peruvian throne. If San Martín aspired to be emperor (because in this century it has become more fashionable to be emperor rather than king), he would have lasted longer than [Agustín de] Iturbide. But he never sought that, ordering the arrest in Lima of a group of people who collected signatures demanding that San Martín be proclaimed in Peru. To obtain the help of Bolívar, or at least to ensure that he would not oppose to his plan [of having a Bourbon on the throne of Peru], San Martín went to Guayaquil as soon as he learned about his [Bolívar’s] arrival in the town. It seems that Bolívar did not dislike the plan on its merits, but rather in terms of the dynasty. According to Bolívar, it would cause alarm among Spanish Americans

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<sup>120</sup> Lynch, *San Martín*, p. 186.

<sup>121</sup> Lynch, *Las Revoluciones Hispanoamericanas*, pp. 208-210. See also Bulnes, *Historia de la Expedición Libertadora del Perú*, vol. II, p. 423; Barros Arana, *Historia general de Chile*, vol. XIII, pp. 478-481; Lynch, *Simón Bolívar*, pp. 171-175; and Lynch, *San Martín*, pp. 185-190.

to see a Bourbon on the throne of the Incas.<sup>122</sup>

It is likely that the goal of building a monarchy in South America did not trouble Bolívar much, as he led a centralized and authoritarian republican regime (even more centralized and authoritarian than O'Higgins'). This made him more powerful than a constitutional monarch. Pinto continues: 'in respect of the truth it must be said that the constitutional monarchy envisioned by San Martín was a hundred times more liberal than that enacted and sworn in Bolivia, where the president was for life and had the right to appoint a successor: a privilege that not even the autocrat of Russia enjoys'.<sup>123</sup> Thus, if Bolívar distrusted not so much the idea of a constitutional monarchy as the notion of this being headed by a foreign prince, the political defeat of San Martín in Guayaquil is to be explained in other terms, chiefly military. Bolívar's military base was much stronger than San Martín's in 1822. He was a victorious general, and his lieutenants, Antonio José de Sucre and Francisco de Paula Santander, were respected and admired military chiefs.<sup>124</sup> San Martín's decision not to pursue La Serna and to remain in Lima had, on the contrary, created the idea among the revolutionary officers in Peru that the Protector had neither the skills nor the desire to keep on fighting. In David Bushnell's words: 'San Martín's relative inactivity brought him criticism and created discouragement and unrest among the military'.<sup>125</sup> San Martín was no longer the triumphant military leader who had re-conquered Chile and organized one of the largest and best trained armies in South America. While Bolívar was at the peak of his success, San Martín was in decline.

In this context, it is not surprising that when San Martín arrived back in Lima from Guayaquil he found a restless city. In his absence, the *limeños* rebelled against Montegudo, thereby provoking a power vacuum in the capital. The Protector was conscious that he was in part responsible for the fall of his protégé, so he took action. He devoted August 1822 to finding a solution to the problem. In the end, San Martín and the *limeño* elites decided on the establishment of a Congress in Lima (whose first session was held on 20 September 1822), which was accompanied by San Martín's resignation. He immediately travelled to Chile, where

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<sup>122</sup> Guillermo Feliú Cruz, 'San Martín y la campaña libertadora del Perú. (Un documento del general don Francisco Antonio Pinto)', in BACHH, number 116, July-December, 1950, p. 11.

<sup>123</sup> Ibidem, p. 49.

<sup>124</sup> See Quintero, *El sucesor de Bolívar*; and David Bushnell, *The Santander regime in Gran Colombia*, University of Delaware Press, Delaware, 1954.

<sup>125</sup> David Bushnell, *Simón Bolívar. Liberation and disappointment*, Pearson Longman, New York, 2004, p. 131.

he was received by O'Higgins and the few friends he still had in the country.<sup>126</sup> After fourteen months in office, San Martín had obtained little in military terms; his political victories, meanwhile, had been important but insufficient to consolidate the insurgency. He proclaimed the independence of Peru, won the support of some of the middle classes and opened the Peruvian economy to the international market. However, he also committed mistakes that alienated his allies, such as never reconciling his monarchism with the creation of the Peruvian state. Bolívar (who did not enter Lima until September 1823), on the contrary, seemed a much more determined leader, a characteristic that, in any case, did not necessarily guarantee a better government, nor a more fluid relationship between those who led the revolution. We will see below that in general the Chilean officers in Peru did not become followers of the Bolivarian project, and that their discomfort in Peru grew along with their desires to return to Chile.

#### IV. BECOMING A CHILEAN ARMY

In the third section I argued that the conflicts between the Peruvian and the Chilean states in the period October 1821-May 1822 prompted O'Higgins' decision –likely influenced by the Senate– to appoint De la Cruz as general-in-chief of the Army of Chile. As a consequence, the Chilean officers in Peru, Cochrane included, began to behave as members of an autonomous army that represented the interests of a different political state [i.e. Chile].<sup>127</sup> However, other, perhaps more prosaic, quarrels involving officers from Chile, Peru, the River Plate and Colombia from mid-1822 onwards destabilized the relationship between the revolutionary allies as much as conflicts like the Abreu affair.<sup>128</sup>

After San Martín resigned, the Peruvian Congress created an Executive Junta, headed by general José de la Mar.<sup>129</sup> Along with the Congress, the Junta prepared a new expedition to pursue the royalists garrisoned in the region of Intermedios.<sup>130</sup> The expedition was led by the

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<sup>126</sup> See Bulnes, *Historia de la Expedición Libertadora del Perú*, vol. II, chapter XII; Barros Arana, *Historia general de Chile*, vol. XIII, pp. 482-490; Lynch, *Las Revoluciones*, pp. 210-212; Lynch, *San Martín*, pp. 191-198.

<sup>127</sup> For a sample of Cochrane's activities in early 1822, see AGNP, box 4, O.L. 32-158.

<sup>128</sup> The freedom of action of the Chilean officers is not just to be analyzed in relation to conflicts between states; we need also to consider that De la Cruz's appointment meant that, from then on, the Army of Chile would be run by its own people and following its own rules. Examples of this can be found in AGNP, box 5, O.L. 38-212, Guido to minister of finance, 3 September 1822; and AHMIP, Ministerio de Guerra, box 2, file 15, doc. 33, Bascuñán to minister of war and navy, 26 September 1822.

<sup>129</sup> Gonzalo Bulnes, *Últimas campañas de la independencia del Perú*, Imprenta y Encuadernación Barcelona, Santiago, 1897, pp. 21-25

<sup>130</sup> The expedition was originally planned by San Martín, but in the end he did not participate in it.

*rioplatense* Rudecindo Alvarado, but it was meant to be a joint venture between the different revolutionary armies. The news of the expedition arrived in Chile in September 1822, and the ‘Chilean state’ was asked to send 300 horses to enlarge the cavalry of the ‘united’ army.<sup>131</sup> Chilean officers in Peru, meanwhile, actively participated in both the preparation of the expedition and the various skirmishes with the royalists in Intermedios. Officers of battalion 5 were especially keen on participating in the action, as shown by a request to Alvarado to be included ‘together with our brothers-in-arms in the following campaign’.<sup>132</sup> Alvarado agreed, and so Luis de la Cruz travelled south as general-in-chief of the Chilean division while Pinto was put in charge of the General Staff.<sup>133</sup>

The expedition, which included some 4,000 men, of whom around 1,500 belonged to the Army of Chile, sailed for the port of Arica in October 1822. The revolutionary army experienced a real odyssey during a voyage that took the lives of ninety men.<sup>134</sup> Both the exhausting journey –it lasted seventy days– and the lack of food and water prevented the troops from disembarking in good shape.<sup>135</sup> On 12 December, only a couple of days after the troops arrived in Arica, Pinto reported to O’Higgins the ruinous state of the Army of Chile. Food was especially needed because the ‘coast is desolated and the army is eating what we brought from Callao’. Besides, men were in need of horses and mules from Chile to pursue the royalists, who, after learning of the revolutionary deployment in Arica, had stationed their troops in Torata, a small village four leagues from Moquegua. ‘Due to the lack of mobility of our army, we are giving [the enemy] enough time to collect as many forces as they are able to gather and destroy whatever they think could be used by us’.<sup>136</sup>

This was the first of a series of reports sent by Pinto to his government between December 1822 and March 1823. On 30 December, Pinto wrote to O’Higgins that conflicts within the *Ejército Libertador* had led Chile’s ‘allies’ to treat his men as inferior subordinates. ‘We have the feeling’, said Pinto, ‘that our plans had been frustrated because of the inveterate arbitrariness of those governments [Peru, the River Plate and Colombia] to do and undo everything that belongs to Chile’. Although in this and future reports Pinto spoke of the

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<sup>131</sup> AGNP, box 5, O.L. 38-22, 7 September 1822.

<sup>132</sup> AHMIP, Ministerio de Guerra, box 2, file 8, doc. 376, Alvarado to Secretary of War and Marine, 29 September 1822.

<sup>133</sup> Bulnes, *Últimas campañas*, p. 60.

<sup>134</sup> *Ibidem* pp. 59-60.

<sup>135</sup> Feliú Cruz, ‘San Martín y la campaña libertadora del Perú’, p. 34.

<sup>136</sup> VM, vol. XCII, pp. 94-95v, Pinto to O’Higgins, 12 December 1822.

‘arbitrariness’ of the revolutionary armies as if Chile’s allies had acted in concert against his officers, we need to individualize his criticisms and thus know more clearly what Pinto meant. In the case of the *rioplatenses*, Pinto claimed that because the Chilean army had never had a proper cavalry in Peru it had always ‘depended on that of the [Army] of the Andes’. For Pinto, there was nothing more damaging to an army than ‘executing movements with a borrowed cavalry’.<sup>137</sup> Even worse, when two months later Pinto acknowledged the arrival of a detachment of 300 cavalymen from Chile, he stated that they knew nothing about their functions, and so the Chilean cavalry remained inadequate.<sup>138</sup> ‘Since the Army of Chile set sail from Valparaíso’, wrote Pinto in other report, ‘it has consistently been at the discretion of general San Martín and other chiefs, whose objective has been to present it in Peru in so small and insignificant a way, that everybody has always considered it an accessory of the Army of the Andes and tried to redeploy its soldiers into the ranks of the other armies’.<sup>139</sup>

Pinto was as critical of the officers of the Army of Peru as he was with those of the Army of the Andes, and that was because most senior officers of the former were also *rioplatenses*. However, in the case of the Peruvian force he went even further, as he blamed its officers for the high number of desertions among the Army of Chile. According to an *Estado de fuerza* of 29 June 1822, the Army of Chile amounted to 2,060 men, divided into: 300 artillerymen, and 1,760 of the infantry.<sup>140</sup> That is, after a year in Peru, the Army of Chile had not significantly reduced its number of contingents. Six months later (30 December), when the expedition to the region of Intermedios had already set sail, the army totalled only 1,377 men.<sup>141</sup> In Pinto’s view, the reason for the decrease in the number of men in the Army of Chile was less casualties than desertions. Desertions that were not carried out either to enrol in the royalist army or to escape from the battlefield, but in order to enlarge the Peruvian troops (i.e. the detachments of the *Ejército Libertador* that were organized in Peru immediately after San Martín disembarked in Pisco); apparently wages in the Peruvian army were higher.<sup>142</sup>

Pinto’s next report is dated 1 March 1823. There, the Chilean general told the new

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<sup>137</sup> VM, vol. XCII, pp., 92-92v, Pinto to O’Higgins, 30 December 1822.

<sup>138</sup> CDIP, tome VI, vol. 2°, pp. 397-398, Pinto to Chile’s minister of war, 6 February 1823.

<sup>139</sup> CDIP, tome VI, vol. 2°, pp. 398-400, Pinto to Chile’s minister of war, 23 February 1823.

<sup>140</sup> CDIP, tome VI, vol. 2°, p. 343.

<sup>141</sup> CDIP, tome VI, vol. 2°, p. 365.

<sup>142</sup> It is worth noting that sometimes Peruvian-born soldiers served in the Army of Chile. In March 1823, Andrés de Santa Cruz requested the Peruvian minister of war allow two Peruvian sergeants of the Artillery of Chile to ‘fight under the flags of their nation [Peru], where their services are better rewarded’. In AHMIP, Ministerio de Guerra, box 4, file 17, doc. 14, 12 March 1823. Another example in AHMIP, Ministerio de Guerra, box 4, file 15, doc. 48, José Prieto to Peru’s minister of war, 16 December 1823.

Chilean government (led by Ramón Freire) that a revolution in Lima headed by the ‘sons of Buenos Aires’ had erased any possibility of finding a solution to the conflict between Chile and Peru. The governor appointed after the revolution, José de la Riva Agüero, ‘was a simulacrum of an authority, always at the discretion of the sons of Buenos Aires, who now more than ever depict themselves as arbiters of the government’. Part of the responsibility lay with San Martín: ‘because General San Martín took good care of appointing *porteño* chiefs at the head of the army of Peru, it has been easy for them, after causing the miseries of the expeditionary army, to plot against the central army and to precipitate the ruin and all imaginable tragedies on this country’. Therefore, five months after San Martín’s fall and six after Monteguado’s, the influence of the *rioplatenses* in Peru was still powerful, not only in the Army of the Andes but also within the Army of Peru.<sup>143</sup> In this context, Pinto’s advice was to ‘save the precious remains’ of the Army of Chile and ‘use them [in Chile] as the basis of a brilliant force’. He emphasized that ‘there is no Chilean officer who is not persuaded of this’.<sup>144</sup>

It is likely that in these reports Pinto tried to explain two severe defeats experienced by his men at Moquegua and Torata in January 1823, and also to prepare and justify a possible withdrawal of the Army of Chile from Peru.<sup>145</sup> This is all the more true if we consider that, in late 1822, the Army of Chile acquired a new indirect enemy: Bolívar’s army. In his report of 30 December 1822, Pinto asserted that ‘every day Bolívar and his agents gain more terrain’ in Peru. After a year and half of ‘anarchy’, Pinto stated, Lima ‘would finally be at the disposal of either the Spaniards or the Colombians. If this does not happen I will believe that there are miracles in politics’. In his view, in the event of a revolution in the Peruvian capital the Chilean navy would probably serve the ‘Colombian faction’, a statement that shows that Pinto’s concerns were not merely military but also political. ‘All factions in Lima deem us their enemies’, he concluded, and so it ‘is time for us to start thinking about our own security’. It would not be mistaken to say that for ‘our own security’ Pinto meant leaving the country. I will

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<sup>143</sup> Rudecindo Alvarado, the *porteño* who led the expedition to Intermedios, did not participate in this revolution. In a letter to San Martín, Alvarado criticized what he saw as the ‘indiscretion’ of the officers of the Army of Andes: ‘since Your [San Martín] departure left there had been transcendent aspirations in the Army of the Andes, followed by a scandalous division of opinions, and [illegible] rivalries which became public in this country [Lima]. [...] Since the landing in Arica [December 1822] [this division of opinions] took a more dreadful turn, because a just [?] rivalry between the Chilean Army and the Army of the Andes resulted from the indiscretion of the latter’s commanders’. In AGN, room VII, Documentos del Museo Histórico Nacional, doc. 1434, 23 March 1823.

<sup>144</sup> CDIP, tome VI, vol. 2º, pp. 406-407, Pinto to Chile’s minister of war, 1 March 1823.

<sup>145</sup> For the combats of Moquegua and Torata, see Feliú Cruz, ‘San Martín y la campaña libertadora del Perú’, pp. 33-41; and Bulnes, *Últimas campañas*, pp. 75-95. For the Chilean reaction to these defeats, see AGN, room X, 23-2-5.

return to this subject at the end of this chapter.<sup>146</sup>

Pinto's negative impression of the Colombians increased throughout time. 'The troops of Colombia have presented themselves as invaders rather than as auxiliary', he wrote on 23 February 1823.<sup>147</sup> And he was right. As a result of the recent defeats of the 'united' army, Bolívar sent General Sucre to Lima to find out whether President Riva Agüero would be willing to subordinate his government to the military power of his Colombian representatives. Sucre arrived in Lima in May 1823, his mission being not just to start planning Bolívar's arrival in Peru,<sup>148</sup> but also to overcome the negative effects of the defeats of Torata and Moquegua in January 1823. Sucre spent the month of May organizing a third expedition to Intermedios, now under the command of Andrés de Santa Cruz. The Chilean army, which was led by Pinto, was added to the Colombian division, under Sucre.<sup>149</sup> However, when the expedition was ready to set sail, the revolutionaries learned that a royalist force was about to attack Lima, thereby forcing the revolutionaries to seek shelter in the port of Callao.<sup>150</sup> Sucre never abandoned the idea of an expedition to Intermedios, and on 23 June he wrote to the Chilean minister of war to ensure that, 'taking into consideration the sacrifices made by the Republic of Colombia for the independence of Peru', the Chilean government would not 'give up the idea of an expedition to the Peruvian coast'.<sup>151</sup> Moreover, on that same day he requested the Chilean government send him fifty thousand pesos to pay for the expedition.<sup>152</sup>

The Freire government agreed to organize a new expedition to help Pinto and the remains of the Army of Chile.<sup>153</sup> José María Benavente was put in charge of the expedition, his mission being to give Pinto fresh instructions. Although Pinto never read these instructions, their contents show the position of the Freire government regarding the military and political behaviour Chileans should follow in Peru. The instructions stressed that Chileans had been

<sup>146</sup> VM, vol. XCII, pp., 92-93v, Pinto to O'Higgins, 30 December 1822.

<sup>147</sup> CDIP, tome VI, vol. 2º, p. 400, Pinto to Chile's minister of war, 23 February 1823.

<sup>148</sup> On 28 May 1823, Pinto wrote to O'Higgins that Bolívar was in his way to Lima. Apparently, the Peruvian capital was divided into those who believed that Bolívar should behave as a *generalísimo* and those who thought that he should rule as a dictator. See VM, vol. XCII, p. 98.

<sup>149</sup> VM, vol. XCII, p. 98, Pinto to O'Higgins, pp. 98-98v, 28 May 1823.

<sup>150</sup> Bulnes, *Últimas campañas*, pp. 184-192.

<sup>151</sup> CDIP, tome VI, vol. 2º, p. 423, Sucre to Chile's minister of war, 23 June 1823.

<sup>152</sup> CDIP, tome VI, vol. 2º, p. 425, Sucre to Chile's minister of war, 23 June 1823. A couple of weeks later, Pinto negotiated a loan with the *limeño* merchant José Ramón Mila de Roca to pay the Chilean troops. See MG, vol. 139, pp. 39v-45, Pinto to Chile's minister of war, 11 July 1823.

<sup>153</sup> As early as March 1823, Chileans reported to Mendoza's intendant their resolution to send a new expedition to Peru. See AHM, box 704, doc. 80, Agustín Eyzaguirre, José Miguel Infante and Federico Errázuriz to Mendoza's intendant, 4 March 1823.

sent to Peru to help Peruvians to fight ‘the Spanish armies, which are the common enemy of the allied states’. This is why Pinto should ‘avoid mixing in any internal quarrel if parties, factions or revolutions arise’, a warning that, as we will see, Pinto himself had long ago decided to heed. Finally, Pinto had to make sure that the Chilean detachments would not be split up, and that the Chilean soldiers would fight under no other flag than the Chilean. If casualties occurred, then ‘the Peruvian government has to give the Chilean soldiers the same treatment as those of the allied army’, thus ‘putting an end to the preferences that have caused so many grievances and demands’.<sup>154</sup>

Benavente disembarked at Arica on 26 October with 1,887 men,<sup>155</sup> hoping to receive positive news from Santa Cruz, who had finally set sail to Intermedios. Soon, Benavente learned that Santa Cruz had been defeated, and that Arequipa was occupied by five thousand royalists.<sup>156</sup> In Arica Benavente also learned about Peru’s political problems. A damaging struggle had recently exploded between Bolívar –who had arrived in the capital on 1 September- and Riva Agüero, whose operational centre was located in the north of the territory. Santa Cruz and admiral Jorge Martín Guise supported Riva Agüero, and in a series of letters to Benavente tried to convince him to join their cause. Benavente had his doubts, but in the end he accepted Santa Cruz’s and Guise’s proposal, re-embarking his division north between 11 and 12 November.<sup>157</sup> However, their plan crumbled. At the same time that Benavente was embarking his troops in Arica, Sucre requested Pinto –who had remained in Callao- to go to Cobija to get his men ready for a new military campaign. Sucre’s idea was to use what was left of Pinto’s army to distract the enemy on the south.<sup>158</sup> Pinto obeyed and set sail for Cobija in mid November 1823. At sea, Pinto’s division encountered Benavente’s, who informed the general-in-chief of the plot prepared in Arica. Pinto reacted indignantly, asserting that Chileans were not supposed to take sides in internal divisions. He consequently ordered Benavente’s ship to turn back and take the two Chilean divisions to Cobija.

But seeing that this port did not have enough food to feed the troops, Pinto changed course and headed towards the Chilean port of Coquimbo, ‘where he hoped to re-concentrate

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<sup>154</sup> Bulnes, *Últimas campañas*, footnotes to pages 294-296. For the preparation of this expedition, see CDIP, tome VI, vol. 2º, pp. 428-437.

<sup>155</sup> The number of men is in accordance with an *Estado de fuerza* of 4 November 1823, and which can be found in CDIP, tome VI, vol. 2º, p. 447.

<sup>156</sup> Barros Arana, Diego Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. XIV, p. 187.

<sup>157</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 189.

<sup>158</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 190.

his forces, procure the necessary assistance and prepare to return to Peru under better conditions'.<sup>159</sup> Pinto reported his decision to Sucre, who, trusting that the Chilean government would continue sending help to Peru, applauded the measure.<sup>160</sup> Pinto, for his part, wrote to Chile on 30 November to explain why he had withdrawn to Coquimbo. He cited both military and political reasons. Regarding the former, he asserted that both the 'lack of weapons of the Army of Chile and the scattering of forces in Pisco, Callao and Cobija' led him to the conclusion that the best and most 'rational' option was to 'go to one of the Chilean ports, assemble the army and organize it in order to take it to wherever the Supreme Director dictates'. Politically, Pinto argued: 'I have also made this resolution considering the pitiful state of Lima, which is preparing itself for a disastrous civil war. Today the war against Spain is almost forgotten'. The worst case scenario was to allow the troops to 'catch' the rebellious mood. It was much safer to 'preserve these forces and use them intelligently, especially considering the numerical superiority of the enemy, which might be very prejudicial for Chile'.<sup>161</sup> Two days later, Pinto described a similar picture to O'Higgins.<sup>162</sup>

Judging by the critical state of the Chilean army, Pinto's decision was correct.<sup>163</sup> Of course, criticisms from Santiago did not take long to appear,<sup>164</sup> yet none of the military who accompanied Pinto questioned him. Bolívar himself considered that the strategy had been well-conceived, and when he asked the Freire government to send the auxiliary division back to Peru, he requested that it be commanded by 'the same accredited [*acreditados*] chiefs'.<sup>165</sup> Such help, however, never materialized; not because Pinto did not want to go back to Peru, but rather because internal problems in Chile forced Freire to concentrate his strength on expelling the remaining royalist troops that were still operating in the island of Chiloé. Thus, when Pinto returned to Chile the official participation of the Army of Chile in Peru ended. There were a few contingents that remained in Peru, and at some point O'Higgins travelled north to join Bolívar in his last military incursions against La Serna. However, these were sporadic efforts made by some Chilean officers and soldiers to the state of Peru. In the case of Pinto, he never left his country again, beginning a successful public career that allowed him to become one of

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<sup>159</sup> Ibidem, pp. 190-191. See also Bulnes, *Últimas campañas*, pp. 302-308.

<sup>160</sup> Ibidem, footnote 64 of page 191.

<sup>161</sup> CDIP, tome VI, vol. 2°, p. 452, Pinto to Chile's minister of war, 30 November 1823.

<sup>162</sup> VM, vol. XCII, p. 99, Pinto to O'Higgins, 1 December 1823.

<sup>163</sup> For the disembarkation of the Army of Chile in Coquimbo, see Ferdinand B. Tupper, *Memorias del Coronel Tupper*, Editorial Francisco de Aguirre, Santiago, 1972, pp. 101-104.

<sup>164</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. XIV, p. 193.

<sup>165</sup> Quoted in Bulnes, *Últimas campañas*, p. 308.

the most powerful members of the military who entered politics in the 1820s. This is one of the main subjects of the next (and last) chapter of this thesis.

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San Martín and O'Higgins rapidly grasped that the battle of Chacabuco in February 1817 allowed them to regain control of the Chilean Central Valley, but that in order to oust the royalists from South America they needed to undertake a much riskier enterprise: the invasion of Lima. To take the war into Peru was almost inevitable, and so the Senate and Chile's principal military chiefs gave San Martín and O'Higgins their full support. Buenos Aires, on the contrary, withdrew their support as internal conflicts with the *rioplatense* provinces escalated. Thus, the organization of the first Chilean navy as well as the sending of forces to Peru in August 1820 were entirely financed and led by Chile. Hiring Cochrane was an expensive move, but one which was worth making if we bear in mind that, before that, Chile's revolutionary presence in the Pacific was almost non-existent.

But if O'Higgins and San Martín thought that preparing the *Ejército Libertador del Perú* would result in Lima's almost immediate fall, they were mistaken. Lima was South America's strongest royalist stronghold and, as such, it was reasonable to expect that the revolutionaries would need more than San Martín's persuasive strategies to enter the capital and consolidate the independence of Peru. San Martín confused criticism of viceroys Abascal and Pezuela with support for his army. The *limeño* elites favoured creole advances in state employment, but this did not make them outright revolutionaries. The elites in Lima –many of whom aimed at reforming the empire from within- feared losing their privileged social, political and economic status. It is not surprising, therefore, that support for San Martín came from provinces like Trujillo.

The change of government in Peru did not mean the immediate introduction of republicanism. Like many other politicians and military men of his generation, San Martín supported monarchism. Monteagudo's influence on San Martín played a part in the Protector's preference for a constitutional monarchy for Peru (a preference that Bolívar shared). But Monteagudo's influence was obvious not only in relation to monarchism; he was, in fact, one of the politicians in Lima who gave form to the state of Peru, that is, a state independent not only from Spain but also from its American allies. Monteagudo was a clever, although

sometimes intransigent, politician, as shown by his quarrels with the Chilean Senate when, on one hand, he informed the government in Santiago that Las Heras had been appointed general-in-chief of the liberating army in place of San Martín and, on the other, defended Lima's right to not pay the debts owed to Chile until Chileans did the same with Buenos Aires. Chile's reaction was swift: in February 1822, and taking advantage of Las Heras' resignation, the O'Higgins government appointed Luis de la Cruz general-in-chief of the Army of Chile, with which the 'united' army (if it ever was 'united') became a conglomeration of armies defending different (and sovereign) states.

My approach to the concept of sovereignty in this chapter is similar but not identical to that used by Jeremy Adelman in his *Sovereign and Revolution in the Iberian world*.<sup>166</sup> Similar, because I think Adelman is correct when he stresses that in 1810 Spanish Americans did not seek to break their ties with the metropolis but to enjoy some degree of political sovereignty (i.e. home rule or administrative autonomy). When the war began and Spanish Americans finally proclaimed their independence, they became, at least in theory, completely sovereign states –in the sense that they no longer depended on other states. Yet this process happened above all in theory, because, and here lies an important difference with Adelman's work, to be independent from the metropolis did not guarantee full independence from the other Spanish American states. Adelman argues that in the aftermath of revolution a 'multitude of sovereignties' emerged; however, *his* multitude of sovereignties were not so much the result of conflict between states as between local military leaders fighting over federalism and centralism; between regional rulers and centralized politicians.<sup>167</sup> As we have seen throughout this chapter, at some point in the late 1810s San Martín's idea of the creation of an 'American nation' lost relevance, and Chile's struggle –and that of Peru, Colombia and the River Plate as well- against Spain turned into a damaging fight between not only different internal political projects but also 'allied' states. Indeed, what in the end secured the independence of Chile was not just the break with the metropolis but also, and especially, the break with the other South American countries.

The Army of Chile had been created immediately after the battle of Chacabuco in early 1817. However, it did not become a properly Chilean force until 1822, and that was intimately connected to the process that led the Chilean state to be independent from its allies.

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<sup>166</sup> Adelman, *Sovereign and Revolution*, especially chapter 9.

<sup>167</sup> It is worth mentioning that Adelman's interest on Chile is just superficial, and that many of his hypotheses cannot be automatically applied to the Chilean case.

In chapter VII it will be claimed that Pinto's decision to return with his men to Coquimbo reaffirmed the power of decision of the Chilean officers in Peru, confirming at the same time that local politics would be, from then and throughout the 1820s, the main preoccupation of the Chilean military.

## CHAPTER VII

### THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN THE MAKING OF THE CHILEAN REPUBLIC, 1822-1826

The aim of the final chapter of this thesis is twofold: first, to provide an overview of the last four years of revolutionary warfare in Chile. Second, to analyze the political participation of officers during the years 1823-1826, that is, the period when political discussions no longer centred on whether or not to break the ties with Spain, but rather on determining the role that the Army of Chile should play in the new republic. While chapter V examined O'Higgins' strategies to secure his political power and that of his closest subordinates, this one studies O'Higgins' fall, as well as the often tense relationship between the new Supreme Director, Ramón Freire, his ministers, including Francisco Antonio Pinto, and the Chilean Congress. However, it will be argued that divisions within the revolutionary army did not prevent the introduction of a series of political reforms that ended up consolidating the military over the civilian elites.

The first section argues that, after Vicente Benavides' death in February 1822, the struggle against royalists in the south of the country continued for a couple of years but without the intensity and radicalism of the first period of irregular warfare analyzed in chapter V. But the fact that irregular fighting had declined does not mean that it lacked political implications. Indeed, the first section will also argue that O'Higgins' fall in early 1823 was largely due to the opposition he faced from regional military leaders from the south of the country, who acted in response to the 'despotism' of the central government. The analysis of the *Proclamas* issued by the so-called *Asamblea de los pueblos libres de Concepción* in December 1822 will be of great help in understanding why and how O'Higgins fell.

The following section will show how Francisco Antonio Pinto exemplified the ways in which officers became involved in politics after O'Higgins' abdication. Pinto's case shows some clues on how the war changed the lives of many officers, above all in political terms. Pinto was first and foremost a military officer, though his military career was influenced by political events, such as the demise of the Spanish crown in 1808, the defence he made of the economic and political rights of the officers of the Army of Chile in Peru, and his willingness to be part of Freire's government. His roles as minister of government and foreign affairs in 1824 and as Coquimbo's intendant in 1825 show his political credentials quite clearly.

The third section studies the politicization experienced by the Army of Chile as a consequence of discussions in Congress. Because some officers were elected members of Congress and military affairs were constantly deliberated in Parliament, the wellbeing of the Army of Chile was the cornerstone of the new republican system. The goal is to prove that, despite some protest from civilian elites, the trend (inaugurated with José Miguel Carrera and strengthened by O'Higgins) to give the military the responsibility to rule the country continued during the 1820s. This is an important point, as it proves that political questions continued indissolubly linked to military matters. Elections, the discussion of constitutional projects, debates about institutionalizing a National Guard, and *representaciones* written by veterans of the revolutionary wars to seek economic benefits for them and their men (to name a few), were all issues discussed in detail in Congress.

The final section considers the last confrontations between royalists and revolutionaries in the island of Chiloé. The 'last' confrontations because, although Benavides' royalist successors -the Pincheira brothers- were not defeated by the central government until the early 1830s, the action of Spain's direct agents was concentrated in Chiloé rather than in the Araucanian region. Antonio Quintanilla, the last royalist commander in Chile, built an allegedly inaccessible military stronghold on the island. Indeed, Chiloé was a vital recruiting centre for the royalists during the war: Pareja's expedition in 1813 was, for example, reinforced with *chilotes*. Like *valdivianos* prior to 1820, the *Situado* paid by Lima led the *chilotes* to feel more attached to the monarchy than to any of the revolutionary governments. When in early 1826 Freire finally defeated the royalists on the island, the relationship between the *chilotes* and the revolutionaries became more fluid, although it did not provoke the actual annexation of the island to the Chilean state.

## I. THE REVIVAL OF CONCEPCIÓN AND THE ARMY OF THE SOUTH

At the same time that San Martín entered Lima and launched his protectorate, the Chilean revolutionaries faced a resurgence of the War to the Death in the south of the country. In May 1821, Joaquín Prieto, general of the second division of the Army of the South, wrote to the capital that 'the war was not over yet', and that the army should be prepared to 'formally open

a new campaign in the coming spring'.<sup>1</sup> At that stage, the revolutionaries were still concentrated on fighting Benavides' guerrillas, who, after a few setbacks, had recovered their strength. As Joaquín Echeverría reported to the Chilean plenipotentiary to London in late September 1821, the capture of the English brigantine *Ocean* allowed Benavides to collect 3,000 muskets, 500 guns and 300 sabres, thanks to which he had 'formed a new army and is on his way to invade the province of Concepción'.<sup>2</sup>

However, Benavides did not invade Concepción, nor did he survive much longer: the revolutionaries captured him in early February 1822, after a group of followers betrayed him. When Benavides arrived in Santiago on 13 February to be executed, the minister of war, José Antonio Rodríguez Aldea, made him wear his royalist colonel uniform, ride a donkey and walk throughout Santiago carrying on his hat a sign that read: 'I am the traitor and infamous Benavides, American unnatural [*desnaturalizado*]'.<sup>3</sup> The sentence stated that Benavides should be 'hanged in the most public way. His body is to remain hanged until sunset, and his head and main parts of his body sent to the province of Concepción so the intendant can show them in the places where he committed his greatest crimes. The rest of his body must be burned by the executioner in the outskirts of the city [Santiago]'.<sup>4</sup> He was hanged on the morning of 23 February 1822.

With the capture and execution of Benavides other royalist officers began to fall. Yet only two of the most powerful leaders shared Benavides' fate: a Chilean-born priest called Juan Antonio Ferrebú and Juan Manuel Pico, a Spanish-born merchant turned into a *guerrillero*. Regarding the 'soldier-priest', as Vicuña Mackenna called Ferrebú, he was betrayed by his guerrilla band, which took him as a prisoner to the town of Colcura, where he was executed on 2 September 1824.<sup>5</sup> Pico was also betrayed by two of his men, Mariano and Pedro Vergara, who had recently been punished by Pico for having stolen a pair of spurs from him. He was executed on 29 October 1824, and his head was publicly shown in Concepción and other towns of the Araucanian region.<sup>6</sup>

Why were Benavides, Ferrebú and Pico betrayed by their men? The royalist *guerrilleros* who betrayed their respective chiefs did not change their allegiances following the example of

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<sup>1</sup> Vicuña Mackenna, *La Guerra a Muerte*, p. 513.

<sup>2</sup> ABO, vol. 4, p. 164, Echeverría to Chile's plenipotentiary to London, 29 September 1821.

<sup>3</sup> Vicuña Mackenna, *La Guerra a Muerte*, p. 583.

<sup>4</sup> Quoted by *Ibidem*, p. 586.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 762.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 790.

people like José Antonio Rodríguez Aldea, who went from being the advisor of the Spanish general Gabino Gaínza in early 1814 to O'Higgins' personal secretary and minister of war. Nor did they act as the *vocales* of the Real Audiencia who, in 1816, withdrew their support of governor Marcó del Pont. In these two cases we see elite members deciding to back the O'Higgins government after concluding that the revolutionary programme was politically more viable than the counterrevolutionary. In the case of the *guerrilleros*, their decision seemed to have been influenced by the outcome of the war rather than by ideological questions. However, like Rodríguez Aldea and the *vocales* of the Real Audiencia, they changed sides because they also believed that the revolutionary government could provide them with something that a distant Spain could not: personal and political stability. The case of Antonio Carrero, a Spanish-born royalist close to Ferrebú, demonstrates this very clearly: he laid down his arms after ensuring that the revolutionary authorities would accept him as sergeant major of the cavalry of the Army of Chile.<sup>7</sup>

After the death of Pico and the capitulations of Carrero, and the rest of the principal royalist chiefs, the government concentrated on pursuing the last band of 'royalists' in Arauco: the Pincheira brothers. The analysis of their *guerrillero* activity in the south exceeds the scope of this thesis, not least because the government defeated them only in 1832, when colonel Manuel Bulnes' men killed Pablo Pincheira, the last member of the family. Also, their commitment to the king's cause is, to say the least, questionable; in fact, it seems that the goal of the Pincheiras was not so much to defend the rights of Ferdinand VII as to fill the power vacuum that the demise of Benavides and Pico provoked in the Araucanian region.<sup>8</sup> Therefore, as Vicuña Mackenna stated, it is safe to claim that the war in Arauco finished with Pico's death. But to argue that the war against the royalists in Arauco ended with Pico's death is not the same as saying that, leaving the threat of the Pincheiras aside, the situation in the province of Concepción automatically normalized. In the last part of this section we will see that, at the same time that the Army of the South fought Benavides' successors, the revolutionaries experienced one of the most traumatic political episodes of the period 1813-1823: the political uprising led by Ramón Freire that brought about O'Higgins' abdication.

Freire's uprising had economic, military and political causes, and all of them were intimately related to O'Higgins' failure to recognize the importance of having a well-trained

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<sup>7</sup> Ibidem, pp. 732-733.

<sup>8</sup> For the Pincheiras, see Ana María Contador, *Los Pincheira. Un caso de bandidaje social. Chile, 1817-1832*, Bravo y Allende Editores, Santiago, 1998.

and properly fed army in the south. Economically, it is true, the government had few resources to alleviate the poverty of the Army of the South. ‘The situation of the state’, said the minister of finance Agustín Vial in September 1821, was financially precarious. The Army of the South was so ‘hungry and naked’ that, after ‘eighteen months of claims’, Freire travelled to the capital to personally demand a solution. Valdivia had no *Situado* from which to draw money; the treasury owed more than 300,000 pesos in debts; soldiers had not received their wages in months; and the wives of the artisans who had been forcibly recruited had received nothing in compensation. Joaquín Prieto was of the same impression. On 9 September 1821 he wrote: ‘I fear the approach of the enemy, because I see the evil and find no remedy with our small cavalry and lack of resources. It troubles me that Chillán has no means to resist. However, it troubles me more that there is not a single grain of wheat, no ox, not a single bushel [*fanega*] of beans, nothing, nothing with which to feed the troops in this city [Concepción]’.<sup>9</sup>

References to the critical economic state of the country, but especially of the province of Concepción, abound in the series of documents written by the members of the *Asamblea de los pueblos libres de Concepción* (APLC) in December 1822 to justify a possible revolt against the central government. The first important document related to the APLC refers to Freire’s symbolic resignation of his political and military powers so the province could be administrated by the representatives of Concepción.<sup>10</sup> It was symbolic, because the APLC rapidly handed power back to Freire, assuring him that his ‘generous’ resignation was the best proof of Freire’s adherence to the ‘laws that we have created’. For them, Freire was the only one capable of ‘freeing the *Pueblos* from the intrigues of power and the ambition of those who degenerate into despots’, which was a direct criticism of O’Higgins.<sup>11</sup> O’Higgins’ political behaviour was all the more striking considering that the Supreme Director was a ‘son of the country’, that is, a *penquista*. Indeed, when at the beginning of the revolution conflicts broke out between the capital and the southern province, O’Higgins had not hesitated to side with his political and military ‘brothers’ of Concepción.<sup>12</sup> Eleven years later, however, O’Higgins had ‘reduced his unfortunate brothers of this province to a state of complete destitution’, as

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<sup>9</sup> Quoted by Vicuña Mackenna, *La Guerra a Muerte*, p. 527.

<sup>10</sup> AHM, box 704, doc. 69, Freire to APLC, 9 December 1822. The *Asamblea* was formed on 8 December 1822 after Freire summoned the *cabildos* of the province of Concepción to elect a provincial authority that could be a counterweight to the power of the Supreme Director. See Eyzaguirre, *O’Higgins*, p. 360; and Salazar, *Construcción de estado en Chile*, p. 173.

<sup>11</sup> AHM, box 704, doc. 69, APLC to Freire 10 December 1822.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. section II of chapter II of this thesis.

‘the lack of money to pay the army, the nakedness, hunger and all sorts of misery’ in Concepción showed.<sup>13</sup>

After ten years of warfare it was to be expected that not only Concepción’s but the entire Chilean economy would be on the verge of bankruptcy, and the APLC seemed aware of that. Yet the APLC believed that other elements, related not so much to the war as to the incapacity and arbitrariness of the government, were equally important to explain the breakdown of the economy. According to the APLC, the government’s indecision regarding how the war in the south should be financed had forced the authorities in Concepción to ‘deprive the *labrador* of his animals’ and ‘curtail the collection points of the *hacendados’ fincas*’.<sup>14</sup> Furthermore, the permission given to a few ‘specific men to export the wheat’ of Concepción to Santiago, ‘in circumstances where the people of [Concepción] are almost dying’ of hunger, had irreversibly damaged the local economy.<sup>15</sup> Of course, O’Higgins’ decision to spend much of the money of the Chilean treasury to pay the Peruvian campaign had done little to lift the provincial economy.

Regarding the military causes of Freire’s uprising, it is worth repeating that O’Higgins never developed a coherent military strategy to face the royalist threat in the south, and that, if the revolutionaries managed to defeat Benavides and the other royalist chiefs, that was surely not due to the O’Higgins government’s intervention. The APLC was especially critical of the ‘contempt with which the government has seen the just demands of this *Pueblo* for the termination of this bloody war that has devastated this province’.<sup>16</sup> ‘What could Freire do [to finish the war if he had] no resources, troops, cavalry and the other [indispensable] elements to make war?’, asked the APLC in late December 1822.<sup>17</sup> Sending a second division to Concepción headed by Joaquín Prieto did not improve matters, and eventually political conflicts between Prieto and Freire became as damaging as the government’s lack of military initiative. Rather than solving military problems, the arrival of Prieto in Concepción hastened the creation of different political factions in the province and, with it, the fall of O’Higgins.

Although the factions that opposed the government did not always work together, they tended to agree on one, significant point: they all resented the political intervention of

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<sup>13</sup> AHM, box 704, doc. 69, APLC to O’Higgins, 11 December 1822.

<sup>14</sup> AHM, box 704, doc. 69, 27 December 1822.

<sup>15</sup> AHM, box 704, doc. 69, APLC to O’Higgins, 11 December 1822.

<sup>16</sup> AHM, box 704, doc. 69, APLC to O’Higgins, 11 December 1822.

<sup>17</sup> AHM, box 704, doc. 69, 27 December 1822.

O'Higgins' secretary, Rodríguez Aldea, in the decision-making process. As Cochrane told O'Higgins in November 1822:

I wish to give your Excellency one more proof of my attachment by imploring you to open your eyes to the general discontent prevailing amongst all classes regarding both the declared and the secret measures of Minister Rodríguez, who has fallen in the public esteem, though he does not realize it, lower than Monteagudo himself, when the populace demanded his resignation and then his punishment. Should Your Excellency then attempt to continue your protection of him, you will yourself be involved in the most serious harm, possibly leading to the destruction of your work and of your personal endeavours for the welfare of the state.<sup>18</sup>

Freire also referred to Rodríguez in a letter to O'Higgins of 22 October 1822, when conflicts between Concepción and Santiago had not yet reached their climax. Writing to his 'respectable and distinguished friend', Freire reported to the Supreme Director that the role of Rodríguez as minister of war was alienating the officers of the south. 'Although it is true that I have no reason to distrust your friendship', Freire said to O'Higgins, 'I cannot affirm the same of Rodríguez'. The minister of war was responsible for the fact that soldiers had not received their wages in months, and so it was reasonable to expect that the military would 'act boldly'. It was too soon to conclude that the army was in a general 'state of corruption' and formed by 'anarchists'; yet it was also clear that Rodríguez Aldea had done little to meet the demands of the military. Freire finished this letter stressing once again that O'Higgins had no reasons to doubt his loyalty; however, he also asserted that his support was subject to an important condition: 'help me properly and I guarantee the loyalty and faithful behaviour of these *provinciales*' [*auxilieme como corresponde, y yo garantizo la lealtad y fiel procedimiento de estos provinciales*].<sup>19</sup>

The publication on 30 October of the Constitution of 1822 –in whose preparation Rodríguez played a leading role– explains much of the *penquistas*' political discontent with the government. They especially resented article 84 of the Constitution, which, as we saw in chapter V, stated that O'Higgins could remain in power for another period.<sup>20</sup> Concepción resented this article not just because O'Higgins' appointment was decided without the approval of the provinces, but also because it was planned deliberately by O'Higgins' group of advisors long before the Constitution entered into force. As a letter sent by Thomas Hardy, who at that time was in Bahia, Brazil, to John Wilson proves, the decision was made weeks, if not months, before the issue of the Constitution. On 29 October 1822 Hardy reported: 'the

<sup>18</sup> Cited by Clissold, *Bernardo O'Higgins*, p. 197.

<sup>19</sup> VM, vol. XCIII, pp. 63-66v, Freire to O'Higgins, 22 October 1822.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. section four of chapter V of this thesis.

Director General O'Higgins, had tendered his resignation of the supreme command of the government, which was not accepted; and reports have reached Rio de Janeiro, that he was afterwards elected Supreme Director for three years<sup>21</sup> (in fact, the Constitution 'provided O'Higgins with another six-year term').<sup>22</sup>

In the letters and *proclamas* written by the *penquistas* we find various references to the Constitution of 1822; and all of them are negative. One of the first of these references appears in the document in which the APLC both acknowledged Freire's resignation and re-appointed him *Gobernador Intendente, Mariscal de Campo de los Ejércitos de la Patria* and *General en Jefe del Ejército del Sur de la República*. In the oath taken by the APLC to Freire, the *penquistas* made him promise that he would defend the rights of the province, as well as 'blindly obey the Constitution and Laws that the Supreme Government of the Republic might form with the representatives freely chosen by all the *Pueblos*' of Chile. With this phrase, the APLC assumed that the Constitution issued in October 1822 was null, and that a new Chart would be published after hearing the opinion of the Chilean *Pueblos* (i.e. the *villas* and cities that formed the three Chilean provinces: Coquimbo, Santiago and Concepción). On that occasion, Freire promised to 'meet and fully satisfy' the requirements of the APLC.<sup>23</sup>

The APLC repeated its arguments in the note they sent to O'Higgins on 11 December. There, they stated that the province would no longer obey the dictates of the government, arguing that the 'illegitimate means used by You to perpetuate your power' excluded O'Higgins as a valid interlocutor. Among those illegitimate means, the Constitution of 1822 was above all others. 'The constitutional articles [recently] issued convince us that a partial and indelicate hand [Rodríguez Aldea] has sought to flatter You by means of convincing you to build your power without the consent of the *Pueblos*', affirmed the APLC. Consequently, the *Asamblea* demanded that O'Higgins call for new elections so that the *Pueblos* could elect 'their *diputados* to create a general Congress aimed at establishing the best form of government'.<sup>24</sup> The *penquistas* had, therefore, two major political grievances: first, they resented the mechanism designed by Rodríguez to ensure that O'Higgins would remain in office for another period. Second, they

<sup>21</sup> BPRO, FO/16/1, p. 53v, Hardy to Wilson, 29 October 1822.

<sup>22</sup> James A. Wood, *The Society of Equality. Popular republicanism and democracy in Santiago de Chile, 1818-1851*, University of New Mexico Press, Albuquerque, 2011, p. 32.

<sup>23</sup> AHM, box 704, doc. 69, 11 December 1822. A similar argument had been advanced by the 'inhabitants of the province of Concepción' in a document they sent to the other provinces of 'the Republic' on 1 December (the APLC was created only on 8 December, which explains why this documents is not signed by its members but by the 'province of Concepción'). See AHM, box 704, doc. 69, 1 December 1822.

<sup>24</sup> AHM, box 704, doc. 69, APLC to O'Higgins, 11 December 1822.

criticized the fact that the Constitution had been issued without the consent of all the *pueblos* of the state.

If the *penquistas* thought that O'Higgins would consider some of their demands, they were mistaken. First of all, he refused to get rid of his protégée, because he was convinced that charges against Rodríguez were exaggerated and slanderous.<sup>25</sup> So he did not seek to negotiate but to directly face the 'infamous anarchy' in the provinces; and for that he needed the help of his allies, not only internal but also external. On 28 December 1822, the Supreme Director asked the support of the *Junta Gubernativa del Perú* to stop the *penquistas*. O'Higgins argued that, after the death of the Carreras, the government had hoped that the Chilean state would shortly reach 'prosperity'. Sadly, O'Higgins wrote, 'there are always unnatural [*desnaturalizados*] enemies of their country who use any pretext to hallucinate the innocent people and use them for their vile ambition'. By 'enemies', O'Higgins meant followers of the Carreras, who, taking advantage of the 'misfortunes faced by Concepción as a result of the poor harvest of wheat of the previous year', had managed not only to foment the revolution in that province but also, and what is more incredible, to seduce general Freire up to the point that he has declared himself against this government'. O'Higgins, in other words, reduced the problems in Concepción to a particular economic juncture, when, as we have seen, the *penquistas* also had military and political grievances. O'Higgins' approach was compounded by the support he explicitly asked from Peruvians: 'I do not doubt that the *Junta del Perú* will see with preoccupation this event and that, persuaded of the negative consequences of a bad example, it will help the [Chilean] government to both fight against traitors and restore order. Not just Chile but all the governments in South America should be interested in this' enterprise. Thus, O'Higgins asked the Peruvian government to prevent ships from sailing from Callao to Talcahuano, 'since whatever support the insurgents may receive will prolong a war that is not just painful but a war between brothers'.<sup>26</sup> Ten days later, O'Higgins requested the governor of Mendoza to send him 200 quintals of rifle bullets, reminding him that this help was all the more needed given the attempts of Concepción to 'turn the whole nation into an ominous anarchy'.<sup>27</sup>

O'Higgins did not have time to gain the support of either Peru or Mendoza. Peru was too wrapped up in its own problems to dispatch a force to help O'Higgins; Mendoza experienced a similar situation, although it is likely that a letter sent by the APLC to Mendoza's

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<sup>25</sup> Eyzaguirre, *O'Higgins*, pp. 361.

<sup>26</sup> AGNP, box 5, O.L., 39-2, O'Higgins to the *Junta Gubernativa del Perú*, 28 December 1822.

<sup>27</sup> AHM, box 704, doc. 69, O'Higgins to Mendoza's governor, 7 January 1823.

*cabildo* denouncing O'Higgins' 'despotism' had influenced their decision to keep out from Chilean politics. In this note we find one of the central pillars of the republicanism followed by the *penquistas*: the notion that republicans should stand against all forms of tyrannical domination. If, in 1817, the province of Cuyo had sent an army to Chile to fight the royalist despotism, the APLC argued, now, in 1823, it was unthinkable that its 'inhabitants and the municipality [*cabildo*] that represent them would be willing to assist any despot who attempts to shackle [Chileans] with heavier chains'. O'Higgins, for the *penquistas*, had illegitimately developed into a despot, and so Mendoza should avoid negotiations with the Chilean Supreme Director. For the *penquistas*, there were only two legitimate political bodies in Chile with which the *mendocinos* should have relations: the APLC and a provincial *Asamblea* created in Coquimbo, whose members 'have followed the same liberal path' as Concepción.<sup>28</sup> Even though the province of Coquimbo 'had not been ravaged by the war, [...] it had been affected by numerous taxes to finance the military plans of Santiago'.<sup>29</sup> The political grievances of the *coquimbano*s were more or less similar to those of the *penquistas*: both groups repudiated the Constitution of 1822 and demanded the resignation of O'Higgins and his principal subordinates. Sensing that the political scenario was completely adverse, on 7 January Rodríguez resigned from his post of minister of war.<sup>30</sup> O'Higgins, for his part, remained in office, but not for very long.

According to Vicuña Mackenna, after Rodríguez's resignation tensions between the capital and the other provinces of the country tended to decrease. To prove his argument, Vicuña Mackenna referred to O'Higgins' decision of 18 January to send delegates to Concepción and Coquimbo to reach an agreement that could prevent the outbreak of a civil war.<sup>31</sup> But, as Vicuña Mackenna himself admitted, at that point there was little that O'Higgins could do to stop his enemies. Even Santiago, where the Supreme Director had built his power in recent years, was filled with opponents. In the words of Valparaíso's governor, José Ignacio Zenteno: 'talking to you [O'Higgins] with the frankness of a faithful friend, I assure you that

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<sup>28</sup> AHM, box 704, doc. 69, APLC to Mendoza's Cabildo, 15 January 1823. In order to give more weight to their claims, the members of the APLC sent copies of the bulk of documents they issued in December 1822. This explains why the sources related to APLC that I have worked with come from Mendoza's provincial archive.

<sup>29</sup> Salazar, *Construcción de estado en Chile*, p. 176.

<sup>30</sup> Eyzaguirre, *O'Higgins*, p. 362.

<sup>31</sup> Benajmín Vicuña Mackenna, *El ostracismo del general D. Bernardo O'Higgins*, Imprenta i Librería del Mercurio, Valparaíso, 1860, p. 432.

the capital, that capital, is as revolutionized as Concepción'.<sup>32</sup> And he was correct: on 28 January 1823 a group of *santiaguinos* gathered inside the building of the Consulado and invited the Supreme Director to 'hear the claims of the people'. The word 'people' was used by the *cabildantes* not so much to defend the interests of the lower classes -as Gabriel Salazar has argued- but those of the towns, cities and provinces of the country. Their use of the word *pueblo* was, indeed, more territorial than socio-political. Still, Salazar was correct when he stressed the rebel characteristics of this *cabildo abierto*: the *santiaguinos* did not so much invite O'Higgins to hear their grievances as to 'relinquish his command before a respectable assembly formed by the *vecindario* of Santiago to obtain the immediate pacification of the Republic'.<sup>33</sup> O'Higgins agreed, and an administrative Junta headed by Agustín Eyzaguirre, José Miguel Infante and Fernando Errázuriz was set up to govern the country.<sup>34</sup>

What kind of role would Concepción and Coquimbo play in the new government? Did the Santiago Junta represent the aspirations of *penquistas* and *coquimbanos*? From the events which happened between the abdication of O'Higgins on 28 January 1823 and the appointment of Freire as Supreme Director in late March, it is possible to conclude that neither province was satisfied with the change of government.<sup>35</sup> In the case of the members of the APLC, they disapproved of the fact that the Santiago Junta had unilaterally arrogated the right to govern on behalf of the whole 'state'.<sup>36</sup> Their objective was, on the contrary, to install a government in the capital made up of three individuals -each representing a province- whose main task was to convoke a general congress.

The APLC also sought to convince both Santiago and Coquimbo to agree on the appointment of Freire as Supreme Director, which proves that Concepción did not aspire to reduce the participation of the military in politics but rather to replace O'Higgins with one of the APLC's allies. Freire's use of his military base to pressure the Santiago Junta to hear the demands of the APLC shows that the backbone of the political power of the *penquistas* was the Army of the South. Indeed, Freire travelled to Valparaíso and then to the capital only after

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<sup>32</sup> Quoted by Ibidem, p. 434.

<sup>33</sup> Quoted by Salazar, *Construcción de estado en Chile*, p. 179.

<sup>34</sup> For the abdication of O'Higgins, see Vicuña Mackenna, *El ostracismo del general D. Bernardo O'Higgins*, pp. 435-460; Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. XII, pp. 584-596; Eyzaguirre, *O'Higgins*, p. 365-376; Collier, *Ideas and Politics*, p. 234-236; Jocelyn-Holt, *La independencia*, pp. 236-237; and Sepúlveda, *Bernardo*, pp. 491-501. The government informed the Chilean delegate to London of these events on 1 March 1823. See ABO, vol. 4, Mariano Egaña to Chile's delegate to London, pp. 195-197.

<sup>35</sup> My analysis of these events is based on Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. XIV, pp. 9-38; and Salazar, *Construcción de estado en Chile*, pp. 181-190.

<sup>36</sup> Quoted by Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. XIV, p. 18.

ensuring that officers as important as Beauchef would back his pretensions. Upon arriving at the port, Freire ordered the imprisonment of O'Higgins –who was staying at José Ignacio Zenteno's house-, but his desire to get to Santiago as soon as possible made him desist from this order. More important than having O'Higgins in jail, Freire realized, was to ensure that the 600 cavalymen who had left Concepción would join with him in Casablanca (near Valparaíso) and enter the capital with him. And they did it: on 17 February 1817 Freire met with the Santiago Junta and, together, they resolved that the capital should create its own provincial assembly and that plenipotentiaries from the three provinces would be in charge of calling for elections for a new congress. In February Freire was appointed *comandante general de armas* of Santiago and general-in-chief of the Army of Chile, while in late March 1823 the plenipotentiaries elected him Supreme Director of the 'Chilean state'.<sup>37</sup>

Freire became Supreme Director on 4 April 1823. The main lines of the Act by which the congress of plenipotentiaries confirmed his appointment stated that Freire was 'the only citizen [...] who is in the position to gather all the *voluntades* and put into practice the act of union'.<sup>38</sup> For the plenipotentiaries Freire was the only person who could guarantee that the Chilean state would remain 'one and indivisible', which was not a superficial statement considering that, a couple of months before, the APLC had implicitly declared its independence in relation to the capital. At the same time, Freire seemed able to keep the peace between the provinces, as his entrance in Santiago without bloodshed shows.<sup>39</sup> In effect, despite its political radicalism, the rise of Concepción was peaceful and did not lead to a civil war between the major provinces of Chile. In many senses, it mirrored the conflicts between Santiago and Concepción in 1812, which, as we saw in chapter II, were also resolved in the political arena rather than on the battlefield. The following section studies a few aspects of the Freire regime, for which I will focus on the political career of Freire's most powerful minister, Francisco Antonio Pinto. It will be contended that, as O'Higgins before him, Freire placed the responsibility of running the country upon the military. However, it will also be argued that, contrary to O'Higgins, Freire's political regime was closer to some elements of European liberalism than to the model of the Roman Dictatorship.

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<sup>37</sup> Quoted by Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. XIV, p. 35.

<sup>38</sup> *Clamor de la Patria*, number 3, 4 April 1823.

<sup>39</sup> Salazar, *Construcción de estado en Chile*, pp. 179.

## II. THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN THE 1820s. THE CASE OF FRANCISCO ANTONIO PINTO

As it was said in the introduction to this chapter, Francisco Antonio Pinto's public life can give us some clues to understand the political role played by some revolutionary officers in the 1820s. His case may serve as an example of how officers who were born around the 1780s – Bernardo O'Higgins, José Miguel Carrera, Ramón Freire, Manuel Rodríguez, Francisco Antonio Pinto and Joaquín Prieto, to name only a few- became active political actors.<sup>40</sup> Pinto was, after Freire, the most powerful politician of the second half of the 1820s, and this was not only because his military experience in Peru allowed him to become one of the highest-ranking officers of the Army of Chile but also, and especially, because he had outstanding political and intellectual credentials. Credentials that, as the conclusion of this thesis will show, enabled him to reach a much more ambitious goal in 1827: the vicepresidency of Chile.

Born in 1785, Pinto studied Law at the Universidad de San Felipe, and in 1807 he enrolled in the militia detachment created by the Santiago Cabildo in the outskirts of Santiago in order to defend the kingdom from a supposed British attack from Buenos Aires. Upon learning of the Napoleonic invasion of the Peninsula, Pinto joined the autonomist movement. Between late 1811 and mid 1812, he was the Chilean delegate to Buenos Aires, where he became friend with important revolutionary leaders, such as Bernardino Rivadavia. He was then sent by José Miguel Carrera's government to Europe to obtain the recognition of Chile's autonomist aspirations from Rome, France and England. However, his demands were heard by none of the European countries he visited, and so in mid 1815 he decided to travel to the River Plate (he could not go back to Chile, because it was seized by the counterrevolutionary army).

In the River Plate, Pinto enlisted in a military detachment organized in Tucumán with the purpose of fighting the royalists in Upper Peru. Soon, this contingent was put under the supervision of Manuel Belgrano, a military officer and diplomat who had lived in London at the same time as Pinto. Pinto rapidly gained the confidence of Belgrano, and together they confronted the regional leaders who jeopardized Buenos Aires' aim of building a single, centralized state in the River Plate. After waiting three years in Tucumán to enter the war, the

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<sup>40</sup> I have discussed some aspects of Pinto's public life in the 1820s in Ossa Santa Cruz, 'La actividad política de Francisco Antonio Pinto. 1823-1828. Notas para una revisión biográfica', in *Historia*, number 40, vol. I, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago, June, 2007, pp. 91-112.

regional conflict forced Belgrano and his men to withdraw to Buenos Aires, from where, nearly ten years after his departure, Pinto returned to Chile. Not long after he arrived in Santiago, O'Higgins ordered him to lead one of the Chilean divisions of the *Ejército Libertador del Perú*. In Peru, Pinto was a privileged observer of San Martín's political fall, as well as of conflicts between the different states that formed the liberating army. From his post of general-in-chief of the Chilean forces, he criticized the military allies' 'arrogance' towards Chileans. He also experienced the consequences of the change of government in Chile in early 1823, the most important of which was Freire's decision to send a new contingent to reinforce Pinto's troops.

This contingent did not remain long in Peru, as Pinto believed that the best way to keep his men out of internal political quarrels was by returning to the port of Coquimbo (November-December 1823), where, he hoped, the Army of Chile would get resources and new troops to undertake a new attack on Peru. Although in Coquimbo his men recovered from a long, arduous campaign, in the end Pinto did not lead that expedition. There were two reasons for this: first, because Freire's government concentrated its military strength on preparing an attack on the island of Chiloé, due to which the idea of sending a large Chilean division to Peru lost urgency (more of this in the last section). Second, because Freire eventually appointed Pinto intendant of Coquimbo.

By then, the political discussion in the capital centred on whether or not the Constitution written by Juan Egaña in 1823 to replace O'Higgins Code of 1822 should rule the country. In this Constitution we find an explicit defence of the Senate's role in politics. To Egaña, the so-called *poder físico* (i.e. the Executive) should always be subordinated to the 'moral power', which 'is vested in the Senate'.<sup>41</sup> In Vasco Castillo's view, 'everything is designed as if Egaña had aimed to make the Senate the leading institution of the Constitution'.<sup>42</sup> The Supreme Directorship was, in turn, subject to a number of constraints by the Senate, thereby losing many of its traditional prerogatives (more of this Constitution in the next section). These articles were criticized by Freire, who, after he returned to Santiago from his first expedition to Chiloé, claimed before the Senate that the three powers of the state should be concentrated on the Supreme Director and that, only after this had been accomplished, a new Constitution ought to be issued. Freire's insistence that the Executive power should continue

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<sup>41</sup> Castillo, *La creación de la República*, p. 130, footnote 70.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 136.

to be the key institution of Chilean politics proves that Chile's political regime did not substantially change as a consequence of O'Higgins' abdication. Freire's power, in fact, was similar, if not stronger, than O'Higgins'. However, as we shall see, there were profound differences between their respective governments, especially regarding the importance given by the Freire government to both 'liberal' reforms and parliamentary discussions.

The complete abrogation of Egaña's Constitution was made possible after the Senate named Mariano Egaña, Juan's son and Freire's minister of government and foreign relations until April 1824, as Chile's delegate to London. Mariano was 'the Constitution's chief defender' and from his post of minister had worked 'vigorously to implement it'. With his departure, 'it became clear that the days of Juan Egaña's political creation were numbered', and that a new political era was approaching.<sup>43</sup> On 12 July 1824, Freire appointed Pinto to replace Mariano Egaña,<sup>44</sup> his mission being twofold: first, to ensure that Egaña's Constitution would no longer have effect. Second, to close the Congress and get the Senate to entrust Freire with the full administration of the state, at least for three months.<sup>45</sup> Although Freire was the major winner in this negotiation with the Senate, Pinto's ideas were behind this political move. As intendant he had seen firsthand the difficulty of implementing Egaña's Constitution in the provinces and, therefore, he felt politically prepared to challenge it. Like his fellow politicians, who were beginning to be called liberals or *pipiolos*, Pinto was ready to increase the power of the Supreme Director. It is true that the closure of Congress could be regarded as a serious threat to the principles of representation defended by the political movement that had allowed Freire to take power. Yet the two basic reasons exposed by the liberals to abrogate Egaña's Constitution –i.e. that it respected neither the autonomy of the provinces nor religious tolerance- were in many ways also backed by Concepción and Coquimbo.<sup>46</sup>

The second reason defended by the liberals was especially important. Most Chilean scholars, politicians and military officers of the 1820s endorsed one of the different variants of republicanism. They differed not so much on the type of regime –i.e. republicanism- that should govern the country as on the characteristics that such a regime should have. One of the main differences between the two major political factions of that time –*pelucones* or

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<sup>43</sup> Collier, *Ideas and Politics*, p. 263.

<sup>44</sup> Pinto's appointment can be found in MI, vol. 61, p. 256. Pinto's resignation to the Coquimbo intendency is dated 26 June 1824. See IC, vol. 17, p. 408.

<sup>45</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. XIV, p. 282. In fact, the new Congress opened its sessions only on 22 November 1824. See *Ibidem*, p. 304.

<sup>46</sup> Heise, *Años de formación y aprendizaje políticos*, p. 156.

conservatives and *pipiolo*s- referred to the public role of religion. The conservative sectors sought to maintain the power of the Church. The liberals, on the contrary, intended to reduce as much as possible the influence of Catholicism in the new republic, but without banishing it completely. For them, the best way to guarantee that all citizens were equal before the law was to make the civil power equal to or greater than the Church. Furthermore, the *pipiolo*s believed that there was an obvious connection between Spain and Catholicism, and that the Church was responsible for the worst aspects of the alleged *oscurantismo* of the colonial period. Thus, the priests who supported the royalists but remained in Chile after Osorio left the country in September 1818 were considered dangerous because they could influence the Chilean people and, therefore, intervene in areas that the state considered its exclusive jurisdiction.

That was the case of Santiago's archbishop, José Santiago Rodríguez Zorrilla, who had not only been one of the most serious opponents of the revolution, but also had great ascendancy over the *pelucones*. Although in 1824 he was no longer a monarchist, he was one of the *pipiolo*s' most powerful enemies; so powerful that the Freire government deprived him of his apostolic credentials. The first occasion for the liberals to attack Rodríguez Zorrilla appeared on 2 August 1824, when Pinto convinced Freire that the archbishop was a serious threat to the government and he ordered the expulsion of Rodríguez from his diocese.<sup>47</sup> Pinto argued that the main reason for the archbishop's removal was the 'constant opposition that he has shown against national independence in all the periods of the revolution', as well as the 'scandalous protection he has given to the priests who have distinguished themselves the most by their hatefulness of the revolution and outstanding services to the Spaniards'. That is, Rodríguez Zorrilla was not punished for being a priest, but rather because the government believed that his stand against independence could have feeble impact on Chileans. This is all the more true considering that, in place of Rodríguez, Freire named José Ignacio Cienfuegos, a well-known priest who backed the revolution.<sup>48</sup>

However, behind Rodríguez's expulsion lay a much more serious issue: should the government or the Church inherit the right of the Spanish kings to appoint ecclesiastic authorities? Rodríguez had opposed the revolution and was an outright enemy of the government; yet more important was the fact that throughout the first half of the 1820s Rodríguez had strongly defended the right of the Church to appoint its authorities, which, in

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<sup>47</sup> MI, vol. 61, pp. 261v-262, Pinto to Rodríguez Zorrilla, 2 August 1824.

<sup>48</sup> MI, vol. 61, p. 262v, Pinto to the Ecclesiastic Cabildo, 2 August 1824.

Pinto's view, challenged the government's goal of subordinating all corporations –civil and religious- to the government. Discussions about the Ecclesiastic *Patronato* gained momentum when, in February 1824, an ecclesiastic mission arrived in Chile from Rome led by monsignor Juan Muzi, his secretary, Juan María Mastai (future Pope Pious IX), and José Sallusti. For Rome's delegate, the destitution of Rodríguez Zorrilla was illegal, since, 'according to the Council of Trent', only the Pope had the right to appoint and dismiss clerics. The Spanish kings, it is true, had enjoyed the *Patronato*, but only after the Pope 'conceded' them this right. Consequently, any attempt by the Spanish American republics to inherit such a right had to be explicitly accepted by the Pope, for which the government should first obtain the recognition of Chile's independence from Rome.<sup>49</sup> Since Spain was one of Rome's closest allies against both revolutionary and 'impious' governments, the recognition of independence by the Pope did not seem likely.

The conflict between the Chilean state and the Church became more acute when the Freire government, led once again by Pinto, began to secularize Catholic rituals and ecclesiastic orders. Regarding the first case, Pinto sought to reformulate the contents of sermons and reduce the number of the festivities. On 2 August, Pinto reported that a priest called Manuel Mata had preached in the Cathedral 'a subversive eulogy', and that another named Juan Crisóstomo had recently been imprisoned in the *Recoleta Dominica* for 'being a die-hard enemy of national independence'.<sup>50</sup> Five days later, Pinto wrote to Muzi that the reduction of festivities was 'intended to prevent the ills that these days provoke in society', as 'they can discontinue the administration of justice and other public offices to the serious detriment of citizens'.<sup>51</sup> Seeing that the government would not yield in this matter, Muzi reluctantly agreed to reduce the annual festivities from seventeen to twelve.<sup>52</sup> The reform of the regular orders also created friction between the government and the Church. In 1824, religious orders in Chile were in an anomalous situation: although the revolution had prevented them from being in contact with their higher authorities in Rome and Madrid, in practice they still depended on

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<sup>49</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. XIV, p. 291.

<sup>50</sup> MI, vol. 61, p. 263, Pinto to Santiago's intendant, 2 August 1824.

<sup>51</sup> MI, vol. 61, pp. 266v-267, Pinto to Muzi, 7 August 1824.

<sup>52</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. XIV, pp. 293-294. On 9 August, the government published a *Bando*, signed by Freire and Pinto, called *Reducción de fiestas. Indulto apostólico dirigido a los Sres. Ordinarios, Clérigos seculares y regulares, y a todos los fieles del Estado de Chile*. See Lilliam Calm, *El Chile de Pío IX: 1824*, Editorial Andrés Bello, Santiago, 1987, footnote 41 of page 88.

them.<sup>53</sup> To solve this anomaly Pinto ordered the regulars to obey neither Rome nor Madrid but the diocesan governors in Chile, who apparently had the confidence of the government.<sup>54</sup>

The new regulation for the regular orders was issued on 6 September 1824, and all its articles were devised and crafted by Pinto. It began by stating that all regulars were bound to live in convents, but those who wished to ‘attain their secularization’ could approach the governors of their dioceses to do so. The fifth article prevented individuals under the age of twenty-one from becoming monks, and the seventh stated the closure of convents with less than eight people. The tenth exonerated the regulars from the administration of Church property (which became state-owned property), so they could be ‘exclusively devoted to their ministry’ and not ‘distracted by profane activities’. A few days later the government ordered all priests to defend independence in religious services, which was accompanied by the publication of a decree that regulated the content of sermons. From then on, priests were forced to finish their eulogies and sermons ‘praying for the conservation of the Catholic religion and the progress of national independence and the Republic of Chile’. Ecclesiastic officials also had the duty of helping Chile remain ‘an independent nation from Spain’, and explain the *pueblos* ‘the advantages, utility and convenience of independence’.<sup>55</sup> Thus, the government did not openly oppose Catholicism (in fact, priests should ‘pray’ for its conservation), but rather sought to use its influence to promote independence.

At first glance, Pinto’s attacks on the Church are a political reaction based on the Jacobin principle that all corporations, especially the Church, should be under the supervision of the state, especially the Church. It is likely that Pinto had the French Civil Constitution of the Clergy in mind when he ordered the secularization of the Chilean regular orders.<sup>56</sup> But while the offensive of the French revolutionaries against the Church did not stop with the issue in 1790 of the Civil Constitution of the Clergy and continued to the point that Robespierre and his fellow Jacobins created their own civil religion, the Freire government never aimed to replace the role of the Church with a state religion. Pinto was clearly aware of the strong influence that Catholicism still had within Chilean society, and so instead of banning the Church he used its rites and priests to promote independence and spread republicanism.

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<sup>53</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. XIV, p. 291.

<sup>54</sup> MI, vol. 61, pp. 274-274v, Pinto to Muzi, 13 August 1824.

<sup>55</sup> MI, vol. 61, pp. 285-285v, minister of government (Pinto?) to governor of Santiago’s bishopric, 16 September 1824.

<sup>56</sup> See Charles Tilly argued in his *The Vendée*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1976, pp. 229-237.

Thus, Freire, Pinto and other members of the 1824 Chilean government adopted some of the ideas and arguments of the branch of French liberalism that ‘thought that freedom entailed the rational control of power rather than its limitation’, and that saw ‘the state as a potential emancipator of the individual from the power of “feudalities” and the grip of corporate privilege’.<sup>57</sup> However, because religion was not eliminated in Chile, the branch of French liberalism that emphasized the importance of religion was also considered an example by the Chilean liberals of the mid 1820s. In my studies of Pinto I did not find any proof that he had read Benjamin Constant’s *De la Religion*, which, according to H.S. Jones, shows that ‘religious preoccupations were at the heart of the liberal world-view’, the French included.<sup>58</sup> Yet it is very clear that Pinto’s approach to the question of religion was implicitly influenced by the idea that, although the state should ensure that the corporate privileges should be as weak as possible, the Chilean government could not –and should not- banish religion from the public sphere.

The Freire government was also influenced by other currents of European liberalism. For example, the relationship between the Chilean government and people established in Chile from both the United States and Great Britain was inspired by the branch of British liberalism which emphasized the importance of free trade.<sup>59</sup> The introduction of free trade in Chile prompted a number of Anglo-Saxon trading houses to send agents to Valparaíso to have direct control of the products they exported. The British consul to Chile, Christopher Richard Nugent, reported to George Canning on 17 March 1825 that, ‘during the six months ending the 31<sup>st</sup> December 1824’, 64 British vessels have ‘entered and cleared from this port [Valparaíso]’, almost the double amount of vessels from the United States (37), which had the second largest commercial presence in Chile on a list that included Chilean, *rioplatense*,

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<sup>57</sup> H.S. Jones, ‘Las variedades del liberalismo europeo en el siglo XIX: perspectivas británicas y francesas’, in Iván Jaksic and Eduardo Posada Carbó, *Liberalismo y poder. Latinoamérica en el siglo XIX*, Fondo de cultura Económica, Santiago, 2011, p. 46. My approximation to this topic is based on Jones’ article, whose most important argument is that the two major variants of European liberalism –the French and the British- should not be seen as watertight compartments. Indeed, contrary to the common view, the limitation of power was not exclusively defended by nineteenth-century British thinkers, nor is it accurate to affirm that all nineteenth-century British liberals were advocators of this sort of liberalism. There were, in fact, famous French men of letters, like Sieyès, who endorsed ‘the modern liberalism’, as well as celebrated British scholars, like Bentham, who ‘conceived liberty as the rational control of power, rather than as its limitation’. The quotations are from the English manuscript, which was kindly e-mailed to me by Iván Jaksic. I have, however, respected the numeration of the Spanish version.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 44.

<sup>59</sup> For the Chilean admiration of the Anglo-Saxon world, see Collier, *Ideas and Politics*, pp. 201-206.

Peruvian, French, Dutch, Genoese and Portuguese vessels.<sup>60</sup> The high number of North American traders in the early 1820s in Valparaíso had a role in the recognition given by the United States in March 1822 of the independence of Chile,<sup>61</sup> a move that brought two important consequences: on one hand, it allowed Chileans and North Americans to have a more fluid economic relationship. On the other, and due to the fact that the new economic relationship between both countries was handled by North American agents established in Valparaíso, it caused frictions between Chilean Catholics and North American Protestants.

In early 1824, the new North American plenipotentiary, Heman Allen, arrived in Santiago with the purpose of formalizing diplomatic relations between the two countries. The agent was treated cordially by the Santiago authorities, as they believed that the new role of the United States in the international economy could lead other powers to follow suit and recognize the independence of Chile. Allen was of the idea that, as long as Chileans encouraged freedom and had respect for the law, republic institutions would flourish and consolidate, two principles that were also promoted by Freire and Pinto. However, in mid 1824 a minor conflict over religious tolerance turned into a major political problem that threatened the survival of the diplomatic relationship between Chile and the United States. In the few months he had lived in Chile, Allen had formed an idea of how Chileans regarded his compatriots, both in commercial as well as religious terms. Regarding commercial terms, Allen had no major complaints, knowing that overtime the trading activity between the two countries would be formalized and invigorated. Allen's religious concerns were, however, much more profound, especially with regards to the burials of his compatriots who died in Chile. On 24 August 1824, Allen reported to Pinto his thoughts on the question of cemeteries. Allen argued that due to the 'laws and customs of Chile, his compatriots, as well as other many foreigners, are deprived from their right to exercise freely their accustomed worship and their solemn burial rites'. Allen wrote to Pinto that he had been informed that Chileans had 'committed shameful indecencies' with the dead bodies of his compatriots, and that he was 'forced by his obligation and duty, as representative of the citizens of the United States, to

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<sup>60</sup> BROP, BT 6/61, pp. 13-17v, Nugent to Canning, 17 March 1825. See also Simon Collier Simon and Sater William, *Historia de Chile, 1808-1994*, Cambridge University Press, Madrid, 1998, p. 49.

<sup>61</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. XIV, p. 336. The sending of British Consuls to Chile was part of Great Britain's plans to recognize the independence of the South American countries (especially after George Canning succeeded Lord Castlereagh as foreign secretary). Full recognition, however, came only in 1841. See Theodore E. Nichols, 'The Establishment of Political Relations between Chile and Great Britain', in HAHR, vol. 28, number 1, 1948, pp. 137-141.

respectfully call the attention of the government of Chile about the need to provide a law to protect the privileges that they [i.e. the North Americans] are accustomed to enjoy'.<sup>62</sup>

Pinto answered Allen's letter four days later, in a tone sympathetic to the requests of the Plenipotentiary. On that occasion, Pinto took the opportunity to highlight the differences between the new regime and the colonial period, arguing that the acceptance of Protestant worship was only possible in a political system that respected economic freedom and religious tolerance. In addition, Pinto hinted that the Supreme Director was willing to meet each of the needs of U.S. citizens in Chile:

The undersigned [Pinto] is convinced of the justice of [Allen's] claims and finds them not only subject to the respectable interests of good morals and customs, but also very important for the progress of this republic. The relics of the colonial education received from the least educated nation in Europe [Spain] prevented the new governments from building their [own] religious institutions, thereby being forced to progress slowly so the *pueblos* became capable of receiving and adopting them. The Supreme Director, convinced of the importance of a law that protects foreigners in the enjoyment of their privileges, [...] is working to issue it promptly. [...] He has also ordered me to inform the Plenipotentiary Minister of the United States that the Supreme Director will provide U.S. citizens all guarantees to ensure they have a peaceful life in Chile.<sup>63</sup>

Needless to say, the will of Pinto was not enough to stop a conflict that lasted throughout the nineteenth century.<sup>64</sup> However, it is remarkable that these sort of discussions had begun in a period as early as 1824, as it shows that, after fourteen years of revolution, debates regarding such controversial subjects as religious tolerance became increasingly common. The periodical press was a vehicle of information used by both the government and the opposition to defend their respective political and economic interests. *El Liberal*, for example, noted that the Church should show a more tolerant face if it was to continue having influence within Chilean society, adding that the 'ignorance and bigotry in which the country is submerged [*sumido*]' could affect future diplomatic negotiations with countries like the United States.<sup>65</sup> Statements like this one abound in the Chilean press of the 1820s, and they show that religious topics were intimately connected to political, economic and cultural issues. Indeed, Pinto and the rest of the Chilean ministers agreed that, in order to overcome its enemies, the

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<sup>62</sup> Quoted by Ricardo Donoso, *Las ideas políticas en Chile*, Fondo de Cultura Económica, México, 1946, pp. 240-241.

<sup>63</sup> Quoted in Donoso, *Las ideas políticas en Chile*, p. 241. Pinto was very critical of colonial education. See his 'Apuntes Autobiográficos', in BACH, number 17, Santiago, 1941, pp. 69-71.

<sup>64</sup> For the tense State-Church relations in nineteenth-century Chile, see Sol Serrano, *¿Qué hacer con Dios en la República?*, Fondo de Cultura Económica, Santiago, 2008, especially chapters II and IX.

<sup>65</sup> Donoso, *Las ideas políticas en Chile*, p. 242.

Freire government ought to deliver a programme as comprehensive –including political, military, economic, cultural and religious issues- as possible. Furthermore, they all tended to agree that such a programme ought to be as ‘national’ as possible, and Pinto was a key figure in this decision.

Pinto resigned his post as minister of government and foreign relations in February 1825, but was rapidly reappointed intendant of Coquimbo.<sup>66</sup> There, he emphasized that intendants were not just regional leaders but representatives of the Chilean ‘nation’. He seemed to have deliberately used the word ‘nation’, both in the documents of 1824 that we have seen as well as in his political interventions in Coquimbo, to express something that until then was vague and meaningless: that the new republic should represent not just revolutionaries, but all Chileans.<sup>67</sup> For Pinto, the word ‘nation’ had a clearly territorial and inclusive meaning: the more Chileans, from north to south, were included in the ‘national’ project the better. To be involved in the ‘national’ project was tantamount to being part of one, clearly defined territory that was to be politically controlled by the two main powers of the central state: the Executive and the Legislature.

Pinto took advantage of the particular political circumstances of 1825 to spread the ‘national’ idea among *coquimbanos*, constantly arguing that, notwithstanding its regional ambitions, Coquimbo should not become an independent territory but remain a province of ‘Chile’. In a period when federalism was gaining adepts, especially in Santiago, Pinto’s stand was not necessarily the most popular. Yet, as an envoy of Freire in Coquimbo, he could not – and did not want to- act otherwise. He firmly believed that the Chilean republic was to be embodied in a single administrative unit, and that regional aspirations should not clash with the creation of a centralized state. If Pinto applauded the creation of the *Asamblea Provincial de Coquimbo* on 22 May 1825,<sup>68</sup> that was not because he flirted with federalism, but rather because he saw in the assembly an instance to have more fluid communications with politicians in the capital, who were also in the process of establishing their own provincial assembly. The objective of the Santiago assembly was to ‘reflect the general will of the province by appointing two plenipotentiaries’, who, ‘in accordance with those appointed by the assemblies of

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<sup>66</sup> The appointment is dated 23 March 1825. See IC, vol. 14.

<sup>67</sup> On 30 July 1824, Freire and his minister Pinto published a decree stating that, from then on, official documents would no longer use the word *Patria* but that of ‘Chile’, which is in accordance with Pinto’s belief that the Chilean state should incorporate not just revolutionaries but Chileans as a whole. See Vicuña Mackenna, *La Guerra a Muerte*, p. 792, footnote 1.

<sup>68</sup> IC, vol. 17, p. 482.

Concepción and Coquimbo', were to draw the 'electoral law for a [new] central legislature'.<sup>69</sup> Indeed, the Congress, which had reinitiated its sessions on 22 November 1824, was once again closed in May 1825 because it could not count on the approval of the provinces. The Santiago assembly was, therefore, instituted as a means of guaranteeing that the new 'central legislature' would be the result of negotiations between the capital, Concepción and Coquimbo.<sup>70</sup>

In Coquimbo, preparations for the opening of the provincial assembly were led by Pinto.<sup>71</sup> He was present the day that the members of the assembly promised to maintain 'the integrity of the State and the province'.<sup>72</sup> That same day, Pinto delivered a long speech before the assembly, proposing modifications to the educational system of the province, as well as changes to improve the economy. He asserted that public education guaranteed the 'immortality' of liberty and the consolidation of 'civilization'. He also stated that such a system should be the result of a joint effort between the central government and regions like Coquimbo; an effort that, in his opinion, would allow the government to disseminate elementary schools, 'the basis of education', throughout the country.<sup>73</sup>

His speech continued with a detailed analysis of the economy of Coquimbo and its potential. Pinto argued that the province could exploit its 'industry' by welcoming foreign investment and protecting private property. For centuries, the 'monstrous trade regulations' had prevented Spanish Americans from having fluid economic relations with territories that, although neutral, did not belong to the Spanish empire. Now, he claimed, Chileans had the chance to create economic ties with other countries (although he did not make his preferences explicit, he was probably thinking on the United States and Great Britain).<sup>74</sup> In addition to opening their economy to the international trade, *coquimbano*s should exploit their natural resources, and facilitate the economic exchange between the various *pueblos* that made up the province. Pinto asserted that in an underdeveloped economy like Coquimbo's, which was based on agriculture and mining, the state should enforce trade laws and promote the modernization of mining, but never stifle private initiative. Speaking of foreign investment in

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<sup>69</sup> Quoted by Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. XIV, p. 382.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 325-330.

<sup>71</sup> IC, vol. 10, pp. 51-52v, 24 June 1825. This is the document by which the assembly was constituted. It is signed by Pinto.

<sup>72</sup> IC, vol. 10, p. 52, 24 June 1825.

<sup>73</sup> IC, vol. 17, pp. 486-487, 26 June 1825.

<sup>74</sup> He made reference to the creation in England of two mining companies whose aim was to 'introduce capital to work the mines' of Coquimbo. In September 1825, meanwhile, the Chilean Mining Association established itself in La Serena. See Simon Collier, 'El Diario de Carlos Lambert, 1825-1830', in RChHG, number 161, Santiago, 1994-95, p. 301.

mining, but extending his arguments to general production, Pinto affirmed that mining had bright prospects, as long as the state allowed entrepreneurs to ‘enjoy freedom and equal access to franchises’.<sup>75</sup>

I have found no proof that Pinto had read Adam Smith, but, as happened with Constant’s *On Religion*, it is probable that he had at least heard of *The Wealth of Nations*. As H.S. Jones has recently reminded us, Smith’s criticism was not directed ‘against the state as such’. Smith fully recognized, Jones continues, ‘that the market mechanism -to use a twentieth-century term rather than an eighteenth- or nineteenth-century one- depended on a legal framework which would, for example, counter the tendency of businessmen to conspire against the public; and he fully appreciated the role the state had to play in the provision of primary education, which was essential to resist the tendency of the division of labour to sap the springs of public spirit’.<sup>76</sup> Pinto’s economic beliefs resembled Smith’s, in that, even though Pinto believed that the state should not asphyxiate private initiative, he considered the state as the institution guaranteeing that commercial laws were enforced and observed by all individuals. One of the most important authors of eighteenth-century British economic liberalism was, therefore, implicitly followed by Pinto when he approached economic issues.

Pinto finished his speech in front of the Coquimbo assembly asking his members to participate in the process that would elect the new Congress: ‘although the national representation does not yet exist, the laudable zeal of the Supreme Director to conserve the rights of the Chilean people cannot tolerate the absence of a legislature. He, therefore, asks you to [send to Santiago] two delegates to form a national legislature in accordance to those appointed by the other [provincial assemblies]’.<sup>77</sup> Pinto managed to convince the members of the assembly to support Freire’s political programme: ‘the province of Coquimbo is an essential part of the Republic of Chile’, said the first article of a *Ley Fundamental* issued in Coquimbo on 1 July.<sup>78</sup> In the fifth article, the *coquimbanos* recognized Ramón Freire as Supreme Director of the republic of Chile, adding in a later article that, if the other provinces of the country agreed to sanction a specific law without the approval of the assembly of Coquimbo, its members would nevertheless abide it.<sup>79</sup> In no respect did the assembly seek to proclaim the

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<sup>75</sup> IC, vol. 17, pp. 488-488v.

<sup>76</sup> Jones, ‘Las variedades del liberalismo europeo en el siglo XIX’, p. 49.

<sup>77</sup> IC, vol. 17, pp. 489v-490.

<sup>78</sup> IC, vol. 17, p. 493.

<sup>79</sup> IC, vol. 17, p. 493.

independence of the province; on the contrary, seeing that Freire was willing to hear the requests and demands of Coquimbo, they felt comfortable with the central government and agreed to play a 'national' role in Chilean politics.

However, before the government's good intentions came to fruition, conflicts in Santiago aborted the negotiations between the province and the capital. Unexpectedly, on 12 July Freire called on the inhabitants of the country to elect a new Congress that would take office on 5 September 1825, forgetting that the plenipotentiaries of the three provinces had first to agree on the best electoral mechanism to 'elect the central legislature'.<sup>80</sup> On 28 July, the *coquimbanos* expressed to the minister their dissatisfaction of government with the way in which the electoral law for the new legislature had been prepared. They insisted that such a Congress was 'premature' and 'contrary to our interests'.<sup>81</sup>

Following these events, Pinto found himself in a difficult dilemma. As the government's official in Coquimbo, he had to inform the *coquimbanos* of whatever decision was made by the Supreme Director. But, at heart, it is likely that he had condemned Freire's move. Let us recall that in the opening of the *Asamblea Provincial de Coquimbo* Pinto had requested to elect the two plenipotentiaries as soon as possible, as this was the only guarantee that the province had an active participation in the national representation. Now, however, the credibility achieved by the intendant was at stake: many could assume that Pinto had responsibility for a decision that, in fact, had been made unilaterally in the capital. Although documents do not show an explicit discontent amongst the *coquimbanos* with Pinto, they show that, in August 1825, the relationship between the province and the Freire regime was almost destroyed. On 13 August, the minister of government answered the letter of the *coquimbanos* of 28 July, asserting that a 'reunion of a Junta of plenipotentiaries of the province' would delay the reestablishment of 'national and governmental unity'.<sup>82</sup> Consequently, the minister urged the *coquimbanos* to join the government's initiative; otherwise, the province would have no representation in the legislature. And that was exactly what happened. In August 1825 elections for Congress were held in the towns that formed the province of Santiago and, on 15 September, its sessions were inaugurated.

The tense relationship between Coquimbo and Santiago gives an idea of the conflicts caused by the emergence of different factions. The revolution brought about not only a

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<sup>80</sup> Cf. footnote 70 of this chapter.

<sup>81</sup> SCL, vol. X, pp. 320-321, Coquimbo's assembly to minister of government, 28 July 1828.

<sup>82</sup> SCL, vol. X, p. 323, minister of government to Coquimbo's assembly, 13 August 1825.

change of political regime, but also the emergence of diverse political groups. These groups tended to agree on one, paramount aspect: they were all republicans. The problem was that the two principal republican alternatives (i.e. the one which favoured a strong Executive power; and the one which, although supportive of a powerful Executive, was more prone to introduce 'liberal' reforms and situate the political discussion in parliament) were poles apart. Like its predecessors, the Congress of 1825 became the focus of debates between federalists, *pipiolo*s and *pelucones*.<sup>83</sup> In the following section we will see a few examples of the types of discussion in Congress in the period 1823-1825.

### III. POLITICIZING THE ARMY IN THE CHILEAN CONGRESS

This thesis has argued that a major consequence of the revolution was that it compelled the military to become active in Chilean politics. However, it has also been argued that, during the first decade of revolutionary warfare (1813-1823), the political role of officers was chiefly concentrated on the Executive rather than on the Legislative power. Despite their differences, José Miguel Carrera and Bernardo O'Higgins shared an important characteristic: both firmly believed that political power should be concentrated on the Executive. In theory, Freire shared the same principle, which explains why he demanded the closure of Congress and strengthened the influence of the Supreme Director. But during the Freire regime the role of Congress was much more visible, and that was largely because Freire and his ministers were convinced that political discussion could not be exclusively centred around the Supreme Directorship. They closed parliament in mid 1824 and again in May 1825, but they also insisted that the writing of a new Constitution should result from the debates held in Congress.

The legislatures of 1823, 1824 and 1825 gathered discussions of various kinds, military matters amongst them. Most of the discussions that this section analyzes dealt with the same context and aimed to answer the same questions: what should the role of the Army of Chile be in the new republic? Should the military have a direct responsibility in politics? Opinions varied according to vested interests: from those who believed that the best way to reward the military for their involvement in the war was by giving them special treatment and the right to

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<sup>83</sup> I am including the so-called *estanqueros* and *o'higginistas* within the *pelucón* faction. Although sometimes their political goals differed, in general they tended to act in accordance against the *pipiolo* government. For a rather schematic yet useful summary of the principal characteristics of Chilean political factions in the 1820s, see Wood, *The Society of Equality*, pp. 24-29.

participate in politics, to those who opposed the Freire government's tendency to make the army the most powerful institution of the state. The first position was clearly defined in 1823 by the author of a periodical pertinently called *El Amigo de los Militares* (*The Friend of the Military*). According to the *Prospecto* of this periodical, there were many in Chile who wanted to 'denigrate the most respectable corporation of all states: the military, the one which is undoubtedly the most brilliant of society'. The author added that 'the military career [...] is unfortunately on the bottom rung of society, and exposed to fall prey to the cassock [*sotana*] and gown [*toga*]'. By the words cassock and gown, the authors referred priest, lawyers and men of letters ,who, in his view, controlled the 'moral power of the state'.<sup>84</sup>

Although the author of this article did not refer explicitly to Juan Egaña, it is possible that he had aimed at criticizing Egaña's Constitution of 1823. Egaña was one of the men of letters who most openly opposed to the political power of the military. As early as in 1811, Egaña warned against the 'danger of having an almighty Executive, particularly when it has a considerable military power'.<sup>85</sup> In his first constitutional project (1811), Egaña recommended banning a permanent army, preferring to give the militias the responsibility of defending the territory. In article 67 of Title III of this proto-Constitution, Egaña stated that 'the honest citizen is a defender of the state: he must be instructed in military discipline, and be a soldier (if the republic does not use him in another capacity)'. However, Egaña also claimed that 'the military [*lo militar*] must always be subject to civilian authority'.<sup>86</sup> Twelve years later, Egaña devoted a substantial part of the Constitution of 1823 to defining and limiting the power of the military, making this code the most articulated response to O'Higgins' militarism. Of the ten articles in which the section *De la fuerza pública* is divided, it may be useful to highlight five: 1) article 226: 'the military force is essentially obedient: no armed body may deliberate'; 2) article 227: 'each year the Senate decrees the number of men in the permanent army, and this is the only force of the state'; 3) article 229: the military force 'cannot make requisitions of any sort without the approval of civilian authorities'; 4) article 230: 'every Chilean must be registered in or exempted from the National Militia records since the age of 18'; 5) article 232: 'the military force is divided into veteran and national militias'.<sup>87</sup> In the last two articles, Egaña picked up his 1811 idea that the country's defence should be led by militiamen -that is, citizens

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<sup>84</sup> *El Amigo de los Militares*, number 1, 12 April 1823.

<sup>85</sup> Castillo, *La creación de la república*, p. 49.

<sup>86</sup> Quoted in *Ibidem*, p. 50.

<sup>87</sup> I have read a copy of the Constitution of 1823 in BPRO, FO/16/1, pp. 151-183.

who only in case of an emergency were called up- instead of veterans of the regular army.

But Egaña did not aim to ‘extinguish’ the army, as the editor of *El Amigo de los Militares* wrote later in the article.<sup>88</sup> At most he sought to put the Army of Chile under the supervision of civilians, a political position that, nevertheless, did not prevent him from accepting that in times of war the civil elites were inevitably depended of the armed forces. Egaña, furthermore, does not seem to have sought to banish the military from the political sphere; and that was because, at least until late 1825, the Chilean military respected the rules of the new republican system. The military were proud of the government they had helped to build, and when they stood against a constituted authority (i.e. O’Higgins) they did it on behalf of political legitimacy. They became involved in politics, because they agreed that politics was the best means to strengthen republican principles. In August 1823, Luis de la Cruz, at the time *comandante general de armas* of Santiago, made all detachments under his command ‘swear allegiance to the Supreme Congress’,<sup>89</sup> a decision that was in line with the participation of veterans of the revolutionary wars as both voters and candidates in elections for the legislatures of 1823-1825. The congressional elections of 1823 were held on 7 July and, among those eligible to vote, were officers who had a ‘military grade from ensign [*alférez*] up’.<sup>90</sup> At the same time, rural lieutenants and headquarters inspectors had the responsibility to ‘ensure that all entitled to vote attend the election on the day and at the time determined’.<sup>91</sup> Thus low-ranking officers became equally involved in the electoral process, not necessarily as voters but as subordinates of those in charge of guaranteeing that elections were orderly and periodically carried out throughout the territory.<sup>92</sup>

In the elections of July 1823 two of the most talented men of letters of the period, Manuel de Salas (Santiago) and Juan Egaña (Santiago), were elected, alongside colonels José

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<sup>88</sup> *El Amigo de los Militares*, number 1, 12 April 1823.

<sup>89</sup> SCL, vol. VIII, p. 53, De la Cruz to Congress, 19 August 1823.

<sup>90</sup> SCL, vol. VIII, p. 8.

<sup>91</sup> SCL, vol. VIII, p. 8.

<sup>92</sup> My approach to Chilean elections is heavily influenced by J. Samuel Valenzuela’s works, where he presents the hypothesis that, although voting restrictions were strict, soldiers and other actors who did not have the right to vote became actively involved in electoral processes. In other words, neither economic nor political requirements of electoral laws prevented soldiers and *inquilinos* from participating in elections. See J. Samuel Valenzuela, *Democratización vía reforma: la expansión del sufragio en Chile*, IDES, Buenos Aires, 1985; J. Samuel Valenzuela, ‘Hacia la formación de instituciones democráticas: prácticas electorales en Chile durante el siglo XIX’, in *Estudios Públicos*, Santiago, 1996. For new perspectives on elections in nineteenth-century Europe and Latin America, see the essays edited by Eduardo Posada Carbó (editor), *Elections before democracy: the history of elections in Europe and Latin America*, Macmillan/Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, London, 1996. For an interesting case of a group of *inquilinos* close to Juan Egaña voting in a 1825 election, see SCL, vol. X, pp. 283-284.

Manuel Borgoño (Santiago), Manuel Cortés (Los Andes), Francisco Fontecilla (Colchagua), Eugenio Muñoz (Colchagua), José María Palacios (Colchagua) and Lorenzo Montt (Casablanca); lieutenant-colonel Manuel Bulnes (Coelemu); and field-marsals Francisco Calderón (Itata) and Joaquín Prieto (Rere).<sup>93</sup> Of these, Prieto was the most active in politics. In 1823, Prieto was part of a commission, formed by deputies Francisco Calderón, José Manuel Borgoño and Luis de la Cruz, to write the draft of a project that was to decide the number of the ‘permanent force of the army’ and the best ways to finance it.<sup>94</sup> This draft was the basis of a *Constitución Político-Militar* that was prepared by Diego José Benavente in March 1824, and discussed and amended by members of Congress. In this Constitution we find an explicit defence not only of the existence of a standing army and a ‘national guard’, but also of the leading role that the military should play in politics.

According to Benavente, ‘all Chileans, between the age of eighteen and fifty, are required to defend the *Patria*’. The armed forces were divided into ‘standing troops’ and ‘national guards’, which, in turn, were divided into ‘active service’ and ‘reserve guards’. More importantly, it was stated that the mission of the armed forces was not just to ‘defend the *Patria* from external enemies’, but also to ‘sustain public order’ and ensure ‘the execution of laws’. This is not to say that Benavente sought to make the army independent from either the Executive or the Legislative. In fact, article 8 of his *Constitución Político-Militar* asserted that every year the Executive should propose the number of troops of the standing army, and that such a proposal ought to be discussed and accepted by Congress. It also stated that the Legislative was entitled to decide the quota which every province had to ‘contribute for the formation of the standing army’.<sup>95</sup> However, changes introduced by Congress did not challenge the bulk of Benavente’s ideas at all; on the contrary, they reaffirmed what was proposed in the draft of the *Constitución Político-Militar*.

Of the thirteen suggestions made by Congress, only two could be deemed threatening to Benavente’s project. Article 19 of the *Constitución* declared that ‘Chileans who do not serve in the standing army will suffer the penalty prescribed for deserters’. Congressmen claimed that this clause was ‘unjust’, because ‘citizens who have not yet enrolled in the army’ should

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<sup>93</sup> The list of deputies for the Congress of 1823 can be found in SCL, vol. VIII, pp. 15-16. A list of deputies for the period 1824-1825 appears in SCL, vol. X, pp. 7-9.

<sup>94</sup> CM, vol. 53, pp. 80v-81, 10 December 182. The name of Luis de la Cruz does not appear in the list of deputies for the Congress of 1823. However, he appears as substitute deputy (*diputado suplente*) for Los Ángeles in the list of 1824-1825.

<sup>95</sup> The *Constitución Político-Militar* can be found in MG, vol. 139, pp. 1-6, 16 March 1824.

not be punished as deserters. Article 27, meanwhile, stated that ‘no military may be deposed from his job, until he is not legitimately investigated and sentenced’. The legislative commission, for its part, recommended adding the following sentence at the end of this article: ‘except those included in the class which can be constitutionally censored’. But, again, these modifications did not alter the substance of the *Constitución Político-Militar*, which proves that, overall, congressmen agreed on the importance assigned by Benavente to the participation of the army in politics.<sup>96</sup>

An indirect consequence of the issue of the *Constitución Político-Militar* was the significant increase in the size of the standing army between September and December 1824. This, in spite of the fact that the press charged that, due to economic reasons, the government was downsizing the regular army. James A. Wood quotes an article which appeared in *El Liberal* on 5 January 1825, whose author reacted, in Wood’s opinion, ‘against [both] the rapid downsizing of the regular army’ and the decision to replace it with a national guard. The reasons to reduce the army are given by Wood himself: ‘budget revenue shortfalls, the political impossibility of raising taxes, and a weak financial bureaucracy’, all which ‘made the [national] guard appear to be a more cost-effective option than the regular army’.<sup>97</sup>

Were the editors of *El Liberal* correct? A *Resumen General de Fuerza* of 1 September 1824 showed the number of troops of the Army of Chile: 449 artillerymen, 2,358 infantrymen and 1,519 cavalrymen, totalling 4,317 men.<sup>98</sup> Three and half months later, the government, represented by Pinto, requested that Congress ‘augment the forces of the State and provide future means for the regularity of the payment of the Troops’. Consul Nugent summarized the political and economic background of this ‘Memorial’ to George Canning:

How far the publication of this Memorial may be a politic step on the part of this Government I am at a loss to conjecture; but its aim, I am told, is to compel the rich landed Proprietors to come forwards with their immense wealth and take a full share in the distresses of the country; for they have, hitherto, by an overawing influence, avoided every sort of tax, loan or contribution – content that the mercantile world might be borne down by the pressure of taxation if they themselves stood exempted, even to the most trivial share of public supply.<sup>99</sup>

However, according to a military commission composed of José Manuel Borgoño, José

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<sup>96</sup> Changes made by Congress can be found in MG, vol. 139, pp. 7-8v, 22 March 1824.

<sup>97</sup> Wood, *The Society of Equality*, p. 44.

<sup>98</sup> VM, vol. XXII, p. 269v, 1 September 1824.

<sup>99</sup> BROP, FO/16/1, p. 347v-348, Nugent to Canning, 22 December 1824.

Santiago Luco, Domingo Torres and Manuel Merino (all of them congressmen),<sup>100</sup> the government –and with it, also its official organ, *El Liberal*– was asking for the approval of a step that had already been taken: in December 1824, the Army of Chile had doubled its size, amounting to 8,431 men. Therefore, the commission argued, the Congress should be devoted only to finding the best way to finance it.<sup>101</sup> Why did the army experience such a significant increase? Undoubtedly, the fear of being invaded by a royalist army from either Spain or Peru and enlarged with *chilote* troops explains in part the increase of the army.<sup>102</sup> Yet the issue of the *Constitución Político-Militar*, especially the article that stated that ‘all Chileans, between the age of eighteen and fifty, are required to defend the *Patria*’, also played a part in this phenomenon. Moreover, the support given by congressmen to this project was key in the government’s success in increasing the troops of the standing army. Indeed, not even Juan Egaña opposed the *Constitución Político-Militar*, as proven by the fact that the few modifications introduced by Congress to Benavente’s project were sent to the Supreme Director by Egaña himself.<sup>103</sup>

We should not conclude from this that all civilians and congressmen applauded the expansion of the army. In the session of 8 June 1824, for example, the Congress agreed that a commission to ‘organize the finances’ of the state should decide whether the dismissal of military officers could help reduce the expenditures of the treasury.<sup>104</sup> We appreciate a similar position in the repercussions of an economically motivated action led by three veteran officers of the revolutionary wars between April and May 1825. On 12 April, the Santiago chief officers, José Rondizonni (infantry), Jorge Beauchef (infantry) and Benajamin Viel (cavalry), informed Luis de la Cruz of their decision to leave the capital and settle their detachments in the countryside to find something to ‘feed their men tomorrow’. According to De la Cruz, the commanders told him that their decision had been previously approved by the Supreme Director.

De la Cruz wrote a report on the situation, informing that the commanders had told him that their decision had been previously approved by the Supreme Director. This report was sent to Francisco Ramón Vicuña, minister of government and war, who, in turn, sent it to

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<sup>100</sup> See the list of deputies for the period 1824-1825 (SCL, vol. X, pp. 7-9).

<sup>101</sup> SCL, vol. X, p. 162, military commission to Congress, 15 December 1824. In his report, Nugent mistakenly reported to Canning that ‘the Military Regular Force of Chile is under 4,000’ (p. 348v).

<sup>102</sup> This is clear from the Spanish copy of the ‘Memorial’ sent by Nugent to Canning, and which is also held in BROP, FO/16/1, pp. 350-353v (it is dated 11 December 1824).

<sup>103</sup> MG, vol. 139, p. 6, Egaña and Gabriel Ocampo to the Supreme Director, 22 March 1824.

<sup>104</sup> SCL, vol. X, pp. 406-407, 8 June 1824. See also Joaquín Fernández, ‘Los orígenes de la Guardia Nacional y la Construcción del ciudadano-soldado (Chile, 1823-1833)’, in *Mapocho*, number 56, Santiago, 2004, p. 316.

the Congress.<sup>105</sup> However, the Congress did not decide immediately on the matter; in fact, it was not until early May that one of the congressmen, Carlos Rodríguez (brother of the *guerrillero* Manuel Rodríguez), elaborated on the subject, not with a view of supporting the commanders but declaring that ‘the troops had no right to demand their wages in times when the treasury cannot pay those of the rest of the [public] employees’. Rodríguez added that, if soldiers were discontent, they could go to work in the countryside, ‘whose tasks were to give employment to many hands’.<sup>106</sup> Hence, Rodríguez argued that the personnel of the army ought to be diminished.

Rodríguez’s speech was followed by an offensive led by Rondizzoni, Beauchef and Viel. On 8 May, Luis de la Cruz informed Vicuña that these officers had sent him three *representaciones* written immediately after Rodríguez’s speech with the purpose of achieving a positive answer to their economic demands from Congress.<sup>107</sup> The three *representaciones* sought more or less the same goals: they did not seek to put into question the Congress, but to get a positive response to their demands. Besides, they sought to censure Rodríguez’s speech, arguing that his words offended the ‘liberators of Chile’.<sup>108</sup> Beauchef’s introduction to the *representación* of the battalion 8 of the infantry summarizes their grievances well: ‘you know the efforts I have made and continue to make to sustain the morale of the force that the Republic has entrusted me. Just when day after day I comfort the officers and troops with hopes that rewards and improvements for the militia from a grateful nation will promptly come, [...] we find one of the members of the Congress of Chile [Rodríguez] who sent us at once as *peones* to work the *chácaras*. And at once he destroys the illusory hope of these well-deserved rewards, and attacks the morale of the army on its bases: what do we get now, Mr. General, urging the patience of these officers if the Sovereign Congress does not look fondly at all veterans!’.<sup>109</sup> Beauchef respected the deliberative power of Congress, but demanded that his men be equally respected by Rodríguez.

Rodríguez’s answer was swift: ‘public testimony and the general feeling of all good Chileans are the best guarantee I can give of the truthfulness of my arguments. I swear I am

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<sup>105</sup> SCL, vol. XI, pp. 131-132, Vicuña to Congress, 12 April 1825.

<sup>106</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. XIV, p. 326. I have not found the exact date of Rodríguez’s speech in the *Sesiones de los Cuerpos Legislativos*, nor does Barros Arana give this data. However, from the following events, it is likely that he delivered it during the first days of May 1825.

<sup>107</sup> The artillery wrote also a *representación*, but it appears that Congress did not consider it.

<sup>108</sup> The *representaciones* can be found in SCL, vol. XI, pp. 241-243, and are dated between 5 and 7 May 1825.

<sup>109</sup> SCL, vol. XI, pp. 242-243, Beauchef to *Jefe del Estado Mayor General* [Luis de la Cruz?]

not moved by particular interests and that only the duty and desire to uphold the rights, honour and peace of my beloved *Patria*, have made me firmly attack what I think outrages it. I refrain myself from knowing whether colonel Beauchef, as I am informed, had told his officers to beat me or assassinate me. My person is worth nothing to either the Congress or the public, and I am willing to take risks without anyone's help. Nothing intimidates me'. In a phrase that indirectly disapproved of the foreign origin of the officers involved in the preparation and writing of the *representaciones* (Beauchef and Viel were French, Rondizzoni Italian), Rodríguez added that 'the Chilean credit exceeds my existence. I do not want it if the character and national honour is to be desecrated with impunity'. And concluding with a not so clear and rather exaggerated sentence aimed at criticizing both the officers who believed that independence had been accomplished with weapons only, as well as the responsibility of O'Higgins in the death of his brother Manuel, Rodríguez asserted: 'shall my case, gentlemen, serve as an example [to stop?] the military. It has been said that Congress and the people owe their freedom to [the army], when [Congress] enjoys its benefits in abundance and when it only takes a bullet or a bayonet to kill a Rodríguez without any responsibility'.<sup>110</sup>

Six days later, congressmen asked the minister of government to make Luis de la Cruz and the rest of the officers step down from their respective posts, 'until Congress decides what is just and convenient'.<sup>111</sup> Although this resolution was not adopted because only a couple of days later the Freire government closed the sessions of Congress, it clearly shows the two positions held at that moment by congressmen regarding the size of the army and the political role of the military. The first position was defended by people like Rodríguez, who distrusted the participation of officers in public debates. It is not surprising, in fact, that a substantial part of Rodríguez's statement of 8 May concentrated on disapproving Beauchef's 'insolence against the people and its representation'. Rodríguez was especially annoyed by Beauchef's alleged animosity against 'the highest corporation of Chileans', the Congress, as well as by his proneness to 'depress the national credit and spirit of the country'.<sup>112</sup> On the other hand, the decision to make the officers step down from their posts but without inflicting a serious punishment on them stood opposite to Rodríguez's opinion, in the sense that it implicitly stated that the officers had not sought to attack the 'representation of the people' as such, but only one of its members. This was a much more conciliatory position than Rodríguez's, and it

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<sup>110</sup> SCL, vol. XI, p. 244, Rodríguez to Congress, 8 May 1825.

<sup>111</sup> SCL, vol. XI, p. 252, Congress to minister of government, 14 May 1825.

<sup>112</sup> SCL, vol. XI, p. 244, Rodríguez to Congress, 8 May 1825.

is likely that it was influenced by these officers' commitment to the law and Constitution. Indeed, throughout their stay in Chile, Beauchef, Viel and Rondizzoni defended the principle that, although the military were entitled to participate in politics, the army was a non-deliberative force. Their strong defence of both the Constitution of 1828 and the constituted government during the civil war of 1829-1830 proves this point very clearly.<sup>113</sup>

Let us explain the conciliatory position of the majority of Congress regarding military affairs by studying one last example; in this case, the discussion was not economic but political. On the session of 12 September 1825, the so-called *Asamblea de diputados de la Provincia de Santiago*, which was the body in which the Santiago deputies gathered before the reopening of Congress on 15 September, congressman José Miguel Infante condemned the 'recruiting excesses committed by the troops' the previous night. According to his narration, soldiers had 'climbed the walls and entered in the houses' of private individuals in order to recruit 'the domestic' servants. 'What is the object of this recruitment? Is there an enemy that threatens us? Is there an expedition to be made? If so, why has the Legislative Body not been informed? Can the Executive order such recruiting without previously asking the Representation?', asked Infante. He added later: 'the Legislative Body should make the Supreme Director understand that he cannot enlarge the armed force without the consent of the Legislature; and, above all, aren't those individuals who have been recruited our represented? Aren't they inhabitants of the province of Santiago? Can we tolerate that they have been dragged to the barracks, suffering the greatest humiliations by the troops? Where is individual security? Can we believe that there is [individual security] when [soldiers] break into and violate citizens' homes?'

However, in another intervention Infante asserted that, in case they wanted, recruits could remain in the army: 'I think that, proceeding with justice, this Body should agree to demand that the authority who have ordered the recruiting, either the Director or any other, release all individuals who had been taken, except those who voluntarily want to stay in barracks'. With this, he sought to defend the right of Congress to decide on military questions, but without necessarily appearing to be against the army. He, in other words, defended the prerogatives of Congress by condemning the 'excesses' and 'abuses' committed by unscrupulous military. Deputy Gaspar Marín agreed with Infante, claiming that the 'excesses of the troops are obvious; for some time now they have committed outrageous attacks', such

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<sup>113</sup> See Heise, *Años de formación y aprendizaje político*, pp. 191-206; and Salazar, *Construcción de Estado en Chile*, pp. 455-490.

as the attempt by a group of soldiers to rape a young, elite lady [*señorita de las principales*], whose ‘natural robustness’ had luckily enabled her to escape from her attackers. Juan Egaña, who had remained silent had a similar opinion, but somewhat moderated: he defended the right of the government to recruit, but criticized the ‘abuses’ committed by soldiers: ‘everyone is required to defend the *Patria* when so requested by the one who is in charge of the government. He has requested it and, therefore, the only [censurable] thing here is the way’ in which this recruiting was done. If Egaña disagreed with Infante that was because of semantic questions. While Egaña believed that the government needed no special regulation to carry out recruitment, Infante claimed that there should be a law to guarantee that ‘citizens will not be dragged into the barracks’. Infante, in short, insisted that a law discussed in Congress was to decide the extent to which the Executive was unilaterally entitled to make recruitments.<sup>114</sup>

After this heated debate, the deputies formed a commission to obtain from the Supreme Director the immediate ‘release’ of recruits enlisted the previous night (with the probable exception of those who decided to remain in the army).<sup>115</sup> The commission reported that Freire had ensured that all citizens would be released, and that his subordinates had not received orders to commit excesses. Undoubtedly, Freire’s positive response reassured the members of Congress. Furthermore, the fact that, throughout his administration, the Supreme Director had encouraged the participation of Congress in the decision-making process favoured a fluid relationship between the two powers of the state. Rodríguez, Infante and Egaña had a clear civil agenda, but only Rodríguez seriously tried to reduce the contingents of the regular army. Infante and Egaña, for their part, denounced the ‘excesses’ of the army, but did not aim to banish the military officers from the public sphere. The army was, together with the Church, the most powerful Chilean body in the 1820s, which explains why civilians reacted with fear and indignation when soldiers and officers committed ‘abuses’. But this did not provoke a wave of criticism, and the army remained in the 1820s as popular as during the first years of the war.<sup>116</sup> In this sense, the transformation of Egaña is symptomatic: he went from insisting in his Constitution of 1823 that the defence of the country had to be led by militiamen to argue that, if the Supreme Director was not allowed to recruit forces for the

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<sup>114</sup> The details of this debate can be followed in SCL, vol. XI, pp. 354-359.

<sup>115</sup> SCL, vol. XI, p. 359.

<sup>116</sup> It is interesting to compare the Chilean case with the *rioplatense*. While the Freire government shared the same reformist spirit with Rivadavia’s, the latter had a much more marked anti-military stance. See Klaus Gallo, ‘Political instability in post-independence Argentina’, p. 116:

standing army, the entire defensive system of the republic could collapse.<sup>117</sup>

It is safe to conclude that Egaña and the rest of the men of letters and lawyers who played an active part in Congress did not seek to disband the detachments that were organized during the war because, in one way or another, they knew that the ‘well-being’ of the republic depended of them. The royalists had not yet been expelled from Chiloé, and the Army of Chile was the only body –over the militias- that was in the position to lead an expedition in the south of the country. The support given by politicians to Freire’s plans to assault Chiloé in the summer of 1826 proved once again the relationship of dependency that, for good or ill, still existed between civilian elites and the military in late 1825.

#### IV. CHILOÉ: CAPITULATION OF REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE

The island of Chiloé, located almost 1,200 kilometres south of Santiago, was the last royalist stronghold in Chile to fall to the revolutionaries. Chiloé was not involved in direct clashes after the war broke out in 1813, though it was a hotbed of recruitment for the royalist army. The historical economic dependence of Lima (through the *Situado*) prevented the revolutionary governments from having political and military control of the island. In fact, throughout the conflict the *chilotes* remained loyal to the king and the viceroy of Lima, a political option that was constantly exercised by the Peruvian government, both to recruit rank-and-file soldiers and to defend in Madrid the idea of the island becoming the centre from which to re-conquer revolutionary Chile. The participation of *chilotes* as royalist soldiers began in early 1813, when brigadier Antonio Pareja arrived in Chiloé from Lima and organized a battalion of veterans and militias to attack the principal revolutionary regions of the south of Chile. According to an interesting account written by the Spanish-born Antonio Quintanilla, the last royalist chief in Chiloé,<sup>118</sup> Pareja recruited around 1,000 men in Chiloé.<sup>119</sup>

At the risk of oversimplifying, it can be said that the revolutionaries did not dispute Spain’s political and military sovereignty over Chiloé until the early 1820s, and that this was due

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<sup>117</sup> SCL, vol. XI, p. 358.

<sup>118</sup> Quintanilla became governor of Chiloé in late 1817. See Diego Barros Arana, *Las campañas de Chiloé (1820-1826)*, Imprenta del Ferrocarril, Santiago, 1856.

<sup>119</sup> Quintanilla’s document is called ‘Apuntes sobre la guerra de Chile por el brigadier D. Antonio de Quintanilla’, and can be found in CDHICH, vol. 3, pp. 207-236 (Quintanilla’s reference of Pareja’s army is from page 208). Cf also section III of the second chapter of this thesis.

to Chiloé's remoteness.<sup>120</sup> Barros Arana reported that O'Higgins once argued that 'the conquest of Chiloé is the necessary complement for our national independence; without it, we will have to fear the king's supporters'.<sup>121</sup> However, the O'Higgins government never undertook an expedition against Chiloé; on the contrary, O'Higgins favoured persuasive strategies to make the *chilotes* join the revolution.<sup>122</sup> On 5 April 1821, O'Higgins wrote a long report in order to convince the *chilotes* that, given the 'numerous armed forces that Chile has in its interior', they 'should abandon their present attitude'. There were two ways for Chiloé to join the revolution: either surrendering peacefully, or 'after a vain resistance'. The second option 'competes openly with the principles of humanity that characterize [the island] and the effective desires that animate it'. Making reference to the consequence of the liberal revolution of 1820 in Spain, O'Higgins argued that Chiloé would never be aided by the metropolis, as the Spanish ministers were too focused on a civil war in the peninsula that was more damaging 'than the Seven Years' War'. 'If Chiloé wants to save herself', O'Higgins continued, the *chilotes* should 'accept the offer that with the most intense brotherhood the Republic of Chile solemnly makes them'. O'Higgins promised that, in case they surrender, the political and military authorities of the island would preserve their jobs, regardless of 'their conduct [...] in the course of the current war'. Finally, he guaranteed that the island would have access to free trade with 'all nations'.<sup>123</sup>

But O'Higgins' report had little or not effect on the *chilotes*. Eight months later, O'Higgins addressed Quintanilla directly. This time, he claimed that 'the fate of Chiloé in the natural order of events is deduced: the happy time has come to meet with the citizens of Chile, to which [the island] belongs by natural boundaries and their political and religious relations'.<sup>124</sup> We shall see that this sort of argument would be employed later by Freire's government when dealing not only with Spain but also Great Britain's and Bolívar's wishes to have some degree of sovereignty over Chiloé. But, once again, O'Higgins' claims did not have the expected result. The remoteness of Chiloé was indeed damaging for Quintanilla and his men; however, that same remoteness safeguarded them from the dangers of the war.

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<sup>120</sup> If the revolutionaries did not have real control over the island, nor did Spain. For an example of Spain's difficulties in administering Chiloé, see AGI, Chile 179, 30 September 1818.

<sup>121</sup> Barros Arana, *Las campañas de Chiloé*, p. IX.

<sup>122</sup> It is worth remembering that Cochrane's attempt to take the island of Chiloé in early 1820 was a complete failure. Cf. footnote 38 of chapter VI of this thesis.

<sup>123</sup> VM, vol. XII, pp. 71-75, 5 April 1821.

<sup>124</sup> VM, vol. XII, p. 84, O'Higgins to Quintanilla, 20 December 1821. Although this document does not show the name of the recipient, it is likely that this letter had been directed to Quintanilla.

Furthermore, according to Quintanilla, his military position was not as weak as O'Higgins believed. In a note to the Chilean Supreme Director, the royalist chief asserted that he 'had plenty of resources, brave troops, weapons and other implements of war'. He was well-equipped enough to attempt an incursion on Valdivia, recently seized by Cochrane. Of course, Quintanilla could have been exaggerating to appear more powerful to O'Higgins than he really was. Yet, from O'Higgins insistence to send delegates to negotiate with Quintanilla (i.e. the Supreme Director sent a priest to parlay with the *chilotes*), it can be inferred that, in 1821-1822, the royalists were in a better position to keep the control of the island than the revolutionaries. If Spain was too wrapped up in its own problems to help Chiloé, so was O'Higgins to undertake an attack on the island.<sup>125</sup>

According to a document of January 1822 signed by José Zenteno, Chiloé had 1,000 veterans (800 infantrymen and 200 artillerymen), besides 3,000 militias,<sup>126</sup> a force large enough to repel a not so well-prepared army. And that was exactly what Quintanilla did in early 1824, when Ramón Freire personally led the first of two expeditions to the island and was humiliatingly stopped by the royalists. This expedition departed from Talcahuano on 27 February, and was composed of 2,149 men, divided into three infantry battalions (led by Isaac Thompson, Rondizonni and Beauchef), two battalions of the *Guardia de Honor*, a small cavalry detachment and 24 artillerymen. On 25 March Freire's men were able to seize the small fort of Coronel and reach Chacao, in the north of the island. However, Freire's subsequent decision to split his forces into three divisions instead of attempting a concerted attack on Castro did nothing but benefit Quintanilla. The combat of Mocupulli on 1 April was extremely bloody, though neither side took full advantage of the result. This is why on 10 April, only a month after the first revolutionary ships began to arrive in Chiloé, Freire and the rest of the officers agreed to withdraw to Valdivia. The withdrawal was done in the midst of a serious rainstorm that damaged the frigate *Lautaro*, which prevented Freire from going back to Talcahuano immediately. He arrived in the port on 24 April.<sup>127</sup>

Two months later, consul Nugent wrote an interesting report of the outcome of events

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<sup>125</sup> MG, vol. 164, Quintanilla to O'Higgins, 27 January 1822. The fact that Quintanilla was better positioned than O'Higgins believed is clear from the military and economic aid that he sent to Benavides in July 1821. See MG, vol. 52, pp. 134-136, Quintanilla to Benavides, 25 July 1821.

<sup>126</sup> VM, vol. XII, p. 10, Zenteno to Rodríguez Aldea, 1822, 16 January 1822. Although this document does not show the name of the recipient, it is likely that this letter had been directed to Rodríguez Aldea.

<sup>127</sup> My analysis of the first expedition to Chiloé is based on Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. XIV, pp. 203-216. See also Puigmal, *Memorias de Jorge Beauchef*, pp. 221-236.

in Chiloé. In his words: ‘the Expedition has been repulsed with considerable loss (the amount I cannot procure); and the Government attribute the failure to the lateness of the Season.- I cannot venture so far, as to deny the case; but, with all allowance for the short space of time I have had for observation, must express my doubts of the Military, or Naval Capacity of Chile, either to invade, with any prospect of Success, the possessions of the Royalists, or even of its ability, in the event of attack from Europe, to resist. Indeed, the Military appearance of the Country is not imposing’. But his criticism of the preparation of the Army of Chile was circumstantial, compared with what became a favourite theme of Nugent in 1824-1825: the possible occupation of Chiloé by Great Britain. In another part of his letter to Canning, Nugent declared that ‘the Island of Chiloe [...] is in possession of the Royalists, and must, from its maritime situation, be of the utmost consequence to either party. It is covered with Timber, fit for all naval purposes, and has a fine Harbour. In the hands of Great Britain it would be the key to the whole Western Side of South America’.<sup>128</sup>

In mid 1825, Nugent’s idea that the British should exercise sovereignty over Chiloé had an indirect ally: Quintanilla. Clearly aware that the state of affairs had changed in South America and that followers of republicanism in Chile were now a majority, Quintanilla addressed captain Thomas Maling of H.M.S. Ships in the Pacific to ask him whether he would be an intermediary between him and the Spanish ambassador to London. Quintanilla sought to make contact with anyone closely connected to the Spanish government to find a solution for his ‘absolute incommunication [sic]’ since the ‘loss of the army commanded by Viceroy La Serna’ in Ayacucho in December 1824, and he found no better strategy than resorting to British neutrality. ‘Should You, Sir, agree with me in thinking that it is not opposed the Neutrality which Great Britain observes between Spain and her revolved Colonies’, Quintanilla wrote to Maling, ‘I hope that in addition to rendering me the singular favour of forwarding the enclosed Despatch, You will Communicate to me by the first Ship sailing to this Port any intelligence you may possess relative to Spains [sic] sending any other expedition of Troops for the pacification of her American dominions: or whether the Spanish Government has adopted any Sovereign resolution as to the fate of those Countries’.<sup>129</sup> Maling sent this letter to Nugent, who, in turn, sent it to Canning. We do not know if the Spanish ambassador ever read it. However, more important is the fact that Quintanilla had written it and sent it to Maling, since

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<sup>128</sup> BROP, FO/16/1, pp. 141v-142v, Nugent to Canning, 4 June 1824.

<sup>129</sup> BROP, FO/16/3, pp. 39-39v, Quintanilla to Maling, 15 June 1825.

it shows the complete abandonment of Chiloé by the metropolis. Equally, Nugent's promptness to dispatch Quintanilla's letter to London shows his interest in keeping Canning abreast regarding the future of Chiloé.

Nugent continued sending reports about Chiloé to London throughout the second half of 1825. In July, he told Canning that 'General Bolivar has, through the Agent of the Colombian State, signified to the Government of Chile his intention of employing an expedition for the reduction of the Island of Chiloe to the Government of Peru, if the State of Chile takes no measures, on their own part, to regain so desirable an occupation within Three Months'. Nugent informed Canning that Bolívar's intentions should not be taken for granted, as he had not only seen the original letter written by Bolívar but 'have also been put into possession of the Fact by a private letter from Colonel O'Leary, aid-de-camp to General Bolivar'. According to the British consul, Bolívar's aspirations were threatening not only to Chile but also Great Britain, not least because he had heard rumours that 'General Quintanilla had expressed a wish to put Chiloe into the hands of the English'. If this was to be the case, Nugent argued that Great Britain should write a declaration stating that 'the British Government absolutely disclaimed any desire of appropriating to itself any portion of the Spanish colonies', which, nevertheless, should not prevent 'His Majesty's Naval Commanders in the Pacific' from taking possession of the island once they had been allowed to do so.<sup>130</sup> Four months later, Nugent made reference once again to the possibility of Great Britain having some sort of presence in Chiloé. On this occasion, Nugent forwarded a letter to Canning written by James Ashcroft stating that the people of Castro 'are extremely hospitable and friendly and strongly prepossessed in favor of the English character'.<sup>131</sup>

Nugent forwarded this letter to Canning on 15 November 1825, probably expecting that the British minister would finally acknowledge his claims about Chiloé. However, when the British government answered Nugent's reports in May 1826 it was too late for Great Britain to achieve sovereignty over Chiloé.<sup>132</sup> on 28 November 1825, Nugent himself had sent yet another note to Canning informing him that the Freire government had decided to undertake a new expedition to the island and that, this time, the troops were 'in good

<sup>130</sup> BROP, FO/16/3, pp. 47-48v, Nugent to Canning, 25 July 1825.

<sup>131</sup> BROP FO/16/3, 197-198, Ashcroft to Nugent, 5 October 1825.

<sup>132</sup> BROP FO/16/5, 14-14v, J. Bidwell to Nugent, 26 May 1826. Canning told Nugent that Great Britain would not take possession of the island. However, he added that if the *chilotes* 'shall fully established their Independence, it is unnecessary to say, Great Britain will not be the last Power to recognize their new character'.

condition and the Director anticipated a successful result to their undertaking'.<sup>133</sup> On 2 October the Chilean Congress 'approved the expedition to Chiloé proposed by the Executive', authorizing the government to 'draw 103,000 pesos [...] that still exist from the London loan' to pay the expenditures.<sup>134</sup> This was an explicit support for both Freire and his military project, thus proving once again that differences between Congress and the Executive tended to subside anytime that the country needed the intervention of the Army of Chile. Freire departed for the second time to Chiloé from Valparaíso on 28 November 1825, and his army amounted to 2,575 men (between infantry, artillery and cavalry). Quintanilla, who, as we have seen, was in a precarious position after the battle of Ayacucho, managed to muster around 2,300 men. The similarity of forces between the two armies was not, however, sufficient for Quintanilla to stop the revolutionaries. Between 9 and 14 January 1826, Freire's men carried out a thoughtful offensive, and on 16 January almost the entire island became under the control of the Chilean state. Seeing that he would not be able to overcome these military defeats and that Spain was unable to send reinforcements, Quintanilla capitulated on 18 January.<sup>135</sup>

The capitulation of Chiloé was signed more or less at the same time that the port of Callao fell to the revolutionaries. The context of both capitulations was different, each responding to particular reasons and events.<sup>136</sup> Yet both reflect the same historical process: after nearly fifteen years of revolutionary warfare, the Spanish empire had almost completely disintegrated and the Spanish American colonies (with the exception of Cuba and Puerto Rico) had become new, independent states. In the case of Chile, the fall of Chiloé meant the end of confrontations between revolutionaries and Spain's direct agents, which is not the same as to claim that internal conflicts ended, nor that all Chilean territories automatically became part of the state. Two immediate consequences of the revolutionary wars in Chile were the poverty of the new state and the incapacity of the central government to exercise sovereignty

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<sup>133</sup> BROP FO/16/3, 205-205v, Nugent to Canning, 28 November 1825. For the preparation of the expedition, see SCL, vol. XI, p. 388, Freire to the *Asamblea de Coquimbo*, 21 September 1825.

<sup>134</sup> SCL, vol. XI, p. 406, Congress to Freire, 2 October 1825.

<sup>135</sup> For the second campaign to Chiloé, see Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. XIV, pp. 433-447. For a summary of events in English, see BROP FO/16/5, pp. 54-60. The terms of the capitulation were summarized by Nugent to Canning on 28 January 1826. The most important article stated: 'The Terms of the Capitulation are, the incorporation of the Province and Archipelago of Chiloe with the Republic of Chile, with an equal enjoyment of Rights to the inhabitants as Chileno-Citizens'. In BROP FO/16/5, pp. 40v-42, Nugent to Canning, 28 January 1826.

<sup>136</sup> For a good summary of events leading to the siege of Callao, see John Lynch, *The Spanish American revolutions, 1808-1826*, Willmer Brothers Limited, London, 1973, pp. 266-272. See also Marks, *Deconstructing Legitimacy*, pp. 328-332.

in places distant from the capital. Regular taxation and standard military recruiting were very difficult to accomplish by nineteenth-century Chilean governments. Indeed, Chile became a complete sovereign state in 1826, but the national project –one of whose principal elements is the integration of the territory under the same economic, political and military laws- was just beginning.

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The last chapter of this thesis has studied some of the most important political and military events of the first half of the 1820s in Chile. Beginning with the last confrontations of the Chilean War to the Death, this chapter has sought to show that military men had an active role in the construction of Chile's republican system, both as political actors and as members of a privileged body whose status was constantly discussed in Congress or the Executive. In previous chapters we saw that the connection between politics and the army became evident from the beginning of the revolution, and that José Miguel Carrera was chiefly responsible for this. However, it was only after O'Higgins' rise to power that the military began to control the political scene. O'Higgins was one of the most politicized officers of the revolution, but his government was not necessarily supported by all branches of the army. Officers of the Army of the South, led by Ramón Freire, turned into O'Higgins' most dangerous opponents, even more dangerous than the royalists and the Carrera brothers. The uprising of the military of the south in 1822 had economic, military and political causes, which explains why the different factions arose during the revolution did not always act in concert. Nevertheless, the people who opposed to O'Higgins in 1822 agreed on three, important points: they all resented the intervention of Rodríguez Aldea in politics, the mishandling of the war in the south by O'Higgins and the personalism of the Supreme Director.

Documents issued by the *Asamblea Provincial de Concepción* in 1822 to justify a possible break with the capital show that military questions were at the heart of the grievances of the *penquistas*. Furthermore, they show that the Army of the South was the armed wing of the APLC, and that Freire became indispensable for *penquistas* and *coquimbanos* to reach power. The struggle against the royalists had brought about an important lesson: all types of despotism were condemnable, regardless of the political credentials of those who happened to be in power. O'Higgins was a revolutionary hero, but one who, according to *penquistas* and

*coquimbanos*, had turned into a despot; that is why, they asked his abdication so vehemently. But not only did they demand O'Higgins' abdication; they also sought to put one of their closest allies in charge of the Supreme Directorship. As section two of this chapter tried to demonstrate, the Freire government was politically inspired by different currents of European liberalism rather than by the model of the Roman dictatorship, as O'Higgins' was. But despite their differences, Freire shared with O'Higgins the tendency to staff cabinets with military officers. The case of Francisco Antonio Pinto exemplifies the kinds of role played by revolutionary officers in the Freire regime.

Among the many areas in which Pinto intervened during the mid 1820s, whether as minister of government or intendant of Coquimbo, there are two worthy of mention: first, the relationship built by the government with the Anglo-Saxon world, both economically and culturally. Second, the idea that the state should guarantee that all Chileans be part of the 'national' project. In my analysis of Pinto I argued that his defence of religious tolerance was influenced by the current of British liberalism that promoted free trade. The arrival in Chile in 1824 of a North American Plenipotentiary made the economic relationship between both countries more dynamic; however, it also created friction between Chile's Catholic society and US protestants established in Valparaíso. Pinto promised to defend the right to worship of North Americans, yet this did not put an end to a conflict that lasted until the 1880s. Pinto did not seek the extinction of religion from the public sphere, although he believed that the state should defend the individual from 'the grip of corporate privilege', especially the Church. In his view, the state had two other responsibilities: to guarantee private property and foment public education. His insistence that Coquimbo should encourage the mining extraction and agricultural activity at the same time as participating in the conformation of one, united government reflects very clearly his two major goals as intendant.

But the Executive was not the only space where these topics were discussed. The aim of the third section was twofold: on one hand, to show that, in the legislatures of 1823-1825, high-ranking officers became members of Congress and, therefore, participated actively in legislative debates. On the other, to prove that Chilean politicians tended to concur in that the consolidation of independence could only be achieved with the help and intervention of the army; this, in spite of the fact that civilian elites did not always approve the participation of the military in politics, nor did they always stand in favour of having a powerful and numerous army. The outcome of the two cases analyzed in this chapter (i.e. the *representaciones* written by

veteran officers, and the debate regarding the abuses committed by the government in the September 1825 recruiting) was similar: in both cases congressmen agreed to reprehend the military but without convicting them. The conciliatory tone of congressmen like Juan Egaña *vis-à-vis* the army is to be explained by the relationship of dependency between civilians and soldiers that still existed in 1825. The war in the Araucanian region was nearly completed by then, but Chiloé still remained a royalist stronghold. When in October 1825 the Chilean Congress approved the expedition to Chiloé, the army –over the militias- was once again viewed as the only body qualified to expel the enemy from Chilean territory. The capitulation of revolutionary warfare in January 1826 confirmed that civilians and military men could indeed work in concert for the wellbeing of the new state.

Would this complementary relationship survive in the years to come?

## CONCLUSION

This thesis has argued that armies played a key political role in the Chilean revolution –hence the three main analytical categories of this thesis: armies, politics and revolution. It endorses Mario Góngora’s hypothesis that warfare was central to the process of state building in Chile, and that the revolution was a prolonged experience that had a permanent effect on Chilean society. Beginning with the last decades of the eighteenth century, I presented the hypothesis that, contrary to other parts of Spanish America, the Bourbon reforms did not have a negative effect on the Chilean elites. The elites improved their political and economic status thanks to the introduction of institution like the Intendancies and the Consulado, which were created to make Chileans intervene more directly in the administration of the colony. The Chilean creoles did not create a professional army after the Seven Years’ War (as Charles III hoped for), but they managed to control the majority of the middle ranks of both the regular army and the militias. Also, I stated that Chileans developed some degrees of patriotism throughout the eighteenth century, but that such patriotism did not necessarily stand against Spain. Indeed, Chileans did not have the need to react against Spain’s alleged absolutism, because absolutist practices were rarely felt with the intensity of other colonies, like Peru and New Spain. To be a defender of the ‘small’ patria –i.e. Spanish America and sometimes even smaller components, like Chile- was not mutually exclusive to being a defender of the ‘big’ patria –i.e. the Spanish empire.

The Chileans’ historic defence of the ‘big’ patria explains why they reacted so loyally to Spain when Napoleon invaded the Peninsula. Problems between the metropolis and Chile did not begin, in fact, until the Spanish corporations that governed the empire in the absence of the king became illegitimate to the eyes of the Spanish Americans. The political process initiated by the demise of the Spanish monarchy in 1808 caused a power vacuum that was only partially resolved when Spanish Americans created local Juntas in Buenos Aires, Caracas and Santiago (among others). These Juntas were revolutionary responses to the immediate problem provoked by the fall of Ferdinand VII, although they did not solve the political crisis caused by the disintegration of the Spanish state. The Santiago Junta posed more questions than answers, not least because the *santiaguinos’* claim to represent politically the whole kingdom was disputed by other provinces. Besides, the radicalism of some *juntistas* was questioned by a majority of moderate autonomists and royalists who did not think that the installation of the Junta should

lead to a break with either the metropolis or viceroy Abascal. Abascal, in turn, accepted the Santiago Junta as the less bad option. However, by 1812 the radicalism of the Carrera brothers (who, among other things, published an *exaltado* Constitutional Chart) led him to prepare the first of a series of military expeditions to stop the Chileans. Antonio Pareja's disembarkation in Talcahuano in March 1813 marked the beginning of revolutionary warfare in Chile, which was not only a bloody but also a civil conflict confronting people born mainly in Spanish America.

The civil war in Chile brought about two important consequences: first, it deepened the conflict over political legitimacy caused by the demise of the monarchy. Governments in the period 1812-1817 lacked legitimacy because there was no consensus within the elites regarding who and what political system should govern the country. The successive governments led by the Carrera brothers were supported by many radicals and some sectors of the revolutionary army. Yet, when Mariano Osorio entered Santiago after the battle of Rancagua, the royalists were equally supported; not by outright revolutionaries, but by the majority of moderates who did not escape to Mendoza following O'Higgins and Carrera. Soon, nevertheless, Osorio and his successor, Francisco Marcó del Pont, were perceived as illegitimate by the elites. It was not as much the alleged impolitic behaviour of the royalists as their misguided insistence to return to the *status quo ante* 1810 that hastened their fall in early 1817. Hence my argument that Osorio and Marcó committed political mistakes that alienated the same elites that had applauded their respective appointments. For the elites, Osorio and Marcó became illegitimate because they did not respect the political rights that Chileans had won since the fall of the monarchy. Legitimacy and authority returned to work in concert only after O'Higgins' rise to power in 1817: from then on, there was a consensus that a government based on republican principles was the best for the country.

The second consequence brought about by the war was the re-definition of the meaning of patriotism. To be a good, loyal patriot became synonymous with being a supporter of the government that happened to be in power. However, between 1812 and 1814 the word 'patriot' began to be used to define he who backed the revolutionary side. The problem was that there were different factions within the revolutionary side –e.g. O'Higgins and Mackenna, on the one hand; the Carrera brothers, on the other-, and so whatever decision that was made without the acquiescence of the other faction –e.g. the signing of the Treaty of Lircay- could lead to accusations of treason. Indeed, critics of the Treaty of Lircay accused O'Higgins and Mackenna of treason and anti-patriotism. O'Higgins, for his part, became increasingly

estranged from Carrera and his way of understanding patriotism during his stay in Mendoza. In Mendoza, O'Higgins met José de San Martín and became acquainted with the *rioplatense's* American project. One of the central arguments of this thesis is that San Martín's 'Americanism' added a clear anti-Spanish sentiment to the concept of patriotism; however, I have also argued that the division between 'Americans' –revolutionaries- and 'Spaniards' –royalists- did not comply with reality, since both armies were mainly represented by American-born people.

San Martín's American project had both military and political elements. This thesis contends that San Martín's American military strategy –i.e. to use the re-conquest of Chile as a springboard to conquer Lima- was successful: his entrance in Lima in July 1821 shows this clearly. The political aspects of San Martín's American project did not, however, meet the same fate. We saw that in 1816 San Martín's and Juan Martín de Pueyrredón's idea of creating an 'American government' in order to constitute an 'American nation' clashed with the building of independent, sovereign states in the early 1820s. Indeed, the organization of the *Ejército Libertador del Perú* allowed the revolutionaries to conquer Lima, but it also caused disputes between the different revolutionary states that formed the liberating army. As a result of these disputes, the Chilean chiefs of the liberating army left Peru, criticizing the 'arrogance' of *rioplatenses*, Peruvians and Colombians *vis-à-vis* the Army of Chile. Thus, the creation of an American government failed both because San Martín declared the independence of Peru, and because Americanism lost importance as sovereign states emerged.

After the creation of independent states in Peru, Chile and the United Provinces, the Chileans focused primarily on internal matters. In 1817-1818, the O'Higgins government became the best alternative to fill the vacuum of power of the 1810s. However, because most resources were spent not in Chile but to prepare and maintain the *Ejército Libertador del Perú*, one cannot say that O'Higgins focused exclusively on Chile. O'Higgins fell from power in early 1823 because he never managed to reconcile his adherence to San Martín's strategy with a thoughtful military and economic plan to finish the war in the south of Chile. Ramón Freire's insistence that the Chilean government should spend more money in the south made him the most popular and powerful figure in the Araucanian region, a fact that accounts for the support he received from the *penquistas* to oust O'Higgins (considered now an illegitimate despot). Freire's rise to power inaugurated an era in which the military became increasingly involved in day-to-day Chilean politics, the building of a national political regime being their

principal objective.

This was the scenario that the revolutionary officers faced in 1826, the year when this thesis ends. That year marked a turning point in Chilean history, and events in Chiloé were crucial: on the one hand, the conquest of Chiloé by Freire allowed the revolutionaries to take control of the last royalist stronghold and end the war against Spain. On the other, only three months after the royalists were expelled from the island a rebellion led by Pedro Aldunate and supported by followers of O'Higgins –then in exile in Peru- inaugurated a period of uprisings which, although small in scope, were sufficient to jeopardize the political stability of the republic.<sup>1</sup> The uprising in Chiloé reflected three major questions: what role should the military have in the republican project? Now that the war was over, should the military still dominate the public sphere? Would they become a threat to the state, as the rebellion in Chiloé had shown? In 1826, most elites were republicans. However, they differed on the characteristics that a republican regime should have. Some supported a strong Executive, as the example of the *o'higgistas* shows. Others, led by officers like Freire and Francisco Antonio Pinto, voted for both concentrating the process of decision-making in Congress and for empowering the provinces. The latter were no less keen on having powerful institutions than the *o'higgistas*. But they followed the branch of European liberalism that favoured the separation and limitation of power, while O'Higgins explicitly stated that his political model was the Roman Dictatorship.

Differences about the best way of introducing republicanism explain in part why, between 1826 and 1830, veterans of the revolutionary wars repeatedly took up arms against the government. The war had made them politicians, but politicians who based their power upon the army. This is why, when the war finished they did not go back to civil society, but aimed at keeping control of politics. It is worth noting, however, that the uprisings of the period 1826-1828 were easily defeated by Freire's, Manuel Blanco Encalada's and Francisco Antonio Pinto's governments. This trend changed in 1829-1830, when a conservative uprising ousted the constituted government. This movement, led by Joaquín Prieto, had two consequences: first, it ended a period known for its liberal reforms, the most important of which was the preparation of the Constitution of 1828 (written by José Joaquín de Mora, and proclaimed by Vice-president Pinto). Second, the new conservative government decided that,

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<sup>1</sup> For this uprising, see Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. XV, pp. 16-23, 40-42; *El Peruano*, number 6, 17 July 1826; MG, vol. 164; documents sent by consul Nugent to Canning held in BROP, FO/16/5; and CG, vol. 337, pp. 1-12.

in order to avoid future insurrections, liberal officers (like Freire, Pinto, Beauchef, Rondizzoni, Borgoño and De la Lastra) should be dismissed from the Army of Chile.<sup>2</sup> For the first time, a major sector of the army was banned from the public sphere.<sup>3</sup>

Although the dismissal of these officers did not eliminate the political role of the liberal officers (Prieto's government faced some ten different insurrections, and his powerful minister, Diego Portales, was killed by a group of officers in 1837),<sup>4</sup> throughout the 1830s the armed forces were increasingly subordinated to the civil power. The Guardia Nacional was increased by Portales with the purpose of reducing the regular army.<sup>5</sup> This was a novelty in Chile, where, as we have seen, the revolution had militarized decision making and made the military the most privileged and powerful body of the country. Until 1826, the civil elites accepted the supremacy of the armed forces, because the royalist threat was still present. Thus, this thesis has argued, prior to 1826 civilians like Juan Egaña or José Miguel Infante did not seek to reduce the army, but rather to make institutions like Congress participate more actively in military decisions. Yet from 1830 onwards the army was overshadowed by civilians, this being the triumph of neither Egaña nor Infante, but of a group of civilians led by Portales. Military officers continued leading the country until 1851 (i.e. Prieto was President of Chile in 1831-1841, and Manuel Bulnes in 1841-1851), but the construction of republican institutions was the work mainly of civilians like Andrés Bello, Manuel Montt and Antonio Varas.<sup>6</sup> Future investigations should try to reveal the role of the liberal officers (who were allowed to return to the army in the early 1840s) during an epoch increasingly headed by civilians, and study how they accommodated to a system they had helped to build during the revolutionary wars but which could only survive in times of internal peace.

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<sup>2</sup> For these events, see Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. 15, chapters XXVIII-XXXIII; Encina, *Historia de Chile*, vol. IX, chapter XV; Encina, *Historia de Chile*, vol. X, chapter, pp. 515-552; Heise, *Años de formación y aprendizaje político*, pp. 180-206; Jocelyn-Holt, *La independencia*, pp. 252-265; Sergio Villalobos, *Portales, una falsificación histórica*, Editorial Universitaria, Santiago, 1989, pp. 84-105; Salazar, *Construcción de Estado en Chile*, pp. 315-377. In mid 1830, José Joaquín de Mora published a periodical called *El Defensor de los Militares llamados Constitucionales* to defend both the dismissed officers and his Constitution of 1828. These officers were expelled from the army because they believed that the Constitution should be respected by the armed forces. They, in other words, defended the government legally constituted, and saw Prieto's movement as no more than an illegitimate insurrection.

<sup>3</sup> In 1827, Vice-president prepared a military reform, one of whose aims was to 'reduce the size of the officer corps'. However, this reform was insignificant in comparison to that of 1830. The quotation is from Wood, *The Society of Equality*, p. 45. See also Nunn, *The military in Chilean history*, p. 32.

<sup>4</sup> See Villalobos, *Portales, una falsificación histórica*, pp. 172-211.

<sup>5</sup> Nunn, *The military in Chilean history*, chapter III; Wood, *The Society of Equality*, chapter III.

<sup>6</sup> Sol Serrano, *Universidad y Nación. Chile en el siglo XIX*, Editorial Universitaria, Santiago, 1993; Iván Jaksic *Andrés Bello: la pasión por el orden*, Editorial Universitaria, Santiago, 2000; Simon Collier, *Chile: the making of a Republic. Politics and Ideas*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2003.

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